# IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA NICHOLAS CHARLES LANZALACA, CASE NO. 837 Electronically Filed Dec 23 2021 10:36 p.m. | Elizabeth A. Brown | Appellant, Clerk of Supreme Court | FAST TRACK STATEMENT | V. | One of the state of Nevada, Court | One of the state of Nevada, Court | One of the state of Nevada, One of Nevada, One

#### 1. Name of party filing this fast track statement:

Respondent.

The name of the party filing this fast track statement is Nicholas Charles Lanzalaca.

2. Name, law firm, address, and telephone number of attorney submitting this fast track statement:

The attorney filing this fast track statement is Benjamin C.

Gaumond of the Ben Gaumond Law Firm, PLLC. His address is 495

Idaho Street, Suite 209, Elko, Nevada 89801. His telephone number is (775)388-4875.

1	3.	Name, law firm, address, and telephone number of appellate counsel if different from trial counsel:	
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3		Appellate counsel and trial counsel are the same.	
4	4.	Judicial district, county, and district court docket number	
5	1.	of lower court proceedings:	
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7		This is an appeal from the Fourth Judicial District Court, in and	
8	for the County of Elko, State of Nevada, Department 3. The docket		
9	number in the lower court is DC-CR-21-202.		
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11	<b>5.</b>	Name of judge issuing decision, judgment, or order appealed from:	
12		appeared from.	
13		The Honorable District Court Judge Mason Simons issued the	
14	T 1		
15	Judg	gment of Conviction in this case.	
16	6.	Length of trial. If this action proceeded to trial in the	
17		district court, how many days did the trial last?	
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19		This case did not proceed to trial.	
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#### 7. Conviction(s) appealed from:

Nicholas Charles Lanzalaca was convicted of Attempted
Possession of a Controlled Substance, a category E felony as defined by
NRS 453.336 and NRS 193.330.

#### 8. Sentence for each count:

Nicholas Charles Lanzalaca was sentenced to twelve to thirty (12-30) months of imprisonment in the Nevada Department of Corrections and that sentence was suspended with probation for eighteen (18) months.

## 9. Date district court announced decision, sentence, or order appealed from:

The district court announced the sentence on October 8, 2021.

#### 10. Date of entry of written judgment or order appealed from:

The district court entered the judgment of conviction on October 11, 2021.

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If this appeal is from an order granting or denying a 11. 1 petition for a writ of habeas corpus, indicate the date written notice of entry of judgment or order was served by 2 the court: 3 4 This appeal does not involve a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 5 **12.** If the time for filing the notice of appeal was tolled by a 6 post-judgment motion. 7 8 There is no post-judgment motion that would toll the time for 9 filing the notice of appeal. 10 11 Date notice of appeal filed: 13. 12 The notice of appeal was filed on November 8, 2021. 13 **14.** Specify statute or rule governing the time limit for filing 14 the notice of appeal, e.g., NRAP 4(b), NRS 34.560, NRS 15 34.575, NRS 177.015, or other: 16 The rule governing the time limit for filing the notice of appeal for 17 this case is NRAP 4(b)(1)(A). 18 19 **15.** Specify statute, rule or other authority which grants this court jurisdiction to review the judgment or order 20 appealed from: 21 22 This court has jurisdiction under NRS 177.015(3). 23 24 4

16. Specify the nature of disposition below, *e.g.*, judgment after bench trial, judgment after jury verdict, judgment upon guilty plea, etc.:

This is an appeal from the judgment of conviction upon a plea of guilty.

17. Pending and prior proceedings in this court. List the case name and docket number of all appeals or original proceedings presently or previously pending before this court which are related to this appeal (e.g., separate appeals by co-defendants, appeal after post-conviction proceedings):

Counsel is not aware of any other proceedings pending before this court which are related to this appeal.

18. Pending and prior proceedings in other courts. List the case name, number and court of all pending and prior proceedings in other courts which are related to this appeal (e.g., habeas corpus proceedings in state or federal court, bifurcated proceedings against co-defendants):

Counsel is not aware of any proceedings in other courts which are related to this appeal.

