IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

GUILLERMO RENTERIA-NOVOA, Supreme Court Case 26.04.05.2 01:57 a.m.

Electronically Filed Elizabeth A. Brown

Clerk of Supreme Court Case No.: C268285-I

Appellant,

VS.

RENEE BAKER, WARDEN, Lovelock Correctional Center

APPELLANT'S APPENDIX Volume VI

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Renteria-Novoa v. Warden Case No. 84656

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somebody says fine, you can do it, that does not equal consent. Consent is something entirely different. Consent is when I want to do something and I'm going to do it. But we're made to do things a lot — we're made to do things that we don't want to do all the time, right? You're made to be here. You submitted to the Court's order to be a juror. That doesn't mean that you consented to it, but you sure — you sure enough submitted to it. 'Cause you knew what was going to happen if you weren't here, right? They issue a warrant for your arrest and all that kind of stuff. So submission is not the equivalent of consent.

All right. Now, the next one, series of charges, lewdness with a child. Lewdness — excuse me — any person who willfully and lewdly commits any lewd or lascivious act other than the acts constituting the crime of sexual assault upon or with any part of the body or any part of a member thereof of a child under the age of 14 with the intent of arousing, appealing or gratifying the lust or passions or sexual desires of that person or the child is guilty of lewdness with a minor.

Now, so what's the difference, right? Sex assault is generally the penetration, right? You have the cunnilingus. You have the — where he's inserting — digital penetration, where he's penetrating her anus with his fingers and/or tongue, that would be the sex assault. Well, what's the

lewdness? Well, the lewdness is when he's directing her to masturbate him, when he is fondling her, when he is kissing and licking her breasts, so it's two different crimes, all right? And so that's why this instruction is important, so you can recognize the difference between a sex assault, i.e. Penetration, and this type of crime.

One of the interesting things that the law states, which is very important for you to understand as jurors in this type of case, is that consent is not a defense. It just isn't. You can't consent.

So let's go over the -- now, let's apply -- now that we know the law, let's apply that to the facts in this case. Oh, excuse me. There are a lot -- we've got to talk about this, first. There are a lot of dates in this case. And fortunately, we are able to tie dates with places that Roxana lived. She moved, basically, on a yearly basis, and so that helps us in determining her age at certain times.

However, the law states that where a minor has been the victim of a sexual assault and/or lewdness and does not remember the exact date of the act, the State is not required to prove a specific date, but may prove a time frame within which the act took place. So that means that we are able to — we don't have to say on August 16th, 2006, this act took place. We can use a time frame based on her knowledge, and that makes sense because she's young at the time. She's a

minor and she — you know, she — she's not writing it down in her journal, she — it's, you know, remembering it and then disclosing it later.

All right. So let's go over the time frame then. So we know from her testimony she was born August 30th, 1993.

That means — so what I've done is just correlated that to the different times when she turned which age. Now, you can say to yourself, so it's 2009 is when she finally disclosed, but it's 2012 now. She testified that she's 18, and by her birthday, we know that on August 30th of this year she's going to be 19, so she's much older. This case — this happened two years ago. So August 30th, 2004, 11; August 30th, 2005, 12, boom, boom, got it right there. So that gives us time frame and kind of a reference point for how old she was when she was living in each apartment.

So we started off with her testimony from 2003 to 2004 she was in the Livertivo Apartments. She turned 11 years old that year and she met Guillermo for the first time, and that's when her mother starts to date him. Eventually, the next year they move into the University Park Apartments, the two-bedroom unit, and when they move into that apartment complex, that's when he starts to — that's when Roxana testified that Yahir moved in, her cousin also moved in there too. And that is when the defendant finds Roxana with her Cousin Yahir under a blanket.

But it's important to know what he does when he finds her under a blanket. He doesn't alert his girlfriend,

Roxana's mom, as to what he says that she saw — or he saw her doing. He doesn't say that as a father figure might. He doesn't tell Yahir's father, who is also living in the same apartment, of what he just saw his 17— to 18—year—old son doing to a girl he says is like his daughter. And he doesn't even tell Roxana anything. He doesn't even counsel her. He doesn't say anything. What's he do? He puts that in his pocket and saves it for later. He says, all right, now I got something. He sees something that makes him realize I might be able to do something to Roxana.

Eventually, the move to the three-bedroom apartment but in the same University Park Apartments, and they get the three-bedroom. This is important because she describes with particularity what she — the first sexual acts and the living arrangements at the house. She told us that the defendant slept in his own room with the makeshift bed, just had blankets on the floor. And Roxana as well as her mother Rosa and Perla all slept in another room, and her uncle and her — and Yahir slept in the living room. And that's when the threats start.

She's about 12 years old at this point and he starts to tell her I'm going to tell your mom I found you with Yahir. I'm going to tell your family you're having sex with your

cousin and I'm going to ruin your life to a 12-year-old little girl.

That's also when the sex abuse begins. She testified for us that he made her pull her shorts down, and when she didn't get them as far down as he wanted, she pulled them — he pulled them further down. He rubbed her breasts, he put his fingers inside her vagina and anus and also put his tongue inside her vagina and anus. She told us that it was in the room, in the University Apartments with the makeshift bed with the blankets on the ground. That when he was finished with her being on her front, he would flip her over onto her all fours and begin to sexually assault her with his tongue by penetrating her anus.

So how does that correlate to the verdict form?

Count 1, sexual assault under 14, sexual penetration, tongue in anal opening.

Count 2, sexual assault under 14, cunnilingus or when he penetrated her vagina with his tongue.

Count 3, lewdness with a child under 14. We know she is under 14 because at that time that they were living in the three apartment — three-bedroom apartment, she hadn't even had her 14th birthday yet. So there it is, lewdness with a child under 14.

Count 4, digital penetration, fingers in genital opening.

Count 5, tongue in anal opening. Count 6,
cunnilingus. Count 7 and this is now, one of the things
I want to clear up about our the way the verdict form
looks. She testified that this would happen on a basically
two times a week or on a biweekly basis. She testified that
it happened throughout the year and that the only time that it
basically stopped was at the Tamarus Apartments. So in
looking at this, the State had the opportunity to charge him
two times a week for several years. Well, that would be, you
know, 600 counts.

So this — the way that we've — the verdict form looks is a representative of the counts in this case based on her testimony and to the particularity of her saying what happened when it happened if that makes sense. So she testified that it at least happened two times even though she said it was a biweekly basis, so we know it happened at least two times so that goes into the rest of the counts.

Sexual penetration, tongue in anal opening. Count 6, cunnilingus. Count 7, rubbing the breasts. Count 8, kissing and/or licking the breasts. Count 9, another digital penetration in her genital opening. Count 10, fingers in the anal opening. And Count 11, masturbating his penis in view of Roxana, and that's when she testified that he would masturbate in front of her and actually ejaculate in front of her. That is different than lewdness because he didn't actually have her

masturbate him. It's a little bit different in that regard.

Next, we move to Andover Place. Andover Place, if you'll remember from the testimony, is the one-bedroom apartment, and in that one-bedroom apartment Roxana testified to something that — to the same — she's now turning 13 to 14 years old, and she testified to the exact same conduct that would happen. He would do the exact same things that he always liked to do.

One of the things that is interesting about Andover Place is that they all slept in the same bed. Perla — or excuse me, Rosa, Roxana and the defendant all slept in the same bed. Defendant even admitted as much in his voluntary statement with the detective, that they all slept in the same bed. But what's interesting about Roxana's testimony is that the defendant would sleep in the middle. I don't know — I don't know how you guys like to sleep, but when somebody says that a 46-year-old man who is sleeping with his girlfriend and his girlfriend's daughter is sleeping in the same bed and he's sleeping in the middle, red light — red — you know, the bells start going off. Why is he sleeping in the middle? And you know exactly why he's sleeping in the middle.

In addition to Count 12, sexual penetration, tongue in anal opening.

Count 13, cunnilingus. Count 14, digital penetration. Count 15, digital penetration, fingers in

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al opening. We also have lewdness with a child under 14, ling the genital area or buttocks of Roxana. fied explicitly that she would be laying there, and while in the middle, he is reaching around, rubbing her butt, ing her butt and rubbing her vagina. That is Count 16, dness with a child under 14.

She testified further that these acts would occur in that same bedroom. There was only one bedroom, and so he was actually sleeping in that bed at this time as opposed to his own room with a makeshift bed. So that brings us to the second series of events, Count 17, cunnilingus again.

Count 18, sexual penetration, tongue in anal opening. Count 19, rubbing the breasts, with lewdness, child under 14.

Count 20, the digital penetration, the fingers in the anal opening.

Count 21, digital penetration, fingers in the genital opening.

And then Count 22, the lewdness with a child under 14, directing her to actually masturbate him. And like I said before, ejaculation was not necessary, and in this case, she testified that after he would make her do it, when he was about to ejaculate, he would finish himself off. She was very explicit in her testimony about that.

Continuing on with Count 23 in the Andover Place, the

sexual assaults continue, but now we know that she turned 14 on August 30th, 2007. So now, it's no longer sexual abuse via penetration on a person under 14. Now, it's under 16, so it's a different type of crime. It's a victim under 16. And she was explicit about the sexual penetration, the cunnilingus, the digital penetration and the digital penetration of her anus.

At the -- from 2007 to 2008, that's when she gets some reprieve, right? She finally doesn't have to deal with this and she testified to you that when she went to Tamarus, she had her 15th birthday, but the defendant didn't come around as much. And why didn't he come around as much? Because her mom had a different work schedule. Now, all of a sudden she's not a latchkey kid.

Now, all of a sudden she's coming home and her mom is home 'cause her mom already got done with work in the morning. So the defendant doesn't have the opportunity to continue with the sexual abuse. And mind you, this is a man who broke up with the victim's mother. She — Rosa testified she had no idea why he keeps coming around. According to Rosa, he already had another girlfriend, but yet he keeps coming around and she can't figure it out. She can't — she doesn't know why, but he keeps coming around except for when she's there at Tamarus.

2008 to 2009 moves to Southern Cove Apartments, and

we know then that she's 15 to 16 years old, and that's approximately the time that she gets a cell phone. He starts calling and texting her. The threats start coming back up and she testified that at Yahir's daughter's first birthday the whole family is there. The whole family is there celebrating the first birthday of Yahir's child, including the defendant, and the defendant is able to get in her ear and manipulate her and to start those threats back up. And soon after that, that's when the abuse starts again. Additionally, that's when she indicates that he would wait for her at the bus stop when she's coming home from school and it just starts all over again, and that's where we get Counts 27 through 31, the sexual penetration, tongue in anal opening.

Fingers in genital opening, Count 28. Count 29, fingers in anal opening. Count 30, cunnilingus. And Count 31, directing her to masturbate his penis. In 2009, we know that they move to Riverbend Village Apartments. Now, August 2009 to December 2009 is only four months. She's now 16 years old. She based on her testimony was starting to resist the defendant. She wasn't answering his phone calls. She wasn't returning his texts. She started to put up a fight because now she's figuring it out. She's growing older, she's maturing, but he would still wait for her, and that's Count 32, sexual penetration. This is the last that happened. This is the last time it happened when we're charging here. Count

32, sexual penetration tongue in anal opening.

33, cunnilingus. 34, digital penetration, fingers in genital opening. Count 35, digital penetration, fingers anal opening. And then directing her to masturbate his penis. So how do we know that this is corroborated, right?

We don't even have to have corroborative evidence.

We don't have to have anything to back it up, but how do we know that this is happening? Well, we're able to get some — and you'll have all this back there and I suggest you look at it. We actually have a translation too of what's going on in this case. So how do we know? Well, we got his text messages. Call me. Call me now. I'm going to tell everybody about Yahir. Here's a picture of your panties. Whose are these? Oh, you know, the panties, that was just a joke, you know. This is a 16-year-old girl that a 48-year-old man is texting who is not his daughter, not his daughter.

Now, let's go into the phone messages. We —— and I encourage you to look through this. We were able to get her phone number as 426-9146. Go through these and look how many times he called her on her cell phone from his cell phone. I put together a little calendar. It's not into evidence, but when you look through here, what you're going to find, November —— the first week in November, 15 times; second week of November, 14 times; third week of November, 18 times; fourth week of November, 26 times. Then he gets into

December, and true to his own word in his — in his statement to the detective he kind of quit calling. Well, he already knew the heat was on and he realized what's going on.

I want to go to one day in particular just to give you an idea of the type of persistence that he's calling this Roxana. December 23rd, 6:30 a.m., 6:32 a.m., 6:42 a.m., 6:43 a.m., 6:44 a.m., 6:44 a.m., 6:45 a.m., 6:46 a.m., 6:51, a.m., 6:52 a.m., 6:53 a.m., 6:54 a.m., 6:55 a.m. When Roxana told you she was tired of being bothered, she was tired of being bothered. He was incessantly contacting her because why? He wasn't keeping her secret. He knew what was going to happen. He knew that his secret was up. He knew that she has started to resist. She told you she would say, hey, come on, you know, be done already. And what would she [sic] say, oh, come on, five more minutes. She started to resist him, she started to grow up. She realized that she didn't have to take this anymore.

At the end of the day — I want to direct your attention, it's Instruction No. 28, and I hope you'll turn with me to it. Although you are to consider only the evidence in this — in the case in reaching a verdict, you must bring to the consideration of the evidence your every day common sense and judgment as reasonable men and women; thus, you are not limited solely to what you see and hear as the witnesses testify.

1	You may draw reasonable inferences from the evidence
2	which you feel are justified in the light of common experience
3	keeping in mind that such inferences should not be based on
4	speculation or guess. You guys are the jury that we picked to
5	return a verdict in this case. We selected you for a reason.
6	We selected you because you gave us your life stories, your
7	comments, your concerns. You are qualified by this Judge to
8	return a verdict in this case, bringing your common sense
9	together to figure out what's going on in this case. I submit
10	to you that the State has proved beyond a reasonable doubt
11	that that man is guilty of all 36 of those counts. Thank you.
12	THE COURT: Is the defendant ready to argue?
13	MR. FELICIANO: Yes. Thank you, Judge.
14	THE COURT: You may continue you may hang on a
15	second here.
16	MR. FELICIANO: Are we switched over? Yes.
17	THE COURT: All right. You may proceed.
18	MR. FELICIANO: Try it again. Something just
19	happened.
20	(Off-record colloquy.)
21	MR. FELICIANO: There it is. Thank you.
22	DEFENDANT'S CLOSING ARGUMENT
23	MR. FELICIANO: Better him than me. That's what this
24	case is about. Ms. Feliciano told you at the beginning of this case that that's what this case is about, and that's what
25	this case that that's what this case is about, and that's what

it is about. It's about Roxana not getting in trouble and getting Guillermo Renteria-Novoa in trouble to save herself. Guillermo is not guilty of any crime. This was a consensual relationship. Roxana was having a secret relationship with Yahir, her cousin. She was also having a secret relationship with her mom's ex-boyfriend. She was going to get in trouble for both of those relationships, so she made up these allegations to get herself out of trouble.

We saw this picture when Roxana testified and she said that Guillermo took it. This was at her 15th birthday, her Quinceanera. That's not the look of a — of a person that's looking at their victimizer. That's the look of a girl that's happy to be turning 15 and that's the picture that Guillermo took of her on that day. That's not the picture of an abused victim.

In this case, Roxana simply is not credible, and you have a credibility instruction in one of your jury instructions. That's Instruction No. 27. But that instruction tells you that — it's that the credibility or believability of a witness should be determined upon the stand, his relationship to the parties' fears, motives, interests or feelings, opportunity to observe the matter to which he testified, and the reasonableness of his statements and strengths or weaknesses of his recollections.

Looking at this case and looking at this instruction,

you can see that Roxana simply doesn't have any credibility.

Additionally, you'll see in this case, as you saw, there was a complete lack of investigation by the police. They took a few statements and that was about it. And you heard Mr.

Renteria—Novoa's statement, which is credible. Mr. Renteria came clean. He said — he said what he did do. He admitted to what he did do. He denied what he didn't do and his statement was credible.

So one of the things that makes Roxana not credible is the inconsistent stories that she told, and that's one of the things that you can consider when you're looking at her credibility, in addition to she told inconsistent stories to several people. In addition to the inconsistencies, you're going to — you heard the testimony of her family, and her family also shows that she's simply not credible. Okay. So the inconsistent stories, you heard what she told her family. She told her family several different stories.

In addition to her family, she talked to a counselor. She told the counselor a different story. After she spoke to the counselor, she did a written statement for the police, which was different. Then she gave a recorded statement to the police several weeks later, which was also different. Then finally, at the preliminary hearing, that's when she made the bulk of her allegations. That was completely different than anything she had ever said, and that was about nine

months before any allegations came to light.

Now, let's start with her family. What did she tell her family? She said — she told Maritza, you heard Maritza testify that Guillermo was bothering her. She never said anything about any type of sexual contact with Guillermo. She never said anything about sex with her cousin, simply that Guillermo was bothering her and wanted her to answer the phone. That was the only thing that Maritza said.

Janet, she spoke to her Aunt Janet. She gave absolutely no details about what happened. All she said is that she was just — she was being touched and that's it. Also, when she was — when she talked about Yahir, she didn't say anything about sex or kissing or anything. All she said was she was sitting on Yahir's legs.

And you heard the 9-1-1 call and you heard Jeimi testify. Jeimi testified, well, through her 9-1-1 tape, that the abuse had been going on for three years, and this was 2009 when this call was made, so they said three years in 2009.

Now, when they went to the counselor, which was right before 9-1-1 was called, they told the counselor that she had been abused for the past year. Also, they said it happened since she was 13 years old and that she was digitally penetrated on three different occasions. That's the first time that information comes up is when she's telling the counselor, and she tells the counselor she had been abused for

the past year, not three years, not five years. It's specifically for the past year.

Then we go to the written statement which happened the day the police were called. Again, Roxana says that she — her private parts were touched, he put his hand inside of her; however, there was no mention of some of the biggest details, and the most egregious conduct here was the vaginal licking and the anal licking and there's absolutely no mention of that. No mention to the counselor, no mention to her family, no mention at all. And if you look at — also looking at the written statement, you see that she was concerned about a sexual relationship coming out with her and her cousin.

So a few weeks later, she does her recorded statement. Now, she says the touching next started in 2004. This is 2010 when she's giving this statement, but she says it happened in 2004, so it's about five years now that she's saying this happened. So we went from three years to one year to possibly five years. They asked her about the last time she was touched and the last time she was touched, again, she doesn't mention anything about any type of anal licking or any type of vaginal licking. She just says that she was touched. And now, she only says that she kissed Yahir. Nothing about a sexual relationship, nothing about just sitting on his legs, now they just kissed.

Then we get to the preliminary hearing. Now, the

preliminary hearing, as you heard, was about nine months after the first — after the case first started after the police were called. Now, she is 11 years old when the touching started. Her breasts were touched, her vagina was touched. Now, she adds to the detail that Guillermo licked her vagina and licked her anus. This is the first time this is — she says any of this in the entire nine months that the case is going on. So she simply is not credible when her story changes that way.

Additionally, you heard Roxana testify to you here in court that Maritza knew, that she talked to Maritza about Yahir and they had a discussion and her and Maritza discussed it and they talked about it being wrong and they needed to stop and some other things about this whole relationship. But you heard Maritza testify. When she testified, she said that she didn't know anything about it until this — all these allegations came out, so that was the lie Roxana told directly to you.

Another thing that shows Roxana's credible is the gifts she accepted. Now, if she was being abused, would she accept gifts from her abuser? Would she accept shoes, iPods, backpacks from the person that was touching her breasts and licking her anus and licking her vagina? No, that simply doesn't make any sense. In addition to the gifts, you also heard that she would call him occasionally. She said that he

would call a lot more, but she also called him and she admitted that on the stand.

So in addition to the inconsistent stories, we have the family's testimony. Now, the family's testimony starts with Marissa — or Maritza. She says that Guillermo never harassed her at work. Now, Roxana, when she testified, she said that, yeah, that Guillermo would go to her work and harass her, but we have no evidence of that through Maritza. Maritza said she never saw anything like that at work, any type — anything that was abnormal. She said their relationship seemed like a normal relationship. She didn't suspect anything, and Roxana never told her anything about Guillermo. And Rox — again, Roxana never told her anything about Yahir.

We heard from Roxana's mother, who was very emotional. She said she never suspected anything. If she would have suspected something, she would have done something. She loves her daughter, she cares about her daughter, she would have done something if she suspected something was wrong. And to say something was going on from the time she was 11 until the time the police were called is simply unreasonable and simply doesn't make any sense.

We heard from Janet. Janet, also, didn't suspect anything. She said if she would have suspected something, she would have told somebody.

You also heard about the immigration benefits that Roxana received as a result of this case. Before these allegations, Roxana and her mother did not have legal status in this country. After these allegations came to light and after the preliminary hearing, they were both given visas. Now, they can both work here and stay here legally, which is — which, you would agree, it's a huge benefit. And that's all as a result of being a victim of a crime in this country. If they were not victims, they would still not have — they still would not have legal status.

We also heard about — we also heard Mr. Renteria's statement. You heard that police went to his home, they left a card. He called the same day. He played phone tag with the detective. He went down to the police station. Well, first, he made an appointment with the detective. He went down there on his own, not in cuffs. He went down there on his own to tell his side of the story, and that's what he did. He admitted to — he admitted to the contact. He admitted that he had seen her breasts. He admitted to the other things, but he did not admit to was the sexual penetration. That's because that didn't happen.

Another thing that you can look at when looking at whether you believe Mr. Renteria is credible is found in Instruction 23. It says the lack of flight of a person after he is accused of a crime is not sufficient in itself to

establish that he is not guilty, but it is a fact that — which may be considered by you in light of all other proved facts in deciding the question of whether he is guilty or not guilty.

Well, you heard after this, Guillermo was not arrested. It took months before he was arrested. He went about his life. He didn't leave the city, he didn't leave the state, he didn't leave the country. He stayed doing what he was going because his conscience was clear. He didn't flee, and this instruction shows that if you — that's something that you can consider when considering his statement.

Additionally, in this case, you see that there is a total lack of police investigation. There is no DNA. There is no fingerprints. You heard from the detective that they didn't do any type of forensic work. You heard that — from Roxana that a lot of these acts allegedly occurred in her house, which the police would have had access to; yet, they did no type of forensic work. They could have checked for DNA, they could have checked for prints, they could have checked for any type of fluids. They did none of that. And when we talked in jury selection, one of the questions I asked was is — do you think that people are entitled to a complete thorough investigation when they're accused of a crime, and the answer was yes, you are entitled to that. Mr. Renteria—Novoa did not get that.

They also interviewed several — they also failed to interview several witnesses. They didn't interview Rosa, they didn't interview Janet, they didn't interview Jeimi or Maritza to find out what they knew about the case.

MS. FLECK: That's a mis — I mean, I'll clear it up, but it's a misstatement. Rosa was interviewed and so was —

THE COURT: Hang on. Hang on.

MS. FLECK: -- Janet.

THE COURT: Are you making an objection or what?

MS. FLECK: I object because it's wrong.

THE COURT: All right. Well, you can correct it on rebuttal.

MR. FELICIANO: So the instruction on sexual assault with a minor under the age of 14 is found at — one of them is found at Instruction 5. And what that instruction tells you, if the State fails to prove beyond a reasonable doubt — I'm paraphrasing. If the State fails to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that they have proved their case, then Mr.

Renteria-Novoa is entitled to a verdict of not guilty, and that's exactly what we have here. Roxana was not under 14 years old when any of this conduct started and there was no sexual penetration.

So the next instruction is instruction — is instruction — well, I'm sorry. Is Lewdness with a minor under the age of 14, that's Instruction 14. Again, if the

State fails to prove lewdness with a child beyond the — under the age of 14, then Mr. Renteria—Novoa is entitled to a verdict of not guilty. Here, again, Roxana was not under 14 years old when any of the touching happened; therefore, he's not guilty of those charges.

Next is sexual assault with a minor under the age of 16. That's found in Instruction 7, and that basically mirrors Instruction 5. Basically, if the State fails to prove their case beyond a reasonable doubt, then he is entitled to a verdict of not guilty. In this case, Roxana consented to the contact. She consented to the conduct. There was no sexual penetration; therefore, there is no sexual assault with a minor under the age of 16.

Next we have sexual assault, which, again, is similar except there is no age requirement on this one. That's in Instruction 9, and Instruction 9 basically tells you if you — if the State fails to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that they have proven their case, that Mr. Renteria—Novoa is entitled to a verdict of not guilty.

Now, regarding the sexual assault charges, the last Instruction is 10 — or the last one I want to talk about is 10. This one — this one states basically that if you don't find there was no — ever any penetration, you must find him guilty of all the sexual assault charges, meaning the sexual assault under the age of 14, under the age of 16 and the

sexual assault charge. So because they have not proven beyond a reasonable doubt that there was penetration, you must find him not guilty.

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Open and gross lewdness is found at 21. Again, because Roxana consented to the conduct, there is no open and gross lewdness, so Mr. Renteria-Novoa is not guilty of that charge — those charges, rather.

The last instruction I'll direct you to is reasonable doubt instruction, which I'm not going to read the instruction to you, but you can read it when you're back in the jury room. But basically, what -- part of the instruction says is that you have to have an abiding conviction of the truth of the charge for there to be -- for there not to be a reasonable doubt, so can you say you have that here? Do you have an abiding conviction of the truth of the charges? Can you say that when Roxana's stories are completely inconsistent, when there was no forensic analysis or forensic testing done, when her family says things that are different than what she says? And looking at the way Roxana acted herself, can you really say there's no reasonable doubt in this case? We submit that There's simply too much reasonable doubt. you can't. Looking at all of the circumstances, looking at all of the inconsistencies, Mr. Renteria is not guilty of any charges.

As I said a moment ago, this case is about it's better him than me, and that's what we have shown you

throughout this trial. This was a consensual relationship.

Roxana was about to be found out about her cousin and about her — about her relationship with Guillermo. She was about to get in trouble. She made these allegations to get herself out of trouble. Based on that, we'd ask that you find Mr. Renteria—Novoa not guilty on all counts. Thanks.

THE COURT: Does the State wish to make a final rebuttal argument?

MS. FLECK: Yeah, I do. Thank you. Can we flip it over to the ELMO, please. Thank you.

STATE'S REBUTTAL ARGUMENT

MS. FLECK: This trial, ladies and gentlemen, like every trial that's happened before it, like every trial that's going to happen after it is about one thing. It's about a search and it's a search for the truth. In this particular case, it's a search for the truth of what happened between 2005 — 2004ish and 2009 between Roxana Perez and this defendant. You may think all of a sudden, I know we're all tired, that you're actually in the trial of State of Nevada versus Roxana Perez; however, you're not. To bring you back to reality, you are in the trial of State of Nevada versus Guillermo Renteria—Novoa.

So let's talk about the truth of what happened to this child starting when she was 12 years old by a person who by his own admission is her father figure, is the only man

that she had known in the United States as a father, as the one she knew back in Mexico left her and her sister Perla and her mother for another man. She comes here, she meets her cousin Yahir.

Again, not State of Nevada versus Yahir. Was Yahir taking advantage, also, of a small young girl, probably, but they're much closer in age, and you have a jury instruction that's going to tell you you are not here to determine the guilt of anybody else. There is but one man on trial today, and that is this defendant.

So he walks in and he finds an 11-year-old girl in bed with her cousin, under blankets with her cousin, and what does he do instead of counseling her, instead of advising her, instead of talking to her about the birds and the bees, no, he shows her about the birds and the bees. He literally turns a child into a woman over night.

Now, the defense tells you that this case is consensual. Okay. Well, first of all, straight away you cannot consent to lewdness with a minor, so we have counts pled under the age of 14 as lewdness with a minor. The defendant told you — or Mr. Feliciano told you that there is no proof that this started before 14. I think in — I think he actually conclusively said it didn't happen when she was younger than 14. He also told you that the defendant is the person who is credible. Of course, Roxana isn't, of course,

Metro isn't, of course, no one else in the case is but the defendant.

Well, if he's so credible, then let's take his word for it, okay? Because he tells the police this happened when she was 12 years old, that he walked in and he saw her with her cousin at 12 years old and that the sexual relationship starts immediately thereafter, and it starts with him touching her boobs —

MR. FELICIANO: Judge, I'm going to object. That's a misstatement.

MS. FLECK: You have the --

MR. FELICIANO: He found --

THE COURT: Hang on. Hang on.

MR. FELICIANO: He found --

THE COURT: This is — the jury heard the testimony. They can draw the — they can make conclusion — their own conclusions about the facts. This is argument, all right?

MS. FLECK: I invite you to. If you want to — if you want to listen to his statement again, I absolutely invite you to, and I promise that this is what you will hear. What you will hear is that he walked in and he saw her when she was 12 years old, and you will hear that the relationship started after he saw her with her cousin, and that was at 12 years old. And it started by him looking at her boobs and her naked body, and it started with him touching her boobs and kissing

her boobs, and those are lewdnesses with a minor for which there is no defense of consent.

That means that he is touching her naked body with the intent of gratifying himself sexually or in his sick mind her sexually. There is no other reason that a 48-year-old man touches a 12-year-old's body, even a 13-year-old's body. There is no other reason but to sexually gratify themselves or her.

