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2021 MAR 30 PM 2: 39

ELKO CO DISTRICT COURT

Electronically Filed Apr 02 2021 02:32 p.m.

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT College A. Brown Clerk of Supreme Court

STATE OF NEVADA, ELKO COUNTY

KODY CREE PATTEN,

No. CV-HC 13-116

Dept. No. I

Petitioner

υ.

WILLIAM "BILL" GITTERE, WARDEN ELY STATE PRISON.

Respondent

Notice of Appeal

Comes Now Kody Patten by his counsel of record, Richard W. Sears who notifies the court and parties that he seeks a Nevada Supreme Court review of this Court's denial of his Post-Conviction writ without an evidentiary hearing.

Dated this 30th day of March, 2021.

Richard W. Sears, 5489

Sears Law Firm, ltd

457 Fifth Street, Ely, Nevada 89301

(775) 289-3366

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that I assisted Richard W. Sears Law Firm and that on the date below written, I served the undersigned District Attorney by placing the Notice of Appeal in their courthouse mail box, a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing Notice of Appeal, dated and addressed as follows:

☐ By placing same to be deposited for mailing in the United States Mail, in a sealed envelope upon which first class postage was prepaid in Ely, Nevada: and/or

☐ Via Facsimile; and/or

 $\[igsimes$ To be hand-delivered to the attorney listed below at the address indicated

below:

Hon. Tyler Ingram District Attorney 540 Court Street, Second Floor Elko, NV 89801

Date: March ₹ 2021.

An assistant of

Richard W. Sears Law

FILED

No. CV-HC 13-116

Dept. No. I

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2021 MAR 30 PM 2: 39 ELKO CO DISTRICT COURT

CLERK______DEPUTY

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

STATE OF NEVADA, ELKO COUNTY

KODY CREE PATTEN,

Petitioner

υ.

WILLIAM "BILL" GITTERE, WARDEN ELY STATE PRISON.

Respondent

CASE APPEAL STATEMENT

- 1. Name of appellant filing this case appeal statement: Cody C. Patten
- 2. Identify the judge issuing the decision, judgment, or order appealed from: Hon. Kirsten Hill.
- 3. Identify each appellant and the name and address of counsel for each appellant: Kody C. Patten, Appellant. Richard W. Sears, 457 Fifth Street, Ely, Nevada 89301, Counsel for Appellant.
- 4. Identify each respondent and the name and address of appellate counsel, if known, for each respondent (if the name of a respondent's appellate counsel is unknown, indicate as much and provide the name and address of that respondent's trial counsel): WILLIAM "BILL" GITTERE, WARDEN ELY STATE PRISON. Name of Appellate Counsel is Elko County District Attorney, Hon. Tyler Ingram, 540 Court Street, 2nd Floor, Elko, Nevada 89801.
- 5. Indicate whether any attorney identified above in response to question 3 or 4 is not licensed to practice law in Nevada and, if so, whether the district court granted that

attorney permission to appear under <u>SCR 42</u> (attach a copy of any district court order granting such permission): All attorneys were licensed to practice law in Nevada.

- 6. Indicate whether appellant was represented by appointed or retained counsel in the district court: Appellant was represented by appointed counsel in the district court.
- 7. Indicate whether appellant is represented by appointed or retained counsel on appeal: Appellant is represented by appointed counsel on appeal.
- 8. Indicate whether appellant was granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis, and the date of entry of the district court order granting such leave: Appellant was granted leave to appear in forma pauperis on February 23, 2013; Petiitoner was appointed counsel and counsel filed a Supplemental Petition on July 9, 2019.
- 9. Indicate the date the proceedings commenced in the district court (e.g., date complaint, indictment, information, or petition was filed): Information filed on August 9, 2011 charged First Degree Murder with a Deadly weapon among other lesser crimes.
- 10. Provide a brief description of the nature of the action and result in the district court, including the type of judgment or order being appealed and the relief granted by the district court: This was a criminal case. Defendant was charged with First Degree Murder with the Use of a Deadly Weapon was sought, and Plead Guilty to First Degree Murder with the Use of a Deadly Weapon after the death penalty was withdrawn. Appellant did not file a Direct Appeal to the Nevada Supreme Court. Appellant filed a post conviction writ of habeas corpus on the basis that district court defense counsel was ineffective. The Elko County District Attorney opposed the writ on the basis the defense counsel was effective. Hon. Kristen Hill determined trial counsel was competent and evidence of guilt

was sufficient in the record to deny an evidentiary hearing on the issue of Kody's actual innocence of first degree murder.

- 11. Indicate whether the case has previously been the subject of an appeal to or original writ proceeding in the Supreme Court and, if so, the caption and Supreme Court docket number of the prior proceeding: None filed.
- 12. Indicate whether this appeal involves child custody or visitation: No child custody or visitation is involved.
- 13. If this is a civil case, indicate whether this appeal involves the possibility of settlement: N/A

Dated this 30th day of March, 2021.

Richard W. Sears, 5489 Sears Law Firm, ltd

457 Fifth Street, Ely, Nevada 89301

(775) 289-3366

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that I assisted Richard W. Sears and that on the date below written, I deposited in the Courthouse mail system true and correct copy of the above and foregoing Case Appeal Statement, dated and addressed as follows:

By placing same to be deposited for mailing in the United States Mail, in a sealed envelope upon which first class postage was prepaid in Ely, Nevada: and/or

☐ Via Facsimile; and/or

To be hand-delivered to the attorney listed below at the address indicated

below:

Hon. Tyler Ingram District Attorney 540 Court Street, Second Floor Elko, NV 89801

Date: March 30th, 2021.

