

1 HAYES, JAMES H ID NO. 1175077

2 SOUTHERN DESERT CORRECTIONAL CTN.
3 20825 COLD CREEK RD.
4 P.O. BOX 208
5 INDIAN SPRINGS, NV 89070

FILED

DEC 13 2021

ELIZABETH A. BROWN
CLERK OF SUPREME COURT
BY [Signature]
DEPUTY CLERK

6 Supreme Court of Nevada

7 JAMES H. HAYES
8 (Appellant)

9 v.

10 State of Nevada
11 (Respondent)

CASE NO.: 83274

DEPT. NO.: _____

DOCKET: _____


12 Motion to Expedite Appeal

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17 COMES NOW, appellant, James H. Hayes, herein above respectfully
18 moves this Honorable Court for an EXPEDITIOUS REVIEW OF ISSUES OF
19 FIRST IMPRESSION AND EXTRAORDINARY CIRCUMSTANCES
20 CONTAINED IN THE INSTANT APPEAL

21 This Motion is made and based upon the accompanying Memorandum of Points and
22 Authorities,

23 DATED: this 8th day of December, 2021

24 BY: James H. Hayes
25 JAMES H. HAYES # 1175077
26 Defendant In Proper Personam



21-35424

ADDITIONAL FACTS OF THE CASE:

1 Comes now, James H. Hayes appellant, in
2 necessity, and hereby "MOVES" this honorable court for
3 an Expeditions ruling on issues of first impression
4 contained in the instant appeal as justice so
5 requires in favor of appellant. In support, the appellant
6 shows this Honorable court the following:

7 1. This is a very unique case for this Honorable
8 court were a dismissed charge at the conclusion of a preim
9 hearing for lack of probable cause, no corpus delicti, no mens
10 rea, and no slight nor marginal evidence that the offense of
11 attempt grand larceny had been committed and that the
12 appellant has committed it, has been resisted without a grand
13 jury indictment or motion for leave of the court to file by
14 affidavit, has resulted in a conviction by way of an
15 "Alford Plea" to an amended information in a guilty plea
16 agreement.

17 2. NRS 171.206 clearly states "if from the evidence
18 it appears to the magistrate that there is probable cause to
19 believe that an offense has been committed and that the
20 defendant has committed it, the magistrate shall forthwith
21 hold the defendant to answer in the district court." (Kinsley
22 v. Sheriff 487 P.2d 340; State v. White 330 P.3d 482). Here, at
23 conclusion of preliminary hearing no probable cause was
24 found for the charge of attempt grand larceny against
25 defendant and charge dismissed (see NRS 174.085(3)). That
26 being a layman at law the conviction and sentence is
27 facially illegal, as no public offense was committed by the
28 appellant.

1 In Thompson v. State (125 Nev. 807) Justice Cherry stated "If
2 the state files a criminal complaint or information that
3 dismisses the charge, and subsequently indicts the
4 defendant on the same charge or charges NRS 174.085(3)
5 comes into play to bar the subsequent prosecution for
6 the same offense that afforded appellant adequate
7 protection from state law double jeopardy. (Cress v. U.S. 1385 Ct. 7)

8 Accordingly, appellant has demonstrated that
9 his counsel's performance fell below an objective stand-
10 ard of reasonableness by failing to argue that appellant's
11 prosecution on the charge of attempted grand larceny
12 was barred by the application of NRS 174.085(3) and/or
13 NRS 178.562 that demonstrates a reasonable probability
14 of a different outcome.

15 1(b). Justice court ruling of probable cause to
16 believe that appellant committed burglary was mis-
17 placed. As appellant could not have committed burglary
18 as alleged by the state in its factual synopsis without
19 an intent when the state's intent of attempted grand
20 larceny was dismissed at conclusion of preliminary
21 hearing that made the burglary offense fatal and it
22 to must have been dismissed for lack of probable cause
23 and insufficient evidence. (see NRS 205.060; State v. Kirk
24 Patrick 94 Nev. 628; Simpson v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court 88
25 Nev. 654)

26 1(c) State clearly brought another prosecution
27 following dismissal of an action in violation of NRS

1 178.562 the dismissal of the charge of attempted grand
2 larceny without another pending vehicle for the prosecution
3 of that charge runs afoul of the provisions of NRS 178.
4 562(a) and barred further prosecution of the defendant
5 on that charge. Even if the order of dismissal was upon
6 motion of the district attorney providing for voluntary
7 dismissal, the prohibition of NRS 178.562(a) was applicable
8 and NRS 174.085(5)(A) was inapplicable as the state's
9 voluntary dismissal was at conclusion of preliminary
10 hearing and not before. Hence NRS 174.085(3) comes in
11 to play to deny prosecution of appellant on the charge
12 of attempted grand larceny, regardless of negotiations.