So when you go back to your — to deliberate and you look at the verdict form and you see Counts 3 for rubbing breasts of the body under 14 and you see Count 8 for licking the breasts, when you see Count 14, rubbing and touching breasts, those are all under 14, and there is absolutely no defense to that. So consent, you cannot have a consensual sexual relationship between a father and a child.

Again, by the defendant's own admission, he is a father figure to her and they had a father daughter relationship. Why? Because they are not equals. They are not emotional equals. There is a power differential in this relationship that makes it impossible for her to consent. This is why teachers don't have sex with children. This is why psychiatrists don't have sex with their patients. There is no freewill here.

Clearly, these are under conditions in which the defendant, as a 48-year-old man who has helped raise this

child, knew or should have known that she is incapable of consenting. How do we know that there was sexual penetration when she was under 14? Because she sat on that witness stand, a girl who told you she came here illegally, a girl who has never disclosed the sickening events that that man put her through to her mother, to her aunt, to a teacher, to her sister, even to date. Is it — is it strange that she has never said that before, absolutely not. What child could possibly make this up?

If she was going to make something up, it would be we had sex — we had sex. We had actual intercourse, but that child that you saw on that witness stand is going to make up a story like he turned her over on all fours and took his tongue and systematically for 15 to 20 minutes licked her anus until he penetrated her anus with his tongue? She told you that because that's what happened, and if it didn't happen and if she didn't feel finally like she could free this from herself, she would never, ever walk in this courtroom, sit on that witness stand and disclose that kind of horrific embarrassing information to a room full of strangers.

It was under conditions in which the defendant knew or should have known. Furthermore, she's 12, she's 13, 14, 15, 16 years old and she is complying because she is being threatened. You know that these threats occurred because up until 2009, even in December, you see the threats on text

messages. It's exactly like she said.

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I mean, odd, right, that five years later he is still using this. When the threats started and she is 12, you have to understand what her mindset is. This is a naive girl who has barely come to this country, who has been caught doing something that's humiliating, okay? Not only is she with a boy and she's scared that her mom's going to find out, but that her whole family will know that she's making out with somebody within her family. That's embarrassing. And she's so naive that she's able to be manipulated. She's being able -- she's able to be manipulated by the defendant saying I'm going to tell everyone. I'm going to ruin your life. In her mind, it is. In her mind, there is literally something that her mother could do, an embarrassment through her family that would be worse for her than this man taking his tongue on a systematic repeated basis and sticking it into her anus. That is how much manipulation had been imposed upon her.

So consent, you have an instruction, and it's Instruction 20. It says it is a defense to the charge of sexual assault that the defendant entertained a reasonable and good faith belief that the alleged victim consented to engage in sexual penetration. If you find such reasonable good faith belief, even if mistaken, you must give the defendant the benefit of the doubt and find him not guilty of sexual assault. A belief that is based upon ambiguous conduct by the

alleged victim that is the product of force, violence, duress, menace or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury on the person or of another is not reasonable or good faith. So did he entertain a reasonable good faith belief that this act repeated over and over again for four years was consensual?

Let's look at his statement. What is the first thing that he says to the detective? I think I did a mistake.

Well, if it's a consensual sexual relationship, why is it a mistake? Why is that the first thing that comes out of his mouth? Because he's raping a 12-year-old, a 13-year-old, a 14-year-old, a 15-year-old, a 16-year-old, and that, ladies and gentlemen, is not a mistake. A mistake is cheating on your spouse, a mistake is, you know, maybe taking a little bit of extra money when you shouldn't take a little bit of extra money. This is 36 counts of criminal conduct. This is not a mistake.

He tells the detective, oh, I tell you the truth. You know, according to him, it was consensual and does he have a reasonable good faith to believe that she's consenting? He says I tell you the truth. Really? Look at how many times in his statement he did not tell the truth. It starts out with, well, yes, I was with her, but she just showed me. Well, showed me morphed into, well, yes, actually, I did — I did touch one time or I kissed one time. It's always one time. And then, well, did you ever masturbate in front of her? No,

never. Did you ever masturbate in front of her? Okay. One time. Did you ever touch her? No, I never touched her. Never, never. Oh, one time I touched her vagina, of course, over her clothes.

Each and every time that the defendant [sic] asked him a question, he had a different response, yet he's the credible one. There's not a shred of truth through that, except for something like this. Yeah, I tried to have sex with her, but she wouldn't. The only reason he didn't have sexual penetration with her with penis to vagina is because she absolutely refused. Oh, and this one, I didn't have sex with her because I have too much respect for her and her mother. That's rich. So apparently, it's disrespectful to put your penis in a child, but it wasn't disrespectful to touch her breasts, to lick her breast, to touch her vagina, to look at her naked body. Apparently, that's not disrespectful according to the defendant.

So when you go through all the times that the defense told you, well, the defendant told you this, the defendant told you that, the defendant said he never kissed her vagina, as you know, you can't trust what the defendant says. Who can you trust? That girl that sat on the witness stand and poured her heart out to you.

Consensual, well, why does he have to threaten her? Why does he have to threaten a girl that is having a

consensual relationship with him? Now, she's 16 years old.

Let's just pretend for argument's sake that by this point in time she has grown to love him. Let's just pretend and give him the benefit of that doubt. Well, really, normally, when women are in consensual relationships with men, they are watching their cell phones and they are literally willing it to ring. They are willing a text message to come through. They are not ignoring 15, 20 phone calls a day. They are begging for their boyfriend to call. So why do you have to threaten a woman that you're having a consensual sexual relationship with to call you? Because it wasn't consensual, because the only reason she had any contact with him ever is because he was blackmailing her and extorting sex from him [sic].

Consensual sexual relationship, let's again just go with the off chance that she's really making these deals with him, okay? It's ridiculous. I mean, she's accepted, what, a JanSport backpack, some shoes, some food, pure necessities from this man, who, again, admittedly is like a father to her. Is it reasonable to think that — the defense said is it reasonable to think that, you know, if — that a victim of a crime would be accepting these gifts and acting this way, yeah, it's reasonable.

In fact, it happens with victims around the world every single day, and that is why, ladies and gentlemen,

1	people can be victimized because it happens in houses that
2	people would never expect. It happens with relationships with
3	people with people that other people would never expect.
4	MR. FELICIANO: Judge, I'm going to object. This is
5	improper
6	THE COURT: Hang on.
7	MR. FELICIANO: argument.
8	THE COURT: I'm sorry?
9	MR. FELICIANO: Argument is improper.
10	THE COURT: How is it improper?
11	MR. FELICIANO: She's talking about other people
12	around in other households throughout the world. That's
13	absolutely improper.
14	MS. FLECK: All right. Well, you can draw on your
15	common sense.
16	THE COURT: All right. Well, hang on. So do you
17	want a ruing on the objection or are you just kind of moving
18	on, Ms. Fleck?
19	MS. FLECK: I'll move on and I'll
20	THE COURT: All right.
21	MS. FLECK: And I'll liken it to a law. Okay?
22	There's a law, ladies and gentlemen, that tells us that the
23	victim of a sexual assault or a lewdness does not need to be
24	corroborated, and the reason that it doesn't need to be

corroborated, that the victim does not, is for situations

1	exactly like this. Mr. Feliciano said that he thought it was
2	ridiculous that no one in her family would ever expect that
3	this abuse was occurring, but guess what, the Nevada Supreme
4	Court, they didn't think it was very ridiculous when they came
5	up with a law that told us that a victim doesn't need to be
6	corroborated, and that's exactly why. Because people don't
7	commit these kinds of crimes in the middle of a casino with
8	an, you know, eye in the sky watching where it's all on video.
9	They commit these kinds of crimes behind closed doors, under
10	the eyes of a family that would never suspect them because
11	they are their boyfriend, they are somebody that they trust,
12	that they love, that they have brought into their home.
13	That's how people like Guillermo Renteria-Novoa get away with
14	it for so long and that's why he did.

So we were talking about this whole thing about her making deals to get things. Again, you know, she got a JanSport backpack. Is she going to allow him to do the things that he did to her for that long for a JanSport backpack?

Finally, consent, when you — if you choose to listen to the defendant's statement again, there is a couple of times where the defendant — detective asks him, was she okay with it, and it's like I hear crickets. Literally, the defendant is silent because he cannot come up with an excuse fast enough, because of course she was not okay with it. She's a beautiful young woman and she's going to have sex with this

∥ man?

2 MR. FELICIANO: Judge, that's — objection. 3 Disparaging. It's improper.

MS. FLECK: Okay. Let me rephrase.

THE COURT: Overruled. Overruled. Go ahead.

MS. FLECK: She's going to have sex with a 48-year-old man who was helping raise her, who had been having sexual relationships with her mother? Of course she wasn't okay with it.

Okay. Briefly, you know, regarding Roxana's credibility, you saw her, you had the opportunity to listen to her, you saw when she cried, when she didn't cry. You saw what she had difficulty talking about and what she didn't. This is a young girl, again, who came here from Mexico, English is her second language, she has to talk about some of the most embarrassing things that have probably ever happened to her, much more have to discuss it. Do her stories lack in — or have — are they inconsistent?

Well, if a story is scripted, there aren't going to be inconsistencies because you have a script and you know it by heart, you've memorized it. But when you're telling the truth and you're recalling what has happened to you in your life, there's, of course, going to be small inconsistencies. You're never going to tell the same story twice when you're relaying — even a trip, if you tell, you know, even when you

guys are out in the nair just waiting for us to, you know,
argue instructions or whatever it is we're talking about in
here, and you talk about, oh, last week I went to the you
know, up to Mount Zion, you might tell the same story later or
tonight at dinner and you won't tell the exact same details,
but it doesn't does it mean that you're lying? Of course
not. Different things come into mind. You might feel much
more comfortable talking tonight at dinner with one of your
friends than you do amongst each other. It certainly doesn't
mean that somebody is lying.

The fact that she didn't tell anybody about the anal licking or the cunnilingus until she came into our office where she was talking with a female DA who does this every single day, that shows how credible she is. She was terrified —

MR. FELICIANO: Judge, I'm going to object. She's vouching at this point for the witness.

MS. FLECK: Okay. Well --

THE COURT: All right. Ms. --

MS. FLECK: And I'll rephrase.

THE COURT: Thanks.

MS. FLECK: But use that when you go back to judge her credibility. Up until that point, she had only spoken to men about this or people in her family. Her stories to Maritza, to Janet, to Jeimi, to the counselor, her written

statement, and then the one that — her recorded statement, there really are no inconsistencies in those. Literally, the only thing that's different between any of them is that she never disclosed the cunnilingus or the anal licking.

There was a lot of talk about the fact that she — what years she said. End of the day, who cares what year she said. Go by what the defendant said. The defendant said it started when she was 12.

The police work, you know, of course, if it's not that Roxana is lying or that it's consensual or that she was doing it for gifts, it's that the police didn't do a good job. Well, what more could they have done? There's not going to be DNA in a case two months later. The last sexual encounter was in November of 2009.

Furthermore, what evidence was there? There was never an allegation that he penetrated her with his penis, that he came inside of her, that he came on her body. You can only do what you can do, and again, that's why the law accounts in cases like this for the fact that if you believe a victim beyond a reasonable doubt, it's enough.

So ladies and gentlemen, at the end of this case, we have the defendant admitting that he has made mistakes. That he wants to take responsibility for them. And his idea was to strike another deal with the detective. His idea was to, you know, just — let's put this behind us. I'll stay away from

that family and I'll just move on with my life. But the 1 problem is is that the mistakes that he made are bigger than 2 that. The mistakes that he made are criminal. 3 systematically, repeatedly raped a child. First, she was 14, 4 5 then she was 15. I'm sorry. First, she was 12 or 13, then 14, 15 and 16. And for those mistakes, he needs to be held 6 7 accountable, so I'm going to ask on behalf of the State of Nevada that you go back after a very long day, that you 8 deliberate, and that you come back in here and you tell him that those mistakes are bigger than just pushing them aside 10 and moving on and staying away from the family. 11 12 mistakes are criminal. Those are choices that he made for

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THE COURT: All right, ladies and gentlemen. You now have heard all the evidence as well as the arguments of counsel. The clerk will now swear the marshal to take charge of the jury and the court recorder will take charge of the alternates.

which he needs to be held accountable. Thank you.

(OFFICERS OF THE COURT, SWORN)

THE COURT: All right. I will now tell you that the two alternates in our case are Juror No. 13, Mr.

Gebrechristos, and Juror No. 14, Mr. Garwood. What I want the two of you to do is hang on for a couple minutes 'cause I have some separate instructions for you. The remaining 12 of you, what I want you to do is this. Joe is going to take you back

to the deliberation room.

I want you to do two things right now. First of all, I want you to pick a foreperson because you're going to need someone to come back here and answer a quick question that I have. The second thing that I want you to do, and this is the question that I'm going to ask you, is — and you can decide any method you want to to pick a foreperson, but the second conversation I want you to have is what you want to do about scheduling? Do you want to call it a day and start tomorrow morning, or do you want to give it a stab at deliberating tonight? What I want you to do is go back and have as long a conversation or as short a conversation as you guys want to, and then when you're ready, let Joe know and he'll bring you back in here.

And Mr. Garwood and Mr. Gebrechristos, let me get you to hang on for one second.

THE MARSHAL: Do you let them take the --

THE COURT: The instructions?

THE MARSHAL: -- the instructions back?

THE COURT: Yes, they can --

THE MARSHAL: Okay.

THE COURT: -- take them back.

(Jury recessed at 7:49 p.m.)

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Gebrechristos and Mr. Garwood -- well, before I do that. Let me just tell you a

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couple of things. In a moment, I'm going to discharge you and Sara over here sitting to the far right is going to have a conversation. Give her your cell phone number and your contact information. The two of you have heard all the evidence in this case. You will not be deliberating, but the reason we have alternates is it's actually surprisingly common that one of the jurors has some issue, maybe a family emergency, something like that where they can't deliberate. And rather than just do the whole trial over again, what we'll do is we'll give you a call on your cell phone and you — one of you may have to jump in and start deliberating.

So even after you leave the courtroom tonight, you're still technically part of this case, which means that all the instructions I gave you before apply. Don't talk to anybody about this case, don't deliberate among yourselves about what you guys think, don't reach any conclusions, all of those kinds of things, all right, because tech — because you could be called in at any second. I don't know what they're going to do, if they're going to keep on going tonight or if they're going to start in the morning, but you know, I would guess anecdotally and probably at least — well, probably around a third of my cases we have to call one or sometimes both of the jurors in for whatever reason, just, you know, stuff happens, you know, that kind of thing.

So you know, you're -- since you're not actively

1	deliberating, so until you get a call from us, you can go
2	about your daily lives, but don't do a brain dump and forget
3	everything you heard the last couple days because you never
4	know, right? And if anybody asks you, even if you go back to
5	work tomorrow or go back to your families, if they ask you,
6	hey, is the trial over, tell them, I'm an alternate, I can't
7	talk to you about this case, I could be called in, all right?
8	And all the same admonishments, don't research the case, don't
9	go to the scene, all that kind of thing because technically
10	you're still part of the jury, all right? So I'm going to
11	have Sara take you back and she'll collect your information
12	and you're free to go
13	UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Do we leave the paperwork here
14	or
15	THE COURT: I'm sorry? Yes. Leave all that stuff
16	here. Joe will collect it. If we need to call you, you'll
17	he'll give you all those things back to you, all right?
18	THE COURT RECORDER: He's wondering if he has to work
19	tomorrow?
20	THE COURT: I'm sorry?
21	THE COURT RECORDER: He might have to work tomorrow.

24 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Yes

back to your employment?

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THE COURT: Yeah, you're free to do so until or

THE COURT: I'm sorry. Do you mean you have to go

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	unless you receive a call 'cause, you know, you may not be
2	called. You might be called, but you obviously, you won't
3	know so go back and resume your life, but tell your boss that
4	since you're an alternate, there's a possibility you might be
5	called, all right?
6	(Juror Nos. 13 and 14 exit the courtroom.)
7	MS. FLECK: What's that, sweetie?
8	THE COURT RECORDER: If their choice is to
9	deliberate, we need something for them to have in the jury
10	room for them to listen to the CDs.
11	MS. FLECK: Okay.
12	MR. GRAHAM: I got two.
13	MS. FLECK: Yeah. We actually have one.
14	THE COURT RECORDER: Okay.
15	THE COURT: Well, let's find out. They should
16	they're they'll probably come back pretty quickly
17	MS. FLECK: Well, we'll leave it anyway.
18	MR. FELICIANO: A laptop?
19	MR. GRAHAM: Yeah.
20	MR. FELICIANO: Is there anything on there?
21	MR. GRAHAM: I don't think this one.
22	MS. FLECK: Well, we just said we're going to clear
23	it off.

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blank. They usually have one that they're IT department --

1	MR. GRAHAM: This one
2	MR. FELICIANO: Okay.
3	MR. GRAHAM: Yeah, I'll clear this one.
4	(Pause in proceedings)
5	(Court recessed for the evening at 7:53 p.m.)
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CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE FOREGOING IS A CORRECT TRANSCRIPT FROM THE AUDIO-VISUAL RECORDING OF THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE ABOVE-ENTITLED MATTER.

AFFIRMATION

I AFFIRM THAT THIS TRANSCRIPT DOES NOT CONTAIN THE SOCIAL SECURITY OR TAX IDENTIFICATION NUMBER OF ANY PERSON OR ENTITY.

KARR REPORTING, INC. Aurora, Colorado

KIMBERLY LAWSON

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DISTRICT COURT

CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

THE STATE OF NEVADA,

Plaintiff,

-VS-

CASE NO. C268285-1

DEPT. NO. XX

GUILLERMO RENTERIA-NOVOA

#2755564

Defendant.

JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION
(JURY TRIAL)

The Defendant previously entered a plea of not guilty to the crimes of COUNTS 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 9, 10, 12, 13, 14, 15, 17, 18, 20, 21 — SEXUAL ASSAULT WITH A MINOR UNDER THE AGE OF 14 (Category A Felony), in violation of NRS 200.364, 200.366; COUNTS 3, 7, 8, 16, 19, 22 — LEWDNESS WITH A CHILD UNDER THE AGE OF 14 (Category A Felony), in violation of NRS 201.230; COUNTS 11, 31, 36 — OPEN OR GROSS LEWDNESS (Gross Misdemeanor), in violation of NRS 201.220; COUNTS 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30 — SEXUAL ASSAULT WITH A MINOR UNDER THE AGE OF 16 (Category A Felony), in violation of NRS 200.366; and COUNTS 32, 33, 34, 35 — SEXUAL ASSAULT (Category A Felony), in violation of NRS 200.366; and the matter having been tried before a jury and the Defendant having been found guilty of the crimes of COUNT 1 — SEXUAL ASSAULT WITH A MINOR UNDER THE AGE OF 14 (Category A Felony), in violation of NRS 200.366; COUNT 2 —

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SEXUAL ASSAULT WITH A MINOR UNDER THE AGE OF 14 (Category A Felony), in violation of NRS 200.364, 200.366; COUNT 3 - LEWDNESS WITH A CHILD UNDER THE AGE OF 14 (Category A Felony), in violation of NRS 201.230; COUNT 4 -SEXUAL ASSAULT WITH A MINOR UNDER THE AGE OF 14 (Category A Felony), in violation of NRS 200.364, 200.366; COUNT 5 – SEXUAL ASSAULT WITH A MINOR UNDER THE AGE OF 14 (Category A Felony), in violation of NRS 200.364, 200.366; COUNT 6 - SEXUAL ASSAULT WITH A MINOR UNDER THE AGE OF 14 (Category A Felony), in violation of NRS 200.364, 200.366; COUNT 7 - LEWDNESS WITH A CHILD UNDER THE AGE OF 14 (Category A Felony), in violation of NRS 201.230; COUNT 8 -LEWDNESS WITH A CHILD UNDER THE AGE OF 14 (Category A Felony), in violation of NRS 201.230; COUNT 9 - SEXUAL ASSAULT WITH A MINOR UNDER THE AGE OF 14 (Category A Felony), in violation of NRS 200.364, 200.366; COUNT 10 -SEXUAL ASSAULT WITH A MINOR UNDER THE AGE OF 14 (Category A Felony), in violation of NRS 200.364, 200.366; COUNT 11 - OPEN OR GROSS LEWDNESS (Gross Misdemeanor), in violation of NRS 201.220; COUNT 12 - SEXUAL ASSAULT WITH A MINOR UNDER THE AGE OF 14 (Category A Felony), in violation of NRS 200.364, 200.366; COUNT 13 - SEXUAL ASSAULT WITH A MINOR UNDER THE AGE OF 14 (Category A Felony), in violation of NRS 200.364, 200.366; COUNT 14 -SEXUAL ASSAULT WITH A MINOR UNDER THE AGE OF 14 (Category A Felony), in violation of NRS 200.364, 200.366; COUNT 15 - SEXUAL ASSAULT WITH A MINOR UNDER THE AGE OF 14 (Category A Felony), in violation of NRS 200.364, 200.366; COUNT 16 - LEWDNESS WITH A CHILD UNDER THE AGE OF 14 (Category A Felony), in violation of NRS 201.230; COUNT 17 - SEXUAL ASSAULT WITH A MINOR

UNDER THE AGE OF 14 (Category A Felony), in violation of NRS 200.364, 200.366; COUNT 18 - SEXUAL ASSAULT WITH A MINOR UNDER THE AGE OF 14 (Category A Felony), in violation of NRS 200.364, 200.366; COUNT 19 - LEWDNESS WITH A CHILD UNDER THE AGE OF 14 (Category A Felony), in violation of NRS 201.230; COUNT 20 - SEXUAL ASSAULT WITH A MINOR UNDER THE AGE OF 14 (Category A Felony), in violation of NRS 200.364, 200.366; COUNT 21 - SEXUAL ASSAULT WITH A MINOR UNDER THE AGE OF 14 (Category A Felony), in violation of NRS 200.364, 200.366; COUNT 22 - LEWDNESS WITH A CHILD UNDER THE AGE OF 14 (Category A Felony), in violation of NRS 201.230; COUNT 23 - SEXUAL ASSAULT WITH A MINOR UNDER THE AGE OF 16 (Category A Felony), in violation of NRS 200.364, 200.366; COUNT 24 - SEXUAL ASSAULT WITH A MINOR UNDER THE AGE OF 16 (Category A Felony), in violation of NRS 200.364, 200.366; COUNT 25 -SEXUAL ASSAULT WITH A MINOR UNDER THE AGE OF 16 (Category A Felony), in violation of NRS 200.364, 200.366; COUNT 26 - SEXUAL ASSAULT WITH A MINOR UNDER THE AGE OF 16 (Category A Felony), in violation of NRS 200.364, 200.366; COUNT 27 - SEXUAL ASSAULT WITH A MINOR UNDER THE AGE OF 16 (Category A Felony), in violation of NRS 200.364, 200.366; COUNT 28 - SEXUAL ASSAULT WITH A MINOR UNDER THE AGE OF 16 (Category A Felony), in violation of NRS 200.364, 200.366; COUNT 29 - SEXUAL ASSAULT WITH A MINOR UNDER THE AGE OF 16 (Category A Felony), in violation of NRS 200.364, 200.366; COUNT 30 -SEXUAL ASSAULT WITH A MINOR UNDER THE AGE OF 16 (Category A Felony), in violation of NRS 200.364, 200.366; COUNT 31 - OPEN OR GROSS LEWDNESS (Gross Misdemeanor), in violation of NRS 201.220; COUNT 32 - SEXUAL ASSAULT

(Category A Felony), in violation of NRS 200.364, 200.366; COUNT 33 - SEXUAL ASSAULT (Category A Felony), in violation of NRS 200.364, 200.366; COUNT 34 - SEXUAL ASSAULT (Category A Felony), in violation of NRS 200.364, 200.366; COUNT 35 - SEXUAL ASSAULT (Category A Felony), in violation of NRS 200.364, 200.366; and COUNT 36 - OPEN OR GROSS LEWDNESS (Gross Misdemeanor), in violation of NRS 201.220; thereafter, on the 6TH day of September, 2012, the Defendant was present in court for sentencing with his counsels, AMY FELICIANO, Deputy Public Defender and, MIKE FELICIANO, Deputy Public Defender, and good cause appearing,

THE DEFENDANT IS HEREBY ADJUDGED guilty of said offense(s) and, in addition to the \$25.00 Administrative Assessment Fee, \$150.00 DNA Analysis Fee including testing to determine genetic markers, and to PAY \$880.00 RESTITUTION, the Defendant is SENTENCED as follows: AS TO COUNTS 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 9, 10, 12, 13, 14, 15, 17, 18, 20, 21 - LIFE with a MINIMUM Parole Eligibility AFTER TWENTY (20) YEARS in the Nevada Department of Corrections (NDC); AS TO COUNTS 3, 7, 8, 16, 19, 22 - LIFE with a MINIMUM Parole Eligibility AFTER TEN (10) YEARS in the Nevada Department of Corrections (NDC); AS TO COUNTS 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30 -LIFE with a MINIMUM Parole Eligibility AFTER TWENTY-FIVE (25) YEARS in the Nevada Department of Corrections (NDC); AS TO COUNTS 11, 31, 36 – TWELVE (12) MONTHS in the Clark County Detention Center (CCDC); and AS TO COUNTS 32, 33, 34, 35 - LIFE with a MINIMUM Parole Eligibility AFTER TEN (10) YEARS in the Nevada Department of Corrections (NDC); COUNT 3 to run CONSECUTIVE to COUNT 1; COUNT 6 to run CONSECUTIVE to COUNTS 1 and 3; COUNT 23 to run CONSECUTIVE to COUNTS 1, 3, and 6; COUNT 32 to run CONSECUTIVE to

COUNTS 1, 3, 6 and 23; ALL REMAINING COUNTS to run CONCURRENT with each other; with SEVEN HUNDRED SIXTY-TWO (762) DAYS Credit for Time Served.

FURTHER ORDERED, a SPECIAL SENTENCE of LIFETIME SUPERVISION is imposed to commence upon release from any term of imprisonment, probation or parole.

ADDITIONALLY, the Defendant is ORDERED to REGISTER as a sex offender in accordance with NRS 179D.460 within FORTY-EIGHT (48) HOURS after any release from custody.

COURT FURTHER ORDERED, Registration after conviction; duties and procedure, offender or sex offender informed of duty to register; effect of failure to inform; duties and procedure upon receipt of notification from another jurisdiction or Federal Bureau of Investigation.

- 1. If the Central Repository receives notice from a court pursuant to NRS 176.0926 that an offender has been convicted of a crime against a child, pursuant to NRS 176.0927 that a sex offender has been convicted of a sexual offense or pursuant to NRS 62F.220 that a juvenile has been adjudicated delinquent for an offense for which the juvenile is subject to registration and community notification pursuant to NRS 179D.010 to 179D.550, inclusive, the Central Repository shall:
- (a) If a record of registration has not previously been established for the offender or sex offender, notify the local law enforcement agency so that a record of registration may be established; or
- (b) If a record of registration has previously been established for the offender or sex offender, update the record of registration for the offender or sex offender and notify the

appropriate local law enforcement agencies.

- 2. If the offender or sex offender named in the notice is granted probation or otherwise will not be incarcerated or confined, the Central Repository shall:
- (a) Immediately provide notification concerning the offender or sex offender to the appropriate local law enforcement agencies and, if the offender or sex offender resides in a jurisdiction which is outside of this State, to the appropriate law enforcement agency in that jurisdiction; and
- (b) Immediately provide community notification concerning the offender or sex offender pursuant to the provisions of NRS 179D.475.
- 3. If an offender or sex offender is incarcerated or confined and has previously been convicted of a crime against a child as described in NRS 179D.0357 or a sexual offense as described in NRS 179D.097, before the offender or sex offender is released:
- (a) The Department of Corrections or a local law enforcement agency in whose facility the offender or sex offender is incarcerated or confined shall:
- (1) Inform the offender or sex offender of the requirements for registration, including, but not limited to:
- (I) The duty to register initially with the appropriate law enforcement agency in the jurisdiction in which the offender or sex offender was convicted if the offender or sex offender is not a resident of that jurisdiction pursuant to NRS 179D.445;
- (II) The duty to register in this State during any period in which the offender or sex offender is a resident of this State or a nonresident who is a student or worker within this State and the time within which the offender or sex offender is required to register pursuant to NRS 179D.460;

- (III) The duty to register in any other jurisdiction during any period in which the offender or sex offender is a resident of the other jurisdiction or a nonresident who is a student or worker within the other jurisdiction;
- (IV) If the offender or sex offender moves from this State to another jurisdiction, the duty to register with the appropriate law enforcement agency in the other jurisdiction;
- (V) The duty to notify the local law enforcement agency for the jurisdiction in which the offender or sex offender now resides, in person, and the jurisdiction in which the offender or sex offender formerly resided, in person or in writing, if the offender or sex offender changes the address at which the offender or sex offender resides, including if the offender or sex offender moves from this State to another jurisdiction, or changes the primary address at which the offender or sex offender is a student or worker; and (VI) The duty to notify immediately the appropriate local law enforcement agency if the offender or sex offender is, expects to be or becomes enrolled as a student at an institution of higher education or changes the date of commencement or termination of the offender or sex offender is enrollment at an institution of higher education or if the offender or sex offender is, expects to be or becomes a worker at an institution of higher
- (2) Require the offender or sex offender to read and sign a form stating that the requirements for registration have been explained and that the offender or sex offender understands the requirements for registration, and to forward the form to the Central Repository.

education or changes the date of commencement or termination of the offender or sex

- (b) The Central Repository shall:
- (1) Update the record of registration for the offender or sex offender;

offender s work at an institution of higher education; and

- (2) Provide community notification concerning the offender or sex offender pursuant to the provisions of NRS 179D.475; and
- (3) Provide notification concerning the offender or sex offender to the appropriate local law enforcement agencies and, if the offender or sex offender will reside upon release in a jurisdiction which is outside of this State, to the appropriate law enforcement agency in that jurisdiction.
- 4. The failure to provide an offender or sex offender with the information or confirmation form required by paragraph (a) of subsection 3 does not affect the duty of the offender or sex offender to register and to comply with all other provisions for registration.
- 5. If the Central Repository receives notice from another jurisdiction or the Federal Bureau of Investigation that an offender or sex offender is now residing or is a student or worker within this State, the Central Repository shall:
- (a) Immediately provide notification concerning the offender or sex offender to the appropriate local law enforcement agencies;
- (b) Establish a record of registration for the offender or sex offender; and
- (c) Immediately provide community notification concerning the offender or sex offender pursuant to the provisions of NRS 179D.475. (Added to NRS by 1997, 1655; A 1999, 1300; 2001, 2058; 2001 Special Session, 227; 2003, 289, 573, 1122; 2007, 2765,3252).

