1 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA 2 WILLIAM DIMONACO, SUPREME COURT CASE No.: 80576 Appellant, 3 DISTRICT COURT CASE Note tronically Filed Nov 10 2021 02 24 p.m. VS. D-16-539340-C Elizabeth A. Brown 4 ADRIANA FERRANDO, Clerk of Supreme Court Respondent. 5 6 RESPONDENT'S APPENDIX 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 Submitted By: 16 FINE CARMAN PRICE Michael P. Carman, Esq. 17 Nevada Bar No. 07639 8965 S. Pecos Road, Suite 9 18 Henderson, NV 89074 702.384.8900 19 mike@fcpfamilylaw.com Respondent Attorney for Adriana Ferrando 20 21

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1 MOT
LAW OFFICES OF F. PETER JAMES, ESQ.
2 F. Peter James, Esq.
Nevada Bar No. 10091
3 Peter@PeterJamesLaw.com
3821 West Charleston Boulevard, Suite 250
Las Vegas, Nevada 89102
702-256-0087
5 702-256-0145 (fax)
Counsel for Plaintiff

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DISTRICT COURT, FAMILY DIVISION CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

WILLIAM DIMONACO. CASE NO. : D-16-539340-C

Plaintiff, DEPT. NO. ; Q

MOTION FOR TEMPORARY ORDERS

ADRIANA DAVINA FERRANDO, Hearing Date: January 3, 2017

Defendant. Hearing Time: 9:00 AM

COMES NOW Plaintiff, William DiMonaco, by and through his counsel, F. Peter James, Esq., who hereby moves this Honorable Court for the following relief:

- For an award of joint legal and joint physical custody;
- For a joint physical custody visitation schedule;
- For child support to be set pursuant to Wright v. Osburn and impute income on Mom;
- For confirmation that Plaintiff shall provide the child's medical insurance;
- For a standard 30/30 rule as to the child's unreimbursed medical, dental, optical, surgical, and orthodontic expenses; and
- For an award of attorney's fees and costs.

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	This Motion is made and based on the papers and pleadings on file herein, the attached				
	2 points and authorities, the attached affidavit(s) / declaration(s), the attached exhibit(s), and				
	upon any oral argument the Court will entertain.				
	Dated this / day of November, 2016				
	LAW OFFICES OF F. PETER JAMES				
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	(
8	3821 W. Charleston Blvd., Suite 250 Las Vegas, Nevada 89102				
9	702-256-0087 Counsel for Plaintiff				
10	NOTICE OF MOTION				
11	Please take notice that the present Motion shall be heard on the 3rd day of				
12	January , 201 7 at the hour of 9:00 a m. in Department Q of the Eighth				
13	Judicial District Court, Family Division, located at 601 North Pecos Road; Las Vegas, Nevada				
14	89101 in courtroom 1.				
15	Dated this day of November, 2016				
16					
17	LAW OFFICES OF F. PETER JAMES F. Peter James, Esq.				
18	Nevada Bar No. 10091 3821 W. Charleston Blvd., Suite 250				
19	Las Vegas, Nevada 89102 702-256-0087				
20	Counsel for Plaintiff				
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POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

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BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, William DiMonaco (hereinafter "Dad"), and Defendant, Adrianna Fettando (hereinafter "Mom"), have one child together, to wit: Grayson DiMonaco-Ferrando (born August 12, 2014) (hereinafter the "child"). There is no dispute as to paternity. (See Complaint at ¶ 5 and Counterclaim at ¶ 4).

The parties started dating in May 2013 and later began to cohabitate. In March 2014, the parties ended their dating relationship and Mom moved out into another apartment in the same complex. The parties maintained a friendship, though. Mom was pregnant when the parties ended their relationship.

When the child was born, Dad was in the hospital with Mom. After Mom left the hospital, Dad visited the child at Mom's house—Mom's rules. Dad had begun dating Tracy McAuliff ("Tracy") after he and Mom broke up.

In October 2014, Dad, who is active duty in the United State Air Force, was deployed to Afghanistan. While deployed, Mom would send Dad pictures of the child (among other pictures) and they would all Facetime.

Things changed drastically when Dad returned from deployment in April 2015. Mom made is abundantly clear that Dad was not permitted to take the child without Mom being present. Mom also made it abundantly clear that the child was forbidden from meeting Tracy. Mom has not permitted Dad to have visitation away from her—for no cause whatsoever.

Dad initially acquiesced to Mom's demands as he hoped to eventually have the same co-parenting relationship he has with his ex-wife. Dad has a fantastic co-parenting relationship

with his ex-wife regarding their child, McKenna DiMonaco (born May 24, 2011). (See Affidavit of Courtney Janson filed October 21, 2016). Dad and Courtney have been coparenting fantastically well since their divorce three years ago. (Id.). Dad and Courtney simply work things out when a co-parenting issue arises. (Id.). Though Dad hopes to have as good a co-parenting relationship with Mom as he does with his ex-wife, Mom has other plans, however.

Mom continues to dictate terms to Dad as to when he can see the child, how he sees the child, where he sees the child, and with whom he sees the child. The coordination between Dad and Mom has been through text messages. Mom will not talk with Dad about co-parenting issues as she must have it in writing—this is far different than how Dad co-parents with Courtney.

Mom has blocked Dad from the child for many reasons and for no reason. Mom has denied Dad the child because she had plans with friends, she did not feel well, and for a plethora of other baseless reasons. Dad has raised a child before this one and has glowing reviews from his ex-wife as to his parenting and co-parenting skills. (Id.). Mom has no basis whatsoever to deny Dad the child. Still, Dad has kept the peace.

From March through May 2016, Mom permitted Dad to see the child three times in three months. Dad had continuously texted her to ask to see the child. Dad even missed a class so that he could visit the child. When Mom did allow Dad to visit the child, the visits typically lasted only 45 to 90 minutes—Mom has cut off all visitation since August 2016. The visits would take place in Dad's truck, a restaurant, or at the park. Dad would even offer to run errands with Mom just to spend more time with the child.

When Mom's relationship with her fiancé grew, Mom further restricted Dad's visitation with the child. All the while, Mom grew to be more and more combative towards Dad and his relationship with the child. It is Mom's plan to eliminate Dad from the picture and have her fiance be the child's stand-in father. Mom wants Dad to terminate his parental rights so her fiance may adopt the child.

Dad grew up in an abusive home. Dad knows firsthand how damaging that can be to a child to grow up with the manipulation, the control, and the emotional abuse that goes with them. Dad recognizes Mom's combative tendencies, as well as her manipulation and controlling behaviors. This is partly why the parties broke off their relationship. Dad does not want the child to grow up in such a household. Dad has not been too assertive in asserting his rights to the child as to not cause more conflict, as it will negatively affect the child. Dad now realizes that Mom will not change and that she will continue to frustrate his visitation unless the Court steps in.

As stated, Dad has the co-parenting relationship with his ex-wife that the courts dream that divorced / separated parents will have with each other. Dad and Courtney simply work it out for the benefit of their daughter. They have not once been back to court—there is no need as they work it out. Dad wants this relationship with Mom, but she is disinclined to acquiesce to his request.

Mom has not allowed Dad to visit Grayson since August 2016.

Nevada law only permits a step-parent adoption, not a fiancé adoption. See NRS 127.030. As such, Mom is mistaken as to Nevada law and her desire for Dad to terminate his parental rights is a legal impossibility.

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DISCUSSION

The Court should award the parties joint legal and joint physical custody of the child both as a temporary and as a final order. The Court should also set a joint physical custody visitation schedule. The Court should set child support and impute income on Mom. The Court should confirm that Dad shall provide the child's health insurance. The Court should implement a standard 30/30 rule as to the child's unreimbursed medical, dental, optical, surgical, and orthodontic expenses. The Court should also award Dad attorney's fees and costs.

THE COURT SHOULD AWARD THE PARTIES JOINT LEGAL AND JOINT

PHYSICAL CUSTODY OF THE CHILD

The Court should award the parties joint legal and joint physical custody of the child.

There is no cause to award anything but joint legal and joint physical custody.²

NRS 125C.002 provides:

- 1. When a court is making a determination regarding the legal custody of a child, there is a presumption, affecting the burden of proof, that joint legal custody would be in the best interest of a minor child if:
 - (a) The parents have agreed to an award of joint legal custody or so agree in open court at a hearing for the purpose of determining the legal custody of the minor child; or
 - (b) A parent has demonstrated, or has attempted to demonstrate but has had his or her efforts frustrated by the other parent, an intent to establish a meaningful relationship with the minor child.

If any parent has cause to request primary physical custody of the child, it is Dad. Mom has hindered Dad's relationship with the child in favor of her new fiancé. Mom wants to force Dad out of the picture. Mom is also extremely high conflict, as will be demonstrated. Mom's precarious financial situation is also cause for Dad to have primary physical custody as Mom's financials show that she and the child (while in her care) will very soon be destitute.

- (2) A judgment or order of a court, or a judgment or order entered pursuant to an expedited process, determining the paternity of the child has not been entered; and
- (3) The father of the child:
 - (I) Is not subject to any presumption of paternity under NRS 126.051;
 - (II) Has never acknowledged paternity pursuant to NRS 126.053; or
 - (III) Has had actual knowledge of his paternity but has abandoned the child.
- (b) The father of the child if:
 - (1) The mother has abandoned the child; and
 - (2) The father has provided sole care and custody of the child in her absence.

Here, the presumption of joint legal custody applies. Dad been a part of the child's life to the extent that Mom has allowed it. Mom has been frustrating (to say the least) Dad's attempts to have a relationship with the child. Dad is listed as the child's natural father on the birth certificate. The child bears Dad's surname.

The preference for joint physical custody applies as well. Dad been a part of the child's life to the extent that Mom has allowed it. Mom has been frustrating (to say the least) Dad's attempts to have a relationship with the child. Dad is more than capable of exercising 146 days a year with the child—as he does with his other child from a prior marriage. (See Affidavit of Courtney Janson filed October 21, 2016). None of the disqualifying factors under NRS 125C.003 apply. Moreover, the newly-revised statutes (AB 263) are prospective looking and do not look back at historical timeshare—for the very reason of the facts of this case. As such, there is a preference for joint physical custody in this case.

"In determining the question of custody of children, the court's paramount consideration should be the welfare of the child." Culbertson v. Culbertson, 91 Nev. 230, 233,

(c) Which parent is more likely to allow the child to have frequent associations and a continuing relationship with the noncustodial parent

Over the past two years of the child's life Mom has controlled all of Dad's and the child's interactions. Mom frequently blames Dad for his lack of interaction with the child. Dad has never been allowed to take the child without Mom's supervision. Dad has done his best to accommodate Mom's demands, but despite his efforts, nothing has change. Mom controls when and where Dad meets her to spend time with the child.

None of Dad's family or friends have meet the child because Adrianna does not like that Dad's family is not a "traditional" family. Dad refers to his ex-wife's family as his family. Dad has done his best to be accommodating to Morn and her family, while Morn has not allowed Dad's family to meet Grayson.

Mom wants nothing more than to push Dad out of the way and have her fiancé stand in as the child's father. Mom is trying to frustrate Dad's relationship to the point that he gives up. That is not going to happen.

The Court should note that Mom has withheld the child from Dad since August 2016.

(d) The level of conflict between the parents

The parties have very little contact with each other outside of the child. What conflict they do have is due to Mom withholding the child from Dad—dictating terms of visitation instead of freely giving the child to him. The parties have had text message tirades where both parties have resorted to name calling and insults. Dad takes responsibility for his improper language. Still, the disputes surround Mom purposefully withholding the child from Dad and her intent to drive him out of the child's life.

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what he went through. Mom is very manipulative and very controlling. Her actions have shown Dad that she is relentless and will stop at nothing to drive Dad out of the child's life. Dad even considered severing his relationship with the child to spare him (the child) growing up in a verbally abusive, manipulative, and controlling household. Dad, however, came to an epiphany that Mom will engage in such verbal abuse, manipulation, and control with whomever she is involved—whether it be Dad, Mom's current flancé, or someone else. Whether Dad is in the picture or not, the child will still be with a mother who thrives on conflict. Dad realized that giving the child up out of love was not going to spare the child from Mom's emotional abuse. That is when Dad filed the present custody action. (e) The ability of the parents to cooperate to meet the needs of the child

Dad grew up in an abusive household and does not want his children to go through

Dad has an outstanding relationship with McKenna's mother and her husband. All three of them work together to do what is best for McKenna, including taking vacations together and coordinating care for her. (See Affidavit of Courtney Janson filed October 21, 2016). Dad hopes that Mom and he could have a relationship similar to this, but Mom has done nothing to indicate that this is the type of relationship she would like to have with him. In fact, Mom has shown that she wants Dad out of the child's life.

Mom must secretly envy Dad's co-parenting relationship with his ex-wife and mother of his daughter as she (Mom) is so adamant about the child not meeting Dad's family. "The lady doth protest too much, methinks."4

William Shakespeare's HAMLET: Act III, Scene II.

Dad's ex-wife gives Dad a glowing affidavit of his parenting and co-parenting skills.

Dad puts his children first. That Dad can co-parent with his ex-wife and her husband evidences that he is not the problem parent. The common denominator with the lack of co-parenting is Mom.

Oddly, Mom used to co-parent much better (though she always controlled Dad's visitation). Mom used to tell Dad when the child needed diapers, when he had a doctor appointment, and the like. Since Mom has been involved with her flancé, Mom communicating with Dad over such things has come to a screeching halt. Now, Mom will notify Dad that the child is sick—but only when it means Dad's visitations (that were then-existing) would not take place. As stated, Mom has withheld the child from Dad completely since August 2016.

(f) The mental and physical health of the parents

Dad has no health issues (mental or physical) that would prevent him from effectively parenting. Dad is not aware of any mental or physical issues with Mom that would prevent her from parenting.

Mom clearly has issues with control, which absolutely affects co-parenting. If her behaviors continue, a psychological / psychiatric evaluation might shed some light on Mom's issues.

(g) The physical, developmental and emotional needs of the child

Dad has raised his daughter with his now ex-wife, Courtney. Dad is a great parent and a great co-parent with his ex-wife. (See Affidavit of Courtney Janson filed October 21, 2016). Dad is actively involved with his daughter. Dad is experienced in raising children. Dad is a good role model for the child as he is a college graduate, is active duty in the USAF,

and is a special agent in the USAF (which is akin to a police detective in civilian police forces).

A child needs both parents—a mother and a father.

As stated herein, Mom is withholding the child from Dad. Dad should be having equal time with the child, but Mom has frustrated Dad's relationship with the child. This is not good for the child, yet Mom is forcing this position.

(h) The nature of the relationship of the child with each parent

As stated, Mom has frustrated Dad's relationship with the child to the extreme. Mom only allowed visits on her terms—take it or leave it. Dad does not accept this Morton's Fork. Dad is fully involved in his daughter's life. Dad's ex-wife gives him a stellar review as a parent and as a co-parent.

Until Mom began dating her current fiance, Mom gave Dad better access to the child than she did before she started dating him. Still, Mom has only allowed Dad visitation when she is present. Dad's visitation have taken place at the park and in his truck (while parked at Mom's house). Mom refuses to permit Dad to have the child away from her—as if he is an unfit parent. That Mom pled the Court for sole legal and primary physical custody of the child with supervised visitation to Dad is a farce. (See Answer and Counterclaim at ¶ 6-7). That in and of itself tells the Court that Mom is a "my child" mother.

Dad is requesting the Court's assistance to order Mom to allow him to have a relationship with the child. There is no cause whatsoever for anything other than joint legal and joint physical custody of the child.

(i) The ability of the child to maintain a relationship with any sibling

Dad has another child (McKenna) who is three years older than the child at issue in this litigation. Mom has not permitted the child and McKenna to have a relationship. The

siblings need to know each other. Mom is frustrating their relationship. McKenna asks to see the child very often. McKenna knows Grayson is her brother and is troubled that she cannot see him.

(j) Any history of parental abuse or neglect of the child or a sibling of the child

There is no known history of abuse or neglect—other than Mom denying the child his father, which is emotional abuse.

(k) Whether either parent or any other person seeking custody has eugaged in an act of domestic violence against the child, a parent of the child or any other person residing with the child

There is no known history of domestic violence.

(l) Whether either parent or any other person seeking custody has committed any act of abduction against the child or any other child

There is no known history of abduction. Given Mom's history, however, it is likely that she will not follow the Court's visitation orders. Failure to follow a visitation order is, technically kidnapping under Nevada law. See NRS 200-359(1).

Under the new custody laws (AB 263), Mom is committing a category D felony. Current Nevada law provides that parents of a child have joint legal and joint physical custody of a child until a court enters an order to the contrary. See NRS 125C.0015. No court has entered any custody orders as to the child; thus, the joint legal and joint physical custody statutory determination controls.

NRS 200.359(2) provides that when parents have joint legal and joint physical custody under NRS 125C.0015, a parent who willfully withholds a child from the other parent with the

intent to frustrate the efforts of the other parent's relationship with the child is guilty of a category D felony. This is precisely what is happening in this case.

Moreover, Nevada law provides that when a parent establishes by clear and convincing evidence that the other parent has violated NRS 200.359, it is presumed that it is not in the child's best interest for the offending parent to have even joint custody of the child and it is presumed that the offending parent has supervised visitation. See NRS 125C.0035(7) and 125C.0035(8); see also NRS 125C.240. So, as it sits, Nevada law presumes that Morn should not have even joint custody of the child and that her visitation should be supervised.

Nevada's public policy against what Mom is doing (frustrating Dad's visitation) is so strong that Nevada has made her conduct a felony. Adding to that, Nevada's policy is to award Dad sole legal and primary physical custody and to have Mom's visitation supervised. Now, Dad is not requesting sole legal and primary physical—he is requesting joint legal and joint physical custody. Dad is a reasonable parent who just wants to see the child. Mom is the bad actor here who needs the Court to tell her that her actions are unacceptable. Dad hopes that Mom will see the light, change her ways, and become the co-parent that he is with his other child.

There is no cause for anything but joint legal and joint physical custody in this case, save in favor of Dad, but he is only requesting joint physical custody.

Mom is frustrating Dad's relationship with the child, which, as stated, is a felony. Dad is the posterchild for a proper co-parent. Dad's co-parenting relationship with his ex-wife is what the Courts hope all parents will achieve—knowing that if they only even come close it would be a miracle. As to his other child, Dad works it out with his ex-wife and her new

husband. Dad's long-time girlfriend (whom Dad's ex-wife deems equivalent to family) works it out with Dad's ex-wife and her husband. So, Dad works it out with everyone in his life as to his other child.

Still, Mom is frustrating Dad's relationship with the child at issue. The common denominator for there being an issue is Mom.

The Court should award the parties joint legal and joint physical custody of the child.

B. THE COURT SHOULD SET A JOINT PHYSICAL CUSTODY VISITATION SCHEDULE

The Court should set a visitation schedule compliant with joint physical custody. The Court may make visitation orders as are in the child's best interest. See NRS 125C.0045(1).

Here, joint physical custody is proper. The Court should set a schedule that allows Dad's other child (McKenna Rose DiMonaco) to have frequent associations with Grayson. The regular visitation and the holidays should mirror each other for both children.⁵

C. THE COURT SHOULD SET CHILD SUPPORT AND IMPUTE INCOME ON MOM

The Court should set child support pursuant to Wright v. Osburn and impute income on Mom. As this is a joint physical custody case, the Court should set child support pursuant to Wright v. Osburn, subject to the deviations delineated herein. As one child is at issue, child support is set at 18% of the parties' gross monthly incomes, subject to offset and subject to the

This may prove to be difficult as Dad and his ex-wife (Courtney Janson) have a semi-fluid schedule as they just work out any deviations in their visitation schedule when the need arises. (See Affidavit of Courtney Janson filed October 21, 2016).

statutory cap after the offset. See NRS 125B.070; see Wright v. Osburn, 114 Nev. 1367, 97-P.2d 1071 (1998); see also Wesley v. Foster, 119 Nev. 110, 65 P.3d 251 (2003).

Dad's income is easily verifiable as he is employed by the United States Air Force.

Dad's income is stated in his Financial Disclosure Form. Dad's gross monthly income is

\$5,352. (See Financial Disclosure Form filed October 19, 2016).

Mom's income, however, is an issue. Mom provides that she has no income. (See Financial Disclosure Form filed November 2, 2016). Mom has some college education. (Id.). Mom has bills and a francé, but no contribution from him. (Id.). Mom offers nothing as to how she pays her bills. (Id.).

The Court should impute Mom's true earning capacity on her for the calculation of child support. "If a parent who has an obligation for support is willfully underemployed or unemployed to avoid an obligation for support of a child, that obligation must be based upon the parent's true potential earning capacity." NRS 125B.080(8). However,

where evidence of willful underemployment preponderates, a presumption will arise that such underemployment is for the purpose of avoiding support. Once this presumption arises, the burden of proving willful underemployment for reasons other than avoidance of a support obligation will shift to the supporting parent.

Minnear v. Minnear, 107 Nev. 495, 497-98, 814 P.2d 85, 86-87 (1991).

Mom claims no income and specifically states that her fiance does not assist with her finances. (See FDF filed November 2, 2016 at 5). Mom needs to get a job before she becomes homeless. Mom has an earning capacity that will be determined during discovery.

As a supplement / alternative to imputing income, the Court should look at Mom's fiance's income to negate Dad paying child support into Mom's household. See Lewis v. Hicks,

108 Nev. 1107, 843 P.2d 828 (1992); see also Rodgers v. Rodgers, 110 Nev. 1370, 887 P.2d 269 (1994).

The Court should also, if there is a child support obligation for Dad, award Dad a deviation for the legal responsibility for supporting another child. All parents are legally charged with supporting their children. See NRS 125B.020(1). Dad has another child from a prior marriage, to wit: McKenna Rose DiMonaco (born May 24, 2011). (See Affidavit of Courtney Janson filed October 21, 2016). Dad has McKenna half of the time. Dad should receive a deviation for his legal obligation to care for another child. Deviations under NRS 125B.080(9) are taken after the statutory cap is applied. See Garrett v. Garrett, 111 Nev. 972, 899 P.2d 1112 (1995).

As such, the Court should set child support pursuant to joint physical custody, impute income on Mom and/or consider Mom's fiance's income to negate Dad paying child support into their household, and award Dad a deviation for the care of his other child. Until the Court determines Mom's true earning capacity, the Court should stay any rulings on child support.

D. THE COURT SHOULD CONFIRM THAT DAD SHALL PROVIDE THE CHILD'S HEALTH INSURANCE

The Court should confirm that Dad shall provide the child's health insurance so long as the same is available through his employer at a reasonable cost. Courts are permitted to enter orders as to the child's care, maintenance and support as are in the child's best interest. See NRS 125C.0045(1). Courts are required to make a determination as to the child's medical insurance. See NRS 125B.085.

Here, Dad is on active duty in the United States Air Force. One of Dad's benefits is medical coverage for the child. Currently, there is no cost for Dad covering the child as the military takes care of the premium.

The Court should order Dad to provide the child's medical insurance so long as the same is available through his employer at a reasonable cost. See NRS 125B.085(2) (defining "reasonable cost").

E. THE COURT SHOULD IMPLEMENT A STANDARD 30/30 RULE

The Court should implement a standard 30/30 rule for the child's unreimbursed medical, dental, optical, surgical, and orthodontic expenses. Courts are permitted to enter orders for a child's support as are in the child's best interest. See NRS 125.0045(1). Absent extraordinary circumstances, the parties shall equally divide the children's unreimbursed medical, dental, optical, surgical, and orthodontic expenses. See NRS 125B.080(7).

Here, the Court should implement a standard 30/30 rule for the parties to equally divide the child's unreimbursed medical, dental, optical surgical, and orthodontic expenses. Dad offers the following 30/30 rule:

The child's unreimbursed medical, dental, optical, orthodontic, and mental health expenses should be equally born by each party subject to the 30/30 rule. The 30/30 rule provides that the party paying any unreimbursed medical expenses has thirty (30) days from the date the expense is paid to forward proof of payment to the opposing party. If that party does not timely forward the proof of payment, then that party waives the right to be reimbursed for that expense. Upon receipt of a timely-forwarded proof of payment of an unreimbursed medical expense, the receiving party has thirty (30) days to reimburse the paying party one-half of the expense or to object to the expense. If the receiving party does not either object to the expense or reimburse the paying party for half of the expense, then that party is subject to sanctions for contempt of court.

Mom has already agreed to this provision. (Compare Complaint at ¶ 13 with Answer at 1:23). As such, the Court should implement the above 30/30 rule.

F. THE COURT SHOULD AWARD DAD ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS

The Court should award Dad attorney's fees and costs for having to bring this matter before the Court. NRS 18.010 allows the Court to liberally award fees when a party maintains a frivolous position. EDCR 7.60 permits an award of fees when a party unnecessarily protracts the litigation. NRS 126.171 allows the Court to award fees in a paternity / custody action.

Here, there is absolutely no basis for the Court to award anything other than joint legal and joint physical custody of the child. Dad is the only party that has a basis for sole legal and primary physical custody based upon the statutory presumption delineated herein; however, Dad is only requesting joint legal and joint physical custody. Mom has been improperly withholding the child. Dad is a perfectly fit parent who has an outstanding parenting and co-parenting relationship with his ex-wife. Not many parents in custody litigation have a glowing recommendation from an ex-spouse. Dad does.

In determining the reasonableness of the fees to be awarded, the Court must analyze the following factors:

- The qualities of the advocate: his ability, training, education, experience, professional standing, and skill;
- The character of the work to be done: its difficulty, intricacy, importance, the time and skill required, the responsibility imposed, and the prominence and character of the parties where they affect the importance of the litigation;
- The work actually performed by the lawyer: the skill, time, and attention given to the work; and
- The result: whether the attorney was successful and what benefits were derived.

See Brunzell v. Golden State Nat. Bank, 85 Nev. 345, 349, 455 P.2d 31, 33 (1969); see also Miller v. Wilfong, 121 Nev. 619, 623-24, 119 P.3d 727, 730 (2005). The Court must also consider the relative income of the parties as this is a domestic case. Miller, 121 Nev. at 623-24, 119 P.3d at 730. No one element should predominate or be given undue weight. Brunzell, 85 Nev. at 349, 455 P.2d at 33.

As to the Brunzell factors, Counsel has successfully litigated countless cases in the Family Division of this district court. Counsel has successfully litigated numerous appeals and writ petitions at the Nevada Supreme Court. Numerous Family Court judges have confirmed that Counsel's legal acumen warranted charging \$350 per hour—with none disagreeing. Counsel is in his eleventh year of practice. In addition to numerous other accolades, Counsel has recently been named one of the top family law attorneys in the state—and received a hand-signed letter from Sen. Harry Reid regarding the same. Counsel is a court-approved Settlement Master whom the Family Courts appoints cases for him to mediate on a pro bono basis. All of the substantive work in this matter was performed by Counsel, not any junior associate or paralegal. What work was done by a paralegal was billed at a lower rate and supervised / amended by Counsel. The legal work did require review of the complex factual history and of several key Nevada cases as to the issues presented. To satisfy Miller, the parties have each filed Financial Disclosure Forms; however, the Court should be imputing income on Mom as she is voluntarily unemployed. As to the result, that is up to the Court.

Should the Court be so inclined to award Dad attorney's fees, he will file a Memorandum of Fees and Costs with the redacted billing statements to comply with Love v. Love.

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VERIFICATION

- I, William DiMonaco, under penalties of perjury in accordance with the laws of the State of Nevada, declare and state:
 - 1. That I am the Plaintiff in the above-entitled action; and
- 2. That I have read the document entitled: MOTION FOR TEMPORARY ORDERS and know the contents thereof; that the factual averments contained therein are true and correct to the best of my own knowledge, except for those matters therein stated upon information and belief, and as to those matters, I believe them to be true. I am competent and willing to testify in a court of law as to the facts stated in said document. Those factual averments contained in said document are incorporated herein as if set forth in full.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the law of the State of Nevada that the foregoing is true and correct.

