IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

KIMBERLY D. TAYLOR, AN INDIVIDUAL,

Appellant,

v.

KEITH BRILL, M.D., FACOG, FACS, AN INDIVIDUAL; AND WOMEN'S HEALTH ASSOCIATES OF SOUTHERN NEVADA-MARTIN, PLLC, A NEVADA PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY COMPANY,

Respondents.

Electronically Filed Jul 15 2022 09:56 a.m. Elizabeth A. Brown Clerk of Supreme Court

SUPREME COURT CASE NO. 84421

Dist. Court Case No. A-18-773472-C

APPELLANT'S RESPONSE TO ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE

Appellant, KIMBERLY TAYLOR, by and through her counsel of record hereby submits this Response to the Order to Show Cause issued by this Court on June 15, 2022, pertaining to whether the order appealed from is a special order after final judgment.

I. Introduction

This appeal raises a procedural issue as to whether an order denying a motion to disqualify opposing counsel filed *after* final judgment in the District Court but during the pendency of an appeal is a "special order after final judgment" which is appealable under NRAP 3A(8). If it is, then Taylor's appeal may continue. If it is not, her remedy would be to re-file an extraordinary writ. The outcome of this issue depends on interpretation of decades of case law which has struggled to find a bright-

1

line rule to the question of what exactly qualifies as a special order after final judgment, leaving the issue open to some unclear interpretation.

II. Background and Procedural History

Appellant Taylor filed a medical malpractice action against Respondents Dr. Brill and his clinic Women's Health Associates of Southern Nevada. The trial resulted in a defense verdict entered on November 19, 2021. (Ex. 1). Taylor appealed that verdict. That separate appeal is fully briefed and remains pending before the Supreme Court.¹

Following trial and post-verdict, Defense counsel hired away the paralegal working on the Taylor case from the law firm of Plaintiff's counsel. This paralegal had extensive knowledge of all confidential communications between Taylor and her counsel, including all trial, post-trial and appellate strategy. Taylor then filed a motion on November 18, 2021 (Ex. 2) in the District Court for imputed disqualification of the Defense law firm based on that firm now having an employee with extensive knowledge of all attorney-client communication between Plaintiff's counsel and his client, Taylor, including all appellate strategy and evaluations. An evidentiary hearing was held on January 7, 2022 (Ex. 3) and the motion for imputed disqualification was denied by way of an Order entered on February 16, 2022 (Ex. 4). Taylor then filed a Notice of Appeal of that decision on March 17, 2022.

¹ Taylor v. Brill, Case No. 83847 (appeal for a new trial).

(Ex. 5).

In response to Taylor's docketing statement, on June 15, 2022 the Supreme Court issued an Order to Show Cause instructing Taylor to brief why the order appealed from constitutes a special order after final judgment under NRAP 3A(8). The outcome of this procedural question will determine whether Taylor can proceed with an appeal or whether she must re-submit her legal position as a writ petition. This Response by Taylor followed.

Law and Argument

The Nevada Supreme Court "may only consider appeals authorized by statute or court rule." *Brown v. MHC Stagecoach, LLC*, 129 Nev. 343, 345, 301 P. 3d 850, 851 (2013). The primary court rule setting forth orders from which an appeal may be taken is NRAP 3A(b). When this appeal was filed, Taylor indicated she believed the order denying her motion to disqualify opposing counsel fell under NRAP 3A(8) as a "special order entered after final judgment."

The Supreme Court clarified what qualifies as a special order in *Gumm v*. *Mainor*, 118 Nev. 912, 59 P.3d 1220 (2002). In *Gumm*, the issue was whether a post-judgment order to interplead funds by plaintiff's attorney which was treated as a motion to adjudicate liens was an appealable special order after final judgment. Because the post-judgment order did not affect the rights of both "parties" due to the defendant having no stake in the outcome, traditionally the order would not have

qualified as an appealable order. However, the Supreme Court adopted a broader approach in *Gumm* and instead explained that "[a] special order made after final judgment, to be appealable under NRAP 3A(b)(2), must be an order affecting the rights of some party to the action, growing out of the judgment previously entered. It must be an order affecting rights incorporated in the judgment." While this shines some light on the issue, this definition is still open to interpretation and the procedural history of this case is unique.

By way of example, the Supreme Court has, on other occasions, opined on what constitutes a special order after final judgment. In Wilkinson v. Wilkinson, 73 Nev. 143, 311 P.2d 735 (1957) the court held that an order providing "preliminary counsel fees" to the wife in a divorce action to defend against a post-decree motion was not a special order after final judgment. Although the opinion is brief and contains little analysis, it noted that it was an order in an "proceedings which remain pending" and was "interlocutory" in nature. Id. As another example of what is not a special order after final judgment, a motion granting a new trial is not a special order after final judgment because the original judgment is no longer in effect, ergo there is no longer any final judgment. TRP Int'l, Inc. v. Proimtu MMI Ltd. Liab. Co., 133 Nev. 84, 84, 391 P.3d 763, 763 (2017). In fact, the vast majority of appeals the Supreme Court denies under *Gumm* appear to be appeals of interlocutory orders lacking a final judgment in the underlying case. E.g., Estate of Adams v. Fallini,

132 Nev. 814, 386 P.3d 621 (2016) (order granting relief after judgment under NRCP 60(b) for fraud on the Court was not an appealable special order as there was no longer a final judgment); *Stockmeier v. Green*, 133 Nev. 1079, 398 P.3d 295 (2017) (unpublished) (appeal from order denying a motion to comply with a previous order and motion to substitute a party).

In contrast, in *Davidson v. Davidson*, 132 Nev. 709, 713, 382 P.3d 880 (2016), the Court found that an order denying a post-decree motion to enforce the property rights set forth in the decree <u>was</u> an appealable special order. And the quintessential example of a special order after final judgment is an order granting or denying a motion for attorney's fees. *Lee v. GNLV Corp.*, 116 Nev. 424, 426, 996 P.2d 416, 417 (2000).

For what it may be worth to the Court, the federal courts clearly recognize an order regarding disqualification as a collateral order which is immediately appealable. *Gough v. Perkowski*, 694 F.2d 1140, 1141 (9th Cir. 1982) ("An order disqualifying counsel in a civil case is immediately appealable under 28 U.S.C.S. § 1291.") Under this legal analysis, a collateral order "must conclusively determine the disputed question, resolve an important issue completely separate from the merits of the action, and be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment." *Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay*, 437 U.S. 463, 57 L. Ed. 2d 351, 98 S. Ct. 2454 (1978); *see Cohen v. Beneficial Indust. Loan Corp.*, 337 U.S. 541, 69 S. Ct. 1221,

93 L. Ed. 1528 (1949) (adopting the collateral order exception to the final judgment rule). The Nevada Supreme Court declined to adopt or consider the collateral order exception for Nevada in *Asi Mktg. Grp., Ltd. Liab. Co. v. Tobias*, 133 Nev. 980, 404 P.3d 411 (2017) (unpublished). Maybe the Court ought to reconsider how the United States Supreme Court addresses this issue given that traditionally Nevada has looked to the federal counterpart to Nevada rules to assist in interpretation.

Frankly, in preparing this Response Taylor's counsel did not find the Nevada Supreme Court's jurisprudence on this topic to be a model of consistency. Indeed, the Nevada Supreme Court commented on the "lack of clarity" as to the special order rule in the *Gumm* case and tried to fashion a test that was "simple and clear" yet it is difficult to anticipate all orders that may arise. Gumm, 118 Nev. at 919. As occasionally happens with the law, when cases span decades earlier cases can start to look wrongly decided under later authority and vice versa. As one example, the Supreme Court recently found in Houston v. Mandalay Bay Corp, No. 84417, 2022 Nev. Unpub. LEXIS 420 (June 6, 2022) (unpublished) that a post-judgment motion to interplead funds was not an appealable special order, but the facts of *Houston* were essentially the same fact pattern the Court held did present an appealable special order in *Gumm* itself (a post-judgment motion by plaintiff's counsel to interplead settlement funds and adjudicate liens). As sometimes happens in the law, it is simply difficult to announce a bright-line rule on a legal issue even when the

Court may try. This seems to be the case with what constitutes a special order made after final judgment.

Turning now to Taylor's case, Taylor was unable to locate any Nevada case addressing this particular legal procedural issue. Admittedly, two of this Court's cases on the topic of disqualification were heard by the Supreme Court as extraordinary writs, as opposed to appeals, based on disqualification issues that were identified post-judgment. E.g., Ryan's Express Transp. Servs. v. Amador Stage Lines, Inc., 128 Nev. 289, 279 P.3d 166 (2012) and Leibowitz v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court of Nev., 119 Nev. 523 (2003) (both adjudicating disqualification issues arising post-judgment as writ proceedings). However, neither of those cases contain any analysis as to whether they procedurally they should have been filed as appeals. As a litigant, guessing that writ relief is the proper relief is a dangerous game because if you guess wrong and file a writ as opposed to filing an appeal because if it is later ruled you should have filed an appeal you have missed the jurisdictional time to file it. Moreover, since even hearing a writ petition is entirely discretionary by the Supreme Court, see Renown Reg'l Med. Ctr. v. Second Judicial Dist, Court, 130 Nev. 824, 827, 335 P.3d 199, 201 (2014), it would be detrimental to an affected party such as Taylor to assume she can only file a writ.

If we apply the *Gumm* factors to this particular case, it is clear that (1) the order arose after final judgment, (2) the order affects the rights of both parties since

it affects the right to counsel for both parties, and (3) the issues have arisen out of the final judgment. Here, Taylor notes that the special order will not affect the amount of money she personally will or will not receive, but *Gumm* made clear this was not necessary to constitute a final order after judgment (the defense paid the same amount of money regardless of the outcome in that matter). The order appealed from is a final order on the issue of disqualification, there are no additional hearings or rulings to be made on that issue. There are also no additional post-judgment issues pending in the District Court, a final judgment based on a trial result occurred. However, there is a still-pending appeal for a new trial² based on asserted errors by the District Court as well as separate appeals of other post-judgment attorney fee³ and costs⁴ issues. Therefore, the disqualification issue clearly affects both parties in ongoing appellate litigation. Indeed, part of what Taylor's counsel tried to stress at the evidentiary hearing held before the District Court⁵ was that Defense counsel now has a paralegal working for them that reviewed, read and worked on letters from Plaintiff's counsel explaining all appellate strategy and evaluation of merits. (Ex. 3

² Taylor v. Brill, Case No. 83847 (appeal for a new trial).

³ Brill v. Taylor, Case No. 84881 (appeal over denial of attorney's fees).

⁴ Brill v. Taylor, Case No. 84492 (appeal over denial of certain costs).

⁵ Taylor's counsel would like to note that he has filed no motions to disqualify in the appeals themselves based on this Court's statement in *Ryan's Express Transp. Servs. v. Amador Stage Lines, Inc.*, 128 Nev. 289, 299, 279 P.3d 166, 172 (2012) that such fact-finding hearings are to occur in the District Court, not the Supreme Court.

pg. 7, 25-27, 50-52). While the disqualification issue does not affect money to be awarded per se, it has a potentially large impact on the parties' abilities to effectively litigate their appeals and any new trial that may be ordered. Thus, the order should qualify as a special order entered post-judgment for purposes of appeal. Gumm seems to have adopted a broad reading of what a special order after entry of judgment is. While *Gumm* is often used by the Court to dispose of improperly-filed appeals of what are simply interlocutory orders, the order is this case is anything but interlocutory and plainly did not enter under after a final judgment. The Supreme Court may also wish to consider procedurally whether issues of this kind should be presented as appeals or writ petitions. If treated as an appeal, there is a finite time to present the issue and the litigant is guaranteed adjudication on the merits of the issue. If writ relief is the only relief available, the issue can linger as there is no finite time to present a writ petition and there is no guarantee of an adjudication on the merits since even hearing a writ petition on the merits is discretionary.

<u>Closing</u>

In closing, Taylor's case was fully adjudicated by the District Court. After a final order on the merits of her case was entered, a post-judgment disqualification issue arose. Taylor filed this and litigated it in the District Court per the Supreme Court's opinion in *Ryan's Express Transp. Servs. v. Amador Stage Lines, Inc.*, 128 Nev. 289, 299, 279 P.3d 166, 172 (2012) (disqualification fact-finding hearings are

to occur in the District Court, not the Supreme Court). She now contests the outcome of that hearing and believes an appeal is the proper procedural remedy. All District Court proceedings have ended, a final judgment on the merits of her case has been entered and the order appealed from completely adjudicates the collateral issue of imputed disqualification of defense counsel. If this doesn't describe a "special order entered after final judgment" it would be hard to describe what does satisfy that term. The disqualification issue plainly affects both parties and their ability to litigate the three other pending appeals regarding the case pending with this Court and potentially re-trial of this action.

Respectfully, Taylor believes she has appealed a special order entered after final judgment, she believes her remedy is an appeal and that this court's jurisdiction has been property invoked.

Respectfully submitted this 15th day of July, 2022.

BREEDEN & ASSOCIATES, PLLC

ÁDAM J. BREEDEN, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 008768 376 E. Warm Springs Road, Ste. 120 Las Vegas, Nevada 89119 Phone: (702) 819-7770 adam@breedenandassociates.com *Attorney for Appellant*

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 15th day of July, 2022, I served a copy of

the foregoing legal document entitled RESPONSE TO ORDER TO SHOW

CAUSE via the method indicated below:

X	Pursuant to NRCP 5 and NEFCR 9, by electronically serving all counsel and e-mails registered to this matter on the Court's official service, Wiznet system.
	Pursuant to NRCP 5, by placing a copy in the US mail, postage pre-paid to the following counsel of record or parties in proper person:
	Robert McBride, Esq. Heather S. Hall, Esq. McBRIDE HALL 8329 W. Sunset Road, Suite 260 Las Vegas, Nevada 89113 Attorneys for Defendants Keith Brill, M.D. and Women's Health Associates
	Via receipt of copy (proof of service to follow)

An Attorney or Employee of the firm:

/s/ Adam J. Breeden BREEDEN & ASSOCIATES PLLC

INDEX OF EXHIBITS

1.	Notice of Entry of Judgment
2.	Motion to Disqualify
3.	Transcript of Disqualification Evidentiary Hearing
4.	Order Denying Motion to Disqualify
5.	Notice of Appeal

EXHIBIT 1

EXHIBIT 1

EXHIBIT 1

		Electronically Filed 11/19/2021 4:46 PM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT
1	NEO	Otimes. Ann
2	ROBERT C. McBRIDE, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 7082	
3	HEATHER S. HALL, ESQ.	
5	Nevada Bar No. 10608	
4	McBRIDE HALL 8329 W. Sunset Road, Suite 260	
5	Las Vegas, Nevada 89113	
6	Telephone No. (702) 792-5855 Facsimile No. (702) 796-5855	
	E-mail: <u>rcmcbride@mcbridehall.com</u> E-mail: <u>hshall@mcbridehall.com</u>	
7	Attorneys for Defendants,	
8	Keith Brill, M.D., FACOG and	
9	Women's Health Associates of Southern Nevada MARTIN, PLLC	! —
10	DISTRIC	T COURT
11	CLARK COUN	NTY, NEVADA
12	KIMBERLY D. TAYLOR, an Individual,	CASE NO.: A-18-773472-C DEPT: III
13	Plaintiff,	
14	vs.	
15	KEITH BRILL, MD, FACOG, FACS, an Individual; WOMEN'S HEALTH	NOTICE OF ENTRY OF JUDGMENT ON JURY VERDICT
16	ASSOCIATES OF SOUTHERN NEVADA –	
17	MARTIN, PLLC, a Nevada Professional Limited Liability Company,	
18	Defendants.	
19		IENT ON JURY VERDICT was entered and filed
20	on the 19 th day of November 2021, a copy of wh	nich is attached hereto.
21	DATED this 19 th day of November2021.	McBRIDE HALL
22	Diffied this if any of november 2021.	
23		/s/Heather S. Hall
24		ROBERT C. McBRIDE, ESQ.
25		Nevada Bar No.: 7082
		HEATHER S. HALL, ESQ.
26		Nevada Bar No.: 10608 8329 W. Sunset Road, Suite 260
27		Las Vegas, Nevada 89113
28		Attorneys For Defendants
		1
	Case Number: A-18-773	472-C

1	CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE		
2	I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 19 th day of November 2021, I served a true and correct		
3	copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF ENTRY OF JUDGMENT ON JURY VERDICT addressed		
4	to the following counsel of record at the following address(es):		
5			
6 7	VIA ELECTRONIC SERVICE: By mandatory electronic service (e-service), proof of e- service attached to any copy filed with the Court; or		
8 9	□ VIA U.S. MAIL: By placing a true copy thereof enclosed in a sealed envelope with postage thereon fully prepaid, addressed as indicated on the service list below in the United States mail at Las Vegas, Nevada		
10	VIA FACSIMILE: By causing a true copy thereof to be telecopied to the number		
11	indicated on the service list below.		
12			
13	Adam J. Breeden, Esq.		
14	BREEDEN & ASSOCIATES, PLLC 376 E. Warm Springs Road, Suite 120		
15	Las Vegas, Nevada 89119 Attorneys for Plaintiff		
16			
17			
18			
19			
20	<u>/s/Candace Cullina</u> An Employee of <i>McBRIDE HALL</i>		
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1		CLERK OF THE COURT
1	JUDG ROBERT C. McBRIDE, ESQ.	
2	Nevada Bar No. 7082	
3	HEATHER S. HALL, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 10608	
4	McBRIDE HALL 8329 W. Sunset Road, Suite 260	
5	Las Vegas, Nevada 89113	
6	Telephone No. (702) 792-5855 Facsimile No. (702) 796-5855	
7	E-mail: <u>rcmcbride@mcbridehall.com</u> E-mail: <u>hshall@mcbridehall.com</u>	
,	Attorneys for Defendants,	
8	Keith Brill, M.D., FACOG and Women's Health Associates of Southern Nevada	-
9	MARTIN, PLLC	
10	DISTRIC	T COURT
11	CLARK COUN	NTY, NEVADA
12		
13	KIMBERLY D. TAYLOR, an Individual,	CASE NO.: A-18-773472-C
14	Plaintiff,	DEPT: III
15		
16	VS.	JUDGMENT ON JURY VERDICT
17	KEITH BRILL, MD, FACOG, FACS, an Individual; WOMEN'S HEALTH	
	ASSOCIATES OF SOUTHERN NEVADA –	
18	MARTIN, PLLC, a Nevada Professional Limited Liability Company,	
19		
20	Defendants.	
21		
22		
23	This action came on for trial before the H	Ionorable Monica Trujillo, and a jury on October
24	11, 2021. Plaintiff and Defendants appeared	by and through counsel, and the Court having
25	submitted the case to the jury and the jury having	ng entered a verdict on October 19, 2021, and in
26	accordance with the verdict of the jury,	
27	///	
28	///	
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		1
	Case Number: A-18-773	472-C

1	IT IS HEREY ORDERED, ADJUD	GED AND DECREED that judgment is entered in
2	favor of Defendants Keith Brill, M.D., FAC	OG and Women's Health Associates of Southern
3	Nevada – MARTIN, PLLC and against Plaint	iff Kimberly D. Taylor.
4		
5		Dated this 19th day of November, 2021
6	_	Carei Kung
7 8		1B9 9FE 7850 3814 Carli Kierny District Court Judge
9	Respectfully submitted by:	Agreed as to form and content:
10	DATED this 8 th day of November, 2021.	DATED this 8 th day of November 2021.
11	McBRIDE HALL	BREEDEN & ASSOCIATES, PLLC
12	/s/Heather S. Hall	/s/Adam J. Breeden
13	Heather S. Hall, Esq.	Adam J. Breeden, Esq.
14	Nevada Bar No. 10608 8329 W. Sunset Road, Suite 260	Nevada Bar No.: 008768 376 E. Warm Springs Road, Suite 120
15	Las Vegas, Nevada 89113	Las Vegas, Nevada 89119
16	Attorneys for Defendants Keith Brill, M.D., FACOG, FACS and	Attorneys for Plaintiff
17 18	Women's Health Associates of Southern Nevada – Martin, PLLC	
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2	DISTRICT COURT		
3	CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA		
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6	Kimberly Taylor, Plaintiff(s)	CASE NO: A-18-773472-C	
7	vs.	DEPT. NO. Department 3	
8	Keith Brill, M.D., Defendant(s)		
9			
10	AUTOMATED	CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE	
11	This automated certificate of se	ervice was generated by the Eighth Judicial District	
12	Court. The foregoing Judgment on Jury	y Verdict was served via the court's electronic eFile	
13	system to all recipients registered for e	-Service on the above entitled case as listed below:	
14	Service Date: 11/19/2021		
15	Adam Breeden	adam@breedenandassociates.com	
16	E-File Admin	efile@hpslaw.com	
17	Heather Hall	hshall@mcbridehall.com	
18	Jody Foote	jfoote@jhcottonlaw.com	
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9	Natalie Jones	njones@mcbridehall.com
10 11	Madeline VanHeuvelen	mvanheuvelen@mcbridehall.com
12	Sarah Daniels	sarah@breedenandassociates.com
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EXHIBIT 2

EXHIBIT 2

EXHIBIT 2

	ELECTRONICALLY SERVED	
	11/18/2021 3:50	Electronically Filed 11/18/2021 3:49 PM
		Huns Summ
		CLERK OF THE COURT
1	MDQA ADAM J. BREEDEN, ESQ.	
2	Nevada Bar No. 008768	
3	BREEDEN & ASSOCIATES, PLLC 376 E. Warm Springs Road, Suite 120	
4	Las Vegas, Nevada 89119 Phone: (702) 819-7770	
5	Fax: (702) 819-7771 Adam@Breedenandassociates.com	
	Attorneys for Plaintiff	
6	EIGHTH JUDICIAI	L DISTRICT COURT
7	CLARK COU	NTY, NEVADA
8	KIMBERLY TAYLOR, an individual,	CASE NO.: A-18-773472-C
9		CASE NO.: A-10-775472-C
10	Plaintiff,	DEPT NO.: III
11	v.	
12	KEITH BRILL, M.D., FACOG, FACS, an	ERRATA TO OR AMENDED PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO
	individual; WOMEN'S HEALTH ASSOCIATES OF SOUTHERN NEVADA –	DISQUALIFY THE MCBRIDE HALL
13	MARTIN, PLLC, a Nevada Professional	LAW FIRM ON AN EX PARTE MOTION FOR ORDER SHORTENING TIME
14	Limited Liability Company; BRUCE HUTCHINS, RN, an individual;	
15	HENDERSON HOSPITAL and/or VALLEY	HEARING REQUESTED:
16	HEALTH SYSTEMS, LLC, a Foreign LLC d/b/a HENDERSON HOSPITAL, a subsidiary	YES
17	of UNITED HEALTH SERVICES, a Foreign LLC; TODD W. CHRISTENSEN, M.D., an	
18	individual; DIGNITY HEALTH d/b/a ST.	
19	ROSE DOMINICAN HOSPITAL; DOES I through XXX, inclusive; and ROE	
20	CORPORATIONS I through XXX, inclusive,	
21	Defendants.	
21 22		
	Distatiff KIMDEDI V TAVI OD hv og d	through her attainers of recend A dam I. Duradan
23		through her attorney of record Adam J. Breeden,
24		hereby submits the following Motion to Disqualify
25	the Law Firm of McBride Hall. This Motion	is made and based on the following Points and
26	Authorities, the pleadings and papers on file here	in, the Declaration of Adam J. Breeden, Esq.,
27	//	
28	//	
	Case Number: A-18-77	3472-C