DATED	SEP 1 0 2012

JEROME TÃO DISTRICT JUDGE

10/05/2012 04:24:22 PM NOAS 1 PHILIP J. KOHN, PUBLIC DEFENDER 2 NEVADA BAR No. 0556 **CLERK OF THE COURT** 309 South Third Street, Suite 226 Las Vegas, Nevada 89155 (702) 455-4685Attorney for Defendant 4 5 DISTRICT COURT 6 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 7 THE STATE OF NEVADA, 8 Plaintiff, CASE NO. C-10-268285-1 9 DEPT. NO. XX v. 10 GUILLERMO RENTERIO-NOVOA, 11 Defendant. NOTICE OF APPEAL 12 13 TO: THE STATE OF NEVADA 14 STEVEN B. WOLFSON, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA and DEPARTMENT NO. XX OF THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL 15 DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLARK. 16 17

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NOTICE is hereby given that Defendant, Guillermo Renterio-Novoa, presently incarcerated in the Nevada State Prison, appeals to the Supreme Court of the State of Nevada from the judgment entered against said Defendant on the 17th day of September, 2012, whereby he was convicted of Cts. 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 9, 10, 12, 13, 14, 15, 17, 18, 20, 21, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32 - Sexual Assault With a Minor Under the Age of 14; Ct. 3, 7, 8, 16, 19, 22 - Lewdness With a Child Under The Age of 14; 11, 31, 36 - Open or Gross Lewdness; Ct. 33, 34, 35 - Sexual Assault and sentenced to \$25 Admin. fee; \$150 DNA analysis fee; genetic testing; \$880 restitution; as to Cts. 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 9, 10, 12, 13, 14, 15, 17, 18, 20, 21 - 20 years to Life in prison; Cts. 3, 7, 8, 16, 19, 22 - 10 years to Life in prison; Cts. 23,

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24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 28, 30 - 25 years to Life in prison; Cts,. 11, 31, 36 - 12 months in CCDC; Cts. 32, 33, 34, 35 - 10 years to Life; Ct. 3 to run consecutive to Ct. 1; Ct. 6 to run consecutive to Cts. 1 and 3; Ct. 23 to run consecutive to Cts. 1, 3, and 6; Ct. 32 to run consecutive to Cts. 1, 3, 6 and 23; all remainings counts to run concurrent with each other; 762 days CTS. Special sentence of lifetime supervision is imposed to commence upon release from any term of imprisonment, probation or parole. Ordered to register as a sex offender within 48 hours after any release from custody; registration after conviction, duties and procedure, offender or sex offender informed of duty to register, effect of failure to inform and procedure upon receipt of notification from another jurisdiction or FBI.

DATED this 5th day of October, 2012.

PHILIP J. KOHN
CLARK COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER

By: /s/ Nancy L. Lemcke
NANCY L. LEMCKE, #5416
Deputy Public Defender
309 S. Third Street, Ste. 226
Las Vegas, Nevada 89155
(702) 455-4685

DECLARATION OF MAILING

Carrie Connolly, an employee with the Clark County Public Defender's Office, hereby declares that she is, and was when the herein described mailing took place, a citizen of the United States, over 21 years of age, and not a party to, nor interested in, the within action; that on the 5th day of October, 2012, declarant deposited in the United States mail at Las Vegas, Nevada, a copy of the Notice of Appeal in the case of the State of Nevada v. Guillermo Renterio-Novoa, Case No. C-10-268285-1, enclosed in a sealed envelope upon which first class postage was fully prepaid, addressed to Guillermo Renterio-Novoa c/o High Desert State Prison, P.O. Box 650, Indian Springs, NV 89018. That there is a regular communication by mail between the place of mailing and the place so addressed.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

EXECUTED on the 5th day of October, 2012.

/s/ Carrie M. Connolly
An employee of the Clark County
Public Defender's Office

CERTIFICATE OF ELECTRONIC FILING I hereby certify that service of the above and foregoing was made this 5th day of October, 2012, by Electronic Filing to: District Attorneys Office E-Mail Address: PDMotions@ccdanv.com Jennifer.Garcia@ccdanv.com Eileen.Davis@ccdanv.com /s/ Carrie M. Connolly_ Secretary for the Public Defender's Office

1 RTRAN CLERK OF THE COURT 2 3 DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 4 5 THE STATE OF NEVADA, CASE NO. C268285 6 Plaintiff, DEPT. NO. XX 7 VS. 8 GUILLERMO RENTERIA-NOVOA, 9 Defendant. 10 11 BEFORE THE HONORABLE JEROME T. TAO, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 12 THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 6, 2012 13 14 RECORDER'S TRANSCRIPT OF SENTENCING 15 16 17 18 APPEARANCES: 19 For the State: MICHELLE FLECK **Deputy District Attorney** 20 For Defendant: MIKE FELICIANO 21 AMY FELICIANO 22 Deputies Public Defender 23 RECORDED BY: SARA RICHARDSON, COURT RECORDER 24 ALSO PRESENT: HECTOR VAZQUEZ-MENA, Interpreter 25

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<u>PAGE</u>

LAS VEGAS, NEVADA, THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 6, 2012, 10:28 A.M.

THE COURT: State versus Guillermo Renteria-Novoa, C268285.

Mr. Renteria-Novoa is present in custody with the assistance of the Spanish interpreter.

For the record, Mr. Interpreter, what is your name?

THE INTERPRETER: Hector Vazquez-Mena.

THE COURT: Thank you. All right. This is the time set for sentencing. Is there any legal cause or reason why sentencing should not go forward?

MR. FELICIANO: No, Judge.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Renteria-Novoa, pursuant to the verdict of the jury, I hereby adjudicate you guilty as follows, for the crime of sexual assault with a minor under the age of 14, a felony, on the following counts: 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 9, 10, 12, 13, 14, 15, 17, 18, 20, and 21. I also adjudicate you guilty of the offense of lewdness with a child under the age of 14 for the following counts: 3, 7, 8, 16, 19, and 22. I adjudicate you guilty of the offense of sexual assault with a minor under the age of 16 for the following counts: 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, and 30. I adjudicate you guilty of the offense of open or gross lewdness, a gross misdemeanor for the following counts: 11, 31, and 36. And adjudicate you guilty of the offense of sexual assault, a felony, for the following counts: 32, 33, 34, and 35.

For the record, Mr. Renteria-Novoa, are you a veteran of the United States Armed Forces?

THE DEFENDANT: No, I am illegal here.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you. Ms. Fleck, your position on sentencing?

MS. FLECK: Thank you, Your Honor. I have reviewed the P.S.I., and I would concur with P&P's recommendation which I believe amounts to 95 years and is a

good representation of the type of conduct that the defendant engaged in as well as the span of years. As you know, presiding over this trial, the sexual abuse in this case started when the victim was just 12 years old up until she was 16 years old. She is in the courthouse today, she's actually sitting outside, but too emotional and fearful and distraught to come in and watch sentencing. And I think that that speaks volumes as to the affect that this has still had on this child and on this family.

You know, watching the trial, watching the defendant throughout the trial, hearing what he said to the detectives and what we've presented to the jury, and then now what he says to P&P, this man has absolutely no remorse for what he has done. He continues to blame a -- what was a 12-year-old child, that he was, for all intents and purposes at that point in time, her father figure, for engaging in these sexual acts with a, you know, 45-year-old man. And to a child of that age, especially, I mean, these acts were beyond what someone of that age should ever engage in in any way consensually or not as a child. She was -- she was forced to do things that many people never do their entire life consensually.

The fact that he still says that these were sexual favors done in -- for gifts, when all of the evidence shows that the only reason that she engaged in this activity was because he was continually using fear and threats based upon something that had happened when she was 12, and he continued with those threats until she was about 16 years old and finally broke and finally realized that whatever happened with her mom wasn't as bad as what the defendant was doing. She was still too young and naïve when he first started this manipulation to realize that telling her mom that she had been kissing an age-appropriate cousin paled in comparison to what she was going to have to endure with the defendant for the rest of her -- her youth. I mean, he literally stole that from her.

So, I don't think that based upon, I mean, 95 years, it sounds like an awfully long time, but I would -- I would say that an awfully long time is the five solid years that this defendant repeatedly sexually abused a child. So, you know, you balance those two out and you compare those two, 95 years is -- is really, that's actually the gift. So I would submit it on P&P's recommendations. And I do have a speaker here. It's Roxane's mother, Rosa, I'm not sure when you'd like to hear from her.

THE COURT: Right, but you said Roxane's not going to be speaking then just --

MS. FLECK: She's not. No. Thank you.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Renteria-Novoa, anything that you want to say prior to sentencing, or do you want to let your attorney speak for you?

THE DEFENDANT: I want this to go very fast.

THE COURT: Okay. On behalf of your client?

MR. FELICIANO: Judge, I would just note that Mr. Renteria does have no prior criminal history before this. He has no felonies, gross misdemeanors. It looks like he has one thing involving immigration several years ago. Basically, almost all these sentences are life sentences, so anything the Court imposes is going to be -- could result in Mr. Renteria-Novoa dying in prison. Count 23 specifically is one of the 25-to-lifes. We would ask the Court to impose that count, the 25-to-life, and run the other counts concurrent. That'll put him at parole eligibility when he's 75 years old. He's 50 now. And we would submit that 25 years is sufficient considering all the circumstances.

THE COURT: All right. Ms. Fleck, I show, the P.S.I. indicates restitution in the amount of \$880.00; is that the figure that you have, or do you have additional

1	information?
2	MS. FLECK: That's what I have as well. And the only thing that I would note,
3	just because I noticed that while I was speaking you did have your head down kind
4	of looking through your own notes, but even just the defendant's attitude today, I
5	mean, he is he is laughing. It's
6	MR. FELICIANO: Judge, I'm going to object.
7	MS. FLECK: No.
8	MR. FELICIANO: I think we've already had our sentencing argument.
9	MS. FLECK: It's funny, the entire process is funny to him. And I just, you
10	know, I I'd just like you to recognize that today as well.
11	THE COURT: All right. Mr. Feliciano, the P.S.I. indicates 762 days credit for
12	time served; is that correct?
13	MR. FELICIANO: Yes.
14	MS. FLECK: That's correct.
15	THE COURT: All right. We have, apparently a victim speaker. Is she in the
16	courtroom or she's out in the hallway, or where is she?
17	MS. FLECK: She's here.
18	ROSA MARIA RODRIGUEZ RUIZ,
19	[having been called as a speaker and being first duly sworn, testified through the
20	court-certified interpreter as follows:]
21	THE CLERK: Please be seated. Please state and spell your name for the
22	record.
23	THE SPEAKER: Rosa Maria Rodriguez Ruiz.
24	THE MARSHAL: If we can have her scoot up so the microphone will pick
25	up

THE RECORDER: The microphone needs to be in front of the interpreter.

THE COURT: Hang on, let's get you -- and I'll note that the speaker is here with the assistance of the Spanish interpreter. For the record, Madam Interpreter, what is your name?

THE INTERPRETER: Carol Partiguian.

THE COURT: Thanks.

THE INTERPRETER: C-A-R-O-L, P-A-R-T-I-G-U-I-A-N.

THE COURT: All right. And Ms. Partiguian, if you can move the microphone in front of you rather than in front of Ms. Rodriguez, that would be great.

THE INTERPRETER: Is this better?

THE COURT: All right. Ma'am, what is it that you wanted me to know before sentencing?

THE SPEAKER: To start, I wanted to tell you that I made the effort of coming here today first of all to give thanks to everybody that helped me in this case. And to -- and to ask you as a judge to give him the maximum sentence you can give him because this really destroyed our lifes. And that's why -- and that's why I'm asking you for him not to make fun of us. Please don't let what he did to my daughter just pass by.

THE DEFENDANT: [Uninterpreted Spanish]

THE COURT: Hey --

THE SPEAKER: Because I trusted in him, and he betrayed us. That's why one more time I beg you, we were not able to be at peace all this time. We had a lot of problems psychologically. I thank you as a judge. And please keep in mind my request as a mother, I believe that because we are two women alone that's why he took advantage of that. Thank you, thank you to everybody, and thank you to you.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you, ma'am. I have a question for you. One of the things that I impose as part of the sentence is any monetary loss that you and your daughter have suffered as a result of the crimes, should be compensated. Now, Mr. Renteria-Novoa is going to prison for a long time so he may or may not be able to pay anything. But just so the record is complete, I wanted to make sure that you, I at least order that he pay whatever is owed to you. I show, according to my paperwork, a financial loss in the amount of \$880.00; is that correct, or is there more, or is there less, or what?

THE SPEAKER: Okay. Not that I can recall at this moment. I don't care about the money. I just care about justice being done.

THE COURT: Okay. Ma'am, thank you very much for being here.

Was there anything else that you wanted to add or --

THE SPEAKER: In the name of my daughter and myself, I want to thank everybody, thank you.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you, ma'am, you can go ahead and have a seat in the back.

In accordance with the laws of the State of Nevada, I assess a \$25.00 administrative assessment fee, a \$150.00 DNA analysis fee and require Mr. Renteria-Novoa to undergo testing for the determination of genetic markers and sentence him as follows: On Counts 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 9, 10, 12, 13, 14, 15, 17, 18, 20, and 21 to a sentence of life with the possibility of parole after 20 years; on Counts 3, 7, 8, 16, 19, and 22 to a sentence of life with the possibility of parole after 10 years; on Counts 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, and 30 to a sentence of life with the possibility of parole after 25 years; on Counts 11, 31, and 36 to 12 months in the Clark County Detention Center; on Counts 32, 33, 34, and 35 to a sentence of life with the

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Counts 3 and 1; Count 23 to be consecutive to Counts 1, 3, and 6; and Count 32 to

Counts 3 to be consecutive to Count 1; Count 6 to be consecutive to

order that Mr. Renteria-Novoa pay restitution in the amount of \$880.00. I also

impose a special sentence of lifetime supervision upon any release from

incarceration and for both parties, do you want me to read all the conditions in, or do

you want me to just incorporate all the provisions of the statute into the J.O.C.?

be consecutive to Counts 1, 3, 6, and 23, all other counts to be concurrent. I also

MR. FELICIANO: That's fine if they're in the J.O.C.

MS. FLECK: Yeah, that's fine with me as well.

THE COURT: All right. I also order that after his release from any period of incarceration that he must register as a sex offender within 48 hours pursuant to N.R.S. 179D.450, and that sentence will be with 762 days credit for time served.

MS. FLECK: Okay. Okay. I might need to --

MR. FELICIANO: Will there be minutes later, just so --

THE CLERK: Yeah.

possibility of parole after 10 years.

THE COURT: Do you want me to repeat that?

MS. FLECK: Yeah.

MR. FELICIANO: I don't know, if there's minutes later I can just pull 'em off Odyssey.

MS. FLECK: I think that I wouldn't mind. I have -- if we could just go through it one more time.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. FLECK: Sorry.

THE COURT: What is it that you have questions about?

1	MS. FLECK: Well, okay, so I've got
2	THE COURT: Or do you want me to do the whole thing
3	MS. FLECK: 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 9, 10, 12, 13, 14, 15, those are all 20s, right?
4	THE COURT: Right. And then and 17, 18, 20, and 21 are also 20-to-life.
5	MS. FLECK: Okay. 17, 18, which ones? 19 and 20?
6	THE COURT: No, 17, 18, 20, and 21.
7	MS. FLECK: Okay.
8	THE COURT: And then on 3, 7, 8, 16, 19, and 22 those are 10-to-lifes.
9	MS. FLECK: Okay.
10	THE COURT: On 23 basically, 23 through 30, those are 25-to-lifes. 11, 31
11	and 36 are the gross misdemeanors, those are 12 months. And then 32, 33, 34,
12	and 35 are 10-to-lifes.
13	MS. FLECK: 32 through 35 are 10. Okay. And then we've got 3 consecutive
14	to 1; 6 consecutive to 3 and 1.
15	THE COURT: 23 consecutive to 1, 3, and 6; and 32 consecutive to 1, 3, 6,
16	and 23.
17	MS. FLECK: Okay.
18	THE COURT: And everything else concurrent.
19	MS. FLECK: Great. All right. Thank you so much.
20	THE COURT: All right. Good luck to you, Mr. Renteria-Novoa.
21	PROCEEDING CONCLUDED AT 10:44 A.M.
22	ATTEST: I do hereby certify that I have truly and correctly transcribed the audio-
23	video recording of this proceeding in the above-entitled case. Aun Ri handan—
24	SARA RICHARDSON
25	Court Recorder/Transcriber

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

GUILLERMO RENTERIA-NOVOA, Appellant,

VS.

THE STATE OF NEVADA,

Respondent.

Supreme Court No. 61865 District Court Case No. C268285

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE

STATE OF NEVADA, ss.

I, Tracie Lindeman, the duly appointed and qualified Clerk of the Supreme Court of the State of Nevada, do hereby certify that the following is a full, true and correct copy of the Judgment in this matter.

<u>JUDGMENT</u>

The court being fully advised in the premises and the law, it is now ordered, adjudged and decreed, as follows: C-10-268285-1

"ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED."

Judgment, as guoted above, entered this 24th day of September, 2014.

CCJA NV Supreme Court Clerks Certificate/Judgn 4390673



IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have subscribed my name and affixed the seal of the Supreme Court at my Office in Carson City, Nevada this October 21, 2014.

Tracie Lindeman, Supreme Court Clerk

By: Sally Williams **Deputy Clerk**

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

GUILLERMO RENTERIA-NOVOA, Appellant, vs. THE STATE OF NEVADA, Respondent. No. 61865

FILED

SEP 2 4 2014

ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE

CLERK OF BUPREME COURT

DEPUTY CLERK

This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction, pursuant to a jury verdict, of 15 counts of sexual assault of a minor under 14 years of age, 8 counts of sexual assault of a minor under 16 years of age, 4 counts of sexual assault, 6 counts of lewdness with a minor under 16 years of age, and 3 counts of open or gross lewdness. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; Jerome T. Tao, Judge.

Guillermo Renteria-Novoa is an ex-boyfriend of the mother of R.P. Renteria-Novoa and R.P. had sexual relations over many years while she was a teenager. Renteria-Novoa was charged with numerous counts of sexual assault with a minor, sexual assault, lewdness with a minor, and open or gross lewdness.

At trial, R.P. testified that the relationship occurred because Renteria-Novoa threatened to reveal to her family that she was sexually intimate with her older cousin. Renteria-Novoa's defense asserted that the relationship was consensual and that R.P. exchanged sexual favors for material goods. The jury convicted Renteria-Novoa on all counts.

SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA

R.P.'s Testimony

During cross-examination, Renteria-Novoa sought to reveal inconsistencies in R.P.'s previous recountings of the alleged abuse. On redirect, the State asked R.P. leading questions about her past statements in order to show that those statements were consistent. On appeal, Renteria-Novoa argues that this part of R.P.'s trial testimony was inadmissible hearsay.

Under NRS 51.035(2)(b), an out-of-court statement is not hearsay if it is "[c]onsistent with the declarant's testimony and offered to rebut an express or implied charge against the declarant of recent fabrication..." Here, the State offered the prior consistent statements in order to rebut the defense's attempts to show fabrication. Thus, the statements were admissible.

Renteria-Novoa also argues that the State improperly used leading questions to elicit testimony during redirect. NRS 50.115(3)(a) states that "[l]eading questions may not be used on the direct examination of a witness without the permission of the court." (Emphasis added). "Whether leading questions should be allowed is a matter mostly within the discretion of the trial court, and any abuse of the rules regarding them is not ordinarily a ground for reversal." Barcus v. State, 92 Nev. 289, 291, 550 P.2d 411, 412 (1976) (internal quotations omitted). Here, the court decided that the leading questions were a permissible way to bring out the prior consistent statements. Because leading questions are only prohibited without permission of the trial court, and the trial court gave permission, we do not find the use of leading questions to be grounds for reversal.

Use of "victim"

Renteria-Novoa argues that the prosecutor's use of the term "victim" throughout trial was improper because it was an assertion of his personal opinion that Renteria-Novoa was guilty of the charged crimes. He alleges that the prosecutor's repeated uses of "victim" were interjections of opinion, constituted vouching, and minimized the prosecution's burden of proof, all of which are examples of prosecutorial misconduct. See, e.g., Rowland v. State, 118 Nev. 31, 39-40, 39 P.3d 114, 119 (2002); McGuire v. State, 100 Nev. 153, 158-59, 677 P.2d 1060, 1064 (1984).

In the present case, the prosecutor's use of "victim" was not misconduct. First, it was not interjecting opinion because the prosecutor was not asking the jury to convict based upon the prosecutor's personal opinions. Second, Renteria-Novoa has not shown that the prosecutor had any intent to mislead. *McGuire*, 100 Nev. at 158-59, 677 P.2d at 1064. Third, the prosecutor's use of the term "victim" was not vouching because the jury would not reasonably infer that the prosecutor meant to speak to the veracity of the accuser. *See Rowland*, 118 Nev. at 39, 39 P.3d at 119. Finally, the Nevada Revised Statutes use "victim" to refer to the accuser, not only in defining crimes but also in setting forth procedures. *See, e.g.*, NRS 50.090. Therefore, we conclude that the use of the term "victim" was not prosecutorial misconduct.

Renteria-Novoa also contests the use of "victim" in the jury instructions and in the witnesses' testimony. For similar reasons, namely that the term was used to define sexual assault and not to express the opinion of the speaker, we also conclude that the use of "victim" in the jury instructions and by the witnesses was not improper.

Brady violations

Renteria-Novoa argues that the State violated his constitutional rights, under *Brady v. Maryland*, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), by suppressing evidence of the U-visa that R.P. received as a result of the charges in this case.

To demonstrate a Brady violation, "the accused must make three showings: (1) the evidence is favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory or impeaching; (2) the State withheld the evidence, either intentionally or inadvertently; and (3) prejudice ensued, i.e., the evidence was material." State v. Huebler, 128 Nev. ___, ___, 275 P.3d 91, 95 (2012) (internal quotations omitted). On the issue of prejudice, federal courts have held that there is no Brady violation so long as the evidence is eventually disclosed at a time when the defense can still use it. Madsen v. Dormire, 137 F.3d 602, 605 (8th Cir. 1998); see also United States v. Scarborough, 128 F.3d 1373, 1376 (10th Cir. 1997); United States v. Word, 806 F.2d 658, 665 (6th Cir. 1986); cf. Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 559 (1977) ("There is no general constitutional right to discovery in a criminal case, and Brady did not create one . . . "). Here the defense discovered R.P.'s U-visa during trial and was able to present it to the jury through cross examination. There was no prejudice and, therefore, no Brady violation.

Renteria-Novoa's call logs and R.P.'s phone number

Renteria-Novoa argues that the evidence of his phone records were not relevant at the time that they were admitted, because the jury did not yet hear testimony as to R.P.'s phone number. Evidence is relevant if it has "any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more or less probable than

it would be without the evidence." NRS 48.015. Renteria-Novoa's call logs were relevant because his numerous calls to R.P.'s phone tended to show that he had some kind of relationship with R.P.

Renteria-Novoa also argues that a witness's testimony revealing R.P.'s phone number was hearsay because the witness only learned the number through R.P. telling him what it was. Evidence is inadmissible hearsay if it is an out-of-court "statement offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted" and it does not qualify for any exemption to the hearsay definition or exception to the hearsay rule. See NRS 51.035; NRS 51.065; NRS 51.075-.385.

We conclude that the witness testimony providing R.P.'s phone number was not hearsay. The witness testified that he knew her phone number belonged to her because he called her using the number. Thus, he was not testifying to an out-of-court statement about the number, but rather to his recollection of the number. See NRS 51.035. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion. Chavez v. State, 125 Nev. 328, 344, 213 P.3d 476, 487 (2009).

Admission of prior bad acts

Renteria-Novoa also argues that R.P.'s testimony, stating that he abused her two or three times a week, was inadmissible prior bad act evidence.

"[W]e review a district court's decision to admit or exclude evidence for abuse of discretion." *Id.* Prior bad act evidence is presumed inadmissible. *Ledbetter v. State*, 122 Nev. 252, 259, 129 P.3d 671, 677 (2006). However, prior bad acts are admissible when they show a common scheme or plan. *See id.* at 260, 129 P.3d at 677-78; see also NRS 48.045(2).

In Daly v. State, we held that uncharged acts of sexual abuse to which the child victim testified "fell within the 'common scheme or plan' exception to the general rule excluding evidence of prior bad acts." 99 Nev. 564, 567, 665 P.2d 798, 801 (1983), holding modified on other grounds by Richmond v. State, 118 Nev. 924, 59 P.3d 1249 (2002). The child victim "testified that she had performed fellatio on appellant at his request an average of once or twice a week since she was about eight years old." Id. at 566, 665 P.2d at 800. We noted that "[a]t least some of the uncharged acts allegedly occurred within the same time period as the charged acts, all alleged acts were between the appellant and his stepdaughter, and both the charged and uncharged acts allegedly occurred under very similar circumstances." Id. at 567, 665 P.2d at 801.

The facts of this case are analogous to Daly. R.P. testified that the abuse occurred two or three times a week. The acts to which R.P. testified allegedly occurred at the time she lived at the University apartments, the same timeframe about which the jury heard that Renteria-Novoa committed other acts. The acts to which R.P. testified all involved her and Renteria-Novoa. And, according to R.P., the acts occurred in the same way every time. Under Daly, the uncharged acts of sexual abuse against R.P. fell within the common-scheme-or-plan exception to the rule against admitting prior bad acts. The district court did not abuse its discretion.

Other issues

Renteria-Novoa also argues that the State illegally excluded minority veniremembers from the jury, the information was insufficient and violated his constitutional rights, the district court misapplied Nevada's rape-shield statute, his statement to police was not voluntary and was given prior to him being mirandized, the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions, the convictions violated redundancy or double jeopardy principles, the district court's jury instructions misstated the law, the prosecution committed misconduct, and cumulative error warrants reversal. We find no merit in his arguments and affirm the judgment of the district court.

Accordingly, we

ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.

Hardesty J.

Douglas, J

Cherry J.

cc: Hon. Jerome T. Tao, District Judge Clark County Public Defender Attorney General/Carson City Clark County District Attorney Eighth District Court Clerk



SUPPLEME COURT
OF
NEVADA

This document is a full true and correct copy of the original on file and of record in my office.

DATE Waker 215, 2014

Supreme Court Clerk, State of Nevada

AA 001076

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

GUILLERMO RENTERIA-NOVOA, Appellant, vs. THE STATE OF NEVADA, Respondent. **Supreme Court No. 61865** District Court Case No. C268285

REMITTITUR

TO: Steven D. Grierson, Eighth District Court Clerk

Pursuant to the rules of this court, enclosed are the following:

Certified copy of Judgment and Opinion/Order. Receipt for Remittitur.

