IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

Justin Maurice,

Supreme Court No. 83009

Appellant,

Electronically Filed District Court Case Sep 1071202068853 p.m.

11

Elizabeth A. Brown Clerk of Supreme Court

VS.

Sarah Maurice,

Respondent.

APPEAL

APPEAL FROM DECISION AND ORDER FROM 10/27/20 HEARING AND DECISION AND ORDER FROM 01/13/21 MOTION FOR CONSIDERATION HEARING

APPENDIX

VOL. 4

Bradley J. Hofland, Esq. HOFLAND & TOMSHECK 228 S. 4th Street, First Floor Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 702-895-6760 Attorney for Appellant

CHRONOLOGICAL INDEX OF APPENDIX

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				ROA000686
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Proceedings				ROA000776
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2015				

Electronically Filed 1/13/2021 8:36 AM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT

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RACHEL M. JACOBSON, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 007827 JACOBSON LAW OFFICE, LTD

64 North Pecos Road, Suite 200

Henderson, Nevada 89074 (702) 601-0770

Attorney for Plaintiff

EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

SARAH MAURICE,

Plaintiff,

VS.

JUSTIN MAURICE,

Defendant.

Case No. D-14-506883-D Dept. No.

SUPPLEMENTAL EXHIBIT

COMES NOW Plaintiff, SARAH MAURICE, by and through her attorney, Rachel M. Jacobson, Esq., at Jacobson Law Office, Ltd., and hereby submits the following Exhibit of Plaintiff's **OPPOSITION** support **AND** COUNTERMOTION.

Plaintiff understands that these Exhibits are not considered substantive evidence in this case until formally admitted into evidence.

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Table of Contents: Exhibit 1 – School Grades Reports. DATED this 13th day of January 2021. JACOBSON LAW OFFICE, LTD /s/ Rachel M. Jacobson, Esq. Rachel M. Jacobson, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 007827 64 North Pecos Road, Ste 200 Henderson, Nevada 89074 Tel. 702) 601-0770 Attorney for Plaintiff

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Pursuant to NRCP 5(b), I certify that I am an employee of JACOBSON LAW OFFICE, LTD., and that on this 13th day of January 2021, I caused a copy of the above referenced document entitled "SUPPLEMENTAL EXHIBIT" to be served as follows to the party(s) listed below at the address, and/or email address indicated below:

- ☐ BY MAIL: Pursuant to NRCP 5(b), I placed a true copy thereof enclosed in a sealed envelope upon which first class mail postage was prepaid in Henderson, Nevada;
- BY ELECTRONIC SERVICE: Pursuant to EDCR 8.05(a), EDCR 8.05(f), NRCP 5(b)(2)(D) and Administrative Order 14-2 captioned "In the Administrative Matter of Mandatory Electronic Service in the Eighth Judicial District Court," by mandatory electronic service through the Eighth Judicial District Court's electronic filing system; and/or
- ☐ BY ELECTRONIC MAIL: Pursuant to EDCR 7.26, I transmitted a copy of the foregoing document this date via electronic mail;

To the party(s) listed below at the address, email address, and/or facsimile number indicated below:

Bradley J. Hofland, Esq.

Email: <u>bradh@hoflandlaw.com</u>

Attorney for Defendant

/s/ Rachel M. Jacobson

An employee of JACOBSON LAW OFFICE, LTD.

Legacy Traditional School Cadence 325 Inflection Street

Henderson, NV 89011 (702)846-2310

Maurice, Emma R 2020 - 2021 Report Card Grade: 01 Student ID: 18193

GPA Summary:

Cumulative GPA

0.0

Attendance Summary By Term:

Terms:	Q	1	Q	2	Q	3	Q	4	To	tal
Period	Absent	Tardy								
AM	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
PM	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CRS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
otal	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Grade Report:

Course	Task	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4
CRS) 101-2 Grammar/Writing [Gatlin, Myra]	Grade Report	В	Α		
CRS) 102-2 Phonograms [Gatlin, Myra]	Grade Report	Α	В		
CRS) 103-2 Spelling [Gatlin, Myra]	Grade Report	Α	Α		
CRS) 104-2 Reading [Gatlin, Myra]	Grade Report	Α	В		
CRS) 105-2 Mathematics [Gatlin, Myra]	Grade Report	Α	Α		
CRS) 106-2 Science [Gatlin, Myra]	Grade Report	Α	В		
CRS) 107-2 Social Studies [Gatlin, Myra]	Grade Report	A	Α		

		Academ	ic Performance Lev	el for A-F		
Α	В	С	D	F	I	NC
Α	В	С	D	F	Incomplete	No Credit

Parent/Guardian of Emma R Maurice

Legacy Traditional School Cadence

325 Inflection Street Henderson, NV 89011 (702)846-2310

Maurice, Savannah E

2020 - 2021 Report Card Grade: 08 Student ID: 18192

GPA Summary:

Cumulative GPA

3.93

Attend	lance	Summ	ary	By '	Гerm:

Terms:	Q	1	Q	2	Q	3	Q	4	To	tal
Period	Absent	Tardy								
1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
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3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
6	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
7	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
С	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Γotal	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Grade Report:

Course	Task	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4
5) JH104-4 JH Course 3 [Malloy, Christian]	Grade Report	Α	Α		
2) JH135-1 8th Grade English [Bates, Bridgett]	Grade Report	Α	Α		
1) JH137-1 8th Grade Social Studies [Stefaniak, David]	Grade Report	В	Α		
6) JH139-3 8th Grade Literature [Bates, Bridgett]	Grade Report	Α	В		
7) JH141-4 8th Grade Science [Stefaniak, David]	Grade Report	В	Α	12-22-11-11-	

		Academi	c Performance Leve	el for A-F		
Α	В	С	D	F	I	NC
Α	В	С	D	F	Incomplete	No Credi

Parent/Guardian of Savannah E Maurice

Skip to Main Content Logout My Account My Cases Search Menu New Family Record Search Refine

Location : Family Courts Images Help

R. GISTER OF ACTIONS

CASE No. D-14-506883-D

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Sarah Maurice, Plaintiff vs. Justin Maurice, Defendant.

Case Type: **Divorce - Complaint** Subtype: Complaint Subject Minor(s) 12/11/2014 Date Filed: Location: Department Q Cross-Reference Case Number: D506883 Supreme Court No.: 83009

PARTY INFORMATION

Defendant Maurice, Justin

108 Westin LN Henderson, NV 89002 Male

Lead Attorneys Bradley J. Hofland Retained 702-895-6760(W)

Plaintiff Maurice, Sarah

1596 Rusy Ridge LN Henderson, NV 89002 Female

Rachel M. Jacobson Retained 702-601-0770(W)

Subject Minor Maurice, Emma

Subject Minor Maurice, Savannah

EVENTS | ORDERS OF THE COURT

01/13/2021

All Pending Motions (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer Duckworth, Bryce C.)

DEFENDANT'S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF ORDER DENYING TO MODIFY THE CURRENT CUSTODIAL ARRANGEMENT; MODIFY CHILD SUPPORT; MODIFY CHILD TAX DEDUCTION; AND FOR AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS; AND RELATED RELIEF; AND RELATED RELIEF...PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND COUNTERMOTION FOR AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES, COSTS AND RELATED RELIEF...DEFENDANT'S REPLY TO PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO DFENDNT'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF ORDER DENYING MOTION TO MODIFY THE CURRENT CUSTODIAL ARRANGEMENT; MODIFY CILD SUPPORT; MODIFY CHILD TX DEDUCTION; AND FOR AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS; AND RELATED RELIEF.

01/13/2021 9:00 AM

DEFENDANT'S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF ORDER DENYING TO MODIFY THE CURRENT CUSTODIAL ARRANGEMENT; MODIFY CHILD SUPPORT, MODIFY CHILD TAX DEDUCTION; AND FOR AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS; AND RELATED RELIEF...PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF ORDER DENYING MOTION TO MODIFY THE CURRENT CUSTODIAL ARRANGEMENT; MODIFY CHILD SUPPORT; MODIFY CHILD TAX DEDUCTION; AND FOR AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS; AND RELATED RELIEF...DEFENDANT'S REPLY TO PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF ORDER DENYING TO MODIFY THE CURRENT CUSTODIAL ARRANGEMENT, ET AL. Plaintiff/Mom, Ms. Jacobson and Mr. Hofland present by video with Defendant/Dad present in the office. Mr. Hofland represented there has been a disconnect in the communication, as he had a matter scheduled for the same time in downtown court at last hearing. Discussion regarding parties' current schedule being convenient for Dad, last custody schedule been from seven (7) years ago, Dad's request to spend more time with the children, Dad's wishes to establish a better relationship with the children request for an evidentiary hearing to be set. Ms. Jacobson discussed Dad's schedule is worst than his previous one, Dad's Financial Disclosure Form (FDF) reflecting he actually works more Mom's schedule not fluctuating despite receiving a promotion, Dad not submitting evidence of a substantial change in circumstance to request a modification of custody and Mom's concerns for Dad's behavior. Ms. Jacobson is further requesting for attorney's fees. The Court noted the Decree of Divorce was filed five (5) years ago and inquired if the parties would like to participate in family mediation. Mr. Hofland argued other jurisdictions have found a schedule change a significant change in circumstances to modify visitation schedule and asked the Court to consider same as Dad is simply requesting to spend more time with his children. The Court noted it does not find

8/30/2021 https://www.clarkcountycourts.us/Secure/CaseDetail.aspx?CaseID=11560501&HearingID=205080989&SingleViewMode=Minutes

sufficient basis to set further proceedings regarding modification of custody, further, it deems appropriate to grant attorney's fees for Ms. Jacobson. For the record, the Court discussed the detailed timeline and thread of e-mail correspondence between Mr. Hofland's office staff and the Court regarding the 10/27/2020 hearing were Mr. Hofland was unable to appear. COURT stated its FINDINGS and ORDERED the following: 1. Motion for RECONSIDERATION is DENIED. 2. Ms. Jacobson shall prepare the order from today in addition to a Brunzell Memorandum of Fees and Costs and leave a blank space for the Court to determine ATTORNEY'S FEES. CASE CLOSED upon entry of order.

<u>Parties Present</u> <u>Return to Register of Actions</u>

Electronically Filed 3/26/2021 6:31 PM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT

MEMC

RACHEL M. JACOBSON, LTD.

Nevada Bar No. 007827

JACOBSON LAW OFFICE, LTD.

64 North Pecos Road, Suite 200

Henderson, Nevada 89074

Phone (702) 601-0770

Attorney for Plaintiff,

Sarah Maurice

EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

SARAH MAURICE,

Plaintiff,

VS.

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JUSTIN MAURICE,

Defendant.

Case No. **D-14-506883-D**

Dept. No. **Q**

FAMILY DIVISION

MEMORANDUM OF ATTORNEY'S
FEES AND COSTS

COMES NOW Plaintiff, SARAH MAURICE ("Sarah"), by and through her attorney, RACHEL M. JACOBSON, ESQ., of the law firm of JACOBSON LAW OFFICE, LTD., and, pursuant to the Court's Order at the time of the January 13, 2021 hearing in this matter, presents to the Court her Memorandum of Attorney's Fees and Costs.

I INTRODUCTION

This matter came before this Court on Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration of Order Denying to Modify the Current Custodial Arrangement; Modify Child Support;

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Case Number: D-14-506883-D

Modify Child Tax Deduction; and for an Award of Attorney's Fees and Costs and Related Relief filed December 7, 2020. Plaintiff filed her Opposition and Countermotion to Defendant's Motion and related Exhibits. Plaintiff also appeared with counsel for hearing of same on January 13, 2021. This Memorandum of Fees and Costs in the above referenced case is provided to the Court indicating fees and costs incurred by Plaintiff from December 7, 2020 through March 26, 2021.

I. FEES INCURRED

A. Plaintiff's billing records in this case from December 7, 2020 through March 26, 2021 reflect the following time entries for Jacobson Law Office, Ltd. A detailed summary is attached hereto as **Exhibit A**:

Fees and Costs	Total:		\$:	3.071.00
Attorney time:	7.2 hours	@\$350.00/hour	\$ 2	2,520.00
Assistant time:	5.8 hours	@\$ 95.00/hour	\$	551.00

II. LEGAL ARGUMENT

Attorney's fees may be awarded in a pre or post-divorce motion under NRS 18.010(2) and NRS 22.100. NRS 18.010(2) provides that fees may be awarded:

- (a) When the prevailing party has not recovered more than \$20,000; or
- (b) Without regard to the recovery sought, when the court finds that the claim, counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint or defense of the opposing party was brought or maintained without reasonable ground or to harass the prevailing party. The court shall liberally construe the provisions of this paragraph in favor of awarding attorney's fees in all appropriate situations. It is the intent of the Legislature that the court award

- 3. In awarding attorney's fees, the court may pronounce its decision on the fees at the conclusion of the trial or special proceeding without written motion and with or without presentation of additional evidence.
- 4. Subsections 2 and 3 do not apply to any action arising out of a written instrument or agreement which entitles the prevailing party to an award of reasonable attorney's fees.

Further, EDCR 7.60(b) provides:

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- (b) The court may, after notice and an opportunity to be heard, impose upon an attorney or a party any and all sanctions which may, under the facts of the case, be reasonable, including the imposition of fines, costs or attorney's fees when an attorney or a party without just cause:
- (1) Presents to the court a motion or an opposition to a motion which is obviously frivolous, unnecessary or unwarranted.
 - (2) Fails to prepare for a presentation.
- (3) So multiplies the proceedings in a case as to increase costs unreasonably and vexatiously.
 - (4) Fails or refuses to comply with these rules.
- (5) Fails or refuses to comply with any order of a judge of the court.

As noted above, Plaintiff has incurred fees and costs in the amount of \$3,071.00 in attempting to address Defendant's filing and failure to reasonably address this matter. In weighing the reasonable value of an attorney's services, the Court has adopted basic elements to be considered along with the attorney's hourly schedule. As provided in

Brunzell v. Golden Gate National Bank, 85 Nev. 345, 349, 455 P.2d 31, 33 (1969) and Miller v. Wilfong, 121 Nev. 619, 119 P.3d 727 (2005), those factors are:

- 1) The Qualities of the Advocate: his ability, his training, education, experience, professional standing and skill.
- 2) The Character of the Work to be Done: its difficulty, its intricacy, its importance, time and skill required, the responsibility imposed and the prominence and character of the parties where they affect the importance of the litigation.
- 3) <u>The Work Actually Performed by the lawyer:</u> the skill, time and attention given to the work.
- 4) The result: whether the attorney was successful and what benefits were derived.

Regarding the initial factor, we respectfully present that the undersigned counsel has obtained her JD in 2001; she has been licensed in the State of Nevada since October of 2001 and has dedicated her practice primarily to the area of family law with a focus on mediation of cases to circumvent litigation for families. And the fees charged by counsel and staff are reasonable and compensable. As to the *character of the work*, it is of importance as Defendant mispresented facts to the Court in his effort to modify primary physical custody forcing Plaintiff to defend herself in her continued efforts to protect the best interest of the parties' minor children and maintain their stability. As to *work* actually performed, the undersigned respectfully asks this Court to find that the work

presented is adequate and well contemplated. As for *the result obtained*, while each of the foregoing factors is relevant, not one should predominate or be given undue weight. *Miller v. Wilfong*, 121 Nev. 619, 119 P.3d 727 (2005).

