1 2 3 4 5 6	MICHAEL F. BOHN, ESQ. Nevada Bar No.: 1641 mbohn@bohnlawfirm.com LAW OFFICES OF MICHAEL F. BOHN, ESQ., LTD. 2260 Corporate Circle, Suite 480 Henderson, Nevada 89074 (702) 642-3113 / (702) 642-9766 FAX Attorney for appellant	Electronically Filed Nov 12 2021 10:54 a.m. Elizabeth A. Brown Clerk of Supreme Court
7	SUPREM	E COURT
8		NEVADA
9		
10	RONALD J. ROBINSON,	No. 83250
11	Appellant,	
12	vs.	APPELLANT'S APPENDIX VOL. 11
13 14	STEVEN A. HOTCHKISS,	
15	Respondent.	
16	RONALD J. ROBINSON,	
17		
18	Appellant,	
19	VS.	
20	ANTHONY WHITE, ROBIN SUNTHEIMER, TROY SUNTHEIMER, STEPHENS	
21	GHESQUIERE, JACKIE STONE, GAYLE CHANY, KENDALL	
22	SMITH GARRIELE	
23	LA VERMICOCCA, ROBERT KAISER.	
2425	Respondents.	
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02/24/20	Trial Exhibit 3 - Emails	6	APP000871 APP000879
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1 2	02/24/20	Trial Exhibit 6 - Emails, Promissory Note & Powerpoint Slides
3	02/24/20	Trial Exhibit 7 - Email & Powerpoint Slides
4	02/25/20	Trial Exhibit 8 - Spreadsheet
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8	02/24/20	Trial Exhibit 11 - Nevada Secretary of State Records for VCC
10	02/24/20	Trial Exhibit 12 - Consolidated Financial Statements for VCC
11	02/24/20	Trial Exhibit 13 - Private Placement Memorandum
12 13	02/24/20	Trial Exhibit 14 - Preliminary Offering Circular
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EXHIBIT A-1

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Electronically Filed 9/30/2020 9:27 AM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT DAVID LIEBRADER, ESQ. 1 STATE BAR NO. 5048 THE LAW OFFICES OF DAVID LIEBRADER, APC 2 3960 HOWARD HUGHES PARKWAY STE 500 LAS VEGAS, NV 89169 3 PH: (702) 380-3131 Attorney for Plaintiffs 4 DISTRICT COURT 5 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 6 IN THE MATTER BETWEEN Case No. A-17-762264-C 7 Steven A. Hotchkiss, Dept.: 9 8 PLAINTIFF, OPPOSITION TO FIRST POST 9 JUDGMENT MOTION v. 10 Ronald J. Robinson, Vernon Rodriguez, Frank 11 Yoder, Alisa Davis and DOES 1-10 and ROES 1-10, inclusively 12 CONSOLIDATED WITH **DEFENDANTS** 13 Case No. A-17-763003-C Anthony White, Robin Suntheimer, Troy 14 Suntheimer, Stephens Ghesquiere, Jackie Stone, Gayle Chany, Kendall Smith, Gabriele 15 Lavermicocca and Robert Kaiser 16 **PLAINTIFFS** 17 v. 18 Ronald J. Robinson, Vernon Rodriguez, Virtual Communications Corporation, Frank Yoder, Alisa 19 Davis and DOES 1-10 and ROES 1-10, inclusively 20 21 Opposition to Vern Rodriguez' first post judgment motion 22 Plaintiffs file this Opposition to Defendant Rodriguez' first post judgment 23 motion. 24 25

Case Number: A-17-762264-C

In his first motion, Defendant seeks two remedies:

- To add additional facts concerning Virtual Communications
 Corporations' ("VCC") bankruptcy, and other superfluous matters to the
 Court's finding that Mr. Rodriguez was a control person for VCC.
- 2. To revisit the statute of limitations issue (which was the subject of POST trial briefing, in which Mr. Fleming participated.)

1. THE COURT NEED NOT SUPPLEMENT ITS PRIOR FINDINGS

Mr. Rodriguez was found liable as a control person for a company that offered and sold unregistered securities. He wasn't simply a place holder CFO; he actively participated in the offering, and figured prominently in every decision the company made to sell their unregistered securities to the public. Plaintiffs easily met their burden at trial by introducing documentary evidence tying Mr. Rodriguez to VCC's fund raising efforts, as well as being the "point of contact for investors." In addition, testimony by Mr. Yoder and Ms. Davis, as well as Mr. Rodriguez himself conclusively established that as CFO he was aware of, directed and participated in the offering. The Court detailed Mr. Rodriguez role in its decision, issued on April 7, 2020. See Exhibit "A "attached.

Subsequently, Plaintiff prepared findings of fact and conclusions of law and sent them to Mr. Rodriguez' attorney for comment. Having received no feedback, Plaintiff submitted the FFCL, and the court signed off and filed the document on May 8, 2020. Now, <u>five months later</u>, Defendant wants to add pages of additional language to its findings of fact in the hope it increases his chances on appeal.

The primary issue on which Mr. Rodriguez seeks further findings relates to the VCC bankruptcy's effect on his liability as a control person. Further findings are unnecessary. While the bankruptcy proceeding converted Plaintiffs' promissory notes into equity in the reorganized VCC (a common result for creditors during a bankruptcy), it did not extinguish Mr. Rodriguez' liability for having been a control person at the time VCC sold unregistered securities. Nothing in any of the bankruptcy orders released or relieved Mr. Rodriguez of such liability.

As discussed extensively in the briefing related to Mr. Robinson's guarantee, "a discharge in bankruptcy does not extinguish the debt itself, but merely releases the debtor from personal liability for the debt." In re Edgeworth, 993 F.2d 51, 53 (5th Cir. 1993). As a result, the guarantor remains liable, as do control persons. Defendant's claim that the bankruptcy "absolutely and irrevocably extinguished" any liability under the notes is unsupported, and legally incorrect. While VCC's liability was extinguished (in exchange for the issuance of preferred stock), the same wasn't true of the guarantor, or the control persons (whose liability is based on point of sale activity).

Similarly, the conversion of debt to equity via the bankruptcy does not serve to extinguish liability for the "offer or sale" of securities, which is an objective fact. Nor does it operate to extinguish the fact that Mr. Rodriguez was a control person for VCC at the time of the offer and sale. Defendant has not cited a single case in support of this position.

As to damages, this was also addressed in Plaintiffs' post-trial brief filed on May 12, 2020. Because NRS §90.660 provides a remedy of recission, or, if the

securities are no longer held, for compensatory damages, Mr. Rodriguez will, upon payment of the amounts due under NRS §90.660 be due the preferred and common shares that Plaintiffs received in exchange for their promissory note interests. This isn't complicated, and Plaintiffs stand ready to tender the shares upon payment of the judgment.

In short, there is no need to add additional facts relating to the bankruptcy. An appeals court can take judicial notice of the bankruptcy, and adding five pages of findings from an issue that has no bearing on the activity that gave rise to liability only muddies the record for any appeal.

2. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS ISSUES

Mr. Rodriguez asks the court to add purchase dates provided by Plaintiffs in their post-trial brief to its findings of fact. This is unnecessary as the purchase dates are a matter of record. If Defendant chooses to appeal, the entire record, including the briefs containing those purchase dates will be part of the record. In asking for a modification, Defendant is only seeking to buy himself additional time.

The SOL issue was also the subject of post-trial briefing. See Plaintiffs' Reply Brief to Mr. Rodriguez' Opposition to the Motion for Damages and Attorney's Fees filed May 28, 2020. In raising the statute of limitations defense, it was incumbent on Defendant to put forth evidence in support of it, especially in light of the evidence of tolling and concealment offered by Mr. Hotchkiss at trial. See Trial Exhibit 3, pages 49-56.

Having offered nothing pretrial, during trial or post trial, not even mentioning the issue during opening or closing, Defendant abandoned the defense, and did not

meet his burden or proof. And, as Counsel points out, the Statute of limitations was raised only as an affirmative defense at to Mr. Hotchkiss. It was not raised in the Answer filed in response to any of the other Plaintiffs (from the consolidated Anthony White case).

Defendant now claims that Plaintiffs "had actual knowledge of a default under the Notes and made demands for payment no later than February, 2015." This is demonstrably false. While Defendants stopped making payments in February 2015, demands for payment were sent years later (see Trial Exhibit 1, showing demand letters sent in 2017) as a result of the stall and delay tactics employed by Defendants (particularly Defendant Rodriguez) See Trial Exhibit 3, pages 49-56.

Facts determinative of this issue are contained on page 5, lines 17 and 18 and the footnote in the motion. There, Defendant acknowledges that he failed to raise the statute of limitations defense in his answer to the White FAC which added all of the Plaintiffs with the exception of Steve Hotchkiss. The White First Amended Complaint (adding the additional Plaintiffs) was filed October 4, 2018. In his Answer filed November 9, 2018 Defendant failed to raise the statute of limitations defense as to the claims. See Exhibit "B" attached.

As a result, the SOL defense is only applicable to the Hotchkiss claim, which was filed within five years, and the defenses waived for the same reasons previously argued. NRS §§ 90.460 and 90.660 are subject to a five year statute of repose.

Regardless, Defendant failed to mention the SOLs at all pretrial or during trial, and failed to offer any proof in support of this defense.

CONCLUSION

Mr. Rodriguez is unhappy with the outcome of the trial, and with the performance of his prior counsel. Not having good facts to argue, Mr. Gewerter made a tactical decision to play on the court's sympathies in hopes it would discount the overwhelming documentary evidence that Mr. Rodriguez was a control person and active participant in the sale of unregistered securities. A new trial, or the reopening of evidence is not going to change these facts. Defendant can't point to any restrictions that prevented him from testifying or introducing evidence in support of a good faith defense to control person liability. Based on the clear and convincing evidence of his active role as a control person of an entity that sold unregistered securities, the Court should deny the motion.

Dated: September 30, 2020

Respectfully submitted,

The Law Office of David Liebrader, Inc.

<u>By:/s/ David Liebrader</u> David Liebrader Attorney for Plaintiffs

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING I hereby certify that on the 30th day of September, 2020, I mailed a copy of the foregoing Opposition to first post judgment brief to the following Harold Gewerter, Esq. Gewerter Law Firm 1212 Casino Center Boulevard Las Vegas, NV 89104 Scott Fleming, Esq. Fleming Law 9525 Hillwood Dr. Ste. 140 Las Vegas, NV 89134 /s/: Dianne Bresnahan An Employee of The Law Office of David Liebrader

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EXHIBIT "A"

1	DECN	
2	Judge Cristina D. Silva Eighth Judicial District Court	
	Department IX	
3	Regional Justice Center 200 Lewis Avenue	
4	Las Vegas, Nevada 89155	
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6		L DISTRICT COURT NTY, NEVADA
7	STEVEN A. HOTCHKISS,	,
		Case No.: A-17-762264-C
8	Plaintiff,	Dept. No.: IX
9	vs.	
10	RONALD J. ROBINSON; VERNON	
11	RODRIGUEZ; VIRTUAL COMMUNICATIONS CORPORATION;	
12	WINTECH, LLC; RETIRE HAPPY, LLC; JOSH STOLL; FRANK YODER; ALISA	
13	DAVIS; and DOES 1-10; and ROES 1-10, inclusively,	
14	Defendants.	
15	ANTHONY WHITE; ROBIN	Consolidated with:
16	SUNTHEIMER; TROY SUNTHEIMER; STEPHENS GHESQUIERE; JACKIE	Case No.: A-17-763003-C Dept. No.: IX
17	STONE; GAYLE CHANY; KENDALL SMITH; GABRIELE LAVERNICOCCA;	Dept. No. 12
	and ROBERT KAISER,	
18	Plaintiffs,	
19	VS.	
20	RONALD J. ROBINSON; VERNON RODRIGUEZ; VIRTUAL	
21	COMMUNICATIONS CORPORATION; WINTECH, LLC; RETIRE HAPPY, LLC;	
22	JOSH STOLL; FRANK YODER; ALISA DAVIS; and DOES 1-10; and ROES 1-10,	
23	inclusively,	
24	Defendants.	
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DECISION

This case came before the Court for Decision following a two-day bench trial in February of 2020. Having considered the evidence presented at trial, together with the arguments presented in the parties' closing briefs, the Court hereby enters the following Decision.

 Virtual Communications Corporation ("VCC") Note was a Security as defined by the Nevada Securities Act (see NRS \$90.295)

In Nevada, NRS 90.295 defines what qualifies as a "security," which includes, amongst other things, "a note." See NRS 90.295. This does not mean that all notes qualify as securities. Rather, the Supreme Court of Nevada established a test for determining whether or not a note qualifies as a security in State v. Friend, 118 Nev. 115, 120-121 (2002). Under the Friend analysis, the court begins with the presumption that every note is a security, which is rebuttable under one of two steps:

- (l) The note subject to review is compared to a series of notes that are not securities; and
- (2) The note subject to review is examined according to four factors: (1) motivation; (2) plan of distribution; (3) expectations, and (4) need for securities law.

The VCC notes do not qualify as: (1) consumer financing; (2) a mortgage on a home; (3) something suggesting it is a "character" loan to a bank customer; (4) an open-account debt incurred in the ordinary course of business; (5) a loan by commercial banks for current operations; (6) short-term notes secured by a lien on a small business or some of its assets; or (7) short-term notes secured by an assignment of accounts receivable. *Friend*, 118 Nev. at 121. As a result, the Court moves to the second part of the test to determine if, upon review, the notes meet the four factors demonstrating they qualify as a security.

An examination of the promissory notes issued by VCC actually meets all four factors.

Much like any other investment opportunity, the evidence at trial revealed that the motivation behind the issuance of the Notes was to raise funds to support VCC¹ and the related "Alice" technology, and that investment in VCC would result in a favorable monetary return.² Testimony from Mr. Robinson and Mr. Rodriguez confirmed the Notes were issued to raise money. Promises of financial gain were made to the purchasers of the Notes; those promises would lead a reasonable person to want to purchase the Notes as an investment. The Defendants' sale of the Notes resulted in them raising over 4 million dollars.

Further, the PowerPoint presentations introduced as exhibits at trial set forth clear plan of distribution and the expectations (i.e. returns) that would result from the distribution of the Notes.³ Testimony from the Defendants, Ms. Davis and Mr. Frank Yoder, confirmed that the Defendants were consulted on the content of the PowerPoints setting forth the plan of distribution, which included language about the personal guarantee by Mr. Robinson and a referral of the notes as "securities."

Last but not least, the end-result of the Notes demonstrates that the purchasers reasonably viewed the Notes as investments. They were presented to investors and potential investors as "securities," which is prima facie proof that the Notes were investments. The purpose of selling the Notes was also to raise money, which further demonstrates that they were intended to be investments.

¹ See Exhibit 4 at Bates No. 00066, PowerPoint presentation for potential investors indicating the "target goal was \$120 billon dollars in the global market."; see also Exhibit 6 at Bates No. 0096 (same).

² See id. at Bates No. 0074 stating the terms of the securities included a "[T]erm of 18 months, with a 6 month extension option. Notes pay 9% annually with interest paid monthly." (Emphasis added); see also Exhibit 6 at 00150 (same).

³ See Exhibit 4 at Bates No. 0070, setting for the "Revenue Forecast," and Bates No. 0074, setting forth the "Growth Strategy."; see also Exhibit 6 at Bates No. 00100 and 00104 (same).

⁴ See Exhibit 5 at Bates No. 74; Exhibit 6 at Bates No. 00150. In fact, the PowerPoints even included information about the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. See Exhibit 4 at Bates No. 0064; Exhibit No. 6 at Bates No. 0094.

Testimony from Plaintiff Mr. Hotchkiss is more evidence that that the VCC Notes meet the four factors. Mr. Hotchkiss testified that he used 1/3 of his personal savings to purchase the notes as part of his overall retirement plan. Specifically he purchased the Notes because of (1) the personal guarantee, and (2) the expectation of a 9% return. Moreover, Mr. Hotchkiss testified that when he repeatedly attempted to contact Vernon Rodriguez to figure out where his returns were, Rodriguez asked him "for patience." Finally, he testified that he never received any of his funds back. The Court notes that there was no evidence introduced at trial that any of the investors received their funds back.

II. The VCC Note Was Not registered as a Security; Defendant Failed to Provide Any Evidence that it was Exempt from the Registration Requirements.

There was no evidence introduced at trial to demonstrate that the VCC Note was exempt from registration as a security. Therefore, the Notes are not exempted.

III. Ronald Robinson and Vernon Rodriguez were control persons as defined in NAC 90.035.

Nevada Administrative Code (NAC) section 90.035 defines a "control person" as an individual who (1) owns or controls 10 percent or more of the voting stock of a corporation; (2) is an officer or director of a corporation; or (3) is in a position to influence the decision-making processes of a corporation. "In general, the determination of who is a controlling person ... is an intensely factual question." *Arthur Children's Trust v. Keim*, 994 F.2d 1390, 1396 (9th Cir.1993) (discussing a "control person" under Federal Securities law). To establish "controlling person" liability, the plaintiff must show that a primary violation was committed and that the defendant "directly or indirectly" controlled the violator. *See Hollinger v. Titan Capital Corp.*, 914 F.2d 1564, 1575 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 976, 111 S.Ct. 1621, 113 L.Ed.2d 719 (1991).

As established above, Plaintiffs have established that VCC was issuing un-exempted, unregistered securities. Plaintiffs also alleged that Ronald Robinson and Vernon Rodriguez are control persons. The evidence at trial proves this allegation by more than a preponderance of the evidence. Robinson and Rodriguez were officers in the corporation. Robinson was a President, Chief Executive Officer (CEO), Chairman of the Board, and a signer on the financial accounts. Rodriguez spoke and gave advice to potential investors. According to Frank Yoder's testimony, Rodriguez was also fully involved in the finances of the corporation. The Court believes Yoder's testimony, in part because Rodriguez was listed as the Chief Financial Officer (CFO) in the various PowerPoints presented to potential investors.

If the plaintiff establishes that a defendant is a "controlling person," then the defendant bears the burden of proving that he "acted in good faith and did not directly or indirectly induce the act or acts constituting the violation or cause of action." *Paracor Fin., Inc. v. Gen. Elec. Capital Corp.*, 96 F.3d 1151, 1161 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a)); *see also Hollinger*, 914 F.2d at 1575. While the testimony of Robinson and Rodriguez suggests that they believed they were acting in good faith, based in part on an alleged lack of knowledge of Nevada security laws, they failed to present any evidence that they were not directly or indirectly involved in the acts regarding the violation of Nevada security regulations. Rather, the evidence demonstrates that they were directly and intimately involved in creating the material to sell the Notes; Robinson then served as the personal guarantor of the Notes and Rodriguez was the proverbial "closer" who spoke to investors when necessary.

⁵ The PowerPoints also belie Rodriguez's testimony that he did not become CFO until 2014.

IV. Ronald Robinson is Liable as a Guarantor

There is no disagreement that Robinson personally guaranteed the Notes/Securities at issue in this case. In fact, Robinson admitted to guaranteeing the Notes during trial, albeit noting he only intended to personally guarantee some of them. Qualified or not, his guarantee was "absolute" and "unconditional." With his admission, the Court must then determine if he is still liable pursuant to personal guarantee after VCC's bankruptcy proceedings. The Court finds that VCC's bankruptcy did not extinguish Robinson's personal guarantee of the promissory notes. The Court adopts the reasoning in the Donnell and Nelson cases in reaching this decision. Specifically, the Court agrees with Plaintiff's argument that VCC's bankruptcy was a tactical, self-interested decision by Robinson to try and eliminate his responsibilities as the personal guarantor. His decision constitutes as consent to the modification, and further did not increase his liability risk. Consequently, he is still liable as a personal guarantor. See generally Marc Nelson Oil Products v. Grim Logging Co., 110 P.3d 120, 122-125.

V. Conclusion

Within 30 days of this decision, the parties shall meet and confer and submit a proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law consistent with this Decision. Further, Plaintiff must submit a brief regarding damages, and the evidence that supports the requested damages within 45 days. Defendant may file an opposition 14 days after the filing of Plaintiff's brief. Plaintiff may file a reply within 7 days of any filed opposition.

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⁶ See Exhibit 5 at Bates No. 0088.

⁷ During trial, Robinson testified that Julie Minushkin issued some of the Notes with his personal guarantee without his permission. No other evidence was introduced to support his position.

⁸ See Exhibit 5 at Bates No. 0088.

After the Court receives and reviews the proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and full briefing on the issue of damages, the Court will issue the Findings of Fact and Conclusion of Law. Thereafter a judgment shall issue in favor of the Plaintiffs and against Defendants.

DATED this 27th day of April, 2020.

CRISTINA D. SILVA DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the date filed, a copy of the foregoing DECISION was electronically served, pursuant to N.E.F.C.R. Rule 9, to all registered parties in the Eighth Judicial District Court Electronic Filing Program (EFP) and/or emailed to any party or proper person not registered with the District Court EFP system.

Jaye L Beltran
Judicial Executive Assistant

EXHIBIT "B"

Electronically Filed

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HAROLD P. GEWERTER, ESQ.

Nevada Bar No. 499

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Attorneys for Defendants Ronald J. Robinson; Vernon 7

Rodriguez; Virtual Communications Corp.; Wintech, LLC; and Alisa Davis

DISTRICT COURT

CLARK COUNTY NEVADA

Case No.: A-17-763003-C

AMENDED ANSWER TO FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

Dept.: XXIV

ANTHONY WHITE; ROBIN SUNTHEIMER; TROY SUNTHEIMER, STEPHENS GHESQUIERE; JACKIE STONE; GAYLE CHANY; KENDALL SMITH; GABRIELE LAVERMICOCCA; AND ROBERT KAISER,

Plaintiffs,

RONALD J. ROBINSON: VERNON RODRIGUEZ; VIRTUAL

20 COMMUNICATIONS CORPORATION: WINTECH, LLC; ALISA DAVIS; JULIE 21

MINUSKIN; JOSH STOLL; RETIRE

HAPPY, LLC; DOES 1-10; AND ROES 1-10, inclusively,

23

Defendants.

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COME NOW Defendants, Ronald J. Robinson, Vernon Rodriguez, Virtual

Communications Corporation, Wintech, LLC, and Alisa Davis (hereinafter "Defendants"), by and

-1-

through their attorney of record, HAROLD P. GEWERTER, ESQ., of the law firm of HAROLD P. GEWERTER, ESQ., LTD., and hereby files their Amended Answer to Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint.

INTRODUCTION

THE PARTIES

- 1. In answering paragraph 1 of the First Amended Complaint on file herein, Defendants are without specific knowledge or information sufficient to enable them to admit or deny the allegations in said paragraph, and on that basis DENY each and every remaining allegation contained therein.
- 2. In answering paragraph 2 of the First Amended Complaint on file herein, Defendants are without specific knowledge or information sufficient to enable them to admit or deny the allegations in said paragraph, and on that basis DENY each and every remaining allegation contained therein.
- 3. In answering paragraph 3 of the First Amended Complaint on file herein, Defendants are without specific knowledge or information sufficient to enable them to admit or deny the allegations in said paragraph, and on that basis DENY each and every remaining allegation contained therein.
- 4. In answering paragraph 4 of the First Amended Complaint on file herein, Defendants are without specific knowledge or information sufficient to enable them to admit or deny the allegations in said paragraph, and on that basis DENY each and every remaining allegation contained therein.
- 5. In answering paragraph 5 of the First Amended Complaint on file herein,
 Defendants are without specific knowledge or information sufficient to enable them to admit or

 deny the allegations in said paragraph, and on that basis DENY each and every remaining allegation contained therein.

- 6. In answering paragraph 6 of the First Amended Complaint on file herein, Defendants are without specific knowledge or information sufficient to enable them to admit or deny the allegations in said paragraph, and on that basis DENY each and every remaining allegation contained therein.
- 7. In answering paragraph 7 of the First Amended Complaint on file herein, Defendants are without specific knowledge or information sufficient to enable them to admit or deny the allegations in said paragraph, and on that basis DENY each and every remaining allegation contained therein.
- 8. In answering paragraph 8 of the First Amended Complaint on file herein, Defendants are without specific knowledge or information sufficient to enable them to admit or deny the allegations in said paragraph, and on that basis DENY each and every remaining allegation contained therein.
- 9. In answering paragraph 9 of the First Amended Complaint on file herein, Defendants are without specific knowledge or information sufficient to enable them to admit or deny the allegations in said paragraph, and on that basis DENY each and every remaining allegation contained therein.
- 10. In answering paragraph 10 of the First Amended Complaint on file herein, Defendants ADMIT the allegations contained therein.
- 11. In answering paragraph 11 of the First Amended Complaint on file herein, Defendants ADMIT the allegations contained therein.

- 12. In answering paragraph 12 of the First Amended Complaint on file herein, Defendants ADMIT that Defendant Robinson was a resident of Nevada but DENY all other allegations contained therein.
- 13. In answering paragraph 13 of the First Amended Complaint on file herein, Defendants ADMIT that Defendant Rodriguez was a resident of Nevada but DENY all other allegations contained therein.
- 14. In answering paragraph 14 of the First Amended Complaint on file herein, Defendants ADMIT the allegations contained therein.
- 15. In answering paragraph 15 of the First Amended Complaint on file herein, Defendants ADMIT the allegations contained therein.
- 16. In answering paragraph 16 of the First Amended Complaint on file herein, Defendants ADMIT the allegations contained therein.
- 17. In answering paragraph 17 of the First Amended Complaint on file herein, Defendants ADMIT the allegations contained therein.
- 18. In answering paragraph 18 of the First Amended Complaint on file herein, Defendants are without specific knowledge or information sufficient to enable them to admit or deny the allegations in said paragraph, and on that basis DENY each and every remaining allegation contained therein.
- 19. In answering paragraph 19 of the First Amended Complaint on file herein, Defendants are without specific knowledge or information sufficient to enable them to admit or deny the allegations in said paragraph, and on that basis DENY each and every remaining allegation contained therein.

20. In answering paragraph 20 of the First Amended Complaint on file herein, Defendants ADMIT that Defendants VCC and Wintech have filed for bankruptcy protection but DENY that the automatic stay applies to only those Defendants.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND GIVING RISE TO THIS CLAIM

- 21. In answering paragraph 21 of the First Amended Complaint on file herein, Defendants DENY the allegations contained therein.
- 22. In answering paragraph 22 of the First Amended Complaint on file herein, Defendants DENY the allegations contained therein.
- 23. In answering paragraph 23 of the First Amended Complaint on file herein, Defendants DENY the allegations contained therein.
- 24. In answering paragraph 24 of the First Amended Complaint on file herein, Defendants DENY the allegations contained therein.
- 25. In answering paragraph 25 of the First Amended Complaint on file herein, Defendants DENY the allegations contained therein.
- 26. In answering paragraph 26 of the First Amended Complaint on file herein, Defendants DENY the allegations contained therein.
- 27. In answering paragraph 27 of the First Amended Complaint on file herein, Defendants are without specific knowledge or information sufficient to enable them to admit or deny the allegations in said paragraph, and on that basis DENY each and every remaining allegation contained therein.
- 28. In answering paragraph 28 of the First Amended Complaint on file herein, Defendants DENY the allegations contained therein.

- 29. In answering paragraph 29 of the First Amended Complaint on file herein, Defendants DENY the allegations contained therein.
- 30. In answering paragraph 30 of the First Amended Complaint on file herein, Defendants DENY the allegations contained therein.
- 31. In answering paragraph 31 of the First Amended Complaint on file herein, Defendants DENY the allegations contained therein.
- 32. In answering paragraph 32 of the First Amended Complaint on file herein, Defendants are without specific knowledge or information sufficient to enable them to admit or deny the allegations in said paragraph, and on that basis DENY each and every remaining allegation contained therein.
- 33. In answering paragraph 33 of the First Amended Complaint on file herein, Defendants DENY the allegations contained therein.
- 34. In answering paragraph 34 of the First Amended Complaint on file herein, Defendants DENY the allegations contained therein.
- 35. In answering paragraph 35 of the First Amended Complaint on file herein, Defendants DENY the allegations contained therein.
- 36. In answering paragraph 36 of the First Amended Complaint on file herein, Defendants DENY the allegations contained therein.
- 37. In answering paragraph 37 of the First Amended Complaint on file herein, Defendants DENY the allegations contained therein.
- 38. In answering paragraph 38 of the First Amended Complaint on file herein, Defendants are without specific knowledge or information sufficient to enable them to admit or

 deny the allegations in said paragraph, and on that basis DENY each and every remaining allegation contained therein.

