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7	IN THE SUPREME COURT	OF THE STATE OF NEVADA	
8	Gabriel L. Martinez; Universal Protection Services, LLC,	Supreme Ct. No.:	
10	Petitioners, vs.	Dist. Ct. Case No.: A-20-820254-C Gabriel L. Martinez & Universal	
11	The Eighth Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada and the Honorable Joe	Protection Services, LLC's Petition for Writ of Mandamus	
12	Hardy, Judge,		
13	Respondents.		
14	and		
15	Douglas J. Kennedy,		
16	Real Party in Interest.		
17 18	ORIGINAL	, PETITION	
		District Court, Clark County	
19		Joe Hardy, Judge	
20			

Docket 84265 Document 2022-05702

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NRAP 26.1 Disclosure

The undersigned counsel of record certifies that the following are persons and entities, as described in NRAP 26.1(a), and must be disclosed. These representations are made in order that the judges of this court may evaluate possible disqualification or recusal.

- Parent Corporation: Universal Protection Service LP d/b/a Allied Universal Security Services
- 2. Publicly held company that owns 10% or more of the party's stock: None.
- Law firms who have appeared or are expected to appear for Mr. Martinez & Universal Protection Services, LLC: Wilson Elser
 DATED this 22nd day of February, 2022.



/s/ Michael P. Lowry

MICHAEL P. LOWRY, ESQ. CHRIS RICHARDSON, ESQ. 6689 Las Vegas Blvd. South, Suite 200 Las Vegas, Nevada 89119 Attorneys for Gabriel L. Martinez; Universal Protection Services, LLC

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Routing Statement

Typically NRAP 17(b)(13) governs pretrial writ proceedings challenging
discovery orders. This petition challenges two discovery orders. However, this
matter should be presumptively retained by the Supreme Court for decision per
NRAP 17(a)(11) because it raises, as a principal issue of first impression, a
question concerning NRCP 35(a)(3). Specifically, the petition addresses when
good cause might exist to audio record a neuropsychological examination. As Lyf
v. Dist. Ct. noted, Rule 35 examinations occur frequently in personal injury cases.
But no appellate court has yet discussed what might demonstrate good cause to
support recording a neuropsychological examination per NRCP 35(a)(3).

Alternatively, NRAP 17(a)(12) would also apply in this circumstance as another reason the Supreme Court should retain the case.

DATED this 22nd day of February, 2022.



/s/ Michael P. Lowry

MICHAEL P. LOWRY, ESQ. CHRIS RICHARDSON, ESQ. 6689 Las Vegas Blvd. South, Suite 200 Las Vegas, Nevada 89119 Attorneys for Gabriel L. Martinez; Universal Protection Services, LLC

Attorney's Certificate of Compliance

- 1. I certify that this brief complies with the formatting requirements of NRAP 32(a)(4), the typeface requirements of NRAP 32(a)(5) and the type style requirements of NRAP 32(a)(6) because it has been prepared in a proportionally spaced typeface using Microsoft Word 2013 in 14 point Times New Roman.
- 2. I further certify that this brief complies with the page- or type-volume limitations of NRAP 32(a)(7) because, excluding the parts of the brief exempted by NRAP 32(a)(7)(C), it is proportionately spaced, has a typeface of 14 points or more, and contains 3,705 words.
- 3. Finally, I certify that I have read this petition, and to the best of my knowledge, information, and belief, it is not frivolous or interposed for any improper purpose. I further certify that this petition complies with all applicable Nevada Rules of Appellate Procedure, in particular NRAP 28(e)(1), which requires every assertion in the petition regarding matters in the record to be supported by a reference to the page and volume number, if any, of the transcript or appendix where the matter relied on is to be found. I understand that I may be subject to sanctions in the event that the accompanying petition is not in conformity with the

