Electronically Filed 11/29/2021 2:24 PM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT

Janat Solandar #/ #1200370

4370 SMILEY ROAD LAS VEGAS, NV 89115

> In the 3+h Judicial District Court of the State of Nevage 07 2021 03:49 p.m. In and for the County of $_$ Clark

Electronically Filed Elizabeth A. Brown **Clerk of Supreme Court**

Case No. A-2.

'40177-N'

Solande Appellant/Plaintiff/Petitioner

٧.

Appellee/Respondent

NOTICE OF APPEAL


)

Notice is hereby given that <u>Janat Solandar</u>, Petitioner above named in the above captioned case, hereby appeals to the SUPREME COURT FOR THE STATE OF NEVADA from the final judgment for <u>HABEAS CORPUS</u> POST CONVICTION entered on the 331 day of Novambur 2021. Dated this 23rd day of November, 2021

Respectfully submitted.

Janet Solander Janet Solander Petitioner

CLERK OF THE COURT NOV 2 9 2021 RECEIVED



VOIS 0" 1.2.3 . 5.3.1 LAS VEGAS NV 890

CLERKOFCOURT 84 JUDICIAL DISTRAT 200 LEWIS AVE LAS VEGAS, NV 89165

000063-10168

Alleneitelleterenteriterteteretereteren ander anderen

		Electronically Filed 12/1/2021 10:37 AM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT	
1	ASTA	Atump. Atum	inger
2			
3			
5			
6	IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL	DISTRICT COURT OF THE	
7		DISTRICT COORT OF THE	
8		Y OF CLARK	
9			
10	JANET SOLANDER,	Case No: A-21-840177-W	
11	Plaintiff(s),	Dept No: XV	
12	vs.		
13	STATE OF NEVADA,		
14	Defendant(s),		
15 16			
10	CASE APPEAL	L STATEMENT	
18	1. Appellant(s): Janet Solander		
19	 Judge: Joe Hardy 		
20	 Appellant(s): Janet Solander 		
21	Counsel:		
22 23	Janet Solander #1200370		
23 24	P.O. Box 650 Indian Springs, NV 89070		
25	4. Respondent (s): State of Nevada		
26	Counsel:		
27	Steven B. Wolfson, District Attorney		
28	200 Lewis Ave. Las Vegas, NV 89155-2212		
	A-21-840177-W -1		
	Case Number: A	A-21-840177-W	

1 2	5.	Appellant(s)'s Attorney Licensed in Nevada: N/A Permission Granted: N/A		
3		Respondent(s)'s Attorney Licensed in Nevada: Yes		
4		Permission Granted: N/A		
5	6.	Has Appellant Ever Been Represented by Appointed Counsel In District Court: No		
6	7.	Appellant Represented by Appointed Counsel On Appeal: N/A		
7	8.	Appellant Granted Leave to Proceed in Forma Pauperis**: Yes, August 30, 2021 **Expires 1 year from date filed		
8 9		Appellant Filed Application to Proceed in Forma Pauperis: N/A Date Application(s) filed: N/A		
10	9.	Date Commenced in District Court: August 26, 2021		
11	10.	Brief Description of the Nature of the Action: Civil Writ		
12		Type of Judgment or Order Being Appealed: Civil Writ of Habeas Corpus		
13	11.	Previous Appeal: No		
14		Supreme Court Docket Number(s): N/A		
15	12. Child Custody or Visitation: N/A			
16	13. Possibility of Settlement: Unknown			
17		Dated This 1 day of December 2021.		
18 19		Steven D. Grierson, Clerk of the Court		
20				
21		/s/ Heather Ungermann		
22		Heather Ungermann, Deputy Clerk 200 Lewis Ave		
23		PO Box 551601 Las Vegas, Nevada 89155-1601		
24		(702) 671-0512		
25	cc: Janet So	olander		
26	ce. suilet S			
27				
28				
	A-21-840177	-W -2-		

Electronically Filed 11/29/2021 2:26 PM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT

Case No. A-21-840177-11

Solan FLORENCE MCCLURE WOMENS CORRECTIONAL CENTER

4370 SMILEY ROAD LAS VEGAS, NV 89115

In the $\underbrace{\mathcal{S}}_{\mathcal{I}}^{\mathcal{I}}$ Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada In and for the County of $\underbrace{\mathcal{S}}_{\mathcal{I}}^{\mathcal{I}}$

In the matter of:

Appellant/Plaintiff/Petitioner

v.

Appellee/Respondent/Defendant

DESIGNATION OF RECORD ON APPEAL

lanat Solandar COMES NOW Appellant,

_, a pro se litigant and hereby designates the entire record of the above-captioned case to include all pleadings, transcripts, papers, and documents for the NOTICE OF APPEAL IN THE SUPREME COURT FOR THE STATE OF NEVADA.

Appellant also requests that the District Court include in this Designation of Record, as applicable, the following documents:

- 1. ORDER
- 2. NOTICE OF ENTRY OF ORDER
- 3. FINDINGS OF FACT AND LAW

Dated this 231 day of Novambar, 2021

Respectfully submitted,

<u>it Solander</u>, Int It Solandor __, Appellant Se Litigant

Print Name

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

OUNTY OF
I am the Plaintiff/Petitioner D Defendant/Respondent
Janat Solandar for Case No: A-21-840177-W.
n this 23^{4} day of Novamber, 2021, I mailed a copy of the
ollowing document(s): NOTICE OF APPEAL
2. DESIGNATION OF RECORD ON APPEAL
3
4
5.

By United States First Class Mail, to the following addresses:

1. <u>Clark of Court</u> 8^{+b} Judicial District 200 LOWIS AVE Las Vagas, NV 89155

2. Attornay Ganaral - Navada 555 E. Washington Avo. St. 3900 las Vagas, NV 89101

3. Janat Solander FMW22 #1200370 4370 Smiley P.d. Las Vogas, NV 89115

Dated this 33 day of Novambar, 2021.

