IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

LAS VEGAS METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENT; AND CANNON COCHRAN MANAGEMENT SERVICES, INC.,

Appellants,

v.

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STATE OF NEVADA DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS AND INDUSTRY, DIVISION OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS; AND STATE OF NEVADA BOARD FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE SUBSEQUENT INJURY ACCOUNT FOR SELF-INSURED EMPLOYERS,

Respondents.

Supreme Court Case No.: 83262
Electronically Filed

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Elizabeth A. Brown

District Court Case Merk of Supreme Court

APPELLANTS' OPENING BRIEF

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4885-9499-1624.1 / 33307-150

Docket 83262 Document 2022-00651

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NRAP 26.1 DISCLOSURE

The undersigned counsel of record certifies that the following are persons and entities as described in NRAP 26.1(a), and must be disclosed:

- 1. The Appellant, CANNON COCHRAN MANAGEMENT SERVICES, INC., states that it does not have any parent corporation, or any publicly held corporation that owns 10% or more of its stock, nor any publicly held corporation that has a direct financial interest in the outcome of the litigation. NRAP 26.1(a).
- 2. The Appellant LAS VEGAS METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENT is a governmental party and therefore exempt from the NRAP 26.1 disclosure requirements.
- 3. DANIEL, L. SCHWARTZ, ESQ., JOEL P. REEVES, ESQ., KIM PRICE, ESQ., and L. MICHAEL FRIEND, ESQ., of LEWIS BRISBOIS BISGAARD & SMITH LLP are counsel of record for CANNON COCHRAN MANAGEMENT SERVICES, INC. and LAS VEGAS METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENT who have appeared in this matter before District Court and/or at the administrative proceedings before the SUBSQUENT INJURY BOARD FOR THE SELF-INSURED EMPLOYERS.

These representations are made in order that the judges of this court may evaluate possible disqualifications or recusal.

DATED this 6th day of January, 2022.

LEWIS BRISBOIS BISGAARD & SMITH LLP

By: /s/ L. Michael Friend
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I.

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

Appellants timely appealed the August 19, 2020, determination of the State of Nevada Board for the Administration of the Subsequent Injury Account for Self-Insured Employers per NRS 616C.370, NRS 616B.557(7), and Chapter 233B of the Nevada Revised Statutes which mandates that judicial review shall be the sole and exclusive authorized judicial proceeding in a contested industrial insurance matter.

On May 5, 2021, Respondents filed a motion to dismiss Appellants' petition for judicial review. The district court issued an order on June 21, 2021, granting Respondents' motion to dismiss. Appellants timely filed an appeal of that order with this honorable court on July 19, 2021. As the order is the final judgment of the district court and it aggrieved Appellants, this court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal under NRS 233B.150.

II.

ROUTING STATEMENT

As a petition for judicial review of a final decision of an administrative agency, this case is presumptively assigned to the Court of Appeals under NRAP 17(b)(10).

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III.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

The district court dismissed Appellants' Petition for Judicial Review of the underlying administrative agency determination. Appellants respectfully request this court to review the district court's findings to determine if dismissal was appropriate. Specifically, this court is asked to address whether Appellants had a statutory mandate under NRS 233B.131(1) to file the transcript of the underlying proceedings before the administrative agency within 45 days after the service of their petition for judicial review; and, if so, was Appellants' failure to do so proper grounds for dismissing their petition for judicial review?

IV.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This case concerns the dismissal of a petition for review from a determination by the Board for Administration of Subsequent Injury Account for Self-Insured Employers (hereinafter "the Board") regarding a request for reimbursement from the Subsequent Injury Account related to an industrial injury sustained by an officer with the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department.

The Board ultimately issued its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Determination on August 19, 2020. Notice of the Board's Determination was issued on September 1, 2020.

Appellants timely filed a Petition for Judicial Review of the Board's determination to the district court on September 24, 2020.

On November 9, 2020, Respondents filed a Transmittal of Record on Appeal in Accordance with the Nevada Administrative Act pursuant to NRS 233B.131.

On April 5, 2021, Appellants filed their Opening Brief in support of their petition.

On May 5, 2021, Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the petition based on its contentions that Appellants never filed the transcript of the underlying administrative proceedings per NRS 233B.131(1)(a) and because Appellants failed to file their Opening Brief within 40 days pursuant to NRS 233B.133(1).

On June 7, 2021, Respondent's motion came o before the district court.