///

1	requirements of the Nevada Rules of Appellate Procedure.
2	DATED this 22 nd day of February, 2022.
3	WILSON ELSER WILSON ELSER MOSKOWITZ EDELMAN & DICKER LLP
4	
5	/s/ Michael P. Lowry MICHAEL P. LOWRY, ESQ. CHRIS RICHARDSON, ESQ.
6	6689 Las Vegas Blvd. South, Suite 200 Las Vegas, Nevada 89119
7	Attorneys for Gabriel L. Martinez; Universa Protection Services, LLC
8	
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10	NRAP 21(a)(5) Verification
11	I am the lead attorney for petitioners in A-20-820254-C and this petition.
12	On their behalf, I believe the facts stated in this motion are true to the best of the
13	information available to me. I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing
14	is true and correct, per NRS 53.045.
15	DATED this 22 nd day of February, 2022.
16	/s/ Michael P. Lowry
17	Attorney for Petitioner
18	
19	
20	

Certificate of Service 1 Per NRAP 21(a) and 25(c), I certify that on February 22, 2022, Gabriel L. 2 3 Martinez & Universal Protection Services, LLC's Petition for Writ of 4 Mandamus was served via electronic means by operation of the Court's electronic filing system to: 5 Joseph J. Troiano 6 Judge Joe Hardy Cogburn Law Eighth Judicial District Court 2580 St. Rose Parkway, Suite 330 Department 15 7 Henderson, Nevada 89074 200 Lewis Ave. 8 Attorneys for Real Parties in Interest Las Vegas, NV 89155 9 BY: /s/ Michael P. Lowry 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20

Relief Sought

This petition seeks a writ of mandamus concerning a request for a neuropsychological examination per NRCP 35. Gabriel L. Martinez and Universal Protection Services, LLC (collectively "Martinez") request a writ that 1) directs the district court to overrule ¶¶ 6 and 7 in the report and recommendations allowing an examination; and 2) directs the district court to grant Martinez's motion to extend discovery, with an appropriate scheduling order to follow.

Issues Presented

- 1. The parties agreed to a neuropsychological examination without an audio recording. The examination started but was not completed. Kennedy then insisted that any continued examination be audio recorded. Did Kennedy waive his ability to request a recording by not raising it when he originally agreed to the examination?
- 2. Unable to reach agreement as to the continued examination, Martinez filed a motion to set one. Kennedy requested that the examination be audio recorded per NRCP 35(a)(3) because he was uncomfortable with the examination. Does that reason satisfy NRCP 35(a)(3)'s good cause requirement? Does it satisfy the good cause requirement if neuropsychological science has conclusively determined such recordings invalidate the data gathered in the examination?

3. Martinez's defense plan was to first evaluate Kennedy via a neuropsychological evaluation, then decide what further expert witnesses were necessary, if any. 2 3 Despite repeated consultations with Kennedy, no agreement could be reached on the continued examination. That in turn delayed Martinez's ability to 4 execute on his plan. Did the district court abuse its discretion by concluding 5 Martinez's efforts to defend himself were not reasonably diligent and then 6 denying a motion to generally extend discovery? 7

Facts Necessary to Consider the Petition

A. Martinez seeks a neuropsychological examination per NRCP 35.

This petition arises from a motor vehicle accident involving Martinez and Kennedy on November 5, 2018. Kennedy alleges he suffered a brain injury from that accident that still affects him in material ways.

Discovery opened in this case when the joint case conference report was filed on December 17, 2020. Martinez requested a neuropsychological examination per NRCP 35 and the parties reached an agreement as to the examination. On June 18, 2021 the examination was noticed for July 20, 2021.² The parties then accommodated that by stipulating to extend discovery for the first time, making initial expert disclosures due October 18, 2021.³

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¹ App. Vol. 1 at App0001-0007.

² *Id.* at App0008-0009.

³ *Id.* at App0010-0020.

