#### IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

# EDUCATION FREEDOM PAC, Appellant,

Supreme Court Case 100 2022 06:37 p.m. District Court Case No. 270 C000271B Clerk of Supreme Court

VS.

BEVERLY ROGERS, AN
INDIVIDUAL; RORY REID, AN
INDIVIDUAL; AND BARBARA K.
CEVASKE, IN HER OFFICIAL
CAPACTY AS NEVADA SECRETARY
OF STATE.

Respondents.

#### **APPELLANT'S APPENDIX, VOLUME ONE OF ONE**

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	Date		Vol
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Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief Challenging Initiative Petition S-02-2022 Pursuant to NRS 295.061(01) Case No. 22-OC-0027-1B	2/22/22	AA0001- AA0036	I
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief Challenging Initiative Petition S-02-2022 Pursuant to NRS 295.061(1)  Case No.22-OC-0027-1B	2/22/22	AA0037- AA0069	I
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Declaration of Service [Summons, Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief Challenging Initiative Petition S-02-2022 Pursuant to NRS 295.061(01), and Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief Challenging Initiative Petition S-02-2022 Pursuant to NRS 295.061(1) upon State of Nevada Office of the Attorney General, February 22, 2022] Case No. 22-OC-0027-1B	3/1/22	AA0072- AA0074	I
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Declaration of Service [Summons, Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief Challenging Initiative Petition S-02-2022 Pursuant to NRS 295.061(01), and Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief Challenging Initiative Petition S-02-2022 Pursuant to NRS 295.061(1) upon State of Nevada Office of the Attorney General, February 22, 2022]Case No. 22-OC-0027-1B	3/1/22	AA0072- AA0074	I
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Memorandum of Temporary Assignment [to the Honorable Charles McGee, Senior Judge] Case No. 22-OC-0027-1B	3/15/22	AA0148	I
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Notice of Entry of Order [Decision Invalidating Petition to Create a Statute to govern Future Appropriations to an Educational System Outside of the School Districts [Part A] Injunction Preventing the Forward Progress of this Initiative [Part B]]  Case No. 22-OC-0027-1B	5/4/22	AA0183- AA0218	I
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Order Transferring Case to Department 2 Case No.22-OC-0027-1B	2/22/22	AA0070- AA0071	Ι
Reply Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief Challenging Initiative Petition S-02-2022 Pursuant to NRS 295.061(1) filed by Plaintiffs Case No. 22-OC-0027-1B	3/25/22	AA0154- AA0161	I
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#### **AFFIRMATION**

The undersigned does hereby affirm that the foregoing document filed in this matter does not contain the social security number of any person.

DATED this 8th day of June 2022.

**HUTCHISON & STEFFEN, PLLC** 

By: /s/ Jason D. Guinasso, Esq.

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Attorneys for Appellant

#### **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

Pursuant to NRCP 5(b), I hereby certify that I am an employee of Hutchison & Steffen, PLLC and that on July 8, 2022, APPELLANT'S APPENDIX, VOLUME ONE OF ONE was electronically filed with the Clerk of the Court for the Nevada Supreme Court by using the Nevada Supreme Court's E-Filing system. Pursuant to NRAP 30 (f)(2), all Participants in the case will be served and provided an electronic copy.

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# IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA IN AND FOR CARSON CITY

BEVERLY ROGERS, an individual; RORY REID, an individual,

Plaintiffs,

vs.

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BARBARA CEGAVSKE, in her official capacity as NEVADA SECRETARY OF STATE,

Defendant.

Case No.: 3200 CCO371B
Dept.: =

COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF CHALLENGING INITIATIVE PETITION S-02-2022 PURSUANT TO NRS 295.061(1)

Arbitration Exemption: Declaratory and Injunctive Relief

BEVERLY ROGERS and RORY REID (collectively, "Plaintiffs"), file this Complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief against Barbara Cegavske, in her official capacity as the Nevada Secretary of State, pursuant to NRS 295.061, NRS 30.030, and NRS 33.010. Plaintiff alleges and complains as follows:

#### **JURISDICTION AND VENUE**

1. This Court has jurisdiction to hear Plaintiffs' claims pursuant to NRS 295.061 and to grant declaratory and injunctive relief pursuant to NRS 30.030, 30.040, and 33.010.

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2. Venue is proper under NRS 13.020 and 13.040 because this action is against a public officer acting in her official capacity, and also pursuant to NRS 295.061(1).