Respectfully submitted,

Janet Solanda nat Solandar

Printed Nam

2	•	1	
	-		
	1	This document does not contain the defined by NRS 603A.40.	personal information of any person a
	2		
	3		
	4	DECLARATION UNI	DER PENALTY OF PERJURY
	5	subject me to penalties of perjury.	ent or answer to any question in this declaration will
	6	<i>I</i> declare, under the penalty of <i>p</i> that the above and/or foregoing information is accurate, co within the terms of ¹ NRS 171.102 and ² NRS 208.165. See	perjury under the laws of the United States of America, orrect and true to the best of my knowledge, executed
	7		
	8	Dated this 33rd day of NOVEmbe	<u>1(, 20_2/</u>
	9	Signature	1200370
	10		Nevada Department of Corrections ID #
	11		
	12		
	13		
	14		
	15		
	16		
	17		
	18		
	19		
	20		
	21		
	22		ļ
	23		
	24		
	25		
	26	¹ NRS 171.102	
	27	² NRS 208.165 ³ 28 U.S.C. \$1746. Unsworn declarations under penalty	
	28	18 U.S.C. § 1621. Perjury generally	or perjury
	~~~~		
		Page 2	of <b>2</b>

### Eighth Judicial District Court CASE SUMMARY CASE NO. A-21-840177-W

vs.	er, Plaintiff(s) la, Defendant(s)	\$ \$ \$ \$ \$ \$ \$ \$		udicial Officer:	08/26/2021	
		CASE INFOR	MATION			
Related Cases C-14-299737-3	(Writ Related Case)			Case Type:	Writ of Hal	oeas Corpus
Statistical Closu				Case Status:	11/10/2021	Closed
DATE		CASE ASSIC	GNMENT			
	<b>Current Case Assignment</b> Case Number Court Date Assigned Judicial Officer	A-21-840177-W Department 15 08/26/2021 Hardy, Joe				
		PARTY INFO	RMATION		T	14
Plaintiff	Solander, Janet				Lea	d Attorneys
Defendant	State of Nevada					Pro Se Wolfson, Steven B Retained 702-671-2700(W)
DATE		EVENTS & ORDERS	OF THE COUR	Г		INDEX
08/26/2021	EVENTS Inmate Filed - Petition f Party: Plaintiff Solander [1] Post Conviction		pus			
08/26/2021	Request Filed by: Plaintiff Solan [2] Request for Submission					
08/26/2021	Motion for Appointmen Filed By: Plaintiff Solan [3] Motion for Appointme	ider, Janet				
08/26/2021	Motion Filed By: Plaintiff Solan [4] Motion to Withdraw (					
08/26/2021	Application to Proceed Filed By: Plaintiff Solan [5]					
08/30/2021	Order to Proceed In For	ma Pauperis				

#### Eighth Judicial District Court CASE SUMMARY CASE NO. A-21-840177-W

	CASE NO. A-21-8401/7-W
	[6] Order to Proceed in forma Pauperis
08/30/2021	Order for Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus [7] Order for Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus
08/31/2021	Clerk's Notice of Hearing [8] Notice of Hearing
10/01/2021	Response Filed by: Defendant State of Nevada [9] State's Response to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Post-Conviction)
11/10/2021	Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order Filed By: Plaintiff Solander, Janet [10] Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order
11/15/2021	Notice of Entry of Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law Filed By: Defendant State of Nevada [11] Notice of Entry of Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order
11/29/2021	Notice of Appeal [12] Notice of Appeal
11/29/2021	Designation of Record on Appeal [13] Designation of Record on Appeal
12/01/2021	Case Appeal Statement Filed By: Plaintiff Solander, Janet Case Appeal Statement
10/28/2021	HEARINGS Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (8:30 AM) (Judicial Officer: Hardy, Joe)
	Denied;
10/28/2021	Motion to Withdraw as Counsel (8:30 AM) (Judicial Officer: Hardy, Joe) <i>Plaintiff's Motion to Withdraw Counsel</i> Motion Granted;
10/28/2021	Motion for Appointment of Attorney (8:30 AM) (Judicial Officer: Hardy, Joe) <i>Plaintiff's Motion for Appointmetn of Attorney</i> Motion Denied;
10/28/2021	All Pending Motions (8:30 AM) (Judicial Officer: Hardy, Joe) Matter Heard; Journal Entry Details: PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUSPLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF ATTORNEYPLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO WITHDRAW COUNSEL The State present via Blue Jeans. The Court noted that it reviewed the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, the Motion for Appointment of Attorney, the Motion to Withdraw Counsel, and the State's Response. Without hearing any oral argument, COURT ORDERED the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, as well as the Plaintiff's Motion for Appointment of Attorney, were hereby DENIED. COURT FURTHER ORDERED the Motion to Withdraw Counsel, was hereby GRANTED. The COURT FOUND the following: (1) the Plaintiff did not have a right to counsel on a post-conviction Petition; (2) the Court may use its discretion to appoint counsel under appropriate circumstances; however, those circumstances were not present in the instant case; and (3) the substance of the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus was substantively denied for all of the reasons set forth in the State's Response. The State to prepare the written Order,

#### EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT CASE SUMMARY CASE NO. A-21-840177-W

incorporating the reasons set forth in its Response as the Court's Findings, and submit it directly to chambers. COURT ORDERED a status check regarding the submittal of the written Order, was hereby SET on this department's chambers calendar. 11/18/21 (CHAMBERS) STATUS CHECK: SUBMITTAL OF ORDER CLERK'S NOTE: A copy of this minute order was provided to Plaintiff via U.S. mail: Janet Solander #1200370 [Florence McClure Womens Correctional Center 4370 Smiley Road Las Vegas, NV 89115]. (KD 10/28/21);

### DISTRICT COURT CIVIL COVER SHEET

		nty, Nevada Dept. 15
	Case No. (Assigned by Clerk's Offic	e)
I. Party Information (provide both ho	me and mailing addresses if different)	
Plaintiff(s) (name/address/phone):		fendant(s) (name/address/phone):
Janet Solar	nder	State of Nevada
Attorney (name/address/phone):	Att	orney (name/address/phone):
······································		
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·		
II. Nature of Controversy (please se Civil Case Filing Types	elect the one most applicable filing type belo	w)
Real Property		Torts
Landlord/Tenant	Negligence	Other Torts
Unlawful Detainer	Auto	Product Liability
Other Landlord/Tenant	Premises Liability	Intentional Misconduct
Title to Property	Other Negligence	Employment Tort
Judicial Foreclosure	Malpractice	Insurance Tort
Other Title to Property	Medical/Dental	Other Tort
Other Real Property	Legal	
Condemnation/Eminent Domain	Accounting	
Other Real Property Other Malpractice		
Probate	Construction Defect & Contract	Judicial Review/Appeal
Probate (select case type and estate value)	Construction Defect	Judicial Review
Summary Administration	Chapter 40	Foreclosure Mediation Case
General Administration	Other Construction Defect	Petition to Seal Records
Special Administration	Contract Case	Mental Competency
Set Aside	Uniform Commercial Code	Nevada State Agency Appeal
Trust/Conservatorship	Building and Construction	Department of Motor Vehicle
Other Probate	Insurance Carrier	Worker's Compensation
Estate Value	Commercial Instrument	Other Nevada State Agency
Over \$200,000	Collection of Accounts	Appeal Other
Between \$100,000 and \$200,000		Other Judicial Review/Appeal
Under \$100,000 or Unknown Under \$2,500	Other Contract	
	l Writ	Other Civil Filing
	1 w m	· · · · · · · ·
Civil Writ	Writ of Prohibition	Other Civil Filing Compromise of Minor's Claim
Writ of Habeas Corpus Writ of Mandamus	Other Civil Writ	Foreign Judgment
Writ of Quo Warrant		Other Civil Matters
	ourt filings should be filed using the Bu	
August 26, 2021		PREPARED BY CLERK

Date

Signature of initiating party or representative

See other side for family-related case filings.

1 2 3 4 5 6	FCL STEVEN B. WOLFSON Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #001565 JONATHAN E. VANBOSKERCK Chief Deputy District Attorney Nevada Bar #006528 200 Lewis Avenue Las Vegas, Nevada 89155-2212 (702) 671-2500 Attorney for Respondent		Electronically Filed 11/10/2021 10:38 AM Action Software CLERK OF THE COURT
7 8	DISTRICT O CLARK COUNT		
9	JANET SOLANDER, #5870905		
10 11	Petitioner,		
12	-vs-	DEPT NO:	A-21-840177-W XV
13	THE STATE OF NEVADA,		
14	Respondent.		
15	FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUS	IONS OF LAW	, AND ORDER
16			
17	THIS CAUSE having been decided by	the Honorable	Joe Hardy, District Judge,
18	pursuant to a Minute Order issued on the 28th day	y of October 202	21, the State present via Blue
19	Jeans, and the Court having considered the matter	, including brief	s, transcripts, and documents
20	on file herein, now therefore, the Court makes th	e following find	lings of fact and conclusions
21	of law:		
22			
23	//		
24	//		
25			
26	//		
27 28	// //		
20			
í	Statistica	ally closed: USJR -	CV - Summary Judgment (USSUJ)

## POINTS AND AUTHORITIES PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On July 28, 2014 the State filed an Information that charged Janet Solander (hereinafter "Petitioner") with CHILD ABUSE, NEGLECT OR ENDANGERMENT WITH SUBSTANTIAL BODILY HARM (Category B Felony - NRS 200.508(1) - NOC 55222), CHILD ABUSE, NEGLECT OR ENDANGERMENT (Category B Felony - NRS 200.508(1) - NOC 55226), SEXUAL ASSAULT WITH A MINOR UNDER FOURTEEN YEARS OF AGE (Category A Felony - NRS 200.364, 200.366 - NOC 50105), ASSAULT WITH USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON (Category B Felony - NRS 200.471 - NOC 50201) and BATTERY WITH INTENT TO COMMIT SEXUAL ASSAULT (Category A Felony - NRS 200.400.4 - NOC 50157).

Petitioner sought pre-trial habeas relief on November 5, 2014. She alleged a failure to establish probable cause and that sexual assault was a specific-intent crime requiring sexual motivation. The State filed a Return on December 17, 2014. On June 17, 2015, the District Court granted relief in part.

Both Petitioner and the State appealed, and, on April 13, 2016, the Nevada Supreme Court reversed. While agreeing that "if the Solanders undertook the catheterization for a bona fide medical purpose, they may avoid criminal liability," the Court held that jurors should determine whether Solander had such a purpose. The Court explicitly rejected the Petitioner's argument that sexual assault "includes an element of sexual motivation or gratification."

On January 4, 2018, the State filed their Notice of Expert Witnesses. Petitioner sought to strike on January 28, 2018. The State opposed on February 2, 2018.

The State filed a prior-bad-acts motion seeking to admit evidence of Petitioner's abuse of foster children. Petitioner opposed on January 18, 2018.

On January 22, 2018, Petitioner's co-defendant filed a motion to suppress victim interviews. Petitioner joined. The State responded on February 1, 2018.

On January 31, 2018, the District Court began a two-day hearing on the prior-bad-acts motion.

A twenty-day jury trial began on February 5, 2018. On February 6, 2018, the State filed an Amended Information. The jury found Petitioner guilty of each count.

Petitioner was sentenced on June 5, 2018. Her sentence included eleven counts of thirtyfive years to life for the sexual-assault counts. The other sentences ran consecutive to each other. The Judgment of Conviction was filed on June 22, 2018.

A Notice of Appeal was filed on June 21, 2018. On October 27, 2020, the Supreme Court of Nevada affirmed the Judgment of Conviction. Remittitur issued October 26, 2020.

On August 26, 2021, Petitioner filed the instant Petition. On August 30, 2021, the Court ordered the State to respond.

### FACTUAL BACKGROUND

This case involves the systemic abuse of three young girls over a period of several years. The oldest, A.S.(2001), was born on October 21, 2001. The middle sister, A.S.(2003), was born on January 23, 2003. The youngest, A.S.(2004), was born on July 25, 2004.

The sisters were removed from their biological families. After a short time with another family, they were placed with Debbie McClain. They lived with McClain for a year and a half. A.S.(2001) and A.S.(2003) were potty trained and did not have accidents during their time with McClain. McClain fed the sisters regular food, but A.S.(2004) was a picky eater. During their time with McClain, the girls did not have "any scars either to the flanks of their body, their buttocks, [or] their upper thighs."

The girls were fostered to the Solanders. The Solanders ultimately adopted them. They lived in two different houses during their time with the Solanders. The first home, when they were foster children, was on "Jubilee." The second was on "Wakashan."

In the Jubilee house, Petitioner implemented rules about using the bathroom. They had to ask before using the toilet, and Petitioner would set a timer on either her phone or a physical timer for "however much time she felt like" the girls needed to "hold it." They could not use the toilet until the timer was up.

The girls were fed regular food at Jubilee for a short period of time. Eventually, Petitioner changed their diet, alleging that A.S.(2001) had Crohn's disease. During the time that the sisters were foster children, Petitioner did not physically punish them. This changed after adoption. Petitioner would make them sleep on boards or towels with a cold fan blowing on them in only their underwear. The other foster children had their own beds. Danielle Hinton remembered her mother threatening the sisters with "the fan" if they acted up, even in the wintertime.

After the adoption, Petitioner's toileting rules remained rigid. The girls still had to ask, and only after they had asked, Petitioner would start the timer. Petitioner would get upset with the girls for not asking earlier. They found it confusing that they had to first ask, and they sometimes got in trouble when they had to go too much when the timer finally rang. At times, they would have to wait so long either after Petitioner started the timer or during the middle of the night that they would wet themselves. Petitioner counted the squares of toilet paper the girls could use. Because they were so limited, their feces would sometimes leave marks on their underwear. The Solanders would check the sisters' underwear for these marks. These rules were corroborated by Jan Finnegan and Hinton. Petitioner would make them sit on buckets and the youngest sit on a tiny toilet all day with their underwear pulled slightly down rather than letting them use the toilet as needed. Hinton saw the girls use their buckets as toilets.