The Notice of Entry of Order Granting Respondent's Motion to Dismiss Petition for Judicial Review was filed on June 22, 2021. The court granted the motion based on Appellants' failure to transmit the transcript of the underlying administrative proceeding without good cause.

Appellants appealed the district court's dismissal for this court's review.



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_	STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS

On April 10, 2018, Appellants/Petitioners Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department ("LVMPD") and Cannon Cochran Management Services, Inc. ("CCMSI")(collectively referred to hereinafter as "Petitioners") submitted a formal request for reimbursement from the Subsequent Injury Account (hereinafter "SIA") pursuant to NRS 616B.557 related to a subsequent industrial injury sustained by an officer with LVMPD. (Appellants' Appendix p. 2.)(hereinafter "APP at ____.")

On April 18, 2018, the Division of Industrial Relations (hereinafter "DIR") submitted its recommendation to the Board for Administration of Subsequent Injury Account for Self-Insured Employers (hereinafter "Board"). (APP at 1-42.)

The recommendation of the DIR was heard by the Board on June 27, 2018. (APP at 63-70.)

On July 11, 2018, the Board issued a letter notifying Petitioners that it voted to approve the request for reimbursement, but for less than Petitioners had requested. (APP at 71-72.)

On August 10, 2018, Petitioners sent a letter to the Board advising that they were appealing the Board's recommendation. (APP at 75.)

On September 28, 2018 the Board conducted a de novo hearing regarding Petitioners' appeal. (APP at. 124.)



The Board ultimately issued its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Determination of the Board (hereinafter "the Board's Determination") on August 19, 2020. (APP at 124-130.) The Notice of the Board's Determination was issued on September 1, 2020. (APP at 131-132.)

Petitioners timely filed their Petition for Judicial Review of the Board's determination to the district court on September 24, 2020. (APP at 133-146.)

Respondents DIR and the Office of the Attorney General (hereinafter "AG") filed their intents to participate in the matter on October 13, 2020, and October 14, 2020, respectively. (APP at 147-153.)

On November 9, 2020, Respondent AG filed the Transmittal of Record on Appeal in Accordance with the Nevada Administrative Act pursuant to NRS 233B.131. That document states:

Pursuant to NRS 233B.131, the STATE OF NEVADA BOARD FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE SUBSEQUENT INJURY ACCOUNT FOR SELF-INSURED EMPLOYERS (SIA) now files the entire record of the proceedings under review by this Court as a result of the Petition for Judicial Review pursuant to NRS 233B.130 filed by LAS VEGAS METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENT and CANNON COCHRAN MANAGEMENT SERVICES, INC., Respondents.

(APP at 154-157.)

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The Record on Appeal transmitted by AG consisted of 132 pages, with a certification by a compliance audit investigator with the DIR "that the documents submitted herewith comprise the record of the administrative proceeding, which is the subject of Case No. Case No. [sic] A-20-821892-J in Department XV of the Eighth Judicial District Court, in and for Clark County, Nevada, which are attached hereto as Bates ROA 0001-0132." (APP at 157, referring to APP at 1-132.)

On April 5, 2021, Petitioners filed their Opening Brief. (APP at 161-182.)

On May 5, 2021, DIR filed its Motion to Dismiss Petitioners' Petition for Judicial Review, or in the Alternative [sic] Motion to Strike "Petitioners [sic] Opening Brief" and Motion to Extend Time to File Reply Memorandum of Points and Authorities. (APP at 183-208.) DIR based its motion on its contentions that Petitioners never filed the transcript of the underlying administrative proceedings per NRS 233B.131(1)(a) and because Petitioners failed to file their Opening Brief within 40 days pursuant to NRS 233B.133(1)." (APP at 183.) AG joined the motion. (APP at 209-211.)

Petitioners filed their opposition on May 19, 2021. (APP at 212-220.)

Thereafter, DIR filed its reply to which AG joined. (APP at 221-236.)

On June 7, 2021, Respondent's motion came on for hearing. The district court granted Respondent's motion to dismiss. (APP at 237.)

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The Notice of Entry of Order Granting Respondent's Motion to Dismiss Petition for Judicial Review was filed on June 22, 2021. (APP at 244-249.) The court granted the motion based on Petitioners' failure to transmit the transcript of the underlying administrative proceeding. The court concluded Petitioners had not established good cause for the failure to transmit the transcript as required by NRS 233B.131(a). (APP at 248-249.) Although the court referenced that Petitioners filed their brief late, the late filing of the brief is not stated as a basis for the dismissal.

