IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

CITY OF LAS VEGAS, A POLITICAL SUBDIVISION OF THE STATE OF NEVADA,

Appellant,

vs.

180 LAND CO., LLC, A NEVADA LIMITED-LIABILITY COMPANY; AND FORE STARS, LTD., A NEVADA LIMITED-LIABILITY COMPANY,

Respondents.

No. 84345

180 LAND CO., LLC, A NEVADA LIMITED-LIABILITY COMPANY; AND FORE STARS, LTD., A NEVADA LIMITED-LIABILITY COMPANY,

Appellants/Cross-Respondents,

vs.

CITY OF LAS VEGAS, A POLITICAL SUBDIVISION OF THE STATE OF NEVADA,

Respondent/Cross-Appellant.

No. 84640

AMENDED JOINT APPENDIX VOLUME 93, PART 3

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DISTRICT COURT

CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

180 LAND CO., LLC, a Nevada limited liability company, FORE STARS Ltd., DOE INDIVIDUALS I through X, ROE CORPORATIONS I through X, and ROE LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES I through X, Plaintiffs, *vs.* CITY OF LAS VEGAS, political subdivision of the State of Nevada, ROE government entities I through X, ROE CORPORATIONS I through X, ROE INDIVIDUALS I through X, ROE LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES I through X, ROE quasi-governmental entities I through X, Defendant.	Case No.: A-17-758528-J Dept. No.: XVI **SUMMARY OF PRIOR RULINGS RELEVANT TO HEARING ON LANDOWNERS' MOTION TO DETERMINE TAKE** **Hearing Date: September 23, 2021** **Hearing Time: 1:30 p.m.**

I. INTRODUCTION

This Court has entered several rulings in this case, leaving just one issue for the hearing commencing on September 23, 2021 – whether the City engaged in actions (of which the "aggregate" must be reviewed) to take the Landowners' 35 Acre Property for which the Landowners had the right to use for single family and multi family residential.

II. RULING ON INVERSE CONDEMNATION PROCEDURE

On October 12, 2020, this Court entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (FFCL) on the proper two-step procedure (two "distinct sub-inquiry") that "must" be followed in this inverse condemnation case. This Court held that the Court "must" **first** determine the "property interest" or "bundle of sticks" owned by the Landowners prior to any alleged taking actions by the City. **Second,** this Court held, it "must determine" whether the City actions alleged by the Landowners constitute a taking of that "property interest" or "bundle of sticks." *See Attached Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Regarding Plaintiff Landowners' Motion to Determine "Property Interest,"* Exhibit 1 to Landowners' Motion to Determine Take, filed on March 26, 2021 (hereinafter "MSJ Exhibit"), p. 4:4-11. Judge Jones heard extensive arguments for two days and entered FFCLs in the 17 Acre Case, also holding that this two-step, distinct sub-inquiry process must be followed in Nevada inverse condemnation proceedings. *See Attached Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Regarding Plaintiff Landowners' Motion to Determine "Property Interest [17 Acre Case],"* MSJ Exhibit 199.

III. RULING ON THE FIRST "PROPERTY INTEREST" OR "BUNDLE OF STICKS" ISSUE

This Court "heard extensive oral arguments" on September 17, 2020, on the **first** distinct sub-inquiry, namely, what property interest or "bundle of sticks" the Landowners had in their 35 Acre Property prior to the City interfering with that property interest. This Court held that the Landowners had the right to use their 35 Acre Property for single family and multi family residential uses prior to the City interfering with that property right:

> 16. Therefore, the Court bases its property interest decision on eminent domain law.
>
> 17. Nevada eminent domain law provides that zoning must be relied upon to determine a landowners' property interest in an eminent domain case. City of Las Vegas v. C. Bustos, 119 Nev. 360 (2003); Clark County v. Alper, 100 Nev. 382 (1984).
>
> 18. The Court concludes that the 35 Acre Property has been hard zoned R-PD7 since at least 1990.

19. The Court further concludes that the Las Vegas Municipal Code Section LVMC 19.10.050 lists single family and multi family residential as the legally permissible uses on R-PD7 zoned properties.

20. Therefore, the Landowners' Motion to Determine Property Interest is GRANTED in its entirety and it is hereby ORDERED that:

1) the 35 Acre Property is hard zoned R-PD7 at all relevant times herein; and,

2) the permitted uses by right of the 35 Acre Property are single-family and multi-family residential.

See Attached Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Regarding Plaintiff Landowners' Motion to Determine "Property Interest," MSJ Exhibit 1, p. 4:19–5:8.

After two days of extensive argument, Judge Jones entered the same ruling on September 16, 2021, in the 17 Acre Case, finding: 1) the City "conceded the R-PD7 zoning" (3:13-14); 2) Judge Jones cited to **6 Nevada Supreme Court** inverse condemnation and eminent domain decisions that hold "zoning" governs the property interest determination in Nevada inverse condemnation proceedings (pp. 5-6); 3) Judge Jones also cited to facts showing that the relevant three City of Las Vegas Departments have always relied on "zoning" to determine property rights in Las Vegas (pp. 6-8); and, 4) Judge Jones concluded that "[t]he legally permitted uses by right of the 17 Acre Property are single-family and multi-family residential." *See Attached Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Regarding Plaintiff Landowners' Motion to Determine "Property Interest [17 Acre Case],"* MSJ Exhibit 199.

Similarly, another District Court Judge held, in a matter involving the Landowners and the Queensridge homeowners, that the zoning on the entire 250 Acre Land (that includes the 35 Acre Property) is "R-PD7" and this zoning "dictates its use and Defendants [Landowners] rights to develop their land." MSJ Exhibit 27, 17:11-12, 26-28. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed. MSJ Exhibits 28 and 29.

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Therefore, this Court (and others) has already decided the **first** sub-inquiry - the property rights issue or, stated another way, the "bundle of sticks" the Landowners had prior to the City interfering with that property right. This means that the sole and only issue at the September 23, 2021, hearing is whether the City engaged in actions to take that underlying property interest.

IV. RULING ON THE CITY ACTIONS THAT MUST BE CONSIDERED WHEN DECIDING THE TAKE ISSUE

This Court has also entered an order that all City actions "in the aggregate" must be considered when deciding the take issue: "In determining whether a taking has occurred, Courts must look at the aggregate of all of the government actions because 'the form, intensity, and the deliberateness of the government actions toward the property must be examined … All actions by the [government], in the aggregate, must be analyzed." *See attached*, MSJ Exhibit 8, pp. 8:9-9:2.

V. RULING ON THE LAW TO APPLY TO DECIDE THE PENDING TAKE ISSUE

This Court has also entered an order that eminent domain and inverse condemnation law, not Petition for Judicial Review (PJR) law, must be used to decide the take issue. This Court has entered several orders rejecting the City's attempt to apply PJR law and, instead, held that eminent domain and inverse condemnation law should apply to decide the take issue in this case. *See e.g. Attached Order Denying City's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, etc.,* MSJ Exhibit 8, pp. 21-23; *See also attached,* MSJ Exhibit 1, 4:14-18; *See also attached,* MSJ Exhibit 7, 11:13-22. Specifically, this Court held "Because of these different evidentiary standards, the Court concludes that its conclusions of law regarding the petition for judicial review do not control its consideration of the [Landowners'] inverse condemnation claims." *See attached,* MSJ Exhibit 7:20-22. Judge Jones also held in the 17 Acre Case that PJR law should not be used in these inverse condemnation cases. *See Attached,* MSJ Exhibit 199, pp. 11-12. The Nevada Supreme Court just three months ago adopted the same rule, holding in the case of City of Henderson v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Ct., 137 Nev. Adv. Op. 26 (June 24, 2001), that a

PJR claim and other civil claim are like "water and oil, the two will not mix." Finally, this Court made this very clear to the City's privately-retained counsel at a very recent hearing in this matter as follows:

> "Wait. Wait. Wait. Wait…the law as it relates to petitions for judicial review are much different than a civil litigation seeking compensation for inverse condemnation, sir…the standards are different. . . . I mean, it's a totally different – it's an administrative process versus a full-blown jury trial in this case. It's different completely." *May 13, 2021, hearing transcript on City's motion to reconsider discovery issues, at 69:20-70:7.*

VI. RULING ON THE CITY'S MASTER PLAN PR-OS ARGUMENT

This Court has also entered an order rejecting the City's PR-OS Master Plan land use argument. First, the only place this PR-OS Master Plan argument could be relevant is during the **first sub-inquiry,** property interest arguments, and the City presented its PR-OS Master Plan land use argument during the "extensive argument" on the property interest issue and this Court rejected the PR-OS argument, holding that "zoning must be relied upon to determine a landowners' property interest in an eminent domain case." *See Attached,* MSJ Exhibit 1, 4:20-21. Judge Jones also rejected the PR-OS argument in detail in the 17 Acre Case, holding: 1) Nevada law requires that zoning must be used to decide the property interest issue, not a master plan PR-OS designation; 2) even if there was a PR-OS master plan land use designation, NRS 278.349(3)(e) states "zoning takes precedence" over any other master plan land use designation; 3) the only legally adopted Master Plan land use designation for the 250 Acre Property was "Medium" residential and there is no evidence this was legally changed to PR-OS; and 4) the City's own long-time City Attorney Brad Jerbic, confirmed there was never a legal change to PR-OS on the 250 Acre Land on the City's master plan. *See attached,* MSJ Exhibit 199, pp. 13-14. In all, Nevada District Courts and the Nevada Supreme Court have ten times rejected the City's PR-OS argument.

VII. RULING ON RIPENESS

This Court entered a decision very early in this case that the Landowners' inverse condemnation "claims were ripe because 180 Land [the Landowners] obtained a final decision from the City regarding

the property at issue and 'a final decision by the responsible state agency informs the constitutional determination whether a regulation has deprived a landowner of 'all economically beneficial use' of the property.' *Palazzolo v. Rhode Island,* 533 U.S. 606, 618, 121 S.Ct. 2448, 2458 (2001)."

VIII. CONCLUSION

After substantial litigation in this matter, the sole and narrow issue for the September 23, 2021, evidentiary hearing is whether the City engaged in actions (of which the "aggregate" must be reviewed) to take the Landowners' 35 Acre Property for which the Landowners had the right to use for single family and multi family residential and that sole and narrow issue should be decided based upon United States and Nevada inverse condemnation law, not PJR law.

DATED this 22nd day of September, 2021.

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that I am an employee of the Law Offices of Kermitt L. Waters, and that on the 22nd day of September, 2021, pursuant to NRCP 5(b), a true and correct copy of the foregoing: **SUMMARY OF PRIOR RULINGS RELEVANT TO HEARING ON LANDOWNERS' MOTION TO DETERMINE TAKE** was served on the below via the Court's electronic filing/service system and/or deposited for mailing in the U.S. Mail, postage prepaid and addressed to, the following:

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Exhibit 1

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DISTRICT COURT
CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

180 LAND COMPANY, LLC, a Nevada limited liability company, and FORE STARS, Ltd., DOE INDIVIDUALS I through X, DOE CORPORATIONS I through X, and DOE LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES I through X, Plaintiffs, *vs.* CITY OF LAS VEGAS, political subdivision of the State of Nevada, ROE government entities I through X, ROE CORPORATIONS I through X, ROE INDIVIDUALS I through X, ROE LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES I through X, ROE quasi-governmental entities I through X, Defendant.	Case No.: A-17-758528-J Dept. No.: XVI **FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW REGARDING PLAINTIFF LANDOWNERS' MOTION TO DETERMINE "PROPERTY INTEREST"** Hearing Date: September 17, 2020 Hearing Time: 9:00 a.m.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiffs, 180 LAND COMPANY, LLC and FORE STARS, Ltd (hereinafter Landowners), brought Plaintiff Landowners' Motion to Determine Property Interest before the Court on September 17, 2020, with James Jack Leavitt, Esq of the Law Offices of Kermitt L. Waters, appearing for and on behalf of the Landowners along with the Landowners' corporate counsel, Elizabeth Ghanem Ham, Esq., and George F. Ogilve III Esq. and Andrew Schwartz, Esq. appearing for and on behalf

of the Defendant, City of Las Vegas (hereinafter the City). Having reviewed all pleadings and attached exhibits filed in this matter and having heard extensive oral arguments on September 17, 2020, in regards to Plaintiff Landowners' Motion to Determine Property Interest, the Court hereby enters the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law:

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. Plaintiff 180 Land Company, LLC is the owner of an approximately 35 acre parcel of property generally located near the southeast corner of Hualapai Way and Alta Drive within the geographic boundaries of the City of Las Vegas, more particularly described as Clark County Assessor Parcel 138-31-201-005 (hereinafter 35 Acre Property).

2. The Landowners' Motion to Determine Property Interest requests this Court enter an order that: 1) the 35 Acre Property is hard zoned R-PD7 as of the relevant September 14, 2017, date of valuation; and, 2) that the permitted uses by right under the R-PD7 zoning are single-family and multi-family residential.

3. In their submitted briefs, the Landowners and the City presented evidence that the 35 Acre Property has been zoned R-PD7 since at least 1990, including: 1) Z-17-90, Resolution of Intent to Rezone the 35 Acre Property to R-PD7, dated March 8, 1990 (Exhibit H to City's Opposition, Vol. 1:00193); and, Ordinance 5353, passed by the City of Las Vegas City Council in 2001, which hard zoned the 35 Acre Property to R-PD7 and repealed anything in conflict (Exhibit 10 to Landowners' Motion).

4. In response to the Landowners' inquiry regarding zoning prior to purchasing the 35 Acre Property, on December 30, 2014, the City of Las Vegas Planning & Development Department provided the Landowners a Zoning Verification Letter, stating, in part: 1) the 35 Acre Property is "zoned R-PD7 (Residential Planned Development District - 7 unites per acre);" 2) "[t]he density allowed in the R-PD District shall be reflected by a numerical designation for that district. (Example, R-PD4 allows up to four units per gross acre.); and 3) "A detailed listing of the permissible uses and all applicable requirements for the R-PD Zone are located in Title 19 ("Las Vegas Zoning Code") of the Las Vegas Municipal Code." Exhibit 3 to Landowners' Motion.