1	and any oral argument allowed by the Court at the time of hearing on this matter.	
2	DATED this 18 th day of November, 2021.	
3	BREEDEN & ASSOCIATES, PLLC	
4	Ader 1 Ban	
5	ADAM J. BREEDEN, ESQ.	
6	Nevada Bar No. 008768 Attorneys for Plaintiff Taylor	
7	DECLADATION OF ADAM I DREEDEN FOO IN CURDORT OF EV DADTE	
8	DECLARATION OF ADAM J. BREEDEN, ESQ. IN SUPPORT OF EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR ORDER SHORTENING TIME	
9	STATE OF NEVADA)	
10) ss: COUNTY OF CLARK:)	
11		
12	I, ADAM J. BREEDEN, ESQ., being first duly sworn, deposes, and says: 1. I am Adam J. Breeden, Esq. and am counsel for Plaintiff Kimberly Taylor in the	
13	1. I am Adam J. Breeden, Esq. and am counsel for Plaintiff Kimberly Taylor in the instant litigation and make this affidavit in support of this motion.	
14	2. This Motion seeks to disqualify the law firm of McBride Hall as defense counsel	
15	after they hired paralegal Kristy Johnson from my law firm. Ms. Johnson worked extensively on	
16	Ms. Taylor's case—including attending all days of the recent trial—and is aware of the most	
17	sensitive, confidential and privileged information regarding this case. Ms. Johnson's first day at	
18	McBride Hall was November 8, 2021.	
19	3. Nevada law contains a <i>rebuttable presumption of disqualification</i> under these	
20	circumstances. If McBride Hall wishes to avoid disqualification the burden is on them after an	
21	evidentiary hearing to show that screening is a reasonable method to cure any imputed	
22	disqualification issue given all factors.	
23	4. Post-trial motions and an appeal will proceed shortly in this case. To preserve all	
24	attorney-client privileged information, an expedited hearing on this motion should be held.	
25	5. I am scheduled to be out of the country from November 25 through December 1,	
26 27	2021 and request the Motion not be set for hearing on those days.	
27	6. I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of Nevada that the	
28		
	2	

1	foregoing is true and correct.
2	DATED this 18th day of November, 2021. Advand Ren
3	
4	ADAM J. BREEDEN, ESQ.
5	ORDER SHORTENING TIME
6	IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that a hearing on the PLAINTIFF KIMBERLY TAYLOR'S
7	MOTION TO DISQUALIFY THE MCBRIDE HALL LAW FIRM FROM REPRESENTING
8	DEFENDANTS DR. BRILL AND WHASN ON AN ORDER SHORTENING TIME, be expedited
9	and heard on the <u>7</u> day of <u>December</u> , 2021, at the hour of <u>9:00</u> am/ pm, or
10	Plaintiff must serve this Motion to opposing counsel by as soon thereafter as counsel can be heard. 11/19/21 5 p.m.
11	Oppositions shall be due on 11/26/21
12	Replies shall be due on No written replies allowed.
13	
14	Dated this 18th day of November, 2021
15	(and purity
16	42B 62C A32F 526A
17	Submitted by: Carli Kierny District Court Judge
18	BREEDEN & ASSOCIATES, PLLC
19	Adlam / Ban
20	ADAM J. BREEDEN, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 008768
21	376 E. Warm Springs Road, Suite 120 Las Vegas, Nevada 89119
22	Phone: (702) 819-7770 Fax: (702) 819-7771
23	Adam@Breedenandassociates.com Attorneys for Plaintiff Taylor
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1	MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION		
2	I. <u>INTRODUCTION</u>		
3	Recently, the McBride Hall law firm (defense counsel for Dr. Brill and WHASN) hired away		
4	a paralegal, Kristy Johnson, from the law firm of Breeden & Associates, PLLC (plaintiff Taylor's		
5	counsel). Because Ms. Johnson worked extensively on the Taylor file at her previous employment		
6	with plaintiff's counsel and has the most sensitive confidential and privileged information regarding		
7	case assessment and strategy, the McBride Hall law firm is subject to a rebuttable presumption that		
8	it is disqualified from further representation in this case pursuant to <i>Leibowitz v. Eighth Judicial</i>		
9	Dist. Court of Nev., 119 Nev. 523 (2003). If it wishes to overcome this rebuttable presumption, it		
10	bears the burden of proof at an evidentiary hearing to establish that effective screening can overcome		
11	the disqualification presumption given all available factors. However, it strongly appears that		
12	McBride Hall would not be able to overcome that presumption given the facts of this case.		
13	II. <u>CASE BACKGROUND</u>		
14	The Court will likely recall that this medical malpractice matter proceeded to trial on October		
15	12-19 and resulted in a defense verdict. Taylor will be appealing and requesting a new trial. This		
16	motion concerns disqualification of defense counsel after defense counsel hired the paralegal of		
17	plaintiff's counsel working on this case. The applicable facts are set forth as follows in Declaration		
18	form from Plaintiff's counsel, Adam J. Breeden, Esq.:		
19	I, ADAM J. BREEDEN, ESQ., declare the following under penalty of perjury:		
20	1. I am Adam J. Breeden, Esq. and am counsel for Plaintiff, Kimberly Taylor, in this		
21	matter.		
22	2. I am a licensed attorney in the state of Nevada. I am the managing member of		
23	Breeden & Associates, PLLC. I know the following facts to be true of my own knowledge and, if		
24	called to testify, I could competently do so.		
25	3. I have a small/solo law practice. While I have two other attorneys who work with my		
26	firm occasionally as of-counsel and several other attorneys and paralegals who do occasional		
27	piecework for my law firm, for the most part I alone manage litigation and represent the clients.		
28	4. Until recently, I had one full-time paralegal and assistant, Kristy Johnson.		

Ms. Johnson had worked for me since October of 2017. She worked 40 hours a week. Ms. Johnson
 worked very closely with me while she was employed. I saw her, worked with her and assigned her
 work daily. She is involved in every case I have at my office. She independently manages some
 aspects of litigation at my firm as well, including preparing discovery supplements and other filings
 and notices. I shared all of my mental impressions and evaluations of every case at my office with
 Ms. Johnson.

- 5. Specifically as to the Kimberly Taylor case, I would testify to the following:a. Ms. Johnson had worked on the Taylor file at my office since its inception at my
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- firm in January 2021, from sign up through discovery and trial.
- b. Ms. Johnson had worked on all or substantially all pleadings and filings in the case, including all motions, status reports and emails to the client and trial. In fact, Ms. Johnson was personally present during every day of trial.
- c. As a matter of course, I copied Ms. Johnson on virtually every case and client
 email I send at my firm, including Ms. Taylor's case. As a result, she is likely
 copied on a hundred emails in this case and perhaps two dozen emails directly to
 the client Ms. Taylor, which detail legal advice, case evaluations and other
 confidential information.
- d. Ms. Johnson has met the client, Ms. Taylor, personally many times and spoke to
 her many times by phone. She literally sat next to Ms. Taylor during trial of this
 matter. Ms. Johnson has sat through all or part of client meetings between me
 and Ms. Taylor and well as privileged courthouse discussions with the client and
 co-counsel Anna Albertson.
- e. There is no confidential communication between my law firm and the client
 Ms. Taylor of which Ms. Johnson was not privy to and actually worked on.
 Perhaps most specifically, she worked on and sent comprehensive status letters
 to the client, *the most recent of which was on October 20 and 25, 2021 which outlines to the client all of my mental impressions of the case, judicial officer, opposing counsel, trial impressions, appellate and settlement strategy.* Notably,

1 Ms. Johnson was also present for both jury focus groups in this matter and was present during post-trial jury interviews for this case. 2 3 f. Ms. Johnson has the same knowledge of this case as if I turned over my entire file to opposing counsel, except that it is ever worse since she has knowledge of 4 5 even unwritten conversations and strategy with co-counsel and Ms. Taylor. 6 6. On October 12-19, 2021, on behalf of the Plaintiff Taylor I took this matter to trial 7 against the McBride Hall law firm called Taylor v. Brill, MD. During that trial, Ms. Johnson appeared every day and operated trial presentation software. Apparently, Ms. Johnson made an 8 9 impression on someone at the McBride Hall law firm during that time and they made a job offer to 10 her, reportedly after conclusion of the trial. 7. On Monday, October 25, 2021 Ms. Johnson advised me that "over the weekend" she 11 discussed a job position at McBride Hall and had accepted an offer. I contacted the principals of 12 13 the McBride Hall law firm to see if they intended to withdraw from matters Ms. Johnson worked on 14 and they indicated they would not and they believed screening would cure any imputed disqualification. There were two clients involved, Jane Nelson and Kimberly Taylor. 15

16 8. I explained this situation to my client, Kimberly Taylor, who has instructed me that 17 she feels uncomfortable with this situation and directed me to file a motion to disqualify the McBride 18 Hall law firm.

19 9. It's hard to imagine a case fraught with more risk of disclosure of confidential information to the adversary. I do not wish to accuse McBride Hall or Ms. Johnson of any unethical 20 21 behavior but the mere circumstances and risk of disclosure warrant imputed disqualification in this matter in my opinion. Given the level of information Ms. Johnson, I do not feel that screening will 22 23 cure this issue and mere screening is unacceptable to Ms. Taylor and me personally.

24 I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of Nevada that the foregoing 25 is true and correct.

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DATED this 16th day of November, 2021.

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Adem / Ban adam J. Breeden, esq.

III. LAW AND ARGUMENT

A. Imputed Disqualification of a Law Firm upon Employment of Legal Staff with Confidential Information about an Opposing Party

The legal issue in this case is when the hiring of legal staff by an opposing law firm results in disqualification of the hiring law firm. The controlling Nevada Supreme Court precedent on this issue is *Leibowitz v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court of Nev.*, 119 Nev. 523 (2003). However, a short primer of Nevada law on this issue is necessary.

The Nevada Supreme Court first addressed imputed disqualification of a law firm due to 9 hiring nonlawyer legal staff from opposing counsel in the case of Ciaffone v. Eighth Judicial Dist. 10 Court, 113 Nev. 1165, 945 P.2d 950 (1997). In Ciaffone, a secretary word processor had worked on 11 a wrongful death case at one firm as a temporary employee but was later hired by the opposing law 12 firm. The first law firm requested imputed disqualification of the hiring or second law firm. The 13 Supreme Court found that "[w]hen SCR 187 [non-lawyers held to same standards as lawyers 14 supervising them] is read in conjunction with SCR 160(2) [imputed disqualification], nonlawyer 15 employees become subject to the same rules governing imputed disqualification. To hold otherwise 16 would grant less protection to the confidential and privileged information obtained by a nonlawyer 17 than that obtained by a lawyer." Id. at 1169. The Nevada Supreme Court rejected screening of non-18 lawyer staff as an effective method of curing imputed disqualification, explaining both that 19 "[a]ttorney disqualification of counsel is part of a court's duty to safeguard the sacrosanct privacy 20 of the attorney-client relationship which is necessary to maintain public confidences in the legal 21 profession and to protect the integrity of the judicial process" Panduit Corp. v. All States Plastic 22 Mfg. Co., 744 F.2d 1564, 1576 (D.C. Cir. 1984), and that "a client must be secure in the knowledge 23 that any information he reveals to counsel will remain confidential." United States v. Schell, 775 24 F.2d 559, 565 (4th Cir. 1985). Therefore, Ciaffone set forth a bright-line, per se rule of 25 disqualification without any inquiry into the level of confidential information the nonlawyer 26 obtained or the ability to screen the employee at the second law firm.

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Ciaffone clearly states that "the policy of protecting the attorney-client privilege must be

preserved through imputed disqualification when a nonlawyer employee, in possession of privileged 1 2 information, accepts employment with a firm who represents a client with materially adverse 3 interests." Id. at 1168. While *Ciaffone* set forth a bright-line rule of imputed disqualification that was easy to apply, it was a bit harsh and came under criticism that it unfairly restricted employment 4 5 opportunities of nonlawyer legal staff, particularly those who had little to no confidential information. In *Ciaffone*, the staff member involved did not have much involvement with the 6 underlying case. The staff member had been a temporary secretarial employee at the first firm and 7 8 did word processing only. She was not regularly assigned to the underlying case and was not 9 assigned to the attorney handling the underlying case, but did some limited work on the case in an 10 "overflow" capacity. Id. at 1166-1167. Regardless, the Nevada Supreme Court found the second firm should be disqualified. The Court barred screening as a means to avoid disqualification of the 11 hiring firm and noted the inherent difficulties allowing screening presented, including (a) the 12 13 effectiveness of the screen, (b) the monetary incentive involved in breaching the screen, (c) the fear 14 of disclosing privileged information in the course of proving an effective screen, and (d) the possibility of accidental disclosures. 15

16 Several years later, the Nevada Supreme Court revisited *Ciaffone* and the issue of screening 17 of nonlawyer legal staff in Leibowitz v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court of Nev., 119 Nev. 523 (2003). 18 In Leibowitz the underlying case concerned a contested divorce which was on appeal when 19 disqualification issues arose. It was discovered that the husband's law firm had hired two different 20 employees that had both previously worked for the wife's law firm. One employee, Magalianes was 21 a legal assistant newly hired by the husband's law firm. However, Maglianes had previously worked on the divorce case for roughly a month while working for the wife's law firm. The evidence was 22 that she took the initial intake call from the wife, prepared a memo for the attorney on the case, may 23 24 have drafted certain legal documents and may have been present at meetings between the wife and 25 her attorneys. Id. at 527-528. The husband's law firm said they would screen Magalianes off the file and prohibit her from discussing the matter at her new law firm to avoid disqualification 26 27 (although this was not allowed at the time under *Ciaffone*). The second employee, Baker, was also 28 a legal assistant. While there was disputed evidence, the court found that Baker had worked at the

wife's law firm for only a short period of time and had access to, but did not actually work on, the
divorce case at issue. Thus, the type of exposure between the two employees was different.
Maglianes had actually worked on the case but perhaps obtained only minimal confidential or
privileged information. Baker did not even seem to have worked on the case at all. The district court
found that under *Ciaffone*, mere access to the file even without a showing of knowledge of
confidential material was sufficient by itself to disqualify the second law firm that hired the legal
staff and ordered the same.

8 In reviewing the District Court's decision, the Supreme Court revisited and modified
9 *Ciaffone*. The Court explained that in *Ciaffone* the nonlawyer's involvement was in a "secretarial,
10 word processor capacity" and the opinion did not consider whether the employee had "exposure
11 related to privileged or confidential information," which was error. *Id.* at 530. The court therefore
12 found that instead of a per se rule of imputed disqualification, "the imputed disqualification
13 standards of SCR 160(2) do not apply simply because a nonlawyer employee was exposed, or had
14 access to, a former client's file. The rule only applies when the nonlawyer employee acquires

15 privileged, confidential information."

16 The Court then continued its analysis and stated that even if the former employee had
17 confidential information, there is a sort of sliding scale as to how much and whether disqualification
18 is warranted. The Court then stated that in some (but not all) cases, the screening of nonlawyer
19 employees at a new firm to cure imputed disqualification was acceptable, explaining as follows:

20 When a law firm hires a nonlawyer employee, the firm has an affirmative duty to determine whether the employee previously had access to adversarial client files. If the hiring law firm determines that the employee had such access, the hiring law firm has an absolute duty to screen the nonlawyer employee from the adversarial cases irrespective of the nonlawyer employee's actual knowledge of privileged or confidential information.

- 24 Although we decline to mandate an exhaustive list of screening requirements, the following provides an instructive minimum:
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 1. "The newly hired nonlawyer [employee] must be cautioned not to disclose any information relating to the representation of a client of the former employer."
- 2. "The nonlawyer [employee] must be instructed not to work on any matter on which [he or] she worked during the prior employment, or regarding which [he or] she has information relating to the former employer's representation."

1 2	3. "The new firm should takereasonable steps to ensure that the nonlawyer [employee] does not work in connection with matters on which [he or] she worked during the prior employment, absent client consent [i.e., unconditional waiver] after consultation."
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4	In addition, the hiring law firm must inform the adversarial party, or their counsel, regarding the hiring of the nonlawyer employee and the screening mechanisms
5	utilized. The adversarial party may then: (1) make a conditional waiver (i.e., agree to the screening mechanisms); (2) make an unconditional waiver (eliminate the screening mechanisms); or (3) file a motion to disqualify counsel.
6	
7 8	However, even if the new employer uses a screening process, disqualification will always be required-absent unconditional waiver by the affected client-under the following circumstances :
0	1. "When information relating to the representation of an adverse client has in fact
9 10	been disclosed [to the new employer]"; or, in the absence of disclosure to the new employer,
10	2. "When screening would be ineffective or the nonlawyer [employee] necessarily
11	would be required to work on the other side of a matter that is the same as or
12	substantially related to a matter on which the nonlawyer [employee] has previously worked."
13	
14	Id. at 533. The Supreme Court continued to explain how the district court should weigh all factors,
1.5	stating the following:
15	Once a district court determines that a nonlawyer employee acquired confidential
16	information about a former client, the district court should grant a motion for disqualification unless the district court determines that the screening is sufficient
17	to safeguard the former client from disclosure of the confidential information. The district court is faced with the delicate task of balancing competing interests,
18	including: (1) "the individual right to be represented by counsel of one's choice,"
19	(2) "each party's right to be free from the risk of even inadvertent disclosure of confidential information," (3) "the public's interest in the scrupulous administration
20	of justice," and (4) "the prejudices that will inure to the parties as a result of the
21	[district court's] decision."
22	To determine whether screening has been or may be effective, the district court should consider: (1) "the substantiality of the relationship between the former and
23	current matters," (2) "the time elapsed between the matters," (3) "the size of the
24	firm," (4) "the number of individuals presumed to have confidential information," (5) "the nature of their involvement in the former matter," (6) "the timing and
	features of any measures taken to reduce the danger of disclosure," and (7) whether
25	the "old firm and the new firm represent adverse parties in the same proceeding, rather than in different proceedings" because inadvertent disclosure by the
26	nonlawyer employee is more likely in the former situation.
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	Id. at 533-534. Based on this new standard, the husband's firm in Leibowitz was clearly not

1	disqualified due to Baker's hiring because Baker had not worked on the actual case while at the
2	wife's law firm and acquired no confidential or privileged information. The issue was closer for
3	Magalianes. Ultimately, imputed disqualification was not ordered as to Magalianes either but only
4	because her involvement with the wife's case at her former law firm had been "brief" (about a month)
5	and affidavits did not "clearly establish that Magalianes was privy to any confidential information"
6	about the wife's case. Therefore, the situation as to Magalianes is quite different factually as to the
7	paralegal involved in this case who knows all confidential information ever sent to the client.
8	Subsequent case law regarding the application of Leibowitz has been sparse. In Ryan's
9	Express Transp. Servs. v. Amador Stage Lines, Inc., 128 Nev. 289, 298-99, 279 P.3d 166, 172 (2012)
10	the Supreme Court further explained that when faced with a screening and disqualification issue for
11	a lawyer ¹ changing employment, the District Court must set an evidentiary hearing and consider the
12	following:
13	When presented with a dispute over whether a lawyer has been properly screened,
14	Nevada courts should conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine the adequacy and timeliness of the screening measures on a case-by-case basis. The burden of
15	proof is upon the party seeking to cure an imputed disqualification with screening to demonstrate that the use of screening is appropriate for the situation and that the
16	disqualified attorney is timely and properly screened.
17	When considering whether the screening measures implemented are adequate, courts are to be guided by the following nonexhaustive list of factors:
18	(1) instructions given to ban the exchange of information between the disqualified
19	attorney and other members of the firm; (2) restricted access to files and other information about the case;
20	(2) restricted access to mes and other information about the case, (3) the size of the law firm and its structural divisions;
21	(4) the likelihood of contact between the quarantined lawyer and other members
22	of the firm; and
23	(5) the timing of the screening.
24	As with motions to disqualify, the consideration of the adequacy of screening is within the sound discretion of the district court, <i>LaSalle</i> , 703 F.2d at 256; however,
	the district court must justify its determination as to the adequacy of the screening
25	in a written order with specific findings of fact and conclusions of law.
26	
27	¹ Presumably, since this is the rule required for screening lawyers, it would also apply to the

Presumably, since this is the rule required for screening lawyers, it would also apply screening of non-lawyers who possess confidential client information.

1 In summary, the law regarding imputed disqualification of a law firm due to the hiring of nonlawyer staff previously working for the opposing party is the following: Because of concerns 2 3 over preservation of confidential information of a client, nonlawyer staff is held to the same confidentiality and loyalty standards as lawyers as well as the same imputed disqualification 4 5 standards. Thus, where a nonlawyer such as a paralegal is hired by an opposing law firm, the court must first inquire as to the degree or level of confidential information the paralegal has about the 6 7 client or case. Where the paralegal has knowledge of highly confidential information, there is a 8 presumption that the hiring law firm is disqualified. The court must consider (1) the individual right 9 to be represented by counsel of one's choice, (2) each party's right to be free from the risk of even inadvertent disclosure of confidential information, (3) the public's interest in the scrupulous 10 11 administration of justice, and (4) the prejudices that will inure to the parties as a result of the [district 12 court's] decision. The hiring law firm may try to overcome the imputed disqualification by 13 establishing a screening process. However, the hiring law firm bears the burden of establishing that 14 the screening will be sufficient. To establish this, an evidentiary hearing must be held and findings 15 of fact must be made as to (1) the substantiality of the relationship between the former and current 16 matters, (2) the time elapsed between the matters, (3) the size of the firm, (4) the number of 17 individuals presumed to have confidential information, (5) the nature of their involvement in the 18 former matter, (6) the timing and features of any measures taken to reduce the danger of disclosure, 19 and (7) whether the old firm and the new firm represent adverse parties in the same proceeding, 20 rather than in different proceedings because inadvertent disclosure by the nonlawyer employee is 21 more likely in the former situation.

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B. An Evidentiary Hearing should be Ordered and Imputed Disqualification should be Found

Under *Ryan's Express Transp. Servs.* an evidentiary hearing must be held on the
disqualification and screening issues. McBride Hall is presumptively disqualified and bears the
burden of refuting that at the evidentiary hearing. However, Taylor will brief the *Ryan's Express Transp. Servs.* case in the hopes that McBride Hall may just decide that disqualification is proper
and withdraw voluntarily.

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1 (1) The substantiality of the relationship between the former and current matters

The matter concerned here, *Taylor v. Brill*, is identical, open, active and the two clients are
in direct conflict with each other. The paralegal will be moving from plaintiff's law firm to Dr. Brill
and WAHSN's law firm. This is not a case where we are talking about a former matter or a former
client or an unrelated matter. This factor favors imputed disqualification.

6 (2) The time elapsed between the matters

7 No time has elapsed at all. In fact, we aren't even talking about related matters in this case,
8 we are talking about the exact same matter. Ms. Johnson is literally working at plaintiff's law firm
9 on a Friday and working for the defendant's law firm on the following Monday. The matter is still
10 active and Taylor intends to appeal. This factor favors imputed disqualification.

11 (3) The size of the firm

12 It is unclear how this factor is to be considered by the court. However, it can be offered that 13 being disqualified from this case will not be a substantial burden to the law firm of McBride Hall. 14 They are a firm of six attorneys and no doubt have hundreds of active files. This issue affects only two pending cases between the law firms (Nelson and Taylor). At the same time, McBride Hall is 15 16 not so large that there is no risk of inadvertent disclosure or Ms. Johnson being in contact with other 17 attorneys or staff at McBride Hall working on the Taylor file. McBride Hall is not a large, multistate 18 law firm. Ms. Johnson will be working in the same office as Mr. McBride and Ms. Hall, the attorneys 19 handling this matter at McBride Hall. In fact, those attorneys are her new employers. This factor favors imputed disqualification. 20

21 (4) The number of individuals presumed to have confidential information

It is again unclear how this factor is to be applied. However, several members of McBride
Hall are known to have worked on this file defending it, including Mr. McBride and Ms. Hall as the
lawyer and other staff. This factor favors imputed disqualification.

