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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELKO

TENNILLE RAE WHITAKER,
Petitioner,

Case No. DC-CV-20-69

NOTICE OF APPEAL

JERRY HOWELL, WARDEN, FLORENCE MCCLURE WOMEN'S CORRECTIONAL CENTER.

Respondent.

NOTICE is hereby given that TENNILLE RAE WHITAKER, Appellant above named, hereby appeals to the Supreme Court of Nevada from the final judgment entered in this action on the 27th day of APRIL 2021.

Dated this 27 day of MAY 2021.

GARY D. WOODBURY
Attorney for Defendant
1053 Idaho St.
Elko, NV 89801

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE Pursuant to NRCP 5(b), I certify that I, KIMBERLY DAWSON, on the _____ day of _ 2021 served the foregoing NOTICE OF APPEAL by delivering, mailing or by facsimile transmission or causing to be delivered, mailed, or transmitted by facsimile transmission, a copy of said document to the following: By Delivering to: THE HONORABLE KRISTON HILL FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT ELKO COUNTY COURTHOUSE ELKO, NV 89801 **AND** ELKO COUNTY DEPUTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY 540 COURT ST, 2ND FLOOR ELKO, NV 89801

Case No. DC-CV-20-69

Dept.: 1

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2021 MAY 27 PM 2: 49

ELKO CO DISTRICT COURT

CLERK____ DEPUTY

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELKO

TENNILLE RAE WHITAKER,
Petitioner.

11 | v.

JERRY HOWELL, WARDEN, FLORENCE MCCLURE WOMEN'S CORRECTIONAL CENTER.

Respondent.

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CASE APPEAL STATEMENT

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1. Name of appellant filing this case appeal statement: Tennille Rae Whitaker

17 18

2. Identify the judge issuing the decision, judgment or order appealed from: *Honorable Kriston N. Hill.*

19 20

3. Identify each appellant and the name and address of counsel for each appellant: Tennille Rae Whitaker is the Appellant. Counsel is Gary D. Woodbury. 1053 Idaho St. Elko, Nevada, 89801.

21 22

4. Identify each respondent and the name and address of appellant counsel, if known for each respondent (if the name of a respondent's appellate counsel is unknown, indicate as much and provide the name and address of that respondent's trial counsel): The State of Nevada, Department of Corrections, is the respondent. Counsel for Respondent is the Elko County District Attorney, 540 Court Street, 2nd Floor. Elko, Nevada 89801.

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5. Indicate whether any attorney identified above in response to question 3 or 4 is not licensed to practice law in Nevada and, if so, whether the district court granted that attorney permission to appear under SCR 42 (attach a copy of any district court order granting such permission): All attorneys are licensed to practice law in the state of Nevada.

6. Indicate whether appellant was represented by appointed or retained counsel in the district 1 court: Retained counsel. 2 7. Indicate whether appellant was granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis, and the date of entry of the district court order granting such leave: No order to proceed in forma pauperis was 3 requested or granted. 4 8. Indicate the date the proceedings commenced in the district court (e.g., date complaint, 5 indictment, information, or petition was filed): A Petition for post-conviction writ of habeas 6 corpus was filed on July 28, 2020 in the Fourth Judicial District Court. 7 9. Provide a brief description of the nature of the action and result in the district court, including the type of judgment or order being appealed and the relief granted by the district court: The 8 Petition for a post-conviction writ of habeas corpus alleged that Petitioner received ineffective assistance of counsel after her entry of plea up to and including sentencing. The District Court denied the Petition on April 27, 2012. A Motion for Reconsideration was filed 10 by Petitioner on May 7, 2021. The District Court denied the Motion for Reconsideration on May 24, 2021. 11 10. Indicate whether the case has previously been the subject of an appeal to or original writ 12 proceeding in the Supreme Court and, if so, the caption and Supreme Court docket number of the 13 prior proceeding: An appeal was filed after sentencing. The Caption is Tennille Rae Whitaker vs. the State of Nevada. The docket number is 77294. 14 11. Indicate whether this appeal involves child custody or visitation: Child custody is not 15 involved. 16 12. If this is a civil case, indicate whether this appeal involves the possibility of settlement: 17 There is no possibility of settlement. 18 19 Dated this 77day of MAY 2021. 20 21 y W weeky 22 GARY D. WOODBURY Nevada State Bar # 1915 23 Attorney for Defendant 1053 Idaho St. 24 Elko, NV 89801 25 775-738-8006 26 27 28