5. The City stated in its opposition to the Landowners' motion that the R-PD7 zoning on the 35 Acre Property "is not disputed." City's Opposition to Motion to Determine Property Interest, 10:17-18.

6. As stated in the City Zoning Verification Letter provided to the Landowners on December 30, 2014, the legally permitted uses of property zoned R-PD7 are include in the Las Vegas Municipal Code (hereinafter LVMC), Title 19.

7. LVMC 19.10.050 is entitled "R-PD Residential Planned Development District" and is the applicable section of the LVMC used to determine those permitted uses on R-PD7 zoned properties in the City of Las Vegas. Exhibit 5 to Landowners' Motion.

8. LVMC 19.10.050 (C) lists as "Permitted Land Uses" on R-PD zoned properties "[s]ingle-family and multi-family residential." Id.

9. LVMC 19.10.050 (A) also provides that "the types of development permitted within the R-PD District can be more consistently achieved using the standard residential districts." Id. The standard residential districts are listed on the City Land Use Table, LVMC 19.12.010. Exhibit 6 to Landowners' Motion. The R-2 residential district listed on the City Land Use Table is the standard residential district most comparable to the R-PD7 zoning, because R-PD7 allows up to 7 units per acre[1] and R-2 allows 6-12 units per acre.[2] The "permitted" uses under the R-2 zoning on the City Land Use Table include "Single Family, Attached" and "Single-Family, Detached" residential uses. LVMC 19.12.010, Exhibit 6 to Landowners' Motion.

10. Table 1 to the City Land Use Table provides that if a use is "permitted" in a certain zoning district then "the use is permitted as a principle use in that zoning district by right." Id.

11. "Permitted Use" is also defined at LVMC 19.18.020 as "[a]ny use allowed in a zoning district as a matter of right." Exhibit 8 to Landowners' Motion.

12. The Landowners have alleged that the City of Las Vegas has taken the 35 Acre Property by inverse condemnation, asserting five (5) separate inverse condemnation claims for relief, a

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[1] *See* City Zoning Verification Letter, Exhibit 3 to Landowners' Motion and LVMC 19.10.050 (A), Exhibit 5 to Landowners' Motion.

[2] *See* LVMC 19.06.100, Exhibit 7 to Landowners' Motion.

Categorical Taking, a Penn Central Regulatory Taking, a Regulatory Per Se Taking, a Non-regulatory Taking, and a Temporary Taking.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

13. The Nevada Supreme Court has held that in an inverse condemnation, such as this, the District Court Judge is required to make two distinct sub inquiries, which are mixed questions of fact and law. ASAP Storage, Inc., v. City of Sparks, 123 Nev. 639 (2008); McCarran Int'l Airport v. Sisolak, 122 Nev. 645 (2006). First, the District Court Judge must determine the "property interest" owned by the landowner or, stated another way, the bundle of sticks owned by the landowner prior to any alleged taking actions by the government. *Id.* Second, the District Court Judge must determine whether the government actions alleged by the landowner constitute a taking of the landowners property. *Id.*

14. The Landowners' Motion to Determine Property Interest narrowly addresses this first sub inquiry and, accordingly, this Court will only determine the first sub inquiry.

15. In addressing this first sub inquiry, this Court has previously held that: 1) "it would be improper to apply the Court's ruling from the Landowners' petition for judicial review to the Landowners' inverse condemnation claims;"[3] and, 2) "[a]ny determination of whether the Landowners have a 'property interest' or the vested right to use the 35 Acre Property must be based on eminent domain law, rather than the land use law."[4]

16. Therefore, the Court bases its property interest decision on eminent domain law.

17. Nevada eminent domain law provides that zoning must be relied upon to determine a landowners' property interest in an eminent domain case. City of Las Vegas v. C. Bustos, 119 Nev. 360 (2003); Clark County v. Alper, 100 Nev. 382 (1984).

18. The Court concludes that the 35 Acre Property has been hard zoned R-PD7 since at least 1990.

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[3] Exhibit 18 to Landowners' Reply, App. at 0026 / 23:7-8

[4] Exhibit 18 to Landowners' Reply, App. at 0010 / 7:26-27

19. The Court further concludes that the Las Vegas Municipal Code Section LVMC 19.10.050 lists single family and multi family residential as the legally permissible uses on R-PD7 zoned properties.

20. Therefore, the Landowners' Motion to Determine Property Interest is **GRANTED** in its entirety and it is hereby **ORDERED** that:

1) the 35 Acre Property is hard zoned R-PD7 at all relevant times herein; and,

2) the permitted uses by right of the 35 Acre Property are single-family and multi-family residential.

DATED this 9th day of October, 2020.

DISTRICT COURT JUDGE ZJ

Respectfully Submitted By:

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Exhibit 7

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DISTRICT COURT

CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

180 LAND CO LLC, a Nevada limited-liability company; DOE INDIVIDUALS I through X; DOE CORPORATIONS I through X; and DOE LIMITED-LIABILITY COMPANIES I through X,

Plaintiffs,

v.

CITY OF LAS VEGAS, a political subdivision of the State of Nevada; ROE GOVERNMENT ENTITIES I through X; ROE CORPORATIONS I through X; ROE INDIVIDUALS I through X; ROE LIMITED-LIABILITY COMPANIES I through X; ROE QUASI-GOVERNMENTAL ENTITIES I through X,

Defendants.

CASE NO.: A-17-758528-J

DEPT. NO.: XVI

~~[PROPOSED]~~ FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW REGARDING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL, MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND AND/OR RECONSIDER THE FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND MOTION TO STAY PENDING NEVADA SUPREME COURT DIRECTIVES

JACK B. BINION, an individual; DUNCAN R. and IRENE LEE, individuals and Trustees of the LEE FAMILY TRUST; FRANK A. SCHRECK, an individual; TURNER INVESTMENTS, LTD., a Nevada Limited Liability Company; ROGER P. and CAROLYN G. WAGNER, individuals and Trustees of the WAGNER FAMILY TRUST; BETTY ENGLESTAD AS TRUSTEE OF THE BETTY ENGLESTAD TRUST; PYRAMID LAKE HOLDINGS, LLC.; JASON AND SHEREEN AWAD AS TRUSTEES OF THE AWAD ASSET PROTECTION TRUST; THOMAS LOVE AS TRUSTEE OF THE ZENA TRUST; STEVE AND KAREN THOMAS AS TRUSTEES OF THE STEVE AND KAREN THOMAS TRUST; SUSAN SULLIVAN AS TRUSTEE OF THE KENNETH J. SULLIVAN FAMILY TRUST, AND DR. GREGORY BIGLER AND SALLY BIGLER,

Intervenors.

Currently before the Court is Plaintiff 180 Land Co, LLC's Motion For A New Trial Pursuant To NRCP 59(e) And Motion To Alter Or Amend Pursuant To NRCP 52(b) And/Or Reconsider The Findings Of Fact And Conclusions Of Law And Motion To Stay Pending Nevada Supreme Court Directives ("the Motion") filed on December 13, 2018. The alternative relief sought by the Developer is a stay of the proceedings until the Nevada Supreme Court decides an appeal from the judgment entered March 5, 2018 by the Honorable James Crockett in Case No. A-17-752344-J ("Judge Crockett's Order"). The City filed an opposition, to which the Intervenors joined, and the Plaintiff filed a reply. The Court held oral argument on the Motion on January 22, 2019.

Having considered the record on file, the written and oral arguments presented, and being fully informed in the premises, the Court makes the following findings of facts and conclusions of law:

I. FINDINGS OF FACT

1. Plaintiff 180 Land Co, LLC ("the Developer") filed a Petition for Judicial Review (the "Petition") challenging the Las Vegas City Council's June 21, 2017 decision to deny its four land use applications ("the 35-Acre Applications") to develop its 34.07 acres of R-PD7 zoned property (the "35-Acre Property").

2. On November 21, 2018, this Court entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on Petition for Judicial Review ("FFCL") that denied the Petition and dismissed the alternative claims for inverse condemnation. The Court concluded that the Las Vegas City Council properly exercised its discretion to deny the 35-Acre Applications and that substantial evidence supported the City Council's June 21, 2017 decision. The Court further concluded that the Developer had no vested rights to have the 35-Acre Applications approved.

3. On February 6, 2019, the Court entered an Order Nunc Pro Tunc that removed those portions of the FFCL that dismissed the inverse condemnation claims. Specifically, the Order *Nunc Pro Tunc* removed FFCL page 23:4-20 and page 24:4-5 but left all findings of fact and all other conclusions of law intact.

4. The Developer seeks a new trial: however, because this matter is a petition for judicial review, no trial occurred.

5. While the Developer has raised new facts, substantially different evidence and new issues of law, none of these new matters warrant rehearing or reconsideration, as discussed infra.

6. The Developer identifies claimed errors in the Court's previous findings of fact in the FFCL and disagrees with the Court's interpretation of law.

7. The Developer has failed to show that the Court's previous findings that the City Council did not abuse its discretion or that sufficient privity exists to bar Plaintiff's Petition under issue preclusion were clearly erroneous.

8. The Developer repeats its arguments that it raised previously in support of its petition for judicial review; namely, that public opposition, the desire for a comprehensive and cohesive development proposal to amend the General Plan's open space designation, and the City

Council's choice not to follow Staff's recommendation purportedly were not ample grounds to affirm the City Council's June 21, 2017 decision.

9. The Developer also reasserts its contentions that: (a) NRS 278.349 gives it vested rights to have the 35-Acre Applications approved; (b) the Queensridge homeowners have no rights in the golf course; (c) no major modification is required; (d) Judge Crockett's Order should be disregarded; and (e) the County Assessor changed the assessed value of the property after the Developer stopped using it as a golf course. The Developer made each of these arguments in the briefs submitted by the Developer in support of the Petition. *See* Pet. Memo. of P&A in support of Second Amended PJR at 5:17-20, 6:3, 7:4-10, 10:4-14:17, 17:8-18:7, 22-42, 26:10-17, 29:10-30:24, n.6, n.37, n.42, n.45, n.79, n.112; Post Hearing Reply Br. at 2:2-4, 2:19-4:3, 7:18-13:14, 13-16, 26:16-29:15, n.79.

10. The Motion also cites to and attaches documents that were not part of the record on review at the time the City Council rendered its June 21, 2017 decision to deny the 35-Acre Applications. *See* Motion at 2:14-3:23, 8:1-21; n.2, n.3, n.18, n.20, n. 21, n.22, citing Exs. 1-6 to the Motion.

11. The transcripts and minutes from the August 2, 2017 and March 21, 2018 City Council meetings on which the Developer relies (Exs. 1 and 6 to the Motion) post-dated the City Council's June 21, 2017 decision to deny the 35-Acre Applications and are, therefore, not part of the record on review.

12. Similarly, the Developer's attacks on Councilmember Seroka are beyond the record on review because he was not on the City Council on June 21, 2017 when the City Council voted to deny the 35-Acre Applications.

13. The Supreme Court's order of affirmance and order denying rehearing related to Judge Smith's orders (Exs. 4 and 5 to the Motion) were entered on October 17, 2018 and November 27, 2018, respectively, after the City Council denied the 35-Acre Applications and, therefore, are not part of the record on review.

14. The Developer previously cited to Judge Smith's underlying orders before the Nevada Supreme Court's actions both before the City Council and before this Court. *See* Pet.'s

P&A at 9:5-10:10, 17:1-2; *see also* 6.29.18 Hrg. Trans. at 109:6-110:13, attached as Exhibit B to City Opp.

15. The Motion relies not only on the aforestated orders, but also the Nevada Supreme Court's decision affirming the orders Judge Smith issued in that case.

16. Judge Smith's orders interpreted the rights of the Queensridge homeowners under the Queensridge CC&Rs, which in the Court's view, have no relevance to the issues in this case or the reasons supporting the Court's denial of the Petition.

17. Judge Smith described the matter before him as the Queensridge homeowners' claims that ***their*** "vested rights" in the CC&Rs were violated. *See* 11.30.16 Smith FFCL at ¶¶2, 7, 29, 108, Ex. 2 to the Motion.

18. Whether the Developer had vested rights to have its development applications approved was not precisely at issue in the matter before Judge Smith. *See id.*

19. Indeed, Judge Smith confirmed that, notwithstanding the zoning designation for the golf course property, the Developer is nonetheless "subject to City of Las Vegas requirements" and that the City is not obligated to make any particular decision on the Developer's applications. 1.31.17 FFCL ¶¶9, 16-17, 71.

20. The Supreme Court's affirmance of Judge Smith's orders has no impact on this Court's denial of the Developer's Petition for Judicial Review.

21. In the Motion, the Developer challenges the Court's application of issue preclusion to Judge Crockett's Order. The Developer reargues its attacks on the substance of Judge Crockett's Order (Motion at 17:21-20:7) and also reargues the application of issue preclusion to Judge Crockett's Order.

22. The Court finds no conflict between Judge Crockett's Order and Judge Smith's orders and therefore rejects the Developer's argument that such orders are "irreconcilable."

23. In its Motion, the Developer argues that this Court's factual findings are incorrect and need amendment. Two findings from the FFCL the Developer argues are incorrect are ¶¶12-13, which the Developer contends are different than Judge Smith's findings. Motion at 20, n.67.

24. As stated supra in finding No. 17, Judge Smith's orders are irrelevant to this Petition for Judicial Review. Thus, the Court finds no cause exists to alter or amend the findings in the FFCL.

II. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

A. The Court May Not Consider Matters Outside The Record On Review

1. The scope of the Court's review is limited to the record made before the administrative tribunal. *Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs of Clark Cty. v. C.A.G., Inc.*, 98 Nev. 497, 500, 654 P.2d 531, 533 (1982). That scope cannot be expanded with a motion for reconsideration of the Court's denial of a petition for judicial review. *See id.*

2. The Developer's Motion cites to matters that post-dated the City Council's June 21, 2017 Decision and that are otherwise outside the record on review.

3. Because the Court's review is limited to the record before the City Council on June 21, 2017, the Court may not consider the documents that post-date the City Council's June 21, 2017 decision submitted by the Developer. *See Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs of Clark Cty. v. C.A.G., Inc.*, 98 Nev. 497, 500, 654 P.2d 531, 533 (1982).

