Case No. 83239

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA Filed

JUDITH SALTER, INDIVIDUALLY; JOSHUA KANER, INDIVIDUALLY; AND JOSHUA KANER AS GUARDIAN AND NATURAL PARENT OF SYDNEY KANER, A MINOR, Nov 02 2021 07:03 p.m. Elizabeth A. Brown Clerk of Supreme Court

District Court Case No.: A-20-827003-C

Appellants,

VS.

EDWARD RODRIGUEZ MOYA, AN INDIVIDUAL; AND BERENICE DOMENZAIN-RODRIGUEZ, AN INDIVIDUAL,

APPELLANT'S APPENDIX, VOLUME 3 (Nos. 500–556)

Respondents.


Price Beckstrom, PLLC


Daniel R. Price, Esq.
Nevada Bar No. 13564
Christopher Beckstrom, Esq.
Nevada Bar No. 14031
1404 South Jones Boulevard
Las Vegas, NV 89146
Attorneys for Appellants


INDEX TO PETITIONER'S APPENDIX


DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION	LOCATION
Defendants' Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement	Vol. 1, 1–112
Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement	Vol. 1, 113–37
Defendants' Reply to Plaintiffs' Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement	Vol. 1, 138–250 Vol. 2, 251–5
Court Minutes, dated March 15, 2021	Vol. 2, 256–7
Order Denying Defendants' Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement	Vol. 2, 258–61
Notice of Entry of Order Denying Defendants' Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement	Vol. 2, 262–8
Motion for Reconsideration of Court's March 15, 2021 Minute Order Denying Defendants' Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement	Vol. 2, 269–392
Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Reconsideration of Court's March 15, 2021 Minute Order Denying Defendants' Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement	Vol. 2, 393–412
Defendants' Reply to Plaintiffs' Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Reconsideration of Court's March 15, 2021 Minute Order Denying Defendants' Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement	Vol. 2, 413–500 Vol. 3, 501–41


Order, dated July 10, 20121, Granting Motion for Reconsideration	Vol. 3, 542–7
Notice of Entry of Order Granting Motion for Reconsideration	Vol. 3, 548–56
Transcript from Hearing on Motion for Reconsideration	Vol. 3, 557–79



































































EXHIBIT C

EXHIBIT C

LEWIS BRISBOIS BISGAARD & SMITH LLP



July 28, 2020

Geico

Fax: 866-568-2132

Re: Your insured : Berenice Domenzain-Rodriguez & Edward J Rodriguez Moya

Date of Loss : 7/25/2020

Claim Number: 0279986740101014

My Client(s) : Judith Salter, Joshua Kaner & Sydney Kaner

Dear claims handler:

This is to advise you that my firm represents the above-named client(s) in a claim for personal injuries against your insured as a result of an incident on 7/25/2020.

Please provide me with a <u>certified copy of all insurance policies</u>, including any umbrella policy(ies), of your insured and retain this letter as an indication of my representation. Kindly forward copies of any recorded oral and or written statements taken from our client with regards to the facts of this loss. Please also preserve any and all information related to this claim.

Please confirm in writing your address and other information to correspond with the adjuster. Should you need further information or assistance with this claim, please feel free to contact me.

Finally, please instruct your insured to preserve all evidence in your insured's possession, custody, or control related to this incident. This includes any photographs, and/or video/audio of the incident, parties, and/or the involved vehicles, statements of the parties, etc. Failure to preserve that evidence may result in sanctions against your insured. See, Stubli v. Big D International Trucks, Inc., 810 P.2d 785, 107 Nev. 309 (1991).

Sincerely,

Daniel Price

Daniel R. Price PRICE BECKSTROM, PLLC

> Office: 702-941-0503 Fax: 702-507-2335 Email: info@pricebeckstromlaw.com 7312 West Cheyenne Avenue Ste. 5, Las Vegas, Nevada 89129



July 29, 2020

Whitney Atterberry

Geico

Fax: 866-568-2132

Re: Your insured : Berenice Domenzain-Rodriguez & Edward J Rodriguez Moya

Date of Loss : 7/25/2020 Claim Number: 0279986740101014

My Client(s) : Judith Salte, Joshua Kanerr & Sydney Kaner

Dear Whitney Atterberry:

Attached please find written authorization to receive the medical reports, records and bills of my above-referenced client related to this claim. Pursuant to NRS 690B, as amended by SB 435, I request that you provide to my office all pertinent facts or provisions of your insured's policy relating to any coverage at issue, including policy limits. This information must be provided within ten (10) days of the date of this request.

Sincerely,

Daniel Price

Daniel R. Price

PRICE BECKSTROM, PLLC

Office: 702-941-0503 Fax: 702-507-2335 Email: info@pricebeckstromlaw.com 7312 West Cheyenne Avenue Ste. 5, Las Vegas, Nevada 89129

EWIS 28 RISBOIS

& SMITH ШР

EXHIBIT D

EXHIBIT D



GEICO Advantage Insurance Company

Attn: Region IV Claims, PO Box 509119 San Diego, CA 92150-9914

9/4/2020

Price Beckstom Attorneys At Law

7312 W CHEYENNE AVE STE 5 Las Vegas, NV 89129-7425

Company Name: GEICO Advantage Insurance Company

Claim Number: 027998674 0101 014 Loss Date: Saturday, July 25, 2020

Policyholder: Berenice Domenzain-rodriguez

Driver: Edward Rodriguez moya

Dear Price Beckstom Attorneys At Law,

We acknowledge your request for the disclosure of our insured's bodily injury liability limits regarding your clients, Judith Salter, Joshua Kaner and Sydney Kaner.

Please accept this letter as confirmation of the available coverage in lieu of a Declarations Page and/or policy. The limits for this policy for the date of loss, 07/25/2020, is \$25.000/\$50.000.

Please note that we are respectfully denying your client's injury claim as having no causal relationship to this loss. We will not be collecting any medical records for this file.

If you have any questions or wish to discuss this matter further, please call me at the number listed below.

Sincerely,

Whitney Atterberry 520-546-5254 Claims Department LEWIS BRISBOIS BISGAARD

& SMITH ШР

EXHIBIT E

EXHIBIT E



Time-Limited Settlement Offer

October 22, 2020

Whitney Atterberry GEICO Advantage Insurance Company PO Box 509119 San Diego, CA 92150

Re: Your insureds: Berenice Domenzain-Rodriguez &

Edward J Rodriguez Moya

Date of Loss : 7/25/2020

Claim Number: 0279986740101014

My Clients : Judith Salter, Joshua Kaner and Sydney Kaner

Dear Ms. Atterberry:

I represent Judith Salter and Joshua Kaner (both individually and as the parent and guardian of minor Sydney Kaner) in connection with the above-referenced date of loss. This letter is a time-limited settlement offer on behalf of my clients. This is an attempt to resolve all of my clients' claims, that they have now or may have in the future, arising from this loss against your insured within the limits of your insureds' insurance policy. This settlement offer is not intended to be used in future litigation. Please consider the below information along with the attached documents as you evaluate this offer.

My clients' make this one-time offer to settle all of my clients' claims arising from this loss against your insured in exchange for the formal limits of your insureds' policy limits of \$50,000 as a global tender.

<u>This offer expires on November 23, 2020 at 1:00 p.m., Pacific Time.</u> This offer can only be accepted by the following performance, accomplished prior to the expiration of this offer:

1) Receipt of \$50,000 (the global policy limits of this policy) in my office, payable to "Price Beckstrom, PLLC, Judith Salter, Joshua Kaner, and Sydney Kaner".