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Pursuant to NRCP 5(b), I certify that I, KIMBERLY DAWSON, on the 27 day of
2021 served the foregoing CASE APPEAL STATEMENT by delivering
/ nailing or by facsimile transmission or causing to be delivered, mailed, or transmitted by
acsimile transmission, a copy of said document to the following:

By Delivering to:

THE HONORABLE KRISTON HILL FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT ELKO COUNTY COURTHOUSE ELKO, NV 89801

AND

ELKO COUNTY DEPUTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY 540 COURT ST, 2ND FLOOR ELKO, NV 89801

KIMBERLY DAWSON

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Case No. DC-CV-20-69 1 Dept.: 1 2 3 4 5 IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELKO 6 7 8 TENNILLE RAE WHITAKER, Petitioner, 9 10 JERRY HOWELL, WARDEN, 11 FLORENCE MCCLURE WOMEN'S CORRECTIONAL CENTER. 12 Respondent. 13 14 CERTIFICATE THAT NO TRANSCRIPT IS BEING REQUSTED. 15 Notice is hereby given that TENNILLE RAE WHITAKER is not requesting the 16 preparation of transcripts for this appeal. 17 19 Dated this ______ 27 day of _______ 2021. 20 21 22 Gary D. Woodbury 23 Nevada Bar # 1915 24 1053 Idaho Street 775-738-8006 25 26

in the last

4021 MAY 27 PM 2: 50 ELKO CO DISTRICT COURT

CLERK____ DEPUTY

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

NO TRANSCRIPT REQUEST

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

- 1	SERVINE OF SERVICE					
2	Pursuant to NRCP 5(b), I certify that I, KIMBERLY DAWSON, on the <u>37</u> day of					
3	2021 served the foregoing NO TRANSCRIPT REQUEST by delivering,					
4	mailing or by facsimile transmission or causing to be delivered, mailed, or transmitted by					
5	facsimile transmission, a copy of said document to the following:					
6						
7	By delivering to:					
В	THE HONORABLE DISTRICT COURT JUDGE KRISTON HILL					
9	FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT ELKO COUNTY COURTHOUSE					
LO	ELKO, NV 89801					
11						
12	ELKO COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY					
L3	540 COURT STREET, 2 ND FLOOR ELKO, NV 89801					
L4						

KIMBERLY DAWSON

Case Summary

DC-CV-20-69 - WHITAKER, TENNILLE VS. WARDEN - HOWELL, JERRY

Court: DC-CV-20-69

Agency: Elko County Clerk's Office

CaseID: 20-73565

Type: Civil Received Date: 7/28/2020 Status: Closed Status Date: 4/28/2021

Age: 317 days Active Age: 317 days

Involvements

HILL, KRISTON Judge -

PORTER, NANCY Judge, Inactive -WHITAKER, TENILLE Appellant -

WOODBURY, GARY Attorney -

WARDEN - HOWELL, JERRY Respondent -

Name Attributes

For: TENILLE WHITAKER

Name Record Source - Name Record Converted

Agency: Elko County Clerk's Office

Status Date: 10/8/2018

Status

from JALAN - District Attorney

1. CVC42 ~ Civil Writ - Writ of Habeas Corpus Occurred: 7/28/2020

Civil Writ - Writ of Habeas Corpus

Related Cases

Companion Case

ECDC-CRFP-17-3893 - STATE OF NEVADA VS.

