Electronically Filed 3/31/2021 2:27 PM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT

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FLORENCE MCCLURE WOMENS CORRECTIONAL CEN 4370 SMILEY ROAD LAS VEGAS, NV 89115	ITER	
		Electronically Filed ate of NevAфr 07 2021 10:36 a.m Elizabeth A. Brown
In and for the C	County of <u>Clask</u>	— Clerk of Supreme Cour
Natasha 6. Jackson Appellant/Plaintiff/Petitioner)	
v.		Case No. A.20-810845-W
State of Nevada Appellee/Respondent/Defendant)	
<u>NC</u>	OTICE OF APPEAL	
Notice is hereby given that Natas		
the above captioned case, hereby appeal		
from the final judgment for <u>Pehhor Loc I</u> entered on the <u>4th</u> day of <u>March</u>	20.21	& Motion be appointment of Coursel
Dated this 29th day of Morch	, 20_21	
	Respectfully subm	itted,
	Signature/ Pro Se Citig	Petitioner ant
	Natasha G. Vac Print Name	and the second
		MAR 3 1 2021

CLERK OF THE COURT

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

1

28

2	COUNTY OF Clark
3	I am the Plaintiff/Petitioner Defendant/Respondent
4	
5	Natasha G. Jackson for Case No: A-20-810845. W
6	On this 29^{th} day of March , 20 21, I mailed a copy of the
7	Following document(s): 1. Notice of Appeal
8	2
9	3
10	4
11	5
12	By United States First Class Mail, to the following addresses:
13	1. Clerk of Courts 2. District Attorney
14	Steven D. Gererson Steven B. Wolfson
15	200 Lewis Are 3rd F/ 200 Lewis Are P.O. Box 552212
16	Los Vegas, NV 89155-1160 Las Vegas, NV 89155-2212
17	
18	3. Alexis M. Oueker 4.
19	8687 W. Sahara Are Ste 201
20	Las Vegas, NV 89/17
21	
22	
23	Dated this 29th day of March , 2021.
24	Respectfully submitted,
25	Gatishe A. Jahson Signature
26	
27	Natasha 6. Jackson Printed Name

DECLARATION UNDER PENALTY OF PERJURY

I, the undersigned, understand that a false statement or answer to any question in this declaration will subject me to penalties of perjury.

I declare, under the penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of America, that the above and/or foregoing information is accurate, correct and true to the best of my knowledge, executed within the terms of ¹NRS 171.102 and ²NRS 208.165. See ³28 U.S.C. 1746 and 18 U.S.C. 1621.

Dated this 29th day of March , 20 21

Signature | March | 118858/

Nevada Department of Corrections ID #

NRS 171.102

NRS 208.165

^{3 28} U.S.C.

^{§1746.} Unsworn declarations under penalty of perjury 18 U.S.C.

^{§ 1621.} Perjury generally

LAS VEGAS NV 890 29 MAR 2021 PM 3 L Natashe G. Jackson 1188581 4370 Smiley Ref Las Vegas, NN 89115

MAR 3 1 2021 RECEIVED Clerk of the Counts Staven D. Greiberson 200 Lowis Are 3rd F1 Las Vegas, N 89155-1160

CLERK OF THE COURT

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Legal May): Confidential

Electronically Filed 4/1/2021 1:21 PM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT

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Las Vegas, NV 89155-2212

IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLARK

NATASHA G. JACKSON,

Plaintiff(s),

vs.

STATE OF NEVADA,

Defendant(s),

Case No: A-20-810845-W

Dept No: X

CASE APPEAL STATEMENT

1. Appellant(s): Natasha G. Jackson

2. Judge: Tierra Jones

3. Appellant(s): Natasha G. Jackson

Counsel:

Natasha G. Jackson #1188581 4370 Smiley Rd. Las Vegas, NV 89115

4. Respondent (s): State of Nevada

Counsel:

Steven B. Wolfson, District Attorney 200 Lewis Ave.

1 2	5. Appellant(s)'s Attorney Licensed in Nevada: N/A Permission Granted: N/A
3	Respondent(s)'s Attorney Licensed in Nevada: Yes Permission Granted: N/A
4	6. Has Appellant Ever Been Represented by Appointed Counsel In District Court: No
5	7. Appellant Represented by Appointed Counsel On Appeal: N/A
7 8	8. Appellant Granted Leave to Proceed in Forma Pauperis**: N/A **Expires 1 year from date filed Appellant Filed Application to Proceed in Forma Pauperis: Yes,
9	Date Application(s) filed: February 14, 2020
	9. Date Commenced in District Court: February 14, 2020
10 11	10. Brief Description of the Nature of the Action: Civil Writ
12	Type of Judgment or Order Being Appealed: Civil Writ of Habeas Corpus
13	11. Previous Appeal: No
14	Supreme Court Docket Number(s): N/A
15	12. Child Custody or Visitation: N/A
16	13. Possibility of Settlement: Unknown
17	Dated This 1 day of April 2021.
18	Steven D. Grierson, Clerk of the Court
19	
20	/s/ Heather Ungermann
21	Heather Ungermann, Deputy Clerk 200 Lewis Ave
22	PO Box 551601 Las Vegas, Nevada 89155-1601
23	(702) 671-0512
24	
25	
26	cc: Natasha G. Jackson
27	

CASE SUMMARY CASE NO. A-20-810845-W

Natasha Jackson, Plaintiff(s) State of Nevada, Defendant(s)

Location: Department 10 Judicial Officer: Jones, Tierra Filed on: **02/14/2020**

Case Number History:

Cross-Reference Case A810845

Number:

CASE INFORMATION

§ §

Related Cases

Case Type: Writ of Habeas Corpus C-14-300032-1 (Writ Related Case)

03/04/2021 Closed **Statistical Closures** Status: 03/04/2021 Other Manner of Disposition

DATE **CASE ASSIGNMENT**

Current Case Assignment

Case Number A-20-810845-W Department 10 Court Date Assigned 09/08/2020 Jones, Tierra Judicial Officer

PARTY INFORMATION

Lead Attorneys **Plaintiff** Jackson, Natasha

Pro Se

Defendant State of Nevada Wolfson, Steven B Retained

702-671-2700(W)

EVENTS & ORDERS OF THE COURT DATE **INDEX**

EVENTS

02/14/2020 Inmate Filed - Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

Party: Plaintiff Jackson, Natasha

Post Conviction

02/14/2020 Request

> Filed by: Plaintiff Jackson, Natasha Request for Submission of Motion

02/14/2020 Motion for Appointment of Attorney

Filed By: Plaintiff Jackson, Natasha

02/14/2020 🚺 Affidavit

Filed By: Plaintiff Jackson, Natasha

02/14/2020 Application to Proceed in Forma Pauperis

Filed By: Plaintiff Jackson, Natasha

02/26/2020 Order for Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus Order for Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

CASE SUMMARY CASE NO. A-20-810845-W

	CASE NO. A-20-810845-VV
02/26/2020	Clerk's Notice of Hearing Notice of Hearing
03/25/2020	Response State's Response to Petitioner's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Post-Conviction) and Opposition to Motion for Appointment of Counsel
05/04/2020	Order for Production of Inmate Party: Defendant State of Nevada Order for Production of Inmate
06/23/2020	Notice of Change of Hearing Notice of Change of Hearing
07/22/2020	Application Filed By: Plaintiff Jackson, Natasha Application to Order Transport and Produce Inmate for Hearing
08/04/2020	Notice of Change of Hearing Notice of Change of Hearing
09/08/2020	Case Reassigned to Department 10 Case Reassignment from Judge Douglas W. Herndon to Judge Tierra Jones
03/04/2021	Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order Filed By: Plaintiff Jackson, Natasha Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order
03/10/2021	Notice of Entry of Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law Filed By: Defendant State of Nevada Notice of Entry of Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order
03/31/2021	Notice of Appeal Filed By: Plaintiff Jackson, Natasha Notice of Appeal
04/01/2021	Case Appeal Statement Filed By: Plaintiff Jackson, Natasha Case Appeal Statement
04/28/2020	HEARINGS Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (3:30 PM) (Judicial Officer: Jones, Tierra) 04/28/2020, 02/11/2021 Granted in Part; Denied; Granted in Part; Denied; Denied;
04/28/2020	Motion for Appointment of Attorney (3:30 PM) (Judicial Officer: Herndon, Douglas W.) Plaintiff's Motion for Appointment of Counsel Motion Denied;
04/28/2020	All Pending Motions (3:30 PM) (Judicial Officer: Herndon, Douglas W.) Matter Heard; Journal Entry Details:

CASE SUMMARY CASE NO. A-20-810845-W

PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS... PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL... Defendant not present and in custody in the Nevada Department of Corrections. COURT STATED the Defendant filed a Pro Per Petition and a Motion for Appointment of Counsel, and just on the pleadings, without argument, Petition DENIED IN PART AND GRANTED IN PART. COURT STATED the Defendant has made allegations that the Court does not believe need examination outside, the record, nor do they believe are complex, which would not warrant the need to appoint an attorney. COURT ADVISED the Defendant negotiated the case, with a stipulated sentence, in which the Court imposed at the time of sentencing, and the Defendant has now filed the instant petition. COURT FURTHER STATED the Defendant has alleged ineffective assistance of counsel, alleging her attorney was deficient for not making certain challenges to the State's version of factual events in regard to the conduct that occurred at the hearing, in light of certain testimony given by the medical examiner, versus things that were in certain statements. COURT STATED Defendant waives any challenges of any dissection of the facts of the case, by virtue of the Defendant's plea; adding the Defendant factually admitted to the conduct she is now complaining about, which is inconsistent with her use of a screw driver, in attacking both the victims. COURT ADDITIONALLY STATED the allegation the matter was not investigated to bring out the discrepancies, the Court pointed out there was never a trial, which means there never was an opportunity to make challenges in terms of examining witnesses at trial. COURT STATED the Defendant makes an allegation there was not a proper investigation of the weapons enhancement, and counsel never provided her with updates with regards to negotiations, adding the Court was pending for a number of years, and there was no change to negotiations, and there is no requirement for counsel to update the Defendant with regards to there being no change in negotiations. COURT STATED the Defendant does make allegations that warrant a hearing, stating the Defendant alleged she attempted to contact counsel to discuss the appeals process after she was sentenced, and only later learned the Defendant had forfeited her right to direct appeal, adding the allegation the Defendant wanted to appeal and somehow was denied that, does entitle the Defendant to an Evidentiary Hearing. COURT FURTHER STATED the Defendant makes bare allegations, with regards to failure to investigation that would have changed the outcome of the proceedings, however there is no specificity to those allegations, and it does not justify any relief; the Defendant also stated there was a failure to object to the weapon enhancement that somehow would have reduced the Defendant's sentence, which is a bare allegation without any support, adding the Defendant pled guilty to the weapon enhancement. COURT ADDITIONALLY STATED the Defendant makes an allegation there was a failure to move to admit, or present to the Grand Jury certain things in regards to the Defendant's interrogation, and counsel made challenges to those allegations in the Pre-Trial Writ of Habeas Corpus, which does not justify any relief. COURT STATED the Defendant makes an argument about counsel predicting that a Judge and Jury would fail to make an impartial assessment of her case, by reading journal entries that were written by the Petition upon her initial introduction to the Co-Defendant, which is a bare allegation without any support, and the Defendant might be referring to what counsel told her with regards to strength or weakness of the case, which is not a ground for ineffective assistance of counsel. COURT FURTHER STATED the Defendant makes allegations her attorney failed to properly instruct her about the Guilty Plea, which is a bare allegation, however it can be addressed at the Evidentiary Hearing. COURT ADDITIONALLY STATED the Defendant alleges her attorney failed to move to suppress the interrogation of the petition, since it was made under the influence, which is an issue which is waived by virtue of negotiating the case, and pleading guilty. COURT STATED the Defendant additionally alleges her attorney failed to delivery Discovery to the Defendant in a timely fashion, which is an allegation that is waived by the Guilty Plea, adding there is no allegation that the Defendant was prejudice by not having the Discovery, adding the Defendant is complaining she did not receive the Discovery after she was sentenced, and the FINDS THERE IS NO PREJUDICE with regards to that claim, since the Court kept extending her Writ time period, which the Discovery boxes were being provided to the Defendant. COURT STATED the Defendant is alleging her attorney failed to extend her right to be sentenced, based on accurate and reliable evidence, which the Court states the Defendant had the ability to make a statement at the time of sentencing, pointing out the Defendant negotiated a stipulated sentence, which the Defendant received, and the FINDS THERE IS NO PREJUDICE with regards to that claim. COURT FURTHER STATED, the Defendant is alleging her attorney failed to giver her verbatim reports of plea conversations between the parties, and failed to provide the Defendant with copies of letters, e-mails, or notes between the Defense and the State regarding negotiations, and the FINDS there is no obligation of attorneys to take verbatim notes of plea negotiation discussions that they have with the State, nor is there any obligation the attorneys have to provide the Defendant with letters, e-mails, notes or verbatim reports of conversation that the attorney has with the prosecutors. COURT ADDITIONALLY STATED the Defendant alleged inconsistent representation resulting delays in obtaining Discovery, pointing out this is a Post- Conviction issue, and FINDS the Defendant WAS NOT PREJUDICED since the Court

CASE SUMMARY CASE NO. A-20-810845-W

kept extending the deadline. COURT ORDERED, Petition DENIED IN PART for all reasons previously stated, and GRANTED IN PART and an Evidentiary Hearing SET with regards to the two issues of whether her attorney properly instructed the Defendant on her Guilty Plea, and whether the Defendant expressed a desire to file a direct appeal, and was somehow lost that ability due to the attorney. Ms. Rinetti stated she would do an Order to Transport. NDC 6/30/2020 9:00 A.M. EVIDENTIARY HEARING;

08/12/2020

Evidentiary Hearing (12:00 PM) (Judicial Officer: Herndon, Douglas W.)

Per Admin Order

Off Calendar;

Journal Entry Details:

Defendant not present; Deputy Public Defender Christy Craig present. COURT STATED the Defendant was not transported, and ORDERED the matter OFF CALENDAR; and DIRECTED parties to figure out a continued hearing date. NDC;

12/04/2020

Evidentiary Hearing (8:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Jones, Tierra)

Off Calendar;

Journal Entry Details:

Court noted Deft. is not here and there is no transport order, in Odyssey. COURT ORDERED, matter OFF CALENDAR. Court will re-set the matter. NDC;

02/11/2021

Evidentiary Hearing (2:00 PM) (Judicial Officer: Jones, Tierra)

Matter Heard;

02/11/2021

All Pending Motions (2:00 PM) (Judicial Officer: Jones, Tierra)

All Pending Motions (02/11/2021)

Matter Heard;

Journal Entry Details:


EVIDENTIARY HEARING:LIMITED ISSUES/PTN...PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS Deft. JACKSON present by video, in custody in the Nevada Department of Corrections (NDC) appearing Pro Se. State noted Ms. Craig present as a witness by subpoena. Court explained this is a hearing regarding the Petition filed for ineffective assistance of counsel. Hearing: Testimony presented; Ms. Craig sworn and testified. State noted the hearing today was only regarding two issues within the writ; 1) properly instructed as to the Guilty Plea Agreement (GPA) and 2) as to the Deft's desire for an appeal. Court will allow leeway in Ms. Jackson's, Deft./Pro Se, direct questioning. State called no witnesses. Arguments by Ms. Jackson and State. Court noted the Deft. did free and voluntarily sign the Guilty Plea Agreement (GPA), Deft. was thoroughly canvassed. Ms. Jackson stated she learned from the Law Library in prison of filing an appeal. Court stated findings; as to the first issue, the Deft. was not forced into the Guilty Plea Agreement, the Deft. had 6 months to accept the agreement, Judge Herndon canvassed the Deft. and the Deft. freely and voluntarily agreed to the Guilty Plea Agreement. As to the second issue; Ms. Craig did not prepare the appeal, Court noted the Deft. was advised it was up to Ms. Jackson/Deft. Court further found it was belied by the record. COURT ORDERED, Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, DENIED. Court directed the State to prepare the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.;

DISTRICT COURT CIVIL COVER SHEET

A-20-810845-W Dept. III

		County, Nevada	
	Case No. (Assigned by Clerk's	Office	
I. Party Information (provide both ho.		Office	
Plaintiff(s) (name/address/phone):	me and maning dualesses if differents	Defendant(s) (name/address/phone):	
Natasha Jac	rkean	State of Nevada	
ivatasiia Jac			
		Attorney (name/address/phone):	
Attorney (name/address/phone):		Attorney (name/address/pnone).	
II. Nature of Controversy (please se	elect the one most applicable filing type	below)	
Civil Case Filing Types		Torts	
Real Property Landlord/Tenant	Negligence	Other Torts	
Unlawful Detainer	Auto	Product Liability	
Other Landlord/Tenant	Premises Liability	Intentional Misconduct	
Title to Property	Other Negligence	Employment Tort	
Judicial Foreclosure	Malpractice	Insurance Tort	
Other Title to Property	Medical/Dental	Other Tort	
Other Real Property	Legal	_	
Condemnation/Eminent Domain	Accounting		
Other Real Property	Other Malpractice		
Probate	Construction Defect & Conti		
Probate (select case type and estate value)	Construction Defect	Judicial Review	
Summary Administration	Chapter 40	Foreclosure Mediation Case	
General Administration	Other Construction Defect	Petition to Seal Records	
Special Administration	Contract Case	Mental Competency	
Set Aside	Uniform Commercial Code	Nevada State Agency Appeal	
Trust/Conservatorship	Building and Construction	Department of Motor Vehicle Worker's Compensation	
Other Probate	Insurance Carrier	Other Nevada State Agency	
Estate Value	Commercial Instrument Collection of Accounts	Appeal Other	
Over \$200,000 Between \$100,000 and \$200,000	Employment Contract	Appeal from Lower Court	
Under \$100,000 or Unknown	Other Contract	Other Judicial Review/Appeal	
Under \$2,500			
_ <u></u>	il Writ	Other Civil Filing	
Civil Writ		Other Civil Filing	
Writ of Habeas Corpus	Writ of Prohibition	Compromise of Minor's Claim	
Writ of Mandamus	Other Civil Writ	Foreign Judgment	
Writ of Quo Warrant	_	Other Civil Matters	
	Court filings should be filed using th	ne Business Court civil coversheet.	
<u></u>			
February 14, 2020		PREPARED BY CLERK	
Date		Signature of initiating party or representative	

See other side for family-related case filings.



1 **FFCO** STEVEN B. WOLFSON 2 Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #001565 3 TALEEN PANDUKHT Chief Deputy District Attorney 4 Nevada Bar #5734 200 Lewis Avenue 5 Las Vegas, Nevada 89155-2212 (702) 671-2500 6 Attorney for Plaintiff 7 8 DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 9 10 THE STATE OF NEVADA. Plaintiff, 11 CASE NO: A-20-810845-W 12 -VS-C300032-1 13 NATASHA JACKSON, #1921058 DEPT NO: X 14 Defendant. 15 16 FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER 17 DATE OF HEARING: FEBRUARY 11, 2021 18 TIME OF HEARING: 8:30 AM THIS CAUSE having come on for hearing before the Honorable TIERRA JONES, 19 District Judge, on the 10 day of February, 2021, the Petitioner being present, proceeding in 20 proper person, the Respondent being represented by STEVEN B. WOLFSON, Clark County 21 District Attorney, by and through MICHELLE FLECK, Chief Deputy District Attorney, and 22 the Court having considered the matter, including briefs, transcripts, testimony and arguments 23 24 by counsels, and documents on file herein, now therefore, the Court makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law: 25 /// 26 /// 27 28 ///

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On August 8, 2014, the State charged Respondent Natasha Jackson ("Petitioner") with Count 1 – Burglary While in Possession of a Firearm (Category B Felony - NRS 205.060); Counts 2 and 3 – Attempt Robbery with use of a Deadly Weapon (Category B Felony - NRS 200.380, 193.330, 193.165); Count 4 – Murder with use of a Deadly Weapon (Category A Felony - NRS 200.010, 200.030, 193.165); Count 5 – Attempt Murder with use of a Deadly Weapon (Category B Felony - NRS 200.010, 200.030, 193.330, 193.165); Count 6 – First Degree Kidnapping (Category A Felony - NRS 200.310, 200.320); Count 7 – Robbery with use of a Deadly Weapon (Category B Felony - NRS 200.380, 193.165); and Count 8 – Burglary while in Possession of a Deadly Weapon (Category B Felony - NRS 205.060).

