IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

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MINH NGUYET LUONG,

S.C. No.: Electronically Filed Apr 08 2022 09:27 a.m.

Elizabeth A. Brown

D.C. Case No.: CDet&-68 StapreDne Court

Petitioner,

VS.

THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLARK, AND THE HONORABLE DAWN THRONE, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE,

Respondents,

and

JAMES W. VAHEY,

Real Party in Interest.

PETITIONER'S APPENDIX

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175.	Stipulation and Order for Guardian Ad Litem	12/13/2021	AA003494 - AA003499
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177.	Supplement to Order from November 12, 2021 Hearing	1/31/2022	AA003513 - AA003516
178.	Notice of Entry of Supplement to Order from November 12, 2021 Hearing	2/1/2022	AA003517 - AA003523
179.	Guardian Ad Litem Report	2/2/2022	AA003524 - AA003527
180.	Declaration of James W. Vahey Regarding Case Status	2/5/2022	AA003528 - AA003537
181.	Defendant's Exhibit Appendix in Support of February 8, 2022, Return Hearing	2/7/2022	AA003538 - AA003564
182.	Defendant's Supplement and Response for the February 3, 2022, Return Hearing	2/7/2022	AA003565 - AA003587
183.	Transcript of Hearing Held on February 8, 2022	2/8/2022	AA003588 - AA003609
184.	Notice of Entry of Order from December 16, 2021 Hearing	2/15/2022	AA003610 - AA003619
185.	Order from December 16, 2021 Hearing	2/15/2022	AA003620 - AA003628
186.	Notice of Hearing	3/15/2022	AA003629 - AA003630
VOLUME XIX			

187.	Appendix of Exhibits in Support of Plaintiff's Emergency Motion for Order for Plaintiff to Participate in the Turning Points for Families Program with Minor Children, for Defendant to be Solely Responsible for the Costs Associated with the Program, and for Related Relief	3/15/2022	AA003631 - AA003700
188.	Plaintiff's Emergency Motion for Order for Plaintiff to Participate in the Turning Points for Families Program with Minor Children, for Defendant to be Solely Responsible for the Costs Associated with the Program, and for Related Relief	3/15/2022	AA003701 - AA003715
189.	Notice of Entry of Order Shortening Time	3/17/2022	AA003716 - AA003720
190.	Ex Parte Motion for Order Shortening Time on Plaintiff's Emergency Motion for Order for Plaintiff to Participate in the Turning Points for Families Program with Minor Children, for Defendant to be Solely Responsible for the Costs Associated with the Program, and for Related Relief	3/17/2022	AA003721 - AA003727
191.	Re3ceipt of Copy	3/18/2022	AA003728 - AA003729
192.	Defendant's Exhibit Appendix in Support of Opposition to Plaintiff's Emergency Motion for Order for Plaintiff to Participate in the Turning Points for Families Program with Minor Children, for Defendant to be Solely Responsible for the Costs Associated with the Program, and for Related Relief and Countermotion to Hannah to be Interviewed, for the Immediate Return of Matthew to Minh, and for Attorney's Fees and Costs	3/20/2022	AA003730 - AA003790

193.	Defendant's Opposition to Plaintiff's Emergency Motion for Order for Plaintiff to Participate in the Turning Points for Families Program with Minor Children, for Defendant to be Solely Responsible for the Costs Associated with the Program, and for Related Relief and Countermotion to Hannah to be Interviewed, for the Immediate Return of Matthew to Minh, and for Attorney's Fees and Costs	3/20/2022	AA003791 - AA003824
	VOLUME XX		
194.	Defendant's Exhibit Appendix in Support of Opposition to Plaintiff's Emergency Motion for Order for Plaintiff to Participate in the Turning Points for Families Program with Minor Children, for Defendant to be Solely Responsible for the Costs Associated with the Program, and for Related Relief and Countermotion to Hannah to be Interviewed, for the Immediate Return of Matthew to Minh, and for Attorney's Fees and Costs	3/21/2022	AA003825 - AA003885
195.	Defendant's Opposition to Plaintiff's Emergency Motion for Order for Plaintiff to Participate in the Turning Points for Families Program with Minor Children, for Defendant to be Solely Responsible for the Costs Associated with the Program, and for Related Relief and Countermotion to Hannah to be Interviewed, for the Immediate Return of Matthew to Minh, and for Attorney's Fees and Costs	3/21/2022	AA003886 - AA003922
196.	Transcript of Hearing on Monday, March 21, 2022, Before the Honorable Judge Dawn R. Throne	3/21/2022	AA003923 - AA003979

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EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT – FAMILY DIVISION COUNTY OF CLARK, STATE OF NEVADA

JAMES W. VAHEY,

Plaintiff,

VS.

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MINH NGUYET LUONG,

Defendant.

CASE NO. D-18-581444-D DEPT. H

Date of Trial: Aug. 8th and Sept. 5th, 2019 Time of Trial: 9:00 a.m.

DEFENDANT'S TRIAL BRIEF PER EDCR 7.27

COMES NOW, Defendant, MINH NGUYET LUONG, by and through her attorney, NEIL M. MULLINS, ESQ., of the KAINEN LAW GROUP, PLLC, and hereby submits her *Trial Brief* in accordance with EDCR 7.27.

DATED this 3^{nd} day of September 2019.

KAINEN LAW GROUP, PLLC

NEIL M. MULLINS, ESQ.

Nevada Bar No. 3544

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Attorney for Defendant

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Eighth Judicial District Court Rule 7.27:

Filing of civil trial memoranda.

Unless otherwise ordered by the court, an attorney may elect to submit to the court in any civil case, a trial memoranda of points and authorities at any time prior to the close of trial. The original trial memoranda of points and authorities must be filed and a copy of the memoranda must be served upon opposing counsel at the time of or before submission of the memoranda to the court. [Amended: effective July 29, 2011.]

ARGUMENT

Defendant, MINH NGUYET LUONG (hereinafter referred to as "Minh" or "Mother") and Plaintiff, JAMES VAHEY (hereinafter referred to as "Jim" or "Father") were married in Henderson, Nevada on July 8, 2006. The parties have three (3) minor children born the issue of their marriage, to-wit: HANNAH VAHEY ("HANNAH"), born March 19, 2009 (age 10); MATTHEW VAHEY ("MATTHEW"), born June 26, 2010 (age 8); and SELENA VAHEY ("SELENA"), born April 4, 2014 (age 5).

Jim filed his Complaint for Divorce on the 13th day of December 2019. Minh filed her Answer and Counterclaim on the 11th day of January 2019. The parties do not dispute the validity of their *Premarital Agreement* ("PMA") that was executed on the 12th day of June 2006. The PMA nearly disposes all financial issues in this matter. Therefore, the primary issue to be tried is related to custody and support of the parties' three (3) minor children.

This case is essentially a one (1) issue matter; whether the three minor children's best interests are served with vesting Minh with primary physical custody, for purposes of relocating with the minor children to Irvine, California.

There is not a more compelling case to be made for a relocation under existing law. The statutes are not phrased in a way that puts an overwhelming burden upon a relocating parent. It does not say that the presumption of joint physical custody cannot be overcome without showing that the relocating parent and the children cannot survive without the impending move. The statutes merely require evidence that the children's best interests will be served, and provides the same old factors necessary for the court to examine those

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interests. The relocation statutes merely codified the case law. Minh has satisfied that burden. The children's lives will be dramatically enhanced if they are allowed to relocate and Jim exercises the custody time being afforded to him with Minh's offer.

But most important, the same cannot be said if this very reasonable move request is denied. The long bitter struggle to make life in Southeast Henderson palatable enough to work for this family will continue. Nannies and third parties will be required. The children will go from school to school, and nanny to nanny, and bear the heavy sacrifice of meaningful relationships with lifelong family members and friends to simply make their life with their father work for them. This case is supposed to be about the children's best interests, not their father's. Instead, Jim has made it a case of "if they cannot be with me 50% of the time, they are not going. Period." The argument is all he has, because there are no advantages to these children remaining in Henderson as compared with moving to Irvine with Minh.

Why is this Case Unique?

Three considerations make this case unique, as compared to most relocation cases. First, Minh is relocating regardless of this court's decision, though she painstakingly explains the compelling reasons why the children need to be with her. Second, both Minh and Jim have actively planned on moving to Orange County together from 2015 with their children, and one of Minh's good faith reasons to relocate is in fact her detrimental reliance upon that agreement. She readily acknowledges however, that such agreement was not reduced to writing and does not obviate the necessity to prove her case in accordance with the statutory factors under Nevada law. Third, this family has significant resources to facilitate the out of state travel.

Starting in 2015, the parties together with their children, began regularly viewing houses in Orange County. The parties met with a financial consultant in 2015 who examined their financial resources and opined that they had sufficient resources to retire.

See Deposition Transcript of Jim Vahey, M. D. at page 115, attached as Exhibit "A'.

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The parties looked for and made offers on houses in Orange County prior to commencement of this action. Minh purchased a home in Irvine in July 2017, which closed in October 2017 for purposes of relocating to California. Minh listed and solicited offers to sell her dental practice in January 2018. All of this was with Jim's knowledge and consent. And all of this was for the purpose of Minh retiring and raising their children, full time, near her family and friends in Irvine, California.

The parties disagree as to Jim's consent. Jim claims he told Minh that he disagreed with her relocation plans in an argument in July 2017. Minh testified Jim did not revoke his consent until April 2018 in a counseling session wherein he admitted "agreeing to the move plans to appease her." Minh has testified to learning Jim's allegation that he told her in July 2017 that he did not consent to the move, for the first time during his deposition on April 22, 2019. Jim testified as follows on page 120 line 24 to page 121 line 2, attached as Exhibit "B":

Q Do you recall in that conversation that that was the first time that you said the words "I told you I'd consider the relocation to appease you"?

A I don't know if that's when.

Jim's testimony is not credible and is refuted by the testimony of Minh, her sister, and basic common sense. Jim claims to have told Minh he "disapproved" on July 16, 2017, the same week Minh made the \$80,000.00 purchase deposit. This date is just ten (10) days **before** Minh loaned Jim \$700,000.00 to help him settle his lawsuit, secured by his house in Las Vegas. It is a full five months **before** Minh signed a Forbearance Agreement to loan Jim nearly \$1,000,000.00 secured by his office building to avoid foreclosure. To add insult to Jim's spurious allegations, Jim testified that during their "throw down" (a non violent argument on July 16, 2017 when Minh told him she was relocating with or without him) that he felt "as if I had been served divorce papers." Jim then claimed to have written the comments down in his diary, which he failed to produce in discovery. **See Jim's Deposition transcript at page 100-103 attached as Exhibit**

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"C'. See written discovery request dated April 3, 2019, and response, dated May 3, 2019, attached as Exhibit "D".

Minh and her sister, Hieu, have testified, that the parties regularly, at times twice per month, traveled to Irvine after the house was purchased in October 2018 to furnish it. Jim purchased vegetables to put in gardens for the children to grow vegetables. Jim helped set up the children's school desks and room furniture. Jim designed the yard landscape. Jim discussed the schools with Realtors and Minh's family members. And according to Minh, on two (2) separate occasions, Jim said absolutely nothing to correct his children when they pointed out their new school to him. Again, Jim's deposition testimony is not credible. Jim conveniently never recalls, specifically, anything that is now adverse to his position.

- Do you recall being present in the car on more than one occasion where either Minh or the kids pointed out which school they were going to attend, and you said, "Okay"?
- I absolutely did not say, "Okay."
- Do you recall a comment being made by either Minh or Q the kids about the school as you were driving by it?
- Α Yes.
- Who made the comment and what was said?
- I don't know which of the children made the comment. If I said anything, it would be, "Well, we don't know that yet. That's something for Mommy and Daddy to decide."
- Do you recall whether that was the only time that that happened, or whether it happened on more than one occasion? Where the comment in front of Minh and you by the children was that they would either attend or go to a particular school?
- Please ask that question again.
- Sure. Was there ever a time besides that one that you just Q

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recalled where both Minh and the children and you were together and a discussion was had about going to that particular school?

A I don't recall if there was more than one event.

Q Besides you, Minh and the kids involving that one conversation, do you ever remember the school issue being brought up or discussed between either you, Minh, or the children?

A It's possible that they told me, "Mommy said we're going to be going to school in California next year." And I said, "That's not true. Let Mommy and Daddy decide that. We don't know what's going to happen tomorrow. Let us decide what's going to happen next year."

[Page 123 line 25 to Page 125 line 11, attached as Exhibit "E"]

The plan has been discussed, refined, and initiated (purchasing a home; signing a business listing agreement; seeking and implementing the financial advisor's recommendation for early retirement; decreasing and later increasing hours of employment, loaning Jim money to settle his lawsuits, etc.). Minh detrimentally relied upon Jim's consent. She has sacrificed time with her children by waiting for Jim to retire, by working extra days to increase business value before sale, etc.

In fact, prior to the parties' marriage, it was contemplated by the parties that upon having children, Minh would primarily assume the parental responsibilities. This was even reflected in the parties' PMA regarding each party's respective contributions to the family living expenses. The pertinent part of the PMA (which was admitted to the record and marked as Defendant's **Exhibit "GGG"**) states as follows:

At such time the parties have children, however, the parties anticipate that it is likely JIM's annual income could be at least twice as much as MINH's annual income, particularly if MINH chooses to cut back on the number of hours she currently is devoting to her practice of dentistry in order to

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care for the parties' children.

PMA, at pg. 14, para. I(2). The PMA goes on to state the financial agreement that Jim would contribute 75% of the household living expenses after Minh reduces her hours to care for the children. The parties agreed to keep their properties separate and in case of separation, Minh would not get anything from Jim.

Minh and Hieu testified (and Jim in his deposition) that after the birth of HANNAH, Minh reduced her work hours wherein Minh would leave work by 3:00 p.m. and trimmed back the number of days that she worked per week to two or three days. Minh kept this lighter work schedule so she can care for the children. Then in furtherance of their retirement plan, in the summer of 2016, Minh increased her hours to three to four days per week, from 8:45 a.m. until 3:00 p.m., to increase the value of her business in order to maximize its value for purposes of selling the practice in 2019. She started work at 8:45 a.m. so she can drop the children off to school before going to work. Jim has admitted in his deposition on page 28 Lines 5-9, attached as Exhibit "F", that Minh at times did not work at all, and at other times for only two or three days per week. But he claims to not know what her work hours are or were during marriage. This is consistent with being uninvolved and leaving the majority of the child rearing to Minh, until his 17 work day was over. He did not have to worry about because Minh covered it, except for 2 Wednesday mornings per month when Minh had surgery days.

In 2018, Minh hired dentists to perform the majority of the dentistry practice. Her practice has remained successful, while allowing Minh to again reduce her work hours. Most recently, Minh testified to reducing her work hours to approximately two (2) surgery days per month until her employee dentists are certified to operate for her.

Minh always scheduled surgeries on only two (2) days per month (Wednesdays), and would purposely schedule them between 6:00 a.m. and 7:00 a.m. so that she could finish her day early to drive the children to and from their extracurricular activities, assist the children with their homework, cook them dinner, and spend quality time with the children prior to their bedtime. It also helped her pediatric patients, who were not able to

eat, be able to nourish themselves earlier on surgery day.

In July 2017, Minh purchased a 6,600 square-foot home in Irvine California for roughly \$2,600,000.00. The sale closed in October 2017. This purchase was after much consideration, by both parties, of homes located in Orange County. In fact, the parties made three (3) other offers prior to this closing. For Jim to argue this July 2017 purchase was impetuous, or was Minh's retaliatory gesture after an argument is simply not supported by the evidence and is not credible.

However, this all changed in April 2018 when Jim rescinded his prior consent to relocate the family to Irvine, California, and filed this divorce case. To make it more clear, according to Minh, Jim never objected to the move until one week after the counseling meeting in April 2018, where he agreed, during the therapy session, that he would try the schedule that Minh proposed, which was for Jim to work three to four days a week and be in Irvine with the family the other three to four days of the week. Jim had agreed to try. See his deposition transcript, page 136 Line 6, attached as Exhibit "G". Jim also admitted in his deposition on page 21 Line 20, attached as Exhibit "H", that he was considering putting in a provision that would allow him to work less hours when negotiating a contract with his partner.

Minh's argument is that Jim either changed his mind or misrepresented his intentions from the very beginning. Either way, Jim would force his children to remain in Clark County, Nevada because Jim has changed his mind and now asserts such is not in the children's best interests; because he will now not relocate.

LEGAL ANALYSIS

While the issues of custody and relocation are still two separate and distinct issues, much of the factual analysis overlaps. *See Schwartz v. Schwartz*, 107 Nev. 378, 382, 812 P.2d 1268, 1270 (Nev. 1991). While NRS 125C.0015 provides that "[i]f a court has not made a determination regarding the custody of a child, each parent has joint legal custody and joint physical custody of the child until otherwise ordered by a court of competent jurisdiction." "When this Court considers a motion to relocate minor children outside of

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the State of Nevada by a parent who has never had an initial custody determination, this Court "must base its decision on the child's best interest." *Druckman v. Ruscitti*, 327 P.3d 511, 515, 130 Nev. Adv. Rep. 50 (Nev. 2014). This was also affirmed by the Nevada Supreme Court in *Inboden v. Ayon*, 431 P.3d 39, 2018 Nev. Unpub. LEXIS 1081, Docket No. 74012 (Nev. Nov. 30, 2018) (unpublished disposition). The *Inboden* Court held that in a custody/relocation case where an initial determination of custody has not yet been established, that "case does not fall within NRS 125C.007's purview because the statute addresses petitions to relocate filed in actions where primary or joint physical custody has already been established by court order." *Id.* Nevertheless, the analysis is similar.

NRS 125C.007 is inapplicable in this matter because "[i]n every instance of a petition for permission to relocate with a child that is filed pursuant to NRS 125C.006 or 125C.0065," the party petitioning the court to relocate out of the State of Nevada with minor children is to satisfy the factors enumerated under NRS 125C.007. See NRS 125C.007. However, both NRS 125C.006 or 125C.0065 unambiguously state that if joint physical or primary physical custody has "been established pursuant to an order, judgment or decree of a court" then that petitioning parent has the burden to satisfy the relocation factors under NRS 125C.007. See NRS 125C.006 and 125C.0065. Neither NRS 125C.006 nor 125C.0065 state anything about the applicability of the relocation factors under NRS 125C.007 in matters wherein the parties have de facto joint legal and joint physical custody per NRS 125C.0015, when no court of competent jurisdiction has entered an order establishing such.

However, in an abundance of caution and analogous to the holding in *Druckman v. Ruscitti*, the well advised policy behind NRS 125C.007 can be used for guidance in this matter. *Druckman*, 327 P.3d at 515. Therefore, Minh has utilized the factors enumerated under NRS 125C.007 to prove that her request to relocate to Irvine is in her and the children's best interests. Minh has met her burden under the statute. Minh has established

¹ In accordance with NRAP 36(c)(3), a complete copy of *Inboden v. Ayon* was attached to Defendant's *Pre-trial Memorandum*. *See Errata to Defendant's Pre-trial Memorandum*, filed on August 2, 2019.

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good-faith reasons and actual benefits to both herself and her children to relocate.

Minh is going to retire and move to Irvine once this case has concluded, regardless of the custody determination, because this has been her plan/goal since having children. Minh believes that the parties have differing parenting styles; they do not work well together; and they cannot co-parent to meet the children's daily needs. Minh has lost trust in Jim. She believes he constantly lies and therefore will only text or email with him.

Therefore, this case really rests upon the policy considerations behind NRS 125C.007, the statutory factors set forth therein, but arguably with the primary focus being the best interest analysis whereby this Court must "determine whether the best interests of the children are better served by living outside of Nevada with the relocating parent as the primary physical custodian or living in Nevada with the nonmoving parent having primary physical custody." Potter v. Potter, 121 Nev. 613, 614-615, 119 P.3d 1246, 1247 (Nev. 2005).

Initial Determination of Physical Custody

The evidence in this matter will categorically show that the minor children's best interests are served by vesting Minh with primary physical custody and granting her permission to relocate to Irvine, California, with the parties' three (3) minor children.

In an initial determination of custody, "the district court has 'broad discretionary power' in determining child custody . . . including visitation." Davis v. Ewalefo, 352 P.3d 1139, 131 Nev. Adv. Rep. 45 (Nev. 2015) (quoting *Hays v. Gallacher*, 115 Nev. 1, 4, 972 P.2d 1138, 1140 (1999)). In exercising its discretionary power in making the initial custody determination, the District Court's "sole consideration . . . is the best interest of the child." NRS 125C.0035. See also Blanco v. Blanco, 129 Nev. 723, 730, 311 P.3d 1170, 1174 (Nev. 2013).

When physical custody is in dispute, this Court is to determine what is in the minor children's best interests by weighing the factors enumerated in NRS 125C.0035 (4), as well other determinative factors that the Nevada Supreme Court articulated in *Rico v*. Rodriguez, 121 Nev. 695, 120 P.3d 812 (2005).

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Physical Custody Factors per NRS 125C.0035 (4):

The wishes of the child if the child is of sufficient age and capacity to (a) form an intelligent preference as to his or her physical custody.

While the children are still considerably young to form an intelligent preference, the two eldest children, ages ten (10) and nine (9), have consistently expressed to both parents, their preference to reside and attend school in California. The plan to move to California was never hidden from these children. Notwithstanding, Minh understands the court has ruled it will not take their testimony. Therefore, this factors slightly weighs in Minh's favor.

- (b) Any nomination of a guardian for the child by a parent. N/A.
- (c) Which parent is more likely to allow the child to have frequent associations and a continuing relationship with the non-custodial

While both parents will likely follow all of this Court's orders, Minh will absolutely facilitate Jim's frequent contact and associations with the children. Minh will always encourage a continuing relationship between the children and Jim. Minh's proposed custodial schedule, if the children are permitted to relocate with Minh to California, is generous and demonstrates she is not moving to remove Jim from their lives, or to frustrate his relationship. Conversely, Minh argues that Jim's use of a recording device during her calls with the children and Jim initially limiting her time to ten (10) minutes per call is evidence that Jim is not fostering her relationship and time with the children.

Jim should have a visitation with the children one weekend per month in Las Vegas, inclusive of three-day weekends during the children's school year (Labor Day, Veterans Day, Martin Luther King, Jr. Day/or President's day, Memorial Day, and staff development days). This equates to 15-20 days of visitation.

Jim should also have a second weekend visitation in Irvine, California, each month, so long as he provides adequate notice and accompanies the children to any

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scheduled activities that they are enrolled in. Minh will allow Jim to stay at her home in Irvine for these weekend visitations (she will vacate during his visits). Minh will also provide a bedroom in her home allowing Jim to keep spare clothes and other personal items to minimize the travel burdens to facilitate frequent weekend trips to Irvine. Minh will do just about anything to ensure that the children and Jim have a great and continuing relationship despite the distance (if permitted to relocate to Irvine).

- Jim should receive 51 consecutive days (two-thirds of the summer recess) visitation each summer commencing the day the children are released from school for summer break.
- Jim would receive Thanksgiving break in alternating years, which equates to 5-7 days of visitation depending on the school schedule.
- Jim would also receive Spring Break each year, which equates to approximately nine (9) days, and Jim would also receive half, or nine (9) days each Winter Break. If Jim takes advantage of the second weekend visit each month in addition to the other custodial timeshare being offered by Minh, Jim will have a total of approximately 116 days with his children each year (only 30 days shy of a joint physical custody schedule).²

This proposed schedule would ensure that Jim and the children would continue to have frequent contact and associations. Just as Jim currently enjoys, he will also have unlimited access to the children via FaceTime, phone calls, and text messaging. Minh understands that a relocation to California would decrease the frequency of Jim's physical contact with the children, but technology assists in allowing him to maintain daily contact with his children. Furthermore, this schedule would allow Jim to have his timeshare with the children when they are **not** in school, allowing him more quality time with the children as he could spend the entire day with them. If Jim is vested with primary

 $^{^{2}}$ 116 days = 5 months of three-day weekends + 5 months of two-day weekends + 10 months of extra weekends in Irvine at two-days + 4 days at Thanksgiving Break + 7 days for Winter Break + 9 days for Spring Break + 51 days for Summer Break.

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physical custody, during the week, after performing surgeries all day, followed by the requisite paperwork and file dictation, Jim would only receive a few hours of quality time each week with the children. Therefore, this factor weighs in Minh's favor.

(d) The level of conflict between the parents.

The evidence in this case is likely to show a moderate level of conflict between the parties due to the high amount of stress the case has caused the entire family. However, both parties are intelligent and rational individuals. Once this divorce matter has concluded, the conflict between the parties will likely subside. Therefore, this factor is not really at issue and is neutral.

The ability of the parents to cooperate to meet the needs of the child. (e)

The evidence has shown that Minh has the ability to meet the needs of their children. Minh is retiring and moving to Irvine, California. This will give Minh the ability to always care for her children without the necessity of retaining a nanny to assist with the childcare responsibilities. Minh will take the children to and from school; she will have time to make home-cooked meals daily; she will have time to assist the children with their homework; and she will have time to take the children to their extracurricular activities.

While the parents have cooperated and met the needs of their children when living in the same household, Jim has relied heavily on Minh and nannies to assist in childcare. Due to Jim's busy schedule as a surgeon, he simply does not have the time to involve himself in all of the facets of childcare. If Jim were to receive primary physical custody, the children would be raised primarily by nannies. The children would not receive assistance on their school work because the parties' previous nannies refused to assist the children with their homework. Furthermore, when Jim gets home after working all day, he usually catches up on his post-operation dictations. Jim's work, while noble, consumes the 90% of his weekly time, leaving very little time to dedicate to his children during weekdays. However, Jim does usually have time on the weekends, which is when Jim historically spends the most time with his children. Even during pendency of this case,

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Jim is not doing his half of the children's homework assignments. And Jim has all but ceased doing extra- curricular activities with them. Minh and the children FaceTime so that Minh can help the children with their book reports.

Allowing Minh the opportunity to relocate to California with their children will give their children the best of both worlds. The children will have the stability and structure provided by Minh during the school year wherein Minh can assist the children every night with their homework; provide a consistent and stable routine for the children during the school year; and Jim will have the children during weekends, holidays, and the majority of the summer break, thus ensuring Jim better quality time with his children as his timeshare would mostly consist of the days he regularly has off of work. Jim will be able to enjoy water sports (their regular activity together) with his children at home and at the beach, which is his favorite thing to do with the children, by having them the majority of the summer recess.

Therefore, this factor favors awarding Minh primary physical custody.

The mental and physical health of the parents.

The evidence will show that both parties are mentally and physically fit. Therefore, this is a neutral factor.

(g) The physical, developmental, and emotional needs of the children.

The parties' children need and deserve engaged, committed, and dedicated parenting, ensuring stability and consistency in these children's lives. This is exactly what Minh brings to the table. Minh is an engaged parent that dedicates her entire existence to ensuring that the children's needs are being met. Minh has primarily taken the children to their multiple extracurricular activities. She is engaging to the point where she also takes classes with them. The children are emotionally attached to both parents, but have made it well known to Jim that they want to live in Irvine. While these children are physically healthy, they are still of the age dependent on daily parental care and guidance, which Minh can provide on a daily basis considering her anticipated retirement. Minh's schedule upon retirement will be better suited than Jim's to accommodate the children's

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physical, developmental, and emotional needs on a more structured, routine and consistent basis. Therefore, this factor also support's Minh's request for primary physical custody. Minh has testified to the lack of stability and structure in Jim's home.

(Revolving door of nannies and tutors; no friends or family to play with; limited social activities, limited extra- curricular activities; long commutes to school, etc.)

The nature of the relationship of the children with each parent. (h)

The children have a good relationship with both parents. Minh believes she is closer to the children because she spends more time with them and they have relied on her. Hannah only confided in Minh when she felt bullied at school, even though it happened during Jim's timeshare. There is substantial testimony that Minh is the disciplinarian that requires them to perform at their best at everything they do, and that she is more committed to sacrifice for their success.

- The ability of the child to maintain a relationship with any sibling. (i) N/A.
- Any history of parental abuse or neglect of the child or a sibling of the **(i)** child.

This is a non-factor in this case, as there is no history of parental abuse nor neglect of the children in this case.

Whether either parent or any other person seeking physical custody gas engaged in an act of domestic violence against the child, a parent of the (k) child or any other person residing with the child.

This is also a non-factor in this case, as there is no history of domestic violence by either party in this case.

Whether either parent or any other person seeking physical custody has **(I)** committed any act of abduction against the child or any other child.

This is also a non-factor in this case, as there is no history of any child abduction by either party in this case.

Additional Considerations in Determining Physical Custody

In addition to the above factors, the Nevada Supreme Court referenced other

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pragmatic factors that the district court may consider when determining the custodial arrangement between the parents. Rico v. Rodriguez, 121 Nev. at 702, 120 P.3d at 816. The factors the *Rico* Court articulated and applied to this case are as follows:

(1) Living conditions and environment.

Minh's home in Irvine, California, is a beautiful 6,600 square-foot home located in the heart of Orange County. The evidence will show the contrast between the living conditions with Minh in Irvine verses with Jim in Las Vegas. Minh's home is located about a five (5) minute walk from the school that the children are slated to attend. The schools in Irvine are highly rated and are only comparable to *private* schools in Las Vegas. If the children are to continue to attend Challenger in Las Vegas, due to Jim living in Lake Las Vegas, a remote part of Henderson, the children would be forced to continue their hour-long commute to and from school every day. The relocation to Irvine would also alleviate the necessity of paying private school tuition; thus, allowing the parties to contribute more funds to their children's college savings accounts. Historically, Jim has expressed his disdain of paying the children's private school tuition, which is why the children have also attended charter schools in the past. In fact, Hannah has attended four (4) different school campuses by the time she finished the fourth grade. It will be proven at trial that the only reason Jim agreed to re-enroll the children into private school was in contemplation of filing this case.

While Jim's home in Lake Las Vegas is nice, it is extremely remote with very few child-friendly activities that are held by his community. The evidence will show that Minh's community, the Groves at Orchard Hills, holds many community events that are geared specifically for children. The parties' children will be able to participate in many of the community activities with their friends and family.

The environment in Irvine also trumps Las Vegas's environment. The evidence will show that the crime rates are considerably lower in Irvine than in Las Vegas. In fact, for the past 13 years Irvine was ranked as the Safest City of its size for Part 1 violent crime according to FBI data. Irvine also has the lowest rate of violent crime per capita of

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any city in the nation with a population of 250,000 or more.

Las Vegas, on the other hand, has significantly greater rates of violent crime compared to Irvine. Even Henderson has a greater rate of violent crime than Irvine. This shows that the environment in Irvine is considerably safer than both Las Vegas or Henderson.

(2) The parties' interaction with the children.

Both parents in this matter have good relationships with their children and are well bonded. However, Minh has more physical interactions with the children because she is the parent that primarily takes them to their extracurricular activities; ensures that they have their homework finished prior to going to school the next day; and ensures that her work schedule is fashioned around the children's schedule.

(3)Medical neglect.

This is a non-factor as both parents in this case properly care for the children, especially considering that Jim is a medical doctor and Minh is a dentist with vast knowledge of biology.

Parental employment and stability.

The stability that Minh can provide to the children in Irvine is far superior to what Jim can provide to the children in Las Vegas. Minh is retiring and looking forward to spending her retirement primarily raising her children in her home in Irvine. Minh will have time to take the children to and from school each day; ensure that the children are getting adequate assistance on their schoolwork (without the reliance of tutors); ensuring that the children have home-cooked meals (without reliance on nannies); and facilitating the children's attendance at their extracurricular activities. If the children are forced to remain in Clark County to be primarily raised by Jim, the children will have to endure an hour long trip to and from school everyday (most of which will be facilitated by a nanny due to Jim's surgery schedule); the children's enrollment and attendance in extracurricular activities will cease (because Jim does not like to take the children to their events due to the travel distance); and the children will be stuck at Jim's home while he

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orders food in as Jim does not cook, and will be required to do his post-operation dictations from his home every night as he has historically done throughout the parties' marriage. Having a mother as a primary custodian that does not have to utilize nannies to care for the children to ensure that their best interests are always being met is preferred over a parent who wants to continue working and growing his medical practice. It simply is not practical to believe that a parent, who is a medical doctor that constantly works, will be able to manage his medical practice, while exercising primary physical custody of three minor children and ensure that their best interests are being met.

While Jim argues he can handle his children and his work responsibilities, his actions during pendency are to the contrary. He has stopped taking them to extracurricular activities, or convinced them to quit. He has forgotten lunches, clothes and shoes. He embarrassed Matthew by forgetting the weapons Matthew needed for his Taekwondo test. Jim did not take Matthew to one of his Taekwondo tests even after Minh had signed him up and reminded Jim about it. And again, even after the first day of trial, Jim again forgot to bring Matthew's weapons to his thrid test since separation.

Minh's Request to Relocate to Irvine, California, with the Minor Children.

A request by one parent to relocate to a different jurisdiction with the children is a separate factual inquiry than the initial custody determination; however, the relocation analysis also centers upon what is in the minor children's best interests.

In a case wherein a parent moves this Court for an order granting permission to remove the children from the jurisdiction where the children currently reside, "the best interests of the child[ren] should . . . be the paramount judicial concern." Schwartz, 812 P.2d at 1271, 107 Nev. 378. In determining whether it is in the subject minor children's best interests to relocate to Irvine, the Nevada legislature codified the Schwartz factors, enumerated under NRS 125C.007, which this Court is to evaluate to determine whether to grant a parent's request to relocate with their minor children. However, the "[d]etermination of the best interests of a child in the removal context necessarily involves a fact-specific inquiry and cannot be reduced to a rigid 'bright-line' test."