My clients reserve all rights and defenses, known or unknown, that arise in law or equity. No comment, action, or inaction should be construed as to waive, alter, or modify any rights and or defenses possessed by my client. Please accept this letter as written confirmation that my office will protect any and all liens applicable to this claim and hold harmless your insureds and GEICO Advantage Insurance Company. My clients have ongoing pain and symptoms from this incident and may require, or may have required, medical care in addition to the care evidenced by the attached documents. Additionally, all funds attributable to minor Sydney Kaner will be held in trust until an order is issued from the appropriate court compromising the minor's claim,

Office: 702-941-0503 Fax: 702-832-4026 info@pbnv.law 7312 W Cheyenne Ave Suite 5, Las Vegas, NV 89129

and at such time the funds will be distributed as ordered by the court. Following acceptance of this offer my clients will execute a release of all claims in favor of your insureds. A copy of my firm's W-9 is attached.

Sincerely,

Daniel Price

Daniel R. Price, Esq. PRICE BECKSTROM, PLLC

EXHIBIT F

EXHIBIT F





GEICO Advantage Insurance Company

Attn: Region IV Claims, PO Box 509119 San Diego, CA 92150-9914

11/12/2020

Price Beckstom Pllc

7312 W CHEYENNE AVE STE 5 Las Vegas, NV 89129-7425

Company Name: GEICO Advantage Insurance Company

Claim Number: 027998674 0101 014 Loss Date: Saturday, July 25, 2020

Policyholder: Berenice Domenzain-rodriguez

Driver: Edward Rodriguez moya

Clients: Judith Salter, Joshua Kaner and Sydney Kaner

Dear Price Beckstom Pllc,

Please be advised that there were a total of three (3) injured parties that were involved in the above referenced loss.

We have Bodily Injury Coverage on our policy with limits of \$25,000.00 per person/\$50,000.00 per occurrence. At this time, we are extending an offer of the global limit of \$50,000.00 to settle the three (3) bodily injury claims presented in this loss.

Please take this matter under consideration to come up with a distribution of our remaining policy limits (with no one person receiving more than the \$25,000.00 single policy limit and all parties limited to \$50,000.00 combined.) Please notify me when you have come to a conclusion regarding the disbursement of the remaining limits.

Please note that all parties must agree to settlement before we can issue payments. We will coordinate with all parties to assist in the agreement and anticipated resolution to include the utilization of a mediator if necessary.

Please note given the nature of the case we will request court approval for any minors involved.

Sincerely,

Whitney Atterberry 520-546-5254 Claims Department

EXHIBIT G

EXHIBIT G





December 1, 2020

Whitney Atterberry GEICO PO Box 509119 San Diego, CA 92150 Via Document Upload

Re: Your insured: Berenice Domenzain-Rodriguez &

Edward J Rodriguez Moya

Date of Loss : 7/25/2020

Claim Number: 0279986740101014

My Clients : Judith Salter, Joshua Kaner and Sydney Kaner

Dear Ms. Atterberry:

My clients were surprised that you did not accept their settlement offer dated October 22, 2020. We did receive your counteroffer dated November 12, 2020, which my clients reject.

Sincerely,

Daniel Price

Daniel R. Price, Esq. PRICE BECKSTROM, PLLC

EXHIBIT H

EXHIBIT H



DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

Negligence - Auto	COURT MINUTES	March 15, 2021
A-20-827003-C	Judith Salter, Plaintiff(s)	
	VS.	
	Edward Rodriguez Moya, Defendant(s)	

March 15, 2021 3:00 AM Minute Order

HEARD BY: Bluth, Jacqueline M. **COURTROOM:** RJC Courtroom 10C

COURT CLERK: Keith Reed

RECORDER:

REPORTER:

PARTIES PRESENT:

JOURNAL ENTRIES

- Having considered Defendants Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement, Plaintiffs Opposition, and Defendants Reply, the motion is hereby DENIED. Plaintiffs Judith Salter, Joshua Kamer, and minor Sydney Kamer allege that they were involved in a motor-vehicle collision involving the defendants which occurred on or about July 25, 2020. Plaintiffs allege they were rear-ended by Defendants and sustained injuries as a result. On October 22, 2020, Plaintiffs sent a Time-Limited Settlement Offer to Defendants. The offer required acceptance by performance and included the following language:

My clients make this one-time offer to settle all of my clients claims arising from this loss against your insured in exchange for the formal limits of your insureds policy limits of \$50,000 as a global tender. This offer expires on November 23, 2020 at 1:00 p.m., Pacific Time. This offer can only be accepted by the following performance, accomplished prior to the expiration of this offer:

1) Receipt of \$50,000 (the global policy limits of this policy) in my office, payable to Price Beckstrom

1) Receipt of \$50,000 (the global policy limits of this policy) in my office, payable to Price Beckstrom, PLLC, Judith Salter, Joshua Kaner, and Sydney Kaner.

(Plaintiffs 10/22/20 Settlement Offer) (emphasis added). GEICO responded to Plaintiffs settlement offer with a letter dated November 12, 2020, stating:

We have Bodily Injury Coverage on our policy with limits of \$25,000.00 per person/\$50,000.00 per PRINT DATE: 03/17/2021 Page 1 of 2 Minutes Date: March 15, 2021

A-20-827003-C

occurrence. At this time, we are extending an offer of the global limit of \$50,000.00 to settle the three (3) bodily injury claims presented in this loss.

Please take this matter under consideration to come up with a distribution of our remaining policy limits (with no one person receiving more than the \$25,000.00 single policy limit and all parties limited to \$50,000.00 combined.) Please notify me when you have come to a conclusion regarding the disbursement of the remaining limits.

GEICO's 11/12/20 Letter. Defendants now argue that the November 12, 2020 letter sent to Plaintiffs constituted valid acceptance of the settlement offer and request that this Court enforce the agreement. Acceptance of an offer is a manifestation of assent to the terms thereof made by the offeree in a manner invited or required by the offer. Eagle Materials, Inc. v. Stiren, 127 Nev. 1131, 373 P.3d 911 (2011); (citing Restatement (Second) of Contracts 50 (1981)). Where an offer invites an offeree to accept by rendering a performance ... [a] contract is created when the offeree tenders or begins the invited performance. Id. (citing Restatement (Second) of Contracts 45 (1981)). Where the offer requires acceptance by performance and does not invite a return promise . . . a contract ca be created only by the offeree's performance. Restatement (Second) of Contracts 50 (1981). A mere promise to perform, without actual performance, does not constitute valid acceptance in such a situation. Id. Plaintiff's October 22, 2020 Settlement Offer clearly states that the offer can only be accepted by performance accomplished prior to the expiration of the offer. It is undisputed that Defendants did not provide payment in the manner specified prior to the deadline. Accordingly, the essential element of acceptance is not present to form an enforceable contract and Defendants motion is DENIED. Plaintiffs counsel shall promptly submit a proposed order.

