IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA 1 Margaret Reddy, Mohan Thalamarla, Supreme Court No. 83763 2 Max Global, INC. 3 Appellants, **Electronically Filed** 4 Jun 21 2022 11:51 p.m. vs. Elizabeth A. Brown 5 MEDAPPEAL, LLC, an Illinois Clerk of Supreme Court limited liability company 6 Respondent. 7 8 9 APPELLANTS' OPENING BRIEF 10 11 12 The Wasielewski Law Firm, LTD. Andrew Wasielewski, Esq. 13 Nevada Bar No. 6161 14 8275 South Eastern Avenue, Suite 200-818 Las Vegas, NV 89123 15 Telephone: (702) 490-8511 Fascimile: (702) 548-9684 16 andrew@wazlaw.com 17 Attorney for Appellants, Margaret Reddy, Mohan Thalamarla, Max Global, LLC 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

Margaret Reddy, Mohan Thalamarla, Max Global, INC.

Supreme Court No. 83763

Appellants,

VS.

MEDAPPEAL, LLC, an Illinois limited liability company

Respondent.

APPELLANTS' NRAP 26.1 DISCLOSURE

The undersigned counsel of record certifies that the following are persons and entities as described in NRAP 26.1(a), and must be disclosed. These representations in order that the judges of this court may evaluate possible disqualification or recusal.

Appellants MARGARET REDDY and MOHAN THALAMARLA are individuals and have no parent corporations. MAX GLOBAL LLC is a limited liability company with no parent corporations.

The following law firms (with the listed attorneys) have appeared previously in this case:

For Appellants:

Leah Martin Law
Leah Martin, Esq.
Amber Scott, Esq.
Kevin Hejmanowski, Esq
The Wasielewski Law Firm, LTD.
Andrew Wasielewski, Esq.

The following law firm is expected to appear in this court for Appellants:

//

The Wasielewski Law Firm, LTD.

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By:

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8			
9			
10	TABLE OF CONTENTS		
11	I. STATEMENT OF CASE		
12	A. RELEVANT DISTRICT COURT PROCEEDINGS 1		
13	B. NATURE OF CASE AND DISPOSITION BELOW 1		
14	II. STATEMENT OF LAW AND DISCUSSION		
15	A. NEVADA DOES NOT ALLOW FOREIGN LLCS TO DO BUSINESS		
16	WITHOUT A LICENSE TO DO BUSINESSB. COMMENCING A LAWSUIT IS DIFFERENT THAN MAINTAINING		
17	A LAWSUITC. NRS 86.5483 WAS NEVER INTENDED TO ALLOW A FOREIGN LLC		
18	TO SUE FOREIGN DEFENDANTS WITHOUT FIRST REQUIRING A LICENSE		
19	D. NEVADA PUBLIC POLICY DID NOT CHANGE SINCE 2003 TO ALLOW FOREGIN LLCS TO SUE WITHOUT A LICENSE		
20			
21	III. CONCLUSION		
22	TABLE OF AUTHORITIES		
23	COURT CASES		
24	AA Primo Builders, LLC v. Wash.,		
25	245 P.3d 1190 (Nev. 2010)		
26	Adams v. Fallini, 132 Nev.Adv.Op. 81 (2016)		
27	Admiralty Fund v. Hugh Johnson & Co.,		
28	677 F.2d. 1301, (9 th Cir. 1982)6		

1	Allen v. Zurich Insurance Co.,	
2	667 F.2d 1162, 1166 (4th Cir., 1982)	14
3	Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986) 6,	7, 8
4	Arbella Mut. Ins. Co. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court,	
5	122 Nev. 509, 512,134 P.3d 710, 712 (2006) 13	1, 12
6	Bidani v. Lewis, 285 Ill. App. 3d 545, 550 (1st Dist. 1996)	15
7	Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co.,	
8	407 U.S. 1, 13, 15, 92 S. Ct. 1907, 1915, 1916,	
9	32 L. Ed. 2d 513 (1972) 22	2 , 23
10	British Airways Bd. v. Boeing Co.,	
12	585 F.2d 946, 952 (9 th Cir. 1978)	8
13	Bulbman, Inc. v. Nevada Bell, 108 Nev. 105, 110 (1992)	7
14	Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 n. 14,	
15	105 S. Ct. 2174, 2182 n. 14, 85 L. Ed. 2d 528 (1985)	22
16	Buckert v. Briggs, 15 Cal.App.3d. 296, 301-02 (1971)	25
17	Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986) 5,	
18	Central Distribs, Inc. v. M.E.T., Inc., 403 F.2d 943,	
20	946 (5th Cir. 1968)	24
21	Collins v. Union Fed. Savings & Loan,	
22	99 Nev. 284, 302 (1983)	6
23	Consipio Holding, BV v. Carlberg,	-
24	P.3d 751, 755 (2012)	13
25	Daley v. County of Butte, 227 Cal.App.2d 380, 391 (1964),	
26	Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 762 (2014)	
27	Dogra v. Liles, 314 P.3d 952, 955 (2013)	
28	19 21-02, 311 1.04 302, 303 (2013)	Τ)