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Schwartz, 812 P.2d at 1271, 107 Nev. 378 (citing In re Marriage of Eckert, 518 N.E.2d 1041, 1045 (Ill. 1988); and Cooper v. Cooper, 491 A.2d 606, 614-15 (N.J. 1984)).

Pursuant to NRS 125C.007(a), Minh will show that she has sensible, good-faith reasons for her request to relocate with the minor children to Irvine, California, and that her request is not intended to deprive Jim from his parenting time. Furthermore, pursuant to NRS 125C.007(b) and (c), Minh will also prove that their children's best interests are served by allowing Minh to relocate with the children to Irvine, and that both Minh and the children will benefit from many actual advantages as a result of this relocation.

Minh's sensible, good-faith reason to request to relocate with minor children, and the relocation is not intended to deprive the non-relocating parent of his or her parenting time. NRS 125C.007 1(a).

"[I]n assessing the 'actual advantage' requirement, courts are not free to ignore noneconomic factors likely to contribute to the well-being and general happiness of the custodial parent and children." *Jones v. Jones*, 110 Nev. 1253, 1260, 885 P.2d 563, 568 (Nev. 1994). Furthermore, the Jones Court recognized that "what is in the best interest of the children cannot be addressed without considering the best interest of the other members of the household in which they live." *Id.* at 1261 and 568. The actual advantage does not have to be substantial, but the advantage must be "based on a sincere and genuine desire of the custodial parent to move and a sensible good faith reason for the move." Id. The Jones Court defined "good faith reason" as one that is "not designed to frustrate the visitation rights of the noncustodial parent." Id. (citing Holder v. Polanski, 111 N.J. 344, 544 A.2d 852, 856-57 (N.J. 1988)).

The evidence in this case will show that Minh has established her good-faith, and sensible reasons to request to relocate to Irvine with the parties' three (3) minor children and that the move will actually benefit both Minh and her children. Minh be a stay at home mother. She and the children will be surrounded by family support. The children's Aunt Hieu, who has helped raise them, will be residing with the family for part of each week. As addressed above, Minh purchased a beautiful home in Irvine for purposes of the entire family relocating to California to be closer to family and friends; for the

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children to attend superior schools; and to live in an environment more conducive to raising children. One would arguably be hard pressed to find a more compelling case for relocation than this case. The children have no friends or family in Henderson.³

Minh is certainly not seeking permission from this Court to relocate to Irvine to frustrate Jim's contact with their children. Minh is simply requesting that this Court grant her permission to effectuate the plan that both she and Jim believed was in the children's best interests, at least until Jim filed this case and demanded that the children remain in Clark County for the foreseeable future. Minh's request is simply to provide a better life for her and their children, to which any reasonable person would understand and support 10 if they objectively compared and contrasted the lifestyles that each environment (Las Vegas versus Irvine) would afford to them. Furthermore, Minh has already made it clear that if Jim ever desires to move to Irvine (or close surrounding area) that the parties would revert back to a joint physical custody schedule. Therefore, Minh's motives are honorable and definitely not intended to frustrate Jim's contact/custodial time with their three (3) beautiful children, as she is making her request in good-faith and has sensible reasons to seek permission from this Court.

The best interests of the children are served by allowing Minh to relocate with the parties' three minor children. NRS 125C.007 1(b).

Minh will prove that it is in the minor children's best interests to allow the children to relocate to Irvine, California, with Minh. Minh has addressed the children's best interests above and hereby incorporates the best interests analysis above by reference. Proximity to extended family, culture, friends in the neighborhood to attend school with are in stark contrast to Henderson, where they have no friends in the community they have lived in for ten (10) years. Jim admitted the children have no friends in the Lake

While Jim argues his brother Ed is retiring and moving to Summerlin, he has also testified to the limited contact Ed and his family have historically lived in Northern California and will now live an hour away in Summerlin where their son, Jason, will attend Bishop Gorman. But to date the children have not benefitted from Ed's planned relocation.

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Las Vegas community in his deposition and in his requests for admissions. Jim admits they had one play date in their childhood. He admits they have no friends outside of school, and the school is a long drive from home. The fact is Lake Las Vegas is good for Jim, but no one else in this family.

Actual benefits conferred to both Minh and the subject minor children as a result of relocating to Irvine, California. NRS 125C.007 1(c).

Minh's evidence will show several benefits that will be conferred to both her and the children if her request to relocate is granted. Many of the benefits associated with a move to Irvine were previously discussed above under the best interest analysis, which should also be incorporated herein by reference.

However, some additional benefits to both the minor children and Minh are as follows:

- Irvine is one of the safest cities in which to live since 2006. The public schools in Irvine are some of the highest rated schools nationwide. Irvine is highly sought after as the ideal city to live and raise a family.
- Minh, upon relocating, intends to retire from the practice of dentistry. Consequently, nannies will no longer be necessary to assist with child care.
- Orange County has one of the largest communities of Vietnamese outside of Vietnam and the children will get to experience their Vietnamese culture and language far better than they could do in Las Vegas.
- Minh and the children would thrive in an environment surround by extended family and friends. The children could establish a close bond to their maternal grandmother and share the remaining years of their lives with her.
- The parties will also save over \$45,000.00 per year in private school tuition because the public schools in the Irvine neighborhood where Minh's home is located are among the best in California.

Since Minh will prove that she has both a sensible, good-faith reason to request the relocation and that there are actual benefits to her and the minor children, the Nevada

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Legislature provided six (6) additional factors that the district courts is to consider when determining whether to grant Minh's relocation request.

These factors are enumerated under NRS 125C.007 (2), which are as follows:

The extent to which the relocation is likely to improve the quality of life for the children and the relocating parent. NRS 125C.007 2(a).

Proximity to school and activities. Irvine is not isolated and remote like Lake Las Vegas. The children will be able to walk to school in five minutes, as opposed to a 45-60 minute drive to and from school each day. Similarly, trips to sporting events and activities will not be much of a burden in Irvine as compared to living in Lake Las Vegas where it takes a minimum of 30 minutes to get anywhere. The children will be able to sleep longer each night as they will not be forced to wake up as early to account for the long trip to school each day. The children will benefit from having a parent prepare them for school instead of nannies. The children will live in the community where they attend school, their school friends will also reside in close proximity as they will be their neighbors, and the children will be raised as normal members of an integrated community and not grow up in retirement community like Lake Las Vegas.

Most importantly, the children will experience the least trauma if permitted to relocate to Irvine with Minh rather than being forced to remain in Henderson with Jim. That is because of the quality of time argument. Even currently, the children spend a greater amount of time with their mom, and are emotionally attached to Minh, if only because she has always devoted more time to their care and custody.

While the children are comfortable and enjoy spending time with their father, the majority of the time they get to spend actual quality time with Jim is on his boat, at Catholic Mass, or participating in other weekend activities with him. Jim is a great father, but he simply does not have the time to devote to primary-care responsibilities, and without Minh being around, the children will simply spend most of their lives being raised by nannies if they are to remain in Henderson.

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A relocation to Irvine will substantially improve the quality of both the children's lives, as well as Minh's life.

Whether the motives of the relocating parent are honorable and not designed to frustrate or defeat any visitation rights accorded to the non-relocating parent. NRS 125C.007 2(b).

Minh's request to relocate to Irvine is honorable as this move was planned for both parties and the children to move as a family. At this distance, it certainly makes it possible for Jim to have one weekend of visitation with his children in Las Vegas per month, and a second weekend of visitation with his children if he desires to drive (or fly) to Irvine for any particular weekend. If this relocation is granted, Jim will still have frequent contact and associations with his children on a consistent basis. Jim has testified that his calendar is easily manipulated. The resources of this family eliminate any financial restraints on contact. Therefore, this factor also weights in Minh's favor in support of her relocation request.

Whether the relocating parent will comply with any substitute visitation orders issued by the court if permission to relocate is granted. NRS 125C.007

This factor weights in Minh favor as she will absolutely comply with all orders made by this Court, not just orders regarding substitute visitation.

Whether the motives of the non-relocating parent are honorable in resisting the petition for permission to relocate or to what extent any opposition to the petition for permission to relocate is intended to secure a financial advantage in the form of ongoing support obligation or otherwise. NRS 125C.007 2(d).

Jim's motives for resisting Minh's relocation request were brought in bad-faith, but only considering the fact that he led Minh to believe that the parties were to relocate together. Jim is unable to separate his own best interests from those of his children. Any move away from a parent is made in bad faith according to Jim's deposition testimony.

Whether there will be a realistic opportunity for the non-relocating parent to maintain a visitation schedule that will adequately foster and preserve the parental relationship between the child and the non-relocating parent if permission to relocate is granted. NRS 125C.007 2(e).

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There will be absolutely no evidence that Jim cannot maintain a visitation schedule which preserves and fosters his bond with his children. This relocation request is for a move to Southern California, not across the Contiguous United States that would likely obstruct monthly contact between a non-relocating parent and their children.

Minh's proposed visitation schedule is very liberal, exercisable and intended to maximize Jim's time with his children. In fact, the proposed out-of-state visitation schedule (if Jim utilizes all of the time offered) is approximately 30 days shy of the 146 days required to qualify as a joint physical custodian. With the financial resources that these parties have, coupled with Minh's ability to facilitate frequent and consistent visitation, this move will have little detrimental impact on Jim's ability to maintain frequent contact and visitation with his children; thus, preserving his strong relationship with his children.

Any other factor necessary to assist the court in determining whether to grant permission to relocate. NRS 125C.007 2(f).

The children will be devastated if they are not allowed to leave with their mother. These children have traveled back and forth, frequently, between Henderson and Orange County since their births. They have gone back and forth between the Irvine and Henderson homes bi-weekly since October 2017. They have no friends or family in Henderson. They know there is no comparison between the two (2) homes, the schools, the communities and their family contacts. Minh believes they will be devastated if they have to remain behind. The children are traumatized because Jim has resisted this move. The children believe their father has led them to believe that this move will happen and should have happened a year ago. They have experienced and enjoyed Orange County life over the life they have lived here in Lake Las Vegas. The children cannot wait to be in Orange County.

Attorney Fees and Costs

Minh should recover prevailing party legal fees and costs pursuant to NRS 18.010 and Miller v. Wilfong, 121 Nev. 619, 119 P.3d 727 (2005). Furthermore, the policy

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considerations behind NRS 125C.006 and NRS 125C.0065 also warrant an award of fees 2 if it is found that Jim unreasonably withheld his consent to allow this relocation to take place. The policy behind NRS 125C.006 and NRS 125C.0065 contemplates that after a review of the relevant facts and statutes, the non-relocating parent should consider the best interests and needs of their children before denying a move request.

Minh respectfully argues that any reasonable parent, similarly situated to Jim, would have granted her relocation request. While a parent is entitled to their day in court to determine what he or she believes is in his child's best interest, the legislature has placed a burden on that decision. If a parent decides to *unreasonably* withhold consent to a reasonable relocation request, he does so at his own peril. Justice is fair, but it comes at a price.

NRS 18.010. Award of attorney's fees.

- 1. The compensation of an attorney and counselor for his or her services is governed by agreement, express or implied, which is not restrained by law.
- 2. In addition to the cases where an allowance is authorized by specific statute, the court may make an allowance of attorney's fees to a prevailing party:
 - (a) When the prevailing party has not recovered more than \$20,000; or
 - (b) Without regard to the recovery sought, when the court finds that the claim, counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint or defense of the opposing party was brought or maintained without reasonable ground or to harass the prevailing party. The court shall liberally construe the provisions of this paragraph in favor of awarding attorney's fees in all appropriate situations. It is the intent of the Legislature that the court award attorney's fees pursuant to this paragraph and impose sanctions pursuant to Rule 11 of the Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure in all appropriate situations to punish for and deter frivolous or vexatious claims and defenses because such claims and defenses overburden limited judicial resources, hinder the timely resolution of meritorious claims and increase the costs of engaging in business and providing professional services to the public.
- 3. In awarding attorney's fees, the court may pronounce its decision on the fees at the conclusion of the trial or special

proceeding without written motion and with or without presentation of additional evidence.

4. Subsections 2 and 3 do not apply to any action arising out of a written instrument or agreement which entitles the prevailing party to an award of reasonable attorney's fees.

In *Miller v. Wilfong*, the Nevada Supreme Court addressed the issue of attorney's fees. 121 Nev. 619, 119 P.3d 727. In *Miller v. Wilfong*, Nevada Supreme Court stated:

[W]hile it is within the trial court's discretion to determine the reasonable amount of attorney fees under a statute or rule, in exercising that discretion, the court must evaluate the factors set forth in *Brunzell v. Golden Gate National Bank* [85 Nev. 345, 349, 455 P.2d 31, 33 (1969)]. Under *Brunzell*, when courts determine the appropriate fee to award in civil cases, they must consider various factors, including the qualities of the advocate, the character and difficulty of the work performed, the work actually performed by the attorney, and the results obtained. We take this opportunity to clarify our jurisprudence in family law cases to require trial courts to evaluate the *Brunzell* factors when deciding attorney fee awards. Additionally, the *Wright v. Osburn* [114 Nev. 1367, 1370, 970 P.2d 1071, 1073 (1998)], this court stated that family law trial courts must also consider the disparity in income of the parties when awarding fees. Therefore, parties seeking attorney fees in family law cases must support their fee request with affidavits or other evidence that meets the factors in *Brunzell* and *Wright*.

Miller, 121 Nev. at 623-624, 119 P.3d at 730.

The *Brunzell* factors adopted by the Nevada Supreme Court were derived from an Arizona case, *Schwartz v. Schwerin*, 85 Ariz. 242, 336 P.2d 144 (Ariz. 1959). In *Schwartz*, the Arizona Supreme Court classified the factors into four general areas:

(1) the qualities of the advocate: his ability, his training, education, experience, professional standing and skill; (2) the character of the work to be done: its difficulty, its intricacy, its importance, time and skill required, the responsibility imposed and the prominence and character of the parties where they affect the importance of the litigation; (3) the work actually performed by the lawyer: the skill, time and attention given to the work; (4) the result: whether the attorney was successful and what benefits were derived. Furthermore, good judgment would dictate that each of these factors be given consideration by the trier of fact and that no one element should predominate or be given undue weight. (citations omitted).

Id. at 245 and 146.

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In this case, this Court should consider the following in applying the foregoing factors:

1. Qualities of Minh's Advocates

The qualities of Minh's attorney are excellent. Mr. Mullins is an AV rated, Nevada Certified Family Law Specialist with (31 years) experience and training in the field of Family Law Litigation. Mr. Mullins is also certified in Family Law by the National Board of Trial Advocacy. Mr. Mullins is a Fellow, American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers. Mr. Mullins' hourly rate is \$500.00, and such is at or below what his peers charge with similar work experience and value. A Law Clerk, as well as paralegal's were also utilized to keep costs down.

2. The Character of the Work Done

In this instance, Minh's counsel was charged with the task of representing her in a contested divorce matter with the primary issue being relocation. Under the circumstances of this case, the character of work required to litigate this matter certainly justifies the fees incurred.

3. The Work Actually Performed by the Lawyer

Mr. Mullins diligently and vigorously represented Minh in a highly contested divorce matter that resulted in having to try the custody issue related to relocation. Mr. Mullins prepared several pleadings; participated in and conducted extensive discovery; prepared for and attended and summarized depositions; reviewed documents and satisfied extensive discovery requests, and has tried this matter in light of the burden of proof.

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4. The Results

The final factor adopted in Brunzell, is whether the attorney was successful and what benefits were derived. Miller, 121 Nev. at 623-624, 119 P.3d at 730. Assuming Minh is the prevailing party, then pursuant to NRS 18.010, the policy behind the relocation statutory mandate, and the Brunzell factors, Minh is entitled to an award of attorney's fees and costs.

day of September 2019. DATED this 5

KAINEN LAW GROUP, PLLC

Nevada Bar No. 3544

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Attorney for Minh Luong

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1	CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
2	I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 3rd day of September 2019, I caused to be
3	served the <i>Defendant's Trial Brief per EDCR 7.27</i> to all interested parties as follows:
4	BY MAIL: Pursuant to N.R.C.P. 5(b), I caused a true copy thereof to be
5	placed in the U.S. Mail, enclosed in a sealed envelope, postage fully prepaid thereon,
6	addressed as follows:
7	BY CERTIFIED MAIL: I caused a true copy thereof to be placed in the
8	U.S. Mail, enclosed in a sealed envelope, certified mail, return receipt requested, postage
9	fully paid thereon, addressed as follows:
10	BY FACSIMILE: Pursuant to EDCR 7.26, I caused a true copy thereof to
11	be transmitted, via facsimile, to the following number(s):
12	BY ELECTRONIC MAIL: Pursuant to EDCR 7.26 and N.E.F.C.R. Rule
13	9, I caused a true copy thereof to be served via electronic mail, via Odyssey eFileNV,
14	to the following e-mail address(es):
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17	4. donna@thedklawgroup.com 5. info@thedklawgroup.com
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19	
20	P. Beller
21	An Employee at the KAINEN LAW GROUP, PLLC
22	Minited Christian Groot, Telec
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VOLUME III

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EXHIBIT A

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financials to a particular broker or financial consultant with the idea that he was going to review each of your portfolios to give him permission about potential retirement or when you could be ready or something of that nature? I remember giving our financial information to a financial advisor to see where we were financially and the ability to retire and live within 9 the lifestyle that we chose to have. In that conversation, were you talking about 10 the lifestyle meaning a California house lifestyle or 11 beach lifestyle, or was it not mentioning the concept of buying something in California at all? 13 The California house was included in it. 14 The sale of the Vegas house and relocating from Vegas 15 was not included in that. 16 So when you were getting this advice, you 17 weren't telling the financial advisor that you were 18 ever going to be willing to give up your house, for instance, to relocate? 20 A Correct. 21 22 O Did she know that? I don't know. 23 So you could have been telling the financial 25 advisor something different than what she understood

EXHIBIT B

AA000445

everybody sort of knew what everybody had? 1 More the second than the first. 2 Did you sign joint returns during the 3 marriage for your personal income? Near the end. And toward the beginning part of the marriage, you did it all separately? 7 Correct. 8 Did you feel like you both knew what each 9 others' financial positions were during the marriage, 10 or did you each hold stuff back? 11 Other than the legal issues we've already 12 Α discussed, I think we both had a reasonable idea of 13 each others' financial positions. 14 Do you recall having conversations about the 15 "give me five years" or "give me another five year" 16 conversations in front of any third parties? 17 A I don't. 19 Do you recall discussing it with a mutual therapist the two of you went to somewhere around 21 April of '18? I believe we addressed the comment of "give 22 me five years" with Carol Conti, the therapist. 23 Do you recall in that conversation that that 24 was the first time that you said the words "I told 25

you I'd consider the relocation to appease you"? 1 I don't know if that's when. 2 Is it possible you did not tell her -- tell 3 Minh that in your mind you were never moving without retirement while she considered and was talking to 6 you about the schools in Southern California, the benefits the children could have for a move to 7 California, et cetera? 8 9 Α I don't believe I ever said I never am moving. 10 11 Q So you never said you were never moving either? 12 A Correct. 13 So she could have been believing you were 14 considering a move for the whole family, but you were 15 only considering moving in terms of retirement, so 16 the two minds never met? 17 I can't speak for her mind, but I know that 18 19 I wasn't planning to move prior to retirement. Did you tell her that? "I'm not moving till I retire, so I don't know why you're talking about 21 our kids moving because it's not going to be any time near now that I'm retiring"? 23 The first time I was ever told that our kids 24 were going to be moved was about a week after the 25

EXHIBIT C

AA000448

interest in that residence, correct? 2 A Correct. So do you recall a particular conversation 3 back in 2017, or right after that lawsuit that we just talked about was settled, where Minh told you that she was so upset with how she thought that lawsuit was handled regarding the incident of whether or not you absolved her from the liability that she 9 was going to start looking out for herself? Do you remember the conversation? 10 That wasn't the conversation. 11 In your mind or in your recollection, what 12 was the conversation? 13 She was sitting at the dining room table. 14 was standing in the kitchen. She looked up at me and 15 she said, "I've come to the conclusion that you don't 16 care about me. I have to take care of myself. going to sell my practice. I'm going to move to 18 California. I'm going to buy a house. You can come 19 when you're ready. I don't know if you will ever be 20 ready." 21 That was her words that you recall? 22 23 A Yes. 24 Do you recall the approximate date of that? She bought the house in approximately October 2017. 25

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Right. Probably July 16th, 2017. 2 Okay. Do you keep and have you kept a journal where you write down -- or a diary where you write down things and write the dates down on them? Not in that level of formality, but I sometimes would write notes to myself after an argument or heated discussion about something. And where do you keep such notes? A 9 particular notebook that you put it in or . . . A I try to put them into a folder to hold 10 loose paper. 11 In your motion you suggested that when the 12 comment happened where you overheard the threat 13 regarding the hand in the door, that that was so 14 troubling to you and on a certain date in 2012, that 15 16 you memorialized it. Would such a comment be in that same folder? 17 I don't know if it was 2012, so I'm not --18 Oh, your motion said 2012. I read it this 19 morning. 20 21 Α Okay. 22 So I'm representing to you that in your 23 motion it said that that was troubling enough to you 24 that you wrote it down. 25 A Okay.

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1 So I'm assuming that that date is correct. 2 But for purposes of my question, would it be the same folder or same place that you would put this argument 3 note down and that argument note down, or would it be scattered somewhere else where you kept it? 5 Sometimes scattered, but many notes are in this folder. 7 Do you recall anything else that's come up in this case where you may have memorialized it 9 contemporaneously that's in that folder? 10 Not that I haven't already shared with my 11 attorney. 12 I can't know what you shared with him. All 13 I can know is what's in your motion and what we 14 talked about today. 15 So, so far I have you said that this might 16 be in that folder. In other words, what you just 17 testified is what she told you that day when she was 18 at the table and you were standing, and you've also 20 mentioned that previous hand in the door incident. 21 So far that's the only two things that you said might be in that folder or that journal. 22 My question is, you know, the other issues 23 in the case, are any of those in the folder as well? 24 25 I haven't reviewed this folder for a long

1 time. I don't know. And how thick is the folder? An inch. 3 A MR. MULLINS: I'm going to ask Mr. Dickerson 5 to review that folder with the client. If there are notes in there that are addressing stuff involving 6 either the custody case, your children, incidents 7 involving arguments with her, that that part of the 8 9 journal be produced. 10 MR. DICKERSON: Okay. MR. MULLINS: If there's a privilege log you 11 need to do because something's privileged, he knows 12 13 how to do that too. All right. BY MR. MULLINS: 14 15 Did you discuss relocating to Orange County with Minh prior to the lawsuit settlement happening? 16 In other words, do you know the date approximately 17 that you settled those lawsuits? Or at least you 19 know the date that the two of you -- when she made 20 that comment to you about moving to California, had 21 you discussed prior to that the two of you moving to 22 California? MR. DICKERSON: So you're looking at before 23 July 16, 2017? 24 25 MR. MULLINS: Yeah.

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EXHIBIT D

AA000453

	REOT
I	NEIL M. MULLINS, ESQ.
	Nevada Bar No. 3544
l	KAINEN LAW GROUP, PLLC
	3303 Novat Street, Suite 200
	Las Vegas, Nevada 89129-8714
-	Telephone (702) 823-4900
ı	Facsimile (702) 823-4488
1	Service@KainenLawGroup.com
١	REQT NEIL M. MULLINS, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 3544 KAINEN LAW GROUP, PLLC 3303 Novat Street, Suite 200 Las Vegas, Nevada 89129-8714 Telephone (702) 823-4900 Facsimile (702) 823-4488 Service@KainenLawGroup.com Attorney for Defendant
П	

EIGHTH DISTRICT COURT, FAMILY DIVISION CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

JAMES W. VAHEY,

Plaintiff,

VS.

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MINH NGUYET LUONG,

Defendant.

CASE NO. D-18-581444-D DEPT. H

Date of Hearing: N/A Time of Hearing: N/A

DEFENDANT'S FIRST REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS TO PLAINTIFF

TO: JAMES W. VAHEY, Plaintiff; and

TO: ROBERT P. DICKERSON, ESQ., Attorney for Plaintiff:

Defendant, MINH NGUYET LUONG, by and through her attorney, NEIL M. MULLINS, ESQ., of the KAINEN LAW GROUP, PLLC, requests, pursuant to Rule 34 of the Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure, that Plaintiff, JAMES W. VAHEY, produce and permit Defendant to inspect and to copy the following documents that Plaintiff or any of his agents, servants, employees, representatives or attorneys may have in their possession, custody, or control.

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

The following preliminary statement and definitions apply to each of the Requests for Production set forth hereinafter and are deemed to be incorporated herein:

KAINEN LAW GROUP, PLLC 3303 Noval Street. Suite 200

Las Vegas, Nevada 89129-8714 702.823.4900 • Fax 702.823.4488

www.KainenLawGroup.com

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4∥B.

DEFINITIONS

A.	"Person" means any individual, corporation, partnership, association, business trust
	municipality, or any other organization or entity.

- "Document" or "documents" means any kind of written or graphic manner, however, produced or reproduced, or in any kind or description, whether sent or received or neither, including originals, copies, and drafts, including both sides thereof, and including, but not limited to, papers, books, letters, correspondence, photographs, objects, tangible things, telegrams, cables, telex messages, memoranda, notes, notations, work, papers, transcripts (including trial and deposition transcripts), pleadings, minutes, reports and recording of telephone or other conversations of interviews or of conferences or other meetings, affidavits, statements, summaries, opinions, reports, studies, analyses, evaluations, contracts, agreements, journals, statistical records, desk calendars, appointment books, diaries, lists, tabulations, sound recordings, computer printouts, data processing input and output, microfilms, computer discs or other memory elements, and all other records kept by electronic, photographic, or mechanical means, and things similar to any of the foregoing, however denominated by you.
- For the purpose of this Request, the phrase "tangible thing" means any material inanimate object or living organism other than human and also includes any human being or part thereof displaying relevant information communicable in any manner other than the verbal testimony of that human being.
- D. For the purpose of this Request, the phrases "in your possession" or "under your control" refer to the documents or tangible things in your actual possession; documents or tangible things in your custody or possession, although located elsewhere; documents or tangible things in your care, custody and control, although in the possession of your attorneys, accountants, agents or employees; and all documents or tangible things, wherever located, as to which you have the right of possession.

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- The term "you" or "your" means the Plaintiff, and all other persons acting or E. purporting to act on her behalf.
- The term "and" means and/or and the term "or" means and/or. F.

INSTRUCTIONS

Document Production. You are requested to produce the documents listed below and tangible things in your possession or under your control to be inspected, sampled, photographed, tested and/or copied.

The documents and tangible things are to be produced at KAINEN LAW GROUP, PLLC, 3303 Novat Street, Suite 200, Las Vegas, Nevada, 89129-8714, on or before the 30th day following the date of service of this Request for Production.

All documents produced shall be organized and labeled to correspond with the appropriate numbered paragraph of this Request for Production to which said documents are responsive.

- Duty to Supplement. These requests are continuing and require supplementary responses if further information and/or documents are obtained following the service of your responses to these requests.
- Claim of Privilege. If any document is withheld under claim of privilege, please identify the document for which there is a claim of privilege with a full description thereof, including without limitation as follows:
 - The date it bears; 1.
 - The name of each person who prepared it or participated in any way in its 2. preparation;
 - 3. The name of each person who signed it;
 - The name of each person to whom it or a copy of it was addressed; 4.
 - 5. The name of each person who presently has custody of it or a copy of it;
 - 6. Its subject matter and its substance; and
 - 7. The basis for this claim of privilege.

Page 3 of 6

KainenLawGroup.com

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REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION

REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 1:

Please produce copies of any and all documents and tangible evidence which you rely upon to support your position that the children's best interests are not served by their relocation to California with their mother.

REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 2:

Please produce any and all tangible evidence or documents you have to support your position that Minh Luong was impatient, abusive or otherwise mistreated any of your children.

REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 3:

Please produce any and all voice, audio, video or FaceTime or other digital or recordings in your possession in which Minh Luong is a party, which were recorded on or after January 1, 2017.

REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 4:

Please produce copies of all recordings described in Request No. 3, above, made prior to January 1, 2017 if deemed by you to be relevant to the issues being litigated in this matter.

REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 5:

Please produce any and all diaries, journals, memos or histories, created by you or on your behalf which memorialize or describe any of the issues or facts in dispute in this matter.

REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 6:

Please produce all documents or tangible evidence which evidences any communication between you and Minh Luong concerning whether you approved or objected to her 28 proposed relocation of your family, or the children to Southern California.

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REQUEST	FOR	PRODU	CTION	NO. 7
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Please produce a file stamped copy of your Financial Disclosure Form. Such is required to be filed by local court rule. Do not skip any pages, as your complete financial condition, including assets and debts is or may be relevant to the custody and relocation case even though not at issue concerning division of assets and debts in this matter.

REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 8:

Please produce a copy of your Homeowners Association Rules, CC & R's for your residence at Lake Las Vegas.

Dated this 3rd day of April, 2019.

KAINEN LAW GROUP, PLLC

By:

NEIL M. MULLINS, ESQ

Nevada Bar No. 3544

3303 Novat Street, Suite 200 Las Vegas, Nevada 89129-8714

Attorney for Defendant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 3 rd day of April, 2019, I caused to be served
Defendant's First Request for Production of Documents to Plaintiff to all interested
parties as follows:
BY MAIL: Pursuant to N.R.C.P. 5(b), I caused a true copy thereof to be
placed in the U.S. Mail, enclosed in a sealed envelope, postage fully prepaid thereon,
addressed as follows:
BY CERTIFIED MAIL: I caused a true copy thereof to be placed in the U.S. Mail, enclosed in a sealed envelope, certified mail, return receipt requested, postage fully
paid thereon, addressed as follows:
BY FACSIMILE: Pursuant to EDCR 7.26, I caused a true copy thereof to be transmitted, via facsimile, to the following number(s): _X_ BY ELECTRONIC MAIL: Pursuant to EDCR 7.26 and N.E.F.C.R. Rule 9,
I caused a true copy thereof to be served by electronic mail, via Odyssey Wiznet E-File
& Serve, to the following e-mail address(es):

<u>info@thedklawgroup.com</u>

Chris L. Cook, Paralegal KAINEN LAW GROUP, PLLC

ELECTRONICALLY SERVED 5/3/2019 7:35 PM

1	RSPN				
2	THE DICKERSON KARACSONYI LAW GROUP				
3	ROBERT P. DICKERSON, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 000945 SABRINA M. DOLSON				
4	Novada Par No. 012105				
5	Las Vegas, Nevada 89134 Telephone: (702) 388-8600 MAY 0 6 2019				
6	Trelephone: (702) 388-8600 Facsimile: (702) 388-0210 Email: info@TheDKlawgroup.com E-SERVED MAY 0 6 2019				
7	Attorneys for Plaintiff				
8					
9	II .				
10	THAILI BILIDIOIL				
11	olinde Goortin, matrix				
12	JAMES W. VAHEY,				
13 14	Plaintiff, CASE NO. D-18-581444-D DEPT NO. H				
15	v. {				
16	MINH NGUYET LUONG,				
17	Defendant.				
18					
19	FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS TO PLAINTIFF				
20	TO: MINH NGUYET LUONG, Defendant; and				
21	TO: NEIL M. MULLINS, ESQ., of KAINEN LAW GROUP, PLLC, Attorney for Defendant:				
22	Attorney for Defendant:				
23	COMES NOW Plaintiff, JAMES W. VAHEY ("JIM"), by and				
24	through his attorneys, ROBERT P. DICKERSON, ESQ., and SABRINA				
25	M. DOLSON, ESQ., of THE DICKERSON KARACSONYI LAW				
26	GROUP, and hereby responds to Defendant's First Request for Production				
27	of Documents to Plaintiff as follows:				
28	• • •				
	Case Number: D-18-581444-D				

REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 1:

Please produce copies of any and all documents and tangible evidence which you rely upon to support your position that the children's best interests are not served by their relocation to California with their mother.

RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 1:

Please see the documents provided in Plaintiff's Initial NRCP 16.2 Disclosure of Documents. Discovery is ongoing in this matter, and Plaintiff reserves the right to supplement this Response should additional information become available to him.

REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 2:

Please produce any and all tangible evidence or documents you have to support your position that Minh Luong was impatient, abusive or otherwise mistreated any of your children.

RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 2:

Objection. This request is unduly burdensome as to the time period covered. Without waiving said objection, please see audio recording being served herewith. Discovery is ongoing in this matter, and Plaintiff reserves the right to supplement this Response should additional information become available to him.

REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 3:

Please produce any and all voice, audio, video or FaceTime or other digital or recordings in your possession in which Minh Luong is a party, which were recorded on or after January 1, 2017.

RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 3:

Objection. This request is unduly burdensome as to the time period covered. Without waiving said objection, please see audio recording being served herewith. Discovery is ongoing in this matter, and Plaintiff reserves

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the right to supplement this Response should additional information become available to him.

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REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 4:

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Please produce copies of all recordings described in Request No. 3, above, made prior to January 1, 2017 if deemed by you to be relevant to the issues being litigated in this matter.

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RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 4:

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Objection. This request is unduly burdensome as to the time period covered. Defendant has no recordings responsive to this request. Discovery is ongoing in this matter, and Plaintiff reserves the right to supplement

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this Response should additional information become available to him.

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REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 5:

13 14

Please produce any and all diaries, journals, memos or histories, created by you or on your behalf which memorialize or describe any of the

documents Bates Nos. PLTF001201 - PLTF001202. Discovery is ongoing

in this matter, and Plaintiff reserves the right to supplement this Response

Objection. This request is unduly burdensome as to the time period

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issues or facts in dispute in this matter.

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RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 5:

should additional information become available to him.

