Electronically Filed 11/8/2021 10:46 AM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT

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DATED this 8th day of November, 2021.

LAW OFFICE OF DAVID H. BENAVIDEZ

By: David A Denowby
David H. Benavidez, Esquire
Nevada Bar No. 004919
850 S Boulder Hwy #375
Henderson, NV 89015
Attorney for Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I, the undersigned, declare under penalty of perjury, that I am an employee of the Law Office of David H. Benavidez, and on the 8th day of November, 2021, I deposited the foregoing NOTICE OF APPEAL in the United States Mail, with first class postage fully prepaid thereon or sent via electronic delivery, copies of the attached document addressed as follows:

Jason Mills, Esq. GGRM Law Firm 2770 S Maryland Pkwy #100 Las Vegas, NV 89109

Peppermill, Inc. ATTN: Pam Sprau 380 Brinkby Ave. Ste. B Reno, NV 89509

Employers Ins Co of NV ATTN: Cary Ferguson 2550 Paseo Verde Pkwy. Ste. 100 Henderson, NV 89074-9004

Rose Mary Keys, Paralegal

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THE LAW OFFICE OF DAVID H. BENAVIDEZ 850 S. BOULDER HIGHWAY, #375

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Jason Mills, Esq. GGRM Law Firm 2770 S Maryland Pkwy #100 Las Vegas, NV 89109

- All attorneys identified in the above response are 5. licensed to practice law in Nevada.
 - Appellant retained counsel in the district court. 6.
- Appellant is represented by retained counsel on 7. appeal.
- Appellant was not granted leave to proceed in forma 8. pauperis.
- The Petition for Judicial Review was filed on February 9. 5, 2021.
- The Respondent appealed the Appeals Officer's January 10. 14, 2021 order granting the Appellant's Motion to Reconsider noting the claimant would benefit from working in the light-duty position offered by the employer. The District Court Judge granted the Petition for Judicial Review.
- The case has not previously been the subject of an 11. appeal to or original writ proceeding in the Supreme Court.
- The appeal does not involve child custody or visitation.
 - 13. The appeal involves the possibility of settlement.

DATED this 8th day of November, 2021.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I, the undersigned, declare under penalty of perjury that I am an employee of the Law Office of David H. Benavidez, and on the 8th day of November, 2021, I deposited the foregoing CASE

APPEAL STATEMENT in the United States Mail, with first class postage fully prepaid thereon or sent via electronic delivery, addressed as follows:

Jason Mills, Esq.
GGRM Law Firm
2770 S Maryland Pkwy #100
Las Vegas, NV 89109

Peppermill, Inc. ATTN: Pam Sprau 380 Brinkby Ave. Ste. B Reno, NV 89509

Employers Ins Co of NV ATTN: Cary Ferguson 2550 Paseo Verde Pkwy. Ste. 100 Henderson, NV 89074-9004

Rose Mary Keys, Paralegal

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CLERK OF THE COURT
    BOND
 1
    DAVID H. BENAVIDEZ, ESQUIRE
 2
    Nevada Bar No. 004919
    LAW OFFICE OF DAVID H. BENAVIDEZ
 3
    850 South Boulder Highway, #375
    Henderson, Nevada 89015
 4
    Davidbenavidez@gmail.com
 5
    (702) 565-9730
    Attorney for Appellant
 6
 7
                              DISTRICT COURT
                           CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA
 8
 9
    EMPLOYERS INSURANCE COMPANY OF NEVADA,
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                    Appellant,
11
                                               )Case No.: A-21-828981-J
    VS.
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                                               ) Dept No.: XIV
    DANIEL CASTELAN, THE DEPARTMENT OF
13
    ADMINISTRATION, HEARINGS DIVISION,
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    APPEALS OFFICE, an agency of the State
    of Nevada
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                    Respondents.
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                NOTICE OF FILING BOND FOR COSTS ON APPEAL
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                                 Date: N/A
                                 Time: N/A
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         NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that Appellant Employers Insurance
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    Company of Nevada, by and through attorney David H. Benavidez,
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    deposited with the Country Clerk of this Court, in compliance
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    with NRAP rule 7, a bond of security for costs on appeal in the
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Electronically Filed 11/8/2021 10:01 AM Steven D. Grierson

sum of five hundred dollars (\$500.00), a copy of which is

attached hereto.

DATED this 8th day of November, 2021.

LAW OFFICE OF DAVID H. BENAVIDEZ

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I, the undersigned, declare under penalty of perjury that I
am an employee of the Law Office of David H. Benavidez, and on
the 8th day of November, 2021, I deposited the foregoing NOTICE
OF POSITION BOND in the United States Mail, with first class
postage fully prepaid thereon or sent via electronic delivery,
addressed as follows:

Jason Mills, Esq.
GGRM Law Firm
2770 S Maryland Pkwy #100
Las Vegas, NV 89109

Peppermill, Inc. ATTN: Pam Sprau 380 Brinkby Ave. Ste. B Reno, NV 89509

Employers Ins Co of NV ATTN: Cary Ferguson 2550 Paseo Verde Pkwy. Ste. 100

Henderson, NV 89074-9004

Rose Mary Keys, Paralegal

CASE SUMMARY CASE No. A-21-828981-J

Daniel Castelan, Petitioner(s)

VS.

Peppermill Hotel & Casino, Respondent(s)

§ Locati

Location: **Department 14**Judicial Officer: **Escobar, Adriana**

Filed on: **02/05/2021** Case Number History:

Cross-Reference Case A828981

Number:

CASE INFORMATION

§ §

Case Type:

Worker's Compensation

Appeal

Case Status:

02/05/2021 Open

DATE

CASE ASSIGNMENT

Current Case Assignment

Case Number A-21-828981-J
Court Department 14
Date Assigned 02/16/2021
Judicial Officer Escobar, Adriana

PARTY INFORMATION

Petitioner Castelan, Daniel

Lead Attorneys
Mills, Jason

Mills, Jason D. Retained 702-384-1616(W)

Respondent Employers Insurance Company of Nevada

Nevada Department of Administration, Hearings Divison Appeals Office

Benavidez, David H Retained 702-565-9730(W)

Peppermill Hotel & Casino

Peppermill Inc

DATE EVENTS & ORDERS OF THE COURT

INDEX

EVENTS

02/05/2021

Petition for Judicial Review

Filed by: Petitioner Castelan, Daniel [1] Petition for Judicial Review

02/05/2021

Initial Appearance Fee Disclosure

Filed By: Petitioner Castelan, Daniel [2] Initial Appearance Fee Disclosure

02/08/2021

Notice

Filed By: Petitioner Castelan, Daniel

[3] Notice of Request to Transmit the Record on Appeal

02/11/2021

Statement of Intent to Participate in Petition for Judicial

Filed By: Respondent Employers Insurance Company of Nevada

[4] Statement of Intent to Participate

CASE SUMMARY CASE NO. A-21-828981-J

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02/11/2021	Peremptory Challenge Filed by: Petitioner Castelan, Daniel [5] Peremptory Challenge of Judge
02/12/2021	Amended Petition Filed By: Petitioner Castelan, Daniel [6] First Amended Petition for Judicial Review
02/12/2021	Statement Filed by: Respondent Employers Insurance Company of Nevada [7] Amended Statement of Intent to Participate
02/16/2021	Notice of Department Reassignment [8] Notice of Department Reassignment
03/10/2021	Order Setting Hearing [9] Order Setting Hearing Re Petitition for Judical Review
03/23/2021	Motion Filed By: Petitioner Castelan, Daniel [10] Motion to Reset Petition Hearing Once Agency Has Transmitted Record on Appeal
03/24/2021	Clerk's Notice of Nonconforming Document [12] Notice of Nonconforming Document
03/26/2021	Clerk's Notice of Nonconforming Document and Curative Action [13] Clerk's Notice of Curative Action
03/26/2021	Clerk's Notice of Hearing [14] Notice of Hearing
03/26/2021	Certificate of Mailing Filed By: Petitioner Castelan, Daniel [15] Certificate of Mailing
05/10/2021	Transmittal of Record on Appeal Party: Respondent Nevada Department of Administration, Hearings Divison Appeals Office [16] Transmittal of Record on Appeal
05/10/2021	Affidavit Filed By: Respondent Nevada Department of Administration, Hearings Divison Appeals Office [17] Affidavit & Certification
05/10/2021	Certification of Transmittal Party: Respondent Nevada Department of Administration, Hearings Divison Appeals Office [18] Certification of Transmittal
06/23/2021	Stipulation and Order Filed by: Petitioner Castelan, Daniel [19] Stipulation and Order Extending Briefing Schedule
'	·

