

EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT CLERK OF THE COURT

REGIONAL JUSTICE CENTER 200 LEWIS AVENUE, 3rd FI. LAS VEGAS, NEVADA 89155-1160 (702) 671-4554 Electronically Filed Feb 16 2022 10:58 a.m. Elizabeth A. Brown Clerk of Supreme Court

Steven D. Grierson Clerk of the Court Anntoinette Naumec-Miller Court Division Administrator

February 16, 2022

Elizabeth A. Brown Clerk of the Court 201 South Carson Street, Suite 201 Carson City, Nevada 89701-4702

RE: ILAN GORODEZKI vs. STUART SACKLEY; DOUGLAS DA SILVA; SACKLEY FAMILY TRUST, STUART SACKLEY AS TRUSTEE; NATIONAL TITLE CO.

S.C. CASE: 84083 D.C. CASE: A-12-663960-C

Dear Ms. Brown:

In response to the e-mail dated February 16, 2022, enclosed is a certified copy of the Amended Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Order filed March 30, 2021 and the Notice of Entry of Order filed April 9, 2021 in the above referenced case. If you have any questions regarding this matter, please do not hesitate to contact me at (702) 671-0512.

Sincerely, STEVEN D. GRIERSON, CLERK OF THE COURT

/s/ Heather Ungermann
Heather Ungermann, Deputy Clerk

Electronically Filed 03/30/2021 10:05 AM CLERK OF THE COURT

FFCL

DISTRICT COURT

CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

ILAN GORODEZKI, an individual,

Plaintiff,
v.

STUART SACKLEY, an individual;
DOUGLAS DaSilva, an individual;
SACKLEY FAMILY TRUST, STUART
SACKLEY AS TRUSTEE, a trust;
NATIONAL TITLE CO., a Nevada corporation and DOES 1 through 100, and ROES 1 through 100, inclusive,

Defendants.

AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND ORDER

WHEREAS, this matter having been heard by this Court in a trial conducted March 16, 2015 through March 20, 2015; and Plaintiff being present and represented by his counsel, Becky A. Pintar, Esq.; and Defendants, Stuart Sackley, Douglas DaSilva, and the Sackley Family Trust, Stuart Sackley as Trustee being present and represented by their counsel, Spencer M. Judd, Esq. and Martin Muckleroy, Esq.; and the Court being fully advised in the premises, both as to the subject matter as well as the parties thereto, and good cause appearing therefore; and

WHEREAS, Plaintiff advised the Court prior to the commencement of the trial that it had agreed to dismiss all claims against Defendant National Title Co., with prejudice; and

WHEREAS, the Court having heard the evidence presented at the trial of this matter and having considered the pleadings and exhibits presented, and after due consideration of the record, evidence, and law, and being fully advised in the premises, makes its FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND ORDER in the matter as follows:

I. <u>FINDINGS OF FACTS</u>

Tod Las Vegas, LLC, the successor m interest to the Sackley Family Trust (hereinafter, the 'Trust'') is the owner of the property commonly known as the Tod Motor Motel, located at 1508 Las Vegas Boulevard South (hereinafter, the "Subject Property"). The Trust acquired the Subject Property through the purchase from different owners of various fractional interests, and at different times.

Real property commonly known as The Tod Motor Motel (hereinafter the "Tod" or the "Property") is located in the City of Las Vegas, Nevada and is comprised of the following Assessor Parcel Numbers: 162-03-210-053, 162-03-210-054, 162-03-210-055, 162-03-210-056 and 162-03-210-063.

Prior to the events that gave rise to the instant Complaint and Counterclaim, the Tod had been owned by various parties and was subject to one or more Trust Deeds. Clayton Mortgage, a mortgage broker on behalf of a group of investors holding ownership interests in a Trust Deed foreclosed on the Subject Property and transferred ownership to those fractional interest owners. Some of the owners agreed to create a limited liability company ("LLC") to hold their ownership interests of the Subject Property together with others similarly situated through their joint ownership of that LLC, LV BLVD Casino FF 370, LLC (hereinafter "LV BLVD"). Other fractional owners declined to transfer their interests in the Real Property to LV BLVD and instead held their fractional interests in their own proper names as tenants in common.

On or about March 24, 2011, Plaintiff Ilan Gorodezki (hereinafter, "Gorodezki" or "Plaintiff') executed a Purchase and Sale Agreement with L V BL VD, a fractional owner of the Subject Property (hereinafter "Purchase Agreement"). The Purchase Agreement offered

by Plaintiff, contained the following language in paragraph 1.1 of Section 1: "The Agreement is not binding until final execution by Buyer and Seller. The Date of the Agreement shall be that date the final signer signs the Agreement."