Elston v. City of Turlock, 38 Cal. 3d. 227, 233 (1985)		
Estate of Adams v. Fallini, 132 Nev.Adv.Op. 81 (2016)		
Fulbright & Jaworski LLP v. Eighth Judicial District Court,		
342 P.3d 997 (Nev. 2015)ix, 11, 12		
Frantz v. Johnson, 116 Nev. 455, 471,		
999 P.2d 351, 361 (2000)ix		
Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown,		
131 S. Ct. 2846, 2851 (2011)12		
In re Frei Irrevocable Tr.,		
133 Nev. 50, 56, 390 P.3d 646, 652 (2017) 14		
In re Marriage of Park, 27 Cal. 3d. 337, 342 (1980)25		
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310,		
66 S. Ct. 154, 90 L. Ed. 95 (1945)		
Jarstad v. Nat'l Farmers Union Prop. & Cas. Co.,		
92 Nev. 380, 387, 552 P.2d 49, 53 (1976)		
Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio,		
475 U.S. 574 (1986)		
New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 749 (2001) 14		
Nichiryo Am., Inc. v. Oxford Worldwide, LLC,		
No. 03:07-CV-00335-LRH-VPC,		
2008 WL 2457935 (D.Nev. June 16, 2008)		
NOLM, LLC v. Cty. Of Clark,		
120 Nev. 736, 743, 100 P.3d 658, 663 (2004) 15		
Orange Empire Nat'l Bank v. Kirk, 259 Cal.App.2d 347,		
353-54 (1968)		

1	Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 732-733,
2	24 L. Ed. 565 (1877)
3	Poller v. CBS, Inc., 368 U.S. 464 (1962)
4	Resort at Summerlin v. Dist. Ct.,
5	118 Nev. 110, 40 P.3d 432 (2002)
6	Robinson v. Varela, 67 Cal.App.3d 611 (1977)
7	Seleme v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, 982 N.E.2d 299, 310-11
8	(Ind. Ct. App. 2012)8
10	Sierra Glass & Mirror v. Viking Indus., Inc.,
11	107 Nev. 119, 125-26,
12	Stretch v. Watson, 6 NJ Superior 456, 469 (1949)
13	Tandy v. Terina's Pizza, 784 P.2d 7 (Nev. 1989) 21, 22, 23
14	Trump v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court,
15	109 Nev. 687, 692, 857 P.2d 740, 743-44 (1993) 10, 11, 13
16	Staschel v. Weaver Bros., 644 P.2d 512 (1982)
17 18	Vaile v. Dist. Ct., 118 Nev. 262, 44 P.3d 506 (2002) 14
19	Viega GmbH v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court,
20	328 P.3d 1152, 1156 (2014)
21	Wood v. Safeway, Inc., 121 Nev. 724 (2005)ix, 6, 7
22	World Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291,
23	100 S. Ct. 559, 564, 62 L. Ed. 2d 490 (1980)
24	STATE STATUTES AND RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
25	Illinois RPC 3.3 17
26	NRS 14.065 11
28	NRS 49.225 10

1	NRS	80.055	20	1
2	NRS	86	19)
3	NRS	86.213	20)
4	NRS	86.544	21	-
5	NRS	86.548),	21
6	NRCI	? 56(c)	 ĵ,	8
7 8	SCR	172	8	
8				

I. JURISDICTION, ROUTING, STATEMENT OF ISSUES

A. JURISDICTION OVER THE APPEAL

NRAP 3(A) sets for the areas in which the Nevada Supreme Court can take jurisdiction over an appeal. The only applicable statute allowing jurisdiction of this matter, as contained within NRAP 3(A) is NRAP 3A(b)(1), appeal from a final judgment.

Prior Appellants' counsel filed the appeal of the orders for granting attorney's fees and denial of Appellants' Huneycutt motion on November 5, 2021. The appeal was timely filed.

Appellants appeal the following decisions:

- a) Order for Attorney's Fees, entered in this action on the 6th day of October, 2021.
- b) Order Denying Appellants' Motion for Relief (Huneycutt Motion) dated October 27, 2021.

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C. STANDARD OF REVIEW

This court reviews de novo a district court's determination of personal jurisdiction. Fulbright & Jaworski LLP v. Eighth Judicial District Court, 342 P.3d 997 (Nev. 2015). Similarly, this Court reviews questions of law under the de novo standard of review Frantz v. Johnson, 116 Nev. 455, 471, 999 P.2d 351, 361 (2000).