As part of the examination on July 20, 2021, the examiner, Staci Ross, Ph.D., asked Kennedy to provide written or verbal consent to the Limits to Confidentiality, review foreseeable risks and benefits to the evaluation, and consent to the neuropsychological evaluation. The Limits to Confidentiality allow divulging of information without permission when it is necessary to protect against a clear and substantial risk of imminent serious harm by the patient or another person... It is the standard in neuropsychology to require any examinee to consent or assent to this limitation.

When Dr. Ross asked Kennedy to agree, either verbally or in writing, to the limitation, Kennedy refused to provide his consent, citing his wife's instruction.⁶ Because Dr. Ross could not ethically continue the exam without Kennedy's consent to the evaluation, knowledge of risks and benefits, and to these Limits to Confidentiality, she adjourned the exam until the issue could be resolved.⁷

During the rest of July, August, and September, Defendants communicated with Kennedy to resolve this misunderstanding and reschedule the examination so it can be completed. During those communications, Kennedy asserted new conditions. He refused to stipulate to Dr. Ross handling the examination *and* insisted that it be recorded. By early October, it was clear no agreement could be

 $\| {}^{4}$ *Id.* at App000035-0036, ¶ 8.

⁵ *Id.* (*citing* NAC 641.224).

⁶ *Id.* at App000036, \P 9.

⁷ *Id.* at ¶ 10.

reached, so on October 7, 2021 Martinez moved for an examination.⁸ The district court scheduled the motion for hearing on December 3, 2021.⁹ Recognizing that the October 18, 2021 initial expert disclosure deadline was no longer workable, the parties stipulated to extend discovery.¹⁰ Initial expert disclosures were then due December 18, 2021.

1. The district court rules on the examination request.

Martinez's motion to set the examination noted Mr. Kennedy's confusion at what he was being asked to do during the examination, that Dr. Ross was an appropriate examiner, that Mr. Kennedy had waived his right to request an recording by not raising it originally, and that, if he hadn't, there was no good cause for a recording because it would invalidate the data gathered. Mr. Kennedy opposed and the motion was heard as scheduled. The discovery commissioner ruled that Dr. Ross could complete the examination. The discovery commissioner also ruled "Plaintiff did not waive his right to recording the continued Rule 35 examination under the circumstances presented. The discovery commissioner ordered that the examination be audio-recorded. "Under

⁸ *Id.* at App0021-0033.

 $\parallel^9 Id$. at App0130.

¹⁰ *Id.* at App0131-0137.

¹¹ *Id.* at App0173, ¶¶ 2 & 3.

¹² *Id*. at ¶ 6.

the circumstances presented, there is good cause for the continued Rule 35 examination to be recorded."¹³

Martinez timely objected to the discovery commissioner's report and recommendations. ¹⁴ The district court overruled the objection without discussion. ¹⁵

B. The delayed examination leads Martinez to move to extend discovery.

When the motion to reset the examination was heard on December 3, 2021, the initial expert disclosure deadline was still December 18, 2021. Given this 17 day period, for practical reasons Martinez believed that Kennedy would agree to extend discovery no matter the ruling on that motion. If Kennedy won, Martinez might object or begin the process of locating a new examiner to schedule the examination. If Martinez won, Kennedy might object, which would then delay scheduling the examination. Even if Martinez's motion for a Rule 35 examination was simply granted in full without objection, it would still have taken more than 17 days between the ruling and the disclosure deadline to mutually coordinate a date and time with Kennedy and Dr. Ross. Recognizing this, Martinez decided it would be more practical to wait for a ruling on the examination to then assess what needed to occur, how long that might take, and what discovery deadlines might be

¹³ *Id*. at ¶ 7.

¹⁴ App. Vol. 2 at App0264-0270.

¹⁵ *Id.* at App0335-0336.

appropriate. Proposing deadlines without that guidance would generate speculative, unrealistic timeframes. Despite that, Kennedy refused to stipulate to extend discovery.