Plaintiff, during the bench trial, produced the Agreement with the signature of the managing member of LV BLVD that purported to sell 100% of the property to Gorodezki. It was not signed by the other tenants in common, including blank signature lines for Frank V. Denaro, Nicholas J. Denaro, Melina Colucci, Carmine Colucci, Gerald Lizzo, and Denise Lizzo.

On or about March 24, 2011, Gorodezki and L V BL VD executed the First Amendment to Purchase and Sale Agreement. Again, the First Amendment was only executed by Gorodezki and LV BLVD, through Laura Lychock, a managing member.

On or about April 28, 2011, Gorodezki and L V BL VD executed the Second Amendment to Purchase and Sale Agreement. Yet again, the Second Amendment was only executed by Gorodezki and LV BLVD.

On or about June 29, 2011, LV BLVD executed the Third Amendment to Purchase and Sale Agreement. The Third Amendment was not signed by Gorodezki or any tenant in common. Three tenants in common, who were not a part of the L V BL VD, realizing that the purchase agreement with L V BL VD would not be finalized, through Arthur Petrie, a licensed Nevada realtor, contacted Defendant DaSilva to inquire as to whether he would be interested in purchasing their tenant in common interests in the Subject Property. The realtor represented those three tenants in common and negotiated a deal between them and DaSilva, the outcome of which was that DaSilva purchased their three tenants in common interests on or about July 1, 2011.

Shortly after the Defendants acquired the tenant in common interest, DaSilva, on behalf of the Trust, made an offer to purchase the remaining ownership interests in the Subject Property from LV BLVD. LV BLVD refused to consider the offer, but did state that it would consider DaSilva's offer as a backup offer. During the trial, Lychock testified that LV BLVD never intended to do business with DaSilva and that it was prepared to move forward with Gorodezki.

On July 11, 2011, Defendant, Sackley Family Trust, filed suit against L V BLVD in the Eighth Judicial District Court, Case # A-11-644772-C. In its Complaint, the Trust alleged that L V BLVD had refused to consider more viable offers to purchase the property and instead attempted to coerce members of the LLC to approve the Gorodezki "offer" and petitioned the Court to appoint a receiver. The Trust also recorded a lis pendens in that proceeding.

Gorodezki filed with the Court on August 15, 2011 a supplement to a Counterclaim and Motion it had filed on August 8, 2011. It attached to that August 15, 2011 filing a Fourth Amendment to Purchase and Sale Agreement which was signed on August 15, 2011 representing its effective date as July 7, 2011; however, it references the July 11 lawsuit filed by the Trust, and the lis pendens recorded by the trust on July 13, 2011. Further, it limits the amount to be purchased to ONLY that amount owned by L V BL VD, and did not purport to be an offer for that tenant in common portion then owned by the Trust.

The Fourth Amendment to Purchase and Sale Agreement was drafted after the date that it was purportedly executed. On the bottom of page 4 of said amendment, it is identified that the amendment was drafted on 8-15-11, but Paragraph I of Page I has the following language - "entered into effective as of July 7, 2011."

Additionally, Paragraph 4 of Page 2, under the heading Disclosure of Lis Pendens, the following language appears - "Seller has disclosed that one of the Non-Selling TIC Owners has recorded a Notice of Lis Pendens." Paragraph 8, on Page 3 of the Amendment, under the heading "Title Review Period" gave a deadline to "notify Seller in writing of any defects" of August 5, 2011. The Notice of Lis Pendens was filed in that case over a month before the amendment was drafted.

LV BLVD entered into a Settlement Agreement with the Trust and agreed to sell the Tod to the Trust as part of the settlement. The purchase price agreed upon was \$1,400,000.00. Gorodezki did not join in the settlement. Rather, on or about October 14, 2011, Gorodezki filed a separate lawsuit in the Eighth Judicial District Court, Case # A-11-649986-C, wherein he sued for, among other things, "Specific Performance." A lis pendens was recorded by Gorodezki in conjunction with that case. The Court consolidated cases A644772 and A649986.

The Court eventually appointed a receiver to "conserve, preserve, protect, and administer the real property" which consisted of the Tod Motel.

LV BLVD filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection (Nevada Bankruptcy Court case number 12-14838-bam) - due in part to the competing claims of the Trust and Gorodezki. As a part of the bankruptcy, LV BLVD obtained an Order granting authority to sell the Property, including its interest and the interest of Defendants. A "Stalking Horse Bid" by Gorodezki was approved by the Bankruptcy Court to begin bidding at \$1,700,000.00. Sackley, who had a first right of refusal due to his tenant in common ownership interest, and after a bidding war with Gorodezki, made the high bid for \$2,100,000.00.