CLERK'S NOTE: The above minute order has been distributed via e-mail to: Attorneys Daniel R. Price & Darrell D. Dennis. kar 3/16/21

PRINT DATE: 03/17/2021 Page 2 of 2 Minutes Date: March 15, 2021

ELECTRONICALLY SERVED 7/12/2021 10:54 AM

Electronically Filed 07/10/2021 9:15 PM CLERK OF THE COURT

1	ORDR	
2	DARRELL D. DENNIS Nevada Bar No. 006618	
3	MICHAEL R. SMITH	
4	Nevada Bar No. 12641 LEWIS BRISBOIS BISGAARD & SMITH LI	.P
-	6385 S. Rainbow Boulevard, Suite 600	
5	Las Vegas, Nevada 89118 Telephone: 702.893.3383	
6	Facsimile: 702.893.3789	
7	E-Mail: <u>Darrell.Dennis@lewisbrisbois.com</u> E-Mail: <u>Michael.R.Smith@lewisbrisbois.com</u>	
8	Attorneys for Defendants	
9	EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT	
10	CLARK COU	NTY, NEVADA
11	JUDITH SALTER, individually; JOSHUA KANER, individually; and JOSHUA KANER	Case No. A-20-827003-C
12	as guardian and natural parent of SYDNEY KANER, a minor;	Dept. No.: VI
13		
14	Plaintiffs, vs.	ORDER
15	EDWARD RODRIGUEZ MOYA, an	
16	individual; BERENICE DOMENZIAN- RODRIGUEZ, an individual; DOE OWNERS	
17	I-V; DOE DRIVERS I-V; and ROE COMPANIES I-V;	
18	Defendants.	
19		
20		and BERENICE DOMENZIAN-RODRIGUEZ's
21	· ·	2021, Minute Order Denying Defendants' Motion
	to Enforce Settlement Agreement, having come on for Hearing before Honorable Jacqueline Bluth	
22	of Department Six of the Eighth Judicial District Court for the State of Nevada on May 25, 2021,	
23	with Daniel R. Price, Esq. and Christopher Beckstrom, Esq. of the law firm Price Beckstrom, PLLC	
24	appearing on behalf of plaintiffs and Michael R. Smith, Esq., of the law firm Lewis Brisbois	
25	Bisgaard & Smith, LLP, appearing on behalf of Defendants, the Court having entertained argument	
26	from counsel and for good cause appearing there	fore:
2.7	THE COURT FINDS that The Court's M	arch 15, 2021, Minute Order, entered by the Court

BRISBOIS BISGAARD & SMITH LLP ATTORNEYS AT LAW 28

4845-3755-3391.1

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on April 22, 2021 denying Defendants' Motion to Enforce Settlement is clearly erroneous, as The

Court failed to properly consider, among other things, the potential for future or additional exposure to liability for Defendants, Defendants' automobile liability insurance carrier, and plaintiff's counsel and the necessary assurances for protection of the interests of the minor plaintiff;

THE COURT ALSO FINDS that the Plaintiffs' Settlement Offer dated October 22, 2020, was a valid offer insofar as it articulated sufficient material terms to allow for full and final settlement;

THE COURT ALSO FINDS that it would not have been impossible for Defendants to tender a single settlement draft to plaintiffs in response to the Plaintiffs' Settlement Offer dated October 22, 2020, albeit subject to the potential for future or additional exposure to liability for Defendants, Defendants automobile liability insurance carrier, and plaintiffs' counsel and the necessary assurances for the protection of the interests of the minor plaintiff as discussed above;

THE COURT ALSO FINDS that the Defendants' Letter dated November 12, 2020, was a valid Acceptance of plaintiff's Offer insofar as the Defendants' Letter dated November 12, 2020, expressed an acceptance of plaintiffs' material terms as articulated in the Plaintiff's Settlement Offer dated October 22, 2020;

THE COURT ALSO FINDS that the Defendants' Letter dated November 12, 2020, was a valid acceptance of plaintiffs' offer and sought guidance from plaintiffs' counsel as to manner of acceptance, i.e., how the settlement drafts should be written and delivered;

THE COURT ALSO FINDS that the valid Offer and Acceptance were present sufficient to form an Agreement;

THE COURT ALSO FINDS that the Defendants' Letter dated November 12, 2020, requested guidance on the distribution of settlement funds and issuance of settlement drafts such that without response and guidance from the plaintiffs' counsel, it was impossible for Defendants to perform under the Agreement;

THE COURT ALSO FINDS that the Defendants were unable to move forward with Performance of the Agreement;

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4845-3755-3391.1

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1
         THE COURT ALSO FINDS that the Agreement shall be enforced.
 2
         THEREFORE,
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         IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that Defendants EDWARD
 4
   RODRIGUEZ and BERENICE DOMENZIAN-RODRIGUEZ's Motion for Reconsideration of
 5
   Court's March 15, 2021, Minute Order Denying Defendants' Motion to Enforce Settlement
    Agreement is GRANTED;
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 7
         IT IS ALSO HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that Defendants
 8
   EDWARD RODRIGUEZ and BERENICE DOMENZIAN-RODRIGUEZ's Motion to Enforce
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   Settlement Agreement is GRANTED;
         IT IS ALSO HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that Plaintiffs' case
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   will be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
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LEWIS
BRISBOIS
BISGAARD
& SMITH LLP
ATTORNEYS AT LAW

4845-3755-3391.1

Salter et al v. Rodriguez Moya et al. Clark County Court Case No. A-20-827003-C

ORDER

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that Defendants EDWARD RODRIQUEZ and BERENICE DOMENZIAN-RODRIGUEZ's Motion for Reconsideration of Court's March 15, 2021, Minute Order Denying Defendants' Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement is GRANTED; and

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that Defendants EDWARD RODRIQUEZ and BERENICE DOMENZIAN-RODRIGUEZ's Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement is GRANTED; and

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that Plaintiffs' case shall be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

DATED this _____ day of June, 2021.

Dated this 10th day of July, 2021

EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

Respectfully submitted by:

CCA 079 7E7D D88D Jacqueline M. Bluth District Court Judge

MT kj

19 /s/ Michael R. Smith

Michael R. Smith

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20 Nevada Bar No. 12641

21 6385 So. Rainbow Blvd., Suite 600

LEWIS BRISBOIS BISGAARD & SMITH, LLP

Las Vegas, Nevada 89118

22 | Attorneys for Defendants

23 | Approved as to form and content:

24 /s/ Daniel R. Price

25 Daniel R. Price

Nevada Bar No. 13564

26 | 1404 South Jones Blvd.

Las Vegas, NV 89146

27 | Attorneys for Plaintiffs

LEWIS BRISBOIS BISGAARD & SMITH LLP ATTORNEYS AT LAW

4

Schroeder, Brenda

From:	Daniel Price <daniel@pbnv.law></daniel@pbnv.law>
Sent:	Thursday, June 17, 2021 4:11 PM Smith, Michael R. (LV)
To: Cc:	Schroeder, Brenda; Stephanie Amundsen; Christopher Beckstrom
Subject:	Re: [EXT] Re: Salter v. Moya - Order
Michael,	
Thank you for the add order, not a motion, y	litional revisions. If you will correct the title of the document in the caption to reflect that it is ar ou may then affix my electronic signature for submission to the department.
Sincerely,	
Daniel Price	
Price Beckstrom, PLLC 1404 S Jones Blvd, Las Ve	gas NV/20146
	gds, NV 89146 :: 702-941-0503 Fax: 702-832-4026
×	

