

**IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA**

FEDERAL HOUSING FINANCE AGENCY, in  
its capacity as Conservator for the Federal  
National Mortgage Association, and FEDERAL  
NATIONAL MORTGAGE ASSOCIATION,

Petitioners,

vs.

EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, Clark  
County, Nevada, and THE HONORABLE  
MARK DENTON, Judge

Respondents,

WESTLAND LIBERTY VILLAGE, LLC;  
WESTLAND VILLAGE SQUARE, LLC;  
AMUSEMENT INDUSTRY, INC.;  
WESTLAND CORONA LLC; WESTLAND  
AMBER RIDGE LLC; WESTLAND  
HACIENDA HILLS LLC; 1097 NORTH  
STATE, LLC; WESTLAND TROPICANA  
ROYALE LLC; VELLAGIO APTS OF  
WESTLAND LLC; THE ALEVY FAMILY  
PROTECTION TRUST; WESTLAND AMT,  
LLC; AFT INDUSTRY NV, LLC; and A&D  
DYNASTY TRUST,

Real Parties in Interest.

Case No. — Electronically Filed  
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**PETITIONERS FEDERAL HOUSING FINANCE AGENCY AND  
FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE ASSOCIATION'S APPENDIX  
VOLUME II OF III**

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1           623. Upon information and belief, Grandbridge negligently misrepresented that it  
2 conducted an adequate review when setting the reserve amounts in August 2018, prior to Westland  
3 signing the loan assumption, because a short one (1) year later, it requested an additional \$2.85  
4 million be placed into escrow with no deterioration of the Properties.

5           624. The information and representations made by Grandbridge was false, in that  
6 unbeknownst to Westland they knew the loan did not have sufficient security, and that there was  
7 a substantial likelihood they would attempt to seek additional reserves.

8           625. Grandbridge supplied the information and made the representations to induce  
9 Westland to rely upon it, to act or refrain from acting in reliance upon it, and to have Westland  
10 enter into the assumption agreement.

11           626. Grandbridge owed Westland a duty not to make material misrepresentations.

12           627. Westland justifiably relied upon the information Grandbridge provided.

13           628. As a direct and proximate result of Grandbridge's misstatements and omissions,  
14 Westland has suffered damages in excess of \$15,000.00, the exact amount of which will be proven  
15 at trial, because, *inter alia*, this is the only default that Westland has ever suffered and it will impair  
16 Westland's credit rating and leading to long term higher borrowing costs, and it has impaired  
17 Westland's ability to re-finance its Properties at a time when interest rates are at an all-time low.

18           **q. SEVENTEENTH CAUSE OF ACTION (INTENTIONAL INTERFERENCE**  
19           **WITH CONTRACT AGAINST GRANDBRIDGE)**

20           629. Counterclaimants repeat, reallege, and incorporate the allegations set forth in the  
21 preceding paragraphs, including in the Counterclaim above, as if fully set forth herein.

22           630. To the extent that Grandbridge is not found to be a party to the assumption  
23 agreements and/or the loan agreements, this cause of action is pleaded in the alternative against it  
24 by Counterclaimants.

25           631. Based on Westland's financial disclosures at the time of the loan assumption,  
26 Grandbridge knew Westland Real Estate Group is a privately held real estate company with a  
27 sizable portfolio of properties, and approximately \$800 million in loans outstanding.

1           632. Each of the loans underlying that are part of that \$800 million loan portfolio is a  
2 written contractual agreement. Upon information and belief, Grandbridge knows these contracts  
3 and lending arrangements exist.

4           633. Further, Grandbridge knew that \$300 million of Westland's loans are outstanding  
5 with Fannie Mae, and that it is economically advantageous for Westland, including  
6 Counterclaimants, to have access to lender funds in order to refinance its properties.

7           634. Grandbridge committed intentional acts intended or designed to disrupt the  
8 contractual loan agreements that Westland, including Counterclaimants, have with Fannie Mae,  
9 and Counterclaimants' ability to refinance those loan agreements with Fannie Mae.

10          635. Grandbridge knew that by manufacturing the purported default, Fannie Mae would  
11 blacklist Westland, including the Counterclaimants, by placing a "lending hold" on any of  
12 Counterclaimants' loan, which would have the effect of limiting, delaying, and/or disrupting  
13 Counterclaimants' ability to refinance a loan with Fannie Mae.

14          636. Grandbridge manufactured the Default in an attempt to put financial pressure on  
15 Counterclaimants, despite that it knew it would cause disruption to Counterclaimants' business  
16 and preclude it from obtaining favorable rates from one of only two primary lenders in the  
17 multifamily housing loan market, and upon information and belief, Grandbridge intended to cause  
18 harm to the contractual relationship between Counterclaimants and Fannie Mae.

19          637. There was, and continues to be, actual disruption of the written loan agreements  
20 that Counterclaimants have with Fannie Mae, as Grandbridge's actions have in fact resulted in  
21 Counterclaimants being placed on Fannie Mae's blacklist, which has caused Counterclaimants  
22 harm.

23          638. As a direct and proximate result of Fannie Mae's breach, Counterclaimants have  
24 suffered damages in excess of \$15,000.00, the exact amount of which will be proven at trial.

25          639. By reason of the foregoing, Grandbridge acted with oppression, fraud and malice,  
26 and therefore, Counterclaimants are entitled to exemplary and punitive damages in excess of  
27 \$15,000.

28

1                    **r. EIGHTEENTH CAUSE OF ACTION (CONVERSION AGAINST**  
2                    **GRANDBRIDGE)**

3            640. Counterclaimants repeat, reallege, and incorporate the allegations set forth in the  
4 preceding paragraphs, including in the Counterclaim above, as if fully set forth herein.

5            641. Westland has submitted several prior reserve reimbursement requests that went  
6 unanswered by Grandbridge, including before its November 2019 demand for additional reserve  
7 funding.

8            642. Westland and its predecessor submitted funds related to two fire insurance claims  
9 to Grandbridge, which earmarked funds were to be held in escrow until the two fire-damaged  
10 building were rebuilt.

11           643. The fire-damaged buildings were completely rebuilt with Westland's funds.

12           644. Westland has submitted reserve disbursement requests for the release of those  
13 funds, and other reserve disbursement requests for work that was completed, each of which was  
14 accompanied by invoices, proof of payment, and documentation showing approval of all required  
15 permits, but Grandbridge has failed to respond to those requests.

16           645. Grandbridge has asserted that it transferred Westland's funds to Fannie Mae after  
17 the December 2019 default was asserted.

18           646. As such, Grandbridge has wrongfully exerted dominion over Westland's personal  
19 property, including, without limitation, the funds that Grandbridge and/or Fannie Mae continued  
20 to hold in reserve accounts, and the funds they were improperly is holding in reserve accounts, that  
21 were earmarked for reconstruction of two fire damaged buildings at the Liberty Property from the  
22 date of disbursement until the fire damaged funds were released in May 2021, several months after  
23 the Court entered an order for those funds to be released in November 2020, and Grandbridge has  
24 thereby wrongly converted the funds to their own use and benefit.

25           647. Grandbridge's continued dominion over Westland's personal property was  
26 unauthorized and inconsistent with Westland's property rights.

27           648. Grandbridge's dominion over Westland's personal property deprived Westland of  
28 all of their property rights relating thereto.

1           649. Grandbridge's acts constitute conversion.

2           650. As a direct and proximate result of Grandbridge's conversion, Westland has  
3 suffered damages in excess of \$15,000.00, the exact amount of which will be proven at trial.

4           651. Further, due to the wanton, malicious, and intentional conduct of Grandbridge,  
5 Westland is entitled to an award of exemplary and punitive damages against Grandbridge.

6           652. Grandbridge knew that by refusing to return the converted proceeds after just  
7 demand, Borrowers would have to hire counsel to have those funds returned. Thus, it was  
8 foreseeable that Borrowers would incur attorney's fees as special damages. Borrowers have  
9 incurred these fees and request same as part of their special damages for conversion.

10                   **s. NINETEENTH CAUSE OF ACTION (INJUNCTIVE RELIEF AGAINST**  
11                   **GRANDBRIDGE)**

12           653. Counterclaimants repeat, reallege, and incorporate the allegations set forth in the  
13 preceding paragraphs, including in the Counterclaim above, as if fully set forth herein.

14           654. On or about July 15, 2020, two NODs that were filed against the Liberty Property  
15 and the Square Property and served on Westland.

16           655. Upon information and belief, in Nevada, the typical period for a foreclosure sale to  
17 occur after a borrower receives a NOD is 120 days.

18           656. As Westland has made all debt service payments, and complied with the terms of  
19 the Loan Agreements, the Properties rightfully belong to Westland.

20           657. Fannie Mae and Grandbridge are attempting to utilize Nevada's non-judicial  
21 foreclosure process to improperly seize and sell Westland's Liberty Property and Square Property.

22           658. Real property is a unique asset, and on that basis, in the event that a wrongful  
23 foreclosure sale occurs, Westland will suffer extreme hardship and actual and impending  
24 irreparable loss and damage.

25           659. Westland has no adequate or speedy remedy at law to prevent the sale of the  
26 Properties, and injunctive relief is therefore Westland's only means for securing relief.

27           660. Westland is likely to succeed in this lawsuit on the merits of its claims.  
28

1           661. Based on the foregoing, Westland is entitled to temporary restraining orders and  
2 preliminary and permanent injunctive relief to preserve the status quo, to mitigate its damages, and  
3 to prevent further irreparable injury to Westland, including, without limitation by: (a) enjoining  
4 Fannie Mae and/or Grandbridge from any further attempts to foreclose on the Properties related to  
5 their baseless requests to adjust the reserve deposits, and (b) enjoining Fannie Mae and/or  
6 Grandbridge from any further attempts to coerce Westland into providing additional reserves or to  
7 pay for the expenses related to the default that Grandbridge manufactured.

8           662. As a further direct and proximate result of Fannie Mae's and/or Grandbridge's  
9 improper demands to adjust reserves, their filing of the NOD, and the filing of their Complaint  
10 seeking appointment of a receiver, Westland has had to hire counsel to prosecute this matter by  
11 reason of which it is entitled to reasonable attorney's fees.

12                   **t. TWENTIETH CAUSE OF ACTION (EQUITABLE RELIEF/RESCISSION/**  
13                   **REFORMATION AGAINST GRANDBRIDGE)**

14           663. Counterclaimants repeat, reallege, and incorporate the allegations set forth in the  
15 preceding paragraphs, including in the Counterclaim above, as if fully set forth herein.

16           664. On or about August 29, 2018, Westland entered into two assumption agreements  
17 for the loans applicable to the Liberty Property and the Square Property.

18           665. Prior to signing the assumption, Grandbridge individually, and on behalf of Fannie  
19 Mae, forwarded Westland a loan assumption agreement letter, which contained the terms under  
20 which it would permit Westland's assumption of the Liberty Loan and Square Loan.

21           666. By letter dated August 20, 2018, Grandbridge represented on behalf of itself and  
22 Fannie Mae to Liberty LLC that, "after a thorough review and analysis of the Proposed Borrower's  
23 [Liberty LLC's] financial and managerial capacity, the Assumption has been approved on the  
24 following terms: . . . No change to the Replacement Reserve monthly deposit or established  
25 schedule identified on Exhibit B attached hereto; No Change to the Required Repair Reserve of  
26 \$39,375.00 as identified in schedule on Exhibit C attached hereto . . ." (Exhibit J.) Further, Exhibit  
27 C, Required Reserve Schedule, listed all items as completed, except for a \$9,375.00 holdback for  
28



1 “Misc. Concrete and Fence Repairs. Sports Court Resurfacing” that was shown as having already  
2 been fully funded. (Exhibit J, at 7.)

3 667. By letter dated August 20, 2018, Grandbridge represented on behalf of itself and  
4 Fannie Mae to Square LLC that, “after a thorough review and analysis of the Proposed Borrower’s  
5 [Square LLC’s] financial and managerial capacity, the Assumption has been approved on the  
6 following terms: . . . No change to the Replacement Reserve monthly deposit or established  
7 schedule identified on Exhibit B attached hereto . . .” (Exhibit K.) Further, Exhibit C, Required  
8 Repair Reserve Schedule, simply stated “N/A” indicating that no repair reserve was required for  
9 that loan. (Exhibit K, at 7.)

10 668. When the loan assumption agreements were signed, the above-referenced Required  
11 Repair Reserve Schedule and Required Replacement Reserve Schedule, for each Property, were  
12 specifically included as part of the assumption agreement.

13 669. The statements made by Grandbridge, on behalf of itself and on behalf of Fannie  
14 Mae, were either false or amounted to a mutual mistake by both parties, because Grandbridge and  
15 Fannie Mae later attempted to obtain additional reserve payments in excess of the schedules that  
16 were provided to Westland, and those requests for additional reserve deposits included requests to  
17 deposit \$2.85 million of funds related to physical conditions that were not of the same type or  
18 category as the expenses included in the schedules.

19 670. In making those statements, Fannie Mae and Grandbridge knew that Westland  
20 would rely upon the amounts and types of conditions requiring reserve deposits when entering into  
21 the Loan Agreements, and intended for Westland to do so, to ensure that the loans would close.

22 671. Westland did rely on the amounts and types of conditions requiring reserve deposits  
23 that were listed in the schedules attached to the loan assumption letters, and as such Westland  
24 justifiably relied upon the information Grandbridge and Fannie Mae provided.

25 672. If Grandbridge or Fannie Mae would have had f3 or another inspection company  
26 perform a PCA as thorough and with the same criteria before the assumption as it did a year later,  
27 and told Westland that an additional reserve deposit would be required, then Westland would have  
28 demanded that the Shamrock Entities met the additional reserve funding requirement prior to

1 agreeing to assume the loan, that the terms of the purchase and/or loan assumption be amended,  
2 and/or other relief from the Shamrock Entities, Fannie Mae and/or Grandbridge, and without such  
3 relief, would not have entered into the two assumption agreements.

4 673. As such, to the extent that a finding is made that the loan agreements would permit  
5 Grandbridge and Fannie Mae to demand additional reserve deposits, then the loan documents  
6 should be reformed consistent with the statements contained in the loan assumption letters and its  
7 attached reserve schedules due to irregularities in assumption process amounting to fraud,  
8 unfairness or oppression, and if not reformed, other appropriate equitable relief to rectify the  
9 inequities and unfairness of this situation, and if not, then rescinded altogether.

10 674. Based on the foregoing, Westland is entitled to reformation, other equitable relief,  
11 or rescission of the loan agreements consistent with Grandbridge's and Fannie Mae's statements  
12 that no additional reserve deposits were required for the loans.

13 675. As a further direct and proximate result of Fannie Mae's and/or Grandbridge's  
14 improper demands to adjust reserves and related actions, Westland has had to hire counsel to  
15 prosecute this matter and obtain reformation of the loan documents by reason of which it is entitled  
16 to reasonable attorney's fees.

17 **u. TWENTY-FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION (FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT –**  
18 **LIBERTY PSA – AGAINST SHAM VI)**

19 676. Counterclaimants repeat, reallege, and incorporate the allegations set forth in the  
20 preceding paragraphs, including in the Counterclaim above, as if fully set forth herein.

21 677. A valid Purchase Agreement was entered into between Liberty LLC and/or  
22 Amusement, on the one hand, and Sham VI on the other hand, on June 22, 2018, for the purchase  
23 of the Property located at 4870 Nellis Oasis Lane, Las Vegas, NV 89115.

24 678. The Purchase Agreement required that Liberty LLC assume Sham VI's loan with  
25 Fannie Mae and Grandbridge, dated November 2, 2017.

26 679. By funding its initial deposit, providing the additional required funds at closing on  
27 August 29, 2018, and assuming the borrower's further obligations on the Sham VI's loan with  
28

1 Fannie Mae and Grandbridge, Liberty LLC performed all of its remaining obligations as a buyer  
2 pursuant to the purchase and sale agreement.

3 680. To the extent that any duties or obligations required of Liberty LLC have not been  
4 performed, such duties or obligations have been excused because of Sham VI's non-performance  
5 of the purchase and sale agreement.

6 681. Sham VI materially breached its agreement with Liberty LLC by failing to perform  
7 its obligations consistent with the terms of the Purchase Agreement, the Loan Agreement, and  
8 Nevada law, including by providing inaccurate/misleading financial disclosures, failing to bring  
9 all vacant units to rent ready condition, failing to remove tenants who did not pay rent, failing to  
10 return vacant units and units remaining in default for months to rent ready condition, failing to  
11 timely commence repairs to fire damaged buildings, and generally violating the terms of the  
12 purchase and sale agreement.

13 682. That as a direct and proximate result of Sham VI's breach of contract, Liberty LLC  
14 has been damaged in an amount in excess of \$15,000.00, the exact amount of which will be  
15 determined at trial.

16 683. That as a direct and proximate result of Sham VI's breach of contract and  
17 requirement that Liberty LLC assume the Loan Agreement and that Counterclaimants assume the  
18 guaranties, which the Sham Defendants were obligated to fulfill, Counterclaimants have been  
19 damaged in an amount in a further amount to be determined at the time of trial and may be liable  
20 to Counterclaimants for all or part of any claim that Fannie Mae has plead against them or any  
21 damages arising from Fannie Mae's related foreclosure proceedings.

22 684. That it has been necessary for Liberty LLC to retain counsel to prosecute this action  
23 by reason of which it is entitled to reasonable attorney's fees, pursuant to the Purchase Agreement.

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1                    **v. TWENTY-SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION (BREACH OF CONTRACT –**  
2                    **SQUARE PSA – AGAINST SHAM VII)**

3                    685. Counterclaimants repeat, reallege, and incorporate the allegations set forth in the  
4 preceding paragraphs, including in the Counterclaim above, as if fully set forth herein.

5                    686. A valid Purchase Agreement was entered into between Amusement and Square  
6 LLC, on the one hand, and Sham VII on the other hand, on June 22, 2018, for the purchase of the  
7 Property located at 5025 Nellis Oasis Lane, Las Vegas, NV 89115.

8                    687. The Purchase Agreement required that Square LLC assume Sham VII's loan with  
9 Fannie Mae and Grandbridge, dated November 2, 2017.

10                  688. By funding its initial deposit, providing the additional required funds at closing on  
11 August 29, 2018, and assuming the borrower's further obligations on the Sham VII's loan with  
12 Fannie Mae and Grandbridge, Square LLC performed all of its remaining obligations as a buyer  
13 pursuant to the purchase and sale agreement.

14                  689. To the extent that any duties or obligations required of Square LLC have not been  
15 performed, such duties or obligations have been excused because of Sham VII's non-performance  
16 of the purchase and sale agreement.

17                  690. Sham VII materially breached its agreement with Square LLC by failing to perform  
18 its obligations consistent with the terms of the Purchase Agreement, the Loan Agreement, and  
19 Nevada law, including by providing inaccurate/misleading financial disclosures, failing to bring  
20 all vacant units to rent ready condition, failing to remove tenants who did not pay rent, failing to  
21 return vacant units and units remaining in default for months to rent ready condition, and generally  
22 violating the terms of the purchase and sale agreement.

23                  691. That as a direct and proximate result of Sham VII's breach of contract, Square LLC  
24 has been damaged in an amount in excess of \$15,000.00, the exact amount of which will be  
25 determined at trial.

26                  692. That as a direct and proximate result of Sham VII's breach of contract and  
27 requirement that Square LLC assume the Loan Agreement and that Counterclaimants assume the  
28 guaranties, which the Sham Defendants were obligated to fulfill, Counterclaimants have been

1 damaged in an amount in a further amount to be determined at the time of trial and may be liable  
2 to Counterclaimants for all or part of any claim that Fannie Mae has plead against them or any  
3 damages arising from Fannie Mae's related foreclosure proceedings.

4 693. That it has been necessary for Square LLC to retain counsel to prosecute this action  
5 by reason of which it is entitled to reasonable attorney's fees pursuant to the Purchase Agreement.

6 **w. TWENTY-THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION (BREACH OF COVENANT OF**  
7 **GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING – AGAINST SHAM VI & SHAM VII)**

8 694. Counterclaimants repeat, reallege, and incorporate the allegations set forth in the  
9 preceding paragraphs, including in the Counterclaim above, as if fully set forth herein.

10 695. A valid and binding agreement was formed between Westland and the Sham  
11 Defendants on each of the two separate Purchase Agreements.

12 696. As a matter of public policy, the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is  
13 a covenant incorporated into every Nevada contract, and as such the Purchase Agreements between  
14 Westland and the Sham VI and Sham VII include an implied covenant of good faith and fair  
15 dealing regardless of any oppressive terms drafted by the Sham Defendants in an attempt to shield  
16 the Sham Defendants from any future claims.

17 697. Sham Defendants breached the duty of good faith and fair dealing by acting in a  
18 manner unfaithful to the purpose of the purchase and sale agreement, including those actions  
19 outlined in this Counterclaim.

20 698. Specifically, Sham Defendants wrongfully and deliberately took advantage of  
21 Westland's good faith actions, by, *inter alia*, failing to perform all conditions, covenants and  
22 promises required under the purchase and sale agreement, including without limitation, failing to  
23 provide complete and accurate financial information, failing to bring all vacant units to rent ready  
24 condition, failing to remove tenants who did not pay rent, failing to return vacant units and units  
25 remaining in default for months to rent ready condition, and by each of these actions the Sham  
26 Defendants thereby breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing inherent in the  
27 subject agreement.

28

1           699. Sham Defendants' actions were taken both on their own behalf, and as owning  
2 members of the corporate entities.

3           700. Wherefore, Sham Defendants did not act in good faith, that is, did not perform its  
4 contract with each Liberty LLC and Village LLC in the manner reasonably contemplated by the  
5 parties, so that both Liberty LLC and Village LLC have a remedy that goes beyond that of breach  
6 of the express terms of their contract.

7           701. Sham Defendants' actions, misrepresentations, deception, concealment, and breach  
8 of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing were done intentionally with malice for the specific  
9 purpose of causing injury to Liberty LLC and Square LLC.

10          702. As a direct and proximate result of Sham Defendants' breach, each  
11 Counterclaimant has suffered damages in excess of \$15,000.00, the exact amount of which will be  
12 proven at trial.

13          703. That as a direct and proximate result of the Sham Defendant's breach of covenant  
14 of good faith and fair dealing and requirement that Counterclaimants assume the Loan Agreements  
15 and guaranties, which the Sham Defendants were obligated to fulfill, Counterclaimants have been  
16 damaged in an amount in a further amount to be determined at the time of trial and may be liable  
17 to Counterclaimants for all or part of any claim that Fannie Mae has plead against them or any  
18 damages arising from Fannie Mae's related foreclosure proceedings.

19          704. As a further direct and proximate result of Sham Defendants' breach, each  
20 Westland entity has had to hire counsel to prosecute this matter by reason of which it is entitled to  
21 reasonable attorney's fees pursuant to the Purchase Agreement.

22                   **x. TWENTY-FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION (BREACH OF EXPRESS AND**  
23                   **IMPLIED WARRANTY AGAINST SHAM VI & SHAM VII)**

24          705. Counterclaimants repeat, reallege, and incorporate the allegations set forth in the  
25 preceding paragraphs, including in the Counterclaim above, as if fully set forth herein.

26          706. A valid and binding agreement was formed between Westland and SHAM VI &  
27 SHAM VII on each of the two separate Purchase Agreements.  
28

1           707. The Purchase Agreement contained express warranty provisions in Section 6.3 of  
2 the Purchase Agreement, warranting that SHAM VI and SHAM VII were qualified to do business  
3 in Nevada; the Sham Defendants had the full power and authority to execute, deliver and perform  
4 their obligations under the Purchase Agreements; the Purchase Agreements were valid and  
5 binding; none of SHAM VI's and SHAM VII's interests were impaired by bankruptcy, trustee  
6 oversight, a creditor assignment; an attachment; "the taking of, failure to take, or submission to  
7 any action indicating an inability to meet its financial obligations as they accrue;" or dissolution,  
8 liquidation or death; the sale was not in furtherance of a fraudulent conveyance or transfer; and the  
9 representations regarding the balances and contents of the loan documents were accurate.

10           708. In addition, Nevada law provides that above-referenced statements regarding the  
11 repairs that Sham Defendants agreed to perform, and the receivables and income the Properties  
12 were generating, constitute express warranties.

13           709. Counterclaimants reasonably relied upon the Sham Defendant's representations  
14 regarding repairs to be performed and the condition of the Properties.

15           710. The Sham Defendants breach that warranty, by failing to perform the repairs that  
16 were promised and by providing financial statements that incorporated misrepresentations or  
17 concealed material information about those financial statements.

18           711. By letter dated February 28, 2019, Counterclaimants provided notice that it was  
19 preserving its right to make such a claim based on such a breach.

20           712. As a direct and proximate result of Sham Defendants' breach, each  
21 Counterclaimant has suffered damages in excess of \$15,000.00, the exact amount of which will be  
22 proven at trial.

23           713. That as a direct and proximate result of the Sham Defendant's breach of express  
24 and implied warranties and requirement that Counterclaimants assume the Loan Agreements and  
25 guaranties, which the Sham Defendants were obligated to fulfill, Counterclaimants have been  
26 damaged in an amount in a further amount to be determined at the time of trial and may be liable  
27 to Counterclaimants for all or part of any claim that Fannie Mae has plead against them or any  
28 damages arising from Fannie Mae's related foreclosure proceedings.

1           714. As a further direct and proximate result of Sham Defendants' breach, each  
2 Westland entity has had to hire counsel to prosecute this matter by reason of which it is entitled to  
3 reasonable attorney's fees pursuant to the Purchase Agreement.

4                   **y. TWENTY-FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION (FRAUD & CONCEALMENT**  
5                   **AGAINST SHAM DEFENDANTS)**

6           715. Counterclaimants repeat, reallege, and incorporate the allegations set forth in the  
7 preceding paragraphs, including in the Counterclaim above, as if fully set forth herein.

8           716. As addressed above, the Sham Defendants misrepresented the value of the Property  
9 to Counterclaimants, by providing false information and/or concealing material information  
10 regarding the income generated, occupancy rates, aged receivables, and rent delinquency balances  
11 at the Properties.

12           717. Specifically, the Sham Defendants repeatedly made several misrepresentations,  
13 including but not limited to:

14           a. Within the December 2014 press releases that remaining accessible at least through  
15 the closing date of the transaction;

16           b. By providing false financial information to the Sham Defendant's brokers related  
17 to the financial information provided on April 11, 2018, with the intent that it be repeated to  
18 Counterclaimants, and which information was provided to Counterclaimants electronically on  
19 April 11, 2018;

20           c. By providing false financial information to broker Mongkolsakulkit on June 26,  
21 2018, with the intent that it be repeated to Counterclaimants, which information was provided to  
22 Counterclaimants electronically on June 26, 2018; and

23           d. By providing false financial information to brokers Carll & Mongkolsakulkit on  
24 July 4, 2018, with the intent that it be repeated to Counterclaimants, which information was  
25 provided to Counterclaimants electronically on July 5, 2018.

26           718. Each of the documents referenced in the foregoing paragraph either contained false  
27 information or concealed material facts, which overstated income, minimized delinquency  
28 balances or failed to convey the true occupancy rates at the Properties.



1           719. From the Sham Defendants prior experiences with Westland and Amusement  
2 during the failed transaction in 2017, the Sham Defendants knew and intended that Westland and  
3 Amusement would find the information material and would rely on that information.

4           720. Weinstein's reassurances, on behalf of herself and the other Sham Defendants, to  
5 Counterclaimants' residential asset manager on August 28 and to Counterclaimants' counsel on  
6 August 29, 2018, regarding shredding and the status of keys were knowingly false.

7           721. Based on that false financial information, Westland and Amusement entered into  
8 the Purchase Agreements.

9           722. Westland and Amusement relied on the Sham Defendants misrepresentations  
10 regarding the income generated, occupancy rates, and rent deficiency balances when entering into  
11 the Purchase Agreements in June 2018, assuming the Loan Agreements in August 2018, and  
12 closing the purchase transaction in August 2018.

13           723. Westland and Amusement reasonably relied upon the false information provided,  
14 because the Sham Defendants limited Counterclaimants from obtaining such information from  
15 other sources via the Purchase Agreement, the Sham Defendants provided that Counterclaimants  
16 were not permitted to contact their employees, there was no outside source of obtaining that  
17 information after the Sham Defendants began self-managing the properties over two years prior to  
18 Counterclaimants' purchase of the Properties, and the Sham Defendants failed to produce full  
19 electronic records until after the purchase was completed. Further, Westland reasonably relied  
20 upon the financial information provided, because Westland has entered into numerous purchase  
21 agreements previously, and for those purchase agreements the seller's financials were accurate.

22           724. Had Westland and Amusement known that the Sham Defendants had  
23 misrepresented the financial information, or that they had no intention of making the repairs agreed  
24 to in the Purchase Agreements, or that they had concealed material adverse information, Westland  
25 would have required a multimillion discount on the Purchase Agreements.

26           725. As a result of the Sham Defendants' misrepresentations, Westland and Amusement  
27 were induced to enter into the Purchase Agreement and to assume the Loan Agreements with  
28 Fannie Mae/Grandbridge, which has damaged Counterclaimants.

1           726. As a direct and proximate result of the Sham Defendants' misstatements and  
2 omissions, Counterclaimants have suffered damages in excess of \$15,000.00, the exact amount of  
3 which will be proven at trial.

4           727. That as a direct and proximate result of the Sham Defendant's fraud and  
5 concealment and requirement that Counterclaimants assume the Loan Agreements and guaranties,  
6 which the Sham Defendants were obligated to fulfill, Counterclaimants have been damaged in an  
7 amount in a further amount to be determined at the time of trial and may be liable to  
8 Counterclaimants for all or part of any claim that Fannie Mae has plead against them or any  
9 damages arising from Fannie Mae's related foreclosure proceedings.

10          728. By reason of the foregoing, the Sham Defendants acted with oppression, fraud and  
11 malice, and therefore, Westland and Amusement are entitled to exemplary and punitive damages;

12          729. By reason of the foregoing, the Sham Defendants knew that their actions would  
13 cause Counterclaimants to be sued by Lenders due to the requirement that the loan be assumed  
14 and as a result of their false financial statements, misrepresentations, and concealments, and  
15 therefore each Westland entity has had to hire counsel to prosecute this matter by reason of which  
16 it is entitled to reasonable attorney's fees as special damages.

17                   **z. TWENTY-SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION (NEGLIGENT**  
18                   **MISREPRESENTATION AGAINST SHAM DEFENDANTS)**

19          730. Counterclaimants repeat, reallege, and incorporate the allegations set forth in the  
20 preceding paragraphs, including in the Counterclaim above, as if fully set forth herein.

21          731. The Sham Defendants supplied information and made material misrepresentations  
22 to Westland and Amusement, including without limitation, as detailed above that overstated  
23 income generated, overstated occupancy rates, understated aged receivables, and understated rent  
24 delinquency balances at the Properties.

25          732. Specifically, the Sham Defendants repeatedly made several misrepresentations,  
26 including but not limited to:

27           a. Within the December 2014 press releases that remained accessible at least through  
28 the closing date of the transaction;

1           b.       By providing false financial information to the Sham Defendant's brokers related  
2 to the financial information provided on April 11, 2018, with the intent that it be repeated to  
3 Counterclaimants, and which information was provided to Counterclaimants electronically on  
4 April 11, 2018;

5           c.       By providing false financial information to broker Mongkolsakulkit on June 26,  
6 2018, with the intent that it be repeated to Counterclaimants, which information was provided to  
7 Counterclaimants electronically on June 26, 2018; and

8           d.       By providing false financial information to brokers Carll & Mongkolsakulkit on  
9 July 4, 2018, with the intent that it be repeated to Counterclaimants, which information was  
10 provided to Counterclaimants electronically on July 5, 2018.

11           733.    Each of the documents referenced in the foregoing paragraph either contained false  
12 information or concealed material facts, which overstated income, minimized delinquency  
13 balances or failed to convey the true occupancy rates at the Properties.

14           734.    Weinstein's reassurances, on behalf of herself and the other Sham Defendants, to  
15 Counterclaimants' residential asset manager on August 28 and to Counterclaimants' counsel on  
16 August 29, 2018, regarding shredding were false, and to the extent that Weinstein did not know  
17 that the representation was false, she negligently made reassurances regarding shredding and the  
18 status of keys at the Properties.

19           735.    Upon information and belief, the Sham Defendants negligently misrepresented the  
20 financial information, because when the electronic information was provided days after closing,  
21 the inaccurate and false financial information regarding the Properties was discovered.

22           736.    The information and representations made by the Sham Defendants was false, in  
23 that unbeknownst to Westland and Amusement the Sham Defendants knew the Properties had a  
24 lower rate of occupancy and that numerous tenants had not been evicted.

25           737.    The Sham Defendants supplied the information and made the representations to  
26 induce Westland and Amusement to rely upon it, to act or refrain from acting in reliance upon it,  
27 and to have Westland and Amusement enter into the Purchase Agreement and assume the Loan  
28 Agreements.

1           738. The Sham Defendants owed Westland and Amusement a duty not to make material  
2 misrepresentations.

3           739. Westland and Amusement justifiably relied upon the information the Sham  
4 Defendants provided.

5           740. As a direct and proximate result of the Sham Defendants' misstatements and  
6 omissions, Westland and Amusement have suffered damages in excess of \$15,000.00, the exact  
7 amount of which will be proven at trial.

8           741. That as a direct and proximate result of the Sham Defendant's negligent  
9 misrepresentations and requirement that Counterclaimants assume the Loan Agreements and  
10 guaranties, which the Sham Defendants were obligated to fulfill, Counterclaimants have been  
11 damaged in an amount in a further amount to be determined at the time of trial and may be liable  
12 to Counterclaimants for all or part of any claim that Fannie Mae has plead against them or any  
13 damages arising from Fannie Mae's related foreclosure proceedings.

14           742. By reason of the foregoing, the Sham Defendants knew that their actions would  
15 cause Counterclaimants to be sued by Lenders due to the requirement that the loan be assumed  
16 and as a result of their false financial statements and negligent misrepresentations, and therefore  
17 each Westland entity has had to hire counsel to prosecute this matter by reason of which it is  
18 entitled to reasonable attorney's fees as special damages.

19           **aa. TWENTY-SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION (NEGLIGENT HIRING AND**  
20           **NEGLIGENT SUPERVISION AGAINST SHAM DEFENDANTS)**

21           743. Counterclaimants repeat, reallege, and incorporate the allegations set forth in the  
22 preceding paragraphs, including in the Counterclaim above, as if fully set forth herein.

23           744. In addition to their direct liability, Sham Defendants, and each of them, known and  
24 unknown, were and are vicariously liable for the acts and omissions of any staff, agents, apparent  
25 agents, servants, contractors, employees or such other persons or entities, consultants, independent  
26 contractors whether in house or outside, entities, individuals, agencies or pools which in any  
27 manner caused or contributed to Counterclaimants' irreparable harm and damage.  
28

1           745. At all times relevant herein, Sham Defendants, through their agents, servants and/or  
2 employees thereof, were acting within the scope of employment with the knowledge, permission  
3 and consent of their employer(s) and/or manager(s). Therefore, employer(s) are responsible and  
4 liable for all of its employee's negligent conduct set forth herein under the theory of respondeat  
5 superior.

6           746. Upon information and belief, Sham Defendants employed onsite personnel and  
7 corporate staff in remote offices, management and other supervisory personnel for the purpose of  
8 supervising employees, and managing said properties, consistent with industry standards for onsite  
9 property management of all books and records.

10          747. At all times material, the Sham Defendants were in control of, and responsible for  
11 training, hiring, and/or screening employees working on the premises and in its corporate offices,  
12 in a way designed to protect potential buyers, such as Counterclaimants from harm.

13          748. Sham Defendants, and each of them, known and unknown, breached their duty to  
14 Counterclaimants in one or more of the following respects, but not limited to:

- 15           a. Failing to adequately supervise employees, agents, contractors and/or subsidiaries.
- 16           b. Failing to adequately train employees, agents, contractors and/or subsidiaries.
- 17           c. Failing to adequately screen potential employees, agents, contractors and/or  
18 subsidiaries before their hiring/contracting.
- 19           d. Failing to follow industry accepted standards for recordkeeping and reporting  
20 financial information.

21          749. Sham Defendants breach of these duties directly and proximately caused  
22 Counterclaimants' injuries.

23          750. At all times relevant herein, DOE Defendants, though their agents, servants and/or  
24 employees thereof, were acting within the scope of employment with the knowledge, permission  
25 and consent of their employer(s) and/or contractors. Therefore, employer(s) are responsible and  
26 liable for all of their agent's negligent conduct set forth herein under the theory of respondeat  
27 superior.

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1           751. Counterclaimants have suffered injury and damages in an amount in excess of  
2 \$15,000.00 subject to proof at trial.

3           752. That as a direct and proximate result of the Sham Defendant's negligent hiring and  
4 negligent supervision and requirement that Counterclaimants assume the Loan Agreements and  
5 guaranties, which the Sham Defendants were obligated to fulfill, Counterclaimants have been  
6 damaged in an amount in a further amount to be determined at the time of trial and may be liable  
7 to Counterclaimants for all or part of any claim that Fannie Mae has plead against them or any  
8 damages arising from Fannie Mae's related foreclosure proceedings.

9                   **bb. TWENTY-EIGHTH CAUSE OF ACTION (INTENTIONAL**  
10                   **INTERFERENCE WITH CONTRACT AGAINST SHAM DEFENDANTS)**

11           753. Counterclaimants repeat, reallege, and incorporate the allegations set forth in the  
12 preceding paragraphs, including in the Counterclaim above, as if fully set forth herein.

13           754. Based on Counterclaimants' disclosures prior to closing of the Purchase  
14 Agreements, the Sham Defendants knew Westland Real Estate Group is a privately held real estate  
15 company with a sizable portfolio of properties, and approximately \$800 million in loans  
16 outstanding.

17           755. Each of the loans that are part of that \$800 million loan portfolio is a written  
18 contractual agreement. Upon information and belief, the Sham Defendants knew those contracts  
19 and lending arrangements existed.

20           756. Further, the Sham Defendants knew that \$300 million of Counterclaimants' loans  
21 are outstanding with Fannie Mae, and that it is economically advantageous for Counterclaimants  
22 to have access to lender funds in order to refinance its properties.

23           757. The Sham Defendants committed intentional acts that it knew would actually or  
24 that were intended or designed to result in a default on the loan assumed, which in turn would  
25 disrupt the contractual loan agreements that Counterclaimants have with Fannie Mae, and  
26 Counterclaimants' ability to refinance those loan agreements with Fannie Mae.

27           758. The Sham Defendants knew that by taking actions that were likely to lead to  
28 Lenders claiming a purported default had occurred, Fannie Mae would blacklist Counterclaimants

1 by placing a “lending hold” on any future loan or borrow up, which would have the effect of  
2 limiting, delaying, and/or disrupting Counterclaimants’ ability to refinance or obtain any new loan  
3 with Fannie Mae.

4 759. The Sham Defendants made the misrepresentations to Counterclaimants knowing  
5 it would likely lead Lenders to declare a default, despite that it knew it would cause disruption to  
6 Westland’s business and preclude it from obtaining favorable rates from one of only two primary  
7 lenders in the multifamily housing loan market, and upon information and belief, the Sham  
8 Defendants intended to cause harm to the contractual relationship between Counterclaimants and  
9 Fannie Mae.

10 760. There was, and continues to be, actual disruption of the written loan agreements  
11 that Counterclaimants have with Fannie Mae, as the Sham Defendant’s actions have in fact resulted  
12 in Counterclaimants being placed on Fannie Mae’s blacklist, which has caused them harm.

13 761. As a direct and proximate result of the Sham Defendants’ actions, Westland has  
14 suffered damages in excess of \$15,000.00, the exact amount of which will be proven at trial.

15 762. By reason of the foregoing, the Sham Defendants acted with oppression, fraud and  
16 malice, and therefore, Counterclaimants are entitled to exemplary and punitive damages in excess  
17 of \$15,000.

18 763. That as a direct and proximate result of the Sham Defendant’s intentional  
19 interference with contracts and requirement that Counterclaimants assume the Loan Agreements  
20 and guaranties, which the Sham Defendants were obligated to fulfill, Counterclaimants have been  
21 damaged in an amount in a further amount to be determined at the time of trial and may be liable  
22 to Counterclaimants for all or part of any claim that Fannie Mae has plead against them or any  
23 damages arising from Fannie Mae’s related foreclosure proceedings.

24 764. By reason of the foregoing, the Sham Defendants knew that their actions would  
25 cause Counterclaimants to be sued by Lenders due to the requirement that the loan be assumed  
26 and as a result of their false financial statements, misrepresentations, and concealments, and  
27 therefore each Westland entity has had to hire counsel to prosecute this matter by reason of which  
28 it is entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees as special damages.

1                   **cc. TWENTY-NINTH CAUSE OF ACTION (CIVIL CONSPIRACY AGAINST**  
2                   **GRANDBRIDGE & SHAM DEFENDANTS)**

3           765. Counterclaimants repeat, reallege, and incorporate the allegations set forth in the  
4 preceding paragraphs, including in the Counterclaim above, as if fully set forth herein.

5           766. The Sham Defendants, by acting in concert, intended to accomplish the unlawful  
6 objectives as set forth herein including, but not limited to breaching Westland's duty of good faith  
7 and fair dealing, misrepresenting or concealing the true financial information related to the  
8 Properties to Counterclaimants and/or Lenders, and improperly using relationships with DOE  
9 Defendant and/or ROE Defendants at Pillar/SunTrust/Grandbridge to improperly obtain, pass  
10 though credit underwriting, and obtain a release via the Assumption Agreement from the Loan  
11 Agreements in an attempt to strip Westland of their substantive legal rights and remedies under  
12 these documents including, but not limited to, those claims asserted herein against the Sham  
13 Defendants, for breach of the Purchase Agreements.

14           767. Grandbridge, by acting in concert, intended to accomplish the unlawful objectives  
15 as set forth herein including, but not limited to breaching Westland's duty of good faith and fair  
16 dealing, misrepresenting or concealing the true terms of the Repair Reserve and Replacement  
17 Reserve portions of the Loan Agreements, and improperly using relationships with the Sham  
18 Defendants, DOE Defendants and/or ROE Defendants, as well as at Fannie Mae, to improperly  
19 document and underwrite the Loan Agreements, reduce their own credit risk, and attempt to strip  
20 Westland of their substantive legal rights and remedies under the Loan Agreements including, but  
21 not limited to, those claims asserted herein against Grandbridge, for breach of the Loan  
22 Agreements.

23           768. As a direct and proximate result of the Sham Defendant's actions, Counterclaimants  
24 have sustained damages in excess of \$15,000.00, the exact amount of which will be proven at trial.

25           769. By reason of the foregoing, the Sham Defendants and Grandbridge knew that their  
26 actions would cause Counterclaimants to be sued by Fannie Mae due to the Sham Defendant's  
27 requirement that the loan be assumed and as a result of their false statements, misrepresentations,  
28



1 and concealments, and therefore each Westland entity has had to hire counsel to prosecute this  
2 matter by reason of which it is entitled to reasonable attorney's fees as special damages.

3 **dd. THIRTIETH CAUSE OF ACTION (UNJUST ENRICHMENT AGAINST**  
4 **THE SHAM DEFENDANTS)**

5 770. Counterclaimants repeat, reallege, and incorporate the allegations set forth in the  
6 preceding paragraphs, including in the Counterclaim above, as if fully set forth herein.

7 771. On or about August 29, 2018, Westland entered into two Purchase Agreements  
8 applicable to the Liberty Property and the Square Property.

9 772. The Sham Defendants received the benefits of Counterclaimants' full performance  
10 of the Purchase Agreements, including but not limited to the payment of \$60,300,000 for the two  
11 Properties through the payment of cash and the assumption of loans the Sham Defendants were  
12 obligated to satisfy.

13 773. The Sham Defendants accepted and retained the funds paid by Counterclaimants  
14 pursuant to the Purchase Agreements.

15 774. The Sham Defendants failed to provide Properties in the condition represented at  
16 the time of closing, because the Properties had a higher delinquency rate, lower occupancy rate,  
17 and generated lower income than represented.

18 775. The Sham Defendants failed to provide Properties in the condition represented at  
19 the time of closing, because the Sham Defendants failed to maintain the Properties consistent with  
20 the exceptions to the "as-is" disclaimer for the Properties in that the Sham Defendants improperly  
21 failed to maintain vacant units in rent ready condition or preform repairs that were other than  
22 ordinary wear and tear.

23 776. The statements made by the Sham Defendants, regarding the quality of its tenants,  
24 income that was being generated by the Properties, and the number of repairs they would perform  
25 prior to closing were either false or amounted to a mutual mistake by both parties.

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1           777. Counterclaimants were later required to make those repairs, engage in a larger  
2 number of evictions, and correct the deficiencies at the Properties at the expense of  
3 Counterclaimants, when the Purchase Agreements contemplated that the Sham Defendants would  
4 bear such costs.

5           778. In making those statements, especially after the terminated transaction in 2017, the  
6 Sham Defendants knew that Westland would rely upon the quality of the tenant base and condition  
7 of the Properties when entering into the Purchase Agreements, and intended for Westland to do  
8 so, to ensure that the Property purchases would be completed with a higher than justified purchase  
9 price, which unjustly enriched the Sham Defendants.

10           779. Westland did rely on the quality of the tenant base and condition of the Properties  
11 when entering into the Purchase Agreements to their detriment and Westland justifiably relied  
12 upon the information the Sham Defendants provided.

13           780. If the Sham Defendants would have disclosed the true financial condition of the  
14 Properties, the true quality of the tenant base, and accurately represented the repairs it would  
15 perform then Westland would have demanded that the Sham Defendants further reduce the  
16 purchase price of the Properties, and/or other relief from the Sham Defendants, and without such  
17 relief, would not have entered into the two Purchase Agreements.

18           781. Based on the foregoing, Westland is entitled to reimbursement in the amount of the  
19 overstated purchase price that was paid.

20           782. That as a direct and proximate result of the Sham Defendant's actions underlying  
21 their unjust enrichment and requirement that Counterclaimants assume the Loan Agreements and  
22 guaranties, which the Sham Defendants were obligated to fulfill, Counterclaimants have been  
23 damaged in an amount in a further amount to be determined at the time of trial and may be liable  
24 to Counterclaimants for all or part of any claim that Fannie Mae has plead against them or any  
25 damages arising from Fannie Mae's related foreclosure proceedings.

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1           783. As a further direct and proximate result of the Sham Defendant's improper conduct,  
2 Westland has had to hire counsel to prosecute this action and Counterclaimants are entitled to  
3 reasonable attorney's fees and costs incurred herein.

4           **WHEREFORE**, Counterclaimants pray for judgment against Counterdefendants, as  
5 follows:

6           1. For declaratory relief acknowledging that no default has occurred and that  
7 Counterdefendants Fannie Mae and Grandbridge improperly sought a property condition  
8 assessment (as to Counterdefendants Fannie Mae and Grandbridge only);2. For injunctive  
9 relief, including without limitation, precluding any non-judicial foreclosure against either the  
10 Liberty Property or the Square Property(as to Counterdefendants Fannie Mae and Grandbridge  
11 only);

12           3. For equitable relief as demanded herein;

13           4. For compensatory damages and/or general damages in excess of \$15,000;

14           5. For punitive damages;

15           6. For prejudgment interest at the statutory rate;

16           7. For attorney's fees and costs of suit herein including as special damages for  
17 conversion with those special damages as to Fannie Mae and Grandbridge, and as to the Sham  
18 Defendants based on their knowledge that their actions would cause Counterclaimants to be sued  
19 by Lenders; and

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1           8.       For such other relief as the Court deems appropriate.

2       Dated: August 26, 2021.

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21                             *Inc., Westland Corona LLC, Westland Amber Ridge*  
22                             *LLC, Westland Hacienda Hills LLC, 1097 North*  
23                             *State, LLC, Westland Tropicana Royale LLC,*  
24                             *Vellagio Apts of Westland LLC, The Alevy Family*  
25                             *Protection Trust, Westland AMT, LLC, AFT Industry*  
26                             *NV, LLC, A&D Dynasty Trust*  
27  
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**DISTRICT COURT  
CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA**

FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE  
ASSOCIATION,

Plaintiff,

vs.

WESTLAND LIBERTY VILLAGE, LLC, and  
WESTLAND VILLAGE SQUARE, LLC,

Defendants.

AND ALL RELATED ACTIONS.

Case No. A-20-819412-B

Dept No. XIII

**HEARING REQUESTED**

**PLAINTIFF AND FHFA'S MOTION TO  
DISMISS IN PART DEFENDANTS'  
FIRST AMENDED ANSWER AND  
AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM**

Plaintiff Federal National Mortgage Association ("Fannie Mae") and Intervenor Federal Housing Finance Agency ("FHFA", and collectively, "Movants") file this Motion to Dismiss In Part Defendants' First Amended Answer and Amended Counterclaim ("the Motion"). This Motion is made and based on the Memorandum of Points and Authorities set forth herein, the attached exhibits, all papers and pleadings already on file with the Court, and any oral argument that the

1 Court may entertain at the time of hearing.<sup>1</sup>

## 2 MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

### 3 I. INTRODUCTION

4 Fannie Mae filed this action seeking the appointment of a receiver after experienced  
5 commercial borrowers Westland Liberty Village, LLC and Westland Village Square, LLC  
6 (together, “Westland” or “Original Defendants”) defaulted on their loans. The loans required the  
7 Original Defendants to submit repair reserves of almost \$2.8 million necessary to repair and restore  
8 two apartment complexes located in Las Vegas, Nevada, which provide housing for more than a  
9 thousand residents (the “Properties”). These significant property condition problems, including  
10 damaged sidewalks and stair landings, missing smoke and carbon monoxide detectors, and mold—  
11 and Original Defendants’ refusal to fund the reserve—not only jeopardized Fannie Mae’s interest  
12 in some \$40,000,000 in combined loans secured by the Properties, but also undermined Fannie  
13 Mae’s mission to facilitate access to quality, affordable rental housing across the United States.  
14 Moreover, the Original Defendants’ actions constituted defaults on the Loan Documents. Fannie  
15 Mae thus initiated non-judicial foreclosure proceedings and sought the appointment of an  
16 experienced receiver to ensure proper repair and management of the Properties. In response,  
17 Westland opposed the appointment of a receiver, sought an injunction, and went so far as to  
18 counterclaim, asserting numerous contractual and tort claims and claiming that they were owed  
19 some hundreds of millions of dollars in supposed damages based on what it contended were  
20 “wrongful” defaults.

21 In August 2021, more than one year into this litigation, Westland filed a First Amended  
22 Answer and Counterclaim (the “Amended Counterclaim”),<sup>2</sup> vastly expanding the scope of the  
23 litigation. It adds more than *twenty* new parties, including *eleven* Westland-affiliated entities,<sup>3</sup> as

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24 <sup>1</sup> Movants will timely file answers to the Amended Counterclaim following resolution of this  
25 Motion pursuant to NRCP 12(a)(3).

26 <sup>2</sup> This Motion focuses on issues newly added by the Amended Counterclaim, or that were not  
27 previously addressed in Fannie Mae’s prior motion to dismiss Westland’s counterclaims or FHFA’s  
28 prior pleadings. Movants reserve all rights to raise all other applicable arguments and defenses not  
specifically referenced in this motion.

<sup>3</sup> The new counter-claimant entities fall into two groups: (1) Amusement Industry, Inc.,  
Westland Corona LLC, Westland Amber Ridge LLC, Westland Hacienda Hills LLC, 1097 North

well as new claims against Grandbridge Real Estate Capital LLC, and against the Original Defendants’ predecessors-in-interest and their principals, the Shamrock parties. In particular, the Amended Counterclaim adds new entities purporting to sue Fannie Mae for breach of the Loan Documents, despite the fact that they are not parties to the Loan Documents, and added new claims arising from an entirely different contract – the Master Credit Facility Agreement (“MCFA”) – that has no relationship to Westland’s default concerning the two rental Properties at issue in this litigation. The MCFA is a line of credit under which six of the seven new Credit Facility Entities claim they were entitled to an advance of more than \$27,000,000, which they allege Fannie Mae wrongfully refused to extend. According to the counterclaimants, Fannie Mae’s declining to extend this “Borrow Up Advance” under the MCFA forced the Securities Entities to satisfy margin calls on their high-risk margin trade business by liquidating other assets to pay these debts. However, the MCFA claims do not state a claim because they have been brought in the wrong forum, are speculative, and, at best, claim consequential damages that have been waived.

In contrast to the newly-added counterclaimants’ focus on leveraged securities trading, Fannie Mae’s primary mission, as declared through statute and through regulation,<sup>4</sup> is “to facilitate equitable and sustainable access to homeownership and quality affordable rental housing across America.”<sup>5</sup> Among other things, Fannie Mae expands access to “multifamily housing for millions of people across the U.S.” and ensures “affordable and workforce rental housing is available in all markets. . . .”<sup>6</sup> Fannie Mae’s multifamily lending is focused on helping to provide “safe, quality rental housing across the United States.”<sup>7</sup> The fulfillment of this mission requires Fannie Mae’s

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State, LLC, Westland Tropicana Royale LLC, and Vellagio Apts of Westland LLC (collectively the “**Credit Facility Entities**”); and (2) The Alevy Family Protection Trust, Westland AMT, LLC, AFT Industry NV, LLC, and A&D Dynasty Trust (collectively, with Amusement, Alevy Trust, Westland AMT, and AFT Industry, the “**Securities Entities**”).

<sup>4</sup> <https://multifamily.fanniemae.com/media/5906/display>; *see also* 12 U.S.C. §§ 4563, 4565; 12 CFR §§ 1282.31-41; <https://multifamily.fanniemae.com/about-multifamily/our-work> (focus is on providing “quality, sustainable, and affordable rental housing”)

<sup>5</sup> <https://www.fanniemae.com/about-us/who-we-are>.

<sup>6</sup> *Id.* (“More than 90 percent of the apartments [Fannie Mae] finance[s] are ‘workforce housing’, and are affordable to . . . the teachers, first responders, and service workers who are an essential part of their communities.”) <https://multifamily.fanniemae.com/>

<sup>7</sup> <https://multifamily.fanniemae.com/>.



1 borrowers to be accountable for ensuring that the multifamily properties they operate are  
2 maintained in a condition consistent with Fannie Mae's mission. As such, Fannie Mae's  
3 multifamily borrowers are contractually obligated to maintain the properties, permit Fannie Mae  
4 access to monitor property condition, and fund repair accounts to ensure that needed repairs can be  
5 completed and will be adequately funded – all of which the Original Defendants failed to do.<sup>8</sup>

6 Movants seek dismissal of several of the newly-added counterclaims, which are not  
7 cognizable or are otherwise infirm as a matter of law and must be dismissed. First, the Credit  
8 Facility Entities and Securities Entities are not parties to the Loan Documents on which several of  
9 Westland's contract claims are premised. The Loan Documents expressly bar third-party  
10 beneficiaries. Therefore, the newly added Credit Facility Entities and Securities Entities  
11 counterclaimants lack standing to assert claims under those agreements. Likewise, the Original  
12 Defendants, Credit Facility Entities and Securities Entities collectively assert a new contract claim  
13 based on the MCFA, which also precludes third-party beneficiaries. Because only the Credit  
14 Facility Entities are parties to that agreement, this new claim must be dismissed as to the Securities  
15 Entities and the Original Defendants.

16 Second, regardless of which entity may have standing to assert claims under the MCFA,  
17 those claims can only be heard by the courts of the District of Columbia pursuant to that contract's  
18 *mandatory* forum-selection clause. The MCFA-based claims must therefore be dismissed in their  
19 entirety.

20 Third, because Fannie Mae is under FHFA's conservatorship, the federal "penalty bar," 12  
21 U.S.C. § 4617(j)(4), prohibits the assessment of penalties or fines against FHFA and Fannie Mae.  
22 Thus, Westland's request for punitive damages and attorney's fees must be dismissed or stricken.

23 Finally, any assertion by Westland that it is entitled to consequential damages must be  
24 dismissed. Whether the theory is asserted under the Loan Documents or the MCFA, Westland has  
25 expressly waived indirect and consequential damages.

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26 <sup>8</sup> Fannie Mae has been under FHFA conservatorship since 2008. Fannie Mae continues to  
27 fulfill its statutory mission of promoting liquidity and efficiency in the nation's housing finance  
28 markets, which includes the purchase of multifamily mortgage loans that finance affordable rental  
housing for the workforce population, for senior citizens, for students, and for families with the  
greatest economic need.

## II. BACKGROUND<sup>9</sup>

### A. The Original Loans and the Default on the Loans.

In November 2017, Westland Village Square’s predecessor-in-interest (Shamrock Properties VII LLC) and Fannie Mae’s predecessor-in-interest (SunTrust) entered into the “Village Square Loan Agreement” setting forth the terms of a mortgage loan of \$9,366,000. Amended Counterclaim ¶ 100. The loan also included the “Village Square Note” in that amount, together with interest and the “Village Square Deed of Trust” to secure repayment. *Id.* The Village Square Deed of Trust encumbers the “Village Square Property,” which includes an apartment complex known as the “Village Square Apartments.” *See id.* ¶ 33.

On the same date, Westland Liberty Village’s predecessor-in-interest (Shamrock Properties VI LLC) and Fannie Mae’s predecessor-in-interest (again SunTrust) executed the “Liberty Village Loan Agreement” for a mortgage loan of \$29,000,000. *Id.* ¶¶ 99–100. The loan also included the “Liberty Village Note” in that amount, together with interest, and the “Liberty Village Deed of Trust” to secure repayment. *Id.* ¶ 100. The Liberty Village Deed of Trust encumbers the “Liberty Village Property,” which includes an apartment complex known as the “Liberty Village Apartments.” *Id.* ¶ 30.

Both Loans were sold to Fannie Mae, and the Original Defendants subsequently assumed the obligations under the Village Square and Liberty Village Loan Documents. *See id.* ¶ 122. Accordingly, these two Westland entities are, in addition to Fannie Mae, the only parties to those contracts, which are collectively referred to throughout as the Loan Documents.

Following a July 2019 inspection and September 2019 property condition assessments of the Properties, which revealed over \$2.8 million dollars in needed repairs, the Original Defendants were required by the Loan Documents, after Fannie Mae’s request, to not only make the documented repairs but also deposit additional funds into the contractually mandated reserve and escrow accounts used to secure such repairs. *Id.* ¶¶ 3, 217, 235–37. After Westland undisputedly

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<sup>9</sup> Movants accept the factual allegations in the Amended Counterclaim as true and construed in favor of the Original Defendants, Credit Facility Entities and Securities Entities solely for purposes of this Motion, and expressly reserve all arguments and defenses to the Amended Counterclaim and any allegations therein.

1 failed to fund those reserve and escrow accounts, Fannie Mae, in December 2019, issued a Notice  
2 of Default. *Id.* ¶¶ 1, 241-47.

### 3 **B. The MCFA and the Securities Entities Margin Call**

4 On March 15, 2019, six of the Credit Facility Entities (not including Amusement Industry,  
5 Inc.) – which do *not* include the Original Defendants – entered into the MCFA, as borrowers, with  
6 Wells Fargo Bank, NA, as lender, to secure ongoing funding. *Id.* ¶ 282. The counterclaimants  
7 allege that the MCFA allowed the Credit Facility Entities to receive funds from the credit facility,  
8 including an initial advance of nearly \$100,000,000. *Id.* ¶¶ 283, 285–86. The counterclaimants  
9 further allege that a certain type of funding under the MCFA – based on the appreciated value of a  
10 mortgaged property already addressed in that agreement – was non-discretionary, meaning that  
11 Fannie Mae was *obligated* to fund such loans. *Id.* ¶¶ 291, 296. The counterclaimants claim that  
12 the Credit Facility Entities requested such a non-discretionary advance in November 2019, but that  
13 Fannie Mae, the following month, refused to fund the loan based on the Notice of Default that it  
14 had issued with respect to the Original Defendants’ default during that same period. *Id.* ¶ 296.

15 The Securities Entities, who are not parties to the MCFA, each claim to own significant  
16 portfolios of financial securities, many of which, in March 2020, were held on margin. *Id.* ¶ 270.  
17 During the market fluctuation in March 2020, due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the Securities  
18 Entities allege that they had more than \$27,000,000 of margin calls, which they covered by  
19 liquidating financial securities. *Id.* ¶ 271-72. The Securities Entities claim that the value of the  
20 securities liquidated have increased after the liquidation. *Id.* ¶ 274. They further allege that the  
21 inability of the Credit Facility Entities to borrow additional funds under the MCFA, and repay  
22 purported loans from the Securities Entities, is what required the Securities Entities to liquidate the  
23 securities to cover the margin calls. *Id.* ¶¶ 278, 302.

### 24 **C. Receivership Litigation and Westland’s Counterclaims**

25 Following the lifting of the Governor’s COVID-19 moratorium on non-judicial  
26 foreclosures, Fannie Mae, in July and August of 2020, initiated non-judicial foreclosure  
27 proceedings and filed this action against the Original Defendants. *Id.* at 533. The Original  
28 Defendants brought counterclaims against Fannie Mae and its servicer, alleging contract-based

1 claims under the Loan Documents and seeking to enjoin the foreclosure. The original Court  
2 assigned to this matter denied Fannie Mae’s application for a receivership and issued an injunction  
3 in favor of Westland. The issues related to the injunction are currently before the Nevada Supreme  
4 Court on interlocutory appeal.

5 A year after litigation initiated, Westland filed the Amended Counterclaim, which, among  
6 other things, adds the Credit Facility Entities and Securities Entities as counterclaimants and asserts  
7 the new causes of action premised on the MCFA.

### 8 III. LEGAL STANDARD

9 A defendant is entitled to dismissal of a claim when a claimant fails “to state a claim upon  
10 which relief can be granted.” NRCP 12(b)(5). A claimant fails to state a claim if it appears beyond  
11 a doubt that the claimant can prove no set of facts that would entitle it to relief. *Buzz Stew, LLC v.*  
12 *City of N. Las Vegas*, 124 Nev. 224, 228, 181 P.3d 670, 672 (2008); *Morris v. Bank of Am. Nev.*,  
13 110 Nev. 1274, 1277, 886 P.2d 454, 456 (1994). In considering the motion, the court must accept  
14 all of a claimant’s factual allegations as true and construe them in the claimant’s favor. *Buzz Stew*,  
15 124 Nev. at 228, 181 P.3d at 672; *Morris*, 110 Nev. at 1276, 886 P.2d at 456. However, the court  
16 is “not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” *Papasan v.*  
17 *Allain*, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986); *see also Pack v. LaTourette*, 128 Nev. 264, 268, 277 P.3d 1246,  
18 1248 (2012) (holding that the court must accept *factual* allegations as true and then determine  
19 whether these allegations are *legally* sufficient to satisfy the elements of the claim asserted).

### 20 IV. LEGAL ARGUMENT

#### 21 A. As Non-parties to the Relevant Agreements, Various Counterclaimants Lack Standing 22 to Assert Certain Contract Claims.