On October 6, 2014, Petitioner filed a Pretrial Petition for Writ Of Habeas Corpus ("Pretrial Writ"). The State filed its Return on October 24, 2014. Petitioner filed a Reply on October 29, 2014. On November 10, 2014, the District Court granted Petitioner's Pretrial Writ in part and denied it in part. Specifically, the District Court dismissed Counts 1 and 8. The Order was filed December 4, 2014. On December 12, 2014, the State appealed the Court's ruling. On March 25, 2016, the Nevada Supreme Court reversed the District Court's dismissal of the two (2) counts and remanded the case back to the District Court.

On September 12, 2017, Petitioner pled guilty to Count 1 – Murder with use of a Deadly Weapon (First Degree); and Count 2 – Robbery with Use of a Deadly Weapon pursuant to a Guilty Plea Agreement ("GPA").

On November 17, 2017, the Court sentenced Petitioner as follows: Count 1 – twenty (20) years to life, plus a consecutive sentence of ninety-six (96) to two hundred forty (240) months for the deadly weapon enhancement; and Count 2 – forty-eight (48) to one hundred eighty (180) months, plus a consecutive sentence of thirty-six (36) to one hundred eighty (180) months for the deadly weapon enhancement. Petitioner's aggregate sentence was thirty-five (35) years to life. The Judgment of Conviction was filed on November 13, 2017. Petitioner did not file a direct appeal.

///

On February 27, 2018, Petitioner's counsel filed a Motion to Withdraw as counsel. On March 20, 2018, the Court granted counsel's Motion.

On July 18, 2018, Petitioner filed a Motion for the Production of Documents, Papers, Pleadings and Tangible Property of Defendant. On August 9, 2018, the Court granted Petitioner's Motion.

On November 1, 2018, Petitioner filed a Motion for Enlargement of Time in Which to File Post-Conviction Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. On November 27, 2018, the Court granted Petitioner's Motion, and ordered a briefing schedule set should Petitioner file a Petition.

On April 19, 2019, Petitioner filed a second Motion for Enlargement of Time to file. The Court granted Petitioner's Motion on May 14, 2019 and ordered Petitioner to file any Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus by August 13, 2019.

On August 9, 2019, Petitioner filed a third Motion for Enlargement of Time to File. On August 15, 2019, the Court granted Petitioner's Motion, and ordered Petitioner to file any Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus by December 12, 2019. On February 20, 2020, the Court set another briefing schedule and ordered Petitioner to file a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus by April 23, 2020.

On February 26, 2020, Petitioner filed the instant Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Post-Conviction) ("Petition"). On March 25, 2020, the State filed a Response to Petitioner's Petition. On February 11, 2021, this Court made the following Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law.

<u>ANALYSIS</u>

I. PETITIONER RECEIVED EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

Courts must dismiss a petition if a petitioner plead guilty and the petitioner is not alleging "that the plea was involuntarily or unknowingly entered, or that the plea was entered without effective assistance of counsel." NRS 34.810(1)(a). Further, substantive claims—even those disguised as ineffective assistance of counsel claims—are beyond the scope of habeas

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and waived. NRS 34.724(2)(a); Evans, 117 Nev. at 646–47, 29 P.3d at 523; Franklin, 110 Nev. at 752, 877 P.2d at 1059.

The United States Supreme Court has long recognized that "the right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2063 (1984); see also State v. Love, 109 Nev. 1136, 1138, 865 P.2d 322, 323 (1993). To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, a petitioner must prove he was denied "reasonably effective assistance" of counsel by satisfying the two-prong test of Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686-87, 104 S. Ct. at 2063-64. See also Love, 109 Nev. at 1138, 865 P.2d at 323. Under the Strickland test, a petitioner must show first that his counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and second, that but for counsel's errors, there is a reasonable probability that the result of the proceedings would have been different. 466 U.S. at 687-88, 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2065, 2068; Warden, Nevada State Prison v. Lyons, 100 Nev. 430, 432, 683 P.2d 504, 505 (1984) (adopting the Strickland twopart test). "[T]here is no reason for a court deciding an ineffective assistance claim to approach the inquiry in the same order or even to address both components of the inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on one." <u>Strickland</u>, 466 U.S. at 697, 104 S. Ct. at 2069.

A habeas corpus petitioner must prove the disputed factual allegations underlying his ineffective-assistance claim by a preponderance of the evidence. Means v. State, 120 Nev. 1001, 1012, 103 P.3d 25, 33 (2004). Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel asserted in a petition for post-conviction relief must be supported with specific factual allegations, which if true, would entitle the petitioner to relief. Hargrove v. State, 100 Nev. 498, 502, 686 P.2d 222, 225 (1984). "Bare" and "naked" allegations are not sufficient, nor are those belied and repelled by the record. Id. NRS 34.735(6) states in relevant part, "[Petitioner] must allege specific facts supporting the claims in the petition[.] . . . Failure to allege specific facts rather than just conclusions may cause your petition to be dismissed." Id. at 502-03, 686 P.2d at 225.

"There are countless ways to provide effective assistance in any given case. Even the best criminal defense attorneys would not defend a particular client in the same way." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S. Ct. at 689. "Strategic choices made by counsel after

 thoroughly investigating the plausible options are almost unchallengeable." <u>Dawson v. State</u>, 108 Nev. 112, 117, 825 P.2d 593, 596 (1992); see also <u>Ford v. State</u>, 105 Nev. 850, 853, 784 P.2d 951, 953 (1989). Counsel cannot be ineffective for failing to make futile objections or arguments. <u>Ennis v. State</u>, 122 Nev., 694, 706, 137 P.3d 1095, 1103 (2006).

In order to meet the "prejudice prong" of the <u>Strickland</u> test when a conviction is the result of a guilty plea, the petitioner must show a "reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial." <u>Kirksey</u>, 112 Nev. at 988, 923 P.2d at 1107 (quoting <u>Hill</u>, 474 U.S. at 59, 106 S.Ct. at 370) "A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." <u>Strickland</u>, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2068. "Bare" or "naked" allegations are not sufficient to show ineffectiveness of counsel. <u>Hargrove</u>, 100 Nev. at 502, 686 P.2d at 225.

Here, Petitioner claims of ineffective assistance of counsel center around pretrial investigation and obtaining discovery after Petitioner was sentenced. Petitioner's claims do not allege that counsel's actions made her plea unknowing, unintelligent, or involuntary; or that she entered her plea without effective assistance of counsel. Therefore, Petitioner waived her ability to raise these claims and this Court should summarily dismiss the instant Petition. However, even on the merits of Petitioner's claims, the Court nevertheless denies this Petition as all of Petitioner's claims are either belied by the record or bare and naked assertions devoid of factual support.

A. Petitioner's claims in Ground 1 fail.

In Ground 1, Petitioner raises several claims dealing primarily with the adequacy of counsel's investigation and trial preparation prior to her guilty plea. <u>Petition</u> at 1-3 & 6.

Counsel is expected to conduct legal and factual investigations when developing a defense so they may make informed decisions on their client's behalf. <u>Jackson v. Warden</u>, 91 Nev. 430, 433, 537 P.2d 473, 474 (1975) (quoting <u>In re Saunders</u>, 2 Cal.3d 1033, 88 Cal.Rptr. 633, 638, 472 P.2d 921, 926 (1970)). "[D]efense counsel has a duty 'to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary." <u>Love</u>, 109 Nev. at 1138, 865 P.2d at 323 (*quoting* Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691,

104 S. Ct. at 2066). A defendant who contends his attorney was ineffective because he did not adequately investigate must show how a better investigation would have rendered a more favorable outcome. Molina, 120 Nev. at 192, 87 P.3d at 538.

Petitioner first argues that counsel failed to note inconsistencies between witness statements and the physical evidence. Petition at 1. Specifically, Petitioner notes that the medical examiner's Grand Jury testimony conflicted with Julie Ramos's statement. The medical examiner testified, while Julie Ramos stated that Petitioner hit her husband with a wrench and stabbed her with a screwdriver. Petition at 2. Petitioner further notes that Julie Ramos's statement conflicted with Petitioner's statement to the police and therefore, Julie Ramos is not to be believed. Petition at 2. As a result of these inconsistencies, Petitioner appears to claim that Count 8 was disingenuous and counsel should have challenged it. Petition at 2.

Petitioner's claim is belied by the record. Counsel did challenge the factual basis for Count 8 in the Pretrial Writ filed on October 6, 2014. Pretrial Writ, at 5-7. Initially, counsel appeared to be successful because, the District Court granted Petitioner's Pretrial Writ in part and dismissed Counts 1 and 8. Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, at 2. It was the Nevada Supreme Court who disagreed with counsel's interpretation and reversed the Court's decision on March 25, 2016. Order of Reversal and Remand at 4. Counsel can hardly be expected to do more. Further, any additional challenge would have been futile, given that even the Nevada Supreme Court stated there was a sufficient factual basis supporting Count 8. As such, Petitioner's claim that counsel did not investigate any inconsistencies or challenge the evidence is belied by the record. Regarding any other inconsistencies counsel allegedly failed to investigate, Petitioner does not demonstrate what specific information that investigation would have revealed or how it would have resulted in her deciding to proceed to trial. Molina, 120 Nev. at 192, 87 P.3d at 538.