Even during the night, the girls had to ask before they could go to the bathroom. Eventually, Petitioner revoked nocturnal toileting. A camera faced the upstairs bathroom. Having been forbidden from using the toilet at night, the girls would soil themselves. Dwight Petitioner enforced this rule by placing gates and alarms on a bathroom door. He was often out of town for work, meaning that Petitioner was the main instigator of punishments.

The girls developed a fear of toileting. This led to multiple accidents daily. When the girls were left in the care of others, the toileting problems would cease.

Petitioner kicked the girls up and down the stairs. When they were showering, she would poor ice on them. Hinton saw her mother get the ice and heard the girls scream.

If they had an accident, the Solanders would beat them with paint sticks until they would bleed and scar. Hinton witnessed these beatings. I.S.(2008), one of the foster children, testified

that she saw this "every day" and that Dwight make her and her sister "be the audience" and laugh at the sisters as they were being beaten. Petitioner would force the girls to put their soiled underwear into their mouths. Once, after A.S.(2004) had an accident, Petitioner took the paint stick and inserted it into A.S.(2004)'s vagina. On another occasion, Petitioner burned A.S.(2004) while she was washing her hands by turning the temperature up and holding her hands under the water and then splashing her with hot water, badly burning her skin. State's Exhibit 192. Petitioner forced A.S.(2004)'s head into a toilet filled with excrement and, on more than one occasion, made her stand naked in a garbage bag as she soiled herself. When A.S.(2001) had an accident, Petitioner made her lick her own urine off the floor. Another time, Petitioner slammed A.S.(2001)'s head into a counter repeatedly after she had an accident. A.S.(2006), a foster child, witnessed Dwight spanking the sisters with their pants down with a "ruler that was pretty thick." I.S.(2008) remembered seeing each of the sisters being hit with paint sticks seeing scabs and burns on their bodies from Petitioner burning them with water.

The Solanders humiliated the girls by making them crawl on the floor in cloth diapers saying that they were babies while the foster children and Danielle Hinton watched. As they crawled doing their "I'm-a-baby chant," the Solanders would make them wear their soiled underwear on their heads or carry them in their mouths.

Dwight Solander purchased six catheters on December 8, 2012, and three days later, on December 11, 2012, Petitioner sent Dwight a picture of a catheter filled with urine and a subject line which read "300 cc's." State's Exhibits 204,243. Petitioner also regularly punished the sisters by inserting catheters into their urethras without their consent and by threatening to cut their genitalia with a razor blade. She did this to A.S.(2003) once, to A.S.(2001) more than once, and to A.S.(2004) between 7-8 times. Petitioner had to hold A.S.(2004) down as she inserted the catheter because she would fight. Hinton heard the Solanders threaten the girls with catheters and saw a catheter in her house. She told police that the Solanders used catheters on the girls, but that she couldn't personally watch.

Petitioner limited the sisters' meals as punishment for accidents. When they did eat, their meals were timed and often blended. A.S.(2001) would "usually have baby formula and

milk" which was blended occasionally with bread. Other times, she would have oatmeal mixed with fish, or quinoa. Dinner was collard greens, beans, horseradish, and fish along with "several other kinds of meat" which Petitioner would blend together.

To eat, A.S.(2001) would have to sand by the sink. Jan Finnegan testified that the girls were required to eat breakfast standing up while the other children in the home could eat at the table. As A.S.(2001) ate, Petitioner would tell A.S.(2001) that she had ground up a mouse or a rat into her meal. She would also tell A.S.(2001) that the fish had been alive. For liquids, A.S.(2001) would get water with medicine or after bathroom breaks. Meals were served without a drink. She was so thirsty that she would drink water from the shower or brushing her teeth. Petitioner saw A.S.(2001) drink shower water and slapped her, cutting and bruising her lip. Finnegan testified that the girls "weren't allowed" to be given water at dinner, in the middle of the day, or "[h]ardly ever."

At first, A.S.(2001) would get three meals each day. Then two, breakfast and dinner, then one, then, at times, none. The Solanders forbade Finnegan from feeding the sisters lunch even though the other children in the home could eat. The meals caused A.S.(2001) to use the toilet more. Hungry, A.S.(2001) would sneak into the pantry to get food. Petitioner beat her with a stick.

Petitioner also severely limited A.S.(2003)'s food intake by timing her meals and letting her go hungry. In response, she would take food in violation of Petitioner's rules. At times, she would, while sitting on her bucket, watch Petitioner eat a hearty breakfast and hungrily wait to be fed. A.S.(2004) was also left to go hungry.

#### Foster Sibling Corroboration

I.S.(2008) and A.S.(2006) lived with the Solanders as foster children. They corroborated the sisters' testimony about Solander's strict toileting rules. I.S.(2008) testified that Petitioner would watch the sisters as they used the restroom.

Petitioner forbade A.S.(2006) from eating dairy even though she did not have any stomach problems. After she was removed from the Petitioner house, she did not have any toileting problems or lactose intolerance.

A.S.(2006) further corroborated the sisters' testimony regarding blended food and the eating conditions. Further, she remembered Petitioner talking about using catheters on one of the sisters and orange Home Depot buckets in the kitchen.

#### Jan Finnegan

In January 2013, Finnegan responded to Petitioner's nanny ad. Finnegan observed two cameras—one in the kitchen and one on the second floor "looking down towards the entrance of the bathroom."

Finnegan corroborated the sisters' testimony about Petitioner's strict bathroom rules and that the rules did not apply to the other children. When she tried to do laundry, Dwight told her to refrain so that he could see the sister's underwear. Despite the rules, none of the children had any toileting accidents during the entire three weeks Finnegan was there. Further, the sisters did not have any severe tantrums or disturbing emotional behavior.

Finnegan corroborated the sisters' testimony that Petitioner would strictly control their diets while allowing the foster children to eat normal food. The Solanders forbade Finnegan from giving the girls food outside of breakfast and dinner, they were required to eat breakfast standing, their food had to be blended, and they could not be given water. To justify this, Dwight cited vague "intestinal problems." Finnegan would sneak them solid, unblended food every day without any resulting intestinal problems.

Finnegan testified that the sisters were not disobedient and that they were well behaved.

### Investigation

On February 26, 2014, Shining Star Therapeutic Services sent a report to CPS about two of Petitioner's foster children. On February 27, 2014, Yvette Gonzales, a senior family services specialist with CPS, visited the school of one of the children. She decided to remove the children.

Gonzales reported to the Solander house and asked to see the remaining foster children. She asked Petitioner where her adoptive daughters were, and Petitioner said they were in Nebraska but refused to provide contact information. Gonzales said she was "going to file a missing person's report" if Petitioner did not provide her with more information. Petitioner

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

asked Gonzales to leave, and CPS took the foster children.

On February 28, 2014, Gonzales contacted the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department Missing Persons Detail. A detective contacted Dwight, who said the girls were in Marvelous Grace Academy in Pace, Florida. The director of the academy, Steven Blankenship, confirmed that the girls were there.

Gonzales decided to have someone speak with the sisters. Jackie Henry from the Department of Family Services contacted the girls. Henry put them in protective custody, and the Solanders' rights over them were removed. CPS opened an investigation. The police department was asked to determine if the Solanders had committed any crimes.

Gonzales interviewed Dwight and informed him that a protective custody hearing would be held. On March 5, 2014, the hearing was conducted. The girls were returned to Nevada and expressed fear over returning to the Solander's home.

On March 13, 2014, the girls were examined by Dr. Sandra Cetl. She conducted a sexual assault assessment of each child. She found nothing significant, but she testified that the administration of a catheter would not result in scarring or tearing. She did find marks on A.S.(2001) during the physical evaluation that caused her concern. She found scars on the buttocks, "in between the thighs right almost to the genital area, and [on] the lower back area." The marks near the buttocks were larger and "had some shape to them" and were in an area that people do not typically injure. Her left buttock had a linear scar. This was consistent with being hit with a paint stick. The mark was caused by blunt force trauma. The physical examination of A.S.(2003) revealed marks on her buttocks, legs, and back which were consistent with blunt force trauma. "[T]he top of her right shoulder" had "substantial scar tissue.". Cetl was "concerned that it may have been from a burn, maybe a scald burn." Her lower back had a linear scar. A.S.(2004) had scars on her buttocks and back which were consistent with blunt force trauma. She had "a light lightening from the skin from ... scarring on her right ear." A scar ran down her shoulder that looked like a "hot liquid type of a burn." The doctor noted concerns about the growth of the girls.

28

#### McClain

In March 2014, the girls were returned to live with McClain. They had changed tremendously, and McClain believed that she "didn't get the same kids back." A.S.(2001) was withdrawn and depressed. A.S.(2003) was argumentative, "real angry," and quick to blame others. A.S.(2004) was confused about everything. By the time the girls were returned, they were not having toileting accidents and properly digesting food. They had marks and scars on their bodies which "were not there previously."

#### Medical

Cetl testified that the genital area included the labia majora, the vagina, and the urethral opening. The labia majora generally completely enclose the inner parts of female genitalia, and they must be spread to get to the inner areas. 19AA4623. Dr. Elizabeth Mileti testified that she would never recommend that a parent administer a catheter to check their child's bladder, and that she did not recommend catheterization of A.S.(2003). Dr. Alphonsa Stephen testified that she never recommended that Petitioner administer a catheter to A.S.(2004).

#### ANALYSIS

### ĺ

I.

PETITIONER'S ARGUMENTS IN GROUND TWO ARE BARRED

A. The Law of The Case Bars Petitioner's Sufficiency of The Evidence Claims

The arguments in Ground two (2) of the petition are procedurally barred by the law of the case given that the Nevada Supreme Court ruled on them. The law of a first appeal is law of the case on all subsequent appeals in which the facts are substantially the same." <u>Hall v.</u> <u>State</u>, 91 Nev. 314, 315, 535 P.2d 797, 798 (1975) (quoting <u>Walker v. State</u>, 85 Nev. 337, 343, 455 P.2d 34, 38 (1969)). "The doctrine of the law of the case cannot be avoided by a more detailed and precisely focused argument subsequently made after reflection upon the previous proceedings." <u>Id.</u> at 316, 535 P.2d at 799. Under the law of the case doctrine, issues previously decided on direct appeal may not be reargued. <u>Pellegrini v. State</u>, 117 Nev. 860, 879, 34 P.3d 519, 532 (2001) (citing <u>McNelton v. State</u>, 115 Nev. 396, 414-15, 990 P.2d 1263, 1275 (1999)). Furthermore, this Court cannot overrule the Nevada Supreme Court. NEV. CONST. Art. VI § 6.

1	Petitioner argues that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that she was				
2	guilty. Petitioner already argued this claim on direct appeal. The Nevada Supreme Court				
3	concluded that there was sufficient evidence:				
4	Solander challenges her convictions of sexual assault of a minor				
5	under 14 years of age and batter with intent to commit sexual assault.				
6	Considering all the evidence, we conclude a rational trier of fact				
7	could find the elements of sexual assault of a minor under 14 years				
. 8	of age and batter with intent to commit sexual assault beyond a reasonable doubt for each of Solander's convictions.				
9 10	Solander next challenges her convictions for child abuse with				
11	substantial bodily harm by means of spanking the victims with a paint stick				
12					
13	Based on this evidence a rational trier of fact could have found each essential element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.				
14	Lastly, Solander contends that the State failed to prove count 11				
15	beyond a reasonable doubt because A.S. (2001) recanted the allegation.				
16	Thus, a rational trier of fact could have found each essential				
17	element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt				
18					
19	Solander v. State, No. 76228, 2020 WL 3603882, at *2-6 (July 1, 2020). The law of the case				
20	bars Petitioner from relitigating these claims. Thus, this Court finds that the law of the case				
21	bars Ground two (2) of the Petition.				
22	B. Petitioner's Claim Regarding the CPS Records Should Have Been Raised on				
23	Direct Appeal				
24	At the end of Ground two, Petitioner asserts that the court incorrectly ruled that certain				
25	evidence was not relevant. This claim should have been raised on direct appeal. NRS				
26	34.724(2)(a); NRS 34.810(1)(b); Franklin v. State, 110 Nev. 750, 752, 877 P.2d 1058, 1059				