- 39. In answering paragraph 39 of the First Amended Complaint on file herein, Defendants DENY the allegations contained therein.
- 40. In answering paragraph 40 of the First Amended Complaint on file herein, Defendants DENY the allegations contained therein.
- 41. In answering paragraph 41 of the First Amended Complaint on file herein, Defendants DENY the allegations contained therein.
- 42. In answering paragraph 42 of the First Amended Complaint on file herein, Defendants DENY the allegations contained therein.
- 43. In answering paragraph 43 of the First Amended Complaint on file herein, Defendants DENY the allegations contained therein.
- 44. In answering paragraph 44 of the First Amended Complaint on file herein, Defendants DENY the allegations contained therein.
- 45. In answering paragraph 45 of the First Amended Complaint on file herein, Defendants are without specific knowledge or information sufficient to enable them to admit or deny the allegations in said paragraph, and on that basis DENY each and every remaining allegation contained therein.
- 46. In answering paragraph 46 of the First Amended Complaint on file herein, Defendants DENY the allegations contained therein.
- 47. In answering paragraph 47 of the First Amended Complaint on file herein, Defendants DENY the allegations contained therein.

- 48. In answering paragraph 48 of the First Amended Complaint on file herein, Defendants DENY the allegations contained therein.
- 49. In answering paragraph 49 of the First Amended Complaint on file herein, Defendants DENY the allegations contained therein.
- 50. In answering paragraph 50 of the First Amended Complaint on file herein, Defendants DENY the allegations contained therein.
- 51. In answering paragraph 51 of the First Amended Complaint on file herein, Defendants are without specific knowledge or information sufficient to enable them to admit or deny the allegations in said paragraph, and on that basis DENY each and every remaining allegation contained therein.

LEGAL BASIS UPON WHICH RELIEF SHOULD BE GRANTED COUNT ONE – MISREPRESENTATIONS AND OMISSIONS

- 52. In answering paragraph 52 of the First Amended Complaint on file herein, Defendants DENY the allegations contained therein.
- 53. In answering paragraph 53 of the First Amended Complaint on file herein, Defendants DENY the allegations contained therein.
- 54. In answering paragraph 54 of the First Amended Complaint on file herein, Defendants DENY the allegations contained therein.
- 55. In answering paragraph 55 of the First Amended Complaint on file herein, Defendants are without specific knowledge or information sufficient to enable them to admit or deny the allegations in said paragraph, and on that basis DENY each and every remaining allegation contained therein.

- 56. In answering paragraph 56 of the First Amended Complaint on file herein, Defendants DENY the allegations contained therein.
- 57. In answering paragraph 57 of the First Amended Complaint on file herein, Defendants DENY the allegations contained therein.

COUNT TWO - VIOLATION OF NEVADA UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT §§ NRS 90.310, 90.460, and 90.660

- 58. In answering paragraph 58 of the First Amended Complaint on file herein, Defendants DENY the allegations contained therein.
- 59. In answering paragraph 59 of the First Amended Complaint on file herein, Defendants DENY the allegations contained therein.
- 60. In answering paragraph 60 of the First Amended Complaint on file herein, Defendants DENY the allegations contained therein.
- 61. In answering paragraph 61 of the First Amended Complaint on file herein, Defendants DENY the allegations contained therein.
- 62. In answering paragraph 62 of the First Amended Complaint on file herein, Defendants DENY the allegations contained therein.
- 63. In answering paragraph 63 of the First Amended Complaint on file herein, Defendants DENY the allegations contained therein.
- 64. In answering paragraph 64 of the First Amended Complaint on file herein, Defendants DENY the allegations contained therein.
- 65. In answering paragraph 65 of the First Amended Complaint on file herein, Defendants DENY the allegations contained therein.

66. In answering paragraph 66 of the First Amended Complaint on file herein, Defendants DENY the allegations contained therein.

COUNT THREE - VIOLATION OF NEVADA UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT §§ NRS 90.570 AND 90.660

- 67. In answering paragraph 67 of the First Amended Complaint on file herein, Defendants DENY the allegations contained therein.
- 68. In answering paragraph 68 of the First Amended Complaint on file herein, Defendants DENY the allegations contained therein.
- 69. In answering paragraph 69 of the First Amended Complaint on file herein, Defendants DENY the allegations contained therein.
- 70. In answering paragraph 70 of the First Amended Complaint on file herein, Defendants DENY the allegations contained therein.
- 71. In answering paragraph 71 of the First Amended Complaint on file herein, Defendants DENY the allegations contained therein.
- 72. In answering paragraph 72 of the First Amended Complaint on file herein, Defendants DENY the allegations contained therein.
- 73. In answering paragraph 73 of the First Amended Complaint on file herein, Defendants DENY the allegations contained therein.

COUNT FOUR – BREACH OF WRITTEN CONTRACT

- 74. In answering paragraph 74 of the First Amended Complaint on file herein, Defendants DENY the allegations contained therein.
- 75. In answering paragraph 75 of the First Amended Complaint on file herein, Defendants DENY the allegations contained therein.

- 76. In answering paragraph 76 of the First Amended Complaint on file herein, Defendants DENY the allegations contained therein.
- 77. In answering paragraph 77 of the First Amended Complaint on file herein, Defendants DENY the allegations contained therein.
- 78. In answering paragraph 78 of the First Amended Complaint on file herein, Defendants DENY the allegations contained therein.
- 79. In answering paragraph 79 of the First Amended Complaint on file herein, Defendants DENY the allegations contained therein.
- 80. In answering paragraph 80 of the First Amended Complaint on file herein, Defendants DENY the allegations contained therein.

AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES

FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

Plaintiff's Complaint on file herein fails to state a claim against these answering Defendants upon which relief can be granted.

SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

That it has been necessary for the Defendants to retain the services of an attorney to defend this action and Defendants are entitled to an award of reasonable attorney's fees and costs incurred herein.

THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

Pursuant to NRCP Rule 11, all possible affirmative defenses may not have been alleged herein insofar as sufficient facts are not available after reasonable inquiry upon the filing of the Plaintiff's Complaint, and therefore, these answering Defendants reserve the right to amend this Answer to add additional affirmative defenses as additional facts are discovered.

FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE law. as follows: (1) (2)

The alleged investments referenced in the Complaint do not constitute a security under

WHEREFORE, Defendants respectfully pray for judgment against Plaintiffs and for relief

- That Plaintiffs take nothing by virtue of their Complaint;
- That judgment be entered in favor of Defendants on all of Plaintiffs' causes of action;
- That Defendants be awarded their attorneys' fees and costs of suit for having to (3) defend against Plaintiffs' claims; and
- (4) For all other relief to which Defendants are entitled.

DATED this 9th day of November, 2018.

HAROLD P. GEWERTER, ESQ., LTD.

/s/: Harold P. Gewerter HAROLD P. GEWERTER, ESQ.

Nevada Bar No. 499 HAROLD P. GEWERTER, ESQ., LTD.

1212 S. Casino Center Blvd.

Las Vegas, Nevada 89104 Tel: (702) 382-1714

Fax: (702) 382-1759

Email: harold@gewerterlaw.com

Attorneys for Defendants Ronald J. Robinson; Vernon

Rodriguez; Virtual Communications Corp.; Wintech, LLC; and Alisa Davis

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this 9th day of November, 2018, a true and correct copy of Defendants' AMENDED ANSWER TO FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT was electronically served through the Court's electronic filing system upon the following:

David Liebrader, Esq. THE LAW OFFICES OF DAVID LIEBRADER, APC 601 S. Rancho Drive, Suite D-29 Las Vegas, Nevada 89106 Attorney for Plaintiffs

AN EMPLOYEE OF HAROLD P. GEWERTER, ESQ., LTD.

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Electronically Filed 9/30/2020 9:27 AM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT DAVID LIEBRADER, ESQ. 1 STATE BAR NO. 5048 THE LAW OFFICES OF DAVID LIEBRADER, APC 2 3960 HOWARD HUGHES PARKWAY STE 500 LAS VEGAS, NV 89169 3 PH: (702) 380-3131 Attorney for Plaintiffs 4 DISTRICT COURT 5 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 6 IN THE MATTER BETWEEN Case No. A-17-762264-C 7 Steven A. Hotchkiss, Dept.: 9 8 OPPOSITION TO SECOND PLAINTIFF, 9 POST JUDGMENT MOTION v. 10 Ronald J. Robinson, Vernon Rodriguez, Frank 11 Yoder, Alisa Davis and DOES 1-10 and ROES 1-10, inclusively 12 CONSOLIDATED WITH **DEFENDANTS** 13 Case No. A-17-763003-C Anthony White, Robin Suntheimer, Troy 14 Suntheimer, Stephens Ghesquiere, Jackie Stone, Gayle Chany, Kendall Smith, Gabriele 15 Lavermicocca and Robert Kaiser 16 **PLAINTIFFS** 17 v. 18 Ronald J. Robinson, Vernon Rodriguez, Virtual Communications Corporation, Frank Yoder, Alisa 19 Davis and DOES 1-10 and ROES 1-10, inclusively 20 21 Opposition to Vern Rodriguez' second post judgment motion 22 Plaintiffs file this Opposition to Defendant Rodriguez' second post judgment 23 motion. 24 25

Case Number: A-17-762264-C

In this motion, Defendant seeks a new trial, or in the alternative, further action. As will be described below, neither is warranted.

The basis for the motion is the claim that Mr. Rodriguez did not receive a fair trial due to the purported conflict of interest of his counsel Harold Gewerter, who represented both Defendants Rodriguez and Robinson. Defendant does not cite any Nevada cases supporting his position (even acknowledging that none exist), offering only a 1984 New York case, which is not controlling authority. While Mr. Rodriguez may have an issue with his prior counsel for the way he tried the case, his remedy lies against Mr. Gewerter. Courts cannot be expected to retry cases when a bad result sends a litigant in search of new counsel to second guess prior **counsel's** trial decisions.

Regardless of the issue of a conflict, the evidence submitted conclusively established that Mr. Rodriguez was a control person for Virtual Communications Corporation ("VCC"), facts that exist irrespective of any purported conflict, waiver or otherwise.

The Court rightly found that VCC sold unregistered securities through the active participation and assistance of its chief financial officer, Vern Rodriguez, who was the "point man" to speak with investors prior to their investing. New counsel Fleming is clearly unfamiliar with the evidence introduced at trial.

Among these facts:

- 1. Mr. Rodriguez was the CFO for a company that sold unregistered securities. See Exhibit 13, page 185.
- 2. Mr. Rodriguez was the "direct contact" to speak with any investors. who

were "wary of making an investment with the company" (per Ms. Davis' testimony) and Exhibit 2. He also spoke with and met with investors (Frank Yoder testimony).

- 3. Mr. Rodriguez was copied on and asked for input on the power point presentation used by VCC to solicit finds from prospective investors. See Exhibits 4 and 6.
- 4. Mr. Rodriguez presented Mr. Robinson with a contract to compensate him for guaranteeing the fund raise (Ex 2, p 48.)
- 5. Mr. Rodriguez introduced fund raiser Retire Happy to VCC. (Rodriguez trial testimony, and Declaration in support of Motion.)

While control person liability under NRS §90.660 does provide for a good faith defense, based upon the evidence submitted, it clearly would not apply to Mr. Rodriguez role in the transaction:

"A person who directly or indirectly controls another person who is liable under subsection 1 or 3 [unlicensed broker dealers, sale of unregistered securities], a partner, officer or director of the person liable, a person occupying a similar status or performing similar functions... are also liable jointly and severally with and to the same extent as the other person, but it is a defense that the person did not know, and in the exercise of reasonable care could not have known, of the existence of the facts by which the liability is alleged to exist."

NRS 90.660 (Emphasis added).

Here, liability was based upon the sale of unregistered securities. Both Mr. Robinson and Mr. Rodriguez knew of, and participated in the offering; Should they have known that the sale required a registration or exemption filing? As to Mr. Rodriguez, as the chief financial officer - with a business degree from the University of New Mexico - he had, at the very least, the duty of inquiry to make sure that the

fund raise was being done in compliance with the securities laws. He took no steps to do so, despite being aware that the securities laws applied, as the PowerPoint presentations that he reviewed and approved contained a statement referencing the securities laws (Ex 13 and 14). In the "exercise of reasonable care" a CFO is obligated to make the necessary inquiries to counsel and accountants to ensure a registration statement or claim for exemption is filed and effective prior to the commencement of the offering. His failure to do so, in light of his active participation in the offering was "unreasonable," and eliminates the ability to rely on the good faith defenses available to control persons under NRS 90.660.

Mr. Rodriguez testified at trial, and was able to introduce exhibits in support of his defense. He was not prevented in any way from offering evidence. Nor did he attempt to offer evidence to which Plaintiffs objected. There were no objections made on the record to preserve any of these issues for appeal.

On appeal, a district court's "'findings of fact and conclusions of law, supported by substantial evidence, will not be set aside unless clearly erroneous."' Sheehan & Sheehan v. Nelson Malley & Co., 121 Nev. 481, 486, 117 P.3d 219, 223 (2005) (quoting Edwards Indus, v. DTE/BTE, Inc., 112 Nev. 1025 1031, 923 P.2d 569, 573 (1996)).

<u>CONCLUSION</u>

Defendant acknowledged testifying for nearly an hour. But, it **wouldn't** have mattered if he testified for eight hours; he was not going to be able to overcome the overwhelming evidence against him that he was a control person who actively participated in an unregistered offering of securities. For this reason, the motion should be denied.

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2	Dated: September 30, 2020	Respectfully submitted,
3		The Law Office of David Liebrader, Inc.
4		By:/s/ David Liebrader David Liebrader
5		Attorney for Plaintiffs
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING I hereby certify that on the 30th day of September, 2020, I mailed a copy of the foregoing Opposition to second post judgment brief to the following Harold Gewerter, Esq. Gewerter Law Firm 1212 Casino Center Boulevard Las Vegas, NV 89104 Scott Fleming, Esq. Fleming Law 9525 Hillwood Dr. Ste. 140 Las Vegas, NV 89134 /s/: Dianne Bresnahan An Employee of The Law Office of David Liebrader

Electronically Filed 9/30/2020 9:27 AM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT DAVID LIEBRADER, ESQ. 1 STATE BAR NO. 5048 THE LAW OFFICES OF DAVID LIEBRADER, APC 2 3960 HOWARD HUGHES PARKWAY STE 500 LAS VEGAS, NV 89169 3 PH: (702) 380-3131 Attorney for Plaintiffs 4 DISTRICT COURT 5 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 6 IN THE MATTER BETWEEN Case No. A-17-762264-C 7 Steven A. Hotchkiss, Dept.: 9 8 OPPOSITION TO THIRD POST PLAINTIFF, 9 JUDGMENT MOTION v. 10 Ronald J. Robinson, Vernon Rodriguez, Frank 11 Yoder, Alisa Davis and DOES 1-10 and ROES 1-10, inclusively 12 CONSOLIDATED WITH **DEFENDANTS** 13 Case No. A-17-763003-C Anthony White, Robin Suntheimer, Troy 14 Suntheimer, Stephens Ghesquiere, Jackie Stone, Gayle Chany, Kendall Smith, Gabriele 15 Lavermicocca and Robert Kaiser 16 **PLAINTIFFS** 17 v. 18 Ronald J. Robinson, Vernon Rodriguez, Virtual Communications Corporation, Frank Yoder, Alisa 19 Davis and DOES 1-10 and ROES 1-10, inclusively 20 21 Opposition to Vern Rodriguez' third post judgment motion 22 Plaintiffs file this Opposition to Defendant Rodriguez' third post judgment 23 motion. 24 25

Case Number: A-17-762264-C

In this motion, Defendant seeks a stay on the enforcement of judgment both during the pendency of his post-trial motions, and also during the pendency of any appeal he intends to file. As to the first request, Plaintiff will conditionally agree. As to the second, Plaintiff is opposed.

1. A Brief Stay Pending Resolution of the Post Judgment Issues is Acceptable

On the request for a stay of execution during the pendency of the post judgment motions, Plaintiffs are not opposed, provided that Defendant also agrees to stay any efforts to hide, conceal or transfer assets during this period of time. While Plaintiffs believe Defendant's post judgment motions will be denied, time, Covid-19 and equitable considerations lean towards a brief stay of enforcement. However, this must be reciprocal; Defendant must not use this time to take steps to frustrate legitimate collection and enforcement efforts. Had counsel raised this issue prior to filing his motion, this issue could have been resolved, and presented to the court as a stipulation.

2. A Stay Pending Appeal Is Unwarranted

As to the request for stay pending appeal, Plaintiffs oppose this request. First, the motion is premature, as Defendant has not filed to appeal the case. Further, such relief is permissive, not mandatory, and Defendant has not met his burden for such drastic relief.

NRCP 62(d) governs stays pending appeal and provides:

(d) Stay Upon Appeal. When an appeal is taken the appellant by giving a supersedeas bond may obtain a stay subject to the exceptions contained in subdivision (a) of this rule. The bond may be

given at or after the time of filing the notice of appeal. The stay is effective when the supersedeas bond is filed.

NRCP

This rule is substantially based on its federal counterpart, FRCP 62(d). Most federal courts interpreting the rule generally recognize that FRCP 62(d) allows an appellant to obtain a stay pending appeal as of right upon the posting of a supersedeas bond for the full judgment amount, but that courts retain the inherent power to grant a stay in the absence of a full bond.

"a supersedeas bond posted under NRCP 62 should usually be set in an amount that will permit full satisfaction of the judgment. But a district court, in its discretion, may provide for a bond in a lesser amount, or may permit security other than a bond, when unusual circumstances exist and so warrant."

Nelson v. Heer, 122 P.3d 1252, 121 Nev. 832 (Nev. 2005)

The purpose of a supersedeas bond is to protect the prevailing party from loss resulting from a stay of execution of the judgment. Thus, a supersedeas bond posted under NRCP 62 should usually be set in an amount that will permit full satisfaction of the judgment. A district court, in its discretion, may provide for a bond in a lesser amount, or may permit security other than a bond, when unusual circumstances exist and so warrant. Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2905, at 328 (1973). See also Fed. Presc. Serv. v. Am. Pharm. Ass'n, 636 F.2d 755 (D.C.Cir.1980); Poplar Grove, Etc. v. Bache Halsey Stuart, Inc., 600 F.2d 1189 (5th Cir.1979).

Defendant has not provided any evidence of any financial hardship justifying reducing, let alone waiving the requirement of a supersedeas bond. Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that Mr. Rodriguez owns property in Clark County Nevada. He is also a large shareholder in Virtual Communications Corporation. Financial hardship is not even addressed in his affidavit, or in his motion.

This is a case of Defendant putting the proverbial cart before the horse; he complains that if his as yet unfiled appeal is over turned, he would encounter difficulty in repatriating any funds collected while any appeal is pending. This is precisely the reason to order a supersedeas bond; to guarantee that while the appeal moves forward, Plaintiffs are protected. Mr. Rodriguez has not provided any argument as to why he **couldn't** obtain a supersedeas bond, or pledge alternate assets, as the <u>Nelson v. Heer</u> case allows.

CONCLUSION

Plaintiffs acknowledge that a brief stay on enforcement of the judgment may be warranted, provided Mr. Rodriguez makes no efforts to hide, conceal or transfer his assets during this time. As to a stay pending appeal, that request is premature, and also lacking in support. As a result, it should be denied.

Dated: September 30, 2020 Respectfully submitted,

The Law Office of David Liebrader, Inc.

By:/s/ David Liebrader
David Liebrader
Attorney for Plaintiffs

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING I hereby certify that on the 30th day of September, 2020, I mailed a copy of the foregoing Opposition to third post judgment brief to the following Harold Gewerter, Esq. Gewerter Law Firm 1212 Casino Center Boulevard Las Vegas, NV 89104 Scott Fleming, Esq. Fleming Law 9525 Hillwood Dr. Ste. 140 Las Vegas, NV 89134 /s/: Dianne Bresnahan An Employee of The Law Office of David Liebrader

RPLY 1 SCOTT D. FLEMING, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 5638 FLEMING LAW FIRM, PLLC 3 9525 Hillwood Drive Suite 140 Las Vegas, Nevada 89134 4 Telephone: (702) 743-6263 E-Mail: scott@fleminglawlv.com 5 Attornevs for Defendant Vernon Rodriguez 6 7 DISTRICT COURT 8 **CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA** 9 10 STEVEN A. HOTCHKISS, 11 Plaintiff, 12 VS. 9525 Hillwood Drive, Suite 140 Las Vegas, Nevada 89134 (702) 743-6263 13 RONALD J. ROBINSON; VERNON RODRIGUEZ; VIRTUAL COMMUNICATIONS CORPORATION; 14 WINTECH, LLC; RETIRE HAPPY, LLC; JOSH STOLL; FRANK YODER; ALISA 15 DAVIS; and DOES 1-10; and ROES 1-10, inclusively, 16 Defendants. 17 18 19 ANTHONY WHITE; ROBIN SUNTHEIMER; TROY SUNTHEIMER; 20 STEPHENS GHESQUIERE; JACKIE STONE; GAYLE CHANY; KENDALL 21 SMITH; GABRIELE LAVERNICOCCA; and ROBERT KAISER, 22 Plaintiffs, 23 VS. 24 RONALD J. ROBINSON; VERNON RODRIGUEZ; VIRTUAL COMMUNICATIONS CORPORATION; 25 WINTECH, LLC; RETIRE HAPPY, LLC; 26 JOSH STOLL; FRANK YODER; ALISA DAVIS; and DOES 1-10; and ROES 1-10, 27 inclusively, 28 Defendants.

FLEMING LAW FIRM, PLL

Electronically Filed 10/13/2020 10:28 AM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT

CASE NO. A-17-762264-C

DEPT NO. IX

REPLY TO OPPOSITION TO FIRST POST-JUDGMENT MOTION BY **DEFENDANT VERNON** RODRIGUEZ FOR ADDITIONAL FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND TO AMEND JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO NEV. R. CIV. P. 52(B), OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, FOR **FURTHER ACTION AFTER A** NONJURY TRIAL PURSUANT TO **NEV. R. CIV. P. 59(B)**

Consolidated with

CASE NO. A-17-763003-C DEPT NO. IX

Hearing Date: 10/27/2020 Hearing Time: 9:00 a.m.

Page 1 of 12

Case Number: A-17-762264-C

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Before turning to the legal arguments raised by Plaintiffs, it may be helpful to first review the matters that are not in dispute.

The Standards for Relief Under Rule 52(a) Were Not Contested 1.

In his motion (the "Motion"), Defendant Vernon Rodriguez ("Rodriguez") observed that "findings of fact must be sufficient to indicate the factual bases for the Court's ultimate decision." See Motion at p. 9, Il. 14-17 (citing Bing Constr. Co. v. Vasey-Scott Eng'g Co., 100 Nev. 72, 73, 674 P.2d 1107, 1107 (1984). He further noted: "In the absence of express findings, an appellate court will imply findings when the evidence clearly supports the judgment." Id. at ll. 17-21 (citing Obstetrics and Gynecologists v. Pepper, 101 Nev. 105, 107, 693 P.2d 1259, 1261 (1985); Gorden v. Gorden, 93 Nev. 494, 496, 569 P.2d 397, 398 (1977) (citing Hardy v. First Nat'l Bank of Nev., 86 Nev. 921, 478 P.2d 581 (1970)). "When the record is not clear, however, an appellate court 'will not imply findings to support the judgment' but will instead 'remand the matter to the district court to set forth the basis for its award." Id. at 11. 21-25 (citing Commercial Cabinet Co. v. Mort Wallin of Lake Tahoe, Inc., 103 Nev. 238, 240, 737 P.2d 515, 517 (1987) (citing Bing Constr. Co. v. Vasey-Scott Eng'g Co., 100 Nev. 72, 73, 674 P.2d 1107 (1984). Finally, "[if] the district court judge cannot do so, the matter will be remanded for a new trial." Id. at 11. 25-28 (citing Luciano v. Diercks, 97 Nev. 637, 638, 637 P.2d. 1219, 1221 (1981) (citing Noble v. Noble, 86 Nev. 459, 470 P.2d 430 (1970); Pease v. Taylor, 86 Nev. 195, 467 P.2d 109 (1970)).

In their opposition to the Motion (the "Opposition"), Plaintiffs offered no points and authorities – or unsupported argument – regarding any of these standards. It thus appears that the parties agree that if essential findings of fact that have not been made, an appellate court must remand this case for further proceedings.

Plaintiffs Confirmed that Mr. Rodriguez's Prior Counsel Did Not Offer Input on the Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

In his Motion, Mr. Rodriguez noted that "Rule 52(b) is an important remedy, given the common practice of the prevailing party preparing and submitting proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law for the court." See Motion at p. 10, ll. 10-15 (citing Foley v. Morse & Mowbray, 109 Nev. 116, 123-24, 848 P.2d 519, 524 (1993); Byford v. State, 123 Nev. 67, 156 P.3d 691, 692

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(2007)). Mr. Rodriguez expressed doubt regarding "whether Mr. Gewerter ever offered any comments" on Plaintiffs' draft findings. See Motion at p. 6, ll. 21-22. In their Opposition, Plaintiffs confirmed that they "received no feedback" from Mr. Gewerter. See Opposition at p. 2, 11. 19-20. It thus appears that this is an appropriate instance for relief under Nev. R. Civ. P. 52(a).

3. Plaintiffs Do Not Challenge the Accuracy or Evidentiary Support for any Additional **Requested Findings of Fact**

In his Motion, Mr. Rodriguez asked the Court to make additional findings of fact on eight (8) issues:

- 1. Requested Finding No. 1: VCC's Chapter 11 Case Was Fully Administered and No Appeals Were Pending at the Time of Trial
- 2. Requested Finding No. 2: VCC's Chapter 11 Plan Was Confirmed by the United States Bankruptcy Court
- 3. Requested Finding No. 3: VCC's Chapter 11 Plan is Binding on All Parties
- 4. Requested Finding No. 4: VCC's Chapter 11 Plan Cancelled All Promissory Notes and Issued Common and Preferred Stock
- 5. Requested Finding No. 5: Plaintiffs in this Action Received a Pro Rata Distribution of 1,300,093 Shares of VCC Common Stock in Exchange for their Promissory Notes
- 6. Distribution of 940,110 Shares of VCC Preferred Stock in Exchange for their Promissory Notes
- 7. Requested Finding No. 7: Confirmation of the Plan Provided for a Complete Discharge of VCC, Enforced by a Permanent Injunction
- 8. Requested Finding No. 8: Plaintiffs Acquired Interests in VCC Promissory Notes Between January 2013 and December 2014

See Motion at pp. 11-16.

In their Opposition, Plaintiffs do not assert that any of the requested findings are inaccurate. Instead, Plaintiffs merely argue that the requested findings are "superfluous" (p. 2, 1 3) and

This comment is not intended to suggest impropriety of any kind on the part of Plaintiffs' counsel, David Liebrader, Esq. Mr. Rodriguez has no doubt that Mr. Liebrader did, in fact, provide a draft version of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law to Mr. Gewerter prior to filing, and that Mr. Gewerter failed to respond. The impact of Mr. Gewerter's omissions, most notably his failure to recognize an actual conflict of interest involving his concurrent representation of Mr. Robinson and Mr. Rodriguez, is the subject of the second post-trial motion.

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"unnecessary" (p. 3, 1, 3). Likewise, Plaintiffs do not allege that there is an absence of evidence in the record to support the requested findings. To the contrary, Plaintiffs acknowledge: "An appeals court can take judicial notice of the bankruptcy . . ." See Opposition at p. 4, ll. 6-7. The only objection offered by Plaintiffs for the inclusion of such findings is that "adding five pages of findings from an issue that has no bearing on the activity that gave rise to liability only muddies the record for any appeal." Id. at 11. 7-9. Mr. Rodriguez respectfully submits that an appellate court will be have no trouble dealing with a few pages of additional findings - but far more importantly, having a complete understanding of events is essential to the proper administration of justice by both this Court and any appellate court.

Plaintiffs Incorrectly Argue that "Control Person" Liability Under Nevada Securities 4. Law is Equivalent to a Personal Guarantee

Plaintiffs' resistance to including findings of fact concerning the VCC Chapter 11 bankruptcy case is clearly the result of a fundamental misunderstanding of the differences between contractual liability under a personal guarantee (i.e., liability applicable to Ronald J. Robinson) and statutory liability extended to certain "control persons" under Nevada law (i.e., the sole basis on which Mr. Rodriguez was found liable). Their conflation of these concepts is readily apparent in their Opposition, which states:

> As discussed extensively in the briefing related to Mr. Robinson's guarantee, "a discharge in bankruptcy does not extinguish the debt itself, but merely releases the debtor from personal liability for the debt." In re Edgeworth, 993 F.2d 51, 53 (5th Cir. 1993). As a result, the guarantor remains liable, as do control persons. Defendant's claim that the bankruptcy "absolutely and irrevocably extinguished" any liability under the notes is unsupported, and legally incorrect. While VCC's liability was extinguished (in exchange for the issuance of preferred stock), the same wasn't true of the guarantor, or the control persons (whose liability is based on point of sale activity).

See Opposition at p. 3, ll. 8-16.

As can be seen in this quotation, no authority was offered by Plaintiffs to support the proposition that statutory "control person" liability under Nevada law is equivalent to the contractual liability of a personal guarantor. A brief review of the two concepts explains why.

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A Personal Guarantee is a Separate and Independent Contract a.

