

APPELLENT'S APPENDIX

Electronically Filed
Dec 15 2021 10:15 p.m.
Elizabeth A. Brown
Clerk of Supreme Court

INDEX OF APPENDIX

Amended Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order.....	p.194-206
Court Minutes of February 13, 2020	p. 176
Court minutes of October 27, 2016	p. 1
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order	pp. 177-184
Judgment of Conviction	pp. 20-21
Motion for Order, or, In the Alternative, Motion for Contempt	pp. 45-49
Motion for Transcripts at State Expense	pp. 42-44
Motion to Compel Public Defender Department to Produce Records.....	pp. 25-29
Notice of Appeal	p. 185, 207
Notice of Motion.....	p. 41
Notice of Motion and Motion for Withdrawal of Attorney of Record	pp. 22-24
Order Granting Defendant's Pro Per Motion for Withdrawal of Attorney of Record ..	pp. 30-31
Order Granting Defendant's Pro Per Motion for Withdrawal of Attorney of Record ..	pp. 50-52
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.....	pp. 53-86
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.....	pp. 99- 148
Petition for Writ of Mandamus.....	pp. 32-40
Recorder's Transcript of January 17, 2018	pp. 186- 193
Recorder's Transcript of October 18, 2016	pp. 2-9
Recorder's Transcript re: Sentencing on June 21, 2018	pp. 87-98
Reply to State's Response to Petitioner's Supplemental Petition.....	pp. 173- 175
Sentencing Memorandum	pp. 10-19
State's Response to Defendant's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus	pp. 149- 172

**DISTRICT COURT
CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA**

Felony/Gross Misdemeanor

COURT MINUTES

October 27, 2016

C-16-318858-1 State of Nevada
 vs
 Jeffrey Brown

**October 27, 2016 8:30 AM All Pending Motions
(10/27/2016)**

HEARD BY: Leavitt, Michelle

COURTROOM: RJC Courtroom 14D

COURT CLERK: Susan Jovanovich

RECORDER: Debbie Winn

REPORTER:

PARTIES

PRESENT:	Brown, Jeffrey	Defendant
	Public Defender	
	Renteria, Marla	Deputy Public Defender
	Rhoades, Kristina A.	Chief Deputy District Attorney
	State of Nevada	Plaintiff

JOURNAL ENTRIES

INDICTMENT WARRANT RETURN...INITIAL ARRAIGNMENT

DEFT. BROWN ARRAIGNED, PLED NOT GUILTY, and WAIVED the 60-DAY RULE. COURT ORDERED, matter SET for trial.

CUSTODY

4/04/17 8:30 A.M. CALENDAR CALL

4/11/17 1:30 P.M. TRIAL BY JURY


PRINT DATE: 10/27/2016

Page 1 of 1

Minutes Date: October 27, 2016

EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA



CLERK OF THE COURT

THE STATE OF NEVADA,)
)
 Plaintiff,)
)
 vs.) GJ No. 16AGJ114X
) DC No. C318858
 JEFFREY BROWN, aka Jeffery Kent)
 Brown,)
)
 Defendant.)

Taken at Las Vegas, Nevada

Tuesday, October 18, 2016

4:03 p.m.

REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

VOLUME 2

Reported by: Danette L. Antonacci, C.C.R. No. 222

12:00 1 GRAND JURORS PRESENT ON OCTOBER 18, 2016
2
3 PAUL MORTALONI, Foreperson
4 WAYNE CLEVELAND, Deputy Foreperson
12:00 5 MARY ANN GOTHARD, Secretary
6 DAVID BAX
7 ARTHUR BYRD
8 NORMA MARTIN
9 MELVINA MISSOURI-DONOVAN
12:00 10 KATHERINE MUNIZ
11 ADRIENNE ODOGHOUE
12 MARRENA POUNCY
13 DELORES POWELL
14 MICHAEL TALKINGTON
12:00 15 DIANA WILSON
16 GERALDINE WOJNAROWSKI
17 LAWRENCE WONG
18
19 Also present at the request of the Grand Jury:
12:00 20 K. Nicholas Portz, Deputy District Attorney
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12:00

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INDEX OF EXHIBITSGrand Jury ExhibitsIdentified

1A - AMENDED PROPOSED INDICTMENT

5

12:00 1 LAS VEGAS, NEVADA, OCTOBER 18, 2016

2 * * * * *

3

4 DANETTE L. ANTONACCI,

12:00 5 having been first duly sworn to faithfully
6 and accurately transcribe the following
7 proceedings to the best of her ability.
8

9 MR. PORTZ: Good afternoon everyone my name
04:03 10 is anything ports I'm a deputy district attorney Clark
11 County DA's office prosecuting the case of State of
12 Nevada versus Jeffrey Brown stylized in your Indictment
13 as case 16AGJ114X. This is a continuation of a hearing
14 that took place last week on the 11th. It's my
04:03 15 understanding that all members present were either here
16 for the testimony or have read transcript of the
17 testimony and are familiar with what was presented at
18 last week's hearing. Is that correct?

19 A JUROR: Yes.

04:03 20 A JUROR: Yes.

21 MR. PORTZ: I'm showing affirmative
22 responses from all the grand jurors. I'm only asking
23 you to deliberate today based on the testimony and the
24 evidence you received at the last hearing. And I just
04:04 25 want to note that you'll be deliberating on a second

04:04 1 proposed Indictment that has been marked Grand Jury
2 Exhibit 1A. The only changes in this Indictment, I know
3 you reviewed it the last time, is that Farha Brown,
4 victim Farha Brown's name is spelled correctly. And if
04:04 5 you look at Count 1, aggravated stalking, page 2, lines
6 15 through 16, the State has amended that to read only
7 that with the intent that Farha Brown be placed in
8 reasonable fear of death or substantial bodily harm, not
9 Monequie Short and/or Farha Brown. There's only one
04:04 10 victim listed in Count 1. Does everyone understand the
11 amendments?

12 A JUROR: Yes.

13 MR. PORTZ: With that all the evidence has
14 been presented. I'll ask that you deliberate and I'll
04:04 15 be right outside if you need me. Thank you.

16 (At this time, all persons, other than
17 members of the Grand Jury, exit the room at 4:04 p.m.
18 and return at 4:07 p.m.)

19 THE FOREPERSON: Mr. District Attorney, by
04:07 20 a vote of 12 or more grand jurors a true bill has been
21 returned against defendant Jeffrey Brown charging the
22 crimes of aggravated stalking, attempt murder with use
23 of a deadly weapon, battery with use of a deadly weapon
24 resulting in substantial bodily harm constituting
04:07 25 domestic violence, battery with use of a deadly weapon

04:07 1 resulting in substantial bodily harm, assault with a
2 deadly weapon, child abuse, neglect or endangerment with
3 use of a deadly weapon, and discharge of a firearm from
4 or within a structure or vehicle, in Grand Jury case
04:07 5 number 16AGJ114X. We instruct you to prepare an
6 Indictment in conformance with the proposed Indictment
7 previously submitted to us.

8 MR. PORTZ: Thank you all.

9 (Proceedings concluded.)

04:07 10 --oo0oo--

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04:07

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REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE

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STATE OF NEVADA)

: Ss

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COUNTY OF CLARK)

04:07

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6

I, Danette L. Antonacci, C.C.R. 222, do

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hereby certify that I took down in Shorthand (Stenotype)

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all of the proceedings had in the before-entitled matter

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at the time and place indicated and thereafter said

04:07

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shorthand notes were transcribed at and under my

11

direction and supervision and that the foregoing

12

transcript constitutes a full, true, and accurate record

13

of the proceedings had.

14

Dated at Las Vegas, Nevada,

04:07

15

October 31, 2016.

16

17

/s/ Danette L. Antonacci

18

19

Danette L. Antonacci, C.C.R. 222

04:07

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04:07

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AFFIRMATION

2

Pursuant to NRS 239B.030

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The undersigned does hereby affirm that the
preceding TRANSCRIPT filed in GRAND JURY CASE NUMBER
16AGJ114X:

04:07

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8

X Does not contain the social security number of any
person,

9

04:07

10

-OR-

11

 Contains the social security number of a person as
required by:

12

13

A. A specific state or federal law, to-
wit: NRS 656.250.

14

-OR-

04:07

15

16

B. For the administration of a public program
or for an application for a federal or
state grant.

17

18

/s/ Danette L. Antonacci

19

Signature

10-31-16

Date

04:07

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Danette L. Antonacci
Print Name


22

23

Official Court Reporter
Title

24

25



MEMO
STEVEN B. WOLFSON
Clark County District Attorney
Nevada Bar #001565
K. NICHOLAS PORTZ
Deputy District Attorney
Nevada Bar #12473
200 Lewis Avenue
Las Vegas, Nevada 89155-2212
(702) 671-2500
Attorney for Plaintiff

DISTRICT COURT
CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

THE STATE OF NEVADA,

Plaintiff,

-vs-

JEFFREY BROWN,
#3074249

Defendant.

CASE NO: C-16-318858-1

DEPT NO: XII

SENTENCING MEMORANDUM

DATE OF HEARING: JUNE 21, 2018
TIME OF HEARING: 8:30 AM

COMES NOW, the State of Nevada, by STEVEN B. WOLFSON, Clark County District Attorney, through K. NICHOLAS PORTZ, Deputy District Attorney, and hereby submits this Memorandum for the Court's consideration.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On October 19, 2016, the State filed a nine (9) count Indictment charging Jeffrey Brown, aka, Jeffrey Kent Brown ("Defendant"), with the following crimes: AGGRAVATED STALKING (Category B Felony - NRS 200.575 - NOC 50333); ATTEMPT MURDER WITH USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON (Category B Felony - NRS 200.010, 200.030, 193.330, 193.165 - NOC 50031); BATTERY WITH USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON RESULTING IN SUBSTANTIAL BODILY HARM CONSTITUTING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE

1 (Category B Felony - NRS 200.481; 200.485; 33.018 - NOC 57936); BATTERY WITH USE
2 OF A DEADLY WEAPON RESULTING IN SUBSTANTIAL BODILY HARM (Category
3 B Felony - NRS 200.481 - NOC 50226); ASSAULT WITH A DEADLY WEAPON (Category
4 B Felony - NRS 200.471 - NOC 50201); CHILD ABUSE, NEGLECT, OR
5 ENDANGERMENT WITH USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON (Category B Felony - NRS
6 200.508, 193.165 - NOC 55228); and DISCHARGE OF FIREARM FROM OR WITHIN A
7 STRUCTURE OR VEHICLE (Category B Felony - NRS 202.287 - NOC 51445). Bail was
8 set at \$650,000.00.

9 Defendant was arraigned on October 27, 2016, wherein Defendant pled Not Guilty and
10 waived his right to a speedy trial. Trial was ultimately set for January 17, 2018.

11 On January 17, 2018, the morning of trial, Defendant entered into a Guilty Plea
12 Agreement with the State wherein he did plead guilty to the following crimes: ATTEMPT
13 MURDER WITH USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON (Category B Felony – NRS 200.010,
14 200.030, 193.330, 193.165 – NOC 50031) and ASSAULT WITH A DEADLY WEAPON
15 (Category B Felony – NRS 200.471 – NOC 50201). A corresponding two (2) count Third
16 Amended Indictment was also filed that day. Sentencing was set for March 8, 2018.

17 Defendant subsequently sought to withdraw his plea and attorney David Fischer, Esq.,
18 was appointed for the purposes of determining whether a motion to withdraw plea was
19 warranted. On June 5, 2018, Mr. Fischer advised the Court that Defendant had no legal basis
20 to withdraw his plea. Sentencing is presently set for June 21, 2018.

21 The State hereby submits this Memorandum for the Court's consideration.

22 STATEMENT OF FACTS

23 Facts Elicited at the Grand Jury

24 Defendant and Farha Brown ("Farha") have been married twenty-two years and share
25 one child in common. Grand Jury Transcript, October 11, 2016 ("GJT"), pp. 23-24. In July
26 of 2016, Farha and Defendant separated, resulting in Farha moving out of their shared
27 residence and into her own apartment in Henderson. GJT, pp. 24-25. Following their
28 separation, Defendant began texting Farha a number of inappropriate messages, which resulted

1 in Farha changing her phone number. GJT, p. 31. Defendant also had password access to an
2 e-mail account that Farha used (Defendant had his own separate e-mail account from which
3 he would e-mail Farha from time to time). GJT, p. 28. Also, unbeknownst to Farha, Defendant
4 had access to an OnStar account linked to Farha's 2015 Chevrolet Equinox, which allowed
5 him to locate and access her vehicle – even if it is locked. GJT, pp. 29, 34.

6 Sometime after Farha had moved out in July, she began dating Moneque Short (“Mo”).
7 GJT, p. 25. Mo was in the process of separating from his wife when he and Farha met. GJT,
8 p. 33. While they were dating, Farha asked Mo for information on filing for divorce on-line
9 and Mo emailed Farha copies of his on-line divorce papers for her to look over. GJT, p. 33.
10 In September of 2016, Mo's sister died and Farha joined Mo and Mekhi (Mo's fifteen year old
11 son) on a trip to Indiana for the funeral. GJT, pp. 26-27, 68. Farha purchased the airline tickets
12 online with her Southwest credit card, which forwarded her travel itinerary – including
13 departure and return dates – to her email account. GJT, p. 27.

14 On Wednesday, September 14, 2016, Farha drove Mo and Mekhi in her car to
15 McCarran Airport, where she parked on the sixth floor of the long-term parking garage. GJT,
16 pp. 28-29. Farha did not tell Defendant that she was leaving town with Mo. GJT, p. 29. On
17 Friday, September 16, while Farha was in Indiana, she talked to Defendant over the phone and
18 Defendant was immediately hostile. GJT, pp. 30-31. Defendant called Farha names, including
19 a liar, and informed her that he knew she was in Indiana with Mo. GJT, p. 32. When Farha
20 asked Defendant how he knew her location, Defendant told her he had accessed her email and
21 read her flight itinerary. GJT, p. 32. Defendant then began to ask questions about Mo,
22 including what he looked like and whether he was still married. GJT, pp. 32. Defendant told
23 Farha he knew Mo had been married because he had also accessed the divorce papers Mo had
24 emailed Farha. GJT, p. 33.

25 During that same call, Defendant informed Farha that he had broken into her car at
26 McCarran. GJT, p. 33. Defendant explained that he had located her car both through her email
27 itinerary and by accessing Farha's OnStar account, which he used to locate the vehicle via the
28 GPS location service. GJT, pp. 33-34. Defendant told Farha that once he located the vehicle

1 and found it locked, he again accessed Farha's OnStar account to unlock the vehicle so that he
2 could get into the car. GJT, pp. 34-35. Defendant told Farha that he searched the car and found
3 a pair of keys that he believed belonged to Mo. GJT, p. 36. Mo had in fact left his keys inside
4 the closed center console of the vehicle. GJT, p. 36. Defendant told Farha that he had removed
5 Mo's keys from her car, drove to her Henderson apartment and tried every single key to see if
6 one fit in Farha's door. GJT, p. 37. Defendant said that one of the keys did fit the lock to
7 Farha's apartment, and Defendant again called Farha a liar and said that she was living with
8 Mo. GJT, p. 37. Defendant then told Farha "don't make me regret what I am going to do or
9 what I am capable of. Or you don't know - [Mo] doesn't know what I'm capable of." GJT,
10 p. 39. Immediately after the phone call, Farha, in tears, told Mo about all of her conversation
11 with Defendant. GJT, p. 54.

12 Based on that threat and the lengths Defendant had taken to access Farha's car and
13 apartment while she was out of town, Farha testified that she "[a]bsolutely" was in fear for her
14 safety and the safety of Mo. GJT, pp. 39-40. Mo also testified that Defendant's behavior had
15 caused him to concern for both his and Farha's safety. GJT, p. 54. To protect herself, Farah
16 immediately called OnStar to change her passcode to prevent Defendant from being able to
17 track her movements. GJT, p. 40. She also immediately called her apartment complex and
18 asked that her locks be changed. GJT, p. 41.

19 Farha, Mo and Mekhi returned to Las Vegas on Monday, September 19, 2016. GJT, p.
20 41. Notably, their arrival date and time was included in the email itinerary she received from
21 Southwest, which Defendant had already accessed. GJT, p. 42. Farha testified that as she
22 packed to leave Indiana that morning, she told Mo about her fear that Defendant may meet
23 them at the airport. GJT, p. 41. She considered calling her son to relay a message to Defendant
24 that her flight would be delayed an extra day. GJT, p. 42. When their plane landed in Las
25 Vegas, Farha again told Mo that she was concerned Defendant might be waiting for them and
26 thought they should get airport security to escort them to the car. GJT, p. 42. Mo responded
27 to Farha that there were a lot of people at the airport and he thought they would be fine without
28 security. GJT, pp. 42-43. During the same time frame, Defendant was recorded on airport

1 surveillance as having entered the airport parking structure, in a 2007 Ford Escape, three times
2 that day: at approximately 10:42 AM, 11:40 AM, and 12:51 PM.

3 Farha, Mo and Mekhi got their luggage and walked to Farha's car on the sixth floor of
4 the parking lot. GJT, p. 43. As the elevator door opened, Farha whispered to Mo to look for a
5 red Corvette Defendant is known to drive. GJT, p. 43. Farha whispered this to Mo so as not
6 to startle or scare Mekhi. GJT, p. 43. Farha testified that they walked quickly to the car as
7 she was looking "over [her] shoulders" and remotely started her vehicle, GJT, pp. 43-44.

8 As Farha opened her trunk and began to load the luggage, she saw her son's 2007 Ford
9 Escape pull up with Defendant alone in the driver's seat. GJT, p. 44. Defendant confronted
10 Farha about Mo, cursing and ranting at her. GJT, pp. 44, 57. Farha told Defendant "we're not
11 going to do this," then nervously walked away to pack the car so they could "quickly leave"
12 the situation. GJT, p. 44. While Farha was putting suitcases in her car, Mo attempted to
13 intervene and told Defendant that if Defendant had something to say to Mo he should say it
14 directly to him rather than to Farha. GJT, pp. 45, 57-58.

15 Defendant looked at Mo, reached into his vehicle's center console and pulled out a
16 silver and black revolver. GJT, pp. 58-59. Defendant then pointed the firearm at Mo and, as
17 Mo was backing away, Defendant fired off two shots, with one bullet striking Mo in the hip.
18 GJT, pp. 58-60. Farha began to scream and ran to the passenger side of her vehicle to get
19 away from Defendant. GJT, p. 45. As she ran, Farha heard tires screeching behind her, then
20 the vehicle come to a stop. GJT, p. 45. Defendant fired off two shots at Farha. GJT, pp. 46,
21 60. After the first shot, Farha screamed "Jeff, no," then the second shot struck her in the lower
22 left part of her back. GJT, pp. 45-46.

23 Mo screamed for his son Mekhi to run. GJT, p. 61. Mekhi was approximately 7 feet
24 away from Farha when she was shot. GJT, p. 70. Mekhi recalled hearing the gunshots,
25 watching his father and Farha fall to the ground and seeing blood. GJT, pp. 70-71. Before
26 running away, Mekhi saw Defendant point the gun at him from inside the car, from
27 approximately twenty (20) to thirty (30) feet away. GJT, pp. 71-72. Mekhi ran down an on-
28 ramp to the fifth floor of the garage to hide. GJT, pp. 69-71.

1 Defendant then sped off down the parking garage ramp. GJT, p. 45. Farha eventually
2 called 9-1-1 and police and medical assistance arrived. GJT, p. 62. Detective Verl Conover
3 of the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department ("LVMPD") was one of the detectives
4 assigned to investigate the shooting. GJT, pp. 12-14. After responding to McCarran, Detective
5 Conover and his partner Detective Treppis went to Defendant's house. GJT, p. 15. Defendant
6 was not there, but the detectives were able to speak to his son and learned that Defendant may
7 be at a veteran's hospital located at 6900 Pecos in North Las Vegas. GJT, p. 16. Detectives
8 Conover and Treppis arrived at the hospital and found the gray Ford Escape Defendant had
9 been driving during the shooting. GJT, p. 17. From outside the vehicle, Detective Conover
10 could see the handle of a revolver handgun that was covered by a towel positioned in the center
11 console of the vehicle. GJT, pp. 17-18. As the detectives approached the hospital, they
12 encountered Defendant who was being escorted out in a wheelchair by a VA hospital officer.
13 GJT, pp. 18-19. They then took Defendant into custody. GJT, p. 20.

14 Since the shooting, Farha continues to suffer from severe back pain and numbness of
15 her left leg. GJT, p. 47. The bullet remains in Farha's back to this day. GJT, p. 46. Mo suffered
16 an entry-exit wound that went through his right hip and exited out of his left buttocks. GJT, p.
17 60. Since being shot, Mo suffers from numbness and prolonged pain in his leg, which prevents
18 him from sleeping for more than two hours at a time. GJT, p. 63. Mo must now walk with the
19 assistance of a cane. GJT, p. 63. Mekhi has had to see a therapist. GJT, p. 65.

20 Additional Facts Pertinent to Sentencing Memorandum

21 While in custody, Defendant made a number of phone calls in which he (1)
22 acknowledged he was trying to kill Mo at the time he shot him; (2) asked others to get "dirt"
23 on Farha he could use to "tear her down" at trial; (3) suborn perjury through his son, Faheeb,
24 a witness to the case; and (4) ask his son to destroy what Defendant believed to be
25 incriminating evidence. See EXHIBIT 1 (Compact Disc). As a result of these calls,
26 Defendant's jail phone call privileges were revoked in Justice Court. See EXHIBIT 2 (Justice
27 Court Minutes, 10/7/2016).

28 ///

1 The State wishes to highlight here the more significant statements made by Defendant
2 in the calls after his arrest:

3 • **Track 55266279**

4 In this call, made on September 22, 2016, Defendant asks the female to “get
5 leverage on Farha” and try to pull up information about her criminal past. Most
6 damning, Defendant discusses portions of the shooting in which he states, while
7 referencing victim Mo Short, “I shot that motherfucker twice... *I tried to kill that*
8 *mother fucker.*” Notably, Mo Short was standing only a few steps away from his
9 fifteen year old son when Defendant was trying to kill him.

10 • **Track 55268389**

11 In this call, also made September 22, 2016, Defendant discusses the incident and
12 concludes by telling the female on the phone “*It was worth it.*” Defendant also
13 discusses the fact that he was going through Farha’s emails before the incident and
14 had read emails between her and the new boyfriend.

15 • **Track 55290193**

16 In this call, made September 23, 2016, Defendant again asks the female to be a
17 witness for him at trial. He tells the female “*You gonna help me tear Farha down.*”
18 He then asks the female to testify that Farha was allegedly involved in illegal
19 activity years ago in Chicago. When the female response “I don’t remember that,”
20 Defendant instructs her that regardless of whether or not she remembers, “*you*
21 *gonna play it like you did.*” Clearly, Defendant is asking this woman to lie on the
22 stand to attack the character of his victim.

23 • **Track 55290397**

24 In this call, made on September 23, 2016, Defendant is talking to his son, and
25 witness in this case, Faheeb Brown. Defendant instructs his son that his mother,
26 Farha, “wants to control you,” and that he is to “tell her you gonna be a character
27 witness at my trial... You not there for the people, you there for your dad.” When
28 Faheeb informs Defendant that he could not testify to anything that would help

1 Defendant's case, Defendant responds "Yes you do. One false move and I go to jail
2 for a long time and you never see your daddy again. You don't let Farha do me like
3 that. You get on the stand and you testify." Defendant also brags to his son about
4 shooting Mo, stating "***He got shot in the chest. Yeah, I popped him in the chest.***
5 ***I'm telling you I know where I shot him at.***" Later on Defendant instructs Faheeb
6 to locate evidence unknown to police that he believes would hurt his case, stating
7 "***You have to get the black bag your mom has to get a key to that dude's house –***
8 ***that will prove my premeditation.***" Clearly, Defendant is seeking to have others
9 destroy evidence he believed to be incriminating.

10 CONCLUSION

11 Defendant systematically stalked, hunted and gunned down his victims. Once he had
12 shot both Farha and Mo he needlessly and cruelly pointed his firearm at Mekhi, who was
13 forced to run away from what he believed to be his dying father. The Defendant's actions the
14 day of the attempted murder constitute the very definition of "lying in wait." Defendant has
15 shown no remorse for his criminal activity and has actively sought to interfere with witnesses
16 and evidence in this case. He should be held to full account.


17 Based on the foregoing, the State respectfully requests that this Court sentence
18 Defendant for Count 1 to a term of incarceration of 96 – 240 months plus a consecutive term
19 of 96 – 240 months. The state respectfully requests that this Court sentence Defendant for
20 Count 2 to a consecutive term of incarceration of 24 – 72 months.

21 DATED this 19th day of June, 2018.

22 Respectfully submitted,

23 STEVEN B. WOLFSON
24 Clark County District Attorney
Nevada Bar #001565

25 BY


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27 K. NICHOLAS PORTZ
28 Deputy District Attorney
Nevada Bar #12473

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
CERTIFICATE OF ELECTRONIC FILING

I hereby certify that service of Sentencing Memorandum, was made this 19th day of June, 2018, by Electronic Filing to:


TIMOTHY
attorneytreffinger@gmail.com


C. Garcia
Secretary for the District Attorney's Office

KNP/cg/L3



“EXHIBIT 1”



1 JOCP

2
3
4
5 DISTRICT COURT

6 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

7
8 THE STATE OF NEVADA,

9 Plaintiff,

10 -vs-

CASE NO. C-16-318858-1

DEPT. NO. XII

11
12 JEFFREY BROWN aka
13 Jeffery Kent Brown
14 #3074249

15 Defendant.

16 JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION

17 (PLEA OF GUILTY)

18
19 The Defendant previously appeared before the Court with counsel and entered a
20 plea of guilty to the crimes of COUNT 1 – ATTEMPT MURDER WITH USE OF A
21 DEADLY WEAPON (Category B Felony) in violation of NRS 200.010, 200.030, 193.330,
22 193.165; and COUNT 2 – ASSAULT WITH A DEADLY WEAPON (Category B Felony)
23 in violation of NRS 200.471; thereafter, on the 21st day of June, 2018, the Defendant
24 was present in court for sentencing with counsel TIMOTHY TREFFINGER, ESQ., and
25 good cause appearing,
26
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28

RECEIVED
JUN 25 2018
DEPT. 12

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1 THE DEFENDANT IS HEREBY ADJUDGED guilty of said offenses and, in
2 addition to the \$25.00 Administrative Assessment Fee, \$741.58 Restitution and
3 \$150.00 DNA Analysis Fee including testing to determine genetic markers plus \$3.00
4 DNA Collection Fee, the Defendant is sentenced to the Nevada Department of
5 Corrections as follows: **COUNT 1** – a MAXIMUM of TWENTY (20) YEARS with a
6 MINIMUM parole eligibility of EIGHT (8) YEARS, plus a CONSECUTIVE term of
7 TWENTY (20) YEARS with a MINIMUM parole eligibility of EIGHT (8) YEARS for the
8 Use of a Deadly Weapon; and **COUNT 2** - a MAXIMUM of SEVENTY-TWO (72)
9 MONTHS with a MINIMUM parole eligibility of SIXTEEN (16) MONTHS,
10 CONCURRENT with COUNT 1; with FIVE HUNDRED THIRTY-SIX (536) DAYS credit
11 for time served.
12
13

14 DATED this 27 day of June, 2018

15
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17 
18 MICHELLE LEAVITT
19 DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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1 JEFFREY K. BROWN
2 MNEC - 1200868
3 P.O. Box 7000
4 CARSON CITY, NV 89702-7000

FILED
OCT 09 2018

7
Clerk of Court

5 EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
6 OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

9
10 STATE OF NEVADA

Case No.: C-16-318858-1

11 Plaintiff,

MOTION FOR WITHDRAWAL
OF ATTORNEY OF RECORD AND
TRANSFER OF RECORDS

12 vs.

13 JEFFREY K. BROWN

DATE OF HEARING: NOVEMBER 13, 2018
TIME OF HEARING: 8:30 AM

14 Defendant

16 NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR WITHDRAWAL
17 OF ATTORNEY OF RECORD AND TRANSFER OF RECORDS

18 COMES NOW, JEFFREY K. BROWN, in PRO PER and herein above SUBMIT his
19 Notice of Motion and Motion for withdrawal of Attorney of Record and transfer of records, moving
20 this court to order that TIMOTHY R. TREFFINGER, counsel of record in the
21 above-entitled action, be withdrawn as counsel of record herein, and that said counsel deliver to
22 defendant all documents, pleadings, papers, and tangible personal property in counsel's possession
23 and control to defendant, at counsel's expense, to the above address.

24 This motion is based upon NRS 7.055, Nevada Supreme Court Rules 46 & 166, and this
25 Courts Local Rule of Practice corresponding to this motion, as well as the attached points and
26 authorities and affidavit supporting same.

RECEIVED
OCT 09 2018
CLERK OF THE COURT

C-16-318858-1
MOT
Motion
4786637



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Upon being discharged by his client,

As the judgment of conviction has been entered in this case, with appeal, if any, having been perfected, counsel's services are no longer required in this criminal matter. Defendant has, pursuant to the mandates of NRS 7.055 (3), directed counsel to forward to him all documentation generated in this action and to withdraw as counsel of record, but counsel has failed to comply. See Affidavit in support of instant motion.


Counsel herein has no legal basis for withholding Defendant's papers in this matter. As defendant owes counsel NO fees, which would permit counsel to maintain said papers under a general or retaining lien. Figliuzzi v. District Court, 111 Nev. 338, 340-11, 890 P.2d 798, 800-02 (1995).

000023

1 Therefore, this Court is moved to exercise its jurisdiction in this matter and ORDER
2 counsel to be withdrawn as counsel of record and deliver to Defendant the entirety of documentation.
3 generated in the instant case, as Defendant has no other remedy at law to compel counsel to do so.
4

5 Dated this 12 day of SEPTEMBER 20 18.
6
7
8

9 By:

JEFFREY K. BROWN


Defendant, in PRO PER
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Case No C-16-318858-1
Dept No 12

FILED

NOV 19 2018

Ann L. Blum
CLERK OF COURT

1. Jeffrey Brown # 1200868

2. NNCC

3. P.O. Box 7000

4. Carson City, NV 89702

5. IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT STATE OF NEVADA
CLARK COUNTY

6.

Case No C-16-318858-1

7. Jeffrey Brown, # 1200868
Defendant,

Dept No 12

8.

9.

January 15 2019

@ 8:30 AM

10. STATE OF NEVADA,

11. Plaintiff.

12. MOTION TO COMPEL PUBLIC DEFENDER DEPARTMENT TO PRODUCE

13. RECORDS

14. The Defendant proceeds in prose, thus, is held to a less stringent

15. Standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyer's (see)

16. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520, 92 S.Ct 594, 30 L.Ed. 2d

17. 652 (1972).

18. The Defendant submits this motion to compel Public

19. Defender's Department to produce records.

20. I. Procedural History

21. On 9/19/16 The Defendant was charged with the offense(s) of

22. Attempt Murder with use of a deadly weapon and a number of

23. other charges. (see case summary).

24. "

25. "

26. "

27. "

28. "

RECEIVED

NOV 19 2018

CLERK OF THE COURT

C-16-318858-1
MCOM
Motion to Compel
4797859



1. II. Authority/Argument

2. The motion for records is not a post-conviction discovery
3 request as outlined in NRS 34.780(2). The motion is gen-
4 eralized in accordance to NRS 7.055(2).

5 First, Defendant approaches this motion with great
6 caution as to not interfere with the integrity of the
7 court.

8 In accordance to NRS 7.055(1) Defendant has made
9 demands for his complete files generated by Defense
10 counsel during the course of representation, these files
11 usually contain all pretrial motions, inter-office memos,
12 E-Mails, Fax's witness interviews and other evidence
13 obtained through discovery and other documents and
14 evidence obtained during trial preparation, In addition
15 to pretrial and trial, transcripts proceedings. Both the
16 Trial Counsel and Appellate counsel have failed to properly
17 provide Defendant with his trial and Appellate files contrary
18 to NRS 7.055(1), leaving Defendant no readily available
19 remedy other than to make application to this court
20 for records. The records are essential to the effect
21 of presentation and support of claims which will be
22 presented in post-conviction relief. In this case,
23 Defendant believes that his conviction is contrary to law
24 and he was denied his right to effective assistance
25 of counsel in that

26 (a) contrary to 34.750(1)(b),(c).


27 (b) counsel failed to investigate both factual and legal to
28 determine if matters of defense can be developed, 000026

1. The record being requested were never provided to Defendant
2. and are indispensable to the presentation and support of the
3. claims stated above and for the development of further
4. claims and are necessary, as not even a seasoned
5. attorney can remember all aspects to a case and all
6. errors which may have occurred both in pretrial and
7. trial proceedings, thus, this is the necessity to have the records
8. in order to have clarity as to the facts and to effectively
9. present the claims to the court, (see) Henderson v. United States,
10. 734 F.2d 483, 484 (9th Cir. 1984) (Showing of particularized need
11. required) In this case, the Defendant has shown such and with-
12. out the records requested herein the Defendant will be pre-
13. cluded from effective and equal access to the court
14. because [a] person with funds can purchase the records from
15. the Court File, here, Defendant is indigent and cannot afford to
16. purchase the records, see generally the con's; declaration's
17. in Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 and Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12.

18. III. CONCLUSION

19. Because the law is clear under NRS 7.055(1) and the Public
20. Defender's Dept both counsel's Trial and Appellate have
21. failed to provide to produce the files. Defendant request
22. this Court to issue it's order directing them to produce such,
23. as an alternative, for the state to produce the entire court
24. file and the District Attorney's file.

25. This document do not contain any Social Security numbers
26. of any person.


27. Respectfully submitted,

Jeffrey Brown Defendant
In pro se

Jeffrey Brown #1200868
NNEC
P.O. Box 7000
Carson City, NV 89702

3763

STEVEN D. GRIERSON, Clerk of the Court
200 LEWIS Ave., 3rd Floor
LAS VEGAS, NV 89155-1160


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NOV 12

NORTHERN NEVADA CORRECTIONAL CE



1 **ORDR**

2 STEVEN B. WOLFSON
3 Clark County District Attorney
4 Nevada Bar #001565
5 AMY FERREIRA
6 Chief Deputy District Attorney
7 Nevada Bar #010347
8 200 Lewis Avenue
9 Las Vegas, NV 89155-2212
10 (702) 671-2500
11 Attorney for Plaintiff

8 DISTRICT COURT
9 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

10 THE STATE OF NEVADA,

11 Plaintiff,

12 -vs-

13 JEFFREY BROWN, aka,
14 Jeffery Kent Brown, #3074249

15 Defendant.

CASE NO: C-16-318858-1

DEPT NO: XII

16 **ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S PRO PER MOTION FOR WITHDRAWAL**
17 **OF ATTORNEY OF RECORD AND TRANSFER OF RECORD**

18 DATE OF HEARING: November 13, 2018
19 TIME OF HEARING: 8:30 A.M.

20 THIS MATTER having come on for hearing before the above entitled Court on the
21 13th day of November, 2018, the Defendant not being present IN PROPER PERSON, the
22 Plaintiff being represented by STEVEN B. WOLFSON, District Attorney, through AMY
23 FERREIRA, Chief Deputy District Attorney, without argument, based on the pleadings and
24 good cause appearing therefor,

25 ///

26 ///

27 ///

28 ///

RECEIVED

NOV 15 2018

DEPT. 12

1 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Defendant's Pro Per Motion for Withdrawal of
2 Attorney of Record and Transfer of Records, shall be, and it is GRANTED.


3 DATED this 20 day of November, 2018.

4
5 
DISTRICT JUDGE

6 STEVEN B. WOLFSON
7 Clark County District Attorney
Nevada Bar #001565

TJ

8
9 BY


10 AMY FERREIRA
11 Chief Deputy District Attorney
12 Nevada Bar #010347

13
14 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

15 I certify that on the 28th day of November, 2018, I mailed a copy of the foregoing Order
16 to: JEFFREY BROWN
17 BAC #1200868
18 P.O. BOX 7000
19 CARSON CITY, NV 89702

20
21
22 BY


Secretary for the District Attorney's Office

23
24
25
26
27
28 16F15698X/mlb/dvu

Jeffrey Brown #1200868

P.O. Box 7000

Carson City NV. 89702

FILED

FEB 26 2019

Alvin L. Shuman
CLERK OF COURT

IN THE Eighth JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF Clark.

Jeffrey Brown
Petitioner/Plaintiff,

v.

Any Timothy Treffinger
Respondent/Defendant

Case No. C-16-318858-1

Dept. No. III of XII

MARCH 21, 2019
@ 8:30 AM

PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS

Comes now, Petitioner, Jeffrey Brown, pro per, moves this
Honorable Court to consider this petition for Writ of Mandamus. This petition is made pursuant to Nev. R.
State. 34.160 inclusive to 34.310, and the following points and authorities, papers, pleadings and document
on file herein.