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covered. Please see Plaintiff's Initial NRCP 16.2 Disclosure of Documents,

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REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 6:

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Please produce all documents or tangible evidence which evidences any communication between you and Minh Luong concerning whether you approved or objected to her proposed relocation of your family, or the children to Southern California.

RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 6:

Objection. This request is unduly burdensome as to the time period covered. Please see Plaintiff's Initial NRCP 16.2 Disclosure of Documents, documents Bates Nos. PLTF001201 - PLTF001202. Discovery is ongoing in this matter, and Plaintiff reserves the right to supplement this Response should additional information become available to him.

REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 7:

Please produce a file stamped copy of your Financial Disclosure Form. Such is required to be filed by local court rule. Do not skip any pages, as your complete financial condition, including assets and debts is or may be relevant to the custody and relocation case even though not at issue concerning division of assets and debts in this matter.

RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 7:

Please see Plaintiff's General Financial Disclosure Form filed on April 26, 2019.

REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 8:

Please produce a copy of your Homeowners Association Rules, CC & R's for your residence at Lake Las Vegas.

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RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 8:

Objection. This Request is overly broad and unduly burdensome, and seeks information not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Discovery is ongoing in this matter, and Plaintiff reserves the right to supplement this Response should additional information become available to him.

DATED this 3rd day of May, 2019.

THE DICKERSON KARACSONYI LAW GROUP

By Sahmine U. Dolson

ROBERT P. DICKERSON, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 000945 SABRINA M. DOLSON, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 013105 1745 Village Center Circle Las Vegas, Nevada 89134 Attorneys for Plaintiff

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

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Pursuant to NRCP 5(b), I certify that I am an employee of THE DICKERSON KARACSONYI LAW GROUP, and that on this 3rd day of May, 2019, I caused the above and foregoing document entitled PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S FIRST REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS TO PLAINTIFF, to be served as follows: pursuant to EDCR 8.05(a), EDCR 8.05(f), NRCP 5(b)(2)(D) and Administrative Order 14-2 captioned "In the Administrative Matter of Mandatory Electronic Service in the X Eighth Judicial District Court," by mandatory electronic service through the Eighth Judicial District Court's electronic filing system; by placing same to be deposited for mailing in the United States Mail, in a sealed envelope upon which first class postage was prepaid in Las Vegas, Nevada; pursuant to EDCR 7.26, to be sent via facsimile, by duly executed consent for service by electronic means; by hand-delivery with signed Receipt of Copy. To the following people listed below at the address, email address, and/or facsimile number indicated below: NEIL M. MULLINS, ESQ. KAINEN LAW GROUP, PLLC 3303 Novat Street, Suite 200 Las Vegas, Nevada 89129 service@kainenlawgroup.com Attorney for Defendant Vorina M. Dolgo An employee of The Dickerson Karacsonyi Law Group

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ME SAS + Sun be complaints.

SAT - A doozie - we've moving to CA or I all take teds

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Sun- when u going to clean this room.

You say JWV good @ saying what I want

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you replayed to things - prong then you ranged you volunteered to things take my name. I then you ranged This is much diff than you deciding to tell me something now a Think I should just accept it.

You aren't true to your wond a this is something that I can't tolerate, I really an disappointed by this.

SAT - you're going to CA I you

only reason you're in LY is forme you have A

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N- I'm going to go to CA much more often - How

is that fair to me - You are complaining about

how little time I have & you a thon you're going

to make it less - ok - Go but love the

Kids here.

PLTF001202 AA000467

EXHIBIT E

AA000468

had to buy it -- she wasn't involved in the selection 2 of color scheme or schematic either. Do you know 3 that? I wouldn't know because I wasn't involved in any way with the purchase of the house. 5 But you used that fact that you weren't involved in the selection of colors as a reason to 7 say that you didn't acquiesce to the purchase of that particular house. 9 Do you recall you were involved in the 10 landscaping design? You helped furnish the property 11 by going with her to the furniture places and picking 12 it out, things of that nature? I recall those things. 14 15 You did help her with the designing the 16 landscaping and all that stuff? She asked me to do it, and I did. 17 And do you recall helping put the kids' 18 19 desks and bedroom furniture together and things of that nature? 21 A I recall standing in the room while her brother-in-law and the other brother-in-law assembled the desks. I did very little to assemble these 23 24 desks. 25 Q Do you recall being present in the car on

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more than one occasion where either Minh or the kids 1 pointed out which school they were going to attend, 2 and you said, "Okay"? 3 I absolutely did not say, "Okay." Do you recall a comment being made by either 5 Minh or the kids about the school as you were driving by it? Yes. 8 A Who made the comment and what was said? 9 I don't know which of the children made the 10 comment. If I said anything, it would be, "Well, we 11 don't know that yet. That's something for Mommy and 12 13 Daddy to decide." Do you recall whether that was the only time 14 15 that that happened, or whether it happened on more than one occasion? Where the comment in front of 16 Minh and you by the children was that they would 17 18 either attend or go to a particular school? Please ask that question again. 19 Sure. Was there ever a time besides that 20 one that you just recalled where both Minh and the 21 children and you were together and a discussion was 22 23 had about going to that particular school? 24 I don't recall if there was more than one 25 event.

Besides you, Minh and the kids involving 1 that one conversation, do you ever remember the 2 school issue being brought up or discussed between 3 either you, Minh, or the children? It's possible that they told me, "Mommy said 5 6 we're going to be going to school in California next 7 year." And I said, "That's not true. Let Mommy and 8 Daddy decide that. We don't know what's going to 9 happen tomorrow. Let us decide what's going to 10 happen next year." 11 And I'm still talking about you may not 12 be -- I'm still talking about pre-divorce conversations. 14 A This was pre-divorce. 15 Okay. So because if you're going to talk 16 about -- just tell me if you're ever going to talk 17 about a conversation that happens after you decided 18 to divorce her because it will help me with my 19 questions. 20 So all pre-divorce. That sounds pretty 21 specific what you just described. That means the 22 children were telling you or inquiring about you 23 moving there, correct? 24 That means Minh was telling them that they 25

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EXHIBIT F

AA000472

I wasn't privy to exactly what her hours 1 were, so that's difficult for me to say. Do you recall whether or not she works three 3 days a week or more than three days a week? In the time we've been together, she's not 6 worked at all for periods of time. She's worked three days a week. Some periods she's had employee doctors. Other periods she's worked five days a 8 9 week. How about in the last couple of years before 10 you separated, do you recall whether she had been on 11 the three-day-a-week-type schedule? 12 I can't remember. 13 Do you recall how many days a week she 14 operated or had surgery in the morning? 15 Usually one. 16 A Was that Wednesday? 17 0 Yes. 18 And is that the day that, to your 19 understanding, she would start surgeries at 6:00 or 20 6:30 in the morning? 21 22 Yes. Now, do you recall on average what time she 23 ended her day? Or -- or not ended the day at work. 24 Arrived home or able to do activities with the kids? 25

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EXHIBIT G

AA000474

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back?"
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              And she agreed, "Yes."
 3
              And Carol said -- she goes, "Do you guys
 4
     agree to give it a try?"
 5
              She looked at Minh, and Minh said, "Yes."
              She looked at me, and I said, "Yes."
              That's the end of the session. And later
 7
     Minh goes, "Well, let's give it a try."
 9
              And I suggested doing it. And I wanted
     anything to save our marriage. And our marriage
10
     would be together to this day if it weren't this
11
     issue of the children. But, you know, to take
12
     children away from one parent, you have to do
13
     something.
14
              So I was willing to try it to try to rescue
15
     our marriage. And I suggested doing it for a couple
16
     of weeks, and Minh absolutely scoffed and got very,
17
     very angry with me. She wanted it for a summertime
18
     or a whole school year.
              And I said, "No. That's not going to
20
21
     happen."
              And she says, "A couple" -- and this is
22
23
     verbatim, "A couple of weeks is a joke. You never
     want to go. You're just saying that. You're never
24
25
     going. You never -- you shouldn't have even said
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EXHIBIT H

AA000476

Dr. Gluck also does shoulders. 1 Do each of these doctors have an equal interest in your practice, or do you retain more of 3 an interest than them? Equal interest. Does your -- do they each have contracts and do you have a contract in terms of a partnership agreement with them? 9 A Yes. And did you, in the contract for either one 10 of those, specifically provide that you can work less 11 hours and pay less overhead or not have extra overhead attributed to you if you work less hours? 13 Not that I know of. 14 A Do you recall ever mentioning such a 15 provision to Minh? That when you were negotiating 16 one of the contracts, that you were either 17 considering or put in a provision that allowed you to 18 work less hours? 19 A Yes. 20 So you remember having that conversation 21 22 with her? I don't remember the conversation, but I 23 remember considering an overhead calculation that 24 25 included hours.

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9/7/2019 1:30 PM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT Ţ CRTF THE DICKERSON KARACSONYI LAW GROUP 2 ROBERT P. DICKERSON, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 000945 3 SABRINA M. DOLSON, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 013105 4 1745 Village Center Circle Las Vegas, Nevada 89134 5 Telephone: (702) 388-8600 Facsimile: (702) 388-0210 Email: info@TheDKlawgroup.com 6 7 Attorneys for Plaintiff 8 9 DISTRICT COURT FAMILY DIVISION 10 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 11 IAMES W. VAHEY. CASE NO. D-18-581444-D DEPT NO. H 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. 14 MINH NGUYET LUONG, 15 Defendant. 16 17 **CERTIFICATE OF SEMINAR COMPLETION** 18 ATTACHED hereto please find the Certificate of Completion of the Seminar for the Separation of Parents (Clark County COPE Class) 19 20 administered by BOSS Court Education for Plaintiff, JAMES VAHEY. DATED this 7th day of September, 2019. 21 22 THE DICKERSON KARACSONYI LAW GROUP 23 24 25 DICKERSON, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 000945 SABRINA M. DOLSON, ESQ. 26 Nevada Bar No. 013105 27 1745 Village Center Circle Las Vegas, Nevada 89134 Attorneys for Plaintiff 28 AA000478 VOLUME III

Electronically Filed

Case Number: D-18-581444-D

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Pursuant to NRCP 5(b), I certify that I am an employee of THE 2 DICKERSON KARACSONYI LAW GROUP, and that on this 7th day of 3 September, 2019, I caused the above and foregoing document entitled 4 CERTIFICATE OF SEMINAR COMPLETION, to be served as follows: 5 pursuant to EDCR 8.05(a), EDCR 8.05(f), NRCP 5(b)(2)(D) and Administrative Order 14-2 captioned "In the Administrative Matter of Mandatory Electronic Service in the Eighth Judicial District Court," by mandatory electronic service through the Eighth Judicial District Court's electronic [X]6 7 8 filing system; 9 by placing same to be deposited for mailing in the United States Mail, in a sealed envelope upon which first class postage was prepaid in Las Vegas, Nevada; 10 IIpursuant to EDCR 7.26, to be sent via facsimile, by duly executed consent for service by electronic means; 12 by hand-delivery with signed Receipt of Copy. 13 To the following people listed below at the address, email address, and/or 14 facsimile number indicated below: 15 NEIL M. MULLINS, ESO. KAINEN LAW GROUP, PLLC 16 3303 Novat Street, Suite 200 17 Las Vegas, Nevada 89129 service@kainenlawgroup.com 18 Attorney for Defendant 19 Salmina M. Dolga 20 An employee of The Dickerson Karacsonyi Law Group 21 22 23

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Certificate of Completion

JAMES VAHEY

Has successfully completed the BOSS Court Education course

"Seminar for the Separation of Parents (Clark County COPE Class)"

This 03rd Day of September, 2019

BOSS Court Education
Business license #: NV20131288654
Nevada DMV Traffic Safety License
ID: TSS000043904
Nevada DMV DUI Class License ID:
DUI000043905

Case Number: d18581444d

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DISTRICT COURT

CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

Plaintiff,)

vs.) CASE NO. D-18-581444-D

DEPT. NO. "H"

MINH NGUYET LUONG,

)
FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW,
DECISION AND ORDER

Defendant.

Dates of Hearing: August 8, 2019, September 5, 2019, September 11, 2019 Time of Hearing: 9:00 a.m. – 5:00 p.m., 9:00 a.m. – 5:00 p.m., 1:30 – 5:00 p.m.

This matter came on for evidentiary hearing before Art Ritchie, District Court Judge, Family Division, Department H. James Vahey was present and represented by his attorneys, THE DICKERSON KARACSONYI LAW GROUP, and Robert P. Dickerson, Esq. and Sabrina M. Dolson, Esq. Minh Luong was present and represented by her attorneys, KAINEN LAW GROUP, and Neil M. Mullins, Esq. The court reviewed the papers and pleadings on file, the evidence

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LAS VEGAS, NV 89155

VOLUME III

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RTHUR RITCHIE, JR DISTRICT JUDGE AMILY DIVISION, DEPT H LAS VEGAS, NV 89155

admitted at the hearing, and for good cause, makes the following findings of fact, conclusions of law, decision and order.

I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This matter is a pre-judgment custody dispute arising out of this divorce case. This court was asked to resolve both parties' claims for legal and physical custody, and Minh Luong's motion for an order allowing her to remove the parties' minor children from Nevada to California over James Vahey's objection.

James Vahey, age 56, and Minh Luong, age 46, were married in Henderson, Nevada on July 8, 2006. Three children were born the issue of their relationship, Hannah Vahey, who was born on March 19, 2009, Matthew Vahey, who was born on June 26, 2010, and Selena Vahey, who was born on April 4, 2014.

James Vahey filed a Complaint for Divorce on December 13, 2018, seeking a divorce on no-fault grounds of incompatibility. James Vahey alleged in his complaint that the Plaintiff and the Defendant are proper persons to be awarded joint legal and joint physical custody of their children. Minh Luong filed an Answer and Counterclaim for Divorce on January 11, 2019. Minh Luong alleged in her counterclaim that the Plaintiff and the Defendant are proper persons to be awarded joint legal custody. Minh Luong alleged that it is in the best interest of the children that she have primary physical custody, and she seeks

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permission to remove the children from Nevada to California. James Vahey opposes the request to remove the children from Nevada.

Minh Luong filed a motion to resolve parent/ child issues, for removal, for support, and for other relief on January 29, 2019. The motion was set for hearing on March 12, 2019. James Vahey filed his opposition and countermotion on February 20, 2019. Minh Luong's reply to opposition and opposition to countermotion was filed on March 5, 2019.

The parties' motions were heard on March 12, 2019. On that date, both parties appeared with counsel. The court ordered that the parties share joint legal and joint physical custody of the children pending an evidentiary hearing. The court's temporary order provided that James Vahey have custodial responsibility from Monday at 9:00 a.m. to Wednesday at 9:00 a.m., and that Minh Luong have custodial responsibility from Wednesday at 9:00 a.m. to Friday at 9:00 a.m. The court ordered the parties alternate weekends defined as Friday at 9:00 a.m. to Monday at 9:00 a.m. The court set a discovery schedule and continued the case management conference to May 28, 2019. The Order from the March 12, 2019 hearing was filed on May 2, 2019.

On May 31, 2019, the court entered an order setting the matter for evidentiary hearing on August 8, 2019. The court held an evidentiary hearing on August 8, 2019, September 5, 2019, and September 11, 2019. The court received documentary proof and heard the testimony from six witnesses, Hieu Luong,

T ARTHUR RITCHIE, JR
DISTRICT JUDGE
FAMILY DIVISION, DEPT H

Minh Luong, James Vahey, Richard Landeis, Bowena Bautista, and Imelda Vahey. This court concludes that the evidence presented at the hearing was sufficient for the court to decide the custody issues in this case.

II. FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

This court has custody jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction over the parties to this case because of their general appearance and their connections and contact with Nevada. Both parties are residents of Clark County, Nevada. Minh Luong owns a residence in Nevada and California, and since the parties' separation in January, 2019, she has spent time at both residences. Nevada is the home state of the parties' minor children pursuant to the UCCJEA as adopted in the Nevada Revised Statutes.

A. CHILD CUSTODY

Child custody orders necessarily address legal custody, which is an expression of parental rights, and physical custody, which is an expression of child placement and custodial responsibility. There is a presumption in Nevada that parents share parental rights through joint legal custody, and a preference that parents share joint physical custody though a parenting plan that affords parents meaningful time and responsibility for minor children for at least 146 days of the year. If a court has not made a determination regarding the custody of a child, each parent has joint legal and joint physical custody of the child until otherwise ordered by a court of competent jurisdiction. NRS 125C.0015 (2).

This court has been asked to establish physical custody orders incident to divorce, and to order the removal of the three minor children from Nevada to California. In considering this request, the court is required to consider the best interest of the children. In any action for determining physical custody of a minor child, the sole consideration of the court is the best interest of the child. NRS 125C.0035 (1). In removing the children from the jurisdiction where the children currently live, the best interest of the children should also be the paramount judicial concern. Schwartz v. Schwartz, 107 Nev. 378, 383, 812 P.2d 1268, 1271 (1991).

The court, with this pre-judgment custody order, makes an order that it finds is in the children's best interest.

1. Legal Custody

NRS 125C.002 provides, in part, that when a court is making a determination regarding the legal custody of a child, there is a presumption, affecting the burden of proof, that joint legal custody would be in the best interest of a minor child if: (a) The parents have agreed to an award of joint legal custody or so agree in open court at a hearing for the purpose of determining the legal custody of the minor child.

Joint legal custody has been the order in this case by agreement, and it is not at issue in these pre-judgment proceedings. The parties have both pled and

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agreed that they should share the legal rights and responsibilities of raising the children jointly.

2. Physical Custody

NRS 125C.001, provides, in part, that the Legislature declares that it is the policy of this State to ensure that minor children have frequent associations and a continuing relationship with both parents after the parents have ended their relationship, become separated, or dissolved their marriage.

NRS 125C.0015 Parents have joint custody until otherwise ordered by court.

- 1. The parent and child relationship extends equally to every child and to every parent, regardless of the marital status of the parents.
- 2. If a court has not made a determination regarding the custody of a child, each parent has joint legal custody and joint physical custody of the child until otherwise ordered by a court of competent jurisdiction.

This divorce case requires the establishment of a physical custody order. Minh Luong seeks an order granting her primary physical custody of the children, and she seeks an order allowing her to remove the children to Irvine, California over James Vahey's objection. Minh Luong had the burden to prove that it is in the children's best interest that she have primary physical custody. Based on the findings below, the court concludes that Minh Luong did not provide sufficient proof to support a conclusion that she have primary physical custody. The evidence supports a conclusion that it is in the best interest of the children that the parties share joint physical custody.

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3. Removal to Irvine, California

Minh Luong seeks an order allowing her to remove the children from Nevada to Irvine, California. Minh Luong has the burden to prove that it is in the children's best interest to be removed from Nevada to Irvine, California, over their father's objection. Even though the court concluded that Minh Luong did not provide sufficient proof to have primary physical custody, the court evaluated the move request factors found in NRS 125C.007. Based on the findings below, the court concludes that Minh Luong did not provide sufficient proof to support a removal of the children to California.

B. MINH LUONG'S MOTION FOR PRIMARY PHYSICAL CUSTODY AND FOR PERMISSION TO RELOCATE WITH THE CHILDREN TO IRVINE, CALIFORNIA

Nevada statutes and case law provide that the district court has broad discretion concerning child custody matters. *Rooney v. Rooney*, 109 Nev. 540, 853 P.2d 123 (1993). This pre-judgment evidentiary hearing establishes the legal and physical custody orders for the parties' divorce judgment.

1. <u>Best Interest Findings</u>

The "best interest" standard applies when parents seek to establish a physical custody order. In a contested case, the district court weighs factors that may affect the consequence of placement. Factors the court considers are found in statutes and in decisional law.

James Vahey has lived in Clark County, Nevada since 1995. James Vahey is an orthopedic surgeon, and has practiced medicine in Nevada for twenty four years. Dr. Vahey testified that he has a busy practice but that he has some control over his patient and surgery schedule. Dr. Vahey testified that his office is located a few miles from the children's school, and that he organizes his work schedule to accommodate his custodial obligations. Bowena Bautista, Dr. Vahey's practice manager, testified that Dr. Vahey sees patients on Mondays and Wednesdays from approximately 9:00 a.m. – 2:00 p.m., and on Fridays from 9:00 a.m.–11:00 a.m. Dr. Vahey's surgeries are scheduled on Tuesdays and Thursdays. Dr. Vahey testified that he earns approximately \$700,000 per year from employment.

Minh Luong has lived in Clark County, Nevada since 2001. Minh Luong is a dentist, and has practiced in Nevada for eighteen years. Dr. Luong is the owner of Tooth Fairy Dental. The business has an office located in Las Vegas, Nevada, and in Henderson, Nevada. Dr. Luong's sister, Hieu Luong worked in the dental offices for approximately five years. Hieu Luong testified that Dr. Luong worked three to four days per week at the dental offices during the time that she worked there. Dr. Luong testified that she worked two to three days a week during the marriage, and she currently works two days per month, every other Wednesday, and she has hired two staff dentists to work her practice. Dr. Luong testified that she plans to retire and have associates run the practice, or sell

the practice. Dr. Luong testified that she earns approximately \$1,000,000 per year, and she would earn between \$700,000 and \$800,000 per year if she employed other dentists to run the practice.

Minh Luong has owned a home in Las Vegas, Nevada since 2002. The parties lived in James Vahey's home located at Lake Las Vegas in Henderson, Nevada, from 2006 until January, 2019. Minh Luong testified that in January, 2019, she moved into her Las Vegas, Nevada home, and she and the children spend her custodial time there.

In October, 2017, Minh Luong purchased a home in Irvine, California. Minh Luong testified that the parties had discussed moving to California during the marriage, and there was an express agreement or tacit understanding that the parties would retire and move to California. James Vahey disputed this claim. The court concludes that the parties did not reach an agreement to move to California, even though Minh Luong purchased a separate property home there in 2017. In support of this conclusion, the court finds that neither party has retired or sold their practice. The parties' marital difficulties predated Minh Luong's purchase of a home in Irvine, California. Minh Luong testified that prior to 2017, she and her husband were parties in a civil suit concerning an investment. Minh Luong testified that after the case was settled, she was hurt and angry, and she told James Vahey that she was going to purchase a home in California, and he could follow her there if he wanted. Minh Luong testified that she discussed

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moving the family to California many times with James Vahey. Minh Luong testified that in an April, 2018 meeting with a therapist, James Vahey told her he was not on board with moving to California.

The court finds that both parties are dedicated to raising their children. Married couples often establish a division of labor that is related to the parties' routines and interests. Both parents in this case have demanding jobs, and they both have successfully guided their busy family through the rigors of raising three children. Both parents have been involved in managing the children's daily routines, sharing responsibilities for supervision, guidance, and education. Minh Luong's allegation that James Vahey was a disengaged or neglectful parent, or that she was the primary parent or the more suitable parent, was not credible, and was not supported by sufficient proof. Minh Luong's testimony in this regard. and these allegations were contradicted by documentary proof and witness testimony that was credible. Hieu Luong, Richard Landeis, Bowena Bautista, and Imelda Vahey testified that James Vahey was an active, engaged parent. Vahey testified that Minh Luong was an exceptional parent.

NRS 125C.0035 (4) sets forth factors that courts are required to consider as part of the balancing test. This court, in evaluating this custody dispute, considered the applicable statutory factors and the decisional law factors. Specifically:

(a) The wishes of the child if the child is of sufficient age and capacity to form an intelligent preference as to his or her physical custody.

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Hannah Vahey is ten (10) years of age, Matthew Vahey is nine (9) years of age, and Selena Vahey is five (5) years of age. None of the children are of sufficient age to form a preference.

(b) Any nomination of a guardian for the child by a parent.

The court is considering custodial placement only with the parents. This factor is not an applicable factor.

(c) Which parent is more likely to allow the child to have frequent associations and a continuing relationship with the noncustodial parent.

The court finds that James Vahey is more likely to allow the children to have a frequent and continuing relationship with the other parent. The court has concerns that Minh Luong's negative attitude towards James Vahey that stems from his refusal to allow her to move the children to California has caused her to negatively influence the relationship between the children and their father. Evidence was presented at the hearing that showed Minh Luong has discussed this dispute with the parties' children. James Vahey's account of the events in August, 2019 when Hannah was upset and crying on the first day of school was credible. James Vahey testified that Minh Luong told him in the presence of the children that he had forced the kids to go to school in Nevada instead of Irvine where he promised, and said to him, in front of the children, that he misled all of us. Evidence was presented that supports a finding that Minh Luong encouraged Hannah and Matthew to discuss the move to California with their father. Minh

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Luong testified that when asked by the children about moving to California, she told the children to ask their dad. James Vahey testified that shortly after the separation, Selena, age 4, told him at a custody exchange that mommy told me to tell you to let her stay with her all of the time. This dialog shows poor judgment and has the potential to alienate the children from their father.

Minh Luong alleged that James Vahey was a good father when he was around, that he did not support the children's emotional needs, and discounted his contributions to their schooling and extracurricular activities. Conversely, James Vahey alleged that it was in the best interest of the children for both parents to share physical custody. James Vahey complimented Minh Luong's parenting and dedication to the children. Of the two parents, James Vahey is less likely to undermine or interfere with the parent-child relationship. The court concludes that James Vahey is more likely to foster and encourage a healthy relationship between the children and the other parent.

(d) The level of conflict between the parents.

The parties have moderate conflict. Minh Luong's decision to seek primary physical custody and removal of the children from Nevada was a catalyst for the filing of this divorce case. Removal disputes within a divorce case can create significant conflict. James Vahey testified that Minh Luong does not speak to him verbally, even in front of the children. Minh Luong insists on texting as the mode of communication between the parties. The court reviewed text

communications admitted into evidence. These communications were rational, devoid of foul language or personal attacks. The court concludes that the parties communicate well enough to address the children's daily needs. The parties disagreed on the frequency of extracurricular activities of the children, and had disagreements concerning parenting style, but both parties demonstrated a commitment to communicate for the benefit of the children.

(e) The ability of the parents to cooperate to meet the needs of the child.

The evidence supports a finding that the parties have the ability to cooperate to meet the needs of the children. During the marriage, the parties coordinated busy work schedules and busy parenting schedules. Despite the fact that Minh Luong testified she cannot co-parent with James Vahey, they have cooperated to meet the needs of the children.

(f) The mental and physical health of the parents.

The court finds that both parties are mentally and physically fit to care for the children.

(g) The physical, developmental and emotional needs of the child.

The children are school age. They attend the Challenger School located in Las Vegas, Nevada. The children are in important developmental stages that requires the support of both parents. Neither parent presented evidence that the children have anything but normal physical, developmental, or emotional needs.

(h) The nature of the relationship of the child with each parent.

The court finds that the children are well-adjusted with a loving relationship with both parents. There was ample evidence showing that Minh Luong and James Vahey participated in many activities with the children, and that both were engaged in the children's schooling, and extracurricular activities.

(i) The ability of the child to maintain a relationship with any sibling.

The court concludes that the sibling relationship is important to maintain. Neither parent suggested a parenting plan that would separate the children from each other.

(j) Any history of parental abuse or neglect of the child or a sibling of the child.

The court finds that neither party proved parental abuse or neglect of the children,

(k) Whether either parent or any other person seeking physical custody has engaged in an act of domestic violence against the child, a parent of the child or any other person residing with the child.

The court finds that neither party provided sufficient proof that the other parent engaged in an act of domestic violence against the children or against any person living with children.

(l) Whether either parent or any other person seeking physical custody has committed any act of abduction against the child or any other child.

The court finds that neither party proved that the other parent engaged in an act of abduction of the children.

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VOLUME III

T ARTHUR RITCHIE, JR DISTRICT JUDGE FAMILY DIVISION, DEPT H LAS VEGAS, NV 89155

Best Interest Conclusion

The court concludes that it is in the best interest of the children that the parties share joint physical custody. A joint physical custody order is only possible if the parties live near one another. Minh Luong testified that she will decide to live in Irvine, California after the divorce, regardless of the outcome of her custody and removal request. If she moves to California, Minh Luong cannot share joint physical custody, and James Vahey shall have primary physical custody by default.

Based on NRS 125C, when the court concludes that a party fails to make a case for primary physical custody, the secondary request for removal fails. However, because the removal considerations overlap the best interest considerations, the court made findings on the removal request.

1. Removal Findings

For the purpose of considering this removal request, the parties have joint physical custody. NRS 125C.0015 (2) provides, in part:

If a court has not made a determination regarding the custody of a child, each parent has joint legal custody and joint physical custody of the child until otherwise ordered by a court of competent jurisdiction.

125C.0065 provides, in part,

1. If joint physical custody has been established pursuant to an order, judgment or decree of a court and one parent intends to relocate his or her residence to a place outside of this State or to a place within this State that is at such a distance that would substantially impair the ability of the other parent to maintain a meaningful relationship with the child, and the relocating parent desires to take the child with him or her, the relocating

parent shall, before relocating: (a) Attempt to obtain the written consent of the non-relocating parent to relocate with the child; and (b) If the non-relocating parent refuses to give that consent, petition the court for primary physical custody for the purpose of relocating.

Removal of a minor child from Nevada by the custodial parent is a separate and distinct issue from child custody. However, some of the same factual and policy considerations overlap. In removing the child from the jurisdiction where the child currently lives, the best interest of the child should also be the paramount judicial concern. *Schwartz v. Schwartz*, 107 Nev. 378, 383, 812 P.2d 1268, 1271 (1991). Determination of the best interest of a child in the removal context necessarily involves a fact-specific inquiry and cannot be reduced to a rigid "bright line" test. *Schwartz* at 1270, (citing *In re Marriage of Eckert*, 518 N.E. 2d 1041, 1045 (Ill. 1988), and *Cooper v. Cooper*, 491 A.2d 606, 614-15 (N.J. 1984)).

The court considered the proof and the factors to be weighed by the court found in NRS 125C.007.

NRS 125C.007 1 (a)

There exists a sensible, good-faith reason for the move, and the move is not intended to deprive the non-relocating parent of his or her parenting time;

The court finds that Minh Luong was sincere in her desire to move to Irvine, California, but concludes that her decision to move is not sensible because joint physical custody is in the best interest of these children, and because the move would deprive James Vahey of the opportunity to share joint physical

custody of the children. The court concludes that it is in the best interest of the children for their parents to live near enough to each other to share physical custody.

Minh Luong testified that she has nine sensible, good faith reasons for the move. They are: (1) The Irvine, California public school is better than the children's Nevada school; (2) Irvine, California is a better community than Henderson, Nevada; (3) Irvine, California is more child friendly than Henderson, Nevada; (4) Irvine, California has better weather than Henderson, Nevada; (5) There is better family support in Irvine, California compared to Henderson, Nevada; (6) The children would be raised by Minh Luong 24/7 in Irvine, California; (7) There are better opportunities for the children in Irvine, California compared to Henderson, Nevada; (8) There are better opportunities for extracurricular activities for the children in Irvine, California compared to Henderson, Nevada; and (9) There are cultural advantages in Irvine, California compared to Henderson, Nevada, because there is a greater Vietnamese population.

Many of these reasons are subjective, and the court accepts that Minh Luong is sincere in her belief that these reasons are senisble. The evidentiary hearing lasted two and one-half days. The court heard several hours of testimony, and yet did not receive sufficient proof to support a favorable finding on these reasons. Minh Luong did not prove that the public school in Irvine, California is

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better for the children than the Challenger private school where the children currently attend. The court concludes that Minh Luong did not prove that Irvine, California is a better community, is more child friendly, has better weather, has better family support, has better opportunities for the children, has better extracurricular activities for the children, or has cultural advantages compared to Henderson, Nevada. Regarding the reason that the move would benefit the children by being raised by Minh Luong 24/7 in Irvine, California the findings in this order show that the court does not conclude that this is sensible or an advantage for the children.

The court finds that Minh Luong's intention to move is, in part, to deprive James Vahey of his parenting time. She suggested that the children would be better served by being raised by Minh Luong 24/7 in Irvine, California. Minh Luong testified that she has been unhappy living in Las Vegas, Nevada for years. Minh Luong testified that she has been trying to persuade James Vahey to move to California since 2015. Between 2015 and 2017, the parties looked at vacation homes in California. After the civil suit was resolved in July, 2017, Minh Luong told James Vahey that he did not care about her, and she was going to purchase a home in California, and you can follow if you want. James Vahey testified that later in July, 2017 he told Minh Luong he was not on board with her plan to move to Irvine, California. Minh Luong then purchased the home in California in October, 2017. The parties continued to live in the marital residence in

Henderson, Nevada throughout 2017 and 2018. Minh Luong testified that in a therapy session in April, 2018 James Vahey again told her that he was not on board with her moving to California with the children. The court is concerned that Minh Luong's decision to live in California is intended to create a distance between the parties, and to create a distance between the children and their father, to avoid the sometimes tedious and inconvenient aspects of co-parenting.

Both parents have significant financial independence. Minh Luong and James Vahey have separate property and substantial income that give them parenting options that many parties cannot afford.

The court concludes that the move to Irvine, California is not sensible because it eliminates the ability of the parties to share the children jointly, and because Minh Luong provided insufficient proof to show that the decision to live in Irvine, California is sensible. Even though the court concludes that Minh Luong did not prove a sensible, good faith reason for the move, the court considered the proof concerning the other factors found in NRS 125C.007, in the event Minh Luong's reason for moving is sensible and made in good faith.

NRS 125C.007 1 (b)

The best interests of the child are served by allowing the relocating parent to relocate with the child;

The court concludes that the children's best interests are not served by allowing Minh Luong to relocate with them to Irvine, California. In support of this conclusion, the court references the best interest findings made in this order.

The court concludes that the children's best interest would be served by the parties sharing joint physical custody.

NRS 125C.007 1 (c)

The child and the relocating parent will benefit from an actual advantage as a result of the relocation.