27	(1994), disapproved on other grounds, <u>Thomas v. State</u> , 115 Nev. 148, 979 P.2d 222 (1999).				
28	Her failure to do so bars this claim.				
	10				

Petitioner's failure to prove good cause or prejudice requires the dismissal of this claim. To overcome this bar, a petitioner must demonstrate: (1) good cause for delay in filing her petition or for bringing new claims or repeating claims in a successive petition; and (2) undue or actual prejudice. NRS 34.726(1); NRS 34.800(1); NRS 34.810(3). To establish prejudice "a petitioner must show that errors in the proceedings underlying the judgment worked to the petitioner's actual and substantial disadvantage." <u>State v. Huebler</u>, 128 Nev. 192, 197, 275 P.3d 91, 94-95 (2012), <u>cert</u>, <u>denied</u>, 568 U.S. 1147, 133 S.Ct. 988 (2013).

"To establish good cause, petitioners must show that an impediment external to the defense prevented their compliance with the applicable procedural rule. A qualifying impediment might be shown where the factual or legal basis for a claim was not reasonably available at the time of default." <u>Clem v. State</u>, 119 Nev. 615, 621, 81 P.3d 521, 525 (2003), rehearing denied, 120 Nev. 307, 91 P.3d 35 cert. denied, 543 U.S. 947, 125 S.Ct. 358 (2004); see also, Hathaway v. State, 119 Nev. 248, 251, 71 P.3d 503, 506 (2003) ("In order to demonstrate good cause, a petitioner must show that an impediment external to the defense prevented him or her from complying with the state procedural default rules"); Pellegrini, 117 Nev. at 887, 34 P.3d at 537 (neither ineffective assistance of counsel, nor a physician's declaration in support of a habeas petition were sufficient "good cause" to overcome a procedural default, whereas a finding by Supreme Court that a defendant was suffering from Multiple Personality Disorder was). An external impediment could be "that the factual or legal basis for a claim was not reasonably available to counsel, or that 'some interference by officials' made compliance impracticable." Id. (quoting Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 2645 (1986)); see also, Gonzalez, 118 Nev. at 595, 53 P.3d at 904 (citing Harris v. Warden, 114 Nev. 956, 959-60 n.4, 964 P.2d 785 n.4 (1998)).

The Nevada Supreme Court has held that, "appellants cannot attempt to manufacture good cause[.]" <u>Clem</u>, 119 Nev. at 621, 81 P.3d at 526. To find good cause there must be a "substantial reason; one that affords a legal excuse." <u>Hathaway</u>, 119 Nev. at 251, 71 P.3d at 506; (quoting, <u>Colley v. State</u>, 105 Nev. 235, 236, 773 P.2d 1229, 1230 (1989), superseded by statute as recognized by, <u>Huebler</u>, 128 Nev. at 197, 275 P.3d at 95, footnote 2). Excuses such

as the lack of assistance of counsel when preparing a petition as well as the failure of trial counsel to forward a copy of the file to a petitioner have been found not to constitute good cause. <u>Phelps v. Dir. Nev. Dep't of Prisons</u>, 104 Nev. 656, 660, 764 P.2d 1303, 1306 (1988), superseded by statute as recognized by, <u>Nika v. State</u>, 120 Nev. 600, 607, 97 P.3d 1140, 1145 (2004); Hood v. State, 111 Nev. 335, 890 P.2d 797 (1995).

Petitioner makes no good cause argument for why this Court should consider her claim. Failure to address good cause amounts to an admission that she is unable to do so. DCR 13(2); EDCR 3.20(b); <u>Polk v. State</u>, 126 Nev. 180, 186, 233 P.3d 357, 360-61 (2010). Nowhere in her petition does Petitioner address the issue of good cause. She fails to allege any impediments that necessitated bringing a claim outside of appeal. Thus, Petitioner's silence should be read as an admission that no good cause exists.

Even if Petitioner did address the issue, good cause cannot be demonstrated. Petitioner had all the facts and law necessary to allege this claim. Thus, Petitioner should have been able to allege it on appeal. Based on Petitioner's failure to properly allege good cause, this Court denies this claim on the grounds that Petitioner cannot demonstrate good cause.

Petitioner's failure to address good cause necessitates the dismissal of this claim. However, Petitioner also fails to properly allege prejudice. "A court *must* dismiss a habeas petition if it presents claims that either were or could have been presented in an earlier proceeding, unless the court finds both cause for failing to present the claims earlier or for raising them again and actual prejudice to the petitioner." Evans v. State, 117 Nev. 609, 646–47, 29 P.3d 498, 523 (2001). To demonstrate prejudice to overcome the procedural bars, a defendant must show "not merely that the errors of [the proceeding] created possibility of prejudice, but that they worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, in affecting the state proceedings with error of constitutional dimensions." <u>Hogan v. Warden</u>, 109 Nev. 952, 960, 860 P.2d 710, 716 (1993) (quoting United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170, 102 S. Ct. 1584, 1596 (1982)). To find good cause there must be a "substantial reason; one that affords a legal excuse." <u>Hathaway v. State</u>, 119 Nev. 248, 252, 71 P.3d 503, 506 (2003) (quoting Colley v. State, 105 Nev. 235, 236, 773 P.2d 1229, 1230 (1989)). Petitioner cannot face prejudice, as she alleges nothing more than a bare and naked claim. "Bare" and "naked" allegations are not sufficient to warrant post-conviction relief, nor are those belied and repelled by the record. <u>Hargrove v. State</u>, 100 Nev. 498, 502, 686 P.2d 222, 225 (1984). "A claim is 'belied' when it is contradicted or proven to be false by the record as it existed at the time the claim was made." <u>Mann v. State</u>, 118 Nev. 351, 354, 46 P.3d 1228, 1230 (2002). Petitioner fails to cite law or explain the improperness of the Court's prior ruling. Thus, even if Petitioner could assert good cause, she is unable to establish prejudice. As such, this claim is denied.

# II. PETITIONER DID NOT RECEIVE INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that, "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense." The United States Supreme Court has long recognized that "the right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel." <u>Strickland v. Washington</u>, 466 U.S. 668, 686, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2063 (1984); <u>see also State v. Love</u>, 109 Nev. 1136, 1138, 865 P.2d 322, 323 (1993).

To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, a defendant must prove she was denied "reasonably effective assistance" of counsel by satisfying the two-prong test of <u>Strickland</u>, 466 U.S. at 686-87, 104 S. Ct. at 2063-64. <u>See also Love</u>, 109 Nev. at 1138, 865 P.2d at 323. Under the <u>Strickland</u> test, a defendant must show first that his counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and second, that but for counsel's errors, there is a reasonable probability that the result of the proceedings would have been different. 466 U.S. at 687-88, 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2065, 2068; <u>Warden, Nevada State Prison</u> v. Lyons, 100 Nev. 430, 432, 683 P.2d 504, 505 (1984) (adopting the <u>Strickland</u> two-part test). "[T]here is no reason for a court deciding an ineffective assistance claim to approach the inquiry in the same order or even to address both components of the inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on one." <u>Strickland</u>, 466 U.S. at 697, 104 S. Ct. at 2069.

The court begins with the presumption of effectiveness and then must determine whether the defendant has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that counsel was ineffective. <u>Means v. State</u>, 120 Nev. 1001, 1011, 103 P.3d 25, 32 (2004). "Effective counsel does not mean errorless counsel, but rather counsel whose assistance is '[w]ithin the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases."" Jackson v. Warden, 91 Nev. 430, 432, 537 P.2d 473, 474 (1975).

Counsel cannot be ineffective for failing to make futile objections or arguments. <u>Ennis</u> <u>v. State</u>, 122 Nev. 694, 706, 137 P.3d 1095, 1103 (2006). Trial counsel has the "immediate and ultimate responsibility of deciding if and when to object, which witnesses, if any, to call, and what defenses to develop." <u>Rhyne v. State</u>, 118 Nev. 1, 8, 38 P.3d 163, 167 (2002).

Based on the above law, the role of a court in considering allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel is "not to pass upon the merits of the action not taken but to determine whether, under the particular facts and circumstances of the case, trial counsel failed to render reasonably effective assistance." <u>Donovan v. State</u>, 94 Nev. 671, 675, 584 P.2d 708, 711 (1978). This analysis does not mean that the court should "second guess reasoned choices between trial tactics nor does it mean that defense counsel, to protect himself against allegations of inadequacy, must make every conceivable motion no matter how remote the possibilities are of success." <u>Id.</u> To be effective, the constitution "does not require that counsel do what is impossible or unethical. If there is no bona fide defense to the charge, counsel cannot create one and may disserve the interests of his client by attempting a useless charade." <u>United States v. Cronic</u>, 466 U.S. 648, 657 n.19, 104 S. Ct. 2039, 2046 n.19 (1984).

"There are countless ways to provide effective assistance in any given case. Even the best criminal defense attorneys would not defend a particular client in the same way." <u>Strickland</u>, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S. Ct. at 689. "Strategic choices made by counsel after thoroughly investigating the plausible options are almost unchallengeable." <u>Dawson v. State</u>, 108 Nev. 112, 117, 825 P.2d 593, 596 (1992); <u>see also Ford v. State</u>, 105 Nev. 850, 853, 784 P.2d 951, 953 (1989). In essence, the court must "judge the reasonableness of counsel's challenged conduct on the facts of the particular case, viewed as of the time of counsel's

conduct." <u>Strickland</u>, 466 U.S. at 690, 104 S. Ct. at 2066.

Even if a defendant can demonstrate that his counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, she must still demonstrate prejudice and show a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the result of the trial would have been different. <u>McNelton v. State</u>, 115 Nev. 396, 403, 990 P.2d 1263, 1268 (1999) (citing <u>Strickland</u>, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at 2064). "A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." <u>Id.</u> (citing <u>Strickland</u>, 466 U.S. at 687-89, 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2064-65, 2068).

The Nevada Supreme Court has held "that a habeas corpus petitioner must prove the disputed factual allegations underlying his ineffective-assistance claim by a preponderance of the evidence." Means v. State, 120 Nev. 1001, 1012, 103 P.3d 25, 33 (2004). Furthermore, claims of ineffective assistance of counsel asserted in a petition for post-conviction relief must be supported with specific factual allegations, which if true, would entitle the petitioner to relief. <u>Hargrove v. State</u>, 100 Nev. 498, 502, 686 P.2d 222, 225 (1984). "Bare" and "naked" allegations are not sufficient, nor are those belied and repelled by the record. <u>Id.</u> NRS 34.735(6) states in relevant part, "[Petitioner] *must* allege specific facts supporting the claims in the petition[.]... Failure to allege specific facts rather than just conclusions may cause your petition to be dismissed." (emphasis added).

There is a strong presumption that appellate counsel's performance was reasonable and fell within "the wide range of reasonable professional assistance." <u>See United States v.</u> <u>Aguirre</u>, 912 F.2d 555, 560 (2nd Cir. 1990); citing <u>Strickland</u>, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S. Ct. at 2065. A claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel must satisfy the two-prong test set forth by <u>Strickland</u>. <u>Kirksey v. State</u>, 112 Nev. 980, 998, 923 P.2d 1102, 1114 (1996). In order to satisfy <u>Strickland</u>'s second prong, the defendant must show that the omitted issue would have had a reasonable probability of success on appeal. <u>Id.</u>

The professional diligence and competence required on appeal involves "winnowing out weaker arguments on appeal and focusing on one central issue if possible, or at most on a few key issues." Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751-52, 103 S. Ct. 3308, 3313 (1983). In

particular, a "brief that raises every colorable issue runs the risk of burying good arguments . . . in a verbal mound made up of strong and weak contentions." <u>Id.</u> at 753, 103 S. Ct. at 3313. For judges to second-guess reasonable professional judgments and impose on appointed counsel a duty to raise every 'colorable' claim suggested by a client would disserve the very goal of vigorous and effective advocacy." <u>Id.</u> at 754, 103 S. Ct. at 3314.

#### A. Counsel Did Not Provide Ineffective Assistance of Counsel By Meeting with Petitioner the Friday Before Trial

Petitioner claims that counsel met with her for less than two hours the Friday prior to trial. Petitioner is not entitled to a particular relationship with counsel. Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 13-14, 103 S. Ct 1610, 1616 (1983). There is no requirement that Counsel meet with Petitioner for an unspecified period the day prior to trial. Additionally, Petitioner fails to show how she was prejudiced by this. Petitioner must show how "further communication would have had a reasonable probability of altering the outcome at trial." <u>Marquez v. State</u>, 455 P.3d, 840, 2020 WL 405466 (Nev. 2020) (unpublished). Petitioner simply states that this caused him to not be prepared. Petitioner never specifies in detail a different outcome at trial. Therefore, this Court denies this claim, as Petitioner's argument is insufficient to demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel. <u>Browning v. State</u>, 120 Nev. 347, 357, 91 P.3d 39, 47 (2004); <u>Hargrove</u>, 100 Nev. at 502, 686 P.2d at 225.