Court: ECDC-CRFP-17-3893

Type: Criminal

Case History

Status: Closed

Date **Event Type Desc**

Awaiting Charging Decision - Case Status

Case Status Change

Pending - Case Status

Case Status Change

Closed - Case Status

Case Status Change

7/28/2020 CIVIL COVERSHEET - Document

7/28/2020 VERFIED PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS

CORPUS (POST CONVICTION) - Document

7/28/2020 - Case Notes

WOODBURY RUNNER HAD COPIES FOR THE DA'S OFFICE

JUSTWARE

Page 1 of 3

6/10/2021 1:28:36 PM

Case Summary

8/28/2020	ORDER DIRECTING RESPONSE - Document	
9/9/2020	RETURN TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS - Document	
	A SEALED ENVELOPE IS ATTACHED TO PLEADING	
9/10/2020	NOTE ADDED TO FILE - Case Notes	
	EMAILED COPY OF PETITION FOR WRIT TO NICOLE FAIRFIELD/AG'S nfairfield@ag.nv.gov	S OFFICE,
10/12/2020	ANSWER TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF HAVEAS CORPUS - Document	
4/2/2021	REQUEST FOR REVIEW PETITON AND ANSWER - Document	Order Filed
4/28/2021	ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS - Document	
4/28/2021	NOTICE OF ENTRY OF ORDER - Document	
	ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS	
5/7/2021	MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION - Document	
5/7/2021	NOTICE OF MOTION - Document	
5/14/2021	OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO RECONSIDER - Document	
5/17/2021	REPLY TO OPPSOTION TO MOTION TO RECONSIDERATION - Document	
5/21/2021	REQUEST FOR REVIEW RE PETITIONER'S MOTION - Document	
5/24/2021	ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION - Document	
5/27/2021	Appeal Bond - District Court - BOND	Posted
	For: WHITAKER, TENILLE	
	Amount	
	\$500.00	
	POSTED BY GARY D. WOODBURY. CHECK #2354 / 1053 IDAHO ST,	ELKO NV 89801



Case Summary

5/27/2021	NOTICE OF APPEAL - Doc	ument			
5/27/2021	CASE APPEAL STATEMENT	- Document			
5/27/2021	NO TRANSCRIPT REQUEST	- Document			
5/27/2021	DEPOSIT OF \$500.00 APPE TENILLE WHITAKER, POST WOODBURY ESQ - Docum	ED BY			
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5/28/2021	Check - Payment	C-CL-14071 EACED IN WO	OODBOKT ESQS 170 BC	<i>5</i> A	
	Payer		Payment Amount		
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		TENILLE WHITAKER	4		
6/10/2021	CLERK'S CERTIFICATION -				
		TH THE SUPREME COURT	ALONG WITH ALL REO	UIRED DOCUMENTS	
Bonds			•	•	
For 2 ~ TENILLE WHITAKER History	Bond Dt Bond Type 5/27/2021 Appeal Bond Court	Bond Status - District Posted	Modified DT 5/27/2021	Amount Amt Paid \$500.00 \$500.0	d Paid By 10 WOODBURY, GARY D on 5/27/2021
Bond D	et For 2021 TENILLE WHITAKER		Status ourt RY D. WOODBURY. CHECK , ELKO NV89801	Amount \$500.00 #2354	
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Obligation DC Supreme Court Appe	Pay By 2WHITAKER, TENILLE~ al TO SUPREME COURT	Due Date APPEAL 5/27/2021	Obligation Amount \$24.00	t Amount Paid \$24.00	Balance Due \$0.00
		tal Personal Obligation(s	\$24.0	00 \$24.00	\$0.00

Total Case Obligation(s):

