Ronny Rove#1173457
WSCL POBOX 7007
Curson city, NY 89702.
(Retitioner Proper Rossan).

FILED

MAR 2 1 2022

Mar 24 2022 09:54 a.m. Elizabeth A. Brown Clerk of Supreme Court

District Count

Clark County Nevada

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Petitioner.

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The State of Nevada.

Respondents.

Case No: 17-21-845477-W

C-15-3083-11-1

Dept No: XII (12).

Notice of Appeal

Comes now Ramy Pave the Petitioner in Proper-pousar in the above pleading "Notice of Appeal", as the Petitioner wiches to appeal the decision rendered by the clark county District Court on February 8th 2003 in which the Petitioners writ for Habeas Corps was derived. This decision is an above of discretion and in violution of the protections of the Constitution, as soon this Dotnie of Appeal is now Given. This appeal is timely as the decision was not rendered will february 20th 2002.

Respectfuly submitted this x 16 day of March 2000

RECEIVED

MAR 2 1 2022

CLERK OF THE COURT

Renny Powe 1173457 WSCC POBOX 7007 COURSON CITY, NY BATUZ

Docket 84430 Document 2022-09220

Nonny Vowe 1173457 Usel Po Box 7007 Carson CAY, NV 89702

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STATÉ OF NEVADA MAIL SERVICES 720 E FIFTH ST CARSON CITY NV 89701

COURT CLERK 8 JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 200 LENIS AVE

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# Certificate of Service

I Rany Pase nevery certify order the parally of perjuly that on this x 16 day of March 2022 I marked a true and correct copy of the attached pleasing Notice of Appeal, to the bellowing parties postage pre paid by united states postent source.

Eighth Zudicial Diot. Ct. Attain court Cherk 200 Lewis Ave. Las vegas, 104 89155

Clark County District Attrioy 200 Lewis Ave Las Vegus DV 89155.

Executed on this site day of March 2022.

\* Place
Renny Powe

**Electronically Filed** 3/23/2022 10:18 AM Steven D. Grierson **CLERK OF THE COURT** 

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RONNY POWE,

vs.

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IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLARK

Dept No: XII

Case No: A-21-845477-W

## CASE APPEAL STATEMENT

1. Appellant(s): Ronny Powe

Plaintiff(s),

Defendant(s),

K. OLSEN, WARDEN (W.S.C.C.),

2. Judge: Michelle Leavitt

3. Appellant(s): Ronny Powe

Counsel:

Ronny Powe #1173457 P.O. Box 7007 Carson City, NV 89702

4. Respondent (s): K. Olsen, Warden (W.S.C.C.)

Counsel:

Steven B. Wolfson, District Attorney 200 Lewis Ave. Las Vegas, NV 89155-2212

A-21-845477-W

Case Number: A-21-845477-W

-1-

1	
2	5. Appellant(s)'s Attorney Licensed in Nevada: N/A Permission Granted: N/A
3	Respondent(s)'s Attorney Licensed in Nevada: Yes Permission Granted: N/A
4	
5	6. Has Appellant Ever Been Represented by Appointed Counsel In District Court: No
6	7. Appellant Represented by Appointed Counsel On Appeal: N/A
7 8	8. Appellant Granted Leave to Proceed in Forma Pauperis**: N/A **Expires 1 year from date filed
9	Appellant Filed Application to Proceed in Forma Pauperis: No Date Application(s) filed: N/A
10	9. Date Commenced in District Court: December 15, 2021
11	10. Brief Description of the Nature of the Action: Civil Writ
12	Type of Judgment or Order Being Appealed: Civil Writ of Habeas Corpus
13	11. Previous Appeal: No
14	Supreme Court Docket Number(s): N/A
15	12. Child Custody or Visitation: N/A
16	13. Possibility of Settlement: Unknown
17	Dated This 23 day of March 2022.
18	·
19	Steven D. Grierson, Clerk of the Court
20	
21	/s/ Heather Ungermann  Heather Ungermann, Deputy Clerk
22	200 Lewis Ave PO Box 551601
23	Las Vegas, Nevada 89155-1601
24	(702) 671-0512
25	cc: Ronny Powe
26	
27	
28	

#### EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

# CASE SUMMARY CASE NO. A-21-845477-W

Ronny Powe, Plaintiff(s)

vs.

K. Olsen, Warden (W.S.C.C.), Defendant(s)

Location: Department 12
Judicial Officer: Leavitt, Michelle
Filed on: 12/15/2021
Cross-Reference Case A845477

Number:

**CASE INFORMATION** 

Related Cases Case Type: Writ of Habeas Corpus

Case Status: 03/18/2022 Closed

**Statistical Closures** 03/18/2022 Other Manner of Disposition

C-15-308371-1 (Writ Related Case)

DATE CASE ASSIGNMENT

**Current Case Assignment** 

Case Number A-21-845477-W
Court Department 12
Date Assigned 12/15/2021
Judicial Officer Leavitt, Michelle

PARTY INFORMATION

Plaintiff Powe, Ronny

Lead Attorneys

Pro Se

Defendant K. Olsen, Warden (W.S.C.C.)