Dated this g day of November, 2016



DISTRICT COURT FAMILY DIVISION CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

WILLIAM DIMONACO	Case No.	D-16-539340-C					
Plaintiff/Petitioner							
v.	Dept.	Q					
ADRIANA DAVINA FERRANDO	MOTION	VOPPOSITION					
Defendant/Respondent	FEE INFORMATION SHEET						
Notice: Motions and Oppositions filed after entry of a f							
subject to the reopen filing fee of \$25, unless specifically excluded by NRS 19.0312. Additionally, Motions and Oppositions filed in cases initiated by joint petition may be subject to an additional filing fee of \$129 or \$57 in							
accordance with Senate Bill 388 of the 2015 Legislative Session.							
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7	DISTRICT COURT					
8	FAMILY DIVISION CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA					
9			, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,			
10	WILLIAM	DIMONICO,)	CASE NO. D-16-539340-C DEPT. NO. Q		
11		Plaintiff,)			
12	vs.		Ś	MY 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 -		
13)	Hearing Date: 11/29/16 Time: 10:00 am		
14	ADRIANA DAVINA FERRANDO,					
15		Defeudant.	Ś			
16	,	**************************************	<i>)</i>			
17	OPPOSIT	ION TO MOTION FOR	TEMPORARY	RELIEF AND COUNTERMOTION		
18	FOR PRIMARY CUSTODY. CHILD SUPPORT, ARREARAGES, AND ATTORNEY'S					
19	<u>FEES</u>					
20	COMES NOW the Defendant, ADRIANA FERRANDO, by and through her attorney.					
21				Court for the following relief:		
22	1. For an Order denying the Plaintiff's requested relief;					
23	2.			ody of the parties' minor child;		
24	3.	For an order requiring th	ie Plaintiff to pay	y 18% of his gross monthly income to the		
25	Defendant;					
26	4.	For an order setting cons	structive child su	pport arrearages;		
27	5.	For attorney's fees;				
28	6.	For such other and fur	ther relief as th	ris Court deems just and proper in the		
	premises.					
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This Opposition and Countermotion is made and based upon the papers and pleadings or file herein, the Affidavits on file herein, the exhibits attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference, the Points and Authorities submitted herewith and any argument which may adduced at the time of hearing.

DATED this day of November, 2016.

STEVEN M. ALTIG, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 006879

Adras & Altig, Attorneys at Law

601 S. Seventh Street Las Vegas, Nevada 89101

(702) 385-7227

Email: steven@adraslaw.com Attorney for Defendant

POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

- DECLARATIONS AND RELEVANT FACTUAL BACKGROUND.
 - A. DECLARATION OF ADRIANA FERRANDO.

County of Clark) ss.
State of Nevada)

ADRIANA FERRANDO, hereby declares under the penalty of purjury of the laws of the State of Nevada that the following statements are true and correct. This Declaration is made pursuant to the provisious of NRS 53.045:

- 1. That the Plaintiff and I were never married but our relationship produced one child to wit: GRAYSON DIMONACO-FERRANDO DOB: August 12, 2014
 - That the Plaintiff has not been present and involved in GRAYSON's life.
 - That the Plaintiff and I broke up while I was pregnant with GRAYSON.
- 4. That GRASYSON was born and I was in the hospital for 2 days. The Plaintiff was present the day that GRAYSON was born. The Plaintiff left the hospital and came back to visit one night. I left the hospital and notified the Plaintiff that Grayson and I were home.

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- 5. From August 14, 2014 to October 14, 2014 the Plaintiff came to visit with GRAYSON at most three (3) times. He would only spend about 10 minutes on each visit. The Plaintiff said that he was too busy taking care of his other responsibilities.
- 6. Sometime around October 14, 2014, the Plaintiff was deployed to Afghanistan. He did not return from Afghanistan until sometime during mid-April of 2015. While the Plaintiff was in Afghanistan he asked not a single question about GRAYSON nor did he Facetime with GRAYSON. All the Plaintiff would ask is that I send him dirty pictures and that I have dirty Facetimes with him.
- On April 13, 2015, the Plaintiff asked if he could see GRAYSON. We met at the park near my house and the Plaintiff spent about 15 minutes with Grayson and then left.
- 8. That between April of 2015 through May of 2016 I would ask for the Plaintiff to come visit with GRAYSON and the Plaintiff would not. I even asked the Plaintiff to set up a permanent visitation schedule and he would not do that because he didn't want to let GRAYSON down given his other priorities. The Plaintiff would not keep our visitation plans on most occasions. During this time period the Plaintiff came to visit with GRAYSON on less than 10 occasions. These visitations would last about 15 minutes each. On only one occasion the Plaintiff spent 45 minutes with GRAYSON. The Plaintiff would only do visitations on his lunch breaks and would not allow me to bring GRAYSION to his home. In fact, I still have no idea where the Plaintiff lives.
- 9. Between June 2, 2016 and August 6, 2016 the Plaintiff visited with Grayson a total of about five times. Again most visits were short with the longest visit being about 45 minutes. I offered the Plaintiff time with GRAYSON on Father's Day and the Plaintiff refused the time. The Plaintiff told me that he could not visit with GRAYSON on GRAYSON's birthday because he had to go to Georgia for work. That was untrue.
 - 10. August 6, 2016 was the final time that the Plaintiff saw GRAYSON.
 - That the Plaintiff rarely asks if he can spend time with GRAYSON.

- 12. On September 13, 2016, the Plaintiff asked if he could see GRAYSON. I told the Plaintiff that I would bring GRAYSON to his house. The Plaintiff refused. He stop texting me back and I didn't hear back from him for two (2) days. The Plaintiff never saw GRAYSON.
 - 13. Since September 13, 2016, the Plaintiff has not asked to see GRAYSON at all.
- 14. That I have always supported a relationship between the Plaintiff and GRAYSON. It is the Plaintiff who has not attempted to have a relationship with GRAYSON and who has asked me twice to terminate his parental rights. These messages are conspicuously missing from the messages turned in by the Plaintiff. (see Exhibit A)
- 15. The Plaintiff is emotionally unstable. He said to me on multiple occasions that he wished that he would die so he wouldn't have to take care of GRAYSON. He has told me that he hoped me and his ex-wife would jump off bridges. He refused to let me know where he lives.
- 16. That the Plaintiff has been a little more consistent with the payment of support. That is until August of 2016. The Plaintiff has not paid a penny since August of 2016. The amounts he has paid have fluctuated from time to time.
- 17. Based upon the Plaintiff's income noted on his FDF his child support obligation should be \$749 per month.
- 18. During the time that the Plaintiff was paying support he did not provide payment for August 2014, September 2014, September 2016, and October 2016. From October 2014 through December 2014 he paid \$420 per month. From January 2015 through January 2016 he paid \$220 per month. From February 2016 through August 2016 he again paid \$420 per month. (see the Schedule of Payments attached as Exhibit B) As a result, his initial child support arrearages are in the neighborhood of \$13,912.

I declare under the penalty of perjury of the laws of the State of Nevada that the foregoing is true and correct to the best of my information and belief.

Executed this day of November, 2016.

ADRIANA DAVINA FERRANDO

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II. ARGUMENT

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A. THE BEST INTEREST OF THE PARTIES MINOR CHILD REQUIRE THAT PLAINTIFF BE AWARDED SOLE LEGAL AND PRIMARY PHYSICAL CUSTODY OF SAID MINOR CHILD.

There does not exist an order of the Court establishing custody of the minor child in this action. Consequently, the "best interest" standard is the appropriate legal standard for the Court.

The "best interest" standard is set forth in NRS §125.480:

NRS 125.480 Best interests of child; preferences; presumptions when court determines parent or person seeking custody is perpetrator of domestic violence or has committed act of abduction against child or any other child.

- 1. In determining custody of a minor child in an action brought under this chapter, the sole consideration of the court is the best interest of the child. If it appears to the court that joint custody would be in the best interest of the child, the court may grant custody to the parties jointly.
- 2. Preference must not be given to either parent for the sole reason that the parent is the mother or the father of the child.
- 3. The court shall award custody in the following order of preference unless in a particular case the best interest of the child requires otherwise:
 - (a) To both parents jointly pursuant to NRS 125.490 or to either parent. If the court does not enter an order awarding joint custody of a child after either parent has applied for joint custody, the court shall state in its decision the reason for its denial of the parent's application.
 - (b) To a person or persons in whose home the child has been living and where the child has had a wholesome and stable environment.
 - (c) To any person related within the fifth degree of consanguinity to the child whom the court finds suitable and able to provide proper care and guidance for the child, regardless of whether the relative resides within this State.
 - (d) To any other person or persons whom the court finds suitable and able to provide proper care and guidance for the child.
- 4. In determining the best interest of the child, the court shall consider and set forth its specific findings concerning, among other things:
 - (a) The wishes of the child if the child is of sufficient age and capacity to form an intelligent preference as to his or her custody.
 - (b) Any nomination by a parent or a guardian for the child.
 - (c) Which parent is more likely to allow the child to have frequent associations and a continuing relationship with the noncustodial parent.
 - (d) The level of conflict between the parents.
 - (e) The ability of the parents to cooperate to meet the needs of the child.
 - (f) The mental and physical health of the parents.
 - (g) The physical, developmental and emotional needs of the child.
 - (h) The nature of the relationship of the child with each parent.
 - The ability of the child to maintain a relationship with any sibling.

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(j) Any history of parental abuse or neglect of the child or a sibling of the child,

(k) Whether either parent or any other person seeking custody has engaged in an act of domestic violence against the child, a parent of the child or any other person residing with the child.

(f) Whether either parent or any other person seeking custody has committed any act of abduction against the child or any other child.

- 5. Except as otherwise provided in subsection 6 or NRS 125C.210, a determination by the court after an evidentiary hearing and finding by clear and convincing evidence that either parent or any other person seeking custody has engaged in one or more acts of domestic violence against the child, a parent of the child or any other person residing with the child creates a rebuttable presumption that sole or joint custody of the child by the perpetrator of the domestic violence is not in the best interest of the child. Upon making such a determination, the court shall set forth:
 - (a) Findings of fact that support the determination that one or more acts of domestic violence occurred; and
 - (b) Findings that the custody or visitation arrangement ordered by the court adequately protects the child and the parent or other victim of domestic violence who resided with the child.
- 6. If after an evidentiary hearing held pursuant to subsection 5 the court determines that each party has engaged in acts of domestic violence, it shall, if possible, then determine which person was the primary physical aggressor. In determining which party was the primary physical aggressor for the purposes of this section, the court shall consider:
 - (a) All prior acts of domestic violence involving either party;
 - (b) The relative severity of the injuries, if any, inflicted upon the persons involved in those prior acts of domestic violence;
 - (c) The likelihood of future injury;
 - (d) Whether, during the prior acts, one of the parties acted in self-defense; and
 - (e) Any other factors which the court deems relevant to the determination.
- In such a case, if it is not possible for the court to determine which party is the primary physical aggressor, the presumption created pursuant to subsection 5 applies to both parties. If it is possible for the court to determine which party is the primary physical aggressor, the presumption created pursuant to subsection 5 applies only to the party determined by the court to be the primary physical aggressor.
- 7. A determination by the court after an evidentiary hearing and finding by clear and convincing evidence that either parent or any other person seeking custody has committed any act of abduction against the child or any other child creates a rebuttable presumption that sole or joint custody or unsupervised visitation of the child by the perpetrator of the abduction is not in the best interest of the child. If the parent or other person seeking custody does not rebut the presumption, the court shall not enter an order for sole or joint custody or unsupervised visitation of the child by the perpetrator and the court shall set forth:
 - (a) Findings of fact that support the determination that one or more acts of abduction occurred; and
 - (b) Findings that the custody or visitation arrangement ordered by the court adequately protects the child and the parent or other person from whom the child was abducted.

- 8. For purposes of subsection 7, any of the following acts constitute conclusive evidence that an act of abduction occurred:
 - (a) A conviction of the defendant of any violation of NRS 200.310 to 200.340, inclusive, or 200.359 or a law of any other jurisdiction that prohibits the same or similar conduct;
 - (b) A plea of guilty or noto contendere by the defendant to any violation of NRS 200.310 to 200.340, inclusive, or 200.359 or a law of any other jurisdiction that prohibits the same or similar conduct; or
 - (c) An admission by the defendant to the court of the facts contained in the charging document alleging a violation of NRS 200.310 to 200.340, inclusive, or 200.359 or a law of any other jurisdiction that prohibits the same or similar conduct.
- 9. If, after a court enters a final order concerning custody of the child, a magistrate determines there is probable cause to believe that an act of abduction has been committed against the child or any other child and that a person who has been awarded sole or joint custody or unsupervised visitation of the child has committed the act, the court shall, upon a motion to modify the order concerning custody, reconsider the previous order concerning custody pursuant to subsections 7 and 8.
- 10. As used in this section:
 - (a) "Abduction" means the commission of an act described in NRS 200.310 to 200.340; inclusive, or 200.359 or a law of any other jurisdiction that prohibits the same or similar conduct.
 - (b) "Domestic violence" means the commission of any act described in NRS 33.018.

The Court has the discretion to deviate from the presumption of "joint custody" if the Court finds that the best interests of the child will not be served by an award of joint custody. In a child custody case, the Court's foremost concern is the welfare of the child. <u>Culbertson v.</u> Culbertson, 91 Nev. 230, 233, 533 P.2d 768, 770 (1975).

Here, in the case as at bar, the evidence presented to this Court establishes that the Defendant is the parent who needs to be granted primary physical custody of GRAYSON. GRAYSON does not know the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff's lack of a relationship with GRAYSON is the result of his own conduct. The Defendant is the parent who keeps in mind the emotional wellbeing of the child and has always looked out for the child's best interest. The Plaintiff has not been present. The Plaintiff is not the looking out for the emotional needs and wellbeing of the parties' children. The Defendant should be awarded primary physical custody with the Plaintiff having only supervised visitation until such time as the Plaintiff can develop a relationship with GRAYSON and stability in his visitation schedule.

B. PLAINTIFF SHOULD BE ORDERED TO PAY PLAINTIFF 18% OF HIS GROSS MONTHLY INCOME AS AND FOR THE SUPPORT AND MAINTENANCE OF THE PARTIES' MINOR CHILD.

Once custody has been established the Plaintiff should be ordered to pay the Defendant support in an amount equal to 18% of his gross monthly income.

N.R.S. 125B.070 provides as in relevant part follows:

- 1. As used in this section and NRS 125B.080, unless the context otherwise requires:
 - (a) "Gross monthly income" means the total amount of income received each month from any source of a person who is not self-employed or the gross income from any source of a self-employed person, after deduction of all legitimate business expenses, but without deduction for personal income taxes, contributions for retirement benefits, contributions to a pension or for any other personal expenses.
 - (b) "Obligation for support" means the sum certain dollar amount determined according to the following schedule:
 - For one child, 18 percent;
 - (2) For two children, 25 percent:
 - (3) For three children, 29 percent;
 - (4) For four children, 31 percent; and
 - (5) For each additional child, an additional 2 percent,

of a parent's gross monthly income, but not more than the presumptive maximum amount per month per child set forth for the parent in subsection 2 for an obligation for support determined pursuant to subparagraphs (1) to (4), inclusive, unless the court sets forth findings of fact as to the basis for a different amount pursuant to subsection 6 of NRS 125B.080.

2. For the purposes of paragraph (b) of subsection 1, the presumptive maximum amount per month per child for an obligation for support, as adjusted pursuant to subsection 3, is:

There is an equal duty of each parent to contribute toward the support of their children in proportion to their respective incomes. See NRS 125B.020(1). The needs of the child are in part determined by the income level of the parents and the ability of each parent to contribute support

proportional to his or her income level.

Nevada's percentage of income approach reflects a public policy that, after a family separation, parents should spend on their children the approximate percentage of income that they would have had the family stayed together. See U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Administration For Children and Families, Office of Child Support Enforcement, The Treatment of Multiple Family Cases Under State Child Support Guidelines, July, 1991, Pages 1-4 (hereinafter "Treatment"). The statutory sum considers the child's needs as well as the income that each parent should contribute to the financial responsibility of his child. The guidelines in part are based on the benefit a child will receive by receiving a fair portion of the non-custodial parent's income.

In Nevada, it was determined that 18% of the non-custodial parent's income should be paid as and for the financial contribution to one child. In this case, neither parent should be considered the primary custodian of the children pursuant to NRS 126.031. "Once the primary custodian is identified, 'the court, then, shall apply the appropriate formula' and order the secondary custodian to pay the formula amount." Barbagallo vs. Barbagallo, 105 Nev. 546, 779 P.2d 532, 549, 786 P.2d 673 (1991). [Emphasis added.] Further, the Supreme Court held that due to "the presumptive nature of the formula, application of the formula must be the rule, any deviation..., must be the exception." Barbagallo at 552. [Emphasis added.] The Supreme Court continued by warning that "care should be taken that children do not suffer while in the care of the primary custodian by reason of unwarranted reductions in the formula payments being made by the secondary custodian." Barbagallo at 550. See also. Lewis v. Hicks, 108 Nev. 1107, 843 P.2d 828.

The Nevada Supreme Court in Lewis, id., that "[t]he statute specifically requires that child support awards be calculated from gross income and exclusive of 'any other personal expenses." NRS 125B.070(1)(a). The legislature's purpose in using 'gross monthly' income was to avoid judicial examination of the minutiae of a parent's finances." Lewis at 832.

As such, the Defendant requests an award of child support.

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(THE PALINTIFF SHOULD PAY CONSTRUCTIVE CHILD SUPPORT AS HE HAS NOT PAID SUPPORT EQUAL TO HIS STAUTORY REQUIREMENT SINCE GRAYSON'S BIRTH.

Based upon the Plaintiff's income noted on his FDF his child support obligation should be \$749 per month. During the time that the Plaintiff was paying support he did not provide payment for August 2014, September 2014, September 2016, and October 2016. From October 2014 through December 2014 he paid \$420 per month. From January 2015 through January 2016 he paid \$220 per month. From February 2016 through August 2016 he again paid \$420 per mouth. (see the Schedule of Payments attached as Exhibit B). As a result, his initial child support arrearages are in the neighborhood of \$13,912.

D. ATTORNEY'S FEES.

As a result of the Plaintiff's conduct, the Defendant has been forced to file this Motion in order to deal with the Plaintiff's careless behavior. The Defendant's request for attorney's fees should be granted as the Defendant will be the prevailing party, pursuant to NRS 18.010 and 125B et. Seq.; see also Women's Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Nevada Nat'l Bank, 623 F. Supp. 469 (D. Nev. 1985). Furthermore, the Defendant's request for attorney's fees is supported by EDCR 5.32, EDCR 5.11, EDCR 7.60, NRS 125.180, NRS 125 et. seq., NRS 125C.180, and Nevada Case Law.

WHEREFORE, based upon the foregoing, let an order issue granting the relief requested by Plaintiff.

day of November, 2016.

STEVEN M. ALTIG, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 006879 Adras & Altig

601 S. Seventh Street Las Vegas, Novada 89101

(702)385-7227

CERTIFICATE OF E-SERVICE

Thereby certify that I am an employee of Adras & Altig Attorneys at Law, and that on the 28th day of November, 2016, I elected to E-SERVE a true and correct filed stamped copy of the foregoing Opposition to Motion for Temporary Relief and Countermotion for Primary Custody, Child Support, Arrearages and Attorney's Fees, to the following:

F. Peter James, Esq. Email: peter@peterjameslaw.com Attorney for Plaintiff

An Employee of Adrits & Altig Attorneys at Law

RA0035

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and the control of th

EXHIBIT A



Termination convo

1 message

Adriana Ferrando ∻davina_83@hotmaii.comb To: Steven Altig ⊀alevan@admalaw.com>

May, Nov 28, 2016-et













Thu, Aug 25, 7:10 AM

I will pay you in cash out of my savings but I want the paper work to sign if this is the way this shit is going to continue to be

I am serious I'm done I want not part of you in my life

Thu, Aug 25, 8:20 AM



Thu, Aug 25, 9:47 AM





For Jon to adopt Grayson

Thu, Aug 25, 2:51 PM

lf you want to sign over your parental rights to have Joh adopt Grayson, let me know for sure I will have my lawyer file







Message



●●○○○AT&T LTE



5:13 PM



William



Thu, Aug 25, 2:51 PM

Yes gray needs a steady life not this shit

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Is that what you want?

Not at all but this doesn't work and I'm done with this

So I will







Massage



●●○○ AT&T LTE

5:14 PM





I told you to have them drawn up. I want you out of my life completely and it's what's best for Grayson

if you get served with any paperwork, my artomeys name is Sieve Allic

Yes ma'am

Mon, Aug 29, 7:35 PM

The papers are drafted. Would you like to set up a time to go Son them attravaltions







Message



Sent from my iPhone

and the control of the control of the Market of the control of the control of the control of the control of the

EXHIBIT B

SCHD Adras & Altig Attorneys at Law Steven M. Altig, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 6879 601 S. Seventh Street Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 (Phone) 702-385-7227 (Fax) 702-974-3677 Email: steven@adraslaw.com ₽ Attorney for Defendant 7 DISTRICT COURT 8 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 8 1.0 WILLIAM DIMONACO 11 Plaintiff(s), CASE NO. D-16-539340-C 12 DEPT. NO. Q -V\$-13 ADRIANA DAVINA FERRANDO Defendant(s). 15 16 SCHEDULE OF PAYMENTS 17 18. STATE OF CLARK 880 19 COUNTY OF NEVADA 20 ADRIANA DAVINA FERRANDO, being first swom, deposes and says: 21 I am owed and entitled to receive certain periodic monthly payments from WILLIAM 22 DIMONACO. WILLIAM DOMONACO has failed to make all of those payments when due as 23 24 set forth herein. The following schedule is a true and accurate statement of all payment due 25 dates and of any payments received by me during the months noted. 26 Further, affiant sayeth naught. 27 28

I declare under penalty of perjury under the law of the State of Nevada that the foregoing is true and contect.

EXECUTED this 28th day of November, 2016.

3.

ADRIANA DAVINA FERRANDO

	•			
DUE DATE SET BY COURT DECREE	AMOUNT DUE THIS PAYMENT	DATE PAYMENT RECEIVED THIS MO.	AMOUNT OF PAYMENT RECEIVED	TOTAL, ARREARAC THIS MON
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		12/01/2014	420.00	
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CERTIFICATE OF E-SERVICE

I hereby certify that I am an employee of Adms & Altig Attorneys at Law, and that on the 28th day of November, 2016, I elected to E-SERVE a true and correct filed stamped copy of the foregoing Schedule of Payments, to the following:

F. Peter James, Esq. Email: peter@peterjameslaw.com Attorney for Plaintiff

An Employee of Adras & Altig Atterneys at Law

MOFIL

DISTRICT COURT FAMILY DIVISION CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

1) Wew True CO	Case No. 3)-10-059500
Plaintiff/Petitioner	Dept.
PAR GOD LOVIOG LEROOM Defendant/Respondent	MOTION/OFPOSITION SEE INFORMATION SHEET
subject to the reopen filing fix of \$25, unless appointed Oppositions filed in cases initiated by joint position ma accordance with Senate Bill 388 of the 2015 Legislative	
Step 1, Select either the \$25 or \$0 filing fee i	in the box below.
() \$25 The Motion/Opposition being filed w	ith this form is subject to the \$25 reopen fee.
The Motion/Opposition being filed w	ith this form is not subject to the \$25 reopen
<i>y</i> •	led before a Divorce/Custody Decree has been
 entered. The Motion/Opposition is being fill established in a final order. 	ed solely to adjust the amount of child support
The Motion/Opposition is for recon within 10 days after a final judgme	nsideration or for a new trial, and is being filed ent or decree was entered. The final order was
entered on	(fy)
Step 2. Select the \$0, \$129 or \$57 filing fee i	
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/ \$57 fee because: No The Motion/Opposition is being fi	iled in a case that was not initiated by joint petition, sition previously paid a fee of \$129 or \$57.
·OR ·	
5129 The Motion being filed with this form to modify, adjust or enforce a final of -OK.	m is subject to the \$129 fee because it is a motion order.
557 The Mation/Opposition being filing v	with this form is subject to the \$57 fee because it is adjust or enforce a final order, or it is a motion aid a fee of \$129.
Step 3. Add the filling fees from Step 1 and S	
The total filing fee for the motion/opposition l	am filing with this form is:
Party filing Motion/Opposition: Seve	0 Altiq Date 11/28/16
Signature of Party or Preparer	- Annual Control of Co

DISTRICT COURT **CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA**

Child Custody Complaint

COURT MINUTES

November 29, 2016

D-16-539340-C

William Eugene DiMonaco, Plaintiff.

Adriana Davina Ferrando, Defendant.

November 29,

10:00 AM

All Pending Motions

2016

HEARD BY: Duckworth, Bryce C.

COURTROOM: Courtroom 01

COURT CLERK: Michael A. Padilla (mp); Karen Christensen

PARTIES:

Adriana Ferrando, Defendant, Counter

Steven Altig, Attorney, present

Claimant, present

Grayson DiMonaco-Ferrando, Subject Minor,

not present

William DiMonaco, Plaintiff, Counter

F James, Attorney, present

Defendant, present

JOURNAL ENTRIES

- PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO STRIKE ANSWER AND COUNTERMOTION ... DEFENDANT'S OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO STRIKE ANSWER AND COUNTERMOITON FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES ... PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR TEMPORARY ORDERS ... DEFENDANT'S OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO STRIKE ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM AND COUNTERMOITON FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES ... EARLY CASE CONFERENCE.

Court reviewed the matters at issue. Mr. James stated Plaintiff exercises a week-on/week-off schedule with his other child in which he and the mother co-parent very well and are flexible with each other. Discussion regarding a visitation schedule; child exchanges; co-parenting issues; Plaintiff's living situation; child support; and the \$2,000.00 medical expense. Following discussion, COURT ORDERED, as follows:

VD.D.					
PRINT DATE:	11/29/2016	Page 1 of 3	Minutes Date:	November 29, 2016	
PRINT DATE:	XX/ 47/ 40X0	Page 1 of 3	Williages Care.	MOVELLIDEL ES, EUIG	
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Notice: Journal entries are prepared by the courtroom clerk and are not the official record of the Court.

- 1. Parties are to attend MEDIATION through the Family Mediation Center (FMC). Order for FMC Services signed and filed in OPEN COURT. RETURN HEARING set for 3/13/17 at 9:00 AM.
- 2. The parties shall have JOINT LEGAL CUSTODY of the minor child.
- Defendant shall have TEMPORARY PRIMARY PHYSICAL CUSTODY of the minor child.
- 4. For this coming weekend, Plaintiff's VISITATION with the minor child shall be on Saturday (12/3/16) and Sunday (12/4/16) from 9:00 AM to 12:00 PM. Defendant shall be allowed to be present during this VISITATION, which shall serve more as reunification between Plaintiff and minor child (the Court does not view this as supervision). These VISITS shall take place at the Gravity Zone located on Tenaya.
- 5. Beginning 12/10/16 and for the month of December 2016, Plaintiff's VISITATION shall be every Saturday and Sunday from 10:00 AM to 6:00 PM. However, on Christmas day, his VISIT shall be from 12:00 PM to 6:00 PM.
- 6. Beginning January 2017, Plaintiff's VISITATION shall be every Saturday at 10:00 AM to Sunday at 6:00 PM. The Court expects an additional overnight to be implemented at some point.
- 7. CHILD EXCHANGES shall take place at the Taco Bell located on Sky Point and the 215.
- 8. Plaintiff is to have a car seat for the minor child.
- Plaintiff's TEMPORARY CHILD SUPPORT obligation is set at six hundred fifty dollars (\$650.00)
 per month beginning December 2016, due and payable on the 1st and 15th day of each month. This
 amount takes into consideration a deviation for the care of another child.
- 10. The issue of ARREARS is DEFERRED.
- Both parties shall continue to provide medical/health insurance for the minor child.
- 12. Plaintiff is to follow through with the approximately two thousand dollar (\$2,000.00) medical expense issue.
- 13. Any unreimbursed medical, dental, optical, orthodontic or other health related expense incurred for the benefit of the minor child is to be divided equally between the parties. Either party incurring an out of pocket medical expense for the child shall provide a copy of the paid invoice/receipt to the

PRINT DATE:	11/29/2016	Page 2 of 3	Minutes Date:	November 29, 2016	
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Notice: Journal entries are prepared by the courtroom clerk and are not the official record of the Court.

other party within thirty days of incurring such expense, if not tendered within the thirty day period, the Court may consider it as a waiver of reimbursement. The other party will then have thirty days from receipt within which to dispute the expense in writing or reimburse the incurring party for one-half of the out of pocket expense, if not disputed or paid within the thirty day period, the party may be subject to a finding of contempt and appropriate sanctions.

