Electronically Filed 2/22/2021 8:38 AM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT

**NOAS** 1 Kerry Faughnan, Esq. Nevada Bar No.12204 2 P.O. Box 335361 3 North Las Vegas, NV 89033 Electronically Filed (702) 301-3096 Feb 24 2021 01:33 p.m. 4 (702) 331-4222- Fax Elizabeth A. Brown Kerry.faughnan@gmail.com 5 Attorney for LN MANAGEMENT, LLC SERIES 3111 BEL AIR 20 Ferk of Supreme Court 6 EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR 7 **CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA** 8 DITECH FINANCIAL LLC F/K/A GREEN Case No.: A-12-669570-C TREE SERVICING LLC, 9 Plaintiff, Dept. No.: XIII 10 11 VS. Consolidated with Case No. A-13-682055-C 12 NOTICE OF APPEAL MICHAEL T. ELLIOTT, an individual; LAS VEGAS INTERNATIONAL COUNTRY 13 **CLUB ESTATES HOME OWNERS** ASSOCIATION, INC., a Nevada 14 Corporation; REGENCY TOWERS ASSOCIATION, INC., a Nevada 15 Corporation; and DOES I-X INCLUSIVE, 16 Defendants. 17 LN MANAGEMENT LLC SERIES 3111 BEL AIR 24G 18 Plaintiff, 19 20 MICHAEL T. ELLIOT, an individual; DITECH FINANCIAL LLC F/K/A 21 GREEN TREE SERVICING LLC and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive; 22 Defendants. 23 24 25 26

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Comes now Plaintiff, LN Management LLC Series 3111 Bel Air 24G, by and through its counsel of record, Kerry P. Faughnan, Esq., who hereby appeals the January 20, 20211 Order Granting Ditech Financial LLC f/k/a Green Tree Servicing LLC's Motion for Summary Judgment; Notice of Entry filed January 21, 2021. DATED February 22, 2021. /s/ Kerry P. Faughnan Kerry P. Faughnan, Esq. **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE** I hereby certify that on February 22, 2021 I allowed the Court's ECF system to serve the following interest persons who have appeared in this matter: ~ All Parties on E-Service List ~ DATED February 22, 2021. /s/ Kerry P. Faughnan Kerry P. Faughnan, Esq. 

Electronically Filed 2/22/2021 8:38 AM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT

**ASTA** 1 Kerry Faughnan, Esq. Nevada Bar No.12204 P.O. Box 335361 3 North Las Vegas, NV 89033 (702) 301-3096 4 (702) 331-4222- Fax Kerry.faughnan@gmail.com 5 Attorney for LN MANAGEMENT, LLC SERIES 3111 BEL AIR 24G 6 EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR 7 **CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA** 8 DITECH FINANCIAL LLC F/K/A GREEN Case No.: A-12-669570-C TREE SERVICING LLC, Dept. No.: XIII Plaintiff, 10 11 VS. Consolidated with Case No. A-13-682055-C 12 MICHAEL T. ELLIOTT, an individual; LAS CASE APPEAL STATEMENT VEGAS INTERNATIONAL COUNTRY 13 **CLUB ESTATES HOME OWNERS** ASSOCIATION, INC., a Nevada 14 Corporation; REGENCY TOWERS 15 ASSOCIATION, INC., a Nevada Corporation; and DOES I-X INCLUSIVE, 16 Defendants. 17 LN MANAGEMENT LLC SERIES 3111 BEL AIR 24G 18 Plaintiff, 19 20 MICHAEL T. ELLIOT, an individual; DITECH FINANCIAL LLC F/K/A 21 GREEN TREE SERVICING LLC and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive; 22 Defendants. 23 24 1. Appellants filing this case appeal statement: LN Management LLC Series 3111 Bel Air 25 24G 26 2. Judge Issuing Decision: Honorable Mark Denton 27 3. Parties in the proceeding:

Plaintiff: LN Management LLC Series 3111 Bel Air 24G

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1	Defendant: PennyMac Holdings LLC		
2	4. Parties involved in this appeal:		
3	Plaintiff: LN Management LLC Series 3111 Bel Air 24G		
4	Defendant: Ditech Financial LLC f/k/a Green Tree Servicing LLC		
5	5. Counsel for parties on appeal:		
6	Plaintiff: LN Management LLC Series 3111 Bel Air 24G		
7	Kerry P. Faughnan, Esq.		
8	Nevada Bar No. 12204		
	P.O. Box 335361 North Las Vegas, Nevada 89033		
9	(702) 301-3096		
10	(702) 331-4222 - Fax		
11	Kerry.faughnan@gmail.com		
12	Defendant: Ditech Financial LLC f/k/a Green Tree Servicing LLC;		
13	Ariel E. Stern, Esq.		
	Natalie L. Winslow, Esq. Nicholas E. Belay, Esq.		
14	Akerman LLP		
15	1635 Village Center Circle, Suite 200		
16	Las Vegas, NV 89134		
	(702) 634-5000 (702) 380-8572- Fax		
17	Ariel.stern@akerman.com		
18	Natalie.winslow@akeman.com		
19	Nicholas.belay@akerman.com		
20	6. Appellant was represented by retained counsel in the district court.		
21	7. Appellant is represented by retained counsel on appeal.		
22	8. No request has been made to proceed in forma pauperis.		
23	9. The Complaint in this matter was originally filed October 3, 2012.		
24	10. The state court proceeding was an action for Quiet Title and Declaratory Relief after a		
25	HOA foreclosure. The order appealed from is January 20, 20211 Order Granting Ditech Financial		
26	LLC f/k/a Green Tree Servicing LLC's Motion for Summary Judgment; Notice of Entry filed		
27	January 21, 2021.		
28	11. The case has not been subject of an appeal to or original writ proceeding in the		

1	Supreme Court.		
2	12. This appeal does not involve child custody or visitation.		
3	13. This appeal does involve the possibility of settlement.		
4	DATED February 22, 2021.		
5			
6	/s/ Kerry P. Faughnan Kerry P. Faughnan, Esq.		
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14	CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE		
15	I hereby certify that on October 14, 2020 I allowed the Court's ECF system to serve the		
16	following interest persons who have appeared in this matter:		
17	~ All Parties on E-Service List ~		
18			
19	DATED October 14, 2020.		
20	/s/ Kerry P. Faughnan		
21	/s/ Kerry P. Faughnan Kerry P. Faughnan, Esq.		
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## **CASE SUMMARY** CASE NO. A-12-669570-C

Bank of America, Plaintiff(s) Michael Elliott, Defendant(s)

A-13-682055-C (Consolidated)

05/23/2018

Location: Department 13 Judicial Officer: Denton, Mark R. Filed on: 10/03/2012 Cross-Reference Case A669570 Number:

**CASE INFORMATION** 

**Related Cases** Case Type: Title to Property

Subtype: Liens

**Statistical Closures** Case Flags: Consolidated - Lead Case 08/14/2019 Transferred (before trial)

**Appealed to Supreme Court** Automatically Exempt from

**Arbitration** 

DATE CASE ASSIGNMENT

**Current Case Assignment** 

Involuntary Dismissal

A-12-669570-C Case Number Department 13 Court Date Assigned 10/03/2012 Judicial Officer Denton, Mark R.

**PARTY INFORMATION** 

Lead Attorneys **Plaintiff Bank of America** Bergstrom, Jeremy T.

Retained 702-333-0007(W)

**Green Tree** Brenner, Darren T.

Retained 702-634-5000(W)

Defendant Elliott, Michael T

Las Vegas International Country Club Estates Home Owners Association

Removed: 05/23/2018

Dismissed

LN Management LLC Series 311 Bel Air 24G

Removed: 05/23/2018

Dismissed

**Regency Towers Association Inc** 

Removed: 05/23/2018

Dismissed

**Third Party Plaintiff** 

LN Management LLC Series 3111 Bel Air 24G

Removed: 06/21/2018

Data Entry Error

DATE **EVENTS & ORDERS OF THE COURT INDEX** 

10/03/2012

🚺 Complaint

Filed By: Plaintiff Bank of America

Complaint

10/03/2012

Case Opened

10/04/2012

Initial Appearance Fee Disclosure

CASE NO. A-12-669570-C			
	Filed By: Plaintiff Bank of America Initial Appearance Fee Disclosure		
10/05/2012	Notice of Lis Pendens  Filed by: Plaintiff Bank of America  Notice of Lis Pendens		
10/10/2012	Affidavit of Service Filed By: Plaintiff Bank of America Affidavit of Service Re Regency Towers Association, Inc., a Nevada Corporation, by Serving Michael T Schulman, Registered Agent		
10/11/2012	Summons Filed by: Plaintiff Bank of America Summons		
10/18/2012	Summons Issued Party: Plaintiff Bank of America Summons		
11/05/2012	Initial Appearance Fee Disclosure Filed By: Defendant Regency Towers Association Inc Initial Appearance Fee Disclosure (NRS Chapter 19)		
11/05/2012	Notice of Appearance Party: Defendant Regency Towers Association Inc Notice of Appearance of Counsel		
11/21/2012	Notice of Intent to Take Default Party: Plaintiff Bank of America Notice of Intent to take Default		
12/12/2012	Default Filed By: Plaintiff Bank of America (SET ASIDE 01-23-14)Default		
12/26/2012	Stipulation and Order Filed by: Defendant Regency Towers Association Inc Stipulation and Order Regarding Status of Defendant Regency Towers Association, Inc.		
12/27/2012	Notice of Entry Filed By: Defendant Regency Towers Association Inc Notice of Entry of Order Regarding Status of Defendant Regency Towers Association, Inc.		
05/07/2013	Notice of Entry of Order  Filed By: Plaintiff Bank of America  Notice of Entry of Order		
05/07/2013	Stipulation and Order Filed by: Plaintiff Bank of America Stipulation And Order Regarding Status of Las Vegas International Country Club Estates Home Owners Association		
09/09/2013	Motion to Consolidate		

	CASE NO. A-12-00/3/0-C
	Filed By: Plaintiff Bank of America  Motion to Consolidate
09/30/2013	Opposition to Motion  Filed By: Defendant LN Management LLC Series 311 Bel Air 24G  LN Management LLC Series 3111 Bel Air 24G Opposition to Motion to Consolidate
10/10/2013	Stipulation and Order Filed by: Plaintiff Bank of America Stipulation and Order to Continue Motion to Consolidate Hearing
10/11/2013	Notice of Entry of Order  Filed By: Plaintiff Bank of America  Notice of Entry of Order
10/16/2013	Reply in Support  Filed By: Plaintiff Bank of America  Reply in Support of Motion to Consolidate
10/21/2013	Motion to Consolidate (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Denton, Mark R.)  Events: 09/09/2013 Motion to Consolidate  Plaintiff's Motion to Consolidate Cases A669570 and A682055  Granted; Plaintiff's Motion to Consolidate Cases A669570 and A682055  Granted
10/22/2013	Notice of Department Reassignment
10/29/2013	Order Granting Motion  Filed By: Plaintiff Bank of America  Order Granting Motion to Consolidate
10/30/2013	Notice of Entry of Order  Filed By: Plaintiff Bank of America  Notice of Entry of Order
01/23/2014	Notice of Entry of Stipulation and Order Filed By: Plaintiff Bank of America Notice of Entry of Stipulation and Order
01/23/2014	Stipulation and Order Filed by: Plaintiff Bank of America Stipulation and Order
03/11/2014	Answer to Third Party Complaint  Filed By: Plaintiff Green Tree  Green Tree Servicing LLC's Answer to LN Management LLC Series 3111 Bel Air 24G's  Complaint for Quite Title and Declaratory Relief
06/19/2014	Motion for Summary Judgment Filed By: Plaintiff Green Tree Motion for Summary Judgment
06/20/2014	Notice of Hearing Filed By: Plaintiff Green Tree

	CASE NO. A-12-6695/U-C
	Notice of Hearing
06/20/2014	Certificate of Mailing Filed By: Plaintiff Green Tree Certificate of Mailing
07/17/2014	Motion for Summary Judgment (3:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Denton, Mark R.)  Motion for Summary Judgment  Motion Granted;  Motion Granted
08/12/2014	Order Granting Summary Judgment Filed By: Plaintiff Green Tree Order Granting Motion for Summary Judgment
08/13/2014	Notice of Entry of Order Filed By: Plaintiff Green Tree Notice of Entry of Order Granting Motion for Summary Judgment
09/03/2014	Motion to Set Aside Filed By: Defendant LN Management LLC Series 311 Bel Air 24G LN Management LLC Series 3111 Bel Air 24G's Motion to Set Aside Summary Judgment Entered August 12, 2014
09/03/2014	Ex Parte Application Party: Defendant LN Management LLC Series 311 Bel Air 24G Ex Parte Application for an Order Shortening Time
09/04/2014	Order Shortening Time Filed By: Defendant LN Management LLC Series 311 Bel Air 24G Order Shortening Time
09/08/2014	Receipt of Copy Filed by: Defendant LN Management LLC Series 311 Bel Air 24G Receipt of Copy
09/08/2014	Receipt of Copy Filed by: Defendant LN Management LLC Series 311 Bel Air 24G Receipt of Copy
09/08/2014	Receipt of Copy Filed by: Defendant LN Management LLC Series 311 Bel Air 24G Receipt of Copy
09/09/2014	Motion to Set Aside (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Denton, Mark R.)  LN Management LLC Series 3111 Bel Air 24G's Motion to Set Aside Summary Judgment Entered August 12, 2014 Granted; Granted
09/24/2014	Order Granting Motion  Filed By: Plaintiff Bank of America  Order Granting Plaintiff's Motion to Set Aside Summary Judgment
09/24/2014	Amended Judgment Set Aside (Judicial Officer: Denton, Mark R.)

	Debtors: Michael T Elliott (Defendant), Las Vegas International Country Club Estates Home Owners Association Inc (Defendant), Regency Towers Association Inc (Defendant), LN Management LLC Series 311 Bel Air 24G (Defendant) Creditors: Bank of America (Plaintiff), Green Tree (Plaintiff) Judgment: 09/24/2014, Docketed: 09/02/2014
09/25/2014	Notice of Entry Filed By: Defendant LN Management LLC Series 311 Bel Air 24G Notice of Entry of Order
09/25/2014	Opposition to Motion  Filed By: Defendant LN Management LLC Series 311 Bel Air 24G  Opposition to Green Tree Servicing LLC's Motion for Summary Judgment
10/02/2014	Hearing (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Denton, Mark R.)  10/02/2014, 10/13/2014  Hearing Re: Motion for Summary Judgment  Continued;  Granted in Part;  Continued;  Granted in Part;  Continued
10/09/2014	Reply in Support  Filed By: Plaintiff Green Tree  Reply in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment
12/07/2015	Order Scheduling Dismissal Hearing  Order Scheduling Dismissal Hearing
01/25/2016	Dismissal Hearing (2:45 PM) (Judicial Officer: Denton, Mark R.)  Matter Heard;  Matter Heard
12/23/2016	Order Scheduling Dismissal Hearing  Order Scheduling Dismissal Hearing
02/21/2017	Dismissal Hearing (3:00 PM) (Judicial Officer: Denton, Mark R.)  Matter Heard;  Matter Heard
08/15/2017	Order  Order Re: Status Check
09/07/2017	Status Check (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Denton, Mark R.)  Matter Heard;  Matter Heard
10/02/2017	Order Scheduling Status Check Order Scheduling Status Check
10/19/2017	Status Check (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Denton, Mark R.) 10/19/2017, 01/18/2018 Continued; Matter Heard;

	CASE 110. A-12-00/3/0-C
	Continued; Matter Heard; Continued
05/23/2018	Order of Dismissal Without Prejudice (Judicial Officer: Denton, Mark R.)  Debtors: Michael T Elliott (Defendant), Las Vegas International Country Club Estates Home Owners Association Inc (Defendant), Regency Towers Association Inc (Defendant), LN Management LLC Series 311 Bel Air 24G (Defendant)  Creditors: Bank of America (Plaintiff), Green Tree (Plaintiff)  Judgment: 05/23/2018, Docketed: 05/23/2018
05/23/2018	Order of Dismissal Without Prejudice Filed By: Plaintiff Bank of America Order of Dismissal Without Prejudice
06/21/2018	Motion Filed By: Third Party Plaintiff LN Management LLC Series 3111 Bel Air 24G  Motion to Reopen Case
07/05/2018	Substitution of Attorney Filed by: Plaintiff Bank of America Substitution Of Counsel
07/23/2018	Motion (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Denton, Mark R.)  Plaintiff, LN Management LLC Series 3111 Bel Air 24G's Motion to Reopen Case Granted; Granted
07/27/2018	Order Filed By: Third Party Plaintiff LN Management LLC Series 3111 Bel Air 24G (A682055) Order Granting LN Management LLC Series 3111 Bel Air 24G's Motion to Reopen Case
07/27/2018	Motion for Summary Judgment  Filed By: Third Party Plaintiff LN Management LLC Series 3111 Bel Air 24G  LN Management LLC Sereis 3111 Bel Air 24G's Motion for Summary Judgment againt Green  Tree Servicing LLC
08/27/2018	Motion for Summary Judgment (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Denton, Mark R.)  08/27/2018, 09/27/2018  LN Management LLC Sereis 3111 Bel Air 24G's Motion for Summary Judgment against Green Tree Servicing LLC  Matter Continued;  Denied With Prejudice;  Matter Continued;  Denied With Prejudice;  Matter Continued
08/27/2018	Stipulation and Order Filed by: Plaintiff Green Tree Stipulation and Order to Extend Briefing Schedule and Continue Hearing on LN Management LLC Series 3111 Bel Air 24G's Motion for Summary Judgment
08/28/2018	Opposition to Motion For Summary Judgment  Filed By: Plaintiff Green Tree  Bank of America, N.A.'s Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment

08/30/2018	Notice of Entry of Stipulation and Order  Filed By: Plaintiff Green Tree  Notice of Entry of Stipulation and Order to Extend Briefing Schedule and Continue Hearing on LN Management LLC Series 3111 Bel Air 24G's Motion for Summary Judgment
09/17/2018	Reply to Opposition  Reply to Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment and Erata to Motion for Summary  Judgment
09/26/2018	Errata Filed By: Plaintiff Bank of America Errata to Bank of America, N.A.'s Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment
03/27/2019	Notice of Bankruptcy Filed By: Plaintiff Green Tree Notice of Bankruptcy Filing and Imposition of Automatic Stay
08/14/2019	Order to Statistically Close Case  Civil Order to Statistically Close Case
09/29/2020	Motion for Summary Judgment  Filed By: Plaintiff Bank of America; Plaintiff Green Tree  Bank of America, N.A. and Ditech Financial LLC f/k/a Green Tree Servicing LLC's Motion  For Summary Judgment (Hearing Requested)
09/29/2020	Clerk's Notice of Hearing  Notice of Hearing
10/26/2020	Notice of Non Opposition  Filed By: Plaintiff Bank of America; Plaintiff Green Tree  Bank of America, N.A. and Ditech Financial LLC f/k/a Green Tree Servicing LLC's Reply in  Support of Motion for Summary Judgment and Notice of Non-Opposition
10/28/2020	Stipulation and Order Stipulation and Order to Continue Hearing
11/11/2020	Opposition to Motion Filed By: Defendant Elliott, Michael T Opposition to Ditech Financial LLC f/k/a Green Tree Servicing LLC's Motion for Summary Judgment
11/30/2020	Reply in Support  Filed By: Plaintiff Bank of America; Plaintiff Green Tree  Bank of America, N.A. and Ditech Financial LLC f/k/a Green Tree Servicing LLC's Reply  Supporting Summary Judgment Motion
12/01/2020	Minute Order (1:15 PM) (Judicial Officer: Denton, Mark R.)  Re: BlueJeans Appearance  Minute Order - No Hearing Held;  Minute Order - No Hearing Held
12/03/2020	Motion for Summary Judgment (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Denton, Mark R.)  Bank of America, N.A. and Ditech Financial LLC f/k/a Green Tree Servicing LLC's Motion  For Summary Judgment