#### **PARTIES**

- 3. Plaintiff BEVERLY ROGERS is a resident of and registered voter in Clark County, Nevada.
- 4. Plaintiff RORY REID is a resident of and registered voter in Clark County, Nevada.
- 5. Defendant Barbara Cegavske is Nevada Secretary of State and is sued in her official capacity. As the Secretary of State, Ms. Cegavske is the Chief Officer of Elections for Nevada and is responsible for the execution, administration, and enforcement of the state's election laws. See NRS 293.124. Ms. Cegavske's duties also include qualifying initiatives for submission to the Nevada Legislature and/or the Nevada electorate and disqualifying initiatives that are determined to be invalid.

#### **GENERAL FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS**

- 6. On or about January 31, 2022, Nevada Statutory Initiative Petition S-02-2022 ("Petition") was filed with the Nevada Secretary of State. See Exhibit 1, a true and accurate copy of Notice of Intent to Circulate Statewide Initiative or Referendum Petition associated with Statutory Initiative Petition S-02-2022.
- 7. The Petition includes a description of effect as required by NRS 295.009(1)(b), which reads, in full:

The Petition establishes an education freedom account program under which parents will be authorized to establish an account for their child's education. The parent of any child required to attend public school who has been enrolled in a public school in Nevada during the entirety of the immediately preceding school year or whose child is eligible to enroll in kindergarten may establish an account for the child. Money in the accounts may be used to pay certain educational expenses including, but not limited to, tuition and fees at participating entities. Participating entities may include eligible private schools, a program of distance education not operated by a public school and parents, among others.

The maximum available grant is 90 percent of the statewide base per pupil funding amount. For Fiscal Year 2021-2022, that statewide base per pupil funding amount is \$6,980 per pupil, and for Fiscal Year 2022-2023 it is \$7,074 per pupil. That said, nothing in the initiative requires the Legislature to appropriate money to fund the accounts. If no money is appropriated, no funding will be available for the accounts. Funding the accounts, however, could necessitate a tax increase or reduction of government services.

See Exhibit 1, at 21.

- 8. The Petition seeks to effectuate a wholesale amendment of Title 34 of Nevada's revised statutes, which relates to education, by adding seventeen new sections to Chapter 385 of the NRS and by amending NRS 835.007, 219A.150, 385B.060, 385B.150, 385B.160, 385B.170, 388A.471, 388.850, 392, 392.033, 392.070, 392.074, and 392.466. The apparent purpose of this broad-reaching statutory revision to Nevada's education statutes is to divert state funds from public to private education by creating a scheme which would permit parents of school age children to establish education savings accounts which would be funded by the State of Nevada.
- 9. Under this proposed statutory scheme, if funded by the Legislature, an education savings account, referred to as "education freedom accounts" ("EFAs") in the proposed initiative, is established when a parent enters into an agreement with the State Treasurer for the creation of the account. To be eligible for an account, a child must have been enrolled in public school during the entirety of the school year immediately preceding the establishment of the EFA. Id. at 2, ¶ 9. The accounts are administered by the Treasurer and must be maintained with a financial management firm chosen by the Treasurer. Id. at 5, § 12.1.
- 10. If a parent enters into an agreement with the State Treasurer for the creation of an EFA, and if the Legislature has appropriated money to fund grants to such EFAs, a grant of money on behalf of the child is to be deposited into the child's EFA in an amount equal to 90 percent of the statewide base per pupil funding amount. *Id.* at 3, §§ 10.1-10.3.

- 11. The money is to be deposited in quarterly installments and may be carried forward from year to year if the agreement is renewed for that student. *Id.* at 4, §§ 10.7, 10.8. An EFA agreement is valid for one school year but may be terminated early. *Id.* at 3, § 8.4. If the child's parent terminates the EFA agreement, or if the child graduates from high school or moves out of state after an account is created, unused funds revert to the State General Fund. *Id.* at 3-4, §§ 9.5, 10.8(b). If an EFA agreement is terminated early, "the child may not receive instruction from a public school in this State until the end of the period for which the last deposit was made into the [EFA]." *Id.* at 2, § 4.
- 12. The EFA program requires participating students to receive instruction from one or more "participating entities," which include private schools, universities, programs of distance education, tutors, and parents. *Id.* at 2, 5, §§ 4, 13.1.
- 13. The EFA funds may be spent by parents on authorized educational expenses, which include tuition and fees, textbooks, tutoring or teaching services, testing and assessment fees, disability services, and transportation to and from the participating entities. *Id.* at 4, § 11.1.
- 14. With some small exceptions, the proposed initiative largely tracks the provisions of Senate Bill (SB) 302 (2015), which the Nevada Supreme Court struck down in Schwartz v. Lopez, 132 Nev. 732 (2016). The Court ruled that the money that the Legislature had appropriated for K–12 public education could not be used in this manner, consistent with the constitutional mandates to fund public education. While attempting to circumvent this funding issue by passing the buck to the Legislature to appropriate the necessary funding for the EFAs contemplated by the proposed initiative, the proponents have plainly run afoul of Article 19, section 6 of the Constitution, which prohibits the "proposal of any statute or statutory amendment which makes an appropriation or otherwise requires the expenditure of money, unless such statute or amendment also imposes a sufficient tax, not prohibited by the Constitution, or otherwise constitutionally provides for raising the