Minh Luong did not show that her decision to move to Irvine, California was for her economic advantage. The court finds that Minh Luong was sincere that she prefers Irvine, California to Nevada. This opinion or preference is subjective, however, and was not proven by the presentation of sufficient evidence.

NRS 125C.007 2 (a)

The extent to which the relocation is likely to improve the quality of life for the child and the relocating parent;

The court finds that Minh Luong did not prove that the move to Irvine, California improves the children's quality of life. Minh Luong testified that she thought the schools and environment was better for the children in Irvine, California. Her testimony was the evidence offered to the court. The court concludes that she did not prove that schools in Irvine, California were better than the children's current school in Las Vegas, Nevada, or that the children's opportunities and environment would be better in Irvine, California.

NRS 125C.007 2 (b)

Whether the motives of the relocating parent are honorable and not designed to frustrate or defeat any visitation rights accorded to the non-relocating parent;

It is Minh Luong's burden to show that her motives are honorable and not designed to defeat James Vahey's custody rights. The court concludes that she provided insufficient proof of this critical element. The court finds that Minh Luong's motives for the move are suspect, and finds that the move would frustrate and limit James Vahey's opportunity to share custody of the children.

The court was unpersuaded that a move to California is best for the children. The court finds that Minh Luong did prove that her home in Irvine, California is larger and more appealing than her home in Las Vegas, Nevada. It was built in 2017, and the photographs of the home admitted into evidence show that it is a beautiful home. Minh Luong described her Las Vegas, Nevada home where she has exercised her custodial time since January, 2019 as a rental home.

NRS 125C.007 2 (c)

Whether the relocating parent will comply with any substitute visitation orders issued by the court if permission to relocate is granted;

Both parties have followed the court orders that were entered in March, 2019 while this matter was pending, and the parties have shared physical custody of the children. The court concludes that both parties will comply with the custody orders that will be entered in this case.

NRS 125C.007 2 (d)

Whether the motives of the non-relocating parent are honorable in resisting the petition for permission to relocate or to what extent any opposition to the petition for permission to relocate is intended to secure a financial advantage in the form of ongoing support obligations or otherwise;

The court finds that James Vahey's motives are honorable in opposing the request to remove his children to Irvine, California. James Vahey cannot maintain a joint physical custody schedule with the children if they live in California. The children are school age, and his custodial time would be limited to school breaks. The court finds that removal of the children would reduce his time by a significant percentage each year, but more importantly, would change the character of his time with the children.

NRS 125C.007 2 (e)

Whether there will be a realistic opportunity for the non-relocating parent to maintain a visitation schedule that will adequately foster and preserve the parental relationship between the child and the nonrelocating parent if permission to relocate is granted; and

Both parents would have a custody or visitation schedule that would preserve the parental relationship between the children and the other parent, if one parent lives in Clark County, Nevada and one parent lives in Irvine, California. The parent who does not have primary physical custody would have a material reduction in custodial time and a material diminution in custodial responsibility.

NRS 125C.007 2 (f)

Any other factor necessary to assist the court in determining whether to grant permission to relocate.

Without Minh Luong's settled purpose to leave Clark County, Nevada to live in Irvine, California, the evidence in this case supports a conclusion that the parties should share joint physical custody. Minh Luong's decision to move to Irvine, California requires the court to fashion a primary/secondary custodial

schedule. Minh Luong should be afforded some reasonable time to consider the effect of this decision in order and take the necessary steps to preserve her joint physical custody rights. The court is directing the parties to submit a divorce judgment by October 18, 2019. If, after considering this decision, and prior to the entry of the divorce judgment, Minh Luong elects to remain in Clark County, Nevada, the parties should notify the court of their intention to share joint legal and joint physical custody of the children. The court shall accept the parties' joint physical custody agreement, or shall place the matter on calendar to establish a joint physical custody schedule. If Minh Luong's settled purpose to live in Irvine, California remains unchanged, James Vahey shall become the primary physical custodian.

C. <u>CHILD SUPPORT</u>

There are financial implications to this custody order. Both parents have an obligation to support their children pursuant to NRS 125B.020. The obligation to support three children is 29% of the obligor's gross monthly income pursuant to NRS 125B.070. Both parties testified that they earn in excess of \$700,000 per year from employment. The parties agree that because of their significant incomes, neither party shall pay child support to the other parent. James Vahey specifically waives child support from Minh Luong in consideration for an agreement that the parties share equally the significant private school tuition and related expenses, all medical and dental expenses for the children that

are not covered by insurance, expenses for the children's extracurricular activities that the parties agree are best for the children, and tutoring or education expenses that the parties agree are best for the children.

The court finds that this child support agreement and order complies with Nevada law.

D. <u>ATTORNEYS FEES / COSTS</u>

The Nevada Supreme Court held that factors found in *Brunzell v. Golden Gate National Bank*, 85 Nev. 345, 349, 455 P.2d 31, 33 (1969) apply to family law cases. Two requirements must be met before making an attorney's fees award:

- (1) There must be a legal basis for the award. Fees must be allowed by an express or implied agreement or when authorized by statute or rule; and
- (2) Fees must be appropriate and reasonable. Courts must consider:
 - (a) The qualities of the advocate;
 - (b) The character and difficulty of the work performed;
 - (c) The work actually performed; and
 - (d) The result obtained.

Miller v. Wilfong, 121 Nev. Adv. Op. 61, 119 P.3d 727 (9/22/2005).

a. NRS 18.010 and EDCR 7.60 (b)

While there is a legal basis in statutes for an award of attorney's fees and costs, this court concludes that the claim pursuant to NRS 18.010 and EDCR 7.60 (b) lacks merit and should be denied.

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The parties litigated the contested issue of physical custody incident to their divorce case. Both parties have the right to their day in court to advance a custody order that they believe is in the children's best interest.

NRS 18.080 permits litigants to recover their attorneys' fees "when the court finds that the claim... or defense of the opposing party was brought without reasonable ground or to harass the prevailing party." EDCR 7.60 (b) provides that the court may, after notice and an opportunity to be heard, impose upon an attorney or a party any and all sanctions which may, under the facts of the case, be reasonable, including the imposition of fines, costs or attorney's fees when an attorney or a party without just cause: (1) Presents to the court a motion or an opposition to a motion which is obviously frivolous, unnecessary or unwarranted. (2) Fails to prepare for a presentation. (3) So multiplies the proceedings in a case as to increase costs unreasonably and veraciously.

This court concludes that this statute and rule should not be applied to this case. NRS 18.010 and EDCR 7.60 are tools allowing courts to remedy claims that are brought without reasonable ground. The court concludes that both parties, through counsel, advanced factual claims and legal arguments that were made in good faith, and with a reasonable basis based on their particular perspective. The work done by counsel was excellent, and reasonable in light of the position of the parties.

b. Disparity in Income and Financial Resources

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attorney's fees and costs based on the disparity of income between the parties. The case at bar is a divorce action. NRS 125.150(3) provides, in part, as follows:

Whether or not application for suit money has been made under the provisions of NRS 125.040, the court may award a reasonable attorney's fee to either party to an action for divorce if those fees are in issue under the pleadings.

There is a legal basis in statutes and in decisional law for an award of

The district court must also consider the disparity in income of the parties in awarding fees. Wright v. Osburn, 114 Nev. 1367, 1370, 970 P.2d. 1071, 1073 (1998).Further, the power of the court to award attorney's fees in divorce actions remains part of the continuing jurisdiction of the court in appropriate postjudgment motions relating to support and child custody. Halbrook v. Halbrook, 114 Nev. 1455, 971 P.2d 1262 (1998).

This court finds that both parties have incurred substantial fees and costs in this case. Custody disputes that involve removal are difficult to resolve, and difficult to present. The amount of fees and costs incurred was a significant investment by the parties. The court accepts that the work performed reflects the quality of the advocates, and the intention of the parties to make a significant financial investment in their claims and defenses. This court concludes that the parties are in similar financial circumstances. The fees and cost incurred, while significant, are well within the parties' ability to pay, and the fees and costs incurred do not significantly affect their financial condition.

Therefore, this court concludes that the parties should bear their own attorney's fees and costs.

E. NOTICES

a. Pursuant to NRS 125.510 (6), the parties are hereby placed on notice of the following:

"PENALTY FOR VIOLATION OF ORDER: THE ABDUCTION, CONCEALMENT OR DETENTION OF A CHILD IN VIOLATION OF THIS ORDER IS PUNISHABLE AS A CATEGORY D FELONY AS PROVIDED IN NRS 193.130. NRS 200.359 provides that every person having a limited right of custody to a child or any parent having no right of custody to the child who willfully detains, conceals or removes the child from a parent, guardian or other person having lawful custody or a right of visitation of the child in violation of an order of this court, or removes the child from the jurisdiction of the court without the consent of either the court or all persons who have the right to custody or visitation is subject to being punished for a category D felony as provided in NRS 193.130."

- b. Pursuant to NRS 125.510 (7) and (8), the parties are hereby placed on notice that the terms of the Hague Convention of October 25, 1980, adopted by the 14th Session of the Hague Conference on Private International Law, apply if a parent abducts or wrongfully retains a child in a foreign country.
- c. NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the parties are subject to the provisions of NRS 31A and 125.450 regarding the collection of delinquent child support payments, and that either party may request a review of child support in accordance with NRS 125B.145.

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DISTRICT JUDGE
FAMILY DIVISION, DEPT H
LAS VEGAS. NV 89155

ORDER

WHEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Minh Luong and James Vahey shall share joint legal and joint physical custody of Hannah Vahey, Matthew Vahey, and Selena Vahey. James Vahey shall have primary physical custody, subject to Minh Luong's visitation. Joint legal custody shall be defined as follows:

The parents shall consult and cooperate with each other in substantial questions relating to religious upbringing, educational programs, significant changes in social environment, and health care of the children. Both parents shall have access to medical and school records pertaining to their children and be permitted to independently consult with any and all professionals involved with the children. Each parent is to notify the other parent as soon as reasonably possible of any illness requiring medical attention or any emergency involving the children. Each parent shall have the power to obtain emergency health care for the children without the consent of the other parent. However, the parent must inform the other parent of the emergency and the healthcare provided as soon as reasonably possible. Each parent acknowledges and agrees that they each currently have and will continue to have adequate access to all information concerning the wellbeing of the children, including, but not limited to, copies of report cards; school meeting notices; vacation schedules; class programs; requests for conferences; results of standardized or diagnostic tests; notices of activities

involving the children; samples of school work; order forms for school pictures; all communications from health care providers; the names, addresses and telephone numbers of all schools, health care providers, regular day care providers, and counselors. Each parent shall have the right to obtain information concerning the athletic and social events in which the children participate. Both parents may participate in school activities for the children such as open houses, attendance at athletic events, etc. Each parent shall provide the other parent with the address and telephone number of the residence where the minor children reside when in that parent's care. In the event that the address and/or telephone number of the residence changes, the parent shall notify the other parent of the new address two (2) weeks prior to any change of address and/or shall provide the other parent with the new telephone number as soon as the number is assigned. The parent vacationing with the minor children shall provide the other parent with a travel itinerary, which shall include telephone numbers, expected times of arrival and departure and destinations.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that James Vahey shall have primary physical custody of Hannah Vahey, Matthew Vahey, and Selena Vahey, subject to Minh Luong's visitation. Specifically:

1. Weekend Holidays: Minh Luong shall have the children for weekend holidays listed below. The weekend holiday time may be exercised in

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California and shall be defined as 4:00 p.m. the day school recesses until 6:00 p.m. the day before school resumes.

- a. Martin Luther King Day Weekend
- b. President's Day Weekend
- c. Memorial Day Weekend
- d. Labor Day Weekend
- e. Nevada Day Weekend
- 2. Weekend Visitation: Minh Luong may have the children for one, non-holiday weekend in Nevada each calendar month. The weekend shall be defined as 4:00 p.m. the day school recesses until 6:00 p.m. on Sunday. Minh Luong shall provide James Vahey with written notice of her intention to exercise a weekend visitation seven days in advance.
- 3. Holidays: The Holiday schedule shall take precedence over Weekend Holidays, Weekend Visitation, and Summer Break.
 - a. **Mother's Day:** This holiday is defined as Friday at 4:00 p.m. through Sunday at 6:00 p.m. Minh Luong shall have the children each year for Mother's Day.
 - b. **Father's Day:** This holiday is defined as Friday at 4:00 p.m. through Sunday at 6:00 p.m. James Vahey shall have the children each year for Father's Day.
 - c. **Spring Break:** Minh Luong shall have the children every year for Spring Break defined as 4:00 p.m. the day school recesses until 6:00 p.m. the day before school resumes.

d. Summer Break: Minh Luong shall have the children for six consecutive weeks each summer in California beginning at 4:00 p.m. the day after school recesses.

- e. Thanksgiving Break: Minh Luong shall have the children for Thanksgiving Break in 2019 and in odd-numbered years. Thanksgiving Break shall be defined as 4:00 p.m. the day school recesses until 6:00 p.m. the day before school resumes. Vahey shall have the children for Thanksgiving Break in evennumbered years.
- f. Winter Break: The Winter Break shall be shared by the parties. James Vahey shall have the first portion of the Winter Break each year defined as the day school recesses until 4:00 p.m. on December 27. Minh Luong shall have the children for the second portion of the Winter Break each year defined as 4:00 p.m. on December 27, until 6:00 p.m. the day before school resumes.
- 4. Transportation. Absent an agreement of the parties, Minh Luong shall provide transportation for the children for her custodial time.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Minh Luong's motion for primary physical custody and for permission to remove the children to Irvine, California is denied.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that neither party shall pay child support to
he other. The parties agree to share equally private school tuition and related
expenses, all medical and dental expenses for the children that are not covered by
nsurance, expenses for the children's extracurricular activities that the parties
agree are best for the children, and tutoring or education expenses that the parties
agree are best for the children. If one party has paid for a shared expense
reimbursement shall be made pursuant to the 30/30 rule for expenses. The parent
who paid for the expenses shall provide the other parent a copy of the receipt of
payment within 30 days of payment. The other parent should reimburse one-half
of the expenses within 30 days.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that both parties shall provide health insurance for the children if it is offered through employment.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that each party shall be responsible for their own attorney's fees and costs.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the court directs the parties to submit a stipulated divorce judgment to the court by October 18, 2019,

DATED this 20 day of Restember, 2019.

DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

T ART RITCHIE, JR.

Vahey / Luong

Electronically Filed 9/20/2019 10:42 AM Steven D. Grierson **CLERK OF THE COURT** 1 **NEOJ** 2 3 DISTRICT COURT 4 **CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA** 5 *** 6 JAMES W. VAHEY, CASE NO.: D-18-581444-D 7 DEPARTMENT H Plaintiff, 8 VS. 9 MINH NGUYET LUONG, 10 Defendant. 11 12 NOTICE OF ENTRY OF ORDER 13 TO: ALL PARTIES AND/OR THEIR ATTORNEYS 14 Please take notice that the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Decision and 15 16 Order was prepared and filed by the court. A copy of the Decision and Order is 17 attached hereto, and the following is a true and correct copy thereof. 18 I hereby certify that on or about the file stamp date the foregoing Notice of Entry of 19 Order was: 20 E-Served pursuant to NEFCR 9; placed in attorney folder(s) at the RJC; or mailed to proper person litigants, via first-class mail, postage fully prepaid to: 21 22 Robert P. Dickerson, Esq. Neil M. Mullins, Esq. for Sabrina M. Dolson, Esq. for **DEFENDANT** 23 **PLAINTIFF** 24 aus N 25 Katrina Rausch 26 Judicial Executive Assistant Department H 27

T. ARTHUR RITCHIE, JR. DISTRICT JUDGE FAMILY DIVISION, DEPT H LAS VEGAS, NV 89155

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DISTRICT COURT

CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

Plaintiff,)

vs.) CASE NO. D-18-581444-D

DEPT. NO. "H"

MINH NGUYET LUONG,

)

FINDINGS OF FACT,

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW,

Defendant.

Defendant.

Dates of Hearing: August 8, 2019, September 5, 2019, September 11, 2019 Time of Hearing: 9:00 a.m. - 5:00 p.m., 9:00 a.m. - 5:00 p.m., 1:30 - 5:00 p.m.

This matter came on for evidentiary hearing before Art Ritchie, District Court Judge, Family Division, Department H. James Vahey was present and represented by his attorneys, THE DICKERSON KARACSONYI LAW GROUP, and Robert P. Dickerson, Esq. and Sabrina M. Dolson, Esq. Minh Luong was present and represented by her attorneys, KAINEN LAW GROUP, and Neil M. Mullins, Esq. The court reviewed the papers and pleadings on file, the evidence

admitted at the hearing, and for good cause, makes the following findings of fact, conclusions of law, decision and order.

I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This matter is a pre-judgment custody dispute arising out of this divorce case. This court was asked to resolve both parties' claims for legal and physical custody, and Minh Luong's motion for an order allowing her to remove the parties' minor children from Nevada to California over James Vahey's objection.

James Vahey, age 56, and Minh Luong, age 46, were married in Henderson, Nevada on July 8, 2006. Three children were born the issue of their relationship, Hannah Vahey, who was born on March 19, 2009, Matthew Vahey, who was born on June 26, 2010, and Selena Vahey, who was born on April 4, 2014.

James Vahey filed a Complaint for Divorce on December 13, 2018, seeking a divorce on no-fault grounds of incompatibility. James Vahey alleged in his complaint that the Plaintiff and the Defendant are proper persons to be awarded joint legal and joint physical custody of their children. Minh Luong filed an Answer and Counterclaim for Divorce on January 11, 2019. Minh Luong alleged in her counterclaim that the Plaintiff and the Defendant are proper persons to be awarded joint legal custody. Minh Luong alleged that it is in the best interest of the children that she have primary physical custody, and she seeks

permission to remove the children from Nevada to California. James Vahey opposes the request to remove the children from Nevada.

Minh Luong filed a motion to resolve parent/ child issues, for removal, for support, and for other relief on January 29, 2019. The motion was set for hearing on March 12, 2019. James Vahey filed his opposition and countermotion on February 20, 2019. Minh Luong's reply to opposition and opposition to countermotion was filed on March 5, 2019.

The parties' motions were heard on March 12, 2019. On that date, both parties appeared with counsel. The court ordered that the parties share joint legal and joint physical custody of the children pending an evidentiary hearing. The court's temporary order provided that James Vahey have custodial responsibility from Monday at 9:00 a.m. to Wednesday at 9:00 a.m., and that Minh Luong have custodial responsibility from Wednesday at 9:00 a.m. to Friday at 9:00 a.m. The court ordered the parties alternate weekends defined as Friday at 9:00 a.m. to Monday at 9:00 a.m. The court set a discovery schedule and continued the case management conference to May 28, 2019. The Order from the March 12, 2019 hearing was filed on May 2, 2019.

On May 31, 2019, the court entered an order setting the matter for evidentiary hearing on August 8, 2019. The court held an evidentiary hearing on August 8, 2019, September 5, 2019, and September 11, 2019. The court received documentary proof and heard the testimony from six witnesses, Hieu Luong,

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Minh Luong, James Vahey, Richard Landeis, Bowena Bautista, and Imelda Vahey. This court concludes that the evidence presented at the hearing was sufficient for the court to decide the custody issues in this case.

II. FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

This court has custody jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction over the parties to this case because of their general appearance and their connections and contact with Nevada. Both parties are residents of Clark County, Nevada. Minh Luong owns a residence in Nevada and California, and since the parties' separation in January, 2019, she has spent time at both residences. Nevada is the home state of the parties' minor children pursuant to the UCCJEA as adopted in the Nevada Revised Statutes.

CHILD CUSTODY Α.

Child custody orders necessarily address legal custody, which is an expression of parental rights, and physical custody, which is an expression of child placement and custodial responsibility. There is a presumption in Nevada that parents share parental rights through joint legal custody, and a preference that parents share joint physical custody though a parenting plan that affords parents meaningful time and responsibility for minor children for at least 146 days of the year. If a court has not made a determination regarding the custody of a child, each parent has joint legal and joint physical custody of the child until otherwise ordered by a court of competent jurisdiction. NRS 125C.0015 (2).

This court has been asked to establish physical custody orders incident to divorce, and to order the removal of the three minor children from Nevada to California. In considering this request, the court is required to consider the best interest of the children. In any action for determining physical custody of a minor child, the sole consideration of the court is the best interest of the child. NRS 125C.0035 (1). In removing the children from the jurisdiction where the children currently live, the best interest of the children should also be the paramount judicial concern. Schwartz v. Schwartz, 107 Nev. 378, 383, 812 P.2d 1268, 1271 (1991).

The court, with this pre-judgment custody order, makes an order that it finds is in the children's best interest.

1. Legal Custody

NRS 125C.002 provides, in part, that when a court is making a determination regarding the legal custody of a child, there is a presumption, affecting the burden of proof, that joint legal custody would be in the best interest of a minor child if: (a) The parents have agreed to an award of joint legal custody or so agree in open court at a hearing for the purpose of determining the legal custody of the minor child.

Joint legal custody has been the order in this case by agreement, and it is not at issue in these pre-judgment proceedings. The parties have both pled and

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agreed that they should share the legal rights and responsibilities of raising the children jointly.

2. Physical Custody

NRS 125C.001, provides, in part, that the Legislature declares that it is the policy of this State to ensure that minor children have frequent associations and a continuing relationship with both parents after the parents have ended their relationship, become separated, or dissolved their marriage.

NRS 125C.0015 Parents have joint custody until otherwise ordered by court.

- 1. The parent and child relationship extends equally to every child and to every parent, regardless of the marital status of the parents.
- 2. If a court has not made a determination regarding the custody of a child, each parent has joint legal custody and joint physical custody of the child until otherwise ordered by a court of competent jurisdiction.

This divorce case requires the establishment of a physical custody order. Minh Luong seeks an order granting her primary physical custody of the children, and she seeks an order allowing her to remove the children to Irvine, California over James Vahey's objection. Minh Luong had the burden to prove that it is in the children's best interest that she have primary physical custody. Based on the findings below, the court concludes that Minh Luong did not provide sufficient proof to support a conclusion that she have primary physical custody. The evidence supports a conclusion that it is in the best interest of the children that the parties share joint physical custody.

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3. Removal to Irvine, California

Minh Luong seeks an order allowing her to remove the children from Nevada to Irvine, California. Minh Luong has the burden to prove that it is in the children's best interest to be removed from Nevada to Irvine, California, over their father's objection. Even though the court concluded that Minh Luong did not provide sufficient proof to have primary physical custody, the court evaluated the move request factors found in NRS 125C.007. Based on the findings below, the court concludes that Minh Luong did not provide sufficient proof to support a removal of the children to California.

B. MINH LUONG'S MOTION FOR PRIMARY PHYSICAL CUSTODY AND FOR PERMISSION TO RELOCATE WITH THE CHILDREN TO IRVINE, CALIFORNIA

Nevada statutes and case law provide that the district court has broad discretion concerning child custody matters. *Rooney v. Rooney*, 109 Nev. 540, 853 P.2d 123 (1993). This pre-judgment evidentiary hearing establishes the legal and physical custody orders for the parties' divorce judgment.

1. Best Interest Findings

The "best interest" standard applies when parents seek to establish a physical custody order. In a contested case, the district court weighs factors that may affect the consequence of placement. Factors the court considers are found in statutes and in decisional law.

James Vahey has lived in Clark County, Nevada since 1995. James Vahey is an orthopedic surgeon, and has practiced medicine in Nevada for twenty four years. Dr. Vahey testified that he has a busy practice but that he has some control over his patient and surgery schedule. Dr. Vahey testified that his office is located a few miles from the children's school, and that he organizes his work schedule to accommodate his custodial obligations. Bowena Bautista, Dr. Vahey's practice manager, testified that Dr. Vahey sees patients on Mondays and Wednesdays from approximately 9:00 a.m. – 2:00 p.m., and on Fridays from 9:00 a.m.–11:00 a.m. Dr. Vahey's surgeries are scheduled on Tuesdays and Thursdays. Dr. Vahey testified that he earns approximately \$700,000 per year from employment.

Minh Luong has lived in Clark County, Nevada since 2001. Minh Luong is a dentist, and has practiced in Nevada for eighteen years. Dr. Luong is the owner of Tooth Fairy Dental. The business has an office located in Las Vegas, Nevada, and in Henderson, Nevada. Dr. Luong's sister, Hieu Luong worked in the dental offices for approximately five years. Hieu Luong testified that Dr. Luong worked three to four days per week at the dental offices during the time that she worked there. Dr. Luong testified that she worked two to three days a week during the marriage, and she currently works two days per month, every other Wednesday, and she has hired two staff dentists to work her practice. Dr. Luong testified that she plans to retire and have associates run the practice, or sell

DISTRICT JUDGE FAMILY DIVISION, DEPT H

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the practice. Dr. Luong testified that she earns approximately \$1,000,000 per year, and she would earn between \$700,000 and \$800,000 per year if she employed other dentists to run the practice.

Minh Luong has owned a home in Las Vegas, Nevada since 2002. The parties lived in James Vahey's home located at Lake Las Vegas in Henderson, Nevada, from 2006 until January, 2019. Minh Luong testified that in January, 2019, she moved into her Las Vegas, Nevada home, and she and the children spend her custodial time there.

In October, 2017, Minh Luong purchased a home in Irvine, California. Minh Luong testified that the parties had discussed moving to California during the marriage, and there was an express agreement or tacit understanding that the parties would retire and move to California. James Vahey disputed this claim. The court concludes that the parties did not reach an agreement to move to California, even though Minh Luong purchased a separate property home there in 2017. In support of this conclusion, the court finds that neither party has retired or sold their practice. The parties' marital difficulties predated Minh Luong's purchase of a home in Irvine, California. Minh Luong testified that prior to 2017, she and her husband were parties in a civil suit concerning an investment. Minh Luong testified that after the case was settled, she was hurt and angry, and she told James Vahey that she was going to purchase a home in California, and he Minh Luong testified that she discussed could follow her there if he wanted.

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moving the family to California many times with James Vahey. Minh Luong testified that in an April, 2018 meeting with a therapist, James Vahey told her he was not on board with moving to California.

The court finds that both parties are dedicated to raising their children. Married couples often establish a division of labor that is related to the parties' routines and interests. Both parents in this case have demanding jobs, and they both have successfully guided their busy family through the rigors of raising three children. Both parents have been involved in managing the children's daily routines, sharing responsibilities for supervision, guidance, and education. Minh Luong's allegation that James Vahey was a disengaged or neglectful parent, or that she was the primary parent or the more suitable parent, was not credible, and was not supported by sufficient proof. Minh Luong's testimony in this regard, and these allegations were contradicted by documentary proof and witness testimony that was credible. Hieu Luong, Richard Landeis, Bowena Bautista, and Imelda Vahey testified that James Vahey was an active, engaged parent. Vahey testified that Minh Luong was an exceptional parent.

NRS 125C.0035 (4) sets forth factors that courts are required to consider as part of the balancing test. This court, in evaluating this custody dispute, considered the applicable statutory factors and the decisional law factors. Specifically:

(a) The wishes of the child if the child is of sufficient age and capacity to form an intelligent preference as to his or her physical custody.

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Hannah Vahey is ten (10) years of age, Matthew Vahey is nine (9) years of age, and Selena Vahey is five (5) years of age. None of the children are of sufficient age to form a preference.

(b) Any nomination of a guardian for the child by a parent.

The court is considering custodial placement only with the parents. This factor is not an applicable factor.

(c) Which parent is more likely to allow the child to have frequent associations and a continuing relationship with the noncustodial parent.

The court finds that James Vahey is more likely to allow the children to have a frequent and continuing relationship with the other parent. The court has concerns that Minh Luong's negative attitude towards James Vahey that stems from his refusal to allow her to move the children to California has caused her to negatively influence the relationship between the children and their father. Evidence was presented at the hearing that showed Minh Luong has discussed this dispute with the parties' children. James Vahey's account of the events in August, 2019 when Hannah was upset and crying on the first day of school was credible. James Vahey testified that Minh Luong told him in the presence of the children that he had forced the kids to go to school in Nevada instead of Irvine where he promised, and said to him, in front of the children, that he misled all of us. Evidence was presented that supports a finding that Minh Luong encouraged Hannah and Matthew to discuss the move to California with their father. Minh

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Luong testified that when asked by the children about moving to California, she told the children to ask their dad. James Vahey testified that shortly after the separation, Selena, age 4, told him at a custody exchange that mommy told me to tell you to let her stay with her all of the time. This dialog shows poor judgment and has the potential to alienate the children from their father.

Minh Luong alleged that James Vahey was a good father when he was around, that he did not support the children's emotional needs, and discounted his contributions to their schooling and extracurricular activities. Conversely, James Vahey alleged that it was in the best interest of the children for both parents to share physical custody. James Vahey complimented Minh Luong's parenting and dedication to the children. Of the two parents, James Vahey is less likely to undermine or interfere with the parent-child relationship. The court concludes that James Vahey is more likely to foster and encourage a healthy relationship between the children and the other parent.

(d) The level of conflict between the parents.

The parties have moderate conflict. Minh Luong's decision to seek primary physical custody and removal of the children from Nevada was a catalyst for the filing of this divorce case. Removal disputes within a divorce case can create significant conflict. James Vahey testified that Minh Luong does not speak to him verbally, even in front of the children. Minh Luong insists on texting as the mode of communication between the parties. The court reviewed text

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communications admitted into evidence. These communications were rational, devoid of foul language or personal attacks. The court concludes that the parties communicate well enough to address the children's daily needs. The parties disagreed on the frequency of extracurricular activities of the children, and had disagreements concerning parenting style, but both parties demonstrated a commitment to communicate for the benefit of the children.

(e) The ability of the parents to cooperate to meet the needs of the child.

The evidence supports a finding that the parties have the ability to cooperate to meet the needs of the children. During the marriage, the parties coordinated busy work schedules and busy parenting schedules. Despite the fact that Minh Luong testified she cannot co-parent with James Vahey, they have cooperated to meet the needs of the children.

(f) The mental and physical health of the parents.

The court finds that both parties are mentally and physically fit to care for the children.

(g) The physical, developmental and emotional needs of the child.

The children are school age. They attend the Challenger School located in Las Vegas, Nevada. The children are in important developmental stages that requires the support of both parents. Neither parent presented evidence that the children have anything but normal physical, developmental, or emotional needs.

(h) The nature of the relationship of the child with each parent.

The court finds that the children are well-adjusted with a loving relationship with both parents. There was ample evidence showing that Minh Luong and James Vahey participated in many activities with the children, and that both were engaged in the children's schooling, and extracurricular activities.

(i) The ability of the child to maintain a relationship with any sibling.

The court concludes that the sibling relationship is important to maintain.

Neither parent suggested a parenting plan that would separate the children from each other.

(j) Any history of parental abuse or neglect of the child or a sibling of the child.

The court finds that neither party proved parental abuse or neglect of the children.

(k) Whether either parent or any other person seeking physical custody has engaged in an act of domestic violence against the child, a parent of the child or any other person residing with the child.

The court finds that neither party provided sufficient proof that the other parent engaged in an act of domestic violence against the children or against any person living with children.

(l) Whether either parent or any other person seeking physical custody has committed any act of abduction against the child or any other child.

The court finds that neither party proved that the other parent engaged in an act of abduction of the children.

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Best Interest Conclusion

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The court concludes that it is in the best interest of the children that the parties share joint physical custody. A joint physical custody order is only possible if the parties live near one another. Minh Luong testified that she will decide to live in Irvine, California after the divorce, regardless of the outcome of her custody and removal request. If she moves to California, Minh Luong cannot share joint physical custody, and James Vahey shall have primary physical custody by default.

Based on NRS 125C, when the court concludes that a party fails to make a case for primary physical custody, the secondary request for removal fails. However, because the removal considerations overlap the best interest considerations, the court made findings on the removal request.

1. Removal Findings

For the purpose of considering this removal request, the parties have joint physical custody. NRS 125C.0015 (2) provides, in part:

If a court has not made a determination regarding the custody of a child, each parent has joint legal custody and joint physical custody of the child until otherwise ordered by a court of competent jurisdiction.

125C.0065 provides, in part,

1. If joint physical custody has been established pursuant to an order, judgment or decree of a court and one parent intends to relocate his or her residence to a place outside of this State or to a place within this State that is at such a distance that would substantially impair the ability of the other parent to maintain a meaningful relationship with the child, and the relocating parent desires to take the child with him or her, the relocating

parent shall, before relocating: (a) Attempt to obtain the written consent of the non-relocating parent to relocate with the child; and (b) If the non-relocating parent refuses to give that consent, petition the court for primary physical custody for the purpose of relocating.

Removal of a minor child from Nevada by the custodial parent is a separate and distinct issue from child custody. However, some of the same factual and policy considerations overlap. In removing the child from the jurisdiction where the child currently lives, the best interest of the child should also be the paramount judicial concern. *Schwartz v. Schwartz*, 107 Nev. 378, 383, 812 P.2d 1268, 1271 (1991). Determination of the best interest of a child in the removal context necessarily involves a fact-specific inquiry and cannot be reduced to a rigid "bright line" test. *Schwartz* at 1270, (citing *In re Marriage of Eckert*, 518 N.E. 2d 1041, 1045 (Ill. 1988), and *Cooper v. Cooper*, 491 A.2d 606, 614-15 (N.J. 1984)).

The court considered the proof and the factors to be weighed by the court found in NRS 125C.007.

NRS 125C.007 1 (a)

There exists a sensible, good-faith reason for the move, and the move is not intended to deprive the non-relocating parent of his or her parenting time;

The court finds that Minh Luong was sincere in her desire to move to Irvine, California, but concludes that her decision to move is not sensible because joint physical custody is in the best interest of these children, and because the move would deprive James Vahey of the opportunity to share joint physical

custody of the children. The court concludes that it is in the best interest of the children for their parents to live near enough to each other to share physical custody.