	Granted; Granted	
12/14/2020	Minute Order (7:15 AM) (Judicial Officer: Denton, Mark R.)  Re: Bank of America, N.A. and Ditech Financial LLC f/k/a Green Tree Servicing LLC's Motion For Summary Judgment  Minute Order - No Hearing Held;  Minute Order - No Hearing Held	
01/20/2021	Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment (A682055) FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND JUDGMENT	
01/21/2021	Notice of Entry of Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law Filed By: Plaintiff Bank of America Notice of Entry of Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment	
01/25/2021	Memorandum of Costs and Disbursements  Filed By: Plaintiff Bank of America; Plaintiff Green Tree  Bank of America, N.A. and Ditech Financial LLC f/k/a Green Tree Servicing LLC's  Memorandum of Costs and Disbursements	
02/22/2021	Notice of Appeal  Notice of Appeal	
02/22/2021	Case Appeal Statement  Case Appeal Statement	
DATE	FINANCIAL INFORMATION	

DATE	FINANCIAL INFORMATION

Third Party Plaintiff LN Management LLC Series 3111 Bel Air 24G	
Total Charges	200.00
Total Payments and Credits	200.00
Balance Due as of 2/23/2021	0.00
<b>Defendant</b> Regency Towers Association Inc	
Total Charges	223.00
Total Payments and Credits	223.00
Balance Due as of 2/23/2021	0.00
Defendant Elliott, Michael T	
Total Charges	24.00
Total Payments and Credits	24.00
Balance Due as of 2/23/2021	0.00
Plaintiff Bank of America	
Total Charges	470.00
Total Payments and Credits	470.00
Balance Due as of 2/23/2021	0.00
Plaintiff Green Tree	
Total Charges	200.00
Total Payments and Credits	200.00
Balance Due as of 2/23/2021	0.00

# CIVIL COVER SHEET

A-12-669570-C

Clark County, Nevada

XIII

Case No. (Assigned by Clerk's Office)

I. Party Information				
Plaintiff(s) (name/address/phone): Bank of Am	nerica, N.A.	Defendant(s) (name/address/phone):		
Attorney (name/address/phone): Jory C. Garabedian, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 1035 Miles, Bauer, Bergstrom & Winters, LLP. 2200 Paseo Verde Parkway, Suite 250 Henderson, NV 89052	52	Michael T. Elliot, an individual; Las Vegas International Country Club Estates Home Owners Association, Inc., a Nevada Corporation; Regency Towers Association, Inc., a Nevada Corporation; and Does I-X Inclusive Attorney (name/address/phone):		
II. Nature of Controversy (Please cha applicable subcategory, if appropriate)	eck applicable bold	category and	Arbitration Requested	
	Civi	il Cases		
Real Property		To	orts	
□ Landlord/Tenant □ Unlawful Detainer □ Title to Property Foreclosure Liens □ Quiet Title □ Specific Performance □ Condemnation/Eminent Domain □ Other Real Property □ Partition	<ul><li>□ Negligence – Au</li><li>□ Negligence – Me</li><li>□ Negligence – Pro</li></ul>	dical/Dental emises Liability Slip/Fall)	☐ Product Liability ☐ Product Liability/Motor Vehicle ☐ Other Torts/Product Liability ☐ Intentional Misconduct ☐ Torts/Defamation (Libel/Slander) ☐ Interfere with Contract Rights ☐ Employment Torts (Wrongful termination) ☐ Other Torts ☐ Anti-trust ☐ Fraud/Misrepresentation ☐ Insurance	
Planning/Zoning			Legal Tort Unfair Competition	
Probate		Other Civil	Filing Types	
Estimated Estate Value:  Summary Administration General Administration Special Administration Set Aside Estates Trust/Conservatorships Individual Trustee Corporate Trustee Other Probate	Insurance of Commercial Commercial Collection Collection Guarantee Sale Control Uniform Collection Civil Petition for Other Admi	ract c Construction Carrier al Instrument tracts/Acet/Judgment of Actions ent Contract act	Appeal from Lower Court (also check applicable civil case box)  Transfer from Justice Court Justice Court Civil Appeal  Civil Writ Other Special Proceeding  Other Civil Filing Compromise of Minor's Claim Conversion of Property Damage to Property Employment Security Enforcement of Judgment Foreign Judgment – Civil Other Personal Property Recovery of Property Stockholder Suit Other Civil Matters	
III. Business Court Requested (Plea	ase check applicable ca	ntegory; for Clark or Wash	toe Counties only.)	
□ NRS Chapters 78-88 □ Commodities (NRS 90) □ Securities (NRS 90)	☐ Investments (NR	S 104 Art. 8) Practices (NRS 598)	☐ Enhanced Case Mgmt/Business ☐ Other Business Court Matters	
10/03/2012		- last		
Date	-	Signature of	initiating party or representative	

**Electronically Filed** 1/20/2021 3:31 PM Steven D. Grierson **CLERK OF THE COURT** 

**FFCL** 

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ARIEL E. STERN, ESQ.

Nevada Bar No. 8276

2 NATALIE L. WINSLOW, ESQ.

Nevada Bar No. 12125

NICHOLAS E. BELAY, ESQ.

4 Nevada Bar No. 15175

**AKERMAN LLP** 

5 1635 Village Center Circle, Suite 200

Las Vegas, Nevada 89134

Telephone: (702) 634-5000 6

Facsimile: (702) 380-8572 Email: ariel.stern@akerman.com

Email: natalie.winslow@akerman.com

8 Email: nicholas.belay@akerman.com

Attorneys for Bank of America, N.A. and Ditech Financial LLC f/k/a Green Tree Servicing LLC

## DISTRICT COURT **CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA**

LN MANAGEMENT LLC SERIES 3111 BEL AIR 24G,

Plaintiff,

v.

MICHAEL T. ELLIOTT, an individual; BANK OF AMERICA, N.A.; and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive,

Defendants.

AND ALL RELATED CLAIMS.

Case No.: A-12-669570-C Consolidated with: A-13-682055-C

Dept. No.: XIII

<del>PROPOSED</del> FINDINGS OF FACT, **CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND JUDGMENT** 

Ditech Financial LLC f/k/a Green Tree Servicing LLC (**Ditech**) and Bank of America, N.A. (collectively, **defendants**) filed a summary judgment motion on September 29, 2020. LN Management LLC Series 3111 Bel Air 24G filed an opposition on November 11, 2020, and defendants filed reply on November 20, 2020. The court held a hearing on the motion on December 3, 2020. Following the hearing, the court took the matter under advisement.

55773364;1

Case Number: A-12-669570-C

**AKERMAN LLP** 

1635 VILLAGE CENTER CIRCLE, SUITE 200 LAS VEGAS, NEVADA 89134 TEL.: (702) 634-5000 – FAX: (702) 380-8572 11 12 13 14 15 16 17

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On December 14, 2020, the court entered a minute order granting defendants' summary judgment motion. The court now enters the following findings of fact and conclusions of law.

### FINDINGS OF FACT

### The Subject Property, Note, and Deed of Trust

- A deed of trust listing Michael T. Elliott as the borrower (Borrower) and Bank of America as the lender and beneficiary was executed on October 6, 2004 and recorded on October 20, 2004 (**Deed of Trust**). The Deed of Trust granted Lender a security interest in real property known as 3111 Bel Air Dr., Unit 24G, Las Vegas, Nevada 89109 (the **Property**) to secure the repayment of a promissory note (the **Note**) in the original amount of \$322,100.00 to the Borrower (the Note and Deed of Trust together are the **Loan**). The Deed of Trust listed the APN number as 162-10-812-185.
- 2. In November 2004, Fannie Mae purchased the Loan, thereby acquiring ownership of the Deed of Trust. Fannie Mae maintained that ownership at the time of the HOA Sale on December 12, 2012.
- 3. In September 2008, Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) placed Fannie Mae into conservatorship "for the purpose of reorganizing, rehabilitating, or winding up [its] affairs." 12 U.S.C. § 4617(a)(2). Fannie Mae remains in conservatorship today.
- 4. At the time of the HOA Sale, Bank of America was the servicer of the Loan for Fannie Mae.
- 5. Bank of America serviced the Loan for Fannie Mae up until on or about April 30, 2013, when the servicing rights were transferred to Ditech.
- 6. On July 30, 2013, Bank of America recorded an assignment of the Deed of Trust to Ditech.
- 7. On December 20, 2019, Ditech recorded an assignment of the Deed of Trust to New Residential Mortgage, LLC.
- 8. On March 17, 2020, New Residential Mortgage, LLC recorded an assignment of the Deed of Trust to NewRez LLC d/b/a Shellpoint Mortgage Servicing (NewRez).

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### Fannie Mae's Contract with Its Servicers, Including Bank of America, Ditech, and NewRez

- 9. The relationship between Bank of America, Ditech, and NewRez, as the servicers of the Loan, and Fannie Mae, as owner of the Loan, is governed by the Fannie Mae's Single-Family Selling Guide at A2-1-01 and Fannie Mae's Single-Family Servicing Guide (**Guide**), a central governing document for Fannie Mae's relationship with servicers nationwide. Among other things, the Guide provides that Fannie Mae's servicers may act as record beneficiaries for the deeds of trust owned by Fannie Mae and requires that servicers assign these deeds of trust to Fannie Mae upon Fannie Mae's demand. Selling Guide at A2-1-01, Servicing Guide F-1-11.
  - 10. The Guide provides that:

The servicer ordinarily appears in the land records as the mortgagee to facilitate performance of the servicer's contractual responsibilities, including (but not limited to) the receipt of legal notices that may impact Fannie Mae's lien, such as notices of foreclosure, tax, and other liens. However, Fannie Mae may take any and all action with respect to the mortgage loan it deems necessary to protect its ... ownership of the mortgage loan, including recordation of a mortgage assignment, or its legal equivalent, from the servicer to Fannie Mae or its designee. In the event that Fannie Mae determines it necessary to record such an instrument, the servicer must assist Fannie Mae by

- preparing and recording any required documentation, such as mortgage assignments, powers of attorney, or affidavits; and
- providing recordation information for the affected mortgage loans.

Selling Guide at A2-1-03 (emphasis added).

11. The Guide also provides for a temporary transfer of possession of the note when necessary for servicing, such as managing litigation on behalf of Fannie Mae:

In order to ensure that a servicer is able to perform the services and duties incident to the servicing of the mortgage loan, Fannie Mae temporarily gives the servicer possession of the mortgage note whenever the servicer, acting in its own name, represents the interests of Fannie Mae in foreclosure actions, bankruptcy cases, probate proceedings, or other legal proceedings.

This temporary transfer of possession occurs automatically and immediately upon the commencement of the servicer's representation, in

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its name, of Fannie Mae's interests in the foreclosure, bankruptcy, probate, or other legal proceeding.

Selling Guide at A2-1-04.

- 11. The Guide includes a chapter describing how and when servicers should pursue foreclosure. See generally Guide at E-3 (Managing Foreclosure Proceedings). The chapter includes detailed provisions for how servicers may foreclose on properties when either Fannie Mae, MERS, or the servicer itself is the beneficiary of record of the relevant deed of trust. Guide at E-3.2-09.
- 12. The Guide also includes a chapter that explains how servicers should manage litigation on behalf of Fannie Mae. See generally Guide at E-1 (Referring Default-Related Legal Matters and Non-Routine Litigation to Law Firms).
- 13. The Guide states that "Fannie Mae is at all times the owner of the mortgage note," and "[a]t the conclusion of the servicer's representation of Fannie Mae's interests in the foreclosure . . . possession automatically reverts to Fannie Mae." Guide at A2-1-04.
- 14. Pursuant to the Guide, a servicer is required to "maintain in the individual mortgage" loan file all documents and system records that preserve Fannie Mae's ownership interest in the individual mortgage loan." Guide at A2-4-01.
- 15. Any servicer retaining documents related to a particular loan, such as a deed of trust, has "no right to possess these documents and records except under the conditions specified by Fannie Mae." Guide at A2-5.1-02.

## The HOA Foreclosure Sale and LN Management's Purported Acquisition of the Property

- On June 21, 2012, Collections, as agent for the HOA, recorded a Notice of Claim 16. Delinquent Assessment Notice.
- 17. On July 25, 2012, Collections, as agent for the HOA, recorded a Notice of Default and Election to Sell.
- 18. After the Notice of Default was recorded, on or about August 16, 2012, Bank of America, through counsel at Miles, Bauer, Bergstrom, & Winters, LLP (Miles Bauer), contacted the HOA through Collections and requested the super-priority amount.

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- 19. Collections responded on or about November 27, 2012, and provided a Statement of Account.
- 20. Following receipt of the Statement of Account, Miles Bauer and Collections discussed the HOA Sale via telephone. In email correspondence recounting the details of the telephone conversation, Collections confirmed that neither it nor the HOA was "foreclosing on a super-priority lien pursuant to NRS 116.3116."
- 21. Collections further confirmed that it and the HOA were "not claiming to have a super-priority lien since the first mortgage [had] not been foreclosed on the property."
- 22. Miles Bauer advised Collections that if the HOA and Collections were to conduct a super-priority sale, "Bank of America would like to payoff any potential senior lien, should one exist, to protect its first mortgage security interest."
- 23. Collections, on behalf of the HOA, then recorded a Notice of Trustee Sale on November 15, 2012.
- 24. On December 17, 2012, a foreclosure deed was recorded against the Property. The foreclosure deed states that the Property was sold at an HOA foreclosure sale on December 12, 2012, to 3111 Bel Air Drive 24G Trust for \$7,001.00.
- 3111 Bel Air Drive 24G Trust subsequently conveyed the Property to LN 25. Management via a Quitclaim Deed recorded on April 26, 2013.
- 26. At no time did the Conservator consent to the HOA Sale extinguishing or foreclosing Fannie Mae's interest in the Property. (FHFA's Statement on HOA Super-Priority Lien Foreclosures (Apr. 21, 2015), www.fhfa.gov/Media/PublicAffairs/Pages/Statement-on-HOA-Super-Priority-Lien-Foreclosures.aspx).
- 27. The fair market value of the Property at the time of the HOA Sale was \$360,000. The purchase price at the HOA Sale was less than 2% of the fair market value.

### Procedural History

28. LN Management initiated an action for quiet title/declaratory relief on May 17, 2013. See Case No. A-13-682055-C. The court consolidated the case with the above-captioned action on October 29, 2013.

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- 29. Ditech moved for summary judgment in June 2014. The court granted summary judgment in favor of Ditech on August 13, 2014. The order granted Ditech's motion "in its entirety" and constituted the "final order/judgment in this matter."
- 30. LN Management moved to set aside the judgment and reopen the case in September 2014. The court granted the motion on September 24, 2014, reinstituting the action.
- 31. After a period of inaction by LN Management, the court dismissed the case without prejudice under Rule 41(e) in May 2018.
- 32. LN Management moved for reconsideration of the court's order on June 21, 2018, arguing the court should set aside the court's five-year rule dismissal and reopen the case so that the parties could obtain "final orders that would determine each of the parties rights as to the property."
- 33. LN Management specifically stated defendants and LN Management "need this Court to issue final orders that would determine each of the parties rights as to the property." LN Management further represented any delay in resolving the case after the court granted its initial motion to reopen in September 2014 was due to LN Management's own "excusable neglect."
  - 34. No other party filed an opposition to LN Management's motion to reopen.
  - 35. The court granted LN Management's motion to reopen the case on July 27, 2018.
- 36. The matter was then stayed due to Ditech's bankruptcy on March 27, 2019, and it remained stayed to date.
- 37. Defendants moved to lift the stay and reopen the case from its statistical closure concurrently with their summary judgment motion, which the court grants.

### CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1. If any findings of fact are properly conclusions of law, or conclusions of law properly findings of fact, they shall be treated as if properly identified and designated.

### Standard of Proof $\boldsymbol{A}$ .

2. "A quiet title action . . . is the proper method by which to adjudicate disputed ownership of real property rights." Howell v. Ricci, 124 Nev. 1222, 1224, 197 P.3d 1044, 1046 (2008). "An action may be brought by any person against another who claims an estate or interest in real property, adverse to him, for the purpose of determining such adverse claim." NRS 40.010.

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- 3. NRS 30.010 et seq. gives courts "power to declare rights, status and other legal relations." LN Management and defendants both seek declaratory relief under that statute.
- 4. Here, defendants request declaratory relief and quiet title. LN Management contends that it bought the property and the first deed of trust was extinguished. Defendants assert the sale did not extinguish the deed of trust because: (1) Fannie Mae owned the loan, and Bank of America was the beneficiary of record of the deed of trust in its capacity as the servicer of the loan for Fannie Mae at the time of the HOA foreclosure sale in December 2012, and thus, the Federal Foreclosure Bar applies; (2) the HOA foreclosed on only the sub-priority portion of its statutory lien; (3) the deed of trust survived as a matter of equity.
- 5. In an action such as the present one, the parties must prove their claims and affirmative defenses by a preponderance of the evidence. See Nev. J.I. 2EV.1. Under Nevada law, "[t]he term 'preponderance of the evidence' means such evidence as, when weighed with that opposed to it, has more convincing force, and from which it appears that the greater probability of truth lies therein." Nev. J.I. 2EV.1; Corbin v. State, 111 Nev. 378, 892 P.2d 580 (1995) (regarding entrapment, "[p]reponderance of the evidence means such evidence as, when weighed with that opposed to it, has more convincing force and the greater probability of truth.").
- 6. Nevada law draws no distinction between circumstantial and direct evidence. Deveroux v. State, 96 Nev. 388, 391 (1980); Nev. J.I. 2EV.3 ("The law makes no distinction between the weight to be given either direct or circumstantial evidence. Therefore, all of the evidence in the case, including circumstantial evidence, should be considered...").

#### В. The Five-Year Rule under NRCP 41(e) Has Not Run

7. LN Management contends the court should dismiss this case under NRCP 41(e) because the five-year rule has expired. The court rejects this argument.