necessary revenue," with the result that this proposed initiative, like its predecessor SB 304, is fatally flawed.

15. Moreover, under the Nevada constitution, the initiative power only extends to actual statutes which impose real obligations. The initiative power does not extend to purported pronouncements of law that only come into effect upon the happening of some future event, such as the Legislature enacting the necessary funding for the EFA grants. See Nev. Const., Art. 19, § 1 ("the people reserve to themselves the power to propose, by initiative petition, statutes and amendments to statutes and amendments to this Constitution, and to enact or reject them at the polls."). By providing that the statutory scheme contemplated in the Petition only becomes effective upon the Legislature appropriating funding for the EFA grants, which may or may not happen, the proposed initiative cannot properly be considered to be a proposed statute and is therefore beyond the initiative power granted by the Constitution.

#### FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION

#### Violation of Description of Effect Requirement, NRS 295.009(1)(b)

- 16. The foregoing paragraphs of this Complaint are re-alleged and fully incorporated as if set forth in full herein.
- 17. NRS 295.009(1)(b) requires that initiative petitions "set forth, in not more than 200 words, a description of the effect of the initiative or referendum if the initiative or referendum is approved by the voters."
- 18. "[A] description of effect . . . [can] not be deceptive or misleading." Educ. Initiative PAC v. Comm. to Protect Nevada Jobs, 293 P. 3d 874, 879 (Nev. 2013) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). It must also "explain these ramifications of the proposed amendment" in order to allow voters to make an informed decision. Nev. Judges Ass'n v. Lau, 112 Nev. 51, 59 (1996).
- 19. Here, the description of effect is deficient, first, because it is deceptive or misleading, and second, because it fails to provide essential information regarding

the Petition's effects, including significant financial, legislative, and practical ramifications that are necessary for voters to make an informed decision as to whether to support the Petition.

- 20. The description of effect is deceptive (or at the very least, highly misleading) in numerous respects, including the following:
  - The very first sentence of the Decision of Effect states that "[t]he Petition establishes an education freedom account program under which parents will be authorized to establish an account for their child's education," misleadingly suggesting that parents are precluded from establishing an account under existing law, which is of course not the case. The Description of Effect thus misleadingly suggests that if the proposed initiative did not pass, parents would be precluded from setting up savings accounts to be used to fund their children's education, which, again, is not the case.
  - The Description of Effect goes on to state that "The parent of any child required to attend public school who has been enrolled in a public school in Nevada during the entirety of the immediately preceding school year or whose child is eligible to enroll in kindergarten may establish an account for the child. Money in the accounts may be used to pay certain educational expenses including, but not limited to, tuition and fees at participating entities. Participating entities may include eligible private schools, a program of distance education not operated by a public school and parents, among others." This makes it seem that if passed, parents would be able to establish an EFA to supplement their child's public education, by, for example, signing their child up for after-school tutoring. In fact, this is not the case, because section 10 of the proposed initiative provides that "[a] parent may not establish [an EFA] ... for a child ... who will remain enrolled full-time in a public school, regardless of whether such child receives

instruction from a participating entity." *Id.*, at 3, § 10. Nowhere is this disclosed in the Description of Effect.