23 It is well established that “only a party to a contract or an intended third-party beneficiary  
24 may sue to enforce the terms of a contract or obtain an appropriate remedy for breach.” *GECCMC*  
25 *2005-C1 Plummer St. Off. Ltd. P’ship v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, Nat. Ass’n*, 671 F.3d 1027, 1033  
26 (9th Cir. 2012). “To assert standing as a third-party beneficiary to a contract, a plaintiff must show  
27 (1) a clear intent to benefit the third party, and (2) the third party’s foreseeable reliance on the  
28 agreement.” *Boesiger v. Desert Appraisals, LLC*, 135 Nev. 192, 197, 444 P.3d 436, 441 (2019).

Whether an individual is an intended third-party beneficiary depends on the parties' intent, "gleaned from reading the contract as a whole in light of the circumstances under which it was entered." *Canfora v. Coast Hotels & Casinos, Inc.*, 121 Nev. 771, 779, 121 P.3d 599, 605 (2005).

But an individual or entity is not a third-party beneficiary "unless it appears that the agreement was made for [their] benefit. The fact that [they] might incidentally benefit by the performance of the agreement is insufficient." *Olson v. Iacometti*, 91 Nev. 241, 245, 533 P.2d 1360, 1363 (1975). In other words, "[t]hird-party beneficiary status requires more than the receipt of incidental benefits. *Robert Dillon Framing, Inc. v. Canyon Villas Apartment Corp.*, 129 Nev. 1102 (2013) (unpublished) (citing 9 John E. Murray Jr., *Corbin on Contracts* § 44.9, at 73 (rev. ed. 2007)); accord 13 Richard A. Lord, *Williston on Contracts* § 37:21 (4th ed. 2021 update) ("An incidental beneficiary acquires no right either against the promisor or the promisee by virtue of the promise.").

Here, the amended counterclaims appear to assert contract claims on behalf of *all* counterclaimants based on two sets of agreements:

- **The Loan Documents** pertaining to the Liberty Village and Village Square Properties: Counterclaims 1, 2, 4, 5, 9, 10
- **The MCFA**: Counterclaims 3, 4<sup>10</sup>

But as addressed below, only certain Westland entities are parties to either set of contracts and *none* of the remaining entities are third-party beneficiaries. Accordingly, only the parties to each set of the contracts can assert a claim against Fannie Mae, and the respective counterclaims must therefore be dismissed as to the remaining entities.

**1. Neither the Original Defendants nor the Securities Entities Are Parties to the MCFA or Intended Beneficiaries.**

The counterclaimants allege and acknowledge that only the Credit Facility Entities, not including Amusement Industry, Inc., are parties to the MCFA. Amended Counterclaim ¶ 282. The

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<sup>10</sup> Counterclaims 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 9, and 10 refer to "Counterclaimants", which would include the Original Defendants, the Credit Facility Entities, and the Securities Entities, but also, in places, make allegations only relating to certain counterclaimants. It is unclear on whose behalf each of these claims is being asserted. In any event, the Court can dismiss any portions of these counterclaims to the extent raised by a party who lacks standing for the reasons set forth herein.

1 counterclaimants have failed to plead that any non-parties to this agreement – the Original  
2 Defendants and Securities Entities – are intended third-party beneficiaries. Nor could they do so  
3 because the MCFA contains a clause expressly disclaiming any third-party beneficiaries:

4 **Section 15.07 Relationship of Parties; No Third Party**  
5 **Beneficiary.**

6 . . . .

7 **(b) No Third Party Beneficiaries.**

8 No creditor of any party to this Master Agreement and no other  
9 Person shall be a third party beneficiary of this Master Agreement  
10 or any other Loan Document or any account created or contemplated  
11 under this Master Agreement or any other Loan Document. Nothing  
12 contained in this Master Agreement shall be deemed or construed to  
13 create an obligation on the part of Lender to any third party nor shall  
14 any third party have a right to enforce against Lender any right that  
15 Borrower may have under this Master Agreement.

16 **Exhibit 1** at p. 105.

17 These clauses preclude any argument that Fannie Mae and the Credit Facility Entities – i.e.,  
18 the parties to the contract – had a “clear intent to benefit” the Original Defendants, the Securities  
19 Entities, or any other third parties. *Boesiger v.* 135 Nev. at 197, 444 P.3d at 441. Any unintended  
20 third-party reliance would likewise be unforeseeable. *See id.* Indeed, courts routinely find  
21 comparable “No Third Party Beneficiaries” clauses dispositive to whether non-parties to a contract  
22 have standing to sue to enforce its terms or seek damages. *E.g., Balsam v. Tucows Inc.*, 627 F.3d  
23 1158, 1163 (9th Cir. 2010) (“[W]e conclude that the “No Third Party Beneficiaries” clause  
24 unambiguously manifests an intent not to create any obligations to third parties through the  
25 [Registration Accreditation Agreement].”); *India.Com, Inc. v. Dalal*, 412 F.3d 315, 321 (2d Cir.  
26 2005) (“[S]ince the parties’ intention to benefit the third-party must be apparent from the contract,  
27 the text of the SPA [which ‘contained a Negating Clause, Section 12.5, entitled “No Third Party  
28 Beneficiaries”] specifically foreclosed the theory of recovery on which [the defendant] and the  
District Court relied.”).

Accordingly, this Court should dismiss the contract-based claim related to the MCFA  
asserted in Counterclaims 3 and 4 as to the Original Defendants and the Securities Entities (as only  
the Credit Facility Entities have standing to pursue claims). However, for the separate reason

discussed below, these claims must be dismissed in their entirety because the District of Columbia is the only proper venue to hear those counterclaims.

**2. Neither the Credit Facility Entities nor the Securities Entities Are Parties to the Loan Documents or Intended Beneficiaries.**

It is also undisputed that the Original Defendants are the only counterclaimants that assumed (and are thus party to) the Loan Documents for the Liberty Village and Village Square Properties. The loan agreements for both properties contain “No Third Party Beneficiaries” provisions nearly identical to the above-quoted provision in the MCFA:

**Section 15.06. Relationship of Parties; No Third Party Beneficiary.**

....

**(b) No Third Party Beneficiaries.**

No creditor of any party to this Loan Agreement and no other Person shall be a third party beneficiary of this Loan Agreement or any other Loan Document or any account created or contemplated under this Loan Agreement or any other Loan Document. Nothing contained in this Loan Agreement shall be deemed or construed to create an obligation on the part of Lender to any third party nor shall any third party have a right to enforce against Lender any right that Borrower may have under this Loan Agreement.

Verified Compl. Exs. 1 (Village Square Multifamily Loan and Security Agreement) and 6 (Liberty Multifamily Loan and Security Agreement), Section 15.06. Once again, counterclaimants have failed to plead that the Credit Facility Entities, the Securities Entities, or any other third parties are intended third-party beneficiaries. The agreements’ unequivocal language precludes any such finding. *See Balsam*, 627 F.3d at 1163; *Dalal*, 412 F.3d at 321.

This Court, therefore, should also dismiss the contract-based claims related to the Loan Documents asserted in Counterclaims 1, 2, 4, 5, 9, and 10 as to the Credit Facility Entities and the Securities Entities (thus leaving only the Original Defendants to prosecute these claims).

**B. The MCFA-Related Claims Must Be Dismissed in Their Entirety Because That Contract Selects the District of Columbia as the Exclusive Venue for Such Claims.**

**1. Dismissal is Appropriate Based on a Forum-Selection Clause.**

As set out below, the MCFA contains a forum-selection clause that precludes this Court from hearing the MCFA counterclaims. There are multiple procedural mechanisms for dismissal

1 of Counterclaim 3 and the portion of Counterclaim 4 related to the MCFA based on the forum-  
2 selection clause in the MCFA. This Court has previously held that NRCP 12(b)(5) is appropriate  
3 for dismissal based on a forum-selection clause because such motion, “in effect,” asserts that a  
4 complaint (or, in this case, a counterclaim) “fails to state a claim on which relief can be granted in  
5 this forum.” *Walters v. FSP Stallion 1, LLC*, No. A564089-B, 2010 WL 8034117 (Nev. Dist. Ct.  
6 Apr. 13, 2010).

7 Alternatively, the Court may dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under  
8 Rule 12(b)(1) based on a mandatory forum-selection clause. *See Am. First Fed. Credit Union v.*  
9 *Soro*, 131 Nev. 737, 738, 359 P.3d 105, 105 (2015) (addressing a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss);  
10 *Tuxedo Int’l Inc. v. Rosenberg*, 127 Nev. 11, 251 P.3d 690 (2011)<sup>11</sup>; *see also DeSage v. AW Fin.*  
11 *Grp., LLC*, 461 P.3d 162, 2020 WL 1952504, \*1 (Nev. 2020) (unpublished) (addressing such a  
12 motion brought both under Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(5)).

13 Finally, the Court may dismiss under the doctrine of *forum non conveniens*. *See Atl. Marine*  
14 *Const. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for W. Dist. of Texas*, 571 U.S. 49, 60-61 (2013); *see also* 5B Charles  
15 Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, *Federal Practice and Procedure* § 1352 (3d ed., 2021 update) (“If  
16 transfer is impossible . . . then a dismissal through *forum non conveniens* is the appropriate method  
17 for dealing with a valid forum-selection clause.”). Although that doctrine, under both federal and  
18 Nevada common law, normally calls for balancing the public and private interest factors, the U.S.  
19 Supreme Court clarified that, “[w]hen parties agree to a forum-selection clause, they waive the right  
20 to challenge the preselected forum as inconvenient or less convenient for themselves or their  
21 witnesses, or for their pursuit of the litigation. A court accordingly must deem the private-interest  
22 factors to *weigh entirely in favor of the preselected forum*.” *Atl. Marine Const. Co.*, 571 U.S. at 64  
23 (emphasis added). The forum-selection clause must therefore be “given controlling weight in all  
24 but the most exceptional cases.” *Id.* at 59–60 (citation omitted). And “the party acting in violation  
25 of the forum-selection clause” bears the burden of showing than any remaining considerations  
26 “overwhelmingly disfavor” enforcing the clause and consequently dismissing the action. *Id.* at 67.

27  
28 <sup>11</sup> Although not apparent from the opinion’s text, the underlying motion to dismiss cites to  
NRCP 12(b)(1). *Tuxedo Int’l Inc. v. Rosenberg*, 2000 WL 35907201 (Nev. Dist. Ct. May 16, 2000).



1           Though courts have addressed multiple mechanisms for dismissing a case based on the  
2           existence of a forum-selection clause, the analysis is the same regardless of the procedural rule or  
3           doctrine cited. Courts look to the parties’ agreement pursuant to such a clause and, as addressed  
4           below, whether the clause is mandatory or permissive. The presence of a clear, mandatory, forum-  
5           selection clause, as here, requires dismissal. Fannie Mae and FHFA move to dismiss the MCFA-  
6           based counterclaims primarily under NRCP 12(b)(5), NRCP 12(b)(1), and the doctrine of *forum*  
7           *non conveniens*, any of which equally applies.

8                   **2.       The MCFA’s Forum-Selection Clause Is Mandatory and It Selects the District**  
9                   **of Columbia as the Exclusive Venue for Related Claims.**

10           In assessing whether a forum-selection clause requires dismissal of a claim, the Nevada  
11           Supreme Court has distinguished between mandatory and permissive clauses. *Soro*, 131 Nev.  
12           at 740, 359 P.3d at 107. It explained that “a mandatory jurisdiction clause requires a particular  
13           forum be the exclusive jurisdiction for litigation, while permissive jurisdiction is merely a consent  
14           to jurisdiction in a venue.” *Id.* at 740, 359 P.3d at 107 (quoting *Garcia Granados Quinones v.*  
15           *Swiss Bank Corp. (Overseas), S.A.*, 509 So.2d 273, 274 (Fla. 1987) (internal quotation marks  
16           omitted)). In *Soro*, the Nevada Supreme Court highlighted numerous examples of this mandatory-  
17           permissive dichotomy with which it expressly agreed. *Id.* at 742, 359 P.3d at 108. The Tenth  
18           Circuit, for instance, determined that a clause was mandatory when it stated that “jurisdiction shall  
19           be in the State of Colorado, and venue shall lie in the County of El Paso, Colorado . . . .” *Id.* at  
20           741, 359 P.3d at 107–08 (quoting *Excell, Inc. v. Sterling Boiler & Mech., Inc.*, 106 F.3d 318, 321  
21           (10th Cir. 1997)). And the Supreme Court of Nebraska ruled that a clause was mandatory based  
22           on the words “shall be brought only in” the selected jurisdiction. *Id.*, 359 P.3d at 107 (quoting *Polk*  
23           *Cty. Recreational Ass’n v. Susquehanna Patriot Com. Leasing Co.*, 734 N.W.2d 750, 758 (Neb.  
24           2007)). In contrast, the *Soro* Court determined that the clause at issue there – “[t]he parties agree  
25           and submit themselves to the jurisdiction of the courts of the State of Utah with regard to the subject  
26           matter of this agreement” – was permissive, “as there is no language within the clause containing  
27           words of exclusivity.” *Id.* at 742, 359 P.3d at 108.

28           Here, the MCFA includes an exclusive forum-selection provision that selects the courts of

the District of Columbia for any claims brought by the Credit Facility Entities:

**Section 15.01 Choice of Law; Consent to Jurisdiction.**

. . . Borrower agrees that any controversy arising under or in relation to the Notes, the Security Documents (other than the Security Instruments), or any other Loan Document *shall be*, except as otherwise provided herein, *litigated* in the District of Columbia. The local and federal courts and authorities with jurisdiction in the District of Columbia shall, except as otherwise provided herein, have jurisdiction over all controversies which may arise under or in relation to the Loan Documents, including those controversies relating to the execution, jurisdiction, breach, enforcement, or compliance with the Notes, the Security Documents (other than the Security Instruments), or any other issue arising under, relating to, or in connection with any of the Loan Documents. Borrower irrevocably consents to service, jurisdiction, and venue of such courts for any litigation arising from the Notes, the Security Documents, or any of the other Loan Documents, *and waives any other venue to which it might be entitled by virtue of domicile, habitual residence, or otherwise*. Nothing contained herein, however, shall prevent Lender from bringing any suit, action, or proceeding or exercising any rights against Borrower and against the collateral in any other jurisdiction. Initiating such suit, action, or proceeding or taking such action in any other jurisdiction shall in no event constitute a waiver of the agreement contained herein that the laws of the District of Columbia shall govern the rights and obligations of Borrower and Lender as provided herein or the submission herein by Borrower to personal jurisdiction within the District of Columbia.

Ex. 1 at p. 103 (emphasis added). Under *Soro*, this provision is undeniably mandatory as to the Credit Facility Entities. It first directs that any action related to the MCFA “shall be . . . litigated” in the District of Columbia – a phrase highly comparable to the “venue shall lie” language that the Tenth Circuit found (and the Nevada Supreme Court agreed) was mandatory. *Soro*, 131 Nev. at 741, 359 P.3d at 107–08. Moreover, by entering into the MCFA, the Credit Facility Entities, “irrevocably . . . waive[d] *any other venue* to which [they] might be entitled by virtue of domicile, habitual residence, or otherwise.” Ex. 1 at p. 103. These are unequivocally “words of exclusivity,” as they are exclusionary of any venue besides the District of Columbia. *See Soro*, 131 Nev. at 741, 359 P.3d at 107 (agreeing that the phrase “shall be brought only in” denotes a mandatory clause). There are no provisions in the MCFA’s forum-selection clause that permit the Credit Facility

1 Entities to pursue the MCFA claims before this Court.

2 Accordingly, the MCFA precludes the Credit Facility Entities from asserting claims that  
3 “arise under or [are] in relation to” that agreement in Nevada, and this Court must therefore dismiss  
4 those claims. Accordingly, this Court should dismiss Counterclaims 3 and 4 as to the MCFA  
5 claims.<sup>12</sup>

6 **C. HERA Precludes Punitive Damages and Attorney’s Fees against Fannie Mae.**

7 Westland seeks punitive damages and attorney’s fees against Fannie Mae under its claims  
8 for fraud and conversion. Amended Counterclaim ¶¶ 508, 530. But federal law precludes assessing  
9 any amount in the nature of penalties against FHFA or Fannie Mae while it is in conservatorship  
10 of FHFA. Specifically, the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 (“HERA”) creates a  
11 “penalty bar” for FHFA, meaning that, “in *any case* in which [FHFA] is acting as a conservator . . .  
12 [FHFA] shall not be liable for any amounts in the nature of *penalties* or fines . . .” 12 U.S.C.  
13 § 4617(j)(1), (4) (emphasis added).

14 Pursuant to HERA, the Director of FHFA placed Fannie Mae into conservatorship in 2008.  
15 *Saticoy Bay LLC Series 9641 Christine View v. Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n*, 134 Nev. 270, 270, 417  
16 P.3d 363, 365 (2018). In its capacity as Conservator, FHFA “immediately succeed[ed]” by  
17 operation of law to “all rights, titles, powers, and privileges of” Fannie Mae and has the authority  
18 to “take over the assets of and operate” Fannie Mae, “perform all functions of” Fannie Mae, and  
19 “preserve and converse the assets of” Fannie Mae. 12 U.S.C. § 4617(b)(2)(A)–(B). Accordingly,  
20 “FHFA, as conservator, stepped into the shoes of Fannie Mae . . .” *Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency v. City*  
21 *of Chicago*, 962 F. Supp. 2d 1044, 1064 (N.D. Ill. 2013); *accord Herron v. Fannie Mae*, 857 F.  
22 Supp. 2d 87, 94 (D.D.C. 2012), *aff’d*, 861 F.3d 160 (D.C. Cir. 2017); *Nat’l Fair Hous. All. v. Fed.*  
23 *Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n*, No. C 16-06969 JSW, 2019 WL 3779531, at \*7 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2019);  
24 *Mwangi v. Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n*, No. 4:14-CV-0079-HLM, 2015 WL 12434327, at \*4 (N.D.

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25 <sup>12</sup> Although Counterclaim 3 asserts a breach-of-contract claim based on the MCFA only,  
26 Counterclaim 4 alleges breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing based on both the Loan  
27 Documents and the MCFA. Accordingly, only the portion of Counterclaim 4 addressing the MCFA  
28 must be dismissed under the forum-selection clause. But as addressed above, the remainder of that  
same counterclaim must be dismissed as to the Credit Facility Entities and the Securities Entities,  
who are not parties nor intended beneficiaries of the Loan Documents. *See supra* § IV.A.2.

1 Ga. Mar. 9, 2015).

2 The penalty bar of 12 U.S.C. § 4617(j) also applies to Fannie Mae while it is in FHFA’s  
3 conservatorship, thereby insulating Fannie Mae from any potential liability for penalties and fines.  
4 *E.g., Gray v. Seterus, Inc.*, 233 F. Supp. 3d 865, 872 (D. Or. 2017) (“Fannie Mae is indeed immune  
5 from punitive damages under 12 U.S.C. § 4617(j).”); *Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency*, 962 F. Supp. 2d at  
6 1064 (“The City contends that any fines and penalties are actually assessed against ‘Fannie and  
7 Freddie,’ . . . and, thus, are not barred by § 4617(j)(4). As explained earlier, these contentions are  
8 meritless.”); *Nat’l Fair Hous. All.*, 2019 WL 3779531, at \*6 (“There is no dispute that since  
9 September 2008, FHFA has acted as Conservator of Fannie Mae. The [penalty] bar applies to  
10 Fannie Mae . . . .”); *Mwangi*, 2015 WL 12434327, at \*4 (“The Court finds that while under  
11 conservatorship with the FHFA, [Defendant] Fannie Mae is statutorily exempt from taxes,  
12 penalties, and fines to the same extent that the FHFA is.” (internal quotation marks and citation  
13 omitted)); *Nevada ex rel. Hager v. Countrywide Home Loans Servicing, LP*, 812 F. Supp. 2d 1211,  
14 1218 (D. Nev. 2011) (“[U]nder conservatorship with the FHFA, Fannie Mae is statutorily exempt  
15 from taxes, penalties, and fines to the same extent that the FHFA is.”); *Higgins v. BAC Home Loans*  
16 *Servicing, LP*, No. 12-CV-183-KKC, 2014 WL 1332825, at \*3 (E.D. Ky. Mar. 31, 2014) (“[W]hen  
17 the Agency acts as conservator, it acts with complete control over Fannie Mae’s assets. By  
18 prohibiting the imposition of fines and penalties on the Agency ‘in any case in which the Agency  
19 is acting as a conservator or a receiver,’ HERA necessarily prohibits the imposition of fines and  
20 penalties on Fannie Mae also.”).

21 Several courts have analogized FHFA’s conservatorship to the FDIC, which, “in its capacity  
22 as receiver for a failed financial institution, is immune from punitive damages under 12 U.S.C.  
23 § 1825(b), a statute similar to 12 U.S.C. § 4617(j) [and] that prohibits the imposition of fines and  
24 penalties against the FDIC in its capacity as receiver.” *Mwangi*, 2015 WL 12434327, at \*5 (“Fannie  
25 Mae is exempt from punitive damages while it is under conservatorship with the FHFA.”); *accord*  
26 *Higgins*, 2014 WL 1332825, at \*2 (citing *County of Fairfax, Va. v. U.S. F.D.I.C.*, No. CIV. A. 92-  
27 0858(RCL), 1993 WL 62247 (D.D.C. Feb. 26, 1993)). The penalty bar thus prohibits punitive  
28 damages against Fannie Mae because such an award is “in the nature of penalties.” *Gray v. Seterus*,

1 *Inc.*, 233 F. Supp. 3d 865, 872–73 (D. Or. 2017) (“Fannie Mae is indeed immune from punitive  
2 damages under 12 U.S.C. § 4617(j).”).

3 It is well-established that “[p]unitive damages are designed not to compensate the plaintiff  
4 for harm suffered but, instead, to punish and deter the defendant’s culpable conduct.” *Bongiovi v.*  
5 *Sullivan*, 122 Nev. 556, 580, 138 P.3d 433, 450 (2006). Such damages are thus clearly a “penalty”  
6 that the penalty bar precludes. *Nat’l Fair Hous. All.*, 2019 WL 3779531, at \*6 (“Punitive damages  
7 are considered penal as they are intended to punish by awarding damages in excess of those actually  
8 suffered.” (citing *Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc.*, 492 U.S. 257,  
9 297–98 (1989)); accord *Poku v. F.D.I.C.*, No. CIV.A. RDB-08-1198, 2011 WL 1599269, at \*4 (D.  
10 Md. Apr. 27, 2011) (“As punitive damages represent penalties, the plain language of Section  
11 1825(b) precludes the imposition of punitive damages on the FDIC as Receiver.”). Accordingly,  
12 Westland’s requests for punitive damages against Fannie Mae must be dismissed under Rule  
13 12(b)(5).

14 The penalty bar also bars counterclaimants’ demand for attorneys’ fees. Absent a  
15 contractual right to attorney’s fees, which counterclaimants do not have, Nevada only permits  
16 attorney’s fees in a civil case “to punish for and deter frivolous or vexatious claims and defenses”  
17 NRS 18.010(2)(b), NRS 7.085; see also *Capanna v. Orth*, 134 Nev. 888, 895, 432 P.3d 726, 734  
18 (2018) (interpreting these statutes). Many other courts have described attorneys’ fees as penal or  
19 punitive in nature. See, e.g., *In re Sterten*, 546 F.3d 278, 280 (3d Cir. 2008) (describing attorneys’  
20 fees as part of the penalty under the Truth in Lending Act); *Sanders v. Jackson*, 209 F.3d 998, 1004  
21 (7th Cir. 2000) (in the context of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, “attorneys’ fees are  
22 punitive in the broad sense of the term”); *Baez v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice*, 684 F.2d 999, 1003 (D.C.  
23 Cir. 1982) (statutes permitting attorneys’ fees “embody the notion[] that assessment of attorneys’  
24 fees against the losers may be a form of penalty”). Thus, the Eastern District of Michigan held that  
25 “an award of [attorneys’ fees] against the FDIC in this [breach of contract] action, wherein it is  
26 acting as receiver of a failed bank, is prohibited by . . . 12 U.S.C. § 1825(b)(3).” *Commercial Law*  
27 *Corp. v. FDIC*, No. 10-13275, 2016 WL 4035508, at \*4 (E.D. Mich. July 28, 2016), *aff’d*, 716 F.  
28

App'x 383 (6th Cir. 2017).<sup>13</sup> Likewise, Section 4617(j) bars attorneys' fees against Fannie Mae in this action.

**D. Counterclaimants are not Entitled to Attorneys' Fees.**

Another reason, aside from the penalty bar's prohibition on attorneys' fees, precludes any attempt by the Original Defendants or the Credit Facility Entities to claim attorneys' fees. Counterclaimants generally plead that they are entitled to attorney's fees for their contract-based claims, but provide no basis. *See* Amended Counterclaim ¶¶ 443, 455, 465, 478, 489, 531, 541, 554. Counterclaimants have not pled any statutory basis for recovering their attorneys' fees and costs, and Movants know of none. Further, the Loan Documents and the MCFA do not provide for the Original Defendants or the Credit Facility Entities to attorneys' fees and costs. On the contrary, Fannie Mae is the only party contractually entitled to attorneys' fees.

The Loan Documents and the MCFA all provide, in nearly identical provisions, that:

**(g) Payment of Costs, Fees, and Expenses.**

In addition to the payments specified in this Loan Agreement, *Borrower shall pay, on demand, all of Lender's out-of-pocket fees, costs, charges, or expenses (including the reasonable fees and expenses of attorneys, accountants, and other experts) incurred by Lender in connection with:*

... (3) the administration or enforcement of, or preservation of rights or remedies under, this Loan Agreement or any other Loan Documents including or in connection with any litigation or appeals, any Foreclosure Event or other disposition of any collateral granted pursuant to the Loan Documents . . . .

Verified Compl. Ex. 1 (Village Square Multifamily Loan and Security Agreement), § 4.02(g)(3) (emphasis added); *see also* Verified Compl. Ex. 6 (Liberty Multifamily Loan and Security Agreement), § 4.02(g)(3); MCFA, Ex. 1 § 4.02(g)(3). These contractual provisions are clear and must be enforced in accordance with their terms. *See Davis v. Beling*, 128 Nev. 301, 321, 278 P.3d

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<sup>13</sup> In wholly different contests, some courts have concluded that certain attorneys' fees are not in the nature of penalties for purposes of a statutory penalty bar. *See, e.g., Bank of the Ozarks v. Arco Cmty. Outreach Coal., Inc.*, No. CV212-017, 2012 WL 2673246 (S.D. Ga. July 5, 2012) (because Georgia cases characterized a Georgia statute's attorneys' fees as not penal [unlike NRS 18.010(2)(b) and NRS 7.085], those attorneys' fees are not barred by § 1825(b)(3)). In the context of civil rights actions, the Ninth Circuit described attorneys' fees as not penal for policy reasons. *Corder v. Gates*, 947 F.2d 374, 383 (9th Cir. 1991) ("Attorney's fees *are* awarded to encourage meritorious civil rights actions by ensuring reasonable compensation for victorious plaintiffs' attorneys.").

1 501, 515 (2012). Accordingly, the Original Defendants or the Credit Facility Entities’ do not have  
2 contractual claims for attorneys’ fees. Given the lack of any statutory or contractual basis for a  
3 claim of attorneys’ fees, and the penalty bar preclusion, the counterclaimants’ claims for attorneys’  
4 fees must be dismissed or stricken.

5 **E. All the Contracts at Issue Preclude Consequential Damages.**

6 Both the Loan Documents and the MCFA include materially identical clauses that preclude,  
7 among other things, consequential damages:

8 **Section 14.04 Waiver of Marshaling.**

9 . . . .

10 NONE OF LENDER OR ITS AFFILIATES, OFFICERS, DIRECTORS, EMPLOYEES,  
11 AGENTS, OR REPRESENTATIVES SHALL BE RESPONSIBLE TO BORROWER (a)  
12 FOR ANY ACT OR FAILURE TO ACT UNDER ANY POWER OF ATTORNEY OR  
13 OTHERWISE, EXCEPT IN RESPECT OF DAMAGES ATTRIBUTABLE SOLELY TO  
14 THEIR OWN GROSS NEGLIGENCE OR WILLFUL MISCONDUCT AS FINALLY  
15 DETERMINED PURSUANT TO A FINAL, NONAPPEALABLE COURT ORDER BY  
16 A COURT OF COMPETENT JURISDICTION, OR (b) FOR ANY PUNITIVE,  
17 EXEMPLARY, **INDIRECT OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES**.

18 Ex. 1 at 102 (emphasis added); *accord* Verified Compl. Exs. 1 (Village Square Multifamily Loan  
19 and Security Agreement), § 14.04, and 6 (Liberty Multifamily Loan and Security Agreement),  
20 § 14.04.

21 “Consequential damages include those damages that, although not an invariable result of  
22 every breach of this sort, were reasonably foreseeable or contemplated by the parties at the time the  
23 contract was entered into as a probable result of a breach.” 24 Richard A. Lord, *Williston on*  
24 *Contracts* § 64:16 (4th ed. 2021 update); *see also Century Sur. Co. v. Andrew*, 134 Nev. 819, 825,  
25 432 P.3d 180, 186 (2018) (“Consequential damages should be such as may fairly and reasonably  
26 be considered as arising naturally, or were reasonably contemplated by both parties at the time they  
27 made the contract.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

28 Here, the Amended Counterclaim does not delineate its theories of damages. However,  
Westland appears to claim that it is entitled to compensatory damages under the Loan Documents  
or the MCFA, or both. For example, Westland claims that the default that Fannie Mae declared  
under the Loan Documents “will impair Westland’s credit rating leading to long term higher

1 borrowing costs, and it has impaired Westland’s ability to re-finance its Properties at a time when  
2 interest rates are at an all-time low.” Amended Counterclaim ¶ 507. Given that Westland’s ability  
3 to obtain *future third-party* loans at certain rates was not part of the benefit of the bargain under the  
4 Loan Documents or MCFA, Westland is asserting, at best, a theory of consequential damages.<sup>14</sup>  
5 Even if Westland could show that the purported harm to Westland’s credit rating was “reasonably  
6 contemplated” by Fannie Mae when the Loan Documents or MCFA were entered into, both sets of  
7 contracts expressly bar compensatory damages.

8 Accordingly, this Court should declare that these contracts bar Westland’s theories of  
9 consequential damages and dismiss the same. *See* Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 351 (1981)  
10 (“When parties expressly exclude or limit consequential damages, the basic principles of freedom  
11 of contract counsel that the agreed upon provision should be enforced.”); 24 Richard A. Lord,  
12 *Williston on Contracts* § 64:16 (4th ed. 2021 update) (“In determining the amount of consequential  
13 damages recoverable for breach of a contract, it is often necessary to consider any limitation of  
14 liability or liquidated damages provisions set forth in the contract in question, since contracting  
15 parties are generally allowed to limit their liability in the event of breach to the performance of  
16 certain prescribed acts, such as repairing or replacing any defective performance or parts, or to the  
17 payment of a specified sum. The effect of such provisions, if lawful, may be to exclude entirely  
18 any liability for consequential damages.”) (footnotes omitted).

## 19 V. CONCLUSION

20 For the foregoing reasons, Fannie Mae and FHFA respectfully request that the Court grant  
21 their motion to dismiss the counterclaims as discussed above.

22 ///

23 ///

24 ///

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25 <sup>14</sup> As an additional example, Westland alleges that the Securities Entities were required to  
26 liquidate securities to fund margin calls and that these securities later increased by tens of millions  
27 of dollars. Amended Counterclaim ¶ 273. Westland, though, fails to attribute this alleged harm to  
28 any specific cause of action or contract. Again, even if Westland could establish standing, breach,  
and foreseeability, which it cannot, these damages would be, at best, consequential and barred by  
the MCFA.



Dated: October 29, 2021

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# **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

I, the undersigned, declare under penalty of perjury, that I am over the age of eighteen years, and I am not a party to, nor interested in, this action. On this date, I caused to be served a true and correct copy of the foregoing **PLAINTIFF AND FHFA'S MOTION TO DISMISS IN PART DEFENDANTS' FIRST AMENDED ANSWER AND AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM** by the method indicated:

\_\_\_\_\_ U. S. Mail  
\_\_\_\_\_ U.S. Certified Mail  
X \_\_\_\_\_ Electronic Service  
\_\_\_\_\_ E-mail

and addressed to the following:

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
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DATED: October 29, 2021

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**EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT**

**CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA**

FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE  
ASSOCIATION,

Plaintiff,

vs.

WESTLAND LIBERTY VILLAGE, LLC, a  
Nevada Limited Liability Company; and  
WESTLAND VILLAGE SQUARE, LLC, a  
Nevada Limited Liability Company,

Defendants.

AND ALL RELATED ACTIONS

CASE NO. A-20-819412-B

DEPT NO. XIII

**OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S  
PARTIAL MOTION TO DISMISS  
DEFENDANT'S FIRST AMENDED  
ANSWER AND AMENDED  
COUNTERCLAIM**

Date of Hearing: December 16, 2021

Time of Hearing: 9:00 a.m.

1 Defendants-Counterclaimants Westland Liberty Village, LLC (“Liberty LLC”) and Westland  
2 Village Square, LLC (“Square LLC” and in combination with Liberty LLC, “Westland”),  
3 Amusement Industry, Inc. (“Amusement”), Westland Corona LLC (“Corona”), Westland Amber  
4 Ridge LLC (“Amber”), Westland Hacienda Hills LLC (“Hacienda”), 1097 North State, LLC (“1097  
5 North”), Westland Tropicana Royale LLC (“Tropicana”), and Vellagio Apts of Westland LLC  
6 (“Vellagio” and in combination with Amusement, Corona, Amber, Hacienda, 1097 North, and  
7 Tropicana, the “Westland Credit Facility Entities”), The Alevy Family Protection Trust (“AFP  
8 Trust”), Westland AMT, LLC (“Westland AMT”), AFT Industry NV, LLC (“AFT NV”), A&D  
9 Dynasty Trust (“Dynasty Trust” and in combination with AFP Trust, Westland AMT, AFT NV, and  
10 Amusement, the “Westland Securities Entities”, and collectively Westland, Westland Credit Facility  
11 Entities and Westland Securities Entities, are referred to herein as the “Counterclaimants”) by and  
12 through their counsel of record, hereby file this Opposition to “Plaintiff and FHFA’s Motion to  
13 Dismiss in Part Defendants’ First Amended Answer and Amended Counterclaim” (the “MTD” and  
14 “MTD Opposition”). This MTD Opposition is based on the pleadings filed in the Case, the attached  
15 Memorandum of Points and Authorities, anything that the Court may or must take Judicial Notice of,  
16 and any arguments of counsel that this Court may allow at the time of the hearing.

## 17 **MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES**

### 18 **I. INTRODUCTION**

19 The Counterclaim contains a clear, plain statement of each claim, which have already been  
20 tested and held sufficient when on October 22, 2020, the Court granted Westland’s request for a  
21 preliminary injunction, and on February 4, 2021, when this court entered an Order denying in all  
22 material respects Federal National Mortgage Association’s (“Fannie Mae”) prior Motion to Dismiss.  
23 Notably, several of the counterclaims, including the first, second, fifth, ninth, and tenth claims, are  
24 virtually unchanged.

25 As such, the first argument Fannie Mae and the Federal Housing Finance Agency (“FHFA”)  
26 raise, which is that the Counterclaims fail to identify the parties to which the first, second, fifth, ninth,  
27 and tenth counterclaim applies is not well placed. Those claims were originally plead by Liberty LLC  
28 or Square LLC with little to no changes to the claims themselves and make no reference to any other

1 party. The only paragraph of each claim that can be interpreted to the contrary is the initial line, which  
2 was unchanged. It continues to refer to “Counterclaimant” when incorporating the preceding  
3 paragraphs. The third counterclaim explicitly references the Westland Credit Facilities Entities as the  
4 parties asserting the claims. Finally, the fourth counterclaim explicitly references all Counterclaimants  
5 related to the breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing arising from the Loan Agreements,  
6 the Master Credit Facility Agreements, the related guarantees, and applications that required  
7 submission of the financial statements and financials of the Westland Securities Entities.

8         Second, the forum selection clause in the Master Credit Facility Agreement is permissive, not  
9 mandatory, as Fannie Mae represents. In drafting the forum selection clause, it now seeks to apply,  
10 Fannie Mae did not limit all suits to the federal circuit in Washington, D.C. Rather, the clause permits  
11 suits to be brought not only there, but in other, possibly several other, jurisdictions. In our case,  
12 Fannie Mae already chose the forum for the whole dispute – Nevada. Neither Fannie Mae nor FHFA  
13 challenges joinder of the Westland Securities Entities or the Westland Credit Facility Entities as  
14 Counterclaimants. Nor does either of those parties challenge the new Counterclaimants’ right to bring  
15 new claims. Fannie Mae and FHFA thus concede that all of the parties and claims arise from the  
16 “same transaction or occurrence” or “series of transactions and occurrences.” Thus, the forum is  
17 proper where Fannie Mae brought suit, and the additional forum selection clause is not implicated.

18         However, even if it were, the Counterclaim asserts that Fannie Mae retaliated against the  
19 Master Credit Facility Entities in part by taking discriminatory actions against the Nevada corporate  
20 entities, including by placing them on a-check in bad faith. Thus, in essence, Fannie Mae seeks  
21 improperly to bifurcate this matter. Under those circumstances, aside from the fact that the consent to  
22 jurisdiction clause is not mandatory, it would also not be “reasonable and just” to permit Fannie Mae  
23 to apply the forum selection clause to the Westland Credit Facility Entities and thus force these  
24 matters to be parceled out into different for a – of Fannie Mae’s choice of course, with the resultant  
25 risk of inconsistent rulings, finding and judgments, and the astronomically higher costs of litigation.

26 //

27 //

1 Third, Fannie Mae attempts to assert that punitive damages and attorney’s fees are statutorily  
2 precluded, but neither punitive damages nor attorney’s fees are “amounts in the nature of penalties or  
3 fines” within the meaning of 12 U.S.C. § 4617(j)(4) that would generally preclude such civil  
4 damages. Tellingly, Fannie Mae’s reading of the statute would render 12 U.S.C. § 4617(d)(3)(B)’s  
5 express limitation of “punitive or exemplary damages” for contract repudiation superfluous, would  
6 improperly negate Westland’s right to offset Westland’s liability to Fannie Mae under the Loan  
7 Agreements (a circumstance that FHFA would not “be liable” for penalties/fines, and a right FHFA  
8 has no power to avoid in conservatorship), and would ignore the statute’s definition of the term  
9 “[t]he Agency” – a term that does not include Fannie Mae.

10 Fourth, Fannie Mae disputes “attorney’s fees for [the] contract-based claims” upon the  
11 assertion that “no basis” was provided for such damages. (Br. at 17-18.) Notice of the basis for such  
12 fees is plead in each claim, but to the extent that a further basis is required, Counterclaimants are  
13 entitled to attorneys’ fees as special damages. *See Sandy Valley Associates v. Sky Ranch Estates*  
14 *Owners Ass’n*, 117 Nev. 948, 957, 35 P.3d 964, 969 (2001) (clarifying contract-based requests for  
15 attorneys’ fees are addressed post-trial, but three separate bases for costs as special damages are  
16 permitted). The *Sandy Valley* court stated attorney fees are available as special damages when the  
17 natural and proximate cause of injurious conduct, related to third-party actions, and to recover real or  
18 personal property or in clarifying or removing a cloud upon title to property. *Id.* The first basis  
19 applies to the first, second, third, fourth, eighth, ninth, and tenth causes of action, the second basis  
20 applies to the fourth cause of action, and the third basis applies to the fifth, eighth, ninth, and tenth  
21 causes of action.

22 Fifth, Fannie Mae’s arguments in favor of a waiver of consequential damages are overstated.  
23 The section and paragraph of the cited provision of the Loan Agreement show the language is limited  
24 to situations that Fannie Mae is resorting to foreclosures and related accountings for collateral.  
25 Specifically, each clause is within a two paragraph Waiver of Marshaling section of the Loan  
26 Agreement and MCFA that Fannie Mae drafted. Waiver of marshaling relates to the waiver of a  
27 specific equitable doctrine requiring that the lender proceed through each source of collateral before  
28 proceeding to the next. The two paragraphs show an intent that Fannie Mae and its principals not be

1 held liable for damages related to seeking recovery from collateral or in how it applies funds from a  
2 foreclosure unless due to gross negligence or willful misconduct. This purported limitation on  
3 consequential damages does not apply to all conduct related to the entire Loan Agreement. Certainly,  
4 it does not apply to the retaliatory and discriminatory faith loan servicing against affiliated entities that  
5 occurred in this matter.

6 Finally, to the extent that the Court is inclined to grant any portion of Fannie Mae's motion,  
7 Counterclaimants seek leave to amend consistent with this filing.

## 8 II. RELEVANT FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

9 Through extensive and ongoing motion practice, the Court has been made aware of the  
10 underlying facts of this action. In short, this case originally arose when Fannie Mae and its servicing  
11 agent, Grandbridge, filed an improper Notice of Default and Acceleration of Note before commencing  
12 improper non-judicial foreclosure proceedings. (Counterclaim, ¶ 1.) This illegal conduct threatened  
13 Westland's two multifamily housing communities located at 4870 Nellis Oasis Lane, Las Vegas,  
14 Nevada 89115, and 5025 Nellis Oasis Lane, Las Vegas, Nevada 89115, and was based on  
15 unsupportable non-financial defaults, which, despite multiple requests by Westland, have never been  
16 substantiated, and to the contrary and rather simply, were manufactured by Fannie Mae and its  
17 servicer. (*Id.* at ¶¶ 1, 9, 15, 24 & 25.) Only after Fannie Mae filed this litigation did Westland first  
18 discover that the lynchpin to Fannie Mae's assertion of a purported default was a purported decline in  
19 occupancy rates that Fannie Mae equates to "deterioration" in the condition of the Mortgaged  
20 Property. However, the Loan Agreements only cite instances of physical deterioration of the  
21 Mortgaged Property to support a request for additional reserves. (Counterclaim, ¶¶ 11, 107, 187, 207,  
22 230, 258-59, 450; Supplemental Declaration of James Noakes in Support of Plaintiff's Application for  
23 Appointment of a Receiver and Opposition to Defendants' Countermotion, at ¶¶ 5-8 [asserting  
24 deterioration based on a decline in occupancy rate].)

25 Still, Fannie Mae, based on the false and repeatedly rejected alleged defaults by Westland, has  
26 remarkably claimed to be undersecured when the Properties have tens of millions in equity each.  
27 Nonetheless, based on its false assertions, Fannie Mae filed this action alleging two causes of action –  
28 to appoint a receiver and for an assignment of rents. (*See generally*, Plaintiff's Complaint.) In light of

1 the facts, including the Properties' improved condition, financial stability, and significantly improved  
2 value, it is not surprising that Fannie Mae flatly failed about a year ago in its attempt to have a receiver  
3 appointed. (*See, e.g.*, Counterclaim, ¶¶ 162-65.) Also, in response, Westland filed a countermotion,  
4 and in October 2020, was granted a preliminary injunction which upheld the *status quo ante litem* – by  
5 placing the Parties in the position they were before the Lenders illegally declared a Default. (Order,  
6 dated November 20, 2020.) However, Fannie Mae's tactics have caused this action to mushroom with  
7 nearly constant motion practice, multiple pending appeals, and intervention by its Conservator, the  
8 Federal Housing Finance Agency.

9       Importantly, some of Fannie Mae's illegal acts, its breach of other provisions in the underlying  
10 contracts, and its tortious and retaliatory actions have been directed not only at the two Defendants but  
11 the eleven intervening Counterclaimants - all of which are Westland affiliates. (Counterclaim, ¶¶ 260,  
12 279-80, 294-302, 453, 463, 473-76.) Fannie Mae's actions - designed as retribution and likely to  
13 attempt to create some leverage in this action – threaten Counterclaimants' hundreds of millions of  
14 dollars invested in real estate assets, their relationships with other lenders, and their business  
15 operations related to various business transactions they were entitled to engage in using funds that  
16 Fannie Mae illegally and unilaterally blocked, all which occurred as a result of Fannie Mae declaring  
17 an improper default and extending that purported default to a host of other loans and entities by  
18 including all Westland entities on a-check. Fannie Mae's actions are coercive and particularly  
19 troublesome because Westland had taken action to notify Fannie Mae that Sellers had provided  
20 fraudulent misrepresentations and concealments within its financial statements, and in the colloquial,  
21 "cooked the books" by overstating rental income and occupancy rates, all of which Westland relied  
22 upon in its early dealings with Fannie Mae. (Counterclaim, ¶¶ 140-44.) And, despite the evidence of  
23 Seller's wrongdoing, Fannie Mae improperly used these fraudulent numbers to attempt show a  
24 "decline in occupancy" to support its claim for "deterioration" that it used to declare a Default.

25       Based on the foregoing facts, the Counterclaims were plead to contain a clear, plain statement  
26 of each claim. Further, those claims have already been tested and held sufficient when on October 22,  
27 2020, the Court granted Westland's request for a preliminary injunction, and on February 4, 2021,  
28 when this court entered an Order denying in all material respects Federal National Mortgage



1 Association's ("Fannie Mae") prior Motion to Dismiss. Notably, several of the Counterclaims are  
2 virtually unchanged, including the first, second, fifth, ninth, and tenth causes of action. (Exhibit 1  
3 [red-lined First Amended Answer and First Amended Counterclaim].) In fact, for each claim, the only  
4 language that is non-specific as to the substantive section of the Counterclaims involves the opening  
5 line of each claim, which generally states: "Counterclaimants repeat, reallege, and incorporate the  
6 allegations set forth in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein." Otherwise, the word  
7 Counterclaimants is not used in those claims. (Counterclaim, ¶¶ 432, 444, 456, 466, 479, 532, and  
8 542.)

### 9 **III. LEGAL ARGUMENT**

#### 10 **A. Dismissal Is Improper - Each Claim Explicitly Identifies The Counterclaimant.**

11 Each cause of action specifically identifies the party on whose behalf the particular claim is  
12 plead. Notably, in the initial Counterclaim, the claims were originally and only plead by Liberty LLC  
13 or Square LLC. Thus, little to no change has been made to the majority of the previously existing  
14 claims raised by those parties. Further, no reference has been added in those Counterclaims to  
15 additional parties. (See Exhibit 1 [Red-lined First Amended Counterclaim], Claims 1, 2, 5, 9, 10.) In  
16 fact, based on the additional parties added to this matter, the only paragraph of each claim that can be  
17 interpreted to the contrary is the initial line of each cause of action, which was unchanged before and  
18 after the Counterclaims were amended and continues to refer to "Counterclaimants" when  
19 incorporating the preceding paragraphs. (Counterclaim, ¶¶ 432, 444, 456, 466, 479, 532, and 542.)

20 Further, by way of example, the specificity regarding each Counterclaimant that the cause of  
21 action applies to is shown by the language in the First Cause of Action, which states: "a valid  
22 assumption agreement was entered into between Liberty LLC," "which obligations were assumed by  
23 Liberty LLC," "Liberty LLC has performed all of the duties and obligations," "Fannie Mae . . .  
24 breached their Loan Agreements with Liberty LLC," and "Liberty LLC has been damaged . . ."  
25 (Counterclaim, ¶¶ 433, 438, 439, 441 and 444.) For that reason, the First Cause of Action applies to  
26 Liberty LLC. Finally, while a limited number of paragraphs more broadly identify "Westland," the  
27 introductory section of the Counterclaim defines Westland as Liberty LLC and Square LLC only.  
28 (Counterclaim, page 14.)

1 In terms of the previously existing causes of action, the sole exception involving a change in  
2 the applicable Counterclaimants is the fourth cause of action, which has been broadened to include  
3 every Counterclaimant. (Counterclaim, ¶¶ 475-78.) But, the fourth counterclaim explicitly references  
4 all Counterclaimants related to the breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing (*Id.*) and also  
5 alleges that duty arises from the Loan Agreements, the Master Credit Facility Agreement, the related  
6 guarantees, and the applications that required submission of the financial statements/financial records  
7 of the Westland Securities Entities. (Counterclaim, ¶¶ 468, 469, 472, 473.) As such, each  
8 Counterclaimant was validly included in that claim because each of those parties was harmed by  
9 Fannie Mae's breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing when engaging in bad faith loan  
10 servicing and placing entities other than those involved with the Loan Agreement on a-check.

11 Finally, the third counterclaim explicitly references the Westland Credit Facilities Entities as  
12 the parties to which that claim applies. (Counterclaim, ¶¶ 457, 461-65.)

13 As such, the first argument Fannie Mae raises, namely that the Counterclaims fail to identify  
14 the parties to which the first, second, third, fourth, fifth, ninth, and tenth cause of actions apply, is  
15 inapplicable and an improper basis to dismiss any portion of those claims.

16 **B. The Intended Beneficiary Arguments Are Misplaced, Because If No Contractual,**  
17 **Intended Beneficiary, Or Other Contract Based Relationship Existed Between**  
18 **Fannie Mae and the Westland Affiliated Entities, Then Fannie Mae's Bad Faith**  
**Actions By Improperly Placing Entities On A-Check Gave Rise to A Tort**

19 Fannie Mae argues that failing to plead that the various Westland-affiliated entities were  
20 parties or intended beneficiaries of each agreement requires the dismissal of those Counterclaimants  
21 from the implied breach of good faith and fair dealing claim because only a party to the contract or  
22 intended beneficiary can sue on a breach of contract claim. (MTD, at 8-10.) However, despite the  
23 contracts' intended beneficiary disclaimer, Westland disagrees. *See In Am. Fed'n of Musicians v.*  
24 *Reno's Riverside Hotel, Inc.*, 86 Nev. 695, 699, 475 P.2d 220, 222 (1970) (finding that a successor to  
25 a party who was alleged to have breached a contract could state a claim for compensatory damages  
26 after the party was improperly placed on a "National Defaulters List").

27 Moreover, a breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing may give rise to both contract  
28 and tort claims. *Hilton Hotels Corp. v. Butch Lewis Productions, Inc.*, 109 Nev. 1043, 1046-47, 862

1 P.2d 1207, 1209 (1993). Specifically, in *Hilton Hotels*, the defendants contended that the court’s  
2 prior ruling that no liability existed on a breach of contract claim “precludes further litigation *against*  
3 *any party not privy to the Hilton/Duo contract* and forecloses the pursuit of any of the former claims  
4 other than that of the alleged breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.” 109  
5 Nev. at 1046 (emphasis added). However, the *Hilton Hotels* court disagreed, and held: “that a  
6 wrongful act which is committed during the course of a contractual relationship may give rise to  
7 both tort and contractual remedies” and remanded to determine whether tort liability should be  
8 imposed on additional parties, who were not parties to the contract. *Id.* Moreover, the Court  
9 reiterated that “the duty not to act in bad faith or deal unfairly thus becomes a part of the contract,  
10 and . . . In certain circumstances, breach of contract, including breach of the covenant of good faith  
11 and fair dealing, may provide the basis for a tort claim.” *Hilton Hotels Corp.*, 109 Nev. at 1046–47  
12 (quoting *Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial Hosp.*, 147 Ariz. 370, 383, 710 P.2d 1025, 1038  
13 (1985)).

14 As such, if Fannie Mae did not place the affiliated-Westland entities on its a-check list based  
15 on a contractual right, then Fannie Mae clearly engaged in coercive behavior designed to improperly  
16 extract additional funds and to intentionally interfere with Counterclaimant’s lending relationships,  
17 which would subject Fannie Mae to liability for business tort claims. Accordingly, in such a case, the  
18 Westland Credit Facility Entities and Westland Securities Entities request leave to state appropriate  
19 business tort claims.

20 **C. Fannie Mae’s Attempt to Use a Permissive Forum Selection Clause To Bifurcate**  
21 **This Matter Is Improper.**

22 The Nevada Supreme Court has held that a forum selection clause stating the parties “agree  
23 and submit themselves to the jurisdiction of the courts of the State of Utah with regard to the subject  
24 matter of this agreement” was permissive. *Am. First Fed. Credit Union v. Soro*, 131 Nev. 737, 738,  
25 742, 359 P.3d 105, 106, 108 (2015). In *Soro*, this state’s highest court made clear that to be  
26 mandatory, it is not enough to mention a particular forum or to specify that disputes will be resolved  
27 there, but rather the agreement must contain “words of exclusivity” and that “[a]bsent such language,  
28 we deem the clause permissive.” 131 Nev. at 742. The parenthetical comments that the Nevada

1 Supreme Court positively cited from other jurisdictions are telling, as even stringent language was  
2 deemed permissive unless only one particular court is stated to have exclusive jurisdiction. *Id.* at 741.  
3 Specifically, the Nevada Supreme Court reviewed the caselaw and recognized the following out of  
4 state authority in finding the challenged clause permissive:

5 *John Boutari & Son, Wines & Spirits, S.A. v. Attiki Imps. & Distribs Inc.*, 22 F.3d 51,  
6 52–53 (2d Cir.1994) (holding the forum selection clause, “[a]ny dispute arising  
7 between the parties hereunder shall come within the jurisdiction of the competent  
8 Greek Courts, specifically of the Thessaloniki Courts,” **as permissive** (internal  
9 quotation marks omitted)); *Hunt Wesson Foods, Inc. v. Supreme Oil Co.*, 817 F.2d 75,  
10 76–78 (9th Cir.1987) (holding the forum selection clause, “[t]he courts of California,  
11 County of Orange, shall have jurisdiction over the parties in any action at law relating  
12 to the subject matter or the interpretation of this contract,” **as permissive, and noting  
that to be considered mandatory, a forum selection clause must clearly require  
that a particular court is the only one that has jurisdiction** (internal quotation  
marks omitted)); *Keaty v. Freeport Indon., Inc.*, 503 F.2d 955, 956–57 (5th Cir.1974)  
(holding the forum selection clause, “[t]his agreement shall be construed and  
enforceable according to the law of the State of New York and the parties submit to  
the jurisdiction of the courts of New York,” **as permissive** (internal quotation marks  
omitted)).

13 *Soro*, 131 Nev. at 741–42 (emphasis added).

14 Faced with the stringent exclusivity requirement established by the Nevada Supreme Court,  
15 Fannie Mae selectively quotes the forum selection clause related to the Master Credit Facility  
16 Agreement and by doing misleads this Court regarding its permissive nature. The full clause provides:

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1       **Section 15.01 Choice of Law; Consent to Jurisdiction.**

2       Notwithstanding anything in the Notes, the Security Documents, or any of the other  
3       Loan Documents to the contrary, each of the terms and provisions, and rights and  
4       obligations of Borrower under this Master Agreement and the Notes and the other  
5       Loan Documents, shall be governed by, interpreted, construed, and enforced pursuant  
6       to and in accordance with the laws of the District of Columbia (excluding the law  
7       applicable to conflicts or choice of law) except to the extent of procedural and  
8       substantive matters relating only to the creation, perfection, and foreclosure of liens  
9       and security interests, and enforcement of the rights and remedies, against the  
10       Mortgaged Properties, *which matters shall be governed by the laws of the jurisdiction*  
11       *in which a Mortgaged Property is located*, the perfection, the effect of perfection and  
12       non-perfection and foreclosure of security interests on personal property, *which*  
13       *matters shall be governed by the laws of the jurisdiction determined by the choice of*  
14       *law provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code in effect for the jurisdiction in which*  
15       *any Borrower is organized*. Borrower agrees that any controversy arising under or in  
16       relation to the Notes, the Security Documents (other than the Security Instruments),  
17       or any other Loan Document shall be, *except as otherwise provided herein*, litigated  
18       in the District of Columbia. The local and federal courts and authorities with  
19       jurisdiction in the District of Columbia shall, except as otherwise provided herein,  
20       have jurisdiction over all controversies which may arise under or in relation to the  
21       Loan Documents, including those controversies relating to the execution, jurisdiction,  
22       breach, enforcement, or compliance with the Notes, the Security Documents (other  
23       than the Security Instruments), or any other issue arising under, relating to, or in  
24       connection with any of the Loan Documents. Borrower irrevocably consents to  
25       service, jurisdiction, and venue of such courts for any litigation arising from the  
26       Notes, the Security Documents, or any of the other Loan Documents, and waives any  
27       other venue to which it might be entitled by virtue of domicile, habitual residence, or  
28       otherwise. *Nothing contained herein, however, shall prevent Lender from bringing*  
*any suit, action, or proceeding or exercising any rights against Borrower and against*  
*the collateral in any other jurisdiction*. Initiating such suit, action, or proceeding or  
taking such action in any other jurisdiction shall in no event constitute a waiver of the  
agreement contained herein that the laws of the District of Columbia shall govern the  
rights and obligations of Borrower and Lender as provided herein or the submission  
herein by Borrower to personal jurisdiction within the District of Columbia.

19       Exhibit 1, at 103 (emphasis added). As the italicized language clarifies, the forum selection clause is  
20       not exclusive but rather contains three provisions that provide for jurisdiction in other forums.  
21       Tellingly, in this case, the other forums identified would all be Nevada, which is the location of the  
22       properties secured by the Master Credit Facility Agreement, the state of incorporation where the  
23       borrowers are organized, and the state from which Lender asserted a default that resulted in it  
24       improperly “exercising [ ] rights against Borrower” by tortiously placing them all on a-check.

25       As such, the forum selection clause is not mandatory as Fannie Mae suggests, because the  
26       clause specifically reserved the right for Fannie Mae to bring suit “or exercis[e] any rights” in other  
27       jurisdictions, specifically limited jurisdiction by stating “except as otherwise provided herein,” and  
28       designated three instances when suit may be filed in other jurisdictions. Simply stated, the forum

1 selection clause is not one that clearly requires suit in a particular court as the only one having  
2 jurisdiction as it must to be mandatory. Just as importantly, Fannie Mae actually exercised rights in  
3 another jurisdiction when it chose to file an action related to the Loan Agreements in Nevada AND  
4 took action against the MCFA entities by placing them on a-check based on the purported breach of  
5 the same Loan Agreement that Fannie Mae sued in Nevada.

6 Additionally, forum selection clauses can only apply “so long as the agreement is reasonable  
7 and just.” *Pal v. Hafterlaw, LLC*, 132 Nev. 1015, at \*1 (Nev. App. 2016). Dismissal of the Master  
8 Credit Facility Entities claims based on a permissive forum selection clause would be improper,  
9 especially where, as here, such a result is inconsistent with Nevada law based on the requirement of  
10 NRCP 13(a) that any claims against an opposing party must be raised in response to a complaint.  
11 Fannie Mae chose to sue in Nevada on the Loan Agreements. By doing so, Fannie Mae consented to  
12 the jurisdiction of the court over this matter, so it cannot choose to engage in discriminatory loan  
13 servicing against the MCFA entities based on the same purported breach that it sued in Nevada while  
14 evading liability by indiscriminately utilizing the forum selection clauses it drafted as a shield. It is  
15 not just or reasonable to remove related counterclaims and to force the bifurcation of claims into  
16 repetitive suits in multiple jurisdictions based simply on Fannie Mae’s whims, especially when arising  
17 from Fannie Mae’s same misconduct against parties that it does not dispute are proper parties to this  
18 case who have raised the same allegations based on the same purported default. *See Pal v. Hafterlaw,*  
19 *LLC*, 132 Nev. 1015, at \*1 (Nev. App. 2016) (*citing Tandy Comput. Leasing, a Div., of Tandy Elecs.,*  
20 *Inc. v. Terina's Pizza, Inc.*, 105 Nev. 841, 843, 784 P.2d 7, 8 (1989)).

21 Notably, in *Pal v. Hafterlaw*, the appellate court addressed whether, in response to a fee  
22 dispute complaint, a malpractice claim could be brought as a counterclaim and whether Nevada was  
23 the proper jurisdiction. As in *Pal*, NRCP 13(a) requires that “a party must raise in response to a  
24 complaint any claim ‘the pleader has against any opposing party, if it arises out of the transaction or  
25 occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party’s claim and does not require for its  
26 adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction.” *See id*  
27 (failing to dismiss malpractice counterclaim filed in response to a fee dispute complaint despite the  
28 assertion that claims were improperly raised with respect to related parties).

1 As such, it would not be just or reasonable to force bifurcation of related claims based on a  
2 forum selection clause, when Fannie Mae chose to sue in Nevada, submitted to the jurisdiction of this  
3 Court related to its conduct arising out of this suit, and is alleged to have engaged in discriminatory  
4 lending practices against related entities based on the same purported breach, especially in light NRC  
5 13(a)'s requirement that any claim against an opposing party be brought in the same action.

6 **D. 12 U.S.C. § 4617(j)(4) Does Not Bar Punitive Damages or Attorney Fees.**

7 FHFA argues that 12 U.S.C. § 4617(j)(4) bars Westland's request for punitive damages and  
8 attorney's fees. This argument fails for three independent reasons.

9 *First*, neither punitive damages nor attorney's fees are "amounts in the nature of penalties or  
10 fines" within the meaning of 12 U.S.C. § 4617(j)(4). FHFA assumes with little explanation that  
11 punitive damages qualify as "penalties" under the statute. But the law frequently distinguishes  
12 between "punitive damages" on the one hand and "penalties" on the other. *See, e.g.*, 18 Nev. Rev.  
13 Stat. § 228.1116(1)(b) (attorney's contingency fee contract "[m]ust not be based on any amount  
14 attributable to a fine or civil penalty, but may be based on an amount attributable to punitive  
15 damages"); *Nevada Power Co. v. Eighth Judicial Dist.*, 120 Nev. 948, 961 (2004) (explaining in the  
16 context of administrative enforcement action that "civil penalties" are "not equivalent" to "punitive  
17 damages").

18 Although courts sometimes characterize punitive damages as "penalties," whether that term  
19 is properly understood to encompass punitive damages depends on the context. The context here is a  
20 statutory provision that is otherwise silent regarding the remedies available to private litigants who  
21 sue FHFA. Rather than specifically addressing remedies in private civil suits like this one, the  
22 balance of Section 4617(j)(4) immunizes FHFA from liability for "fines" and other punishments that  
23 governments impose for various forms of misconduct, including failures "to pay any real property,  
24 personal property, probate, or recording tax or any recording or filing fees when due." 12 U.S.C.  
25 § 4617(j)(4). When read in context, the word "penalties" in the statute is thus most naturally  
26 understood as limited to *punishments imposed by the government* and not to restrict the remedies  
27 otherwise available to private parties in civil litigation.

1 This reading of Section 4617(j)(4) is reinforced by 12 U.S.C. § 4617(d)(3)(B), which  
2 expressly limits FHFA’s liability for “punitive or exemplary damages” when it repudiates contracts.  
3 Section 4617(d)(3)(B) would be entirely superfluous if Section 4617(j)(4)’s prohibition on  
4 “penalties” encompassed punitive damages, thus violating “one of the most basic interpretive  
5 canons” of construction. *Corley v. United States*, 556 U.S. 303, 314 (2009). The specific limitations  
6 on civil remedies against FHFA that appear in Section 4617(d)(3)(B) must not be nullified by an  
7 overbroad interpretation of the more general language that appears in Section 4617(j)(4). *See*  
8 *RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank*, 556 U.S. 639, 645 (2012) (discussing the  
9 “general/specific” canon).<sup>1</sup>

10 FHFA cites a handful of cases in which courts have read the word “penalties” more broadly  
11 to extend to claims for punitive damages. But none of the cases FHFA identifies grapple with the  
12 statutory text, and in any event, the precedents do not uniformly favor FHFA’s interpretation. For  
13 example, in *Higgins v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP*, 2014 WL 1332825, at \*5 (E.D. Ky. March  
14 31, 2014), the court distinguished between an “ordinary action for damages where exemplary or  
15 punitive damages are awarded” and remedies that are “properly characterized as penal.” The court  
16 explained that only “penal” remedies are “penalties” under Section 4617(j)(4) and held that a suit for  
17 treble damages under a Kentucky statute could go forward. Likewise, here, the punitive damages  
18 Westland seeks are not “penal,” so Section 4617(j)(4) does not apply.<sup>2</sup>

19 *Second*, Section 4617(j)(4) only limits when FHFA may “be liable” for penalties and fines,  
20 and thus does not prevent the Court from using punitive damages or attorney’s fees as a basis for  
21 offsetting Westland’s liability to Fannie Mae under the relevant Loan Agreements. Notably, certain  
22 contractual rights “to offset or net out” payment obligations are among the contractual provisions  
23

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24  
25 <sup>1</sup> FHFA cannot avoid punitive damages under Section 4617(b)(3)(B) because under its own  
26 regulations its authority to repudiate contracts had expired by the time of the events that gave rise to  
this lawsuit. *See* 12 C.F.R. § 1237.5(b).