B. No "Retrial" Is Appropriate For A Petition For Judicial Review

4. Under NRCP 59(a), the Court may grant a new trial on some or all issues based upon certain grounds specifically enumerated in that rule.

5. Where a petition for judicial review is limited to the record and does not involve the Court's consideration of new evidence, a motion for a new trial is not the appropriate mechanism to seek reconsideration of the denial of a petition for judicial review.

6. "Retrial" presupposes that a trial occurred in the first instance, but no trial occurred here or is allowed for a petition for judicial review because the Court's role is limited to reviewing the record below for substantial evidence to support the City Council's decision. *See City of Reno v. Citizens for Cold Springs*, 126 Nev. 263, 271, 236 P. 3d 10, 15-16 (2010) (citing *Kay v. Nunez*, 122 Nev. 1100, 1105, 146 P.3d 801, 805 (2006)).

7. Moreover, a motion for a new trial under NRCP 59(a), which is the authority cited by the Developer (at 16:22-23), may only be granted based upon specific enumerated grounds

cited in the rule, none of which is invoked by the Developer. As a result, no "retrial" may be granted.

C. The Developer's Repetition of its Previous Arguments is Not Grounds for Reconsideration

8. Pursuant to EDCR 2.24(a), no motions once heard and disposed of may be renewed in the same cause, nor may the same matters therein embraced be reheard, unless by leave of the court.

9. "Although Rule 59(e) permits a district court to reconsider and amend a previous order, the rule offers an 'extraordinary remedy, to be used sparingly in the interests of finality and conservation of judicial resources.'" *Kona Enters., Inc. v. Estate of Bishop*, 229 F.3d 877, 890 (9th Cir. 2000), quoting 12 Moore's Federal Practice §59.30[4] (3d ed. 2000) (discussing the federal corollary of NRCP 59(e)).

10. A Rule 59(e) motion may not be used "to relitigate old matters." 11 Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. §2810.1 (3d ed.); *accord Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker*, 554 U.S. 471, 486 n.5 (2008).

11. "Rehearings are not granted as a matter of right and are not allowed for the purpose of re-argument, unless there is a reasonable probability that the court may have arrived at an erroneous conclusion." *Geller v. McCowan*, 64 Nev. 106, 108, 178 P.2d 380, 381 (1947) (citations omitted) (discussing petition for rehearing of appellate decision).

12. Because the Developer has not raised sufficient new facts, substantially different evidence or new issues of law for rehearing or reconsideration showing an erroneous conclusion, the Court rejects the Developer's repetitive arguments.

D. NRCP 52(b) Does Not Apply Where the Developer Does Not Identify Any of the Court's Findings of Fact That Warrant Amendment

13. Although it brings its motion to alter or amend pursuant to NRCP 52(b), that rule is directed only at amendment of factual "findings," not legal conclusions. *See id.* "Rule 52(b) merely provides a method for amplifying and expanding the lower court's findings, and is not intended as a vehicle for securing a re-hearing on the merits." *Matter of Estate of Herrmann*, 100 Nev. 1, 21 n.16, 677 P.2d 594, 607 n.16 (1984).

14. The only findings mentioned in the Motion (at ¶¶12-13) are supported by the portion of the record cited by the Court, namely, the Peccole Ranch Master Development Plan. Judge Smith's findings in support of his interpretation of the Queensridge CC&Rs do not alter the Court's findings.

15. Because the Developer has not identified any findings that should be amended under NRCP 52(b), the Court declines to amend any of its findings.

E. The Developer May Not Present Arguments and Materials it Could Have Presented Earlier But Did Not

16. The Developer's Motion cannot be granted based upon arguments the Developer could have raised earlier but chose not to.

17. "A Rule 59(e) motion may not be used to raise arguments or present evidence for the first time when they could reasonably have been raised earlier in the litigation." *Kona Enters.*, 229 F.3d at 890.

18. "Points or contentions not raised in the original hearing cannot be maintained or considered on rehearing." *Achrem v. Expressway Plaza Ltd. P'ship*, 112 Nev. 737, 742, 917 P.2d 447, 450 (1996).

19. Contrary to the Developer's assertion (Motion at 16:1-2), the Court considered all of the arguments in its Petition related to Judge Smith's orders. The Court simply rejected them because Judge Smith's interpretation of the Queensridge CC&R's does not affect the City Council's discretion under NRS Chapter 278 and the City's Unified Development Code to deny the 35-Acre Applications.

F. The Supreme Court's Affirmance of Judge Smith's Orders Has No Impact on this Court's Denial of the Developer's Petition for Judicial Review

20. The fact that the Supreme Court affirmed Judge Smith's orders is not grounds for reconsideration because Judge Smith's orders interpreted the Queensridge homeowners' rights under the CC&R's, not the City Council's discretion to deny re-development applications.

21. As a result, the Developer's assertion (at 3:4-5) that Judge Smith's Orders are "irreconcilable" with Judge Crockett's Decision does not accurately reflect the scope of the matter before Judge Smith.

22. This Court correctly concluded that the Developer does not have vested rights to have the 35-Acre Applications approved, and neither Judge Smith's orders, nor the Supreme Court's orders of affirmance, alter that conclusion.

G. The Court Correctly Determined That Judge Crockett's Order Has Preclusive Effect Here

23. The Developer has failed to show that the Court's conclusion that sufficient privity exists to bar the Developer's petition under the doctrine of issue preclusion was clearly erroneous.

24. The Court correctly determined that Judge Crockett's Order has preclusive effect here and, as a result, the Developer must obtain the City Council's approval of a major modification to the Peccole Ranch Master Developer Plan before it may develop the 35-Acre Property.

25. The Court's conclusion that the City Council's decision was supported by substantial evidence was independent of its determination that Judge Crockett's Order has preclusive effect here. Judge Crockett's Order was only a "further" (i.e., not exclusive) reason to deny the Developer's petition for judicial review.

H. The Developer Does Not Identify Any Clear Error That Warrants Reconsideration

26. The sole legal grounds for reconsideration asserted by the Developer is purported "clear error."

27. The only legal conclusions in the FFCL with which the Developer takes issue are the Court's determinations that public opposition constitutes substantial evidence for denial of the 35-Acre Applications and that the City Council properly exercised its discretion to insist on comprehensive and orderly development for the entirety of the property of which the 35-Acre Property was a part. Motion at 20:8-24:7. In making these arguments, however, the Developer never contends that the Court incorrectly interpreted the law cited in the FFCL. *See id.* It therefore

cannot satisfy its burden of showing "clear error." The Developer has failed to show that the Court's previous conclusion that the City Council did not abuse its discretion was clearly erroneous.

28. The Court's analysis of these issues was correct. The *Stratosphere* and *C.A.G.* cases hold that public opposition from neighbors, even if rebutted by a developer, constitutes substantial evidence to support denial of development applications. *See Stratosphere Gaming*, 120 Nev. at 529, 96 P.3d at 760; *C.A.G.*, 98 Nev. at 500-01, 654 P.2d at 533. The Developer's Motion is silent as to this point.

29. Citing NRS 278.349(3)(e), the Developer contests the Court's reliance on *Nova Horizon* and *Cold Springs* that zoning must substantially conform to the master plan and that the master plan presumptively governs a municipality's land use decisions. *Nova Horizon*, 105 Nev. at 97, 769 P.2d at 724; *Citizens for Cold Springs*, 126 Nev. at 266, 236 P.3d at 12. The Developer's discussion fails to discredit the *Nova Horizon* decision given NRS 278.349(3)(a) and does not address the *Cold Springs* case.

30. Having failed to demonstrate any clear error in the Court's decision, the Developer fails to satisfy its burden for reconsideration.

31. Nothing presented in the Motion alters the Court's conclusion that the City Council properly exercised its discretion to deny the 35-Acre Applications and the June 21, 2017 decision was supported by substantial evidence. *See City of Reno v. Citizens for Cold Springs*, 126 Nev. 263, 271, 236 P.3d 10, 15-16 (2010) (*citing Kay v. Nunez*, 122 Nev. 1100, 1105, 146 P.3d 801, 805 (2006)); *Cty. of Clark v. Doumani*, 114 Nev. 46, 53, 952 P.2d 13, 17 (1998), *superseded by statute on other grounds*; *Stratosphere Gaming Corp. v. City of Las Vegas*, 120 Nev. 523, 528, 96 P.3d 756, 760 (2004).

32. As the Court correctly concluded, its job was to evaluate whether substantial evidence supports the City Council's decision, not whether there is substantial evidence to support a contrary decision. *Nevada Power Co. v. Pub. Utilities Comm'n of Nevada*, 122 Nev. 821, 836 n.36, 138 P.3d 486, 497 (2006).

33. This is because the administrative body alone, not a reviewing court, is entitled to weigh the evidence for and against a project. *Liquor & Gaming Licensing Bd.*, 106 Nev. at 99, 787 P.2d at 784.

I. The Developer Failed to Advance Any Argument to Justify a Stay

34. The Motion lacks any argument or citation whatsoever related to its request for a stay.

35. "A party filing a motion must also serve and file with it a memorandum of points and authorities in support of each ground thereof. The absence of such memorandum may be construed as an admission that the motion is not meritorious, as cause for its denial or as a waiver of all grounds not so supported." EDCR 2.20(c) (emphasis added).

36. Because the Developer provides no points and authorities in support of its motion for stay, the motion for stay must be denied.

J. Effect On The Developer's Inverse Condemnation Claims

37. The Developer's petition for judicial review and its inverse condemnation claims involve different evidentiary standards.

38. Relative to the petition for judicial review, the Developer had to demonstrate that the City Council abused its discretion in that the June 21, 2017 decision was not supported by substantial evidence; whereas, relative to its inverse condemnation claims, the Developer must prove its claims by a preponderance of the evidence.

39. Because of these different evidentiary standards, the Court concludes that its conclusions of law regarding the petition for judicial review do not control its consideration of the Developer's inverse condemnation claims.

ORDER

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the Motion For A New Trial Pursuant To NRCP 59(e) And Motion To Alter Or Amend Pursuant To NRCP 52(b) And/Or Reconsider The Findings Of Fact And Conclusions Of Law And Motion To Stay Pending Nevada Supreme Court Directives is DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT the Court's conclusions of law regarding the petition for judicial review do not control its consideration of the Developer's inverse condemnation claims, which will be subject to further action by the Court.

DATED: April 6th, 2019.

TIMOTHY C. WILLIAMS
District Court Judge

CB + TCW

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Exhibit 8

ORD

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Attorneys for Plaintiff Landowners

DISTRICT COURT
CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

180 LAND COMPANY, LLC, a Nevada limited liability company, DOE INDIVIDUALS I through X, DOE CORPORATIONS I through X, and DOE LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES I through X,

Plaintiffs,

vs.

CITY OF LAS VEGAS, political subdivision of the State of Nevada, ROE government entities I through X, ROE CORPORATIONS I through X, ROE INDIVIDUALS I through X, ROE LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES I through X, ROE quasi-governmental entities I through X,

Defendant.

Case No.: A-17-758528-J
Dept. No.: XVI

ORDER GRANTING The Landowners' Countermotion to Amend/Supplement the Pleadings; DENYING The City's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings on Developer's Inverse Condemnation Claims; and DENYING the Landowners' Countermotion for Judicial Determination of Liability on the Landowners' Inverse Condemnation Claims

Hearing Date: March 22, 2019
Hearing Time: 1:30 p.m.

ORDER GRANTING The Landowners' Countermotion to Amend/Supplement the Pleadings; DENYING The City's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings on Developer's Inverse Condemnation Claims; and DENYING the Landowners' Countermotion for Judicial Determination of Liability on the Landowners' Inverse Condemnation Claims

The City of Las Vegas's (The City") Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings on Developer's Inverse Condemnation Claims; Plaintiff, 180 LAND COMPANY, LLC's ("Landowner") Opposition to City's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings on Developer's Inverse Condemnation Claims and Countermotion for Judicial Determination of Liability on the Landowners' Inverse Condemnation Claims and Countermotion to Supplement/amend the Pleadings, if Required; and Plaintiff Landowners' Motion to Estop the City's Private Attorney from Making the Major Modification Argument or for an Order to Show Cause Why the Argument May Proceed in this Matter on Order Shortening Time along with the City's and the Intervenors' (from the Petition for Judicial Review[1]) Oppositions and the Landowners Replies[2] to the same having come for hearing on March 22, 2019 at 1:30 p.m. in Department XVI of the Eighth Judicial District Court, Kermitt L. Waters, Esq., James J. Leavitt, Esq., Mark Hutchison, Esq., and Autumn Waters, Esq., appearing for and on behalf of the Landowners, George F. Ogilvie III Esq., and Debbie Leonard, Esq., appearing for and on behalf of the City, and Todd Bice, Esq., and Dustun H. Holmes, Esq., appearing for and on behalf of Intervenors (from the Petition for Judicial Review). The Court having read the briefings, conducted a hearing and after considering the writings and oral arguments presented and being fully informed in the premise makes the following findings of facts and conclusions of law:

I. The Landowners' Countermotion to Supplement/Amend the Pleadings

The Landowners moved this Court to supplement/amend their pleadings. The Landowners attached a copy of their proposed amended/supplemental complaint to their request pursuant to NRCP Rule 15. This matter is in its early stages, as discovery has yet to commence so no prejudice

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[1] The Intervenors have not moved nor been granted entry into this case dealing with the Landowners' inverse condemnation claims, they have moved and been granted entry into the severed petition for judicial review.

[2] The Landowners withdrew this Motion to Estop the City's Private Attorney from Making the Major Modification Argument or for an Order to Show Cause Why the Argument May Proceed in this Matter on Order Shortening Time, accordingly, no arguments were taken nor rulings issued.

or delay will result in allowing the amendment. The City argues that permitting the amendment would result in impermissible claim splitting as the Landowners currently have other litigation pending which also address the City action complained of in the amended/supplemental complaint. However, those other pending cases deal with other property also allegedly affected by the City action and do not seek relief for the property at issue in this case.