- Under section 4 of the proposed initiative, when a parent terminates an EFA agreement before the end of a school year, that parent's child "may not receive instruction from a public school in this state until the end of the period for which the last deposit was made into the EFA. *Id.*, at 3, § 4. The Description of Effect misleadingly fails to inform potential signatories that if passed, Nevada children could potentially be barred from attending public school for a portion of a school year, under certain circumstances.
- The Description of Effect does not disclose that the program would only come into effect if the Legislature appropriates funding for the accounts.
- The Description of Effect fails to disclose the significant financial burden placed on the State Treasurer and the Department of Education, or of the fact that no revenue source is established by the proposed initiative to pay for the substantial expenditures required by the proposed initiative.
- While stating (in the very last sentence) that "[f]unding the accounts, however, could necessitate a tax increase or reduction of government services," the Description of Effect misleadingly fails to disclose that any funding appropriated for the contemplated program would inevitably reduce the funding available funding for Nevada's public school system, leading to a deterioration in Nevada's public school system.
- The Description of Effect misleadingly fails to disclose that if passed, substantial state assets would be used to fund private schools who, unlike public schools, are not obligated to provide their educational services to any eligible Nevada students
- 21. Collectively, these misleading statement and omissions render it impossible for a potential signatory to make an informed decision whether to sign the

Petition. Accordingly, the Petition is invalid and must be stricken, and the Secretary of State should be enjoined from taking any further action upon it.

#### SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION

#### Violation of Unfunded Expenditure Prohibition, Nev. Const. Art. 19, Sec. 6

- 22. The foregoing paragraphs of this Complaint are re-alleged and fully incorporated as if set forth in full herein.
- 23. Nev. Const. Art. 19, Sec. 6 prohibits any initiative that "makes an appropriation or otherwise requires the expenditure of money, unless such statute or amendment also imposes a sufficient tax, not prohibited by the Constitution, or otherwise constitutionally provides for raising the necessary revenue."
- 24. When an initiative violates this "threshold content restriction" by mandating unfunded expenditures, it is void *ab initio*, and pre-election intervention by Nevada courts is warranted. *Herbst Gaming, Inc. v. Heller*, 122 Nev. 877, 891, 141 P.3d 1224, 1233 (2006) (quoting *Rogers v. Heller*, 117 Nev. 169, 173, 18 P.3d 1034, 1036 (2001)).
- 25. Here, the Petition seeks to institute a complex and elaborate system of EFAs to be funded by grants from the state and to be used to pay educational expenses provided by entities other than public schools. But this proposed initiative, on its face, fails to impose any taxes or otherwise raise the necessary revenue to either fund the grants for the EFAs contemplated by the initiative, or to pay for the substantial administrative expenses that would necessarily have to be incurred in creating, maintaining and administering the EFA scheme contemplated by the proposed initiative.
- 26. First, by its plain language, the proposed initiative does not provide for any taxes or other means of raising revenue to fund the grants deposited into the EFAs established pursuant to the initiative. Instead, the appropriation of these funds, without which the program cannot proceed or function, is left to the

Legislature to accomplish, if it chooses to do so at all, as the following provisions of the proposed initiative make clear:

- "... if a parent enters into or renews an agreement pursuant to section 9 of this act and the Legislature has appropriated money to fund grants described in this section, a grant of money on behalf of the child must be deposited in the education freedom account of the child." Exhibit 1 at 3, § 10.1.
- "Nothing herein shall require the Legislature to appropriate money to fund the grants described in this section. The availability of grants is subject to the availability of funds as determined by the Legislature." Id., ¶ 10.2.
- "Nothing herein shall require the Legislature to appropriate money to fund education freedom accounts or any expenses related thereto." Id. at 20, § 35.
- "The provisions of this act become effective upon an appropriation by the Legislature to fund the education freedom accounts." *Id.*, § 37.
- 27. Putting aside its failure to provide for the appropriation of moneys to pay the grants contemplated by the initiative which, on its own, is a fatal defect the initiative also purports to impose numerous regulatory obligations on the state Treasurer and other state and local governmental entities, but fails to impose any taxes or otherwise raise revenue to fund such necessary expenditures as Article 19, section 6 of the Constitution requires. For example, if enacted:
  - The State Treasurer would be required to develop an application process for parents to enter into an agreement with the State Treasurer to establish an EFA, and to "make the application available on the Internet website of the State Treasurer." Exhibit 1, at 3, § 9.8.
  - The State Treasurer would be required to "provide to the parent who enters into or renews the agreement a written explanation of the authorized uses . . . of the money in an [EFA] and the responsibilities of the parent and the

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State Treasurer pursuant to the agreement and sections 2 to 17, inclusive." *Id.*, at 3, § 9.9.