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19. Proceedings raising same issues. List the case name and docket number of all appeals or original proceedings presently pending before this court, of which you are aware, which raise the same issues you intend to raise in this appeal:

In <u>Martin v. State</u>, Nevada Supreme Court Case Number 83665, the issue of mandatory probation as articulated in NRS 176.211 is currently being litigated. Admittedly, that case involves a conviction for Possession of a Controlled Substance – unlike the instant case.

20. Procedural history. Briefly describe the procedural history of the case (provide citations for every assertion of fact to the appendix, if any, or to the rough draft transcript):

The criminal information was filed in the Fourth Judicial District Court on July 9, 2021 wherein Mr. Lanzalaca was charged with Possession of a Schedule I or II Controlled Substance as defined by NRS 453.336. *Joint Appendix 1*. An amended criminal information was filed pursuant to plea negotiations wherein Mr. Lanzalaca was charged with Attempted Possession of a Schedule I or II Controlled Substance, a category E felony or gross misdemeanor as defined by NRS 453.336 and NRS 193.330. *Joint Appendix 4*.

The guilty plea agreement was filed on August 5, 2021. Joint Appendix 7. The arraignment was held on August 6, 2021. Joint Appendix 16. The guilty plea was accepted in open court. Joint Appendix 36. The sentencing was held on October 8, 2021. Joint Appendix 43.

The judgment of conviction was filed on October 11, 2021. *Joint Appendix 64*. The notice of appeal was filed on November 8, 2021. *Joint Appendix 68*.

# 21. Statement of facts. Briefly set forth the facts material to the issues on appeal:

In the guilty plea agreement, the parties agreed that Mr.

Lanzalaca would plead guilty to Attempted Possession of a Controlled Substance. *Joint Appendix 7*. As part of that resolution, the parties agreed that in "accordance with NRS 176.211, if this case is adjudicated as a category E felony, for a first or second offense of NRS 453.336, the court shall defer judgment upon my consent." *Joint Appendix 8*.

Deputy Elko County District Attorney Justin M. Barainca signed this plea agreement on behalf of the State of Nevada. *Joint Appendix 14*.

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The Presentence Investigation Report was prepared on September
8, 2021. Presentence Investigation Report 1.1 In the offense synopsis, it
is indicated that the quantity of methamphetamine involved in this case
was one point six (1.6) grams. Presentence Investigation Report 7. Mr.
Lanzalaca had zero (0) felony convictions on his record at the time of
this report. Presentence Investigation Report 2-6.

At the time of sentencing in this matter, Deputy Elko County District Attorney Mercedes Martinez represented the State of Nevada. Joint Appendix 44. Ms. Martinez requested treatment of Mr. Lanzalaca's matter as a felony. Joint Appendix 47.

Defense counsel for Mr. Lanzalaca highlighted the fact that 1.6 grams of the controlled substance did not warrant felony treatment. Joint Appendix 49. Mr. Lanzalaca had zero (0) felony convictions on his record. Joint Appendix 50. ///

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> An order directing the Elko County Clerk's Office to release this Presentence Investigation Report was entered on December 9, 2021.

### 22. Issues on appeal. State concisely the principal issue(s) in this appeal:

- Did the district court exceed its jurisdiction when it sentenced
   Nicholas Charles Lanzalaca as a convicted felon when NRS
   176.211 required diversion for a first offense under NRS 453.336?
- 2) In the alternative, did the district court commit plain error in sentencing Nicholas Charles Lanzalaca to a felony conviction when the plea agreement stated that he was to receive mandatory diversion for a first offense under NRS 453.336?
- 3) Is a remand to district court necessary to allow a re-sentencing contingent on the State violating the plea agreement during this appeal?

#### 23. Legal argument, including authorities:

1) The district court exceeded its jurisdiction when it adjudicated Mr. Lanzalaca to be a convicted felon.