\$24.00

\$24.00

\$0.00

PILED 1 CASE NO. DC-CV-20-69 2021 APR 27 PM 2: 20 2 DEPT. NO. ELKO CO DISTRICT COURT 3 4 CLERK___DEPUTY ! 5 6 IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 7 OF THE STATE OF NEVADA, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELKO 8 9 TENILLE WHITAKER, 10 Petitioner, ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR ٧. WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 11 JERRY HOWELL, WARDEN 12 FLORENCE MCCLURE WOMEN'S CORRECTIONAL CENTER, 13 Respondent. 14 15 16 On July 28, 2020, Petitioner Tenille Whitaker filed the instant verified petition for writ of 17 habeas corpus, alleging that her trial counsel was ineffective for decisions made and actions not 18 taken at sentencing, and that the court would have sentenced her differently had counsel been 19 effective. On August 28, 2020, this Court directed the District Attorney's Office to file a response to the petition. On October 12, 2020, the District Attorney's Office filed a response to the petition. 20 21 For the reasons stated below, the petition is DENIED. I. 22 **Mandatory Dismissal**

Preliminarily, it appears that the Court must dismiss this petition pursuant to NRS

34.810(1)(a), as the petition was "not based upon an allegation that the plea was involuntarily or

unknowingly entered or that the plea was entered without effective assistance of counsel." Petitioner

has alleged deficient performance by trial counsel at sentencing which she believes negatively

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impacted the sentence imposed by the Court; she does not link this deficient performance up to her entry of plea, however, so it appears that these claims fall outside the limited scope of postconviction *habeas corpus* petitions challenging judgments based on guilty pleas.

As the issue of the correct interpretation of NRS 34.810(1)(a) is currently before the Nevada Supreme Court, however, the Court will also address the petition on the merits.

II. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

To show ineffective assistance of counsel, Petitioner must show first, that trial counsel's representation of her fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and second, that trial counsel's deficient performance prejudiced her defense, meaning that there is a reasonable probability that, but for trial counsel's mistakes, the results of the proceeding at issue (here, the sentencing hearing) would have been different. Strickland v. Washington, 466 US 668, 688 (1984); Warden v. Lyons, 100 Nev 430, 432 (1984). A court may address the Strickland prongs in any order. Strickland at 697. To warrant an evidentiary hearing, Petitioner must make specific factual allegations not belied by the record that, if true, would entitle her to relief. Hargrove v. State, 100 Nev. 498, 502-03 (1984).

A. Trial Counsel's Sentencing Argument (Issues Addressed)

Petitioner first states that trial counsel's sentencing argument focused almost exclusively on whether the victims were "pupils" under NRS 201.540, whether Petitioner had committed the crimes to which she pled no contest, and the fact that trial counsel indicated to the Court that he had not looked at the legislative history of NRS 201.450. Petitioner additionally states that trial counsel had been injured and hospitalized shortly before sentencing and as a result had been in irregular communication with Petitioner for a significant period of time before sentencing, and, further, that trial counsel informed the Court that he was unprepared and confused, but the Court did not inquire further and trial counsel did not seek a continuance. Petitioner does not state how any of the above

¹ See Gonzales v. Nevada, No. 78152 (NV. Sup. Ct, filed on Feb. 20, 2019).

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falls below an objective standard of reasonableness, nor how the results of the sentencing hearing would have been different had trial counsel acted differently.

Trial counsel did spend time correcting the Pre-Sentence Investigation ("PSI") report's interchanging the words "pupil" and "student" and "student aide" when asked by the Court if he saw any errors or omissions in the PSI and did spend time making argument as to whether the victims in this case were "pupils" under NRS 201.450. When asked for his argument as to sentencing, trial counsel continued to discuss the meaning of the word "pupil" as well as whether Petitioner should have pled No Contest or gone to trial. He also made arguments as to the constitutionality of NRS 201.450, alleging that the statute is overbroad and/or void for vagueness.