On July 13, 2021, Petitioners moved the district court for reconsideration, attaching the transcript of the underlying proceedings as an exhibit (having obtained a copy upon learning that no transcript had been produced). (APP at 250-333). The district court denied reconsideration. (APP at 388-398.)

On July 19, 2021, Petitioners timely filed an appeal of the dismissal with this court. (APP at 335-345.)

VI.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

Petitioners argue that the district court's dismissal of its petition was an abuse of discretion based on erroneous statutory interpretation. Specifically, the district court determined Petitioner was mandated to transmit a transcript of the underlying administrative proceeding within 45 days of serving their petition per

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NRS 616C.131(a)(a). The district court concluded that Petitioner's failure to do so without good cause was grounds for dismissal.

Petitioners do not dispute that they did not file the transcript within 45 days of service of their petition. However, Petitioners argue that this omission is not jurisdictional and does not mandate dismissal, nor was good cause the proper standard of review. In support of this position, Petitioners posit they relied upon certifications and representations made by Respondents that the entire record had been transmitted to the district court; that equitable remedies forestall dismissal; and that public policy supports hearing this case on the merits.

VII.

ARGUMENT

A.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

This court reviews de novo a district court's order granting a motion to dismiss. Moon v. McDonald, Carano & Wilson, LLP, 129 Nev. 547, 550, 306 P.3d 406, 408 (2013). At issue is the district court's interpretation of the requirements set forth in NRS 233B.131. This court also reviews issues of statutory construction de novo. Liberty Mut. v. Thomasson, 130 Nev. 27, 30, 317 P.3d 831, 833 (2014). When interpreting a statute, the court first looks to its language, and "[w]hen the language . . . is clear on its face, 'this court will not go beyond [the]

statute's plain language." J.E. Dunn Nw. v. Corus Constr. Venture, 127 Nev. 72, 79, 249 P.3d 501, 505 (2011) (second alteration in original) (quoting Great Basin Water Network v. State Eng'r, 126 Nev. Adv. Rep. 20, 234 P.3d 912, 918 (2010)).

В.

Petitioners' actions regarding the transmittal of the transcript of the underlying administrative proceedings were in good faith and are not grounds for dismissal of their petition

The district court dismissed Petitioners' petition for judicial review based on their failure to transmit the transcript of the underlying administrative proceedings per NRS 233B.131(1)(a). The deadlines established by NRS 233B.131 are not jurisdictional, and dismissal for failure to comply is not mandatory. NRS 233B.131 allows the court discretion to extend the deadlines without a showing of good cause. Based on the facts before the court, the district court abused its discretion by dismissing the petition for judicial review.

The district court's findings in its order hinge solely on Petitioners' failure to transmit a transcript of proceedings per NRS 233B.131(1)(a). The court held that the requirement under NRS 233B.131(1)(a) is mandatory; however, it stated the deadline provided in NRS 233B.131 is not jurisdictional and could be excused for good cause. (Finding No. 12, APP at 248.) The court concluded Petitioners did not meet their burden to show good cause under the <u>Scrimer</u> factors. (Finding No. 17,

APP at 249.) Scrimer v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 116 Nev. 507, 516, 998 P.2d 1190, 1195-1196 (2000).

NRS 233B.131 states in pertinent part:

- 1. Within 45 days after the service of the petition for judicial review or such time as is allowed by the court:
- (a) The party who filed the petition for judicial review shall transmit to the reviewing court an original or certified copy of the transcript of the evidence resulting in the final decision of the agency.
- (b) The agency that rendered the decision which is the subject of the petition shall transmit to the reviewing court the original or a certified copy of the remainder of the record of the proceeding under review.
- The record may be shortened by stipulation of the parties to the proceedings. A party unreasonably refusing to stipulate to limit the record, as determined by the court, may be assessed by the court any additional costs. The court may require or permit subsequent corrections or additions to the record. (Emphasis added)

The court concluded the use of "shall" in NRS 233B.131(1)(a) made the requirement mandatory; however, the use of "shall" is only "**presumptively** mandatory." (Emphasis added.) <u>Comm'n on Ethics v. JMA/ Lucchesi</u>, 110 Nev. 1, 9-10, 866 P.2d 297, 302 (1994) In the context of NRS 233B.131, "shall" is not mandatory as evidenced by the statute's plain and unambiguous giving of discretion to the court to extend the time to serve the record, to correct the record, or to add to the record.