This court reviews the district court's findings of fact for an abuse of discretion, and this court will not set aside those findings "unless they are clearly erroneous or not supported by substantial evidence". Sandy Valley Assocs. v. Sky Ranch Estates, 117 Nev. 948, 954, 35 P.3d 964, 968 (2001).

Appellants address the findings of fact made from documentary evidence otherwise precluded from admission for legal reasons such as privilege and evidentiary inadmissibility during ruling on motions for summary judgment and as such, as it is involving a purely legal question, these rulings are reviewed de novo. Settelmeyer & Sons v. Smith & Harmer, 124 Nev. 1206, 1215 (2008).

This court interprets an unambiguous statute based on its plain meaning by reading it as a whole and "giv[ing] effect to each. . . word[]and phrase[]." Davis v. Beling, 278 P.3d 501, 508 (2012). We do not look to other sources, such as legislative history, unless a statutory ambiguity requires us to look beyond the statute's language to determine the legislative intent. State Div. of Ins. v. State Farm Mitt. Auto. Ins. Co., 116 Nev. 290, 294 (2000).

D. ROUTING STATEMENT

This matter is presumptively retained by the Supreme Court and Appellants believe the Supreme Court shall retain this case.

E. ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

Remand is necessary for the following questions for review:

Previously the Court ruled on June 17, 2022 denying Appellants'

first appeal of the District Court's granting of Respondent's Motion

for Summary Judgment.

Appellants' second appeal asserts review of those issues contained in the opposition of the Motion for Attorney's fees and Appellants' Motion for Relief. Further, to the extent that prior counsel did not raise issues before current counsel was hired, this appeal addresses those issues raised in post judgment motions after the first appeal and before the second appeal.

Does Nevada allow a foreign LLC to do business without a license?

Does commencing a lawsuit equate to maintaining a lawsuit?

Does NRS 86.5483 allow a foreign LLC to sue foreign defendants in Nevada without having to get a license or to do business in Nevada?

Is it the public policy in Nevada to allow foreign LLCs to create litigation in Nevada without being licensed?

I. STATEMENT OF CASE

A. RELEVANT DISTRICT COURT PROCEEDINGS

Illinois:

١	Complaint (Appellants are not Defendants)	October 1, 2018
	Motion to Dismiss Illinois Complaint	December 14, 2018
	Order Granting Motion to Dismiss	March 19, 2019
	Nevada:	
	Complaint filed	April 12, 2019
	Motion to Dismiss (personal jurisdiction)	August 1, 2019
	Con't hearing, Motion to Dismiss, deny	August 20, 2019
	First Amended Complaint	August 31, 2019
	Order Denying Motion to Dismiss	October 4, 2019
	Answer to First Amended Complaint	October 28, 2019
	Motion for Attorney's Fees	August 31, 2021
	Notice of Entry of Order for Motion for	
	Attorney's Fees	October 6, 2021
	Motion for Relief	April 29, 2021
	Notice of Entry of Order for Denial of	
	Motion for Relief	October 27, 2021
	Notice of Appeal	November 5, 2021
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B. NATURE OF CASE AND DISPOSITION BELOW

Respondent is a company owned by two IL attorney residents licensed to practice in the State of Illinois (Vol 1, p196 first paragraph). Respondent's owners contracted on behalf of another company to receive commercial business from 5 other defendants not

included in this appeal. (Vol 1, p9, paras 4-8). Respondent was dissatisfied with the commercial business it received and sued Brown, Weinstein, Vijay Reddy and two companies, Medasset and VBB, in Illinois. (Vol 1, p13, paras 37-43).

In the complaint, Respondent mentions Appellant MARGARET REDDY but does not name her as a defendant (Vol~1, p11, para27). MOHAN THALAMARLA and MAX GLOBAL LLC are neither mentioned in the complaint, nor sued in Illinois. (Vol~1, p8-20). The five entities objected to personal jurisdiction assertions in Illinois and prevailed on a Motion to Dismiss, (Vol~II, p270).

Respondent, then filed another action in Nevada, naming the same five defendants, plus Appellants as parties in this action ($Vol\ II$, $p313\ line\ 24\ -\ p314\ line\ 18$).

All defendants and Appellants filed another Motion to Dismiss asserting lack of personal jurisdiction (Vol II, p366 lines 20-24). Appellants filed affidavits stating no contacts with Nevada or with this Respondent (Vol II, p376, 377, 379). Respondent asserted that judicial estoppel precluded all 8 defendants, including Appellants who were not named parties in Illinois, estopped them from arguing lack of personal jurisdiction in Nevada (Vol II, p385 line 21 - p387 line 6). Appellants' motion was denied on August 20, 2019. (Vol III, p538 lines 14-15). Appellants' attorneys did not attend the 08/20/19 hearing (Vol III, p526 lines 19-23 and p538 lines 23-24).