13 Accordingly, counsel's performance fell below an
14 objective standard of reasonableness by failing to
15 move to dismiss or seek a bill of particulars to the
16 information and amended information constituted
17 constitutionally deficient performance. Here the infor-
18 mation for the charge of Burglary was fatal as the
19 intent of attempted grand larceny had been dismissed
20 and intent is an essential element of Burglary and the
21 charge could not be proven beyond a reasonable doubt
22 as describe by the state in its filed factual synopsis
23 contained in the information. The charge of attempted
24 grand larceny in the state's filed amended information
25 was without probable cause and lack the essential
26 element of value of \$650.00 or greater so the charge
27 could not be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. (Shepard
28 v. Hicks 89 Nev. 78)

ADDITIONAL FACTS OF THE CASE:

2. District court failed to make the requisite individualized determination that it was proper that appellant be judged a habitual criminal as mandated by state law violated appellant's due process rights (Walker v. Jones 50 F.3d 670). Court had to properly understand the discretionary nature of habitual criminal adjudication and exercise its discretion (Hughes v. State 116 Nev. 327). As Nevada Supreme Court precedent clearly states that a prior conviction record for non-violent property crimes (credit card abuse; fraudulent possession of identification) though reprehensible simply does not warrant the harsh sanction available under the habitual criminality statute. Furthermore, the boilerplate clause is not sufficient notice of enhancement of penalty. Habitual criminality was not alleged in the state's filed amended information so there was no proper notice to the appellant that the state was seeking enhancement of penalty (Opler v. Boyle 368 U.S. 448) and no reasonable notice in violation of due process (Gray v. State 178 P.3d 154). Stacks v. Warden 476 P.2d 469 states "possibility of being charged as an habitual criminal should not weigh heavily if appellant were not guilty of the primary offense, since proof of guilt of the primary charge is a precondition to a subsequent habitual hearing." (Hodges v. State 78 P.3d 87)

Footnote: 1. Section 17 of the California Penal Code reads: A felony is a crime which is punishable with death or by imprisonment in the state prison. Every other crime is a misdemeanor. Appellant could not be sent to prison for offense. Conviction was one event, one trial. -5-

3. "No factual basis" (Alford v. Smith 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66711) THERE WAS NO FACTUAL BASIS FOR APPELLANT'S ALFORD PLEA TO THE CRIME OF ATTEMPTED GRAND LARCENY. IT THEREFORE WAS INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL FOR TRIAL COUNSEL TO ADVISE APPELLANT TO ENTER "ALFORD PLEA" TO THE CHARGE WHEN THERE WAS NO FACTUAL BASIS FOR SUCH A CHARGE ON THE UNDISPUTED FACTS PRESENTED AT PRELIMINARY HEARING. DUE PROCESS REQUIRES THAT APPELLANT FACTUAL GUILT OF THE CRIME CHARGED BE ESTABLISHED AND THE RECORD BEFORE THE JUDGE CONTAINS STRONG EVIDENCE OF GUILT (North Carolina v. Alford 400 U.S. 25). A plea cannot support a judgment of guilt unless it is voluntary and intelligent under the 14th amendment. THE U.S. SUPREME COURT HAS DETERMINED THAT A DEFENDANT'S PLEA CANNOT BE VOLUNTARY IN THE SENSE THAT IT CONSTITUTED AN INTELLIGENT ADMISSION THAT HE COMMITTED THE OFFENSE UNLESS THE DEFENDANT RECEIVED REAL NOTICE OF THE TRUE NATURE OF THE CHARGE, THE 1ST AND MOST UNIVERSALLY RECOGNIZED REQUIREMENT OF DUE PROCESS. HERE APPELLANT DID NOT UNDERSTAND NOT ONLY THE NATURE OF THE CHARGE AGAINST HIM BUT ALSO THAT HIS CONDUCT ACTUALLY FALLS WITHIN THE CHARGE. (741 F.2d 199). THE JUDGE FAILED TO DETERMINE THAT THE CONDUCT WHICH THE APPELLANT ADMITTED CONSTITUTES A PUBLIC OFFENSE (Mendez-Diaz v. U.S. 870 F.2d 417). BASED ON JESSONS V. DIMAZA (138 S.Ct. 1204) APPELLANT COULD NOT KNOWINGLY AND VOLUNTARILY PLEAD GUILTY TO SOMETHING THAT IS NOT A CRIME. HERE THE ALLEGED CONDUCT IN THE STATE'S FACTUAL SUPERSIS IN ITS EMENDED INFORMATION IS VARIOUS