# **B.** Petitioner only Asserts Bare and Naked Claims Regarding Counsel's Failure to Call Witnesses

Petitioner claims Counsel failed to call certain witnesses. However, Counsel maintains the "immediate and ultimate responsibility of deciding if and when to object, which witnesses, if any, to call, and what defenses to develop." <u>Rhyne</u>, 118 Nev. at 8, 38 P.3d at 167. Additionally, Petitioner does not state what witnesses Counsel should have called or what these unknown witnesses would testify to. Without such information, Petitioner cannot demonstrate how these witnesses would affect the outcome of trial. Thus, this Court denies Petitioner's argument, as it is "bare" and "naked." <u>Browning v. State</u>, 120 Nev. at 357, 91 P.3d at 47 (2004); <u>Hargrove</u>, 100 Nev. at 502, 686 P.2d at 225.

# C. Petitioner Fails to Demonstrate How Appellate Counsel Provided Ineffective Assistance

Petitioner claims that Appellate Counsel failed to inform her about the status of her appeal from January 14, 2021, until April 22, 2021. Even if this is true, Petitioner fails to explain how she is prejudiced by this. By this point, Petitioner's Appellate Counsel already submitted Appellant's Opening Brief and appeared at oral argument. Additionally, Petitioner still had the ability to file a timely habeas petition during this time. Since Petitioner cannot show prejudice, this Court denies this claim.

### III. THERE WAS NO CUMULATIVE ERROR

The Nevada Supreme Court has not endorsed application of its direct appeal cumulative error standard to the post-conviction <u>Strickland</u> context. <u>McConnell v. State</u>, 125 Nev. 243, 259, 212 P.3d 307, 318 (2009). Nor should cumulative error apply on post-conviction review. <u>Middleton v. Roper</u>, 455 F.3d 838, 851 (8th Cir. 2006), <u>cert. denial</u>, 549 U.S. 1134, 1275 S. Ct. 980 (2007) ("a habeas petitioner cannot build a showing of prejudice on series of errors, none of which would by itself meet the prejudice test.")

Nevertheless, even where available a cumulative error finding in the context of a <u>Strickland</u> claim is extraordinarily rare and requires an extensive aggregation of errors. <u>See</u>, e.g., <u>Harris By and through Ramseyer v. Wood</u>, 64 F.3d 1432, 1438 (9th Cir. 1995). In fact, logic dictates that there can be no cumulative error where the defendant fails to demonstrate any single violation of <u>Strickland</u>. <u>See Turner v. Quarterman</u>, 481 F.3d 292, 301 (5th Cir. 2007) ("where individual allegations of error are not of constitutional stature or are not errors, there is 'nothing to cumulate.'") (quoting <u>Yohey v. Collins</u>, 985 F.2d 222, 229 (5th Cir. 1993)); <u>Hughes v. Epps</u>, 694 F.Supp.2d 533, 563 (N.D. Miss. 2010) (citing <u>Leal v. Dretke</u>, 428 F.3d 543, 552-53 (5th Cir. 2005)). Because Petitioner has not demonstrated that any claim warrants relief under <u>Strickland</u>, there is nothing to cumulate. Therefore, Petitioner's cumulative error claim should be denied.

Notwithstanding a cumulative error analysis not being applicable, Petitioner has failed to demonstrate cumulative error sufficient to warrant reversal. In addressing a claim of cumulative error, the relevant factors are: 1) whether the issue of guilt is close; 2) the quantity and character of the error; and 3) the gravity of the crime charged. <u>Mulder v. State</u>, 116 Nev. 1, 17, 992 P.2d 845, 854-5 (2000). While Petitioner was charged with serious offenses, she is unable to demonstrate any error. This is because her claims are either barred or meritless. Without any error, there can be no aggregation of errors. Additionally, the issue of guilt is not close given that the Nevada Supreme Court already held there was sufficient proof to justify a guilty verdict. Thus, this Court denies Petitioner's claim as she cannot show cumulative error.

### IV. PETITIONER IS NOT ENTITLED TO COUNSEL

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

Under the U.S. Constitution, the Sixth Amendment provides no right to counsel in postconviction proceedings. <u>Coleman v. Thompson</u>, 501 U.S. 722, 752, 111 S. Ct. 2546, 2566 (1991). In <u>McKague v. Warden</u>, 112 Nev. 159, 163, 912 P.2d 255, 258 (1996), the Nevada Supreme Court similarly observed that "[t]he Nevada Constitution...does not guarantee a right to counsel in post-conviction proceedings, as we interpret the Nevada Constitution's right to counsel provision as being coextensive with the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution." <u>McKague</u> specifically held that with the exception of NRS 34.820(1)(a) (entitling appointed counsel when petitioner is under a sentence of death), one does not have "any constitutional or statutory right to counsel at all" in post-conviction proceedings. <u>Id.</u> at 164, 912 P.2d at 258.

The Nevada Legislature has, however, given courts the discretion to appoint postconviction counsel so long as "the court is satisfied that the allegation of indigency is true and the petition is not dismissed summarily." NRS 34.750. NRS 34.750 reads:

> A petition may allege that the Defendant is unable to pay the costs of the proceedings or employ counsel. If the court is satisfied that the allegation of indigency is true and the petition *is not dismissed summarily*, the court may appoint counsel at the time the court orders the filing of an answer and a return. In making its determination, the court may consider whether: (a) The issues are difficult; (b) The Defendant is unable to comprehend the proceedings; or (c) Counsel is necessary to proceed with discovery.

Under NRS 34.750, it is clear that the court has discretion in determining whether to appoint counsel. More recently, the Nevada Supreme Court examined whether a district court appropriately denied a defendant's request for appointment of counsel based upon the factors listed in NRS 34.750. Renteria-Novoa v. State, 133 Nev. 75, 391 P.3d 760 (2017). In Renteria-Novoa, the petitioner had been serving a prison term of eighty-five (85) years to life. Id. at 75, 391 P.3d at 760. After his judgment of conviction was affirmed on direct appeal, the defendant filed a pro se postconviction petition for writ of habeas corpus and requested counsel be appointed. Id. The district court ultimately denied the petitioner's petition and his appointment of counsel request. Id. In reviewing the district court's decision, the Nevada Supreme Court examined the statutory factors listed under NRS 34.750 and concluded that the district court's decision should be reversed and remanded. Id. The Court explained that the petitioner was indigent, his petition could not be summarily dismissed, and he had in fact satisfied the statutory factors. Id. at 76, 391 P.3d 760-61. As for the first factor, the Court concluded that because petitioner had represented he had issues with understanding the English language which was corroborated by his use of an interpreter at his trial, that was enough to indicate that the petitioner could not comprehend the proceedings. Id. Moreover, the petitioner had demonstrated that the consequences he faced—a minimum eighty-five (85) year sentence were severe and his petition may have been the only vehicle for which he could raise his claims. Id. at 76-77, 391 P.3d at 761-62. Finally, his ineffective assistance of counsel claims may have required additional discovery and investigation beyond the record. Id.

Here, Petitioner has not demonstrated that counsel should be appointed. The issues here are not difficult as part of Petitioner's claims were already ruled upon by the Nevada Supreme Court. The remaining claims are meritless. Additionally, Petitioner's claims do not require any additional discovery. Therefore, this Court denies Petitioner's request for counsel.

ORDER
Based on the foregoing IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus shall be, and is, hereby denied.
DATED this day of November, 2021. Dated this 10th day of November, 2021
Holtandy
DISTRICATIUDGE
E19 9E9 9341 123B Joe Hardy District Court Judge
STEVEN B. WOLFSON Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #001565
() the second se
BY #10539 for JONATHAN E. VANBOSKERCK
Chief Deputy District Attorney Nevada Bar #006528
14F04585C/JV/ee/mlb/SVU
20

1	CSERV	
2	D	ISTRICT COURT
3		K COUNTY, NEVADA
4		
5		
6	Janet Solander, Plaintiff(s)	CASE NO: A-21-840177-W
7	vs.	DEPT. NO. Department 15
8	State of Nevada, Defendant(s)	
9		
10	AUTOMATED	CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
11	Electronic service was attempte	ed through the Eighth Judicial District Court's
12		no registered users on the case. The filer has been
13	notified to serve an parties by tradition	ai means.
14		
15		
16		
17		
18		
19		
20		
21		
22		
23		
24		
25		
26		
27		
28		

1	NEFF
2	
3	DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA
4	CLARK COUNT I, NEVADA
5	JANET SOLANDER,
6	Case No: A-21-840177-W Petitioner,
7	Dept No: XV
8	VS.
9	STATE OF NEVADA, NOTICE OF ENTRY OF FINDINGS OF FACT,
10	Respondent, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER
11	<b>PLEASE TAKE NOTICE</b> that on November 10, 2021, the court entered a decision or order in this matter,
12	a true and correct copy of which is attached to this notice.
13	You may appeal to the Supreme Court from the decision or order of this court. If you wish to appeal, you
14	must file a notice of appeal with the clerk of this court within thirty-three (33) days after the date this notice is mailed
	to you. This notice was mailed on November 15, 2021.
15	STEVEN D. GRIERSON, CLERK OF THE COURT
16	/s/ Amanda Hampton Amanda Hampton, Deputy Clerk
17	
18	
19	CERTIFICATE OF E-SERVICE / MAILING
20	I hereby certify that on this 15 day of November 2021, I served a copy of this Notice of Entry on the following:
21	
22	☑ By e-mail: Clark County District Attorney's Office
23	Attorney General's Office – Appellate Division-
24	☑ The United States mail addressed as follows:
25	Janet Solander # 1200370 4370 Smiley Rd.
26	Las Vegas, NV 89115
27	
28	/s/ Amanda Hampton Amanda Hampton, Deputy Clerk
	-1-
	Case Number: A-21-840177-W

1 2 3 4 5 6	FCL STEVEN B. WOLFSON Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #001565 JONATHAN E. VANBOSKERCK Chief Deputy District Attorney Nevada Bar #006528 200 Lewis Avenue Las Vegas, Nevada 89155-2212 (702) 671-2500 Attorney for Respondent		Electronically Filed 11/10/2021 10:38 AM Action Software CLERK OF THE COURT
7 8	DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA		
9	JANET SOLANDER, #5870905		
10 11	Petitioner,		
12	-vs-	DEPT NO:	A-21-840177-W XV
13	THE STATE OF NEVADA,		
14	Respondent.		
15	FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND ORDER		
16			
17	THIS CAUSE having been decided by the Honorable Joe Hardy, District Judge,		
18	pursuant to a Minute Order issued on the 28th day of October 2021, the State present via Blue		
19	Jeans, and the Court having considered the matter, including briefs, transcripts, and documents		
20	on file herein, now therefore, the Court makes the following findings of fact and conclusions		
21	of law:		
22			
23	//		
24	//		
25			
26	//		
27 28	// //		
20			
í	Statistica	ally closed: USJR -	CV - Summary Judgment (USSUJ)

## POINTS AND AUTHORITIES PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On July 28, 2014 the State filed an Information that charged Janet Solander (hereinafter "Petitioner") with CHILD ABUSE, NEGLECT OR ENDANGERMENT WITH SUBSTANTIAL BODILY HARM (Category B Felony - NRS 200.508(1) - NOC 55222), CHILD ABUSE, NEGLECT OR ENDANGERMENT (Category B Felony - NRS 200.508(1) - NOC 55226), SEXUAL ASSAULT WITH A MINOR UNDER FOURTEEN YEARS OF AGE (Category A Felony - NRS 200.364, 200.366 - NOC 50105), ASSAULT WITH USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON (Category B Felony - NRS 200.471 - NOC 50201) and BATTERY WITH INTENT TO COMMIT SEXUAL ASSAULT (Category A Felony - NRS 200.400.4 - NOC 50157).

Petitioner sought pre-trial habeas relief on November 5, 2014. She alleged a failure to establish probable cause and that sexual assault was a specific-intent crime requiring sexual motivation. The State filed a Return on December 17, 2014. On June 17, 2015, the District Court granted relief in part.

Both Petitioner and the State appealed, and, on April 13, 2016, the Nevada Supreme Court reversed. While agreeing that "if the Solanders undertook the catheterization for a bona fide medical purpose, they may avoid criminal liability," the Court held that jurors should determine whether Solander had such a purpose. The Court explicitly rejected the Petitioner's argument that sexual assault "includes an element of sexual motivation or gratification."

On January 4, 2018, the State filed their Notice of Expert Witnesses. Petitioner sought to strike on January 28, 2018. The State opposed on February 2, 2018.

The State filed a prior-bad-acts motion seeking to admit evidence of Petitioner's abuse of foster children. Petitioner opposed on January 18, 2018.

On January 22, 2018, Petitioner's co-defendant filed a motion to suppress victim interviews. Petitioner joined. The State responded on February 1, 2018.

On January 31, 2018, the District Court began a two-day hearing on the prior-bad-acts motion.

A twenty-day jury trial began on February 5, 2018. On February 6, 2018, the State filed an Amended Information. The jury found Petitioner guilty of each count.

Petitioner was sentenced on June 5, 2018. Her sentence included eleven counts of thirtyfive years to life for the sexual-assault counts. The other sentences ran consecutive to each other. The Judgment of Conviction was filed on June 22, 2018.

A Notice of Appeal was filed on June 21, 2018. On October 27, 2020, the Supreme Court of Nevada affirmed the Judgment of Conviction. Remittitur issued October 26, 2020.

On August 26, 2021, Petitioner filed the instant Petition. On August 30, 2021, the Court ordered the State to respond.

### FACTUAL BACKGROUND

This case involves the systemic abuse of three young girls over a period of several years. The oldest, A.S.(2001), was born on October 21, 2001. The middle sister, A.S.(2003), was born on January 23, 2003. The youngest, A.S.(2004), was born on July 25, 2004.