13 14 15

12

17 18

16

19 20

21

22

23 24

25

26 27

28

There is no evidence in the record that any party ever contemplated using NRS 645B.340 prior to the instant lawsuit.

II. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AS TO THE PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS

1. Tortious Interference with Contractual Relationship

The Honorable Judge Jerry A. Wiese II, District Court Department 30 Judge, presided over this case initially. He considered a Motion for Summary Judgment brought by Defendants and made a finding, on August 11, 2014, that no binding contract existed between all of the parties as a result of the "Purchase Agreement" and that the original Purchase Agreement was not valid. The Court, at that time, found that the only possible contract giving Plaintiff an interest in the Subject Property was the Fourth Amendment to Purchase and Sale Agreement, which also invalidated the First, Second and Third Amendments to the Purchase and Sale Agreement.

"In an action for intentional interference with contractual relations, a plaintiff must establish: (I) a valid and existing contract; (2) the defendant's knowledge of the contract; (3) intentional acts intended or designed to disrupt the contractual relationship; (4) actual disruption of the contract; and (5) resulting damage." J.J. Indus., LLC v. Bennett, 119 Nev. 269, 274, 71P.3d1264, 1267 (2003) (citations omitted).

The Court finds that the Fourth Amendment, which was the only "Contract" at issue at trial, was not vaild or enforceable. The Fourth Amendment fails because it lacked elements required of a land purchase contract. The contract admitted at trial (Exhibit 9) had no exhibits. It had no description of the Property; there was no legal description, no property address, no tax i.d. number, or any other means of identifying the property to be purchased according to the "agreement." The Amendment purported to amend an agreement that this Court ruled, in August

2014, was invalid. The Amendment was drafted after the "effective date" listed for said amendment. The Court finds that the Fourth Amendment could not stand alone as an independent contract and was never effective as such.

The Court further finds that NRS 6458.340 could not have been used here to force other tenants in common to sell their interest in the Subject Property, as not all owners were 4 natural people, as required by the 2009 version of the statute. Additionally, the operative 2009 version of NRS 6458.340 requires that any action taken under the statute be in writing; the evidence is devoid of any writing that purports to invoke the powers of the statute.

As to the element of knowledge of the contractual relationship, Plaintiff failed to establish that Defendants knew of the August 14, 2011 Fourth Amended Purchase and Sale Agreement prior to filing the lawsuit in July of that year.

2. Tortious Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage

To establish a claim for tortious interference with a prospective economic advantage a (1) party must establish: "(1) a prospective contractual relationship between the plaintiff and a third party; (2) the defendant's knowledge of this prospective relationship; (3) the intent to harm the plaintiff by preventing the relationship; (4) the absence of privilege or justification by the defendant; and, (5) actual harm to the plaintiff as a result of the defendant's conduct." Las Vegas-Tonopah-Reno Stage Line, Inc. v. Gray Line Tours of S. Nevada, 106 Nev. 283 287, 792 P.2d 386, 388 (1990) (citing Leavitt v. Leisure Sports, Inc., 103 Nev. 81, 734 P.2d 1221 (1987)).

Plaintiff failed to establish the third and fourth element of the claim. As tenants in common the Defendants were legally justified in attempting to protect their position from being sold to Gorodezki. Plaintiff was not able to demonstrate that Defendants intended to harm the Plaintiff or that they were not justified in protecting their property interests. Without more evidence this claim must fail.

3. Attorneys' Fees as Special Damages

Given that the Court cannot find for the Plaintiff on his two intentional tort claims. the Court is unable to award attorneys' fees as special damages stemming from those claims as a matter of law.

III. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AS TO THE DEFENDANTS' COUNTERCLAIMS

1. Tortious Interference with Contractual Relationship

Identical to the Plaintiff, the Defendants in their Counterclaim for intentional interference with contractual relations must establish: "(1) a valid and existing contract; (2) the [Plaintiff]'s knowledge of the contract; (3) intentional acts intended or designed to disrupt the contractual relationship; (4) actual disruption of the contract; and (5) resulting damage." *J.J. Indus., LLC*, 119 Nev. at 274, 71 P.3d at 1267.

The Defendants have failed to establish that Gorodezki knew that the Defendants and LV BLVD had an existing valid contract. Gorodezki always believed that he had a valid contract for the purchase of the property and that any agreement Defendants would have had would be invalid. Upon this good faith belief, Gorodezki initiated a lawsuit and demanded specific performance. Gorodezki did not attempt to stop the settlement in order to harm the Defendants but to protect his legal rights to enforce his contract with LV BLVD. The fact that he was incorrect about the legality of the purchase and sale agreement is not sufficient to establish this tort. Gorodezki acted aggressively, as did Defendants, in order to purchase the Tod. Filing the lawsuit is not sufficient to prove intentional disruption of the settlement agreement.