Minh Luong testified that she has nine sensible, good faith reasons for the move. They are: (1) The Irvine, California public school is better than the children's Nevada school; (2) Irvine, California is a better community than Henderson, Nevada; (3) Irvine, California is more child friendly than Henderson. Nevada; (4) Irvine, California has better weather than Henderson, Nevada; (5) There is better family support in Irvine, California compared to Henderson, Nevada; (6) The children would be raised by Minh Luong 24/7 in Irvine. California; (7) There are better opportunities for the children in Irvine, California compared to Henderson, Nevada; (8) There are better opportunities for extracurricular activities for the children in Irvine, California compared to Henderson, Nevada; and (9) There are cultural advantages in Irvine, California compared to Henderson, Nevada, because there is a greater Vietnamese population.

Many of these reasons are subjective, and the court accepts that Minh Luong is sincere in her belief that these reasons are senisble. The evidentiary hearing lasted two and one-half days. The court heard several hours of testimony, and yet did not receive sufficient proof to support a favorable finding on these reasons. Minh Luong did not prove that the public school in Irvine, California is

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better for the children than the Challenger private school where the children currently attend. The court concludes that Minh Luong did not prove that Irvine, California is a better community, is more child friendly, has better weather, has better family support, has better opportunities for the children, has better extracurricular activities for the children, or has cultural advantages compared to Henderson, Nevada. Regarding the reason that the move would benefit the children by being raised by Minh Luong 24/7 in Irvine, California the findings in this order show that the court does not conclude that this is sensible or an advantage for the children.

The court finds that Minh Luong's intention to move is, in part, to deprive James Vahey of his parenting time. She suggested that the children would be better served by being raised by Minh Luong 24/7 in Irvine, California. Minh Luong testified that she has been unhappy living in Las Vegas, Nevada for years. Minh Luong testified that she has been trying to persuade James Vahey to move to California since 2015. Between 2015 and 2017, the parties looked at vacation homes in California. After the civil suit was resolved in July, 2017, Minh Luong told James Vahey that he did not care about her, and she was going to purchase a home in California, and you can follow if you want. James Vahey testified that later in July, 2017 he told Minh Luong he was not on board with her plan to move to Irvine, California. Minh Luong then purchased the home in California in October, 2017. The parties continued to live in the marital residence in

Henderson, Nevada throughout 2017 and 2018. Minh Luong testified that in a therapy session in April, 2018 James Vahey again told her that he was not on board with her moving to California with the children. The court is concerned that Minh Luong's decision to live in California is intended to create a distance between the parties, and to create a distance between the children and their father, to avoid the sometimes tedious and inconvenient aspects of co-parenting.

Both parents have significant financial independence. Minh Luong and James Vahey have separate property and substantial income that give them parenting options that many parties cannot afford.

The court concludes that the move to Irvine, California is not sensible because it eliminates the ability of the parties to share the children jointly, and because Minh Luong provided insufficient proof to show that the decision to live in Irvine, California is sensible. Even though the court concludes that Minh Luong did not prove a sensible, good faith reason for the move, the court considered the proof concerning the other factors found in NRS 125C.007, in the event Minh Luong's reason for moving is sensible and made in good faith.

NRS 125C.007 1 (b)

The best interests of the child are served by allowing the relocating parent to relocate with the child;

The court concludes that the children's best interests are not served by allowing Minh Luong to relocate with them to Irvine, California. In support of this conclusion, the court references the best interest findings made in this order.

The court concludes that the children's best interest would be served by the parties sharing joint physical custody.

NRS 125C.007 1 (e)

The child and the relocating parent will benefit from an actual advantage as a result of the relocation.

Minh Luong did not show that her decision to move to Irvine, California was for her economic advantage. The court finds that Minh Luong was sincere that she prefers Irvine, California to Nevada. This opinion or preference is subjective, however, and was not proven by the presentation of sufficient evidence.

NRS 125C.007 2 (a)

The extent to which the relocation is likely to improve the quality of life for the child and the relocating parent;

The court finds that Minh Luong did not prove that the move to Irvine, California improves the children's quality of life. Minh Luong testified that she thought the schools and environment was better for the children in Irvine, California. Her testimony was the evidence offered to the court. The court concludes that she did not prove that schools in Irvine, California were better than the children's current school in Las Vegas, Nevada, or that the children's opportunities and environment would be better in Irvine, California.

NRS 125C.007 2 (b)

Whether the motives of the relocating parent are honorable and not designed to frustrate or defeat any visitation rights accorded to the non-relocating parent;

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It is Minh Luong's burden to show that her motives are honorable and not designed to defeat James Vahey's custody rights. The court concludes that she provided insufficient proof of this critical element. The court finds that Minh Luong's motives for the move are suspect, and finds that the move would frustrate and limit James Vahey's opportunity to share custody of the children.

The court was unpersuaded that a move to California is best for the children. The court finds that Minh Luong did prove that her home in Irvine, California is larger and more appealing than her home in Las Vegas, Nevada. It was built in 2017, and the photographs of the home admitted into evidence show that it is a beautiful home. Minh Luong described her Las Vegas, Nevada home where she has exercised her custodial time since January, 2019 as a rental home.

NRS 125C.007 2 (c)

Whether the relocating parent will comply with any substitute visitation orders issued by the court if permission to relocate is granted;

Both parties have followed the court orders that were entered in March, 2019 while this matter was pending, and the parties have shared physical custody of the children. The court concludes that both parties will comply with the custody orders that will be entered in this case.

NRS 125C.007 2 (d)

Whether the motives of the non-relocating parent are honorable in resisting the petition for permission to relocate or to what extent any opposition to the petition for permission to relocate is intended to secure a financial advantage in the form of ongoing support obligations or otherwise;

The court finds that James Vahey's motives are honorable in opposing the request to remove his children to Irvine, California. James Vahey cannot maintain a joint physical custody schedule with the children if they live in California. The children are school age, and his custodial time would be limited to school breaks. The court finds that removal of the children would reduce his time by a significant percentage each year, but more importantly, would change the character of his time with the children.

NRS 125C.007 2 (e)

Whether there will be a realistic opportunity for the non-relocating parent to maintain a visitation schedule that will adequately foster and preserve the parental relationship between the child and the nonrelocating parent if permission to relocate is granted; and

Both parents would have a custody or visitation schedule that would preserve the parental relationship between the children and the other parent, if one parent lives in Clark County, Nevada and one parent lives in Irvine, California. The parent who does not have primary physical custody would have a material reduction in custodial time and a material diminution in custodial responsibility.

NRS 125C.007 2 (f)

Any other factor necessary to assist the court in determining whether to grant permission to relocate.

Without Minh Luong's settled purpose to leave Clark County, Nevada to live in Irvine, California, the evidence in this case supports a conclusion that the parties should share joint physical custody. Minh Luong's decision to move to Irvine, California requires the court to fashion a primary/secondary custodial

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schedule. Minh Luong should be afforded some reasonable time to consider the effect of this decision in order and take the necessary steps to preserve her joint physical custody rights. The court is directing the parties to submit a divorce judgment by October 18, 2019. If, after considering this decision, and prior to the entry of the divorce judgment, Minh Luong elects to remain in Clark County, Nevada, the parties should notify the court of their intention to share joint legal and joint physical custody of the children. The court shall accept the parties' joint physical custody agreement, or shall place the matter on calendar to establish a joint physical custody schedule. If Minh Luong's settled purpose to live in Irvine, California remains unchanged, James Vahey shall become the primary physical custodian.

C. CHILD SUPPORT

There are financial implications to this custody order. Both parents have an obligation to support their children pursuant to NRS 125B.020. The obligation to support three children is 29% of the obligor's gross monthly income pursuant to NRS 125B.070. Both parties testified that they earn in excess of \$700,000 per year from employment. The parties agree that because of their significant incomes, neither party shall pay child support to the other parent. James Vahey specifically waives child support from Minh Luong in consideration for an agreement that the parties share equally the significant private school tuition and related expenses, all medical and dental expenses for the children that

are not covered by insurance, expenses for the children's extracurricular activities that the parties agree are best for the children, and tutoring or education expenses that the parties agree are best for the children.

The court finds that this child support agreement and order complies with Nevada law.

D. <u>ATTORNEYS FEES / COSTS</u>

The Nevada Supreme Court held that factors found in *Brunzell v. Golden Gate National Bank*, 85 Nev. 345, 349, 455 P.2d 31, 33 (1969) apply to family law cases. Two requirements must be met before making an attorney's fees award:

- (1) There must be a legal basis for the award. Fees must be allowed by an express or implied agreement or when authorized by statute or rule; and
- (2) Fees must be appropriate and reasonable. Courts must consider:
 - (a) The qualities of the advocate;
 - (b) The character and difficulty of the work performed;
 - (c) The work actually performed; and
 - (d) The result obtained.

Miller v. Wilfong, 121 Nev. Adv. Op. 61, 119 P.3d 727 (9/22/2005).

a. NRS 18.010 and EDCR 7.60 (b)

While there is a legal basis in statutes for an award of attorney's fees and costs, this court concludes that the claim pursuant to NRS 18.010 and EDCR 7.60 (b) lacks merit and should be denied.

The parties litigated the contested issue of physical custody incident to their divorce case. Both parties have the right to their day in court to advance a custody order that they believe is in the children's best interest.

NRS 18.080 permits litigants to recover their attorneys' fees "when the court finds that the claim... or defense of the opposing party was brought without reasonable ground or to harass the prevailing party." EDCR 7.60 (b) provides that the court may, after notice and an opportunity to be heard, impose upon an attorney or a party any and all sanctions which may, under the facts of the case. be reasonable, including the imposition of fines, costs or attorney's fees when an attorney or a party without just cause: (1) Presents to the court a motion or an opposition to a motion which is obviously frivolous, unnecessary or unwarranted. (2) Fails to prepare for a presentation. (3) So multiplies the proceedings in a case as to increase costs unreasonably and veraciously.

This court concludes that this statute and rule should not be applied to this NRS 18.010 and EDCR 7.60 are tools allowing courts to remedy claims that are brought without reasonable ground. The court concludes that both parties, through counsel, advanced factual claims and legal arguments that were made in good faith, and with a reasonable basis based on their particular perspective. The work done by counsel was excellent, and reasonable in light of the position of the parties.

b. Disparity in Income and Financial Resources

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There is a legal basis in statutes and in decisional law for an award of attorney's fees and costs based on the disparity of income between the parties. The case at bar is a divorce action. NRS 125.150(3) provides, in part, as follows:

Whether or not application for suit money has been made under the provisions of NRS 125.040, the court may award a reasonable attorney's fee to either party to an action for divorce if those fees are in issue under the pleadings.

The district court must also consider the disparity in income of the parties in awarding fees, Wright v. Osburn, 114 Nev. 1367, 1370, 970 P.2d. 1071, 1073 Further, the power of the court to award attorney's fees in divorce (1998).actions remains part of the continuing jurisdiction of the court in appropriate postjudgment motions relating to support and child custody. Halbrook, 114 Nev. 1455, 971 P.2d 1262 (1998).

This court finds that both parties have incurred substantial fees and costs in this case. Custody disputes that involve removal are difficult to resolve, and difficult to present. The amount of fees and costs incurred was a significant investment by the parties. The court accepts that the work performed reflects the quality of the advocates, and the intention of the parties to make a significant financial investment in their claims and defenses. This court concludes that the parties are in similar financial circumstances. The fees and cost incurred, while significant, are well within the parties' ability to pay, and the fees and costs incurred do not significantly affect their financial condition.

Therefore, this court concludes that the parties should bear their own attorney's fees and costs.

E. **NOTICES**

Pursuant to NRS 125.510 (6), the parties are hereby placed on notice of the following:

"PENALTY FOR VIOLATION OF ORDER: THE ABDUCTION. CONCEALMENT OR DETENTION OF A CHILD IN VIOLATION OF THIS ORDER IS PUNISHABLE AS A CATEGORY D FELONY AS PROVIDED IN NRS 193.130. NRS 200.359 provides that every person having a limited right of custody to a child or any parent having no right of custody to the child who willfully detains, conceals or removes the child from a parent, guardian or other person having lawful custody or a right of visitation of the child in violation of an order of this court, or removes the child from the jurisdiction of the court without the consent of either the court or all persons who have the right to custody or visitation is subject to being punished for a category D felony as provided in NRS 193.130."

- Pursuant to NRS 125.510 (7) and (8), the parties are hereby b. placed on notice that the terms of the Hague Convention of October 25, 1980, adopted by the 14th Session of the Hague Conference on Private International Law, apply if a parent abducts or wrongfully retains a child in a foreign country.
- NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the parties are subject to c. the provisions of NRS 31A and 125.450 regarding the collection of delinquent child support payments, and that either party may request a review of child support in accordance with NRS 125B.145.

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ARTHUR RITCHIE, IR

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T ARTHUR RITCHIE, JR DISTRICT JUDGE FAMILY DIVISION, DEPT H LAS VEGAS, NV 89155

ORDER

WHEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Minh Luong and James Vahey shall share joint legal and joint physical custody of Hannah Vahey, Matthew Vahey, and Selena Vahey. James Vahey shall have primary physical custody, subject to Minh Luong's visitation. Joint legal custody shall be defined as follows:

The parents shall consult and cooperate with each other in substantial questions relating to religious upbringing, educational programs, significant changes in social environment, and health care of the children. Both parents shall have access to medical and school records pertaining to their children and be permitted to independently consult with any and all professionals involved with the children. Each parent is to notify the other parent as soon as reasonably possible of any illness requiring medical attention or any emergency involving the children. Each parent shall have the power to obtain emergency health care for the children without the consent of the other parent. However, the parent must inform the other parent of the emergency and the healthcare provided as soon as reasonably possible. Each parent acknowledges and agrees that they each currently have and will continue to have adequate access to all information concerning the wellbeing of the children, including, but not limited to, copies of report cards; school meeting notices; vacation schedules; class programs; requests for conferences; results of standardized or diagnostic tests; notices of activities

involving the children; samples of school work; order forms for school pictures; all communications from health care providers; the names, addresses and telephone numbers of all schools, health care providers, regular day care providers, and counselors. Each parent shall have the right to obtain information concerning the athletic and social events in which the children participate. Both parents may participate in school activities for the children such as open houses, attendance at athletic events, etc. Each parent shall provide the other parent with the address and telephone number of the residence where the minor children reside when in that parent's care. In the event that the address and/or telephone number of the residence changes, the parent shall notify the other parent of the new address two (2) weeks prior to any change of address and/or shall provide the other parent with the new telephone number as soon as the number is assigned. The parent vacationing with the minor children shall provide the other parent with a travel itinerary, which shall include telephone numbers, expected times of arrival and departure and destinations.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that James Vahey shall have primary physical custody of Hannah Vahey, Matthew Vahey, and Selena Vahey, subject to Minh Luong's visitation. Specifically:

1. Weekend Holidays: Minh Luong shall have the children for weekend holidays listed below. The weekend holiday time may be exercised in

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California and shall be defined as 4:00 p.m. the day school recesses until 6:00 p.m. the day before school resumes.

- a. Martin Luther King Day Weekend
- b. President's Day Weekend
- c. Memorial Day Weekend
- d. Labor Day Weekend
- e. Nevada Day Weekend
- 2. Weekend Visitation: Minh Luong may have the children for one, non-holiday weekend in Nevada each calendar month. The weekend shall be defined as 4:00 p.m. the day school recesses until 6:00 p.m. on Sunday. Minh Luong shall provide James Vahey with written notice of her intention to exercise a weekend visitation seven days in advance.
- 3. Holidays: The Holiday schedule shall take precedence over Weekend Holidays, Weekend Visitation, and Summer Break.
 - a. Mother's Day: This holiday is defined as Friday at 4:00 p.m. through Sunday at 6:00 p.m. Minh Luong shall have the children each year for Mother's Day.
 - b. Father's Day: This holiday is defined as Friday at 4:00 p.m. through Sunday at 6:00 p.m. James Vahey shall have the children each year for Father's Day.
 - c. Spring Break: Minh Luong shall have the children every year for Spring Break defined as 4:00 p.m. the day school recesses until 6:00 p.m. the day before school resumes.

- d. Summer Break: Minh Luong shall have the children for six consecutive weeks each summer in California beginning at 4:00 p.m. the day after school recesses.
- e. Thanksgiving Break: Minh Luong shall have the children for Thanksgiving Break in 2019 and in odd-numbered years. Thanksgiving Break shall be defined as 4:00 p.m. the day school recesses until 6:00 p.m. the day before school resumes. James Vahey shall have the children for Thanksgiving Break in evennumbered years.
- f. Winter Break: The Winter Break shall be shared by the parties.

 James Vahey shall have the first portion of the Winter Break each year defined as the day school recesses until 4:00 p.m. on December 27. Minh Luong shall have the children for the second portion of the Winter Break each year defined as 4:00 p.m. on December 27, until 6:00 p.m. the day before school resumes.
- 4. Transportation. Absent an agreement of the parties, Minh Luong shall provide transportation for the children for her custodial time.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Minh Luong's motion for primary physical custody and for permission to remove the children to Irvine, California is denied.

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that neither party shall pay child support to the other. The parties agree to share equally private school tuition and related expenses, all medical and dental expenses for the children that are not covered by insurance, expenses for the children's extracurricular activities that the parties agree are best for the children, and tutoring or education expenses that the parties agree are best for the children. If one party has paid for a shared expense, reimbursement shall be made pursuant to the 30/30 rule for expenses. The parent who paid for the expenses shall provide the other parent a copy of the receipt of payment within 30 days of payment. The other parent should reimburse one-half of the expenses within 30 days.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that both parties shall provide health insurance for the children if it is offered through employment.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that each party shall be responsible for their own attorney's fees and costs.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the court directs the parties to submit a stipulated divorce judgment to the court by October 18, 2019,

DATED this 20 day of Restauber, 2019.

DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

T ART RITCHIE, JR.

Vahey / Luong

ARTHUR RITCHIE, JR

Electronically Filed 10/9/2019 9:32 AM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT

SUBT

FRED PAGE, ESQ.

NEVADA STATE BAR NO. 6080

PAGE LAW FIRM

6930 SOUTH CIMARRON ROAD, SUITE 140

LAS VEGAS, NEVADA 89113 TELEPHONE: (702) 469-3278

FACSIMILE: (702) 628-9884 Email: fpage@pagelawoffices.com Attorney for Defendant

DISTRICT COURT FAMILY DIVISION CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

JAMES W. VAHEY,

Case No.: D-18-581444-D

Dept.: H

Plaintiff.

VS.

MINH NGUYET LUONG.

Defendant,

SUBSTITUTION OF ATTORNEY

I. NEIL MULLINS, ESQ., attorney for Defendant, MINH NGUYET

LUONG, does hereby consent to the substitution of FRED PAGE, ESQ., for the

Defendant, in the above entitled matter in his place and stead.

day of September 2019

NEIL MULLINS, ESQ.

AA000546

MINH NGUYET LUONG, Defendant, in the above entitled case consents to the substitution of FRED PAGE, ESQ., in the place and stead of NEIL MULLINS.

ESQ, has his attorney of record in the above entitled matter.

DATED this day of September 2019

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FRED PAGE. ESQ., attorney at law, does hereby consent of the substitution of himself as attorney for Defendant, MING NGUYET LUONG, in the above entitled matter in NEIL MULLINS, ESQ.'S name and stead.

FRED PAGE, ESQ.

1/22/2020 10:08 AM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT NOH 1 2 3 DISTRICT COURT 5 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 6 7 JAMES W. VAHEY, CASE NO.: D-18-581444-D 8 DEPARTMENT H Plaintiff, **RJC-Courtroom 3G** 9 VS. 10 MINH NGUYET LUONG, 11 Defendant. 12 13 **NOTICE OF HEARING** 14 Date of Hearing: Febaruary 18, 2020 15 Time of Hearing: 10:00 a.m. 16 TO: ALL PARTIES AND/OR THEIR ATTORNEYS 17 Please be advised that the above-entitled matter has been scheduled for a Case 18 19 Management Conference regarding the Decree of Divorce to be heard in Department 20 H, at the Regional Justice Center, 200 Lewis Avenue, Courtroom 3G, Las Vegas, 21 Nevada, on the 18th day of February, 2020, at the hour of 10:00 a.m. 22 23 Honorable T. Arthur Ritchie, Jr. 24 25 Katrina Rausch Judicial Executive Assistant 26 Department H 27

T. ARTHUR RITCHIE, JR. DISTRICT JUDGE FAMILY DIVISION, DEPT. H LAS VEGAS, NV 89155

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VOLUME III

AA000548

Electronically Filed

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that on or about the file stamp date the foregoing Notice of

E-Served pursuant to NEFCR 9; placed in attorney folder(s) at the RJC; or

mailed to proper person litigants, via first-class mail, postage fully prepaid to:

Hearing was:

PLAINTIFF

Robert P. Dickerson, Esq. for

''

Fred Page, Esq. for DEFENDANT

Katrina Rausch

Judicial Executive Assistant

Department H

1	Electronically Filed 2/10/2020 5:06 PM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT
$\begin{bmatrix} 1 \\ 2 \end{bmatrix}$	THE DICKERSON KARACSONYI LAW GROUP ROBERT P. DICKERSON, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 000945 SABRINA M. DOLSON, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 013105 1745 Village Center Circle Las Vegas, Nevada 89134 Telephone: (702) 388-8600 Facsimile: (702) 388-0210 Email: info@thedklawgroup.com Attorneys for Plaintiff
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7	Attorneys for Plaintiff
8 9	DISTRICT COURT FAMILY DIVISION CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA
10	
11	JAMES W. VAHEY, CASE NO. D-18-581444-D Plaintiff, DEPT NO. H
12)
13	v. MINH NGUYET LUONG,
14	Defendant.
15)
16	APPENDIX OF EXHIBITS IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S INDIVIDUAL CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE BRIEF
17	
18	COMES NOW Plaintiff, JAMES W. VAHEY ("Jim"), by and
19	through his attorneys, ROBERT P. DICKERSON, ESQ., and SABRINA
20	M. DOLSON, ESQ., of THE DICKERSON KARACSONYI LAW
21	GROUP, and hereby submits his Appendix of Exhibits in Support of
22	Plaintiff's Individual Case Management Conference Brief.
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Case Number: D-18-581444-D

VOLUME III

AA000550

1	Title/Description of Document	Exhibit Number
2	Decree of Divorce	1
3	Marital Settlement Agreement	2
4	DATED this 10th day of February, 202	0.
5	THE DICKI KARACSON	ERSON NYI LAW GROUP
6		
7	By Calor	ina M. Nolso
8		
9	Nevada B SABRINA	ar No. 000945 M. DOLSON, ESQ.
10	Nevada B J 745 Vill	ar No. 013105 age Center Circle
11	Las Vegas Attorneys	M. DOLSON, ESQ. Far No. 013105 Fage Center Circle S. Nevada 89134 For Plaintiff
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Pursuant to NRCP 5(b), I certify that I am an employee of THE DICKERSON KARACSONYI LAW GROUP, and that on this 10th day of February, 2020, I caused the above and foregoing document entitled APPENDIX OF EXHIBITS IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S INDIVIDUAL CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE BRIEF, to be served as follows:

- [X] pursuant to NEFCR 9, NRCP 5(b)(2)(E) and Administrative Order 14-2 captioned "In the Administrative Matter of Mandatory Electronic Service in the Eighth Judicial District Court," by mandatory electronic service through the Eighth Judicial District Court's electronic filing system;
- [] pursuant to NRCP 5(b)(2)(C), by placing same to be deposited for mailing in the United States Mail, in a sealed envelope upon which first class postage was prepaid in Las Vegas, Nevada;
- [] pursuant to NRCP 5(b)(2)(F), to be sent via facsimile, by duly executed consent for service by electronic means;
- pursuant to NRCP 5(b)(2)(A), by hand-delivery with signed Receipt of Copy.

To the attorney(s) and/or person(s) listed below at the address, email address, and/or facsimile number indicated below:

FRED PAGE, ESQ. PAGE LAW FIRM

6930 South Cimarron Road, Suite 140

Las Vegas, Nevada 89113

fpage@pagelawoffices.com Attorney for Defendant

An employee of The Dickerson Karacsonyi Law Group

EXHIBIT 1

EXHIBIT 1

EXHIBIT 1

1	DECD
2	THE DICKERSON KARACSONYI LAW GROUP ROBERT P. DICKERSON, ESO
3	THE DICKERSON KARACSONYI LAW GROUP ROBERT P. DICKERSON, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 000945 SABRINA M. DOLSON, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 013105
4	Nevada Bar No. 013105 1745 Village Center Circle
5	Las Vegas, Nevada 89134 Telephone: (702) 388-8600
6	1745 Village Center Circle Las Vegas, Nevada 89134 Telephone: (702) 388-8600 Facsimile: (702) 388-0210 Email: info@TheDKlawgroup.com
7	Attorneys for Plaintiff
8	DISTRICT COURT
9	FAMILY DIVISION
10	CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA
11	IANAEC MA MATIEM
12	JAMES W. VAHEY,) CASE NO. D-18-581444-D
13	Plaintiff,) DEPT NO. H
14	$\langle v. \rangle$
15	MINH NGUYET LUONG,
16	Defendant.)
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18	DECREE OF DIVORCE

DECREE OF DIVORCE

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The above-entitled action having come on regularly for a summary disposition of an uncontested divorce without a hearing, Plaintiff, JAMES W. VAHEY ("JIM"), being represented by and through his attorneys, ROBERT P. DICKERSON, ESQ., and SABRINA M. DOLSON, ESQ., of THE DICKERSON KARACSONYI LAW GROUP, and Defendant, MINH NGUYET LUONG ("MINH"), being represented by and through her attorney, FRED PAGE, ESQ., of PAGE LAW FIRM. This divorce action is at issue upon JIM's Complaint for Divorce, MINH's Answer and Counterclaim for Divorce, and JIM's Reply to the Counterclaim. The Court having conducted an evidentiary hearing over several days on the

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child custody and child support issues, and JIM having testified in support of the material allegations of his Complaint through his affidavit, and the affidavit of his resident witness, and both parties having waived the making, filing, and service of Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and written Notice of Entry of Judgment, and the giving of any and all notices required by law or rules of the District Court; the cause having been submitted for decision and judgment, and the Court having before it all the files, pleadings, and papers in the action, being fully apprised in the premises and being satisfied that the action has been duly and regularly commenced, and good cause appearing therefor, the Court finds and concludes as follows:

The Court finds that it has complete jurisdiction in the premises, both as to the subject matter of this divorce action and as to the parties to this action; that for more than six (6) weeks before the commencement of this action JIM was, has been, and is now an actual bona fide resident and domiciliary of the State of Nevada, actually and physically residing and being domiciled in Clark County, Nevada during all of said period of time; that the parties have three (3) minor children the issue of their marriage, namely, HANNAH VAHEY, born March 19, 2009, MATTHEW VAHEY, born June 26, 2010, and SELENA VAHEY, born April 4, 2014 (hereinafter sometimes collectively referred to as the "children" and individually referred to as a "child"); that the parties have no other minor children, including no adopted minor children, and MINH is not now pregnant; that on August 8, 2019, September 5, 2019, and September 11, 2019, the Court held an evidentiary hearing on the issues of child custody and child support, and entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Decision and Order on September 20, 2019; that the Court's said Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Decision and Order is merged

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Thus, with good cause appearing therefor, the Court hereby enters the following Orders:

I. TERMINATION OF THE PARTIES' MARRIAGE

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the bonds of matrimony heretofore and now existing between JIM and MINH be dissolved, set aside, and forever held for naught, and that JIM be, and he hereby is, awarded and decreed an absolute and final Decree of Divorce from MINH, and that the parties, and each of them, is hereby restored to the status of a single, unmarried person.

II. CHILD CUSTODY AND CHILD SUPPORT

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that JIM and MINH shall have joint legal custody of their minor children, HANNAH VAHEY, born March 19, 2009, MATTHEW VAHEY, born June 26, 2010, and SELENA VAHEY, born April 4, 2014, with JIM being awarded primary physical custody, pursuant to and in accordance with the Court's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Decision and Order, entered September 20, 2019. As set forth at page 23, lines 1-14 of the Court's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Decision and Order, entered September 20, 2019, the Court afforded MINH a reasonable period of time up to October 18, 2019, to consider whether she chooses to live primarily in Irvine, California, or in Clark County, Nevada. As the Court states at page 23, lines 12-14, of its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Decision and Order, entered September 20, 2019, "[i]f Minh Luong's settled purpose to live in Irvine, California remains unchanged, James Vahey shall become the primary physical custodian." MINH acknowledges, agrees, and represents that her settled purpose is to continue to live in Irvine, California, as has been the case since the entry of the Court's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Decision and Order, entered September 20, 2019. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the said Court's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Decision and Order, entered September 20, 2019, and the specific child custody and child support Orders set forth therein, is incorporated and merged into this Decree of Divorce as though the same were set forth herein in full.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED, and the parties are put on notice, that the following Nevada statutory provisions apply to each party:

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1	1. The provisions of NRS 125C.006, NRS 125C.0065, NRS
2	125C.007, and NRS 125C.0075 apply to each party. Specifically, such
3	Nevada statutory provisions provide as follows with respect to a parent's
4	desire to relocate with the minor children to a place outside the State of
5	Nevada or to a place within the State of Nevada that is at such a distance
6	that the relocation would substantially impair the ability of the other
7	parent to maintain a meaningful relationship with the minor children –
8	(these provisions do not apply to vacations planned by either parent):
9	NRS 125C.006 Consent required from noncustodial parent to relocate child when primary physical custody established; petition for permission from court; attorney's
10	established; petition for permission from court; attorney's fees and costs.
11	
12	 If primary physical custody has been established pursuant to an order, judgment or decree of a court and the custodial parent intends to relocate his or her residence to a
13	place outside of this State or to a place within this State that
14	of the other parent to maintain a meaningful relationship with
15	place outside of this State or to a place within this State that is at such a distance that would substantially impair the ability of the other parent to maintain a meaningful relationship with the child, and the custodial parent desires to take the child with him or her, the custodial parent shall, before relocating:
16	(a) Attempt to obtain the written consent of the noncustodial parent to relocate with the child; and
17	(b) If the persuate diel persuate refuses to give that
18	(b) If the noncustodial parent refuses to give that consent, petition the court for permission to relocate with the child.
19	
20	2. The court may award reasonable attorney's fees and costs to the custodial parent if the court finds that the noncustodial parent refused to consent to the custodial
21	parent's relocation with the child:
22	(a) Without having reasonable grounds for such
23	refusal; or
24	(b) For the purpose of harassing the custodial parent.
25	3. A parent who relocates with a child pursuant to this
26	section without the written consent of the noncustodial parent or the permission of the court is subject to the provisions of
27	NRS 200.359.

1 2	NRS 125C.0065 Consent required from non- relocating parent to relocate child when joint physical custody established; petition for primary physical
3	custody; attorney's rees and costs.
4	1. If joint physical custody has been established
5	parent intends to relocate his or her residence to a place outside of this State or to a place within this State that is at
6	such a distance that would substantially impair the ability of the other parent to maintain a meaningful relationship with
7	1. If joint physical custody has been established pursuant to an order, judgment or decree of a court and one parent intends to relocate his or her residence to a place outside of this State or to a place within this State that is at such a distance that would substantially impair the ability of the other parent to maintain a meaningful relationship with the child, and the relocating parent desires to take the child with him or her, the relocating parent shall, before relocating:
8	(a) Attempt to obtain the written consent of the non-relocating parent to relocate with the child; and
9	(b) If the non-relocating parent refuses to give
10	(b) If the non-relocating parent refuses to give that consent, petition the court for primary physical custody for the purpose of relocating.
11	2. The court may award reasonable attorney's fees and
12	2. The court may award reasonable attorney's fees and costs to the relocating parent if the court finds that the non-relocating parent refused to consent to the relocating parent's
13	relocation with the child:
14	(a) Without having reasonable grounds for such refusal; or
15	(b) For the purpose of harassing the relocating
16	parent.
17	3. A parent who relocates with a child pursuant to this
18	3. A parent who relocates with a child pursuant to this section before the court enters an order granting the parent primary physical custody of the child and permission to relocate with the child is subject to the provisions of NRS
19	relocate with the child is subject to the provisions of NRS 200.359.
20	
21	NRS 125C.007 Petition for permission to relocate; factors to be weighed by court.
22	1. In every instance of a petition for permission to
23	1. In every instance of a petition for permission to relocate with a child that is filed pursuant to NRS 125C.006 or 125C.0065, the relocating parent must demonstrate to the court that:
24	(a) There exists a sensible good faith reason for
25	(a) There exists a sensible, good-faith reason for the move, and the move is not intended to deprive the non-relocating parent of his or her parenting time;
26	
27	(b) The best interests of the child are served by allowing the relocating parent to relocate with the child; and
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1	(c) The child and the relocating parent will benefit from an actual advantage as a result of the relocation.
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3	2. If a relocating parent demonstrates to the court the provisions set forth in subsection 1, the court must then weigh the following factors and the impact of each on the child, the
4	relocating parent and the non-relocating parent, including,
5	the following factors and the impact of each on the child, the relocating parent and the non-relocating parent, including, without limitation, the extent to which the compelling interests of the child, the relocating parent and the non-relocating parent are accommodated:
6	- ·
7	(a) The extent to which the relocation is likely to improve the quality of life for the child and the relocating parent;
8	(b) Whather the motives of the relocating perent
9	(b) Whether the motives of the relocating parent are honorable and not designed to frustrate or defeat any visitation rights accorded to the non-relocating parent;
10	
11	(c) Whether the relocating parent will comply with any substitute visitation orders issued by the court if permission to relocate is granted;
12	(d) Whether the motives of the non-relocating
13	parent are honorable in resisting the petition for permission to
14	(d) Whether the motives of the non-relocating parent are honorable in resisting the petition for permission to relocate or to what extent any opposition to the petition for permission to relocate is intended to secure a financial advantage in the form of ongoing support obligations or otherwise.
15	otherwise;
16	(e) Whether there will be a realistic opportunity
	for the non-relocating parent to maintain a visitation schedule
17	that will adequately foster and preserve the parental relationship between the child and the non-relocating parent
18	(e) Whether there will be a realistic opportunity for the non-relocating parent to maintain a visitation schedule that will adequately foster and preserve the parental relationship between the child and the non-relocating parent if permission to relocate is granted; and
19	(f) Any other factor necessary to assist the court
20	in determining whether to grant permission to relocate.
21	3. A parent who desires to relocate with a child pursuant to NRS 125C.006 or 125C.0065 has the burden of
22	proving that relocating with the child is in the best interest of the child.
23	
	NRS 125C.0075 Unlawful relocation with child;
24	attorney's tees and costs. It a parent with primary
25	attorney's fees and costs. If a parent with primary physical custody or joint physical custody relocates with a child in violation of NRS 200.359.
26	1. The court shall not consider any post-relocation
27	 The court shall not consider any post-relocation facts or circumstances regarding the welfare of the child or the relocating parent in making any determination.
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2. If the non-relocating parent files an action in response to the violation, the non-relocating parent is entitled to recover reasonable attorney's fees and costs incurred as a result of the violation.