1	CCEDY	
2	CSERV	
3	DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA	
4		
5		
6	Judith Salter, Plaintiff(s)	CASE NO: A-20-827003-C
7	VS.	DEPT. NO. Department 6
8	Edward Rodriguez Moya,	
9	Defendant(s)	
10		
11	AUTOMATED CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE	
12 13	This automated certificate of service was generated by the Eighth Judicial District Court. The foregoing Order was served via the court's electronic eFile system to all recipients registered for e-Service on the above entitled case as listed below:	
14	Service Date: 7/12/2021	
15	Darrell Dennis	darrell.dennis@lewisbrisbois.com
16 17	Carrie Dunham	carrie.dunham@lewisbrisbois.com
18	Abigail Prince	abigail.prince@lewisbrisbois.com
19	Michael Smith	michael.r.smith@lewisbrisbois.com
20	Price Beckstrom, PLLC Eservice	info@pbnv.law
21	Brenda Schroeder	brenda.schroeder@lewisbrisbois.com
22		
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Electronically Filed 7/12/2021 11:42 AM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT

1 DARRELL D. DENNIS Nevada Bar No. 006618 MICHAEL R. SMITH Nevada Bar No. 12641 3 LEWIS BRISBOIS BISGAARD & SMITH LLP 6385 S. Rainbow Boulevard, Suite 600 Las Vegas, Nevada 89118 5 Telephone: 702.893.3383 Facsimile: 702.893.3789 6 E-Mail: Darrell.Dennis@lewisbrisbois.com E-Mail: Michael.R.Smith@lewisbrisbois.com Attorneys for Defendants 8 9 EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT **CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA** 10 11 JUDITH SALTER, individually; JOSHUA Case No. A-20-827003-C 12 KANER, individually; and JOSHUA KANER Dept. No.: VI as guardian and natural parent of SYDNEY 13 KANER, a minor; 14 Plaintiffs, NOTICE OF ENTRY OF ORDER 15 VS. 16 EDWARD RODRIGUEZ MOYA, an individual; BERENICE DOMENZIAN-17 RODRIGUEZ, an individual; DOE OWNERS I-V; DOE DRIVERS I-V; and ROE 18 **COMPANIES I-V:** 19 Defendants. 20 21 22 PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that an Order on Defendants EDWARD RODRIGUEZ and 23 BERENICE DOMENZIAN-RODRIGUEZ' Motion for Reconsideration of Court's March 15, 24 2021, Minute Order Denying Defendants' Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement was entered 25

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with the Court in the above-entitled case on the 10th day of July, 2021, a copy of which is

attached hereto. DATED this 12^{th} day of July, 2021. LEWIS BRISBOIS BISGAARD & SMITH LLP (s/ Michael R. Smith By: DARRELL D. DENNIS Nevada Bar No. 006618 MICHAEL R. SMITH Nevada Bar No. 12641 6385 S. Rainbow Boulevard, Suite 600 Las Vegas, Nevada 89118 Attorneys for Defendants

LEWIS BRISBOIS BISGAARD & SMITH LLP 4851-5159-0641.1

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Pursuant to NRCP 5(b), I hereby certify that I am an employee of LEWIS BRISBOIS BISGAARD & SMITH LLP and that on this 12th day of July, 2021, I did cause a true copy of the foregoing **NOTICE OF ENTRY OR ORDER**, to be served via the Court's electronic filing and service system to all parties on the current service list.

Daniel R. Price Christopher Beckstrom

PRICE BECKSTROM, PLLC

1404 South Jones Blvd. Las Vegas, NV 89146 Attorneys for Plaintiff

By <u>/s/Brenda Schroeder</u>

An Employee of LEWIS BRISBOIS BISGAARD & SMITH LLP

EWIS 28 RISBOIS GGAARD

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ELECTRONICALLY SERVED 7/12/2021 10:54 AM

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1	ORDR	
2	DARRELL D. DENNIS Nevada Bar No. 006618	
3	MICHAEL R. SMITH Nevada Bar No. 12641	
4	LEWIS BRISBOIS BISGAARD & SMITH LI	.P
5	6385 S. Rainbow Boulevard, Suite 600 Las Vegas, Nevada 89118	
6	Telephone: 702.893.3383 Facsimile: 702.893.3789	
7	E-Mail: <u>Darrell.Dennis@lewisbrisbois.com</u>	
8	E-Mail: Michael.R.Smith@lewisbrisbois.com Attorneys for Defendants	
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10		
11	JUDITH SALTER, individually; JOSHUA	Case No. A-20-827003-C
12	KANER, individually; and JOSHUA KANER as guardian and natural parent of SYDNEY	Dept. No.: VI
13	KANER, a minor;	
14	Plaintiffs, vs.	ORDER
15	EDWARD RODRIGUEZ MOYA, an	
16	individual; BERENICE DOMENZIAN- RODRIGUEZ, an individual; DOE OWNERS	
17	I-V; DOE DRIVERS I-V; and ROE COMPANIES I-V;	
18	Defendants.	
19	Defendants EDWARD RODRIQUEZ a	and BERENICE DOMENZIAN-RODRIGUEZ's
20	Motion for Reconsideration of Court's March 15, 2021, Minute Order Denying Defendants' Motion	
21	to Enforce Settlement Agreement, having come on for Hearing before Honorable Jacqueline Bluth	
22	of Department Six of the Eighth Judicial District Court for the State of Nevada on May 25, 2021,	
23	with Daniel R. Price, Esq. and Christopher Beckstrom, Esq. of the law firm Price Beckstrom, PLLC	
24	appearing on behalf of plaintiffs and Michael R. Smith, Esq., of the law firm Lewis Brisbois	
25	Bisgaard & Smith, LLP, appearing on behalf of Defendants, the Court having entertained argument	
26	from counsel and for good cause appearing therefore:	
27	THE COURT FINDS that The Court's M	arch 15, 2021, Minute Order, entered by the Court

LEWIS BRISBOIS BISGAARD & SMITH LLP ATTORNEYS AT LAW 28

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on April 22, 2021 denying Defendants' Motion to Enforce Settlement is clearly erroneous, as The

Court failed to properly consider, among other things, the potential for future or additional exposure to liability for Defendants, Defendants' automobile liability insurance carrier, and plaintiff's counsel and the necessary assurances for protection of the interests of the minor plaintiff;

THE COURT ALSO FINDS that the Plaintiffs' Settlement Offer dated October 22, 2020, was a valid offer insofar as it articulated sufficient material terms to allow for full and final settlement;

THE COURT ALSO FINDS that it would not have been impossible for Defendants to tender a single settlement draft to plaintiffs in response to the Plaintiffs' Settlement Offer dated October 22, 2020, albeit subject to the potential for future or additional exposure to liability for Defendants, Defendants automobile liability insurance carrier, and plaintiffs' counsel and the necessary assurances for the protection of the interests of the minor plaintiff as discussed above;

THE COURT ALSO FINDS that the Defendants' Letter dated November 12, 2020, was a valid Acceptance of plaintiff's Offer insofar as the Defendants' Letter dated November 12, 2020, expressed an acceptance of plaintiffs' material terms as articulated in the Plaintiff's Settlement Offer dated October 22, 2020;

THE COURT ALSO FINDS that the Defendants' Letter dated November 12, 2020, was a valid acceptance of plaintiffs' offer and sought guidance from plaintiffs' counsel as to manner of acceptance, i.e., how the settlement drafts should be written and delivered;

THE COURT ALSO FINDS that the valid Offer and Acceptance were present sufficient to form an Agreement;