Other State of Nevada Wolfson, Steven B

*Retained* 702-671-2700(W)

DATE EVENTS & ORDERS OF THE COURT INDEX

**EVENTS** 

12/15/2021 Inmate Filed - Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

Party: Plaintiff Powe, Ronny

[1] Post Conviction

12/27/2021 Order for Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

[2] Order for Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

02/03/2022 Response

[3] State's Return to Petitioner's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Post-Conviction)

03/06/2022 Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order

[4] Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order

03/07/2022 Notice of Entry of Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law

[5] Notice of Entry of Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order

03/18/2022 Answer

Filed By: Plaintiff Powe, Ronny

[6] Petitioner's Answer to State's Return of Writ of Habeas Corpus

# EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT CASE SUMMARY CASE NO. A-21-845477-W

03/18/2022 Order to Statistically Close Case [7] Order to Statistically Close Case 03/21/2022 Notice of Appeal Filed By: Plaintiff Powe, Ronny [8] Notice of Appeal 03/23/2022 Case Appeal Statement Case Appeal Statement **HEARINGS** 02/08/2022 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (12:00 PM) (Judicial Officer: Ellsworth, Carolyn) Denied; Journal Entry Details: COURT FINDS Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is time-barred; Petitioner failed to file within one year of remittitur, that was filed on 04/10/2020 and the said Petition was filed on 12/15/21. COURT ORDERED, State to prepare Findings of Facts and Conclusion of Law and

## DISTRICT COURT CIVIL COVER SHEET

A-21-845477-W Dept. 12

County, Nevada

Case No.

(Assigned by Clerk's Office)

I. Party Information (provide both ho	ome and mailing addresses if different)			
Plaintiff(s) (name/address/phone):			nt(s) (name/address/phone):	
Ronny Po	owe	K. Olsen, Warden (W.S.C.C.)		
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Attorney (name/address/phone):		Attorney	(name/address/phone):	
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II. Nature of Controversy (please s	elect the one most applicable filing type	e below)		
Civil Case Filing Types		•		
Real Property			Torts	
Landlord/Tenant	Negligence	. T	Other Torts	
Unlawful Detainer	Auto		Product Liability	
Other Landlord/Tenant	Premises Liability	İ	Intentional Misconduct	
Title to Property	Other Negligence		Employment Tort	
Judicial Foreclosure	Malpractice		Insurance Tort	
Other Title to Property	Medical/Dental		Other Tort	
Other Real Property	Legal			
Condemnation/Eminent Domain	Accounting			
Other Real Property	Other Malpractice	ļ		
Probate	Construction Defect & Cont	ract	Judicial Review/Appeal	
Probate (select case type and estate value)	Construction Defect		Judicial Review	
Summary Administration	Chapter 40		Foreclosure Mediation Case	
General Administration	Other Construction Defect		Petition to Seal Records	
Special Administration	Contract Case		Mental Competency	
Set Aside	Uniform Commercial Code		Nevada State Agency Appeal	
Trust/Conservatorship	Building and Construction		Department of Motor Vehicle	
Other Probate	Insurance Carrier		Worker's Compensation	
Estate Value	Commercial Instrument		Other Nevada State Agency	
Over \$200,000	Collection of Accounts		Appeal Other	
Between \$100,000 and \$200,000	Employment Contract		Appeal from Lower Court	
Under \$100,000 or Unknown	Other Contract		Other Judicial Review/Appeal	
Under \$2,500				
Civi	l Writ		Other Civil Filing	
Civil Writ			Other Civil Filing	
Writ of Habeas Corpus	Writ of Prohibition	İ	Compromise of Minor's Claim	
Writ of Mandamus	Other Civil Writ		Foreign Judgment	
Writ of Quo Warrant			Other Civil Matters	
Business C	ourt filings should be filed using th	e Business	Court civil coversheet.	
December 15, 2021 PREPARED BY CLERK				
Date	<u> </u>	Signat	ure of initiating party or representative	

See other side for family-related case filings.

Electronically Filed 03/06/2022 10:28 PM CLERK OF THE COURT

1 **FCL** STEVEN B. WOLFSON 2 Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #001565 3 ALEXANDER CHEN Chief Deputy District Attorney 4 Nevada Bar #10539 200 Lewis Avenue 5 Las Vegas, Nevada 89155-2212 (702) 671-2500 6 Attorney for Plaintiff 7 DISTRICT COURT 8 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 9 **RONNY POWE** 10 Petitioner, A-21-845477-W 11 -VS-CASE NO: C-15-308371-1 12 THE STATE OF NEVADA, **DEPT NO:** XII 13 Respondent. 14 FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF 15 LAW AND ORDER 16 DATE OF HEARING: February 8, 2022 17 TIME OF HEARING: 12:00 PM 18 THIS CAUSE having come on for hearing before the Honorable Carolyn Ellsworth, 19 District Judge, on the 8th day of February 2022, Petitioner not being present and Respondent 20 being represented by STEVEN WOLFSON, Clark County District Attorney, by and through 21 HAGAR TRIPPIEDI, Chief Deputy District Attorney, and the Court having considered the 22 matter, including briefs, transcripts, and documents on file herein, the Court makes the 23 following findings of fact and conclusions of law: 24 // 25 // 26 // 27 // 28

## PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This Petition comes before this Court following a plea that Ronny Powe (hereinafter "Petitioner") entered on December 22, 2016. Pursuant to the Guilty Plea Agreement, Petitioner agreed to plead guilty to one count of First-Degree Kidnapping with Use of a Deadly Weapon. The parties stipulated to a sentence of five (5) years to life in the Nevada Department of Corrections with a consecutive five (5) years to twelve and a half (12.5) years for the Deadly Weapon enhancement.