Petitioner next claims that counsel failed to prepare a trial strategy. <u>Petition</u> at 2. Petitioner claims this shows that counsel's only plan of action was for Petitioner to plead guilty. <u>Id.</u> at 2. Not only is this a bare and naked claim unsupported by any specific facts, but

whether counsel prepared for trial is irrelevant because Petitioner pled guilty over two (2) months before the scheduled trial date. As Petitioner pled guilty, there was no need for trial strategy and counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for allegedly not preparing one. <u>United States v. Cronic</u>, 466 U.S. 648, 657 n.19, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 2046 n. 19 (1984) ("The constitution does not require that defense counsel do what is impossible or unethical. If there is no bona fide defense to the charge, counsel cannot create one and may disserve the interests of his client by attempting a useless charade").

Third, Petitioner accuses counsel of ineffectiveness because the State's offer was extended three and a half years after her arrest and allegedly did not change. Petition at 2. Counsel had no control over the timing or the substance of the State's offer. From December 2014 until March 2016, this matter was pending before the Nevada Supreme Court on appeal and the District Court did not have the jurisdiction to do anything, including accept a guilty plea. Once the Nevada Supreme Court remanded the matter back to the District Court, counsel immediately began discussing offers with the State. That the offer conveyed by the State did not change is not something counsel had any control over, and Petitioner fails to provide any authority stating otherwise. Indeed, common sense dictates that defense counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to do something they had no control over. Additionally, Petitioner had six (6) months to decide whether to plead guilty and the plea canvass established that when Petitioner did plead guilty, she did so freely and voluntarily.

Moreover, Petitioner cannot show prejudice because she does not claim she would have rejected a better or earlier conveyed offer and insisted on proceeding to trial. <u>Kirksey</u>, 112 Nev. at 988, 923 P.2d at 1107. Indeed, she cannot, as such a claim would be logically inconsistent. Had counsel received a better offer, because Petitioner accepted the instant negotiation, Petitioner would not have likely accepted a more favorable offer. As such, this claim fails.

Fourth, Petitioner claims counsel should have challenged the deadly weapon enhancement and that she would have received a lesser sentence had counsel done so. <u>Petition</u> at 6. To the extent Petitioner claims counsel should have challenged the deadly weapon

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enhancement pre-plea, such a claim was waived when she pled guilty and is further belied by the record. In Petitioner's Pretrial Writ, counsel expressly argued that there was not sufficient evidence supporting the deadly weapon enhancement. Pretrial Writ, at 5-7. To the extent Petitioner is claiming counsel should have challenged the enhancement post-plea, Petitioner continues to fault counsel of ineffectiveness for failing to make a futile motion or argument. Ennis, 122 Nev. at 706, 137 P.3d at 1103. Petitioner pled guilty to Murder with Use of a Deadly Weapon (First Degree). GPA at 1. Once Petitioner did so, the deadly weapon enhancement could not be removed from the charging document. As such, Petitioner's claim is baseless and otherwise belied by the record.

Fifth, Petitioner's final claim raised in Ground 1 revolves around her police interrogation. Petitioner first claims counsel should have filed a motion to admit the interrogation at the Grand Jury so they could assess the accuracy of Detective McCarthy's version of Petitioner's story, intent, and lucidity. <u>Petition</u> at 6. Second, Petitioner claims counsel should have attempted to suppress the interrogation as the statements were made while she was under the influence of methamphetamine and experiencing delusional thoughts, erratic speech patterns and sporadic loss of consciousness. Id. Petitioner's first claim is belied by counsel's arguments in the Pretrial Writ. Counsel argued that the charges against Petitioner should be dismissed because the State should have, and failed to, admit Petitioner's interrogation to the Grand Jury to highlight the inconsistencies in Detective McCarthy's statement. Pretrial Writ, at 7-12. As counsel has no control over what evidence the State presents to a Grand Jury save for a pretrial writ, counsel did all they could and cannot be deemed ineffective. Second, Petitioner's claim that counsel should have moved to suppress her statements is meritless because Petitioner pled guilty in lieu of trial. When Petitioner pled guilty, any question of her state of mind during the police interrogation became irrelevant as there was no longer a trial where her statement could or could not be admitted. Moreover, Petitioner does not establish that counsel could have successfully suppressed her statement. Counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to make a futile motion. Ennis, 122 Nev. at 706, 137 P.3d at 1103. Finally, Petitioner does not explain that had counsel attempted to

suppress her statement, she would have insisted on proceeding to trial. Therefore, Petitioner's claim fails.

B. Petitioner's claims in Ground 2 fail.

The crux of Petitioner's claims in Ground 2 revolve around the speed with which defense counsel provided copies of her discovery post-sentence. Petitioner claims that counsel ignored Court orders to send Petitioner her discovery in a timely fashion. Petition at 4. Petitioner then claims that even when she received her file from counsel, the file did not include a transcript of the plea canvass and did not include emails between counsel and the state regarding negotiations. Id. at 7.

As an initial matter, counsel's actions after she was sentenced and transported to prison had absolutely no bearing on the validity of her plea. Therefore, there is no way Petitioner can demonstrate that counsel's actions impacted her decision to plead guilty and her claim is dismissed.

Further, Petitioner cannot show prejudice. The court allowed Petitioner to file the instant Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus over two and a half years after the Judgment of Conviction was filed because Petitioner continued to inform the Court she did not have all of the information necessary to file a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. Moreover, Petitioner has not established that any email communication between the State and counsel regarding negotiations exists. Counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to provide nonexistent information. Finally, counsel did not provide a copy of the transcript of Petitioner's plea canvass because that transcript was not prepared until the State requested the Court prepare it after Petitioner filed her Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Post-Conviction). Order for Transcript, filed on March 11, 2020. Therefore, Petitioner's claim in Ground 2 should fail.

Petitioner also appears to claim in Ground 2 that she was sentenced on incorrect information. Petition at 7. Such a claim is nothing more than a bare and naked claim unsupported by specific facts in the record. Petitioner does not point to specific facts that she alleges to be incorrect. Hargrove, 100 Nev. at 502, 686 P.2d at 225. To the extent Petitioner claims the Court incorrectly sentenced her on the Deadly Weapon enhancement, as explained

above, because Petitioner pled guilty to Murder with use of a Deadly Weapon (First Degree), she admitted to using a deadly weapon. As such, the Court did not err in considering that fact when sentencing her and counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for not making a futile objection. Ennis, 122 Nev. at 706, 137 P.3d at 1103.

C. Petitioner's plea was knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made.

Petitioner appears to claim that counsel was ineffective in advising her to accept the State's plea deal of a stipulated aggregate sentence of thirty-five (35) years to life. Petition at 3. Petitioner claims counsel did not elaborate on the terms outlined in the Guilty Plea Agreement and led her to believe it was in her best interest to plead guilty and file an appeal after. Petition at 6. Petitioner further claims that counsel did not warn her that by pleading guilty, she would be waiving her right to file a direct appeal. Petition at 6. Petitioner's claim is belied by the record.

To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for advice regarding a guilty plea, a defendant must show "gross error on the part of counsel." Turner v. Calderon, 281 F.3d 851, 880 (9th Cir. 2002). It is true that defendant is entitled to effective assistance of counsel in the plea-bargaining process and in determining whether to accept or reject a plea offer. Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 163, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1384 (2012); see also McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771, 90 S. Ct. 1441 (1970) (the Constitution guarantees effective counsel when accepting guilty plea). In considering the defendant's "right to make a reasonably informed decision whether to accept a plea offer," importantly, the question is not whether, "counsel's advice [was] right or wrong, but . . . whether that advice was within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases." Id. (quoting United States v. Day, 969 F.2d 39, 43 (3rd Cir. 1992), and McMann, 397 U.S. 771, 90 S. Ct. at 1449.

Petitioner's claim that counsel was ineffective when advising her to accept the plea deal was is nothing more than a bare and naked claim. Petitioner offers no specific facts indicating that counsel's advice to plead guilty was unreasonable. Petitioner was charged with eight (8) serious felony counts, including Murder with use of a Deadly Weapon, and First-Degree Kidnapping, both of which carried potential sentences of life without the possibility of parole.

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Had Petitioner proceeded to trial, and had Petitioner been convicted of only those two (2) counts, she could have been sentenced to two (2) consecutive life sentences. As such, counsel was very reasonable in recommending that Petitioner accept the State's offer to stipulate to an aggregate sentence of thirty-five (35) years to life. Moreover, it was Petitioner's decision of whether to plead guilty and counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for offering candid advice.

Further, Petitioner's claim that counsel did not spend time reviewing the GPA with her or that counsel forced her to plead guilty is belied by the record. First, in signing the GPA, Petitioner acknowledged that she knew and understood she was waiving the right to file a direct appeal. Guilty Plea Agreement at 5. The Court confirmed that she understood that waiver during the plea canvass. Plea Canvass at 6. During the plea canvass, Petitioner further confirmed that she had been discussing and reviewing the GPA with counsel for nine (9) months and that counsel had reviewed the entire GPA with her:

MS. CRAIG: Your Honor, if I could, she and I had been talking about this negotiation since January.

THE COURT: Right.

MS. CRAIG: So we've had very long term discussions over the last --

THE COURT: Well, I notice that -- MS. CRAIG: -- nine months or so.

THE COURT: -- the plea agreement was originally dated in June --

MS. CRAIG: That's correct.

THE COURT: -- so obviously this particular offer has been outstanding for some period of time.

MS. CRAIG: Yes.

THE COURT: Is that correct, Ms. Jackson?

MS. CRAIG: Yes, that's accurate.