Under NRS 176.211(1)-(3):

1. Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, upon a plea of guilty, guilty but mentally ill or nolo contendere, but before a judgment of guilt, the court may, without entering a judgment of guilt and with the consent of the defendant, defer judgment on the

case to a specified future date and set forth specific terms and conditions for the defendant. The duration of the deferral period must not exceed the applicable period set forth in subsection 1 of NRS 176A.500 or the extension of the period pursuant to subsection 2 of NRS 176A.500. The court may not defer judgment pursuant to this <u>sub</u>section if the defendant has entered into a plea agreement with a prosecuting attorney unless the plea agreement allows the deferral.

- 2. The terms and conditions set forth for the defendant during the deferral period may include, without limitation, the:
- (a) Payment of restitution;
- (b) Payment of court costs;
- (c) Payment of an assessment in lieu of any fine authorized by law for the offense;
- (d) Payment of any other assessment or cost authorized by law;
- (e) Completion of a term of community service;
- (f) Placement on probation pursuant to NRS 176A.500 and the ordering of any conditions which can be imposed for probation pursuant to NRS 176A.400; or
- (g) Completion of a specialty court program.
- 3. The court:
- (a) Upon the consent of the defendant:
- (1) <u>Shall</u> defer judgment for any defendant who has entered a plea of guilty, guilty but mentally ill or nolo contendere to a violation of paragraph (a) of subsection 2 of NRS 453.336; or
- (2) May defer judgment for any defendant who is placed in a specialty court program. The court may extend any deferral period for not more than 12 months to allow for the completion of a specialty court program.
- (b) Shall not defer judgment for any defendant who has been convicted of a violent or sexual offense as defined in NRS 202.876, a crime against a child as defined in NRS 179D.0357 or a violation of NRS 200.508.

(Emphasis added.)

NRS 453.336(2)(a), likewise, requires diversion on a first offense of violating NRS 453.336:

For a first or second offense, if the controlled substance is listed in schedule I or II and the quantity possessed is less than 14 grams, or if the controlled substance is listed in schedule III, IV or V and the quantity possessed is less than 28 grams, is guilty of possession of a controlled substance and shall be punished for a category E felony as provided in NRS 193.130. In accordance with NRS 176.211, the court **shall** defer judgment upon the consent of the person.

(Emphasis added.)

Based on NRS 176.211 <u>and</u> NRS 453.336(2)(a), the district court did not have jurisdiction to adjudicate Mr. Lanzalaca as a felon. However, the defense anticipates the argument that because Mr. Lanzalaca pled to Attempted Possession of a Controlled Substance rather than Possession of a Controlled Substance, NRS 176.211 and NRS 453.336(2)(a) do not apply to the instant case. The defense would disagree with that contention.

The general rule in this jurisdiction is that statutes should be interpreted so as to avoid "absurd results." Nunnery v. State, 127 Nev. 749, 763, 263 P.3d 235, 245 (2011), citing State v. Kopp, 118 Nev. 199, 204, 43 P.3d 340, 343 (2002).

If this Court follows the State's expected argument that Mr. Lanzalaca could be adjudicated a convicted felon because the State did not have to affirmatively recommend diversion under the terms of the plea agreement, there would be an absurd result. The State obviously is not prepared to argue that Mr. Lanzalaca would be ineligible for diversion if he went to jury trial and lost on the charge of Possession of a Controlled Substance. However, the State is expected to argue that Mr. Lanzalaca could expect a **harsher** result by negotiating with the State for a **lesser** charge. What could be more absurd than that?

As such, this Court should reverse Mr. Lanzalaca's sentence and remand this matter for a re-sentencing hearing wherein NRS 176.211(1) and NRS 453.336(2)(a) are followed. Specifically, this Court should remand this case with the instruction that Mr. Lanzalaca's judgment be deferred.

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2) In the alternative, this Court should reverse the conviction of Nicholas Charles Lanzalaca under a plain error standard because the plea agreement ensured that he would receive drug diversion if the matter were treated as a felony.

This Court has held that "a guilty plea is presumptively valid, and the defendant has the burden of establishing that the plea was not entered knowingly and intelligently." Hubbard v. State, 110 Nev. 671, 675, 877 P.2d 519, 521 (1994), citing Bryant v. State, 102 Nev. 268, 272, 721 P.2d 364, 368 (1986).