Petitioner was sentenced on February 14, 2017, consistent with the Guilty Plea Agreement between the parties. He received an aggregate sentence of one hundred twenty (120) months to a maximum of life imprisonment. A Judgment of Conviction was filed on February 17, 2017.

Petitioner filed an untimely notice of appeal, and his appeal was dismissed by the Nevada Supreme Court on May 19, 2017. Remittitur issued on June 14, 2017. Petitioner subsequently filed two separate Motions for Modification of Sentence in 2018 and in 2019. Both motions were denied.

Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus on December 15, 2021. This Court filed an order to respond on December 27, 2021. On February 3, 2022, the State filed the State's Return to Petitioner's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Post-Conviction). On February 8, 2022, this Court denied Petitioner's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.

## <u>ANALYSIS</u>

## I. PETITIONER'S PETITION IS PROCEDURALLY BARRED

## A. Petitioner's Petition is time-barred

The mandatory provision of NRS 34.726(1) states:

Unless there is good cause shown for delay, a petition that challenges the validity of a judgment or sentence must be filed within I year after entry of the judgment of conviction or, if an appeal has been taken from the judgment, within I year after the Supreme Court issues its remittitur. For the purposes of this subsection, good cause for delay exists if the petitioner demonstrates to the satisfaction of the court:

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(emphasis added). "[T]he statutory rules regarding procedural default are mandatory and cannot be ignored when properly raised by the State." Riker, 121 Nev. at 233, 112 P.3d at 1075.

Accordingly, the one-year time bar prescribed by NRS 34.726 begins to run from the date the judgment of conviction is filed or a remittitur from a timely direct appeal is filed. Dickerson v. State, 114 Nev. 1084, 1087, 967 P.2d 1132, 1133–34 (1998); see Pellegrini v. State, 117 Nev. 860, 873, 34 P.3d 519, 528 (2001) (holding that NRS 34.726 should be construed by its plain meaning).

In <u>Gonzales v. State</u>, 118 Nev. 590, 593, 590 P.3d 901, 902 (2002), the Nevada Supreme Court affirmed the rejection of a habeas petition that was filed two days late, pursuant to the "clear and unambiguous" mandatory provisions of NRS 34.726(1). <u>Gonzales</u> reiterated the importance of filing the petition with the district court within the one-year mandate, absent a showing of "good cause" for the delay in filing. <u>Gonzales</u>, 118 Nev. at 593, 590 P.3d at 902. The one-year time bar is therefore strictly construed. In contrast with the short amount of time to file a notice of appeal, a prisoner has an ample full year to file a post-conviction habeas petition, so there is no injustice in a strict application of NRS 34.726(1). <u>Id.</u> at 593, 53 P.3d at 903.

Here, the Judgment of Conviction was filed on February 17, 2017. Petitioner filed an untimely notice of appeal and thus, the Nevada Supreme Court dismissed Petitioner's appeal. Petitioner then had one year from the Judgment of Conviction to file his petition. Petitioner's instant petition was filed on December 15, 2021, which was over three years after the Judgment of Conviction was filed. As a matter of law, Petitioner is untimely on the filing of his petition. Therefore, this petition is denied.

## B. The procedural bars are mandatory

The Nevada Supreme Court has specifically found that the district court has a duty to consider whether the procedural bars apply to a post-conviction petition and not arbitrarily disregard them. In <u>Riker</u>, the Court held that "[a]pplication of the statutory procedural default rules to post-conviction habeas petitions is mandatory," and "cannot be ignored when properly

raised by the State." 121 Nev. at 231–33, 112 P.3d at 1074–75. There, the Court reversed the district court's decision not to bar the petitioner's untimely and successive petition:

Given the untimely and successive nature of [petitioner's] petition, the district court had a duty imposed by law to consider whether any or all of [petitioner's] claims were barred under NRS 34.726, NRS 34.810, NRS 34.800, or by the law of the case . . . [and] the court's failure to make this determination here constituted an arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of discretion.

<u>Id.</u> at 234, 112 P.3d at 1076. The Court justified this holding by noting that "[t]he necessity for a workable system dictates that there must exist a time when a criminal conviction is final." <u>Id.</u> at 231, 112 P.3d 1074 (citation omitted); <u>see also State v. Haberstroh</u>, 119 Nev. 173, 180–81, 69 P.3d 676, 681–82 (2003) (holding that parties cannot stipulate to waive, ignore or disregard the mandatory procedural default rules nor can they empower a court to disregard them).

In <u>State v. Greene</u>, the Nevada Supreme Court reaffirmed its prior holdings that the procedural default rules are mandatory when it reversed the district court's grant of a post-conviction petition for writ of habeas corpus. <u>See State v. Greene</u>, 129 Nev. 559, 565–66, 307 P.3d 322, 326 (2013). There, the Court ruled that the petitioner's petition was untimely and successive, and that the petitioner failed to show good cause and actual prejudice. <u>Id.</u> Accordingly, the Court reversed the district court and ordered the petitioner's petition dismissed pursuant to the procedural bars. <u>Id.</u> at 567, 307 P.3d at 327.