Martinez moved to extend discovery, discussing this reasoning. ¹⁶ He proposed a 9 month extension of discovery because he anticipated 1) his objection would not be heard for a month; 2) it could take another 60-90 days beyond that to schedule and conduct the examination; and 3) he recognized that this writ petition could result. Martinez wrote "a protracted delay seems inevitable because, again, the conditions put on the Rule 35 examination effectively prevent Defendants from obtaining one. They prefer to be transparent about that and propose a schedule based upon it." ¹⁷

Kennedy argued Martinez had not been diligent because the brain injury has been an issue in the case since it was filed and Martinez should have prosecuted his defense differently. Kennedy cited no authority that indicates one party may dictate another's litigation strategy, nor does Rule 35 impose such a requirement. Each party is free to select their own litigation strategies and have the ability to independently gather evidence relevant to those strategies. Martinez took reasonable steps to prosecute his defense that Kennedy impeded by insisting on new conditions for a continued examination.

¹⁶App. Vol. 1 at App0164-0171.

¹⁷ *Id.* at App0169:23-26.

During oral argument, Martinez specified that his expert witness strategy started with obtaining the neuropsychological assessment of Kennedy. Based upon the findings of that assessment, Martinez then planned to determine what other damages experts might be necessary.

The district court ultimately granted only a 60 day extension to complete the neuropsychological examination. Its written order, filed February 15, 2022, concluded in relevant part:

This Court finds as follows: (1) the Discovery Commissioner's Report and Recommendations was filed on December 30, 2021, with an Objection filed on January 3, 2022; however, a hearing date had not yet been set to address the Objection; (2) under the facts and circumstances, there was no basis at all to grant the general nine to ten months extension of discovery, as requested by the Defendants; (3) the issue of the alleged TBI had been in the case from its inception; (4) the Court must weigh the preference for a trial on the merits vs. the deadlines to which the parties had stipulated; (5) there was a lack of due diligence on the part of the Defendants, particularly regarding the fact that the exam was supposed to go forward in July of 2021, and when it did not go forward, defense counsel waited three months to raise the issue with the Discovery Commissioner, and then another two months to raise the instant Motion with the Court; (6) in making its decision, the Court considered the totality of the circumstances, the Plaintiffs' pending Motion to Amend Complaint, and the Discovery Commissioner's Report and Recommendations, wherein the Discovery Commissioner found that the Rule 35 exam should be reconvened and completed; (7) finding good cause for the late filing of the instant Motion, the instant Motion was hereby GRANTED IN PART to allow the partial reopening of discovery for a period of THIRTY (30) DAYS, for the limited purpose of identifying an expert in neuropsychology, and conducting the remainder of the Rule 35 exam, subject to what the Discovery Commissioner may decide on the

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¹⁸ App. Vol. 2 at 325:9-24.

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Objection to the Report and Recommendations; (8) no good cause had been shown to extend discovery for any other purpose; (9) the deadline for the initial expert disclosure of the neuropsychologist by the Defendants, as well as the taking of the Rule 35 examination, is March 14, 2022;¹⁹

Why the Writ Should Issue

A. An important issue of law needs clarification.

Writ relief is available when there is no "plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law."²⁰ "Because an appeal from a final judgment or order is ordinarily an adequate remedy, in most cases, we decline to exercise our discretion to consider writ petitions challenging interlocutory district court orders."²¹ Nevada's appellate courts "generally will not exercise our discretion to review discovery orders through" writ petitions.²² "Nevertheless, in certain cases, consideration of a writ petition raising a discovery issue may be appropriate if an important issue of law needs clarification and public policy is served by this court's invocation of its original jurisdiction."²³

This petition presents an important issue of law for many of the same reasons that were considered in *Lyft, Inc. v. Dist. Ct. Lyft* noted "physical and

¹⁹ App. Vol. 2 at 0346-0347. ²⁰ NRS 34.170.

²¹ Oxbow Constr., LLC v. Dist. Ct., 130 Nev. 867, 872, 335 P.3d 1234, 1238 (2014).