A plain error analysis applies when there was no objection lodged to the sentencing decision. See NRS 178.602; see also Mendoza-Lobos v. State, 125 Nev. 634, 643, 218 P.3d 501, 507-08 (2009); Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 129 S. Ct. 1423, 1428-29, 173 L. Ed. 2d 266 (2009).<sup>2</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> The defense would submit that no objection was ultimately necessary when the district court exceeded its jurisdiction. <u>Colwell v. State</u>, 118

Mr. Lanzalaca, in no uncertain terms, was notified that a first offense under NRS 453.336 would be subject to diversion if the matter is treated as a felony. Judge Simons elected to adjudicate this matter as a felony but went a step further in bypassing diversion. That constitutes reversible error.

Was the guilty plea in this case knowingly and intelligently entered? How could it have been when the district court sentenced Mr. Lanzalaca in a manner wholly inconsistent with the terms of the plea agreement?

The State could try to argue on this appeal that the issue of diversion that was mentioned in the plea agreement would only apply to an actual Possession case rather than an Attempted Possession matter such as the instant case. That would be unpersuasive. Could

Nev. 807, 812, 59 P.3d 463, 467 (2002), <u>citing Swan v. Swan</u>, 106 Nev. 464, 469, 796 P.2d 221, 224 (1990) ("subject-matter jurisdiction is not waivable, and a court's lack of such jurisdiction can be raised for the first time on appeal.")

the State possibly say that such language was surplusage? If so, that is absurd.

Accordingly, this Court should reverse Mr. Lanzalaca's conviction.

# 3) A remand back to district court with a re-sentencing is necessary if the State of Nevada violates the plea agreement during the course of this appeal.

"When a State enters into a plea agreement, it 'is held to "the most meticulous standards of both promise and performance" with respect to both the terms and spirit of the plea bargain." Sparks v. State, 121 Nev. 107, 110, 110 P.3d 486, 487 (2005), quoting Van Buskirk v. State, 102 Nev. 241, 243, 720 P.2d 1215, 1216 (1986) (quoting Kluttz v. Warden, 99 Nev. 681, 683-84, 669 P.2d 244, 245 (1983)).

This Court has cited United States Supreme Court precedent when discussing the issue of a prosecuting authority breaching a plea agreement:

[The sentencing judge] stated that the prosecutor's recommendation did not influence him and we have no reason to doubt that. Nevertheless, we conclude that the interests of justice and appropriate recognition of the duties of the prosecution in relation to promises made in the negotiation of pleas of guilty will be

best served by remanding the case to the state courts for further consideration [of the appropriate relief for the breach-specific performance or withdrawal of the plea].

Echeverria v. State, 119 Nev. 41, 43-44, 62 P.3d 743, 745 (2003), quoting Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262-63, 30 L. Ed. 2d 427, 433, 92 S. Ct. 495, 499 (1971).

This court went further and declared "that the State's violation of a plea agreement "requires reversal."" Id. at 44, 745, quoting Citti v. State, 107 Nev. 89, 91, 807 P.2d 724, 726 (1991) (quoting Van Buskirk v. State, 102 Nev. 241, 243, 720 P.2d 1215, 1216 (1986)); see also Kluttz v. Warden, 99 Nev. 681, 684, 669 P.2d 244, 246 (1983); Riley v. Warden, 89 Nev. 510, 513-14, 515 P.2d 1269, 1271 (1973). Harmless-error analysis is inapplicable in the event that a prosecutor breaches a plea agreement. Id.

When an appellate court determines that a prosecutor has breached a plea agreement and that specific performance is the proper remedy, a re-sentencing must be ordered before a different sentencing judge. <u>Id. See, e.g.</u>, <u>Citti</u>, 107 Nev. at 94, 807 P.2d at 727; <u>Wolf v. State</u>,

106 Nev. 426, 428, 794 P.2d 721, 723 (1990); <u>Van Buskirk</u>, 102 Nev. at 244, 720 P.2d at 1217; <u>Kluttz</u>, 99 Nev. at 684, 669 P.2d at 246; <u>Riley</u>, 89 Nev. at 514, 515 P.2d at 1271.