Petitioner does not set forth any good cause for his delayed filing in this matter. His Judgment of Conviction was filed on February 17, 2017; thus, he should have filed his petition by February 17, 2018. While he was able to file two Motions for Modification of Sentence, Petitioner never filed a timely petition. He has not set forth any good cause as to why his filing was untimely. Because the procedural bars are mandatory and Petitioner has failed to show good cause to overcome the procedural defaults, this petition is denied.

# II. PETITIONER CANNOT DEMONSTRATE THAT COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense." The United States Supreme Court has long recognized that "the right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel." <u>Strickland v. Washington</u>, 466 U.S. 668, 686, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2063 (1984); <u>see also State v. Love</u>, 109 Nev. 1136, 1138, 865 P.2d 322, 323 (1993).

To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, a Petitioner must prove he was denied "reasonably effective assistance" of counsel by satisfying the two-prong test of Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686–87, 104 S. Ct. at 2063–64. See also Love, 109 Nev. at 1138, 865 P.2d at 323. Under the Strickland test, a Petitioner must show first that his counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and second, that but for counsel's errors, there is a reasonable probability that the result of the proceedings would have been different. 466 U.S. at 687–88, 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2065, 2068; Warden, Nevada State Prison v. Lyons, 100 Nev. 430, 432, 683 P.2d 504, 505 (1984) (adopting the Strickland two-part test). "[T]here is no reason for a court deciding an ineffective assistance claim to approach the inquiry in the same order or even to address both components of the inquiry if the Petitioner makes an insufficient showing on one." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697, 104 S. Ct. at 2069.

The court begins with the presumption of effectiveness and then must determine whether the Petitioner has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that counsel was ineffective. Means v. State, 120 Nev. 1001, 1011, 103 P.3d 25, 32 (2004). "Effective counsel does not mean errorless counsel, but rather counsel whose assistance is '[w]ithin the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases." Jackson v. Warden, 91 Nev. 430, 432, 537 P.2d 473, 474 (1975).

Based on the above law, the role of a court in considering allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel is "not to pass upon the merits of the action not taken but to determine whether, under the particular facts and circumstances of the case, trial counsel failed to render reasonably effective assistance." <u>Donovan v. State</u>, 94 Nev. 671, 675, 584 P.2d 708, 711

(1978). This analysis does not mean that the court should "second guess reasoned choices between trial tactics nor does it mean that defense counsel, to protect himself against allegations of inadequacy, must make every conceivable motion no matter how remote the possibilities are of success." <u>Id.</u> To be effective, the Constitution "does not require that counsel do what is impossible or unethical. If there is no bona fide defense to the charge, counsel cannot create one and may disserve the interests of his client by attempting a useless charade." United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 657 n.19, 104 S. Ct. 2039, 2046 n.19 (1984).

"There are countless ways to provide effective assistance in any given case. Even the best criminal defense attorneys would not defend a particular client in the same way." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S. Ct. at 689. "Strategic choices made by counsel after thoroughly investigating the plausible options are almost unchallengeable." Dawson v. State, 108 Nev. 112, 117, 825 P.2d 593, 596 (1992); see also Ford v. State, 105 Nev. 850, 853, 784 P.2d 951, 953 (1989). In essence, the court must "judge the reasonableness of counsel's challenged conduct on the facts of the particular case, viewed as of the time of counsel's conduct." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, 104 S. Ct. at 2066.

Even if a Petitioner can demonstrate that his counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, he must still demonstrate prejudice and show a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the result of the trial would have been different. McNelton v. State, 115 Nev. 396, 403, 990 P.2d 1263, 1268 (1999) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at 2064). "A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Id. (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-89, 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2064–65, 2068). This portion of the test is slightly modified when the convictions occurs due to a guilty plea. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985); Kirksey v. State, 112 Nev. 980, 988 (1996). For a guilty plea, a Petitioner "must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial." Kirksey, 112 Nev. at 998 (quoting Hill, 474 U.S. at 59). The Nevada Supreme Court has held "that a habeas corpus petitioner must prove the disputed factual allegations underlying his ineffective-assistance claim by a preponderance of the

evidence." Means v. State, 120 Nev. 1001, 1012, 103 P.3d 25, 33 (2004). Furthermore, claims of ineffective assistance of counsel asserted in a petition for post-conviction relief must be supported with specific factual allegations, which if true, would entitle the petitioner to relief. Hargrove v. State, 100 Nev. 498, 502, 686 P.2d 222, 225 (1984). "Bare" and "naked" allegations are not sufficient, nor are those belied and repelled by the record. Id. NRS 34.735(6) states in relevant part, "[Petitioner] *must* allege specific facts supporting the claims in the petition[.] . . . Failure to allege specific facts rather than just conclusions may cause your petition to be dismissed." (emphasis added).

## A. Ground One – DNA evidence

Petitioner cannot show that but for a better investigation, he would not have accepted the plea and would have insisted on going to trial. Petitioner sets forth no explanation of what investigation should have been completed by his counsel. His first complaint is that the DNA evidence exonerates him. However, this is not a case where DNA evidence was relevant to the charges. The allegation was that the victim had been battered by her boyfriend, Petitioner. Much of the evidence rested on her injuries and her statement to police.

Even assuming that counsel had not gone over the DNA evidence with petitioner, the DNA itself would have done nothing to negate her statement that he was responsible, along with his daughter, for causing her injuries. Thus, there is no prejudice to Petitioner and this evidence would not have changed his desire to plea.