DATED this 26th day of March 2021.

Respectfully Submitted By: JACOBSON LAW OFFICE, LTD.

/s/ Rachel M. Jacobson

RACHEL M. JACOBSON, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 007827 64 No. Pecos Road, Suite 200 Henderson, Nevada 89074 T: 702-601-0770 Attorney for Plaintiff

DECLARATION OF ATTORNEY

- 1. I, Rachel M. Jacobson, Esq., declare that I am competent to testify to the facts contained in the preceding filing.
- 2. I am an attorney duly licensed to practice law in the state of Nevada.
- 3. I am an attorney representing the Plaintiff, Sarah Maurice.
- 4. I have personal knowledge of the above costs and disbursements expended, and the items contained in the above memorandum are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief. In addition, any disbursements have been necessarily incurred and paid in this action.
- 5. I declare under penalty of perjury, under the laws of the State of Nevada and United States (NRS 53.045 and 28 U.S.C. § 1746) that the foregoing is true and correct.

_/s/ Rachel M. Jacobson RACHEL M. JACOBSON, ESQ.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 1 2 Pursuant to NRCP 5(b), I certify that I am an employee of JACOBSON LAW 3 4 OFFICE, LTD., and that on this 26th day of March 2021, I caused the above and foregoing 5 document entitled "MEMORANDUM OF FEES AND COSTS" to be served as follows: ☑ BY ELECTRONIC SERVICE: Pursuant to EDCR 8.05(a), EDCR 8.05(f), NRCP 5(b)(2)(D) and Administrative Order 14-2 captioned "In the Administrative Matter of Mandatory Electronic Service in the Eighth Judicial District Court," by mandatory electronic service through the Eighth Judicial District Court's electronic filing system; ☑ BY MAIL: Pursuant to NRCP 5(b), I placed a true copy thereof enclosed in a sealed 11 envelope upon which first class mail postage was prepaid in Henderson, Nevada; 12 ☐ BY FACSIMILE: Pursuant to EDCR 7.26, I transmitted a copy of the foregoing 13 document this date via facsimile: 14 ☐ BY ELECTRONIC MAIL: Pursuant to EDCR 7.26, I transmitted a copy of the 15 foregoing document this date via electronic mail; 16 ☐ BY CERTIFIED MAIL: I placed a true copy thereof enclosed in a sealed envelope, 17 return receipt requested. 18 To the party(s) listed below at the address, email address, and/or facsimile number 19 20 indicated below: 21 Bradley J. Hofland, Esq. 22 Email: bradh@hoflandlaw.com Attorney for Defendant 23 24 /s/ Rachel M. Jacobson 25 An employee of JACOBSON LAW OFFICE, LTD. 26 27

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Sarah Maurice

Date Range: 12/07/2020 - 03/26/2021

Billable vs total

\$3,071.00 13 hour(s)

DATE	ACTIVITY	DURATION	DESCRIPTION	RATE	TOTAL	STATUS	USER
Mar 25, 2021	Correspondence	0.2	Prepare response correspondence to OC re: order; request to submit competing order for Court's review given unresolved discrepancies in preparation	\$350.00/hr	\$70.00		Rachel Jacobson
Mar 1, 2021	Receipt and Review	0.2	Receipt and review correspondence from OC requesting revisions to proposed order	\$350.00/hr	\$70.00		Rachel Jacobson
Feb 23, 2021	Receipt and Review	0.2	Receipt and review email communication from OC requesting add'l time to respond to proposed order	\$350.00/hr	\$70.00		Rachel Jacobson
Feb 18, 2021	Preparation	1.8	Continue finalization of proposed order from hearing; review hearing video for same; email OC re: same	\$350.00/hr	\$630.00		Rachel Jacobson
Feb 18, 2021	Correspondence	0.2	Emails to/from client & Hofland. Review of letter from OC	\$350.00/hr	\$70.00		Rachel Jacobson
Feb 11, 2021	Preparation	0.4	Review initial draft of proposed order from hearing	\$350.00/hr	\$140.00		Rachel Jacobson
Jan 20, 2021	Preparation	5.0	Review video transcript of hearing of 1.13.21 and prepare order and memo re fees for review by RJ	\$95.00/hr	\$475.00		Legal Assistant
Jan 19, 2021	Receipt and Review	0.2	Answer and Counter	\$350.00/hr	\$70.00		Rachel Jacobson
Jan 13, 2021	Court Appearance	1.6	Preparation for and court appearance	\$350.00/hr	\$560.00		Rachel Jacobson
Jan 12, 2021	Draft	0.2	Supp EXHS	\$350.00/hr	\$70.00		Rachel Jacobson
Jan 8, 2021	Receipt and Review	0.4	D's Reply to OPPO. Emails to/from client re EXHS	\$350.00/hr	\$140.00		Rachel Jacobson
Jan 7, 2021	File	0.3	Communication with client regarding FDF; efile and serve same	\$95.00/hr	\$28.50		Legal Assistant
Jan 5, 2021	Draft	1.6	Oppo and CM	\$350.00/hr	\$560.00		Rachel Jacobson
Dec 21, 2020	Review and finalize	0.2	Answer and Counter	\$350.00/hr	\$70.00		Rachel Jacobson
Dec 16, 2020	Preparation	0.5	Begin review and preparation of opposition and countermotion to new motion filed by Defendant 12.7.20	\$95.00/hr	\$47.50		Legal Assistant

Electronically Filed 4/2/2021 1:44 PM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT

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HOFLAND & TOMSHECK Bradley J. Hofland, Esq. Nevada Bar Number: 6343 bradh@hoflandlaw.com 228 South 4th Street, 1st Floor Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 Telephones: (702) 895-6760 Facsimile: (702) 731-6910

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Attorney for Défendant, Justin Maurice

DISTRICT COURT, FAMILY DIVISION **CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA**

SARAH MAURICE,) CASE NO.: D-14-506883-D
) DEPT. NO.: Q
Plaintiff,)
) OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFF'S
vs.) MEMORANDUM OF ATTORNEY'S
) FEES AND COSTS
JUSTIN MAURICE,)
)
Defendant.)
)

COMES NOW, Defendant Justic Maurice ("Justin") by and through his attorneys, Bradley J. Hofland, Esq. of Hofland & Tomsheck, and hereby submits his Objection to Plaintiff's Memorandum of Attorney's Fees and Costs and respectfully submits that any award of attorney's fees and costs to Plaintiff Sarah Maurice ("Sarah") is not warranted under the facts of this case and applicable authority and to do so would constitute an injustice.

Dated this 2nd day of April, 2021

HOFLAND & TOMSHECK

By:/s/ Bradley J. Hofland Bradley J. Hofland, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 6343 228 South 4th Street, 1st Floor Las Vegas Nevada 89101 Attorneys for Defendant Justin Maurice

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Case Number: D-14-506883-D

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

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I. **Introduction**

On September 17, 2020 Defendant Justin Maurice ("Justin" "Defendant") filed his motion to modify child custody, child support and tax deduction based on a substantial change of circumstances. The hearing on Prior to the hearing Defendant's motion was set for October 27, 2020. Defendant's counsel informed the Court of a scheduling conflict due counsel's appearance at the same time in an unrelated matter. As a result, the Court called the hearing without Defendant's counsel or Defendant present issued a ruling. The Order after the October 27, 2020 hearing denying Defendant's motion was entered on November 23, 2020. Thereafter, on December 7 2020, Defendant filed his motion for reconsideration based on new circumstances, no factual finding made by the Court and error of law. Plaintiff filed her opposition to Defendant's motion 30 days after service on January 6, 2021. The hearing on Defendant's motion was conducted on January 13, 2021, and the Court denied Defendant's motion for reconsideration and awarded Plaintiff attorney's fees.

II. Legal Analysis

NRS 18.010(2) permits attorney's fees under both subsections, to wit: (a) as a prevailing party, and (b) because Plaintiff's positions were brought and maintained without reasonable ground. Although Defendant's motion for reconsideration was denied the motion was brought and maintained with reasonable ground as result of the underlying motion to modify being heard without a hearing and additional events occurred after court issued its ruling that warranted reconsideration.

Plaintiff's request for \$ 3,071.00 in attorney's fees for opposing

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Defendant's motion for reconsideration and the amount of work done is unreasonable and unfair. Furthermore, Plaintiff's opposition to Defendant's motion for reconsideration was untimely. Justin filed and served his motion for reconsideration on December 7, 2020. Pursuant to EDCR 5.502, Sarah's opposition was due on December 21, 2020. According to Plaintiff's counsel's billing (Exhibit "A"), counsel's office began preparing the opposition and countermotion on December 16, 2020. However, Plaintiff's opposition was not filed until January 6, 2021, such that Justin's requested relief should have been granted without a hearing. Nevertheless, a hearing on Defendant's motion was conducted and this Court denied Defendant's motion for reconsideration and awarded Plaintiff attorney's fees and costs and ordered Plaintiff's counsel to prepare the Order and a Brunzell Memorandum of Fees and Costs to determine the attorney's fees.

The order after hearing was prepared by Plaintiff's counsel prior to the court minutes being prepared requiring not only Plaintiff's counsel to spend time reviewing the hearing video, but also required Defendant's counsel to review the hearing video ensure the order corresponded with the Court's findings and orders. Additionally, Plaintiff's counsel's legal assistant spent 5 hours of unnecessary time reviewing the video transcript and preparing the order after hearing and Plaintiff's counsel spent an additional 2.2 hours reviewing the order and the hearing video. Additional time requested by Plaintiff's counsel consist of another .8 hours in review of correspondence between counsel regarding the order and revisions. The time spent on reviewing the hearing video and preparation of the order and revisions could have been avoided had Plaintiff's counsel waited until the court minutes were prepared, which were detailed and consistent with the Court's findings and rulings.

Additionally, no declaration from Plaintiff's counsel's legal assistant was submitted with the Memorandum of Attorney's Fees and Costs with regards to the

legal assistant's qualifications, whether said time was reasonable and permitted by Nevada law. NRS 28.010 does not mention attorney's fees to be awarded for non-attorney's work and time. As such all of the legal assistant's time (5.8 hours of which 5 hours was spent reviewing the hearing video and preparing the order) should be disregarded in the amount of \$551.00.

Plaintiff's counsel also included attorney's fees for 3.2 hours for activities performed *subsequent* to the hearing, including review of the hearing video, finalization of the order and correspondence which time and fees are unreasonable and should be disregarded.

Nevertheless, as it pertains to Plaintiff's request, an award of fees is not warranted, it would not be fair, and it would not be just. However, should the Court be inclined to award Plaintiff reasonable attorney's fees, Defendant request the amount of attorney's fees be set at a maximum amount of \$1,400.00.

Dated this 2nd day of April, 2021

HOFLAND & TOMSHECK

By:/s/ Bradley J. Hofland
Bradley J. Hofland, Esq.
Nevada Bar No. 6343
228 South 4th Street, 1st Floor
Las Vegas Nevada 89101
Attorneys for Defendant Justin Maurice

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I am an employee of Hofland & Tomsheck, that Pursuant to NRCP 5(b) and EDCR 7.26, I certify that on the 2nd day of April, 2021, I served the **OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM OF ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS** on the following parties by E-Service through Odyssey and/or U.S. mail addressed as follows:

Jacobson Law Office, Ltd. 64 North Pecos Road, Suite 200 Henderson, NV 89074 Attorney for Plaintiff

By: /s/ Nikki Warren
Employee of Hofland & Tomsheck

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ORDR

RACHEL M. JACOBSON, LTD. Nevada Bar No. 007827 JACOBSON LAW OFFICE, LTD.

64 North Pecos Road, Suite 200 Henderson, Nevada 89074

Phone (702) 601-0770

Attorney for Plaintiff, Sarah Maurice

EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

SARAH MAURICE,

Plaintiff,

VS.

JUSTIN MAURICE,

Defendant.

Case No. **D-14-506883-D**

Dept. No. **Q**

FAMILY DIVISION

Date of Hearing: 01/13/2021 Time of Hearing: 9:00 AM

ORDER

THIS MATTER having come on for hearing upon Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration of Order Denying to Modify the Current Custodial Arrangement; Modify Child Support; Modify Child Tax Deduction; and for an Award of Attorney's Fees and Costs and Related Relief, and Plaintiff's Opposition and Countermotion thereto and Defendant's Reply; Plaintiff, SARAH MAURICE ("Plaintiff/Mother"), appearing via *Blue Jeans* and being represented by RACHEL M. JACOBSON, ESQ., of Jacobson Law Office, Ltd., and Defendant, JUSTIN MAURICE ("Defendant/Father"), also appearing via *Blue Jean* and being

Statistically closed: USJR-FAM-Set/Withdrawn with Judicial Conf/Hearing Close Case (UWJC)

represented by BRADLEY J. HOFLAND, ESQ.; the Court, having reviewed the pleadings and papers on file herein, and the Court being fully advised in the premises and good cause appearing therefore, makes the following Notations, Findings and Orders:

THE COURT NOTED that no stipulations between the parties have been reached.

THE COURT FURTHER NOTED that the Stipulated Decree of Divorce was entered September 30, 2015, and, recognizing that the Decree is five years of age, the Court questioned counsel as to whether there would be any value in having the parties participate in mediation regarding a modification to the schedule. It is clear to the Court that there has been communication and dialog between the parties over the past year with things that have happened and the environment that we live in now. The parties have demonstrated the capacity to communicate with each other. The Court also stated that this is independent of the request to modify custody. (VT 9:13) Counsel's opinions differed as to mediation.