- 14. Plaintiff's Motion to Strike Answer and Counterclaim is DENIED.
- 15. The request for ATTORNEY'S FEES is DENIED.

Mr. James is to prepare the Order from today's hearing with Mr. Altig to countersign.

INTERIM CONDITIONS:

FUTURE HEARINGS: Canceled: January 03, 2017 9:00 AM Motion

March 13, 2017 9:00 AM Early Case Conference

Duckworth, Bryce C. Courtroom 01

March 13, 2017 9:00 AM Return Hearing

Duckworth, Bryce C. Courtroom 01

PRINT DATE:	11/29/2016	Page 3 of 3	Minutes Date:	November 29, 2016
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Notice: Journal entries are prepared by the courtroom clerk and are not the official record of the Court.

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1	ORDR	Alun A. Chuin		
2	LAW OFFICES OF F. PETER JAMES, ESQ. F. Peter James, Esq.	CLERK OF THE COURT		
3	Nevada Bar No. 10091 Peter@PeterJamcsLaw.com			
4	3821 West Charleston Boulevard, Suite 250 Las Vegas, Nevada 89102			
5	702-256-0087 702-256-0145 (fax)			
6	Counsel for Plaintiff			
7	DISTRICT COURT, FAMILY DIVISION CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA			
8	WILLIAM DIMONACO,	CASE NO. : D-16-539340-C DEPT. NO. : Q		
9	Plaintiff,			
10	vs.	ORDER		
11	ADRIANA DAVINA FERRANDO,			
12	Defendant.	Hearing Date: November 29, 2016 Hearing Time: 10:00 a.m.		
13				
14	This matter came before the Court on th	e 29 th day of November, 2016 on Plaintiff's		
15	Motion to Strike Answer and Counterclaim, I	Defendant's Opposition and Countermotion,		
16	Plaintiff's Motion for Temporary Orders (heard on shortened time), and for an Early Case			
17	Conference / Evaluation. F. Peter James, Esq. appeared with Plaintiff, William DiMonaco.			
18	Steven M. Altig, Esq. appeared with Defendant, Adriana Ferrando. The Honorable Bryce C.			
19	Duckworth presided over the matter.			
20	The Court reviewed the matters at issue. Mr. James stated that Plaintiff exercises a			
21	week on / week off schedule with his other child and that Plaintiff and the mother of his other			
22	child co-parent very well and are flexible with ea	nch other. There was discussion regarding a		
23		RECEIVED		
24	1 of 9			

FAMILY COURT DEPARTMENT Q

visitation schedule, child exchanges, co-parenting issues, Plaintiff's living situation, child support, and the \$2,000 medical expense.

The Court, having read the papers and pleadings on file herein, having heard argument and from the parties, being well advised in the premises, and for sufficient cause shown, hereby finds and orders as follows:

THE COURT HEREBY FINDS that it has jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the parties. The minor child at issue is Grayson Ashton DiMonaco-Ferrando (born August 12, 2014) (hereinafter "the child"). The child was born in Nevada and has resided in Nevada for his entire life. As such, the Court has the necessary UCCJEA jurisdiction to enter orders as to child custody and visitation. Nevada is the child's home state and state of habitual residence.

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that Plaintiff is the child's natural father. (Compare Complaint at ¶ 5 with Answer at ¶ 3). Plaintiff and Defendant signed an affidavit of paternity which has not been rescinded or revoked. (Id.). Plaintiff appears on the child's birth certificate as the child's natural father. (Id.).

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that there is a statutory mandate to build parentchild relationships. (Video Record at 10:29:42).

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that, regardless of fault (which is neither being decided today nor is it relevant to the statutory mandate to build relationships), Plaintiff has had a limited relationship with the child. (Video Record at 10:36:20).

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that it must determine if either parent is incapable of caring for the child for at least 146 days per year. If the Court cannot make that finding, then this is likely a joint physical custody case. (Video Record at 10:37:10). The Court is

gradually increasing Plaintiff's visitation, starting with daytime visits and working into overnights. (Video Record at 10:38:00). The Court notes that, just because it is slowly building Plaintiff's visits and is only temporarily giving him limited time, that is not necessarily where the Court will end up. (Video Record at 10:38:30). Defendant is being awarded temporary primary physical custody of the child, but the Court has indicated where it is headed. The law provides a preference for joint physical custody unless the Court can find a deficiency in a parent. The Court does not know if it can find such a deficiency with a parent who already has joint physical custody of another child. (Video Record at 10:52:00).

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that 18% of Plaintiff's gross monthly income is \$963.00; however, the statutory cap for Plaintiff's income range is \$749.00. Plaintiff also has another child for whom he is legally responsible to provide care. Plaintiff has joint physical custody of this child, and there is no child support obligation between him and the mother of that child. A deviation in child support in the amount of \$99.00 per month is appropriate. (Video Record at 10:52:50).

Therefor,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the parties shall be referred to the Family Mediation Center for mediation. (Video Record at 10:29:16). The Order for the same was prepared and noticed in open court. The return hearing from FMC mediation is set for Marcy 13, 2017 at 9:00 a.m.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Court is not striking any pleadings. (Video Record at 10:29:40). Plaintiff's request to strike Defendant's Answer and Counterclaim is denied. (Video Record at 10:58:00).

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the parties shall be awarded joint legal custody of the child. (Video Record at 10:52:40).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant shall have temporary primary physical custody of the child. (Video Record at 10:52:42).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff shall have temporary visitation as follows:

- December visitation
 - o December 3rd and 4th from 9am to noon each day an agreed-upon park (if weather permits) or at GravityZone (Cheyenne and Tenaya). Defendant may be present to ease the child and to assist in reunification. (Video Record at 10:44:56 10:47:50).
 - o December 10th, 11th, 17th, 18th, 24th, 31st, and January 1, 2017 from 10am to 6pm each day. (Video Record at 10:40:05, 10:47:50).
 - December 25th from Noon until 6pm. (Video Record at 10:50:15).
- January 2017 forward until further order of the Court
 - o Beginning January 7, Plaintiff shall have visitation with the child every weekend from Saturday at 10am until Sunday at 6pm. (Video Record at 10:51:20).
- Until further order of the Court or by mutual agreement, the parties shall effectuate the child exchanges at the Taco Bell at Sky Pointe and the 215 Beltway. (Video Record at 10:47:50).
- · Plaintiff shall have a car seat for the child.

THE COURT NOTED that it is not ordering further visitation time at this time. The Court wants to see what the parties do in mediation. The Court expects that Plaintiff will

Record at 10:51:20).

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN of the following provision of NRS 125C.0045(6):

receive another overnight. The Court wants to see Defendant's role as a gatekeeper. (Video

Penalty for violation of order: The abduction, concealment or detention of a child in violation of this order is punishable as a category D felony as provided in NRS 193.130. NRS 200.359 provides that every person having a limited right of custody to a child or any parent having no right of custody to the child who willfully detains, conceals or removes the child from a parent, guardian or other person having lawful custody or a right of visitation of the child in violation of an order of this court, or removes the child from the jurisdiction of the court without the consent of either the court or all persons who have the right to custody or visitation is subject to being punished for a category D felony as provided in NRS 193.130.

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the terms of the Hague Convention of October 25, 1980, adopted by the 14th Session of the Hague Conference on Private International Law apply if a parent abducts or wrongfully retains a child in a foreign country. The parties are also put on notice of the following provisions of NRS 125C.0045(8):

If a parent of the child lives in a foreign country or has significant commitments in a foreign country:

The parties may agree, and the court shall include in the order for custody of the child, that the United States is the country of habitual residence of the child for the purposes of applying the terms of the Hague Convention as set forth in subsection 7.

Upon motion of one of the parties, the court may order the parent to post a bond if the court determines that the parent poses an imminent risk of wrongfully removing or concealing the child outside the country of habitual residence. The bond must be in an amount determined by the court and may be used only to pay for the cost of locating the child and returning him to his habitual residence if the child is wrongfully removed from or concealed outside the country of habitual residence. The fact that a parent has significant commitments in a foreign country does not create a presumption that the parent poses an imminent risk of wrongfully removing or concealing the child.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all parties shall be bound by the provisions of NRS 125C.006, which states:

 If primary physical custody has been established pursuant to an order, judgment or decree of a court and the custodial parent intends to relocate his or her

(b) For the purpose of harassing the relocating parent.

 A parent who relocates with a child pursuant to this section before the court enters an order granting the parent primary physical custody of the child and pennission to relocate with the child is subject to the provisions of NRS 200.359.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff shall provide a crib for the child. Defendant noted that the child cannot sleep in a toddler bed (which Plaintiff has provided) as he gets up from sleeping and gets into things. (Video Record at 10:50:30).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the parties shall use the child's diaper bag to exchange the child's items and to exchange information on the child. (Video Record at 10:51:00).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff shall pay temporary child support to Defendant in the amount of \$650.00 per month. (Video Record at 10:52:50). At least half of the \$650.00 shall be due on the first day of each month with the remainder due by the fifteenth day of each month. (Video Record at 10:54:28). This amount shall be effective December 2016. (Video Record at 10:57:35).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant's request for constructive child support arrears shall be deferred. (Video Record at 10:53:35). The issue of child support order being retroactive to the filing of Defendant's motion shall also be deferred. Pursuant to Ramacciotti v. Ramacciotti, 106 Nev. 529, 532, 795 P.2d 1042, 1048 (2004), the Court may make child support retroactive to the filing of the motion; however, the Court is dealing with all child support arrears issues separately. (Video Record at 10:57:35).

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the provisions of NRS 31A and 125.450 apply regarding the collection of delinquent child support payments.

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that either party may request a review of child support pursuant to NRS 125B.145.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the each party shall continue their respective health insurance coverage for the child. Plaintiff has TriCare. Defendant has Amerigroup. (Video Record at 10:56:00).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, in the event that there are any unreimbursed medical, dental, optical, surgical, or orthodontic expenses for the child, the parties shall equally divide the same pursuant to the 30/30 rule. The 30/30 rule provides that the party paying any unreimbursed medical expenses has thirty (30) days from the date the expense is paid to forward proof of payment to the opposing party. If that party does not timely forward the proof of payment, then that party waives the right to be reimbursed for that expense. Upon receipt of a timely-forwarded proof of payment of an unreimbursed medical expense, the receiving party has thirty (30) days to reimburse the paying party one-half of the expense or to object to the expense. If the receiving party does not either object to the expense or reimburse the paying party for half of the expense, then that party is subject to sanctions for contempt of court.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff shall follow up with TriCare as to the approximate \$2,000 medical bill relating to the child's birth that is currently being tossed between the insurance providers. It is in the interest of both parties to have insurance cover as much of the child's medical costs as possible. (Video Record at 10:55:49).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that both parties' respective requests for attorney's fees are denied. (Video Record at 10:58:00).

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1 | NEOJ CLERK OF THE COURT LAW OFFICES OF F. PETER JAMES, ESQ. F. Peter James, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 10091 3 | Peter@PeterJamesLaw.com 3821 West Charleston Boulevard, Suite 250 Las Vegas, Nevada 89102 702-256-0087 702-256-0145 (fax) Counsel for Plaintiff 6 DISTRICT COURT, FAMILY DIVISION CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 7 8 CASE NO. : D-16-539340-C WILLIAM DIMONACO, DEPT. NO. : Q 9 Plaintiff, NOTICE OF ENTRY OF ORDER 10 VS. 11 ADRIANA DAVINA FERRANDO, 12 Defendant. Hearing Date: November 29, 2016 13 Hearing Time: 10:00 a.m. Please take notice that the attached Order was entered on January 27, 2017. 14 15 day of February, 2017 Dated this 16 LAW OFFICES OF F. PETER JAMES F. Peter James, Esq. 18 Nevada Bar No. 10091 3821 W. Charleston Blvd., Suite 250 19 Las Vegas, Nevada 89102 702-256-0087 20 Counsel for Plaintiff 1 of 2

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1 2 3 4 5	ORDR LAW OFFICES OF F. PETER JAMES, ESQ. F. Peter James, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 10091 Peter@PeterJamesLaw.com 3821 West Charleston Boulevard, Suite 250 Las Vegas, Nevada 89102 702-256-0087 702-256-0145 (fax) Counsel for Plaintiff	CLERK OF THE COURT			
7	DISTRICT COURT, I CLARK COUN				
8 9 10	WILLIAM DIMONACO, Plaintiff, vs.	CASE NO.: D-16-539340-C DEPT. NO.: Q ORDER			
11 12	ADRIANA DAVINA FERRANDO, Defendant.	Hearing Date: November 29, 2016 Hearing Time: 10:00 a.m.			
13	This matter came before the Court on the 29th day of November, 2016 on Plaintiff's				
15 16	Motion to Strike Answer and Counterclaim, Defendant's Opposition and Countermotion, Plaintiff's Motion for Temporary Orders (heard on shortened time), and for an Early Case				
17	Conference / Evaluation. F. Peter James, Esq. appeared with Plaintiff, William DiMonaco.				
18	Steven M. Altig, Esq. appeared with Defendant, Adriana Ferrando. The Honorable Bryce C.				
19	Duckworth presided over the matter.				
20	The Court reviewed the matters at issue. Mr. James stated that Plaintiff exercises a				
21	week on / week off schedule with his other child and that Plaintiff and the mother of his other				
22	child co-parent very well and are flexible with e	ach other. There was discussion regarding a			
23		RECEIVED			
24	1 of	9 77.12			
		FAMILY COURT DEPARTMENT Q			

visitation schedule, child exchanges, co-parenting issues, Plaintiff's living situation, child support, and the \$2,000 medical expense.

The Court, having read the papers and pleadings on file herein, having heard argument and from the parties, being well advised in the premises, and for sufficient cause shown, hereby finds and orders as follows:

THE COURT HEREBY FINDS that it has jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the parties. The minor child at issue is Grayson Ashton DiMonaco-Ferrando (born August 12, 2014) (hereinafter "the child"). The child was born in Nevada and has resided in Nevada for his entire life. As such, the Court has the necessary UCCJEA jurisdiction to enter orders as to child custody and visitation. Nevada is the child's home state and state of habitual residence.

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that Plaintiff is the child's natural father. (Compare Complaint at ¶ 5 with Answer at ¶ 3). Plaintiff and Defendant signed an affidavit of paternity which has not been rescinded or revoked. (Id.). Plaintiff appears on the child's birth certificate as the child's natural father. (Id.).

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that there is a statutory mandate to build parentchild relationships. (Video Record at 10:29:42).

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that, regardless of fault (which is neither being decided today nor is it relevant to the statutory mandate to build relationships), Plaintiff has had a limited relationship with the child. (Video Record at 10:36:20).

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that it must determine if either parent is incapable of caring for the child for at least 146 days per year. If the Court cannot make that finding, then this is likely a joint physical custody case. (Video Record at 10:37:10). The Court is

 gradually increasing Plaintiff's visitation, starting with daytime visits and working into overnights. (Video Record at 10:38:00). The Court notes that, just because it is slowly building Plaintiff's visits and is only temporarily giving him limited time, that is not necessarily where the Court will end up. (Video Record at 10:38:30). Defendant is being awarded temporary primary physical custody of the child, but the Court has indicated where it is headed. The law provides a preference for joint physical custody unless the Court can find a deficiency in a parent. The Court does not know if it can find such a deficiency with a parent who already has joint physical custody of another child. (Video Record at 10:52:00).

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that 18% of Plaintiff's gross monthly income is \$963.00; however, the statutory cap for Plaintiff's income range is \$749.00. Plaintiff also has another child for whom he is legally responsible to provide care. Plaintiff has joint physical custody of this child, and there is no child support obligation between him and the mother of that child. A deviation in child support in the amount of \$99.00 per month is appropriate. (Video Record at 10:52:50).

Therefor,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the parties shall be referred to the Family Mediation Center for mediation. (Video Record at 10:29:16). The Order for the same was prepared and noticed in open court. The return hearing from FMC mediation is set for Marcy 13, 2017 at 9:00 a.m.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Court is not striking any pleadings. (Video Record at 10:29:40). Plaintiff's request to strike Defendant's Answer and Counterclaim is denied. (Video Record at 10:58:00).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the parties shall be awarded joint legal custody of the child. (Video Record at 10:52:40).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant shall have temporary primary physical custody of the child. (Video Record at 10:52:42).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff shall have temporary visitation as follows:

- · December visitation
 - o December 3rd and 4th from 9am to noon each day an agreed-upon park (if weather permits) or at GravityZone (Cheyenne and Tenaya). Defendant may be present to ease the child and to assist in reunification. (Video Record at 10:44:56 10:47:50).
 - December 10th, 11th, 17th, 18th, 24th, 31st, and January 1, 2017 from 10am to 6pm each day. (Video Record at 10:40:05, 10:47:50).
 - December 25th from Noon until 6pm. (Video Record at 10:50:15).
- · January 2017 forward until further order of the Court
 - Beginning January 7, Plaintiff shall have visitation with the child every weekend from Saturday at 10am until Sunday at 6pm. (Video Record at 10:51:20).
- Until further order of the Court or by mutual agreement, the parties shall effectuate the child exchanges at the Taco Bell at Sky Pointe and the 215 Beltway. (Video Record at 10:47:50).
- Plaintiff shall have a car scat for the child.

THE COURT NOTED that it is not ordering further visitation time at this time. The Court wants to see what the parties do in mediation. The Court expects that Plaintiff will

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 receive another overnight. The Court wants to see Defendant's role as a gatekeeper. (Video Record at 10:51:20).

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN of the following provision of NRS 125C.0045(6):

Penalty for violation of order: The abduction, concealment or detention of a child in violation of this order is punishable as a category D felony as provided in NRS 193.130. NRS 200.359 provides that every person having a limited right of custody to a child or any parent having no right of custody to the child who willfully detains, conceals or removes the child from a parent, guardian or other person having lawful custody or a right of visitation of the child in violation of an order of this court, or removes the child from the jurisdiction of the court without the consent of either the court or all persons who have the right to custody or visitation is subject to being punished for a category D felony as provided in NRS 193.130.

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the terms of the Hague Convention of October 25, 1980, adopted by the 14th Session of the Hague Conference on Private International Law apply if a parent abducts or wrongfully retains a child in a foreign country. The parties are also put on notice of the following provisions of NRS 125C.0045(8):

If a parent of the child lives in a foreign country or has significant commitments in a foreign country:

The parties may agree, and the court shall include in the order for custody of the child, that the United States is the country of habitual residence of the child for the purposes of applying the terms of the Hague Convention as set forth in subsection 7.

Upon motion of one of the parties, the court may order the parent to post a bond if the court determines that the parent poses an imminent risk of wrongfully removing or concealing the child outside the country of habitual residence. The bond must be in an amount determined by the court and may be used only to pay for the cost of locating the child and returning him to his habitual residence if the child is wrongfully removed from or concealed outside the country of habitual residence. The fact that a parent has significant commitments in a foreign country does not create a presumption that the parent poses an imminent risk of wrongfully removing or concealing the child.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all parties shall be bound by the provisions of NRS

125C.006, which states:

 If primary physical custody has been established pursuant to an order, judgment or decree of a court and the custodial parent intends to relocate his or her

- (b) For the purpose of harassing the relocating parent.
- A parent who relocates with a child pursuant to this section before the court
 enters an order granting the parent primary physical custody of the child and
 permission to relocate with the child is subject to the provisions of NRS
 200.359.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff shall provide a crib for the child.

Defendant noted that the child cannot sleep in a toddler bed (which Plaintiff has provided) as he gets up from sleeping and gets into things. (Video Record at 10:50:30).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the parties shall use the child's diaper bag to exchange the child's items and to exchange information on the child. (Video Record at 10:51:00).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff shall pay temporary child support to Defendant in the amount of \$650.00 per month. (Video Record at 10:52:50). At least half of the \$650.00 shall be due on the first day of each month with the remainder due by the fifteenth day of each month. (Video Record at 10:54:28). This amount shall be effective December 2016. (Video Record at 10:57:35).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant's request for constructive child support arrears shall be deferred. (Video Record at 10:53:35). The issue of child support order being retroactive to the filing of Defendant's motion shall also be deferred. Pursuant to Ramacciotti v. Ramacciotti, 106 Nev. 529, 532, 795 P.2d 1042, 1048 (2004), the Court may make child support retroactive to the filing of the motion; however, the Court is dealing with all child support arrears issues separately. (Video Record at 10:57:35).

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the provisions of NRS 31A and 125.450 apply regarding the collection of delinquent child support payments.

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that either party may request a review of child support pursuant to NRS 125B.145.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the each party shall continue their respective health insurance coverage for the child. Plaintiff has TriCare. Defendant has Amerigroup. (Video Record at 10:56:00).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, in the event that there are any unreimbursed medical, dental, optical, surgical, or orthodontic expenses for the child, the parties shall equally divide the same pursuant to the 30/30 rule. The 30/30 rule provides that the party paying any unreimbursed medical expenses has thirty (30) days from the date the expense is paid to forward proof of payment to the opposing party. If that party does not timely forward the proof of payment, then that party waives the right to be reimbursed for that expense. Upon receipt of a timely-forwarded proof of payment of an unreimbursed medical expense, the receiving party has thirty (30) days to reimburse the paying party one-half of the expense or to object to the expense. If the receiving party does not either object to the expense or reimburse the paying party for half of the expense, then that party is subject to sanctions for contempt of court.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff shall follow up with TriCare as to the approximate \$2,000 medical bill relating to the child's birth that is currently being tossed between the insurance providers. It is in the interest of both parties to have insurance cover as much of the child's medical costs as possible. (Video Record at 10:55:49).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that both parties' respective requests for attorney's fees are denied. (Video Record at 10:58:00).

1	IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Mr. James shall prepare the Order from today's		
2	bearing with Mr. Altig to countersign as to form and content. (Video Record at 10:57:25).		
3	3 IT IS SO ORDERED.		
4	4 Dated this day of January, 2017		
5	1	- Jank	
6	6 DISTRICT COUR	LIUTGE ""	
7	7 Respectfully submitted by Appro	oved as to form and content by:	
8	8 Dated this 24 day of January, 2017 Queed	this day of January, 2017	
9	9 7M1_		
10		OFFICES OF STEVEN M. ALTIG a.M. Alug, Esq.	
11	1 Nevada Bar No. 10091 Nevada	la Bar No. 6879 outh 7th Street	
12	2 Las Vegas, Nevada 89102 Las V	egas, Nevada 89101 85-7227	
13		sel for Defendant	
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DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

Child Custody Complaint

COURT MINUTES

March 13, 2017

D-16-539340-C

William Eugene DiMonaco, Plaintiff.

VS.

Adriana Davina Ferrando, Defendant.

March 13, 2017

9:00 AM

All Pending Motions

HEARD BY: Duckworth, Bryce C.

COURTROOM: Courtroom 01

COURT CLERK: Michael A. Padilla

PARTIES:

Adriana Ferrando, Defendant, Counter

Steven Altig, Attorney, not present

Claimant, present

Grayson DiMonaco-Ferrando, Subject Minor,

not present

William DiMonaco, Plaintiff, Counter

F James, Attorney, present

Defendant, present

JOURNAL ENTRIES

- RETURN HEARING: FMC MEDIATION ... EARLY CASE CONFERENCE.

Attorney Paul Adras, Nevada Bar #8350, present with Defendant and on behalf of attorney Steven Altig.

Mr. James stated the parties have resolved the medical issue and the minor child is on Tricare. Mr. James stated the issue regarding Defendant going out of town at the end of the month has been resolved; Plaintiff has received an extra overnight; and there is an issue in which Defendant in communication refers to the minor child as "my child." Upon inquiry by the Court, Plaintiff stated his time is Saturday at 10:00 AM to Sunday at 6:00 PM and Thursday after work (between 4:00 PM and 4:30 PM) to Friday morning (between 6:30 AM and 7:30 AM) depending on his work schedule. Mr. Adras took issue with some of Mr. James' representation; however, he believes progress has been

PRINT DATE:	03/13/2017	Page 1 of 3	Minutes Date:	March 13, 2017
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made and that the case can be resolved. MATTER TRAILED to allow for some discussion.

MATTER RECALLED. Mr. James stated there has been no resolution. Upon inquiry by the Court, Mr. James requested a trial date and would be requesting a large amount of attorney's fees as he does not believe this case should go to trial. COURT ORDERED, as follows:

- 1. Matter is set for a NON-JURY TRIAL on 6/21/17 at 1:30 PM. Each party shall have ninety (90) minutes to present their case which includes opening statements, examination time (direct and cross) and closing statements.
- 2. Pretrial memorandum to be exchanged and filed with courtesy copies delivered to chambers no later than 6/14/17.
- 3. Discovery shall close at the close of business on 6/7/17.
- 4. Parties are to exchange lists of witnesses no later than the close of business on 5/1/17 which is to include the name of the witness, address of the witness, telephone number and a brief description of what each witness shall have to offer. Any witness not identified in advance of the hearing who is presented at the hearing will not be permitted to testify at the hearing absent compelling circumstances. (The Court expects testimony from the parties.)
- 5. Parties are to exchange their proposed exhibits and they are to provide their proposed exhibits to the Court Clerk by the close of business on 6/14/17. Exhibits for Plaintiff are to be marked numerically and exhibits for Defendant are to be marked alphabetically. Exhibits are not to be filed.
- 6. There shall be no modification to the physical custody designation at this time.
- 7. Plaintiff shall continue to have TEMPORARY VISITATION with the minor child on Saturday at 10:00 AM to Sunday at 6:00 PM and Thursday after work (between 4:00 PM and 4:30 PM) to Friday morning (between 6:30 AM and 7:30 AM).

Mr. James is to prepare the Order from today's hearing with Mr. Adras to countersign.

INTERIM CONDITIONS:

June 21, 2017 1:30 PM Non-Jury Trial FUTURE HEARINGS:

Duckworth, Bryce C.

Courtroom 01

ſ	PRINT DATE:	03/13/2017	Page 2 of 3	Minutes Date:	March 13, 2017
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CLERK OF THE COURT ORDR 1 LAW OFFICES OF F. PETER JAMES, ESQ. F. Peter James, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 10091 Peter@PeterJamesLaw.com 3821 West Charleston Boulevard, Suite 250 Las Vegas, Nevada 89102 702-256-0087 702-256-0145 (fax) Counsel for Plaintiff 6 DISTRICT COURT, FAMILY DIVISION 7 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 8 CASE NO. : D-16-539340-C WILLIAM DIMONACO. DEPT. NO.: Q ġ Plaintiff, ORDER 10 VS. 11 ADRIANA DAVINA FERRANDO, 12 Hearing Date: March 13, 2017 Defendant. Hearing Time: 9:00 a.m. 13 This matter came before the Court on the 13th day of March, 2017 at 9:00 14 a.m. on a Return Hearing from Family Mediation Center (FMC) Mediation and 15 Early Case Conference. F. Peter James, Esq. appeared with Plaintiff, William 16 DiMonaco. Paul Adras, Esq. appeared on behalf of Steven Altig, Esq. with 17 Defendant Adriana Ferrando. The Honorable Bryce C. Duckworth presided over 18 19 the matter. 20 1 of 8 APR 0.7 200 FAMILY COURT

DEPARTMENT Q

The Court, having read the papers and pleadings on file herein, having heard argument and from the parties, being well advised in the premises, and for sufficient cause shown, hereby notes, finds and orders as follows:

THE COURT NOTES that it has already ordered joint legal custody on a temporary basis and expects that to be the final order upon resolution of the matter. (Video Record at 08:18:27).