25 $\| (5)$ The nature of their involvement in the former matter

As previously explained by Declaration, Ms. Johnson has worked on the Taylor matter since
its inception at Breeden & Associates, PLLC in January 2021. She has reviewed every pleading. She
has reviewed every status report and email to the client detailing litigation, expert and settlement

strategy, both for trial and appeal. She has personally spoken to the client, Ms. Taylor, on numerous
 occasions and been part of some attorney-client meetings. She sat at Plaintiff's table next to the
 Plaintiff during trial. She was copied on virtually every email and letter correspondence in the case.
 It is not possible for nonlawyer staff to have more confidential, privileged information regarding the
 Taylor case than Ms. Johnson has. This factor favors imputed disqualification.

6 (6) The timing and features of any measures taken to reduce the danger of disclosure

7 The extent of screening measures is unknown at present, although upon inquiry McBride
8 Hall did indicate they would employ some screening measures.

9 (7) Whether the old firm and the new firm represent adverse parties in the same proceeding, rather
10 than in different proceedings because inadvertent disclosure by the nonlawyer employee is more
11 likely in the former situation.

Here the prior firm, Breeden & Associates, PLLC, represents Taylor is the same proceeding,
an active civil matter soon to be on an appeal where a new trial will be requested. The risk of
disclosure of confidential information, intentional or inadvertent, is at its maximum. Indeed, it is
hard to imagine facts more convincing for disqualification that this one.

In summary, this case presents the strongest possible facts for imputed disqualification.

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III. <u>CLOSING</u>

18 In closing, the law of the state of Nevada presumes that the McBride Hall law firm must be 19 disqualified because they now employ a paralegal with knowledge of all confidential 20 communications between Taylor and her attorney. If McBride Hall wishes to overcome the 21 presumption, they must seek an evidentiary hearing as to their screening efforts and the court must make specific findings of fact and conclusions of law as to why the presumption is overcome. 22 23 However, the facts of this case are so enormously strong in favor of disqualification the District 24 Court may deny even that hearing. Screening was a process invented to allow legal staff with 25 minimal confidential knowledge to change positions. Screening was never intended to allow a legal professional with thorough, intimate knowledge of the case to switch sides while the case is still 26 27 pending.

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The legal system is honorable, but must concern itself with realities that even the appearance

of impropriety must be avoided to maintain the public's confidence. The legal system must concern
 itself with both intentional and inadvertent disclosures. And the legal system must recognize that
 there are bad actors in the industry and when the nonlawyer employee has the most sensitive of
 confidential information one cannot merely trust one's adversary and hope no "shenanigans" are
 going on.

Several members of the Nevada Supreme Court dissented from the decision to allow 6 7 screening of nonlawyer employees with access to confidential information from the prior law firm. Surely, those dissenters had this case in mind. It is a foolishly Pollyanna² attitude that puts absolute 8 9 trust in one's adversary that they will follow the rules strictly and not use or try to use confidential information to their advantage. Indeed, the Court should ask itself "If I were the client, Taylor, in 10 this matter, would I reasonably be concerned that a paralegal working on this case knowing all 11 12 confidential evaluation of it by my attorney is now working for the defense?" Surely the answer is 13 "yes," it is reasonable to be concerned. The legal system has a duty to make certain that the system 14 appears fair and the appearance of impropriety is removed.

15 Respectfully, the McBride Hall law firm must be disqualified from further representation in16 this case.

DATED this 18th day of November, 2021.

BREEDEN & ASSOCIATES, PLLC

ADAM J. BREEDEN, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 008768 376 E. Warm Springs Road, Suite 120 Las Vegas, Nevada 89119 Phone: (702) 819-7770 Fax: (702) 819-7771 Adam@Breedenandassociates.com Attorneys for Plaintiff

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&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> The character of Pollyanna is from a book and 1960 Disney film of the same name and has come to stand for a person characterized by irrepressible optimism and a tendency to find good in
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1	CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
2	I hereby certify that on the 18 th day of November, 2021, I served a copy of the foregoing
3	legal document ERRATA TO OR AMENDED PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO DISQUALIFY
4	THE MCBRIDE HALL LAW FIRM ON AN EX PARTE MOTION FOR ORDER
5	SHORTENING TIME via the method indicated below:
6	X Pursuant to NRCP 5 and NEFCR 9, by electronically serving all counsel and
7	e-mails registered to this matter on the Court's official service, Wiznet system.
8	Pursuant to NRCP 5, by email using a Dropbox link and/or by placing a copy in the US mail, postage pre-paid to the following counsel of record or parties in proper person:
9	Robert McBride, Esq.
10	Heather S. Hall, Esq. McBRIDE HALL
11	8329 W. Sunset Road, Suite 260
12	Las Vegas, Nevada 89113
13	Attorneys for Defendants Keith Brill, M.D. and Women's Health Associates
13	Via receipt of copy (proof of service to follow)
15	
16	An Attorney or Employee of the following firm:
	/s/ Sarah Daniels
17	BREEDEN & ASSOCIATES, PLLC
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1	CSERV	
2		ISTRICT COURT
3	CLAR	K COUNTY, NEVADA
4		
6	Kimberly Taylor, Plaintiff(s)	CASE NO: A-18-773472-C
7	vs.	DEPT. NO. Department 3
8	Keith Brill, M.D., Defendant(s)	
9		
10	AUTOMATED	CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
11	This automated certificate of se	ervice was generated by the Eighth Judicial District
12		ed via the court's electronic eFile system to all
13	Service Date: 11/18/2021	
14		
15	Adam Breeden	adam@breedenandassociates.com
16	E-File Admin	efile@hpslaw.com
17	Heather Hall	hshall@mcbridehall.com
18	Jody Foote	jfoote@jhcottonlaw.com
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Ш

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EXHIBIT 3

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2	DISTRICT COURT
3	CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA
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6	KIMBERLY D. TAYLOR,)
7) CASE NO. A-18-773472-C Plaintiff,)
8) vs.) DEPT. NO. III
9) KEITH BRILL, M.D., WOMEN'S)
10	HEALTH ASSOCIATES OF SOUTHERN) Transcript of Proceedings
11	NEVADA - MARTIN PLLC, UNITED) HEALTH SERVICES,)
12) Defendants.)
13	BEFORE THE HONORABLE DAVID BARKER, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
14	PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO DISQUALIFY THE MCBRIDE HALL LAW FIRM
15	ON EX PARTE MOTION FOR ORDER SHORTENING TIME; EVIDENTIARY HEARING
16	FRIDAY, JANUARY 7, 2022
17	APPEARANCES:
18	For the Plaintiff: ADAM J. BREEDEN, ESQ.
19	For the Defendants: ROBERT C. MCBRIDE, ESQ.
20	[Via BlueJeans] HEATHER S. HALL, ESQ.
21	
22	RECORDED BY: REBECA GOMEZ, DISTRICT COURT
23	TRANSCRIBED BY: KRISTEN LUNKWITZ
24	
25	Proceedings recorded by audio-visual recording; transcript produced by transcription service.
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	Case Number: A-18-773472-C

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1	FRIDAY, JANUARY 7, 2022, AT 8:58 A.M.
2	
3	THE COURT: We're on the record in A773472,
4	Kimberly Taylor versus Keith Brill, M.D. Can I have
5	counsel for plaintiffs state appearance for the record,
6	please?
7	MR. BREEDEN: Good morning, Your Honor. This is
8	attorney Adam Breeden, bar number 8768, on behalf of the
9	plaintiff, Ms. Taylor, who is present today, I believe, by
10	BlueJeans.
11	THE COURT: Thank you.
12	Can I have counsel for defendants state
13	appearances, please?
14	MR. MCBRIDE: Yes, Your Honor. Robert McBride,
15	counsel for Dr. Brill, as well as Heather Hall and Kristy
16	Johnson from my office.
17	THE COURT: Thank you very much.
18	I am Judge Barker. I'm sitting for Judge Trujillo
19	in this effort. I have been through the register of
20	actions. I understand the nature of the issues today. I'm
21	on behalf of the courts, I want to apologize. It seems
22	like it's been kind of convoluted for all of you to have a
23	different trial judge, a different hearing judge. I know
24	you've listened to Judge Becker, had Judge Becker, now you
25	have me. But I can assure you I've reviewed everything I

think is relevant. I'm sure the lawyers will bring me up 1 2 to speed and what they think is important to bring out further in this evidentiary hearing. 3 4 Who wants to start? 5 MR. BREEDEN: Your Honor, if I could just give 6 some introduction here about how I foresee this hearing 7 moving today. 8 THE COURT: Okay. MR. BREEDEN: So, today's hearing is an 9 10 evidentiary hearing on all the facts for my client's Motion 11 to Disqualify or Apply Imputed Disqualification to the McBride Hall Law Firm for defendants Brill and WHASN. 12 Т 13 anticipate calling my client, Ms. Taylor. I will call Ms. 14 Johnson to testify to some facts and background. 15 THE COURT: Okay. 16 MR. BREEDEN: I will testify myself regarding Ms. 17 Johnson's involvement with this file. And, then, those are 18 the witnesses I intend to call. I think that we can 19 probably conclude this in roughly an hour. 20 THE COURT: Time -- it takes what it takes. 21 MR. BREEDEN: I understand and I appreciate that 22 the Court made time to set this evidentiary hearing. 23 THE COURT: Okay. 24 I would just say, Your Honor, that MR. BREEDEN: 25 before we start calling witnesses, just to frame today's

1 hearing, --2 THE COURT: Okay. 3 MR. BREEDEN: -- understand there is no difference 4 in the standard for imputed disqualification, regardless of 5 whether you were talking about an attorney or a non-6 attorney, like a paralegal in this case. The legal 7 standard is the same. Imputed disqualification is presumed in this matter, given the level of confidential attorney-8 9 client information that Ms. Johnson has about my client's 10 case. 11 THE COURT: Frankly, Mr. Breeden, that's why I 12 paused the beginning because it seems like, from my review 13 of the law and the brief, the burden lies with the defense 14 to offer explanation why there shouldn't be --15 MR. BREEDEN: Yes. And --THE COURT: -- disgualification, but I've -- I'm 16 17 comfortable with the process, as you've outlined it, 18 assuming Mr. McBride is. 19 MR. BREEDEN: Well, yes. And I will just note, 20 again, it is McBride Hall's burden in this proceeding to 21 show why screening would be effective. Screening is not 22 required to be accepted in all cases and there are 23 considerations that go beyond actual leaking or sharing of confidential information, including the possibility for 24 25 inadvertent disclosures, disclosures in the future, but,

1 also, the public's trust in the legal process, and the 2 ability of a client and an attorney to freely communicate 3 and not have that worry that that's going to wind up in the 4 hands of an adversary. So, that's why we're here today 5 doing this evidentiary.

6 THE COURT: Fair. Now, before we get into the 7 actual evidentiary portion of this effort, you indicated 8 you anticipated calling your client. In my review and 9 understanding of the brief, it appears that nobody is 10 contesting the fact that the paralegal, Johnson, worked the 11 file from your side. Is that fair?

MR. BREEDEN: Yes.

THE COURT: And, as a consequence, was
communicating with your client about whatever information
the client felt was relevant, including, as you assert,
privileged information.

17MR. BREEDEN: I agree. I don't think McBride Hall18is going to dispute a lot of the background here.

THE COURT: Okay.

20 MR. BREEDEN: But I think it's important to create 21 a record at this evidentiary hearing of the extreme extent 22 of the contact between Ms. Johnson and the client, Ms. 23 Taylor, and the confidential information that Ms. Johnson 24 has.

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12

THE COURT: All right. Do you believe that --

1	frankly, lawyers you're pretty far along in this
2	litigation. I mean, you're in post-trial effort. You're
3	in appeal on appeal on the verdict. Does that is
4	that relevant?
5	MR. BREEDEN: You know what? It isn't, Your
6	Honor. And let me tell you a couple of reasons why.
7	First of all, the fact that this matter already
8	went to trial and is on appeal, that is the same factual
9	background that was presented in the Leibowitz case, which
10	is the leading case in this field. And that fact was of no
11	relevance at all to the Court in Leibowitz.
12	THE COURT: Okay.
13	MR. BREEDEN: All right. It was not cited as any
14	factor.
15	But, beyond that, Your Honor, I will say we are
16	trying to get this verdict reversed and to get a new trial.
17	But, also, as will be explained more fully in the
18	evidentiary hearing, there was a period of time that is
19	very sensitive in this case between when Ms. Johnson was
20	applying for a job at McBride Hall and when I was advised
21	that she would be leaving. And, during that time frame,
22	everything regarding appellate strategy, my assessment of
23	chances of appeal, grounds for appeal, what settlement
24	offers might be made and how those might be handled, Ms.
25	Johnson was exposed to all of that.

THE COURT: Okay.

1

2 MR. BREEDEN: So, she's aware of all of the 3 appellate strategy and assessments of my office as well. 4 THE COURT: All right. Well, unless I hear 5 differently from defense counsel or defense counsel wishes 6 to address the comments already made by Mr. Breeden, we can move into evidentiary hearing. 7 Mr. McBride, are you ready to move into evidence? 8 9 MR. MCBRIDE: No, Your Honor. I would like to 10 make a couple of comments, if I could. And, first of all, 11 12 THE COURT: Okay. 13 MR. MCBRIDE: -- I wanted to apologize that I'm 14 not there in person, but, unfortunately, I just found out 15 this morning that I tested positive for Covid. THE COURT: Okay. 16 17 MR. MCBRIDE: So, I am at home, but prepared to 18 really primarily direct the questioning of the witnesses. My partner, Heather Hall, is there and in court, 19 20 as you know. And, frankly, I think since Ms. Hall argued -21 - she briefed the matter, she argued the matter in front of 22 Justice Becker, I think it's important too that a couple of points may be raised on the issues, the legality, and the 23 24 legal rulings previous made by Justice Becker. 25 And the fact that the purpose of this hearing

1 really is solely to determine whether or not there was an adequate or sufficient screening in place. Justice Becker, 2 as Your Honor has already read the minutes, I'm sure, and 3 4 read all the papers. Her reason for ordering this was simply because plaintiff had requested it and she felt that 5 6 she had to give plaintiff an opportunity to at least ask 7 questions about whether appropriate screening methods were 8 in place.

9 The Court has already brought up the fact that the issues about -- there's no factual dispute as to whether or 10 11 not confidential information may have been shared with Ms. Johnson by Ms. Taylor and by Mr. Breeden. That's not the 12 13 issue that we're here for today and I would say that, in 14 terms of the -- well, Ms. Taylor certainly has every right to be here today as a party in this case, to be here as a 15 16 witness and to hear the matter, to have her testify to 17 those specific background issues or what confidential 18 information may have been disclosed, that's irrelevant to 19 the issues that are here today. It's whether or not the 20 screening methods by McBride and Hall were in place.

Ms. Hall may be able to address more specifically some of those legal arguments that were raised. And, contrary to Mr. Breeden's comments, it -- in fact, the law is very clear that the *Leibowitz* case is -- its strict disqualification does not apply to paralegals. And that's

1 the point that is very important to make clear in this, and they can be screened off, and they can -- if there's 2 3 adequate screening measures in place. And, again, Justice 4 Becker had essentially acknowledged that she felt that 5 there was sufficient screening in place. She also said 6 that Mr. Breeden's concerns about accidental disclosure, 7 whether that could, you know, be an issue, that's not a grounds for disqualifying our firm. 8

9 As Your Honor also pointed out, the case is very 10 far along. I can assure you in my 30 years of being an 11 attorney, and the past 20-plus years practicing here in Nevada, that under no circumstance -- I'm very well aware, 12 13 as is Ms. Hall, as are other members of our firm, of the 14 importance of screening any individuals who might 15 potentially come to our firm who have confidential 16 information. This is a very small community. There are 17 paralegals that we have hired from other law firms and 18 secretaries that, for reasons that we know, even though there may not be a request by a firm that they came from, 19 20 to screen them off. We've taken those affirmative measures 21 to make sure those individuals are screened off by putting 22 places -- putting measures in place.

So, -- and, again, under no circumstances would
that ever occur, and it hasn't occurred with Ms. Johnson's
case. But I just -- if there's any specific issues that

1 the Court needs further clarification from the caselaw 2 existing on the issue of disqualification, I think Ms. 3 Hall, even though she is going to be called as a witness by 4 Mr. Breeden, I think she may be able to address more 5 specifically anything that I'm missing. 6 THE COURT: All right. I -- if I'm coming around 7 to understand what we're about to try to accomplish here, gonna work on, because Ms. Hall, present in the room, is 8 9 going to be called as a witness, I have Mr. McBride ready 10 to take an examination on a -- take you on cross, as 11 circumstances might require. Right? 12 MS. HALL: That is correct, Your Honor. 13 THE COURT: And other than that, you're going to 14 be carrying the responsibility for the evidentiary hearing 15 on the other witnesses. Is that fair? 16 MS. HALL: No. I think, Your Honor, Mr. McBride 17 is going to handle the witnesses. I think that his point 18 is that since I am here, that the last hearing with Judge 19 Becker, --20 THE COURT: Okay. 21 MS. HALL: -- and we did address the Leibowitz 22 case, which I think she was involved in, and we discussed 23 that, you know, the whole issue of imputed 24 disqualification, I think that that may be what he's 25 referring to, just the caselaw --

1 THE COURT: Okay. Fair enough. 2 MS. HALL: -- aspect. 3 MR. MCBRIDE: Yes. 4 THE COURT: All right. Let's move into the 5 evidence then. Mr. Breeden, call your witness. 6 MR. BREEDEN: Yeah. Plaintiff would call Kimberly 7 Taylor. 8 Kimberly is with us on BlueJeans. 9 THE WITNESS: Yes. I am here. Can you hear me? 10 MR. BREEDEN: Yes. We can hear you. I think the 11 Court Clerk is going to swear you in now. 12 THE CLERK: Please raise your right hand. 13 THE WITNESS: Thank you. 14 KIMBERLY TAYLOR [having been first duly sworn via video conference, 15 testifies as follows:] 16 17 THE CLERK: Please state and spell your name for 18 the record. THE WITNESS: Kimberly Taylor, K-I-M-B-E-R-L-Y T-19 20 $A - Y - I_{I} - O - R$. 21 THE COURT: Mr. Breeden, your witness. 22 DIRECT EXAMINATION OF KIMBERLY TAYLOR 23 BY MR. BREEDEN: 24 Good morning, Kimberly, and thanks for joining us 0 25 today. And, just for the record, Ms. Taylor had a health

1 issue as well and that's why we're kind of having her 2 testify remotely. THE COURT: I have become very comfortable in this 3 4 process with the realities that we all live with. 5 MR. BREEDEN: Fantastic. I appreciate that, Your 6 Honor. 7 BY MR. BREEDEN: 8 Kimberly, are you the plaintiff in this matter? Q 9 А Yes. 10 Q And you've sought to have the opposing law firm, 11 McBride Hall, disqualified because they've hired Kristy 12 Johnson. Is that true? 13 That is correct. Α 14 By way of background, when did my law firm, 0 Breeden and Associates, first begin representing you in 15 16 your case? 17 January of 2021. А 18 Q While my law firm represented you, did you get to know Kristy Johnson? 19 20 T did. А 21 And what was your understanding of what Kristy's Q 22 job position and job duties were at the firm of Breeden and Associates? 23 24 I knew she was a paralegal, acting -- working А 25 directly with you and I would speak with her directly on a

1 || lot of the conversations that had to do with my case.

Q Okay. During the time that Kristy worked at Breeden and Associates, how many times would you estimate that she was included on attorney-client e-mails between you and I?

6 A Probably about 99.9 percent of all of the e-mails 7 that were sent from you to me, she was CC'd on them. She 8 was involved in every step of the way, the process.

9 Q During the time Kristy worked at my law firm, how 10 many times would you estimate you spoke to Kristy either by 11 phone or met with her personally?

A More than a dozen times. When I would come into your office, she was the person that would be at the meet and greet door.

Q And this case went to trial several months ago.
During trial, did you see Kristy?

A Every day.

18 Q Where did you sit during trial in relation to
19 Kristy?

A I sat on the lefthand side, Kristy was on the righthand side of me. Any questions I had for you, I would direct them to her and she would answer them on your behalf if she knew the answer. If she didn't, she would write it down and pass it over to you.

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Q Okay. And would you and I also have meetings in

1 the hall during trial where we would discuss confidential
2 information, that Ms. Johnson would be present?

- 3 A Yes.
 - Q Okay.

A Yes. She was present.

6 Q Okay. And just to be clear, in all of these 7 meetings and e-mails that we've discussed, you would 8 discuss confidential case information with Kristy that you 9 would not want disclosed to the McBride Hall Law Firm. Is 10 that correct?

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A One hundred percent.

12 Q Do you have any way of knowing for certain whether 13 any confidential information has been shared with the 14 McBride Hall Law Firm?

A I do not. I don't -- I would never know that.
They wouldn't share that information with me voluntarily
that they are talking amongst themselves regarding my case.
I'm assuming that that would all be kept private behind the
scenes with them.

Q And would allowing Kristy to switch sides to the McBride Hall Law Firm cause you to be concerned in this case that there would either be an intentional or an accidental disclosure of confidential information about your case to McBride Hall?

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I believe so. Yes. Again, reiterating that I

1 have no way of knowing what conversations that they would 2 have about my case behind the scenes. I want to have good faith in this judicial process and with her going over to 3 4 the other side, with as much knowledge as she has in 5 regards to my case, does not give me good faith in the 6 judicial process. I don't believe that that is fair to me. 7 Okay. So, it would cause you to trust the legal Q 8 system and the legal process for your case less if the 9 McBride Hall Law Firm were allowed to stay on the case? Absolutely. 10 Α 11 MR. BREEDEN: Okay. Those are all the questions I 12 have for you. Thank you. 13 THE COURT: Cross-examination. 14 THE WITNESS: Thank you. 15 MR. MCBRIDE: Thank you, Your Honor. I just have 16 a few questions. 17 CROSS-EXAMINATION OF KIMBERLY TAYLOR 18 BY MR. MCBRIDE: Ms. Taylor, good morning. How are you? 19 0 20 Better, thank you. Α 21 Good. I know how you feel. Trust me. Q 22 But in terms of the testimony that you were just 23 providing a second ago, you remember the trial in this 24 matter that I was present, together with Ms. Hall, on 25 behalf of Dr. Brill in the Taylor case? Do you remember

1 || that?

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12

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Yes.

Q At any point in time, did you observe either me or Ms. Hall engage in any in-depth conversations with your -with the paralegal, Kristy Johnson, who was employed with Mr. Breeden at that time?

A It was not done in front of me, no.

8 Q Okay. Did you ever observe any interactions that 9 caused you to believe that perhaps -- or concern that there 10 was sharing of confidential information by Ms. Johnson 11 during the trial?

A Not directly in front of me, no.

13 Okay. And, well, subsequently, and up until Q 14 today, do you have any facts in which in any way would 15 support, other than your belief or concern that that might occur, do you have any facts to support that Ms. Johnson 16 17 has shared confidential information with anyone at my firm? 18 Α The only fact that I know is she's now with your 19 firm and what she's sharing with you behind the scenes I do 20 not know.