THE COURT MAKES THE FOLLOWING FINDINGS AND ORDERS based upon the arguments of counsel and papers that have been filed with the Court: (VT 9:19:44)

THE COURT HEREBY FINDS that this matter comes before the Court on Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration of Order Denying to Modify the Current

Custodial Arrangement; Modify Child Support; Modify Child Tax Deduction; and for an Award of Attorney's Fees and Costs and Related Relief. The standard applied by the Court in evaluating such a motion for reconsideration is the *Ellis v. Carucci* standard, recognizing that the controlling order (the Decree of Divorce), provides the parties with Joint Legal Custody and the Plaintiff/Mother with Primary Physical Custody. That order was entered in 2015, subject to the visitation defined therein for Father. Pursuant to the *Ellis v. Carucci* standard, the Court is required to initially make a finding that there has been a substantial change in circumstances affecting the well-being of the child in evaluating whether or not there is a basis to modify custody. After making a finding that there has been a substantial change in circumstances, the Court then considers the best interest factors, which is a focal point in looking at the best interests of the children. (VT 9:21)

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS AND CONCLUDES that the *Ellis v.*Carucci case modified the *Murphy* test that had been in place up until the time of
Ellis v. Carucci. The standard that is set forth in both cases relies in part upon
maintaining some stability in custodial arrangements for the benefit of children.
That is the basis for the original *Murphy* test, lessened somewhat in the Ellis v.
Carucci test. The test in Ellis v. Carucci is the standard to be applied by the Court.
(VT 9:21:43)

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that when the case first came before the Court on the Defendant's motion on October 27, 2020, the Court was asked to make such a determination. Upon review of the original papers filed pursuant to the *Rooney* case, the Court determined that there was not a sufficient showing pursuant to *Rooney* to set further proceedings on the motion. (VT 9:22:12)

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that the primary focus of the Defendant's Motion relates to his work schedule. Although Defendant raises other issues and arguments, the change in his work schedule is the primary focus of his request. There is reference to an offer of proof that the parties' older child, Savannah (13 years of age and soon to be 14), has expressed a preference regarding her custody (which is a "best interest" factor pursuant to NRS 125C.0035). Plaintiff disputes this offer of proof, arguing that the opposite is true. This Court concludes that such an expression of a preference is not determinative of a substantial change in circumstances. Rather, such an offer is part of the best interest analysis. (VT 9:23:13)

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that, looking at work schedules in general, the Court posed the question: if someone loses his/her job and becomes unemployed (which the Court has seen a fair amount of this past year), does that constitute a substantial change in circumstances to warrant the Court permanently modifying custody (because someone becomes unemployed). (VT 9:15) This

Court's approach is not determined by how other judicial Departments may or may not be approaching this issue. This Court applies the law to the facts. The Court recognizes that we are living in unique times, including a rise in unemployment. The Court, therefore, posed the question regarding unemployment. The Court would not conclude that the loss of employment necessarily triggers an automatic review with evidentiary proceedings for a permanent modification of custody and the Court also views the same a temporary circumstance. Defendant's specific situation is offered something that is more than a temporary circumstance. In this regard, Defendant's work schedule has changed, including the availability of "working" from home. Such a "work" arrangement is something that we are seeing a lot more frequently today under the current circumstances with the Pandemic (and may remain after things get back to "normal"). However, when the Court hears the phrase "working from home," the connotation that that frequently is attaches is that "working" from home does not really mean "working." The suggestion is that someone who is "working" from home is actually not working, but is available to provide daycare for children, available to educate children or involved in some form of distance learning. The good news for the Court is that the parties' children are fortunate enough to be receiving some in-person education, which is a fabulous and a fantastic scenario for them. It is not complete. but they at least get some socialization and some classroom time. Nevertheless,

when the Court hears "working from home," the Court should necessarily view such a claims as actually *working* from home. It may not mean that every minute of that time is spent actually performing work, but clearly the Court's expectation would be that the employer expects that one is available and actually working from home. (VT 9:25:27)

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that, based upon the offers that have been made, there has not been a sufficient basis nor has there been a sufficient showing, pursuant to *Rooney*, that would warrant this Court to reconsider the prior Order (Nov. 21, 2020) and set further proceedings. The Court is not persuaded, based upon those papers, and pursuant to *Rooney*, that there is sufficient cause to set further proceedings. (VT 9:26)

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that Plaintiff is entitled to an award of attorney's fees pursuant to EDCR 7.60. This Court has considered the factors set forth in *Brunzell v. Golden Gate National Bank* in evaluating an award of fees. After this Court's review and consideration of Plaintiff's Memorandum of Attorney's Fees and Costs (Mar. 26, 2021) and Defendant's Objection to Plaintiff's Memorandum of Attorney's Fees and Costs (Apr. 2, 2021), this Court finds that an award of \$1,500 is appropriate.

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that it also is important to clarify the record as it relates to what transpired in the prior hearing in light of the assertions

made in the paperwork filed on behalf of Defendant that misstate how this Court handled the prior proceedings and, as such, the Court finds the clarification as to what exactly transpired is necessary and, in that regard, the COURT FINDS AS FOLLOWS: (VT 9:26:20)

1. Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration of Order Denying to Modify the Current Custodial Arrangement; Modify Child Support; Modify Child Tax Deduction; and for an Award of Attorney's Fees and Costs and Related Relief states in specific footnote 2:

At no time, did the Court's staff inform Mr. Hofland's office that the hearing was starting with or without him. [Emphasis added]

The Defendant's Motion continues in footnote 3:

.... Clark County while smaller than Los Angeles, San Bernardino, San Francisco, Orange County and San Diego Counties, has generally like other large counties in other states accommodated scheduling conflicts caused by conflicts with other appearances scheduled for the same time and date. Mr. Hofland inadvertently wrongly assumed Department Q granted the same "common" courtesy followed in other divisions of the Eighth Judicial District Court and other Courts where Mr. Hofland has appeared to trail hearings so all parties and counsel would be present at important hearings.

Further, on page 3 of Defendant's Reply to Plaintiff's Opposition:

"Sadly, and unacceptably this Court chose to deprive Defendant of his due process rights to a fair and meaningful hearing (he was not allowed to appear given the Court's method of disposition), and more troubling his fundamental rights as a parent were not recognized and accommodated. Along with that, Defendant's counsel was not allowed (denied) the opportunity to be heard (unlike Plaintiff's counsel). Instead, this Court simply focused on one factor, denied

argument and an evidentiary hearing, claiming that factor alone was insufficient to modify custody and child support, and promptly ruled the case would be closed as soon as Plaintiff's counsel could get an order to the Court. (VT 9:28)

- 2. (VT 9:28) For the record, this Court's JEA and Law Clerk received an email from Mr. Hofland's office on Monday, October 26, 2020 at 1:25 PM, to notify the Department that "Mr. Hofland will be a few minutes late logging on to Bluejeans in the morning as he also has a telephonic hearing with one of his civil cases at 9:00 AM tomorrow also." Department Q's Law Clerk responded on October 26, 2020 at 3:15 PM and stated: "Thank you for the notice." The Department Q JEA was included in the email.
- 3. Department Q's JEA followed up with Mr. Hofland's office on Tuesday, October 27, 2020 (the date of the hearing) at 10:02 AM. The hearing was scheduled for 9:00 AM on the Court's calendar. The suggestion that this Court failed to trail the matter is completely inaccurate. The hearing was scheduled at 9:00 AM. As of 10:02 AM, the Court had trailed the matter. Department Q's JEA's email to Mr. Hofland's office stated: "Can you please tell me the status of Mr. Hofland? Unfortunately, Ms. Jacobson was not notified by your office and she has been waiting since 9 AM. Judge Duckworth will be calling the matter...." Thus, notice was *in fact* imparted on Mr. Hofland's office that the matter was going to be called and was called at 10:03 AM.

- 4. After trailing the matter for more than an hour to accommodate counsel, the hearing proceeded at 10:03 AM. On October 27, 2020 at 10:08 AM, an email was received by Department Q's JEA from Mr. Hofland's office stating "I apologize for the delay. Mr. Hofland is *still waiting* to be called for his civil hearing this morning in Department 25. Mr. Hofland anticipates he will be finished by 10:30 AM/11:00 AM. Our Client Justine Maurice is at our office for the Maurice Hearing, and he just stepped out for 15 mins to get a cup of coffee." (Emphasis added). (VT 9:30:30)
- 5. Again, the suggestion that this Court failed to offer any courtesy whatsoever is inaccurate. Moreover, the Court would expect that, as a professional courtesy, if an attorney anticipates being late to a hearing, counsel would communicate the anticipated delay to opposing counsel. The Court did accommodate the delay; the Court waited for more than an hour. This matter was not the only case on the Court's calendar that morning; the Court had other matters scheduled and the Court.
- 6. It is this Court's prerogative to review the papers and make a determination on those papers because the Court views the papers as being the mode by which counsel for both parties, especially capable counsel that both parties have, to communicate all of the relevant information the Court needs to make a decision. It is this Court's prerogative to make decisions based on the

papers that have been filed, again presuming that all of the relevant information the Court needs to make a decision have been accurately stated in those papers. In this particular matter, the hearing was scheduled for 9:00 AM. It started at 10:03 AM and apparently the hearing before this Court was less of a priority than the hearing before another department downtown in a civil matter. This Court waited over an hour. That was an accommodation that was offered notwithstanding the arguments to the contrary.

THEREFORE,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration of Order Denying to Modify the Current Custodial Arrangement; Modify Child Support; Modify Child Tax Deduction; and for an Award of Attorney's Fees and Costs and Related Relief is DENIED. (VT 9:25:50; 9:32:10)

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Ms. Jacobson shall prepare the Order, submit it to Mr. Hofland for review and signature and leave a blank in the Order for the Court to make a determination as it relates to the issue of attorney's fees. The Plaintiff is directed to file a Memorandum of Fees indicating the amount incurred in responding to Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration of Order Denying to Modify the Current Custodial Arrangement; Modify Child Support; Modify Child Tax Deduction; and for an Award of Attorney's Fees and Costs and Related Relief.

1 **CSERV** 2 DISTRICT COURT 3 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 4 5 Sarah Maurice, Plaintiff CASE NO: D-14-506883-D 6 vs. DEPT. NO. Department Q 7 8 Justin Maurice, Defendant. 9 10 **AUTOMATED CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE** 11 This automated certificate of service was generated by the Eighth Judicial District Court. The foregoing Order was served via the court's electronic eFile system to all 12 recipients registered for e-Service on the above entitled case as listed below: 13 Service Date: 4/23/2021 14 "Carol Beitler, Legal Assistant". jakobslaw@gmail.com 15 "Rachel Jacobson, Esq.". reli@jacobsonlawltd.com 16 17 **Bradley Hofland** Bradh@hoflandlaw.com 18 Dina DeSousa Cabral DinaD@hoflandlaw.com 19 Rachel Jacobson eservice@jacobsonlawltd.com 20 Nikki Woulfe clerk@hoflandlaw.com 21 Anna Stein bhassistant@hoflandlaw.com 22 Rachel Jacobson Reli@jacobsonlawltd.com 23 24 25 26 27 28

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2 RACHEL M. JACOBSON, ESQ.

Nevada Bar No. 007827

³ JACOBSON LAW OFFICE, LTD.

64 North Pecos Road, Suite 200

Henderson, Nevada 89074

Phone (702) 601-0770

Attorney for Plaintiff,

Sarah Maurice

EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

SARAH MAURICE,

Plaintiff,

VS.

JUSTIN MAURICE,

Defendant.

Case No. **D-14-506883-D** Dept. No. **Q**

FAMILY DIVISION

NOTICE OF ENTRY OF ORDER

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that an ORDER from hearing of January 13,

2021, attached hereto, was duly entered in the above-referenced case on the 23rd

day of April 2021.

DATED this 26th day of April 2021.

22 Respectfully Submitted by:

 ${\bf JACOBSON}\,{\bf LAW}\,{\bf OFFICE}, {\bf LTD}$

24 /s/ Rachel M. Jacobson, Esq.

RACHEL M. JACOBSON, ESQ.

Nevada Bar No. 007827

64 North Pecos Road, Suite 200

Henderson, Nevada 89074

27 Henderson, New (702) 601-0770

Attorney for Plaintiff

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Pursuant to NRCP 5(b), I certify that I am an employee of JACOBSON LAW OFFICE, LTD., and that on this 26th day of April 2021, I caused the above and foregoing document entitled *NOTICE OF ENTRY OF ORDER* to be served as follows:

☑ BY ELECTRONIC SERVICE: Pursuant to EDCR 8.05(a), EDCR 8.05(f), NRCP 5(b)(2)(D) and Administrative Order 14-2 captioned "In the Administrative Matter of Mandatory Electronic Service in the Eighth Judicial District Court," by mandatory electronic service through the Eighth Judicial District Court's electronic filing system;

- ☐ BY MAIL: Pursuant to NRCP 5(b), I placed a true copy thereof enclosed in a sealed envelope upon which first class mail postage was prepaid in Henderson, Nevada;
- ☐ BY FACSIMILE: Pursuant to EDCR 7.26, I transmitted a copy of the foregoing document this date via facsimile;
- ☐ BY ELECTRONIC MAIL: Pursuant to EDCR 7.26, I transmitted a copy of the foregoing document this date via electronic mail;
- ☐ BY CERTIFIED MAIL: I placed a true copy thereof enclosed in a sealed envelope, return receipt requested.

To the party(s) listed below at the address, email address, and/or facsimile number indicated below:

Bradley J. Hofland, Esq. Bradh@hoflandlaw.com

/s/ Carol Beitler. Legal Assistant
An employee of JACOBSON LAW OFFICE, LTD.

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ORDR

RACHEL M. JACOBSON, LTD.
Nevada Bar No. 007827

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64 North Pecos Road, Suite 200

Henderson, Nevada 89074

Phone (702) 601-0770

Attorney for Plaintiff,

Sarah Maurice

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EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

SARAH MAURICE,

Plaintiff,

VS.

JUSTIN MAURICE,

Defendant.

Case No. **D-14-506883-D** Dept. No. **O**

FAMILY DIVISION

Date of Hearing: 01/13/2021 Time of Hearing: 9:00 AM

ORDER

THIS MATTER having come on for hearing upon Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration of Order Denying to Modify the Current Custodial Arrangement; Modify Child Support; Modify Child Tax Deduction; and for an Award of Attorney's Fees and Costs and Related Relief, and Plaintiff's Opposition and Countermotion thereto and Defendant's Reply; Plaintiff, SARAH MAURICE ("Plaintiff/Mother"), appearing via *Blue Jeans* and being represented by RACHEL M. JACOBSON, ESQ., of Jacobson Law Office, Ltd., and Defendant, JUSTIN MAURICE ("Defendant/Father"), also appearing via *Blue Jean* and being

represented by BRADLEY J. HOFLAND, ESQ.; the Court, having reviewed the pleadings and papers on file herein, and the Court being fully advised in the premises and good cause appearing therefore, makes the following Notations, Findings and Orders:

THE COURT NOTED that no stipulations between the parties have been reached.

THE COURT FURTHER NOTED that the Stipulated Decree of Divorce was entered September 30, 2015, and, recognizing that the Decree is five years of age, the Court questioned counsel as to whether there would be any value in having the parties participate in mediation regarding a modification to the schedule. It is clear to the Court that there has been communication and dialog between the parties over the past year with things that have happened and the environment that we live in now. The parties have demonstrated the capacity to communicate with each other. The Court also stated that this is independent of the request to modify custody. (VT 9:13) Counsel's opinions differed as to mediation.