2. Tortious Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage

To establish a the counterclaim for tortious interference with a prospective economic advantage the Defendants must establish: "(I) a prospective contractual relationship between the [defendants] and a third party; (2) the [plaintiff's] knowledge of this prospective relationship; (3)

the intent to harm the [defendants] by preventing the relationship; (4) the absence of privilege or justification by the [plaintiff]; and, (5) actual harm to the [defendants] as a result of the plaintiff's conduct." *Las Vegas-Tonopah-Reno Stage Line, Inc.*, 106 Nev. at 287, 792 P.2d at 388 (1990).

Defendants have failed to establish the existence of any prospective economic advantage and Plaintiff's knowledge of any alleged advantage. The evidence and testimony was clear that LV BLVD refused to do business with the Defendants. It was not until settlement discussions in the subsequent lawsuits that Defendants ever had a possible shot at acquiring all the interest in the Tod. LV BLVD, through its mortgage broker, stated to Gorodezki that it was not going to sell to the Defendants and that it planned on moving forward with Gorodezki. The same is evidenced by several failed attempts to amend the purchase and sale agreement with Gorodezki. The Court further finds that any legal action taken by Gorodezki was justified and protected by litigation privilege.

3. Defamation Per Se

To prove a claim for defamation per se the plaintiff, or counterclaimant in this instance, must establish: (I) a false and defamatory communication; (2) an unprivileged publication to a third person; and (3) fault, amounting to at least negligence. See *Clark Cty. Sch. Dist. v. Virtual Educ. Software, Inc.*, 125 Nev. 374, 385, 213 P.3d 496, 503 (2009) (citing *Pope v. Motel 6*, 121 Nev. 307, 315, 114 P.3d 277, 282 (2005)). If the defamatory communication "imputes a 'person's lack of fitness for trade, business, or profession,' or tends to injure the plaintiff in his or her business, it is deemed defamation per se and damages are presumed." Id. (quoting *K-Mart Corp. v. Washington*, 109 Nev. 1180, 1192, 866 P.2d 274, 282 (1993)).

The Defendants failed to establish the first prong of this claim. The defamatory communication alleged here was the !is pendens filed by Gorodezki in Case# A-11-649986- C. The Court finds as a matter of law that the !is pendens was filed in good faith and was not filed

with the intent to harm Defendants. Gorodezki believed, albeit incorrectly, that he had a valid contract to purchase the LV BLVD LLC interest. The Court cannot conclude that the lis pendens constitutes a false, malicious, or defamatory communication. Thus, the counterclaim for defamation must fail.

IV. ORDER

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Plaintiff's claims against Defendant National Title Co. are dismissed, with prejudice.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Plaintiff's claim against Defendants for intentional interference with contractual relations is without merit, and this Court finds in favor of the Defendants.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Plaintiff's claim against Defendants for attorney's fees as special damages is without merit, and this Court finds in favor of the Defendants.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Plaintiff's claim against Defendants for intentional interference with prospective economic advantage is without merit, and this Court finds in favor of the Defendants.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Defendants' counterclaim against Plaintiff for intentional interference with contractual relations is without merit, and this Court finds in favor of the Plaintiff.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Defendants' counterclaim against Plaintiff for intentional interference with prospective economic advantage is without merit, and this Court finds in favor of the Plaintiff.

1	IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Defendants'
2	counterclaim against Plaintiff for defamation per se is without merit, and this Court finds in
3	favor of the Plaintiff.
4	DATED this day of, 20 Pated this 30th day of March, 2021
5	
6	
7	DISTRICT COLUMN HUDGE
8	DISTRICT COURT JUDGE KENNETH C. CORY
9	Christy Craig 23B 538 97CC 39D8 Christy Craig
10	Christy Craig District Court Judge
11	
12	
13	
14	
15	
16	
17	
18	
19	
20	February 16, 2022
21	TATES OF
22	S OF THE 2
23 24	JUDICIAL OF DISTRICT
25	CERTIFIED COPY
26	CERTIFIED COPY
27	ELECTRONIC SEAL (NRS 1.190(3))

A-12-663960-C

1 **CSERV** 2 DISTRICT COURT 3 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 4 5 CASE NO: A-12-663960-C Ilan Gorodezki, Plaintiff(s) 6 DEPT. NO. Department 32 VS. 7 8 Stuart Sackley, Defendant(s) 9 10 **AUTOMATED CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE** 11 This automated certificate of service was generated by the Eighth Judicial District Court. The foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment was served via the 12 court's electronic eFile system to all recipients registered for e-Service on the above entitled 13 case as listed below: 14 Service Date: 3/30/2021 15 "Spencer M. Judd, Esq.". spencer@sjuddlaw.com 16 "Tyler R. Andrews, Esq.". andrewst@gtlaw.com 17 Becky Pintar. becky@pintaralbiston.com 18 Bryan Albiston. bryan@pintaralbiston.com 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

Spencer M. Judd, Esq.

