Alex B. Ghibaudo, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 10592 **ALEX GHIBAUDO, PC.** 197 E. California St., Suite 250 Las Vegas, Nevada 89104 T: 702.978.7090 F: 702.924.6553 Email: alex@glawvegas.com *Attorney for Appellant*

Electronically Filed Nov 05 2021 08:16 p.m. Elizabeth A. Brown Clerk of Supreme Court

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

STEPHANIE RUBIDOUX

Appellant,

VS.

DANIEL RUBIDOUX

Respondent.

Supreme Court Case: 83628

DOCKETING STATEMENT

COMES NOW, Appellant STEPHANIE RUBIDOUX, (hereinafter referred to as "Appellant"), through her attorney of record, ALEX B. GHIBAUDO, ESQ., of the law firm of ALEX B. GHIBAUDO, P.C., and hereby submits the following docketing statement pursuant to NRAP 14.

 This is an appeal from a judgment rendered in the Eight Judicial District Court, Family Division, County of Clark, Department U, Judge Dawn Throne, Case No. D-20-601936-D.

2) ATTORNEY FILING THIS DOCKETING STATEMENT:

Alex B. Ghibaudo, Esq., of the law firm Alex B. Ghibaudo, P.C., located at 197 E. California St., Suite 250, Las Vegas, Nevada 89104, telephone number 702-978-7090, client STEPHANIE RUBIDOUX.

3) ATTORNEY REPRESENTING RESPONDENT:

Nedda Ghandi, Esq. Ghandi Deeter Blackham 725 S 8th St, Suite 210. Las Vegas, NV 89101 nedda@ghandilaw.com P - (702) 878-1115, client DANIEL RUBIDOUX.

4) NATURE OF DISPOSITION BELOW:

This is an appeal from an order granting Defendant-Respondent joint legal and joint physical custody of the minor child after a two (2) day evidentiary hearing.

5) DOES THIS APPEAL RAISE ISSUES RE: CHILD CUSTODY, VENUE, OR TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS: Yes.

6) PENDING AND PRIOR PROCEEDINGS IN THIS COURT: There are no other pending or prior proceedings in this Court related to this matter.

7) **PENDING AND PRIOR PROCEEDINGS IN OTHER COURTS:** N/A.

8) **NATURE OF ACTION:**

On September 16, 2021 the district court issued its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment awarding the parties joint physical

and joint legal custody of the minor child. Notice of entry of that order was filed on the same day. The district court found that Defendant-Respondent committed acts of domestic violence by clear and convincing evidence. The district court ruled that Defendant-Respondent overcame the presumption that he is not fit to have either joint or primary physical custody (citing the wrong rule). However, the district court made no findings of fact justifying it's conclusory statement and, similarly, made no findings or explanation how its order protected the minor child from further acts of domestic violence. In addition, there was no substantial evidence presented that joint physical custody was in the child's best interest. Furthermore, the district court recited the best interests factors and those facts that it thought fit those factors but failed to tie the findings made to the ruling rendered.

9) ISSUES ON APPEAL:

a. Did the district court commit legal error or abuse its discretion when it failed to make specific findings of fact justifying its belief that Defendant-Respondent overcame the presumption against joint or primary physical custody after the district court found by clear and convincing evidence that acts of domestic violence in fact occurred?

- b. Did the district court err or abuse its discretion when it failed to make specific findings or orders that would protect the child from further acts of domestic violence?
- c. Were the district court's conclusory statements related to its finding that Defendant-Respondent overcame the presumption against domestic violence sufficient to justify its ruling?
- d. Were the district court's conclusory statements concerning its orders and whether they would sufficiently protect the minor child from further acts of domestic violence sufficient to satisfy the requirements of NRS 125C.0035(5)?
- e. Did the district court have substantial evidence justifying its order granting Defendant-Respondent joint legal and joint physical custody of the minor child?
- f. Should this Court set forth factors or define what evidence is necessary to overcome the presumption against domestic violence to give the district courts guidance when making a determination under NRS 125C.0035(5)?

10) PENDING PROCEEDINGS IN THIS COURT RAISING THE SAME OR SIMILAR ISSUES:

N/A.

11) CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES:

None.

12) **OTHER ISSUES:**

None.

13) ASSIGNMENT TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OR RETENTION IN THE SUPREME COURT:

This matter should be retained by the Supreme Court pursuant to NRAP 17(a)(11) because it raises a matter of first impression (whether this Court should give further guidance, in the form of factors to consider, or otherwise, when the district courts must determine if the presumption contained in NRS 125C.0035(5) is overcome).

14) **TRIAL:**

This matter was adjudicated after a two (2) day trial on May 14, 2021 and June 25, 2021.

15) JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION:

Appellant does not intend to file a Motion to disqualify any justice.

16) DATE OF ENTRY OF WRITTEN JUDGMENT OR ORDER

APPEALED FROM:

March 23, 2021.

17) DATE WRITTEN NOTICE OF ENTRY OF JUDGMENT OR ORDER WAS SERVED:

September 16, 2021.

18) **TOLLING OF NOTICE OF APPEAL:**

The time for filing the *Notice of Appeal* was not tolled by a postjudgment Motion.

- 19) DATE NOTICE OF APPEAL WAS FILED: October 4, 2021.
- 20) SPECIFY STATUTE OR RULE GOVERNING THE TIME LIMIT FOR FILING THE NOTICE OF APPEAL: NRAP 4(a)(1).
- 21) SPECIFY THE STATUTE OR OTHER AUTHORITY GRANTING THIS COURT JURISDICTION TO REVIEW THE JUDGMENT OR ORDER APPEALED FROM: NRAP 3A(b)(1).
- 22) LIST ALL PARTIES INVOLVED IN THE ACTION OR CONSOLIDATED ACTIONS IN THE DISTRICT COURT: STEPHANIE RUBIDOUX and DANIEL RUBIDOUX.
- 23) **DESCRIPTION OF CLAIMS**:

This is a domestic relations matter.

- 24) DID THE JUDGMENT OR ORDER APPEALED FROM ADJUDICATE ALL THE CLAIMS ALLEGED BELOW AND THE RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES OF ALL THE PARTIES TO THE ACTION OR CONSOLIDATED ACTIONS BELOW? Yes.
- 25) SPECIFY THE CLAIMS REMAINING BELOW: None.

26) SPECIFY THE PARTIES REMAINING BELOW: None.

27) **CERTIFICATION OF JUDGMENT:**

The District Court did not certify the judgment as final.

28) **BASIS FOR SEEKING APPELLATE REVIEW:**

The challenged order is appealable pursuant to NRAP 3A(b)(1).

29) ATTACHMENTS:

- 1) Complaint;
- 2) Answer and Counterclaim;
- 3) Reply to Counterclaim;
- Findings of fact and conclusions of law and notice of entry of order;
- 5) Notice of appeal.

DATED this 5th day of November, 2021.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Alex Ghibaudo

Alex B. Ghibaudo, Esq. Attorney for Appellant

VERIFICATION

I declare under penalty of perjury that I have read this docketing statement, that the information provided in this docketing statement is true and complete to the best of my knowledge, information and belief, and that I have attached all required documents to this docketing statement.