THE COURT NOTES that the current schedule that the parties are following is very close to a joint custody schedule and that one overnight would need to be added to make a schedule that the Court would view as a joint physical custody schedule. (Video Record at 08:15:27).

THE COURT NOTES that it would have to make a determination that Plaintiff could not exercise 146 days of visitation each year in order to make permanent the temporary primary physical custody to Defendant. (Video Record at 09:59:37).

THE COURT HEREBY FINDS that a letter was received from FMC indicating that mediation services were complete but that an agreement was not reached. (Video Record at 08:09:52).

The time stamp was not updated to reflect Daylight Savings Time.

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that the parties have resolved the medical issue and the child is now enrolled in Tricare. (Video Record at 08:10:09).

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that the issue regarding Defendant going out of town at the end of the month has been resolve. (Video Record at 08:10:34).

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that Plaintiff has gotten his extra overnight as the Court had requested at the last hearing with attorney involvement to reach the resolution. (Video Record at 08:11:19).

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that the matter was trailed to allow the parties to have further discussion. (Video Record at 08:18:50).

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that the matter was recalled without resolution of the issues. (Video Record at 09:56:19).

Therefor,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the matter is set for Non-Jury Trial on June 21, 2017 at 1:30 p.m. Each party shall have ninety (90) minutes to present their case with includes opening statement, examination time (direct and cross), and closing statements. (Video Record at 09:57:37).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that discovery shall close on June 7, 2017. (Video Record at 09:58:30).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Pretrial Memoranda shall be exchanged and filed with courtesy copies delivered to chambers no later than June 14, 2017. (Video Record at 09:58:38).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the parties are to exchange lists of witnesses no later than the close of business on May 1, 2017, which are to include the name of the witness, address of the witness, telephone number of the witness, and a brief description of what each witness shall have to offer. Any witness not identified in advance of the hearing who is presented at the hearing shall not be permitted to testify at the hearing absent compelling circumstances. The Court expects testimony from the parties. (Video Record at 09:58:45).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the parties are to exchange their proposed exhibits and they are to provide their proposed exhibits to the Court Clerk by the close of business on June 14, 2017. Exhibits for Plaintiff are to be marked numerically and exhibits for Defendant are to be marked alphabetically. Exhibits are not to be filed. (Video Record at 09:58:38).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that there shall be no modification to the physical custody designation at this time. (Video Record at 09:59:35).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff shall continue to have temporary visitation with the minor child on Saturday at 10:00 a.m. through Sunday at 6:00 p.m. and Thursday after work (between 4:00 p.m. and 4:30 p.m.)

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the terms of the Hague Convention of October 25, 1980, adopted by the 14th Session of the Hague Conference on Private International Law apply if a parent abducts or wrongfully retains a child in a foreign country. The parties are also put on notice of the following provisions of NRS 125C.0045(8):

If a parent of the child lives in a foreign country or has significant commitments in a foreign country:

The parties may agree, and the court shall include in the order for custody of the child, that the United States is the country of habitual residence of the child for the purposes of applying the terms of the Hague Convention as set forth in subsection 7.

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Upon motion of one of the parties, the court may order the parent to post a bond if the court determines that the parent poses an imminent risk of wrongfully removing or concealing the child outside the country of habitual residence. The bond must be in an amount determined by the court and may be used only to pay for the cost of locating the child and returning him to his habitual residence if the child is wrongfully removed from or concealed outside the country of habitual residence. The fact that a parent has significant commitments in a foreign country does not create a presumption that the parent poses an imminent risk of wrongfully removing or concealing the child.

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all parties shall be bound by the provisions of NRS 125C.006, which states:

- 1. If primary physical custody has been established pursuant to an order, judgment or decree of a court and the custodial parent intends to relocate his or her residence to a place outside of this State or to a place within this State that is at such a distance that would substantially impair the ability of the other parent to maintain a meaningful relationship with the child, and the custodial parent desires to take the child with him or her, the custodial parent shall, before relocating:
 - Attempt to obtain the written consent of the noncustodial (a) parent to relocate with the child; and
 - If the noncustodial parent refuses to give that consent, petition (b) the court for permission to relocate with the child.
- The court may award reasonable attorney's fees and costs to the 2. custodial parent if the court finds that the noncustodial parent refused to consent to the custodial parent's relocation with the child:
 - (a) Without having reasonable grounds for such refusal; or
 - (b) For the purpose of harassing the custodial parent.

A parent who relocates with a child pursuant to this section without the written consent of the noncustodial parent or the permission of

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2	LAW OFFICES OF F. PETER JAMES, 1 F. Peter James, Esq.	ESQ. CLERK OF THE COURT
3	Nevada Bar No. 10091 Peter@PeterJamesLaw.com 3821 West Charleston Boulevard, Suite 2	50
4	Las Vegas, Nevada 89102 702-256-0087	.50
5	702-256-0145 (fax) Counsel for Plaintiff	
6		
7	DISTRICT COURT, I CLARK COUN	
8	WILLIAM DIMONACO,	CASE NO. : D-16-539340-C DEPT. NO. : Q
9	Plaintiff,	NOTICE OF ENTRY OF ORDER
10	vs.	
11	ADRIANA DAVINA FERRANDO,	Hearing Date: March 13, 2017
12	Defendant.	Hearing Time: 9:00 a.m.
13		
14	Please take notice that the attached	Order was entered on April 17, 2017.
15	Dated this / day of April, 2017	
16	All	
17	LAW ØFFICES OF F. PETER JAMES F. Peter James, Esq.	
18	Nevada Bar No. 10091 3821 W. Charleston Blvd., Suite 250	
19	Las Vegas, Nevada 89102 702-256-0087	
20	Counsel for Plaintiff	
	1 of	2
- }		

foregoing document entitled NOTICE OF ENTRY OF ORDER to be served

as follows:

pursuant to EDCR 8.05(A), EDCR 8.05(F), NRCP 5(b)(2)(D) and Administrative Order 14-2 captioned "In the Administrative Matter of Mandatory Electronic Service in the Eighth Judicial District Court," by mandatory electronic service through the Eighth Judicial District Court's electronic filing system;

[] pursuant to EDCR 7.26 / NEFCR 9, to be sent via facsimile / email;

to the attorney(s) / party(ies) listed below at the address(es), email address(es), and/or facsimile number(s) indicated below:

Steven M. Altig, Esq. 601 South 7th Street
Las Vegas, Nevada 89101
702-385-7227
702-385-5351 (fax)
steven@adraslaw.com
Counsel for Defendant

By:

An employee of the Law Offices of F. Peter James, Esq., PLLC

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ORIGINAL CLERK OF THE COURT ORDR LAW OFFICES OF F. PETER JAMES, ESQ. 2 F. Peter James, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 10091 Peter@PeterJamesLaw.com 3821 West Charleston Boulevard, Suite 250 Las Vegas, Nevada 89102 702-256-0087 702-256-0145 (fax) Counsel for Plaintiff 6 DISTRICT COURT, FAMILY DIVISION 7 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 8 CASE NO. : D-16-539340-C WILLIAM DIMONACO, DEPT. NO.: Q 9 Plaintiff. ORDER 10 Vŝ. 11 ADRIANA DAVINA FERRANDO, 12 Hearing Date: March 13, 2017 Defendant. 9:00 a.m. Hearing Time: 13 This matter came before the Court on the 13th day of March, 2017 at 9:00 14 15 16

a.m. on a Return Hearing from Family Mediation Center (FMC) Mediation and Early Case Conference. F. Peter James, Esq. appeared with Plaintiff, William 17 | DiMonaco. Paul Adras, Esq. appeared on behalf of Steven Altig, Esq. with Defendant Adriana Ferrando. The Honorable Bryce C. Duckworth presided over the matter.

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FAMILY COURT DEPARTMENT Q

The Court, having read the papers and pleadings on file herein, having heard argument and from the parties, being well advised in the premises, and for sufficient cause shown, hereby notes, finds and orders as follows:

THE COURT NOTES that it has already ordered joint legal custody on a temporary basis and expects that to be the final order upon resolution of the matter. (Video Record at 08:18:27).

THE COURT NOTES that the current schedule that the parties are following is very close to a joint custody schedule and that one overnight would need to be added to make a schedule that the Court would view as a joint physical custody schedule. (Video Record at 08:15:27).

THE COURT NOTES that it would have to make a determination that Plaintiff could not exercise 146 days of visitation each year in order to make permanent the temporary primary physical custody to Defendant. (Video Record at 09:59:37).

THE COURT HEREBY FINDS that a letter was received from FMC indicating that mediation services were complete but that an agreement was not reached. (Video Record at 08:09:52)¹.

The time stamp was not updated to reflect Daylight Savings Time.

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THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that the parties have resolved the medical issue and the child is now enrolled in Tricarc. (Video Record at 08:10:09).

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that the issue regarding Defendant going out of town at the end of the month has been resolve. (Video Record at 08:10:34).

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that Plaintiff has gotten his extra overnight as the Court had requested at the last hearing with attorney involvement to reach the resolution. (Video Record at 08:11:19).

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that the matter was trailed to allow the parties to have further discussion. (Video Record at 08:18:50).

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that the matter was recalled without resolution of the issues. (Video Record at 09:56:19).

Therefor,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the matter is set for Non-Jury Trial on June 21, 2017 at 1:30 p.m. Each party shall have ninety (90) minutes to present their case with includes opening statement, examination time (direct and cross), and closing statements. (Video Record at 09:57:37).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that discovery shall close on June 7, 2017. (Video Record at 09:58:30).

 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Pretrial Memoranda shall be exchanged and filed with courtesy copies delivered to chambers no later than June 14, 2017. (Video Record at 09:58:38).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the parties are to exchange lists of witnesses no later than the close of business on May 1, 2017, which are to include the name of the witness, address of the witness, telephone number of the witness, and a brief description of what each witness shall have to offer. Any witness not identified in advance of the hearing who is presented at the hearing shall not be permitted to testify at the hearing absent compelling circumstances. The Court expects testimony from the parties. (Video Record at 09:58:45).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the parties are to exchange their proposed exhibits and they are to provide their proposed exhibits to the Court Clerk by the close of business on June 14, 2017. Exhibits for Plaintiff are to be marked numerically and exhibits for Defendant are to be marked alphabetically. Exhibits are not to be filed. (Video Record at 09:58:38).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that there shall be no modification to the physical custody designation at this time. (Video Record at 09:59:35).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff shall continue to have temporary visitation with the minor child on Saturday at 10:00 a.m. through Sunday at 6:00 p.m. and Thursday after work (between 4:00 p.m. and 4:30 p.m.)

through Friday morning (between 6:30 a.m. and 7:30 a.m.). (Video Record at 08:12:30 and 09:59:23).

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN of the following provision of NRS 125C.0045(6):

Penalty for violation of order: The abduction, concealment or detention of a child in violation of this order is punishable as a category D felony as provided in NRS 193.130. NRS 200.359 provides that every person having a limited right of custody to a child or any parent having no right of custody to the child who willfully detains, conceals or removes the child from a parent, guardian or other person having lawful custody or a right of visitation of the child in violation of an order of this court, or removes the child from the jurisdiction of the court without the consent of either the court or all persons who have the right to custody or visitation is subject to being punished for a category D felony as provided in NRS 193.130.

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the terms of the Hague Convention of October 25, 1980, adopted by the 14th Session of the Hague Conference on Private International Law apply if a parent abducts or wrongfully retains a child in a foreign country. The parties are also put on notice of the following provisions of NRS 125C.0045(8):

If a parent of the child lives in a foreign country or has significant commitments in a foreign country:

The parties may agree, and the court shall include in the order for custody of the child, that the United States is the country of habitual residence of the child for the purposes of applying the terms of the Hague Convention as set forth in subsection 7.

Upon motion of one of the parties, the court may order the parent to post a bond if the court determines that the parent poses an imminent risk of wrongfully removing or concealing the child outside the country of habitual residence. The bond must be in an amount determined by the court and may be used only to pay for the cost of locating the child and returning him to his habitual residence if the child is wrongfully removed from or concealed outside the country of habitual residence. The fact that a parent has significant commitments in a foreign country does not create a presumption that the parent poses an imminent risk of wrongfully removing or concealing the child.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all parties shall be bound by the provisions of NRS 125C.006, which states:

- 1. If primary physical custody has been established pursuant to an order, judgment or decree of a court and the custodial parent intends to relocate his or her residence to a place outside of this State or to a place within this State that is at such a distance that would substantially impair the ability of the other parent to maintain a meaningful relationship with the child, and the custodial parent desires to take the child with him or her, the custodial parent shall, before relocating:
 - (a) Attempt to obtain the written consent of the noncustodial parent to relocate with the child; and
 - (b) If the noncustodial parent refuses to give that consent, petition the court for permission to relocate with the child.
- The court may award reasonable attorney's fees and costs to the custodial parent if the court finds that the noncustodial parent refused to consent to the custodial parent's relocation with the child:
 - (a) Without having reasonable grounds for such refusal; or
 - (b) For the purpose of harassing the custodial parent.

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125.450 apply regarding the collection of delinquent child support payments. NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that either party may request a review of child support pursuant to NRS 125B.145. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Mr. James shall prepare the order from today's hearing with Mr. Adras to countersign. (Video Record at 10:01:03). IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated this day of, 2017 APR 1 3 2017 APR 1 3 2017 APR 1 3 2017 Approved as to form and content by: LAW OFFICES OF F. PETER JAMES ADRAS & ALTIG AFF FSAT LAW F. Peter James, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 10091 3821 W. Charleston Blvd., Suite 250 Las Vegas, Nevada 89102 702-256-0087 Counsel for Plaintiff Respectfully submitted by: Approved as to form and content by: Nevada Bar No. 08350 Steven Altig, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 06879 601 South 7th Street Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 702-385-7227 Counsel for Defendant	1	NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the provisions of NRS 31A and	
child support pursuant to NRS 125B.145. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Mr. James shall prepare the order from today's hearing with Mr. Adras to countersign. (Video Record at 10:01:03). IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated this day of, 2017 APR 1 3 2017 APR 1 3 2017 APR 1 3 2017 Approved as to form and content by: LAW OFFICES OF F. PETER JAMES ADRAS: ALTICATT'S AT LAW F. Peter James, Esq. Paul Adras, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 10091 3821 W. Charleston Blvd., Suite 250 Las Vegas, Nevada 89102 702-256-0087 Counsel for Plaintiff Nevada Bar No. 06879 601 South 7th Street Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 702-385-7227 Counsel for Defendant	2	125.450 apply regarding the collection of delinquent child support payments.	
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Mr. James shall prepare the order from today's hearing with Mr. Adras to countersign. (Video Record at 10:01:03). IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated thisday of, 2017 APR 1 3 2017 APR 1 3 2017 APR 1 3 2017 Approved as to form and content by: Approved as to form and content by: LAW OFFICES OF F. PETER JAMES ADRAS ALTICATTYS AT LAW Paul Adras, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 10091 Nevada Bar No. 08350 Steven Altig, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 06879 702-256-0087 Counsel for Plaintiff Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 702-385-7227 Counsel for Defendant	3	NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that either party may request a review of	
today's hearing with Mr. Adras to countersign. (Video Record at 10:01:03). IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated thisday of, 2017 APR 1 3 2017 DISTRICT COUR! JUDGE AP 10 Respectfully submitted by: Approved as to form and content by: LAW OFFICES OF F. PETER JAMES ADRAS & ACTIC ATT FS AT LAW F. Peter James, Esq. Paul Adras, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 10091 Nevada Bar No. 08350 Steven Altig, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 06879 702-256-0087 601 South 7th Street Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 702-385-7227 Counsel for Plaintiff Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 702-385-7227 Counsel for Defendant	4	child support pursuant to NRS 125B.145.	
IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated this day of, 2017 APR 1 3 2017 DISTRICT COURT JUDGE of II Respectfully submitted by: Approved as to form and content by: LAW OFFICES OF F. PETER JAMES ADRAS ALTICATTYS AT LAW F. Peter James, Esq. Paul Adras, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 10091 Nevada Bar No. 08350 Steven Altig, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 06879 601 South 7th Street Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 702-385-7227 Counsel for Plaintiff Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 702-385-7227 Counsel for Defendant	5	IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Mr. James shall prepare the order from	
Dated thisday of, 2017 APR 1 3 2017 DISTRICT COUR JUDGE NOT DISTR	6	today's hearing with Mr. Adras to countersign. (Video Record at 10:01:03).	
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE Respectfully submitted by: Approved as to form and content by: LAW OFFICES OF F. PETER JAMES ADRAS & ALTICATPYS AT LAW F. Peter James, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 10091 3821 W. Charleston Blvd., Suite 250 Las Vegas, Nevada 89102 702-256-0087 Counsel for Plaintiff Respectfully submitted by: Approved as to form and content by: Paul Adras, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 08350 Steven Altig, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 06879 601 South 7th Street Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 702-385-7227 Counsel for Defendant	7	IT IS SO ORDERED.	
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE Respectfully submitted by: Approved as to form and content by: LAW OFFICES OF F. PETER JAMES ADRAS & ALTICATPYS AT LAW F. Peter James, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 10091 3821 W. Charleston Blvd., Suite 250 Las Vegas, Nevada 89102 702-256-0087 Counsel for Plaintiff Respectfully submitted by: Approved as to form and content by: Paul Adras, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 08350 Steven Altig, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 06879 601 South 7th Street Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 702-385-7227 Counsel for Defendant	8	Dated this day of, 2017	
Respectfully submitted by: Approved as to form and content by: LAW OFFICES OF F. PETER JAMES ADRAS & ALTICATT FS AT LAW F. Peter James, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 10091 Nevada Bar No. 08350 3821 W. Charleston Blvd., Suite 250 Las Vegas, Nevada 89102 Nevada Bar No. 06879 702-256-0087 Counsel for Plaintiff Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 702-385-7227 Counsel for Defendant 19 20	9	APR 1 3 2017	
Respectfully submitted by: Approved as to form and content by: LAW OFFICES OF F. PETER JAMES ADRAS & ALTICATT FS AT LAW F. Peter James, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 10091 Nevada Bar No. 08350 3821 W. Charleston Blvd., Suite 250 Las Vegas, Nevada 89102 Nevada Bar No. 06879 702-256-0087 Counsel for Plaintiff Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 702-385-7227 Counsel for Defendant 19 20	10	DISTRICA COURT JUDGE NO	
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LAW OFFICES OF F. PETER JAMES ADRAS & ALTIC ATT FS AT LAW F. Peter James, Esq. Paul Adras, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 10091 Nevada Bar No. 08350 3821 W. Charleston Blvd., Suite 250 Steven Altig, Esq. Las Vegas, Nevada 89102 Nevada Bar No. 06879 702-256-0087 601 South 7th Street Counsel for Plaintiff Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 702-385-7227 Counsel for Defendant 19 20	12	Respectfully submitted by: Approved as to form and content by:	
F. Peter James, Esq. Paul Adras, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 10091 Nevada Bar No. 08350 3821 W. Charleston Blvd., Suite 250 Steven Altig, Esq. Las Vegas, Nevada 89102 Nevada Bar No. 06879 702-256-0087 601 South 7th Street Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 702-385-7227 18 Counsel for Plaintiff Counsel for Defendant 19 20	13	MM	
Nevada Bar No. 10091 Nevada Bar No. 08350 3821 W. Charleston Blvd., Suite 250 Steven Altig, Esq. Las Vegas, Nevada 89102 Nevada Bar No. 06879 702-256-0087 601 South 7th Street Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 702-385-7227 18	14		
16 Las Vegas, Nevada 89102 Nevada Bar No. 06879 702-256-0087 601 South 7th Street Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 702-385-7227 Counsel for Defendant 19 20	15	Nevada Bar No. 10091 Nevada Bar No. 08350	
Counsel for Plaintiff Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 702-385-7227 Counsel for Defendant 19 20	16	Las Vegas, Nevada 89102 Nevada Bar No. 06879	
Counsel for Defendant 19 20	17	Counsel for Plaintiff Las Vegas, Nevada 89101	
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ORIGINAL

Electronically Filed 6/12/2017 3:52 PM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT

CLERK OF THE COURT 1 PAGR LAW OFFICES OF F. PETER JAMES, ESQ. F. Peter James, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 10091 || Peter@PeterJamesLaw.com 3821 West Charleston Boulevard, Suite 250 Las Vegas, Nevada 89102 702-256-0087 702-256-0145 (fax) 5 Counsel for Plaintiff 6 DISTRICT COURT, FAMILY DIVISION 7 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 8 WILLIAM DIMONACO, CASE NO. : D-16-539340-C DEPT. NO.: Q 9 Plaintiff, PARTIAL PARENTING 10 AGREEMENT VS. 11 ADRIANA DAVINA FERRANDO, 12 Defendant. 13 14 STIPULATED PARTIAL PARENTING AGREEMENT 15 COME NOW Plaintiff, William DiMonaco (hereinafter "Dad"), by and 16 through his counsel, F. Peter James, Esq., and Defendant, Adriana Ferrando 17 (hereinafter "Mom"), by and through her counsel, Steven M. Altig, Esq., who 18 stipulate and request entry of an order as follows: 19 20 1 of 9 MAY 17 297 FAMILY COURT

Case Number: D-16-539340-C

DEPARTMENT Q

IT IS HEREBY STIPULATED that Dad and Mom shall share joint legal custody of their minor child, Grayson Ashton DiMonaco-Ferrando (born August 12, 2014) (hereinafter "the child").

IT IS FURTHER STIPULATED that Dad and Mom shall share joint physical custody of the child effective May 1, 2017.

IT IS FURTHER STIPULATED that, for the purposes of child support calculation, Mom shall have her prior income imputed upon her.

IT IS FURTHER STIPULATED that any unreimbursed medical, dental, optical, surgical, and orthodontic expenses for the child shall be equally divided between the parties pursuant to the 30/30 rule. The 30/30 rule provides that the party paying any unreimbursed medical expenses has thirty (30) days from the date the expense is paid to forward proof of payment to the opposing party. If that party does not timely forward the proof of payment, then that party waives the right to be reimbursed for that expense. Upon receipt of a timely-forwarded proof of payment of an unreimbursed medical expense, the receiving party has thirty (30) days to reimburse the paying party one-half of the expense or to object to the expense. If the receiving party does not either object to the expense or reimburse the paying party for half of the expense, then that party is subject to sanctions for contempt of court.

deduction for the child with Dad claiming the tax deduction in even years and Mom claiming the tax deduction in odd years.

IT IS FURTHER STIPULATED that the parties shall alternate the tax

IT IS FURTHER STIPULATED that, as the parties have resolved the main issues of child custody (both legal and physical) and as the parties have agreed that Mom shall have her prior income imputed upon her, the non-jury trial date of June 21, 2017 at 1:30 p.m. should be vacated and set as the date for the unresolved issues to be argued. The parties have agreed to argue the outstanding issues of the regular schedule, the holiday / vacation schedule, and child support arrears, as well as any other outstanding issues (should the parties not resolve the same).

IT IS SO STIPULATED.

day of May, 2017

Dated this Z day of May, 2017

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OFFICES OF F. PETER JAMES ADKAS & ALTIG F. Peter James, Esq.

Nevada Bar No. 10091

3821 W. Charleston Blvd., Suite 250

Las Vegas, Nevada 89102

702-256-0087

Counsel for Plaintiff

Steven M. Altig, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 6879 601 South 7th Street

Las Vegas, Nevada 89101

702-385-7227

Counsel for Defendant

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DAD'S VERIFICATION

William DiMonaco, being first duly sworn under penalties of perjury, deposes and says:

I am the Plaintiff herein, and I have read the foregoing *Partial Parenting*Agreement and know the contents thereof; that the same is true and correct to the best of my knowledge, except as to those matters therein stated upon information and belief, and as to those matters, I believe them to be true.

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WILLIAM DIMONACO

10 STATE OF NEVADA

) ss.

COUNTY OF CLARK

Appointment No. 07-4047-1
My Appointment Expires Nov. 27, 2020

SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me by William DiMonaco this _\(\(\(\)_\) day of May, 2017

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NOTARY PUBLIC in and for said County and State

1 MOM'S VERIFICATION 2 Adriana Ferrando being first duly sworn under penalties of perjury, 3 deposes and says: 4 I am the Defendant herein, and I have read the foregoing Partial Parenting 5 Agreement and know the contents thereof; that the same is true and correct to the best of my knowledge, except as to those matters therein stated upon information 7 and belief, and as to those matters, I believe them to be true. 8 ADRIANA FERRANDO STATE OF CLARK 10 SS. 11 COUNTY OF CLARK 12 SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me by Adriana Ferrando this $28^{\circ\circ}$ day of May, 2017 13 14 MOTARY PUBLIC in and for said County and State 15 16 17 18 19

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SARAH HUGAR

Notary Public, State of Nevada Appointment No. 11-4399-1 My Appt. Expires Apr 25, 2019

<u>ORDER</u>

The Court, having considered the above Stipulated Partial Parenting

Agreement and for sufficient cause shown, hereby orders as follows:

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the above Stipulated Partial Parenting
Agreement shall be ratified, incorporated as though fully set forth herein, merged
into this order, and adopted as an Order of the Court.

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN of the following provision of NRS 125C.0045(6):

Penalty for violation of order: The abduction, concealment or detention of a child in violation of this order is punishable as a category D felony as provided in NRS 193.130. NRS 200.359 provides that every person having a limited right of custody to a child or any parent having no right of custody to the child who willfully detains, conceals or removes the child from a parent, guardian or other person having lawful custody or a right of visitation of the child in violation of an order of this court, or removes the child from the jurisdiction of the court without the consent of either the court or all persons who have the right to custody or visitation is subject to being punished for a category D felony as provided in NRS 193.130.

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the terms of the Hague Convention of October 25, 1980, adopted by the 14th Session of the Hague Conference on Private International Law apply if a parent abducts or wrongfully retains a child in a foreign country. The parties are also put on notice of the following provisions of NRS 125C,0045(8):

If a parent of the child lives in a foreign country or has significant commitments in a foreign country:

The parties may agree, and the court shall include in the order for custody of the child, that the United States is the country of habitual residence of the child for the purposes of applying the terms of the Hague Convention as set forth in subsection 7.

Upon motion of one of the parties, the court may order the parent to post a bond if the court determines that the parent poses an imminent risk of wrongfully removing or concealing the child outside the country of habitual residence. The bond must be in an amount determined by the court and may be used only to pay for the cost of locating the child and returning him to his habitual residence if the child is wrongfully removed from or concealed outside the country of habitual residence. The fact that a parent has significant commitments in a foreign country does not create a presumption that the parent poses an imminent risk of wrongfully removing or concealing the child.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all parties shall be bound by the

provisions of NRS 125C.006, which states:

- 1. If primary physical custody has been established pursuant to an order, judgment or decree of a court and the custodial parent intends to relocate his or her residence to a place outside of this State or to a place within this State that is at such a distance that would substantially impair the ability of the other parent to maintain a meaningful relationship with the child, and the custodial parent desires to take the child with him or her, the custodial parent shall, before relocating:
 - (a) Attempt to obtain the written consent of the noncustodial parent to relocate with the child; and
 - (b) If the noncustodial parent refuses to give that consent, petition the court for permission to relocate with the child.