DATE: October 21, 2014

Tracie Lindeman, Clerk of Court

By: Sally Williams Deputy Clerk

cc (without enclosures):

Hon. Jerome T. Tao, District Judge Clark County Public Defender Clark County District Attorney Attorney General/Carson City

RECEIPT FOR REMITTITUR

Received of Tracie Lindeman, Clerk of the Supreme Court of the State of Nevada, the REMITTITUR issued in the above-entitled cause, on
HEATHER UNGERMANN
Deputy District Court Clerk

RECEIVED

OCT 2 5 2014

AA 001077 14-35031

N

Case No. (269295-1

Dept. No. XIV XY

FILED
FEB - 9 2015
CLERK OF COURT

C - 10 - 268285 - 1 IPWHC

inmate Filed — Petition for Writ of Habeas



IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

IN AND FOR CLARK COUNTY

-000-

GILILLERMO RENTERIA-NOVOA

Petitioner,

vs.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS (POST CONVICTION)

State of Heraly GRN

I, Baca, Warden

INSTRUCTIONS:

- (1) This petition must be legibly handwritten or typewritten, signed by the petitioner and verified.
- (2) Additional pages are not permitted except where noted or with respect to the facts which you rely upon to support your grounds for relief. No citation of authorities need be furnished. If briefs or arguments are submitted, they should be submitted in the form of a separate memorandum.
- (3) If you want an attorney appointed, you must complete the Affidavit in Support of Request to Proceed in Forma Pauperis. You must have an authorized officer at the prison complete the certificate as to the amount of money and securities on deposit to your credit in any account in the institution.
- (4) You must name as respondent the person by whom you are confined or restrained. If you are in a specific institution of the department of prisons, name the warden or head of the institution. If you are not in a specific institution of the department but within its custody, name the director of the department of prisons.
- (5) You must include all grounds or claims for relief which you may have regarding your conviction or sentence. Failure to raise all grounds in this petition may preclude you from filing future petitions challenging your conviction and sentence 18

CLERK OF THE COURT

15

- (6) You must allege specific facts supporting the claims in the petition you file seeking relief from any conviction or sentence. Failure to allege specific facts rather than just conclusions may cause your petition to be dismissed. If your petition contains a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, that claim will operate to waive the attorney-client privilege for the proceeding in which you claim your counsel was ineffective.
- (7) When the petition is fully completed, the original and one copy must be filed with the clerk of the state district court for the county in which you were convicted. One copy must be mailed to the respondent, one copy to the attorney general's office, and one copy to the district attorney of the county in which you were convicted or to the original prosecutor if you are challenging your original conviction or sentence. Copies must conform in all particulars to the original submitted for filing.

osmitted for filing.
PETITION
1. Name of institution and county in which you are
presently imprisoned or where and how you are presently
restrained of your liberty: Northern Nevada Correctional Center
Carson City County, Nevada
2. Name and location of court which entered the judgment
of conviction under attack: 9th Judicial District Court Clark
Sounty, Nevado D: strict Judge How. Jerone T. Tao
3. Date of judgment of conviction: September 17,2012
4. Case number: <u>C269285-1</u>
5. (a) Length of sentence: 25 years to Life
(b) If sentence is death, state any date upon which
execution is scheduled:
6. Are you presently serving a sentence for a conviction
other than the conviction under attack in this motion?
Yes No V
If "yes" list crime, case number and sentence being served at ${f AA}$ 001079

this ti	me:
7.	Nature of offense involved in conviction being
challen	ged: Sexualt, assualt, Lewdness under 14 years
8.	What was your plea? (check one)
(a)	Not Guilty V
(b)	Guilty
(c)	Guilty but mentally ill
(d)	Nolo Contendere
9.	If you entered a plea of guilty or guilty but mentally
	ne count of an indictment or information, and a plea of
	ty to another count of an indictment or information, or
if a plea	a of guilty or guilty but mentally ill was negotiated,
give deta	ails:
	
10.	If you were found guilty after a plea of not guilty,
was the f	Einding made by: (check one)
(a)	Jury (b) Judge without a jury
11.	Did you testify at the trial? Yes No
	Did you appeal from the judgment of conviction?
Yes	No
13.	If you did appeal, answer the following:
(a)	Name of court: Nevada Supreme Court
(p)	Case number or citation: 6/865
(c)	Result: Arrivaed "Den:ed"
	Date of result: <u>Sep. 24, 2014</u> AA 001080
	AA 001080

14. If you did not appeal, explain briefly why you did no
15. Other than a direct appeal from the judgment of
conviction and sentence, have you previously filed any petitions
applications or motions with respect to this judgment in any
court, state or federal? Yes No
16. If your answer to No. 15 was "yes", give the following
information:
(a) (1) Name of court:
(2) Nature of proceedings:
(3) Grounds raised:
(4) Did you receive an evidentiary hearing on your
petition, application or motion? Yes No
(5) Result:
(6) Date of result:
(7) If known, citations of any written opinion or date
of orders entered pursuant to such result:
(b) As to any second petition, application or motion, give
the same information:
(1) Name of court:
(2) Nature of proceedings: AA 001081
AA 001081

	(3) Grounds raised: 1)//
	(4) Did you receive an evidentiary hearing on your
petition,	application or motion? Yes No
	(5) Result: //A
	(6) Date of result: \mathcal{D}/\mathcal{A}
	(7) If known, citations of any written opinion or dat
of orders	entered pursuant to such result:
·	
(c)	As to any third or subsequent additional applications
or motions	, give the same information as above, list them on a
separate s	heet and attach.
(d)	Did you appeal to the highest state or federal court
having jur	isdiction, the result or action taken on any petition,
application	n or motion?
	(1) First petition, application or motion?
	Yes No
	Citation or date of decision:
(2) Second petition, application or motion?
	Yes No
	Citation or date of decision:
(3) Third or subsequent petitions, applications or
motions?	Yes No
	Citation or date of decision:
(e) I	f you did not appeal from the adverse action on any
	pplication or motion, explain briefly why you did not.
	elate specific facts in response to this question.

Your response may be included on paper which is $8\ 1/2$ by 11

five handwritten or typewritten pages in length.)
17. Has any ground being raised in this petition been
previously presented to this or any other court by way of
petition for habeas corpus, motion, application or any other
post-conviction proceeding? If so, identify: NO
(a) Which of the grounds is the same:
(b) The proceedings in which these grounds were raised:
(c) Briefly explain why you are again raising these
grounds. (You must relate specific facts in response to this
question. Your response may be included on paper which is $3\ 1/2$
by 11 inches attached to the petition. Your response may not
exceed five handwritten or typewritten pages in length.)
N/A
18. If any of the grounds listed in Nos. 23(a), (b), (c)
and (d), or listed on any additional pages you have attached,
were not previously presented in any other court, state or
federal, list briefly what grounds were not so presented, and
give your reasons for not presenting them. (You must relate
specific facts in response to this question. Your response may
be included on paper which is 8 1/2 by 11 inches attached to the
petition. Your response may not exceed five handwritten or
typewritten pages in length.) \mathcal{U}/\mathcal{A}

19. Are you filing this petition more than 1 year following
the filing of the judgment of conviction or the filing of a
decision on direct appeal? N_{1f} so, state briefly the reasons for
the delay. (You must relate specific facts in response to this
question. Your response may be included on paper which is $3\ 1/2$
by 11 inches attached to the petition. Your response may not
exceed five handwritten or typewritten pages in length.)
20. Do you have any petition or appeal now pending in any
court, either state or federal, as to the judgment under attack?
Yes No
If yes, state what court and the case number: \mathcal{U}/\mathcal{A}
21. Give the name of each attorney who represented you in
the proceeding resulting in your conviction and on direct appeal:
Mike Feliciano, Esq. and Any A. Feliciano, Esq. Trial Allowers
Mike Feliciano, Esq. and Any A. Feliciano, Esq. Trial Attorneys and Nancy L. Lencke, Esq. Direct Appeal Attorney' Deputy Clara Co. Public
22. Do you have any future sentences to serve after you
complete the sentence imposed by the judgment under attack?
Yes No
If yes, specify where and when it is to be served, if you know: \mathcal{N}/\mathcal{A}
23. State concisely every ground on which you claim that
you are being held unlawfully. Summarize briefly the facts
supporting each ground. If necessary you may attach pages

AA 001084

stating additional grounds and facts supporting same.

(a) Ground one:

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Petitioner is in custody in violation of his sixth and fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution under the guarantees of due process of law, effective assistance of coursel and equal protection.

Supporting Facts:

When I was first questioned, prior to arrest, by Mr. Jagger, I was not given, nor did they ask if I needed an interpreter. I did not understand what I was being asked and told him I spoke little to no English. When he read/toll me my Miranda rights I did not understand what was going on and when he told me I could leave, I left. This occured in December I was arrested in August of 2009 Prior to my arraignment/Preliminary hearing in justice court my public defender told me there was an offer of 1-5 years if I plead now. I told him no as I did not do the crime. I asked my public defender to contact my witnesses and friends to investigate the claims against me. He never did. Instead he said he would use the alledged victims witnesses for my defense. I never spoke to an investigator and I don't believe my attorney used one for my case so nothing was investigated. My Attorney coerced me into wairing my right to a speedy trial by saying he needed more time to investigate my case and contact my witnesses. He never did Contact anyone or investigate my innocence. The alledged voctions testimony changed from the original police report to the preliminary hearing and my attorney did nothing to bring this to light. I Was railroaded and did not receive a fair thial or effective assistance of counsel,

` 1	Ground two:
2	I am not a lawyer and do not understand the law so I need
3	an attorney appointed who can help me determine what other
4	claims/grounds I have.
5	
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7	Supporting Facts:
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WHEREFORE, petitioner prays that the court grant petitioner relief to which he may be entitled in this proceeding.

Day of January February, 2015.

CillemoRenterra Navac

Guillermo Renteria - Mouca

None


IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

GUILLERMO RENTERIA-NOVOA, Appellant, vs. THE STATE OF NEVADA, Respondent. No. 61865

FILED

SEP 2 4 2014

ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE



This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction, pursuant to a jury verdict, of 15 counts of sexual assault of a minor under 14 years of age, 8 counts of sexual assault of a minor under 16 years of age, 4 counts of sexual assault, 6 counts of lewdness with a minor under 16 years of age, and 3 counts of open or gross lewdness. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; Jerome T. Tao, Judge.

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At trial, R.P. testified that the relationship occurred because Renteria-Novoa threatened to reveal to her family that she was sexually intimate with her older cousin. Renteria-Novoa's defense asserted that the relationship was consensual and that R.P. exchanged sexual favors for material goods. The jury convicted Renteria-Novoa on all counts.

SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA

AA 001088₈₄

VERIFICATION

Under penalty of perjury, the undersigned declares that he is the petitioner named in the foregoing petition and knows the contents thereof; that the pleading is true of his own knowledge, except as to those matters stated on information and belief, and as to such matters he believes them to be true.

CUI Le Mol Dutenz 1000a.
Petitioner

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE BY MAIL

I do certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing

PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS to the below addresses on this 5 day of

CRAN June 17 February, 2015, by placing same into the hands of prison law library staff for posting in the U.S. Mail, pursuant to N.R.C.P. 5:

Steven D. Grierson

Clerkof the Court

Eighth Judicini Dist. Count

200 Lewis Ave 3 of floor

has Vegas, NV 89155-1160

Clark (sunty District Alterney

Steve Wolfson

ZOO LOWIS Ave 3 of floor

Las Vegas, NV 89155

Nevada 89

OMOMO Rentosta - NO 1000 Signature of Petitioner In Pro Se

///

AFFIRMATION Pursuant to NRS 239B.030

4	1 4134411 10 11113 2335.039						
5	The undersigned does hereby affirm that the preceding document, <u>Petition</u>						
ő	For writ of habeas Corpus, Verification, Proof of Service						
7							
8	(Title of Document)						
	filed in case number:						
9	I lied in case number.						
10	Document does not contain the social security number of any person						
11	-OR-						
12	Document contains the social sécurity number of a person as required by:						
13							
14	A specific state or federal law, to wit:						
15	(State specific state or federal law)						
16							
17	-or-						
18	For the administration of a public program						
19	-or-						
20	For an application for a federal or state grant						
21							
22	Confidential Family Court Information Sheet (NRS 125.130, NRS 125.230 and NRS 1258.055)						
23	(WING 125.130) WING 125.230 and WING 1258.055)						
24	Date Tebruary 5 2015 (Manufleytein Nova						
25	(Signature)						
26	Guillermo Reiteria-Novoa (Print Name)						
27							
28	Pro Per (Altorney for)						
	(Attorney for)						

Affirmation
Hex sed Decumber 15, 2006

1092343 'NNCC Getllerme Renteria Novae Po Box 7000 Carson City, NV 89702

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Gight Jod icked Dishid Gort 200 lews but. 3th plear

les Vegas, NV 89155-1160

LEGAL MARIL

Habeas Corpos ORRECTIONAL CENTER FEB 0 2 2015

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Hun J. Colin **RSPN** 1 STEVEN B. WOLFSON Clark County District Attorney **CLERK OF THE COURT** Nevada Bar #001565 3 JAMES R. SWEETIN Chief Deputy District Attorney Nevada Bar #005144 4 200 Lewis Avenue 5 Las Vegas, Nevada 89155-2212 (702) 671-2500 Attorney for Plaintiff 6 7 **DISTRICT COURT** 8 **CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA** 9 10 THE STATE OF NEVADA, Plaintiff, 11 12 -VS-C-10-268285-1 CASE NO: GUILLERMO RENTERIA-NOVOA, 13 DEPT NO: $\mathbf{X}\mathbf{X}$ #2755564 14 Defendant. 15 16 STATE'S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S POST-CONVICTION 17 **PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS** 18 DATE OF HEARING: APRIL 16, 2015 19 TIME OF HEARING: 8:30 AM COMES NOW, the State of Nevada, by STEVEN B. WOLFSON, Clark County 20 District Attorney, through JAMES R. SWEETIN, Chief Deputy District Attorney, and hereby 21 submits the attached Points and Authorities in Response to Defendant's Post-Conviction 22 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. 23 This response is made and based upon all the papers and pleadings on file herein, the 24 attached points and authorities in support hereof, and oral argument at the time of hearing, if 25 deemed necessary by this Honorable Court. 26 // 27 // 28

¹ On May 22, 2012, the State filed a Second Amended Information dropping several counts.
² Count 3 to run to consecutive to Count 1: Count 6 to run consecutive to Counts 1 and 3: Co

POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On January 26, 2011, the State filed an Information charging Defendant Guillermo Renteria-Novoa as follows: Counts 1-2, 4-6, 10-19, 22-23, and 25-30: Sexual Assault with a Minor under the age of 14; Counts 3, 7-9, 21, 24, and 43-44: Lewdness with a Child under the age of 14; Counts 20, 45, and 53: Open or Gross Lewdness; Counts 31-42: Sexual Assault with a Minor under the age of 16; and Counts 46-52: Sexual Assault.¹

On May 21, 2012, Defendant's jury trial began. On May 25, 2012, the jury returned a verdict of guilty on all counts as charged in the Second Amended Information. On September 6, 2012, Defendant was sentenced as follows: as to the Sexual Assault with a Minor under the age of 14 counts: Life with the possibility of parole after 20 years; as to the Lewdness with a Child under the Age of 14 counts: Life with the possibility of parole after 10 years; as to the Sexual Assault with a Minor under the age of 16 counts: Life with the possibility of parole after 25 years; as to the Open or Gross Lewdness counts: 12 months in the Clark County Detention Center; as to the Sexual Assault Counts: Life with the possibility of parole after 10 years.² A Judgment of Conviction was filed on September 17, 2012.

Defendant filed a Notice of Appeal on October 5, 2012. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions on September 24, 2014. <u>Renteria-Novoa</u>, No. 61865 (Sept. 24, 2014). Remittitur issued October 21, 2014.

On February 9, 2015, Defendant filed the instant post-conviction Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. The State hereby responds as follows.

ARGUMENT

In Defendant's post-conviction petition, Defendant asserts several due process of law violations and ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Specifically, Defendant claims that his Miranda rights were violated, that his right to a speedy trial was violated, and that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate witnesses on his behalf and for failing to reveal the

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² Count 3 to run to consecutive to Count 1; Count 6 to run consecutive to Counts 1 and 3; Counts 23 to run consecutive to Counts 1, 3, and 6; and Count 32 to run consecutive to Counts 1, 3, 6, and 23.

"inconsistent" testimony of the victim during trial. Defendant's claims, however, are not properly raised in a post-conviction petition, belied by the record, barred by the law of the case, and are without merit. Accordingly, Defendant's petition must be denied.

I. DEFENDANT'S DUE PROCESS CLAIMS ARE NOT COGNIZABLE IN A PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

Defendant claims that he was not properly Mirandized during his interview with police Detectives because he was not granted an interpreter and that his right to a speedy trial was violated when counsel "coerced" him into waiving his right because counsel "needed more time to investigate." PWHC at 8. Nevertheless, said claims are not cognizable in a post-conviction petition for writ of habeas corpus. See NRS 34.720 ("The provisions of NRS 34.720 to 34.830...apply only to petitions...in which the petitioner: 1. Requests relief from a judgment of conviction or sentence in a criminal case; or 2. Challenges the computation of time that the petitioner has served pursuant to a judgment of conviction.); McConnell v. State, 125 Nev. 243, 247, 212 P.3d 307, 310 (2009). Because Defendant's claims are framed as due process violations, they are outside of the limited scope of NRS Chapter 34.

Moreover, "all [] claims that are appropriate for a direct appeal must be pursued on direct appeal, or they will be considered waived in subsequent proceedings." Franklin v. State, 110 Nev. 750, 752, 877 P.2d 1058, 1059 (1994) (emphasis added). "A court must dismiss a habeas petition if it presents claims that either were or could have been presented in an earlier proceeding, unless the court finds both cause for failing to present the claims earlier or for raising them again and actual prejudice to the petitioner." Evans v. State, 117 Nev. 609, 646-47, 29 P.3d 498, 523 (2001). Here, Defendant's claims are not cognizable in a post-conviction petition as they could have been brought in an earlier proceeding.

In any event, to the extent this Court construes Defendant's Miranda claim as alleging counsel was ineffective for failing to appropriately challenge the purported violation below, his claim is belied by the record and barred by the law of the case. Indeed, the district court conducted a <u>Jackson v. Denno</u> hearing on May 15, 2012. The detective who interviewed Defendant testified that at no time during the interview did Defendant indicate that he did not

understand English, ask the detective to clarify himself, or ask the detective for an interpreter. RT 5-15-2012 at 12. Moreover, Defendant was properly Mirandized and informed the detective that he understand those rights. <u>Id.</u> at 13.

Importantly, Defendant's counsel thoroughly cross-examined the detective regarding Defendant's ability to understand English and the fact that Defendant spoke with a heavy Spanish accent. <u>Id.</u> at 17-20. The detective, however, maintained that the communication between the two was fine and that there was no need for an interpreter nor did Defendant ask for an interpreter. <u>Id.</u> at 19-20. Accordingly, Defendant's claim is belied by the record.

Additionally, Defendant's Miranda claim was also brought on direct appeal and held to be without merit. Renteria-Novoa, No. 61865 at 6. Thus, to the extent this Court considers Defendant's Miranda claim, it is also barred by the law of the case. See Hall v. State, 91 Nev. 314, 315, 535 P.2d 797, 798 (1975).

To the extent this Court construes Defendant's speedy trial claim as alleging counsel was ineffective in informing Defendant that he needed time to prepare for trial, Defendant cannot demonstrate deficient performance. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686-87, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2063-64 (1984) (noting that deficient performance is performance that falls below an objective standard of reasonableness). Defendant waived his right to a speedy trial on November 5, 2010, and his trial occurred in May of 2012. Notably, Defendant was charged with four counts of sexual assault with a minor and one count of attempt sexual assault with a minor. To suggest that counsel could have proceeded to trial within 60 days considering the nature of the charges is inappropriate. Trial counsel needed adequate time to prepare for Defendant's case.

Indeed, trial counsel filed several pre-trial motions, such as a pre-trial petition for writ of habeas corpus on December 23, 2010, a Motion in Limine to preclude the State's experts from improper witness vouching, a motion to prevent the State from using the term "victim" during trial, and a motion for discovery on April 7, 2011. Moreover, as noted supra, trial counsel filed a motion to suppress on April 25, 2012, in an attempt to prevent Defendant's confession from being admitted during trial.

Importantly, as noted infra, trial counsel's strategy for trial was to attack the credibility of the State's witnesses. Thoroughly reviewing the victim's numerous statements required extensive time and attention to detail. In Defendant's motion for discovery, trial counsel requested all of the notes from the interviews of the victim and any witnesses in the case, including any audio and video recordings. Motion for Discovery 4-7-2011 at 7. Notably, on November 1, 2011, trial counsel represented to the district court that they were still in the process of receiving the statements of the victim and reviewing the statements. RT 11-1-2011 at 2. The simple fact of the matter is, Defendant was charged with several serious felonies that required extensive investigation. Trial counsel would have been ineffective in insisting on proceeding to trial within 60 days. Defendant was not coerced into waiving his right to a speedy trial and then abandoned. Trial counsel properly informed Defendant of the need for an investigation and then properly investigated the case and filed several pre-trial motions on behalf of Defendant. Accordingly, Defendant cannot establish deficient performance.

II. DEFENDANT HAS FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

Defendant asserts trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate witnesses on his behalf and for failing to reveal the "inconsistent" testimony of the victim. <u>PWHC</u> at 8. Defendant's claims, however, are belied by the record, barred by the law of the case, and without merit.

a. Standard of Review

In order to assert a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must prove he was denied "reasonably effective assistance" of counsel by satisfying the two-prong test of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686-87, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2063-64 (1984) (accord State v. Love, 109 Nev. 1136, 1138, 865 P.2d 322, 323 (1993)). Under this test, a defendant must show that his counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and, but for counsel's errors, there is a reasonable probability that the result of the proceedings would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88, 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2065, 2068; Warden v. Lyons, 100 Nev. 430, 432, 683 P.2d 504, 505 (1984) (adopting Strickland's two-

part test).

Bare and conclusory claims are insufficient. See Hargrove v. State, 100 Nev. 498, 502, 686 P.2d 222, 225 (1984). The claims must be supported by specific factual allegations that are not belied by the record, and, if true, would entitle him to relief. Id. Indeed, the Nevada Supreme Court has held "that a habeas corpus petitioner must prove the disputed factual allegations underlying his ineffective-assistance claim by a preponderance of the evidence." Means v. State, 120 Nev. 1001, 1012, 103 P.3d 25, 33 (2004) (emphasis added). "A court may consider the two test elements in any order and need not consider both prongs if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on either one." Kirksey v. State, 112 Nev. 980, 987, 923 P.2d 1102, 1107 (1997).

b. Failure to investigate

Defendant claims trial counsel failed to "contact [his] witnesses and friends to investigate the claims against [him]." <u>PWHC</u> at 8. A defendant who contends that his attorney was ineffective because he did not adequately investigate must show how a better investigation would have rendered a more favorable outcome. <u>Molina v. State</u>, 120 Nev. 185, 87 P.3d 533 (2004).

Defendant's claims are vague accusations that fail to offer sufficient specific factual allegations under Molina. Indeed, consistent with Molina, it is not the responsibility of the State to develop vague claims asserted by the defendant for the purpose of arguing the issue. See Maresca v. State, 103 Nev. 669, 673, 748 P.2d 3, 6 (1987). Defendant fails to identify these potential witnesses, what these potential witnesses would have said, or even if these potential witnesses would have spoken with counsel. See Davis v. State, 110 Nev. 1107, 1120, 881 P.2d 657, 665 (1994) (noting that witnesses and victims cannot be compelled to speak with defense counsel or their agents).

In any event, the day-to-day conduct of the defense is the responsibility of the attorney. See Rhyne v. State, 118 Nev. 1, 8, 38 P.3d 163, 167 (2004); see also Ford v. State, 105 Nev. 850, 853, 784 P.2d 951, 953 (1989) (noting that how to exam a witness is a tactical decision that is virtually unchallengeable absent extraordinary circumstances). As Defendant concedes,

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trial counsel used the State's witnesses for Defendant's defense. <u>PWHC</u> at 8. As noted infra, trial counsel focused on the inconsistencies between the victim's statement on cross-examination and on the fact that Defendant came clean to establish that this contact was consensual.

Notably, the Nevada Supreme Court has repeatedly found that the uncorroborated testimony of a victim of a sexual offense is sufficient standing alone to sustain a verdict of guilty. Gaxiola v. State, 121 Nev. 638, 647, 119 P.3d 1225, 1231 (2005) (stating that the uncorroborated testimony of a victim, without more, is sufficient to uphold a rape conviction). Case law such as this was developed exactly for situations like the instant matter. These crimes were committed behind closed doors, under the eyes of a family that would never suspect them because Defendant was somebody that they trusted and loved, somebody that they brought into their home. Focusing on the victim's credibility through cross-examination of the State's witnesses instead of investigating witnesses who were not present during these assaults is not deficient performance. Equally, and for the same reasons, Defendant cannot demonstrate prejudice. There was overwhelming evidence presented that Defendant sexually assaulted the victim over the course of years. See Renteria-Novoa, No. 61865 at 7 (rejecting an insufficiency of the evidence argument on direct appeal). Instead of being a father figure to a very young, and vulnerable girl, Defendant abused his position for his own sexual gratification. His betrayal of trust will follow her for the rest of her life, and color all of the relationships she forms and develops.

c. Failure to reveal the "inconsistent" testimony of the victim

Additionally, Defendant asserts trial counsel was ineffective for failing to reveal the inconsistent statements of the victim's testimony that changed from "the original police report to the preliminary hearing..." <u>PWHC</u> at 8. Defendant's claim is belied by the record, however, as trial counsel "sought to reveal [the] inconsistencies in [the victim's] previous recounting of the alleged abuse [during cross-examination]." <u>Renteria-Novoa</u>, No. 61865 at 2; <u>see Hargrove</u>, 100 Nev. at 502, 686 P.2d at 225; <u>see also Hall</u>, 91 Nev. at 315, 535 P.2d at 798.

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Indeed, trial counsel thoroughly cross-examined the victim regarding her inconsistent statements and attempted to discredit the victim. For instance, trial counsel questioned the victim regarding the fact that she received a "U-Visa" as a result of her testimony, allowing her to remain in the country legally. RT 5-23-12 at 146-47. Moreover, trial counsel questioned the victim regarding her statements to the school counselor, Id. at 153, her statements to her family, Id. at 154, and her statements to the police, Id. at 155. Trial counsel emphasized that the victim's statements were "inconsistent from one to the other" and that Defendant was "entitled to impeach her on what she told the police initially to the next statement, which is inconsistent, to the next statement, which is inconsistent." Id. at 164. "[I]t's different from what she said at the preliminary hearing, it's different from what she said in her voluntary statement. It's different from what...she said today." Id. 167. The following colloquy took place:

Q: Now, today you testified that you put your hand [] that you would actually put your hand on his penis?

A: He would tell me to touch his penis.

Q: All right. Did you testify today that you actually put your hand on his penis?

A: Yes.

Q: Okay. Today, is that—that's the first time we're hearing that. That's the first time you've said that, right?

A: I don't think so. I think I said it before.

Q: Do you remember when you said it before?

A: Well, [] I talked [] I remember talking about it with Stacy.

Q: Okay. But you never said it in any of the previous statement that you gave?

A: I think the time I came in court for the first time.

<u>Id.</u> at 189-90.

Moreover, trial counsel emphasized that the victim had given inconsistent "stories"

during closing arguments. RT 5-24-12 at 183. Specifically:

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"So one of the things that makes [the victim] not credible is the inconsistent stories that she told, and that's one of the things that you can consider when you're looking at her credibility, in addition to [telling] inconsistent stories to several people. In addition to the inconsistencies, you're going to [] you heard testimony of her family, and her family also shows that she's simply not credible...[s]he told her family several different stories."

"In addition to her family, she talked to a counselor. She told the counselor a different story. After she spoke to the counselor, she did a written statement for the police, which was different. Then she gave a recorded statement to the police several weeks later, which was also different. Then finally, at the preliminary hearing, that's when she made the bulk of her allegations. That was completely different than anything she had ever said, and that was about nine months before any allegations came to light."

"Now, let's start with her family. What did she tell her family? [] She never said anything about any type of sexual contact with [the Defendant]. She never said anything about sex with her cousin...she gave absolutely not details about what happened [to her aunt]. All she said is that she was just...being touched."

"Then we go to the written statement which happened the day the police were called. Again, [the victim] says that...her private parts were touched, he put his hand inside of her; however, there was not mention of some of the biggest details [] [or] the most egregious conduct here...no mention to the counselor, no mention to her family, no mention at all...[s]o a few weeks later, she does her recorded statement. Now she says the touching next started in 2004. This is 2010 when she's giving this statement, but she says it happened in 2004, so it's about five years now that she's saying this happened. So we went from three years to one year to possibly five years. They asked her about the last time she was touched...she doesn't mention anything about any type of anal licking or any type of vaginal licking. She just says that she was touched."

"Then we get to the preliminary hearing....[n]ow she is 11 years old when the touching started. Her breasts were touched, her vagina was touched. Now, she adds to the detail that [the defendant] licked her vagina and licked her anus. So she simply is not credible when her story changes that way."

<u>Id.</u> at 183-86. The simple fact of the matter is, trial counsel thoroughly emphasized the inconsistencies between the two parties and the Nevada Supreme Court noted as much. Accordingly, Defendant's claim is barred by the law of the case and belied by the record. <u>Renteria-Novoa</u>, No. 61865 at 2; <u>see Hargrove</u>, 100 Nev. at 502, 686 P.2d at 225; <u>see also Hall</u>, 91 Nev. at 315, 535 P.2d at 798.