In addition to the above, however, trial counsel eventually acknowledged that his client had pled to the underlying offenses and did provide argument as to how the Court should sentence Petitioner. Specifically, trial counsel focused on the mitigating factors of Petitioner's psychosexual evaluation, which found her to be a low risk of reoffending; her going to counseling; her guilt and remorse; the allegation that her students initiated the sexual contact with her; that she would be interested in serving her probation outside of Elko County, away from her victims' families; and the good character testimonies of Petitioner's pastor, father, and friend. Trial counsel also made a point to make sure the Court was not considering the letter sent from a group of people living in Wells, some of whom were not victims pursuant to NRS 176.015. Petitioner does not show how trial counsel discussing the definition of "pupils," correcting the PSI, and making comments as to whether Petitioner should have pled No Contest or not fell below an objective standard of reasonableness when those comments were coupled with trial counsel's actual sentencing argument and discussion of mitigating factors. Further, Petitioner has not shown a reasonable probability that her sentence would have been lesser without those comments being made. Without those comments, trial counsel still would have addressed the same mitigating factors he eventually did. The Court finds Petitioner has not met her burden for an evidentiary hearing as to trial counsel's "pupils" argument.

Further, the Court finds Petitioner has not met her burden as to the allegations that trial counsel had been hospitalized, uncommunicative with Petitioner, and unprepared and confused at the sentencing hearing. Petitioner has provided no factual support for her allegations that trial counsel was hospitalized or uncommunicative; a bald allegation will not suffice to set an evidentiary hearing. Further, trial counsel did not state that he was unprepared and confused at the sentencing hearing; rather, he stated that he had not delved into the legislative history of NRS 201.450. Petitioner has not shown that trial counsel's failure to look into the legislative history of NRS 201.450 fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, or that, had he done so, Petitioner's resulting sentence would have been lower. The Court therefore declines to set an evidentiary hearing as to these allegations.

B. Trial Counsel's Sentencing Argument (Issues not Addressed)

Petitioner next states that trial counsel should have addressed the following issues at the sentencing hearing:

whether Petitioner deliberately initiated any of the relationships with her victims; whether Petitioner had mental health problems and, if so, what they were; whether Petitioner refused treatment for her mental health problems; whether the suicide of one of Petitioner's victims was attributable to Petitioner's relationship with him; whether a significant number of Wells residents feared and opposed Petitioner returning to the community; whether the victims who left Wells did so because of their humiliation at having engaged in sexual behaviors with Petitioner; and whether a victim impact statement can properly include the public's point of view about sentencing.

Pertinently, trial counsel's sentencing argument did address who initiated the sexual relationships (1), Petitioner's ongoing mental health counseling (3), the first victim's suicide and how it was distant in both time and location from his relationship with Petitioner (4), and the inappropriateness of the written letter or petition from the citizens of Wells (7). The question of Petitioner's mental health diagnoses (2) was addressed in the psychosexual evaluation that trial counsel had had prepared for Petitioner, and which found her to be suffering from borderline

 personality disorder, ADHD, and major depressive disorder. The Court weighed and considered all of the above at sentencing.

Petitioner alleges that trial counsel should have gone into who initiated the sexual relationships further by advising the Court that Petitioner's first victim forced himself on her with kisses and eventually forced her to engage in oral sex with him when she was inebriated. Petitioner does not deny that she engaged in repeated, consensual, sexual contact with the victims in this case outside of those unwanted kisses and oral sex. Although Petitioner states that there were rumors at the school about her engaging in sexual contact with her pupils, Petitioner admits that she was neither forced nor blackmailed into engaging in these additional sexual contacts with the victims. Having pled to consensually engaging in sexual relations with her pupils, Petitioner cannot now (or at sentencing) allege that these acts were actually nonconsensual. Trial counsel not raising this issue was not objectively unreasonable.

As to whether a significant number of Wells residents feared and opposed Petitioner returning to Wells (5), and whether the victims who left Wells did so because of Petitioner's presence therein (6), Petitioner has not shown how trial counsel's addressing these issues in his sentencing argument would have had a reasonable probability of changing the ultimate sentencing decision, nor how not addressing them was objectively unreasonable.