Leave to amend should be freely given when justice so requires. NRCP Rule 15(a)(2); Adamson v. Bowker, 85 Nev. 115, 121 (1969). Absent undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, leave to amend should be freely given. Stephens v. Southern Nev. Music Co., 89 Nev. 104 (1973). Justice requires leave to amend under the facts of this case and there has been no showing of bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the Landowners.

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Landowners' Countermotion to Supplement/Amend the Pleadings is **GRANTED**. The Landowners may file the amended / supplemental complaint in this matter.

II. The City's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings on Developer's Inverse Condemnation Claims

The City moved this Court for judgment on the pleadings on the Landowners' inverse condemnation claims pursuant to NRCP 12(c). Only under rare circumstances is dismissal proper, such as where plaintiff can prove no set of facts entitling him to relief. Williams v. Gerber Prod., 552 F.3d 934, 939 (9th Cir. 2008). The Nevada Supreme Court has held that a motion to dismiss "is subject to a rigorous standard of review on appeal," that it will recognize all factual allegations as true, and draw all inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Buzz Stew, LLC v. City of North Las Vegas, 181 P.3d 670, 672 (2008). The Nevada Supreme Court rejected the reasonable doubt standard and held that a complaint should be dismissed only where it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff could prove no set of facts, which, if true, would entitle the plaintiff to relief. Id., *see also* fn. 6. Additionally, Nevada is a notice pleading state. NRCP Rule 8; Liston v. Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Dep't, 111 Nev. 1575 (1995) (referring to an amended complaint, deposition testimony, interrogatory responses and pretrial demand statement as a basis to provide notice of facts that support a claim). Moreover, the Nevada Supreme Court has adopted the "policy of this state that

cases be heard on the merits, whenever possible." Schulman v. Bongberg-Whitney Elec., Inc., 98 Nev. 226, 228 (1982).

A. The Landowners' Inverse Condemnation Claims

The Landowners have asserted five (5) separate inverse condemnation claims for relief, a Categorical Taking, a Penn Central Regulatory Taking, a Regulatory Per Se Taking, a Non-regulatory Taking and, finally, a Temporary Taking. Each of these claims is a valid claim in the State of Nevada:

Categorical Taking - "Categorical [taking] rules apply when a government regulation either (1) requires an owner to suffer a permanent physical invasion of her property or (2) completely deprives an owner of all economical use of her property." McCarran Intern. Airport v. Sisolak, 122 Nev. 645, 663, 137 P. 3d 1110, 1122 (2006).

Penn Central Regulatory Taking - A Penn Central taking analysis examines three guideposts: the regulations economic impact on the property owner; the regulations interference with investment backed expectations; and, the character of the government action. Sisolak, supra, at 663.

Regulatory Per Se Taking - A Per Se Regulatory Taking occurs where government action "preserves" property for future use by the government. Sisolak, supra, at 731.

Non-regulatory Taking / De Facto Taking - A non-regulatory/de facto taking occurs where the government has "taken steps that directly and substantially interfere with [an] owner's property rights to the extent of rendering the property unusable or valueless to the owner." State v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 131 Nev. Adv. Op. 41, 351 P.3d 736 (2015). "To constitute a taking under the Fifth Amendment it is not necessary that property be absolutely 'taken' in the narrow sense of that word to come within the protection of this constitutional provision; it is sufficient if the action by the government involves a direct interference with or disturbance of property rights." Richmond Elks Hall Assoc. v. Richmond Red. Agency, 561 F.2d 1327, 1330 (9th Cir. Ct. App. 1977).

Temporary Taking - "[T]emporary deprivations of use are compensable under the Taking Clause." Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1011-12 (1992); Arkansas Game & Fish Comm's v. United States, 568 U.S. 23, 133 S.Ct. 511 (2012).

Here, the Landowners have alleged facts and provided documents sufficient to sustain these inverse condemnation claims as further set forth herein, which is sufficient to defeat the City's motion for judgment on the pleadings.

B. The Landowners' Property Interest

"An individual must have a property interest in order to support a takings claim....The term 'property' includes all rights inherent in ownership, including the right to possess, use, and enjoy the property." McCarran v. Sisolak, 122 Nev. 645, 137 P.3d 1110, 1119 (2006). "It is well established that an individual's real property interest in land supports a takings claim." ASAP Storage, Inc. v. City of Sparks, 123 Nev. 639, 645, 173 P.3d 734, 738 (2007) *citing to* Sisolak and Clark County v. Alper, 100 Nev. 382 (1984). Meaning a landowner merely need allege an ownership interest in the land at issue to support a takings claim and defeat a judgment on the pleadings. The Landowners have made such an allegation.

The Landowners assert that they have a property interest and vested property rights in the Subject Property for the following reasons:

1) The Landowners assert that they own approximately 250 acres of real property generally located south of Alta Drive, east of Hualapai Way and north of Charleston Boulevard within the City of Las Vegas, Nevada; all of which acreage is more particularly described as Assessor's Parcel Numbers 138-31-702-003, 138-31-601-008, 138-31-702-004; 138-31-201-005; 138-31-801-002; 138-31-801-003; 138-32-301-007; 138-32-301-005; 138-32-210-008; and 138-32-202-001 ("250 Acre Residential Zoned Land"). This action deals specifically and only with Assessor Parcel Number 138-31-201-005 (the "35 Acre Property" and/or "35 Acres" and/or "Landowners' Property" or "Property").

2) The Landowners assert that they had a property interest in the 35 Acre Property; that they had the vested right to use and develop the 35 Acre Property; that the hard zoning on the 35 Acre Property has always been for a residential use, including R-PD7 (Residential Planned Development District – 7.49 Units per Acre). The City does not contest that the hard zoning on the Landowners' Property has always been R-PD7.

3) The Landowners assert that they had the vested right to use and develop the 35 Acre Property up to a density of 7.49 residential units per acre as long as the development is comparable and compatible with the existing adjacent and nearby residential development. The Landowners' property interest and vested property rights in the 35 Acre Property are recognized under the United States and Nevada Constitutions, Nevada case law, and the Nevada Revised Statutes.

4) The Landowners assert that their property interest and vested right to use and develop the 35 Acre Property is further confirmed by the following:

a) On March 26, 1986, a letter was submitted to the City Planning Commission requesting zoning on the entire 250 Acre Residential Zoned Land (which includes the 35 Acre Property) and the zoning that was sought was R-PD7 as it allows the developer flexibility and shows that developing the 35 Acre Property for a residential use has always been the intent of the City and all prior owners.

b) The City has confirmed the Landowners' property interest and vested right to use and develop the 35 Acre Property residentially in writing and orally in, without limitation, 1996, 2001, 2014, 2016, and 2018.

c) The City adopted Zoning Bill No. Z-2001, Ordinance 5353, which specifically and further demonstrates that the R-PD7 Zoning was codified and incorporated into the City of Las Vegas' Amended Zoning Atlas in 2001. As part of this action, the City "repealed" any prior City actions that could conflict with this R-PD7 hard zoning adopting: "SECTION 4: All ordinances or parts of ordinances or sections, subsections, phrases, sentences, clauses or paragraphs contained in the Municipal Code of the City of Las Vegas, Nevada, 1983 Edition, in conflict herewith are hereby repealed."

d) At a November 16, 2016, City Council hearing, Tom Perrigo, the City Planning Director, confirmed the 250 Acre Residential Zoned Land (which includes the 35 Acre Property) is hard zoned R-PD7, which allows up to 7.49 residential units per acre.

e) Long time City Attorney, Brad Jerbic, has also confirmed the 250 Acre Residential Zoned Land (which includes the 35 Acre Property) is hard zoned R-PD7, which allows up to 7.49 residential units per acre.

f) The City Planning Staff has also confirmed the 250 Acre Residential Zoned Land (which includes the 35 Acre Property) is hard zoned R-PD7, which allows up to 7.49 residential units per acre.

g) The City's own 2020 master plan confirms the 250 Acre Residential Zoned Land (which includes the 35 Acre Property) is hard zoned R-PD7, which allows up to 7.49 residential units per acre.

h) The City issued two formal Zoning Verification Letters dated December 20, 2014, confirming the R-PD7 zoning on the entire 250 Acre Residential Zoned Land (which includes the 35 Acre Property).

i) The City confirmed the Landowners' vested right to use and develop the 35 Acres prior to the Landowners' acquisition of the 35 Acres and the Landowners materially relied upon the City's confirmation regarding the Subject Property's vested zoning rights.

j) The City has approved development on approximately 26 projects and over 1,000 units in the area of the 250 Acre Residential Zoned Land (which includes the 35 Acre Property) on properties that are similarly situated to the 35 Acre Property further establishing the Landowners' property interest and vested right to use and develop the 35 Acre Property.

k) The City has never denied an application to develop in the area of the 250 Acre Residential Zoned Land (which includes the 35 Acre Property) on properties that are similarly situated to the 35 Acre Property further establishing the Landowners' property interest and vested right to use and develop the 35 Acre Property.

l) There has been a judicial finding that the Landowners have the "right to develop" the 35 Acre Property.

m) The Landowners' property interest and vested right to use and develop the entire 250 Acre Residential Zoned Land (which includes the 35 Acre Property) is so widely accepted that even the Clark County tax Assessor has assessed the property as residential for a value of approximately $88 Million and the current Clark County website identifies the 35 Acre Property "zoned" R-PD7.

n) There have been no other officially and properly adopted plans or maps or other recorded document(s) that nullify, replace, and/or trump the Landowners' property interest and vested right to use and develop the 35 Acre Property.

o) Although certain City of Las Vegas planning documents show a general plan designation of PR-OS (Parks/Recreation/Open Space) on the 35 Acre Property, that designation was placed on the Property by the City without the City having followed its own proper notice requirements or procedures. Therefore, any alleged PR-OS on any City planning document is being shown on the 35 Acre Property in error. The City's Attorney confirmed the City cannot determine how the PR-OS designation was placed on the Subject Property.

p) The 35 Acre Property has always been zoned and land use planned for a residential use. The City has argued that the Peccole Concept Plan applies to the Landowners' 35 Acre Property and that plan has always identified the specific 35 Acre Property in this case for a residential use. The land use designation where the 35 Acre Property is located is identified for a residential use under the Peccole Concept Plan and no major modification of Mr. Peccole's Plan would be needed in this specific case to use the 35 Acre Property for a residential use.

Any determination of whether the Landowners have a "property interest" or the vested right to use the 35 Acre Property must be based on eminent domain law, rather than the land use law. The Nevada Supreme Court in both the Sisolak and Schwartz v. State, 111 Nev. 998, fn 6 (1995)

decisions held that all property owners in Nevada, including the Landowners in this case, have the vested right to use their property, even if that property is vacant, undeveloped, and without City approvals. The City can apply "valid" zoning regulations to the property to regulate the use of the property, but if those zoning regulations "rise to a taking," Sisolak at fn 25, then the City is liable for the taking and must pay just compensation.

Here, the Landowners have alleged facts and provided documents sufficient to show they have a property interest in and a vested right to use the 35 Acre Property for a residential use, which is sufficient to defeat the City's motion for judgment on the pleadings.

C. City Actions the Landowners Claim Amount to A Taking

In determining whether a taking has occurred, Courts must look at the aggregate of all of the government actions because "the form, intensity, and the deliberateness of the government actions toward the property must be examined … All actions by the [government], in the aggregate, must be analyzed." Merkur v. City of Detroit, 680 N.W.2d 485, 496 (Mich.Ct.App. 2004). *See also* State v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 351 P.3d 736 (Nev. 2015) (*citing* Arkansas Game & Fish Comm's v. United States, 568 U.S. --- (2012)) (there is no "magic formula" in every case for determining whether particular government interference constitutes a taking under the U.S. Constitution; there are "nearly infinite variety of ways in which government actions or regulations can effect property interests." Id., at 741); City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687 (1999) (inverse condemnation action is an "ad hoc" proceeding that requires "complex factual assessments." Id., at 720.); Lehigh-Northampton Airport Auth. v. WBF Assoc., L.P., 728 A.2d 981 (Comm. Ct. Penn. 1999) ("There is no bright line test to determine when government action shall be deemed a de facto taking; instead, each case must be examined and decided on its own facts." Id., at 985-86).

The City has argued that the Court is limited to the record before the City Council in considering the Landowners' applications and cannot consider all the other City action towards the Subject Property, however, the City cites the standard for petitions for judicial review, not inverse condemnation claims. A petition for judicial review is one of legislative grace and limits a court's review to the record before the administrative body, unlike an inverse condemnation, which is of

constitutional magnitude and requires all government actions against the property at issue to be considered.

The Landowners assert that the following City actions individually and/or cumulatively amount to a taking of their Property:

1. City Denial of the 35 Acre Property Applications.

The Landowners submitted complete applications to develop the 35 Acre Property for a residential use consistent with the R-PD7 hard zoning. *Exhibit 22:App LO 00000932-949.* The City Planning Staff determined that the proposed residential development was consistent with the R-PD7 hard zoning, that it met all requirements in the Nevada Revised Statutes, and in the City's Unified Development Code (Title 19), and appropriately recommended approval. *Exhibit 22: 4 App LO 00000932-949 and Exhibit 23: 4 App LO 00000950-976.* Tom Perrigo, the City Planning Director, stated at the hearing on the Landowners' applications that the proposed development met all City requirements and should be approved. *Exhibit 5: 2 App LO 00000376 line 566 - 377 line 587.* The City Council denied the 35 Acre Property applications, stating as the sole basis for denial that the City did not want piecemeal development and instead wanted to see the entire 250 Acre Residential Zoned Land developed under one Master Development Agreement ("MDA").