 ²² Club Vista Fin. Servs. v. Dist. Ct., 128 Nev. 224, 228, 276 P.3d 246, 249 (2012).
 ²³ Las Vegas Sands Corp. v. Dist. Ct., 130 Nev. 578, 581, 331 P.3d 876, 878 (2014).

mental examinations are frequently conducted during discovery" so resolving the conflict between NRCP 35 and NRS 52.380 was important.²⁴ It also concluded "this is a substantial issue of public policy due to the conflicting interests of plaintiffs and defendants with respect to the procedures for the examinations."

These two points apply equally here. Mental examinations are frequently conducted during discovery and there are conflicting interests between parties as to the examinations. This petition concerns a requested mental examination. This petition also involves the conflicting interests between a plaintiff and a defendant. Kennedy wants to audio record the examination, but Martinez has provided scientific literature indicating that if the examination is audio recorded then the data gathered in the examination are invalid. If the district court's ruling stands, then Martinez is effectively deprived of his ability to obtain the very examination that the district court concluded was appropriate.

Finally, this is not a hypothetical point limited to one case. Of the writ petitions that were filed contesting NRS 52.380's constitutionality, many of them arose from mental examinations. While *Lyft* concluded NRS 52.380 could not be used to justify an observer or audio recording, *Lyft* did not analyze if, or how, an observer or audio recording could be justified under NRCP 35. The petitions

²⁴ Lyft, Inc. v. Dist. Ct., 137 Nev. Adv. Op. 86 (December 30, 2021).

raising that point were returned to the district courts for further factual development, and perhaps inevitably to return later as new writ petitions.

Deciding this petition on its merits will provide guidance to litigants and district courts trying to address these frequently arising issues. This in turn promotes judicial economy and provides litigants further ability to resolve their potential disputes about neuropsychological examinations per NRCP 35 without court intervention.

B. The standard of review is de novo and then abuse of discretion.

"Conclusions of law, including the meaning and scope of statutes, are reviewed de novo."²⁵ Once the conclusions of law are decided, an abuse of discretion standard applies. "Discovery matters are within the district court's sound discretion, and we will not disturb a district court's ruling regarding discovery unless the court has clearly abused its discretion."²⁶

C. The district court erred by allowing Kennedy to assert a new condition.

When the NRCP 35 exam was originally proposed and scheduled, Kennedy did not ask to record the examination. He could have raised that issue, but did not. Because he did not raise this topic at the appropriate time, the issue about whether to record the examination was waived just like any other objection that is not timely asserted.

²⁵ Canarelli v. Dist. Ct., 136 Nev. Adv. Op. 29, 464 P.3d 114, 119 (2020). ²⁶ Id.

Allowing a party to assert new conditions to a Rule 35 examination after agreeing to the exam would only promote gamesmanship. The parties here worked amicably to reach an agreement for the exam. Kennedy's misunderstanding of what Dr. Ross was asking him is the only reason the examination did not go forward. He should not benefit from that by adding a new condition to the exam.

D. Allowing an audio recording makes an examination impossible.

If Kennedy did not waive this issue, then he has not met his burden to demonstrate good cause to support it. Martinez seeks a mental examination per NRCP 35. When an examination is allowed, NRCP 35(a)(3) allows permits audio recording under certain circumstances. "On request of a party or the examiner, the court may, for good cause shown, require as a condition of the examination that the examination be audio recorded."

The report and recommendations did not state what factual finding supported the good cause requirement. The hearing transcript provides some insight as to what good cause the discovery commissioner found.

I'm going to grant the motion in part and deny it in part. The Plaintiff is compelled to attend a second examination. I think because of the circumstances here there is good cause to require recordation, if nothing else, to calm the Plaintiff's nerves about it. But because of the interaction before with Dr. Ross, [plaintiff's counsel], I understand your argument about your client not being terribly comfortable. I'm never comfortable going to a doctor. I'll tell you that much, but the Defendant gets to choose their examiner, and your client is stuck with that.