Electronically Filed

Spencer M. Judd, Esq.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24

25

26

27

28

The undersigned does hereby certify pursuant to Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure that on the 9th day of April, 2021 I served a copy of the attached <u>Amended Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order</u> via electronic service to all parties on the Odyssey E-Service Master List.

Becky A. Pintar, Esq.

Becky@pintaralbiston.com

/s/ Spencer M. Judd SPENCER M. JUDD, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 10095 325 South 3rd Street, #5 Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 Telephone: (702) 606-4357

Attorneys for Defendants/Counterclaimants

ELECTRONICALLY SERVED 3/30/2021 10:05 AM

Electronically Filed 03/30/2021 10:05 AM Alcus Account CLERK OF THE COURT

FFCL

DISTRICT COURT

CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

ILAN GORODEZKI, an individual,	Case No.: A-12-663960-C
Plaintiff, v.	Dept. No.: 🖍 XXXII
STUART SACKLEY, an individual; DOUGLAS DaSilva, an individual; SACKLEY FAMILY TRUST, STUART SACKLEY AS TRUSTEE, a trust; NATIONAL TITLE CO., a Nevada corporation and DOES 1 through 100, and ROES 1 through 100, inclusive,	
Defendants.	

AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND ORDER

WHEREAS, this matter having been heard by this Court in a trial conducted March 16, 2015 through March 20, 2015; and Plaintiff being present and represented by his counsel, Becky A. Pintar, Esq.; and Defendants, Stuart Sackley, Douglas DaSilva, and the Sackley Family Trust, Stuart Sackley as Trustee being present and represented by their counsel, Spencer M. Judd, Esq. and Martin Muckleroy, Esq.; and the Court being fully advised in the premises, both as to the subject matter as well as the parties thereto, and good cause appearing therefore; and

WHEREAS, Plaintiff advised the Court prior to the commencement of the trial that it had agreed to dismiss all claims against Defendant National Title Co., with prejudice; and

WHEREAS, the Court having heard the evidence presented at the trial of this matter and having considered the pleadings and exhibits presented, and after due consideration of the record, evidence, and law, and being fully advised in the premises, makes its FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND ORDER in the matter as follows:

I. <u>FINDINGS OF FACTS</u>

Tod Las Vegas, LLC, the successor m interest to the Sackley Family Trust (hereinafter, the 'Trust'') is the owner of the property commonly known as the Tod Motor Motel, located at 1508 Las Vegas Boulevard South (hereinafter, the "Subject Property"). The Trust acquired the Subject Property through the purchase from different owners of various fractional interests, and at different times.

Real property commonly known as The Tod Motor Motel (hereinafter the "Tod" or the "Property") is located in the City of Las Vegas, Nevada and is comprised of the following Assessor Parcel Numbers: 162-03-210-053, 162-03-210-054, 162-03-210-055, 162-03-210-056 and 162-03-210-063.

Prior to the events that gave rise to the instant Complaint and Counterclaim, the Tod had been owned by various parties and was subject to one or more Trust Deeds. Clayton Mortgage, a mortgage broker on behalf of a group of investors holding ownership interests in a Trust Deed foreclosed on the Subject Property and transferred ownership to those fractional interest owners. Some of the owners agreed to create a limited liability company ("LLC") to hold their ownership interests of the Subject Property together with others similarly situated through their joint ownership of that LLC, LV BLVD Casino FF 370, LLC (hereinafter "LV BLVD"). Other fractional owners declined to transfer their interests in the Real Property to LV BLVD and instead held their fractional interests in their own proper names as tenants in common.

On or about March 24, 2011, Plaintiff Ilan Gorodezki (hereinafter, "Gorodezki" or "Plaintiff') executed a Purchase and Sale Agreement with L V BL VD, a fractional owner of the Subject Property (hereinafter "Purchase Agreement"). The Purchase Agreement offered

by Plaintiff, contained the following language in paragraph 1.1 of Section 1: "The Agreement is not binding until final execution by Buyer and Seller. The Date of the Agreement shall be that date the final signer signs the Agreement."

Plaintiff, during the bench trial, produced the Agreement with the signature of the managing member of LV BLVD that purported to sell 100% of the property to Gorodezki. It was not signed by the other tenants in common, including blank signature lines for Frank V. Denaro, Nicholas J. Denaro, Melina Colucci, Carmine Colucci, Gerald Lizzo, and Denise Lizzo.