Electronically Filed 6/13/2017 3:26 PM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT 1 NEOJ LAW OFFICES OF F. PETER JAMES, ESQ. F. Peter James, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 10091 3 Peter@PeterJamesLaw.com 3821 West Charleston Boulevard, Suite 250 Las Vegas, Nevada 89102 702-256-0087 702-256-0145 (fax) 5 Counsel for Plaintiff 6 DISTRICT COURT, FAMILY DIVISION 7 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 8 WILLIAM DIMONACO, CASE NO. : D-16-539340-C DEPT. NO. : Q 9 Plaintiff, NOTICE OF ENTRY OF PARTIAL 10 VS. PARENTING AGREEMENT 11 ADRIANA DAVINA FERRANDO, 12 Defendant. 13 14 1/// 15 11/// 16 | / / / 17 /// 18 /// 19 /// 20 111 1 of 3

Case Number: D-16-539340-C

1 Please take notice that the attached Partial Parenting Agreement was entered on June 12, 2017. 2 day of June, 2017 Dated this / \ 3 4 LAW OFFICES OF F. PETER JAMES 5 F. Peter James, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 10091 3821 W. Charleston Blvd., Suite 250 Las Vegas, Nevada 89102 702-256-0087 Counsel for Plaintiff 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 2 of 3

Steven M. Altig, Esq. 601 South 7th Street Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 702-385-7227 702-385-5351 (fax) steven@adraslaw.com Counsel for Defendant

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Ву:

An employee of the Law Offices of F. Peter James, Esq., PLLC

ORIGINAL

Electronically Filed 6/12/2017 3:52 PM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT

PAGR LAW OFFICES OF F. PETER JAMES, ESQ. F. Peter James, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 10091 3 Peter@PeterJamesLaw.com 3821 West Charleston Boulevard, Suite 250 Las Vegas, Nevada 89102 702-256-0087 5 702-256-0145 (fax) Counsel for Plaintiff 6 DISTRICT COURT, FAMILY DIVISION 7 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 8 WILLIAM DIMONACO, CASE NO. : D-16-539340-C DEPT. NO. : Q 9 Plaintiff. PARTIAL PARENTING 10 VS. **AGREEMENT** 11 ADRIANA DAVINA FERRANDO. 12 Defendant. 13 14 STIPULATED PARTIAL PARENTING AGREEMENT 15 COME NOW Plaintiff, William DiMonaco (hereinafter "Dad"), by and 16 through his counsel, F. Peter James, Esq., and Defendant, Adriana Ferrando 17 (hereinafter "Mom"), by and through her counsel, Steven M. Altig, Esq., who 18 stipulate and request entry of an order as follows: 19 20 l of 9 MAY 17 257 FAMILY COURT DEPARTMENT

Case Number: D-16-539340-C

IT IS HEREBY STIPULATED that Dad and Mom shall share joint legal custody of their minor child, Grayson Ashton DiMonaco-Ferrando (born August 12, 2014) (hereinafter "the child").

IT IS FURTHER STIPULATED that Dad and Mom shall share joint physical custody of the child effective May 1, 2017.

IT IS FURTHER STIPULATED that, for the purposes of child support calculation, Mom shall have her prior income imputed upon her.

IT IS FURTHER STIPULATED that any unreimbursed medical, dental, optical, surgical, and orthodontic expenses for the child shall be equally divided between the parties pursuant to the 30/30 rule. The 30/30 rule provides that the party paying any unreimbursed medical expenses has thirty (30) days from the date the expense is paid to forward proof of payment to the opposing party. If that party does not timely forward the proof of payment, then that party waives the right to be reimbursed for that expense. Upon receipt of a timely-forwarded proof of payment of an unreimbursed medical expense, the receiving party has thirty (30) days to reimburse the paying party one-half of the expense or to object to the expense. If the receiving party does not either object to the expense or reimburse the paying party for half of the expense, then that party is subject to sanctions for contempt of court.

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IT IS FURTHER STIPULATED that the parties shall alternate the tax deduction for the child with Dad claiming the tax deduction in even years and Mom claiming the tax deduction in odd years.

IT IS FURTHER STIPULATED that, as the parties have resolved the main issues of child custody (both legal and physical) and as the parties have agreed that Mom shall have her prior income imputed upon her, the non-jury trial date of June 21, 2017 at 1:30 p.m. should be vacated and set as the date for the unresolved issues to be argued. The parties have agreed to argue the outstanding issues of the regular schedule, the holiday / vacation schedule, and child support arrears, as well as any other outstanding issues (should the parties not resolve the same).

IT IS SO STIPULATED.

Dated this 6 day of May, 2017

3821 W. Charleston Blvd., Suite 250

F. Peter James, Esq.

702-256-0087

Nevada Bar No. 10091

Counsel for Plaintiff

Las Vegas, Nevada 89102

Dated this 3 day of May, 2017

OFFICES OF F. PETER JAMES ADRAS & ALTIG

Steven M. Altig, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 6879 601 South 7th Street

Las Vegas, Nevada 89101

702-385-7227

Counsel for Defendant

DAD'S VERIFICATION

William DiMonaco, being first duly sworn under penalties of perjury, deposes and says:

I am the Plaintiff herein, and I have read the foregoing *Partial Parenting*Agreement and know the contents thereof; that the same is true and correct to the best of my knowledge, except as to those matters therein stated upon information and belief, and as to those matters, I believe them to be true.

C. O'BRIEN

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WILLIAM DIMONACO

STATE OF NEVADA

) ss. COUNTY OF CLARK)

11 COUNTY OF CLARK
12 SUBSCRIBED and SWO

SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me by William DiMonaco this \(\lambda_{\mathcal{G}} \) day of May, 2017

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MOM'S VERIFICATION

Adriana Ferrando being first duly sworn under penalties of perjury, deposes and says:

I am the Defendant herein, and I have read the foregoing *Partial Parenting*Agreement and know the contents thereof; that the same is true and correct to the best of my knowledge, except as to those matters therein stated upon information and belief, and as to those matters, I believe them to be true.

ADRIANA FERRANDO

STATE OF CLARK) ss. COUNTY OF CLARK)

SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me by Adriana Ferrando this 28th day of May, 2017

SARAH HUGAR
Notary Public, State of Nevada
Appointment No. 11-4399-1
My Appt, Expires Apr 25, 2019

OTARY PUBLIC in and for spid County and State

ORDER

The Court, having considered the above Stipulated Partial Parenting

Agreement and for sufficient cause shown, hereby orders as follows:

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the above Stipulated Partial Parenting Agreement shall be ratified, incorporated as though fully set forth herein, merged into this order, and adopted as an Order of the Court.

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN of the following provision of NRS 125C.0045(6):

Penalty for violation of order: The abduction, concealment or detention of a child in violation of this order is punishable as a category D felony as provided in NRS 193.130. NRS 200.359 provides that every person having a limited right of custody to a child or any parent having no right of custody to the child who willfully detains, conceals or removes the child from a parent, guardian or other person having lawful custody or a right of visitation of the child in violation of an order of this court, or removes the child from the jurisdiction of the court without the consent of either the court or all persons who have the right to custody or visitation is subject to being punished for a category D felony as provided in NRS 193.130.

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the terms of the Hague Convention of October 25, 1980, adopted by the 14th Session of the Hague Conference on Private International Law apply if a parent abducts or wrongfully retains a child in a foreign country. The parties are also put on notice of the following provisions of NRS 125C.0045(8):

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If a parent of the child lives in a foreign country or has significant commitments in a foreign country:

The parties may agree, and the court shall include in the order for custody of the child, that the United States is the country of habitual residence of the child for the purposes of applying the terms of the Hague Convention as set forth in subsection 7.

Upon motion of one of the parties, the court may order the parent to post a bond if the court determines that the parent poses an imminent risk of wrongfully removing or concealing the child outside the country of habitual residence. The bond must be in an amount determined by the court and may be used only to pay for the cost of locating the child and returning him to his habitual residence if the child is wrongfully removed from or concealed outside the country of habitual residence. The fact that a parent has significant commitments in a foreign country does not create a presumption that the parent poses an imminent risk of wrongfully removing or concealing the child.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all parties shall be bound by the

provisions of NRS 125C.006, which states:

- 1. If primary physical custody has been established pursuant to an order, judgment or decree of a court and the custodial parent intends to relocate his or her residence to a place outside of this State or to a place within this State that is at such a distance that would substantially impair the ability of the other parent to maintain a meaningful relationship with the child, and the custodial parent desires to take the child with him or her, the custodial parent shall, before relocating:
 - Attempt to obtain the written consent of the noncustodial (a) parent to relocate with the child; and
 - If the noncustodial parent refuses to give that consent, petition (b) the court for permission to relocate with the child.

The court may award reasonable attorney's fees and costs to the

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1	3. A parent who relocates with a child pursuant to this section before
2	the court enters an order granting the parent primary physical custody of the child and permission to relocate with the child is subject to the provisions of NRS 200.359.
3	Subject to the provisions of NKB 200.339.
4	NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the provisions of NRS 31A and
5	125.450 apply regarding the collection of delinquent child support payments.
6	NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that either party may request a review of
7	child support pursuant to NRS 125B,145.
8	IT IS SO ORDERED.
9	Dated this day of May, 2017 JUN 0 8 2017
10	1000 00 2017
11	DISTRICT COURT JUDGE AND
12	Respectfully submitted by:
13	7M
14	LAW OFFICES OF F. PETER JAMES F. Peter James, Esq.
15	Nevada Bar No. 10091 3821 W. Charleston Blvd., Suite 250
16	Las Vegas, Nevada 89102 702-256-0087
17	Counsel for Plaintiff
18	
19	
20	

DISTRICT COURT **CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA**

Child Custody Complaint

COURT MINUTES

June 21, 2017

D-16-539340-C

William Eugene DiMonaco, Plaintiff.

Adriana Davina Ferrando, Defendant.

June 21, 2017

1:30 PM

Non-Jury Trial

HEARD BY: Duckworth, Bryce C.

COURTROOM: Courtroom 01

COURT CLERK: Michael A. Padilla

PARTIES:

Adriana Ferrando, Defendant, Counter

Steven Altig, Attorney, present

Claimant, present

Grayson DiMonaco-Ferrando, Subject Minor,

not present

William DiMonaco, Plaintiff, Counter

F James, Attorney, present

Defendant, present

JOURNAL ENTRIES

- Discussion regarding the unresolved issues. Plaintiff and Defendant sworn and testified. Based upon the COURT'S FINDINGS as set forth on the record, COURT ORDERED, as follows:
- 1. Per STIPULATION, the parties shall have JOINT PHYSICAL CUSTODY of the minor child.
- Defendant's PARENTAL TIMESHARE shall be every Monday at 8:00 AM to Wednesday at 8:00 AM.
- 3. Plaintiff's PARENTAL TIMESHARE shall be every Wednesday at 8:00 AM to Friday at 8:00 AM. In the event Plaintiff is working on Wednesday, then the minor child shall remain with Defendant until Plaintiff gets out of work. This provision is for Wednesday only.

PRINT DATE:	06/23/2017	Page 1 of 2	Minutes Date:	June 21, 2017

Notice: Journal entries are prepared by the courtroom clerk and are not the official record of the Court.

- 4. The parties shall alternate the weekends, which shall be defined as beginning Friday at 8:00 AM and concluding Monday at 8:00 AM. Defendant shall have this weekend, 6/23/17.
- 5. Parties shall abide by the Court's default holiday schedule, absent an agreement. The holiday schedule shall supersede the regular schedule and vacations. Vacation time shall only supersede the regular schedule.
- 6. Per STIPULATION, Plaintiff shall provide for the transportation. In the event Plaintiff is unable to provide the transportation, then the parties are to communicate in advance to designate an alternate individual.
- 7. Plaintiff's CHILD SUPPORT obligation is set at four hundred fifty dollars (\$450.00) per month effective May 2017.
- 8. The Plaintiff's CHILD SUPPORT obligation for the months of September, October and November 2016, shall be calculated at the rate of six hundred fifty dollars (\$650.00) per month. The ARREARS shall be payable at the rate of fifty dollars (\$50.00) per month until paid in full.
- 9. Both parties shall continue to provide medical/health insurance for the minor child.
- 10. The parties shall bear their own ATTORNEY'S FEES and COSTS.

Mr. James is to prepare the Order from today's hearing with Mr. Altig to countersign.

INTERIM CONDITIONS:

FUTURE HEARINGS: Canceled: June 21, 2017 1:30 PM Motion to Compel

July 19, 2017 2:00 PM Status Check

Bailey, Soonhee Courtroom 17

PRINT DATE:	06/23/2017	Page 2 of 2	Minutes Date:	June 21, 2017
	}	§	}	ļ

Notice: Journal entries are prepared by the courtroom clerk and are not the official record of the Court.

original

Electronically Filed 11/9/2017 10:11 AM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT

1	DECC				
	LAW OFFICES OF F. PETER JAMES, ESQ.				
2	F. Peter James, Esq.				
	Nevada Bar No. 10091				
3	G- +				
А	3821 West Charleston Boulevard, Suite 2 Las Vegas, Nevada 89102	.50			
7	702-256-0087				
5					
	Counsel for Plaintiff				
6		•			
-	DISTRICT COURT, I				
7	CLARK COUN	ΓY, NEVADA			
8	WILLIAM DIMONACO,	CASE NO . D 16 620240 C			
Ū	WILDIAM DIMONACO,	CASE NO. : D-16-539340-C DEPT. NO. : Q			
9	Plaintiff,	DEI I. NO Q			
		DECREE OF CUSTODY			
10	vs.				
11	ADDIANA DANDA EEDDANDO				
11	ADRIANA DAVINA FERRANDO,				
12	Defendant.	Hearing Date: June 21, 2017			
		Hearing Time: 1:30 p.m.			
13	Little Control of the	The second secon			
14	This server has server to server				
1 *1	Inis matter came before the Court of	on the 21st day of June, 2017 for a Non-			
15	Jury Trial. F. Peter James, Esq. appear	ed with Plaintiff William DiMonaco			
	The state of the s	VIIII I Idilliani, VIIII Dilliano			
16	(hereinafter "Dad"). Steven M. Altig, Es	sq. appeared with Defendant, Adriana			
17	Ferrando (hereinafter "Mom"). The Hor	orable Bryce C. Duckworth presided			
18	over the matter.				
	over the matter.				
19	The parties had numerous stipulation	ns, but requested that the Court decide			
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20	several matters.				
	 Ngn-Trial Dispositions:	RECEIVED			
☐ Olamiased - Wad	Settled/Withdrawn: 1 OT 1 of Prosecution El Without Judicial Conf/Hm				
☐ Involuntary (Stat) ☐ Default Judgment ☐ Transferred	tory) Dismissal	OCT 12 28!7			
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1		DEPARTMENTQ			

Case Number: D-16-539340-C

The Court, having read the papers and pleadings on file herein, having heard argument, having heard from the parties, having heard from third parties in the courtroom, having heard the stipulations of the parties, being well advised in the premises, and for sufficient cause shown, hereby finds and orders as follows:

THE COURT HEREBY FINDS that Dad is now and has been an actual bona fide resident of the State of Nevada and has actually been domiciled in the State of Nevada for more than six weeks prior to the commencement of this action.

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that it has complete jurisdiction in the premises, both as to the subject matter thereof as well as the parties hereto.

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that Dad and Mom were never married to each other.

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that Dad and Mom have one child together, to wit: Grayson Ashton DiMonaco-Ferrando (born August 12, 2014 (hereinafter "the child"); the parties have no other minor children together, no adopted children together, and, Mom is not currently pregnant with Dad's child.

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that Dad is the child's natural father.

Mom and Dad signed an affidavit of paternity as to the child, which has not been revoked. Dad is listed as the child's natural father on the child's birth certificate.

The child bears Dad's surname. Dad has held the child out to the world as his natural child. Mom does not contest that Dad is the child's natural father.

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that the child has resided in the State of Nevada for at least six months prior to the filing of the Complaint. As such, this Court has the necessary UCCJEA jurisdiction to enter orders as to child custody and visitation. Nevada is the child's home state and state of habitual residence.

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that the parties have stipulated to having joint legal custody and joint physical custody of the child. This arrangement is in the child's best interest.

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that the visitation schedule delineated is in the child's best interest. Mom proposed a visitation schedule that spits weekends. Setting a visitation schedule that splits the weekends is not in the child's best interest. While it may be feasible due to the child not yet being in school, from a planning standpoint, it does not work as the parents would not have full weekends. (Video Record at 14:12:00).

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that, under the case law (Lewis v. Hicks and Rodgers v. Rodgers), a spouse has a community property interest in the other spouses income, which may be used to offset a child support award. (Video Record at 14:15:00, 14:25:00). Dad offered that Mom's husband makes

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approximately \$120,000.00 per year (\$79,029.00 regular pay + \$20,843.14 in overtime pay + \$20,897.75 in other pay = \$120,769.89 or \$10,064.16 gross monthly income—benefits are not included in this calculation). (See Exhibits filed June 19, 2017 at W DIMONACO 000039; see also Video Record at 14:23:15, 14:29:20). The Court inquired as to what Dad's girlfriend earns. Dad's counsel stated that his girlfriend contributes \$500 per month to his household and that her actual income is not relevant as they are not married. The Court stated "what is good for the goose is good for the gander." (Video Record at 14:24:50). Dad's girlfriend stated that she makes \$47,000.00 per year salary (which is a gross monthly income of \$3,916.67). (Video Record at 14:30:20). Using a Wright v. Osburn calculation to determine child support only imputing Mom's prior income upon her, the child support obligation from Dad to Mom is \$550.00. (Video Record at 14:27:10). Another deviation factor the Court may consider is the relative income of the parties (NRS 125B.080(9)). (Video Record at 14:27:20). The total household income of each side is germane to the Court's calculation of child support. (Video Record at 14:28:15). The Court acknowledged that Dad wants further discovery into Mom's household income, but the Court stated it could attempt to determine that issue today and resolve the need for further discovery into this issue. (Video Record at 14:28:35). The household incomes appear to be \$109,400 on Dad's side (Dad and his girlfriend)

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and \$120,769 on Defendant's side without imputing income on Mom-with an approximate \$11,000 higher income in Mom's household. (Video Record at 14:31:25). The Court accepts the offers of proof as to Dad's girlfriend's income and as to Mom's husband's income. (Video Record at 14:32:55). The Court inquired if any party needed further discovery into the household income issue, but the parties stated that they did not need further discovery. (Video Record at 14:33:25). The Court inquired of the parties and confirmed that both parties are providing health insurance for the child, which shall continue. (Video Record at 14:35:20). The Court is utilizing the deviation factor of relative income of the parties to look at the additional income the parties receive from their significant others. (Video Record at 14:35:35). The Court is imputing \$2,143.72 in gross monthly income upon Mom, which is essentially her 2014 income recomputed to a full yearly figure. This is her earning capacity. (Video Record at 14:35:50). Dad's gross monthly income is \$5,200.00, which makes his obligation \$936.00; whereas, Mom's obligation is \$386.00, which results in a Wright v. Osburn calculation of \$550.00. (Video Record at 14:36:30). Based on the relative income of the parties and given the \$10,000 difference in incomes (between Mom's husband by himself and Dad and his girlfriend combined), the Court is going to give a downward deviation in the sum of \$100.00, thus making Dad's child support obligation \$450.00 per month. (Video Record at 14:36:42).

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arrears, the law is discretionary as to a reasonable amount—and not that the statutory formula be applied retroactively. Mom alleges that Dad did not pay for September, October, and November 2016 and that Dad did make payments prior to then, albeit not at the amount eventually ordered by the Court. As payments were made up through August 2016, the Court is not going to revisit that issue. The Court will apply the December 2016 child support amount (\$650.00) to September, October, and November 2016. The parties shall work out any overpayments and give credit for the same. (Video Record at 15:01:00 – 15:04:45).

Therefor,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that, pursuant to stipulation of the parties, Mom and Dad shall have joint legal custody and joint physical custody of the child.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the parties shall have the following regular visitation with the child:

Mom shall have regular visitation with the child from Monday at 8:00 am
or drop off at school if school is in session until Wednesday at 8:00 am or
drop off at school if school is in session;

- Dad shall have regular visitation with the child from Wednesday at 8:00 am or drop off at school if school is in session until Friday at 8:00 am or drop off at school if school is in session; however, if Dad is working on Wednesday, the child shall remain with Mom until Dad gets out of work—this provision is only for Wednesdays; Wednesdays are still days designated to Dad (Video Record at 14:51:20);
- The parties shall alternate the weekends, which shall be defined as beginning Friday at 8:00 am or drop off at school if school is in session and concluding Monday at 8:00 am or drop off at school if school is in session; For clarity, Mom has the weekend of June 23, 2017.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the Court's standard holiday and visitation schedule shall control. A copy of the same is attached hereto as Ex. 1. The parties may agree to deviate from the schedule, as they are free to agree to deviate as to any visitation schedule. (Video Record at 14:57:25). Holiday visitation time shall take precedence over all other visitation time, and vacation visitation time shall take precedence only over regular visitation time. (Video Record at 15:00:12).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that either party may designate other parties to drop off/collect the child. The Court

expects that when a party designates another to collect the child, that parent would notify the other in advance. (Video Record at 14:56:40).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that, pursuant to stipulation of the parties, Dad shall provide the transportation of the child for child exchanges. Currently, Dad drives nearby Mom's house on the way to and from his work. (Video Record at 14:55:00). In the event that Dad is unable to provide the transportation, then the parties shall communicate in advance to designate an alternate individual to do the transporting.

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN of the following provision of NRS 125C.0045(6):

Penalty for violation of order: The abduction, concealment or detention of a child in violation of this order is punishable as a category D felony as provided in NRS 193.130. NRS 200.359 provides that every person having a limited right of custody to a child or any parent having no right of custody to the child who willfully detains, conceals or removes the child from a parent, guardian or other person having lawful custody or a right of visitation of the child in violation of an order of this court, or removes the child from the jurisdiction of the court without the consent of either the court or all persons who have the right to custody or visitation is subject to being punished for a category D felony as provided in NRS 193.130.

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the terms of the Hague Convention of October 25, 1980, adopted by the 14th Session of the Hague Conference on Private International Law apply if a parent abducts or wrongfully retains a child

in a foreign country. The parties are also put on notice of the following provisions of NRS 125C.0045(8):

If a parent of the child lives in a foreign country or has significant commitments in a foreign country:

The parties may agree, and the court shall include in the order for custody of the child, that the United States is the country of habitual residence of the child for the purposes of applying the terms of the Hague Convention as set forth in subsection 7.

Upon motion of one of the parties, the court may order the parent to post a bond if the court determines that the parent poses an imminent risk of wrongfully removing or concealing the child outside the country of habitual residence. The bond must be in an amount determined by the court and may be used only to pay for the cost of locating the child and returning him to his habitual residence if the child is wrongfully removed from or concealed outside the country of habitual residence. The fact that a parent has significant commitments in a foreign country does not create a presumption that the parent poses an imminent risk of wrongfully removing or concealing the child.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all parties shall be bound by the provisions of NRS 125C.006, which states:

- If primary physical custody has been established pursuant to an order, judgment or decree of a court and the custodial parent intends to relocate his or her residence to a place outside of this State or to a place within this State that is at such a distance that would substantially impair the ability of the other parent to maintain a meaningful relationship with the child, and the custodial parent desires to take the child with him or her, the custodial parent shall, before relocating:
 - (a) Attempt to obtain the written consent of the noncustodial parent to relocate with the child; and

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(a)	Without having reasonable	grounds for	such refusal; or

- (b) For the purpose of harassing the relocating parent.
- A parent who relocates with a child pursuant to this section before
 the court enters an order granting the parent primary physical
 custody of the child and permission to relocate with the child is
 subject to the provisions of NRS 200.359.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that, based upon the findings herein, Dad shall pay Mom monthly child support in the amount of \$450.00 effective May 1, 2017.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that Dad's child support obligation for the months of September, October, and November 2016 shall be calculated at the rate of \$650.00 per month. The arrears of \$1,950.00 shall be payable at the rate of \$50.00 per month until paid in full. The parties shall work out any overpayments. (Video Record at 15:04:10).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that both parties shall continue to provide the medical / health insurance for the child.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that any of the child's unreimbursed medical, dental, optical, orthodontic, surgical, and other health-related expenses shall be equally divided by the parties pursuant to the 30/30 rule. The 30/30 rule provides that the party paying any unreimbursed medical expenses has thirty (30) days from the date the expense is paid to forward

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 proof of payment to the opposing party. If that party does not timely forward the proof of payment, then the Court may construe that the party waived the right to be reimbursed for that expense. Upon receipt of a timely-forwarded proof of payment of an unreimbursed medical expense, the receiving party has thirty (30) days to reimburse the paying party one-half of the expense or to object to the expense. If the receiving party does not either object to the expense or reimburse the paying party for half of the expense, then that party is subject to sanctions for contempt of court. (Compare Complaint for Custody at ¶ 13 with Answer at 1:23).

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the provisions of NRS 31A and 125.007 apply regarding the collection of delinquent child support payments.

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that either party may request a review of child support pursuant to NRS 125B.145.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that each side shall bear his / her own attorney's fees and costs.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that each party shall provide their social security numbers on a separate form to the Court and to the Welfare Division of the Department of Health and Human Services pursuant to NRS 125B.055, NRS 125.130, and/or NRS 125.230. Such information shall be maintained by the Clerk in a confidential manner and shall

	> 1			
1	not be part of the public record. The I	parties shall update the information filed		
2	with the Court and the Welfare Division	of the Department of Human Resources		
3	within ten (10) days should any of that	within ten (10) days should any of that information become inaccurate.		
4	IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, A	ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that Mr.		
5	James shall prepare the Order with Mr.	Altig to countersign.		
6	IT IS SO ORDERED, ADJUDO	GED, AND DECREED.		
7	Dated thisday of October, 2017			
8	NOV 0 6 2017	m 7 16		
9	T.	DISTRICT COURT JUDGE NP		
10	Respectfully submitted by:	Approved as to form and content by:		
11	7/1/			
12	LAW OFFICES OF F. PETER JAMES			
13	F. Peter James, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 10091	Steven M. Altig, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 6879		
14		601 South 7th Street Las Vegas, Nevada 89101		
15	702-256-0087 Counsel for Plaintiff	702-285-7227 Counsel for Defendant		
16		/		
17				
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	13 o	f 13		

EXHIBIT 1

HOLIDAY AND VACATION PLAN

Department Q

The Court encourages parents to communicate regarding holiday and vacation time with their children. The following Holiday and Vacation Plan is a "default" schedule where parents are unable to otherwise agree. Any deviation therefrom should be memorialized in writing with both parents' signatures. Holidays/Special Occasions take precedence over residential time and Vacation time. Unless otherwise ordered, reference to a "school" schedule for the purpose of defining a Holiday or Special Occasion shall be defined by the Clark County, Nevada School District Schedule. (See www.ccsd.net)

THREE DAY HOLIDAYS (Holiday visitation begins when school gets out on the day preceding the holiday weekend (or 3:00 p.m. if the children are not in school) and continues until 9:00 a.m. on the day following the holiday weekend or when the children are scheduled to resume school.)	ODD YEAR	EVEN YEAR
Martin Luther King Day	Mom	Dad
Presidents' Day	Dad	Mom
Memorial Day	Mom	Dad
Labor Day	Dad	Mom
Nevada Admission Day	Mom	Dad

EXTENDED HOLIDAYS	ODD YEAR	EVEN YEAR
Thanksgiving: The holiday visitation shall begin when school gets out on the Wednesday preceding Thanksgiving (or 3:00 p.m. if the children are not in school) and continue until school is scheduled to resume (or 9:00 a.m. if the children are not in school). The parent exercising this time is responsible for all transportation for the children.	Mom	Dad
Christmas/Winter Break: Winter break shall be divided equally between the parents, with the first half commencing when the children get out of school to begin the Winter Break (or 3:00 p.m. if the children are not in school), and continue until December 26 at 10:00 a.m. The second half shall commence on December 26 at 10:00 a.m. and continue until school is scheduled to resume (or 9:00 a.m. if the children are not in school).		
First Half	Dad	Mom
Second Half	Mom	Dad

EXTENDED HOLIDAYS, cont'd.	ODD YEAR	EVEN YEAR
Easter/Spring Break: The holiday visitation shall begin when school gets out on the last day of school (or 3:00 p.m. if the children are not in school) and continue until school is scheduled to resume (or 9:00 a.m. if the children are not in school). The parent exercising this time is responsible for all transportation for the children.	Dad	Mom

SPECIAL OCCASIONS (Special Occosions begin at 9:00 a.m. on the individual day and continue until 9:00 p.m. on the same day)	ODD YEAR	EVEN YEAR
Mother's Day	Mom	Mom
Father's Day	Dad	Dad
Children's Birthdays	Dad	Mom

Summer/Track Break Vacations

Each parent shall be entitled to one (1) vacation each year with the children for a period not to exceed two (2) consecutive weeks (unless otherwise agreed to in writing). Each parent shall designate his/her respective vacation plans by May 1st of each year. The dates shall be conveyed to the other party in writing by way of certified mail. If there is a conflict in dates, the parent who designates the vacation first (as verified by the certified mail stamp) will prevail as to the vacation time. Neither party shall schedule vacation time during the ather party's holiday time or during time the children are scheduled to be in school.