RECEIVED
FEB 26 2019

CLERK OF THE COURT

C-16-318858-1
PMAN
Petition for Writ of Mandamus
4818601



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STATEMENT OF FACTS

On November 28th 2018 The District Court via The
Dept No XII Judge, did so grant Mr. Brown's Pro-per
Motion For withdrawal of Attorney of record and
did so "order" this Attorney of Record being that of
Attorney Timothy Treffinger

As this Attorney was ordered to Transfer
and to Deliver onto Mr. Jeffrey Brown. his entire
Case File, All papers, pleadings, case-notes, evidence,
and Any other documents pertinent and/or related
to Mr. Jeffrey Brown's case that "Attorney Treffinger"
was in fact The Attorney of record for case no.
C-16-318858-1

whereas to date Mr. Brown has "NOT" received A
single document from "Attorney Treffinger"
As this Attorney has defiantly ignored to comply
and Adhere to this court "order" Filed 11/28/2018.

Therefore this petitioner Mr. Jeffrey Brown hereby
respectfully requests this honorable court to
enforce said "order" Filed 11/28/18 in no C-16-318858-1
As to compel Attorney Treffinger
to Deliver onto Mr. Brown his entire case File
in 7 seven Business Days other-wise this Attorney
shall be held in Contempt of court. As the
name and Address of said Attorney of Record is
Timothy R. Treffinger # 12877 ---
1148 S. Maryland Parkway Las-Vegas NV. 89129

DISCUSSION

When a writ of mandamus is appropriate

“A writ of mandamus is available to compel the performance of an act that the law requires as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station or to control an arbitrary or capricious exercise of discretion.” *International Game Tech. v. Dist. Cr.*, 124 Nev. 193, 197, 179 P.3d 556, 558 (2008) (footnote omitted); NRS 34.160. this court has held that the decision to admit or exclude expert opinion testimony is discretionary and is not typically subject to review on a petition for a writ of mandamus. *Walton v. District Court*, 94 Nev. 690, 693, 586 P.2d 309, 311 (1978). Mandamus is also not available when the “petitioner has a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law,” *Mineral County v. State, Dep’t of Conserv.*, 117 Nev. 235, 243, 20 P.3d 800, 805 (2001), and the opportunity to appeal a final judgment typically provides an adequate legal remedy, see *Walton*, 94 Nev. At 693, 586 P.2d at 310.

Despite these limitations, we recognize some narrow exceptions when writ relief is appropriate concerning challenges to decisions that admit or exclude evidence. We acknowledge that the ability to appeal a final judgment may not always constitute an adequate and speedy remedy that precludes writ relief, depending on the “underlying proceedings” status, the types of issues raised I the writ petition, and whether a future appeal will permit this court to meaningfully review the issues presented.” *D.R. Horton v. Dist. Ct.*, 123 Nev. 468, 474-75, 168 P.3d 731, 736 (2007). Thus, we may consider writ petitions challenging the admission or exclusion of evidence when “an important issue of law needs clarification and public policy is served by this court’s invocation of its original jurisdiction,” *Sonia f. V. Dist. Ct.*, 125 Nev. 495, 498, 215 P.3d 705, 707 (2009) (quoting *Mineral County*, 117 Nev. At 243, 20 P.3d at 805), or when the issue is “one of first impression and of fundamental public importance,” *County of Clark v. Upchurch*, 114 Nev. 749, 753 961 P.2d 754, 757 (1998). We may also consider whether resolution of the writ petition will mitigate or resolve related or future litigation. *Id.* Ultimately, however, our analysis turns on the promotion of judicial economy. *Smith v. District Court*, 113 Nev. 1343, 1345, 950 P.2d 280, 281 (1997) (“The interests of judicial economy . . . will remain the primary standard by which this court exercises its discretion.”).

II. LEGAL ARGUMENT

1 Petitions for Extraordinary Writs are addressed to the sound discretion of the Supreme Court of
2 Nevada and may issue when there is no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy at law. See, State v. Second
3 Judicial District Court ex. Rel. County of Washoe, 116 Nev. 953, 11 P.3d 1209 (2000).

4 A writ of mandamus is issued to compel performance of an act which the law especially enjoins as a
5 duty resulting from an office, trust or station. See, Lewis v. Stewart, 96 Nev. 846, 619 P.2d 1212 (1980).

6 A writ of mandamus may issue to control arbitrary or capricious exercise of discretion. See, Barnes v.
7 Eighth Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada, in and for Clark County, 103 Nev. 679,
8 748 P.2d 483 (1987).

9 This Court has also held that the action being sought to be compelled must be one already required
10 By law. See, Mineral County v. State Department of Conservation and Natural Resources, 117 Nev. 235
11 , 20 P.3d 800 (2001).

12 Mandamus is the appropriate vehicle for challenging contested orders entered by the District Court.
13 See, Angell v. Eighth Judicial District Court In and For the County of Clark, 18 Nev. 923,
14 839 P.2d 1329, (1992).

AFFIRMATION
Pursuant to NRS 239B.030

The undersigned does hereby affirm that the preceding _____

Petition For writ of MANDAMUS
(Title of Document)

Filed in District Court Case No. C-16-318858-1

☒ Does not contain the social security number of any person.

-OR-

☐ Contains the social security number of a person as required by:

A. A specific state or federal law, to wit:

(State specific law)

-OR-

B. For the administration of a public program or

J. H. Brun
(Signature)

2-19-19
(Date)

CONCLUSION

Wherefore, all of the above stated reasons, Petitioner/Plaintiff respectfully requests this Honorable Court to Order Attorney To Deliver onto This
petitioner Mr. Brown his entire case file
within a reasonable amount of time as required by N.R.S. 34.830.

DATED this 19th day of February, 2019

Respectfully submitted,

[Signature]
Petitioner/Plaintiff

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify pursuant to N.R.C.P. 5(b) that I am the Petitioner/Plaintiff in the foregoing Petition for Writ of Mandamus, and that on this 19th day of February, 2019, I did serve a true and correct copy of the above mentioned document, by giving it to a prison official at the [Signature]

To deposit in the U. S. Mail, sealed in an envelope, postage pre-paid, and addressed as follows:

clerk of the court

office of the district Attorney

200 Lewis Avenue

200 Lewis Avenue

Las-Vegas NEVADA

P.O. Box 552212

89155-2311

Las-Vegas NV

89155-2212

DATED this 19th day of February, 2019

[Signature]
Petitioner/Plaintiff

Attorney Timothy Treffinger #13877
1148 S. Maryland pkwy
Las-Vegas NV
89129

1 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Defendant's Pro Per Motion for Withdrawal of
2 Attorney of Record and Transfer of Records, shall be, and it is GRANTED.


3 DATED this 20 day of November, 2018.

4
5 
DISTRICT JUDGE

6 STEVEN B. WOLFSON
7 Clark County District Attorney
8 Nevada Bar #001565

TS

9 BY


10 AMY FERREIRA
11 Chief Deputy District Attorney
12 Nevada Bar #010347

13
14 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

15 I certify that on the 28th day of November, 2018, I mailed a copy of the foregoing Order

16 to: JEFFREY BROWN

17 BAC #1200868

18 P.O. BOX 7000

19 CARSON CITY, NV 89702

20
21
22 BY


Secretary for the District Attorney's Office

23
24
25
26
27
28 16F15698X/mlb/dvu

Jeffrey Brown #1200868

P.O. Box 2000

error city NV

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
Eight Judicial District Court

200 Lewis Avenue

Las Vegas NEVADA

89155-2311

Legal Mail / Confidential



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NORTHERN NEVADA CORRECTIONAL CENTER

FEB 22 2019

1 CASE. NO. C-16-138858-1

2 DEPT. NO. XII

FILED

MAR 12 2019 7

Ann L. Blum
CLERK OF COURT

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4
5
6 IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF
7 NEVADA IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLARK

8
9 STATE OF NEVADA
10 Plaintiff,

11 vs
12 JEFFREY BROWN
13 Defendant

NOTICE OF MOTION

HEARING DATE: April 6 2019

HEARING TIME: 8:30 AM

14 TO:

15 Notice is hereby given pursuant to the Nevada Rules of Criminal Procedure
16 that the above-named Defendant has on this date filed with the Clerk of the District
17 Court in the above-entitled Court in the above-cited case Number a

18 A MOTION FOR ORDER / CONTEMPT PURSUANT TO NRS 22.010
19 on _____

20 Dated this 5th day of MARCH, 2019.

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RECEIVED

Jeffrey Brown
Defendant on Pro Per

C-16-318858-1
NOTM
Notice of Motion
4821858



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CLERK OF THE COURT
MAR 12 2019

JEFFREY BROWN

(Name)

1200868

(I.D. No.)

Northern Nevada Correctional Center
Post Office Box 7000
Carson City, NV 89702

Movant, In Proper Person

FILED

MAR 12 2019

Ann L. Blum
CLERK OF COURT

April 6 2019
@ 8:30 AM

IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLARK

JEFFREY BROWN

Plaintiff/Movant

vs.

STATE OF NEVADA

Defendant/Respondent

Case No.: C-16-318858-1

**MOTION FOR TRANSCRIPTS
AT STATE EXPENSE**

COMES NOW, JEFFREY BROWN, in his proper person and requests that this Honorable Court order the Clerk of the Court to prepare a complete transcript of the testimony offered at the hearings held on SENTENCING TRANSCRIPT
JULY 21, 2018?, and that Plaintiff / Movant not be held liable for payment of such transcripts.

1. Plaintiff / Movant is currently incarcerated at Northern Nevada Correctional Center, 1721 E. Snyder Avenue, Post Office Box 7000, Carson City, NV 89702.
2. Petitioner is proceeding in proper person.
3. Petitioner is indigent per ADKT 411 and as proof by the accompanying Motion for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis, with attached sworn affidavit of Plaintiff / Movant and Certificate of Inmate Financial status.
4. A transcript of the court proceedings in this matter is necessary to allow Plaintiff / Movant to prepare a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Post-Conviction) that will rely on the record requested.

CLERK OF THE COURT

MAR 12 2019

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C-16-318858-1
MOT
Motion
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5. Prior counsel of record does not possess the requested transcripts.

Respectfully Submitted this 7th day of March, 2019.

Jeff Brown
(Signature)

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, JEFFREY BROWN certify that on this date I did serve a true and correct copy of the foregoing Motion upon Respondent(s), via U.S. Mail, by placing same in the United States Postal Service (Prison Mail System), postage being fully prepaid, and addressed to:

STEVE WOLFSON, DIST. ATTOR.
200 LEWIS AV.
POB 552212
LUNV 89155-2212

Dated this 7th day of March, 2019.

By: Jeff Brown
Movant, In Proper Person

AFFIRMATION PURSUANT TO NRS 239B.030

** I certify that the foregoing document DOES NOT contain the social security number of any Persons.

3 / 7 / 19
(Date)

Jeff Brown
(Signature)

JEFFER BROWN, 1200868
POB 7000
CARSON CITY, NV. 89201

Basic

ST-CLASS MAIL

03/08/2019

US POSTAGE

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911D12602121

STEVEN D. GRIERSON, COURT CLERK

200 LEWIS AV. 3d FL.

200 NV 89155-1160

CONFIDENTIAL

89101\$6300 CONFIDENTIAL

JEFFREY BROWN
(Name)

1200868
(I.D. No.)

Northern Nevada Correctional Center
Post Office Box 7000
Carson City, NV 89702

Movant, In Proper Person

FILED

MAR 12 2019

Alan L. Blum
CLERK OF COURT

DISTRICT COURT
CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

JEFFREY BROWN

Plaintiff/Movant

vs.

TIMOTHY TREFFINGER

Defendant/Respondent

Case No.: C-16-138858-1

MOTION FOR ORDER, OR,
IN THE ALTERNATIVE, MOTION
FOR CONTEMPT

COMES NOW, JEFFREY BROWN, in proper person and herein
above respectfully moves this Honorable Court for a(n) ORDER HOLDING ATTORNEY
TIMOTHY TREFFINGER IN CONTEMPT OF THIS COURT'S ORDER DATED
NOV. 28, 2018 ORDERING THE TRANSFER OF RECORDS.

The instant motion is made and based upon all papers and pleadings on file herein as well
as the following Memorandum of Points and Authorities and attached exhibits (where
applicable).

C-16-318858-1
MOT
Motion
4821855



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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

A. THE COURT SHOULD HOLD ATTORNEY TREFFINGER
IN CONTEMPT FOR REFUSING TO TRANSFER THE
DEFENDANT'S CRIMINAL RECORD FILE TO HIM.

NRS 22.010(3) CITES:

THE FOLLOWING ACTS OR OMISSIONS SHALL BE DEEMED
CONTEMPTS:

(3) DISOBEDIENCE OR RESISTANCE TO ANY LAWFUL
WRIT, [ORDER], RULE OR PROCESS ISSUED BY THE COURT OR
JUDGE AT CHAMBERS.

ON SEPT. 12, 2018, THE DEFENDANT IN CASE NO. C-16-138858-1
(JEFFREY BROWN) MAILED A NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL (INFORMAL LETTER)
AND A MOTION FOR WITHDRAWAL RE: ATTORNEY TIMOTHY TREFFINGER.

ON NOV. 13, 2018, SAID MATTER CAME ON FOR HEARING, AND,
WITHOUT ARGUMENT, BASED ON THE PLEADINGS AND GOOD CAUSE
APPEARING THEREFOR — WAS GRANTED AND SIGNED BY THE DIST-
RICT COURT JUDGE ON NOV. 20, 2018. SEE EXHIBIT 1.

BUT, TO DATE, ATTORNEY TREFFINGER THROUGH EITHER BAD
FAITH, NEGLIGENCE, INADVERTANCE, ECT., HAS BEEN DISOBEDIENT OR
RESISTANT TO THE LAWFUL ORDER AT ISSUE.

ATTORNEY TREFFINGER'S FAILURE OR REFUSAL TO REMIT THE CRIMINAL FILE/RECORDS IS HAVING A DETRIMENTAL IMPACT UPON MR. BROWN'S ABILITY TO MARSHAL FACTS TO COMPILE HIS POST-CONVICTION PETITION OUTLINING INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL (IAC).

THE LACK OF THE RECORDS LEAVES MR. BROWN TO GUESS AT WHAT FACTS THEY MAY CONTAIN AND, THUS, UNAWARE OF WHAT ADDITIONAL RECORDS THAT MAY NEED TO BE OBTAINED IN ORDER TO COMPLY WITH NRS 34, AND, HARGROVE V. STATE, 686 P.2D 822 (NV. 1984).

B. CONCLUSION

THE COURT SHOULD GRANT THIS MOTION AND ORDER ATTORNEY TREFFINGER TO PRODUCE THE RECORDS IN QUESTION WITH, A DETAILED TABLE OF CONTENTS WITHIN TEN (10) DAYS.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, THIS 5th DAY OF MARCH, 2019.

Jeff Brown

JEFFREY BROWN,
NDOC # 1200868
CARSON CITY, NV. 89201

PREPARED BY: C.A. JONES, 50600
INMATE LAW LIBRARY WORKER
PURSUANT TO AR 722.04

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, JEFFREY BROWN certify that on this date I did serve a true and correct copy of the foregoing Motion upon Respondent(s), via U.S. Mail, by placing same in the United States Postal Service (Prison Mail System), postage being fully prepaid, and addressed to:

TIMOTHY R. TREFFINGER
1148 S. MARYLAND PKWY
LUNN 89104

AND

Dated this 5th day of March, 2019.

By: Jeff Brown
Movant, In Proper Person

AFFIRMATION PURSUANT TO NRS 239B.030

** I certify that the foregoing document DOES NOT contain the social security number of any

Person(s).


3/5/19
(Date)

Jeff Brown
(Signature)

EXHIBIT 1

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S
PRO PER MOTION FOR WITHDRAWAL
OF ATTORNEY OF RECORD AND TRANSFER
OF RECORD FILED 11/28/2018

EXHIBIT 1



1 **ORDR**
2 STEVEN B. WOLFSON
3 Clark County District Attorney
4 Nevada Bar #001565
5 AMY FERREIRA
6 Chief Deputy District Attorney
7 Nevada Bar #010347
8 200 Lewis Avenue
9 Las Vegas, NV 89155-2212
10 (702) 671-2500
11 Attorney for Plaintiff

8 DISTRICT COURT
9 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

10 THE STATE OF NEVADA,
11 Plaintiff,

12 -vs-

13 JEFFREY BROWN, aka,
14 Jeffery Kent Brown, #3074249

15 Defendant.

CASE NO: C-16-318858-1

DEPT NO: XII

16 **ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S PRO PER MOTION FOR WITHDRAWAL**
17 **OF ATTORNEY OF RECORD AND TRANSFER OF RECORD**

18 DATE OF HEARING: November 13, 2018
19 TIME OF HEARING: 8:30 A.M.

20 THIS MATTER having come on for hearing before the above entitled Court on the
21 13th day of November, 2018, the Defendant not being present IN PROPER PERSON, the
22 Plaintiff being represented by STEVEN B. WOLFSON, District Attorney, through AMY
23 FERREIRA, Chief Deputy District Attorney, without argument, based on the pleadings and
24 good cause appearing therefor.

25 ///

26 ///

27 ///

28 ///

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
NOV 28 2018

DEPT 12

W:\2016\2016F\15698\16F15698-ORDR-001.DOCX

1 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Defendant's Pro Per Motion for Withdrawal of
2 Attorney of Record and Transfer of Records, shall be, and it is GRANTED.


3 DATED this 20 day of November, 2018.

4
5 
DISTRICT JUDGE

6 STEVEN B. WOLFSON
7 Clark County District Attorney
Nevada Bar #001565

TJ

8
9 BY


10 AMY FERREIRA
11 Chief Deputy District Attorney
12 Nevada Bar #010347

13
14 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

15 I certify that on the 28th day of November, 2018, I mailed a copy of the foregoing Order
16 to: JEFFREY BROWN
17 BAC #1200868
18 P.O. BOX 7000
19 CARSON CITY, NV 89702

20
21
22 BY


Secretary for the District Attorney's Office

23
24
25
26
27
28 16F15698X/mlb/dvu

JEFFREY BROWN, 1200868

POB 7000
CARSON CITY, NV. 89201

03/08/2019
US POSTAGE
\$00.80
3717
ZIP 89701
011D12602121

STEVEN J. GRIERSON, COURT CLERK

200 LEWIS AVE. 3D FL.

LUNU 89155-1160

CONFIDENTIAL

BB10182300 8075

JEFFREY BROWN

(Name)
1200868

(I.D. Number)

Northern Nevada Correctional Center
Post Office Box 7000
Carson City, NV 89702

FILED

APR 11 2019

Alvin L. Blum
CLERK OF COURT

Petitioner, In Proper Person

IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLARK

JEFFREY BROWN

Petitioner,

vs.

ISIDRO BACA, WARDEN, NNCC

Respondent.

Case No.: **A-19-793350-W**

Dept. XII

Dept. No.

**PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS
CORPUS (POST-CONVICTION)**
(Non Death Penalty)

INSTRUCTIONS:

EVIDENTIARY HEARING REQUESTED

1. This petition must be legibly handwritten or typewritten, signed by the petitioner and verified.
2. Additional pages are not permitted except where noted or with respect to the facts which you rely upon to support your grounds for relief. No citation of authorities need be furnished. If briefs or arguments are submitted, they should be submitted in the form of a separate memorandum.
3. If you want an attorney appointed, you must complete the Affidavit in Support of Motion for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis. You must have an authorized officer at the prison complete the certificate as to the amount of money and securities on deposit to your credit in any account in the institution.
4. You must name as Respondent the person by whom you are confined or restrained. If you are in a specific institution of the department of corrections, name the warden or head of the

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APR 11 2019

CLERK OF THE COURT

1 institution. If you are not in a specific institution of the department but within its custody, name the
2 director of the department of corrections.

3 (5) You must include all grounds or claims for relief which you may have regarding your
4 conviction or sentence. Failure to raise all grounds in this petition may preclude you from filing
5 future petitions challenging your conviction and sentence.

6 (6) You must allege specific facts supporting the claims in the petition you file seeking
7 relief from any conviction or sentence. Failure to allege specific facts rather than just conclusions
8 may cause your petition to be dismissed. If your petition contains a claim of ineffective assistance of
9 counsel, that claim will operate to waive the attorney-client privilege for the proceeding in which you
10 claim your counsel was ineffective.

11 (7) When the petition is fully completed, the original and copy must be filed with the
12 clerk of the state district court for the county in which you were convicted. One copy must be mailed
13 to the respondent, one copy to the attorney general's office, and one copy to the district attorney of
14 the county in which you were convicted or to the original prosecutor if you are challenging your
15 original conviction or sentence. Copies must conform in all particulars to the original submitted for
16 filing.

17 PETITION

18 1. Name of institution and county in which you are presently imprisoned or where and
19 how you are presently restrained of you liberty: NORTHERN NV. CORR. CENTER/CARSON CITY

20 2. Name and location of court which entered the judgment of conviction under attack:

21 8TH JUD. DIST. CT. CLARK COUNTY, NV.

22 3. Date of judgment of conviction: JULY 2, 2018

23 4. Case Number: C-16-318858-1

24 5. (a) Length of sentence: COUNT 1 - 8-20 FOR ATTEMPTED

25 MURDER, PLUS, CONSECUTIVE TERM OF 8-20 FOR UDW;

26 COUNT 2 - SIXTEEN (16) TO SEVENTY TWO (72) MONTHS FOR

27 ASSAULT WDW TO RUN CONCURRENT WITH COUNT 1.

6. Are you presently serving a sentence for a conviction other than the conviction under attack in this motion? Yes _____ No X

If "yes", list crime, case number and sentence being served at this time:

N/A

7. Nature of offense involved in conviction being challenged: ATTEMPT MURDER
AND ASSAULT WITH A DEADLY WEAPON.

8. What was your plea? (check one)

(a) Not guilty X (c) Guilty but mentally ill _____

(b) Guilty _____ (d) Nolo contendere _____

9. If you entered a plea of guilty to one count of an indictment or information, and a plea of not guilty to another count of an indictment of information, or if a plea of guilty was negotiated, give details: ENTERED INTO AN ILL-ADVISED GUILTY PLEA

AGREEMENT ON JAN. 17, 2018 PRIOR TO COMPETENCY BEING

DETERMINED BY THE COMPETENCY COURT ON APRIL 6, 2018.

10. If you were found guilty after a plea of not guilty, was the finding made by: (check one)

(a) Jury N/A

(b) Judge without a jury N/A

11. Did you testify at the trial? Yes N/A No N/A

12. Did you appeal from the judgment of conviction?

Yes _____ No X

13. If you did appeal, answer the following:

(a) Name of court: _____

(b) Case number or citation: N/A

(c) Result: _____

(d) Date of result: _____

(Attach copy of order or decision, if available)

14. If you did not appeal, explain briefly why you did not:

THE DEFENDER'S RIGHT TO A DIRECT APPEAL WAS
WAIVED AS PART OF THE PLEA AGREEMENT EXECUTED ON JAN. 17, 2018.

15. Other than a direct appeal from the judgment of conviction and sentence, have you previously filed any petitions, applications or motions with respect to this judgment in any court, state or federal? Yes X No

16. If you answer to No. 15 was "yes," give the following information:

- (a) (1) Name of court: EIGHTH JUD. DIST. CT
(2) Name of proceeding: PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
(3) Grounds raised: INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUBMIT

THE CASE TO THE GRAND JURY FOR THE CHARGES OF AGGRAVATED STALKING
AND TWO (2) COUNTS OF DISCHARGING A FIREARM FROM STRUCTURE OR VEHICLE.

(4) Did you receive an evidentiary hearing on your petition, application or motion? Yes No X

(5) Result: PETITION GRANTED

(6) Date of result: DEC. 6, 2016

(7) If known, citations of any written opinion or date of orders entered pursuant to such result:

(b) As to any second petition, application or motion, give the same information:

(1) Name of court: N/A

(2) Nature of proceeding: N/A

(3) Grounds raised: N/A

(4) Did you receive an evidentiary hearing on your petition, application or motion? Yes N/A No N/A

(5) Result: N/A

(6) Date of result: N/A

(7) If known, citations of any written opinion or date of orders entered pursuant to such result: N/A

(c) As to any third or subsequent additional applications or motions, give the same information as above, list them on a separate sheet and attach.

(d) Did you appeal to the highest state or federal court having jurisdiction, the result or action taken on any petition, application or motion?

(1) First petition, application or motion?

Yes _____ No X

(2) Second petition, application or motion?

Yes N/A No N/A

(3) Third or subsequent petitions, applications or motions?

Yes N/A No N/A

Citation or date of decision.

(e) If you did not appeal from the adverse action on any petition, application or motion, explain briefly why you did not. (You must relate specific facts in response to this question. Your response may be included on paper which is 8 1/2 by 11 inches attached to the petition. Your response may not exceed five handwritten or typewritten pages in length)

THE PETITION WAS GRANTED THUS, NO ADVERSE ACTION EXISTED FOR AN
APPEAL OF THAT PARTICULAR ISSUE.

17. Has any ground being raised in this petition been previously presented to this or any other court by way of petition for habeas corpus, motion, application or any other post-conviction proceeding? If so, identify: NO —

(a) Which of the grounds is the same:

N/A

(b) The proceedings in which these grounds were raised: N/A

N/A

(c) Briefly explain why you are again raising these grounds. (You must relate specific facts in response to this question. Your response may be included on paper which is 8 1/2 by 11 inches attached to the petition. Your response may not exceed five handwritten or typewritten pages in length.)

N/A

18. If any of the grounds listed in Nos. 23(a), (b), (c) and (d), or listed on any additional pages you have attached, were not previously presented in any other court, state or federal, list briefly what grounds were not so presented, and give your reasons for not presenting them. (You must relate specific facts in response to this question. Your response may be included on paper which is 8 1/2 by 11 inches attached to the petition. Your response may not exceed five handwritten or typewritten pages in length.)

THE GROUNDS ARE BASED UPON INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF
COUNSEL (IAC) THAT MUST BE BROUGHT ON POST-CONVICTION.

19. Are you filing this petition more than 1 year following the filing of the judgment of conviction or the filing of a decision on direct appeal? If so, state briefly the reasons for the delay. (You must relate specific facts in response to this question. Your response may be included on paper which is 8 1/2 by 11 inches attached to the petition. Your response may not exceed five handwritten or typewritten pages in length.)

N/A

20. Do you have any petition or appeal now pending in any court, either state or federal, as to the judgment under attack? Yes _____ No X

If yes, state what court and the case number:

21. Give the name of each attorney who represented you in the proceeding resulting in your conviction and on direct appeal: MARLA RENTERIA (HABEAS PETITION),

TIMOTHY R. TREFFINGER; DAVID FISCHER

22. Do you have any future sentences to serve after you complete the sentence imposed by the judgment under attack:

Yes _____ No X

23. State concisely every ground on which you claim that you are being held unlawfully. Summarize briefly the facts supporting each ground. If necessary you may attach pages stating additional grounds and facts supporting same.

(a) Ground One:

DEFENSE COUNSEL FAILED TO INFORM THE PETITIONER THAT THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY INTENDED ON SEEKING A GRAND JURY INDICTMENT, RESPOND TO ANY SUCH NOTICE OR ADVISE PETITIONER OF HIS RIGHT TO APPEAR VIOLATING THE RIGHT OF EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AND THE 6TH AND 14TH AMENDMENTS.

Supporting Facts:

A. DEFENSE COUNSEL FAILED TO PROTECT THE PROCEAL DUE PROCESS RIGHT OUTLINED IN NRS 172.241 AND 172.095 (1)(b) AS, DEFENSE COUNSEL KNEW, OR SOMEONE HAVE KNOWN THAT THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY INTENDED TO SEEK AN INDICTMENT BEFORE THE GRAND JURY BUT — SUCH NOTWITHSTANDING, DID NOT INFORM THE PETITIONER OF HIS RIGHT TO APPEAR AND TESTIFY TO EXPLAIN AWAY CHARGES OR, INFORM HIM ABOUT SUBMITTING A REQUEST TO SO DO AND EXECUTE A WAIVER OF SELF-INCRIMINATION TO EXERCISE THE RIGHT.

DEFENSE COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE FOR WITHHOLDING ALL SUCH PROCEDURAL INFORMATION THAT WOULD HAVE HAD AN IMPACT ON FINDING A TRUE BILL ON SEVERAL CHARGES.

ALTHOUGH THE PROSECUTING ATTORNEY HAD PLANNED TO USE SEVERAL EXCITED UTTERANCES AND EMOTIONALLY AND OR MENTALLY QUESTIONABLE STATEMENTS MADE BY THE PETITIONER [PRIOR] TO AND AT THE TIME OF HIS ARREST

Ground: ONE CONTINUED

DEFENSE COUNSEL FAILED TO TAKE SUCH INTO CONSIDERATION AND PROPERLY INFORM THE PETITIONER OF HIS RIGHT TO APPEAR AND TESTIFY. SEE GJ WITNESS LIST NAMING SGT. AMY WILLIAMS AS WELL AS LUMPD DETECTIVES. (RE PREARREST STATEMENTS).

SAID STATEMENTS WERE USED / PRESENTED TO THE GRAND JURY AS WELL AS, THE ONE-SIDED TESTIMONY OF THE VICTIMS THAT WERE ARTFULLY SOLICITED BY THE PROSECUTOR. THE PETITIONER'S SIDE OF THE STORY WAS NOT HEARD.

AS THE RECORD SUPPORTS, SEVERAL OF THE VICTIM STATEMENTS AS TO WHAT TRANSPIRED IN THE WAY OF THE SHOOTING ARE IN CONFLICT ON WHAT CONSTITUTES ATTEMPT MURDER AS TO MS. BROWN. EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THAT MS. BROWN WAS IN FACT AN UNINTENDED VICTIM OF COLLATERAL DAMAGE, I.E. A STRAY BULLET FIRED AT HER BOYFRIEND (MR. SHORT) WHEN HE PUT HANDS ON THE PETITIONER (APPROACHED HIM IN A THREATENING MANNER WHILE PETITIONER WAS IN HIS VEHICLE AND STRUCK HIM) SEE FARA BROWN GUT P. 45, LL 3-4.

THE PETITIONER FURTHER CHARGES THAT HAD HE BEEN GIVEN TIMELY NOTICE OF THE GRAND JURY INVESTIGATION, HE COULD HAVE SOUGHT DISMISSAL OF THE INDICTMENT OF THE AGGRAVATED STALKING CHARGE (COUNT 1) AND DISCHARGE OF FIREARM FROM OR WITHIN STRUCTURE OR VEHICLE (COUNTS 6-9) DUE TO THE PARTICULAR FACTUAL CIRCUMSTANCES AND NOT HAVE HAD THEM HANG OVER HIS HEAD AT LATER LEVEL FOR THE PROSECUTING ATTORNEY'S USE FOR THE PUA DEAL.

THE DEFENSE ATTORNEY'S ACTIONS WERE IN CONFLICT WITH HUMBELOT COUNTY V. MARCUM, 783 P.2D 1389 (1989) AND RAMIREZ V. 8TH JUD. DIST. CT., 913 P.2D 1293 (1996).

1. THE GRAND JURY WAS DEPRIVED OF TESTIMONY RE WHY THE PETITIONER ACTUALLY APPEARED AT THE AIRPORT AT THE TIME THE ALLEGED VICTIMS ARRIVED AND, THAT HE WAS PHYSICALLY ATTACKED WHILE SITTING IN HIS VEHICLE.

Ground: ONE CONCLUDED

THE GRAND JURY RETURNED A TRUE BILL ON NINE (9) COUNTS ON OCT. 18, 2016 WITH A WARRANT / INDICTMENT WARRANT ISSUING ON SAID SAME DATE, FOLLOWED BY THE INDICTMENT WARRANT RETURN ON OCT. 20, 2016.

B.

DEFENSE COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING TO BRING THE INADEQUATE GRAND JURY PROCEEDINGS IN THE PRETRIAL HABEAS CORPUS PETITION FILED NOV. 17, 2016, IN VIOLATION OF PETITIONER'S 6TH AND 14TH AMEND.

ASSUMING ADEQUACY - THAT DEFENSE ATTORNEY WAS NOT PROVIDED WITH THE MANDATORY NOTICE PURSUANT TO NRS 172.241 (THE "MADISON" NOTICE), DEFENSE COUNSEL WAS LAX IN REPRESENTATION FOR NOT CHALLENGING SAID DEFECT IN THE PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS FILED ON NOV. 17, 2016.

THE CASE LAW WAS CLEARLY ESTABLISHED IN MADISON, SUPRA AND RAMIREZ, SUPRA THAT NOTICE IS A REQUIRED PREREQUISITE IN GRAND JURY PROCEEDINGS OF THIS NATURE AS THERE IS NO RECORD OR FACTS TO SUPPORT A SECRET INDICTMENT.

ALTHOUGH DEFENSE COUNSEL ADMITS TO BEING AWARE THAT THE STATE PRESENTED THE CASE TO THE GRAND JURY ON OCT. 11, 2016, (HABEAS PETITION P. 7, 11 24-25), COUNSEL DOES NOT MENTION ANYTHING ABOUT THE MANDATORY NOTICE OR, INFORMING THE PETITIONER ABOUT SUCH OR, OTHERWISE COUNSEL HIM CONCERNING THAT PROCESS.

(b) Ground Two:

DEFENSE COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE FOR NOT REQUESTING ANY
COMPETENCY HEARING TO STOP ALL PROCEEDINGS AND, ALLOWING
AND OR ADVISING THE PETITIONER TO ENTER INTO A GUILTY PLEA
PRIOR TO THE COMPETENCY HEARING ORDERED BY THE COURT IN
VIOLATION OF THE 6TH AND 14TH AMENDMENTS.

Supporting Facts:

DEFENSE COUNSEL[S] WERE AWARE OF THE PETITIONER'S
FRAGILE MENTAL AND OR CONFUSED STATE BY WAY OF SEVERAL
PREARREST STATEMENTS AND OBSERVATIONS MADE BY THE VA
POLICE OFFICER - SGT AMY WILLIAMS ON SEPT. 19, 2016 ('LOOKING
CONFUSED...').

DEFENSE COUNSEL WAS ALSO ON ADEQUATE NOTICE OF THE
PETITIONER'S QUESTIONABLE/VULNERABLE MENTAL STATE BY WAY OF THE
STATEMENTS MADE TO LUMP ON SEPT. 19, 2016, ALONG WITH, STATE-
MENTS MADE TO COUNSEL THAT EVIDENCED DEEP DEPRESSION, SELF-
PUNISHING AND OR, SEVERE ABSTENTION THAT IMPAIRED SOUND JUDGE-
MENT.

THE ABOVE NOTWITHSTANDING, DEFENSE COUNSEL REFUSED TO BRING THESE
EARLY CONCERNS TO THE COURT'S ATTENTION PRIOR TO MAR 15, 2018 WHEN,
THE DISTRICT JUDGE REFERRED THE DEFENDANT TO THE COMPETENCY COURT
[AFTER], DEFENSE COUNSEL ALLOWED, RECOMMENDED, OR MISLED THE
PETITIONER TO ENTER INTO GUILTY PLEA NEGOTIATIONS ON JAN. 17, 2018.

AT THE TIME THE PETITIONER ENTERED INTO A GUILTY PLEA AGREE-
MENT OF (COUNT 1) ATTEMPT MURDER WITH USE OF DEADLY WEAPON
AND (COUNT 2) ASSAULT WITH A DEADLY WEAPON - HE HAD NOT BEEN
FOUND COMPETENT, ALTHOUGH, EVIDENCE SUGGEST THAT HIS COMPETENCY
WAS IN QUESTION.

Ground: TWO CONTINUED

MOREOVER, DEFENSE COUNSEL (MR. TREFFINGER) DID NOT EVEN HAVE GOOD CONTACT INFORMATION TO ALLOW THE COURT TO CONTACT HIM AND THE COMPETENCY COURT REFERRAL MATTER HAD TO BE CONTINUED.

AT THE COMPETENCY COURT HEARING ON APRIL 6, 2018, DEFENSE COUNSEL (TREFFINGER) LOANED NO OBJECTIONS; DID NOT PROPERLY DEFEND THE PETITIONER AT THE COMPETENCY HEARING BY [NOT] CHALLENGING THE COMPETENCY REPORT BY WAY OF AN EXPERT FOR THE DEFENSE, AND OR ANY SUCH EVALUATION. COUNSEL DID NOTHING!

THE LAW IS CLEAR AS TO THE DETERMINATION OF COMPETENCY OF AN ACCUSED BEFORE HE OR SHE STANDS TRIAL. *PATE V. ROBINSON*, 383 U.S. 375, 377, 86 S. CT. 836, 838 (1966); *DOPE V. MISSOURI*, 420 U.S. 163, 171, 95 S. CT. 896, 903 (1975); ALSO, *MELCHER-GLORIA V. STATE OF NEVADA*, 660 P.2D 109 (1983). THUS, IN THE SAME LINE OF THINKING/RATIONALE, IT APPEARS THAT OUR PROCESS REQUIRES A DETERMINATION OF COMPETENCY [PRIOR], TO AN ACCUSED ENTERING INTO A PLEA AGREEMENT WHICH HAS A SENTENCE THAT OPERATES AS A FUNCTIONAL EQUIVALENT OF A LIFE SENTENCE FOR A SEVENTY-EIGHT (68) YEAR OLD MAN, . I.E. [TWO (2) ABBRECIATED 8-20 YEAR SENTENCES, WHICH MEANS - SIXTEEN (16) YEARS BEFORE HE IS ELIGIBLE FOR PAROLE] AT EIGHTY-FOUR (84).