THE COURT: Okay. So you did have a chance to read the plea agreement before you signed it?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: And was your attorney available to answer any questions you had before you signed it?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: And do you believe you understood everything in it?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Did you all discuss the six constitutional rights listed on pages 4 and 5 that you waive and give up by entering a plea? THE DEFENDANT: Yes -- okay. Yes, sir.

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THE COURT: Do you remember what I'm talking about in there?

THE DEFENDANT: Mm-hmm.

THE COURT: Okay. And you're comfortable that you understand

those?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir

Recorder's Transcript of Hearing Re: Murder Team Assignment ("Plea Canvass"), at 6-7 (emphasis added).

Therefore, the record is clear that Petitioner understood the consequences outlined in the GPA, which belies her claim that counsel did not review the entirety of the GPA or that she did not understand what rights she was waiving by pleading guilty. <u>Id.</u> at 5-6. Finally, Petitioner confirmed that her attorney reviewed the agreement with her and answered all of her questions. <u>Id.</u> at 6. As such, Petitioner knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily pled guilty, and Petitioner has failed to demonstrate otherwise.

II. PETITIONER IS NOT ENTITLED TO POST-CONVICTION COUNSEL

Under the U.S. Constitution, the Sixth Amendment provides no right to counsel in post-conviction proceedings. <u>Coleman v. Thompson</u>, 501 U.S. 722, 752, 111 S. Ct. 2546, 2566 (1991). In <u>McKague v. Warden</u>, 112 Nev. 159, 163, 912 P.2d 255, 258 (1996), the Nevada Supreme Court specifically held that with the exception of NRS 34.820(1)(a) (entitling appointed counsel when petitioner is under a sentence of death), one does not have "any constitutional or statutory right to counsel at all" in post-conviction proceedings. <u>Id.</u> at 164, 912 P.2d at 258.

Although NRS 34.750 gives courts the discretion to appoint post-conviction counsel, that discretion should be used only to the extent "the court is satisfied that the allegation of indigency is true and the petition is not dismissed summarily." NRS 34.750. NRS 34.750 further requires courts to "consider whether: (a) the issues are difficult; (b) the Defendant is unable to comprehend the proceedings; or (c) counsel is necessary to proceed with discovery." Id.

Here, Petitioner is not entitled to counsel. First, her claims are either waived or belied by the record. Moreover, Petitioner's claims are not complex, and no additional discovery is needed. As such, Petitioner's Motion for Appointment of Counsel is denied.

1	<u>ORDER</u>	
2	THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Petition for Post-Conviction Relief Dated this 4th day of March, 2021	
3	and Motion for Appointment of Counsel shall be, and it is, hereby denied.	
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8	STEVEN B. WOLFSON Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #001565 AB9 89B 611D 974C Tierra Jones District Count Judge	
10	District Court Judge	
11	BY <u>/s/ TALEEN PANDUKHT</u> TALEEN PANDUKHT	
12	Chief Deputy District Attorney Nevada Bar #5734	
13		
14		
15	CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE	
16	I certify that on the 2nd day of March, 2021, I mailed a copy of the foregoing proposed	
17	Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order to:	
18	NATAGIA IA GIZGON #1100501	
19	NATASHA JACKSON, #1188581 FLORENCE MCCLURE WOMEN'S CC	
20	4370 SMILEY ROAD LAS VEGAS NV 89115	
21		
22	BY /s/ J. HAYES Soonstown for the District Attorney's Office	
23	Secretary for the District Attorney's Office	
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CSERV DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA Natasha Jackson, Plaintiff(s) CASE NO: A-20-810845-W VS. DEPT. NO. Department 10 State of Nevada, Defendant(s) **AUTOMATED CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE** This automated certificate of service was generated by the Eighth Judicial District Court. The foregoing Final Accounting was served via the court's electronic eFile system to all recipients registered for e-Service on the above entitled case as listed below: Service Date: 3/4/2021 Dept 3 Law Clerk dept03lc@clarkcountycourts.us

Electronically Filed 3/10/2021 10:56 AM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT

NEFF

DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

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NATASHA JACKSON, 5

VS.

Petitioner,

Case No: A-20-810845-W

Dept No: X

STATE OF NEVADA,

Respondent,

true and correct copy of which is attached to this notice.

NOTICE OF ENTRY OF FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on March 4, 2021, the court entered a decision or order in this matter, a

You may appeal to the Supreme Court from the decision or order of this court. If you wish to appeal, you must file a notice of appeal with the clerk of this court within thirty-three (33) days after the date this notice is mailed to you. This notice was mailed on March 10, 2021.

STEVEN D. GRIERSON, CLERK OF THE COURT

/s/ Amanda Hampton

Amanda Hampton, Deputy Clerk

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CERTIFICATE OF E-SERVICE / MAILING

I hereby certify that on this 10 day of March 2021, I served a copy of this Notice of Entry on the following:

☑ By e-mail:

Clark County District Attorney's Office Attorney General's Office - Appellate Division-

☑ The United States mail addressed as follows:

Natasha Jackson # 1188581 4370 Smiley Rd. Las Vegas, NV 89115

/s/ Amanda Hampton

Amanda Hampton, Deputy Clerk

Case Number: A-20-810845-W



1 **FFCO** STEVEN B. WOLFSON 2 Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #001565 3 TALEEN PANDUKHT Chief Deputy District Attorney 4 Nevada Bar #5734 200 Lewis Avenue 5 Las Vegas, Nevada 89155-2212 (702) 671-2500 6 Attorney for Plaintiff 7 8 DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 9 10 THE STATE OF NEVADA. Plaintiff, 11 CASE NO: A-20-810845-W 12 -VS-C300032-1 13 NATASHA JACKSON, #1921058 DEPT NO: X 14 Defendant. 15 16 FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER 17 DATE OF HEARING: FEBRUARY 11, 2021 18 TIME OF HEARING: 8:30 AM THIS CAUSE having come on for hearing before the Honorable TIERRA JONES, 19 District Judge, on the 10 day of February, 2021, the Petitioner being present, proceeding in 20 proper person, the Respondent being represented by STEVEN B. WOLFSON, Clark County 21 District Attorney, by and through MICHELLE FLECK, Chief Deputy District Attorney, and 22 the Court having considered the matter, including briefs, transcripts, testimony and arguments 23 24 by counsels, and documents on file herein, now therefore, the Court makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law: 25 /// 26 /// 27 28 ///

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On August 8, 2014, the State charged Respondent Natasha Jackson ("Petitioner") with Count 1 – Burglary While in Possession of a Firearm (Category B Felony - NRS 205.060); Counts 2 and 3 – Attempt Robbery with use of a Deadly Weapon (Category B Felony - NRS 200.380, 193.330, 193.165); Count 4 – Murder with use of a Deadly Weapon (Category A Felony - NRS 200.010, 200.030, 193.165); Count 5 – Attempt Murder with use of a Deadly Weapon (Category B Felony - NRS 200.010, 200.030, 193.330, 193.165); Count 6 – First Degree Kidnapping (Category A Felony - NRS 200.310, 200.320); Count 7 – Robbery with use of a Deadly Weapon (Category B Felony - NRS 200.380, 193.165); and Count 8 – Burglary while in Possession of a Deadly Weapon (Category B Felony - NRS 205.060).

On October 6, 2014, Petitioner filed a Pretrial Petition for Writ Of Habeas Corpus ("Pretrial Writ"). The State filed its Return on October 24, 2014. Petitioner filed a Reply on October 29, 2014. On November 10, 2014, the District Court granted Petitioner's Pretrial Writ in part and denied it in part. Specifically, the District Court dismissed Counts 1 and 8. The Order was filed December 4, 2014. On December 12, 2014, the State appealed the Court's ruling. On March 25, 2016, the Nevada Supreme Court reversed the District Court's dismissal of the two (2) counts and remanded the case back to the District Court.

On September 12, 2017, Petitioner pled guilty to Count 1 – Murder with use of a Deadly Weapon (First Degree); and Count 2 – Robbery with Use of a Deadly Weapon pursuant to a Guilty Plea Agreement ("GPA").

On November 17, 2017, the Court sentenced Petitioner as follows: Count 1 – twenty (20) years to life, plus a consecutive sentence of ninety-six (96) to two hundred forty (240) months for the deadly weapon enhancement; and Count 2 – forty-eight (48) to one hundred eighty (180) months, plus a consecutive sentence of thirty-six (36) to one hundred eighty (180) months for the deadly weapon enhancement. Petitioner's aggregate sentence was thirty-five (35) years to life. The Judgment of Conviction was filed on November 13, 2017. Petitioner did not file a direct appeal.

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On February 27, 2018, Petitioner's counsel filed a Motion to Withdraw as counsel. On March 20, 2018, the Court granted counsel's Motion.

On July 18, 2018, Petitioner filed a Motion for the Production of Documents, Papers, Pleadings and Tangible Property of Defendant. On August 9, 2018, the Court granted Petitioner's Motion.

On November 1, 2018, Petitioner filed a Motion for Enlargement of Time in Which to File Post-Conviction Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. On November 27, 2018, the Court granted Petitioner's Motion, and ordered a briefing schedule set should Petitioner file a Petition.

On April 19, 2019, Petitioner filed a second Motion for Enlargement of Time to file. The Court granted Petitioner's Motion on May 14, 2019 and ordered Petitioner to file any Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus by August 13, 2019.

On August 9, 2019, Petitioner filed a third Motion for Enlargement of Time to File. On August 15, 2019, the Court granted Petitioner's Motion, and ordered Petitioner to file any Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus by December 12, 2019. On February 20, 2020, the Court set another briefing schedule and ordered Petitioner to file a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus by April 23, 2020.

On February 26, 2020, Petitioner filed the instant Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Post-Conviction) ("Petition"). On March 25, 2020, the State filed a Response to Petitioner's Petition. On February 11, 2021, this Court made the following Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law.