### The Action was Brought to Trial

8. NRCP 41(e) only applies if an action is not brought to trial within 5 years after the action was filed. See NRCP 41(e)(2)(B). The Nevada supreme court defines "trial" as "the examination before a competent tribunal, according to the law of the land, of questions of fact or of law put in issue by pleadings, for the purpose of determining the rights of the parties." United Ass'n

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of Journeymen & Apprentices of Plumbing & Pipe Fitting Indus. v. Manson, 105 Nev. 816, 819–20, 783 P.2d 955, 957 (1989). Under this definition, "proceedings leading to a complete grant of summary judgment constitute a trial" for purposes of the five-year rule. Monroe v. Columbia Sunrise Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 123 Nev. 96, 100, 158 P.3d 1008, 1010 (2007). This holds true even when thirdparty claims remain outstanding. *Id.* at 1011.

- 9. The court granted summary judgment in favor of Ditech on August 13, 2014. The order granted Ditech's motion "in its entirety" and constituted the "final order/judgment in this matter." While the court ultimately granted LN Management's motion to set aside the judgment in September 2014, nothing in either NRCP 41(e) or Nevada case law negates the fact Ditech brought the action "to trial" within the meaning of Rule 41(e).
- 10. Rule 41(e)'s plain language does not contemplate the five-year rule being reinstated after it has already been satisfied on summary judgment. See Vanguard Piping v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 129 Nev. 602, 608, 309 P.3d 1017, 1020 (2013) (stating the rules of statutory interpretation apply to procedural rules and noting the court should look to the plain language of the rule); Thran v. District Ct., 79 Nev. 176, 180-81 (1963) (Rule 41(e) is "clear, unambiguous and requires no construction other than its own language.").
- 11. Because Ditech already satisfied the five-year rule, it is no longer applicable to this action.

### LN Management Stipulated to Forego the Five-Year Rule

- Even if the five-year rule had not already been satisfied, the court finds the parties 12. have stipulated to waive it.
- 13. NRCP 41(e)(5) provides a party may stipulate in writing to extend the time in which to prosecute an action.
- 14. The court finds this is precisely what LN Management did when it moved for reconsideration of the court's May 2018 order dismissing the action under Rule 41(e).
- 15. In the motion, LN Management argued the court should set aside the court's five-year rule dismissal and reopen the case so that the parties could obtain "final orders that would determine

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each of the parties rights as to the property." No other party filed an opposition to LN Management's motion.

16. By filing an unopposed motion to disregard the five-year rule dismissal and litigate the matter on the merits, the court finds LN Management and the remaining parties stipulated to forego application of the five-year rule to this matter.

### LN Management is judicially estopped from obtaining dismissal under the Five-Year Rule.

- 17. Even assuming the five-year rule continues to apply, the court finds LN Management is judicially estopped from obtaining dismissal.
- 18. Judicial estoppel has five elements: "(1) the same party has taken two positions; (2) the positions were taken in judicial or quasi-judicial administrative proceedings; (3) the party was successful in asserting the first position (i.e., the tribunal adopted the position or accepted it as true); (4) the two positions are totally inconsistent; and (5) the first position was not taken as a result of ignorance, fraud, or mistake." Matter of Frei Irrevocable Tr. Dated Oct. 29, 1996, 133 Nev. 50, 56, 390 P.3d 646, 652 (2017) (citation omitted). All elements are satisfied to prevent LN Management from now asserting the five-year rule.
- 19. First, LN Management has taken two positions. In its opposition, LN Management contends the five-year rule expired on October 3, 2017, necessitating dismissal of this action. But LN Management previously moved for reconsideration on June 21, 2018, of the court's order dismissing the action for want of prosecution under the very same rule LN Management now seeks to enforce.
  - 20. Second, LN Management's positions were taken in this case, a judicial proceeding.
- 21. Third, LN Management successfully obtained reconsideration of the court's order dismissing the action under Rule 41(e). The court granted LN Management's motion and reopened the case on July 27, 2018.
- 22. Fourth, the positions are inconsistent. LN Management moved for (and obtained) reconsideration of the court's Rule 41(e) dismissal, explicitly arguing such relief was appropriate due to its own wrongful conduct. LN Management now seeks to undo its own motion by arguing the

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five-year rule somehow expired in October 2017. These positions are entirely irreconcilable. LN Management cannot now argue for dismissal under Rule 41(e) when it previously moved to reopen the case (for the second time) notwithstanding this very rule.

23. Finally, LN Management's conduct cannot be found to result from ignorance, fraud or mistake. LN Management moved on its own volition for reconsideration of the court's dismissal order and directly argued the order should be set aside based on excusable neglect. Management's own words, such reconsideration was justified because the parties "need" the court to determine the parties' respective rights in the property.

### LN Management's Five-Year Rule argument is barred by Waiver and Equitable Estoppel.

- 24. In addition to being judicially estopped from arguing for five-year rule dismissal, LN Management also waived or else should be equitably estopped from raising the issue.
- 25. Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right. Nev. Yellow Cab Corp. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court ex rel. Cty. of Clark, 152 P.3d 737, 740 (Nev. 2007). Waiver of a right may be inferred when a party engages in conduct so inconsistent with an intent to enforce the right as to induce a reasonable belief that the right has been relinquished. Id. Further, a party seeking equity is required to do equity. Overhead Door Co. of Reno, Inc. v. Overhead Door Corp., 734 P.2d 1233, 1235 (Nev. 1987). Equitable estoppel operates to prevent a party from asserting legal rights that, in equity and good conscience, they should not be allowed to assert because of their own conduct. NGA #2 Liab. Co. v. Rains, 946 P.2d 163, 168 (Nev. 1997).
- 26. Here, the court finds LN Management twice moved to reopen this case: First, after Ditech brought the action to trial; and second, after LN Management obtained reconsideration of the court's rule 41(e) dismissal order.
- 27. To the extent LN Management believed the five-year rule expired in October 2017, LN Management has intentionally relinquished any such argument.
- 28. Had LN Management indicated any intent to argue for five-year rule dismissal prior to its opposition to the instant motion, defendants could have acted accordingly to either obtain

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affirmative relief or request an expediated resolution of the matter. Instead, LN Management did the exact opposite, arguing the court should maintain the case notwithstanding any such rule.

29. Defendants reasonably relied on this relinquishment and would be severely prejudiced if the court dismissed the action without resolving the parties' respective interests in the property.

### Alternatively, the Five-Year Rule has not run due to tolling.

- 30. To the extent the five-year rule was reinstituted based on its September 24, 2014 order granting LN Management's post-trial motion to reopen the case, the court finds the deadline still would not have run due to tolling.
- 31. Under this scenario, the earliest the five-year rule could have expired is September 24, 2019, or five-years after the court reinstituted the action.
- 32. But the Nevada supreme court has explicitly recognized the deadline can be tolled under certain circumstances, such as when the court stays proceedings. Baker v. Noback, 112 Nev. 1106, 1110 (1996) (noting it would be "patently unfair" to dismiss an action for failure to bring to trial when a stay prevented the parties from going to trial within the period); see also Boren v. City of N. Las Vegas, 98 Nev. 5, 6, 638 P.2d 404, 405 (1982) ("Any period during which the parties are prevented from bringing an action to trial by reason of a stay order shall not be computed in determining the five-year period of [NRCP] 41(e).") (emphasis added).
- 33. Here, this matter was closed between May 23, 2018 and July 27, 2018 before the court granted LN Management's motion to reopen. The matter was then stayed due to Ditech's bankruptcy on March 27, 2019, and it remains stayed to date.
- 34. Accounting for these tolling periods, the five-year deadline would be at least 246 days from when the stay is lifted and/or the case is reopened. Accordingly, the court finds there is no merit to LN Management's contention the five-year rule deadline has expired.

### *C*. Federal Foreclosure Bar – 12 U.S.C. § 4617(j)(3)

Pursuant to the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 ("HERA"), Congress granted FHFA an array of powers, privileges, and exemptions from otherwise applicable laws to enable FHFA to carry out its statutory functions when acting as Conservator of Fannie Mae and Freddie

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Mac (together, the "enterprises"). Among these is a broad statutory "exemption" captioned "property protection" that provides when the enterprises are under the conservatorship of the FHFA, none of their property "shall be subject to ... foreclosure ... without the consent of [FHFA]." 12 U.S.C. § 4617(j)(3) (the "Federal Foreclosure Bar").

- 35. The Federal Foreclosure Bar contains no conditions precedent to effectiveness of its statutory protections. Unless and until FHFA gives its consent, the federal protection "shall" be given full effect, which includes preemption of state law. SFR Invs. Pool 1, LLC v. Green Tree Servicing, LLC, No. A-13-680704 (Nev. Dist. Ct. Nov. 17, 2016) (citing 12 U.S.C. § 4617(j)(3)). A contrary interpretation would invert the default rule provided in the statutory text on its head, as if Congress decreed that FHFA's property interests are subject to extinguishment by foreclosure unless FHFA affirmatively declares that it will not grant consent to the extinguishment of a specific property interest. This is not what the statute says, and courts should not rewrite a statute's text. See Lamie v. United States Trustee, 540 U.S. 526, 538 (2004) (rejecting argument that "would result not [in] a construction of [the] statute, but, in effect, an enlargement of it by the court" (quoting *Iselin v*. United States, 270 U. S. 245, 251 (1926))); Conn. Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-54 (1992) ("[I]n interpreting a statute a court should always turn first to one, cardinal canon before all others . . . that a legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says."). Here, there is no evidence FHFA consented to extinguishment of the deed of trust.
- The Nevada supreme court and the Ninth Circuit have both held unequivocally that 36. the Federal Foreclosure Bar, 12 U.S.C. § 4617(j)(3), protects Fannie Mae's property interests while it under the conservatorship of the FHFA by preempting the NRS 116.3116 (the **State Foreclosure Statute**), which would otherwise permit an HOA's foreclosure of its superpriority lien to extinguish Fannie Mae's deed of trust. See Saticoy Bay LLC Series 9641 Christine View v. Fannie Mae, 417 P.3d 363 (Nev. 2018); Berezovsky v. Moniz, 869 F.3d 923 (9th Cir. 2017); FHFA v. SFR Invs. Pool 1, LLC, 893 F.3d 1136 (9th Cir. 2018); Elmer v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., 707 F. App'x 426 (9th Cir. 2017); Saticoy Bay, LLC v. Flagstar Bank, FSB, 699 F. App'x 658 (9th Cir. 2017).
- 37. In Christine View, the Nevada supreme court held that "according to the plain language of the statute, Fannie Mae's property interest effectively becomes the FHFA's while the

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conservatorship exists. Thus, the Federal Foreclosure Bar protects Fannie Mae's deed of trust while Fannie Mae is under the conservatorship." Christine View, 417 P.3d at 367. Christine View is published precedent that forecloses any argument suggesting that the Federal Foreclosure Bar does not preempt the State Foreclosure Statute or does not protect Fannie Mae's property interest from extinguishment. See id. at 365 (holding that "the Federal Foreclosure Bar invalidates any purported extinguishment of a regulated entity's property interest while under the FHFA's conservatorship unless the FHFA affirmatively consents.").

- 38. Three other recent decisions from the Nevada supreme court, four Ninth Circuit decisions, and dozens of decisions from federal and state district courts in Nevada agree with the Nevada Supreme Court's decision in *Christine View*—an HOA foreclosure sale cannot extinguish property interests of the Enterprises while they are in conservatorship. See, e.g., Guberland, 2018 WL 3025919, at \*2; A&I Series 3, LLC v. Fannie Mae, No, 71124, 2018 WL 3387787 (Nev. July 10, 2018) (unpublished disposition); 5312 La Quinta Hills, LLC v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP, No. 71069, 2018 WL 3025927, at \*1 (Nev. June 15, 2018) (unpublished disposition); *Berezovsky*, 869 F.3d 923; FHFA v. SFR, 893 F.3d 1136; Elmer, 707 F. App'x 426; Flagstar Bank, FSB, 699 F. App'x 658; see also CMI's Motion for Summary Judgment at (citing dozens of state and federal district court cases in Nevada).
- 39. The preemption doctrine, which provides that federal law supersedes conflicting state law, arises from the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Here, the text of the Federal Foreclosure Bar declares that "[n]o property of the Agency shall be subject to levy, attachment, garnishment, foreclosure, or sale." 12 U.S.C. § 4617(j)(3).
- 40. The Federal Foreclosure Bar preempts the State Foreclosure Statute under a theory of conflict preemption because "state law is naturally preempted to the extent of any conflict with a federal statute." Valle del Sol, 732 F.3d at 1023 (quoting Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372 (2000)).
- Congress's clear and manifest purpose in enacting Section 4617(j)(3) was to protect 41. FHFA conservatorships from actions, such as the HOA Sale, that otherwise would deprive them of their property interests. "[T]he [State Foreclosure Statute] is in direct conflict with Congress's clear

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and manifest goal to protect Fannie Mae's property interest while under the FHFA's conservatorship from threats arising from state foreclosure law." Christine View, 417 P.3d at 367; Berezovsky, 869 F.3d at 930 ("[T]he Federal Foreclosure Bar implicitly demonstrates a clear intent to preempt [the State Foreclosure Statute]."); FHFA v. SFR Invs. Pool 1, LLC, 893 F.3d at 1146-47 (following Berezovsky); Elmer, 707 F. App'x at 427-28 (same); Flagstar, 699 F. App'x at 658-59 (same).

- 42. Accordingly, the Federal Foreclosure Bar preempts the State Foreclosure Statute to the extent a homeowner association's foreclosure of its super-priority lien cannot extinguish a Fannie Mae property interest while it is under FHFA's conservatorship, without the consent of FHFA.
- 43. At the time of the HOA foreclosure sale, Bank of America was the Deed of Trust beneficiary of record in its capacity as the servicer for Fannie Mae. The evidence, which includes a Fannie Mae employee declaration and supporting business records, proves Fannie Mae owned the note and deed of trust at the time of the HOA sale and was in a contractual relationship with Bank of America as the loan servicer. Fannie Mae maintained a property interest in the underlying collateral. See Daisy Trust, 135 Nev. at 233-34, 445 P.3d at 849; In re Montierth, 131 Nev. 543, 354 P.3d 648 (2015); CitiMortgage, Inc. v. SFR Invs. Pool 1, LLC, No. 70237, 2019 WL 289690 (Nev. Jan. 18, 2019) (unpublished disposition); CitiMortgage, Inc. v. TRP Fund VI, LLC, No. 71318, 2019 WL 1245886, at \*1 (Nev. Mar. 14, 2019); Guberland, 2018 WL 3025919 at \*2-3 (citing Montierth); Restatement (Third) of Property: Mortgages § 5.4 (1997). In citing *Montierth* and the Nevada Supreme Court's adoption of the Restatement (Third) of Property: Mortgages, the Ninth Circuit held that a loan-owner servicer relationship "preserves the note owner's power to enforce its interest under the security instrument, because the note owner can direct the beneficiary to foreclose on its Berezovsky, 869 F.3d at 931. Under these circumstances, the loan owner maintains a secured property interest. Id. Therefore, an enterprise's "property interest is valid and enforceable under Nevada law even if the recorded document omits [the Enterprise]'s name, if the recorded beneficiary of the deed of trust is a party acting on [the Enterprise's] behalf." Elmer, 2017 WL 3822061, at \*1.
- 44. The Nevada Supreme Court has held materially identical "business records and testimony" constitute "ample evidence" to demonstrate an Enterprise's ownership of a loan and the

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contractual relationship between an Enterprise and its servicer. See M&T Bank v. Wild Calla St. Tr., No. 74715, 2019 WL 1423107, at \*2 (Nev. Mar. 28, 2019) (unpublished disposition); see also CitiMortgage v. SFR, 2019 WL 289690, at \*1 & n.1 ("Although respondent contends that appellant's evidence[—"deposition testimony of appellant's NRCP 30(b)(6) witness, affidavit, and relied-upon business records"—] does not establish that Fannie Mae owned the loan at the time of the HOA foreclosure sale, we disagree."); CitiMortgage v. TRP, 2019 WL 1245886, at \*1; SFR Invs. Pool 1, LLC v. Green Tree Servicing, LLC, No. 72010, 2018 WL 6721370, at \*1 (Dec. 17, 2018) (unpublished disposition).

- 45. The Ninth Circuit agrees and has held materially the same evidence was admissible and sufficient to establish an Enterprise's property interest for the purposes of summary judgment. See, e.g., Berezovsky, 869 F.3d at 933; Elmer, 707 F. App'x at 428; Williston, 736 F. App'x at 169; *G&P Investments*, 740 F. App'x at 564.
- 46. Nevada law does not require Fannie Mae's ownership interest to be recorded in its own name. Daisy Trust, 445 P.3d at 849; JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Guberland LLC-Series 2, No. 73196, 2019 WL 2339537, at \*1 (Nev. May 31, 2019) ("Guberland II"). The protection of the Federal Foreclosure Bar is not limited to the interest Fannie Mae might have if it were record beneficiary of the deed of trust at the time of the HOA sale. Rather, it extends to the property interest that Fannie Mae has as the owner of the note and deed of trust while its contractually authorized servicer appears as record beneficiary of that deed of trust, a property interest that Nevada law recognizes. See Montierth, 131 Nev. 543, 354 P.3d 648 (holding that a loan owner has a secured property interest when a contractually authorized servicer is the record beneficiary of a deed of trust); see also Guberland, 2018 WL 3025919, at \*2-3 (applying the Federal Foreclosure Bar where an enterprise "was not the beneficiary of the deed of trust" and its servicer appeared as record beneficiary); CitiMortgage v. SFR, 2019 WL 289690 at \*2 (relying on Montierth and holding the loan servicer's status as record beneficiary of the deed of trust "does not create a question of material fact regarding whether Fannie Mae owns the subject loan"); CitiMortgage v. TRP, 2019 WL 1245886, at \*1 (reversing the district court's finding that the Federal Foreclosure Bar did not prevent the extinguishment of Fannie Mae's deed of trust because it was not publicly recorded in Fannie

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Mae's name and confirming, under Montierth, that "the record beneficiary need not be the actual owner of the loan").

- 47. LN Management bears the burden of proof to establish that FHFA expressly consented to extinguish Fannie Mae's ownership interest in the deed of trust. FHFA's April 21, 2015 statement confirms that FHFA did not provide express consent here. In the absence of express consent, the Court cannot imply FHFA's consent, as doing so would ignore the plain text of the Federal Foreclosure Bar. See Berezovsky, 869 F.3d 923 (holding that FHFA's consent can only be manifested affirmatively); see also Alessi & Koenig, LLC v. Dolan, Jr., No. 2:15-cv-00805-JCM-CWH, 2017 WL 773827, at \*3 (D. Nev. Feb. 27, 2017) (citing and relying on cases in which FHFA's statement was sufficient to show FHFA's lack of consent). Although the federal law controls, it is consistent with Nevada's policy against requiring a party to prove a negative, such as proving a lack of consent. Andrews v. Harley Davidson, Inc., 106 Nev. 533, 539, 796 P.2d 1092, 1096-97 (1990) (even where a plaintiff bears the burden of proving his or her strict liability claim, "it is unfair to force the plaintiff consumer to prove a negative, i.e., that the product was not altered."); see also State v. Haskell, 14 Nev. 209, 209-210 (1879) (in a forfeiture case, once the defendant establishes good title to the property the burden shifts to the state – "not upon the defendants to prove a negative", *i.e.* that the property was not abandoned or forfeited).
- 48. LN Management has not shown it obtained such consent. To the contrary, FHFA has publicly announced that it "has not consented, and will not consent in the future, to the foreclosure or other extinguishment of any Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac lien or other property interest in connection with HOA foreclosures of super-priority liens." Therefore, the Federal Foreclosure Bar applies.
- 49. Having found that the Federal Foreclosure Bar applies, the next step is to determine if defendants have standing, as the servicer and beneficiary of record at the time of the HOA foreclosure sale and during the applicable periods of this action, to represent Fannie Mae's Mac interest in the loan. The Court finds that defendants were Fannie Mae's contractually authorized servicers of the loan, with standing to represent and defend Fannie Mae's interests in this action. See Nationstar Mortgage, LLC v. SFR Investments Pool 1, LLC, 396 P.3d 754 (Nev. 2017); Flagstar, 699 F. App'x at 658.

