#### IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

STUART SACKLEY, AN INDIVIDUAL; DOUGLAS DASILVA, AN INDIVIDUAL; AND SACKLEY FAMILY TRUST, STUART SACKLEY AS TRUSTEE, A TRUST, Appellants, vs. ILAN GORODEZKI, AN INDIVIDUAL, Respondent.

Supreme Court Noah 31 2022 11:38 a.m. District Court Care 12 20 6 A Brown Clerk of Supreme Court

#### MOTION TO DISMISS APPEAL

Comes now Respondent, Ilan Gorodezki, by and through his attorney, Becky A. Pintar, and files this Motion to Dismiss respectfully requests that the appeal be dismissed. Pursuant to NRAP 27, Respondent hereby brings this Motion to Dismiss Appeal. The Motion to Dismiss is filed pursuant to NRAP 4 and 27.

### **MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES**

#### I. LEGAL ARGUMENT

#### A. The Appeal is Untimely

NRAP 4(a)(1) provides that, "a notice of appeal must be filed after entry of a written judgment or order, and no later than 30 days after the date that written notice of entry of the judgment or order appealed from is served." NRAP 4(a)(3), further provides that, "[a]judgment or order is entered for purposes of this Rule when it is signed by the judge or by the clerk, as the case may be, and filed with the clerk."

An appeal must be filed within 30 days after service of written notice of entry of the judgment or order appealed from. NRAP 4(a). This requirement is jurisdictional; an untimely appeal may not be considered. *Culinary Workers v. Haugen*, 76 Nev. 424, 357 P.2d 113 (1960); *Rogers v. Thatcher*, 70 Nev. 98, 255 P.2d 731 (1953).<sup>1</sup>

In this case, an amended findings of fact and conclusions of law was entered on April 9, 2021. *See* Notice of Entry, Exhibit 1, attached hereto.

#### B. The District Court entered an Order to Enlarge Time to File Appeal

On December 21, 2021, the district court granted a motion by Appellants to enlarge time to file an appeal until January 20, 2022. *See* Notice of Entry of Order, Exhibit 2, attached hereto. The district court has no authority to enlarge the time to file an appeal. Therefore, the district court order is ineffectual to allow Appellants additional time in which to file an appeal.

Therefore, it is respectfully requested that the appeal be dismissed.

DATED: January 31, 2022 PINTAR ALBISTON LLP

/s/ Becky A. Pintar

By:\_\_\_\_

Becky A. Pintar, Esq.

Nevada State Bar # 7867 6069 S. Fort Apache Road, #100 Las Vegas, Nevada 89148 Becky@PintarAlbiston.com Attorneys for Respondent

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Ross v. Giacomo, 97 Nev. 550, 553, 635 P.2d 298, 300 (1981)

### **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

The undersigned hereby certifies that on January 31, 2022, she served a copy of the foregoing **Motion to Dismiss** via Electronic Service to:

Spencer@SJLaw.vegas

/s/ Becky A. Pintar

PINTAR ALBISTON LLP

Spencer M. Judd, Esq.

**EXHIBIT 1** 

**Electronically Filed** 

Case Number: A-12-663960-C

# Spencer M. Judd, Esq.

# EXHIBIT 1 CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

The undersigned does hereby certify pursuant to Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure that on the 9th day of April, 2021 I served a copy of the attached <u>Amended Findings of Fact, Conclusions of</u>

Law, and Order via electronic service to all parties on the Odyssey E-Service Master List.

Becky A. Pintar, Esq.
Becky@pintaralbiston.com

/s/ Spencer M. Judd SPENCER M. JUDD, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 10095 325 South 3<sup>rd</sup> Street, #5 Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 Telephone: (702) 606-4357

Attorneys for Defendants/Counterclaimants

#### ELECTRONICALLY SERVED 3/30/2021 10:05 AM EXHIBIT 1

Electronically Filed 03/30/2021 10:05 AM CLERK OF THE COURT

**FFCL** 

#### **DISTRICT COURT**

#### **CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA**

ILAN GORODEZKI, an individual,	Case No.: A-12-663960-C
Plaintiff, v.	Dept. No.: 🗸 XXXII
STUART SACKLEY, an individual; DOUGLAS DaSilva, an individual; SACKLEY FAMILY TRUST, STUART SACKLEY AS TRUSTEE, a trust; NATIONAL TITLE CO., a Nevada corporation and DOES 1 through 100, and ROES 1 through 100, inclusive,	
Defendants.	

#### AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND ORDER

WHEREAS, this matter having been heard by this Court in a trial conducted March 16, 2015 through March 20, 2015; and Plaintiff being present and represented by his counsel, Becky A. Pintar, Esq.; and Defendants, Stuart Sackley, Douglas DaSilva, and the Sackley Family Trust, Stuart Sackley as Trustee being present and represented by their counsel, Spencer M. Judd, Esq. and Martin Muckleroy, Esq.; and the Court being fully advised in the premises, both as to the subject matter as well as the parties thereto, and good cause appearing therefore; and

WHEREAS, Plaintiff advised the Court prior to the commencement of the trial that it had agreed to dismiss all claims against Defendant National Title Co., with prejudice; and

WHEREAS, the Court having heard the evidence presented at the trial of this matter and having considered the pleadings and exhibits presented, and after due consideration of the record, evidence, and law, and being fully advised in the premises, makes its FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND ORDER in the matter as follows:

### EXHIBIT 1

#### I. <u>FINDINGS OF FACTS</u>

Tod Las Vegas, LLC, the successor m interest to the Sackley Family Trust (hereinafter, the 'Trust") is the owner of the property commonly known as the Tod Motor Motel, located at 1508 Las Vegas Boulevard South (hereinafter, the "Subject Property"). The Trust acquired the Subject Property through the purchase from different owners of various fractional interests, and at different times.

Real property commonly known as The Tod Motor Motel (hereinafter the "Tod" or the "Property") is located in the City of Las Vegas, Nevada and is comprised of the following Assessor Parcel Numbers: 162-03-210-053, 162-03-210-054, 162-03-210-055, 162-03-210-056 and 162-03-210-063.

Prior to the events that gave rise to the instant Complaint and Counterclaim, the Tod had been owned by various parties and was subject to one or more Trust Deeds. Clayton Mortgage, a mortgage broker on behalf of a group of investors holding ownership interests in a Trust Deed foreclosed on the Subject Property and transferred ownership to those fractional interest owners. Some of the owners agreed to create a limited liability company ("LLC") to hold their ownership interests of the Subject Property together with others similarly situated through their joint ownership of that LLC, LV BLVD Casino FF 370, LLC (hereinafter "LV BLVD"). Other fractional owners declined to transfer their interests in the Real Property to LV BLVD and instead held their fractional interests in their own proper names as tenants in common.

On or about March 24, 2011, Plaintiff Ilan Gorodezki (hereinafter, "Gorodezki" or "Plaintiff") executed a Purchase and Sale Agreement with L V BL VD, a fractional owner of the Subject Property (hereinafter "Purchase Agreement"). The Purchase Agreement offered

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by Plaintiff, contained the following language in paragraph 1.1 of Section 1: "The Agreement is not binding until final execution by Buyer and Seller. The Date of the Agreement shall be that date the final signer signs the Agreement."

Plaintiff, during the bench trial, produced the Agreement with the signature of the managing member of LV BLVD that purported to sell 100% of the property to Gorodezki. It was not signed by the other tenants in common, including blank signature lines for Frank V. Denaro, Nicholas J. Denaro, Melina Colucci, Carmine Colucci, Gerald Lizzo, and Denise Lizzo.

On or about March 24, 2011, Gorodezki and L V BL VD executed the First Amendment to Purchase and Sale Agreement. Again, the First Amendment was only executed by Gorodezki and LV BLVD, through Laura Lychock, a managing member.

On or about April 28, 2011, Gorodezki and L V BL VD executed the Second Amendment to Purchase and Sale Agreement. Yet again, the Second Amendment was only executed by Gorodezki and LV BLVD.