On or about March 24, 2011, Gorodezki and L V BL VD executed the First Amendment to Purchase and Sale Agreement. Again, the First Amendment was only executed by Gorodezki and LV BLVD, through Laura Lychock, a managing member.

On or about April 28, 2011, Gorodezki and L V BL VD executed the Second Amendment to Purchase and Sale Agreement. Yet again, the Second Amendment was only executed by Gorodezki and LV BLVD.

On or about June 29, 2011, LV BLVD executed the Third Amendment to Purchase and Sale Agreement. The Third Amendment was not signed by Gorodezki or any tenant in common. Three tenants in common, who were not a part of the L V BL VD, realizing that the purchase agreement with L V BL VD would not be finalized, through Arthur Petrie, a licensed Nevada realtor, contacted Defendant DaSilva to inquire as to whether he would be interested in purchasing their tenant in common interests in the Subject Property. The realtor represented those three tenants in common and negotiated a deal between them and DaSilva, the outcome of which was that DaSilva purchased their three tenants in common interests on or about July 1, 2011.

Shortly after the Defendants acquired the tenant in common interest, DaSilva, on behalf of the Trust, made an offer to purchase the remaining ownership interests in the Subject Property from LV BLVD. LV BLVD refused to consider the offer, but did state that it would consider DaSilva's offer as a backup offer. During the trial, Lychock testified that LV BLVD never intended to do business with DaSilva and that it was prepared to move forward with Gorodezki.

On July 11, 2011, Defendant, Sackley Family Trust, filed suit against L V BLVD in the Eighth Judicial District Court, Case # A-11-644772-C. In its Complaint, the Trust alleged that L V BLVD had refused to consider more viable offers to purchase the property and instead attempted to coerce members of the LLC to approve the Gorodezki "offer" and petitioned the Court to appoint a receiver. The Trust also recorded a lis pendens in that proceeding.

Gorodezki filed with the Court on August 15, 2011 a supplement to a Counterclaim and Motion it had filed on August 8, 2011. It attached to that August 15, 2011 filing a Fourth Amendment to Purchase and Sale Agreement which was signed on August 15, 2011 representing its effective date as July 7, 2011; however, it references the July 11 lawsuit filed by the Trust, and the lis pendens recorded by the trust on July 13, 2011. Further, it limits the amount to be purchased to ONLY that amount owned by L V BL VD, and did not purport to be an offer for that tenant in common portion then owned by the Trust.

The Fourth Amendment to Purchase and Sale Agreement was drafted after the date that it was purportedly executed. On the bottom of page 4 of said amendment, it is identified that the amendment was drafted on 8-15-11, but Paragraph I of Page I has the following language - "entered into effective as of July 7, 2011."

Additionally, Paragraph 4 of Page 2, under the heading Disclosure of Lis Pendens, the following language appears - "Seller has disclosed that one of the Non-Selling TIC Owners has recorded a Notice of Lis Pendens." Paragraph 8, on Page 3 of the Amendment, under the heading "Title Review Period" gave a deadline to "notify Seller in writing of any defects" of August 5, 2011. The Notice of Lis Pendens was filed in that case over a month before the amendment was drafted.

LV BLVD entered into a Settlement Agreement with the Trust and agreed to sell the Tod to the Trust as part of the settlement. The purchase price agreed upon was \$1,400,000.00. Gorodezki did not join in the settlement. Rather, on or about October 14, 2011, Gorodezki filed a separate lawsuit in the Eighth Judicial District Court, Case # A-11-649986-C, wherein he sued for, among other things, "Specific Performance." A lis pendens was recorded by Gorodezki in conjunction with that case. The Court consolidated cases A644772 and A649986.

The Court eventually appointed a receiver to "conserve, preserve, protect, and administer the real property" which consisted of the Tod Motel.

LV BLVD filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection (Nevada Bankruptcy Court case number 12-14838-bam) - due in part to the competing claims of the Trust and Gorodezki. As a part of the bankruptcy, LV BLVD obtained an Order granting authority to sell the Property, including its interest and the interest of Defendants. A "Stalking Horse Bid" by Gorodezki was approved by the Bankruptcy Court to begin bidding at \$1,700,000.00. Sackley, who had a first right of refusal due to his tenant in common ownership interest, and after a bidding war with Gorodezki, made the high bid for \$2,100,000.00.

13 14 15

12

17 18

16

19 20

21

22

23 24

25

26 27

28

There is no evidence in the record that any party ever contemplated using NRS 645B.340 prior to the instant lawsuit.

II. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AS TO THE PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS

1. Tortious Interference with Contractual Relationship

The Honorable Judge Jerry A. Wiese II, District Court Department 30 Judge, presided over this case initially. He considered a Motion for Summary Judgment brought by Defendants and made a finding, on August 11, 2014, that no binding contract existed between all of the parties as a result of the "Purchase Agreement" and that the original Purchase Agreement was not valid. The Court, at that time, found that the only possible contract giving Plaintiff an interest in the Subject Property was the Fourth Amendment to Purchase and Sale Agreement, which also invalidated the First, Second and Third Amendments to the Purchase and Sale Agreement.

"In an action for intentional interference with contractual relations, a plaintiff must establish: (I) a valid and existing contract; (2) the defendant's knowledge of the contract; (3) intentional acts intended or designed to disrupt the contractual relationship; (4) actual disruption of the contract; and (5) resulting damage." J.J. Indus., LLC v. Bennett, 119 Nev. 269, 274, 71P.3d1264, 1267 (2003) (citations omitted).

The Court finds that the Fourth Amendment, which was the only "Contract" at issue at trial, was not vaild or enforceable. The Fourth Amendment fails because it lacked elements required of a land purchase contract. The contract admitted at trial (Exhibit 9) had no exhibits. It had no description of the Property; there was no legal description, no property address, no tax i.d. number, or any other means of identifying the property to be purchased according to the "agreement." The Amendment purported to amend an agreement that this Court ruled, in August

2014, was invalid. The Amendment was drafted after the "effective date" listed for said amendment. The Court finds that the Fourth Amendment could not stand alone as an independent contract and was never effective as such.

The Court further finds that NRS 6458.340 could not have been used here to force other tenants in common to sell their interest in the Subject Property, as not all owners were 4 natural people, as required by the 2009 version of the statute. Additionally, the operative 2009 version of NRS 6458.340 requires that any action taken under the statute be in writing; the evidence is devoid of any writing that purports to invoke the powers of the statute.

As to the element of knowledge of the contractual relationship, Plaintiff failed to establish that Defendants knew of the August 14, 2011 Fourth Amended Purchase and Sale Agreement prior to filing the lawsuit in July of that year.

2. Tortious Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage

To establish a claim for tortious interference with a prospective economic advantage a (1) party must establish: "(1) a prospective contractual relationship between the plaintiff and a third party; (2) the defendant's knowledge of this prospective relationship; (3) the intent to harm the plaintiff by preventing the relationship; (4) the absence of privilege or justification by the defendant; and, (5) actual harm to the plaintiff as a result of the defendant's conduct." Las Vegas-Tonopah-Reno Stage Line, Inc. v. Gray Line Tours of S. Nevada, 106 Nev. 283 287, 792 P.2d 386, 388 (1990) (citing Leavitt v. Leisure Sports, Inc., 103 Nev. 81, 734 P.2d 1221 (1987)).

Plaintiff failed to establish the third and fourth element of the claim. As tenants in common the Defendants were legally justified in attempting to protect their position from being sold to Gorodezki. Plaintiff was not able to demonstrate that Defendants intended to harm the Plaintiff or that they were not justified in protecting their property interests. Without more evidence this claim must fail.

3. Attorneys' Fees as Special Damages

Given that the Court cannot find for the Plaintiff on his two intentional tort claims. the Court is unable to award attorneys' fees as special damages stemming from those claims as a matter of law.

III. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AS TO THE DEFENDANTS' COUNTERCLAIMS

1. Tortious Interference with Contractual Relationship

Identical to the Plaintiff, the Defendants in their Counterclaim for intentional interference with contractual relations must establish: "(1) a valid and existing contract; (2) the [Plaintiff]'s knowledge of the contract; (3) intentional acts intended or designed to disrupt the contractual relationship; (4) actual disruption of the contract; and (5) resulting damage." *J.J. Indus., LLC*, 119 Nev. at 274, 71 P.3d at 1267.

The Defendants have failed to establish that Gorodezki knew that the Defendants and LV BLVD had an existing valid contract. Gorodezki always believed that he had a valid contract for the purchase of the property and that any agreement Defendants would have had would be invalid. Upon this good faith belief, Gorodezki initiated a lawsuit and demanded specific performance. Gorodezki did not attempt to stop the settlement in order to harm the Defendants but to protect his legal rights to enforce his contract with LV BLVD. The fact that he was incorrect about the legality of the purchase and sale agreement is not sufficient to establish this tort. Gorodezki acted aggressively, as did Defendants, in order to purchase the Tod. Filing the lawsuit is not sufficient to prove intentional disruption of the settlement agreement.