THE FACT THAT A QUESTIONABLE AND UNCHALLENGED FINDING OF COMPETENCY WAS LATER FOUND ON APRIL 6, 2018, STILL DOES NOT CURE THE OVER-ALL INEFFECTIVENESS OF COUNSEL, THE TOTAL BUTCHERY OF THE SPIRIT OF THE "COMPETENCY" STATUTE AND THE "CART BEFORE THE HORSE" POST-HOC PROCESSES.

Ground: TWO CONCLUDED

AS CITED/HOLD IN NRS 178.405-- REQUIRES COMPETENCY AS A LEGAL PREREQUISITE TO [ANY] COURT PROCEEDING. THUS, A HEARING TO DETERMINE DEFENDANT'S COMPETENCY IS CONSTITUTIONALLY, AND STATUTORILY REQUIRED WHERE REASONABLE DOUBT EXISTS ON ISSUE. MELLETOR - GLORIA, SUPRA, PRIOR TO, SIGNING ANY BINDING AGREEMENT. AND, ANY ERROR RELATIVE THERETO IS NOT HARMLESS WHEN VIEWED IN CONJUNCTION TO THE CUMULATIVE ERRORS ASPECT RELATIVE TO THE NUMEROUS PROCEDURAL AND OTHER DEFICIENCIES IN THIS MATTER PREMISED UPON, COUNSEL'S INEFFECTIVENESS.

BASED UPON THE ABOVE FACTS, THE PETITIONER'S GUILTY PLEA AND CONVICTION/SENTENCE SHOULD BE SET ASIDE.

(c) Ground Three:

DEFENSE COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING TO PROPERLY COMMUNICATE WITH THE PETITIONER; MISLEADING OR ILL ADVISING TO ENTER INTO A GUILTY PLEA AGREEMENT AND IMPEDING DEFENSE OF REPLEMONT COUNSEL VIOLATING THE 6TH AND 14TH AMEND.

Supporting Facts:

THE PRECEDING COUNTS AND THEIR EXAMPLES OF (IAC) ARE INCORPORATED HEREIN.

ON APRIL 12, 2018, THE MINUTES DOCUMENT THAT THE PETITIONER IS SO DISSATISFIED WITH COUNSEL TREFFINGER UNTIL HE WANTS TO WITHDRAW HIS GUILTY PLEA (PRE SENTENCING); WANTS TO DISMISS HIS ATTORNEY AND REPRESENT HIMSELF (ALTHOUGH IT IS NOTED THAT A FAREITA CANVASS WILL BE CONDUCTED, NO TRANSCRIPTS OF SAID CANVASS WERE PRODUCED OR AVAILABLE AT THE TIME THIS PETITION WAS DRAFTED).

WHAT IS EVIDENT, IS A COMPLETE DISCONNECT BETWEEN THE PETITIONER AND MR. TREFFINGER TO THE POINT THAT, NO WORKING RELATIONSHIP IS LEFT AND ANY ADOXENCY IS QUESTIONABLE AT BEST.

DEFENSE COUNSEL INFORMED THE COURT THAT THE PETITIONER NO LONGER WANTED TO REPRESENT HIMSELF DESPITE, THE OBVIOUS DISCONNECT. THEN, MOVES TO WITHDRAW FROM THE CASE, WHICH, IS GRANTED BY THE COURT. THE COURT THEN APPOINTS ATTORNEY DAVID FISCHER, WHICH, HAS CONSIDERABLE DIFFICULTIES GETTING DISCOVERY FROM MR. TREFFINGER BUT, NO RESPONSE, HAS TO ATTEMPT TO COMPILE SOME INFORMATION ON ITS OWN AND REQUESTED THE STATE TO PRODUCE A COPY OF THE DISCOVERY THAT WAS MET WITH AN OBJECTION FROM MS. CLOWERS AGREEING, HAVING TO RE-PRODUCE

Ground: THREE CONCLUDED

THE DISCOVERY ALL OVER AGAIN AFTER ALREADY PRODUCING IT TO PRIOR DEFENSE COUNSEL [NUMEROUS TIMES] IS RIDICULOUS.

THE COURT ORDERED THE SENTENCING MATTER CONTINUED AND MR. TREFFINGER IS ORDERED TO PROVIDE ALL DISCOVERY TO MR. FISCHER

THERE IS NO INDICATION THAT ATTORNEY TREFFINGER EVER TIMELY PRODUCED THE CASE FILE TO MR. FISCHER (PUBLIC DEFENDER) BY MAY 15, 2018, AS, THE DOCUMENTS PRODUCED BY MR. FISCHER PURSUANT TO THE WITHDRAWAL OF COUNSEL GRANTED ON NOV. 13, 2018, CONTAINS NO DISCOVERY NOR: THE JAVIS VIDEO OF DEF'S PLEA; THE NPS 178.420 COMPETENCE REPORT; NOR, THE SENTENCING RECOMMENDATIONS JUST TO NAME A FEW; INCLUDING, NO SENTENCING RECOMMENDATIONS OR EVEN A COPY OF PETITIONER'S MOTION TO WITHDRAW FROM THE GUILTY PLEA AGREEMENT.

BASED UPON THE ABOVE FACTS, THE PETITIONER'S GUILTY PLEA AND CONVICTION / SENTENCE SHOULD BE SET ASIDE.

(d) Ground Four:

ALLOWED, ILL ADVISED, OR MISLED PETITIONER INTO SIGNING A GUILTY PLEA AGREEMENT WHEN A VIABLE DEFENSE EXISTED THAT IN FACT, DEFENSE COUNSEL FILED NOTICE OF SAID AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE ON OCT. 26, 2017 IN VIOLATION OF THE 6TH AND 14TH AMENDMENTS.

Supporting Facts:

PETITIONER TOLD COUNSEL THAT THE ALLEGED VICTIM "MONEQUE SHORT" APPROACHED THE DRIVER'S SIDE OF HIS VEHICLE IN AN AGGRESSIVE MANNER AND SAID: "DO YOU HAVE A PROBLEM WITH ME MUTHAFUCKA"?!
SEE GUT P. 45, LL 3-4 (THE CLEANED UP VERSION) STATING:
"... ALL I HEAR IS "MO" WALKING TOWARDS HIM
SAYING DO YOU HAVE A PROBLEM WITH ME, MAN" (FARAH BROWN) ALSO;

GUT 57; 21:35; 58:1 - MONEQUE SHORT'S TESTIMONY ABOUT CONFRONTING THE PETITIONER BY APPROACHING HIM AND IN AN AGGRESSIVE MANNER — STATING: IF YOU HAVE SOMETHING TO SAY, SAY IT TO ME"! THIS LANGUAGE INFERS A CONFRONTATIONAL STANCE ON PART OF MR. SHORT.²

THE PETITIONER GOES ON TO INFORM DEFENSE COUNSEL THAT "SHORT" WENT ON TO GRAB HIM BY THE CLOPP AT THE HEIGHT OF HIS STATEMENTS / AGGRESSIVE AND ASSAULTIVE ACTIONS. AT THAT POINT — THE PETITIONER DREW / RETRIEVED HIS LEGALLY OWNED WEAPON AND, IN A NOW EXTREMELY EXCITED EMOTIONAL STATE, STARTED TO FIRE THE WEAPON IN A DOWNWARD MANNER STRIKING "SHORT" IN THE LOWER RIGHT SIDE OF HIS BACK TRACKING DOWNWARD TO SHORT'S UPPER LEFT BUTTOX.

THESE CIRCUMSTANCES SUGGEST AN ADEQUATE PROVOCATION

² A REASONABLE INFERENCE CAN BE DRAWN THAT MR. SHORT WAS BACKING UP AND TURNED TO RUN AFTER SEEING PETITIONER DRAW HIS WEAPON [AFTER] BEING ASSAULTED BY FARA

Ground: FOUR CONTINUED

IN THAT, THE PETITIONER DID NOT ARRIVE WITH THE INTEN-
TIONS OF HARMING / SHOOTING ANYONE AS HIS WEAPON WAS
NOT INITIALLY DRAWN BUT PUT AWAY AND NOT PRODUCED
[UNTIL] HE WAS PHYSICALLY ATTACKED AFTER BEING APPROACHED
IN A THREATENING MANNER BY "SHORT".

THE ALLEGED VICTIMS, ESPECIALLY MR. SHORT, COULD HAVE
SIMPLY CONTINUED TO LOAD THE LUGGAGE AND LEAVE, AS, AT
NO TIME DID THE PETITIONER EVER EXIT HIS VEHICLE NOR,
DID HE IMPEDE THEIR EGRESS FROM THE PARKING SPACE.

THE ABOVE NOTWITHSTANDING - THE PETITIONER (A SIXTY-
EIGHT (68) YEAR OLD MAN) WITH, NUMEROUS HEALTH ISSUES, e.g.
(CCOC MEDICAL EXAM RECORDS WILL SUPPORT THAT PETITIONER
WAS CATHETERIZED AT THE TIME) - AND UNDER CONSIDERABLE STRESS
AND OR EMOTIONAL UPHEAVAL DUE TO MARITAL ASTRAANGEMENT FROM
A WIFE OF TWENTY-TWO (22) YEARS, [IS] APPROACHED ON THE DRIVER'S
SIDE OF HIS VEHICLE IN AN AGRESSIVE AND CHALLENGING MANNER,
BY, THE WIFE'S BOYFRIEND (A YOUNGER AND LARGER MAN) AND IN
FACT, (ACCORDING TO INFORMATION GIVEN TO DEFENSE ATTORNEY) IS
PHYSICALLY ATTACKED OR BATTERED.

THE ABOVE PLEADINGS MAKE A FACIAL SHOWING OF ADEQUATE PROVOCATION THAT, INFERREDLY, PROMPTED DEFENSE COUNSEL TO FILE THE NOTICE OF THE SELF-DEFENSE ALTERNATIVE DEFENSE ON OCT. 26, 2017 BUT, SUCH INFORMATION AND FILING NOTWITHSTANDING, LED THE PETITIONER TO ENTER INTO A GUILTY PLEA FOR ATTEMPT MURDER OF MS. FARA BROWN AND MONIQUE SHORT AS TO COUNT I.

Ground: FOUR CONTINUED

THE ADEQUATE PROVOCATION DEFENSE WOULD HAVE HAD A MAJOR IMPACT, WHEN PROVEN, UPON EACH AND EVERY COUNT OF ATTEMPT MURDER; ASSAULT WITH A DEADLY WEAPON; DISCHARGING A FIREARM FROM A VEHICLE OR WITHIN A STRUCTURE; BATTERY WITH UDW; AND, CHILD ABUSE, NEGLECT, OR ENDANGERMENT — AS, THE STATE COULD NOT HAVE MADE A CASE IF THE PETITIONER WAS DEFENDING HIMSELF FROM OR REACTING TO, AN UNPROVOKED ATTACK. (NRS 200.275).

THE PROSECUTING ATTORNEY INSTRUCTED THE GRAND JURY, THAT:

MALICE AFORETHOUGHT MEANS THE INTENTIONAL DOING OF A WRONGFUL ACT WITHOUT LEGAL CAUSE OR EXCUSE OR WHAT THE LAW CONSIDERS ADEQUATE PROVOCATION.

SEE,

PARAGRAPHS 1-5, PP 15-16 ABOVE IN SUPPORT OF THE ADEQUATE PROVOCATION. THE STATE OF NEVADA'S ADEQUATE PROVOCATION DOCTRINE ("STAND YOUR GROUND") IS SET OUT IN NRS 200.120 "UNLAWFUL HOMICIDE" THAT IS IN FACT, ADOPTED IN NRS 200.275 "JUSTIFIABLE INFLECTION OR THREAT OF BODILY INJURY NOT PUNISHABLE".

EVEN THOUGH — NO DEATH OCCURRED IN THIS MATTER, THE PROVOCATION DOCTRINE THAT IS PREMISED ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT ONE WHO KILLS WHILE IN A HIGHLY EMOTIONAL STATE MAY NOT ACT FROM "ANY WICKEDNESS OF HEART OR CRUELTY OR RECKLESSNESS OF DISPOSITION", BUT RATHER AS "[A] RESULT OF THE TEMPORARY EXCITEMENT, BY WHICH THE CONTROL OF REASON WAS DISTURBED", APPLIES HERE.

Ground: FOUR CONTINUED

THERE IS ADEQUATE EVIDENCE WITHIN THE EXISTING RECORD THAT SUPPORTS THAT THE PETITIONER WAS ACTUALLY SITTING IN HIS VEHICLE WHEN HE WAS ACCOSTED BY THE BOYFRIEND OF HIS ASTRANGED WIFE (MR. SHORT), P. 15 AT PARAGRAPH #1, SUPRA. AND, THE PETITIONER ACTUALLY SUCCEEDS TO AND SUSTAINED AN UNWANTED BATTERY AS DEFINED IN NRS 200.400 AND OR, AN ASSAULT AS DEFINED IN NRS 200.471.

ALL THE WHILE, THE PETITIONER WAS NOT REQUIRED TO RETREAT BEFORE USING FORCE TO REPEL HIS ATTACKER AS: (1) HE WAS NOT THE ORIGINAL AGGRESSOR (WAS ACTUALLY SEATED IN HIS VEHICLE AND SIMPLY SPEAKING WITH HIS LAWFUL WIFE ALTHOUGH, ASTRANGED); (2) HAD A RIGHT TO BE PRESENT AT THE LOCATION, A PUBLIC PLACE (AS NO RESTRAINING ORDER HAD ISSUED); AND (3) THE PETITIONER WAS [NOT] ACTUALLY ENGAGED IN CONDUCT IN FURTHERANCE OF CRIMINAL ACTIVITY (THE AGGRAVATED STALKING CHARGES WERE UNFOUNDED AND INVALIDATED BY A PRETRIAL HABEAS).

AS SUCH, THE ABOVE FACTUAL UNDERPINNINGS WOULD EVEN HAVE SUPPORTED JUSTIFIABLE HOMICIDE UPON (MR. SHORT) HAD HIS LIFE BEEN TAKEN AFTER ASSAULTING AND BATTERING THE PETITIONER IN HIS VEHICLE.

MOREOVER, IN ADDITION TO ANY OTHER CIRCUMSTANCES RECOGNIZED AS JUSTIFICATION AT COMMON LAW (NRS 200.275), SUPRA, THE INFLECTION OR THREAT OF BODILY INJURY IS JUSTIFIED, AND DOES NOT CONSTITUTE MAYHEM, BATTERY, OR ASSAULT, IF DONE UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH WOULD JUSTIFY HOMICIDE.

Ground: FOUR CONTINUED

AS FOR THE INJURIES SUSTAINED BY THE ASTRAINED WIFE (MS. BROWN) THERE WAS "INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE", AS A MATTER OF LAW, TO PROVE ATTEMPTED MURDER AS, UNDER STATE LAW, A CONVICTION OF ATTEMPTED MURDER REQUIRES, AMONG OTHER THINGS, PROOF OF AN INTENT TO KILL.

THE ADMISSIBLE EVIDENTIARY FACTS/EVIDENCE CLEARLY SHOW THAT (MS. BROWN'S) INJURIES WERE TO THE LOWER PART OF HER BACK TRACKING IN A CROSSWISE MOTION. THE INJURIES WERE NOT IN AN UPWARDS TRAJECTORY AND, AS ARGUED ABOVE, WERE THE RESULT OF ADEQUATE PROVOCATION BY HER NEW BOYFRIEND.

THE PETITIONER SIMPLY Lapsed INTO A HIGHLY EMOTIONAL STATE (IF NOT ALREADY PRONE TO SUCH) THAT CAUSED HIM TO REACT AND BEHAVE IN A WAY THAT HE WOULD OTHERWISE FEEL IS MORALLY AND OR LAWFULLY UNACCEPTABLE.

THE EVIDENCE OF ATTEMPT MURDER WAS LAWFULLY NONEXISTANT AS, THE TYPICAL COMMON LAW STANDARD ON PROVOKING EVENTS IS STRUCTURED SUCH THAT ANY NUMBER OF CIRCUMSTANCES MIGHT CONSTITUTE ADEQUATE PROVOCATION SO LONG AS THE/A DEFENDANT CAN SHOW: (1) THAT A REASONABLE PERSON IN THE DEFENDANT'S SITUATION WOULD HAVE BEEN ADEQUATELY PROVOKED, (2) THAT THE DEFENDANT WAS IN -FACT PROVOKED AND BECAME EMOTIONALLY CHARGED TO AN EXTENT THAT HE LOST SELF-CONTROL, (3) THAT A REASONABLE PERSON IN THE DEFENDANT'S SITUATION WOULD NOT HAVE HAD SUFFICIENT TIME TO "COOL OFF" BETWEEN PROVOCATION AND THE INSUING AGGRESSIVE REACTIVE RESPONSE, AND (4) THAT THE DEFENDANT DID NOT, IN -FACT, COOL OFF BEFORE HE ACTED.

Ground: FOUR CONTINUED

TODAY, IN COMMON LAW JURISDICTIONS, PASSION IS OFTEN BROAD ENOUGH TO INCLUDE EMOTIONS LIKE FEAR OR RESSENTMENT NOTING THAT "PASSION NEED NOT MEAN 'RAGE OR ANGER' BUT MAY BE ANY '[V]IOLENT, INTENSE, HIGHWROUGHT OR ENTHUSIASTIC EMOTION' "") PEOPLE V. WU, 286 CAL RPT. 868, 884 (CAL. CT. APP. 1991).

NOT ONLY WAS THE PETITIONER SITUATED THE MENTALLY STRESSING FACT THAT HE WAS ACTUALLY SEEING HIS ESTRANGED WIFE WITH THE MAN SHE WAS NOW SLEEPING WITH - THAT SAME MAN GOES ON TO GET IN HIS FACE AND PUT HANDS ON HIM. THIS WOULD CAUSE OVERWHELMING ANGER IN ANY REASONABLE MAN! (NRS 200.275).

THUS, THE INJURIES TO THE WIFE (MS. BROWN) ARE NOT UPON THE LEVEL OF ATTEMPTED MURDER.

DEFENSE COUNSEL [WAS] AWARE OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES AND THE ADEQUATE PROVOCATION RELATED THERETO WHICH, EXPLAINS THE FILING OF THE NOTICE OF AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE: SELF-DEFENSE ON OCT. 26, 2017.

BUT, ALL OF THE ABOVE FACTS NOTWITHSTANDING, DEFENSE COUNSEL DID NOT PURSUE SAID DEFENSES BUT INSTEAD, GETS THE PETITIONER TO SIGN HIS LIFE AWAY IN A GUILTY PLEA AGREEMENT. DISPUTE —

SHORT EXPLAINED THAT AFTER BROWN PULLED UP, SHORT INTERVIEWED IN THEIR CONVERSATION BY APPROACHING THE FORD ESCAPE AND TELLING HIM "IF YOU WANT TO SAY ANYTHING TO ME, YOU CAN SAY SOMETHING TO ME." GUT 57:21-25; 58:1. MR. SHORT SEEMED TO EXCERBATE AN ALREADY TENSE SITUATION BY WAY OF HIS OWN BRAVADO.

Ground: FOUR CONCLUDED

AT THE GRAND JURY PROCEEDING (AGAIN, FOR WHICH THE PETITIONER WAS NOT PRESENT) THE STATE PROSECUTOR INSTRUCTED SAID GRAND JURY (AS NOTED AT PAGE 17 ABOVE) ON MALICE AFORETHOUGHT BUT — AS THOROUGHLY ADDRESSED ABOVE IN PAGES 15-20, THAT ELEMENT MUST FAIL AS THERE IS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENTIARY AND FACTUAL SUPPORT IN LIGHT OF AN ADEQUATE PROVOCATION EXISTING.

THE INSTRUCTION [EVEN] RECOGNIZES THAT MALICE IS THE INTENTIONAL DOING OF A WRONGFUL ACT WITHOUT LEGAL CAUSE OR EXCUSE OR WHAT THE LAW CONSIDERS ADEQUATE PROVOCATION.

BUT, CONSIDERING THE FACTUAL CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS MATTER (TAKEN UPON THE WHOLE) ADEQUATE PROVOCATION EXISTED WHICH, WERE SUFFICIENT TO EXCITE FEAR IN A REASONABLE PERSON AND — THAT THIS PETITIONER ACTUALLY ACTED UNDER INFLUENCE OF THOSE FEARS AND OR EMOTION AND [NOT], IN SPITE OF REVENGE. IT WAS PURE EMOTIONAL REACTIVENESS THAT STEERED THE PETITIONER'S BEHAVIOR.

MALICE AFORETHOUGHT COULD HAVE NEVER BEEN PROVEN BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT, AND AS SUCH, DEFENSE COUNSEL'S PERFORMANCE WAS TOTALLY DEFICIENT IN LIGHT OF THE FACT THAT HE WAS TOTALLY AWARE OF THE EMOTIONALLY FRO CONFRONTATIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES, TO THE POINT, OF PILING THE AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE, BUT, BACKED AWAY / ABANDONED IT FOR A GUILTY PLEA AGREEMENT.

BASED UPON THE ABOVE FACTS AND LAW, THE PETITIONER'S GUILTY PLEA AND CONVICTION / SENTENCE SHOULD BE SET ASIDE.

(e) Ground Five:

ADVISING OR MISLEADING THE PETITIONER TO ENTER INTO AN
ILL ADVISED GUILTY PLEA AGREEMENT THAT WAS NOT IN PETITIONER'S
BEST INTEREST CONSTITUTING INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
IN VIOLATION OF THE 6TH AND 14TH AMENDMENTS

Supporting Facts:

THE PETITIONER INCORPORATES GROUND FOUR ABOVE AS THOUGH
FULLY SET OUT HEREIN AS ADDITIONAL SUPPORT FOR THIS GROUND.

DEFENSE COUNSEL, TIMOTHY R. TREFFINGER, MISLED AND OR
WRONGLY ADVISED AND OR INFLUENCED (BY WAY OF OFF THE RECORD
COERCION) THE PETITIONER TO ENTER INTO A DEFECTIVE GUILTY PLEA
AGREEMENT. COUNSEL KNEW THAT A VALID DEFENSE EXISTED (COUNT
4 ABOVE) BUT, LED THE PETITIONER TO ENTER INTO THE PLEA AGREEMENT
THAT CARRIED A SENTENCE THAT HAD AN OPERATIONAL
FUNCTIONAL EQUIVALENT OF LIFE FOR A SIXTY-EIGHT (68)
YEAR OLD MAN, I.E., THE PETITIONER WOULD BE EIGHTY-FOUR
(84) YEARS OLD AT THE TIME OF PAROLE ELIGIBILITY.

LIKEWISE, THE CHARGES WERE PROBATIONABLE BUT, COUNSEL
FAILED TO PROPERLY ADVOCATE FOR SUCH DISPUTE — THE PETITIONER
BEING/WAS A DECORATED VETERAN; WAS AN OTHERWISE
LAW ABIDING CITIZEN WITH NO PRIORS; AND, AS OUTLINED IN
GROUND 4, THE INCIDENT WAS EMOTIONALLY CHARGED ALONG
WITH, ADEQUATE PROVOCATION / SUFFICIENT PROVOCATION EVEN
UNDER NRS 200.120 TO UNDERMINE THE CHARGES HE FACED.

ALSO, THE PLEA AGREEMENT INCLUDED: (a) AN ENHANCEMENT
PENALTY THAT WAS [NOT] MANDATORY CONSIDERING, NO JURY

Ground: FIVE CONTINUED

FOUND THE USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON (WHICH COULD HAVE BEEN NULLIFIED DUE TO ADEQUATE PROVOCATION, GROUND 4, SUPRA);

(b) THE TWO (2) ALLEGED VICTIMS HAS BEEN MERGED INTO A SINGLE COUNT OF ATTEMPT MURDER (COUNT 1) WHEN IN FACT, THEY WERE SEPERATE COUNTS BEFORE THE GRAND JURY (WHICH AGAIN, COULD HAVE BEEN NULLIFIED DUE TO ADEQUATE PROVOCATION, GROUND 4, ID.);

(c) DEFENSE COUNSEL FAILED TO ABIDE BY THE STANDARDS SET OUT IN ADKT. #411 (DISSENT MAGNIN, SAITH, AND CHERRY) REGARDING ADVISING THE PETITIONER OF THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE GUILTY PLEA UPON HIS PENDING DIVORCE PROCEEDINGS THAT, COUNSEL TREFFINGER, WAS IN FACT HANDLING.

THE ALLEGED FACTUAL DETERMINATIONS ESTABLISHED BY WAY OF SAID GUILTY PLEA HAD A MONUMENTAL IMPACT UPON SAID DIVORCE PROCEEDINGS AND, SUBSEQUENTLY, A MONETARY ASPECT IN THE FORM OF THE PETITIONER'S PENSION BEING AWARDED TO HIS ESTRANGED WIFE ALONG WITH, EXTREME PUNITIVE AWARDS.

SUCH A FAILURE IMPLICATES A LAWYER'S GENERAL DUTY OF CARE TOWARD THE CLIENT;

(d) DID NOT EXPLAIN THE ADVANTAGES OF A TRIAL AND OR A DIRECT APPEAL INCLUDING, ANY ADDITIONAL INVESTIGATION OR LEGAL CHALLENGES TO THE AGREEMENTS THAT FAILED IN THE PRETRIAL HABEAS CORPUS PETITION RE: COUNTS 8 AND 9;

Ground: FIVE CONCLUDED

(e) FAILED TO PRESERVE THE PETITIONER'S RIGHTS AND PREPARE THE DEFENSE IN RELATION TO ADVISING PETITIONER TO ENTER INTO A GUILTY PLEA AGREEMENT, PRIOR, TO COMPETENCY BEING ESTABLISHED EVEN THOUGH, COUNSEL HAD CONCERNS ABOUT MENTAL STABILITY/COMPETENCY BUT NEVER, BROUGHT ANY SUCH CONCERNS TO THE COURT'S ATTENTION AND, KNOWING THAT AN ADEQUATE PROVOCATION DEFENSE EXISTED;

(f) FAILED TO DEVELOPE ANY NEGOTIATION STRATEGY DISPITE THE EMOTIONALLY CHARGED CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE AND THE ASPECT OF ADEQUATE PROVOCATION;

(g) AFTER THE PETITIONER GAINED SOME ADDITIONAL INFORMATION AND OR INSIGHT AS TO THE GUILTY PLEA AGREEMENT NOT BEING IN HIS BEST INTEREST, HE WANTED TO WITHDRAW IT [PRIOR] TO SENTENCING BUT, DEFENSE COUNSEL GAVE HIM INACCURATE AND MISLEADING INFORMATION TO INFLUENCE HIM TO RETRACT HIS MOTION TO WITHDRAW, E.G. DEFENSE COUNSEL TOLD THE PETITIONER THAT THERE WAS NO BASIS IN LAW TO WITHDRAW THE GUILTY PLEA. (DAVID FISCHER APPOINTED 4/17/2018); AND,

(h) THE PETITIONER WAS SO DISSATISFIED WITH DEFENSE COUNSEL THAT HE WANTED TO REPRESENT HIMSELF AND CONTINUE WITH WITHDRAWING HIS PLEA BUT, COUNSEL NEVER GOT A MERITS RULING ON THE MOTION.

BASED UPON THE ABOVE FACTS, THE PETITIONER'S GUILTY PLEA AND CONVICTION/SENTENCE SHOULD BE SET ASIDE.

(F) Ground SIX

DEFENSE COUNSELS WERE INEFFECTIVE IN RELATION TO
THE MANNER THEY HANDLED, MISLED, AND OR ILL ADVISED
THE PETITIONER REGARDING HIS PRESENTING MOTION TO
WITHDRAW FROM THE GUILTY PLEA AGREEMENT VIOLATING THE
6TH AND 14TH AMENDMENTS

Supporting Facts:

AS EARLY AS APRIL 12, 2018, THE PETITIONER HAD BEEN IN-
FORMING BOTH DEFENSE COUNSELS (TREFFINGER AND FISCHER)
THAT HE WANTED TO WITHDRAW HIS PLEA AND, ATTEMPTED TO FILE /
SUBMIT A MOTION IN PROPER PERSON.

ON SAID SAME DATE, ATTORNEY TREFFINGER STATED THAT HE
WOULD BE MOVING TO WITHDRAW AS ATTORNEY OF RECORD. THE
COURT ADVISED MR. TREFFINGER IT WOULD NOT ALLOW HIM TO
WITHDRAW UNTIL THE COURT GETS THROUGH THE "FARETTA" CANVASS.

AFTER THE FARETTA HEARING, THE COURT GRANTS ATTORNEY TREFFINGER'S
MOTION TO WITHDRAW AND APPOINTS ATTORNEY DAVID
FISCHER AND SETS A STATUS CHECK ON PETITIONER'S MOTION TO
WITHDRAW GUILTY PLEA FOR APRIL 17, 2018 AT 8:30 A.M. .

ON APRIL 12, 2018, THE COURT SET A STATUS CHECK FOR PETITIONER'S
MOTION TO WITHDRAW GUILTY PLEA AND CONFIRMATION OF NEWLY APPOINTED
COUNSEL FOR APRIL 17, 2018.

ON APRIL 17, 2018, COUNSEL FISCHER CLAIMS TO HAVE REVIEWED THE
CASE FILE INCLUDING PLEA CANVASS AND GUILTY PLEA AGREEMENT AND, TO
HAVE MET WITH THE PETITIONER THEN NOTES, THAT PETITIONER HAS NO
LEGAL BASIS TO WITHDRAW THE PLEA, AND, MOVES TO WITHDRAW FROM
THE CASE (WHICH WAS GRANTED), AND THE CASE IS REFERRED BACK

Ground: SIX CONTINUED

TO COUNSEL TREFFINGER IN WHICH, THE PETITIONER INITIALLY
HAD SO MUCH CONFLICT WITH AS TO MOVE HIM TO ATTEMPT TO PROCEED
PRO SE. (MINUTES DATED APRIL 12, 2018).

DISPITE COUNSEL FISCHER'S CLAIMS TO HAVE REVIEWED CERTAIN
DOCUMENTATION TO SUPPORT HIS CLAIM THAT THE PETITIONER HAD "NO
LEGAL BASIS TO WITHDRAW HIS PLEA" — HE ADMITS THAT HE WAS
HAVING DIFFICULTIES GETTING DISCOVERY FROM COUNSEL TREFF-
INGER. THE STATE EVEN OBJECTS TO RE-PRODUCING THE DISCOVERY
ALL OVER AGAIN / NUMEROUS TIMES SAYING SUCH IS REDICULOUS.

THERE WAS NO RULING UPON PETITIONER'S MOTION TO WITHDRAW
FROM HIS GUILTY PLEA AGREEMENT AND THE COURT WENT ON TO SET
ANOTHER STATUS CHECK ON SAID MOTION FOR JUNE 5, 2018
AND, "JEA" NOTIFIED AND LEFT MESSAGE VOICEMAIL FOR ATTORNEY
TREFFINGER, REGARDING THE CASE AND [COURT'S ORDER] REGARDING
DISCOVERY ON MAY 15, 2018.

THE MATTER CONTINUED TO BE SHUFFLED BACK AND FORTH BETWEEN
TWO(2) ATTORNEYS (NEITHER OF WHICH WANTED THE CASE), ONE
NEVER OBTAINED THE ENTIRE CASE FILE (DISCOVERY); AND ONE HAD
NOT PROTECTED THE PETITIONER'S INTERESTS TO THE POINT, THE PETITIONER
WANTED TO REPRESENT HIMSELF.

NO ACTUAL RULING IS MADE BY THE COURT
ON THE MOTION TO WITHDRAW FROM THE GUILTY PLEA AGREE-
MENT AS REFLECTED IN THE CASE SUMMARY AND MINUTES.

Ground: SIX CONCLUDED

ON JUNE 21, 2018, NO DECISION UPON THE PETITIONER'S MOTION TO WITHDRAW FROM HIS PROBLEMATIC /ILL ADVISED GUILTY PLEA AGREEMENT NOTWITHSTANDING — THE COURT CONDUCTS A SENTENCING HEARING AND SENTENCES THE PETITIONER IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PLEA AGREEMENT.

GRANTING OF A MOTION TO WITHDRAW ONE'S PLEA [BEFORE] SENTENCING IS THE PROPER WAY FOR ANY SUBSTANTIAL REASON. BUT, SUCH CANNOT BE SAID TO HAVE EVEN HAD A FAIR PROCEDURAL OPPORTUNITY IN [THIS] MATTER AS, NO ACTUAL ADJUDICATION OCCURRED ONE WAY OR, THE OTHER ON SAID MOTION.

THUS, THE COURT'S DISCRETION TO DENY SUCH A MOTION NOT BEING REVERSED UNLESS THERE HAS BEEN A CLEAR ABUSE OF DISCRETION IS [NOT] IN PLAY AS THE COURT MADE NO DOCUMENTED RULING AT ALL BUT SIMPLY NOTED: "COURT STATED IT WILL MAKE IT PART OF THE RECORD".

SUCH IS FAR FROM AN ACTUAL ADJUDICATION UPON THE MERITS OR, RULING AS A MATTER OF PROCEDURAL LAW.

THE [ONLY] MATTERS THAT THE COURT ACTUALLY ADDRESSED AND MADE DOCUMENTED RULINGS UPON WERE "COUNSELS" MOTIONS TO WITHDRAW AS COUNSELS OF RECORD.

THE PETITIONER HAS NOW IDENTIFIED CREDIBLE AND SUBSTANTIAL REASONS (RELATIVE TO THE VALIDITY OF THE PLEA AND OR HOW HE WAS OTHERWISE MISLED)³ TO SET ASIDE THAT GUILTY PLEA AGREEMENT.

THE PRECEDING GROUNDS ARE INCORPORATED IN SUPPORT OF THIS FACTUAL POSITION. THE PETITIONER'S GUILTY PLEA AND SENTENCE SHOULD BE SET ASIDE.

³ COUNSEL DID NOT ACTUALLY EXPLAIN THAT THE PETITIONER WOULD BE 64 YEARS OLD PRIOR TO EVEN ELIGIBLE TO BE CONSIDERED FOR PAROLE, JUST AS AN EXAMPLE.

1 (9) Ground SEVEN

2 THE NUMEROUS EXAMPLES OF INEFFECTUENESS OF COUNSELS
3 CULMINATED IN "CUMULATIVE ERRORS" THAT VIOLATED THE
4 6TH, 5TH AND 14TH AMENDMENTS
5

6 Supporting Facts:

7 THE OPERATIVE FACTS AND STATEMENTS SET OUT ABOVE IN GROUNDS
8 1-6 ARE INCORPORATED HEREIN AS THOUGH FULLY SET FORTH IN
9 SUPPORT OF THIS GROUND.
10

11 DEFENSE COUNSELS ASSIGNED TO THE CASE OR RETAINED - FAILED TO:

12 1. NOT PROTECTING PETITIONER'S GRAND JURY RIGHTS

13 A. INFORM THE PETITIONER THAT HE WAS THE SUBJECT OF THE STATES
14 INTENT TO SEEK AN INDICTMENT BY WAY OF THE GRAND JURY;

15
16 B. DID NOT CHALLENGE THE GRAND JURY PROCEEDINGS IN REGARDS TO
17 LACK OF ADEQUATE / MANDATORY NRS 12.241 NOTICE;

18 2. NOT REQUESTING A COMPETENCY HEARING AND ALLOWING PETITIONER
19 TO ENTER INTO A GUILTY PLEA AGREEMENT PRIOR TO THE COMPETENCY
20 HEARING ORDERED BY THE COURT;

21
22 3. NOT PROPERLY COMMUNICATING WITH PETITIONER, MISLEADING
23 OR ILL ADVISING TO ENTER INTO A GUILTY PLEA AGREEMENT
24 AND, IMPEDING DEFENSE OF REPLACEMENT COUNSEL;

25 4. ILL ADVISED OR MISLED PETITIONER TO SIGN A GUILTY PLEA AGREEMENT
WHEN A VIABLE DEFENSE EXISTED RE: MEDICATE PROVOCATION;

Ground: SEVEN CONTINUED

5. ADVISING OR MISLEADING THE PETITIONER TO ENTER INTO AN ILL ADVISED GUILTY PLEA AGREEMENT THAT WAS NOT IN PETITIONER'S BEST INTEREST;

(a) AN ENHANCEMENT PENALTY THAT WAS NOT MANDATORY CONSIDERING NO JURY FOUND THE USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON;

(b) THE TWO (2) ALLEGED VICTIMS HAD BEEN MERGED INTO A SINGLE COUNT OF ATTEMPT MURDER (COUNT 1) WHEN INITIALLY WERE SEPARATE COUNTS BEFORE THE GRAND JURY;

(c) DEFENSE COUNSEL FAILED TO ADVISE THE PETITIONER ABOUT THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES THE GUILTY PLEA COULD HAVE UPON HIS PENDING DIVORCE PROCEEDINGS;

(d) DID NOT EXPLAIN THE ADVANTAGES OF A TRIAL AND OR A DIRECT APPEAL INCLUDING ANY ADDITIONAL INVESTIGATION OR LEGAL CHALLENGES TO ARGUMENTS THAT FAILED IN THE PRETRIAL HABEAS CORPUS PETITION RE: COUNTS 8 AND 9.