27 <sup>2</sup> FHFA is on even weaker footing in arguing that an award of attorney’s fees would qualify  
28 as an impermissible penalty under Section 4617(j)(4). Even assuming that punitive damages are  
“penalties” within the meaning of the statute, an award of attorney’s fees is not. *See, e.g., Nat’l Fair  
Housing Alliance v. Fannie Mae*, 2019 WL 3779531, at \*6 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2019).



1 that FHFA cannot avoid during conservatorship. *See* 12 U.S.C. § 4617(d)(8)(E)(iii). Thus, to the  
2 extent that Westland’s prayer for punitive damages and attorney’s fees is used as a basis for reducing  
3 Westland’s contractual liability to the Plaintiffs, these remedies would not make FHFA “liable” for  
4 anything.

5 *Third*, Section 4617(j)(4) immunizes “[t]he Agency” from liability for penalties and fines—a  
6 term that the Housing and Economic Recovery Act elsewhere defines to include FHFA but not  
7 Fannie Mae. *See* 12 U.S.C. § 4502(2) (“The term ‘Agency’ means the Federal Housing Finance  
8 Agency established under section 4511 of this title.”). Thus, although FHFA cites non-binding  
9 precedents from other jurisdictions that say otherwise, the better reading of the statutory text is that  
10 Section 4617(j)(4) does not apply to Fannie Mae. That is what the court concluded in *Burke v.*  
11 *Fannie Mae*, 221 F. Supp. 3d 707, 710 (E.D. Va. Dec. 6, 2016), *vacated upon settlement*, 2016 WL  
12 7451624 (E.D. Va. Dec. 6, 2016), which is the most thorough and persuasive judicial treatment of  
13 the relevant statutory text. This conclusion follows not only from Congress’s definition of “Agency”  
14 but also its careful effort to distinguish throughout Section 4617 between “the Agency” and a  
15 “regulated entity” in conservatorship or receivership. *See Burke*, 221 F. Supp. 3d at 710 (observing  
16 that Section 4617 uses the term “Agency” 138 times and “regulated entity” 189 times and  
17 consistently differentiates between the two terms). What is more, Section 4617(j) only applies to  
18 cases “in which the Agency *is acting* as a conservator or receiver,” 12 U.S.C. § 4617(j)(1), and it is  
19 undisputed that FHFA had no involvement in the events underlying this lawsuit until it belatedly  
20 parachuted into the case in an effort to shield Fannie Mae from liability.

21 **E. Counterclaimants Validly Seek Attorneys’ Fees As Special Damages.**

22 Fannie Mae disputes “attorney’s fees for [the] contract-based claims” upon the assertion that  
23 “no basis” was provided for such damages. (Br. at 17-18.) Notice of the basis for such fees is plead in  
24 each claim, but to the extent that a further basis is required, Counterclaimants are entitled to attorneys’  
25 fees as special damages.

26 In Nevada, attorney’s fees can be recovered as an element of consequential damage and may  
27 be plead when foreseeably arising out of breach of contract or tortious conduct as special damages.  
28 *Sandy Valley Associates v. Sky Ranch Estates Owners Assoc.*, 117 Nev. 948, 955, 35 P.3d 964, 968-69

1 (2001) (consolidating cases exploring the circumstances under which attorney's fees can be  
2 recovered); NRC 9(g). Based on *Sandy Valley* and its progeny, attorney fees are available as special  
3 damages when they are either: 1) the natural and proximate cause of injurious conduct, 2) related to  
4 third-party actions, or 3) incurred to recover real or personal property or in clarifying or removing a  
5 cloud upon title to property. *Id.*; *Liu v. Christopher Homes, LLC*, 130 Nev. 147, 151, 321 P.3d 875,  
6 878 (2014) (clarifying the cloud to title basis includes claims other than slander of title, such as  
7 declaratory judgment or equitable relief, as long as in the nature of slander of title). In reviewing the  
8 relevant authority on the topic, the *Sandy Valley* court also pointed out several matters where  
9 attorneys' fees as special damages were deemed to have been warranted. 117 Nev. 955, n.7.

10 For the first basis, an award of special damages based attorneys' fees was permitted when  
11 incurred to obtain a restraining order that was necessary to remove a hotel from "National Defaulters  
12 List." *Am. Fed'n of Musicians v. Reno's Riverside Hotel, Inc.*, 86 Nev. 695, 699, 475 P.2d 220, 222  
13 (1970) disapproved of by *Sandy Valley Associates v. Sky Ranch Estates Owners Ass'n*, 117 Nev. 948,  
14 35 P.3d 964 (2001) (recognizing no statutory or rule basis existed for these attorneys' fees, and they  
15 were damages). In that case, the hotel assumed an events contract from its predecessor that was not  
16 fulfilled, the music federation demanded a default fee, the hotel refused to pay the default fee, the  
17 hotel was placed on the federation's defaulters list, and the federation directed the local union to  
18 advise musicians not to contract with the hotel further. *Id.* at 698. The Court found the federation's  
19 tactics were a "coercive device" since no "no dispute existed between the new owner and its employed  
20 musicians," and that Nevada has "denounced coercion of similar character" even in the face of an  
21 "illusory pre-emption rule" based on federal National Labor Relations Act. *Id.* at 699. As such, the  
22 Court found the attorneys' fee expenditure necessary and awarded fees as special damages. *Id.*

23 As to the second basis, shortly before *Sandy Valley*, the Court determined that attorneys' fees  
24 were permitted to be recovered by a subcontractor as special damages against a school district. *Clark*  
25 *County Sch. Dist. v. Rolling Plains Const., Inc.*, 117 Nev. 101, 102, 16 P.3d 1079, 1080  
26 (2001), *disapproved of in part by Sandy Valley Associates v. Sky Ranch Estates Owners Ass'n*, 117  
27 Nev. 948, 35 P.3d 964 (2001) (recognizing no statutory or rule basis existed for these attorneys' fees,  
28 and they were damages). In that case, despite no direct relationship between the subcontractor and the

1 school district, the Court found that when the school district breached its contract with its contractor,  
2 and the contractor, in turn, breached its contract with the subcontractor, the subcontractors' attorneys'  
3 fees were recoverable as special damages. *Id.*

4 The causes of actions in the present case have plead substantially similar allegations and have  
5 sought attorneys' fees as special damages. In the first, second, third, fourth, and ninth causes of  
6 action, like in *Reno's Riverside Hotel*, Westland has sought injunctive relief to *inter alia* be removed  
7 from Fannie Mae's own "national defaulters list" known as a-check, and sought related compensatory  
8 damages, including attorneys' fees as special damages due to Fannie Mae's and its servicer's coercive  
9 conduct. (Counterclaim, ¶¶ 6, 260, 279, 280, 296-98, 300, 441, 453, 463, 540-41.) Additionally, like  
10 in *Rolling Plains Const.*, in the fourth cause of action, Counterclaimants allege that Fannie Mae and  
11 Grandbridge engaged in bad faith loan servicing based on the purported default arising from the Loan  
12 Agreements and expanded that to a wider range of Westland entities who were not direct parties to the  
13 Loan Agreements, but were harmed by Fannie Mae and Grandbridge's breach. Similar to the related  
14 subcontractor, which felt the effects of the school district's default, attorneys' fees as special damages  
15 for Fannie Mae's breach should be permitted for the Westland Credit Facility Entities and Westland  
16 Security Entities. Finally, under the third basis, Westland is entitled to recover attorneys' fees, which  
17 were required to be paid to obtain a recovery of their reserve funds that were improperly converted and  
18 to remove the slander of title created by the Notice of Sale related to the real properties, as special  
19 damages for the fifth, eighth, ninth, and tenth causes of action. On that basis, the motion to dismiss  
20 should be denied as to Westland's contract-based attorneys' fees.

21 **F. Counterclaimants Validly Seek Attorneys' Fees As Special Damages.**

22 Fannie Mae's arguments in favor of a waiver of consequential damages are overstated. The  
23 section and paragraph of the cited provision of the Loan Agreement show the language is limited to  
24 situations that Fannie Mae is resorting to foreclosures and related accountings for collateral.  
25 Specifically, each clause is within a two paragraph Waiver of Marshaling section of the Loan  
26 Agreement and MCFA that Fannie Mae drafted. Waiver of marshaling relates to the waiver of a  
27 specific equitable doctrine requiring that the lender proceed through each source of collateral before  
28 proceeding to the next. The full text of the section makes clear that the cited provision is not intended

as a general waiver of consequential damages, which text states as follows:

**Section 14.04 Waiver of Marshaling.**

Notwithstanding the existence of any other security interests in the Mortgaged Properties held by Lender or by any other party, Lender shall have the right to determine the order in which any or all of the Mortgaged Properties (or any part thereof) shall be subjected to the remedies provided in this Master Agreement, any other Loan Document or Applicable Law. Lender shall have the right to determine the order in which all or any part of the Indebtedness is satisfied from the proceeds realized upon the exercise of such remedies. Borrower and any party who now or in the future acquires a security interest in any Mortgaged Property and who has actual or constructive notice of this Master Agreement waives any and all right to require the marshaling of assets or to require that any of the Mortgaged Properties be sold in the inverse order of alienation or that any of the Mortgaged Properties be sold in parcels or as an entirety in connection with the exercise of any of the remedies permitted by Applicable Law or provided in this Master Agreement or any other Loan Documents.

Lender shall account for any moneys received by Lender in respect of any foreclosure on or disposition of collateral hereunder and under the other Loan Documents provided that Lender shall not have any duty as to any collateral, and Lender shall be accountable only for amounts that it actually receives as a result of the exercise of such powers. NONE OF LENDER OR ITS AFFILIATES, OFFICERS, DIRECTORS, EMPLOYEES, AGENTS, OR REPRESENTATIVES SHALL BE RESPONSIBLE TO BORROWER (a) FOR ANY ACT OR FAILURE TO ACT UNDER ANY POWER OF ATTORNEY OR OTHERWISE, EXCEPT IN RESPECT OF DAMAGES ATTRIBUTABLE SOLELY TO THEIR OWN GROSS NEGLIGENCE OR WILLFUL MISCONDUCT AS FINALLY DETERMINED PURSUANT TO A FINAL, NONAPPEALABLE COURT ORDER BY A COURT OF COMPETENT JURISDICTION, NOR (b) FOR ANY PUNITIVE, EXEMPLARY, INDIRECT OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES.

Based on the full text of the two paragraphs, the Wavier of Marshaling section shows an intent that Fannie Mae and its principals not be held liable for damages when seeking recovery from collateral or in how the funds generated from a foreclosure are applied unless due to gross negligence or willful misconduct. Perhaps most insightful is the text of clause (a) of the last sentence, which addresses when Fannie Mae acts or fails to act “under any power of attorney or otherwise,” which in the context of general litigation would not make sense. As such, it seems clear that clause (b) is not separately severable and capable of providing a general waiver as to consequential damages. Moreover, this purported limitation on consequential damages does not apply to all conduct related to the entire Loan Agreement, and certainly does not apply to the retaliatory and discriminatory faith loan servicing against affiliated entities that occurred in this matter.

1           **G.      To The Extent The Motion Is Granted In Any Part, Counterclaimants Seek Leave**  
2           **to Amend.**

3           In *Cohen v. Mirage Resorts*, 119 Nev. 1, 22 (2003), the Nevada Supreme Court reviewed the  
4 standard for a motion to dismiss under NRCP 12(b)(5) and stated:

5           When considering a motion to dismiss under NRCP 12(b)(5), a district court must  
6           construe the complaint liberally and draw every fair inference in favor of the plaintiff.  
7           A complaint should not be dismissed unless it appears to a certainty that the plaintiff  
8           could prove no set of facts that would entitle him or her to relief. Moreover, when a  
            complaint can be amended to state a claim for relief, leave to amend, rather than  
            dismissal, is the preferred remedy.

9           *Id.* (citing *Capital Mortgage Co. Holding v. Hahn*, 101 Nev. 314, 315 (1985), *Edgar v. Wagner*, 101  
10          Nev. 226, 228 (1985), and *Zulk-Josephs Co. v. Wells Cargo, Inc.*, 81 Nev. 163, 169-70 (1965)).

11          Thus, while Counterclaimants believe that the Counterclaim filed in this case adequately  
12          pleads each claim asserted against Fannie Mae, if this Court should determine that there is any  
13          deficiency in the pleading, then consistent with the requirements of *Cohen*, Counterclaimants move  
14          and respectfully request permission to amend the complaint according to NRCP 15.

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#### IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Court should **DENY** the joint Fannie Mae and FHFA Motion to Dismiss in Part Defendant's First Amended Answer and Amended Counterclaim.

DATED this 23rd day of November 2021.

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**CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on November 23, 2021, a copy of the foregoing **OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S PARTIAL MOTION TO DISMISS DEFENDANT'S FIRST AMENDED ANSWER AND AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM**, was served on the parties listed below via electronic service through Odyssey to the following:

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An Employee of the Law Offices of John Benedict



**EXHIBIT “1”**

**EXHIBIT “1”**

**AACC**

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~~Plaintiffs~~ Westland Liberty Village, LLC & Westland  
Village Square LLC, and Counterclaimants  
Amusement Industry, Inc., Westland Corona LLC,  
Westland Amber Ridge LLC, Westland Hacienda Hills  
LLC, 1097 North State, LLC, Westland Tropicana Royale  
LLC, Vellagio Apts of Westland LLC, The Alevy Family  
Protection Trust, Westland AMT, LLC, AFT Industry NV,  
LLC, A&D Dynasty Trust*

**DISTRICT COURT**

**CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA**

FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE  
ASSOCIATION,

Plaintiff,

vs.

WESTLAND LIBERTY VILLAGE, LLC and  
WESTLAND VILLAGE SQUARE, LLC,

Defendants.

CASE NO. A-20-819412-C

DEPT NO. 4

**FIRST AMENDED ANSWER TO  
PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT, AND FIRST  
AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM AND THIRD  
PARTY COMPLAINT**

**EXEMPTION FROM ARBITRATION:  
Title to Real Property and Declaratory Relief  
requested via Counterclaim**

WESTLAND LIBERTY VILLAGE, LLC, a Nevada Limited Liability Company; ~~and~~ WESTLAND VILLAGE SQUARE, LLC, a Nevada Limited Liability Company; AMUSEMENT INDUSTRY, INC., a California Corporation; WESTLAND CORONA LLC, a Nevada Limited Liability Company; WESTLAND AMBER RIDGE LLC, a Nevada Limited Liability Company; WESTLAND HACIENDA HILLS LLC, a Nevada Limited Liability Company; 1097 NORTH STATE, LLC, a Delaware Limited Liability Company; WESTLAND TROPICANA ROYALE LLC, a Nevada Limited Liability Company; VELLAGIO APTS OF WESTLAND LLC, a Nevada Limited Liability Company; THE ALEVY FAMILY PROTECTION TRUST, a Nevada Irrevocable Trust; WESTLAND AMT, LLC, a Nevada Limited Liability Company; AFT INDUSTRY NV, LLC, a Nevada Limited Liability Company; and A&D DYNASTY TRUST, a Nevada Irrevocable Trust,

Counterclaimants,

vs.

FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE ASSOCIATION, a federally-charted corporation, GRANDBRIDGE REAL ESTATE CAPITAL, LLC, a North Carolina Limited Liability Company, SHAMROCK PROPERTIES VI LLC, a Delaware limited liability company; SHAMROCK PROPERTIES VII LLC, a Delaware limited liability company; ND MANAGER LLC, a Delaware (Connecticut) limited liability company; SHAMROCK COMMUNITIES, LLC, a Delaware limited liability corporation; SHAMROCK COMMUNITIES MANAGEMENT LLC, a Connecticut limited liability company; SHAMROCK PROPERTY MANAGEMENT LLC, a Delaware limited liability company; MMM INVESTMENTS LLC, a Delaware limited liability company; ELLEN WEINSTEIN, an individual; HILARY DAVIDSON, an individual; JENNIFER WILDE, an individual; and DOES 1 through 100; and ROE CORPORATIONS 101 through 200, inclusive,

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Counter-Defendant.
<del>WESTLAND LIBERTY VILLAGE, LLC, a</del> <del>Nevada Limited Liability</del> <del>Company; and WESTLAND</del> <del>VILLAGE SQUARE, LLC, a</del> <del>Nevada Limited Liability</del> <del>Company, — Third Party</del> <del>Plaintiffs,</del>
<del>vs.</del>
<del>GRANDBRIDGE REAL ESTATE CAPITAL,</del> <del>LLC, a North Carolina Limited Liability</del> <del>Company,</del>
Third Party Defendants.

**FIRST AMENDED ANSWER**

Defendants, Westland Liberty Village, LLC (“Liberty LLC”) and Westland Village Square, LLC (“Square LLC” and in combination with Liberty LLC, “Defendants” or “Westland”), by and through their counsel of record, the Law Offices of John Benedict, answer Plaintiff’s Verified Complaint, and admits, denies and alleges, as follows:

Defendants deny each and every allegation of Plaintiff’s Complaint, except those allegations that are specifically admitted, qualified, or otherwise answered.

**I. PARTIES, JURISDICTION AND VENUE**

1. In response to the allegations contained in Paragraph 1 of the Complaint, Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained therein, and therefore deny same.

2. In response to the allegations contained in Paragraph 2 of the Complaint, Defendants admit the allegations contained therein.

3. In response to the allegations contained in Paragraph 3 of the Complaint, Defendants admit the allegations contained therein.

1           4.     In response to the allegations contained in Paragraph 4 of the Complaint,  
2 Defendants admit the allegations related to the location of the properties and regarding expressly  
3 agreeing to the jurisdiction and venue of this Court, but the remaining allegations are so vague  
4 and ambiguous that they are unintelligible, and on that based Defendant denies the remaining  
5 allegations contained therein.

6           5.     In response to the allegations contained in Paragraph 5 of the Complaint,  
7 Defendants admit the allegations contained therein.

8           6.     In response to the allegations contained in Paragraph 6 of the Complaint,  
9 Defendants admit the allegations contained therein.

## 10       **II.     GENERAL ALLEGATIONS**

11          7.     In response to the allegations contained in Paragraph 7 of the Complaint,  
12 Defendants admit only that the Loan Agreement speaks for itself, and Defendants are without  
13 knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the remaining allegations  
14 contained in paragraph 7 of the Complaint, and therefore deny same.

15          8.     In response to the allegations contained in Paragraph 8 of the Complaint,  
16 Defendants admit only that the Loan Agreement and Note speak for themselves, and Defendants  
17 are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the remaining  
18 allegations contained in paragraph 8 of the Complaint, and therefore deny same.

19          9.     In response to the allegations contained in Paragraph 9 of the Complaint,  
20 Defendants admit only that the Deed of Trust speaks for itself and the address of the real  
21 property, and Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to  
22 the truth of the remaining allegations contained in paragraph 9 of the Complaint, and therefore  
23 deny same.

24          10.    In response to the allegations contained in Paragraph 10 of the Complaint,  
25 Defendants are not required to answer or respond to the allegations set forth therein because they  
26 lack any substance, but to the extent there is any allegation in Paragraph 10 that requires a  
27 response, such allegation is denied.

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1           11. In response to the allegations contained in Paragraph 11 of the Complaint,  
2 Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the  
3 allegations contained therein, and therefore deny same.

4           12. In response to the allegations contained in Paragraph 12 of the Complaint,  
5 Defendants admit only that the Assumption and Release Agreement speaks for itself, and  
6 Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the  
7 remaining allegations contained in paragraph 12 of the Complaint, and therefore deny same.

8           13. In response to the allegations contained in Paragraph 13 of the Complaint,  
9 Defendants admit only that the Loan Agreement speaks for itself, and Defendants are without  
10 knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the remaining allegations  
11 contained in paragraph 13 of the Complaint, and therefore deny same.

12           14. In response to the allegations contained in Paragraph 14 of the Complaint,  
13 Defendants admit only that the Loan Agreement and Note speak for themselves and Defendants  
14 are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the remaining  
15 allegations contained in paragraph 14 of the Complaint, and therefore deny same.

16           15. In response to the allegations contained in Paragraph 15 of the Complaint,  
17 Defendants admit only that the Deed of Trust speaks for itself, and Defendants are without  
18 knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the remaining allegations  
19 contained in paragraph 15 of the Complaint, and therefore deny same.

20           16. In response to the allegations contained in Paragraph 16 of the Complaint,  
21 Defendants are not required to answer or respond to the allegations set forth therein because they  
22 lack any substance, but to the extent there is any allegation in Paragraph 16 that requires a  
23 response, such allegation is denied.

24           17. In response to the allegations contained in Paragraph 17 of the Complaint,  
25 Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the  
26 allegations contained therein, and therefore deny same.

27           18. In response to the allegations contained in Paragraph 18 of the Complaint,  
28 Defendants admit only that the Assumption and Release Agreement speaks for itself, and

1 Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the  
2 remaining allegations contained in paragraph 18 of the Complaint, and therefore deny same.

3 19. In response to the allegations contained in Paragraph 19 of the Complaint,  
4 Defendants admit only that each Deed of Trust speaks for itself, and Defendants are without  
5 knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the remaining allegations  
6 contained in paragraph 18 of the Complaint, and therefore deny same.

7 20. In response to the allegations contained in Paragraph 20 of the Complaint,  
8 Defendants admit only that each Deed of Trust speaks for itself, and Defendants deny the  
9 remaining allegations contained in paragraph 20 of the Complaint.

10 21. In response to the allegations contained in Paragraph 21 of the Complaint,  
11 Defendants admit only that the quoted text is contained in each Deed of Trust and that each Deed  
12 of Trust speaks for itself, and Defendants deny the remaining allegations contained in paragraph  
13 21 of the Complaint.

14 22. In response to the allegations contained in Paragraph 22 of the Complaint,  
15 Defendants admit only that the quoted texted is contained in each Loan Agreement and that each  
16 Loan Agreement speaks for itself, and Defendants deny the remaining allegations contained in  
17 paragraph 22 of the Complaint.

18 23. In response to the allegations contained in Paragraph 23 of the Complaint,  
19 Defendants admit only that f3 was onsite at each real property purportedly to conduct a Property  
20 Condition Assessment, and Defendants deny the remaining allegations contained in paragraph 23  
21 of the Complaint.

22 24. In response to the allegations contained in Paragraph 24 of the Complaint,  
23 Defendants deny the allegations contained therein.

24 25. In response to the allegations contained in Paragraph 25 of the Complaint,  
25 Defendants deny the allegations contained therein.

26 26. In response to the allegations contained in Paragraph 26 of the Complaint,  
27 Defendants deny the allegations contained therein.

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1           27. In response to the allegations contained in Paragraph 27 of the Complaint,  
2 Defendants deny the allegations contained therein.

3           28. In response to the allegations contained in Paragraph 28 of the Complaint,  
4 Defendants admit only that the quoted text is contained in each Loan Agreement and that each  
5 Loan Agreement speaks for itself, and Defendants deny the remaining allegations contained in  
6 paragraph 28 of the Complaint.

7           29. In response to the allegations contained in Paragraph 29 of the Complaint,  
8 Defendants deny the allegations contained therein.

9           30. In response to the allegations contained in Paragraph 30 of the Complaint,  
10 Defendants admit only that the quoted text is contained in each Loan Agreement and that each  
11 Loan Agreement speaks for itself, and Defendants deny the remaining allegations contained in  
12 paragraph 30 of the Complaint.

13           31. In response to the allegations contained in Paragraph 31 of the Complaint,  
14 Defendants deny the allegations contained therein.

15           32. In response to the allegations contained in Paragraph 32 of the Complaint,  
16 Defendants deny the allegations contained therein.

17           33. In response to the allegations contained in Paragraph 33 of the Complaint,  
18 Defendants deny the allegations contained therein.

19           34. In response to the allegations contained in Paragraph 34 of the Complaint,  
20 Defendants deny the allegations contained therein.

21           **III. CLAIMS FOR RELIEF**

22                           **FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION**

23                                   **(Specific Performance)**

24           35. In response to the allegations contained in Paragraph 35 of the Complaint,  
25 Defendants restate and incorporate by reference their answers to paragraphs 1 through 34 of  
26 Plaintiff's Complaint as if fully set forth herein.

27           36. In response to the allegations contained in Paragraph 36 of the Complaint,  
28 Defendants deny the allegations contained therein.



37. In response to the allegations contained in Paragraph 37 of the Complaint, Defendants deny the allegations contained therein.

38. In response to the allegations contained in Paragraph 38 of the Complaint, Defendants deny the allegations contained therein.

39. In response to the allegations contained in Paragraph 39 of the Complaint, Defendants deny the allegations contained therein.

40. In response to the allegations contained in Paragraph 40 of the Complaint, Defendants deny the allegations contained therein.

41. In response to the allegations contained in Paragraph 41 of the Complaint, Defendants deny the allegations contained therein.

42. In response to the allegations contained in Paragraph 42 of the Complaint, Defendants deny the allegations contained therein.

## SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION

**(Petition for Appointment of Receiver)**

43. In response to the allegations contained in Paragraph 43 of the Complaint, Defendants restate and incorporate by reference their answers to paragraphs 1 through 42 of Plaintiff's Complaint as if fully set forth herein.

44. In response to the allegations contained in Paragraph 44 of the Complaint, Defendants deny the allegations contained therein.

45. In response to the allegations contained in Paragraph 45 of the Complaint, Defendants deny the allegations contained therein.

46. In response to the allegations contained in Paragraph 46 of the Complaint, Defendants deny the allegations contained therein.

47. In response to the allegations contained in Paragraph 47 of the Complaint, Defendants deny the allegations contained therein.

48. In response to the allegations contained in Paragraph 48 of the Complaint, Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained therein, and therefore deny same.

1           49. In response to the allegations contained in Paragraph 49 of the Complaint,  
2 Defendants deny the allegations contained therein.

3           50. In response to the allegations contained in Paragraph 50 of the Complaint,  
4 Defendants deny the allegations contained therein.

5           51. In response to the allegations contained in Paragraph 51 of the Complaint,  
6 Defendants deny the allegations contained therein.

7           52. In response to the allegations contained in Paragraph 52 of the Complaint,  
8 Defendants deny the allegations contained therein.

9           53. In response to the allegations contained in Paragraph 53 of the Complaint,  
10 Defendants deny the allegations contained therein.

#### 11                                   **AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES**

12           As separate affirmative defenses to Plaintiff's Complaint, Westland alleges as follows:

#### 13                                   **FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE**

14           ~~Plaintiff's Complaint, and each and every allegation contained therein, fails to state a~~  
15 ~~claim upon which relief can be granted. Withdrawn [but numbering kept to maintain consistency]~~

#### 16                                   **SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE**

17           Plaintiff has waived its right to assert every cause of action set forth in Plaintiff's  
18 Complaint through its conduct and actions.

#### 19                                   **THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE**

20           Plaintiff is estopped from obtaining the relief sought in Plaintiff's Complaint.

#### 21                                   **FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE**

22           If Plaintiff suffered any damages ~~or less~~, which is expressly denied, then Westland  
23 alleges that persons, both served and unserved, named and unnamed, in some manner or  
24 percentage were responsible for Plaintiff's damages.

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#### 26                                   **FIFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE**

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1 Westland alleges that any damage allegedly suffered by Plaintiff as asserted~~Heged~~ in its  
2 Complaint was the result of Plaintiff's acts, omissions and failure to satisfy the conditions of the  
3 contracts s it sues upon, which resulted in breaching the contracts and not the result of acts or  
4 omissions of Westland.

5  
6 **SIXTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE**

7 Plaintiff's allegations contained in Plaintiff's Complaint, and each of them, are barred by  
8 the doctrine of laches in that Plaintiff has unreasonably delayed in bringing these claims, and  
9 said delays have caused prejudice to Westland.

10 **SEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE**

11 No relief may be obtained under the Complaint by reason of the doctrine of unclean  
12 hands and by reason of the unconscionability of Plaintiff's acts and claims.

13 **EIGHTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE**

14 Westland acted in good faith and dealt fairly and responsibly with Plaintiff, based on all  
15 relevant facts and circumstances known by them at the time Westland acted. However, Plaintiff  
16 and its agents have acted in bad faith, including but not limited to filing an improper notice of  
17 default and intention to sell ("NOD").

18 **NINTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE**

19 Plaintiff's claims are barred, in whole or in part, because in the event the Court  
20 determines the language of the applicable contractual documents support the construction  
21 Plaintiff now places on them, the Court should reform such language due to the mutual mistake  
22 of the parties, their assignors and predecessors-in-interest, regarding the construction the Court  
23 would make of such language.

24 **TENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE**

25 Plaintiff's claims are barred, in whole or in part, by the failure of conditions precedent or  
26 other anticipated incidents whose occurrence or non-occurrence were assumptions of the parties'  
27 agreement and understanding.

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**ELEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE**

The injury or damage purportedly suffered by Plaintiff, if any, would be adequately compensated in an action at law for damages, and accordingly Plaintiff has a complete and adequate remedy at law and is not entitled to seek equitable relief.

**TWELFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE**

No relief may be obtained under the Complaint by reason of Plaintiff’s failure to do equity in the matters alleged in the Complaint, including, but not limited to, failing to make a valid and viable statement of the indebtedness due and of the value of the improvements made by Westland to the real property in this litigation.

**THIRTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE**

No relief may be obtained under the Complaint by Plaintiff by reason of the prohibitions against enforcement of unconscionable contracts, and prohibition on receipt of benefits accruing through unconscionable conduct, and the unconscionability of Plaintiff’s acts and claims.

**FOURTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE**

Having prevented and hindered Westland from performing under the applicable contracts and from obtaining the benefits thereof, Plaintiff would be unjustly enriched if allowed to enforce the contracts or obtain damages for the alleged breaches in this Complaint.

**FIFTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE**

Prior to any of the acts of Westland complained of in the Complaint, Plaintiff had breached the contracts and obligations on which Plaintiff seeks damages. Plaintiff’s breaches thus prevented Westland’s performance and excused any obligation to perform that might be said to be resting on Westland. Plaintiff’s breach occurred when Westland was performing as the parties had expressly agreed, and the breach constituted a breach of Plaintiff’s obligations in violation of contract and of the inherent covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

**SIXTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE**

1 Plaintiff is barred from recovering any damages or any other relief by reason of the  
2 failure of consideration that defeats the effectiveness of the contract between the parties.

3 ///

#### 4 SEVENTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

5 As a result of Plaintiff's failure to conduct a reasonable inspection at the time of the  
6 initial loan and prior to Westland's assumption of the loan agreements, Plaintiff failed to obtain  
7 reserves based on the same standard used in September 2019, and through no fault of Westland,  
8 the purposes recognized by both Plaintiff and Westland as the basis for the contract, which was a  
9 loan of funds, would be fundamentally frustrated and defeated. Accordingly, Plaintiff's claims  
10 are without merit.

#### 11 EIGHTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

12 The Complaint constitutes a pleading per Nevada Rule of Civil Procedure 11 and/or NRS  
13 18.010(2)(b) which is submitted for an improper purpose; is not warranted by existing law or by  
14 a non-frivolous argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or the  
15 establishment of new law; contains allegations and other factual contentions without evidentiary  
16 support or which are likely not to have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for  
17 further investigation or discovery; and/or which is brought without any basis and/or to harass  
18 Westland. The Complaint thus violates Rule 11 and/or NRS 18.010(2)(b).

#### 19 NINETEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

20 ~~It has been necessary for Westland to retain the services of an attorney to defend against~~  
21 ~~Plaintiff's claims, and Westland is thereby entitled to recover reasonable attorney's fees and~~  
22 ~~costs in defending this matter.~~Omitted [but numbering remains for consistency]

#### 23 TWENTIETH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

24 Westland affirmatively alleges that they have not had a reasonable opportunity to  
25 complete discovery and facts hereinafter may be discovered which may substantiate other  
26 affirmative defenses not listed herein. By this Answer, Westland waives no affirmative defenses  
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28

1 and reserves the right to amend this Answer to insert any subsequently discovered affirmative  
2 defenses.

3 **WHEREFORE**, Westland prays for judgment as follows:

4 1. That the Court make a judicial determination that Plaintiff is not entitled to the  
5 specific performance requested.

6 2. That Plaintiff takes nothing by its Complaint and that this action be dismissed in  
7 its entirety with prejudice;

8 3. For costs incurred in defense of this action;

9 4. For reasonable attorneys' fees incurred in defense of this action; and

10 5. For such other relief as the Court may deem just and proper.

11 Dated: August ~~31~~\_\_, ~~2020~~2021

LAW OFFICES OF JOHN BENEDICT

/s/ John Benedict

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Attorneys for Defendants/Counterclaimants  
Westland Liberty Village, LLC & Westland Village  
Square LLC, and Counterclaimants Amusement  
Industry, Inc., Westland Corona LLC, Westland  
Amber Ridge LLC, Westland Hacienda Hills LLC,  
1097 North State, LLC, Westland Tropicana Royale  
LLC, Vellagio Apts of Westland LLC, The Alevy  
Family Protection Trust, Westland AMT, LLC, AFT  
Industry NV, LLC, A&D Dynasty Trust

**FIRST AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM**

Defendants/Counterclaimants, Westland Liberty Village, LLC (“Liberty LLC”), ~~and~~  
Westland Village Square, LLC (“Square LLC” and in combination with Liberty LLC,  
“Westland”), Amusement Industry, Inc. (“Amusement”), Westland Corona LLC (“Corona”),  
Westland Amber Ridge LLC (“Amber”), Westland Hacienda Hills LLC (“Hacienda”), 1097  
North State, LLC (“1097 North”), Westland Tropicana Royale LLC (“Tropicana”), and Vellagio  
Apts of Westland LLC (“Vellagio” and in combination with Amusement, Corona, Amber,  
Hacienda, 1097 North, and Tropicana, the “Westland Credit Facility Entities”), The Alevy  
Family Protection Trust (“AFP Trust”), Westland AMT, LLC (“Westland AMT”), AFT Industry  
NV, LLC (“AFT NV”), A&D Dynasty Trust (“Dynasty Trust” and in combination with AFP  
Trust, Westland AMT, AFT NV, and Amusement, the “Westland Securities Entities”), ~~and in~~  
~~combination with Liberty LLC,~~ and collectively Westland, Westland Credit Facility Entities and  
Westland Securities Entities, are referred to herein as the “Counterclaimants”) ~~or “Westland”),~~  
through their attorneys of record, the Law Offices of John Benedict, John W. Hofsaess, and  
Dickinson Wright PLLC, for their Counterclaim against Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant Federal  
National Mortgage Association (“Fannie Mae”), Grandbridge Real Estate Capital, LLC  
(formerly Cohen Financial, Suntrust Bank, and Truist Bank, but for ease of reference, regardless  
of the time period, it shall be referred to solely as “Grandbridge” or “Servicer,” and together with  
“Fannie Mae” as the “Lenders”)<sup>1</sup>, Shamrock Properties VI LLC (“Sham VI”), Shamrock  
Properties VII LLC (“Sham VII”), ND Manager LLC (“NDM”), Shamrock Communities LLC  
 (“Sham C”); Shamrock Communities Management LLC (“Sham CM”), Shamrock Property  
Management LLC (“Sham PM”), MMM Investment LLC (“MMM LLC”), Ellen Weinstein  
 (“Weinstein”), Hilary Davidson aka Hilary Burt (“Davidson”), Jennifer Wilde (“Wilde,” and  
together with Sham VI, Sham VII, NDM, Sham C, Sham CM, Sham PM, MMM LLC,

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<sup>1</sup> While the Servicer has had multiple name changes, including based on a merger with BB&T Bank, the employees “servicing” this loan have continuously remained the same regardless of the name of the entity.

Weinstein, and Davidson, collectively referred to herein as the “Sham Defendants”), Does 1 through 100, and Roe Corporations 101 through 200, allege as follows<sup>2</sup>:

**I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE**

1. This ~~ease~~Counterclaim arises because Fannie Mae and its agents, including Grandbridge ~~Real Estate Capital, LLC (formerly Cohen Financial, Suntrust Bank, and Truist Bank, but for ease of reference, regardless of the time period, it shall be referred to solely as “Grandbridge” or “Servicer”),~~<sup>3</sup> have filed an improper Notice of Default and Intent to Sell (“NOD”), and have thus caused improper non-judicial foreclosure proceedings to be commenced. This illegal conduct *threatens to foreclose on Westland’s two multifamily housing communities (the “Properties”) based on insupportable non-financial defaults*, which, despite multiple requests by Westland, have never been substantiated, *and to be put simply, were manufactured, by Fannie Mae’s Servicer*. To be clear, all monthly debt service payments have been timely made on this loan. In fact, ~~since-between~~ February 2020, when Servicer abruptly ceased sending loan statements, ~~and December 2020,~~ Counterclaimants ~~have actually~~ overpaid their monthly debt service obligation payments by over \$~~4~~500,000. Moreover, Counterclaimants have over \$20 million of equity in the Properties, and therefore, there is absolutely no good faith basis for the noticed foreclosure sales or for any assertion that Fannie Mae or Grandbridge has a risk of loss of assets or the need for an appointment of a receiver.

2. Instead, in reality, the Properties were only in a distressed condition, *prior* to Westland’s acquisition of the two properties in August 2018.<sup>4</sup> Immediately before Westland bought the Properties, the Properties were in disrepair, had management that misrepresented the true occupancy rates at the properties, and had such a high rate of serious crimes that the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department even sent a Notice and Declaration of Chronic Nuisance

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<sup>2</sup>-As noted in the Third Party Complaint below, the general allegations contained in this Counterclaim also form the general allegations for the causes of action asserted in the Third Party Complaint, and thus there are references to both the Counterclaim Defendant and the Third Party Defendant herein.

<sup>3</sup>-While the Servicer has had multiple name changes, including based on a merger with BB&T Bank, the employees “servicing” this loan have continuously remained the same regardless of the name of the entity.

<sup>4</sup> Even when Fannie Mae owned the Properties during 2014 after a foreclosure, and the Properties were operated by a receiver, the Properties were crime-ridden.



1 (the “Nuisance Notice”) to address the criminal activity *at that time*.<sup>5</sup> Still, in late 2017, despite  
2 the poor condition of the Properties, Delegated Underwriting and Servicing (“DUS”) lender/loan  
3 servicer Grandbridge<sup>6</sup> made an initial loan on the properties. Upon information and belief that  
4 loan never should have been made under Fannie Mae’s lending guidelines.

5 3. Compounding matters, when the initial loan documents were signed, Grandbridge  
6 used a local office of CBRE to conduct a property condition assessment (“PCA”) and based  
7 thereon, only required a combined total deposit of \$560,187.00 for the replacement reserve and  
8 repair reserve accounts at both Properties, plus a small addition to the monthly debt service. In  
9 August 2018, those reserve accounts were reduced to approximately \$143,000<sup>7</sup> when the loan  
10 was assumed by Westland, and the same monthly debt service additions were maintained. At  
11 that point Grandbridge also made an explicit representation in its loan assumption letter that  
12 “after a thorough review and analysis of the Proposed Borrower’s financial and managerial  
13 capacity, the Assumption has been approved on the following terms: . . . No change to the  
14 Replacement Reserve” and “No Change to the Required Repair Reserve.” The statement was  
15 either a negligent misrepresentation based on absence of any adequate review, or made  
16 fraudulently to induce Westland to sign the assumption, *because only one year later*,  
17 Grandbridge sent its Notice of Demand seeking to have Westland deposit another \$2.7-85  
18 million into the reserves.

19 4. As such, in July 2019, Westland was taken completely by surprise, when after it  
20 had: invested over \$20 million of its own cash to purchase the Properties, cleaned up the crime  
21 problem, spent approximately \$1.8 million in capital improvements,<sup>8</sup> installed competent

22 <sup>5</sup> The Nuisance Notice (Exhibit A) provides it was sent because the two properties had generated over 1,000 calls for  
23 service to the police department in the six-month period between September 28, 2017 and April 4, 2018. As of the  
24 date of the April 4, 2018 notice, unless crime was abated, the matter would be referred to the District Attorney, and a  
Complaint would be filed seeking “to secure and close the property until the nuisance is abated.” Under current  
ownership, the calls decreased to 5% of that amount by July 2019, and now rarely include violent offenses.

25 <sup>6</sup> A DUS lender is able to make loans without Fannie Mae’s prior approval.

26 <sup>7</sup> While there was approximately an additional \$545,000 in escrow for the Liberty Property, those funds were  
27 separately deposited insurance proceeds that were earmarked for use in rebuilding two apartment buildings that were  
28 completely destroyed by fires in April 2018 and May 2018, after the initial the initial loans were taken out. Those  
building have since been fully rebuilt, but Fannie Mae and Grandbridge continue to hold those funds.

<sup>8</sup> Based on Westland’s efforts and investment, the condition of the Properties only continues to improve. In the year

1 management, and acquired an adjacent parcel to further stabilize the Properties with local  
2 community services,<sup>9</sup> Grandbridge then improperly and without justification sought a PCA  
3 conducted by the Texas-based f3, Inc. which employed a heightened standard. Grandbridge, and  
4 Fannie Mae acting through Servicer, then bootstrapped that assessment into a demand to place an  
5 additional \$2.7-85 million into the reserve accounts Servicer maintained. To be blunt, the PCAs  
6 should not have even been performed, because after Westland's purchase of the Properties the  
7 condition of the Properties improved, not deteriorated, which meant that the Servicer had no  
8 right to demand a property assessment, let alone any subsequent demand for additional reserves  
9 based on that PCA. Essentially, Westland's efforts to work with Fannie Mae and its Servicer in  
10 good faith on this loan, have led to the first NOD that any Westland--related entity has ever  
11 received, even though: ~~the Westland~~ ~~Real~~ ~~eEstate~~ ~~gGroup~~ has been in operation for over 50  
12 years, has a loan portfolio with Fannie Mae amounting to approximately \$300 million,  
13 Westland's efforts have improved the lives of the diverse working class families who reside in  
14 the over 10,000 multifamily housing units that Westland Real Estate Group serves in the Las  
15 Vegas market alone, and *Westland has timely made every monthly debt service payment related*  
16 *to this loan.*

17 5. Moreover, after declaring a default in December 2019, Lenders began not only to  
18 improperly service the two loans related to the Liberty Village and Village Square properties, but  
19 Lenders also began to discriminate against other Westland-related entities based solely on  
20 Westland's failure to accede to Lenders' unilateral modification of the Loan Agreements by  
21 demanding a \$2.85 million reserve increase, and then filing the NOD when Westland did not  
22 capitulate.

23  
24 since the PCA occurred, Westland has poured over an *additional \$1.7 million* into capital expenditures and related costs at the Properties.

25 <sup>9</sup> In July 2019, a Westland associated entity, AF Properties 2015 LLC, signed a purchase and sale agreement for the  
26 adjacent retail properties at 3435-3455 N. Ellis Blvd. The parcels are largely undeveloped, with only a bar and  
27 liquor store onsite, and based on our management team's assessment were a magnet that drew the criminal element  
28 to the neighborhood. To neutralize the negative influence of that site, Westland purchased the parcel, and is working with the Office of the County Commissioner to build local community-based resources at the site, which would serve the Properties and be attractive to working class families. Proposals being investigated include building a police substation and/or day care center.

1       6.       After the NOD, Fannie Mae improperly placed the Westland affiliates into a-  
2       check status, meaning they could not borrow from lenders whose loans were securitized by  
3       Fannie Mae, and that loans already sold to Fannie Mae with borrow-up provisions were locked  
4       out, which meant that in this case Westland’s safety net – a nearly \$30M credit facility was  
5       suspended. Specifically, those Westland-related entities whose borrow up loan was locked out  
6       included the Credit Facility Entities, who had applied for a credit facility that would be funded  
7       by Fannie Mae, had already been charged fees related to the issuance of that credit facility, had  
8       been approved to receive funds via the credit facility, and had their real property subject to liens  
9       in connection with that credit facility. However, in February 2020, when it was time for Fannie  
10      Mae to disburse funds to the Credit Facility Entities, Fannie Mae refused to do so. Upon  
11      information and belief, the reason for refusing to adhere to the credit facilities terms as had been  
12      promised was the purported default related to the Liberty Village and Village Square loans.  
13      Additionally, Fannie Mae improperly retaliated against other Westland-related entities by adding  
14      them to its “a-check” list of borrowers to whom Fannie Mae’s servicing agents and DUS lenders  
15      were unable to write new or refinance loans on behalf of Fannie Mae. As a result of Fannie  
16      Mae’s conduct, in March 2020, Counterclaimants incurred large direct losses when the financial  
17      markets were adversely affected by the threat of COVID-19, and contrary to the terms of the  
18      credit facility Fannie Mae refused to make the promised funds available to the Credit Facility  
19      Entities, despite that Counterclaimants had relied on the availability of the funds promised in the  
20      credit facility to provide a safety net in the event of an economic downturn.

21       7.       As such, ~~Counterclaimants Westland~~ wasere required to bring this Counterclaim  
22      ~~and the Third Party Complaint below~~ to prevent Fannie Mae’s pending foreclosure, ~~and~~ to  
23      preserve the Properties along with the vibrant communities ~~they Westland~~ haves established, to  
24      prevent Fannie Mae from being unjustly enriched, and further to prevent it from taking any  
25      adverse action against any Westland-related entity on other loans due to the purported default  
26      that arose from failing to deposit an additional \$2.49 million into the reserve escrow accounts,  
27      including for example by improperly discriminating against the Counterclaimants on new loans  
28      or failing to honor loan-related disbursement requests.

1           8. In addition to the claims against Lenders, this Counterclaim raises claims against  
2 the Sham Defendants, which are the entities and principals who sold Westland the Properties.

3           9. The claims against the Sham Defendants concern the omissions and material  
4 misrepresentations on the financial statements and accounting records of Sham VI and Sham VII  
5 that resulted in the overpayment of more than \$10 million from Liberty LLC, Village LLC and  
6 Amusement for the purchase of the Liberty Property and the Square Property, from Weinstein,  
7 her affiliated entities, and the shareholders of Sham VI and Sham VII.

8           10. On August 28, 2018, Counterclaimants paid the Sham Defendants \$60.3 million  
9 for the purchase of the two residential communities with a total of 1129 apartments based on the  
10 documents from the Sham Defendants representing those communities had a combined  
11 occupancy rate of 84%. However, after Closing Westland discovered that the true occupancy  
12 rate of the Properties was much lower, because the reported occupancy had been inflated by  
13 nefarious practices, such as failing to evict non-rent paying tenants while misreporting that  
14 income continued to be generated from those same apartments, providing financial reporting in  
15 due diligence that was materially misleading by failing to list any “noncurrent” tenants within  
16 delinquency reports and aging summaries, failing to make repairs in excess of ordinary wear and  
17 tear or habitability-related conditions in apartments where tenants resided, and engaging in  
18 wholesale shredding of business records immediately prior to the Closing of the sale of the  
19 Properties in an attempt to prevent Westland from discovering the Properties true financial state.

20           11. The harmful effects of such practices not only resulted in a misrepresentation of  
21 the value of the Properties based on a reduced stream of income being generated, but also meant  
22 that Westland was forced to incur the costs associated with performing a substantially greater  
23 number of evictions of those non-rent paying tenants, increased costs to restore the units to rent-  
24 ready condition, and costs associated with a purported default Lenders asserted based on a  
25 purported deterioration of the condition of the Mortgaged Property related to a decline in  
26 occupancy.

27           12. The Sham Defendants had a clear financial incentive to not evict tenants, because  
28 the Purchase and Sale Agreements provided that the Sham Defendants’ were obligated to restore

1 any vacant units to “rent ready” condition and to maintain conditions in rented apartments that  
2 were in excess of ordinary wear and tear, and thus the Sham Defendants would have incurred a  
3 substantial additional cost if the Sham Defendants had properly removed those occupants and  
4 performed the repairs needed to restore those apartments to rent ready condition.

5 13. Moreover, the effects of fraud have been magnified by the Sham Defendants’  
6 requirement that Westland agree to assume their loans with Lenders, because when Westland  
7 advised Lenders of the true state of the Properties’ occupancy, it resulted in a purported default  
8 being declared on the Loan Agreements, despite that after the purchase Counterclaimants spent  
9 millions of dollars to rehabilitate the conditions at the Properties.

## 10 **II. PARTIES**

11 4.14. Counterclaimant ~~and Third Party Plaintiff~~, Westland Liberty Village, LLC dba  
12 Liberty Village Apartment Homes (“Liberty LLC”) is and at all times herein mentioned ~~is~~ was a  
13 Nevada Limited Liability Company, ~~which conducted business in and was the owner of real~~  
14 property located in Clark County, Nevada.

15 5.15. Counterclaimant ~~and Third Party Plaintiff~~, Westland Village Square, LLC dba  
16 Village Square Apartment Homes (“Square LLC”) is and at all times herein mentioned ~~is~~ was a  
17 Nevada Limited Liability Company, ~~which conducted business in and was the owner of real~~  
18 property located in Clark County, Nevada.

19 16. Counterclaimant Amusement Industry, Inc. dba Westland Real Estate Group  
20 (“Amusement”) is and at all times herein mentioned was a California Corporation.

21 17. Counterclaimant Westland Corona, LLC dba Corona Del Sol Apartments  
22 (“Corona”) is and at all times herein mentioned was a Nevada Limited Liability Company, which  
23 conducted business in and was the owner of real property located in Clark County, Nevada.

24 18. Counterclaimant Westland Amber Ridge, LLC dba Amber Ridge Apartments  
25 (“Amber”) is and at all times herein mentioned was a Nevada Limited Liability Company, which  
26 conducted business in and was the owner of real property located in Clark County, Nevada.

27 19. Counterclaimant 1097 North State, LLC (“1097 North”), is and at all times herein  
28 mentioned was a Delaware Limited Liability Company.

1           20. Counterclaimant Westland Hacienda Hills, LLC dba Hacienda Hills Apartments  
2 ("Hacienda") is and at all times herein mentioned was a Nevada Limited Liability Company,  
3 which conducted business in and was the owner of real property located in Clark County,  
4 Nevada.

5           21. Counterclaimant Westland Tropicana Royale, LLC dba Tropicana Royale  
6 Apartments ("Tropicana") is and at all times herein mentioned was a Nevada Limited Liability  
7 Company, which conducted business in and was the owner of real property located in Clark  
8 County, Nevada.

9           22. Counterclaimant Vellagio Apts of Westland LLC dba Vellagio Apartments  
10 ("Vellagio") is and at all times herein mentioned was a Nevada Limited Liability Company,  
11 which conducted business in and was the owner of real property located in Clark County,  
12 Nevada.

13           23. Counterclaimant The Alevy Family Protection Trust ("AFP Trust"), is and at all  
14 times herein mentioned was a Nevada Irrevocable Trust, which conducted business in and  
15 through its entity membership interests was the holder of a beneficial interest in real property  
16 located in Clark County, Nevada. AFP Trust is a guarantor of a real estate loan underwritten and  
17 secured by real property located in Clark County, Nevada.

18           24. Counterclaimant Westland AMT, LLC ("Westland AMT"), is and at all times  
19 mentioned herein was a Nevada Limited Liability Company.

20           25. Counterclaimant AFT Industry NV, LLC ("AFT NV"), is and at all times  
21 mentioned herein was a Nevada Limited Liability Company. AFT NV is a guarantor of a real  
22 estate loan underwritten and secured by real property located in Clark County, Nevada.

23           26. Counterclaimant A&D Dynasty Trust ("Dynasty Trust"), is and at all times  
24 mentioned herein was a Nevada Irrevocable Trust, which conducted business in and through its  
25 entity membership interests was the owner of real property located in Clark County, Nevada.  
26 Dynasty Trust is a guarantor of a real estate loan underwritten and secured by real property  
27 located in Clark County, Nevada.

1       ~~6.27.~~ Counter-Defendant, Federal National Mortgage Association, is a federally chartered  
2 corporation (“Fannie Mae”), which at all times mentioned herein has done business in the State  
3 of Nevada.

4       ~~7.28. Third Party Defendant~~Counterdefendant, Grandbridge Real Estate Capital, LLC,  
5 is a North Carolina Limited Liability Company (formerly known as Cohen Financial, Suntrust  
6 Bank, and Truist Bank, but for ease of reference, regardless of the time period, it shall be  
7 referred to solely as “Grandbridge” or “Servicer”), which at all times mentioned herein has done  
8 business in the State of Nevada.

9       29. All of the acts or failures to act herein were duly performed by and attributable to  
10 Counter-Defendant or those acting on Counter-Defendant’s behalf, who each acted as agent,  
11 employee, or under the direction and/or control of Counter-Defendant. Said acts or failures to act  
12 were within the scope of said agency and/or employment, and Counter-Defendant ratified the  
13 acts and omissions by such parties, including ~~third-party-counter~~defendant Grandbridge and its  
14 employees. Whenever and wherever reference is made in this Complaint to any acts by Counter-  
15 Defendant, such allegations and references shall also be deemed to mean the acts of Counter-  
16 Defendant and ~~third-party-defendant~~Grandbridge acting individually, jointly or severally.

17       30. Counterclaimants are informed and believe and thereupon allege that, at all times  
18 material herein, Counterdefendant Shamrock Properties VI LLC dba Liberty Village Apartments  
19 (hereinafter “Sham VI”) is a Delaware limited liability company doing business in Clark County,  
20 State of Nevada. At the time of the events in question, Sham VI was the owner of an interest in  
21 real property located in Clark County, Nevada.

22       31. Counterclaimants are informed and believe and thereupon allege that, at all times  
23 material herein, Counterdefendant Shamrock Properties VIII dba Village Square Apartments  
24 (hereinafter “Sham VII”) is a limited liability company doing business in Clark County, State of  
25 Nevada. At the time of the events in question, Sham VII was the owner of an interest in real  
26 property located in Clark County, Nevada.

27       32. Counterclaimants are informed and believe and thereupon allege that, at all times  
28 material herein, Counterdefendant Sham VI owned and/or operated and/or managed certain



1 property located at 4870 Nellis Oasis Lane, Las Vegas, NV 89115, in Clark County, Nevada, and  
2 commonly referred to as Liberty Village, Liberty Village Apartments, and Shamrock Properties.

3 33. Counterclaimants are informed and believe and thereupon allege that, at all times  
4 material herein, Counterdefendant Sham VII owned and/or operated and/or managed certain  
5 property located at 5025 Nellis Oasis Lane, Las Vegas, NV 89115, in Clark County, Nevada, and  
6 commonly referred to as Village Square, Village Square Apartments, and Shamrock Properties.

7 34. Counterclaimants are informed and believe and thereupon allege that, at all times  
8 material herein, Counterdefendant ND Manger LLC (hereinafter “NDM”) is a Delaware limited  
9 liability company, with a principal place of business in Greenwich, CT, also doing business in  
10 Clark County, State of Nevada. At the time of the events in question, NDM through its entity  
11 membership interests was the holder of a beneficial interest in real property located in Clark  
12 County, Nevada.

13 35. Counterclaimants are informed and believe and thereupon allege that, at all times  
14 material herein, Counterdefendant Shamrock Property Management LLC (hereinafter “SHAM  
15 PM”) is a Delaware limited liability company, with a principal place of business in Greenwich,  
16 CT, also doing business in Clark County, State of Nevada.

17 36. Counterclaimants are informed and believe and thereupon allege that, at all times  
18 material herein, Counterdefendant Shamrock Communities LLC (hereinafter “SHAM C”) is a  
19 Delaware limited liability company, with a principal place of business in Greenwich, CT, was  
20 also doing business in Clark County, State of Nevada.

21 37. Counterclaimants are informed and believe and thereupon allege that, at all times  
22 material herein, Counterdefendant Shamrock Communities Management LLC (hereinafter  
23 “SHAM CM”) is a Delaware limited liability company, with a principal place of business in  
24 Greenwich, CT, was also doing business in Clark County, State of Nevada.

25 38. Counterclaimants are informed and believe and thereupon allege that, at all times  
26 material herein, Counterdefendant MMM INVESTMENTS LLC (hereinafter “MMM INV”) is a  
27 Delaware limited liability company, also doing business in Clark County, State of Nevada. At  
28



1 the time of the events in question, MMM INV through its entity membership interests was the  
2 holder of a beneficial interest in real property located in Clark County, Nevada.

3 39. Counterclaimants are informed and believe and thereupon allege that, at all times  
4 material herein, Counterdefendant Weinstein is a resident of Utah. At all times relevant herein,  
5 Weinstein conducted business in Clark County, Nevada, was the Chief Executive Officer of  
6 Shamrock Communities LLC, and manager of NDM, which was in turn the managing manager  
7 of SHAM VI and SHAM VII, and through which Weinstein exercised control over SHAM VI  
8 and SHAM VII; individually was a member and key principal of SHAM VI and VII; and was a  
9 guarantor of a real estate loan underwritten in and secured by real property located in Clark  
10 County, Nevada.

11 40. Counterclaimants are informed and believe and thereupon allege that, at all times  
12 material herein, Counterdefendant Davidson, currently known as Hilary Burt, is a resident of  
13 New York. At all times relevant herein, Davidson conducted business in Clark County, Nevada;  
14 was the Managing Director and Chief Operations Officer of Shamrock Property Management  
15 LLC, which was property management company for SHAM VI and SHAM VII, including the  
16 Properties which were located in Clark County, Nevada, and through which Davidson exercised  
17 control over SHAM VI and SHAM VII as a key principal of SHAM VI and VII.

18 41. Counterclaimants are informed and believe and thereupon allege that, at all times  
19 material herein, Counterdefendant Wilde is a resident of Indiana. At all times relevant herein,  
20 Wilde conducted business in Clark County, Nevada; was the Director of Operations of Shamrock  
21 Property Management LLC, which was property management company for SHAM VI and  
22 SHAM VII, including the Properties which were located in Clark County, Nevada, and through  
23 which Wilde exercised control over SHAM VI and SHAM VII as a key principal of SHAM VI  
24 and VII.

25 42. Counterclaimants allege that the true names and capacities, whether individual,  
26 corporate, associate or otherwise of Counterdefendants named herein as Doe Individuals and Roe  
27 Entities 1 through 200, inclusive, are unknown to Counterclaimants, who therefore sue said  
28 Counterdefendants by such fictitious names. Counterclaimants will ask leave to amend this

1 Complaint to show the true names and capacities Does Individuals and Roe Entities 1 through  
2 200, inclusive, when the same have been ascertained. Counterclaimants believe and therefore  
3 allege that each Counterdefendant named as a Doe Individual and Roe Entity is responsible in  
4 some manner for the events herein referred to and caused damages proximately thereby to  
5 Counterclaimants as alleged herein.

6 43. Counterclaimants allege Counterdefendants named herein as Doe Individuals and  
7 Roe Entities 1 through 200, were legal entities/residents of Clark County, Nevada, and/or  
8 authorized to do business by the State of Nevada. Furthermore, said Doe and Roe Counter-  
9 defendants were employees, agents, or servants of Counterdefendants in its control and  
10 functioned and assisted in the operation, control, maintenance and/or management of the  
11 premises, in which Counterclaimants were injured by Counterdefendants' conduct, which caused  
12 Counterclaimants' damages.

13 44. Counterclaimants allege Counterdefendants named herein as Doe Individuals and  
14 Roe Entities 1 through 200, were acting on behalf of either the Sham Defendants or Grandbridge  
15 according to proof.

16 45. Counterclaimants allege Counterdefendants, including those named herein as Doe  
17 Individuals and Roe Entities 1 through 200, are persons, corporations, partnerships, or other  
18 entities whose acts, activities, misconduct or omissions, at all time material hereto, make them  
19 jointly and severally liable under the claims for relief set forth hereinafter.

20 46. Doe 1/Roe 1 is the unknown prior legal owner of the premises located at 4870  
21 Nellis Oasis Lane, Las Vegas, NV 89115.

22 47. Doe 2/Roe 2 is the unknown prior legal owner of the premises located at 5025  
23 Nellis Oasis Lane, Las Vegas, NV 89115.

24 48. Doe 3/Roe 3 is the unknown prior owner of the business located at 4870 Nellis  
25 Oasis Lane, Las Vegas, NV 89115.

26 49. Doe 4/Roe 4 is the unknown prior owner of the business located at 5025 Nellis  
27 Oasis Lane, Las Vegas, NV 89115.

1       50. Doe 5/Roe 5 is the unknown prior manager(s) and/or owner(s) and/or operator(s)  
2 of the apartment complex located at 4870 Nellis Oasis Lane, Las Vegas, NV 89115.

3       51. Doe 6/Roe 6 is the unknown prior manager(s) and/or owner(s) and/or operator(s)  
4 of the apartment complex located at 5025 Nellis Oasis Lane, Las Vegas, NV 89115.

5       52. Doe 7/Roe 7 is the prior true legal owner(s) and/or corporate owner(s) of the  
6 property located at 4870 Nellis Oasis Lane, Las Vegas, NV 89115.

7       53. Doe 8/Roe 8 is the prior true legal owner(s) and/or corporate owner(s) of the  
8 property located at 5025 Nellis Oasis Lane, Las Vegas, NV 89115.

9       54. Doe 9/Roe 9 is the prior true legal owner(s) and/or subsidiaries of Sham VI  
10 operated the property located at 4870 Nellis Oasis Lane, Las Vegas, NV 89115.

11       55. Doe 10/Roe 10 is the prior true legal owner(s) and/or subsidiaries of Sham VII  
12 operated the property located at 5025 Nellis Oasis Lane, Las Vegas, NV 89115.

13       56. Doe 11/Roe 11 is the prior unknown subsidiary of Sham VI that operated and/or  
14 owned and/or managed the property located at 4870 Nellis Oasis Lane, Las Vegas, NV 89115.

15       57. Doe 12/Roe 12 is the prior unknown subsidiary of Sham VII that operated and/or  
16 owned and/or managed the property located at 5025 Nellis Oasis Lane, Las Vegas, NV 89115.

17       58. Doe 13/Roe 13 is the prior unknown property management company responsible  
18 for managing the property located at 4870 Nellis Oasis Lane, Las Vegas, NV 89115.

19       59. Doe 14/Roe 14 is the prior unknown property management company responsible  
20 for managing the property located at 5025 Nellis Oasis Lane, Las Vegas, NV 89115.

21       60. Does 15 through 24/Roes 15 through 24 are the current or prior unknown owners,  
22 members or shareholders of Counterdefendant MMM INVESTMENTS LLC, either directly or  
23 indirectly through an intermediary company, corporation, firm, partnership, trust, or any other  
24 form of business organization.