On or about June 29, 2011, LV BLVD executed the Third Amendment to Purchase and Sale Agreement. The Third Amendment was not signed by Gorodezki or any tenant in common. Three tenants in common, who were not a part of the L V BL VD, realizing that the purchase agreement with L V BL VD would not be finalized, through Arthur Petrie, a licensed Nevada realtor, contacted Defendant DaSilva to inquire as to whether he would be interested in purchasing their tenant in common interests in the Subject Property. The realtor represented those three tenants in common and negotiated a deal between them and DaSilva, the outcome of which was that DaSilva purchased their three tenants in common interests on or about July 1, 2011.

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Shortly after the Defendants acquired the tenant in common interest, DaSilva, on behalf of the Trust, made an offer to purchase the remaining ownership interests in the Subject Property from LV BLVD. LV BLVD refused to consider the offer, but did state that it would consider DaSilva's offer as a backup offer. During the trial, Lychock testified that LV BLVD never intended to do business with DaSilva and that it was prepared to move forward with Gorodezki.

On July 11, 2011, Defendant, Sackley Family Trust, filed suit against L V BLVD in the Eighth Judicial District Court, Case # A-11-644772-C. In its Complaint, the Trust alleged that L V BLVD had refused to consider more viable offers to purchase the property and instead attempted to coerce members of the LLC to approve the Gorodezki "offer" and petitioned the Court to appoint a receiver. The Trust also recorded a lis pendens in that proceeding.

Gorodezki filed with the Court on August 15, 2011 a supplement to a Counterclaim and Motion it had filed on August 8, 2011. It attached to that August 15, 2011 filing a Fourth Amendment to Purchase and Sale Agreement which was signed on August 15, 2011 representing its effective date as July 7, 2011; however, it references the July 11 lawsuit filed by the Trust, and the lis pendens recorded by the trust on July 13, 2011. Further, it limits the amount to be purchased to ONLY that amount owned by L V BL VD, and did not purport to be an offer for that tenant in common portion then owned by the Trust.

The Fourth Amendment to Purchase and Sale Agreement was drafted after the date that it was purportedly executed. On the bottom of page 4 of said amendment, it is identified that the amendment was drafted on 8-15-11, but Paragraph I of Page I has the following language - "entered into effective as of July 7, 2011."

Additionally, Paragraph 4 of Page 2, under the heading Disclosure of Lis Pendens, the following language appears - "Seller has disclosed that one of the Non-Selling TIC Owners has recorded a Notice of Lis Pendens." Paragraph 8, on Page 3 of the Amendment, under the heading "Title Review Period" gave a deadline to "notify Seller in writing of any defects" of August 5, 2011. The Notice of Lis Pendens was filed in that case over a month before the amendment was drafted.

LV BLVD entered into a Settlement Agreement with the Trust and agreed to sell the Tod to the Trust as part of the settlement. The purchase price agreed upon was \$1,400,000.00. Gorodezki did not join in the settlement. Rather, on or about October 14, 2011, Gorodezki filed a separate lawsuit in the Eighth Judicial District Court, Case # A-11-649986-C, wherein he sued for, among other things, "Specific Performance." A lis pendens was recorded by Gorodezki in conjunction with that case. The Court consolidated cases A644772 and A649986.

The Court eventually appointed a receiver to "conserve, preserve, protect, and administer the real property" which consisted of the Tod Motel.

LV BLVD filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection (Nevada Bankruptcy Court case number 12-14838-bam) - due in part to the competing claims of the Trust and Gorodezki. As a part of the bankruptcy, LV BLVD obtained an Order granting authority to sell the Property, including its interest and the interest of Defendants. A "Stalking Horse Bid" by Gorodezki was approved by the Bankruptcy Court to begin bidding at \$1,700,000.00. Sackley, who had a first right of refusal due to his tenant in common ownership interest, and after a bidding war with Gorodezki, made the high bid for \$2,100,000.00.

There is no evidence in the record that any party ever contemplated using NRS 645B.340 prior to the instant lawsuit.

#### II. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AS TO THE PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS

#### 1. Tortious Interference with Contractual Relationship

The Honorable Judge Jerry A. Wiese II, District Court Department 30 Judge, presided over this case initially. He considered a Motion for Summary Judgment brought by Defendants and made a finding, on August 11, 2014, that no binding contract existed between all of the parties as a result of the "Purchase Agreement" and that the original Purchase Agreement was not valid. The Court, at that time, found that the only possible contract giving Plaintiff an interest in the Subject Property was the Fourth Amendment to Purchase and Sale Agreement, which also invalidated the First, Second and Third Amendments to the Purchase and Sale Agreement.