THE COURT MAKES THE FOLLOWING FINDINGS AND ORDERS based upon the arguments of counsel and papers that have been filed with the Court: (VT 9:19:44)

THE COURT HEREBY FINDS that this matter comes before the Court on Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration of Order Denying to Modify the Current

Custodial Arrangement; Modify Child Support; Modify Child Tax Deduction; and for an Award of Attorney's Fees and Costs and Related Relief. The standard applied by the Court in evaluating such a motion for reconsideration is the *Ellis v. Carucci* standard, recognizing that the controlling order (the Decree of Divorce), provides the parties with Joint Legal Custody and the Plaintiff/Mother with Primary Physical Custody. That order was entered in 2015, subject to the visitation defined therein for Father. Pursuant to the *Ellis v. Carucci* standard, the Court is required to initially make a finding that there has been a substantial change in circumstances affecting the well-being of the child in evaluating whether or not there is a basis to modify custody. After making a finding that there has been a substantial change in circumstances, the Court then considers the best interest factors, which is a focal point in looking at the best interests of the children. (VT 9:21)

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS AND CONCLUDES that the *Ellis v.*Carucci case modified the *Murphy* test that had been in place up until the time of
Ellis v. Carucci. The standard that is set forth in both cases relies in part upon
maintaining some stability in custodial arrangements for the benefit of children.
That is the basis for the original *Murphy* test, lessened somewhat in the Ellis v.
Carucci test. The test in Ellis v. Carucci is the standard to be applied by the Court.
(VT 9:21:43)

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THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that when the case first came before the Court on the Defendant's motion on October 27, 2020, the Court was asked to make such a determination. Upon review of the original papers filed pursuant to the Rooney case, the Court determined that there was not a sufficient showing pursuant to *Rooney* to set further proceedings on the motion. (VT 9:22:12)

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that the primary focus of the Defendant's Motion relates to his work schedule. Although Defendant raises other issues and arguments, the change in his work schedule is the primary focus of his request. There is reference to an offer of proof that the parties' older child, Savannah (13 years of age and soon to be 14), has expressed a preference regarding her custody (which is a "best interest" factor pursuant to NRS 125C.0035). Plaintiff disputes this offer of proof, arguing that the opposite is true. This Court concludes that such an expression of a preference is not determinative of a substantial change in circumstances. Rather, such an offer is part of the best interest analysis. (VT 9:23:13)

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that, looking at work schedules in general, the Court posed the question: if someone loses his/her job and becomes unemployed (which the Court has seen a fair amount of this past year), does that constitute a substantial change in circumstances to warrant the Court permanently modifying custody (because someone becomes unemployed). (VT 9:15) This Court's approach is not determined by how other judicial Departments may or may not be approaching this issue. This Court applies the law to the facts. The Court recognizes that we are living in unique times, including a rise in unemployment. The Court, therefore, posed the question regarding unemployment. The Court would not conclude that the loss of employment necessarily triggers an automatic review with evidentiary proceedings for a permanent modification of custody and the Court also views the same a temporary circumstance. Defendant's specific situation is offered something that is more than a temporary circumstance. In this regard, Defendant's work schedule has changed, including the availability of "working" from home. Such a "work" arrangement is something that we are seeing a lot more frequently today under the current circumstances with the Pandemic (and may remain after things get back to "normal"). However, when the Court hears the phrase "working from home," the connotation that that frequently is attaches is that "working" from home does not really mean "working." The suggestion is that someone who is "working" from home is actually not working, but is available to provide daycare for children, available to educate children or involved in some form of distance learning. The good news for the Court is that the parties' children are fortunate enough to be receiving some in-person education, which is a fabulous and a fantastic scenario for them. It is not complete. but they at least get some socialization and some classroom time. Nevertheless,

when the Court hears "working from home," the Court should necessarily view such a claims as actually *working* from home. It may not mean that every minute of that time is spent actually performing work, but clearly the Court's expectation would be that the employer expects that one is available and actually working from home. (VT 9:25:27)

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that, based upon the offers that have been made, there has not been a sufficient basis nor has there been a sufficient showing, pursuant to *Rooney*, that would warrant this Court to reconsider the prior Order (Nov. 21, 2020) and set further proceedings. The Court is not persuaded, based upon those papers, and pursuant to *Rooney*, that there is sufficient cause to set further proceedings. (VT 9:26)

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that Plaintiff is entitled to an award of attorney's fees pursuant to EDCR 7.60. This Court has considered the factors set forth in *Brunzell v. Golden Gate National Bank* in evaluating an award of fees. After this Court's review and consideration of Plaintiff's Memorandum of Attorney's Fees and Costs (Mar. 26, 2021) and Defendant's Objection to Plaintiff's Memorandum of Attorney's Fees and Costs (Apr. 2, 2021), this Court finds that an award of \$1,500 is appropriate.

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that it also is important to clarify the record as it relates to what transpired in the prior hearing in light of the assertions

made in the paperwork filed on behalf of Defendant that misstate how this Court handled the prior proceedings and, as such, the Court finds the clarification as to what exactly transpired is necessary and, in that regard, the COURT FINDS AS FOLLOWS: (VT 9:26:20)

1. Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration of Order Denying to Modify the Current Custodial Arrangement; Modify Child Support; Modify Child Tax Deduction; and for an Award of Attorney's Fees and Costs and Related Relief states in specific footnote 2:

At no time, did the Court's staff inform Mr. Hofland's office that the hearing was starting with or without him. [Emphasis added]

The Defendant's Motion continues in footnote 3:

.... Clark County while smaller than Los Angeles, San Bernardino, San Francisco, Orange County and San Diego Counties, has generally like other large counties in other states accommodated scheduling conflicts caused by conflicts with other appearances scheduled for the same time and date. Mr. Hofland inadvertently wrongly assumed Department Q granted the same "common" courtesy followed in other divisions of the Eighth Judicial District Court and other Courts where Mr. Hofland has appeared to trail hearings so all parties and counsel would be present at important hearings.

Further, on page 3 of Defendant's Reply to Plaintiff's Opposition:

"Sadly, and unacceptably this Court chose to deprive Defendant of his due process rights to a fair and meaningful hearing (he was not allowed to appear given the Court's method of disposition), and more troubling his fundamental rights as a parent were not recognized and accommodated. Along with that, Defendant's counsel was not allowed (denied) the opportunity to be heard (unlike Plaintiff's counsel). Instead, this Court simply focused on one factor, denied

 argument and an evidentiary hearing, claiming that factor alone was insufficient to modify custody and child support, and promptly ruled the case would be closed as soon as Plaintiff's counsel could get an order to the Court. (VT 9:28)

- 2. (VT 9:28) For the record, this Court's JEA and Law Clerk received an email from Mr. Hofland's office on Monday, October 26, 2020 at 1:25 PM, to notify the Department that "Mr. Hofland will be a few minutes late logging on to Bluejeans in the morning as he also has a telephonic hearing with one of his civil cases at 9:00 AM tomorrow also." Department Q's Law Clerk responded on October 26, 2020 at 3:15 PM and stated: "Thank you for the notice." The Department Q JEA was included in the email.
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- 4. After trailing the matter for more than an hour to accommodate counsel, the hearing proceeded at 10:03 AM. On October 27, 2020 at 10:08 AM, an email was received by Department Q's JEA from Mr. Hofland's office stating "I apologize for the delay. Mr. Hofland is *still waiting* to be called for his civil hearing this morning in Department 25. Mr. Hofland anticipates he will be finished by 10:30 AM/11:00 AM. Our Client Justine Maurice is at our office for the Maurice Hearing, and he just stepped out for 15 mins to get a cup of coffee." (Emphasis added). (VT 9:30:30)
- 5. Again, the suggestion that this Court failed to offer any courtesy whatsoever is inaccurate. Moreover, the Court would expect that, as a professional courtesy, if an attorney anticipates being late to a hearing, counsel would communicate the anticipated delay to opposing counsel. The Court did accommodate the delay; the Court waited for more than an hour. This matter was not the only case on the Court's calendar that morning; the Court had other matters scheduled and the Court.
- 6. It is this Court's prerogative to review the papers and make a determination on those papers because the Court views the papers as being the mode by which counsel for both parties, especially capable counsel that both parties have, to communicate all of the relevant information the Court needs to make a decision. It is this Court's prerogative to make decisions based on the

papers that have been filed, again presuming that all of the relevant information the Court needs to make a decision have been accurately stated in those papers. In this particular matter, the hearing was scheduled for 9:00 AM. It started at 10:03 AM and apparently the hearing before this Court was less of a priority than the hearing before another department downtown in a civil matter. This Court waited over an hour. That was an accommodation that was offered notwithstanding the arguments to the contrary.

THEREFORE,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration of Order Denying to Modify the Current Custodial Arrangement; Modify Child Support; Modify Child Tax Deduction; and for an Award of Attorney's Fees and Costs and Related Relief is DENIED. (VT 9:25:50; 9:32:10)

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Ms. Jacobson shall prepare the Order, submit it to Mr. Hofland for review and signature and leave a blank in the Order for the Court to make a determination as it relates to the issue of attorney's fees. The Plaintiff is directed to file a Memorandum of Fees indicating the amount incurred in responding to Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration of Order Denying to Modify the Current Custodial Arrangement; Modify Child Support; Modify Child Tax Deduction; and for an Award of Attorney's Fees and Costs and Related Relief.

1 **CSERV** 2 DISTRICT COURT 3 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 4 5 Sarah Maurice, Plaintiff CASE NO: D-14-506883-D 6 VS. DEPT. NO. Department Q 7 8 Justin Maurice, Defendant. 9 10 **AUTOMATED CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE** 11 This automated certificate of service was generated by the Eighth Judicial District Court. The foregoing Order was served via the court's electronic eFile system to all 12 recipients registered for e-Service on the above entitled case as listed below: 13 Service Date: 4/23/2021 14 "Carol Beitler, Legal Assistant". jakobslaw@gmail.com 15 "Rachel Jacobson, Esq.". reli@jacobsonlawltd.com 16 17 **Bradley Hofland** Bradh@hoflandlaw.com 18 Dina DeSousa Cabral DinaD@hoflandlaw.com 19 Rachel Jacobson eservice@jacobsonlawltd.com 20 Nikki Woulfe clerk@hoflandlaw.com 21 Anna Stein bhassistant@hoflandlaw.com 22 Rachel Jacobson Reli@jacobsonlawltd.com 23 24 25 26 27 28

Electronically Filed 5/26/2021 4:56 PM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT

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HOFLAND & TOMSHECK Bradley J. Hofland, Esq. Nevada Bar Number: 6343

bradh@hoflandlaw.com
228 South 4th Street, 1st Floor
Las Vegas, Nevada 89101
Telephones: (702) 895-6760
Facsimile: (702) 731-6910

Attorney for Defendant, Justin Maurice

DISTRICT COURT, FAMILY DIVISION **CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA**

SARAH MAURICE,) CASE NO.: D-14-506883-D
) DEPT. NO.: Q
Plaintiff,)
) NOTICE OF APPEAL
VS.)
)
JUSTIN MAURICE,)
)
Defendant.)
)

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that Defendant, Justin Maurice, hereby appeals to the Supreme Court of the State of Nevada the Court's final Order Denying to Modify the Current Custodial Arrangement; Modify Child Support; Modify Child Tax Deduction; and for an Award of Attorney's Fees and Costs and Related Relief entered on April 26, 2021.

Dated this 26th day of May, 2021

HOFLAND & TOMSHECK

By:/s/ Bradley J. Hofland Bradley J. Hofland, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 6343 228 South 4th Street, 1st Floor Las Vegas Nevada 89101 Attorneys for Defendant Justin Maurice

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I am an employee of Hofland & Tomsheck, that Pursuant to NRCP 5(b) and EDCR 7.26, I certify that on the 26th day of May, 2021, I served the **NOTICE OF APPEAL** on the following parties by E-Service through Odyssey and/or U.S. mail addressed as follows:

Jacobson Law Office, Ltd. 64 North Pecos Road, Suite 200 Henderson, NV 89074 Attorney for Plaintiff

By: /s/ Nikki Warren
Employee of Hofland & Tomsheck

Electronically Filed 5/26/2021 4:56 PM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT

1 **HOFLAND & TOMSHECK** Bradley J. Hofland, Esq. Nevada Bar Number: 6343 bradh@hoflandlaw.com
228 South 4th Street, 1st Floor
Las Vegas, Nevada 89101
Telephones: (702) 895-6760
Facsimile: (702) 731-6910 4 5 Attorney for Defendant, Justin Maurice 6 DISTRICT COURT, FAMILY DIVISION 7 **CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA** 8 SARAH MAURICE,) CASE NO.: D-14-506883-D 9) DEPT. NO.: Q 10 Plaintiff, **CASE APPEAL STATEMENT** 11 VS. 12 13 JUSTIN MAURICE, 14 Defendant. 15 16 1. Name of appellant filing this case appeal statement: **17 Defendant Justin Maurice** 18 2. Judge issuing the decision, judgment, or order appealed from: 19 The Honorable Bryce C. Duckworth; Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark 20 County. 21 3. Counsel for Appellant: 22 23 Party: Defendant/Appellant, Justin Maurice (702) 895-6760 (702) 731-6910 24 **Counsel:** Bradley J. Hofland, Esq. Telephone HOFLÁND & TOMSHECK Facsimile 228 South 4th Street, 1st Fl. 25 Email bradh@hoflandlaw.com Las Vegas, NV 89101 26 27 4. Identify each respondent and the name and address of appellate 28

counsel, if known, for each respondent (if the name of a respondent's appellate counsel is unknown, indicate as much and provide the name and

Plaintiff/Respondent, Sarah Maurice

(702) 601-0770 Telephone

Facsimile Email

eservice@jacobsonla vltd.com; Reli@jacobsonlawlt

Ms. Jacobson is the trial counsel; undersigned counsel does not know if respondent will retain additional or separate appellate counsel.

5. Indicate whether any attorney identified above in response to question 3 or 4 is not licensed to practice law in Nevada and, if so, whether the district court granted that attorney permission to appear under SCR 42 (attach a copy of any district court order granting such permission):

All counsel are licensed to practice law in Nevada.

6. Indicate whether appellant was represented by appointed or retained

7. Indicate whether appellant is represented by appointed or retained

8. Indicate whether appellant was granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis, and the date of entry of the district court order granting such leave:

9. Indicate the date the proceedings commenced in the district court

(e.g., date complaint, indictment, information, or petition was filed):

December 11, 2014, Complaint for Divorce.

10. Provide a brief description of the nature of the action and result in the district court, including the type of judgment or order being appealed and the relief granted by the district court:

This is an appeal from a final judgment of the district court,

The issues on appeal include:

- 1. Whether the Court erred in denying Defendant's motion to modify current custodial arrangement, child support and child tax deduction without allowing him an opportunity to be heard;
- 2. Whether the Court erred in refusing to find adequate cause for the setting of an evidentiary hearing.
- 3. Whether the Court erred in failing to make the requisite factual findings in denying Defendant's motion;
- 4. Whether the Court erred in ruling that a change in work schedules is not a factor the Court could consider in modification of current custodial arrangement.
- 5. Whether the Court erred in its refusal to recognize best interest factors as a substantial change in circumstances.
- 6. Whether the Court erred in failing to make additional findings as provided for in NRCP 52.
- 11. Indicate whether the case has previously been the subject of an appeal to or original writ proceeding in the Supreme Court and, if so, the caption and Supreme Court docket number of the prior proceeding:

Not Applicable.

12. Indicate whether this appeal involves child custody or visitation:

This appeal involves child custody and visitation.