Q Ma'am, my question is very simple. Do you have any facts to support that Ms. Johnson has shared confidential information with anyone at my firm? MR. BREEDEN: I would object --THE WITNESS: The only fact that I --

MR. BREEDEN: -- as asked and answered. 1 2 THE WITNESS: -- know --3 THE COURT: Overruled at this point. I'll let her 4 -- one more time. BY MR. MCBRIDE: 5 6 It's a yes or a no. 0 7 The only --А 8 It's a yes or no, ma'am. Q 9 А I don't -- I can't answer that. The only fact 10 that I know is that she's now with your firm, sir. 11 I understand that. 0 12 I don't know anything other than that. А 13 Okay. So, it's fair to say you have no facts to Q 14 support any information has been shared by Ms. Johnson of a confidential nature with our firm? 15 16 Not directly to me, no. А 17 Okay. Or directly to anyone for that matter, 0 18 true? You've hired her now. Only you know what you're 19 А 20 sharing wither. I don't know that, sir. 21 Exactly. Ma'am, you understand you're under Q 22 penalty of perjury. You're testifying under oath here 23 today, correct? 24 А I do. 25 You understand that Ms. Johnson will be a witness Q 18

1 on the stand, as called by your attorney, and she will be 2 testifying under the penalty of perjury, the same one you're doing. Correct? 3 4 А Correct. You understand that Ms. Hall, an attorney in my 5 0 6 office, is also going to be answering questions. She's an 7 Officer of the Court. She's a member in good standing of the Bar. You understand that she's also going to be 8 9 answering questions under oath here today. Correct? 10 А I do. 11 MR. MCBRIDE: Okay. That's all the questions I 12 Thank you. have. 13 THE COURT: Redirect? 14 THE WITNESS: Thank you. 15 MR. BREEDEN: Nothing further, Your Honor. 16 THE COURT: Thanks for your testimony, Ms. Taylor. 17 Call your next witness. 18 MR. BREEDEN: I would call Kristy Johnson, Your 19 Honor. 20 You don't mind if I stay seated, do you, Your 21 Honor? 22 THE COURT: That's fine. 23 THE MARSHAL: Thank you, ma'am. Please turn and 24 face the Clerk. Riase your right hand. 25 KRISTY JOHNSON 19

1 [having been first duly sworn, testifies as follows:] 2 THE CLERK: Thank you. Please be seated. Please 3 state and spell your name for the record. 4 THE WITNESS: Kristy Johnson, K-R-I-S-T-Y J-O-H-N-5 S-0-N. THE COURT: Counsel, your witness. 6 7 DIRECT EXAMINATION OF KRISTY JOHNSON 8 BY MR. BREEDEN: 9 All right. Good morning, Kristy. I'd like to 0 10 start with just some background facts from you. First of all, are you a paralegal? 11 12 Yes. А 13 How long have you been a paralegal? Q 14 Over 20 years. А 15 Okay. Do you have an undergraduate degree? Q 16 I do. А 17 And when did you receive that and from what 0 18 institution? 19 I received my certification from Duke University, А 20 roughly 2015. And, then, I received my bachelor's degree 21 from Grand Canyon University in 2020. 22 Okay. So, you have both an undergraduate degree 0 23 and a certificate in paralegal studies or a paralegal 24 program. 25 Α Yes.

1 Correct? 0 2 Α Yes. 3 Okay. Does the state of Nevada require paralegals Q 4 to be certified or licensed? 5 Α No. 6 Okay. So were you working as a paralegal even 0 7 before you obtained that certificate? 8 Α Yes. 9 Okay. The word paralegal can be very broad 0 10 sometimes. Would you agree? 11 Α Yes. 12 All right. Go ahead and describe a little more, Q 13 generally, your training and experience as a paralegal, 14 including other firms where you've worked. 15 А Okay. I guess -- so you want like job duties? 16 Yeah. So, you've been in the industry 20 years. 0 17 Why don't you jus sort of summarize different positions 18 you've held. 19 Sure. I've gone in law firms, I've done Α 20 everything from answer the phones, to legal assistant work, 21 to drafting pleadings, to attending court hearings, being 22 part of depositions, clerical work, stuff like that. 23 Q Okay. And what -- I -- you've worked for my law firm, obviously. What other law firms have you worked for? 24 25 I worked for Kenneth Frizzell, criminal law. Α I've

worked for Lionel Sawyer and Collins, and Brian Berman. 1 2 0 Okay. And when did you first start working at my law firm, Breeden and Associates? 3 4 А October of 2017. 5 Q When was your last day? October -- I can't remember the exact day. 6 А 7 Well, let me help you out a little bit. I believe Q it was November 5th of 2021. 8 Oh, November 5th. My apologies. Yes. 9 А 10 Q Did -- and so you would agree with that? 11 Yes. А 12 So, roughly four years? Q 13 А Yes. All right. During the time that you worked at 14 Q 15 Breeden and Associates, who was your supervisor? 16 А You. 17 Okay. And did you work with me every day? Q 18 Α Yes. 19 Q Just, generally speaking, did you work at every 20 case at my law firm? 21 Α Yes. 22 And, again, just broadly, when you worked at my Q 23 law firm, what were some of your day-to-day duties and 24 assignments? 25 Answering incoming calls, potential new clients, А 22

1 drafting of discovery responses, handling letters/correspondence to counsel, to the Court, to 2 clients, handling the medical records. 3 4 Okay. During your employment, was it common for Q 5 me to copy you on attorney-client communications with the 6 client? 7 А Yes. 8 And was it also common for clients to copy you on Q communications back? 9 10 А Yes. 11 And, during your employment, was it common for me 0 12 to discuss confidential information about cases with you? 13 Α Yes. 14 0 And do you agree that the work product at the 15 firm, which includes a confidential status and evaluations 16 to clients, that those would be read by you during the 17 course of your employment? 18 Α Yes. You would have name proof those. 19 0 Okay. And, so, virtually, any communication in a 20 case at my law firm, if it was a letter to the client, you 21 would review and proof those. Correct? 22 А Letters, yes. 23 Q Yes. And, then, e-mails you would be copied on? 24 Α Yes. 25 Okay. And nothing is different between how things Q

generally work in Ms. Taylor's case. Correct? 1 2 А Correct. 3 And you agree that during the time you worked at Q 4 my law firm, very confidential information about my evaluation and assessment of Ms. Taylor's case was reviewed 5 6 by you. 7 Yes. А 8 Would you agree with that? Q 9 А Mm-hmm. Where do you currently work? 10 Q 11 McBride Hall. А 12 When was your first day of work at McBride Hall? Q The 11th, November 11th. 13 А Okay. So, November 5th was --14 Q 15 А Oh, I'm sorry. So then it would have been November 8th. November 5th was my last day with you, then 16 17 November 8th. Okay. November 5th, 2021 was a Friday? 18 Q Yes. 19 А 20 And, then, you began work on Monday, November the Q 8th? 21 22 Yes. А 23 Q At McBride Hall. Correct? 24 А Yes. 25 And when you worked at Breeden and Associates, you Q

1 were assigned to the Kimberly Taylor file. Correct? 2 Α Yes. 3 I want to ask you or note -- and I'll testify a 0 4 little bit about these communications. Obviously, given 5 their nature, I'm not going to show the witness them or introduce them into evidence. 6 7 THE COURT: Okay. 8 BY MR. BREEDEN: But, I have in my hand here, an April 20th, 2021 9 0 10 correspondence between my office and Kimberly Taylor. Ιt 11 is a lengthy letter to Ms. Taylor about an upcoming settlement conference. Would you have reviewed that 12 13 letter? 14 Α Yes. 15 Now, the Kimberly Taylor trial ended on October Q 19th of 2021. When did you first arrange an employment 16 17 interview with the McBride Hall Law Firm? 18 А Around 9 p.m. that night. 19 Okay. So, court probably concluded around 5 p.m. 0 20 and within hours you were arranging an interview with the 21 firm? 22 А Yeah. I think the verdict was read shortly before 23 5 p.m. and then that evening was when I first spoke with 24 them. 25 Okay. You did not immediately tell me of this, Q

1	did you?	
2	A No.	
3	Q When did you actually tell me that you intended to	
4	accept another employment offer and leave the firm?	
5	A That same weekend.	
6	Q Okay. Do you remember the actual date?	
7	A I believe it was that Sunday, so the 24 th possibly.	
8	Q Okay. So,	
9	A Without looking at a calendar.	
10	Q Okay. So, just to refresh your memory, do you	
11	recall sending me an e-mail to notify me of that?	
12	A Yes.	
13	Q Okay. And do you recall whether that was before	
14	you began work on Monday, the 25 th ?	
15	A It was.	
16	Q Okay. So you just testified that you thought	
17	maybe it was the 24 th . Hearing that, does it sort of	
18	refresh your memory that it was October 25 th ?	
19	A I believe the e-mail was the Sunday before I	
20	started work with you that following Monday morning. I	
21	believe I sent it to you that Sunday evening.	
22	Q So, in between October 19^{th} and October 24^{th} or	
23	25^{th} , whichever the date is, you continued to work on the	
24	<i>Taylor</i> case at my office, despite contemplating leaving my	
25	firm and joining McBride Hall?	

1 I recall that the work on the *Taylor* case during А 2 those couple of days was actually quite minimal. The discussions that you were having with Ms. Taylor was how to 3 4 proceed forward at that moment. So there had been no 5 communications or actual decisions made on how to proceed forward. 6 Okay. Do you remember working on an October 20^{th} 7 Q 8 correspondence to Ms. Taylor that was sent by my office? 9 А It's possible. I don't recall if it was. 10 Q Okay. Do you remember working on a second October $20^{\rm th}$ correspondence regarding juror interviews that was sent 11 12 to Ms. Taylor? 13 I recall juror interviewing being discussed, yes. А In fact, you were the one from my office, along 14 0 with attorney Anna Albertson, who actually took place in 15 the post-verdict juror interviews. Correct? 16 17 Α Yes. Yes. Sitting along -- McBride Hall was also 18 there. Do you remember being copied on a October 21st 19 0 20 correspondence outlining possible grounds for appeal and 21 assessing them to Ms. Taylor? 22 А I do. And do you recall on October 24th, which was a 23 Q 24 Sunday, being assigned to work on a comprehensive status 25 letter to Ms. Taylor about settlement offers made by the

1 McBride Law Firm?

2 Α I don't recall that, but I would -- if you have 3 it, I would testify to that. Yes. 4 Let's talk about your employment at McBride Hall. Q 5 How many attorneys work at that firm? 6 Α Six. 7 How many paralegals or people who do jobs similar Q 8 to yours? 9 Α Three, including me. 10 Q Okay. Who are the other two paralegals? 11 Kristine Herpin and Priscilla Santos [phonetic]. А 12 And how many other non-attorney staff then? Q So, 13 excluding attorneys and paralegals, how many other people? 14 There's four legal assistants. There is a human А 15 resources/accounting person, and then there's also a person who handles invoices and such coming from the insurance 16 17 carriers. 18 Q Okay. How many office locations does McBride Hall 19 have? 20 А One. 21 Q Okay. And, so, I assume you physically work at 22 that one location? 23 А Yes. What's the office address? 24 Q 25 I believe it's 8350 West Sunset [sic], but off the Α

1 top of my head. I'm not exactly sure still. 2 Q All right. MR. MCBRIDE: For the 8329. 3 4 MR. BREEDEN: I'll cross-examine you later, Mr. McBride. 5 6 BY MR. BREEDEN: 7 The attorneys assigned to the Taylor case at the 0 8 McBride Hall Law Firm, to your knowledge, who are those 9 attorneys? Heather Hall and Robert McBride. 10 А 11 okay. Those are currently your direct 0 12 supervisors, aren't they? 13 I have a couple. Yes. Α 14 Okay. So, Mr. McBride and Ms. Hall, what's your 0 understanding of their positon at that law firm? 15 16 Α The owners and partners of the firm, two of the 17 partners. 18 Q Okay. And how often do you see them while you're 19 employed there? 20 I stay in my office a lot. So, not very often. А 21 And they're gone quite a bit to court and such. But I 22 would say during the week, you know, quite often, but not -23 - it's not even every day. 24 Okay. But they work out of the exact same office 0 25 you do?

1 Yes. Yes. Α 2 And are you assigned any other cases where Mr. Q 3 McBride and Ms. Hall are the assigned attorneys? 4 А Yes. 5 Q Okay. So, you work with Mr. McBride and Ms. Hall, 6 just not on the Taylor case, which, at their firm, is 7 probably known as the Dr. Brill case? 8 Yes. I don't work on that one. No. Α 9 0 Okay. Now, to your knowledge, who is the 10 paralegal at the McBride Hall Law Firm assigned to the 11 Taylor versus Brill case? 12 А Kristine Herpin. 13 Okay. How often do you see Ms. Herpin at your Q 14 employment? 15 А About the same. Like I said, we stick basically to our offices a lot. So, I see her roughly maybe twice a 16 17 day. 18 Q Okay. So, is it fair to say that Mr. McBride, Ms. Hall, and Ms. Herpin, these are all people that you now 19 20 work with at the same office and you interact with them 21 nearly daily? 22 А Yes. 23 MR. BREEDEN: I have no further questions of this 24 witness. 25 THE COURT: Cross-examination? 30

1	M	MR. MCBRIDE: Yes. Thank you, Your Honor.
2	CROSS-EXAMINATION OF KRISTY JOHNSON	
3	BY MR. MCB	RIDE:
4	Q G	Good morning, Kristy. I there you go. I know
5	you're the	re.
6	k	Kristy, what's your current title at McBride Hall?
7	A E	Paralegal.
8	Q A	And you indicated there's two other paralegals,
9	Priscilla	Santos and Kristine Herpin that also work there.
10	Correct?	
11	A Y	les.
12	Q S	Since you have come on board, are you aware how
13	our office utilizes paralegals?	
14	A I	do now, yes.
15	Q C	Okay. And, in terms of the role that you have
16	with Mr. B	reeden's office, would you agree that the role
17	that you h	ave where you were involved in potentially
18	strategy a	nd conversations directly with the client, that
19	differs qu	ite a bit from what your current role is as a
20	paralegal.	Correct?
21	A Y	Yeah. I am not included in strategy or direct
22	communications with the client at all at McBride Hall.	
23	Q C	Okay. And, in your previous employment with Mr.
24	Breeden, h	low long were you there?
25	A E	Four years.

1 Was that from October 2017 through November 5 of 0 2021? 2 3 Yes. А 4 Okay. And you also indicated that you have worked Q 5 at other law firms as a paralegal prior to Mr. Breeden. 6 Correct? 7 Α Yes. 8 At any point in time during your employment at Q 9 those other firms, before Mr. Breeden, did you ever share 10 any confidential information with any person outside of 11 that law firm with -- regarding any of the cases that you 12 were working on? 13 Not at all. Α 14 Ο Okay. And, similarly, up until today, at any 15 point in time during the four years that you worked with 16 Mr. Breeden, have you ever shared any confidential 17 information with any individual at any other law firm or 18 any location that you're aware of? 19 Α No. 20 Okay. Why not? Q 21 Because I take my job seriously. I pride myself Α 22 on my character and the job that I do. I have no reason to 23 disclose information regarding any case to anybody. I am 24 there to do my job and that is it. 25 And, at any point in time, when you were employed Q

1	by Mr. Breeden, did you ever share any confidential		
2	information about the <i>Taylor</i> matter or any confidential		
3	communications with Ms. Taylor or Mr. Breeden with me or		
4	any member of our law firm?		
5	A No. I did not and I would not.		
6	Q Okay. Then, in terms of the first time that you		
7	were contacted regarding a potential interview, that was		
8	the evening after the evening of the verdict. Is that		
9	correct?		
10	A Yes.		
11	Q And how did that occur? Was that by way of a text		
12	with Ms. Hall?		
13	A Yes. It was.		
14	Q Okay. And, then, you subsequently came to our		
15	office for an interview on October 21. Is that correct?		
16	A Yes.		
17	Q At any point in time during that communication		
18	well, let me back up and I'll ask you the same question.		
19	At any point in time during the actual trial of the Taylor		
20	case, did you ever share any confidential communication		
21	with either me, or Ms. Hall, or any member of my law firm		
22	while that trial was ongoing?		
23	A No, sir.		
24	Q Okay. And did you eventually come to our office		
25	for an interview on October 21?		

A

Α

I did.

Q During that interview, were potential professional conflicts discussed in terms of other potential cases that Mr. Breeden had with our office?

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Yes. It was discussed.

Q Okay. In fact, do you remember in addition to this matter, the Taylor versus Brill matter, was there another case that potentially posed a conflict that you were aware of, Nelson versus Pioneer?

10 A Yes.

Q Okay. And, are you aware, as you sit here, -and, at any point in time, did you share any confidential information regarding the *Nelson versus Pioneer* matter with me, or Ms. Hall, or anyone in our firm?

A No.

Q In fact, are you aware that Mr. Breeden had also filed a Motion to Disqualify our firm from the *Nelson versus Pioneer* matter at or around the same time he filed the Motion to Disqualify us in this case?

20 A I suspected so, but no one had discussed it with21 me.

Q Okay. And, so, you were not privy to the fact that Judge Johnson, on that matter, had denied Plaintiff's Motion --

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MR. BREEDEN: Well, Judge, I'll object. She just

1 says she has no knowledge, but we can discuss this in 2 closing statements. 3 THE COURT: I'm going to sustain the objection on 4 relevance. 5 MR. MCBRIDE: Thank you, Your Honor. BY MR. MCBRIDE: 6 7 Moving on, in terms of, again, just to clarify on Q 8 the Nelson versus Pioneer matter, you have not had any --9 have you had any contact or allowed access to any aspect of that file? 10 11 Not at all. Α No. 12 While you were at our office? Q 13 Α No. 14 Okay. Going back to the interview, and the 0 15 conflicts that were discussed, was it made very clear to 16 you that screening measures were going to be put in place 17 that you could not access any portions of the file from our 18 office and any confidential communications with Dr. Brill 19 and, likewise, you were not to share any confidential 20 communications with us regarding Ms. Taylor's case? 21 Yes. You both detailed very much exactly what was Α 22 going to be put in place to basically not allow me to have 23 any access to the file, as well as to not be able to speak 24 with any other employee at McBride Hall about any 25 information in the case.

1	Q And did you understand that as an express
2	condition of your employment with our office that you were
3	prohibited from discussing the Taylor matter, other than
4	for purposes of the hearing here today, or accessing any
5	portion of that file at any point in time? Do you
6	understand that was an express condition that you were
7	prohibited from doing that of your employment?
8	A Yes. I was made very aware of that.
9	Q Were you also prohibited from any access of the
10	paper or electronic file for this matter or even for the
11	Nelson matter?
12	A Yes. It's my understanding that our IT person or
13	company made it to where I cannot access that those
14	files.
15	Q And, at any point in time, have you made any
16	attempt to access any portion of the computer file or the
17	paper file for either one of those matters?
18	A Not at all because I value my employment.
19	Q And have you likewise, you have been prohibited
20	from having any discussions with anyone at our office,
21	including the other paralegals who were assigned to this
22	case, or the other Nelson matter, that would be Ms. Herpin
23	and Ms. Santos. Correct?
24	A Correct.
25	Q And did you agree to those conditions when you

1 accepted the job?

2 A Yes. I did.

3 Q At any point in time, have you ever violated those 4 conditions?

A No. I have not.

6 Q Do you understand the importance of you continuing 7 to strictly adhere to those conditions for the remainder of 8 your career as a paralegal with McBride Hall?

II Z

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A Very much so.

Q From the time of the first contact regarding a potential interview, up until the time that you left Mr. Breeden's law firm, did you ever share any confidential communication on matters regarding *Taylor versus Brill* with any member of our firm?

A No.

16 Q And since you've started employment with our 17 office, have you also been, to your knowledge, screened 18 from both of those matters, the *Nelson* matter and this one? 19 A Yes. I have.

20 Q Do you recall, with regard to the *Nelson* matter, 21 actually signing an Affidavit under penalty of perjury 22 indicating that you have not and would not ever disclose 23 confidential information regarding that matter due to the 24 prohibitions against that confidential disclosure?

А

Yes.

And did you also do the same and sign an Affidavit 1 0 2 under penalty of perjury for this matter, the Taylor 3 matter, attesting to those same facts? 4 А Yes. 5 Q And, Ms. Johnson, you understand in your position 6 as a paralegal for many years the importance of testifying 7 truthfully, honestly, under penalty of perjury? 8 Yes. I do. Α 9 Have you done so in both of those Affidavits and 0 10 here today on the stand? You testified under penalty of 11 perjury that the matters that you have -- are attesting to are true and correct? 12 13 Yes. I have. Α 14 0 Finally, can you assure this Court, Mr. Breeden, 15 and Ms. Taylor that you will not disclose, under any 16 circumstances, any confidential communications that you may 17 have learned of with -- during your employment with Mr. 18 Breeden with any member of the McBride Hall Firm? I can absolutely assure that. 19 Α 20 MR. MCBRIDE: That's all the questions I have. 21 Thank you. 22 THE COURT: Redirect? 23 MR. BREEDEN: Yeah. I have very brief questions. 24 REDIRECT EXAMINATION OF KRISTY JOHNSON 25 BY MR. BREEDEN:

1 When you interviewed with McBride Hall on October 0 21st 2 of 2021, who did you interview with? 3 Both Heather Hall and Mr. McBride. А 4 Okay. What time of day was that? Q 5 А Late in the evening, about 5 or 5:30. 6 MR. BREEDEN: Okay. Thank you. 7 THE COURT: Any redirect -- or, excuse me, 8 recross? 9 MR. MCBRIDE: No questions, Your Honor. 10 THE COURT: Thank you for your testimony. Please 11 step down. 12 Call your next witness. 13 MR. BREEDEN: Your Honor, I would like to testify 14 about this matter. 15 THE COURT: Let's put you under oath. 16 ADAM BREEDEN 17 [having been first duly sworn, testifies as follows:] 18 THE CLERK: Please state your name for the record. 19 MR. BREEDEN: Adam Breeden, A-D-A-M, last name is 20 B-R-E-E-D-E-N. 21 THE COURT: Mr. Breeden, you may proceed. 22 DIRECT TESTIMONY OF ADAM BREEDEN 23 MR. BREEDEN: Absolutely. Thank you, Your Honor, 24 for allowing us to create a record for this issue here 25 today. It's an important one for me and my office, and my

1 || clients, frankly.

I am an attorney, licensed in the state of Nevada.
Been licensed in Nevada since 2004. I've also been
licensed in the states of Arizona, Florida, and Ohio.

5 Since -- well, during my career as an attorney 6 here in Clark County, Nevada, I've always been a personal 7 injury litigator. I started at a firm that did a mix of plaintiff and defense work. Then, for several years, I 8 9 worked for a law firm and did primarily defense work. But, 10 since 2015, I've had my own law firm, Breeden and 11 Associates. That firm primarily consists of me, my 12 assistant, whoever that is at the time, and two attorneys 13 who work with my firm on an of-counsel, or part-time, or 14 as-needed basis.