THE COURT ALSO FINDS that the Defendants' Letter dated November 12, 2020, requested guidance on the distribution of settlement funds and issuance of settlement drafts such that without response and guidance from the plaintiffs' counsel, it was impossible for Defendants to perform under the Agreement;

THE COURT ALSO FINDS that the Defendants were unable to move forward with Performance of the Agreement;

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         THE COURT ALSO FINDS that the Agreement shall be enforced.
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         THEREFORE,
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         IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that Defendants EDWARD
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   RODRIGUEZ and BERENICE DOMENZIAN-RODRIGUEZ's Motion for Reconsideration of
 5
   Court's March 15, 2021, Minute Order Denying Defendants' Motion to Enforce Settlement
    Agreement is GRANTED;
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 7
         IT IS ALSO HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that Defendants
   EDWARD RODRIGUEZ and BERENICE DOMENZIAN-RODRIGUEZ's Motion to Enforce
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   Settlement Agreement is GRANTED;
         IT IS ALSO HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that Plaintiffs' case
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   will be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
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LEWIS BRISBOIS BISGAARD & SMITH LLP ATTORNEYS AT LAW

4845-3755-3391.1

<u>Salter et al v. Rodriguez Moya et al.</u> Clark County Court Case No. A-20-827003-C

ORDER

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that Defendants EDWARD RODRIQUEZ and BERENICE DOMENZIAN-RODRIGUEZ'S Motion for Reconsideration of Court's March 15, 2021, Minute Order Denying Defendants' Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement is GRANTED; and

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that Defendants EDWARD RODRIQUEZ and BERENICE DOMENZIAN-RODRIGUEZ's Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement is GRANTED; and

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that Plaintiffs' case shall be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

Dated this _____ day of June, 2021.

Dated this 10th day of July, 2021

EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

Respectfully submitted by:

LEWIS BRISBOIS BISGAARD & SMITH, LLP

CCA 079 7E7D D88D Jacqueline M. Bluth District Court Judge

MT kj

19 /s/ Michael R. Smith

Michael R. Smith

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20 Nevada Bar No. 12641

21 6385 So. Rainbow Blvd., Suite 600

Las Vegas, Nevada 89118

22 | Attorneys for Defendants

23 | Approved as to form and content:

24 /s/ Daniel R. Price

25 Daniel R. Price

Nevada Bar No. 13564

26 | 1404 South Jones Blvd.

Las Vegas, NV 89146

27 | Attorneys for Plaintiffs

LEWIS BRISBOIS BISGAARD & SMITH LLP ATTORNEYS AT LAW

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Schroeder, Brenda

From:	Daniel Price <daniel@pbnv.iaw></daniel@pbnv.iaw>
Sent:	Thursday, June 17, 2021 4:11 PM
To:	Smith, Michael R. (LV)
Cc:	Schroeder, Brenda; Stephanie Amundsen; Christopher Beckstrom
Subject:	Re: [EXT] Re: Salter v. Moya - Order
Michael,	
Thank you for the ad order, not a motion,	ditional revisions. If you will correct the title of the document in the caption to reflect that it is ar you may then affix my electronic signature for submission to the department.
Sincerely,	
Daniel Price	
Price Beckstrom, PLLC	
1404 S Jones Blvd, Las V	
www.pbnv.law	xt: 702-941-0503 Fax: 702-832-4026
givenums services and made the court came came on inches in the time	
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2	DISTRICT COURT	
3	CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA	
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5	I I'd G I DI ' 'CCC'	GAGENO A 20 027002 G
6	Judith Salter, Plaintiff(s)	CASE NO: A-20-827003-C
7	VS.	DEPT. NO. Department 6
8	Edward Rodriguez Moya,	
9	Defendant(s)	
10		
11	AUTOMATEI	D CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
12 13	Court. The foregoing Order was served via the court's electronic eFile system to all	
14	Service Date: 7/12/2021	
15	Darrell Dennis	darrell.dennis@lewisbrisbois.com
16 17	Carrie Dunham	carrie.dunham@lewisbrisbois.com
18	Abigail Prince	abigail.prince@lewisbrisbois.com
19	Michael Smith	michael.r.smith@lewisbrisbois.com
20	Price Beckstrom, PLLC Eservice	info@pbnv.law
21	Brenda Schroeder	brenda.schroeder@lewisbrisbois.com
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Electronically Filed 6/28/2021 1:53 PM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT

TRAN 1 2 DISTRICT COURT 3 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 4 5 JUDITH SALTER, 6 Plaintiff(s), Case No. A-20-827003-C 7 VS. Department VI 8 EDWARD RODRIGUEZ MOYA, 9 Defendant(s). 10 11 BEFORE THE HONORABLE JACQUELINE M. BLUTH, 12 DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 13 14 TUESDAY, MAY 25, 2021 15 16 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS RE: MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF COURT'S MARCH 15, 2021, 17 MINUTE ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO ENFORCE 18 SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT (Via Audio Via BlueJeans) 19 20 **APPEARANCES:** 21 For the Plaintiff(s): CRISTOPHER BECKSTROM, ESQ. DANIEL R. PRICE, ESQ. 22 23 For the Defendant(s): MICHAEL R. SMITH, ESQ. 24

RECORDED BY: DE'AWNA TAKAS, COURT RECORDER

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THE COURT: 827003, Judith Salter versus Moya. If I could have the appearances for the record, please.

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MR. BECKSTROM: Cristopher Beckstrom for the plaintiff -- plaintiffs, I should say.

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THE COURT: Thank you.

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MR. PRICE: And Daniel --

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MR. SMITH: Good morning. Michael Smith on behalf of

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the defendants.

THE COURT: And then did I hear Mr. Price as well?

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MR. PRICE: That's right, Your Honor.

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THE COURT: Okay. All right. Let me pull up my notes. I

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have a few questions for the parties.

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So let's start, if we can, with -- let's start with you first,

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Mr. Smith. So in the motion work, it says:

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So by stating that Defendant's insurer was required to perform an illegal act, the district court is ignoring state law and

So when I looked at the two statutes, right, and I think

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stating illegal contracts are valid.

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Plaintiff discusses this, we have NRS 485.185, which is the

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requirement on motor vehicle owners to carry liability insurance

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with certain minimums. And then I looked at 41.200, which 25

discusses minor comp claims and it's clear, you know, the rationale

behind the statute is to protect minors from unfair fees or their parents or guardians taking advantage of the situation.

So I'm not seeing anything in here that would make it illegal for GEICO to enter into this type of contract. So can you go into a little bit more depth and explain to me why it is that you believe it would be an illegal act.

MR. SMITH: Certainly. First let me -- I'd like to thank the Court and the attorneys at Price Beckstrom for allowing this hearing to go forward and to giving us a week continuance. I apologize that I was out last week.

THE COURT: That's okay.

MR. SMITH: But thank you, everyone, for accommodating.

THE COURT: Sure.

MR. SMITH: To address the Court's concern, I'm not saying that it -- that the contract is legal. The contract is 100 percent legal and that's why we're trying to enforce the agreement. What we're trying to say is that by providing one check without an allocation between the three, it puts my carrier in a position to where one individual may receive more than \$25,000, which is a violation of that statute.