Appellants filed a Huneycutt motion based on the concept that it is unlawful for a foreign LLC which has not done business in Nevada,

and is not licensed in Nevada filed and is still not licensed, to commence a lawsuit in Nevada on April 12, 2019 ($Vol\ IV\ Ex\ 30$). The Court denied this motion ($Vol\ IV\ Ex\ 32$).

Appellants appealed this Order and the Order granting attorney's fees and costs on November 5, 2021.

Appellants previously appealed the District Court granting Summary Judgment on July 16, 2021. This Court filed its Order affirming decision on June 17, 2022 in related appeal 83253.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

For Purposes of this appeal, Appellants do not dispute the following facts from the Notice of Entry of Order Denying Motions to Dismiss filed on October 4, 2019. ($Vol\ IV$, $p\ 764-768$).

1: (Vol IV, p765 lines 21-23)

15: (Vol IV, p767, lines 10-11)

Appellants filed a Motion to Dismiss (in Nevada) separate from anything filed in Illinois in which they argued that they were not subject to personal jurisdiction in Nevada (Vol~II, p366-379).

Respondent filed a complaint in Cook County, Illinois, arising out of an agreement to purchase a medical appeals and medical credentialing business (the "Purchase Agreement") (Vol I, p8 para 1).

There is not any dispute as to the following facts:

- a) Respondent did not make Appellants parties in the Illinois litigation. (Vol I, p8-9).
- b) Respondent never communicated to any Appellant. (Vol II, ps 376, 377, 379).

- c) Appellants are not parties to the contract. (Vol I, p41-43)
- d) Respondent is an LLC, not licensed in the State of Nevada to do business. (Vol~I, p8~para~1).
- e) Respondent has never done business in Nevada, other than to commence this litigation. ($Exhibit\ 31$).
- f) Respondent's principal place of business is in Illinois (Vol I, page 9, para 3). Ostensibly Respondent does business in its principal place of business, just not in Nevada (Ex 31).

No Appellant resides in Nevada (*Vol II*, *p376*, *377*, *379*). There is no dispute that the Respondent is a foreign LLC who never did business in Nevada and is not licensed to do business in Nevada, but rather is licensed in Illinois and does business there (Vol 1, page 9, para 3 and *Ex 31*).

In the instant case, the district court did not attempt a prima facia showing of either general or specific personal jurisdiction as to any of these Appellants ($Vol\ III\ p513-539$). The District Court solely ordered the motion to be dismissed because of judicial estoppel and for no other reason ($Vol\ III$, p541; $Vol\ IV\ p767\ line\ 15-p768\ line\ 11$).

There is nothing in the record that shows Appellants contacts with the forum state. There is undisputed evidence neither Appellants or Respondent have any contact with the forum state (Vol II, p376, 377, 379). From their sole evidence of Appellants' declarations, we see that they had no such contacts. Id. In fact,

there is no evidence that Appellants had anything to do with Respondent, and vice versa. Id.

STATEMENT OF LAW AND DISCUSSION

II.

A. NEVADA DOES NOT ALLOW FOREIGN LLCS TO DO BUSINESS WITHOUT A LICENSE TO DO BUSINESS

The complaint and the amended complaint do NOT aver that Plaintiff is licensed to do business in the State of Nevada. Furthermore, Respondent's Opposition to the Motion for Relief states that Respondent was never licensed and has never done business in the State of Nevada.

It appears that this issue is a matter of first appearance before

this court. This is solely because Respondent is a foreign LLC commencing a lawsuit without a license or any legal authority to do any type of business in this court. (Exhibits 30 and 31). There is no evidence available that would serve to allow Plaintiff to maintain this action against these Appellants in any event, because of Respondent's assertions that it never was licensed and never did business here. Id.

Respondent never cured this defect, to the best of the knowledge of the Appellants. *Id.* Respondent never made that fact known to any Appellant or in any pleading, until after Judgment. (*Ex 31 and 32*). Literally years of litigation occurred while so not licensed, in violation of NRS 86. Simply, MEDAPPEAL cannot maintain this action and any judgment granted to it must be immediately vacated.

Declarations were made and signed during the beginning of this case which in essence, established with certainty, there was no

connection with the instant lawsuit and their personal lives in Michigan / India.

MARGARET and MOHAN are non-resident defendants that reside over 1500 miles away. They had never met Medappeal employees or its officers. They never had any dealings with the Plaintiff on any level. They never spoke about Plaintiff to any other defendant in this case.