(e) DID NOT PRESERVE PETITIONER'S RIGHTS AND PREPARE A DEFENSE RE PLEA AGREEMENT, COMPETENCY HEARING, AND, ADEQUATE PROVOCATION DEFENSE COUNSEL WAS AWARE OF;

(f) DID NOT DEVELOPE ANY NEGOTIATION STRATEGY DESPITE THE EMOTIONALLY CHARGED CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE AND THE ASPECT OF ADEQUATE PROVOCATION;

Ground: SEVEN CONCLUDED


(g-h) DID NOT PROPERLY ASSIST THE PETITIONER IN EXECUTING HIS PRESENTENCING WITHDRAWAL FROM THE GUILTY PLEA AGREEMENT INCLUDING, GIVING PETITIONER INACCURATE AND MISLEADING INFORMATION TO INFLUENCE HIM TO RETRACT THE MOTION AND — NOT ACTUALLY OBTAINING A RULING UPON SAID MOTION.

THE ABOVE EXAMPLES ARE NOT AN EXHAUSTIVE LIST AS THIS PETITION WAS DRAFTED WITHOUT THE BENEFIT OF A COMPLETE JUDICIAL RECORD INCLUDING TRANSCRIPTS. THUS, SAID DOCUMENTATION MAY YIELD NEW OR ADDITIONAL FACTS TO SUPPORT THESE CLAIMS OR, AN AMENDMENT TO BRING ADDITIONAL GROUNDS.

DUE TO THE ABOVE CUMULATIVE ERRORS, THE PETITIONER'S GUILTY PLEA — CONVICTION AND SENTENCE SHOULD BE SET ASIDE.

1 WHEREFORE, petitioner prays that the court grant petitioner
2 Relief to which he may be entitled in this proceeding.

3 EXECUTED at NNCC, CARSON CITY, Nevada on the 8th
4 Day of April, 2019.

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6 
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8 JEFFREY BROWN, 1200868
9 PETITIONER PRO SE

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17 PREPARATION OR PREPARED/ASSISTED

18 BY: C.A. JONES, 50600


19 LAW LIBRARY WORKER PER AD 722
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[illegible]

Jeffery Brown
Petitioner

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STEVE WOLFSON
DISTRICT ATTORNEY
200 LEWIS AVE.
POB 89155 -
LAS VEGAS, Nevada 89 155


Signature of Petitioner In Pro Se

AFFIRMATION
Pursuant to NRS 239B.030

The undersigned does hereby affirm that the preceding document.

(POST-CONVICTION)

PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

(Title of Document)

filed in case number: C-16-138858-1



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Confidential Family Court Information Sheet
(NRS 125.130, NRS 125.230 and NRS125B.055)

Date: 4/8/19

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
JEFFREY BROWN
(Print Name)

PETITIONER PRO SE
(Attorney for)

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P.O. BOX 7000
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3717

MR. STEVEN D. GRIERSON
CLERK OF THE COURT
REGIONAL JUSTICE CENTER
200 LEWIS AVE
CARSON CITY NV 89702



1 RTRAN

2
3
4 DISTRICT COURT
5 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

6 THE STATE OF NEVADA,

7 Plaintiff,

8 vs.

9 JEFFREY BROWN, aka,

10 JEFFERY KENT BROWN,

11 Defendant.

)
) CASE NO. C-16-318858-1

)
) DEPT. XII
)
)
)
)

12 BEFORE THE HONORABLE MICHELLE LEAVITT, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

13 THURSDAY, JUNE 21, 2018

14 **RECORDER'S TRANSCRIPT RE:**
15 **SENTENCING**

16 APPEARANCES:

17 For the Plaintiff:

KENNETH N. PORTZ, ESQ.
Chief Deputy District Attorney

18 For the Defendant:

TIMOTHY R. TREFFINGER, ESQ.

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24
25 RECORDED BY: KRISTINE SANTI, COURT RECORDER

1 LAS VEGAS, NEVADA, THURSDAY, JUNE 21, 2018

2 * * * * *

3 [Case called at 10:44 a.m.]

4 THE COURT: State of Nevada versus Jeffrey Brown, C318858. He's
5 present. He's in custody. This is on for sentencing.

6 Mr. Brown, any legal cause or reason why judgment should not be
7 pronounced against you at this time?

8 THE DEFENDANT: No.

9 THE COURT: By virtue of your plea entered in this matter, I hereby
10 adjudicate you guilty of Attempt Murder with Use of a Deadly Weapon and
11 Assault with a Deadly Weapon.

12 Does the State wish to be heard?

13 MR. PORTZ: Yes, Your Honor. And did the Court receive the State's
14 sentencing memorandum?

15 THE COURT: I just want to make sure I did because this has been on
16 a few times. Yes.

17 MR. PORTZ: Thank you. And I also did want to point out that the
18 victims in this case, at least two of the three victims, Mo and Farha, are both
19 present in court today. They're both noticed as speakers and Mo will be
20 speaking on behalf of the family.

21 Your Honor, Jeffrey Brown systematically stalked and hunted his
22 victims in this case. By the time that he gunned them down at the McCarran
23 airport, he had been waiting for them to arrive for hours. How did he know where
24 their car was? He hacked into Farha's OnStar account to locate her vehicle.
25 How did he know when they would be returning? He hacked into Farha's email

1 address to locate her flight itinerary so that he could be there when they arrived
2 back. So he sits and he waits in his vehicle with a firearm until Farha, Mo, and
3 Mo's 15-year-old son Mehki come back from a funeral in Indiana. And as they're
4 approaching their car to load their luggage, he pulls up on them and from the
5 comfort of his vehicle he shoots Mo, he shoots Farha, and then he points that
6 firearm at that young boy, who has to run away from his father, who he believes
7 is dying at that moment or already dead.

8 The facts and the circumstances of this case warrant the maximum
9 sentence and that's part of the reason why we filed the sentencing
10 memorandum, but there's additional facts I want the Court to consider and some
11 of those include the calls that we highlighted made after the arrest that are
12 placed inside the sentencing memorandum.

13 I anticipate in mitigation the Defense is going to point, as is obvious,
14 that there's a lack of real criminal history in this case. And I think that's a
15 legitimate argument, Your Honor, when someone falls on hard times and turns to
16 an act of crime, in an act of desperation, or a lapse of judgment. That's not what
17 we have here. We have a well-thought-out, sophisticated plan to commit murder.
18 It's days long that he is locating her vehicle, locating when she's going to be
19 coming back, and then waiting there, seen on surveillance coming back to the
20 car time and time again, waiting for them to arrive so that he can drive up and
21 shoot them.

22 And how do we know he had an intent to kill? Well, we have, one, his
23 plea. Two, you have one of the calls in which he is bragging that he tried to kill.
24 He says I tried to kill that mother fucker, in reference to Mo, when he's talking to
25 his daughter.

1 I also anticipate there will be a suggestion that the Defendant's age
2 should somehow mitigate the sentence that the Court might impose today. First
3 of all, I think that that's not really an issue to consider because – just because he
4 was older when he decided to commit these crimes doesn't negate the fact that
5 Mo and Farha and Mehki have been severely victimized, that Farha will carry a
6 bullet in her back for the rest of her life, that Mo still has a limp and numbness in
7 his leg and that Mehki still has to see a therapist and undergo treatment for being
8 witness to such a traumatic event.

9 Furthermore, as seen in some of the calls that we presented to the
10 Court, particularly the calls where he's talking about how this act or this criminal
11 act, this attempt to kill these people was, quote, "worth it" in his mind. He had
12 been discussing with his daughter the fact that he will be spending the rest of his
13 life likely behind bars and he said it was worth it. He understood and thought –
14 he actually contemplated the fact that he was near the end of his life somehow
15 as a motivator that he wouldn't – we couldn't fully punish him because at some
16 point he just planned on dying anyways and he wouldn't have to serve out the
17 maximum term of the sentence is the implication there.

18 So his age is almost a motivating factor behind the commission of the
19 crime. He thought his time was over and so a man at the end of his life has no
20 need to worry about the consequences of his actions when he goes to this airport
21 and guns these people down.

22 And, finally, I anticipate there might be some suggestion that this was
23 an act of self-defense against Mo. First of all, let's forget the fact that he stalks
24 them, that he locates where they are and he waits all day with a firearm for them
25 to return. That belies this notion of self-defense. But let's look at the fact of

1 where these victims were shot. Both Mo and Farha were shot in the back as
2 they were running away from this man pointing the gun at them. There is no self-
3 defense in this case. That argument should fall on deaf ears before this Court.
4 And where's the self-defense when he points the firearm at that 15-year-old boy,
5 after he's gun these two people down, who's hiding behind a car? There's no
6 justification. There's no self-defense to these crimes.

7 And I want to speak just briefly about the charge with Mehki, the
8 Assault with Deadly Weapon. The State is asking that that run consecutive.
9 First of all, the act of pointing the firearm at that child is above and beyond
10 anything that could've been necessary to commit the crimes of shooting Farha
11 and Mo. If he was going there to kill them, to shoot them, it had – this boy was
12 caught up in that. He is completely innocent and the act of pointing that gun at
13 him was one-hundred percent unnecessary.

14 But we're also asking the Court to run it consecutive just to consider
15 the fact that this boy is scared. He's hiding behind a car. He sees his father
16 gunned down, believes him to be dead. Mehki was one of the first people to call
17 9-1-1 and on that 9-1-1 call he's telling the 9-1-1 reporter that his dad is already
18 dead. He truly believed his father was murdered in front of his eyes. And I can't
19 imagine, as he's hiding behind that car watching his father gunned down with
20 every fiber of his being telling him to run to his father to help him, that he can't
21 because the man who just shot him is stilling in his car pointing a gun at him, so
22 he was to run away for his own life and call 9-1-1.

23 Judge, this man, Jeffrey Brown, has no remorse for his actions. He
24 has – through the jail calls, you can see him playing games trying to suborn
25 perjury from his family, trying to have his son locate what he believes to be

1 incriminating evidence of his premeditation to get rid of it, to waiting 'til the very
2 day of trial, the brinksmanship of waiting to take a plea on the morning before the
3 jury walks in, to then at the last minute before sentencing attempting to withdraw
4 his plea, coming back with absolutely no legal basis to withdraw his plea. This is
5 a game to him. He does not believe he has done anything wrong. He has no
6 remorse and the State submits that he should receive the maximum penalty in
7 this case.

8 THE COURT: Thank you.

9 Mr. Brown?

10 THE DEFENDANT: Everything he said is not true. I can prove that
11 the son was not there. He was never in any danger. And I'll let my lawyer talk
12 for me.

13 THE COURT: Thank you.

14 MR. TREFFINGER: And, Your Honor, that, the story that the State
15 tells is one side of this. He calls waiting until the day of trial brinksmanship and,
16 you know, part of this is Mr. Brown is upset at the situation he's in. His side of
17 the story is completely different. We had a self-defense argument prepared to go
18 to trial. In reviewing the jail calls, some of the things that were said in anger after
19 his arrest wasn't going to paint that in the best light, but his side of the story –
20 and I will note the State says he hacked into Farha's email to find out the flight
21 itinerary. Farha sent him an email saying the flight changed to let him know that
22 the flight was going to be delayed if he was going to show up at the airport.

23 THE DEFENDANT: And I got proof of that.

24 MR. TREFFINGER: And we – I did submit that email to the DA. The
25 DA has seen that. As far as going into the vehicle, his side of this is Farha cut off

1 all communication with him. He's a 70-year-old man. She has his paperwork.
2 She has one of his firearms. He can't get ahold of her. He's trying to get his
3 documentation, his handicap tag back, and he's trying to make whatever effort
4 he can to meet up with her. Should he have gone to the airport that day? He
5 and I have discussed that at length. No. That was a bad idea. But when
6 Farha's boyfriend got in his face – and that's in the jail call too, I might add. I
7 shot him because he got in my face. He got up –

8 THE COURT: Okay. That's not self-defense.

9 MR. TREFFINGER: We're getting there, Your Honor. He's sitting in
10 his car. He has severe medical issues. The guy comes up and grabs onto him.
11 At that point, he pulls his – he pulls the firearm –

12 THE COURT: That's still not self-defense.

13 MR. TREFFINGER: I would disagree with that, Your Honor.

14 THE COURT: Okay.

15 MR. TREFFINGER: If someone comes up to the –

16 THE COURT: That's why your client pled guilty, because you can't
17 use deadly force unless deadly force is being used against you.

18 MR. TREFFINGER: And it very well could've been. That's a much
19 younger man coming up. He's in his car. He's got a catheter in. He's not very
20 mobile. I mean I disagree with that position, Your Honor. We were ready to go
21 to trial on that fact. I mean if that's – if that's Your Honor's position that's fine.

22 THE COURT: That's not my position. That's the law in the State of
23 Nevada; that you cannot use deadly force unless deadly force is being used
24 against you.

25 MR. TREFFINGER: He didn't know what – force was used on him? It

1 could've been deadly. He's an old, infirm man in a car that's being approached
2 by someone much younger than him. I mean that's – that's a subject of
3 argument, I guess. I would argue that there are issues there that the jury could
4 have found self-defense, especially if we put the whole case on. This – part of
5 this was risk versus reward going to trial and that's why there was an attempt at
6 a plea withdraw. Obviously, there was not found that to be an issue.

7 I will note, as the State said, he has no criminal history. He's a
8 decorated Marine. He lived an exemplary life for 69 years, went through four
9 marriages with no prior domestic violence, no arrests, no felonies, no
10 misdemeanors, multiple service medals. He's in poor health, and I mean no
11 history of substance abuse, and has led a completely exemplary life up to this
12 point. But there's more to this than he stalked them with the intent to gun them
13 down. And I mean if Farha is, indeed, so afraid of him, the fact that she's
14 sending him emails, telling him when she's going to be at the airport, that kind of
15 flies in the face of that argument.

16 Again, should he have gone to the airport to try to get his stuff back?
17 Should he have engaged in this confrontation? No. That was a mistake. I do
18 believe there were self-defense issues here. I understand the Court doesn't
19 agree with me. I do believe that there was potential for that here. I am asking for
20 a minimum sentence or a maximum sentence with probation.

21 THE COURT: It doesn't matter whether I agree with you or not. Your
22 client pled guilty.

23 MR. TREFFINGER: Correct. I'm just responding to what the Court
24 has said. And I will submit it on that.

25 THE COURT: Okay. You can call your first witness.

1 MR. PORTZ: Thank you, Your Honor. The State calls Monequie
2 Short.

3 THE COURT: You can either stand here or you can go to the podium,
4 sir. It's up to you.

5 THE SPEAKER: Where do you want me to go, right here?

6 MR. PORTZ: Wherever you prefer.

7 THE SPEAKER: This is fine.

8 THE COURT: Okay. If you'll just raise your right hand so you can be
9 sworn by the clerk.

10 **MONEQUIE SHORT**

11 [having been called as a speaker, being first duly sworn, testified as follows:]

12 THE CLERK: Thank you. Could you please state and spell your
13 name for the record?

14 THE SPEAKER: It's Monequie and it's M-o-n-e-q-u-i-e.

15 THE CLERK: Thank you.

16 THE COURT: Go ahead, sir.

17 THE SPEAKER: Okay. So I want to respond to what he said. I never
18 approached the car. I'm coming back from a funeral. My sister has passed
19 away. He had been calling over – and I was in Indianapolis. He had been
20 calling, cursing her out. He was sending, you know, threatening emails saying
21 how dangerous he was. So we get to the – back to the car. He just pulls up. He
22 starts yelling at her, cursing at her. I'm putting in the luggage. You know I'm kind
23 of like trying to stay out of it just so that, you know, if they're gonna – you know,
24 say whatever you have to say. You're gonna say it. But then he started getting
25 threatening to her, so that's when, you know, I told her to go to the car, just get in

1 the car, and I told him – I just said, you know, whatever you want to say, you can
2 say it to me, but I was not at the car. He reaches for his gun and I'm backing
3 away. I got shot in the hip. I'm backing away and then he fired – and then he
4 fired at her, so this other stuff about me attacking him is totally – I never reached
5 in the car, never.

6 This guy is the type of person who's a controlling person. The whole
7 thing is he's upset that he can't control her anymore. His son doesn't even want
8 to have anything to do with him. He threatened me, you know, through the email,
9 in the phone conversations. My son right now, he's still going through things
10 because he's scared of life and it's very hard, you know, to see your son like that.
11 And we're coming from a funeral and this guy had been stalking her. He helped
12 her move out, so the whole thing is he's a controlling person. He couldn't control
13 her anymore. His whole life, according to what her – Farha and the son have
14 said – his son was terrified to come here, doesn't even want to come here, just
15 the way, you know, he is, the type of person he is.

16 He's the type of person who his son was dating a young girl. He told
17 her to – well, he told him to get her pregnant right away. That's the type of
18 father –

19 MR. TREFFINGER: I'm going to object. I don't know what this has to
20 do with –

21 THE COURT: Okay.

22 THE SPEAKER: I'm just saying –

23 THE COURT: All right, just –

24 THE SPEAKER: – that's going to the type of person he is.

25 THE COURT: I agree. It doesn't really have anything to do with this.

1 THE SPEAKER: I'm just saying the type of person he is. He's a
2 controlling – like I say, he's a controlling person. And that's all I have to say is
3 that he deserves to be in jail the rest of his life. I mean everything that he's put
4 Farha through, put me through, put my son through that he has to deal with for
5 the rest of his life, so all this other stuff – I mean that's pretty much what I say.
6 He needs to be in jail for the rest of his life. And everything else is just not true.

7 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you very much, sir.

8 THE SPEAKER: Thank you.

9 THE COURT: Do you have any other witnesses?

10 MR. PORTZ: No, Your Honor. Thank you.

11 THE COURT: Okay. In accordance with the laws of the State of
12 Nevada, this Court does now sentence you as follows: In addition to \$25
13 administrative assessment, \$150 DNA fee, order you submit to genetic marker
14 testing. The \$3 DNA collection fee will be imposed. As to Count 1, the Court is
15 going to sentence you to 8 to 20 years in Nevada Department of Corrections,
16 plus a consecutive 8 to 20 years for the deadly weapon enhancement, for an
17 aggregate of 16 to 20 years in Nevada Department of Corrections; as to Count 2,
18 16 to 72 months to run concurrent to Count 1.

19 How much credit does he have?

20 MR. TREFFINGER: I believe it's 536 days, Your Honor.

21 THE COURT: Five hundred and thirty-six days credit for time served.

22 MR. PORTZ: Thank you.

23 THE COURT: Is there any restitution?

24 MR. PORTZ: Your Honor, there is. It's referenced in the PSI. It's
25 \$700 – I'm sorry. It goes to Victims of Crime and it's in the amount of \$741.58.

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THE COURT: \$741.58 in restitution will be imposed. Thank you.
MR. TREFFINGER: Thank you, Your Honor.
MR. PORTZ: Thank you, Your Honor.

[Proceedings concluded at 11:00 a.m.]

* * * * *

ATTEST: I hereby certify that I have truly and correctly transcribed the audio/visual proceedings in the above-entitled case to the best of my ability.



KRISTINE SANTI
Court Recorder

JEFFREY BROWN

(Name)
1200868

(I.D. Number)

Northern Nevada Correctional Center
Post Office Box 7000
Carson City, NV 89702

FILED

MAY 10 2019

John L. Williams
CLERK OF COURT

Petitioner, In Proper Person

IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLARK

JEFFREY BROWN

Petitioner,

vs.

ISIDRO BACA, WARDEN, NNCC

Respondent.

Case No.: A-19-793350-W

Dept. No.: XII

AMENDED

PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS
CORPUS (POST-CONVICTION)
(Non Death Penalty)

INSTRUCTIONS:

EVIDENTIARY HEARING REQUESTED

1. This petition must be legibly handwritten or typewritten, signed by the petitioner and verified.
2. Additional pages are not permitted except where noted or with respect to the facts which you rely upon to support your grounds for relief. No citation of authorities need be furnished. If briefs or arguments are submitted, they should be submitted in the form of a separate memorandum.
3. If you want an attorney appointed, you must complete the Affidavit in Support of Motion for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis. You must have an authorized officer at the prison complete the certificate as to the amount of money and securities on deposit to your credit in any account in the institution.
4. You must name as Respondent the person by whom you are confined or restrained. If you are in a specific institution of the department of corrections, name the warden or head of the

A-19-793350-W
APET
Amended Petition
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RECEIVED

MAY 10 2019

CLERK OF THE COURT

1 institution. If you are not in a specific institution of the department but within its custody, name the
2 director of the department of corrections.

3 (5) You must include all grounds or claims for relief which you may have regarding your
4 conviction or sentence. Failure to raise all grounds in this petition may preclude you from filing
5 future petitions challenging your conviction and sentence.

6 (6) You must allege specific facts supporting the claims in the petition you file seeking
7 relief from any conviction or sentence. Failure to allege specific facts rather than just conclusions
8 may cause your petition to be dismissed. If your petition contains a claim of ineffective assistance of
9 counsel, that claim will operate to waive the attorney-client privilege for the proceeding in which you
10 claim your counsel was ineffective.

11 (7) When the petition is fully completed, the original and copy must be filed with the
12 clerk of the state district court for the county in which you were convicted. One copy must be mailed
13 to the respondent, one copy to the attorney general's office, and one copy to the district attorney of
14 the county in which you were convicted or to the original prosecutor if you are challenging your
15 original conviction or sentence. Copies must conform in all particulars to the original submitted for
16 filing.

17 PETITION

18 1. Name of institution and county in which you are presently imprisoned or where and
19 how you are presently restrained of you liberty: NORTHERN NV. CORR. CENTER/CARSON CITY

20 2. Name and location of court which entered the judgment of conviction under attack:

21 8TH JUD. DIST. CT. CLARK COUNTY, NV.

22 3. Date of judgment of conviction: JULY 2, 2018

23 4. Case Number: C-16-318858-1

24 5. (a) Length of sentence: COUNT 1 - 8-20 FOR ATTEMPTED

25 MURDER, PLUS, CONSECUTIVE TERM OF 8-20 FOR UDW;

26 COUNT 2 - SIXTEEN (16) TO SEVENTY TWO (72) MONTHS FOR

27 ASSAULT WDW TO RUN CONCURRENT WITH COUNT 1.

6. Are you presently serving a sentence for a conviction other than the conviction under attack in this motion? Yes _____ No X

If "yes", list crime, case number and sentence being served at this time:

N/A

7. Nature of offense involved in conviction being challenged: ATTEMPT MURDER
AND ASSAULT WITH A DEADLY WEAPON.

8. What was your plea? (check one)

(a) Not guilty X (c) Guilty but mentally ill _____

(b) Guilty _____ (d) Nolo contendere _____

9. If you entered a plea of guilty to one count of an indictment or information, and a plea of not guilty to another count of an indictment of information, or if a plea of guilty was negotiated, give details: ENTERED INTO AN ILL-ADVISED GUILTY PLEA

AGREEMENT ON JAN. 17, 2018 PRIOR TO COMPETENCY BEING

DETERMINED BY THE COMPETENCY COURT ON APRIL 6, 2018.

10. If you were found guilty after a plea of not guilty, was the finding made by: (check one)

(a) Jury N/A

(b) Judge without a jury N/A

11. Did you testify at the trial? Yes N/A No N/A

12. Did you appeal from the judgment of conviction?

Yes _____ No X

13. If you did appeal, answer the following:

(a) Name of court: _____

(b) Case number or citation: _____

N/A

(c) Result: _____

(d) Date of result: _____

(Attach copy of order or decision, if available)

14. If you did not appeal, explain briefly why you did not:

THE PETITIONER'S RIGHT TO A DIRECT APPEAL WAS
WAIVED AS PART OF THE PLEA AGREEMENT EXECUTED ON JAN. 17, 2018.

15. Other than a direct appeal from the judgment of conviction and sentence, have you previously filed any petitions, applications or motions with respect to this judgment in any court, state or federal? Yes X No

16. If you answer to No. 15 was "yes," give the following information:

- (a) (1) Name of court: EIGHTH JUD. DIST. CT
(2) Name of proceeding: PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
(3) Grounds raised: INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUBMIT

THE CASE TO THE GRAND JURY FOR THE CHARGES OF AGGRAVATED STALKING
AND TWO (2) COUNTS OF DISCHARGING A FIREARM FROM STRUCTURE OR VEHICLE.

(4) Did you receive an evidentiary hearing on your petition, application or motion? Yes No X

(5) Result: PETITION GRANTED

(6) Date of result: DEC. 6, 2016

(7) If known, citations of any written opinion or date of orders entered pursuant to such result:

(b) As to any second petition, application or motion, give the same information:

(1) Name of court:

(2) Nature of proceeding: N/A

(3) Grounds raised:

(4) Did you receive an evidentiary hearing on your petition, application or motion? Yes N/A No N/A

(5) Result: N/A

(6) Date of result:

(7) If known, citations of any written opinion or date of orders entered pursuant to such result: N/A

(c) As to any third or subsequent additional applications or motions, give the same information as above, list them on a separate sheet and attach.

(d) Did you appeal to the highest state or federal court having jurisdiction, the result or action taken on any petition, application or motion?

(1) First petition, application or motion?

Yes _____ No X

(2) Second petition, application or motion?

Yes N/A No N/A

(3) Third or subsequent petitions, applications or motions?

Yes N/A No N/A

Citation or date of decision.

(e) If you did not appeal from the adverse action on any petition, application or motion, explain briefly why you did not. (You must relate specific facts in response to this question. Your response may be included on paper which is 8 1/2 by 11 inches attached to the petition. Your response may not exceed five handwritten or typewritten pages in length)

THE PETITION WAS GRANTED THUS, NO ADVERSE ACTION EXISTED FOR AN
APPEAL OF THAT PARTICULAR ISSUE.

17. Has any ground being raised in this petition been previously presented to this or any other court by way of petition for habeas corpus, motion, application or any other post-conviction proceeding? If so, identify: NO —

(a) Which of the grounds is the same:

N/A

(b) The proceedings in which these grounds were raised: N/A

N/A

(c) Briefly explain why you are again raising these grounds. (You must relate specific facts in response to this question. Your response may be included on paper which is 8 ½ by 11 inches attached to the petition. Your response may not exceed five handwritten or typewritten pages in length.)

N/A

18. If any of the grounds listed in Nos. 23(a), (b), (c) and (d), or listed on any additional pages you have attached, were not previously presented in any other court, state or federal, list briefly what grounds were not so presented, and give your reasons for not presenting them. (You must relate specific facts in response to this question. Your response may be included on paper which is 8 ½ by 11 inches attached to the petition. Your response may not exceed five handwritten or typewritten pages in length.)

THE GROUNDS ARE BASED UPON INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL (IAC) THAT MUST BE BROUGHT ON POST-CONVICTION.

19. Are you filing this petition more than 1 year following the filing of the judgment of conviction or the filing of a decision on direct appeal? If so, state briefly the reasons for the delay. (You must relate specific facts in response to this question. Your response may be included on paper which is 8 ½ by 11 inches attached to the petition. Your response may not exceed five handwritten or typewritten pages in length.)

N/A

20. Do you have any petition or appeal now pending in any court, either state or federal, as to the judgment under attack? Yes _____ No X

If yes, state what court and the case number:

21. Give the name of each attorney who represented you in the proceeding resulting in your conviction and on direct appeal: MARIA RENTERIA (HABEAS PETITION);

TIMOTHY R. TREFFINGER; DAVID FISCHER

22. Do you have any future sentences to serve after you complete the sentence imposed by the judgment under attack:

Yes _____ No X

23. State concisely every ground on which you claim that you are being held unlawfully. Summarize briefly the facts supporting each ground. If necessary you may attach pages stating additional grounds and facts supporting same.

(a) Ground One:

DEFENSE COUNSEL FAILED TO INFORM THE PETITIONER THAT THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY INTENDED ON SEEKING A GRAND JURY INDICTMENT, RESPOND TO ANY SUCH NOTICE OR ADVISE PETITIONER OF HIS RIGHT TO APPEAR VIOLATING THE RIGHT OF EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AND THE 6TH AND 14TH AMENDMENTS.

Supporting Facts:

A.
DEFENSE COUNSEL FAILED TO PROTECT THE PROCEMAL DUE PROCESS RIGHT OUTLINED IN NAS 17A.241 AND 17A.095 (1)(b) AS, DEFENSE COUNSEL KNEW, OR SHOULD HAVE KNOWN THAT THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY INTENDED TO SEEK AN INDICTMENT BEFORE THE GRAND JURY BUT — SUCH NOTWITHSTANDING, DID NOT INFORM THE PETITIONER OF HIS RIGHT TO APPEAR AND TESTIFY TO EXPLAIN AWAY CHARGES OR, INFORM HIM ABOUT SUBMITTING A REQUEST TO SO DO AND EXECUTE A WAIVER OF SELF-INCRIMINATION TO EXERCISE THE RIGHT.

DEFENSE COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE FOR WITHHOLDING ALL SUCH PROCEDURAL INFORMATION THAT WOULD HAVE HAD AN IMPACT ON FINDING A TRUE BILL ON SEVERAL CHARGES.

ALTHOUGH THE PROSECUTING ATTORNEY HAD PLANNED TO USE SEVERAL EXCITED UTTERANCES AND EMOTIONALLY AND OR MENTALLY QUESTIONABLE STATEMENTS MADE BY THE PETITIONER [PRIOR] TO AND AT THE TIME OF HIS ARREST

Ground: ONE CONTINUED

DEFENSE COUNSEL FAILED TO TAKE SUCH INTO CONSIDERATION AND PROPERLY INFORM THE PETITIONER OF HIS RIGHT TO APPEAR AND TESTIFY. SEE G.J. WITNESS LIST NAMING SGT. AMY WILLIAMS AS WELL AS LUMPA DETECTIVES. (RE PREARREST STATEMENTS).

SAID STATEMENTS WERE USED / PRESENTED TO THE GRAND JURY AS WELL AS, THE ONE SIDED TESTIMONY OF THE VICTIMS THAT WERE ARTFULLY SOLICITED BY THE PROSECUTOR. THE PETITIONER'S SIDE OF THE STORY WAS NOT HEARD.

AS THE RECORD SUPPORTS, SEVERAL OF THE VICTIM STATEMENTS AS TO WHAT TRANSPIRED IN THE WAY OF THE SHOOTING ARE IN CONFLICT ON WHAT CONSTITUTES ATTEMPT MURDER AS TO MS. BROWN. EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THAT MS. BROWN WAS IN FACT AN UNINTENDED VICTIM OF COLLATERAL DAMAGE, I.E. A STRAY BULLET FIRED AT HER BOYFRIEND (MR. SHORT) WHEN HE PUT HANDS ON THE PETITIONER (APPROACHED HIM IN A THREATENING MANNER WHILE PETITIONER WAS IN HIS VEHICLE AND STRUCK HIM) SEE FAMA BROWN GUT P. 45, LL 3-4.

THE PETITIONER FURTHER CHARGES THAT HAD HE BEEN GIVEN TIMELY NOTICE OF THE GRAND JURY INVESTIGATION, HE COULD HAVE SOUGHT DISMISSAL OF THE INDICTMENT OF THE ABBREVIATED STALKING CHARGE (COUNT 1) AND DISCHARGE OF FIREARM FROM OR WITHIN STRUCTURE OR VEHICLE (COUNTS 6-9) DUE TO THE PARTICULAR FACTUAL CIRCUMSTANCES AND NOT, HAVE HAD THEM HANG OVER HIS HEAD AT LATER LEVEL FOR THE PROSECUTING ATTORNEY'S USE FOR THE PLEA DEAL.

THE DEFENSE ATTORNEY'S ACTIONS WERE IN CONFLICT WITH HUMBLDT COUNTY V. MADON, 783 P.2D 1389 (1989) AND RAMIREZ V. 8TH JUD. DIST. CT., 913 P.2D 1293 (1996).

1. THE GRAND JURY WAS DEPRIVED OF TESTIMONY RE WHY THE PETITIONER ACTUALLY APPEARED AT THE MARCH AT THE TIME THE ALLEGED VICTIMS ARRIVED AND, THAT HE WAS PHYSICALLY ATTACKED WHILE SITTING IN HIS VEHICLE.

Ground: ONE CONCLUDED

THE GRAND JURY RETURNED A TRUE BILL ON NINE(9) COUNTS ON OCT. 18, 2016 WITH A WARRANT /INDICTMENT WARRANT ISSUING ON SAID SAME DATE, FOLLOWED BY THE INDICTMENT WARRANT RETURN ON OCT. 20, 2016.

B.

DEFENSE COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING TO BRING THE INADEQUATE GRAND JURY NOTICE ISSUE IN THE PRETRIAL HEARING CORPUS PETITION FILED NOV. 17, 2016, IN VIOLATION OF PETITIONER'S 6TH AND 14TH AMEND. RIGHTS.

ASSUMING ADEQUACY - THAT DEFENSE ATTORNEY WAS NOT PROVIDED WITH THE MANDATORY NOTICE PURSUANT TO NRS 172.241 (THE "MANDUM" NOTICE), DEFENSE COUNSEL WAS LAX IN REPRESENTATION FOR NOT CHALLENGING SAID DEFECT IN THE PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS FILED ON NOV. 17, 2016.

THE CASE LAW WAS CLEARLY ESTABLISHED IN MARCUM, SUPRA AND RAMIREZ, SUPRA THAT NOTICE IS A REQUIRED PREREQUISITE IN GRAND JURY PROCEEDINGS OF THIS NATURE AS THERE IS NO RECORD OR FACTS TO SUPPORT A SECRET INDICTMENT.

ALTHOUGH DEFENSE COUNSEL ADMITS TO BEING AWARE THAT THE STATE PRESENTED THE CASE TO THE GRAND JURY ON OCT. 11, 2016, (HABEAS PETITION P 7, LL 24-25), COUNSEL DOES NOT MENTION ANYTHING ABOUT THE MANDATORY NOTICE OR, INFORMING THE PETITIONER ABOUT SUCH OR, OTHERWISE COUNSEL HIM CONCERNING THAT PROCESS.

(b) Ground Two:

DEFENSE COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE FOR NOT REQUESTING ANY COMPETENCY HEARING TO STOP ALL PROCEEDINGS AND, ALLOWING AND OR ALLOWING THE PETITIONER TO ENTER INTO A GUILTY PLEA PRIOR TO THE COMPETENCY HEARING ORDERED BY THE COURT IN VIOLATION OF THE 6TH AND 14TH AMENDMENTS.

Supporting Facts:

DEFENSE COUNSEL[S] WERE AWARE OF THE PETITIONER'S FRAGILE MENTAL AND OR CONFUSED STATE BY WAY OF SEVERAL PREARREST STATEMENTS AND OBSERVATIONS MADE BY THE VA POLICE OFFICER - SGT AMY WILLIAMS ON SEPT. 19, 2016 ("LOOKING CONFUSED..."). SEE ALSO, EX. A AND B.²

DEFENSE COUNSEL WAS ALSO ON ADEQUATE NOTICE OF THE PETITIONER'S QUESTIONABLE/VULNERABLE MENTAL STATE BY WAY OF THE STATEMENTS MADE TO LUMP ON SEPT. 19, 2016, ALONG WITH, STATEMENTS MADE TO COUNSEL THAT EVIDENCED DEEP DEPRESSION, SELF-PUNISHING AND OR, SEVERE ANXIETY THAT IMPAIRED SOUND JUDGMENT. Id.

THE ABOVE NOTWITHSTANDING, DEFENSE COUNSEL REFUSED TO BRING THESE EARLY CONCERNS TO THE COURT'S ATTENTION PRIOR TO MAR 15, 2018 WHEN, THE DISTRICT JUDGE REFERRED THE DEFENDANT TO THE COMPETENCY COURT BUT, [AFTER], DEFENSE COUNSEL ALLOWED, RECOMMENDED, OR MISLED THE PETITIONER TO ENTER INTO GUILTY PLEA NEGOTIATIONS ON "JAN. 17, 2018."

AT THE TIME THE PETITIONER ENTERED INTO A GUILTY PLEA AGREEMENT OF (COUNT 1) ATTEMPT MURDER WITH USE OF DEADLY WEAPON AND (COUNT 2) ASSAULT WITH A DEADLY WEAPON - HE HAS NOT BEEN FOUND COMPETENT, ALTHOUGH, EVIDENCE SUGGEST THAT HIS COMPETENCY WAS IN QUESTION. EX. A AND B, SUPRA.

2

PLEASE IT THE COURT TO TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE OF THE COURT MINUTES OF CASE NO. D-16-542464-D DATED MAR. 6, 2018 AND APRIL 10, 2018 RESPECTIVELY.

Ground: TWO CONTINUED

Moreover, defense counsel (MR. TREFFINGER) DID NOT EVEN HAVE GOOD CONTACT INFORMATION TO ALLOW THE COURT TO CONTACT HIM AND THE COMPETENCY COURT REFERRAL MATTER HAD TO BE CONTINUED.