Petitioner next alleges that trial counsel should have advised the Court that Petitioner and her husband were having marital difficulties and that Petitioner was drinking heavily at the time she engaged in sexual relations with her pupils. This information was already provided to the Court in the psychosexual evaluation. Trial counsel not bringing this information up a second time was not objectively unreasonable.

1. Failure to Update Psychosexual Evaluation Prior to Sentencing

Petitioner next alleges that the psychosexual evaluation should have been updated immediately prior to sentencing. Petitioner does not allege what an updated psychosexual evaluation would have shown. She states instead that the current psychosexual evaluation stated that she had

not followed the medical consultation recommended by Mr. Ing, the preparer of the evaluation, and that, if asked, Petitioner would have told the Court that she had obtained an MRI and had followed up with a physician to see if she had any identifiable medical conditions which might explain her criminal behaviors. Trial counsel already addressed Petitioner's history of consistently attending her counseling sessions, so Petitioner has not shown that trial counsel was deficient in that regard. As to the MRI and physician consultation, Petitioner has not shown what the results of the MRI and consultation were, and how production of those results would have led to a reasonable probability of a different outcome at sentencing.

2. Petitioner's Medications

Petitioner next alleges that trial counsel was deficient for not instructing her to tell the Court that she was not taking medications because both Mr. Ing and Petitioner's husband opposed her doing so. Again, Petitioner has not shown how her making this statement at sentencing would have had a reasonable probability of changing the results of the sentencing hearing, which is especially true as neither trial counsel, nor the prosecution, nor any of the witnesses, nor the Court itself made any references to medication during the hearing. The statement as to medication not being made did not, as Petitioner alleges, cause it to appear that Petitioner had done and would continue to do nothing to address her mental health problems. As indicated above, trial counsel mentioned several times that Petitioner had been consistently attending mental health counseling and intended to continue doing so. There is no indication that whether Petitioner was or was not taking medication had any kind of effect on the Court's sentencing decision.

3. The Pre-Sentence Investigation Report and Petitioner's Need for Treatment

Petitioner next alleges that trial counsel was deficient for not continuing to object to the inclusion of Mr. Ing's statement, copied into the PSI, that Petitioner's need for treatment was as high as it was overdue. Petitioner argues that this statement made it appear to the Court that she was not seeking medical help for her behavior. This is belied by the fact that trial counsel mentioned several times that Petitioner was attending counseling and had been for some time, as well as by the fact that

the Court stated that it was aware that the PSI statement had come directly from the psychosexual evaluation. That evaluation clearly indicated that Petitioner had been attending treatment and was interested in continuing to attend treatment. Thus, in context, Mr. Ing's statement is understood as describing the reasons why it is important that Petitioner continue counseling, now that she has finally started attending. Trial counsel allowing this statement to remain in the PSI did not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness, and Petitioner has not shown that the results of the sentencing hearing would have been any different without it.

4. Letters or Statements about Petitioner's Depression or Depressed Behavior

Petitioner next alleges that trial counsel was deficient for not objecting to the State's statement that Mr. Ing did not know what he was talking about. The Court reviewed both the transcript and the video of the sentencing hearing. Petitioner misstates the record. The State indicated that, contrary to what was indicated in the psychosexual evaluation, none of the letters provided to the Court on behalf of Petitioner mentioned any awareness or belief that Petitioner had been depressed.

Petitioner goes on to argue that trial counsel was deficient because he could have gotten letters and/or testimony from friends of Petitioner who could have told the Court that they had known or believed Petitioner to be depressed at or before the time she committed her crimes. Petitioner neither identifies these people, nor what testimony they would have provided, nor how having that testimony would have provided a reasonable probability of a different sentencing outcome.