Stephanie Rubidoux Name of Appellant <u>Alex B. Ghibaudo, Esq.</u> Name of Counsel of Record

November 5th, 2021

/s/ Alex Ghibaudo

Dated

Signed

Clark County, Nevada

State and County Where Signed

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that in the 5th day of November, 2021, I served a true and correct copy of Appellant's *Docketing Statement* upon Respondent through the Nevada Supreme Court's electronic filing system to:

Nedda Ghandi, Esq. Ghandi Deeter Blackham 725 S 8th St, Suite 210. Las Vegas, NV 89101 <u>nedda@ghandilaw.com</u> *Attorney for Respondent*

DATED this 5th day of November, 2021.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Alex Ghibaudo

Alex B. Ghibaudo, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 10592 **ALEX B. GHIBAUDO, PC.** *Attorney for Appellant*

EXHIBIT 1

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		CLERK OF THE COURT
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	1	COMD
	2	JOHN T. KELLEHER, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 006012 CASE NO: D-20-601936-D
	3	R. NATHAN GIBBS, ESQ. Department: To be determined
	4	KELLEHER & KELLEHER, LLC 40 South Stephanie Street, Suite 201
	5	Henderson, Nevada 89012 Telephone (702) 384-7494 Facsimile (702) 384-7545
	6	racsimile (702) 384-7345 rngibbs@kelleherandkelleher.com Attorney for Plaintiff, STEPHANIE RUBIDOUX
	7	DISTRICT COURT
	8	CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA
	9	
	10	STEPHANIE RUBIDOUX,)) CASE NO.:
TC	11	Plaintiff,) DEPT. NO.:
EHER LLC	12	v
	13	DANIEL RUBIDOUX,
AW OFFICES & KGY MESTRUET, MUESTRUET, 2001, NEVAN 7023, 384-7494 AMA (702), 384-7494	14	Defendant.
R & EPHANJE VDERSON (702)	15	
ELLEHE 405.571 *##*	16	COMPLAINT FOR DIVORCE
ELL	17	COMES NOW Plaintiff, STEPHANIE RUBIDOUX, by and through her attorney, R. Nathan
K	18	Gibbs, Esq., of the law firm of Kelleher and Kelleher, LLC, and as and for a Complaint for Divorce
	19	against Defendant, DANIEL RUBIDOUX, alleges as follows:
	20	1. That Plaintiff, STEPHANIE RUBIDOUX is a resident of the State of Nevada and,
	21	for a period of more than six weeks immediately preceding the commencement of this action, has
	22	resided and been physically present and domiciled in Clark County in the State of Nevada, and now
	23	resides and is domiciled therein, and, during all of said period of time, Plaintiff has had and still has
	24	the intent to make said State of Nevada her home, residence and domicile for an indefinite period
	25	of time.
	26	2. That Plaintiff and Defendant were married on or about June 21, 2014 in Las Vegas,
	27	Nevada and ever since said date have been and now are, husband and wife.
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1	3.	That there is one minor child born the issue of this marriage, to wit: RILEY
2	RUBIDOUX,	born January 13, 2016. There are no adopted children and Plaintiff is not currently
3	pregnant	
4	4.	That Nevada is the habitual residence and home state of the minor child
5	5.	That the parties are fit and proper persons to have joint legal custody of the minor
6	child, with prim	ary physical custody of the minor child to Plaintiff, STEPHANIE RUBIDOUX
7	6.	That Defendant should pay child support to STEPHANIE RUBIDOUX as well as
8	pay a share of I	RILEY's preschool and daycare expenses pursuant to Nevada law.
9	7.	That Defendant shall provide medical insurance for the minor child and the parties
10	should split equ	ally all medical expenses not covered by insurance,
11	8.	That there is community property to be adjudicated by this Court.
12	9.	That there are community debts to be adjudicated by this Court.
13	10,	That Plaintiff STEPHANIE RUBIDOUX shall have exclusive possession of the
14	martial residence	e, and that Defendant DANIEL RUBIDOUX not be allowed to bring his animals to
15	the marital resid	ence.
16	11.	That Defendant has engaged in marital waste and has incurred debts which he alone
17	should be respo	nsible for.
18	12.	That Plaintiff STEPHANIE RUBIDOUX should receive spousal support from
19	Defendant DAN	VIEL RUBIDOUX.
20	13.	That Plaintiff has incurred attorneys fees and costs in bringing this action, and
21	Defendant shou	ld pay the attomeys fees and costs of Plaintiff.
22	14.	That Plaintiff and Defendant are incompatible in their tastes, natures, views, likes and
23	dislikes, which l	have become widely separate and divergent so that the parties hereto have been and
24	now are incom	mpatible to such an extent that it now appears that there is no possibility of
25	reconciliation be	etween Plaintiff and Defendant and there remains such an incompatible temperament
26	between Plaintif	f and Defendant that a happy marital status can no longer exist.
27	WHERI	EFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment as follows:
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	1	1. That the bonds of matrimony now and heretofore existing between Plaintiff and
	2	Defendant be dissolved, set aside and forever held for naught, and the parties hereto, and each of
	3	them, be restored to their single, unmarried status.
	4	2. That the Court grant the relief requested in the Complaint.
	5	DATED this <u>6</u> day of January, 2020.
	6	KELLEHER & KELLEHER, LLC.
	7	D'I JUL
	8	R. NATHAN GIBBS, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 005965
	9	40 South Stephanie Street, Suite 201
F)	10	Henderson, Nevada 89012 Attorney for Plaintiff, STEPHANIE RUBIDOUX
TLC	11	
EHER] 112,8201 19012	12	
	13	
LAW OFFICES & KELLI AMESTREFT, SUI REON, NEVATA IR (702) 384-7549 mile (702) 384-7549	14	
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



EXHIBIT 2



Case Number: D-20-601936-D

Jaw Offices of WEBSTER & ASSOCIATES 6882 Edna Avenue 1 as Vegas, Nevada 89146 Telephone (702) 562-2309 + Easemile (702) 562-2305 share joint legal custody of the child but denies the remaining allegations contained therein.

- 3. In response to Paragraph 7, denied in part and admitted in part. Plaintiff is currently maintaining medical insurance, but the parties must share the medical insurance premiums, therefore denied in part. Defendant admits that the parties should be responsible for 50% of the medical costs and deductibles not covered by insurance pursuant to the 30/30 rule, therefore admitted in part.
- 4. Defendant denies the allegations contained in Paragraphs 6, 10, 11, 12 and 13 of the Plaintiff's Complaint for Divorce.

Counterclaim

COMES NOW the Defendant/Counterclaimant, and for his Counterclaim for Divorce against the Plaintiff/Counterdefendant, complains and alleges as follows:

Ι.

Plaintiff/Counterdefendant, for a period of more than six weeks
 immediately preceding commencement of this action, has been and now is an
 actual, bona fide resident of the State of Nevada.

II.

Plaintiff/Counterdefendant and Defendant/Counterclaimant were married
 on June 21, 2014, in Las Vegas, Nevada, and ever since have been and now
 are husband and wife.

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III.

There is one minor child of this relationship, namely: Riley Rubidoux, born January 13, 2016. Plaintiff/Counterdefendant is not currently pregnant to Defendant/Counterclaimant's knowledge. The State of Nevada, County of Clark has jurisdiction over the minor child as the child has resided in Clark County, Nevada for more than six months prior to these proceedings.

IV.

The parties are fit and proper persons to be awarded joint legal and joint physical custody of the minor child.

V.

The court should set child support in accordance with NRS 125B.070 et. seq. and <u>Wright v. Osburn</u>, 114 Nev. 1367, 970 P.2d 1071 (1998) and NAC 425.

VI.

Plaintiff should continue to maintain health insurance for the minor child
 and the parties should divide the monthly premium and equally divide all
 unreimbursed medical, dental, optical, and orthodontic expenses pursuant to
 the 30/30 Rule.

VII.

The parties should equally divide all agreed upon extracurricular expenses for the minor child pursuant to the 30/30 Rule.

VIII.

The parties' community property and community debt should be divided

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in accordance with Nevada law.

IX.

The Defendant/Counterclaimant should be awarded exclusive possession of the marital residence, perform drywall, paint and other minor repairs, and ready the residence to be promptly listed for sale with a mutually agreeable licensed real estate agent. Any out-of-pocket expenses for repair supplies should be equally shared by the parties. The net sale proceeds should be divided between the parties in accordance with Nevada law.

Х.