It is well accepted that a personal guarantee is an original, separate, and independent contract that exists between a guarantor and a lender. As described by the Nevada Supreme Court:

> "The guaranty of a note is not a promise to answer for the debt of the maker . . . when it is negotiated in consideration of value received by the guarantor, but it becomes the original and absolute obligation of the guarantor himself, whereby he promises to pay his own debt to the guarantee; that is to say, the debt he owes his guarantee for what he has received from the latter. The note meanwhile is delivered and held as collateral to the promise of the guarantor. If the maker pays it at the date of its maturity, the guarantor's obligation is by that fact discharged; but, if the maker fails to pay, the guarantor remains liable upon his own obligation, which is absolute and independent of the note itself."

Manufacturers & Traders Trust Co. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court In and For Clark County, 583 P.2d 444, 447, 94 Nev. 551, 556 (1978) (citing Randono v. Turk, 86 Nev. 123, 131, 466 P.2d 218, 223 (1970) and quoting Swenson v. Stoltz, 36 Wash. 318, 78 P. 999, 1000 (1904)) (overruled on other grounds by First Interstate Bank of Nevada v. Shields, 730 P.2d 429, 430-31, 102 Nev. 616, 618 (1986)) [emphasis added].²

It is thus entirely logical that this Court should hold that Defendant Robinson remains individually liable on his personal guarantee, notwithstanding proceedings that occurred in the VCC Chapter 11 case. Direct privity of contract exists between Mr. Robinson and the Plaintiffs. That is not true with respect to Mr. Rodriguez.

b. Statutory Liability Under Nev. Rev. Stat. 90.660(4) is Entirely Dependent **Upon that of the Primary Obligor**

In sharp contrast to the common law principle that a personal guarantee is a separate and independent obligation, statutory "control person" liability under Nev. Rev. Stat. 90.660(4) is entirely dependent upon that of the primary obligor. The plain language of Nev. Rev. Stat. 90.660(1) imposes primary liability on the person of "offers or sells" an unregistered security:

Beginning with the Shields decision, the Nevada Supreme Court began applying certain protections to parties that had offered personal guarantees of obligations secured by deeds of trust, including application of the "one-action rule" and "anti-deficiency" statutes. The common law principle that a personal guarantee constitutes a separate obligation of a guarantor, independent of a primary borrower, has never been renounced.

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NRS 90.660 Civil liability.

1. A person who offers or sells a security in violation of any of the following provisions:

(b) NRS 90.460;

is liable to the person purchasing the security. . .

As noted in the Motion, the Honorable Philip M. Pro has recognized the distinction between a primary violator under Subsection (1) and a secondary party under Subsection (4). See Baroi v. Platinum Condo. Dev., LLC, 914 F.Supp.2d 1179, 1200-01 (D. Nev. 2012) ("Pursuant to Nevada Revised Statutes § 90.660(4), a person who 'directly or indirectly controls' a primary violator of Nevada securities law is jointly and severally liable for the securities violation. . ." Subsection (4) imposes secondary liability against a control person "to the same extent as" the primary violator offering the securities for sale:

NRS 90.660 Civil liability.

4. A person who directly or indirectly controls another person who is liable under subsection 1 or 3, a partner, officer or director of the person liable, a person occupying a similar status or performing similar functions, any agent of the person liable, an employee of the person liable if the employee materially aids in the act, omission or transaction constituting the violation, and a brokerdealer or sales representative who materially aids in the act, omission or transaction constituting the violation, are also liable jointly and severally with and to the same extent as the other person. . .

[Emphasis added.]

Simply stated, Mr. Rodriguez cannot be liable "to the same extent" as VCC because VCC has been discharged in bankruptcy. The VCC Chapter 11 plan is outcome determinative as to Mr. Rodriguez, not as a matter of Federal bankruptcy law, but because of Nevada law. Plaintiffs have offered no authority (or unsupported argument) to refute this plain reading of Nev. Rev. Stat. 90.660(4) or the holding in Baroi v. Platinum Condo. Dev., LLC.

5. Plaintiffs' "Tender" Offer is Another Misinterpretation of Law

In his Motion, Mr. Rodriguez noted that the award of damages against him was improper because it failed to account for any value for the shares issued to VCC's investors and that it is a

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"bedrock principle of law that a Court may not award damages based on speculation." See Motion at p. 19, Il. 3-4 (citing J.J. Indus., LLC v. Bennett, 119 Nev. 269, 278, 71 P.3d 1264, 1269 (2003)). In their Opposition, Plaintiffs attempted to sidestep that argument by offering to "tender" their shares in the reorganized company: "This isn't complicated, and Plaintiffs stand ready to tender the shares upon payment of the judgment." See Opposition at p. 4, ll. 3-5. In fact, it is more complicated than that.

To Whom a Tender a May be Made: A Purchaser May Tender Securities to the

Once again, it is essential to appreciate the distinction between a primary obligor under Nev. Rev. Stat. 90.660(1) and a secondary "control person" under Nev. Rev. Stat. 90.660(4). The measure of damages for which a primary obligor (i.e., the issuer) may be liable made be determined upon a tender to the primary obligor:

NRS 90.660 Civil liability.

1. A person who offers or sells a security in violation of any of the following provisions:

(b) NRS 90.460;

is liable to the person purchasing the security. Upon tender of the security, the purchaser may recover the consideration paid for the security and interest at the legal rate of this State from the date of payment, costs and reasonable attorney's fees, less the amount of income received on the security. A purchaser who no longer owns the security may recover damages. Damages are the amount that would be recoverable upon a tender less the value of the security when the purchaser disposed of it, plus interest at the legal rate of this State from the date of disposition of the security, costs and reasonable attorney's fees determined by the court. Tender requires only notice of willingness to exchange the security for the amount specified.

[Emphasis added.]

Plaintiffs cannot "tender" their securities to VCC because that would constitute an effort to enforce a payment obligation that has been discharged in bankruptcy and is now subject to a permanent injunction. There is no provision in Nevada law that allows a plaintiff to tender securities to a secondary control person, and certainly no authority offered by Plaintiffs to support such a notion.

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b. What May be Tendered: A Purchaser Must Tender the Securities Issued by the Primary Obligor

The plain language of Nev. Rev. Stat. 90.660(1) is equally clear regarding what must be tendered: the original security sold in violation of law. In this case, Plaintiffs acknowledge that "the bankruptcy proceeding converted Plaintiffs' promissory notes into equity in the reorganized VCC. . " See Opposition at p. 3, Il. 3-4. There are no longer any promissory notes to tender – even assuming for the sake of argument that there was still a primary obligor to which such a tender could be made.

Plaintiffs Arguments Regarding the Statute of Limitation Are Unpersuasive 6.

In the final section of their brief, Plaintiffs discuss three (3) issues concerning Mr. Rodriguez's assertion of a statute of limitation defense under Nev. Rev. Stat. 90.670.

Plaintiffs Acknowledge that Evidence Exists to Support the Statute of a. **Limitation Defense**

According to Plaintiffs: "Mr. Rodriguez asks the court to add purchase dates provided by Plaintiffs in their post-trial brief to its findings of fact. This is unnecessary as the purchase dates are a matter of record." See Opposition at p. 4, 1l. 11-13. In the very next paragraph, however, Plaintiffs argued that "[i]n raiding the statute of limitation defense, it was incumbent on Defendant to put forth evidence to support it, especially in light of the evidence of tolling and concealment offered by Mr. Hotchkiss at trial." Id. at ll. 18-21. Plaintiffs' positions on this issue are obviously irreconcilable. Either evidence exists in the record – or it does not.

If Plaintiffs are correct that no additional findings are necessary because purchase dates do appear in the Court's record, then no further evidence is necessary for this Court to resolve the issues concerning the statute of limitation defense. Mr. Rodriguez presented authority holding that claims related to the sale of unregistered securities accrue on the date the securities are issued and that a discovery rule cannot apply. See Motion at p. 19, et seq. (citing Baroi v. Platinum Condo. Dev., LLC, 914 F.Supp.2d 1179, 1199 (D. Nev. 2012)). Plaintiffs failed to offer any points and authorities to contradict Baroi. In fact, Plaintiffs never discussed the case at all.

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b. Plaintiffs Offer Differing Positions Regarding the Assertion of the Statute of Limitation Defense

According to Plaintiffs, "The SOL issue was also the subject of post-trial briefing. See Plaintiffs' Reply Brief to Mr. Rodriguez' Opposition to the Motion for Damages and Attorney's Fees filed May 28, 2020." See Opposition at p. 4, ll. 16-18. In the next paragraph, however, they claim the defense was not raised: "Having offered nothing pretrial, during trial or post trial, not even mentioning the issue during opening or closing, Defendant abandoned the defense, and did not meet his burden or proof." *Id.* at p. 4, 1. 22- p. 5, 1. 1.

No authority is offered for the proposition that an affirmative defense must be discussed during opening or closing arguments at trial to be effective. Mr. Rodriguez respectfully submits that such opening and closing arguments are frequently waived in bench trials, and in any event, the purpose of those arguments is to preview or summarize the *facts* adduced at trial. In this matter, the Court very properly requested post-trial briefing on legal issues, and Mr. Rodriguez raised the statute of limitation defense at his earliest opportunity.

As for the comments regarding "tolling" or "concealment," if Plaintiffs are correct that the dates of their investments appear in the record, then the uncontroverted rule announced in Baroi, namely that claims related to the sale of unregistered securities accrue at the time of issuance, can be fully determined. Since no discovery rule applies, statutes of limitation ran exactly two years the unregistered securities were sold.

Defendant's Assertion of an Affirmative Defense Should Apply to the Entire **Consolidated Case**

The final issue raised by Plaintiffs is an interesting one. Mr. Rodriguez, having a duty of candor to the Court, noted in his Motion that the statute of limitation defense had been expressly asserted in his response to the Hotchkiss complaint, but not that filed by Mr. White. See Motion at p. 5, Il. 17-18. Plaintiffs now argue that that defense should not be applied to the additional parties added in the White pleading. See Opposition at p. 5, ll. 11-17.

On July 1, 2019, long after responses were filed by Mr. Rodriguez to both complaints, this Court approved a Stipulation and Order Consolidating Cases, which provided: "The parties acknowledge that the issues in both cases are identical, and involve the same Defendants and same 9525 Hillwood Drive, Suite 140 Las Vegas, Nevada 89134 (702) 743-6263

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causes of action. Consolidating the two cases would save time and money, and is in the interest of the parties and the Eighth Judicial District Court." *Id.* at p. 1, 11. 20-23.

Consolidation of cases is governed by Nev. R. Civ. P. 42, which provides, in pertinent part:

Rule 42. Consolidation; Separate Trials

- (a) Consolidation. If actions before the court involve a common question of law or fact, the court may:
 - (1) join for hearing or trial any or all matters at issue in the actions:
 - (2) consolidate the actions; or
 - (3) issue any other orders to avoid unnecessary cost

or delay...

Rule 42(a)(1) allows for a joint hearing or trial, while Rule 42(a)(2) allows the court to "consolidate" the actions. A plain reading of Rule 42(a)(2) suggests "consolidation" is more than simply coordinating a hearing or trial and that a Court may combine two or more cases into a single action, at least until the time of any appeal.³ That is certainly what happened in this case. Following entry of the stipulation, all filings were made under the *Hotchkiss* case number. No distinction was made between any of the Plaintiffs in any pre- or post-trial briefing, and indeed, this Court issued only one Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order on Defendants Liability and a Judgment awarding Plaintiffs collectively a single amount as damages. Mr. Rodriguez respectfully submits that because the two cases have been treated as a single proceeding for all purposes, it would be fundamentally unfair not to incorporate all his affirmative defenses in that single consolidated action. Plaintiffs offered no evidence or argument suggesting that they would be prejudiced as a result.

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It should be noted that the Nevada Supreme Court recently held that "Consolidated cases retain their separate identities so that an order resolving all of the claims in one of the consolidated cases is immediately appealable as a final judgment under NRAP 3A..." Estate of Sarge v. Quality Loan Serv. Corp. (In re Estate of Sarge), 432 P.3d 718, 722 (Nev. 2018).

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, Mr. Rodriguez respectfully requests that this Honorable Court offer the eight (8) additional findings of fact described above pursuant to Nev. R. Civ. P. 52(a). Alternatively, Mr. Rodriguez requests that this Court take "further action" after a nonjury trial pursuant to Nev. R. Civ. P. 59(b) to consider additional evidence. After consideration of those findings, Mr. Rodriguez requests that the Court amend the Judgment to vacate the finding of liability and award of damages against him. Finally, Mr. Rodriguez requests such other relief as is just and proper.

Dated this 13th day of October, 2020.

FLEMING LAW FIRM, PLLC

By /s Scott D. Fleming

SCOTT D. FLEMING, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 5638 9525 Hillwood Drive Suite 140 Las Vegas, Nevada 89134 Attorney for Vernon Rodriguez

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I am an employee of Fleming Law Firm, PLLC, and that on the 13th day of October, 2020, I caused to be served a true and correct copy of foregoing REPLY TO OPPOSITION TO FIRST POST-JUDGMENT MOTION BY DEFENDANT VERNON RODRIGUEZ FOR ADDITIONAL FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND TO AMEND JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO NEV. R. CIV. P. 52(B), OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, FOR FURTHER ACTION AFTER A NONJURY TRIAL PURSUANT TO NEV. R. CIV. P. 59(B) in the following manner:

(VIA ELECTRONIC SERVICES) The above-referenced documents were electronically filed on the dates listed above and served on October 13, 2020, through the Notice of Electronic Filing automatically generated by the Court's facilities to those parties listed on the Court's Master Service List as follows:

> HAROLD P. GEWERTER, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 499 1212 South Casino Center Boulevard Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 Attorney for Vernon Rodriguez

DAVID LIEBRADER, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 5048 THE LAW OFFICES OF DAVID LIEBRADER, APC 601 S. Rancho Drive, Suite D-29 Las Vegas, Nevada 89106 Attorney for Plaintiffs

By <u>/s Scott D. Fleming</u> SCOTT D. FLEMING, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 5638 9525 Hillwood Drive Suite 140 Las Vegas, Nevada 89134 Attorney for Vernon Rodriguez

Page 12 of 12

RPLY 1 SCOTT D. FLEMING, ESQ. 2 Nevada Bar No. 5638 FLEMING LAW FIRM, PLLC 9525 Hillwood Drive 3 Suite 140 Las Vegas, Nevada 89134 4 Telephone: (702) 743-6263 E-Mail: scott@fleminglawlv.com 5 Attorneys for Defendant Vernon Rodriguez 6 7 8 9 10 11 Plaintiff, 12 VS. 9525 Hillwood Drive, Suite 140 Las Vegas, Nevada 89134 (702) 743-6263 13 14 15 DAVIS; and DOES 1-10; and ROES 1-10, inclusively, 16 17 18 19 20 21 and ROBERT KAISER, 22 VS. 23 24 25 26 inclusively, 27 28

FLEMING LAW FIRM, PLLC

Electronically Filed 10/13/2020 10:28 AM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT

DISTRICT COURT **CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA**

STEVEN A. HOTCHKISS,

RONALD J. ROBINSON; VERNON RODRIGUEZ; VIRTUAL COMMUNICATIONS CORPORATION; WINTECH, LLC; RETIRE HAPPY, LLĆ; JOSH STOLL; FRANK YODER; ALISA

Defendants.

ANTHONY WHITE: ROBIN SUNTHEIMER; TROY SUNTHEIMER; STEPHENS GHESQUIERE; JACKIE STONE; GAYLE CHANY; KENDALL SMITH; GABRIELE LAVERNICOCCA;

Plaintiffs,

RONALD J. ROBINSON; VERNON RODRIGUEZ; VIRTUAL COMMUNICATIONS CORPORATION; WINTECH, LLC; RETIRE HAPPY, LLC; JOSH STOLL; FRANK YODER; ALISA DAVIS; and DOES 1-10; and ROES 1-10,

Defendants.

CASE NO. A-17-762264-C DEPT NO. IX

REPLY TO OPPOSOTION TO SECOND POST-JUDGMENT MOTION BY DEFENDANT VERNON RODRIGUEZ FOR A NEW TRIAL, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, FURTHER ACTION AFTER A NONJURY TRIAL PURSUANT TO **NEV. R. CIV. P. 59(A)**

Consolidated with

CASE NO. A-17-763003-C DEPT NO. IX

Hearing Date: 10/27/2020 Hearing Time: 9:00 a.m.

Page 1 of 7

Case Number: A-17-762264-C

FLEMING LAW FIRM, PLLC 9525 Hillwood Drive, Suite 140 Las Vegas, Nevada 89134 (702) 743-6263

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As with his reply to Plaintiffs' opposition to the first post-judgment motion by Defendant Vernon Rodriguez ("Rodriguez"), we begin by noting matters that are not contested or otherwise in dispute.

1. The Standards for Relief Under Rule 59 Were Not Contested

In his second post-trial motion (the "Motion"), Mr. Rodriguez observed: "The rule at common law was that a new trial would be granted when an injustice had been done." See Motion at p. 4, Il. 9-10 (citing Shute v. Big Mountain Inv. Co., 45 Nev. 99, 102, 198 P.227 (1921)). Similarly, relief could be granted where there was a showing of "manifest injustice." Id. at 11. 14-15 (citing Frances v. Plaza Pac. Equities, 109 Nev. 91, 94, 847 P.2d 772, 725 (1993) (citing Price v Sinnott, 85 Nev. 600, 460 P.2d 837, (1969); Avery v. Gilliam, 97 Nev. 181, 625 P.2d 1166 (1981)).

The injustice to which Mr. Rodriguez referred was an actual conflict of interest that resulted from the concurrent representation by Harold P. Gewerter, Esq. of Defendants Ronald J. Robinson and Mr. Rodriguez. According to Plaintiffs, "Defendant does not cite any Nevada cases supporting his position (even acknowledging that none exist), offering only a 1984 New York case, which is not controlling authority." See Opposition at p. 2, ll. 5-7. In fact, what appears to be the seminal case on this admittedly esoteric issue is from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, and involves essentially identical facts: Dunton v. Suffolk County, State of N.Y., 729 F.2d 903 (2nd Cir. 1984). Plaintiffs certainly offer no authorities suggesting that the existence of an actual, material conflict of interest is not an irregularity that can support a new trial or further action under Rule 59.

Mr. Rodriguez's Claim that an Actual Conflict of Interest Existed Was Not Contested

In his Motion, Mr. Rodriguez described in detail how the concurrent representation of Mr. Robinson and himself presented an irreconcilable conflict of interest. Two statutory defenses were available to Mr. Rodriguez, but neither was fully presented – because doing so would have interfered with Mr. Robinson's argument that he had not intended to personally guarantee the promissory notes formerly held by Plaintiffs. No authority, or unsupported argument, was presented by Plaintiff in opposition to the observation that an actual conflict of interest existed.

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3. Plaintiffs Mischaracterize Nev. Rev. Stat. 90.660(4)

Turning now to the substance of Plaintiffs' argument, they refer to a single "good faith" defense: "While control person liability under NRS §90.660 does provide for a good faith defense, based upon the evidence submitted, it clearly would not apply to Mr. Rodriguez role in the transaction. .." *Id.* at p. 3, ll. 11-13. In fact, as noted in the Motion, there are *two* statutory defenses to "control person" liability under Nev. Rev. Stat. 90.660(4):

NRS 90.660 Civil liability.

4. A person who directly or indirectly controls another person who is liable under subsection 1 or 3, a partner, officer or director of the person liable, a person occupying a similar status or performing similar functions, any agent of the person liable, an employee of the person liable if the employee materially aids in the act, omission or transaction constituting the violation, and a broker-dealer or sales representative who materially aids in the act, omission or transaction constituting the violation, are also liable jointly and severally with and to the same extent as the other person, but it is a defense that the person did not know, and in the exercise of reasonable care could not have known, of the existence of the facts by which the liability is alleged to exist. With respect to a person who directly or indirectly, controls another person who is liable under subsection 3, it is also a defense that the controlling person acted in good faith and did not, directly or indirectly, induce the act, omission or transaction constituting the violation. Contribution among the several persons liable is the same as in cases arising out of breach of contract.

[Emphasis added.]

In this case, Plaintiffs hope to rewrite Nev. Rev. Stat. 90.660(4) to add an affirmative "duty of inquiry" to ensure absolute compliance with all securities laws:

Here, liability was based upon the sale of unregistered securities. Both Mr. Robinson and Mr. Rodriguez knew of, and participated in the offering; Should they have known that the sale required a registration or exemption filing? As to Mr. Rodriguez, as the chief financial officer - with a business degree from the University of New Mexico - he had, at the very least, the duty of inquiry to make sure that the fund raise was being done in compliance with the securities laws. . . In the "exercise of reasonable care" a CFO is obligated to make the necessary inquiries to counsel and accountants to ensure a registration statement or claim for exemption is filed and effective prior to the commencement of the offering. His failure to do so, in light of his active participation in the offering was "unreasonable," and eliminates the ability to rely on the good faith defenses available to control persons under NRS 90.660.

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See Opposition at p. 3, 1. 19 - p. 4, 1. 1 [emphasis added].

Under Plaintiffs' faulty interpretation, one's status as a control person would always create a "duty of inquiry," and any failure to discover any defect in an offering would, per se, constitute a lack of "reasonable care." The same faulty logic would also negate the second defense. Plaintiffs would have this Court hold that any failure to discover a defect would prevent such a person from acting in "good faith." In sum, Plaintiffs proposal to rewrite Nev. Rev. Stat. 90.660(4) to add a "duty of inquiry" that would render it impossible for anyone to ever invoke either statutory defense. It is well established, however, that courts must not render any part of a statute meaningless and must not read a statute's language so as to produce absurd or unreasonable results. See, e.g., Leven v. Frey, 123 Nev. 399, 405, 168 P.3d 712, 716 (2007).

4. Additional Testimony is Needed for the Court to Evaluate the Two Statutory Defenses **Under Nev. Rev. Stat. 90.660(4)**

In its Decision on April 27, 2020, this Court noted that Mr. Rodriguez presented testimony that was not aware of the registration requirements under Nevada securities law:

> While the testimony of Robinson and *Rodriguez suggests that* they believed they were acting in good faith, based in part on an alleged lack of knowledge of Nevada security laws, they failed to present any evidence that they were not directly or indirectly involved in the acts regarding the violation of Nevada security regulations. Rather, the evidence demonstrates that they were directly and intimately involved in creating the material to sell the Notes; Robinson then served as the personal guarantor of the Notes and Rodriguez.

Id. at p. 5, ll. 14-20 [emphasis added].

As Mr. Rodriguez has explained, testimony regarding the second elements of the two statutory defenses (i.e., reasonable care and inducement of the violation) was never presented because doing so would have interfered with Mr. Robinson's argument that he never intended to offer his personal guarantee. The conflict of interest is readily apparent and resulted in an irregularity at trial that warrants either a new trial or further action pursuant to Nev. R. Civ. P. 59.

In his Motion and supporting declaration, Mr. Rodriguez made an offer of proof on eleven (11) issues, summarized below:

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- 1. Mr. Rodriguez's Role with WinTech, LLC.
- 2. Fundraising Exclusively by Ron Robinson.
- 3. The Meeting With a Representative of Provident Trust.
- 4. Meetings With Retire Happy.
- 5. Requests by Retire Happy to Avoid Contact With Investors.
- 6. Licensure.
- 7. The Power Point Presentation.
- 8. Investor Questions.
- 9. Use of Investor Proceeds.
- 10. Compensation from WinTech.
- 11. Identification of Investors.

See Motion at pp. 8-11.

Mr. Rodriguez concluded by noting that the additional facts set forth in his offer of proof would be sufficient to establish both statutory defenses available under Nev. Rev. Stat. 90.660(4). *Id.* at p. 11, 11. 20-27. Plaintiffs offered no evidence or authorities (or even unsupported argument) to suggest that Mr. Rodriguez's offer of proof, if accepted, would fail to establish either of the two statutory defenses under Nev. Rev. Stat. 90.660(4).

CONCLUSION

According to Plaintiffs: "While Mr. Rodriguez may have an issue with his prior counsel for the way he tried the case, his remedy lies against Mr. Gewerter." See Opposition at p. 2, 1l. 7-9. It is worth taking a moment to consider how that scenario would play out. If this Court declines Mr. Rodriguez's request for further action, he will be forced to file an appeal. At least one possible outcome of such an appeal (after dozens of hours and tens of thousands of dollars in fees incurred by both sides) would be a remand to this Court to consider the testimony for which Mr. Rodriguez has made his offer of proof. A claim against Mr. Gewerter would, of course, require the commencement of a new action where Mr. Rodriguez would have to prove the "case within a case," meaning that but for some omission on the part of counsel, he would have prevailed in this matter. There is a possibility, however, that an appeal, a new trial on remand, and a new lawsuit

can all be avoided if this Court is willing to consider a half-day of additional testimony. Accordingly, Mr. Rodriguez respectfully requests that this Court take "further action" pursuant to Nev. R. Civ. P. 59, to amend the Judgment to reflect any additional findings, and to grant such other relief as is just and proper.

Dated this 13th day of October 2020.

FLEMING LAW FIRM, PLLC

By <u>/s Scott D. Fleming</u>
SCOTT D. FLEMING, ESQ.
Nevada Bar No. 5638
9525 Hillwood Drive
Suite 140
Las Vegas, Nevada 89134
Attorney for Vernon Rodriguez

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9525 Hillwood Drive, Suite 140 Las Vegas, Nevada 89134

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I am an employee of Fleming Law Firm, PLLC, and that on the 13th day of October, 2020, I caused to be served a true and correct copy of foregoing REPLY TO OPPOSITION TO SECOND POST-JUDGMENT MOTION BY DEFENDANT VERNON RODRIGUEZ FOR A NEW TRIAL, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, FURTHER ACTION AFTER A NONJURY TRIAL PURSUANT TO NEV. R. CIV. P.

59(A) in the following manner:

(VIA ELECTRONIC SERVICES) The above-referenced documents were electronically filed on the dates listed above and served on October 13, 2020, through the Notice of Electronic Filing automatically generated by the Court's facilities to those parties listed on the Court's Master Service List as follows:

> HAROLD P. GEWERTER, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 499 1212 South Casino Center Boulevard Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 Attorney for Vernon Rodriguez

DAVID LIEBRADER, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 5048 THE LAW OFFICES OF DAVID LIEBRADER, APC 601 S. Rancho Drive, Suite D-29 Las Vegas, Nevada 89106 Attorney for Plaintiffs

By /s Scott D. Fleming

SCOTT D. FLEMING, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 5638 9525 Hillwood Drive Suite 140 Las Vegas, Nevada 89134 Attorney for Vernon Rodriguez

RPLY 1 SCOTT D. FLEMING, ESQ. 2 Nevada Bar No. 5638 FLEMING LAW FIRM, PLLC 9525 Hillwood Drive 3 Suite 140 Las Vegas, Nevada 89134 4 Telephone: (702) 743-6263 E-Mail: scott@fleminglawlv.com 5 Attorney for Defendant Vernon Rodriguez 6 7 DISTRICT COURT 8 9 10 STEVEN A. HOTCHKISS, 11 Plaintiff, 12 VS. 9525 Hillwood Drive, Suite 140 Las Vegas, Nevada 89134 (702) 743-6263 13 RONALD J. ROBINSON; VERNON RODRIGUEZ; VIRTUAL COMMUNICATIONS CORPORATION; 14 WINTECH, LLC; RETIRE HAPPY, LLĆ; 15 JOSH STOLL; FRANK YODER; ALISA DAVIS; and DOES 1-10; and ROES 1-10, inclusively, 16 Defendants. 17 18 ANTHONY WHITE; ROBIN SUNTHEIMER; TROY SUNTHEIMER; STEPHENS GHESQUIERE; JACKIE 19 STONE; GAYLE CHANY; KENDALL 20 SMITH; GABRIELE LAVERNICOCCA; and ROBERT KAISER, 21 Plaintiffs, 22 VS. 23 RONALD J. ROBINSON; VERNON RODRIGUEZ; VIRTUAL 24 COMMUNICATIONS CORPORATION; WINTECH, LLC; RETIRE HAPPY, LLĆ; 25 JOSH STOLL; FRANK YODER; ALISA DAVIS; and DOES 1-10; and ROES 1-10, 26 inclusively, 27 Defendants.

FLEMING LAW FIRM, PLLC

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Electronically Filed 10/13/2020 10:28 AM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT

CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

CASE NO. A-17-762264-C DEPT NO. IX

REPLY TO OPPOSITION TO THIRD POST-JUDGMENT MOTION BY DEFENDANT VERNON RODRIGUEZ FOR STAYS PENDING DISPOSITION OF POST-JUDGMENT MOTIONS AND **APPEAL**

Consolidated with

CASE NO. A-17-763003-C DEPT NO. IX

Hearing: Chambers Only

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Case Number: A-17-762264-C

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Defendant Vernon Rodriguez ("Rodriguez") offers the following reply to the opposition this third post-trial motion (the "Motion").