The sisters were removed from their biological families. After a short time with another family, they were placed with Debbie McClain. They lived with McClain for a year and a half. A.S.(2001) and A.S.(2003) were potty trained and did not have accidents during their time with McClain. McClain fed the sisters regular food, but A.S.(2004) was a picky eater. During their time with McClain, the girls did not have "any scars either to the flanks of their body, their buttocks, [or] their upper thighs."

The girls were fostered to the Solanders. The Solanders ultimately adopted them. They lived in two different houses during their time with the Solanders. The first home, when they were foster children, was on "Jubilee." The second was on "Wakashan."

In the Jubilee house, Petitioner implemented rules about using the bathroom. They had to ask before using the toilet, and Petitioner would set a timer on either her phone or a physical timer for "however much time she felt like" the girls needed to "hold it." They could not use the toilet until the timer was up.

The girls were fed regular food at Jubilee for a short period of time. Eventually, Petitioner changed their diet, alleging that A.S.(2001) had Crohn's disease. During the time that the sisters were foster children, Petitioner did not physically punish them. This changed after adoption. Petitioner would make them sleep on boards or towels with a cold fan blowing on them in only their underwear. The other foster children had their own beds. Danielle Hinton remembered her mother threatening the sisters with "the fan" if they acted up, even in the wintertime.

After the adoption, Petitioner's toileting rules remained rigid. The girls still had to ask, and only after they had asked, Petitioner would start the timer. Petitioner would get upset with the girls for not asking earlier. They found it confusing that they had to first ask, and they sometimes got in trouble when they had to go too much when the timer finally rang. At times, they would have to wait so long either after Petitioner started the timer or during the middle of the night that they would wet themselves. Petitioner counted the squares of toilet paper the girls could use. Because they were so limited, their feces would sometimes leave marks on their underwear. The Solanders would check the sisters' underwear for these marks. These rules were corroborated by Jan Finnegan and Hinton. Petitioner would make them sit on buckets and the youngest sit on a tiny toilet all day with their underwear pulled slightly down rather than letting them use the toilet as needed. Hinton saw the girls use their buckets as toilets.

Even during the night, the girls had to ask before they could go to the bathroom. Eventually, Petitioner revoked nocturnal toileting. A camera faced the upstairs bathroom. Having been forbidden from using the toilet at night, the girls would soil themselves. Dwight Petitioner enforced this rule by placing gates and alarms on a bathroom door. He was often out of town for work, meaning that Petitioner was the main instigator of punishments.

The girls developed a fear of toileting. This led to multiple accidents daily. When the girls were left in the care of others, the toileting problems would cease.

Petitioner kicked the girls up and down the stairs. When they were showering, she would poor ice on them. Hinton saw her mother get the ice and heard the girls scream.

If they had an accident, the Solanders would beat them with paint sticks until they would bleed and scar. Hinton witnessed these beatings. I.S.(2008), one of the foster children, testified

that she saw this "every day" and that Dwight make her and her sister "be the audience" and laugh at the sisters as they were being beaten. Petitioner would force the girls to put their soiled underwear into their mouths. Once, after A.S.(2004) had an accident, Petitioner took the paint stick and inserted it into A.S.(2004)'s vagina. On another occasion, Petitioner burned A.S.(2004) while she was washing her hands by turning the temperature up and holding her hands under the water and then splashing her with hot water, badly burning her skin. State's Exhibit 192. Petitioner forced A.S.(2004)'s head into a toilet filled with excrement and, on more than one occasion, made her stand naked in a garbage bag as she soiled herself. When A.S.(2001) had an accident, Petitioner made her lick her own urine off the floor. Another time, Petitioner slammed A.S.(2001)'s head into a counter repeatedly after she had an accident. A.S.(2006), a foster child, witnessed Dwight spanking the sisters with their pants down with a "ruler that was pretty thick." I.S.(2008) remembered seeing each of the sisters being hit with paint sticks seeing scabs and burns on their bodies from Petitioner burning them with water.

The Solanders humiliated the girls by making them crawl on the floor in cloth diapers saying that they were babies while the foster children and Danielle Hinton watched. As they crawled doing their "I'm-a-baby chant," the Solanders would make them wear their soiled underwear on their heads or carry them in their mouths.

Dwight Solander purchased six catheters on December 8, 2012, and three days later, on December 11, 2012, Petitioner sent Dwight a picture of a catheter filled with urine and a subject line which read "300 cc's." State's Exhibits 204,243. Petitioner also regularly punished the sisters by inserting catheters into their urethras without their consent and by threatening to cut their genitalia with a razor blade. She did this to A.S.(2003) once, to A.S.(2001) more than once, and to A.S.(2004) between 7-8 times. Petitioner had to hold A.S.(2004) down as she inserted the catheter because she would fight. Hinton heard the Solanders threaten the girls with catheters and saw a catheter in her house. She told police that the Solanders used catheters on the girls, but that she couldn't personally watch.

Petitioner limited the sisters' meals as punishment for accidents. When they did eat, their meals were timed and often blended. A.S.(2001) would "usually have baby formula and

milk" which was blended occasionally with bread. Other times, she would have oatmeal mixed with fish, or quinoa. Dinner was collard greens, beans, horseradish, and fish along with "several other kinds of meat" which Petitioner would blend together.

To eat, A.S.(2001) would have to sand by the sink. Jan Finnegan testified that the girls were required to eat breakfast standing up while the other children in the home could eat at the table. As A.S.(2001) ate, Petitioner would tell A.S.(2001) that she had ground up a mouse or a rat into her meal. She would also tell A.S.(2001) that the fish had been alive. For liquids, A.S.(2001) would get water with medicine or after bathroom breaks. Meals were served without a drink. She was so thirsty that she would drink water from the shower or brushing her teeth. Petitioner saw A.S.(2001) drink shower water and slapped her, cutting and bruising her lip. Finnegan testified that the girls "weren't allowed" to be given water at dinner, in the middle of the day, or "[h]ardly ever."

At first, A.S.(2001) would get three meals each day. Then two, breakfast and dinner, then one, then, at times, none. The Solanders forbade Finnegan from feeding the sisters lunch even though the other children in the home could eat. The meals caused A.S.(2001) to use the toilet more. Hungry, A.S.(2001) would sneak into the pantry to get food. Petitioner beat her with a stick.

Petitioner also severely limited A.S.(2003)'s food intake by timing her meals and letting her go hungry. In response, she would take food in violation of Petitioner's rules. At times, she would, while sitting on her bucket, watch Petitioner eat a hearty breakfast and hungrily wait to be fed. A.S.(2004) was also left to go hungry.

#### Foster Sibling Corroboration

I.S.(2008) and A.S.(2006) lived with the Solanders as foster children. They corroborated the sisters' testimony about Solander's strict toileting rules. I.S.(2008) testified that Petitioner would watch the sisters as they used the restroom.

Petitioner forbade A.S.(2006) from eating dairy even though she did not have any stomach problems. After she was removed from the Petitioner house, she did not have any toileting problems or lactose intolerance.

A.S.(2006) further corroborated the sisters' testimony regarding blended food and the eating conditions. Further, she remembered Petitioner talking about using catheters on one of the sisters and orange Home Depot buckets in the kitchen.

#### Jan Finnegan

In January 2013, Finnegan responded to Petitioner's nanny ad. Finnegan observed two cameras—one in the kitchen and one on the second floor "looking down towards the entrance of the bathroom."

Finnegan corroborated the sisters' testimony about Petitioner's strict bathroom rules and that the rules did not apply to the other children. When she tried to do laundry, Dwight told her to refrain so that he could see the sister's underwear. Despite the rules, none of the children had any toileting accidents during the entire three weeks Finnegan was there. Further, the sisters did not have any severe tantrums or disturbing emotional behavior.

Finnegan corroborated the sisters' testimony that Petitioner would strictly control their diets while allowing the foster children to eat normal food. The Solanders forbade Finnegan from giving the girls food outside of breakfast and dinner, they were required to eat breakfast standing, their food had to be blended, and they could not be given water. To justify this, Dwight cited vague "intestinal problems." Finnegan would sneak them solid, unblended food every day without any resulting intestinal problems.

Finnegan testified that the sisters were not disobedient and that they were well behaved.

### Investigation

On February 26, 2014, Shining Star Therapeutic Services sent a report to CPS about two of Petitioner's foster children. On February 27, 2014, Yvette Gonzales, a senior family services specialist with CPS, visited the school of one of the children. She decided to remove the children.

Gonzales reported to the Solander house and asked to see the remaining foster children. She asked Petitioner where her adoptive daughters were, and Petitioner said they were in Nebraska but refused to provide contact information. Gonzales said she was "going to file a missing person's report" if Petitioner did not provide her with more information. Petitioner

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

asked Gonzales to leave, and CPS took the foster children.

On February 28, 2014, Gonzales contacted the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department Missing Persons Detail. A detective contacted Dwight, who said the girls were in Marvelous Grace Academy in Pace, Florida. The director of the academy, Steven Blankenship, confirmed that the girls were there.

Gonzales decided to have someone speak with the sisters. Jackie Henry from the Department of Family Services contacted the girls. Henry put them in protective custody, and the Solanders' rights over them were removed. CPS opened an investigation. The police department was asked to determine if the Solanders had committed any crimes.

Gonzales interviewed Dwight and informed him that a protective custody hearing would be held. On March 5, 2014, the hearing was conducted. The girls were returned to Nevada and expressed fear over returning to the Solander's home.

On March 13, 2014, the girls were examined by Dr. Sandra Cetl. She conducted a sexual assault assessment of each child. She found nothing significant, but she testified that the administration of a catheter would not result in scarring or tearing. She did find marks on A.S.(2001) during the physical evaluation that caused her concern. She found scars on the buttocks, "in between the thighs right almost to the genital area, and [on] the lower back area." The marks near the buttocks were larger and "had some shape to them" and were in an area that people do not typically injure. Her left buttock had a linear scar. This was consistent with being hit with a paint stick. The mark was caused by blunt force trauma. The physical examination of A.S.(2003) revealed marks on her buttocks, legs, and back which were consistent with blunt force trauma. "[T]he top of her right shoulder" had "substantial scar tissue.". Cetl was "concerned that it may have been from a burn, maybe a scald burn." Her lower back had a linear scar. A.S.(2004) had scars on her buttocks and back which were consistent with blunt force trauma. She had "a light lightening from the skin from ... scarring on her right ear." A scar ran down her shoulder that looked like a "hot liquid type of a burn." The doctor noted concerns about the growth of the girls.

28

#### McClain

In March 2014, the girls were returned to live with McClain. They had changed tremendously, and McClain believed that she "didn't get the same kids back." A.S.(2001) was withdrawn and depressed. A.S.(2003) was argumentative, "real angry," and quick to blame others. A.S.(2004) was confused about everything. By the time the girls were returned, they were not having toileting accidents and properly digesting food. They had marks and scars on their bodies which "were not there previously."

#### Medical

Cetl testified that the genital area included the labia majora, the vagina, and the urethral opening. The labia majora generally completely enclose the inner parts of female genitalia, and they must be spread to get to the inner areas. 19AA4623. Dr. Elizabeth Mileti testified that she would never recommend that a parent administer a catheter to check their child's bladder, and that she did not recommend catheterization of A.S.(2003). Dr. Alphonsa Stephen testified that she never recommended that Petitioner administer a catheter to A.S.(2004).

#### ANALYSIS

### ĺ

I.

PETITIONER'S ARGUMENTS IN GROUND TWO ARE BARRED

A. The Law of The Case Bars Petitioner's Sufficiency of The Evidence Claims

The arguments in Ground two (2) of the petition are procedurally barred by the law of the case given that the Nevada Supreme Court ruled on them. The law of a first appeal is law of the case on all subsequent appeals in which the facts are substantially the same." <u>Hall v.</u> <u>State</u>, 91 Nev. 314, 315, 535 P.2d 797, 798 (1975) (quoting <u>Walker v. State</u>, 85 Nev. 337, 343, 455 P.2d 34, 38 (1969)). "The doctrine of the law of the case cannot be avoided by a more detailed and precisely focused argument subsequently made after reflection upon the previous proceedings." <u>Id.</u> at 316, 535 P.2d at 799. Under the law of the case doctrine, issues previously decided on direct appeal may not be reargued. <u>Pellegrini v. State</u>, 117 Nev. 860, 879, 34 P.3d 519, 532 (2001) (citing <u>McNelton v. State</u>, 115 Nev. 396, 414-15, 990 P.2d 1263, 1275 (1999)). Furthermore, this Court cannot overrule the Nevada Supreme Court. NEV. CONST. Art. VI § 6.