2. City Action #2: Denial of the Master Development Agreement (MDA).

To comply with the City demand to have one unified development, for over two years (between July, 2015, and August 2, 2017), the Landowners worked with the City on an MDA that would allow development on the 35 Acre Property along with all other parcels that made up the 250 Acre Residential Zoned Land. *Exhibit 25: 5 App LO 00001132-1179.* The Landowners complied with each and every City demand, making more concessions than any developer that has ever appeared before this City Council. A non-exhaustive list of the Landowners' concessions, as part of the MDA, include: 1) donation of approximately 100 acres as landscape, park equestrian facility, and recreation areas (*Exhibit 29: 8 App LO 00001836; Exhibit 24: 4 App LO 00000998 lines 599-601; Exhibit 30: 8 App LO 00001837*); 2) building two new parks, one with a vineyard; (Id.) and, 3) reducing the number of units, increasing the minimum acreage lot size, and reducing the number and height of towers. *Exhibit 5: 2 App LO 00000431 lines 2060-2070; Exhibit 29: 8 App LO*

00001836; and Exhibit 30: 8 App LO 00001837. In total, the City required at least 16 new and revised versions of the MDA. *Exhibit 28: 5-7 App LO 00001188-00001835.* The City's own Planning Staff, who participated at every step in preparing the MDA, recommended approval, stating the MDA "is in conformance with the requirements of the Nevada Revised Statutes 278" and "the goals, objectives, and policies of the Las Vegas 2020 Master Plan" and "[a]s such, staff [the City Planning Department] is in support of the development Agreement." *Exhibit 24: 4 App LO 00000985 line 236 – 00000986 line 245; LO 00001071-00001073; and Exhibit 40: 9 App LO 00002047-2072.* And, as will be explained below, the MDA also met and exceeded any and all major modification procedures and standards that are set forth in the City Code.

On August 2, 2017, the MDA was presented to the City Council and the City denied the MDA. *Exhibit 24: 5 App LO 00001128-112.* The City did not ask the Landowners to make more concessions, like increasing the setbacks or reducing the units per acre, it simply and plainly denied the MDA altogether. *Id.* As the 35 Acre Property is vacant, this meant that the property would remain vacant.

3. City Action #3: Adoption of the Yohan Lowie Bills.

After denial of the MDA, the City adopted two Bills that solely target the 250 Acre Residential Zoned Land and preserve the Landowners' Property for public use. City Bill No. 2018-5 and Bill No. 2018-24 (now City Ordinances LVMC 19.16.105) not only target solely the Landowners' Property (no other golf course in the City is privately owned with residential zoning and no deed restrictions); but also requires the Landowners to preserve their Property for public use (LVMC 19.16.105 (E)(1)(d), (G)(1)(d)), provide ongoing public access to their Property (LVMC 19.16.105(G)(1)(d)), and provides that failure to comply with the Ordinances will result in a misdemeanor crime punishable by imprisonment and $1,000 per day fine. (LVMC 19.16.105 (E)(1)(d), (G)(5)(b)&(c)). The Ordinance requires the Landowners to perform an extensive list of requirement, beyond any other development requirements in the City for residential development, before development applications will be accepted by the City. LVMC 19.16.105.

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4. City Action #4: Denial of an Over the Counter, Routine Access Request.

The Landowners have sufficiently alleged that in August of 2017, the Landowners filed with the City a routine over the counter request (specifically excluded from City Council review - LVMC 19.16.100(f)(2)(a) and 19.16.100(f)(2)(a)(iii)) for three access points to streets the 250 Acre Residential Zoned Land abuts – one on Rampart Blvd. and two on Hualapai Way. *Exhibit 58: 10 App LO 00002359-2364.* The City denied the access applications citing as the sole basis for the denial, "the various public hearings and subsequent debates concerning the development on the subject site." *Exhibit 59: 10 App LO 00002365.* The City required that the matter be presented to the City Council through a "Major Review." The City has required that this extraordinary standard apply only to the Landowners to gain access to their property.

The Nevada Supreme Court has held that a landowner cannot be denied access to abutting roadways, because all property that abuts a public highway has a special right of easement to the public road for access purposes and this is a recognized property right in Nevada. Schwartz v. State, 111 Nev. 998 (1995). The Court held that this right exists "despite the fact that the Landowner had not yet developed access."Id., at 1003.

5. City Action #5: Denial of an Over the Counter, Routine Fence Request.

The Landowners have sufficiently alleged that in August, 2017, the Landowners filed with the City a routine request to install chain link fencing to enclose two water features/ponds that are located on the 250 Acre Residential Zoned Land. *Exhibit 55: 10 App LO 00002345-2352.* The City Code expressly states that this application is similar to a building permit review that is granted over the counter and not subject to City Council review. LVMC 19.16.100(f)(2)(a) and 19.16.100(f)(2)(a)(iii). The City denied the application, citing as the sole basis for denial, "the various public hearings and subsequent debates concerning the development on the subject site." *Exhibit 56: 10 App LO 2343.* The City then required that the matter be presented to the City Council through a "Major Review" pursuant to LVMC 19.16.100(G)(1)(b) which states that "the Director determines that the proposed development could significantly impact the land uses on the site or on surrounding properties." *Exhibit 57: 10 App LO 00002354-2358.*

The Major Review Process contained in LVMC 19.16.100 is substantial. It requires a pre-application conference, plans submittal, circulation to interested City departments for comments/recommendation/requirements, and publicly noticed Planning Commission and City Council hearings. The City has required that this extraordinary standard apply despite the fact that LVMC 19.16.100 F(3) specifically prohibits review by the City Council, "[t]he Provisions of this Paragraph (3) shall not apply to *building permit level reviews* described in Paragraph 2(a) of this Subsection (F). Enumerated in Paragraph 2(a) as only requiring a "building level review" are "onsite signs, walls and fences."

6. City Action #6: Denial of a Drainage Study.

The Landowners have sufficiently alleged that in an attempt to clear the property, replace drainage facilities, etc., the Landowners submitted an application for a technical drainage study, which should have been routine, because the City and the Landowners already executed an On-Site Drainage Improvements Maintenance Agreement that allows the Landowners to remove and replace the flood control facilities on their property. *Exhibit 78: 12 App LO 00002936-2947.* Additionally, the two new City Ordinances referenced in City Action #3 require a technical drainage study. However, the City has refused to accept an application for a technical drainage study from the Landowners claiming the Landowners must first obtain entitlements, however, the new City Ordinances will not provide entitlements until a drainage study is received.

7. City Action #7: The City's Refusal to Even Consider the 133 Acre Property Applications.

The Landowners have sufficiently alleged that as part of the numerous development applications filed by the Landowners over the past three years to develop all or portions of the 250 Acre Residential Zoned Land, in October and November 2017, the necessary applications were filed to develop residential units on the 133 Acre Property (part of the 250 Acre Residential Zoned Land) consistent with the R-PD7 hard zoning. *Exhibit 47: 9 App LO 00002119-10 App LO 2256. Exhibit 49: 10 App LO 00002271-2273.* The City Planning Staff determined that the proposed residential development was consistent with the R-PD7 hard zoning, that it met all requirements in the Nevada Revised Statutes, the City Planning Department, and the Unified Development Code (Title 19), and recommended approval. *Exhibit 51: 10 App. LO 00002308-2321.* Instead of approving the

development, the City Council delayed the hearing for several months until May 16, 2018 - the same day it was considering the Yohan Lowie Bill (now LVMC 19.16.105), referenced above in City Action #3. *Exhibit 50: 10 App LO 00002285-2287.* The City put the Yohan Lowie Bill on the morning agenda and the 133 Acre Property applications on the afternoon agenda. The City then approved the Yohan Lowie Bill in the morning session. Thereafter, Councilman Seroka asserted that the Yohan Lowie Bill applied to deny development on the 133 Acre Property and moved to strike all of the applications for the 133 Acre Property filed by the Landowners. *Exhibit 6: 2 App LO 00000490 lines 206-207.* The City then refused to allow the Landowners to be heard on their applications for the 133 Acre Property and voted to strike the applications. *Exhibit 51: 10 App LO 00002308-2321 and Exhibit 53: 10 App LO 00002327-2336.*

8. City Action #8: The City Announces It Will Never Allow Development on the 35 Acre Property, Because the City Wants the Property for a City Park and Wants to Pay Pennies on the Dollar for it.

The Landowners have sufficiently alleged that in documents obtained from the City it was discovered that the City has already allocated $15 million to acquire the Landowners' private property - "$15 Million-Purchase Badlands and operate." *Exhibit 35: 8 App LO 00001922.* In this same connection, Councilman Seroka issued a statement during his campaign entitled "The Seroka Badlands Solution" which provides the intent to convert the Landowners' private property into a "fitness park." *Exhibit 34: 8 App LO 00001915.* In an interview with KNPR Seroka stated that he would "turn [the Landowners' private property] over to the City." *Id. at LO 00001917.* Councilman Coffin agreed, stating his intent referenced in an email as follows: "I think your third way is the only quick solution...Sell off the balance to be a golf course with water rights (key). Keep the bulk of Queensridge green." *Exhibit 54: 10 App LO 00002344.* Councilman Coffin and Seroka also exchanged emails wherein they state they will not compromise one inch and that they "need an approach to accomplish the desired outcome," which, as explained, is to prevent all development on the Landowners' Property so the City can take it for the City's park and only pay $15 Million. *Exhibit 54: 10 App LO 00002340.* In furtherance of the City's preservation for public use, the City has announced that it will never allow any development on the 35 Acre Property or any other part of the 250 Acre Residential Zoned Land.

As it is universally understood that tax assessed value is well below market value, to "Purchase Badlands and operate" for "$15 Million," (which equates to less than 6% of the tax assessed value and likely less than 1% of the fair market value) shocks the conscience. And, this shows that the City's actions are in furtherance of a City scheme to specifically target the Landowners' Property to have it remain in a vacant condition to be "turned over to the City" for a "fitness park" for 1% of its fair market value. *Exhibit 34: 8 App LO 00001915 and Exhibit 35: 8 App LO 00001922.*

9. City Action #9: The City Shows an Unprecedented Level of Aggression To Deny All Use of the 250 Acre Residential Zoned Land.

The Landowners have sufficiently alleged that the City has gone to unprecedented lengths to interfere with the use and enjoyment of the Landowners's Property. Council members sought "intel" against one of the Landowners so that the "intel" could, presumably, be used to deny any development on the 250 Acre Residential Zoned Land (including the 35 Acre Property). In a text message to an unknown recipient, Councilman Coffin stated:

> Any word on your PI enquiry about badlands [250 Acre Residential Zoned Land] guy?
> While you are waiting to hear **is there a fair amount of intel on the scum** behind [sic] the badlands [250 Acre Residential Zoned Land] takeover? **Dirt will be handy if I need to get rough.** *Exhibit 81: 12 App LO 00002969. (emphasis supplied).*

Instructions were then given by Council Members on how to hide communications regarding the 250 Acre Residential Zoned Land from the Courts. Councilman Coffin, after being issued a documents subpoena, wrote:

> "Also, his team has filed an official request for all txt msg, email, anything at all on my personal phone and computer under an erroneous supreme court opinion…So everything is subject to being turned over so, for example, your letter to the c[i]ty email is now public and this response might become public (to Yohan). I am considering only using the phone but awaiting clarity from court. **Please pass word to all your neighbors. In any event tell them to NOT use the city email address but call or write to our personal addresses. For now…PS. Same crap applies to Steve [Seroka]** as he is also being individually sued i[n] Fed Court and also his personal stuff being sought. This is no secret so let all your neighbors know." *Exhibit 54: 10 App LO 00002343. (Emphasis added).*

Councilman Coffin advised Queensridge residents on how to circumvent the legal process and the Nevada Public Records Act *NRS 239.001(4)* by instructing them on how not to trigger any of the search terms being used in the subpoenas. "Also, please pass the word for everyone to not use B…l..nds in title or text of comms. That is how search works." Councilman Seroka testified at the

Planning Commission (during his campaign) that it would be "over his dead body" before the Landowners could use their private property for which they have a vested right to develop. *Exhibit 21: 4 App LO 00000930-931.* And, In reference to development on the Landowners' Property, Councilman Coffin stated firmly "I am voting against the whole thing," (*Exhibit 54: 10 App LO 00002341*)

10. City Action #10: the City Reverses the Past Approval on the 17 Acre Property.

The Landowners have sufficiently alleged that in approving the 17 Acre Property applications the City agreed the Landowners had the vested right to develop without a Major Modification, now the City is arguing in other documents that: 1) the Landowners have no property rights; and, 2) the approval on the 17 Acre Property was erroneous, because no major modification was filed:

> "[T]he Developer must still apply for a major modification of the Master Plan before a takings claim can be considered..." *Exhibit 37: 8 App LO 00001943 lines 18-20*;
>
> "Moreover, because the Developer has not sought a major modification of the Master Plan, the Court cannot determine if or to what extent a taking has occurred." *Id. at LO 00001944 lines 4-5*;
>
> "According to the Council's decision, the Developer need only file an application for a major modification to the Peccole Ranch Master Development Plan ...to have its Applications considered." *Exhibit 39: 9 App LO 00002028 lines 11-15*;
>
> "Here, the Council's action to strike the Applications as incomplete in the absence of a major modification application does not foreclose development on the Property or preclude the City from ultimately approving the Applications or other development applications that the Developer may subsequently submit. It simply held that the City would not consider the Applications without the Developer first submitting a major modification application." *Id. at LO 00002032 lines 18-22.*

The reason the City changed its position is the City is seeking to deny the Landowners their constitutional property rights so the Landowners' Property will remain in a vacant condition to be "turned over to the City" for a "fitness park" for 1% of its fair market value. *Exhibit 34: 8 App LO 00001915 and Exhibit 35: 8 App LO 00001922.*

11. City Action #11: The City Retains Private Counsel to Advance an Open Space Designation on the 35 Acre Property.

The Landowners have sufficiently alleged that the City has retained and authorized private counsel to advance an "open space" designation/major modification argument in this case to prevent any and all development on the 35 Acre Property. This is a contrary position from that taken by the

City over the past 32 years on at least 1,067 development units in the Peccole Concept Plan area. *Exhibit 105.* As explained above, over 1,000 units have been developed over the past 32 years in the Peccole Concept Plan area and not once did the City apply the "open space"/major modification argument it is now advancing, even though those +1,000 units were developed contrary to the land use designation on the Peccole Concept Plan. The City has specifically targeted the Landowners and their Property and is treating them differently than it has treated all other properties and owners in the area (+1,000 other units in the area) for the purpose of forcing the Landowners' Property to remain in a vacant condition to be "turned over to the City" for a "fitness park" for 1% of its fair market value. *Exhibit 34: 8 App LO 00001915 and Exhibit 35: 8 App LO 00001922.*

Here, the Landowners have alleged facts and provided documents sufficient to show their Property has been taken by inverse condemnation, which is sufficient to defeat the City's motion for judgment on the pleadings.