And also the purpose of the minor's compromise statute is twofold. And I discuss that in my opposition -- or, excuse me, in my reply. The minor's compromise statute not only protects minors, but it affords the insurer or the alleged tortfeasor with

some sort of measure of finality, meaning that in the -- let's say the hypothetical that Price Beckstrom, in this case, there was an issue with getting the money to the actual minor. What would happen is all of a sudden now the defendants and their insurer are in a position where 15, 20 years down the line, they're all of a sudden subject to another potential lawsuit based on the same occurrence that they thought they had resolved.

And so while I'm not saying that there's possible penalties for the defendants presented by the minor's compromised statute; what I'm saying is there's no finality of judgment. And that's something that you can understand and appreciate that insurance carriers and defendants want, and that's something that the minor's compromise statute allows to happen and accelerates that potential, you know, statute of limitations issue for minors.

So I'm not saying that the contract is illegal. The contract is 100 percent valid. What I'm saying is that in order for the carrier in this case to satisfy the requirements of the agreement, they need to know that -- how the money's being distributed such that they're not inadvertently violating the statute that says only one -- in this case, only one person could get \$25,000. And they're also stating that, yes, they know that the minor has been protected, has been -- the compromise has been addressed by the Court and the carrier themselves are protected from future liability or claims.

The original motion was hoping to address the fact that the carrier in this case attempted to satisfy their obligations under

the contract, but Plaintiff's counsel never really provided that instruction. And for the carrier, knowing that they're in compliance with the law and that they have that reassurance that's provided by the minor's compromise statute is what prevented the carrier from tendering a single check for the entire policy limits. And that's the type of clarification that I'm here to request before the Court.

We don't believe that the contract was illegal; we just want to make sure the compliance was in conformity with those statutes.

THE COURT: But so what do you say -- well, to two of their arguments, the first one is, well, then can the contract, though, actually be valid and legal if the contract specifically calls for, basically, two things: Specific performance of the delivery of one check by that time period?

MR. SMITH: Well, as long as there's an allocation, an allocation is in compliance with the statute, then yes. I mean, I agree that the -- what Plaintiff's counsel's asking for in their initial ask is something that carriers do all the time.

However, in fulfilling their obligations under that, they allocate, you know, a certain amount to this individual, to that individual. And they hold back a position for the minor.

This is a peculiar situation. I would not have -- I have issues with the ask. I don't think the ask was in itself illegal or anything like that. I just think that, you know, had the plaintiff's counsel provided a response to the carrier of the \$50,000 check

would have been issued. It's just in this case it wasn't, because the carrier had questions on their end that needed to be resolved and those questions are why we're here today.

THE COURT: And then, lastly, they said -- Plaintiff states that to comply with NRS 41.200, there was a specific clause in there stating, additionally, all funds attributable to minor Sydney Kaner will be held in trust until an order is issued from the appropriate court compromising the minor's claim, and at such time the funds will be distributed as ordered by the Court.

And Plaintiff also brings up the point, look, like, if we mess this up or, you know, it's not given to the minor as appropriate or, you know, as it should be, then that's on us, not on you. What's your response to that?

MR. SMITH: Well, again, that may be on them, but it also could be an issue that isn't presented to the Court for resolution for another 15, 20 years.

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

MR. SMITH: And while I certainly wish Mr. Price and Mr. Beckstrom all the success in the world, there's no guarantee that in 15 years when the minor, who was aggrieved by the inability to put something in the trust or to have the minor's compromise claim in the event that they are forced to bring a claim, who's on the hook? It would be the carrier, right? And that's one of the things that the minor's compromise scheme is meant to avoid.

And also, had -- again, I'm not accusing Mr. Price or

Mr. Beckstrom of any shenanigans, but let's just say that there was a delay or an issue in preparing the minor's compromise or getting that issue before the Court, the carrier and the defendants would have no real mechanism to move forward and force that compromise.

And I'll hold out to the Court that minor's compromise are something that I do quite often as a, you know, added benefit to minor claimants. And sometimes they can get a little squirrelly, because there's a lot of issues and things like that. So while I'm not accusing or attempting to infer that Mr. Price or Mr. Beckstrom would do anything untoward, however, the fact that it's a future promise of which the carrier and the defendants can't really enforce, it kind of puts them in a position to where maybe they're in -- they have to pay twice. Right? And that's what they're trying to avoid.

THE COURT: Okay. Let me -- and so who is arguing today, Mr. Price or Mr. Beckstrom?

MR. BECKSTROM: That would be me, Your Honor, Mr. Beckstrom.

THE COURT: All right. So Mr. Beckstrom, I'm going to allow you the opportunity to respond to any of the comments Mr. Smith made. But first, I'd like to ask you a few questions on my end. Okay?

So defense states in their motion:

By failing to address Defendant's insurer's legitimate legal

concerns in complying with Plaintiff's demand, the district court did not provide a method by which Defendant's insurer could perform under the contract and still maintain compliance with Nevada law.

In the Court's March 15th, 2021, minute order, this
Honorable Court stated the failure of the underlying contract
was a failure of performance. In so stating without more, the
Honorable Court did not present guidance on how to resolve
this dilemma moving forward. The scenario of several
claimants presenting demands to a single automobile liability
insurance policy will surely happen again.

So how was Defendant supposed to comply with your request? I mean, to me, so I look -- I'm looking back at this, right? So you send over the offer, they e-mail: We accept, how would you like the checks?

I guess why did it have to become so complex? Why didn't you just e-mail them back and say, Great, sounds good, send three checks. This is how it is. What was the breakdown?

MR. BECKSTROM: Sure, Your Honor.

I do want to disagree a little bit with some of the premise for this question, because they did not e-mail back: We accept.

They e-mailed back: We are asserting a new offer -- or we are asserting an offer for the global policy limit.

And, essentially, here, when they're looking at this statute under Chapter 485.185, this is really their whole basis for this

argument. All this statute does, interestingly, is it does not actually impose any requirements on insurers. If you read the statute, it applies to every owner of a motor vehicle.

This statute places the responsibility on motorists to make sure that their insurance -- or that their financial responsibility, essentially, complies with the statute. Now, insurers often will take it upon themselves to make sure they're providing state minimum limits. But there's nothing in the statute that stops, you know, a motorist from buying two separate policies, you know, a \$10,000 individual limit and then another \$50,000 individual limit. That, technically, would comply with the statute.

Chapter 45 also allows motorists to not even have insurance, but to buy a bond to show that they are financially viable and collectible in the event that something happens, right? A car crash.

So this statute doesn't actually stop them from doing anything as opposed -- you know, with regard to what we requested. The statute does say, yes, there's a \$25,000 individual minimum policy limit, and then there's a 50 -- for bodily injury, of course, and also for bodily injury, a \$50,000 per incident limit. We often call that a global policy limit. And, in this case, we were not requesting the individual policy limit, but we were requesting the global limit for all three plaintiffs.

And as far as specific reasons why, you know, we didn't provide a specific breakdown, essentially, you know, perhaps that,

you know, could have been something to be done. But here, this was a very clearly, you know, the medical bills alone for all of these three claimants exceeded the global policy limit.

It's then incumbent upon GEICO to protect its insured, if they had just sent this check the way it was requested, you know, we wouldn't be here right now, this would not be an issue. If the plaintiffs wanted to sue GEICO or their -- you know, their insured, the defendants in this case, they would be precluded from doing so. But there's really no -- there's no dispute that that just didn't happen.

So whatever the reasons might have be -- might have been, unfortunately, this is not material to our decision, because as this Court's order states on the previous Motion to Enforce, we required acceptance by performance, and that acceptance by performance never took place. There's no dispute as to that.