The district court did not elaborate further in overruling Martinez's objection.

1. "Calming nerves" is not good cause.

"I think because of the circumstances here there is good cause to require recordation, if nothing else, to calm the Plaintiff's nerves about it."²⁷ The district court cited no legal authority indicating that the examinee's subjective unease about the examination establishes good cause for an audio recording. Instead, it appears the district court read a requirement into Rule 35 that the rule's plain language does not support. This is similar to the conclusion in *Ferrellgas, Inc. v. Dist. Ct.* where the district court manifestly abused its discretion by concluding good cause supported an audio recording because there was no doctor-patient relationship between the examiner and examinee.²⁸ In both circumstances, the district courts read language into the rule that the rule's plain language does not support.

2. The harm of recording outweighs the perceived benefit.

If Kennedy presented good cause sufficient to justify audio recording the examination, Martinez presented good cause to overcome it. Scientific studies uniformly conclude that recording a neuropsychological evaluation invalidates the data gathered from it. Martinez presented these studies to support his motion, Kennedy presented no studies reaching the opposite conclusion.

²⁷ App. Vol. 1 at 162:6-8.

²⁸ No. 82670, 2022 Nev. Unpub. LEXIS 81, at *2 (Jan. 27, 2022).

In fact, ethical rules bar recording. The American Board of Professional Neuropsychology has adopted a policy statement concerning what they term "third party observation" (TPO) of examinations.²⁹ The Board examined these requests and noted they are inconsistent with good practice. "Given the body of literature that exists regarding observer effects, it is incumbent on neuropsychologists who provide evaluations to make clear to patients, clients, families, and other professionals that they do not endorse TPO and to try to avoid this type of intrusion in the assessment."³⁰ "Multiple studies have established and replicated the dubious validity of data obtained during recorded or observed evaluations."³¹ When confronted with a situation such as is at issue here, "neuropsychologists should resist demands for TPO if requested by opposing counsel, retaining counsel, or the court. The neuropsychologist should educate the court or those involved as to the APA Ethics Code and the existing scientific research that supports the negative effects of this type of intrusion."³² "Neuropsychologists should therefore not engage in, endorse, abet, or conduct assessments complicated by TPO or recording of any kind other than under the order of a court after all reasonable alternatives have been exhausted."33 The Board concluded: ²⁹ App. Vol. 1 at App0070. 30 *Id.* at App0073. 31 *Id.* at App0075.

³² *Id*. at App0076. ³³ *Id*. at App0077.

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³⁴ *Id.* at App0076.

Requests for TPO frequently create an ethical dilemma for neuropsychologists as any observation or recording of neuropsychological tests or their administration has the potential to influence and compromise the behavior of both the examinee and the administrator, threatens the validity of the data obtained under these conditions by, and consequently limits normative comparisons, clinical conclusions, opinions, interpretations, and recommendations. For these reasons, APA ethical standards support the position that TPO in neuropsychological testing should be avoided.³⁴

These comments were echoed during the public comment process that led to

Rule 35's current language. Nevada's Board of Psychological Examiners submitted comments against a draft proposal that would have allowed TPO at psychological or neuropsychological examinations. It highlighted that allowing TPO "poses a significant threat to public safety" and discussed the science concluding why observers and recordings invalidate the testing data.³⁵

The Nevada Psychological Association also submitted comments against TPO.³⁶ It included a bibliography of literature discussing the problems TPO create and how it invalidates testing data.³⁷ The Association also provided the Official Position Statement of the National Academy of Neuropsychology as to both test security and TPO.³⁸ Seven individual psychologists and neuropsychologists also submitted comments against the proposal. Teri Belmont, Ph.D provided the

¹⁹ || ³⁵ App. Vol. 1 at App0099.

³⁶ *Id.* at App0101-0102.