2 F. Peter James Nevada Bar No 3 Peter@PeterJa	o. 10091 imesLaw.com arleston Boulevard, Suite 2 ivada 89102 (fax)	50 FAMILY DIVISION	
8 WILLIAM D	IMONACO,	CASE NO. : D-16-539340-C	
9 PI	aintiff,	DEPT. NO. : Q	
10 vs.		OF CUSTODY OF DECREE	
11 ADRIANA D	AVINA FERRANDO,		
12 D	efendant.		
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17 ///			1
18 ///			;
19 ///			•
20 ///			:
	1 of	3	
	Case Number; D-16∹	539340-C	

1 Please take notice that the attached Decree of Custody was entered on 2 November 9, 2017. __day of November, 2017 3 4 LAW OFFICES OF F. PETER JAMES F. Peter James, Esq. 6 Nevada Bar No. 10091 3821 W. Charleston Blvd., Suite 250 Las Vegas, Nevada 89102 702-256-0087 Counsel for Plaintiff 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 2 of 3

1 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I certify that on this day of November, 2017, I caused the above and 2 foregoing document entitled NOTICE OF ENTRY OF DECREE OF 3 CUSTODY to be served as follows: 4 pursuant to EDCR 8.05(A), EDCR 8.05(F), NRCP 5(b)(2)(D) 5 and Administrative Order 14-2 captioned "In the Administrative 6 Matter of Mandatory Electronic Service in the Eighth Judicial 7 District Court," by mandatory electronic service through the 8 Eighth Judicial District Court's electronic filing system; 9 pursuant to EDCR 7.26 / NEFCR 9, to be sent via facsimile / 10 11 email; to the attorney(s) / party(ies) listed below at the address(es), email address(es), 12 and/or facsimile number(s) indicated below: 13 14 Steven M. Altig, Esq. 601 South 7th Street Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 15 702-385-7227 702-385-5351 (fax) 16 steven@adraslaw.com Counsel for Defendant 17 18 19 By: An employee of the Law Offices of F. Peter James, Esq., PLLC

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Electronically Filed
11/9/2017 10:11 AM
Steven D. Grierson
CLERK OF THE COURT

1	DECC		<u></u>		
1	LAW OFFICES OF F. PETER JAMES, ESQ.				
2					
	Nevada Bar No. 10091				
3	Peter@PeterJamesLaw.com				
4	3821 West Charleston Boulevard, Suite 2 Las Vegas, Nevada 89102	50			
7	702-256-0087				
5	702-256-0145 (fax)				
,	Counsel for Plaintiff				
6	DISTRICT COURT, I	Zamii v divisio:	N		
7	CLARK COUN'				
8	WILLIAM DIMONACO,	CASE NO. : D-	16-539340-C		
9	Plaintiff,	DEPT. NO. : Q			
•	fiamuii,	DECREE OF CU	STODY		
10	vs.				
11	ADDIANA DATES				
11	ADRIANA DAVINA FERRANDO,		İ		
12	Defendant.	Hearing Date: Jur	ne 21, 2017		
		Hearing Time: 1:3	- 1		
13					
14	This matter came before the Court of	on the 21st day of Jur	ne. 2017 for a Non-		
		•	-		
15	Jury Trial. F. Peter James, Esq. appear	ed with Plaintiff, V	Villiam DiMonaco		
16	(hereinafter "Dad"). Steven M. Altig, E	ra ammanuad with T	Valendant Adriana		
10	(nerematter Dad). Steven W. Attig, E.	sq. appeared with L	reiendam, Adriana		
17	Ferrando (hereinafter "Mom"). The Hor	orable Bryce C. D	uckworth presided		
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18	over the matter.				
19	The parties had numerous stipulation	ns, but requested the	at the Court decide		
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20	several matters.				
.∐ Qther	Non-Trial Dispositions: 1 of 1	3	RECEIVED		
☐ Dismissed - War ☐ Involuntary (Stat)	of Prospection Classical Author Constant				
Default Judgmer	I By ADR		OCT 12 20!7		
Li Disposed Alter I Pi Staff X Judgment Reached by Trial PANILY COUR.					
ŧ!			DEPARTMENT Q		

Case Number: D-16-539340-C

The Court, having read the papers and pleadings on file herein, having heard argument, having heard from the parties, having heard from third parties in the courtroom, having heard the stipulations of the parties, being well advised in the premises, and for sufficient cause shown, hereby finds and orders as follows:

THE COURT HEREBY FINDS that Dad is now and has been an actual bona fide resident of the State of Nevada and has actually been domiciled in the State of Nevada for more than six weeks prior to the commencement of this action.

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that it has complete jurisdiction in the premises, both as to the subject matter thereof as well as the parties hereto.

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that Dad and Mom were never married to each other.

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that Dad and Mom have one child together, to wit: Grayson Ashton DiMonaco-Ferrando (born August 12, 2014 (hereinafter "the child"); the parties have no other minor children together, no adopted children together, and, Mom is not currently pregnant with Dad's child.

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that Dad is the child's natural father.

Mom and Dad signed an affidavit of paternity as to the child, which has not been revoked. Dad is listed as the child's natural father on the child's birth certificate.

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The child bears Dad's surname. Dad has held the child out to the world as his natural child. Morn does not contest that Dad is the child's natural father.

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that the child has resided in the State of Nevada for at least six months prior to the filing of the Complaint. As such, this Court has the necessary UCCJEA jurisdiction to enter orders as to child custody and visitation. Nevada is the child's home state and state of habitual residence.

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that the parties have stipulated to having joint legal custody and joint physical custody of the child. arrangement is in the child's best interest.

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that the visitation schedule delineated is in the child's best interest. Mom proposed a visitation schedule that spits weekends. Setting a visitation schedule that splits the weekends is not in the child's best interest. While it may be feasible due to the child not yet being in school, from a planning standpoint, it does not work as the parents would not -have-full-weekends- (Video-Record-at-14:12:00)-

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that, under the case law (Lewis v. Hicks and Rodgers v. Rodgers), a spouse has a community property interest in the other spouses income, which may be used to offset a child support award. (Video Record at 14:15:00, 14:25:00). Dad offered that Mom's husband makes

approximately \$120,000.00 per year (\$79,029.00 regular pay + \$20,843.14 in overtime pay + \$20,897.75 in other pay = \$120,769.89 or \$10,064.16 gross monthly income—benefits are not included in this calculation). (See Exhibits filed June 19, 2017 at W DIMONACO 000039; see also Video Record at 14:23:15, 14:29:20). The Court inquired as to what Dad's girlfriend earns. Dad's counsel stated that his girlfriend contributes \$500 per month to his household and that her actual income is not relevant as they are not married. The Court stated "what is good for the goose is good for the gander." (Video Record at 14:24:50). Dad's girlfriend stated that she makes \$47,000.00 per year salary (which is a gross monthly income of \$3,916.67). (Video Record at 14:30:20). Using a Wright v. Osburn calculation to determine child support only imputing Mom's prior income upon her, the child support obligation from Dad to Mom is \$550.00. (Video Record at 14:27:10). Another deviation factor the Court may consider is the relative income of the parties (NRS 125B.080(9)). (Video Record at 14:27:20). The total household income of each side is germane to the Court's calculation of child support. (Video Record at 14:28:15). acknowledged that Dad wants further discovery into Mom's household income, but the Court stated it could attempt to determine that issue today and resolve the need for further discovery into this issue. (Video Record at 14:28:35). The household incomes appear to be \$109,400 on Dad's side (Dad and his girlfriend)

and \$120,769 on Defendant's side without imputing income on Mom—with an approximate \$11,000 higher income in Mom's household. (Video Record at 14:31:25). The Court accepts the offers of proof as to Dad's girlfriend's income and as to Mom's husband's income. (Video Record at 14:32:55). The Court inquired if any party needed further discovery into the household income issue, but the parties stated that they did not need further discovery. (Video Record at 14:33:25). The Court inquired of the parties and confirmed that both parties are providing health insurance for the child, which shall continue. (Video Record at 14:35:20). The Court is utilizing the deviation factor of relative income of the parties to look at the additional income the parties receive from their significant others. (Video Record at 14:35:35). The Court is imputing \$2,143.72 in gross monthly income upon Morn, which is essentially her 2014 income recomputed to a full yearly figure. This is her earning capacity. (Video Record at 14:35:50). Dad's gross monthly income is \$5,200.00, which makes his obligation \$936.00; whereas, Mom's obligation is \$386.00, which results in a Wright v. Osburn calculation of \$550.00. (Video Record at 14:36:30). Based on the relative income of the parties and given the \$10,000 difference in incomes (between Mom's husband by himself and Dad and his girlfriend combined), the Court is going to give a downward deviation in the sum of \$100.00, thus making Dad's child support obligation \$450.00 per month. (Video Record at 14:36:42).

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THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that, as to constructive child support arrears, the law is discretionary as to a reasonable amount—and not that the statutory formula be applied retroactively. Mom alleges that Dad did not pay for September, October, and November 2016 and that Dad did make payments prior to then, albeit not at the amount eventually ordered by the Court. As payments were made up through August 2016, the Court is not going to revisit that issue. The Court will apply the December 2016 child support amount (\$650.00) to September, October, and November 2016. The parties shall work out any overpayments and give credit for the same. (Video Record at 15:01:00 – 15:04:45).

Therefor,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that, pursuant to stipulation of the parties, Mom and Dad shall have joint legal custody and joint physical custody of the child.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the parties shall have the following regular visitation with the child:

Mom shall have regular visitation with the child from Monday at 8:00 am
or drop off at school if school is in session until Wednesday at 8:00 am or
drop off at school if school is in session;

- Dad shall have regular visitation with the child from Wednesday at 8:00 am or drop off at school if school is in session until Friday at 8:00 am or drop off at school if school is in session; however, if Dad is working on Wednesday, the child shall remain with Mom until Dad gets out of work—this provision is only for Wednesdays; Wednesdays are still days designated to Dad (Video Record at 14:51:20);
- The parties shall alternate the weekends, which shall be defined as beginning Friday at 8:00 am or drop off at school if school is in session and concluding Monday at 8:00 am or drop off at school if school is in session; For clarity, Mom has the weekend of June 23, 2017.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the Court's standard holiday and visitation schedule shall control. A copy of the same is attached hereto as Ex. 1. The parties may agree to deviate from the schedule, as they are free to agree to deviate as to any visitation schedule. (Video Record at 14:57:25). Holiday visitation time shall take precedence over all other visitation time, and vacation visitation time shall take precedence only over regular visitation time. (Video Record at 15:00:12).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that either party may designate other parties to drop off / collect the child. The Court

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expects that when a party designates another to collect the child, that parent would notify the other in advance. (Video Record at 14:56:40).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that, pursuant to stipulation of the parties, Dad shall provide the transportation of the child for child exchanges. Currently, Dad drives nearby Mom's house on the way to and from his work. (Video Record at 14:55:00). In the event that Dad is unable to provide the transportation, then the parties shall communicate in advance to designate an alternate individual to do the transporting.

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN of the following provision of NRS 125C.0045(6):

Penalty for violation of order: The abduction, concealment or detention of a child in violation of this order is punishable as a category D felony as provided in NRS 193.130. NRS 200.359 provides that every person having a limited right of custody to a child or any parent having no right of custody to the child who willfully detains, conceals or removes the child from a parent, guardian or other person having lawful custody or a right of visitation of the child in violation of an order of this court, or removes the child from the jurisdiction of the court without the consent of either the court or all persons who have the right to custody or visitation is subject to being punished for a category D felony as provided in NRS 193.130.

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the terms of the Hague Convention of October 25, 1980, adopted by the 14th Session of the Hague Conference on Private International Law apply if a parent abducts or wrongfully retains a child

in a foreign country. The parties are also put on notice of the following provisions of NRS 125C.0045(8):

If a parent of the child lives in a foreign country or has significant commitments in a foreign country:

The parties may agree, and the court shall include in the order for custody of the child, that the United States is the country of habitual residence of the child for the purposes of applying the terms of the Hague Convention as set forth in subsection 7.

Upon motion of one of the parties, the court may order the parent to post a bond if the court determines that the parent poses an imminent risk of wrongfully removing or concealing the child outside the country of habitual residence. The bond must be in an amount determined by the court and may be used only to pay for the cost of locating the child and returning him to his habitual residence if the child is wrongfully removed from or concealed outside the country of habitual residence. The fact that a parent has significant commitments in a foreign country does not create a presumption that the parent poses an imminent risk of wrongfully removing or concealing the child.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all parties shall be bound by the provisions of NRS 125C.006, which states:

- 1. If primary physical custody has been established pursuant to an order, judgment or decree of a court and the custodial parent intends to relocate his or her residence to a place outside of this State or to a place within this State that is at such a distance that would substantially impair the ability of the other parent to maintain a meaningful relationship with the child, and the custodial parent desires to take the child with him or her, the custodial parent shall, before relocating:
 - (a) Attempt to obtain the written consent of the noncustodial parent to relocate with the child; and

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- (a) Without having reasonable grounds for such refusal; or
- (b) For the purpose of harassing the relocating parent.
- A parent who relocates with a child pursuant to this section before
 the court enters an order granting the parent primary physical
 custody of the child and permission to relocate with the child is
 subject to the provisions of NRS 200.359.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that, based upon the findings herein, Dad shall pay Mom monthly child support in the amount of \$450.00 effective May 1, 2017.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that Dad's child support obligation for the months of September, October, and November 2016 shall be calculated at the rate of \$650.00 per month. The arrears of \$1,950.00 shall be payable at the rate of \$50.00 per month until paid in full. The parties shall work out any overpayments. (Video Record at 15:04:10).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that both parties shall continue to provide the medical / health insurance for the child.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that any of the child's unreimbursed medical, dental, optical, orthodontic, surgical, and other health-related expenses shall be equally divided by the parties pursuant to the 30/30 rule. The 30/30 rule provides that the party paying any unreimbursed medical expenses has thirty (30) days from the date the expense is paid to forward

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proof of payment to the opposing party. If that party does not timely forward the proof of payment, then the Court may construe that the party waived the right to be reimbursed for that expense. Upon receipt of a timely-forwarded proof of payment of an unreimbursed medical expense, the receiving party has thirty (30) days to reimburse the paying party one-half of the expense or to object to the expense. If the receiving party does not either object to the expense or reimburse the paying party for half of the expense, then that party is subject to sanctions for contempt of court. (Compare Complaint for Custody at ¶ 13 with Answer at 1:23).

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the provisions of NRS 31A and 125.007 apply regarding the collection of delinquent child support payments.

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that either party may request a review of child support pursuant to NRS 125B.145.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that each side shall bear his / her own attorney's fees and costs.

each party shall provide their social security numbers on a separate form to the Court and to the Welfare Division of the Department of Health and Human Services pursuant to NRS 125B.055, NRS 125.130, and/or NRS 125.230. Such information shall be maintained by the Clerk in a confidential manner and shall

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1	not be part of the public record. The	parties shall update the information filed
2	with the Court and the Welfare Divisio	n of the Department of Human Resources
3	within ten (10) days should any of that	information become inaccurate.
4	IT IS FURTHER ORDERED,	ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that Mr.
5	James shall prepare the Order with Mr.	Altig to countersign.
б	IT IS SO ORDERED, ADJUD	GED, AND DECREED.
7	Dated this day of October, 2017	
8	NOV 0 6 2017	D TH
9	i	DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
10	Respectfully submitted by:	Approved as to form and content by:
11	7/11/2	
12	LAW OFFICES OF F. PETER JAMES F. Peter James, Esq.	ADRAS & ALTIG Steven M. Altig, Esq.
13	Nevada Bar No. 10091	Nevada Bar No. 6879
14	3821 W. Charleston Blvd., Suite 250 Las Vegas, Nevada 89102 702-256-0087	601 South 7th Street Las Vegas, Nevada 89101
15	Counsel for Plaintiff	702-285-7227 Counsel for Defendant
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EXHIBIT 1

HOLIDAY AND VACATION PLAN

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The Court encourages parents to communicate regarding holiday and vacation time with their children. The following Holiday and Vacation Plan is a "default" schedule where parents are unable to otherwise agree. Any deviation therefrom should be memorialized in writing with both parents' signatures. Holidays/Special Occasions take precedence over residential time and Vacation time. Unless otherwise ordered, reference to a "school" schedule for the purpose of defining a Holiday or Special Occasion shall be defined by the Clark County, Nevada School District Schedule. (See www.ccsd.net)

THREE DAY HOLIDAYS (Holiday visitation begins when school gets out on the day preceding the holiday weekend (or 3:00 p.m. if the children are not in school) and continues until 9:00 a.m. on the day following the holiday weekend or when the children are scheduled to resume school.)	ODD YEAR	EVEN YEAR
Martin Luther King Day	Mom	Dad
Presidents' Day	Dad	Mom
Memorial Day	Mom	Dad
Labor Day	Dad	Mom
Nevada Admission Day	Mom	Dad

EXTENDED HOLIDAYS	ODD YEAR	EVEN YEAR
Thanksgiving: The holiday visitation shall begin when school gets out on the Wednesday preceding Thanksgiving (or 3:00 p.m. if the children are not in school) and continue until school is scheduled to resume (or 9:00 a.m. if the children are not in school). The parent exercising this time is responsible for all transportation for the children.	Mom	Dad
Christmas/Winter Break: Winter break shall be divided equally between the parents, with the first half commencing when the children get out of school to begin the Winter Break (or 3:00 p.m. if the children are not in school), and continue until December 26 at 10:00 a.m. The second half shall commence on December 26 at 10:00 a.m. and continue until school is scheduled to resume (or 9:00 a.m. if the children are not in school).		
First Half	Dad	Мот
Second Half	Mom	Dad

EXTENDED HOLIDAYS, cont'd.	ODD YEAR	EVEN YEAR
Easter/Spring Break: The holiday visitation shall begin when school gets out on the last day of school (or 3:00 p.m. If the children are not in school) and continue until school is scheduled to resume (or 9:00 a.m. if the children are not in school). The parent exercising this time is responsible for all transportation for the children.	Dad	Mom

SPECIAL OCCASIONS (Special Occasions begin at 9:00 a.m. on the individual day and continue until 9:00 p.m. on the same day)	ODD YEAR	EVEN YEAR
Mother's Day	Mom	Mom
Father's Day	Dad	Dad
Children's Birthdays	Dad	Mom

Summer/Track Break Vacations

Each parent shall be entitled to one (1) vacation each year with the children for a period not to exceed two (2) consecutive weeks (unless otherwise agreed to in writing). Each parent shall designate his/her respective vacation plans by May 1st of each year. The dates shall be conveyed to the other party in writing by way of certified mail. If there is a conflict in dates, the parent who designates the vacation first (as verified by the certified mail stamp) will prevail as to the vacation time. Neither party shall schedule vacation time during the other party's holiday time or during time the children are scheduled to be in school.

Electronically Filed 12/6/2017 4:16 PM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COUR 1 NOAS LAW OFFICES OF F. PETER JAMES, ESQ. F. Peter James, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 10091 Peter@PeterJamesLaw.com 3821 West Charleston Boulevard, Suite 250 Las Vegas, Nevada 89102 702-256-0087 702-256-0145 (fax) Counsel for Plaintiff 6 DISTRICT COURT, FAMILY DIVISION 7 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 8 WILLIAM DIMONACO, CASE NO. : D-16-539340-C DEPT. NO.: Q 9 Plaintiff, NOTICE OF APPEAL 10 VS. 11 ADRIANA DAVINA FERRANDO, 12 Defendant. 13 Notice is hereby given that Plaintiff, William DiMonaco, hereby appeals 14 15 111 16 11/// 17 /// 18 111 19 111 20 111 1 of 3

Case Number: D-16-539340-C

to the Supreme Court of Nevada from the Decree of Custody entered November 1 2 9, 2017. day of December, 2017 3 4 LAW OFFICES OF F. PETER JAMES F. Peter James, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 10091 3821 W. Charleston Blvd., Suite 250 Las Vegas, Nevada 89102 702-256-0087 Counsel for Plaintiff 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 2 of 3

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Electronically Filed 7/18/2018 4:23 PM Stoven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COUR

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LAW OFFICES OF F. PETER JAMES, ESQ.

F. Peter James, Esq.

Nevada Bar No. 10091

Peter@PeterJamesLaw.com

3821 West Charleston Boulevard, Suite 250

Las Vegas, Nevada 89102

702-256-0087

702-256-0145 (fax)

Counsel for Plaintiff

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DISTRICT COURT, FAMILY DIVISION
CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

WILLIAM DIMONACO,

Plaintiff,

Flammin

ADRIANA DAVINA FERRANDO,

Defendant.

CASE NO. : D-16-539340-C

DEPT. NO. : E

STIPULATION AND ORDER

STIPULATION

COMES NOW Plaintiff, William DiMonaco ("Dad"), by and through his counsel, F. Peter James, Esq., and Defendant, Adriana Ferrando ("Mom"), by and through her counsel, Michael P. Carman, Esq., who hereby stipulate and request entry of an order as follows:

IT IS HEREBY STIPULATED that the parties shall claim any and all tax benefits / child tax dependent benefits for their minor child (Grayson Ashton RECEIVED

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JUL 1 6 2018

DED ARTMENT E

Case Number: D-16-539340-C

l	DiMonaco-Ferrando born August 12, 2014) as follows:					
2	2017 tax year: Dad					
3	2018 tax year: Mom					
4	2019 tax year: Mom					
5	Every even tax year thereafter: Dad					
6	Every odd tax year thereafter: Mom					
7	IT IS FURTHER STIPULATED that the parties shall execute upon					
8	demand any and all forms, releases, or other documents to effectuate the terms of					
9	this Stipulation and Order.					
10	IT IS FURTHER STIPULATED that the terms herein supplant any prior					
11	orders and agreements as to the issues contained herein.					
12	IT IS FURTHER STIPULATED that no party shall be deemed the					
13	drafter of this Stipulation and Order.					
14	IT IS SO STIPULATED.					
15	Dated this 2 day of June, 2018 Dated this day of June, 2018					
16	MA CONTRACTOR OF THE CONTRACTO					
17	LAW OFFICES OF F. PETER JAMES FINE CARMAN & PRICE F. Peter James, Esq. Michael P. Carman, Esq.					
18	Nevada Bar No. 10091 Nevada Bar No. 7639 3821 W. Charleston Blvd., Suite 250 8965 S. Pecos Road, Suite 9					
19	Las Vegas, Nevada 89102 Henderson, Nevada 89074 702-256-0087 702-384-8900					
20	Counsel for Plaintiff Counsel for Defendant					

DAD'S VERIFICATION

William DiMonaco, being first duly sworn under penalties of perjury, deposes and says:

I am the Plaintiff herein, and I have read the foregoing Stipulation and Order and know the contents thereof; that the same is true and correct to the best of my knowledge, except as to those matters therein stated upon information and belief, and as to those matters, I believe them to be true.

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WILLIAM DIMONACO

10 STATE OF NEVADA

ss:

11 COUNTY OF CLARK

SUBSCRIBED and SWORN TO before me by William DiMonaco this 25th day of June, 2018

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NOTARY PUBLIC in and for said County and State

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
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MOM'S VERIFICATION

Adriana Ferrando, being first duly swom under penalties of perjury, deposes and says:

I am the Defendant, and I have read the foregoing Stipulation and Order and know the contents thereof; that the same is true and correct to the best of my knowledge, except as to those matters therein stated upon information and belief, and as to those matters, I believe them to be true.

ADRIANA FERRANDO

STATE OF NEVADA

COUNTY OF CLARK

SUBSCRIBED and SWORN TO before me by Adriana Ferrando this Land of June, 2018

NOTARY PUBLIC in and for said County and State

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SAMANTHA WILLIS

Notary Public - State of Nevada

Appointment Recorded in Washoe County

No: 17-1954-2 Expires May 4, 2021

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Electronically Filed 7/23/2019 12:01 PM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT MOT 1 FINE CARMAN PRICE Michael P. Carman, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 07639 3 8965 S. Pecos Road, Suite 9 Henderson, NV 89074 702.384.8900 mike@fcpfamilylaw.com Counsel for Adriana Ferrando DISTRICT COURT 6 **FAMILY DIVISION** CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 7 8 WILLIAM DIMONACO. Case No.: D-16-539340-C FINE | CARMAN | PRICE Dept. No.: E 9 Plaintiff, Date and time of hearing: 10 VS. Oral Argument Requested: 11 ADRIANA DAVINA FERRANDO, ☐ YES / 🔀 NO 12 Defendant. 13 MOTION TO CONFIRM SCHOOL ENROLLMENT AT SOMERSET ACADEMY 15 NOTICE: YOU ARE REQUIRED TO FILE A WRITTEN RESPONSE TO THIS MOTION WITH THE CLERK OF THE COURT AND TO PROVIDE THE UNDERSIGNED WITH A COPY OF YOUR RESPONSE WITHIN FOURTEEN (14) DAYS OF YOUR RECEIPT OF THIS MOTION. FAILURE TO 16 FILE A WRITTEN RESPONSE WITH THE CLERK OF THE COURT WITHIN FOURTEEN (14) DAYS OF YOUR RECEIPT OF THIS MOTION MAY RESULT IN THE REQUESTED RELIEF BEING GRANTED BY THE COURT WITHOUT HEARING PRIOR TO THE SCHEDULED HEARING DATE. 17 COMES NOW, Defendant, Adriana Ferrando ("Adriana"), appearing 18 with her counsel, Michael P. Carman, Esq., of FINE CARMAN PRICE, and 19 hereby submits this Motion to Confirm School Enrollment at Somerset 20 Academy. 21 1

Case Number: D-16-539340-C

FINE CARMAN PRICE

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This motion is made and based upon the pleadings and papers on file herein, the Points and Authorities submitted herewith, Adriana's declaration attached hereto, and such other evidence and argument as may be brought before the Court at the hearing of this matter.

As set forth below, Adriana hereby asks the Court grant to her the following relief:

- For an Order permitting Grayson's enrollment at Somerset Academy – Sky Pointe;
- 2. For an award of attorney's fees and costs; and
- 3. For any and all other relief deemed warranted by the Court at the time of the hearing of this matter.

DATED: July 23, 2019.

FINE CARMAN PRICE

Michael P. Carman, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 07639 8965 S. Pecos Road, Suite 9 Henderson, NV 89074 702.384.8900 mike@fcpfamilylaw.com Counsel for Adriana Ferrando

FINE CARMAN PRICE

POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

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BACKGROUND

As this Court is aware, the parties to this action were never married and have one child together, to wit: Grayson Ashton DiMonaco-Ferrando ("Grayson") born August 12, 2014.

Relevant to this motion, Adriana has subsequently remarried and, as a result of such marriage, Grayson has gained a five (5) year old brother named Gage with whom he has become inseparable. Suffice it to say that Grayson and Gage are brothers in every sense of the word, and serve as a powerful support system for one another.