An assistant of

Richard W. Sears

ECDC-CVHC-13-116 - PATTEN, KODY C VS. BAKER - WARDEN, RENEE

Court: ECDC-CVHC-13-116 Agency: Elko County Clerk's Office

CaseID: 13-406

Type: Civil Received Date: 2/20/2013 Status: Closed Status Date: 3/15/2021

Age: 2961 days Active Age: 2961 days

Involvements

HILL, KRISTON Judge -

KACIN, ALVIN Judge, Inactive - PORTER, NANCY Judge, Inactive -

PATTEN KODY Petitioner -

TORVINEN, MARK Attorney, Inactive - BAKER - WARDEN, RENEE Respondent - SEARS, RICHARD Defense Attorney -

Related Name(s)

RENEE BAKER - WARDEN

ELY STATE PRISONis On Behalf Of

Name Attributes

For: RENEE BAKER - WARDEN

Name Record Source - Name Record Converted

from JALAN - Court For: KODY CREE PATTEN

Name Record Notes (Converted): NNCC #1091721 Name Record Source - Name Record Converted

from JALAN - Court Place of Birth: LOGAN UT

Related Cases

Related Case (Converted)
PATTEN, KODY CREE ~ Civil

Court: CV-HC-13-0116

Agency: Elko County District Attorney's

Office

Cype History Status: Pending (Conversion) Status Date: 2/20/2013

Date Event Type Desc Status

Closed - Case Status

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS FILED

2/20/2013 Proceedings (Converted) - Event

Event Type Code: F17

Event Type Description: FILE OPENED - DC



2/20/2013 Proceedings (Converted) - Event Event Type Code: £5 Event Type Description: JUDGE ASSIGNED 2/20/2013 Proceedings (Converted) - Event Event Type Code: W18 Event Type Description: WRIT OF HABEAS CORP Note: PETITION (POST CONVICTION) 2/20/2013 Proceedings (Converted) - Event Event Type Code: M21 Event Type Description: MOT FOR LEAVE Note: TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS 2/20/2013 Proceedings (Converted) - Event Event Type Code: M10 **Event Type Description: MOTION** Note: FOR THE APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL AND REQUEST FOR EVIDENTIARY HEARING 2/20/2013 Proceedings (Converted) - Event Event Type Code: DAS Event Type Description: CASE SENT TO DA Note: CASE SENT ELECTRONICALLY TO DA Action Code: EX Action Description: EXPIRED TIME 2/20/2013 Proceedings (Converted) - Event Event Type Code: F15 Event Type Description: FILE CHECKED OUT BY: Note: DC 2 for review/signature 2/22/2013 Proceedings (Converted) - Event Event Type Code: F16 Event Type Description: FILE CHECKED IN BY: 2/22/2013 Proceedings (Converted) - Event Event Type Code: 051 Event Type Description: ORD DISQUALIFY JUDGE 2/22/2013 Proceedings (Converted) - Event Event Type Code: F15 Event Type Description: FILE CHECKED OUT BY: Note: DC I for review/signature Proceedings (Converted) - Event 3/14/2013

JUSTWARE

Event Type Code: D31

Event Type Description: DECLARATION

Note: STATE'S INITIAL DECLARATION W/ RESPECT TO PETITIONERS PETITION FOR WRIT OF HC FILED 2/20/13 APPL FOR A STAY PENDING RESOLUTION OF THE ISSUE OF THE APPT OF COUNSEL AND CERT OF SERVICE PLEADING PLACED IN DC1 PICK UP BOX ON 3/14/13 @9:51

4/17/2013 Proceedings (Converted) - Event

Event Type Code: 024

Event Type Description: ORD APPOINTING ATTY

4/17/2013 Proceedings (Converted) - Event

Event Type Code: F16

Event Type Description: FILE CHECKED IN BY:

4/17/2013 Proceedings (Converted) - Event

Event Type Code: C35

Event Type Description: COPIES PREPARED FOR Note: TROY JORDAN OF THE PETITION FOR HC

5/1/2013 Proceedings (Converted) - Event

Event Type Code: C35

Event Type Description: COPIES PREPARED FOR

Note: KAREN @ ELKO CO DA'S OFFICE OF THE ORD APPT ATTORNEY FILED4/17/13 COPY

PICKED UP & SIGNED FOR BY DA RUNNER, G DALTON ON5/1/13

5/7/2013 Proceedings (Converted) - Event

Event Type Code: E06

Event Type Description: EX PARTE MOTION Note: FOR PRIVATE INVESTIGATOR FEES

5/7/2013 Proceedings (Converted) - Event

Event Type Code: F15

Event Type Description: FILE CHECKED OUT BY:

Note: DC I for review/signature TROY JORDAN'S PROPOSED ORD WAS PLACED IN DC1 PICK UP

BOX @ 8:48

5/15/2013 Proceedings (Converted) - Event

Event Type Code: E07

Event Type Description: EX PARTE ORDER

Note: ORD GRANTING EX PARTE MOT FOR PRIVATE INVESTIGATION FEES COPY MAILED BACK TO

TROY JORDAN ON 5/16/13

5/15/2013 Proceedings (Converted) - Event

Event Type Code: F16

Event Type Description: FILE CHECKED IN BY:

5/15/2013 Proceedings (Converted) - Event



Event Type Code: F16

Event Type Description: FILE CHECKED IN BY:

5/17/2013 Proceedings (Converted) - Event

Event Type Code: \$15

Event Type Description: STIPULATION

Note: BY THE PARTIES TO: A BRIEFING SCHEDULE WITH RESPECT TO THE POST-CONVICTION PETITION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS; FILED IN PRO PER IN THIS MATTER ON ABOUT THE

20TH DAY OF FEBRUARY, 2013

5/20/2013 Proceedings (Converted) - Event

Event Type Code: 032

Event Type Description: ORD APPROVING

Note: STIPULATION TO A BRIEFING SCHEDULE W/RESPECT TO THE POST-CONVICTION PETITION

FOR A WRIT OF HC; FILED IN PROPER IN THIS MATTER ON OR ABOUT2/20/2013

5/24/2013 Proceedings (Converted) - Event

Event Type Code: N50

Event Type Description: NOTICE OF ENTRY ORDR

11/7/2013 Proceedings (Converted) - Event

Event Type Code: \$25

Event Type Description: STIP FOR EXT OF TIME

Note: RE: OPENING BRIEF

11/8/2013 Proceedings (Converted) - Event

Event Type Code: F15

Event Type Description: FILE CHECKED OUT BY:

Note: DC I for review/signature

11/14/2013 Proceedings (Converted) - Event

Event Type Code: F16

Event Type Description: FILE CHECKED IN BY:

11/14/2013 Proceedings (Converted) - Event

Event Type Code: 012

Event Type Description: ORDER

Note: APPROVING THE STIPULATION BY THE PARTIES TO AN EXTENSION OF TIME WITHIN WHICH THE PETITIONER MAY FILE HIS OPENING BRIEF WITH RESPECT TO THE POST