25       61. Does 25 through 34/Roes 25 through 34 are the current or prior unknown  
26 employees, contractors, or agents of the Sham Defendants, either directly or indirectly through  
27 an intermediary company, corporation, firm, partnership, trust, or any other form of business  
28

1 organization, who made misstatements or participated in the creation of documents to support the  
2 making of the misstatements on behalf of the Sham Defendants.

3 62. Does 35 through 44/Roes 35 through 44 are the current or prior unknown  
4 employees, contractors, or agents of Grandbridge, including during the periods of time that it  
5 was known or doing business as Cohen Financial, SunTrust Bank or Truist Bank, who either  
6 directly or indirectly through an intermediary company, corporation, firm, partnership, trust, or  
7 any other form of business organization conspired or colluded to enable the Sham Defendants to  
8 improperly pass loan underwriting in 2017, to otherwise obtain a loan in 2017, or to assign those  
9 loans that did not meet Fannie Mae's underwriting criteria to Counterclaimants.

10 63. Does 45 through 54/Roes 45 through 54 are the current or prior unknown  
11 employees, contractors, or agents of Fannie Mae, who either directly or indirectly through an  
12 intermediary company, corporation, firm, partnership, trust, or any other form of business  
13 organization conspired or colluded to enable the Sham Defendants to improperly pass loan  
14 underwriting in 2017, to otherwise obtain a loan in 2017, or to assign those loans that did not  
15 meet Fannie Mae's underwriting criteria to Counterclaimants.

16 64. This Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendants because they are residents of  
17 or have conducted business at all times relevant herein in Clark County, Nevada and their  
18 obligations to Plaintiffs arise from contracts pertaining to real estate located in Clark County,  
19 Nevada and/or from actions undertaken in Clark County, Nevada.

20 65. Venue is proper in this district pursuant to Nevada Revised Statutes §§ 13.010 and  
21 13.040.

22 **III. FACTS COMMON TO ALL CAUSES OF ACTION RELATED TO**  
23 **FANNIE MAE AND GRANDBRIDGE**

24 8-66. Counterclaimants repeat, reallege, and incorporate the allegations set forth in the  
25 preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.

26 **Westland's Real Estate Wherewithal**

27 9-67. By way of background, Amusement ~~Industry, Inc., a California entity,~~ and Las  
28 Vegas Residential Properties, LLC, a Nevada limited liability company, are entities doing

1 business as Westland Real Estate Group, which was founded by an individual who has over 50  
2 years of experience in the Southern California and Las Vegas real estate markets.

3 ~~10.68.~~ During the 50 years Westland Real Estate Group has been in business, consistent  
4 with lender required practices for risk allocation in the real estate industry, Westland has formed  
5 numerous special purpose entities to own each separate large multifamily real property.

6 ~~11.69.~~ Cumulatively, the ownership of and entities associated with Westland Real Estate  
7 Group, are characterized by the following traits:

- 8 a. Westland Real Estate Group associated entities focus on ownership of  
9 properties in the Las Vegas and Southern California multifamily housing  
10 markets.
- 11 b. Westland Real Estate Group associated entities own and manage  
12 approximately 100 multifamily residential properties and a limited number of  
13 manufactured home sites, for a combined 13,000 residential units, *over 10,000*  
14 *of which are located at 38 different multifamily housing communities in all*  
15 *sections of the Las Vegas metropolitan area.*
- 16 c. Westland Real Estate Group associated entities have approximately \$300  
17 million of loans outstanding with Fannie Mae, and approximately \$800  
18 million of loans with all lenders.
- 19 d. *Prior to the present matter*, over the course of the 50 years that Westland Real  
20 Estate Group has been in operation, its associated entities have had an  
21 unblemished lending reputation, in that no entity associated with Westland  
22 Real Estate Group has ever had a notice of default issued on even a single  
23 mortgage loan with any lender.
- 24 e. The primary tenant base associated with Westland Real Estate Group are  
25 working class families of modest means. With its major investments in these  
26 communities, Westland is able to provide housing to tenants of all protected  
27 classes and socio-economic groups, and build local communities.

- 1 f. The mission of Westland Real Estate Group entities is to provide those  
2 working class families a safe, stable and pleasant living environment within its  
3 communities. Unlike most real estate investors, Westland invests the time and  
4 financial resources to do so.
- 5 g. In order to provide those safe and stable communities, Westland Real Estate  
6 Group entities employ approximately 500 employees, such as onsite  
7 managers, maintenance personnel, a dedicated “turn” team that rehabilitates  
8 vacant units, accounting staff, marketing staff, leasing representatives, and  
9 call center personnel, who have attained substantial experience in addressing  
10 the needs of its tenant base. The majority of that staff is located in Las Vegas.
- 11 h. Westland Real Estate Group employees give the group a competitive  
12 advantage by allowing the combined entities to function in a cost-effective  
13 manner, which efficiencies cannot be replicated by other property  
14 management entities that operate primarily by employing outside contractors.
- 15 i. Westland Real Estate Group’s associated entities and employees are able to  
16 create safe and stable communities by their established productive  
17 relationships with law enforcement officers and providers of specialized  
18 services.

19 70. In 2018, Liberty, LLC and Village, LLC were the two entities formed by the  
20 principals of Westland Real Estate Group to hold the properties located at 4870 Nellis Oasis  
21 Lane, Las Vegas, NV 89115, and 5025 Nellis Oasis Lane, Las Vegas, NV 89115.

22 //

23 //

24  
25 #

#### 26 **The Westland Liberty Property & Square Property Ownership**

27 12.71. On or about August 29, 2018, Liberty LLC purchased the property commonly  
28 known as 4870 Nellis Oasis Lane, Las Vegas, NV 89115 (the “Liberty Property”).

1 ~~13.72.~~ Liberty LLC recorded its deed with the Clark County Recorder's Office as  
2 Instrument No. 20180830-0002684 (the "Liberty Deed") on or about August 30, 2018, thus  
3 Liberty LLC is the legal title holder of the Liberty Property. (Exhibit B, Liberty Property Grant,  
4 Bargain and Sale Deed, filed August 30, 2018.)

5 ~~14.73.~~ On or about August 29, 2018, Square LLC purchased the property commonly  
6 known as 5025 Nellis Oasis Lane, Las Vegas, NV 89115 (the "Square Property" and together  
7 with the Liberty Property, the "Properties").

8 ~~15.74.~~ Square, LLC recorded its deed with the Clark County Recorder's Office as  
9 Instrument No. 20180830-0002651 (the "Square Deed") on or about August 30, 2018, thus  
10 Square, LLC is the legal title holder of the Square Property. (Exhibit C, Square Property Grant,  
11 Bargain and Sale Deed, filed August 30, 2018.)

## 12 **The Shamrock Purchase**

13 ~~16.75.~~ Prior to Liberty LLC's and Square LLC's purchase of the Liberty Property and  
14 the Square Property, the Properties were owned by Shamrock Properties VI LLC and Shamrock  
15 Properties VII LLC (in combination the "Shamrock Entities").

16 ~~17.76.~~ Upon information and belief, the Shamrock Entities acquired the properties in a  
17 distressed condition from a lender Real Estate Owned ("REO") sale held for the benefit of  
18 Fannie Mae in 2014.

19 ~~18.77.~~ An REO is a lender owned property that the lender was unable to sell at a  
20 foreclosure auction, which requires that lending bank or quasi-governmental entity (namely  
21 Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac) to take ownership of the foreclosed property after it was unable to  
22 be sold for an amount sufficient to cover the existing loan at a foreclosure sale.

23 ~~19.78.~~ It is commonly known in the real estate industry that lenders sell REO properties  
24 "as is" and do not make repairs to the properties before the properties are sold, and on that basis  
25 such properties are typically in disrepair.

26 ~~20.79.~~ Upon information and belief, typically when Fannie Mae conducts a REO sale,  
27 Fannie Mae will not agree to finance that property again.

28

1       ~~21.80.~~ At the time of initial purchase at the REO sale, the Liberty Property and the  
2 Square Property were not financed by the Shamrock Entities through Fannie Mae or Freddie  
3 Mac.

#### 4       **The Properties' Condition During the Shamrock Years**

5       ~~22.81.~~ In 2017, the Liberty Property and the Square Property remained in a perilous  
6 position.

7       ~~23.82.~~ Upon information and belief, at the time of the initial purchase of the two  
8 properties, the owners of the Shamrock Entities had hoped to be able to capitalize on the close  
9 proximity of the properties to Nellis Air Force Base by becoming approved as a provider of off-  
10 base housing for military personnel.

11       ~~24.83.~~ However, the ownership group associated with the Shamrock Entities operated  
12 out of Indiana and Connecticut, ~~that ownership group~~ attempted to oversee the properties from  
13 those remote locations, and ~~they~~ were not invested in the Las Vegas community.

14       ~~25.~~ Further, the ownership and onsite staff employed by the Shamrock Entities  
15 utilized questionable business practices, including in the area of financial accounting.

16       ~~26.84.~~ By way of example, after Westland took over the two properties, it discovered  
17 that the financial information it received from the Shamrock Entities had improperly accounted  
18 for the occupancy rate at the properties. While at the time of purchase in August 2018, the  
19 Shamrock Entities touted the occupancy rate as 85%, the Shamrock Entities' financials failed to  
20 show the true occupancy rate by failing to report that a substantial portion of its "tenant" base  
21 was delinquent, failing to disclose that those tenants had not paid rent for several months,  
22 continuing to show those units as generating rental income that had not been paid, and by not  
23 taking any action to evict those "tenants."

24       ~~85.~~ Upon information and belief, the Shamrock Entities provided the same financial  
25 misinformation regarding occupancy rates to Fannie Mae and Grandbridge, the its loan servicer.

26  
27       ~~27.86.~~ Upon information and belief, the high levels of delinquencies at the properties  
28 were related to the utilization of questionable leasing practices, including a lax background check



1 process that resulted in the Shamrock Entities accepting tenants with unacceptably high levels of  
2 credit risk and/or ~~those with~~ unacceptable criminal records. Those practices were implemented  
3 to further inflate occupancy rates but were counterproductive in that the Shamrock Entities' acts  
4 and omission~~the processes~~ resulted in the lack of a safe, viable community for the qualified  
5 residents of the properties, which in turn resulted in high turnover rates among qualified  
6 residents ~~of the properties~~.

7 28.87. The Shamrock Entities were never able to operate the Properties as effective  
8 communities, were never able to fully physically rehabilitate the properties, and were not able to  
9 become an approved off-base housing provider for Nellis Air Force Base consistent with their  
10 original plan.

11 29.88. Instead, during the Shamrock Entities ownership, the condition of the Properties  
12 continued to deteriorate and the rate of crime at the Properties increased to precarious levels.

13 30.89. Upon information and belief, prior to Fannie Mae's ownership of the Properties in  
14 2014, ~~it was~~they were crime ridden and gang infested.

15 31.90. Upon information and belief, when Fannie Mae installed a receiver in 2014, the  
16 receiver was unable to get rid of the criminal element at the Properties, and that criminal element  
17 continued to plague the Properties until Westland purchased them.

18 32.91. In fact, by letter dated April 4, 2018, the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police  
19 Department, sent the Shamrock Entities a Notice and Declaration of Chronic Nuisance (the  
20 "Nuisance Notice"), based on the high rate of crime at the ~~two-p~~Properties, which included a  
21 high rate of violent and serious criminal conduct. (Attached as Exhibit A, is the Letter of  
22 Matthew J. Christian on behalf of Sherriff Joseph Lombardo, dated April 4, 2018.)

23 92. The Nuisance Notice states that it was sent because the ~~two-P~~Properties had  
24 generated over 1000 calls for service to the police department in the six-month period between  
25 September 28, 2017, and April 4, 2018. (Exhibit A at 2.)

26  
27 33.93. Further, the Nuisance Notice noted that the calls generated at the ~~two-p~~Properties  
28 included an alarming number of violent and serious offenses, such as "fights, assaults, batteries,

1 and illegal shootings” and stated that “[d]rugs, gangs, and sexual predators are also prevalent at  
2 the Property.” (Exhibit A at 2.)

3 ~~34.94.~~ The Nuisance Notice provided a “sample of recent events,” which recounted  
4 conduct that frequently involved the use of firearms and dangerous weapons, and the letter noted  
5 that “violent crime has been a continual problem at the Property. The lack of cooperation from  
6 management and security is also a continual problem.” (Exhibit A at 3-6.)

7 ~~35.95.~~ Simply stated, the Shamrock Entities were never able to rehabilitate the Properties  
8 ~~as they had planned.~~

### 9 **Shamrock’s Exit Strategy & The Loan Agreements**

10 ~~36.96.~~ During early to mid-2017, recognizing their ongoing failure~~inability~~ to  
11 rehabilitate the Properties, the Shamrock Entities marketed the Liberty Property and the Square  
12 Property for sale.

13 ~~37.97.~~ However, the Shamrock Entities were unable to sell the two Properties.

14 ~~38.98.~~ As such, upon information and belief, the owners of the Shamrock Entities did the  
15 next best thing; they shifted their focus to obtaining financing in an effort to remove their capital  
16 investment in the Properties; until the Properties could be sold.

17 ~~39.99.~~ Upon information and belief, one of the owners of the Shamrock Entities had a  
18 prior relationship with a division of SunTrust Bank known as Cohen Financial, which after  
19 several name changes was later renamed Grandbridge Real Estate Capital, LLC.

20 ~~40.100.~~ Upon information and belief, based on that pre-existing relationship,  
21 during November 2017, the Shamrock Entities were able to secure financing for seven years on a  
22 \$29,000,000 loan on the Liberty Property (the “Liberty Loan”) and a \$9,366,000 loan on the  
23 Square Property (the “Square Loan,” and in combination with the Liberty Loan, the “Loans”),  
24 allowing the owners of the Shamrock Entities to cash out roughly \$38,000,000.

25 ~~41.101.~~ As the entity underwriting and servicing the Loans, Grandbridge has, at all  
26 times mentioned herein, done business in the State of Nevada as a DUS lender and loan servicer  
27 for Fannie Mae.

28

1 42.102. In relation to the “DUS Servicing and Underwriting platform,” Fannie  
2 Mae’s own website states that “**25 DUS** lender partners are authorized to **underwrite, close,**  
3 **and deliver loans** on our behalf. In exchange, Lenders and Fannie Mae **share the risk** on those  
4 loans” by covering 1/3 of the credit risk.  
5 <https://www.fanniemae.com/powerofpartnershiparbor/index.html>.

6 43.103. Further, information published by Fannie Mae states that “the DUS  
7 program grants approved lenders the ability to underwrite, close, and sell loans on multifamily  
8 properties to Fannie Mae without prior Fannie Mae review.”

9 44.104. Stated differently, Grandbridge, was able to make the Liberty Loan and  
10 the Square Loan without Fannie Mae’s prior approval.

11 45.105. Upon information and belief, when making loans, DUS lenders are  
12 required to follow Fannie Mae’s credit and underwriting criteria for loans, and the DUS lender is  
13 subject to ongoing credit review and monitoring.

14 46.106. Upon information and belief, at the time that the loans were underwritten  
15 by Grandbridge for the Shamrock Entities, the Liberty Property and Square Property did not  
16 meet Fannie Mae’s credit and underwriting criteria, because, *inter alia*, the two properties had  
17 excessively high crime rates,<sup>10</sup> the Properties were subject to a prior Fannie Mae REO sale, the  
18 income for the Properties was overstated.

#### 19 **Grandbridge’s & Fannie Mae’s Reserve Requirements for the Shamrock Entities**

20 47.107. Additionally, to the extent that Fannie Mae and Grandbridge claim that the  
21 present physical condition of the Properties requires a larger repair and/or replacement reserve  
22 deposit based on Fannie Mae’s underwriting criteria, then the physical condition of the  
23 Properties in November 2017 would also have violated Fannie Mae’s credit and underwriting  
24 criteria, and since the condition of the Properties has improved, the initial funding of the loan to  
25 Grandbridge should have required an even larger repair and/or replacement reserve deposit.

26  
27 <sup>10</sup> To be clear, as stated in Paragraphs 49-5236-39, the LVMPD’s letter was sent in response to conduct taking place  
28 between-from September 28, 2017 through April 4, 2018, which means that the loans were underwritten while the  
high levels of crime related to the Nuisance Notice were in process.

1       ~~48.108.~~ Upon information and belief, at the time of the November 2017 loan,  
2 Grandbridge contracted to have a property condition assessment report prepared by CBRE for  
3 both properties.

4       ~~49.109.~~ At the Liberty Property, CBRE did not inspect every unit, but rather only  
5 made “[r]epresentative observations” from 71 units at the 720 unit, 90 building property, and  
6 while several units were found to be in poor condition, the comment to that section of the report  
7 was only “[n]o further action required.” (Exhibit D, CBRE Property Condition Assessment  
8 Report for Liberty Village, dated August 8, 2017, at 5, 29-32.) Similarly, at the Square Property,  
9 CBRE’s “[r]epresentative observations” were made from 41 units at the 409 unit, 7 building  
10 property, and although several units were found to be in poor condition the report concluded  
11 there was “[n]o further action required.” (Exhibit E, CBRE Property Condition Assessment  
12 Report for Village Square, dated August 8, 2017, at 5, 29-30.)

13       ~~50.110.~~ Further, while the August 2017 Liberty report noted that “[t]he unit  
14 finishes appeared in generally good to poor condition,” the report opined that maintenance could  
15 be “addressed as part of unit turns, tenant request, or periodic inspections.” (Exhibit D, at 32.)  
16 This was echoed by the August 2017 Square report that noted 13 of the 41 units inspected were  
17 “undergoing renovation,” and that another 4 units were only in “fair condition,” but still the  
18 report concluded that maintenance could be “addressed as part of unit turns, tenant request, or  
19 periodic inspections.” (Exhibit E, at 29-31.)

20       ~~51.111.~~ As such, despite discrepancies being noted within the inspected units at  
21 the Properties in the August 2017 reports, Grandbridge and Fannie Mae did not require any funds  
22 to be immediately deposited into a reserve account for unit repairs. (Exhibit D, at 8-10; Exhibit  
23 E, at 8-10.)

24       ~~52.112.~~ Instead, aside from units that were considered “down units” related to an  
25 insurable event, the Shamrock Entities were only required to supply a monthly deferred  
26 maintenance payment for each unit, rather than an immediate reserve deposit. (Exhibit D, at 6,  
27 8-10, 32; Exhibit E, at 6, 8-10, 32.)  
28

1       ~~53.113.~~ The amount of that monthly reserve deposit was based on a formulaic  
2 calculation related to the depreciable life of various features of the multiple bedroom layouts at  
3 the Liberty Property, such as appliances, paving, HVAC systems, and flooring, which resulted in  
4 a cost of \$300 per unit/per annum, which was increased to \$354 per unit per annum when  
5 accounting for inflation. (Exhibit D, at 6, 10.) The same formulaic calculation was conducted for  
6 the Square Properties' studio units, and resulted in a cost of \$210 per unit/per annum, which was  
7 increased to \$248 per unit/per annum when accounting for inflation. (Exhibit E, at 6, 10.)

8       ~~54.114.~~ Based on the standard used during those inspections, it is clear that the  
9 PCA report from Grandbridge's inspector, recommended that no reserve deposit amounts were  
10 required for vacant units that needed to be "turned" for re-rental, including those that were in  
11 need of repair or "undergoing renovations." Thus, Fannie Mae and Grandbridge did not increase  
12 required repair reserves for the Shamrock Entities to account for "turning" rental units, nor did it  
13 require the same large capital infusion for maintenance, repairs or replacements.

14       ~~55.115.~~ Instead, the only reserve and repair escrow items that were required to be  
15 deposited were items related to immediate substantial extra-ordinary property improvements,  
16 such as asphalt repairs, façade repairs, balcony repairs, fire damage repairs, laundry room  
17 renovations, sport court renovations, and pool equipment replacement. (Plaintiff's Complaint,  
18 Ex. 1, page 117, 131, 133; Plaintiff's Complaint, Ex. 6, pages 117, 131 133, 149.)

19       ~~56.116.~~ Based on the use of that standard, for the Liberty Property, the Shamrock  
20 Entities were only required to deposit a total of \$315,000 for the initial replacement reserve and  
21 \$165,635 for the initial repair reserve, and for the Square Property, the Shamrock Entities only  
22 deposited \$85,091 for the repair reserve with no replacement reserve. (Plaintiff's Complaint, Ex.  
23 1, page 117, 131, 133; Plaintiff's Complaint, Ex. 6, pages 117, 131 133, 149.) Stated differently,  
24 in order to meet all of the repair and replacement reserve requirements at the time of the initial  
25 loan closing, the Shamrock Entities were only required to place \$560,187.00 into the reserve  
26 accounts, combined, for both Properties.

27       ~~57.117.~~ At the time of the initial loan closing, Grandbridge had an incentive to  
28 obtain the smallest repair and replacement reserve requirements possible in order to increase its

1 chance of closing the loan with the Shamrock Entities, which would, in turn, reduce its own loan  
2 portfolio risk, generate ~~initial~~ underwriting fees, and require continuing Servicer fees for itself, as  
3 well as business for Fannie Mae.

4 58.118. As such, Grandbridge, with the knowledge and consent of Fannie Mae,  
5 utilized CBRE to perform the August 2017 PCA, despite that Grandbridge and Fannie Mae knew  
6 doing so would result in minimal repair and replacement reserve requirements that were  
7 inadequate.

#### 8 **Westland's Purchase of the Properties & Loan Assumption**

9 59.119. Approximately one year after the CBRE inspections, and only nine  
10 months after the initial loan closing, Westland completed its purchase of the Liberty Property  
11 and Square Property on August 29, 2018.

12 60.120. Westland acquired the Liberty Property through Liberty LLC for  
13 \$44,300,000, *including a \$15,300,000.00 cash deposit* from Westland's own funds and by  
14 assuming the \$29,000,000 loan made by Grandbridge and Fannie Mae to the Shamrock Entities.  
15 (Exhibit F, Purchase and Sale Agreement for Liberty Village, dated June 22, 2018, at Pages 4,  
16 Section 1.18 & Page 5, Section 1.33.)

17 61.121. Westland acquired the Square Property through Square LLC for  
18 \$16,000,000.00, *including a \$6,634,000.00 cash deposit* from Westland's own funds and by  
19 assuming the \$9,366,000 loan made by Grandbridge and Fannie Mae to the Shamrock Entities.  
20 (Exhibit G, Purchase and Sale Agreement for Village Square, dated June 22, 2018, at Page 4,  
21 Section 1.12 & Page 5, Section 1.25.)

22 62.122. Prior to permitting Counterclaimants to assume the two loan agreements,  
23 Grandbridge required the payment of a 1% loan assumption fee, amounting to \$290,000 and  
24 \$93,660 respectively for the two Properties, as well as payment of all costs and expenses  
25 associated with approving the assumption agreement. (Exhibit H, Assumption Closing Statement  
26 for Liberty Village, dated August 29, 2018; Exhibit I, Assumption Closing Statement for Village  
27 Square, dated August 29, 2018.)  
28

1        ~~63.~~123. One of the costs included on each closing statement was a \$435.00 charge  
2 for a “property inspection invoice,” which was far short of the fee that would normally be  
3 charged for a full and accurate property condition assessment report, and far short of the  
4 approximately \$30,000 fee for f3, Inc.’s PCA ~~that~~ for which Fannie Mae is now seeking  
5 reimbursement. (Exhibits H & I.)

6        ~~64.~~ While no legitimate property condition assessment report appears to have been  
7 performed at the time of the assumption, based on Article 13.02(a)(3)(B) of the loan agreement,  
8 Fannie Mae and Grandbridge had the ability to require such another inspection to be  
9 performed at that time, and to require that any transfer be conditioned on an additional transfer  
10 into the repair or replacement reserves. (Plaintiff’s Complaint, Ex. 1, pages 69-70, Section  
11 13.02(a)(3)(B); Plaintiff’s Complaint, Ex. 6, pages 69-70, Section 13.02(a)(3)(B).)

12        ~~65.~~124. Grandbridge and Fannie Mae simply failed to do so.

13        125. Instead, at the time the loans were assumed, Grandbridge and Fannie Mae did not  
14 require any change ~~was made~~ to the Replacement Reserve monthly payment and they did not  
15 require any additional Repair Reserve deposit ~~was required~~. As such, at that time, the total  
16 reserves for both Properties was \$143,319.30. (Exhibit J, Assumption Approval Letter for  
17 Liberty Village, dated August 22, 2018, at 2, 5-7; Exhibit K, Assumption Approval Letter for  
18 Village Square, dated August 22, 2018, at 2, 5-7.)

19        126. At a minimum, if they had any concern with the condition of the Properties,  
20 Grandbridge and Fannie Mae should have made changes to the contracts’ reserve and  
21 replacement amounts by amending the Required Repair Schedules to adjust for any deterioration  
22 that existed at the time of the loan assumption.

23        127. The Lenders’ failure to specify such deterioration as Additional Required Repairs  
24 at that time, while simultaneously agreeing to new Required Repair schedules either meant that  
25 Lenders specifically agreed not to require a reserve for such conditions, and if such deterioration  
26 existed at the time of loan assumption it was inconsistent with Fannie Mae’s own loan  
27 underwriting criteria to permit the assumption without requiring an additional reserve deposit.~~or~~  
28 that Grandbridge performed incompetent underwriting.

1 ~~66-128.~~ Further, Grandbridge recognized the repairs that had already been  
2 performed in the nine months since the initial PCA, which resulted in the funds for the repair  
3 reserve account being *reduced* to a de minim~~us~~ amount of \$39,375 for both Properties, and  
4 Grandbridge maintained the same monthly debt service payments to account for the depreciable  
5 items related to the replacement reserves. (*Id.*)

6 ~~67-129.~~ At the time the loans were assumed, Grandbridge had access to both the  
7 Shamrock Entities' and Westland's financial information, and based on that information,  
8 Grandbridge realized that Westland possessed greater financial wherewithal and property  
9 management experience.

10 ~~68-130.~~ Stated differently, based on disclosures regarding the financial securities  
11 held by the Westland Securities Entities, such as the July 25 and July 28, 2018 email disclosures  
12 detailing the Westland Securities Entities' role as guarantors and as the source of funds,  
13 Grandbridge knew Westland was a much more financially secure~~better~~ borrower, ~~and more~~  
14 experienced owners than the Shamrock Entities, and that substituting a better borrower for the  
15 Shamrock Entities would decrease the risk associated with the loan to the benefit of both itself  
16 and Fannie Mae.

17 ~~69-131.~~ As such, Grandbridge had an incentive to utilize the smallest repair and  
18 replacement reserve requirements possible in order to increase its chance of completing the loan  
19 assumption with Westland.

20 ~~70-132.~~ Completing the loan assumption from the Shamrock Entities to Westland  
21 resulted in Grandbridge's generation of a 1% loan assumption fee of \$383,660 with nearly no  
22 effort from Grandbridge.

23 ~~71-133.~~ In completing the loan assumption, Grandbridge was acting as an agent for  
24 the benefit of Fannie Mae, by substituting a borrower on the loan, which stated in the simplest  
25 terms, had a superior~~n-increased~~ credit rating and financial wherewithal.

26 ~~72-134.~~ As such, before closing the assumption transaction between Westland and  
27 the Shamrock Entities, Grandbridge, with the knowledge and consent of Fannie Mae, continued  
28 to rely solely upon CBRE's August 2017 PCA, despite that Grandbridge and Fannie Mae knew



1 doing so would result in minimal repair and replacement reserve requirements in the Loan  
2 Documents.

3 ~~73.135.~~ Westland relied on Grandbridge's and Fannie Mae's actions. For example,  
4 Westland did not require the Shamrock Entities to-in-refraining-from increasesing those reserves  
5 at the time of the loan assumption, because~~which lead~~ Westland ~~to~~-believed, based on the  
6 express terms of the Loan Agreements' limited terms for adjustments to the reserves (i.e. to  
7 expenses of the same type that had been charged in the original loan document), that the same  
8 levels of reserve funding that had been required to that point would continue to be used in the  
9 future, ~~especially since the Loan Agreements' limited adjustments to the reserves to expenses of~~  
10 ~~the same type that had been charged in the original loan documents.~~

11 ~~74.136.~~ Based on Westland's increased capital expenditure spending, no  
12 deterioration in the condition of the Properties, other than ordinary wear and tear, has occurred  
13 since Westland's assumption of the Loan Agreements.

#### 14 **Westland's Rehabilitation of the Properties and Community Building**

15 ~~75.137.~~ Nearly immediately after it began managing the Properties, Westland  
16 realized that the Properties were not in the condition that had been represented by the Shamrock  
17 Entities, because the onsite tenants made unusual statements regarding the Shamrock Entities'  
18 practices at the Properties.

19 ~~76.138.~~ Further, the day before closing, the Shamrock Entities were required to  
20 supply complete electronic financial information for the Properties, but did not do so, and instead  
21 shortly after~~nearly contemporaneously with~~ the closing, Westland was required to have a  
22 software vendor access the Shamrock Entities records to obtain ~~had produced~~ a full copy of the  
23 Shamrock Entities complete electronic records ~~that, and~~ once uploaded, it was discovered the  
24 complete records contained additional embedded financial information related to historical data  
25 that show~~proving that~~ the Shamrock Entities had overstated occupancy numbers and presented  
26 misleading information on its delinquency balances.

27 ~~77.139.~~ Even after obtaining the additional post-closing data, ~~B~~ased on the  
28 voluminous amount of financial information that had to be unraveled, and compared to the

1 ~~method that such~~the information ~~is typically~~ disclosed during due diligence unrelated to athe  
2 property sale, Westland did not immediately unravel the Shamrock Entities improper accounting  
3 practices.

4 78.140. However, based on the method that financial delinquencies and  
5 occupancies are reported to lenders, which upon information and belief included additional  
6 reports that were not available to Westland in due diligence, the Shamrock Entities misstated  
7 financials should have been detected by Grandbridge and Fannie Mae, and it was only through  
8 the Lender's lack of proper oversight and investigation that the Lender's failed to detect the  
9 occupancy irregularities, which would have been detected if they had used proper loan servicing  
10 and oversight protocols for these properties and the Shamrock Entities' loans.

11 79.141. Consequently, the Shamrock Entities' ~~At the time of due diligence or a~~  
12 ~~real estate closing in Nevada, the industry practice is that only limited financial statements,~~  
13 ~~including a rent roll, will be provided to a purchaser, but here the~~ rent roll failed to show accurate  
14 levels of delinquencies by listing delinquent units as income producing. H; however, based on  
15 their loan agreements, Fannie Mae and Servicer were entitled to more detailed financial  
16 information that would account for those delinquencies ~~unless they were provided false~~  
17 ~~information.~~ The Lender's lack of oversight and failure to enforce the Shamrock Entities' loan  
18 agreements permitted the Shamrock Entities' false reporting, which in turn Westland relied upon  
19 in assuming those loans, believing that the Lenders had been following and enforcing the much  
20 more thorough reporting requirements from their borrower that the contracts required.

21 80.142. Upon ~~discovering~~termining the Shamrock Entities' improper accounting  
22 practices and misrepresentations, Westland, at the time it made its first quarterly financial report,  
23 informed Fannie Mae, through Grandbridge, that the Shamrock Entities' financials appeared  
24 inaccurate ~~at the time it made its first quarterly financial report.~~

25 81.143. Westland made those disclosures knowing that it was required to  
26 incorporate a portion of the Shamrock Entities' financial information in order to produce the first  
27 quarterly financial report, and on that basis, it wanted Grandbridge and Fannie Mae to know that  
28 it could not ensure the complete reliability of that financial information.

1 82.144. Specifically, Westland advised Grandbridge and Fannie Mae that the  
2 Shamrock Entities' financials overstated occupancy rates at the Properties by approximately 10%  
3 from the 86% that had been reported and that the overstated occupancy rates resulted from the  
4 Shamrock Entities' failure to evict tenants that had not paid rent for several months and their  
5 failure to show tenants that had not paid rent as delinquent.

6 83.145. Upon information and belief, the Shamrock Entities had an incentive to  
7 misrepresent the true occupancy rates at the Properties for several reasons, including that:

- 8 a) a standard term in purchase and sale agreements, including the purchase and  
9 sale agreement applicable to the sale of the Properties, requires a property  
10 seller to restore all vacant units to rent ready condition and disclosing the true  
11 occupancy rate would disclose that additional units were vacant,
- 12 b) processing evictions is costly in terms of time and money, ~~and~~
- 13 c) the Shamrock Entities had misrepresented the true vacancy rate to Fannie Mae  
14 and Grandbridge at the time the loan was initiated several months early in  
15 November 2017, and continued to misrepresent that rate for the remainder of  
16 the time that they owned the Properties, and  
17 d) a higher occupancy rate would induce Westland to pay a higher purchase price.

18  
19 84.146. Tellingly, when Westland purchased the Properties from the Shamrock  
20 Entities, Shamrock provided that Westland could retain any of its local staff, but due to  
21 widespread issues of incompetence and ethically questionable behavior, Westland was only able  
22 to retain 2 of Shamrock's 20 employees that worked at the Properties. ~~Further, based on~~  
23 ~~Westland's experience, a staff of 32 employees is required to handle the onsite operations at the~~  
24 ~~Properties.~~

25 85.147. ~~After closing~~ additionally, in order to clean up the crime problems at the  
26 Properties, Westland enforced a "no tolerance" crime policy, including by evicting tenants who  
27 were engaging in criminal acts, offensive misconduct, or who received "red cards" from the Las  
28 Vegas Metropolitan Police Department. The immediate fallout from evicting tenants causing

1 these problems was that the occupancy rate at the Properties fell further, at least temporarily,  
2 until more stable and law-abiding tenants could be found and moved into the Properties.

3 86.148. The eviction of the individuals who failed to pay rent and who engaged in  
4 criminal offenses was necessary to create a safe, stable community at the Properties for  
5 Westland's responsible tenants.

6 87.149. Westland also utilized an elevated security guard presence at the  
7 Properties to decrease the "fights, assaults, batteries, and illegal shootings, [d]rugs, gangs, and  
8 sexual predators" that were "so prevalent at the Property" prior to Westland's ownership.

9 88.150. Specifically, to create a safer environment for the Properties' tenants,  
10 during the slightly less than two years from the date of purchase through ~~the present~~ August 31,  
11 2020 (the time of the initial Counterclaim), Westland ~~has~~ paid approximately ~~total of~~ \$1,573,600  
12 to security guard providers that have, depending on the relevant time period, continuously  
13 provided either three or four guards on a twenty-four hour basis consistent with the needs of the  
14 Properties.

15 89.151. Westland implemented heightened background and credit check standards  
16 to increase the likelihood that it was filling vacant units at the Properties with a quality tenant  
17 base.

18 90.152. Westland's efforts to create safe, viable communities for its working class  
19 family residents were successful, because Westland was able to dramatically decrease the  
20 incidents of crime at the Properties, decrease the number of violent and firearm related crimes at  
21 the Properties, decrease the delinquency rates at the Properties, and improve the condition of the  
22 Properties for the remaining tenants.

23 91.153. By way of example, shortly prior to Westland's purchase, the Nuisance  
24 Notice recognized that over 1,000 calls were made to the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police  
25 Department over a six month period of time, whereas by mid-2019, prior to the property  
26 condition assessment being performed only 69 calls were received by the police department for  
27 the prior six months, and there ~~was~~ ~~has been~~ a corresponding decrease in the number of violent  
28 and firearm related offenses.

1       ~~92.154.~~ By July 2019, less than a year after the loan ~~was~~ were assigned, Westland  
2 had caused dramatic enhancements at the Properties, including replacing the criminal element  
3 with viable tenants, hiring competent management, and investing \$1.8 million in capital  
4 improvements.

5       ~~93.155.~~ In fact, Westland's dramatic turnaround of the Properties has been  
6 recognized by the Executive Director of the Nevada State Apartment Association and the County  
7 Commissioner for the Properties. (Exhibit L, Letter of Nevada State Apartment Association  
8 Executive Director, dated November 22, 2019; Exhibit M, Letter of County Commissioner, dated  
9 August 20, 2020.)

10       ~~94.~~ However, those long-term improvements came with a short-term cost related to  
11 the financial profitability of the Properties resulting from a ~~\_dramatic\_~~ decrease in the occupancy  
12 rate during the first few months that Westland operated the Properties.

13       ~~95.156.~~ Specifically, occupancy rates at the Properties bottomed out at 44% during  
14 July 2019.

15       ~~96.157.~~ Based on those decreased occupancy rates at the Properties, from the time  
16 of Westland's acquisition through early 2020, the Properties were not even generating sufficient  
17 income to pay the Properties' monthly debt service obligations.

18       ~~97.158.~~ When the Properties were not generating sufficient income between  
19 September 2018 through early 2020, Westland ~~was required to~~ invested several million dollars of  
20 its own funds for the Properties to be able to meet their monthly debt service and other  
21 obligations ~~and other obligations~~.

22       ~~98.159.~~ However, by early 2020 Westland's efforts had begun to pay off  
23 ~~financially as well~~, because not only had the occupancy rate at the Properties risen to 61% in  
24 February 2020, but Westland was able to obtain an increased rental rate for each renovated  
25 residential unit that Westland had "turned" and made rent ready – or stated differently, *by*  
26 *January 2020 the Properties were stabilized with a positive NOI, and by April 2020 they were*  
27 *meeting their monthly debt service payments* *without the need for funding from*  
28 *Counterclaimants*.

1       ~~99.160.~~ Under Westland's management, the occupancy rates have continued to  
2 increase by ~~approximately~~the 3% per month – ~~the same percentage that figure~~ Westland projected  
3 within its November 2019 ~~S~~strategic ~~P~~plan, ~~and the Properties currently have had over an 80%~~  
4 ~~occupancy rate as of August 2020.~~ (Exhibit N, Westland Strategic Improvement Plan for Liberty  
5 Village and Village Square, dated November 27, 2019.)

6       ~~100.161.~~ Coincidentally, the Properties' ~~current~~ over 80% occupancy rate in August  
7 2020 (at the time of Fannie Mae's Complaint) ~~was~~ nearly identical to, but slightly higher than,  
8 the 77.7% *real* occupancy rate that existed at the Properties at the time they were operated by the  
9 Shamrock Entities.

10       ~~101.162.~~ ~~T~~Even though the occupancy rates are nearly the same, the Properties are  
11 currently ~~far~~ more profitable than under the Shamrock Entities ownership or the ownership of  
12 any entity associated with Fannie Mae, because based on the higher quality renovations that  
13 Westland performs when "turning" units, as well as Westland's superior screening of tenants,  
14 Westland has been able to implement significantly higher unit rents.

15       ~~102.163.~~ By August 2020, ~~T~~the Properties ~~are~~were ~~now~~ not only covering debt  
16 service but are now also generating income in excess of operating expenses and improvement  
17 costs.

18       164. In fact, the Properties' occupancy rates continued to improve, and as of August 1,  
19 2021, the occupancy rate for each of the Properties was over 93%, which upon information and  
20 belief is much higher than at any point during the Shamrock Entities ownership and much higher  
21 than at any point when Fannie Mae operated the Properties, directly or indirectly, as an REO –  
22 stated differently occupancy rates are now approximately 10% higher than they had been during  
23 the 10 years prior to Westland's ownership.

24       ~~103.165.~~ As such, Westland's management has been able to restore the Properties,  
25 and is now operating them at a high level of efficiency, despite the fallout from the Pandemic  
26 and more than almost 18 months of eviction moratoria.

1       ~~104.166.~~ The efficient management that Westland has put in place at the Properties  
2 is unlikely to be able to be replicated by an outside property management vendor, as Westland's  
3 ~~32~~ onsite employees have developed an in-depth knowledge of the Properties.

4       ~~105.167.~~ Further, not only has Westland invested in the Properties themselves, but  
5 Westland has also ~~\_begun to~~ strategically invested in the local community, in order to develop  
6 community-based resources in the local area that will make the Properties attractive to hard-  
7 working families.

8       ~~106.168.~~ Specifically, shortly after Westland's purchase of the Properties, its onsite  
9 management reported that a liquor store and bar located on a parcel adjacent to the Square  
10 Property, at 3435 North Nellis Boulevard, Las Vegas (the "Parcel"), were attracting a criminal  
11 element to the neighborhood. (Exhibit O, Property Site Map [showing the location of the Parcel  
12 in relation to Properties].)

13       ~~107.169.~~ Upon contacting the Parcel's owners, Westland learned that the bar and  
14 liquor store were then being under-managed, because the original owner had passed away and  
15 the Parcel was under the supervision an out-of-state executor for an estate.

16       ~~108.170.~~ The bar and liquor store only occupied a small portion space on the Parcel.

17       ~~109.171.~~ Ultimately, when Westland's efforts to have the administrator take a more  
18 active role with the Parcel ~~w~~ereas ineffective, in January 2019, Westland offered to buy the  
19 Parcel, so that it could oversee the businesses that would operate ~~there, and there and~~ could  
20 redevelop the site to improve the community-based resources available to the Properties'  
21 residents.

22       ~~110.172.~~ Westland signed a purchase and sale agreement for the Parcel on July 8,  
23 2019, and completed its purchase of the property in February 2020. (Exhibit P, Purchase and  
24 Sale Agreement for 3435 N. Nellis Blvd., Las Vegas, dated July 8, 2019.)

25       ~~111.~~ Since completing the purchase in February 2020, Westland has been working with  
26 the Office of the County Commissioner to develop community-based services at the Parcel.

27       ~~112.~~ Proposals for such services include a police substation and/or community day-care  
28 center.

1 ~~113.173.~~ Based on interactions with its tenants, Westland's management staff has  
2 determined that increasing such community-based services in the immediate vicinity of the  
3 Properties would be attractive to the working class families that Westland serves.

4 ~~114.174.~~ Based not only on Westland's investment in the Properties, but also in the  
5 local community, Westland would be irreparably harmed, if a receiver is put in place.

#### 6 **Grandbridge's Servicing of the Loans since the Assumption**

7 ~~115.175.~~ Upon information and belief, after Westland disclosed to Grandbridge and  
8 Fannie Mae that the Shamrock Entities' financial statements failed to provide accurate  
9 occupancy rates for the Properties, the loans and Grandbridge's underwriting came under greater  
10 scrutiny from Fannie Mae.

11 ~~116.176.~~ Upon information and belief, Fannie Mae for the first time recognized that  
12 Grandbridge's underwriting for the Properties was insufficient and did not comply with Fannie  
13 Mae guidelines.

14 ~~117.177.~~ More specifically, uUpon information and belief, Fannie Mae for the first  
15 time recognized that the loan had been underwritten despite it violating Fannie Mae's credit and  
16 underwriting criteria credit and underwriting criteria, because, *inter alia*, the two properties had  
17 excessively high crime rates, the properties were subject to a prior Fannie Mae REO sale, and the  
18 income for the Properties was overstated.

19 ~~118.178.~~ Upon information and belief, Fannie Mae demanded for Grandbridge to  
20 either provide additional reserve funding as security or for Grandbridge to obtain additional  
21 security from the borrower on the Loans.

22 ~~119.179.~~ Upon information and belief, Grandbridge decided that it would push th~~ate~~  
23 obligation onto Westland.

24 ~~120.180.~~ Based on the assumption agreement that Liberty LLC and Square LLC  
25 executed, any effort by Grandbridge and/or Fannie Mae to adjust the deposits required from  
26 Westland had to be administered consistent with the terms of the Multifamily Loan and Security  
27 Agreement signed by the Shamrock Entities (the "Loan Agreements") for each Property.

#### 28 **The Loan Agreements' Requirements for Adjustments to Deposits**



1       ~~121.181.~~ Section 13.02(a)(3) of the Loan Agreements governs *adjustments to*  
2 *deposits* and permits such adjustments under only two limited circumstances: 1) after a property  
3 condition assessment is performed on loans with a term that is over 10 years long; or 2) as a  
4 condition for a transfer of either the underlying real property or an entity owning the real  
5 property. (Plaintiff's Complaint, Ex. 1, pages 69-70, Section 13.02(a)(3); Plaintiff's Complaint,  
6 Ex. 6, pages 69-70, Section 13.02(a)(3).)

7       ~~122.182.~~ Schedule B to the Loan Agreements shows that each of the loans at issue  
8 here has loan terms lasting 84 months, or seven years, so Section 13.02(a)(3)(A) does not permit  
9 an adjustment to the deposits. (Plaintiff's Complaint, Ex. 1, pages 69-70, Section  
10 13.02(a)(3)(A), and page 115, Schedule B [showing the 84 month loan term]; Plaintiff's  
11 Complaint, Ex. 6, pages 69-70, Section 13.02(a)(3)(A), and page 115, Schedule B [showing the  
12 84 month loan term].)

13       ~~123.183.~~ Even in the case of a ten-year loan, the PCA is not conducted until  
14 between the sixth and ninth month of the tenth year, unless it is an affordable housing loan,  
15 which ~~these are~~ is not. (*Id.*)

16       ~~124.184.~~ Otherwise, an adjustment to the deposits may only be made as a condition  
17 for a transfer of either the underlying real property or an entity owning the real property, but here  
18 no such condition was presented at the time that the loans were assumed. (Plaintiff's Complaint,  
19 Ex. 1, pages 69-70, Section 13.02(a)(3)(B); Plaintiff's Complaint, Ex. 6, pages 69-70, Section  
20 13.02(a)(3)(B).)

21       ~~125.185.~~ Fannie Mae and Grandbridge have failed to act in good faith by ignoring  
22 the explicit contract term that governs when adjustments to the ~~loans~~ Loan Agreements' required  
23 deposits may be required from the borrower.

24       ~~126.186.~~ Upon information and belief, the limitations on adjustments to the deposits  
25 exist as a borrower protection, so that an unscrupulous servicer, such as Grandbridge, does not  
26 improperly attempt to revise the deposit amounts after a loan has already been agreed upon by a  
27 borrower and the borrower no longer has any recourse, because at that point the borrower would  
28

1 be subject to additional costs and fees in order to arrange for alternative financing, and faces  
2 foreclosure if it does not acquiesce.

### 3 **The Loan Terms for Property Condition Assessments**

4 ~~127.187.~~ Additionally, the Loan Agreements ~~expressly limits~~specify that limitations  
5 ~~apply on~~ when a Property Condition Assessment may be conducted, namely when. ~~Such an~~  
6 ~~assessment may only occur after~~ “Lender determines that the condition of the Mortgaged  
7 Property has deteriorated (ordinary wear and tear excepted) since the Effective Date” of the loan.  
8 (Plaintiff’s Complaint, Exhibit 1, page 39, Article 6.03(c).)

9 ~~128.188.~~ Neither Fannie Mae nor Grandbridge had any reasonable basis to  
10 determine that the condition of the Properties had deteriorated in excess of ordinary wear and  
11 tear from the time the loans were taken out in November 2017, and certainly not after August  
12 2019 loan assumption, which is when they actually lowered the reserve amounts before Westland  
13 closed on its purchase and the assumption of the loans.

14 ~~129.189.~~ Moreover, neither Fannie Mae nor Grandbridge bothered to obtain a report  
15 or other information establishing the condition of the Properties at the time the loans were  
16 assumed in late August 2018, despite the Loan Agreements providing for such an assessment.

17 ~~130.190.~~ Their failure to obtain such a report renders any assertion by Fannie Mae  
18 and/or Grandbridge that the condition of either Property has deteriorated since the loan on the  
19 Properties was assumed baseless and unsupportable.

20 ~~131.191.~~ Despite not having ~~Without~~ a valid basis in the loan documents to do so,  
21 in mid-2019, Grandbridge’s representatives, individually and as an agent/servicer for Fannie  
22 Mae, demanded access for a property assessment by the Texas-based f3, Inc.

23 ~~132.192.~~ Despite that the Loan Agreements provides a Property Condition  
24 Assessment will be conducted “at Borrower’s expense” when it is warranted by the Loan  
25 Agreements. (Plaintiff’s Complaint, Exhibit 1, page 39, Article 6.03(c).) However~~Moreover,~~  
26 Fannie Mae and Grandbridge knew that they were improperly seeking a Property Condition  
27 Assessment report, because prior to conducting the property condition assessment, during a  
28 phone call in July 2019, Grandbridge’s Senior Vice President of Loan Servicing and Asset

1 Management Joe Greenhaw represented that Westland would not be required to pay the cost of  
2 the assessment if Westland agreed to provide f3, Inc. PCA access to the Properties, ~~despite that~~  
3 ~~the Loan Agreements provides a Property Condition Assessment will be conducted “at~~  
4 ~~Borrower’s expense” when it is warranted by the Loan Agreements. (Plaintiff’s Complaint,~~  
5 ~~Exhibit 1, page 39, Article 6.03(e).)~~

6 ~~133.193.~~ Mr. Greenhaw also represented that if any deficiencies were found,  
7 Westland would only be required to provide a small addition to the reserve accounts, consistent  
8 with deferred maintenance scheduling practices then in place, which would ~~stretch the depositing~~  
9 ~~of amortize~~ the cost of any repairs required over the life of the loans.

10 ~~134.194.~~ Based on Mr. Greenhaw’s representations, Westland provided f3, Inc.  
11 access to conduct a property condition assessment.

12 ~~135.195.~~ Had Mr. Greenhaw, Grandbridge, or Fannie Mae been honest about their  
13 intentions, Westland would not have provided access to f3, Inc. for a property condition  
14 assessment, because there was no requirement to do so based on the Loan Agreements.

15 ~~136.196.~~ Upon information and belief, Fannie Mae and its servicers do not utilize  
16 f3, Inc. for PCA reports issued before a loan closes, but f3, Inc. is one of their preferred vendors  
17 when Fannie Mae and Grandbridge want a report to support a demand for additional repair and  
18 replacement reserve funding.

19 ~~137.197.~~ Not surprisingly then, f3, Inc., provided a skewed and inflated assessment  
20 designed to cover for Grandbridge’s prior poor underwriting at the Properties.

21 ~~138.198.~~ The PCA resulted in those inflated values because f3, Inc. was employed  
22 to, and in fact did, utilize a far different standard than the lenient standard employed by CBRE  
23 when it was to Grandbridge’s and Fannie Mae’s benefit to have lower reserve numbers.

24 ~~139.199.~~ In contrast to CBRE, which inspected a random 10% of the units at each  
25 Property, f3’s inspections were consistent with a stated agenda by servicer Grandbridge and  
26 Fannie Mae.

27 ~~140.200.~~ f3 noted that it inspected 352 of the 720 units at the Liberty Property,  
28 which amounted to 48.9% of the units, and 211 of the 409 units at the Square Property, which

1 amounted to 51.6% of the units, including nearly every vacant unit at both Properties. Consistent  
2 with Grandbridge's design, the inspections were performed or replacement costs to serve as the  
3 basis for an improper adjustment of reserve deposits. (Plaintiff's Complaint, Ex. 11, page 7 and  
4 315.)

5 ~~141.201.~~ Further, in contrast to CBRE's depreciation schedule for the Liberty  
6 Property that required \$300 per unit/per annum, which was increased to \$354 per unit per annum  
7 when accounting for inflation (Exhibit D, at 6, 10), f3, Inc. recommended a monthly fee of \$406  
8 per unit per annum, which amounted to \$446 when accounting for inflation. (Plaintiff's  
9 Complaint, Ex. 11, pages 334.)

10 ~~202.~~ Likewise, in contrast to CBRE's depreciation schedule for the Square Property  
11 that required \$210 per unit/per annum, which was increased to \$248 per unit per annum when  
12 accounting for inflation (Exhibit E, at 6, 10), f3, Inc. recommended a monthly fee of \$312 per  
13 unit per annum, which amounted to \$342 when accounting for inflation. (Plaintiff's Complaint,  
14 Ex. 11, page 23.)

15  
16 ~~142.203.~~ For scheduled maintenance on the same depreciable items identified in  
17 two inspections around a year apart there is no reason for the Liberty Property to have a \$92, i.e.  
18 25.6% increase in reserves per door; or the Square Property to have a \$94, i.e. 37.9% increase  
19 per door. f3's numbers increased despite the tens of thousands of dollars Westland had already  
20 invested in the Properties to fix them up, particularly as units turned over. It is clear not only that  
21 f3 used a totally different standard than the inspection report that was part of the inducement to  
22 have Westland assume these non-performing loans from Shamrock, it is equally clear that f3 was  
23 given and executed an agenda, and did not undertake an independent assessment of the  
24 Properties' condition.

25 ~~143.204.~~ Had the same standard been employed at the time of the loans' initial  
26 property condition assessment, or during a property condition assessment at the time of the  
27 assumption, the Shamrock Entities would have been responsible to pay those costs. And, if  
28 neither Grandbridge nor Fannie Mae required an additional deposit from the Shamrock Entities

1 at that time, then Westland would have required either an adjustment to the purchase price that it  
2 paid Shamrock or required Shamrock to fully fund the lender's adjustment to the reserve deposit.  
3 Had Westland known it would be held to a higher standard after closing than Shamrock was  
4 helped to before and during the assumption period, then these protections would have been a  
5 condition to completing the loan assumption or Westland would not have completed the  
6 purchase and loan assumption at all. Instead, Fannie Mae and ~~Grandview~~ Grandbridge changed  
7 the rules after the fact.

8 144.205. Based on the f3, Inc. assessment, a demand was made for Westland to  
9 deposit an additional \$2,~~706,845,150,980~~.00 (\$1,~~507,098,753,145~~.00 for the Liberty Property and  
10 \$1,~~199,092,052,835~~.00 for the Square Property) into reserves.<sup>11</sup>

11 145.206. The f3, Inc. report identified those deposits as repair reserve items.<sup>12</sup>

12 146.207. When Westland objected and advised Fannie Mae and Grandbridge that  
13 their actions seemed in bad faith because Westland had already spent \$1.8 million on capital  
14 expenditures that improved the condition of the Property, which caused the condition of the  
15 Properties to have improved, not deteriorated, Defendants responded with a non-specific default  
16 notice letter in December 2019.

17 147.208. And, even though Westland objected to placing those funds into reserve  
18 accounts due to the fact that Grandbridge has routinely failed to respond to any reserve  
19 disbursement request,<sup>13</sup> Westland has still performed the vast majority, if not all of the items

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21 <sup>11</sup> While the demand was for \$2.85 million, the amount of new funding requested was lower, because Grandbridge  
22 provided it would move \$246,047 from the Liberty Replacement Reserve and \$106,217 from the Village  
Replacement Reserve, or a total of \$352,264, which would make the new money demand \$2,493,716.

23 <sup>12</sup> Upon information and belief, Grandbridge and Fannie Mae recognized that the physical conditions listed in the f3,  
24 Inc. PCAs were not the types of items previously listed in the repair schedules, and on that basis at the time of  
25 default attempted to recast those amount as an addition to the replacement reserve in the Notice of Default and  
Acceleration of Note, despite that Grandbridge had specifically transferred funds from the interest bearing  
replacement reserve to the non-interest bearing repair reserve. (Pl. Complaint, Exhibit 13, at page 1 [listing  
purported defaults]; cf. Pl. Complaint, Exhibit 12, at page 2 [transferring funds to repair reserve escrow].)

26 <sup>13</sup> For instance, at the time of acquisition of the Properties, two buildings at Liberty Village were damaged by fires,  
27 which rendered them complete losses. The insurance carrier issued joint checks for the nearly \$1 million that it cost  
28 to restore those buildings. All of the funds from the carrier ~~have been were~~ held by Grandbridge ~~since from~~ that time  
until May 2021, which was months after the Court entered a preliminary injunction requiring that the funds be  
disbursed in November 2020, and Westland funded the full cost to completely restore those buildings. Still, nothing  
was received in response to Westland's reserve disbursement request, despite those funds being specifically

1 identified in the September 2019 PCA reports for both Properties over the course of the past  
2 year, and has continued fully to perform on the loans.

3 ~~148.209.~~ As such, based on Fannie Mae's and Grandbridge's deceptive practices, it  
4 would be improper to permit Fannie Mae and Grandbridge to continue to utilize the improperly  
5 obtained f3, Inc. property condition assessment.

### 6 **The Loan Terms for Additional Lender Reserves and Replacements**

7 ~~149.210.~~ Additionally, instead of utilizing the applicable section of the Loan  
8 Agreements dealing with adjustments to deposits, namely Article 13.02(a)(3), Fannie Mae and  
9 Grandbridge asserted a default based on Section 13.02(a)(4) regarding insufficient funds in  
10 reserve accounts, without clearly identifying the mechanism by which they assert that such an  
11 "increase in the Replacement Reserve Account" is warranted.

12 ~~150.211.~~ The reason for the lack of clarity is simple, their demands for adjustments  
13 to the deposits violate the Loan Agreements.

14 ~~151.212.~~ Specifically, Section 13.02(a)(4) is a vague catch-all section of the Loan  
15 Agreements that deals with additional deposits for Replacement Reserves, Required Repairs,  
16 Additional Lender Repairs, Additional Lender Replacements and Borrower Requested Repairs.

17 ~~152.213.~~ Westland has not submitted any request for disbursements related to a  
18 "Borrower Requested Repair," which is a defined term in the Loan Agreements that only arises  
19 when a borrower asks for a disbursement for items other than those appearing on a schedule, but  
20 with such disbursement request it is clear that no such deposit is required from the Westland.

21 ~~153.214.~~ The Required Repairs Escrow was fully funded at the time the initial loan  
22 was funded, no additional Required Repairs deposit was mandated at the time the loans were  
23 assumed, and there was, and is, no basis for Fannie Mae to assert that the amount escrowed for  
24 such repairs was insufficient because at the time of the loan assumption Fannie Mae and  
25

26  
27 earmarked for restoring the buildings associated with the fires. As such, *Grandbridge ~~has~~ improperly withheld \$1*  
28 *million of Westland's funds, which Lenders only returned after Westland filed and OSC Re: contempt to get them to*  
*do so.*

Grandbridge recognized that all such repairs had been performed other than a \$9,375.00 reserve related to refinishing the sport courts at the Liberty Property (Exhibit J, at 7; Exhibit K, at 7.)

~~154.215.~~ Notably, the only cost remaining in the repair reserve at the time of the assumption of the Loan Agreements, for sport court related repairs, remains fully funded – specifically, \$9,375.00 remains in the Required Repair Escrow for that purpose, even though the repair has been completed.

~~155.216.~~ Likewise, Schedule 1 of each Loan Agreement, which defines “Additional Lender Repairs” as “*repairs of the type listed on the Required Repair Schedule* but not otherwise identified thereon . . . to keep the Mortgaged Property in good order and repair (ordinary wear and tear excepted)” effectively prohibits any request for additional reserves, because Grandbridge and Fannie Mae have admitted that no such repairs remained outstanding. (Plaintiff’s Complaint, Ex. 1, Schedule 1, page 93; Plaintiff’s Complaint, Ex. 6, Schedule 1, page 93. [emphasis added].)

~~156.217.~~ Nonetheless, the PCA conducted by f3, Inc., demands a deposit of approximately \$2.~~7~~85 million dollars for “immediate repairs.”

~~157.218.~~ \$1,908,760 of those “immediate repairs” were related to “turning” vacant apartments into rent ready units, which was an expense that was clearly not addressed in any prior schedule at the time of the initial loan or at Westland’s ~~the~~ assumption.

~~158.219.~~ Instead, the prior report by CBRE stated that such costs were expected to be handled in the ordinary course of business as opposed to part of the reserve process.

~~159.220.~~ The remaining “repair” items either were not addressed in any schedule, or were of a type that was addressed in the original replacement reserve schedule by an addition to the monthly debt service charges.

~~160.221.~~ As to deposits under the Replacement Reserve, it would be improper to require an immediate deposit, because no immediate deposit was required for any such expense at the Square Property either upon the initial closing of the loan or upon its assumption.

~~161.222.~~ To now demand over one million dollars (\$1,000,000) of reserves for only the Square Property related to such depreciable costs, on items such as roofs, boilers and turning



1 vacant units, after the passage of only one year seems disingenuous at best, and instead reveals  
2 that a different condition standard ~~is-beingwas~~ used, apparently to cover up ~~Grandview's~~  
3 ~~Grandbridge's~~ poor underwriting of the loans ~~from-to~~ a weaker borrower (Shamrock) in the first  
4 place.

5 ~~162-223.~~ Of course changing the rules after closing a deal is not permitted. Here,  
6 using a different standard is directly contrary to Schedule 1 of each Loan Agreement that defined  
7 the term "Additional Lender Replacements" to mean "*replacements of the type listed on the*  
8 *Required Replacement Schedule* but not otherwise identified thereon . . . to keep the Mortgaged  
9 Property in good order and repair (ordinary wear and tear excepted)." (Plaintiff's Complaint, Ex.  
10 1, Schedule 1, page 93; Plaintiff's Complaint, Ex. 6, Schedule 1, page 93. [emphasis added].)

11 ~~163-224.~~ Based on the depreciation~~ionble~~ schedule associated with such costs it is  
12 insupportable to demand that the entire cost of such items would be advanced to the present.  
13 Rather, such costs are naturally consistent with funding through inclusion on a monthly debt  
14 service obligation payment designed to match the depreciation schedule of the underlying asset.

15 ~~164-225.~~ Likewise, deviating from the depreciation schedule agreed when the loans  
16 funded is improper for both Properties, because the underlying depreciation schedules for the  
17 same assets should not have changed, and did not change when Westland assumed the two loans.

18 ~~165-226.~~ Notably, each definition of additional repairs, additional replacements, and  
19 conditions that justify performing a property condition assessment provides that "ordinary wear  
20 and tear [is] excepted," but the vast majority of the items Servicer seeks a deposit for are items  
21 related to "ordinary wear and tear" within vacant units, which is thereby precluded by the  
22 definitions contained in the Loan Agreements.

23 ~~166-227.~~ Additionally, Servicer's demand is improper because the definitions for  
24 Additional Lender Repair and Additional Lender Replacement are limited to repairs or  
25 replacements "of the type listed" on the two schedules attached to the Loan Agreement.

26 ~~167-228.~~ However, even ignoring the language of the defined terms from the Loan  
27 Agreement, it is clear that the amount included in the original schedules for the Liberty Property  
28 and Square Property which totaled \$560,187.00, or 1.5% of the loan balance are not of the same



1 type or substantially equivalent to the additional reserve funding that Fannie Mae and  
2 Grandbridge seek in the amount of \$2,~~706,845,150~~980.00 or ~~7.0542~~% of the loan balance, after  
3 only one year has passed, and both Properties, by any objective measure are much improved and  
4 the collateral is much more valuable than when Westland assumed the loans.

5 ~~168,229.~~ Perhaps even more alarming is that the figures for the calculation of  
6 monthly reserve allocations payments changed dramatically as well. Based upon Westland's  
7 substantial investment in and improvements made to both Properties, ~~t~~The monthly reserve  
8 allocations should actually have gone down ~~remained the same~~ if the same standard had been  
9 used.

10 ~~169,230.~~ As such, the factual circumstances evidence that Fannie Mae and  
11 Grandbridge's assertion of a default is baseless, because there is no demonstrable deterioration in  
12 the condition of the Properties.

### 13 **The Abandoned Default**

14 ~~170,231.~~ Notably, this is not the only baseless default that Fannie Mae and  
15 Grandbridge have ~~made~~claimed, because they also initially cited a default based on "Borrower's  
16 [ ] failure to maintain the Mortgage Property in accordance with Article 6 of the Loan  
17 Agreement." (Ex. 13, page 1.)