Petitioner then states that trial counsel was deficient for not informing the Court about Petitioner's marital difficulties, her confused and pointless life, or the fact that one of her victims had noted a change in her personality from professional to childlike. Again, Petitioner's mental health struggles, drinking, feelings of worthlessness, and marital issues were mentioned in the psychosexual evaluation and in Petitioner's pastor's testimony. The Court was aware of all of these issues at the time of sentencing; Petitioner has not met her burden of showing that more testimony on this subject

would have created a reasonable probability of a different sentencing outcome.

5. Petitioner's First Victim's Suicide

Petitioner next asserts that trial counsel was deficient because he did not focus more on Petitioner's first victim and the first victim's suicide. Trial counsel mentioned that the suicide was separated in time and space from the victim's relationship with Petitioner, and that the victims, not Petitioner, initiated the sexual behaviors between them.

Petitioner argues that trial counsel should have brought up her first victim's mental health history, or the fact that he was broken up with by his girlfriend shortly before killing himself. Petitioner provides no specific facts as to what the victim's mental health history entails, who she would have had testify about it and the victim's break-up, and how any of this testimony would have created a reasonable probability of a lesser sentence.

If it is true that Petitioner's first victim was mentally ill and therefore an even more vulnerable and pliable victim even than the other children with whom she engaged in sexual relations, trial counsel may have thought it prudent not to raise this fact to the Court at sentencing. There is no reason to believe that trial counsel's strategic decisions fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.

6. Victim Impact Testimony

Petitioner next argues that trial counsel should have objected to Ms. Hooper's victim impact testimony when she stated that all four of the victims had been student aides of Petitioner, that Petitioner had been grooming students for years, that she had ruined proms, stalked students, taunted girlfriends, and threatened to engage in more relationships with more teenage boys, and that the community of Wells was completely devastated by Petitioner's acts. Again, trial counsel previously clarified that only two out of four students were Petitioner's student aides.

There is no reason to believe that the Court relied on the statements as to Petitioner's past bad acts or the statement as to the devastation of Wells in making its ruling. The Court stated that the four teenage boys with whom Petitioner engaged in sexual relations and their families were the

victims in this case. The Court did not reference the grooming or other bad acts Ms. Hooper described, nor the impact of this case on the people of Wells. Trial counsel not delving into a series of bad acts of which he appeared to be unaware may have been a prudent strategic decision. Petitioner has failed to show how trial counsel not questioning the witness as to these allegations, or the allegation that all of Wells was suffering, fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. As the Court never mentioned these statements in its ruling, Petitioner has also failed to show how, but for those statements being allowed to be made, Petitioner's sentence would have been lesser.

7. Classification of Victims and Harm

Petitioner also alleges that it was improper for the Court to determine that the family and victims who did not testify were injured by Petitioner's actions. All four teenage boys with whom Petitioner engaged in sexual relations are legally her victims under NRS 201.540 and NRS 176.015(5)(d)—they are the individuals against whom these crimes were committed.

The Court did not need to rely on anything other than Petitioner's no contest plea to these crimes to know that these teenage boys and their families were her victims and were thus, by definition, injured by her. Petitioner has not shown how trial counsel not objecting to the Court's identification of these teenage boys as victims fell below an objective standard of reasonableness or unreasonably prejudiced him.

8. Petitioner's Plans Post-Sentencing

Petitioner next contends that trial counsel was deficient by not making Petitioner's specific ongoing treatment and residency plans clear to the Court. Petitioner does not make those plans clear now, nor how these specific treatment plans would have caused a reasonable probability of a different sentencing result for Petitioner. Trial counsel and the psychosexual evaluation and Petitioner's pastor all already indicated that Petitioner was in treatment, had been for an extended period of time, and that she intended to continue that treatment post-sentencing.