## B. Ground Two – Desire for appeal and his attorney committing misconduct

Petitioner states that he wished to challenge his conviction, but this is belied by the record and is a bare claim. The record does not indicate that he was dissatisfied with his plea or with his sentence. Petitioner did not lodge an objection prior to or at his sentencing on February 14, 2017. There is no evidence that he wanted counsel to appeal his sentence. Thus, there is no grounds to grant him relief.

Petitioner also speculates about his attorney committing misconduct, but he presents no coherent argument to this claim. He states that his attorney lied and abandoned him without

1	supporting it with any argument or evidence. This is a bare claim and does not entitle him to			
2	relief.			
3	C. Ground Three – Prosecutorial misconduct			
4	Petitioner argues that the State should not have proceeded with the case because of			
5	DNA results and mental health issues of the victim. Even from Petitioner's pleadings, the DNA			
6	results were provided to his counsel, thus the State cannot be held in violation of <u>Brady</u> .			
7	As for proceeding with charges, the victim's testimony that the events happened, along			
8	with her injuries and other evidence, were sufficient for the State to proceed. Petitioner cannot			
9	show any misconduct by the prosecution.			
10	D. Ground Four – Appeal and Post-conviction dismissals			
11	Petitioner says that his rights were violated by the Nevada Courts because his appeals			
12	were previously dismissed. In those cases, the appellate courts clearly stated why his appeal			
13	was being dismissed. Moreover, he never filed a petition until now. Given that the record is			
14	clear as to why his previous appeals were dismissed, this is not a basis to grant his petition.			
15	<u>ORDER</u>			
16	THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Petitioner's Petition for Writ of			
17	Habeas Corpus is DENIED.			
18	Dated this 6th day of March, 2022			
19	DICKRICH HOURS			
20	DISTRICT JUDGE			
21	STEVEN B. WOLFSON Clark County District Attorney  Michelle Leavitt			
22	Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #001565  District Court Judge			
23	DV /a/ Alarandan Chan			
24	BY /s/ Alexander Chen ALEXANDER CHEN Chief Deputy District Attermery			
25	Chief Deputy District Attorney Nevada Bar #010539			
26				
27				

## **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE** I hereby certify that service of Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order, was made this 28th day of February, 2022, by Mail via United States Postal Service to: RONNY POWE #1173457 WARM SRPINGS CORRECTIONAL CENTER P.O. BOX 7007 CARSON CITY, NV 89702 /s/ Kristian Falcon Secretary for the District Attorney's Office ac/kf/dvu

**CSERV** DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA Ronny Powe, Plaintiff(s) CASE NO: A-21-845477-W DEPT. NO. Department 12 VS. K. Olsen, Warden (W.S.C.C.), Defendant(s) **AUTOMATED CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE** Electronic service was attempted through the Eighth Judicial District Court's electronic filing system, but there were no registered users on the case. The filer has been notified to serve all parties by traditional means. 

Electronically Filed 3/7/2022 9:13 AM Steven D. Grierson CLER& OF THE COURT

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RONNY POWE,

VS.

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DISTRICT COURT
CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

Case No: A-21-845477-W

Dept No: XII

K. OLSEN, WARDEN (W.S.C.C.),

Petitioner,

Respondent,

NOTICE OF ENTRY OF FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER

**PLEASE TAKE NOTICE** that on March 6, 2022, the court entered a decision or order in this matter, a true and correct copy of which is attached to this notice.

You may appeal to the Supreme Court from the decision or order of this court. If you wish to appeal, you must file a notice of appeal with the clerk of this court within thirty-three (33) days after the date this notice is mailed to you. This notice was mailed on March 7, 2022.

STEVEN D. GRIERSON, CLERK OF THE COURT

/s/ Amanda Hampton

Amanda Hampton, Deputy Clerk

CERTIFICATE OF E-SERVICE / MAILING

I hereby certify that on this 7 day of March 2022, I served a copy of this Notice of Entry on the following:

☑ By e-mail:

Clark County District Attorney's Office Attorney General's Office – Appellate Division-

☑ The United States mail addressed as follows:

Ronny Powe # 1173457 P.O. Box 7007 Carson City, NV 89702

/s/ Amanda Hampton

Amanda Hampton, Deputy Clerk

Electronically Filed 03/06/2022 10:28 PM CLERK OF THE COURT

1 **FCL** STEVEN B. WOLFSON 2 Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #001565 3 ALEXANDER CHEN Chief Deputy District Attorney 4 Nevada Bar #10539 200 Lewis Avenue 5 Las Vegas, Nevada 89155-2212 (702) 671-2500 6 Attorney for Plaintiff 7 DISTRICT COURT 8 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 9 **RONNY POWE** 10 Petitioner, A-21-845477-W 11 -VS-CASE NO: C-15-308371-1 12 THE STATE OF NEVADA, **DEPT NO:** XII 13 Respondent. 14 FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF 15 LAW AND ORDER 16 DATE OF HEARING: February 8, 2022 17 TIME OF HEARING: 12:00 PM 18 THIS CAUSE having come on for hearing before the Honorable Carolyn Ellsworth, 19 District Judge, on the 8th day of February 2022, Petitioner not being present and Respondent 20 being represented by STEVEN WOLFSON, Clark County District Attorney, by and through 21 HAGAR TRIPPIEDI, Chief Deputy District Attorney, and the Court having considered the 22 matter, including briefs, transcripts, and documents on file herein, the Court makes the 23 following findings of fact and conclusions of law: 24 // 25 // 26 // 27 // 28

## **PROCEDURAL HISTORY**

This Petition comes before this Court following a plea that Ronny Powe (hereinafter "Petitioner") entered on December 22, 2016. Pursuant to the Guilty Plea Agreement, Petitioner agreed to plead guilty to one count of First-Degree Kidnapping with Use of a Deadly Weapon. The parties stipulated to a sentence of five (5) years to life in the Nevada Department of Corrections with a consecutive five (5) years to twelve and a half (12.5) years for the Deadly Weapon enhancement.