In the seminal case of AA Primo Builders, LLC v. Wash., 245 P.3d 1190 (Nev. 2010), the Nevada Supreme Court rules in pertinent part, to identify the difference between operating an LLC in a revoked status and operating an LLC without a charter:

"Doing business as an LLC without filing the initial organizational documents carries significant fines of up to \$10,000. NRS 86.213(1). A revoked charter, by contrast, carries no fines, only a \$75 penalty reinstatement fee. NRS 86.272(3). As for incentivizing judgment-proof LLCs to litigate with wanton abandon, NRS 86.361 provides that members of an unchartered entity risk individual liability unless the default is cured. See Nichiryo Am., Inc. v. Oxford Worldwide, LLC, No. 03:07-CV-00335-LRH-VPC, 2008 WL 2457935 (D.Nev. June 16, 2008); see also Resort at Summerlin v. Dist. Ct., 118 Nev. 110, 40 P.3d 432 (2002) (interpreting NRS 80.210 (now NRS 80.055) to condition commencement and maintenance of a lawsuit for foreign corporations on initial qualification rather than continuous upkeep of its qualification). The Legislature has addressed the penalties for an administrative default leading to charter revocation and loss of capacity to sue is not among them." Id. (emphasis added)

Currently, NRS 86.213 requires in pertinent part:

"1. Every person, other than a foreign limited-liability company, who is purporting to do business in this State as a limited-liability company and who willfully fails or neglects to file with the Secretary of State articles of organization is subject to a fine of not less than \$1,000 but not more than \$10,000, to be recovered in a court of competent jurisdiction."

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The analogous statute for foreign limited liability companies is NRS 86.548 which has the same penalty and additionally states in pertinent part:

"2. Every foreign limited-liability company transacting business in this State which fails or neglects to register with the Secretary of State in accordance with the provisions of NRS 86.544 may not commence or maintain any action, suit or proceeding in any court of this State until it has registered with the Secretary of State."

The Nevada Supreme Court has <u>clearly stated</u> that the penalty for LLCs that DO BUSINESS in Nevada, but never register is not the same as the LLC who has registered but let its registration lapse in revocation status. It is clear, the curing of the willful failure to comply with the requirement to register NEVER gives a company the right to bring or maintain an action in this state.

Furthermore, in AA Primo Builders, commencement of a lawsuit is doing business in Nevada. There is no ambiguity of this term as it was used in that disposition (see also Resort at Summerlin v. Dist. Ct., 118 Nev. 110, 40 P.3d 432 (2002)).

In the instant case, Respondent is a foreign LLC (licensed to do business in Illinois) (Vol I, p8). It has its primary place of business located in Illinois. Id. It conducts business in Illinois and it intended to conduct business through the contract that it purchased, through another entity that ostensibly owns it, but which connection to this contract has never been properly established (Vol 1, page 52, footnote 1). While it states it has not done business in Nevada by creating a lawsuit in Nevada, it stated in Illinois that it has a right to do business there, because it created a lawsuit there to sue Appellants (see Vol 1, page 8). Clearly, Respondent has no right to do business in Nevada. The fact that it has, subjects it to a fine of

\$10,000.00 and any liability for sanctions are passed through the LLC to its managers, pursuant to AA Primo Builders LLC.

Further, Medappeal LLC cannot cure the problem by registering now. It needs to dismiss this action, register and then bring it again. There is simply no way for Medappeal to avail itself of this state's jurisdiction until it follows the simple rules.

B. COMMENCING A LAWSUIT IS DIFFERENT THAN MAINTAINING A LAWSUIT

As this Court has stated in *Resort at Summerlin v. Dist. Ct.*, 118 Nev. 110, 40 P.3d 432 (2002), commencement of a lawsuit is totally different than maintaining a lawsuit. It states this in 2 separate places, first it states:

"In this original proceeding, we are asked to decide a corporate law question of first impression: Whether Nevada's "door closing" statute, NRS 80.210, bars foreign corporations from **commencing or maintaining** suits in the courts of this state when those corporations have initially qualified to conduct business in Nevada pursuant to the laws of this state, yet fail to comply with the statutorily prescribed annual reporting requirements. We conclude that the express terms of NRS 80.210 do not preclude such corporations from commencing or maintaining suits in Nevada courts." *Id.* at 110 – 111. (emphasis added)

Next, it states again that the two words are different by explaining a page later:

"This statute provides that a foreign corporation "which fails or neglects to comply with the provisions of NRS 80.010 to 80.040, inclusive . . . may not commence or maintain any action or proceeding in any court of this state until it has fully complied with the provisions of NRS 80.010 to 80.040, inclusive." *Id.* at 112. (emphasis added)

Later on the same page, this Court ostensibly defines "commencement" as:

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"Accordingly, in this original proceeding, we decide whether NRS 80.210 bars a foreign corporation such as A B from bringing suit in courts of this state when the foreign corporation initially qualifies to conduct business in Nevada, yet fails to comply with Nevada's annual reporting requirements." (emphasis added).

since it was no longer discussing "maintaining" in this context any longer.