"In an action for intentional interference with contractual relations, a plaintiff must establish: (I) a valid and existing contract; (2) the defendant's knowledge of the contract; (3) intentional acts intended or designed to disrupt the contractual relationship; (4) actual disruption of the contract; and (5) resulting damage." *J.J. Indus., LLC v. Bennett*, 119 Nev. 269, 274, 71P.3d1264, 1267 (2003) (citations omitted).

The Court finds that the Fourth Amendment, which was the only "Contract" at issue at trial, was not vaild or enforceable. The Fourth Amendment fails because it lacked elements required of a land purchase contract. The contract admitted at trial (Exhibit 9) had no exhibits. It had no description of the Property; there was no legal description, no property address, no tax i.d. number, or any other means of identifying the property to be purchased according to the "agreement." The Amendment purported to amend an agreement that this Court ruled, in August

2014, was invalid. The Amendment was drafted after the "effective date" listed for said amendment. The Court finds that the Fourth Amendment could not stand alone as an independent contract and was never effective as such.

The Court further finds that NRS 6458.340 could not have been used here to force other tenants in common to sell their interest in the Subject Property, as not all owners were 4 natural people, as required by the 2009 version of the statute. Additionally, the operative 2009 version of NRS 6458.340 requires that any action taken under the statute be in writing; the evidence is devoid of any writing that purports to invoke the powers of the statute.

As to the element of knowledge of the contractual relationship, Plaintiff failed to establish that Defendants knew of the August 14, 2011 Fourth Amended Purchase and Sale Agreement prior to filing the lawsuit in July of that year.

#### 2. Tortious Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage

To establish a claim for tortious interference with a prospective economic advantage a (1) party must establish: "(2) a prospective contractual relationship between the plaintiff and a third party; (2) the defendant's knowledge of this prospective relationship; (3) the intent to harm the plaintiff by preventing the relationship; (4) the absence of privilege or justification by the defendant; and, (5) actual harm to the plaintiff as a result of the defendant's conduct." *Las Vegas-Tonopah-Reno Stage Line, Inc. v. Gray Line Tours of S. Nevada*, 106 Nev. 283 287, 792 P.2d 386, 388 (1990) (citing *Leavitt v. Leisure Sports, Inc.*, 103 Nev. 81, 734 P.2d 1221 (1987)).

Plaintiff failed to establish the third and fourth element of the claim. As tenants in common the Defendants were legally justified in attempting to protect their position from being sold to Gorodezki. Plaintiff was not able to demonstrate that Defendants intended to harm the Plaintiff or that they were not justified in protecting their property interests. Without more evidence this claim must fail.

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#### 3. Attorneys' Fees as Special Damages

Given that the Court cannot find for the Plaintiff on his two intentional tort claims. the Court is unable to award attorneys' fees as special damages stemming from those claims as a matter of law.

#### III. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AS TO THE DEFENDANTS' COUNTERCLAIMS

#### 1. Tortious Interference with Contractual Relationship

Identical to the Plaintiff, the Defendants in their Counterclaim for intentional interference with contractual relations must establish: "(1) a valid and existing contract; (2) the [Plaintiff]'s knowledge of the contract; (3) intentional acts intended or designed to disrupt the contractual relationship; (4) actual disruption of the contract; and (5) resulting damage." *J.J. Indus., LLC*, 119 Nev. at 274, 71 P.3d at 1267.

The Defendants have failed to establish that Gorodezki knew that the Defendants and LV BLVD had an existing valid contract. Gorodezki always believed that he had a valid contract for the purchase of the property and that any agreement Defendants would have had would be invalid. Upon this good faith belief, Gorodezki initiated a lawsuit and demanded specific performance. Gorodezki did not attempt to stop the settlement in order to harm the Defendants but to protect his legal rights to enforce his contract with LV BLVD. The fact that he was incorrect about the legality of the purchase and sale agreement is not sufficient to establish this tort. Gorodezki acted aggressively, as did Defendants, in order to purchase the Tod. Filing the lawsuit is not sufficient to prove intentional disruption of the settlement agreement.