- 50. The Nevada Supreme Court confirmed that "the servicer of a loan owned by [Fannie Mae] may argue that the Federal Foreclosure Bar preempts NRS 116.3116, and that neither [Freddie Mac] nor the FHFA need be joined as a party." *Nationstar*, 396 P.3d at 758.
- 51. Furthermore, there is no bar against private parties like defendants raising a federal preemption argument. *Id.* at 757. To the contrary, in cases state and federal law clash, "*judges are bound by federal law*." *Id.* (quoting *Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Center, Inc.*, 135 S. Ct. 1378, 1384 (2015)) (emphasis in original); *See Saticoy Bay LLC Series Christine View v. Federal National Mortgage Association*, 134 Nev. Adv. Op. 36 (2018).
- 52. LN Management offers no evidence conflicting with Fannie Fae's ownership of the loan or defendants' right to represent Fannie Mae's interest in the loan.
- 53. Since no party has refuted evidence of Fannie Mae's ownership, the Federal Foreclosure Bar defeats LN Management's contention it took title to the property free and clear of the deed of trust.

### D. Tender Was Excused as Futile.

- 54. Even if the Federal Foreclosure Bar did not apply, Fannie Mae's deed of trust would still have survived because Bank of America's tender was excused under the Nevada supreme court's decision in *Perla del Mar. 7510 Perla Del Mar Ave Trust v. Bank of Am. N.A.*, 458 P.3d 348, 349 (Nev. 2020). That case held the obligation to tender is excused for futility where the evidence shows that the HOA or its foreclosure agent "had a known policy of rejecting such payments." *Id.*at 351 (citing cases from other jurisdictions endorsing the general proposition that a tender is excused when the party entitled to payment demonstrates by words or conduct it will not accept the tender).
- 55. Just as in *Perla Del Mar*, Bank of America and Miles Bauer offered to pay the HOA, through Collections of America, the superpriority amount "actually due" with no impermissible conditions attached. *See 7510 Perla Del Mar Ave. Trust v. Bank of America*, N.A., 458 P.3d 348, 349 (Nev. 2020) (noting "[a]n actual tender is unnecessary where it is apparent the other party will not accept it."). The HOA, through its agent, stated no superpriority lien existed until Bank of America completed its own foreclosure.

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- In analyzing materially similar representations from an HOA trustee, the Nevada 56. supreme court confirmed "[t]he necessary implication of these statements is that [the HOA trustee] would not have accepted a superpriority tender before the first deed of trust was foreclosed." See U.S. Bank N.A. v. SFR Invs. Pool 1 LLC, No. 78003, 2020 WL 3003017, at \*1 (Nev. June 4, 2020) (unpublished) (directing judgment in the bank's favor based on futility).
- 57. Bank of America stood ready, willing, and able to tender the full statutory superpriority amount to protect the deed of trust, but the HOA obstructed Bank of America's ability to tender the superpriority portion of the HOA's lien through its false representations and assurances. Id. The HOA sale thus did not extinguish the deed of trust because Bank of America was excused from formal tender.

### E. The HOA Conducted a Sub-Priority Sale.

- Irrespective of Bank of America's superpriority offer, the HOA foreclosed on only the 58. subpriority portion of its lien because that is what the HOA and its agent chose to do.
- 59. The Nevada Supreme Court in SFR Investments, applying the plain language of the statute, explained that "[a]s to first deeds of trust, NRS 116.3116(2) thus splits an HOA lien into two pieces, a superpriority piece and a subpriority piece." SFR Investments Pool 1 v. U.S. Bank, 334 P.3d 408, 411 (Nev. 2014). Only "[t]he superpriority piece" is "prior to a first deed of trust." *Id.* "The subpriority piece, consisting of all other HOA fees or assessments, is subordinate to a first deed of trust." Id. An association can choose to foreclose on either the sub-priority or super-priority portion of its lien. See Shadow Wood Homeowners Ass'n v. New York Cmty. Bancorp, Inc., 132 Nev. Adv. Op. 5, 366 P.3d 1105, 1116 (2016) ("And if the association forecloses on its superpriority lien portion, the sale also would extinguish other subordinate interests in the property."). See also River Glider Ave. Tr. v. The Bank of N.Y. Mellon, No. 79808 (Nev. Sup. Ct. Sept. 18, 2020) (unpublished disposition) (finding representations of purchaser in judicial proceeding determinative for whether a sale was a subpriority or super-priority sale).
- 60. This comports with long-standing Nevada law that the foreclosing party's intent determines what is transferred at auction. See, e.g., Dayton Valley Investors, LLC v. Union Pac. R. Co., 664 F.Supp. 2d 1174, 1185 (D. Nev. 2009) ("[I]t is the intent of the parties to the deed which ...

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must determine the nature and extent of the interest conveyed.") (quoting City Motel, Inc. v. Nevada ex. rel. State Dep't of Highways, 75 Nev. 137, 140, 336 P.2d 375, 377 (1959)). The foreclosing party's intent "is determined from 'all the circumstances surrounding the transaction[.]" See Dayton Valley, 664 F.Supp. 2d at 1185 (quoting Kartheiser v. Hawkins, 98 Nev. 237, 239, 645 P.2d 967, 968 (1982)).

- 61. Here, the undisputed evidence shows the HOA's agent, Collections of America, explicitly informed Bank of America it was not "foreclosing on a super-priority lien pursuant to NRS 116.3116" and that the HOA did not claim "to have a super-priority lien since the first mortgage [had] not [been] foreclosed."
- 62. "Because the HOA foreclosed on only its sub-priority lien, [LN Management] cannot meet its burden of showing it has title superior to [the Deed of Trust]." 7912 Limbwood Court Trust v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 2015 WL 5123317 at \*4 (D. Nev. Aug. 31, 2015); see also MacDonald v. Krause, 77 Nev. 312, 315, 362 P.2d 724, 727 (1961) ("In a quiet title action, the only issue is whether plaintiff has an interest or estate in the property superior to the adverse claim."). Accordingly, defendants are entitled to summary judgment on this alternative basis.

### F. Alternatively, The Court Finds the Deed of Trust Survived as a Matter of Equity

- 63. The court need not reach the equities in this matter because Fannie Mae's deed of trust survived as a matter of law. Bank of America, N.A. v. SFR Invs. Pool 1, LLC, 427 P.3d 113 (Nev. 2018). But even if the court balanced the equities in this case, they tip strongly in defendants' favor.
- 64. If an association sells a property for a price that is "palpabl[y] and great[ly] inadequate," all that is needed to show the deed of trust survived as a matter of equity is "very slight additional evidence of unfairness." Nationstar Mortgage, LLC v. Saticoy Bay LLC Series 2227 Shadow Canyon, 405 P.3d 641, 642 (Nev. 2017). To determine if an association's foreclosure-sale price is inadequate, courts must compare that price to the foreclosed property's fair market value at the time of the sale. See id., at 649 (comparing the \$35,000.00 association-foreclosure-sale price to an appraisal showing the fair-market value of free and clear title was \$335,000.00 to determine the association sold the property "for roughly 11 percent of [its] fair market value"). A foreclosure-sale

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price below 20% of fair market value is "obviously inadequate." See Shadow Wood, 366 P.3d at 1116.

- 65. The Nevada supreme court has provided a non-exhaustive list of "irregularities that may rise to the level of fraud, unfairness, or oppression" required to set aside an association sale or hold that it did not extinguish a senior deed of trust, including: (1) "failure to mail a deed of trust beneficiary the statutorily required notices"; (2) "an HOA's representation that the foreclosure sale will not extinguish the first deed of trust"; (3) "collusion between the winning bidder and the entity selling the property"; (4) "a foreclosure trustee's refusal to accept a higher bid"; and (5) "a foreclosure trustee's misrepresentation of the sale date." *Id.* at n.11 (emphasis added).
- 66. Here, the HOA sold the Property for less than 2% of its fair market value. In light of this "palpabl[y] and great[ly]" inadequate sales price, only slight evidence of unfairness is needed to set aside the foreclosure sale. See Nationstar, 405 P.3d at 648. Prior to the HOA Sale, Bank of America contacted Collections to offer to pay the full statutory super-priority amount, as it has done in hundreds – if not thousands – of other cases. Collections subsequently assured Bank of America that it was not foreclosing on a "super-priority lien pursuant to NRS 116.3116" and that the HOA did not claim to "have a super-priority lien." Miles Bauer, on behalf of Bank of America, asked Collections to let them know if the circumstances of the HOA Sale changed, as "Bank of America would like to payoff any potential senior lien, should one exist, to protect [the Deed of Trust]." Id. Again, in response to Bank of America's willingness to tender the full statutory super-priority amount, Collections advised that no such lien existed, and it would notify Bank of America if anything changed. Id.
- 67. Bank of America attempted to pay the superpriority amount of the HOA's lien here to ensure Fannie Mae's deed of trust was protected, and the HOA prevented it from doing so. This is another example of unfairness the supreme court explicitly identified in Shadow Canyon. See 405 P.3d at 650 (explaining that whether a senior lender "tried to tender payment" to an association before the sale is "significant[]" to determine whether the lender's deed of trust survived as an equitable matter).

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- 68. In light of the HOA and its agents' representations to Bank of America and Miles Bauer, coupled with the HOA's efforts to thwart Bank of America's superpriority payment, holding that the deed of trust was extinguished would be much more than "very slight[ly] unfair," and "[v]ery slight additional evidence of unfairness or oppression" is all that is needed in light of the "palpabl[y] and great[ly]" inadequate sale price to hold the deed of trust was not extinguished on equitable grounds. See Shadow Canyon, 405 P.3d at 648.
- 69. Even if LN Management was a bona fide purchaser, it is but one factor of many when balancing the equities between it and defendants and does not change the above result. Further, the court finds LN Management was not a bona fide purchaser.
- 70. To be a bona fide purchaser, one must take property "for a valuable consideration and without notice of the prior equity, and without notice of facts which upon diligent inquiry would be indicated and from which notice would be imputed to him, if he failed to make such inquiry." Shadow Wood, 366 P.3d at 1115 (citing Bailey v. Butner, 64 Nev. 1, 19, 176 P.2d 226, 234 (1947)).
- 71. A putative bona fide purchaser has the burden to prove it is a bona fide purchaser. See, e.g., Berge v. Fredericks, 95 Nev. 183, 185, 591 P.2d 246, 248 (1979) (explaining that the putative bona fide purchaser "was required to show that legal title had been transferred to her before she had notice of the prior conveyance to appellant"). Here, LN Management cannot satisfy its burden to show that it was a bona fide purchaser.
- 72. First, and most obvious, LN Management put forth no evidence that it was a bona fide purchaser.
- 73. Second, LN Management cannot be a bona fide purchaser because it had inquiry notice of Miles Bauer's superpriority offer. A party cannot qualify as a bona fide purchaser if it was under a duty of inquiry that it failed to discharge before purchasing the property at issue. Berge, 95 Nev. at 189. The *Berge* Court explained that this duty arises:

when the circumstances are such that a purchaser is in possession of facts which would lead a reasonable man in his position to make an investigation that would advise him of the existence of prior unrecorded rights. He is said to have constructive notice of their existence whether he does or does not make the investigation. The authorities are unanimous in holding that he has notice of whatever the search would disclose.

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Id.

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- 74. A purchaser "put upon inquiry may rebut the presumption of notice by showing that he made due investigation without discovering the prior right or title he was bound to investigate." *Id.*, at 185. LN Management has produced no evidence it conducted such an investigation.
- 75. The bona fide purchaser doctrine does not protect against willful ignorance plaintiff's decision to purchase a lawsuit cannot transform the encumbered interest it purchased into free and clear title. See Allison Steel, 86 Nev. at 497.
- 76. As such, the deed of trust survived the HOA's foreclosure sale as a matter of equity and continues to encumber plaintiff's title to the property.

### G. The Court Reforms the Deed of Trust and Subsequent Assignment.

- 77. Deeds and other instruments, like an assignment, can be "reformed in accordance with the intention of parties when that intention is frustrated by a mutual mistake." Grappo v. Mauch, 110 Nev. 1396, 1398, 887 P.2d 740, 741 (1994). Reformation should be utilized "when a written instrument fails to conform to the parties' previous understanding or agreement." Id.
- 78. Borrower purchased two units in the same condominium development. First, Borrower obtained a loan in the amount of \$322,100.00 to purchase the Property (3111 Bel Air Dr., Unit 24G), repayment of which was secured by a Deed of Trust recorded on October 20, 2004. The Property was conveyed to Borrower by the previous owner through a Grant Deed recorded on October 16, 2003 as instrument number 20031016-01640. The Deed of Trust lists the APN as 162-10-812-185.
- 79. Borrower subsequently obtained a second loan to purchase another unit in the same condominium complex. Specifically, Borrower obtained a loan in the amount of \$149,000 to purchase real property commonly known as 3111 Bel Air Dr. #216, Las Vegas, NV 89109 (216 **Property**), repayment of which was secured by a Deed of Trust recorded on December 31, 2007 (216 Deed of Trust). The 216 Deed of Trust, like the Deed of Trust, lists Bank of America as the Lender. The 216 Property's APN number as 162-10-812-003.
- 80. While the property address and the APN on the Deed of Trust are correct, the Court finds the legal description is incorrect. The Grant Deed conveying the Property to Borrower

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specifies that Unit 24G is designated Unit 185 in the original Regency Towers plat. Due to a mutual mistake, however, the legal description in the Deed of Trust states that Unit 24G is designated as Unit 3 in the Regency Towers plat. In reality, Unit 3 is the correct legal description for the 216 Property. The property records, the Regency Towers plat, and defendants' expert report make clear that the Property's legal description should list Unit 185, as opposed to Unit 3.

- 81. Based on the uncontroverted evidence, the Court reforms the legal description in the Deed of Trust to list Unit 185, as opposed to Unit 3.
- 82. The second instrument requiring reformation is an Assignment of the Deed of Trust recorded on July 30, 2013. Due to a mutual mistake and confusion, the Assignment was inadvertently recorded against APN #162-10-812-003, which is the 216 Property. The Assignment correctly states that it is assigning the Deed of Trust (not the 216 Deed of Trust) but does not appear in the property records for the Property when conducting an assessor's parcel no. search on account of the incorrect APN. The language in the Assignment makes it clear that the Assignment should have been recorded against APN 162-10-812-185.
- 83. Based on the uncontroverted evidence, the Court reforms the Assignment to reflect the correct APN (162-10-812-185) and orders that the Assignment's effective date as to the subject property was the date it was recorded against the incorrect parcel number (July 30, 2013).

#### ORDER AND JUDGMENT

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the deed of trust, instrument number 20041020-0001569 with the Clark County Recorder, was not extinguished by the HOA's foreclosure sale that is reflected in the trustee's deed upon sale, instrument number 201212170000834 with the Clark County Recorder.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the deed of trust, instrument number 20041020-0001569 with the Clark County Recorder, remains a valid, firstposition lien encumbering the property located at as 3111 Bel Air Dr., Unit 24G, Las Vegas, Nevada 89109, assessor's parcel no. 162-10-812-185.

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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the legal description of the property in the deed of trust, instrument number 20041020-0001569 with the Clark County Recorder, is reformed to list Unit 185, as opposed to Unit 3.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the Assignment of the deed of trust, recorded on July 30, 2013 as instrument number 201307300000199 with the Clark County Recorder, is reformed to reflect the assessor's parcel no. 162-10-812-185. The assignment's effective date remains the date it was recorded against the incorrect parcel number, or July 30, 2013. The court intends this judgment to correct any alleged deficiencies in the at-issue deed of trust and subsequent assignment.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that defendants' motion for summary judgment is **GRANTED** in its entirety. Judgment is entered in favor of defendants and against LN Management. This is a final judgment.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED the court lifts the stay and reopens this case for the purpose of granting defendants' summary judgment motion and entering the court's judgment.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that all remaining claims are **DISMISSED** as moot.

DATED this 20th day of January, 2021.

DISTRICT JUDGE

Submitted by:

AKERMAN LLP

<u>/s/ Nicholas E. Belay</u> ARIEL E. STERN, ESQ.

Nevada Bar No. 8276

24 NATALIE L. WINSLOW, ESQ.

Nevada Bar No. 12125

NICHOLAS E. BELAY, ESQ.

Nevada Bar No. 15175

1635 Village Center Circle, Suite 200

Las Vegas, Nevada 89134

Attorneys for Bank of America, N.A. and Ditech

Financial LLC f/k/a Green Tree Servicing LLC

Approved as to form and content by:

<u>/s/ Kerry P. Faughnan</u>

KERRÝ P. FAUGHNAN, ESO.

Nevada Bar No. 12204

P.O. Box 335361

N. Las Vegas, Nevada 89033

(702) 301-3096 Telephone: Facsimile: (702) 331-4222

Email: kerry.faughnan@gmail.com

Attorneys for LN Management LLC Series 3111

Bel Air 24G

AKERMAN LLP

1635 VILLAGE CENTER CIRCLE, SUITE 200 LAS VEGAS, NEVADA 89134 TEL.: (702) 634-5000 – FAX: (702) 380-8572 

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#### Llarena, Carla (LAA-Las)

From: Belay, Nicholas (Assoc-Las)

Sent: Wednesday, January 6, 2021 2:00 PM

**To:** Belay, Nicholas (Assoc-Las)

**Subject:** FW: A-12-669570-C (Elliott, Michael) - proposed order

From: Kerry Faughnan

Sent: Wednesday, January 6, 2021 8:45 AM

To: Belay, Nicholas (Assoc-Las)

Subject: Re: A-12-669570-C (Elliott, Michael) - proposed order

You may add my electronic signature.

On Tue, Jan 5, 2021 at 4:16 PM < <u>nicholas.belay@akerman.com</u>> wrote:

Hi Kerry,

Just following up. Think you could let me know by tomorrow?