<u>ANALYSIS</u>

I. PETITIONER RECEIVED EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

Courts must dismiss a petition if a petitioner plead guilty and the petitioner is not alleging "that the plea was involuntarily or unknowingly entered, or that the plea was entered without effective assistance of counsel." NRS 34.810(1)(a). Further, substantive claims—even those disguised as ineffective assistance of counsel claims—are beyond the scope of habeas

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and waived. NRS 34.724(2)(a); Evans, 117 Nev. at 646–47, 29 P.3d at 523; Franklin, 110 Nev. at 752, 877 P.2d at 1059.

The United States Supreme Court has long recognized that "the right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2063 (1984); see also State v. Love, 109 Nev. 1136, 1138, 865 P.2d 322, 323 (1993). To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, a petitioner must prove he was denied "reasonably effective assistance" of counsel by satisfying the two-prong test of Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686-87, 104 S. Ct. at 2063-64. See also Love, 109 Nev. at 1138, 865 P.2d at 323. Under the Strickland test, a petitioner must show first that his counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and second, that but for counsel's errors, there is a reasonable probability that the result of the proceedings would have been different. 466 U.S. at 687-88, 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2065, 2068; Warden, Nevada State Prison v. Lyons, 100 Nev. 430, 432, 683 P.2d 504, 505 (1984) (adopting the Strickland twopart test). "[T]here is no reason for a court deciding an ineffective assistance claim to approach the inquiry in the same order or even to address both components of the inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on one." <u>Strickland</u>, 466 U.S. at 697, 104 S. Ct. at 2069.

A habeas corpus petitioner must prove the disputed factual allegations underlying his ineffective-assistance claim by a preponderance of the evidence. Means v. State, 120 Nev. 1001, 1012, 103 P.3d 25, 33 (2004). Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel asserted in a petition for post-conviction relief must be supported with specific factual allegations, which if true, would entitle the petitioner to relief. Hargrove v. State, 100 Nev. 498, 502, 686 P.2d 222, 225 (1984). "Bare" and "naked" allegations are not sufficient, nor are those belied and repelled by the record. Id. NRS 34.735(6) states in relevant part, "[Petitioner] must allege specific facts supporting the claims in the petition[.] . . . Failure to allege specific facts rather than just conclusions may cause your petition to be dismissed." Id. at 502-03, 686 P.2d at 225.

"There are countless ways to provide effective assistance in any given case. Even the best criminal defense attorneys would not defend a particular client in the same way." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S. Ct. at 689. "Strategic choices made by counsel after

 thoroughly investigating the plausible options are almost unchallengeable." <u>Dawson v. State</u>, 108 Nev. 112, 117, 825 P.2d 593, 596 (1992); see also <u>Ford v. State</u>, 105 Nev. 850, 853, 784 P.2d 951, 953 (1989). Counsel cannot be ineffective for failing to make futile objections or arguments. <u>Ennis v. State</u>, 122 Nev., 694, 706, 137 P.3d 1095, 1103 (2006).

In order to meet the "prejudice prong" of the <u>Strickland</u> test when a conviction is the result of a guilty plea, the petitioner must show a "reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial." <u>Kirksey</u>, 112 Nev. at 988, 923 P.2d at 1107 (quoting <u>Hill</u>, 474 U.S. at 59, 106 S.Ct. at 370) "A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." <u>Strickland</u>, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2068. "Bare" or "naked" allegations are not sufficient to show ineffectiveness of counsel. <u>Hargrove</u>, 100 Nev. at 502, 686 P.2d at 225.

Here, Petitioner claims of ineffective assistance of counsel center around pretrial investigation and obtaining discovery after Petitioner was sentenced. Petitioner's claims do not allege that counsel's actions made her plea unknowing, unintelligent, or involuntary; or that she entered her plea without effective assistance of counsel. Therefore, Petitioner waived her ability to raise these claims and this Court should summarily dismiss the instant Petition. However, even on the merits of Petitioner's claims, the Court nevertheless denies this Petition as all of Petitioner's claims are either belied by the record or bare and naked assertions devoid of factual support.

A. Petitioner's claims in Ground 1 fail.

In Ground 1, Petitioner raises several claims dealing primarily with the adequacy of counsel's investigation and trial preparation prior to her guilty plea. <u>Petition</u> at 1-3 & 6.

Counsel is expected to conduct legal and factual investigations when developing a defense so they may make informed decisions on their client's behalf. <u>Jackson v. Warden</u>, 91 Nev. 430, 433, 537 P.2d 473, 474 (1975) (quoting <u>In re Saunders</u>, 2 Cal.3d 1033, 88 Cal.Rptr. 633, 638, 472 P.2d 921, 926 (1970)). "[D]efense counsel has a duty 'to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary." <u>Love</u>, 109 Nev. at 1138, 865 P.2d at 323 (*quoting* Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691,

104 S. Ct. at 2066). A defendant who contends his attorney was ineffective because he did not adequately investigate must show how a better investigation would have rendered a more favorable outcome. Molina, 120 Nev. at 192, 87 P.3d at 538.

Petitioner first argues that counsel failed to note inconsistencies between witness statements and the physical evidence. Petition at 1. Specifically, Petitioner notes that the medical examiner's Grand Jury testimony conflicted with Julie Ramos's statement. The medical examiner testified, while Julie Ramos stated that Petitioner hit her husband with a wrench and stabbed her with a screwdriver. Petition at 2. Petitioner further notes that Julie Ramos's statement conflicted with Petitioner's statement to the police and therefore, Julie Ramos is not to be believed. Petition at 2. As a result of these inconsistencies, Petitioner appears to claim that Count 8 was disingenuous and counsel should have challenged it. Petition at 2.

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Petitioner next claims that counsel failed to prepare a trial strategy. <u>Petition</u> at 2. Petitioner claims this shows that counsel's only plan of action was for Petitioner to plead guilty. <u>Id.</u> at 2. Not only is this a bare and naked claim unsupported by any specific facts, but

whether counsel prepared for trial is irrelevant because Petitioner pled guilty over two (2) months before the scheduled trial date. As Petitioner pled guilty, there was no need for trial strategy and counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for allegedly not preparing one. <u>United States v. Cronic</u>, 466 U.S. 648, 657 n.19, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 2046 n. 19 (1984) ("The constitution does not require that defense counsel do what is impossible or unethical. If there is no bona fide defense to the charge, counsel cannot create one and may disserve the interests of his client by attempting a useless charade").

Third, Petitioner accuses counsel of ineffectiveness because the State's offer was extended three and a half years after her arrest and allegedly did not change. Petition at 2. Counsel had no control over the timing or the substance of the State's offer. From December 2014 until March 2016, this matter was pending before the Nevada Supreme Court on appeal and the District Court did not have the jurisdiction to do anything, including accept a guilty plea. Once the Nevada Supreme Court remanded the matter back to the District Court, counsel immediately began discussing offers with the State. That the offer conveyed by the State did not change is not something counsel had any control over, and Petitioner fails to provide any authority stating otherwise. Indeed, common sense dictates that defense counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to do something they had no control over. Additionally, Petitioner had six (6) months to decide whether to plead guilty and the plea canvass established that when Petitioner did plead guilty, she did so freely and voluntarily.

Moreover, Petitioner cannot show prejudice because she does not claim she would have rejected a better or earlier conveyed offer and insisted on proceeding to trial. <u>Kirksey</u>, 112 Nev. at 988, 923 P.2d at 1107. Indeed, she cannot, as such a claim would be logically inconsistent. Had counsel received a better offer, because Petitioner accepted the instant negotiation, Petitioner would not have likely accepted a more favorable offer. As such, this claim fails.

Fourth, Petitioner claims counsel should have challenged the deadly weapon enhancement and that she would have received a lesser sentence had counsel done so. <u>Petition</u> at 6. To the extent Petitioner claims counsel should have challenged the deadly weapon

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enhancement pre-plea, such a claim was waived when she pled guilty and is further belied by the record. In Petitioner's Pretrial Writ, counsel expressly argued that there was not sufficient evidence supporting the deadly weapon enhancement. Pretrial Writ, at 5-7. To the extent Petitioner is claiming counsel should have challenged the enhancement post-plea, Petitioner continues to fault counsel of ineffectiveness for failing to make a futile motion or argument. Ennis, 122 Nev. at 706, 137 P.3d at 1103. Petitioner pled guilty to Murder with Use of a Deadly Weapon (First Degree). GPA at 1. Once Petitioner did so, the deadly weapon enhancement could not be removed from the charging document. As such, Petitioner's claim is baseless and otherwise belied by the record.

Fifth, Petitioner's final claim raised in Ground 1 revolves around her police interrogation. Petitioner first claims counsel should have filed a motion to admit the interrogation at the Grand Jury so they could assess the accuracy of Detective McCarthy's version of Petitioner's story, intent, and lucidity. <u>Petition</u> at 6. Second, Petitioner claims counsel should have attempted to suppress the interrogation as the statements were made while she was under the influence of methamphetamine and experiencing delusional thoughts, erratic speech patterns and sporadic loss of consciousness. Id. Petitioner's first claim is belied by counsel's arguments in the Pretrial Writ. Counsel argued that the charges against Petitioner should be dismissed because the State should have, and failed to, admit Petitioner's interrogation to the Grand Jury to highlight the inconsistencies in Detective McCarthy's statement. Pretrial Writ, at 7-12. As counsel has no control over what evidence the State presents to a Grand Jury save for a pretrial writ, counsel did all they could and cannot be deemed ineffective. Second, Petitioner's claim that counsel should have moved to suppress her statements is meritless because Petitioner pled guilty in lieu of trial. When Petitioner pled guilty, any question of her state of mind during the police interrogation became irrelevant as there was no longer a trial where her statement could or could not be admitted. Moreover, Petitioner does not establish that counsel could have successfully suppressed her statement. Counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to make a futile motion. Ennis, 122 Nev. at 706, 137 P.3d at 1103. Finally, Petitioner does not explain that had counsel attempted to

suppress her statement, she would have insisted on proceeding to trial. Therefore, Petitioner's claim fails.