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III. DEFENDANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO AN ATTORNEY

The United States Supreme Court ruled in <u>Coleman v. Thompson</u>, 501 U.S. 722, 111 S. Ct. 2546 (1991), that the Sixth Amendment provides no right to counsel in post-conviction proceedings. Nonetheless, NRS 34.750 provides:

[a] petition may allege that the Defendant is unable to pay the costs of the proceedings or employ counsel. If the court is satisfied that the allegation of indigency is true and the petition is not dismissed summarily, the court may appoint counsel at the time the court orders the filing of an answer and a return. In making its determination, the court may consider whether:

- (a) The issues are difficult;
- (b) The Defendant is unable to comprehend the proceedings; or
- (c) Counsel is necessary to proceed with discovery.

Under NRS 34.750, it is clear that the court has discretion in determining whether to appoint counsel. However, the Nevada Supreme Court explained that a petitioner "must show that the requested review is not frivolous before he may have an attorney appointed." Peterson v. Warden, Nevada State Prison, 87 Nev. 134, 483 P.2d 204 (1971). Here, Defendant's claims are not difficult, belied by the record, barred by the law of the case, not cognizable in a post-conviction petition, and without merit. Further, Defendant has failed to demonstrate that he is unable to understand the proceedings or a need for discovery. Accordingly, Defendant is not entitled to post-conviction counsel and this Court should deny his request.

CONCLUSION

Based on the aforementioned, Defendant's petition should be denied.

DATED this 13th day of April, 2015.

Respectfully submitted,

STEVEN B. WOLFSON Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #001565

BY /s/ JAMES R. SWEETIN

JAMES R. SWEETIN

Chief Deputy District Attorney
Nevada Bar #005144

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that	service of the	above ar	nd foregoing	was mad	e this	13th	day	of
APRIL 2015, to:								

GUILLERMO RENTERIA-NOVOA, #1092343 N.N.C.C. P.O. BOX 7000 CARSON CITY, NV 89702

BY /s/ HOWARD CONRAD Secretary for the District Attorney's Office Special Victims Unit

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CLERK OF THE COURT

FCL STEVEN B. WOLFSON Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #001565 JAMES R. SWEETIN Chief Deputy District Attorney Nevada Bar #005144 200 Lewis Avenue Las Vegas, Nevada 89155-2212 (702) 671-2500 Attorney for Plaintiff

DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

THE STATE OF NEVADA,

Plaintiff,

-VS-

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CASE NO:

C-10-268285-1

GUILLERMO RENTERIA-NOVOA,

#2755564

DEPT NO:

 $\mathbf{X}\mathbf{X}$

Defendant.

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF **LAW AND ORDER**

DATE OF HEARING: APRIL 16, 2015 TIME OF HEARING: 8:30 AM

THIS CAUSE having come on for hearing before the Honorable CHARLES THOMPSON, District Judge, on the 16 day of April, 2015, the Petitioner not being present, proceeding IN FORMA PAUPERIS, the Respondent being represented by STEVEN B. WOLFSON, Clark County District Attorney, by and through ALICIA ALBRITTON, Chief Deputy District Attorney, and the Court having considered the matter, including briefs, transcripts, arguments of counsel, and documents on file herein, now therefore, the Court makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law:

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FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

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This is Petitioner Guillermo Renteria-Novoa's post-conviction petition for writ of habeas corpus. On January 26, 2011, the State filed an Information Petitioner as follows: Counts 1-2, 4-6, 10-19, 22-23, and 25-30: Sexual Assault with a Minor under the age of 14; Counts 3, 7-9, 21, 24, and 43-44: Lewdness with a Child under the age of 14; Counts 20, 45, and 53: Open or Gross Lewdness; Counts 31-42: Sexual Assault with a Minor under the age of 16; and Counts 46-52: Sexual Assault.¹

On May 21, 2012, Petitioner's jury trial began. On May 25, 2012, the jury returned a verdict of guilty on all counts as charged in the Second Amended Information. On September 6, 2012, Petitioner was sentenced as follows: as to the Sexual Assault with a Minor under the age of 14 counts: Life with the possibility of parole after 20 years; as to the Lewdness with a Child under the Age of 14 counts: Life with the possibility of parole after 10 years; as to the Sexual Assault with a Minor under the age of 16 counts: Life with the possibility of parole after 25 years; as to the Open or Gross Lewdness counts: 12 months in the Clark County Detention Center; as to the Sexual Assault Counts: Life with the possibility of parole after 10 years. A Judgment of Conviction was filed on September 17, 2012.

Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal on October 5, 2012. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed Petitioner's convictions on September 24, 2014. Renteria-Novoa, No. 61865 (Sept. 24, 2014). Remittitur issued October 21, 2014.

On February 9, 2015, Petitioner filed the instant post-conviction petition. Petitioner asserts several due process of law violations and ineffective assistance of counsel claims. Specifically, Petitioner claims that his Miranda rights were violated, that his right to a speedy trial was violated, and that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate witnesses on his behalf and for failing to reveal the "inconsistent" testimony of the victim during trial. Nonetheless, this Court finds, as to the grounds properly cognizable in a habeas-corpus petition, Petitioner's grounds are without merit.²

¹ On May 22, 2012, the State filed a Second Amended Information dropping several counts.

² Defendant's due process claims (a purported failure to be Mirandized and a purported speedy trial violation) are not cognizable in a post-conviction petition. See NRS 34.720 ("The provisions of NRS 34.720 to 34.830...apply only to petitions...in which the petitioner: 1. Requests relief from a

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As to Petitioner's claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate, this Court finds that Defendant's claim is without merit. A defendant who contends that his attorney was ineffective because he did not adequately investigate must show how a better investigation would have rendered a more favorable outcome. Molina v. State, 120 Nev. 185, 87 P.3d 533 (2004); see Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686-87, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2063-64 (1984) (noting that a defendant must show that his counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and, but for counsel's errors, there is a reasonable probability that the result of the proceedings would have been different). Petitioner's claims are vague accusations that fail to offer sufficient specific factual allegations under Molina. Petitioner failed to identify these potential witnesses, what these potential witnesses would have said, or even if these potential witnesses would have spoken with counsel. See Hargrove v. State, 100 Nev. 498, 502, 686 P.2d 222, 225 (1984) (noting that bare and conclusory claims are insufficient); see also Davis v. State, 110 Nev. 1107, 1120, 881 P.2d 657, 665 (1994) (noting that witnesses and victims cannot be compelled to speak with defense counsel or their agents).

Moreover, the Nevada Supreme Court has *repeatedly* found that the uncorroborated testimony of a victim of a sexual offense is sufficient standing alone to sustain a verdict of guilty. Gaxiola v. State, 121 Nev. 638, 647, 119 P.3d 1225, 1231 (2005) (stating that the uncorroborated testimony of a victim, without more, is sufficient to uphold a rape conviction). Case law such as this was developed exactly for situations like the instant matter. These crimes were committed behind closed doors, under the eyes of a family that would never suspect them because Petitioner was somebody that they trusted and loved, somebody that they brought into their home. Petitioner's counsel focused on the victim's credibility through extensive cross-examination of the State's witnesses instead of investigating witnesses who were not present during these assaults. This is a trial strategy and is virtually unchallengeable. See Ford v.

judgment of conviction or sentence in a criminal case; or 2. Challenges the computation of time that the petitioner has served pursuant to a judgment of conviction.); McConnell v. State, 125 Nev. 243, 247, 212 P.3d 307, 310 (2009). Moreover, "all [] claims that are appropriate for a direct appeal must be pursued on direct appeal, or they will be considered waived in subsequent proceedings." Franklin v. State, 110 Nev. 750, 752, 877 P.2d 1058, 1059 (1994) (emphasis added). Because these claims are outside of the limited scope of NRS Chapter 34 and should have been raised, if at all, on direct appeal, they will not be considered.

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State, 105 Nev. 850, 853, 784 P.2d 951, 953 (1989). Equally and for the same reasons, Petitioner cannot establish prejudice.

As to Petitioner's claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to reveal the inconsistent testimony of the victim, this Court finds that Petitioner's claim is belied by the record as trial counsel "sought to reveal [the] inconsistencies in [the victim's] previous recounting of the alleged abuse [during cross-examination]." Renteria-Novoa, No. 61865 at 2; see Hargrove, 100 Nev. at 502, 686 P.2d at 225; see also Hall, 91 Nev. at 315, 535 P.2d at 798. The record is replete with cross-examination regarding the inconsistent statements of the victim. Trial counsel thoroughly emphasized the inconsistencies between the statements given and the Nevada Supreme Court noted as much. Therefore, this Court finds that Petitioner has failed to establish ineffective assistance of counsel as he has failed to establish deficient performance or prejudice.3

ORDER

THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Petition for Post-Conviction Relief shall be, and is, denied.

DATED this 26 day of May, 2015.

DISTRICT/JVDGE

ERIC JOHNSON

STEVEN B. WOLFSON

Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #001565

hief Deputy District Attorney evada Bar #009492

³ Because Defendant failed to establish that his issues were difficult, that he was unable to comprehend the proceedings, or that there was a need for discovery, he is not entitled to an attorney and his motion is hereby denied. See NRS 34.750; Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 111 S. Ct. 2546

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that service of the above and foregoing was made this 20th day of MAY 2015, to:

GUILLERMO RENTERIA-NOVOA, #1092343 N.N.C.C. P.O. BOX 7000 CARSON CITY, NV 89702

BY /s/ HOWARD CONRAD
Secretary for the District Attorney's Office
Special Victims Unit

hjc/SVU

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADOR

GUILLERMO RENTERIA-NOVOA, Appellant, vs. THE STATE OF NEVADA, Respondent. Supreme Court No. 68239 District Court Case No. C268285

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE

STATE OF NEVADA, ss.

I, Elizabeth A. Brown, the duly appointed and qualified Clerk of the Supreme Court of the State of Nevada, do hereby certify that the following is a full, true and correct copy of the Judgment in this matter.

JUDGMENT

The court being fully advised in the premises and the law, it is now ordered, adjudged and decreed, as follows:

"Reversed and Remanded."

Judgment, as quoted above, entered this 30th day of March, 2017.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have subscribed my name and affixed the seal of the Supreme Court at my Office in Carson City, Nevada this April 24, 2017.

Elizabeth A. Brown, Supreme Court Clerk

By: Dana Richards Deputy Clerk

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133 Nev., Advance Opinion

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

GUILLERMO RENTERIA-NOVOA, Appellant, vs. THE STATE OF NEVADA, Respondent. No. 68239

FILED

MAR 3 0 2017

Appeal from a district court order denying a postconviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; Eric Johnson, Judge.

Reversed and remanded.

Guillermo Renteria-Novoa, Carson City, in Pro Se.

Adam Paul Laxalt, Attorney General, Carson City; Steven B. Wolfson, District Attorney, Clark County, for Respondent.

BEFORE PICKERING, HARDESTY and PARRAGUIRRE, JJ.

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Appellant Guillermo Renteria-Novoa was convicted, pursuant to a jury verdict, of 36 felony sexual offenses and sentenced to a total term of life with the possibility of parole after 85 years. After the judgment of conviction was affirmed on direct appeal, Renteria-Novoa filed a timely pro se postconviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the district

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SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA



court and moved for the appointment of counsel. Under Nevada law, the appointment of postconviction counsel was discretionary with the district court because Renteria-Novoa had not been sentenced to death. Compare NRS 34.750(1), with NRS 34.820(1). Exercising that discretion, the district court declined to appoint postconviction counsel and denied the petition following a hearing at which Renteria-Novoa was not present. This appeal followed. We take this opportunity to address the factors that are relevant to the district court's exercise of its discretion to appoint postconviction counsel under NRS 34.750(1). Because we conclude that the district court abused its discretion, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.

Under NRS 34.750(1), the district court has discretion to appoint counsel to represent a petitioner who has filed a postconviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus if (1) the petitioner is indigent and (2) the petition is not summarily dismissed. The statute sets forth a nonexhaustive list of factors that the district court "may consider" in deciding whether to appoint postconviction counsel: the severity of the

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¹Senior Judge Charles Thompson presided over the hearing on the postconviction petition and orally denied the petition and the motion for appointment of counsel. Judge Johnson entered the written order denying the petition and motion.

²Although this matter was docketed before the amendments to the Nevada Rules of Appellate Procedure that allow parties appearing without the assistance of counsel to file briefs and other documents without seeking leave of court, see NRAP 28(k) (effective October 1, 2015); NRAP 46A (effective October 1, 2015), we have considered the pro se brief received on October 20, 2015, and the pro se informal brief received on February 12, 2016.

consequences that the petitioner faces, the difficulty of the issues presented, the petitioner's ability to comprehend the proceedings, and the necessity of counsel to proceed with discovery. We review the district court's decision to deny the appointment of counsel for an abuse of discretion.

The threshold requirements for the appointment of postconviction counsel were met in this case. First, the district court necessarily found that Renteria-Novoa was indigent when it granted him permission to proceed in forma pauperis in the postconviction proceedings. Second, the petition was not subject to summary dismissal as it was Renteria-Novoa's first petition challenging the validity of his judgment of conviction and sentence. See NRS 34.745(1), (4).

In briefly considering some of the factors identified in NRS 34.750(1), the district court noted in its written order that Renteria-Novoa had not demonstrated that the issues were difficult, that he was unable to comprehend the proceedings, or that discovery was needed. We disagree.

The motion for appointment of postconviction counsel generally tracked the factors set forth in NRS 34.750(1) without much explanation. With respect to Renteria-Novoa's ability to comprehend the proceedings in particular, the motion recited that he had "very limited knowledge of the law and process thereof." The petition made a similar representation, but it also indicated that Renteria-Novoa has limited English-language proficiency. The potential language barrier is further supported by the trial record, which shows that Renteria-Novoa had the assistance of a Spanish language interpreter throughout the trial proceedings. The use of an interpreter throughout trial indicates that Renteria-Novoa may be unable to comprehend the postconviction

proceedings due to a language barrier. While the district court specifically found that Renteria-Novoa did not demonstrate an inability to comprehend the proceedings, this finding, which was made after a hearing where Renteria-Novoa was not present and which appears to have been based solely on the petition, lacks support in the record, particularly as the petition was not well pleaded and Renteria-Novoa had previously needed an interpreter.

The other factors identified in NRS 34.750(1) also weigh in favor of the appointment of counsel in this case. The consequences that Renteria-Novoa faces are severe: he has been convicted of 36 felony offenses following a jury trial and is serving what arguably is the functional equivalent of a life-without-parole sentence as he must serve approximately 85 years before being eligible for release on parole. This petition is Renteria-Novoa's only opportunity to assert ineffectiveassistance and other claims that could not have been raised at trial or on direct appeal. The pro se petition, although not well pleaded, raised several ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims, including the failure to investigate, which may require discovery and investigation of facts outside the record.

We also are troubled by the possibility that the district court's decision as to the appointment of counsel was influenced by the assertion in the State's responsive pleading that, quoting Peterson v. Warden, 87 Nev. 134, 136, 483 P.2d 204, 205 (1971), Renteria-Novoa had to "show that the requested review is not frivolous before he may have an attorney appointed." The quoted language from Peterson referred to former NRS 177.345(2). That provision addressed the appointment of counsel to assist a petitioner on appeal from the district court's judgment on a petition for

postconviction relief. 1969 Nev. Stat., ch. 87, § 5, at 107. It provided for the appointment of appellate postconviction counsel only if the appellate court determined that the petitioner's appeal "is not frivolous." 177.345(2) (1969). In contrast, the appointment of postconviction counsel to represent the petitioner in the district court proceedings was mandatory if the petitioner was indigent, with no regard for whether the allegations in the petition were frivolous. NRS 177.345(1) (1969). And, when the Legislature later made the appointment of postconviction counsel to represent the petitioner in the district court proceedings discretionary and added the factors that today appear in NRS 34.750(1), the Legislature did not include the "frivolous" language that previously had restricted the appointment of appellate postconviction counsel under NRS 177.345(2) (1969). See 1987 Nev. Stat., ch. 539, § 42, at 1230-31 (amending NRS 177.345(1)). For these reasons and because NRS 177.345 was repealed in its entirety effective January 1, 1993, 1991 Nev. Stat., ch. 44, § 31, at 92, the language in Peterson has no bearing on a district court's decision to appoint postconviction counsel to represent a petitioner under current Nevada law set forth in NRS 34.750(1).

We take this opportunity to stress that the decision whether to appoint counsel under NRS 34.750(1) is not necessarily dependent upon whether a pro se petitioner has raised claims that clearly have merit or would warrant an evidentiary hearing. In some cases, such as this one where a language barrier may have interfered with the petitioner's ability to comprehend the proceedings, the petitioner may be unable to sufficiently present viable claims in his or her petition without the assistance of counsel. See generally Woodward v. State, 992 So. 2d 391, 392 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008) (noting that the decision to appoint counsel

"turns upon whether, under the circumstances of a particular case, the assistance of counsel is essential to accomplish a fair and thorough presentation of a defendant's claim(s) for collateral relief' (internal quotation marks omitted)); cf. Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1, 11-12 (2012) (recognizing inherent difficulties for prisoners in presenting claims of trial error without the assistance of counsel). In such cases, the district court's failure to appoint postconviction counsel may deprive the petitioner of a meaningful opportunity to present his or her claims to the district court.

In light of the severity of the consequences that Renteria-Novoa faces, the potential need for discovery, and Renteria-Novoa's questionable proficiency with the English language, we conclude that the district court abused its discretion in declining to appoint postconviction counsel to represent Renteria-Novoa. Accordingly, we reverse the district court's order denying Renteria-Novoa's petition and remand this matter for the appointment of counsel to assist Renteria-Novoa in the postconviction proceedings.³

Pickering

Hurlesty, J.

Hardestv

Parraguirre

³We express no opinion as to the merits of Renteria-Novoa's postconviction petition. Given our disposition of this matter, we deny the motion for appointment of appellate counsel submitted to this court on December 16, 2015.

CERTIFIED COPY
This document is a full, true and correct copy of the original on file and of record in my office.

DATE: 12017
Suppleme Court Clerk, State of Nevada

By Deputy

AA 001116

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

GUILLERMO RENTERIA-NOVOA, Appellant, vs. THE STATE OF NEVADA, Respondent. Supreme Court No. 68239 District Court Case No. C268285

REMITTITUR

TO: Steven D. Grierson, Eighth District Court Clerk

Pursuant to the rules of this court, enclosed are the following:

Certified copy of Judgment and Opinion/Order. Receipt for Remittitur.

DATE: April 24, 2017

Elizabeth A. Brown, Clerk of Court

By: Dana Richards Deputy Clerk

cc (without enclosures):

Hon. Eric Johnson, District Judge Guillermo Renteria-Novoa Attorney General/Carson City Clark County District Attorney

RECEIPT FOR REMITTITUR

Received of Elizabeth A. Brown, Clerk of the Supreme Court of the State of Nevada, th REMITTITUR issued in the above-entitled cause, onAPR 2 8 2017	e
HEATHER UNGERMANN	
Deputy District Court Clerk	

RECEIVED

APR 2 8 2017

1	CLIDDI		
2	SUPPL JEAN J. SCHWARTZER, ESQ.		
3	Nevada Bar No. 11223		
3	Law Office of Jean J. Schwartzer		
4	10620 Southern Highlands Parkway, Suite 110-473		
5	Las Vegas, Nevada 89141 Phone: (702) 979-9941		
6	Fax: (702) 977-9954		
7	jean.schwartzer@gmail.com		
8	Attorney for Petitioner		
9	DISTRICT COURT		
10	CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA		
11	GUILLERMO RENTERIA-NOVOA,)		
12	Petitioner,)		
13) CASE NO: C268285-1		
	v.) DEPT NO: XX		
14			
15	RENEE BAKER, WARDEN,)		
16	Lovelock Correctional Center)		
17	Respondent.)		
18)		
19	SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT		
	OF PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS (POST-CONVICTION)		
20			
21	DATE OF HEARING: February 7, 2019		
22	TIME OF HEARING: 9:00 A.M.		
23	THVIE OF THE MAING. 7.00 MINI.		
24	COMES NOW, GUILLERMO RENTERIA-NOVOA, by and through his attorney,		
25	JEAN SCHWARTZER, ESQ., and hereby submits the instant Supplemental		
26	Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus		
27	(Post-Conviction).		
28	/// AA 001118		

This Supplemental Memorandum is made and based upon all the papers and 2 pleadings on file herein, the attached points and authorities in support hereof, and oral 3 argument at the time of hearing, if deemed necessary by this Honorable Court. 4 DATED this 9th day of November, 2018. 5 Respectfully submitted, 6 7 <u>/s/ Jean J. Schwartzer</u> 8 JEAN J. SCHWARTZER, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 11223 9 LAW OFFICE OF JEAN J. SCHWARTZER 10 10620 Southern Highlands Parkway Suite 110-473 11 Las Vegas, Nevada 89141 12 Phone: (702) 979-9941 Fax: (702) 977-9954 13 Counsel for Petitioner 14 15 POINTS AND AUTHORITIES 16 STATEMENT OF THE CASE 17 18 On May 22, 2012, the State charged Guillermo Renteria-Novoa ("Petitioner") by 19 way of Second Amended Information with a total of thirty-three (33) Category A Felonies 20 and three (3) Gross Misdemeanors: COUNTS 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 9, 10, 12, 13, 14, 15, 17, 18, 20, & 21 21 – Sexual Assault With a Minor Under the Age of 14 (Category A Felony – NRS 22 200.364, 200.366); **COUNTS 3, 7, 8, 16, 19 & 22** – Lewdness With a Child Under the Age 23 of 14 (Category A Felony – NRS 201.230); COUNTS 23 through 30 – Sexual Assault with 24 a Minor Under the Age of 16 (Category A Felony – NRS 200.364, 200.366); COUNTS 11, 25 31 & 36 - Open or Gross Lewdness (Gross Misdemeanor - NRS 201.220); and COUNTS **32 through 35** – Sexual Assault (Category A Felony – NRS 200.364, 200.366). 27 28 AA 001119

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Petitioner's jury trial commenced on May 21, 2012. On May 25, 2012, the jury returned a verdict of guilty on all thirty-six (36) counts.

On September 6, 2012, the District Court sentenced Petitioner as follows: COUNTS 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 9, 10, 12, 13, 14, 15, 17, 18, 20, 21 - LIFE with the possibility of parole after TWENTY (20) YEARS; COUNTS 3, 7, 8, 16, 19, 22 - LIFE with the possibility of parole after TEN (10) YEARS; COUNTS 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30 - LIFE with possibility of parole after TWENTY FIVE (25) YEARS; COUNTS 11, 31, 36 - TWELVE (12) MONTHS Clark County Detention Center (CCDC); COUNTS 32, 33, 34, 35 - LIFE with the possibility of parole after TEN (10) YEARS, with 762 DAYS credit for time served. 10 FURTHER COURT ORDERED, COUNT 3 TO RUN CONSECUTIVE TO COUNT 1; COUNT 6 TO RUN CONSECUTIVE TO COUNTS 1 & 3; COUNT 23 TO RUN CONSECUTIVE TO COUNTS 1, 3, & 6 AND COUNT 32 TO RUN CONSECUTIVE TO COUNTS 1, 3, 6 & 23; REMAINING COUNTS TO RUN CONCURRENT. FURTHER COURT ORDERED, a special SENTENCE OF LIFETIME SUPERVISION is imposed upon release from incarceration and pursuant to NRS 179D.450 and Petitioner must register as a sex offender within 48 hours of release from custody.

The District Court filed the Judgment of Conviction on September 17, 2012. On October 5, 2012, Petitioner filed a timely Notice of Appeal.

On September 24, 2014, the Supreme Court of Nevada affirmed Petitioner's conviction. Remittitur was issued on October 21, 2014.

On February 9, 2015, Petitioner filed a timely Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Post-Conviction) as well as a Motion for Appointment of Counsel. On April 13, 2015, the State filed a Response. On April 16, 2015, a hearing was held wherein the Petition and Motion were denied. On May 27, 2015, the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order were filed. On May 29, 2015, on Notice of Entry of Decision and Order was filed.

On June 15, 2015, Petitioner filed a timely Notice of Appeal. On March 30, 2017, the Supreme Court of Nevada reversed the denial of the Petition and Motion for Appointment of Counsel and remanded the case back to District Court for appointment

of counsel. Remittitur was issued on April 24, 2017.

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On May 11, 2017, a hearing was held wherein Jean J. Schwartzer, Esq. was appointed to represent Petitioner in his post-conviction habeas proceedings.

Petitioner now files the instant Supplemental Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Post-Conviction).

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Minor victim, R.P., testified that between 2005 and 2009, Petitioner committed numerous sex crimes against her including touching her breasts, buttocks, vagina with 10 his fingers and tongue; digitally penetrating her anus and vagina; rubbing her with his penis outside of her clothing; making her touch his penis and masturbating in front of her. She said that Petitioner threatened to tell her family about her inappropriate sexual conduct with her cousin if she did not comply with his requests. During time period of the alleged crimes, R.P. ranged in age from under 14 to 16 years of age. (See Trial Transcript Day 3 ("T3") at 195-223). Most of these accusations were not corroborated.

R.P.'s cousin, Maritza Moreno-Rodriguez ("Maritza") testified that she lived with R.P and R.P's mother and had a respectful relationship with Petitioner. (<u>See</u> T3 at 231-233). Maritza testified that on November 29, 2009, Petitioner called her on her cell phone and asked that she tell R.P. that if she did not answer her phone, he [Petitioner] would tell everyone about R.P's sexual relationship with her cousin. (*See* T3 at 233-237). Maritza further testified that she never suspected Petitioner of assaulting R.P. and that she never told R.P.'s mother about the phone call from Petitioner on November 29, 2009. (See T3 at 237-240).

R.P.'s mother, Rosa Moreno-Rodriguez ("Rosa"), testified that she learned from her sister, Janet Rodriguez ("Janet"), of the alleged sexual assault in December of 2009. (<u>See</u> T3 at 249-253). Rosa immediately called the police and reported the abuse. (<u>See</u> T3 at 249-253). After reporting Petitioner to the police, Rosa claims she did not see Petitioner again except to talk to him once over the phone. (See T3 at 249-253). At no point in time

did Rosa ever suspect that Petitioner had any sort of inappropriate relationship with R.P.—had she thought so, she would have reported him sooner. (*See* T3 at 253-258).

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Jeimi Leon ("Leon") is R.P.'s cousin and the daughter of Janet. (*See* T3 at 261-265). Leon translated for Rosa when Rosa called 911 in December of 2009. (See T3 at 265-267). In December of 2009, Janet learned from her niece, Maritza, that R.P. had been sexually assaulted by Petitioner. (See Trial Transcript Day 4 ("T4") at 9-10). She tried to convince R.P. to talk to someone about what she had gone through. (See T4 at 9-10). Janet also testified that she never suspected Petitioner of abusing R.P. (See T4 at 12-14).

Detective Ryan Jaegar ("Jaegar") investigated this matter. (See T4 at 47-51). Jaegar 10 stated that he did not recommend R.P. be taken to the hospital for an exam because the last instance of alleged assault was more than 72 hours before the report. (*See* T4 at 47-51). In this matter, Jaegar interviewed R.P. while she was at school. (*See* T4 at 51-54). During her interview, R.P. told Jaegar that Petitioner had been sexually abusing her for a while. (See T4 at 51-54). Over the course of the investigation, Jaegar spoke with R.P and R.P.'s mother a few times, various other family members and Petitioner. (*See* T4 at 61-65, 72-76).

During the interview, Petitioner was aware that he could leave at any time but stayed and talked because he wanted to "fix the problem." (See T4 at 82-86). Petitioner corroborated some of the accusations during his voluntary statement, which was played for the jury at trial. (See T4 at 76-82; see also Trial Exhibit 27). The jury was also given a transcript of Petitioner's statement. (See T4 at 80-81; see also Voluntary Statement of Guillermo Renteria-Novoa, attached hereto as "Exhibit 1"). Petitioner claimed he never blackmailed R.P. into performing sexual favors for him; he only used his knowledge of R.P.'s relationship with her cousin to get R.P. to answer his calls in 2009. (*See T4* at 86-90). Petitioner stated that he caught R.P. engaging in inappropriate sexual conduct with her cousin. (See Exhibit 1 at 4-5). After this incident, R.P. would show Petitioner various naked body parts and ask for gifts in exchange. (See Exhibit 1 at 4-5). Petitioner admitted to kissing R.P.'s breasts on one occasion; masturbating on another occasion when R.P.

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27 28 showed him a body part; and touching her vagina over her clothing on a third occasion. (See Exhibit 1 at 7-10). Throughout the interview, Petitioner's recollection of events changed several times, which lead Jaegar to believe that Petitioner was not being forthcoming with the authorities. (*See* T4 at 105-108).

At the time R.P. made the accusation against Petitioner, she was 16 years old and pregnant. The father of the child was <u>not</u> Petitioner. R.P.'s story changed numerous times between statements made to her family, counselor, police, at the preliminary hearing and then at trial. (<u>See</u> T4 at 183-87).