D. The City's Argument that the Landowners have No Vested Property Right

The City contends that the Landowners do not have a vested right to use their property for anything other than open space or a golf course. As set forth above, the Landowners have alleged facts and provided documents sufficient to show they have a property interest in and a vested right to use the 35 Acre Property for a residential use, which is sufficient to defeat the City's motion for judgment on the pleadings.

E. The City's Argument that the Landowners' Taking Claims are Not Ripe

The City contends that the Landowners's taking claims are not ripe, because they have not filed a major modification application, which the City contends is a precondition to any development on the Landowners' Property. This City argument is closely related to the City's vested rights argument as the City also contends the Landowners have no vested right to use their property for anything other than a golf course until such time as they submit a major modification application. The Landowners have alleged that a ripeness/exhaustion of administrative remedies analysis does not apply to the four inverse condemnation claims for which the Landowners' are requesting a judicial finding of a taking - regulatory per se, non-regulatory/de facto, categorical, or temporary

taking of property[4] and, therefore, the City's ripeness/exhaustion of administrative remedies argument has no application to these four inverse condemnation claims. The Landowners further allege that the ripeness analysis only applies to the Landowners' inverse condemnation Penn Central Regulatory Takings Claim and, if the Court applies the ripeness analysis, all claims are ripe,[5] including the Penn Central claim.

1. The Landowners Allege Facts Sufficient to Show They Made At Least One Meaningful Application and It Would be Futile to Seek Any Further Approvals From the City.

"While a landowner must give a land-use authority an opportunity to exercise its discretion, once [...] the permissible uses of the property are known to a reasonable degree of certainty, a [regulatory] taking claim [Penn Central claim] is likely to have ripened."[6] The purpose of this rule is to understand what the land use authority will and will not allow to be developed on the property at issue. But, "[g]overnment authorities, of course, may not burden property by imposition of repetitive or unfair land-use procedures in order to avoid a final decision."[7] "[W]hen exhausting available remedies, including the filing of a land-use permit application, is futile, a matter is deemed ripe for review."[8]

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[4] Hsu v. County of Clark, supra, ("[d]ue to the "per se" nature of this taking, we further conclude that the landowners were not required to apply for a variance or otherwise exhaust their administrative remedies prior to bringing suit." Id., at 732); McCarran Int'l Airport v. Sisolak, 122 Nev. 645, 137 P.3d 1110 (2006) ("Sisolak was not required to exhaust administrative remedies or obtain a final decision from the Clark County Commission by applying for a variance before bringing his inverse condemnation action based on a regulatory per se taking of his private property." Id. at 664).

[5] The Nevada Supreme Court has stated regulatory takings claims are generally "not ripe until the government entity charged with implementing the regulations has reached a final decision regarding the application of the regulations to the property at issue." State v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 131 Nev. Adv. Op. 41 (2015) (*quoting* Williamson County Reg'l Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172, 186, 105 S. Ct. 3108, 87 L. Ed. 2d 126 (1985)).

[6] Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 620, (2001) ("The central question in resolving the ripeness issue, under *Williamson County* and other relevant decisions, is whether petitioner obtained a final decision from the Council determining the permitted use for the land." *Id.*, at 618.).

[7] Palazzolo, at 621. *Citing to* Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 698, 119 S.Ct. 1624, 143 L.Ed. 2d 882 (1999).

[8] State v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court of Nev., 351 P.3d 736, 742 (Nev. 2015). For example, in Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 698, 119 S.Ct. 1624,

In City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes 526 U.S. 687, 119 S.Ct. 1624 (1999) the United States Supreme Court held that a taking claim was ripe where the City of Monterey required 19 changes to a development application and then asked the landowner to make even more changes. Finally, the landowner filed inverse condemnation claims. Similar to the City argument in this case, the City of Monterey asserted the landowners' inverse condemnation claims were not ripe for review. The City of Monterey asserted that the City's decision was not final and the landowners' claim was not ripe, because, if the landowner had worked longer with the City of Monterey or filed a different type of application with the City of Monterey, the City of Monterey may have approved development on the landowner's property. The United States Supreme Court approved the Ninth Circuit opinion as follows: "to require additional proposals would implicate the concerns about repetitive and unfair procedures" and "the city's decision was sufficiently final to render [the landowner's] claim ripe for review." Del Monte Dunes, at 698. The United States Supreme Court re-affirmed this rule in the Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 121 S.Ct. 2448 (2001) holding the "Ripeness Doctrine does not require a landowner to submit applications for their own sake. Petitioner is required to explore development opportunities on his upland parcel only if there is uncertainty as to the land's permitted uses." Id at 622.

As set forth above, the Landowners have alleged facts and provided documents sufficient to show they submitted the necessary applications to develop the 35 Acre Property, that the City denied every attempt at development, and that it would be futile to seek any further development

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143 L.Ed. 2d 882 (1999) "[a]fter five years, five formal decisions, and 19 different site plans, [internal citation omitted] Del Monte Dunes decided the city would not permit development of the property under any circumstances." Id., at 698. "After reviewing at some length the history of attempts to develop the property, the court found that to require additional proposals would implicate the concerns about repetitive and unfair procedures expressed in MacDonld, Commer & Frates v. Yolo County, 477 U.S. 340, 350 n. 7, (1986) [*citing* Stevens concurring in judgment from Williamson Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172 at 205-206, 105 S.Ct. 3108 at 3126 (1985)] and that the city's decision was sufficiently final to render Del Monte Dunes' claim ripe for review." Del Monte Dunes, at 698. The "Ripeness Doctrine does not require a landowner to submit applications for their own sake. Petitioner is required to explore development opportunities on his upland parcel only if there is uncertainty as to the land's permitted uses." Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, at 622.

applications from the City, which is sufficient to defeat the City's motion for judgment on the pleadings.

2. The Landowners Allege Facts Sufficient to Show That a Major Modification Application Was Not Required To Ripen Their Inverse Condemnation Claims

The Landowners further allege that no major modification of the Peccole Concept Plan was necessary to develop the 35 Acre Property, because the Landowners were seeking to develop the 35 Acre Property residentially and the land use designation on the Peccole Concept Plan for the 35 Acre Property is a residential use. *Exhibit 107.* Therefore, there was no need to "modify" the Peccole Concept Plan to develop the 35 Acre Property residentially.

The Landowners have also alleged that the City has never required a major modification application to develop properties included in the area of the Peccole Concept Plan. The Landowners allege the City has approved development for approximately 26 projects and over 1,000 units in the area of the 250 Acre Residential Zoned Land (which includes the 35 Acre Property) on properties that were developed with a use contrary to the Peccole Concept Plan and not once did the City require a major modification application.

Here, the Landowners have alleged facts and provided documents sufficient to show that a major modification was not required to ripen their inverse condemnation claims, which is sufficient to defeat the City's motion for judgment on the pleadings.

3. The Landowners Allege Facts Sufficient to Show That, Even if a Major Modification Application was Necessary to Ripen Their Inverse Condemnation Claims, They Met this Requirement

Specific to the City's assertion that a major modification application is necessary to ripen the Landowners' inverse condemnation claims, the Landowners allege that even if a major modification application is required, the MDA the Landowners worked on with the City for over two years, referenced above, included and far exceeded all of the requirements of a major modification application. Exhibit 28. Moreover, the Landowners have cited to a statement by the City Attorney wherein he stated on the City Council record as follows: "Let me state something for the record just to make sure we're absolutely accurate on this. There was a request for a major modification that

accompanied the development agreement [MDA], that was voted down by Council. So that the modification, major mod was also voted down." Exhibit 61, City Council Meeting of January 3, 2018 Verbatim Transcript – Item 78, Page 80 of 83, lines 2353-2361. Additionally, the Landowners allege that they also submitted an application referred to as a General Plan Amendment (GPA), which includes and far exceeds the requirements of the City's major modification application and the City denied the GPA as part of its denial of any use of the 35 Acre Property. Exhibit 5.

Here, the Landowners have alleged facts and provided documents sufficient to show that, even if a major modification application is required to ripen their inverse condemnation claims, they met these requirements, which is sufficient to defeat the City's motion for judgment on the pleadings.

F. The City's Argument that the Statute of Limitation has Run on the Landowners Inverse Condemnation Claims

The City contends that, if there was a taking, it resulted from the City action related to adoption of the City's Master Plan and the City's Master Plan was adopted more than 15 years ago and, therefore, the statute of limitations has run on the Landowners' inverse condemnation claims. The Landowners contend that a City Plan cannot result in a taking, that the City must take action to implement the Plan on a specific property to make the City liable for a taking.

The statute of limitations for an inverse condemnation action in Nevada is 15 years. White Pine Limber v. City of Reno, 106 Nev. 778 (1990). Nevada law holds that merely writing a land use designation over a parcel of property on a City land use plan is "insufficient to constitute a taking for which an inverse condemnation action will lie." Sproul Homes of Nev. v. State ex rel. Dept of Highways, 96 Nev. 441, 443 (1980) *citing to* Selby Realty Co. v. City of San Buenaventura, 169 Cal.Rptr. 799, 514 P.2d 111, 116 (1973) (Inverse claims could not be maintained from a City's "General Plan" showing public use of private land). *See also* State v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 131 Nev. Adv. Op. 41, 351 P.3d 736 (2015) (City's amendment to its master plan to allow for a road widening project on private land did not amount to a regulatory taking). This rule and its policy are set forth by the Nevada Supreme Court as follows:

> If a governmental entity and its responsible officials were held subject to a claim for inverse condemnation merely because a parcel of land was designated for potential

> public use on one of the several authorized plans, the process of community planning would either grind to a halt, or deteriorate to publication of vacuous generalizations regarding the future use of land. We indulge in no hyperbole to suggest that if every landowner whose property might be affected at some vague and distant future time by any of these legislatively permissible plans was entitled to bring an action in declaratory relief to obtain a judicial declaration as to the validity and potential effect of the plan upon his land, the courts of this state would be inundated with futile litigation. Sproul Homes, supra, at 444.

Accordingly, the date that would trigger the statute of limitations would not be the master plan or necessarily the designation of the Property as PR-OS, but it will be the acts of the City of Las Vegas / City Council that would control.

Here, the Landowners have alleged facts and provided documents sufficient to show their property has been taken by inverse condemnation based upon the acts of the City of Las Vegas / City Council that occurred less than 15 years ago. Therefore, the City's statute of limitations argument is denied.

G. The City's Argument that the Court Should Apply Its Holding in the Petition For Judicial Review to the Landowners Inverse Condemnation Claims

The City contends that the Court's holding in the Landowners' petition for judicial review should control in this inverse condemnation action. However, both the facts and the law are different between the petition for judicial review and the inverse condemnation claims. The City itself made this argument when it moved to have the Landowners' inverse condemnation claims dismissed from the petition for judicial review earlier in this litigation. Calling them "two disparate sets of claims" the City argued that:

> "The procedural and structural limitations imposed by petitions for judicial review and complaints, however, are such that they cannot afford either party ample opportunity to litigate, in a single lawsuit, all claims arising from the transaction. For instance, Petitioner's claim for judicial review will be "limited to the record below," and "[t]he central inquiry is whether substantial evidence supports the agency's decision." United Exposition Service Company v. State Industrial Insurance System, 109 Nev. 421,424, 851 P.2d 423,425 (1993). On the other hand, Petitioner's inverse condemnation claims initiate a new a civil action requiring discovery (not limited to the record below), and the central inquiry is whether Petitioner (as plaintiff) can establish its claims by a preponderance of the evidence. Thus, allowing Petitioner's four "alternative" inverse condemnation claims (i.e., the complaint) to remain on the Petition will create an impractical situation for the Court and parties, and may allow Petitioner to confuse the record for judicial review by attempting to augment it with discovery obtained in the inverse condemnation action." (October 30, 2017, City of Las Vegas Motion to Dismiss at 8:2)

The evidence and burden of proof are significantly different in a petition for judicial review than in civil litigation. And, as further recognized by the City, there will be additional facts in the inverse condemnation case that must be considered which were not permitted to be considered in the petition for judicial review. This is true, as only City Action #1 above was considered in the petition for judicial review, not City Actions #2-11. And, as stated above, this Court must consider all city actions in the aggregate in this inverse condemnation proceeding.

As an example, if the Court determined in a petition for judicial review that there was substantial evidence in the record to support the findings of a workers' compensation hearing officer's decision, that would certainly not be grounds to dismiss a civil tort action brought by the alleged injured individual, as there are different fact, different legal standards and different burdens of proof.

Furthermore, the law is also very different in an inverse condemnation case than in a petition for judicial review. Under inverse condemnation law, if the City exercises discretion to render a property valueless or useless, there is a taking. Tien Fu Hsu v. County of Clark, 173 P.3d 724 (Nev. 2007), McCarran Int'l Airport v. Sisolak, 122 Nev. 645, 137 P.3d 1110 (Nev. 2006), City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. 687, 119 S.Ct. 1624 (1999), Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). In an inverse condemnation case, every landowner in the state of Nevada has the vested right to possess, use, and enjoy their property and if this right is taken, just compensation must be paid. Sisolak. And, the Court must consider the "aggregate" of all government action and the evidence considered is not limited to the record before the City Council. Merkur v. City of Detroit, 680 N.W.2d 485 (Mich.Ct.App. 2004), State v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 131 Nev. Adv. Op. 41, 351 P.3d 736 (2015), Arkansas Game & Fish Comm's v. United States, 568 U.S. 23, 133 S.Ct. 511 (2012). On the other hand, in petitions for judicial review, the City has discretion to deny a land use application as long as valid zoning laws are applied, there is no vested right to have a land use application granted, and the record is limited to the record before the City Council. Stratosphere Gaming Corp., v. City of Las Vegas, 120 Nev. 523, 96 P.3d 756 (2004).

The Court has previously entered a Nunc Pro Tunc Order in this case recognizing the petition for judicial review matter is different from the inverse condemnation matter:

> "this Court had no intention of making any findings, conclusions of law or orders regarding the Landowners' severed inverse condemnation claims as a part of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law entered on November 21, 2018, ("FFCL"). Accordingly, as stated at the hearing on January 17, 2019, the findings, conclusions and order set forth at page 23:4-20 and page 24:4-5 of the FFCL are hereby removed nunc pro tunc." (Order filed February 6, 2019).