B. Petitioner's claims in Ground 2 fail.

The crux of Petitioner's claims in Ground 2 revolve around the speed with which defense counsel provided copies of her discovery post-sentence. Petitioner claims that counsel ignored Court orders to send Petitioner her discovery in a timely fashion. Petition at 4. Petitioner then claims that even when she received her file from counsel, the file did not include a transcript of the plea canvass and did not include emails between counsel and the state regarding negotiations. Id. at 7.

As an initial matter, counsel's actions after she was sentenced and transported to prison had absolutely no bearing on the validity of her plea. Therefore, there is no way Petitioner can demonstrate that counsel's actions impacted her decision to plead guilty and her claim is dismissed.

Further, Petitioner cannot show prejudice. The court allowed Petitioner to file the instant Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus over two and a half years after the Judgment of Conviction was filed because Petitioner continued to inform the Court she did not have all of the information necessary to file a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. Moreover, Petitioner has not established that any email communication between the State and counsel regarding negotiations exists. Counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to provide nonexistent information. Finally, counsel did not provide a copy of the transcript of Petitioner's plea canvass because that transcript was not prepared until the State requested the Court prepare it after Petitioner filed her Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Post-Conviction). Order for Transcript, filed on March 11, 2020. Therefore, Petitioner's claim in Ground 2 should fail.

Petitioner also appears to claim in Ground 2 that she was sentenced on incorrect information. Petition at 7. Such a claim is nothing more than a bare and naked claim unsupported by specific facts in the record. Petitioner does not point to specific facts that she alleges to be incorrect. Hargrove, 100 Nev. at 502, 686 P.2d at 225. To the extent Petitioner claims the Court incorrectly sentenced her on the Deadly Weapon enhancement, as explained

above, because Petitioner pled guilty to Murder with use of a Deadly Weapon (First Degree), she admitted to using a deadly weapon. As such, the Court did not err in considering that fact when sentencing her and counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for not making a futile objection. Ennis, 122 Nev. at 706, 137 P.3d at 1103.

C. Petitioner's plea was knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made.

Petitioner appears to claim that counsel was ineffective in advising her to accept the State's plea deal of a stipulated aggregate sentence of thirty-five (35) years to life. Petition at 3. Petitioner claims counsel did not elaborate on the terms outlined in the Guilty Plea Agreement and led her to believe it was in her best interest to plead guilty and file an appeal after. Petition at 6. Petitioner further claims that counsel did not warn her that by pleading guilty, she would be waiving her right to file a direct appeal. Petition at 6. Petitioner's claim is belied by the record.

To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for advice regarding a guilty plea, a defendant must show "gross error on the part of counsel." Turner v. Calderon, 281 F.3d 851, 880 (9th Cir. 2002). It is true that defendant is entitled to effective assistance of counsel in the plea-bargaining process and in determining whether to accept or reject a plea offer. Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 163, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1384 (2012); see also McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771, 90 S. Ct. 1441 (1970) (the Constitution guarantees effective counsel when accepting guilty plea). In considering the defendant's "right to make a reasonably informed decision whether to accept a plea offer," importantly, the question is not whether, "counsel's advice [was] right or wrong, but . . . whether that advice was within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases." Id. (quoting United States v. Day, 969 F.2d 39, 43 (3rd Cir. 1992), and McMann, 397 U.S. 771, 90 S. Ct. at 1449.

Petitioner's claim that counsel was ineffective when advising her to accept the plea deal was is nothing more than a bare and naked claim. Petitioner offers no specific facts indicating that counsel's advice to plead guilty was unreasonable. Petitioner was charged with eight (8) serious felony counts, including Murder with use of a Deadly Weapon, and First-Degree Kidnapping, both of which carried potential sentences of life without the possibility of parole.

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Had Petitioner proceeded to trial, and had Petitioner been convicted of only those two (2) counts, she could have been sentenced to two (2) consecutive life sentences. As such, counsel was very reasonable in recommending that Petitioner accept the State's offer to stipulate to an aggregate sentence of thirty-five (35) years to life. Moreover, it was Petitioner's decision of whether to plead guilty and counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for offering candid advice.

Further, Petitioner's claim that counsel did not spend time reviewing the GPA with her or that counsel forced her to plead guilty is belied by the record. First, in signing the GPA, Petitioner acknowledged that she knew and understood she was waiving the right to file a direct appeal. Guilty Plea Agreement at 5. The Court confirmed that she understood that waiver during the plea canvass. Plea Canvass at 6. During the plea canvass, Petitioner further confirmed that she had been discussing and reviewing the GPA with counsel for nine (9) months and that counsel had reviewed the entire GPA with her:

MS. CRAIG: Your Honor, if I could, she and I had been talking about this negotiation since January.

THE COURT: Right.

MS. CRAIG: So we've had very long term discussions over the last --

THE COURT: Well, I notice that -- MS. CRAIG: -- nine months or so.

THE COURT: -- the plea agreement was originally dated in June --

MS. CRAIG: That's correct.

THE COURT: -- so obviously this particular offer has been outstanding for some period of time.

MS. CRAIG: Yes.

THE COURT: Is that correct, Ms. Jackson?

MS. CRAIG: Yes, that's accurate.

THE COURT: Okay. So you did have a chance to read the plea agreement before you signed it?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: And was your attorney available to answer any questions you had before you signed it?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: And do you believe you understood everything in it?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Did you all discuss the six constitutional rights listed on pages 4 and 5 that you waive and give up by entering a plea? THE DEFENDANT: Yes -- okay. Yes, sir.

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THE COURT: Do you remember what I'm talking about in there?

THE DEFENDANT: Mm-hmm.

THE COURT: Okay. And you're comfortable that you understand

those?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir

Recorder's Transcript of Hearing Re: Murder Team Assignment ("Plea Canvass"), at 6-7 (emphasis added).

Therefore, the record is clear that Petitioner understood the consequences outlined in the GPA, which belies her claim that counsel did not review the entirety of the GPA or that she did not understand what rights she was waiving by pleading guilty. <u>Id.</u> at 5-6. Finally, Petitioner confirmed that her attorney reviewed the agreement with her and answered all of her questions. <u>Id.</u> at 6. As such, Petitioner knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily pled guilty, and Petitioner has failed to demonstrate otherwise.

II. PETITIONER IS NOT ENTITLED TO POST-CONVICTION COUNSEL

Under the U.S. Constitution, the Sixth Amendment provides no right to counsel in post-conviction proceedings. <u>Coleman v. Thompson</u>, 501 U.S. 722, 752, 111 S. Ct. 2546, 2566 (1991). In <u>McKague v. Warden</u>, 112 Nev. 159, 163, 912 P.2d 255, 258 (1996), the Nevada Supreme Court specifically held that with the exception of NRS 34.820(1)(a) (entitling appointed counsel when petitioner is under a sentence of death), one does not have "any constitutional or statutory right to counsel at all" in post-conviction proceedings. <u>Id.</u> at 164, 912 P.2d at 258.

Although NRS 34.750 gives courts the discretion to appoint post-conviction counsel, that discretion should be used only to the extent "the court is satisfied that the allegation of indigency is true and the petition is not dismissed summarily." NRS 34.750. NRS 34.750 further requires courts to "consider whether: (a) the issues are difficult; (b) the Defendant is unable to comprehend the proceedings; or (c) counsel is necessary to proceed with discovery." Id.

Here, Petitioner is not entitled to counsel. First, her claims are either waived or belied by the record. Moreover, Petitioner's claims are not complex, and no additional discovery is needed. As such, Petitioner's Motion for Appointment of Counsel is denied.

1	<u>ORDER</u>		
2	THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Petition for Post-Conviction Relief Dated this 4th day of March, 2021		
3	and Motion for Appointment of Counsel shall be, and it is, hereby denied.		
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5	Illu J		
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8	STEVEN B. WOLFSON Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #001565 AB9 89B 611D 974C Tierra Jones District Count Judge		
10	District Court Judge		
11	BY _/s/ TALEEN PANDUKHT TALEEN PANDUKHT		
12	Chief Deputy District Attorney Nevada Bar #5734		
13			
14			
15	CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE		
16	I certify that on the 2nd day of March, 2021, I mailed a copy of the foregoing proposed		
17	Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order to:		
18	NATAGUA LA GUGON #1100501		
19	NATASHA JACKSON, #1188581 FLORENCE MCCLURE WOMEN'S CC 4370 SMILEY ROAD LAS VEGAS NV 89115		
20			
21			
22	BY /s/ J. HAYES Soontony for the District Atterney's Office		
23	Secretary for the District Attorney's Office		
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27	14E12024V/TD/;b/;b/MV/H		
28	14F12024X/TB/jb/jh/MVU		
	.1		

CSERV DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA Natasha Jackson, Plaintiff(s) CASE NO: A-20-810845-W VS. DEPT. NO. Department 10 State of Nevada, Defendant(s) **AUTOMATED CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE** This automated certificate of service was generated by the Eighth Judicial District Court. The foregoing Final Accounting was served via the court's electronic eFile system to all recipients registered for e-Service on the above entitled case as listed below: Service Date: 3/4/2021 Dept 3 Law Clerk dept03lc@clarkcountycourts.us

Writ of Habeas Corpus

COURT MINUTES

April 28, 2020

A-20-810845-W

Natasha Jackson, Plaintiff(s)

vs.

State of Nevada, Defendant(s)

April 28, 2020

3:30 PM

All Pending Motions

HEARD BY: Herndon, Douglas W.

COURTROOM: RJC Lower Level Arraignment

COURT CLERK: Kory Schlitz

RECORDER: Stacey Ray

REPORTER:

PARTIES

PRESENT: Rinetti, Dena I.

State of Nevada

Attorney Defendant

JOURNAL ENTRIES

- PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS... PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL...