On the next page, this Court again stated that commencing an action is "[i]n this case, however, it is uncontested that A B was "doing business" in Nevada" in footnote 9. *Id.* at fn 9, page 113. Further, it comes up again in footnote 10 on the same page. Again, on pages 114 and 115 this Court concludes there is a difference between commencement and maintaining.

Just to make sure there is no confusion that commencing and maintaining DO NOT mean the same thing, Appellants define them both. "Commencement of an action" is defined as "the time of filing the petition" (see https://www.lawinsider.com/dictionary/ commencement-of-the-action and see also NRS 41.010. Maintaining is keeping a lawsuit going, apart from "bringing a lawsuit" as can be seen in the language of NRS 41.085(3) which states in pertinent part:

"An action brought by the heirs of a decedent pursuant to subsection 2 and the cause of action of that decedent brought or maintained by the decedent's personal representatives which arose out of the same wrongful act or neglect may be joined." (emphasis added)

In the instant case, it is clear that as in everyday english, the law regards commencing a lawsuit as totally different than maintaining a lawsuit. Since the legislature in 19 years has not

added in the ability of a foreign LLC to commence a lawsuit without being licensed anywhere in NRS 86, it must be that it is intentionally not allowing Respondent to do so in this matter.

C. NRS 86.5483 WAS NEVER INTENDED TO ALLOW A FOREIGN LLC TO SUE FOREIGN DEFENDANTS WITHOUT FIRST REQUIRING A LICENSE

In AA Primo Builders, the court addresses companies like
Respondent which is a foreign LLC that is solely formed to sue
Appellants and the previous defendants not appealing. This Court
stated:

"Some corporations are primarily in the business of collecting debts and/or filing lawsuits. But most corporations are primarily engaged in some other business ... The term "transact business" probably could be construed to include pursuing litigation... Nevertheless, ... we cannot conclude that it must be necessarily so construed." AA Primo Builders, LLC v. Wash., 245 P.3d 1190 (Nev. 2010), quoting Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 167, 1327 (11th Ed. 2005).

While in Nevada, the idea of what constitutes "doing business" is not defined (see AA Primo Builders), the California Franchise Board defines doing business as "actively engaging in any transaction for the purpose of financial or pecuniary gain or profit."

https://www.ftb.ca.gov/file/business/doing-business-in-california.html

In Illinois, doing business is defined as "include[ing] every trade, occupation, profession, and other lawful purpose, whether or not carried on for profit." (see 805 ILCS 180 1-5).

In Delaware, the following statute applies to foreign LLCs doing business in that state:

"§ 18-907. Doing business without registration.

- (a) A foreign limited liability company doing business in the State of Delaware may not maintain any action, suit or proceeding in the State of Delaware until it has registered in the State of Delaware, and has paid to the State of Delaware all fees and penalties for the years or parts thereof, during which it did business in the State of Delaware without having registered.
- (b) The failure of a foreign limited liability company to register in the State of Delaware does not impair:
- (1) The validity of any contract or act of the foreign limited liability company;
- (2) The right of any other party to the contract to maintain any action, suit or proceeding on the contract; or
- (3) Prevent the foreign limited liability company from defending any action, suit or proceeding in any court of the State of Delaware.
- (c) A member or a manager of a foreign limited liability company is not liable for the obligations of the foreign limited liability company solely by reason of the limited liability company's having done business in the State of Delaware without registration.
- (d) Any foreign limited liability company doing business in the State of Delaware without first having registered shall be fined and shall pay to the Secretary of State \$200 for each year or part thereof during which the foreign limited liability company failed to register in the State of Delaware." (emphasis added)

The Nevada Legislature, presumably taking the Delaware lead (as Delaware is the leader in many business litigation rules) adopted NRS 86.5483 to allow companies in Nevada to defend themselves in Nevada regardless if they were doing business or not, solely as a benefit to Nevada citizens so they would not have to chase Foreign LLCs around the country to be sued. The Legislative remarks from 2003, discussing SB 436 state in pertinent part:

"The third proposal involves statutes setting forth activities that do not require qualification for doing business in Nevada. The referenced sections are Sections 141, 142, 175, and 176. These sections allow foreign limited-liability companies under NRS Chapter 86, and

limited partnerships under NRS Chapter 88, the same list of activities that foreign corporations currently can engage in that do not trigger the necessity of qualifying to do business in Nevada. Those sections are under NRS Chapter 80 currently. There are two options that were suggested:

- Delete this extension of the law in NRS Chapters 86 and 88, so it would delete the new sections of the bill.
- Repealing some of the activities that may cause concern as far as those activities that would not constitute doing business in the state. Those activities are listed on the bottom of page 3 of the Work Session Document (Exhibit P), which include: making sales through independent contractors; soliciting or receiving orders outside the state through or in response to letters or catalogs or other forms of advertising; accepting the orders outside the state and filling them by shipping goods into the state; and creating or acquiring indebtedness, mortgages and security interests in real or personal property.