The State of Nevada is held to a high standard when it comes to plea negotiations and its obligation to comply with plea agreements. If the State is going to repudiate a material part of the plea agreement (i.e., the requirement for diversion if the court treats this matter as a felony), Mr. Lanzalaca asks that this matter be remanded for a new sentencing hearing before a different judge.

24. Preservation of issues. State concisely how each numerated issue on appeal was preserved during trial. If the issue was not preserved, explain why this court should review the issue:

Pertaining to the issue of the lack of jurisdiction of the district court to sentence Mr. Lanzalaca as a convicted felon, that does not require preservation.

As for the matter of the plain error of the district court in sentencing Mr. Lanzalaca, this Court allows for review on the plain error standard even without a preservation of error – although a

reversal on jurisdictional grounds makes this lack of preservation issue moot.

Finally, as to the issue of a potential breach of the plea agreement that could arise on this appeal, this Court has ruled that a harmless-error analysis does not apply to a breach of a plea agreement. Hence, error preservation is not required.

25. Issues of first impression or of public interest. Does this appeal present a substantial legal issue of first impression in this jurisdiction or one affecting an important public interest: If so, explain:

This appeal presents an issue of first impression insofar as there is no appellate ruling from this jurisdiction as to the mandatory diversion provisions of NRS 176.211 and NRS 453.336(2)(a).

#### 26. Routing statement pursuant to NRAP 17:

This case involves a direct appeal from a judgment of conviction based upon a plea of guilty. Under NRAP 17(b)(1), this case is presumptively assigned to the Court of Appeals.

However, under NRAP 17(a)(11), this Court retains and decides matters of first impression.

Based on this case presenting an issue of first impression, Mr. Lanzalaca asks that this Court retain this appeal.

#### **VERIFICATION**

- 1. I hereby certify that this fast track statement complies with the formatting requirements of NRAP 32(a)(4), the typeface requirements of NRAP 32(a)(5) and the type style requirements of NRAP 32(a)(6) because this fast track statement has been prepared in a proportionally spaced typeface using Microsoft Word 2013 in size 14 Century Schoolbook font.
- 2. I further certify that this fast track statement complies with the page- or type-volume limitations of NRAP 3C(h)(2) because it is either:
- [x] Proportionately spaced, has a typeface of 14 points or more, and contains 3,480 words; or
- [ ] Monospaced, has 10/5 or fewer characters per inch, and contains \_\_\_\_ words or \_\_\_ lines of text; or
  - [ ] Does not exceed 16 pages.

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- Finally, I recognize that pursuant to NRAP 3C, I am responsible 3. for filing a timely fast track statement and that the Supreme Court of Nevada may sanction an attorney for failing to file a timely fast track statement, or failing to raise material issues or arguments in the fast track statement, or failing to cooperate fully with appellate counsel during the course of an appeal.
- I therefore certify that the information provided in this fast track 4. statement is true and complete to the best of my knowledge, information and belief.

DATED this 23rd day of December, 2021.

#### BEN GAUMOND LAW FIRM, PLLC

By:\_

BENJAMIN C. GAUMOND, ESQ. Nevada Bar Number 8081 495 Idaho Street, Suite 209 Elko, Nevada 89801 (775)388-4875 (phone) (800)466-6550 (facsimile)

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#### **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

- (a) I hereby certify that this document was electronically filed with the Nevada Supreme Court on the 23rd day of December, 2021.
- (b) I further certify that on the 23rd day of December, 2021, electronic service of the foregoing document shall be made in accordance with the Master Service List to Aaron Ford, Nevada Attorney General; Tyler J. Ingram, Elko County District Attorney; and Justin Barainca, Deputy Elko County District Attorney.
- (c) I further certify that on the 23rd day of December, 2021, I emailed a copy of this document to Nicholas Charles Lanzalaca.

DATED this 23rd day of December, 2021.



Benjamin C. Gaumond, Owner Ben Gaumond Law Firm, PLLC