CASE SUMMARY CASE No. A-21-828981-J

	CASE NO. A-21-828981-J
07/08/2021	Brief Filed By: Petitioner Castelan, Daniel [20] Petitioner's Opening Brief A-21-828981-J
07/30/2021	Brief Filed By: Respondent Employers Insurance Company of Nevada [21] Respondent's Answering Brief
08/19/2021	Reply Filed by: Petitioner Castelan, Daniel [22] Petitioner's Reply Brief A-21-828981-J
08/20/2021	Request Filed by: Petitioner Castelan, Daniel [23] Request for Hearing on Petitioner's Petition for Judicial Review
08/20/2021	Clerk's Notice of Hearing [24] Notice of Hearing
08/26/2021	Motion to Continue Filed By: Petitioner Castelan, Daniel [25] Petitioner's Motion to Continue Hearing Set for September 23, 2021
08/26/2021	Clerk's Notice of Hearing [26] Notice of Hearing
09/20/2021	Stipulation and Order Filed by: Petitioner Castelan, Daniel [27] Stipulation and Order to Continue Hearing Set for September 23, 2021
11/03/2021	Objection Filed By: Respondent Employers Insurance Company of Nevada [28] Respondent's Objection to the Proposed Order Granting Petition for Judicial Review
11/03/2021	Order Granting Judicial Review of Administrative Decision [29] Order Granting Petition for Judicial Review A-20-828981-J
11/03/2021	Notice of Entry of Order Filed By: Petitioner Castelan, Daniel [30] Notice of Entry of Order
11/08/2021	Motion to Stay Filed By: Respondent Peppermill Hotel & Casino; Respondent Employers Insurance Company of Nevada [31] Motion for Stay Pending Supreme Court Review with Order Shortening Time
11/08/2021	Case Appeal Statement Filed By: Respondent Peppermill Hotel & Casino; Respondent Employers Insurance Company of Nevada [32] Case Appeal Statement
11/08/2021	Notice of Filing Cost Bond Filed By: Respondent Peppermill Hotel & Casino; Respondent Employers Insurance Company of Nevada

CASE SUMMARY CASE NO. A-21-828981-J

	[33] Notice of Filing Bond for Costs on Appeal	
11/08/2021	Notice of Appeal Filed By: Respondent Peppermill Hotel & Casino; Respondent Employers Insurance Company of Nevada [34] Notice of Appeal	
11/03/2021	DISPOSITIONS Order Granting Judicial Review (Judicial Officer: Escobar, Adriana) Debtors: Peppermill Hotel & Casino (Respondent), Employers Insurance Company of Nevada (Respondent), Nevada Department of Administration, Hearings Divison Appeals Office (Respondent), Peppermill Inc (Respondent) Creditors: Daniel Castelan (Petitioner) Judgment: 11/03/2021, Docketed: 11/04/2021	
	HEARINGS	
04/22/2021	CANCELED Petition for Judicial Review (10:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Escobar, Adriana) Vacated	
05/06/2021	CANCELED Motion (10:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Escobar, Adriana) Vacated Petitioner's Motion to Reset Petition Hearing Once Agency Has Transmitted Record on Appeal	I
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11/18/2021	CANCELED Motion to Continue (10:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Escobar, Adriana) Vacated Petitioner's Motion to Continue Hearing Set for September 23, 2021	
DATE	FINANCIAL INFORMATION	
	Petitioner Castelan, Daniel Total Charges Total Payments and Credits Balance Due as of 11/9/2021	450.00 450.00 0.00
	Respondent Employers Insurance Company of Nevada Total Charges Total Payments and Credits Balance Due as of 11/9/2021	24.00 24.00 0.00

Respondent Employers Insurance Company of Nevada Appeal Bond Balance as of 11/9/2021


500.00

DISTRICT COURT CIVIL COVER SHEET

		County, Nevada	CASE NO: A-21-82898
	Case No. (Assigned by Clerk's	r Offica)	Departmen
I. Party Information (provide both ho		s Office)	
Plaintiff(s) (name/address/phone):	me una maning addresses if afferent	Defendant(s) (nam	ne/address/phone):
DANIEL CAS	TELAN		eppermill Hotel & Casino,
P.O. Box 2			Insurance Company of Nevada,
Las Vegas, N			sion, Appeals Office, an Agency of the
Las Vegas, IV	V 03120	Tiearings Divis	State of Nevada
		A 11	
.ttorney (name/address/phone):	- For	Attorney (name/ad	idress/phone).
Jason D. Mill			
GGRM LAW			
2770 S. Maryland Pkwy., Ste. 1			
702-384-1			
I. Nature of Controversy (please so	elect the one most applicable filing type	: below)	
Civil Case Filing Types	1		
Real Property Landlord/Tenant	Negligence	Torts Other	Torts
Unlawful Detainer	Auto		duct Liability
Other Landlord/Tenant	Premises Liability	==	entional Misconduct
Title to Property	Other Negligence	<u> </u>	ployment Tort
Judicial Foreclosure	Malpractice		urance Tort
Other Title to Property	Medical/Dental		er Tort
Other Real Property	Legal		
Condemnation/Eminent Domain	Accounting		
Other Real Property	Other Malpractice		
Probate	Construction Defect & Contr	ract	Judicial Review/Appeal
Probate (select case type and estate value)	Construction Defect	Judici	al Review
Summary Administration	Chapter 40	For	eclosure Mediation Case
General Administration	Other Construction Defect	Peti	ition to Seal Records
Special Administration	Contract Case		ntal Competency
Set Aside	Uniform Commercial Code		a State Agency Appeal
Trust/Conservatorship	Building and Construction		partment of Motor Vehicle
Other Probate	Insurance Carrier		rker's Compensation
Estate Value	Commercial Instrument		er Nevada State Agency
Over \$200,000	Collection of Accounts		d Other
Between \$100,000 and \$200,000	Employment Contract		peal from Lower Court
Under \$100,000 or Unknown	Other Contract		er Judicial Review/Appeal
Under \$2,500			Out C' VEW
	l Writ		Other Civil Filing
Civil Writ			Civil Filing
Writ of Habeas Corpus	Writ of Prohibition	===	mpromise of Minor's Claim
Writ of Mandamus Other Civil Writ			eign Judgment
Writ of Quo Warrant	(Cl. 1 111 C1 1 1 1		er Civil Matters
	ourt filings should be filed using the	e Business Court ci	vil coversheet.
February 5, 2021			Jarle .
Date		Signature of thi	tiating parts or representative

Form PA 201 Rev 3.1

Nevada AOC - Research Statistics Unit Pursuant to NRS 3.275 See other side for family-related case filings



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1	OGJR
,	JASON D. MILLS, ESQ.
_	Nevada Bar No. 7447
3	GGRM LAW FIRM
4	JASON D. MILLS, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 7447 GGRM LAW FIRM 2770 S. Maryland Parkway, Suite 100 Las Vegas, Nevada 89109 Phone: (702) 384-1616
	Las Vegas, Nevada 89109
5	Phone: (702) 384-1616

Email: jmills@ggrmlawfirm.com

Attorneys for Petitioner

v.

Facsimile: (702) 384-2990

DISTRICT COURT

CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

DANIEL CASTELAN,	CASE NO: A-21-828981

Petitioner,

DEPT NO: XIV

PEPPERMILL, INC., EMPLOYERS INSURANCE COMPANY OF NEVADA and THE DEPARTMENT OF ADMINISTRATION, HEARINGS DIVISION, APPEALS OFFICE, an Agency of the State of Nevada

Respondents.

ORDER GRANTING PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW

This matter came before this Court on October 14, 2021, on the Petition for Judicial Review filed by Petitioner, DANIEL CASTELAN. Petitioner was represented JASON D. MILLS, ESQ. of GGRM LAW FIRM. Respondents,

PEPPERMILL, INC., and EMPLOYERS INSURANCE COMPANY OF NEVADA were represented by DAVID H. BENAVIDEZ, ESQ. of THE LAW OFFICE OF DAVID H. BENAVIDEZ. No other parties were present or represented.

After a review and consideration of the record, the Points and Authorities on file herein, and oral arguments of counsel, the Court hereby grants the Petition for Judicial Review, strikes the Appeals Officer's January 14, 2021, Decision and Order, reinstates the Appeals Officer's December 22, 2020, Decision and Order and orders the Respondent to authorize Dr. Shah's treatment plan outlined in his November 18, 2019 IME report, authorize Dr. Shah as the Petitioner's treating physician, and provide the Petitioner TTD benefits from November 18, 2019 to the present, plus interest.

FINDINGS OF FACT

The Petitioner sustained an industrial injury on December 31, 2017, while working in the course and scope of his employment with Peppermill Inc. ("Employer"). Specifically, while walking and carrying dishes, Petitioner slipped on standing water and fell, resulting in numerous facial injuries, a head injury and lacerations of the head and hand. (Record on Appeal "ROA" 206-247).

On January 16, 2018, the Respondent notified Petitioner that his claim was accepted for cervical strain, lumbar strain, right knee sprain, right elbow sprain,

facial contusion, forehead laceration, closed head injury, and left ring finger laceration. (ROA 268-269).

Following acceptance of liability for the industrial injury claim, Petitioner received medical treatment at Concentra Medical Centers from January 22, 2018, to approximately March 2, 2018. Petitioner also received medical treatment from Dr. Leo Germin for his head injury and, on December 12, 2018, a Hearing Officer affirmed the Respondent's October 31, 2018, determination denying his request for a follow up appointment with Dr. Germin. Petitioner timely appealed this Decision and Order to the Appeals Officer, resulting in Appeal Number 1908458-DM. (ROA 685-689).

On October 24, 2018, the Respondent denied Petitioner's request for payment of medical bills for dry eye syndrome treatment. This determination was affirmed by a Hearing Officer, which Petitioner timely appealed, resulting in Appeal Number 1908459-DM. (ROA 679-684).