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The district court further erred by requiring Petitioners to show good cause under the <u>Scrimer</u> factors. This court has rejected the contention that the <u>Scrimer</u> factors apply when evaluating good cause under NRS 233B.130 (regarding service a petition), as <u>Scrimer</u> applied to a service deadline for a complaint in a civil action. <u>Spar Bus. Servs. v. Olson</u>, 135 Nev. Adv. Rep. 40, FN 4, 448 P.3d 539, 543 (2019). Those factors included such considerations as difficulties in locating a defendant, plaintiff's diligence in attempting to serve the defendant. <u>Scrimer</u>, 116 Nev. at 516. As this case deals with transmittal of the record in an administrative proceeding, <u>Scrimer</u> factors are not relevant.

Moreover, NRS 233B.131 does not require a showing of good cause. NRS 233B.130(5) regarding service of petitions mandates deadlines that "must" be followed absent a showing of good cause. Likewise, NRS 233B.133(6) allows the court to extend deadlines for filing briefs upon a showing of good cause. Unlike those two statutes, NRS 233B.131 allows the court discretion to extend the deadlines without specifying a showing of good cause.

In this case, there are several reasons why Petitioners' failure to transmit the transcript of the evidence should be excused. Specifically, Petitioners relied upon the certifications and representations of the DIR and AG that the entire record had been transmitted, as is customary with the Department of Administration, Hearings Division.

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Both Respondents—DIR and AG—were involved in the transmission of the Record on Appeal. Respondent AG filed the Transmittal of Record on Appeal stating:

> Pursuant to NRS 233B.131, the STATE OF NEVADA BOARD FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE SUBSEQUENT INJURY ACCOUNT FOR SELF-INSURED EMPLOYERS (SIA) now files the entire record of the proceedings under review by this Court as a result of the Petition for Judicial Review pursuant to NRS 233B.130 filed by LAS VEGAS METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENT and CANNON COCHRAN MANAGEMENT SERVICES, INC., Respondents.

(APP at 154-157.)

AG specifically stated that the "entire record of the proceedings under review by this Court" were filed "[p]ursuant to NRS 233B.131." AG did not submit the entire record per NRS 233B.131(2) as was asserted after the fact. Likewise, DIR completed a certification of compliance that the "documents submitted herewith comprise the record of the administrative proceeding." (APP at 157.)

Note that there is no caveat in either of these declarations by the AG or DIR. There is no certification that this is the "remainder" of the record save for a transcript. The AG, i.e., the same party who later moved for dismissal because the record was allegedly not complete, clearly states that it has transmitted "the entire

record of the proceedings under review" based on the DIR's certification. (APP at 154-157.)

In addition, NRS 233B.131(a) is not consistently utilized by administrative agencies bound by the Nevada Industrial Insurance Act (i.e., the DIR and the Dept. of Administration, Hearings Division). In fact, this is the first petition for judicial review that the undersigned has seen where the state agency failed to include something in the record and then alleged that the appealing party had some burden to supplement what the state agency did not submit. As stated by counsel before the district court and is customary practice, when any party files a petition for judicial review of a decision by an Appeals Officer with the Department of Administration, Hearings Division in a contested industrial insurance matter, the Hearings Division always files the complete record on appeal, including the transcript of the proceedings. Based on the representations made by both DIR and AG in the transmittal that the "entire record" was being transmitted, Appellants had no reason to question whether the record was complete. Appellants did not rely on the transcript of the underlying proceedings to makes its arguments as set forth in its Opening Brief.

Even if Petitioners were required to establish good cause for their omission, this court reviews a district court's "good cause" determination for an abuse of discretion. Spar Busi. Serv., 135 Nev. Ad. Op. at 448, P.3d at 543. An abuse of



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discretion occurs when (a) a court makes a clearly erroneous factual determination, or (b) it disregards controlling law. In this case, the district court stated Petitioners did not establish good cause because NRS 233B.131 was the controlling statute and it was plain and ambiguous that Petitioners were required to transmit the transcript to the court. As stated above, this is a misreading of the controlling law of the statutory requirements.

C.

Respondent's motion to dismiss should be denied based on equitable remedies

Petitioners request that this court consider equitable estoppel and waiver as equitable defenses under the facts of this case. Petitioners make this request because they unwittingly relied upon the actions of the DIR and AG to their detriment.