AT THE COMPETENCY COURT HEARING ON APRIL 6, 2018, DEFENSE COUNSEL (TREFFINGER) LOADED NO OBJECTIONS, DID NOT PROPERLY DEFEND THE PETITIONER AT THE COMPETENCY HEARING BY [NOT] CHALLENGING THE COMPETENCY ASSESSMENT BY WAY OF AN EXPERT FOR THE DEFENSE AND OR ANY SUCH EVALUATION. COUNSEL DID NOTHING!

THE LAW IS CLEAR AS TO THE DETERMINATION OF COMPETENCY OF AN ACCUSED BEFORE HE OR SHE STANDS TRIAL. *PATE V. ROBINSON*, 383 U.S. 375, 377, 86 S. CT. 836, 838 (1966); *DEPE V. MISSOURI*, 420 U.S. 162, 171, 95 S. CT. 896, 903 (1975); ALSO, *MELCHOR-GLORIA V. STATE OF NEVADA*, 660 P.2d 109 (1983). THUS, IN THE SAME LINE OF THINKING/RATIONALE, IT APPEARS THAT OUR PROCESS REQUIRES A DETERMINATION OF COMPETENCY [PRIOR], TO AN ACCUSED ENTERING INTO A PLEA AGREEMENT WHICH HAS A SENTENCE THAT OPERATES AS A FUNCTIONAL EQUIVALENT OF A LIFE SENTENCE FOR A SEVENTY-EIGHT (68) YEAR OLD MAN, . I.E. [TWO (2) AGGREGATED 8-20 YEAR SENTENCES, WHICH MEANS - SIXTEEN (16) YEARS BEFORE HE IS ELIGIBLE FOR PAROLE] AT EIGHTY-FOUR (84).

THE FACT THAT A QUESTIONABLE AND UNCHALLENGED FINDING OF INCOMPETENCY WAS LATER FOUND ON APRIL 6, 2018, STILL DOES NOT CURE THE OVER-ALL INEFFECTIVENESS OF COUNSEL, THE TOTAL BUTCHERY OF THE SPIRIT OF THE "COMPETENCY" STATUTE AND THE "CART BEFORE THE HORSE" POST-HOC PROCESSES.

Ground: TWO CONCLUDED

AS CITED / HELD IN NRS 178 405 - REQUIRES COMPETENCY AS
A LEGAL PREREQUISITE TO [ANY] COURT PROCEEDING. THAT, A
HEARING TO DETERMINE DEFENDANT'S COMPETENCY IS CONSTITUTION-
ALLY, AND STATUTORILY REQUIRED WHERE REASONABLE DOUBT
EXISTS ON ISSUE. MELLER - GLORIA, SUPRA, PRIOR TO, SIGNING
ANY BINDING AGREEMENT. AND, ANY ERROR RELATIVE THERETO IS NOT
HARMLESS WHEN VIEWED IN CONJUNCTION TO THE CUMULATIVE ERRORS
ASPECT RELATIVE TO THE NUMEROUS PROSECUTOR AND OTHER DEFICIENCIES
IN THIS MATTER PREMISED UPON, COUNSEL'S INEFFECTIVENESS. SEE GROUND
7.

BASED UPON THE ABOVE FACTS, THE PETITIONER'S GUILTY PLEA AND
CONVICTION / SENTENCE SHOULD BE SET ASIDE.

(c) Ground Three:

DEFENSE COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING TO PROPERLY COMMUNICATE WITH THE PETITIONER; MISLEADING OR, ILL ADVISING TO ENTER INTO A GUILTY PLEA AGREEMENT AND IMPEDING DEFENSE OF PERMANENT COUNSEL VIOLATING THE 6TH AND 14TH AMEND.

Supporting Facts:

THE PRECEDING COUNTS AND THEIR EXAMPLES OF (IAC) ARE INCORPORATED HEREIN.

ON APRIL 12, 2018, THE MINUTES DOCUMENT THAT THE PETITIONER IS SO DISSATISFIED WITH COUNSEL TREEFINGER UNTIL HE WANTS TO WITHDRAW HIS GUILTY PLEA (PRE SENTENCING); WANTS TO DISMISS HIS ATTORNEY AND REPRESENT HIMSELF (ALTHOUGH IT IS NOTED THAT A FAREITA CANVASS WILL BE CONDUCTED, NO TRANSCRIPTS OF SAID CANVASS WERE PRODUCED OR AVAILABLE AT THE TIME THIS PETITION WAS DRAFTED).

WHAT IS EVIDENT, IS A COMPLETE DISCONNECT BETWEEN THE PETITIONER AND MR. TREEFINGER TO THE POINT THAT, NO WORKING RELATIONSHIP IS LEFT AND ANY ADOCKNEY IS QUESTIONABLE AT BEST.

DEFENSE COUNSEL INFORMED THE COURT THAT THE PETITIONER NO LONGER WANTED TO REPRESENT HIMSELF DESPITE, THE OBVIOUS DISCONNECT. THEN, MOVES TO WITHDRAW FROM THE CASE, WHICH, IS GRANTED BY THE COURT. THE COURT THEN APPOINTS ATTORNEY DAVID FISCHER, WHICH, HAS CONSIDERABLE DIFFICULTIES GETTING DISCOVERY FROM MR. TREEFINGER BUT, NO RESPONSE, HAS TO ATTEMPT TO COMPILE SOME INFORMATION ON HIS OWN AND REQUESTED THE STATE TO PRODUCE A COPY OF THE DISCOVERY THAT WAS MET WITH AN OBJECTION FROM MS. CLOWERS ADOCKNEY, HAVING TO RE-PRODUCE

Ground: THREE CONCLUDED

THE DISCOVERY ALL OVER AGAIN AFTER ALREADY PRODUCING IT TO PRIOR DEFENSE COUNSEL [NUMEROUS TIMES] IS RIDICULOUS.

THE COURT ORDERED THE SENTENCING MATTER CONTINUED AND MR. TREFFINGER IS ORDERED TO PROVIDE ALL DISCOVERY TO MR. FISCHER

THERE IS NO INDICATION THAT ATTORNEY TREFFINGER EVER TIMELY PRODUCED THE CASE FILE TO MR. FISCHER (PUBLIC DEFENDER) BY MAY 15, 2018, AS, THE DOCUMENTS PRODUCED BY MR. FISCHER PURSUANT TO THE WITHDRAWAL OF COUNSEL GRANTED ON NOV. 13, 2018, CONTAINS NO DISCOVERY NOR: THE JAVIS VIDEO OF DEF'S PLEA; THE NPS 178.420 COMPETENCE REPORT; NOR, THE SENTENCING RECOMMENDATIONS JUST TO NAME A FEW, INCLUDING, NO SENTENCING RECOMMENDATIONS OR EVEN, A COPY OF PETITIONER'S MOTION TO WITHDRAW FROM THE GUILTY PLEA AGREEMENT.

BASED UPON THE ABOVE FACTS, THE PETITIONER'S GUILTY PLEA AND CONVICTION / SENTENCE SHOULD BE SET ASIDE.

(d) Ground Four:

ALLOWED, ILL ADVISED, OR MISLED PETITIONER INTO SIGNING A GUILTY PLEA AGREEMENT WHEN A VIABLE DEFENSE EXISTED THAT IN FACT, DEFENSE COUNSEL FILED NOTICE OF SAID AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE ON OCT. 26, 2017 IN VIOLATION OF THE 6TH AND 14TH AMENDMENTS.

Supporting Facts:

PETITIONER TOLD COUNSEL THAT THE ALLEGED VICTIM "MONIQUE SHORT" APPROACHED THE DRIVER'S SIDE OF HIS VEHICLE IN AN AGGRESSIVE MANNER AND SAID: "DO YOU HAVE A PROBLEM WITH ME MUTHAFUCKA"?! SEE GUT P. 45, LL 3-4 (THE CLEANED UP VERSION) STATING: "... ALL I HEAR IS "MO" WALKING TOWARDS HIM SAYING DO YOU HAVE A PROBLEM WITH ME, MAN" (FARAH BROWN) ALSO;

GUT 57; 21-25; 58:1 - MONIQUE SHORT'S TESTIMONY ABOUT CONFRONTING THE PETITIONER BY APPROACHING HIM AND IN AN AGGRESSIVE MANNER — STATING: IF YOU HAVE SOMETHING TO SAY, SAY IT TO ME"! THIS LANGUAGE INFERS A CONFRONTATIONAL STANCE ON PART OF MR. SHORT³

THE PETITIONER GOES ON TO INFORM DEFENSE COUNSEL THAT "SHORT" WENT ON TO GRAB HIM BY THE "COLLAR" AT THE HEIGHT OF HIS STATEMENTS / AGGRESSIVE ACTIONS. SEE EX. C. P. 7. AT THAT POINT — THE PETITIONER DREW / RETRIEVED HIS LEGALLY OWNED WEAPON⁴ AND IN A NOW EXTREMELY EXCITED EMOTIONAL STATE, STARTED TO FIRE THE WEAPON IN A DOWNWARD TRAJECTORY STRIKING "SHORT" IN THE LOWER RIGHT SIDE OF HIS BACK TRACKING DOWNWARD TO SHORT'S UPPER LEFT BUTTOCK.

THESE CIRCUMSTANCES SUGGEST AN ADEQUATE PROVOCATION

A REASONABLE INFERENCE CAN BE DRAWN THAT MR. SHORT WAS BACKING UP AND TURNED TO RUN AFTER SEEING PETITIONER DRAW HIS WEAPON [AFTER] BEING ASSAULTED BY HIM

SEE EX. D CONCEALED FIREARM PERMIT 15

Ground: FOUR CONTINUED

IN THAT, THE PETITIONER DID NOT ARRIVE WITH THE INTEN-
TIONS OF HARMING / SHOOTING ANYONE AS HIS WEAPON WAS
NOT INITIALLY DRAWN BUT PUT AWAY AND NOT PRODUCED
[UNTIL] "HE" WAS PHYSICALLY ATTACKED AFTER BEING APPROACHED
IN A THREATENING MANNER BY "SHORT".

THE ALLEGED VICTIMS, ESPECIALLY MR. SHORT, COULD HAVE
SIMPLY CONTINUED TO LOAD THE LUGGAGE AND LEAVE, AS, AT
NO TIME DID THE PETITIONER EVER EXIT HIS VEHICLE NOR,
DID HE IMPEDE THEIR EGRESS FROM THE PARKING SPACE.

THE ABOVE NOTWITHSTANDING - THE PETITIONER (A SIXTY-
EIGHT (68) YEAR OLD MAN) WITH, NUMEROUS HEALTH ISSUES, e.g.,
(CCOC MEDICAL EXAM RECORDS WILL SUPPORT THAT PETITIONER
WAS CATHETERIZED AT THE TIME) - AND UNDER CONSIDERABLE STRESS
AND OR EMOTIONAL UPHEAVAL DUE TO MARITAL ESTRANGEMENT FROM
A WIFE OF TWENTY-TWO (22) YEARS, [IS] APPROACHED ON THE DRIVER'S
SIDE OF HIS VEHICLE IN AN AGGRESSIVE AND CHALLENGING MANNER,
BY THE WIFE'S BOYFRIEND (A YOUNGER AND LARGER MAN) AND IN
FACT, (ACCORDING TO INFORMATION GIVEN TO OFFENSE ATTORNEY) IS
PHYSICALLY ATTACKED OR BATTERED. EX. (AT p. 7, LL 9-10.

THE ABOVE PLEADINGS MAKE A FACIAL SHOWING OF ADEQUATE PROVO-
CATION THAT, INFERREDLY, PROMPTED DEFENSE COUNSEL TO FILE THE
NOTICE OF THE SELF-DEFENSE ALTERNATIVE DEFENSE ON OCT. 26, 2017
BUT, SUCH INFORMATION AND FILING NOTWITHSTANDING, LED THE
PETITIONER TO ENTER INTO A GUILTY PLEA FOR ATTEMPT MURDER
OF MS. FARA BROWN AND MONIQUE SHORT AS TO COUNT I.

Ground: FOUR CONTINUED

THE ADEQUATE PROVOCATION DEFENSE WOULD HAVE HAD A MAJOR IMPACT, WHEN PROVEN, UPON EACH AND EVERY COUNT OF ATTEMPT MURDER; ASSAULT WITH A DEADLY WEAPON; DISCHARGING A FIREARM FROM A VEHICLE OR WITHIN A STRUCTURE; BATTERY WITH UDW; AND, CHILD ABUSE, NEGLECT OR ENDANGERMENT —⁵
AS, THE STATE COULD NOT HAVE MADE A CASE IF THE PETITIONER WAS OFFENDING HIMSELF FROM OR REACTING TO, AN UNPROVOKED ATTACK. (NRS 200.275). AND, BY MRS BROWN'S OWN ADMISSIONS— NO GUN WAS EVER POINTED AT MERKISHORT. FN 5, SUPRA.

THE PROSECUTING ATTORNEY INSTRUCTED THE GRAND JURY, THAT:

MALICE AFORETHOUGHT MEANS THE INTENTIONAL DOING OF A WRONGFUL ACT WITHOUT LEGAL CAUSE OR EXCUSE OR WHAT THE LAW CONSIDERS ADEQUATE PROVOCATION.

SEE,

PARAGRAPHS 1-5, PP 15-16 ABOVE IN SUPPORT OF THE ADEQUATE PROVOCATION. THE STATE OF NEVADA'S ADEQUATE PROVOCATION DOCTRINE ("STAND YOUR GROUND") IS SET OUT IN NRS 200.120 "UNLAWFUL HOMICIDE" THAT IS IN FACT, ADOPTED IN NRS 200.275 "JUSTIFIABLE INFLECTION OR THREAT OF BODILY INJURY NOT PUNISHABLE".

EVEN THOUGH — NO DEATH OCCURED IN THIS MATTER, THE PROVOCATION DOCTRINE THAT IS PREMISED ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT ONE WHO KILLS WHILE IN A HIGHLY EMOTIONAL STATE MAY NOT ACT FROM "ANY WICKEDNESS OF HEART OR CRUELTY OR RECKLESSNESS OF DISPOSITION", BUT RATHER AS "[A] RESULT OF THE TEMPORARY EXCITEMENT, BY WHICH THE CONTROL OF REASON WAS DISTURBED", APPLIES HERE.

⁵ SEE EX.E, TEXT MESSAGE OF FARHA BROWN THAT THE PETITIONER NEVER POINTED THE WEAPON AT THE "SON".

Ground: FOUR CONTINUED

THERE IS ADEQUATE EVIDENCE WITHIN THE EXISTING RECORD THAT SUPPORTS THAT THE PETITIONER WAS ACTUALLY SEITING IN HIS VEHICLE WHEN HE WAS ACCOSTED BY THE BOYFRIEND OF HIS ESTRANGED WIFE (MR. SHORT), P. 15 AT PARAGRAPH #1, SUPRA. AND, THE PETITIONER ACTUALLY SUCCUMBS TO AND SUSTAINED AN UNWANTED BATTERY AS DEFINED IN NRS 200.400 AND OR, AN ASSAULT AS DEFINED IN NRS 200.471. RETURN FORCE WAS JUSTIFIED PER NEVADA LAW.

ALL THE WHILE, THE PETITIONER WAS NOT REQUIRED TO RE-TREAT BEFORE USING FORCE TO REPELL HIS ATTACKER AS: (1) HE WAS NOT THE ORIGINAL AGGRESSOR (WAS ACTUALLY SEATED IN HIS VEHICLE) AND SIMPLY SPEAKING WITH HIS LAWFUL WIFE ALTHOUGH, ESTRANGED; (2) HAD A RIGHT TO BE PRESENT AT THE LOCATION, A PUBLIC PLACE (AS NO RESTRAINING ORDER HAD ISSUED); AND (3) THE PETITIONER WAS [NOT] ACTUALLY ENGAGED IN CONDUCT IN FURTHERANCE OF CRIMINAL ACTIVITY (THE AGGRAVATED STALKING CHARGES WERE UNFOUNDED AND INVALIDATED BY A POSTRIAL HABEAS).

AS SUCH, THE ABOVE FACTUAL UNDERPINNINGS WOULD EVEN HAVE SUPPORTED JUSTIFIABLE HOMICIDE UPON (MR. SHORT) HAD HIS LIFE BEEN TAKEN AFTER ASSAULTING AND BATTERING THE PETITIONER IN HIS VEHICLE.

MOREOVER, IN ADDITION TO ANY OTHER CIRCUMSTANCES RECOGNIZED AS JUSTIFICATION AT COMMON LAW (NRS 200.275), SUPRA, THE INFLECTION OR THREAT OF BODILY INJURY IS JUSTIFIED, AND DOES NOT CONSTITUTE MAYHEM, BATTERY, OR ASSAULT, IF DONE UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH WOULD JUSTIFY HOMICIDE.

Ground: FOUR CONTINUED

AS FOR THE INJURIES SUSTAINED BY THE ESTRAINED WIFE (MS. BROWN) THERE WAS "INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE", AS A MATTER OF LAW, TO PROVE ATTEMPTED MURDER AS, UNDER STATE LAW, A CONVICTION OF ATTEMPTED MURDER REQUIRES, AMONG OTHER THINGS, PROOF OF AN INTENT TO KILL.

THE ADMISSIBLE EVIDENTIARY FACTS/EVIDENCE CLEARLY SHOW THAT (MS. BROWN'S) INJURIES WERE TO THE LOWER PART OF HER BACK TRACKING IN A CROSSWISE MOTION. THE INJURIES WERE NOT IN AN UPWARDS TRAJECTORY AND, AS ARGUED ABOVE, WERE THE RESULT OF ADEQUATE PROVOCATION BY HER NEW BOYFRIEND.

THE PETITIONER SIMPLY Lapsed INTO A HIGHLY EMOTIONAL STATE (IF NOT ALREADY PRONED TO SUCH) THAT CAUSED HIM TO REACT AND BEHAVE IN A WAY THAT HE WOULD OTHERWISE FEEL IS MORALLY AND OR LAWFULLY UNACCEPTABLE.

THE EVIDENCE OF ATTEMPT MURDER WAS LAWFULLY NONEXISTENT AS, THE TYPICAL COMMON LAW STANDARD ON PROVOKING EVENTS IS STRUCTURED SUCH THAT ANY NUMBER OF CIRCUMSTANCES MIGHT CONSTITUTE ADEQUATE PROVOCATION SO LONG AS THE/A DEFENDANT CAN SHOW: (1) THAT A REASONABLE PERSON IN THE DEFENDANT'S SITUATION WOULD HAVE BEEN ADEQUATELY PROVOKED, (2) THAT THE DEFENDANT WAS IN -FACT PROVOKED AND BECAME EMOTIONALLY CHARGED TO AN EXTENT THAT HE LOST SELF-CONTROL, (3) THAT A REASONABLE PERSON IN THE DEFENDANT'S SITUATION WOULD NOT HAVE HAD SUFFICIENT TIME TO "COOL OFF" BETWEEN PROVOCATION AND THE INSUING AGGRESSIVE REACTIVE RESPONSE, AND (4) THAT THE DEFENDANT DID NOT, IN -FACT, COOL OFF BEFORE HE ACTED.

Ground: FOUR CONTINUED

TODAY, IN COMMON LAW JURISDICTIONS, PASSION IS OFTEN BROAD ENOUGH TO INCLUDE EMOTIONS LIKE FEAR OR RESENTMENT NOTING THAT "PASSION NEED NOT MEAN 'RAGE OR ANGER' BUT MAY BE ANY '[V]IOLENT, INTENSE, HIGHWROUGHT OR ENTHUSIASTIC EMOTION' ") PEOPLE V. WU, 286 CAL RPTR. 868, 884 (CAL. CT. APP. 1991).

NOT ONLY WAS THE PETITIONER SHOULDERING THE MENTALLY STRESSING FACT THAT HE WAS ACTUALLY SEEING HIS ESTRANGED WIFE WITH THE MAN SHE WAS NOW SLEEPING WITH — THAT SAME MAN GOES ON TO GET IN HIS FACE AND PUTS HANDS ON HIM.⁶ THIS WOULD CAUSE OVERWHELMING ANGER IN ANY REASONABLE MAN! (NRS 200.275).

THUS, THE INJURIES TO THE WIFE (MS. BROWN) ARE NOT UPON THE LEVEL OF ATTEMPTED MURDER.

DEFENSE COUNSEL [WAS] AWARE OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES AND THE ADEQUATE PROVOCATION RELATED THERETO WHICH, EXPLAINS THE FILING OF THE NOTICE OF AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE: SELF-DEFENSE ON OCT. 26, 2017. (FN 4 AT PP. 7-8).

BUT, ALL OF THE ABOVE FACTS NOTWITHSTANDING, DEFENSE COUNSEL DID NOT PURSUE SAID DEFENSES BUT INSTEAD, GETS THE PETITIONER TO SIGN HIS LIFE AWAY IN A GUILTY PLEA AGREEMENT. DISPUTE —

SHORT EXPLAINED THAT AFTER BROWN PULLED UP, SHORT INTERVENED IN THEIR CONVERSATION BY APPROACHING THE FORD ESCAPE AND TELLING HIM "IF YOU WANT TO SAY ANYTHING TO ME, YOU CAN SAY SOMETHING TO ME." GUT 57:21-25; 58:1. MR. SHORT SEEMED TO EXCERBATE AN ALREADY TENSE SITUATION BY WAY OF HIS OWN BRAVADO.

⁶ SEE SENTENCING TRANSCRIPT P. 7, LL 9-10, EXHIBIT C.

Ground: FOUR CONCLUDED

AT THE GRAND JURY PROCEEDING (AGAIN, FOR WHICH THE PETITIONER WAS NOT PRESENT) THE STATE PROSECUTOR INSTRUCTED SAID GRAND JURY (AS NOTED AT PAGE 17 ABOVE) ON MALICE AFORETHOUGHT BUT—AS THOROUGHLY ADDRESSED ABOVE IN PAGES 15-20, THAT ELEMENT MUST FAIL AS THERE IS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENTIARY AND FACTUAL SUPPORT IN LIGHT OF AN ADEQUATE PROVOCATION EXISTING.

THE INSTRUCTION [EVEN] RECOGNIZES THAT MALICE IS THE INTENTIONAL DOING OF A WRONGFUL ACT WITHOUT LEGAL CAUSE OR EXCUSE OR WHAT THE LAW CONSIDERS ADEQUATE PROVOCATION.

BUT, CONSIDERING THE FACTUAL CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS MATTER (TAKEN UPON THE WHOLE) ADEQUATE PROVOCATION EXISTED WHICH, WERE SUFFICIENT TO EXCITE FEAR IN A REASONABLE PERSON AND— THAT THIS PETITIONER ACTUALLY ACTED UNDER INFLUENCE OF THOSE FEARS AND OR EMOTION AND [NOT], IN SPITE OR REVENGE. IT WAS PURE EMOTIONAL REACTIVENESS THAT STEERED THE PETITIONER'S BEHAVIOR.

MALICE AFORETHOUGHT COULD HAVE NEVER BEEN PROVEN BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT, AND AS SUCH, DEFENSE COUNSEL'S PERFORMANCE WAS TOTALLY DEFICIENT IN LIGHT OF THE FACT THAT HE WAS TOTALLY AWARE OF THE EMOTIONALLY FUELED CONFRONTATIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES, TO THE POINT, OF PILING THE AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE, BUT, BACKED AWAY / ABANDONED IT FOR A GUILTY PLEA AGREEMENT.

BASED UPON THE ABOVE FACTS AND LAW, THE PETITIONER'S GUILTY PLEA AND CONVICTION / SENTENCE SHOULD BE SET ASIDE.

(e) Ground Five:

ADVISING OR MISLEADING THE PETITIONER TO ENTER INTO AN
ILL ADVISED GUILTY PLEA AGREEMENT THAT WAS NOT IN PETITIONER'S
BEST INTEREST CONSTITUTING INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
IN VIOLATION OF THE 6TH AND 14TH AMENDMENTS

Supporting Facts:

THE PETITIONER INCORPORATES GROUND FOUR ABOVE AS THOUGH
FULLY SET OUT HEREIN AS ADDITIONAL SUPPORT FOR THIS GROUND.

DEFENSE COUNSEL, TIMOTHY R. TREFFINGER, MISLED AND OR
WRONGLY ADVISED AND OR INFLUENCED (BY WAY OF OFF THE RECORD
COERSION) THE PETITIONER TO ENTER INTO A DEFECTIVE GUILTY PLEA
AGREEMENT. COUNSEL KNEW THAT A VALID DEFENSE EXISTED (COUNT
4 ABOVE)⁷ BUT, LED THE PETITIONER TO ENTER INTO THE PLEA AGREEMENT
THAT CARRIED A SENTENCE THAT HAD AN OPERATIONAL
FUNCTIONAL EQUIVALENT OF LIFE FOR A SIXTY-EIGHT (68)
YEAR OLD MAN, I.E., THE PETITIONER WOULD BE EIGHTY-FOUR
(84) YEARS OLD AT THE TIME OF PAROLE ELIGIBILITY.

LIKEWISE, THE CHARGES WERE PROBATIONABLE BUT, COUNSEL
FAILED TO PROPERLY ADVOCATE FOR SUCH DISPUTE — THE PETITIONER
BEING/WAS A DECORATED VETERAN⁷; WAS AN OTHERWISE
LAW ABIDING CITIZEN WITH NO PRIORS, AND, AS OUTLINED IN
GROUND 4, THE INCIDENT WAS EMOTIONALLY CHARGED ALONG
WITH, ADEQUATE PROVOCATION / SUFFICIENT PROVOCATION EVEN
UNDER NRS 200.120 TO UNDERMINE THE CHARGES HE FACED.

ALSO, THE PLEA AGREEMENT INCLUDED: (C) AN ENHANCEMENT
PENALTY THAT WAS [NOT] MANDATORY CONSIDERING, NO JURY

⁷ SEE ALSO EX. C, pp. 7-8.

Ground: FIVE CONTINUED

FOUND THE USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON (WHICH COULD HAVE BEEN NULLIFIED DUE TO ADEQUATE PROVOCATION, GROUND 4, SUPRA);

(b) THE TWO (2) ALLEGED VICTIMS HAD BEEN MERGED INTO A SINGLE COUNT OF ATTEMPT MURDER (COUNT 1) WHEN IN FACT, THEY WERE SEPARATE COUNTS BEFORE THE GRAND JURY (WHICH AGAIN, COULD HAVE BEEN NULLIFIED DUE TO ADEQUATE PROVOCATION, GROUND 4, ID.);

(c) DEFENSE COUNSEL FAILED TO ABIDE BY THE STANDARDS SET OUT IN ADKT. #411 (DISSENT MAGNIN, SAITH, AND CHERRY) REGARDING ADVISING THE PETITIONER OF THE "COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES" OF THE GUILTY PLEA UPON HIS PENDING DIVORCE PROCEEDINGS THAT COUNSEL TREFFINGER, WAS IN FACT HANDLING. NRS 41.133⁸ AND EX. A-8.

THE ALLEGED FACTUAL DETERMINATIONS ESTABLISHED BY WAY OF SAID GUILTY PLEA HAD A MONUMENTAL IMPACT UPON SAID DIVORCE PROCEEDINGS AND, SUBSEQUENTLY, A MONETARY ASPECT IN THE FORM OF THE PETITIONER'S PENSION BEING AWARDED TO HIS ESTRANGED WIFE ALONG WITH, EXTREME PUNITIVE AWARDS.

SUCH A FAILURE IMPLICATES A LAWYER'S GENERAL DUTY OF CARE TOWARD THE CLIENT;

(d) DID NOT EXPLAIN THE ADVANTAGES OF A TRIAL AND OR A DIRECT APPEAL INCLUDING, ANY ADDITIONAL INVESTIGATION OR LEGAL CHALLENGER TO THE AGREEMENTS THAT FAILED IN THE PRETRIAL HABEAS CORPUS PETITION RE: COUNTS 8 AND 9;

⁸ SEE EX. F, NRS 41.133

Ground: FIVE CONCLUDED

(e) FAILED TO PRESERVE THE PETITIONER'S RIGHTS AND PREPARE THE DEFENSE IN RELATION TO ADVISING PETITIONER TO ENTER INTO A GUILTY PLEA AGREEMENT, PRIOR, TO COMPETENCY BEING ESTABLISHED EVEN THOUGH, COUNSEL HAD CONCERNS ABOUT MENTAL STABILITY/COMPETENCY BUT NEVER, BROUGHT ANY SUCH CONCERNS TO THE COURT'S ATTENTION AND, KNOWING THAT AN ADEQUATE PROVOCATION DEFENSE EXISTED;

(f) FAILED TO DEVELOPE ANY NEGOTIATION STRATEGY DISPIE THE EMOTIONALLY CHARGED CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE AND THE ASPECT OF ADEQUATE PROVOCATION;

(g) AFTER THE PETITIONER GAINED SOME ADDITIONAL INFORMATION AND OR INSIGHT AS TO THE GUILTY PLEA AGREEMENT NOT BEING IN HIS BEST INTEREST, HE WANTED TO WITHDRAW IT [PRIOR] TO SENTENCING BUT, DEFENSE COUNSEL GAVE HIM INACCURATE AND MISLEADING INFORMATION TO INFLUENCE HIM TO RETRACT HIS MOTION TO WITHDRAW, E.G. DEFENSE COUNSEL TOLD THE PETITIONER THAT THERE WAS NO BASIS IN LAW TO WITHDRAW THE GUILTY PLEA. (DAVID FISCHER APPOINTED 4/17/2018); AND,

(h) THE PETITIONER WAS SO DISSATISFIED WITH DEFENSE COUNSEL THAT HE WANTED TO REPRESENT HIMSELF AND CONTINUE WITH WITHDRAWING HIS PLEA BUT, COUNSEL NEVER GOT A MERITS RULING ON THE MOTION.

BASED UPON THE ABOVE FACTS, THE PETITIONER'S GUILTY PLEA AND CONVICTION/SENTENCE SHOULD BE SET ASIDE.

(F) Ground SIX

DEFENSE COUNSELS WERE INEFFECTIVE IN RELATION TO
THE MANNER THEY HANDLED, MISLED, AND OR ILL ADVISED
THE PETITIONER REGARDING HIS PRESENTING MOTION TO
WITHDRAW FROM THE GUILTY PLEA AGREEMENT VIOLATING THE
6TH AND 14TH AMENDMENTS

Supporting Facts:

AS EARLY AS FEB 21, 2018, THE PETITIONER HAD BEEN IN-
FORMING BOTH DEFENSE COUNSELS (TREFFINGER AND FISCHER)
THAT HE WANTED TO WITHDRAW HIS PLEA AND, ATTEMPTED TO FILE /
SUBMIT A MOTION IN PROPER PERSON. SEE EX. A (SECOND
PARAGRAPH).

ON SAID SAME DATE, ATTORNEY TREFFINGER STATED THAT HE
WOULD BE MOVING TO WITHDRAW AS ATTORNEY OF RECORD. THE
COURT ADVISED MR. TREFFINGER IT WOULD NOT ALLOW HIM TO
WITHDRAW UNTIL THE COURT GETS THROUGH THE "FARETTA" CANVASS.

AFTER THE FARETTA HEARING, THE COURT GRANTS ATTORNEY TREE-
FINGER'S MOTION TO WITHDRAW AND APPOINTS ATTORNEY DAVID
FISCHER AND SETS A STATUS CHECK ON PETITIONER'S MOTION TO
WITHDRAW GUILTY PLEA FOR APRIL 17, 2018 AT 8:30 A.M. .

ON APRIL 12, 2018, THE COURT SET A STATUS CHECK FOR PETITIONER'S
MOTION TO WITHDRAW GUILTY PLEA AND CONFIRMATION OF NEWLY APPOINTED
COUNSEL FOR APRIL 17, 2018.

ON APRIL 17, 2018, COUNSEL FISCHER CLAIMS TO HAVE REVIEWED THE
CASE FILE INCLUDING PLEA CANVASS AND GUILTY PLEA AGREEMENT AND, TO
HAVE MET WITH THE PETITIONER THEN NOTES, THAT PETITIONER HAS NO
LEGAL BASIS TO WITHDRAW THE PLEA, AND, MOVES TO WITHDRAW FROM
THE CASE (WHICH WAS GRANTED), AND THE CASE IS REFERRED BACK

Ground: SIX (CONTINUED)

TO COUNSEL TREFFINGER IN WHICH, THE PETITIONER INITIALLY HAD SO MUCH CONFLICT WITH AS TO MOVE HIM TO ATTEMPT TO PROCEED PRO SE. (MINUTES DATE APRIL 12, 2018).

DISPITE COUNSEL FISCHER'S CLAIMS TO HAVE REVIEWED CERTAIN DOCUMENTATION TO SUPPORT HIS CLAIM THAT THE PETITIONER HAD "NO LEGAL BASIS TO WITHDRAW HIS PLEA" — HE ADMITS THAT HE WAS HAVING DIFFICULTIES GETTING DISCOVERY FROM COUNSEL TREFFINGER. THE STATE EVEN OBJECTS TO RE-PRODUCING THE DISCOVERY ALL OVER AGAIN / NUMEROUS TIMES SAYING SUCH IS RADICULOUS.

THERE WAS NO RULING UPON PETITIONER'S MOTION TO WITHDRAW FROM HIS GUILTY PLEA AGREEMENT AND THE COURT WENT ON TO SET ANOTHER STATUS CHECK ON SAID MOTION FOR JUNE 5, 2018 AND, "JEA" NOTIFIED AND LEFT MESSAGE VOICEMAIL FOR ATTORNEY TREFFINGER, REGARDING THE CASE AND [COURT'S ORDER] REGARDING DISCOVERY ON MAY 15, 2018.

THE MATTER CONTINUED TO BE SHUFFLED BACK AND FORTH BETWEEN TWO (2) ATTORNEYS (NEITHER OF WHICH WANTED THE CASE), ONE NEVER OBTAINED THE ENTIRE CASE FILE (DISCOVERY); AND ONE HAD NOT PROTECTED THE PETITIONER'S INTERESTS TO THE POINT, THE PETITIONER WANTED TO REPRESENT HIMSELF.

NO ACTUAL RULING IS MADE BY THE COURT ON THE MOTION TO WITHDRAW FROM THE GUILTY PLEA AGREEMENT AS REFLECTED IN THE CASE SUMMARY AND MINUTES.

Ground: SIX CONCLUDED

ON JUNE 21, 2018, NO DECISION UPON THE PETITIONER'S MOTION TO WITHDRAW FROM HIS PROBLEMATIC / ILL ADVISED GUILTY PLEA AGREEMENT NOTWITHSTANDING — THE COURT CONDUCTS A SENTENCING HEARING AND SENTENCES THE PETITIONER IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PLEA AGREEMENT.

GRANTING OF A MOTION TO WITHDRAW ONE'S PLEA [BEFORE] SENTENCING IS THE PROPER WAY FOR ANY SUBSTANTIAL REASON. BUT, SUCH CANNOT BE SAID TO HAVE EVEN HAD A FAIR PROCEDURAL OPPORTUNITY IN [THIS] MATTER AS, NO ACTUAL ADJUDICATION OCCURRED ONE WAY OR THE OTHER ON SAID MOTION.

THUS, THE COURT'S DISCRETION TO DENY SUCH A MOTION NOT BEING REVERSED UNLESS THERE HAS BEEN A CLEAR ABUSE OF DISCRETION IS [NOT] IN PLAY AS THE COURT MADE NO DOCUMENTED RULING AT ALL BUT SIMPLY NOTED: "COURT STATES IT WILL MAKE IT PART OF THE RECORD".

SUCH IS FAR FROM AN ACTUAL ADJUDICATION UPON THE MERITS OR RULING AS A MATTER OF PROCEDURAL LAW.

THE [ONLY] MATTERS THAT THE COURT ACTUALLY ADDRESSED AND MADE DOCUMENTED RULINGS UPON WERE "COUNSELS" MOTIONS TO WITHDRAW AS COUNSELS OF RECORD.

THE PETITIONER HAS NOW IDENTIFIED CREDIBLE AND SUBSTANTIAL REASONS (RELATIVE TO THE VALIDITY OF THE PLEA AND OR HOW HE WAS OTHERWISE ⁹ MISLED) TO SET ASIDE THAT GUILTY PLEA AGREEMENT.

THE PRECEDING GROUNDS ARE INCORPORATED IN SUPPORT OF THIS FACTUAL POSITION. THE PETITIONER'S GUILTY PLEA AND SENTENCE SHOULD BE SET ASIDE.

⁹ COUNSEL DID NOT ACTUALLY EXPLAIN THAT THE PETITIONER WOULD BE 84 YEARS OLD PRIOR TO EVEN BEING ELIGIBLE TO BE CONSIDERED FOR PAROLE, JUST AS AN EXAMPLE.