Trial counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge a biased juror and for failing 10 to sanitize R.P.'s pregnancy at the time she made the accusation against Petitioner so as to present a complete and logically sound theory of defense. This prejudiced Petitioner and he is entitled to a new trial, especially given that Petitioner was convicted of the crimes based solely upon the testimony of R.P., most of them without any corroboration.

ARGUMENT

In the instant case, Petitioner's proceedings were fundamentally unfair, he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial, he was prejudiced, and is entitled to a new trial.

I. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL STANDARD

To state a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel that is sufficient to invalidate a judgment of conviction, the petitioner must demonstrate that: (1) counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness; and (2) counsel's errors were so severe that they rendered the verdict unreliable. Lozada v. State, 110 Nev. 349, 353, 871 P.2d 944, 946 (1994) *citing* <u>Strickland v. Washington</u>, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, (1984).

Once the defendant establishes that counsel's performance was deficient, the defendant must next show that, but for counsel's errors, the result of the trial would probably have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068; Davis v. State,

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107 Nev. 600, 601, 602, 817 P.2d 1169, 1170 (1991). The defendant must also demonstrate errors were so egregious as to render the result of the trial unreliable or the proceedings fundamentally unfair. State v. Love, 109 Nev. 1136, 1145, 865 P.2d 322, 328 (1993) citing Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 113 S.Ct. 838, 122 L.Ed.2d 180 (1993); Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. at 2064.

First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient. This requires a showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. at 2064.

Second, the defendant must show that he was prejudiced by the deficient performance of prior counsel. In meeting the prejudice requirement of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, Petitioner must show a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's error, the result of the trial would have been different. Reasonable probability is probability sufficient to undermine the confidence in the outcome. Kirksey, 112 Nev. at 980, 923 P.2d at 1102.

"Strategy or decisions regarding the conduct of a defendant's case are virtually unchallengeable, absent extraordinary circumstances." Mazzan v. State, 105 Nev. 745, 783 P.2d 430 (1989); Olausen v. State, 105 Nev. 110, 771 P.2d 583 (1989). However, counsel is still required to be effective in his or her strategic decisions. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068.

II. GROUND ONE: TRIAL COUNSEL WAS INEFFECIVE FOR FAILING TO CHALLENGE A JUROR WHO ADMITTED TO BIAS IN FAVOR OF THE VICTIM WITNESS

A. Law

"The purpose of jury voir dire is to discover whether a juror will consider and decide the facts impartially and conscientiously apply the law as charged by the court." <u>Johnson v. State</u>, 122 Nev. 1344, 1354, 148 P.3d 767, 774 (2006). "Even if 'only one juror is unduly biased or prejudiced,' the defendant is denied his constitutional right to an

impartial jury." <u>United States v. Eubanks</u>, 591 F.2d 513, 517 (9th Cir.1979).

"The presence of a biased juror cannot be harmless; the error requires a new trial without a showing of actual prejudice." <u>Dyer v. Calderon</u>, 151 F.3d 970, 973, n. 2 (9th Cir.1998); see also <u>United States v. Martinez-Salazar</u>, --- U.S. ---, ---, 120 S.Ct. 774, 782, 145 L.Ed.2d 792 (2000). To show prejudice, the defendant would need only to show that a juror who remained on the jury was biased, either actually or impliedly. <u>United States v, Gonzales</u>, 214 F.3d 1109 (9th Cir.2000).

The relevant test for determining whether a juror is biased is "whether the juror[] ... had such fixed opinions that [he] could not judge impartially the guilt of the defendant." Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1035, 104 S.Ct. 2885, 2891 (1984) (citation omitted). The defendant must show that the juror's "views were so fixed that he would not and did not honor his oath to faithfully apply the law" in the absence of a juror's "stated intention to disregard it." United States v. Quintero-Barraza, 78 F.3d 1344, 1350 (9th Cir. 1995) (Cert denied by Quintero-Barraza v. United States, 519 U.S. 848, 117 S.Ct. 135 (1996) (No. 95-9280).

Although "[b]ias can be revealed by a juror's express admission of that fact, ... more frequently, jurors are reluctant to admit actual bias, and the reality of their biased attitudes must be revealed by circumstantial evidence." <u>United States v. Allsup</u>, 566 F.2d 68, 71 (9th Cir.1977)(internal citations omitted). Determinations of impartiality may be based in large part upon demeanor. <u>Gonzales</u>, 214 F.3d at 1112. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that prejudice is to be presumed "where the relationship between a prospective juror and some aspect of the litigation is such that it is highly unlikely that the average person could remain impartial in his deliberations under the circumstances." <u>Tinsley v. Borg</u>, 895 F.2d 520, 527 (9th Cir.1990)(internal quotations and citations omitted)(emphasis added). A juror is considered to be impartial "only if he can lay aside his opinion and render a verdict based on the evidence presented in court...." <u>Yount</u>, 467 U.S. at 1037 n.12. "**Doubts regarding bias <u>must</u> be resolved against the juror**." <u>Gonzales</u>, 214 F.3d at 1114 (emphasis added).

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2		mitted To Making a Credibility Determination in Favo fore Hearing Any Evidence
3	of the victim be.	Total Hearing They Evidence
4	During voir dire, the fo	llowing exchange took place between defense counsel and
5	Juror No. 12 : 1	
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	Prospective Juror:	035
7	Defense Counsel:	Ms. Moreno-Zepeda?
8	Prospective Juror:	Mm-hmm.
9	Defense Counsel:	Now you heard us talk about the presumption of innocence and how everyone's presumed
10		innocent. How does that make you feel? What
		do you think about that?
11	Prospective Juror:	I mean, it is our justice system and that's how
12	•	it's built, so that's what we have to follow.
13	Defense Counsel:	So as Mr. Renteria-Novoa sits there right now,
13		is he guilty or not guilty?
14	Prospective Juror:	Not guilty.
15	Defense Counsel:	And why is that?
1.0	Prospective Juror:	Because he hasn't been proven guilty yet.
16	Defense Counsel:	So if the State, after they present all their
17		witnesses and you feel that they haven't
18		proven their case, what would be your vote for, guilty or not guilty?
	Prospective Juror:	I guess not guilty. It's just really hard to say
19	riospective juroi.	because I haven't heard all the facts.
20	Defense Counsel:	And considering the nature of those charges,
21		does that factor into it in any way as far as
21		your ability to be fair?
22	Prospective Juror:	It is a very heinous crime in my eyes. I don't
23		see why anybody would lie about something
24		like that, especially if it happened so long
24		ago, for her to, you know, bring those
25		feelings back and just talk about that, it's just
26		really hard to know that she's lying about something like that. I just
27		,
28	1 Prior to being selected to sit on the jury 12 was <i>not</i> an alternate. (<u>See</u> Amended J	y as Juror No. 12, she was Prospective Juror No. 35. Additionally, Juror No. 12, structury List, attached hereto as "Exhibit 2"). AA 001126

Defense Counsel: Okay. So do you think that some child would 1 never lie in that circumstance, or they could 2 possibly lie? 3 **Prospective Juror:** I mean there is that possibility. But I believe she's 19 years old now, so for her to just 4 revisit that and bring that all to light and 5 want to go through all of this is just hard to, you know, really tell that she's-wouldn't lie 6 about that. 7 Defense Counsel: Okay. All right. Thank you. 8 (See Transcript of Day Two of Trial, attached hereto as "Exhibit 3," 91-9 93)(emphasis added). 10 Initially Juror No. 12 indicated that she understood the presumption of innocence 11 and that the State has the burden to prove Petitioner's guilty. However, upon further 12 questioning by defense counsel, Juror No. 12 made it clear that she did not think a child 13 who was molested would lie about such an ordeal years later and rehash old feelings and 14 wounds. (See Exhibit 3 at 91-93). Juror No. 12 made a credibility determination with 15 respect to the victim before hearing any evidence at all. This demonstrates that this juror 16 was biased in favor of the victim witness and could not "lay aside [her] opinion and 17 render a verdict based upon the evidence in court." Yount, 467 U.S. at 1037 n.12. Juror 18 No. 12 had views that were fixed in favor of the victim witness. Therefore Juror No. 12 19 was admittedly biased and partial in favor of the State. Id.; Quintero-Barraza, 78 F.3d at 20 1350. Any doubts to whether or not this Juror was biased "must be resolved against 21 the juror." Gonzales, 214 F.3d at 1114 (emphasis added). 22 C. Petitioner Was Prejudiced by Juror No. 12's Bias in Favor of the State's 23 Victim Witness 24 With respect to prejudice, during appellate and post-conviction proceedings 25 evidence in the form of post-conviction testimony from a juror that he or she was biased 26 in his or deliberation is not permitted. Therefore, to some degree, any appellate or post-27 conviction argument, whether by the State or a defendant, related to the prejudicial effect

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of an alleged error on a juror's deliberation will always be speculation. However, the Supreme Court of the United States and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals have held that "[t]he presence of a biased juror cannot be harmless; the error requires a new trial without a showing of actual prejudice." <u>Dyer</u>, 151 F.3d at 973, n. 2 (emphasis added); see also Martinez-Salazar, --- U.S. ---, ---, 120 S.Ct. 774, 782, 145 L.Ed.2d 792 (2000). To show prejudice, the defendant would need only to show that a juror who remained on the jury was biased, either actually or impliedly. Gonzales, 214 F.3d 1109. As discussed, supra, Juror No. 12 was admittedly biased. *That bias cannot be harmless*. <u>Dyer</u>, *supra*; <u>Gonzales</u>, supra; see also Martinez-Salazar, supra. Therefore, the fact that defense counsel did not 10 challenge this juror for cause or use a peremptory challenge on her falls below an objective standard of reasonableness. Counsel's failure to do so prejudiced Petitioner because the presence of a biased juror cannot be harmless and Petitioner was, in fact, found guilty. Therefore, Petitioner received ineffective assistance of counsel during jury selection, was prejudiced and is entitled to a new trial. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052; <u>Dyer, supra; Gonzales</u>, supra; see also <u>Martinez-Salazar, supra.</u>

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III. GROUND TWO: TRIAL COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING TO PROPERLY SANITIZE R.P.'S PREGNANCY SO AS TO PRESENT A COMPLETE THEORY OF DEFENSE

A. The Fact That R.P. Was Pregnant and 16 At the Time She Made the Accusations Against Petitioner Went to the Heart of Petitioner's Defense

R.P. was 16 years old and pregnant when she told her mother about Petitioner's sexual contact with her. The father of the baby was neither her cousin nor Petitioner. It was during this same conversation that R.P. told her mother she was pregnant. On the first day of trial, defense counsel moved to admit R.P.'s pregnancy and then question R.P. about said pregnancy as a motive to fabricate the accusations against Petitioner. The State objected pursuant to the Nevada Rape Shield Law. (See Trial Transcript Day 1 "T1") at 2-11). The State further argued that this would hurt their case because the jury would naturally think that the father of the child was R.P.'s cousin. The Court stated that AA 001128

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her pregnancy simply makes her appear as though R.P. has sexual relations with a lot of men (which is prohibited under the Nevada Rape Shield Law) and questioned how the pregnancy was relevant. Defense counsel argued that the pregnancy is important to disclose because if R.P. told her mother and family that she was a victim, this would then ease the treatment she would receive from her family once she also revealed she was pregnant. (See T1 at 11-17). Defense counsel knew from the onset of this case that this was central to the theory of defense:

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"In the declaration of warrant the officer says Roxana had just told her mother she was pregnant.....She's blaming [Petitioner] for raping her to get her out of trouble for being pregnant by somebody else. If she tells her mom that she's pregnant, she's going to get in trouble. But if she says at the same time, oh, and I've been sexually abused by your ex-boyfriend for years, that's going to minimize any amount to trouble she would have gotten in for being pregnant in the first place.

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(*See* T1 at 5-7).

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This Court agreed that R.P.'s pregnancy cut to the heart of the Petitioner's defense case but expressed that both the Court and the State were blindsided because the issue was not raised prior to trial in a written motion. (See T1 at 28-42). This Court then offered to let the defense sanitize the pregnancy and call it a "medical condition." The defense objected to this compromise because teenagers do not get into trouble for simply having a medical condition but they do get in trouble for getting pregnant. (See T1 at 42-49). Ultimately, this Court denied the request to admit R.P.'s pregnancy pursuant to the Nevada Rape Shield Law and told the defense that it needed to think of another way to 'phrase it, that it's not the sexual conduct, there's some consequences, she's going to be in trouble for something..." so that it does not connote that R.P. had sexual contact as a minor. (See T1 at 50). Defense responded by saying that there is no way to do this; their defense is "gutted;" and asked for a stay so as to file a brief with the Supreme Court of Nevada. (*See* T1 at 49-63). The District Court denied the request for the stay.

On appeal, the issue of whether or not it was proper to admit R.P.'s pregnancy to

AA 001129

show motive to lie or be able to present a theory of defense, thereby subverting the Nevada Rape Shield Law, was fully briefed by both appellate counsel and the State. The Supreme Court of Nevada affirmed the denial of Petitioner's oral motion to admit R.P.s' pregnancy and found that the Nevada Rape Shield Law was properly applied. (See Order of Affirmance, Case No. 61865, attached hereto as "Exhibit 4," at 6-7). However there was absolutely no discussion by the Nevada Supreme Court regarding the materiality of this evidence of R.P. pregnancy. Id. In the instant Supplemental Memorandum, Petitioner is not attempting to reassert the argument made on appeal, which was that the District Court erred in denying Petitioner's oral motion to admit evidence of R.P.'s pregnancy. Petitioner is arguing that his trial counsel did not effectively prepare for this issue prior to trial and furthermore did not sanitize the pregnancy, discussed *infra* at section III(B), thereby providing an incomplete and weak defense theory. This amounts to ineffective assistance of counsel. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. at 2064; Kirksey, 112 Nev. at 980, 923 P.2d at 1102.

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B. Defense Counsel Failed to Sanitize R.P.'s Pregnancy Despite Being Given the Opportunity to Do So By the Court

"Few rights are more fundamental than that of an accused to present witnesses in his own defense." <u>Chambers v. Mississippi</u>, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973). Precluding a defendant from presenting evidence tending to exculpate offends Sixth Amendment jury trial, right to counsel, and confrontation clause guarantees. See Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 409 (1988)(providing that right of a defendant to present evidence "stands on no less footing than any other Sixth Amendment right"). It also abrogates Fourteenth Amendment Due Process guarantees, which "assure an accused the right to introduce into evidence any testimony or documentation which would tend to prove the defendant's theory of the case." Vipperman v. State, 96 Nev. 592, 596 (1980) (citations omitted); Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 (1986).

At trial, defense counsel did nothing to sanitize R.P.'s pregnancy, despite being given the opportunity to do so as so ensure Petitioner was afforded his Due Process right

to introduce into evidence any testimony or documentation which would tend to prove the defendant's theory of the case. Vipperman, 96 Nev.at 596 (citations omitted); Crane, 476 U.S. at 690. In opening and closing statements, defense counsel termed the defense theory as "better him than me." (See T3 at 17; T4 at 181-85). Counsel admitted that Petitioner and R.P. did have an inappropriate relationship but that it a) did not begin until R.P. was 14 years old thereby refuting Counts 1-10 and 12-22; b) was consensual from 15-16 thereby refuting Counts 11, 31 and 36; and c) penetration was not proven beyond a reasonable doubt thereby refuting Counts 32 to 35. (See T4 at 190-192). In short, the defense theory was that R.P. lied about when her sexual relationship started with Petitioner; what specific sexual acts occurred; and whether or not it was consensual. Just as Juror No. 12 questioned: Why would anyone lie about something like that?

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To answer that question, defense counsel needed to present the motive R.P. had for fabricating or embellishing her relationship with Petitioner. However, due to counsel's failure to adequately prepare for the application of the Nevada Rape Shield Law, at the last minute counsel ultimately presented the weak defense theory that R.P. lied about her interaction with Petitioner because she was so afraid that Petitioner was going to tell her mother about her inappropriate relationship with her cousin, Yahir, as well as her inappropriate relationship with Petitioner. (See T4 at 182 and 193). Theoretic ally, with this lie, instead of being mad at her, her mother would focus her anger on Petitioner. First, it is nonsensical that Petitioner would tell R.P.'s mother about his own relationship with her daughter given that it would result in Petitioner suffering major consequences. Second, her relationship with Yahir occurred 5 years prior to the accusations she made against Petitioner. Given this temporal remoteness, R.P. would have plausible deniability regarding her relationship with her cousin due to the fact that Petitioner waited so long to tell R.P.'s mother, if he did, in fact, did tell her. It does not make sense that R.P would be so scared of her family knowing about a 5 year old brief, benign and harmless dalliance with her cousin, that she would make up a story as severe as, "mom, your boyfriend has been sexually abusing me for the last five years."

What would have strengthened the defense theory of "better him than me," would have been the argument that R.P. was so fearful of getting into trouble for making a serious mistake that is recent and that could negatively impact her the rest of her lift with respect to opportunities; her education; future relationships; her health; her psychological state; as well as her financial and living situations. This would make any parent angry at; fearful for; disappointed in; and upset with their child, far more so than having an inappropriate relationship with a cousin 5 years ago that has long since ended. Being pregnant at 16 presents far more life altering issues and results in more severe consequences from parents.

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While this Court ruled that the admission of the actual pregnancy was not allowed under the Nevada Rape Shield Law, a ruling affirmed by the Supreme Court of Nevada, defense counsel had the opportunity to sanitize the pregnancy. A simple way to do that would have been to call the pregnancy "a mistake recently made by R.P. that that could negatively impact her the rest of her lift with respect to opportunities in life, education, future relationships, her health, her psychological state, as well as her financial and living situation; a mistake that would make her parents angry at; fearful for; disappointed in; and upset with her and would result in severe consequences." Doing so would have allowed the defense to present its complete defense theory, which is that R.P. lied to minimize the judgment and punishment she would receive for making a huge mistake, and simultaneously would avoid violating the Nevada Rape Shield Law.

While defense counsel was not given much time to come up with a creative way to sanitize the pregnancy, this was simply because counsel failed to address this issue before the first day of trial. Failure to do so and failure to properly sanitize the pregnancy fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Due to the fact that this was the only rational reason R.P. would have had for fabricating or embellishing aspects of her relationship with Petitioner, it cut to the core of the defense theory of "better him than me." Given the fact that there was no corroboration for many of R.P allegations, that she changed her story multiple times, and Petitioner's only defense was that R.P. was not

being truthful, had trial counsel properly sanitized R.P.'s pregnancy, the outcome of trial with respect to some of the counts, would have been different and Petitioner was 3 prejudiced. Therefore, Petitioner received ineffective assistance of counsel and is entitled 4 to a new trial. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. at 2064; Kirksey, 112 Nev. at 980, 923 5 P.2d at 1102.

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IV.

CUMULATIVE ERROR

The relevant factors to consider in determining whether error is harmless or prejudicial include whether (1) the issue of innocence or guilt is close, (2) the quantity and character of the error (3) and the gravity of the crime charged." Mulder v. State, 116 Nev. 1, 17, 992 P.2d 845, 854-55 (2000). The issue of Petitioner's guilt was somewhat close given that with respect to most of the counts, his conviction was based solely upon the uncorroborated testimony of R.P. Here, Petitioner was convicted of multiple counts (36 total) of the grave crimes of Sexual Assault With a Minor Under the Age of 14, Lewdness With a Child Under the Age of 14, Open or Gross Lewdness, and Sexual Assault. He is serving a total sentence of LIFE with parole eligibility after serving eighty-five (85) years.

As discussed *supra*, two instances of ineffective assistance of counsel occurred in this case—failure to challenge an admittedly biased juror and failure to properly sanitize R.P.'s pregnancy so as to present a complete theory of defense. These errors on the part of trial counsel were harmful due to the fact that with respect to most of the counts, the only evidence was the uncorroborated testimony of the victim, who changed her story multiple times. As discussed *supra* in section III, R.P. had a motive to lie to her family about her relationship with Petitioner but that motive was never presented to the jury. Therefore, the Mulder factors weigh in favor of finding there is cumulative error warranting reversal of Petitioner's convictions and a new trial.

V. **REQUEST FOR EVIDENTIARY HEARING PURSUANT TO NRS 34.770**

NRS 34.770 determines when a defendant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing. NRS 34.770 provides: AA 001133

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1. The judge or justice, upon review of the return, answer and all supporting documents which are filed, shall determine whether an evidentiary hearing is required. A petitioner must not be discharged or committed to the custody of a person other than the respondent *unless* an evidentiary hearing is held.

2. If the judge or justice determines that the petitioner is not entitled to relief and an evidentiary hearing is not required, he shall dismiss the

petition without a hearing.

3. If the judge or justice determines that an evidentiary hearing is required, he shall grant the writ and shall set a date for the hearing.

Nev. Rev. Stat. § 34.770 (1991).

The Nevada Supreme Court has held that if a petition can be resolved without expanding the record, then no evidentiary hearing is necessary. Marshall v. State, 110 Nev. 1328, 885 P.2d 603 (1994); Mann v. State, 118 Nev. 351, 356, 46 P.3d 1228, 1231 (2002). A defendant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing if his petition is supported by specific factual allegations, which, if true, would entitle him to relief unless the factual allegations are repelled by the record. Marshall, 110 Nev. at 1331, 885 P.2d at 605; See also Hargrove v. State, 100 Nev. 498, 503, 686 P.2d 222, 225 (1984) (1984) (holding that "[a] defendant seeking post-conviction relief is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing on factual allegations belied or repelled by the record"). "A claim is 'belied' when it is contradicted or proven to be false by the record as it existed at the time the claim was made." Mann, 118 Nev. at 354, 46 P.3d at 1230 (2002). The district court cannot rely on affidavits submitted with a response or answer in determining whether the factual allegations are belied by the record. Id. at 354-56, 46 P.3d at 1230-31. Additionally, the district court cannot make credibility decisions without an evidentiary hearing. See Id. at 356, 46 P.3d at 1231 (rejecting suggestion that district court can resolve factual dispute within an evidentiary hearing and noting that "by observing the witnesses' demeanors during an evidentiary hearing, the district court will be better able to judge credibility").

Here, Petitioner has alleged that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge an admittedly biased juror and for failing to properly sanitize R.P.'s pregnancy so as to present a complete theory of defense. Because the juror admitted to bias and prejudice is presumed where there is an admitted biased juror, discussed *supra* in section

AA 001134

II, there are no issues of credibility or fact. However, the reason why defense counsel did 2 challenge this particular juror is an issue of credibility 3 Therefore, this issue may not be determined by the district court without an evidentiary hearing. Mann, 118 Nev. at 354-56, 46 P.3d at 1230-31. With respect to defense counsel's 5 reason for not properly sanitizing R.P.'s pregnancy, this is an issue of fact and credibility and may not be determined by the district court without an evidentiary hearing. Mann, 118 Nev. at 354-56, 46 P.3d at 1230-31. 8 While the State may claim that the decisions not to challenge Juror No. 12 and not 9 to properly sanitize R.P.'s pregnant were strategic in nature and therefore virtually

10 unquestionable, that is unclear from the record before the Court at this time. Finally, 11 Petitioner has alleged specific factual allegations, which if true, would entitle him to relief and these allegations are not belied by the record. Therefore, Petitioner is entitled to an evidentiary hearing under NRS 34.770.

Dated this 9th day of November, 2018.

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/s/ Jean Schwartzer

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Nevada Bar No. 11223

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Las Vegas, Nevada 89141

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Attorney for Petitioner

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AA 001135

1 2	CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
3	IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED by the undersigned that 9th day of November, 2018,
4	I served a true and correct copy of the foregoing SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM
5	OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR WRIT OF
6	HABEAS CORPUS (POST-CONVICTION) on the parties listed on the attached service
7	list via one or more of the methods of service described below as indicated next to the
8	name of the served individual or entity by a checked box:
10	VIA U.S. MAIL: by placing a true copy thereof enclosed in a sealed envelope with
	postage thereon fully prepaid, in the United States mail at Las Vegas, Nevada.
11	VIA FACSIMILE: by transmitting to a facsimile machine maintained by the attorney or
	the party who has filed a written consent for such manner of service.
13	BY PERSONAL SERVICE: by personally hand-delivering or causing to be hand delivered by such designated individual whose particular duties include delivery of such
14	on behalf of the firm, addressed to the individual(s) listed, signed by such individual or
15	his/her representative accepting on his/her behalf. A receipt of copy signed and dated by such an individual confirming delivery of the document will be maintained with the
16	document and is attached.
17	BY E-MAIL: by transmitting a copy of the document in the format to be used for
18	attachments to the electronic-mail address designated by the attorney or the party who
19	has filed a written consent for such manner of service.
20	<u>/s/ Jean Schwartzer</u>
21	JEAN J. SCHWARTZER, ESQ.
22	Nevada Bar No. 11223 Law Office of Jean J. Schwartzer
	10620 Southern Highlands Parkway
23	Suite 110-473
24	Las Vegas, Nevada 89141
25	Phone: (702) 979-9941
25	Fax: (702) 977-9954
26	jean.schwartzer@gmail.com
27	Attorney for Petitioner
28	AA 001136

SERVICE LIST

1			
2 3	ATTORNEYS OF RECORD	PARTIES REPRESENTED	METHOD OF SERVICE
4 5 6 7 8	CLARK COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE 200 E. LEWIS AVENUE LAS VEGAS, NEVADA 89101 pdmotions@clarkcountyda.com	State of Nevada	Personal service Email service Fax service Mail service
9			
11 12 13 14 15	GUILLERMO RENTERIA-NOVOA INMATE NO. 1092343 LOVELOCK CORRECTIONAL CENTER 1200 PRISON ROAD LOVELOCK, NEVADA 89419		Personal service Email service Fax service Mail service
16 17			
18 19			
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2324			
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EXHIBIT 1

LAS VEGAS METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENT VOLUNTARY STATEMENT PAGE 1

EVENT #:091217-4008 STATEMENT OF: GUILLERMO RENTERIA NOVOA

SPECIFIC CRIME:	SEXUAL ASSAULT		
DATE OCCURRED:	:	TIME OCC	URRED:
LOCATION OF OCC	CURRENCE:		
	CITY OF LAS VEGAS	CLARK COUNTY	
NAME OF PERSON	GIVING STATEMENT:	GUILLERMO RENTERIA NOVOA	
DOB	:	SOCIAL SECURITY #:	
RACE	:	SEX:	
HEIGHT	:	WEIGHT:	
HAIR	:	EYES:	
WORK SCHEDULE	:	DAYS OFF:	
HOME ADDRESS	3139 EAST SAHARA	#208, LV HOME PHONE: 7	02-460-1242
WORK ADDRESS	:	WORK PHONE:	
BEST PLACE TO CONTACT:			
BEST TIME TO CO	NTACT:		
		of a tape-recorded interv MPD Sexual Assault Detail, o	
Q:	Operator, this is	Detective R. Jaeger J-A-E-G-	E-R, P#5587. I'll be
conducting	g one interview in re	ference to Event #091217-40	08. The location of
the intervi	ew is the ISD building	g located at 4750 West Oakey	. The person being

LAS VEGAS METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENT VOLUNTARY STATEMENT PAGE 2

EVENT #091217-4008: STATEMENT OF GUILLERMO RENTERIA NOVOA

interviewed's last name is R-E-N-T-E-R-I-A hyphen NOVOA N-O-V-O-A, first name of Guillermo G-U-I-L-L-E-R-M-O. His birthday is 12/4/61. His home address is 3139 East Sahara Space #208 in Las Vegas Nevada. Contact phone number is area code 702-460-1242. Today's date is 3/6/10 and the start of the interview is 1012 hours. Um, Guillermo, earlier we were -- we were talking a little bit before we went on the recording. Um, I reassured you that I'm not gonna take you to jail today. That's still true. The tape recording hasn't changed. Um, there's just some stuff -- there's rules I have to follow and before I talk to you about a criminal matter, I've got to advise you of your rights. So you have the right to remain silent. Anything you say can be used against you in either -- in a court of law. You have the right to the presence of an attorney. If you cannot afford an attorney, one will be appointed before questioning. Do you understand your rights?

A:	Yes.
Q:	Okay. Um, do you still want to talk with me about Roxana?
A:	I I don't want to forgot
Q:	You want to put
((Crosstalk))	

A: ...put everything away, I don't want to go see anymore family. I don't want to know nothing about that family. I think what I did a mistake, but I want to fix it.

Keep -- keep me away from her.