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORIES

Plaintiffs Do Not Dispute the Standards for Relief Under Nev. R. Civ. P. 62 A.

In his Motion, Mr. Rodriguez observed that "stays pending appeal pursuant to Nev. R. Civ. P. 62(d) are permissive rather than mandatory." See Motion at p. 3, ll. 18-19 (citing State ex rel. Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. First Judicial Dist. Court ex rel. Carson City, 94 Nev. 42, 45, 574 P.2d 272, 274 (1978) (abrogated on other grounds by Nelson v. Heer, 121 Nev. 832, 834 n. 4, 122 P.3d 1252, 1253 n. 4 (2005)). A supersedeas bond posted pursuant to Rule 62(d) is typically set in an amount that will permit full satisfaction of the judgment. A District Court may, however, provide for a bond in a lesser amount, or may permit security other than a bond, when unusual circumstances exist. Id. at 11. 22-24 (citing McCulloch v. Jeakins, 99 Nev. 122, 659 P.2d 302 (1983)). Plaintiffs did not dispute any of these authorities.

Plaintiffs Consent to a Stay Pending Resolution of the Post-Judgment Motions В.

The filing of a post-trial motion pursuant to Nev. R. Civ. P. 59 will toll the time for filing an appeal but does not stay enforcement measures while such a motion is pending. Accordingly, in an abundance of caution, Mr. Rodriguez requested a temporary stay in addition to a stay pending appeal. It appears that Plaintiffs do not oppose Mr. Rodriguez's request for a stay pending resolution of the post-trial motions.

Plaintiffs Focus Exclusively on Financial Hardship as a Basis to Grant or Deny Relief Pending Appeal

In their Opposition, Plaintiffs argue that the Motion should be denied because Mr. Rodriguez did not present evidence regarding his inability to post a supersedeas bond. See Opposition at p. 4, ll. 1-5. While it is certainly true that Mr. Rodriguez does not have the ability to fund a cash bond or the ability to collateralize a surety bond, he did not rely on that fact in seeking a stay. Rather, he pointed to the fact that (i) he has asserted multiple plausible defenses to liability and (ii) that Plaintiffs are located in multiple states and have individual claims that would render it all but impossible for Mr. Rodriguez to commence separate actions to recover any amounts collected if the Judgment is reversed on appeal or remand. Plaintiffs did not offer a

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substantive response to these observations. Instead, they offered a completely circular argument that Mr. Rodriguez could avoid this result by posting a supersedeas bond. See Opposition at p. 4, II. 7-13. They never addressed either the likelihood of Mr. Rodriguez prevailing on his appeal, the clear difficulty he would suffer attempting to recoup funds if the Judgment is reversed, or the fact that the balance of hardships tips sharply in favor of Mr. Rodriguez.

CONCLUSION

For all the foregoing reasons, Mr. Rodriguez respectfully requests that this Honorable Court issue a stay of execution pursuant to Nev. R. Civ. P. 62(b) pending the final resolution of the Post-Judgment Motions. Should it then become necessary for Mr. Rodriguez to file an appeal, he further requests entry of a stay pending appeal pursuant to Nev. R. Civ. P. 62(d) without bond. Finally, Mr. Rodriguez requests such other relief as is just and proper.

Dated this 13th day of October, 2020.

FLEMING LAW FIRM, PLLC

By /s Scott D. Fleming SCOTT D. FLEMING, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 5638 9525 Hillwood Drive Suite 140 Las Vegas, Nevada 89134 Attorney for Vernon Rodriguez

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(702) 743-6263

FLEMING LAW FIRM, PLLC 9525 Hillwood Drive, Suite 140 Las Vegas, Nevada 89134

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I am an employee of Fleming Law Firm, PLLC, and that on the 13th day of October, 2020, I caused to be served a true and correct copy of foregoing THIRD POST-JUDGMENT MOTION BY DEFENDANT VERNON RODRIGUEZ FOR STAYS PENDING DISPOSITION OF POST-JUDGMENT MOTIONS AND APPEAL in the following manner:

(VIA ELECTRONIC SERVICES) The above-referenced documents were electronically filed on the dates listed above and served on October 13, 2020, through the Notice of Electronic Filing automatically generated by the Court's facilities to those parties listed on the Court's Master Service List as follows:

> HAROLD P. GEWERTER, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 499 1212 South Casino Center Boulevard Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 Attorney for Vernon Rodriguez

DAVID LIEBRADER, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 5048 THE LAW OFFICES OF DAVID LIEBRADER, APC 601 S. Rancho Drive, Suite D-29 Las Vegas, Nevada 89106 Attorney for Plaintiffs

> By /s Scott D. Fleming SCOTT D. FLEMING, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 5638 9525 Hillwood Drive Suite 140 Las Vegas, Nevada 89134 Attorney for Vernon Rodriguez

> > Page 4 of 4

Electronically Filed 11/12/2020 9:13 AM CLERK OF THE COURT

DAVID LIEBRADER, ESQ. 1 STATE BAR NO. 5048 THE LAW OFFICES OF DAVID LIEBRADER, APC 2 3960 HOWARD HUGHES PARKWAY STE 500 LAS VEGAS, NV 89169 3 PH: (702) 380-3131 Attorney for Plaintiffs 4 DISTRICT COURT 5 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 6 IN THE MATTER BETWEEN Case No. A-17-762264-C 7 Steven A. Hotchkiss, Dept.: 9 8 PLAINTIFF, **ORDER** 9 v. 10 Ronald J. Robinson, Vernon Rodriguez, Frank 11 Yoder, Alisa Davis and DOES 1-10 and ROES 1-10, inclusively CONSOLIDATED WITH 12 **DEFENDANTS** Case No. A-17-763003-C 13 Anthony White, Robin Suntheimer, Troy 14 Suntheimer, Stephens Ghesquiere, Jackie Stone, Gayle Chany, Kendall Smith, Gabriele 15 Lavermicocca and Robert Kaiser 16 **PLAINTIFFS** 17 v. 18 Ronald J. Robinson, Vernon Rodriguez, Virtual Communications Corporation, Frank Yoder, Alisa 19 Davis and DOES 1-10 and ROES 1-10, inclusively 20 21 ORDER ON POST JUDGEMNT MOTIONS 22 Defendant Rodriguez' three post judgment motions came on for hearing on 23 October 27, 2020. Appearing for Plaintiffs was David Liebrader. Appearing for 24

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Defendant Rodriguez was Scott Fleming. Harold Gewerter was in attendance, but did not participate.

After considering the motions, oppositions and replies, and hearing oral argument from counsel, the court rules that further briefing is required on the issue of control person liability under NRS 90.660 in light of Virtual Communications Corporation's bankruptcy, and sets the following briefing schedule:

- 1. Mr. Rodriguez' brief is due November 24, 2020;
- 2. Plaintiffs' reply brief is due by December 22, 2020;
- 3. Briefs are limited to 20 pages.
- 4. A hearing on the three post trial motions is set for January 19, 2021 at 9:00 a.m.

The Court FURTHER ORDERS that while a decision on these three motions remains pending, and until further order of the Court, Plaintiff shall not seek to enforce the judgment against Defendant Rodriguez, and Mr. Rodriguez shall not transfer, dispose, remove or conceal any assets, except those required for everyday, ordinary expenses.

Any transfer in violation of this order will result in a contempt of court citation.

Dated this 12th day of November, 2020

IT IS SO ORDERED:

Dated this _____day of November, 2020

Hon Cristina Silva District Court Judge

EC

A1B 201 3412 0F80 Cristina D. Silva District Court Judge

1	Submitted by:
2	<u>/s/David Liebrader</u> David Liebrader
3	Attorney for Plaintiff
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1 **CSERV** 2 DISTRICT COURT 3 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 4 5 Steven Hotchkiss, Plaintiff(s) CASE NO: A-17-762264-C 6 VS. DEPT. NO. Department 9 7 8 Ronald Robinson, Defendant(s) 9 10 **AUTOMATED CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE** 11 This automated certificate of service was generated by the Eighth Judicial District Court. The foregoing Order was served via the court's electronic eFile system to all 12 recipients registered for e-Service on the above entitled case as listed below: 13 Service Date: 11/12/2020 14 Harold Gewerter harold@gewerterlaw.com 15 T. Louis Palazzo, Esq. louis@palazzolawfirm.com 16 17 Celina Moore celina@palazzolawfirm.com 18 Miriam Roberts miriam@palazzolawfirm.com 19 David Liebrader, Esq. dliebrader@gmail.com 20 David Liebrader DaveL@investmentloss.com 21 Vernon Rodriquez harold@gewerterlaw.com 22 **Scott Fleming** scott@fleminglawlv.com 23 24 25 26 27

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MPA 1 SCOTT D. FLEMING, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 5638 2 FLEMING LAW FIRM, PLLC 3 9525 Hillwood Drive Suite 140 Las Vegas, Nevada 89134 4 Telephone: (702) 743-6263 E-Mail: scott@fleminglawlv.com 5 Attorney for Defendant Vernon Rodriguez 6 7 8 9 * * * 10 STEVEN A. HOTCHKISS, 11 FLEMING LAW FIRM, PLLC Plaintiff, 12 VS. 9525 Hillwood Drive, Suite 140 Las Vegas, Nevada 89134 (702) 743-6263 RONALD J. ROBINSON; VERNON 13 RODRIGUEZ; VIRTUAL COMMUNICATIONS CORPORATION; 14 WINTECH, LLC; RETIRE HAPPY, LLC; 15 JOSH STOLL; FRANK YODER; ALISA DAVIS; and DOES 1-10; and ROES 1-10, inclusively, 16 17 Defendants. 18 ANTHONY WHITE; ROBIN SUNTHEIMER; TROY SUNTHEIMER; 19 STEPHENS GHESQUIERE; JACKIE STONE; GAYLE CHANY; KENDALL 20 SMITH: GABRIELE LAVERNICOCCA: and ROBERT KAISER, 21 Plaintiffs, 22 VS. 23 RONALD J. ROBINSON; VERNON RODRIGUEZ; VIRTUAL 24 COMMUNICATIONS CORPORATION; WINTECH, LLC; RETIRE HAPPY, LLĆ; 25 JOSH STOLL; FRANK YODER; ALISA DAVIS; and DOES 1-10; and ROES 1-10, 26 inclusively, 27 Defendants. 28

Electronically Filed 11/24/2020 8:13 AM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT

DISTRICT COURT

CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

CASE NO. A-17-762264-C DEPT NO. IX

DEFENDANT VERNON RODRIGUEZ'S SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND **AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF** POST-JUDGMENT MOTIONS

Hearing date: 1/19/21 Hearing time: 9:00 a.m.

Consolidated with

CASE NO. A-17-763003-C DEPT NO. IX

Page 1 of 16

Case Number: A-17-762264-C

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Defendant Vernon Rodriguez ("Rodriguez") offers the following supplemental memorandum of points and authorities in support of the post-judgment motions that are currently set for a continued hearing on January 19, 2021.

This memorandum will discuss the interplay between Nev. Rev. Stat. 90.660 and Title 11 of the United States Code (the "Bankruptcy Code"), together with supporting case law.

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

A. Primary and Secondary Liability Under Nev. Rev. Stat. 90.660

1. "Primary" Violator Liability Under Nev. Rev. Stat. 90.660(1)

We begin with the observation that there are two distinct categories of persons from whom a plaintiff may obtain a recovery for violations of securities law. Pursuant to Nev. Rev. Stat. 90.660(1), a plaintiff may recover from a person "who offers or sells a security" in violation of law:

NRS 90.660 Civil liability.

- 1. A person who offers or sells a security in violation of any of the following provisions:
- (b) NRS 90.460 [failure to register];

is liable to the person purchasing the security. . .

An offeror or seller of a security to whom liability may extend under Nev. Rev. Stat. 90.660(1) has been referred to as a "Primary" violator.

2. "Secondary" Control Person Liability Under Nev. Rev. Stat. 90.660(4)

A plaintiff may also recover from a secondary "control person":

NRS 90.660 Civil liability.

4. A person who directly or indirectly controls another person who is liable under subsection 1 or 3, a partner, officer or director of the person liable, a person occupying a similar status or performing similar functions, any agent of the person liable, an employee of the person liable if the employee materially aids in the act, omission or transaction constituting the violation, and a brokerdealer or sales representative who materially aids in the act, omission or transaction constituting the violation, are also liable jointly and severally with and to the same extent as the other person...

[Emphasis added.]

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There appear to be only three cases discussing Nev. Rev. Stat. 90.660, but all three recognize the distinction between a "primary" violator and a "secondary" control person. See Baroi v. Platinum Condo. Dev., LLC, 914 F.Supp.2d 1179, 1200-01 (D. Nev. 2012) ("Pursuant to Nevada Revised Statutes § 90.660(4), a person who 'directly or indirectly controls' a primary violator of Nevada securities law is jointly and severally liable for the securities violation. . .") [emphasis added]; see also Tsutsumi v. Advanced Power Techs., Inc., Case No. 2:12-cv-01784-MMD-VCF at *7 (D. Nev. January 24, 2014) (complaint failed to meet pleading requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b) where it did not detail whether corporate defendants were themselves liable or whether individual defendants were "vicariously" liable as controlling persons under Nev. Rev. Stat. 90.660(4)) [unpublished decision]; Avers v. Lee, Case No. 14cv542-LAB(WVG) at *2 (S.D. Cal. March 13, 2015) ("Section 90.660(1) provides that a person who offers or sells securities in violation of certain provisions of law is liable to the person who purchases the security. Section 90.660(4) provides for the liability of several other classes of people. . .") [unpublished decision].

B. Damages Recoverable from a Primary Violator Under Nev. Rev. Stat. 90.660(1)

There are two (and only two) statutory formulas for determining damages that may be recovered from a Primary violator under Nev. R. Civ. P. 90.660(1): the "Tender Rule" and the "Disposition Rule."

1. The Tender Rule

If a purchaser still holds a security, he may "tender" the security to the Primary violator from whom he purchased it. Damages consist of the amount paid for the security, less income received from the security, plus interest, fees, and costs:

NRS 90.660 Civil liability.

1. A person who offers or sells a security in violation of any of the following provisions:

(b) NRS 90.460;

is liable to the person purchasing the security. Upon tender of the security, the purchaser may recover the consideration paid for the security and interest at the legal rate of this State from the date of payment, costs and reasonable attorney's fees, less the amount of income received on the security. . .

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[Emphasis added.]

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The Tender Rule appears in Nev. Rev. Stat. 90.660(1), which deals solely with the liability of a Primary violator. The plain language is thus clear that the person to whom a tender must be made is the "person who offers or sells a security" in violation of law – i.e., the Primary violator.

As importantly, the Tender Rule states clearly *what* must be tendered: the original security. There is nothing in Nev. Rev. Stat. 90.660(1) that allows for the "tender" of anything other than that which was purchased. If a purchaser has "disposed of" a security, he must rely on the second formula to determine damages.

2. The Disposition Rule

Nev. Rev. Stat. 90.660(1) provides for a recovery from a Primary violator if a purchaser has "disposed" of a security.

NRS 90.660 Civil liability.

1. A person who offers or sells a security in violation of any of the following provisions:

(b) NRS 90.460;

is liable to the person purchasing the security... A purchaser who no longer owns the security may recover damages. Damages are [1] the amount that would be recoverable upon a tender [2] less the value of the security when the purchaser disposed of it, plus [3] interest at the legal rate of this State from the date of disposition of the security, costs and reasonable attorney's fees determined by the court. . .

[Emphasis and numbers in brackets added.]

The damages calculation under the Disposition Rule requires a three-part analysis. First, a plaintiff must determine what amount would be recoverable under the Tender Rule (i.e., the purchase price less the income derived from the security). Second, a plaintiff must then subtract the value of the security when the purchaser disposed of it. Finally, a plaintiff then may add interest, fees, and costs.

The second element of the Disposition Rule requires two pieces of evidence. A purchaser must show that he "disposed" of the security (i.e., that he transferred the property) and the "value" of the security when that event occurred.

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C. Damages Recoverable From a Secondary Control Person Under Nev. Rev. Stat. 90.660(4)

The Tender Rule and the Disposition Rule are the only two means of measuring damages against a Primary violator under Nev. Rev. Stat. 90.660(1). There are no formulas for determining the liability of a Secondary control person. There is no equivalent of the Tender Rule and no Disposition Rule in subsection (4). There is nothing that authorizes an award of interest or attorneys' fees or costs. Instead, the statute provides that a Secondary control person may only be held liable "with and to the same extent as" the Primary violator:

NRS 90.660 Civil liability.

4. A person who directly or indirectly controls another person who is liable under subsection 1 or 3, a partner, officer or director of the person liable, a person occupying a similar status or performing similar functions, any agent of the person liable, an employee of the person liable if the employee materially aids in the act, omission or transaction constituting the violation, and a brokerdealer or sales representative who materially aids in the act, omission or transaction constituting the violation, are also liable jointly and severally with and to the same extent as the other person...

[Emphasis added.]

With these principles in mind, we turn to a discussion of the Bankruptcy Code.

D. The Effect of the VCC Bankruptcy

In the Request by Defendants Vernon Rodriguez for Judicial Notice in Support of Post-Judgment Motions ("RFJN") filed September 19, 2020, Mr. Rodriguez provided copies of three key documents entered in the Chapter 11 bankruptcy case by Virtual Communications Corporation ("VCC"). We refer to those documents extensively in the following section.

1. **VCC Cannot be Held Liable as a Primary Violator**

a. **VCC's Chapter 11 Case Has Been Concluded**

Mr. Rodriguez attached as Exhibit 1 to the RFJN the Order Entering Final Decree dated March 14, 2019, Electronic Case Filing (ECF) No. 119. The order is significant because it establishes that the VCC case has been fully administered and that there are no pending appeals.

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b. VCC's Plan of Reorganization Was "Confirmed"

On September 5, 2018, the Bankruptcy Court entered the *Order Confirming First Amended Chapter 11 Plan of Reorganization of Virtual Communications Corporation* [ECF No. 75] (the "Confirmation Order"). This document was attached as **Exhibit 2** to the RFJN.

The Confirmation Order is significant because it provides Bankruptcy Court approval of the "Plan" (as defined below), which is expressly binding upon all parties:

5. In accordance with Section 1141(a) of the Bankruptcy Code and upon the occurrence of the Effective Date, the Plan shall be binding upon and inure to the benefit of: (i) the Debtor; (ii) all Claimants and all Holders of Claims or Equity Interests (regardless of whether any such Claimants or Holders voted to accept the Plan, is Impaired under the Plan, or has filed, or is deemed to have filed, a Proof of Claim); (iii) any other Entity giving, acquiring, or receiving property under the Plan; (iv) any party to an executory contract or unexpired lease of the Debtor; and (v) each of the foregoing's respective heirs, successors, assigns, trustees, executors, administrators, affiliates, officers, directors, agents, representatives, attorneys, beneficiaries, or guardians, if any.

Id. at p. 7, 11. 14-21.

c. The Plan of Reorganization Provides a Discharge to VCC

The Plan provides a discharge that prohibits any parties from asserting any claims against VCC or its property that arose prior to the "Effective Date":

A. Discharge Injunction.

The rights afforded in the Plan and the treatment of all Claims shall be in exchange for and in complete satisfaction, discharge, and release of all Claims of any nature whatsoever arising prior to the Effective Date against the Debtor and the Estate, including any interest accrued on such Claims from and after the Petition Date. Except as otherwise provided in the Plan or the Confirmation Order, on the Effective Date, (a) the Debtor, the Estate, the Reorganized Debtor and their respective property are discharged and released hereunder to the fullest extent permitted by Bankruptcy Code sections 524 and 1141 from all Claims and rights against them that arose before the Effective Date, including all debts, obligations, demands, and liabilities, and all debts of the kind specified in Bankruptcy Code sections 502(g), 502(h), or 502(i), regardless of whether or not (i) a proof of Claim based on such debt is Filed or deemed Filed, (ii) a Claim based on such debt is allowed pursuant to Bankruptcy Code section 502, or (iii) the Holder of a Claim based on such debt has or has not accepted the Plan; (b) any judgment underlying a Claim discharged hereunder is void; and (c) all entities are precluded from asserting against the Debtor, the Estate, the Reorganized Debtor and their respective property, any Claims or

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rights based upon any act or omission, transaction, or other activity of any kind or nature that occurred prior to the Effective Date.

See Plan, Exhibit 3 to the RFJN, at p. 25, 11. 13-23.

The discharge provided by the Plan is enforceable by a permanent injunction:

Discharge Injunction.

Except as otherwise provided in the Plan or the Confirmation Order, on and after the Effective Date, all entities who have held, currently hold, or may hold a Claim against the Debtor, the Estate, or the Reorganized Debtor, that is based upon any act or omission, transaction, or other activity of any kind or nature that occurred prior to the Effective Date, that otherwise arose or accrued prior to the Effective Date, or that otherwise is discharged pursuant to the Plan, are permanently enjoined from taking any of the following actions on account of any such discharged Claim, (the "Permanent Injunction"): (a) commencing or continuing in any manner any action or other proceeding against the Debtor, the Estate the Reorganized Debtor or their respective property, that is inconsistent with the Plan or the Confirmation Order; (b) enforcing, attaching, collecting, or recovering in any manner any judgment, award, decree, or order against the Debtor, the Estate, the Reorganized Debtor or their respective property, other than as expressly permitted under the Plan; (c) creating, perfecting, or enforcing any lien or encumbrance against property of Debtor, the Estate, the Reorganized Debtor, or their respective property, other than as expressly permitted under the Plan; and (d) commencing or continuing any action, in any manner, in any place that does not comply with or is inconsistent with the provisions of the Plan, the Confirmation Order, or the discharge provisions of Bankruptcy Code section 1141. Any person or entity injured by any willful violation of such Permanent Injunction shall recover actual damages, including costs and attorneys' fees, and, in appropriate circumstances, may recover punitive damages, from the willful violator.

Id. at p. 25, 1. 24 – p. 26, 1. 6 [emphasis added].

In sum, the Plan provides a discharge to VCC that is enforceable by a permanent injunction by any person or entity injured by its violation – including Mr. Rodriguez.

d. Because VCC Cannot be Held Liable as a Primary Violator, No Liability May Attach to Mr. Rodriguez

As a result of the bankruptcy filing, any liability that VCC may have had as a "Primary" violator under Nev. Rev. Stat. 90.660(1) has been extinguished, and Plaintiffs are subject to a permanent injunction under federal law prohibiting them from pursuing any claim. Without a

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judgment against a Primary violator, there is no ability to hold Mr. Rodriguez liable as a "Secondary" control party "with and to the same extent as" under Nev. Rev. Stat. 90.660(4).

The Tender Rule Under Nev. Rev. Stat. 90.660(1) Cannot Apply in this Case

It is anticipated that Plaintiffs will argue that even if they cannot pursue a claim against VCC, this Court can nevertheless consider what VCC's liability would have been if a claim could be asserted. There is, of course, no authority for a "hypothetical" finding of liability against a Primary violator – but even if there were, damages could not be assessed against VCC, or Mr. Rodriguez, because Plaintiffs cannot satisfy the "Tender Rule."

Tender Must be Made to the Primary Violator a.

As noted above, the Tender Rule appears in Nev. Rev. Stat. 90.660(1), which deals exclusively with the Primary violator, which in this case is VCC. The discharge and permanent injunction prohibit Plaintiffs from demanding payment in exchange for the surrender of the securities issued in violation of law. There is nothing in Nev. Rev. Stat. 90.660(4) that allows for a tender to a Secondary control party.

b. Plaintiffs No Longer Hold Securities Issued by the Primary Violator

Just as there is no Primary violator to which a tender may be made, there are no longer any original securities available for Plaintiffs to tender. VCC's Plan effected a "debt for equity swap," meaning that Plaintiffs' promissory notes were cancelled and that shares of stock were issued to them in "full and final satisfaction" of VCC's obligations:

3. Class 3 – Unsecured Promissory Notes.

Classification: Class 3 consists of all Claims held by the Unsecured Noteholders.

Treatment: Except to the extent that a Holder of an Allowed Class 3 Claim agrees to a less favorable treatment, in exchange for and in full and final satisfaction, compromise, settlement, release, and discharge of each Allowed Class 3 Claim, each Holder of an Allowed Class 3 Claim shall receive on the Effective Date, or as soon thereafter as reasonably practicable, (i) its Pro Rata share of the Common Stock Distribution and (ii) its Pro Rata Share of the Series A Preferred Distribution.

Id. at p. 11, Il. 4-9 [underlining in original and bold italics added].

The "Common Stock Distribution" under the Plan consisted of 1,300,093 shares of

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common stock of the reorganized debtor:

Stock Distribution: Α distribution Common shares of Common Stock of the approximately 1.300.093 Reorganized Debtor to be allocated among the Holders of Allowed Class 3 Claims on a Pro Rata basis according to the amount of contract-rate interest accrued on the principal balance included in each Holder's respective Allowed Class 3 Claim as of the Petition Date, which shall be subject to adjustment to provide that the number of shares of Common Stock included within the Common Stock Distribution is equal to the total amount of all contract-rate interest accrued on the aggregate principal balances included within all Allowed Class 3 Claims as of the Petition Date.

Id. at p. 3, 11. 9-13.

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The "Series A Preferred Distribution" consisted of a pro rata share of 940,110 shares of VCC preferred stock:

> Series A Preferred Distribution: A distribution of approximately 940,110 shares of Series A Preferred Stock of the Reorganized Debtor to be allocated among the Holders of Allowed Class 3 Claims on a Pro Rata basis according to the principal indebtedness included in each Holder's Allowed Class 3 Claim, which shall be subject to adjustment to provide that the number of shares of Series A Preferred Stock included within the Series A Preferred Distribution is equal to one-fifth (1/5th) of the total dollar amount of all principal indebtedness included within all Allowed Class 3 Claims.

Id. at p. 6, 11. 21-25.

In sum, because of the VCC confirmed Plan, there is no one to whom a tender can be made --- and nothing to tender. There is no ability to award damages against a Primary violator for whom Mr. Rodriguez could have Secondary control person liability "with and to the same extent as."

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3. The Disposition Rule Under Nev. Rev. Stat. 90.660(1) Cannot Apply in this Case

As discussed above, the Disposition Rule may allow for a recovery where a purchaser has "disposed of" securities:

NRS 90.660 Civil liability.

1. A person who offers or sells a security in violation of any of the following provisions:

(b) NRS 90.460;

is liable to the person purchasing the security... A purchaser who no longer owns the security may recover damages. *Damages are* [1] *the amount that would be recoverable upon a tender* [2] *less the value of the security when the purchaser disposed of it*, plus [3] interest at the legal rate of this State from the date of disposition of the security, costs and reasonable attorney's fees determined by the court...

[Emphasis and numbers in brackets added.]

a. Plaintiffs Did Not "Dispose Of" Their Notes

Once again, the Plan makes it impossible for Plaintiffs to prove damages against VCC, even as a hypothetical matter. To begin with, Plaintiffs did not "dispose of" their notes. The plain meaning of that phrase is as follows:

dispose of

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1 a (1): to get rid of

// how to dispose of toxic waste

(2): to deal with conclusively

// disposed of the matter efficiently

b: to transfer to the control of another

// disposing of personal property to a total stranger

2: to place, distribute, or arrange especially in an orderly way

// disposing of the weapons in the new fort
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See https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/dispose [italics in original].

Plaintiffs did not transfer their promissory notes to a third party. Instead, those notes were

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cancelled through the Plan and pro rata shares of common and preferred stock were issued to them in "full and final satisfaction" of those debts.

b. Plaintiffs Cannot Demonstrate a Loss in Value

In addition to demonstrating that they "disposed of" their promissory notes, Plaintiffs must prove the difference between the amount that they paid for their securities and the "value" they received in exchange for the transfer. As noted above, the Plan provides that the debt for equity swap constitutes "full and final satisfaction" of all debts. The Plan also refers to the "complete satisfaction" of all prior obligations:

A. Discharge Injunction.

The rights afforded in the Plan and the treatment of all Claims shall be in exchange for and in complete satisfaction, discharge, and release of all Claims of any nature whatsoever arising prior to the Effective Date against the Debtor and the Estate, including any interest accrued on such Claims from and after the Petition Date. . .

See Plan, Exhibit 3 to the RFJN, at p. 25, ll. 13-15 [emphasis added].

Even if the Court were to consider the debt for equity swap to be a "disposition," and if the Court were willing to ignore the language of the Plan regarding "full and final satisfaction" and "complete satisfaction" and presume that the shares are worth less than the original notes, no evidence was offered regarding the *value* of the common and preferred stock issued to Plaintiffs. It is a bedrock principle of law that a Court may not award damages based on speculation. *See*, *e.g.*, *J.J. Indus.*, *LLC v. Bennett*, 119 Nev. 269, 278, 71 P.3d 1264, 1269 (2003).