1 (9) Ground SEVEN

2 THE NUMEROUS EXAMPLES OF INEFFECTUENESS OF COUNSELS
3 CULMINATED IN "CUMULATIVE ERRORS" THAT VIOLATED THE
4 6TH, 5TH AND 14TH AMENDMENTS
5

6 Supporting Facts:

7 THE OPERATIVE FACTS AND STATEMENTS SET OUT ABOVE IN PARAGRAPHS
8 1-6 ARE INCORPORATED HEREIN AS THOUGH FULLY SET FORTH IN
9 SUPPORT OF THIS GROUND.
10

11 DEFENSE COUNSELS ASSIGNED TO THE CASE OR RETAINED - FAILED TO:

12 1. NOT PROTECTING PETITIONER'S GRAND JURY RIGHTS

13 A. INFORM THE PETITIONER THAT HE WAS THE SUBJECT OF THE STATE'S
14 INTENT TO SEEK AN INDICTMENT BY WAY OF THE GRAND JURY;

15
16 B. DID NOT CHALLENGE THE GRAND JURY PROCEEDINGS IN REGARDS TO
17 LACK OF ADEQUATE / MANDATORY NRS 172.241 NOTICE;

18 2. NOT REQUESTING A COMPETENCY HEARING AND ALLOWING PETITIONER
19 TO ENTER INTO A GUILTY PLEA AGREEMENT PRIOR TO THE COMPETENCY
20 HEARING ORDERED BY THE COURT;

21
22 3. NOT PROPERLY COMMUNICATING WITH PETITIONER, MISLEADING
23 OR ILL ADVISING TO ENTER INTO A GUILTY PLEA AGREEMENT
24 AND, IMPEDING DEFENCE OF REPLACEMENT COUNSEL;

25 4. ILL ADVISED OR MISLED PETITIONER TO SIGN A GUILTY PLEA AGREEMENT
WHEN A VIABLE DEFENCE EXISTED RE: ASSOCIATE PROVOCATION;

Ground: SEVEN CONTINUED

5. ADVISING OR MISLEADING THE PETITIONER TO ENTER INTO AN ILL ADVISED GUILTY PLEA AGREEMENT THAT WAS NOT IN PETITIONER'S BEST INTEREST;

(a) AN ENHANCEMENT PENALTY THAT WAS NOT MANDATORY CONSIDERING NO JURY FOUND THE USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON;

(b) THE TWO (2) ALLEGED VICTIMS HAD BEEN MERGED INTO A SINGLE COUNT OF ATTEMPT MURDER (COUNT 1) WHEN INITIALLY WERE SEPARATE COUNTS BEFORE THE GRAND JURY;

(c) DEFENSE COUNSEL FAILED TO ADVISE THE PETITIONER ABOUT THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES THE GUILTY PLEA COULD HAVE UPON HIS PENDING DIVORCE PROCEEDINGS IN LIGHT OF NRS 41.133.¹⁰

(d) DID NOT EXPLAIN THE ADVANTAGES OF A TRIAL AND OR A DIRECT APPEAL INCLUDING ANY ADDITIONAL INVESTIGATION OR LEGAL CHALLENGES TO ARGUMENTS THAT FAILED IN THE PRETRAIL HABEAS CORPUS PETITION RE: COUNTS 8 AND 9.

(e) DID NOT PRESERVE PETITIONER'S RIGHTS AND PREPARE A DEFENSE RE PLEA AGREEMENT, COMPETENCY HEARING, AND, MEDICINE PROSECUTION DEFENSE COUNSEL WAS AWARE OF;

(f) DID NOT DEVELOPE ANY NEGOTIATION STRATEGY DESPITE THE EMOTIONALLY CHARGED CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE AND THE ASPECT OF ADEQUATE PROVOCATION;

¹⁰ SEE FN 8, NRS 41.133 EX. F

Ground: SEVEN CONCLUDED


(g-b) DID NOT PROPERLY ASSIST THE PETITIONER IN EXECUTING HIS PRESENTENCING WITHDRAWAL FROM THE GUILTY PLEA AGREEMENT INCLUDING, GIVING PETITIONER INACCURATE AND MISLEADING INFORMATION TO INFLUENCE HIM TO RETRACT THE MOTION OR — NOT ACTUALLY OBTAINING A RULING UPON SAID MOTION.

THE ABOVE EXAMPLES ARE NOT AN EXHAUSTIVE LIST AS THIS PETITION WAS DRAFTED WITHOUT THE BENEFIT OF A COMPLETE JUDICIAL RECORD INCLUDING TRANSCRIPTS. THUS, SAID DOCUMENTATION MAY YIELD NEW OR ADDITIONAL FACTS TO SUPPORT THESE CLAIMS OR, AN AMENDMENT TO BRING ADDITIONAL GROUNDS.

DUE TO THE ABOVE CUMULATIVE ERRORS, THE PETITIONER'S GUILTY PLEA — CONVICTION AND SENTENCE SHOULD BE SET ASIDE.

WHEREFORE, petitioner prays that the court grant petitioner
Relief to which he may be entitled in this proceeding.

EXECUTED at NNCC, CARSON CITY, Nevada on the 6th
Day of MAY, 2019.


JEFFREY BROWN, 1200568
PETITIONER PRO SE

PREPARATION OR PREPARED/ASSISTED
BY: C.A. JONES, 50600
LAW LIBRARY WORKER PER AD 722

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AFFIRMATION
Pursuant to NRS 239B.030

The undersigned does hereby affirm that the preceding document.

(POST-CONVICTION)

PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS (AMENDED)

(Title of Document)

filed in case number:

A-19-793350-W



Document does not contain the social security number of any person

-OR-



Document contains the social security number of a person as required by:



A specific state or federal law, to wit:

(State specific state or federal law)

-or-



For the administration of a public program

-or-



For an application for a federal or state grant

-or-



Confidential Family Court Information Sheet
(NRS 125.130, NRS 125.230 and NRS125B.055)

Date:

5/6/19

(Signature)

(Print Name)

(Attorney for)

EXHIBIT A

COURT MINUTES MAR. 06, 2018

CASE NO. D-16-542464-0

STATUS CHECK PAGE 1 OF 2

EXHIBIT A

**DISTRICT COURT
CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA**

Divorce - Complaint**COURT MINUTES****March 06, 2018**

D-16-542464-D Farha Brown, Plaintiff
vs.
Jeffrey K. Brown, Defendant.

March 06, 2018 1:30 PM Status Check

HEARD BY: Gentile, Denise L**COURTROOM:** Courtroom 03**COURT CLERK:** Andrea Slayton**PARTIES:**

Farha Brown, Plaintiff, Counter Defendant, Rhonda Forsberg, Attorney, present
present
Jeffrey Brown, Defendant, Counter Claimant, Timothy Treffinger, Attorney, present
not present

JOURNAL ENTRIES

- STATUS CHECK, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE FOR DISMISSAL

Attorney Forsberg represented it is Plaintiff's understanding that Defendant is still incarcerated, he took a plea agreement, however, he is now going to withdraw his plea agreement.

Attorney Treffinger represented that is correct, Defendant did sign a guilty plea agreement, however, Defendant informed counsel last week requesting to withdraw his plea agreement. Attorney Treffinger further represented that he believes he will not be representing Defendant as of the 8th due to a conflict of interest going into the plea withdraw process. Additionally, Counsel indicated he will be sending Defendant for a competency evaluation due to his belief Defendant has some serious issues.

COURT ORDERED, Plaintiff's motion currently set to be heard on March 27, 2018 at 2:00 p.m.
STANDS.

PRINT DATE:	03/12/2018	Page 1 of 2	Minutes Date:	March 06, 2018
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Notice: Journal entries are prepared by the courtroom clerk and are not the official record of the Court.

EXHIBIT B

COURT MINUTES APRIL 10, 2018
CASE NO D-16-542464-D
TELEPHONIC HEARING RE: DEFENDANT'S
COMPETENCY STATUS PAGE 1 OF 2

EXHIBIT B

**DISTRICT COURT
CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA**

Divorce - Complaint

COURT MINUTES

April 10, 2018

D-16-542464-D Farha Brown, Plaintiff
vs.
Jeffrey K. Brown, Defendant.

April 10, 2018 1:30 PM Telephonic Hearing

HEARD BY: Hardcastle, Kathy

COURTROOM: Courtroom 03

COURT CLERK: Andrea Slayton

PARTIES:

Farha Brown, Plaintiff, Counter Defendant, not present	Rhonda Forsberg, Attorney, present
Jeffrey Brown, Defendant, Counter Claimant, not present	Timothy Treffinger, Attorney, present

JOURNAL ENTRIES

- TELEPHONIC HEARING RE: DEFENDANT'S COMPETENCY STATUS

Both counsel appeared by telephone.

Upon inquiry from the Court, Attorney Treffinger represented there were two evaluations completed, which showed some concerns regarding cognitive issues, however, both evaluations reported Defendant to be competent pursuant to the Duskey standard.

COURT ORDERED, Trial set to be heard on June 28, 2018 at 9:00 a.m. STANDS.

INTERIM CONDITIONS:

FUTURE HEARINGS:

PRINT DATE:	04/16/2018	Page 1 of 2	Minutes Date:	April 10, 2018
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Notice: Journal entries are prepared by the courtroom clerk and are not the official record of the Court.

EXHIBIT C

RECORDER'S TRANSCRIPT RE:
SENTENCING
CASE NO. C-16-318858 -1
PAGES 1, 6, 7 AND 8

EXHIBIT _____



1 RTRAN

2
3
4 DISTRICT COURT
5 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

6 THE STATE OF NEVADA,
7 Plaintiff,
8 vs.
9 JEFFREY BROWN, aka,
10 JEFFERY KENT BROWN,
11 Defendant.

)
) CASE NO. C-16-318858-1
)
) DEPT. XII
)
)
)
)
)

12 BEFORE THE HONORABLE MICHELLE LEAVITT, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
13 THURSDAY, JUNE 21, 2018

14 **RECORDER'S TRANSCRIPT RE:**
15 **SENTENCING**

16 APPEARANCES:
17 For the Plaintiff:

KENNETH N. PORTZ, ESQ.
Chief Deputy District Attorney

18 For the Defendant:

TIMOTHY R. TREFFINGER, ESQ.

19
20
21
22
23
24
25 RECORDED BY: KRISTINE SANTI, COURT RECORDER

1 incriminating evidence of his premeditation to get rid of it, to waiting 'til the very
2 day of trial, the brinksmanship of waiting to take a plea on the morning before the
3 jury walks in, to then at the last minute before sentencing attempting to withdraw
4 his plea, coming back with absolutely no legal basis to withdraw his plea. This is
5 a game to him. He does not believe he has done anything wrong. He has no
6 remorse and the State submits that he should receive the maximum penalty in
7 this case.

8 THE COURT: Thank you.

9 Mr. Brown?

10 THE DEFENDANT: Everything he said is not true. I can prove that
11 the son was not there. He was never in any danger. And I'll let my lawyer talk
12 for me.

13 THE COURT: Thank you.

14 MR. TREFFINGER: And, Your Honor, that, the story that the State
15 tells is one side of this. He calls waiting until the day of trial brinksmanship and,
16 you know, part of this is Mr. Brown is upset at the situation he's in. His side of
17 the story is completely different. We had a self-defense argument prepared to go
18 to trial. In reviewing the jail calls, some of the things that were said in anger after
19 his arrest wasn't going to paint that in the best light, but his side of the story –
20 and I will note the State says he hacked into Farha's email to find out the flight
21 itinerary. Farha sent him an email saying the flight changed to let him know that
22 the flight was going to be delayed if he was going to show up at the airport.

23 THE DEFENDANT: And I got proof of that.

24 MR. TREFFINGER: And we – I did submit that email to the DA. The
25 DA has seen that. As far as going into the vehicle, his side of this is Farha cut off

1 all communication with him. He's a 70-year-old man. She has his paperwork.
2 She has one of his firearms. He can't get ahold of her. He's trying to get his
3 documentation, his handicap tag back, and he's trying to make whatever effort
4 he can to meet up with her. Should he have gone to the airport that day? He
5 and I have discussed that at length. No. That was a bad idea. But when
6 Farha's boyfriend got in his face – and that's in the jail call too, I might add. I
7 shot him because he got in my face. He got up –

8 THE COURT: Okay. That's not self-defense.

9 MR. TREFFINGER: We're getting there, Your Honor. He's sitting in
10 his car. He has severe medical issues. The guy comes up and grabs onto him.
11 At that point, he pulls his – he pulls the firearm –

12 THE COURT: That's still not self-defense.

13 MR. TREFFINGER: I would disagree with that, Your Honor.

14 THE COURT: Okay.

15 MR. TREFFINGER: If someone comes up to the –

16 THE COURT: That's why your client pled guilty, because you can't
17 use deadly force unless deadly force is being used against you.

18 MR. TREFFINGER: And it very well could've been. That's a much
19 younger man coming up. He's in his car. He's got a catheter in. He's not very
20 mobile. I mean I disagree with that position, Your Honor. We were ready to go
21 to trial on that fact. I mean if that's – if that's Your Honor's position that's fine.

22 THE COURT: That's not my position. That's the law in the State of
23 Nevada; that you cannot use deadly force unless deadly force is being used
24 against you.

25 MR. TREFFINGER: He didn't know what – force was used on him? It

1 could've been deadly. He's an old, infirm man in a car that's being approached
2 by someone much younger than him. I mean that's -- that's a subject of
3 argument, I guess. I would argue that there are issues there that the jury could
4 have found self-defense, especially if we put the whole case on. This -- part of
5 this was risk versus reward going to trial and that's why there was an attempt at
6 a plea withdraw. Obviously, there was not found that to be an issue.

7 I will note, as the State said, he has no criminal history. He's a
8 decorated Marine. He lived an exemplary life for 69 years, went through four
9 marriages with no prior domestic violence, no arrests, no felonies, no
10 misdemeanors, multiple service medals. He's in poor health, and I mean no
11 history of substance abuse, and has led a completely exemplary life up to this
12 point. But there's more to this than he stalked them with the intent to gun them
13 down. And I mean if Farha is, indeed, so afraid of him, the fact that she's
14 sending him emails, telling him when she's going to be at the airport, that kind of
15 flies in the face of that argument.

16 Again, should he have gone to the airport to try to get his stuff back?
17 Should he have engaged in this confrontation? No. That was a mistake. I do
18 believe there were self-defense issues here. I understand the Court doesn't
19 agree with me. I do believe that there was potential for that here. I am asking for
20 a minimum sentence or a maximum sentence with probation.

21 THE COURT: It doesn't matter whether I agree with you or not. Your
22 client pled guilty.

23 MR. TREFFINGER: Correct. I'm just responding to what the Court
24 has said. And I will submit it on that.

25 THE COURT: Okay. You can call your first witness.

EXHIBIT D

L V M P DEPARTMENT
CONCEALED FIREARM PERMIT
FOR: JEFFREY K. BROWN PERMIT NO.
3074249 ISSUED 03-05-2013
EXPIRES 03-05-2018

EXHIBIT D

**Las Vegas Metropolitan
Police Department**

**CONCEALED
FIREARMS PERMIT**



JEFFERY K BROWN

Permit No: 3074249

Issued: 03-05-2013

Expires: 03-05-2018

EXHIBIT E

TEXT MESSAGE OF MRS.
FRAHA BROWN

EXHIBIT E

5:15 PM

suspect

Wow!!!!

5:37 PM

That's was real accurate except for the part where he pointed the gun at the son that never happened.

5:38 PM

My Daughter →

5:41 PM

Well someone told them that

Not necessarily because sometimes cops put words in your mouth and he was just probably scared and nervous. He ran with the first shots went off so he did not stick around to get a gun pointed at him after I was shocked

Shot

5:43 PM

But everything else was right

EXHIBIT F

NRS 41.133

EXHIBIT F

41.133. Conviction of crime is conclusive evidence of facts necessary to impose civil liability for related injury.

If an offender has been convicted of the crime which resulted in the injury to the victim, the judgment of conviction is conclusive evidence of all facts necessary to impose civil liability for the injury.

HISTORY:

1985, p. 968.

NVCC
-NVCODE

JERRY DEAN 12000000
KNEC
P.O. BOX 7060
CARSON CITY NV 89702


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STEVEN D. GRIERSON
200 LEWIS AVE. 3d FL.
LVNV 89155-1160

CONFIDENTIAL

MAY 07 2019

COMPONENTS OF THE
NATIONAL CENTER
FOR THE STUDY OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE



1 **RSPN**
2 STEVEN B. WOLFSON
3 Clark County District Attorney
4 Nevada Bar #001565
5 CHARLES THOMAN
6 Chief Deputy District Attorney
7 Nevada Bar #12649
8 200 Lewis Avenue
9 Las Vegas, Nevada 89155-2212
10 (702) 671-2500
11 Attorney for Plaintiff

7
8 DISTRICT COURT
9 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

9 THE STATE OF NEVADA,
10
11 Plaintiff,

11 -vs-

12 JEFFREY BROWN, aka,
13 Jeffery Kent Brown #3074249
14 Defendant.

CASE NO: A-19-793350-W

DEPT NO: XII

15 **STATE'S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS**
16 **CORPUS (POST-CONVICTION), REQUEST FOR EVIDENTIARY HEARING, AND**
17 **MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL**

18
19 DATE OF HEARING: JUNE 13, 2019
20 TIME OF HEARING: 8:30 AM

21 COMES NOW, the State of Nevada, by STEVEN B. WOLFSON, Clark County
22 District Attorney, through CHARLES THOMAN, Chief Deputy District Attorney, and hereby
23 submits the attached Points and Authorities in Response to Defendant's Petition for Writ of
24 Habeas Corpus (Post-Conviction), Request for Evidentiary Hearing, and Motion for
25 Appointment of Counsel.

26 This response is made and based upon all the papers and pleadings on file herein, the
27 attached points and authorities in support hereof, and oral argument at the time of hearing, if
28 deemed necessary by this Honorable Court.

//

//

1 **POINTS AND AUTHORITIES**

2 **STATEMENT OF THE CASE**

3 On October 19, 2016, a grand jury indicted Defendant with aggravated stalking, attempt
4 murder with use of a deadly weapon, battery with use of a deadly weapon resulting in
5 substantial bodily harm constituting domestic violence, battery with use of a deadly weapon
6 resulting in substantial bodily harm, assault with a deadly weapon, child abuse, neglect, or
7 endangerment with use of a deadly weapon, and discharge of firearm from or within a structure
8 or vehicle. On January 17, 2018, Defendant voluntarily entered a guilty plea agreement (GPA),
9 pleading guilty to attempt murder with use of a deadly weapon and assault with a deadly
10 weapon. On June 21, 2018, the district court sentenced Defendant to an aggregate of a
11 maximum of 20 years and a minimum parole eligibility of 8 years, plus a consecutive term of
12 20 years with a minimum parole eligibility of 8 years for the use of a deadly weapon. The
13 judgment of conviction was filed on July 2, 2018. On April 11, 2019, Defendant filed a petition
14 for writ of habeas corpus. On May 10, 2019, without a leave of court, Defendant filed an
15 Amendment to the petition.¹

16 **ARGUMENT**

17 **I. DEFENDANT'S GUILTY PLEA AGREEMENT CURES EARLIER**
18 **CONSTITUTIONAL DEFECTS**

19 In McMann v. Richardson, the United States Supreme Court stated that "a voluntary
20 plea of guilty entered on advice of counsel constitutes a waiver of all non-jurisdictional defects
21 in any prior stage of the proceedings against the defendant." McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S.
22 759, 762, 90 S. Ct. 1441, 1444 (1970) (citing Glenn v. McMann, 349 F.2d 1018 (C. A. 2d Cir.
23 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 915 (1966)). Therefore, any earlier constitutional defects, such as
24 the State's failure to provide Marcum notice, are cured by the guilty plea agreement.

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28 ¹ If this court elects to consider Defendant's improper amendment to his petition for habeas
corpus, the State requests an opportunity to respond.

II. DEFENDANT FAILED TO SHOW HIS COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE

A defendant has the Sixth Amendment right to an effective assistance of counsel in criminal proceedings. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2063 (1984); see also State v. Love, 109 Nev. 1136, 1138, 865 P.2d 322, 323 (1993). Nevada has adopted the standard outlined in Strickland in determining whether a defendant received effective assistance of counsel. Kirksey v. State, 112 Nev. 980, 998, 923 P.2d 1102, 1113 (1996); Warden v. Lyons, 100 Nev. 430, 432-33, 683 P.2d 504, 505 (1984). To show that counsel was ineffective, the defendant must prove that he was denied “reasonably effective assistance” of counsel by satisfying a two-pronged test. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686–687, 104 S. Ct. at 2064; see State v. Love, 109 Nev. 1136, 1138, 865 P.2d 322, 323 (1993). Under this test, the defendant must show that his counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and that, but for counsel’s errors, there is a reasonable probability that the result of the proceedings would have been different. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687–688, 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2064, 2068.

“Surmounting Strickland’s high bar is never an easy task.” Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 371, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1485 (2010). The question is whether an attorney’s representations amounted to incompetence under prevailing professional norms, “not whether it deviated from best practices or most common custom.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 88, 131 S. Ct. 770, 778 (2011). Furthermore, “[e]ffective counsel does not mean errorless counsel, but rather counsel whose assistance is ‘[w]ithin the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.’” Jackson v. Warden, Nevada State Prison, 91 Nev. 430, 432, 537 P.2d 473, 474 (1975) (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771, 90 S. Ct. 1441, 1449 (1970)).

A court begins with a presumption of effectiveness and then must determine whether the defendant has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that counsel was ineffective. Means v. State, 120 Nev. 1001, 1011-12, 103 P.3d 25, 35 (2004). The role of a court in considering allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel is “not to pass upon the

1 merits of the action not taken but to determine whether, under the particular facts and
2 circumstances of the case, trial counsel failed to render reasonably effective assistance.”
3 Donovan v. State, 94 Nev. 671, 675, 584 P.2d 708, 711 (1978) (emphasis added) (citing
4 Cooper v. Fitzharris, 551 F.2d 1162, 1166 (9th Cir. 1977)).

5 In considering whether trial counsel was effective, the court must determine whether
6 counsel made a “sufficient inquiry into the information . . . pertinent to his client’s case.”
7 Doleman v State, 112 Nev. 843, 846, 921 P.2d 278, 280 (1996)(citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at
8 690–691, 104 S. Ct. at 2066). Once this decision is made, the court will consider whether
9 counsel made “a reasonable strategy decision on how to proceed with his client’s case.”
10 Doleman, 112 Nev. at 846, 921 P.2d at 280 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690–691, 104 S. Ct.
11 at 2066). Counsel’s strategy decision is a “tactical” decision and will be “virtually
12 unchallengeable absent extraordinary circumstances.” Doleman, 112 Nev. at 846, 921 P.2d at
13 280; see also Howard v. State, 106 Nev. 713, 722, 800 P.2d 175, 180 (1990); Strickland, 466
14 U.S. at 691, 104 S. Ct. at 2066.

15 The Strickland analysis does not mean courts should “second guess reasoned choices
16 between trial tactics, nor does it mean that defense counsel, to protect himself against
17 allegations of inadequacy, must make every conceivable motion no matter how remote the
18 possibilities are of success.” Donovan, 94 Nev. at 675, 584 P.2d at 711 (citing Cooper, 551
19 F.2d at 1166 (9th Cir. 1977)). Therefore, counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to
20 make futile objections, file futile motions, or raise futile arguments. Ennis v. State, 122 Nev.
21 694, 706, 137 P.3d 1095, 1103 (2006).

22 Even if a defendant can show that his counsel’s representation fell below an objective
23 standard of reasonableness, he must still demonstrate prejudice and a reasonable probability
24 that, but for counsel’s errors, the result of the trial would have been different. McNelson v.
25 State, 115 Nev. 396, 403, 990 P.2d 1263, 1268 (1999) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687). “A
26 reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.”
27 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2068.

28 //

1 Finally, the Nevada Supreme Court has held “that a habeas corpus petitioner must prove
2 the disputed factual allegations underlying his ineffective-assistance claim by a preponderance
3 of the evidence.” Means v. State, 120 Nev. 1001, 1012, 103 P.3d 25, 33 (2004). Furthermore,
4 the petitioner must satisfy this burden with specific factual allegations, which if true, would
5 entitle the petitioner to relief. Hargrove v. State, 100 Nev. 498, 503, 686 P.2d 222, 225 (1984).
6 Therefore, “Bare” and “naked” allegations are not sufficient, nor are those belied and repelled
7 by the record. Id.

8 A. Defendant failed to show that counsel was ineffective for failing to raise
9 Marcum notice (Ground 1)

10 Defendant first argues that counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the State’s
11 failure to provide Marcum notice. Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, 7-9. However,
12 Defendant failed to show a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not
13 have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial. Molina v. State, 120 Nev. 185,
14 190-91, 87 P.3d 533, 537 (2004). Thus, Defendant failed to demonstrate that counsel was
15 ineffective for failing to challenge the lack of Marcum notice.

16 B. Defendant failed to show that counsel was ineffective for failing to order a
17 competency evaluation (Ground 2)

18 Defendant next argues that counsel was ineffective for advising Defendant to take a
19 plea before subjecting him to a competency exam. Petition, 10-12. Defendant’s claim is a
20 naked and bare allegation because he does not identify what a competency evaluation would
21 have revealed. Defendant merely states that his mental state was “fragile” and “confused.” Id.
22 at 10. Defendant failed to explain how a fragile and confused state affected his decision to
23 enter a guilty plea agreement. Without this information, this court cannot determine how a
24 competency evaluation would have rendered a different outcome for the Defendant.

25 In fact, Defendant’s claim is belied by the record and his petition. First, Defendant
26 alleges that counsel was ineffective for failing to order a competency exam, but immediately
27 claims that he was at a competency hearing on April 1, 2018. Petition, 11. Second, the record
28

1 shows that Defendant was found competent to stand for trial under the Dusky standard. Court
2 Minutes, April 6, 2018. Thus, Defendant's naked and bare allegation is belied by the record.

3 C. Defendant failed to show counsel was ineffective for making misleading
4 representations (Ground 3)

5 Defendant argues that counsel was ineffective for providing him with ill and misleading
6 advises. Petition, 13. A defendant is not entitled to a particular "relationship" with his attorney.
7 Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 14, 103 S. Ct. 1610, 1617 (1983). There is no requirement for
8 any specific amount of communication as long as counsel is reasonably effective in his
9 representation. Id. Defendant's current complaint is belied by his statement that he was
10 satisfied with his representation. GPA, 6. Thus, the claim must be denied. Furthermore,
11 Defendant has failed to specify what kind of "ill" and "misleading" information his counsel
12 gave him that compelled him into pleading guilty. Similarly, Defendant complains that his
13 counsel failed to provide case files to him once withdrawn. However, he does not identify what
14 these files were. Without this information, this court cannot determine how the alleged
15 misleading information and the failure to provide Defendant with files affected his decision to
16 plead guilty. Since Defendant has not shown that the result would have been different had he
17 had more communication with counsel, his claim is a naked and bare allegation that is belied
18 by the record.

19 D. Defendant failed to show that counsel was ineffective for advising him to
20 enter a plea when he had a valid self-defense claim (Ground 4 and 5)

21 Defendant next argues that his self-defense theory would have had a major impact on
22 every count of attempt murder. Petition, 17 (Ground 4). Defendant further argues that counsel
23 was ineffective because he advised Defendant to plead guilty despite knowing about the self-
24 defense theory. Petition, 22 (Ground 5).

25 Defendant fails to identify what type of advice his counsel gave him that forced him to
26 plead guilty. Without this information, this court cannot analyze how, but for counsel's alleged
27 misleading advise, Defendant would have insisted on proceeding to trial. Defendant's claim is
28 also belied by the record. All of the information Defendant discusses in his petition were

1 available to him before he decided to plead guilty. Defendant has the ultimate authority to
2 enter or reject a plea offer. Johnson v. State, 117 Nev. 153, 161-62, 17 P.3d 1008, 1012 (2001)
3 (citing Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751, 103 S. Ct. 3302 (1983) (the accused has the ultimate
4 authority to plead guilty)). In fact, Defendant's GPA states "I have discussed with my attorney
5 any possible defense, defense strategies and circumstances which might be in my favor." GPA,
6 at 5. The GPA also stated that "I believe that pleading guilty and accepting this plea bargain
7 is in my best interest, and that a trial would be contrary to my best interest." Id. Finally,
8 considering Defendant's crime and the strength of the evidence—shooting two victims in the
9 back and admitting to shooting his estranged wife to "shut her up"—it was objectively
10 reasonable to advise Defendant to take the plea. Presentence Investigation Report, 4-5. Thus,
11 Defendant's claims include only naked and bare allegation that is belied by the record.

12 E. Defendant failed to show counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion
13 to withdraw guilty plea (Ground 6)

14 It is well-settled law that when a defendant pleads guilty, the only claims that may be
15 raised thereafter are those involving the voluntariness of the plea itself, or that the plea was
16 entered without effective assistance of counsel. NRS 34.810(1); Kirksey, 112 Nev. at 999, 923
17 P.2d at 1114, (citing Warden, Nevada State Prison v. State, 100 Nev. 430, 432, 683 P.2d 504,
18 505 (1984)). A defendant cannot enter a guilty plea then later raise independent claims alleging
19 a deprivation of his rights before entry of the plea. State v. Eighth Judicial District Court, 121
20 Nev. 225, 112 P.3d 1070, n.24 (2005) (quoting Tollet v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973)).

21 Here, Defendant's allegation is a naked and bare allegation because he failed to identify
22 the basis for wanting to withdraw his GPA. Without this information, this court cannot analyze
23 filing a motion to withdraw guilty plea would have rendered him a more favorable result. Also,
24 Defendant does not allege his entry of plea was involuntary. Therefore, Defendant's claim is
25 a naked and bare allegation that must be denied.

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III. DEFENDANT CANNOT DEMONSTRATE CUMULATIVE ERROR

The Nevada Supreme Court has not endorsed application of its direct appeal cumulative error standard to the post-conviction Strickland context. McConnell v. State, 125 Nev. 243, 259, 212 P.3d 307, 318 (2009). Nor should cumulative error apply on post-conviction review. Middleton v. Roper, 455 F.3d 838, 851 (8th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1134, 1275 S. Ct. 980 (2007) (“a habeas petitioner cannot build a showing of prejudice on series of errors, none of which would by itself meet the prejudice test.”).

Nevertheless, even where available, a cumulative error finding in the context of a Strickland claim is extraordinarily rare and requires an extensive aggregation of errors. See Harris By and Through Ramseyer v. Wood, 64 F.3d 1432, 1438 (9th Cir. 1995). In fact, logic dictates that there can be no cumulative error where the defendant fails to demonstrate any single violation of Strickland. See Turner v. Quarterman, 481 F.3d 292, 301 (5th Cir. 2007) (“where individual allegations of error are not of constitutional stature or are not errors, there is ‘nothing to cumulate.’”) (quoting Yohey v. Collins, 985 F.2d 222, 229 (5th Cir. 1993)); Hughes v. Epps, 694 F.Supp.2d 533, 563 (N.D. Miss. 2010) (citing Leal v. Dretke, 428 F.3d 543, 552-553 (5th Cir. 2005)). Since Defendant has not demonstrated any claim warrants relief under Strickland, there are no errors to cumulate.

IV. DEFENDANT’S REQUEST FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL IS UNWARRANTED

The U.S. Constitution provides no right to counsel in post-conviction proceedings. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 752, 111 S. Ct. 2546, 2566 (1991). In McKague v. Warden, 112 Nev. 159, 163, 912 P.2d 255, 258 (1996), the Nevada Supreme Court similarly observed that “[t]he Nevada Constitution...does not guarantee a right to counsel in post-conviction proceedings, as we interpret the Nevada Constitution’s right to counsel provision as being coextensive with the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution.” McKague specifically held that with the exception of NRS 34.820(1)(a) (entitling appointed counsel when petitioner is under a sentence of death), one does not have “any constitutional or statutory right to counsel at all” in post-conviction proceedings. Id. at 164, 912 P.2d at 258.

1 However, the Nevada Legislature has given courts the discretion to appoint post-
2 conviction counsel so long as “the court is satisfied that the allegation of indigency is true and
3 the petition is not dismissed summarily.” NRS 34.750. NRS 34.750 reads:

4 A petition may allege that the Petitioner is unable to pay the costs of
5 the proceedings or employ counsel. If the court is satisfied that the
6 allegation of indigency is true and the petition *is not dismissed*
7 *summarily*, the court may appoint counsel at the time the court orders
8 the filing of an answer and a return. In making its determination, the
9 court may consider whether:

- 10 (a) The issues are difficult;
- 11 (b) The Petitioner is unable to comprehend the proceedings; or
- 12 (c) Counsel is necessary to proceed with discovery.

13 Here, there is no need for appointment of counsel. The issues are not difficult because
14 the claims include only naked and bare allegations that are belied by the record. Also, counsel
15 is not necessary to proceed with discovery because existing record fully resolves the issues.
16 Therefore, Defendant’s request for counsel must be denied.

17 **V. AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING IS UNWARRANTED**

18 Defendant’s request for an evidentiary hearing should be denied because his request
19 does not meet the statutory criteria.²

20 NRS 34.770 grants this Court discretion to determine whether an evidentiary hearing is
21 necessary:

- 22 1. The judge or justice, upon review of the return, answer and all
23 supporting documents which are filed, shall determine whether an
24 evidentiary hearing is required. A petitioner must not be
25 discharged or committed to the custody of a person other than the
26 respondent unless an evidentiary hearing is held.
- 27 2. If the judge or justice determines that the petitioner is not
28 entitled to relief and an evidentiary hearing is not required, he shall
dismiss the petition without a hearing.
3. If the judge or justice determines that an evidentiary hearing is
required, he shall grant the writ and shall set a date for the hearing.

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² The State does not object to Defendant’s request for files from his counsel.

Importantly, the Nevada Supreme Court has ruled that if a petition can be resolved without expanding the record, then no evidentiary hearing is necessary. Mann v. State, 118 Nev. 351, 356, 46 P.3d 1228, 1231 (2002); Marshall v. State, 110 Nev. 1328, 1331, 885 P.2d 603, 605 (1994). A defendant is only entitled to an evidentiary hearing if his petition is supported by specific factual allegations that are not belied by the record and, if true, would entitle him to relief. Marshall, 110 Nev. at 1331, 885 P.2d at 605; Hargrove v. State, 100 Nev. 498, 503, 686 P.2d 222, 225 (1984). Moreover, it is improper to hold an evidentiary hearing simply to make a complete record. State v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 121 Nev. 225, 234, 112 P.3d 1070, 1076 (2005) (“The district court considered itself the ‘equivalent of . . . the trial judge’ and consequently wanted ‘to make as complete a record as possible.’ This is an incorrect basis for an evidentiary hearing”).

Here, there is no need to expand the record to resolve the petition and Defendant has failed to demonstrate any need to expand the record. The existing record fully addresses Defendant's allegations. His request for an evidentiary hearing must be denied.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests that Defendant's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Motion for Appointment of Counsel, and Request for Evidentiary Hearing be DENIED.

DATED this 4th day of June, 2019.

Respectfully submitted,

STEVEN B. WOLFSON
Clark County District Attorney
Nevada Bar # 1565

BY

CHARLES THOMAN
Chief Deputy District Attorney
Nevada Bar #12649

#10114
for

mLB

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1 CERTIFICATE OF MAILING


2 I hereby certify that service of the above and foregoing was made this 4th day of
3 June, 2019, by depositing a copy in the U.S. Mail, postage pre-paid, addressed to:

4 JEFFREY BROWN
5 BAC #1200868
6 P.O. BOX 7000 (NNCC)
7 CARSON CITY, NEVADA, 89702

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Secretary for the District Attorney's Office

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RSPN
STEVEN B. WOLFSON
Clark County District Attorney
Nevada Bar #001565
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200 Lewis Avenue
Las Vegas, Nevada 89155-2212
(702) 671-2500
Attorney for Plaintiff

DISTRICT COURT
CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

THE STATE OF NEVADA,
Plaintiff,

-vs-

JEFFREY BROWN, aka,
Jeffery Kent Brown #3074249
Defendant.

CASE NO: A-19-793350-W

DEPT NO: XII

**STATE'S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S SUPPLEMENTAL PETITION
FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS**

DATE OF HEARING: FEBRUARY 13, 2020
TIME OF HEARING: 8:30 AM

COMES NOW, the State of Nevada, by STEVEN B. WOLFSON, Clark County District Attorney, through JONATHON VANBOSKERCK, Chief Deputy District Attorney, and hereby submits the attached Points and Authorities in Response to Defendant's Supplemental Petition for Writ Of Habeas Corpus.

This response is made and based upon all the papers and pleadings on file herein, the attached points and authorities in support hereof, and oral argument at the time of hearing, if deemed necessary by this Honorable Court.

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1 POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

2 STATEMENT OF THE CASE

3 On October 19, 2016, a grand jury indicted Petitioner with Aggravated Stalking;
4 Attempt Murder with use of a Deadly Weapon; Battery with use of a Deadly Weapon Resulting
5 in Substantial Bodily Harm Constituting Domestic Violence; Battery with use of a Deadly
6 Weapon Resulting in Substantial Bodily Harm; Assault with a Deadly Weapon; Child Abuse,
7 Neglect, or Endangerment with use of a Deadly Weapon; and Discharge of a Firearm from or
8 Within a Structure or Vehicle.

9 On January 17, 2018, Petitioner plead guilty to Attempt Murder with use of a Deadly
10 Weapon and Assault with a Deadly Weapon.