That neither party should be awarded spousal support.

XI.

That Defendant/Counterclaimant be reimbursed for the community waste committed by Plaintiff/Counterdefendant.

XII.

That the Plaintiff/Counterdefendant shall maintain her married name or revert to using her maiden name, if she so chooses.

XIII.

That the Plaintiff/Counterdefendant should be responsible for paying Defendant/Counterclaimant's attorney's fees and costs.

XIV.

During the course of said marriage, the tastes, mental disposition, views, likes and dislikes of Defendant/Counterclaimant and Plaintiff/Counterdefendant have become so widely separated and divergent that the parties have become

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incompatible to such an extent that it is impossible for them to live together as husband and wife; that the incompatibility between Plaintiff and Defendant is so great that there is no possibility of reconciliation between them.

WHEREFORE, Defendant/Counterclaimant prays for a Judgment as follows:


- 1. That the marriage existing between Plaintiff and Defendant be dissolved and that Defendant be granted an absolute Decree of Divorce and that each of the parties be restored to the status of a single, unmarried person;
- 2. That the Court deny Plaintiff the relief requested in the complaint.
- 3. That the Court grant the Defendant the relief requested in this Counterclaim; and
- 4. For such other relief as the Court finds to be just and proper.

DATED this $\underline{-2l}$ day of January, 2020.

WEBSTER & ASSOCIATES

By:

AMITA A. WÉBSTER, ÉSQ. Nevada Bar No. 1221 JEANNE F. LAMBERTSEN, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 9460 6882 Edna Ave. Las Vegas, Nevada 89146 Attorney for Defendant, unbundled




1_aw Offices of WEBSTER & ASSOCIATES 6882 1:data Avenue + 1.as Vegas, Nevada 89146 Telephone (702) 562-2300 + Parsennike (702) 562-2303

1		CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE		
2	Purs	Pursuant to NRCP 5(b), I certify that I am employed in the Law Offices		
3	<pre>of WEBST</pre>	ER & ASSOCIATES, and that on this $2\sqrt{3}$ day of January, 2020, I		
4 5		caused the above and foregoing document to be served as follows:		
6 7		by mandatory electronic service through the Eighth Judicial District Court's electronic filing system;		
7 8 9	f 1	by placing the same to be deposited for mailing in the United States Mail, in a sealed envelope upon which first class postage was prepaid in Las Vegas, Nevada;		
10 11	[]	pursuant to EDCR 7.26 to be sent via facsimile, by duly executed consent for service by electronic means;		
12	[]	by hand-delivery with signed Receipt of Copy.		
13	To the attorney(s) listed below at the address, email address, and/or facsimile			
14	number indicated below: John T. Kelleher, Esq.			
15	<u>Hjuilfs@kell</u>	eherandkelleher.com		
16 17		A Charles		
18		An employee of WEBSTER & ASSOCIATES		
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EXHIBIT 3



4. Answering paragraph VI of Defendant's Counterclaim on file herein, Plaintiff admits that the parties should divide the monthly insurance premium for the minor child and equally divide all unreimbursed medical, dental, optical, and orthodontic expenses pursuant to the 30/30 Rule but denies that Plaintiff should continue to maintain health insurance for the minor child.

- 5. Answering paragraph VII of Defendant's Counterclaim on file herein, Plaintiff is without sufficient information necessary to form a basis for belief regarding the truth or falsity contained in said paragraph and therefor denies the same.
- 9
 6. Answering paragraph VIII of Defendant's Counterclaim on file herein, Plaintiff is without sufficient information necessary to form a basis for belief regarding the truth or falsity contained in said paragraph and therefor denies the same.
 - 7. Answering paragraph 11 of Defendant's Counterclaim on file herein, Plaintiff is without sufficient information necessary to form a basis for belief regarding the truth or falsity contained in said paragraph and therefor denies the same.
 - 8. Answering paragraph 12 of Defendant's Counterclaim on file herein, Plaintiff is without sufficient information necessary to form a basis for belief regarding the truth or falsity contained in said paragraph and therefor denies the same.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays that Defendant take nothing by reason of his Counterclaim,
and for such other relief requested and otherwise as the Court may deem just and proper in the
circumstances.

DATED this _____ day of February, 2019.

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KELLEHER & KELLEHER, LLC

R. NATHAN GIBBS, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 5965 40 S. Stephanie Street, Suite #201 Henderson, Nevada 89012 Attorney for Plaintiff

LAW OFFICES LAW OFFICES AS STEPHANIE STREFT, SUITE #201 HENDERSON, NEV AND 89012 (702) 384-7494 Facsimile (702) 384-7545 1

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


EXHIBIT 4

		Electronically Filed 9/16/2021 3:07 PM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT
1	NEOJ	Atump. Sum
2	GHANDI DEETER BLACKHAM Nedda Ghandi, Esq.	
_	Nevada Bar No. 11137	
3	Email: nedda@ghandilaw.com Brian E. Blackham, Esq.	
4	Nevada Bar No. 9974	
	Email: brian@ghandilaw.com	
5	725 S. 8 th Street, Suite 100 Las Vegas, Nevada 89101	
6	Telephone: (702) 878-1115	
	Facsimile: (702) 979-2485	
7	Attorneys for Defendant	
8	EIGHTH JUDICIA	L DISTRICT COURT
9	FAMILY	DIVISION
	CLARK COU	NTY, NEVADA
10		
11	STEPHANIE RUBIDOUX,	
12	Plaintiff,	Case No.: D-20-601936-D
	VS.	Dept. No.: R
13	v 5.	
14	DANIEL RUBIDOUX,	
15	Defendant.	
16	NOTICE OF EN	TRY OF ORDER
16		
17	TO: ALL INTERESTED PARTIES:	
18	YOU ARE HEREBY NOTICED	that Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law,
19	and Decree of Divorce was entered on th	e 16 th day of September 2021.
20	///	
	Pa	age 1
	Case Number: D-20)-601936-D

Case Number: D-20-601936-D

1	A copy of said Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Decree of Divorce
2	is attached hereto.
3	Dated this _16 th _ day of September, 2021.
4	GHANDI DEETER BLACKHAM
5	
6	142
7	Brian E. Blackham, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 9974
8	725 S. 8 th Street, Suite 100 Las Vegas, Nevada 89101
9	Attorney for Defendant
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	Page 2

1	CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
2	I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 16^{TH} day of September 2021, I served a
3	copy of this NOTICE OF ENTRY OF ORDER upon each of the parties and
4	addressed to those counsel of record:
5 6	 Electronic Service to: Via Facsimile to: Via Email to:
7	Placing in the U.S. Mail, with postage fully prepaid, addressed to:
8	PAGE LAW FIRM Fred Page, Esq. 6930 S. Cimarron Rd., Suite 140
9	Las Vegas, NV 89113 Email: <u>fpage@pagelawoffices.com</u>
10	Attorney for Plaintiff
11	[]. An
12	An employee of Ghandi Deeter Blackham
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	Page 3

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09/16/2021 10	0:15 AM
CLERK OF THE	COURT

EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

FAMILY DIVISION

CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

STEPHANIE RUBIDOUX,

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vs.

Plaintiff,

DANIEL RUBIDOUX,

Defendant.

CASE NO.: D-20-601936-D

DEPT. NO.: U

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND DECREE OF DIVORCE

On May 14, 2021, and June 25, 2021, this matter came on for a Non-Jury Trial, before the Honorable Dawn R. Throne, Department U of the Eighth Judicial District Court, Family Division. Plaintiff Stephanie Rubidoux (Stephanie) was present and represented by her attorney of record, Fred Page, Esq., of PAGE LAW FIRM. Defendant Daniel Rubidoux (Dan) was present and represented by his attorney of record, Brian E. Blackham, Esq., of GHANDI DEETER BLACKHAM. The Court, having read and reviewed all the papers and pleadings on file, having heard and considered testimony of the parties and witnesses, having considered the exhibits admitted at the Non-Jury Trial, and good cause appearing therefore, makes the following Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law,
 Decision and Orders.