If Plaintiffs cannot satisfy the Disposition Rule to prove damages (even hypothetical damages) on the part of VCC as a Primary violator, there is no amount for which Mr. Rodriguez may be held liable as a Secondary party "with and to the same extent as."

4. The Bankruptcy Rule Against the Discharge of Non-Debtor Parties

In the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order ("FFCL") issued May 8, 2020, the Court observed that the VCC bankruptcy case did not extinguish the liability of Ronald J. Robinson under his personal guarantee:

. . .

The Court also finds that the VCC Bankruptcy did not extinguish Mr. Robinson's personal guarantee. The Court asked for and received post trial briefs on this issue, and relying on the reasoning set forth in Donnell v. Perpetual Investments, Inc. (USDC) Nevada, case 2:04-cv-01172, Decision issued 10/11/06) and Marc Nelson Oil Prods. v. Grim Logging Co., 110 P.3d 120 (Or. App. 2005) fins that the VCC bankruptcy did not extinguish Mr. Robinson's liability as guarantor of the Notes.

Id. at p. 4, 11. 6-11.

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Mr. Rodriguez does not dispute that proposition. It is well accepted that a personal guarantee is an original, separate, and independent contract that exists between a guarantor and a lender. As described by the Nevada Supreme Court:

> "The guaranty of a note is not a promise to answer for the debt of the maker . . . when it is negotiated in consideration of value received by the guarantor, but it becomes the original and absolute obligation of the guarantor himself, whereby he promises to pay his own debt to the guarantee; that is to say, the debt he owes his guarantee for what he has received from the latter. The note meanwhile is delivered and held as collateral to the promise of the guarantor. If the maker pays it at the date of its maturity, the guarantor's obligation is by that fact discharged; but, if the maker fails to pay, the guarantor remains liable upon his own obligation, which is absolute and independent of the note itself."

Manufacturers & Traders Trust Co. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court In and For Clark County, 583 P.2d 444, 447, 94 Nev. 551, 556 (1978) (citing Randono v. Turk, 86 Nev. 123, 131, 466 P.2d 218, 223 (1970) and quoting Swenson v. Stoltz, 36 Wash. 318, 78 P. 999, 1000 (1904)) (overruled on other grounds by First Interstate Bank of Nevada v. Shields, 730 P.2d 429, 430-31, 102 Nev. 616, 618 (1986)) [emphasis added].

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It is unclear why the parties cited a U.S. District Court decision and Oregon state court opinion for a proposition that is black letter law within the Ninth Circuit. See, e.g., Underhill v. Rôyal, 769 F.2d 1426, 1432 (9th Cir. 1985) ("the bankruptcy court has no power to discharge the liabilities of a nondebtor pursuant to the consent of creditors as part of a reorganization plan."); In re Am. Hardwoods, Inc., 885 F.2d 621, 626 (9th Cir. 1989) ("Section 524(e) ... limits the court's equitable power under section 105 to order the discharge of the liabilities of nondebtors."); In re Lowenschuss, 67 F.3d 1394, 1401 (9th Cir. 1995) ("[t]his court has repeatedly held, without exception, that § 524(e) precludes bankruptcy courts from discharging the liabilities of nondebtors."); Blixseth v. Credit Suisse, 961 F.3d 1074, 1082 (9th Cir. 2020) ("[b]y its terms, § 524(e) prevents a bankruptcy court from extinguishing claims of creditors against non-debtors over the very debt discharged through the bankruptcy proceedings.").

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It is thus entirely logical that this Court should hold that Defendant Robinson remains individually liable on his personal guarantee, notwithstanding proceedings that occurred in the VCC Chapter 11 case. Direct privity of contract exists between Mr. Robinson and the Plaintiffs, but that is not true with respect to Mr. Rodriguez. Instead, as discussed at length above, Mr. Rodriquez can only be found liable as a Secondary control party "with and to the same extent as" the Primary violator VCC, which has – and cannot – occur.

Ε. The VCC Bankruptcy Did Not Affect the Statute of Limitation Applicable to the Claim Against Mr. Rodriguez

Having discussed the many ways in which VCC's bankruptcy has affected Plaintiffs' claims under Nevada securities law, it is worth mentioning one issue on which the VCC Plan has had no effect: the statute of limitation applicable to the claim against Mr. Rodriguez.

1. The Statute of Limitation Applicable to Claims Under Nev. Rev. Stat. 90.660

Nevada law provides a two (2) year statute of limitation with a discovery period, and a five (5) year statute of repose, for claims arising under Nev. Rev. Stat. 90.660:

> NRS 90.670 Statute of limitations. A person may not sue under NRS 90.660 unless suit is brought within the earliest of 2 years after the discovery of the violation, 2 years after discovery should have been made by the exercise of reasonable care, or 5 years after the act, omission or transaction constituting the violation.

When a case involves the sale of an unregistered security, the discovery rule cannot, as a matter of law, apply and the statute of limitation thus begins to run on the date a security is sold. See Baroi, 914 F.Supp.2d at 1199 ("The securities' status as registered or unregistered was publicly available information capable of discovery through reasonable care. . . Plaintiffs therefore had all facts necessary to bring their registration claims at the time they signed their purchase agreements, even if they did not understand the legal significance of those facts until later."). In this case, it is undisputed that Plaintiffs purchased securities from VCC more than two years before the commencement of the earlier of these consolidated actions.

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The VCC Bankruptcy Filing Did Not Toll the Statute of Limitation Applicable 2. to the Claim Against Mr. Rodriguez

The Bankruptcy Code includes a provision, 11 U.S.C. § 108(a), that allows a trustee or debtor-in-possession to bring an action up to two years after the commencement of a bankruptcy case, notwithstanding the expiration of any applicable statute of limitation. See, e.g., In re Flying S. Land & Cattle Co., Inc., 71 B.R. 183, 186 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1987). That provision does not, however, toll statutes of limitation for any other parties, including creditors. U.S. for Use of American Bank v. C.I.T. Const. Inc. of Texas, 944 F.2d 253, 259 (5th Cir. 1991) ("Neither the language nor the purpose of section 108(a) support the proposition that a creditor independently pursuing a claim can avail itself of the elongated statute of limitation provided by section 108(a).").

The two-year statute of limitation imposed by Nev. Rev. Stat. 90.670 began running on the date each promissory note was issued to a Plaintiff, the latest of which occurred in December 2014. Any claim against Mr. Rodriguez was time-barred in December 2016, and that date could not have been extended by the VCC bankruptcy filing.

CONCLUSION

For all of the foregoing reasons, Mr. Rodriguez respectfully submits that the confirmed Plan extinguished all liability on behalf of VCC, and that as a result, there is no Nev. Rev. Stat. 90.660(1) "Primary" violator for which he could be held liable "with and to the same extent as" as a "Secondary" control party under Nev. Rev. Stat. 90.660(4). Moreover, the VCC bankruptcy plan renders it impossible for Plaintiffs to satisfy either of the two statutory formulas for determining damages: the Tender Rule and the Disposition Rule. There was neither a "tender" nor a "disposition," nor could there be given the facts of this matter. Finally, the VCC bankruptcy filing did not affect the two-year statute of limitation applicable to the claim against Mr. Rodriguez, which expired roughly nine (9) months before the commencement of the first of these consolidated actions.

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Mr. Rodriguez requests that the Court amend the Judgment to vacate the finding of liability and award of damages against him. Finally, Mr. Rodriguez requests such other relief as is just and proper.

Dated this 24th day of November, 2020.

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that I am an employee of Fleming Law Firm, PLLC, and that on the 24th day of
November, 2020, I caused to be served a true and correct copy of foregoing DEFENDANT
VERNON RODRIGUEZ'S SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF POST-JUDGMENT MOTIONS in the following
manner:
ANA ELECTRONIC SERVICES) The above of several decomposite over all the several decomposite over the sev

(VIA ELECTRONIC SERVICES) The above-referenced documents were electronically filed on the dates listed above and served on November 24, 2020, through the Notice of Electronic Filing automatically generated by the Court's facilities to those parties listed on the Court's Master Service List as follows:

> DAVID LIEBRADER, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 5048 THE LAW OFFICES OF DAVID LIEBRADER, APC 601 S. Rancho Drive, Suite D-29 Las Vegas, Nevada 89106 Attorney for Plaintiffs

HAROLD P. GEWERTER, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 499 1212 South Casino Center Boulevard Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 Attorney for Ronald J. Robinson

MICHAEL F. BOHN, ESQ. Nevada Bar No.: 1641 mbohn@bohnlawfirm.com ADAM R. TRIPPIEDI, ESQ. Nevada Bar No.: 12294 atrippiedi@bohnlawfirm.com LAW OFFICES OF MICHAEL F. BOHN, ESQ., LTD. 2260 Corporate Circle, Suite 480 Henderson, Nevada 89074 (702) 642-3113/ (702) 642-9766 FAX Attorney for Ronald J. Robinson

> By /s Scott D. Fleming SCOTT D. FLEMING, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 5638 9525 Hillwood Drive Suite 140 Las Vegas, Nevada 89134 Attorney for Vernon Rodriguez

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Electronically Filed 12/22/2020 5:12 AM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT DAVID LIEBRADER, ESQ. 1 STATE BAR NO. 5048 THE LAW OFFICES OF DAVID LIEBRADER, APC 2 3960 HOWARD HUGHES PARKWAY STE 500 LAS VEGAS, NV 89169 3 PH: (702) 380-3131 Attorney for Plaintiffs 4 DISTRICT COURT 5 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 6 IN THE MATTER BETWEEN Case No. A-17-762264-C 7 Steven A. Hotchkiss. Dept.: 8 8 PLAINTIFF, REPLY TO DEFENDANT 9 VERNON RODRIGUEZ' v. **MEMORANDUM OF** 10 **SUPPLEMENTAL** Ronald J. Robinson, Vernon Rodriguez, Frank **AUTHORITIES ON POST** 11 Yoder, Alisa Davis and DOES 1-10 and ROES 1-JUDGMENT MOTIONS 10, inclusively 12 **DEFENDANTS** 13 Anthony White, Robin Suntheimer, Troy 14 Suntheimer, Stephens Ghesquiere, Jackie Stone, CONSOLIDATED WITH Gayle Chany, Kendall Smith, Gabriele 15 Lavermicocca and Robert Kaiser Case No. A-17-763003-C 16 **PLAINTIFFS** 17 v. 18 Ronald J. Robinson, Vernon Rodriguez, Virtual Communications Corporation, Frank Yoder, Alisa 19 Davis and DOES 1-10 and ROES 1-10, inclusively 20 21 22 REPLY BRIEF Ten months after this case went to trial, Defendant is before the court looking 23

Case Number: A-17-762264-C

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for a fourth bite at the apple. At the hearing on Defendant's three post trial motions

the court asked for authority in support of his claim that control person Vernon Rodriguez couldn't be liable to Plaintiff – as a matter of law - because the primary tortfeasor, Virtual Communications Corporation ("VCC") filed for bankruptcy. Despite providing Defendant an additional thirty days, Defendant's supplemental memorandum doesn't cite a single case in support.

Instead, he focuses on a new argument; that NRS §90.660 only permits damages to be recoverable from the primary tortfeasor. This novel argument is unsupported – save an unpersuasive cite to <u>Merriam Webster's Dictionary</u>. It is also improper. This issue should have been raised pretrial, via either a motion to dismiss or a motion in limine; or at trial. It wasn't. As a result, this argument was waived.

A. Mr. Rodriguez is Liable as a Control Person for Selling <u>Unregistered Securities</u>

Defendant asks the court to throw out its judgment, arguing that because VCC filed for bankruptcy, Mr. Rodriguez cannot be liable "to the same extent" as VCC, because VCC wasn't found liable to the Plaintiffs. This argument fails on two grounds:

- This Court made a specific finding that VCC sold unregistered securities.
- 2. It is well settled law that a discharge of a primary tortfeasor in bankruptcy does not release a joint tortfeasor from liability.

1. The Court found that VCC sold unregistered securities

The issue of whether the Notes sold by VCC were securities was settled at trial.

The court received briefs on the subject, and heard testimony from Mr. Rodriguez

and Mr. Robinson on the issue. Probably the most conclusive piece of evidence at trial was VCC's own power point presentation, which referred to the Notes as securities See Exhibit "A", attached. As a result, the Court found that VCC sold unregistered, non-exempt securities in violation of NRS §90.460 and §90.660. Nor was this finding made in violation of the bankruptcy stay, as the court was apprised of the bankruptcy, the bankruptcy court issued an order allowing the case to proceed, and the issue was argued and decided solely for the purpose of establishing control person liability.

As to VCC's bankruptcy, Defendants brief cites to the confirmed plan of reorganization. Nothing in the confirmed plan acts as a release of any claims against third parties. The Discharge Injunction applies solely to "the Debtor and the Estate", not to Mr. Rodriguez or Mr. Robinson.

2. VCC's Bankruptcy Does Not Absolve Mr. Rodriguez of Control Person Liability

Defendant cites NRS §90.660, which provides that control persons are liable "to the same extent" as the primary violator. Because VCC received a discharge, Mr. Rodriguez argues he cannot be liable, since his liability exists only "to the same extent" as VCC's. This argument contradicts a bedrock principle of bankruptcy law; that a discharge of the debtor does not serve as a discharge or release of liability for third parties.

Mr. Rodriguez' argument is identical to the one raised by control persons in Schleicher v. Wendt, 529 F. Supp. 2d 959 (S.D. Ind. 2007). There, the Plaintiffs alleged that individual "control persons" were liable for securities fraud committed by

the corporate Defendant Conseco. The control persons argued that they couldn't be liable, because Conseco filed for bankruptcy and received a discharge. The Court rejected this argument.

The Court's analysis involved an interpretation of Section 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act, the federal regulatory scheme upon which Nevada's Securities Act and control person statute is based. The federal statute contains the identical "to the same extent" language that Mr. Rodriguez relies upon in his Opposition:

"Every person who, directly or indirectly, controls any person liable under any provision of this chapter or of any rule or regulation thereunder shall also be liable jointly and severally with and to the same extent as such controlled person to any person to whom such controlled person is liable..."

15 U.S.C. § 78t(a). (Emphasis added)."

"to the same extent as" Conseco is held liable. Since Conseco was discharged in bankruptcy from any potential liability under the Exchange Act, defendants argue, plaintiffs cannot state a claim against them under section 20(a)."

"Plaintiffs counter by citing <u>Kemmerer v. Weaver</u>, 445 F.2d 76 (7th Cir. 1971). In <u>Kemmerer</u>, the alleged primary violator, an agricultural cooperative association, was dissolved by the defendants. Defendants there, like the defendants here, argued they could be held liable under section 20(a) only to the same extent as the alleged primary violator; *i.e.*, not at all. The court disposed of the defendants' argument as follows:

"The premise of this argument is that there is a finding of "no liability" with respect to the [alleged primary violator]. No such finding exists, it appearing instead that the [alleged primary violator] was dismissed from the suit for lack of jurisdiction due to a failure to obtain service of process. It further appears that the reason for the failure to obtain process was that the [alleged primary violator] had been dissolved on the initiative of many of the individual defendants in the present suit.

On such facts it is evident that [§ 20(a)] is of no avail to defendants."

Id. at 78. "(Emphasis added).

"Conseco has not been found "not liable" for securities fraud.

It would be inconsistent with the broad remedial purposes of the securities laws to permit senior executives of a bankrupt corporation — whose actions allegedly contributed to the bankruptcy — to avoid liability by relying on the same corporation's bankruptcy.

Schleicher v. Wendt, 529 F. Supp. 2d 959, 980-981 (S.D. Ind. 2007). (Emphasis added.)

Similarly, in <u>Underhill v. Royal</u>, 769 F. 2d 1426 (9th Cir. 1985) a company that sold unregistered securities filed for bankruptcy, but the control person were still held liable. There, Mr. Royal a control person for a corporation that filed for bankruptcy sought to escape control person liability:

"When the recession hit hard in 1981, NMESC's cash flow suffered because many of the notes in its portfolio went into default. NMESC filed for Chapter 11 reorganization."

Underhill at 1429

"Carlos Royal, the principal shareholder of both companies, was a defendant in this separate trial in order to determine his derivative liability on a control person theory."

Underhill at 1431.

"Royal contends that the personal release in the amended plan of reorganization effectively bars the action against him for securities law violations."

Underhill at 1431

"Generally, discharge of the principal debtor in bankruptcy will not discharge the liabilities of co-debtors or guarantors. 11 U.S.C. Sec. 524(e) provides: "Except as provided in subsection (a)(3) of this section, discharge of a debt of the debtor does not affect the liability of any other entity on, or the property of any other entity for, such debt." This section of the 1978 Bankruptcy Reform Act was a reenactment of Section 16 of the 1898 Act which provided that "[t]he liability of a person who is a co-debtor with, or guarantor or in any manner a surety for, a bankrupt shall not be altered by the discharge of such bankrupt." Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, Sec. 16, 30 Stat. 550 (formerly codified at 11 U.S.C. Sec. 34 (1976))."

"In addition, the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, as amended, provided that a corporation's discharge in bankruptcy "shall not release its officers, the members of its board of directors or trustees or of other similar controlling bodies, or its stockholders or members, as such, from any liability under the laws of a State or of the United States." Act of June 22, 1938, ch. 575, Sec. 4(b), 52 Stat. 845 (formerly codified at 11 U.S.C. Sec. 22(b) (1976)). Thus, under the old Act, stockholders or directors could remain liable for substantive violations despite discharge of the corporate entity. 1A J. Moore Collier on Bankruptcy p 16.14, at 1551 (14th ed. 1978)."

<u>Underhill</u> at 1432

Like the corporations in <u>Schleicher</u> and <u>Underhill</u>, VCC was put into bankruptcy by its control persons. Permitting them to escape liability for this self-serving act would be contrary to established law, and produce an inequitable result. In addition, the issues before the court are more compelling than those in <u>Schleicher</u>; Here, the court made a specific finding that VCC sold unregistered securities. See Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law filed May 8, 2020, attached as Exhibit "B". Based on that finding, the court found control person liability.

The Court was able to make the finding because Plaintiffs had petitioned the Bankruptcy court for permission to advance their control person claims. Judge Barbero granted the request. See Exhibit "C", attached. Defendants were thus aware that the claims were being prosecuted solely for the purpose of establishing facts upon which control person liability could be based.

Further, as acknowledged by Defendant, the bankruptcy court's final order did not release claims against anyone other than VCC; so, neither Mr. Rodriguez nor Mr. Robinson were afforded relief by the VCC bankruptcy.

As in <u>Schleicher</u>, VCC wasn't found "not liable"; the District Court received evidence on the issue, and for purposes of control person liability only, made a finding that VCC sold unregistered securities. Based on that finding, control person liability was established.

B. Mr. Rodriguez' New "Tender" Defense is Untimely and Inapplicable

¹ This was done prior to the time the cases were consolidated.

Defendant seeks to rewrite NRS §90.660 by claiming that Plaintiffs may only recover damages from the primary violator. This is a misreading of the statute which provides:

'A person who offers or sells a security in violation of (b) NRS 90.460;

is liable to the person purchasing the security.

Upon tender of the security, the purchaser may recover the consideration paid for the security and interest at the legal rate of this State from the date of payment, costs and reasonable attorney's fees, less the amount of income received on the security.

A purchaser who no longer owns the security may recover damages.

Damages are the amount that would be recoverable upon a tender less the value of the security when the purchaser disposed of it, plus interest at the legal rate of this State from the date of disposition of the security, costs and reasonable attorney's fees determined by the court. Tender requires only notice of willingness to exchange the security for the amount specified.'

NRS §90.660

This statute is also the source for control person liability, which under paragraph 4 provides:

"A person who directly or indirectly controls another person who is liable under subsection 1 or 3, a partner, officer or director of the person liable... are also liable jointly and severally with and to the same extent as the other person..."

Nothing in NRS §90.660 limits the recovery of damages, or puts a tender

requirement solely against the primary violator. To do so would render the joint and several control person liability provisions meaningless. Defendant cites no cases in support, save the Merriam Webster dictionary in an unpersuasive effort to argue his point.

As part of the discharge, VCC issued preferred securities to Plaintiffs in exchange for their promissory notes. The plan provided a conversion formula, and the shares issued are directly traceable to the promissory notes, and the funds Plaintiffs had on deposit in their IRAs to make the purchases. Plaintiffs still hold the conversion shares, which are illiquid, haven't paid distributions, and have no trading market. Plaintiffs have no rights to demand distributions, and have no effective rights to direct management to either make distributions or liquidate the company. As a closely held private company, VCC isn't obligated to report its earnings, leaving potential buyers of Plaintiffs' illiquid, restricted shares without any means to gauge the value of the shares. For all intents and purposes the shares have no value.

Nevertheless, at such time that Mr. Rodriquez pays the judgment, or a portion, he may choose to deposit the funds with the court or escrow, and ask for a hearing to determine the value of the shares. The Court, should it be so inclined, can hear from experts from both sides as to the value of the VCC shares.

Plaintiffs have maintained since trial that they are prepared to tender their preferred shares in exchange for payment of damages under NRS §90.660, and remain willing to do so today.

C. The Statute of Limitations Defense is Inapplicable

While Defendant raised the statute of limitations affirmative defense in his original answer to the Hotchkiss complaint (but not against any of the other Plaintiffs), it is a fact that he abandoned the defense, and did nothing to advance, argue or even attempt to prove it at trial. As a result, he failed to meet his burden of proof.

After a cursory assertion as an affirmative defense his answer, Defendant never brought up the statutes of limitations again; He failed to file a motion to dismiss, motion for summary judgment, or a motion in limine on the issue; he conducted no discovery on the subject, he failed to argue them in a pretrial or post trial brief; he failed to mention them in his opening statement or closing argument, and he failed to ask Plaintiff a single question in support of them. Not a single piece of evidence was introduced (or even offered) at trial in support of the defense.

Now, three years later, after a change of counsel, and after the record has been closed, Defendant wants to finally argue the point, and have the court throw out its decision. This is inappropriate. Had Defendant raised the issue, or even questioned Plaintiffs on it, Plaintiffs would have opposed it by pointing to evidence in the record, whereby Defendant claimed in a PowerPoint slide that the securities were being sold in compliance with the securities laws (Trial Exhibit 4, page 60). See Exhibit "D", or where Mr. Robinson and Mr. Rodriguez stalled Plaintiffs, by promising compensation (Trial Exhibit 3, pages 49 and 54). See Exhibit "E". Both of these pieces of evidence effectively mislead the Plaintiffs, and delayed their discovery of the violations.

Since the averments of an affirmative defense are taken as denied or avoided, each element of the defense must be affirmatively proved. The burden of proof clearly rests

with the defendant. Res. Grp., LLC v. Nev. Ass'n Servs., Inc., 437 P.3d 154 (Nev. 2019). The date on which a statute of limitations accrues is normally a question of fact, and the district court may determine that date as a matter of law only when the uncontroverted evidence irrefutably demonstrates the accrual date. Winn v. Sunrise Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 128 Nev. Adv. Op. 23, 277 P.3d at 458, 462-63 (2012). Noncompliance with a statute of limitations is a non-jurisdictional, affirmative defense, see, e.g., Dozier v. State, 124 Nev. 125, 129 (2008), and the party asserting an affirmative defense bears the burden of proof. See Nev. Ass'n Servs., Inc. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 130 Nev. Adv. Op. 94, 338 P.3d 1250, 1254 (2014).

The appropriate accrual date for the statute of limitations is a question of law only if the facts are uncontroverted. <u>Day v. Zubel</u>, 112 Nev. 972, 977, 922 P.2d 536, 539 (1996); see also <u>Bemis v. Estate of Bemis</u>, 114 Nev. 1021 1025, 967 P.2d 437, 440 (1998) ("Dismissal on statute of limitations grounds is only appropriate 'when uncontroverted evidence irrefutably demonstrates plaintiff discovered or should have discovered' the facts giving rise to the cause of action." (quoting <u>Nevada Power Co. v. Monsanto Co.</u>, 955 F.2d 1304, 1307 (9th Cir.1992).

Here, all of the Plaintiffs purchased within the five year window provided for under the statute. Plaintiffs submitted evidence showing

- 1. that VCC mispresented that the securities were being offered in compliance with the securities laws, and
- 2. a July, 2017 communication from Mr. Rodriguez that a subsequent securities offering would get Plaintiffs repaid (Trial Ex. 3, page 54) See Exhibit "E".

This evidence - which is in the record- shows that Defendants took steps to

prevent and delay Plaintiffs from discovering they had a claim for the sale of unregistered securities from the outset.

Further, Defendant is wrong when he states that Plaintiffs knew as early as February, 2015 that they had a claim, because they submitted demand letters to VCC. In fact, the demand letters were submitted years afterwards (See Trial Exhibit 1, pages 4, 8, 12, 19, 23 and 40).

Viewing all of this evidence in a light most favorable to the Plaintiffs, it is clear that the issue of when the statute began to run <u>is controverted</u>. Because Defendant offered nothing in support of his defense, the court need not disturb its findings.

Lastly, with respect to Judge Pro's decision in *Baroi*, had the legislature intended a hard and fast two year statute of limitation rule to apply to all unregistered securities claims, it would have written that into the statute. Instead, it provides for a five year statute of repose, to allow the parties to present evidence on the date of discovery, tolling, and other relevant matters for the court to weigh in making its decision.

But the court need not even go that far; by failing to put forth any arguments or offer any evidence on the statute of limitations defense, Defendant abandoned his affirmative defense, and failed to meet his burden of proof.

CONCLUSION

Mr. Rodriguez' arguments are novel, but unpersuasive. VCC was not found "not liable" for purposes of the securities laws. As the Court noted previously, VCC made a tactical move to file for bankruptcy, after Judge Williams affirmatively found in a prior case that VCC sold unregistered securities. Rodriguez and Robinson

directed this filing, and were the beneficiaries of it. Defendant's attempt to avoid liability is transparent. As to the statute of limitations defense, prior counsel abandoned it, and literally did nothing to advance it, thereby failing to meet his burden of proof. It is too late, now, almost a year later, to reopen evidence, and force Plaintiffs to fly to Las Vegas from around the country to address arguments that should have been made at trial. For these reasons, as well as those arguments made in the three Oppositions filed in response to Defendant's post trial motions, the Plaintiffs ask that the Court affirm the judgment.

Dated: December 22, 2020

Respectfully submitted,

The Law Office of David Liebrader, Inc.

By:/s/ David Liebrader David Liebrader Attorney for Plaintiffs

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2	CERTIFICATE OF MAILING	
3	I hereby certify that on the 22 day of December 2020, I mailed a copy of the foregoing	
4	Reply Brief	
5	to the following	
6		
7	Harold Gewerter, Esq. Gewerter Law Firm	
8	1212 Casino Center Boulevard Las Vegas, NV 89104	
9	Scott Fleming, Esq.	
10	Fleming Law 9525 Hillwood Dr. Ste. 140	
11	Las Vegas, NV 89134	
12	/s/: Dianne Bresnahan	
13	An Employee of The Law Office of David Liebrader	
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EXHIBIT "A"



Securities: 9% Notes

Maximum Offering: \$1,000,000 Minimum Offering: \$20,000

TERMS OF SECURITIES:

Return:

9% annually with interest paid monthly. (Escrow Agent: Provident Trust Group) Notes have a term of 18 months, with a 6 month extension option. Note pays

Secured:

Robinson has a net worth of \$17,698,000. Financial Statement is available for Notes are secured by a Promissory Note .The Guarantor of the note is Mr. R.J. Robinson, chairman & CEO of Virtual Communications Corporation. Mr. inspection in the offices of Retire Happy.

Termination Date:

June 15, 2014, unless extended by the Company's board of directors.

Plaintiffs' Production 000075

EXHIBIT "B"

Electronically Filed 5/8/2020 9:20 AM Steven D. Grierson **FFCO** CLERK OF THE COURT DAVID LIEBRADER, ESQ. 1 STATE BAR NO. 5048 THE LAW OFFICES OF DAVID LIEBRADER, APC 2 3960 HOWARD HUGHES PARKWAY STE 500 LAS VEGAS, NV 89169 3 PH: (702) 380-3131 Attorney for Plaintiff 4 DISTRICT COURT 5 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 6 IN THE MATTER BETWEEN Case No. A-17-762264-C 7 Steven A. Hotchkiss, Dept.: 6 8 PLAINTIFF, 9 CONSOLIDATED WITH ٧. 10 Case No. A-17-763003-C Ronald J. Robinson, Vernon Rodriguez, Frank 11 Yoder, Alisa Davis and DOES 1-10 and ROES 1-10, inclusively 12 FINDINGS OF FACT, **DEFENDANTS** CONLCUSIONS OF LAW AND 13 ORDER ON DEFENDANTS LIABILITY Anthony White, Robin Suntheimer, Troy 14 Suntheimer, Stephens Ghesquiere, Jackie Stone, Gayle Chany, Kendall Smith, Gabriele 15 Lavermicocca and Robert Kaiser 16 **PLAINTIFFS** 17 ٧. 18 Ronald J. Robinson, Vernon Rodriguez, Virtual Communications Corporation, Frank Yoder, Alisa 19 Davis and DOES 1-10 and ROES 1-10, inclusively 20 **DEFENDANTS** 21 FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER 22 This matter was submitted for a bench trial before the Hon. Cristina Silva on 23 February 25-25,2020. Testifying were Plaintiff Steve Hotchkiss and Defendants

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Ronald Robinson and Vern Rodriguez. In addition, the court heard testimony from Alisa Davis and Frank Yoder, named Defendants who were dismissed at the conclusion of Plaintiffs' case in chief. Prior to trial there was briefing on the issues of whether the notes were securities and whether Plaintiffs had standing to bring their claim. Furthermore, after trial the court received post trial briefs from the parties.