³⁷ *Id.* at App0103.

³⁸ *Id.* at App0104-0113.

American Academy of Clinical Neuropsychology's policy statement against TPO, among other materials.³⁹ All of the psychologists and neuropsychologists provided scientific references about why TPO is scientifically impermissible.

Applying all of this here, audio recording the neuropsychological examination invalidates the data that the examination would gather. If the data cannot be used, then the examination is pointless. This in effect deprives Martinez of his opportunity to obtain the examination the district court concluded is permitted here. To the extent Kennedy demonstrated good cause for a recording, the scientific evidence and ethical guidelines that the neuropsychological community itself have created are stronger cause to deny an audio recording in this instance. Ruling otherwise would turn the neuropsychological examination into an exercise in futility, defeating the very reason Rule 35 exists.

E. The district court abused its discretion by not extending discovery.

Martinez's motion to extend discovery was governed by EDCR 2.35(a). It requires that "motions to extend any date set by the discovery scheduling order must be in writing and supported by a showing of good cause for the extension and be filed no later than 21 days before the discovery cut-off date or any extension thereof." Martinez's motion was filed within 21 days of the deadline it sought to extend. "A request made beyond the period specified above shall not be granted

³⁹ *Id.* at App0115-0124.

unless the moving party, attorney or other person demonstrates that the failure to act was the result of excusable neglect." Although not expressly stated in its order, the district court did consider the motion on its merits and implicitly concluded good cause for the motion's timing was present. The district court then concluded there was no good cause to extend discovery as Martinez proposed.

Nevada appellate courts have not expressly evaluated what "good cause" requires. The federal courts have a similar "good cause" requirement. Their "good cause" analysis "primarily considers the diligence of the party seeking the amendment. The district court may modify the pretrial schedule if it cannot reasonably be met despite the diligence of the party seeking the extension." But "carelessness is not compatible with a finding of diligence and offers no reason for a grant of relief." Further, while "the existence or degree of prejudice to the party opposing the modification might supply additional reasons to deny a motion, the focus of the inquiry is upon the moving party's reasons for seeking modification." A party is not required to be perfectly diligent, just reasonably diligent.

Applied here, Martinez demonstrated reasonable diligence to support an extension. Martinez adopted a reasonable defense plan that attempted to assess

⁴⁰ Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, 975 F.2d 604, 609 (9th Cir. 1992).

⁴¹ *Id*.

⁴² *Id*.

Kennedy's condition with a neuropsychologist before then assessing whether to spend tens of thousands more on other expert witnesses who might ultimately not be necessary. Martinez took concrete steps to execute this plan by arranging for the examination, working with Kennedy to extend discovery twice as their disputes arose, and by bringing appropriate motions to the district court when the parties were unable to reach an agreement. While Kennedy might believe Martinez could or should have implemented a different defense plan, that does not factor into whether Martinez was reasonably diligent in pursuing the defense plan that he selected.

Martinez was reasonably diligent in pursuing the discovery he needs to evaluate the claims and defenses in this case. Denying the motion except as to the neuropsychological examination was an abuse of discretion in this particular circumstance.

Conclusion

Martinez's writ petition should be decided on its merits. It presents the next question started by the various writ petitions that led to *Lyft*: What circumstances might demonstrate good cause per NRCP 35(a)(3) sufficient to merit recording a neuropsychological examination? There might not be a bright-line, one size fits all answer to that question. But if the answer requires case-by-case assessment, then providing examples of what is or is not good cause will help litigants resolve these

questions on their own or, if court intervention is necessary, will help guide district courts to appropriate conclusions.

Martinez requests a writ that directs the district court to 1) overrule ¶¶ 6 and 7 to the findings section of the report and recommendations; and 2) withdraw its order partially granting Martinez's motion to extend discovery and instead grant that motion, with an appropriate scheduling order to follow.

DATED this 22nd day of February, 2022.



/s/ Michael P. Lowry

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