For these reasons, it would be improper to apply the Court's ruling from the Landowners' petition for judicial review to the Landowners' inverse condemnation claims.

H. Conclusion on The City's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings on Developer's Inverse Condemnation Claims

The City moved the Court for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to NRCP 12(c). The rule is designed to provide a means of disposing of cases when material facts are not in dispute, and a judgment on the merits can be achieved by focusing on the contents of the pleadings. It has utility only when all material allegations of facts are admitted in the pleadings and only questions of law remain.

This Court reviewed extensive briefings and entertained three and a half to four hours of oral arguments which contained factual disputes and argument throughout the entire hearing. The Court cannot say as a matter of law that the Landowners have no case, there are still factual disputes that must be resolved. Moreover, the court finds that this case can be heard on the merits as that policy is provided in Schulman v. Bongberg-Whitney Elec., Inc., 98 Nev. 226, 228 (1982).

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that The City's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings on Developer's Inverse Condemnation Claims is **DENIED**.

III. The Landowners Rule 56 Motion for Summary Judgment on Liability for the Landowners Inverse Condemnation Claims

The Landowners countermoved this Court for summary judgment on the Landowners' inverse condemnation claims. Discovery has not commenced nor as of the date of the hearing have the parties had a NRCP 16.1 case conference. The Court finds it would be error to consider a Rule 56 motion at this time.

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Landowners' Countermotion for Judicial Determination of Liability on the Landowners' Inverse Condemnation Claims is **DENIED** without prejudice.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED this ~~4th~~ day of ~~April~~, 2019. CH
May 14,

DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

Respectfully Submitted By:
LAW OFFICES OF KERMITT L. WATERS

By: _____

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Exhibit 199

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FFCL
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DISTRICT COURT

CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

FORE STARS, LTD; SEVENTY ACRES LLC, a Nevada liability company; DOE INDIVIDUALS I through X, DOE CORPORATIONS I through X, and DOE LIMITED LIABILITIES COMPANIES I through X,

Plaintiffs,

vs.

CITY OF LAS VEGAS, a political subdivision of the State of Nevada; ROE government entities I though X, ROE LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES I though X, ROE quasi-governmental I through X,

Defendants.

Case No.: A-18-773268-C

Dept No.: XXIX

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW REGARDING PLAINTIFF LANDOWNERS' MOTION TO DETERMINE "PROPERTY INTEREST"

Hearing Date: August 13, 2021
Hearing Time: 8:30 a.m.

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Plaintiffs, FORE STARS, LTD. and SEVENTY ACRES LLC, a Nevada Limited Liability Company (hereinafter Landowners), brought Plaintiff Landowners' Motion to Determine "Property Interest" before the Court at an evidentiary hearing on August 13, 2021, with Kermitt L. Waters, Esq., and James Jack Leavitt, Esq. of the Law Offices of Kermitt L. Waters, appearing for and on behalf of the Landowners along with the Landowners' in-house counsel, Elizabeth Ghanem Ham, Esq., and George F. Ogilvie III, Esq. and Christopher J. Molina, Esq., of McDonald Carano, Andrew Schwartz, Esq. of Shute, Mihaly & Weinberger, LLP, and Philip R. Byrnes, Esq. and Rebecca Wolfson, Esq. with the City Attorney's Office, appearing on behalf of Defendant City of Las Vegas (hereinafter "City"). Having reviewed all pleadings and attached exhibits filed in this matter, and having heard extensive oral arguments at the evidentiary hearing, the Court enters, based on the evidence presented, the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law:

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1. The Landowners are the owner of an approximately 17.49 Acre parcel of property generally located near the southwest corner of Rampart Blvd and Alta Drive within the geographic boundaries of the City of Las Vegas, more particularly described as Clark County Assessor Parcel number 138-32-301-005 (hereinafter "17 Acre Property").

2. On April 20, 2018, the Landowners filed a complaint alleging that the City took their property by inverse condemnation.

3. The Nevada Supreme Court has held that in an inverse condemnation action, such as this, the District Court Judge is required to make two distinct sub inquiries, which are mixed questions of fact and law. ASAP Storage, Inc., v. City of Sparks, 123 Nev. 639 (2008); McCarran Int'l Airport v. Sisolak, 122 Nev. 645 (2006). First, the District Court Judge must determine the "property interest" owned by the landowner or, stated another way, the "bundle of sticks" owned by the landowner prior to any alleged taking actions by the government. *Id.* Second, the District

Court Judge must determine whether the government actions alleged by the landowner constitute a taking of the landowners property. *Id.*

4. The Landowners filed a motion requesting that this Court enter a finding on the first sub-inquiry to determine the property interest / "bundle of property sticks" they had in their 17 Acre Property prior to any alleged City interference with the use of the 17 Acre Property and prior to the filing of the Complaint in this matter. Specifically, the Landowners request a finding that the 17 Acre Property was hard zoned R-PD7 and re-zoned to R-3 and that the legally permissible uses of the 17 Acre Property, pursuant to the R-PD7 and R-3 zoning, were single-family and multi-family residential uses.

5. As the Landowners' request narrowly addresses this first sub inquiry, this Court will only determine the first sub inquiry, at this time.

The R-PD7 Zoning and the Landowners' Due Diligence

6. The City conceded the R-PD7 zoning at the evidentiary hearing and the evidence presented confirms this R-PD7 zoning.

7. Landowner Exhibit 30, Bates numbers 000443 – 000480, particularly the zoning action and map on bates numbers 000449-451, and 462, is evidence that on May 20, 1981, the City of Las Vegas City Commission (now the City Council), at a public hearing, zoned the 17 Acre Property for a residential use (R-PD7).

8. Landowners' Exhibit 31, Bates numbers 000481 – 482, is evidence that on April 4, 1990, the City Council, at a public hearing, confirmed the R-PD7 zoning on the 17 Acre Property.

9. Landowners' Exhibit 8, Bates numbers 000104 – 185 is evidence that on August 15, 2001, the City Council, at a public hearing, adopted Ordinance 5353 that confirmed the R-PD7 zoning on the 17 Acre Property and states "All ordinances or parts of ordinances or sections,

subsections, phrases, sentences, clauses or paragraphs contained in the Municipal Code of the City of Las Vegas, Nevada, 1983 Edition, in conflict herewith are hereby repealed."

10. The Landowners presented further evidence that from 2001 through 2014, prior to acquiring the 17 Acre Property, they engaged in significant due diligence to confirm the zoning and developability of the 17 Acre Property and, during this approximately 14 year period, the City of Las Vegas Planning Department, on numerous occasions, confirmed the residential zoning on the 17 Acre Property, that the residential zoning governed the development of the 17 Acre Property, and this residential zoning conferred the right to develop the 17 Acre Property residentially. Exhibit 5, 000042, para. 6; 000043, para. 8; Exhibit 6, 000068, pp. 74-75.

11. The Landowners presented further evidence that, to complete their due diligence just prior to acquiring the 17 Acre Property, they requested and obtained from the City a "Zoning Verification Letter" on December 30, 2014, which states, in part: 1) the 17 Acre Property is "zoned R-PD7 (Residential Planned Development District - 7 units per acre);" 2) "the R-PD District is intended to provide for flexibility and innovation in residential development;" 3) "[t]he density allowed in the R-PD District shall be reflected by a numerical designation for that district. (Example, R-PD4 allows up to four units per gross acre.); and 4) "A detailed listing of the permissible uses and all applicable requirements for the R-PD Zone are located in Title 19 ("Las Vegas Zoning Code") of the Las Vegas Municipal Code." Exhibit 7.

12. The City also did not contest during the evidentiary hearing that the residential zoning information was provided to the Landowners as part of their due diligence prior to acquiring the 17 Acre Property.

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The R-3 Zoning

13. The parties agree that, prior to the April 20, 2018, filing of the complaint in this matter, on February 15, 2017, the City of Las Vegas re-zoned the 17 Acre Property to R-3, for the construction of 435 residential units. Exhibit 3, 000015:8-9; Exhibit 5, at 000263-275.

Zoning and the Likelihood of a Re-Zoning Governs the Property Interest Determination in Nevada Inverse Condemnation Cases

The Nevada Supreme Court

14. Nevada Supreme Court precedent provides that zoning and the likelihood of re-zoning governs the property interest determination in this inverse condemnation case.

15. In the inverse condemnation case of McCarran Intl. Airport v. Sisolak, 122 Nev. 645 (2006), the Nevada Supreme Court, in the section entitled "The Property," determined Mr. Sisolak's property rights, relying on zoning: "During the 1980's, Sisolak bought three adjacent parcels of land for investment purposes, which were each zoned for the development of a hotel, a casino, or apartments." Sisolak, at 651. Zoning was also used to determine the compensation due Mr. Sisolak. Sisolak, at 672.

16. In the inverse condemnation case of Clark County v. Alper, 100 Nev. 382, 390 (1984), the Nevada Supreme Court held, "when determining the market value of a parcel of land at its highest and best use, due consideration should be given to those zoning ordinances that would be taken into account by a prudent and willing buyer."

17. In the eminent domain case of City of Las Vegas v. C. Bustos, 119 Nev. 360, 362 (2003), the Nevada Supreme Court affirmed a district court, concluding "the district court properly considered the current zoning of the property, as well as the likelihood of a zoning change." *See also* County of Clark v. Buckwalter, 974 P.2d 1162, 59 (Nev. 1999); Alper v. State, Dept. of Highways, 603 P.2d 1085 (Nev. 1979), on reh'g sub nom. Alper v. State, 621 P.2d 492, 878 (Nev. 1980); Andrews v. Kingsbury Gen. Imp. Dist. No. 2, 436 P.2d 813, 814 (Nev. 1968).

18. The Court relies on both inverse condemnation and direct eminent domain cases, because the Nevada Supreme court has held, "inverse condemnation proceedings are the constitutional equivalent to eminent domain actions and are governed by the same rules and principles applied to formal condemnation proceedings." County of Clark v. Alper, 100 Nev. 382, 391 (1984).

The Nevada Legislature

19. Nevada Revised Statutes also provide that zoning is of the highest order when determining property rights in the State of Nevada. NRS 278.349(3)(e) provides if "any existing zoning ordinance is inconsistent with the master plan, the zoning takes precedence."

The Nevada Executive Branch

20. The Court also finds persuasive Attorney General Opinion 84-06, which finds that "[i]n 1977, the Nevada Legislature declared its intention that zoning ordinances take precedence over provisions contained in a master plan" and that the Legislature's "recent enactment buttresses our conclusion that the Nevada Legislature always intended local zoning ordinances to control over general statements or provisions of a master plan." Exhibit 23.

Three City Departments

21. The Court also finds persuasive that the three departments at the City which would provide an opinion on the adoption, interpretation, and application of zoning at the City of Las Vegas have confirmed zoning is of the highest order when determining property rights.

22. The City Planning Department confirmed zoning is of the highest order: 1) zoning trumps everything; 2) "if the land use [master plan] and the zoning aren't in conformance, then the zoning would be the higher order entitlement; 3) and "a zone district gives a property owner property rights." Exhibit 6, 000068, pp. 74-75; Exhibit 46, 000608, p. 53:4-6; Exhibit 54 (LO Appx. Ex. 160 at 005007, p. 242:5-6.

23. The City Attorney's Office confirmed that zoning is of the highest order. Veteran City Attorney Brad Jerbic stated, in speaking directly about this property, "the rule is the hard zoning, in my opinion, does trump the General Plan [Master Plan] designation. Exhibit 17, p. 000227:1787-1789. Veteran deputy City attorney Phil Byrnes and Brad Jerbic submitted pleadings to the Eighth Judicial District, which state: 1) "in the hierarchy, the land use designation [master plan] is subordinate to the zoning designation;" 2) "zoning designations specifically define allowable uses and contain the design and development guidelines for those intended uses;" and, 3) a master plan is a "planning document" and a land use designation on a master plan "was a routine planning activity that had no legal effect on the use and development" of affected property. Exhibit 24, 000253:8-12; Exhibit 26, 000282-283.

24. The City Tax Assessor's department confirmed that zoning is of the highest order. After the Landowners acquired the 17 Acre Property, the Clark County Tax Assessor, who is "ex officio, the City Assessor of the City" (City Charter Sec. 3.120), was required to determine the "full cash value" of the 17 Acre Property by "considering the uses to which it may lawfully be put" and "any legal or physical restrictions" pursuant to NRS 361.227(1). The assessor determined the use of the 17 Acre Property to be "residential" based on the "zoning designation: R-PD7," placed a value of $88 million on the entire 250 Acre Property, and has been taxing the Landowners approximately $1 million per year based on this lawful "residential" use. The City does not contest this tax evidence. *See* Exhibit 40 (LO Appx. Ex. 49, Bates number 001164-001179); Exhibit 41 (LO Appx. Ex. 52, Bates number 001184-001189, specifically, 001185); Exhibit 53 (LO Appx. Ex. 151, Bates number 004831-4836); Exhibit 53 (LO Appx. Ex. 152, Bates number 004837-4861).

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25. Evidence was also presented at the evidentiary hearing that the City's 2050 Master Plan states that zoning is "the law" and the Master Plan is a "policy." Exhibit 44, Bates number 000595.

26. Finally, the Court finds persuasive that in litigation involving adjoining landowners, who were trying to stop residential development on the 17 Acre Property, the District Court held "the zoning on the GC Land [250 Acre Property] dictates its use and Defendants [Landowners] rights to develop their land. Exhibit 55 (LO Appx. Ex. 173, Bates number 005123-5167, specifically 0005142:11-12).

27. Based on the foregoing, the Court will rely on zoning to determine the property rights issue in this matter. Specifically, the Court will consider "the current zoning of the property, as well as the likelihood of a zoning change" as directed by the Nevada Supreme Court in City of Las Vegas v. C. Bustos, 119 Nev. 360, 362 (2003).