CONVICTION PETITION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS; FILED (IN PRO PER) IN THIS MATTER

ON OR ABOUT THE 20TH DAY OF FEBRUARY 2013 (PUT COPIES IN DA

12/20/2013 Proceedings (Converted) - Event

Event Type Code: \$15

Event Type Description: STIPULATION

Note: BY THE PATRIES TO AND EXTENSION OF TIME WITHIN WHICH THE PETITIONER MAY FILE HIS OPENING BRIEF WITH RESPECT TO THE POST CONVICTION PETITION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS FILED IN PRO PER IN THIS MATTER ON OR ABOUT THE 20TH DAY OF

FEBRUARY, 2013

12/20/2013 Proceedings (Converted) - Event

Event Type Code: F15

Event Type Description: FILE CHECKED OUT BY:

Note: DC I for review/signature

1/2/2014 Proceedings (Converted) - Event

Event Type Code: 032

Event Type Description: ORD APPROVING

Note: EXTENSTION OF TIME

1/2/2014 Proceedings (Converted) - Event

Event Type Code: F16

Event Type Description: FILE CHECKED IN BY:

1/22/2014 Proceedings (Converted) - Event

Event Type Code: N08

Event Type Description: NOTICE OF Note: CHANGE OF ADDRESS OF LAW FIRM

2/3/2014 Proceedings (Converted) - Event

Event Type Code: M37

Event Type Description: MOT TO Note: TO BE RELIEVED AS COUNSEL

2/3/2014 Proceedings (Converted) - Event

Event Type Code: R31

Event Type Description: REQUEST - SUBMISSION

2/3/2014 Proceedings (Converted) - Event

Event Type Code: F15

Event Type Description: FILE CHECKED OUT BY:

Note: DC I for review/signature

2/4/2014 Proceedings (Converted) - Event

Event Type Code: M65

Event Type Description: MISC PLEADING

Note: STATE'S SUBMISSION OF TROY JORDAN'S MOTION TO BE RELIEVED AS COUNSEL FILED ON FEBRUARY 3, 2014, TO THE COURT'S DISCRETION AND CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE WITH RESPECT

THERETO FILE CHECKED OUT, PLEADING PLACED IN DCI PICK UP BOX

2/25/2014 ORDER APPOINTING ATTORNEY-Document 2/25/2014 Proceedings (Converted) - Event Event Type Code: F16 Event Type Description: FILE CHECKED IN BY: Proceedings (Converted) - Event 2/25/2014 Event Type Code: L01 **Event Type Description: LETTER FROM** Note: KODY CREE PATTEN 2/25/2014 Proceedings (Converted) - Event Event Type Code: 026 Event Type Description: ORD APPT COUNSEL 2/28/2014 Proceedings (Converted) - Event Event Type Code: L01 Event Type Description: LETTER FROM Note: DFFFNDANT 6/5/2014 Proceedings (Converted) - Event Event Type Code: A38 Event Type Description: APPL FOR ATTY FEES 6/5/2014 Proceedings (Converted) - Event Event Type Code: A56 Event Type Description: AFFID IN SUPPORT Note: OF APPLICATION FOR PAYMENT OF ATTORNEY'S FEES/COSTS 6/5/2014 Proceedings (Converted) - Event Event Type Code: 528 Event Type Description: SUBMISSION OF ORDER Note: ORDER SENT TO JUDGE FOR SIGNATURE FOR PAYMENT OF ATTORNEY FEES 6/6/2014 Proceedings (Converted) - Event Event Type Code: F15 Event Type Description: FILE CHECKED OUT BY: Note: DC I for review/signature 6/10/2014 Proceedings (Converted) - Event Event Type Code: F16 Event Type Description: FILE CHECKED IN BY: Proceedings (Converted) - Event 6/10/2014

JustWare

Event Type Code: 012

Event Type Description: ORDER

Note: ON APPLICATION FOR PAYMENT OF ATTORNEYS FEES AND COSTS

6/13/2014 Proceedings (Converted) - Event

Event Type Code: F02

Event Type Description: FAX SENT

Note: SEARS of Order

6/23/2014 Proceedings (Converted) - Event

Event Type Code: \$38

Event Type Description: SUPPLEMENTAL

Note: CERT OF SERVICE WITH RESPECT TO THE PETITIONER'S PROPER PERSON MOTION FOR

WITHDRAWAL OF ATTORNEY OF RECORD OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE REQUEST FOR

RECORDS/COURT CASE DOCUMENTS SERVED UPON THE RESPONDENTS COUNSEL ON JUNE 20,

201

7/30/2014 Proceedings (Converted) - Event

Event Type Code: E06

Event Type Description: EX PARTE MOTION

Note: FOR ATTORNEYS FEES

7/30/2014 Proceedings (Converted) - Event

Event Type Code: 528

Event Type Description: SUBMISSION OF ORDER

Note: ORDER SENT TO JUDGE FOR SIGNATURE - ORDER RE: FEES

Action Date: 08/12/2014

Action Code: R99

Action Description: RESPONSE/ORDER
Action Comment: ORDER APPROVING FEES

7/30/2014 Proceedings (Converted) - Event

Event Type Code: F15

Event Type Description: FILE CHECKED OUT BY:

Note: DC I for review/signature

8/12/2014 Proceedings (Converted) - Event

Event Type Code: F16

Event Type Description: FILE CHECKED IN BY:

8/12/2014 Proceedings (Converted) - Event

Event Type Code: 036

Event Type Description: ORD APPR FEES

12/29/2016 Proceedings (Converted) - Event

Event Type Code: F15

Event Type Description: FILE CHECKED OUT BY:

Note: DC I for review/signature

12/29/2016 Proceedings (Converted) - Event

Event Type Code: F16

Event Type Description: FILE CHECKED IN BY:

3/25/2019 Proceedings (Converted) - Event

Event Type Code: \$38

Event Type Description: SUPPLEMENTAL

Note: PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS (POST CONVICTION) AND REQUEST FOR

EVIDENTIARY HEARING COPIES IN SASE TO SEARS

3/25/2019 Proceedings (Converted) - Event

Event Type Code: F15

Event Type Description: FILE CHECKED OUT BY:

Note: DC I for review/signature

6/19/2019 Proceedings (Converted) - Event

Event Type Code: F16

Event Type Description: FILE CHECKED IN BY:

6/19/2019 Proceedings (Converted) - Event

Event Type Code: 012

Event Type Description: ORDER Note: DIRECTING RESPONSE

6/24/2019 Proceedings (Converted) - Event

Event Type Code: E31

Event Type Description: E-MAIL

Note: PETITION FILED ON 3/25/19 TO NICOLE F. AT THE AG'S OFFICE PER HER REQUEST

7/9/2019 Proceedings (Converted) - Event

Event Type Code: M17

Event Type Description: MOT TO DISMISS

Note: PETITION AND SUPPLEMENTAL PETITION FOR UNTIMELINESS (LACHES) AND IN THE ALTERNATIVE, MOTION TO EXTEND TIME FOR STATE TO ANSWER WRIT AND/OR SUPPLEMENTAL

WRIT

8/15/2019 Proceedings (Converted) - Event

Event Type Code: O10

Event Type Description: OPPOSITION

Note: TO DISMISSAL OF SUPPLEMENT TO POST CONVICTION WRIT

8/21/2019 Proceedings (Converted) - Event



Event Type Code: R29

Event Type Description: REQUEST FOR REVIEW

Note: MOTION TO DISMISS PETITION AND SUPPLEMENTAL PETITION FOR UNTIMELINESS (LACHES) AND IN THE ALTERNATIVE MOTION TO EXTEND TIME FOR STATE TO ANSWER WRIT

AND/OR SUPPLEMENTAL WRIT

8/21/2019 Proceedings (Converted) - Event

Event Type Code: F15

Event Type Description: FILE CHECKED OUT BY:

Note: DC I for review/signature

1/10/2020 Proceedings (Converted) - Event

Event Type Code: O47

Event Type Description: ORD DENYING MOTION

Note: TO DISMISSD AND ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO EXTEND TIME FOR STATE'S RESPONSE

1/10/2020 Proceedings (Converted) - Event

Event Type Code: F16

Event Type Description: FILE CHECKED IN BY:

1/10/2020 Proceedings (Converted) - Event

Event Type Code: F16

Event Type Description: FILE CHECKED IN BY:

Action Date: 01/13/2020

Action Code: ERR

Action Description: ERROR

2/7/2020 Open - Case Status

Case status change.

7/13/2020 SUBMISSION OF ORDER - STIP & ORD TO

EXTEND RESPONDENT'S TIME - Document

COPIES PROVIDED BY DA'S OFFICE

7/14/2020 STIPULATION & ORDER TO EXTEND

RESPONDENT'S RESPONSE TIME -

Document

COPIES PLACED IN DA'S BOX.

7/28/2020 VOLUME 2 CREATED - Document

7/28/2020 OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS AND OPPOSITION TO SUPPLEMENTAL PETITION FOR WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS - Document

7/28/2020 NOTE ADDED TO FILE - Case Notes

CREATED VOL 2

1/29/2021 ORDER TO FILE DOCUMENTS - Document

JUSTWARE

Page 9 of 10 3/31/2021 2:03:29 PM

Order Filed

	PLACED IN DC1 BOX	
2/4/2021	NOTICE OF FILING OF PETITIONER'S COMPENTENCY EVALUATION UNDER SEAL PER COURT ROOM - Document	
	SEALED ENVELOPE ATTACHED FILE CHECKED OUT PLACED IN DC1 P/U BOX	
3/15/2021	ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS - Document	
3/16/2021	NOTICE OF ENTRY OF ORDER - Document	
3/30/2021	CASE APPEAL STATEMENT- Document	
3/30/2021	NOTICE OF APPEAL - Document	
3/31/2021	CLERK'S CERTIFICATION - Document SIGNED AND SEALED	

1	Case No. CV-HC-13-116		
2	Dept. No. 1		
3	THE CO DISTRICT COURT		
4	CLERKDEPUTY		
5			
6	IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT		
7	OF THE STATE OF NEVADA, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELKO		
8			
9	KODY CREE PATTEN,		
10	Petitioner, ORDER APPOINTING ATTORNEY		
11	V.		
12	RENEE BAKER, Warden of the Ely		
13	State Prison, Respondent.		
14	On Echnyami 2, 2014, a Matian to be Paliaved as Counsel was filed by Tray C. Jarden, Ess		
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18	that said Petitioner is indigent and presently incarcerated.		
19	THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AS FOLLOWS:		
20	That Troy C. Jordan, Esq., is hereby relieved of his appointment as attorney of record for above		
21	named Petitioner, and that Richard W. Sears, Esq., is hereby appointed to represent said Petitioner in al		
22	matters regarding this case.		
23	IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the office of Richard W. Sears, Esq., shall be responsible for		
24	obtaining a copy of the files related to this matter through the Elko County Clerk's office (775-753-4600)		
25	SO ORDERED this <u>24</u> day of February, 2014.		
26	NANCY PORTER District Judge - Dept. No. 1		

1 CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY 2 Pursuant to NRCP 5(b), I certify that I am an employee of the Fourth Judicial District Court, day of February, 2014, I personally hand delivered a file stamped Department 1, and that on this 25 copy of the foregoing ORDER APPOINTING ATTORNEY to: 5 Mark D. Torvinen, Esq. Elko County District Attorney 540 Court Street, 2nd Floor 6 Elko, NV 89801 7 {1 File Stamped Copy} Box in Clerk's Office 8 day of February, 2014. 9 10 11 12 CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 13 Pursuant to NRCP 5(b), I hereby certify that I am an employee of the Fourth Judicial District Court, Department 1, and that on this day of February, 2014, I deposited for mailing in the U.S. 14 15 mail at Elko, Nevada, postage prepaid, a file stamped copy of the foregoing ORDER APPOINTING ATTORNEY addressed to: 16 17 Troy C. Jordan, Esq. 3715 Lakeside Drive, Suite A 18 Reno, NV 89509 19 Richard W. Sears, Esq. 1330 Aultman Street Ely, NV 89301 20 21 day of February, 2014. 22 23

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CASE NO.: CV-HC-13-116

DEPT. NO.: 1

2021 MAR 15 PH 2: 00 ELKO CO DISTRICT COURT

CLERK___ DEPUTY

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELKO. STATE OF NEVADA

KODY CREE PATTEN,

Petitioner,

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT

OF HABEAS CORPUS

WILLIAM "BILL" GITTERE, WARDEN ELY STATE PRISON

Respondent.