As a result of the Respondent's determination to deny Petitioner's continued medical treatment with Dr. Germin, Petitioner requested that he be scheduled for an Independent Medical Evaluation pursuant to NRS 616C.145 with Dr. Russell Shah for his head injury. The Respondent failed to timely respond to this request, resulting in a de facto denial of this request, which the Petitioner timely appealed. A Hearing Officer affirmed the de facto denial and Petitioner timely appealed this

Decision and Order to the Appeals Officer, resulting in Appeal Number 1911529-DM. (ROA 664-669).

On December 4, 2018, Petitioner was placed on permanent light duty restrictions by Dr. Ronald Kong. These restrictions were based on the FCE performed on November 15, 2018, which indicated that Petitioner "did not appear to be capable of safely performing all of his pre-injury job duties (cleanup for Peppermill, Inc.) without modifications. Specifically, he appears to fall short of requirement for occasional lifting and carrying up to 80 lbs." The FCE report also indicated that Petitioner is capable of working a medium physical demand level. The FCE evaluation failed to consider the head injury. (ROA 354-378).

On February 5, 2019, the Vocational Rehabilitation Counselor notified Petitioner that the Employer offered him a permanent light duty job of hostess/cashier, which required him to "greet and seat guests, distribute guest between food servers, accept payment on guest tickets and give proper change, answer phones and properly direct calls and directing beverage service, bussing and cleaning of tables." The permanent light duty job was approved by Dr. Ronald Kong. The counselor also notified Petitioner that because of the permanent light duty job offer, his vocational rehabilitation process closed February 12, 2019, and his vocational rehabilitation maintenance was terminated. (ROA 389). Petitioner did not accept this light duty position because of his head injury.

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Petitioner timely appealed the Vocational Rehabilitation counselor's determination dated February 5, 2019, and the Hearing Officer was bypassed, resulting in Appeal Number 1912693-DM. (ROA 645-652).

On December 12, 2018, and December 19, 2018, the Respondent notified Petitioner that his claim was closed for further medical treatment, and he was scheduled for a PPD Evaluation. This determination was affirmed by a Hearing Officer on March 6, 2019, which Petitioner timely appealed, resulting in Appeal Number 1913110-DM. (ROA 639-644).

On February 1, 2019, Petitioner underwent a PPD evaluation with Dr. Gobinder Chopra, who indicated that Petitioner had a 0% whole person impairment. On February 11, 2019, the Respondent notified Petitioner that his claim was closed with a 0% whole person impairment. Petitioner timely appealed this determination, and the Hearing Officer was bypassed, resulting in Appeal Number 1913610-DM. (ROA 405-412).

On November 6, 2019, the Appeals Officer filed an Interim Order which ordered that Petitioner undergo an Independent Medical Evaluation with Dr. Russell Shah for the Petitioner's head injury. (ROA 176-179).

On November 18, 2019, Petitioner underwent the IME with Dr. Shah. Dr. Shah opined that Petitioner's industrially related impressions include a concussion with "post concussive syndrome with continued cognitive impairment, sleep

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impairment and vestibular impairment consisting of memory difficulties, focusing difficulties, insomnia, restlessness and imbalance sensations." Dr. Shah also indicated that Petitioner needed additional medical treatment for his head injury, and he had not reached maximum medical improvement for the concussion and that he "more likely than not has a permanent post traumatic brain injury from the December 31, 2017, trauma." Dr. Shah recommended further medical treatment, including brain exercises, medication, and cognitive behavioral therapy. Dr. Shah also placed Petitioner on temporary disability. (ROA 164-175).

On January 17, 2020, Petitioner requested authorization for Dr. Shah's treatment plan. However, the Respondent failed to respond to this request, resulting in a de facto denial. Petitioner appealed this determination to the Hearing Officer, but the matter was subsequently bypassed to the Appeals Officer, resulting in Appeal Number 2017002-DM. (ROA 133-141).

All appeal numbers were consolidated with Appeal Number 1908458-DM before Appeals Officer Denise McKay. Esq. (ROA 131-132).

On October 22, 2020, the consolidated appeals 1908458-DM, et al. came on for hearing before Appeals Officer Denise McKay, Esq. and a ruling was issued from the bench. (ROA 42-49). Specifically, during her ruling the Appeals Officer stated, "With regard to the light-duty job offer, I don't necessarily agree that Dr. Shah needs to opine on it because Dr. Shah has clearly said this claimant needs

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much more testing and treatment, so it doesn't seem worthwhile to even ask Dr. Shah to opine on that." (ROA 42, lines 14-18). Further the Appeals Officer stated, "the time is not right for anybody to be determining if this claimant is ready to take this valid light-duty job offer." (ROA 46, lines 15-17). Finally, the Appeals Officer stated, "With regard to the entirety of Dr. Shah's reporting and his phrasing about the temporary disability, he's substantially complied with this slip requirement." (ROA 49, lines 5-8).

On November 20, 2020, Petitioner's Counsel, Jason D. Mills, Esq. hand delivered the Proposed Decision and Order for the consolidated matters to the Administrative Court and sent the Proposed Decision and Order via fax to Respondent's counsel. (ROA 99-100).

On December 9, 2020, the Respondent filed its "Motion to Reconsider the Appeals Officer Decision Regarding TTD." (ROA 68-98). In its Motion, the Respondent conceded to having drafted a letter to Dr. Shah after the administrative trial ("Trial") had concluded, stating that "On October 28, 2020, Insurer Counsel drafted a letter to Dr. Shah asking the doctor if he found the claimant disabled from employment. If not did he agree with the permanent job offered by the employer." (ROA 68-69). Based on this newly manufactured evidence, not newly discovered, the Respondent moved the Administrative Court to "reconsider [the] order for TTD." (ROA 69).

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On December 22, 2020, the Appeals Officer issued Administrative Decision and Order 1908458-DM et al. which found, in relevant part:

> "Regarding appeal number 1912693-DM, under NRS 616C.590, the vocational rehabilitation issue is premature at this time because he has not been placed on a permanent light duty restriction based upon his closed head injuries because he is not at maximum medical improvement. Additionally, Dr. Shah's reporting of November 18, 2019, indicates that as of that date, claimant is on temporary total disability status as it pertains to Claimant's industrial closed head injury. As such, the Claimant is entitled to TTD benefits pursuant to NRS 616C.475, plus interest pursuant to NRS 616C.335."

(ROA 59).

"The full nature and duration and whether claimant can return to gainful employment will be determined by Dr. Shah in the future following additional industrial care by Dr. Shah. At that time, depending on the subsequent findings by Dr. Shah, the issue of permanent restrictions and what type, if any, permanent modified duty job Claimant is capable of performing will be determined at that time pursuant to NRS 616C.590. However, the issue is not currently ripe for adjudication given the state of Claimant's temporary total disability status."

(ROA 59).

Following these Conclusions of Law, the Appeals Officer ordered "that the determination from the vocational rehabilitation services counselor dated February 5, 2019, is also **REVERSED** and the Insurer is **REMANDED** to provide Claimant

TTD benefits from November 18, 2019, to the present, plus interest." (ROA 59-60).

On January 14, 2021, the Appeals Officer issued her Order Granting the Respondent's Motion for Reconsideration, which merely amended the December 22, 2020, Order, rather than schedule the rehearing within 30 days of the granted petition, as required by NAC 616C.327. (ROA 51-53). The Appeals Officer amended the December 22, 2020, Order to erroneously deny the Petitioner's entitlement to TTD benefits. Id.

The Petitioner timely filed his Petition for Judicial Review of the Administrative Court on grounds that the Order as amended by the Appeals Officer on January 14, 2021, violates the substantial rights of the Petitioner as it was rendered upon unlawful procedure and is in excess of the statutory authority of the agency, pursuant to NRS 233B.135(3).

On May 11, 2021, the Department of Administration transmitted the Record on Appeal, and the Petitioner filed his Opening Brief on July 8, 2021. The Respondent filed its Answering Brief on July 30, 2021, and the Petitioner filed his Reply Brief on August 19, 2021. This Petition for Judicial Review came before the Court on October 14, 2021.

The Issue before the Court is whether the Appeals Officer's Decision and Order initially dated December 22, 2020, but later modified by the Appeals

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Officer, in violation of NAC 616C.372 on January 14, 2021, was improper. The determinations initially giving rise to this dispute are the Insurer's ("Respondent") February 11, 2019, determination regarding the Claimant's ("Petitioner") treatment with Dr. Shah and the Respondent's February 5, 2019, determination regarding the Petitioner's vocational rehabilitation status and entitlement to temporary total disability ("TTD") benefits.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

In contested workers' compensation claims, judicial review first requires an identification of whether the issue to be resolved is a factual or legal issue. While questions of law may be reviewed de novo by this Court, a more deferential standard must be employed when reviewing the factual findings of an administrative adjudicator.

NRS 233B.135, which governs judicial review of a final decision of an administrative agency, provides, in pertinent part, the following:

- 2. The final decision of the agency shall be deemed reasonable and lawful until reversed or set aside in whole or in part by the court. The burden of proof is on the party attacking or resisting the decision to show that the final decision is invalid pursuant to subsection 3.
- 3. The court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of evidence on a question of fact. The court may remand or affirm the final decision or set it aside in whole or in part if substantial rights of



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the petitioner have been prejudiced because the final decision of the agency is:

- In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;
 - (b) In excess of the statutory authority of the agency;
 - (c) Made upon unlawful procedure;
 - (d) Affected by other error of law;
- (e) Clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative and substantial evidence on the whole record; or
- (f) Arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion.