1	Petitioner argues that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that she was				
2	guilty. Petitioner already argued this claim on direct appeal. The Nevada Supreme Court				
3	concluded that there was sufficient evidence:				
4	Solander challenges her convictions of sexual assault of a minor				
5	under 14 years of age and batter with intent to commit sexual assault.				
6	 Considering all the evidence, we conclude a rational trier of fact				
7	could find the elements of sexual assault of a minor under 14 years				
. 8	reasonable doubt for each of Solander's convictions.				
9 10	Solander next challenges her convictions for child abuse with				
11	substantial bodily harm by means of spanking the victims with a paint stick				
12					
13	Based on this evidence a rational trier of fact could have found each essential element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.				
14	Lastly, Solander contends that the State failed to prove count 11				
15	beyond a reasonable doubt because A.S. (2001) recanted the allegation.				
16	Thus, a rational trier of fact could have found each essential				
17	element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt				
18					
19	Solander v. State, No. 76228, 2020 WL 3603882, at *2-6 (July 1, 2020). The law of the case				
20	bars Petitioner from relitigating these claims. Thus, this Court finds that the law of the case				
21	bars Ground two (2) of the Petition.				
22	B. Petitioner's Claim Regarding the CPS Records Should Have Been Raised on				
23	Direct Appeal				
24	At the end of Ground two, Petitioner asserts that the court incorrectly ruled that certain				
25	evidence was not relevant. This claim should have been raised on direct appeal. NR				
26	34.724(2)(a); NRS 34.810(1)(b); Franklin v. State, 110 Nev. 750, 752, 877 P.2d 1058, 1059				
27	(1994), disapproved on other grounds, <u>Thomas v. State</u> , 115 Nev. 148, 979 P.2d 222 (1999).				
28	Her failure to do so bars this claim.				
	10				

Petitioner's failure to prove good cause or prejudice requires the dismissal of this claim. To overcome this bar, a petitioner must demonstrate: (1) good cause for delay in filing her petition or for bringing new claims or repeating claims in a successive petition; and (2) undue or actual prejudice. NRS 34.726(1); NRS 34.800(1); NRS 34.810(3). To establish prejudice "a petitioner must show that errors in the proceedings underlying the judgment worked to the petitioner's actual and substantial disadvantage." <u>State v. Huebler</u>, 128 Nev. 192, 197, 275 P.3d 91, 94-95 (2012), <u>cert</u>, <u>denied</u>, 568 U.S. 1147, 133 S.Ct. 988 (2013).

"To establish good cause, petitioners must show that an impediment external to the defense prevented their compliance with the applicable procedural rule. A qualifying impediment might be shown where the factual or legal basis for a claim was not reasonably available at the time of default." <u>Clem v. State</u>, 119 Nev. 615, 621, 81 P.3d 521, 525 (2003), rehearing denied, 120 Nev. 307, 91 P.3d 35 cert. denied, 543 U.S. 947, 125 S.Ct. 358 (2004); see also, Hathaway v. State, 119 Nev. 248, 251, 71 P.3d 503, 506 (2003) ("In order to demonstrate good cause, a petitioner must show that an impediment external to the defense prevented him or her from complying with the state procedural default rules"); Pellegrini, 117 Nev. at 887, 34 P.3d at 537 (neither ineffective assistance of counsel, nor a physician's declaration in support of a habeas petition were sufficient "good cause" to overcome a procedural default, whereas a finding by Supreme Court that a defendant was suffering from Multiple Personality Disorder was). An external impediment could be "that the factual or legal basis for a claim was not reasonably available to counsel, or that 'some interference by officials' made compliance impracticable." Id. (quoting Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 2645 (1986)); see also, Gonzalez, 118 Nev. at 595, 53 P.3d at 904 (citing Harris v. Warden, 114 Nev. 956, 959-60 n.4, 964 P.2d 785 n.4 (1998)).

The Nevada Supreme Court has held that, "appellants cannot attempt to manufacture good cause[.]" <u>Clem</u>, 119 Nev. at 621, 81 P.3d at 526. To find good cause there must be a "substantial reason; one that affords a legal excuse." <u>Hathaway</u>, 119 Nev. at 251, 71 P.3d at 506; (quoting, <u>Colley v. State</u>, 105 Nev. 235, 236, 773 P.2d 1229, 1230 (1989), superseded by statute as recognized by, <u>Huebler</u>, 128 Nev. at 197, 275 P.3d at 95, footnote 2). Excuses such

as the lack of assistance of counsel when preparing a petition as well as the failure of trial counsel to forward a copy of the file to a petitioner have been found not to constitute good cause. <u>Phelps v. Dir. Nev. Dep't of Prisons</u>, 104 Nev. 656, 660, 764 P.2d 1303, 1306 (1988), superseded by statute as recognized by, <u>Nika v. State</u>, 120 Nev. 600, 607, 97 P.3d 1140, 1145 (2004); Hood v. State, 111 Nev. 335, 890 P.2d 797 (1995).

Petitioner makes no good cause argument for why this Court should consider her claim. Failure to address good cause amounts to an admission that she is unable to do so. DCR 13(2); EDCR 3.20(b); <u>Polk v. State</u>, 126 Nev. 180, 186, 233 P.3d 357, 360-61 (2010). Nowhere in her petition does Petitioner address the issue of good cause. She fails to allege any impediments that necessitated bringing a claim outside of appeal. Thus, Petitioner's silence should be read as an admission that no good cause exists.

Even if Petitioner did address the issue, good cause cannot be demonstrated. Petitioner had all the facts and law necessary to allege this claim. Thus, Petitioner should have been able to allege it on appeal. Based on Petitioner's failure to properly allege good cause, this Court denies this claim on the grounds that Petitioner cannot demonstrate good cause.

Petitioner's failure to address good cause necessitates the dismissal of this claim. However, Petitioner also fails to properly allege prejudice. "A court *must* dismiss a habeas petition if it presents claims that either were or could have been presented in an earlier proceeding, unless the court finds both cause for failing to present the claims earlier or for raising them again and actual prejudice to the petitioner." Evans v. State, 117 Nev. 609, 646–47, 29 P.3d 498, 523 (2001). To demonstrate prejudice to overcome the procedural bars, a defendant must show "not merely that the errors of [the proceeding] created possibility of prejudice, but that they worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, in affecting the state proceedings with error of constitutional dimensions." <u>Hogan v. Warden</u>, 109 Nev. 952, 960, 860 P.2d 710, 716 (1993) (quoting United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170, 102 S. Ct. 1584, 1596 (1982)). To find good cause there must be a "substantial reason; one that affords a legal excuse." <u>Hathaway v. State</u>, 119 Nev. 248, 252, 71 P.3d 503, 506 (2003) (quoting Colley v. State, 105 Nev. 235, 236, 773 P.2d 1229, 1230 (1989)). Petitioner cannot face prejudice, as she alleges nothing more than a bare and naked claim. "Bare" and "naked" allegations are not sufficient to warrant post-conviction relief, nor are those belied and repelled by the record. <u>Hargrove v. State</u>, 100 Nev. 498, 502, 686 P.2d 222, 225 (1984). "A claim is 'belied' when it is contradicted or proven to be false by the record as it existed at the time the claim was made." <u>Mann v. State</u>, 118 Nev. 351, 354, 46 P.3d 1228, 1230 (2002). Petitioner fails to cite law or explain the improperness of the Court's prior ruling. Thus, even if Petitioner could assert good cause, she is unable to establish prejudice. As such, this claim is denied.

# II. PETITIONER DID NOT RECEIVE INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that, "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense." The United States Supreme Court has long recognized that "the right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel." <u>Strickland v. Washington</u>, 466 U.S. 668, 686, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2063 (1984); <u>see also State v. Love</u>, 109 Nev. 1136, 1138, 865 P.2d 322, 323 (1993).

To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, a defendant must prove she was denied "reasonably effective assistance" of counsel by satisfying the two-prong test of <u>Strickland</u>, 466 U.S. at 686-87, 104 S. Ct. at 2063-64. <u>See also Love</u>, 109 Nev. at 1138, 865 P.2d at 323. Under the <u>Strickland</u> test, a defendant must show first that his counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and second, that but for counsel's errors, there is a reasonable probability that the result of the proceedings would have been different. 466 U.S. at 687-88, 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2065, 2068; <u>Warden, Nevada State Prison</u> v. Lyons, 100 Nev. 430, 432, 683 P.2d 504, 505 (1984) (adopting the <u>Strickland</u> two-part test). "[T]here is no reason for a court deciding an ineffective assistance claim to approach the inquiry in the same order or even to address both components of the inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on one." <u>Strickland</u>, 466 U.S. at 697, 104 S. Ct. at 2069.

The court begins with the presumption of effectiveness and then must determine whether the defendant has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that counsel was ineffective. <u>Means v. State</u>, 120 Nev. 1001, 1011, 103 P.3d 25, 32 (2004). "Effective counsel does not mean errorless counsel, but rather counsel whose assistance is '[w]ithin the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases."" Jackson v. Warden, 91 Nev. 430, 432, 537 P.2d 473, 474 (1975).

Counsel cannot be ineffective for failing to make futile objections or arguments. <u>Ennis</u> <u>v. State</u>, 122 Nev. 694, 706, 137 P.3d 1095, 1103 (2006). Trial counsel has the "immediate and ultimate responsibility of deciding if and when to object, which witnesses, if any, to call, and what defenses to develop." <u>Rhyne v. State</u>, 118 Nev. 1, 8, 38 P.3d 163, 167 (2002).

Based on the above law, the role of a court in considering allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel is "not to pass upon the merits of the action not taken but to determine whether, under the particular facts and circumstances of the case, trial counsel failed to render reasonably effective assistance." <u>Donovan v. State</u>, 94 Nev. 671, 675, 584 P.2d 708, 711 (1978). This analysis does not mean that the court should "second guess reasoned choices between trial tactics nor does it mean that defense counsel, to protect himself against allegations of inadequacy, must make every conceivable motion no matter how remote the possibilities are of success." <u>Id.</u> To be effective, the constitution "does not require that counsel do what is impossible or unethical. If there is no bona fide defense to the charge, counsel cannot create one and may disserve the interests of his client by attempting a useless charade." <u>United States v. Cronic</u>, 466 U.S. 648, 657 n.19, 104 S. Ct. 2039, 2046 n.19 (1984).

"There are countless ways to provide effective assistance in any given case. Even the best criminal defense attorneys would not defend a particular client in the same way." <u>Strickland</u>, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S. Ct. at 689. "Strategic choices made by counsel after thoroughly investigating the plausible options are almost unchallengeable." <u>Dawson v. State</u>, 108 Nev. 112, 117, 825 P.2d 593, 596 (1992); <u>see also Ford v. State</u>, 105 Nev. 850, 853, 784 P.2d 951, 953 (1989). In essence, the court must "judge the reasonableness of counsel's challenged conduct on the facts of the particular case, viewed as of the time of counsel's

conduct." <u>Strickland</u>, 466 U.S. at 690, 104 S. Ct. at 2066.

Even if a defendant can demonstrate that his counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, she must still demonstrate prejudice and show a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the result of the trial would have been different. <u>McNelton v. State</u>, 115 Nev. 396, 403, 990 P.2d 1263, 1268 (1999) (citing <u>Strickland</u>, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at 2064). "A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." <u>Id.</u> (citing <u>Strickland</u>, 466 U.S. at 687-89, 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2064-65, 2068).

The Nevada Supreme Court has held "that a habeas corpus petitioner must prove the disputed factual allegations underlying his ineffective-assistance claim by a preponderance of the evidence." Means v. State, 120 Nev. 1001, 1012, 103 P.3d 25, 33 (2004). Furthermore, claims of ineffective assistance of counsel asserted in a petition for post-conviction relief must be supported with specific factual allegations, which if true, would entitle the petitioner to relief. <u>Hargrove v. State</u>, 100 Nev. 498, 502, 686 P.2d 222, 225 (1984). "Bare" and "naked" allegations are not sufficient, nor are those belied and repelled by the record. <u>Id.</u> NRS 34.735(6) states in relevant part, "[Petitioner] *must* allege specific facts supporting the claims in the petition[.]... Failure to allege specific facts rather than just conclusions may cause your petition to be dismissed." (emphasis added).

There is a strong presumption that appellate counsel's performance was reasonable and fell within "the wide range of reasonable professional assistance." <u>See United States v.</u> <u>Aguirre</u>, 912 F.2d 555, 560 (2nd Cir. 1990); citing <u>Strickland</u>, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S. Ct. at 2065. A claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel must satisfy the two-prong test set forth by <u>Strickland</u>. <u>Kirksey v. State</u>, 112 Nev. 980, 998, 923 P.2d 1102, 1114 (1996). In order to satisfy <u>Strickland</u>'s second prong, the defendant must show that the omitted issue would have had a reasonable probability of success on appeal. <u>Id.</u>