3

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This matter was initiated by a Complaint for Divorce, filed by
 Stephanie, on January 7, 2020. Dan filed his Answer and Counterclaim for Divorce
 on January 21, 2020, and Stephanie filed her Reply to Dan's Counterclaim on
 February 7, 2020.

2. 8 Pursuant to the Order entered May 15, 2020, from the Case Management Conference and Return Hearing from FMC Mediation, held on April 9 16, 2020, the Court ordered, in pertinent part, that the Partial Parenting Agreement 10 is to be executed at a later date, that there will be no custody designation at this 11 12 time, and that Dan shall have alternating visitation with Riley during week one, from Friday at 6:00 p.m. until Sunday at 6:00 p.m., and during week two, from 13 Friday at 6:00 p.m. until Monday at 10:00 a.m.¹ The Court further ordered that 14 without prejudice, and based on the stipulation of the parties, effective May 1, 15 16 2020, Dan shall pay child support to Stephanie in the amount of \$998.64 per month.² 17

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3. At the September 15, 2020 status check regarding trial viability, the parties advised that a global resolution had not been reached as to child custody, $\frac{1}{2} \frac{See}{Id}$ Order entered May 15, 2020.

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divorce, and all related matters, and Non-Jury Trial was set for February 2, 2021
 and February 22, 2021. The Non-Jury Trial dates were continued via stipulation of
 the parties, and the Non-Jury Trial was eventually held in this matter on May 14,
 2021 and June 25, 2021.

NOW THEREFORE, BASED UPON THE TESTIMONY AND
EVIDENCE ADMITTED AT THE EVIDENTIARY HEARING, THIS COURT
H.REBY FINDS:

8

FINDINGS OF FACTS

9 1. The parties were married on June 21, 2014. This is almost a seven
10 year marriage.

11 2. There is one (1) minor child issue of this marriage, to wit: Riley
12 Rubidoux (Riley), born January 13, 2016.

13 3. The parties are both bona fide residents of Nevada and the Court has
14 personal and subject matter jurisdiction in this case.

4. Per the parties' Partial Parenting Agreement entered on June 16,
2020, the parties share joint legal custody and reached an agreement on holidays,
vacations, and transportation.

18 5. The parties are incompatible in marriage such that there is no chance
19 of reconciliation, Plaintiff is not now pregnant, and the parties are entitled to an
20 absolute Decree of Divorce.

1	6. At the time of the Non-Jury trial, the parties stipulated that neither
2	party would be awarded alimony and thus, that issue was not before the Court.
3	7. The parties have not resolved physical custody. This is the primary
4	dispute in this case. The sole consideration is what is in Riley's best interest. The
5	Court must consider the best interest factors in NRS 125C.0035(4).
6	8. The parties also do not have an agreement regarding where Riley will
7	attend school for Kindergarten. This is also a best interest analysis.
8	9. As to the division of community property and debts, this Court took
9	evidence and considered argument in the context of NRS 125.150, while also
10	considering the stipulations of the parties as to the division of some community
11	property and debts as further described below. In that regard, the parties
12	stipulated to following division of specified community property and debts, which
13	the Court adopts as its orders as to these assets and debts:
14	i. Each party shall be awarded any and all bank accounts in
15	their respective names;
16	ii. Dan shall be awarded the Ford Fusion as his sole and
17	separate property, subject to the loan thereon;
18	iii. Stephanie shall be awarded the 2009 Mercury Mariner,
19	subject to the loan thereon, as her sole and separate property;
20	iv. Stephanie's Nevada PERS shall be divided in accordance
	Page 4

with the time rule set forth in <u>Gemma v. Gemma</u> as of June 30, 2021. The
 division shall be accomplished by a Qualified Domestic Relations Order or
 equivalent order (QDRO) to be prepared by Shann Winesett, Esq. at Las Vegas
 QDRO, with the parties equally sharing the cost thereof;

v. Dan's Fidelity 401(k) shall be equally divided as of June
30, 2021. If a QDRO is required to divide this asset, the same shall be performed
by a QDRO-preparer of Stephanie's choice, and Stephanie shall be solely
responsible for the cost of the QDRO;

9 vi. Stephanie's T-Rowe Price IRA is a mixed-character asset.
10 The balance of the IRA at the time of marriage was \$25,376.27, and the parties
11 agree that this sum is Stephanie's sole and separate property. The remaining value
12 as of June 30, 2021 shall be divided equally between the parties. If a QDRO is
13 required, the same shall be prepared by Shann Winesett, Esq. at Las Vegas
14 QDRO, with Dan being solely responsible for the cost of the same;

15 vii. Each party shall be solely responsible for all credit card
16 debts in their respective names;

17 viii. Dan shall be solely responsible for the Navy Federal Credit
18 Union Debt; and

ix. Each party shall be awarded all personal effects, jewelry,
and clothing in their possession and/or in their respective names and any and all

1	bank accounts and other property in each party's name, possession, or control and
2	not otherwise disposed of.
3	CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
4	1. <u>Child Custody</u>
5	At the outset, the Court notes that the parties have stipulated to sharing joint
6	legal custody of Riley, subject to the terms contained in the Partial Parenting
7	Agreement entered on June 16, 2020.
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9	NRS 125C.001 states:
	The Legislature declares that it is the policy of this State:
10	1. To ensure that minor children have frequent associations
11	and a continuing relationship with both parents after the parents have ended their relationship, become separated or dissolved
12	their marriage;
13	2. To encourage such parents to share the rights and responsibilities of child rearing; and
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15	3. To establish that such parents have an equivalent duty to provide their minor children with necessary maintenance, health
16	care, education and financial support. As used in this subsection, "equivalent" must not be construed to mean that both parents are responsible for providing the same amount of financial support
17	to their children.
18	NRS 125C.0015 states:
19	Parents have joint custody until otherwise ordered by court.
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	Page 6

The parent and child relationship extends equally to every 1 1. child and to every parent, regardless of the marital status of the 2 parents. If a court has not made a determination regarding the 3 2. custody of a child, each parent has joint legal custody and joint physical custody of the child until otherwise ordered by a court 4 of competent jurisdiction. 5 NRS 125C.0025 states: 6 Joint physical custody. 7 1. When a court is making a determination regarding the physical custody of a child, there is a preference that joint 8 physical custody would be in the best interest of a minor child if: 9 (a) The parents have agreed to an award of joint physical custody or so agree in open court at a hearing for the 10 purpose of determining the physical custody of the minor 11 child; or (b) A parent has demonstrated, or has attempted to 12 demonstrate but has had his or her efforts frustrated by the other parent, an intent to establish a meaningful 13 relationship with the minor child. 14 For assistance in determining whether an award of joint 2. physical custody is appropriate, the court may direct that an 15 investigation be conducted. 16 (Emphasis supplied). 17 The Court must determine the child's "best interests" pursuant to the NRS 18 125C.0035(4) which states and is analyzed in the underlying matter as follows: 19 20 Page 7

(a) The wishes of the child if the child is of sufficient age and capacity to form an intelligent preference as to his custody.

Riley is only five years old and thus, not of a sufficient age and capacity to form an intelligent preference as to her custody.

(b) Any nomination by a parent or a guardian for the child.

This factor is not applicable to the present case.

(c) Which parent is more likely to allow the child to have frequent associations and a continuing relationship with the noncustodial parent

The Court concludes this factor favors Dan. The Court has serious concerns 8 9 with Stephanie's ability to support Dan's relationship with Riley. Specifically, prior to the April 16, 2020 hearing in this matter, where the Court awarded 10 visitation to Dan, Stephanie refused to allow Dan any visitation with Riley from 11 12 March 15, 2020 until the Court ordered the same at the hearing. Likewise, 13 Stephanie withheld Dan's visitation during Christmas, which was a violation of the Court's order. These actions demonstrate Stephanie's unwillingness to foster 14 Riley's relationship with Dan. 15

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(d) The level of conflict between the parents.