FINDINGS OF FACT; CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

After considering the testimony of the parties and witnesses, the exhibits offered and received into evidence, the parties' briefs, the arguments of counsel, and the rulings issued by this court on previously submitted matters, the Court makes the following findings:

That Plaintiffs invested in Virtual Communications Corporation's 9% Promissory Notes which were personally guaranteed by Ronald Robinson.

That VCC stopped making payments in February, 2015 and the company and Ronald Robinson were notified of the default, with a demand to bring all amounts due current, and to repay the principal.

That VCC filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection, and all proceedings against VCC were stayed. The case proceeded against the other, nonbankrupt defendants.

As to the legal issues, the Court makes the following findings:

1. VCC sold unregistered nonexempt securities.

Applying the test set forth in <u>State v. Friend</u>, 118 Nev. 115 (2002) the Court finds that the Promissory Notes offered by VCC and sold to the Plaintiffs meet the definition of a security under NRS §90.295. Further, none of the Defendants either claimed or

attempted to prove that any exemption from registration applied to the offering or any of the individual transactions. As a result, the court finds that VCC sold unregistered nonexempt securities to the Plaintiff in violation of NRS §90.460.

2. Ronald Robinson and Vernon Rodriguez are liable as Control Persons.

Nevada Administrative Code (NAC) section 90.035 defines a "control person" as an individual who (1) owns or controls 10 percent or more of the voting stock of a corporation; (2) is an officer or director of a corporation; or (3) is in a position to influence the decision-making processes of a corporation.

The evidence at trial proved by more than a preponderance of the evidence that Mr. Robinson and Mr. Rodriguez were VCC's officers, and that they were in a position to, and did in fact, influence the unregistered Promissory Note offering.

Mr. Robinson was VCC's President, Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and the Chairman of the Board. Mr. Rodriguez was the CFO, and was designated as the point of contact for investors who had questions about the Promissory Note offering. Both men were fully involved in the finances of the company, and both were aware of the Power Point presentations that were prepared by VCC to show to prospective investors.

Based upon this evidence, Plaintiffs met their burden of establishing that Mr. Robinson and Mr. Rodriguez were statutory control persons within the definition of NAC 90.035.

3. Mr. Robinson is liable as a guarantor

The evidence introduced at trial proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the Note bears the signature of Defendant Ronald Robinson, as guarantor. Mr.

Robinson claimed that his signature was used without his permission, and that he did not intend to guarantee repayment.

The Court found Defendant Robinson's position unpersuasive. No less than six separate documents introduced at trial evidenced Mr. Robinson's intent to guarantee the Note.

The Court also finds that the VCC Bankruptcy did not extinguish Mr.

Robinson's personal guarantee. The Court asked for and received post trial briefs on this issue, and relying on the reasoning set forth in <u>Donnell v. Perpetual Investments</u>, <u>Inc.</u> (USDC Nevada, case 2:04-cv-01172, Decision issued 10/11/06) and <u>Marc Nelson Oil Prods. v. Grim Logging Co.</u>, 110P. 3d 120 (Or. App. 2005) finds that the VCC bankruptcy did not extinguish Mr. Robinson's liability as guaranter of the Notes.

As Chairman of the Board, Robinson directed VCC to file for Chapter 11 bankruptcy with full knowledge that such a filing would preserve his equity position in the company, while simultaneously hoping the filing would extinguish his \$4 million personal liability under the Notes. As a result, the Court finds such conduct serves as a defacto consent to the modification, which also did not increase Mr. Robinson's risk under the Note terms.

As a result of the sale of unregistered securities under NRS §90.460, the Court finds control persons Robinson and Rodriguez liable for the sale of unregistered securities, and finds that Plaintiffs are entitled to damages under NRS §90.660.

The Court further finds that VCC was in breach of contract, and that as guarantor Ronald Robinson is liable to the Plaintiffs for damages under the Note terms.

Upon the submission of briefs detailing their statutory and contract damages the Court will issue judgment in favor of Plaintiffs.

IT IS SO ORDERED:

_th day of May, 2020

Mon. Cristina Silva District Court Judge

MUL

Submitted by:

/s/ David Liebrader David Liebrader, Esq. Attorney for Plaintiff

EXHIBIT "C"

1 2 Honorable Laurel E. Babero 3 United States Bankruptcy Judge 4 **Entered on Docket** July 17, 2018 5 DAVID LIEBRADER, ESQ. SBN 5048 THE LAW OFFICE OF DAVID LIEBRADER 6 601 S. RANCHO DR. STE. D-29 LAS VEGAS, NV 89106 7 Ph: (702) 380-3131 DaveL@investmentloss.com 8 Attorney for Plaintiff 9 UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT 10 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 11 12 IN RE: In Re: Case No 18-12951-leb 13 Virtual Communications Corporation, Chapter 11 14 Debtor, 15 **ORDER GRANTING MOTION** 16 FOR RELIEF FROM STAY 17 Date of Hearing: July 10, 2018 Time of Hearing: 9:30 a.m. 18 Place: Courtroom No. 3, Third Floor Foley Federal Building300 19 Las Vegas Blvd., S. Las Vegas, NV 20 89101 21 Judge: Honorable Laurel E. Babero 22 ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM STAY 23 This matter having come on before the Court for hearing on July 10, 2018 at 9:30 a.m., 24 David Liebrader appearing for moving party Anthony White, and the court having considered 25 26

the motion for relief from stay and noting no opposition having been filed rules as follows:

That the automatic stay in place concerning Virtual Communications Corporation does not apply to preclude Anthony White from pursuing the claims he has asserted against individual defendants Ronald Robinson, Alisa Davis and Vern Rodriguez in Dept. 24 of the Clark County District Court (White v. VCC et al., case A-17-763003-C) (the "State Court Action"), which is set for trial on May 20, 2019.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Anthony White may proceed in his underlying lawsuit against individual defendants Ronald Robinson, Alisa Davis and Vern Rodriguez, while all further proceedings in the State Court Action as against Virtual Communications Corporation and its wholly-owned subsidiary WinTech, LLC remain subject to the automatic stay.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any order or judgment entered in the State Court Action as to individual defendants Ronald Robinson, Alisa Davis and Vern Rodriguez shall not be binding upon Virtual Communications Corporation or otherwise effective against any property of Virtual Communications Corporation's bankruptcy estate.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Prepared and Submitted By:

David Liebrader

By: /s/ David Liebrader
The Law Office of David Liebrader
601 S. Rancho Dr. Ste. D-29
Las Vegas, NV 89106
DaveL@investmentloss.com

	Case 18-12951-abl Doc 57 Entered 07/17/18 08:43:43 Page 3 of 3			
1	Attorney for Moving Party			
2	Bart Larsen, Esq.			
3	By:/s/ Bart Larsen Kolesar & Leatham			
4	400 S Rampart Blvd #400 Las Vegas, NV 89145			
5	<u>blarsen@klnevada.com</u> Attorney for Debtor			
6				
7	LOCAL RULE 9021 CERTIFICATION			
8	In accordance with LR 9021, counsel submitting this document certifies that the order accurately reflects the court's ruling and that (check one):			
9	The court has waived the requirement set forth in LR 9021(b)(1).			
10	No party appeared at the hearing or filed an objection to the motion.			
11	X I have delivered a copy of this proposed order to all counsel who appeared at the hearing, and each has approved or disapproved the order, or failed to respond, as indicated below [list each party and whether the party has approved, disapproved, or failed to respond to the document]:			
12				
13				
14	Attorneys for Creditor and Debtor jointly drafted the Order, which was approved for submission to the Court.			
15	I certify that this is a case under Chapter 7 or 13, that I have served a copy of this order with the motion pursuant to LR 9014(g), and that no party has objected to the form or content of the order			
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EXHIBIT "D"

Frank Yoder

From:

Frank Yoder

Sent: To: Monday, December 17, 2012 1:03 PM

10;

Ron Robinson

Cc: Subject:

Vernon Rodriguez RE: revised note

Ron, Is this ok?

Return:

Notes have a term of 18 months, with a 6 month extension option. Note pays 9% annual interest paid monthly. (Escrow Agent: Provident Trust Group)

Offering Summary

Securities: 9% Notes

Minimum Offering: \$20,000 Maximum Offering: \$1,000,000

TERMS OF SECURITIES:

Return:

Notes have a term of 18 months, with a 5 month extension option. Note pays 9% annual interest paid monthly, (Europi Agent: Provident Trust Group)

Secured:

Notes are secured by a Promissory Note. The Guaranter of the cote is Mr. R.J., Robinson, chairman & CEO of Virtual Communications Corporation. Mr. Robinson has a net worth of \$17,698,000. Finantial Statement is available for inspection in the offices of Rebre Happy.

Termination Date:

lune 15, 2013, unless extended by the Company's boat dof directors. Offering is conducted pursuant to Rule 506 of Regulation D under the Securities Act of 1933 (as amended);

Frank Yoder Wintech, LLC 311 East Warm Springs Road, Suite #100 Las Vogas, NV 88119 phone: (702) 284-7311

email: Frank. Yoder@WinTechLLC.com Web: www.ALICEreceptionist.com

From: Robin1031@aol.com [mailto:Robin1031@aol.com]

Sent: Monday, December 17, 2012 11:36 AM

To: Frank Yoder

Subject: Re: revised note

1

Plaintiffs' Production 000078

EXHIBIT "E"

8/24/2017

Gmail - Investment



Steve Hotchkiss <stevehotchkiss52@gmail.com>

Investment

2 messages

Vernon Rodriguez <vern.rodriguez@alicereceptionist.com> To: Steve Hotchkiss <stevehotchkiss52@gmail.com>

Wed, Jul 26, 2017 at 4:25 PM

Mr. Hotchkiss:

Please go to virtualcommunicationscorp.com to receive the latest correspondence regarding the company's effort to raise capital in order to address your investment payback. We are still in the process with this capital raise through the New York Investment Banking firm. We are hopeful that within the next 30 days that we will be successful. In the meantime we will post any news on the web site. Sorry you could not reach Mr. Robinson. We are still committed to take care of our note holders as soon as we can.

Vernon Rodriguez

ALICE Receptionist

Direct: (702) 284-7310

Twitter: @alicereception

Online: www.ALICEreceptionist.com

ALICE Receptionist explained in 67 seconds:



Steve Hotchkiss <stevehotchkiss52@gmail.com>
To: Vernon Rodriguez <vern.rodriguez@alicereceptionist.com>

Wed, Jul 26, 2017 at 6:56 PM

Thank you for your reply (Quoted text hidden)

https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0/7u/=2&lk=14d5869be58.jsver=NO90xUauj60.en.&vev=pl&search=inbox8th=15d815481183d8d6&siml=15d80ca14d25b639&slm(... 1/1

Plaintiff's ECC Production 000010

Plaintiffs' Production 000050

8/24/2017

Great - Fw. YOUR VCC INVESTMENT Update

Gmail Gmail	Stave Hotchkiss <stave hotchkiss52@gmail.com=""></stave>
Fw: YOUR VCC INVESTMENT Update 6 messages	
Stave Hotchidas <shotchidas@kc.m.com> To: StaveHotchidas 52@gmail.com</shotchidas@kc.m.com>	man manaka mendalah dan dan dan mendapat bapada di dibagai bagai bengangan pada dan persamban dan melampakan b
From: Ronald Robinson Sent: Tuesday, January 10, 2017 5:17 PM To: Steet Indichliss Subject: Re: YOUR VCC INVESTMENT Update	
Yes, we are working on all the details right as I write, please be patient we will get those shares to you just as ou	ickly 85 possible (hank you Ronald Robinson
On Jan 10, 2017, at 10:57 AAt. Steve Hotzhkiss «shotzhkiss@kc.rc.com» wrote:	
Was wondering if you have an update on when this transfer will take place?	
From: Robin 1031@sol.com Sent: Monday, December 05, 2018 3:45 PM To: shotchidas@sc.n.com Cc: san@crovichack.com Subject: Ro: Fw: YOUR VCC INVESTMENT Update	
We wish to thanks you for your acceptance of our proposal. We shall keep you informed as we progress in	completing our agreement. From Robinson
In a message dated 12/5/2018 12:09:00 P.M. Pacific Standard Time, sholchkins@kc.m.com vrites:	
My name is Steve Hotchkiss, from Leaverworth Kansas and I just had a phone converse hereby authorize VCC to make that conversion with the Notes they have for my Provider SteveHotchkise52@gmeil.com	ation with Mr Ron Robinson regarding the VCC offer to exchange at Trust account number 130800142. Please notify when this ex
From: Vernon Rodriguez Sent: Friday, November 04, 2016 2:51 PM To: Sieve Hotchidse Subject: RE: YOUR VCC RIVESTMENT Update	
"Please look over the ettached .pdf teller regarding your Exchange Option. When you have had a morner	nt to go through the document, please give Ron Robinson a call to discuss (
	-
ALICE Receptioniss	
Direct: (702) 731-4111	
Twinter: @allcerecaption	
Online: www.ALICEreseptiontsT.com	
AUCE Reception is respiration of in 67 seconds:	
http://Lsignauxdeux.com/link?ud=http://www.alicereceptionist.com/media/&ukey=agxtfnNpZ2:	ShbHN cnhyGAsSC1VzZXIQcm9nmWxlGICAgt-d9aQIDA&k=42cb34838623
From: Steve Hotchidas [meillo:shotchidas@ko.m.com] Sent: Friday, November 04, 2016 11:37 AM To: Vernon Rodriguez Subject: Re: YOUR VCC DINESTMENT Update	
Please forward a copy of your (ega) proposal	
Prom: Virtual Communications Corp	
Sents Monday, October 17, 2016 3:03 PM	

https://mail.g.oogle.com/mail/ur07/ui=28ik=14d5869be58jsver=NQ90bJ.auj60.en.8view=pt8.search=starred8th=15d2f30f8c1d3e028.siml=15a95a3b8cf26a98.siml... 1/5

Plaintiff's ECC Production 000005

Subject: YOUR VCC INVESTMENT Update

To: sholchkiss@kc.m.com

Plaintiffs' Production 000045

Electronically Filed 3/16/2021 4:15 PM Steven D. Grierson **CLERK OF THE COURT** 1 **MOT** MICHAEL F. BOHN, ESQ. 2 Nevada Bar No.: 1641 mbohn@bohnlawfirm.com 3 ADAM Ř. TRIPPIEDI, ESO. Nevada Bar No.: 12294 4 atrippiedi@bohnlawfirm.com LAW OFFICES OF 5 MICHAEL F. BOHN, ESO., LTD. 2260 Corporate Circle, Suite 480 6 Henderson, Nevada 89074 (702) 642-3113/ (702) 642-9766 FAX Attorney for defendant Ronald J. Robinson 8 DISTRICT COURT 9 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 10 STEVEN A. HOTCHKISS, 11 CASE NO.: A-17-762264-C Plaintiff, DEPT NO.: XXIII 12 VS. 13 RONALD J. ROBINSON; VERNON RODRIGUEZ; 14 VIRTUAL COMMUNICATIONS CORPORATION; WINTECH, LLC; RETIRE HAPPY, LLC; JOSH STOLL; FRANK YODER; ALISA DAVIS; and 15 DOES 1-10; and ROES 1-10, inclusively, 16 Defendants. 17 ANTHONY WHITE; ROBIN SUNTHEIMER; TROY CONSOLIDATED WITH 18 SUNTHEIMER; STEPHENS GHESQUIERE; 19 JACKIE STONÉ; GAYLE CHANY; ŘENDÁLL CASE NO.: A-17-763003-C SMITH; GABRIÉLE LAVERNICOCCA; and ROBERT KAISER, 20 **MOTION FOR RULE 54(b) DETERMINATION** Plaintiffs, 21 RONALD J. ROBINSON; VERNON RODRIGUEZ; 22 **HEARING REQUESTED** VIRTUAL COMMUNICATIONS CORPORATION; WINTECH, LLC; RETIRE HAPPY, LLC; JOSH STOLL; FRANK YODER; ALISA DAVIS; and 23 24 DOES 1-10; and ROES 1-10, inclusively, Defendants. 25 26 27 28 1

1 Defendant Ronald J. Robinson (hereinafter "Robinson"), by and through his attorney, the Law Offices of Michael F. Bohn, Esq., Ltd., hereby moves this court for a determination that there is no just reason for delay and a Rule 54(b) certification for the findings of fact, conclusions of law and 3 order on motion for damages and attorney's fees, filed on August 20, 2020. This motion is based 4 5 on the points and authorities contained herein DATED this 16th day of March, 2021. 6 7 LAW OFFICES OF MICHAEL F. BOHN, ESQ., LTD. 8 9 By: /s/ Michael F. Bohn, Esq. / Michael F. Bohn, Esq. 10 Adam R. Trippiedi, Esq. 2260 Corporate Circle, Ste. 480 11 Henderson, NV 89074 Attorneys for defendant Ronald J. Robinson 12 13 **FACTS** 14 On September 28, 2017, plaintiff Steven A. Hotchkiss filed a complaint for damages in Case No. A-17-762264-C that included Retire Happy, LLC and Josh Stoll as defendants. On February 5, 2018, defendants Retire Happy, LLC and Josh Stoll filed an answer, affirmative 16 defenses and cross claim. The cross claim requested contribution and indemnity from Virtual Communications Corporation (hereinafter "VCC") and Robinson in the event that Retire Happy, LLC 18 and Josh Stoll were found to be liable to plaintiff, or any other party for damages. 19 20 On February 20, 2019, this court entered an order granting defendants Retire Happy, LLC and 21 Josh Stoll's unopposed good faith settlement pursuant to NRS 17.245 and dismissing all claims against said defendants with prejudice in Case No. A-17-762264-C. This order did not mention the cross claim filed by Retire Happy, LLC and Josh Stoll against VCC and Robinson. 23 24

On October 12, 2017, plaintiffs Anthony White, et al, filed a first amended complaint in Case No. A-17-763003-C that included Retire Happy, LLC, Julie Minuskin, and Josh Stoll as defendants. This case was assigned to Dept. 24.

On April 23, 2019, the court entered an order granting defendants Retire Happy, LLC, Julie

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Minuskin, and Josh Stoll's unopposed motion for determination of good faith settlement pursuant to NRS 17.245 and dismissing all claims against said defendants with prejudice in Case No. A-17-763003-C.

On July 1, 2019, a stipulation and order consolidating cases, which consolidated Case No. A-17-763003-C pending in Dept. 24 with Case No. A-17-763003-C.

A bench trial was held in Dept. 9 for the consolidated cases on February 24, 2020 and February 25, 2020.

Retire Happy, LLC and Josh Stoll did not appear at or participate in the trial.

On August 20, 2020, the court entered findings of fact, conclusions of law and order in favor of plaintiffs against Robinson and Vernon Rodriguez (hereinafter "Rodriguez"). The findings of fact, conclusions of law and order do not mention the cross claim filed by Retire Happy, LLC and Josh Stoll against Robinson.

On August 20, 2020, this court entered judgment in favor of plaintiffs against Robinson and Rodriguez.

A duplicate judgment in favor of plaintiffs against Robinson and Rodriguez was also filed on August 21, 2020.

On August 21, 2020, plaintiffs filed and served notice of entry of the findings of fact, conclusions of law and order entered on August 20, 2020.

On August 21, 2020, plaintiffs also filed and served notice of entry of the judgment entered on August 21, 2020.

On September 16, 2020, Rodriguez filed a motion to amend judgment pursuant to NRCP 52(b) or for further action after a nonjury trial pursuant to NRCP 59(b).

On September 16, 2020, Rodriguez also filed a motion for a new trial pursuant to NRCP 59(a). These motions are currently scheduled for decision on April 20, 2021.

On September 21, 2020, Robinson filed a notice of appeal from the judgment entered on August 21, 2020, and Case No. 81838 was assigned to this appeal.

On March 8, 2021, the Nevada Supreme Court issued an order to show cause and file amended docketing statement in Case No. 81838 because the docketing statement filed by Robinson's prior counsel

stated that the challenged order was certified as final under NRCP 54(b), but "no such certification appears on the challenged order and appellant has not provided this court with a copy of any certification."

The order to show cause also stated that the judgment entered on August 21, 2020 may be "duplicative of the August 20, 2020, findings of fact and conclusions of law, and thus not substantively appealable."

POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

NRCP 54(b) provides in part:

(b) Judgment Involving Multiple Parties. When multiple parties are involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the parties only upon an express determination that there is no just reason for delay and upon an express direction for the entry of judgment. In the absence of such determination and direction, any order or other form of decision, however designated, which adjudicates the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the parties, and the order or other form of decision is subject to revision at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the rights and liabilities of all the parties.

Because plaintiffs' claims against Retire Happy, LLC and Josh Stoll have been dismissed with prejudice, and because Retire Happy, LLC and Josh Stoll did not appear at trial to pursue their cross claim against Robinson, Robinson respectfully requests that this court make a determination pursuant to NRCP 54(b) that there is no just reason for delay and certify the findings of fact, conclusions of law and order entered on August 20, 2020 as final.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Robinson respectfully requests that the court certify the findings of fact, conclusions of law and order entered on August 20, 2020 as final under NRCP 54(b).

DATED this 16th day of March, 2021

LAW OFFICES OF MICHAEL F. BOHN, ESQ., LTD.

By: / s / Michael F. Bohn, Esq. /
Michael F. Bohn, Esq.
Adam R. Trippiedi, Esq.
2260 Corporate Circle, Ste. 480
Henderson, Nevada 89074
Attorneys for defendant Ronald J. Robinson

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Pursuant to NRCP 5, NEFCR 9 and EDCR 8.05, I hereby certify that I am an employee of Law Offices of Michael F. Bohn., Esq., and on the 16th day of March, 2021 an electronic copy of the MOTION FOR RULE 54(b) DETERMINATION was served on opposing counsel via the Court's electronic service system to the following counsel of record:

David Liebrader, Esq.


Scott D. Fleming, Esq.

David Liebrader, Esq. The Law Offices of David Liebrader, APC 601 S. Rancho Dr., Ste. D-29 Las Vegas, NV 89106 Attorney for plaintiffs

Scott D. Fleming, Esq. FLEMING LAW FIRM, PLLC 9525 Hillwood Drive, Suite 140 Las Vegas, Nevada 89134 Attorneys for Defendant Vernon Rodriguez

/s//Maurice Mazza /
An Employee of the LAW OFFICES OF MICHAEL F. BOHN, ESQ., LTD.

ELECTRONICALLY SERVED 6/15/2021 4:55 PM



1 2 3	ORDG MICHAEL F. BOHN, ESQ. Nevada Bar No.: 1641 mbohn@bohnlawfirm.com LAW OFFICES OF MICHAEL F. BOHN, ESQ., LTD.			
5	2260 Corporate Circle, Suite 480 Henderson, NV 89074			
6	702) 642-3113/ (702) 642-9766 FAX			
7	Attorney for defendant Ronald J. Robinson			
8	DISTRIC1	.		
9	CLARK COUN	TY, NEVADA		
10	STEVEN A. HOTCHKISS,	CASE NO.: A-17-762264-C DEPT NO.: 23		
11	Plaintiff,	DELLINO 23		
12	vs.	Consolidated with:		
13	RONALD J. ROBINSON; VERNON RODRIGUEZ; VIRTUAL	CASE NO. A-17-763003-C		
14	COMMUNICATIONS CORPORATION; WINTECH LLC: RETIRE HAPPY, LLC; JOSH	ORDER GRANTING MOTION		
15	STOLL; FRANK YODER; ALISA DAVIS; and DOES 1-10; and ROES 1-10, inclusively,	FOR RULE 54(b) DETERMINATION		
16	Defendants.			
17				
18	ANTHONY WHITE; ROBIN SUNTHEIMER;			
19	TROY SUNTHEIMER; STEPHENS GHESQUIERE; JACKIE STONE; GAYLE			
20	CHANY: KENDALL SMITH; GABRIELE			
21	LAVERNICOCCA; and ROBERT KAISER,			
22	Plaintiffs,			
23	RONALD J. ROBINSON; VERNON			
24	RODRIGUEZ; VIRTUAL COMMUNICATIONS CORPORATION;	<u> </u>		
25	WINTECH, LLC; RETIRE HAPPY, LLC; JOSH STOLL; FRANK YODER; ALISA DAVIS; and			
26	DOES 1-10; and ROES 1-10, inclusively,			
27	Defendants.			
28		1 -		

Reviewed by: Fleming Law Firm, PLLC By: /s//Scott D. Fleming, Esq./ Scott D. Fleming, Esq. 8250 West Charleston Blvd., Suite 100 Las Vegas, NV 89117 Attorney for defendant Vernon Rodriguez Reviewed by: The Law Office of David Liebrader, Inc. See attached email from Atty. David Liebrader By: No Response David Liebrader, Esq. 3960 Howard Hughes Pkwy # 500 Las Vegas, Nevada 89169 Attorney for plaintiff - 3 -

Michael Bohn

From:

Scott Fleming <scott@fleminglawlv.com>

Sent:

Wednesday, April 28, 2021 7:38 AM

To:

Michael Bohn; Dave Liebrader

Cc:

Maurice Mazza

Subject:

Re: Hotchkiss v. Robinson A762264-C

Good morning Mickey -- The order looks fine, although my name is spelled incorrectly and you have my old address (please see below). With those changes, you have my permission to add my electronic signature.

Regards,

Scott

Please Note Our New Address:

MIN G F

LAW F RM, PILC

Scott D. Fleming, Esq. 8250 West Charleston Boulevard Suite 100 Las Vegas, Nevada 89117 www.fleminglawlv.com scott@fleminglawlv.com (702) 743-6263

> This transmission (and the documents, if any, accompanying it) may contain confidential information belonging to the se the intended recipient that is protected by the attorney-client privilege. It is intended only for use by the person(s) to wh addressed. If you are not the intended recipient you are hereby notified that any disclosure, distribution, copying or taking action in reliance on the contents of this transmission is strictly prohibited. If you have received this transmission in error notify us immediately by return e-mail, delete the transmission, and destroy, as applicable, all copies.

From: Michael Bohn <mbohn@bohnlawfirm.com>

Sent: Tuesday, April 27, 2021 4:54 PM

To: Dave Liebrader <dliebrader@gmail.com>; Scott Fleming <scott@fleminglawlv.com>

Cc: Maurice Mazza <mazza@bohnlawfirm.com> Subject: Hotchkiss v. Robinson A762264-C

Counsel

Please see attached order from today's hearing. Please advise if I have your permission to file with your e signature, or advise if you have any requested changes.

Mickey Bohn, Esq.

Bohn Law Firm
2260 Corporate Circle
Suite 480
Henderson, NV 89074
(702) 642-3113
(702) 642-9766 FAX
mbohn@bohnlawfirm.com
www.bohnlawfirm.com
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Boyer, Deborah

From:

David Liebrader <davel@investmentloss.com>

Sent:

Monday, June 14, 2021 8:41 AM

To:

Boyer, Deborah Roberson, Anise

Cc: Subject:

Re: A-17-762264-C, Hotchkiss vs Robinson, Order Granting Motion for Rule 54(b)

Determination

[NOTICE: This message originated outside of Eighth Judicial District Court -- DO NOT CLICK on links or open attachments unless you are sure the content is safe.]

Yes Deborah, I have no objection to that order.

Also, can you confirm that the court is reviewing my submitted order re: the post trial motions? Its been a long time.

Thanks.