11 On June 21, 2018, Petitioner was sentenced to an aggregate sentence of 8 to 20 years,
12 with a consecutive sentence of 8 to 20 years for the deadly weapon enhancement. The
13 Judgment of Conviction was filed on July 2, 2018.

14 On April 11, 2019, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. On May 10,
15 2019, Petitioner filed an Amended Petition. The State filed its response June 4, 2019.

16
17 ARGUMENT

18 A defendant has the Sixth Amendment right to an effective assistance of counsel in
19 criminal proceedings. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2063
20 5 (1984); see also State v. Love, 109 Nev. 1136, 1138, 865 P.2d 322, 323 (1993). Nevada has
21 adopted the standard outlined in Strickland in determining whether a defendant received
22 effective assistance of counsel. Kirksey v. State, 112 Nev. 980, 998, 923 P.2d 1102, 1113
23 (1996); Warden v. Lyons, 100 Nev. 430, 432-33, 683 P.2d 504, 505 (1984). To show that
24 counsel was ineffective, the defendant must prove that he was denied "reasonably effective
25 assistance" of counsel by satisfying a two-pronged test. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686-687, 104
26 S. Ct. at 2064; see State v. Love, 109 Nev. 1136, 1138, 865 P.2d 322, 323 (1993). Under this
27 test, the defendant must show that his counsel's representation fell below an objective standard
28 of reasonableness, and that, but for counsel's errors, there is a reasonable probability that the

1 result of the proceedings would have been different. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-688, 694,
2 104 S. Ct. at 2064, 2068.

3 "Surmounting Strickland's high bar is never an easy task." Padilla v. Kentucky, 559
4 U.S. 356, 371, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1485 (2010). The question is whether an attorney's
5 representations amounted to incompetence under prevailing professional norms, "not whether
6 it deviated from best practices or most common custom." Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86,
7 88, 131 S. Ct. 770, 778 (2011). Furthermore, "[e]ffective counsel does not mean errorless
8 counsel, but rather counsel whose assistance is '[w]ithin the range of competence demanded
9 of attorneys in criminal cases.'" Jackson v. Warden, Nevada State Prison, 91 Nev. 430, 432,
10 537 P.2d 473, 474 (1975) (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771, 90 S. Ct. 1441,
11 1449 (1970)).

12 A court begins with a presumption of effectiveness and then must determine whether
13 the defendant has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that counsel was
14 ineffective. Means v. State, 120 Nev. 1001, 1011-12, 103 P.3d 25, 35 (2004). The role of a
15 court in considering allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel is "not to pass upon the
16 merits of the action not taken but to determine whether, under the particular facts and
17 circumstances or' the case, trial counsel failed to render reasonably effective assistance."
18 Donovan v. State, 94 Nev. 671, 675, 584 P.2d 708, 711 (1978) (emphasis added) (citing
19 Cooper v. Fitzharris, 551F.2d 1162, 1166 (9th Cir. 1977)). In considering whether trial counsel
20 was effective, the court must determine whether counsel made a "sufficient inquiry into the
21 information . . . pertinent to his client's case." Doleman v State, 112 Nev. 843, 846, 921 P.2d
22 278, 280 (1996)(citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-691, 104 S. Ct. at 2066). Once this decision
23 is made, the court will consider whether counsel made "a reasonable strategy decision on how
24 to proceed with his client's case." Doleman, 112 Nev. at 846, 921 P.2d at 280 (citing Strickland,
25 466 U.S. at 690-691, 104 S. Ct. at 2066). Counsel's strategy decision is a "tactical" decision
26 and will be "virtually unchallengeable absent extraordinary circumstances." Id. at 846, 921
27 P.2d at 280; see also Howard v. State, 106 Nev. 713, 722, 800 P.2d 175, 180 (1990); Strickland,
28 466 U.S. at 691, 104 S. Ct. at 2066.

1 The Strickland analysis does not mean courts should "second guess reasoned choices
2 between trial tactics, nor does it mean that defense counsel, to protect himself against
3 allegations of inadequacy, must make every conceivable motion no matter how remote the
4 possibilities are of success." Donovan, 94 Nev. at 675, 584 P.2d at 711 (citing Cooper, 551
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6 make futile objections, file futile motions, or raise futile arguments. Ennis v. State, 122 Nev.
7 694, 706, 137 P.3d 1095, 1103 (2006).

8 Even if a defendant can show that his counsel's representation fell below an objective
9 standard of reasonableness, he must still demonstrate prejudice and a reasonable probability
10 that, but for counsel's errors, the result of the trial would have been different. McNelson v.
11 State, 115 Nev. 396, 403, 990 P.2d 1263, 1268 (1999) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687). "A
12 reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome."
13 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2068.

14 Courts must dismiss a petition if a petitioner plead guilty and the petitioner is not
15 alleging "that the plea was involuntarily or unknowingly entered, or that the plea was entered
16 without effective assistance of counsel." NRS 34.810(1)(a). Although a defendant may attack
17 the validity of a guilty plea by showing that he received ineffective assistance of counsel, the
18 defendant maintains the burden of demonstrating "a reasonable probability that, but for
19 counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial."
20 See Molinav. State, 120 Nev.185, 190, 87 P.3d 533, 537 (2004); Kirksey v. State, 112 Nev.
21 980, 988, 923 P.2d 1102, 1107 (1996) (quoting Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59, 106 S.Ct.
22 366, 370 (1985)). "A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence
23 in the outcome." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2068. "Bare" or "naked" allegations
24 are not sufficient to show ineffectiveness of counsel. Hargrove v. State, 100 Nev. 498, 502,
25 686 P.2d 222, 225 (1984). A defendant who contends his attorney was ineffective because he
26 did not adequately investigate must show how a better investigation would have rendered a
27 more favorable outcome. Molina, 120 Nev. at 192, 87 P.3d at 538. Ultimately, while it is
28 counsel's duty to candidly advise a defendant regarding a plea offer, the decision of whether

1 or not to accept a plea offer is the defendant's. Rhyne v. State, 118 Nev. 1, 8, 38 P.3d 163, 163
2 (2002).

3 **I. TRIAL COUNSEL WAS NOT INEFFECTIVE IN HIS PRETRIAL**
4 **INVESTIGATION OF PETITIONER'S SELF-DEFENSE CLAIM**

5 A defendant who contends his attorney was ineffective because he did not adequately
6 investigate must show how a better investigation would have changed the outcome of trial.
7 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at 2064. Such a defendant must allege with specificity
8 what the investigation would have revealed and how it would have altered the outcome of the
9 trial. See Love, 109 Nev. at 1138, 865 P.2d at 323.

10 Petitioner argues that trial counsel was ineffective because he did not investigate
11 Petitioner's self-defense claim. Supp. Petition at 3. First, Petitioner claims counsel should have
12 consulted ballistics experts to study the trajectory of the bullets as well as the positions of the
13 victim and Petitioner. Supp. Petition at 3. Next, Petitioner claims counsel should have hired
14 an investigator to determine whether witnesses could corroborate Petitioner's self-defense
15 claim. Supp. Petition at 3. Specifically, Petitioner argues that counsel should have interviewed
16 the victims, security guards at the incident. Supp. Petition at 4. However, in pleading guilty,
17 Petitioner waived his ability to raise this claim because it does not allege that Petitioner's plea
18 was involuntary or that counsel was ineffective in the plea process. NRS 34.810(1)(a).

19 Additionally, Petitioner's claims fail under Molina because Petitioner does not explain
20 what better investigation into those areas would have shown. Petitioner does not explain how
21 a ballistics expert's conclusion would have shown that Petitioner acted in self-defense. Next,
22 Petitioner does not allege that there even were witnesses who could corroborate Petitioner's
23 claims. Petitioner also does not explain what information counsel would have received if he
24 had interviewed the security guards and victim.

25 Further, all of Petitioner's claims are belied under Hargrove by the Guilty Plea
26 Agreement. In signing the Guilty Plea, Petitioner confirmed that he had spoken with his
27 attorney about any possible defenses, defense strategies, and circumstances that were in his
28 favor. Guilty Plea Agreement at 5. Petitioner further confirmed that he believed that pleading

1 guilty would be in his best interest. Guilty Plea Agreement at 5. Additionally, Petitioner does
2 not allege that he would not have plead guilty had trial counsel conducted the alleged
3 investigation. Finally, it was Petitioner's decision to enter the guilty plea without this level of
4 investigation and that decision belonged to him and not counsel. Rhyne, 118 Nev. at 8, 38 P.3d
5 at 163. As Petitioner pled guilty in lieu of going to trial, Petitioner fails to explain how any
6 such investigation or interviews would have changed the result of trial.

7
8 **II. COUNSEL WAS NOT INEFFECTIVE REGARDING INFORMING**
9 **PETITIONER OF HIS RIGHT TO TESTIFY BEFORE THE GRAND JURY**

10 Petitioner claims that trial counsel was ineffective because he did not inform him of his
11 right to testify and present evidence at the grand jury. Supp. Petition at 4. Petitioner argues
12 that had he known of this right, he would have testified that he was defending himself. Marcum
13 notice was served to defense counsel on October 5, 2016. Exhibit 1. As such, Petitioner cannot
14 show prejudice sufficient for ineffective assistance of counsel purposes because he does not
15 articulate what specific facts or evidence would have impacted the outcome as required under
16 Strickland. Petitioner does not explain how his testimony would have established that he shot
17 two victims, whom he stalked, out of self-defense. Petitioner failed to show a reasonable
18 probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have
19 insisted on going to trial. Molina, 120 Nev. at 190-91, 87 P.3d at 537. Thus, Defendant failed
20 to demonstrate that counsel was ineffective.

21 **III. NO INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL FOR FAILING TO**
22 **PREPARE A SENTENCING MEMORANDUM**

23 Petitioner complains that counsel was ineffective because he did not file a sentencing
24 memorandum and did not address the prejudicial information in the state's sentencing
25 memorandum. Supp. Petition at 5. As a result, Petitioner claims he was sentenced to the
26 maximum sentence. Petitioner's claim fails because the decision to file a sentencing
27 memorandum or offer the information orally at a sentencing hearing is a virtually
28 unchallengeable strategic decision. Doleman, 112 Nev. at 846, 921 P.2d at 280.

1 At sentencing, defense counsel's argument rebutted arguments made by the state in
2 their sentencing memorandum and orally. Specifically, in the State's sentencing
3 memorandum, the State argued that Petitioner should be sentenced to the maximum and
4 regurgitated the facts elicited from the Grand Jury and pointed the court to several calls
5 Petitioner made while in custody where he (1) acknowledged that he was trying to kill one of
6 the victims; (2) asked others to get "dirt" on another victim to use at trial; (3) suborn perjury
7 through his son, a witness to the case; and (4) asked his son to destroy what he believed to be
8 incriminating evidence. Sentencing Memorandum at 2-8. At sentencing, the State highlighted
9 the key facts, trauma suffered by the victims, Petitioner's lack of remorse; and rebutted
10 mitigating factors such as his age, self-defense claim, and lack of criminal history. Recorder's
11 Transcript Re: Sentencing at 2-6. In response, trial counsel argued his theory of the case, and
12 explained that given Petitioner's age, health, and lack of history, they had a valid argument for
13 self-defense. Transcript Re: Sentencing at 6-8.

14 However, the district court disagreed with Petitioner's argument, explaining that per
15 the law in Nevada, a person cannot use deadly force in self-defense unless deadly force is first
16 used against them. Transcript Re: Sentencing at 7. Petitioner fails to explain what other facts
17 would have changed the district court's position because Petitioner is not alleging that deadly
18 force was actually used against Petitioner before he shot two people in the back. As such,
19 Petitioner's claim fails.

20 //

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1 CONCLUSION


2 For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests that Petitioner's Supplemental
3 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus be DENIED.

4 DATED this 16th day of January, 2020.

5 Respectfully submitted,

6 STEVEN B. WOLFSON
7 Clark County District Attorney
8 Nevada Bar #1565

9 BY


JONATHAN VANBOSKERCK
Chief Deputy District Attorney
Nevada Bar #6528

#10347 for
mub


10 CERTIFICATE OF ELECTRONIC FILING

11
12
13
14 I hereby certify that service of State's Response To Defendant's Supplemental
15 Petition For Writ Of Habeas Corpus, was made this 16th day of January, 2020, by Electronic
16 Filing to:

17
18 JEANNIE HUA, ESQ.

19 EMAIL: jeanniehua@aol.com

20
21 BY


Secretary for the District Attorney's Office

22
23
24
25
26
27
28 16F15698X/JB/mlb/dvu

TRANSMISSION VERIFICATION REPORT

TIME : 10/05/2016 13:58
NAME :
FAX :
TEL :
SER. # : BRQJ3V465787

DATE, TIME	10/05 13:57
FAX NO./NAME	7023661911
DURATION	00:00:32
PAGE(S)	01
RESULT	OK
MODE	STANDARD
	ECM

NOTICE OF INTENT TO SEEK INDICTMENT

TO: JEFFREY BROWN AND/OR YOUR LEGAL COUNSEL MARLA RENTERIA, ESQ.

YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED THAT THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY MAY SEEK AN INDICTMENT AGAINST YOU FOR THE CRIMES OF:

ATTEMPT MURDER WITH USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON (Category B Felony - NRS 200.010, 200.030, 193.330, 193.165 - NOC 50031); BATTERY WITH USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON RESULTING IN SUBSTANTIAL BODILY HARM CONSTITUTING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE (Category B Felony - NRS 200.481; 200.485; 33.018 - NOC 57936); BATTERY WITH USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON RESULTING IN SUBSTANTIAL BODILY HARM (Category B Felony - NRS 200.481 - NOC 50226); ASSAULT WITH A DEADLY WEAPON (Category B Felony - NRS 200.471 - NOC 50201); PREVENTING OR DISSUADING WITNESS FROM TESTIFYING OR PRODUCING EVIDENCE (Gross Misdemeanor - NRS 199.230 - NOC 52983); DISCHARGE OF FIREARM FROM OR WITHIN A STRUCTURE OR VEHICLE (Category B Felony - NRS 202.287 - NOC 51445); AGGRAVATED STALKING (Category B Felony - NRS 200.575 - NOC 50333); UNLAWFUL DISSEMINATION OF AN INTIMATE IMAGE (Category D Felony - NRS AB 49 - NOC 58738); STALKING WITH USE OF INTERNET OR ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATION (Category C Felony - NRS 200.575 - NOC 50335); AND/OR ANY OTHER CHARGES ARISING OUT OF THE INCIDENTS OCCURRING ON OR ABOUT SEPTEMBER 15, 2016, THROUGH OCTOBER 2016; AGENCY EVENT NUMBERS: 160919-3279

A person whose indictment the District Attorney intends to seek or the Grand Jury on its own motion intends to return, but who has not been subpoenaed to appear before the Grand Jury, may testify before the Grand Jury if he requests to do so and executes a valid waiver in writing of his constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. Nev. Rev. Stat. 172.241

You are advised that you may testify before the Grand Jury only if you submit a written request to the District Attorney and include an address where the District Attorney may send a notice of the date, time and place of the scheduled proceeding of the Grand Jury. Nev. Rev. Stat. 172.241

A person whose indictment the District Attorney intends to seek or the Grand Jury on its own motion intends to return, may be accompanied by legal counsel during any appearance before the Grand Jury. The legal counsel who accompanies a person may advise his client, but shall not address directly the members of the Grand Jury, speak in such a manner as to be heard by members of the Grand Jury, or in any other way participate in the proceedings of the Grand Jury. The court or the foreperson of the Grand Jury may have the legal counsel removed if he violates any of these provisions or in any other way disrupts the proceedings of the Grand Jury. Nev. Rev. Stat. 172.239

If you are aware of any evidence which tends to explain away the above crimes, and it is your desire that this evidence be presented to the Grand Jury, then you or your attorney must furnish such evidence to the office of the District Attorney immediately. Responses to testify or present evidence must be addressed to:

Clark County District Attorney, 200 Lewis Avenue, 3rd Floor, Rm. 3418 - Grand Jury Testimony, NV89155-2721. The

EXHIBIT "1"

000168

NOTICE OF INTENT TO SEEK INDICTMENT

TO: JEFFREY BROWN AND/OR YOUR LEGAL COUNSEL MARLA RENTERIA, ESQ.

YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED THAT THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY MAY SEEK AN INDICTMENT AGAINST YOU FOR THE CRIMES OF:

ATTEMPT MURDER WITH USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON (Category B Felony - NRS 200.010, 200.030, 193.330, 193.165 - NOC 50031); BATTERY WITH USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON RESULTING IN SUBSTANTIAL BODILY HARM CONSTITUTING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE (Category B Felony - NRS 200.481; 200.485; 33.018 - NOC 57936); BATTERY WITH USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON RESULTING IN SUBSTANTIAL BODILY HARM (Category B Felony - NRS 200.481 - NOC 50226); ASSAULT WITH A DEADLY WEAPON (Category B Felony - NRS 200.471 - NOC 50201); PREVENTING OR DISSUADING WITNESS FROM TESTIFYING OR PRODUCING EVIDENCE (Gross Misdemeanor - NRS 199.230 - NOC 52983); DISCHARGE OF FIREARM FROM OR WITHIN A STRUCTURE OR VEHICLE (Category B Felony - NRS 202.287 - NOC 51445); AGGRAVATED STALKING (Category B Felony - NRS 200.575 - NOC 50333); UNLAWFUL DISSEMINATION OF AN INTIMATE IMAGE (Category D Felony - NRS AB 49 - NOC 58738); STALKING WITH USE OF INTERNET OR ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATION (Category C Felony - NRS 200.575 - NOC 50335); AND/OR ANY OTHER CHARGES ARISING OUT OF THE INCIDENTS OCCURRING ON OR ABOUT SEPTEMBER 15, 2016, THROUGH OCTOBER 2016; AGENCY EVENT NUMBERS: 160919-3279

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If you are aware of any evidence which tends to explain away the above crimes, and it is your desire that this evidence be presented to the Grand Jury, then you or your attorney must furnish such evidence to the office of the District Attorney immediately. Responses to testify or present evidence must be addressed to:

Clark County District Attorney, 200 Lewis Avenue, 3rd Floor, Rm. 3418 - Grand Jury, Las Vegas, NV89155-2211. The Grand Jury telephone numbers are operative 8:00 A.M. - 5:00 P.M. (702) 671-2570/ 671-2575

THIS IS THE ONLY NOTICE YOU WILL RECEIVE. It is your duty to respond as set forth above. Any response inconsistent with the above directions will be disregarded.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that service of the above and foregoing was made this 5 day of OCTOBER, 2016, by K. NICHOLAS PORTZ to:


MARLA RENTERIA, ESQ.
PUBLIC DEFENDER'S OFFICER

by  #12473
K. NICHOLAS PORTZ
District Attorney's Office

I certify that I received the above Notice of Intent To Seek Indictment

16F15698X
K. NICHOLAS PORTZ

CCDA 9/05



RPLY
JEANNIE N. HUA, ESQ.
Law Office of Jeannie N. Hua, Inc.
5550 Painted Mirage Road, Suite 320
Las Vegas, Nevada 89149
(702) 239-5715
(702)901-6032 (f)
jeanniehua@aol.com

DISTRICT COURT
CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

JEFFREY BROWN,

Petitioner,

vs.

ISIDRO BACA, WARDEN, NNCC

Respondent.

Case No.: A-19-793350-W

DEPT. NO.:XII

REPLY TO STATE'S RESPONSE TO PETITIONER'S SUPPLEMENTAL

PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

In State's Response, the State argued that Petitioner waived his ability to raise the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for lack of investigation because Petitioner didn't raise the issue of involuntary plea per NRS 34.810(1)(a). (State's Response, p. 5, ls. 16-18). Per NRS 34.810(1)(a), "The court shall dismiss a petition if the court determines that the petitioner's conviction was upon a plea of guilty... and the petition is not based upon an allegation that the plea was involuntarily or unknowingly entered or that the plea was entered without effective assistance of counsel." If this Court decides to grant an evidentiary hearing, Petitioner will testify to how his trial counsel failed to do any investigation much less investigation as to self-defense issue including expert opinion as to trajectory of bullets and witness interviews. Investigation is a necessary part of the decision as to whether to negotiate or to proceed to trial. By failing to investigate, Petitioner's trial counsel was ineffective up to, during, and after the plea process.

State further argued that Petitioner had not shown enough evidence of prejudice from trial counsel's lack of effort in pursuing self-defense claim. If this Court grants an evidentiary hearing, Petitioner will testify and relate the threat he felt prior to being forced to defend himself.

DEPT. NO.:XII - 1

1 The Court in State v. Colbert, 949 S.W.2d 932 (1997) found that Petitioner's counsel's performance
2 was deficient, that Petitioner was prejudiced from the deficiency and remanded the case for evidentiary hearing.
3 While Colbert is a Missouri case, the Court arrived at its ruling by applying Strickland, Id. The State charged
4 Petitioner with Forcible Rape, Kidnapping, and First-Degree Robbery. Jury found Petitioner guilty of all counts. The
5 trial court sentenced Petitioner to life for rape, fifteen years for kidnapping, and thirty years for robbery, all counts to
6 run consecutively. After trial, Petitioner filed for Post-Conviction relief, contending that this trial counsel failed to
7 relay an offer from the State for twenty-five years for rape, five year each for kidnapping and robbery. The five
8 years to run concurrently to each other but consecutive to the twenty-five years for a total of thirty years. The offer
9 was made to Petitioner's Public Defender prior to Petitioner retaining private counsel. The court decided to remand
10 Petitioner's case for evidentiary hearing based upon his claim of the offer not relayed and how he would have taken
11 the deal had he known of the offer.

12 Here, per Colbert, Petitioner asserts that trial counsel failed to effectively investigate his case and
13 as a result, Petitioner was unable to make an informed decision and was prejudiced by the deficiency. Because the
14 Petitioner's assertions merited an evidentiary hearing in Colbert, Petitioner respectfully request this Court to grant
15 an evidentiary hearing on the issue.

16 The State's last argument on the issues of a lack of investigation invalidating Petitioner's guilty
17 plea is based upon Hargrove v. State, 100 Nev. 498, 686 P.2d 222 (1984). Appellant in Hargrove argued that he was
18 forced to plead guilty even though his trial counsel failed to effectively investigate his case because he wanted to
19 avoid the greater threat of receiving habitual criminal treatment. Court in Hargrove held that threat would not give
20 rise to a claim of coercion. This case is different. Petitioner pled to the most serious charge of Attempt Murder with
21 Use of a Deadly Weapon plus a count of Assault with Use of a Deadly Weapon. Why else would any defendant in
22 Petitioner's position plead to the charge that carried the longest prison sentences? It's because he was forced into it
23 from his trial counsel's complete lack of effort to investigate his case much less his valid claim of self-defense.
24 Thus, Hargrove should not apply here.

25 Dated this 10th day of February, 2020.

26
27 /s/ Jeannie N. Hua

28 Jeannie N. Hua, Esq.


DEPT. NO.:XII - 2

CERTIFICATE OF ELECTRONIC FILING

I hereby certify that service of REPLY TO STATE'S RESPONSE TO PETITIONER'S
SUPPLEMENTAL PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS was made this 10th day of February 2020 by

Electronic Filing to: Jonathon Vanboskerck, Chief Deputy District Attorney

Jonathan.VanBoskerck@clarkcountyda.com



RPLY
JEANNIE N. HUA, ESQ.
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Las Vegas, Nevada 89149
(702) 239-5715
(702)901-6032 (f)
jeanniehua@aol.com

DISTRICT COURT
CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

JEFFREY BROWN,

Petitioner,

vs.

ISIDRO BACA, WARDEN, NNCC

Respondent.

Case No.: A-19-793350-W

DEPT. NO.:XII

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PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

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State further argued that Petitioner had not shown enough evidence of prejudice from trial counsel's lack of effort in pursuing self-defense claim. If this Court grants an evidentiary hearing, Petitioner will testify and relate the threat he felt prior to being forced to defend himself.

DEPT. NO.:XII - 1

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Here, per Colbert, Petitioner asserts that trial counsel failed to effectively investigate his case and as a result, Petitioner was unable to make an informed decision and was prejudiced by the deficiency. Because the Petitioner's assertions merited an evidentiary hearing in Colbert, Petitioner respectfully request this Court to grant an evidentiary hearing on the issue.

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Dated this 10th day of February, 2020.

/s/ Jeannie N. Hua

Jeannie N. Hua, Esq.

DEPT. NO.:XII - 2

000174

CERTIFICATE OF ELECTRONIC FILING

I hereby certify that service of REPLY TO STATE'S RESPONSE TO PETITIONER'S
SUPPLEMENTAL PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS was made this 10th day of February 2020 by

Electronic Filing to: Jonathon Vanboskerck, Chief Deputy District Attorney

Jonathan.VanBoskerck@clarkcountyda.com

Writ of Habeas Corpus

COURT MINUTES

February 13, 2020

A-19-793350-W Jeffrey Brown, Plaintiff(s)
vs.
Isidro Baca, Warden, Defendant(s)

February 13, 2020 08:30 AM All Pending Motions

HEARD BY: Leavitt, Michelle COURTROOM: RJC Courtroom 14D

COURT CLERK: Pannullo, Haly

RECORDER: Richardson, Sara

REPORTER:

PARTIES PRESENT:

Andrea D. Orwoll Attorney for Defendant, Plaintiff

Jeannie N Hua Attorney for Plaintiff

JOURNAL ENTRIES

HEARING: RE: PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS ... PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS ... MOTION TO REVISIT PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR TRANSCRIPTS AT STATE'S EXPENSE BY CONSIDERATION OF THE SUPPLEMENTAL

Counsel submitted on the briefs. COURT ORDERED, Petition DENIED; Motion to Revisit Motion OFF CALENDAR. Ms. Hua requested the Court sign an Order for Appointment for Appellate Counsel. COURT SO CONFIRMED.

NDC

Heather S. Linn

CLERK OF THE COURT

FCL
STEVEN B. WOLFSON
Clark County District Attorney
Nevada Bar #001565
JONATHON VANBOSKERCK
Chief Deputy District Attorney
Nevada Bar #6528
200 Lewis Avenue
Las Vegas, Nevada 89155-2212
(702) 671-2500
Attorney for Plaintiff

**DISTRICT COURT
CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA**

THE STATE OF NEVADA,
Plaintiff,

-vs-

JEFFREY BROWN,
#3074249

Defendant.

CASE NO: A-19-793350-W

DEPT NO: XII

**FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF
LAW AND ORDER**

DATE OF HEARING: FEBRUARY 13, 2020
TIME OF HEARING: 8:30 AM

THIS CAUSE having come on for hearing before the Honorable MICHELLE LEAVITT, District Judge, on the 13 day of February, 2020, the Petitioner not being present, represented by Jeannie N. Hua, the Respondent being represented by STEVEN B. WOLFSON, Clark County District Attorney, by and through ANDREA ORWOLL, Deputy District Attorney, and the Court having considered the matter, including briefs, transcripts, arguments of counsel, and documents on file herein, now therefore, the Court makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law:

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On October 19, 2016, a grand jury indicted Petitioner with Aggravated Stalking; Attempt Murder with use of a Deadly Weapon; Battery with use of a Deadly Weapon Resulting

1 in Substantial Bodily Harm Constituting Domestic Violence; Battery with use of a Deadly
2 Weapon Resulting in Substantial Bodily Harm; Assault with a Deadly Weapon; Child Abuse,
3 Neglect, or Endangerment with use of a Deadly Weapon; and Discharge of a Firearm from or
4 Within a Structure or Vehicle.

5 On January 17, 2018, Petitioner plead guilty to Attempt Murder with use of a Deadly
6 Weapon and Assault with a Deadly Weapon.

7 On June 21, 2018, Petitioner was sentenced to an aggregate sentence of 8 to 20 years,
8 with a consecutive sentence of 8 to 20 years for the deadly weapon enhancement. The
9 Judgment of Conviction was filed on July 2, 2018.

10 On April 11, 2019, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. On May 10,
11 2019, Petitioner filed an Amended Petition. The State filed its response June 4, 2019.

12 ANALYSIS

13 A defendant has the Sixth Amendment right to an effective assistance of counsel in
14 criminal proceedings. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2063
15 5 (1984); see also State v. Love, 109 Nev. 1136, 1138, 865 P.2d 322, 323 (1993). Nevada has
16 adopted the standard outlined in Strickland in determining whether a defendant received
17 effective assistance of counsel. Kirksey v. State, 112 Nev. 980, 998, 923 P.2d 1102, 1113
18 (1996); Warden v. Lyons, 100 Nev. 430, 432-33, 683 P.2d 504, 505 (1984). To show that
19 counsel was ineffective, the defendant must prove that he was denied "reasonably effective
20 assistance" of counsel by satisfying a two-pronged test. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686-687, 104
21 S. Ct. at 2064; see State v. Love, 109 Nev. 1136, 1138, 865 P.2d 322, 323 (1993). Under this
22 test, the defendant must show that his counsel's representation fell below an objective standard
23 of reasonableness, and that, but for counsel's errors, there is a reasonable probability that the
24 result of the proceedings would have been different. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-688, 694,
25 104 S. Ct. at 2064, 2068.

26 "Surmounting Strickland's high bar is never an easy task." Padilla v. Kentucky, 559
27 U.S. 356, 371, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1485 (2010). The question is whether an attorney's
28 representations amounted to incompetence under prevailing professional norms, "not whether

1 it deviated from best practices or most common custom." Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86,
2 88, 131 S. Ct. 770, 778 (2011). Furthermore, "[e]ffective counsel does not mean errorless
3 counsel, but rather counsel whose assistance is '[w]ithin the range of competence demanded
4 of attorneys in criminal cases.'" Jackson v. Warden, Nevada State Prison, 91 Nev. 430, 432,
5 537 P.2d 473, 474 (1975) (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771, 90 S. Ct. 1441,
6 1449 (1970)).

7 A court begins with a presumption of effectiveness and then must determine whether
8 the defendant has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that counsel was
9 ineffective. Means v. State, 120 Nev. 1001, 1011-12, 103 P.3d 25, 35 (2004). The role of a
10 court in considering allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel is "not to pass upon the
11 merits of the action not taken but to determine whether, under the particular facts and
12 circumstances or' the case, trial counsel failed to render reasonably effective assistance."
13 Donovan v. State, 94 Nev. 671, 675, 584 P.2d 708, 711 (1978) (emphasis added) (citing
14 Cooper v. Fitzharris, 551 F.2d 1162, 1166 (9th Cir. 1977)). In considering whether trial counsel
15 was effective, the court must determine whether counsel made a "sufficient inquiry into the
16 information . . . pertinent to his client's case." Doleman v State, 112 Nev. 843, 846, 921 P.2d
17 278, 280 (1996)(citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-691, 104 S. Ct. at 2066). Once this decision
18 is made, the court will consider whether counsel made "a reasonable strategy decision on how
19 to proceed with his client's case." Doleman, 112 Nev. at 846, 921 P.2d at 280 (citing Strickland,
20 466 U.S. at 690-691, 104 S. Ct. at 2066). Counsel's strategy decision is a "tactical" decision
21 and will be "virtually unchallengeable absent extraordinary circumstances." Id. at 846, 921
22 P.2d at 280; see also Howard v. State, 106 Nev. 713, 722, 800 P.2d 175, 180 (1990); Strickland,
23 466 U.S. at 691, 104 S. Ct. at 2066.

24 The Strickland analysis does not mean courts should "second guess reasoned choices
25 between trial tactics, nor does it mean that defense counsel, to protect himself against
26 allegations of inadequacy, must make every conceivable motion no matter how remote the
27 possibilities are of success." Donovan, 94 Nev. at 675, 584 P.2d at 711 (citing Cooper, 551
28 F.2d at 1166 (9th Cir. 1977)). Therefore, counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to

1 make futile objections, file futile motions, or raise futile arguments. Ennis v. State, 122 Nev.
2 694, 706, 137 P.3d 1095, 1103 (2006).

3 Even if a defendant can show that his counsel's representation fell below an objective
4 standard of reasonableness, he must still demonstrate prejudice and a reasonable probability
5 that, but for counsel's errors, the result of the trial would have been different. McNelson v.
6 State, 115 Nev. 396, 403, 990 P.2d 1263, 1268 (1999) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687). "A
7 reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome."
8 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2068.

9 Courts must dismiss a petition if a petitioner pled guilty and the petitioner is not alleging
10 "that the plea was involuntarily or unknowingly entered, or that the plea was entered without
11 effective assistance of counsel." NRS 34.810(1)(a). Although a defendant may attack the
12 validity of a guilty plea by showing that he received ineffective assistance of counsel, the
13 defendant maintains the burden of demonstrating "a reasonable probability that, but for
14 counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial."
15 See Molinav. State, 120 Nev.185, 190, 87 P.3d 533, 537 (2004); Kirksey v. State, 112 Nev.
16 980, 988, 923 P.2d 1102, 1107 (1996) (quoting Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59, 106 S.Ct.
17 366, 370 (1985)). "A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence
18 in the outcome." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2068. "Bare" or "naked" allegations
19 are not sufficient to show ineffectiveness of counsel. Hargrove v. State, 100 Nev. 498, 502,
20 686 P.2d 222, 225 (1984). A defendant who contends his attorney was ineffective because he
21 did not adequately investigate must show how a better investigation would have rendered a
22 more favorable outcome. Molina, 120 Nev. at 192, 87 P.3d at 538. Ultimately, while it is
23 counsel's duty to candidly advise a defendant regarding a plea offer, the decision of whether
24 or not to accept a plea offer is the defendant's. Rhyne v. State, 118 Nev. 1, 8, 38 P.3d 163, 163
25 (2002).

26 //

27 //

28 //

1 **I. TRIAL COUNSEL WAS NOT INEFFECTIVE IN HIS PRETRIAL**
2 **INVESTIGATION OF PETITIONER'S SELF-DEFENSE CLAIM**

3 A defendant who contends his attorney was ineffective because he did not adequately
4 investigate must show how a better investigation would have changed the outcome of trial.
5 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at 2064. Such a defendant must allege with specificity
6 what the investigation would have revealed and how it would have altered the outcome of the
7 trial. See Love, 109 Nev. at 1138, 865 P.2d at 323.

8 Petitioner argues that trial counsel was ineffective because he did not investigate
9 Petitioner's self-defense claim. Supp. Petition at 3. First, Petitioner claims counsel should have
10 consulted ballistics experts to study the trajectory of the bullets as well as the positions of the
11 victim and Petitioner. Supp. Petition at 3. Next, Petitioner claims counsel should have hired
12 an investigator to determine whether witnesses could corroborate Petitioner's self-defense
13 claim. Supp. Petition at 3. Specifically, Petitioner argues that counsel should have interviewed
14 the victims, security guards at the incident. Supp. Petition at 4. However, in pleading guilty,
15 Petitioner waived his ability to raise this claim because it does not allege that Petitioner's plea
16 was involuntary or that counsel was ineffective in the plea process. NRS 34.810(1)(a).

17 Additionally, Petitioner's claims fail under Molina because Petitioner does not explain
18 what better investigation into those areas would have shown. Petitioner does not explain how
19 a ballistics expert's conclusion would have shown that Petitioner acted in self-defense. Next,
20 Petitioner does not allege that there even were witnesses who could corroborate Petitioner's
21 claims. Petitioner also does not explain what information counsel would have received if he
22 had interviewed the security guards and victim.

23 Further, all of Petitioner's claims are belied under Hargrove by the Guilty Plea
24 Agreement. In signing the Guilty Plea, Petitioner confirmed that he had spoken with his
25 attorney about any possible defenses, defense strategies, and circumstances that were in his
26 favor. Guilty Plea Agreement at 5. Petitioner further confirmed that he believed that pleading
27 guilty would be in his best interest. Guilty Plea Agreement at 5. Additionally, Petitioner does
28 not allege that he would not have plead guilty had trial counsel conducted the alleged

1 investigation. Finally, it was Petitioner's decision to enter the guilty plea without this level of
2 investigation and that decision belonged to him and not counsel. Rhyne, 118 Nev. at 8, 38 P.3d
3 at 163. As Petitioner pled guilty in lieu of going to trial, Petitioner fails to explain how any
4 such investigation or interviews would have changed the result of trial.

5 **II. COUNSEL WAS NOT INEFFECTIVE REGARDING INFORMING**
6 **PETITIONER OF HIS RIGHT TO TESTIFY BEFORE THE GRAND JURY**

7 Petitioner claims that trial counsel was ineffective because he did not inform him of his
8 right to testify and present evidence at the grand jury. Supp. Petition at 4. Petitioner argues
9 that had he known of this right, he would have testified that he was defending himself. Marcum
10 notice was served to defense counsel on October 5, 2016. As such, Petitioner cannot show
11 prejudice sufficient for ineffective assistance of counsel purposes because he does not
12 articulate what specific facts or evidence would have impacted the outcome as required under
13 Strickland. Petitioner does not explain how his testimony would have established that he shot
14 two victims, whom he stalked, out of self-defense. Petitioner failed to show a reasonable
15 probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have
16 insisted on going to trial. Molina, 120 Nev. at 190-91, 87 P.3d at 537. Thus, Defendant failed
17 to demonstrate that counsel was ineffective.