Relating to the standard of review of administrative decisions, our Supreme Court has consistently held that the factual findings made by administrative adjudicators may not be disturbed on appeal unless they lack the support of substantial evidence. SIIS v. Hicks, 100 Nev. 567, 688 P.2d 324 (1984); SIIS v. Thomas, 101 Nev. 293, 701 P.2d 1012 (1985); SIIS v. Swinney, 103 Nev. 17, 731 P.2d 359 (1987); SIIS v. Christensen, 106 Nev. 85, 787 P.2d 408 (1990).

Thus, "the central inquiry is whether substantial evidence in the record supports the agency decision." Brocas v. Mirage Hotel & Casino, 109 Nev. 579, 583, 854 P.2d 862, 865 (1993). Substantial evidence is "that quantity and quality of evidence which a reasonable [person] could accept as adequate to support a conclusion." State Employment Sec. Dep't v. Hilton Hotels, 102 Nev. 606, 608 n.1, 729 P.2d 497, 498 n.1 (1986). Therefore, if the agency's decision lacks substantial evidentiary support, the decision is unsustainable as being arbitrary and capricious. Barrick Goldstrike Mine v. Peterson, 116 Nev. 541, 547, 2 P.3d 850,

854 (2000). The Court must defer to an agency's findings of fact only as long as they are supported by substantial evidence. <u>Law Offices of Barry Levinson v.</u>

Milko, 124 Nev. 355, 362, 184 P.3d 378, 383-84 (2008).

On the other hand, purely legal questions may be determined by the District Court without deference to an agency determination, upon de novo review. <u>SIIS</u> v. Khweiss, 108 Nev. at 126, 825 P.2d at 220 (1992). Furthermore, the construction of a statute is a question of law, subject to de novo review. <u>See State, Dep't of Motor Vehicles v. Lovett</u>, 110 Nev. 473, 476, 874 P.2d 1274, 1249 (1994).

However, NRS 233B.135(3) identifies multiple scenarios in which the reviewing court may set it aside in whole or in part an administrative decision. That is when a petitioner's substantial rights have been prejudiced as a result of unlawful procedure. *See* NRS 233B.135(3)(c).

Further, the Supreme Court of Nevada has determined that a reviewing court may set aside an agency decision if substantial rights of the petitioner have been prejudiced because the decision of the agency is in violation of constitution or statutory provisions. Field v. State, Dep't of Motor Vehicles & Pub. Safety, 111 Nev. 552, 554, (1995).

In this matter, the Administrative Order as amended by the Appeals Officer on January 14, 2021, contains both violation of regulatory law as well as unlawful procedure, and this Court finds that it is clearly prejudicial to the Petitioner's

substantial rights. The Administrative Order, as amended by the Appeals Officer on January 14, 2021, directly contradicts the plain and unambiguous language found in NAC 616C.327. Specifically, NAC 616C.327(2) states:

2. The appeals officer shall grant or deny the petition for rehearing within 15 days after the receipt of the petition. If the petition is granted, the rehearing must be held within 30 days after the petition is granted.

The Court finds that the language of NAC 616C.327 is plain and unambiguous. Accordingly, there is no need to go beyond this plain meaning. *See* City of N. Las Vegas v. Warburton, 127 Nev. 682, 686, (2011) ("When the text of a statute is plain and unambiguous, [we] should ... not go beyond that meaning."), and Silver State Elec. v. State, Dep't of Tax., 123 Nev. 80, 85, (2007) ("These rules of statutory construction also apply to administrative regulations"). Therefore, if a petition for rehearing is granted, or in this instance, a motion for reconsideration, the appeals officer is required to hold the rehearing within 30 days after the petition is granted. *See* NAC 616C.327(2).

The Court acknowledges that motions for reconsideration are not recognized under Nevada Workers' Compensation administration, rather petitions for rehearing are the regulatorily accepted means for aggrieved parties to seek remedies outside of the appellate process. *See* NAC 616C.327. But for the purposes of this Order, the Court will treat the Respondent's motion for

reconsideration as a petition for rehearing, as the title of the respondent's December 9, 2020, document has no bearing on the Court's decision in this case.

The Court finds that the amendments made to the Administrative Decision post trial, and therefore the Administrative Decision in and of itself, are in violation of regulatory and statutory law. NRS 233B.135(3)(c) provides that a court may remand an agency decision if the Petitioner's substantial rights have been prejudiced because the agency's decision is made upon unlawful procedure or is in violation of statutory procedures. The Supreme Court of Nevada has previously found that an appeals officer's failure to meet relevant statutory requirements is considered "procedurally deficient." Elizondo v. Hood Mach., Inc., 129 Nev. 780, 785, (2013).

In <u>Elizondo</u>, the Supreme Court of Nevada considered whether an administrative order that failed to include "findings of fact and conclusions of law, separately stated" pursuant to NRS 233B.125 was procedurally sufficient. <u>Id</u>. The Court in <u>Elizondo</u> found that because the language of NRS 233B.125 was plain and unambiguous ("a final decision must include findings of fact and conclusions of law, separately stated"), the appeals officer was bound by this mandate. <u>Id</u>. The Court went on to conclude that "the appeals officer's order fails to meet the statutory requirements of NRS 233B.125 and is thus procedurally deficient." <u>Id</u>.

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The Court finds that the facts of Elizondo are similar to the facts of this petition, and the facts before this Court lend themselves to an interpretation under the precedent established by the Supreme Court of Nevada in Elizondo. The appeals officer violated plain and unambiguous regulatory law when she failed to hold a rehearing within 30 days after the Respondent's Motion was granted, as it is evident that no rehearing was scheduled. Rather, the appeals officer simply granted the Respondent's Motion and stripped the Petitioner of his monetary benefits via amended order. The Appeals Officer's failure to schedule the rehearing directly contradicts NAC 616C.327, which constitutes a clear violation of a regulatory provision and is highly prejudicial to the Petitioner's substantial rights.

Accordingly, the Administrative Order is in direct violation of relevant regulatory provisions, is highly prejudicial to his substantial rights, and therefore must be found to be procedurally deficient pursuant to NRS 233B.135, as clarified in Elizondo v. Hood Mach., Inc., 129 Nev. 780, (2013).

In support of its position, the Respondent argued that the Administrative Order is supported by substantial evidence and contains no error of law. (Respondent's Brief p. 8). For the aforementioned reasons, the Court finds that this argument bears no relevance to judicial review as NRS 233B.135(3) identifies multiple scenarios in which the reviewing court may set it aside in whole or in part

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an administrative decision. That is when a petitioner's substantial rights have been prejudiced as a result of unlawful procedure. See NRS 233B.135(3)(c).

Further, the Respondent argued that its motion for reconsideration was proper as it was based on newly discovered evidence. (Respondent's Brief p. 14-15). However, the Court concludes that the response from Dr. Shah fails to meet the burden of "newly discovered evidence."

In workers' compensation matters, rehearing of a decision is only appropriate if it is "based on good cause or newly discovered evidence." See NAC 616C.327(1). However, the Respondent failed to show good cause for rehearing, and failed to produce newly discovered evidence.

Though the precedential case law in the state of Nevada is limited on the question of newly discovered evidence in civil cases, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has found that "evidence is not newly discovered if it was in the party's possession at the time of summary judgement or could have been discovered with reasonable diligence." Wallis v. J.R. Simplot Co., 26 F.3d 885, 892 n.6 (9th Cir. 1994) (emphasis added); see also Defs. Of Wildlife v. Bernal, 204 F.3d 920, 929 (9th Cir. 2000) (providing that, in moving for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence under FRCP 59(a), the movant must demonstrate "the exercise of due diligence would not have resulted in the evidence being discovered at an earlier stage").

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Nevada's higher courts have confirmed this interpretation of "newly discovered evidence" in various unpublished opinions, through their reliance on Drespel v. Drespel, 56 Nev. 368, 374, (1935) (recognizing that evidence that was within a party's power to present during a first trial will not constitute newly discovered evidence supporting a grant of a motion for a new trial). The Court in Drespel was presented with the question of whether a new trial should be grand upon the ground of newly discovered evidence following the plaintiff's recovery in a divorce action. Drespel v. Drespel, 56 Nev. 368, (1935). The Court ultimately affirmed the denial of a new trial on grounds that "reasonable diligence was not used prior to the trial to discover the evidence offered." Id. (emphasis added). Therefore, because there was no evidence that reasonable diligence was used prior to the trial to discover the evidence offered in support of the motion for new trial, the evidence offered failed to constitute "newly discovered evidence." Id.

Most recently, the Nevada Supreme Court has confirmed that the "reasonable diligence" standard for the effort of a moving party is a low threshold. In Motor Coach Indus., Inc. v. Khiabani by & through Rigaud, 137 Nev. Adv. Op. 42, 493 P.3d 1007 (2021) the Appellant, Motor Coach, had moved the lower court for a new trial following the entry of judgement upon jury verdict for the Appellee. The theory put forth by Motor Coach was that news reporting that occurred post trial "brought to light new facts that merited a new trial." Id. 1015. Motor Coach

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went on to argue that "the revelations in these reports placed Khiabani's continued employment—had he lived—in such doubt that a new trial was warranted." Id. 1015–16. However, the both the District Court and the Supreme Court in Khiabani disagreed with this argument, as evidence put forth showed that the Appellee "provided MCI with a release months before trial commenced, authorizing MCI to obtain Khiabani's employment information from the medical school." Id. 1016. The Court went on to find that, because Motor Coach failed to subpoena the Appellee's employment information, the evidence could have been discovered with reasonable diligence, and therefore this information fails to constitute "newly discovered evidence."