#### **Nicholas Belay**

Associate

Akerman LLP | 1635 Village Center Circle, Suite 200 | Las Vegas, NV 89134

D: 702 634 5029

nicholas.belay@akerman.com

Steven D. Grierson **CLERK OF THE COURT NEFF** 1 ARIEL E. STERN, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 8276 2 NATALIE L. WINSLOW, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 12125 3 NICHOLAS E. BELAY, ESQ. 4 Nevada Bar No. 15175 AKERMAN LLP 5 1635 Village Center Circle, Suite 200 Las Vegas, Nevada 89134 Telephone: (702) 634-5000 6 Facsimile: (702) 380-8572 Email: ariel.stern@akerman.com 7 Email: natalie.winslow@akerman.com 8 Email: nicholas.belay@akerman.com 9 Attorneys for Bank of America, N.A. and Ditech Financial LLC f/k/a Green Tree Servicing LLC 10 1635 VILLAGE CENTER CIRCLE, SUITE 200 LAS VEGAS, NEVADA 89134 TEL.: (702) 634-5000 – FAX: (702) 380-8572 **DISTRICT COURT** 11 **CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA** 12 LN MANAGEMENT LLC SERIES 3111 BEL 13 A-12-669570-C AIR 24G, Consolidated with: A-13-682055-C 14 Plaintiff, Dept. No.: XIII 15 v. 16 NOTICE OF ENTRY OF FINDINGS OF MICHAEL T. ELLIOTT, an individual; BANK FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND OF AMERICA, N.A.; and DOES 1 through 10, **JUDGMENT** 17 inclusive, 18 19 Defendants. 20 AND ALL RELATED CLAIMS. 21 22 /// 23 /// 24 /// 25 /// 26 /// 27 ///

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Case Number: A-12-669570-C

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# AKERMAN LLP

### 1635 VILLAGE CENTER CIRCLE, SUITE 200 LAS VEGAS, NEVADA 89134 TEL.: (702) 634-5000 – FAX: (702) 380-8572

#### TO ALL PARTIES AND TO THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD:

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that a **FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND JUDGMENT** has been entered by this Court on the 20<sup>th</sup> day of January, 2021, in the above-captioned matter. A copy of said Order is attached hereto as **Exhibit A**.

Dated this 21st day of January, 2021.

#### **AKERMAN LLP**

/s/ Nicholas E. Belay
ARIEL E. STERN, ESQ.
Nevada Bar No. 8276
NATALIE L. WINSLOW, ESQ.
Nevada Bar No. 12125
NICHOLAS E. BELAY, ESQ.
Nevada Bar No. 15175
1635 Village Center Circle, Suite 200
Las Vegas, Nevada 89134

Attorneys for Bank of America, N.A. and Ditech Financial LLC f/k/a Green Tree Servicing LLC

## AKERMAN LLP

### 1635 VILLAGE CENTER CIRCLE, SUITE 200 LAS VEGAS, NEVADA 89134 TEL.: (702) 634-5000 – FAX: (702) 380-8572 11 12 13 14 15 16 17

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#### **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

I HEREBY CERTIFY that I am an employee of AKERMAN LLP, and that on this 21st day of January, 2021, I caused to be served a true and correct copy of the foregoing **NOTICE OF ENTRY** OF FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND JUDGMENT, in the following manner:

(ELECTRONIC SERVICE) Pursuant to Administrative Order 14-2, the above-referenced document was electronically filed on the date hereof and served through the Notice of Electronic Filing automatically generated by the Court's facilities to those parties listed on the Court's Master Service List as follows:

kerry.faughnan@gmail.com Kerry P. Faughnan, Esq. DocPrep filings@docprep.info Jory Garabedian jgarabedian@mileslegal.com

I declare that I am employed in the office of a member of the bar of this Court at whose discretion the service was made.

> /s/ Carla Llarena An employee of AKERMAN LLP

## **EXHIBIT A**

## **EXHIBIT A**

**Electronically Filed** 1/20/2021 3:31 PM Steven D. Grierson **CLERK OF THE COURT** 

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ARIEL E. STERN, ESQ.

Nevada Bar No. 8276

2 NATALIE L. WINSLOW, ESQ.

Nevada Bar No. 12125

NICHOLAS E. BELAY, ESQ.

4 Nevada Bar No. 15175

**AKERMAN LLP** 

5 1635 Village Center Circle, Suite 200

Las Vegas, Nevada 89134

Telephone: (702) 634-5000 6

Facsimile: (702) 380-8572 Email: ariel.stern@akerman.com

Email: natalie.winslow@akerman.com

8 Email: nicholas.belay@akerman.com

Attorneys for Bank of America, N.A. and Ditech Financial LLC f/k/a Green Tree Servicing LLC

#### DISTRICT COURT **CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA**

LN MANAGEMENT LLC SERIES 3111 BEL AIR 24G,

Plaintiff,

v.

MICHAEL T. ELLIOTT, an individual; BANK OF AMERICA, N.A.; and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive,

Defendants.

AND ALL RELATED CLAIMS.

Case No.: A-12-669570-C Consolidated with: A-13-682055-C

Dept. No.: XIII

<del>PROPOSED</del> FINDINGS OF FACT, **CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND JUDGMENT** 

Ditech Financial LLC f/k/a Green Tree Servicing LLC (**Ditech**) and Bank of America, N.A. (collectively, **defendants**) filed a summary judgment motion on September 29, 2020. LN Management LLC Series 3111 Bel Air 24G filed an opposition on November 11, 2020, and defendants filed reply on November 20, 2020. The court held a hearing on the motion on December 3, 2020. Following the hearing, the court took the matter under advisement.

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Case Number: A-12-669570-C

**AKERMAN LLP** 

1635 VILLAGE CENTER CIRCLE, SUITE 200 LAS VEGAS, NEVADA 89134 TEL.: (702) 634-5000 – FAX: (702) 380-8572 11 12 13 14 15 16 17

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On December 14, 2020, the court entered a minute order granting defendants' summary judgment motion. The court now enters the following findings of fact and conclusions of law.

#### FINDINGS OF FACT

#### The Subject Property, Note, and Deed of Trust

- A deed of trust listing Michael T. Elliott as the borrower (Borrower) and Bank of America as the lender and beneficiary was executed on October 6, 2004 and recorded on October 20, 2004 (**Deed of Trust**). The Deed of Trust granted Lender a security interest in real property known as 3111 Bel Air Dr., Unit 24G, Las Vegas, Nevada 89109 (the **Property**) to secure the repayment of a promissory note (the **Note**) in the original amount of \$322,100.00 to the Borrower (the Note and Deed of Trust together are the **Loan**). The Deed of Trust listed the APN number as 162-10-812-185.
- 2. In November 2004, Fannie Mae purchased the Loan, thereby acquiring ownership of the Deed of Trust. Fannie Mae maintained that ownership at the time of the HOA Sale on December 12, 2012.
- 3. In September 2008, Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) placed Fannie Mae into conservatorship "for the purpose of reorganizing, rehabilitating, or winding up [its] affairs." 12 U.S.C. § 4617(a)(2). Fannie Mae remains in conservatorship today.
- 4. At the time of the HOA Sale, Bank of America was the servicer of the Loan for Fannie Mae.
- 5. Bank of America serviced the Loan for Fannie Mae up until on or about April 30, 2013, when the servicing rights were transferred to Ditech.
- 6. On July 30, 2013, Bank of America recorded an assignment of the Deed of Trust to Ditech.
- 7. On December 20, 2019, Ditech recorded an assignment of the Deed of Trust to New Residential Mortgage, LLC.
- 8. On March 17, 2020, New Residential Mortgage, LLC recorded an assignment of the Deed of Trust to NewRez LLC d/b/a Shellpoint Mortgage Servicing (NewRez).

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#### Fannie Mae's Contract with Its Servicers, Including Bank of America, Ditech, and NewRez

- 9. The relationship between Bank of America, Ditech, and NewRez, as the servicers of the Loan, and Fannie Mae, as owner of the Loan, is governed by the Fannie Mae's Single-Family Selling Guide at A2-1-01 and Fannie Mae's Single-Family Servicing Guide (**Guide**), a central governing document for Fannie Mae's relationship with servicers nationwide. Among other things, the Guide provides that Fannie Mae's servicers may act as record beneficiaries for the deeds of trust owned by Fannie Mae and requires that servicers assign these deeds of trust to Fannie Mae upon Fannie Mae's demand. Selling Guide at A2-1-01, Servicing Guide F-1-11.
  - 10. The Guide provides that:

The servicer ordinarily appears in the land records as the mortgagee to facilitate performance of the servicer's contractual responsibilities, including (but not limited to) the receipt of legal notices that may impact Fannie Mae's lien, such as notices of foreclosure, tax, and other liens. However, Fannie Mae may take any and all action with respect to the mortgage loan it deems necessary to protect its ... ownership of the mortgage loan, including recordation of a mortgage assignment, or its legal equivalent, from the servicer to Fannie Mae or its designee. In the event that Fannie Mae determines it necessary to record such an instrument, the servicer must assist Fannie Mae by

- preparing and recording any required documentation, such as mortgage assignments, powers of attorney, or affidavits; and
- providing recordation information for the affected mortgage loans.

Selling Guide at A2-1-03 (emphasis added).

11. The Guide also provides for a temporary transfer of possession of the note when necessary for servicing, such as managing litigation on behalf of Fannie Mae:

In order to ensure that a servicer is able to perform the services and duties incident to the servicing of the mortgage loan, Fannie Mae temporarily gives the servicer possession of the mortgage note whenever the servicer, acting in its own name, represents the interests of Fannie Mae in foreclosure actions, bankruptcy cases, probate proceedings, or other legal proceedings.

This temporary transfer of possession occurs automatically and immediately upon the commencement of the servicer's representation, in

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its name, of Fannie Mae's interests in the foreclosure, bankruptcy, probate, or other legal proceeding.

Selling Guide at A2-1-04.

- 11. The Guide includes a chapter describing how and when servicers should pursue foreclosure. See generally Guide at E-3 (Managing Foreclosure Proceedings). The chapter includes detailed provisions for how servicers may foreclose on properties when either Fannie Mae, MERS, or the servicer itself is the beneficiary of record of the relevant deed of trust. Guide at E-3.2-09.
- 12. The Guide also includes a chapter that explains how servicers should manage litigation on behalf of Fannie Mae. See generally Guide at E-1 (Referring Default-Related Legal Matters and Non-Routine Litigation to Law Firms).
- 13. The Guide states that "Fannie Mae is at all times the owner of the mortgage note," and "[a]t the conclusion of the servicer's representation of Fannie Mae's interests in the foreclosure . . . possession automatically reverts to Fannie Mae." Guide at A2-1-04.
- 14. Pursuant to the Guide, a servicer is required to "maintain in the individual mortgage" loan file all documents and system records that preserve Fannie Mae's ownership interest in the individual mortgage loan." Guide at A2-4-01.
- 15. Any servicer retaining documents related to a particular loan, such as a deed of trust, has "no right to possess these documents and records except under the conditions specified by Fannie Mae." Guide at A2-5.1-02.

#### The HOA Foreclosure Sale and LN Management's Purported Acquisition of the Property

- On June 21, 2012, Collections, as agent for the HOA, recorded a Notice of Claim 16. Delinquent Assessment Notice.
- 17. On July 25, 2012, Collections, as agent for the HOA, recorded a Notice of Default and Election to Sell.
- 18. After the Notice of Default was recorded, on or about August 16, 2012, Bank of America, through counsel at Miles, Bauer, Bergstrom, & Winters, LLP (Miles Bauer), contacted the HOA through Collections and requested the super-priority amount.

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- 19. Collections responded on or about November 27, 2012, and provided a Statement of Account.
- 20. Following receipt of the Statement of Account, Miles Bauer and Collections discussed the HOA Sale via telephone. In email correspondence recounting the details of the telephone conversation, Collections confirmed that neither it nor the HOA was "foreclosing on a super-priority lien pursuant to NRS 116.3116."
- 21. Collections further confirmed that it and the HOA were "not claiming to have a super-priority lien since the first mortgage [had] not been foreclosed on the property."
- 22. Miles Bauer advised Collections that if the HOA and Collections were to conduct a super-priority sale, "Bank of America would like to payoff any potential senior lien, should one exist, to protect its first mortgage security interest."
- 23. Collections, on behalf of the HOA, then recorded a Notice of Trustee Sale on November 15, 2012.
- 24. On December 17, 2012, a foreclosure deed was recorded against the Property. The foreclosure deed states that the Property was sold at an HOA foreclosure sale on December 12, 2012, to 3111 Bel Air Drive 24G Trust for \$7,001.00.
- 3111 Bel Air Drive 24G Trust subsequently conveyed the Property to LN 25. Management via a Quitclaim Deed recorded on April 26, 2013.
- 26. At no time did the Conservator consent to the HOA Sale extinguishing or foreclosing Fannie Mae's interest in the Property. (FHFA's Statement on HOA Super-Priority Lien Foreclosures (Apr. 21, 2015), www.fhfa.gov/Media/PublicAffairs/Pages/Statement-on-HOA-Super-Priority-Lien-Foreclosures.aspx).
- 27. The fair market value of the Property at the time of the HOA Sale was \$360,000. The purchase price at the HOA Sale was less than 2% of the fair market value.

#### Procedural History

28. LN Management initiated an action for quiet title/declaratory relief on May 17, 2013. See Case No. A-13-682055-C. The court consolidated the case with the above-captioned action on October 29, 2013.

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- 29. Ditech moved for summary judgment in June 2014. The court granted summary judgment in favor of Ditech on August 13, 2014. The order granted Ditech's motion "in its entirety" and constituted the "final order/judgment in this matter."
- 30. LN Management moved to set aside the judgment and reopen the case in September 2014. The court granted the motion on September 24, 2014, reinstituting the action.
- 31. After a period of inaction by LN Management, the court dismissed the case without prejudice under Rule 41(e) in May 2018.
- 32. LN Management moved for reconsideration of the court's order on June 21, 2018, arguing the court should set aside the court's five-year rule dismissal and reopen the case so that the parties could obtain "final orders that would determine each of the parties rights as to the property."
- 33. LN Management specifically stated defendants and LN Management "need this Court to issue final orders that would determine each of the parties rights as to the property." LN Management further represented any delay in resolving the case after the court granted its initial motion to reopen in September 2014 was due to LN Management's own "excusable neglect."
  - 34. No other party filed an opposition to LN Management's motion to reopen.
  - 35. The court granted LN Management's motion to reopen the case on July 27, 2018.
- 36. The matter was then stayed due to Ditech's bankruptcy on March 27, 2019, and it remained stayed to date.
- 37. Defendants moved to lift the stay and reopen the case from its statistical closure concurrently with their summary judgment motion, which the court grants.

#### CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1. If any findings of fact are properly conclusions of law, or conclusions of law properly findings of fact, they shall be treated as if properly identified and designated.

#### Standard of Proof $\boldsymbol{A}$ .

2. "A quiet title action . . . is the proper method by which to adjudicate disputed ownership of real property rights." Howell v. Ricci, 124 Nev. 1222, 1224, 197 P.3d 1044, 1046 (2008). "An action may be brought by any person against another who claims an estate or interest in real property, adverse to him, for the purpose of determining such adverse claim." NRS 40.010.

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- 3. NRS 30.010 et seq. gives courts "power to declare rights, status and other legal relations." LN Management and defendants both seek declaratory relief under that statute.
- 4. Here, defendants request declaratory relief and quiet title. LN Management contends that it bought the property and the first deed of trust was extinguished. Defendants assert the sale did not extinguish the deed of trust because: (1) Fannie Mae owned the loan, and Bank of America was the beneficiary of record of the deed of trust in its capacity as the servicer of the loan for Fannie Mae at the time of the HOA foreclosure sale in December 2012, and thus, the Federal Foreclosure Bar applies; (2) the HOA foreclosed on only the sub-priority portion of its statutory lien; (3) the deed of trust survived as a matter of equity.
- 5. In an action such as the present one, the parties must prove their claims and affirmative defenses by a preponderance of the evidence. See Nev. J.I. 2EV.1. Under Nevada law, "[t]he term 'preponderance of the evidence' means such evidence as, when weighed with that opposed to it, has more convincing force, and from which it appears that the greater probability of truth lies therein." Nev. J.I. 2EV.1; Corbin v. State, 111 Nev. 378, 892 P.2d 580 (1995) (regarding entrapment, "[p]reponderance of the evidence means such evidence as, when weighed with that opposed to it, has more convincing force and the greater probability of truth.").
- 6. Nevada law draws no distinction between circumstantial and direct evidence. Deveroux v. State, 96 Nev. 388, 391 (1980); Nev. J.I. 2EV.3 ("The law makes no distinction between the weight to be given either direct or circumstantial evidence. Therefore, all of the evidence in the case, including circumstantial evidence, should be considered...").

#### В. The Five-Year Rule under NRCP 41(e) Has Not Run

7. LN Management contends the court should dismiss this case under NRCP 41(e) because the five-year rule has expired. The court rejects this argument.

#### The Action was Brought to Trial

8. NRCP 41(e) only applies if an action is not brought to trial within 5 years after the action was filed. See NRCP 41(e)(2)(B). The Nevada supreme court defines "trial" as "the examination before a competent tribunal, according to the law of the land, of questions of fact or of law put in issue by pleadings, for the purpose of determining the rights of the parties." United Ass'n

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of Journeymen & Apprentices of Plumbing & Pipe Fitting Indus. v. Manson, 105 Nev. 816, 819–20, 783 P.2d 955, 957 (1989). Under this definition, "proceedings leading to a complete grant of summary judgment constitute a trial" for purposes of the five-year rule. Monroe v. Columbia Sunrise Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 123 Nev. 96, 100, 158 P.3d 1008, 1010 (2007). This holds true even when thirdparty claims remain outstanding. *Id.* at 1011.

- 9. The court granted summary judgment in favor of Ditech on August 13, 2014. The order granted Ditech's motion "in its entirety" and constituted the "final order/judgment in this matter." While the court ultimately granted LN Management's motion to set aside the judgment in September 2014, nothing in either NRCP 41(e) or Nevada case law negates the fact Ditech brought the action "to trial" within the meaning of Rule 41(e).
- 10. Rule 41(e)'s plain language does not contemplate the five-year rule being reinstated after it has already been satisfied on summary judgment. See Vanguard Piping v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 129 Nev. 602, 608, 309 P.3d 1017, 1020 (2013) (stating the rules of statutory interpretation apply to procedural rules and noting the court should look to the plain language of the rule); Thran v. District Ct., 79 Nev. 176, 180-81 (1963) (Rule 41(e) is "clear, unambiguous and requires no construction other than its own language.").
- 11. Because Ditech already satisfied the five-year rule, it is no longer applicable to this action.

#### LN Management Stipulated to Forego the Five-Year Rule

- Even if the five-year rule had not already been satisfied, the court finds the parties 12. have stipulated to waive it.
- 13. NRCP 41(e)(5) provides a party may stipulate in writing to extend the time in which to prosecute an action.
- 14. The court finds this is precisely what LN Management did when it moved for reconsideration of the court's May 2018 order dismissing the action under Rule 41(e).
- 15. In the motion, LN Management argued the court should set aside the court's five-year rule dismissal and reopen the case so that the parties could obtain "final orders that would determine

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each of the parties rights as to the property." No other party filed an opposition to LN Management's motion.

16. By filing an unopposed motion to disregard the five-year rule dismissal and litigate the matter on the merits, the court finds LN Management and the remaining parties stipulated to forego application of the five-year rule to this matter.