13. If this is a civil case, indicate whether this appeal involves the possibility of settlement:

There is a potential for this matter to be resolved at a settlement conference. Dated this 26^{th} day of May, 2021

HOFLAND & TOMSHECK

By:/s/ Bradley J. Hofland
Bradley J. Hofland, Esq.
Nevada Bar No. 6343
228 South 4th Street, 1st Floor
Las Vegas Nevada 89101
Attorneys for Defendant Justin Maurice

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I am an employee of Hofland & Tomsheck, that Pursuant to NRCP 5(b) and EDCR 7.26, I certify that on the 26th day of May, 2021, I served the **CASE APPEAL STATEMENT** on the following parties by E-Service through Odyssey and/or U.S. mail addressed as follows:

Rachel Jacobson Jacobson Law Office, Ltd. 64 North Pecos Road, Suite 200 Henderson, NV 89074 Attorney for Plaintiff

By: /s/ Nikki Warren
Employee of Hofland & Tomsheck

Electronically Filed 6/1/2021 5:12 PM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT

HOFLAND & TOMSHECK Bradley J. Hofland, Esq. Nevada Bar Number: 6343 1 bradh@hoflandlaw.com
228 South 4th Street, 1st Floor
Las Vegas, Nevada 89101
Telephones: (702) 895-6760
Facsimile: (702) 731-6910 5 Attorney for Defendant, Justin Maurice 6 DISTRICT COURT, FAMILY DIVISION 7 **CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA** 8 SARAH MAURICE,) CASE NO.: D-14-506883-D 9) DEPT. NO.: Q 10 Plaintiff, 11) NOTICE OF POSTING APPEAL) BOND FOR DEFENDANT JUSTIN VS. 12) MAURICE 13 JUSTIN MAURICE, 14 Defendant. 15 16 PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that an Appeal Bond for Defendant, Justin 17 Maurice in the amount of FIVE HUNDRED DOLLARS and 00/100 (\$500.00) 18 was filed with the Court. 19 Dated this 1st day of June, 2021 20 **HOFLAND & TOMSHECK** By:/s/ Bradley J. Hofland 21 Bradley J. Hofland, Esq. 22 Nevada Bar No. 6343 23 228 South 4th Street, 1st Floor Las Vegas Nevada 89101 24 Attorneys for Defendant Justin Maurice 25 26 27 28

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I am an employee of Hofland & Tomsheck, that Pursuant to NRCP 5(b) and EDCR 7.26, I certify that on the 1st day of June, 2021, I served the **NOTICE OF POSTING APPEAL BOND FOR DEFENDANT JUSTIN MAURICE** on the following parties by E-Service through Odyssey and/or U.S. mail addressed as follows:

Jacobson Law Office, Ltd. 64 North Pecos Road, Suite 200 Henderson, NV 89074 Attorney for Plaintiff

By: /s/ Nikki Warren
Employee of Hofland & Tomsheck

Electronically Filed 7/29/2021 11:27 AM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT

ROST 1 HOFLAND & TOMSHECK Bradley J. Hofland, Esq. Nevada Bar Number: 6343 bradh@hoflandlaw.com 228 South 4th Street, 1st Floor Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 Telephones: (702) 895-6760 Facsimile: (702) 731-6910 Attorney for Défendant, Justin Maurice 6 DISTRICT COURT, FAMILY DIVISION 7 **CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA** 8 SARAH MAURICE,) CASE NO.: D-14-506883-D 9) DEPT. NO.: Q 10 Plaintiff, 11 VS. 12 13 JUSTIN MAURICE, 14 Defendant. 15 16 REQUEST FOR TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS **17** Transcript Video Services, 601 N. Pecos Road, Las Vegas, NV 89101. To: 18 Defendant, Justin Maurice, requested preparation of a transcript of the 19 proceedings before the District Court as follows: 20 Judge or Officer hearing the proceeding: Honorable Bryce C. Duckworth. 21 Specific portions of the transcript being requested: 22 PORTIONS REQUESTED: 23 October 27, 2020: Motion Hearing 24 25 January 13, 2021: Motion Hearing 26 NUMBER OF COPIES REQUESTED: 2 copies. 27 28

I hereby certify that on July 29, 2021, I ordered the transcripts listed above from the Court Reporter named above and paid the required deposit to Clerk of Court on July 29, 2021¹. A deposit of \$160.00 was was required for ordering the transcripts. DATED this 29th day of July, 2021. HOFLAND AND TOMSHECK By: /s/ Bradley J. Hofland BRADLEY J. HOFLAND, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 006343 228 S. 4th Street, 1st Floor Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 Attorneys for Defendant

¹ See Exhibit 1, a copy of Estimate of Transcript for Appeal Purposes filed 07/29/21

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I am an employee of Hofland & Tomsheck, that Pursuant to NRCP 5(b) and EDCR 7.26, I certify that on the 29th day of July, 2021, I served the **REQUEST FOR TRANSCRIPTS PROCEEDINGS** on the following parties by E-Service through Odyssey and/or U.S. mail addressed as follows:

Jacobson Law Office, Ltd. 64 North Pecos Road, Suite 200 Henderson, NV 89074 Attorney for Plaintiff

By: /s/ Nikki Warren
Employee of Hofland & Tomsheck

EXHIBIT "1"

FILED JUL 2 9 2021

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EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

FAMILY DIVISION

CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

SARAH MAURICE,)	CASE NO. D-14-506883-D
Plaintiff,)	DEPT. Q
)	APPEAL NO. 83009
VS.)	
JUSTIN MAURICE,)	
Defendant.)	
)	

ESTIMATED COST OF EXPEDITED/RUSH TRANSCRIPT(S)

The office of Transcript Video Services received a request for transcript estimate from Bradley J. Hofland, Esq., on July 28, 2021, for the following proceedings in the abovecaptioned case:

OCTOBER 27, 2020; JANUARY 13, 2021

for original transcripts and one copy of each.

The estimated cost for the transcripts is \$155.00 for a a four-day expedite or \$160.00 for a 48-hour rush (excluding weekends). Payment in the amount of \$155.00 or \$160.00 must be paid directly to VERBATIM REPORTING & TRANSCRIPTION prior to work commencing on the transcripts. Please call Verbatim Reporting & Transcription to make deposit payment (281) 724-8600 or (520) 303-7356.

DATED this 29th day of July, 2021.

Sherry Justice Transcript Video Services

Transcript	ESTIMATE	amount	of_		Direct	Pay	Invoice	#
Received t	this	day	of	s		2021	١.	

This is only an estimate. Upon completion of transcript(s), a balance may be due, or you may receive a refund of your deposit if overpayment is greater than \$15.00. NOTE: STATUTORY FEES ARE SUBJECT TO CHANGE PER LEGISLATIVE SESSION.

ITEMS LEFT BEYOND NINETY DAYS ARE SUBJECT TO DISPOSAL WITHOUT REFUND.

COUNTY RETENTION POLICY APPROVED BY INTERNAL AUDIT.

FILED JUL 2 9 2021

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ORIGINAL

EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FAMILY DIVISION CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

SARAH MAURICE, Plaintiff,) CASE NO. D-14-506883-I) DEPT. Q) APPEAL NO. 83009
vs.)
JUSTIN MAURICE, Defendant.)

ESTIMATED COST OF EXPEDITED/RUSH TRANSCRIPT(S)

The office of Transcript Video Services received a request for transcript estimate from Bradley J. Hofland, Esq., on July 28, 2021, for the following proceedings in the above-captioned case:

OCTOBER 27, 2020; JANUARY 13, 2021

for original transcripts and one copy of each.

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DATED this 29th day of July, 2021.

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Transci	cipt	Video	Serv	ices	

Transcript ESTIMATE	amount of	Direct Pay Invoice #
Received this	day of	, 2021.

This is only an **estimate**. Upon completion of transcript(s), a balance may be due, or you may receive a refund of your deposit if overpayment is greater than \$15.00.

NOTE: STATUTORY FEES ARE SUBJECT TO CHANGE PER LEGISLATIVE SESSION.

ITEMS LEFT BEYOND NINETY DAYS ARE SUBJECT TO DISPOSAL WITHOUT REFUND.

COUNTY RETENTION POLICY APPROVED BY INTERNAL AUDIT.

ORIGINAL

FILED

EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

AUG 03 2021

FAMILY DIVISION

CLERK OF COURT

CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

SARAH MAURICE,) CASE NO. D-14-506883-D
Plaintiff,) DEPT. Q
)
VS.)
) NV SUPREME CT. APPEAL NO.83009
JUSTIN MAURICE,)
Defendant.)

CERTIFICATION OF TRANSCRIPTS NOTIFICATION OF COMPLETION

The Office of Transcript Video Services received a request for transcript and one copy, for the purposes of appeal from Bradley J. Hofland, Esq., on July 28, 2021 for the following proceedings in the above-captioned case:

October 27, 2020; January 13, 2021

I do hereby certify that copies of the transcript requested in the above-captioned case were submitted to be filed with the Eighth Judicial District Court on August 03, 2021, and ordering party was notified August 03, 2021.

DATED this 03rd day of August 2021.

Maria Balagtas, Law Office Assistant II Transcription Video Services

EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT - TRANSCRIPT VIDEO SERVICES 601 N. Pecos Road, Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 (702) 455-4977

FILED TRANS 1 AUG 03 2021 2 ORIGINAL 3 4 EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 5 FAMILY DIVISION 6 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 7 8 9 SARAH MAURICE, Plaintiff, CASE NO. D-14-506883-D 10 vs. DEPT. Q 11 12 JUSTIN MAURICE, APPEAL NO. 83009 13 Defendant. 14 BEFORE THE HONORABLE BRYCE C. DUCKWORTH DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 15 16 TRANSCRIPT RE: ALL PENDING MOTIONS WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 13, 2021 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 D-14-506883-D MAURICE v MAURICE 01/13/21 TRANSCRIPT

D-14-506883-D MAURICE V MAURICE 01/13/21 TRANSCRIPT VERBATIM REPORTING & TRANSCRIPTION, LLC (520) 303-7356

1	APPEARANCES:
2	The Plaintiff: SARAH MAURICE
3	For the Plaintiff: RACHEL JACOBSON, ESQ. 64 North Pecos Rd., Suite #200
4	Henderson, Nevada 89074 (702) 601-0770
5	The Defendant: JUSTIN MAURICE For the Defendant: BRADLEY HOFLAND, ESQ.
6	626 S. Third St. Las Vegas, Nevada 89101
7	(702) 472-8686
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	D-14-506883-D MAURICE v MAURICE 01/13/21 TRANSCRIPT

D-14-506883-D MAURICE V MAURICE 01/13/21 TRANSCRIPT VERBATIM REPORTING & TRANSCRIPTION, LLC (520) 303-7356

LAS VEGAS, NEVADA

WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 13, 2021

PROCEEDINGS BEGAN AT 9:03:03 A.M.)

THE COURT: We are on the record in the Maurice

side, please confirm your appearances by stating your names.

matter, case D-14-506883-D. Starting with the Plaintiff's

MS. JACOBSON: Good morning, Your Honor. Rachel Jacobson, bar number 7827 on behalf of the Plaintiff, Sarah Maurice, who is also present via Bluejeans.

THE COURT: Good morning. And now, moving to the Defense side. Please confirm your appearances by stating your names.

MR. HOFLAND: Good morning, Your Honor. Brad Hofland. My bar number is 6343 and present with me is Justin Maurice in my office.

THE COURT: Good morning. And I believe we have the Plaintiff, Ms. Maurice, on the line separately. Ma'am, if you could state your name.

MS. MAURICE: Yes. This is Sarah Maurice.

THE COURT: Good morning. And I would request -- we are having appearances by video means. Those who are not appearing in this hearing, if you please mute your mics and your cameras as well, and then we'll call your case shortly

once we've completed this matter.

All right. This case comes before the Court on Defendant's motion for reconsideration of order denying to modify the current custodial arrangement and related relief. The opposition filed by the Plaintiff and the reply filed by the -- by the Defendant. Let me start by asking, are there any stipulations or agreements to report to the Court?

MS. JACOBSON: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: I've had a chance to read the papers.

It is the Defendant's motion. Mr. Hofland, is there anything not contained in the papers that needs to be brought to the attention of the Court?

THE CLERK: You're muted, Mr. Hofland.

THE COURT: You're muted, Counsel.

MR. HOFLAND: Can you hear me now?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. HOFLAND: Oh, beautiful. I -- I don't know what occurred at the last hearing where there was a disconnect as far as our appearance at the hearing. I had another hearing in front of -- in district court downtown in front of Judge Delaney and we -- at that matter trailed in which I was told that the hearing prior to that that we were going to give prior -- have priority in that -- in that case, and unfortunately, in that case, which wasn't a couple important

issues.

We were not given priority at which we were in constant with the Court and letting the Court be aware that we're -- this matter is trailed. For some reason, Judge Delaney -- and she apologized when she called our matter that our matter was called at a later period in time. She apologized for that for any inconveniences which were created by that.

During COVID during a lot of different cases is that this is one of the things which occurs, that the scheduling and doing the video appearances and generally I've appeared in gosh, in front of this Court for over 20 years -- you know, probably about 20 years or so and when there's been instances when somebody's not available, usually there's considerations which were admitted.

So I was quite shocked when I -- I found out that the hearing went forward without my participation. And then in other departments during COVID, there's been phone calls, whatever, but which I've -- so many different cases which the other side which hasn't appeared, which the matter has trailed or even set for a new date if the counsel's not there in which the consideration and the courtesy is given.

But I was shocked to see that that courtesy wasn't extended in this matter. As far as the pleadings are

concerned is that Justin -- his schedule right now compared to what his schedule before was at the time when the parties were divorced, Sarah and him kind of have the reverse schedule. Now she's working, goes to work at 6:00 in the morning till 6:00 at night versus my client just got this incredible schedule, which he gets paid from court to court.

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So when he leaves in the morning, it's ten hours. So he's from 8:00 until 6:00 generally and four days a week. And so he's available. I mean, the Court's schedule -- the Court doesn't get paid from court to court. The Court gets paid and staff gets paid from being in a presence inside the building. But he's got this incredible schedule at which he's available. The circumstances have changed dramatically since when the initial decree went into place is at that period of time, which he was working for Justo (phonetic).

And at that period of time, when he was working, he had a more extended schedule which did not tend -- well, it really did, but it didn't tend to promote a schedule for the parties to have joint physical schedule -- a joint physical custody. Seven years has gone fast and now Emma is now eight years old and Savannah is, I think, 16 years old and --

Mr. Maurice: Six and 13.

MR. HOFLAND: Six and 13, and so the circumstances have changed dramatically. He's available. His work

D-14-506883-D MAURICE v MAURICE 01/13/21 TRANSCRIPT

schedule. He wasn't available before. He's only spending 48 hours with the kids every month. And so this comes down to is that, what is he asking for? He's asking for more time with the children. I mean, it's to benefit, not just him, but to benefit the children. It's in the children's best interest.

The children shouldn't have a limited schedule to see their father 48 hours a month when he's available. And he's making and asking in which to have additional time. He's put together a motion. He's asked for it. One of the most fundamental that he's asked for is additional time with his kids. That's nothing outrageous. That not something novel. They are children. They're not object. They're children.

They want to -- he wants to develop and have a relationship -- more of a relationship. He wants to do things. Ironically in this case is that when the pandemic started in the beginning of March of this year, the time that he spends with his children on -- or his daughters was about a 50/50 schedule. During this summer for a few months up until she wanted to change it around in which caused the motion to be filed is that the parties shared this schedule.

There's no reason which to pull the father away from their children. There's no reason why the kids shouldn't have their father. And there's been many (indiscernible) which state is that having both parents in their life. And our

1	legislature said the same thing. And I know that this is a
2	motion for modification, but you know what? He is available.
3	There's no reason to restrict that. We request that there's
4	an evidentiary hearing in which to address this issue.
5	THE COURT: Okay. Ms. Jacobson, let me Mr.
6	Hofland, from my review of the papers, will you acknowledge
7	that everything that's been stated was contained in the papers
8	you filed with the Court?
9	MR. HOFLAND: No, Judge. It it's argument on the
10	papers is content contained in there.
11	THE COURT: But the there's nothing
12	MR. HOFLAND: But I
13	THE COURT: new I've learned from the argument.
14	It's the same thing that's stated in the papers. That's my
15	only questions.
16	MR. HOFLAND: Well, yeah. But my argument is is
17	is is that Dad should have more time with his children.
18	THE COURT: And and that was argued in the
19	papers. Ms. Jacobson
20	MR. HOFLAND: No, and wasn't
21	THE COURT: is there is there anything that
22	you desire
23	MR. HOFLAND: Well, and when
24	THE COURT: to add that was not contained in the

papers on your side?