- The State Treasurer would be required to "qualify one or more private financial management firms to manage education freedom accounts and shall establish reasonable fees, based on market rates, for the management of education freedom accounts." Id., at 5, § 12.1.
- EFAs established pursuant to this proposed initiative would be required to be "audited randomly each year by a certified or licensed public accountant. The State Treasurer may provide for additional audits of an education freedom account as it determines necessary." Id., §12.2.
- The State Treasurer would be required to receive and evaluate applications for institutions to become "participating entities" under the program and to "approve an application submitted pursuant to subsection 1 or request additional information to demonstrate that the person meets the criteria to serve as a participating entity." Id., §§ 13.1, 13.2.
- The State Treasurer would be required to prescribe regulations for any participating entities that are "reasonably expected . . . [to] receive, from payments made from [EFAs], more than \$50,000 during any school year" to post surety bonds in the amounts expected to be received, or to "[p]rovide evidence satisfactory to the State Treasurer that the participating entity otherwise has unencumbered assets sufficient to pay to the State Treasurer" such amounts. Id., § 13.3.
- The State Treasurer would be required to police the participating entities to ensure that they do not engage in improper conduct, and, if they do, may refuse them to continue to participate in the program. *Id.*, at 6, § 13.5.
- The State Treasurer would be required to "provide immediate notice" of any participating entities not permitted to continue participating in the

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program "to each parent of a child receiving instruction from" such entities. *Id.*, § 13.6.

- The Department of Education would be required to aggregate the results of examinations taken by children participating in the program and make such aggregated data available on the internet. *Id.*, § 14.2.
- The State Treasurer would be required to "administer an annual survey of parents who enter into or renew an agreement," under this program to determine their relative satisfaction with the program and their opinions "regarding any topics, items or issues that the State Treasurer determines may aid the State Treasurer in evaluating and improving the effectiveness of the grant program." of this act. *Id.*, § 14.3.
- The State Treasurer would be required to "annually make available a list of participating entities, other than any parent of a child." *Id.*, at 7, § 15.1.
- The State Treasurer would be required to "adopt any regulations necessary or convenient to carry out the provisions of" the proposed initiative.
- 28. Notably, the initiative does not raise any taxes or otherwise provide for the revenue necessary to carry out the foregoing numerous and burdensome tasks. Section 10.6 of the proposed initiative provides only that "[t]he State Treasurer may deduct not more than 4 percent of each grant for the administrative costs of implementing the provisions" of the proposed initiative. But this does not satisfy the constitutional mandate of Article 19, section 6, because: (1) the proposed initiative provides no taxes or other method of revenue necessary to fund the grants; and (2) even if it did, there is no basis to conclude that 4% of such grants (if appropriated) would be sufficient to cover the expenditures required by the proposed initiative.
- 29. Accordingly, the Petition is invalid and must be stricken, and the Secretary of State should be enjoined from taking any further action upon it.

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#### Impermissible Inclusion of Administrative Details

- 30. The foregoing paragraphs of this Complaint are re-alleged and fully incorporated as if set forth in full herein.
- 31. It is well established that that "regardless whether an initiative proposes enactment of a new statute or ordinance, or a new provision in the constitution or city charter, or an amendment to any of these types of laws, it must propose policy—it may not dictate administrative details." Nevadans for the Prot. of Prop. Rts., Inc. v. Heller, 122 Nev. 894, 913, 141 P.3d 1235, 1248 (2006). This follows from the principle that "[t]he people's initiative power is 'coequal, coextensive, and concurrent' with that of the Legislature; thus, the people have power that is legislative in nature," (Id. at 914), and administrative details are determined not by the Legislature, "but by [other] entities with rule-making authority, which fill in administrative details pertaining to the policy articulated in legislation." Id.
- 32. The proposed initiative goes far beyond the articulation of policy, and improperly purports to mandate a host of administrative details, that are beyond the power of both the Legislature, and therefore of the people's co-extensive initiative power. The recitation of administrative details outlined above in Paragraph 27 and its subparts represent a sample of the instances of impermissible inclusion in the Petition.
- 33. Accordingly, the Petition is invalid and must be stricken, and the Secretary of State should be enjoined from taking any further action upon it.