The Court concludes this factor is neutral. While the conflict between the
parties was previously high due to the level of toxicity in their relationship and
how they put Riley in the middle of it, since their separation, the level of conflict
has minimized.

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(e) The ability of the parents to cooperate to meet the needs of the child.

Stephanie's attitude in all respects is that she is superior to Dan as a parent, that his wishes and ideas should not be considered, and that it is "her way or the highway." Such attitudes demonstrate that Stephanie has impeded the parties' ability to cooperate to meets Riley's need. The testimony and evidence did not show that Stephanie is a superior parent and in fact, both parents have shortcomings. However, the Court's concerns as to this factor are moderated by the temporary visitation schedule, wherein Dan had custody of Riley 35.7% of the time. The parties abided by this schedule over the past fourteen months, most of which occurred without issue and with the parties working together. Thus, the Court concludes this factor is neutral.

12 13 14

(f) The mental and physical health of the parents.

Some testimony was presented that Stephanie had problems in the past with anxiety and prescriptions; however, Stephanie testified she is no longer taking anxiety medication and instead switched to melatonin to help with her sleep and 15 anxiety. Some testimony was presented that Dan previously had issues with 16 17 marijuana, but the testimony shows this was no longer an issue after the parties' 18 reconciliation in 2019. Dad's use of alcohol did increased, but at no point in the litigation did Stephanie file anything with the Court indicating that there was an 19 imminent, ongoing concern, such as a request for Soberlink monitoring, SCRAM 20

monitoring, or proof of arrests, or calls to the police that predate the filing of the
 present divorce action. The Court therefore concludes this factor is neutral.

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(g) The physical, developmental and emotional needs of the child.

Riley has multiple needs that do not favor either parent having primary physical custody. Riley is five years old and needs to feel safe and secure. While residing together, the parties did not provide Riley with safety and security due to their constant fighting, and the chaos, and drama in the home. Now that the parties have separated, Riley is safer, more secure, and happy because there is no longer ongoing chaos in the parties' relationship. The Court concludes this factor is neutral.

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(h) The nature of the relationship of the child with each parent

Riley has a good relationship with both parties, and Stephanie testified at the time of trial and at her deposition that Riley looks forward to her time with Dan. Riley is a happier child now that she has one-on-one time with each parent. The Court concludes this factor is neutral.

(i) The ability of the child to maintain a relationship with any sibling.

This factor is not applicable to the present case.

18 (j) Any history of parental abuse or neglect of the child or a sibling of the child.

Both parties have neglected Riley's emotional needs by involving the childand in, and letting her observe, their conflict. The Court notes in particular the

1	incidents occurring in January 2019 and in May 2019, which were quite
2	frightening to Riley. Stephanie's action of waking Riley up in the middle of the
3	night, removing her from the residence, and driving with Riley in her lap 20 miles
4	to her parents' house was completely irresponsible, as there was no need to wake
5	Riley up and remove her from the home in the middle of the night. If something
6	was going on in the home, Stephanie should have called the police. This was not a
7	good decision on Stephanie's part. The Court concludes this factor is neutral.
8	(k) Whether either parent or any other person seeking custody has engaged in an
9	act of domestic violence against the child, a parent of the child or any other person residing with the child.
10	NRS 125C.0035(5) requires that this Court make specific findings of fact
11	after an evidentiary hearing is held on whether the alleged acts of domestic
12	violence occurred.
13	NRS 125C.0035(5) states as follows:
14	Except as otherwise provided in subsection 6 or <u>NRS 125C.210</u> , a determination by the court after an avidentiary hearing and finding
15	determination by the court after an evidentiary hearing and finding by clear and convincing evidence that either parent or any other person seeking physical custody has engaged in one or more acts
16	person seeking physical custody has engaged in one or more acts of domestic violence against the child, a parent of the child or any other person residing with the child creates a robuttable
17	other person residing with the child creates a rebuttable presumption that sole or joint physical custody of the child by the permetrator of the domestic violence is not in the best interest of the
18	perpetrator of the domestic violence is not in the best interest of the child. Upon making such a determination, the court shall set forth:
19	(a) Findings of fact that support the determination that one or
20	more acts of domestic violence occurred; and
	Page 11

(b) Findings that the custody or visitation arrangement ordered by the court adequately protects the child and the parent or other victim of domestic violence who resided with the child.

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3 The testimony and evidence presented demonstrate a lot of domestic violence allegations between the parties. There were multiple inappropriate actions 4 5 between the parties in front of the child, such as the language used, Stephanie 6 removing the child from the home in the middle of the night, and Dan attempting to stop Stephanie and Riley from leaving, all of which put Riley in danger. The 7 8 Court finds there is one act of domestic violence that Stephanie proved by clear 9 and convincing evidence, and that is the incident that occurred in January 2019. 10 The Court concludes this incident was clearly domestic violence on the part of 11 Dan, as he put his hands on Stephanie, and it does not matter what Stephanie said 12 to antagonize the incident. However, Dan has rebutted the presumption under NRS 124C.0035(5) because he has been able to parent Riley over the past 14 months, 13 14 and he has demonstrated that Stephanie did not appear afraid in any of the alleged domestic violence incidents, but in fact, antagonized him by calling him things 15 such as an "oversensitive bitch." Both parties have engaged in inappropriate 16 behavior, but in the January 2019 incident, Dan's actions rose to the level of 17 18 domestic violence. Despite this, and because Dan rebutted the presumption that 19 sole or joint physical custody of the child by the perpetrator of the domestic violence is not in the best interest of the child, the Court can craft a custodial 20

timeshare and exchange protocol (contained in the orders below) that minimizes
 the parties' contact with each other and the chances of further inappropriate verbal
 arguments or physical altercations, thereby protecting Stephanie and Riley.

The Court further notes that both criminal cases against Dan resulting from
Stephanie's allegations of domestic violence were dismissed. Thus, the Court
cannot use either of those cases as clear and convincing evidence of domestic
violence.

 (1) Whether either parent or any other person seeking physical custody has committed any act of abduction against the child or any other child.
 This factor is not applicable.

Based upon the analysis above, the Court finds that it is in Riley's best interest to award the parties joint physical custody, subject to the timeshare and protocol contained in the orders below.

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1	 2. <u>Child Support and Health Insurance.</u> NAC 425.115 states, in pertinent part, the following: 	1
2 3	1. If the parties do not stipulate to a child support obligation pursuant to NAC 425.110, the court must determine the child	
4	support obligation in accordance with the guidelines set forth in this chapter.	
5	2. If a party has primary physical custody of a child, he or she is	
6	deemed to be the obligee and the other party is deemed to be the obligor, and the child support obligation of the obligor must be	
7	determined.	
8	3. If the parties have joint physical custody of a child, the child support obligation of each party must be determined. After each	
9	party's respective child support obligation is determined, the child support obligations must be offset so that the party with the higher	
10	child support obligation pays the other party the difference.	
11		
12	NAC 425.140 states the following, in pertinent part:	
13	1. For one child, the sum of:]
14	(a) For the first \$6,000 of an obligor's monthly gross income,16 percent of such income;	
15	(b) For any portion of an obligor's monthly gross income that	
16	is greater than \$6,000 and equal to or less than \$10,000, 8 percent of such a portion; and	
17	(c) For any portion of an obligor's monthly gross income that	
18	is greater than \$10,000, 4 percent of such a portion.	1
19	Commensurate with an award of joint physical custody to the parties, an	
20	award of child support should be made. Relevant to this determination, the Court	
	Page 14	1

finds that Dan's gross monthly income is \$9,571.07, Stephanie's gross monthly
 income is \$6,144.02, and Stephanie provides health insurance for Riley in the total
 amount of \$210.00 per month. The Court's child support calculation is contained
 in the orders below.