MR. HOFLAND: Well, Judge, I first --

MS. JACOBSON: Yes, Your Honor.

MR. HOFLAND: I -- I've argued in there as well is that her schedule that she had before is different from what it is now. I've also -- and made the arguments is that the time that she spent and the time that he spent with the children has changed, and that there was additional time.

THE COURT: Okay. Miss -- Ms. Jacobson, is there anything that you would like to add that is not contained in your papers that you filed with the Court?

MS. JACOBSON: Yes, Your Honor. Though it's something I'd like to add, it is not nothing new to -- and it is not anything new to the record. If the Court reflects upon the record itself, the Court will see that the Defendant's schedule has actually worsened as far as his available from the time that the parties entered the decree of divorce, at which time he was unemployed as provided in his own filings back in 2015.

If we look at his FDF previously filed, you'll see that his schedule, yes, has changed by the fact that he works now an additional day and even more time. On the other hand, looking at Sarah's schedule, nothing has changed except that she's made it up in the chains of command in her employment,

so it just shows continued stability on his part.

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So the fact that the Defendant now wants the Court to accept his change in schedule as a change of circumstances of the decree as entered cannot do so because looking at the schedule at the time of the decree, it actually shows that he's available less time than he was when the decree was entered. Your Honor, moreover, I'd like to point out that the Court simply negate the request for modification based on the Defendant's nonappearance.

The Court specifically indicated at the time of the last hearing that its making a decision on the papers regarding the Defendant's schedule. It specifically stated in this instant. The Court did not as a -- as a global (indiscernible) reject this schedule change as a -- as a consubstantial modification. The Court stated in this instance. That is not substantial change, and I would not -- and nothing there has been provided in the new papers to indicate a substantial change.

So I would request that the Court affirm its prior decision on the papers, and that the Court, at this juncture, grant the Plaintiff attorneys' fees for the necessity of coming, yet again, before the Court. Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Let me ask both sides. I recognize the decree of divorce is -- is dated September 30th, 2015. It was

a stipulated decree, and that's what these issues and arguments emanate from. Recognizing that the decree is five years of age, is there any appetite on either or both sides for Mom and Dad to participate in mediation to perhaps talk about modifications to the schedule.

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This is independent of the request to modify custody, but recognizing that five years or so have past, is there an appetite -- and it's clear to me on both sides acknowledge that there have been communication and dialog over the past year with -- with things that have happened in -- in the environment we live in now. So there certainly has -- they have demonstrated the capacity to communicate with each other. Is there -- would there be any value to having the parties participate in mediation?

MS. JACOBSON: There's none --

MR. HOFLAND: This is Brad Hofland -- this is Brad Hofland. Yes, Judge.

MS. JACOBSON: And Your Honor, not from the Plaintiff's side. The existing schedule is one that was best for the girls. In fact, there's been an indication that as represented in our papers, that there's concerns regarding Dad's behavior, and those are the same concerns that Mom had initially. The decree was not -- the schedule was not entered based on Dad's schedule. It was entered based on Dad's

behavior, including violent behavior, which as you seen in our exhibits, continues.

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As Dad had another conviction in 2018 for domestic violence is that -- against his then girlfriend. So no, Your Honor, there is no -- Ms. Maurice does not request to change the schedule at this juncture.

THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Hofland, the -- the primary focus of Dad's motion is not the only focus is -- is this change in work schedule. It is -- is it the Defendant's position if someone loses their job and becomes unemployed, which I've seen a fair amount of this -- this past year, is that a sufficient change in circumstances to warrant the Court permanently modifying custody because someone becomes unemployed?

MR. HOFLAND: Judge, unfortunately, that case is right on that point. And other judges, your brother in there do believe that that is a basis, and they have invoked that consistently in two to three different departments. As far as looking at what the law is, is to look at whether or not the -- the party has the ability to care for a child. That's what the -- what the focus is on.

And Mr. Maurice does have that ability, whereas before, he did not. He does not work on Fridays. He wants to spend additional time. Consistently throughout the United

States, there has been several different courts, and there's been decisions by the Nevada Court of Appeals, which I can cite before the Court as far as precedent or persuasive authority, but -- but in other jurisdictions, there are -- are cases, which we cited so the Court -- and this is a basis and for consideration for the Court -- for the Court to consider as far as modification of the -- of a current order.

But to answer your question, as far as somebody being unemployed, if that's the triggering event, the parent is now available where the -- the parent is not now -- was not before, would that be a basis for permanent. I -- I mean, a bunch of different factors would have to be looked into consideration and is whether or not that that -- the party or the parent was now permanently unemployed has the ability to have the means, the financial means not to work in the future.

So I mean, it -- it could be. But in the cases which I've worked with, it was not on those on those basis, which they've given temporary custody orders because somebody is not working and now is available because of the extended benefits to the federal government through the state government in which to give additional benefits.

I have a case pending right now before one of the other departments which one of the parties who had a full-time job, which was a terrible job where they're working at nights,

now is unemployment and -- and now is taking trips with the children and doing this, that, and the other thing. And because of that, that schedule the court has granted that person basically the fact of primary physical custodian timeshare because they're unemployed.

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I mean, I'm -- I'm -- I'm arguing against that in that case, of course, and I -- you know, believe that you should look at other factors in addition to that, but I mean, that as far as a permanency would look at as whether or not that person's -- has the ability to sustain that -- that schedule as far as their financials.

MS. JACOBSON: Your Honor, may I respond?
THE COURT: You may briefly.

MS. JACOBSON: Thank you, Your Honor. Your Honor, what we're looking at here is a temporary situation. One, the girls have already gone back to school physically, and then to — for two days a week and are anticipated to go back soon too for most days. What we're — what the Court is asked to find is that Dad has had a change of circumstances affecting the welfare of the kids by now he's not working on Fridays.

But I ask the Court to looks at Dad's own prior FDF. He never worked on Fridays. None of his prior filings reflect that he worked on Fridays. So just taking into account the -- the FDF Dad filed in December of 2015, it reflects that Dad's

days off were Thursday and Friday with the same hours that he reports today:

So working one less days. But for Dad to make the argument that he is now more available -- assuming arguendo that this change was not a temporary one, which it is due to COVID, the girls' schooling at least, Dad was working more time than he was by his own admission in 2015 when the decree was signed, Your Honor. Thank you.

MR. HOFLAND: And Judge --

THE COURT: All right.

MR. HOFLAND: -- if I could respond briefly?

THE COURT: Briefly.

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MR. HOFLAND: Thank you, Your Honor. His -- his schedule, he worked Monday through Friday schedule before. The representations that Counsel's making that he worked a schedule, that he had Mondays and Fridays off is completely false. He was -- always worked a Monday through Friday schedule. The schedule that he's working right now working four tens is not temporary, Your Honor. It is permanent.

Consider -- I mean, that's different from the -- the conversation we're having regarding somebody being available because they're unemployed. This is not because he's unemployed. He's working four tens. His job schedule is four tens, and it is permanent four tens. He works for a different

employer. And the four tens that he works is from court to court. He's working less time. He's working less time than Sarah's working right now.

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THE COURT: All right. I make the following findings and orders based on the arguments that have been submitted, the papers filed with the Court. This matter comes before the Court on the Defendant's motion for reconsideration. The standard applied by the Court in evaluating a -- such a motion for reconsideration is the Ellis v. Carucci standard recognizing that the controlling order, which is the decree of divorce, provides the parties with joint legal custody and the Plaintiff, Mother with primary physical custody.

Again, that was entered in 2015, subject to the custodial time defined therein for -- for the father.

Pursuant to the Ellis v. Carucci standard, the -- the Court is required to initially make a finding that there has been a substantial change in circumstances affecting the well-being of the child in evaluating whether or not there's a basis to modify custody, and then the best interest factors are -- are -- are applied at that point in time, which -- which is a focal point when looking at the best interest of the children.

The $\overline{\text{Ellis v. Carucci}}$ case essentially modified the Murphy test that had -- had been in place up until the time of

Ellis v. Carucci. And -- and the standard that's set forth in both cases does rely in -- in part on the -- the maintaining some stability in custodial arrangements for the children. And that's the basis for the original Murphy test, less in somewhat in the Ellis v. Carucci test. So that's the standard ultimately to be applied by the Court.

When the case first came before the Court on the Defendant's motion on October 27th, the Court was asked to make a determination and upon review of the papers pursuant to the Runi case, I determined at that point in time based on the papers that had been filed that there -- there was not a sufficient showing pursuant to Runi to set for further proceedings on the motion.

The primary focus of the -- the Defendant's motion relates to his work schedule. There are other issues that are raised, to be clear for the record, as it relates to his request to modify custody. There's a reference to at least the offer that the parties' older child, Savannah, who is 13 years of age, soon to be 14, has expressed a preference, which is a factor under the best interest factors pursuant to enter as 125:c.0035.

That -- that factual assertion or offer is in dispute, clearly based on the papers in Mom's response stating that just the opposite is true. Again, that's not something

that I would conclude is -- determinative of a substantial change in circumstances where a child expresses a preference. That's more under the best interest analysis. So looking at the work schedule, and -- and I pose the question and -- and I -- I -- I'm -- I've never been the type to necessarily -- and I don't know what departments are doing elsewhere.

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That's -- it's -- it's not necessarily the -- the mode of operation here to -- to -- to keep track of what everyone else is doing. I have to apply the law to the facts as they stand before me. And -- and I recognize that we're living in some very unique times. Unique times in terms of unemployment. I pose that question. I don't -- I -- I would not conclude that the loss of employment necessarily would trigger an automatic review with evidentiary proceedings for a permanent modification of custody because I view it as a temporary circumstance.

This is offered to the Court as perhaps something more than a temporary circumstance based on Dad's employment, his availability based on the type of work, working from home, which is something that we're seeing a lot more frequently today under the current circumstances with the pandemic. That may be around to stay after things get back to, quote, unquote, normal however that -- that looks. But even that phrase, when I hear working from home, it certainly -- it

appears that somewhat the connotation is that because you're working from home, you're really not working.

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You're available to provide daycare for children. You're available to educate your children who are maybe involved in some form of distance learning. The good news for from what I've read is your children actually get some inperson education, which is fabulous. And -- and a fantastic scenario from them. It's not complete, but they at least get some socialization and some classroom time. But my -- when I hear working from home, I view that as actually working from home.

And the responsibility at the -- and it may not mean that it's every minute of -- of that time, you're actually performing, but clearly, my expectation would be that the employer expects that you're available and you are actually working from home. I -- I don't -- I -- I don't find based on what the offers that have been made that it is a sufficient basis that there has been a sufficient showing pursuant to Runi that would warrant this Court setting further proceedings on a modification of custody.

I'm not persuaded based on those papers pursuant to Runi that there is sufficient cause to set further proceedings. So the motion is denied. I did want to clarify certain things for the record as well, and this is more an --

an aside and not germane to the issues before the Court. But I -- I do believe it is important to make things clear for the record as it relates to what transpired at the prior hearing.

Because there are assertions made in the paperwork filed on behalf of the Defendant that do suggest things about how this Court handled the prior proceedings, that, again, I want to make a clear record as to exactly what happened. The motion states that specific footnote two in Defendant's motion states at no time did the Court's staff inform Hofland's office that the hearing was starting with or without him.

Again, at no time did the Court's staff inform Mr. Hofland's office that the hearing was starting with or without him. It goes on in footnote three, Clark County, while smaller in -- than Los Angeles, San Bernardino, San Francisco, Orange County, and San Diego Counties has generally, like other large counties and other states, accommodated scheduling conflicts caused by conflicts with other appearance scheduled for the same time and date.

Mr. Hofland inadvertently wrongly assumed Department Q granted the same common courtesy followed in other divisions of the Eighth Judicial District Court and other courts where Mr. Hofland has appeared to trail hearings so all parties and counsel would be present at important hearings.

On page 3, sadly and unacceptably, this Court chose

to deprive Defendant of his due process rights to a fair and meaningful hearing. He was not allowed to appear given the Court's method of disposition and more troubling his fundamental rights as a parent were not recognized and accommodated. Along with that, Defendant's counsel is not allowed, denied the opportunity to be heard, unlike Plaintiff's counsel.

Instead, this Court simply focused on one factor, denied argument, and an evidentiary hearing claiming that factor alone was insufficient to modify custody and child support and promptly rule the case would be closed as soon as Plaintiff's counsel could get an order from the Court.

For the record, this Court -- this Court's JA and law clerk received an email from Mr. Hofland's office on Monday, October 26th, 2020, at 1:25 p.m. to notify the Department that, quote, Mr. Hofland will be a few minutes later logging onto Bluejeans in the morning as he also has a telephonic hearing for one of his civil cases at 9:00 a.m. tomorrow also.

Department Q's law clerk responded on October 26th, 2020, at 3:15 p.m. and stated, quote, thank you for the notice, closed quote. The JA -- the Department Q JA was included in the email. Department Q's JA followed with Mr. Hofland's office on Tuesday, October 27th, the date of the

hearing, 2020, at 10:02 a.m.. Recognizing that the hearing was scheduled to -- to start at 9:00 a.m.

So the suggestion that this Court failed to trail the matter is completely inaccurate. The hearing was scheduled at 9:00 a.m. As of 10:02 a.m., the Court had trailed the matter. Department Q's JA's email to Mr. HOfland's office stated, quote, can you please tell me the status of Mr. Hofland. Unfortunately, Ms. Jacobson was not notified by your office, and she has been waiting since 9:00 a.m. Judge Duckworth will be calling the matter, close quote.

Clearly indicating that notice was imparted on Mr. Hofland's office that the matter was going to be called and was called at 10:03 a.m. The hearing proceeded at 10:03 a.m. after trailing the matter for more than an hour to accommodate counsel. The -- at -- at -- on October 27th, 2020, at 10:08 a.m. a -- an email was received by Department Q's JA stating, quote, from Mr. Hofland's office, quote, I apologize for the delay.

Mr. Hofland is still waiting to be called for his civil hearing this morning in Department 25. Mr. Hofland anticipates he will be finished by 10:30 a.m., 11:00 a.m. Our client, Justin Maurice is at our office for the Maurice hearing, and he just stepped out 15 minutes to get a cup of coffee.

Again, the suggestion that this Court failed to offer any courtesy, and I would expect as a professional courtesy that if someone's going to be late, and this is expected in any case, that counsel have the professional courtesy to communicate with opposing counsel to let them know they're going to be late. I did accommodate the delay. I waited for more than an hour.

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The Maurice case was not the only case on my calendar that morning. I had other matters scheduled that morning, and I waited an hour. This Court -- it is this Court's prerogative to review the papers and make a determination on those papers because I do view the papers as being the mode by which Counsel for both parties, especially capable counsel, that both parties have to communicate all of the relevant information I need to make a decision without any oral argument being made.