Petitioner was sentenced on February 14, 2017, consistent with the Guilty Plea Agreement between the parties. He received an aggregate sentence of one hundred twenty (120) months to a maximum of life imprisonment. A Judgment of Conviction was filed on February 17, 2017.

Petitioner filed an untimely notice of appeal, and his appeal was dismissed by the Nevada Supreme Court on May 19, 2017. Remittitur issued on June 14, 2017. Petitioner subsequently filed two separate Motions for Modification of Sentence in 2018 and in 2019. Both motions were denied.

Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus on December 15, 2021. This Court filed an order to respond on December 27, 2021. On February 3, 2022, the State filed the State's Return to Petitioner's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Post-Conviction). On February 8, 2022, this Court denied Petitioner's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.

## <u>ANALYSIS</u>

#### I. PETITIONER'S PETITION IS PROCEDURALLY BARRED

## A. Petitioner's Petition is time-barred

The mandatory provision of NRS 34.726(1) states:

Unless there is good cause shown for delay, a petition that challenges the validity of a judgment or sentence must be filed within I year after entry of the judgment of conviction or, if an appeal has been taken from the judgment, within I year after the Supreme Court issues its remittitur. For the purposes of this subsection, good cause for delay exists if the petitioner demonstrates to the satisfaction of the court:

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(emphasis added). "[T]he statutory rules regarding procedural default are mandatory and cannot be ignored when properly raised by the State." Riker, 121 Nev. at 233, 112 P.3d at 1075.

Accordingly, the one-year time bar prescribed by NRS 34.726 begins to run from the date the judgment of conviction is filed or a remittitur from a timely direct appeal is filed. Dickerson v. State, 114 Nev. 1084, 1087, 967 P.2d 1132, 1133–34 (1998); see Pellegrini v. State, 117 Nev. 860, 873, 34 P.3d 519, 528 (2001) (holding that NRS 34.726 should be construed by its plain meaning).

In Gonzales v. State, 118 Nev. 590, 593, 590 P.3d 901, 902 (2002), the Nevada Supreme Court affirmed the rejection of a habeas petition that was filed two days late, pursuant to the "clear and unambiguous" mandatory provisions of NRS 34.726(1). Gonzales reiterated the importance of filing the petition with the district court within the one-year mandate, absent a showing of "good cause" for the delay in filing. Gonzales, 118 Nev. at 593, 590 P.3d at 902. The one-year time bar is therefore strictly construed. In contrast with the short amount of time to file a notice of appeal, a prisoner has an ample full year to file a post-conviction habeas petition, so there is no injustice in a strict application of NRS 34.726(1). Id. at 593, 53 P.3d at 903.

Here, the Judgment of Conviction was filed on February 17, 2017. Petitioner filed an untimely notice of appeal and thus, the Nevada Supreme Court dismissed Petitioner's appeal. Petitioner then had one year from the Judgment of Conviction to file his petition. Petitioner's instant petition was filed on December 15, 2021, which was over three years after the Judgment of Conviction was filed. As a matter of law, Petitioner is untimely on the filing of his petition. Therefore, this petition is denied.

## B. The procedural bars are mandatory

The Nevada Supreme Court has specifically found that the district court has a duty to consider whether the procedural bars apply to a post-conviction petition and not arbitrarily disregard them. In <u>Riker</u>, the Court held that "[a]pplication of the statutory procedural default rules to post-conviction habeas petitions is mandatory," and "cannot be ignored when properly

raised by the State." 121 Nev. at 231–33, 112 P.3d at 1074–75. There, the Court reversed the district court's decision not to bar the petitioner's untimely and successive petition:

Given the untimely and successive nature of [petitioner's] petition, the district court had a duty imposed by law to consider whether any or all of [petitioner's] claims were barred under NRS 34.726, NRS 34.810, NRS 34.800, or by the law of the case . . . [and] the court's failure to make this determination here constituted an arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of discretion.

<u>Id.</u> at 234, 112 P.3d at 1076. The Court justified this holding by noting that "[t]he necessity for a workable system dictates that there must exist a time when a criminal conviction is final." <u>Id.</u> at 231, 112 P.3d 1074 (citation omitted); <u>see also State v. Haberstroh</u>, 119 Nev. 173, 180–81, 69 P.3d 676, 681–82 (2003) (holding that parties cannot stipulate to waive, ignore or disregard the mandatory procedural default rules nor can they empower a court to disregard them).