Defendant not present and in custody in the Nevada Department of Corrections. COURT STATED the Defendant filed a Pro Per Petition and a Motion for Appointment of Counsel, and just on the pleadings, without argument, Petition DENIED IN PART AND GRANTED IN PART. COURT STATED the Defendant has made allegations that the Court does not believe need examination outside, the record, nor do they believe are complex, which would not warrant the need to appoint an attorney. COURT ADVISED the Defendant negotiated the case, with a stipulated sentence, in which the Court imposed at the time of sentencing, and the Defendant has now filed the instant petition. COURT FURTHER STATED the Defendant has alleged ineffective assistance of counsel, alleging her attorney was deficient for not making certain challenges to the State's version of factual events in regard to the conduct that occurred at the hearing, in light of certain testimony given by the medical examiner, versus things that were in certain statements. COURT STATED Defendant waives any challenges of any dissection of the facts of the case, by virtue of the Defendant's plea; adding the Defendant factually admitted to the conduct she is now complaining about, which is inconsistent with her use of a screw driver, in attacking both the victims. COURT ADDITIONALLY STATED the

PRINT DATE: 04/01/2021 Page 1 of 7 Minutes Date: April 28, 2020

allegation the matter was not investigated to bring out the discrepancies, the Court pointed out there was never a trial, which means there never was an opportunity to make challenges in terms of examining witnesses at trial. COURT STATED the Defendant makes an allegation there was not a proper investigation of the weapons enhancement, and counsel never provided her with updates with regards to negotiations, adding the Court was pending for a number of years, and there was no change to negotiations, and there is no requirement for counsel to update the Defendant with regards to there being no change in negotiations. COURT STATED the Defendant does make allegations that warrant a hearing, stating the Defendant alleged she attempted to contact counsel to discuss the appeals process after she was sentenced, and only later learned the Defendant had forfeited her right to direct appeal, adding the allegation the Defendant wanted to appeal and somehow was denied that, does entitle the Defendant to an Evidentiary Hearing. COURT FURTHER STATED the Defendant makes bare allegations, with regards to failure to investigation that would have changed the outcome of the proceedings, however there is no specificity to those allegations, and it does not justify any relief; the Defendant also stated there was a failure to object to the weapon enhancement that somehow would have reduced the Defendant's sentence, which is a bare allegation without any support, adding the Defendant pled guilty to the weapon enhancement. COURT ADDITIONALLY STATED the Defendant makes an allegation there was a failure to move to admit, or present to the Grand Jury certain things in regards to the Defendant's interrogation, and counsel made challenges to those allegations in the Pre-Trial Writ of Habeas Corpus, which does not justify any relief. COURT STATED the Defendant makes an argument about counsel predicting that a Judge and Jury would fail to make an impartial assessment of her case, by reading journal entries that were written by the Petition upon her initial introduction to the Co-Defendant, which is a bare allegation without any support, and the Defendant might be referring to what counsel told her with regards to strength or weakness of the case, which is not a ground for ineffective assistance of counsel. COURT FURTHER STATED the Defendant makes allegations her attorney failed to properly instruct her about the Guilty Plea, which is a bare allegation, however it can be addressed at the Evidentiary Hearing. COURT ADDITIONALLY STATED the Defendant alleges her attorney failed to move to suppress the interrogation of the petition, since it was made under the influence, which is an issue which is waived by virtue of negotiating the case, and pleading guilty. COURT STATED the Defendant additionally alleges her attorney failed to delivery Discovery to the Defendant in a timely fashion, which is an allegation that is waived by the Guilty Plea, adding there is no allegation that the Defendant was prejudice by not having the Discovery, adding the Defendant is complaining she did not receive the Discovery after she was sentenced, and the FINDS THERE IS NO PREJUDICE with regards to that claim, since the Court kept extending her Writ time period, which the Discovery boxes were being provided to the Defendant. COURT STATED the Defendant is alleging her attorney failed to extend her right to be sentenced, based on accurate and reliable evidence, which the Court states the Defendant had the ability to make a statement at the time of sentencing, pointing out the Defendant negotiated a stipulated sentence, which the Defendant received, and the FINDS THERE IS NO PREJUDICE with regards to that claim. COURT FURTHER STATED, the Defendant is alleging her attorney failed to giver her verbatim reports of plea conversations between the parties, and failed to provide the Defendant with copies of letters, e-mails, or notes between the Defense and the State regarding negotiations, and the FINDS there is no obligation of attorneys to take verbatim notes of plea negotiation discussions that they have with the State, nor is there any obligation the attorneys

A-20-810845-W

have to provide the Defendant with letters, e-mails, notes or verbatim reports of conversation that the attorney has with the prosecutors. COURT ADDITIONALLY STATED the Defendant alleged inconsistent representation resulting delays in obtaining Discovery, pointing out this is a Post-Conviction issue, and FINDS the Defendant WAS NOT PREJUDICED since the Court kept extending the deadline. COURT ORDERED, Petition DENIED IN PART for all reasons previously stated, and GRANTED IN PART and an Evidentiary Hearing SET with regards to the two issues of whether her attorney properly instructed the Defendant on her Guilty Plea, and whether the Defendant expressed a desire to file a direct appeal, and was somehow lost that ability due to the attorney. Ms. Rinetti stated she would do an Order to Transport.

NDC

6/30/2020 9:00 A.M. EVIDENTIARY HEARING

PRINT DATE: 04/01/2021 Page 3 of 7 Minutes Date: April 28, 2020

Writ of Habeas Corpus

COURT MINUTES

August 12, 2020

A-20-810845-W

Natasha Jackson, Plaintiff(s)

VS.

State of Nevada, Defendant(s)

August 12, 2020

12:00 AM

Evidentiary Hearing

HEARD BY: Herndon, Douglas W.

COURTROOM: RJC Courtroom 16C

COURT CLERK: Kory Schlitz

RECORDER: Stacey Ray

REPORTER:

PARTIES

PRESENT: Weckerly, Pamela C

Attorney

JOURNAL ENTRIES

- Defendant not present; Deputy Public Defender Christy Craig present.

COURT STATED the Defendant was not transported, and ORDERED the matter OFF CALENDAR; and DIRECTED parties to figure out a continued hearing date.

NDC

Writ of Habeas Corpus

COURT MINUTES

December 04, 2020

A-20-810845-W

Natasha Jackson, Plaintiff(s)

vs.

State of Nevada, Defendant(s)

December 04, 2020

8:00 AM

Evidentiary Hearing

HEARD BY: Jones, Tierra

COURTROOM: RJC Courtroom 14B

COURT CLERK: Teri Berkshire

RECORDER: Victoria Boyd

REPORTER:

PARTIES PRESENT:

JOURNAL ENTRIES

- Court noted Deft. is not here and there is no transport order, in Odyssey. COURT ORDERED, matter OFF CALENDAR. Court will re-set the matter.

NDC

PRINT DATE: 04/01/2021 Page 5 of 7 Minutes Date: April 28, 2020

Writ of Habeas Corpus

COURT MINUTES

February 11, 2021

A-20-810845-W

Natasha Jackson, Plaintiff(s)

VS.

State of Nevada, Defendant(s)

February 11, 2021

2:00 PM

All Pending Motions

HEARD BY: Jones, Tierra

COURTROOM: RJC Courtroom 14B

COURT CLERK: Kathy Thomas

RECORDER: Victoria Boyd

REPORTER:

PARTIES

PRESENT: Fleck, Michelle

Jackson, Natasha

Attorney Plaintiff

JOURNAL ENTRIES

- EVIDENTIARY HEARING:LIMIITED ISSUES/PTN...PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

Deft. JACKSON present by video, in custody in the Nevada Department of Corrections (NDC) appearing Pro Se. State noted Ms. Craig present as a witness by subpoena. Court explained this is a hearing regarding the Petition filed for ineffective assistance of counsel. Hearing:

Testimony presented; Ms. Craig sworn and testified. State noted the hearing today was only regarding two issues within the writ; 1) properly instructed as to the Guilty Plea Agreement (GPA) and 2) as to the Deft's desire for an appeal. Court will allow leeway in Ms. Jackson's, Deft./Pro Se, direct questioning. State called no witnesses. Arguments by Ms. Jackson and State. Court noted the Deft. did free and voluntarily sign the Guilty Plea Agreement (GPA), Deft. was thoroughly canvassed. Ms. Jackson stated she learned from the Law Library in prison of filing an appeal. Court stated findings; as to the first issue, the Deft. was not forced into the Guilty Plea Agreement, the Deft. had 6 months to accept the agreement, Judge Herndon canvassed the Deft. and the Deft. freely and voluntarily agreed to the Guilty Plea Agreement. As to the second issue; Ms. Craig did not prepare the appeal, Court noted the Deft. was advised it was up to Ms. Jackson/Deft. Court further found it was belied by the record. COURT ORDERED, Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, DENIED. Court

PRINT DATE: 04/01/2021 Page 6 of 7 Minutes Date: April 28, 2020

A-20-810845-W

directed the State to prepare the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.

Certification of Copy

State of Nevada	٦	SS:
County of Clark	}	

I, Steven D. Grierson, the Clerk of the Court of the Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County, State of Nevada, does hereby certify that the foregoing is a true, full and correct copy of the hereinafter stated original document(s):

NOTICE OF APPEAL; CASE APPEAL STATEMENT; DISTRICT COURT DOCKET ENTRIES; CIVIL COVER SHEET; FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER; NOTICE OF ENTRY OF FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER; DISTRICT COURT MINUTES

NATASHA G. JACKSON,

Plaintiff(s),

VS.

STATE OF NEVADA,

Defendant(s),

now on file and of record in this office.

Case No: A-20-810845-W

Dept No: X

IN WITNESS THEREOF, I have hereunto Set my hand and Affixed the seal of the Court at my office, Las Vegas, Nevada This 1 day of April 2021.

Steven D. Grierson, Clerk of the Court

Heather Ungermann, Deputy Clerk