Similarly, in this case, the Court finds that the evidence submitted by the Respondent in support of its Motion for Reconsideration could have been discovered with reasonable diligence during the normal course of discovery, prior to the conclusion of the administrative trial, and therefore must not be considered "newly discovered." The Court finds that the Respondent cannot show that the documents offered in support of its Motion for Reconsideration satisfy the burden of being considered "newly discovered." In support of its Motion for Reconsideration, the Respondent supplied only the response of Dr. Shah to a letter crafted by the Respondent's counsel on October 28, 2020, post-trial. The Respondent conceded in its Motion and its Brief that it was only after the Appeals

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Officer issued a ruling ordering the Respondent to pay TTD benefits that Respondent's counsel prepared the letter to Dr. Shah. (ROA 68-69, Respondent's Brief p. 6-7). The Respondent made no allegation that this evidence was unobtainable prior to the administrative trial, and the Court concludes that, had Respondent's counsel simply exercised reasonable diligence, this evidence could have easily been obtained and submitted to the record prior to the October 22, 2020, hearing.

Rather than exercising reasonable diligence, Respondent simply waited until the date of the administrative trial, waited for the presentation of the Petitioner's arguments and evidence, and then waited until an adverse ruling had been issued against it before making the decision to go on an improper and unwarranted post-trial discovery expedition. Therefore, the Court concludes that the ill-gotten means by which the December 7, 2020, response from Dr. Shah was procured mandate that the response be stricken from the record as a fugitive document and that because this document was obtained improperly, through unauthorized and improper post-trial discovery, this document has no effect upon this industrial injury claim.

ORDER

In summation, THIS COURT FINDS AND HEREBY ORDERS that the January 14, 2021, Decision and Order is in violation of statutory provisions, made GGRM
NEVADA'S PREMIER INJURY

upon unlawful procedure, and violates the Petitioner's substantial rights. Based on the Court's finding, it is hereby ORDERED the Appeals Officer's January 14, 2021, Decision and Order is stricken, Appeals Officer's December 22, 2020, Decision and Order is reinstated, and the Respondent is ordered to authorize Dr. Shah's treatment plan outlined in his November 18, 2019, IME report, authorize Dr. Shah as the Petitioner's treating physician, and provide the Petitioner TTD benefits from November 18, 2019, to the present, plus interest

DATED this <u>Q. Escalay of</u> , 2021.

ADRIANA ESCOBAR
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

Submitted by: GGRM LAW FIRM

Dated this 3rd day of November, 2021

O. Escoleria

20A 746 3D18 705A Adriana Escobar District Court Judge

By: /s/ Jason D. Mills, Esq.
JASON D. MILLS, ESQ.
Nevada Bar No. 7447
2770 S. Maryland Parkway
Suite 100
Las Vegas, Nevada 89109
Attorney for Petitioner

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO COURT GUIDELINES

Counsel submitting this document certifies as follows (check one):

_____ The court has waived the requirements set forth in the Guidelines;

____ No party appeared at the hearing or filed an objection to the motion;

X I have delivered a copy of this proposed order to all counsel who appeared at the hearing, and each has approved or disapproved the order, or failed to respond as indicated below:

[] Approved [X] Disapproved [] Failed to Respond

/s/ David Benavidez

DAVID H. BENAVIDEZ ESQ., of THE LAW OFFICE OF DAVID H. BENAVIDEZ, Attorney for Respondents PEPPERMILL, INC., and EMPLOYERS INSURANCE COMPANY OF NEVADA.

Ethan Wallace

From: David Benavidez <davidbenavidez@gmail.com>

Sent: Monday, November 1, 2021 7:19 AM

To: Jason Mills
Cc: Ethan Wallace

Subject: Re: Proposed Order Granting PJR, Castelan v. Peppermill, Inc et al., A-21-828981-J

Disapproved.

On Sun, Oct 31, 2021 at 6:36 PM Jason Mills < mills@ggrmlawfirm.com > wrote:

Dave;

Do you want me to put your electronic signature attached along with the "**DISAPPROVED**" check box or do you wish me to leave your electronic signature off/blank and simply check "**FAILED TO RESPOND**" on the order I am submitting to the court?

Thank you, sir.



Jason D. Mills, Esq.
Strategic Development Partner

O: 702.384.1616 | F: 702.384.2990 | <u>www.ggrmlawfirm.com</u> 2770 S. Maryland Pkwy., Ste. 100 Las Vegas, NV 89109









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2	DISTRICT COURT		
3	CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA		
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6	Daniel Castelan, Petitioner(s)	CASE NO: A-21-828981-J	
7	VS.	DEPT. NO. Department 14	
8	Peppermill Hotel & Casino,		
9	Respondent(s)		
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11	AUTOMATED CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE		
12			
13	Court. The foregoing Order Granting Judicial Review of Administrative Decision was served via the court's electronic eFile system to all recipients registered for e-Service on the above		
14	entitled case as listed below:		
15	Service Date: 11/3/2021		
16	Ethan Wallace	ewallace@ggrmlawfirm.com	
17	Veronica Salas	vsalas@ggrmlawfirm.com	
18	Jason Mills	jmills@ggrmlawfirm.com	
19	Denise McKay	denise.mckay@admin.nv.gov	
20		davidbenavidez@gmail.com	
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JASON D. MILLS, ESQ.

Nevada Bar No. 7447

GGRM LAW FIRM

2770 S. Maryland Parkway, Suite 100

Las Vegas, Nevada 89109

Phone: (702) 384-1616

Facsimile: (702) 384-2990

Email: jmills@ggrmlawfirm.com

Attorneys for Petitioner

DISTRICT COURT

CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

DANIEL CASTELAN,

Petitioner,

v.

PEPPERMILL, INC., EMPLOYERS INSURANCE COMPANY OF NEVADA and THE DEPARTMENT OF ADMINISTRATION, HEARINGS DIVISION, APPEALS OFFICE, an Agency of the State of Nevada

Respondents.

CASE NO: A-21-828981-J

DEPT NO: XIV

NOTICE OF ENTRY OF ORDER

All parties of interest. TO:

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that an Order was entered in the above-entitled

case on the 3rd day of November, 2021.

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A true and accurate copy	of which	is attached
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DATED this 3rd day of November, 2021.

GGRM LAW FIRM

By: /s/ Jason D. Mills, Esq.
JASON D. MILLS, ESQ.
Nevada Bar No. 7447
2770 S. Maryland Parkway
Suite 100
Las Vegas, Nevada 89109
Attorney for Petitioner

GGRM VADA'S PREMIER INJURY

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

ELECTRONIC

Pursuant to NRCP 5(b), I certify that I am an employee of GGRM LAW FIRM, and that on the 3rd day of November, 2021, I caused the foregoing document entitled NOTICE OF ENTRY OF ORDER to be served upon those persons designated by parties in the E-Service Master List for the above-referenced matter in the Eighth Judicial District Court eFiling System in accordance with the mandatory electronic service requirements of Administrative Order 14-2 and the Nevada Electronic Filing and Conversion Rules, to wit:

BY MAIL

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 3rd day of November, 2021, I served the foregoing by placing a copy of the NOTICE OF ENTRY OF ORDER which a true copy thereof was placed in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, addressed to:

David H. Benavidez, Esq. The Law Office of David H. Benavidez 850 S. Boulder Highway #375 Henderson, Nevada 89015

/s/ Ethan Wallace
An Employee of GGRM LAW FIRM

ELECTRONICALLY SERVED 11/3/2021 1:48 PM

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Attorneys for Petitioner

DISTRICT COURT

CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

DANIEL CASTELAN,

CASE NO: A-21-828981-J

Petitioner,

DEPT NO: XIV

v.

PEPPERMILL, INC., EMPLOYERS INSURANCE COMPANY OF NEVADA and THE DEPARTMENT OF ADMINISTRATION, HEARINGS DIVISION, APPEALS OFFICE, an Agency of the State of Nevada

Respondents.

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ORDER GRANTING PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW

This matter came before this Court on October 14, 2021, on the Petition for Judicial Review filed by Petitioner, DANIEL CASTELAN. Petitioner was represented JASON D. MILLS, ESQ. of GGRM LAW FIRM. Respondents,

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PEPPERMILL, INC., and EMPLOYERS INSURANCE COMPANY OF NEVADA were represented by DAVID H. BENAVIDEZ, ESQ. of THE LAW OFFICE OF DAVID H. BENAVIDEZ. No other parties were present or represented.

After a review and consideration of the record, the Points and Authorities on file herein, and oral arguments of counsel, the Court hereby grants the Petition for Judicial Review, strikes the Appeals Officer's January 14, 2021, Decision and Order, reinstates the Appeals Officer's December 22, 2020, Decision and Order and orders the Respondent to authorize Dr. Shah's treatment plan outlined in his November 18, 2019 IME report, authorize Dr. Shah as the Petitioner's treating physician, and provide the Petitioner TTD benefits from November 18, 2019 to the present, plus interest.