In <u>State v. Greene</u>, the Nevada Supreme Court reaffirmed its prior holdings that the procedural default rules are mandatory when it reversed the district court's grant of a post-conviction petition for writ of habeas corpus. <u>See State v. Greene</u>, 129 Nev. 559, 565–66, 307 P.3d 322, 326 (2013). There, the Court ruled that the petitioner's petition was untimely and successive, and that the petitioner failed to show good cause and actual prejudice. <u>Id.</u> Accordingly, the Court reversed the district court and ordered the petitioner's petition dismissed pursuant to the procedural bars. <u>Id.</u> at 567, 307 P.3d at 327.

Petitioner does not set forth any good cause for his delayed filing in this matter. His Judgment of Conviction was filed on February 17, 2017; thus, he should have filed his petition by February 17, 2018. While he was able to file two Motions for Modification of Sentence, Petitioner never filed a timely petition. He has not set forth any good cause as to why his filing was untimely. Because the procedural bars are mandatory and Petitioner has failed to show good cause to overcome the procedural defaults, this petition is denied.

# II. PETITIONER CANNOT DEMONSTRATE THAT COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense." The United States Supreme Court has long recognized that "the right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel." <u>Strickland v. Washington</u>, 466 U.S. 668, 686, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2063 (1984); <u>see also State v. Love</u>, 109 Nev. 1136, 1138, 865 P.2d 322, 323 (1993).

To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, a Petitioner must prove he was denied "reasonably effective assistance" of counsel by satisfying the two-prong test of Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686–87, 104 S. Ct. at 2063–64. See also Love, 109 Nev. at 1138, 865 P.2d at 323. Under the Strickland test, a Petitioner must show first that his counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and second, that but for counsel's errors, there is a reasonable probability that the result of the proceedings would have been different. 466 U.S. at 687–88, 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2065, 2068; Warden, Nevada State Prison v. Lyons, 100 Nev. 430, 432, 683 P.2d 504, 505 (1984) (adopting the Strickland two-part test). "[T]here is no reason for a court deciding an ineffective assistance claim to approach the inquiry in the same order or even to address both components of the inquiry if the Petitioner makes an insufficient showing on one." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697, 104 S. Ct. at 2069.

The court begins with the presumption of effectiveness and then must determine whether the Petitioner has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that counsel was ineffective. Means v. State, 120 Nev. 1001, 1011, 103 P.3d 25, 32 (2004). "Effective counsel does not mean errorless counsel, but rather counsel whose assistance is '[w]ithin the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases." Jackson v. Warden, 91 Nev. 430, 432, 537 P.2d 473, 474 (1975).

Based on the above law, the role of a court in considering allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel is "not to pass upon the merits of the action not taken but to determine whether, under the particular facts and circumstances of the case, trial counsel failed to render reasonably effective assistance." <u>Donovan v. State</u>, 94 Nev. 671, 675, 584 P.2d 708, 711

(1978). This analysis does not mean that the court should "second guess reasoned choices between trial tactics nor does it mean that defense counsel, to protect himself against allegations of inadequacy, must make every conceivable motion no matter how remote the possibilities are of success." <u>Id.</u> To be effective, the Constitution "does not require that counsel do what is impossible or unethical. If there is no bona fide defense to the charge, counsel cannot create one and may disserve the interests of his client by attempting a useless charade." United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 657 n.19, 104 S. Ct. 2039, 2046 n.19 (1984).

"There are countless ways to provide effective assistance in any given case. Even the best criminal defense attorneys would not defend a particular client in the same way." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S. Ct. at 689. "Strategic choices made by counsel after thoroughly investigating the plausible options are almost unchallengeable." Dawson v. State, 108 Nev. 112, 117, 825 P.2d 593, 596 (1992); see also Ford v. State, 105 Nev. 850, 853, 784 P.2d 951, 953 (1989). In essence, the court must "judge the reasonableness of counsel's challenged conduct on the facts of the particular case, viewed as of the time of counsel's conduct." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, 104 S. Ct. at 2066.

Even if a Petitioner can demonstrate that his counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, he must still demonstrate prejudice and show a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the result of the trial would have been different. McNelton v. State, 115 Nev. 396, 403, 990 P.2d 1263, 1268 (1999) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at 2064). "A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Id. (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-89, 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2064–65, 2068). This portion of the test is slightly modified when the convictions occurs due to a guilty plea. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985); Kirksey v. State, 112 Nev. 980, 988 (1996). For a guilty plea, a Petitioner "must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial." Kirksey, 112 Nev. at 998 (quoting Hill, 474 U.S. at 59). The Nevada Supreme Court has held "that a habeas corpus petitioner must prove the disputed factual allegations underlying his ineffective-assistance claim by a preponderance of the

evidence." Means v. State, 120 Nev. 1001, 1012, 103 P.3d 25, 33 (2004). Furthermore, claims of ineffective assistance of counsel asserted in a petition for post-conviction relief must be supported with specific factual allegations, which if true, would entitle the petitioner to relief. Hargrove v. State, 100 Nev. 498, 502, 686 P.2d 222, 225 (1984). "Bare" and "naked" allegations are not sufficient, nor are those belied and repelled by the record. Id. NRS 34.735(6) states in relevant part, "[Petitioner] *must* allege specific facts supporting the claims in the petition[.] . . . Failure to allege specific facts rather than just conclusions may cause your petition to be dismissed." (emphasis added).

## A. Ground One – DNA evidence

Petitioner cannot show that but for a better investigation, he would not have accepted the plea and would have insisted on going to trial. Petitioner sets forth no explanation of what investigation should have been completed by his counsel. His first complaint is that the DNA evidence exonerates him. However, this is not a case where DNA evidence was relevant to the charges. The allegation was that the victim had been battered by her boyfriend, Petitioner. Much of the evidence rested on her injuries and her statement to police.