And, Your Honor, you've read our briefing, you know our position that there is nothing that prevented GEICO from doing this, from issuing a global limit check for three claimants who were all members of the same family, had actually agreed to distribute the funds in a certain way with their attorneys. And I'm not at liberty to divulge that due to attorney/client privilege, the specific amounts. But this agreement was in place. We crafted this very carefully when we sent this offer to make sure that it was in compliance with all of these statutes.

And so even if Defendant's position is true, that this is

somehow impossible or illegal, which, you know, we maintain it is not, there's no change in the end result here. The -- there is no enforceable contract.

THE COURT: So, Mr. Beckstrom, I'm sorry, when you started this, did you say that you consider their letter to be a counter offer?

MR. BECKSTROM: Yes, Your Honor. I mean, by its plain language -- I'm referring to the November 12th letter.

THE COURT: Yeah. So, actually, let me go back to yours first. Sorry. So on October 22nd, you state:

My clients make this one-time offer to settle all of my clients' claims arising from this loss against your insured in exchange for the formal limits of your insurance policy limit of \$50,000 as a global tender. This offer expires on November 23rd.

And it talks about the, you know, following performance, acceptance, expiration, blah, blah.

MR. BECKSTROM: Yes.

THE COURT: So receipt of one \$50,000 -- the global policy limits of this policy in my office, payable to Price Beckstrom.

Right?

But then -- so when I read their letter dated November 12th, they're stating:

We have bodily injury coverage on our policy with limits of 25 per person, 50,000 per occurrence. At this time, we are

extending an offer of the global limits of 50,000 to settle the three bodily injuries.

But wasn't -- you were asking for the 50,000 for the three. And I guess their wording is -- they shouldn't have used the word, We are extending an offer. I think it should have probably said, We are accepting your offer. But both of you are discussing the same thing, right? 50,000.

MR. BECKSTROM: Correct. That is correct.

THE COURT: So then I guess what I'm -- so why do you -- do you -- are you considering that a counter offer because they used the word: We are extending an offer?

MR. BECKSTROM: Well, there's that. And there's also the fact that, you know, our offer was very specific, very unambiguous about how to accept it, and they were proposing something else. Those are revised terms. You know, the case law and the restatements, they all say, you know, there's this mirror image rule, you know, if you're revising the terms of these offers in any way, then it is legally a counter offer.

THE COURT: Well, when you say -- I think that they talk about material terms, though, right? So if they're saying -- you say, Hey, we want 50,000 for all three, they're saying, We'll give you 50,000 for all three, let us know how to cut the checks; is that material?

MR. BECKSTROM: Well, we're not -- so, Your Honor, we're kind of getting the cart ahead of the horse when we're talking

 about materiality. In order for materiality to even be a legal concern, there has to be offer and acceptance. Right? Once the -- there's case law, I believe this was briefed in the original motion that Defendants brought, a separate case. There was -- it was another car crash case and the plaintiff's attorney agreed to accept the policy limits for settlement. I apologize, I don't have the name of the case off the top of my head, I could pull it up here.

What, essentially, happened is then after he gave the release to his client, client looked at it and said, No, they're not admitting fault, we have to release other parties. But then we -- I can't agree to this release. The insurance company didn't want to alter the release. And so then it came to the Court and the Court decided these other terms here are immaterial. They're peripheral terms, they're not material terms. The material terms of the agreement were, you know, that you would accept settlement in this amount in exchange for, you know, a covenant not to sue and releasing them of any further liability.

So that analysis can be pertinent, but only after there's offer and acceptance. If there's no offer and acceptance, materiality is not a consideration for determining whether a contract does exist.

THE COURT: But your argument is that their e-mail – that -- your argument is, is the only way they could have accepted was one \$50,000 check to you by -- what was it, December 23rd? Or, no, November 23rd. That -- you're saying that that's the only

Case No. A-20-827003-C

way they could have accepted, correct?

MR. BECKSTROM: We made that very clear in our -

THE COURT: Demand letter.

MR. BECKSTROM: -- October 22nd settlement offer, that this is the only way to accept this offer, it was by performance prior to the expiration of the offer. So yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. So, Mr. Smith, what is your response to -- I guess my questions of Mr. Beckstrom in regards to, well, you sent the e-mail asking for 50,000, they send the e-mail back saying, We'll give you 50,000, just tell us how to cut the checks. Then Mr. Beckstrom's response was, Well -- because I said, Well, wasn't that an acceptance? Mr. Beckstrom's position is no, because it could only be accepted in one way, by the one check by November 23rd. So then I followed up with the materiality of the terms question.

So what is your position in regards to that?

MR. SMITH: Thank you, Your Honor.

I think the material terms were addressed and the material terms, again, under *May v Anderson*, that was the case Mr. Beckstrom was looking for. The material terms were agreed upon. They weren't written down, but the material terms are, essentially, \$50,000 in exchange for all three claimants to release their claims. Very, very simple terms.

Now, Mr. Beckstrom said something very interesting a few minutes ago when he used the phrase, Protect their insureds.

And you had asked a question regarding how this will come up in the future. What Plaintiffs -- or what the scenario is -- presented itself, whether deliberate or unintentional, is a demand was made that requires certain questions on the behalf of the insurer to answer, to resolve prior to resolution. And whether or not those questions were intentional or not, those questions still need to be addressed prior to cutting the check. So what -- or checks.

So what Plaintiffs have done is, again, intentionally or not, is introduce certain questions, concerns, and hurdles for satisfaction, and now they're saying, well, because we deliberately failed to -- or negligently or inadvertently did not respond to your request on how to perform, the only way for you to perform is by giving us a check and leaving these questions unanswered and potential additional exposure to the client -- or to the insureds and the defendants down the road.

Basically, you're getting the situation where satisfaction of demands is going to become more and more complicated and more and more difficult for the insurance companies and defendants to do in order to – I actually -- as the minute order says, satisfy the demand.

What we have in the instant cases, you do have -- a demand was made and questions were presented on how to satisfy that demand. Now, the material terms were addressed by the insurer, and the insurer made a good-faith effort to satisfy those questions, get those answers and issues resolved, and still provide

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the material terms, which was a total of \$50,000 to the claimants in release of their claims.

You mention the November 12 letter. I agree, the use of the word extending, instead of accepting, was unfortunate. But I don't think that defeats the material terms of the agreement such that acceptance of the offer, the material terms, and enforcement of the settlement agreement proper. I believe it is proper under *May v* Anderson, I think it's proper under the fact that material terms are -were addressed. And the only thing that the carrier had were questions on its side to make sure that the satisfaction and the resolution of this case was in compliance with the policy and the statutes regarding policies and single payers, which is what the demand Plaintiff's counsel made, they made a demand on the policy. And they wanted to make sure that there was some sort of protection by the minors compromised, not only for the minor claimant, but also -- and agreed, selfishly, by the carrier and the defendants. The defendants and the carrier, they want to know that the -- all claims are completely satisfied, which is one of the questions they had. And those were not --

THE COURT: Can you I ask you just -- Mr. Smith, can I ask you just a practical question? Because on this side of the courtroom, you know, I don't generally see how these are done.

When a minor is involved, do -- and you have a family involved, do the checks normally come separate? Do the checks over to Plaintiff normally come in separate amounts or do they

normally go over to the Plaintiff and then Plaintiff cuts it? How does that work?