FINDINGS OF FACT

The Petitioner sustained an industrial injury on December 31, 2017, while working in the course and scope of his employment with Peppermill Inc. ("Employer"). Specifically, while walking and carrying dishes, Petitioner slipped on standing water and fell, resulting in numerous facial injuries, a head injury and lacerations of the head and hand. (Record on Appeal "ROA" 206-247).

On January 16, 2018, the Respondent notified Petitioner that his claim was accepted for cervical strain, lumbar strain, right knee sprain, right elbow sprain,

facial contusion, forehead laceration, closed head injury, and left ring finger laceration. (ROA 268-269).

Following acceptance of liability for the industrial injury claim, Petitioner received medical treatment at Concentra Medical Centers from January 22, 2018, to approximately March 2, 2018. Petitioner also received medical treatment from Dr. Leo Germin for his head injury and, on December 12, 2018, a Hearing Officer affirmed the Respondent's October 31, 2018, determination denying his request for a follow up appointment with Dr. Germin. Petitioner timely appealed this Decision and Order to the Appeals Officer, resulting in Appeal Number 1908458-DM. (ROA 685-689).

On October 24, 2018, the Respondent denied Petitioner's request for payment of medical bills for dry eye syndrome treatment. This determination was affirmed by a Hearing Officer, which Petitioner timely appealed, resulting in Appeal Number 1908459-DM. (ROA 679-684).

As a result of the Respondent's determination to deny Petitioner's continued medical treatment with Dr. Germin, Petitioner requested that he be scheduled for an Independent Medical Evaluation pursuant to NRS 616C.145 with Dr. Russell Shah for his head injury. The Respondent failed to timely respond to this request, resulting in a de facto denial of this request, which the Petitioner timely appealed. A Hearing Officer affirmed the de facto denial and Petitioner timely appealed this

Decision and Order to the Appeals Officer, resulting in Appeal Number 1911529-DM. (ROA 664-669).

On December 4, 2018, Petitioner was placed on permanent light duty restrictions by Dr. Ronald Kong. These restrictions were based on the FCE performed on November 15, 2018, which indicated that Petitioner "did not appear to be capable of safely performing all of his pre-injury job duties (cleanup for Peppermill, Inc.) without modifications. Specifically, he appears to fall short of requirement for occasional lifting and carrying up to 80 lbs." The FCE report also indicated that Petitioner is capable of working a medium physical demand level. The FCE evaluation failed to consider the head injury. (ROA 354-378).

On February 5, 2019, the Vocational Rehabilitation Counselor notified Petitioner that the Employer offered him a permanent light duty job of hostess/cashier, which required him to "greet and seat guests, distribute guest between food servers, accept payment on guest tickets and give proper change, answer phones and properly direct calls and directing beverage service, bussing and cleaning of tables." The permanent light duty job was approved by Dr. Ronald Kong. The counselor also notified Petitioner that because of the permanent light duty job offer, his vocational rehabilitation process closed February 12, 2019, and his vocational rehabilitation maintenance was terminated. (ROA 389). Petitioner did not accept this light duty position because of his head injury.

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Petitioner timely appealed the Vocational Rehabilitation counselor's determination dated February 5, 2019, and the Hearing Officer was bypassed, resulting in Appeal Number 1912693-DM. (ROA 645-652).

On December 12, 2018, and December 19, 2018, the Respondent notified Petitioner that his claim was closed for further medical treatment, and he was scheduled for a PPD Evaluation. This determination was affirmed by a Hearing Officer on March 6, 2019, which Petitioner timely appealed, resulting in Appeal Number 1913110-DM. (ROA 639-644).

On February 1, 2019, Petitioner underwent a PPD evaluation with Dr. Gobinder Chopra, who indicated that Petitioner had a 0% whole person impairment. On February 11, 2019, the Respondent notified Petitioner that his claim was closed with a 0% whole person impairment. Petitioner timely appealed this determination, and the Hearing Officer was bypassed, resulting in Appeal Number 1913610-DM. (ROA 405-412).

On November 6, 2019, the Appeals Officer filed an Interim Order which ordered that Petitioner undergo an Independent Medical Evaluation with Dr. Russell Shah for the Petitioner's head injury. (ROA 176-179).

On November 18, 2019, Petitioner underwent the IME with Dr. Shah. Dr. Shah opined that Petitioner's industrially related impressions include a concussion with "post concussive syndrome with continued cognitive impairment, sleep

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impairment and vestibular impairment consisting of memory difficulties, focusing difficulties, insomnia, restlessness and imbalance sensations." Dr. Shah also indicated that Petitioner needed additional medical treatment for his head injury, and he had not reached maximum medical improvement for the concussion and that he "more likely than not has a permanent post traumatic brain injury from the December 31, 2017, trauma." Dr. Shah recommended further medical treatment, including brain exercises, medication, and cognitive behavioral therapy. Dr. Shah also placed Petitioner on temporary disability. (ROA 164-175).

On January 17, 2020, Petitioner requested authorization for Dr. Shah's treatment plan. However, the Respondent failed to respond to this request, resulting in a de facto denial. Petitioner appealed this determination to the Hearing Officer, but the matter was subsequently bypassed to the Appeals Officer, resulting in Appeal Number 2017002-DM. (ROA 133-141).

All appeal numbers were consolidated with Appeal Number 1908458-DM before Appeals Officer Denise McKay. Esq. (ROA 131-132).

On October 22, 2020, the consolidated appeals 1908458-DM, et al. came on for hearing before Appeals Officer Denise McKay, Esq. and a ruling was issued from the bench. (ROA 42-49). Specifically, during her ruling the Appeals Officer stated, "With regard to the light-duty job offer, I don't necessarily agree that Dr. Shah needs to opine on it because Dr. Shah has clearly said this claimant needs

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much more testing and treatment, so it doesn't seem worthwhile to even ask Dr. Shah to opine on that." (ROA 42, lines 14-18). Further the Appeals Officer stated, "the time is not right for anybody to be determining if this claimant is ready to take this valid light-duty job offer." (ROA 46, lines 15-17). Finally, the Appeals Officer stated, "With regard to the entirety of Dr. Shah's reporting and his phrasing about the temporary disability, he's substantially complied with this slip requirement." (ROA 49, lines 5-8).

On November 20, 2020, Petitioner's Counsel, Jason D. Mills, Esq. hand delivered the Proposed Decision and Order for the consolidated matters to the Administrative Court and sent the Proposed Decision and Order via fax to Respondent's counsel. (ROA 99-100).

On December 9, 2020, the Respondent filed its "Motion to Reconsider the Appeals Officer Decision Regarding TTD." (ROA 68-98). In its Motion, the Respondent conceded to having drafted a letter to Dr. Shah after the administrative trial ("Trial") had concluded, stating that "On October 28, 2020, Insurer Counsel drafted a letter to Dr. Shah asking the doctor if he found the claimant disabled from employment. If not did he agree with the permanent job offered by the employer." (ROA 68-69). Based on this newly manufactured evidence, not newly discovered, the Respondent moved the Administrative Court to "reconsider [the] order for TTD." (ROA 69).

"Regarding appeal number 1912693-DM, under NRS 616C.590, the vocational rehabilitation issue is premature at this time because he has not been placed on a permanent light duty restriction based upon his closed head injuries because he is not at maximum medical improvement. Additionally, Dr. Shah's reporting of November 18, 2019, indicates that as of that date, claimant is on temporary total disability status as it pertains to Claimant's industrial closed head injury. As such, the Claimant is entitled to TTD benefits pursuant to NRS 616C.475, plus interest pursuant to NRS 616C.335."

(ROA 59).

"The full nature and duration and whether claimant can return to gainful employment will be determined by Dr. Shah in the future following additional industrial care by Dr. Shah. At that time, depending on the subsequent findings by Dr. Shah, the issue of permanent restrictions and what type, if any, permanent modified duty job Claimant is capable of performing will be determined at that time pursuant to NRS 616C.590. However, the issue is not currently ripe for adjudication given the state of Claimant's temporary total disability status."

(ROA 59).

Following these Conclusions of Law, the Appeals Officer ordered "that the determination from the vocational rehabilitation services counselor dated February 5, 2019, is also **REVERSED** and the Insurer is **REMANDED** to provide Claimant

TTD benefits from November 18, 2019, to the present, plus interest." (ROA 59-60).

On January 14, 2021, the Appeals Officer issued her Order Granting the Respondent's Motion for Reconsideration, which merely amended the December 22, 2020, Order, rather than schedule the rehearing within 30 days of the granted petition, as required by NAC 616C.327. (ROA 51-53). The Appeals Officer amended the December 22, 2020, Order to erroneously deny the Petitioner's entitlement to TTD benefits. Id.

The Petitioner timely filed his Petition for Judicial Review of the Administrative Court on grounds that the Order as amended by the Appeals Officer on January 14, 2021, violates the substantial rights of the Petitioner as it was rendered upon unlawful procedure and is in excess of the statutory authority of the agency, pursuant to NRS 233B.135(3).

On May 11, 2021, the Department of Administration transmitted the Record on Appeal, and the Petitioner filed his Opening Brief on July 8, 2021. The Respondent filed its Answering Brief on July 30, 2021, and the Petitioner filed his Reply Brief on August 19, 2021. This Petition for Judicial Review came before the Court on October 14, 2021.