AA 001140

LAS VEGAS METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENT VOLUNTARY STATEMENT PAGE 3

EVENT #091217-4008: STATEMENT OF GUILLERMO RENTERIA NOVOA

Q:	Okay. Yeah and we can do that. Um, for starters, how long did you live with		
	her?		
A:	I live with her mom maybe for two years.		
Q:	And what do you remember the address when you lived with her?		
A:	Um, it was Flamingo Flamingo.		
Q:	It was that a house or an apartment?		
A:	Apartment 100 127.		
Q:	Is that gonna be East Flamingo, like Flamingo and		
A:	East Flamingo.		
Q:	And what kind of relationship did you have with her mom?		
A:	Like, uh, boyfriend girlfriend.		
Q:	Okay. And I		
A:	I I have my own apartment I have come came to see her every evening and I		
	would stay there all night.		
Q:	Okay and what was your relationship like with Roxana?		
A:	Like a father and daughter.		
Q:	Okay and and did that relationship kind of change a little bit over time or		
A:	She that relation change maybe two years ago when she got the high school.		
Q:	Okay. And and explain that to me, how did the relationship change?		
A:	Uh, she was make deals with me to show me show me her body body parts		
	and for to get something like a clothes, shoes, anything she want ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑		

VOLUNTARY STATEMENT PAGE 4

	or something like that. She come and said "I do this and you will give me that."
	Like like I never force her to something to do something.
Q:	Like i- if she wanted a an iPod, what what would she say? "Hey, I'll give you
	a blow job for an iPod" or what?
A:	No. She, uh, just show show me her body.
Q:	Okay, like, naked or
A:	Naked.
Q:	Okay.
A:	Just, like
Q:	Um, about when did this start? How old was she?
A:	I she started to do things when I caught her with her cousin Zaer.
Q:	Okay well what what happened with her and Za- Zaer?
A:	I saw her and he was and he was with without clothes and she was bending
	on her knees in front of him. When I opened the door, I found I saw her and
	him and he pull out pull out or pull up his pant fast.
Q:	So did it look like he she was giving him a blow job or
A:	It's something like that. I can't be sure, because when I opened the door, it was
	so fa- I found her him in that position. And mean time I found her and him just
	covered with a blanket the same blanket maybe her or
	him. I don't know what happened behind this blanket.
Q:	How how old was she when you found her with Zaer? AA 001142

A:	I think she was 14, 15.
Q:	Okay so she was about 14 or 15? And and did you ever tell her mom about
	that?
A:	No, I kept I keep the secret for protection protection and I don't want to
	because I want I I love her still like a daughter. I would like so
	many good things
Q:	What what other kind of things did you see that that made that your whole
	look on her change?
A:	When when we when I found him with her with her cousin, I'm not sure I
	don't know, but I guess when she want something to buy something, she will
	have the money or money to get to get it , she make that kind of deals "I
	show you this, you give me that."
Q:	Okay, so what was the the first deal that she made with ya?
A:	The first deal was when I think that she show you
	my boobies, you take me to That was the first deal, my boobs.
Q:	Okay. And then, I mean, would you masturbate then or
A:	Never.
Q:	I mean, and would you do it in front of her or would you just leave, like, and go
	somewhere else?
A :	No show I saw her and I leave.
ο.	Okay And what did she was she okay with it or AA 001143

A:	She was from food to shoes to backpack, I mp3
	player.
Q:	Her iPod?
A:	I could not but I bought two times the same, because she wanted
	she lost it or she broke it. But I I
	don't want to speak about her, because I don't so she that
	that's okay for for him or for everybody in the family. So I don't want to say that
	if if we left this behind and keep for you right way. I told you my b- my life
	change. I don't want to see anymore that family. I don't want toI
	have enough problems with my job, with my friends and and other things too
	so for this time. So that's the point, I am not a bad a guy. I've had to be a good
	man, but sometimes we make mistakes. Like I tried to be the best man from
	from three years ago to now.
Q:	So it it's safe to say now, you got everything turned around, right? I mean, you
	got a nice house, you have you're living with a new girlfriend, right?
A:	It's not a nice house. It's a just a house
Q:	I mean, it was
A:	Even though my house I keep clean.
Q:	I mean, it wasn't
A:	She keeps clean. We go together to keep clean the house to keep another, but I
	told you liget my check last week I in two weeks we A A 001144

Q:	
A:	I pay my bills, I pay everything and I just keep my in my pocket
	in my pocket for two weeks. So I have to
Q:	Money's tight.
A:	Money's tight very tight. So I don't want to get an apartment, so for me it's
	better forgot her family forget her family and never talk talk speak about
	for him
Q:	And and that's I want the same thing, but we need to find out, 'cause
	Roxanne is telling a little bit different story.
A:	Yes. I think so, she's telling you her her own story, but I tell you my own story.
	And I can tell you this in front of her, whatever you want. You have to
	his story, but I tell you the truth.
Q:	Okay.
A:	That happened sometimes so
Q:	When when you when you say that happened, 'cause I think something more
	than just seeing her boobies has happened. I mean, have you ever kissed her
	breasts?
A:	One time.
Q:	Okay. Um, has she ever put her mouth on your penis?
A:	No, never.
Q:	Okay. Have you ever had sex with her? AA 001145

A:	No.
Q:	Have you ever masturbated in front of her?
A:	One time she was over there and showed me and yeah, I masturbate.
Q:	And and which which apartment was that in? Was that at East Flamingo?
A:	No it was in the when she was living living, uh,
Q:	At Tamarist? Is that where she lives now still?
A:	No she lives I don't know she she moved from there to another apartment
	and then to another apartment another apartment. She's not
	she's moving times. I that's a lot of something
	that I would remember. She many times say, "With this I can get whatever I
	want from her." That is bad for a girl like 15, 16
Q:	But for her mom it, kind of, works, right, 'cause she was
A:	Yeah, she's work, but she works, but I told her she use her special
	with this I can get, uh, whatever I want in front of her.
Q:	So you think that's where she learned?
A:	That may be, I don't want to be too, but I think so. She can do
	that. She can do "I can do that. I can get my phone, my p-
	did that."
Q:	When the the time you masturbated in front of her, was that like a while ago
	or about how long ago was that? Was it recent or
A:	Re- recent um AA 001146

Q:	Did this happen just a little while ago?
A:	Uh, yes
Q:	Or about about how old was she when this happened?
A:	I think she was around 16, 15
Q:	So she was about 15 or 16?
A:	Yes.
Q:	Um, do you remember, like, what time of year? Was it around Christmas, in the
	summer?
A:	Uh, really really don't know because I wasn't I wasn't even
	and I came to visit her mom many times a week, so I remember I was living the
	I wasn't even there. I was living at
Q:	Okay you were living on
A:	I was living that's where that that happened. I was living there
	for two years at that address, but I was to visit her and come back.
Q:	Um, when you have you ever masturbated on her chest or anything like
	?
A:	No. No, no, no.
Q:	And did you ever put your mouth on her vagina?
A:	No.
Q:	Just just on her breasts?
A:	Yes. AA 001147

Q:	And what did she say to that? Was she okay with it or
A:	She make a deal remember. So I let you do do this, you you
Q:	So so the time you put her your mouth on her breasts, what did she get out
	of that? Did you buy her, like, some clothes or a camera or
A:	Something like I don't remember what what the deal is that time, but maybe
	shoes, but it had to be the brand they have brands like a Converse or
	whatever, they had to be there's brands No, they were not shoes
	or whatever, I want this brand for this backpack JanSport or
	whatever backpack brand brand.
Q:	And then and then a time that that you were you were masturbating, was
	she just standing there or was she, like, doing, like
A:	Well this is what I went show me that is it.
Q:	And it was just her was it just her breasts or did she ever get totally naked?
A:	Well yes may be totally, no.
Q:	Did you ever see her her vagina?
A:	One time she when one time she showed me.
Q:	Okay. Did you ever kiss her vagina?
A:	No.
Q:	Uh, did you ever touch it with your fingers?
A:	One time, um, with clothes, no naked.
Q:	Okay not naked, but did you ever touch it while she was naked? Not the various?

EVENT #091217-4008: STATEMENT OF GUILLERMO RENTERIA NOVOA

Just the one time was with clothes?

A:	With with clothes on.
Q:	Okay.
A:	Sometimes like I said, I it's not but nothing
Q:	And and she was okay with that?
A:	I never push push her to do something. Whatever she wants to do, I don't
	She make the deal. She make I can
	, but something I can do, I cannot afford lipo. I can afford one
	camera digital camera or something like that, so I can do it. So we made a
	deal she had to do nothing. Every time she do something she was agree and
	never forced to do something. She had I I know it was a
	mistake to see her, touch her and do that kind. But I want to fix this that's
	starting now. I don't want to get a large problem because I change
	my life. I don't want to see anymore of her family. I don't want to see anymore
	Roxana. I don't want to see anyone there.
Q:	Okay. When when was the last time you would have sent Roxana a text?
A:	I think it was the December December last
Q:	So just a few months ago, like, um, around Christmas?
A:	Yes, but the the text wasn't, um, I know she she her secrets secret. I
	know I found her with her cousin. And I found her with the
	That's easy text I know the secret, AA 001149

Q:	I mean, did you kind of want to keep in touch with her because you like seeing
	her boobs, right?
A :	Well, yes. But I told you, I changed my life. I found a new girl. I want to forgot
	that. I want to forget that and forget that. I don't want to see
	anymore of that family. I think so I when she be grown her mom be grown if,
	uh, couple bad things together.
Q:	Um
A:	And now I assume I am the bad guy, but I'm not the only bad guy in this story.
	Roxana have she start and her cousin, her mom and me.
Q:	I agree with that.
A:	It's a lot of things to put together I don't want to see anymore of
	the family. I don't want to speak about anymore of that case. Um, I
	if I assure I swear you I swear to you, I never talk with her
	anymore. From December to now, I never I never will be, uh, to get in touch
	with her or her family.
Q:	Th- they're actually going to court to make sure that you don't text her.
A :	
Q:	Did did you know about that?
۹:	No. I told I I already changed their numbers contact numbers, everything
	about the family. I told I delete all of the telephone. I want to know if
	or is A A 001150

Q :	'Cause, uh, I looked through her phone and she saved every text from you that
	she's gotten. And most of them were in Spanish so I it took me a a while to
	read 'em, 'cause my Spanish isn't as good as your English, that's for sure.
۹:	No, my English is not good.
Q :	And, uh, there were some texts that were pretty concerning to me in there. Um,
	one of them was a picture of her underwear.
۹:	Yes.
Q :	H- how did you get her underwear?
۹:	gave to I I I have a text a text to
	I saw the dirty clothes was in the bathroom, so when I went to the
	bathroom, I found her and take a picture.
Q :	Okay. So you didn't you never kept the underwear?
۹:	Never.
Q :	Okay. Um
۹:	I don't have und- underwear for her.
Q :	Okay. I mean, why why would you take a picture of her underwear?
۹:	It was, like a joke like, uh, just like a joke like something not bad.
Q :	Okay. And is is it safe to say that you were attracted to Roxana? She's a
	pretty good looking girl?
Δ:	Attractive?
Q :	Uh, attractive, like did you think she was good looking? AA 001151

A:	I think so she's pretty. Um, but the thing is, I loved her like a daughter, but she
	changed she changed when she was 15 or 16, she make change in her life,
	making something no good. She tried to get, um, from
	everywhere and everybody every everyone. So I thought I don't want to
	say that, but I think so, I'm pretty sure pretty sure make
	something too. Because she got, uh, for him too, also i
	, but you have to ask her about Carlos and maybe
	·
Q:	Okay
A:	But that is
Q:	Yeah, that's another issue, 'cause I'm I'm c- I'm worried about you right now.
	That's all I'm worried about.
A:	I give you the maybe two, maybe another two to be sure I am not the bad guy in
	this story the only bad guy in this story, my point is I insist I
	want to forget this. I want to keep away from me the family and I want to be a
	good man.
Q:	And move on, right?
A:	Whole time
Q:	Put it past you.
A:	Put it pa- past in the past and m- make a new life. That is my point. So
Q:	While these special deals were being made, what ever kept it from progressing to

EVENT #091217-4008: STATEMENT OF GUILLERMO RENTERIA NOVOA

just having sex with her? I mean, was it something she wasn't interested in or something you weren't interested in? I mean, if she's showing you her breasts and letting her kiss your breasts for an iPod, I mean, was there ever a time when you said, -- "Hey, I'll give you \$100 if you sleep with me?"

	and letting her kiss your breasts for an iPod, I mean, was there ever a time when
	you said, "Hey, I'll give you \$100 if you sleep with me?"
A:	No. I don't have money to to afford that. I to
Q:	W- was that one of the main reasons that you never did sleep with her is 'cause
	she wanted too much?
A:	No, no, no I mean, in respect of her mom and her. I never force
	her to let me.
Q:	I mean, is is one of the main reasons you never slept with her is 'cause you
	didn't want to disrespect her mom? Do you think she would have let you if you
	had asked her?
A:	I don't know, really I don't know.
Q:	I mean, what what if you had asked her for, like, a blow job or something,
	would she
A:	No, I never tried that.
Q:	But do you think Roxana would have or
A:	I don't know.
Q:	
A:	Maybe she did have deals with the something, because, you
	know. I am older. It wasn't if I'm not the same age, you known it is very

	different. So I don't know that. I try that's why I don't want to keep speaking of
	this, because really affects family, mom would come for me and
	her sister family and all her family would be affected wit this.
Q:	Oh yeah.
A:	Because she she like something from that family that friend, that cousin, that
	so if it was for her, it was for it's not for me. If it was it would be
	close to her. So I don't want to keep speaking of this, but I want to fix this. Um, if
	he want to keep away from her, I could do it very easy. I change my life, I don't
	want to see anymore of the family and I don't want to see her more.
Q:	Yeah. Well, do you think it's okay to look at a 15-year-old's breasts?
A:	No. No.
Q:	I mean, if I mean, was it was it just something that you did
	because it was there or 'cause I'm 'cause I'm I'm trying to figure out how
	the conversation would come up. You're you basically she's a step-
	daughter.
A:	Yes.
Q:	Yo- you're not married, but and you she would just she would just say,
	"Um, Guillermo, I need, uh, \$5 to go out tonight." Which she, kind of looks
	looks up to you, 'cause you're an adult. Would she say, "If you give me \$5 I'll
	show you my breasts?" Or would it be, "Well, before I give you the \$5 you have
	to show me your breasts?" I mean, whose idea would it be? Would it in the property or

	yours?
A:	No, sometimes it wasn't to her
Q:	'Cause the I mean, the way she's telling the story, is she admits to you
	catching her with Zaer and you told her, "Well, I'm gonna tell your mom about
	what you're doing with Zaer" unless you do same stuff with me." So she didn't
	want to be put in a position of her mom finding out about what she was doing
	with her much older cousin, so she was going along with everything that you
	wanted. Is that is that safe to say that that's the way the story went or
A:	I don't remember the way to happen.
Q:	So, I mean, were were you did you, kind of, use the fact that you caught her
	with her cousin to your advantage?
A:	I found her when she was maybe 12 or years old. I keep the
	secret for many years and for her for I didn't want to her mom.
	Her mom was the the with the boys and
Q:	Yeah, I I I know I know why you didn't tell her mom, but did did you, kind
	of, use that as leverage against her? Did you say, "Hey, I know you're doing
	this with your cousin, you better do it with me or I'm gonna tell your mom." Did
	you ever do that?
A:	That's why when she the phone, I start to do that,
	because she never answer the phone, she never does I said, "
	you go don't answer the phone I " A A 001155

Q:	I know
((Cros	sstalk))
Q:	seen that message.
A:	I to- I don't want to I want to keep one good relation because that's eight years
	of relation maybe seven years of relation. I want to keep that relation without that
	mistake, you know. As many years with that family, but if I can keep that relation
	so keep away
Q:	Mm-hm. But y- you're not really trying to keep away because you've been
	texting her so much. You want to be with her some more. It wasn't until you
	learned that the cops were involved that you stopped texting her.
A:	I did. I I didn't know the cops were involved. When I went to see her mom at
	the subway, I went take everything and she was
	screaming, "I want to call the police to take to take the stuff. I
	didn't want to come and meet you. I anymore." And, uh, she told it
	to me, I will keep away from from you and forget. I want to know any more
	people
Q:	I I mean, I mean, you you can see why she's mad though, right? I mean,
	her
A:	Yeah, but
Q:	 .
A:	I don't see why it is That is the point. IA 001156

Q:	So
A:	I am sure I found her making something wrong many times time
	After I will tell you after Carlos and
Q:	She she told me all about him. I know all about
((Cro	sstalk))
A:	Okay.
Q:	And and I'm dealing with them too.
A:	Yes.
((Cro	sstalk))
A:	You know why she tell you I tell you what I see.
Q:	Yeah a- and the stories are pretty close.
A:	Yes.
Q:	Um, what what if I told you that she said that you and her had had sex?
A:	I tried to, but I never do it.
Q:	Okay. Explain to me how you tried to have sex with her?
A:	Approaching her and making a deal and she never do it, but I insis
	we are walking the same I mean, I never touc
	her. I never had sex with her.
((Cro	sstalk))
A:	1
((Cro	sstalk))

VOLUNTARY STATEMENT PAGE 20

Q:	Penis to vagina sex.
A:	Never. Never, never, never.
Q:	Okay. Did you ever lay on top of her?
A:	What is that? Like
Q:	She was on her back and you were
A:	Never, never. Also I have to tell you something, her mom, me and
	her many years. Her mom, me and her all in the same bed with the same
	blanket for many years. I never touch her. I respect her like a daughter.
Q:	But that changed when you saw her
A:	Yeah, it changed.
Q:	Okay.
A:	But I tell you I am not a bad guy. I am, uh, I am not a I try to be a good man,
	but sometimes we make we make mistakes.
Q:	You make mistakes.
A:	So I am in best position to fix this. My proposal proposal for
	both for both of them is I don't want to see anymore of that family. I don't want
	to remember that situation anymore. If I did something wrong, I have to fix
	making be a good man now from this point to this point. So my proposal is that
	I keep away from that family forever. I don't want to see anymore of that family. I
	don't want to see you anymore. And I you can be my friend, but I don't see you
	as a cop. AA 001158

Q:	As a cop.
A:	Cop.
Q:	Um, so
((Cros	sstalk))
Q:	is there anything that I've forgotten to ask you? Anything that you think would
	be important that I need to know? 'Cause now is the time to get it all off your
	chest. If there's if there's something else that happened between you and
	Roxana, you've been carrying that weight around. You might as well leave it in
	here
A:	No.
Q:	and get it all over with.
A:	I leave everything. I let I am free. I am paying my rnistakes. I
	am carrying with that. I can't see anymore her mom. I can't see anymore her
	housing her house. I I look that family.
	what I know to jobs for work for company for
	for everything. I lost a lot of things with that family. I am
	for that. So but if this is what I have to pay I have to pay that
	way. I don't I can't go to south Mexico, she's there. I have to work with the
	other to I don't care to I don't allow family with
	for that mistake. I don't want to see anymore of that family. I am -
	- I lose a lot. AA 001159

VOLUNTARY STATEMENT PAGE 22

EVENT #091217-4008: STATEMENT OF GUILLERMO RENTERIA NOVOA

Q:	Okay.	
A:		
Q:	All right, um, operator this concludes the interview.	The same people present.
	The time is 10:41.	

THIS VOLUNTARY STATEMENT WAS COMPLETED AT 4750 WEST OAKEY ON THE 6TH DAY OF MARCH, 2010, AT 1041 HOURS.

RJ:Nettranscripts

R 403/

EXHIBIT 2

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FILED IN OPEN COURT STEVEN D. GRIERSON CLERK OF THE COURT

MAT 24 2012

DISTRICT COURT

TIA EVERETT, DEPUTY

CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

STATE OF NEVADA

Plaintiff(s),

-VS-

CASE NO. C268285

GUILLERMO RENTERIA-NOVOA

Defendant(s).

DEPT. NO. 20

C-10-268285-1 AJUR Amended Jury List 1860398

AMENDED JURY LIST



- 1. JOSHUA BRAHMER
- 2. GARY RICHARD
- 3. JAMES SCHMIDT
- 4. GED CORDERO
- 5. MICHAEL HELBERT
- 6. GLENDA PAGE

- 7. VIRGINIA JOHNSON
- 8. SCOTT THALER
- 9. SOPHIA STIPERSKI
- 10. DANIEL CARRERA
- 11. ROBERT DELL
- 12. INGRID MORENO-ZEPEDA

SECRET ALTERNATE

- 1. MULUGETA GEBRECHRISTOS
- 2. GARY GARWOOD

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EXHIBIT 3

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CLERK OF THE COURT

DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

* * * * *

THE STATE	OF NEVADA,)	
	Plaintiff,))	CASE NO. C268285-1 DEPT NO. XX
VS.)	
GUILLERMO	RENTERIA-NOVOA,)	TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
	Defendant.))	

BEFORE THE HONORABLE JEROME TAO, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

JURY TRIAL - DAY 2

TUESDAY, MAY 22, 2012

APPEARANCES:

For the State: MICHELLE FLECK, ESQ.

> NICKOLAS J. GRAHAM, ESQ. Deputy District Attorneys

For the Defendant: MIKE FELICIANO, ESQ.

AMY A. FELICIANO, ESQ. Deputy Public Defenders

Interpreters: Maria Peralta de Gomez

> Irma Sanchez Mario Maldonado Manuel Cavillo Rico Rodriguez Josephine Dooley

RECORDED BY SARA RICHARDSON, COURT RECORDER TRANSCRIBED BY: KARR Reporting, Inc.

KARR REPORTING, INC.

AA 001164

LAS VEGAS, NEVADA, TUESDAY, MAY 22, 2012, 10:56 A.M.

(Outside the presence of the prospective jurors.)

THE COURT: Back on the record. State versus

Guillermo Renteria-Novoa. Case No. C268285. Mr. Renteria

Novoa is present in custody with the assistance of a Spanish interpreter.

Madam Interpreter, for the record, what is your name?
THE INTERPRETER: Maria Peralta de Gomez.

THE COURT: Thank you. Here's the situation. It is now 11:00 o'clock. We had instructed the jurors to come back here at 10:00 o'clock and check in with jury services on the third floor. They're all here except for Juror No. 64, Charolette Temple, who has not checked in downstairs and she's not out in the hallway right now.

Everyone else is here, and we checked around and we don't have a cellphone number for her. People have been trying to get in touch with her from jury services and we are unable to do so. So I'll also note that it looks like if anybody in the box is challenged, she would actually be the very next juror to be put in the box.

So the question is, what are we going to do about this? She's an hour late now officially, and the rest of the jury is waiting out in the hallway. And they've been waiting out there for at least half an hour. So anybody have any

suggestions, proposals?

MS. FLECK: She's the one who is sitting over here in the corner, 26, Seat 26?

THE MARSHAL: No. She's next up if we --

THE COURT: She's not in the box yet. She's the next person who would be in the box, so she doesn't have a numbered seat. She's in like the second row there.

MS. FLECK: Oh. I mean, that's fine. I don't have any problems getting rid of her. I can't even remember who she is.

THE COURT: I honestly can't even — you know, because she's not in the box she hasn't been asked anything yet, and my notes indicate she hasn't responded to any of the general questions that I've asked the panel, so we don't know very much about her.

So on behalf of the defendant then?

MR. FELICIANO: We'll submit it, Judge.

THE COURT: All right. Well, here is what I'm going to do. She is over an hour late. No one has any contact information, and because I don't really know very much about her, she hasn't answered any questions in the affirmative or the negative, what we'll do is we'll proceed without her.

So what we'll do is we'll excuse Juror No. 64, and bring the rest of the jury in rather than have them just keep waiting out in the hallway then. All right, Randy.

Before we do that, is there anything else that either side wanted to put on the record?

MS. FLECK: Nothing from the State.

THE COURT: I'll note for the record that the second amended Information was filed in open court this morning by the State. On behalf of the defendant, do you guys have a copy of this?

MR. FELICIANO: We do.

THE COURT: Okay. And I also have been given — I know we actually [unintelligible] off the record, but on the record given a proposed set of jury instructions revised by the State, and apparently to at least in part reflect the second amended Information. Does the defense have a copy of this?

MR. FELICIANO: We do.

THE COURT: All right. So what we'll do is we'll have to see how far we get today, and set aside some time maybe — what I'm thinking was actually maybe tomorrow, I have a civil calendar that should be over relatively quickly, probably around like 10:00 or so, but at some point we need to settle the jury instructions.

I don't know if you guys think we'll be ready to do so tomorrow, or if you guys need more time to work on your proposed instructions.

MS. FELICIANO: I think it depends on how many

1	witnesses we get through. We're hesitant about settling jury
2	instructions before we're done with the State's presentation
3	of the evidence obviously. We're working on them, but there
4	are some that we just can't submit.
5	THE COURT: Right. All right. Well, let's see how
6	far we get and we'll have to do that at some point. I usually
7	like to do it, you know, in the mornings before we bring the
8	jury back, rather than have them wait for a couple hours just
9	cooling their heels and wondering what's going on.
10	So all right. If there's nothing else that either
11	side wanted to put on the record, let's go ahead and bring the
12	jurors in.
13	I also notice that there's two other additional
14	interpreters, one Spanish interpreter and one Tagalog
15	interpreter from the court interpreter's office here to assist
16	Jurors No. 69 and 71. For the record, can you state your
17	names for the record?
18	THE INTERPRETER: Josephina Dooley, Tagalog
19	interpreter, and
20	THE INTERPRETER: Rico Rodriguez.
21	THE COURT: Okay. Thank you for being here. And
22	when Mr I'm sorry?
23	(The Court and clerk confer.)
24	THE COURT: Oh, you're both Tagalog interpreters?

THE INTERPRETER: Yes, Your Honor.

25

bring the

to assist

I usually

1	THE COURT: Oh. We need a second Spanish interpreter
2	for Mr. Aguilar though. Do we have one?
3	THE MARSHAL: We've called and nobody's come over
4	yet.
5	MS. FLECK: So they just sent somebody else.
6	THE COURT: Okay. Yeah. We don't need two Tagalog
7	interpreters. We need one Spanish and one Tagalog. Well,
8	Mr. Aguilar would actually be next up, since Ms. Temple's not
9	here.
10	THE CLERK: [Inaudible.]
11	THE COURT: Got you. Okay.
12	THE COURT: All right. Well, did they give any
13	THE MARSHAL: The secretary [inaudible] up
14	immediately. She didn't know that he wasn't here.
15	THE COURT: Okay. Well, let's wait for a couple
16	minutes then.
17	THE CLERK: Ms. Temple has just showed up. Jury
18	services contacted Paula and she's on her way up.
19	THE COURT: Okay. Well, so let's wait a couple
20	minutes for her to get here and for the interpreter to get
21	here. So we'll go ahead and
22	(Pause in proceeding.)
23	THE COURT: Are we still on the record?
24	THE COURT RECORDER: Yes.
25	THE COURT: All right. So that moots we've just
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1	been notified by jury services that Ms. Temple, Juror No. 64,
2	is here, so that moots the record that I made a couple minutes
3	ago. So we'll wait until she gets here.
4	(Pause in proceeding.)
5	THE COURT: All right. We now have the assistance
6	of a are we on the record?
7	THE COURT RECORDER: Mm-hmm.
8	THE COURT: A Spanish interpreter to assist
9	Mr. Aguilar, Juror No. 68. Madam Interpreter, for the record,
10	what is your name?
11	THE INTERPRETER: Irma Sanchez.
12	THE COURT: All right. Thanks. One of the jurors is
13	going to come in here. Juror No. 68 is a Spanish-speaker, and
14	what we're going to do is we're going to have him and the
15	other Tagalog speakers sit in the first row over there. All
16	right. Thanks.
17	All right. Randy, let's bring them in.
18	(Prospective jurors enter at 11:11 a.m.)
19	THE COURT: All right. Will counsel stipulate to the
20	presence of the prospective jury?
21	MS. FLECK: The State does. Thank you.
22	MR. FELICIANO: Yes, Your Honor.
23	THE COURT: All right. Ladies and gentlemen, welcome
24	back. I know that we're off to a little bit of a later start
25	than we had anticipated, but apparently we had trouble

1	rounding everybody up. But we're all here now, so we are
2	ready to resume.
3	Yesterday afternoon the State passed the panel for
4	cause. So on behalf of Mr. Renteria-Novoa, did you guys have
5	any questions?
6	MR. FELICIANO: Yes, Your Honor.
7	THE COURT: All right. Please proceed.
8	MR. FELICIANO: Does anybody have the mike?
9	THE MARSHAL: I have the mike. Just let me know who
LO	you want it to go to.
L1	MR. FELICIANO: Okay. I'm just going to go move
L2	along the line [inaudible].
L3	THE MARSHAL: Folks, please remember, the last four
L4	of your badge number and your name, and speak directly into
L5	the top of the mike.
L6	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 001: 001, Brahmer.
L7	MR. FELICIANO: Mr. Brahmer. Okay. You talked about
L8	some issue you had 21 years ago when you were were you
L9	arrested in that case?
20	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 001: Yeah.
21	MR. FELICIANO: How were you treated by the police?
22	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 001: Just fine.
23	MR. FELICIANO: And did you go to trial or anything
24	like that?
25	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 001: Just yeah, court, and

1	just an in and out type deal. No major no big deal.
2	MR. FELICIANO: And I wanted to ask you about the
3	presumption of innocence. You've heard we heard a lot
4	yesterday about the district attorney saying if they prove
5	their case would people be willing to convict. Now, what if
6	they don't prove their case?
7	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 001: You acquit.
8	MR. FELICIANO: And how do you feel about that?
9	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 001: That's fine. That's how
10	it works.
11	MR. FELICIANO: So as Mr. Renteria-Novoa stands here
12	now, if I were to ask you what your verdict was, what would
13	you say?
14	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 001: Not guilty.
15	MR. FELICIANO: And that's because?
16	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 001: Because no one's proved
17	anything yet. There's I don't even know if a crime's been
18	committed.
19	MR. FELICIANO: And that's because that's what we're
20	here for, right?
21	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 001: [No audible response.]
22	MR. FELICIANO: So I mean, you've heard the nature of
23	the allegations and, you know, these types of allegations can
	be very emotional for a lot of people, as we've heard
25	yesterday. I mean, how does that make you feel, sitting on a

1	jury where we have allegations of sexual misconduct?
2	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 001: It's a dirty world, you
3	know, it happens. If it really happened, then it's horrible,
4	but we don't know yet.
5	MR. FELICIANO: But the actual charge itself, is
6	there something that it triggers in you where you don't think
7	you could be fair, or do you think you could
8	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 001: No. Sure, I can be fair.
9	Sure.
10	MR. FELICIANO: Now, is there anything else that
11	since you know, you heard a lot of other questions and
12	answers yesterday. Is there anything else that maybe
13	triggered something in your mind that you wanted to share with
14	us?
15	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 001: No.
16	MR. FELICIANO: If you were sitting where
17	Mr. Renteria-Novoa is sitting, would you want somebody like
18	yourself, like minded sitting where you're sitting right now?
19	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 001: Yeah.
20	MR. FELICIANO: So you think you can be fair?
21	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 001: Sure.
22	MR. FELICIANO: All right. Thanks. If you could
23	pass the mike. Thank you.
24	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 002: 002, Garry Richard.
25	MR. FELICIANO: Mr. Richard, you have a child.