#### LN Management is judicially estopped from obtaining dismissal under the Five-Year Rule.

- 17. Even assuming the five-year rule continues to apply, the court finds LN Management is judicially estopped from obtaining dismissal.
- 18. Judicial estoppel has five elements: "(1) the same party has taken two positions; (2) the positions were taken in judicial or quasi-judicial administrative proceedings; (3) the party was successful in asserting the first position (i.e., the tribunal adopted the position or accepted it as true); (4) the two positions are totally inconsistent; and (5) the first position was not taken as a result of ignorance, fraud, or mistake." Matter of Frei Irrevocable Tr. Dated Oct. 29, 1996, 133 Nev. 50, 56, 390 P.3d 646, 652 (2017) (citation omitted). All elements are satisfied to prevent LN Management from now asserting the five-year rule.
- 19. First, LN Management has taken two positions. In its opposition, LN Management contends the five-year rule expired on October 3, 2017, necessitating dismissal of this action. But LN Management previously moved for reconsideration on June 21, 2018, of the court's order dismissing the action for want of prosecution under the very same rule LN Management now seeks to enforce.
  - 20. Second, LN Management's positions were taken in this case, a judicial proceeding.
- 21. Third, LN Management successfully obtained reconsideration of the court's order dismissing the action under Rule 41(e). The court granted LN Management's motion and reopened the case on July 27, 2018.
- 22. Fourth, the positions are inconsistent. LN Management moved for (and obtained) reconsideration of the court's Rule 41(e) dismissal, explicitly arguing such relief was appropriate due to its own wrongful conduct. LN Management now seeks to undo its own motion by arguing the

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five-year rule somehow expired in October 2017. These positions are entirely irreconcilable. LN Management cannot now argue for dismissal under Rule 41(e) when it previously moved to reopen the case (for the second time) notwithstanding this very rule.

23. Finally, LN Management's conduct cannot be found to result from ignorance, fraud or mistake. LN Management moved on its own volition for reconsideration of the court's dismissal order and directly argued the order should be set aside based on excusable neglect. Management's own words, such reconsideration was justified because the parties "need" the court to determine the parties' respective rights in the property.

#### LN Management's Five-Year Rule argument is barred by Waiver and Equitable Estoppel.

- 24. In addition to being judicially estopped from arguing for five-year rule dismissal, LN Management also waived or else should be equitably estopped from raising the issue.
- 25. Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right. Nev. Yellow Cab Corp. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court ex rel. Cty. of Clark, 152 P.3d 737, 740 (Nev. 2007). Waiver of a right may be inferred when a party engages in conduct so inconsistent with an intent to enforce the right as to induce a reasonable belief that the right has been relinquished. Id. Further, a party seeking equity is required to do equity. Overhead Door Co. of Reno, Inc. v. Overhead Door Corp., 734 P.2d 1233, 1235 (Nev. 1987). Equitable estoppel operates to prevent a party from asserting legal rights that, in equity and good conscience, they should not be allowed to assert because of their own conduct. NGA #2 Liab. Co. v. Rains, 946 P.2d 163, 168 (Nev. 1997).
- 26. Here, the court finds LN Management twice moved to reopen this case: First, after Ditech brought the action to trial; and second, after LN Management obtained reconsideration of the court's rule 41(e) dismissal order.
- 27. To the extent LN Management believed the five-year rule expired in October 2017, LN Management has intentionally relinquished any such argument.
- 28. Had LN Management indicated any intent to argue for five-year rule dismissal prior to its opposition to the instant motion, defendants could have acted accordingly to either obtain

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affirmative relief or request an expediated resolution of the matter. Instead, LN Management did the exact opposite, arguing the court should maintain the case notwithstanding any such rule.

29. Defendants reasonably relied on this relinquishment and would be severely prejudiced if the court dismissed the action without resolving the parties' respective interests in the property.

#### Alternatively, the Five-Year Rule has not run due to tolling.

- 30. To the extent the five-year rule was reinstituted based on its September 24, 2014 order granting LN Management's post-trial motion to reopen the case, the court finds the deadline still would not have run due to tolling.
- 31. Under this scenario, the earliest the five-year rule could have expired is September 24, 2019, or five-years after the court reinstituted the action.
- 32. But the Nevada supreme court has explicitly recognized the deadline can be tolled under certain circumstances, such as when the court stays proceedings. Baker v. Noback, 112 Nev. 1106, 1110 (1996) (noting it would be "patently unfair" to dismiss an action for failure to bring to trial when a stay prevented the parties from going to trial within the period); see also Boren v. City of N. Las Vegas, 98 Nev. 5, 6, 638 P.2d 404, 405 (1982) ("Any period during which the parties are prevented from bringing an action to trial by reason of a stay order shall not be computed in determining the five-year period of [NRCP] 41(e).") (emphasis added).
- 33. Here, this matter was closed between May 23, 2018 and July 27, 2018 before the court granted LN Management's motion to reopen. The matter was then stayed due to Ditech's bankruptcy on March 27, 2019, and it remains stayed to date.
- 34. Accounting for these tolling periods, the five-year deadline would be at least 246 days from when the stay is lifted and/or the case is reopened. Accordingly, the court finds there is no merit to LN Management's contention the five-year rule deadline has expired.

#### *C*. Federal Foreclosure Bar – 12 U.S.C. § 4617(j)(3)

Pursuant to the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 ("HERA"), Congress granted FHFA an array of powers, privileges, and exemptions from otherwise applicable laws to enable FHFA to carry out its statutory functions when acting as Conservator of Fannie Mae and Freddie

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Mac (together, the "enterprises"). Among these is a broad statutory "exemption" captioned "property protection" that provides when the enterprises are under the conservatorship of the FHFA, none of their property "shall be subject to ... foreclosure ... without the consent of [FHFA]." 12 U.S.C. § 4617(j)(3) (the "Federal Foreclosure Bar").

- 35. The Federal Foreclosure Bar contains no conditions precedent to effectiveness of its statutory protections. Unless and until FHFA gives its consent, the federal protection "shall" be given full effect, which includes preemption of state law. SFR Invs. Pool 1, LLC v. Green Tree Servicing, LLC, No. A-13-680704 (Nev. Dist. Ct. Nov. 17, 2016) (citing 12 U.S.C. § 4617(j)(3)). A contrary interpretation would invert the default rule provided in the statutory text on its head, as if Congress decreed that FHFA's property interests are subject to extinguishment by foreclosure unless FHFA affirmatively declares that it will not grant consent to the extinguishment of a specific property interest. This is not what the statute says, and courts should not rewrite a statute's text. See Lamie v. United States Trustee, 540 U.S. 526, 538 (2004) (rejecting argument that "would result not [in] a construction of [the] statute, but, in effect, an enlargement of it by the court" (quoting *Iselin v*. United States, 270 U. S. 245, 251 (1926))); Conn. Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-54 (1992) ("[I]n interpreting a statute a court should always turn first to one, cardinal canon before all others . . . that a legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says."). Here, there is no evidence FHFA consented to extinguishment of the deed of trust.
- The Nevada supreme court and the Ninth Circuit have both held unequivocally that 36. the Federal Foreclosure Bar, 12 U.S.C. § 4617(j)(3), protects Fannie Mae's property interests while it under the conservatorship of the FHFA by preempting the NRS 116.3116 (the **State Foreclosure Statute**), which would otherwise permit an HOA's foreclosure of its superpriority lien to extinguish Fannie Mae's deed of trust. See Saticoy Bay LLC Series 9641 Christine View v. Fannie Mae, 417 P.3d 363 (Nev. 2018); Berezovsky v. Moniz, 869 F.3d 923 (9th Cir. 2017); FHFA v. SFR Invs. Pool 1, LLC, 893 F.3d 1136 (9th Cir. 2018); Elmer v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., 707 F. App'x 426 (9th Cir. 2017); Saticoy Bay, LLC v. Flagstar Bank, FSB, 699 F. App'x 658 (9th Cir. 2017).
- 37. In Christine View, the Nevada supreme court held that "according to the plain language of the statute, Fannie Mae's property interest effectively becomes the FHFA's while the

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conservatorship exists. Thus, the Federal Foreclosure Bar protects Fannie Mae's deed of trust while Fannie Mae is under the conservatorship." Christine View, 417 P.3d at 367. Christine View is published precedent that forecloses any argument suggesting that the Federal Foreclosure Bar does not preempt the State Foreclosure Statute or does not protect Fannie Mae's property interest from extinguishment. See id. at 365 (holding that "the Federal Foreclosure Bar invalidates any purported extinguishment of a regulated entity's property interest while under the FHFA's conservatorship unless the FHFA affirmatively consents.").

- 38. Three other recent decisions from the Nevada supreme court, four Ninth Circuit decisions, and dozens of decisions from federal and state district courts in Nevada agree with the Nevada Supreme Court's decision in *Christine View*—an HOA foreclosure sale cannot extinguish property interests of the Enterprises while they are in conservatorship. See, e.g., Guberland, 2018 WL 3025919, at \*2; A&I Series 3, LLC v. Fannie Mae, No, 71124, 2018 WL 3387787 (Nev. July 10, 2018) (unpublished disposition); 5312 La Quinta Hills, LLC v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP, No. 71069, 2018 WL 3025927, at \*1 (Nev. June 15, 2018) (unpublished disposition); *Berezovsky*, 869 F.3d 923; FHFA v. SFR, 893 F.3d 1136; Elmer, 707 F. App'x 426; Flagstar Bank, FSB, 699 F. App'x 658; see also CMI's Motion for Summary Judgment at (citing dozens of state and federal district court cases in Nevada).
- 39. The preemption doctrine, which provides that federal law supersedes conflicting state law, arises from the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Here, the text of the Federal Foreclosure Bar declares that "[n]o property of the Agency shall be subject to levy, attachment, garnishment, foreclosure, or sale." 12 U.S.C. § 4617(j)(3).
- 40. The Federal Foreclosure Bar preempts the State Foreclosure Statute under a theory of conflict preemption because "state law is naturally preempted to the extent of any conflict with a federal statute." Valle del Sol, 732 F.3d at 1023 (quoting Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372 (2000)).
- Congress's clear and manifest purpose in enacting Section 4617(j)(3) was to protect 41. FHFA conservatorships from actions, such as the HOA Sale, that otherwise would deprive them of their property interests. "[T]he [State Foreclosure Statute] is in direct conflict with Congress's clear

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and manifest goal to protect Fannie Mae's property interest while under the FHFA's conservatorship from threats arising from state foreclosure law." Christine View, 417 P.3d at 367; Berezovsky, 869 F.3d at 930 ("[T]he Federal Foreclosure Bar implicitly demonstrates a clear intent to preempt [the State Foreclosure Statute]."); FHFA v. SFR Invs. Pool 1, LLC, 893 F.3d at 1146-47 (following Berezovsky); Elmer, 707 F. App'x at 427-28 (same); Flagstar, 699 F. App'x at 658-59 (same).

- 42. Accordingly, the Federal Foreclosure Bar preempts the State Foreclosure Statute to the extent a homeowner association's foreclosure of its super-priority lien cannot extinguish a Fannie Mae property interest while it is under FHFA's conservatorship, without the consent of FHFA.
- 43. At the time of the HOA foreclosure sale, Bank of America was the Deed of Trust beneficiary of record in its capacity as the servicer for Fannie Mae. The evidence, which includes a Fannie Mae employee declaration and supporting business records, proves Fannie Mae owned the note and deed of trust at the time of the HOA sale and was in a contractual relationship with Bank of America as the loan servicer. Fannie Mae maintained a property interest in the underlying collateral. See Daisy Trust, 135 Nev. at 233-34, 445 P.3d at 849; In re Montierth, 131 Nev. 543, 354 P.3d 648 (2015); CitiMortgage, Inc. v. SFR Invs. Pool 1, LLC, No. 70237, 2019 WL 289690 (Nev. Jan. 18, 2019) (unpublished disposition); CitiMortgage, Inc. v. TRP Fund VI, LLC, No. 71318, 2019 WL 1245886, at \*1 (Nev. Mar. 14, 2019); Guberland, 2018 WL 3025919 at \*2-3 (citing Montierth); Restatement (Third) of Property: Mortgages § 5.4 (1997). In citing *Montierth* and the Nevada Supreme Court's adoption of the Restatement (Third) of Property: Mortgages, the Ninth Circuit held that a loan-owner servicer relationship "preserves the note owner's power to enforce its interest under the security instrument, because the note owner can direct the beneficiary to foreclose on its Berezovsky, 869 F.3d at 931. Under these circumstances, the loan owner maintains a secured property interest. Id. Therefore, an enterprise's "property interest is valid and enforceable under Nevada law even if the recorded document omits [the Enterprise]'s name, if the recorded beneficiary of the deed of trust is a party acting on [the Enterprise's] behalf." Elmer, 2017 WL 3822061, at \*1.
- 44. The Nevada Supreme Court has held materially identical "business records and testimony" constitute "ample evidence" to demonstrate an Enterprise's ownership of a loan and the

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contractual relationship between an Enterprise and its servicer. See M&T Bank v. Wild Calla St. Tr., No. 74715, 2019 WL 1423107, at \*2 (Nev. Mar. 28, 2019) (unpublished disposition); see also CitiMortgage v. SFR, 2019 WL 289690, at \*1 & n.1 ("Although respondent contends that appellant's evidence[—"deposition testimony of appellant's NRCP 30(b)(6) witness, affidavit, and relied-upon business records"—] does not establish that Fannie Mae owned the loan at the time of the HOA foreclosure sale, we disagree."); CitiMortgage v. TRP, 2019 WL 1245886, at \*1; SFR Invs. Pool 1, LLC v. Green Tree Servicing, LLC, No. 72010, 2018 WL 6721370, at \*1 (Dec. 17, 2018) (unpublished disposition).

- 45. The Ninth Circuit agrees and has held materially the same evidence was admissible and sufficient to establish an Enterprise's property interest for the purposes of summary judgment. See, e.g., Berezovsky, 869 F.3d at 933; Elmer, 707 F. App'x at 428; Williston, 736 F. App'x at 169; *G&P Investments*, 740 F. App'x at 564.
- 46. Nevada law does not require Fannie Mae's ownership interest to be recorded in its own name. Daisy Trust, 445 P.3d at 849; JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Guberland LLC-Series 2, No. 73196, 2019 WL 2339537, at \*1 (Nev. May 31, 2019) ("Guberland II"). The protection of the Federal Foreclosure Bar is not limited to the interest Fannie Mae might have if it were record beneficiary of the deed of trust at the time of the HOA sale. Rather, it extends to the property interest that Fannie Mae has as the owner of the note and deed of trust while its contractually authorized servicer appears as record beneficiary of that deed of trust, a property interest that Nevada law recognizes. See Montierth, 131 Nev. 543, 354 P.3d 648 (holding that a loan owner has a secured property interest when a contractually authorized servicer is the record beneficiary of a deed of trust); see also Guberland, 2018 WL 3025919, at \*2-3 (applying the Federal Foreclosure Bar where an enterprise "was not the beneficiary of the deed of trust" and its servicer appeared as record beneficiary); CitiMortgage v. SFR, 2019 WL 289690 at \*2 (relying on Montierth and holding the loan servicer's status as record beneficiary of the deed of trust "does not create a question of material fact regarding whether Fannie Mae owns the subject loan"); CitiMortgage v. TRP, 2019 WL 1245886, at \*1 (reversing the district court's finding that the Federal Foreclosure Bar did not prevent the extinguishment of Fannie Mae's deed of trust because it was not publicly recorded in Fannie

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Mae's name and confirming, under Montierth, that "the record beneficiary need not be the actual owner of the loan").

- 47. LN Management bears the burden of proof to establish that FHFA expressly consented to extinguish Fannie Mae's ownership interest in the deed of trust. FHFA's April 21, 2015 statement confirms that FHFA did not provide express consent here. In the absence of express consent, the Court cannot imply FHFA's consent, as doing so would ignore the plain text of the Federal Foreclosure Bar. See Berezovsky, 869 F.3d 923 (holding that FHFA's consent can only be manifested affirmatively); see also Alessi & Koenig, LLC v. Dolan, Jr., No. 2:15-cv-00805-JCM-CWH, 2017 WL 773827, at \*3 (D. Nev. Feb. 27, 2017) (citing and relying on cases in which FHFA's statement was sufficient to show FHFA's lack of consent). Although the federal law controls, it is consistent with Nevada's policy against requiring a party to prove a negative, such as proving a lack of consent. Andrews v. Harley Davidson, Inc., 106 Nev. 533, 539, 796 P.2d 1092, 1096-97 (1990) (even where a plaintiff bears the burden of proving his or her strict liability claim, "it is unfair to force the plaintiff consumer to prove a negative, i.e., that the product was not altered."); see also State v. Haskell, 14 Nev. 209, 209-210 (1879) (in a forfeiture case, once the defendant establishes good title to the property the burden shifts to the state – "not upon the defendants to prove a negative", *i.e.* that the property was not abandoned or forfeited).
- 48. LN Management has not shown it obtained such consent. To the contrary, FHFA has publicly announced that it "has not consented, and will not consent in the future, to the foreclosure or other extinguishment of any Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac lien or other property interest in connection with HOA foreclosures of super-priority liens." Therefore, the Federal Foreclosure Bar applies.
- 49. Having found that the Federal Foreclosure Bar applies, the next step is to determine if defendants have standing, as the servicer and beneficiary of record at the time of the HOA foreclosure sale and during the applicable periods of this action, to represent Fannie Mae's Mac interest in the loan. The Court finds that defendants were Fannie Mae's contractually authorized servicers of the loan, with standing to represent and defend Fannie Mae's interests in this action. See Nationstar Mortgage, LLC v. SFR Investments Pool 1, LLC, 396 P.3d 754 (Nev. 2017); Flagstar, 699 F. App'x at 658.

- 50. The Nevada Supreme Court confirmed that "the servicer of a loan owned by [Fannie Mae] may argue that the Federal Foreclosure Bar preempts NRS 116.3116, and that neither [Freddie Mac] nor the FHFA need be joined as a party." *Nationstar*, 396 P.3d at 758.
- 51. Furthermore, there is no bar against private parties like defendants raising a federal preemption argument. *Id.* at 757. To the contrary, in cases state and federal law clash, "*judges are bound by federal law*." *Id.* (quoting *Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Center, Inc.*, 135 S. Ct. 1378, 1384 (2015)) (emphasis in original); *See Saticoy Bay LLC Series Christine View v. Federal National Mortgage Association*, 134 Nev. Adv. Op. 36 (2018).
- 52. LN Management offers no evidence conflicting with Fannie Fae's ownership of the loan or defendants' right to represent Fannie Mae's interest in the loan.
- 53. Since no party has refuted evidence of Fannie Mae's ownership, the Federal Foreclosure Bar defeats LN Management's contention it took title to the property free and clear of the deed of trust.