#### 2. Tortious Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage

To establish a the counterclaim for tortious interference with a prospective economic advantage the Defendants must establish: "(I) a prospective contractual relationship between the [defendants] and a third party; (2) the [plaintiff's] knowledge of this prospective relationship; (3)

EXHIBIT ?

the intent to harm the [defendants] by preventing the relationship; (4) the absence of privilege or justification by the [plaintiff]; and, (5) actual harm to the [defendants] as a result of the plaintiff's conduct." *Las Vegas-Tonopah-Reno Stage Line, Inc.*, 106 Nev. at 287, 792 P.2d at 388 (1990).

Defendants have failed to establish the existence of any prospective economic advantage and Plaintiff's knowledge of any alleged advantage. The evidence and testimony was clear that LV BLVD refused to do business with the Defendants. It was not until settlement discussions in the subsequent lawsuits that Defendants ever had a possible shot at acquiring all the interest in the Tod. LV BLVD, through its mortgage broker, stated to Gorodezki that it was not going to sell to the Defendants and that it planned on moving forward with Gorodezki. The same is evidenced by several failed attempts to amend the purchase and sale agreement with Gorodezki. The Court further finds that any legal action taken by Gorodezki was justified and protected by litigation privilege.

#### 3. Defamation Per Se

To prove a claim for defamation per se the plaintiff, or counterclaimant in this instance, must establish: (I) a false and defamatory communication; (2) an unprivileged publication to a third person; and (3) fault, amounting to at least negligence. See *Clark Cty. Sch. Dist. v. Virtual Educ. Software, Inc.*, 125 Nev. 374, 385, 213 P.3d 496, 503 (2009) (citing *Pope v. Motel 6*, 121 Nev. 307, 315, 114 P.3d 277, 282 (2005)). If the defamatory communication "imputes a 'person's lack of fitness for trade, business, or profession,' or tends to injure the plaintiff in his or her business, it is deemed defamation per se and damages are presumed." Id. (quoting *K-Mart Corp. v. Washington*, 109 Nev. 1180, 1192, 866 P.2d 274, 282 (1993)).

The Defendants failed to establish the first prong of this claim. The defamatory communication alleged here was the !is pendens filed by Gorodezki in Case# A-11-649986- C. The Court finds as a matter of law that the !is pendens was filed in good faith and was not filed

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with the intent to harm Defendants. Gorodezki believed, albeit incorrectly, that he had a valid contract to purchase the LV BLVD LLC interest. The Court cannot conclude that the lis pendens constitutes a false, malicious, or defamatory communication. Thus, the counterclaim for defamation must fail.

#### IV. ORDER

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Plaintiff's claims against Defendant National Title Co. are dismissed, with prejudice.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Plaintiff's claim against Defendants for intentional interference with contractual relations is without merit, and this Court finds in favor of the Defendants.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Plaintiff's claim against Defendants for attorney's fees as special damages is without merit, and this Court finds in favor of the Defendants.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Plaintiff's claim against Defendants for intentional interference with prospective economic advantage is without merit, and this Court finds in favor of the Defendants.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Defendants' counterclaim against Plaintiff for intentional interference with contractual relations is without merit, and this Court finds in favor of the Plaintiff.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Defendants' counterclaim against Plaintiff for intentional interference with prospective economic advantage is without merit, and this Court finds in favor of the Plaintiff.

1	IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Defendants'
2	counterclaim against Plaintiff for defamation per se is without merit, and this Court finds in
3	favor of the Plaintiff.
4	DATED this day of, 2020 ated this 30th day of March, 2021
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7	DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
8	<del>KENNETH C. CORY</del>
9	Christy Craig 23B 538 97CC 39D8 Christy Craig District Court Judge
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6	Ilan Gorodezki, Plaintiff(s)	CASE NO: A-12-663960-C	
7	VS.	DEPT. NO. Department 32	
8	Stuart Sackley, Defendant(s)		
9			
10	AUTOMATED	CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE	
11		ervice was generated by the Eighth Judicial District	
12		, Conclusions of Law and Judgment was served via the ecipients registered for e-Service on the above entitled	
13	case as listed below:		
14	Service Date: 3/30/2021		
15	"Spencer M. Judd, Esq.".	spencer@sjuddlaw.com	
16	"Tyler R. Andrews, Esq.".	andrewst@gtlaw.com	
17	Becky Pintar .	becky@pintaralbiston.com	
18	Bryan Albiston .	bryan@pintaralbiston.com	
19	Bryun Moiston.	oryuna pinararoiston.com	
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Spencer M. Judd, Esq.