Two additional activities were also suggested, if the Committee were to choose to go with the deletion from existing law of these provisions: securing or collecting debts or enforcing mortgages and security interests, and owning real or personal property.

Finally, in Section 266, page 149, the penalty for a violation of NRS Chapter 602, "Doing Business Under Assumed or Fictitious Name," or falsely filing a certificate of termination is changed. Currently in the law, it is a misdemeanor but the amendment would make that a fine instead. The suggestion raised would be to maintain the existing misdemeanor penalty.

Chairman Anderson:

Ms. Buckley, do you have a feeling as to how you want to proceed with S.B. 436?

Assemblywoman Buckley:

Just a comment on paragraph c, the third proposal, the general concept is that you subject yourself to jurisdiction or you can be sued here if you have minimum contacts with the state. That means that if a company does something to you, you are not forced to go to Florida, if they come into the state. It's this minimum contact concept, which Mr. Brown can explain in full, but generally that's the law now. It just gives me a little concern to begin to do this laundry list so that if something a company does may not fall squarely within it, but they have done something in our state and harmed someone, that we have lost jurisdiction. Perhaps Mr. Fowler can provide more information, but he is gone. I suggest eliminating this (paragraph c) and if he can bring back more explanations to the Committee, maybe the Assembly would reverse. I don't

feel comfortable taking away Nevada jurisdiction without a better reason, so that suggestion under paragraph c is to leave the wall the way it is now unless there's a better reason presented.

The rest of the amendments I agree with. The clerks brought up changing the fictitious names, as did Mr. Carpenter, related to telling people when the certificate is expiring; I think those are good suggestions so that you can track down when people change their names. Likewise the first part of paragraph 3, it makes the law more clear. If you are amenable, I would do an Amend and Do Pass motion, including all of the amendments on our Work Session Document (Exhibit P) to include 1, 2, and 3.

Risa Lang, Committee Counsel:

I want to clarify on amendment 3, whether we are going with c(i) or c(ii)? I think Ms. Buckley was suggesting c(i).

Assemblywoman Buckley:

Yes, amendment 3c(i), just delete it and keep the law the way it is now.

Chairman Anderson:

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We are not doing 3c(ii)?

Assemblywoman Buckley:

No, we are doing 3c(i) instead of 3c(ii).

Chairman Anderson:

Are we doing the additional activities that might also be considered for deletion?

[Assemblywoman Buckley indicated no.] OK, we are not doing that part at all-just deleting the new sections of the bill.

ASSEMBLYWOMAN BUCKLEY MOVED TO AMEND AND DO PASS S.B. 436 WITH AMENDMENTS 1, 2, AND 3a, 3b, 3c(i), and 3d AS

OUTLINED IN THE WORK SESSION DOCUMENT.

ASSEMBLYMAN CONKLIN SECONDED THE MOTION.

THE MOTION CARRIED UNANIMOUSLY.

The bill has passed. Mr. Brown, it is your turn to defend this bill on the Assembly Floor." Legislative remarks, S.B. 436, pages 89-92 (2003).

https://www.leg.state.nv.us/Division/Research/Library/LegHi
story/LHs/2003/SB436,2003.pdf

In the legislative history, it is clear that the true intent of the NRS 86.5483 is to limit the effectiveness of the statute to allowing Foreign LLCs to be sued and to not limit the question of personal jurisdiction over them to how or what kind

of business they do. This has nothing to do with the business of Respondent, which was solely formed for the sole purpose of bring this action against Appellants and others. As it is doing the business for which it was designed, therefore, it is doing business in Nevada.

As it is doing business in Nevada, it cannot be allowed to commence an action in Nevada. Therefore, the action it did bring must be dismissed immediately and this case go back to the District Court pursuant to the law in the State of Nevada, as it is in the states of Illinois, California and Delaware.