#### D. Tender Was Excused as Futile.

- 54. Even if the Federal Foreclosure Bar did not apply, Fannie Mae's deed of trust would still have survived because Bank of America's tender was excused under the Nevada supreme court's decision in *Perla del Mar. 7510 Perla Del Mar Ave Trust v. Bank of Am. N.A.*, 458 P.3d 348, 349 (Nev. 2020). That case held the obligation to tender is excused for futility where the evidence shows that the HOA or its foreclosure agent "had a known policy of rejecting such payments." *Id.*at 351 (citing cases from other jurisdictions endorsing the general proposition that a tender is excused when the party entitled to payment demonstrates by words or conduct it will not accept the tender).
- 55. Just as in *Perla Del Mar*, Bank of America and Miles Bauer offered to pay the HOA, through Collections of America, the superpriority amount "actually due" with no impermissible conditions attached. *See 7510 Perla Del Mar Ave. Trust v. Bank of America*, N.A., 458 P.3d 348, 349 (Nev. 2020) (noting "[a]n actual tender is unnecessary where it is apparent the other party will not accept it."). The HOA, through its agent, stated no superpriority lien existed until Bank of America completed its own foreclosure.

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- In analyzing materially similar representations from an HOA trustee, the Nevada 56. supreme court confirmed "[t]he necessary implication of these statements is that [the HOA trustee] would not have accepted a superpriority tender before the first deed of trust was foreclosed." See U.S. Bank N.A. v. SFR Invs. Pool 1 LLC, No. 78003, 2020 WL 3003017, at \*1 (Nev. June 4, 2020) (unpublished) (directing judgment in the bank's favor based on futility).
- 57. Bank of America stood ready, willing, and able to tender the full statutory superpriority amount to protect the deed of trust, but the HOA obstructed Bank of America's ability to tender the superpriority portion of the HOA's lien through its false representations and assurances. Id. The HOA sale thus did not extinguish the deed of trust because Bank of America was excused from formal tender.

#### **E**. The HOA Conducted a Sub-Priority Sale.

- Irrespective of Bank of America's superpriority offer, the HOA foreclosed on only the 58. subpriority portion of its lien because that is what the HOA and its agent chose to do.
- 59. The Nevada Supreme Court in SFR Investments, applying the plain language of the statute, explained that "[a]s to first deeds of trust, NRS 116.3116(2) thus splits an HOA lien into two pieces, a superpriority piece and a subpriority piece." SFR Investments Pool 1 v. U.S. Bank, 334 P.3d 408, 411 (Nev. 2014). Only "[t]he superpriority piece" is "prior to a first deed of trust." *Id.* "The subpriority piece, consisting of all other HOA fees or assessments, is subordinate to a first deed of trust." Id. An association can choose to foreclose on either the sub-priority or super-priority portion of its lien. See Shadow Wood Homeowners Ass'n v. New York Cmty. Bancorp, Inc., 132 Nev. Adv. Op. 5, 366 P.3d 1105, 1116 (2016) ("And if the association forecloses on its superpriority lien portion, the sale also would extinguish other subordinate interests in the property."). See also River Glider Ave. Tr. v. The Bank of N.Y. Mellon, No. 79808 (Nev. Sup. Ct. Sept. 18, 2020) (unpublished disposition) (finding representations of purchaser in judicial proceeding determinative for whether a sale was a subpriority or super-priority sale).
- 60. This comports with long-standing Nevada law that the foreclosing party's intent determines what is transferred at auction. See, e.g., Dayton Valley Investors, LLC v. Union Pac. R. Co., 664 F.Supp. 2d 1174, 1185 (D. Nev. 2009) ("[I]t is the intent of the parties to the deed which ...

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must determine the nature and extent of the interest conveyed.") (quoting City Motel, Inc. v. Nevada ex. rel. State Dep't of Highways, 75 Nev. 137, 140, 336 P.2d 375, 377 (1959)). The foreclosing party's intent "is determined from 'all the circumstances surrounding the transaction[.]" See Dayton Valley, 664 F.Supp. 2d at 1185 (quoting Kartheiser v. Hawkins, 98 Nev. 237, 239, 645 P.2d 967, 968 (1982)).

- 61. Here, the undisputed evidence shows the HOA's agent, Collections of America, explicitly informed Bank of America it was not "foreclosing on a super-priority lien pursuant to NRS 116.3116" and that the HOA did not claim "to have a super-priority lien since the first mortgage [had] not [been] foreclosed."
- 62. "Because the HOA foreclosed on only its sub-priority lien, [LN Management] cannot meet its burden of showing it has title superior to [the Deed of Trust]." 7912 Limbwood Court Trust v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 2015 WL 5123317 at \*4 (D. Nev. Aug. 31, 2015); see also MacDonald v. Krause, 77 Nev. 312, 315, 362 P.2d 724, 727 (1961) ("In a quiet title action, the only issue is whether plaintiff has an interest or estate in the property superior to the adverse claim."). Accordingly, defendants are entitled to summary judgment on this alternative basis.

#### F. Alternatively, The Court Finds the Deed of Trust Survived as a Matter of Equity

- 63. The court need not reach the equities in this matter because Fannie Mae's deed of trust survived as a matter of law. Bank of America, N.A. v. SFR Invs. Pool 1, LLC, 427 P.3d 113 (Nev. 2018). But even if the court balanced the equities in this case, they tip strongly in defendants' favor.
- 64. If an association sells a property for a price that is "palpabl[y] and great[ly] inadequate," all that is needed to show the deed of trust survived as a matter of equity is "very slight additional evidence of unfairness." Nationstar Mortgage, LLC v. Saticoy Bay LLC Series 2227 Shadow Canyon, 405 P.3d 641, 642 (Nev. 2017). To determine if an association's foreclosure-sale price is inadequate, courts must compare that price to the foreclosed property's fair market value at the time of the sale. See id., at 649 (comparing the \$35,000.00 association-foreclosure-sale price to an appraisal showing the fair-market value of free and clear title was \$335,000.00 to determine the association sold the property "for roughly 11 percent of [its] fair market value"). A foreclosure-sale

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price below 20% of fair market value is "obviously inadequate." See Shadow Wood, 366 P.3d at 1116.

- 65. The Nevada supreme court has provided a non-exhaustive list of "irregularities that may rise to the level of fraud, unfairness, or oppression" required to set aside an association sale or hold that it did not extinguish a senior deed of trust, including: (1) "failure to mail a deed of trust beneficiary the statutorily required notices"; (2) "an HOA's representation that the foreclosure sale will not extinguish the first deed of trust"; (3) "collusion between the winning bidder and the entity selling the property"; (4) "a foreclosure trustee's refusal to accept a higher bid"; and (5) "a foreclosure trustee's misrepresentation of the sale date." *Id.* at n.11 (emphasis added).
- 66. Here, the HOA sold the Property for less than 2% of its fair market value. In light of this "palpabl[y] and great[ly]" inadequate sales price, only slight evidence of unfairness is needed to set aside the foreclosure sale. See Nationstar, 405 P.3d at 648. Prior to the HOA Sale, Bank of America contacted Collections to offer to pay the full statutory super-priority amount, as it has done in hundreds – if not thousands – of other cases. Collections subsequently assured Bank of America that it was not foreclosing on a "super-priority lien pursuant to NRS 116.3116" and that the HOA did not claim to "have a super-priority lien." Miles Bauer, on behalf of Bank of America, asked Collections to let them know if the circumstances of the HOA Sale changed, as "Bank of America would like to payoff any potential senior lien, should one exist, to protect [the Deed of Trust]." Id. Again, in response to Bank of America's willingness to tender the full statutory super-priority amount, Collections advised that no such lien existed, and it would notify Bank of America if anything changed. Id.
- 67. Bank of America attempted to pay the superpriority amount of the HOA's lien here to ensure Fannie Mae's deed of trust was protected, and the HOA prevented it from doing so. This is another example of unfairness the supreme court explicitly identified in Shadow Canyon. See 405 P.3d at 650 (explaining that whether a senior lender "tried to tender payment" to an association before the sale is "significant[]" to determine whether the lender's deed of trust survived as an equitable matter).

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- 68. In light of the HOA and its agents' representations to Bank of America and Miles Bauer, coupled with the HOA's efforts to thwart Bank of America's superpriority payment, holding that the deed of trust was extinguished would be much more than "very slight[ly] unfair," and "[v]ery slight additional evidence of unfairness or oppression" is all that is needed in light of the "palpabl[y] and great[ly]" inadequate sale price to hold the deed of trust was not extinguished on equitable grounds. See Shadow Canyon, 405 P.3d at 648.
- 69. Even if LN Management was a bona fide purchaser, it is but one factor of many when balancing the equities between it and defendants and does not change the above result. Further, the court finds LN Management was not a bona fide purchaser.
- 70. To be a bona fide purchaser, one must take property "for a valuable consideration and without notice of the prior equity, and without notice of facts which upon diligent inquiry would be indicated and from which notice would be imputed to him, if he failed to make such inquiry." Shadow Wood, 366 P.3d at 1115 (citing Bailey v. Butner, 64 Nev. 1, 19, 176 P.2d 226, 234 (1947)).
- 71. A putative bona fide purchaser has the burden to prove it is a bona fide purchaser. See, e.g., Berge v. Fredericks, 95 Nev. 183, 185, 591 P.2d 246, 248 (1979) (explaining that the putative bona fide purchaser "was required to show that legal title had been transferred to her before she had notice of the prior conveyance to appellant"). Here, LN Management cannot satisfy its burden to show that it was a bona fide purchaser.
- 72. First, and most obvious, LN Management put forth no evidence that it was a bona fide purchaser.
- 73. Second, LN Management cannot be a bona fide purchaser because it had inquiry notice of Miles Bauer's superpriority offer. A party cannot qualify as a bona fide purchaser if it was under a duty of inquiry that it failed to discharge before purchasing the property at issue. Berge, 95 Nev. at 189. The *Berge* Court explained that this duty arises:

when the circumstances are such that a purchaser is in possession of facts which would lead a reasonable man in his position to make an investigation that would advise him of the existence of prior unrecorded rights. He is said to have constructive notice of their existence whether he does or does not make the investigation. The authorities are unanimous in holding that he has notice of whatever the search would disclose.

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- 74. A purchaser "put upon inquiry may rebut the presumption of notice by showing that he made due investigation without discovering the prior right or title he was bound to investigate." *Id.*, at 185. LN Management has produced no evidence it conducted such an investigation.
- 75. The bona fide purchaser doctrine does not protect against willful ignorance plaintiff's decision to purchase a lawsuit cannot transform the encumbered interest it purchased into free and clear title. See Allison Steel, 86 Nev. at 497.
- 76. As such, the deed of trust survived the HOA's foreclosure sale as a matter of equity and continues to encumber plaintiff's title to the property.

#### G. The Court Reforms the Deed of Trust and Subsequent Assignment.

- 77. Deeds and other instruments, like an assignment, can be "reformed in accordance with the intention of parties when that intention is frustrated by a mutual mistake." Grappo v. Mauch, 110 Nev. 1396, 1398, 887 P.2d 740, 741 (1994). Reformation should be utilized "when a written instrument fails to conform to the parties' previous understanding or agreement." Id.
- 78. Borrower purchased two units in the same condominium development. First, Borrower obtained a loan in the amount of \$322,100.00 to purchase the Property (3111 Bel Air Dr., Unit 24G), repayment of which was secured by a Deed of Trust recorded on October 20, 2004. The Property was conveyed to Borrower by the previous owner through a Grant Deed recorded on October 16, 2003 as instrument number 20031016-01640. The Deed of Trust lists the APN as 162-10-812-185.
- 79. Borrower subsequently obtained a second loan to purchase another unit in the same condominium complex. Specifically, Borrower obtained a loan in the amount of \$149,000 to purchase real property commonly known as 3111 Bel Air Dr. #216, Las Vegas, NV 89109 (216 **Property**), repayment of which was secured by a Deed of Trust recorded on December 31, 2007 (216 Deed of Trust). The 216 Deed of Trust, like the Deed of Trust, lists Bank of America as the Lender. The 216 Property's APN number as 162-10-812-003.
- 80. While the property address and the APN on the Deed of Trust are correct, the Court finds the legal description is incorrect. The Grant Deed conveying the Property to Borrower

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specifies that Unit 24G is designated Unit 185 in the original Regency Towers plat. Due to a mutual mistake, however, the legal description in the Deed of Trust states that Unit 24G is designated as Unit 3 in the Regency Towers plat. In reality, Unit 3 is the correct legal description for the 216 Property. The property records, the Regency Towers plat, and defendants' expert report make clear that the Property's legal description should list Unit 185, as opposed to Unit 3.

- 81. Based on the uncontroverted evidence, the Court reforms the legal description in the Deed of Trust to list Unit 185, as opposed to Unit 3.
- 82. The second instrument requiring reformation is an Assignment of the Deed of Trust recorded on July 30, 2013. Due to a mutual mistake and confusion, the Assignment was inadvertently recorded against APN #162-10-812-003, which is the 216 Property. The Assignment correctly states that it is assigning the Deed of Trust (not the 216 Deed of Trust) but does not appear in the property records for the Property when conducting an assessor's parcel no. search on account of the incorrect APN. The language in the Assignment makes it clear that the Assignment should have been recorded against APN 162-10-812-185.
- 83. Based on the uncontroverted evidence, the Court reforms the Assignment to reflect the correct APN (162-10-812-185) and orders that the Assignment's effective date as to the subject property was the date it was recorded against the incorrect parcel number (July 30, 2013).

#### ORDER AND JUDGMENT

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the deed of trust, instrument number 20041020-0001569 with the Clark County Recorder, was not extinguished by the HOA's foreclosure sale that is reflected in the trustee's deed upon sale, instrument number 201212170000834 with the Clark County Recorder.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the deed of trust, instrument number 20041020-0001569 with the Clark County Recorder, remains a valid, firstposition lien encumbering the property located at as 3111 Bel Air Dr., Unit 24G, Las Vegas, Nevada 89109, assessor's parcel no. 162-10-812-185.

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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the legal description of the property in the deed of trust, instrument number 20041020-0001569 with the Clark County Recorder, is reformed to list Unit 185, as opposed to Unit 3.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the Assignment of the deed of trust, recorded on July 30, 2013 as instrument number 201307300000199 with the Clark County Recorder, is reformed to reflect the assessor's parcel no. 162-10-812-185. The assignment's effective date remains the date it was recorded against the incorrect parcel number, or July 30, 2013. The court intends this judgment to correct any alleged deficiencies in the at-issue deed of trust and subsequent assignment.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that defendants' motion for summary judgment is **GRANTED** in its entirety. Judgment is entered in favor of defendants and against LN Management. This is a final judgment.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED the court lifts the stay and reopens this case for the purpose of granting defendants' summary judgment motion and entering the court's judgment.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that all remaining claims are **DISMISSED** as moot.

DATED this 20th day of January, 2021.

DISTRICT JUDGE

Submitted by:

AKERMAN LLP

<u>/s/ Nicholas E. Belay</u> ARIEL E. STERN, ESQ.

Nevada Bar No. 8276

24 NATALIE L. WINSLOW, ESQ.

Nevada Bar No. 12125

NICHOLAS E. BELAY, ESQ.

Nevada Bar No. 15175

1635 Village Center Circle, Suite 200

Las Vegas, Nevada 89134

Attorneys for Bank of America, N.A. and Ditech

Financial LLC f/k/a Green Tree Servicing LLC

Approved as to form and content by:

<u>/s/ Kerry P. Faughnan</u>

KERRÝ P. FAUGHNAN, ESO.

Nevada Bar No. 12204

P.O. Box 335361

N. Las Vegas, Nevada 89033

(702) 301-3096 Telephone: Facsimile: (702) 331-4222

Email: kerry.faughnan@gmail.com

Attorneys for LN Management LLC Series 3111

Bel Air 24G

#### Llarena, Carla (LAA-Las)

From: Belay, Nicholas (Assoc-Las)

Sent: Wednesday, January 6, 2021 2:00 PM

**To:** Belay, Nicholas (Assoc-Las)

**Subject:** FW: A-12-669570-C (Elliott, Michael) - proposed order

From: Kerry Faughnan

Sent: Wednesday, January 6, 2021 8:45 AM

To: Belay, Nicholas (Assoc-Las)

Subject: Re: A-12-669570-C (Elliott, Michael) - proposed order

You may add my electronic signature.

On Tue, Jan 5, 2021 at 4:16 PM < <u>nicholas.belay@akerman.com</u>> wrote:

Hi Kerry,

Just following up. Think you could let me know by tomorrow?

#### **Nicholas Belay**

Associate

Akerman LLP | 1635 Village Center Circle, Suite 200 | Las Vegas, NV 89134

D: 702 634 5029

nicholas.belay@akerman.com

#### DISTRICT COURT **CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA**

Title to Property		COURT MINUTES	October 21, 2013
A-12-669570-C	vs.	rica, Plaintiff(s) tt, Defendant(s)	
October 21, 2013	9:00 AM	Motion to Consolidate	Plaintiff's Motion to Consolidate Cases A669570 and A682055
<b>HEARD BY:</b> Dent	on, Mark R.	COURTROOM:	RJC Courtroom 12A

**COURT CLERK:** Sharon Chun

Cynthia Georgilas RECORDER:

**REPORTER:** 

**PARTIES** PRESENT:

#### **JOURNAL ENTRIES**

- Counsel present for A669570: Jory Garabedian for Bank of America and Gregory Kerr for Regency Towers Association Inc. Counsel present for A682055: Kerry Faughnan.

THIS MATTER having come before the Court on October 21, 2013, for hearing on Plaintiffs Motion To Consolidate A669570 and A682055, and the Court, having considered the papers submitted in connection with such item and heard the arguments made on behalf of the parties, hereby entered its decision as follows:

COURT ORDERED, Plaintiff's Motion to Consolidate A669570 and A682055, GRANTED and both cases are now assigned to Department XIII.

CLERK'S NOTE: Clerk has notified Master Calendar of the consolidation of A682055 with A669570.

PRINT DATE: 02/23/2021 Page 1 of 18 Minutes Date: October 21, 2013

## DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

Title to Property		COURT MINUTES	July 17, 2014
A-12-669570-C	vs.	rica, Plaintiff(s) et, Defendant(s)	
July 17, 2014	3:00 AM	Motion for Summary Judgment	
<b>HEARD BY:</b> Denton, Mark R.		COURTROOM: No Location	
COURT CLERK:	Keri Cromer		
RECORDER:			

#### **JOURNAL ENTRIES**

- Cause appearing, and pursuant to EDCR 2.20(e) and EDCR 2.23(c), the Court GRANTS Plaintiff s Motion for Summary Judgment without oral argument and ORDERS such Motion removed from its civil law and motion calendar of July 21, 2014. Counsel for Plaintiff to submit a proposed order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

**REPORTER:** 

PARTIES PRESENT:

Attorneys/Parties:

Jory C. Garabedian, Esq. (MILES, BAUER, BERGSTROM & WINTERS LLP)

Fax: 702-369-4955

Kerry Faughnan, Esq. Fax: 702-331-4222

Gregory Kerr, Esq. (WOLF, RIFKIN, SHAPIRO, SCHULMAN & RABKIN, LLP)

PRINT DATE: 02/23/2021 Page 2 of 18 Minutes Date: October 21, 2013

#### A-12-669570-C

Fax: 702-341-5300

Michael R. Mushkin, Esq. (MICHAEL R. MUSHKIN & ASSOC.)