18 **III. NO INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL FOR FAILING TO**
19 **PREPARE A SENTENCING MEMORANDUM**

20 Petitioner complains that counsel was ineffective because he did not file a sentencing
21 memorandum and did not address the prejudicial information in the state's sentencing
22 memorandum. Supp. Petition at 5. As a result, Petitioner claims he was sentenced to the
23 maximum sentence. Petitioner's claim fails because the decision to file a sentencing
24 memorandum or offer the information orally at a sentencing hearing is a virtually
25 unchallengeable strategic decision. Doleman, 112 Nev. at 846, 921 P.2d at 280.

26 At sentencing, defense counsel's argument rebutted arguments made by the state in
27 their sentencing memorandum and orally. Specifically, in the State's sentencing
28 memorandum, the State argued that Petitioner should be sentenced to the maximum and

1 regurgitated the facts elicited from the Grand Jury and pointed the court to several calls
2 Petitioner made while in custody where he (1) acknowledged that he was trying to kill one of
3 the victims; (2) asked others to get "dirt" on another victim to use at trial; (3) suborn perjury
4 through his son, a witness to the case; and (4) asked his son to destroy what he believed to be
5 incriminating evidence. Sentencing Memorandum at 2-8. At sentencing, the State highlighted
6 the key facts, trauma suffered by the victims, Petitioner's lack of remorse; and rebutted
7 mitigating factors such as his age, self-defense claim, and lack of criminal history. Recorder's
8 Transcript Re: Sentencing at 2-6. In response, trial counsel argued his theory of the case, and
9 explained that given Petitioner's age, health, and lack of history, they had a valid argument for
10 self-defense. Transcript Re: Sentencing at 6-8.

11 However, the district court disagreed with Petitioner's argument, explaining that per
12 the law in Nevada, a person cannot use deadly force in self-defense unless deadly force is first
13 used against them. Transcript Re: Sentencing at 7. Petitioner fails to explain what other facts
14 would have changed the district court's position because Petitioner is not alleging that deadly
15 force was actually used against Petitioner before he shot two people in the back. As such,
16 Petitioner's claim fails.

17 **ORDER**

18 THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Petition for Post-Conviction Relief
19 shall be, and it is, hereby denied.

20 DATED this ____ day of July, 2020.

Dated this 30th day of July, 2020




22 MICHELLE LEAVITT

23 STEVEN B. WOLFSON
24 Clark County District Attorney
Nevada Bar #001565

10B 538 1AB1 9DC4
Michelle Leavitt
District Court Judge

25 BY


26 JONATHON VANBOSKERCK
27 Chief Deputy District Attorney
Nevada Bar #6528

28 16F15698X/JB/jb/mlb/dvu

1 **CSERV**

2
3 DISTRICT COURT
CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

4
5
6 Jeffrey Brown, Plaintiff(s)

CASE NO: A-19-793350-W

7 vs.

DEPT. NO. Department 12

8 Isidro Baca, Warden,
9 Defendant(s)

10
11 **AUTOMATED CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

12 This automated certificate of service was generated by the Eighth Judicial District
13 Court. The foregoing Finding of Fact and Conclusions of Law was served via the court's
14 electronic eFile system to all recipients registered for e-Service on the above entitled case as
listed below:

15 Service Date: 7/30/2020

16 JEANNIE HUA, ESQ.

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JEANNIE N. HUA, ESQ.
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Attorneys for Defendant
Jeffrey Brown

Dept No. XII



DISTRICT COURT
CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

THE STATE OF NEVADA,

Plaintiff,

vs.

JEFFREY BROWN,

Defendant.

CASE NO. C-16-318858-1

DEPT. NO. XII

BEFORE THE HONORABLE MICHELLE LEAVITT, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 17, 2018

RECORDER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
TRIAL BY JURY - DAY 1

APPEARANCES:

For the State:

SHANON L. CLOWERS
KENNETH N. PORTZ
Chief Deputy District Attorneys

For the Defendant:

TIMOTHY TREFFINGER, ESQ.

RECORDED BY: KRISTINE SANTI, COURT RECORDER

1 LAS VEGAS, NEVADA, WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 17, 2018, 9:08 A.M.

2 * * * * *

3 [Outside the Presence of the Prospective Jury]

4 THE COURT: Everybody's ready to go and your client's going to take a plea?

5 MR. TREFFINGER: Yes, Your Honor.

6 THE COURT: Okay. State versus Jeffrey Brown, case C318858, Mr. Brown
7 is present. He's in custody. Do you want to state your appearances, and then,
8 Counsel, you can state the negotiations.

9 MR. PORTZ: Nick Portz and Shanon Clowers for the State.

10 MR. TREFFINGER: Tim Treffinger, bar number 12877, on behalf of
11 Mr. Brown who is present in custody.

12 The guilty plea agreement is as follows, Your Honor, he's going to
13 plead guilty to attempt murder with use of a deadly weapon and assault with a
14 deadly weapon; both sides are retaining the full right to argue including for
15 consecutive treatment.

16 THE COURT: Between counts?

17 MR. TREFFINGER: Yes.

18 THE COURT: Okay. And, Mr. Brown, is that your understanding of the
19 negotiations?

20 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. Yes, Judge.

21 THE COURT: And that's what you want to do today?

22 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Judge.

23 THE COURT: Your true and full name for the record?

24 THE DEFENDANT: I'm sorry?

25 THE COURT: Your true and full name for the record?

1 THE DEFENDANT: Jeffrey Kurt Brown.

2 THE COURT: How old are you?

3 THE DEFENDANT: 69.

4 THE COURT: How far did you go in school?

5 THE DEFENDANT: 13.

6 THE COURT: You do read, write, and understand the English language?

7 THE DEFENDANT: I do.

8 THE COURT: You received a copy of the third amended indictment in this
9 case charging you with attempt murder with use of a deadly weapon and assault
10 with a deadly weapon?

11 THE DEFENDANT: I did.

12 THE COURT: And you had a chance to review it?

13 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Judge.

14 THE COURT: Discussed it with your lawyer?

15 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Judge.

16 THE COURT: You understand those charges against you?

17 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Judge.

18 THE COURT: How do you plead to the charges in the third amended
19 indictment?

20 THE DEFENDANT: Guilty.

21 THE COURT: Are you entering into this plea today freely and voluntarily?

22 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Judge.

23 THE COURT: Did anyone threaten or coerce you into entering into this plea?

24 THE DEFENDANT: No, Judge.

25 THE COURT: Other than what's contained in this guilty plea agreement, did

1 anyone make you any promises to get you to enter into this agreement?

2 THE DEFENDANT: No, Judge.

3 THE COURT: I have before me a guilty plea agreement; is that your
4 signature on page 6?

5 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Judge.

6 THE COURT: And you read it --

7 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Judge.

8 THE COURT: -- before you signed it?

9 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Judge.

10 THE COURT: You discussed it with your lawyer prior to signing it?

11 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Judge.

12 THE COURT: He answered all your questions prior to signing it?

13 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Judge.

14 THE COURT: Do you have any questions of the Court regarding this guilty
15 plea agreement?

16 THE DEFENDANT: No, Judge.

17 THE COURT: You understand as to Count 1 you are facing 2 to 20 years in
18 the Nevada Department of Corrections plus a consecutive term of 1 to 20 years?

19 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Judge.

20 THE COURT: And you understand as to Count 2 you're facing 1 to 6 years in
21 the Nevada Department of Corrections?

22 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Judge.

23 THE COURT: And you understand the State of Nevada has retained the full
24 right to argue for any lawful sentence within that sentencing range?

25 THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

1 THE COURT: Including consecutive time between the counts?

2 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Judge.

3 THE COURT: Do you have any questions about that?

4 THE DEFENDANT: No.

5 THE COURT: And you understand that sentencing is completely within the
6 discretion of the Court, that no one can make you any promises regarding what will
7 happen at the time of sentencing?

8 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Judge.

9 THE COURT: Anyone make you any promises?

10 THE DEFENDANT: No.

11 THE COURT: You also understand you are giving up all your trial rights by
12 entering into this plea today, that you do have a right to a speedy and public trial,
13 that if this matter went to trial the State would be required to prove each of the
14 elements as alleged in their charging document by proof beyond a reasonable
15 doubt; and did your attorney explain to you what the State would have to prove if
16 this matter went to trial?

17 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Judge.

18 THE COURT: You discussed any defenses that you may have to these
19 charges?

20 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Judge.

21 THE COURT: You understand at the time of trial you'd have the right to
22 testify, to remain silent, to have others come in and testify for you, to be confronted
23 by the witnesses against you and cross-examine them, to appeal any conviction,
24 and to be represented by counsel throughout all critical stages of the proceedings?

25 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Judge.

1 THE COURT: You understand all these trial rights?

2 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Judge.

3 THE COURT: And you understand that by entering into this plea today that
4 you are giving up all of these trial rights?

5 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Judge.

6 THE COURT: And do you have any questions about the trial rights that
7 you're giving up?

8 THE DEFENDANT: No, Judge.

9 THE COURT: Any questions about this guilty plea agreement?

10 THE DEFENDANT: No, Judge.

11 THE COURT: Okay. On or about the 19th day of September, 2016, as to
12 Count 1, did you willfully, unlawfully, feloniously, and without -- I'm sorry, and with
13 malice aforethought attempt to kill Farha Brown?

14 THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

15 THE COURT: And/or Monequie Short with the use of deadly weapon, a
16 firearm, by shooting at or into their bodies?

17 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Judge.

18 THE COURT: As to Count 2, did you willfully, unlawfully, feloniously,
19 intentionally place another person in reasonable apprehension of immediate bodily
20 harm and/or did you willfully, unlawfully attempt to use physical force against
21 another person, to wit, M.S., with use of a deadly weapon, a firearm, by displaying
22 and/or pointing the firearm at M.S.?

23 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Judge.

24 THE COURT: Is the State satisfied with that?

25 MR. PORTZ: Yes, Your Honor. Thank you.

1 THE COURT: Okay. At this time the Court's going to accept your plea, make
2 a finding you've entered into it freely and voluntarily, that you understand the nature
3 of the charges and the consequences of your plea. The matter will be referred to
4 Parole and Probation and it will be set for sentencing.

5 THE CLERK: March 8, 8:30.

6 THE COURT: Does he have bail in this case? At this time if there's any bail
7 amount, he -- it'll be revoked and he'll be held without bail pending sentencing.

8 MR. PORTZ: Thank you, Your Honor.

9 And, Your Honor, there's -- I believe he has current restrictions on his
10 phone privileges, I just ask that that remain in effect, that he not be allowed to make
11 phone calls or contact individuals associated with the case.

12 THE COURT: Okay.

13 MR. TREFFINGER: He has a current phone restriction that he's not allowed
14 to make any calls whatsoever. He can't call counsel or his family. I have no issue
15 with that phone restriction to people involved, but if we could lift it so that he can call
16 his sick mother or his attorney; I'd appreciate it.

17 MR. PORTZ: The reason it was revoked is because he was using the calls
18 and contacting family members to have them illegally --

19 THE COURT: Third-party?

20 MR. PORTZ: -- attempt to -- yeah, engage in contact with our victims.
21 There's never been a restriction on his ability to contact counsel and we wouldn't
22 ask that be imposed. I just want it to remain in effect when we're remanding him
23 without bail.

24 THE COURT: Okay. Because I'm kind of surprised there would be a
25 restriction, I'm going to leave the restriction in place, however, he can contact his

1 lawyer.

2 MR. TREFFINGER: I'll take it up with the jail.

3 THE COURT: Yeah, and I have confidence you wouldn't participate in any of
4 that.

5 Thank you.

6 MR. PORTZ: Thank you, Your Honor.

7 MS. CLOWERS: Thank you.

8 THE COURT: And trial date will be vacated and the jury will be excused.
9 Thank you.

10 MR. TREFFINGER: Thank you, Your Honor.

11 THE COURT: Thank you.

12 PROCEEDING CONCLUDED AT 9:15 A.M.

13 * * * * *

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21
22 ATTEST: I do hereby certify that I have truly and correctly transcribed the audio-
video recording of this proceeding in the above-entitled case.

23 

24 SARA RICHARDSON
25 Court Recorder/Transcriber

1 **FCL**
2 **STEVEN B. WOLFSON**
3 **Clark County District Attorney**
4 **Nevada Bar #001565**
5 **ALEXANDER CHEN**
6 **Chief Deputy District Attorney**
7 **Nevada Bar #10539**
8 **200 Lewis Avenue**
9 **Las Vegas, Nevada 89155-2212**
10 **(702) 671-2500**
11 **Attorney for Plaintiff**

DISTRICT COURT
CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

9 THE STATE OF NEVADA,
10 Plaintiff,

11 -vs-

12 JEFFREY BROWN,
13 #3074249

14 Defendant.

CASE NO: A-19-793350-W

DEPT NO: XII

15 **AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF**
16 **LAW AND ORDER**

17 DATE OF HEARING: FEBRUARY 13, 2020
18 TIME OF HEARING: 8:30 AM

19 THIS CAUSE having come on for hearing before the Honorable MICHELLE
20 LEAVITT, District Judge, on the 13 day of February, 2020, the Petitioner not being present,
21 represented by Jeannie N. Hua, the Respondent being represented by STEVEN B. WOLFSON,
22 Clark County District Attorney, by and through ANDREA ORWOLL, Deputy District
23 Attorney, and the Court having considered the matter, including briefs, transcripts, arguments
24 of counsel, and documents on file herein, now therefore, the Court makes the following
25 findings of fact and conclusions of law:

26 **FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW**

27 **PROCEDURAL HISTORY**

28 On October 19, 2016, a grand jury indicted Petitioner with Aggravated Stalking;
Attempt Murder with use of a Deadly Weapon; Battery with use of a Deadly Weapon Resulting

1 in Substantial Bodily Harm Constituting Domestic Violence; Battery with use of a Deadly
2 Weapon Resulting in Substantial Bodily Harm; Assault with a Deadly Weapon; Child Abuse,
3 Neglect, or Endangerment with use of a Deadly Weapon; and Discharge of a Firearm from or
4 Within a Structure or Vehicle.

5 On January 17, 2018, Petitioner plead guilty to Attempt Murder with use of a Deadly
6 Weapon and Assault with a Deadly Weapon.

7 On June 21, 2018, Petitioner was sentenced to an aggregate sentence of 8 to 20 years,
8 with a consecutive sentence of 8 to 20 years for the deadly weapon enhancement. The
9 Judgment of Conviction was filed on July 2, 2018.

10 On April 11, 2019, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus ("Petition").
11 On May 10, 2019, Petitioner filed an Amended Petition ("Amended Petition"). The State filed
12 its response June 4, 2019.

13 On June 18, 2019, the district court appointed counsel. On October 7, 2019, counsel for
14 Petitioner filed a Supplement to Petitioner's Post Conviction Writ of Habeas Corpus
15 ("Supplement"). On January 16, 2020, the State filed a Response to Petitioner's Supplement.
16 On February 10, 2020, counsel for Petitioner filed a Reply to the State's Response to
17 Petitioner's Supplement. On February 13, 2020, the district court denied Petitioner's Petition,
18 Amended Petition, and Supplement. Findings of Fact, Conclusion of Law and Order reflecting
19 the Court's denial of Petitioner's Supplement were filed on July 30, 2020. Petitioner appealed
20 the court's decision and on July 12, 2021, the Nevada Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal
21 because the filed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order "did not resolve all of the
22 claims raised in those Petitions."

23 ANALYSIS

24 A defendant has the Sixth Amendment right to an effective assistance of counsel in
25 criminal proceedings. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2063
26 (1984); see also State v. Love, 109 Nev. 1136, 1138, 865 P.2d 322, 323 (1993). Nevada has
27 adopted the standard outlined in Strickland in determining whether a defendant received
28 effective assistance of counsel. Kirksey v. State, 112 Nev. 980, 998, 923 P.2d 1102, 1113

1 (1996); Warden v. Lyons, 100 Nev. 430, 432-33, 683 P.2d 504, 505 (1984). To show that
2 counsel was ineffective, the defendant must prove that he was denied "reasonably effective
3 assistance" of counsel by satisfying a two-pronged test. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686-687, 104
4 S. Ct. at 2064; see State v. Love, 109 Nev. 1136, 1138, 865 P.2d 322, 323 (1993). Under this
5 test, the defendant must show that his counsel's representation fell below an objective standard
6 of reasonableness, and that, but for counsel's errors, there is a reasonable probability that the
7 result of the proceedings would have been different. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-688, 694,
8 104 S. Ct. at 2064, 2068.

9 "Surmounting Strickland's high bar is never an easy task." Padilla v. Kentucky, 559
10 U.S. 356, 371, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1485 (2010). The question is whether an attorney's
11 representations amounted to incompetence under prevailing professional norms, "not whether
12 it deviated from best practices or most common custom." Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86,
13 88, 131 S. Ct. 770, 778 (2011). Furthermore, "[e]ffective counsel does not mean errorless
14 counsel, but rather counsel whose assistance is '[w]ithin the range of competence demanded
15 of attorneys in criminal cases.'" Jackson v. Warden, Nevada State Prison, 91 Nev. 430, 432,
16 537 P.2d 473, 474 (1975) (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771, 90 S. Ct. 1441,
17 1449 (1970)).

18 A court begins with a presumption of effectiveness and then must determine whether
19 the defendant has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that counsel was
20 ineffective. Means v. State, 120 Nev. 1001, 1011-12, 103 P.3d 25, 35 (2004). The role of a
21 court in considering allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel is "not to pass upon the
22 merits of the action not taken but to determine whether, under the particular facts and
23 circumstances or' the case, trial counsel failed to render reasonably effective assistance."
24 Donovan v. State, 94 Nev. 671, 675, 584 P.2d 708, 711 (1978) (emphasis added) (citing
25 Cooper v. Fitzharris, 551F.2d1162, 1166 (9th Cir. 1977)). In considering whether trial counsel
26 was effective, the court must determine whether counsel made a "sufficient inquiry into the
27 information . . . pertinent to his client's case." Doleman v State, 112 Nev. 843, 846, 921 P.2d
28 278, 280 (1996)(citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-691, 104 S. Ct. at 2066). Once this decision

1 is made, the court will consider whether counsel made "a reasonable strategy decision on how
2 to proceed with his client's case." Doleman, 112 Nev. at 846, 921 P.2d at 280 (citing Strickland,
3 466 U.S. at 690-691, 104 S. Ct. at 2066). Counsel's strategy decision is a "tactical" decision
4 and will be "virtually unchallengeable absent extraordinary circumstances." Id. at 846, 921
5 P.2d at 280; see also Howard v. State, 106 Nev. 713, 722, 800 P.2d 175, 180 (1990); Strickland,
6 466 U.S. at 691, 104 S. Ct. at 2066.

7 The Strickland analysis does not mean courts should "second guess reasoned choices
8 between trial tactics, nor does it mean that defense counsel, to protect himself against
9 allegations of inadequacy, must make every conceivable motion no matter how remote the
10 possibilities are of success." Donovan, 94 Nev. at 675, 584 P.2d at 711 (citing Cooper, 551
11 F.2d at 1166 (9th Cir. 1977)). Therefore, counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to
12 make futile objections, file futile motions, or raise futile arguments. Ennis v. State, 122 Nev.
13 694, 706, 137 P.3d 1095, 1103 (2006).

14 Even if a defendant can show that his counsel's representation fell below an objective
15 standard of reasonableness, he must still demonstrate prejudice and a reasonable probability
16 that, but for counsel's errors, the result of the trial would have been different. McNelson v.
17 State, 115 Nev. 396, 403, 990 P.2d 1263, 1268 (1999) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687). "A
18 reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome."
19 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2068.

20 Courts must dismiss a petition if a petitioner pled guilty and the petitioner is not alleging
21 "that the plea was involuntarily or unknowingly entered, or that the plea was entered without
22 effective assistance of counsel." NRS 34.810(1)(a). Although a defendant may attack the
23 validity of a guilty plea by showing that he received ineffective assistance of counsel, the
24 defendant maintains the burden of demonstrating "'a reasonable probability that, but for
25 counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.'"
26 See Molina v. State, 120 Nev. 185, 190, 87 P.3d 533, 537 (2004); Kirksey v. State, 112 Nev.
27 980, 988, 923 P.2d 1102, 1107 (1996) (quoting Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59, 106 S.Ct.
28 366, 370 (1985)). "A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence

1 in the outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2068. “Bare” or “naked” allegations
2 are not sufficient to show ineffectiveness of counsel. Hargrove v. State, 100 Nev. 498, 502,
3 686 P.2d 222, 225 (1984). A defendant who contends his attorney was ineffective because he
4 did not adequately investigate must show how a better investigation would have rendered a
5 more favorable outcome. Molina, 120 Nev. at 192, 87 P.3d at 538. Ultimately, while it is
6 counsel’s duty to candidly advise a defendant regarding a plea offer, the decision of whether
7 or not to accept a plea offer is the defendants. Rhyne v. State, 118 Nev. 1, 8, 38 P.3d 163, 163
8 (2002).

9 **I. PETITIONER’S PETITION IS DENIED**

10 **A. Petitioner’s Guilty Plea Agreement Cures Earlier Constitutional Defects.**

11 In McMann v. Richardson, the United States Supreme Court stated that “a voluntary
12 plea of guilty entered on advice of counsel constitutes a waiver of all non-jurisdictional defects
13 in any prior stage of the proceedings against the defendant.” 397 U.S. 759, 762, 90 S. Ct. 1441,
14 1444 (1970) (citing Glenn v. McMann, 349 F.2d 1018 (C. A. 2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383
15 U.S. 915 (1966)). Therefore, any earlier constitutional defects, such as the State’s failure to
16 provide Marcum notice, are cured by Petitioner’s guilty plea agreement.

17 **B. Petitioner failed to show his counsel was ineffective.**

18 **1. Petitioner failed to show that counsel was ineffective for failing to raise**
19 **Marcum notice (Ground 1).**

20 Petitioner first argues that counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the State’s
21 alleged failure to provide Marcum notice. Petition, at 7-9. However, Petitioner failed to show
22 a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and
23 would have insisted on going to trial. Molina, 120 Nev. at 190-91, 87 P.3d at 537. Thus,
24 Petitioner failed to demonstrate that counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the lack
25 of Marcum notice.

26 //

27 //

28 //

1 **2. Petitioner failed to show that counsel was ineffective for failing to order a**
2 **competency evaluation (Ground 2).**

3 Petitioner next argues that counsel was ineffective for advising Defendant to take a plea
4 before subjecting him to a competency exam. Petition, 10-12. Petitioner claim is a naked and
5 bare allegation because he does not identify what a competency evaluation would have
6 revealed. Petitioner merely states that his mental state was “fragile” and “confused.” Id. at 10.
7 Petitioner failed to explain how a fragile and confused state affected his decision to enter a
8 guilty plea agreement. Without this information, this court cannot determine how a
9 competency evaluation would have rendered a different outcome for the Petitioner.

10 In fact, Petitioner’s claim is belied by the record and his petition. First, Petitioner alleges
11 that counsel was ineffective for failing to order a competency exam, but immediately claims
12 that he was at a competency hearing on April 1, 2018. Petition, 11. Second, the record shows
13 that Petitioner was found competent to stand for trial under the Dusky standard. Court Minutes,
14 April 6, 2018. Thus, Defendant's naked and bare allegation is belied by the record.

15 **3. Petitioner failed to show counsel was ineffective for making misleading**
16 **representations (Ground 3).**

17 Petitioner argues that counsel was ineffective for providing him with ill and misleading
18 advice. Petition, 13. A defendant is not entitled to a particular “relationship” with his attorney.
19 Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 14, 103 S. Ct. 1610, 1617 (1983). There is no requirement for
20 any specific amount of communication as long as counsel is reasonably effective in his
21 representation. Id. Petitioner’s current complaint is belied by his statement that he was satisfied
22 with his representation. GPA, 6. Thus, the claim must be denied. Furthermore, Petitioner has
23 failed to specify what kind of “ill” and “misleading” information his counsel gave him that
24 compelled him into pleading guilty. Similarly, Petitioner complains that his counsel failed to
25 provide case files to him once withdrawn. However, he does not identify what these files were.
26 Without this information, this court cannot determine how the alleged misleading information
27 and the failure to provide Petitioner with files affected his decision to plead guilty. Since
28 Petitioner has not shown that the result would have been different had he had more

1 communication with counsel, his claim is a naked and bare allegation that is belied by the
2 record.

3 **4. Petitioner failed to show that counsel was ineffective for advising him to**
4 **enter a plea when he had a valid self-defense claim (Grounds 4 and 5).**

5 Petitioner next argues that his self-defense theory would have had a major impact on
6 every count of attempt murder. Petition, 17 (Ground 4). Petitioner further-argues that counsel
7 was ineffective because he advised Petitioner to plead guilty despite knowing about the self-
8 defense theory. Petition, 22 (Ground 5).

9 Petitioner fails to identify what type of advice his counsel gave him that forced him to
10 plead guilty. Without this information, this court cannot analyze how, but for counsel's alleged
11 misleading advise, Petitioner would have insisted on proceeding to trial. Petitioner's claim is
12 also belied by the record. All of the information Petitioner discusses in his petition were
13 available to him before he decided to plead guilty. Petitioner has the ultimate authority to enter
14 or reject a plea offer. Johnson v. State, 117 Nev.153, 161-62, 17P.3d 1008, 1012 (2001) (citing
15 Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751, 103 S. Ct. 3302 (1983) (the accused has the ultimate
16 authority to plead guilty)). In fact, Petitioner's GPA states "I have discussed with my attorney
17 any possible defense, defense strategies and circumstances which might be in my favor." GPA,
18 at 5. The GPA also stated that "I believe that pleading guilty and accepting this plea bargain
19 is in my best interest, and that a trial would be contrary to my best interest." Id. Finally,
20 considering Petitioner's crime and the strength of the evidence-shooting two victims in the
21 back and admitting to shooting his estranged wife to "shut her up" it was objectively
22 reasonable to advise Petitioner to take the plea. Presentence Investigation Report, 4-5. Thus,
23 Petitioner's claims include only naked and bare allegation that is belied by the record.

24 **5. Petitioner failed to show counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion**
25 **to withdraw guilty plea (Ground 6).**

26 It is well-settled law that when a defendant pleads guilty, the only claims that may be
27 raised thereafter are those involving the voluntariness of the plea itself, or that the plea was
28 entered without effective assistance of counsel. NRS 34.810(1); Kirksey, 112 Nev. at 999,923

1 P.2d at 1114, (citing Warden, Nevada State Prison v. State, 100 Nev. 430,432, 683 P.2d 504,
2 505 (1984)). A defendant cannot enter a guilty plea then later raise independent claims alleging
3 a deprivation of his rights before entry of the plea. State v. Eighth Judicial District Court, 121
4 Nev. 225, 112 P.3d 1070, n.24 (2005) (quoting Tollet v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258,267 (1973)).

5 Here, Petitioner's allegation is a naked and bare allegation because he failed to identify
6 the basis for wanting to withdraw his GPA. Without this information, this court cannot analyze
7 filing a motion to withdraw guilty plea would have rendered him a more favorable result. Also,
8 Petitioner does not allege his entry of plea was involuntary. Therefore, Petitioner's claim is a
9 naked and bare allegation that must be denied.

10 **C. Petitioner cannot demonstrate cumulative error.**

11 The Nevada Supreme Court has not endorsed application of its direct appeal cumulative
12 error standard to the post-conviction Strickland context. McConnell v. State, 125 Nev. 243,
13 259, 212 P.3d 307,318 (2009). Nor should cumulative error apply on post-conviction review.
14 Middleton v. Roper, 455 F.3d 838, 851 (8th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1134, 1275 S.Ct.
15 980 (2007) ("a habeas petitioner cannot build a showing of prejudice on series of errors, none
16 of which would by itself meet the prejudice test.").

17 Nevertheless, even where available, a cumulative error finding in the context of a
18 Strickland claim is extraordinarily rare and requires an extensive aggregation of errors. See
19 Harris By and Through Ramseyer v. Wood, 64 F.3d 1432, 1438 (9th Cir. 1995). In fact, logic
20 dictates that there can be no cumulative error where the defendant fails to demonstrate any
21 single violation of Strickland. See Turner v. Quarterman, 481 F.3d 292, 301 (5th Cir. 2007)
22 ("where individual allegations of error are not of constitutional stature or are not errors, there
23 is 'nothing to cumulate.'") (quoting Yohey v. Collins, 985 F.2d 222, 229 (5th Cir. 1993));
24 Hughes v. Epps, 694 F.Supp.2d 533, 563 (N.D. Miss. 2010) (citing Leal v. Dretke, 428 F.3d
25 543, 552-553 (5th Cir. 2005)). Since Petitioner has not demonstrated any claim warrants relief
26 under Strickland, there are no errors to cumulate.

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1 **II. PETITIONER'S AMENDED PETITION IS DENIED**

2 Upon filing a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus, NRS 34.750(5) prohibits a
3 petitioner from filing any additional pleadings or supplements, except for those specifically
4 provided for in subsections (2)-(4), unless ordered by the Court. Because Petitioner's
5 Amended Petition was filed after he filed his Petition and filed without leave of this Court, the
6 pleadings and claims raised are hereby struck and any new claims or allegations contained
7 therein are denied.

8 **III. PETITIONER'S SUPPLEMENT IS DENIED**

9 **A. Trial counsel was not ineffective in his pretrial investigation of petitioner's self-**
10 **defense claim.**

11 A defendant who contends his attorney was ineffective because he did not adequately
12 investigate must show how a better investigation would have changed the outcome of trial.
13 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at 2064. Such a defendant must allege with specificity
14 what the investigation would have revealed and how it would have altered the outcome of the
15 trial. See Love, 109 Nev. at 1138, 865 P.2d at 323.

16 Petitioner argues that trial counsel was ineffective because he did not investigate
17 Petitioner's self-defense claim. Supp. Petition at 3. First, Petitioner claims counsel should have
18 consulted ballistics experts to study the trajectory of the bullets as well as the positions of the
19 victim and Petitioner. Supp. Petition at 3. Next, Petitioner claims counsel should have hired
20 an investigator to determine whether witnesses could corroborate Petitioner's self-defense
21 claim. Supp. Petition at 3. Specifically, Petitioner argues that counsel should have interviewed
22 the victims, security guards at the incident. Supp. Petition at 4. However, in pleading guilty,
23 Petitioner waived his ability to raise this claim because it does not allege that Petitioner's plea
24 was involuntary or that counsel was ineffective in the plea process. NRS 34.810(1)(a).

25 Additionally, Petitioner's claims fail under Molina because Petitioner does not explain
26 what better investigation into those areas would have shown. Petitioner does not explain how
27 a ballistics expert's conclusion would have shown that Petitioner acted in self-defense. Next,
28 Petitioner does not allege that there even were witnesses who could corroborate Petitioner's

1 claims. Petitioner also does not explain what information counsel would have received if he
2 had interviewed the security guards and victim.

3 Further, all of Petitioner's claims are belied under Hargrove by the Guilty Plea
4 Agreement. In signing the Guilty Plea, Petitioner confirmed that he had spoken with his
5 attorney about any possible defenses, defense strategies, and circumstances that were in his
6 favor. Guilty Plea Agreement at 5. Petitioner further confirmed that he believed that pleading
7 guilty would be in his best interest. Guilty Plea Agreement at 5. Additionally, Petitioner does
8 not allege that he would not have plead guilty had trial counsel conducted the alleged
9 investigation. Finally, it was Petitioner's decision to enter the guilty plea without this level of
10 investigation and that decision belonged to him and not counsel. Rhyne, 118 Nev. at 8, 38 P.3d
11 at 163. As Petitioner pled guilty in lieu of going to trial, Petitioner fails to explain how any
12 such investigation or interviews would have changed the result of trial.

13 **D. COUNSEL WAS NOT INEFFECTIVE REGARDING INFORMING**
14 **PETITIONER OF HIS RIGHT TO TESTIFY BEFORE THE GRAND JURY**

15 Petitioner claims that trial counsel was ineffective because he did not inform him of his
16 right to testify and present evidence at the grand jury. Supp. Petition at 4. Petitioner argues
17 that had he known of this right, he would have testified that he was defending himself. Marcum
18 notice was served to defense counsel on October 5, 2016. As such, Petitioner cannot show
19 prejudice sufficient for ineffective assistance of counsel purposes because he does not
20 articulate what specific facts or evidence would have impacted the outcome as required under
21 Strickland. Petitioner does not explain how his testimony would have established that he shot
22 two victims, whom he stalked, out of self-defense. Petitioner failed to show a reasonable
23 probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have
24 insisted on going to trial. Molina, 120 Nev. at 190-91, 87 P.3d at 537. Thus, Defendant failed
25 to demonstrate that counsel was ineffective.

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1 **E. NO INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL FOR FAILING TO**
2 **PREPARE A SENTENCING MEMORANDUM**

3 Petitioner complains that counsel was ineffective because he did not file a sentencing
4 memorandum and did not address the prejudicial information in the state's sentencing
5 memorandum. Supp. Petition at 5. As a result, Petitioner claims he was sentenced to the
6 maximum sentence. Petitioner's claim fails because the decision to file a sentencing
7 memorandum or offer the information orally at a sentencing hearing is a virtually
8 unchallengeable strategic decision. Doleman, 112 Nev. at 846, 921 P.2d at 280.

9 At sentencing, defense counsel's argument rebutted arguments made by the state in
10 their sentencing memorandum and orally. Specifically, in the State's sentencing
11 memorandum, the State argued that Petitioner should be sentenced to the maximum and
12 regurgitated the facts elicited from the Grand Jury and pointed the court to several calls
13 Petitioner made while in custody where he (1) acknowledged that he was trying to kill one of
14 the victims; (2) asked others to get "dirt" on another victim to use at trial; (3) suborn perjury
15 through his son, a witness to the case; and (4) asked his son to destroy what he believed to be
16 incriminating evidence. Sentencing Memorandum at 2-8. At sentencing, the State highlighted
17 the key facts, trauma suffered by the victims, Petitioner's lack of remorse; and rebutted
18 mitigating factors such as his age, self-defense claim, and lack of criminal history. Recorder's
19 Transcript Re: Sentencing at 2-6. In response, trial counsel argued his theory of the case, and
20 explained that given Petitioner's age, health, and lack of history, they had a valid argument for
21 self-defense. Transcript Re: Sentencing at 6-8.

22 However, the district court disagreed with Petitioner's argument, explaining that per
23 the law in Nevada, a person cannot use deadly force in self-defense unless deadly force is first
24 used against them. Transcript Re: Sentencing at 7. Petitioner fails to explain what other facts
25 would have changed the district court's position because Petitioner is not alleging that deadly
26 force was actually used against Petitioner before he shot two people in the back. As such,
27 Petitioner's claim fails.


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ORDER

THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Petition for Post-Conviction Relief shall be, and it is, hereby denied.

DATED this _____ day of August, 2021.


Dated this 9th day of August, 2021


MICHELLE LEAVITT

STEVEN B. WOLFSON
Clark County District Attorney
Nevada Bar #001565

5EB 5B6 1E0E 81BF
Michelle Leavitt
District Court Judge

BY



JONATHON VANBOSKERCK
Chief Deputy District Attorney
Nevada Bar #6528

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that on the 5th day of August, 2021, I mailed a copy of the foregoing proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order to:

JEFFREY BROWN, NDC #1200868
NNCC
P.O. BOX 7000
CARSON CITY, NV 89702

BY



Secretary for the District Attorney's Office

16F15698X/jb/JV/ckb/L4

1 **CSERV**

2
3 DISTRICT COURT
CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

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6 Jeffrey Brown, Plaintiff(s)

CASE NO: A-19-793350-W

7 vs.

DEPT. NO. Department 12

8 Isidro Baca, Warden,
9 Defendant(s)


10
11 **AUTOMATED CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

12 This automated certificate of service was generated by the Eighth Judicial District
13 Court. The foregoing Finding of Fact and Conclusions of Law was served via the court's
14 electronic eFile system to all recipients registered for e-Service on the above entitled case as
listed below:

15 Service Date: 8/9/2021

16 JEANNIE HUA, ESQ.

jeanniehua@aol.com



NOTC

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Jeffrey Brown

CASE NO: A-21-839615-A
Department 27

**DISTRICT COURT
CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA**

THE STATE OF NEVADA,

Plaintiff,

vs.

JEFFREY BROWN, aka
Jeffrey Kent Brown, #3074249 ,

Defendant.

Case No. A-19-793350-W

Dept No. XII

NOTICE OF APPEAL

Notice is hereby given that JEFFREY BROWN, defendant above named, hereby appeals to the Supreme Court of Nevada from the Findings of Facts, Conclusions of Law entered in this action on the 11 th day of August, 2021.

DATED this 17th of August, 2021.

LAW OFFICE OF JEANNIE HUA

By /s/ Jeannie N. Hua
JEANNIE N. HUA, ESQ.
Nevada Bar No. 5672
Attorney for Defendant
Jeffrey Brown

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Jeannie Hua hereby affirm that I serviced a copy of the Notice of Appeal via electronic transmission to –

Alexander Chen
Chief Deputy District Attorney
Alexander.chen@clarkcountynvda.com