28. As the evidence is undisputed that the 17 Acre Property had R-PD7 zoning since 1981 and was re-zoned to R-3 on February 15, 2017, the Court turns to the RPD-7 and R-3 zoning to determine the property rights issue.

Legally Permissible Uses of R-PD7 and R-3 Zoned Properties

General Zoning Standards

29. As stated in the City's official Zoning Verification Letter provided to the Landowners on December 30, 2014, Exhibit 7, the legally permitted uses of property zoned R-PD7 are include in the Las Vegas Municipal Code (hereinafter "LVMC") Title 19. Therefore, the Court looks to the LVMC for guidance on the legally permitted uses of property zoned R-PD7.

30. LVMC 19.18.020 (Words and Terms Defined) defines Zoning District as "An area designated on the Official Zoning Map in which certain uses are permitted and certain others are not permitted, all in accordance with this Title."

31. LVMC 19.18.020 (Words and Terms Defined) defines Permitted Uses as "Any use allowed in a zoning district as a matter of right if it is conducted in accordance with the restrictions applicable to that district. Permitted uses are designated in the Land Use Table by the Letter 'P.'"

32. LVMC 19.16.090 is entitled "Rezoning" and section (O) states that once zoning is in place, "[s]uch approval authorizes the applicant to proceed with the process to develop and/or use the property in accordance with the development and design standards and procedures of all City departments and in conformance with all requirements and provisions of the City of Las Vegas Municipal Code."

R-PD7 Zoning

33. LVMC 19.10.050 is the part of the LVMC directly applicable to the R-PD7 zoning on the 17 Acre Property. The "R" in P-PD7 zoning stands for "residential. Section (A) identifies the "Intent of the R-PD District" and states that "the R-PD District has been to provide for flexibility and innovation in residential development" and section (C) lists as the "Permitted Land Uses," "Single family and multi-family residential." Exhibit 10.

34. The City Attorney at the time, Brad Jerbic, further stated in regards to the R-PD7 zoning on the 17 Acre Property that the City "Council gave hard zoning to this golf course, R-PD7, which allows somebody to come in and develop." Landowners' Exhibit 16, Transcript, 10.18.16 Special Planning Comm. Meeting, 000225:3444-3445.

R-3 Zoning

35. In regards to R-3 zoning, LVMC 19.12.010(B) is the City Code "Land Use Table" which identifies those uses "permitted as a principle use in that zoning district by right" with a "P" designation. The R-3 zoning lists "multi-family residential," "single family attached," and "single family detached" with a "P" designation, meaning these are uses "permitted as a principle use in [the R-3] zoning district by right."

36. Accordingly, the R-PD7 and R-3 zoning on the 17 Acre Property provide the Landowners the right to use the 17 Acre Property for single family residential and multi-family residential uses. In fact, the City conceded this issue when it re-zoned the 17 Acre Property to R-3 and granted the 435 residential units on February 15, 2017, prior to the filing of the complaint in this matter. *See* Exhibit 3, 000015:8-9.

The Judge Williams Order in the 35 Acre Case

37. The Court also takes notice of the property interest order entered by Judge Williams in the 35 Acre Case, which addressed the same issue before this Court, except that the 35 Acre Property was not yet re-zoned to R-3 prior to the filing of the Complaint in that matter.

38. Judge Williams held: 1) "it would be improper to apply the Court's ruling from the Landowners' petition for judicial review to the Landowners' inverse condemnation claims" as they are entirely different types of proceedings; 2) "any determination of whether the Landowners' have a 'property interest' or the vested right to use the 35 Acre Property must be based on eminent domain law, rather than the land use law;" 3) "Nevada eminent domain law provides that zoning must be relied upon to determine a landowners' property interest in an eminent domain case [citations omitted];" and, 4) "the Court further concludes that the Las Vegas Municipal Code Section LVMC 19.10.050 lists single family and multi-family residential as the legally permissible uses on R-PD7 zoned properties." Exhibit 2.

39. Judge Williams then concluded, "1) "the 35 Acre Property is hard zoned R-PD7 at all relevant time herein; and, 2) the permitted uses by right of the 35 Acre Property are single-family and multi-family residential." Exhibit 2.

40. The Court finds Judge Williams order in the 35 Acre Case to be persuasive as it is on the same issue now pending before this Court.

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Petition for Judicial Review Law

41. The Court declines the City's request to apply petition for judicial review rules from the cases of Stratosphere Gaming Corp., v. City of Las Vegas, 120 Nev. 523 (2004); Nova Horizon v. City of Reno, 105 Nev. 92 (1989); Am. W. Dev. Inc. v. City of Henderson, 111 Nev. 804 (1995), Boulder City v. Cinnamon Hills Assoc., 110 Nev. 238 (1994); Tigh v. Von Goerken, 108 Nev. 440 (1992) and other petition for judicial review cases cited by the City. The Nevada Supreme Court very recently held in City of Henderson v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Ct, 137 Nev. Adv. Op. 26 (June 24, 2001) that petition for judicial review actions are entirely distinct from other civil actions - "[c]ivil actions and judicial review actions are distinct types of legal proceedings. ... Thus the district court's role is entirely different in hearing a petition for judicial review, where the district court functions in a quasi-appellate role distinct from its usual role as a trial court." The Court concluded that "petitions for judicial review of land use decisions pursuant to NRS 278.3195 are distinct from civil actions, and as such, they cannot be joined together" and "[t]o conclude otherwise would allow confusingly hybrid proceedings in the district courts, wherein the limited appellate review of an administrative decision would be combined with broad, original civil trial matters." Id. This is an inverse condemnation case, not a petition for judicial review case, and the Nevada Supreme Court inverse condemnation cases, cited above, set forth the rule for deciding the property interest in this inverse condemnation case. Therefore, it would be improper to apply petition for judicial review law (that has limited review) in this inverse condemnation action (that includes broad, original review).

42. The Court also declines the City's request to apply the petition for judicial review order from the 35 Acre Case entered by Judge Williams for the reasons stated above. Moreover, Judge Williams himself held "it would be improper to apply the Court's ruling from the Landowners' petition for judicial review to the Landowners' inverse condemnation claims."

Exhibit 2, 000012:14-16. Additionally, the Judge Williams 35 Acre petition for judicial review order was based, in part, on the Crockett Order [that adopted the PR-OS] and the Crockett Order has been reversed by the Nevada Supreme Court (Exhibit 4). Finally, as explained, Judge Williams granted the Landowners' motion to determine property interest in the inverse condemnation side of the 35 Acre Case (Exhibit 2), which is directly relevant to the pending issue, not the questionable petition for judicial review order.

43. The Court also declines the City's request to apply the petition for judicial review order from the 133 Acre Case entered by Judge Sturman for the reasons stated above. Moreover, Judge Sturman's petition for judicial review order expressly states that, "Without reaching any other issued raised by the parties, the Court makes the following conclusions of law: 1. Based on the doctrine of issue preclusion, Judge Crockett's Order has preclusive effect on this case." Eighth Judicial District Court case no. A-18-775804-J, filing dated July 29, 2021, p. 7:2-5. And, the Crockett Order has been reversed by the Nevada Supreme Court. Exhibit 4.

44. Finally, the City's petition for judicial review law is inconsequential as the City conceded the R-PD7 zoning and conceded the use of the 17 Acre Property for 435 residential units when it re-zoned the property to R-3 zoning to allow this use on February 15, 2017.

The Herndon Order

45. The Court also declines the City's request to apply the Herndon Order from the 65 Acre Case. Judge Herndon stated at the end of his order that his ruling was very limited to the ripeness doctrine and that ripeness holding "renders further court inquiry unnecessary." Eighth Judicial District Court case no. A-18-780184-C, filed on December 30, 2020, p. 35:5-8. Judge Herndon also specifically held that "the court believes that addressing the merits of any of the remaining issues would be unwise as there are companion cases still pending with similar issues and any ruling by this court on the remaining issues could be construed as having preclusive effect

in the other pending court actions, much like the then controlling Crockett Order [now reversed] was previously perceived to have had in both the 35-Acre Property case and the 133-Acre Property case." Id., p. 35:9-14. Therefore, Judge Herndon did not reach the merits of the pending property interest issue and, moreover, it would be improper for this Court to rely on the Herndon Order where Judge Herndon himself held it should not be relied upon.

The Master Plan Land Use as Parks, Recreation, Open Space (PR-OS) Issue

46. The Court declines the City's request to apply the City Master Plan, in place of zoning, to determine the property interest in this inverse condemnation case.

47. First, as stated above, Nevada Supreme Court precedent relies on zoning to determine the property interest in inverse condemnation and eminent domain proceedings, not a master plan land use designation. In this same connection, as explained above, three City departments – Planning, the City Attorney's Office, and Taxation – have confirmed that zoning is applied to determine property rights. The City tax department in 2016 used "residential" based on the "zoning designation: R-PD7," as the "lawful" use of the 17 Acre Property in order to collect taxes from the Landowners in the amount of $1 million per year for the past five years and back taxes upon conversion pursuant to NRS 361A.280. To allow the City to shift positions in this inverse condemnation action, where it may be liable to pay compensation, and now claim that the residential zoning is not used to determine the "lawful" use of the property, but instead the master plan PR-OS designation should be applied, violates basic and fundamental notions of fairness and justice.

48. Second, even if there was a PR-OS land use designation on the City's Master Plan, zoning would still apply to determine the property interest issue, because NRS 278.349(3)(e) provides if "any existing zoning ordinance is inconsistent with the master plan, the zoning takes precedence."

49. Third, Landowners' Exhibit 30, specifically Bates numbers 000443-448, and Exhibit 42 (LO Appx. Ex. 6, specifically Bates numbers 000051 and 000069) are evidence that the first City Master Plan designation for the 17 Acre Property was MED and ML, which is the land use designation for a residential use for 6-12 residential units per acre and which is consistent with the R-PD7 zoning that legally permits up to 7 residential units per acre. And, the City has failed to present the evidence showing that this original MED and ML City Master Plan land use designation was ever legally changed from MED and ML to PR-OS, pursuant to the legal requirements set forth in NRS Chapter 278 and LVMC 19.16.030. *See* Exhibit 56 (LO Appx. Exs. 177 and 178), listing the requirements to make a parcel specific amendment to the City's Master Plan.

50. Fourth, City Attorney, Brad Jerbic, confirmed the City Attorney's Office researched the alleged PR-OS Master Plan land use designation and determined there was never a proper change to PR-OS on the City's Master Plan: "There is absolutely no document that we could find that really explains why anybody thought it should be changed to PR-OS, except maybe somebody looked at a map one day and said, hey look, it's all golf course. It should be PR-OS. I don't know." Exhibit 18, Bates number 000228:1943-1948.

51. The Court also declines the City's request to find the Landowners conceded to a PR-OS master plan land use designation. The Landowners presented evidence that they vehemently objected in writing to any alleged PR-OS designation on any part of the 250 Acre Property and, when requested by the City to file a GPA application that references the PR-OS designation, the Landowners submitted the GPA application with a letter stating the GPA application was "submitted under protest." Exhibit 56 (LO Appx. Exs. 180 and 182).

52. Finally, the City's 25-day statute of limitations argument does not apply here, because the Landowners are not challenging a change to the PR-OS on the City's master plan, they maintain, and the Court agrees, that the evidence shows a PR-OS change never occurred

The "Condition" Issue

53. The Court also declines the City's request to find there is a "condition" that the 17 Acre Property remain a golf course and open space into perpetuity.

54. There is no evidence that there is any such alleged condition or that the alleged condition was ever properly recorded at the Clark County Recorder's Office in the 17 Acre Property chain of title.

55. Moreover, "a grantee can only be bound by what he had notice of, not the secret intentions of the grantor." Diaz v. Ferne, 120 Nev. 70, 75 (2004). *See also* In re Champlain Oil Co. Conditional Use Application, 93 A.3d 139 (Vt. 2014) ("land use regulations are in derogation of private property rights and must be construed narrowly in favor of the landowner." Id., at 141); Hoffmann v. Gunther, 666 N.Y.S.2d 685, 687 (S.Ct. App. Div. 2nd Dept. N.Y. 1997) (not every item discussed at a hearing becomes a "condition" to development, rather the local land use board has a duty to "clearly state" the conditions within the approval ordinance without reference to the minutes of a proceeding. Id., at 687).

The Purchase Price Issue

56. The Court declines the City's request to apply the purchase price the Landowners paid to acquire all of the assets of Fore Stars, Ltd., the entity that owned the entire 250 Acre Property (that includes the 17 Acre Property) in 2015, as one of the guiding factors to decide the property rights issue.

57. The City cites no Nevada law where a court relied on the purchase price to decide the pending property rights issues and the six Nevada Supreme Court inverse condemnation and

direct condemnation cases referenced above uniformly relied on zoning, not a purchase price paid for a property, to determine the property rights issue.

58. Moreover, although the City presented evidence of what the purchase price for the Fore Stars, Ltd. entity may have been, the Landowners referenced the deposition of the principle, Yohan Lowie, that occurred one day prior to the hearing in this matter, on August 12, 2021, and argued that, in that deposition, Mr. Lowie laid out in detail the approximately 14 years of due diligence and work done to acquire the 250 Acre Property, the extensive consideration that was involved in the acquisition, amounting to approximately $100 million and $45 million of direct monetary compensation, which is contrary to the purchase price presented by the City.

Therefore, the Landowners' request that the Court determine the property interest is **GRANTED** in its entirety and it is hereby **ORDERED** that:

1) The determination of the property interest in this inverse condemnation action must be based on inverse condemnation and eminent domain law;

2) Nevada inverse condemnation and eminent domain law provides that zoning must be relied upon to determine the Landowners' property interest prior to any alleged City interference with that property interest;

3) The 17 Acre Property has been hard zoned R-PD7 since 1981 and was re-zoned to R-3 prior to the filing of the Complaint in this matter;

4) The Las Vegas Municipal Code lists single-family and multi-family residential as legally permissible uses on R-PD7 and R-3 zoned properties by right;

5) The legally permitted uses by right of the 17 Acre Property are single-family and multi-family residential; and

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6) The 17 Acre Property has at all times since 1981 been designated as "M" (residential) on the City's Master land use plan.



RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED BY:

LAW OFFICES OF KERMITT L. WATERS

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