The court permits the doctrines of equitable estoppel and waiver in workers' compensation proceedings. Dickinson v. American Medical Response, 124 Nev. 460, 186 P.3d 878 (2008). Dickinson was a claimant's appeal that challenged an Appeals Officer's Decision that denied PPD benefits for the cervical spine, in pertinent part, because the claimant failed to appeal the exclusion of her neck from her claim. The claimant argued that because the insurer authorized months of physical therapy and numerous injections for the cervical spine, despite it not being an accepted body part, so the doctrines of equitable estoppel or waiver should

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apply. The court agreed that "equitable estoppel may be invoked against a party who claims a statutory right in administrative workers' compensation proceedings, when the invoking party has reasonably relied on the other party's words or conduct to her detriment." Id. at 467, P.3d 883.

Petitioners relied on certifications by both the DIR and AG that the "entire record" was included in its transmission (consistent with how the Hearings Division operates). (See APP at 154-157.) Accordingly, Petitioners filed their Opening Brief referencing the Record on Appeal. Although Petitioners brief was filed late, neither the DIR, the AG, nor the district court raised this issue prior to Petitioners filing their brief. In fact, the DIR did not file its motion to dismiss until the date when its Answering Brief was due (i.e., 30 days after the Petitioners filed their brief per NRS 233B.133(2)). Petitioners reliance upon those certifications and the actions of the DIR and AG in not raising the issue of Petitioners' late filing until after filing of said brief had occurred were clearly detrimental to Petitioners as their petition was dismissed.

Based on the facts in the case, equitable estoppel and waiver support Petitioners' position that their petition be heard on the merits.

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Public policy supports hearing Petitioners' case on the merits

The underlying action is a request to the Subsequent Injury Account by LVMPD related to a subsequent injury sustained by a police officer during the course and scope of his employment. The purpose of the Subsequent Injury Account is to encourage employers to hire and retain workers with permanent impairment and to provide relief to the employer in the event of a subsequent injury. This purpose is paramount in this case because it deals with police officers who provide public safety to our community. The Nevada legislature has dedicated significant time and resources to establishing this fund.

Petitioners find it disheartening that the court would preclude its petition being heard on the merits on what basically amounts to a legally and equitably excusable technicality. Both the DIR and AG had knowledge of the appeal and both had stated their intent to participate over seven months prior to moving to dismiss the petition. Moreover, neither the DIR nor the AG moved to dismiss the petition on this technicality until *after* Petitioner had filed its brief.

The process of the Subsequent Injury Account is ongoing, and in this case, had begun in April of 2018. Under these facts, there was no harm to the DIR and AG due to any delays, yet the prejudice to the Petitioners is substantial. Public policy favors hearing this case on the merits.

VIII.

CONCLUSION

Based upon the foregoing, Appellants respectfully request this court to reverse the district court's order dismissing their petition and remand for the petition to continue on its merits.

Dated this 6th day of January, 2022.

Respectfully submitted,

LEWIS, BRISBOIS, BISGAARD & SMITH, LLP

/s/ L. Michael Friend

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CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

- 1. I hereby certify that this brief complies with the formatting requirements of NRAP 32(a)(4), the typeface requirements of NRAP 32(a)(5) and the type style requirements of NRAP 32(a)(6) because this brief has been prepared in a proportionally spaced typeface using Microsoft Word in Times New Roman font size 14.
- 2. I further certify that this brief complies with the type-volume limitations of NRAP 32(a)(7)(A)(ii) because, excluding the parts of the brief exempted by NRAP 32(a)(7)(C), it is proportionally spaced, has a typeface of 14 points or more, and contains 4,521 words and 632 lines of text.
- 3. Finally, I hereby certify that I have read this appellate brief, and to the best of my knowledge, information, and belief, it is not frivolous or interposed for any improper purpose. I further certify that this brief complies with all applicable Nevada Rules of Appellate Procedure, in particular NRAP 28(e)(1), which requires every assertion in the brief regarding matters in the record to be supported by a reference to the page and volume number, if any, of the transcript or Appendix where the matter relied on is to be found.

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4. I understand that I may be subject to sanctions in the event that the accompanying brief is not in conformity with the requirements of the Nevada Rules of Appellate Procedure.

Respectfully submitted, LEWIS, BRISBOIS, BISGAARD & SMITH, LLP

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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

Pursuant to Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure 5(b), I hereby certify that, on the 6th day of January, 2022, service of the attached APPELLANTS' OPENING **BRIEF** was made this date by depositing a true copy of the same for mailing, first class mail, and/or electronic service as follows:

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