2. Tortious Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage

To establish a the counterclaim for tortious interference with a prospective economic advantage the Defendants must establish: "(I) a prospective contractual relationship between the [defendants] and a third party; (2) the [plaintiff's] knowledge of this prospective relationship; (3)

the intent to harm the [defendants] by preventing the relationship; (4) the absence of privilege or justification by the [plaintiff]; and, (5) actual harm to the [defendants] as a result of the plaintiff's conduct." *Las Vegas-Tonopah-Reno Stage Line, Inc.*, 106 Nev. at 287, 792 P.2d at 388 (1990).

Defendants have failed to establish the existence of any prospective economic advantage and Plaintiff's knowledge of any alleged advantage. The evidence and testimony was clear that LV BLVD refused to do business with the Defendants. It was not until settlement discussions in the subsequent lawsuits that Defendants ever had a possible shot at acquiring all the interest in the Tod. LV BLVD, through its mortgage broker, stated to Gorodezki that it was not going to sell to the Defendants and that it planned on moving forward with Gorodezki. The same is evidenced by several failed attempts to amend the purchase and sale agreement with Gorodezki. The Court further finds that any legal action taken by Gorodezki was justified and protected by litigation privilege.

3. Defamation Per Se

To prove a claim for defamation per se the plaintiff, or counterclaimant in this instance, must establish: (I) a false and defamatory communication; (2) an unprivileged publication to a third person; and (3) fault, amounting to at least negligence. See *Clark Cty. Sch. Dist. v. Virtual Educ. Software, Inc.*, 125 Nev. 374, 385, 213 P.3d 496, 503 (2009) (citing *Pope v. Motel 6*, 121 Nev. 307, 315, 114 P.3d 277, 282 (2005)). If the defamatory communication "imputes a 'person's lack of fitness for trade, business, or profession,' or tends to injure the plaintiff in his or her business, it is deemed defamation per se and damages are presumed." Id. (quoting *K-Mart Corp. v. Washington*, 109 Nev. 1180, 1192, 866 P.2d 274, 282 (1993)).

The Defendants failed to establish the first prong of this claim. The defamatory communication alleged here was the !is pendens filed by Gorodezki in Case# A-11-649986- C. The Court finds as a matter of law that the !is pendens was filed in good faith and was not filed

with the intent to harm Defendants. Gorodezki believed, albeit incorrectly, that he had a valid contract to purchase the LV BLVD LLC interest. The Court cannot conclude that the lis pendens constitutes a false, malicious, or defamatory communication. Thus, the counterclaim for defamation must fail.

IV. ORDER

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Plaintiff's claims against Defendant National Title Co. are dismissed, with prejudice.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Plaintiff's claim against Defendants for intentional interference with contractual relations is without merit, and this Court finds in favor of the Defendants.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Plaintiff's claim against Defendants for attorney's fees as special damages is without merit, and this Court finds in favor of the Defendants.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Plaintiff's claim against Defendants for intentional interference with prospective economic advantage is without merit, and this Court finds in favor of the Defendants.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Defendants' counterclaim against Plaintiff for intentional interference with contractual relations is without merit, and this Court finds in favor of the Plaintiff.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Defendants' counterclaim against Plaintiff for intentional interference with prospective economic advantage is without merit, and this Court finds in favor of the Plaintiff.

1	IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Defendants'
2	counterclaim against Plaintiff for defamation per se is without merit, and this Court finds in
3	favor of the Plaintiff.
4	DATED this day of, 20 Dated this 30th day of March, 2021
5	
6	Aught son
7	DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
8	KENNETH C. CORY
9 10	Christy 538 97CC 39D8 Christy Craig District Court Judge
11	
12	
13	
14	
15	
16	
17	
18	
19	
20	
21	
22	
23	
24	
25	
26	
27	

A-12-663960-C

1 **CSERV** 2 DISTRICT COURT 3 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 4 5 Ilan Gorodezki, Plaintiff(s) CASE NO: A-12-663960-C 6 DEPT. NO. Department 32 VS. 7 8 Stuart Sackley, Defendant(s) 9 10 **AUTOMATED CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE** 11 This automated certificate of service was generated by the Eighth Judicial District Court. The foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment was served via the 12 court's electronic eFile system to all recipients registered for e-Service on the above entitled 13 case as listed below: 14 Service Date: 3/30/2021 15 "Spencer M. Judd, Esq.". spencer@sjuddlaw.com 16 "Tyler R. Andrews, Esq.". andrewst@gtlaw.com 17 Becky Pintar. becky@pintaralbiston.com 18 Bryan Albiston. bryan@pintaralbiston.com 19 20 21 22 23 February 16, 2022 24 25 26 27

> CERTIFIED COPY ELECTRONIC SEAL (NRS 1.190(3))

28