However, for the most part, it is a solo type 15 16 It's me and my assistant. And, as previously operation. 17 testified here, I hired Kristy Johnson, a paralegal, as my 18 assistant in 2017. If I recall correctly, when I first hired her she didn't actually -- she had been working as a 19 20 paralegal for many years, but she didn't actually have a 21 paralegal certificate. Of course, you don't need that, but 22 I think during her course of her employment she obtained that through a program at Duke University. 23

Her position at my firm over those four years
entailed a little bit of everything. There are some things

1 that I would call administrative in nature, like, for 2 example, maybe she's just arranging for carpet cleaners at the firm or doing some administrative task like dealing 3 4 with the shredding company that comes in and securely 5 shreds our documents. But she also does quite a bit on 6 each case that is at my law firm, including drafting, 7 assisting with the filings, and discussing things, specifically with clients. 8

9 At my law firm, I discuss all aspects of every 10 case with Kristy. She works on every case that I have at 11 my office. My policy is to copy her on all substantive e-12 mails, including all confidential attorney-client e-mails. 13 And I do this because she works extensively on each file in 14 my office. So, she needs to be up to the speed and up to 15 the minute on what's going on in every file.

16 She also proofs all confidential letters that go 17 In other words, if I write a long status letter to out. 18 the client, it will go by e-mail to Kristy, that says: Hey, here's this status letter to the client. You need to 19 20 review the entire letter. You need to proof it for 21 typographical errors. Every once in a while she'll come to 22 me with something substantive as well and say: Hey, boss, 23 this really doesn't make sense. You know, I didn't 24 understand this, you know, maybe you need to adjust this 25 letter. It's not comprehensible to the client.

1 So, she's very involved in that sense and she 2 also, essentially, independently, would handle some aspects of litigation, particularly with discovery supplements, and 3 4 obtaining medical records, and making sure that proper 5 witnesses are disclosed. And I'll give you an example, and 6 this is exactly what she would do, for example, in the 7 Taylor case. Medical records or other documents would come in, she would review them and find appropriate doctors that 8 9 needed to be disclosed, along with the records. She would 10 prepare the disclosure statement, whether it's the initial 11 disclosures or, as in the Taylor, supplemental disclosures. 12 And she would prepare that all on her own and it would be 13 submitted to me for review and approval. Most of her work, 14 over the course of our four years of working together, got to need very little editing or updating by me. 15

16 So, this is -- she would also do tasks -- like, 17 for example, everything in the Taylor case, like a Notice 18 of Deposition, or something of that nature, that was all 19 prepared by Ms. Johnson. She would prepare that from 20 scratch and then I would simply review and approve it. So, 21 this is not an employee that had minimal information or 22 work on this case. She had the highest level of 23 involvement possible with Ms. Taylor's case.

And, you know, if you look back at the filings in this case, you know, dozens of notices and filings she has

1 prepared, and/or reviewed, and proofed all of them.

2 I want to speak a little more specifically about 3 Kristy's involvement in the Taylor file at my office. Т recall that I took over this file from another attorney, 4 5 James Kent, in January of 2021. At that point in time, it 6 was probably roughly halfway through the discovery phase 7 and I advised Kristy that we would be taking on this case. I explained to her some of the basic facts. I have made 8 numerous comments to Kristy, you know, during the nine 9 10 months that we worked together on the case about strengths 11 and weaknesses of the case and the type of case that it 12 was.

Kristy has extensively met and spoken with Ms.
Taylor. It is a case that went all the way to trial and there was a huge amount of attorney-client interaction.
Numerous times Ms. Taylor would come to the office or call and Ms. Johnson or Kristy is the first person who she would interact with, typically.

Kristy has been copied on every e-mail to the client. Now, if you ask me to go through and look at the probably 100 e-mails that I've sent to the client, maybe there's one or two that she wasn't copied on. But that's my standard practice, is that every confidential attorneyclient e-mail is copied to Kristy because Kristy needs to know what is going on with the file. She's running parts

1	of it. Okay? Particularly with discovery productions.
2	Kristy did sit through, monitor, and assist for
3	two different focus groups that were run on this case prior
4	to trial. So, she has all of that confidential information
5	from the focus groups, what different mock jurors thought
6	about the case, the value of the case the different jurors
7	assigned, and how those results were reported to Ms.
8	Taylor.
9	Kristy attended and assisted with jury selection -
10	-
11	MR. MCBRIDE: Your Honor, I'm sorry.
12	THE COURT: yeah.
13	MR. MCBRIDE: I don't mean to interrupt. I just
14	want to interject an objection as to relevance. I've on
15	the grounds, again, there is no factual dispute that Ms.
16	Johnson possesses confidential communication and was privy
17	to confidential communication regarding this matter. It
18	this whole and I have allowed Mr. Breeden to go on quite
19	a bit on to explaining this, but it's really not
20	relevant as to the issues as to whether or not proper
21	screening measures were in place and that's the purpose of
22	this hearing. I just wanted to make my record
23	THE COURT: And I'm going to let
24	MR. MCBRIDE: and
25	THE COURT: And I'm going to let Mr I

1 appreciate that. I think all I've heard for the last 45 2 minutes is that Ms. Johnson was intimately involved with 3 this case. Everybody agrees. Ms. Johnson agrees. Mr. 4 Breeden's asserting --5 MR. MCBRIDE: Right. 6 THE COURT: Ms. Taylor expressed her views on 7 that. Everybody agrees. So, in terms of building his record, I'm going to let Mr. Breeden do -- continue this 8 9 direction. So, I'm overruling an objection but it --10 MR. MCBRIDE: Thank you, Your Honor. 11 THE COURT: I mean, nobody's arguing that --12 arguing this point. 13 MR. BREEDEN: Thank you, Your Honor. And understand why I want to lay a very lengthy foundation. 14 15 THE COURT: Sure. 16 MR. BREEDEN: Kristy attended trial and would 17 assist with the jury selection. Of course, jury selection 18 is primarily the attorney's responsibility, but I want to note that Kristy has an important role in jury selection. 19 20 You know, she will tell me things that you can't pick up as 21 an attorney, like, this juror looks like they're sleeping. 22 Or this juror when you asked this question to another 23 potential juror was nodding their head up and down. So, 24 doing some substantive things for jury selection. 25 During trial, Kristy attended all days. She would

operate all PowerPoints and trial director to display
exhibits. So, she had access to all of my notes for the
case and my outlines for different witnesses. She did sit
immediately next to the client, Ms. Taylor, during the
entire trial.

6 Post-trial, Kristy helped conduct or sit through 7 jury interviews and reported to me information that was 8 passed along to Ms. Taylor.

9 From my point of view, moving on now to Kristy's 10 departure from my firm, I had no idea Kristy was having any 11 interviews or discussions with employment with the McBride Law Firm until she e-mailed me on the morning of October 12 25th, which was a Monday. And, just to put that in 13 14 perspective, the trial ended on Tuesday, October the 19th. 15 And, she contacted me, first, by e-mail. And she wrote a 16 very polite e-mail and she said that, you know, she was a 17 little troubled by, you know, her departure because she did 18 enjoy working at my firm and she wanted to talk to me about things, but she wanted to e-mail me first. So, she sent me 19 20 a very nice e-mail that said, quote:

Over the weekend, end quote, she had made a
decision to leave my firm and join the McBride Law
Firm.

I sent her a very polite e-mail back that essentially said, you know, you have to do what's best for

you and your family, but, you know, we'll talk about it 1 2 more when I get in the office. I kind of mention this because, you know, this is an example that I don't accuse 3 4 Kristy of falsifying anything, but when she notified me on October 24th, that's incorrect. It was an e-mail. I 5 6 actually remember because I was laying in bed still. It 7 was like at 7:30 maybe in the morning and she sent an email. And I said: Well, that's odd that something came in 8 9 from Kristy this early. You know, maybe she's ill or can't 10 come into work today. And it was about her decision to 11 leave.

12 It was not until the Opposition to this 13 disqualification motion and this case was filed that I 14 found out that, in fact, these discussions between Kristy and the McBride Hall Law Firm had started on Tuesday, the 15 19^{th} , the very evening after the verdict. And the testimony 16 17 you hear from Ms. Johnson matches my recollection that, you 18 know, the jury verdict was probably around 5 p.m. And, 19 then, it appears that within four hours, you know, she's 20 having discussions. I find out today that it was with Ms. 21 Hall personally. I didn't know that until her testimony 22 earlier today. And I didn't know when she actually 23 interviewed until that Opposition to the Motion to 24 Disqualify was filed.

25

And, so, I want to speak in particularly about

some highly confidential information that Ms. Johnson has. I'm going to start with one letter that was earlier, but then I wanted to tell you about some very specific concerns that I have about this time frame of, you know, roughly a week where she is interviewing with the defense law firm and she is continuing to work on highly sensitive client information at that -- my law firm.

The first thing I do want to mention is Ms. 8 9 Johnson did work on, review, and send to Ms. Taylor a 10 comprehensive letter of -- it looks like seven pages, that 11 was sent to Ms. Taylor -- actually e-mailed to her by Ms. Johnson, after Ms. Johnson reviewed and proofed the letter, 12 13 dated April 20th of 2021. And this is a very long letter 14 that details my entire assessment of her case, you know, probable verdicts, probable things that could happen at the 15 settlement conferences, you know, ranges of offers that 16 17 might be acceptable, and what our demand strategy would be.

Turning to the more crucial time that this hearing involves, I want to talk to you about that time frame between October 19th and October 25th, when I had no knowledge that Ms. Johnson was interviewing with the defense law firm and considering changing.

So, the first thing is the day after the trial
verdict -- so, trial verdict is on the 19th at 5. Ms.
Johnson, unbeknown to me, is setting up an interview that

evening. And, then, the next morning, on October 20th, she 1 2 comes to work and she is assigned to work on an October 20th, 2021, formal letter that was then e-mailed to the 3 4 client. This letter gives my assessment of the trial 5 results, probable post-trial motions and filings that would 6 be made, the possibility of appeal, and the potential merits of an appeal, potential strategy to -- when 7 discussing defense settlement offers that may come in, and 8 9 -- well, trial case costs that had been incurred. And this 10 -- along with this letter, and obviously given the 11 confidential information of it I can't admit it or have it be part of the record, but it -- this -- I mean, I can show 12 13 you that this is the e-mail transmitting this letter and this is from Ms. Johnson to Ms. Taylor. 14

15 The next thing she worked on that day -- or, I'm 16 sorry, the next correspondence that was sent was later in 17 that day, I had had a conversation specifically with my co-18 counsel, Anna Albertson, as well as Ms. Johnson, about post-trial or post-verdict juror interviews, what juror 19 20 impressions were of counsel, of the case, things they 21 liked, things they didn't like. Ms. Johnson prepared some 22 handwritten notes on that. I did not personally go to the 23 post-verdict interviews because Ms. Taylor was distraught 24 about losing the case and I wanted to be with her and 25 support her. So, I left it to Ms. Johnson and my co-

1 counsel to handle those.

So, Ms. Johnson, again, after -- or during a time when she's setting up an interview with the defense law firm, is discussing this information with me. I am putting it with my assessment in an e-mail to the client, Ms. Taylor. And I sent that to Ms. Taylor on October 20th at 3:30 p.m. It was copied to Anna Albertson, my co-counsel, and Kristy Johnson.

The next thing, chronologically, is that on 9 Thursday, October the 21^{st} at 9:02 a.m., I sent another e-10 11 mail to Ms. Taylor, and I copied Ms. Albertson and Ms. Johnson on this. This is the day, unbeknownst to me, that 12 13 Ms. Johnson's interview with McBride Hall occurred. And, 14 apparently, it occurred later that day or after her regular 15 work hours. It indicates numerous bullet points with 16 potential grounds for appeal, assessment of how an appeal 17 might work out, assessment of juror opinions on the case, 18 and a great deal of confidential information regarding what 19 I thought of a potential appeal here and what the best 20 grounds for an appeal were, as well as different comments 21 on things that could have or might have happened 22 differently during the trial, and essentially why the trial 23 result was not what we wanted.

The next thing, chronologically, that happens is that on the evening of Sunday, October the 24th, at 9:26

1 p.m., I had prepared a letter of two pages that was to go 2 to Ms. Taylor and this letter details a settlement offer 3 that had come in from the McBride Law Firm that day. Ιt 4 was a Sunday, but there was still some activity in the 5 case. So, this letter relayed that settlement offer to Ms. 6 Taylor. It contains my assessment of the settlement offer 7 versus appeal, potential results of post-verdict motions, and Ms. Johnson was assigned to review, proof, and send 8 9 this letter to Ms. Taylor. I do not know whether she saw 10 this letter before it went out, Ms. Johnson that is, because that was on Sunday October 24th at 9:26 p.m. As I 11 previously testified, very early the following Monday, 12 13 maybe in response to seeing this e-mail that I had assigned 14 her additional work in the Taylor case, she e-mailed me 15 that she was going to accept an employment offer at the 16 other firm.

17 So, when you look at what occurred here during 18 that time frame, it very much concerns me that I had an 19 employee who was clearly contemplating going to work for 20 the other law firm and I am sharing with that employee, or 21 continuing to share, highly sensitive information about --22 not only what I thought about the appeal, but going forward 23 -- I'm sorry. Not only what I thought about the trial and 24 the trial results, but going forward what my client's 25 settlement strategy should be and what her basis of appeal

would be and sort of the merits of appeal or strategy
 dealing with the appeal.

3	And, so, I'm asked or I would hypothetically ask
4	myself a question, you know, Ms. Johnson got up on the
5	stand and she said: Oh, I you know, I would not share
6	any confidential information. So, the question is: Do I
7	trust Kristy? Do I trust Ms. Johnson? I can only answer
8	that by saying, Judge, I've been doing this for 18, 19
9	years. I don't trust anybody with stuff like this. I just
10	don't. I have seen attorney after attorney come to court
11	and flat-out lie to judges about
12	MR. MCBRIDE: Objection, Your Honor. Objection,
13	Your Honor. This is irrelevant. She's a paralegal, not an
14	attorney.
14 15	THE COURT: Sustained.
15	THE COURT: Sustained.
15 16	THE COURT: Sustained. MR. BREEDEN: Well, and what I'm saying is if an
15 16 17	THE COURT: Sustained. MR. BREEDEN: Well, and what I'm saying is if an attorney can give false information, you know, certainly a
15 16 17 18 19	THE COURT: Sustained. MR. BREEDEN: Well, and what I'm saying is if an attorney can give false information, you know, certainly a paralegal could. And I'm not accusing Kristy of sharing any confidential information because I don't have that
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MR. BREEDEN: Sure. Sure. So, I'll move on. MR. MCBRIDE: I would object.

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3 MR. BREEDEN: McBride Hall, I contacted Ms. Hall. I believe the same day, on the 25th, possibly it was the 4 26th, after I looked at what the legal standard here was for 5 6 imputed disqualification. I asked them to explain what 7 they had done. They indicated to me that they had advised Ms. Johnson, you know, not to discuss the file with any of 8 9 them and that they had advised their other employees not to 10 discuss the file with Kristy. They also indicated that 11 they had locked their own computer system up and locked their own physical file in an area that Kristy would not 12 13 have access to it, but that was not acceptable to me 14 because that protects their attorney-client communications. 15 That does nothing to protect my client's confidential information. 16

17 You know, that's what they're doing and I think 18 it's telling that when it came to their own attorney-client 19 communications, they didn't have absolute trust of their 20 staff either. You know, they took steps to --21 MR. MCBRIDE: Objection, Your Honor. Objection, 22 Your Honor. This is argumentative, it calls for 23 speculation. Talking about our staff --24 THE COURT: Sustained. 25 MR. MCBRIDE: It's --

1 THE COURT: Mr. McBride, --2 MR. MCBRIDE: Thank you. 3 THE COURT: -- I'm sustaining it. I'm letting Mr. 4 Breeden testify, btu this is moving into argument. So, --5 MR. BREEDEN: I also asked Ms. Hall, I said: 6 Look, let's put the two firms on equal standing. 7 THE COURT: Okay. MR. BREEDEN: Why don't you copy your entire file 8 9 with all of your confidential information, send it over to 10 my office, I'll store it somewhere in my office, I promise 11 you I will not look at it, I will not use it to my client's advantage, and then that way each firm is sort of on equal 12 13 footing. 14 Now, you can know or you can guess that that was a 15 bit of a facetious request but it was a request made to 16 make an important that this is a business that we don't 17 trust people like that, that the confidentiality concerns 18 of attorney-client communications are more than this scout's honor system. And, so, of course Ms. Hall 19 20 indicated to me that that would not be an acceptable 21 resolution to this and it was more my way of making a 22 point. 23 The last thing that I want to testify about, 24

24 because this is some of the factors, you know, do I think 25 not allowing screening in this case would diminish public

1 trust and confidence in the judicial system? I could tell 2 you that for my client, Ms. Taylor, it absolutely does. I 3 had another client, Ms. Nelson, and it absolutely reduced 4 her trust and confidence and she requested that I file a 5 similar motion.

6 I want to talk about me personally. I have seen 7 everything in the world in this business and, to be honest with you, Judge, I think a lot of things in this business 8 9 are pretty darn crooked. But you ask me if allowing 10 McBride Hall to stay on this file would reduce my confidence in the judicial process, for me, personally, 11 absolutely. It continues to lower my impression of a fair 12 13 judicial process.

The only other subject that I would like to
testify regarding is what happened with the other client,
the Nelson case. I'll just do this under oath. Filed a
very similar Motion to Disqualify in the Nelson case. That
matter is in mid-litigation. It is roughly halfway through
discovery. It had not yet gone to trial. That matter is
before Judge Johnson.

Judge Johnson believed that because we had not established that there was an actual exchange of confidential information that she was going to flatly deny the Motion and deny an evidentiary hearing. I filed a Writ on January 3rd over that denial. So, it is still being

1 contested. Unfortunately, Judge Johnson did not even feel that my client and myself should get our day in court to 2 3 even testify in that matter to the full facts. And I think 4 that was a procedural error by her, but I also believe she 5 substantively erred because she held us to a standard that 6 we had to prove an actual leak of confidential information. 7 And that's clearly not the standard. The standard is that McBride Hall is presumed to be disqualified --8 9 MR. MCBRIDE: Objection, Your Honor. This is 10 argument. 11 MR. BREEDEN: -- [indiscernible] --THE COURT: It's hard to --12 13 MR. BREEDEN: So, that's --14 THE COURT: Sustained. 15 MR. BREEDEN: -- all that I have to say. 16 THE COURT: All right. Now, we're moving to 17 cross-examination of the witness. Mr. McBride? 18 MR. MCBRIDE: Thank you, Your Honor. I just have 19 a few questions. 20 CROSS-EXAMINATION OF ADAM BREEDEN 21 BY MR. MCBRIDE: 22 Mr. Breeden, you had been an attorney since 2004. Ο 23 Is that correct? 24 In Nevada, yes. I was licensed in Ohio in 2003. А 25 Okay. So, since 2003, you -- as part of your Q 56

1 position as a member of the Bar in good standing to the state of Nevada, you understand you had to take a 2 3 professional responsibility exam and pass that exam. 4 Correct? 5 Α Yes. I think I've passed three or four of those. 6 Okay. So, you're well aware of what the 0 7 responsibilities are of attorneys, in general, with regard 8 to confidential communications and any potential disclosure 9 of that information against the rules. Correct? 10 Α Yes. 11 Okay. Now, you told the Court, and you testified 0 12 that on -- the first time that you became aware that Kristy 13 had accepted a position, or at least had interviewed and 14 accepted a position with McBride Hall was -- correct me if I'm wrong, was in the evening or early morning of October 15 25? 16 17 It was very early in the morning of Monday, Α October 25th, at approximately 7:30 to 8:30 a.m. 18 19 Okay. And you advised the Court about the e-mail 0 20 that you had sent to both myself and Ms. Hall where I'll 21 just read a portion of it and just ask you if you recall 22 this. It says: 23 Heather and Robert, my paralegal, Kristy Johnson, 24 gave me notice today that she will be leaving to join 25 your law firm. I am sad to see Kristy leave, but wish

1 her the best and you are getting an outstanding 2 paralegal. 3 That -- do you remember that comment at the 4 offset? 5 Α Absolutely. I agree with all that. I -- Kristy's 6 work product was excellent. 7 Okay. And during the time she was employed by Q 8 you, for the four years that she was an employee of yours, 9 you trusted her with confidential communications without 10 question on all of the files that she worked on. True? 11 Α True. 12 You -- did you ever advise her during that four-Q 13 year employment that she, under no circumstances, could 14 ever disclose confidential communication regarding any of 15 your cases, not just the Taylor matter, with any individual outside of your firm? 16 17 Annually, I would review this with Kristy and have А 18 her sign an agreement explaining the confidentiality rules 19 of attorneys and law firms. 20 And attorneys, but I also understand that Q agreement extends to paralegals? 21 22 А I'm sorry. Did I -- I may have -- well, I see. 23 You're confused by my phrasing. 24 So, the form explains the duty of confidentiality 25 and preservation of attorney-client information for

1	attorneys and law firms and how it's applicable to everyone
2	at the firm, including Ms. Johnson.
3	Q Okay. And did she, at any point in time during
4	your employment, ever indicate that she was confused by
5	that those that agreement or that she did not
6	understand any aspect of that agreement?
7	A No.
8	Q Okay. Up front so, from October 25 until Ms.
9	Johnson joined our firm, she was employed with you from
10	October 25 and continued that employment from October 25
11	through November 5 th . Correct?
12	A That's correct.
13	Q Did you specifically advise Ms. Johnson after she
14	gave notice of coming to McBride and Hall that she could
15	not disclose any information with regard to any
16	confidential communication met confidential
17	communications on any matters, including the Nelson versus
18	Pioneer matter and the Taylor versus Brill case?
19	A Well, on my end, what I did for Ms. Johnson, and I
20	considered including the severity of what happened, just
21	simply letting her go that day. But Ms. Johnson and I I
22	would consider her to be a close friend and she had worked
23	with me for many years. So, I allowed her to work an
24	additional two weeks. That's the notice she indicated
25	she's like to give.

1	Q And on
2	A Yeah. And I'm getting to answer your question.
3	On my part, I immediately took steps to prevent
4	any further disclosure of confidential information about
5	the file. I removed her access, electronically, to the
6	file at my law firm. I advised both clients that they were
7	not to communicate with Kristy in any manner regarding the
8	matter and I indicated to her that she was not to work on
9	either matter at all.
10	Q But my question is more specific. Did you ever
11	tell her before she or during that week, during the time
12	she was still employed by you, that she could not disclose
13	or discuss any aspect of the Taylor versus Brill matter
14	with any member of McBride Hall, or that Nelson matter as
15	well?
16	A I can't recall specifically advising her of that,
17	but I think that was well understood.
18	Q And you believed that was well understood because
19	of the prior actions that you had taken by having her sign
20	agreements understanding what the nature of confidential
21	communications and the significance of those. True?
22	A Well, yes. And that she's been in the industry
23	for 20 years. You know, she's aware of the ethical duties
24	of attorneys and non-lawyer staff.
25	Q Did you ever ask before Ms during the time she

1	was still employed with you, during that week,
2	approximately, did you or approximately two weeks. Did
3	you ever specific ask that she sign a different agreement,
4	a specific nondisclosure agreement, with regard to
5	confidential communications she may have learned about on
6	either Taylor or the Nelson matter?
7	A I don't believe I asked her to sign anything
8	specific. No.
9	Q Okay. And, Mr. Breeden, you have also worked in
10	other firms in the past. Correct?
11	A Correct.
12	Q And you're familiar with the issues with regard to
13	screening measures that have been put in place for other
14	employees on those cases?
15	A Yes. I've never had a situation as concerning as
16	Ms. Johnson's but I am aware of some other measures that
17	have been taken.
18	Q Okay. Well, you indicated that you had every
19	reason to trust Ms. Johnson with confidential
20	communications the entire time and that she was an
21	outstanding paralegal with your firm. You had no reason
22	not to trust her to not disclose information at any point
23	with her employment with you. Correct?
24	A There was nothing prior to these events that led
25	me to believe Ms. Johnson was making improper disclosures

1 of confidential client communications outside the law firm. 2 Okay. And let me ask this very directly. Do you 0 3 have any facts, direct facts or knowledge, that Ms. Johnson 4 has in any way disclosed any confidential communication 5 regarding the Taylor matter or the Nelson matter with any member of the McBride Hall Firm? And it's a yes or no 6 7 answer. 8 Α Well, the answer is no. 9 Thank you. The --0 10 Α Well, I'm -- okay. I'll explain later. 11 You have been told by Ms. Hall in subsequent e-0 12 mail communications what measures have been put in place to 13 ensure that Ms. Johnson did not have access to any 14 confidential communication regarding the Taylor versus 15 Brill matter from our office. True? 16 I have been advised things from your office. А 17 Okay. And you have been advised of the screening 0 18 measures that have been put in place -- you've been advised 19 of that by virtue of not only prior e-mails with our 20 office, but also through the pleadings on file and the two 21 Motions that you filed to disqualify our office. True? 22 А I would say that is the source of my scope of 23 knowledge on that issue. 24 Okay. Did you ever tell Ms. -- at the time, while 0 25 she was still an employee with you, did you ever tell Ms.