The Issue before the Court is whether the Appeals Officer's Decision and Order initially dated December 22, 2020, but later modified by the Appeals

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Officer, in violation of NAC 616C.372 on January 14, 2021, was improper. The determinations initially giving rise to this dispute are the Insurer's ("Respondent") February 11, 2019, determination regarding the Claimant's ("Petitioner") treatment with Dr. Shah and the Respondent's February 5, 2019, determination regarding the Petitioner's vocational rehabilitation status and entitlement to temporary total disability ("TTD") benefits.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

In contested workers' compensation claims, judicial review first requires an identification of whether the issue to be resolved is a factual or legal issue. While questions of law may be reviewed de novo by this Court, a more deferential standard must be employed when reviewing the factual findings of an administrative adjudicator.

NRS 233B.135, which governs judicial review of a final decision of an administrative agency, provides, in pertinent part, the following:

- 2. The final decision of the agency shall be deemed reasonable and lawful until reversed or set aside in whole or in part by the court. The burden of proof is on the party attacking or resisting the decision to show that the final decision is invalid pursuant to subsection 3.
- 3. The court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of evidence on a question of fact. The court may remand or affirm the final decision or set it aside in whole or in part if substantial rights of



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the petitioner have been prejudiced because the final decision of the agency is:

- In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;
 - (b) In excess of the statutory authority of the agency;
 - (c) Made upon unlawful procedure;
 - (d) Affected by other error of law;
- (e) Clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative and substantial evidence on the whole record; or
- (f) Arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion.

Relating to the standard of review of administrative decisions, our Supreme Court has consistently held that the factual findings made by administrative adjudicators may not be disturbed on appeal unless they lack the support of substantial evidence. SIIS v. Hicks, 100 Nev. 567, 688 P.2d 324 (1984); SIIS v. Thomas, 101 Nev. 293, 701 P.2d 1012 (1985); SIIS v. Swinney, 103 Nev. 17, 731 P.2d 359 (1987); SIIS v. Christensen, 106 Nev. 85, 787 P.2d 408 (1990).

Thus, "the central inquiry is whether substantial evidence in the record supports the agency decision." Brocas v. Mirage Hotel & Casino, 109 Nev. 579, 583, 854 P.2d 862, 865 (1993). Substantial evidence is "that quantity and quality of evidence which a reasonable [person] could accept as adequate to support a conclusion." State Employment Sec. Dep't v. Hilton Hotels, 102 Nev. 606, 608 n.1, 729 P.2d 497, 498 n.1 (1986). Therefore, if the agency's decision lacks substantial evidentiary support, the decision is unsustainable as being arbitrary and capricious. Barrick Goldstrike Mine v. Peterson, 116 Nev. 541, 547, 2 P.3d 850,

854 (2000). The Court must defer to an agency's findings of fact only as long as they are supported by substantial evidence. <u>Law Offices of Barry Levinson v.</u>

Milko, 124 Nev. 355, 362, 184 P.3d 378, 383-84 (2008).

On the other hand, purely legal questions may be determined by the District Court without deference to an agency determination, upon de novo review. <u>SIIS</u> v. Khweiss, 108 Nev. at 126, 825 P.2d at 220 (1992). Furthermore, the construction of a statute is a question of law, subject to de novo review. <u>See State, Dep't of Motor Vehicles v. Lovett</u>, 110 Nev. 473, 476, 874 P.2d 1274, 1249 (1994).

However, NRS 233B.135(3) identifies multiple scenarios in which the reviewing court may set it aside in whole or in part an administrative decision. That is when a petitioner's substantial rights have been prejudiced as a result of unlawful procedure. *See* NRS 233B.135(3)(c).

Further, the Supreme Court of Nevada has determined that a reviewing court may set aside an agency decision if substantial rights of the petitioner have been prejudiced because the decision of the agency is in violation of constitution or statutory provisions. Field v. State, Dep't of Motor Vehicles & Pub. Safety, 111 Nev. 552, 554, (1995).

In this matter, the Administrative Order as amended by the Appeals Officer on January 14, 2021, contains both violation of regulatory law as well as unlawful procedure, and this Court finds that it is clearly prejudicial to the Petitioner's

substantial rights. The Administrative Order, as amended by the Appeals Officer on January 14, 2021, directly contradicts the plain and unambiguous language found in NAC 616C.327. Specifically, NAC 616C.327(2) states:

2. The appeals officer shall grant or deny the petition for rehearing within 15 days after the receipt of the petition. If the petition is granted, the rehearing must be held within 30 days after the petition is granted.

The Court finds that the language of NAC 616C.327 is plain and unambiguous. Accordingly, there is no need to go beyond this plain meaning. *See* City of N. Las Vegas v. Warburton, 127 Nev. 682, 686, (2011) ("When the text of a statute is plain and unambiguous, [we] should ... not go beyond that meaning."), and Silver State Elec. v. State, Dep't of Tax., 123 Nev. 80, 85, (2007) ("These rules of statutory construction also apply to administrative regulations"). Therefore, if a petition for rehearing is granted, or in this instance, a motion for reconsideration, the appeals officer is required to hold the rehearing within 30 days after the petition is granted. *See* NAC 616C.327(2).

The Court acknowledges that motions for reconsideration are not recognized under Nevada Workers' Compensation administration, rather petitions for rehearing are the regulatorily accepted means for aggrieved parties to seek remedies outside of the appellate process. *See* NAC 616C.327. But for the purposes of this Order, the Court will treat the Respondent's motion for

reconsideration as a petition for rehearing, as the title of the respondent's December 9, 2020, document has no bearing on the Court's decision in this case.

The Court finds that the amendments made to the Administrative Decision post trial, and therefore the Administrative Decision in and of itself, are in violation of regulatory and statutory law. NRS 233B.135(3)(c) provides that a court may remand an agency decision if the Petitioner's substantial rights have been prejudiced because the agency's decision is made upon unlawful procedure or is in violation of statutory procedures. The Supreme Court of Nevada has previously found that an appeals officer's failure to meet relevant statutory requirements is considered "procedurally deficient." Elizondo v. Hood Mach., Inc., 129 Nev. 780, 785, (2013).

In <u>Elizondo</u>, the Supreme Court of Nevada considered whether an administrative order that failed to include "findings of fact and conclusions of law, separately stated" pursuant to NRS 233B.125 was procedurally sufficient. <u>Id</u>. The Court in <u>Elizondo</u> found that because the language of NRS 233B.125 was plain and unambiguous ("a final decision must include findings of fact and conclusions of law, separately stated"), the appeals officer was bound by this mandate. <u>Id</u>. The Court went on to conclude that "the appeals officer's order fails to meet the statutory requirements of NRS 233B.125 and is thus procedurally deficient." <u>Id</u>.

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The Court finds that the facts of Elizondo are similar to the facts of this petition, and the facts before this Court lend themselves to an interpretation under the precedent established by the Supreme Court of Nevada in Elizondo. The appeals officer violated plain and unambiguous regulatory law when she failed to hold a rehearing within 30 days after the Respondent's Motion was granted, as it is evident that no rehearing was scheduled. Rather, the appeals officer simply granted the Respondent's Motion and stripped the Petitioner of his monetary benefits via amended order. The Appeals Officer's failure to schedule the rehearing directly contradicts NAC 616C.327, which constitutes a clear violation of a regulatory provision and is highly prejudicial to the Petitioner's substantial rights.

Accordingly, the Administrative Order is in direct violation of relevant regulatory provisions, is highly prejudicial to his substantial rights, and therefore must be found to be procedurally deficient pursuant to NRS 233B.135, as clarified in Elizondo v. Hood Mach., Inc., 129 Nev. 780, (2013).

In support of its position, the Respondent argued that the Administrative Order is supported by substantial evidence and contains no error of law. (Respondent's Brief p. 8). For the aforementioned reasons, the Court finds that this argument bears no relevance to judicial review as NRS 233B.135(3) identifies multiple scenarios in which the reviewing court may set it aside in whole or in part

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an administrative decision. That is when a petitioner's substantial rights have been prejudiced as a result of unlawful procedure. See NRS 233B.135(3)(c).

Further, the Respondent argued that its motion for reconsideration was proper as it was based on newly discovered evidence. (Respondent's Brief p. 14-15). However, the Court concludes that the response from Dr. Shah fails to meet the burden of "newly discovered evidence."

In workers' compensation matters, rehearing of a decision is only appropriate if it is "based on good cause or newly discovered evidence." See NAC 616C.327(1). However, the Respondent failed to show good cause for rehearing, and failed to produce newly discovered evidence.

Though the precedential case law in the state of Nevada is limited on the question of newly discovered evidence in civil cases, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has found that "evidence is not newly discovered if it was in the party's possession at the time of summary judgement or could have been discovered with reasonable diligence." Wallis v. J.R. Simplot Co., 26 F.3d 885, 892 n.6 (9th Cir. 1994) (emphasis added); see also Defs. Of Wildlife v. Bernal, 204 F.3d 920, 929 (9th Cir. 2000) (providing that, in moving for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence under FRCP 59(a), the movant must demonstrate "the exercise of due diligence would not have resulted in the evidence being discovered at an earlier stage").