2. NRS 125C.0045(6) provides as follows with respect to either parent's violation of this Court Order:

PENALTY FOR VIOLATION OF ORDER: THE ABDUCTION, CONCEALMENT OR DETENTION OF A CHILD IN VIOLATION OF THIS ORDER IS PUNISHABLE AS A CATEGORY D FELONY AS PROVIDED IN NRS 193.130. NRS 200.359 provides that every person having a limited right of custody to a child or any parent having no right of custody to the child who willfully detains, conceals or removes the child from a parent, guardian or other person having lawful custody or a right of visitation of the child in violation of an order of this court, or removes the child from the jurisdiction of the court without the consent of either the court or all persons who have the right to custody or visitation is subject to being punished for a category D felony as provided in NRS 193.130.

3. Pursuant to NRS 125C.0045(7) and (8), the terms of the Hague Convention of October 25, 1980, adopted by the Fourteenth Session of the Hague Conference on Private International Law, apply if a parent abducts or wrongfully retains a child in a foreign country. The Court finds and concludes that the minor children's habitual residence is located in the County of Clark, State of Nevada, within the United States of America. NRS 125C.0045(7) and (8) specifically provide as follows:

Section 7. In addition to the language required pursuant to subsection 6, all orders authorized by this section must specify that the terms of the Hague Convention of October 25, 1980, adopted by the 14th Session of the Hague Conference on Private International Law, apply if a parent abducts or proportially retains a child in a foreign country.

wrongfully retains a child in a foreign country.

Section 8. If a parent of the child lives in a foreign country or has significant commitments in a foreign country:

(a) The parties may agree, and the court shall include in the order for custody of the child, that the United States is the country of habitual residence of the child for the

purposes of applying the terms of the Hague Convention as set forth in Subsection 7.

- (b) Upon motion of one of the parties, the court may order the parent to post a bond if the court determines that the parent poses an imminent risk of wrongfully removing or concealing the child outside the country of habitual residence. The bond must be in an amount determined by the court and may be used only to pay for the cost of locating the child and returning the child to his or her habitual residence if the child is wrongfully removed from or concealed outside the country of habitual residence. The fact that a parent has significant commitments in a foreign country does not create a presumption that the parent poses an imminent risk of wrongfully removing or concealing the child.
- 4. Pursuant to the terms of the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738A, and the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, NRS 125A.005, et seq., the courts of Nevada have exclusive modification jurisdiction of the custody, visitation, and child support terms relating to the child at issue in this case so long as either of the parents, or the child, continue to reside in Nevada.
- 5. Pursuant to NRS 125.007, the parties are placed on notice that the wages and commissions of the party responsible for paying support are subject to assignment or withholding for the purpose of payment of the foregoing obligation of support as provided in NRS 31A.025 through 31A.350, inclusive.
- 6. Pursuant to NRS 125B.095, if an installment of an obligation to pay support for a child becomes delinquent in the amount owed for one (1) month's support, a 10% per annum penalty must be added to the delinquent amount. In this regard, NRS 125B.095 provides as follows:

NRS 125B.095 Penalty for delinquent payment of installment of obligation of support.

1. Except as otherwise provided in this section and NRS 125B.012, if an installment of an obligation to pay support for a child which arises from the judgment of a court becomes delinquent in the amount owed for I month's support, a penalty must be added by operation of this section

to the amount of the installment. This penalty must be included in a computation of arrearages by a court of this State and may be so included in a judicial or administrative proceeding of another state. A penalty must not be added to the amount of the installment pursuant to this subsection if the court finds that the employer of the responsible parent or the district attorney or other public agency in this State that enforces an obligation to pay support for a child caused the payment to be delinquent.

- 2. The amount of the penalty is 10 percent per annum, or portion thereof, that the installment remains unpaid. Each district attorney or other public agency in this State undertaking to enforce an obligation to pay support for a child shall enforce the provisions of this section.
- 7. Pursuant to NRS 125B.140, if an installment of an obligation to pay support for a child becomes delinquent, the Court will determine interest upon the arrearages at a rate established pursuant to NRS 99.040, from the time each amount became due. Interest will continue to accrue on the amount ordered until it is paid, and additional attorney's fees must be allowed if required for collection.
- 8. Pursuant to NRS 125B.145, the parties are placed on notice that the Court's order for support will be reviewed by the Court at least every three (3) years to determine whether the order should be modified. The review will be conducted upon the filing of a request by (1) a parent or legal guardian of the child; or (2) the Division of Welfare and Supportive Services of the Department of Health and Human Services, its designated representative or the District Attorney's Office, if the Division of Welfare and Supportive Services or the District Attorney has jurisdiction over the case. In this regard, NRS 125B.145 provides as follows:
 - 1. An order for the support of a child must, upon the filing of a request for review by:
 - (a) The Division of Welfare and Supportive Services of the Department of Health and Human Services, its designated representative or the district attorney, if the

1	Division of Welfare and Supportive Services or the district attorney has jurisdiction in the case; or
2 3	(b) A parent or legal guardian of the child, be reviewed by the court at least every 3 years pursuant to this section to determine whether the order should be modified or
4	adjusted. Each review conducted pursuant to this section must
5	be in response to a separate request. 2. If the court:
6	
7	 (a) Does not have jurisdiction to modify the order, the court may forward the request to any court with appropriate jurisdiction.
8	(b) Has jurisdiction to modify the order and,
9 10	(b) Has jurisdiction to modify the order and, taking into account the best interests of the child, determines that modification or adjustment of the order is appropriate, the court shall enter an order modifying or adjusting the
11	previous order for support in accordance with the requirements of NRS 125B.070 and 125B.080.
12	3. The court shall ensure that:
13	(a) Each person who is subject to an order for the
14	 (a) Each person who is subject to an order for the support of a child is notified, not less than once every 3 years, that the person may request a review of the order pursuant to this section; or
15	(b) An order for the support of a child includes
16	 (b) An order for the support of a child includes notification that each person who is subject to the order may request a review of the order pursuant to this section.
17	4. An order for the support of a child may be reviewed
18 19	4. An order for the support of a child may be reviewed at any time on the basis of changed circumstances. For the purposes of this subsection, a change of 20 percent or more in the gross monthly income of a person who is subject to an order for the support of a child shall be deemed to constitute changed circumstances requiring a review for modification of
20	order for the support of a child shall be deemed to constitute changed circumstances requiring a review for modification of
21	changed circumstances requiring a review for modification of the order for the support of a child.
22	5. As used in this section:
23	(a) "Gross monthly income" has the meaning ascribed to it in NRS 125B.070.
24	(b) "Order for the support of a child" means such an order that was issued or is being enforced by a court of this
25	an order that was issued or is being enforced by a court of this state.
26	9. The parties shall provide the information required by NRS
27	125.130, NRS 125.230, and NRS 125B.055, on a separate form to b
28	submitted to the Court and the Division of Welfare and Supportiv
	and the second of the second o
	VOLUME III AA000564

III. MERGER OF MARITAL SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the parties' Marital Settlement Agreement be, and the same hereby is, ratified, confirmed, and approved by this Court, and the same is incorporated and merged into, and shall become a part of, this Decree of Divorce as if the same were included in this Decree in its entirety.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the parties' Marital Settlement Agreement, a copy of which has been filed with the Court as a sealed document, shall remain a sealed document in the Court's files, and the same shall not be open to public inspection.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that each party shall comply with each and every provision set forth in, and

perform all acts and obligations required by, the Marital Settlement 1 2 Agreement, under penalty of contempt. 3 IV. ADDITIONAL ORDERS IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that, 4 5 pursuant to the Court's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Decision and Order, entered September 20, 2019, the parties shall pay 6 their own respective attorneys' fees, experts' fees, and costs incurred in this 8 matter. 9 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that 10 the Joint Preliminary Injunction previously entered in this matter is dissolved. 11 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that 12 this matter will be kept in a confidential and sealed file in accordance with 13 the Order of this Court entered on January 3, 2019. 14 15 DATED this day of January, 2020. 16 17 DISTRICT JUDGE 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

VOLUME III

AA000566

1	The parties to this action, JAMES W. VAHEY, Plaintiff, and MINH			
2	NGUYET LUONG, Defendant, hereby STIPULATE AND AGREE to the			
3	Court's entry of the Decree of Divorce set forth above, and each party			
4	agrees to fully comply with the same.			
5				
6	JAMES W. VAHEY	MINH NGUYET LUONG		
7	Plaintiff	Defendant		
8				
9				
10	Submitted by:	Approved as to form and content:		
11	THE DICKERSON KARACSONYI LAW GROUP	PAGE LAW FIRM		
12	n	n		
13	By	By		
14	ROBERT P. DICKERSON, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 000945	FRED PAGE, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 006080		
15	SABRINA M. DOLSON, ESQ.	6930 South Cimarron Road		
16	Nevada Bar No. 013105 1745 Village Center Circle	Suite 140 Las Vegas, Nevada 89113		
17	Las Vegas, Nevada 89134	Las Vegas, Nevada 89113 Attorney for Defendant		
18	Attorneys for Plaintiff			
19	Decree of Divorce (James W. Vahey v. Minh Ngu	vet Luong Case No. D-18-581444-D)		
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VOLUME III

AA000567

EXHIBIT 2

EXHIBIT 2

EXHIBIT 2

MARITAL SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT

THIS AGREEMENT is made and entered into on the ____ day of January, 2020, by and between MINH NGUYET LUONG ("MINH"), a resident of the State of California, and JAMES W. VAHEY ("JIM"), a resident of the County of Clark, State of Nevada. JIM and MINH sometimes will be collectively referred to in this Agreement as the "parties", and individually may be referred to as a "party."

WITNESSETH:

WHEREAS, the parties to this Agreement were married on July 8, 2006, in Henderson, Nevada, and ever since such date have been and now are married to each other;

WHEREAS, on or about June 14, 2006, approximately three (3) weeks prior to the parties' marriage, the parties entered into a Premarital Agreement (the "Premarital Agreement");

WHEREAS, the parties, and each of them, acknowledge and agree that the said Premarital Agreement is a valid and binding agreement between the parties;

WHEREAS, the parties have three (3) minor children the issue of their marriage, namely, Hannah Vahey, born March 19, 2009, Matthew Vahey, born June 26, 2010, and Selena Vahey, born April 4, 2014 (sometimes collectively referred to in this Agreement as the "children" and individually referred to as a "child"); the parties have no other minor children, no adopted minor children, and MINH is not pregnant;

WHEREAS, as a consequence of disputes and numerous differences, divorce proceedings have been initiated in the Eighth Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada, in and for the County of Clark (the "Court"), for the purpose of terminating their marriage;

WHEREAS, the parties have separated and presently are living separate and apart from each other;

WHEREAS, it is the mutual wish and desire of the parties that a full and final adjustment and settlement of their property rights, interests, and claims against each other be had, settled, and determined at the present time by this integrated Agreement; and all questions concerning the support of the parties, with the parties releasing and forever discharging each other from any liability for alimony, spousal support, and maintenance (collectively referred to in this Agreement as "alimony"), also be settled and determined in finality at this time, such provisions for alimony being an inseparable part of the property settlement and of this integrated Agreement; and

WHEREAS, this Agreement shall be subject to the approval and order of the Court in the divorce action involving the parties currently pending in the Eighth Judicial District Court of Nevada, County of Clark, Case No. D-18-581444-D.

NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing facts and the mutual agreements and covenants contained in this Agreement, it is covenanted, agreed, and promised by each party hereto as follows:

I.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF RECITALS AND LIVING SEPARATE AND APART

- A. The parties acknowledge, warrant, represent, and agree that the recitals set forth on pages one and two of this Agreement are true and correct, and the same are incorporated in this Section I as though the same are repeated in this Section in full.
- B. The parties further agree that at all times hereafter it shall be lawful for each party to live separate and apart from the other, free from the marital control, interference, restraint, and authority of the other, either directly or indirectly, as if each party were sole, separate, and unmarried. Neither party shall molest, harass, disturb or malign the other to their children, or to his or her friends, neighbors, relatives, employers, employees, co-workers, agents, or any other person, in any manner whatsoever.

II.

CHILD CUSTODY AND CHILD SUPPORT

Pursuant to the Court's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Decision and Order (the "Court's Child Custody/Support Order") enter by the Court on September 20, 2019, in the parties' divorce case currently pending before the Court, the parties shall have joint legal custody of their three (3) minor children, with JIM having primary physical custody of the children, subject to MINH's visitation rights as specifically set forth in the Court's Child Custody/Support Order. A copy of the Court's Child Custody/Support Order is attached to this Agreement as **Exhibit A**, and the same is incorporated herein by this reference as of the same were set forth in full in this Agreement.

III.

WAIVER OF ALIMONY

A. JIM and MINH agree that they each forever waive any right or claim he or she may have, now or at any time in the future, to receive alimony from the other, whether for the present time, for any time in the future, or for any time in the past. The parties expressly agree that neither party is in need of alimony from the other.

B. Each party's waiver of any right or claim to alimony is intended to be non-modifiable by the court. Specifically, the parties agree that this provision, as well as all other provisions of this Agreement, shall be non-modifiable, and specifically state and agree that no court shall have jurisdiction of any kind over either party's property or with respect to the terms of this Agreement to modify this or any other provision of this Agreement without the specific written consent of both parties to this Agreement.

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CONFIRMATION OF EACH PARTY'S SEPARATE PROPERTY AND DEBT

- A. The parties acknowledge and agree that, pursuant to the terms of their Premarital Agreement, the parties have no community or jointly owned property, nor do they have any community or joint debt. The parties further acknowledge and agree that all property held in JIM's name, as well as all his personal property in his possession, is JIM's sole and separate property, and all debt owed by JIM is his separate debt. Similarly, the parties also acknowledge and agree that all property held in MINH's name, as well as all her personal property in her possession, is MINH's sole and separate property, and all debt owed by MINH is her separate debt.
- B. The parties further acknowledge that JIM's sole and separate debt, secured by his property, includes two (2) promissory notes in favor of MINH, which combined balances were originally \$1,590,760.81 (the "MINH Promissory Notes"). Nothing in this agreement shall be interpreted or construed as a release of JIM's continuing obligations to MINH under the MINH Promissory Notes. MINH is still entitled to her prioritized collateral on JIM's assets to secure payment of those obligations, which shall also survive the Decree in this matter.
- C. The parties also acknowledge and agree that one party may owe the other party monies to reimburse such other party for his or her overpayment of the parties' total federal income taxes for the 2014, 2015, 2016, and 2017 tax years. Pursuant to Section XVIII of the parties' Premarital Agreement, the parties filed a joint income tax return for each of the said tax years. As the said Section XVIII of the parties' Premarital Agreement provides:

. . . Any tax obligation shall be divided proportionately based upon the taxable income earned by the respective party. In the event the parties file a joint federal income tax return for any qualifying year, the parties' accountant shall prepare calculations setting forth the amount of tax due on each party's separate property income and gains, and each party shall then be required to tender the appropriate share of the total tax due.

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The parties are not certain as to exactly how much either party may owe to the other for any such overpayment of the parties' income taxes for each of the said tax years. Therefore, the parties agree to jointly retain Ty Anderson, CPA, their accountant who prepared each of the said joint federal tax returns, and Mr. Anderson shall prepare the necessary calculations to determine how much money JIM may owe to MINH or how much money MINH may owe to JIM. The parties agree that once Mr. Anderson determines the total amount of the reimbursement to which either party is entitled to receive from the other party, such amount shall be paid within ten (10) days from the date Mr. Anderson provided each party with his calculations. If it turns out that MINH owes any monies to JIM, the amount owed shall be deducted and offset from the total amount of the outstanding balance JIM owes to MINH under the MINH Promissory Notes.

- D. The parties agree that all the real and personal property, and all outstanding debt, listed in **Exhibit B** attached to this Agreement is JIM's sole and separate property, and his separate debt, and the same should be confirmed to him as such.
- E. The parties agree that all the real and personal property listed in **Exhibit C** attached to this Agreement is MINH's sole and separate property, and her separate debt, and the same should be confirmed to her as such.
- F. As noted in subparagraph B of this Section IV, JIM currently owes to MINH and/or Luong Investments, LLC, and shall continue to owe until paid in full, the remaining balance on that certain *Forbearance Agreement* dated December 31, 2017. The original New Note Balance, incident to this *Forbearance Agreement*, was \$890,760.81. The parties agree that interest and principal payments shall continue to be due and owing from JIM to MINH and shall survive the Decree of Divorce as a sole and separate obligation of JIM and his business entities. Additionally, JIM individually, and as trustee of the Via Mira Monte Trust, owes MINH and Luong Investments, LLC, the

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balance remaining on that certain *Promissory Note* dated July 26, 2017, which original balance was \$700,000.00. The parties agree that interest and principal payments shall continue to be due and owing from JIM and MINH and shall survive the Decree of Divorce as a sole and separate obligation of JIM and his business entities. All terms and conditions of the *Forbearance Agreement* dated December 31, 2017, and the Promissory Note dated July 26, 2017, shall continue to govern.

- G. MINH'S REVOCABLE TRUST AND HER FAMILY PROTECTION TRUST: The parties acknowledge and agree that, during the parties' marriage, MINH created two (2) separate trusts, namely, (1) MNL Revocable Trust, and (2) MNL Family Protection Trust (collectively, "MINH's Trusts"). The parties further acknowledge and agree that all the assets held in each such trust was MINH's sole and separate property at the time she conveyed such property to the trust. JIM acknowledges and agrees that he has no interest in any property held in either of MINH's Trusts. Additionally, to the extent JIM is named in either of MINH's Trusts, including any reference to him as MINH's "spouse," whether as a beneficiary, trustee, successor trustee, or in any other respect, JIM relinquishes and waives any and all rights, claims, and benefits he may have under MINH's Trusts. The parties agree that any reference in either of MINH's Trusts to her "spouse" shall not be a reference to JIM, and JIM waives any rights, interests, or claims he may have as MINH's spouse.
- H. JIM'S REVOCABLE TRUST AND HIS FAMILY PROTECTION TRUST: The parties acknowledge and agree that, during the parties' marriage, JIM created two (2) separate trusts, namely, (1) JWV Revocable Trust, and (2) JWV Family Protection Trust (collectively, "JIM's Trusts"). The parties further acknowledge and agree that all the assets held in each such trust was JIM's sole and separate property at the time he conveyed such property to the trust. MINH acknowledges and agrees that she has no interest in any property held in either of JIM's Trusts. Additionally, to the extent MINH is named in either of JIM's Trusts, including any reference to her as JIM's

"spouse," whether as a beneficiary, trustee, successor trustee, or in any other respect, MINH relinquishes and waives any and all rights, claims, and benefits she may have under JIM's Trusts. The parties agree that any reference in either of JIM's Trusts to his "spouse" shall not be a reference to MINH, and MINH waives any rights, interests, or claims he may have as JIM's spouse.

- I. EACH PARTY'S SEPARATE PROPERTY INTEREST IN THE ARIZONA PROPERTIES: Each party owns, as his or her sole and separate property, the following interests in real property located in Arizona.
- 1. The parcel located at the South Half of the Northwest quarter of the Northwest Quarter of Section 28, Township 5 South, Range 2 East, of the Gila and Salt River Base and Meridian, Pinal County, Arizona, of which JIM has a 67.039% interest, as his sole and separate property, and MINH has a 20.803% interest, as her sole and separate property;
- 2. The parcel located at the North Half of the Northwest quarter of the Northwest quarter of Section 28, Township 5 South, Range 2 East, of the Gila and Salt River Base and Meridian, Pinal County, Arizona, of which JIM has a 67.039% interest, as his sole and separate property, and MINH has a 20.803% interest, as her sole and separate property;
- 3. The parcel that is comprised of a portion of Section 36, Township 16 South, Range 24 East of the Gila and Salt River Base and Meridian, Cochise County, Arizona, of which JIM has a 50% interest, as his sole and separate property, and MINH has a 50% interest, as her sole and separate property;
- 4. The parcel that is comprised of a portion of Section 36, Township 16 South, Range 24 East, and Section 1, Township 17 South, Range 24 East of the Gila and Salt River Base and Meridian, Cochise County, Arizona, of which JIM has a 50% interest, as his sole and separate property, and MINH has a 50% interest, as her sole and separate property;

- 5. The parcel that is comprised of a portion of Section 1, Township 17 South, Range 24 East of the Gila and Salt River Base and Meridian, Cochise County, Arizona, of which JIM has a 50% interest, as his sole and separate property, and MINH has a 50% interest, as her sole and separate property; and
- 6. The parcel that is comprised of a portion of Section 1, Township 17 South, Range 24 East of the Gila and Salt River Base and Meridian, Cochise County, Arizona, of which JIM has a 50% interest, as his sole and separate property, and MINH has a 50% interest, as her sole and separate property.

Each party will continue to own his or her respective ownership interest in each such parcel of real property as his or her sole and separate property. With respect to the ongoing payment of property taxes and all other costs and expenses relating to each such parcel of real property, each party shall pay his or her proportionate share of the same. At such time as either party elects to sell any of the above-referenced parcels of real property, which is owned only by the parties and is not owned with any other person or entity, they shall mutually select a realtor and place the property on the market for sale. Notwithstanding the foregoing, if only one party desires to sell any such parcel of real property that is owned by the parties with no other co-owner, the party who does not desire to sell the property at such time shall have the right to purchase the other party's ownership interest in the property under such terms that are acceptable to both parties. If the parties are unable to agree to such terms, then the parties shall mutually select a realtor and place the property on the market for sale, as provided above.

- J. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the parties agree that each party shall receive the following personal property:
- 1. MINH shall receive as her sole and separate property, free from any claims by JIM, the sole possession and ownership in and to the following: the Audi automobile, valued at approximately \$5,000; and the Thule Luggage Rack, valued at approximately \$1,500. JIM shall cooperate with MINH and execute any car titles to

remove JIM's name from the titles within seven (7) days of MINH's presentment of the titles to JIM.

2. JIM shall receive as his sole and separate property, free from any claims by MINH, the sole possession and ownership in and to the following: the Acura automobile, valued at approximately \$2,000; and the boat dock, valued at approximately \$10,000. MINH shall cooperate with JIM and execute any car titles, bills of sales, and/or any other form of ownership certificate to remove MINH's name from the titles within seven (7) days of JIM's presentment of the deed to MINH.

V.

CHILDREN'S 529 PLANS

The parties acknowledge and agree that they currently have an account (529 account) opened for each child for the purpose of using the funds on deposit for each child's college education. The parties agree that each such account shall be divided into two (2) separate accounts (529 accounts) for each child, with MINH having one (1) such account in her name for the benefit of each child, and JIM having the other account in his name for the benefit of the child. In this regard, MINH shall be entitled to receive seventy five percent (75%) of the monies held in each child's currently existing 529 account, and JIM shall receive the remaining twenty five percent (25%) of each child's account. Such accounts to be held by each party for the benefit of each child shall continue to be held by each party in trust for the child for whom the account has been opened, and each party agrees to use the monies held in each child's account for the benefit of that child's attainment of his or her post-high school education. Each party shall be free to continue to invest monies in a child's account at his or her sole discretion.

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PROPERTY ACQUIRED IN FUTURE TO BE SEPARATE PROPERTY

Any and all property acquired by either party from and after the date of this Agreement, specifically including, but not limited to, any and all wages, salary, commissions, income, and other earnings each party receives as a result of his or her respective present or future employment, shall be the sole and separate property of the one so acquiring the same, and each of the parties hereby respectively grants to the other all such future acquisitions of property as the sole and separate property of the one so acquiring the same.

VII.

RIGHT TO DISPOSE OF PROPERTY BY WILL

Each of the parties shall have an immediate right to dispose of or bequeath by Will, living trust, or other estate planning vehicle, his or her respective interests in and to any and all property belonging to him or her from and after the date of this Agreement, and such right shall extend to all future acquisitions of property as well as to all property set over to either party under this Agreement.

VIII.

WAIVER OF INHERITANCE RIGHTS

Except as provided below, and except as may be provided by Will, Codicil, or other such testamentary instrument voluntarily executed after the date each party has signed this Agreement, the parties each hereby waive any and all right to the estate of the other left at his or her death and forever quitclaim any and all right to share in the estate of the other by the laws of succession; and the parties hereby release one to the other all rights to inherit from the other. Furthermore, the parties hereby renounce, one to the other, all right to be administrator or administratrix, executor or executrix, of the estate of the other. The parties hereby waive any and all right to the estate or any interest in the estate of the other by way of inheritance, or otherwise; for family

allowance; to a probate or other homestead upon any property of the other; and to have set aside to him or her any property of the other exempt from execution. From the date of this Agreement to the end of the world, all such waivers by each party in the estate of the other party shall be effective, and the parties shall have all the rights of single persons and maintain the relationship of such toward each other.

IX.

MUTUAL RELEASE OF OBLIGATIONS AND LIABILITIES

It is hereby mutually understood and agreed by and between the parties hereto that this Agreement is deemed to be a final and conclusive and integrated agreement between the parties. Except as specified in this Agreement, each party to this Agreement (together with their agents, representatives, assigns, and attorneys) is hereby released and absolved from any and all liabilities and obligations for the future acts and duties of the other, and each party hereby releases the other from any and all liabilities, future accounts, alimony and support, or otherwise, and all debts and obligations of any kind or character incurred by the other, except as expressly provided in this Agreement. It is the understanding and intent of the parties that this Agreement is intended to finally and conclusively settle the rights of the parties hereto in all respects arising out of their marital relationship, except as otherwise provided in this Agreement.

X.

AGREEMENT SHALL MERGE INTO DECREE OF DIVORCE

This Agreement shall be taken as a full and final property settlement agreement between the parties. The provisions of this Agreement shall be submitted for approval to the Court in the divorce action or proceeding filed with the Court, and the same shall be incorporated and merged into the Court's Decree of Divorce. This Agreement shall determine the property rights and obligations of the parties. The provisions hereof shall not be subject to modification or change at any time hereafter by any court or otherwise,

except by a written agreement executed by both JIM and MINH with the same formality as this Agreement.

XI.

EXECUTION OF NECESSARY DOCUMENTS

A. JIM and MINH agree to execute quitclaim deeds, stock transfers, and any and all other instruments that may be required in order to effectuate the transfer of any and all interest either may have in and to the property hereby conveyed to the other as specified in this Agreement, or as otherwise provided by the terms of this Agreement. Should either party fail to execute any such documents, this Agreement shall constitute a full and complete transfer of the interest of one to the other as provided in this Agreement, or to otherwise effectuate any provision of this Agreement. Upon failure of either party to execute and deliver any such deed, conveyance, title, certificate or other document or instrument to the other party, or as otherwise provided in this Agreement, this Agreement shall constitute and operate as such properly executed document, and the County Auditor and County Recorder and any and all other public and private officials are hereby authorized and directed to accept this Agreement or a properly certified copy thereof in lieu of the document regularly required for such conveyance or transfer.

B. JIM and MINH each agree that should either party sell any property in which the other has no right, title, or interest by virtue of this Agreement, that such other party will and shall sign any deed, contract, or other instrument necessary to perfect title to any such property so conveyed.

XII.

DISCLOSURE

Each party hereto acknowledges that he or she has read the foregoing Agreement, fully understands the contents of this Agreement, and accepts the same as fair, just, and equitable. Each party further acknowledges that there has been no promise, agreement or understanding of either of the parties made to the other, except as expressly set forth

in this Agreement, which has been relied upon by either as a matter of inducement to enter into this Agreement. Furthermore, each party hereto has had the opportunity to be independently advised by his or her attorney as to the legal effect of the terms and the execution of this Agreement.

XIII.

REPRESENTATION BY COUNSEL AND COMPLETE SETTLEMENT

- A. Each party hereto stipulates with the other and warrants that he or she has had the opportunity for independent legal representation by counsel of his or her own choosing in the negotiations for and the preparation of this Agreement. MINH hereby acknowledges, represents, and warrants that she has retained Fred Page, Esq., of Page Law Firm ("MINH's Attorney") for the purpose of representing her in the negotiation and preparation of this Agreement. JIM hereby acknowledges, represents, and warrants that he has retained Robert P. Dickerson, Esq., of The Dickerson Karacsonyi Law Group ("JIM's Attorney") for the purpose of representing him in the negotiation and preparation of this Agreement.
- B. Each party to this Agreement hereby understands that MINH's Attorney represents MINH in this matter and is an advocate for MINH's position, and that JIM's Attorney represents JIM in this matter and is an advocate for JIM's position. Both parties have entered into this Agreement without undue influence or coercion, or misrepresentation, or for any other cause except as specified in this Agreement.
- C. JIM and MINH admit and agree that each of them has had the opportunity to discuss with independent tax counselors, other than MINH's Attorney and JIM's Attorney, concerning the income tax and estate tax implications and consequences with respect to the agreed upon division of properties and indebtedness, and that MINH's Attorney and JIM's Attorney were not expected to provide and did not provide tax advice concerning this Agreement. Each party acknowledges neither MINH's Attorney nor JIM's Attorney has made or is making any representations as to the tax obligations

or consequences to either party as a result of this Agreement. Each party specifically has been advised to seek independent tax advice concerning the effects of this Agreement.

XIV.

PAYMENT OF ATTORNEYS' FEES

The parties agree that each party shall pay his or her own respective attorneys' fees and costs incurred in the negotiation and preparation of this Agreement. Additionally, to the extent either party owes an outstanding amount to his or her attorney, such party further agrees to pay the remaining amount owed to his or her respective attorney(s) for all fees and costs incurred in his or her representation in the divorce proceeding filed in the Eighth Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada, in and for the County of Clark, or in any other divorce proceeding that may be commenced in the future. Each party agrees to indemnify and hold the other party harmless from any such attorneys' fees and costs incurred by such indemnifying party. Neither party shall be required to reimburse to the other party any attorneys' fee that have been paid to either party's legal counsel as of the date of this Agreement.

XV.

WAIVER OF ALL OTHER CLAIMS

- A. Other than expressly set forth in this Agreement, each party agrees that he or she forever waives, releases, and discharges the other party (together with his or her agents, representatives, assigns, and attorneys) from any and all rights, claims, demands, causes of action, and damages of any kind, known or unknown, existing or arising in the future, resulting from or relating to any personal injuries, property damage, events, conduct, happenings, or actions arising at any time prior to the date of this Agreement, whether arising from or during the marriage of the parties, or prior to the marriage of the parties.
- B. The parties mutually understand and agree that this Agreement is intended and deemed to be a final and conclusive agreement between the parties, and, except as

otherwise expressly provided in this Agreement, each party (together with their agents, representatives, assigns, and attorneys) is hereby released and absolved from any and all liabilities and obligations for the past acts and duties of the other party. The parties understand and agree that this Agreement is intended to settle fully, finally, and conclusively the rights of the parties hereto in all respects arising out of their marital and business relationships, and any and all other relationships between the parties, except as expressly provided in this Agreement. Such release shall specifically include, but not necessarily be limited to, all existing causes of actions that actually exist or may exist between the parties, and all causes of actions accruing during the marriage but discovered after the execution of this Agreement.

C. Each party's waiver, release, and discharge as set forth in subparagraphs A and B immediately above is an integral part of this property settlement and may not be modified. The specific releases and waivers of liability set forth above in this Section of this Agreement are intended to be in addition to the specific mutual release of obligations and liabilities set forth in Section VIII of this Agreement.

XVI.

ENTIRE AGREEMENT

This Agreement contains the entire agreement and understanding of the parties, and there are no representations, warranties, covenants, or understandings other than those expressly set forth in this Agreement. The parties expressly agree that any and all other agreements which may have been made between the parties prior to the date of this Agreement, whether written or oral, shall be null and void upon the execution of this Agreement. The parties further represent and agree that no warranties or representations, whether written or oral, except as may be expressly provided in this Agreement, have been made by either party to the other to induce the execution of this Agreement, and the parties agree that this Agreement contains their entire agreement. Furthermore, this Agreement may not be changed, modified, or terminated orally, and

any such change, modification, or termination may only be made by a written instrument executed by the parties with the same formality as this Agreement. No written agreement to change, modify, or terminate this Agreement need be supported by any consideration, and each party hereby waives the defenses of part performance, estoppel, and similar defenses, whether legal or equitable. This Agreement shall be binding on and inure to the benefit of the heirs, executors, administrators, and assigns of each of the parties.