Trial counsel also indicated that Petitioner would like to move out of the Wells area if she were granted probation. There is no guarantee that Petitioner would have been allowed to move

within or without Elko County even if granted probation, however. The Nevada Division of Parole and Probation would have to take into account numerous factors once Petitioner were granted probation to decide whether to grant her request to move, and, if so, to where. There is no reason to believe that trial counsel was deficient for not more strenuously stating Petitioner's desire to leave Wells. There is further nothing to suggest that, had trial counsel done so, there would have been a reasonable probability of a more lenient sentence.

9. Change of Plea

Petitioner finally contends that trial counsel should have advised her to plead no contest but mentally ill. Nevada does not recognize such a plea. The closest equivalent would be where a plea of guilty but mentally ill. See NRS 175.553(1) and NRS 174.035. If a defendant is found to be guilty but mentally ill, and still mentally ill at the time of sentencing, the sentencing court is required to include an order for the defendant to receive mental health treatment while incarcerated or on probation. NRS 176.057(1)(b)(2). To accept Petitioner's plea of guilty but mentally ill, the Court must have been able to find her guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, that she established by a preponderance of the evidence that due to a mental disease or defect, she was mentally ill at the time she committed her offenses, and that she had not established by a preponderance of the evidence that she was not guilty by reason of insanity. NRS 175.533(1). Petitioner has not shown that she would have met the qualifications to so plead; neither has she shown that she was still mentally ill at the time of her sentencing such that the Court would have been required to order her to receive ongoing mental health treatment as part of her sentence. Thus, Petitioner has neither shown that trial counsel was deficient for not having her plead this way, nor that there is a reasonable probability of her sentence changing if she were able to plead guilty but mentally ill.

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THEREFORE, as Petitioner has not met her burden of proof for a habeas corpus evidentiary hearing as to any of the grounds she raised, her petition for writ of habeas corpus is hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED this 2021.

KRISTON WHILL

-DEPARTMENT I

CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY

Pursuant to NRCP 5(b), I certify that I am an employee of the Fourth Judicial District Court
Department 1, and that on this 27th day of April, 2021, I personally hand delivered a file stamped
copy of the foregoing addressed to:

Tyler J. Ingram, Esq.
Elko County District Attorney
540 Court Street, 2nd Floor
Elko, NV 89801
[Box in Clerk's Office]

Gary Woodbury, Esq. 1053 Idaho Street Elko, NV 89801 [Box in Clerk's Office]

Mormane_

Case No. DC-CV-20-69

FILED

Dept. No. 1 2021 JUN 10 PM 1: 39

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELKO, STATE OF NEVADA

CLERK___DEPUTY_am

TENNILLE WHITAKER.

Appellant,

VS.

CLERK'S CERTIFICATION

JERRY HOWELL, WARDEN FLORENCE MCCLURE WOMEN'S CORRECTIONAL CENTER.

Respondent,

I, KRISTINE JAKEMAN, the duly elected, acting and qualified County Clerk and

Ex-Officio Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the State of Nevada, in and for the County of Elko, do hereby certify that the annexed are true, full and correct copies of certain documents in Case No. DC-CV-20-69, Dept. 1, Tennille Whitaker, Appellant, vs. Jerry Howell, Warden Florence McClure Women's correctional Center, Respondent, as appears on file and of record in my office.

WITNESS My Hand and Seal of said Court on June 10, 2021.

KRISTINE JAKEMAN, ELKO COUNTY CLERK

Annette Marshall, DEPUTY CLERK

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I caused to be sent electronically and/or mailed a certified copy of the annexed documents in Case No. DC-CV-20-69, Dept. 1, Tennille Whitaker, Appellant, vs. Jerry Howell, Warden Florence McClure Women's correctional Center,, Respondent, as appears on file and of record in this Court, to the following:

Gary D. Woodbury 1053 Idaho St. Elko, Nevada 89801

Elko County District Attorney 640 Court Street, 2nd Floor Elko, Nevada 89801

DATED this 10th, day of June, 2021.

Annette Marshall, Deputy Clerk