MR. SMITH: Well, that's interesting, because it happens very -- a lot of different ways. Generally, if the claimant -- minor claimant is unrepresented, I or my firm will petition the Court, we'll present all the facts to the Court and the medical records, and say this is an agreement that the insurance company and the parents of the minor have come to agreement, and this is what we'd like the Court to address. We do that as a courtesy, because in our instance, where I would do it, there's no attorneys' fees involved, so there's more recovery for the minor.

And the Court says, okay, we're going to take -- we're going to accept that. We're going to make sure that these medical providers are paid, the liens are satisfied, and the remainder will go into a blocked trust account for the benefit of the minor. And the financial institution has to be approved, that's part of the petition for minors compromised. And depending on the amount, the depository institution will report to the Court the balance of the trust amount.

In instances where Plaintiff's counsel generally would prepare the minors' compromise, they do also articulate the facts of the underlying event, they talk about the treatment and the cost of treatment, and everybody presents the bills. They present the -- whatever fee that the plaintiff's counsel would get for their services would be, and they would ask -- and would identify the depository

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institution, and they would request the Court to accept that agreement and enter an order saying that this has been agreed to by all the parties and the minors' ability to make a claim against the alleged tortfeasor once they reach the age of maturity is exhausted.

And then in the event that, either way, whether it's prepared by Defendant's counsel or the insurance counsel or the plaintiff's -- the plaintiff's counsel, once the minor reaches the age of 18, they have to petition the Court to release those funds.

Sometimes it can be very, very simple. I'll be honest with you, there was one time I was in front of a judge who's no longer practicing -- or sitting on the bench, and I heard him call a 17th Amended Petition for Minors Compromise claim. I think that's a little extreme.

But, generally, like I said, all the facts and the medical records and the depository institution and who's getting paid what are presented to the Court. The Court approves it, enters an order, and that, basically, extinguishes the minor's right to bring a claim once they become 18, but also provides that the money is sitting in a appropriate financial institution for their benefit once they reach the age of maturity.

THE COURT: Mr. Beckstrom --

MR. BECKSTROM: And, Your Honor, if I could provide a little perspective from the other side of the aisle here?

THE COURT: Yeah.

MR. BECKSTROM: This is Mr. Beckstrom.

THE COURT: I was going to ask you what your experience is in that regard.

MR. BECKSTROM: What typically happens when a minor is represented, whether -- and this is true whether we're in litigation and a lawsuit or whether it's just a prelitigation settlement, what will happen is we'll agree on the settlement, the insurance company will then -- and like Mr. Smith said, it doesn't always happen the same way every time. But the typical routine thing that we see most often is that the insurance company will then send us the check and a copy of the release. The minor cannot -- the minor's parent, rather, cannot sign the release until the Court approves the settlement.

However, we hold those funds in trust until the minor's compromise is approved by the Court, which they routinely do -- are approved, provided the attorney fees and costs don't exceed the minor's recovery, we're getting appropriate reductions from any lienholders or medical providers, and, you know, it's an overall fair settlement, which will, basically, never get denied if it's for policy limits, and we can show sufficient, you know, evidence that the defendant is judgment proof for, you know, not collectible.

And at that point, once the Court does approve the minor's compromise, we typically always need to have those funds in trust, because then we have I believe it's 30 or 60 days, it's a fairly quick turnaround to -- and this has especially been difficult during the pandemic, but getting an appointment with the bank,

going there with the parent of the minor, making that deposit. And then the bank has to send us proof of the blocked trust account with the amount in it that we can provide for the Court to satisfy that obligation to place the net proceeds into a blocked trust account at an appropriate financial institution.

THE COURT: Understood. Okay. Thank you.

So, first of all, I want to say that I appreciate everyone's briefing initially, and then on the Motion for Reconsideration. I think the briefs were exceptional on the -- it was very thorough on both sides. And I've actually struggled with this decision, because on one side, I do see the plaintiff's point of it, saying, Listen, it was very simple, we asked for \$50,000, we asked for a specific performance, the only way that that could be done was by having a check to us in that amount by November 23rd.

But then I have looked at the defense side of it, and I see, you know, the initial letter from Plaintiff saying specific performance, \$50,000, all three people. And then I look at the -- I can't remember if it was a letter or an e-mail on behalf of Mr. Smith saying, okay, \$50,000, how do you want the checks written so we can comply?

So I am granting Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration. I do find my previous ruling to be erroneous. There were different factors that I took into consideration at the second look in regards to the potential liability down the road, which I do agree with Plaintiff, it could also be on them too. But I think that it can also be

on the back of the carrier, as well. As well as the assurances that the money is going to the minor in the appropriate way.

I think a valid offer was made. I think a valid acceptance was made. When it was stated that they would accept the \$50,000 offer and that the checks -- they just wanted guidance in regards to how the checks would -- they -- how Plaintiff would like the checks written and delivered. So I think that it made it somewhat impossible for Defendants to go forward with that acceptance when Plaintiff did not get back to them in telling them how the checks were to be delivered.

So for those reasons, I am enforcing the settlement.

I would ask, Mr. Smith, that you create a detailed order with my findings today. You run it by Plaintiff's counsel, Mr. Beckstrom, and then you get it to my office.

Does anybody have -- or my chambers -- does anybody have any questions about that?

MR. SMITH: This is Michael Smith.

Yes, Your Honor. I would -- I'm going to track the order off the minutes of the hearing. So I would just like to, you know, have a couple of days for those to be posted, because I want them to track as best as possible. So thank you for that.

THE COURT: Okay. So just so you know, I mean, that's fine, but the minutes are probably not going to be as detailed as I would want the findings. So if you need a transcript or you need a CD, we can do that as well.

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MR. SMITH: I think that's what we'll do.

THE COURT: Okay. So we'll get -- we'll just do a CD, if we can, De'Awna, of today.

MR. BECKSTROM: And, Your Honor, I am -- I would like one point of clarification for this order. Would -- are you finding impossibility such that, essentially, it was impossible for GEICO to accept this offer?

THE COURT: Impossible in that -- no. No, I'm not finding that it was -- I think it was impossible for them -- when you didn't respond, I think it was impossible for them to have guidance once they asked that question. However, let's say that it was a different insurance carrier and they just gave you the \$50,000 -- they just sent over the \$50,000 check. So I don't think it's impossible.

I think once that they sent you the e-mail just asking for clarification and how they wanted the three checks written, that is what I was talking about in specific to that. Does that make sense?

MR. BECKSTROM: That clarifies the issue. Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. So we're preparing a CD for each of you.

Will that be ready today, De'Awna, the CDs?

THE COURT RECORDER: Yes.

THE COURT: So those will be ready for pick-up by today. However, if you want a transcript, then you have to pay for it. So I would just pick up the CDs, because the last four minutes of my --

1	you know, are the only thing that you really need for the order.
2	MR. SMITH: All right. Thank you, Your Honor.
3	THE COURT: All right. Sounds good.
4	Anything else? All right.
5	[Proceeding concluded at 10:38 a.m.]
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17	ATTEST: I do hereby certify that I have truly and correctly transcribed the audio/video proceedings in the above-entitled case
18	to the best of my ability. Please note: Technical glitches in the
19	BlueJeans audio/video which resulted in audio distortion and/or audio cutting out completely were experienced and are reflected in
20	the transcript. Shawna Ortega, CET*562
21	Shawha Shoga, SE1 SS2
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