1 to the state's factual synopsis in its criminal complaint
2 that was dismissed at the conclusion of the preliminary
3 hearing on the state's initiation for failure to satisfy
4 the elements of the statute that is a clear and convincing
5 showing that no public offense of attempted grand
6 larceny was committed by the appellant. There is
7 simply no indication on the record of the "Affidavit"
8 proceeding that appellant's plea can stand as an
9 intelligent, knowing, and voluntary admission of guilt
10 as to all elements of the crime with which he was
11 charged. (Nash v. Israel 707 F.2d 298)

12 4. Appellant never had retained or appointed
13 counsel for the completion of his direct appeal and
14 had trial counsel who filed fast-track statement
15 by threat of sanctions by this honorable court. Further
16 more trial counsel was dismissed in July 2019 and
17 the Order of affirmance was January 2020. Leaving
18 appellant completely without counsel for direct appeal
19 and no reply being filed on appellant's behalf.

20 5. All appellant claims were based on an
21 allegation that his "Affidavit" was involuntary and
22 unknowingly entered or that his "Affidavit" was
23 entered without effective assistance of counsel (see
24 Supplemental petition filed 4-7-2021 and Supplemental
25 petition addendum filed 4-14-21). Appellant followed
26 the court's instructions and filed the Supplemental
27 pleadings to address the specificity issue ordered by
28 district court (SEE EXHIBIT 200) Page 2

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE BY MAILING

I, JAMES H. HAYES, hereby certify, pursuant to NRCP 5(b), that on this 8th
day of DECEMBER, 2021, I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing, "Motion
to Expedite Appeal"

by placing document in a sealed pre-postage paid envelope and deposited said envelope in the
United State Mail addressed to the following:

SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA
OFFICE OF THE CLERK
202 S. CAESAR ST., STE 201
CARSON CITY, NV
89201

Attorney General of Nevada
100 NORTH CAESAR ST
CARSON CITY, NV
89201

CLERK COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY
200 LAUREL AVE
LAS VEGAS, NV
89155-7212

CC:FILE

DATED: this 8th day of DECEMBER, 2021.

James H. Hayes
JAMES H. HAYES # 1175072
/In Propria Personam
Post Office Box 208, S.D.C.C.
Indian Springs, Nevada 89018
IN FORMA PAUPERIS:

**DISTRICT COURT
CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA**

Writ of Habeas Corpus

COURT MINUTES

March 08, 2021

A-19-793315-W James Hayes, Plaintiff(s)
vs.
Nevada State of, Defendant(s)

March 08, 2021 8:30 AM Motion to Compel

HEARD BY: Trujillo, Monica

COURTROOM: RJC Courtroom 11C

COURT CLERK: Alan Castle

RECORDER: Rebeca Gomez

REPORTER:

PARTIES

PRESENT: Iscan, Ercan E Attorney
Nevada State of Defendant

JOURNAL ENTRIES

- After reviewing petition, Court determined Defendant needs to supplement his petition with specificity. Further, Court directed State to respond to Defendant's petition. Supplemental briefing schedule set and matter continued for decision. Defendant has until April 4, 2021 to supplement his petition; State has until May 5, 2021 to file a response.

5/10/21 8:30 a.m. Decision

EXHIBIT 2020