Before this Court is a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (hereinafter "Petition") filed by Kody Cree Patten (hereinafter "Petitioner"), *in propria persona*, on February 20, 2013. Petitioner then filed a Supplemental Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Post Conviction) and Request for Evidentiary Hearing (hereinafter "Supplement"), by and through Richard W. Sears, Esq. Thereafter, the State of Nevada (hereinafter "Respondent"), by and through Elko County District Attorney, Tyler J. Ingram, Esq., filed a Motion to Dismiss Petition and Supplemental Petition for Untimeliness (Laches); and in the Alternative, Motion to Extend Time for State to Answer Writ and/or Supplemental Writ on July 9, 2019. Petitioner filed an Opposition to Dismissal of Supplement to Post-Conviction Writ on August 15, 2019. This Court issued an Order Denying Motion to Dismiss and Order Granting Motion to Extend Time for State's Response on January 10, 2020. Thereafter, Respondent filed an Opposition to Petition for Writ

 of Habeas Corpus and Opposition to Supplemental Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus on July 28, 2020.

Petitioner is currently incarcerated at Ely State Prison. On May 9, 2012, Petitioner entered a plea of guilty to the criminal offense of First-Degree Murder with the Use of a Deadly Weapon pursuant to the terms of a written Statutory Plea Agreement.

"Any person convicted of a crime and under sentence of death or imprisonment who claims that the conviction was obtained, or that the sentence was imposed, in violation of the Constitution of the United States or the Constitution or laws of this State . . ." may file a post-conviction petition for writ of habeas corpus. NRS 34.724(1). In cases where the conviction was obtained through a plea of guilty, a petition for writ of habeas corpus is limited to claims that the plea was "involuntarily or unknowingly entered or that the plea was entered without effective assistance of counsel." NRS 34.810(1)(a). A post-conviction habeas petitioner "is entitled to a post-conviction evidentiary hearing when he asserts claims supported by specific factual allegations not belied by the record that, if true, would entitle him to relief." Mann v. State, 118 Nev. 351, 353, 46 P.3d 1228, 1229 (2002).

Petitioner makes several contentions in both his Petition and Supplement. This Court will address each contention in turn. As a preliminary matter, Petitioner refers to himself several times in his Supplement as a "minor." Nevada law recognizes those who attained the age of 18 as adults. At all relevant times, Petitioner had attained 18 years of age or older.

A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

A defendant who pleads guilty upon the advice of counsel may attack the validity of the guilty plea by showing that he received ineffective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. To succeed on such a claim, a defendant must prove both that: (1) counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness; and (2) there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the defendant would not have pled guilty. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). The objective standard of

 reasonableness is measured by prevailing professional norms. ld. at 688.

1. Defense Counsel "told Hon. Papez that [Petitioner] had said everything to the police need [sic] to convict [Petitioner] of 1st Degree Murder."

Petitioner does not identify where in the record Defense Counsel ("Counsel") made this statement to Hon. Papez. Even if Counsel had made this statement to Hon. Papez, Petitioner does not show how Counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, nor how, but for this failure, there is a reasonable probability that Petitioner would not have pled guilty.

At his Change of Plea hearing prior to the Sentencing hearing, Petitioner admitted to every element of first-degree murder with the use of a deadly weapon while under oath. It thus perplexes this Court how Counsel's alleged statement, which essentially acknowledged Petitioner's admissions, would amount to ineffective assistance of counsel. The Court therefore denies the Petition as to this ground.

2. Counsel said that he "had been speaking with the DA [sic] about a deal since around pre-lim [sic]."

Petitioner alleges that Counsel had been negotiating with the District Attorney's Office since around the time of the Preliminary hearing. Again, Petitioner fails to show how Counsel's plea bargain strategy fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Plea bargaining is a normal segment of a criminal defense attorney's job. Again, even if Petitioner were able to show that Counsel's strategy was objectively unreasonable, he has still not shown how, but for this strategy, there is a reasonable probability that Petitioner would not have pled guilty. The Court therefore denies the Petition as to this ground.

3. Counsel told Petitioner that he would be convicted and get the death penalty if he went to trial, based on the testimony of Toni Fratto, his co-defendant.

Petitioner alleges that Counsel told him that he would be convicted and sentenced to death if he chose to go to trial. Petitioner fails to show where in the record these statements

were made, nor does he show how these statements, if made, fell below an objective standard of reasonableness for Counsel. Counsel advising Petitioner about the likelihood of conviction, given the extensive evidence against Petitioner, is not ineffective assistance of counsel. Even if so advising Petitioner were found to be objectively unreasonable, however, Petitioner has also not shown how, but for Counsel's advice, there is a reasonable probability that Petitioner would have chosen to go to trial. The Court therefore denies the Petition as to this ground.

4. Counsel told Petitioner that because of his Pre-Sentence Investigation report he would not be "maxed out at sentencing."

Petitioner alleges that Counsel told him that his Pre-Sentence Investigation report ("PSI report"), militated against him being placed in the high end of the sentencing guidelines. Petitioner again fails to show where in the record this statement was made or state how Counsel making it fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Even assuming that it was objectively unreasonable for Counsel to make such a statement, however, Petitioner's claim still fails.

Regardless of any alleged statement by Counsel, Petitioner was aware of all possible sentences before him, as well as the fact that the Court did not have to follow the sentencing recommendations of Parole and Probation in its PSI report or that of any of the parties. Petitioner's choices were to go to trial and risk the possibility of being sentenced to death, or to take the plea deal and risk that he would be sentenced to life without the possibility of parole instead of life with the possibility of parole. Petitioner was aware too of the details of the heinous, violent, sadistic murder to which he was pleading and which the Court would have to weigh against any mitigating factors to determine his sentence. Nothing in the Petition provides any support for the contention that Petitioner would have chosen to go to trial and risk death but for Counsel's statement about the PSI report. The Court therefore denies the Petition as to this ground.

5. Counsel failed to show that Petitioner did not inflict the life-ending wounds to

Micaela Costanzo.

Petitioner states that his counsel was ineffective for failing to show that Petitioner did not personally deal the blow that killed victim Micaela Costanzo. As Respondent aptly points out, however, "a defendant will not be relieved of criminal liability for murder when his action was a substantial factor in bringing about the death of the victim." Lay v. State, 110 Nev. 1189, 1192-93 (1994). The record clearly demonstrates that Petitioner's actions were a significant factor in the victim's death— during his Change of Plea hearing, Petitioner confessed to stabbing the victim in the neck with the serrated end of an entrenching tool; the autopsy report stated that the victim died due to exsanguination caused by multiple stab and slash wounds to her face and neck. Petitioner's actions were thus clearly a substantial factor in bringing about the victim's death. It was therefore not objectively unreasonable for Counsel not to focus on showing which particular act by which particular defendant actually killed the victim. Further, Petitioner has not shown that there is a reasonable probability that he would not have pled guilty had Counsel been able to show who struck the final killing blow. The Court therefore denies the Petition as to this ground.