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#### PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff asks this Court to enter an order:

- 1. Declaring that the Petition does not comply with Article 19, Section 6 of the Nevada Constitution because it impermissibly mandates numerous unfunded expenditures;
- 2. Declaring that the Petition exceeds the people's initiative power by improperly dictating administrative details;
- 3. Declaring that the Petition's description of effect does not comply with NRS 295.009(1)(b) because it does not adequately inform voters of the Petition's effects, and is therefore invalid;
- 4. Enjoining and prohibiting the Nevada Secretary of State from placing the Petition on the 2022 general election ballot, or from taking further action upon it;
- 5. Awarding Plaintiff his reasonable costs and attorneys' fees;
- 6. Granting such other relief as the Court deems appropriate.

#### **AFFIRMATION**

The undersigned hereby affirm that the foregoing document does not contain the social security number of any person.

DATED this 22d day of February, 2022

WOLF, RIFKIN, SHAPIRO, SCHULMAN & RABKIN, LLP

By:

BRADLEY S. SCHRAGER, ESQ. (NSB 10217)

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# NOTICE OF INTENT TO CIRCULATE STATEWIDE INITIATIVE OR REFERENDUM PETITION

State of Nevada Secretary of State Barbara K. Cegavske Pursuant to NRS 295.015, before a petition for initative or referendum may be presented to registered voters for signatures, the person who intends to circulate the petition must provide the following information: NAME OF PERSON FILING THE PETITION **Education Freedom PAC** NAME(S) OF PERSON(S) AUTHORIZED TO WITHDRAW OR AMEND THE PETITION (provide up to three) 1. Erin Phillips 2. 3. NAME OF THE POLITICAL ACTION COMMITTEE (PAC) ADVOCATING FOR THE PASSAGE OF THE INITIATIVE OR REFERENDUM (if none, leave blank) Education Freedom PAC Please note, if you are creating a Political Action Committee for the purpose of advocating for the passage of the initiative or referendum, you must complete a separate PAC registration form. Additionally, a copy of the initiative or referendum, including the description of effect, must be filed with the Secretary of State's office at the time you submit this form.

EL500 NRS 295,000; NRS 295,015 Revised: 07-24-2017

Signature of Petition Filer

01/27/2022

Date

### <u>State of Nevada - Initiative Petition - Statewide Statutory Measure</u>

EXPLANATION: Matter in **bolded italics** is new; matter between brackets [omitted material] is material to be omitted.

#### The People of the State of Nevada do enact as follows:

- **Section 1.** Chapter 385 of NRS is hereby amended by adding thereto the provisions set forth as sections 2 to 17, inclusive, of this act.
- Sec. 2. As used in sections 2 to 17, inclusive, of this act, unless the context otherwise requires, the words and terms defined in sections 3 to 8, inclusive, of this act have the meanings ascribed to them in those sections.
- Sec. 3. "Education freedom account" means an account established for a child pursuant to section 9 of this act.
- Sec. 4. "Eligible institution" means: 1. A university, state college or community college within the Nevada System of Higher Education; or 2. Any other college or university that: (a) Was originally established in, and is organized under the laws of, this State; (b) Is exempt from taxation pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3); and (c) Is accredited by a regional accrediting agency recognized by the United States Department of Education.
- Sec. 5. "Parent" means the parent, custodial parent, legal guardian or other person in this State who has control or charge of a child and the legal right to direct the education of the child.
- Sec. 6. "Participating entity" means a private school that is licensed pursuant to chapter 394 of NRS or exempt from such licensing pursuant to NRS 394.211, an eligible institution, a program of distance education that is not offered by a public school or the Department, a tutor or tutoring agency or a parent that has provided to the State Treasurer the application described in subsection 1 of section 13 of this act.
- Sec. 7. "Program of distance education" has the meaning ascribed to it in NRS 388,829,
- Sec. 8. "Resident school district" means the school district in which a child would be enrolled based on his or her residence.
- Sec. 9. 1. Except as otherwise provided in subsection 10, the parent of any child required by NRS 392.040 to attend a public school who was enrolled in a public school in this State during the entirety of the school year immediately preceding the establishment of an education freedom account pursuant to this section or is eligible to enroll in kindergarten may establish an education freedom account for the child by entering into a written agreement with the State Treasurer, in a manner and on a form provided by the State Treasurer. The agreement must provide that:
- (a) The child will receive instruction in this State from a participating entity for the school year for which the agreement applies;
- (b) The child will receive a grant, in the form of money deposited pursuant to section 10 of this act in the education freedom account established for the child pursuant to subsection 2;
- (c) The money in the education freedom account established for the child must be expended only as authorized by section 11 of this act; and