18 ~~171,232.~~ However, if it was based on the failure to make repairs, that purported  
19 default was disingenuous because Fannie Mae and Grandbridge never provided Westland an  
20 opportunity to perform repairs, as contemplated by the Loan Agreements, prior to making their  
21 \$2.~~7~~85 million demand to place funds into escrow.

22 ~~172,233.~~ Upon information and belief, such an assertion of a default was in bad  
23 faith, because Article 6 is six pages in length, and after Westland's request for further  
24 information on the purported default, including the identification of the section breached, neither  
25 Grandbridge nor Fannie Mae ever provided any response.

26 ~~173,234.~~ Upon information and belief, Fannie Mae and Grandbridge have  
27 abandoned that baseless claim, because it does not appear as a basis for relief in the Complaint.

### 28 **The Purported Default**

1 ~~174-235.~~ On or about October 18, 2019, Michael Woolf of Grandbridge forwarded  
2 a letter to each Westland entity, which recounted that a Property Condition Assessment was  
3 performed on September 9 through 11, 2019, and included “a schedule of needed repairs” as an  
4 attachment.

5 ~~175-236.~~ The letter stated that the various physical conditions at the Properties  
6 amounted to Additional Lender Repairs and Additional Lender Replacements under the Loan  
7 Agreements, and that Grandbridge would require Westland to “execute an Amendment to the  
8 Loan Agreement reflecting the amendment and restatement of the” repair and replacement  
9 reserve schedules that were attached to the Loan Agreement.

10 ~~176-237.~~ Based on that demand for Westland to execute new replacement and repair  
11 reserve schedules, it was stated that Westland would need to deposit \$1,753,145 to the Liberty  
12 Property repairs escrow account, and \$1,092,835.00 to the Square Property repairs escrow  
13 account.

14 ~~177-238.~~ Further, the letter noted that Grandbridge would be transferring 75% of the  
15 balance from the interest bearing Replacement Reserve account balance to the non-interest  
16 bearing Repair Reserve account.

17 ~~178-239.~~ Based on those transfers, Westland would be deprived of the interest that  
18 would normally accrue to the \$246,047.00 transferred from Replacement Reserve at the Liberty  
19 Property and to the interest normally accruing on the \$106,217 for the Square Property.

20 ~~179-240.~~ Grandbridge and/or Fannie Mae took those actions in bad faith.

21 ~~180.~~ On November 1, 2019, Westland requested an extension of time to consider the  
22 request, so it could evaluate the PCA reports and formulate a response without interfering with  
23 Jewish holidays.

24 ~~181-241.~~ However, ~~m~~Minutes later, Grandbridge and/or Fannie Mae refused this  
25 request for a little bit more time.

26 ~~182-242.~~ On November 13, 2019, Westland contested the demand, noted that the  
27 requested adjustments to the reserves was improper, and gave a list of reasons why. Westland  
28

1 also advised that it would agree to engage in an open dialogue to attempt to obtain a resolution.  
2 (Exhibit Q, Letter of John Hofsaess, dated November 13, 2019.)

3 ~~183.243.~~ In response to Westland's letter, prior to the November 18, 2019, deadline  
4 for a deposit, Grandbridge stated that Westland would have to place the full amount of the  
5 requested reserves into escrow or face a Default, refused to extend Westland's time for a  
6 response, and intimated that had Westland forwarded a plan to meet the demand additional time  
7 could have been provided, even though no request for a plan had previously been made in the  
8 demand letter or prior communications with Grandbridge.

9 ~~184.244.~~ After Grandbridge refused to have any substantive conversation with  
10 Westland or to extend its time to respond to the demand, Westland requested to speak directly  
11 with Fannie Mae prior to November 18, 2019, but Westland did not receive any further response  
12 to its inquiry prior to November 18, 2019.

13 ~~185.245.~~ After November 18, 2019, Fannie Mae and Grandbridge refused to have  
14 any discussion of the proper amount of reserve funding unless Westland signed a pre-negotiation  
15 letter, which would require Westland to admit to a default.

16 ~~186.246.~~ ~~On an effort to pacify Grandbridge and Fannie Mae,~~ on November 28,  
17 2019, Westland forwarded a letter containing Westland's Strategic Plan for the Properties, which  
18 designated a budget for any outstanding repairs, and addressed that many of the requested repairs  
19 had already been performed.

20 ~~247.~~ On or about December 21, 2019, Westland received a default letter, dated  
21 December 17, 2019, with the above-referenced purported defaults.

## 22 **Lenders' Improper Servicing and Discrimination**

23 ~~187.248.~~ On December 23, 2019, Westland submitted a letter to Fannie Mae's  
24 counsel requesting additional details, including an identification of the specific sections of the  
25 loan agreements that had been violated, but no response was ever received. (Exhibit R, Letter of  
26 John Hofsaess, dated December 23, 2019.)

27  
28

1 ~~188,249.~~ On January 6, 2020, after not having received a response to the December  
2 23, 2019, Westland again sought further clarification, but no clarifying response was ever  
3 received. (Exhibit S, Letter of John Hofsaess, dated January 6, 2020.)

4 ~~189,250.~~ Instead, Fannie Mae and Grandbridge only forwarded a pre-negotiation  
5 letter with unacceptable terms, including which unilateral dictate terms for were required by  
6 Fannie Mae to even enter into a potential discussion of the proper amount of reserves.

7 ~~190,251.~~ When Westland requested that Grandbridge agree to make adjustments to  
8 the draconian requirements of the pre-negotiation letter, Fannie Mae and Grandbridge refused.

9 ~~191,252.~~ Despite declaring a default on or about December 17, 2019, Grandbridge  
10 and Fannie Mae continued, consistent with the Loan Agreements, and previous practice, to  
11 remove an ACH payment from Westland's account for the month of January 2020.

12 ~~192,253.~~ However, ~~i~~n February 2020, in an apparent attempt to create a financial  
13 default, where no such default previously existed, without prior notice, Grandbridge did not  
14 remove any ACH payment for February 2020, as it had been doing for months, and as had been  
15 requested by ~~Grandview~~Grandbridge, and agreed to by Westland as its method of paying the  
16 loans each month.

17 ~~193,254.~~ When Westland realized the monthly debt service obligation payment was  
18 not timely withdrawn on or about February 4, 2020, Westland contacted the loan servicer,  
19 requested a billing statement, and the loan servicer's representative responded that a statement  
20 would be sent.

21 ~~194,255.~~ The loan servicer never responded further, nor did it provide any billing  
22 statement as promised, until after ordered by this Court to do so through the preliminary  
23 injunction order that was entered during November 2020.

24 ~~195,256.~~ As such, on February 10, 2020, without any response from the loan  
25 servicer ~~at that time~~, Square LLC issued a check for \$58,471.94, and Liberty LLC issued a check  
26 for \$180,621.79, which approximated the amount of the last monthly debt service obligation  
27 payment plus 10%.

1        257. Every month ~~since~~between February 2020 and December 2020, Square LLC and  
2 Liberty LLC ~~have~~ forwarded the loan servicer a check for \$58,471.94 and \$180,621.79  
3 respectively to approximate the amount of the last monthly debt service obligation payment plus  
4 10%. The loan servicer ~~has~~ accepted those funds, and legal counsel for the lender has confirmed  
5 receipt of each of those payments in a series of non-waiver letters. (See e.g., Exhibit T, Lender’s  
6 counsel’s Non-Waiver Letters, dated February 19, 2020 (February 2020 payment), March 11,  
7 2020 (March 2020 payment), June 4, 2020 (April, May & June 2020 payments) August 12, 2020  
8 (July & August 2020 payments).)

9        258. Still, despite all initial payments, scheduled reserve payments and monthly debt  
10 service payments having been made, and without providing any evidence of deterioration in the  
11 condition of the Mortgaged Property, Lenders refused to recognize that no default had occurred.

12        259. Approximately eighteen months have passed, since Westland’s December 2019  
13 and January 2020 letters that requested further information on the purported default, or at “a  
14 minimum the specific subsection number and other identifying information” Lenders asserted  
15 was breached, but Lenders still have not provided any response with greater details on the basis  
16 for the purported breach in Article 6 of the Loan Agreements, which is a six (6) page densely  
17 worded section of the Loan Agreement, and as such should be deemed to have refused to set  
18 forth the precise basis for the alleged default.

19        260. Instead, Lenders engaged in coercive and overbearing tactics to assert improper  
20 pressure on Westland, including but not limited to placing all Westland-related entities, even  
21 those with no relationship to the two properties at issue on a “blacklist” status known as “a-  
22 check.” By placing Westland and the Westland-related entities on “a-check” it meant that no  
23 Westland related entity was able to obtain any new financing through Fannie Mae, and Westland  
24 had to disclose to other lenders that Fannie Mae asserted it had a loan in default, even though the  
25 default was contested by Westland.

#### 26 **The Lender-Required SPE Structure**

27        261. Generally, Fannie Mae and mortgage lenders require that the borrower on a  
28 mortgage loan have a single purpose entity (“SPE”) structure, which is a legal entity created to

1 hold title to real property and that is limited from engaging in any business not related to the  
2 rental of the mortgaged property identified in the loan agreement.

3 262. Here, Lenders required Liberty LLC and Square LLC to use an SPE structure, by  
4 requiring that they be entities that had no other assets or liabilities other than those associated  
5 with the one particular piece of real estate to which each loan was related.

6 263. Lenders required use of the SPE structure to meet the narrow, specific objective  
7 of isolating the real estate assets securing the Loan Agreement from liabilities that might  
8 adversely affect the other Westland-affiliated owners, shareholders, and/or parent companies as a  
9 whole.

10 264. Lenders also required those Westland-affiliated owners, shareholders, and/or  
11 parent companies to: act as guarantors, share the guarantor's financial information with Lenders,  
12 and share the borrower's sources of cash used to buy the Properties.

13 265. As such, prior to the August 29, 2018 closing, Westland was required to provide  
14 the document entitled Summary of Sources of Cash, and supporting documentation, which listed  
15 AFT NV as the primary contributor of funds for the borrowing entities, and showed the financial  
16 security holdings of the Westland Securities Entities.

17 266. As such, Lenders knew that Liberty LLC and Village LLC, as the borrowing  
18 SPEs, had each received funds for the initial down payment used to purchase the Properties from  
19 the commonly-owned Westland Securities Entities, including from AFT NV, Dynasty Trust, and  
20 the Alevy Descendant's Trust, which were specifically required by the Lenders to be guarantors  
21 for the Westland borrower's two loans at issue in this case.

## 22 **The COVID-19 Pandemic**

23 267. In March 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic hit the United States, which caused  
24 substantial uncertainty for individuals, companies, governments, and the financial markets,  
25 including Westland, the Westland Credit Facility Entities and the Westland Securities Entities.

26 268. Upon information and belief, during four trading days in March 2020, the "Dow  
27 Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) plunged 6,400 points, an equivalent of roughly 26%. The crash  
28 was caused by the governmental/market's reaction to a novel coronavirus (COVID-19), a disease

1 which originated in the Chinese city of Wuhan in December 2019 and quickly spread around the  
2 world causing a pandemic.”<sup>14</sup>

3 269. The Westland Securities Entities, including Amusement, AFP Trust, Westland  
4 AMT, AFT NV, and Dynasty Trust, were not immune to the dramatic market fluctuations, and  
5 overall financial securities market decline.

6 270. The Westland Securities Entities each owned a significant portfolio of financial  
7 securities, and a significant amount of those holdings were held on margin.

8 271. During March 2020, when the markets fluctuated so dramatically, the Westland  
9 Security Entities had more than \$27,211,000 of margin calls.

10 272. In response, the Westland Securities Entities were required to put up sufficient  
11 additional cash to cover those margin calls, and to do so the Westland Securities Entities  
12 liquidated financial securities during March 2020.

13 273. When liquidating securities for margin calls, the total value of the securities held  
14 decreases, and based on market conditions during March 2020, the Westland Security Entities  
15 were required to liquidate securities valued at nearly twice the amount of the margin call.

16 274. The financial securities that were required to be liquidated due to margin calls  
17 have increased in value by tens of millions of dollars, the exact amount of which increase will be  
18 determined at trial.

19 275. When making loans and contributions to other closely-held and commonly-owned  
20 Westland-related entities, the Westland Securities Entities depended on those entities being able  
21 to later borrow against the real property acquired to be able to quickly return such funds based on  
22 the appreciation of the real property owned.

23 276. Being able to utilize the appreciation of the real property that is owned by  
24 Westland and the Westland-related entities allows them to utilize their combined financial capital

25  
26  
27 <sup>14</sup> Mazur, Mieszko, et al., Finance Research Letters, Jan 2021; 38: 101690, US National Library of Medicine  
28 National Institutes of Health, Elsevier Public Health Emergency Collection, at  
<https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7343658/> (showing market volatility during March 2020 of the  
DJIA, which is a commonly used index that functions as a quick proxy for the large capitalization financial markets..

1 to fund further growth and to engage in effective risk balancing by diversifying assets in the real  
2 estate and financial markets, which reduces the effect of volatility in any one market.

3 277. The margin calls that occurred during March 2020 were the result of instability  
4 caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, which caused a financial market collapse, is the type of  
5 market risk that the Westland Security Entities had planned to have a reserve available through  
6 the use of borrow up loans and lines of credit by entities such as the Westland Credit Facility  
7 Entities.

8 278. Specifically, the Westland Securities Entities made inter-company loans and  
9 contributions, to the Westland Credit Facility Entities directly, and indirectly through loans and  
10 contributions made to the Westland Credit Facility Entities' owning entities.

11 279. However, the ability of those Westland-related entities to return funds was  
12 foreclosed in March 2020 by Lenders' actions related to the purported default in this matter, and  
13 specifically because they put the Westland Securities Entities on a-check and cut off their credit  
14 facility.

15 280. Upon information and belief, in December 2019, contemporaneously with the  
16 purported default Fannie Mae placed Westland, the Westland Securities Entities and Westland  
17 Credit Facility Entities on "a-check" and improperly discriminated against any Westland-related  
18 entity for new loans, draws on existing lines of credit, and re-financing applications.

19 **Discriminatory Lending Practices & the Master Credit Facility Agreement**

20 281. In fact, six Westland-related entities, namely Amusement, Corona, Amber,  
21 Hacienda, 1097 North, Tropicana, and Vellagio, described above as the Westland Credit Facility  
22 Entities, had already ensured that funds were available to meet Counterclaimants' need in the  
23 event of a financial market collapse.

24 282. Specifically, on March 15, 2019, the Westland credit Facility Entities entered into  
25 a Master Credit Facility Agreement (the "MCFA") with loan servicer Wells Fargo Bank, NA  
26 ("Wells"), as a lender, which could be used as an additional cash resource.

27 283. Before entering into the MCFA, the Westland Credit Facility Entities were  
28 required to submit an application, vetted according to Fannie Mae's underwriting criteria, were



1 charged legal fees for underwriting, were charged costs for appraisals, and were required to pay  
2 additional loan issuance costs.

3 284. As part of that application and vetting, Fannie Mae reviewed the Westland Credit  
4 Facility Entities financial statements, and the financials of their affiliated owners, shareholders,  
5 and/or parent companies, who were required to act as guarantors and share their financial  
6 information, including but not limited to guarantors Amusement, the Alevy Descendant's Trust,  
7 and the AA 2015 Dynasty Trust B.

8 285. After being fully vetted, the Westland Credit Facility Entities were approved by  
9 Wells, and Fannie Mae confirmed that it would purchase the MCFA related notes, so that the  
10 Westland Credit Facility Entities could receive funds via the credit facility.

11 286. The initial advance under the MCFA was for \$97,789,000.

12 287. The MCFA contractually obligated the lender to extend certain funds to the  
13 Westland Credit Facility Entities, as Future Advances consistent with the MCFA and agreed  
14 upon schedule.

15 288. The same day the MCFA was executed by Westland, Wells entered into an  
16 assignment agreement, which assigned the lender's benefits and obligations in the MCFA to  
17 Fannie Mae.

18 289. The terms of the MCFA provided that "any Future Advance . . . and any  
19 Conversion of an Advance shall be subject to the precondition that Lender must confirm with  
20 Fannie Mae that Fannie Mae is generally offering to purchase in the marketplace advances of the  
21 execution type requested by Borrower at the time of the Request and at the timer the rate for such  
22 Advance is locked." In such an event, if Fannie Mae was no longer purchasing advances of the  
23 same type, Wells Fargo would seek an alternative advance consistent with the type then offered,  
24 which would be conditioned on Wells approval through Fannie Mae, "except for a Borrow Up  
25 provided in the proviso of Section 2.02(c)(2)(B)."

26 290. The terms for a borrow up made clear that Future Advances addressed by new  
27 offerings (discussed in the prior paragraph) that involved an "Addition of Additional Mortgaged  
28 Properties" ("Additional Mortgage Advance") were discretionary.

1        291. However, a “Borrow Up” based on appreciation in the value of the mortgaged  
2 property that was already part of the MCFA would be made so long as there was “compliance  
3 with the terms of the Future Advance Schedule and the Underwriting and Servicing  
4 Requirements subject to the terms of this Section 2.02(c)(2) and Section 2.02(b) where the  
5 Valuations of the Mortgaged Properties will be based on Appraisals ordered by Lender and paid  
6 for by Borrower” (“Borrow Up Advance”), which advances were non-discretionary.

7        292. Those terms provided in part that the Westland Credit Facility Entities were able  
8 to seek a Future Advance not more than one time per year during the first five years of the  
9 MCFA, and not more than a total of three times during those first five years.

10       293. Schedule 14 to the MCFA was the Future Advance Schedule, and Form  
11 6001.MCFA was the Future Advance Request form, which together permitted Future Advances  
12 based on the following terms provided that:

- 13           a. The Future Advance would be for a minimum of \$5 million, with a total of all  
14           advances not exceeding \$125 million;
- 15           b. A Borrow Up Advance required that Coverage and LTV Tests be met, based  
16           on a desk appraisal, and that all Underwriting and Servicing Requirements be  
17           satisfied;
- 18           c. An Addition Advance required the underwriting of Mortgaged Property  
19           Addition Schedule be satisfied; and
- 20           d. “Lender’s determination that the proposed borrower, key principal, and  
21           guarantor meet all of Lender’s eligibility, credit, management and other  
22           standards customarily applied by Lender in connection with the origination or  
23           purchase of similar mortgage finance structures on similar Multifamily  
24           Residential Properties at the time of the Future Advance Request for the  
25           Future Advance”;
- 26           e. Submission of an additional variable or fixed rate note;

1 f. Payment of an Additional Origination Fee for Addition Advance or a non-  
2 refundable Re-Underwriting Fee for a Borrow Up Advance, as well as legal  
3 fees, related costs, and that a “request opinion” was obtained; and  
4 g. Receipt of “Property-Related Documents” if applicable.

5 294. Pursuant to the MCFA, the Westland Credit Facility Entities were able to seek a  
6 Borrow Up Advance on March 15, 2020, because the MCFA was originated on March 15, 2019.

7 295. The Westland Credit Facility Entities began preparation for such an advance  
8 during November 2019, and knew that the Mortgaged Property securing the MCFA had  
9 substantially appreciated so that it would allow a Future Advance equal to the full \$125 million  
10 Future Advance amount, or an additional Future Advance of up to \$27,211,000.

11 296. Nonetheless, in December 2019, the Westland Credit Facility Entities were  
12 advised that Fannie Mae refused to extend funds for a Borrow Up Advance, even though  
13 contractually obligated to do so, and the sole stated reason for Fannie Mae’s refusal to extend  
14 funds was the disputed default in this matter that resulted in all Westland-related entities being  
15 wrongfully placed on a-check.

16 297. Being wrongfully placed on “a-check” meant that when any lender, servicing  
17 agent, or DUS lender attempted to underwrite, refinance, or borrow up on loans for Westland,  
18 the Westland Credit Facility Entities, other Westland affiliated entities, their key principals, and  
19 their guarantors, they were automatically deemed to no longer met Fannie Mae’s “eligibility,  
20 credit, management and other standards customarily applied by Lender in connection with the  
21 origination or purchase of a similar mortgage finance structure[.]”

22 298. Moreover, between early 2020 and July 2021, additional Westland affiliated  
23 entities, made new loan and/or refinance inquiries with mortgage brokers related to obtaining a  
24 loan through Fannie Mae, but were told they were on “a-check,” so they were not eligible to get  
25 a loan through Fannie Mae.

26 299. As such, Fannie Mae continued to enjoy full performance by the Westland Credit  
27 Facility Entities, including the timely receipt of all MCFA loan payments, maintenance of the  
28

1 same liens on their Mortgaged Property, and security from the same guaranty, despite Fannie  
2 Mae's breach of the Future Advance provisions of the MCFA.

3 300. Fannie Mae's had no independent basis related to the Westland Credit Facility  
4 Entities to breach the Future Advance provisions, and instead solely justified its breach on the  
5 "a-check," because the Westland Credit Facility Entities were affiliated entities of Westland.

6 301. As such, the purported breach was a baseless assertion arising from Westland's  
7 valid objection to Lenders' own unilateral modification of the Loan Agreement that required  
8 Westland to place an additional \$2.85 million into reserves.

9 302. Counterclaimants had relied on the availability of the Future Advance funds  
10 promised in the credit facility to provide a safety net in the event of an economic downturn, and  
11 if Counterclaimants had access to the additional \$27,211,000, the Westland Securities Entities  
12 would not have been required to liquidate their holdings in order to cover the March 2020 margin  
13 calls.

14 **Lenders' Continuing Improper Servicing and Discrimination**

15 ~~196.303.~~ On several occasions, after the October 2019 Notice of Demand, Westland  
16 has attempted to discuss the proper amount of reserve funding related to the loans, but through  
17 counsel, Grandbridge and/or Fannie Mae have refused to do so without attaching conditions that  
18 have in effect operated as a poison pill, including that Westland pay for all costs associated with  
19 Grandbridge's attempts to increase Westland's reserve deposits despite having no such rights in  
20 the Loan documents.

21 ~~197.304.~~ For instance, in June 2020, Fannie Mae's counsel relayed that Fannie Mae  
22 would agree to discuss the purported default and attempt to resolve the parties' dispute, but  
23 represented that they would not do so without an update regarding the Properties' status, without  
24 counsel being present, without Westland continuing to make monthly debt service payments, and  
25 without Westland agreeing to pay all the costs and legal fees that Fannie Mae and Grandbridge  
26 had incurred in conjunction with the improper default.

27 ~~198.305.~~ Westland responded by consenting to each of those terms, other than  
28 agreeing to pay the costs and legal fees ~~thate the Lendersy~~ were attempting to extract as an

1 entrance fee to enter into a discussion with Fannie Mae. ~~However, Still~~, in June 2020, Fannie  
2 Mae responded that the ~~Lendersy~~ would not agree to meet without Westland agreeing to all four  
3 terms. On August 13, 2020, after Westland produced over 2,300 pages of work orders showing  
4 the additional work that had been done at the Properties between May 2019 and June 2020,  
5 Fannie Mae's counsel provided that he would request that Fannie Mae meet without Westland  
6 agreeing to pay such cost and fees. On August 24, 2020, Fannie Mae's counsel confirmed that  
7 the ~~Lendersy~~ would not agree to a waiver of those costs and fees, and stated that they would  
8 agree to meet only based on the application of Westland's excess monthly debt service obligation  
9 payments, because Fannie Mae planned to apply those payments to costs and fees.

10 ~~306.~~ Despite Westland fully paying its monthly debt service obligations on time, and  
11 its continuing to make improvements at the Properties that render the purported default notice  
12 moot, and further despite both Fannie Mae and Grandbridge knowing those facts to be true, on  
13 July 15, 2020, Fannie Mae's counsel illegally forwarded Westland a notice of default and  
14 election to sell the Properties.

15 ~~199,307.~~ Based on the foregoing, Westland has had to ~~respond with this legal filing,~~  
16 ~~in order defend itself~~ to prevent and improper foreclosure and appointment of a receiver.

17 ~~200,308.~~ Westland's legal filings are necessary to prevent Fannie Mae and  
18 Grandbridge from selling or foreclosing on the Property until Westland's claims are heard on the  
19 merits.

20 ~~201,309.~~ Without an injunction, Westland will be irreparably harmed by the loss of  
21 the Properties, or control of the Properties to the extent a receiver is appointed.

22 ~~202,310.~~ Moreover, since Westland's purchase of the Properties, Westland has  
23 expended significant additional funds and resources in relation to the Properties, in excess of  
24 \$3.5 million in capital expense and related improvements alone, which would be lost by the  
25 foreclosure sale.

26 ~~311.~~ ~~Finally, w~~Without Court intervention, \$20,000,000 in ~~initial purchase funds, plus~~  
27 ~~any appreciation equity combined for in the value of~~ the Properties will be lost via foreclosure.

1        312. Additionally, Counterclaimants were required to bring this Counterclaim to  
2 prevent Fannie Mae and Grandbridge from taking any adverse action against any Westland-  
3 related entity on other loans due to the purported default that arose from failing to deposit an  
4 additional \$2.85 million into the reserve escrow accounts, including for example by improperly  
5 discriminating against the Counterclaimants on new loans, failing to honor loan-related reserve  
6 disbursement requests, and failing to adhere to non-discretionary Future Advance provisions for  
7 which Counterclaimants have already provided consideration.

8        **IV. SUPPLEMENTAL FACTUAL BACKGROUND & GENERAL**  
9        **ALLEGATIONS AS TO THE SHAM DEFENDANTS**

10       313. Counterclaimants repeat, reallege, and incorporate the allegations set forth in the  
11 preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.

12       **a. Shamrock's Purchase of the Properties**

13       314. Upon information and belief, during August 2014 "Shamrock Communities LLC  
14 [ ] a Greenwich, Conn. based multifamily real estate investment firm that was founded in 2011"  
15 purchased 4870 Nellis Oasis Lane, Las Vegas, NV 89115 and 5025 Nellis Oasis Lane, Las  
16 Vegas, NV 89115 from Blue Valley Apartments, Inc. ("Blue Valley").

17       315. Upon information and belief, ownership of the Properties were transferred from  
18 Fannie Mae to Blue Valley on or about February 13, 2012.

19       316. Upon information and belief, Blue Valley was an entity affiliated with Fannie  
20 Mae and/or Fannie Mae's officers and directors until its dissolution in September 2018.

21       317. Upon information and belief, Blue Valley owned and/or operated financially  
22 distressed properties, including real estate owned ("REO") properties, and was responsible for  
23 the management, operation, marketing, and sale of such properties after Fannie Mae has  
24 foreclosed upon a loan.

25       318. REOs are properties owned by a lender after a borrower default and unsuccessful  
26 foreclosure sale auction.

27       319. At the time Blue Valley sold 4870 Nellis Oasis Lane, Las Vegas, NV 89115 and  
28 5025 Nellis Oasis Lane, Las Vegas, NV 89115 to the Sham Defendants, the Properties were still

1 in distress, had high rates of crime, and were not capable of receiving financing through Fannie  
2 Mae.

3 320. Upon information and belief, Fannie Mae has a policy that it will not extend  
4 financing for Properties that were previously a Fannie Mae REO, unless the Property meets  
5 exhaustive criteria.

6 321. In December 2014, Shamrock Communities LLC circulated a press release that  
7 represented it had substantial real estate wherewithal, by stating it had “completed seven  
8 [multifamily property] acquisitions in the mid-West and West since the beginning of” 2014.

9 322. In that press release, Weinstein represented that Shamrock Communities three  
10 purchases in 2014 “were distressed, bank-owned assets” that would “be repositioned and turned  
11 into viable communities, in which residents will benefit from substantial upgrades and be able to  
12 take pride in their surroundings.”

13 323. The press release provides that Liberty and Square would “undergo an estimated  
14 \$4 million capital improvement plan” and that “[t]he properties[’] transformation will take  
15 approximately 12 to 18 months to complete.”

16 324. Weinstein stated the plan was that “[a]fter extensive renovations, management  
17 changes and enhanced services for tenants, we hope to attract military employees looking for  
18 housing close to Nellis Air Force Base.”

19 325. Upon information and belief, shortly after or contemporaneously with the  
20 acquisition of the Properties, Shamrock Communities LLC conveyed title to the Properties to  
21 SHAM VI and SHAM VII.

22 326. Although the information disseminated by the Sham Defendants in press releases  
23 remained publicly accessible by internet searches, the information regarding the extensive capital  
24 improvement plan, the 12-18 month transition period, the plan to attract military employees and  
25 transform the Properties never came to fruition and/or was false.

26 **b. The Properties’ Financing**  
27  
28

1        327. Based on the foregoing, the Properties were ineligible for a Fannie Mae backed  
2 loan when the Sham Defendants purchased them in 2014, and remained ineligible under Fannie  
3 Mae's underwriting criteria so a Fannie Mae backed loan never should have been issued in 2017.

4        328. In fact, at the time of the Sham Defendants' acquisition of the Properties in 2014,  
5 those defendants obtained private financing through Pillar Multifamily LLC ("Pillar").

6        329. In lending to the Sham Defendants, Pillar was aware of the poor state of the  
7 Properties, as it obtained an appraisal by Butler Burger Group, LLC, which recognized that as of  
8 August 2014, "the property is 70.5% occupied having been poorly managed since it was  
9 foreclosed on in 2012," which was the entire period during which it was managed by Fannie Mae  
10 and its affiliate Blue Valley.

11       330. Upon information and belief, during October 2016, SunTrust Bank acquired Pillar  
12 and its associated loan administration, investor services and mortgage brokerage business, named  
13 Cohen Financial ("Cohen").

14       331. Upon information and belief, a primary driver in the purchase transaction was that  
15 Pillar Financial had expertise in government sponsored enterprise loans, which gave SunTrust  
16 access to full loan underwriting through Pillar's Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and Federal Housing  
17 Administration license transfer approval.

18       332. Based on that expertise, SunTrust/Pillar were well aware of Fannie Mae  
19 underwriting criteria.

20       333. Upon information and belief, in mid to late 2017, SunTrust/Pillar evaluated the  
21 Sham Defendant's loan for a potential refinance, and found it to be high risk.

22       334. Upon information and belief, SunTrust/Pillar still underwrote and issued the DUS  
23 loan for the Sham Defendants in 2017.

24       335. Upon information and belief, issuing a DUS loan generated additional loan  
25 issuance fees and reduced SunTrust's/Pillar's lending risk, because it would be converting a  
26 direct loan, where it was 100% at risk, to a DUS loan, which Fannie Mae would securitize and  
27 spread the vast majority of the lending risk either to Fannie Mae or its CMBS investors.

28



1       336. As SunTrust/Pillar and/or Cohen had serviced the loans since 2014, they knew  
2 when underwriting the loans during 2017 that the Properties were not eligible for a Fannie Mae  
3 loan and/or did not meet Fannie Mae’s underwriting criteria.

4       337. When underwriting the new loans, SunTrust/Pillar utilized the services of CBRE  
5 to perform a PCA and appraisal of the two Properties, because it was known that CBRE utilized  
6 a property condition assessment standard that was more lenient to the borrower, would minimize  
7 the reserve funds required, and increase the chance a DUS loan could be issued.

8       338. Ultimately, SunTrust/Pillar underwrote the transaction through the DUS lending  
9 program that did not require Fannie Mae’s prior approval, integrated the PCA criteria from the  
10 CBRE PCA into its reserve schedules, failed to address that the Properties did not meet Fannie  
11 Mae’s criteria related to crime, and failed to adequately review or overlooked the financial  
12 information that the Sham Defendants had submitted with its re-finance application and available  
13 in its own servicing files.

14               **c. The Failed 2017 Shamrock-Westland Purchase Transaction**

15       339. By email dated November 2, 2016, a real estate broker, Art Carll of NAI  
16 contacted Counterclaimants; provided information on the Properties, including a mini offering  
17 statement, rent rolls, and a listing of capital improvements; stated the properties were “nice” but  
18 “simply mismanaged”, and inquired whether Countclaimants had any interest in the Properties.

19       340. Within the mini offering memorandum, which the Sham Defendants intended to  
20 be shared with potential purchasers, it was represented that:

- 21               a. The physical occupancy rate for the Liberty Village property was 82%;
- 22               b. The physical occupancy rate for the Village Square property was 81%;
- 23               c. The Liberty Village property was generating \$5,135,162 of Net Rentable Income  
24 and \$3,232,170 of net operating income a year;
- 25               d. The Village Square property was generating \$2,287,464 of Net Rentable Income  
26 and \$1,120,353 of net operating income a year;

27       341. In a further communication made on November 30, 2016, the same broker  
28 showed a “surrounding properties” map, which listed 83% occupancy rates for both Properties,

1 and showed the higher occupancy rates for surrounding properties, leading the broker to state the  
2 map “depict[s] how badly the asset is underperforming and where the opportunity is for you to  
3 lift the asset to market conditions.”

4 342. In early 2017, Counterclaimants forwarded a Letter of Intent related to the  
5 purchase of the Properties.

6 343. In response, by email dated January 10, 2017, Weinstein represented through  
7 broker Art Carll that the LOI was acceptable, except that Counterclaimants would need to pick  
8 up most of the closing costs and knowing that the Properties were in unacceptable physical  
9 condition that “[t]he sale is As-Is with limited reps,” and that the Sham Defendants “do not need  
10 to make the units rent ready.”

11 344. Buyer accepted the terms other than the closing date and a portion of the cost  
12 shifting, and on January 18, 2017 an initial PSA was forwarded, and at the time Seller’s broker,  
13 Art Carll represented that “seller is not overly sophisticated” and will “blow up” the deal if there  
14 are a “bunch of changes.”

15 345. After exchanging drafts and minor changes by both parties, on February 8, 2017,  
16 the Sham Defendants and Westland both signed the 2017 PSA, with the following key terms:

- 17 a. Liberty Village’s purchase price would be \$44,500,000;
- 18 b. Village Square’s purchase price would be \$16,000,000;
- 19 c. Counterclaimants would forward a \$667,500 initial deposit for Liberty Village  
20 and \$240,000 initial deposit for Village Square;
- 21 d. Sham VI & Sham VII would deliver or make available due diligence items within  
22 five (5) business days by February 15, 2017;
- 23 e. Counterclaimants would approve or disapprove title, inspection and due diligence  
24 contingencies by March 10, 2017, and a \$907,500 additional deposit would be  
25 made that day;
- 26 f. The due diligence deadline would be March 10, 2017; and
- 27 g. The closing date would occur on April 27, 2017.

1       346. On February 12, 2017, Weinstein wrote an email stating the tenant lease files  
2 were available onsite, inquiring whether the tenant ledgers should be pulled, and requesting  
3 confirmation that the brokers could access the online portion of the due diligence folders.

4       347. On February 16, 2017, Counterclaimants forwarded a schedule for site inspections  
5 planned for February 22 & 23, 2017, both for Counterclaimants and an outside vendor, Partner  
6 Engineering and Science, Inc. (“Partner”).

7       348. On February 28, 2017, Davidson sent an email stating: “The questionnaires for  
8 the PRCs are already in the dropbox for both properties,” Davidson requested that the broker  
9 address any further questions, and later that same day broker Art Carll confirmed that Westland  
10 had the questionnaires but was requesting a copy of the delinquency report for Village Square.

11       349. The next day, on March 1, 2017, the deal began to break apart when Weinstein  
12 forwarded a copy of the delinquency report to broker Art Carll and Davidson, with the intent that  
13 the information be forwarded to Westland.

14       350. On March 6, 2017, Counterclaimants received inspection findings from Partner  
15 Engineering and Science, Inc., which raised several concerns with the condition of the  
16 Properties, including pest control issues, roof leaks and need for replacement, water leaks, water  
17 damage to floors and ceilings, potential microbial growth, the need for asphalt pavement  
18 replacement, and damaged carports.

19       351. As such, on March 8, 2017, prior to the close of due diligence, Yanki Greenspan,  
20 on behalf of Westland, emailed Art Carll stating: “Thank you for working diligently with us  
21 through this long process. As you are aware the physical condition of this property is  
22 unacceptable to us. The issues that are holding us back are criminal activity, mold in more than  
23 15% of the units, buildings sinking, insanely poor collections, etc. We are anticipating a 2+ year  
24 clean up period and expenditures exceeding \$6mil. If I had to throw out a number we could pay  
25 for this property it would be closer to \$45mil. If you think that the seller is at all interested in  
26 selling the building at that price please let me know. Otherwise we will be canceling escrow by  
27 tomorrow.”

1        352. On March 10, 2017, Westland’s in-house counsel, Michael Libraty advised the  
2 Sham Defendants that Westland was providing a written disapproval of contingencies for both  
3 Properties.

4        353. Counterclaimants’ email from Yanki Greenspan and written disapproval of  
5 contingencies provided the Sham Defendants a roadmap for the attributes at the Properties that  
6 Counterclaimants found material, and how the Sham Defendants could document that the  
7 condition of the Properties had improved.

8                    **d. Manufacturing the “Rent” and “Occupancy” Numbers Before and After**  
9                    **the Failed 2017 Transaction**

10        354. Upon information and belief, there was no source of information regarding the  
11 Properties’ financial performance other than directly from the Sham Defendants at the time of  
12 the 2018 purchase and sale transaction.

13        355. Upon information and belief, until July 2015 the Properties were managed by  
14 outside property management, but thereafter the Sham Defendants controlled the Properties  
15 financial records and maintained such books, financial records and rent rolls with limited  
16 assistance from Westcorp.

17        356. Upon information and belief, leading up to and at the time it was trying to sell the  
18 Properties to Westland, SHAM VI and SHAM VII were processing an extraordinarily high  
19 number of five (5) day notices to pay rent or quit each month, which amounted to “hundreds” of  
20 notices, but the SHAM Defendants were not actually evicting the occupants in the units.

21        357. Upon information and belief, even after an apartment was vacant the SHAM  
22 Defendants would not permit its accounting employees/contractors to simply process tenant  
23 move-outs in the Yardi computerized database property management and accounting records for  
24 SHAM VI and SHAM VII as those vacancies occurred.

25        358. Instead of accurately reflecting the true occupancy status of the apartments, upon  
26 information and belief, Weinstein and Wilde would decide on the number of tenants that they  
27 would permit to be “processed” each month, in order to control the number of tenants that were  
28

1 shown as having moved out each month in the computerized database the Sham Defendants  
2 maintained.

3 359. Upon information and belief, Weinstein and Wilde would only typically permit 5  
4 or 6 tenants to be shown as having moved out each month in the computerized database.

5 360. Upon information and belief, a primary factor in deciding how many past tenants  
6 that Weinstein & Wilde would permit to be shown as having moved out of the Properties was  
7 based on the amount of “rent” they wanted to show as having been paid each month at the  
8 Properties.

9 361. Upon information and belief, after determining that amount of “rent” they wished  
10 to show for that month, Weinstein and Wilde would work backwards to determine the number of  
11 tenants who needed to occupy the Properties to create rent account receivables that would  
12 support those calculations, and would only process “move outs” for a corresponding number of  
13 apartments and delay processing the remaining “move-outs.”

14 362. The process resulted in Weinstein and Wilde listing rental income that they knew  
15 would never be collected in order to create the appearance that the Properties were generating an  
16 elevated level of income in both the electronic tenant records and the financial records generated  
17 with those records by Sham VI and Sham VII.

18 363. However, upon information and belief, the Sham Defendants knew the true rent  
19 roll information, because they maintained a separate set of hard copy books and records within  
20 vacant unit(s), which initially was a vacant two bedroom unit near the Village Square rental  
21 office and that was later moved to a unit at Liberty Village.

22 364. Upon information and belief, each tenant had a hardcopy file in the vacant unit(s)  
23 that was contained in a large envelope, and the large envelopes were in turn stored in bankers’  
24 boxes in the vacant unit(s).

25 365. Upon information and belief, Weinstein and Wilde knowingly and intentionally  
26 failed to accurately document the true number of vacant units at the Properties in order to “keep  
27 the numbers up” in electronic records produced to outside parties, but the files stored in the  
28

1 bankers boxes in the vacant unit(s) contained annotations identifying the true occupancy status  
2 and/or rental payment history of each tenant.

3 366. Upon information and belief, the Sham Defendants required daily “rent roll  
4 correction” and delinquency reports to be submitted electronically via email and/or Dropbox to  
5 accounting personnel at the Shamrock Communities LLC corporate office, which records were  
6 reviewed by Weinstein, Davidson, Wilde and accounting personnel at the corporate office in  
7 Connecticut.

8 367. Upon information and belief, Weinstein had a primary, active role in establishing  
9 the improper, inaccurate accounting practices, but Weinstein shared those duties with Davidson.

10 368. Upon information and belief, both Weinstein and Davidson operated remotely,  
11 but Davidson provided daily directives regarding the handling of the improper accounting.

12 369. Upon information and belief, Weinstein would periodically travel to the  
13 Properties to review the onsite hardcopy records contained in the bankers’ boxes in the vacant  
14 unit, and access to the unit was limited to Weinstein and a small number of individuals assisting  
15 her.

16 370. Upon information and belief, Wilde ensured the improper accounting practices  
17 were being followed onsite, and trained the accounting, collections and/or leasing staff to follow  
18 the procedures that were established by Weinstein and Davidson related to documenting the  
19 improper accounting information.

20 371. A former employee/contractor estimated that over 70% of the tenant ledgers  
21 contained significant incorrect and inaccurate rent balance information and/or tenancy status.

22 372. When that employee/contractor first started working onsite, the individual  
23 estimated that it took approximately a month, on a fulltime basis, just to compare the rent roll  
24 and find out the units that were actually vacant due to the extremely inaccurate recordkeeping,  
25 and that the inaccuracies involved between 200-300 apartments.

26 373. Further, when the employee/contractor asked why the Sham Defendants were not  
27 processing “move-outs,” the individual was not given any substantive reason, but instead was

28

1 initially told that the employee/contractor should not be concerned and just could not process the  
2 “move-outs just yet.”

3 374. Later, when the Sham Defendants had listed the Properties for sale in 2017 and  
4 preparing for another sale in 2018, the Sham Defendants told the employee/contractor that they  
5 were “trying to sell” the Properties and the move-outs could not be processed while the sale was  
6 pending.

7 375. Upon information and belief, over the next several months during 2017 and early  
8 2018, the Sham Defendants used the information Counterclaimants provided at the time of the  
9 termination of the 2017 purchase transaction in order to improperly adjust Sham VI’s and Sham  
10 VII’s financial records, so that those records would appear to conform to Counterclaimants’  
11 standards, even though the actual rent collection and vacancies at the Properties did not support  
12 that information.

13 **c. The Consummated Purchase Transaction**

14 376. During early 2018, the Sham Defendants relisted the Properties for sale.

15 377. Counterclaimants became aware of the new listing and began to investigate  
16 whether the condition of the Properties had improved.

17 378. The Sham Defendants made representations, including within financial records,  
18 which appeared to show that the Properties rental receivables and delinquency rates had  
19 improved.

20 379. Specifically, on April 11, 2018, the Sham Defendants provided, *inter alia*, the  
21 following through their broker, with the intent that it be provided to Counterclaimants:

22 a. An Aging Summary Report for each Property, as of March 31, 2018, which  
23 metadata shows was authored by Davidson, and last saved by Weinstein, both on  
24 April 3, 2018, which show a “Total Unpaid Charges” balance of \$8,714.15 for the  
25 Village Square Property, and \$61,957.20 for the Liberty Village Property;

26 b. A Delinquency Report for each Property, as of April 12, 2018, which metadata  
27 shows was authored by Weinstein on April 12, 2018, and last saved by Weinstein,

- 1                   on April 13, 2018, which show a “Total Owed” balance of \$26,571.08 for Liberty  
2                   Village and a “Total Owed” balance of \$10,744.68 for Village Square.
- 3                   c. Twelve Month Income Statements for each Property, for both 2016 and 2017,  
4                   which metadata shows was authored by Weinstein, and last saved by Weinstein  
5                   on February 11, 2018;
- 6                   d. A 12 Month Occupancy Report for Village Square, showing the first three months  
7                   of information for 2018, and listed occupancy rates of 85.75% for January 2018,  
8                   87.63% for February 2018, and 88.78% for March 2018, which metadata does not  
9                   show an author, but was last saved by Weinstein on April 11, 2018.
- 10                  380. Each of the documents purported to show improvement in the financial condition  
11                  of the Properties between March 2017, when the initial 2017 agreement was cancelled, and April  
12                  2018, when this financial information was provided.
- 13                  381. Each of the documents referenced in the foregoing paragraph either contained  
14                  false information or concealed material facts, which overstated income, minimized delinquency  
15                  balances or failed to convey the true occupancy rates at the Properties.
- 16                  382. Based on the continuing interest of both parties in relation to completing a sale of  
17                  the Properties in light of the improvements at the Properties that the Sham Defendants  
18                  represented they made, on April 25, 2018, the Sham Defendants’ counsel provided a draft  
19                  purchase and sale agreement with factual revisions that modified the terms of the parties last  
20                  proposed agreement that was terminated in March 2017. Those factual modifications included:
- 21                       a. The disclosure of fire renovation work for the April 2018 fire;  
22                       b. The disclosure of a new loan that was entered into with Lenders in November  
23                       2017, and a requirement that Counterclaimants assume that loan;  
24                       c. The disclosure of the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department’s Notice and  
25                       Declaration of Chronic Nuisance, and recognition that Counterclaimants were not  
26                       permitted to independently seek information or to address the outstanding  
27                       nuisance notice prior to the closing date;  
28                       d. A demand for increased initial and additional deposits;



- 1           e. A limitation on inspections of the real property to being, a one day inspection by  
2           two to four individuals “who are its own personnel” and a limitation that  
3           Counterclaimants’ lease review would be conducted onsite, only on that same  
4           day;  
5           f. Terms related to Required Repairs, including that the Sham Defendants would  
6           “use diligent efforts to complete” the required repairs prior to closing, or give a  
7           credit for all remaining Required Repairs.  
8           g. Disclosure “that the pool near the gym of the Property has a material crack and  
9           that the pool likely needs to be replaced.”

10           383. On June 22, 2018, Amusement entered into two purchase and sale agreements,  
11           one with Sham VI for the purchase of the real property located at 4870 Nellis Oasis Lane, Las  
12           Vegas, NV 89115 for \$44,300,000, and the second with Sham VII for the purchase of the real  
13           property located at 5025 Nellis Oasis Lane, Las Vegas, NV 89115 for \$16,000,000 (singularly  
14           the “Purchase Agreement” or together “Purchase Agreements”).

15           384. Section 3.7.1 of the Purchase Agreements provided that “All representations and  
16           warranties of Buyer or Seller, as appropriate, contained in this Agreement shall be true and  
17           correct as of the date made and as of the Close of Escrow with the same effect as though such  
18           representations and warranties were made at and as of the Close of Escrow.”

19           385. In those agreements, the Sham Defendants mandated extremely strict terms and a  
20           tight timeframe for due diligence, as well as a quick closing date approximately 60 days after the  
21           purchase and sale agreement.

22           386. Section 3.3.1 of the Purchase Agreement was drafted to require all due diligence  
23           to go through the Sham Defendant’s broker or Weinstein, as the agreement stated that “In no  
24           event shall Buyer contact any employees of Seller or its property manager at the Property  
25           without the consent of Seller.”

26           387. One term of the Purchase Agreements was the Sham Defendants’ mandated that  
27           Counterclaimants were required to assume the Sham Defendants’ current loans so that the Sham  
28           Defendants would not be required to pay an early termination fee.

1       388. During due diligence on June 26, 2018, the Sham Defendants produced, *inter alia*,  
2 the following through their broker Jannie Mongkolsakulkit, with the intent that it be provided to  
3 Counterclaimants:

4       a. Income Statements for Liberty Village, for the years ending December 31, 2016  
5 and December 31, 2017, and the period of July 1, 2017 to June 30, 2018, all of  
6 which metadata shows were authored and last saved by Weinstein;

7       b. Income Statements for Village Square, for the years ending December 31, 2016  
8 and December 31, 2017, and the period of July 1, 2017 to June 30, 2018, all of  
9 which metadata shows were authored and last saved by Weinstein;

10       c. Rent Roll with Lease Charges for Liberty Village, showing an occupancy rate of  
11 85.13% and vacancy rate of 11.94%, as of June 26, 2018, which metadata shows  
12 was authored by Davidson, and last saved by Davidson on June 26, 2018;

13       d. Rent Roll with Lease Charges for Village Square, showing an occupancy rate of  
14 83.86% and vacancy rate of 14.91%, as of June 26, 2018, which metadata shows  
15 was authored by Davidson, and last saved by Davidson on June 26, 2018;

16       e. Delinquency Report for Liberty Village, showing -\$26,718.13 under the “Total  
17 Owed” column for the “Grand Total” of all delinquencies as of June 26, 2018, for  
18 which metadata listing the author and last individual saving the file appeared to be  
19 removed, but which contained a footer stating “UserId: ellenw Date : 6/26/2018  
20 Time : 9:44 PM”; and

21       f. Delinquency Report for Village Square, showing -\$45,240.59 under the “Total  
22 Owed” column for the “Grand Total” of all delinquencies as of June 26, 2018 for  
23 which metadata listing the author and last individual saving the file appeared to be  
24 removed, but which contained a footer stating ““UserId: ellenw Date : 6/26/2018  
25 Time : 9:46 PM”.

26       389. Each of the documents referenced in the foregoing paragraph either contained  
27 false information or concealed material facts, which overstated income, minimized delinquency  
28 balances or failed to convey the true occupancy rates at the Properties.

1       390. During due diligence on July 4, 2018, the Sham Defendants produced, *inter alia*,  
2 the following via an email from Ellen Weinstein to brokers Spence Ballif and Jannie  
3 Mongkolsakulkit, with the intent that it be provided to Counterclaimants, and on July 5, 2018,  
4 the documents were both emailed to Counterclaimants directly by Mongkolsakulkit and passed  
5 through Bailiff to Counterclaimants' own broker Devin Lee:

6           a. Rent Roll with Lease Charges for Village Square, showing an occupancy rate of  
7           85.57% and vacancy rate of 13.20%, as of June 30, 2018, which metadata shows  
8           was authored and last saved by Weinstein on July 4, 2018;

9           b. Rent Roll with Lease Charges for Liberty Village, showing an occupancy rate of  
10           86.52% and vacancy rate of 11.25%, as of June 30, 2018, which metadata shows  
11           was authored and last saved by Weinstein on July 4, 2018;

12           c. Village Square TTM, as of June 2018, which metadata shows was authored and  
13           last saved by Weinstein on July 4, 2018; and

14           d. Liberty Village TTM, as of June 2018, which metadata shows was authored and  
15           last saved by Weinstein on July 4, 2018;

16       391. Each of the documents referenced in the foregoing paragraph either contained  
17 false information or concealed material facts, which overstated income, minimized delinquency  
18 balances or failed to convey the true occupancy rates at the Properties.

19       392. Based on the foregoing materials provided during due diligence, the total  
20 delinquencies the Sham Defendants listed in the delinquency reports provided to  
21 Counterclaimants was only \$36,615.53.

22       393. On July 13, 2018, a First Amendment to the Purchase Agreement for 4870 Nellis  
23 Oasis Lane, Las Vegas, NV 89115 was executed to remove all conditions other than the lender  
24 approval contingency.

25       394. On August 23, 2018, the Purchase Agreement for 4870 Nellis Oasis Lane, Las  
26 Vegas, NV 89115, was assigned by Amusement to Liberty LLC, and the Purchase Agreement  
27 for 5025 Nellis Oasis Lane, Las Vegas, NV 89115, was assigned by Amusement to Village LLC.

28       d.       **The Shredding Coverup and Key Charade**

1       395. On August 28, 2018, in the late afternoon, Counterclaimants received a telephone  
2 call from an outside vendor who had visited the Property’s onsite property management offices  
3 that day, and who reported that the onsite staff was “busy shredding a bunch of stuff in the  
4 office.”

5       396. Counterclaimants’ residential asset manager, Ruth Garcia, immediately contacted  
6 Weinstein on August 28, 2018, at 4:57 PM, told her that Counterclaimants had received a phone  
7 call regarding the shredding and asked her “Do you know what that is about?”

8       397. Weinstein responded minutes later at 5:11 PM, “I don’t. We didn’t give them that  
9 directive. Which office is it, liberty or village?”

10       398. On August 29, 2018, at 1:15 PM, the date of closing, Westland’s counsel  
11 contacted Weinstein by email, stating that “There was virtually no one at the management office  
12 when Westland’s management team arrived to handle the transition. I’m told that the office was  
13 locked and completely empty save for a pile of unlabeled keys. That’s it. Westland was also told  
14 that Shamrock’s management company spent the day yesterday shredding documents and files. I  
15 don’t know at this point what the status of the files is and what impact all of this shredding  
16 activity will have on Westland’s management of these properties on a go forward basis. I’m hard  
17 pressed to understand why this happened. . . . As I mentioned above, there’s a pile of unlabeled  
18 keys and Westland’s team has absolutely no clue which key goes to which door.”

19       399. On August 29, 2018, at 1:51 PM, Weinstein responded: “To the best of my  
20 knowledge most of our staff stayed with Westland and we were directed to come to work today  
21 at the normal times. . . . The prior property manager had left: a) all of the keys on her desk in  
22 marked envelopes and, b) in the safe checks being held for Westland’s arrival. The combination  
23 to the safe was given to Westland upon confirmation that funds had been received. I have no  
24 knowledge of shredding that would impact operations.” Weinstein then noted that the prior  
25 onsite manager would return to the office “to go through the items left for Westland’s takeover.”

26       400. When Counterclaimants took over the management of the Properties on August  
27 29, 2018, none of the information discussed above, including various reports, such as the rent  
28

1 roll correction reports, full delinquency reports, and aged receivable reports, which had been  
2 prepared onsite were present in the records at the onsite offices.

3 401. Upon information and belief, the Sham Defendants knew that rent roll correction  
4 reports, full delinquency reports, and aged receivable reports, would disclose the information on  
5 the true occupancy rates at the Properties that they had concealed from Counterclaimants.

6 402. Upon information and belief, the Sham Defendants shredded the rent roll  
7 correction reports, full delinquency reports, and other information capable of showing the true  
8 occupancy rates at the Properties with the intent to conceal their misrepresentations regarding the  
9 true occupancy rates.

10 403. Upon information and belief, the Sham Defendants knew that to recreate that  
11 information, Westland would need to need to physically visit each unit to determine whether the  
12 unit was in fact occupied, and that providing a stack of over 1100 unlabeled, unsorted keys,  
13 especially when Westland would need to provide a twenty-four our notice for access to each unit  
14 prior to conducting a physical check, would substantially impair Westland's ability to determine  
15 the true occupancy rates at the properties.

16 404. Upon information and belief, the Sham Defendants provided a stack of 1100  
17 unlabeled, unsorted keys in order to impair Westland's ability to physically examine the units.

18 405. Westland relied on financial information that the Sham Defendants had provided  
19 at the time of the failed 2017 transaction, the information disclosed by brokers in offering the  
20 Properties for sale, the information provided during due diligence, and the other communications  
21 that the Sham Defendants made through the date of the August 2018 closing, which contained  
22 false and inaccurate information.

23 **e. The Sham Defendants' Failure to Repair**

24 406. The Purchase Agreements provided that the properties would be generally be  
25 transferred in "as is" condition, but there were several exceptions, including the fire insurance  
26 repairs, the Nuisance Notice Work repairs, and making "vacated residential unit(s) rent ready at  
27 or prior to Close of Escrow."

1       407. Specifically, two of the buildings onsite had been damaged by fire, and based on  
2 amendments to the Loan Agreements, the Sham Defendants were required to repair and restore  
3 those properties within one year of each fire.

4       408. The first fire occurred on April 15, 2018.

5       409. The second fire occurred on May 9, 2018.

6       410. The Purchase Agreement for the Liberty Property provided that repairs of the two  
7 buildings would be commenced but not completed by the closing date.

8       411. Despite the passage of four and a half months for one of the buildings, and the  
9 passage of four months for the second building, nearly no action had been taken to commence  
10 restoring those structures. Instead, the damaged structures had only been boarded up and  
11 demolition was performed on one of the buildings.

12       412. Likewise, Section 3.6.1 the Purchase Agreements stated “from the Effective Date  
13 through the Close of Escrow, Seller shall maintain the Property in its present condition, subject  
14 to normal wear and tear (from the last required repair) . . . provided that, to the extent a  
15 residential unit is vacated after the Effective Date and prior to the date that is five (5) business  
16 days prior to the Close of Escrow, Seller shall make such vacated residential unit(s) rent ready at  
17 or prior to Close of Escrow . . .”

18       413. However, in practice, the Sham Defendants made representations to tenants that  
19 repairs would be made, but the Sham Defendants simply failed to maintain currently occupied  
20 units in need of any substantial repair, and improperly failed to evict or remove non-compliant  
21 and non-rent paying tenants in order to avoid “turning” residential unit(s) by making them in rent  
22 ready condition before the Close of Escrow.

23       414. Upon information and belief, the Sham Defendants made a conscious decision not  
24 to fix items in disrepair in the apartments and the common areas at the Properties.

25       415. Many of the items in disrepair that the Sham Defendants failed to repair or  
26 maintain, included items that the Sham Defendants were required to repair as a matter of law,  
27 which resulted in tenant claims seeking rent reductions and damages for the failure to provide  
28 habitable premises and essential services, including but not limited to failures to adequate fix or

1 maintain hot water heaters, refrigerators, pest control, roofs, flooring, ceilings, plumbing,  
2 window glass, and water intrusion issues.

3 416. As a result of the Sham Defendants' failures in this regard, Counterclaimants  
4 were required to either pay damages to such tenants, or to discount their rental balance during  
5 future rental periods due to the repairs that the Sham Defendants failed to perform.

6 417. Additionally, the failure to properly manage the properties by neglecting to evict  
7 non-compliant and non-rent paying tenants improperly shifted that burden to Counterclaimants,  
8 resulted in Counterclaimants being required to cover the cost of repairs that the Purchase  
9 Agreements required the Sham Defendants to perform, and were responsible, at least in part, for  
10 Fannie Mae declaring a default in December 2019, which has resulted in substantial damage to  
11 Counterclaimants.

12 **f. False and Misleading Information Discovered Post-Closing**

13 418. Counterclaimants utilize the same tenant property management and accounting  
14 database that the Sham Defendants used to track rental balances, delinquencies, occupancy rates,  
15 and past due receivables.

16 419. Based on Section 3.15 of the Purchase Agreements, the Sham Defendants were  
17 required to "cutoff [their] books of Property tenant related transactions" two business days prior  
18 to the closing date for the purchase of the Properties, and one day prior to closing provide  
19 Counterclaimants digital copies of its full files and reports, including in the file format of the  
20 property management software the Sham Defendants used to manage tenant records.

21 420. Section 3.15 specified that at least seventeen types of information were required  
22 to be provided, which were:

- 23 a. Residential Unit Types;
- 24 b. Residential Unit Type Details;
- 25 c. Residential Tenants;
- 26 d. Residential Roommates;
- 27 e. Residential Lease Charges;
- 28 f. Residential Property Amenities;

- g. Residential Unit Amenities;
- h. Residential Rentable Item Types;
- i. Residential Rentable Items;
- j. a Rent Roll with Lease Charges report;
- k. a Security Deposit Activity report;
- l. a Financial Aged Receivables - Tenant by Charge Code report;
- m. a Resident Directory report;
- n. a Roommate Directory report;
- o. a Unit Directory report;
- p. a Rentable Items Directory report; and
- q. an Amenities Listing report.

421. The information provided by the Sham Defendants the day prior to closing was incomplete.

422. The Sham Defendants claimed the information provided was complete, and that if it were not, then they were unable to extract the information from their tenant record database.

423. As such, after closing, Counterclaimants were required to contract with a third party to obtain a complete copy of the Sham Defendants' records.

424. Shortly after the August 29, 2018 closing, through that vendor the Sham Defendants produced additional information to Counterclaimants, including additional financial information exported from the Sham Defendants' Yardi database for the Properties.

425. Based on the additional information provided shortly after closing for the purchase of the Properties, Counterclaimants' Chief Financial Officer began to discover many tenants with delinquent accounts and substantial unpaid rents.

426. Based on Counterclaimants' Chief Financial Officer's review, several of the records that were unavailable to Counterclaimants prior to the August 29, 2018 sale of the Properties provided evidence that the Sham Defendants had provided misleading or inaccurate information to Counterclaimants.



1       427. Based on the above, Counterclaimants contacted a forensic accountant and spoke  
2 with internal accounting personnel and determined the following:

3           a. The additional information provided post-closing permitted an Aged Receivables  
4 Analysis, which as of August 31, 2018 showed past due delinquencies of  
5 \$1,669,403.30, which is an amount much greater than the \$36,615.53 shown in  
6 the Delinquency Reports that the Sham Defendants provided prior to closing or  
7 the Aging Summaries provided in April 2018, which showed a combined  
8 \$70,671.35 of “Total Unpaid Charges”;

9           b. The Sham Defendants had run reports to only provide information on “current”  
10 tenants and omitted information on tenants that it placed in a “noncurrent” status;

11           c. The Sham Defendants did not provide Balance Sheet information to  
12 Counterclaimants, which would have disclosed the elevated accounts receivable;

13           d. The Sham Defendants failed to provide information to Counterclaimants  
14 overstated income by failing to provide information related to bad debts, and  
15 failing to show and/or utilize an allowance for bad debts or a charge to income for  
16 the bad debts consistent with generally accepted accounting principles.

17       428. The Sham Defendants intentionally ran reports and only provided information on  
18 “current” tenants in an attempt to mislead Counterclaimants.

19       429. Upon information and belief, the Sham Defendants intentionally failed to produce  
20 full financial information both prior to closing the transaction and thereafter in order to hide their  
21 misrepresentations.

22       430. The financial information that the Sham Defendants provided was false and/or  
23 concealed material information on the true state of delinquencies and total unpaid charges at the  
24 Properties.

25       431. The Aging Summaries, Income Statements, Rent Rolls, Delinquency Reports, and  
26 Occupancy Reports, provided prior to closing were relied upon by Counterclaimants and  
27 materially overstated income and failed to reveal the true financial condition of the Properties.

28       **IV.V. COUNTERCLAIMS**

1                   **a. FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION (BREACH OF CONTRACT – LIBERTY**  
2                   **LOAN—BY WESTLAND LIBERTY VILLAGE, LLC)**

3                   203.395. Counterclaimants repeat, reallege, and incorporate the allegations set forth  
4 in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.

5                   204.396. A valid assumption agreement was entered into between Liberty LLC, on  
6 the one hand, and Fannie Mae and Grandbridge on the other hand, on August 29, 2018,  
7 specifically the Assumption and Release Agreement.

8                   205.397. The assumption agreement utilized the general provisions of the  
9 Multifamily Loan and Security Agreement entered into between Liberty LLC's predecessor on  
10 the one hand, and Fannie Mae and Grandbridge on the other hand, to specify the terms that  
11 would govern the parties' practices for administration of the loan.

12                   206.398. Upon information and belief, Grandbridge assigned its interests in a  
13 portion of the Multifamily Loan and Security Agreement to Fannie Mae, but continued as Lender  
14 and Servicer on either the Loan agreement or a portion of the agreements that were signed by  
15 Liberty LLC's predecessor, which obligations were assumed by Liberty LLC.

16                   207.399. Separately, Grandbridge signed the closing statement, which conveyed its  
17 1% loan assumption fee as "Lender."