6. Counsel did not investigate witnesses.

Petitioner next claims that he gave Counsel and private investigator the names of witnesses, which Counsel failed to investigate. Petitioner does not identify these witnesses, or what information they would have provided—it is therefore impossible to deduce how Counsel not calling these unknown persons to provide unknown testimony could have fallen below an objective standard of reasonableness. Petitioner also neither states nor shows that there is a reasonable probability that Petitioner would not have pled guilty had Counsel found and/or investigated these unknown witnesses. The Court therefore denies the Petition as to this ground.

7. Counsel told Petitioner that the Court would not accept his guilty plea if he based it on the factual basis that he himself prepared and that he would instead have to

base it on his first statement or confession.

Petitioner next states that Counsel prevented him from using his prepared factual basis, which would have stated that he did not kill the victim, in court. Taking Petitioner's allegations as true, and therefore assuming that Counsel did provide this advice to Petitioner, Counsel would have been exactly correct. The Court could not have accepted a guilty plea to murder where the factual basis for that plea stated that Petitioner did not kill the victim. Petitioner has therefore not shown that this advice fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.

Further, if Counsel had not explained to Petitioner that his personally prepared factual basis was insufficient, the Court would have had to have done so. Regardless of Counsel's advice, therefore, Petitioner would have been in the same position: either stand by the factual basis he had prepared and go to trial, with all its uncertainties, or present a factual basis that admitted to killing Micaela Costanzo. Petitioner has therefore not shown that there is a reasonable probability that he would not have pled guilty without Counsel's advice. The Court therefore denies the Petition as to this ground.

8. During a "closed court hearing," Petitioner tried to fire his counsel and counsel said that Petitioner was making the second biggest mistake of his life and it would result in him being put on death row.

Petitioner states that he attempted to fire Counsel, but that Counsel told him that doing so would be a mistake and result in him likely receiving a death sentence. Petitioner does not allege how this statement by Counsel fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Petitioner further does not allege that, without this statement, there is a reasonable probability that he would not have pled guilty. At most, without this statement, Petitioner might have fired Counsel and been appointed or retained a different attorney. There is no way to know what attorney's advice would have been, nor how that advice would have changed Petitioner's predilection for accepting a plea agreement. The Court therefore denies the Petition as to this ground.

9. Counsel did not "put forth any motion that [Petitioner] asked to be added and also failed to get statements from witnesses."

Petitioner states that Counsel did not file the motions he asked to be filed, nor did he investigate the witnesses and evidence that he asked Counsel to investigate. The failure to investigate witnesses ground has already been addressed, *supra*.

As to the failure to file motions, Petitioner has failed to state with specificity what facts and claims for relief those motions would have contained. It is therefore unclear how Counsel's failure to file those motions fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Petitioner also does not allege or show that, but for the failure to file these motions, there is a reasonable probability that he would not have pled guilty. The Court is therefore denying the Petition as to this ground.

10. Counsel failed to "get evidence to constitute a different outcome."

Petitioner states that Counsel failed to get evidence to constitute a different outcome. Petitioner does not suggest what evidence Counsel should have found, nor how that evidence would create a different outcome. Without knowing what evidence Counsel did not find, the Court cannot say that Counsel was deficient for not finding it. Petitioner has failed to show that Counsel's actions fell below an objective standard of reasonableness as to this ground. Further, Petitioner has not shown that there is a reasonable probability that he would not have pled guilty had Counsel found this unknown evidence. The Court therefore denies the Petition as to this ground as well.

11. Counsel failed to fully advise Petitioner of all of his defenses to first-degree murder prior to entry of a guilty plea, including the "pretrial phase of defense."

Petitioner claims that Counsel failed to advise him of all his defenses to first-degree murder prior to his decision to enter a guilty plea. Petitioner does not specify of what defenses Counsel should have informed him; i.e., how Counsel's advice was deficient such that it fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Without knowing how Counsel's advice was

deficient, the Court cannot know whether, but for that deficient advice, there is a reasonable probability that Petitioner would not have pled guilty. The Court must deny the Petition as to this ground as well.

12. Counsel allowed Petitioner to make a proffer without knowing whether or not he was committed to the plea agreement.

Here, Petitioner argues that Counsel was ineffective because Counsel did not inform Petitioner of all the consequences of withdrawing from a proffer. Petitioner does not state of what consequences Counsel should have informed him, nor how Counsel's failure to do so fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Petitioner merely states that the government learned information it could not have otherwise obtained. As Petitioner had already confessed before the proffer, it is unknown what information Petitioner believes the District Attorney learned only at the proffer.

As Petitioner has failed to show that Counsel's failure to inform him of unknown consequences of withdrawing from the proffer fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and as Petitioner has not alleged that, had he been informed of these consequences, there is a reasonable probability that he would not have pled guilty, the Petition is denied as to this ground.

13. Counsel failed to investigate and replicate the injuries on the victim, resulting in a decision to plead guilty on insufficient facts.

Petitioner contends that Counsel should have replicated the injuries on the victim so as to determine which injuries Petitioner made and which were caused by his co-defendant. As Petitioner had already confessed to shoving, hitting, and stabbing the victim, actions that were substantial factors in causing the victim's death, Petitioner cannot show why Counsel's decision not to replicate the injuries to the victim fell below an objective standard of reasonableness for a defense attorney. Petitioner is also unable to show that there is a reasonable probability that, had Counsel been able to replicate these injuries, Petitioner would

not have entered a guilty plea. The Petition is denied as to this ground.

14. Counsel failed to prepare a psychological evaluation of Petitioner to explain his rationale in protecting his co-defendant.

Petitioner states that Counsel failed to seek a psychological evaluation that would have explained his rationale for not revealing that his co-defendant had participated in the victim's murder with him. Petitioner admitted to causing many of the severe cuts that caused the exsanguination that led to the victim's death in this case. He is, a substantial cause of her death. Petitioner's rationale for not mentioning his co-defendant does not mitigate his own culpability, and so it cannot be said that Counsel's failure to inquire into this fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Petitioner also does not show how getting this evaluation would have created a reasonable probability that Petitioner would not have entered a guilty plea.