David Liebrader
The Law Office of David Liebrader, Inc.
3960 Howard Hughes Parkway Ste. 500
Las Vegas, NV 89169

Ph: (702) 380-3131 Fx: (702) 583-4227

e-mail: <u>DaveL@investmentloss.com</u>

www.investmentloss.com

www.nevadasecuritiesattorney.com

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On Thu, Jun 10, 2021 at 4:46 PM Boyer, Deborah < BoyerD@clarkcountycourts.us > wrote:

1 **CSERV** 2 DISTRICT COURT 3 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 4 5 Steven Hotchkiss, Plaintiff(s) CASE NO: A-17-762264-C 6 VS. DEPT. NO. Department 23 7 8 Ronald Robinson, Defendant(s) 9 10 **AUTOMATED CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE** 11 This automated certificate of service was generated by the Eighth Judicial District Court. The foregoing Order was served via the court's electronic eFile system to all 12 recipients registered for e-Service on the above entitled case as listed below: 13 Service Date: 6/15/2021 14 E-Service BohnLawFirm office@bohnlawfirm.com 15 Michael Bohn mbohn@bohnlawfirm.com 16 17 Harold Gewerter harold@gewerterlaw.com 18 T. Louis Palazzo, Esq. louis@palazzolawfirm.com 19 Celina Moore celina@palazzolawfirm.com 20 Miriam Roberts miriam@palazzolawfirm.com 21 David Liebrader, Esq. dliebrader@gmail.com 22 David Liebrader DaveL@investmentloss.com 23 Vernon Rodriquez harold@gewerterlaw.com 24 25 scott@fleminglawlv.com **Scott Fleming** 26 Mark Kemp mkemp@bohnlawfirm.com 27

1				
$_{2}$	If indicated below, a copy of the above mentioned filings were also served by mail via United States Postal Service, postage prepaid, to the parties listed below at their last			
$3 \parallel 1$	known addresses on 6/16/2021			
4	T. Palazzo	520 S. Fourth St., 2nd Fl		
5		Las Vegas, NV, 89101		
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ELECTRONICALLY SERVED 6/15/2021 5:05 PM

Electronically Filed
06/15/2021 5:05 PM
CLERK OF THE COURT

l		06/13/2021 5:05 PM	
		CLERK OF THE COURT	
1	DAVID LIEBRADER, ESQ.		
2	STATE BAR NO. 5048 THE LAW OFFICES OF DAVID LIEBRADER, APC 3960 HOWARD HUGHES PARKWAY STE 500		
3	LAS VEGAS, NV 89169 PH: (702) 380-3131		
4	Attorney for Plaintiffs		
5	DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA		
6	ŕ	·	
7	IN THE MATTER BETWEEN) Case No. A-17-762264-C	
8	Steven A. Hotchkiss,) Dept.: 23	
9	PLAINTIFF,	OMNIBUS ORDER ON POST JUDGMENT MOTIONS	
10	v.		
11	Ronald J. Robinson, Vernon Rodriguez, Frank Yoder, Alisa Davis and DOES 1-10 and ROES 1-)))	
12	10, inclusively)) CONSOLIDATED WITH	
13	DEFENDANTS) Case No. A-17-763003-C	
14	Anthony White, Robin Suntheimer, Troy Suntheimer, Stephens Ghesquiere, Jackie Stone,) Case No. A-17-703003-C)	
15	Gayle Chany, Kendall Smith, Gabriele Lavermicocca and Robert Kaiser))	
16	PLAINTIFFS)	
17	v.)	
18	Ronald J. Robinson, Vernon Rodriguez, Virtual)	
19	Communications Corporation, Frank Yoder, Alisa Davis and DOES 1-10 and ROES 1-10, inclusively)	
20)	
21)	
22	OMNIBUS ORDER ON POST JUDGMENT MOTIONS		
23	Defendant Rodriguez' three post judgmen	_	
24	March 9, 2021 and April 27, 2021. Appearing for Plaintiffs was David Liebrader;		
25			
26			

Case Number: A-17-762264-C

Appearing for Defendant Rodriguez was Scott Fleming; Appearing for Defendant Robinson was Michael Bohn.

After considering the motions, oppositions and replies, and argument from counsel, the court rules as follows:

A. Post Judgment Motion One: For Additional Findings of Fact

This motion is denied.

Having reviewed the trial transcript, the Court finds no irregularities, no surprise or new evidence, no manifest disregard of the law, and no errors of law in the record. No objections were made at time of trial on any of the issues raised in the motion. The Court finds that the parties had an opportunity to, and did present testimony without restrictions.

In addition, a prior motion for reconsideration filed by Defendant Rodriguez was denied.

As a result there is not a sufficient basis to change or amend the findings of facts and conclusions of law, and on that basis the Motion is Denied.

B. Post-Trial Motion Two: For a New Trial

The Court finds that Defendant wasn't denied a fair trial, and is not inclined to reopen evidence, as the issues raised in Defendant's motion do not establish any irregularities.

However, the Court will give Defendant an opportunity to address his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel as it pertains to plain error and manifest injustice.

And, while the Court is not inclined to reopen evidence or retry the case, it will permit additional briefing on the following schedule:

1	Attorney for Plaintiff
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Dave Liebrader <dliebrader@gmail.com>

Hotchkiss Order

7 messages

Dave Liebrader < dliebrader@gmail.com>

Wed, May 5, 2021 at 2:32 PM

To: Scott Fleming <scott@fleminglawlv.com>, Michael Bohn <mbohn@bohnlawfirm.com>

Scott and Mickey

Attached is a proposed order on the post trial motions.

Please review and let me know if you have any comments.


Thank you.

David Liebrader
The Law Office of David Liebrader, Chtd.
3960 Howard Hughes Parkway Ste. 500
Las Vegas, NV 89169
Ph: (702) 380-3131
Fx: (702) 583-4227

e-mail: dliebrader@gmail.com www.investmentloss.com

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Michael Bohn <mbohn@bohnlawfirm.com>

Wed, May 5, 2021 at 7:32 PM

To: Dave Liebrader <dliebrader@gmail.com>, Scott Fleming <scott@fleminglawlv.com>

If you want to submit with my e signature, you may.

I forwarded you the order on my motion last week. Can you email me back that I can file with your e signature?

Thank you

Morning Dave -- I have no objection to the order. Please feel free to add my electronic signature.

Thanks

Please Note Our New Address:



Scott D. Fleming, Esq. 8250 West Charleston Boulevard Suite 100 Las Vegas, Nevada 89117 www.fleminglawlv.com scott@fleminglawlv.com (702) 743-6263

This transmission (and the documents, if any, accompanying it) may contain confidential information belor sender and the intended recipient that is protected by the attorney-client privilege. It is intended only for upperson(s) to whom it is addressed. If you are not the intended recipient you are hereby notified that any didistribution, copying or taking any action in reliance on the contents of this transmission is strictly prohibite received this transmission in error, please notify us immediately by return e-mail, delete the transmission, applicable, all copies.

From: Dave Liebrader <dliebrader@gmail.com>

Sent: Wednesday, May 5, 2021 11:32 AM

To: Scott Fleming <scott@fleminglawlv.com>; Michael Bohn <mbohn@bohnlawfirm.com>

Subject: Hotchkiss Order

[Quoted text hidden]

Dave Liebrader diebrader@gmail.com/diebrader

Fri, May 7, 2021 at 3:17 PM

On this motion, Hotchkiss v. Robinson, I have no objection.

[Quoted text hidden]

1 **CSERV** 2 DISTRICT COURT 3 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 4 5 Steven Hotchkiss, Plaintiff(s) CASE NO: A-17-762264-C 6 VS. DEPT. NO. Department 23 7 8 Ronald Robinson, Defendant(s) 9 10 **AUTOMATED CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE** 11 This automated certificate of service was generated by the Eighth Judicial District Court. The foregoing Order was served via the court's electronic eFile system to all 12 recipients registered for e-Service on the above entitled case as listed below: 13 Service Date: 6/15/2021 14 E-Service BohnLawFirm office@bohnlawfirm.com 15 Michael Bohn mbohn@bohnlawfirm.com 16 17 Harold Gewerter harold@gewerterlaw.com 18 T. Louis Palazzo, Esq. louis@palazzolawfirm.com 19 Celina Moore celina@palazzolawfirm.com 20 Miriam Roberts miriam@palazzolawfirm.com 21 David Liebrader, Esq. dliebrader@gmail.com 22 David Liebrader DaveL@investmentloss.com 23 Vernon Rodriquez harold@gewerterlaw.com 24 25 scott@fleminglawlv.com **Scott Fleming** 26 Mark Kemp mkemp@bohnlawfirm.com 27

Electronically Filed 7/12/2021 5:49 AM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT DAVID LIEBRADER, ESQ. 1 STATE BAR NO. 5048 THE LAW OFFICES OF DAVID LIEBRADER, APC 2 3960 HOWARD HUGHES PARKWAY STE 500 LAS VEGAS, NV 89169 3 PH: (702) 380-3131 Attorney for Plaintiffs 4 DISTRICT COURT 5 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 6 IN THE MATTER BETWEEN Case No. A-17-762264-C 7 Steven A. Hotchkiss, Dept.: 8 8 PLAINTIFF, REPLY TO DEFENDANT 9 VERNON RODRIGUEZ' v. **SECOND** MEMORANDUM OF 10 **SUPPLEMENTAL** Ronald J. Robinson, Vernon Rodriguez, Frank **AUTHORITIES ON POST** 11 Yoder, Alisa Davis and DOES 1-10 and ROES 1-JUDGMENT MOTIONS 10, inclusively 12 **DEFENDANTS** 13 Anthony White, Robin Suntheimer, Troy 14 CONSOLIDATED WITH Suntheimer, Stephens Ghesquiere, Jackie Stone, Gayle Chany, Kendall Smith, Gabriele 15 Lavermicocca and Robert Kaiser Case No. A-17-763003-C 16 **PLAINTIFFS** 17 v. 18 Ronald J. Robinson, Vernon Rodriguez, Virtual Communications Corporation, Frank Yoder, Alisa 19 Davis and DOES 1-10 and ROES 1-10, inclusively 20 21

REPLY BRIEF

Fifteen months after this case went to trial, rather than taking whatever issues he has to the appellate court, Defendant is still seeking to undo the judgment.

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Case Number: A-17-762264-C

In his *second* supplemental brief, Mr. Rodriguez continues to cite criminal cases that have no applicability to this civil lawsuit. Claiming he had ineffective assistance of counsel, he demands a new evidentiary hearing, but doesn't cite a single Nevada case on point. He acknowledges that "it does not appear that the Nevada Supreme Court has ever held that an evidentiary hearing is required when a party requests a new trial or further proceedings" *See* Defendant's Supplemental Brief at 3:4-5.

This should end the discussion. Mr. Rodriguez was represented by counsel who put on a spirited defense; he filed motions to dismiss the case, raised the VCC bankruptcy issues that new counsel now complains of, called and crossed examined witnesses, and argued for dismissal in opening and closing. Judge Silva carefully considered the evidence, and ruled in Plaintiffs' favor. As this Court stated in its Order on Mr. Rodriguez' post-trial motions after reviewing the transcript: "The Court finds that the parties had an opportunity to, and did present testimony without restriction."

See Omnibus Order on Post-Trial Motions at 2:10-11 (Exhibit "A") attached.

Nor were the trial Court's decisions on control person liability, and whether the VCC promissory notes were securities difficult; Defendants referred to the Promissory Notes as securities <u>in their own documents</u>, and Mr. Rodriguez was the chief financial officer, whose job it was to speak with investors. See Exhibit "B".

Despite these findings, and without any legal support, Defendant continues to rehash the same arguments he has made since he retained new counsel. He claims prior counsel failed to raise the statute of limitation defense, failed to argue that

VCC's bankruptcy extinguished Mr. Rodriguez' personal liability, ¹ and failed to elicit testimony on two statutory defenses. Plaintiffs dispute these contentions. Perhaps Mr. Gewerter did not focus on these defenses enough for Mr. Fleming's liking, but the bankruptcy issues were argued throughout the case, and control person liability was disputed. If Mr. Rodriguez is not satisfied with Mr. Gewerter's presentation of evidence he should consider a malpractice action. He should not expect this Court to re-open evidence on a trial held fifteen months ago in a different department, which would require ten Plaintiffs to come to Las Vegas to testify in opposition.

Lastly, one of the problems with new counsel arguing facts to a Judge who didn't preside over the underlying trial is that new counsel is not familiar with the evidence and arguments made at trial. As a result, his arguments to the new presiding Judge are inaccurate. For example; He cites Judge Silva's Decision on control person liability, but fails to provide the whole quote, leaving the new presiding Judge with a potentially wrong impression. For example, he argues that Mr. Gewerter failed to raise the control person defense due to a conflict of interest with his other client, Defendant Robinson. This claim is belied by the evidence, and Judge Silva's findings. Her full quote from her Decision:

If the plaintiff establishes that a defendant is a "controlling person," then the defendant bears the burden of proving that he "acted in good faith and did not directly or indirectly induce the act or acts constituting the

¹ Defendant concedes that the VCC Bankruptcy was "certainly discussed at trial and in pretrial motions."

violation or cause of action." Paracor Fin., Inc. v. Gen. Elec. Capital Corp., 96 F.3d 1151, 1161 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a)); see also Hollinger, 914 F.2d at 1575. While the testimony of Robinson and Rodriguez suggests that they believed they were acting in good faith, based in part on an alleged lack of knowledge of Nevada security laws, they failed to present any evidence that they were not directly or indirectly involved in the acts regarding the violation of Nevada security regulations. Rather, the evidence demonstrates that they were directly and intimately involved in creating the material to sell the Notes; Robinson then served as the personal guarantor of the Notes and Rodriguez was the proverbial "closer" who spoke to investors when necessary.

See Decision at 5:10-20, Attached as Exhibit "C". (omitted language in emphasis).

In conclusion, Defendant provides no support whatsoever that ineffective assistance of counsel justifies reopening evidence. Not a single Nevada civil case. His arguments (including that the worthless shares that Plaintiffs received in VCC's bankruptcy have value) are novel, but are more suited for the appellate courts. Defendant has not provided any new support or Nevada authorities to overturn Judge Silva's decision, or this Court's ruling on Defendant's post-trial motions. For these reasons, Defendant's motion should be denied, and he should seek redress, if at all, with the appellate courts.


Dated: July 12, 2021 Respectfully submitted,

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING I hereby certify that on the 12th day of July, 2021, I mailed a copy of the foregoing Opposition Brief to the following Scott Fleming, Esq. Fleming Law 9525 Hillwood Dr. Ste. 140 Las Vegas, NV 89134 /s/: Dianne Bresnahan An Employee of The Law Office of David Liebrader

26 II

EXHIBIT "A"

ELECTRONICALLY SERVED 6/15/2021 5:05 PM



		06/15/2021 5:05 Alexand Hi
		CLERK OF THE COL
1	DAVID LIEBRADER, ESQ. STATE BAR NO. 5048	
2	THE LAW OFFICES OF DAVID LIEBRADER, AF 3960 HOWARD HUGHES PARKWAY STE 500	PC
3	LAS VEGAS, NV 89169 PH: (702) 380-3131	
4	Attorney for Plaintiffs	
5	DISTRICT COU CLARK COUNTY, N	
6		ILTADA
7	IN THE MATTER BETWEEN) Case No. A-17-762264-C
8	Steven A. Hotchkiss,) Dept.: 23
9	PLAINTIFF,) OMNIBUS ORDER ON POST
10	v.) JUDGMENT MOTIONS)
11	Ronald J. Robinson, Vernon Rodriguez, Frank Yoder, Alisa Davis and DOES 1-10 and ROES 1-)))
12	10, inclusively) CONSOLIDATED WITH
13	DEFENDANTS)
14	Anthony White, Robin Suntheimer, Troy Suntheimer, Stephens Ghesquiere, Jackie Stone,) Case No. A-17-763003-C)
15	Gayle Chany, Kendall Smith, Gabriele Lavermicocca and Robert Kaiser))
16	PLAINTIFFS))
17	v.))
18	Ronald J. Robinson, Vernon Rodriguez, Virtual	,)
19	Communications Corporation, Frank Yoder, Alisa Davis and DOES 1-10 and ROES 1-10, inclusively))
20		,))
21))
22	OMNIBUS ORDER ON POST J	UDGMENT MOTIONS
23	Defendant Rodriguez' three post judgment	t motions came on for hearing on
24	March 9, 2021 and April 27, 2021. Appearing for	_
25		

Appearing for Defendant Rodriguez was Scott Fleming; Appearing for Defendant Robinson was Michael Bohn.

After considering the motions, oppositions and replies, and argument from counsel, the court rules as follows:

A. Post Judgment Motion One: For Additional Findings of Fact

This motion is denied.

Having reviewed the trial transcript, the Court finds no irregularities, no surprise or new evidence, no manifest disregard of the law, and no errors of law in the record. No objections were made at time of trial on any of the issues raised in the motion. The Court finds that the parties had an opportunity to, and did present testimony without restrictions.

In addition, a prior motion for reconsideration filed by Defendant Rodriguez was denied.

As a result there is not a sufficient basis to change or amend the findings of facts and conclusions of law, and on that basis the Motion is Denied.

B. Post-Trial Motion Two: For a New Trial

The Court finds that Defendant wasn't denied a fair trial, and is not inclined to reopen evidence, as the issues raised in Defendant's motion do not establish any irregularities.

However, the Court will give Defendant an opportunity to address his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel as it pertains to plain error and manifest injustice.

And, while the Court is not inclined to reopen evidence or retry the case, it will permit additional briefing on the following schedule:



Dave Liebrader <dliebrader@gmail.com>

Hotchkiss Order

7 messages

Dave Liebrader <dliebrader@gmail.com>

Wed, May 5, 2021 at 2:32 PM

To: Scott Fleming <scott@fleminglawlv.com>, Michael Bohn <mbohn@bohnlawfirm.com>

Scott and Mickey

Attached is a proposed order on the post trial motions.

Please review and let me know if you have any comments.

Thank you.


David Liebrader
The Law Office of David Liebrader, Chtd.
3960 Howard Hughes Parkway Ste. 500
Las Vegas, NV 89169
Phy (702) 282 2424

Ph: (702) 380-3131 Fx: (702) 583-4227

e-mail: dliebrader@gmail.com www.investmentloss.com

CONFIDENTIAL COMMUNICATION

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Michael Bohn <mbohn@bohnlawfirm.com>

Wed, May 5, 2021 at 7:32 PM

To: Dave Liebrader <dliebrader@gmail.com>, Scott Fleming <scott@fleminglawlv.com>

If you want to submit with my e signature, you may.

I forwarded you the order on my motion last week. Can you email me back that I can file with your e signature?

Thank you

Morning Dave -- I have no objection to the order. Please feel free to add my electronic signature.

Thanks

Please Note Our New Address:

F LEMIN G

Scott D. Fleming, Esq. 8250 West Charleston Boulevard Suite 100 Las Vegas, Nevada 89117 www.fleminglawlv.com scott@fleminglawlv.com (702) 743-6263

This transmission (and the documents, if any, accompanying it) may contain confidential information belor sender and the intended recipient that is protected by the attorney-client privilege. It is intended only for uperson(s) to whom it is addressed. If you are not the intended recipient you are hereby notified that any didistribution, copying or taking any action in reliance on the contents of this transmission is strictly prohibite received this transmission in error, please notify us immediately by return e-mail, delete the transmission, applicable, all copies.

From: Dave Liebrader diebrader@gmail.com

Sent: Wednesday, May 5, 2021 11:32 AM

To: Scott Fleming <scott@fleminglawlv.com>; Michael Bohn <mbohn@bohnlawfirm.com>

Subject: Hotchkiss Order

[Quoted text hidden]

Dave Liebrader diebrader@gmail.com/diebrader

Fri, May 7, 2021 at 3:17 PM

On this motion, Hotchkiss v. Robinson, I have no objection.

[Quoted text hidden]

EXHIBIT "B"

Miriam

Fronc

Robin1031@aol.com

Sent

Monday, December 10, 2012 10:50 AM

Subject

Julie Minuskin Re: Agreement

Attachments:

image001 png; image002.png; image003.png; image002 png; image002.png;

image003.png

We are in complete agreement with our communication with you investors. Vern will be the direct contact. In we are in compute agreement with our communication must you investors, want with your investors; naturally addition we would be open to make a presentation of our bettrology at any time with your investors; naturally. Frank would be the contact for this. It is our desire to make full disclosure to all investors and for this reason we are open to any suggestion that you might have in accomplishing this, so don't healize in making this dear to your contacts. In addition should your investors wish to contact me directly, I would be happy to meet with them and show them my Accountant's prepared current financial statement. My present net worth is \$17,698,000, which is represented in cash and equilies toth real and personal. Ron Robinson

In a message dated 12/10/2012 10:23/46 A.M. Pacific Standard Time, iminuskin@retirehappy.com writes:

Thank you for your letter, but we are not going to complete this unless we have attended sanding of who the investors will speak with if they ever have questions? Will it be Frank? There might be only 3-4 lavestors who will want to speak directly to the company, and we always have an open policy byt some kivestors just need that. Ask Terry Howlett now many calls he has ever gotten....We just this hed raising his funda and he might of gotten 3 or 4 calls. We need to be able to "offer" the opportunity but they rarely ever do it. And it is usually only a confirmation call, it will not be on a daily basis or frequent, if at all, as long as they are getting poldiii

Thoughts?

Julie Minuskin

Investment Specifisher | Refire Happy, LLC 4840 W. University Ave., A1 | Las Vegas, NV 85103 Direct: /32.756 1548 | Toll Free: 884-899-4766 Fax: 625-990-4762

minuskin@retkehappy.com



Retire Happy

tega: Discipanent tio earnings claims, moranties, or specific bivestment advice in aboved to building from this office.

Any advination contained to this email is for geographilistrative or educational purposes may and is not browning to consider figure, lax, or the until source in any person or engantation while an educative context our accountably filed.

Plaintiffs' Production 000037

Frank Yoder

From:

Frank Yoder

Sent:

Monday, December 17, 2012 1:03 PM

To: Cc:

Ron Robinson Vernon Rodriguez

Subject:

RE: revised note

Ron, Is this ok?

Notes have a term of 18 months, with a 6 month extension option. Note pays 9% annual interest paid monthly. (Escrow Agent: Provident Trust Group)

Offering Summary

Securities: 9% Notes

Minimum Offering: \$20,000 Maximum Offering: \$1,000,000

JERMS OF SECURITIES:

Notes have a term of 18 months, with a 6 month extension option. Note pays 9% annual noticest paid monthly. (Escrow Agent: Provident Trust Group)

Secured:

Notes are secured by a Promussory Notes. The Guarantor of the note is Mr. R.J., Robinson, chairman & CEO of Virtual Communications Corporation. Mr. Robinson has a net viorth of \$17,698,000. Finantial Statement is available for inspection in the offices of Rabra Happy.

Termination Date:

Igne 15, 2013, unless extended by the Company's board of directors. Offering is conducted pursuant to Rule 506 of Regulation D under the Securities Act of 1933 (as emended).

Frank Yoder Wintech, LLC 311 Esst Warm Springs Road, Suite #100 Las Vegns, NV 89119 phone: (702) 284-7311


email: Frank.Yoden@WinTechLLC.com web: www.ALICEreceptionist.com

From: Robin1031@aol.com [mailto:Robin1031@aol.com]

Sent: Monday, December 17, 2012 11:36 AM

To: Frank Yoder

Subject: Re: revised note



Plaintiffs' Production 000078

EXHIBIT "C"

:						
1	DECN Index Cristian D. Silve					
2	Judge Cristina D. Silva Eighth Judicial District Court Department IX					
3	Regional Justice Center 200 Lewis Avenue					
4	Las Vegas, Nevada 89155					
5	FIGURE HUDICIAL DISTRICT COVERT					
6	EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA					
7	STEVEN A. HOTCHKISS,	C N 4 17 700 64 G				
8	Plaintiff,	Case No.: A-17-762264-C Dept. No.: IX				
9	vs.					
10	RONALD J. ROBINSON; VERNON					
11	RODRIGUEZ; VIRTUAL COMMUNICATIONS CORPORATION;					
12	WINTECH, LLC; RETIRE HAPPY, LLC; JOSH STOLL; FRANK YODER; ALISA					
13	DAVIS; and DOES 1-10; and ROES 1-10, inclusively,					
14	Defendants.					
15	ANTHONY WHITE; ROBIN SUNTHEIMER; TROY SUNTHEIMER;	Consolidated with:				
16	STEPHENS GHESQUIERE; JACKIE STONE; GAYLE CHANY; KENDALL	Case No.: A-17-763003-C Dept. No.: IX				
17	SMITH; GABRIELE LAVERNICOCCA; and ROBERT KAISER,					
18	Plaintiffs,					
19	vs.					
20	RONALD J. ROBINSON; VERNON RODRIGUEZ; VIRTUAL					
21	COMMUNICATIONS CORPORATION; WINTECH, LLC; RETIRE HAPPY, LLC; JOSH STOLL; FRANK YODER; ALISA DAVIS; and DOES 1-10; and ROES 1-10,					
22						
23	inclusively,					
24	Defendants.					
		1				

DECISION

This case came before the Court for Decision following a two-day bench trial in February of 2020. Having considered the evidence presented at trial, together with the arguments presented in the parties' closing briefs, the Court hereby enters the following Decision.

I. Virtual Communications Corporation ("VCC") Note was a Security as defined by the Nevada Securities Act (*see* NRS \$90.295)

In Nevada, NRS 90.295 defines what qualifies as a "security," which includes, amongst other things, "a note." *See* NRS 90.295. This does not mean that all notes qualify as securities. Rather, the Supreme Court of Nevada established a test for determining whether or not a note qualifies as a security in *State v. Friend*, 118 Nev. 115, 120-121 (2002). Under the *Friend* analysis, the court begins with the presumption that every note is a security, which is rebuttable under one of two steps:

- (1) The note subject to review is compared to a series of notes that are not securities; and
- (2) The note subject to review is examined according to four factors: (1) motivation; (2) plan of distribution; (3) expectations, and (4) need for securities law

The VCC notes do not qualify as: (1) consumer financing; (2) a mortgage on a home; (3) something suggesting it is a "character" loan to a bank customer; (4) an open-account debt incurred in the ordinary course of business; (5) a loan by commercial banks for current operations; (6) short-term notes secured by a lien on a small business or some of its assets; or (7) short-term notes secured by an assignment of accounts receivable. *Friend*, 118 Nev. at 121. As a result, the Court moves to the second part of the test to determine if, upon review, the notes meet the four factors demonstrating they qualify as a security.

An examination of the promissory notes issued by VCC actually meets all four factors.

Much like any other investment opportunity, the evidence at trial revealed that the motivation behind the issuance of the Notes was to raise funds to support VCC¹ and the related "Alice" technology, and that investment in VCC would result in a favorable monetary return.² Testimony from Mr. Robinson and Mr. Rodriguez confirmed the Notes were issued to raise money. Promises of financial gain were made to the purchasers of the Notes; those promises would lead a reasonable person to want to purchase the Notes as an investment. The Defendants' sale of the Notes resulted in them raising over 4 million dollars.

Further, the PowerPoint presentations introduced as exhibits at trial set forth clear plan of distribution and the expectations (i.e. returns) that would result from the distribution of the Notes. Testimony from the Defendants, Ms. Davis and Mr. Frank Yoder, confirmed that the Defendants were consulted on the content of the PowerPoints setting forth the plan of distribution, which included language about the personal guarantee by Mr. Robinson and a referral of the notes as "securities."

Last but not least, the end-result of the Notes demonstrates that the purchasers reasonably viewed the Notes as investments. They were presented to investors and potential investors as "securities," which is prima facie proof that the Notes were investments. The purpose of selling the Notes was also to raise money, which further demonstrates that they were intended to be investments.

¹ See Exhibit 4 at Bates No. 00066, PowerPoint presentation for potential investors indicating the "target goal was \$120 billon dollars in the global market."; see also Exhibit 6 at Bates No. 0096 (same).

² See id. at Bates No. 0074 stating the terms of the securities included a "[T]erm of 18 months, with a 6 month extension option. Notes pay 9% annually with interest paid monthly." (Emphasis added); see also Exhibit 6 at 00150 (same).

³ See Exhibit 4 at Bates No. 0070, setting for the "Revenue Forecast," and Bates No. 0074, setting forth the "Growth Strategy."; see also Exhibit 6 at Bates No. 00100 and 00104 (same).

⁴ See Exhibit 5 at Bates No. 74; Exhibit 6 at Bates No. 00150. In fact, the PowerPoints even included information about the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. See Exhibit 4 at Bates No. 0064; Exhibit No. 6 at Bates No. 0094.

the four factors. Mr. Hotchkiss testified that he used 1/3 of his personal savings to purchase the notes as part of his overall retirement plan. Specifically he purchased the Notes because of (1) the personal guarantee, and (2) the expectation of a 9% return. Moreover, Mr. Hotchkiss testified that when he repeatedly attempted to contact Vernon Rodriguez to figure out where his returns were, Rodriguez asked him "for patience." Finally, he testified that he never received any of his funds back. The Court notes that there was no evidence introduced at trial that any of the investors received their funds back.

Testimony from Plaintiff Mr. Hotchkiss is more evidence that that the VCC Notes meet

II. The VCC Note Was Not registered as a Security; Defendant Failed to Provide Any Evidence that it was Exempt from the Registration Requirements.

There was no evidence introduced at trial to demonstrate that the VCC Note was exempt from registration as a security. Therefore, the Notes are not exempted.