With Grayson approaching kindergarten age, and with Adriana wanting to ensure that Grayson and Gage would have an opportunity to attend school together, the parties began discussing the issue of school enrollment. From that discussion, Will agreed to apply to Somerset Academy – Sky Pointe and Adriana applied in accordance with Will's wishes. Ironically, Somerset was the only option that Will gave Adriana. As a result of such application, Grayson was offered a spot at Somerset Academy – Sky Pointe.

Upon learning of Grayson's acceptance, and with there being an extremely narrow window in which to enroll Grayson, Will suddenly began

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to voice second thoughts in relation to the parties' selection of schools, and implied to Adriana that he may block Grayson's enrollment as he began to communicate with Adriana's husband's ex. With the intervention of counsel, Will finally agreed to allow for Grayson's enrollment on March 6, 2019 "for the express purpose of preserving the child's seat at that school."

With Will indicating that he was not agreeing that Grayson could attend Somerset and hiring new counsel (who is also representing Adriana's husband's ex in an effort to block Gage's enrollment at Somerset pursuant to their Parenting Coordinator's recommendations), undersigned counsel reached out to Will's counsel to determine Will's position regarding enrollment. In response, undersigned counsel was advised that, unless the parties came up with another option, Will would likely consent to enrollment at Somerset.

With no clear resolution to the school enrollment issue, and with Will not discussing any alternate enrollment with Adriana, undersigned counsel followed up with Will's counsel on May 24th in an effort to determine what his actual position was in relation to Grayson's enrollment at Somerset. With no clear objection being voiced by Will, and with no clear agreement regarding enrollment at Somerset, undersigned counsel attempted to secure a clear resolution from Will's counsel throughout the month of June. While a clear answer was promised by Will's counsel by July 12, 2019, no

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follow-up has occurred weeks away from the start of school as Grayson's enrollment remains unresolved. In following up directly with Will, Will has refused to give Adriana a clear answer as well indicating that his attorney is "handling the matter."

With school evaluations set for August 1st, and Meet Your Teacher set for August 9th, Adriana files this motion to confirm Grayson's school enrollment at Somerset Academy – Sky Pointe at this time.

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EDCR 5.501 CERTIFICATE

As set forth above, despite the efforts of counsel this matter remains unresolved. With school fast approaching, and further EDCR 5.501 efforts believed to be impractical at this time, the filing of this motion has become necessary.

III.

ARGUMENT

A. Adriana Requests That Grayson's Enrollment at Somerset Academy be Confirmed at This Time

While Will consented to Grayson's enrollment at Somerset Academy Sky Pointe, and has thus far not objected to his attending the school, Will has kept the school enrollment issue in limbo by also not consenting to Grayson's attendance at the school. Out of an abundance of caution,

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FAMILY LAW ATTORNEYS

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Adriana files this motion to confirm Grayson's school enrollment at Somerset.

As set forth in Arcella v. Arcella, 407 P.3d 341 (2017), when parents in a joint custody situation disagree as to their child's upbringing, a court must resolve the dispute by ordering what it determines to be in a child's best interest. Citing Rivero v. Rivero, 125 Nev. at 421, 216 P.3d at 221-22. In the context of a school selection dispute, the district court must determine which school is best tailored to the needs of the child considering the following non-exhaustive factors:

- (1) The wishes of the child, to the extent that the child is of sufficient age and capacity to form an intelligent preference;
- (2) The child's educational needs and each school's ability to meet them:
- (3) The curriculum, method of teaching, and quality of instruction at each school:
- (4) The child's past scholastic achievement and predicted performance at each school;
- (5) The child's medical needs and each school's ability to meet them;
- (6) The child's extracurricular interests and each school's ability to satisfy them:
- (7) Whether leaving the child's current school would disrupt the child's academic progress;
- (8) The child's ability to adapt to an unfamiliar environment;

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(9)	The	length	of	commute	to	each	school	and	othe
logi	stical	concer	ns:	and					

(10) Whether enrolling the child at a school is likely to alienate the child from a parent.

With Will not proposing any alternative schools, Adriana can only apply such factors to Grayson's enrollment at Somerset at follows:

 The wishes of the child, to the extent that the child is of sufficient age and capacity to form an intelligent preference

While very young, Grayson would express a clear and steadfast desire to attend school with his brother. If advised that he will be attending a different school than Gage, it is believed that Grayson would be devastated.

 <u>The child's educational needs and each school's ability</u> to meet them

It is believed that Somerset will meet Grayson's educational needs.

<u>The curriculum, method of teaching, and quality of instruction at each school</u>

Somerset has excellent standardized testing scores, and is known for having very high educational standards.

 The child's past scholastic achievement and predicted performance at each school

This factor is not applicable as Grayson is not currently enrolled at Somerset at this time.

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The child's medical needs and each school's ability to meet them

Grayson does not have any special medical needs, and this factor is not applicable.

The child's extracurricular interests and each school's ability to satisfy them

It is hopeful that attendance at Somerset will allow Grayson to participate in extracurricular activities with his stepbrother.

Whether leaving the child's current school would disrupt the child's academic progress

As Grayson is not currently enrolled at Somerset at this time, this factor is not applicable.

The child's ability to adapt to an unfamiliar environment

It is believed that attending school with his older brother will assist Grayson in transitioning to Somerset.

The length of commute to each school and other logistical concerns

In the event that Grayson and Gage were to attend different schools. Adriana would face insurmountable daily logistical challenges with two children having to be in two different places at the same time.

Whether enrolling the child at a school is likely to alienate the child from a parent

Adriana does not believe that enrollment at Somerset would alienate Grayson from Will.

For the reasons set forth above, Adriana firmly believes that Grayson's enrollment at Somerset would best serve his interests at this

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time. Such an enrollment will allow Grayson to continue to attend school with his brother, will ensure that Grayson is at an excellent school, will ensure that Grayson can continue to participate in extracurricular activities with his brother as he grows older, and will ensure that Grayson's transition to a new school is eased by him having a sibling support system.

With Will having consented to Grayson's application to Somerset, and having consented to Grayson's enrollment at Somerset, and with Will not articulating any clear reason as to why Grayson's attending Somerset would be detrimental, Adriana requests that the Court confirm his enrollment at Somerset at this time.

C. Adriana Requests that she be Awarded Attorney's Fees and Costs

NRS 18.010 states as follows:

In addition to the cases where an allowance is authorized by specific statute, the court may make an allowance of attorney's fees to a prevailing party:

- (a) When he has not recovered more than \$20,000; Οľ
- (b) Without regard to the recovery sought, when the court finds that the claim, counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint or defense of the opposing party was brought or maintained without reasonable ground or to harass the prevailing party. The court shall liberally construe the provisions of this paragraph in favor of awarding attorney's fees in all appropriate situations. It is the intent of the Legislature that the court award attorney's fees pursuant to this paragraph and impose sanctions

FINE CARMAN PRICE

pursuant to Rule 11 of the Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure in all appropriate situations to punish for and deter frivolous or vexatious claims and defenses because such claims and defenses overburden limited judicial resources, hinder the timely resolution of meritorious claims and increase the costs of engaging in business and providing professional services to the public.

Furthermore, EDCR 7.60(b) states as follows:

The court may, after notice and an opportunity to be heard, impose upon an attorney or a party any and all sanctions which may, under the facts of the case, be reasonable, including the imposition of fines, costs or attorney's fees when an attorney or a party without just cause:

- (1) Presents to the court a motion or an opposition to a motion which is obviously frivolous, unnecessary or unwarranted.
- (2) Fails to prepare for a presentation.
- (3) So multiplies the proceedings in a case as to increase costs unreasonably and vexatiously.
- (4) Fails or refuses to comply with these rules.
- (5) Fails or refuses to comply with any order of a judge of the court.

With no basis for any objection to Grayson's enrollment at Somerset having been articulated by Will, and with Will not suggesting any alternative enrollment possibilities, Adriana does not believe that his refusal to confirm Grayson's enrollment at Somerset has been made in good faith. To the contrary, by refusing to consent to Grayson's attendance, Will has made

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what should be a fun and exciting time for Grayson preparing for a new school very difficult with the parties having not decided on a school. Under such circumstances, Adriana requests that Will be deemed responsible for the attorney's fees that he has incurred in this action.

In regard to the factors set forth in Brunzell v. Golden Gate National Bank, 85 Nev. 345, 349, 455 P.2d 31, 33 (1969), undersigned counsel's hourly rate of \$400.00 and the total amount of time incurred in fees was reasonable under the circumstances of this case. Specifically, undersigned counsel is an AV rated attorney who has practiced since 1997, has practiced primarily in the field of family law for over fourteen (14) years, and is currently serving on the State Bar of Nevada's Family Law Executive Council. It is hopeful that the Court will deem counsel's work in this matter as more than adequate, both factually and legally, and that the Court will recognize that counsel has diligently reviewed the applicable law, explored the relevant facts, and properly applied one to the other.

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FINE CARMAN PRICE FAMILY LAW ATTORNEYS

CONCLUSION

As set forth above, Adriana hereby asks the Court grant to her the

following relief:

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- For an Order permitting Grayson's enrollment at Somerset Academy – Sky Pointe;
- 2. For an award of attorney's fees and costs; and
- 3. For any and all other relief deemed warranted by the Court at the time of the hearing of this matter.

DATED: July 23, 2019.

FINE CARMAN PRICE

Michael P. Carman, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 07639 8965 S. Pecos Road, Suite 9 Henderson, NV 89074 702.384.8900 mike@fcpfamilylaw.com Counsel for Adriana Ferrando

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DECLARATION OF ADRIANA FERRANDO

STATE OF NEVADA) ss:

CLARK COUNTY

I, Adriana Ferrando, pursuant to EDCR 2.21, hereby declare under penalty of perjury that I am the Plaintiff in the above-entitled action and have read the above and foregoing Motion to Confirm School Enrollment at Somerset Academy, know the contents thereof, and that the same is true of my own knowledge, except for those matters therein stated on information and belief, and as for those matters, I believe them to be true.

Adriana Ferrando

FINE CARMAN PRICE

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	CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE					
Purs	suant to NRCP 5(b), I certify that on this 2 day of July, 2019, I					
caused th	e above and foregoing document, Motion to Adopt Parenting					
Coordinator Recommendations, to be served as follows:						
	Pursuant to EDCR 8.05(a), EDCR 8.05(f), NRCP 5(b)(2)(D) and Administrative Order 14-2 captioned "In the Administrative Matter of Mandatory Electronic Service in the Eighth Judicial District Court," by mandatory electronic service through the Eighth Judicial District Court's electronic filing system to the following:					
MACOUNTAL STATE OF THE STATE OF	by placing same to be deposited for mailing in the United States Mail, in a sealed envelope upon which first class postage was prepaid in Las Vegas, Nevada;					
	pursuant to EDCR 7.26, to be sent via facsimile, by duly executed consent for service by electronic means.					
	To the following attorney listed below at the address, email address, and/or facsimile number indicated below:					
	To the following address:					
	Matthew H. Friedman, Esq. mfriedman@fordfriedmanlaw.com					
	Tracey McAuliff tracy@fordfriedmanlaw.com					
	Eddie Rueda eddie@fordfriedmanlaw.com					

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Gary Segal, Esq. gsegal@fordfriedmanlaw.com

Employee of FINE CARMAN PRICE

DISTRICT COURT FAMILY DIVISION ARK COUNTY NEW DEC

FAMILY DIVISION
CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA
Plaintiff/Petitioner Case No. D-(6-539340-(
AN MAN DOWN A Former of Dept.
Defendant/Respondent MOTION/OPPOSITION
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Notice: Mations and Comparison of the
subject to the reopen filing fee of \$25, unless specifically excluded by NRS 19.0312. Additionally, Moless and Oppositions filed in cases initiated by joint petition may be subject to an additional filed.
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accordance with Senate Bill 388 of the 2015 Legislative Session.
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☐ The Motion/Opposition is being filed collaboration at
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The Motion/Opposition is for reconsideration or for a new trial, and is beingiled within 10 days after a final judgment or decree was a reconstruction.
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Other Excluded Motion (must specify)
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and the opposing party has already paid a fee of \$129.
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Party filing Motion/Opposition: AVMM FRMM (1) Date 7/23/2019
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7/23/2019 12:19 PM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT 1 APPL FINE CARMAN PRICE 2 Michael P. Carman, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 07639 3 8965 S. Pecos Road, Suite 9 Henderson, NV 89074 702.384.8900 mike@fcpfamilylaw.com 5 Counsel for Adriana Ferrando DISTRICT COURT 6 FAMILY DIVISION **CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA** 7 8 WILLIAM DIMONACO, FINE | CARMAN | PRICE 9 Plaintiff, Case No.: D-16-539340-C FAMILY LAW ATTORNEYS Dept. No.: E 10 VS. 11 ADRIANA DAVINA FERRANDO, 12 Defendant. 13 EX PARTE APPLICATION TO TEMPORARILY PERMIT SCHOOL 14 ENROLLMENT, OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, FOR ORDER SHORTENING TIME 15 COMES NOW, Defendant, Adriana Ferrando ("Adriana"), appearing 16 with her counsel, Michael P. Carman, Esq., of FINE CARMAN PRICE, and 17 hereby submits this Ex Parte Application to Temporarily Permit School 18 Enrollment, and for an Order Shortening Time. 19 20 1

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Case Number: D-15-539340-C

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This application is based upon the attached Points and Authorities, the attached exhibits, any and all pleadings and papers on file in this matter, and any oral representation to take place at the hearing of this Motion.

Adriana hereby requests that the Court grant to her the following relief:

- 1. For an Order temporarily permitting Grayson to attend Somerset Academy;
- 2. For an Order Shortening Time; and
- For such other and further relief this Court deems just and proper in the premises.

DATED July 23, 2019.

FINE CARMAN PRICE

Michael P. Carman, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 07639 8965 S. Pecos Road, Suite 9 Henderson, NV 89074 702.384.8900 mike@fcpfamilylaw.com Attorney for Adriana Ferrando

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POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

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ARGUMENT

A. Adriana Requests that the Court Temporarily Confirm Grayson's Enrollment at Somerset Academy

NRS 125C.0045(1)(a) states as follows:

During the pendency of the action, at the final hearing or at any time thereafter during the minority of the child, make such an order for the custody, care, education, maintenance and support of the minor child as appears in his or her best interest.

As set forth in Adriana's Motion to Confirm School Enrollment at Somerset Academy, the parties agreed to apply to Somerset Academy – Sky Pointe, and Somerset was the only option that was deemed acceptable to Will. As a result of such application, Grayson was offered a spot at Somerset Academy – Sky Pointe.

While Will consented to Grayson's enrollment at Somerset, Will indicated that such enrollment was "for the express purpose of preserving the child's seat at that school" and reserved the right to object to Grayson's attendance at the school.

While Will has – thus far - not objected to Gage's attendance at Somerset, he has been non-committal and has not confirmed that he is in agreement with Grayson's attendance at the school.

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With no objection having been voiced by Will, and with school evaluations set for August 1st, and meet your teacher set for August 9th, Adriana requests that the Court temporarily confirm Grayson's enrollment at Somerset - Sky Pointe, without prejudice, at this time.

B. Adriana Further Requests That This Matter be Heard on an Order Shortening Time

EDCR 5.513 authorizes this Court to shorten time for a hearing upon a showing of good cause as follows:

Orders shortening time for a hearing.

- (a) Unless prohibited by other rule, statute, or court order, a party may seek an order shortening time for a hearing.
- (b) An ex parte motion to shorten time must explain the need to shorten the time. Such a motion must be supported by affidavit.
- (c) Absent exigent circumstances, an order shortening time will not be granted until after service of the underlying motion on the nonmoving parties. Any motion for order shortening time filed before service of the underlying motion must provide a satisfactory explanation why it is necessary to do so.
- (d) An order shortening time must be served on all parties promptly. An order that shortens the notice of a hearing to less than 10 calendar days may not be served by mail. In no event may a motion be heard less than 1 judicial day after the order shortening time is filed and served.
- (e) Should the court shorten the time for the hearing of a motion, the court may direct that the subject matter of any countermotion be addressed at the accelerated time, at the original hearing time, or at some other time.

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With school evaluations set for August 1st, and meet your teacher set for August 9th, and with Grayson needing a firm decision regarding his school enrollment, Adriana requests that this matter be heard on an Order Shortening Time at the Court's next available hearing date.

DATED July 23, 2019.

FINE CARMAN PRICE

Michael P. Carman, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 07639 8965 S. Pecos Road, Suite 9 Henderson, NV 89074 702.384.8900 mike@fcpfamilylaw.com Attorney for Adriana Ferrando

FINE CARMAN PRICE

AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL IN SUPPORT OF REQUEST FOR ORDER SHORTENING TIME

I am counsel for Adriana Ferrando and hereby swear, under penalty of perjury, as follows:

As set forth in Adriana's underlying motion, the parties agreed to apply to Somerset Academy – Sky Pointe, and Somerset was the only option that was deemed acceptable to Will. As a result of such applications, Grayson was offered a spot at Somerset Academy – Sky Pointe.

While Will consented to Grayson's enrollment at Somerset, Will indicated that such enrollment was "for the express purpose of preserving the child's seat at that school" and reserved the right to object to Grayson's attendance at the school.

While Will has – thus far – not objected to Gage's attendance at Somerset, he has been non-committal and has not confirmed that he is in agreement with Grayson's attendance at the school.

With school evaluations fast approaching, and with Grayson having no final decision from Will as to whether he will be permitted to attend Somerset Academy – Sky Pointe, undersigned counsel believes that good cause exists to shorten the time for the hearing upon Adriana's motion.

For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully requested that this matter be heard on an Order Shortening Time.

DATED this 230 day of July, 2019.

Michael P. Carman, Esq.

SIGNED and SWORN to before me this 23nd day of July, 2019.

ROBIN HADDAD

Notary Public, State of Neveda

No. 16-4539-1

My Appl. Exp. Nov. 27, 2022

NOTARY PUBLIC State of Nevada Clark County

FINE CARMAN PRICE

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Pursuant to NRCP 5(b), I certify that on this 2^2 day of July, 2019, I caused the above and foregoing document, Ex Parte Application to Temporarily Permit School Enrollment, Or, In the Alternative, For Order Shortening Time, to be served as follows:

- Pursuant to EDCR 8.05(a), EDCR 8.05(f), NRCP 5(b)(2)(D) and Administrative Order 14-2 captioned "In the Administrative Matter of Mandatory Electronic Service in the Eighth Judicial District Court," by mandatory electronic service through the Eighth Judicial District Court's electronic filing system to the following:
- by placing same to be deposited for mailing in the United States Mail, in a sealed envelope upon which first class postage was prepaid in Las Vegas, Nevada;
- pursuant to EDCR 7.26, to be sent via facsimile, by duly executed consent for service by electronic means.

To the following attorney listed below at the address, email address, and/or facsimile number indicated below:

To the following address:

Matthew H. Friedman, Esq. mfriedman@fordfriedmanlaw.com

Tracey McAuliff tracey@fordfriedmanlaw.com

Eddie Rueda eddie@fordfriedmanlaw.com .

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27 28 MATTHEW H. FRIEDMAN, ESQ.

Nevada Bar No. 11571

FORD & FRIEDMAN

2200 Paseo Verde Pkwy, Suite 350

Henderson, Nevada 89052

Telephone: (702) 476-2400

Facsimile: (702) 476-2333

mfriedman@fordfriedmanlaw.com

Attorney for Plaintiff

EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, FAMILY DIVISION CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

WILLIAM DIMONACO,

Case No.: D-16-539340-C

Plaintiff.

Department: E

vs.

14

ADRIANA FERRANDO,

Defendant.

ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED:YES

PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTION TO DEFENDANT'S EX-PARTE APPLICATION TO TEMPORARILY PERMIT SCHOOL ENROLLMENT and JOINDER FOR HEARING MATTER ON AN ORDER SHORTENTING

JOINDER FOR HEARING MATTER ON AN ORDER SHORTENTING TIME.

COMES NOW Plaintiff, WILLIAM DiMONACO, (hereinafter referred to as "Will") by and through his counsel of record, Matthew H. Friedman, Esq. of the law firm Ford & Friedman and respectfully states as follows:

1. Plaintiff objects to Defendant, ADRIANA FERRANDO's Ex-Parte

Application to Temporarily Permit School Enrollment;

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Case Number: 0-16-539340-C

- 2. Plaintiff agrees to Hear Oral Arguments on Defendant's underlying Motion to Confirm School Enrollment at Somerset Academy on an Order Shortening Time; and
- 3. For an award of Plaintiff's attorney's fees and costs incurred in having to respond herein.

This Objection and Joinder is made and based upon the Attached Points and Authorities, all pleadings and papers on file herein and the arguments to be adduced at the time of Hearing herein and is made in good faith and not to delay justice.

Dated this 24 day of July, 2019.

FORD & FRIEDMAN

MATTHEW H. FRIEDMAN, ESQ.

Nevada Bar No.: 11571

2200 Paseo Verde Parkway, Suite 350

Henderson, Nevada 89052

(702) 476-2400

Attorney for Plaintiff

POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

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STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS

The parties herein were never married to each other, but do have one child together, such being Grayson Ashton DiMonaco—Ferrando, born August 12, 2014, (who will be referred to herein as Grayson.) Wholly absent from Defendant's underlying Motion and Ex Parte Application is mention of Grayson's half sibling—McKenna Rose DiMonaco (born May 24, 2011), with whom Grayson is equally attached to and who is planning to attend 3rd grade at Richard H. Bryan Elementary School this Fall, 2019. The parties herein and their minor children involve three (3) children and four (4) families:

The parties herein having Grayson;

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- Defendant, Ferrando and her current husband, Jon Collingwood, have a child together who is not of school age for some time and therefore not a factor in the current issues;
- Jon has a child, Gage (Grayson's step-brother), with his former girlfriend,
 Kristy McConnell; and
- WILL has McKenna (Grayson's half-sister) with his former wife, Courtney
 DiMonaco.

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The parents of all three (3) children share joint legal and joint physical custody of the respective minor children.

While Will did not dispute Defendant applying for enrollment at Somerset Academy for Grayson, let it be known, that he never agreed that Grayson would in fact matriculate there. Defendant acknowledges such fact at page 4, line 3 of her underlying Motion wherein she admits Grayson's enrollment at Somerset is "for the express purpose of preserving the child's seat at that school." Both Will and Defendant have investigated possible schools for Grayson in anticipation of him entering Kindergarten this Fall. Accordingly, in April, Will applied for a zone variance in order to seek to obtain the option for Grayson to attend Richard H. Bryan Elementary alongside his half-sister, McKenna. Although Will has diligently communicated with the staff at Richard H. Bryan Elementary concerning the status of such variance, to date, the Principal has not confirmed her decision concerning Grayson attending Kindergarten there this Fall. Will expects to receive the decision concerning the zone variance early next week."

II.

PROCEDURAL POSTURE PERTINENT TO THE PRESENT ISSUES.

While it is true that WILL's and Jon's former girlfriend Kristy McConnell (in case number D-15-517451-C, pending in Department R), now share the same counsel, it should be noted that Defendant and her current husband, Jon Collingwood, have shared counsel throughout the pendency of the instant litigation. Furthermore, it should be noted that in case D-15-517451-C, Shelley Cooley, Esq. has been appointed as the Parenting Coordinator.

On July 23, 2019, Defendant filed her underlying "Motion to Confirm School Enrollment at Somerset Academy" without requesting "Oral Argument" concerning the same. Accordingly, such matter is now set for consideration by this Honorable Court on the "Chambers Calendar" on August 23, 2019. Concurrently, Defendant filed her "Ex Parte Application to Temporarily Permit School Enrollment, Or, In the Alternative, For Order Shortening Time". While the title of Defendant's Ex Parte Application notes the alternative of setting the matter on an Order Shortening Time, the prayer contained in the Ex Parte Application does not provide the same alternative — in essence asking this Court to decide enrollment (without a Hearing) AND setting a Hearing on an Order Shortening Time.

Given the factual disputes at issue herein, Will believes it important that this Court hear oral argument prior to rendering any decision in this matter, and therefore, wholeheartedly objects to a decision concerning the child's school enrollment without holding a Hearing herein. Moreover, while Will has no objection to setting this matter for Hearing on an Order Shortening Time, he would only ask that any such setting occur after the expiration of his ten (10) day deadline within which to file his responsive pleading, to wit: on or after August 5, 2019. Will's requested relief will not prejudice Grayson's schooling as, Grayson's spot would be preserved at both schools currently in dispute. Upon this matter

being set for Hearing on an Order Shortening Time, Will shall file his appropriate response to Defendant's underlying Motion.

FORD & FRIEDMAN

MATTHEW H. FRIEDMAN, ESQ.

Nevada Bar No.: 11571

2200 Paseo Verde Pkwy, Suite 350

Henderson, Nevada 89052 Telephone: (702) 476-2400

Attorneys to Plaintiff

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Pursuant to NRCP 5(b), I certify that I am an employee of Ford & Friedman and that on this <u>luke</u> day of July, 2019, I caused the above and foregoing "Plaintiff's Objection To Defendant's Ex-Parte Application To Temporarily Permit School Enrollment And Joinder For Hearing Matter On An Order Shortening Time", to be served as follows:

- [X] Pursuant to EDCR 8.05(a), EDCR 8.05(f) and NRCP 5(b)(2)(d) and Administrative Order 14-2 captioned, "In the Administrative Matter of Mandatory Electronic Service in the Eighth Judicial District Court," by mandatory electronic service through the Eighth Judicial District Court's electronic filing system;
- [] By placing the same to be deposited for mailing in the United States Mail, in a sealed envelope upon which first class postage was prepaid in Henderson, Nevada;
- [] Pursuant to EDCR 7.26, to be sent via facsimile, by duly executed consent for service by electronic means;
- [] By hand delivery with signed Receipt of Copy.

To the person listed below at the address indicated below:

Michael P. Carman
File Clerk
Robin Haddad
Dominique Hoskins
Missy Weber
Attorney for Defendant

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26 27 28 Mike@FCPfamilylaw.com fileclerk@fcpfamilylaw.com Reception@FCPfamilylaw.com Paralegal@FCPFamilylaw.com Missy@FCPfamilylaw.com

An Employee of Ford & Eriedman

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2200 Paseo Verde Parkway, Suite 350 Henderson, Nevada 89052 T: 702-476-2400 / F: 702-476-2333

mfriedman@fordfriedmanlaw.com Attorney for Plaintiff

MATTHEW H. FRIEDMAN, ESQ.

Nevada Bar No.: 11571 FORD & FRIEDMAN

> DISTRICT COURT, FAMILY DIVISION CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

WILLIAM DIMONACO,

Plaintiff,

VS.

ADRIANA FERRANDO,

Defendant.

Case No.: D-16-539340-C

Department: E

Oral Argument Requested: YES

Date of Hearing: August 1, 2019 Time of Hearing: 10:00 a.m.

PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR ENROLLMENT AT SOMERSET ACADEMY AND FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS; AND COUNTERMOTION FOR THE CHILD TO BE ENROLLED AT RICHARD H. BRYAN ELEMENTARY SCHOOL, AND FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS

COMES NOW Plaintiff, William DiMonaco (hereinafter referred to as "Will"), by and through his counsel of record, Matthew H. Friedman, Esq., of the law firm Ford & Friedman who hereby files this Opposition To Defendant's Motion For Enrollment At Somerset Academy And For Attorney's Fees And Costs; And Countermotion or the Child to be Enrolled at Richard H. Bryan

Case Number: D-16-539340-C

26 27 28 Elementary School, And For Attorney's Fees And Costs, and requests that this Honorable Court enter the following orders:

- 1. That Defendant's motion be denied in its entirety;
- 2. That the minor child be enrolled at Richard H. Bryan Elementary;
- That Will be awarded his attorney's fees and costs for having to oppose the instant motion; and
- 4. For any other relief this Court may deem necessary and proper.

This Opposition is based upon the following memorandum of points and authorities, the papers and pleadings on file in this matter, and any oral argument the Court may wish to hear.

DATED this 31st day of July, 2019.