XVII.

EFFECT OF PARTIAL INVALIDITY

If any term, provision, promise, or condition of this Agreement is determined by a court of competent jurisdiction to be invalid, void, or unenforceable, in whole or in part, the remainder of this Agreement shall remain in full force and effect, and shall in no way be affected, impaired, or invalidated.

XVIII.

ENFORCEMENT OF AGREEMENT

If either party institutes any action or proceeding to enforce, or for the breach of any of the terms of this Agreement, or any of the terms or orders of a decree of divorce relating to this Agreement, or if either party contests the validity of this Agreement or challenges or claims that this Agreement is not enforceable, then the prevailing party shall be entitled to recover his or her attorneys' fees and costs from the other party. In any such action or proceeding, the prevailing party shall be entitled to recover all attorneys' fees and costs incurred by that party, regardless of whether the action or proceeding is prosecuted to judgment. This shall include attorneys' fees and costs incurred by a party defending a claim or suit necessitated by the other party's failure to indemnify as required in this Agreement.

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XIX.

NO PARTY DEEMED DRAFTER

The parties agree that neither party shall be deemed to be the drafter of this Agreement. In the event this Agreement is ever construed by a court of law or equity, such court shall not construe this Agreement or any provision hereof against either party as the drafter of the Agreement. The parties further hereby acknowledge and agree that both have contributed substantially and materially to the preparation of this Agreement.

XX.

GOVERNING LAW

The laws of the State of Nevada shall govern the validity, construction, performance and effect of this Agreement. This Agreement and the rights of the parties hereto shall be governed and interpreted in all respects by the law applied to contracts made wholly to be performed within the State of Nevada.

XX1.

CUMULATIVE EFFECT

The parties' rights and remedies hereunder shall be cumulative, and the exercise of one or more shall not preclude the exercise of any other(s).

XXII.

COUNTERPARTS

This Agreement may be executed in any number of counterparts, each of which shall be deemed an executed original, but all of which together shall be deemed one and the same document.

XXIII.

VERIFICATION

A. Each party agrees that he or she has read this Agreement in its entirety prior to his or her execution of this Agreement, and fully understands the same.

B. Each party further agrees that he or she has disclosed fully the nature and extent of all his or her assets and debts, whether community, joint, or separate, and all such assets and debts are accounted for in, and divided and distributed by this Agreement.

C. Each party further acknowledges and agrees that, prior to his or her execution of this Agreement, he or she independently has consulted with counsel of his or her choice and has received independent counsel's advise pertaining to his or her rights and obligations set forth in this Agreement.

D. Each party further acknowledges and agrees that he or she fully understands that this Agreement is a full and final settlement of rights and obligations pertaining to the matters addressed in and resolved by this Agreement.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have hereunto set their hands to this Agreement the year and date above written.

MINH NGUYET LUONG	
JAMES W. VAHEY	

<u>ACKNOWLEDGMENTS</u>

STATE OF NEVADA)
STATE OF NEVADA) ss. COUNTY OF CLARK)
On this day of January, 2020, personally appeared before me, a Notary
Public in and for said County and State, MINH NGUYET LUONG, personally known
(or proved) to me to be the person whose name is subscribed to the above instrument
and who acknowledged that she executed the instrument.
Notary Public
STATE OF NEVADA) ss. COUNTY OF CLARK)
COUNTY OF CLARK) ss.
On this day of January, 2020, personally appeared before me, a Notary
Public in and for said County and State, JAMES W. VAHEY, personally known (or
proved) to me to be the person whose name is subscribed to the above instrument, and
who acknowledged that he executed the instrument.
Notary Public

ATTORNEY CERTIFICATION

I, the undersigned hereby certifies that I am an attorney at law, duly licensed and admitted to practice in the State of Nevada; that I have been employed and compensated by MINH NGUYET LUONG, a party to this Marital Settlement Agreement ("Agreement"), and that I have advised such party with respect to this Agreement and explained to her the legal effect of it; and that MINH NGUYET LUONG has acknowledged to the undersigned her full and complete understanding of the Agreement and its legal consequences, and has freely and voluntarily executed the Agreement in my presence.

PAGE LAW FIRM

By			
,			

FRED PAGE, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 006080 6930 South Cimarron Road, Suite 140 Las Vegas, Nevada 89113 Attorney for MINH NGUYET LUONG

I, the undersigned hereby certifies that I am an attorney at law, duly licensed and admitted to practice in the State of Nevada; that I have been employed and compensated by JAMES W. VAHEY, a party to this Marital Settlement Agreement ("Agreement"), and that I have advised such party with respect to this Agreement and explained to him the legal effect of it; and that JAMES W. VAHEY has acknowledged to the undersigned his full and complete understanding of the Agreement and its legal consequences, and has freely and voluntarily executed the Agreement in my presence.

THE DICKERSON KARACSONYI LAW GROUP

Вy	

ROBERT P. DICKERSON, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 000945 1745 Village Center Circle Las Vegas, Nevada 89134 Attorneys for JAMES W. VAHEY

EXHIBIT A

EXHIBIT A

EXHIBIT A

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JAMES W. VAHEY.

Plaintiff,

Defendant.

MINH NGUYET LUONG,

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VS.

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T ARTHUR RITCHIE, JR DISTRICT JUDGE AMILY DIVISION, DEPT H LAS VEGAS, NV 89155

DISTRICT COURT

CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

CASE NO. D-18-581444-D DEPT. NO. "H" FINDINGS OF FACT, **CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, DECISION AND ORDER**

Dates of Hearing: August 8, 2019, September 5, 2019, September 11, 2019 Time of Hearing: 9:00 a.m. - 5:00 p.m., 9:00 a.m. - 5:00 p.m., 1:30 - 5:00 p.m.

This matter came on for evidentiary hearing before Art Ritchie, District Court Judge, Family Division, Department H. James Vahey was present and represented by his attorneys, THE DICKERSON KARACSONYI LAW GROUP, and Robert P. Dickerson, Esq. and Sabrina M. Dolson, Esq. Minh Luong was present and represented by her attorneys, KAINEN LAW GROUP, and Neil M. Mullins, Esq. The court reviewed the papers and pleadings on file, the evidence

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CHIE, JR

T ARTHUR RITCHIE, JR
DISTRICT JUDGE
FAMILY DIVISION, DEPT H

LAS VEGAS, NV 89155

admitted at the hearing, and for good cause, makes the following findings of fact, conclusions of law, decision and order.

I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This matter is a pre-judgment custody dispute arising out of this divorce case. This court was asked to resolve both parties' claims for legal and physical custody, and Minh Luong's motion for an order allowing her to remove the parties' minor children from Nevada to California over James Vahey's objection.

James Vahey, age 56, and Minh Luong, age 46, were married in Henderson, Nevada on July 8, 2006. Three children were born the issue of their relationship, Hannah Vahey, who was born on March 19, 2009, Matthew Vahey, who was born on June 26, 2010, and Selena Vahey, who was born on April 4, 2014.

James Vahey filed a Complaint for Divorce on December 13, 2018, seeking a divorce on no-fault grounds of incompatibility. James Vahey alleged in his complaint that the Plaintiff and the Defendant are proper persons to be awarded joint legal and joint physical custody of their children. Minh Luong filed an Answer and Counterclaim for Divorce on January 11, 2019. Minh Luong alleged in her counterclaim that the Plaintiff and the Defendant are proper persons to be awarded joint legal custody. Minh Luong alleged that it is in the best interest of the children that she have primary physical custody, and she seeks

permission to remove the children from Nevada to California. James Vahey opposes the request to remove the children from Nevada.

Minh Luong filed a motion to resolve parent/ child issues, for removal, for support, and for other relief on January 29, 2019. The motion was set for hearing on March 12, 2019. James Vahey filed his opposition and countermotion on February 20, 2019. Minh Luong's reply to opposition and opposition to countermotion was filed on March 5, 2019.

The parties' motions were heard on March 12, 2019. On that date, both parties appeared with counsel. The court ordered that the parties share joint legal and joint physical custody of the children pending an evidentiary hearing. The court's temporary order provided that James Vahey have custodial responsibility from Monday at 9:00 a.m. to Wednesday at 9:00 a.m., and that Minh Luong have custodial responsibility from Wednesday at 9:00 a.m. to Friday at 9:00 a.m. The court ordered the parties alternate weekends defined as Friday at 9:00 a.m. to Monday at 9:00 a.m. The court set a discovery schedule and continued the case management conference to May 28, 2019. The Order from the March 12, 2019 hearing was filed on May 2, 2019.

On May 31, 2019, the court entered an order setting the matter for evidentiary hearing on August 8, 2019. The court held an evidentiary hearing on August 8, 2019, September 5, 2019, and September 11, 2019. The court received documentary proof and heard the testimony from six witnesses, Hieu Luong,

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ARTHUR RITCHIE, JR DISTRICT JUDGE FAMILY DIVISION, DEPT H Minh Luong, James Vahey, Richard Landeis, Bowena Bautista, and Imelda Vahey. This court concludes that the evidence presented at the hearing was sufficient for the court to decide the custody issues in this case.

FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS II.

This court has custody jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction over the parties to this case because of their general appearance and their connections and Both parties are residents of Clark County, Nevada. contact with Nevada. Minh Luong owns a residence in Nevada and California, and since the parties' separation in January, 2019, she has spent time at both residences. Nevada is the home state of the parties' minor children pursuant to the UCCJEA as adopted in the Nevada Revised Statutes.

CHILD CUSTODY

Child custody orders necessarily address legal custody, which is an expression of parental rights, and physical custody, which is an expression of child placement and custodial responsibility. There is a presumption in Nevada that parents share parental rights through joint legal custody, and a preference that parents share joint physical custody though a parenting plan that affords parents meaningful time and responsibility for minor children for at least 146 days of the year. If a court has not made a determination regarding the custody of a child, each parent has joint legal and joint physical custody of the child until otherwise ordered by a court of competent jurisdiction. NRS 125C.0015 (2).

This court has been asked to establish physical custody orders incident to divorce, and to order the removal of the three minor children from Nevada to California. In considering this request, the court is required to consider the best interest of the children. In any action for determining physical custody of a minor child, the sole consideration of the court is the best interest of the child. NRS 125C.0035 (1). In removing the children from the jurisdiction where the children currently live, the best interest of the children should also be the paramount judicial concern. *Schwartz v. Schwartz*, 107 Nev. 378, 383, 812 P.2d 1268, 1271 (1991).

The court, with this pre-judgment custody order, makes an order that it finds is in the children's best interest.

1. Legal Custody

NRS 125C.002 provides, in part, that when a court is making a determination regarding the legal custody of a child, there is a presumption, affecting the burden of proof, that joint legal custody would be in the best interest of a minor child if: (a) The parents have agreed to an award of joint legal custody or so agree in open court at a hearing for the purpose of determining the legal custody of the minor child.

Joint legal custody has been the order in this case by agreement, and it is not at issue in these pre-judgment proceedings. The parties have both pled and

agreed that they should share the legal rights and responsibilities of raising the children jointly.

2. Physical Custody

NRS 125C.001, provides, in part, that the Legislature declares that it is the policy of this State to ensure that minor children have frequent associations and a continuing relationship with both parents after the parents have ended their relationship, become separated, or dissolved their marriage.

NRS 125C.0015 Parents have joint custody until otherwise ordered by court.

- 1. The parent and child relationship extends equally to every child and to every parent, regardless of the marital status of the parents.
- 2. If a court has not made a determination regarding the custody of a child, each parent has joint legal custody and joint physical custody of the child until otherwise ordered by a court of competent jurisdiction.

This divorce case requires the establishment of a physical custody order. Minh Luong seeks an order granting her primary physical custody of the children, and she seeks an order allowing her to remove the children to Irvine, California over James Vahey's objection. Minh Luong had the burden to prove that it is in the children's best interest that she have primary physical custody. Based on the findings below, the court concludes that Minh Luong did not provide sufficient proof to support a conclusion that she have primary physical custody. The evidence supports a conclusion that it is in the best interest of the children that the parties share joint physical custody.

3. Removal to Irvine, California

Minh Luong seeks an order allowing her to remove the children from Nevada to Irvine, California. Minh Luong has the burden to prove that it is in the children's best interest to be removed from Nevada to Irvine, California, over their father's objection. Even though the court concluded that Minh Luong did not provide sufficient proof to have primary physical custody, the court evaluated the move request factors found in NRS 125C.007. Based on the findings below, the court concludes that Minh Luong did not provide sufficient proof to support a removal of the children to California.

B. MINH LUONG'S MOTION FOR PRIMARY PHYSICAL CUSTODY AND FOR PERMISSION TO RELOCATE WITH THE CHILDREN TO IRVINE, CALIFORNIA

Nevada statutes and case law provide that the district court has broad discretion concerning child custody matters. *Rooney v. Rooney*, 109 Nev. 540, 853 P.2d 123 (1993). This pre-judgment evidentiary hearing establishes the legal and physical custody orders for the parties' divorce judgment.

1. <u>Best Interest Findings</u>

The "best interest" standard applies when parents seek to establish a physical custody order. In a contested case, the district court weighs factors that may affect the consequence of placement. Factors the court considers are found in statutes and in decisional law.

James Vahey has lived in Clark County, Nevada since 1995. James Vahey is an orthopedic surgeon, and has practiced medicine in Nevada for twenty four years. Dr. Vahey testified that he has a busy practice but that he has some control over his patient and surgery schedule. Dr. Vahey testified that his office is located a few miles from the children's school, and that he organizes his work schedule to accommodate his custodial obligations. Bowena Bautista, Dr. Vahey's practice manager, testified that Dr. Vahey sees patients on Mondays and Wednesdays from approximately 9:00 a.m. – 2:00 p.m., and on Fridays from 9:00 a.m.–11:00 a.m. Dr. Vahey's surgeries are scheduled on Tuesdays and Thursdays. Dr. Vahey testified that he earns approximately \$700,000 per year from employment.

Minh Luong has lived in Clark County, Nevada since 2001. Minh Luong is a dentist, and has practiced in Nevada for eighteen years. Dr. Luong is the owner of Tooth Fairy Dental. The business has an office located in Las Vegas, Nevada, and in Henderson, Nevada. Dr. Luong's sister, Hieu Luong worked in the dental offices for approximately five years. Hieu Luong testified that Dr. Luong worked three to four days per week at the dental offices during the time that she worked there. Dr. Luong testified that she worked two to three days a week during the marriage, and she currently works two days per month, every other Wednesday, and she has hired two staff dentists to work her practice. Dr. Luong testified that she plans to retire and have associates run the practice, or sell

the practice. Dr. Luong testified that she earns approximately \$1,000,000 per year, and she would earn between \$700,000 and \$800,000 per year if she employed other dentists to run the practice.

Minh Luong has owned a home in Las Vegas, Nevada since 2002. The parties lived in James Vahey's home located at Lake Las Vegas in Henderson, Nevada, from 2006 until January, 2019. Minh Luong testified that in January, 2019, she moved into her Las Vegas, Nevada home, and she and the children spend her custodial time there.

In October, 2017, Minh Luong purchased a home in Irvine, California. Minh Luong testified that the parties had discussed moving to California during the marriage, and there was an express agreement or tacit understanding that the parties would retire and move to California. James Vahey disputed this claim. The court concludes that the parties did not reach an agreement to move to California, even though Minh Luong purchased a separate property home there in 2017. In support of this conclusion, the court finds that neither party has retired or sold their practice. The parties' marital difficulties predated Minh Luong's purchase of a home in Irvine, California. Minh Luong testified that prior to 2017, she and her husband were parties in a civil suit concerning an investment. Minh Luong testified that after the case was settled, she was hurt and angry, and she told James Vahey that she was going to purchase a home in California, and he could follow her there if he wanted. Minh Luong testified that she discussed

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moving the family to California many times with James Vahey. Minh Luong testified that in an April, 2018 meeting with a therapist, James Vahey told her he was not on board with moving to California.

The court finds that both parties are dedicated to raising their children. Married couples often establish a division of labor that is related to the parties' routines and interests. Both parents in this case have demanding jobs, and they both have successfully guided their busy family through the rigors of raising three children. Both parents have been involved in managing the children's daily routines, sharing responsibilities for supervision, guidance, and education. Minh Luong's allegation that James Vahey was a disengaged or neglectful parent, or that she was the primary parent or the more suitable parent, was not credible, and was not supported by sufficient proof. Minh Luong's testimony in this regard. and these allegations were contradicted by documentary proof and witness testimony that was credible. Hieu Luong, Richard Landeis, Bowena Bautista, and Imelda Vahey testified that James Vahey was an active, engaged parent. Vahey testified that Minh Luong was an exceptional parent.

NRS 125C.0035 (4) sets forth factors that courts are required to consider as part of the balancing test. This court, in evaluating this custody dispute, considered the applicable statutory factors and the decisional law factors. Specifically:

(a) The wishes of the child if the child is of sufficient age and capacity to form an intelligent preference as to his or her physical custody.

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Hannah Vahey is ten (10) years of age, Matthew Vahey is nine (9) years of age, and Selena Vahey is five (5) years of age. None of the children are of sufficient age to form a preference.

(b) Any nomination of a guardian for the child by a parent.

The court is considering custodial placement only with the parents. This factor is not an applicable factor.

(c) Which parent is more likely to allow the child to have frequent associations and a continuing relationship with the noncustodial parent.

The court finds that James Vahey is more likely to allow the children to have a frequent and continuing relationship with the other parent. The court has concerns that Minh Luong's negative attitude towards James Vahey that stems from his refusal to allow her to move the children to California has caused her to negatively influence the relationship between the children and their father. Evidence was presented at the hearing that showed Minh Luong has discussed this dispute with the parties' children. James Vahey's account of the events in August, 2019 when Hannah was upset and crying on the first day of school was credible. James Vahey testified that Minh Luong told him in the presence of the children that he had forced the kids to go to school in Nevada instead of Irvine where he promised, and said to him, in front of the children, that he misled all of us. Evidence was presented that supports a finding that Minh Luong encouraged Hannah and Matthew to discuss the move to California with their father. Minh

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Luong testified that when asked by the children about moving to California, she told the children to ask their dad. James Vahey testified that shortly after the separation, Selena, age 4, told him at a custody exchange that mommy told me to tell you to let her stay with her all of the time. This dialog shows poor judgment and has the potential to alienate the children from their father.

Minh Luong alleged that James Vahey was a good father when he was around, that he did not support the children's emotional needs, and discounted his contributions to their schooling and extracurricular activities. Conversely, James Vahey alleged that it was in the best interest of the children for both parents to share physical custody. James Vahey complimented Minh Luong's parenting and dedication to the children. Of the two parents, James Vahey is less likely to undermine or interfere with the parent-child relationship. The court concludes that James Vahey is more likely to foster and encourage a healthy relationship between the children and the other parent.

(d) The level of conflict between the parents.

The parties have moderate conflict. Minh Luong's decision to seek primary physical custody and removal of the children from Nevada was a catalyst for the filing of this divorce case. Removal disputes within a divorce case can create significant conflict. James Vahey testified that Minh Luong does not speak to him verbally, even in front of the children. Minh Luong insists on texting as the mode of communication between the parties. The court reviewed text communications admitted into evidence. These communications were rational, devoid of foul language or personal attacks. The court concludes that the parties communicate well enough to address the children's daily needs. The parties disagreed on the frequency of extracurricular activities of the children, and had disagreements concerning parenting style, but both parties demonstrated a commitment to communicate for the benefit of the children.

(e) The ability of the parents to cooperate to meet the needs of the child.

The evidence supports a finding that the parties have the ability to cooperate to meet the needs of the children. During the marriage, the parties coordinated busy work schedules and busy parenting schedules. Despite the fact that Minh Luong testified she cannot co-parent with James Vahey, they have cooperated to meet the needs of the children.

(f) The mental and physical health of the parents.

The court finds that both parties are mentally and physically fit to care for the children.

(g) The physical, developmental and emotional needs of the child.

The children are school age. They attend the Challenger School located in Las Vegas, Nevada. The children are in important developmental stages that requires the support of both parents. Neither parent presented evidence that the children have anything but normal physical, developmental, or emotional needs.

(h) The nature of the relationship of the child with each parent.

The court finds that the children are well-adjusted with a loving relationship with both parents. There was ample evidence showing that Minh Luong and James Vahey participated in many activities with the children, and that both were engaged in the children's schooling, and extracurricular activities.

(i) The ability of the child to maintain a relationship with any sibling.

The court concludes that the sibling relationship is important to maintain.

Neither parent suggested a parenting plan that would separate the children from each other.

(j) Any history of parental abuse or neglect of the child or a sibling of the child.

The court finds that neither party proved parental abuse or neglect of the children.

(k) Whether either parent or any other person seeking physical custody has engaged in an act of domestic violence against the child, a parent of the child or any other person residing with the child.

The court finds that neither party provided sufficient proof that the other parent engaged in an act of domestic violence against the children or against any person living with children.

(l) Whether either parent or any other person seeking physical custody has committed any act of abduction against the child or any other child.

The court finds that neither party proved that the other parent engaged in an act of abduction of the children.

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Best Interest Conclusion

The court concludes that it is in the best interest of the children that the parties share joint physical custody. A joint physical custody order is only possible if the parties live near one another. Minh Luong testified that she will decide to live in Irvine, California after the divorce, regardless of the outcome of her custody and removal request. If she moves to California, Minh Luong cannot share joint physical custody, and James Vahey shall have primary physical custody by default.

Based on NRS 125C, when the court concludes that a party fails to make a case for primary physical custody, the secondary request for removal fails. However, because the removal considerations overlap the best interest considerations, the court made findings on the removal request.

1. Removal Findings

For the purpose of considering this removal request, the parties have joint physical custody. NRS 125C.0015 (2) provides, in part:

If a court has not made a determination regarding the custody of a child, each parent has joint legal custody and joint physical custody of the child until otherwise ordered by a court of competent jurisdiction.

125C.0065 provides, in part,

1. If joint physical custody has been established pursuant to an order, judgment or decree of a court and one parent intends to relocate his or her residence to a place outside of this State or to a place within this State that is at such a distance that would substantially impair the ability of the other parent to maintain a meaningful relationship with the child, and the relocating parent desires to take the child with him or her, the relocating

parent shall, before relocating: (a) Attempt to obtain the written consent of the non-relocating parent to relocate with the child; and (b) If the non-relocating parent refuses to give that consent, petition the court for primary physical custody for the purpose of relocating.

Removal of a minor child from Nevada by the custodial parent is a separate and distinct issue from child custody. However, some of the same factual and policy considerations overlap. In removing the child from the jurisdiction where the child currently lives, the best interest of the child should also be the paramount judicial concern. *Schwartz v. Schwartz*, 107 Nev. 378, 383, 812 P.2d 1268, 1271 (1991). Determination of the best interest of a child in the removal context necessarily involves a fact-specific inquiry and cannot be reduced to a rigid "bright line" test. *Schwartz* at 1270, (citing *In re Marriage of Eckert*, 518 N.E. 2d 1041, 1045 (Ill. 1988), and *Cooper v. Cooper*, 491 A.2d 606, 614-15 (N.J. 1984)).

The court considered the proof and the factors to be weighed by the court found in NRS 125C.007.

NRS 125C.007 1 (a)

There exists a sensible, good-faith reason for the move, and the move is not intended to deprive the non-relocating parent of his or her parenting time;

The court finds that Minh Luong was sincere in her desire to move to Irvine, California, but concludes that her decision to move is not sensible because joint physical custody is in the best interest of these children, and because the move would deprive James Vahey of the opportunity to share joint physical

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custody of the children. The court concludes that it is in the best interest of the children for their parents to live near enough to each other to share physical custody.

Minh Luong testified that she has nine sensible, good faith reasons for the move. They are: (1) The Irvine, California public school is better than the children's Nevada school; (2) Irvine, California is a better community than Henderson, Nevada; (3) Irvine, California is more child friendly than Henderson, Nevada; (4) Irvine, California has better weather than Henderson, Nevada; (5) There is better family support in Irvine, California compared to Henderson, Nevada; (6) The children would be raised by Minh Luong 24/7 in Irvine, California; (7) There are better opportunities for the children in Irvine, California compared to Henderson, Nevada; (8) There are better opportunities for extracurricular activities for the children in Irvine, California compared to Henderson, Nevada; and (9) There are cultural advantages in Irvine, California compared to Henderson, Nevada, because there is a greater Vietnamese population.

Many of these reasons are subjective, and the court accepts that Minh Luong is sincere in her belief that these reasons are senisble. The evidentiary hearing lasted two and one-half days. The court heard several hours of testimony, and yet did not receive sufficient proof to support a favorable finding on these reasons. Minh Luong did not prove that the public school in Irvine, California is

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better for the children than the Challenger private school where the children currently attend. The court concludes that Minh Luong did not prove that Irvine, California is a better community, is more child friendly, has better weather, has better family support, has better opportunities for the children, has better extracurricular activities for the children, or has cultural advantages compared to Henderson, Nevada. Regarding the reason that the move would benefit the children by being raised by Minh Luong 24/7 in Irvine, California the findings in this order show that the court does not conclude that this is sensible or an advantage for the children.

The court finds that Minh Luong's intention to move is, in part, to deprive James Vahey of his parenting time. She suggested that the children would be better served by being raised by Minh Luong 24/7 in Irvine, California. Minh Luong testified that she has been unhappy living in Las Vegas, Nevada for years. Minh Luong testified that she has been trying to persuade James Vahey to move to California since 2015. Between 2015 and 2017, the parties looked at vacation homes in California. After the civil suit was resolved in July, 2017, Minh Luong told James Vahey that he did not care about her, and she was going to purchase a home in California, and you can follow if you want. James Vahey testified that later in July, 2017 he told Minh Luong he was not on board with her plan to move to Irvine, California. Minh Luong then purchased the home in California in October, 2017. The parties continued to live in the marital residence in

Henderson, Nevada throughout 2017 and 2018. Minh Luong testified that in a therapy session in April, 2018 James Vahey again told her that he was not on board with her moving to California with the children. The court is concerned that Minh Luong's decision to live in California is intended to create a distance between the parties, and to create a distance between the children and their father, to avoid the sometimes tedious and inconvenient aspects of co-parenting.

Both parents have significant financial independence. Minh Luong and James Vahey have separate property and substantial income that give them parenting options that many parties cannot afford.

The court concludes that the move to Irvine, California is not sensible because it eliminates the ability of the parties to share the children jointly, and because Minh Luong provided insufficient proof to show that the decision to live in Irvine, California is sensible. Even though the court concludes that Minh Luong did not prove a sensible, good faith reason for the move, the court considered the proof concerning the other factors found in NRS 125C.007, in the event Minh Luong's reason for moving is sensible and made in good faith.

NRS 125C.007 1 (b)

The best interests of the child are served by allowing the relocating parent to relocate with the child;

The court concludes that the children's best interests are not served by allowing Minh Luong to relocate with them to Irvine, California. In support of this conclusion, the court references the best interest findings made in this order.

The court concludes that the children's best interest would be served by the parties sharing joint physical custody.

NRS 125C.007 1 (c)

The child and the relocating parent will benefit from an actual advantage as a result of the relocation.

Minh Luong did not show that her decision to move to Irvine, California was for her economic advantage. The court finds that Minh Luong was sincere that she prefers Irvine, California to Nevada. This opinion or preference is subjective, however, and was not proven by the presentation of sufficient evidence.

NRS 125C.007 2 (a)

The extent to which the relocation is likely to improve the quality of life for the child and the relocating parent;

The court finds that Minh Luong did not prove that the move to Irvine, California improves the children's quality of life. Minh Luong testified that she thought the schools and environment was better for the children in Irvine, California. Her testimony was the evidence offered to the court. The court concludes that she did not prove that schools in Irvine, California were better than the children's current school in Las Vegas, Nevada, or that the children's opportunities and environment would be better in Irvine, California.

NRS 125C.007 2 (b)

Whether the motives of the relocating parent are honorable and not designed to frustrate or defeat any visitation rights accorded to the non-relocating parent;

It is Minh Luong's burden to show that her motives are honorable and not designed to defeat James Vahey's custody rights. The court concludes that she provided insufficient proof of this critical element. The court finds that Minh Luong's motives for the move are suspect, and finds that the move would frustrate and limit James Vahey's opportunity to share custody of the children.

The court was unpersuaded that a move to California is best for the children. The court finds that Minh Luong did prove that her home in Irvine, California is larger and more appealing than her home in Las Vegas, Nevada. It was built in 2017, and the photographs of the home admitted into evidence show that it is a beautiful home. Minh Luong described her Las Vegas, Nevada home where she has exercised her custodial time since January, 2019 as a rental home.

NRS 125C.007 2 (c)

Whether the relocating parent will comply with any substitute visitation orders issued by the court if permission to relocate is granted;

Both parties have followed the court orders that were entered in March, 2019 while this matter was pending, and the parties have shared physical custody of the children. The court concludes that both parties will comply with the custody orders that will be entered in this case.

NRS 125C.007 2 (d)

Whether the motives of the non-relocating parent are honorable in resisting the petition for permission to relocate or to what extent any opposition to the petition for permission to relocate is intended to secure a financial advantage in the form of ongoing support obligations or otherwise;

The court finds that James Vahey's motives are honorable in opposing the request to remove his children to Irvine, California. James Vahey cannot maintain a joint physical custody schedule with the children if they live in California. The children are school age, and his custodial time would be limited to school breaks. The court finds that removal of the children would reduce his time by a significant percentage each year, but more importantly, would change the character of his time with the children.

NRS 125C.007 2 (e)

Whether there will be a realistic opportunity for the non-relocating parent to maintain a visitation schedule that will adequately foster and preserve the parental relationship between the child and the nonrelocating parent if permission to relocate is granted; and

Both parents would have a custody or visitation schedule that would preserve the parental relationship between the children and the other parent, if one parent lives in Clark County, Nevada and one parent lives in Irvine, California. The parent who does not have primary physical custody would have a material reduction in custodial time and a material diminution in custodial responsibility.

NRS 125C.007 2 (f)

Any other factor necessary to assist the court in determining whether to grant permission to relocate.

Without Minh Luong's settled purpose to leave Clark County, Nevada to live in Irvine, California, the evidence in this case supports a conclusion that the parties should share joint physical custody. Minh Luong's decision to move to Irvine, California requires the court to fashion a primary/secondary custodial

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effect of this decision in order and take the necessary steps to preserve her joint The court is directing the parties to submit a divorce physical custody rights. judgment by October 18, 2019. If, after considering this decision, and prior to the entry of the divorce judgment, Minh Luong elects to remain in Clark County, Nevada, the parties should notify the court of their intention to share joint legal and joint physical custody of the children. The court shall accept the parties' joint physical custody agreement, or shall place the matter on calendar to establish a joint physical custody schedule. If Minh Luong's settled purpose to live in Irvine, California remains unchanged, James Vahey shall become the primary physical custodian.

schedule. Minh Luong should be afforded some reasonable time to consider the

C. CHILD SUPPORT

There are financial implications to this custody order. Both parents have an obligation to support their children pursuant to NRS 125B.020. The obligation to support three children is 29% of the obligor's gross monthly income pursuant to NRS 125B.070. Both parties testified that they earn in excess of \$700,000 per year from employment. The parties agree that because of their significant incomes, neither party shall pay child support to the other parent. James Vahey specifically waives child support from Minh Luong in consideration for an agreement that the parties share equally the significant private school tuition and related expenses, all medical and dental expenses for the children that

are not covered by insurance, expenses for the children's extracurricular activities that the parties agree are best for the children, and tutoring or education expenses that the parties agree are best for the children.

The court finds that this child support agreement and order complies with Nevada law.

D. <u>ATTORNEYS FEES / COSTS</u>

The Nevada Supreme Court held that factors found in *Brunzell v. Golden Gate National Bank*, 85 Nev. 345, 349, 455 P.2d 31, 33 (1969) apply to family law cases. Two requirements must be met before making an attorney's fees award:

- (1) There must be a legal basis for the award. Fees must be allowed by an express or implied agreement or when authorized by statute or rule; and
- (2) Fees must be appropriate and reasonable. Courts must consider:
 - (a) The qualities of the advocate;
 - (b) The character and difficulty of the work performed;
 - (c) The work actually performed; and
 - (d) The result obtained.

Miller v. Wilfong, 121 Nev. Adv. Op. 61, 119 P.3d 727 (9/22/2005).

a. NRS 18.010 and EDCR 7.60 (b)

While there is a legal basis in statutes for an award of attorney's fees and costs, this court concludes that the claim pursuant to NRS 18.010 and EDCR 7.60 (b) lacks merit and should be denied.

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The parties litigated the contested issue of physical custody incident to their divorce case. Both parties have the right to their day in court to advance a custody order that they believe is in the children's best interest.

NRS 18.080 permits litigants to recover their attorneys' fees "when the court finds that the claim... or defense of the opposing party was brought without reasonable ground or to harass the prevailing party." EDCR 7.60 (b) provides that the court may, after notice and an opportunity to be heard, impose upon an attorney or a party any and all sanctions which may, under the facts of the case, be reasonable, including the imposition of fines, costs or attorney's fees when an attorney or a party without just cause: (1) Presents to the court a motion or an opposition to a motion which is obviously frivolous, unnecessary or unwarranted. (2) Fails to prepare for a presentation. (3) So multiplies the proceedings in a case as to increase costs unreasonably and veraciously.

This court concludes that this statute and rule should not be applied to this case. NRS 18.010 and EDCR 7.60 are tools allowing courts to remedy claims that are brought without reasonable ground. The court concludes that both parties, through counsel, advanced factual claims and legal arguments that were made in good faith, and with a reasonable basis based on their particular perspective. The work done by counsel was excellent, and reasonable in light of the position of the parties.

b. Disparity in Income and Financial Resources

There is a legal basis in statutes and in decisional law for an award of attorney's fees and costs based on the disparity of income between the parties.