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<u>The Child's School.</u>

Where parents disagree as to where a minor child should attend school, the 6 7 case of Arcella v. Arcella, 133 Nev. 868, 407 P.3d 341 (2017) controls. In Arcella, 8 the Court identified 10 factors that must be considered in determining which 9 school a minor child should attend, which are analyzed below. These factors are 10 illustrative rather than exhaustive; they are merely intended to serve as a starting 11 point for a district court's analysis. Id. at 346-47, 872. Determining which school 12 placement is in the best interest of a child is a broad-ranging and highly fact-13 specific inquiry, so a court should consider any other factors presented by the particular dispute, and it should use its discretion to decide how much weight to 14 afford each factor. Id., at 347, 872. 15

Here, Dan asks the Court to order that Riley continue attending Good
Samaritan Christian Academy (Good Samaritan), and Stephanie asks the Court to
order that Riley attend Sheila Tarr Academy of International Studies (Sheila Tarr).
Given the factual findings contained above, the Court makes the following analysis
of the factors set forth in *Arcella*:

<u>1. The wishes of the child, to the extent that the child is of sufficient age and capacity to form an intelligent preference.</u>

Riley is only five years old and is not of a sufficient age or capacity to form an intelligent preference as to her school.

2. The child's educational needs and each school's ability to meet them, and 3. The curriculum, method of teaching, and quality of instruction at each school.

At Sheila Tarr, there will be more opportunity for a bigger class, more
options for subjects, challenging subjects, and diversity, given Riley will attend
the magnet program at Sheila Tarr. Online learning does not work for Riley and at
Sheila Tarr, Riley will have a full day of kindergarten in person, which will meet
Riley's needs. The Court concludes that Riley's educational needs and the
schools' respective abilities to meet those needs favors the magnet program at
Sheila Tarr Elementary.

13 <u>4. The child's past scholastic achievement and predicted performance at each</u> 14 <u>school.</u>

The Court cannot measure predicted scholastic achievement as Riley will only be starting kindergarten. The Court concludes this factor is neutral.

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5. The child's medical needs and each school's ability to meet them.

18 Riley does not have any specific medical needs relevant to this factor. The19 Court concludes this factor is neutral.

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<u>6. The child's extracurricular interests and each school's ability to satisfy them.</u>

The Court makes no findings concerning this factor.

7. Whether leaving the child's current school would disrupt the child's academic progress and 8. The child's ability to adapt to an unfamiliar environment.

Although there was some testimony and theory that Riley may experience an advantage to beginning school at Good Samaritan based on her prior daycare experience at the school. This factor might favor Good Samaritan. No evidence was presented indicating Riley does not have the normal ability at her age to adapt to change and regardless, it is going to be a change as Riley is beginning kindergarten.

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9. The length of commute to each school and other logistical concerns.

Given Dan's testimony as to the location of his job, work schedule, and flexibility in his work schedule as to him being an outside salesperson, the Court finds he can still make the commute to work on his custodial days if the parties are able to coordinate in advance, and Stephanie is flexible. If Dan has to be at office early, he should let Stephanie know ahead of time. Although this factor favors Good Samaritan, the advantages of going to Sheila Tarr outweigh the logistical concerns, and Dan has ability to work around logistical concerns and make it work.

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1	10. Whether enrolling the child at a school is likely to alienate the child from a parent.	
2	<u>nom a parent.</u>	
3	The Court concludes that Riley will not be alienated from a parent by	
4	attending either school and therefor concludes this factor is neutral.	
	Based upon the above analysis, the Court concludes that Riley's best	
5	interests would be served by attending the magnet program at Sheila Tarr	
6	Elementary School beginning the 2021-22 school year.	
7	4. <u>Division of Community Property and Debts:</u>	
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9	NRS 125.150(1)(b) states:	
9	1. In granting a divorce, the court:	
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11 12	(b) Shall, to the extent practicable, make an equal disposition of the community property of the parties, except that the court may make an unequal disposition of the	
13	community property in such proportions as it deems just if the court finds a compelling reason to do so and sets forth in	
14	writing the reasons for making the unequal disposition.	
14	As previously mentioned, the parties stipulated to the disposition of much of	E
15	the community property and debt at issue, leaving only a few items of community	7
16	property and debt for this Court to address.	
17		
	As to the net proceeds from the sale of the marital residence located at 7183	3
18	\mathbf{D}_{1} is \mathbf{D}_{2} , \mathbf{A}_{2} , \mathbf{L}_{2} , \mathbf{N}_{2} , \mathbf{L}_{2} , \mathbf{D}_{1} , \mathbf{D}_{2} , \mathbf{L}_{2} , \mathbf{L}_{2} , \mathbf{D}_{1} , \mathbf{L}_{2} , \mathbf{D}_{2} , $$	
10	Blowing Breeze Ave, Las Vegas, Nevada 89179, Stephanie introduced Plaintiff's	3
19	Exhibit 25, an alleged Postnuptial Agreement, in her request that the Court award	1
20	Exhibit 25, an aneged i ostnaptial regreement, in her request that the Court award	
	Page 18	
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her the entirety of the net proceeds from the sale of the marital residence. The
 Court finds that Plaintiff's Exhibit 25 is not a valid Postnuptial Agreement for the
 following reasons:

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- The Postnuptial Agreement contains terms regarding a future custody arrangement. Said terms are not enforceable under NRS 123.080, as parties cannot make agreements as to future custody agreement. These terms alone make the Postnuptial Agreement unenforceable;
 - The Postnuptial Agreement does not comply with NRS 123.270, as it is not signed with the required formality to transfer an interest in real property, which invokes the statute of frauds. The Postnuptial Agreement is not notarized and is also not recorded against the property;
 - 3. Finally, the parties, as married couple, have a fiduciary duty to each other as defined in *Sogg v. Nevada State Bank*, 832 P.2d 781, 782, 108 Nev. 308, 310 (Nev. 1992). Pursuant to *Buettner v. Buettner*, 505 P.2d 600, 601, 89 Nev. 39, 41 (Nev. 1973). The Court finds that the terms of the purported Postnuptial Agreement are so unconscionable and unfair, that it should be denied and not enforced because it is completely one-sided.

18 Dan previously sold the parties' Ford Truck in 2019 before the parties
19 separated. The Court concludes that Dan spent the funds from the sale of the Ford
20 Truck on community responsibilities and paid down community debts.

1	Stephanie received the entirety of the 2020 tax refund, in addition to		
2	stimulus payments. The Court concludes that any funds received by Dan for the		
3	sale of the Ford Truck are offset by the funds received by Stephanie from the 2020		
4	tax refund and stimulus payments.		
5	Dan has not filed his 2019 or 2020 tax returns. The Court concludes there is		
6	no reason why Dan should have delayed the filing of these respective taxes.		
7	4. <u>Attorney's Fees and Costs.</u>		
8	NRS 18.010(2) provides as follows:		
9	2. In addition to the cases where an allowance is		
10	authorized by specific statute, the court may make an allowance of attorney's fees to a prevailing party:		
11	(a) When he has not recovered more than \$20,000; or		
12	(b) Without regard to the recovery sought, when the		
13	court finds that the claim, counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint or defense of the opposing party		
14	was brought or maintained without reasonable ground or to harass the prevailing party.		
15			
16	Furthermore, EDCR 7.60(b) states as follows:		
17	The court may, after notice and an opportunity to be heard, impose upon an attorney or a party any and all sanctions which		
18	may, under the facts of the case, be reasonable, including the imposition of fines, costs or attorney's fees when an attorney or		
19	a party without just cause:		
20	(1) Presents to the court a motion or an opposition to a motion which is obviously frivolous, unnecessary or		
	Page 20		