1 Johnson that you were going to file Motions to Disqualify 2 our firm because of your concerns about her sharing 3 confidential communications?

A I advised Ms. Johnson to the effect that this
5 created disqualification issues, that I was going to
6 discuss it with the McBride Law Firm, and it was possible,
7 depending on what the clients wanted, that I would have to
8 file Motions for Disqualification.

9 Q Did you advise Ms. Johnson in those conversations
10 that you trusted Ms. Johnson, but that you were under
11 direction to file the Motions because of your clients?

A No. I don't -- I wouldn't -- I don't specifically
recall words to that effect.

14 || Q Okay.

A At that point, I wanted to have as little
conversation with Ms. Johnson as possible regarding those
files.

Q Okay. But during the time, the two weeks you were there with Ms. Johnson, was she there every day in the office?

A Yeah. I believe so. I don't think there was any
time that she missed during those two weeks.

Q Okay. Was there any indication that she was not fulfilling her duties as a paralegal during those two weeks that -- those last two weeks with you?

1	A Well, on other matters she was.
2	Q Okay. Did and not the Taylor and Nelson
3	matter. Is that correct?
4	A Correct.
5	Q Because you had effectively screened her on your
6	end from those matters. Correct?
7	A I do believe I had effectively blocked her
8	continued access to the file in the sense that I don't
9	believe she would have been able to, for example, log onto
10	the computer system and download files. But, I mean, she
11	already knew everything about all my cases, especially the
12	Taylor case since it was so close to trial and it was sort
13	of the hottest case at the time in my office.
14	Q And, at any point in time, has Ms. Johnson, during
15	the two weeks that she was still with you or up until
16	today, has she ever disclosed to you that she obtained
17	confidential communications or information regarding our
18	file on behalf of Dr. Brill? Has she ever disclosed any
19	confidential communications to you?
20	A The answer no. I've had no communications with
21	Ms. Johnson since.
22	Q Okay.
23	A Maybe some sort of Facebook congratulations.
24	MR. MCBRIDE: Okay. That's all the questions I
25	have. Thanks.

1	THE COURT: Any redirect from your side?
2	REDIRECT TESTIMONY OF ADAM BREEDEN
3	MR. BREEDEN: Yeah. The only thing that I would
4	say, Your Honor, is, you know, one of the first things that
5	did happen is the McBride Hall Law Firm opposed the Motions
6	to Disqualify in both cases. And, both cases, the first
7	thing they did when this arose is they went to Ms. Johnson
8	and they had Ms. Johnson complete and sign an Affidavit
9	against both clients' interests in the Motion. So, sort of
10	the first difficulty that arose, they go to their employee.
11	I get that, you know, maybe it's factual information and
12	maybe Ms. Johnson feels compelled that she has to cooperate
13	with her new firm against my clients, her former clients,
14	but that's what was done. And, again, you have Affidavits
15	being made against my clients' interests.
16	THE COURT: Any recross regarding that last
17	statement, Mr. McBride?
18	MR. MCBRIDE: Just very briefly, Your Honor.
19	RECROSS-EXAMINATION OF ADAM BREEDEN
20	BY MR. MCBRIDE:
21	Q Mr. Breeden, in either of those Affidavits that
22	were submitted by Ms. Johnson under the penalty of perjury,
23	did she ever disclose any confidential communications
24	whatsoever regarding the Nelson or the Taylor matter?
25	A I don't believe so.

1 MR. MCBRIDE: Okay. That's all I have. Thank 2 you, Your Honor. 3 THE COURT: Thank you. Call your next witness. MR. BREEDEN: Nothing further from plaintiff. 4 5 THE COURT: All right. Mr. McBride, do you wish 6 to call a witness? And I'm looking at your partner. 7 MS. HALL: Yes. 8 MR. MCBRIDE: I quess so. This is going to be her 9 moment on the stand. Yes. Or, actually, where she's 10 sitting, I guess. Right? 11 THE COURT: Please raise your right hand. 12 MS. HALL: Yes, Your Honor. 13 HEATHER HALL 14 [having been first duly sworn, testifies as follows:] 15 THE CLERK: Thank you. Please be seated. Please 16 state and spell your name for the record. 17 MS. HALL: My name is Heather S. Hall, H-E-A-T-H-18 E-R, last name is Hall, H-A-L-L. 19 THE COURT: Counsel, your witness. 20 MR. MCBRIDE: Thank you, Your Honor. 21 DIRECT EXAMINATION OF HEATHER HALL 22 BY MR. MCBRIDE: 23 Q Ms. Hall, what is your profession? 24 Α I am an attorney. 25 Where did you go to law school? Q

1 I went to law school at Brandeis in Louisville, А 2 Kentucky. 3 And where -- when did you pass the Nevada Bar? 0 4 А I sat for and passed the Nevada Bar -- I actually 5 got my results in October of 2007. Okay. And what's your title currently at the law 6 Ο 7 firm, McBride and Hall? 8 I'm an owner and partner, 50/50 partner of the law Α 9 firm. 10 Q And did you co-try the Taylor versus Brill matter 11 together with myself back in October of 2021? 12 Yes. I did. А 13 Okay. What was your involvement in that case as Q 14 co-counsel? 15 А Essentially, I was involved in that case as early 16 pre-litigation, and I did the majority of the work on the 17 matter leading up to trial. And I would say during the 18 trial, Mr. McBride and I shared 50/50 of the 19 responsibilities of, you know, trial prep, and trial 20 presentation. 21 During the trial of that matter, did you see Ms. Ο 22 Johnson on the other side every day in court with Mr. 23 Breeden? 24 I did. Every single day, I saw her here in the А 25 morning setting up for Mr. Breeden.

Q At any point in time did you engage in any conversations which -- where you attempted to obtain any confidential communication with her regarding the *Taylor versus Brill* matter?

A Never.

5

6 At any point int time during that trial did you 0 7 have any conversations with Ms. Johnson regarding obtaining a position or being offered a position with McBride Hall? 8 9 Α I did not ever speak with Ms. Johnson about an 10 employment position with my office. I had heard -- we had 11 a vacancy for a paralegal position and I had heard from my paralegal, Kristine, that Ms. Johnson might be interested 12 13 in leaving her current firm. My advice and instruction to 14 Ms. Herpin was you are not to even discuss a position with 15 Ms. Johnson and I will not speak with her until this matter 16 is concluded.

17 So, the first time that I actually had any 18 communication with Ms. Johnson about potential interview 19 was the night that the verdict came in. And I think it was 20 around 8:30 or 9 o'clock that night. I sent a text message 21 to her and said: At the risk of being overeager, would you 22 be interested in coming in and interviewing at my law firm 23 for a paralegal positon? And, subsequently, we had the 24 interview.

25

0

Okay. What -- and, so, is that the first

1 communication with Ms. Johnson about a position at McBride 2 Hall? Yes. At no time --3 А 4 Was that --Q 5 А -- during the trial did she and I ever communicate 6 either verbally or in writing about anything at all related 7 to an employment position. 8 And when was she interviewed --Q 9 А She ---- at our office? 10 Q She was interviewed that Thursday, the 21st, and I 11 А think it was late in the evening, like 5 o'clock. 12 13 All right. And during the interview, was I also Q 14 there? 15 А You were. Okay. And can you briefly tell the Court what was 16 0 17 discussed with Ms. Johnson and myself regarding potential 18 conflicts if she were to accept a paralegal position with our office? 19 20 Having been a member of the Bar here for Α Yes. 21 many years, as well as having served on the Honor Council 22 in law school, I am very concerned, probably overly 23 concerned with conflicts and issues that could potentially create ethical violations and issues. 24 25 So, one of the very big points discussed during

1 Ms. Johnson's interview was the fact that I know of two 2 cases, the Nelson matter and the Taylor matter, for obvious 3 reasons because we had just completed the trial. And I 4 asked her if she was aware of any other files. I had 5 looked at my list and found no others. Had she found any 6 or was she aware of any. And we discussed that for any matters that she had ever worked on at the Breeden Law Firm 7 that she could not work on those at my office, she could 8 9 not access those matters. And, just as significantly, she 10 could not talk about those cases or be in the vicinity of 11 anybody in my office who was talking about them.

So, that was a big -- I would say the interview maybe lasted an hour and that was at least 20 to 30 minutes of the interview process.

Q And during that -- the interview process, at any point intime did Ms. Johnson voluntarily disclose or involuntarily disclose any confidential communications or discussions regarding the *Taylor versus Brill* matter or the *Nelson* matter?

A She did not. And, in fact, we didn't have any discussion of either of those matters outside of the fact that there could be a conflict issue and these measures that need to be in place, if she accepted a position.

24 Q And did -- based on that interview, did you have 25 an understanding that Ms. Johnson agreed, and understood,

1 and agreed to comply with our request to not disclose any 2 confidential information?

3 A Yes. She had verbally indicated that and also
4 indicated that, having been a paralegal for a number of
5 years, she understood the significance of that.

6 Q When Mr. Breeden advised you by way of e-mail 7 about the -- his intent to potentially request that our 8 firm be disqualified, did you respond to that e-mail? 9 A I did. And if I could address that e-mail for a 10 brief moment, Mr. McBride?

11 The e-mail that I received from Mr. Breeden was at 9:24 in the morning of October the 25th. And, in that e-12 13 mail, I was told the introductory remark that Mr. McBride 14 questioned Mr. Breeden about earlier. But I was also told 15 that my firm was -- had imputed disqualification applying 16 to it, and that I needed to withdraw , and my law firm 17 needed to withdraw for both of those matters. And that I 18 needed to advise him of my decision and whether I intended to withdraw or he would file a Motion to Disqualify. 19

So, that day, I did look at the Leibowitz case, as
well as some other caselaw, and that day I responded to Mr.
Breeden in a letter and informed him of all of the things
that I have put in place. And there were several things,
but one is, of course, the discussion that I had with Ms.
Johnson before she even accepted a position, in terms of

there being a serious issue and the need for her to strictly maintain confidentiality on both sides. Because, just as Mr. Breeden and Ms. Taylor have concerns, of course, I have concerns, as Dr. Brill has concerns. He wants confidentiality maintained, and so do I, on both sides.

So, I had my IT provided, which is Network Heroes,
the day that Ms. Johnson accepted a position, I didn't have
her e-mail set up, but long before she started on November
the 8th, I had them block access to her desk so her computer
cannot access either the *Taylor* matter or the *Nelson*matter. So, that's the first thing that I did.

The second thing that I did is I took both of those paper files and I put them in a giant locked file cabinet. There's one key to that file cabinet and my law partner, Sean Kelly, has the only copy of that key.

17 And the third thing that I did is I have my office 18 administrator, with input from me, draft an office memo on 19 this issue and the fact that these two matters, Ms. Johnson 20 is conflicted off, she cannot have any access to these matters, she cannot have any discussions with anyone or in 21 22 the vicinity of anyone discussing these matters for fear of 23 there being any potential inadvertent disclosure. And that 24 memo was circulated to every single member of my law firm, 25 including my receptionist.

And, then, finally, I also outlined all of these measures in that letter that I sent to Mr. Breeden and assured him that I would be responsible for ensuring that nothing ever was violated and that these protocols were followed.

6 One question I have there just to follow-up. \bigcirc With 7 regard to the conversations and communications with Network 8 Heroes, the IT Department, to lock Ms. Johnson out of 9 access, in our office, does -- do each of the computer 10 monitors and computers in the -- for the paralegals, 11 attorneys, and secretaries, do they require access be obtained through a actual code or a -- an access code 12 13 before you can even open those computers?

A Do you mean like password or credentials?
Q Password. Yes. That's the word I was looking
for.

17 So, yes. Essentially, every member of our law Α 18 firm has their own computer in their workspace. That 19 computer has a user ID and password that only that user can 20 And, for instance, I can't -- even as the access. 21 owner/partner, I can't go and log in to my receptionist's 22 computer. My credentials don't work on her computer. So, 23 she has to log in with her name and password and that's the 24 only way that any individual at my firm can access our 25 electronic server.

1	Q So, in other words, is there any way for Ms.
2	Johnson to access computer files on any other computer in
3	the office other than her own?
4	A Absolutely not. Every single computer in my
5	office has that security feature.
6	Q So, and does Ms. Johnson have, or has she ever had
7	access to, the electronic files for the Nelson or the
8	Taylor matter?
9	A No. Never.
10	Q And how do you know that?
11	A Because I, personally, was responsible for putting
12	these things in place and I got confirmation in writing
13	from my IT provider, Network Heroes, that she has no
14	access.
15	Q Ms. Hall, did you every time with regard to Ms.
16	Johnson's employment and with regard to this case, have you
17	complied with the Nevada Rules of Professional Conduct 1
18	- in particular, 1.10, paragraph E?
19	A I have.
20	Q Okay. The with regard to the have you ever
21	had any discussions with Ms. Johnson about any of these
22	matters, the Taylor matter or the Nelson matter, of any
23	confidential communication?
24	A I have not, nor to my knowledge has there been any
25	communication by Ms. Johnson to any other member of my law

1 || firm.

25	CROSS-EXAMINATION OF HEATHER HALL
24	THE COURT: Cross?
22	Thank you, Your Honor.
21	MR. MCBRIDE: That's all the questions I have.
20	we all adhere to a very stringent standard.
20	office is well aware of those important ethical duties and
10	think not just myself, I think each attorney with my
18	always been very concerned with those kinds of issues and I
10	accepting new matters, and things of that nature. I've
15	normal requirement is in ensuring even [indiscernible],
14	when none exist and I think I go above and beyond what the
13	A Because I feel that I sometimes I see conflicts
12	Q And explain to the Court why.
12	A I do.
11	obligations seriously?
10	standing in the state of Nevada, do you take those ethical
9	past approximate 16 or 17 years, as a member in good
8	Q Okay. In your experience as an attorney for the
6 7	<pre>matter by any other party? A Absolutely.</pre>
5 6	to confidential communication inadvertently disclosed in a
4	disclosing confidential communication or obtaining access
3	you indicated that you do, but the importance of not
2	Q Do you understand the importance again, I think

1 BY MR. BREEDEN:

2	Q Yeah. Ms. Hall, let's talk about the screening
3	measures that were implemented. One screening measure was
4	that you advised Kristy that she was not to disclose any
5	confidential information of Ms. Taylor's. Is that true?
6	A That's not exactly true.
7	Q Okay. Tell me how you would rephrase that.
8	A It was even broader than that. My I did
9	mention that she could not discuss anything confidential,
10	but even broader than that, I also told her she could not
11	discuss those cases, period.
12	Q And the next step that you took was that you
13	advised other attorneys and employees of your firm not to
14	discuss these cases with Ms. Johnson as well. Is that
15	true?
16	A I don't think that's the exact order, but that is
17	one of the steps.
18	Q Okay. And, then, you have testified that you took
19	steps to electronically shut Ms. Johnson out of the file at
20	your firm?
21	A I, personally, didn't manually do the limitation
22	of the electronic file access. I don't even know how to do
23	that. That's why I retained Network Heroes to handle all
24	of my computer needs and they did.
25	Q Okay.

1	A Network Heroes did.
2	Q So, you had your tech people do it?
3	A Correct.
4	Q And, then, at McBride Hall, for the Taylor versus
5	Brill file, do you also have a physical file for that?
6	A As I testified earlier, I also have a paper file,
7	which is in a locked file cabinet that Mr. Kelly has the
8	key to.
9	Q Okay. So, in terms of electronically shutting Ms.
10	Johnson out of the file at your law firm, that is not a
11	step to protect my client. That's a step to protect Dr.
12	Brill's confidential information. Right?
13	A No. I don't agree with that.
14	Q What confidential
15	A I don't agree with that.
16	Q information of my client, Ms. Taylor, would be
17	in your electronic file then?
18	A Well, I don't agree with the premise of your
19	question because more it's not just about what's in my
20	electronic file. The blocking of that file also prevents
21	any to use your, I guess, insinuation earlier, that she
22	might give information to my firm that she obtained during
23	your employment, I'm equally concerned with her accessing
24	my file. And I think that is equally important to both
25	sides. I don't think that's just protecting the defendants

1 in this case. Her not being able to access my file should, 2 in my belief, give you some assurance that she's not working on that matter. Kristine Herpin is and she's not 3 4 providing any information to my firm that she might have obtained during your employment. 5 6 And, so, let's talk about this. The other measure 7 you took was to make sure that Kristy could not access the 8 physical file at your law firm by putting it in another 9 attorney's office and locking it up. 10 Α It's not in Mr. Kelly's office. 11 Q Okay. 12 А It's in a locked filing cabinet that Mr. Kelly has 13 the key to. 14 Okay. And, again, none of Ms. Taylor's Ο 15 confidential information is in your physical file. Is it? 16 But I don't agree that that means it's not to А No. 17 both parties' benefit. 18 Okay. So, those two steps, in terms of 0 electronically shutting Ms. Johnson out and locking up the 19 20 physical file, the -- those are not steps to protect Ms. 21 Taylor's confidential information. They're steps to 22 protect Dr. Brill's confidential information? 23 Α I don't agree with that. 24 Okay. You took those steps because even your own 0 25 office did not have 100 percent trust in Ms. Johnson that

1 confidential information might be improperly accessed or 2 used. Right?

3 A No. I took those steps because I have an ethical
4 duty to take those steps and ensure that they are followed
5 by anyone I hire at my office.

6 Q So, why do you think you have an ethical duty to 7 screen off Dr. Brill's file from Ms. Johnson?

8 A Again, I think my ethical duty is to ensure that
9 confidential information is not disclosed either way on
10 those two matters. So, I think and I know that that's
11 what's required of me as a member of the Bar of the state
12 of Nevada.

Q If you absolutely trusted Ms. Johnson, couldn't you just tell Ms. Johnson, hey, we have Dr. Brill's file in our computer system, please never access it?

A Well, Mr. Breeden, I don't believe that following what is required of me by the rules of professional responsibility indicates mistrust. I believe those are distinct issues. So, I don't believe following the rules, as I'm required to do, indicates that Ms. Johnson is an untrustworthy person.

Q Okay. So, you can indicate that you believe Ms.
Johnson has none of Dr. Brill's confidential information
from your firm. Right?

25

Α

Well, and I certainly take you at your word that

1	you trust her and believe her to be a person of good
2	character.
3	Q Okay. But that's not my question. And I
4	appreciate how you turned that around, like a good
5	attorney. But the question that I had asked was
6	A Could you repeat your question?
7	Q Yes.
8	You took steps to ensure that Ms. Johnson did not
9	obtain any confidential information of Dr. Brill from your
10	firm's files?
11	A As I said, I believe the steps that I took are to
12	both parties' benefit.
13	Q Okay. And you've talked about, you know, the
14	professional rules, etcetera, etcetera. But the
15	professional rules don't set forth exactly what the
16	attorney is supposed to do. They're just broad that client
17	confidences have to be preserved. Correct?
18	A Well, I think that is the caselaw that interprets
19	it requires what I did.
20	Q Yeah. And we'll give some closing arguments about
21	the caselaw here in a minute.
22	Would you agree with me that this entire situation
23	could have been avoided if you just simply chose not to
24	hire Ms. Johnson?
25	A Theoretically, I would agree with that.
	80

1 Okay. And did you discuss hiring Ms. Johnson with 0 2 your own client, Dr. Brill, before you hired her? 3 А No. 4 MR. BREEDEN: Those are all the questions that I 5 have. THE COURT: Redirect? 6 7 MR. MCBRIDE: Your Honor, very briefly. 8 REDIRECT EXAMINATION OF HEATHER HALL 9 BY MR. MCBRIDE: 10 0 Ms. Hall, at any point int time, did Mr. Breeden, 11 either by way of e-mail or telephone communication, ever 12 advise you that he had concerns that Ms. Johnson would 13 still access Ms. Taylor's file, either electronically or 14 paper file, that he maintained at his office? 15 А No. Never. 16 Did he ever advise you that he had not taken and 0 17 he was concerned that she would access -- Ms. Johnson could 18 access any portion of that file and inadvertently or purposefully disclose that information to our office? 19 20 А No. 21 The -- with regard to the measures that were put Ο 22 in place by our office, could you just explain very briefly 23 why you believe that the measures that you took were adequate to ensure that Ms. Johnson did not have access? 24 25 And, also, likewise, could not share confidential

1 information regarding the Taylor matter with anyone from 2 our office?

3 So, in terms of those formal steps, I think that's А 4 what the caselaw and the rules require. But, more 5 importantly, to me, as someone who is so concerned with, 6 you know, just all of the issues that this involves, I --7 we do have a small office and it's a small space. You know, it's only maybe seven -- maybe 20,000 square feet. 8 It's not a big office. And I was more -- even more 9 10 concerned about verbal -- you know, just in passing, if 11 someone says something. And that's kind of, you know, why I went, I think, above and beyond and sent that memo and 12 13 sent it with an e-mail telling everyone how important it 14 was in our office to not discuss this case in any general 15 areas where Ms. Johnson could be present after she starts on November the 8th. 16

17 And the paralegal who has worked on this case 18 since the beginning is still with my office. I use 19 paralegals in a very different way and that's one of the 20 reasons why these measures, I think, are more than 21 sufficient. My paralegals are never involved in an appeal. 22 The trial record is what it is. I mean, the trial has 23 occurred and there's nothing -- I don't believe there's 24 anything I could ever obtain from an employee that would change you know, the appeal. But that's not the analysis. 25

1	I believe that strict confidentiality has to be
2	maintained, regardless of whether the information disclosed
3	could have an impact. And what I've put in place, I think,
4	is very sufficient. In particular, advising all of the
5	members that they can't talk about it as well. Because,
6	it's not, to me, just about the written documents or what
7	she could possibly have viewed had I not put those measures
8	in place. It's the verbal, you know, could someone
9	disclose something or vice versa.
10	THE COURT: Well, Leibowitz talks about that, but
11	we're in evidence right now.
12	MR. BREEDEN: Right.
13	THE COURT: All right.
14	MR. MCBRIDE: And that's all the questions I have,
15	Your Honor.
16	THE COURT: Any recross?
17	MR. BREEDEN: Nothing further, Your Honor.
18	THE COURT: All right. Any additional witnesses
19	from the defense? Mr. McBride?
20	MR. MCBRIDE: No, Your Honor.
21	THE COURT: All right. So, that concludes the
22	evidence portion. Let's move into actually, let's take
23	a 15-minute recess, so my staff can stretch their legs and
24	then we'll come back for argument.
25	MR. BREEDEN: Thank you. And, again, I would just

1 like a brief argument. Sure. 2 THE COURT: 3 [Recess taken at 10:47 a.m.] 4 [Hearing resumed at 10:56 a.m.] 5 THE COURT: The record should -- the minutes 6 should reflect we've concluded the evidentiary portion of 7 this hearing. We're moving into argument. Mr. Breeden, this is your effort. You have the floor. 8 9 MR. BREEDEN: Again, do you mind if I sit, Your Honor? 10 11 THE COURT: No. Be comfortable. 12 MR. BREEDEN: Thank you. 13 MR. MCBRIDE: Your Honor, I'm muted. I cannot 14 hear --15 THE COURT RECORDER: I apologize, Your Honor. 16 MR. MCBRIDE: The Court is muted, rather. Sorry. 17 THE COURT: Do you have me now? 18 MR. MCBRIDE: Yeah. I can hear you now. 19 THE COURT: All right. Good. All I did was put 20 us on the record. Mr. Breeden is heading into argument. 21 He's going to -- I told him to be comfortable and I want to 22 hear his words. 23 MR. BREEDEN: Okay. Thank you, Your Honor. 24 Just, again, to recap some things that I said at 25 the beginning, and I don't mean to sound like a broken

1 record, but this is an important legal issue, especially to 2 my office, it's a small office. We try to work very 3 closely with all of my clients and I have two clients that 4 are very concerned about what's happened here.