Further, there were two mental health evaluations prepared for Petitioner: a psychiatric evaluation by Dr. H. Hale Henson, MD, and a psychological competency evaluation by Dr. Sally Farmer, PhD. Both evaluations indicated that Petitioner had no compromised cognitive functions, and that he understood the charges and parties involved in his criminal case. Dr. Henson, given the opportunity to diagnose Petitioner with a mental illness, stated that he found "no diagnosis or condition"; Dr. Farmer indicated that Petitioner had been evaluated for a period of approximately two weeks, during which Petitioner did not show any symptoms of any mental disorder that could interfere with his competency. Petitioner has not stated what mental health disorder he believes Counsel would have discovered, had another evaluation been performed, nor how not doing a third evaluation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, nor how the performance of this third evaluation would have created a reasonable probability that Petitioner would not have entered a guilty plea. The Petition is therefore denied as to this ground.

15. Petitioner argues that Counsel should have informed him that it was virtually

certain the Court would sentence him to life without the possibility of parole.

Petitioner argues that Counsel should have informed him that it was virtually certain that between the options the Court had of sentencing Petitioner to life with the possibility of parole or life without the possibility of parole, the Court would choose to sentence Petitioner to life without parole. Petitioner claims that he was "shocked when he received life in prison without parole" describing it as "having a knife pushed into his body." This Court notes the glaring irony in Petitioner's statement.

Petitioner was informed by the Court when he entered his plea that it was not a party to the plea agreement between Counsel and the District Attorney, and that the Court was not bound to follow the recommendations of either party. Petitioner stated on the record that he understood this.

Further, Petitioner's Memorandum of Plea agreement also stated that the Court could sentence Petitioner to life with or without parole, and that that decision would be made solely by the Court, regardless of the recommendations by Counsel or the District Attorney. Petitioner signed that agreement. Petitioner was thus informed exactly what could happen upon him taking the plea. Counsel's actions thus did not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness.

Yet further, Petitioner has neither alleged nor shown how, but for Counsel's actions, there is a reasonable probability that Petitioner would not have pled guilty. Even if Petitioner had not been informed by Counsel that the Court had final sentencing authority, the Court so informed Petitioner at his Change of Plea hearing. Petitioner was then given the opportunity to decide whether he wanted to go forward with changing his plea, or whether he wanted to withdraw his guilty plea and go to trial. Petitioner stated that he still wanted to plead. As he has met neither prong of <u>Strickland</u>, the Petition fails as to this ground as well.

16. Counsel told Petitioner that he could get the benefit of a lesser sentence without having to admit to a murder he did not commit.

Petitioner alleges that Counsel told him he could plead to murder without having to admit to committing a murder. If true, this allegation would fall below an objective standard of reasonableness for an attorney. This allegation is belied by the record, however. Petitioner was specifically questioned about understanding his plea by both Counsel and the Court at his Change of Plea hearing and given an opportunity to withdraw his plea and go to trial, should he change his mind. He also admitted to committing the murder in his Memorandum of Plea agreement, which he signed. Therefore, there is no basis to believe Counsel provided this advice to Petitioner. Further, as the facts of this allegation are belied by the record, there is also not a reasonable probability that, without this advice, Petitioner would have chosen to go to trial. As the facts do not support this allegation, the Court denies the Petition as to this ground.

17. Counsel divulged information to the press and unknown information to the District Attorney.

Petitioner states that Counsel divulged information to the press and District Attorney that harmed his case. Petitioner provides no information as to what was said to the press or District Attorney. Even if this Court assumes what Petitioner alleges is true, it cannot be determined, without more, whether Counsel's actions fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, nor whether, without these communications, Petitioner would have chosen to go to trial in lieu of pleading guilty. As Petitioner has not provided any substantive grounds to support his allegations, the Court must deny his Petition as to this ground as well.

18. During a "plea deal meeting" with the District Attorney, Defense Counsel said to Petitioner that, "You being there is as if you put the knife in her throat." Petitioner replied "I didn't kill her!" Defense Counsel then said, "Okay, if your [sic] not taking the deal we're done here."

Petitioner next states that Counsel told Petitioner he was just as culpable of killing the victim in this case whether he stuck the final blow to her or not. Assuming this conversation

 between Petitioner and his attorney took place as he claims it did, Petitioner still fails to show how Counsel's advice fell below an objective standard of reasonableness or that there is a reasonable probability that, but for this statement by Counsel, Petitioner would not have entered a guilty plea.

Petitioner has admitted to engaging in many of the violent stabs and cuts that led the victim in this case to exsanguinate; as indicated above, it is irrelevant whether Petitioner or his co-defendant thrust the final, killing blow. The Court thus finds it necessary to deny the Petition as to this ground as well.

The Court notes that Petitioner also alleges under this ground that Counsel was prejudiced against him. Petitioner has alleged only that Counsel essentially explained to him that his not dealing the final blow to the victim was immaterial, and that Counsel decided on ending the plea negotiations after Petitioner indicated he would not be taking the plea deal. There is nothing in those statements to support that Counsel was prejudiced against his client and so provided ineffective assistance; further, there is no reason to believe, even if Counsel were prejudiced against his client, that, absent that prejudice, the effect of which is unknown, that Petitioner would not have eventually chosen to plead guilty. The Court denies this ground under either theory of ineffective assistance, therefore.

B. Constitutional Objections

Petitioner argues that the sentencing Court and Nevada law removed the possibility for balancing mitigating and aggravating factors in determining his sentence, and that this lack of balancing is violative of the Eighth Amendment. Firstly, there was, in fact, balancing at the Sentencing hearing— Counsel, the District Attorney, and the Court all addressed both the mitigating factor of Petitioner's young adult age, as well as the aggravating factor of the heinous, vicious nature of the underlying offense. Secondly, the caselaw Petitioner cites to finds that it is cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment to sentence juveniles to life in prison without the possibility of parole. Although Petitioner was a young man

when he committed his crime, he was not a juvenile. Petitioner fails to provide any applicable caselaw regarding sentencing adults to life in prison without the possibility of parole. As his sentence does not violate the Eighth Amendment, his Petition is denied as to this ground.