FORD & FRIEDMAN

/s/ Matthew H. Friedman, Esq.

MATTHEW H. FRIEDMAN, ESQ. Nevada Bar No.: 11571 FORD & FRIEDMAN 2200 Paseo Verde Parkway, Suite 350 Henderson, Nevada 89052 T: 702-476-2400 / F: 702-476-2333 Attorney for Plaintiff

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

I.

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff William DiMonaco (hereinafter referred to as "Will") and Defendant, Adriana Ferrando (hereinafter referred to as "Defendant") were never married, however, the parties have one minor child born the issue of their relationship, to wit: Grayson Ashton DiMonaco-Ferrando (hereinafter referred to as "Grayson"), born August 12, 2014, age 4 years. It must be noted at the outset that Will shares custody of another child from his previous marriage, to wit: McKenna Rose DiMonaco, born May 24, 2011, age eight (8) years with whom Grayson has grown inseparable.

The instant action was initiated by Will on or about September 8, 2016 as a result of Defendant's unilateral decision to sever Will's access to Grayson. Indeed, from approximately August 2016 until the Court's entry of temporary Orders on November 29, 2016, Defendant did not permit Will any contact with Grayson at all. His interaction with Grayson was limited to text message updates and sporadic pictures begrudgingly provided by Defendant at Will's insistence. Prior to the initiation of litigation, Defendant sought to dictate Will's interactions with Grayson and indeed mandated that all of Will's "custodial time" was to be spent in her presence, at a time and location of her choosing.

While Will did not agree to this arrangement, it was his hope that he would eventually be able to share a co-parenting relationship with Defendant, similar to that which he shares with his McKenna's mother. Indeed, despite their divorce Will and McKenna's mother (Courtney Janson) enjoy a health and productive co-parenting relationship, and have successfully raise McKenna as divorced parents for more than six (6) years, without ever requiring Court intervention.

Despite Will's best efforts, Defendant's need to control and manipulate coupled with her outright refusal to co-parent in a manner consistent with Grayson's best interests has proved a substantial impediment. Indeed, it is precisely these sorts of behaviors which bring the parties before the Court in the instant matter.

Starting on December 17, 2018 (following Defendant's unilateral decision to submit an application to Coral Academy - Centennial Hills Campus) the parties herein began discussing Grayson's Kindergarten enrollment (see Exhibit "1" at PLF 0001). It was only after Defendant submitted an application for Grayson (wherein she lists Jonathan Collingwood - Grayson's step-father as Grayson's guardian - see Exhibit "2" at PLF 0024),

Of note, the application was started November 8, 2018. Long before Defendant broached the subject with Will.

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that Defendant thought to offer Will the "consideration" of adding McKenna to her application as well. Will politely responded that Defendant refrain from submitting applications to any school for any of the children until all of the respective parents have had the opportunity to discuss this matter. It was apparent to Will that this was a major decision that required discussion and careful consideration prior to any action being taken. (see Exhibit "1" at PLF 0001). Defendant agreed to not move forward with enrolling the children without prior discussion, however, she made it clear that she would continue to apply to other schools without notice or consent from Will. She made it abundantly clear that she placed primary the relationship of Grayson and his step-brother over that of Grayson and his half-sister. A position she stated repeatedly advising that Grayson would not be attending school with McKenna unless or until Will conceded to sending her to Defendant's desired school without regard for Will, his family, or the logistical concerns which could plague Grayson (see Exhibit "I" at PLF 0002 - 0003).

Will further requested that the application submitted to Coral Academy (without his knowledge or consent), be corrected to properly list him as Grayson's legal guardian and that the amended application would include Will's contact information alongside Defendant's (something Defendant failed to do). Despite Defendant's protestations to the contray, the application

provided to him by the school failed to list his name or information at all. After continued inquiry by Will, Defendant advised that she had created a "family profile" and alleged that this profile listed Will, along with Defendant and her current spouse (Jonathan Collingwood). Still skeptical, but endeavoring to give the Defendant the benefit of the doubt, Will requested the login information to allow him to access the account. Defendant refused to provide Will with this information insisting the she would limit him to the information she deemed him privy to. Again, Defendant demonstrated her belief that she alone may determine what information Will is privy to — despite his status as joint legal and physical custodian of Grayson. (see Exhibit "1" at PLF 0009 - 0014).

On January 7 2019, Defendant submitted multiple applications, to wit: she applied to Somerset – Sky Pointe, Somerset – Sky Canyon, Doral Academy – Red Rock, Saddle, and West Pebble. It must be noted that on each and every application, Defendant once again only provided contact information for herself and her husband (who at the time was merely her boyfriend and had no guardianship/custodial rights to Grayson). As such, it seems clear that Defendant was determined to remove Will from the school selection process all together (see Exhibit "3"). Such actions are in direct violation of this Court's Orders for joint legal custody and fly in the face of meaningful cooperative parenting. Upon receipt of the applications, by way of a forwarded email from

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Defendant, Will immediately requested that Defendant update these applications to include his name and contact information in lieu of Defendant's current spouse/then boyfriend. Unable to obtain Defendant's cooperation, Will was left to contact the schools and ultimately the applications for Grayson were updated to include only Will and Defendant as parents/guardians.

On March 1, 2019, Grayson was offered enrollment at the Somerset Academy (subject to his successfully passing the admissions evaluation) and was waitlisted for all other charter schools. At this time Defendant initiated conversation with Will and inquired if Will's daughter McKenna (Grayson's hlf-sister) had been accepted to Somerset Sky Pointe (see Exhibit "4" at Bates No. PLF 0034). Upon being informed that an application was not submitted for McKenna as the logistics of the school were not feasible, Defendant conclusively remarked "So she isn't going to be going to school with Gray[son]?" Will sought to explain that this was an improper characterization as he had not consented to Grayson's attendance at Somerset Academy either. Over the next few days, the parties continued discussions regarding Grayson's school enrollment and Will consistently expressed his logistical concerns with getting the children to school while fulfilling his other commitments as well as his ongoing preference that McKenna and Grayson attend school together, as siblings.

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Defendant in turn offered no consideration to Will's concerns regarding Grayson's sister and instead dictatorially stated that Grayson would be attending Somerset Sky Pointe, with his step-brother (Gage). It seems apparent that Defendant feels she is entitled to unilaterally dictate the course of Grayson's life irrespective of McKenna and Grayson's relationship or logistical realities of Will's life. Stated plainly, if Grayson attends a different school than McKenna, Will will be forced to navigate the logistical minefield of transporting his two (2) children to two different schools at essentially the same time. Ironically, Defendant is a stay-at-home mother, free from employment obligations, or any other responsibilities hindering her ability to transport Grayson to school. As such, Will believes that a school choice that accommodates, or at least contemplates his logistical constraints is patently more equitable.

Accordingly, on or about the 11th day of Mar, 2019 Will submitted a zone variance request for both McKenna and Grayson for Richard H. Bryan Elementary School. While the final decision concerning the children's attendance at the school has yet to be decided, Will has been informed by the school that the questions surrounding acceptance revolve around the capacity for third grade students (McKenna will be entering third grade next month). In the alternative, should this variance not be granted, Will proposes that Grayson

 attend John Tartan Elementary, the school McKenna has attended the past several years. Either school (Bryan Elementary or Tartan Elementary) would allow the children to attend school together (giving Grayson the support and guidance of an older sister who has adjusted to elementary school), as well as allow for a singular drop-off/pick-up point for Will, while equitably dividing the burdens of transportation upon both Defendant and Will.

It is expected that Defendant will allege that Grayson's step-brother (Gage), will be attending Somerset in support of her request. However, it must be noted that Gage's enrollment at Somerset is being vehemently contested by Gage's mother and is the subject of a pending evidentiary hearing. Will would ask that this Court form a decision that is solely in the best interest of Grayson given that the outcome of the decision on Gage's school selection is wholly uncertain.

II.

OPPOSITION

1. THE CHILD SHOULD NOT ATTEND SOMERSET ACADEMY

As was discussed supra, Defendant continues to be a "my child" mother who fails to recognize Wil's essential role in Grayson's life or as her co-parent.

As is made clear by the ongoing discussions, Defendant has emphatically proclaimed that Grayson <u>WILL</u> attend school with his step-brother. She has

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advised that unless McKenna goes to the school Defendant selects, Grayson WILL NOT attend school with McKenna. Thankfully this Court recognizes what Defendant refuses to – that school selection is a joint decision to be made by both parents. Unfortunately, Defendant seeks to dictate the school Grayson will attend, having previously dictated the schools to which he could apply², all the while refusing to even acknowledge Will as Grayson's father on applications.

Defendant distorts Will's involvement in Grayson's application to Somerset. Will did agree that Defendant could apply to Somerset Academy³, but contrary to Defendant assertions in her underlying motion, he did not consent to Grayson's attendance at the same. Moreover, Will did agree that he would try to keep the Grayson and Gage (step-brothers) together but not at the expense of Grayson's opportunity to attend school with his biological sister, McKenna.

² Notably, Defendant submitted applications for Grayson to attend Doral West Pebble Campus and Doral Saddle Campus, schools that are neither between nor near that parties homes but instead are between Defendant's home and Henderson. These were submitted in furtherance of Defendant unilateral decision that Grayson would only attend a school which his step-brother would attend.

³ Of specific importance, the only schools ever discussed between the parties, prior to applications being submitted, were Somerset Academy, Doral Academy Red Rock, McKenna's current school (Tartan Elementary) and Will's zoned school.

 Defendant falsely claims that Will "has thus far not objected to [Grayson's] attending [Somerset]". In fact, will has repeatedly stated that the logistics do not work for him. Will is the biological father of both McKenna and Grayson. He has joint physical custody of both children and the custodial schedules mirror each other. To have Grayson attend Somerset Academy, would not only deprive Grayson of the opportunity to attend school with his sister, but also require Will to have two children in two separate locations at the same time resulting in both children suffering. Either one (or both) children will be forced to attend before and after school care.

While Will intends to set forth his complete analysis within the Countermotion of the instant pleading, he vehemently disputes portions of Defendant's analysis and addresses those as follows:

• The wishes of the child to the extent that the child is of sufficient age and capacity to form an intelligent preference: While Defendant contends Grayson has expressed a "clear and steadfast desire" to attend school with his brother, he has expressed an equally clear desire to attend school with his sister McKenna with whom he has become very attached. Additionally, upon information and belief, Grayson has been "programmed" by Defendant since December that he would be attending

school with Gage. As such, this "steadfast" desire is not unexpected and is indeed grounded on false representations as it is still unknown where Gage will ultimately attend school. Such tactics are indicative of Defendant's ongoing attempts to alienate and diminish Will and his family from Grayson's life.

Whether enrolling the child at a school is likely to alienate the child from a parent: Despite Defendant's claims that enrollment at Somerset would not alienate Will, this is plainly not true. Will has been alienated by Defendant throughout the school application process. As explained supra, Defendant refused to include Will on any of the applications and instead included her husband's email for the secondary email. Additionally, Defendant created a "family profile" for the Somerset School that she continues to refuse Will access to thereby rendering him wholly unable to schedule or change appointments, obtain information concerning Grayson's enrollment, etc. Instead, Defendant unilaterally decides appointment dates and times that best suite her schedule (despite being a stay-at-home-mother with no responsibilities outside of her home). Often this results in Defendant setting appointments during Will's custodial time, without his consent and thereafter notifies Will

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matter-of-factly of the need for the child's attendance (see Exhibit "5"). Finally, perhaps the greatest indication of the potential for alienation can be found in the contents of the enrollment packet submitted by Defendant without Will's consent (see Exhibit "6"). This Court should note that Will's name and information appears only once and Will's telephone number is not listed as a preferred method of contact for all school communications. This, despite there being a clear option to include a "Phone #2." When inputting the order of phone numbers to be called by the school, Will's number is not listed as the second number. Instead, Defendant has inserted her husband's number in his place. Further, Will notes that no member of his family or household is listed as an emergency contact - only Defendant's husband and mother are. Neither Will nor any member of his family or household is listed as approved parties to collect Grayson from school. It is demonstrably clear that Grayson's attendance at Somerset not only will, but is intended to further alienate Will and his family.

Accordingly, Will requests that this Court decline to confirm Grayson's enrollment at Somerset Academy.

2. DEFENDANT FAILED TO FILE A FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE FORM WITH THE COURT, AND THEREFORE HER MOTION SHOULD BE DENIED

EDCR 5.506 provides as follows:

"(a) Any motion for fees and allowances, temporary spousal support, child support, exclusive possession of a community residence, or any other matter involving the issue of money to be paid by a party <u>must be accompanied by an affidavit of financial condition describing the financial condition and needs of the movant.</u> The affidavit of financial condition must be prepared on a form approved by the court. An incomplete affidavit or the absence of the affidavit of financial condition may be construed as an admission that the motion is not meritorious and as cause for its denial. Attorney's fees and other sanctions may be awarded for an untimely, fraudulent, or incomplete filing."

EDCR 5.506 requires all parties to file a financial disclosure form with the Court *prior* to requesting any financial orders, including a request for attorney's fees or modification of child support. Where a party has failed to comply with this requirement, the entirety of the Motion may be deemed meritless. Defendant's Motion indeed contains a request for financial relief, yet as of the date of this filing of this opposition, Defendant has failed to file her financial disclosure form. As such, any financial relief requested in her Motion summarily must be denied. Although Will believes Defendant's Motion is utterly lacking in merit in a number of other ways, Defendant's Motion can and should be denied on this basis alone.

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COUNTERMOTION

1. THIS COURT HAS THE AUTHORITY TO ENTER ORDERS REGARDING SELECTION OF THE MINOR CHILD'S SCHOOL, AND SHOULD ORDER THE MINOR CHILD'S ATTENDANCE AT RICHARD H. BRYAN ELEMENTARY SCHOOL, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, JOHN TARTAN ELEMENTARY SCHOOL

Pursuant to the terms of Joint Legal Custody, the parties are to select any school jointly. As is evident from the numerous "Talking Parents" communications and underlying motion, they were unable to reach a decision jointly and in the best interest of the minor child.

As this Court is likely aware, when joint custodians are unable to reach an agreement regarding major decisions involving educational, religious, or health issues, this Court retains jurisdiction to decide such matters. Specifically, when making determinations regarding a child's school selection, the Court is instructed to look to *Acrella v. Acrella*, 133 Nev. Adv. Op. 104, 407 P.3d 341 (2017). Pursuant to *Acrella*, the Court must consider the following best interest factors when making a determination as to which school is in the best interest of the minor children:

- (1) The wishes of the child, to the extent that the child is of sufficient age and capacity to form an intelligent preference.
- (2) The child's educational needs and each school's ability to meet them.

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- (3) The curriculum, method of teaching, and quality of instruction at the school.
- (4) The child's past scholastic achievement and predicted performance at each school.
- (5) The child's extracurricular interests and each school's ability to satisfy them.
- (6) Whether leaving the child's current school would disrupt the child's academic performance.
- (7) The child's ability to adapt to an unfamiliar environment. Again, previous schooling should not be considered.
- (8) The length of commute to each school and other logistical concerns.
- (9) Whether enrolling the child at a school is likely to alienate the child from a parent.

An analysis of the Arcella factors as applied to this case follows.

(1) The wishes of the child, to the extent that the child is of sufficient age and capacity to form an intelligent preference.

At five (5) years old, Grayson is likely too young for this Court to give much consideration to allegations concerning his preferences regarding many matters. Here it is alleged that Grayson desires to attend school with his stepbrother. Conversely, Grayson has expressed a desire to attend school alongside his older sister with whom he has grown extremely close.

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(2) The child's educational needs and the schools ability to meet them.

Grayson is a healthy child and upon information and belief does not require special education or a custom tailored program to meet his needs. However, despite Will's attempts to prepare Grayson for Kindergarten by way of preschool through Creative Kids, and requests for Defendant to work with him, to that end, Grayson appears unable to meet some of the basic standards required of a child entering Kindergarten. He is unable to count to twenty (20), write his first name, distinguish between numbers and letters, and lacks a grasp of the alphabet. While Will does not attribute Grayson's educational delays solely to Defendant, his requests for Defendant to engage with Grayson have been met with resistance (see Exhibit "7"). Conversely, Grayson's sister McKenna, with full-time family support (in both Will's and her mother's home), has become a G.A.T.E. student. McKenna has also taken it upon herself to create flash cards for Grayson and enjoys working with Grayson to improve his school readiness as well. It is Will's belief that should Grayson attend school with his sister, she (as well as Will) would have the opportunity to continue assisting Grayson in his academics and help him achieve a position to be academically successful.

(3) The curriculum, method of teaching, and quality of instruction at the school.

It is Will's belief that as Grayson is entering Kindergarten, the curriculum and method of teaching at both schools will be similar. However, the considerably lower student to teacher ratio offered by Bryan Elementary will likely provide Grayson with the individual attention to maximize the educational process and further his ability to obtain optimal instruction.

(4) The child's past scholastic achievement and predicted performance at each school.

Grayson is set to enter Kindergarten and as such has no past scholastic achievement to analyze. However, as previously stated, he appears to be somewhat behind the average Kindergarten student. Accordingly, Will believes Bryan Elementary (or in the alternative Tartan Elementary) will offer Grayson a smaller, more intimate classroom setting; similar to what he has become accustomed in his preschool. Given that this year will mark his transition into Kindergarten, the smaller classroom setting offered at Bryan Elementary (or in the alternative Tartan Elementary) will clearly allow for a less stressful transition for Grayson. By contrast – Somerset with its 6,400 students – many of them much older and much bigger than Grayson, will likely prove overwhelming for him.

(5) The child's extracurricular interests and each school's ability to satisfy them.

Grayson is not currently enrolled in any extracurricular activities; however, McKenna plays soccer on Wednesdays. Given Grayson's close age in proximity to the other player's McKenna's coach allows Grayson to participate in the practices with the other children which Grayson thoroughly enjoys. Additionally, Grayson and McKenna enjoy playing soccer together at home and at the park. Given the opportunity to attend school together McKenna and Grayson will undoubtedly continue to enrich their lifelong familial bond.

(6) Whether leaving the child's current school would disrupt the child's academic performance.

Grayson's current school concludes at the Pre-K level, so the option to remain is not a possibility. However, Grayson does well with the smaller class setting which he is accustomed to, which would remain consistent should he attend Bryan Elementary (or in the alternative Tartan Elementary).

(7) The child's ability to adapt to an unfamiliar environment.

Again, previous schooling should not be considered.

Grayson is a well-behaved and friendly child and will likely adapt well to any new environment, however, given that he is entering Kindergarten his acclimation will be aided by enrollment in a less overwhelming setting limited

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to elementary aged students. Additionally, attending school with his older sister, who has already successfully navigated the transition to school will offer Grayson further support and security.

(8) The length of commute to each school and other logistical concerns.

While the distance itself is not exceedingly troublesome, the simple logistics of having to transport two (2) children, to two schools nearly fifteen miles apart at essentially the same time will prove nearly impossible. As stated previously, Will is the biological father of both McKenna and Grayson. He has joint physical custody of both children and the custodial schedules mirror each other. On each of his custodial days, Will would be left to engineer a means by which to transport both children to different schools all the while meeting his obligations of full-time employment. Conversely, Defendant is a stay-at-home mother with no responsibilities outside of her household and the flexibility to share in the transportation of Grayson. Instead, Defendant requests this Court enter orders which would have Grayson attend a school located 0.3 miles from her home (and even shorter walk as there is a walkway with direct access to the school campus), while having Will drive nearly fifteen (15) miles to Somerset, then and additional fifteen (15) miles to Bryan Elementary (or in the alternative Tartan Elementary).

While the undersigned anticipates that Defendant will assert that Will's significant other should share in the responsibilities of school transportation, this Court cannot lay that burden at her feet. Indeed, Defendant herself proclaimed (when Will stated that he wanted to seek the input of his significant other, Tracy, concerning the logistics), that "Tracy has no say so in where Gray goes to school or anything when decisions are made in regards to Gray." Given her position she can hardly seek to rely on Tracy to absorb the transportation burden now that it suits her agenda.

2. WILL SHOULD RECEIVE A COMPREHENSIVE AWARD OF FEES RELATED TO WORK REQUIRED TO OPPOSE THE INSTANT MOTION

NRS 18.010 allows for an award of attorney's fees where:

- 2. In addition to the cases where an allowance is authorized by specific statute, the court may make an allowance of attorney's fees to a prevailing party:
- (a) When the prevailing party has not recovered more than \$20,000; or
- (b) Without regard to the recovery sought, when the court finds that the claim, counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint or defense of the opposing party was brought or maintained without reasonable ground or to harass the prevailing party. The court shall liberally construe the provisions of this paragraph in favor of awarding attorney's fees in all appropriate situations. It is the intent of the Legislature that the court award attorney's fees pursuant to this paragraph and impose sanctions pursuant to Rule 11 of the Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure in all appropriate situations to punish for and deter frivolous or vexatious claims and defenses because such claims and defenses overburden limited judicial resources, hinder the

timely resolution of meritorious claims and increase the costs of engaging in business and providing professional services to the public.

And EDCR 7.60 provides that:

- b) The court may, after notice and an opportunity to be heard, impose upon an attorney or a party any and all sanctions which may, under the facts of the case, be reasonable, including the imposition of fines, costs or attorney's fees when an attorney or a party without just cause:
 - 1) Presents to the court a motion or an opposition to a motion, which is obviously frivolous, unnecessary or unwarranted.
 - 2) Fails to prepare for a presentation.
 - 3) So multiplies the proceedings in a case as to increase costs unreasonably and vexatiously.
 - 4) Fails or refuses to comply with these rules.
 - 5) Fails or refuses to comply with any order of a judge of the court.

Defendant has filed a motion with this Court rife with lies and misrepresentations of facts concerning the parties' discussions. Specifically, she has falsely alleged Will failed to provide any reasonable objection to Grayson's attendance at Somerset Academy. The instant motion is rife with false and otherwise misleading arguments aimed toward manipulating this Court into rendering a ruling inconsistent with Grayson's best interests. Defendant's actions have forced Will to incur additional attorney's fees and this Court to needlessly squander precious judicial resources. Accordingly, Will should be fully reimbursed for the attorney's fees and costs she has been forced to expend regarding the same. Will requests leave of the Court to file a memorandum of

fees and costs pursuant to Brunzell v. Golden Gate Nat. Bank, 85 Nev. 345, 349 (1969) and Miller v. Wilfong, 119 P.3d 727 (2005) for consideration by the Court. Will further requests the ability to submit a proposed order awarding fees related to this motion including an empty delimiter within which the Court may enter a dollar amount for the award of any fees it deems necessary upon review of his memorandum of fees and costs.

DATED this 31st day of July, 2019.

FORD & FRIEDMAN

/s/ Matthew H. Friedman, Esq.

MATTHEW H. FRIEDMAN, ESQ. Nevada Bar No.: 11571 FORD & FRIEDMAN 2200 Paseo Verde Parkway, Suite 350 Henderson, Nevada 89052 Attorney for Plaintiff

<u>VERIFICATION</u> STATE OF NEVADA SS: COUNTY OF CLARK I, WILLIAM DIMONACO, being first duly sworn, deposes and says: That I am the Plaintiff in the instant action; that I have read the foregoing Opposition and Countermotion and know the contents thereof; that the same is true of my own knowledge, except for those matters therein contained stated upon information and belief and, as to those matters, I believe them to be true. DATED this 31 day of July, 2019. WILLIAM DIMONACO SUBSCRIBED and SWORN TO before me this $\frac{3}{5}l^{s}$ day of July, 2019 by William DiMonaco. NOTARY PUBLIC IN AND FOR SAID COUNTY AND STATE

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

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Pursuant to NRCP 5(b), I certify that I am an employee of Ford & Friedman and that on this 31 day of July, 2019, I caused the above and foregoing document entitled, "Plaintiff's Opposition To Defendant's Motion For Enrollment At Somerset Academy And For Attorney's Fees And Costs; And Countermotion or the Child to be Enrolled at Richard H. Bryan Elementary School, And For Attorney's Fees And Costs" to be served as follows:

[X] Pursuant to EDCR 8.05(a), EDCR 8.05(f) and NRCP 5(b)(2)(d) and Administrative Order 14-2 captioned, "In the Administrative Matter of Mandatory Electronic Service in the Eighth Judicial District Court," by mandatory electronic service through the Eighth Judicial District Court's electronic filing system;

To the person listed below at the address indicated below:

Michael P. Carman	Mike@FCPfamilylaw.com
File Clerk	fileclerk@fcpfamilylaw.com
Robin Haddad	Reception@FCPfamilylaw.com
Dominique Hoskins	Paralegal@FCPFamilylaw.com
Missy Weber	Missy@FCPfamilylaw.com
Attorney for Defendant	_

An Employee of Ford & Friedman

DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

Child Custody Complaint COURT MINUTES August 01, 2019

D-16-539340-C William Eugene DiMonaco, Plaintiff.
vs.
Adriana Davina Ferrando, Defendant.

August 01, 2019 10:00 AM All Pending Motions

Hoskin, Charles J. COURTROOM: Courtroom 02

COURT CLERK: Estes, Sherri

PARTIES PRESENT:

HEARD BY:

William Eugene DiMonaco, Counter Defendant, Matthew H. Friedman, Attorney, Present

Plaintiff, Present

Adriana Davina Ferrando, Counter Claimant, Michael P. Carman, Attorney, Present

Defendant, Present

Grayson Ashton DiMonaco-Ferrando, Subject

Minor, Not Present

JOURNAL ENTRIES

- DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO CONFIRM SCHOOL ENROLLMENT AT SOMERSET ACADEMY...PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO CONFIRM ENROLLMENT AT SOMERSET ACADEMY; AND COUNTERMOTION FOR THE CHILD TO BE ENROLLED INTO RICHARD H, BRYAN ELEMENTARY SCHOOL, AND FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COST

Discussion regarding the parties communication regarding the school issue, applications being accepted, and in March the dispute occurred. Further discussion regarding Mr. Carman's efforts to communicate with Mr. Friedman and Mr. Friedman's failure to do so. Discussion regarding the ratings of the multiple schools, where the child should attend, Dad wanting the siblings to attend the same school the possible zone variance pending according to Dad, Mom's willingness to care for the child both before and after school to avoid the child going to safekey and Mr. Carman's request for the Court to make a decision today. Further arguments by Mr. Friedman regarding the zone variance being in limbo.

COURT NOTES Dad has left this Court no choice, the discussion began in March it is now August and Dad has no viable choice. There is no dispute currently the option is Somerset, and based on that understanding and being consistent with the findings pursuant to Arcella the Court does not feel it needs to go through individually. The Court cannot set an evidentiary hearing today based on the facts before it as of today. It is Dad's burden to prove the school the child is enrolled in is not in the child's best interest and it would be to make a change midstream.

COURT ORDERED the following:

- 1. When the objection was filed it created a new hearing date, therefore the Plaintiff's objection set to be heard on 8/27/19 is hereby VACATED and addressed today (8/1/19).
- 2. The minor child shall begin attending Somerset. If Dad does obtain a zone variance the Court shall require Mr. Friedman to contact bot Mr. Carman and chambers and provide information on Brian Elementary as compared to Somerset so this Court can make Arcella findings. If Mr. Friedman does not feel that is sufficient the Court directed Mr. Friedman to contact both Mr. Carman and chambers and the Court will determine whether it is appropriate to set an evidentiary hearing on that basis. The Court will not be setting a return hearing and shall issue either a minute order to either resolve it or set it for an evidentiary hearing.

Printed Date: 8/6/2019 Page 1 of 2 Minutes Date: August 01, 2019

Notice: Journal Entries are prepared by the courtroom clerk and are not the official record of the Court.

Mr. Carman shall prepare the order,	Mr. Friedman to review and sign off.
CASE CLOSED	

INTERIM CONDITIONS: FUTURE HEARINGS:

Printed Date: 8/6/2019 Page 2 of 2 Minutes Date: August 01, 2019

Notice: Journal Entries are prepared by the courtroom clerk and are not the official record of the Court,