5 There's no difference in the legal standard of 6 imputed disgualification between attorneys and non-7 And that's because both of them are held by the attorneys. 8 same standards of confidentiality towards clients. Imputed 9 disqualification is presumed in this case. I realize that 10 I went first, as if I was the plaintiff, and have the 11 burden of proof. But the amount of confidential information that Ms. Johnson has, as has been noted, is not 12 13 even disputed. It's McBride Hall's burden of proof in this 14 evidentiary hearing to establish to you that screening is 15 proper.

16 I would say that the inquiry that people say, 17 well, you have no evidence that actual breach of 18 confidentiality has occurred. That is not a cure-all. And 19 the applicable cases clearly establish that some cases are 20 just not meant for screening. It does not have to be 21 accepted in all cases and it isn't a cure-all to imputed 22 disqualification. There are other considerations, such as 23 the potential for inadvertent disclosure and the effect 24 that -- you know, possible distrust in the legal process 25 that people, particularly clients, think: Oh my goodness,

1 the other side has an employee now who knows all of my
2 confidential information.

3 THE COURT: Well, let's stop there for a second, 4 Mr. Breeden. What -- we -- you are very far along in this 5 litigation from the perspective of the trial. Right? The 6 record on appeal is what it is. Is -- does that make a 7 difference here? I mean, I -- frankly, it's more 8 compelling in your other -- your Nelson case, to the extent that we're discussing it, when you're halfway through 9 10 litigation because parallel -- or paralegals, as you know 11 better than I, but I know well enough, are critical in that process. 12 They're developing your theory. How do you --13 what are your thoughts on that? 14 MR. BREEDEN: Well, it may be that Nelson is even 15 more compelling than this case, but I think both are 16 compelling cases. 17 THE COURT: Okay. 18 MR. BREEDEN: And, again we discussed this briefly at the outset in that, essentially, the case being on 19 20 appeal, is the same factual scenario that was presented --21 THE COURT: But the record is what it is. You 22 draw from that record, the issues that you believe are 23 grounds for reversal. 24 MR. BREEDEN: Well, I mean, if we weren't 25 appealing and the entire appellate strategy and, you know,

1 what I advised the client about, you know, should you take 2 this settlement offer, here's what might happen, you know, 3 here's what our grounds for appeal potentially are, --4 THE COURT: Okay. 5 MR. BREEDEN: -- here's where I think the 6 weaknesses and strengths are in the grounds for appeal. 7 THE COURT: That third [indiscernible] you were 8 discussing. 9 MR. BREEDEN: If none of that had been exchanged, 10 then perhaps that would be a compelling argument. I'm not 11 here because these cases involve past or former clients with cases that have concluded. I'm not here because of 12 13 that. I'm here because both of these cases involve ongoing 14 legal matters. 15 And when you talk about -- and I'm going to talk 16 about the actual factors that come from the cases here in 17 just a minute or two. But --18 THE COURT: You said you were going to be brief. 19 MR. BREEDEN: You know lawyers don't mean it when 20 they say that. 21 THE COURT: I told staff to load their glasses 22 because whenever I hear those words --23 MR. BREEDEN: So, by brief, I mean less than an 24 hour, how about that? 25 So, I find it funny, Judge, and this is argument,

1 but, you know, when you went to law school, if this had 2 been on your law school exam, shown these facts and imputed 3 disqualification apply, you would have failed that exam if 4 you would have said: No problem here, no imputed 5 disqualification.

Now, the standard has changed a little bit, but we didn't completely reverse what that old standard was, for these reasons, you always have to be concerned about what's going to happen in the future, whether that's intentional or inadvertent, and you have to concern yourself with public perception.

THE COURT: Should I be -- you've been stressing, as a good litigator will, the effects on your client, Ms. Taylor, moving forward. What about the caselaw talking to me about balancing the effect on Dr. Brill and the -- his rights to be represented by counsel of his choosing?

MR. BREEDEN: But both clients should have that
right. So, when we look at --

THE COURT: Okay.

19

20 MR. BREEDEN: -- what happened in this case, which 21 party could have avoided the problem? And, so, if one 22 party is going to bear the burdens or the consequence of 23 what happened, surely that should be Dr. Brill, whose 24 attorneys created this imputed disqualification issue. If 25 there -- you certainly can't blame Ms. Taylor for any of

1 || the procedural history of how we got here.

2 THE COURT: I think that would be -- everybody
3 would have to agree on that.

MR. BREEDEN: Yes. She's just litigating her
case. So if we're to balance that factor and say, you
know, which party -- I don't want to say which party is at
fault here, but which party could have avoided this
situation? It clearly would be Dr. Brill.

9 And, by the way, all the caselaw says, if it's a
10 close issue, you err in favor of disqualification. Okay?

11 We heard about some of the screening efforts that 12 took place. Look, all of the screening efforts boil down 13 to they told Ms. Johnson: Please don't discuss either of 14 these cases with anyone else at our firm. And they sent a 15 memo around to everyone at their firm saying: Please don't 16 discuss these cases, you know, in public areas or with Ms. 17 Johnson, specifically. Okay. Every other screening 18 measure that they took protects their client, not Ms. 19 Taylor's secret.

You know, and I think it's telling that when it came to protect their client's confidences, Dr. Brill's confidences, they're able to go and pay some tech person to lock Ms. Johnson out of the file, they're able to take their physical file and put it behind lock and key because they don't implicitly trust that no shenanigans or anything

1 like that is going to go on, or even accidental disclosure 2 of that. My client, Ms. Taylor, doesn't have that 3 privilege. Okay? Ms. Johnson already knows all the 4 confidential information about her client.

5 So, when McBride Hall goes on and on about, oh, 6 look, we've blocked her out eccentrically, we have the 7 physical file under lock and key, none of that addresses 8 the concerns in this case, which are Ms. Taylor's 9 confidential information, which Ms. Johnson already has and 10 has had for some time.

11 And we hear a lot of talk from McBride and Hall 12 about, yeah, they -- they're highly concerned about this as 13 well. You know, they wanted to lock up their file and they 14 wanted to make sure that even their employees maybe weren't 15 -- there wasn't an accidental disclosure. And, you know, maybe somebody a couple of cubicles over is talking about 16 17 one of these files and Ms. Johnson overhears it. But 18 that's the exact type of thing that is inherently impossible for them to avoid under the facts of this case. 19

Let me tell you when screening works extremely well and why screening came about. It came about, and maybe this is my opinion or argument, but it came about with the advent of these large, multi-state law firms and some office in Phoenix hires a paralegal that would have a technical conflict with some client whose matter is being

handling out of a Las Vegas office. Given normal
circumstances, that paralegal would never see or have
access to the file, or any involvement with those clients.
And, so, it seemed unfair to absolutely, strictly apply
imputed disqualification to situations like that.

6 But look at what's going on in this case. Okay? Ms. Johnson has the most extreme level of confidential 7 8 information possible. She interacts daily, or near daily, 9 with everyone at that law firm who is assigned to Ms. 10 Taylor's case. Okay? She even has to work with those 11 other folks on other matters, including her direct supervisors and the owners of the firm, Mr. McBride and Ms. 12 13 Hall, who are the attorneys handling Dr. Brill's matter 14 opposing Ms. Taylor's case.

The caselaw says: Look, the smaller the firm, the more likely it's going to be that imputed disqualification is going to apply. And that general rule has its origin in a situation like this.

And I'm going to tell you that when I read this Leibowitz case, let me honest with you, if I had been on the Supreme Court, I don't think I would have signed off on that opinion. It was not a unanimous opinion. There were two Supreme Court justices that dissented and basically what they said was: Well, you know, these past cases, they're very sympathetic because, you know, one of them

1 just involved a typist, a temporary employee typist who had 2 very little actual involvement with the case. In fact, 3 mere access is later what they said. Not even proof that 4 the typist actually had confidential information. Those 5 are cases very sympathetic to screening and allowing non-6 lawyer staff to change jobs.

7 Sometimes, extreme facts, or bad facts, make for
8 bad law. And, so, here we have a case where two Nevada
9 Supreme Court Justices warned us in the *Leibowitz* case:
10 Maybe this is going a bit too far, and maybe we ought to
11 look at, you know, keeping this imputed disqualification.

Now, -- pardon me. The Leibowitz case actually does that. It says: Hey there's all these factors and there's big sliding scales here. And there's even some categories of cases, and I allege this is one of those, where you can just even never use screening. Right?

17 The first big sliding scale is the level of 18 confidential information the employee actually has. Okay? 19 And that's undisputed in this case, that it's extreme, that 20 Ms. Johnson has an extreme level of confidential 21 information and it would be highly damaging to Ms. Taylor 22 if it was shared with the other side.

So, look at what some of these other factors are.
I mean, these come from *Leibowitz*. So, we talked about the individual right to be represented by counsel of one's

1 choice and my point is Ms. Taylor and Dr. Brill have that 2 right. If you were going to balance that one way or 3 another, you would say: Well, you know, it's Dr. Brill or 4 Dr. Brill's attorneys that had the ability to avoid this 5 situation. So, if there's going to be some consequences, 6 it probably ought to fall on them.

7 Second is each party's right to be free from the 8 risk of even inadvertent disclosure of confidential 9 information. Well, surely that weighs in favor of 10 disqualification here because that risk is only borne by 11 Ms. Taylor in this situation. It's not borne by Dr. Brill. 12 They made sure to lock Kris -- Ms. Johnson out of Dr. 13 Brill's files, so she could never access that.

The third factor is the public's interest in scrupulous administration of justice. And I think when they use the word scrupulous there, I think they're talking here about public trust of people in the process, that it will be fair, and people will respect the decision, and not think that something unusual was occurring. And, surely, that factor weighs in favor of Ms. Taylor.

The next factor is the prejudices that will inure to the parties as a result of the District Court's decision. You know, I guess if you were McBride and Hall, you might say: Well, I think it prejudices my client that he has to go and get new counsel at this point. As has

been noted, this matter is on appeal. There are many fine appellate attorneys. The appellate record is what it is, at this point. Many law firms actually separate. You know, we have appellate attorneys specialists. And, so, I don't see a great deal of prejudice to Dr. Brill at this point if he were told, you know, you have to get another attorney now to handle this appeal.

8 And, by the way, the opening brief on the appeal 9 is not even filed yet. It probably won't be filed for 10 another 60 days. And, certainly, if imputed 11 disqualification were granted, I would work with new 12 counsel to ensure that they had adequate time to get up to 13 speed and prepared.

14 Now, the next part of Leibowitz sort of talks 15 about these screening factors, okay, as to whether 16 screening has been or may be effective, is what it says. 17 One is the substantiality of the relationship between the 18 former and current matters. Notice the language there, they're really assuming that you're talking about different 19 20 matters for the same client or a closed matter. There 21 aren't -- there isn't a former and current matter. It's 22 the same matter.

Number two, the time elapsed between the matters.
Well, there's no time, but if you were to look at this as
well, you talk about, you know, this isn't a case where Ms.

1 Johnson worked on this file three years ago, she left my 2 firm, and then three years later she just happens to show 3 up at McBride Hall. Literally working at my firm until a 4 Friday and then joining McBride Hall on a Monday. And I 5 did what I could, reasonably, to lock her out of the file, 6 so, you know, the confidential information that she had stopped, but I could only do so much. I can't hypnotize 7 her and remove the information. 8

9 Three, the size of the firm. And, again, here, 10 we're talking about: Is this a big, multi-state firm, and 11 the affected employee is going to be in a totally different 12 office and never have to deal with the attorneys assigned 13 to the case? Or is it a situation, which this matter 14 presents, where it's a very small firm and Ms. Johnson is 15 going to be working very closely on other matters with the attorneys assigned to this case? And, so, surely that 16 17 factor favors Ms. Taylor against screening.

18 Number four is the number of individuals presumed
19 to have confidential information. I don't know that that's
20 highly relevant to this particular case.

Number five is the nature of their involvement in the former matter. And, so, that's why I spent so much time establishing the extreme level of confidential communication that Ms. Johnson has because it's one of the factors here that weighs heavily against allowing

1 screening.

Number six is the timing and features of any measures taken to reduce the danger of disclosure. Well, to McBride Hall's credit, they recognize the issue early. It's a serious issue and they sent some office memos and they advised Ms. Johnson about it, but they did that because they recognize it's a problem and it's a serious issue.

9 Number seven, whether the old firm and the new 10 firm represent adverse parties in the same proceeding 11 rather than in different proceedings because inadvertent disclosure by the non-lawyer employee is more likely in the 12 13 former situation. Of course, we have the case here where 14 it's the same client, same active case. We just have a paralegal working for the plaintiff firm one week and the 15 16 defense firm the next week.

I will comment that some of the caselaw on screening, it's outside of Nevada, but some of it says you can't screen if it's the exact same case and it's ongoing at both firms. Screening is not even allowed under those circumstances.

I want to move on because those are the factors set forth in *Leibowitz*. We actually have some additional factors set forth in the *Ryan's Express* case as well that talk about screening. And the fact -- and I'm going to

start with the factor number two here, restricted access -these are just factors that are to be considered on a caseby-case basis to assess whether screening is a proper, and
appropriate, and acceptable in the given case.

5 Second factor is restricted access to files and 6 other information about the case. McBride Hall can protect 7 Dr. Brill's files, but they can't erase the if that Ms. Johnson already has about Ms. Taylor's files, and that's 8 9 what we're concerned with here. My client, Ms. Taylor, 10 isn't concerned about Dr. Brill's confidences. And Ms. 11 Hall has said: Hey, look, I have a concern because Ms. Johnson is a personal friend of Mr. Breeden and she worked 12 13 for him for four years. You know, I have some concerns. Maybe she would get into Dr. Brill's files and leak 14 15 something to Mr. Breeden. And I think that shows that it's 16 just the nature of the business that you can't have 100 17 percent trust in everybody 100 percent of the time.

The third factor here from *Ryan's Express* is the size of the law firm and its structural divisions. Again, we have a small law firm here. The McBride Hall, one office location. The affected employee is going to see the McBride Hall personnel on this file probably every day and work with them closely on other files, direct supervisor.

Four is the likelihood of contact between the
quarantined lawyer or other members of the firm. Now this

1 says lawyer because it was a lawyer involved in Ryan's
2 Express case, but the same standard applies to non-lawyers.
3 Okay? Like paralegals or legal assistant. And, so, the
4 likelihood of contact here is undisputed. It's extremely
5 high and it's going to occur nearly every day.

Number five is the timing of the screening and McBride Hall did recognize that this was an issue. And, in the end, though, all they can really do is verbally advise people: Hey, don't do this. They don't have any other failsafe method of controlling it, like a physical file that you can lock in a drawer, which is what they did with Dr. Brill's file.

13 I will indicate here that when you talk about the 14 timing of the screening, and I think what truly does 15 distinguish this case from maybe the facts of some others, 16 is you have this period of five or six days when Ms. 17 Johnson is actively seeking employment and interviews at 18 the McBride Hall Firm and she's continuing to work on the Taylor case at the Breeden Firm and she's getting some of 19 20 the most confidential, sensitive information about post-21 trial motions, post-trial strategy, settlement strategy, 22 appellate strategy, all of that information.

And I realize Ms. Johnson was in a tough place. And I realize Ms. Johnson was in a tough place. She hadn't been hired, yet. Right? So you don't want to go around telling your employer: Hey, I'm thinking about

getting out of here, so -- or you don't even want to subtly 1 2 say there's a reason why I shouldn't be working on this 3 So, I get why she did it, but it happened. case. And 4 that's a big problem in this case and I think that's where this case distinguishes itself from maybe some others, you 5 6 know, certainly because of the level of confidentiality 7 that Ms. Johnson had.

8 But, Your Honor, I do just want to note in closing 9 here that, you know, it's frustrating and I realize they 10 have a Motion to Defend, but, again, the first thing that 11 came along when these Motions for Disgualification were 12 filed was they went to Ms. Johnson and they obviously must 13 have discussed the Motions with her. And they had her do 14 Affidavits to support their Opposition, and so that is a 15 former employee of mine who is assisting the defense in 16 defeating my clients' Motions. And I think that shows the 17 problematic nature of imputed disqualification and what 18 occurred here.

So, in closing, I think there are -- there's a presumption that they are disqualified, McBride Hall, imputed disqualification. There is caselaw that states if the matter is kind of a close issue, you have to err on the side of imputed disqualification. McBride Hall is the law firm that created this situation. So, if there's consequences, they should be the firm to bear those. And

Ms. Johnson just has an extreme level of very sensitive confidential information and we would ask that you apply imputed disqualification.

THE COURT: Thank you.

4

5

Mr. McBride, your response?

6 MR. MCBRIDE: Thank you, Your Honor. I'll be very
7 brief.

8 And, Your Honor, I just want to remind the Court 9 the reason why we're here -- we were in front of Justice 10 Becker who heard the arguments on the Motion from both 11 plaintiff and defense at great length. This is not -- her 12 ruling was to allow an evidentiary hearing for the sole 13 purpose of determining whether there was adequate screening 14 measures in place. In her preliminary opinion, comments 15 from the Court, she felt sufficient screening was in place. 16 She also said, however, that plaintiff would be entitled to 17 an evidentiary hearing and it was probably wise to set one 18 for that purpose.

19 There's no argument, as Your Honor heard at length 20 -- so, I guess my point in closing is that this is not an -21 - this evidentiary hearing should not be used as an 22 opportunity to reargue the merits of the Motion, but rather 23 present the evidence, the burden that McBride Hall was to 24 present sufficient evidence that adequate screening 25 measures were in place under the Leibowitz matter.

1 Now, I understand that Mr. Breeden -- if he was on 2 that Leibowitz Court, he would have ruled the opposite way. 3 Clearly, we know that from his argument here today and 4 previously. However, Justice Becker, who was on that Supreme Court, had intimate knowledge for the reasoning and 5 6 the basis for that ruling. Basically, had told us that she 7 felt that there was sufficient screening in place. We have shown today, by way of this evidentiary hearing, that those 8 9 sufficient screening measures were in place. 10 And I'll just remind the Court and remind Mr. 11 Breeden, a lot was made of the fact that our firm put 12 screening measures on our end in place. I'll quote to the 13 Leibowitz case where it says: 14 When a law firm hires a non-lawyer employee, the 15 firm has an affirmative duty to determine whether the 16 employee previously had access to an adversarial file. 17 If the hiring law firm determines that the employee had 18 such access, the hiring law firm, the hiring law firm, 19 has an absolute duty to screen the non-lawyer employee 20 from the adversarial cases, irrespective of the nonlawyer employee's actual knowledge of the privileged or 21 22 confidential information.

That's the why. That -- and Mr. Breeden, I'm sure, knows that's the reason we took the measures that we did, to screen Ms. Johnson, and certainly he's testified as

1 to what measures he put in place to screen Ms. Johnson from 2 obtaining any information -- confidential information.

3 Now, and it's noteworthy that rather than even 4 though he contemplated them, Mr. Breeden chose not to 5 terminate Ms. Johnson immediately. He determined it was 6 not necessary to have her sign a specific nondisclosure 7 agreement, should she go to any firm, or should she go to our firm and decide to take that job. She -- he had the 8 9 opportunity to terminate her at that time if he so chose. He didn't. 10

11 So, the Court is -- the caselaw does not require 12 that we erase Ms. Johnson's memory and everything she may 13 have learned from other cases, not including this Taylor 14 case. It simply requires us to put proper security 15 measures in place and we have done that. We have gone over 16 and above the requirements of the Leibowitz case and our 17 ethical obligations as attorneys and Officers of this 18 Court.

Again, Your Honor, as an attorney in good standing in this Court, as well as an attorney in California for years before, I take this job very seriously and I think you can understand that both Ms. Johnson, as a paralegal, who has done her job for many years at various wellrespected law firms, including the Lionel Sawyer Collins Firm, one of the largest law firms and oldest law firms in

the state for a long time, that she understands those obligations. And, again, there's no way we can ever erase her memory of what may have -- information she may have obtained, but that's not what is required by the law.

5 And, so, with respect to the request to do an 6 Affidavit, Your Honor, this is -- it's something that is -we're in a catch-22. We feel as it's important as Officers 7 of the Court in order to provide an adequate factual basis, 8 9 the factual basis and issues surrounding the 10 confidentiality in our office, as well as Ms. Johnson's 11 knowledge, and what, you know, she was aware of, and what 12 screening measures were in place, we had to do those 13 Affidavits. And, if we had not presented those Affidavits, 14 counsel would have made the argument that we have presented 15 no evidence from her that we didn't exercise or conduct 16 those measures to prevent her from accessing it.

17 So, again, Mr. Breeden has already indicated in 18 testimony that he trusts Ms. Johnson. He trusted her for the entire time that she was employed with him. 19 Не 20 believes her to be an outstanding paralegal, wishes her the 21 This is not -- Your Honor, this is not about whether best. 22 or not there is a legitimate concern of disclosure of 23 confidential information because, as Your Honor pointed 24 out, the Taylor matter has already been concluded. It's on 25 The issues are a matter of public record. appeal now. So,

to the extent there are any potential concerns about this case, and that's the only one we're here today on is the *Taylor* matter. The -- those issues are moot and non -they are not important to the issues and irrelevant to the issues here today.

This is a matter of Mr. -- frankly, Your Honor, 6 7 it's a matter of Mr. Breeden feeling he can use this, and Ms. Johnson's employment with our office, as a strategic 8 9 advantage to disgualify our office to get another law firm 10 on the case to handle the appeal. Your Honor, our office 11 handles these appeals of these matters. Ms. Hall and other 12 members, Ms. [indiscernible], another partner of mine, 13 handles these appeals very well. There's no reason, under 14 the circumstance, because of the adequate measures taken, 15 and because of the representations made by Ms. Johnson, Ms. 16 Hall, and myself, that no disclosures will have or have 17 ever occurred.

So, to put it very succinctly, Your Honor, this -we have fulfilled our obligations. I think we've gone over
and above and met our obligations for the purposes of this
evidentiary hearing of demonstrating that we have
established sufficient safeguards in place. And, with
that, Your Honor, I would submit.
THE COURT: Thank you very much.