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- 2. If an agreement is entered into pursuant to subsection 1, an education freedom account must be established by the parent on behalf of the child. The account must be maintained with a financial management firm qualified by the State Treasurer pursuant to section 12 of this act.
- 3. The failure to enter into an agreement pursuant to subsection 1 for any school year for which a child is required by NRS 392.040 to attend a public school does not preclude the parent of the child from entering into an agreement for a subsequent school year.
- 4. An agreement entered into pursuant to subsection 1 is valid for 1 school year but may be terminated early. If the agreement is terminated early, the child may not receive instruction from a public school in this State until the end of the period for which the last deposit was made into the education freedom account pursuant to section 10 of this act, except to the extent the pupil was allowed to receive instruction from a public school under the agreement or the participating entity providing education to the child ceases to lawfully operate.
- 5. An agreement terminates automatically if the child no longer resides in this State. In such a case, any money remaining in the education freedom account of the child reverts to the State General Fund.
- 6. An agreement may be renewed for any school year for which the child is required by NRS 392.040 to attend a public school. The failure to renew an agreement for any school year does not preclude the parent of the child from renewing the agreement for any subsequent school year.
- 7. A parent may enter into a separate agreement pursuant to subsection 1 for each child of the parent. Not more than one education freedom account may be established for a child.
- 8. Except as otherwise provided in subsection 10, the State Treasurer shall enter into or renew an agreement pursuant to this section with any parent of a child required by NRS 392.040 to attend a public school who applies to the State Treasurer in the manner provided by the State Treasurer. The State Treasurer shall make the application available on the Internet website of the State Treasurer.
- 9. Upon entering into or renewing an agreement pursuant to this section, the State Treasurer shall provide to the parent who enters into or renews the agreement a written explanation of the authorized uses, pursuant to section 11 of this act, of the money in an education freedom account and the responsibilities of the parent and the State Treasurer pursuant to the agreement and sections 2 to 17, inclusive, of this act.
- 10. A parent may not establish an education freedom account for a child who will be homeschooled, who will receive instruction outside this State or who will remain enrolled full-time in a public school, regardless of whether such a child receives instruction from a participating entity. A parent may establish an education freedom account for a child who receives a portion of his or her instruction from a public school and a portion of his or her instruction from a participating entity.
- Sec. 10. 1. Subject to the limitations described in subsection 2, if a parent enters into or renews an agreement pursuant to section 9 of this act and the Legislature has appropriated money to fund grants described in this section, a grant of money on behalf of the child must be deposited in the education freedom account of the child.
- 2. Nothing herein shall require the Legislature to appropriate money to fund the grants described in this section. The availability of grants is subject to the availability of funds as determined by the Legislature.
- 3. Except as otherwise provided in subsections 4, 5 and 6, the grant required by subsection 1 must, for the school year for which the grant is made, be in an amount equal to 90 percent of the statewide base per pupil funding amount.

- (a) Refund any portion of the payment to the parent who made the payment, unless the refund is for an item that is being returned or an item or service that has not been provided; or
- (b) Rebate or otherwise share any portion of the payment with the parent who made the payment.
- 3. A parent who receives a refund pursuant to subsection 2 shall deposit the refund in the education freedom account from which the money refunded was paid.
- 4. Nothing in this section shall be deemed to prohibit a parent or child from making a payment for any tuition, fee, service or product described in subsection 1 from a source other than the education freedom account of the child.
- Sec. 12. 1. The State Treasurer shall qualify one or more private financial management firms to manage education freedom accounts and shall establish reasonable fees, based on market rates, for the management of education freedom accounts.
- 2. An education freedom account must be audited randomly each year by a certified or licensed public accountant. The State Treasurer may provide for additional audits of an education freedom account as it determines necessary.
- 3. If the State Treasurer determines that there has been substantial misuse of the money in an education freedom account, the State Treasurer may:
- (a) Freeze or dissolve the account, subject to any regulations adopted by the State Treasurer providing for notice of such action and opportunity to respond to the notice; and
- (b) Give notice of his or her determination to the Attorney General or the district attorney of the county in which the parent resides.
- Sec. 13. 1. The following persons may become a participating entity by submitting an application demonstrating that the person is:
- (a) A private school licensed pursuant to chapter 394 of NRS or exempt from such licensing pursuant to NRS 394.211;
- (b) An eligible institution;
- (c) A program of distance education that is not operated by a public school or the Department;
- (d) A tutor or tutoring facility that is accredited by a state, regional or national accrediting organization; or
- (e) The parent of a child.
- 2. The State Treasurer shall approve an application submitted pursuant to subsection 1 or request additional information to demonstrate that the person meets the criteria to serve as a participating entity. If the applicant is unable to provide such additional information, the State Treasurer may deny the application.
- 3. If it is reasonably expected that a participating entity will receive, from payments made from education freedom accounts, more than \$50,000 during any school year, the participating entity shall annually, on or before the date prescribed by the State Treasurer by regulation:
- (a) Post a surety bond in an amount equal to the amount reasonably expected to be paid to the participating entity from education freedom accounts during the school year; or