**EXHIBIT 2** 

**Electronically Filed** 

Case Number: A-12-663960-C

# Spencer M. Judd, Esq.

EXHIBIT 2
<b>CERTIFICATE OF MAILING</b>

The undersigned does hereby certify pursuant to Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure that on the
20th day of December, 2021 a true and correct copy of the Notice of Entry of Order - Order
Granting Motion for Enlargement of Time was e-served on the parties listed below:

Becky@PintarAlbiston.com

Becky A. Pintar, Esq. Pintar & Albiston 6053 S. Fort Apache Rd., Suite 120 Las Vegas, NV 89148

> \s\ Spencer M. Judd SPENCER M. JUDD, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 10095 325 South 3<sup>rd</sup> Street, #5 Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 Telephone: (702) 606-4357 Attorneys for Defendants/Counterclaimants

### 12/14/2021 12:16 PM EXHIBIT 2

#### **ORD**

SPENCER M. JUDD, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 10095 325 So. 3<sup>rd</sup> Street, #5 Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 Telephone: (702) 606-4357

Facsimile: (702) 974-3146
Spencer@SJuddLaw.com
Attorneys for Appellants

# CLERK OF THE COURT

#### EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

#### **CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA**

STUART SACKLEY, an individual; DOUGLAS DASILVA, an individual; SACKLEY FAMILY TRUST, STUART SACKLEY as TRUSTEE, a trust;

Appellants,

VS.

ILAN GORODEZKI, an individual,

Case No.: A-12-663960-C

Dept. No.: XXXII

#### ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR ENLARGEMENT OF TIME

THIS MATTER having come before the Honorable CHRISTY CRAIG, District Court Judge, on the 10th day of November, 2021, IN CHAMBERS, and the Court having considered the facts and circumstances of this case, and the papers and pleadings on file herein; now therefore, the Court finds and orders as follows:

Pursuant to Nevada Rules of Appellate Procedure ("NRAP") 4(a), Appellants, through counsel, have demonstrated good cause for the enlargement of time within which to file their appeal.

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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, Appellants' Amended Motion for Enlargement of Time is GRANTED; Appellants shall have thirty (30) days from the filing of the instant Order within which to file their appeal pursuant to the Nevada Rules of Appellate Procedure.

**DATED** this \_\_\_\_\_ day of \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_, 2021.

Submitted by:

Spencer Judd

SPENCER M. JUDD, ESQ.
Nevada Bar No. 10095
325 So. 3<sup>rd</sup> Street, #5
Las Vegas, Nevada 89101
Attorney for Plaintiff

9 106 48B9 D800 risty Craig strict Court Judge

1	CSERV		
2	DISTRICT COURT		
3	CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA		
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5	Han Garadazki Blaintiff(s)	CASE NO: A-12-663960-C	
6	Ilan Gorodezki, Plaintiff(s)		
7	VS.	DEPT. NO. Department 32	
8	Stuart Sackley, Defendant(s)		
9			
10	AUTOMATED CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE		
11	This automated certificate of service was generated by the Eighth Judicial District Court. The foregoing Order Granting was served via the court's electronic eFile system to all		
12   13	recipients registered for e-Service on the		
14	Service Date: 12/14/2021		
15	"Spencer M. Judd, Esq.".	spencer@sjuddlaw.com	
16	"Tyler R. Andrews, Esq." .	andrewst@gtlaw.com	
17	Becky Pintar .	becky@pintaralbiston.com	
18	Bryan Albiston .	bryan@pintaralbiston.com	
19	Spencer Judd	spencer@sjlaw.vegas	
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24	Becky Pintar	becky@pintaralbiston.com	
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