Ladies and gentlemen, I've listened patiently to

25

1 the evidence that's been presented. I believe the decision 2 I'm about to enter is consistent with the Leibowitz decision. As it's articulated in that opinion, this Court 3 4 is faced with the delicate task of balancing competing 5 interests. There is no dispute that Ms. Johnson was privy 6 to privileged information as a consequence of her previous 7 employer, but I believe that the McBride Firm, the new hire, has done adequate and met their necessary 8 9 obligations.

10 I note in the decision that the Supreme Court 11 talks about that an employee must be cautioned not to disclose any information relating to the representation of 12 13 a client of a former employer. That's been more than 14 adequately, in this Court's opinion, addressed as a 15 consequence of this evidentiary hearing. As is the second 16 prong, as I read, must be instructed not to work on any 17 matter which he or she has done -- worked on during prior 18 employment. Again, stressed significantly both with the 19 direct testimony of Ms. Johnson and her direct partner, Ms. 20 Hall.

And I believe the firm has taken reasonable steps to make sure the non-lawyer employee does not work in connection with the matters for which she worked during her prior employment, absent consent -- client consent, which is obviously not part of this case.

1	Based upon those factors, and the fact that the
2	decision talks about: We balance the interest of the
3	identified client for or Dr. Brill. We talked about the
4	decision talks at length about this being or discusses
5	that the imputed disqualification should be considered a
6	harsh remedy and should only be invoked if the Court is
7	satisfied that real harm is likely to result. I find it
8	important to note that the action is substantially complete
9	on appeal and I think that is a factor that ultimately
10	leads me to the conclusion of denial.
11	So, Mr. McBride, I'd direct you to make prepare
12	the Order, consistent with that decision, and submit it for
13	review. All right?
14	MR. MCBRIDE: Thank you.
15	MR. BREEDEN: Your Honor, I just want to make sure
16	it's formal findings of fact and conclusions of law.
17	THE COURT: Formal findings of facts and
18	conclusions of law.
19	MR. MCBRIDE: Thank you, Your Honor. We will
20	THE COURT: All right. Thank you very much.
21	Anything else?
22	MS. HALL: No. Thank you, Your Honor.
23	
24	PROCEEDING CONCLUDED AT 11:29 A.M.
25	* * * *
	106

1	CERTIFICATION
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4	I certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript from
5	the audio-visual recording of the proceedings in the above-entitled matter.
6	
7	
8	AFFIRMATION
9	
10	I affirm that this transcript does not contain the social security or tax identification number of any person or
11	entity.
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20	KRISTEN LUNKWITZ INDEPENDENT TRANSCRIBER
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EXHIBIT 4

EXHIBIT 4

EXHIBIT 4

1		Electronically Filed 2/16/2022 12:03 PM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT
1 2	NEO ROBERT C. McBRIDE, ESQ.	Atenno.
3	Nevada Bar No. 7082 HEATHER S. HALL, ESQ.	
4	Nevada Bar No. 10608 McBRIDE HALL	
5	8329 W. Sunset Road, Suite 260 Las Vegas, Nevada 89113	
6	Telephone No. (702) 792-5855 Facsimile No. (702) 796-5855	
7	E-mail: <u>rcmcbride@mcbridehall.com</u> E-mail: <u>hshall@mcbridehall.com</u>	
8	Attorneys for Defendants, <i>Keith Brill, M.D., FACOG and</i>	
9	Women's Health Associates of Southern Nevada MARTIN, PLLC	1 —
10		
11	DISTRIC	CT COURT
12	CLARK COUT	NTY, NEVADA
13		
14	KIMBERLY D. TAYLOR, an Individual,	CASE NO.: A-18-773472-C DEPT: III
15	Plaintiff,	NOTICE OF ENTRY OF ORDER
16	VS.	DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO
17	KEITH BRILL, MD, FACOG, FACS, an Individual; WOMEN'S HEALTH	DISQUALIFY THE McBRIDE LAW FIRM ON AN EX PARTE MOTION FOR
18	ASSOCIATES OF SOUTHERN NEVADA –	ORDER SHORTENING TIME
19	MARTIN, PLLC, a Nevada Professional Limited Liability Company,	
20	Defendants.	
21		
22		
23	PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that an OR	DER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO
24	DISQUALIFY THE McBRIDE LAW FIRM	ON AN EX PARTE MOTION FOR ORDER
25	SHORTENING TIME was entered and filed on	the 16 th day of February 2022, a copy of which is
26	///	
27	///	
28	///	
		1
	Case Number: A-18-773	472-C

1	attached hereto.	
2	DATED this 16 th day of February 2022.	McBRIDE HALL
3	DATED uns to day of reordary 2022.	WEDNIDE HALL
4		
5		<u>/s/ Heather S. Hall</u> ROBERT C. McBRIDE, ESQ.
6		Nevada Bar No.: 7082 HEATHER S. HALL, ESQ.
7		Nevada Bar No.: 10608 8329 W. Sunset Road, Suite 260
8		Las Vegas, Nevada 89113
9		Attorneys For Defendants, Keith Brill, M.D., FACOG and
10		Women's Health Associates of Southern Nevada–Martin, PLLC
11 12		
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1	CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE		
2	I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 16 th day of February 2022, I served a true and correct		
3	copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF ENTRY OF ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S		
4	MOTION TO DISQUALIFY THE McBRIDE LAW FIRM ON AN EX PARTE MOTION		
5	FOR ORDER SHORTENING TIME addressed to the following counsel of record at the		
6 7	following address(es):		
8			
8 9	VIA ELECTRONIC SERVICE: By mandatory electronic service (e-service), proof of e- service attached to any copy filed with the Court; or		
10	VIA U.S. MAIL: By placing a true copy thereof enclosed in a sealed envelope with postage thereon fully prepaid, addressed as indicated on the service list below in the United		
11	States mail at Las Vegas, Nevada		
12 13	□ VIA FACSIMILE: By causing a true copy thereof to be telecopied to the number indicated on the service list below.		
14			
15			
16	Adam J. Breeden, Esq. BREEDEN & ASSOCIATES, PLLC		
17	376 E. Warm Springs Road, Suite 120 Las Vegas, Nevada 89119		
18	Attorneys for Plaintiff		
19			
20			
21			
22	/s/ Natalie A. Jones An Employee of McBRIDE HALL		
23	An Employee of <i>McBRIDE HALL</i>		
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20	3		
	<u>_</u>		

	ELECTRONICALLY SE	
	2/16/2022 10:24 AM Electronically Filed	
	02/16/2022 10:24 AM	
		CLERK OF THE COURT
1	ORDR	
2	ROBERT C. McBRIDE, ESQ. Nevada Bar No.: 7082	
3	HEATHER S. HALL, ESQ.	
C	Nevada Bar No.: 10608	
4	McBRIDE HALL 8329 W. Sunset Road, Suite 260	
5	Las Vegas, Nevada 89113 Telephone No. (702) 792-5855	
6	Facsimile No. (702) 796-5855	
7	E-mail: <u>rcmcbride@mcbridehall.com</u> E-mail: <u>hshall@mcbridehall.com</u>	
	Attorneys for Defendants,	
8	Keith Brill, M.D., FACOG and Women's Health Associates of Southern Nevada	
9	MARTIN, PLLC	
10		
11	DISTRIC	T COURT
	CLARK COUN	NTY, NEVADA
12		
13	KIMBERLY D. TAYLOR, an Individual,	CASE NO.: A-18-773472-C
14	Plaintiff,	DEPT: III
15	T failtiff,	
	vs.	
16	KEITH BRILL, MD, FACOG, FACS, an	ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO DISQUALIFY THE
17	Individual; WOMEN'S HEALTH	McBRIDE HALL LAW FIRM ON AN EX
18	ASSOCIATES OF SOUTHERN NEVADA – MARTIN, PLLC, a Nevada Professional	PARTE MOTION FOR ORDER
19	Limited Liability Company; TODD W.	SHORTENING TIME
	CHRISTENSEN, MD, an Individual; DOES I through XXX, inclusive; and ROE	
20	CORPORATIONS I through XXX, inclusive;	DATE OF HEARING: 1/7/2022
21		TIME OF HEARING: 9:00 A.M.
22	Defendants.	
23		
24	Plaintiff Kimberly Taylor's Motion to Γ	Disqualify the McBride Hall Law Firm on an Ex
25		
26	Parte Motion for Order Shortening Time cam	
27	evidentiary hearing was conducted on January	7, 2022. Plaintiff Kimberly Taylor appeared by
28	and through her attorney of record ADAM BR	EEDEN, ESQ. of the law firm of BREEDEN &
20	ASSOCIATES. Defendants, Keith Brill, M.D	., FACOG and Women's Health Associates of 1
	Case Number: A-18-7734	472-C

Taylor v. Brill, M.D., et. Al Case No.: A-18-773472-C

1	Southern Nevada – Martin, PLLC appeared by and through their attorneys of record ROBERT C.
2	McBRIDE, ESQ. and HEATHER S. HALL, ESQ. of the law firm of McBRIDE HALL. The
3	Court, having reviewed all pleadings and papers on file herein, having considered the written and
4	oral argument of counsel, as well as the testimony of Kimberly Taylor, Kristy Johnson, Adam
5	Breeden, and Heather Hall, and good cause appearing therefor, the Court makes the following
6	Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law:
7	I.
8	FINDINGS OF FACT
9	1. The current litigation went to jury trial on October 11, 2021 with trial concluding
10	on October 19, 2021, when the jury found in favor of Defendants.
11	2. Judgment was entered on November 19, 2021. Thus, the case is concluded except
12	for any appeal Plaintiff pursues.
13	3. Ms. Kristine Herpin was and is the paralegal which McBride Hall has assigned to
14	work on this case.
15	4. Ms. Kristy Johnson worked as a paralegal at the law firm of Breeden & Associates,
16	PLLC from October 2017 until November 5, 2021.
17	5. Following the jury verdict, Ms. Johnson was interviewed for a paralegal position
18	with the McBride Hall law firm on October 21, 2021.
19	6. During her interview, it was discussed that she would need to be screened off of
20	any active files between the law firms of Breeden & Associates, PLLC and McBride Hall and
21	could not discuss the litigation between the two law firms, including the cases Jane Nelson v.
22	Muhammad Saeed Sabir, M.D., et al. (Case No. A-20-823285-C) and Kimberly Taylor v. Keith
23	Brill, M.D., et al. (Case No. A-18-773472-C).
24	7. Subsequently, Ms. Johnson accepted a paralegal position at McBride Hall and
25	began working there on November 8, 2021.
26	8. Prior to beginning her employment with McBride Hall on November 8, 2021, Ms.
27	Johnson was informed by Heather S. Hall, Esq. that she could not discuss either matter with anyone
28	
	2

who is employed with McBride Hall. Ms. Johnson agreed that she would not discuss either the
 Jane Nelson or Kimberly Taylor matters with anyone employed with the McBride Hall law firm.

3 9. Ms. Johnson continued her employment with Breeden & Associates, PLLC until
4 November 5, 2021.

5 10. On October 25, 2021, Adam J. Breeden, Esq. sent correspondence to McBride Hall
6 regarding his position that there was imputed disqualification for this matter.

7 11. That same day, October 25, 2021, Ms. Hall sent a responsive letter to Mr. Breeden
8 outlining the screening measures that were put in place for this matter.

9 12. Prior to Ms. Johnson's start date of November 8, 2021, McBride Hall's paper file
10 for *Kimberly Taylor v. Keith Brill, M.D., et al.* (Case No. A-18-773472-C) was locked in a filing
11 cabinet that only Sean M. Kelly, Esq. has a key to open.

12 13. Prior to Ms. Johnson beginning her employment at McBride Hall, the IT provider
13 for the law firm locked her out of access to the electronic file for *Kimberly Taylor v. Keith Brill*,
14 *M.D., et al.* (Case No. A-18-773472-C).

15 14. Prior to Ms. Johnson starting her position at the McBride Hall law firm, Ms. Hall
16 prepared and distributed a memorandum to members of the entire firm advising all of the screening
17 of Ms. Johnson for *Kimberly Taylor v. Keith Brill, M.D., et al.* (Case No. A-18-773472-C).

15. Ms. Johnson began her employment at McBride Hall on November 8, 2021.

19 16. On November 17, 2021, Plaintiff's Motion to Disqualify the McBride Hall Law
20 Firm on an Exparte Motion for Order Shortening Time was filed.

- 21 17. On November 24, 2021, Defendants' Opposition Plaintiff's Motion to Disqualify
 22 the McBride Hall Law Firm on an Exparte Motion for Order Shortening Time was filed.
- 23 18. On December 7, 2021, Plaintiff Kimberly Taylor's Motion to Disqualify the
 24 McBride Hall Law Firm on an Ex Parte Motion for Order Shortening Time came on for hearing
 25 on December 7, 2021 and an evidentiary hearing was set for January 7, 2022.
- 26 19. On January 7, 2022, this Court conducted an evidentiary hearing on the issues
 27 raised and whether or not McBride Hall should be disqualified.
- 28

18

Taylor v. Brill, M.D., et. Al Case No.: A-18-773472-C

1 20. During the evidentiary hearing, the Court heard testimony from Plaintiff Kimberly 2 Taylor, Kristy Johnson, Adam J. Breeden, Esq., and Heather S. Hall, Esq. 3 21. The testimony of Ms. Taylor and Mr. Breeden addressed concerns that confidential 4 information Ms. Johnson obtained during her employment with Breeden & Associates may be 5 exchanged to her new employer, McBride Hall. 6 22. The testimony of Ms. Johnson and Ms. Hall addressed that no confidential and/or 7 privileged information has been discussed with Ms. Johnson by anyone at McBride Hall, the 8 numerous screening mechanisms in place to ensure that confidential information regarding this 9 case is never exchanged, and represented to this Court that these screening measure will continue 10 throughout the litigation of this matter through its conclusion. 11 II. 12 **CONCLUSIONS OF LAW** 13 1. Because "...[i]mputed disgualification is a harsh remedy that 'should be invoked 14 only if the court is satisfied that real harm is likely to result from failing to invoke it," the Nevada 15 Supreme Court permits screening mechanisms. Leibowitz v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Court, 119 Nev.523, 16 532, 78 P.3d 515, 521 (Nev. 2003). 17 2. The Nevada Supreme Court recognizes that nonlawyer, firm employees may be 18 screened to maintain employment and representation of clients with potentially adverse interests. 19 Leibowitz v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Court, 119 Nev.523, 526, 78 P.3d 515, 517 (Nev. 2003). 20 3. Sufficient screening mechanism are enough to avoid disqualification because of a 21 "client's right to counsel of the client's choosing and likelihood of prejudice and economic harm 22 to the client when severance of the attorney-client relationship is ordered." Id. at 532, 521. 23 4. To determine if such mechanisms are appropriate, the Nevada Supreme Court 24 evaluates several factors including: (1) the substantiality of the relationship between the former 25 and current matters; (2) the time elapsed between the matters; (3) the size of the firm; (4) the 26 number of individuals presumed to have confidential information; (5) the nature of their 27 involvement in the former matter; (6) the timing and features of any measure taken to reduce the 28 danger of disclosure; and (7) whether the old firm and new firm represent adverse parties in the 4

	Taylor v. Brill, M.D., et. Al Case No.: A-18-773472-C
1	same proceeding rather than in different proceedings. Id. at 534, 522.
2	5. Further, the Nevada Supreme Court has set forth a non-exhaustive list of screening
3	requirements, which are as follows:
4	(1) "The newly hired nonlawyer [employee] must be cautioned not to disclose any
5	information relating to the representation of a client of the former employer."
6	(2) "The nonlawyer [employee] must be instructed not to work on any matter on which [he or] she worked during the prior employment, or regarding which [he or] she has
7	information relating to the former employer's representation."
8	(3) "The new firm should take reasonable steps to ensure that the nonlawyer
9	[employee] does not work in connection with matters on which [he or] she worked during the prior employment, absent client consent [i.e. unconditional waiver] after
10	consultation."
11	See Leibowitz v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Court, 119 Nev. 523, 532 - 533 (Nev. 2003).
12	6. As articulated in <i>Leibowitz</i> , this Court is faced with the delicate task of balancing
13	competing interests, including: (1) "the individual right to be represented by counsel of one's
14	choice," (2) "each party's right to be free from the risk of even inadvertent disclosure of
15	confidential information," (3) "the public's interest in the scrupulous administration of justice,"
16	and (4) "the prejudices that will inure to the parties as a result of the [district court's] decision." <i>Id.</i>
17	at 534, 522.
18	7. During the evidentiary hearing, no evidence was presented that Ms. Johnson has
19	exchanged confidential information. There is no dispute that Ms. Johnson was privy to privileged
20	information as a consequence of her previous employer, Breeden & Associates.
21	8. However, McBride Hall law firm has met its obligations and taken more than
22	adequate steps to appropriately screen Ms. Johnson, such that disqualification is not warranted.
23	9. Ms. Johnson has been cautioned by McBride Hall not to disclose any information
24	relating to the representation of her former' employer, Breeden & Associates' representation of
25	Kimberly Taylor.
26	10. Ms. Johnson has been instructed by McBride Hall not to work on any matter on
27	which she worked during her prior employment with Breeden & Associates, or regarding which
28	Ms. Johnson has information relating to her former employer's representation.
	5

Taylor v. Brill, M.D., et. Al Case No.: A-18-773472-C

1	11. Based upon the documentation	n submitted and the testimony at the evidentiary	
2	hearing, this Court finds that McBride Hall has taken reasonable steps to ensure that paralegal Ms.		
3	Johnson does not work in connection with matters on which she worked during her prior		
4	employment with Breeden & Associates.		
5	12. Balancing the competing interest	ests and in light of this matter being substantially	
6	complete pending the appeal, this Court is satist	fied that Ms. Johnson has been sufficiently screened	
7	from Kimberly Taylor v. Keith Brill, M.D., et a	al. (Case No. A-18-773472-C) and disqualification	
8	of McBride Hall is not warranted.		
9	IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUI	DGED AND DECREED that Plaintiff's Motion to	
10	Disqualify the McBride Hall Law Firm on an Ex Parte Motion for Order Shortening Time is		
11	DENIED.		
12	IT IS SO ORDERED.		
13			
14		nis 16th day of February, 2022	
15	<u> </u>	Charles Thompson	
16			
17	B0A 977 1EC6 A91F J. Charles Thompson District Court Judge		
18	Respectfully Submitted by:	Approved as to Form and Content by:	
19	DATED this 8 th day of February, 2022.	DATED this 14 th day of February 2022.	
20	McBRIDE HALL	BREEDEN & ASSOCIATES, PLLC	
21	/s/ Heather S. Hall	/s/ Adam J. Breeden	
22	Heather S. Hall, Esq.	Adam J. Breeden, Esq.	
23	Nevada Bar No. 10608	Nevada Bar No.: 008768	
24	8329 W. Sunset Road, Suite 260 Las Vegas, Nevada 89113	376 E. Warm Springs Road, Suite 120 Las Vegas, Nevada 89119	
25	Attorneys for Defendants <i>Keith Brill, M.D., FACOG, FACS and</i>	Attorneys for Plaintiff	
26	Women's Health Associates of Southern Nevada – Martin, PLLC		
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1	CSERV	
2	D	ISTRICT COURT
3	CLARK	K COUNTY, NEVADA
4		
5	Kimberly Taylor, Plaintiff(s)	CASE NO: A-18-773472-C
6	vs.	DEPT. NO. Department 3
7 8	Keith Brill, M.D., Defendant(s)	DEI I. NO. Department 5
° 9		
10		
11		CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
12		rvice was generated by the Eighth Judicial District fotion was served via the court's electronic eFile
13	system to all recipients registered for e	-Service on the above entitled case as listed below:
14	Service Date: 2/16/2022	
15	Adam Breeden	adam@breedenandassociates.com
16	E-File Admin	efile@hpslaw.com
17	Heather Hall	hshall@mcbridehall.com
18	Jody Foote	jfoote@jhcottonlaw.com
19	Jessica Pincombe	jpincombe@jhcottonlaw.com
20	Robert McBride	rcmcbride@mcbridehall.com
21	Kristine Herpin	kherpin@mcbridehall.com
22 23	John Cotton	jhcotton@jhcottonlaw.com
24	Adam Schneider	aschneider@jhcottonlaw.com
25	Michelle Newquist	mnewquist@mcbridehall.com
26	James Kent	jamie@jamiekent.org
27		
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1	Diana Samora	dsamora@hpslaw.com
2 3	Candace Cullina	ccullina@mcbridehall.com
4	Alex Caceres	alex.caceres@lewisbrisbois.com
5	Reina Claus	rclaus@hpslaw.com
6	Camie DeVoge	cdevoge@hpslaw.com
7	Lauren Smith	lsmith@mcbridehall.com
8	Natalie Jones	njones@mcbridehall.com
9	Anna Albertson	mail@legalangel.com
10 11	Madeline VanHeuvelen	mvanheuvelen@mcbridehall.com
12	Sarah Daniels	sarah@breedenandassociates.com
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EXHIBIT 5

EXHIBIT 5

EXHIBIT 5

		Electronically Filed 3/17/2022 9:48 AM Steven D. Grierson
		CLERK OF THE COURT
1	NOAS ADAM J. BREEDEN, ESQ.	Alenn S. Frum
2	Nevada Bar No. 008768 BREEDEN & ASSOCIATES, PLLC	
3	376 E. Warm Springs Road, Suite 120 Las Vegas, Nevada 89119	
4	Phone: (702) 819-7770	
5	Fax: (702) 819-7771 Adam@Breedenandassociates.com	
6	Attorneys for Plaintiff	
7		L DISTRICT COURT
8		NTY, NEVADA
9	KIMBERLY TAYLOR, an individual,	CASE NO.: A-18-773472-C
10	Plaintiff,	DEPT NO.: III
11	V.	
12	KEITH BRILL, M.D., FACOG, FACS, an	
13	individual; WOMEN'S HEALTH ASSOCIATES OF SOUTHERN NEVADA –	NOTICE OF APPEAL
13	MARTIN, PLLC, a Nevada Professional Limited Liability Company,	
15	Defendants.	
16		
10		
17		BERLY TAYLOR, hereby appeals to the Supreme
10		tiff's Motion to Disqualify the McBride Hall Law
20		vith Notice of Entry being filed February 16, 2022.
	DATED this 17th day of March, 2022.	
21 22		BREEDEN & ASSOCIATES, PLLC
22		Molden A Sa
		ADAM J. BREEDAN, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 009768
24 25		376 E. Warm Springs Road, Suite 120
25		T V N 1 00110
•		Las Vegas, Nevada 89119 Phone: (702) 819-7770
26		Phone: (702) 819-7770 adam@breedenandassociates.com
27		Phone: (702) 819-7770
		Phone: (702) 819-7770 adam@breedenandassociates.com
27		Phone: (702) 819-7770 adam@breedenandassociates.com

1	CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE	
2	I hereby certify that on the 17th day of March, 2022, I served a copy of the foregoing legal	
3	document NOTICE OF APPEAL via the method indicated below:	
4 5	X	Pursuant to NRCP 5 and NEFCR 9, by electronically serving all counsel and e-mails registered to this matter on the Court's official service, Wiznet system.
6 7		Pursuant to NRCP 5, by placing a copy in the US mail, postage pre-paid to the following counsel of record or parties in proper person:
8 9 10		Robert McBride, Esq. Heather S. Hall, Esq. McBRIDE HALL 8329 W. Sunset Road, Suite 260 Las Vegas, Nevada 89113
11		Attorneys for Defendants Keith Brill, M.D. and Women's Health Associates
12		Via receipt of copy (proof of service to follow)
13 14		An Attorney or Employee of the following firm:
15		<u>/s/ Sarah Daniels</u> BREEDEN & ASSOCIATES, PLLC
16 17		
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