There are departments that will dispose of the papers just based on the papers without even holding a hearing and issue orders taking matters off calendar. I -- I scheduled a hearing. The hearing was set for 9:00 a.m. It started at 10:03 a.m. And apparently, the -- the hearing before this Court was less of a priority than the hearing in front of another department downtown in a civil matter. This Court waited over an hour.

That was an accommodation that was offered notwithstanding the arguments to the contrary. It is my prerogative to make decisions based on the papers that have been filed presuming that all of the information I need to make a decision has been accurately stated in those papers. The Defendant's motion is denied. I'll direct Ms. Jacobson to prepare the order, submit it to Mr. Hofland for review and signature.

Leave a blank in the order for the Court to make a determination. As it relates to the issue of attorneys' fees, the Plaintiff is -- is directed to file a memorandum of fees indicating the amount concurred in responding to the motion for reconsideration. Those are the Court's orders. Thank you for your appearances.

(PROCEEDINGS CONCLUDED AT 9:32:39 A.M.)

* * * * * *

ATTEST: I do hereby certify that I have truly and correctly transcribed the digital proceedings in the above-entitled case to the best of my ability.

Kimberly C. McCright, CET

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FILED TRANS 1 AUG 03 2021 2 ORIGINAL 3 4 EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 5 6 FAMILY DIVISION 7 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 8 9 SARAH MAURICE, 10 Plaintiff, CASE NO. D-14-506883-D DEPT. Q 11 vs. APPEAL NO. 83009 12 JUSTIN MAURICE, 13 Defendant. 14 BEFORE THE HONORABLE BRYCE C. DUCKWORTH 15 DISTRICT COURT JUDGE TRANSCRIPT RE: ALL PENDING MOTIONS 16 TUESDAY, OCTOBER 27, 2020 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24

D-14-506883-D MAURICE v MAURICE 10/27/20 TRANSCRIPT VERBATIM REPORTING & TRANSCRIPTION, LLC (520) 303-7356

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1	APPEARANCES:	
2		SARAH MAURICE
3	s 	RACHEL JACOBSON, ESQ. 44 North Pecos Rd., Suite #200
4	H	lenderson, Nevada 89074 702) 601-0770
5		USTIN MAURICE BRADLEY HOFLAND, ESQ.
6	5 	226 S. Third St.
7		702) 472-8686 NOT PRESENT)
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D-14-506883-D MAURICE v MAURICE 10/27/20 TRANSCRIPT VERBATIM REPORTING & TRANSCRIPTION, LLC (520) 303-7356

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LAS VEGAS, NEVADA

TUESDAY, OCTOBER 27, 2020

PROCEEDINGS

(THE PROCEEDINGS BEGAN AT 10:03:12)

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THE COURT: Okay. We are on the record in the Maurice matter, case D-14-506883-D. Starting with Plaintiff's side, please confirm your appearance.

MS. JACOBSON: Good morning, Your Honor. Rachel Jacobson, bar number 7827 on behalf of the Plaintiff, Sarah Maurice who is present by Bluejeans.

THE COURT: Good morning. And I -- I see the Plaintiff present. On Defendant's side, do we have anyone present? Okay. And I'm not hearing anyone, and this was set for 9:00 a.m. We've waited an hour. And Ms. Jacobson, it's my understanding you -- you didn't receive any communication about --

MS. JACOBSON: I have not.

THE COURT: -- any delay in today's hearing?

 $\label{eq:MS.JACOBSON: Correct. The only communication I} % The constant of the I called the Court this morning to confirm that I'm in the right Bluejeans link. % The only communication I confirm that I'm in the right Bluejeans link.$

THE COURT: Right. And you are in the right location. And again, it's been -- it's been more than an hour. The word that the Court did receive is that counsel for

Defendant would be a little late. I usually give 15 minutes. It's been more than an hour. Have you had any communication with opposing counsel?

MS. JACOBSON: I have not, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay.

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MS. JACOBSON: Not in a while regarding this case.

THE COURT: Okay. And I've had a chance to review the papers. Anything you all wanted to add, Counsel, beyond what's in the papers?

MS. JACOBSON: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. I've had a chance to review the papers. In the nature of the request by the -- the Defendant is to modify custody, requesting that the Court adopt a joint physical custody schedule, and as a -- as a result, thereof, to modify child support, pursuant to Wright v. Osburn and -- and the dependency exemption.

As I indicated, I've had a -- I've had a chance to review the -- the papers that I'm -- had been filed, so I was prepared to -- to rule on the papers anyway. I don't find that a modification of a work schedule is a sufficient basis under Ellis v. Carucci, that as a substantial change in circumstances affecting the well-being of -- of the children in this instance that would invoke the Court pursuing a modification of custody pursuant to Ellis v. Carucci and then

proceeding to the best interest factor. 2 So I don't -- i don't find that that's a sufficient 3 basis to modify the underlying custody arrangement. So I deny the -- the Defendant's motion to modify custody. And if 4 you'll -- if you'll prepare an order from today, Counsel? 5 MS. JACOBSON: Will do, Your Honor. Thank you. 6 7 THE COURT: All right. Thank you for your 8 appearance. 9 MS. JACOBSON: Thank you for your time. 10 (PROCEEDINGS CONCLUDED AT 10:06:12 A.M.) 11 12 ATTEST: I do hereby certify that I have truly and 13 correctly transcribed the digital proceedings in the aboveentitled case to the best of my ability. 14 15 16 17 Kimberly C. McCright, CET 18 19 20 21 22 23 24

D-14-506883-D MAURICE v MAURICE 10/27/20 TRANSCRIPT VERBATIM REPORTING & TRANSCRIPTION, LLC (520) 303-7356

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Electronically Filed 8/9/2021 1:40 PM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT

ROST 1 HOFLAND & TOMSHECK Bradley J. Hofland, Esq. Nevada Bar Number: 6343 bradh@hoflandlaw.com 228 South 4th Street, 1st Floor Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 Telephones: (702) 895-6760 Facsimile: (702) 731-6910 Attorney for Défendant, Justin Maurice 6 DISTRICT COURT, FAMILY DIVISION 7 **CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA** 8 SARAH MAURICE,) CASE NO.: D-14-506883-D 9) DEPT. NO.: Q 10 Plaintiff, 11 VS. 12 13 JUSTIN MAURICE, 14 Defendant. 15 16 REQUEST FOR TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS **17** Transcript Video Services, 601 N. Pecos Road, Las Vegas, NV 89101. To: 18 Defendant, Justin Maurice, requested preparation of a transcript of the 19 proceedings before the District Court as follows: 20 Judge or Officer hearing the proceeding: Honorable Bryce C. Duckworth. 21 Specific portions of the transcript being requested: 22 PORTIONS REQUESTED: 23 February 10, 2015: Motion Hearing 24 25 NUMBER OF COPIES REQUESTED: 2 copies. 26 27 28 1

I hereby certify that on August 9, 2021, I ordered the transcripts listed above from the Court Reporter named above and paid the required deposit to Clerk of Court on August 9, 2021¹. A deposit of \$115.00 was required for ordering the transcripts.

DATED this 9th day of August, 2021.

HOFLAND AND TOMSHECK

By: /s/ Bradley J. Hofland
BRADLEY J. HOFLAND, ESQ.
Nevada Bar No. 006343
228 S. 4th Street, 1st Floor
Las Vegas, Nevada 89101
Attorneys for Defendant

¹ See Exhibit 1, a copy of Estimate of Transcript for Appeal Purposes filed 08/09/21

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I am an employee of Hofland & Tomsheck, that Pursuant to NRCP 5(b) and EDCR 7.26, I certify that on the 9th day of August, 2021, I served the **REQUEST FOR TRANSCRIPTS PROCEEDINGS** on the following parties by E-Service through Odyssey and/or U.S. mail addressed as follows:

Jacobson Law Office, Ltd. 64 North Pecos Road, Suite 200 Henderson, NV 89074 Attorney for Plaintiff

By: /s/ Nikki Warren
Employee of Hofland & Tomsheck

EXHIBIT "1"

FILED

AUG 0 9 2021

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EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FAMILY DIVISION

CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

SARAH MAURICE, Plaintiff,) CASE NO. D-14-506883-D DEPT. Q APPEAL NO. 83009
vs.)
JUSTIN MAURICE, Defendant.)) _)

ESTIMATED COST OF EXPEDITED/RUSH TRANSCRIPT(S)

The office of Transcript Video Services received a request for transcript estimate from Bradley J. Hofland, Esq., on August 05, 2021, for the following proceedings in the abovecaptioned case:

FEBRUARY 10, 2015

for original transcript and one copy.

The estimated cost for the transcript is \$95.00 for a a four-day expedite or \$115.00 for a 48-hour rush (excluding weekends). Payment in the amount of \$95.00 or \$115.00 must be paid directly to VERBATIM REPORTING & TRANSCRIPTION prior to work commencing on the transcript. Please call Verbatim Reporting & Transcription to make deposit payment (281) 724-8600 or (520) 303-7356.

DATED this 9th day of August, 2021.

Sherry Justige Transcript Video Services

Transcript ESTIMATE	amount of_	Direct :	Pay Invoice	#
Received this	day of		2021	

This is only an estimate. Upon completion of transcript(s), a balance may be due, or you may receive a refund of your deposit if overpayment is greater than \$15.00.

NOTE: STATUTORY FEES ARE SUBJECT TO CHANGE PER LEGISLATIVE SESSION.

ITEMS LEFT BEYOND NINETY DAYS ARE SUBJECT TO DISPOSAL WITHOUT REFUND.

COUNTY RETENTION POLICY APPROVED BY INTERNAL AUDIT.

FILED AUG 1 2 2021 TRANS 1 2 ORIGINAL 3 4 EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 5 FAMILY DIVISION 6 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 7 8 9 SARAH MAURICE, Plaintiff, CASE NO. D-14-506883-D 10 DEPT. Q 11 APPEAL NO. 83009 12 JUSTIN MAURICE, 13 Defendant. 14 BEFORE THE HONORABLE BRYCE C. DUCKWORTH DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 15 TRANSCRIPT RE: ALL PENDING MOTIONS 16 TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 10, 2020 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24

D-14-506883-D MAURICE v MAURICE 02/10/15 TRANSCRIPT VERBATIM REPORTING & TRANSCRIPTION, LLC (520) 303-7356

1

1	APPEARANCES:	
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5	The Defendant: JUSTIN MAURICE	
6	For the Defendant: ROBERT HILL, ESQ. 7341 W Charleston Blvd.	
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D-14-506883-D MAURICE v MAURICE 02/10/15 TRANSCRIPT VERBATIM REPORTING & TRANSCRIPTION, LLC (520) 303-7356

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LAS VEGAS, NEVADA

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 10, 2015

PROCEEDINGS

(THE PROCEEDINGS BEGAN AT 09:11:02)

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THE COURT: Okay. We are on the record in the Maurice matter, Case D-14-506883-D. Please confirm your appearances.

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MS. JACOBSON: Thank you, Your Honor. Rachel Jacobson, bar number 7827 on behalf of Sarah Maurice who is also present.

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THE COURT: Good morning.

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MR. HILL: Robert Hill, 8496, on behalf of Mr.

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Maurice in an unbundled capacity.

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THE COURT: Good morning. This is the time set for hearing on Plaintiff's motion for preliminary relief, the

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opposition and countermotion filed by the Defendant, and the

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reply I received from the Plaintiff. And I've had a chance to

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receive $\operatorname{\mathsf{--}}$ read the papers and review the exhibits which were

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quite extensive, and that includes attendance detail records

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With that being said, have any issues been resolved

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at this point?

MS. JACOBSON: No, Your Honor.

from the -- the preschool daycare provider.

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THE COURT: Okay. The -- based on the papers that

have been filed, it's not in dispute that the parties separated in September of 2014. So that establishes an important timeline for me as I look at the conduct and your behavior in regards to how you're raising your children since that time. And that establishes somewhat of a blueprint as to how the two of you as Mom and Dad define what was in the best interest of Emma and Savannah during that period of time.

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I am going to be referring the two of you to mediation to sit down as parents to have a discussion as to how you're going to raise your children. I always emphasize to parents at an initial hearing, it's important as you enter into mediation to recognize that as the parents, you know your children better than I ever will.

I'm a stranger to your children, I've never met them, likely never will meet your children, and therefore, it's incumbent on the two of you to have those discussions as to how you're going to raise them. Doesn't mean you have to reach an agreement.

If you don't reach an agreement, we'll come back in about 90 days and determine exactly what we need to do at that point. It'll be a return hearing from FMC, it'll serve also as our case management conference when we come back. And we may need to set a trial where you call witnesses to the witness stand and then I make a final decision on all issues,

including custody, and that is how you're going to raise your children. But again, I emphasize to you that even under that scenario, I gather as much information as I can and I make a decision based on that evidence as to how you're going to raise your children. But I am still the stranger at that point in time.

That's why I -- as I stated at the outset, what's important for me to look at is what behaviors have been in place up until the complaint was filed. How did the two of you interact in terms of caretaking responsibilities from the time that you separated until the litigation was initiated.

And -- and also fundamentally, I have to look at this from a standpoint that I want to build and maintain a relationship between both of you and your children. And Savannah is almost eight years of age, Emma is just a couple days from her first birthday. So, young children to very young.

So that being said, it is Plaintiff's motion; Counsel, do you have anything to add beyond what's in the papers?

MS. JACOBSON: I would just simply like to reiterate, Your Honor, that since the parties' separation, Dad has only had two overnights with the younger child and four with Savannah, the older child. And when Dad did pick up the

girls from school or daycare, it was only for a period of about one or two hours until they were returned to Mom's care.

THE COURT: Okay. What specific schedule -- on a

temporary basis, because --

MS. JACOBSON: Sure.

THE COURT: -- even though I'm sending you to mediation, I -- I want you to leave with some schedule that I'm going to define. And it's probably not a perfect schedule, but I'd like to -- to know exactly what you're --

MS. JACOBSON: According to my client, Your Honor, the parties were able to discuss a schedule and it basically involved alternating weekends and Dad will continue to pick up the girls from school or daycare when he's available and Mom will get the girls from Dad immediately when she gets off work.

THE COURT: Okay. And so that's something -- and I know that the preschool records showed the times in which Dad would pick up.

MS. JACOBSON: Correct.

THE COURT: And so I recognize that it did happen.

It wasn't necessarily an everyday -- it looked like there were weeks in which it was everyday and then there were gaps in time when it didn't happen. So you're saying if Dad is available each of those days, he could pick up the children?

MS. JACOBSON: And that's a concern. Mom can't really rely on that on Dad's availability or -- or commitment to pick up the girls daily, but if he's available to pick them up --

THE COURT: Okay.

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MS. JACOBSON: -- certainly, I think that would be helpful, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. Thank you, Counsel.

MS. JACOBSON: Thank you.

MR. HILL: Your Honor, Mr. Maurice isn't okay with the schedule the way it's been and the Court, as the Court indicated, looked through the exhibits that were just provided to Mr. Maurice two days ago, so he didn't have a chance to respond and provide everything to put everything in context. But the Court can notice from the texts that are in there, back in October he was asking for 50 percent time. But unfortunately, he's been in the position -- he's been in this relationship long enough to know that he's been trying to keep the peace and he's asking for 50 percent, just like he has been since October.

Unfortunately, the way things go with -- with Plaintiff, it turns into a fight if -- if that he asks for more or, you know, he's just trying to avoid any type of conflict. But as I said, back since October he's asking for

50 percent time.