18                   208.400. Grandbridge signed the Liberty Loan agreements, and the assumption  
19 agreement with Westland, both on its own behalf and on behalf of Fannie Mae.

20                   209.401. Unless legally excused from doing so by the Lenders' illegal actions,  
21 ~~Libert~~Liberty LLC has performed all of the duties and obligations required of it under the terms  
22 of the Loan Agreement with Fannie Mae, including timely making monthly periodic loan  
23 payments and paying the 1% loan assumption fee.

24                   210.402. Unless legally excused from doing so by the Lenders' illegal actions,  
25 Liberty LLC has performed all of the duties and obligations required of it under the terms of the  
26 terms of the Loan Agreement with Grandbridge, including timely making monthly periodic loan  
27 payment and paying the 1% loan assumption fee.  
28

1        211.403. To the extent that any duties or obligations required of Westland have not  
2 been performed, such duties or obligations have been excused because of Grandbridge's and  
3 Fannie Mae's ~~breach-non-performance~~ of the Loan Agreements.

4        212.404. Fannie Mae and Grandbridge have materially breached their Loan  
5 Agreements with Liberty LLC by failing to require adequate reserves at the time of the initial  
6 loan, requesting and performing an improper property condition assessment, utilizing that  
7 improper PCA to demand and adjustment to reserve deposits, failing to disburse funds in  
8 response to reserve disbursement requests, sending/filing improper notices, improperly listing  
9 Liberty and the affiliated Westland entities on a-check, discriminating against Liberty LLC and  
10 the affiliated Westland entities on borrow ups, new loans and refinance loans, and generally  
11 violating the terms of the Multifamily Loan and Security Agreement to the point that the  
12 administration has become so one-sided that Liberty LLC had no option but to commence these  
13 proceedings.

14        213.405. That as a direct and proximate result of Fannie Mae's breach of contract,  
15 Liberty LLC has been damaged in an amount in excess of \$15,000.00, the exact amount of which  
16 will be determined at trial.

17        214.406. That it has been necessary for Liberty LLC to retain counsel to prosecute  
18 this action by reason of which it is entitled to reasonable attorney's fees.

19                    **b. SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION (BREACH OF CONTRACT – SQUARE**  
20                    **LOAN—BY WESTLAND VILLAGE SQUARE, LLC)**

21        215.407. Counterclaimants repeat, reallege, and incorporate the allegations set forth  
22 in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.

23        216.408. A valid assumption agreement was entered into between Square LLC, on  
24 the one hand, and Fannie Mae and Grandbridge on the other hand, on August 29, 2018,  
25 specifically the Assumption and Release Agreement.

26        217.409. The assumption agreement utilized the general provisions of the  
27 Multifamily Loan and Security Agreement entered into between Square LLC's predecessor on  
28

1 the one hand, and Fannie Mae and Grandbridge on the other hand, to specify the terms that  
2 would govern the parties' practices for administration of the loan.

3 218.410. Upon information and belief, Grandbridge assigned its interests in a  
4 portion of the Multifamily Loan and Security Agreement to Fannie Mae, but continued as Lender  
5 and Servicer on either the loan agreement or a portion of the agreements that were signed by  
6 Square LLC's predecessor, which obligations were assumed by Square LLC.

7 219.411. Separately, Grandbridge signed the closing statement, which conveyed its  
8 1% loan assumption fee as "Lender."

9 220.412. Grandbridge signed the Square Loan agreements, and the assumption  
10 agreement with Westland, both on its own behalf and on behalf of Fannie Mae.

11 221.413. Square LLC has performed all of the duties and obligations required of it  
12 under the terms of the Loan Agreement with Fannie Mae, including timely making monthly  
13 periodic loan payment and paying the 1% loan assumption fee.

14 222.414. Square LLC has performed all of the duties and obligations required of it  
15 under the terms of the terms of the Loan Agreement with Grandbridge, including timely making  
16 monthly periodic loan payment and paying the 1% loan assumption fee.

17 223.415. To the extent that any duties or obligations required of Westland have not  
18 been performed, such duties or obligations have been excused because of Grandbridge's and  
19 Fannie Mae's non-performance of the Agreement.

20 224.416. Fannie Mae has materially breached its agreement with Square LLC by  
21 failing to require adequate reserves at the time of the initial loan, requesting and performing an  
22 improper property condition assessment, utilizing that improper PCA to demand an adjustment  
23 to reserve deposits, failing to disburse funds in response to reserve disbursement requests,  
24 sending/filing improper notices, improperly listing Square and the affiliated Westland entities on  
25 a-check, discriminating against Square LLC and the affiliated Westland entities on borrow ups,  
26 new loans and refinance loans, and generally violating the terms of the Multifamily Loan and  
27 Security Agreement to the point that the administration has become so one-sided that Square  
28 LLC had no option but to commence these proceedings.

1       ~~225.417.~~ That as a direct and proximate result of Fannie Mae's breach of contract,  
2 Square LLC has been damaged in an amount in excess of \$15,000.00, the exact amount of which  
3 will be determined at trial.

4       ~~226.418.~~ That it has been necessary for ~~Liberty Square~~ LLC to retain counsel to  
5 prosecute this action by reason of which it is entitled to reasonable attorney's fees.

6               **c. THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION (BREACH OF CONTRACT – MCFA—BY**  
7               **WESTLAND CREDIT FACILITY ENTITIES)**

8       ~~419. Counterclaimants repeat, reallege, and incorporate the allegations set forth in the~~  
9 ~~preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.~~

10       ~~420. A valid agreement was entered into between the Westland Credit Facility Entities,~~  
11 ~~on the one hand, and Fannie Mae, on the other hand, on March 15, 2019, specifically the MCFA.~~

12       ~~421. The MCFA specified the terms that would govern the parties' practices for~~  
13 ~~administration of the loan.~~

14       ~~422. Upon information and belief, Wells assigned its interests in the MCFA to Fannie~~  
15 ~~Mae, but continued as Servicer on the agreement related to the processing of Future Advances~~  
16 ~~and the servicing of the credit facility agreement.~~

17       ~~423. Upon information and belief, after assigning the MCFA to Fannie Mae, Wells had~~  
18 ~~no further discretion under the MCFA agreement.~~

19       ~~424. The Westland Credit Facility Entities have performed all of the duties and~~  
20 ~~obligations required of them under the terms of the MCFA with Fannie Mae, including timely~~  
21 ~~making monthly periodic loan payment and paying all required loan fees.~~

22       ~~425. To the extent that any duties or obligations required of the Westland Credit~~  
23 ~~Facility Entities have not been performed, such duties or obligations have been excused because~~  
24 ~~of Fannie Mae's non-performance of the MCFA.~~

25       ~~426. Fannie Mae has materially breached its agreement with the Westland Credit~~  
26 ~~Facility Entities by improperly placing the Westland Credit Facility Entities on "a-check,"~~  
27 ~~discriminating against the Westland Credit Facility Entities, failing to permit Borrow Up~~  
28

Advances despite all conditions for such advances having been made, failing to allow the submission of any other Future Advance request, and generally violating the terms of the MCFA.

427. That as a direct and proximate result of Fannie Mae's breach of contract, the Westland Credit Facility Entities have been damaged in an amount in excess of \$15,000.00, the exact amount of which will be determined at trial.

428. That it has been necessary for the Westland Credit Facility Entities to retain counsel to prosecute this action by reason of which it is entitled to reasonable attorney's fees.

**e.d. FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION (BREACH OF COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING)**

227.429. Counterclaimants repeat, reallege, and incorporate the allegations set forth in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.

228.430. A valid and binding agreement was formed between Westland and Fannie Mae/Grandbridge on each of the two separate sets of loan agreements, related to the Properties.

431. Westland's agreements for the two properties utilized the general provisions of the underlying loan agreement entered into between Westland's predecessor and Fannie Mae/Grandbridge to specify the terms that would govern the parties' practices for administration of the loan.

229.432. In addition, the Westland Credit Facility Entities entered into the MCFA with Fannie Mae to specify the terms that would govern the parties' practices for administration of the loan and credit line established by the MCFA.

230.433. In every contract, including the loans between Westland and Fannie Mae/Grandbridge, there exists in law an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

434. Both prior to the loan assumption and after, Westland acted in good faith by paying Fannie Mae/Grandbridge a 1% loan assumption fee under each agreement related to the Properties, providing Fannie Mae/Grandbridge access to both the Liberty Property and the Square Property, paying for substantial improvements at each of the Properties, improving the condition of each of the Properties and their tenant base, providing confidential business documents to Fannie Mae/Grandbridge, and continuously paying Westland's full loan payments

1 on a timely basis even after Fannie Mae/Grandbridge without prior notice suspended the  
2 automatic ACH payments the parties had used as the agreed upon method of payment by  
3 Westland for the Loan.

4 435. Prior to and after the closing for the MCFA, the Westland Credit Facility Entities  
5 acted in good faith by submitting an application; being vetted according to Fannie Mae's  
6 underwriting criteria; paying Fannie Mae/Wells all required legal fees for underwriting, all costs  
7 for appraisals, and all additional loan issuance costs; and providing supporting documentation  
8 related to the Westland Credit Facility Entities financial statements, and the financials of their  
9 affiliated owners, shareholders, and/or parent companies, who were required to act as guarantors  
10 and share their financial information.

11 231.436. Fannie Mae and Grandbridge wrongfully and deliberately took advantage  
12 of Westland's good faith actions, by, *inter alia*, failing to perform all conditions, covenants and  
13 promises required by them in accordance with the loans, including without limitation, altering  
14 the standard that they would apply to a property condition assessment undertaken in July 2019  
15 from the standard used at the time the loan was assumed, telling Westland that they would cover  
16 the cost of the July 2019 property condition assessments but then refusing to discuss the  
17 purported default unless Westland paid those costs, making a demand that Westland deposit an  
18 additional \$2,~~706,150~~845,980.00 into escrow despite that the condition of its Properties had  
19 improved not deteriorated since the assumption agreement was signed, placing Westland and its  
20 affiliated entities on a-check, discriminating against Liberty, Square and the Westland-affiliated  
21 entities on borrow ups, new loans and refinance loans based on Lenders' own unilateral  
22 modification of the Loan Agreement, and by each of these actions Fannie Mae thereby breached  
23 the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing inherent in the subject agreement.

24 232.437. Grandbridge's actions were taken both on its own behalf as a Lender  
25 and/or Servicer, and/or on behalf of Fannie Mae as its agent.

26 438. Wherefore Grandbridge and Fannie Mae did not act in good faith, that is, did not  
27 perform its contract with each Counterclaimant in the manner reasonably contemplated by the  
28

1 parties, so that each Counterclaimant has a remedy that goes beyond that of breach of the express  
2 terms of their contract.

3  
4 233.439. Grandbridge's and Fannie Mae's actions, misrepresentations, deception,  
5 concealment, and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing were done intentionally  
6 with malice for the specific purpose of causing injury to Liberty LLC, ~~and~~ Square LLC, the  
7 Westland Securities Entities and the Westland Credit Facility Entities.

8 234.440. As a direct and proximate result of Fannie Mae's breach, each  
9 Counterclaimant has suffered damages in excess of \$15,000.00, the exact amount of which will  
10 be proven at trial.

11 235.441. As a further direct and proximate result of Fannie Mae's breach, each  
12 Counterclaimant has had to hire counsel to prosecute this matter by reason of which it is entitled  
13 to reasonable attorney's fees.

14 **d.e.FOURTH FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION (DECLARATORY RELIEF)**

15 236.442. Counterclaimants repeat, reallege, and incorporate the allegations set forth  
16 in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.

17 237.443. A genuine justiciable controversy exists relevant to the rights and  
18 obligations herein regarding Westland's obligations under each of the Loan Agreements, and  
19 whether Fannie Mae and Grandbridge may demand that Westland deposit additional funds into  
20 reserve accounts.

21 238.444. The interests of Counterclaimants, on the one hand, and Fannie Mae and  
22 Grandbridge on the other are adverse.

23 239.445. Specifically, the present dispute that resulted in a Notice of Default and  
24 Election to Sell being sent by Fannie Mae is a dispute over the parties' interpretation of Article  
25 13.02 of the Loan Agreement related to adjustments to reserve funding and the related reserve  
26 administration requirements, as well as Article 6.03 related to the conditions when property  
27 condition assessments may be utilized.

28 240.446. Westland has a legally protectable interest in the two Properties.



1       ~~241.447.~~ These issues are ripe for judicial determination, because on or about  
2       October 18, 2019, Grandbridge served a Notice of Demand, both as Servicer/Lender, and on  
3       behalf of Fannie Mae.

4       ~~242.448.~~ These issues are ripe for judicial determination, because on or about July  
5       15, 2020, Fannie Mae served Westland with a Notice of Default and Intent to Sell the Properties.

6       ~~243.449.~~ These issues are ripe for judicial determination, because on or about  
7       August 12, 2020, Fannie Mae filed a complaint seeking the appointment of a receiver to ouster  
8       Westland from its Properties.

9       ~~244.450.~~ Westland seeks an order from this Court declaring that Article 13.02 and  
10       Article 6.03 are only implicated if the condition of the Properties has physically deteriorated, or  
11       impaired the value of Fannie Mae's and Grandbridge's security, and that no additional reserve  
12       deposit is needed.

13       ~~245.451.~~ Westland seeks an order from this Court declaring that Fannie Mae and/or  
14       Grandbridge breached the terms of the two Loan Agreements by demanding a property condition  
15       assessment, demanding the adjustment of reserve deposits without any proper basis, and filing a  
16       NOD.

17       ~~246.452.~~ That it has been necessary for Westland to retain the services of legal  
18       counsel for which Westland is entitled to recover such costs and expenses from Fannie Mae.

19               ~~**e.f. FIFTH-SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION (FRAUD & CONCEALMENT-IN**~~  
20               ~~**THE INDUCEMENT)**~~

21       ~~247.453.~~ Counterclaimants repeat, reallege, and incorporate the allegations set forth  
22       in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.

23       ~~248.454.~~ That Westland entered into its Loan Agreement relying on Fannie Mae  
24       and Grandbridge continuing to utilize the same standard for evaluating the condition of the  
25       Properties that had been used at the origination of the Loan Agreements during late 2017, and at  
26       the time of the loan assumption during the summer of 2018.

27       ~~249.455.~~ When Grandbridge forwarded documents regarding the loan assumption  
28       and loan agreements to Westland, it did so not only on its own behalf, but also on behalf of

1 Fannie Mae, who advised Grandbridge to forward those documents to Westland with the intent  
2 that Westland would be provided the loan assumption, loan agreements, and reserve schedules,  
3 and that Westland would rely on those documents.

4 250.456. By letter dated August 20, 2018, Grandbridge represented on behalf of  
5 itself and Fannie Mae to Liberty LLC that, “after a thorough review and analysis of the Proposed  
6 Borrower’s [Liberty LLC’s] financial and managerial capacity, the Assumption has been  
7 approved on the following terms: . . . No change to the Replacement Reserve monthly deposit or  
8 established schedule identified on Exhibit B attached hereto; No Change to the Required Repair  
9 Reserve of \$39,375.00 as identified in schedule on Exhibit C attached hereto . . .” (Exhibit J.)  
10 Further, Exhibit C, Required Reserve Schedule, listed all items as completed, except for a  
11 \$9,375.00 holdback for “Misc. Concrete and Fence Repairs. Sports Court Resurfacing” that was  
12 shown as having already been fully funded. (Exhibit J, at 7.)

13 251.457. Further, by letter dated August 20, 2018, Grandbridge represented on  
14 behalf of itself and Fannie Mae to Square LLC that, “after a thorough review and analysis of the  
15 Proposed Borrower’s [Square LLC’s] financial and managerial capacity, the Assumption has  
16 been approved on the following terms: . . . No change to the Replacement Reserve monthly  
17 deposit or established schedule identified on Exhibit B attached hereto . . .” (Exhibit K.)  
18 Further, Exhibit C, Required Repair Reserve Schedule, simply stated “N/A” indicating that no  
19 repair reserve was required for that loan. (Exhibit K, at 7.)

20 252.458. Fannie Mae and Grandbridge knew that Westland relied upon the amounts  
21 and types of conditions requiring reserve deposits when entering into the Loan Agreements.

22 253.459. To induce Westland to consent to the Loan Agreements, to collect the loan  
23 assumption fee from Westland, for Grandbridge to improve its own liquidity position with  
24 Fannie Mae, to improve the creditworthiness of Fannie Mae’s loan portfolio, to attempt to  
25 improperly generate additional fees and costs, and to improperly profit off of holding Westland’s  
26 funds in a non-interest bearing escrow account, That Fannie Mae and Grandbridge did not inform  
27 Westland that they planned to seek additional reserves at the time the Loan Agreements were  
28 assumed by Westland in order to induce Westland to consent to the Loan Agreements, to collect

1 ~~the loan assumption fee from Westland, for Grandbridge to improve its own liquidity position~~  
2 ~~with Fannie Mae, to improve the creditworthiness of Fannie Mae's loan portfolio, to attempt to~~  
3 ~~improperly generate additional fees and costs, and to improperly profit off of holding Westland's~~  
4 ~~funds in a non-interest bearing escrow account.~~

5 254.460. That Fannie Mae does credit reviews and monitoring of Grandbridge's  
6 lending practices, and upon information and belief, that Fannie Mae determined that Grandbridge  
7 failed to follow Fannie Mae's credit and underwriting criteria for loans in underwriting the  
8 November 2017 loan.

9 461. Upon information and belief, that Fannie Mae required that Grandbridge obtain  
10 additional security due to its poor underwriting, and thus Grandbridge had no intent to service  
11 the Loan Agreements consistent with the documentation that was provided at the time of the  
12 August 2018 loan assumption.

13 462. Additionally, in July 2019, despite that the Loan Agreements permitted Fannie  
14 Mae to charge for a Property Condition Assessment based on deterioration, a PCA of the  
15 Properties was requested by Lenders, and Joseph Greenhaw represented on behalf of  
16 Grandbridge and Fannie Mae that Westland would not be required to pay the cost of the PCA if  
17 it provided access to the Properties, and that if any deficiencies were found that Grandbridge and  
18 Fannie Mae would work with Westland by only requiring a small addition to the reserve  
19 accounts consistent with deferred maintenance schedules.

20 463. Westland knew that there had not been any deterioration in the condition of the  
21 Properties, and relied upon Mr. Greenhaw's statement when providing access to the Properties in  
22 September 2019, which as represented would only require nominal action by Westland in order  
23 to preserve its broader relationship with Fannie Mae.

24 255.—

25 464. That had Westland known that Fannie Mae and Grandbridge would require an  
26 additional deposit of over \$2.~~7~~85 million of additional reserve funding based on a loan balance  
27 of approximately \$38.6 million, which amounts to approximately 7% of the loan amount, for a  
28

1 loan with a seven year term, Counterclaimants would not have entered into the assumption  
2 agreement and would have obtained alternative financing.

3 465. That had Westland known that Fannie Mae and Grandbridge would require an  
4 additional deposit of over \$2.85 million of additional reserve funding based on a loan balance of  
5 approximately \$38.6 million, which amounts to approximately 7% of the loan amount, for a loan  
6 with a seven year term, as well as later having Lenders seek repayment for the improper PCA  
7 costs and related legal fees, Counterclaimants would not have permitted access to the Properties  
8 for a PCA that was in excess of what was required by the Loan Agreements.

9 256.—

10 257.466. Westland reasonably relied upon the types of expenses contained in the  
11 repair and replacement escrow accounts schedules, because Westland has entered into numerous  
12 loan agreements previously, but on those loan agreements, the lender never requested any  
13 significant adjusted reserve deposits.

14 467. Westland relied on Fannie Mae's material misstatements and omissions by paying  
15 a 1% loan assumption fee, providing Fannie Mae access to the Property, paying for substantial  
16 improvements at the Property, improving the condition of the Property and its tenant base,  
17 providing Fannie Mae confidential business documents, and continuously paying loan payments.

18 468. However, Fannie Mae and Grandbridge knew that they were improperly seeking a  
19 Property Condition Assessment report, because prior to conducting the property condition  
20 assessment, during a phone call in July 2019, Grandbridge's Senior Vice President of Loan  
21 Servicing and Asset Management Joe Greenhaw represented that Westland would not be  
22 required to pay the cost of the assessment if Westland agreed to provide f3, Inc. PCA access to  
23 the Properties.

24 258.—

25 259.469. As a result of Grandbridge's misrepresentations and concealments, on  
26 behalf of itself and Fannie Mae, Westland was induced to enter into the assumption agreement  
27 with Fannie Mae as lender and Grandbridge as servicer, and to permit Fannie Mae and  
28

1 Grandbridge to access its Properties to conduct a PCA when in excess of what was required by  
2 the Loan Agreements, which has damaged Westland.

3 260-470. As a direct and proximate result of Fannie Mae's misstatements and  
4 omissions, Westland has suffered damages in excess of \$15,000.00, the exact amount of which  
5 will be proven at trial, because, *inter alia*, this is the only default that Westland has ever suffered,  
6 it will impair Westland's credit rating leading to long term higher borrowing costs, and it has  
7 impaired Westland's ability to re-finance its Properties at a time when interest rates are at an all-  
8 time low.

9 471. By reason of the foregoing, Fannie Mae acted with oppression, fraud and malice,  
10 and therefore, Westland is entitled to exemplary and punitive damages.

11 **f.g. SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION (NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION**  
12 **AND CONCEALMENT)**

13 261-472. Counterclaimants repeat, reallege, and incorporate the allegations set forth  
14 in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.

15 262-473. Grandbridge, on behalf of itself and Fannie Mae, and Fannie Mae supplied  
16 information and made material misrepresentations to Westland, including without limitation, as  
17 detailed above that adequate reserve amounts had already been submitted, consistent with the  
18 schedules attached to the loan assumption letters and documentation.

19 263-474. By letter dated August 20, 2018, Grandbridge represented on behalf of  
20 itself and Fannie Mae to Westland that, it conducted "a thorough review and analysis of the  
21 Proposed Borrower's financial and managerial capacity" before approving the assumption.

22 264-475. Upon information and belief, Grandbridge, on behalf of itself and Fannie  
23 Mae, negligently misrepresented that it conducted an adequate review when setting the reserve  
24 amounts in August 2018, prior to Westland signing the loan assumption, because a short one (1)  
25 year later, it requested an additional \$2.7-85 million be placed into escrow with no deterioration  
26 of the Properties.

27 265-476. The information and representations made by Grandbridge, on behalf of  
28 itself and Fannie Mae, and Fannie Mae was false, in that unbeknownst to Westland they knew

1 the loan did not have sufficient security, and that there was a substantial likelihood they would  
2 attempt to seek additional reserves.

3 266-477. Grandbridge, on behalf of itself and Fannie Mae, and Fannie Mae supplied  
4 the information and made the representations to induce Westland to rely upon it, to act or refrain  
5 from acting in reliance upon it, and to have Westland enter into the assumption agreement.

6 267-478. Grandbridge and Fannie Mae owed Westland a duty not to make material  
7 misrepresentations.

8 268-479. Westland justifiably relied upon the information Grandbridge and Fannie  
9 Mae provided.

10 269-480. As a direct and proximate result of Grandbridge's, on behalf of itself and  
11 Fannie Mae, and Fannie Mae's misstatements and omissions, Westland has suffered damages in  
12 excess of \$15,000.00, the exact amount of which will be proven at trial, because, *inter alia*, this  
13 is the only default that Westland has ever suffered and it will impair Westland's credit rating and  
14 leading to long term higher borrowing costs, and it has impaired Westland's ability to re-finance  
15 its Properties at a time when interest rates are at an all-time low.

16 g.h. **SEVENTH-EIGHTH CAUSE OF ACTION (CONVERSION)**

17 270-481. Counterclaimants repeat, reallege, and incorporate the allegations set forth  
18 in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.

19 271-482. Grandbridge processed all reserve reimbursement payment requests, both  
20 on behalf of Fannie Mae, and for its own benefit.

21 272-483. Westland has submitted several prior reserve reimbursement requests that  
22 have gone unanswered by Grandbridge, including before its November 2019 demand for  
23 additional reserve funding.

24 273-484. Westland and its predecessor submitted funds related to two fire insurance  
25 claims to Grandbridge, which earmarked funds were to be held in escrow until the two fire-  
26 damaged building were rebuilt.

27 274-485. The fire-damaged buildings were completely rebuilt with Westland's  
28 funds.

1        275.486. Westland has submitted reserve disbursement requests for the release of  
2 those funds, and other reserve disbursement requests for work that was completed, each of which  
3 was accompanied by invoices, proof of payment, and documentation showing approval of all  
4 required permits, but Grandbridge has failed to respond to those requests.

5        487. Grandbridge has asserted that it transferred Westland's funds to Fannie Mae after  
6 the December 2019 default was asserted.

7        276.488. As such, Fannie Mae has wrongfully exerted dominion over Westland's  
8 personal property, including, without limitation, the funds that Grandbridge and/or Fannie Mae is  
9 continued to hold in reserve accounts, and the funds that they were improperly holding in reserve  
10 accounts, that were earmarked for reconstruction of two fire damaged buildings at the Liberty  
11 Property from the date of the requests for disbursement until the fire damage funds were released  
12 in May 2021, several months after the Court entered an order for those funds to be released in  
13 November 2020, and Grandbridge Fannie Mae has thereby wrongly converted the funds to their  
14 own use and benefit.

15        277.489. Fannie Mae's continued dominion over Westland's personal property was  
16 unauthorized and inconsistent with Westland's property rights.

17        278.490. Fannie Mae's dominion over Westland's personal property deprived  
18 Westland of all of their property rights relating thereto.

19        279.491. Fannie Mae's acts constitute conversion.

20        280.492. As a direct and proximate result of Fannie Mae's conversion, Westland  
21 has suffered damages in excess of \$15,000.00, the exact amount of which will be proven at trial.

22        281.493. Further, due to the wanton, malicious, and intentional conduct of Fannie  
23 Mae, Westland is entitled to an award of exemplary and punitive damages against Fannie Mae.

24        282.494. Fannie Mae knew that by refusing to return the converted proceeds after  
25 just demand, Borrowers would have to hire counsel to have those funds returned. Thus, it was  
26 foreseeable that Borrowers would incur attorney's fees as special damages. Borrowers have  
27 incurred these fees and request same as part of their special damages for conversion.

28        **h.i. EIGHTH-NINTH CAUSE OF ACTION (INJUNCTIVE RELIEF)**

1       ~~283.495.~~ Counterclaimants repeat, reallege, and incorporate the allegations set forth  
2 in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.

3       ~~284.496.~~ On or about July 15, 2020, two NODs were filed against the Liberty  
4 Property and the Square Property and served on Westland.

5       ~~285.497.~~ Upon information and belief, in Nevada, the typical period for a  
6 foreclosure sale to occur after a borrower receives a NOD is 120 days.

7       ~~286.498.~~ As Westland has made all debt service payments, and complied with the  
8 terms of the Loan Agreements, the Properties rightfully belong to Westland.

9       ~~287.499.~~ Fannie Mae and Grandbridge are attempting to utilize Nevada's non-  
10 judicial foreclosure process to improperly seize and sell Westland's Liberty Property and Square  
11 Property.

12       ~~288.500.~~ Real property is a unique asset, and on that basis, in the event that a  
13 wrongful foreclosure sale occurs, Westland will suffer extreme hardship and actual and  
14 impending irreparable loss and damage.

15       ~~289.501.~~ Westland has no adequate or speedy remedy at law to prevent the sale of  
16 the Properties, and injunctive relief is therefore Westland's only means for securing relief.

17       ~~290.502.~~ Westland is likely to succeed in this lawsuit on the merits of its claims.

18       ~~291.503.~~ Based on the foregoing, Westland is entitled to temporary restraining  
19 orders and preliminary and permanent injunctive relief to preserve the status quo, to mitigate its  
20 damages, and to prevent further irreparable injury to Westland, including, without limitation by:  
21 (a) enjoining Fannie Mae and/or Grandbridge from any further attempts to foreclose on the  
22 Properties related to their baseless requests to adjust the reserve deposits, and (b) enjoining  
23 Fannie Mae and/or Grandbridge from any further attempts to coerce Westland into providing  
24 additional reserves or to pay for the expenses related to the default that Grandbridge  
25 manufactured.

26       ~~292.504.~~ As a further direct and proximate result of Fannie Mae's and/or  
27 Grandbridge's improper demands to adjust reserves, their filing of the NOD, and the filing of  
28



1 their Complaint seeking appointment of a receiver, Westland has had to hire counsel to prosecute  
2 this matter by reason of which it is entitled to reasonable attorney's fees.

3 ~~i.j.~~ ~~NINTH~~ ~~TENTH~~ CAUSE OF ACTION (EQUITABLE  
4 RELIEF/RESCISSION/ REFORMATION)

5 ~~293.505.~~ Counterclaimants repeat, reallege, and incorporate the allegations set forth  
6 in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.

7 ~~294.506.~~ On or about August 29, 2018, Westland entered into two assumption  
8 agreements for the loans applicable to the Liberty Property and the Square Property.

9 ~~295.507.~~ Prior to signing the assumption, Grandbridge individually, and on behalf  
10 of Fannie Mae, forwarded Westland a loan assumption agreement letter, which contained the  
11 terms under which it would permit Westland's assumption of the Liberty Loan and Square Loan.

12 ~~296.508.~~ By letter dated August 20, 2018, Grandbridge represented on behalf of  
13 itself and Fannie Mae to Liberty LLC that, "after a thorough review and analysis of the Proposed  
14 Borrower's [Liberty LLC's] financial and managerial capacity, the Assumption has been  
15 approved on the following terms: . . . No change to the Replacement Reserve monthly deposit or  
16 established schedule identified on Exhibit B attached hereto; No Change to the Required Repair  
17 Reserve of \$39,375.00 as identified in schedule on Exhibit C attached hereto . . ." (Exhibit J.)  
18 Further, Exhibit C, Required Reserve Schedule, listed all items as completed, except for a  
19 \$9,375.00 holdback for "Misc. Concrete and Fence Repairs. Sports Court Resurfacing" that was  
20 shown as having already been fully funded. (Exhibit J, at 7.)

21 ~~297.509.~~ By letter dated August 20, 2018, Grandbridge represented on behalf of  
22 itself and Fannie Mae to Square LLC that, "after a thorough review and analysis of the Proposed  
23 Borrower's [Square LLC's] financial and managerial capacity, the Assumption has been  
24 approved on the following terms: . . . No change to the Replacement Reserve monthly deposit or  
25 established schedule identified on Exhibit B attached hereto . . ." ~~(Exhibit K.)~~ Further,  
26 Exhibit C, Required Repair Reserve Schedule, simply stated "N/A" indicating that no repair  
27 reserve was required for that loan. (Exhibit K, at 7.)  
28

1       ~~298.510.~~ When the loan assumption agreements were signed, the above-referenced  
2 Required Repair Reserve Schedule and Required Replacement Reserve Schedule, for each  
3 Property, were specifically included as part of the assumption agreement.

4       ~~299.511.~~ The statements made by Grandbridge, on behalf of itself and on behalf of  
5 Fannie Mae, were either false or amounted to a mutual mistake by both parties, because  
6 Grandbridge and Fannie Mae later attempted to obtain additional reserve payments in excess of  
7 the schedules that were provided to Westland, and those requests for additional reserve deposits  
8 included requests to deposit \$2.~~857~~ million of funds related to physical conditions that were not  
9 of the same type or category as the expenses included in the schedules.

10       ~~300.512.~~ In making those statements, Fannie Mae and Grandbridge knew that  
11 Westland would rely upon the amounts and types of conditions requiring reserve deposits when  
12 entering into the Loan Agreements, and intended for Westland to do so, to ensure that the loans  
13 would close.

14       ~~301.513.~~ Westland did rely on the amounts and types of conditions requiring  
15 reserve deposits that were listed in the schedules attached to the loan assumption letters, and as  
16 such Westland justifiably relied upon the information Grandbridge and Fannie Mae provided.

17       ~~302.514.~~ If Grandbridge or Fannie Mae would have had f3 or other inspection  
18 company perform a PCA as thorough and with the same criteria before the assumption as it did a  
19 year later, and told Westland that an additional reserve deposit would be required, then Westland  
20 would have demanded that the Shamrock Entities meet the additional reserve funding  
21 requirement prior to agreeing to assume the loan, that the terms of the purchase and/or loan  
22 assumption be amended, and/or other relief from the Shamrock Entities, Fannie Mae and/or  
23 Grandbridge, and without such relief, would not have entered into the two assumption  
24 agreements.

25       ~~303.515.~~ As such, to the extent that ~~that~~ a finding is made that the loan agreements  
26 would permit Grandbridge and Fannie Mae to demand additional reserve deposits, then the loan  
27 documents should be reformed consistent with the statements contained in the loan assumption  
28 letters and its attached reserve schedules due to irregularities in assumption process amounting to

1 fraud, unfairness or oppression, and if not reformed, other appropriate equitable relief to rectify  
2 the inequities and unfairness of this situation, and if not, then rescinded altogether.

3 304.516. Based on the foregoing, Westland is entitled to reformation, other  
4 equitable relief, or rescission of the loan agreements consistent with Grandbridge's and Fannie  
5 Mae's statements that no additional reserve deposits were required for the loans.

6 517. As a further direct and proximate result of Fannie Mae's and/or Grandbridge's  
7 improper demands to adjust reserves and related actions, Westland has had to hire counsel to  
8 prosecute this matter and obtain reformation of the loan documents by reason of which it is  
9 entitled to reasonable attorney's fees.

10 **k. ELEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION (FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT –**  
11 **LIBERTY LOAN – AGAINST GRANDBRIDGE)**

12 557. Counterclaimants repeat, reallege, and incorporate the allegations set forth in the  
13 preceding paragraphs, including in the Counterclaim above, as if fully set forth herein.

14 558. A valid assumption agreement was entered into between Liberty LLC, on the one  
15 hand, and Fannie Mae and Grandbridge on the other hand, on August 29, 2018, specifically the  
16 Assumption and Release Agreement.

17 559. The assumption agreement utilized the general provisions of the Multifamily  
18 Loan and Security Agreement entered into between Liberty LLC's predecessor on the one hand,  
19 and Fannie Mae and Grandbridge on the other hand, to specify the terms that would govern the  
20 parties' practices for administration of the loan.

21 560. Upon information and belief, Grandbridge assigned its interests in a portion of the  
22 Multifamily Loan and Security Agreement to Fannie Mae, but continued as Lender and Servicer  
23 on either the loan agreement or a portion of the agreements that were signed by Liberty LLC's  
24 predecessor, which obligations were assumed by Liberty LLC.

25 561. Separately, Grandbridge signed the closing statement, which conveyed its 1%  
26 loan assumption fee as "Lender."

27 562. Grandbridge signed the Liberty Loan agreements, and the assumption agreement  
28 with Westland, both on its own behalf and on behalf of Fannie Mae.

1        563. Unless legally excused from doing so by the Lenders' illegal actions, Liberty LLC  
2 has performed all of the duties and obligations required of it under the terms of the Loan  
3 Agreement with Fannie Mae, including timely making monthly periodic loan payment and  
4 paying the 1% loan assumption fee.

5        564. Unless legally excused from doing so by the Lenders' illegal actions, Liberty LLC  
6 has performed all of the duties and obligations required of it under the terms of the terms of the  
7 Loan Agreement with Grandbridge, including timely making monthly periodic loan payment  
8 and paying the 1% loan assumption fee.

9        565. To the extent that any duties or obligations required of Westland have not been  
10 performed, such duties or obligations have been excused because of Grandbridge's and Fannie  
11 Mae's breach of the Liberty Loan Agreement.

12        566. Grandbridge has materially breached its Loan Agreement with Liberty LLC by  
13 failing to require adequate reserves at the time of the initial loan, requesting and performing an  
14 improper property condition assessment, utilizing that improper PCA to demand an adjustment  
15 to reserve deposits, failing to disburse funds in response to reserve disbursement requests,  
16 sending/filing improper notices, and generally violating the terms of the Multifamily Loan and  
17 Security Agreement to the point that the administration has become so one-sided that Liberty  
18 LLC had no option but to commence these proceedings.

19        567. That as a direct and proximate result of Grandbridge's breach of contract, Liberty  
20 LLC has been damaged in an amount in excess of \$15,000.00, the exact amount of which will be  
21 determined at trial.

22        568. That it has been necessary for Liberty LLC to retain counsel to prosecute this  
23 action by reason of which it is entitled to reasonable attorney's fees.

24        **I. TWELFTH CAUSE OF ACTION (BREACH OF CONTRACT – SQUARE**  
25 **LOAN – AGAINST GRANDBRIDGE)**

26        569. Counterclaimants repeat, reallege, and incorporate the allegations set forth in the  
27 preceding paragraphs, including in the Counterclaim above, as if fully set forth herein.

1       570. A valid assumption agreement was entered into between Square LLC, on the one  
2 hand, and Fannie Mae and Grandbridge on the other hand, on August 29, 2018, specifically the  
3 Assumption and Release Agreement.

4       571. The assumption agreement utilized the general provisions of the Multifamily  
5 Loan and Security Agreement entered into between Liberty Square LLC's predecessor on the  
6 one hand, and Fannie Mae and Grandbridge on the other hand, to specify the terms that would  
7 govern the parties' practices for administration of the loan.

8       572. Upon information and belief, Grandbridge assigned its interests in a portion of the  
9 Multifamily Loan and Security Agreement to Fannie Mae, but continued as Lender and Servicer  
10 on either the loan agreement or a portion of the agreements that were signed by Square LLC's  
11 predecessor, which obligations were assumed by Square LLC.

12       573. Separately, Grandbridge signed the closing statement, which conveyed its 1%  
13 loan assumption fee as "Lender."

14       574. Grandbridge signed the Square Loan agreements, and the assumption agreement  
15 with Westland, both on its own behalf and on behalf of Fannie Mae.

16       575. Unless legally excused from doing so by the Lenders' illegal actions, Square LLC  
17 has performed all of the duties and obligations required of it under the terms of the Loan  
18 Agreement with Fannie Mae, including timely making monthly periodic loan payment and  
19 paying the 1% loan assumption fee.

20       576. Unless legally excused from doing so by the Lenders' illegal actions, Square LLC  
21 has performed all of the duties and obligations required of it under the terms of the terms of the  
22 Loan Agreement with Grandbridge, including timely making monthly periodic loan payment  
23 and paying the 1% loan assumption fee.

24       577. To the extent that any duties or obligations required of Westland have not been  
25 performed, such duties or obligations have been excused because of Grandbridge's and Fannie  
26 Mae's breach of the Square Loan Agreement.

27       578. Grandbridge has materially breached its Loan Agreement with Square LLC by  
28 failing to require adequate reserves at the time of the initial loan, requesting and performing an

1 improper property condition assessment, utilizing that improper PCA to demand an adjustment  
2 to reserve deposits, failing to disburse funds in response to reserve disbursement requests,  
3 sending/filing improper notices, and generally violating the terms of the Multifamily Loan and  
4 Security Agreement to the point that the administration has become so one-sided that Square  
5 LLC had no option but to commence these proceedings.

6 579. That as a direct and proximate result of Grandbridge's breach of contract, Square  
7 LLC has been damaged in an amount in excess of \$15,000.00, the exact amount of which will be  
8 determined at trial.

9 580. That it has been necessary for Square LLC to retain counsel to prosecute this  
10 action by reason of which it is entitled to reasonable attorney's fees.

11 **m. THIRTEENTH CAUSE OF ACTION (BREACH OF COVENANT OF**  
12 **GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING – AGAINST GRANDBRIDGE)**

13 581. Counterclaimants repeat, reallege, and incorporate the allegations set forth in the  
14 preceding paragraphs, including in the Counterclaim above, as if fully set forth herein.

15 582. A valid and binding agreement was formed between Westland and Fannie  
16 Mae/Grandbridge on each of the two separate sets of loan agreements, related to the Properties.

17 583. Westland's agreements for the two Properties utilized the general provisions of  
18 the underlying loan agreement entered into between Westland's predecessor and Fannie  
19 Mae/Grandbridge to specify the terms that would govern the parties' practices for administration  
20 of the loan.

21 584. In every contract, including the loans between Westland and Fannie  
22 Mae/Grandbridge, there exists in law an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

23 585. Both prior to the loan assumption and after, Westland acted in good faith by  
24 paying Fannie Mae/Grandbridge a 1% loan assumption fee under each agreement related to the  
25 Properties, providing Fannie Mae/Grandbridge access to both the Liberty Property and the  
26 Square Property, paying for substantial improvements at each of the Properties, improving the  
27 condition of each of the Properties and their tenant base, providing confidential business  
28 documents to Fannie Mae/Grandbridge, and continuously paying Westland's full loan payments

1 on a timely basis even after Fannie Mae/Grandbridge suspended the automatic ACH payments  
2 the parties had used without prior notice.

3 586. Grandbridge wrongfully and deliberately took advantage of Westland's good faith  
4 actions, by, *inter alia*, failing to perform all conditions, covenants and promises required under  
5 the Loan Agreements, including without limitation, altering the standard that they would apply to  
6 a property condition assessment undertaken in July 2019 from the standard used at the time the  
7 loan was assumed, telling Westland that they would cover the cost of the July 2019 property  
8 condition assessments but then refusing to discuss the purported default unless Westland paid  
9 those costs, making a demand that Westland deposit an additional \$2,845,980.00 into escrow  
10 despite that the condition of its Properties had improved not deteriorated since the assumption  
11 agreement was signed, and by each of these actions Grandbridge and Fannie Mae thereby  
12 breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing inherent in the subject agreement.

13 587. Grandbridge's actions were taken both on its own behalf as a Lender and/or  
14 Servicer.

15 588. Wherefore Grandbridge did not act in good faith, that is, did not perform its  
16 contract with each Counterclaimant in the manner reasonably contemplated by the parties, so that  
17 each Counterclaimant has a remedy that goes beyond that of breach of the express terms of their  
18 contract.

19 589. Grandbridge's actions, misrepresentations, deception, concealment, and breach of  
20 the covenant of good faith and fair dealing were done intentionally with malice for the specific  
21 purpose of causing injury to Liberty LLC, Square LLC, the Westland Securities Entities and the  
22 Westland Credit Facility Entities.

23 590. As a direct and proximate result of Grandbridge's breach, each Counterclaimant  
24 has suffered damages in excess of \$15,000.00, the exact amount of which will be proven at trial.

25 591. As a further direct and proximate result of Grandbridge's breach, each  
26 Counterclaimant has had to hire counsel to prosecute this matter by reason of which it is entitled  
27 to reasonable attorney's fees.

28

1                    **n. FOURTEENTH CAUSE OF ACTION (DECLARATORY RELIEF**  
2                    **AGAINST GRANDBRIDGE)**

3                    592. Counterclaimants repeat, reallege, and incorporate the allegations set forth in the  
4 preceding paragraphs, including in the Counterclaim above, as if fully set forth herein.

5                    593. A genuine justiciable controversy exists relevant to the rights and obligations  
6 herein regarding Westland's obligations under each of the Loan Agreements, and whether  
7 Grandbridge may demand that Westland deposit additional funds into reserve accounts.

8                    594. The interests of Counterclaimants, on the one hand, and Grandbridge on the other  
9 are adverse.

10                  595. Specifically, the present dispute that resulted in a Notice of Default and Election  
11 to Sell being sent by Fannie Mae is a dispute over the parties' interpretation of Article 13.02 of  
12 the Loan Agreement related to adjustments to reserve funding and the related reserve  
13 administration requirements, as well as Article 6.03 related to the conditions when property  
14 condition assessments may be utilized.

15                  596. Westland has a legally protectable interest in the two Properties.

16                  597. These issues are ripe for judicial determination, because on or about October 18,  
17 2019, Grandbridge served a Notice of Demand, both as Servicer/Lender, and/or on behalf of  
18 Fannie Mae.

19                  598. These issues are ripe for judicial determination, because on or about July 15,  
20 2020, Fannie Mae served Westland with a Notice of Default and Intent to Sell Westland's  
21 Properties.

22                  599. These issues are ripe for judicial determination, because on or about August 12,  
23 2020, Fannie Mae filed a complaint seeking the appointment of a receiver to ouster Westland  
24 from its Properties.

25                  600. Westland seeks an order from this Court declaring that Article 13.02 and Article  
26 6.03 are only implicated if the condition of the Properties has physically deteriorated, or  
27 impaired the value of Fannie Mae's and Grandbridge's security, and that no additional reserve  
28 deposit is needed.



1       601. Westland seeks an order from this Court declaring that Fannie Mae and/or  
2 Grandbridge breached the terms of the two Loan Agreements by demanding a property condition  
3 assessment, demanding the adjustment of reserve deposits without any proper basis, and filing a  
4 NOD.

5       602. That it has been necessary for Westland to retain the services of legal counsel for  
6 which Westland is entitled to recover such costs and expenses from Grandbridge.

7               **o. FIFTEENTH CAUSE OF ACTION (FRAUD & CONCEALMENT**  
8               **AGAINST GRANDBRIDGE)**

9       603. Counterclaimants repeat, reallege, and incorporate the allegations set forth in the  
10 preceding paragraphs, including in the Counterclaim above, as if fully set forth herein.

11       604. That Westland entered into its Loan Agreement relying on Fannie Mae and  
12 Grandbridge continuing to utilize the same standard for evaluating the condition of the Properties  
13 that had been used at the origination of the Loan Agreements during late 2017, and at the time of  
14 the loan assumption during the summer of 2018.

15       605. When Grandbridge forwarded documents regarding the loan assumption and loan  
16 agreements to Westland, it did so not only on its own behalf, but also on behalf of Fannie Mae,  
17 who advised Grandbridge to forward those documents to Westland with the intent that Westland  
18 would be provided the loan assumption, loan agreements, and reserve schedules, and that  
19 Westland would rely on those documents.

20       606. By letter dated August 20, 2018, Grandbridge represented on behalf of itself and  
21 Fannie Mae to Liberty LLC that, “after a thorough review and analysis of the Proposed  
22 Borrower’s [Liberty LLC’s] financial and managerial capacity, the Assumption has been  
23 approved on the following terms: . . . No change to the Replacement Reserve monthly deposit or  
24 established schedule identified on Exhibit B attached hereto; No Change to the Required Repair  
25 Reserve of \$39,375.00 as identified in schedule on Exhibit C attached hereto . . .” (Exhibit J.)  
26 Further, Exhibit C, Required Reserve Schedule, listed all items as completed, except for a  
27 \$9,375.00 holdback for “Misc. Concrete and Fence Repairs. Sports Court Resurfacing” that was  
28 shown as having already been fully funded. (Exhibit J, at 7.)

1        607. Further, by letter dated August 20, 2018, Grandbridge represented on behalf of  
2 itself and Fannie Mae to Square LLC that, “after a thorough review and analysis of the Proposed  
3 Borrower’s [Square LLC’s] financial and managerial capacity, the Assumption has been  
4 approved on the following terms: . . . No change to the Replacement Reserve monthly deposit or  
5 established schedule identified on Exhibit B attached hereto . . .” (Exhibit K.) Further, Exhibit  
6 C, Required Repair Reserve Schedule, simply stated “N/A” indicating that no repair reserve was  
7 required for that loan. (Exhibit K, at 7.)

8        608. Grandbridge knew that Westland relied upon the amounts and types of conditions  
9 requiring reserve deposits when entering into the Loan Agreements.

10       609. To induce Westland to consent to the Loan Agreements, to collect the loan  
11 assumption fee from Westland, for Grandbridge to improve its own liquidity position with  
12 Fannie Mae, to improve the creditworthiness of Fannie Mae’s loan portfolio, to attempt to  
13 improperly generate additional fees and costs, and to improperly profit off of holding Westland’s  
14 funds in a non-interest bearing escrow account, Grandbridge did not inform Westland that it  
15 planned to seek additional reserves at the time the Loan Agreements were assumed by Westland..

16       610. That Fannie Mae does credit reviews and monitoring of Grandbridge’s lending  
17 practices, and upon information and belief, that Fannie Mae determined that Grandbridge failed  
18 to follow Fannie Mae’s credit and underwriting criteria for loans in underwriting the November  
19 2017 loan.

20       611. Upon information and belief, that Fannie Mae required that Grandbridge obtain  
21 additional security due to its poor underwriting, and thus Grandbridge had no intent to service  
22 the Loan Agreements consistent with the documentation that was provided at the time of the  
23 August 2018 loan assumption.

24       612. Additionally, in July 2019, despite that the Loan Agreements permitted Fannie  
25 Mae to charge for a Property Condition Assessment based on deterioration, a PCA of the  
26 Properties was requested by Lenders, and Joseph Greenhaw represented on behalf of  
27 Grandbridge and Fannie Mae that Westland would not be required to pay the cost of the PCA if  
28 it provided access to the Properties, and that if any deficiencies were found that Grandbridge and

1 Fannie Mae would work with Westland by only requiring a small addition to the reserve  
2 accounts consistent with deferred maintenance schedules.

3 613. Westland knew that there had not been any deterioration in the condition of the  
4 Properties, and relied upon Mr. Greenhaw's statement when providing access to the Properties in  
5 September 2019, which as represented would only require nominal action by Westland in order  
6 to preserve its broader relationship with Fannie Mae.

7 614. That had Westland known that Fannie Mae and Grandbridge would require an  
8 additional deposit of over \$2.85 million of additional reserve funding based on a loan balance of  
9 approximately \$38.6 million, which amounts to approximately 7% of the loan amount, for a loan  
10 with a seven year term, Counterclaimants would not have entered into the assumption agreement  
11 and would have obtained alternative financing.

12 615. That had Westland known that Fannie Mae and Grandbridge would require an  
13 additional deposit of over \$2.85 million of additional reserve funding based on a loan balance of  
14 approximately \$38.6 million, which amounts to approximately 7% of the loan amount, for a loan  
15 with a seven year term, as well as later having Lenders seek repayment for the improper PCA  
16 costs and related legal fees, Counterclaimants would not have permitted access to the Properties  
17 for a PCA that was in excess of what was required by the Loan Agreements.

18 616. Westland reasonably relied upon the types of expenses contained in the repair and  
19 replacement escrow accounts schedules, because Westland has entered into numerous loan  
20 agreements previously, but on those loan agreements, the lender never requested any significant  
21 adjusted reserve deposits.

22 617. Westland relied on Fannie Mae's material misstatements and omissions by paying  
23 a 1% loan assumption fee, providing Fannie Mae access to the Property, paying for substantial  
24 improvements at the Property, improving the condition of the Property and its tenant base,  
25 providing Fannie Mae confidential business documents, and continuously paying loan payments.

26 618. However, Fannie Mae and Grandbridge knew that they were improperly seeking a  
27 Property Condition Assessment report, because prior to conducting the property condition  
28 assessment, during a phone call in July 2019, Grandbridge's Senior Vice President of Loan

1 Servicing and Asset Management Joe Greenhaw represented that Westland would not be  
2 required to pay the cost of the assessment if Westland agreed to provide f3, Inc. PCA access to  
3 the Properties.

4 619.

5 620. As a result of Grandbridge's misrepresentations, Westland was induced to enter  
6 into the assumption agreement with Fannie Mae as lender and Grandbridge as servicer, and to  
7 permit Fannie Mae and Grandbridge to access its Properties to conduct a PCA when in excess of  
8 what was required by the Loan Agreements, which has damaged Westland.

9 621. As a direct and proximate result of Grandbridge's misstatements and omissions,  
10 Westland has suffered damages in excess of \$15,000.00, the exact amount of which will be  
11 proven at trial, because, *inter alia*, this is the only default that Westland has ever suffered, it will  
12 impair Westland's credit rating leading to long term higher borrowing costs, and it has impaired  
13 Westland's ability to re-finance its Properties at a time when interest rates are at an all-time low.

14 622. By reason of the foregoing, Grandbridge acted with oppression, fraud and malice,  
15 and therefore, Westland is entitled to exemplary and punitive damages.

16 **p. SIXTEENTH CAUSE OF ACTION (NEGLIGENT**  
17 **MISREPRESENTATION AND CONCEALMENT AGAINST**  
18 **GRANDBRIDGE)**

19 623. Counterclaimants repeat, reallege, and incorporate the allegations set forth in the  
20 preceding paragraphs, including in the Counterclaim above, as if fully set forth herein.

21 624. Grandbridge supplied information and made material misrepresentations to  
22 Westland, including without limitation, as detailed above that adequate reserve amounts had  
23 already been submitted, consistent with the schedules attached to the loan assumption letters and  
24 documentation.

25 625. By letter dated August 20, 2018, Grandbridge represented on behalf of itself and  
26 Fannie Mae to Westland that, it conducted "a thorough review and analysis of the Proposed  
27 Borrower's financial and managerial capacity" before approving the assumption.

1       626. Upon information and belief, Grandbridge negligently misrepresented that it  
2 conducted an adequate review when setting the reserve amounts in August 2018, prior to  
3 Westland signing the loan assumption, because a short one (1) year later, it requested an  
4 additional \$2.85 million be placed into escrow with no deterioration of the Properties.

5       627. The information and representations made by Grandbridge was false, in that  
6 unbeknownst to Westland they knew the loan did not have sufficient security, and that there was  
7 a substantial likelihood they would attempt to seek additional reserves.

8       628. Grandbridge supplied the information and made the representations to induce  
9 Westland to rely upon it, to act or refrain from acting in reliance upon it, and to have Westland  
10 enter into the assumption agreement.

11       629. Grandbridge owed Westland a duty not to make material misrepresentations.

12       630. Westland justifiably relied upon the information Grandbridge provided.

13       631. As a direct and proximate result of Grandbridge's misstatements and omissions,  
14 Westland has suffered damages in excess of \$15,000.00, the exact amount of which will be  
15 proven at trial, because, *inter alia*, this is the only default that Westland has ever suffered and it  
16 will impair Westland's credit rating and leading to long term higher borrowing costs, and it has  
17 impaired Westland's ability to re-finance its Properties at a time when interest rates are at an all-  
18 time low.

19       **q. SEVENTEENTH CAUSE OF ACTION (INTENTIONAL INTERFERENCE**  
20 **WITH CONTRACT AGAINST GRANDBRIDGE)**

21       632. Counterclaimants repeat, reallege, and incorporate the allegations set forth in the  
22 preceding paragraphs, including in the Counterclaim above, as if fully set forth herein.

23       633. To the extent that Grandbridge is not found to be a party to the assumption  
24 agreements and/or the loan agreements, this cause of action is pleaded in the alternative against it  
25 by Counterclaimants.

26       634. Based on Westland's financial disclosures at the time of the loan assumption,  
27 Grandbridge knew Westland Real Estate Group is a privately held real estate company with a  
28 sizable portfolio of properties, and approximately \$800 million in loans outstanding.

1        635. Each of the loans underlying that are part of that \$800 million loan portfolio is a  
2 written contractual agreement. Upon information and belief, Grandbridge knows these contracts  
3 and lending arrangements exist.

4        636. Further, Grandbridge knew that \$300 million of Westland's loans are outstanding  
5 with Fannie Mae, and that it is economically advantageous for Westland, including  
6 Counterclaimants, to have access to lender funds in other to refinance its properties.

7        637. Grandbridge committed intentional acts intended or designed to disrupt the  
8 contractual loan agreements that Westland, including Counterclaimants, have with Fannie Mae,  
9 and Counterclaimants' ability to refinance those loan agreements with Fannie Mae.

10        638. Grandbridge knew that by manufacturing the purported default, Fannie Mae  
11 would blacklist Westland, including the Counterclaimants, by placing a "lending hold" on any of  
12 Counterclaimants' loan, which would have the effect of limiting, delaying, and/or disrupting  
13 Counterclaimants' ability to refinance a loan with Fannie Mae.

14        639. Grandbridge manufactured the Default in an attempt to put financial pressure on  
15 Counterclaimants, despite that it knew it would cause disruption to Counterclaimants' business,  
16 and preclude it from obtaining favorable rates from one of only two primary lenders in the  
17 multifamily housing loan market, and upon information and belief, Grandbridge intended to  
18 cause harm to the contractual relationship between Counterclaimants and Fannie Mae.

19        640. There was, and continues to be, actual disruption of the written loan agreements  
20 that Counterclaimants have with Fannie Mae, as Grandbridge's actions have in fact resulted in  
21 Counterclaimants being placed on Fannie Mae's blacklist, which has caused Counterclaimants  
22 harm.

23        641. As a direct and proximate result of Fannie Mae's breach, Counterclaimants have  
24 suffered damages in excess of \$15,000.00, the exact amount of which will be proven at trial.

25        642. By reason of the foregoing, Grandbridge acted with oppression, fraud and malice,  
26 and therefore, Counterclaimants are entitled to exemplary and punitive damages in excess of  
27 \$15,000.

1                    **r. EIGHTEENTH CAUSE OF ACTION (CONVERSION AGAINST**  
2                    **GRANDBRIDGE)**

3                    643. Counterclaimants repeat, reallege, and incorporate the allegations set forth in the  
4 preceding paragraphs, including in the Counterclaim above, as if fully set forth herein.

5                    644. Westland has submitted several prior reserve reimbursement requests that went  
6 unanswered by Grandbridge, including before its November 2019 demand for additional reserve  
7 funding.

8                    645. Westland and its predecessor submitted funds related to two fire insurance claims  
9 to Grandbridge, which earmarked funds were to be held in escrow until the two fire-damaged  
10 building were rebuilt.

11                    646. The fire-damaged buildings were completely rebuilt with Westland's funds.

12                    647. Westland has submitted reserve disbursement requests for the release of those  
13 funds, and other reserve disbursement requests for work that was completed, each of which was  
14 accompanied by invoices, proof of payment, and documentation showing approval of all required  
15 permits, but Grandbridge has failed to respond to those requests.

16                    648. Grandbridge has asserted that it transferred Westland's funds to Fannie Mae after  
17 the December 2019 default was asserted.

18                    649. As such, Grandbridge has wrongfully exerted dominion over Westland's personal  
19 property, including, without limitation, the funds that Grandbridge and/or Fannie Mae continued  
20 to hold in reserve accounts, and the funds they were improperly is holding in reserve accounts,  
21 that were earmarked for reconstruction of two fire damaged buildings at the Liberty Property from  
22 the date of disbursement until the fire damaged funds were released in May 2021, several months  
23 after the Court entered an order for those funds to be released in November 2020, and  
24 Grandbridge has thereby wrongly converted the funds to their own use and benefit.

25                    650. Grandbridge's continued dominion over Westland's personal property was  
26 unauthorized and inconsistent with Westland's property rights.

27                    651. Grandbridge's dominion over Westland's personal property deprived Westland of  
28 all of their property rights relating thereto.

1           652. Grandbridge's acts constitute conversion.

2           653. As a direct and proximate result of Grandbridge's conversion, Westland has  
3 suffered damages in excess of \$15,000.00, the exact amount of which will be proven at trial.

4           654. Further, due to the wanton, malicious, and intentional conduct of Grandbridge,  
5 Westland is entitled to an award of exemplary and punitive damages against Grandbridge.

6           655. Grandbridge knew that by refusing to return the converted proceeds after just  
7 demand, Borrowers would have to hire counsel to have those funds returned. Thus, it was  
8 foreseeable that Borrowers would incur attorney's fees as special damages. Borrowers have  
9 incurred these fees and request same as part of their special damages for conversion.

10           **s. NINETEENTH CAUSE OF ACTION (INJUNCTIVE RELIEF AGAINST**  
11 **GRANDBRIDGE)**

12           656. Counterclaimants repeat, reallege, and incorporate the allegations set forth in the  
13 preceding paragraphs, including in the Counterclaim above, as if fully set forth herein.

14           657. On or about July 15, 2020, two NODs that were filed against the Liberty Property  
15 and the Square Property and served on Westland.

16           658. Upon information and belief, in Nevada, the typical period for a foreclosure sale  
17 to occur after a borrower receives a NOD is 120 days.

18           659. As Westland has made all debt service payments, and complied with the terms of  
19 the Loan Agreements, the Properties rightfully belong to Westland.

20           660. Fannie Mae and Grandbridge are attempting to utilize Nevada's non-judicial  
21 foreclosure process to improperly seize and sell Westland's Liberty Property and Square  
22 Property.

23           661. Real property is a unique asset, and on that basis, in the event that a wrongful  
24 foreclosure sale occurs, Westland will suffer extreme hardship and actual and impending  
25 irreparable loss and damage.

26           662. Westland has no adequate or speedy remedy at law to prevent the sale of the  
27 Properties, and injunctive relief is therefore Westland's only means for securing relief.

28           663. Westland is likely to succeed in this lawsuit on the merits of its claims.



1        664. Based on the foregoing, Westland is entitled to temporary restraining orders and  
2 preliminary and permanent injunctive relief to preserve the status quo, to mitigate its damages,  
3 and to prevent further irreparable injury to Westland, including, without limitation by: (a)  
4 enjoining Fannie Mae and/or Grandbridge from any further attempts to foreclose on the  
5 Properties related to their baseless requests to adjust the reserve deposits, and (b) enjoining  
6 Fannie Mae and/or Grandbridge from any further attempts to coerce Westland into providing  
7 additional reserves or to pay for the expenses related to the default that Grandbridge  
8 manufactured.

9        665. As a further direct and proximate result of Fannie Mae's and/or Grandbridge's  
10 improper demands to adjust reserves, their filing of the NOD, and the filing of their Complaint  
11 seeking appointment of a receiver, Westland has had to hire counsel to prosecute this matter by  
12 reason of which it is entitled to reasonable attorney's fees.

13        **t. TWENTIETH CAUSE OF ACTION (EQUITABLE RELIEF/RESCISSION/**  
14 **REFORMATION AGAINST GRANDBRIDGE)**

15        666. Counterclaimants repeat, reallege, and incorporate the allegations set forth in the  
16 preceding paragraphs, including in the Counterclaim above, as if fully set forth herein.

17        667. On or about August 29, 2018, Westland entered into two assumption agreements  
18 for the loans applicable to the Liberty Property and the Square Property.

19        668. Prior to signing the assumption, Grandbridge individually, and on behalf of  
20 Fannie Mae, forwarded Westland a loan assumption agreement letter, which contained the terms  
21 under which it would permit Westland's assumption of the Liberty Loan and Square Loan.

22        669. By letter dated August 20, 2018, Grandbridge represented on behalf of itself and  
23 Fannie Mae to Liberty LLC that, "after a thorough review and analysis of the Proposed  
24 Borrower's [Liberty LLC's] financial and managerial capacity, the Assumption has been  
25 approved on the following terms: . . . No change to the Replacement Reserve monthly deposit or  
26 established schedule identified on Exhibit B attached hereto; No Change to the Required Repair  
27 Reserve of \$39,375.00 as identified in schedule on Exhibit C attached hereto . . ." (Exhibit J.)  
28 Further, Exhibit C, Required Reserve Schedule, listed all items as completed, except for a

1 \$9,375.00 holdback for “Misc. Concrete and Fence Repairs. Sports Court Resurfacing” that was  
2 shown as having already been fully funded. (Exhibit J, at 7.)

3 670. By letter dated August 20, 2018, Grandbridge represented on behalf of itself and  
4 Fannie Mae to Square LLC that, “after a thorough review and analysis of the Proposed  
5 Borrower’s [Square LLC’s] financial and managerial capacity, the Assumption has been  
6 approved on the following terms: . . . No change to the Replacement Reserve monthly deposit or  
7 established schedule identified on Exhibit B attached hereto . . .” (Exhibit K.) Further, Exhibit  
8 C, Required Repair Reserve Schedule, simply stated “N/A” indicating that no repair reserve was  
9 required for that loan. (Exhibit K, at 7.)