unwarranted. 1 2 (2) Fails to prepare for a presentation. 3 (3) So multiplies the proceedings in a case as to increase costs unreasonably and vexatiously. 4 (4) Fails or refuses to comply with these rules. 5 (5) Fails or refuses to comply with any order of a judge of the 6 court. Testimony and evidence were presented that the parties have had equal 7 access to community funds for payment of their attorney's fees and costs 8 9 throughout this litigation. Likewise, although Dan has a greater gross monthly 10 income, Dan has expenses that Stephanie does not have, such as rent and car 11 expenses. Finally, Stephanie has had a monthly financial surplus since this matter 12 has been pending. As such, good cause exists to order the parties to pay their own 13 attorney's fees and costs. Based upon the above considerations of fact and law, IT IS HEREBY 14 ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the bonds of matrimony now and 15 16 heretofore existing between Stephanie and Dan are hereby wholly dissolved and 17 are forever set aside, and an absolute Decree of Divorce is hereby granted to the 18 parties, and each of the parties is hereby restored all the rights and privileges of a 19 single, unmarried person.

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IT IS FURTHERORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Partial
 Parenting Agreement shall be adopted in full by the Court, to include the
 transportation provision therein that had been suspended by temporary order.

IT IS FURTHERORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the 4 parties are awarded joint physical custody of Riley in accordance with the 5 following timeshare: Riley shall reside with Dan every Monday morning at 6 daycare/school drop off until Wednesday morning at daycare/school drop off; 7 8 Riley shall reside with Stephanie every Wednesday morning at daycare/school drop off until Friday at daycare/school drop off; the parties shall alternate the 9 weekends, which shall be defined as beginning Friday at daycare/school drop off 10 11 until Monday at daycare/school drop off. This custodial timeshare shall begin on 12 August 6, 2021, which shall be deemed as Dan's weekend with Riley. Prior to 13 August 6, 2021, the parties shall continue to abide by the temporary custodial timeshare in effect at the time of trial. 14

15 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the 16 receiving parent shall be responsible for providing transportation for the custodial 17 exchanges in accordance with the text and seatbelt rule, unless otherwise mutually 18 agreed upon by the parties in writing. The text and seatbelt rule shall be defined as 19 follows: During custodial exchanges, the receiving parent shall remain in the 20 parent's vehicle with the seatbelt fastened, the delivering parent shall remain in the doorway of the exchange location, and the child shall exit the delivering parent's
 residence on his own and join the receiving parent.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the
parties shall continue to communicate via Our Family Wizard, absent an
emergency involving Riley or a parent's need to notify the other parent that he or
she is running late to a custodial exchange.

7 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that 8 presently, Stephanie has and shall continue to maintain health insurance coverage 9 for Riley, so long as it is available through her employer at a reasonable cost, with 10 the parties sharing equally in the premium thereon via an upward deviation in 11 Dan's child support obligation as further ordered below. Health insurance shall 12 continue until such time as Riley reaches 18 years of age if no longer enrolled in 13 high school, otherwise until the earlier of when Riley graduates from high school, 14 reaches 19 years of age, dies, marries, or otherwise becomes emancipated pursuant to Nevada law. 15

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that each
party shall also be responsible for one-half (1/2) of any and all unreimbursed
medical expenses incurred on behalf of Riley, including, but not limited to, optical,
dental, surgical, or any psychological or psychiatric expenses. Regarding such
reimbursements, the parties shall utilize the "30/30 Rule." Specifically, either

party incurring an out-of-pocket medical expense for Riley shall provide a copy of the paid invoice/receipt to the other party within 30 days of incurring such expense. If not tendered within the 30-day period, the Court may consider it as a waiver of reimbursement. The other party will have 30 days from receipt within which to dispute the expense in writing or reimburse the incurring party for onehalf of the out-of-pocket expense. If not disputed or paid within the 30-day period, the party may be subject to a finding of contempt and appropriate sanctions.

8 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that effective August 1, 2021, Dan shall pay child support to Stephanie in the amount of \$274.00 9 per month, plus \$105.00 per month for Dan's one-half share in Riley's medical 10 11 insurance premium, for a total child support obligation of \$379 per month. This 12 amount is consistent with the formula set forth in NAC 425.115(3) and NAC 13 425.140(1). Child support shall continue until such time as Riley reaches 18 years of age if no longer enrolled in high school, otherwise until the earlier of when 14 Riley graduates from high school, reaches 19 years of age, dies, marries, or 15 otherwise becomes emancipated pursuant to Nevada law. Until August 1, 2021, 16 17 Dan shall continue to pay Stephanie the previously ordered child support in the amount of \$998.00. 18

19 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the20 parties shall alternate the federal dependency exemption for Riley. Specifically,

beginning in tax year 2021, Dan shall claim the federal dependency exemption for
 Riley in odd-numbered tax years, and Stephanie shall claim the federal dependency
 exemption for Riley in even-numbered tax years.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Riley
shall attend the magnet program at Sheila Tarr Elementary School for the 20212022 academic school year.

7 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that based on
8 the stipulation of the parties, the following community property and debts shall be
9 divided as follows:

10 A. Each party shall be awarded any and all bank accounts in their
11 respective names;

B. Dan shall be awarded the Ford Fusion as his sole and separate
property, subject to the loan thereon;

14 C. Stephanie shall be awarded the 2009 Mercury Mariner, as her sole15 and separate property;

D. Stephanie's NV PERs shall be divided utilizing the "wait and see" approach set forth in <u>Gemma v. Gemma</u>, 105 Nev. 458, 778 P.2d 429 (1989), and divided by the "time rule" as of June 30, 2021. Pursuant to the "time rule," Dan shall be entitled to one-half of the community interest in Stephanie's NVPERS, with the community interest in such benefits being represented by a fractional

portion of the total. Pursuant to Gemma, in determining the fractional community 1 interest, the numerator shall be the number of months that the parties were married 2 3 while Stephanie was subject to NVPERS, and the denominator shall be the total number of months that Stephanie was subject to NVPERS. Subsequent to the 4 entry of this Decree, a QDRO or equivalent Order shall direct the plan 5 administrator to divide Stephanie's NVPERS as set forth above. The parties agree 6 7 that Las Vegas QDRO shall prepare the QDRO or equivalent Order, and the parties 8 shall equally divide the cost of the same.

9 E. Dan's Fidelity 401(k) shall be equally divided as of June 30, 2021. If
10 a QDRO is required to divide this asset, the same shame be performed by a
11 QDRO-preparer of Stephanie's choice, and Stephanie shall be solely responsible
12 for the cost of the QDRO;

F. Stephanie's T-Rowe Price IRA is a mixed-character asset. The balance of the IRA at the time of marriage was \$25,376.27, and the parties agree that this sum is Stephanie's sole and separate property. The remaining value as of June 30, 2021 shall be divided equally between the parties. If a QDRO is required, the same shall be prepared by Shann Winesett, Esq. at Las Vegas QDRO, with Dan being solely responsible for the cost of the same;

19 G. Each party shall be solely responsible for all credit card debts in their
20 respective names; and

H. Dan shall be solely responsible for the Navy Federal Credit Union 2 Debt; each party shall be awarded all personal effects, jewelry, and clothing in 3 their possession and/or in their respective names and any and all bank accounts 4 and other property in each party's name, possession, or control and not otherwise disposed of. 5

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the net 6 7 proceeds from the sale of the marital residence located at 7183 Blowing Breeze Ave, Las Vegas, Nevada 89179, currently held in escrow at North American Title 8 9 Company, shall be divided equally between the parties and two escrow checks 10 presented by Stephanie's attorney at the time of trial shall be deposited and divided 11 equally between the parties.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Dan shall file his 2019 and 2020 taxes and shall be entitled to any refund and responsible for any liability resulting therefrom.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the parties shall be solely responsible for their respective attorney's fees and costs incurred.