D. NEVADA PUBLIC POLICY DID NOT CHANGE SINCE 2003 TO ALLOW FOREIGN LLCS TO SUE WITHOUT A LICENSE

NRS 86.5483(4) states in pertinent part:

- "4. The fact that a person is not transacting business in this State within the meaning of this section:
- (a) Does not affect the determination of whether any court, administrative agency or regulatory body in this State may exercise personal jurisdiction over the person in any civil action, criminal action, administrative proceeding or regulatory proceeding; and
- (b) Except as otherwise provided in subsection 3, does not affect the applicability of any other provision of law with respect to the person and may not be offered as a defense or introduced in evidence in any civil action, criminal action, administrative proceeding or regulatory proceeding to prove that the person is not transacting business in this State, including, without limitation, any civil action, criminal action, administrative proceeding or regulatory proceeding involving an alleged violation of chapter 597, 598 or 598A of NRS." (emphasis added)

This provision of the law has not changed since 2003, in the 19 years that NRS 86.5483 as been established law after modification by bill number S.B. 436. Nothing about NRS 86.5483 can be used to establish or disestablish any type of personal jurisdiction that

Respondent has to bring a lawsuit in the State of Nevada. Further, nothing about this statute can be used to justify ANY FACT in any civil action, INCLUDING THIS CIVIL ACTION.

Notwithstanding that Respondent was NOT the contracting party with Appellants and that there is no contractual relationship with Appellants and Respondent on any level, it is clear that Respondent was formed solely to do business in Nevada for the purpose of suing the non-appealing Defendants in Illinois and for no other reason.

Despite the fact that this law was amended in both 2015 and 2017, the legislature insists that the list in NRS 86.5483(1) CANNOT be used to justify that a foreign LLC is NOT transacting business because it is NOT doing something NOT listed in subsection (1) a-m.

In this instant matter, Respondent was solely formed to bring this lawsuit, first in Illinois and then in Nevada. By bringing the lawsuit in Illinois, it organized itself, paid its dues, did the required statutorily mandated actions and then after it lost the ability to sue in Illinois, came to Nevada. However, while its sole business is bringing this lawsuit, it never cooperated with the Nevada Revised Statutes and never intends to (Ex 31).

There is no statute in Nevada that allows it to commence a lawsuit as a foreign LLC without registering in Nevada. There is one statute that says it cannot. There are two cases that say it cannot. The statute that allows it to maintain a case, is ambiguous and furthermore, does not affect its inability to COMMENCE a case. The preclusion from COMMENCING a case without being licensed could have been changed in 2015 and 2017 but was not.

This provision clearly supports Appellants who all insist that the Nevada Legislature NEVER intended any LLC, while not being licensed here, to be able to commence a lawsuit here.

III. CONCLUSION

For all of the reasons set forth, Appellants request remand of all causes of action regarding these appealing Appellants. Dated this $21^{\rm st}$ day of June, 2022.

THE WASIELEWSKI LAW FIRM, LTD.

/s/ Andrew Wasielewski

By:

ANDREW WASIELEWSKI, ESQ. Nevada Bar #6161 8275 S. Eastern Ave #200-818 Las Vegas, NV 89123 Attorneys for Plaintiff

ATTORNEY'S CERTIFICATE

1. I hereby certify that this brief complies with the formatting requirements of NRAP 32(a)(4), the typeface requirements of NRAP 32(a)(5) and the type style requirements of NRAP 32(a)(6) because:

[X] This brief has been prepared in a monospaced typeface using MICROSOFT WORD with Courier New typeface, 12 point font.

- 2. I further certify that this brief complies with the page- or type-volume limitations of NRAP 32(a)(7) because, excluding the parts of the brief exempted by NRAP 32(a)(7)(C), it:
 - [X] Does not exceed 30 pages and contains 9164 words
- 3. Finally, I hereby certify that I have read this appellate brief, and to the best of my knowledge, information, and belief, it is not frivolous or interposed for any improper purpose. I further certify that this brief complies with all applicable Nevada Rules of Appellate Procedure, in particular NRAP 28(e)(1), which requires every assertion in the brief regarding matters in the record to be supported by a reference to the page and volume number, if any, of the transcript or appendix where the matter relied on is to be found. I understand that I may be subject to sanctions in the event that the accompanying brief is not in conformity with the requirements of the Nevada Rules of Appellate Procedure.

DATED this 21st day of February, 2022.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Andrew Wasielewski

Ву:_

ANDREW WASIELEWSKI, ESQ. Nevada Bar #6161 8275 S. Eastern Ave #200-818 Las Vegas, NV 89123 Attorneys for Appellants

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY AND AFFIRM that this document and the Appendix was filed electronically with the Nevada Supreme Court on February 14, 2022. Electronic service of the foregoing document shall be made in accordance with the Master Service List as follows:

MICHAEL A SINGER, Esq.
STEPHEN HABERFIELD, Esq.
Supreme Court Settlement Judge

ZACHARY T Ball, Esq.

Attorneys for Respondents