They want to --

THE COURT: But how is he defining that time? I guess understanding his work schedule, and it's my understanding, and I recognize both parties work for the same company. It's my understanding Dad works early and gets off around 1:00 was the representation, so --

MR. HILL: And he's already discussed it with his employers and they will allow him to come in later, to adjust his schedule, on the days that he does have the girls. So what he was asking for was a 4-3-3-4 split, alternating weeks. I mean, he wants as much time with the girls as possible.

He can move his work back an hour and a half to two hours, so he can take them to -- to Safekey in the morning and then pick them up around 2:00, 3:00, on the days that he gets off -- the days he has them. So that's what he's able to move his schedule two hours to adjust for it on the days that he has the children.

I mean, the Court knows we have clients that work graveyards, they have to make arrangements for their kids, but there's no reason why he shouldn't have as much time as he wants with the children and that's all he's asking for here.

And it's -- he's glad it's in front of the Court so the Court can help decide that issue so he's not fighting back and forth

with her trying to get much more time. But it's clear in the text messages, back since right after they separated beginning in October, he's telling her he wants 50 percent time. He's not okay with the schedule, and he is able to take care of them.

He is in the house. They each have their room in the house. He does have the furniture for the young one. She did not take that out of the house when she left, so he has the ability to take care. He has the furnishing. She lives in a two bedroom apartment and her mother lives with her, so it's -- there's four people in a two bedroom apartment at her house versus his house where he has a three bedroom home, each girl having their own room. There's no reason why he doesn't get as much time here.

They were able to work it out and talk and coparent, but there are some allegations of cheating that kind of muddied the water, but you know, at this point we're thinking about the children and it's best for Dad to be a part of their life as much as possible. So that's what we're asking for is a 3-4-4-3 split at this point. Hopefully they can work it out in mediation so they can accommodate their schedules, but there's no reason why Dad should be shut out of the girls' lives.

THE COURT: Well, and certainly that -- the

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objective of the court is -- is to make sure that both parties, both Mom and Dad are part of the children's lives. And I don't sense from even the proposal made by Mom that that's even part or parcel of what she's looking to accomplish.

The two of you were -- you separated on September 9th, this litigation was initiated on December 30th, so it's about a four month period of time. And again, that's what I'm looking at. And I recognize that perhaps the schedule was not the ideal schedule, but I even look at ultimately if we have evidentiary proceedings, the caretaking responsibilities prior to that. The daycare records, the preschool records, are part of that, it's not necessarily determinative of that, for me to get a glimpse of what the caretaking responsibilities were like, even while you were in the home together.

In an intact household, the ideal world is that you do cover for each other. You have different work schedules and when Mom's working Dad's available, Dad can pick up early from -- from school and then Mom covers because Dad goes to work early --

MR. HILL: Okay.

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THE COURT: -- in the morning.

MR. HILL: Yeah.

THE COURT: And -- and that's the way you raise

children.

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Now you're at the point where you're going through these divorce proceedings, so this is a tumultuous time for the two of you. My objective today is not to start throwing wholesale changes at your children. Again, you know your children better than I -- I do, and for four months there was some type of a pattern and I know one of the issues that's been discussed is the overnight time, that Dad has had.

And even the schedule that Mom is proposing expands that significantly, which I think is -- is a good step in the right direction. Dad's response was that he didn't have overnights because he didn't have the appropriate sleeping accommodations. It's not that difficult to go to a thrift store and get some very basic inexpensive sleeping accommodations.

I also, in looking at the intake -- the records from the preschool, there were times without question that Dad was picking up from school, but even on those occasions, it looked like some of the -- on many occasions it was late in the day, 4:00, 5:00, well after the Court's information as to when Dad was getting off from work.

So I $\operatorname{\mathsf{--}}$ I am going to maintain some semblance of the status quo in terms of the $\operatorname{\mathsf{--}}$ the schedule. It is going to be

1	every other weekend. That will provide Dad with more
2	overnights than he's had up to this point in time. I define
3	weekend as beginning on Friday, and so Dad would be allowed to
4	pick the children up from the the preschool or daycare
5	provider.
6	Is Savannah in Safekey or does she also
7	ultimately is she transported to Kids' House (ph)?
8	MR. HILL: He picks up the child from
9	MS. JACOBSON: She's in second grade, Your Honor, so
10	she can be picked up right after school.
11	THE COURT: From school, right.
12	MR. HILL: He picks Savannah up everyday day after
13	school anyway.
14	THE COURT: Okay. So that'll Dad's time will
15	begin picking the children up on his weekend and who had last
16	weekend? Did Mom have last weekend?
17	THE PLAINTIFF: Yeah, we already said he could have
18	her for her
19	THE COURT: This weekend?
20	THE PLAINTIFF: Yes.
21	THE COURT: Okay. Okay, that's right. There's no
22	school on Friday, so or Monday, so it's an extended
23	weekend, so this will be Dad's weekend.
24	Also, I'll order that Dad is is allowed to pick

up the girls after work from preschool or school with -- would Mom pick up when she gets off from work?

MS. JACOBSON: Yes, Mom can pick up right after work, Your Honor.

20 l

THE COURT: Okay. So that would be a schedule on a -- essentially a daily basis, to the extent Dad's able -- that gives Dad contact with the children virtually everyday.

Although it's -- it's for a short period of time, I think that especially for Emma at her age, that enhances her bonding because it's frequent contact. And at that age, it's not so much the duration of the contact that I'm concerned with as it is the frequency. And I don't know that we can get as frequent.

Now I will say this. That's not necessarily a common schedule that I order because it sets up multiple exchanges between the two of you. So this will give me a 90-day period of time to see how that goes and whether or not that's workable. When parties are going through court, going through a divorce, sometimes that's problematic when we have multiple exchanges.

And the last thing I want to do is expose your children to any type of acrimony between the two of you. They need to be shield from that. They're not part of -- part of this in terms of knowing about anything that's going on in

court. Not that -- not that Emma would -- would have any -any comprehension of it, but certainly Savannah might. Neither of you should discuss these matters with either 3 children, particularly Savannah who may be more understanding and recognize that Mom and Dad are not together. Neither of 5 you should say anything negative about the other parent in 6 front of the children. Again, they should be shielded and insulated. both parties do need to take the COPE class it appears. I 9 didn't see COPE certificates from either parent, so both of 10 you need to -- to participate in that -- in that course, and I 11 12 expect that to be completed by the time we come back. The -- and then we'll come back in 90 days and see 13 what progress you've made. 14 THE CLERK: The return hearing is going to be May 15 4th at 9:00 a.m. 16 MS. JACOBSON: Your Honor, I might have a conflict 17 on that day. I might be in D.C. 18 19 THE COURT: Okay. If you want to check your 20 calendar. 21 So the weekend -- we would -- we would have an exchange Sunday evening then at 7:00 p.m. 22

though it's a holiday?

Now does Dad work on Monday, this coming Monday even

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1	MR. HILL: No, he's indicated he's off.
2	THE COURT: Okay. So I would allow Dad, Dad's time
3	would continue Monday until 7:00 because he has the day off.
4	I expect as part of mediation you'll talk about
5	holidays and special occasions. I even if you can't
6	resolve the underlying schedule, I would expect you to at
7	least be able to have a discussion about holidays and and
8	vacation time.
9	There's no magic to to those schedules, usually
10	it's alternated; one year Mom's going to have certain holidays
11	and Dad's going to have other holidays, and then the next year
12	you're going to you're going to flip those holidays.
13	Is that date a problem, Counsel?
14	MS. JACOBSON: I am out of town, Your Honor. I'm
15	sorry.
16	THE COURT: Okay.
17	THE CLERK: The week after work better?
18	MS. JACOBSON: Yes. Please. Thank you.
19	THE CLERK: May 11th at 9:00 a.m.
20	THE COURT: Is that acceptable on both sides?
21	MR. HILL: Yes.
22	THE COURT: Okay. It's a Monday. The is there -
23	- I see health insurance reflected on the Defendant's
24	financial disclosure form. Does the Defendant provide medical

1 2 MR. HILL: Yes, he does. THE COURT: -- insurance coverage? For? 3 MR. HILL: The family, it's family coverage. 4 5 THE COURT: The entire family, okay. 6 MS. JACOBSON: Your Honor, the parties I think calculated and half of that would be -- half of the child 7 8 support obligation would be \$130. 9 THE COURT: Half of the health insurance? MS. JACOBSON: Yes. Half of the health insurance, 10 11 I'm sorry. Thanks. 12 THE COURT: So the parties would maintain joint legal custody on a temporary basis, Plaintiff is designated as 13 14 the primary physical custodian subject to Dad's visitation, which includes every other weekend, plus daytime visits each 15 16 day. 17 The calculating child support --18 MS. JACOBSON: Your Honor, I do want to correct the 19 financial disclosure form provided by Dad. It is my understanding that he was -- received a raise of \$.75 per 20 hour, which per our calculation raises his gross income to 21 22 \$5,558, provided he's working only 40 hours a week, and he does work overtime, too, but that's just the new calculation. 23 24 THE COURT: Okay.

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1	MS. JACOBSON: And it was backdated to October, so
2	he received backdated pay as well.
3	THE COURT: What is
4	MR. HILL: It just it hasn't been reflected on
5	his it the raise was last week.
6	THE DEFENDANT: Or the last check.
7	MR. HILL: So it wasn't indicated in this, so it is
8	correct.
9	THE DEFENDANT: The union was in a stalemate with
10	THE COURT: Oh, okay.
11	THE DEFENDANT: negotiations from October until
12	just recently, so the
13	THE COURT: Okay.
14	THE DEFENDANT: the raise wasn't being shown
15	until just recently.
16	THE COURT: So but you you would agree that the
17	current amount what was the amount, Counsel, that you
18	five thousand
19	MS. JACOBSON: \$5,558. That's assuming he's making
20	\$32.07 per hour and working 40 hours a week.
21	THE COURT: Okay. Did so is that accurate?
22	THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
23	THE COURT: Okay. Based on the statutory formula,
24	the child support calculation results in \$1,389.50 minus \$130
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1 for insurance, results in \$1,260 rounded. So that would be the monthly child support commencing with the month of 3 February. Any -- any constructive amount would be a deferred 4 5 issue to the time of trial. 6 MS. JACOBSON: Okay. Thank you, Your Honor. 7 THE COURT: We'll have half due -- 630 due on the 8 10th and 20th of each month. I'm denying the request for spousal support given the financial circumstances of the 9 parties and the child support that's been requested, at least 10 on a temporary basis. I'm not saying that that's not a trial 11 12 issue, but on a temporary basis I'm denying that. 13 There have been issued raised about spending and -and accounting issues. That's a discovery issue. I'm not 14 going to make any rulings today in that regard. 15 16 The -- neither party disclosed the amounts that they paid for attorneys fees on their financial disclosure forms, 17 18 so --19 MS. JACOBSON: Your Honor, Ms. -- Ms. Maurice has 20 paid 2500 in attorneys fees and 289 in filing fees. THE COURT: Okay. How much has Mr. Maurice paid in 21 fees, Counsel? 22 MR. HILL: Your Honor, he just hired us for today's 23 hearing.

1 THE COURT: Unbundled. MR. HILL: Just 400 for today's hearing. 2 THE COURT: Okay. Well, given the fact I'm just 3 recently receiving that information, I'm not going to make any further orders today in regards to the -- the attorneys fees, 5 so I'll defer that issue as well. 6 You have your referral to mediation. The -- I am also granting the request that each party should have 8 exclusive possession of their respective places of residence that was requested in Defendant's countermotion. That makes 10 sense to -- to order that. 11 Any -- any expenses not covered by insurance also, 12 13 the order is that those expenses are to be divided equally pursuant to the 30-30 rule. 14 So you have your return hearing, we'll come back and 15 see what progress you've made in mediation. And do we need an 16 order prepared from today or will the minutes suffice? 17 MS. JACOBSON: I think the minutes would suffice, 18 but I'd be happy to prepare an order. 19 MR. HILL: The minutes should be fine. 20 THE COURT: Okay. 21 MS. JACOBSON: Your Honor, I do have a couple of 22 requests for clarification. 24 One is Ms. Maurice advises that the youngest child

goes to bed around 8:00 p.m., so we're -- we're proposing that a pick up time would be at 6:00 p.m. instead of 7:00, if possible, just to allow the bedtime routine, the bath time, and -- and ensure that everything is ready to go for the next day at school when the exchanges are on Sunday, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. HILL: Your Honor, he's just requested leave it as the same, leave it what the Court ordered. I mean, he's the father, he can take care of that stuff. 7:00 gives them

as the same, leave it what the Court ordered. I mean, he's the father, he can take care of that stuff. 7:00 gives them plenty of time to get home, get ready for bed. Any baths that are needed on the weekends he has he can take care of. It's just one of the issues where she's trying to control things which he's concerned about. Leave it the same, 7:00, let him take care of the children when he has them and there'll be no issues here.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. HILL: So 7:00 isn't a problem, I don't know why we need to move it up one hour for --

THE COURT: I'm inclined to leave it at 7:00~p.m. for the time being.

MS. JACOBSON: Okay. Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And again, I want the two of you as parents to have those discussions and that's -- that's why I said it, it's not necessarily a perfect scenario when you're

inviting a stranger into your home to tell you how to raise your children, and that's why I want you to have that discussion in mediation.

Okay? All right.

MS. JACOBSON: And Your Honor, one question.

As far as property as Your Honor indicated in our moving papers, we did reference some liquidating, transferring, purchasing new property. Can we make sure the - the parties are aware the JPI is in force and they cannot liquidate or transfer any assets?

THE COURT: The joint preliminary injunction, I treat that as a -- a -- as an order of the Court that is punishable by the pow -- the Court's contempt powers, so both parties are on notice that you're governed by the strictures of the joint preliminary injunction. Okay?

MS. JACOBSON: I'm so sorry, Your Honor, one more issue. The daycare expense is approximately \$1,000 per month for both of the girls, Safekey and the child's daycare, and the parties have been splitting that amount, correct? And just moving forward so there's no confusion about that, should the parties continue splitting that expense, Your Honor?

THE COURT: What's the Defendant's position in that regard?

MR. HILL: Yeah, he's okay with splitting it equally

50/50 which hasn't been happening. He's been paying more than half, so he's okay with splitting it 50/50. 3 THE COURT: Splitting the day -- okay. MS. JACOBSON: Thank you, Your Honor. 4 THE COURT: All right. So you're okay with the 5 6 Court issuing an order based on the minutes or do you desire 7 to prepare an order? It doesn't -- it doesn't matter to me, 8 on either side. MS. JACOBSON: I'm comfortable with minutes, Your 9 10 Honor. 11 MR. HILL: Minutes should be fine. 12 THE COURT: Okay. The Court will issue an order 13 based on the minutes. MS. JACOBSON: Thank you, Your Honor. 14 THE COURT: Okay? All right. Thank you for your 15 16 appearances. 17 MS. JACOBSON: Thank you. (THE PROCEEDINGS CONCLUDED AT 09:35:10) 18 * * * * * * 19 ATTEST: I do hereby certify that I have truly and 20 correctly transcribed the digital proceedings in the above-21 entitled case to the best of my ability. 22 /s/ Kimberly C. McCright 23 24 Kimberly C. McCright, CET