18 NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the following statutory notices relating 19 to the custody and visitation of the minor child are applicable to the parties herein:

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1 Pursuant to NRS 125C.0065, the parties are hereby placed on notice of the following: 2 3 1. If joint physical custody has been established pursuant to an order, judgment or decree of a court and one parent intends to relocate his or her residence to a place outside of this State or 4 to a place within this State that is at such a distance that would substantially impair the ability of the other parent to maintain a 5 meaningful relationship with the child, and the relocating parent desires to take the child with him or her, the relocating 6 parent shall, before relocating: 7 (a) Attempt to obtain the written consent of the non-relocating parent to relocate with the child; and 8 9 (b) If the non-relocating parent refuses to give that consent, petition the court for primary physical custody for the purpose of relocating. 10 11 The court may award reasonable attorney's fees and costs 2. to the relocating parent if the court finds that the non-relocating parent refused to consent to the relocating parent's relocation with 12 the child: 13 (a) Without having reasonable grounds for such refusal; or 14 (b) For the purpose of harassing the relocating parent. 15 A parent who relocates with a child pursuant to this 3. section before the court enters an order granting the parent 16 primary physical custody of the child and permission to relocate with the child is subject to the provisions of NRS 200.359. 17 18 Pursuant to NRS Chapter 125C.0045(6), the parties are hereby placed on 19 notice of the following: 20 Page 28

PENALTY FOR VIOLATION OF ORDER: THE ABDUCTION, CONCEALMENT OR DETENTION OF A CHILD IN VIOLATION OF THIS ORDER IS PUNISHABLE AS A CATEGORY D FELONY AS PROVIDED IN NRS 193.130. NRS 200.359 provides that every person having a limited right of custody to a child or any parent having no right of custody to the child who willfully detains, conceals or removes the child from a parent, guardian or other person having lawful custody or a right of visitation of the child in violation of an order of this court, or removes the child from the jurisdiction of the court without the consent of either the court or all persons who have the right to custody or visitation is subject to being punished for a category D felony as provided in NRS 193.130.

Pursuant to NRS 125C.0045, subsections (7) and (8), the parties are hereby placed on notice that the terms of the Hague Convention of October 25, 1980, adopted by the 14th Session of the Hague Conference on Private International Law, apply if a parent abducts or wrongfully retains a child in a foreign country.

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that pursuant to NAC 425.170, except as otherwise provided in NAC Chapter 425, any modification or adjustment to a child support obligation must be based upon a showing of a change in circumstances.

NOTICE IS FURTHER GIVEN as follows:

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NOTICE: If you want to adjust the amount of child support established in this order, you MUST file a motion to modify the order with or submit a stipulation to the court. If a motion to modify the order is not filed or a stipulation is not submitted, the child support obligation established in this order will continue until such time as all children who are the subject of this order reach 18 years of age or, if the youngest child who is subject to this order is still in high school when he or she reaches 18 years of age, when the child graduates from high

school or reaches 19 years of age, whichever comes first. Unless the 1 parties agree otherwise in a stipulation, any modification made pursuant to a motion to modify the order will be effective as of the date the 2 motion was filed. 3 NOTICE IS FURTHER GIVEN that pursuant to NRS 31A.025 to 31A.240, 4 inclusive, child support payments shall be subject to wage assignment by the 5 obligor's employer should the obligor become more than 30 days delinquent in 6 said child support payment. 7 IT IS FURTHER STIPULATED AND THEREFORE ORDERED, 8 ADJUDGED AND DECREED that this Decree is the full and final resolution of 9 this matter, and that it shall not be amended, absent further Court Order, unless in 10 writing, and signed by both parties. 11 // 12 // 13 // 14 // 15 // 16 // 17 // 18 // 19 // 20 Page 30

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that each party shall submit the information required in NRS 125B.055, NRS 125.130 and NRS 125.230 on a separate form to the Court and the Welfare Division of the Department of Human Resources within ten days from the date this Decree is filed. Such information shall be maintained by the Clerk in a confidential manner and not part of the public record. The parties shall update the information filed with the Court and the Welfare Division of the Department of Human Resources within ten days should any of that information become inaccurate.

Dated this 16th day of September, 2021

BFB 827 EBB5 80E0 Dawn R. Throne District Court Judge

1	CSERV		
2	ת	DISTRICT COURT	
3		K COUNTY, NEVADA	
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5			
6	Stephanie Rubidoux, Plaintiff	CASE NO: D-20-601936-D	
7	VS.	DEPT. NO. Department U	
8	Daniel Rubidoux, Defendant.		
9			
10	AUTOMATED CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE		
11		ervice was generated by the Eighth Judicial District	
12	Court. The foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment was served via the court's electronic eFile system to all recipients registered for e-Service on the above entitled		
13	case as listed below:	1 0	
14	Service Date: 9/16/2021		
15	Laura Deeter, Esq.	laura@ghandilaw.com	
16	Brian Blackham, Esq.	brian@ghandilaw.com	
17 18	Leah Blakesley, Esq.	leah@ghandilaw.com	
19	Fred Page	fpage@pagelawoffices.com	
20	Theresa Calabrese Vance	tcv@ghandilaw.com	
21	Renee Humphrey	rmh@ghandilaw.com	
22	Nedda Ghandi	nedda@ghandilaw.com	
23	Admin Admin	Admin@pagelawoffices.com	
24	Joshua Boren	jb@ghandilaw.com	
25	Brian Blackham, Jr.	bb2@ghandilaw.com	
26	,		
27			
28			

EXHIBIT 5



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1	NOAS Alay Chihanda Eag		Oten A.	4
2	Alex Ghibaudo, Esq. Bar No. 10592			
3	ALEX B. GHIBAUDO, PC. 197 E. California Ave., Suite 250			
4	Las Vegas, Nevada 89104			
5	T: (702) 978-7090 F: (702) 924-6553			
	Email: alex@glawvegas.com			
6	Attorney for Plaintiff			
7 8	DISTRICT COURT, FAMILY DIVISION			
9	CLARK COUN	NTY, NEVADA		
10	STEPHANIE RUBIDOUX,	Dist. Ct. No.:	D-20-601936-D	
11	Plaintiff,	Dist. Ct. Dept. No	o.: U	
12	VS.			
13	DANIEL RUBIDOUX,	NOTICE OF AP	PEAL	
14	Defendants.			
15	Defendants.			
16				
17	COMES NOW Plaintiff STEPHAN	IE RUBIDOUX, (he	reinafter referred to as	
18	"Plaintiff"), by and through her attorney of r	ecord, ALEX B. GH	IBAUDO, ESQ., of the	
19	law firm of ALEX B. GHIBAUDO, P.C., an	nd pursuant to the Ne	vada Rule of Appellant	
20	Procedure 3, files the following Notice of	Appeal from the ab	pove-captioned Court's	
21	"Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Ju	dgment" filed on Sept	tember 16, 2021. Notice	
22	of Entry of Order was filed the same day.			
23	DATED this 4 th day of October, 2021			
24		ALEX B. GH	IBAUDO, P.C.	
25		By: <u>/s/ Alex B. Ghi</u>		
26		Alex B. Ghiba NV Bar No. 1	· 1	
27		Attorney for F		
28				
	1	l		
	Case Number: D-20-	601936-D		



CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

1	
2	I HEREBY CERTIFIY that on this 4 th day of October, 2021, I served a true and
3	correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF APPEAL, via the Court designated electronic
4	service, addressed to the following:
5	Nedda Ghandi, Esq.
6	brian@ghandilaw.com
7	By: <u>/s/ Alex Ghibaudo</u>
8	An Employee of ALEX B. GHIBAUDO, P.C.
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