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Nevada's higher courts have confirmed this interpretation of "newly discovered evidence" in various unpublished opinions, through their reliance on Drespel v. Drespel, 56 Nev. 368, 374, (1935) (recognizing that evidence that was within a party's power to present during a first trial will not constitute newly discovered evidence supporting a grant of a motion for a new trial). The Court in Drespel was presented with the question of whether a new trial should be grand upon the ground of newly discovered evidence following the plaintiff's recovery in a divorce action. Drespel v. Drespel, 56 Nev. 368, (1935). The Court ultimately affirmed the denial of a new trial on grounds that "reasonable diligence was not used prior to the trial to discover the evidence offered." Id. (emphasis added). Therefore, because there was no evidence that reasonable diligence was used prior to the trial to discover the evidence offered in support of the motion for new trial, the evidence offered failed to constitute "newly discovered evidence." Id.

Most recently, the Nevada Supreme Court has confirmed that the "reasonable diligence" standard for the effort of a moving party is a low threshold. In Motor Coach Indus., Inc. v. Khiabani by & through Rigaud, 137 Nev. Adv. Op. 42, 493 P.3d 1007 (2021) the Appellant, Motor Coach, had moved the lower court for a new trial following the entry of judgement upon jury verdict for the Appellee. The theory put forth by Motor Coach was that news reporting that occurred post trial "brought to light new facts that merited a new trial." Id. 1015. Motor Coach

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went on to argue that "the revelations in these reports placed Khiabani's continued employment—had he lived—in such doubt that a new trial was warranted." Id. 1015–16. However, the both the District Court and the Supreme Court in Khiabani disagreed with this argument, as evidence put forth showed that the Appellee "provided MCI with a release months before trial commenced, authorizing MCI to obtain Khiabani's employment information from the medical school." Id. 1016. The Court went on to find that, because Motor Coach failed to subpoena the Appellee's employment information, the evidence could have been discovered with reasonable diligence, and therefore this information fails to constitute "newly discovered evidence."

Similarly, in this case, the Court finds that the evidence submitted by the Respondent in support of its Motion for Reconsideration could have been discovered with reasonable diligence during the normal course of discovery, prior to the conclusion of the administrative trial, and therefore must not be considered "newly discovered." The Court finds that the Respondent cannot show that the documents offered in support of its Motion for Reconsideration satisfy the burden of being considered "newly discovered." In support of its Motion for Reconsideration, the Respondent supplied only the response of Dr. Shah to a letter crafted by the Respondent's counsel on October 28, 2020, post-trial. The Respondent conceded in its Motion and its Brief that it was only after the Appeals

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Officer issued a ruling ordering the Respondent to pay TTD benefits that Respondent's counsel prepared the letter to Dr. Shah. (ROA 68-69, Respondent's Brief p. 6-7). The Respondent made no allegation that this evidence was unobtainable prior to the administrative trial, and the Court concludes that, had Respondent's counsel simply exercised reasonable diligence, this evidence could have easily been obtained and submitted to the record prior to the October 22, 2020, hearing.

Rather than exercising reasonable diligence, Respondent simply waited until the date of the administrative trial, waited for the presentation of the Petitioner's arguments and evidence, and then waited until an adverse ruling had been issued against it before making the decision to go on an improper and unwarranted post-trial discovery expedition. Therefore, the Court concludes that the ill-gotten means by which the December 7, 2020, response from Dr. Shah was procured mandate that the response be stricken from the record as a fugitive document and that because this document was obtained improperly, through unauthorized and improper post-trial discovery, this document has no effect upon this industrial injury claim.

ORDER

In summation, THIS COURT FINDS AND HEREBY ORDERS that the January 14, 2021, Decision and Order is in violation of statutory provisions, made GGRM
NEVADA'S PREMIER INJURY

upon unlawful procedure, and violates the Petitioner's substantial rights. Based on the Court's finding, it is hereby ORDERED the Appeals Officer's January 14, 2021, Decision and Order is stricken, Appeals Officer's December 22, 2020, Decision and Order is reinstated, and the Respondent is ordered to authorize Dr. Shah's treatment plan outlined in his November 18, 2019, IME report, authorize Dr. Shah as the Petitioner's treating physician, and provide the Petitioner TTD benefits from November 18, 2019, to the present, plus interest

DATED this <u>Q. Escalay of</u> , 2021.

ADRIANA ESCOBAR
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

Submitted by: GGRM LAW FIRM

Dated this 3rd day of November, 2021

O. Escoleria

20A 746 3D18 705A Adriana Escobar District Court Judge

By: /s/ Jason D. Mills, Esq.
JASON D. MILLS, ESQ.
Nevada Bar No. 7447
2770 S. Maryland Parkway
Suite 100
Las Vegas, Nevada 89109
Attorney for Petitioner

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO COURT GUIDELINES

Counsel submitting this document certifies as follows (check one):

_____ The court has waived the requirements set forth in the Guidelines;

____ No party appeared at the hearing or filed an objection to the motion;

X I have delivered a copy of this proposed order to all counsel who appeared at the hearing, and each has approved or disapproved the order, or failed to respond as indicated below:

[] Approved [X] Disapproved [] Failed to Respond

/s/ David Benavidez

DAVID H. BENAVIDEZ ESQ., of THE LAW OFFICE OF DAVID H. BENAVIDEZ, Attorney for Respondents PEPPERMILL, INC., and EMPLOYERS INSURANCE COMPANY OF NEVADA.

Ethan Wallace

From: David Benavidez <davidbenavidez@gmail.com>

Sent: Monday, November 1, 2021 7:19 AM

To: Jason Mills
Cc: Ethan Wallace

Subject: Re: Proposed Order Granting PJR, Castelan v. Peppermill, Inc et al., A-21-828981-J

Disapproved.

On Sun, Oct 31, 2021 at 6:36 PM Jason Mills < mills@ggrmlawfirm.com > wrote:

Dave;

Do you want me to put your electronic signature attached along with the "**DISAPPROVED**" check box or do you wish me to leave your electronic signature off/blank and simply check "**FAILED TO RESPOND**" on the order I am submitting to the court?

Thank you, sir.



Jason D. Mills, Esq.
Strategic Development Partner

O: 702.384.1616 | F: 702.384.2990 | <u>www.ggrmlawfirm.com</u> 2770 S. Maryland Pkwy., Ste. 100 Las Vegas, NV 89109









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2	DISTRICT COURT		
3	CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA		
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5			
6	Daniel Castelan, Petitioner(s)	CASE NO: A-21-828981-J	
7	VS.	DEPT. NO. Department 14	
8	Peppermill Hotel & Casino,		
9	Respondent(s)		
10			
11	AUTOMATED CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE		
12	This automated certificate of service was generated by the Eighth Judicial District		
13	Court. The foregoing Order Granting Judicial Review of Administrative Decision was served via the court's electronic eFile system to all recipients registered for e-Service on the above entitled case as listed below:		
14			
15	Service Date: 11/3/2021		
16	Ethan Wallace	ewallace@ggrmlawfirm.com	
17	Veronica Salas	vsalas@ggrmlawfirm.com	
18	Jason Mills	jmills@ggrmlawfirm.com	
19	Denise McKay	denise.mckay@admin.nv.gov	
20	David Benavidez	davidbenavidez@gmail.com	
21 22			
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Certification of Copy

State of Nevada
County of Clark

I, Steven D. Grierson, the Clerk of the Court of the Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County, State of Nevada, does hereby certify that the foregoing is a true, full and correct copy of the hereinafter stated original document(s):

NOTICE OF APPEAL; CASE APPEAL; STATEMENT; NOTICE OF FILING BOND FOR COSTS ON APPEAL; DISTRICT COURT DOCKET ENTRIES; CIVIL COVER SHEET; ORDER GRANTING PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW; NOTICE OF ENTRY OF ORDER

DANIEL CASTELAN,

Petitioner(s),

VS.

PEPPERMILL HOTEL & CASINO; EMPLOYERS INSURANCE COMPANY OF NEVADA; THE DEPARTMENT OF ADMINISTRATION, HEARINGS DIVISION, APPEALS OFFICE, an agency of the STATE OF NEVADA,

Respondent(s),

now on file and of record in this office.

Case No: A-21-828981-J

Dept No: XIV

IN WITNESS THEREOF, I have hereunto Set my hand and Affixed the seal of the Court at my office, Las Vegas, Nevada This 9 day of November 2021.

Steven D. Grierson, Clerk of the Court

Heather Ungermann, Deputy Clerk



EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT CLERK OF THE COURT

REGIONAL JUSTICE CENTER 200 LEWIS AVENUE, 3rd FI. LAS VEGAS, NEVADA 89155-1160 (702) 671-4554

Steven D. Grierson Clerk of the Court Anntoinette Naumec-Miller Court Division Administrator

November 9, 2021

Elizabeth A. Brown Clerk of the Court 201 South Carson Street, Suite 201 Carson City, Nevada 89701-4702

RE: DANIEL CASTELAN vs. PEPPERMILL HOTEL & CASINO; EMPLOYERS INSURANCE COMPANY OF NEVADA; THE DEPARTMENT OF ADMINISTRATION, HEARINGS DIVISION, APPEALS OFFICE, an agency of the STATE OF NEVADA D.C. CASE: A-21-828981-J

Dear Ms. Brown:

Please find enclosed a Notice of Appeal packet, filed November 9, 2021. Due to extenuating circumstances minutes from the date(s) listed below have not been included:

October 14, 2021

We do not currently have a time frame for when these minutes will be available.

If you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact me at (702) 671-0512.

Sincerely,

STEVEN D. GRIERSON, CLERK OF THE COURT

Heather Ungermann, Deputy Clerk