1	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 002: Yes.
2	MR. FELICIANO: And you've heard the nature of these
3	allegations.
4	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 002: Yes.
5	MR. FELICIANO: How does that make you feel?
6	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 002: It's shocking. You hear
7	it all the time, on the news and everything also.
8	MR. FELICIANO: Do you think just because there's an
9	allegation, an allegation has been made, does that make you
10	think that something must have happened?
11	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 002: No. No. I mean, we
12	don't know the information on everything yet, so I'll sit and
13	listen.
14	MR. FELICIANO: So is there anything that you've
15	heard today or you've heard yesterday that would that makes
16	you want to add something that we might want to know before we
17	proceed about you?
18	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 002: No. I'm open minded.
19	MR. FELICIANO: Now, you sat on a jury. Was that
20	about 18 years ago?
21	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 002: Correct.
22	MR. FELICIANO: When you were sitting on that jury,
23	were the lawyers objecting and doing things like that, going
24	back and forth?
25	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 002: Yes.

1	MR. FELICIANO: Was it getting kind of maybe a little
2	heated?
3	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 002: It was, yes. I mean, but
4	we came up with a decision and it was two two different
5	stories about the whole entire thing, but we made a decision.
6	MR. FELICIANO: Now, as far as the way the lawyers
7	were acting, how does that make you feel as far as lawyers
8	getting up and objecting and
9	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 002: You guys have to do what
10	you have to do. I mean, if one object to another, then you
11	have the right. I mean, we still want to listen to each side.
12	MR. FELICIANO: All right. So like if we're over
13	here during certain testimony and we're objecting and doing
14	our job, are you going to hold that against us?
15	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 002: No. You guys have to do
16	your job.
17	MR. FELICIANO: Even if it might make it a little bit
18	heated at some times?
19	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 002: No. You guys still have
20	to do your job.
21	MR. FELICIANO: Is that something that you're going
22	to hold against Mr. Renteria
23	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 002: No.
24	MR. FELICIANO: the conduct of his lawyers?
25	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 002: No.

MR. FELICIANO: Okay. Now, you had the carrying a 1 concealed -- the CCW conviction way back. You said you since 2 3 got your permit. PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 002: Yes. 4 MR. FELICIANO: And do you -- you were treated fairly by the police? 6 7 PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 002: Yes. I was. MR. FELICIANO: You didn't go to trial or anything 8 like that? 9 10 PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 002: No. Just in and out of court and then paid the fine and they confiscated the weapon. 11 12 MR. FELICIANO: Now, if -- if you had gone to trial, I mean, what type of evidence would you expect -- maybe not 13 14 specifically in your case. What type of evidence would you 15 expect the government to bring against somebody? And there's 16 no wrong answers. 17 PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 002: Yeah. I mean, I was I was young at the time for carrying it without a 18 19 permit. I did have the blue card and everything else. just wasn't, you know, registered through Metro to have a 20 21 carrying a concealed weapon. 22 MR. FELICIANO: How about things like say 23 fingerprints; is that something that you would expect to see 24 if you were -- if you were listening to a case and trying to 25 determine whether someone was guilty or innocent?

1	MS. FLECK: Judge, can we approach?
2	THE COURT: You may.
3	(Bench conference.)
4	MS. FLECK: I think that this is sorry. I think
5	that this is improper. It's starting to go to like
6	THE COURT: Yeah. [Inaudible.]
7	MS. FLECK: And it's like, you know, that we need to
8	get into jury instructions and we need to start explaining
9	that, you know, all evidence is the circumstantial evidence
10	is [inaudible] into that jury instruction where, you know,
11	the all you need is the testimony of the victim. Like
12	you're starting to get into things that you're going to then
13	need to explain instructions to them.
14	MR. FELICIANO: You know, yesterday they asked the
15	CSI question, which is exactly the same type of thing.
16	THE COURT: Yeah, but the difference is they didn't
17	go into specifics [inaudible] what about that.
18	MS. FLECK: And the difference is, is it's my burden.
19	MR. FELICIANO: It doesn't matter. What else are we
20	talking about? We're talking about CSI. We're talking about
21	[inaudible].
22	(Inaudible - remainder of bench not transcribed.)
23	(End bench conference.)
24	MR. FELICIANO: Okay. So just getting back to what
25	we were talking about, say fingerprints. If there was a case

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1	where say the State didn't have fingerprints, do you think
2	that would affect your decision whether somebody was guilty or
3	innocent?
4	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 002: It probably will, yeah.
5	Maybe.
6	MR. FELICIANO: What about things like DNA, like
7	having DNA versus not having DNA?
8	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 002: Well, if they have DNA,
9	then it's proven.
10	MR. FELICIANO: So it's a pretty solid if there's
11	some DNA, it's a pretty solid case; is that fair to say?
12	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 002: Yes.
13	MR. FELICIANO: Okay. Thank you, sir.
14	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 005: 005, James Schmidt.
15	MR. FELICIANO: Mr. Schmidt, you were your
16	apartment was broken into years ago?
17	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 005: About 40 years ago.
18	MR. FELICIANO: Forty years ago. Do you remember it
19	pretty well?
20	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 005: I wasn't there when it
21	happened, so. I remember the incident. They just broke in a
22	window and came in and
23	MR. FELICIANO: Did the, when the police came out
24	for it?
25	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 005: Yeah. It was pretty

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1	obvious it was a bunch of kids, because they stole a whole
2	stack of Playboy magazines.
3	MR. FELICIANO: Did they take a lot of other things,
4	or just the Playboy?
5	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 005: That was probably worth
6	as much as anything. You know, whatever was visible they
7	grabbed and took.
8	MR. FELICIANO: So was there a you could tell
9	where they came in from?
10	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 005: Yeah. They broke a
11	window out.
12	MR. FELICIANO: Did they do like forensic type work,
13	like CSI type work?
14	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 005: Not that I remember.
15	MR. FELICIANO: And how do you feel about that?
16	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 005: I have no problem
17	with it. It's something that happens.
18	MR. FELICIANO: Well, as far as like with a crime
19	scene investigation, do you think someone who's charged with a
20	crime is entitled to a complete thorough investigation?
21	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 005: Absolutely.
22	MR. FELICIANO: And what are some things that would
23	be included in the complete thorough investigation, say in
24	your case, that might have changed the outcome?
25	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 005: Well, they could have

1	found fingerprints. They may or may not have been on file,
2	so if it was as they thought, kids.
3	MR. FELICIANO: And was it because, I guess, just the
4	Playboys were stolen they really didn't do much with it, or
5	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 005: Well, there was a few
6	other things. The stereo was taken and a few things like
7	that. But the whole thing didn't amount to that much.
8	MR. FELICIANO: And you do have one son.
9	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 005: Yes.
10	MR. FELICIANO: And I don't remember. Do you have
11	grandkids?
12	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 005: No, not yet.
13	MR. FELICIANO: The nature of these types of charges,
14	how do they make you feel?
15	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 005: They don't make me feel
16	anything one way or the other particularly. I mean, it's
17	something that goes on these days unfortunately.
18	MR. FELICIANO: All right. How do you feel I
19	mean, do you think because somebody has been charged with a
20	crime like this that they must have done it?
21	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 005: Well, they've got to have
22	some basis to make the charge. I'll have to hear what the
23	information is.
24	MR. FELICIANO: So you need to listen to the
25	witnesses and hear what they have to say?

1	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 005: Absolutely.
2	MR. FELICIANO: And is it
3	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 005: I mean, somebody thinks
4	they have enough to make a charge, but
5	MR. FELICIANO: So when listening to the witnesses
6	testify, when you're judging their credibility, what are
7	things that you look at?
8	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 005: Their actions, their
9	attitude, the way they handle themselves in the situation.
10	MR. FELICIANO: What about
11	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 005: Whether they're confident
12	in what they're saying or whether they're lying.
13	MR. FELICIANO: What about if say the information
14	that they're testifying to changes over time, would that
15	affect your
16	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 005: Changes in what way?
17	MR. FELICIANO: Well, if they tell a story one time
18	and then it changes the next time they tell it, would that
19	influence your how you see them as far as credible one way
20	or another?
21	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 005: Probably.
22	MR. FELICIANO: And the truth doesn't change.
23	It's
24	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 005: Yeah. I mean, if you're
25	going to tell a story, let's stick to it.

1	MR. FELICIANO: Okay. So I mean
2	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 005: Get your story straight
3	before you start.
4	MR. FELICIANO: So I mean, do you think that the
5	truth generally doesn't change and whatever's true tends to
6	stay the same?
7	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 005: I would think so, yes.
8	MR. FELICIANO: And how about like keeping lies, do
9	you think keeping lies straight is difficult?
10	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 005: It's more difficult than
11	keeping the truth straight, definitely.
12	MR. FELICIANO: Is that because you have to kind of
13	remember what you lied about?
14	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 005: What did I say the last
15	time.
16	MR. FELICIANO: You see that Mr. Renteria-Novoa's
17	using the assistance of an interpreter. How does that make
18	you feel one way or another?
19	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 005: Not a whole lot
20	[inaudible]. That's his right and his privilege.
21	MR. FELICIANO: I know these days there's a
22	certain there's a certain climate. There are certain
23	attitudes sometimes towards people that might not speak the
24	language if they're here in this country. Is that anything do you feel anything about that do you feel anything like
25	do you feel anything about that do you feel anything like

that, that, you know, he should be here, he should know the 1 language, things like that? 2 3 PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 005: As far as that goes, I'm old school, you know. If you're going to live here you should 4 be speaking the language, yes. 5 MR. FELICIANO: All right. But is that something you 6 7 would hold against him, say as far as him being guilty or not guilty? 8 PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 005: 9 No. MR. FELICIANO: Now, is there anybody else that feels 10 differently about that? You do. Okay. Can we -- we might 11 have to bounce around a little bit. Thank you, sir. 12 13 Badge No. 38. Okay. So how do you feel about it? 14 PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 038: Well, I think he's 15 clearly either now an illegal immigrant or was at some point of his coming to the U.S. And illegal immigration is by 16 17 definition contemptuous, so it's clear that this man already 18 breaks the law. 19 And the fact that he's lived here long enough to potentially commit crimes and still doesn't speak the language 20 that's native to the U.S. is aggravating, to say the least. 21 22 MR. FELICIANO: And you had some issues with -- I 23 guess at work, right, with Latino men? 24 PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 038: Correct. 25 MR. FELICIANO: It's happened a lot throughout the

1	years?
2	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 038: Throughout my life, yes.
3	MR. FELICIANO: Now, it sounds like you have some
4	pretty strong strong opinions about this; is that fair to
5	say?
6	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 038: Fair to say.
7	MR. FELICIANO: And it sounds like if you were
8	sitting where Mr. Renteria-Novoa was sitting, you probably
9	wouldn't want somebody who thinks like you sitting on this
LO	jury.
L1	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 038: Absolutely not.
L2	MR. FELICIANO: Okay. So although you want to give
L3	him a fair shake, I would imagine, it sounds like it might be
L4	impossible in this case.
L5	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 038: I could not fairly give
L6	him a fair open minded opinion or trial because to me he's
L7	already a law breaker in the U.S.
L8	MR. FELICIANO: Judge, I have a motion.
L9	THE COURT: All right. Does the State wish to
20	traverse?
21	MS. FLECK: No, that's okay. Thank you, Your Honor.
22	THE COURT: All right. Ms. Alessio, is that how you
23	pronounce your last name, Alessio or Alessio?
24	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 038: Alessio.
25	THE COURT: Thank you for your service. You are

1	excused. Please go down to the jury services room on the
2	third floor and they'll give you further instructions.
3	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 038: Okay. Thank you.
4	THE COURT: All right. So we need the next person,
5	who will be?
6	THE CLERK: Badge No. 064, Charolette Temple.
7	THE COURT: All right. Ms. Temple, do you have the
8	microphone? Since you're just now coming up here, can you
9	give us a little bit of a biographical sketch? What do you
10	do, are you married, what does your husband do, do you have
11	kids?
12	THE MARSHAL: Your badge number.
13	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 064: I'm an administrative
14	assistant for Desert Springs Hospital.
15	THE COURT: I'm sorry. Can you repeat that?
16	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 064: Administrative assistant
17	for Desert Springs Hospital.
18	THE COURT: Okay.
19	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 064: Not married. I have
20	a 29-year-old son, a two-year-old granddaughter that lives in
21	Chicago.
22	THE COURT: And how long have you worked at that
23	hospital?
24	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 064: For 14 months.
25	THE COURT: Fourteen months. Did you live in Las

1	Vegas before that?
2	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 064: No.
3	THE COURT: How so you've only been in Las Vegas
4	for 14 months?
5	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 064: I've been in Las Vegas
6	for 12 month well, I've been in Las Vegas for 15 months.
7	THE COURT: Fifteen months. And where'd you move
8	from?
9	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 064: Texas.
10	THE COURT: From Texas. Did you come out here just
11	for the job, or for other reasons?
12	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 064: No. For other reasons.
13	THE COURT: Okay. So let me ask you this. You
14	haven't been in Las Vegas for very long, 15 months. Do you
15	feel like you're part of the community? And what I'm really
16	getting at is this. Obviously the way what we want on the
17	jury is a cross-section of the community, people who sort of
18	care enough that they're taking an interest in what's going on
19	here.
20	Given the fact you've only been here 15 months, do
21	you feel that this is your home and you care about what's
22	happening in this community in general?
23	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 064: [Inaudible.]
24	THE COURT: I'm sorry?
25	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 064: For now.

1	THE COURT: For now. Okay. Ever served on a jury
2	before?
3	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 064: No.
4	THE COURT: Have you or anyone close to you ever been
5	the victim of a crime either sexual in nature or otherwise?
6	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 064: My son.
7	THE COURT: Your son. Where and when and what
8	happened?
9	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 064: He was a victim of
10	attempted murder in Chicago, Illinois.
11	THE COURT: How long ago?
12	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 064: In 2002.
13	THE COURT: 2010.
14	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 064: 2002.
15	THE COURT: Okay. Were the police called?
16	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 064: Yes.
17	THE COURT: Was there a court case? Was someone
18	arrested?
19	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 064: Yes.
20	THE COURT: And did your son or did you have to
21	participate in the court case at all?
22	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 064: No.
23	THE COURT: All right. Your son, did he have to
24	testify?
25	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 064: Yes.

1	THE COURT: Are you happy with the way that court
2	case worked out?
3	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 064: Yes.
4	THE COURT: So was there anything about that case,
5	what happened to your son or how the court system or the
6	police treated him or anyone else in the case, that would
7	affect your ability to be fair and impartial in this criminal
8	case?
9	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 064: No.
10	THE COURT: All right. Have you or anyone closely
11	associated with you ever been accused of a crime, whether or
12	not there was a conviction, either sexual in nature or
13	otherwise?
14	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 064: I had a DUI in 2006,
15	January 1st of 2006.
16	THE COURT: Was that also in Chicago?
17	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 064: In Texas.
18	THE COURT: Texas. I'm sorry. All right. Were you
19	convicted?
20	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 064: No.
21	THE COURT: Okay. What happened?
22	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 064: They dropped it.
23	THE COURT: Oh. So the case was dismissed?
24	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 064: Yes.
25	THE COURT: All right. Any feelings about that case?

1	Were you treated fairly by the police and the system?
2	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 064: Yes.
3	THE COURT: Okay. A little bit of hesitation there.
4	Do you I mean, or am I reading too much into
5	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 064: It was a random thing.
6	It was New Year's Day and I was living in Houston at that
7	time. It was my second day actually living in Houston from
8	Chicago, and they randomly pulled over so many cars that was
9	leaving a concert.
10	THE COURT: Right. Okay.
11	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 064: And I was involved in the
12	pullover.
13	THE COURT: Checkpoint type thing. Okay.
14	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 064: Yes.
15	THE COURT: So the case was ultimately dismissed. So
16	how do you feel overall about the criminal justice system and
17	how you were treated?
18	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 064: It was fine.
19	THE COURT: Okay. Anything about that case that
20	would cause you to be something other than fair and impartial
21	if asked to serve in this case?
22	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 064: No.
23	THE COURT: So would you hold it against law
24	enforcement in this case that the police in Texas pulled you over? If would you hold it against the DAs or any of their
25	over? If would vou hold it against the DAs or anv of their

1	witnesses in any way that, hey, you know, this was maybe a bad
2	arrest in Houston and they just kind of pulled over everybody?
3	Would that be an issue for you?
4	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 064: No.
5	THE COURT: All right. Mr. Feliciano, you may
6	continue.
7	THE MARSHAL: [Inaudible.]
8	MR. FELICIANO: Yes, please.
9	MS. FLECK: Judge, can we approach real quickly?
10	THE COURT: Sure.
11	(Bench conference.)
12	MS. FLECK: I get to question the new ones.
13	THE COURT: I'm sorry?
14	MS. FLECK: When if do I get to question the new
15	ones once he's finished completely?
16	THE COURT: Yeah.
17	MS. FLECK: Okay. So once he's finished with
18	everyone, and then I'll
19	THE COURT: Or do you want to do it now? It doesn't
20	matter to me either way. Whatever you prefer.
21	MR. FELICIANO: Do you just want to go now?
22	MS. FLECK: Yeah, that's fine.
23	MR. FELICIANO: Since should we stick with the
24	same order?
25	THE COURT: You just wanted to do the two of you

-	
1	just do right now, and just do
2	MS. FLECK: I do it and then he'll go up again?
3	THE COURT: Yeah.
4	MS. FLECK: Once I pass for cause.
5	THE COURT: Yeah, let's do that.
6	(End bench conference.)
7	THE COURT: All right. Here's what we're going
8	to do. Ms. Temple, since you just came up for the first time,
9	we're going to allow Ms. Fleck to ask a couple questions of
10	you first. All right.
11	MS. FLECK: Thank you, Your Honor.
12	Just briefly, just some of the questions that you
13	heard yesterday regarding children and kind of children's
14	experiences. If somebody at a young age made a kind of an
15	immature decision, is that something that you would hold
16	against them later in life, or would you be able to account
17	for that?
18	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 064: [Inaudible.]
19	THE COURT RECORDER: I can't hear her.
20	THE MARSHAL: Ma'am, [inaudible].
21	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 064: Everybody makes some bad
22	choices in life when they're younger, and I think everybody
23	I mean, some people change once they get older.
24	MS. FLECK: So just because someone at one point made
25	maybe an immature decision, you would agree that they're

1	entitled to the exact same level of justice under the law as
2	anyone else?
3	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 064: Exactly.
4	MS. FLECK: Okay. Any problems that you have thought
5	of or any issues that have come to mind as you've sat and
6	listened to everybody?
7	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 064: No.
8	MS. FLECK: Promise you'll do the very best job you
9	can possibly do if you're chosen to be a juror?
10	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 064: If I can.
11	MS. FLECK: Thank you. I will pass Ms. Temple for
12	cause.
13	MR. FELICIANO: Can we approach briefly?
14	THE COURT: Sure.
15	(Bench conference.)
16	MR. FELICIANO: [Inaudible.]
17	MS. FLECK: I'll push it down so they can't see it.
18	THE COURT: Okay. I can't see it from here, so
19	[inaudible].
20	MS. FLECK: Yeah. I'll push it down, or I'll
21	minimize it.
22	THE COURT: Okay.
23	(End bench conference.)
24	THE COURT: All right. Mr. Feliciano, you may
25	proceed.

1	MR. FELICIANO: Thank you.
2	THE MARSHAL: [Inaudible.]
3	MR. FELICIANO: Yes, please.
4	THE MARSHAL: Did you want Juror No. 3?
5	MR. FELICIANO: Perfect.
6	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 053: 053, Antonio Correa.
7	MR. FELICIANO: Zero, five, three. Mr. Correa?
8	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 053: Yeah.
9	MR. FELICIANO: You just heard what the last juror
10	that just got excused said. Did you hear that, about
11	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 053: Yes.
12	MR. FELICIANO: How do you feel about that?
13	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 053: I'm Hispanic myself. I
14	was born in Puerto Rico, raised in Puerto Rico until I was 25
15	years old, so I have no issues with that.
16	MR. FELICIANO: Now, is there anybody else in this
17	room that feels the way that prospective juror feels? Because
18	now is the time. Okay. Could you pass the mike over to him
19	real quick.
20	And how do you feel about that?
21	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 057: I think you
22	MR. FELICIANO: I'm sorry. I need your badge number.
23	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 057: 057.
24	MR. FELICIANO: Mr. Anderson?
25	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 057: Yes.

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1	MR. FELICIANO: So you feel the same way she felt
2	about, I guess, non-English speakers?
3	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 057: Yes.
4	MR. FELICIANO: Could you explain that for us?
5	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 057: I think if you live here
6	you should speak English.
7	MR. FELICIANO: All right. Do you feel that that
8	feeling is so strong that you couldn't give Mr. Renteria-Novoa
9	a fair trial?
10	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 057: Yes.
11	MR. FELICIANO: And why is that? Could you maybe
12	explain
13	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 057: Just how she said. I
14	think if you live here you should speak English, and
15	especially if you're getting in trouble you should be able to
16	understand what's going on.
17	MR. FELICIANO: So although although you'd like to
18	give Mr. Renteria a fair trial, is that something you're
19	telling us that's something you just can't do?
20	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 057: Yes.
21	MR. FELICIANO: Judge, I have a motion.
22	THE COURT: Mr. Anderson, let me ask you a question.
23	Yesterday I asked everybody in the room does anybody here have
24	a problem with the fact that the defendant is here with the
25	assistance of a Spanish interpreter, and you didn't raise your

How come your answer is different now? 1 PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 057: Well, I just --3 THE COURT: Is it because you just heard what she said and you're trying to get off of jury duty? Because I'm 4 5 going to be blunt with you. If I think that you're lying, I can throw you in jail. 6 7 PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 057: No, I'm not. I just -- I thought about it. I didn't really think about it until then. 8 But I thought about it and that's how I feel. Like I didn't 10 expect to be asked it, but now I thought about it over the day and I agree. 11 12 THE COURT: All right. Does the State wish to 13 traverse? 14 MS. FLECK: No, thank you. 15 All right. Mr. Anderson, you -- let me THE COURT: ask you this. I mean, you may prefer that people in the 16 17 United States speak English, but obviously you're aware that a lot of people don't, right? 18 19 PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 057: Yes. 20 All right. In fact, millions of people THE COURT: now living in the United States don't speak English, or at 21 22 least don't speak it very well, correct? 23 PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 057: 24 Are you saying that in any case involving 25 any one of those millions of people you could never be a fair

and impartial juror?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 057: I mean, I think if you're — like if they're not getting in trouble, then I have no problem with it. But if they're in trouble and they're in court, they should be able to understand what's going on, otherwise you — I mean, you should stay out of trouble either way, but especially if you're in this type of situation you should understand what's going on. Otherwise —

THE COURT: Well, if they don't understand what's going on, does that make them guilty of what they're accused of doing?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 057: I think that --

THE COURT: What about — let me ask you a hypothetical. What if somebody who doesn't speak English happens to be falsely accused, now he's in court, he obviously doesn't understand what's going on. What would you do if you were a juror in that case? Would you find him guilty because he doesn't understand what's going on?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 057: Well, I also think that the charges just don't come out of nowhere. Like you don't just wake up one day and out of nowhere it's, you know, all the sudden you're in jail. Like something happens. So that's another reason that I don't think I would be able to be —

THE COURT: So anyone who's charged with a crime is automatically guilty; is that what you're saying?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 057: It depends on the crime. 1 I mean, but for the most part, yes. 2 3 THE COURT: And does it make any difference to you whether the person who's charged with a crime does or does not 4 5 speak English? I mean, isn't what you're saying also true of people who speak English, or am I misunderstanding? 6 7 PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 057: Well, yes. It's true for both sides that if you get -- I think for the most part if you 8 get charged with a crime that you probably did it. 9 10 THE COURT: So I mean, do you not -- I mean, the point of a trial is to determine whether or not the person did 11 what they are accused of doing. Do you understand that? I 12 13 mean, I went through this yesterday and you didn't indicate 14 any misunderstanding about what I said, right? 15 PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 057: Yes. But I mean, the 16 more I thought about it -- I mean, I didn't raise my hand 17 yesterday, but I thought about it and I agree with like what she was saying earlier. 18 19 THE COURT: All right. Mr. Anderson, here's what's going to happen. You don't get to go home. You get to go sit 20 in the back of the courtroom. All right. So we're going to 21 22 pull someone else to sit in your seat. 23 Badge No. 068, Mr. Aguilar. THE CLERK: 24 UNKNOWN SPEAKER: [Inaudible.]

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THE COURT: Right. So I don't know how we're going

1	to do that. We need I don't know if there's a way that we
2	can re-arrange people or
3	I don't know if there's a way that we can
4	(Inaudible discussion.)
5	THE COURT: All right. Mr. Aguilar, can you give us
6	a brief biographical sketch of yourself? What do you do for a
7	living, are you married, does your wife work, do you have
8	kids?
9	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 068: Yes. I'm married and I
10	have children.
11	THE COURT: What do you do for a living?
12	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 068: I'm a member of the
13	carpenter's union.
14	THE COURT: Okay. How long have you lived in Las
15	Vegas?
16	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 068: I want to rectify
17	something. I got confused yesterday. I said that I had been
18	living here for 10 years. But I've been living here for 20
19	years.
20	THE COURT: Oh, okay. All right. So you've been
21	here for 20 years. And you said that you're married. Does
22	your wife work?
23	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 068: My wife works.
24	THE COURT: What does she do?
25	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 068: She works as housekeeping

1	in Palazzo Venetian.
2	THE COURT: Okay. And how old are your kids?
3	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 068: Sixteen, fourteen, and
4	eight.
5	THE COURT: Are they boys or girls?
6	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 068: Boys.
7	THE COURT: Have you ever served on a jury before?
8	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 068: No.
9	THE COURT: Have you or anyone closely associated
10	with you ever been the victim of a crime either sexual in
11	nature or otherwise?
12	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 068: No.
13	THE COURT: Have you or anyone closely associated
14	with you ever been accused of a crime, whether or not there
15	was a conviction, either sexual in nature or otherwise?
16	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 068: No.
17	THE COURT: Okay. I appreciate it.
18	Ms. Fleck, do you have any questions for Mr. Aguilar?
19	MS. FLECK: Yes. Mr. Aguilar, now that you have an
20	interpreter helping you, how do you feel now about
21	participating in the trial?
22	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 068: Well, I've listened to
23	several experiences, unfortunate ones that I haven't happened,
24	unfortunate ones that I haven't happened.
25	MS. FLECK: You mean while we were going through this

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1	process?
2	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 068: Yes.
3	MS. FLECK: So you mean other things that people have
4	disclosed?
5	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 068: No.
6	MS. FLECK: I don't understand. Have you now that
7	you have the use of an interpreter, how do you feel about
8	sitting as a juror, about the entire process?
9	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 068: As far as far the
10	questions that have been asked, I feel uncomfortable being
11	here.
12	MS. FLECK: What part makes you uncomfortable?
13	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 068: On the part of the
14	accused, what he's accused about.
15	MS. FLECK: So the crime themselves make you feel
16	uncomfortable?
17	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 068: Yes, the crime.
18	MS. FLECK: Okay. I mean, is that just is it that
19	you feel uncomfortable because they're of the nature of the
20	crime, or is there something about the accused and his
21	position that makes you feel uncomfortable?
22	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 068: I'm not used to being in
23	these kind of situations, but it's uncomfortable for me that
24	somebody commits a crime.
25	MS. FLECK: Okay. Understood. You moved here 20