10 671. When the loan assumption agreements were signed, the above-referenced  
11 Required Repair Reserve Schedule and Required Replacement Reserve Schedule, for each  
12 Property, were specifically included as part of the assumption agreement.

13 672. The statements made by Grandbridge, on behalf of itself and on behalf of Fannie  
14 Mae, were either false or amounted to a mutual mistake by both parties, because Grandbridge  
15 and Fannie Mae later attempted to obtain additional reserve payments in excess of the schedules  
16 that were provided to Westland, and those requests for additional reserve deposits included  
17 requests to deposit \$2.85 million of funds related to physical conditions that were not of the same  
18 type or category as the expenses included in the schedules.

19 673. In making those statements, Fannie Mae and Grandbridge knew that Westland  
20 would rely upon the amounts and types of conditions requiring reserve deposits when entering  
21 into the Loan Agreements, and intended for Westland to do so, to ensure that the loans would  
22 close.

23 674. Westland did rely on the amounts and types of conditions requiring reserve  
24 deposits that were listed in the schedules attached to the loan assumption letters, and as such  
25 Westland justifiably relied upon the information Grandbridge and Fannie Mae provided.

26 675. If Grandbridge or Fannie Mae would have had f3 or another inspection company  
27 perform a PCA as thorough and with the same criteria before the assumption as it did a year  
28 later, and told Westland that an additional reserve deposit would be required, then Westland

1 would have demanded that the Shamrock Entities met the additional reserve funding requirement  
2 prior to agreeing to assume the loan, that the terms of the purchase and/or loan assumption be  
3 amended, and/or other relief from the Shamrock Entities, Fannie Mae and/or Grandbridge, and  
4 without such relief, would not have entered into the two assumption agreements.

5 676. As such, to the extent that a finding is made that the loan agreements would  
6 permit Grandbridge and Fannie Mae to demand additional reserve deposits, then the loan  
7 documents should be reformed consistent with the statements contained in the loan assumption  
8 letters and its attached reserve schedules due to irregularities in assumption process amounting to  
9 fraud, unfairness or oppression, and if not reformed, other appropriate equitable relief to rectify  
10 the inequities and unfairness of this situation, and if not, then rescinded altogether.

11 677. Based on the foregoing, Westland is entitled to reformation, other equitable relief,  
12 or rescission of the loan agreements consistent with Grandbridge's and Fannie Mae's statements  
13 that no additional reserve deposits were required for the loans.

14 678. As a further direct and proximate result of Fannie Mae's and/or Grandbridge's  
15 improper demands to adjust reserves and related actions, Westland has had to hire counsel to  
16 prosecute this matter and obtain reformation of the loan documents by reason of which it is  
17 entitled to reasonable attorney's fees.

18 **u. TWENTY-FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION (FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT –**  
19 **LIBERTY PSA – AGAINST SHAM VI)**

20 679. Counterclaimants repeat, reallege, and incorporate the allegations set forth in the  
21 preceding paragraphs, including in the Counterclaim above, as if fully set forth herein.

22 680. A valid Purchase Agreement was entered into between Liberty LLC and/or  
23 Amusement, on the one hand, and Sham VI on the other hand, on June 22, 2018, for the purchase  
24 of the Property located at 4870 Nellis Oasis Lane, Las Vegas, NV 89115.

25 681. The Purchase Agreement required that Liberty LLC assume Sham VI's loan with  
26 Fannie Mae and Grandbridge, dated November 2, 2017.

27 682. By funding its initial deposit, providing the additional required funds at closing on  
28 August 29, 2018, and assuming the borrower's further obligations on the Sham VI's loan with

1 Fannie Mae and Grandbridge, Liberty LLC performed all of its remaining obligations as a buyer  
2 pursuant to the purchase and sale agreement.

3 683. To the extent that any duties or obligations required of Liberty LLC have not been  
4 performed, such duties or obligations have been excused because of Sham VI's non-performance  
5 of the purchase and sale agreement.

6 684. Sham VI materially breached its agreement with Liberty LLC by failing to  
7 perform its obligations consistent with the terms of the Purchase Agreement, the Loan  
8 Agreement, and Nevada law, including by providing inaccurate/misleading financial disclosures,  
9 failing to bring all vacant units to rent ready condition, failing to remove tenants who did not pay  
10 rent, failing to return vacant units and units remaining in default for months to rent ready  
11 condition, failing to timely commence repairs to fire damaged buildings, and generally violating  
12 the terms of the purchase and sale agreement.

13 685. That as a direct and proximate result of Sham VI's breach of contract, Liberty  
14 LLC has been damaged in an amount in excess of \$15,000.00, the exact amount of which will be  
15 determined at trial.

16 686. That as a direct and proximate result of Sham VI's breach of contract and  
17 requirement that Liberty LLC assume the Loan Agreement and that Counterclaimants assume the  
18 guaranties, which the Sham Defendants were obligated to fulfill, Counterclaimants have been  
19 damaged in an amount in a further amount to be determined at the time of trial and may be liable  
20 to Counterclaimants for all or part of any claim that Fannie Mae has plead against them or any  
21 damages arising from Fannie Mae's related foreclosure proceedings.

22 687. That it has been necessary for Liberty LLC to retain counsel to prosecute this  
23 action by reason of which it is entitled to reasonable attorney's fees, pursuant to the Purchase  
24 Agreement.

25 **v. TWENTY-SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION (BREACH OF CONTRACT –**  
26 **SQUARE PSA – AGAINST SHAM VII)**

27 688. Counterclaimants repeat, reallege, and incorporate the allegations set forth in the  
28 preceding paragraphs, including in the Counterclaim above, as if fully set forth herein.

1       689. A valid Purchase Agreement was entered into between Amusement and Square  
2 LLC, on the one hand, and Sham VII on the other hand, on June 22, 2018, for the purchase of the  
3 Property located at 5025 Nellis Oasis Lane, Las Vegas, NV 89115.

4       690. The Purchase Agreement required that Square LLC assume Sham VII's loan with  
5 Fannie Mae and Grandbridge, dated November 2, 2017.

6       691. By funding its initial deposit, providing the additional required funds at closing on  
7 August 29, 2018, and assuming the borrower's further obligations on the Sham VII's loan with  
8 Fannie Mae and Grandbridge, Square LLC performed all of its remaining obligations as a buyer  
9 pursuant to the purchase and sale agreement.

10       692. To the extent that any duties or obligations required of Square LLC have not been  
11 performed, such duties or obligations have been excused because of Sham VII's non-  
12 performance of the purchase and sale agreement.

13       693. Sham VII materially breached its agreement with Square LLC by failing to  
14 perform its obligations consistent with the terms of the Purchase Agreement, the Loan  
15 Agreement, and Nevada law, including by providing inaccurate/misleading financial disclosures,  
16 failing to bring all vacant units to rent ready condition, failing to remove tenants who did not pay  
17 rent, failing to return vacant units and units remaining in default for months to rent ready  
18 condition, and generally violating the terms of the purchase and sale agreement.

19       694. That as a direct and proximate result of Sham VII's breach of contract, Square  
20 LLC has been damaged in an amount in excess of \$15,000.00, the exact amount of which will be  
21 determined at trial.

22       695. That as a direct and proximate result of Sham VII's breach of contract and  
23 requirement that Square LLC assume the Loan Agreement and that Counterclaimants assume the  
24 guaranties, which the Sham Defendants were obligated to fulfill, Counterclaimants have been  
25 damaged in an amount in a further amount to be determined at the time of trial and may be liable  
26 to Counterclaimants for all or part of any claim that Fannie Mae has plead against them or any  
27 damages arising from Fannie Mae's related foreclosure proceedings.

1       696. That it has been necessary for Square LLC to retain counsel to prosecute this  
2 action by reason of which it is entitled to reasonable attorney's fees pursuant to the Purchase  
3 Agreement.

4               **w. TWENTY-THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION (BREACH OF COVENANT OF**  
5               **GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING – AGAINST SHAM VI & SHAM**  
6               **VII)**

7       697. Counterclaimants repeat, reallege, and incorporate the allegations set forth in the  
8 preceding paragraphs, including in the Counterclaim above, as if fully set forth herein.

9       698. A valid and binding agreement was formed between Westland and the Sham  
10 Defendants on each of the two separate Purchase Agreements.

11       699. As a matter of public policy the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is  
12 a covenant incorporated into every Nevada contract, and as such the Purchase Agreements  
13 between Westland and the Sham VI and Sham VII include an implied covenant of good faith and  
14 fair dealing regardless of any oppressive terms drafted by the Sham Defendants in an attempt to  
15 shield the Sham Defendants from any future claims.

16       700. Sham Defendants breached the duty of good faith and fair dealing by acting in a  
17 manner unfaithful to the purpose of the purchase and sale agreement, including those actions  
18 outlined in this Counterclaim.

19       701. Specifically, Sham Defendants wrongfully and deliberately took advantage of  
20 Westland's good faith actions, by, *inter alia*, failing to perform all conditions, covenants and  
21 promises required under the purchase and sale agreement, including without limitation, failing to  
22 provide complete and accurate financial information, failing to bring all vacant units to rent  
23 ready condition, failing to remove tenants who did not pay rent, failing to return vacant units and  
24 units remaining in default for months to rent ready condition, and by each of these actions the  
25 Sham Defendants thereby breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing inherent  
26 in the subject agreement.

27       702. Sham Defendants' actions were taken both on their own behalf, and as owning  
28 members of the corporate entities.

1        703. Wherefore, Sham Defendants did not act in good faith, that is, did not perform its  
2 contract with each Liberty LLC and Village LLC in the manner reasonably contemplated by the  
3 parties, so that both Liberty LLC and Village LLC have a remedy that goes beyond that of  
4 breach of the express terms of their contract.

5        704. Sham Defendants' actions, misrepresentations, deception, concealment, and  
6 breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing were done intentionally with malice for the  
7 specific purpose of causing injury to Liberty LLC and Square LLC.

8        705. As a direct and proximate result of Sham Defendants' breach, each  
9 Counterclaimant has suffered damages in excess of \$15,000.00, the exact amount of which will  
10 be proven at trial.

11        706. That as a direct and proximate result of the Sham Defendant's breach of covenant  
12 of good faith and fair dealing and requirement that Counterclaimants assume the Loan  
13 Agreements and guaranties, which the Sham Defendants were obligated to fulfill,  
14 Counterclaimants have been damaged in an amount in a further amount to be determined at the  
15 time of trial and may be liable to Counterclaimants for all or part of any claim that Fannie Mae  
16 has plead against them or any damages arising from Fannie Mae's related foreclosure  
17 proceedings.

18        707. As a further direct and proximate result of Sham Defendants' breach, each  
19 Westland entity has had to hire counsel to prosecute this matter by reason of which it is entitled  
20 to reasonable attorney's fees pursuant to the Purchase Agreement.

21        **x. TWENTY-FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION (BREACH OF EXPRESS AND**  
22 **IMPLIED WARRANTY AGAINST SHAM VI & SHAM VII)**

23        708. Counterclaimants repeat, reallege, and incorporate the allegations set forth in the  
24 preceding paragraphs, including in the Counterclaim above, as if fully set forth herein.

25        709. A valid and binding agreement was formed between Westland and SHAM VI &  
26 SHAM VII on each of the two separate Purchase Agreements.

27        710. The Purchase Agreement contained express warranty provisions in Section 6.3 of  
28 the Purchase Agreement, warranting that SHAM VI and SHAM VII were qualified to do

1 business in Nevada; the Sham Defendants had the full power and authority to execute, deliver  
2 and perform their obligations under the Purchase Agreements; the Purchase Agreements were  
3 valid and binding; none of SHAM VI's and SHAM VII's interests were impaired by bankruptcy,  
4 trustee oversight, a creditor assignment; an attachment; "the taking of, failure to take, or  
5 submission to any action indicating an inability to meet its financial obligations as they accrue;"  
6 or dissolution, liquidation or death; the sale was not in furtherance of a fraudulent conveyance or  
7 transfer; and the representations regarding the balances and contents of the loan documents were  
8 accurate.

9       711. In addition, Nevada law provides that above-referenced statements regarding the  
10 repairs that Sham Defendants agreed to perform, and the receivables and income the Properties  
11 were generating, constitute express warranties.

12       712. Counterclaimants reasonably relied upon the Sham Defendant's representations  
13 regarding repairs to be performed and the condition of the Properties.

14       713. The Sham Defendants breach that warranty, by failing to perform the repairs that  
15 were promised and by providing financial statements that incorporated misrepresentations or  
16 concealed material information about those financial statements.

17       714. By letter dated February 28, 2019, Counterclaimants provided notice that it was  
18 preserving its right to make such a claim based on such a breach.

19       715. As a direct and proximate result of Sham Defendants' breach, each  
20 Counterclaimant has suffered damages in excess of \$15,000.00, the exact amount of which will  
21 be proven at trial.

22       716. That as a direct and proximate result of the Sham Defendant's breach of express  
23 and implied warranties and requirement that Counterclaimants assume the Loan Agreements and  
24 guaranties, which the Sham Defendants were obligated to fulfill, Counterclaimants have been  
25 damaged in an amount in a further amount to be determined at the time of trial and may be liable  
26 to Counterclaimants for all or part of any claim that Fannie Mae has plead against them or any  
27 damages arising from Fannie Mae's related foreclosure proceedings.



1        717. As a further direct and proximate result of Sham Defendants' breach, each  
2 Westland entity has had to hire counsel to prosecute this matter by reason of which it is entitled  
3 to reasonable attorney's fees pursuant to the Purchase Agreement.

4                **y. TWENTY-FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION (FRAUD & CONCEALMENT**  
5 **AGAINST SHAM DEFENDANTS)**

6        718. Counterclaimants repeat, reallege, and incorporate the allegations set forth in the  
7 preceding paragraphs, including in the Counterclaim above, as if fully set forth herein.

8        719. As addressed above, the Sham Defendants misrepresented the value of the  
9 Property to Counterclaimants, by providing false information and/or concealing material  
10 information regarding the income generated, occupancy rates, aged receivables, and rent  
11 delinquency balances at the Properties.

12        720. Specifically, the Sham Defendants repeatedly made several misrepresentations,  
13 including but not limited to:

- 14                a. Within the December 2014 press releases that remaining accessible at least  
15 through the closing date of the transaction;  
16                b. By providing false financial information to the Sham Defendant's brokers related  
17 to the financial information provided on April 11, 2018, with the intent that it be  
18 repeated to Counterclaimants, and which information was provided to  
19 Counterclaimants electronically on April 11, 2018;  
20                c. By providing false financial information to broker Mongkolsakulkit on June 26,  
21 2018, with the intent that it be repeated to Counterclaimants, which information  
22 was provided to Counterclaimants electronically on June 26, 2018; and  
23                d. By providing false financial information to brokers Carll & Mongkolsakulkit on  
24 July 4, 2018, with the intent that it be repeated to Counterclaimants, which  
25 information was provided to Counterclaimants electronically on July 5, 2018.

26        721. Each of the documents referenced in the foregoing paragraph either contained  
27 false information or concealed material facts, which overstated income, minimized delinquency  
28 balances or failed to convey the true occupancy rates at the Properties.

1        722. From the Sham Defendants prior experiences with Westland and Amusement  
2 during the failed transaction in 2017, the Sham Defendants knew and intended that Westland and  
3 Amusement would find the information material and would rely on that information.

4        723. Weinstein's reassurances, on behalf of herself and the other Sham Defendants, to  
5 Counterclaimants' residential asset manager on August 28 and to Counterclaimants' counsel on  
6 August 29, 2018, regarding shredding and the status of keys were knowingly false.

7        724. Based on that false financial information, Westland and Amusement entered into  
8 the Purchase Agreements.

9        725. Westland and Amusement relied on the Sham Defendants misrepresentations  
10 regarding the income generated, occupancy rates, and rent deficiency balances when entering  
11 into the Purchase Agreements in June 2018, assuming the Loan Agreements in August 2018, and  
12 closing the purchase transaction in August 2018.

13        726. Westland and Amusement reasonably relied upon the false information provided,  
14 because the Sham Defendants limited Counterclaimants from obtaining such information from  
15 other sources via the Purchase Agreement, the Sham Defendants provided that Counterclaimants  
16 were not permitted to contact their employees, there was no outside source of obtaining that  
17 information after the Sham Defendants began self-managing the properties over two years prior  
18 to Counterclaimants' purchase of the Properties, and the Sham Defendants failed to produce full  
19 electronic records until after the purchase was completed. Further, Westland reasonably relied  
20 upon the financial information provided, because Westland has entered into numerous purchase  
21 agreements previously, and for those purchase agreements the seller's financials were accurate.

22        727. Had Westland and Amusement known that the Sham Defendants had  
23 misrepresented the financial information, or that they had no intention of making the repairs  
24 agreed to in the Purchase Agreements, or that they had concealed material adverse information,  
25 Westland would have required a multimillion discount on the Purchase Agreements.

26        728. As a result of the Sham Defendants' misrepresentations, Westland and  
27 Amusement were induced to enter into the Purchase Agreement and to assume the Loan  
28 Agreements with Fannie Mae/Grandbridge, which has damaged Counterclaimants.

1       729. As a direct and proximate result of the Sham Defendants' misstatements and  
2 omissions, Counterclaimants have suffered damages in excess of \$15,000.00, the exact amount  
3 of which will be proven at trial.

4       730. That as a direct and proximate result of the Sham Defendant's fraud and  
5 concealment and requirement that Counterclaimants assume the Loan Agreements and  
6 guaranties, which the Sham Defendants were obligated to fulfill, Counterclaimants have been  
7 damaged in an amount in a further amount to be determined at the time of trial and may be liable  
8 to Counterclaimants for all or part of any claim that Fannie Mae has plead against them or any  
9 damages arising from Fannie Mae's related foreclosure proceedings.

10       731. By reason of the foregoing, the Sham Defendants acted with oppression, fraud  
11 and malice, and therefore, Westland and Amusement are entitled to exemplary and punitive  
12 damages;

13       732. By reason of the foregoing, the Sham Defendants knew that their actions would  
14 cause Counterclaimants to be sued by Lenders due to the requirement that the loan be assumed  
15 and as a result of their false financial statements, misrepresentations, and concealments, and  
16 therefore each Westland entity has had to hire counsel to prosecute this matter by reason of  
17 which it is entitled to reasonable attorney's fees as special damages.

18       **z. TWENTY-SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION (NEGLIGENT**  
19 **MISREPRESENTATION AGAINST SHAM DEFENDANTS)**

20       733. Counterclaimants repeat, reallege, and incorporate the allegations set forth in the  
21 preceding paragraphs, including in the Counterclaim above, as if fully set forth herein.

22       734. The Sham Defendants supplied information and made material misrepresentations  
23 to Westland and Amusement, including without limitation, as detailed above that overstated  
24 income generated, overstated occupancy rates, understated aged receivables, and understated rent  
25 delinquency balances at the Properties.

26       735. Specifically, the Sham Defendants repeatedly made several misrepresentations,  
27 including but not limited to:

- 1           a. Within the December 2014 press releases that remained accessible at least  
2           through the closing date of the transaction;  
3           b. By providing false financial information to the Sham Defendant's brokers related  
4           to the financial information provided on April 11, 2018, with the intent that it be  
5           repeated to Counterclaimants, and which information was provided to  
6           Counterclaimants electronically on April 11, 2018;  
7           c. By providing false financial information to broker Mongkolsakulkit on June 26,  
8           2018, with the intent that it be repeated to Counterclaimants, which information  
9           was provided to Counterclaimants electronically on June 26, 2018; and  
10          d. By providing false financial information to brokers Carll & Mongkolsakulkit on  
11          July 4, 2018, with the intent that it be repeated to Counterclaimants, which  
12          information was provided to Counterclaimants electronically on July 5, 2018.

13          736. Each of the documents referenced in the foregoing paragraph either contained  
14          false information or concealed material facts, which overstated income, minimized delinquency  
15          balances or failed to convey the true occupancy rates at the Properties.

16          737. Weinstein's reassurances, on behalf of herself and the other Sham Defendants, to  
17          Counterclaimants' residential asset manager on August 28 and to Counterclaimants' counsel on  
18          August 29, 2018, regarding shredding were false, and to the extent that Weinstein did not know  
19          that the representation was false, she negligently made reassurances regarding shredding and the  
20          status of keys at the Properties.

21          738. Upon information and belief, the Sham Defendants negligently misrepresented the  
22          financial information, because when the electronic information was provided days after closing,  
23          the inaccurate and false financial information regarding the Properties was discovered.

24          739. The information and representations made by the Sham Defendants was false, in  
25          that unbeknownst to Westland and Amusement the Sham Defendants knew the Properties had a  
26          lower rate of occupancy and that numerous tenants had not been evicted.

27          740. The Sham Defendants supplied the information and made the representations to  
28          induce Westland and Amusement to rely upon it, to act or refrain from acting in reliance upon it,

1 and to have Westland and Amusement enter into the Purchase Agreement and assume the Loan  
2 Agreements.

3 741. The Sham Defendants owed Westland and Amusement a duty not to make  
4 material misrepresentations.

5 742. Westland and Amusement justifiably relied upon the information the Sham  
6 Defendants provided.

7 743. As a direct and proximate result of the Sham Defendants' misstatements and  
8 omissions, Westland and Amusement have suffered damages in excess of \$15,000.00, the exact  
9 amount of which will be proven at trial.

10 744. That as a direct and proximate result of the Sham Defendant's negligent  
11 misrepresentations and requirement that Counterclaimants assume the Loan Agreements and  
12 guaranties, which the Sham Defendants were obligated to fulfill, Counterclaimants have been  
13 damaged in an amount in a further amount to be determined at the time of trial and may be liable  
14 to Counterclaimants for all or part of any claim that Fannie Mae has plead against them or any  
15 damages arising from Fannie Mae's related foreclosure proceedings.

16 745. By reason of the foregoing, the Sham Defendants knew that their actions would  
17 cause Counterclaimants to be sued by Lenders due to the requirement that the loan be assumed  
18 and as a result of their false financial statements and negligent misrepresentations, and therefore  
19 each Westland entity has had to hire counsel to prosecute this matter by reason of which it is  
20 entitled to reasonable attorney's fees as special damages.

21 **aa. TWENTY-SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION (NEGLIGENT HIRING AND**  
22 **NEGLIGENT SUPERVISION AGAINST SHAM DEFENDANTS)**

23 746. Counterclaimants repeat, reallege, and incorporate the allegations set forth in the  
24 preceding paragraphs, including in the Counterclaim above, as if fully set forth herein.

25 747. In addition to their direct liability, Sham Defendants, and each of them, known  
26 and unknown, were and are vicariously liable for the acts and omissions of any staff, agents,  
27 apparent agents, servants, contractors, employees or such other persons or entities, consultants,  
28

1 independent contractors whether in house or outside, entities, individuals, agencies or pools  
2 which in any manner caused or contributed to Counterclaimants' irreparable harm and damage.

3 748. At all times relevant herein, Sham Defendants, through their agents, servants  
4 and/or employees thereof, were acting within the scope of employment with the knowledge,  
5 permission and consent of their employer(s) and/or manager(s). Therefore, employer(s) are  
6 responsible and liable for all of its employee's negligent conduct set forth herein under the  
7 theory of respondeat superior.

8 749. Upon information and belief, Sham Defendants employed onsite personnel and  
9 corporate staff in remote offices, management and other supervisory personnel for the purpose of  
10 supervising employees, and managing said properties, consistent with industry standards for  
11 onsite property management of all books and records.

12 750. At all times material, the Sham Defendants were in control of, and responsible for  
13 training, hiring, and/or screening employees working on the premises and in its corporate offices,  
14 in a way designed to protect potential buyers, such as Counterclaimants from harm.

15 751. Sham Defendants, and each of them, known and unknown, breached their duty to  
16 Counterclaimants in one or more of the following respects, but not limited to:

- 17 a. Failing to adequately supervise employees, agents, contractors and/or  
18 subsidiaries.
- 19 b. Failing to adequately train employees, agents, contractors and/or subsidiaries.
- 20 c. Failing to adequately screen potential employees, agents, contractors and/or  
21 subsidiaries before their hiring/contracting.
- 22 d. Failing to follow industry accepted standards for recordkeeping and reporting  
23 financial information.

24 752. Sham Defendants breach of these duties directly and proximately caused  
25 Counterclaimants' injuries.

26 753. At all times relevant herein, DOE Defendants, though their agents, servants and/or  
27 employees thereof, were acting within the scope of employment with the knowledge, permission  
28 and consent of their employer(s) and/or contractors. Therefore, employer(s) are responsible and

1 liable for all of their agent's negligent conduct set forth herein under the theory of respondeat  
2 superior.

3 754. Counterclaimants have suffered injury and damages in an amount in excess of  
4 \$15,000.00 subject to proof at trial.

5 755. That as a direct and proximate result of the Sham Defendant's negligent hiring  
6 and negligent supervision and requirement that Counterclaimants assume the Loan Agreements  
7 and guaranties, which the Sham Defendants were obligated to fulfill, Counterclaimants have  
8 been damaged in an amount in a further amount to be determined at the time of trial and may be  
9 liable to Counterclaimants for all or part of any claim that Fannie Mae has plead against them or  
10 any damages arising from Fannie Mae's related foreclosure proceedings.

11 **bb. TWENTY-EIGHTH CAUSE OF ACTION (INTENTIONAL**  
12 **INTERFERENCE WITH CONTRACT AGAINST SHAM DEFENDANTS)**

13 756. Counterclaimants repeat, reallege, and incorporate the allegations set forth in the  
14 preceding paragraphs, including in the Counterclaim above, as if fully set forth herein.

15 757. Based on Counterclaimants' disclosures prior to closing of the Purchase  
16 Agreements, the Sham Defendants knew Westland Real Estate Group is a privately held real  
17 estate company with a sizable portfolio of properties, and approximately \$800 million in loans  
18 outstanding.

19 758. Each of the loans that are part of that \$800 million loan portfolio is a written  
20 contractual agreement. Upon information and belief, the Sham Defendants knew those contracts  
21 and lending arrangements existed.

22 759. Further, the Sham Defendants knew that \$300 million of Counterclaimants' loans  
23 are outstanding with Fannie Mae, and that it is economically advantageous for Counterclaimants  
24 to have access to lender funds in order to refinance its properties.

25 760. The Sham Defendants committed intentional acts that it knew would actually or  
26 that were intended or designed to result in a default on the loan assumed, which in turn would  
27 disrupt the contractual loan agreements that Counterclaimants have with Fannie Mae, and  
28 Counterclaimants' ability to refinance those loan agreements with Fannie Mae.

1        761. The Sham Defendants knew that by taking actions that were likely to lead to  
2 Lenders claiming a purported default had occurred, Fannie Mae would blacklist  
3 Counterclaimants by placing a “lending hold” on any future loan or borrow up, which would  
4 have the effect of limiting, delaying, and/or disrupting Counterclaimants’ ability to refinance or  
5 obtain any new loan with Fannie Mae.

6        762. The Sham Defendants made the misrepresentations to Counterclaimants knowing  
7 it would likely lead Lenders to declare a default, despite that it knew it would cause disruption to  
8 Westland’s business, and preclude it from obtaining favorable rates from one of only two  
9 primary lenders in the multifamily housing loan market, and upon information and belief, the  
10 Sham Defendants intended to cause harm to the contractual relationship between  
11 Counterclaimants and Fannie Mae.

12        763. There was, and continues to be, actual disruption of the written loan agreements  
13 that Counterclaimants have with Fannie Mae, as the Sham Defendant’s actions have in fact  
14 resulted in Counterclaimants being placed on Fannie Mae’s blacklist, which has caused them  
15 harm.

16        764. As a direct and proximate result of the Sham Defendants’ actions, Westland has  
17 suffered damages in excess of \$15,000.00, the exact amount of which will be proven at trial.

18        765. By reason of the foregoing, the Sham Defendants acted with oppression, fraud  
19 and malice, and therefore, Counterclaimants are entitled to exemplary and punitive damages in  
20 excess of \$15,000.

21        766. That as a direct and proximate result of the Sham Defendant’s intentional  
22 interference with contracts and requirement that Counterclaimants assume the Loan Agreements  
23 and guaranties, which the Sham Defendants were obligated to fulfill, Counterclaimants have  
24 been damaged in an amount in a further amount to be determined at the time of trial and may be  
25 liable to Counterclaimants for all or part of any claim that Fannie Mae has plead against them or  
26 any damages arising from Fannie Mae’s related foreclosure proceedings.

27        767. By reason of the foregoing, the Sham Defendants knew that their actions would  
28 cause Counterclaimants to be sued by Lenders due to the requirement that the loan be assumed



1 and as a result of their false financial statements, misrepresentations, and concealments, and  
2 therefore each Westland entity has had to hire counsel to prosecute this matter by reason of  
3 which it is entitled to reasonable attorney's fees as special damages.

4 **cc. TWENTY-NINTH CAUSE OF ACTION (CIVIL CONSPIRACY AGAINST**  
5 **GRANDBRIDGE & SHAM DEFENDANTS)**

6 768. Counterclaimants repeat, reallege, and incorporate the allegations set forth in the  
7 preceding paragraphs, including in the Counterclaim above, as if fully set forth herein.

8 769. The Sham Defendants, by acting in concert, intended to accomplish the unlawful  
9 objectives as set forth herein including, but not limited to breaching Westland's duty of good  
10 faith and fair dealing, misrepresenting or concealing the true financial information related to the  
11 Properties to Counterclaimants and/or Lenders, and improperly using relationships with DOE  
12 Defendant and/or ROE Defendants at Pillar/SunTrust/Grandbridge to improperly obtain, pass  
13 though credit underwriting, and obtain a release via the Assumption Agreement from the Loan  
14 Agreements in an attempt to strip Westland of their substantive legal rights and remedies under  
15 these documents including, but not limited to, those claims asserted herein against the Sham  
16 Defendants, for breach of the Purchase Agreements.

17 770. Grandbridge, by acting in concert, intended to accomplish the unlawful objectives  
18 as set forth herein including, but not limited to breaching Westland's duty of good faith and fair  
19 dealing, misrepresenting or concealing the true terms of the Repair Reserve and Replacement  
20 Reserve portions of the Loan Agreements, and improperly using relationships with the Sham  
21 Defendants, DOE Defendants and/or ROE Defendants, as well as at Fannie Mae, to improperly  
22 document and underwrite the Loan Agreements, reduce their own credit risk, and attempt to strip  
23 Westland of their substantive legal rights and remedies under the Loan Agreements including,  
24 but not limited to, those claims asserted herein against Grandbridge, for breach of the Loan  
25 Agreements.

26 771. As a direct and proximate result of the Sham Defendant's actions,  
27 Counterclaimants have sustained damages in excess of \$15,000.00, the exact amount of which  
28 will be proven at trial.

1        772. By reason of the foregoing, the Sham Defendants and Grandbridge knew that  
2 their actions would cause Counterclaimants to be sued by Fannie Mae due to the Sham  
3 Defendant's requirement that the loan be assumed and as a result of their false statements,  
4 misrepresentations, and concealments, and therefore each Westland entity has had to hire counsel  
5 to prosecute this matter by reason of which it is entitled to reasonable attorney's fees as special  
6 damages.

7                    **dd. THIRTIETH CAUSE OF ACTION (UNJUST ENRICHMENT AGAINST**  
8                    **THE SHAM DEFENDANTS)**

9        773. Counterclaimants repeat, reallege, and incorporate the allegations set forth in the  
10 preceding paragraphs, including in the Counterclaim above, as if fully set forth herein.

11        774. On or about August 29, 2018, Westland entered into two Purchase Agreements  
12 applicable to the Liberty Property and the Square Property.

13        775. The Sham Defendants received the benefits of Counterclaimants' full  
14 performance of the Purchase Agreements, including but not limited to the payment of  
15 \$60,300,000 for the two Properties through the payment of cash and the assumption of loans the  
16 Sham Defendants were obligated to satisfy.

17        776. The Sham Defendants accepted and retained the funds paid by Counterclaimants  
18 pursuant to the Purchase Agreements.

19        777. The Sham Defendants failed to provide Properties in the condition represented at  
20 the time of closing, because the Properties had a higher delinquency rate, lower occupancy rate,  
21 and generated lower income than represented.

22        778. The Sham Defendants failed to provide Properties in the condition represented at  
23 the time of closing, because the Sham Defendants failed to maintain the Properties consistent  
24 with the exceptions to the "as-is" disclaimer for the Properties in that the Sham Defendants  
25 improperly failed to maintain vacant units in rent ready condition or preform repairs that were  
26 other than ordinary wear and tear.

1        779. The statements made by the Sham Defendants, regarding the quality of its tenants,  
2 income that was being generated by the Properties, and the amount of repairs they would  
3 perform prior to closing were either false or amounted to a mutual mistake by both parties.

4        780. Counterclaimants were later required to make those repairs, engage in a larger  
5 number of evictions, and correct the deficiencies at the Properties at the expense of  
6 Counterclaimants, when the Purchase Agreements contemplated that the Sham Defendants  
7 would bear such costs.

8        781. In making those statements, especially after the terminated transaction in 2017,  
9 the Sham Defendants knew that Westland would rely upon the quality of the tenant base and  
10 condition of the Properties when entering into the Purchase Agreements, and intended for  
11 Westland to do so, to ensure that the Property purchases would be completed with a higher than  
12 justified purchase price, which unjustly enriched the Sham Defendants.

13        782. Westland did rely on the quality of the tenant base and condition of the Properties  
14 when entering into the Purchase Agreements to their detriment and Westland justifiably relied  
15 upon the information the Sham Defendants provided.

16        783. If the Sham Defendants would have disclosed the true financial condition of the  
17 Properties, the true quality of the tenant base, and accurately represented the repairs it would  
18 perform then Westland would have demanded that the Sham Defendants further reduce the  
19 purchase price of the Properties, and/or other relief from the Sham Defendants, and without such  
20 relief, would not have entered into the two Purchase Agreements.

21        784. Based on the foregoing, Westland is entitled to reimbursement in the amount of  
22 the overstated purchase price that was paid.

23        785. That as a direct and proximate result of the Sham Defendant's actions underlying  
24 their unjust enrichment and requirement that Counterclaimants assume the Loan Agreements and  
25 guaranties, which the Sham Defendants were obligated to fulfill, Counterclaimants have been  
26 damaged in an amount in a further amount to be determined at the time of trial and may be liable  
27 to Counterclaimants for all or part of any claim that Fannie Mae has plead against them or any  
28 damages arising from Fannie Mae's related foreclosure proceedings.

1        786. As a further direct and proximate result of the Sham Defendant's improper  
2 conduct, Westland has had to hire counsel to prosecute this action and Counterclaimants are  
3 entitled to reasonable attorney's fees and costs incurred herein.

4        **WHEREFORE,** Counterclaimants pray for judgment against Counter~~claim-~~  
5 ~~D~~efendants, as follows:

- 6            1. For declaratory relief acknowledging that no default has occurred and that  
7            Counter~~claim-~~Defendants Fannie Mae and Grandbridge improperly sought a  
8            property condition assessment (as to Counterdefendants Fannie Mae and  
9            Grandbridge only);
- 10           2. For injunctive relief, including without limitation, precluding any non-judicial  
11           foreclosure against either the Liberty Property or the Square Property (as to  
12           Counterdefendants Fannie Mae and Grandbridge only);
- 13           3. For equitable relief as demanded herein;
- 14           4. For compensatory damages and/or general damages in excess of \$15,000;
- 15           5. For punitive damages;
- 16           6. For prejudgment interest at the statutory rate;
- 17           7. For attorney's fees and costs of suit herein including as special damages for  
18           conversion with those special damages as to Fannie Mae and Grandbridge, and as  
19           to the Sham Defendants based on their knowledge that their actions would cause  
20           Counterclaimants to be sued by Lenders; and
- 21           8. For such other relief as the Court deems appropriate.

22 Dated: August ~~31~~\_\_, 20201

**LAW OFFICES OF JOHN BENEDICT**

/s/ John Benedict

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/s/ John P. Desmond

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*Attorneys for Defendants/Counterclaimants/~~Third~~*  
*~~Party Plaintiffs~~ Westland Liberty Village, LLC &*  
*Westland Village Square LLC, and Counterclaimants*  
*Amusement Industry, Inc., Westland Corona LLC,*  
*Westland Amber Ridge LLC, Westland Hacienda*  
*Hills LLC, 1097 North State, LLC, Westland*  
*Tropicana Royale LLC, Vellagio Apts of Westland*  
*LLC, The Alevy Family Protection Trust, Westland*  
*AMT, LLC, AFT Industry NV, LLC, A&D Dynasty*  
*Trust*

**~~THIRD PARTY COMPLAINT~~**

**~~518.~~** ~~———— Defendants/Counterclaimants/Third Party Plaintiffs, Westland Liberty Village, LLC (“Liberty LLC”) and Westland Village Square, LLC (“Square LLC” and in combination with Liberty LLC, “Counterclaimants” or “Westland”), through their attorneys of record, the Law Offices of John Benedict, for their Third Party Complaint against Grandbridge Real Estate Capital, LLC (formerly Cohen Financial, Suntrust Bank, and Truist Bank, but for ease of reference, regardless of the time period, it shall be referred to solely as “Grandbridge” or “Servicer”)<sup>15</sup> hereby incorporate in full all allegations contained in Section I, Statement of Case, Section II, Parties, and Section III, Facts Common to all Causes of Action, as asserted above in the Counterclaim, and assert the following causes of action against Grandbridge as follows and maintaining the numbering from the Counterclaim for ease of reference:~~

~~————~~<sup>2</sup>

**~~V. CLAIMS FOR RELIEF~~**

**~~a. FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION (FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT—LIBERTY LOAN—BY WESTLAND LIBERTY VILLAGE, LLC)~~**

~~557.~~ Third Party Plaintiffs repeat, reallege, and incorporate the allegations set forth in the preceding paragraphs, including in the Counterclaim above, as if fully set forth herein.

~~558.~~ A valid assumption agreement was entered into between Liberty LLC, on the one hand, and Fannie Mae and Grandbridge on the other hand, on August 29, 2018, specifically the Assumption and Release Agreement.

~~559.~~ The assumption agreement utilized the general provisions of the Multifamily Loan and Security Agreement entered into between Liberty LLC’s predecessor on the one hand, and Fannie Mae and Grandbridge on the other hand, to specify the terms that would govern the parties’ practices for administration of the loan.

<sup>15</sup> While the Servicer has had multiple name changes, including based on a merger with BB&T Bank, the employees “servicing” this loan have continuously remained the same regardless of the name of the entity.

1           ~~560. — Upon information and belief, Grandbridge assigned its interests in a portion of the~~  
2 ~~Multifamily Loan and Security Agreement to Fannie Mae, but continued as Lender and Servicer~~  
3 ~~on either the loan agreement or a portion of the agreements that were signed by Liberty LLC's~~  
4 ~~predecessor, which obligations were assumed by Liberty LLC.~~

5           ~~561. — Separately, Grandbridge signed the closing statement, which conveyed its 1%~~  
6 ~~loan assumption fee as "Lender."~~

7           ~~562. — Grandbridge signed the Liberty Loan agreements, and the assumption agreement~~  
8 ~~with Westland, both on its own behalf and on behalf of Fannie Mae.~~

9           ~~563. — Liberty LLC has performed all of the duties and obligations required of it under~~  
10 ~~the terms of the Loan Agreement with Fannie Mae, including timely making monthly periodic~~  
11 ~~loan payment and paying the 1% loan assumption fee.~~

12           ~~564. — Liberty LLC has performed all of the duties and obligations required of it under~~  
13 ~~the terms of the terms of the Loan Agreement with Grandbridge, including timely making~~  
14 ~~monthly periodic loan payment and paying the 1% loan assumption fee.~~

15           ~~565. — To the extent that any duties or obligations required of Westland have not been~~  
16 ~~performed, such duties or obligations have been excused because of Grandbridge's and Fannie~~  
17 ~~Mae's non-performance of the Agreement.~~

18           ~~566. — Grandbridge has materially breached its agreement with Liberty LLC by failing to~~  
19 ~~require adequate reserves at the time of the initial loan, requesting and performing an improper~~  
20 ~~property condition assessment, utilizing that improper PCA to demand and adjustment to reserve~~  
21 ~~deposits, failing to disburse funds in response to reserve disbursement requests, sending/filing~~  
22 ~~improper notices, and generally violating the terms of the Multifamily Loan and Security~~  
23 ~~Agreement to the point that the administration has become so one-sided that Liberty LLC had no~~  
24 ~~option but to commence these proceedings.~~

25           ~~567. — That as a direct and proximate result of Grandbridge's breach of contract, Liberty~~  
26 ~~LLC has been damaged in an amount in excess of \$15,000.00, the exact amount of which will be~~  
27 ~~determined at trial.~~

1       ~~568. That it has been necessary for Liberty LLC to retain counsel to prosecute this~~  
2 ~~action by reason of which it is entitled to reasonable attorney's fees.~~

3               ~~**b. SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION (BREACH OF CONTRACT — SQUARE**~~  
4 ~~**LOAN BY WESTLAND VILLAGE SQUARE, LLC)**~~

5       ~~569. Third Party Plaintiffs repeat, reallege, and incorporate the allegations set forth in~~  
6 ~~the preceding paragraphs, including in the Counterclaim above, as if fully set forth herein.~~

7       ~~570. A valid assumption agreement was entered into between Square LLC, on the one~~  
8 ~~hand, and Fannie Mae and Grandbridge on the other hand, on August 29, 2018, specifically the~~  
9 ~~Assumption and Release Agreement.~~

10       ~~571. The assumption agreement utilized the general provisions of the Multifamily~~  
11 ~~Loan and Security Agreement entered into between Liberty Square LLC's predecessor on the~~  
12 ~~one hand, and Fannie Mae and Grandbridge on the other hand, to specify the terms that would~~  
13 ~~govern the parties' practices for administration of the loan.~~

14       ~~572. Upon information and belief, Grandbridge assigned its interests in a portion of the~~  
15 ~~Multifamily Loan and Security Agreement to Fannie Mae, but continued as Lender and Servicer~~  
16 ~~on either the loan agreement or a portion of the agreements that were signed by Square LLC's~~  
17 ~~predecessor, which obligations were assumed by Square LLC.~~

18       ~~573. Separately, Grandbridge signed the closing statement, which conveyed its 1%~~  
19 ~~loan assumption fee as "Lender."~~

20       ~~574. Grandbridge signed the Square Loan agreements, and the assumption agreement~~  
21 ~~with Westland, both on its own behalf and on behalf of Fannie Mae.~~

22       ~~575. Square LLC has performed all of the duties and obligations required of it under~~  
23 ~~the terms of the Loan Agreement with Fannie Mae, including timely making monthly periodic~~  
24 ~~loan payment and paying the 1% loan assumption fee.~~

25       ~~576. Square LLC has performed all of the duties and obligations required of it under~~  
26 ~~the terms of the terms of the Loan Agreement with Grandbridge, including timely making~~  
27 ~~monthly periodic loan payment and paying the 1% loan assumption fee.~~



1       ~~577. To the extent that any duties or obligations required of Westland have not been~~  
2 ~~performed, such duties or obligations have been excused because of Grandbridge's and Fannie~~  
3 ~~Mae's non-performance of the Agreement.~~

4       ~~578. Grandbridge has materially breached its agreement with Square LLC by failing to~~  
5 ~~require adequate reserves at the time of the initial loan, requesting and performing an improper~~  
6 ~~property condition assessment, utilizing that improper PCA to demand and adjustment to reserve~~  
7 ~~deposits, failing to disburse funds in response to reserve disbursement requests, sending/filing~~  
8 ~~improper notices, and generally violating the terms of the Multifamily Loan and Security~~  
9 ~~Agreement to the point that the administration has become so one-sided that Square LLC had no~~  
10 ~~option but to commence these proceedings.~~

11       ~~579. That as a direct and proximate result of Grandbridge's breach of contract, Square~~  
12 ~~LLC has been damaged in an amount in excess of \$15,000.00, the exact amount of which will be~~  
13 ~~determined at trial.~~

14       ~~580. That it has been necessary for Square LLC to retain counsel to prosecute this~~  
15 ~~action by reason of which it is entitled to reasonable attorney's fees.~~

16               ~~**c. THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION (BREACH OF COVENANT OF GOOD**~~  
17 ~~**FAITH AND FAIR DEALING BY BOTH THIRD PARTY PLAINTIFFS)**~~

18       ~~581. Third Party Plaintiffs repeat, reallege, and incorporate the allegations set forth in~~  
19 ~~the preceding paragraphs, including in the Counterclaim above, as if fully set forth herein.~~

20       ~~582. A valid and binding agreement was formed between Westland and Fannie~~  
21 ~~Mae/Grandbridge on each of the two separate sets of loan agreements.~~

22       ~~583. Westland's agreements utilized the general provisions of the underlying loan~~  
23 ~~agreement entered into between Westland's predecessor and Fannie Mae/Grandbridge to specify~~  
24 ~~the terms that would govern the parties' practices for administration of the loan.~~

25       ~~584. In every contract, including the loans between Westland and Fannie~~  
26 ~~Mae/Grandbridge, there exists in law an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.~~

27       ~~585. Both prior to the loan assumption and after, Westland acted in good faith by~~  
28 ~~paying Fannie Mae/Grandbridge a 1% loan assumption fee under each agreement, providing~~

1 ~~Fannie Mae/Grandbridge access to both the Liberty Property and the Square Property, paying for~~  
2 ~~substantial improvements at each of the Properties, improving the condition of each of the~~  
3 ~~Properties and their tenant base, providing confidential business documents to Fannie~~  
4 ~~Mae/Grandbridge, and continuously paying Westland's full loan payments on a timely basis~~  
5 ~~even after Fannie Mae/Grandbridge suspended the automatic ACH payments the parties had used~~  
6 ~~without prior notice.~~

7 ~~586. Grandbridge wrongfully and deliberately took advantage of Westland's good faith~~  
8 ~~actions, by, *inter alia*, failing to perform all conditions, covenants and promises required under~~  
9 ~~the Loan Agreements, including without limitation, altering the standard that they would apply to~~  
10 ~~a property condition assessment undertaken in July 2019 from the standard used at the time the~~  
11 ~~loan was assumed, telling Westland that they would cover the cost of the July 2019 property~~  
12 ~~condition assessments but then refusing to discuss the purported default unless Westland paid~~  
13 ~~those costs, making a demand that Westland deposit an additional \$2,706,150.00 into escrow~~  
14 ~~despite that the condition of its Properties had improved not deteriorated since the assumption~~  
15 ~~agreement was signed, and by each of these actions Grandbridge and Fannie Mae thereby~~  
16 ~~breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing inherent in the subject agreement.~~

17 ~~587. Grandbridge's actions were taken both on its own behalf as a Lender and/or~~  
18 ~~Servicer.~~

19 ~~588. Wherefore Grandbridge did not act in good faith, that is, did not perform its~~  
20 ~~contract with each Third Party Plaintiff in the manner reasonably contemplated by the parties, so~~  
21 ~~that each Third Party Plaintiff has a remedy that goes beyond that of breach of the express terms~~  
22 ~~of their contract.~~

23 ~~589. Grandbridge's actions, misrepresentations, deception, concealment, and breach of~~  
24 ~~the covenant of good faith and fair dealing were done intentionally with malice for the specific~~  
25 ~~purpose of causing injury to Liberty LLC and Square LLC.~~

26 ~~590. As a direct and proximate result of Grandbridge's breach, each Third Party~~  
27 ~~Plaintiff has suffered damages in excess of \$15,000.00, the exact amount of which will be proven~~  
28 ~~at trial.~~

1           ~~591. As a further direct and proximate result of Grandbridge's breach, each Third Party~~  
2 ~~Plaintiff has had to hire counsel to prosecute this matter by reason of which it is entitled to~~  
3 ~~reasonable attorney's fees.~~

4           ~~**d. FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION (DECLARATORY RELIEF)**~~

5           ~~592. Third Party Plaintiffs repeat, reallege, and incorporate the allegations set forth in~~  
6 ~~the preceding paragraphs, including in the Counterclaim above, as if fully set forth herein.~~

7           ~~593. A genuine justiciable controversy exists relevant to the rights and obligations~~  
8 ~~herein regarding Westland's obligations under each of the Loan Agreements, and whether~~  
9 ~~Grandbridge may demand that Westland deposit additional funds into reserve accounts.~~

10          ~~594. The interests of Third Party Plaintiffs, on the one hand, and Grandbridge on the~~  
11 ~~other are adverse.~~

12          ~~595. Specifically, the present dispute that resulted in a Notice of Default and Election~~  
13 ~~to Sell being sent by Fannie Mae is a dispute over the parties' interpretation of Article 13.02 of~~  
14 ~~the Loan Agreement related to adjustments to reserve funding and the related reserve~~  
15 ~~administration requirements, as well as Article 6.03 related to the conditions when property~~  
16 ~~condition assessments may be utilized.~~

17          ~~596. Westland has a legally protectable interest in the two Properties.~~

18          ~~597. These issues are ripe for judicial determination, because on or about October 18,~~  
19 ~~2019, Grandbridge served a Notice of Demand, both as Servicer/Lender, and/or on behalf of~~  
20 ~~Fannie Mae.~~

21          ~~598. These issues are ripe for judicial determination, because on or about July 15,~~  
22 ~~2020, Fannie Mae served Westland with a Notice of Default and Intent to Sell Westland's~~  
23 ~~Properties.~~

24          ~~599. These issues are ripe for judicial determination, because on or about August 12,~~  
25 ~~2020, Fannie Mae filed a complaint seeking the appointment of a receiver to ouster Westland~~  
26 ~~from its Properties.~~

27          ~~600. Westland seeks an order from this Court declaring that Article 13.02 and Article~~  
28 ~~6.03 are only implicated if the condition of the Properties has physically deteriorated, or~~

1 ~~impaired the value of Fannie Mae's and Grandbridge's security, and that no additional reserve~~  
2 ~~deposit is needed.~~

3 ~~601. Westland seeks an order from this Court declaring that Fannie Mae and/or~~  
4 ~~Grandbridge breached the terms of the two Loan Agreements by demanding a property condition~~  
5 ~~assessment, demanding the adjustment of reserve deposits without any proper basis, and filing a~~  
6 ~~NOD.~~

7 ~~602. That it has been necessary for Westland to retain the services of legal counsel for~~  
8 ~~which Westland is entitled to recover such costs and expenses from Grandbridge.~~

9 ~~**c. FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION (FRAUD IN THE INDUCEMENT)**~~

10 ~~603. Third Party Plaintiffs repeat, reallege, and incorporate the allegations set forth in~~  
11 ~~the preceding paragraphs, including in the Counterclaim above, as if fully set forth herein.~~

12 ~~604. That Westland entered into its Loan Agreement relying on Fannie Mae and~~  
13 ~~Grandbridge continuing to utilize the same standard for evaluating the condition of the Properties~~  
14 ~~that had been used at the origination of the Loan Agreements during late 2017, and at the time of~~  
15 ~~the loan assumption during the summer of 2018.~~

16 ~~605. When Grandbridge forwarded documents regarding the loan assumption and loan~~  
17 ~~agreements to Westland, it did so not only on its own behalf, but also on behalf of Fannie Mae,~~  
18 ~~who advised Grandbridge to forward those documents to Westland with the intent that Westland~~  
19 ~~would be provided the loan assumption, loan agreements, and reserve schedules, and that~~  
20 ~~Westland would rely on those documents.~~

21 ~~606. By letter dated August 20, 2018, Grandbridge represented on behalf of itself and~~  
22 ~~Fannie Mae to Liberty LLC that, "after a thorough review and analysis of the Proposed~~  
23 ~~Borrower's [Liberty LLC's] financial and managerial capacity, the Assumption has been~~  
24 ~~approved on the following terms: . . . No change to the Replacement Reserve monthly deposit or~~  
25 ~~established schedule identified on Exhibit B attached hereto; No Change to the Required Repair~~  
26 ~~Reserve of \$39,375.00 as identified in schedule on Exhibit C attached hereto . . ." (Exhibit J.)~~  
27 ~~Further, Exhibit C, Required Reserve Schedule, listed all items as completed, except for a~~

1 ~~\$9,375.00 holdback for “Misc. Concrete and Fence Repairs. Sports Court Resurfacing” that was~~  
2 ~~shown as having already been fully funded. (Exhibit J, at 7.)~~

3 ~~607. Further, by letter dated August 20, 2018, Grandbridge represented on behalf of~~  
4 ~~itself and Fannie Mae to Square LLC that, “after a thorough review and analysis of the Proposed~~  
5 ~~Borrower’s [Square LLC’s] financial and managerial capacity, the Assumption has been~~  
6 ~~approved on the following terms: . . . No change to the Replacement Reserve monthly deposit or~~  
7 ~~established schedule identified on Exhibit B attached hereto . . .” (“(Exhibit K.) Further,~~  
8 ~~Exhibit C, Required Repair Reserve Schedule, simply stated “N/A” indicating that no repair~~  
9 ~~reserve was required for that loan. (Exhibit K, at 7.)~~

10 ~~608. Grandbridge knew that Westland relied upon the amounts and types of conditions~~  
11 ~~requiring reserve deposits when entering into the Loan Agreements.~~

12 ~~609. Grandbridge did not inform Westland that they planned to seek additional~~  
13 ~~reserves in order to induce Westland to consent to the Loan Agreements, to collect the loan~~  
14 ~~assumption fee from Westland, for Grandbridge to improve its own liquidity position with~~  
15 ~~Fannie Mae, to improve the creditworthiness of Fannie Mae’s loan portfolio, to attempt to~~  
16 ~~improperly generate additional fees and costs, and to improperly profit off of holding Westland’s~~  
17 ~~funds in a non-interest bearing escrow account.~~

18 ~~610. That Fannie Mae does credit reviews and monitoring of Grandbridge’s lending~~  
19 ~~practices, and upon information and belief, that Fannie Mae determined that Grandbridge failed~~  
20 ~~to follow Fannie Mae’s credit and underwriting criteria for loans in underwriting the November~~  
21 ~~2017 loan.~~

22 ~~611. Upon information and belief, that Fannie Mae required that Grandbridge obtain~~  
23 ~~additional security due to its poor underwriting, and thus Grandbridge had no intent to service~~  
24 ~~the Loan Agreements consistent with the documentation that was provided at the time of the~~  
25 ~~August 2018 loan assumption.~~

26 ~~612. That had Westland known that Fannie Mae and Grandbridge would require an~~  
27 ~~additional deposit of over \$2.7 million of additional reserve funding based on a loan balance of~~  
28 ~~approximately \$38.6 million, which amounts to approximately 7% of the loan amount, for a loan~~

1 with a seven year term, Counterclaimants would not have entered into the assumption agreement  
2 and would have obtained alternative financing.

3 613. — Westland reasonably relied upon the types of expenses contained in the repair and  
4 replacement escrow accounts schedules, because Westland has entered into numerous loan  
5 agreements previously, but on those loan agreements, the lender never requested any significant  
6 adjusted reserve deposits.

7 614. — Westland relied on Fannie Mae's material misstatements and omissions by paying  
8 a 1% loan assumption fee, providing Fannie Mae access to the Property, paying for substantial  
9 improvements at the Property, improving the condition of the Property and its tenant base,  
10 providing Fannie Mae confidential business documents, and continuously paying loan payments.

11 615. — As a result of Grandbridge's misrepresentations, Westland was induced to enter  
12 into the assumption agreement with Fannie Mae as lender and Grandbridge as servicer, which  
13 has damaged Westland.

14 616. — As a direct and proximate result of Grandbridge's misstatements and omissions,  
15 Westland has suffered damages in excess of \$15,000.00, the exact amount of which will be  
16 proven at trial, because, *inter alia*, this is the only default that Westland has ever suffered, it will  
17 impair Westland's credit rating leading to long term higher borrowing costs, and it has impaired  
18 Westland's ability to re-finance its Properties at a time when interest rates are at an all time low.

19 617. — By reason of the foregoing, Grandbridge acted with oppression, fraud and malice,  
20 and therefore, Westland is entitled to exemplary and punitive damages.

21 **~~f. SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION (NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION~~**  
22 **~~AND CONCEALMENT)~~**

23 618. — Third Party Plaintiffs repeat, reallege, and incorporate the allegations set forth in  
24 the preceding paragraphs, including in the Counterclaim above, as if fully set forth herein.

25 619. — Grandbridge supplied information and made material misrepresentations to  
26 Westland, including without limitation, as detailed above that adequate reserve amounts had  
27 already been submitted, consistent with the schedules attached to the loan assumption letters and  
28 documentation.