The case at bar is a divorce action. NRS 125.150(3) provides, in part, as follows:

Whether or not application for suit money has been made under the provisions of NRS 125.040, the court may award a reasonable attorney's fee to either party to an action for divorce if those fees are in issue under the pleadings.

The district court must also consider the disparity in income of the parties in awarding fees. Wright v. Osburn, 114 Nev. 1367, 1370, 970 P.2d. 1071, 1073 (1998). Further, the power of the court to award attorney's fees in divorce actions remains part of the continuing jurisdiction of the court in appropriate post-judgment motions relating to support and child custody. Halbrook v. Halbrook, 114 Nev. 1455, 971 P.2d 1262 (1998).

This court finds that both parties have incurred substantial fees and costs in this case. Custody disputes that involve removal are difficult to resolve, and difficult to present. The amount of fees and costs incurred was a significant investment by the parties. The court accepts that the work performed reflects the quality of the advocates, and the intention of the parties to make a significant financial investment in their claims and defenses. This court concludes that the parties are in similar financial circumstances. The fees and cost incurred, while significant, are well within the parties' ability to pay, and the fees and costs incurred do not significantly affect their financial condition.

Therefore, this court concludes that the parties should bear their own attorney's fees and costs.

E. NOTICES

a. Pursuant to NRS 125.510 (6), the parties are hereby placed on notice of the following:

"PENALTY FOR VIOLATION OF ORDER: THE ABDUCTION, CONCEALMENT OR DETENTION OF A CHILD IN VIOLATION OF THIS ORDER IS PUNISHABLE AS A CATEGORY D FELONY AS PROVIDED IN NRS 193.130. NRS 200.359 provides that every person having a limited right of custody to a child or any parent having no right of custody to the child who willfully detains, conceals or removes the child from a parent, guardian or other person having lawful custody or a right of visitation of the child in violation of an order of this court, or removes the child from the jurisdiction of the court without the consent of either the court or all persons who have the right to custody or visitation is subject to being punished for a category D felony as provided in NRS 193.130."

- b. Pursuant to NRS 125.510 (7) and (8), the parties are hereby placed on notice that the terms of the Hague Convention of October 25, 1980, adopted by the 14th Session of the Hague Conference on Private International Law, apply if a parent abducts or wrongfully retains a child in a foreign country.
- c. NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the parties are subject to the provisions of NRS 31A and 125.450 regarding the collection of delinquent child support payments, and that either party may request a review of child support in accordance with NRS 125B.145.

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T ARTHUR RITCHIE, JR
DISTRICT JUDGE
FAMILY DIVISION, DEPT H

LAS VEGAS, NV 89155

ORDER

WHEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Minh Luong and James Vahey shall share joint legal and joint physical custody of Hannah Vahey, Matthew Vahey, and Selena Vahey. James Vahey shall have primary physical custody, subject to Minh Luong's visitation. Joint legal custody shall be defined as follows:

The parents shall consult and cooperate with each other in substantial questions relating to religious upbringing, educational programs, significant changes in social environment, and health care of the children. Both parents shall have access to medical and school records pertaining to their children and be permitted to independently consult with any and all professionals involved with the children. Each parent is to notify the other parent as soon as reasonably possible of any illness requiring medical attention or any emergency involving the children. Each parent shall have the power to obtain emergency health care for the children without the consent of the other parent. However, the parent must inform the other parent of the emergency and the healthcare provided as soon as reasonably possible. Each parent acknowledges and agrees that they each currently have and will continue to have adequate access to all information concerning the wellbeing of the children, including, but not limited to, copies of report cards; school meeting notices; vacation schedules; class programs; requests for conferences; results of standardized or diagnostic tests; notices of activities

involving the children; samples of school work; order forms for school pictures; all communications from health care providers; the names, addresses and telephone numbers of all schools, health care providers, regular day care providers, and counselors. Each parent shall have the right to obtain information concerning the athletic and social events in which the children participate. Both parents may participate in school activities for the children such as open houses, attendance at athletic events, etc. Each parent shall provide the other parent with the address and telephone number of the residence where the minor children reside when in that parent's care. In the event that the address and/or telephone number of the residence changes, the parent shall notify the other parent of the new address two (2) weeks prior to any change of address and/or shall provide the other parent with the new telephone number as soon as the number is assigned. The parent vacationing with the minor children shall provide the other parent with a travel itinerary, which shall include telephone numbers, expected times of arrival and departure and destinations.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that James Vahey shall have primary physical custody of Hannah Vahey, Matthew Vahey, and Selena Vahey, subject to Minh Luong's visitation. Specifically:

1. Weekend Holidays: Minh Luong shall have the children for weekend holidays listed below. The weekend holiday time may be exercised in

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LAS VEGAS, NV 89155

California and shall be defined as 4:00 p.m. the day school recesses until 6:00 p.m. the day before school resumes.

- a. Martin Luther King Day Weekend
- b. President's Day Weekend
- c. Memorial Day Weekend
- d. Labor Day Weekend
- e. Nevada Day Weekend
- 2. Weekend Visitation: Minh Luong may have the children for one, non-holiday weekend in Nevada each calendar month. The weekend shall be defined as 4:00 p.m. the day school recesses until 6:00 p.m. on Sunday. Minh Luong shall provide James Vahey with written notice of her intention to exercise a weekend visitation seven days in advance.
- 3. Holidays: The Holiday schedule shall take precedence over Weekend Holidays, Weekend Visitation, and Summer Break.
 - a. **Mother's Day:** This holiday is defined as Friday at 4:00 p.m. through Sunday at 6:00 p.m. Minh Luong shall have the children each year for Mother's Day.
 - b. **Father's Day:** This holiday is defined as Friday at 4:00 p.m. through Sunday at 6:00 p.m. James Vahey shall have the children each year for Father's Day.
 - c. **Spring Break:** Minh Luong shall have the children every year for Spring Break defined as 4:00 p.m. the day school recesses until 6:00 p.m. the day before school resumes.

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ARTHUR RITCHIE, JR DISTRICT JUDGE MILY DIVISION, DEPT H d. Summer Break: Minh Luong shall have the children for six consecutive weeks each summer in California beginning at 4:00 p.m. the day after school recesses.

- e. Thanksgiving Break: Minh Luong shall have the children for Thanksgiving Break in 2019 and in odd-numbered years. Thanksgiving Break shall be defined as 4:00 p.m. the day school recesses until 6:00 p.m. the day before school resumes. Vahey shall have the children for Thanksgiving Break in evennumbered years.
- f. Winter Break: The Winter Break shall be shared by the parties. James Vahey shall have the first portion of the Winter Break each year defined as the day school recesses until 4:00 p.m. on December 27. Minh Luong shall have the children for the second portion of the Winter Break each year defined as 4:00 p.m. on December 27, until 6:00 p.m. the day before school resumes.
- 4. Transportation. Absent an agreement of the parties, Minh Luong shall provide transportation for the children for her custodial time.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Minh Luong's motion for primary physical custody and for permission to remove the children to Irvine, California is denied.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that neither party shall pay child support to the other. The parties agree to share equally private school tuition and related expenses, all medical and dental expenses for the children that are not covered by insurance, expenses for the children's extracurricular activities that the parties agree are best for the children, and tutoring or education expenses that the parties agree are best for the children. If one party has paid for a shared expense, reimbursement shall be made pursuant to the 30/30 rule for expenses. The parent who paid for the expenses shall provide the other parent a copy of the receipt of payment within 30 days of payment. The other parent should reimburse one-half of the expenses within 30 days.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that both parties shall provide health insurance for the children if it is offered through employment.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that each party shall be responsible for their own attorney's fees and costs.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the court directs the parties to submit a stipulated divorce judgment to the court by October 18, 2019,

DATED this 20 day of September, 2019.

DISTRICT COURT JUDGE T ART RITCHIE, JR.

Vahey / Luong

EXHIBIT B

EXHIBIT B

EXHIBIT B

Oberweis Funds James W. Vahey individual	\$579
Oberweis Funds IRA	\$28,538
Vehicles owned by James W. Vahey	
2019 Toyota Sienna	\$35,000
2004 Acura TL	\$900
2008 Audi Q7 Vin *9234 (Minh and Jim)	\$10,000
Boats owned by James W. Vahey	
boats owned by James W. Vaney	
2008 MasterCraft X15	\$20,000
2006 ElectraCraft	\$1000
Property owned by James W. Vahey or by LLCs and Trusts in his name	
27 Via Mira Monte owned by Via Mira Monte Trust	\$1,200,000
8585 S. Eastern Suite 100 owned by Other Hand	\$1,495,000
Raw Land behind 8585 S. Eastern Suite 100	\$1000
0 N. Los Hijos Rd., Maricopa, AZ (raw land) (amount paid by Vahey in 2005 for 67% of two parcels with total purchase price = \$1,800,000)	\$1,200,000
1900 N. Highway 191, Sunsite, AZ (raw land) (amount paid by Vahey in 2006 for 50% of four parcels with total purchase price = \$669,936)	\$334,968
Other LLCs in which James W. Vahey is a limited partner	
Specialty Surgery Center, LLC	\$34,177

TOTAL ASSETS: \$9,041,039

LIABILITIES

Mortgage – 27 Via Mira Monte (Residence), Bank of America *8884	\$987,698
Mortgage – 8585 S. Eastern (Office building), Luong Investments, LLC	\$890,761
Promissory Note, Luong Investments, LLC	\$700,000
UBS Loan *6984	\$999,247
MidCountry Bank Loan *8027	\$742,984
Bank of America Credit Card *5930	\$133,357

TOTAL LIABILITIES: \$4,454,047

<u>NET WORTH</u>: \$4,586,992

EXHIBIT C

EXHIBIT C

EXHIBIT C

EXHIBIT B

SOLE AND SEPARATE PROPERTY OF MINH LUONG

Property	Estimated Cash Value

as of January 2019

Cash, Savings, Certificates and IRA Accounts owned by Minh Luong

MidCountry Bank checking account *9082 \$36,502.09

(ToothFairy Childrens Dental)

MidCountry Bank checking account *9096 \$34,460.99

(ToothFairy Childrens Dental Luong Investments, LLC)

Mid Country Bank checking account *9243 \$88.38

(ToothFairy Childrens Dental Luong Estate Major)

MidCountry Bank checking account *9250 \$35.00

(Luong Estate Minor, LLC)

MidCountry Bank checking account *9537 \$15,341.50

(The Minh-Nguyet Thi Luong Rev. Fam. Trust personal account)

Capital Group, American Funds, 401k/Profit Sharing Plan \$1,400,000.00

Account *7992

Interactive Brokers LLC Institution Master account \$4,000,000.00

*3460 (Luong Estate Major, LLC)

Tootfairy/HCON Defined Benefit Plan Etrade (Retirement Plan) \$500,000.00

account *0517

529 Kids College Fund, from VCSP/College America, \$700,600.42
Minh-NGUYET Thi Luong as owner, FBO Hannah,
account *2852
529 Kids College Fund, from VCSP/College America, \$370,000.00
Minh-NGUYET Thi Luong as owner, FBO Matthew,
account *2782

Vehicles owned by Minh Luong

2016 Tesla MOD vin no. *9517	\$90,000.00
2002 Lexis S43 vin no. *8552 (Minh-Nguyet Luong	\$500.00
DDS PC)	
1998 Toyota Camry	\$500.00
2008 Audi LVQ7 Vin. *9234 (Minh and Jim)	\$5,000.00

Businesses owned by Minh Luong and Selling Prices

Luong Investments, LLC

Minh-Nguyet Luong, D.D.S., P.C.

Listing the following for sale at:

Got Smile Dentistry	\$100,000.00
Sahara Surgery Center Office	\$50,000.00
Toothfairy Sahara Office	\$1,000,000.00
Toothfairy Eastern Office	\$400,000.00
VALU, LLC	Unknown (Minh has a
	20.803% interest in this LLC)

Other Property owned by Minh Luong or by Trusts in her name

1829 W. Brewer Ave., Santa Ana, California	\$350,000.00
9742 W. Tompkins Ave., Las Vegas, Nevada	\$250,000.00
5281 River Glen Dr., Unit 223, Las Vegas, Nevada	\$100,000.00
9470 Peace Way, Unit 118, Las Vegas, Nevada	\$100,000.00
7400 W. Flamingo Rd., Unit 2082, Las Vegas, Nevada	\$100,000.00

1909 Villa Palms Ct., Unit 205, Las Vegas, Nevada	\$100,000.00
1401 N. Michael Way, Unit 114, Las Vegas, Nevada	\$100,000.00
2750 S. Durango Dr., Unit 1009, Las Vegas, Nevada	\$100,000.00
8101 W. Flamingo Rd., Unit 1068, Las Vegas, Nevada	\$100,000.00
9580 W. Reno Ave., Unit 269, Las Vegas, Nevada	\$100,000.00
855 N. Stephanie St., Unit 2322, Henderson, Nevada	\$100,000.00
2201 Ramsgate Dr., Unit 125, Henderson, Nevada	\$100,000.00
10925 S. Eastern Ave., Henderson, Nevada	\$1,370,000.00
135 Larksong, Irving, CA 92602	\$2,600,000.00 (purchase price)
0 N. Los Hijos Rd., Maricopa, Arizona (Land)	\$350,000.00 (put in by Minh at purchase)
50% of 1900 N. Highway 191, Sunsite, Arizona (Land)	\$669,600.00 (one-half of purchased)
1027 Lot 156 & 157, Kingman, Arizona (Land) 100% ownership	\$355,092.63 (purchase of Lot 157) \$275,073.84 (purchase of Lot 156)
Total Assets:	

SEPARATE DEBTS OF MINH LUONG

CreditorAmount of Debtas of January 2019Interactive Brokers loan\$2,300,000.00Total Debts:\$2,300,000.00

2009-28485
Page 1 of 7
Requested By: UDLED
Christine Rhodes - Recorder
Cochise County , AZ
11-25-2009 12:06 PM Recording Fee \$16.00

SPACE ABOVE THIS LINE FOR RECORDER'S USE

AFTER RECORDING MAIL TO:

uDeed, LLC - 25676 9041 South Pecos Road, Suite 3900 Henderson, NV 89071

MAIL TAX STATEMENTS TO:

Minh Nguyet Luong, Trustee, et al 27 Via Mira Monte Henderson, NV 89011

RECORDING REQUESTED BY:

Minh Nguyet Luong 27 Via Mira Monte Henderson, NV 89011

WARRANTY DEED

TITLE OF DOCUMENT

FOR A GOOD AND VALUABLE CONSIDERATION, I or we,

Minh Nguyet Luong, an unmarried woman and James W. Vahey, an unmarried man, GRANTOR,

WHOSE mailing address is 27 Via Mira Monte, Henderson, Nevada 89011,

DO HEREBY CONVEY TO:

Minh Nguyet Luong, Trustee of The MNL Revocable Trust, as to an undivided fifty percent (50%) interest and James W. Vahey, Trustee of The JWV Revocable Trust, as to an undivided fifty percent (50%) interest, GRANTEE.

WHOSE mailing address is 27 Via Mira Monte, Henderson, Nevada 89011,

ALL RIGHT, title or interest to the real property located in the County of Cochise, State of Arizona, described as follows:

SEE EXHIBIT "A" ATTACHED HERETO AND BY THIS REFERENCE MADE A PART HEREOF.

Assessor's Parcel Number: 11802004D

Prior Recorded Doc. Ref.: Warranty Deed: Recorded: August 30, 2006; Doc. No. 060832797

EXEMPT: per A.R.S. §11-1134 B8

NOTE: Pursuant to A.R.S. 33-404, the names and addresses of the beneficiaries of "The MNL Revocable Trust" are attached hereto in EXHIBIT "B" and by this reference made a part hereof.

NOTE: Pursuant to A.R.S. 33-404, the names and addresses of the beneficiaries of "The JWV Revocable Trust" are attached hereto in EXHIBIT "C" and by this reference made a part hereof.

SUBJECT TO current taxes and other assessments, reservations in patents and all easements, rights-of-way, encumbrances, liens, covenants, conditions, restrictions, obligations and liabilities as may appear of record, the GRANTOR hereby binds itself to warrant and defend the title as against all acts of the GRANTOR herein and no other.

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WITNESS my/our hand(s), this 13 day	y of Oct , 20 09.
Miner Nguyet Lung	
James W. Vahey	
COUNTY OF CLOYK ss County of Clayk ss The foregoing instrument was acknowledged before me	this 13th day of MtDber 2019
by Minh Nguyet Luong and James W. Vahey. NOTARY STAMP/SEAL	
KRISTEN HENDERSON NOTARY PUBLIC STATE OF NEVADA APPT. No. 08-108844-1 MY APPT. EXPIRES AUG. 9, 2010	Notary Public My Commission Expires: 8/9/10
The second secon	All Th

2009-28485 11-25-2009 12:06 PM Page 3 of 7

EXHIBIT "A" LEGAL DESCRIPTION

ALL RIGHT, TITLE OR INTEREST TO THE REAL PROPERTY LOCATED IN THE COUNTY OF COCHISE, STATE OF ARIZONA, DESCRIBED AS FOLLOWS:

PARCEL NO. 1:

A PORTION OF SECTION 36, TOWNSHIP 16 SOUTH, RANGE 24 EAST OF THE GILA AND SALT RIVER BASE AND MERIDIAN, COCHISE COUNTY, ARIZONA, MORE PARTICULARLY DESCRIBED AS FOLLOWS:

COMMENCING AT THE SOUTHEAST CORNER OF SECTION 36:

THENCE NORTH 89 DEGREES 59 MINUTES 31 SECONDS WEST ALONG THE SOUTH LINE THEREOF, A DISTANCE OF 755.65 FEET;

THENCE NORTH 23 DEGREES 08 MINUTES 03 SECONDS WEST, A DISTANCE OF 1226.78 FEET TO THE TRUE POINT OF BEGINNING;

THENCE NORTH 89 DEGREES 56 MINUTES 03 SECONDS WEST, A DISTANCE OF 2239.52 FEET TO THE EASTERLY RIGHT-OF-WAY LINE OF STATE HIGHWAY 191;

THENCE NORTH 23 DEGREES 07 MINUTES 50 SECONDS WEST ALONG SAID RIGHT-OF-WAY LINE, A DISTANCE OF 520.73 FEET:

THENCE SOUTH 89 DEGREES 57 MINUTES 27 SECONDS EAST, A DISTANCE OF 1538.29 FEET;

THENCE NORTH 00 DEGREES 02 MINUTES 12 SECONDS EAST, A DISTANCE OF 1035.10 FEET;

THENCE SOUTH 89 DEGREES 57 MINUTES 23 SECONDS EAST, A DISTANCE OF 257.92 FEET;

THENCE SOUTH 23 DEGREES 08 MINUTES 03 SECONDS EAST, A DISTANCE OF 1647.45 FEET TO THE TRUE POINT OF BEGINNING;

(ALSO SHOWN AS PARCEL A OF RECORD OF SURVEY RECORDED IN BOOK 28 OF SURVEYS, PAGE 68, OFFICIAL RECORDS)

EXCEPT ALL COAL, OIL, GAS AND MINERAL RIGHTS AS RESERVED IN DEED RECORDED IN DOCKET 180, PAGE 502, OFFICIAL RECORDS.

PARCEL NO. 2:

A PORTION OF SECTION 36, TOWNSHIP 16 SOUTH, RANGE 24 EAST, AND SECTION 1, TOWNSHIP 17 SOUTH, RANGE 24 EAST OF THE GILA AND SALT RIVER BASE AND MERIDIAN, COCHISE COUNTY, ARIZONA, MORE PARTICULARLY DESCRIBED AS FOLLOWS:

COMMENCING AT THE SOUTHEAST CORNER OF SECTION 36;

THENCE NORTH 89 DEGREES 59 MINUTES 31 SECONDS WEST ALONG THE SOUTH LINE THEREOF, A DISTANCE OF 755.65 FEET TO THE TRUE POINT OF BEGINNING;

THENCE SOUTH 00 DEGREES 01 MINUTES 19 SECONDS EAST, A DISTANCE OF 280.36 FEET;

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EXHIBIT "A" LEGAL DESCRIPTION (CONTINUED)

THENCE NORTH 89 DEGREES 56 MINUTES 03 SECONDS WEST, A DISTANCE OF 2119.89 FEET TO THE EASTERLY RIGHT-OF-WAY LINE OF STATE HIGHWAY 191;

THENCE NORTH 23 DEGREES 07 MINUTES 50 SECONDS WEST ALONG SAID RIGHT-OF-WAY LINE, A DISTANCE OF 769.96 FEET;

THENCE SOUTH 89 DEGREES 56 MINUTES 03 SECONDS EAST, A DISTANCE OF 2239.57 FEET:

THENCE SOUTH 23 DEGREES 08 MINUTES 03 SECONDS EAST, A DISTANCE OF 464.95 FEET TO THE TRUE POINT OF BEGINNING:

(ALSO SHOWN AS PARCEL C OF RECORD OF SURVEY RECORDED IN BOOK 28 OF SURVEYS, PAGE 68 OFFICIAL RECORDS)

EXCEPT ALL COAL, OIL, GAS AND MINERAL RIGHTS AS RESERVED IN DEED RECORDED IN DOCKET 180, PAGE 502, OFFICIAL RECORDS.

PARCEL NO. 3:

A PORTION OF SECTION 1, TOWNSHIP 17 SOUTH, RANGE 24 EAST OF THE GILA AND SALT RIVER BASE AND MERIDIAN, COCHISE COUNTY, ARIZONA, MORE PARTICULARLY DESCRIBED AS FOLLOWS:

COMMENCING AT THE NORTHEAST CORNER OF SECTION 1:

THENCE NORTH 89 DEGREES 59 MINUTES 31 SECONDS WEST ALONG THE NORTH LINE THEREOF, A DISTANCE OF 775.65 FEET;

THENCE SOUTH 00 DEGREES 01 MINUTES 19 SECONDS EAST, A DISTANCE OF 280.36 FEET TO THE TRUE POINT OF BEGINNING:

THENCE CONTINUING SOUTH 00 DEGREES 01 MINUTES 19 SECONDS EAST, A DISTANCE OF 805.03 FEET;

THENCE NORTH 89 DEGREES 56 MINUTES 03 SECONDS WEST, A DISTANCE OF 1776.15 FEET TO THE EASTERLY RIGHT-OF-WAY LINE OF STATE HIGHWAY 191;

THENCE NORTH 23 DEGREES 07 DEGREES 50 SECONDS WEST ALONG SAID RIGHT-OF-WAY LINE, A DISTANCE OF 875.82 FEET;

THENCE SOUTH 89 DEGREES 56 MINUTES 03 SECONDS EAST, A DISTANCE OF 2119.89 FEET TO THE TRUE POINT OF BEGINNING;

(ALSO SHOWN AS PARCEL D OF RECORD OF SURVEY RECORDED IN BOOK 28 OF SURVEYS, PAGE 68. OFFICIAL RECORDS)

EXCEPT ALL COAL, OIL, GAS AND MINERAL RIGHTS AS RESERVED IN DEED RECORDED IN DOCKET 180, PAGE 502, OFFICIAL RECORDS.

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EXHIBIT "A" LEGAL DESCRIPTION (CONTINUED)

PARCEL NO. 4:

A PORTION OF SECTION 1, TOWNSHIP 17 SOUTH, RANGE 24 EAST OF THE GILA AND SALT RIVER BASE AND MERIDIAN, COCHISE COUNTY, ARIZONA MORE PARTICULARLY DESCRIBED AS FOLLOWS:

BEGINNING AT THE NORTHEAST CORNER OF SECTION 1:

THENCE SOUTH 00 DEGREES 01 MINUTES 22 SECONDS EAST ALONG THE EAST LINE THEREOF, A DISTANCE OF 1389.24 FEET;

THENCE NORTH 89 DEGREES 56 MINUTES 03 SECONDS WEST, A DISTANCE OF 2402.41 FEET TO THE EASTERLY RIGHT-OF-WAY LINE OF STATE HIGHWAY 191;

THENCE NORTH 23 DEGREES 08 MINUTES 03 SECONDS WEST ALONG SAID RIGHT-OF-WAY LINE, A DISTANCE OF 329.73 FEET:

THENCE SOUTH 89 DEGREES 56 MINUTES 03 SECONDS EAST, A DISTANCE OF 1776.15 FEET;

THENCE NORTH 00 DEGREES 01 MINUTES 19 SECONDS WEST, A DISTANCE OF 1065.39 FEET;

THENCE SOUTH 89 DEGREES 56 MINUTES 31 SECONDS EAST, A DISTANCE OF 755.65 FEET TO THE POINT OF BEGINNING:

(ALSO SHOWN AS PARCEL E OF RECORD OF SURVEY RECORDED IN BOOK 28 OF SURVEYS, PAGE 68, OFFICIAL RECORDS)

EXCEPT ALL COAL, OIL, GAS AND MINERAL RIGHTS AS RESERVED IN DEED RECORDED IN DOCKET 180, PAGE 502, OFFICIAL RECORDS.

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EXHIBIT "B" DISCLOSURE OF BENEFICIARIES THE MNL REVOCABLE TRUST

1.	MINH NGUYET LUMUG JAMES W.VABEY	27VIA MIRA MONTE, HENDERSON, NV 89011 27 VIN MIRA MONTE, HENDERSON, NV 89011

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EXHIBIT "C" DISCLOSURE OF BENEFICIARIES THE JWV REVOCABLE TRUST

NAME ADDRESS

Return to:) Managing Member) 10925 S. Eastern Ave. #130) Henderson, NV 89052 BIII NO PARKAD HAMEAHAM MAKAMARI III

B: 7635 P:

OFFICIAL RECORDS OF MOHAVE COUNTY CAROL MEIER, COUNTY RECORDER 976

11/20/2009 11:12 AM Fee: \$14.00 DOC TYPE: QCD PAID BY:L KLINGSBERG

Exempt B7

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS THAT:

FOR VALUABLE CONSIDERATION OF TEN DOLLARS (\$ 10.00), and other good and valuable consideration, cash in hand paid, the receipt and sufficiency of which is hereby acknowledged, Luong Investment 306-24-156 Golden Valley, AZ, LLC, hereinafter referred to as "grantor" does hereby transfer, remise, release, and forever quitclaim unto LUONG INVESTMENT, LLC a limited liability company, organized under the laws of the state of Nevada hereinafter "Grantee" the following lands and property, together with all improvements, located thereon, lying in the County Mohave, State of Arizona towit.

PARCEL 1:

Sun West Acres, Track 1027, Lot 156, Section 35 21 18, Mohave County, Arizona.

EXCEPT all coal and other minerals as reserved unto the UNITED STATES of AMERICA in the patent to said land.

LESS AND EXCEPT all oil, gas and minerals, on and under the above described property owned by Grantors, if any, which are reserved by Grantors.

Subject to all easements, rights-of-way, protective covenants and mineral reservations of record, if any.

TO HAVE AND TO HOLD SAME UNTO Grantee, and unto Grantee's assigns forever, with all appurtenances thereunto belong.

Taxes for the year 2009 shall be prorated between Grantors and Grantee as of the date selected by Grantors and Grantee, or paid by Grantee, or paid by Grantee, or paid by Grantors.
The property herein conveyed X is not a part of the homestead of Grantors, or is part of the homestead of Grantors.
WITNESS Grantors hand this the 811 day of Nove miles 2009.
MINH NOUVET LUONG
State of Nevada
County of Clark
The foregoing instrument was acknowledged before me this
Day of Nauember 2009.
Notary Public - State of Novada County of Clark County of Clark County of Clark August 13, 2011 NOTARY PUBLIC ON 199715
My Commission Expires:
on 8/13/2011

Luong Investment 306-24-156 Golden Valley, AZ, LLC Luong Investment, LLC 10925 S, Eastern Avenue #130 Henderson, NV 89052 702-222-9700 Recording Requested by: FIRST AMERICAN TITLE

When recorded mail to: Luong Inv 306-24-156 Golden Valley AZ, LLC 10925 S. Eastern Ave. Suite #130 Henderson, NV 89052



B: 7208 P: 9

OFFICIAL RECORDS OF MOHAVE COUNTY JOAN MCCALL, COUNTY RECORDER



05/22/2008 12:30 PM Fee: \$1 DOC TYPE: RECON PAID BY:NOTEWORLD SERVICING

DEED OF RELEASE AND FULL RECONVEYANCE

Account #71082644

FIRST AMERICAN TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY, a California Corporation, Trustee under Deed of Trust executed by Luong Investment 306-24-156 Golden Valley AZ, LLC, a Nevada Limited Liability Company, Trustor, dated August 23, 2006, and recorded September 7, 2006, in Fee No. 2006088512, Book 6439, Page 558, Records of Mohave County, Arizona, having been requested to do so by Beneficiary in said Deed of Trust, hereby releases and reconveys to the person or persons legally entitled thereto, without covenant or warranty, express or implied, all the estate, title and interest acquired by Trustee under said Deed of Trust.

In witness whereof, Trustee has executed this Release and Reconveyance this day of May 2008

FIRST AMERICAN TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY, a California Corporation, as Trustee

() sim

John K. Graham, Regional Counsel

STATE OF ARIZONA)

County of Maricopa)

NIGOLE SAENZ

This area for official notarial seal)

O Release and Reconveyance Firstam AZ Forms PAYOFF RELEASE-FULL-FATCO.doc (REV 02/01)

Return to:)
Managing Member)
10925 S. Eastern Ave. #130)
Henderson, NV 89052

Page: 1 of 2 FEE # 2009071073

B: 7635 P:

OFFICIAL RECORDS OF MOHAVE COUNTY CAROL MEIER, COUNTY RECORDER 9/8

11/20/2009 11:12 AM Fee: \$14.00 DOC TYPE: QCD PAID BY:L KLINGSBERG

QUITCLAIM DEED Exempt B7

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS THAT:

FOR VALUABLE CONSIDERATION OF TEN DOLLARS (\$ 10.00), and other good and valuable consideration, cash in hand paid, the receipt and sufficiency of which is hereby acknowledged, Luong Investment 306-24-157 Golden Valley, AZ, LLC, hereinafter referred to as "grantor" does hereby transfer, remise, release, and forever quitclaim unto LUONG INVESTMENT, LLC a limited liability company, organized under the laws of the state of Nevada, hereinafter "Grantee" the following lands and property, together with all improvements, located thereon, lying in the County Mohave, State of Arizona towit.

PARCEL 1:

Sun West Acres, Track 1027, Lot 157, Section 35 21 18, Mohave County, Arizona.

EXCEPT all coal and other minerals as reserved unto the UNITED STATES of AMERICA in the patent to said land.

LESS AND EXCEPT all oil, gas and minerals, on and under the above described property owned by Grantors, if any, which are reserved by Grantors.

Subject to all easements, rights-of-way, protective covenants and mineral reservations of record, if any.

TO HAVE AND TO HOLD SAME UNTO Grantee, and unto Grantee's assigns forever, with all appurtenances thereunto belong.

Recording Requested by: FIRST AMERICAN TITLE

When recorded mail to: Luong Investment 306-24-157 Golden Valley AZ. LLC 10925 S. Eastern Avenue Henderson, NV 89052

DEED OF RELEASE AND FULL RECONVEYANCE

Account #71082643

FIRST AMERICAN TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY, a California corporation, Trustee under Deed of Trust executed by Luong Investments 306-24-157 Golden Valley AZ LLC, a Nevada Limited Liability Company, Trustor, dated August 25, 2006, and recorded September 7, 2006, in Fee No. 2006088514, Book 6439, Page 568, Records of Mohave County, Arizona, having been requested to do so by Beneficiary in said Deed of Trust, hereby releases and reconveys to the person or persons legally entitled thereto, without covenant or warranty, express or implied, all the estate, title and interest acquired by Trustee under said Deed of Trust.

In witness whereof, Trustee has executed this Release and Reconveyance this day of June, 2008. FIRST AMERICAN TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY. a California corporation, as Trustee John K. Graham, Regional Counsel STATE OF ARIZONA) County of Maricopa This instrument was acknowledged and executed before me this day of June, 2008 by John K. Graham who acknowledged to be the Regional Counsel of FIRST AMERICAN TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY, a California corporation, and that as such officer, being authorized so to do, signed the name of the corporation as such officer Notary Public (This area for official notarial seal)

DOC TYPE: RECON PAID BY: NOTE WORLD SERVICING CTR

C Release and Recommensure Firstam AZ Foren-PAYOFF-RELEASE-PLIL FAICO doc (REV 02-01)

Recording Requested by: FIRST AMERICAN TITLE

When recorded mail to: Luong Investment 306-24-157 Golden Valley AZ LLC 10925 S. Eastern Avenue Henderson, NV 89052

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In witness whereof, Trustee has executed this Release and Reconveyance this

674

day of June, 2008.

FIRST AMERICAN TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY,

a California corporation, as Trustee

By:

John K. Graham, Regional Counsel

STATE OF ARIZONA)

) ss.

County of Maricopa

Notary Public

OFFICIAL SEAS NICOLE SAENA NOTARY PUBLIC - APUZONA NOTARY PUBLIC - APUZONA NY Comm Expiras October 14, 2009

(This area for official notarial seal)

THE STREET STREET

PAGE: 1 of 1 FEE # 200804656

B: 7249 P: 666

OFFICIAL RECORDS OF MOHAVE COUNTY JOAN MCCALL, COUNTY RECORDER

07/03/2008 11:37 AM Fee: \$14.00 DOC TYPE: RECON PAID BY:NOTE WORLD SERVICING CTR

G Release and Recurveyance FirstAm AZ FormstPAYOFF-RELEASE-FULL-PATCO.doc (REV.02/01)