III. Ronald Robinson and Vernon Rodriguez were control persons as defined in NAC 90.035.

Nevada Administrative Code (NAC) section 90.035 defines a "control person" as an individual who (1) owns or controls 10 percent or more of the voting stock of a corporation; (2) is an officer or director of a corporation; or (3) is in a position to influence the decision-making processes of a corporation. "In general, the determination of who is a controlling person ... is an intensely factual question." *Arthur Children's Trust v. Keim*, 994 F.2d 1390, 1396 (9th Cir.1993) (discussing a "control person" under Federal Securities law). To establish "controlling person" liability, the plaintiff must show that a primary violation was committed and that the defendant "directly or indirectly" controlled the violator. *See Hollinger v. Titan Capital Corp.*, 914 F.2d 1564, 1575 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 976, 111 S.Ct. 1621, 113 L.Ed.2d 719 (1991).

As established above, Plaintiffs have established that VCC was issuing un-exempted, unregistered securities. Plaintiffs also alleged that Ronald Robinson and Vernon Rodriguez are control persons. The evidence at trial proves this allegation by more than a preponderance of the evidence. Robinson and Rodriguez were officers in the corporation. Robinson was a President, Chief Executive Officer (CEO), Chairman of the Board, and a signer on the financial accounts. Rodriguez spoke and gave advice to potential investors. According to Frank Yoder's testimony, Rodriguez was also fully involved in the finances of the corporation. The Court believes Yoder's testimony, in part because Rodriguez was listed as the Chief Financial Officer (CFO) in the various PowerPoints presented to potential investors.

If the plaintiff establishes that a defendant is a "controlling person," then the defendant bears the burden of proving that he "acted in good faith and did not directly or indirectly induce the act or acts constituting the violation or cause of action." *Paracor Fin., Inc. v. Gen. Elec. Capital Corp.*, 96 F.3d 1151, 1161 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a)); *see also Hollinger*, 914 F.2d at 1575. While the testimony of Robinson and Rodriguez suggests that they believed they were acting in good faith, based in part on an alleged lack of knowledge of Nevada security laws, they failed to present any evidence that they were not directly or indirectly involved in the acts regarding the violation of Nevada security regulations. Rather, the evidence demonstrates that they were directly and intimately involved in creating the material to sell the Notes; Robinson then served as the personal guarantor of the Notes and Rodriguez was the proverbial "closer" who spoke to investors when necessary.

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⁵ The PowerPoints also belie Rodriguez's testimony that he did not become CFO until 2014.

IV. Ronald Robinson is Liable as a Guarantor

There is no disagreement that Robinson personally guaranteed the Notes/Securities at issue in this case. In fact, Robinson admitted to guaranteeing the Notes during trial, albeit noting he only intended to personally guarantee some of them. Qualified or not, his guarantee was "absolute" and "unconditional." With his admission, the Court must then determine if he is still liable pursuant to personal guarantee after VCC's bankruptcy proceedings. The Court finds that VCC's bankruptcy did not extinguish Robinson's personal guarantee of the promissory notes. The Court adopts the reasoning in the *Donnell* and *Nelson* cases in reaching this decision. Specifically, the Court agrees with Plaintiff's argument that VCC's bankruptcy was a tactical, self-interested decision by Robinson to try and eliminate his responsibilities as the personal guarantor. His decision constitutes as consent to the modification, and further did not increase his liability risk. Consequently, he is still liable as a personal guarantor. *See generally Marc Nelson Oil Products v. Grim Logging Co.*, 110 P.3d 120, 122-125.

V. Conclusion

Within 30 days of this decision, the parties shall meet and confer and submit a proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law consistent with this Decision. Further, Plaintiff must submit a brief regarding damages, and the evidence that supports the requested damages within 45 days. Defendant may file an opposition 14 days after the filing of Plaintiff's brief. Plaintiff may file a reply within 7 days of any filed opposition.

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. .

²³ See Exhibit 5 at Bates No. 0088.

⁷ During trial, Robinson testified that Julie Minushkin issued some of the Notes with his personal guarantee without his permission. No other evidence was introduced to support his position.

See Exhibit 5 at Bates No. 0088.

After the Court receives and reviews the proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and full briefing on the issue of damages, the Court will issue the Findings of Fact and Conclusion of Law. Thereafter a judgment shall issue in favor of the Plaintiffs and against Defendants.

DATED this 27th day of April, 2020.

CRISTINA D. SILVA DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the date filed, a copy of the foregoing DECISION was electronically served, pursuant to N.E.F.C.R. Rule 9, to all registered parties in the Eighth Judicial District Court Electronic Filing Program (EFP) and/or emailed to any party or proper person not registered with the District Court EFP system.

<u>Jaye L. Beltran</u> Judicial Executive Assistant

Electronically Filed 7/15/2021 9:31 AM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT 1 NOAS MICHAEL F. BOHN, ESQ. Nevada Bar No.: 1641 mbohn@bohnlawfirm.com LAW OFFICES OF MICHAEL F. BOHN, ESO., LTD. 2260 Corporate Circle, Suite 480 Henderson, Nevada 89074 (702) 642-3113/ (702) 642-9766 FAX Attorney for defendant Ronald J. Robinson 6 7 DISTRICT COURT 8 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 9 STEVEN A. HOTCHKISS, CASE NO.: A-17-762264-C 10 DEPT NO.: XXIII Plaintiff, 11 12 RONALD J. ROBINSON; VERNON RODRIGUEZ; VIRTUAL COMMUNICATIONS CORPORATION; 13 WINTECH, LLC; RETIRE HAPPY, LLC; JOSH STOLL; FRANK YODER; ALISA DAVIS; and 14 DOES 1-10; and ROES 1-10, inclusively, 15 Defendants. 16 ANTHONY WHITE; ROBIN SUNTHEIMER; TROY CONSOLIDATED WITH SUNTHEIMER; STEPHENS GHESQUIERE; 17 JACKIE STONE; GAYLE CHANY; KENDALL CASE NO.: A-17-763003-C SMITH; GABRIELE LAVERNICOCCA; and 18 ROBERT KAISER, 19 NOTICE OF APPEAL Plaintiffs, 20 RONALD J. ROBINSON; VERNON RODRIGUEZ; VIRTUAL COMMUNICATIONS CORPORATION; 21 WINTECH, LLC; RETIRE HAPPY, LLC; JOSH STOLL; FRANK YODER; ALISA DAVIS; and 22 DOES 1-10; and ROES 1-10, inclusively, 23 Defendants. 24 NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that defendant, Ronald J. Robinson, hereby appeals to the Supreme 25 Court of Nevada from the findings of fact, conclusions of law and order on motion for damages and 26 attorney's fees, filed on August 20, 2020, the judgment, filed on August 20, 2020, and the duplicate 2.7 28 1

1	judgment, filed on August 21, 2020.				
2	DATED this 13th day of July, 2021.				
3	By: /s//Michael F. Bohn, Esq./				
4	MICHAEL F. BOHN, ESQ.				
5	2260 Corporate Circle, Suite 480 Henderson, NV 89074 Attorney for defendant Ronald J. Robinson				
6	Attorney for defendant Ronard J. Roomson				
7	<u>CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE</u>				
8	Pursuant to NRCP 5, NEFCR 9 and EDCR 8.05, I hereby certify that I am an employee of LAW				
9	OFFICES OF MICHAEL F. BOHN., ESQ., and on the 13th day of July, 2021, an electronic copy of the				
10	NOTICE OF APPEAL was served on opposing counsel via the Court's electronic service system to the				
11	following counsel of record:				
12	II David Liebrader, Esq.				
13	3960 Howard Hughes Parkway, Ste. 300				
14	I as Vegas NV 90160				
15					
16	/s/ /Maurice Mazza /				
17	A 1 CT OCC C				
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Electronically Filed 7/15/2021 9:33 AM Steven D. Grierson **CLERK OF THE COURT** 1 ASTA MICHAEL F. BOHN, ESQ. 2 Nevada Bar No.: 1641 mbohn@bohnlawfirm.com 3 LAW OFFICES OF MICHAEL F. BOHN, ESO., LTD. 4 2260 Corporate Circle, Suite 480 Henderson, Nevada 89074 5 (702) 642-3113/ (702) 642-9766 FAX Attorney for defendant Ronald J. Robinson 7 DISTRICT COURT 8 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 9 STEVEN A. HOTCHKISS, CASE NO.: A-17-762264-C 10 DEPT NO.: XXIII Plaintiff, 11 12 RONALD J. ROBINSON; VERNON RODRIGUEZ; VIRTUAL COMMUNICATIONS CORPORATION; 13 WINTECH, LLC; RETIRE HAPPY, LLC; JOSH STOLL; FRANK YODER; ALISA DAVIS; and 14 DOES 1-10; and ROES 1-10, inclusively, 15 Defendants. 16 ANTHONY WHITE; ROBIN SUNTHEIMER; TROY CONSOLIDATED WITH SUNTHEIMER; STEPHENS GHESQUIERE; 17 JACKIE STONÉ; GAYLE CHANY; KENDALL CASE NO.: A-17-763003-C SMITH; GABRIELE LAVERNICOCCA; and 18 ROBERT KAISER, 19 Plaintiffs, 20 RONALD J. ROBINSON; VERNON RODRIGUEZ; VIRTUAL COMMUNICATIONS CORPORATION; 21 WINTECH, LLC; RETIRE HAPPY, LLC; JOSH STOLL; FRANK YODER; ALISA DAVIS; and 22 DOES 1-10; and ROES 1-10, inclusively, 23 Defendants. 24

CASE APPEAL STATEMENT

1. The appellant filing this case appeal statement is Ronald J. Robinson.

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2. The judge issuing the judgment appealed from is the honorable Cristina Silva.

- 4. The parties to this appeal are the appellant Ronald J. Robinson, and respondents Steven A. Hotchkiss, Anthony White, Robin Suntheimer, Troy Suntheimer, Stephens Ghesquiere, Jackie Stone, Gayle Chany, Kendall Smith, Gabrielle Lavernicocca, and Robert Kaiser.
- 5. Counsel for appellant Ronald J. Robinson is Michael F. Bohn, Esq.; 2260 Corporate Circle, Suite 480, Henderson, NV 89074; (702) 642-3113. Counsel for respondents is David Liebrader, Esq., The Law Offices of David Liebrader, APC, 3960 Howard Hughes Parkway, Ste. 500, Las Vegas, NV 89169, (702) 380-3131.
- 6. The attorneys for both the defendant/appellant and plaintiff/respondent are licensed in the state of Nevada.
 - 7. The appellant was represented by retained counsel in the District Court;
 - 8. The appellant is represented by retained counsel on appeal;
 - 9. There were no orders granting leave to proceed in forma pauperis;
- 10. The complaint in Case No. A-17-762264-C was filed in District Court on September 28, 2017. The complaint in Case No. A-17-763003-C was filed in District Court on October 12, 2017.
- 11. The complaint in Case No. A-17-762264-C and the first amended complaint in Case No. A-17-763003-C alleged claims for relief based on fraud, misrepresentation and omissions, violation of the Nevada Uniform Securities Act, and breach of written contract. The district court found in favor of the plaintiffs.
 - 12. The case has previously been the subject of appeal SC# 81838.
 - 13. The case does not involve child custody or visitation; and,
 - 14. This case is one that is not likely to be settled.

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1	DATED this 13th day of July 2021.		
2	LAW OFFICES OF		
3	MICHAEL F. BOHN, ESQ., LTD.		
4			
5	By: /s//Michael F. Bohn, Esq./ MICHAEL F. BOHN, ESQ. 2260 Corporate Circle, Suite 480		
7	Henderson, NV 89074 Attorney for defendant Ronald J. Robinson		
8	CEDTIFICATE OF SEDVICE		
9	Pursuant to NRCP 5, NEFCR 9 and EDCR 8.05, I hereby certify that I am an employee of Law		
10	Offices of Michael F. Bohn., Esq., and on the 13th day of June, 2021, an electronic copy of the CASE		
11	APPEAL STATEMENT was served on opposing counsel via the Court's electronic service system to		
12	the following counsel of record:		
13	David Liebrader, Esq.		
14			
15	Las Vegas, NV 89169 Attorney for plaintiffs		
16			
17			
18	/s/ /Maurice Mazza / An employee of Law Offices of		
19	Michael F. Bohn, Esq., Ltd.		
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RPLY 1 SCOTT D. FLEMING, ESQ. 2 Nevada Bar No. 5638 FLEMING LAW FIRM, PLLC 3 8250 West Charleston Boulevard Suite 100 Las Vegas, Nevada 89117 4 Telephone: (702) 743-6263 E-Mail: scott@fleminglawlv.com 5 Attorneys for Defendant Vernon Rodriguez 6 7 8 9 10 STEVEN A. HOTCHKISS, 11 FLEMING LAW FIRM, PLLC 8250 West Charleston Boulevard, Suite 100 Las Vegas, Nevada 89117 (702) 743-6263 Plaintiff, 12 VS. 13 RONALD J. ROBINSON; VERNON RODRIGUEZ; VIRTUAL COMMUNICATIONS CORPORATION; 14 WINTECH, LLC; RETIRE HAPPY, LLC; 15 JOSH STOLL; FRANK YODER; ALISA DAVIS; and DOES 1-10; and ROES 1-10, inclusively, 16 Defendants. 17 18 19 ANTHONY WHITE; ROBIN SUNTHEIMER; TROY SUNTHEIMER; 20 STEPHENS GHESQUIERE; JACKIE STONE; GAYLE CHANY; KENDALL 21 SMITH; GABRIELE LAVERNICOCCA; and ROBERT KAISER, 22 Plaintiffs, 23 VS. 24 RONALD J. ROBINSON; VERNON RODRIGUEZ; VIRTUAL COMMUNICATIONS CORPORATION; 25 WINTECH, LLC; RETIRE HAPPY, LLC; JOSH STOLL; FRANK YODER; ALISA 26 DAVIS; and DOES 1-10; and ROES 1-10, 27 inclusively, 28 Defendants.

Electronically Filed 7/20/2021 10:13 AM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT

DISTRICT COURT

CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

CASE NO. A-17-762264-C DEPT NO. 23

REPLY TO OPPOSITION TO SUPPLEMENT TO SECOND POST-JUDGMENT MOTION BY DEFENDANT VERNON RODRIGUEZ FOR A NEW TRIAL, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, FURTHER ACTION AFTER A NONJURY TRIAL PURSUANT TO **NEV. R. CIV. P. 59(A)**

Date: August 3, 2021 Time: 9:30 a.m.

Consolidated with

CASE NO. A-17-763003-C DEPT NO. 23

Page 1 of 7

Case Number: A-17-762264-C

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Trials are chaotic. Things get missed. In a world where every bench trial resulted in a complete and perfect record, there would be no need for Nev. R. Civ. P. 59 and the various forms of relief that rule provides:

- A new trial on all or some of the issues as to any party
- Additional testimony
- Amended findings of fact and conclusions of law
- New findings and conclusions
- A new judgment

In his extensive post-trial briefing, Defendant Vernon Rodriguez has noted errors in these proceedings by his prior counsel, including (i) failure to file a dispositive motion based on an expired two-year statute of limitation, (ii) failure to file a dispositive motion regarding the "debt for equity swap" by the issuer of the promissory notes at issue in this case, and (iii) failure to file a dispositive motion, or elicit testimony at trial, regarding the two statutory defenses available to "control persons" under Nev. Rev. Stat. 90.660. Should these issues have been raised before trial? Absolutely. Is it too late now for Mr. Rodriguez to raise these issues? Absolutely not. This is exactly the sort of situation that Rule 59 (a) was designed to address. See, e.g., Sierra Pac. Power Co. v. Day, 391 P.2d 501, 80 Nev. 224 (Nev. 1964) ("Error in some respects, or injustice in the result, alone authorizes an interference with a judgment or decree once rendered...") (quoting Shute v. Big Meadow Inv. Co., 45 Nev. 99, 198 P. 227 (1921)).

In their Opposition, Plaintiffs state that they "dispute these contentions." Id. at p. 3, 1. 2. They do not, however, offer any argument or legal authorities to demonstrate that these defenses are not viable. To recap:

1. The Statute of Limitation Defense

The statute of limitation for claims under Nev. Rev. Stat. 90.660 is two (2) years. Nev. Rev. Stat. 90.670. As a matter of law, there is no applicable discovery period when a violation involves failure to register securities because that information is publicly available. Baroi v. Platinum Condo. Dev., LLC, 914 F.Supp.2d 1179, 1191 (D. Nev. 2012). These statements of law were never contested. As importantly, Plaintiffs never contested the fact that the earlier of these

consolidated cases was commenced two (2) years and nine (9) months after the last investor purchased notes from VCC. Based on undisputed facts and law, the sole claim against Mr. Rodriguez would be time-barred if this Court were to consider the statute of limitation defense.

Plaintiffs argue – without citation to any authority – that Mr. Rodriguez was too late in raising that issue. At what point, however, was it too late? Was it the opening date of the trial? Was it the date when Judge Silva issued her Decision? Was it the date when the Court approved the *Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law* ("FFCL") prepared by Plaintiffs' counsel? Was it some other date? The purpose of a trial is to adduce facts. We rely on post-trial briefing to explain the legal significance of those facts. No authorities, or even unsupported argument, has been made by Plaintiffs to explain why this Court should not consider an expired statute of limitation when that issue has been raised in a timely-filed motion under Rule 59(a).

2. The VCC Bankruptcy

It is a universally accepted premise that a plaintiff is only entitled to one recovery. *Calloway v. City of Reno*, 993 P.2d 1259, 1279, 116 Nev. 250 (2000) ("no plaintiff is entitled to more than one recovery no matter how many theories of recovery may be applicable") (*citing Ambassador Hotel Co. v. Wei-Chuan Inv.*, 189 F.3d 1017 (9th Cir.1999) [additional citation omitted]. In his post-trial motions, Mr. Rodriguez has explained that the noteholders – including the Plaintiffs in this action – were the beneficiaries of a "debt for equity swap" as a result of VCC's confirmed Chapter 11 plan. No authority, or unsupported argument, has been offered to explain why it is "too late" for Mr. Rodriguez to request a ruling that the Plaintiffs have already obtained recovery in this matter. In their opposition, Plaintiffs claim that these shares are "worthless." *Id.* at p. 4, l. 16. There has been no expert testimony offered, however, regarding the present or potential future value of those shares. As for lay opinion, the bankruptcy demonstrates that a super-majority of noteholders reached a different conclusion, as 81% of them voted in favor of VCC's plan of reorganization. Mr. Rodriguez respectfully submits that it would be a profound

The 81% voting figure is set forth on page 4, line 22 of the Order Confirming First Amended Chapter 11 Plan of Reorganization of Virtual Communications Corporation, which was attached as Exhibit 2 to the Request by Defendant Vernon Rodriguez for Judicial Notice in Support of Post-Judgment Motions filed on or about September 16, 2020.

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miscarriage of justice for this Court to continue to refuse to take up the issue of the recovery that has already been obtained by the Plaintiffs. It is, after all, Plaintiffs' burden to prove that they have suffered damages. If they acknowledge that they have received VCC shares, and then offer to them over to Mr. Rodriguez in exchange for cash, they have not met their burden of proving a loss.

3. The Nev. Rev. Stat. 90.660 Defenses

Much has been made of the fact that Mr. Rodriguez was identified on a Power-Point slide as a person to whom potential VCC investors could direct questions regarding the company. In her Decision, Judge Silva referred to Mr. Rodriguez as the "proverbial 'closer." Id. at p. 5, 1. 20.² That reference, however, reveals a fundamental misapprehension of the law. As noted in his motion, there is nothing remotely improper about a company borrowing money and issuing promissory notes. The violation of law that occurred in this case consisted of VCC's failure to register securities with the Secretary of State. See Nev. Rev. Stat. 90.460. Even if Mr. Rodriguez had had multiple discussions with every one of the Plaintiffs regarding VCC's business, there is nothing in the Decision or FFCL to suggest that Mr. Rodriguez was the person in charge of registering those securities. Had that issue been addressed, Mr. Rodriquez would have testified that Ronald J. Robinson supervised all of VCC's fundraising and that former Defendant Retire Happy, LLC responsible for ensuring compliance with securities law. The Court never heard that testimony, however, because presenting those defenses on behalf of Mr. Rodriguez would have required Mr. Gewerter to introduce testimony that would have implicated his other client. Plaintiffs have never asserted that a conflict of interest did not exist or that a different outcome would likely have occurred but for that conflict. As with their other arguments, Plaintiffs' position is that it is too late for Mr. Rodriguez to raise that defense.

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Of course, there is nothing in the Decision or FFCL to suggest that Mr. Rodriguez was an "actual" closer -and Mr. Rodriguez has submitted a declaration to confirm that he never spoke with any of the Plaintiffs prior to them

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4. An Appeal and/or Malpractice Action Should Not be Necessary

According to Plaintiffs, Mr. Rodriguez "should seek redress, if at all, with the appellate courts." See Opposition at p. 4, ll. 20-21. The problem with that argument is that Mr. Rodriguez is not asking this Court to reconsider facts on which it has already made rulings - he is, instead, asking the Court to consider new facts and address new legal issues. He respectfully submits that if this matter does go up on appeal, the most likely outcome is that an appellate court will order the matter remanded with instructions to consider the issues that this Court has so far declined to offer any substantive ruling. A decision now will save both parties a good deal of time, effort and expense.

Plaintiffs also assert that "[i]f Mr. Rodriguez is not satisfied with Mr. Gewerter's presentation of evidence he should consider a malpractice action." Id. at p. 3, 1l. 5-6. The irony is that a successful legal malpractice action would necessarily mean that this Court came to the wrong decision in holding Mr. Rodriguez liable for Plaintiffs' purported losses. The purpose of Rule 59 is to prevent error and injustice in the first place, not to force parties to seek secondary redress because a party was allegedly "too late" in presenting otherwise case dispositive issues.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, Mr. Rodriguez respectfully requests that this Honorable Court enter additional findings and conclusions regarding (i) the expired statute of limitation and (ii) the satisfaction of Plaintiffs' debt through the debt for equity swap in VCC's bankruptcy. If necessary (i.e., if the Court declines to grant relief based on either of the first two grounds), Mr. Rodriguez requests that the Court take "further action" pursuant to Nev. R. Civ. P. 59(a) to allow him to present testimony regarding the person (Ronald J. Robinson) and entity (former Defendant Retire Happy, LLC), who were actually responsible for registering the VCC notes. Based on those subsequent findings, Mr. Rodriguez asks that the Court modify the Judgment in this matter to remove all references to him. Finally, Mr. Rodriguez requests such other relief as is just and proper.

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FLEMING LAW FIRM, PLLC 8250 West Charleston Boulevard, Suite 100 Las Vegas, Nevada 89117 (702) 743-6263

Dated this 20th day of July, 2021.

FLEMING LAW FIRM, PLLC

By <u>/s Scott D. Fleming</u>
SCOTT D. FLEMING, ESQ.
Nevada Bar No. 5638
8250 West Charleston Boulevard

Suite 100 Las Vegas, Nevada 89117 Attorney for Vernon Rodriguez

Page 6 of 7

FLEMING LAW FIRM, PLLC 8250 West Charleston Boulevard, Suite 100 Las Vegas, Nevada 89117 (702) 743-6263

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I am an employee of Fleming Law Firm, PLLC, and that on the 20th day of July, 2021, I caused to be served a true and correct copy of foregoing REPLY TO OPPOSITION TO SUPPLEMENT TO SECOND POST-JUDGMENT MOTION BY DEFENDANT VERNON RODRIGUEZ FOR A NEW TRIAL, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, FURTHER ACTION AFTER A NONJURY TRIAL PURSUANT TO NEV. R. CIV. P.

59(A) in the following manner:

(VIA ELECTRONIC SERVICES) The above-referenced documents were electronically filed on the dates listed above and served on through the Notice of Electronic Filing automatically generated by the Court's facilities to those parties listed on the Court's Master Service List as follows:

> DAVID LIEBRADER, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 5048 THE LAW OFFICES OF DAVID LIEBRADER, APC 601 S. Rancho Drive, Suite D-29 Las Vegas, Nevada 89106 Attorney for Plaintiffs

> > By /s Scott D. Fleming

SCOTT D. FLEMING, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 5638 8250 West Charleston Boulevard Suite 100 Las Vegas, Nevada 89117 Attorney for Vernon Rodriguez

ELECTRONICALLY SERVED 8/31/2021 1:03 PM

Electronically Filed 08/31/2021 1:03 PM

1	DAVID LIEBRADER, ESQ. STATE BAR NO. 5048		
2	THE LAW OFFICES OF DAVID LIEBRADER, AP 3960 HOWARD HUGHES PARKWAY STE 500	C	
3	LAS VEGAS, NV 89169 PH: (702) 380-3131		
4	Attorney for Plaintiffs		
5	DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA		
6	IN THE MATTED DETWEEN) C N- A 17 7(22(4 C	
7	IN THE MATTER BETWEEN) Case No. A-17-762264-C	
8	Steven A. Hotchkiss,) Dept.: 23	
9	PLAINTIFF,	ORDER ON DEFENDAT'S SECOND POST JUDGMENT	
10	v.) MOTION (SUPPLEMENTAL) BRIEFING)	
11 12	Ronald J. Robinson, Vernon Rodriguez, Frank Yoder, Alisa Davis and DOES 1-10 and ROES 1- 10, inclusively)))	
	DEFENDANTS)	
13) CONSOLIDATED WITH	
14	Anthony White, Robin Suntheimer, Troy Suntheimer, Stephens Ghesquiere, Jackie Stone,) Case No. A-17-763003-C	
15	Gayle Chany, Kendall Smith, Gabriele Lavermicocca and Robert Kaiser))	
16	PLAINTIFFS)	
17	v.)	
18	Ronald J. Robinson, Vernon Rodriguez, Virtual)	
19	Communications Corporation, Frank Yoder, Alisa Davis and DOES 1-10 and ROES 1-10, inclusively))	
20))	
21)	
22	ORDER ON POST JUDG	MENT MOTIONS	

ORDER ON POST JUDGMENT MOTIONS

The Court considered briefing on Defendant Rodriguez' post judgment motion, specifically Defendants "supplement to second post judgment motion for a new trial,

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26 Case Number: A-17-762264-C

or in the alternative, for further action" filed June 10, 2021, as well as Plaintiff's 1 Opposition and Defendant's Reply. 2 The Court held a hearing on August 3, 2021. Appearing for Plaintiffs was David 3 Liebrader; Appearing for Defendant Rodriguez was Scott Fleming. 4 After considering the briefing and argument from counsel, the court finds as 5 follows: 6 The Court previously denied Defendant's motions for reconsideration, and for 7 a new trial, and Defendant has not cited any evidence of plain error, manifest 8 injustice or irregularities in the proceeding justifying the reopening of evidence. 9 As to the claim of ineffectiveness of counsel, the Court finds that Defendant 10 Rodriguez was represented by counsel at trial, and had an opportunity to, and did 11 present testimony without restrictions. 12 As a result there is not a sufficient basis to change or amend the findings of 13 facts and conclusions of law or reopen the record to permit the introduction of 14 additional evidence. 15 On that basis, Defendant's Motion is Denied. 16 17 18 IT IS SO ORDERED: 19 Dated this 31st day of August, 2021 20 Dated this _____day of August, 2021 Hon. Jasmin Lilly-Spells 21 District Court Judge F49 0F1 E65E ABA7 22 Jasmin Lilly-Spells District Court Judge Submitted by: 23 24 25 2

:	
1	<u>/s/David Liebrader</u> David Liebrader
2	Attorney for Plaintiff
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David Liebrader <davel@investmentloss.com>

Proposed Order Aug 3 hearing

Scott Fleming <scott@fleminglawlv.com>
To: David Liebrader <davel@investmentloss.com>

Fri, Aug 13, 2021 at 4:12 PM

Hello Dave. No objection to the form of order. You may submit with my electronic signature.

Thanks.

Sent from my iPhone

On Aug 13, 2021, at 9:37 AM, David Liebrader <davel@investmentloss.com> wrote:

[Quoted text hidden]

<Order on post trial motions August 2021.doc>

1 **CSERV** 2 DISTRICT COURT 3 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 4 5 Steven Hotchkiss, Plaintiff(s) CASE NO: A-17-762264-C 6 DEPT. NO. Department 23 7 8 Ronald Robinson, Defendant(s) 9 10 AUTOMATED CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 11 This automated certificate of service was generated by the Eighth Judicial District Court. The foregoing Order was served via the court's electronic eFile system to all 12 recipients registered for e-Service on the above entitled case as listed below: 13 Service Date: 8/31/2021 14 E-Service BohnLawFirm office@bohnlawfirm.com 15 Michael Bohn mbohn@bohnlawfirm.com 16 17 Harold Gewerter harold@gewerterlaw.com 18 T. Louis Palazzo, Esq. louis@palazzolawfirm.com 19 Celina Moore celina@palazzolawfirm.com 20 Miriam Roberts miriam@palazzolawfirm.com 21 David Liebrader, Esq. dliebrader@gmail.com 22 David Liebrader DaveL@investmentloss.com 23 Vernon Rodriquez harold@gewerterlaw.com 24 25 scott@fleminglawlv.com **Scott Fleming** 26 Mark Kemp mkemp@bohnlawfirm.com 27