1           ~~620. By letter dated August 20, 2018, Grandbridge represented on behalf of itself and~~  
2 ~~Fannie Mae to Westland that, it conducted “a thorough review and analysis of the Proposed~~  
3 ~~Borrower’s financial and managerial capacity” before approving the assumption.~~

4           ~~621. Upon information and belief, Grandbridge negligently misrepresented that it~~  
5 ~~conducted an adequate review when setting the reserve amounts in August 2018, prior to~~  
6 ~~Westland signing the loan assumption, because a short one (1) year later, it requested an~~  
7 ~~additional \$2.7 million be placed into escrow with no deterioration of the Properties.~~

8           ~~622. The information and representations made by Grandbridge was false, in that~~  
9 ~~unbeknownst to Westland they knew the loan did not have sufficient security, and that there was~~  
10 ~~a substantial likelihood they would attempt to seek additional reserves.~~

11           ~~623. Grandbridge supplied the information and made the representations to induce~~  
12 ~~Westland to rely upon it, to act or refrain from acting in reliance upon it, and to have Westland~~  
13 ~~enter into the assumption agreement.~~

14           ~~624. Grandbridge owed Westland a duty not to make material misrepresentations.~~

15           ~~625. Westland justifiably relied upon the information Grandbridge provided.~~

16           ~~626. As a direct and proximate result of Grandbridge’s misstatements and omissions,~~  
17 ~~Westland has suffered damages in excess of \$15,000.00, the exact amount of which will be~~  
18 ~~proven at trial, because, *inter alia*, this is the only default that Westland has ever suffered and it~~  
19 ~~will impair Westland’s credit rating and leading to long term higher borrowing costs, and it has~~  
20 ~~impaired Westland’s ability to re-finance its Properties at a time when interest rates are at an all-~~  
21 ~~time low.~~

22           ~~**g. SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION (INTENTIONAL INTERFERENCE**~~  
23 ~~**WITH CONTRACT)**~~

24           ~~627. Third Party Plaintiffs repeat, reallege, and incorporate the allegations set forth in~~  
25 ~~the preceding paragraphs, including in the Counterclaim above, as if fully set forth herein.~~

26           ~~628. To the extent that Grandbridge is not found to be a party to the assumption~~  
27 ~~agreements and/or the loan agreements, this cause of action is pleaded in the alternative against it~~  
28 ~~by both Third Party Plaintiffs.~~

1       ~~629. Based on Westland's financial disclosures at the time of the loan assumption;~~  
2 ~~Grandbridge knew Westland Real Estate Group is a privately held real estate company with a~~  
3 ~~sizable portfolio of properties, and approximately \$800 million in loans outstanding.~~

4       ~~630. Each of the loans underlying that are part of that \$800 million loan portfolio is a~~  
5 ~~written contractual agreement. Upon information and belief, Grandbridge knows these contracts~~  
6 ~~and lending arrangements exist.~~

7       ~~631. Further, Grandbridge knew that \$300 million of Westland's loans are outstanding~~  
8 ~~with Fannie Mae, and that it is economically advantageous for Westland to have access to lender~~  
9 ~~funds in order to refinance its properties.~~

10       ~~632. Grandbridge committed intentional acts intended or designed to disrupt the~~  
11 ~~contractual loan agreements that Westland has with Fannie Mae, and Westland's ability to~~  
12 ~~refinance those loan agreements with Fannie Mae.~~

13       ~~633. Grandbridge knew that by manufacturing the purported default, Fannie Mae~~  
14 ~~would blacklist Westland, by placing a "lending hold" on any Westland loan, which would have~~  
15 ~~the effect of limiting, delaying, and/or disrupting Westland's ability to refinance a loan with~~  
16 ~~Fannie Mae.~~

17       ~~634. Grandbridge manufactured the Default in an attempt to put financial pressure on~~  
18 ~~Westland, despite that it knew it would cause disruption to Westland's business, and preclude it~~  
19 ~~from obtaining favorable rates from one of only two primary lenders in the multifamily housing~~  
20 ~~loan market, and upon information and belief, Grandbridge intended to cause harm to the~~  
21 ~~contractual relationship between Westland and Fannie Mae.~~

22       ~~635. There was, and continues to be, actual disruption of the written loan agreements~~  
23 ~~that Westland has with Fannie Mae, as Grandbridge's actions have in fact resulted in Westland~~  
24 ~~being placed on Fannie Mae's blacklist, which has caused Westland harm.~~

25       ~~636. As a direct and proximate result of Fannie Mae's breach, Westland has suffered~~  
26 ~~damages in excess of \$15,000.00, the exact amount of which will be proven at trial.~~

27       ~~637. By reason of the foregoing, Grandbridge acted with oppression, fraud and malice,~~  
28 ~~and therefore, Westland is entitled to exemplary and punitive damages in excess of \$15,000.~~



1                    **~~h. EIGHTH CAUSE OF ACTION (CONVERSION)~~**

2                    ~~638. Third Party Plaintiffs repeat, reallege, and incorporate the allegations set forth in~~  
3 ~~the preceding paragraphs, including in the Counterclaim above, as if fully set forth herein.~~

4                    ~~639. Westland has submitted several prior reserve reimbursement requests that went~~  
5 ~~unanswered by Grandbridge, including before its November 2019 demand for additional reserve~~  
6 ~~funding.~~

7                    ~~640. Westland and its predecessor submitted funds related to two fire insurance claims~~  
8 ~~to Grandbridge, which earmarked funds were to be held in escrow until the two fire-damaged~~  
9 ~~building were rebuilt.~~

10                    ~~641. The fire-damaged buildings were completely rebuilt with Westland's funds.~~

11                    ~~642. Westland has submitted reserve disbursement requests for the release of those~~  
12 ~~funds, and other reserve disbursement requests for work that was completed, each of which was~~  
13 ~~accompanied by invoices, proof of payment, and documentation showing approval of all required~~  
14 ~~permits, but Grandbridge has failed to respond to those requests.~~

15                    ~~643. As such, Grandbridge has wrongfully exerted dominion over Westland's personal~~  
16 ~~property, including, without limitation, the funds that Grandbridge is holding in reserve accounts,~~  
17 ~~that were earmarked for reconstruction of two fire-damaged buildings at the Liberty Property, and~~  
18 ~~Grandbridge has thereby wrongly converted the funds to their own use and benefit. Grandbridge's~~  
19 ~~continued dominion over Westland's personal property was unauthorized and inconsistent with~~  
20 ~~Westland's property rights.~~

21                    ~~644. Grandbridge's dominion over Westland's personal property deprived Westland of~~  
22 ~~all of their property rights relating thereto.~~

23                    ~~645. Grandbridge's acts constitute conversion.~~

24                    ~~646. As a direct and proximate result of Grandbridge's conversion, Westland has~~  
25 ~~suffered damages in excess of \$15,000.00, the exact amount of which will be proven at trial.~~

26                    ~~647. Further, due to the wanton, malicious, and intentional conduct of Grandbridge,~~  
27 ~~Westland is entitled to an award of exemplary and punitive damages against Grandbridge.~~

1       ~~648. Grandview knew that by refusing to return the converted proceeds after just~~  
2 ~~demand, Borrowers would have to hire counsel to have those funds returned. Thus, it was~~  
3 ~~foreseeable that Borrowers would incur attorney's fees as special damages. Borrowers have~~  
4 ~~incurred these fees and request same as part of their special damages for conversion.~~

5           ~~**i. NINTH CAUSE OF ACTION (INJUNCTIVE RELIEF)**~~

6       ~~649. Third Party Plaintiffs repeat, reallege, and incorporate the allegations set forth in~~  
7 ~~the preceding paragraphs, including in the Counterclaim above, as if fully set forth herein.~~

8       ~~650. On or about July 15, 2020, two NODs that were filed against the Liberty Property~~  
9 ~~and the Square Property and served on Westland.~~

10       ~~651. Upon information and belief, in Nevada, the typical period for a foreclosure sale~~  
11 ~~to occur after a borrower receives a NOD is 120 days.~~

12       ~~652. As Westland has made all debt service payments, and complied with the terms of~~  
13 ~~the Loan Agreements, the Properties rightfully belong to Westland.~~

14       ~~653. Fannie Mae and Grandbridge are attempting to utilize Nevada's non-judicial~~  
15 ~~foreclosure process to improperly seize and sell Westland's Liberty Property and Square~~  
16 ~~Property.~~

17       ~~654. Real property is a unique asset, and on that basis, in the event that a wrongful~~  
18 ~~foreclosure sale occurs, Westland will suffer extreme hardship and actual and impending~~  
19 ~~irreparable loss and damage.~~

20       ~~655. Westland has no adequate or speedy remedy at law to prevent the sale of the~~  
21 ~~Properties, and injunctive relief is therefore Westland's only means for securing relief.~~

22       ~~656. Westland is likely to succeed in this lawsuit on the merits of its claims.~~

23       ~~657. Based on the foregoing, Westland is entitled to temporary restraining orders and~~  
24 ~~preliminary and permanent injunctive relief to preserve the status quo, to mitigate its damages,~~  
25 ~~and to prevent further irreparable injury to Westland, including, without limitation by: (a)~~  
26 ~~enjoining Fannie Mae and/or Grandbridge from any further attempts to foreclose on the~~  
27 ~~Properties related to their baseless requests to adjust the reserve deposits, and (b) enjoining~~  
28 ~~Fannie Mae and/or Grandbridge from any further attempts to coerce Westland into providing~~

1 ~~additional reserves or to pay for the expenses related to the default that Grandbridge~~  
2 ~~manufactured.~~

3 ~~658. As a further direct and proximate result of Fannie Mae's and/or Grandbridge's~~  
4 ~~improper demands to adjust reserves, their filing of the NOD, and the filing of their Complaint~~  
5 ~~seeking appointment of a receiver, Westland has had to hire counsel to prosecute this matter by~~  
6 ~~reason of which it is entitled to reasonable attorney's fees.~~

7 ~~**j. TENTH CAUSE OF ACTION (EQUITABLE RELIEF/RESCISSION/**~~  
8 ~~**REFORMATION)**~~

9 ~~659. Third Party Plaintiffs repeat, reallege, and incorporate the allegations set forth in~~  
10 ~~the preceding paragraphs, including in the Counterclaim above, as if fully set forth herein.~~

11 ~~660. On or about August 29, 2018, Westland entered into two assumption agreements~~  
12 ~~for the loans applicable to the Liberty Property and the Square Property.~~

13 ~~661. Prior to signing the assumption, Grandbridge individually, and on behalf of~~  
14 ~~Fannie Mae, forwarded Westland a loan assumption agreement letter, which contained the terms~~  
15 ~~under which it would permit Westland's assumption of the Liberty Loan and Square Loan.~~

16 ~~662. By letter dated August 20, 2018, Grandbridge represented on behalf of itself and~~  
17 ~~Fannie Mae to Liberty LLC that, "after a thorough review and analysis of the Proposed~~  
18 ~~Borrower's [Liberty LLC's] financial and managerial capacity, the Assumption has been~~  
19 ~~approved on the following terms: . . . No change to the Replacement Reserve monthly deposit or~~  
20 ~~established schedule identified on Exhibit B attached hereto; No Change to the Required Repair~~  
21 ~~Reserve of \$39,375.00 as identified in schedule on Exhibit C attached hereto . . ." (Exhibit J.)~~  
22 ~~Further, Exhibit C, Required Reserve Schedule, listed all items as completed, except for a~~  
23 ~~\$9,375.00 holdback for "Misc. Concrete and Fence Repairs. Sports Court Resurfacing" that was~~  
24 ~~shown as having already been fully funded. (Exhibit J, at 7.)~~

25 ~~663. By letter dated August 20, 2018, Grandbridge represented on behalf of itself and~~  
26 ~~Fannie Mae to Square LLC that, "after a thorough review and analysis of the Proposed~~  
27 ~~Borrower's [Square LLC's] financial and managerial capacity, the Assumption has been~~  
28 ~~approved on the following terms: . . . No change to the Replacement Reserve monthly deposit or~~

1 ~~established schedule identified on Exhibit B attached hereto . . .” (“Exhibit K.) Further,~~  
2 ~~Exhibit C, Required Repair Reserve Schedule, simply stated “N/A” indicating that no repair~~  
3 ~~reserve was required for that loan. (Exhibit K, at 7.)~~

4 ~~664. When the loan assumption agreements were signed, the above-referenced~~  
5 ~~Required Repair Reserve Schedule and Required Replacement Reserve Schedule, for each~~  
6 ~~Property, were specifically included as part of the assumption agreement.~~

7 ~~665. The statements made by Grandbridge, on behalf of itself and on behalf of Fannie~~  
8 ~~Mae, were either false or amounted to a mutual mistake by both parties, because Grandbridge~~  
9 ~~and Fannie Mae later attempted to obtain additional reserve payments in excess of the schedules~~  
10 ~~that were provided to Westland, and those requests for additional reserve deposits included~~  
11 ~~requests to deposit \$2.7 million of funds related to physical conditions that were not of the same~~  
12 ~~type or category as the expenses included in the schedules.~~

13 ~~666. In making those statements, Fannie Mae and Grandbridge knew that Westland~~  
14 ~~would rely upon the amounts and types of conditions requiring reserve deposits when entering~~  
15 ~~into the Loan Agreements, and intended for Westland to do so, to ensure that the loans would~~  
16 ~~close.~~

17 ~~667. Westland did rely on the amounts and types of conditions requiring reserve~~  
18 ~~deposits that were listed in the schedules attached to the loan assumption letters, and as such~~  
19 ~~Westland justifiably relied upon the information Grandbridge and Fannie Mae provided.~~

20 ~~668. If Grandbridge or Fannie Mae would have had f3 or another inspection company~~  
21 ~~perform a PCA as thorough and with the same criteria before the assumption as it did a year~~  
22 ~~later, and told Westland that an additional reserve deposit would be required, then Westland~~  
23 ~~would have demanded that the Shamrock Entities met the additional reserve funding requirement~~  
24 ~~prior to agreeing to assume the loan, that the terms of the purchase and/or loan assumption be~~  
25 ~~amended, and/or other relief from the Shamrock Entities, Fannie Mae and/or Grandbridge, and~~  
26 ~~without such relief, would not have entered into the two assumption agreements.~~

27 ~~669. As such, to the extent that that a finding is made that the loan agreements would~~  
28 ~~permit Grandbridge and Fannie Mae to demand additional reserve deposits, then the loan~~

documents should be reformed consistent with the statements contained in the loan assumption letters and its attached reserve schedules due to irregularities in assumption process amounting to fraud, unfairness or oppression, and if not reformed, other appropriate equitable relief to rectify the inequities and unfairness of this situation, and if not, then rescinded altogether.

670. Based on the foregoing, Westland is entitled to reformation, other equitable relief, or rescission of the loan agreements consistent with Grandbridge's and Fannie Mae's statements that no additional reserve deposits were required for the loans.

As a further direct and proximate result of Fannie Mae's and/or Grandbridge's improper demands to adjust reserves and related actions, Westland has had to hire counsel to prosecute this matter and obtain reformation of the loan documents by reason of which it is entitled to reasonable attorney's fees or that they had concealed material adverse information, Plaintiffs would actually or Third Plaintiffs' occurred **NINETEENTH** WHEREFORE, Third Party Plaintiffs pray for judgment against Third Party Defendants, as follows:

1. For declaratory relief acknowledging that no default has occurred and that Third Party Defendant improperly sought a property condition assessment;
2. For injunctive relief, including without limitation, precluding any non-judicial foreclosure against either the Liberty Property or the Square Property;
3. For equitable relief as demanded herein;
4. For compensatory damages in excess of \$15,000;
5. For punitive damages;
6. For prejudgment interest at the statutory rate;
7. For attorney's fees and costs of suit, including as special damages for conversion and
8. For such other relief as the Court deems appropriate. Dated: August 31, 2020

**LAW OFFICES OF JOHN BENEDICT**

*/s/ John Benedict*

John Benedict (NV Bar No. 5581)

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**DISTRICT COURT  
CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA**

FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE  
ASSOCIATION,

Plaintiff,

vs.

WESTLAND LIBERTY VILLAGE, LLC, and  
WESTLAND VILLAGE SQUARE, LLC,

Defendants.

AND ALL RELATED ACTIONS.

Case No. A-20-819412-B

Dept No. XIII

**PLAINTIFF AND FHFA'S REPLY IN  
SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS IN  
PART DEFENDANTS' FIRST  
AMENDED ANSWER AND AMENDED  
COUNTERCLAIM**

Hearing Date: December 16, 2021  
Hearing Time: 9:00 a.m.

Plaintiff Federal National Mortgage Association ("Fannie Mae") and Intervenor Federal  
Housing Finance Agency ("FHFA", and collectively, "Movants") file their *Reply In Support of:*  
*Motion to Dismiss In Part Defendants' First Amended Answer and Amended Counterclaim* ("the  
Reply"), responding to the opposition ("Opposition") filed by Defendants/Counterclaimants  
Westland Liberty Village, LLC ("Liberty Village"), Westland Village Square, LLC's ("Village



1 Square,” collectively with Liberty Village, “Westland” or “Original Defendants”), Amusement  
2 Industry, Inc. (“Amusement”), Westland Corona LLC (“Corona”), Westland Amber Ridge LLC  
3 (“Amber Ridge”), Westland Hacienda Hills LLC (“Hacienda Hills”), 1097 North State, LLC  
4 (“North State”), Westland Tropicana Royale LLC (“Tropicana”), and Vellagio Apts of Westland  
5 LLC (“Vellagio”, collectively with Amusement, Corona, Amber Ridge, Hacienda Hills, North  
6 State, and Tropicana, the “Credit Facility Entities”); The Alevy Family Protection Trust  
7 (“Protection Trust”), Westland AMT, LLC (“AMT”), AFT Industry NV, LLC (“AFT”), and A&D  
8 Dynasty Trust (“Dynasty Trust,” collectively, with Amusement, Protection Trust, AMT, and AFT,  
9 the “Securities Entities”). For ease of reference, Westland, the Credit Facility Entities, and the  
10 Securities Entities will be referred to collectively as the “Counterclaimants,” even though Original  
11 Defendants are the only true counterclaimants.

12 This Reply is based on the following Memorandum of Points and Authorities, all pleadings  
13 and papers of record, and any evidence or oral argument the Court entertains at the hearing in this  
14 matter.

## 15 MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

### 16 I. SUMMARY

17 A year into this litigation, Counterclaimants filed a First Amended Counterclaim (the  
18 “Amended Counterclaim”), adding 21 new parties (11 of which are counterclaim-plaintiffs) and 11  
19 new causes of action. As to Fannie Mae, the Amended Counterclaim adds the 11 new  
20 Counterclaimants to Westland’s good faith and fair dealing claim and asserts a new breach of  
21 contract action based on a Master Credit Facility Agreement (“MCFA”) between Fannie Mae and  
22 the Credit Facility Entities. The MCFA was not at issue during the first year of this litigation and  
23 bears no relation to the litigation originally filed by Fannie Mae or even Westland’s original  
24 counterclaims. Instead, Counterclaimants now seek hundreds of millions of dollars in purported  
25 damages based solely on the Securities Entities’—strangers to all of the relevant contracts—market  
26 losses caused by their speculative investments during a global pandemic. Despite these indisputable  
27 facts, Counterclaimants ask the Court to deny Movants’ targeted request to dismiss those portions  
28 of the Amended Counterclaim which attempt to expand this litigation beyond all reasonable

1 bounds. As a matter of law, this Court should reject Counterclaimants' invitation and dismiss (1)  
2 the contractual claims asserted by strangers to the underlying contracts,<sup>1</sup> (2) the two MCFA claims;  
3 and (3) the claims for punitive damages, consequential damages, and attorneys' fees.

4 More specifically, the contract claims asserted by strangers to the contracts must be  
5 dismissed for lack of standing. "Only a party to a contract or an intended third-party beneficiary  
6 may sue to enforce the terms of a contract or obtain an appropriate remedy for breach." *GECCMC*  
7 *2005-C1 Plummer St. Off. Ltd. P'ship v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, Nat. Ass'n*, 671 F.3d 1027, 1033  
8 (9th Cir. 2012)). The Opposition largely concedes that the Counterclaimants (who are strangers to  
9 the contracts) cannot assert claims under those contracts. Therefore, counterclaims 1, 2, 3, 5, 9,  
10 and 10 should be dismissed as to any Counterclaimant which is not a party to the relevant contract.  
11 The Court should also dismiss Counterclaimants' claim for breach of the duty of good faith and  
12 fair dealing to the extent it is asserted by strangers to the contracts. Whether Counterclaimants  
13 plead breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing in contract or tort, they cannot assert  
14 this claim, as a matter of law, on behalf of parties who are not parties to the MCFA or the loan  
15 documents signed by Liberty Village and Village Square (the "Loan Documents"). *See Bell v.*  
16 *Bimbo*, 2016 WL 3536173, at \*4 (D. Nev. June 27, 2016)

17 Counterclaims 3 and 4, to the extent they assert claims under the MCFA, must also be  
18 dismissed. The MCFA contains a mandatory forum selection clause for claims brought by the  
19 Credit Facility Entities. The forum selection clause clearly provides that the Credit Facility Entities  
20 can only bring those claims in the District of Columbia. Contrary to the Credit Facility Entities'  
21 argument, counterclaims 3 and 4 are not compulsory in this litigation—they arise out of a separate  
22 contract and purported breach. Even if they were compulsory counterclaims, however, the law is  
23 clear that the forum selection clause should be enforced.

24 Counterclaimants' requests for punitive damages and attorneys' fees should be dismissed  
25 pursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 4617(j)(4) (the "Penalty Bar"). Courts have routinely held that 12 U.S.C.  
26 § 4617(j)(4), which precludes awards against FHFA and Fannie Mae "in the nature of penalties or  
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28 <sup>1</sup> For ease of reference, Movants have attached a list of Counterclaimants who should be  
dismissed from each counterclaim for lack of standing as **Exhibit A**.

1 fines,” prohibits punitive damages. *See* Mot. 15-16 (*citing* numerous cases including *Gray v.*  
2 *Seterus, Inc.*, 233 F. Supp. 3d 865, 872 (D. Or. 2017) (“Fannie Mae is indeed immune from punitive  
3 damages under 12 U.S.C. § 4617(j).”). Punitive damages are clearly “in the nature of penalties or  
4 fines.” *See Webb v. Shull*, 128 Nev. 85, 90 (2012). Similarly, the attorneys’ fees Counterclaimants  
5 seek are precluded penalties. Contrary to Counterclaimants’ arguments, there are no exceptions or  
6 carve-outs to the Penalty Bar and it precludes recovery of punitive damages and/or attorneys’ fees  
7 from FHFA and Fannie Mae.

8 Attorneys’ fees are also unavailable under the contracts at issue or as special damages. As  
9 established in the Motion, and undisputed in the Opposition, the Loan Documents and MCFA  
10 provide no basis for recovery of attorneys’ fees by Counterclaimants. Verified Compl. Ex. 1  
11 (Village Square Multifamily Loan and Security Agreement), § 4.02(g)(3) (emphasis added); *see*  
12 *also* Verified Compl. Ex. 6 (Liberty Multifamily Loan and Security Agreement), § 4.02(g)(3); Mot.,  
13 Ex. 1 § 4.02(g)(3). Counterclaimants cite no statutory basis for the recovery of attorneys’ fees  
14 because there is none. They assert instead that attorneys’ fees may be recovered as special damages.  
15 They are wrong. Special damages cannot be recovered for breach of contract as a matter of law.  
16 *Pardee Homes of Nevada v. Wolfram*, 135 Nev. 173, 177 (2019). In any event, Counterclaimants  
17 have not properly pleaded a claim for special damages.

18 Finally, the Original Defendants and the Credit Facility Entities have contractually waived  
19 their claims for consequential damages. The contractual waiver is clear and conspicuous. The  
20 waiver’s inclusion in a section of the Loan Documents and MCFA relating to marshaling of assets  
21 does not alter the express waiver and the Court should enforce the waiver by dismissing the  
22 consequential damages claims.

23 As is readily apparent, the current Motion does not revisit old territory from Fannie Mae’s  
24 prior motion to dismiss, contrary to Counterclaimants’ assertion, and establishes that dismissal is  
25 required by the contracts and applicable law. Accordingly, the Movants respectfully request that  
26 the Court grant the Motion and deny Counterclaimants’ futile request to amend.

27 ///

28 ///

## II. ARGUMENT

### A. Various Counterclaimants Concede that They Lack Standing to Assert Counterclaims 1, 2, 3, 5, 9, and 10.

In the Motion, Movants argued that counterclaims 1, 2, 3, 5, 9, and 10 must be dismissed, for lack of standing, as to all Counterclaimants who are not parties or third-party beneficiaries to the relevant contract. Mot. at 7-10. Specifically, Movants argued that counterclaims 1, 2, 5, 9, and 10 must be dismissed as to the Credit Facility Entities and the Securities Entities because they are not parties to, or third-party beneficiaries of, the loan documents entered into by Liberty Village or Village Square (the “Loan Documents”).<sup>2</sup> Mot. at 10. Movants also established that counterclaim 3 must be dismissed as to the Original Defendants and the Securities Entities because they are not parties to the MCFA. *Id.* at 8-10.

Counterclaimants concede these points. They do not argue that non-parties to the relevant contracts can assert counterclaims 1, 2, 3, 5, 9, and 10, nor that any of them are parties or third-party beneficiaries. Instead, they argue only that the allegations in counterclaims 1, 2, 3, 5, 9, and 10 are clear about the party or parties asserting each claim, and identify particular Counterclaimants as the relevant party for each such counterclaim.<sup>3</sup> Opp. at 7-8. According to Counterclaimants, counterclaim 1 is only asserted on behalf of Liberty Village, counterclaim 2 is only asserted on behalf of Village Square, counterclaim 3 is only asserted on behalf of the Credit Facility Entities, and counterclaims 5, 9, and 10 are only asserted on behalf of Liberty Village and Village Square,

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<sup>2</sup> Movants established that counterclaim 4, the breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing counterclaim, should also be dismissed as to the Original Defendants (to the extent the counterclaim is based on the MCFA), the Securities Entities (as non-parties to any relevant contract), and the Credit Facility Entities (to the extent the counterclaim is based on the Loan Documents). The dismissal of counterclaim 4 will be addressed in detail below.

<sup>3</sup> Movants would not have sought dismissal if the Amended Counterclaim was clear. Contrary to Counterclaimants’ argument, the Amended Counterclaim does reference parties in counterclaims which are not parties to the contract. Specifically, counterclaims 1 and 2, which Counterclaimants assert were largely unchanged, were amended to add allegations related to unnamed “Westland entities.” Amended Counterclaim, ¶¶ 441, 453. Additionally, as discussed more below, counterclaim 4 asserts a breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing by all of the Counterclaimants without regard to which Counterclaimants are parties to which contracts. Amended Counterclaim, ¶¶ 466-78.

1 per their respective Loan Documents.<sup>4</sup>

2 Based on this clarification, the Court should dismiss counterclaims 1, 2, 3, 5, 9, and 10 as  
3 to any Counterclaimant other than those identified in the Opposition as asserting the particular  
4 claims. *GECCMC 2005-C1 Plummer*, 671 F.3d at 1033 (“[O]nly a party to a contract or an intended  
5 third-party beneficiary may sue to enforce the terms of a contract or obtain an appropriate remedy  
6 for breach.”); *see also* EDCR 2.20(e) (stating that a failure to file an opposition is an admission that  
7 a motion is meritorious and consenting to granting the same); *Bates v. Chronster*, 100 Nev. 675,  
8 681-82, 683 (1984) (treating a failure to respond to an argument on the appropriate interest rate  
9 under the contract as conceded).

10 **B. The Court Should Dismiss the Breach of the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing**  
11 **Claim as to Every Counterclaimant Except Liberty Village, Village Square, and the**  
12 **Credit Facility Entities, for Lack of Standing.**

13 Movants maintain that, just as with the breach of contract claims, only parties to a contract  
14 have standing to bring a claim for the breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. *See*  
15 *GECCMC 2005-C1 Plummer*, 671 F.3d at 1033 (holding that “only a party to a contract or an  
16 intended third-party beneficiary” may sue to enforce a contract or obtain an appropriate remedy for  
17 breach). In response, and as described above, Counterclaimants conceded that non-parties to  
18 contracts lack standing to assert breach of contract claims. However, they maintained that the  
19 fourth counterclaim, for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, “include[s] every  
20 counterclaimant,” notwithstanding whether they are parties to the contracts. Opp. at 8. They argue  
21 that Fannie Mae’s alleged acts of “bad faith loan servicing and placing entities other than those  
22 involved with the Loan Agreement on a-check” generates a breach of the covenant of good faith  
23 and fair dealing claim under contracts as to which Counterclaimants are not a party. Their theory,  
24 which does not have any support in the law, is that because a breach of the covenant of good faith  
25 and fair dealing can, in some limited circumstances, be a tort, no contractual relationship is  
26 necessary to assert it.

27 That is not the law. “The existence of a contract between the parties” is a required element  
28 to establish a claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. *Shaw v.*

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<sup>4</sup> See Exhibit A.

1 *CitiMortgage, Inc.*, 201 F. Supp. 3d 1222, 1251 (D. Nev. 2016), amended in part, 2016 WL  
2 11722898 (D. Nev. Nov. 1, 2016). The claim should be dismissed for lack of standing except as to  
3 Liberty Village and Village Square as to their respective Loan Documents and as to the Credit  
4 Facility Entities as to the MCFA.<sup>5</sup>

5 **1. It Is Black-Letter Law that a Claim for Breach of the Covenant of Good Faith**  
6 **and Fair Dealing Requires that the Claimant Be a Party to that Contract.**

7 “Similar to breach of contract claims, *non-parties to a contract cannot recover under a*  
8 *breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.*” *Bell*, 2016 WL 3536173, at \*4  
9 (granting defendants’ motion to dismiss breach of good faith and fair dealing claims, without leave  
10 to amend where plaintiffs were not parties to the contract) (emphasis added). There must be a  
11 “contract between the parties” to assert a claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith  
12 and fair dealing. *Shaw*, 201 F. Supp. at 1251; *see also Bertsch v. Discover Fin. Servs.*, 2020 WL  
13 1170212, at \*4 (D. Nev. Mar. 11, 2020) (holding that to establish a claim for breach of the implied  
14 covenant of good faith and fair dealing, a plaintiff must show that “*the plaintiff and defendant*  
15 *were parties to a contract,*” and dismissing the claims where no such contract existed); *Macionski*  
16 *v. Alaska Airlines*, 94 F.3d 652 (9th Cir. 1996) (unpublished) (“The prerequisite for any action for  
17 breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is the existence of a contractual  
18 relationship.”); *Langlois v. Harrah’s Tahoe, Inc.*, 959 F.2d 240 (9th Cir. 1992) (unpublished)  
19 (affirming dismissal of claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing  
20 where no contract existed between the parties); *State, Univ. & Cmty. Coll. Sys. v. Sutton*, 120 Nev.  
21 972, 989 (2004) (holding that “every contract imposes *upon the contracting parties* the duty of  
22 good faith and fair dealing”) (emphasis added). The covenant cannot “be endowed with an  
23 existence independent of its contractual underpinnings.” *Guz v. Bechtel Nat’l Inc.*, 8 P.3d 1089,  
24 1110 (Cal. 2000).

25 Counterclaimants’ response to this black-letter law is to “disagree” with it, without citation  
26 to any applicable authority in support of their disagreement. *Opp.* at 8. This is not adequate and,

27 \_\_\_\_\_  
28 <sup>5</sup> As addressed below, the claims arising from the MCFA and brought by the Credit Facility  
Entities should be dismissed based on the forum selection clause.

1 as the many cases cited above make clear, it is not the law. Counterclaimants cite only one case in  
2 support of their position—*American Federation of Musicians v. Reno’s Riverside Hotel, Inc.*, 86  
3 Nev. 695, 697 (1970)—which has no application here, and is wholly inapposite. That decision does  
4 not address who has standing to sue under a contract, whether for breach of express contractual  
5 terms or for the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Indeed, that case does not even  
6 involve a claim for the breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Instead, the Nevada  
7 Supreme Court addressed “whether the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, preempts state  
8 jurisdiction to enjoin the American Federation of Musicians from placing the Riverside Hotel on  
9 the National Defaulters List,” analyzing whether certain labor practices were unlawful and who had  
10 jurisdiction to adjudicate them. That case is wholly irrelevant to this question. Stated simply,  
11 Counterclaimants have no authority for their position that a stranger to a contract may sue to enforce  
12 the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. *See, e.g., Bell*, 2016 WL 3536173, at \*4 (granting  
13 defendants’ motion to dismiss breach of good faith and fair dealing claims, without leave to amend  
14 where plaintiffs were not parties to the contract).

15 **2. Strangers to a Contract Do Not Have Standing to Bring a Claim for Breach of**  
16 **the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing, Regardless Whether the**  
**Claim Sounds in Contract or Tort.**

17 Despite the undeniably contractual nature of Counterclaimants’ claim for a breach of the  
18 implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, they argue that if there is no contractual relationship  
19 between various Counterclaimants and Fannie Mae, then Fannie Mae’s placing (unspecified)  
20 entities<sup>6</sup> on A-Check gave rise to an implied covenant claim sounding in tort, regardless whether  
21 those entities were parties to a contract with Fannie Mae. *Opp.* at 8. This is not a correct statement  
22 of the law, for two reasons. First, regardless whether the breach of the covenant of good faith and  
23 fair dealing is a contract or a tort, strangers to the contract lack standing to sue on that claim.  
24 Second, Counterclaimants did not and cannot allege a tortious breach of the covenant of good faith  
25 and fair dealing as a matter of law because the pre-requisite for a tortious breach—a special  
26 relationship—does not exist here.

27  
28 <sup>6</sup> The Opposition states only that Fannie Mae “engag[ed] in bad faith loan servicing and placing entities other than those involved with the Loan Agreement on a-check.” *Opp.* at 8.

1                   **a. Non-Parties to a Contract Lack Standing to Bring a Claim for Breach of**  
2                   **the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing, Even When the Claim**  
3                   **Sounds in Tort.**

4                   The Opposition is silent regarding how the potentially tortious nature of this claim somehow  
5                   opens it to strangers to the contract. Counterclaimants provide no authority supporting their  
6                   position, nor did Movants locate any. The law on this issue uniformly holds that a claim for the  
7                   breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing requires the plaintiff to allege and prove the  
8                   existence of a contract between the parties, regardless whether the breach is contractual or tortious.  
9                   *Stebbins v. Geico Ins. Agency*, 2019 WL 281281, at \*2 (D. Nev. Jan. 22, 2019) (articulating the  
10                  elements of the claim as applying to both types of breaches); *Innovative Bus. Partnerships, Inc. v.*  
11                  *Inland Cty. Reg'l Ctr., Inc.*, 194 Cal. App. 4th 623, 631–32, 123 Cal. Rptr. 3d 525, 533 (2011)  
12                  (holding that a cause of action for tortious breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing  
13                  requires the existence of an enforceable contract).

14                  Indeed, the standard for a tortious breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing  
15                  requires a special relationship between the parties. Case law makes clear that this claim only arises  
16                  between parties to a contract. *See, e.g., Hilton Hotels Corp. v. Butch Lewis Prods, Inc.*, 109 Nev.  
17                  1043, 1046 (1993) (holding, with respect to tortious breach of the covenant of good faith and fair  
18                  dealing that “[i]t is well established within Nevada that every contract imposes ***upon the***  
19                  ***contracting parties*** the duty of good faith and fair dealing.” (emphasis added)).

20                  The Opposition’s statement that the Supreme Court remanded the matter in *Hilton Hotels*  
21                  “to determine whether tort liability should be imposed on additional parties, who were not parties  
22                  to the contract” is incorrect, or at least misleading. Opp. at 9. The breach of the implied covenant  
23                  claims were *only* between parties to the contract, whereas Hilton had brought other tort claims  
24                  against separate defendants. *Hilton Hotels Corp.*, 109 Nev. at 1049. To be clear, Hilton was *not*  
25                  seeking to sue non-parties to the contract for a tortious breach of the duty of good faith and fair  
26                  dealing, nor was the remand for the purpose of allowing claims by additional *plaintiffs* who were  
27                  strangers to the contract.

28                  In sum, in addition to limited and special circumstances (none of which are present in this  
case), a tortious breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing requires a contractual



1 relationship between the parties, just as an express contractual breach does. Counterclaimants offer  
2 absolutely no support for their contention that a contractual stranger can assert a claim for breach  
3 of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing—whether it be contractual or tortious. The fourth  
4 counterclaim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing should be dismissed  
5 for lack of standing except as to Liberty Village and Village Square as to their respective Loan  
6 Documents and as to the Credit Facility Entities as to the MCFA.<sup>7</sup>

7 **b. Counterclaimants Did Not Allege, and Cannot Allege, an Implied**  
8 **Covenant Claim Sounding in Tort Because No Special Relationship**  
9 **Between the Parties Exists Here.**

10 The Amended Counterclaim does not, by its terms, allege a tortious breach of the covenant  
11 of good faith and fair dealing. Nor could it, as the requisite relationship between the parties does  
12 not exist.

13 “Although every contract contains an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, an  
14 action in tort for breach of the covenant arises only ‘in rare and exceptional cases’ when there is a  
15 special relationship....” *Ins. Co. of the W. v. Gibson Tile Co.*, 122 Nev. 455, 461 (2006). The  
16 imposition of liability in tort for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing is “limited  
17 ... to those cases involving special relationships characterized by elements of public interest,  
18 adhesion, and fiduciary responsibility.” *Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Gen. Builders, Inc.*, 113 Nev. 346,  
19 355 (1997) (discussing an insurer/insured relationship as an example of a special relationship). It  
20 requires the special element of reliance or fiduciary duty. *Id.* at 354. Tort liability is not permitted  
21 where, as here, “agreements have been heavily negotiated and the aggrieved party was a  
22 sophisticated businessman.” *Id.* at 355; *see also A.C. Shaw Constr. v. Washoe County*, 105 Nev.  
23 913, 915 (1989); *K Mart v. Ponsock*, 103 Nev. 39 (1987) (abrogated on other grounds).

24 Indeed, courts consistently recognize that there is no special or fiduciary relationship  
25 between a lender and borrower. *Davenport v. Homecomings Fin., LLC*, 130 Nev. 1169 (2014)  
26 (unpublished) (“[T]his court has never recognized the existence of a special or fiduciary  
27 relationship arising solely from a routine, arm’s-length relationship between a borrower and a

28 <sup>7</sup> The MCFA claims brought by the Credit Facility Entities, though, should be dismissed  
based on the forum selection clause, as discussed below.

1 lender or successor lender.”); *Jordan v. Bank of America*, 2013 WL 5308268 at \*7 (D. Nev. Sept.  
2 19, 2013) (recognizing that lenders do not typically have a fiduciary duty to a borrower).

3 Here, the Amended Counterclaim does not allege or attempt to allege any special  
4 relationship between the parties, acknowledging that the agreements “specified the terms that  
5 would govern the parties’ practices for administration of the loans” and the contracts at issue were  
6 “two separate sets of loan agreements, related to the Properties.” Amended Counterclaim ¶¶ 307-  
7 308. Accordingly, even if a tortious breach of the implied covenant claim could be brought by a  
8 non-party to a contract, no such claim can be brought here as a matter of law because there are no  
9 allegations of the required “special relationship.”

10 **3. Current Non-Party Counterclaimants Fail to Identify Any Contract or Breach,  
Which Is Also Fatal to their Claim.**

11 In an apparent attempt to argue that the Counterclaimants who are not parties to any relevant  
12 contract do have contractual claims, the Opposition asserts, in conclusory fashion, that the implied  
13 good faith and fair dealing claim “arises from the Loan Agreements, the Master Credit Facility  
14 Agreement, the related guarantees, and the applications that required submission of the financial  
15 statements/financial records of the Westland Securities Entities.”<sup>8</sup> This tactic fails Rule 8, as it  
16 does not provide notice as to what contract or conduct gives rise to the claim as to each party.

17 A complaint for breach of contract should be dismissed where it fails to “identify what  
18 provisions ... were breached...” *Davenport v. GMAC Mortg.*, 129 Nev. 1109 (2013)  
19 (unpublished); *Herold v. One W. Bank*, No. 2:10-CV-02204-KJD, 2011 WL 4543998, at \*2 (D.  
20 Nev. Sept. 29, 2011) (dismissing complaint where Plaintiff did not identify the provisions of a  
21 contract that defendants allegedly breached); *Silvas v. GMAC Mortgage, LLC*, 2009 WL 4573234  
22 \*5 (D. Ariz. 2010) (dismissing breach of contract claim where plaintiff failed to provide defendant  
23 notice of the contractual provision allegedly breached, or the nature of the breach); *In re Mortg.*  
24 *Elec. Registration Sys., Inc.*, 555 F. App’x 661, 665 (9th Cir. 2014) (unpublished) (affirming  
25 dismissal of complaint where the complaint failed “to specify what provisions of the agreement ...  
26 were breached.”). Counterclaimants’ laundry list of potential agreements that may be implicated  
27

28 <sup>8</sup> Counterclaimants do not explain how an application constitutes a contract. It does not.

1 by this claim, without identification of any provision that was breached, is insufficient to state a  
2 claim for relief. *See* Opp. at 8 (broadly referencing “all Counterclaimants related to the breach of  
3 the covenant of good faith and fair dealing and also the Loan Agreements, the Master Credit Facility  
4 Agreement, the related guarantees, and the applications that required submission of the financial  
5 statements/financial records of the Westland Securities Entities.”).

6 **C. The MCFA’s Forum Selection Clause Mandates Dismissal of Counterclaim 3 and the**  
7 **MCFA Allegations of Counterclaim 4.**

8 Movants have established that the Credit Facility Entities expressly “waive[d]” the right to  
9 bring “any controversy arising under or in relation to” the MCFA in “any other venue” than the  
10 District of Columbia,<sup>9</sup> requiring dismissal of counterclaim 3 and the MCFA-related claims in  
11 counterclaim 4. In response, the Credit Facility Entities advance two reasons why the Court may  
12 supposedly ignore the parties’ forum selection clause. First, they contend that the forum selection  
13 clause is merely permissive. This is wrong because, unlike the cases cited by the Credit Facility  
14 Entities, the MCFA forum selection clause dictates the jurisdiction and venue where the Credit  
15 Facility Entities agreed to litigate. That fact is not changed just because the MCFA permits *Fannie*  
16 *Mae*—not the Credit Facility Entities—to file suit in jurisdictions other than the District of  
17 Columbia. Second, the Credit Facility Entities argue that application of the clause here is  
18 unreasonable because their counterclaims are compulsory. Their counterclaims are not compulsory,  
19 but, even if they were, the MCFA forum selection clause remains enforceable.

20 **1. The MCFA Forum-Selection Clause Is Mandatory, Not Permissive, and**  
21 **Enforceable As Written.**

22 The Credit Facility Entities failed to address the key language from the forum selection  
23 clause highlighted in the Motion, including:

24 Borrower agrees that any controversy arising under or in relation to  
25 the Notes, the Security Documents (other than the Security  
26 Instruments), or any other Loan Document *shall be*, except as  
27 otherwise provided herein, *litigated* in the District of Columbia.  
28 . . . Borrower *irrevocably consents* to service, jurisdiction, *and*  
*venue* of such courts for any litigation arising from the Notes, the  
Security Documents, or any of the other Loan Documents, and  
*waives any other venue* to which it might be entitled by virtue of  
domicile, habitual residence, or otherwise.

<sup>9</sup> *See* Mot. at 13 (quoting Mot., Ex. 1, §15.01).

1 *Compare* Mot. at 13 (quoting Mot., Ex. 1, §15.01 (emphasis added)), *with* Opp. at 11–13. There is  
2 nothing permissive about language that not only specifies that any actions based on the MCFA  
3 “shall be . . . litigated” in a single, exclusive jurisdiction—the District of Columbia—but also  
4 declares that the party bound by the clause—the Credit Facility Entities—“irrevocably consents,”  
5 to “waiv[ing] any other venue to which it may be entitled . . . .” This unequivocal language is  
6 undeniably mandatory and requires dismissal of the MCFA counterclaims.

7       Rather than address this language head on, the Credit Facility Entities contend that three  
8 other provisions in Section 15.01 somehow mutate the clause into being permissive. But the first  
9 two phrases that they highlight are choice-of-law provisions, which do not affect, let alone negate,  
10 the forum selection clause. *See* Opp. at 11 (quoting Mot., Ex. 1, §15.01). Those provisions merely  
11 provide that the MCFA is to be governed by the laws of the District of Columbia, except in the  
12 enumerated instances where (i) the *laws* of the jurisdiction in which the Mortgaged Property is  
13 located apply or (ii) the *choice of law* provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code in effect for the  
14 jurisdiction in which any Borrower is organized apply. Mot., Ex. 1, §15.01. Thus, the bulk of the  
15 language that Counterclaimants highlight in no way addresses—and certainly does not alter—the  
16 language that governs *where* a dispute brought by the Credit Facility Entities must be litigated.

17       Although the final sentence italicized by Counterclaimants does pertain to forum selection,  
18 it does not modify the language limiting the Credit Facility Entities’ claims under the MCFA to the  
19 District of Columbia. *See* Opp. at 11. Rather, the provision—which immediately follows the Credit  
20 Facility Entities’ waiver of any other venue—states that “[n]othing contained” in the MCFA “shall  
21 prevent [Fannie Mae] from bringing any suit, action, or proceeding or exercising any rights against  
22 [the Credit Facility Entities] and against the collateral in any other jurisdiction.” *Id.* (quoting Mot.,  
23 Ex. 1, §15.01). Therefore, unlike the Credit Facility Entities, Fannie Mae is not limited in selecting  
24 a forum under the MCFA. That does not render the forum selection clause permissive or expand  
25 the forum access rights of any party *other than* Fannie Mae.

26       Counterclaimants’ reliance on that provision is particularly inappropriate here because  
27 Fannie Mae never sued the Credit Facility Entities and has not alleged any claims against anyone  
28 based on the MCFA. In other words, not only does the provision (permitting *Fannie Mae* to bring

1 suit in any jurisdiction) not alter the effect of the forum selection clause on the Credit Facility  
2 Entities, the provision was not implicated by Fannie Mae’s decision to sue different entities for  
3 breach of different contracts in the forum appropriate under those contracts.

4 Moreover, the cases that the Opposition highlights from the examples discussed in  
5 *American First Federal Credit Union v. Soro*, 131 Nev. 737 (2015), do not advance  
6 Counterclaimants’ argument. As addressed in the Motion, *Soro* distinguished between mandatory  
7 clauses, which limit venue to a single jurisdiction, and permissive clauses, in which a party consents  
8 to venue in a jurisdiction but no “words of exclusivity” dictate that the specified venue is *only*  
9 proper in that jurisdiction. Mot. at 12. The cases that Counterclaimants cite are expressly examples  
10 in the permissive category. See *John Boutari & Son, Wines & Spirits, S.A. v. Attiki Imps. & Distribs*  
11 *Inc.*, 22 F.3d 51, 52 (2d Cir.1994) (stating that disputes “shall come within the jurisdiction of the  
12 competent Greek Courts” but not limiting disputes to such courts); *Hunt Wesson Foods, Inc. v.*  
13 *Supreme Oil Co.*, 817 F.2d 75, 76-78 (9th Cir.1987) (stating that “[t]he courts of California, County  
14 of Orange, shall have jurisdiction” but including no words of exclusivity); *Keaty v. Freeport Indon.,*  
15 *Inc.*, 503 F.2d 955, 956-57 (5th Cir.1974) (stating that “the parties submit to the jurisdiction of the  
16 courts of New York” but not restricting jurisdiction to New York). Unlike the parties to the  
17 permissive forum selection clauses in these cases, the Credit Facility Entities not only consented to  
18 venue in the District of Columbia, but they “waive[d] any other venue . . . .” This phrase—which  
19 Counterclaimants again fail to address—unquestionably constitutes “words of exclusivity” that,  
20 under *Soro*, render the MCFA’s forum selection clause mandatory. *Soro*, 131 Nev. at 740 (agreeing  
21 with the Nebraska Supreme court that the phrase “shall be brought only in” a specific jurisdiction,  
22 renders a forum selection clause mandatory).

23 **2. Even If the MCFA Counterclaims Are Compulsory, They Are Still Subject to**  
24 **the Mandatory Forum Selection Clause.**

25 Counterclaimants next contend that enforcement of the clause is not “reasonable” in this  
26 instance because counterclaims 3 and 4 are “compulsory.” Opp. at 12–13. This argument fails for  
27 two independent reasons. First, those counterclaims are not compulsory. Under NRCP 13(a), a  
28 counterclaim is compulsory if it “arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter

1 of the opposing party’s claim . . . .” “The relevant consideration is whether the pertinent facts of  
2 the different claims are so logically related that issues of judicial economy and fairness mandate  
3 that all issues be tried in one suit.” *Mendenhall v. Tassinari*, 133 Nev. 614, 621 (2017).  
4 Counterclaimants only summarily assert that the MCFA counterclaims arise out of the “same  
5 transaction or occurrence” but they do not provide any reasons why this is the same transaction or  
6 occurrence and therefore fail to meet their burden under Rule 13.

7 That specific allegations as to the “same transaction or occurrence” are absent is not  
8 surprising given that Fannie Mae’s claims and the MCFA-based counterclaims address two distinct  
9 disputes. Fannie Mae initiated this action against Liberty Village and Village Square for a  
10 receivership based on breaches of the underlying Loan Documents. Conversely, the Credit Facility  
11 Entities—which are not parties to the Loan Documents nor otherwise involved in the Liberty  
12 Village and Village Square properties—claim that Fannie Mae breached a different contract by not  
13 extending them credit—*i.e.*, conduct wholly separate and distinct from Fannie Mae’s claims against  
14 Liberty Village and Village Square. These are demonstrably not the same transaction or  
15 occurrence. Because Counterclaimants fail to even address this critical distinction, the Court  
16 should disregard their argument that counterclaims 3 and 4 are compulsory.

17 Second, even if the MCFA counterclaims were compulsory, those claims still must be filed  
18 in the District of Columbia, as the contract expressly requires. Courts routinely dismiss compulsory  
19 counterclaims pursuant to mandatory forum selection clauses just like this one. *See, e.g., Publicis*  
20 *Comm’n v. True N. Comm’ns Inc.*, 132 F.3d 363, 366 (7th Cir. 1997) (“True North promised not  
21 to assert such claims in other forums [besides Delaware] whether or not they would be  
22 ‘compulsory’ counterclaims . . . . By presenting the claim in Chicago, True North broke its promise.  
23 The district court should have enforced the pooling agreement by dismissing the counterclaim.”)  
24 *Mil-Ray v. EVP Int’l, LLC*, No. 3:19-CV-00944-YY, 2021 WL 2903224, at \*10 (D. Or. July 8,  
25 2021) (agreeing with the analysis in *Publicis*, stating that “other courts have similarly dismissed or  
26 transferred counterclaims that are subject to a forum selection clause”); *Reading Rock Ne., LLC v.*  
27 *Russel*, No. CV 20-5728 (RBK/KMW), 2021 WL 870642, at \*8 (D.N.J. Mar. 8, 2021)  
28 (unpublished) (finding dismissal appropriate “even if Defendants were asserting compulsory

1 counterclaims”).

2 As the Seventh Circuit explained, this is a matter of basic contract principles. On one hand,  
3 the party bound by a mandatory forum selection clause has promised not to sue the other party in a  
4 different venue—making no distinction between compulsory and non-compulsory counterclaims.  
5 *Publicis Commc’n*, 132 F.3d at 366. The only relevance to a counterclaim being deemed  
6 “compulsory” is that a party is usually precluded from asserting that claim in a future action if not  
7 asserted in the first action. *Mendenhall*, 133 Nev. at 620. But under a forum selection clause, the  
8 party that would seek to enforce the clause against a mandatory counterclaim is implicitly  
9 promising not to raise the defense of preclusion if the counterclaimant files suit in the proper venue.  
10 *Publicis Commc’n*, 132 F.3d at 366; accord 6 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, *Federal*  
11 *Practice and Procedure* § 1412 (3d ed.). The clause thus entails a promise for a promise.

12 Counterclaimants cite to *Pal v. Hafterlaw, LLC*, 132 Nev. 1015, 2016 WL 1190352 (Nev.  
13 App. 2016) in an attempt to avoid this outcome. Opp. at 12. *Pal*, an unpublished Court of Appeals  
14 decision, nowhere determined that the existence of a compulsory counterclaim precludes  
15 application of a forum selection clause.<sup>10</sup> Instead, the Court of Appeals found that the court below  
16 “had jurisdiction over the matter” because the agreement’s forum selection clause was enforceable  
17 and the clause selected “Nevada courts [as] having exclusive jurisdiction over any contract  
18 disputes . . . .” *Pal*, 2016 WL 1190352, \*1. The court then *separately* addressed whether the  
19 appellant’s counterclaims were compulsory, but it did not address, much less hold, as  
20 Counterclaimants assert, that the existence of a compulsory counterclaim precludes application of  
21 a forum selection clause. *Id.* at \*2.

22 Finally, Counterclaimants’ assertion of unfairness and their insinuation that they will have  
23 no relief if the Court enforces the forum selection clause are wrong. Once the MCFA  
24 “counterclaims” are dismissed here, the Credit Facility Entities may file those claims, if they choose  
25 to do so, in the District of Columbia.<sup>11</sup> The Credit Facility Entities’ argument that they would be  
26

27 <sup>10</sup> Any “unpublished dispositions issued by the Court of Appeals may not be cited in any  
Nevada court for any purpose.” NRAP 36(c)(3).

28 <sup>11</sup> Movants reserve their defenses to any potential claims.

1 forced to incur additional expense by filing a separate action in a separate jurisdiction does not  
2 render the forum selection clause unreasonable or unjust. *See* Opp. at 12. If it did, forum selection  
3 clauses would be rendered categorically unenforceable—which is clearly not the law. And though  
4 Counterclaimants complain that it would be “unreasonable” to bifurcate “claims into repetitive suits  
5 in multiple jurisdictions,” they again ignore the fact that Fannie Mae’s dispute with Liberty Village  
6 and Village Square is separate and distinct and involves different parties and different contracts.  
7 At bottom, the forum selection clause here is clear and conspicuous, the Counterclaimants are  
8 sophisticated borrowers, and the mandatory forum selection clause must be enforced.

9 Accordingly, Counterclaim 3 and the MCFA claims in counterclaim 4 must be dismissed  
10 based on the forum selection clause, even if they are compulsory “counterclaims.”

11 **D. The Penalty Bar Precludes Plaintiffs’ Claims for Punitive Damages and Attorneys’**  
12 **Fees.**

13 Counterclaimants’ argument that their claims for punitive damages and attorneys’ fees  
14 withstand 12 U.S.C. § 4617(j)(4), which bars awards “in the nature of penalties or fines,” fails.

15 **1. The Penalty Bar Applies to Punitive Damages.**

16 **a. Punitive Damages Are “In the Nature of Penalties.”**

17 The central tenet of Counterclaimants’ argument for punitive damages is that they are not  
18 “amounts in the nature of penalties’ within the meaning of [the Penalty Bar].” Opp. at 13. That  
19 is not correct. Indeed, as noted in Movants’ opening brief, courts uniformly hold that 4617(j)(4)  
20 bars punitive damages. Mot. at 15-16. And still more courts have uniformly interpreted the  
21 corresponding FDIC provision, 12 U.S.C. § 1825(b)(3), also to prohibit punitive damages. *See,*  
22 *e.g., Poku v. F.D.I.C.*, No. CIV.A. RDB-08-1198, 2011 WL 1599269, at \*3-4 (D. Md. Apr. 27,  
23 2011). This is because punitive damages are universally recognized as penal. “Punitive damages  
24 are awarded not as compensation to the victim *but to punish the offender.*” *Webb*, 128 Nev. at 90  
25 (emphasis added).<sup>12</sup>

26 Counterclaimants ask the Court to disregard these myriad decisions, claiming that “the law

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27 <sup>12</sup> *See also City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc.*, 453 U.S. 247, 266-67 (1981) (similar);  
28 N.R.S. 42.005 (permitting punitive damages for “the sake of example and by way of *punishing* the  
defendant” (emphasis added)); Mot. at 15-16 (citing additional authorities).



frequently distinguishes” punitive damages from other kinds of penalties, citing a case and statute Counterclaimant says show “civil penalties are not equivalent to punitive damages.” Opp. at 13 (citing *Nevada Power Co. v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct. of Nevada ex rel. Cty. of Clark*, 120 Nev. 948, 961 (2004), and 18 NRS 228.1116(1)(b)). While that may be, Counterclaimants’ point is immaterial when juxtaposed against Congress’ clear exemption of liability for “any amounts in the nature of penalties or fines” under Section 4617(j)(4). Punitive damages and civil penalties need not be “equivalent” for both to be “in the nature of ... penalties,” and Congress expressly exempted the conservatorship from liability for *any* such amounts. Counterclaimants neither recognize nor address the inclusiveness of this exemption. In the end, Counterclaimants offer no coherent argument that *punitive* damages are not inherently *penal*. They are, and the expansive phrase “in the nature of ... penalties or fines” therefore covers all of Counterclaimants’ claims of entitlement to punitive damages and attorney’s fees.

Counterclaimants similarly contend that the Penalty Bar applies only to “punishments imposed by the government.” Opp. at 13. No court has ever interpreted Section 4617(j)(4) or Section 1825(b) that way, while many have squarely held that these statutes bar punitive damages sought by private litigants.<sup>13</sup> Counterclaimants imply that only “a handful of [such] cases” exist, Opp. at 14, but a simple search on Westlaw reveals more than two dozen. Bereft of on-point authority, Counterclaimants direct the Court to a case that *does not* address punitive damages—*Higgins v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP*, No. 12-CV-183-KKC, 2014 WL 1332825 (E.D. Ky. Mar. 31, 2014). Opp. at 14. That case is irrelevant, as it addresses statutory damages, not punitive damages.<sup>14</sup> *Id.* at \*1.

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<sup>13</sup> See, e.g., *Gray*, 233 F. Supp. 3d at 872–73 (D. Or. 2017) (punitive damages barred against Fannie Mae based on federal and state law claims, including breach of contract claim); *Nat’l Fair Hous. All. v. Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n*, No. C 16-06969 JSW, 2019 WL 3779531, at \*6 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2019) (similar); *Banneck v. Federal Nat’l Mort. Ass’n*, 17-cv-04657-WHO (N.D. Cal. Dec. 13, 2017) (Dkt. No. 37) (similar); *Mwangi v. Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n*, No. 4:14-CV-0079-HLM, 2015 WL 12434327, at \*4-5 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 9, 2015) (similar); *Poku*, 2011 WL 1599269, at \*4 (holding that Section 1825(b) bars punitive damages); *Kistler v. F.D.I.C.*, No. CV411-024, 2013 WL 265803, at \*8 n.7 (S.D. Ga. Jan. 23, 2013) (similar).

<sup>14</sup> Fannie Mae and FHFA believe that *Higgins* applied the wrong test and therefore erred in concluding that the statutory damages in question were not penal. But even on its own terms,

Counterclaimants next argue that Section 4617(j)(4)'s *prohibition* on awards "in the nature of ... penalties" must be read to *permit* punitive-damages awards, because a separate HERA provision that applies in the narrow context of contract repudiation expressly addresses punitive damages. Opp. at 14. The provision Counterclaimants cite, Section 4617(d)(3), specifies that where the Conservator repudiates a contract, the counterparty recovers "actual direct compensatory damages" only, a category from which Congress expressly excluded "punitive or exemplary damages" as well as "lost profits" and "pain and suffering." That harmonizes readily with Section 4617(j)(4)'s general bar on awards "in the nature of ... penalties"—Section 4617(d)(3) provides belt-and-suspenders clarity in the very specific scenario of contracts entered into by a regulated entity before appointment of the Conservator and for which the Conservator has determined in its sole discretion that such pre-conservatorship contracts are burdensome and impede the goals of the conservatorship. Specifically, it confirms unmistakably that the idiosyncratic term "actual direct compensatory damages" does not somehow override Section 4617(j)(4)'s general bar on awards "in the nature of penalties." The level of precision in Section 4617(d)(3) is especially important in the context of repudiation of pre-conservatorship contracts, where the Conservator must be able to reliably predict financial consequences in deciding how best to proceed in order to promote the orderly administration of an insolvent entity, because opposing parties might otherwise contest the meaning of "actual direct compensatory damages," as they often do for items Congress did *not* specifically exclude from the definition. See, e.g., *ALLTEL Information Services, Inc. v. F.D.I.C.*, 194 F.3d 1036, 1043 (9th Cir. 1999) (liquidated damages); *McMillian v. F.D.I.C.*, 81 F.3d 1041 (11th Cir. 1996) (severance pay award); *Resolution Trust Corp. v. Management, Inc.*, 25 F.3d 627, 631-32 (8th Cir. 1994) (contractual non-renewal fee).

**b. The Penalty Bar Has No Carve-Out for Offsets.**

Counterclaimants also argue that Section 4617(j)(4)'s phrase "be liable" means only that Fannie Mae and FHFA do not have to affirmatively *pay* punitive damages or attorneys' fees. From there, Counterclaimants argue that the statute permits such amounts to be *assessed and applied as*

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*Higgins* provides no support for Counterclaimants' argument because, as the Nevada Supreme Court has held, punitive damages *are* penal. *Webb*, 128 Nev. at 90.

1 *an offset* against any amount the Original Defendants are ordered to pay on Fannie Mae’s claims.  
2 Counterclaimants offer no legal support for this novel theory.<sup>15</sup> As a logical matter, the argument  
3 is untenable. For punitive damages to affect an ultimate award at all—whether as a collectable  
4 award or, as Counterclaimant argues, as a non-refundable offset only—FHFA or Fannie Mae would  
5 have to be *liable* for them first. The common law of set-off confirms the point—a party can only  
6 apply a set-off for amounts the opposing party would otherwise be *obligated to pay*. *Citizens Bank*  
7 *of Maryland v. Strumpf*, 516 U.S. 16, 18 (1995) (an offset “allows entities that *owe each other*  
8 *money* to apply their *mutual debts* against each other” to avoid “absurdity” (emphasis added)  
9 (citation omitted)); *Westgate Planet Hollywood Las Vegas, LLC v. Tutor-Saliba Corp.*, 133 Nev.  
10 1092 (2017) (unpublished disposition) (applying an offset *after* awarding damages to both plaintiff  
11 and defendant on their claims against one another). But the Penalty Bar precludes the possibility  
12 that Fannie Mae could, while in conservatorship, ever owe Westland any amount of punitive  
13 damages: Congress mandated that the conservatorship “shall not be liable for any amounts in the  
14 nature of ... penalties or fines.” 12 U.S.C. § 4617(j)(4). And, as a practical matter, there is no  
15 functional difference for Fannie Mae or FHFA between a required disbursement and an offset  
16 against a receipt otherwise due, as each carries the same financial effect—reducing net income.  
17 Therefore, this Court should decline to recognize Counterclaimants’ fanciful non-refundable offset  
18 theory.

## 19 2. The Penalty Bar Precludes an Award of Attorneys’ Fees.

20 Counterclaimants do not separately address the Penalty Bar’s applicability to attorneys’ fees  
21 apart from punitive damages except to assert, based on *National Fair Housing Alliance*, that  
22 attorneys’ fees are on a “weaker footing.” Opp. at 14 n.2. That is not correct. *National Fair*  
23 *Housing Alliance* relied solely on *Corder v. Gates*, 947 F.2d 374 (9th Cir. 1991), a case discussing

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24  
25 <sup>15</sup> Counterclaimant cites a HERA provision that uses the word “offset” in an entirely different,  
26 and irrelevant, context. See Opp. at 14-15 (citing 12 U.S.C. § 4617(d)(8)(E)(iii)). That provision  
27 cabins the Conservator’s ability to repudiate a specific category of agreements known as “qualified  
28 financial contracts,” which does not include the loan agreements at issue here. See 12 U.S.C.  
§ 4617(d)(8)(D)(i) (defining “qualified financial contracts” as “any securities contract, commodity  
contract, forward contract, repurchase agreement, swap agreement, and any similar agreement that  
the Agency determines by regulation, resolution, or order to be a qualified financial contract”).

attorneys' fees in federal civil rights cases. Congress authorized attorneys' fees in such cases to "encourage meritorious civil rights claims ...." *Blanchard v. Bergeron*, 489 U.S. 87, 96 (1989). No such statute evinces a public policy to encourage claims like Counterclaimants' by authorizing attorneys' fees. Instead, there is the opposite—the Penalty Bar. In any event, the type of attorneys' fees sought here are punitive under Nevada law and, therefore, fall squarely within Section 4617(j)(4)'s ambit. *See* N.R.S. 7.085, 18.010(2)(b); *see also Capanna v. Orth*, 134 Nev. 888, 895 (2018) (interpreting these statutes); *Thomas v. City of N. Las Vegas*, 122 Nev. 82, 90 (2006) ("Nevada follows the American rule that attorney[s'] fees may not be awarded absent a statute, rule, or contract authorizing such award."). And Counterclaimants' response makes no attempt to grapple with the cases finding attorneys' fees as penalties in other circumstances, including under the analogous FDIC statute. Mot. at 16-17.

### 3. The Penalty Bar Exempts Fannie Mae as Well as FHFA from Liability.

Counterclaimants' final argument is that the Penalty Bar applies only to FHFA, not Fannie Mae, because it protects "the Agency" from liability. *See* Opp. at 15. But under HERA, "the Agency" is Fannie Mae's legal successor, 12 U.S.C. § 4617(b)(2)(A)(i), and any monetary judgment against Fannie Mae would necessarily be paid out of "assets" that have been "take[n] over" by the Conservator, *see id.* § 4617(b)(2)(B)(i). It is therefore legally and logically impossible to impose liability on Fannie Mae during conservatorship without imposing liability on "the Agency" as Conservator.

The Nevada Supreme Court has already rejected a similar argument under Section 4617(j)(3), the Federal Foreclosure Bar, holding that, "[a]ccording to the plain language of the statute, Fannie Mae's property interest effectively becomes the FHFA's while the conservatorship exists." *See Saticoy Bay LLC Series 9641 Christine View v. Fed. Nat'l Mortg. Ass'n*, 134 Nev. 270, 272 (2018). That reasoning applies equally here, because Sections 4617(j)(3) and (j)(4) both refer only to "the Agency."

Counterclaimants' argument relies on the flawed reasoning of the sole district court decision—subsequently vacated for lack of jurisdiction—ever to hold that the Penalty Bar does not protect Fannie Mae. Opp. at 15 (citing *Burke v. Fed. Nat'l Mortg. Ass'n*, 221 F. Supp. 3d 707 (E.D.

1 Va. 2016), *vacated by* 2016 WL 7451624 (E.D. Va. Dec. 6, 2016) (concluding that “the Court lacks  
2 [subject matter] jurisdiction over this matter, [and] was without jurisdiction to issue any prior  
3 opinion or order in this case”). *Burke* is a nullity that carries no persuasive effect. *See Gonzalez*  
4 *v. Crosby*, 545 U.S. 524, 534 (2005) (court cannot validly act without jurisdiction); *Elliott v.*  
5 *Peirsol’s Lessee*, 26 U.S. 328, 340 (1828) (orders entered without jurisdiction are “nullities[,] ...  
6 not voidable, but simply void”). Regardless, *Burke’s* departure from HERA’s unambiguous  
7 statutory language is incorrect. *See* 12 U.S.C. § 4617(b)(2)(A)(i). And a 2019 District of Nevada  
8 decision rejects it as “unpersuasive.” *1209 Vill. Walk Tr., LLC v. Broussard*, No. 2:15-CV-01903-  
9 MMD-PAL, 2019 WL 452728, at \*3 (D. Nev. Feb. 4, 2019).

10 Counterclaimants also contend that Section 4617(j)(4) is inapplicable because Fannie Mae,  
11 not FHFA, took all the relevant actions here. *Opp.* at 15. Counterclaimants’ theory is that FHFA  
12 was not “acting as conservator.” *Id.* But Section 4617(j) in its entirety applies regardless of whether  
13 the Conservator takes any affirmative act. Again, the Nevada Supreme Court has already rejected  
14 a similar argument under Section 4617(j)(3), concluding that the Federal Foreclosure Bar applies  
15 throughout conservatorship—*i.e.*, regardless of whether FHFA acts in any particular way as  
16 Conservator. *See Christine View*, 134 Nev. at 274; *Nationstar Mortgage, LLC v. SFR Investments*  
17 *Pool I, LLC*, 133 Nev. 247, 250-52 (2017). In any event, because the Conservator is Fannie Mae’s  
18 statutory successor and holds all of its rights, titles, powers, privileges and assets, FHFA as  
19 Conservator has the ultimate authority over everything relating to Fannie Mae. All of Fannie Mae’s  
20 actions necessarily embody exercises of the Conservator’s statutory powers and functions. *See* 12  
21 U.S.C. §§ 4617(b)(2)(A), (b)(2)(B).

22 Accordingly, Counterclaimants’ claims for punitive damages and attorneys’ fees must fail  
23 as a matter of law.

24 **E. Counterclaimants Cannot Recover Attorneys’ Fees as Special Damages on their**  
25 **Contract Claims.**

26 The Motion established that Counterclaimants have no basis to recover attorneys’ fees on  
27 their contract-based claims. *Mot.* at 17-18. Specifically, the Loan Documents and the MCFA  
28 expressly provide that only Fannie Mae can recover attorneys’ fees arising out of any disputes

## **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

I certify that on April 15, 2022, a true and correct copy of PETITIONERS FEDERAL HOUSING FINANCE AGENCY AND FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE ASSOCIATION'S APPENDIX – VOLUME II OF III, was transmitted electronically through the Court's e-filing system to the attorney(s) associated with this case.

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/s/ Debbie Sorensen  
An Employee of Fennemore Craig, P.C.