Fax: 702-454-3333

PRINT DATE: 02/23/2021 Page 3 of 18 Minutes Date: October 21, 2013

A-12-669570-C

Bank of America, Plaintiff(s)
vs.
Michael Elliott, Defendant(s)

September 09, 2014 9:00 AM Motion to Set Aside

**HEARD BY:** Denton, Mark R. **COURTROOM:** RJC Courtroom 12A

**COURT CLERK:** Keri Cromer

**RECORDER:** Cynthia Georgilas

**REPORTER:** 

**PARTIES** 

**PRESENT:** Faughnan, Kerry P, ESQ Attorney Garabedian, Jory Attorney

#### **JOURNAL ENTRIES**

- Arguments by counsel regarding whether or not summary judgment should be set aside; whether or not there were genuine issues of material fact; whether or not there had to be some meritorious defense. Colloquy regarding whether or not Yochum vs. Davis applied or if it had been modified. Court stated its findings and ORDERED, Motion GRANTED; briefing schedule SET; hearing SET. Opposition due by close of business on 9/19/14; reply to opposition due by close of business on 9/26/14; hearing to be held on 10/2/14, 9:00 AM. Mr. Faughnan to submit a proposed order; Mr. Garabedian to review as to form and content.

PRINT DATE: 02/23/2021 Page 4 of 18 Minutes Date: October 21, 2013

Title to Property COURT MINUTES October 02, 2014

A-12-669570-C Bank of America, Plaintiff(s)

VS.

Michael Elliott, Defendant(s)

October 02, 2014 9:00 AM Hearing

**HEARD BY:** Denton, Mark R. **COURTROOM:** RJC Courtroom 12A

**COURT CLERK:** Keri Cromer

**RECORDER:** Cynthia Georgilas

**REPORTER:** 

**PARTIES** 

**PRESENT:** Faughnan, Kerry P, ESQ Attorney

Garabedian, Jory Attorney

#### **JOURNAL ENTRIES**

- Mr. Garabedian requested a continuance in order to file a reply; advised his firm moved offices and he did not have access to files. Mr. Faughnan did not oppose a continuance. COURT ORDERED, matter CONTINUED; reply due by noon on 10/9/14; requested courtesy copies be provided to the Court.

CONTINUED TO: 10/13/14; 9:00 AM

PRINT DATE: 02/23/2021 Page 5 of 18 Minutes Date: October 21, 2013

Title to Property COURT MINUTES October 13, 2014

A-12-669570-C Bank of America, Plaintiff(s)

VS.

Michael Elliott, Defendant(s)

October 13, 2014 9:00 AM Hearing

**HEARD BY:** Denton, Mark R. **COURTROOM:** RJC Courtroom 12A

**COURT CLERK:** Keri Cromer

**RECORDER:** Cynthia Georgilas

**REPORTER:** 

**PARTIES** 

**PRESENT:** Faughnan, Kerry P, ESQ Attorney

Garabedian, Jory Attorney

#### **JOURNAL ENTRIES**

- Mr. Garabedian reviewed the background of the case. Arguments by counsel regarding the merits of the motion. Applicable statutes cited. COURT ORDERED, Motion GRANTED as to Reformation; DENIED as to Lien Priority. Mr. Garabedian to submit a proposed order.

PRINT DATE: 02/23/2021 Page 6 of 18 Minutes Date: October 21, 2013

A-12-669570-C

Bank of America, Plaintiff(s)
vs.
Michael Elliott, Defendant(s)

January 25, 2016 2:45 PM Dismissal Hearing

**HEARD BY:** Denton, Mark R. **COURTROOM:** RJC Courtroom 12A

**COURT CLERK:** Marwanda Knight

**RECORDER:** Debbie Winn

**REPORTER:** 

PARTIES PRESENT:

#### **JOURNAL ENTRIES**

- Kerry P. Faughnan, Esq., appearing on behalf of Defendant, LN Management LLC Series 311 Bel Air 24G

Following representations made by Mr. Faughnan at the Dismissal Hearing, Court stated counsel had shown cause why this action should not be dismissed; counsel to file the appropriate motions.

A-12-669570-C

Bank of America, Plaintiff(s)
vs.
Michael Elliott, Defendant(s)

February 21, 2017 3:00 PM Dismissal Hearing

**HEARD BY:** Denton, Mark R. **COURTROOM:** RJC Courtroom 03D

**COURT CLERK:** Marwanda Knight

**RECORDER:** Martha Szramek

**REPORTER:** 

PARTIES PRESENT:

#### **JOURNAL ENTRIES**

- Kerry Faughnan, Esq., appeared on behalf of Deft., LN Management LLC Series 311 Bell Air 24G

In light of the representations made by Mr. Faughnan regarding the claims his client has in this case, COURT FINDS that cause has been shown why said claims of LN Management should not be dismissed and ORDERED the remaining claims DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

Mr. Faughnan directed to submit a proposed order.

PRINT DATE: 02/23/2021 Page 8 of 18 Minutes Date: October 21, 2013

A-12-669570-C

Bank of America, Plaintiff(s)
vs.
Michael Elliott, Defendant(s)

September 07, 2017 9:00 AM Status Check

**HEARD BY:** Denton, Mark R. **COURTROOM:** RJC Courtroom 03D

**COURT CLERK:** Marwanda Knight

**RECORDER:** Jennifer Gerold

REPORTER:

PARTIES PRESENT:

### **JOURNAL ENTRIES**

- Court noted no appearances and no status reported. Court will accordingly dismiss the action and close the case.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

CLERK S NOTE: Following these proceedings, Kerry Faughnan contacted chambers and stated that an associate mistakenly missed the fact that this item was on calendar and requested that a status check be set. Accordingly, upon so informing the Court, the dismissal is rescinded and the Court will issue an Order Scheduling a Status Hearing and providing that failure to attend on the part of Plaintiff's counsel will result in a dismissal of the action.

PRINT DATE: 02/23/2021 Page 9 of 18 Minutes Date: October 21, 2013

A-12-669570-C

Bank of America, Plaintiff(s)
vs.
Michael Elliott, Defendant(s)

October 19, 2017 9:00 AM Status Check

**HEARD BY:** Denton, Mark R. **COURTROOM:** RJC Courtroom 03D

**COURT CLERK:** Marwanda Knight

**RECORDER:** Jennifer Gerold

**REPORTER:** 

PARTIES PRESENT:

### **JOURNAL ENTRIES**

- APPEARANCES: Kerry Faughnan, Attorney for Deft. LN Management LLC Series 311 Bell Air 24G Gregory Kerr, Attorney for Deft, Regency Towers Association

Mr. Faughnan stated that in his review of the register it appears that the only parties remaining are the former homeowners. Further, Mr. Faughnan stated his intent is to do a default judgment or a Motion for Summary Judgment to finish the case. Mr. Kerr advised that there are no claims pending against Regency Towers.

Court noted the status of the case reported, and ORDERED status check CONTINUED ninety (90) days.

CONTINUED TO: 01/18/2018 9:00 A.M.

PRINT DATE: 02/23/2021 Page 10 of 18 Minutes Date: October 21, 2013

A-12-669570-C

Bank of America, Plaintiff(s)
vs.
Michael Elliott, Defendant(s)

January 18, 2018 9:00 AM Status Check

**HEARD BY:** Denton, Mark R. **COURTROOM:** RJC Courtroom 03D

**COURT CLERK:** Marwanda Knight

**RECORDER:** Jennifer Gerold

**REPORTER:** 

PARTIES PRESENT:

#### **JOURNAL ENTRIES**

- Mr. Faughnan stated Defts have tried to reach out to opposing counsel to get some type of resolution with no responses; advised counsel will file a motion for summary judgment within the next thirty (30) days. COURT so noted.

PRINT DATE: 02/23/2021 Page 11 of 18 Minutes Date: October 21, 2013

Title to Property COURT MINUTES July 23, 2018

A-12-669570-C Bank of America, Plaintiff(s)

VS.

Michael Elliott, Defendant(s)

July 23, 2018 9:00 AM Motion

**HEARD BY:** Denton, Mark R. **COURTROOM:** RJC Courtroom 03D

**COURT CLERK:** Madalyn Kearney

**RECORDER:** Jennifer Gerold

**REPORTER:** 

**PARTIES** 

**PRESENT:** Faughnan, Kerry P, ESQ Attorney

#### **JOURNAL ENTRIES**

- Mr. Faughnan advised the Motion is unopposed. There being good cause appearing and no opposition, COURT ORDERED, Motion GRANTED.

PRINT DATE: 02/23/2021 Page 12 of 18 Minutes Date: October 21, 2013

A-12-669570-C

Bank of America, Plaintiff(s)
vs.
Michael Elliott, Defendant(s)

August 27, 2018 9:00 AM Motion for Summary Judgment

**HEARD BY:** Denton, Mark R. **COURTROOM:** RJC Courtroom 03D

COURT CLERK: Madalyn Kearney

**RECORDER:** Jennifer Gerold

**REPORTER:** 

**PARTIES** 

**PRESENT:** Faughnan, Kerry P, ESQ Attorney

#### **JOURNAL ENTRIES**

- Jared Sechrist, Esq, present for Plaintiff Bank of America.

Mr. Sechrist advised he has a Stipulation and Order to continue as his office did not get an opposition on file and Mr. Faughnan agreed to allow a continuance. Stipulation and Order SIGNED IN OPEN COURT.

CONTINUED TO: 9/27/18 9:00 AM

PRINT DATE: 02/23/2021 Page 13 of 18 Minutes Date: October 21, 2013

A-12-669570-C Bank of America, Plaintiff(s)

VS.

Michael Elliott, Defendant(s)

September 27, 2018 9:00 AM Motion for Summary

Judgment

**HEARD BY:** Denton, Mark R. **COURTROOM:** RJC Courtroom 03D

**COURT CLERK:** Elizabeth Vargas

**RECORDER:** Sandra Pruchnic

**REPORTER:** 

**PARTIES** 

**PRESENT:** Brenner, Darren T. Attorney

Faughnan, Kerry P, ESQ Attorney

### **JOURNAL ENTRIES**

- Mr. Faughnan noted this case was closed and reopened for the purpose of filing this Motion for Summary Judgment; argued given the lack of evidence presented, summary judgment in LN Management's favor was appropriate. Court reviewed the history of the Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion to Set Aside in 2014, stated due to inactivity the case was closed. Mr. Faughnan stated he had an issue contacting prior opposing counsel, there was no evidence, discovery was closed, and now claim the federal foreclosure bar, stated there was nothing that bars summary judgment at this point. Arguments by counsel regarding the 5-year rule. Mr. Brenner argued LN Management stated they would file a Motion for Summary Judgment and did not, this was a Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac deed of trust, if the court was not going to find that the 5-year rule applies, requesting additional time to meet and confer, conduct discovery. Mr. Faughnan argued regarding what constitutes tender and lack of proof that Freddie Mae or Fannie Mac purchased the loan. COURT ORDERED, Motion DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Court directed counsel to agree regarding the proposed Order, or submit competing orders. Mr. Faughnan stated he believed parties would come to an agreement on the Order.

PRINT DATE: 02/23/2021 Page 14 of 18 Minutes Date: October 21, 2013

A-12-669570-C Bank of America, Plaintiff(s)
vs.
Michael Elliott, Defendant(s)

December 01, 2020 1:15 PM Minute Order

**HEARD BY:** Denton, Mark R. **COURTROOM:** Chambers

**COURT CLERK:** Madalyn Kearney

**RECORDER:** 

**REPORTER:** 

PARTIES PRESENT:

#### **JOURNAL ENTRIES**

- Until further notice, Department 13 will be conducting court hearings REMOTELY using the BlueJeans Video Conferencing system. Department 13 has adopted this policy as a precautionary measure in light of public health concerns for Coronavirus COVID-19, and the Court orders that any party intending to appear before Department 13 for law and motion matters do so by BlueJeans only. As a result, your matter scheduled December 3, 2020 in this case will be conducted via BlueJeans. You have the choice to appear either by phone or computer/video.

Dial the following number: 1-408-419-1715

Meeting ID: 628 582 066

URL: bluejeans.com/ 628582066

To connect by phone, dial the number provided and enter the meeting ID followed by #.

To connect by computer if you do NOT have the app, copy the URL link into a web browser. Google Chrome is preferred but not required. Once you are on the BlueJeans website click on Join with Browser which is located on the bottom of the page. Follow the instructions and prompts given by BlueJeans.

PRINT DATE: 02/23/2021 Page 15 of 18 Minutes Date: October 21, 2013

#### A-12-669570-C

You may also download the BlueJeans app and join the meeting by entering the meeting ID.

PLEASE NOTE the following protocol each participant will be required to follow:

You will be automatically muted upon entry to the meeting. Please remain muted while waiting for your matter to be called. If you are connecting by phone, you can mute/unmute yourself by pressing \*4.

Do NOT place the call on hold since some phones may play wait/hold music.

Please do NOT use speaker phone as it causes a loud echo/ringing noise.

Please state your name each time you speak so that the court recorder can capture a clear record.

Please be mindful of rustling papers, background noise, and coughing or loud breathing.

Please be mindful of where your camera is pointing.

We encourage you to visit the Bluejeans.com website to get familiar with the BlueJeans phone/videoconferencing system before your hearing.

If your hearing gets continued to a different date after you have already received this minute order please note a new minute order will issue with a different meeting ID since the ID number changes with each meeting/hearing.

Please be patient if you call in and we are in the middle of oral argument from a previous case. Your case should be called shortly. Again, please keep your phone or computer mic on MUTE until your case is called.

CLERK'S NOTE: This Minute Order was electronically served by Courtroom Clerk, Madalyn Kearney, to all registered parties for Odyssey File & Serve. /mk 12/1/20

PRINT DATE: 02/23/2021 Page 16 of 18 Minutes Date: October 21, 2013

A-12-669570-C

Bank of America, Plaintiff(s)
vs.
Michael Elliott, Defendant(s)

December 03, 2020 9:00 AM Motion for Summary

Judgment

**HEARD BY:** Denton, Mark R. **COURTROOM:** RJC Courtroom 03D

**COURT CLERK:** Madalyn Kearney

**RECORDER:** Jennifer Gerold

**REPORTER:** 

PARTIES PRESENT:

#### **JOURNAL ENTRIES**

- Natalie Winslow, Esq. present for Bank of America. Kerry Faughnan, Esq. present for LN Management LLC Series 3111 Bel Air 24G. Counsel present via BlueJeans.

Following arguments by Ms. Winslow and Mr. Faughnan, COURT ORDERED, Bank of America, N.A. and Ditech Financial LLC f/k/a Green Tree Servicing LLC's Motion for Summary Judgment UNDER ADVISEMENT.

PRINT DATE: 02/23/2021 Page 17 of 18 Minutes Date: October 21, 2013

A-12-669570-C Bank of America, Plaintiff(s)
vs.
Michael Elliott, Defendant(s)

December 14, 2020 7:15 AM Minute Order

**HEARD BY:** Denton, Mark R. **COURTROOM:** Chambers

**COURT CLERK:** Madalyn Kearney

**RECORDER:** 

REPORTER:

PARTIES PRESENT:

#### **JOURNAL ENTRIES**

- HAVING further reviewed and considered the parties' filings and the argument of counsel pertaining to the Bank of America/Ditech Financial moving parties' Motion for Summary Judgment, heard and taken under advisement on December 3, 2020, and being now fully advised in the premises, and being persuaded by the procedural and substantive contentions of the moving parties, the Court GRANTS the subject Motion in its entirety. Counsel for the moving parties is directed to submit a proposed order consistent herewith and with supportive briefing and argument after providing the same to opposing counsel for signification of approval/disapproval.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

CLERK'S NOTE: This Minute Order was electronically served by Courtroom Clerk, Madalyn Kearney, to all registered parties for Odyssey File & Serve. /mk 12/14/20

PRINT DATE: 02/23/2021 Page 18 of 18 Minutes Date: October 21, 2013



# EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT CLERK'S OFFICE NOTICE OF DEFICIENCY ON APPEAL TO NEVADA SUPREME COURT

KERRY FAUGHNAN, ESQ. P.O. BOX 335361 NORTH LAS VEGAS, NV 89033

> DATE: February 23, 2021 CASE: A-12-669570-C C/W A-13-682055-C

RE CASE: GREEN TREE SERVICING LLC nka DITECH FINANCIAL LLC vs. MICHAEL T. ELLIOTT

NOTICE OF APPEAL FILED: February 22, 2021

YOUR APPEAL HAS BEEN SENT TO THE SUPREME COURT.

#### PLEASE NOTE: DOCUMENTS **NOT** TRANSMITTED HAVE BEEN MARKED:

- \$250 Supreme Court Filing Fee (Make Check Payable to the Supreme Court)\*\*

   If the \$250 Supreme Court Filing Fee was not submitted along with the original Notice of Appeal, it must be mailed directly to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court Filing Fee will not be forwarded by this office if submitted after the Notice of Appeal has been filed.

   \$24 District Court Filing Fee (Make Check Payable to the District Court)\*\*
- S500 − Cost Bond on Appeal (Make Check Payable to the District Court)\*\*
  - NRAP 7: Bond For Costs On Appeal in Civil Cases
    - Previously paid Bonds are not transferable between appeals without an order of the District Court.
- ☐ Case Appeal Statement
  - NRAP 3 (a)(1), Form 2
- ☐ Order
- ☐ Notice of Entry of Order

#### NEVADA RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 3 (a) (3) states:

"The district court clerk must file appellant's notice of appeal despite perceived deficiencies in the notice, including the failure to pay the district court or Supreme Court filing fee. The district court clerk shall apprise appellant of the deficiencies in writing, and shall transmit the notice of appeal to the Supreme Court in accordance with subdivision (g) of this Rule with a notation to the clerk of the Supreme Court setting forth the deficiencies. Despite any deficiencies in the notice of appeal, the clerk of the Supreme Court shall docket the appeal in accordance with Rule 12."

#### Please refer to Rule 3 for an explanation of any possible deficiencies.

<sup>\*\*</sup>Per District Court Administrative Order 2012-01, in regards to civil litigants, "...all Orders to Appear in Forma Pauperis expire one year from the date of issuance." You must reapply for in Forma Pauperis status.

### **Certification of Copy**

State of Nevada
County of Clark

I, Steven D. Grierson, the Clerk of the Court of the Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County, State of Nevada, does hereby certify that the foregoing is a true, full and correct copy of the hereinafter stated original document(s):

NOTICE OF APPEAL; CASE APPEAL STATEMENT; DISTRICT COURT DOCKET ENTRIES; CIVIL COVER SHEET; FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND JUDGMENT; NOTICE OF ENTRY OF FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND JUDGMENT; DISTRICT COURT MINUTES; NOTICE OF DEFICIENCY

GREEN TREE SERVICING LLC nka DITECH FINANCIAL LLC,

Plaintiff(s),

VS.

MICHAEL T. ELLIOTT,

Defendant(s),

now on file and of record in this office.

Case No: A-12-669570-C

Consolidated with A-13-682055-C

Dept No: XXIII

**IN WITNESS THEREOF,** I have hereunto Set my hand and Affixed the seal of the Court at my office, Las Vegas, Nevada This 23 day of February 2021.

Steven D. Grierson, Clerk of the Court

Heather Ungermann, Deputy Clerk