Even assuming that counsel had not gone over the DNA evidence with petitioner, the DNA itself would have done nothing to negate her statement that he was responsible, along with his daughter, for causing her injuries. Thus, there is no prejudice to Petitioner and this evidence would not have changed his desire to plea.

## B. Ground Two – Desire for appeal and his attorney committing misconduct

Petitioner states that he wished to challenge his conviction, but this is belied by the record and is a bare claim. The record does not indicate that he was dissatisfied with his plea or with his sentence. Petitioner did not lodge an objection prior to or at his sentencing on February 14, 2017. There is no evidence that he wanted counsel to appeal his sentence. Thus, there is no grounds to grant him relief.

Petitioner also speculates about his attorney committing misconduct, but he presents no coherent argument to this claim. He states that his attorney lied and abandoned him without

1	supporting it with any argument or evidence. This is a bare claim and does not entitle him to			
2	relief.			
3	C. Ground Three – Prosecutorial misconduct			
4	Petitioner argues that the State should not have proceeded with the case because of			
5	DNA results and mental health issues of the victim. Even from Petitioner's pleadings, the DNA			
6	results were provided to his counsel, thus the State cannot be held in violation of <u>Brady</u> .			
7	As for proceeding with charges, the victim's testimony that the events happened, along			
8	with her injuries and other evidence, were sufficient for the State to proceed. Petitioner cannot			
9	show any misconduct by the prosecution.			
10	D. Ground Four – Appeal and Post-conviction dismissals			
11	Petitioner says that his rights were violated by the Nevada Courts because his appeals			
12	were previously dismissed. In those cases, the appellate courts clearly stated why his appeal			
13	was being dismissed. Moreover, he never filed a petition until now. Given that the record is			
14	clear as to why his previous appeals were dismissed, this is not a basis to grant his petition.			
15	<u>ORDER</u>			
16	THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Petitioner's Petition for Writ of			
17	Habeas Corpus is DENIED.			
18	Dated this 6th day of March, 2022			
19	DICKRICH HOURS			
20	DISTRICT JUDGE			
21	STEVEN B. WOLFSON Clark County District Attorney  Michelle Leavitt			
22	Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #001565  District Court Judge			
23	DV /a/ Alarandan Chan			
24	BY /s/ Alexander Chen ALEXANDER CHEN Chief Deputy District Attermery			
25	Chief Deputy District Attorney Nevada Bar #010539			
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27				

## **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE** I hereby certify that service of Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order, was made this 28th day of February, 2022, by Mail via United States Postal Service to: RONNY POWE #1173457 WARM SRPINGS CORRECTIONAL CENTER P.O. BOX 7007 CARSON CITY, NV 89702 /s/ Kristian Falcon Secretary for the District Attorney's Office ac/kf/dvu

**CSERV** DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA Ronny Powe, Plaintiff(s) CASE NO: A-21-845477-W DEPT. NO. Department 12 VS. K. Olsen, Warden (W.S.C.C.), Defendant(s) **AUTOMATED CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE** Electronic service was attempted through the Eighth Judicial District Court's electronic filing system, but there were no registered users on the case. The filer has been notified to serve all parties by traditional means. 

## DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

Writ of Habeas Corpus COURT MINUTES February 08, 2022

A-21-845477-W Ronny Powe, Plaintiff(s)

VS.

K. Olsen, Warden (W.S.C.C.), Defendant(s)

February 08, 2022 12:00 PM Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

HEARD BY: Ellsworth, Carolyn COURTROOM: RJC Courtroom 14D

COURT CLERK: Burchfield, Pharan; Pannullo, Haly

**RECORDER:** Richardson, Sara

**REPORTER:** 

**PARTIES PRESENT:** 

Hagar L Trippiedi Attorney for Other

**JOURNAL ENTRIES** 

COURT FINDS Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is time-barred; Petitioner failed to file within one year of remittitur, that was filed on 04/10/2020 and the said Petition was filed on 12/15/21. COURT ORDERED, State to prepare Findings of Facts and Conclusion of Law and Order.

Printed Date: 2/16/2022 Page 1 of 1 Minutes Date: February 08, 2022

Prepared by: Pharan Burchfield

# **Certification of Copy**

State of Nevada	7	QQ.
<b>County of Clark</b>		SS:

I, Steven D. Grierson, the Clerk of the Court of the Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County, State of Nevada, does hereby certify that the foregoing is a true, full and correct copy of the hereinafter stated original document(s):

"NOTICE OF APPEAL"; CASE APPEAL STATEMENT; DISTRICT COURT DOCKET ENTRIES; CIVIL COVER SHEET; FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER; NOTICE OF ENTRY OF FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER; DISTRICT COURT MINUTES

RONNY POWE,

Plaintiff(s),

VS.

K. OLSEN, WARDEN (W.S.C.C.),

Defendant(s),

now on file and of record in this office.

Case No: A-21-845477-W

Dept No: XII

**IN WITNESS THEREOF,** I have hereunto Set my hand and Affixed the seal of the Court at my office, Las Vegas, Nevada This 23 day of March 2022.

Steven D. Grierson, Clerk of the Court

Heather Ungermann, Deputy Clerk