The professional diligence and competence required on appeal involves "winnowing out weaker arguments on appeal and focusing on one central issue if possible, or at most on a few key issues." Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751-52, 103 S. Ct. 3308, 3313 (1983). In

particular, a "brief that raises every colorable issue runs the risk of burying good arguments . . . in a verbal mound made up of strong and weak contentions." <u>Id.</u> at 753, 103 S. Ct. at 3313. For judges to second-guess reasonable professional judgments and impose on appointed counsel a duty to raise every 'colorable' claim suggested by a client would disserve the very goal of vigorous and effective advocacy." <u>Id.</u> at 754, 103 S. Ct. at 3314.

#### A. Counsel Did Not Provide Ineffective Assistance of Counsel By Meeting with Petitioner the Friday Before Trial

Petitioner claims that counsel met with her for less than two hours the Friday prior to trial. Petitioner is not entitled to a particular relationship with counsel. <u>Morris v. Slappy</u>, 461 U.S. 1, 13-14, 103 S. Ct 1610, 1616 (1983). There is no requirement that Counsel meet with Petitioner for an unspecified period the day prior to trial. Additionally, Petitioner fails to show how she was prejudiced by this. Petitioner must show how "further communication would have had a reasonable probability of altering the outcome at trial." <u>Marquez v. State</u>, 455 P.3d, 840, 2020 WL 405466 (Nev. 2020) (unpublished). Petitioner simply states that this caused him to not be prepared. Petitioner never specifies in detail a different outcome at trial. Therefore, this Court denies this claim, as Petitioner's argument is insufficient to demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel. <u>Browning v. State</u>, 120 Nev. 347, 357, 91 P.3d 39, 47 (2004); <u>Hargrove</u>, 100 Nev. at 502, 686 P.2d at 225.

### **B.** Petitioner only Asserts Bare and Naked Claims Regarding Counsel's Failure to Call Witnesses

Petitioner claims Counsel failed to call certain witnesses. However, Counsel maintains the "immediate and ultimate responsibility of deciding if and when to object, which witnesses, if any, to call, and what defenses to develop." <u>Rhyne</u>, 118 Nev. at 8, 38 P.3d at 167. Additionally, Petitioner does not state what witnesses Counsel should have called or what these unknown witnesses would testify to. Without such information, Petitioner cannot demonstrate how these witnesses would affect the outcome of trial. Thus, this Court denies Petitioner's argument, as it is "bare" and "naked." <u>Browning v. State</u>, 120 Nev. at 357, 91 P.3d at 47 (2004); <u>Hargrove</u>, 100 Nev. at 502, 686 P.2d at 225.

# C. Petitioner Fails to Demonstrate How Appellate Counsel Provided Ineffective Assistance

Petitioner claims that Appellate Counsel failed to inform her about the status of her appeal from January 14, 2021, until April 22, 2021. Even if this is true, Petitioner fails to explain how she is prejudiced by this. By this point, Petitioner's Appellate Counsel already submitted Appellant's Opening Brief and appeared at oral argument. Additionally, Petitioner still had the ability to file a timely habeas petition during this time. Since Petitioner cannot show prejudice, this Court denies this claim.

### III. THERE WAS NO CUMULATIVE ERROR

The Nevada Supreme Court has not endorsed application of its direct appeal cumulative error standard to the post-conviction <u>Strickland</u> context. <u>McConnell v. State</u>, 125 Nev. 243, 259, 212 P.3d 307, 318 (2009). Nor should cumulative error apply on post-conviction review. <u>Middleton v. Roper</u>, 455 F.3d 838, 851 (8th Cir. 2006), <u>cert. denial</u>, 549 U.S. 1134, 1275 S. Ct. 980 (2007) ("a habeas petitioner cannot build a showing of prejudice on series of errors, none of which would by itself meet the prejudice test.")

Nevertheless, even where available a cumulative error finding in the context of a <u>Strickland</u> claim is extraordinarily rare and requires an extensive aggregation of errors. <u>See</u>, e.g., <u>Harris By and through Ramseyer v. Wood</u>, 64 F.3d 1432, 1438 (9th Cir. 1995). In fact, logic dictates that there can be no cumulative error where the defendant fails to demonstrate any single violation of <u>Strickland</u>. <u>See Turner v. Quarterman</u>, 481 F.3d 292, 301 (5th Cir. 2007) ("where individual allegations of error are not of constitutional stature or are not errors, there is 'nothing to cumulate.'") (quoting <u>Yohey v. Collins</u>, 985 F.2d 222, 229 (5th Cir. 1993)); <u>Hughes v. Epps</u>, 694 F.Supp.2d 533, 563 (N.D. Miss. 2010) (citing <u>Leal v. Dretke</u>, 428 F.3d 543, 552-53 (5th Cir. 2005)). Because Petitioner has not demonstrated that any claim warrants relief under <u>Strickland</u>, there is nothing to cumulate. Therefore, Petitioner's cumulative error claim should be denied.

Notwithstanding a cumulative error analysis not being applicable, Petitioner has failed to demonstrate cumulative error sufficient to warrant reversal. In addressing a claim of cumulative error, the relevant factors are: 1) whether the issue of guilt is close; 2) the quantity and character of the error; and 3) the gravity of the crime charged. <u>Mulder v. State</u>, 116 Nev. 1, 17, 992 P.2d 845, 854-5 (2000). While Petitioner was charged with serious offenses, she is unable to demonstrate any error. This is because her claims are either barred or meritless. Without any error, there can be no aggregation of errors. Additionally, the issue of guilt is not close given that the Nevada Supreme Court already held there was sufficient proof to justify a guilty verdict. Thus, this Court denies Petitioner's claim as she cannot show cumulative error.

### IV. PETITIONER IS NOT ENTITLED TO COUNSEL

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

Under the U.S. Constitution, the Sixth Amendment provides no right to counsel in postconviction proceedings. <u>Coleman v. Thompson</u>, 501 U.S. 722, 752, 111 S. Ct. 2546, 2566 (1991). In <u>McKague v. Warden</u>, 112 Nev. 159, 163, 912 P.2d 255, 258 (1996), the Nevada Supreme Court similarly observed that "[t]he Nevada Constitution...does not guarantee a right to counsel in post-conviction proceedings, as we interpret the Nevada Constitution's right to counsel provision as being coextensive with the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution." <u>McKague</u> specifically held that with the exception of NRS 34.820(1)(a) (entitling appointed counsel when petitioner is under a sentence of death), one does not have "any constitutional or statutory right to counsel at all" in post-conviction proceedings. <u>Id.</u> at 164, 912 P.2d at 258.

The Nevada Legislature has, however, given courts the discretion to appoint postconviction counsel so long as "the court is satisfied that the allegation of indigency is true and the petition is not dismissed summarily." NRS 34.750. NRS 34.750 reads:

> A petition may allege that the Defendant is unable to pay the costs of the proceedings or employ counsel. If the court is satisfied that the allegation of indigency is true and the petition *is not dismissed summarily*, the court may appoint counsel at the time the court orders the filing of an answer and a return. In making its determination, the court may consider whether: (a) The issues are difficult; (b) The Defendant is unable to comprehend the proceedings; or (c) Counsel is necessary to proceed with discovery.

Under NRS 34.750, it is clear that the court has discretion in determining whether to appoint counsel. More recently, the Nevada Supreme Court examined whether a district court appropriately denied a defendant's request for appointment of counsel based upon the factors listed in NRS 34.750. Renteria-Novoa v. State, 133 Nev. 75, 391 P.3d 760 (2017). In Renteria-Novoa, the petitioner had been serving a prison term of eighty-five (85) years to life. Id. at 75, 391 P.3d at 760. After his judgment of conviction was affirmed on direct appeal, the defendant filed a pro se postconviction petition for writ of habeas corpus and requested counsel be appointed. Id. The district court ultimately denied the petitioner's petition and his appointment of counsel request. Id. In reviewing the district court's decision, the Nevada Supreme Court examined the statutory factors listed under NRS 34.750 and concluded that the district court's decision should be reversed and remanded. Id. The Court explained that the petitioner was indigent, his petition could not be summarily dismissed, and he had in fact satisfied the statutory factors. Id. at 76, 391 P.3d 760-61. As for the first factor, the Court concluded that because petitioner had represented he had issues with understanding the English language which was corroborated by his use of an interpreter at his trial, that was enough to indicate that the petitioner could not comprehend the proceedings. Id. Moreover, the petitioner had demonstrated that the consequences he faced—a minimum eighty-five (85) year sentence were severe and his petition may have been the only vehicle for which he could raise his claims. Id. at 76-77, 391 P.3d at 761-62. Finally, his ineffective assistance of counsel claims may have required additional discovery and investigation beyond the record. Id.

Here, Petitioner has not demonstrated that counsel should be appointed. The issues here are not difficult as part of Petitioner's claims were already ruled upon by the Nevada Supreme Court. The remaining claims are meritless. Additionally, Petitioner's claims do not require any additional discovery. Therefore, this Court denies Petitioner's request for counsel.

ORDER				
Based on the foregoing IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Petition for Writ of Habeas				
Corpus shall be, and is, hereby denied.				
DATED this day of November, 2021. Dated this 10th day of November, 2021				
fortandy				
DISTRICATIUDGE				
E19 9E9 9341 123B Joe Hardy District Court Judge				
STEVEN B. WOLFSON Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #001565				
() the second				
BY #10539 for JONATHAN E. VANBOSKERCK				
Chief Deputy District Attorney Nevada Bar #006528				
14F04585C/JV/ee/mlb/SVU				
20				

1	CSERV				
2	DISTRICT COURT				
3	CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA				
4					
5					
6	Janet Solander, Plaintiff(s)	CASE NO: A-21-840177-W			
7	vs.	DEPT. NO. Department 15			
8	State of Nevada, Defendant(s)				
9					
10	AUTOMATED CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE				
11	Electronic service was attempted through the Eighth Judicial District Court's				
12	electronic filing system, but there were no registered users on the case. The filer has been				
13	notified to serve all parties by traditional means.				
14					
15					
16					
17					
18					
19					
20					
21					
22					
23					
24					
25					
26					
27					
28					

#### DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

Writ of Habeas Corpus		COURT MINUTES	October 28, 2021	
A-21-840177-W	VS.	Janet Solander, Plaintiff(s) vs. State of Nevada, Defendant(s)		
October 28, 2021	08:30 AM	All Pending Motions		
HEARD BY:	Hardy, Joe	COURTROOM: RJC Courtroo	om 11D	
COURT CLERK:	Duncan, Kristin			
RECORDER:	Yarbrough, Matt			
REPORTER:				
PARTIES PRESE	NT:			
Jennifer M. Clemo	ns	Attorney for Defendant		
State of Nevada		Defendant		
		JOURNAL ENTRIES		
PETITION FOR W	RIT OF HABEAS C	ORPUSPLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR	APPOINTMENT	

The State present via Blue Jeans.

The Court noted that it reviewed the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, the Motion for Appointment of Attorney, the Motion to Withdraw Counsel, and the State's Response. Without hearing any oral argument, COURT ORDERED the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, as well as the Plaintiff's Motion for Appointment of Attorney, were hereby DENIED. COURT FURTHER ORDERED the Motion to Withdraw Counsel, was hereby GRANTED. The COURT FOUND the following: (1) the Plaintiff did not have a right to counsel on a post-conviction Petition; (2) the Court may use its discretion to appoint counsel under appropriate circumstances; however, those circumstances were not present in the instant case; and (3) the substance of the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus was substantively denied for all of the reasons set forth in the State's Response.

The State to prepare the written Order, incorporating the reasons set forth in its Response as the Court's Findings, and submit it directly to chambers.

COURT ORDERED a status check regarding the submittal of the written Order, was hereby SET on this department's chambers calendar.

11/18/21 (CHAMBERS) STATUS CHECK: SUBMITTAL OF ORDER

OF ATTORNEY...PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO WITHDRAW COUNSEL

CLERK'S NOTE: A copy of this minute order was provided to Plaintiff via U.S. mail: Janet Solander #1200370 [Florence McClure Womens Correctional Center 4370 Smiley Road Las Vegas, NV 89115]. (KD 10/28/21)

### **Certification of Copy**

State of Nevada County of Clark SS:

I, Steven D. Grierson, the Clerk of the Court of the Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County, State of Nevada, does hereby certify that the foregoing is a true, full and correct copy of the hereinafter stated original document(s):

NOTICE OF APPEAL; CASE APPEAL STATEMENT; DESIGNATION OF RECORD ON APPEAL; DISTRICT COURT DOCKET ENTRIES; CIVIL COVER SHEET; FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND ORDER; NOTICE OF ENTRY OF FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER; DISTRICT COURT MINUTES

JANET SOLANDER,

Plaintiff(s),

vs.

STATE OF NEVADA,

Defendant(s),

now on file and of record in this office.

Case No: A-21-840177-W

Dept No: XV

ALAN ALAN ALAN **IN WITNESS THEREOF, I have hereunto** Set my hand and Affixed the seal of the Court at my office, Las Vegas, Nevada This 1 day of December 2021. Steven D. Grierson, Clerk of the Court Heather Ungermann, Deputy Clerk