C. Misunderstood Guilty Plea

Petitioner next states that he did not understand the plea he made. Petitioner admitted to murder in the first-degree with the use of a deadly weapon on the record, under oath, after being extensively canvassed by the Court and Counsel about whether he understood the nature and elements of the offense to which he was pleading. He also had the opportunity to stop the hearing to ask questions. He specifically stated on the record that he murdered Micaela Costanzo maliciously, willfully, without lawful justification, and that the crime was not an accident. He further stated that he did this with a deadly weapon. These facts are also laid out in Petitioner's signed Memorandum of Plea agreement. Petitioner's decision to plead guilty to first-degree murder was knowing and voluntary. As the record directly contradicts Petitioner's claim that he misunderstood his guilty plea. The Court is denying the petition as to this ground as well.

D. Judicial Prejudice

1. Hon. Papez had already decided Petitioner's sentence prior to the Sentencing hearing.

Petitioner states that he believes Hon. Papez had already decided Petitioner's sentence before the Sentencing hearing. Petitioner puts forth no evidence as to how Hon. Papez was unduly prejudiced against him, however. Further, this Court sees nothing in the record which evidences bias or prejudice by Hon. Papez for or against any party or attorney in this matter. Therefore, the Court denies the Petition as to this ground as well.

2. Hon. Papez told the Petitioner, "Mr. Patten, your blood runs cold."

Petitioner believes that Hon. Papez was unduly prejudiced against him because Hon. Papez made this statement about Petitioner during his Sentencing hearing. Petitioner had by

this time confessed to beating a sixteen-year-old girl, his childhood friend, with a shovel, cutting and stabbing her with a dagger, stripping her of her clothing, and leaving her in a shallow grave. Hon. Papez was tasked with assessing Petitioner's crimes and deciding the appropriate sentencing under the law. The record supports Hon. Papez's statement. This Court sees no evidence of prejudice by Hon. Papez. The Petition is denied as to this ground as well.

E. New Evidence and Actual Innocence

Following the precedent of the Federal Circuit Courts, the Nevada Supreme Court has held that an evidentiary hearing regarding actual innocence is required where the new evidence, "if credited," would show that it is more likely than not that no reasonable jury would find the petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Berry v. State, 131 Nev. 957, 967-968 (2015). The Court "must make its determination concerning the petitioner's innocence in light of all the evidence." Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 328.

Petitioner claims that Toni Fratto, his co-defendant, made a jailhouse confession wherein she stated that she had committed the murder by herself while Petitioner "just stood around." This Court must take co-defendant's alleged jailhouse confession and consider it in light of all the evidence in this case, including Petitioner's confession, the specificities of which were previously corroborated by co-defendant's proffer. In light of all the evidence in this case, co-defendant's alleged jailhouse confession does not make it more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted the petitioner of the charged offenses. Thus, this Court denies Petitioner's request for an evidentiary hearing as to this ground.

F. Disproportionate Sentencing

Petitioner states that the sentence he received was disproportionally harsher than the sentence his co-defendant received. The sentence Petitioner received was within the statutory guidelines under NRS 200.030(4) and was contained within the Memorandum of Plea agreement that Petitioner signed; Petitioner was also canvassed about this particular sentence at his Change of Plea hearing. Petitioner's co-defendant received a lesser sentence because

she pled to a lesser degree of murder than Petitioner did. Although the sentences are different, this Court sees nothing unlawful about Petitioner's sentence.

Therefore, as Petitioner has not met his burden as to any of the grounds he has cited in his Petition, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Petitioner's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is DENIED.

DATED this 12 day of March, 2021.

DISTRICT JUDGE. - DEPT. 1

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CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY

Pursuant to NRCP 5(b), I certify that I am an employee of the Fourth Judicial District Court, Department 1, and that on this day of March, 2021, I personally hand delivered a file stamped copy of the foregoing ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS addressed to:

Tyler J. Ingram
Elko County District Attorney
540 Court Street, 2nd floor
Elko, Nevada 89801
[Box in Clerk's Office]




CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

Pursuant to NRCP 5(b), I certify that I am an employee of the Fourth Judicial District Court, Department 1, and that on this https://doi.org/10.2021/, I personally deposited for mailing in the U.S. mail at Elko, Nevada, postage prepaid, a file stamped copy of the foregoing ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS addressed to:

Richard Wayne Sears, Esq. Sears Law Firm, Itd 457 5th St. Ely, NV 89301 William Gittere, Warden Ely State Prison PO Box 1989 Ely, NV 89301-1989

Kody Cree Patten #1091721 Ely State Prison PO Box 1989 Ely, NV 89301-1989 Aaron D. Ford, Esq. Nevada Attorney General 100 N. Carson St. Carson City, NV 89701



FILED

Case No. CV-HC-13-116

Dept. No. 1

2021 MAR 31 PM 1:59

ELKO CO DISTRICT COURT

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELKO, STATE OF NEVADA

KODY CREE PATTEN,

Appellant,

VS.

CLERK'S CERTIFICATION

WILLIAM "BILL" GITTERE, WARDEN ELY STATE PRISON,

Respondent,

I, KRISTINE JAKEMAN, the duly elected, acting and qualified County Clerk and

Ex-Officio Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the State of Nevada, in and for the County of Elko, do hereby certify that the annexed are true, full and correct copies of certain documents in Case No. CV-HC-13-116 Dept. 1, KODY CREE PATTEN, Appellant, vs. WILLIAM "BILL" GITTERE, WARDEN ELY STATE PRISON, Respondent, as appears on file and of record in my office.

WITNESS My Hand and Seal of said Court on March 31, 2021.

KRISTINE JAKEMAN, ELKO COUNTY CLERK

Annette Marshall, DEPUTY CLERK

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I caused to be sent electronically and/or mailed a certified copy of the annexed documents in Case No. CV-HC-13-116 Dept. 1, KODY CREE PATTEN, Appellant, vs. WILLIAM "BILL" GITTERE, WARDEN ELY STATE PRISON, Respondent, as appears on file and of record in this Court, to the following:

Richard W. Sears, Esq. Sears Law Firm, Itd 457 Fifth Street Ely, Nevada 89301

Elko County District Attorney canchondo@elkocountynv.net csmith@elkocountynv.net kdarby@elkocountynv.net tyell@elkocountynv.net tingram@elkocountynv.net

DATED this 31st, day of March, 2021.

Annette Marshall, Deputy Clerk