- (b) Provide evidence satisfactory to the State Treasurer that the participating entity otherwise has unencumbered assets sufficient to pay to the State Treasurer an amount equal to the amount described in paragraph (a).
- 4. Each participating entity that accepts payments made from education freedom accounts shall provide a receipt for each such payment to the parent who makes the payment.
- 5. The State Treasurer may refuse to allow an entity described in subsection 1 to continue to participate in the grant program provided for in sections 2 to 17, inclusive, of this act if the State Treasurer determines that the entity:
- (a) Has routinely failed to comply with the provisions of sections 2 to 17, inclusive, of this act; or
- (b) Has failed to provide any educational services required by law to a child receiving instruction from the entity if the entity is accepting payments made from the education freedom account of the child.
- 6. If the State Treasurer takes an action described in subsection 5 against an entity described in subsection 1, the State Treasurer shall provide immediate notice of the action to each parent of a child receiving instruction from the entity who has entered into or renewed an agreement pursuant to section 9 of this act and on behalf of whose child a grant of money has been deposited pursuant to section 10 of this act.
- Sec. 14. 1. Each participating entity that accepts payments for tuition and fees made from education freedom accounts shall:
- (a) Ensure that each child on whose behalf a grant of money has been deposited pursuant to section 10 of this act and who is receiving instruction from the participating entity takes:
- (1) Any examinations in mathematics and English language arts required for pupils of the same grade pursuant to chapter 389 of NRS; or
- (2) Norm-referenced achievement examinations in mathematics and English language arts each school year;
- (b) Provide for value-added assessments of the results of the examinations described in paragraph (a); and
- (c) Subject to the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974, 20 U.S.C. § 1232g, and any regulations adopted pursuant thereto, provide the results of the examinations described in paragraph (a) to the Department or an organization designated by the Department pursuant to subsection 4.
- 2. The Department shall:
- (a) Aggregate the examination results provided pursuant to subsection 1 according to the grade level, gender, race and family income level of each child whose examination results are provided; and
- (b) Subject to the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974, 20 U.S.C. § 1232g, and any regulations adopted pursuant thereto, make available on the Internet website of the Department:
- (1) The aggregated results and any associated learning gains; and
- (2) After 3 school years for which examination data has been collected, the graduation rates, as applicable, of children whose examination results are provided.
- 3. The State Treasurer shall administer an annual survey of parents who enter into or renew an agreement pursuant to section 9 of this act. The survey must ask each parent to indicate the number of years the parent has entered into or renewed such an agreement and to express:

- (a) The relative satisfaction of the parent with the grant program established pursuant to sections 2 to 17, inclusive, of this act; and
- (b) The opinions of the parent regarding any topics, items or issues that the State Treasurer determines may aid the State Treasurer in evaluating and improving the effectiveness of the grant program established pursuant to sections 2 to 17, inclusive, of this act.
- 4. Subject to available funding, the Department may arrange for a third-party organization to perform the duties of the Department prescribed by this section.
- Sec. 15. 1. The State Treasurer shall annually make available a list of participating entities, other than any parent of a child.
- 2. Subject to the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974, 20 U.S.C. § 1232g, and any regulations adopted pursuant thereto, the Department shall annually require the resident school district of each child on whose behalf a grant of money is made pursuant to section 10 of this act to provide to the participating entity any educational records of the child.
- Sec. 16. Except as otherwise provided in sections 2 to 17, inclusive, of this act, nothing in the provisions of sections 2 to 17, inclusive, of this act, shall be deemed to limit the independence or autonomy of a participating entity or to make the actions of a participating entity the actions of the State Government.
- Sec. 17. The State Treasurer shall adopt any regulations necessary or convenient to carry out the provisions of sections 2 to 17, inclusive, of this act.
- **Sec. 18.** NRS 385.007 is hereby amended to read as follows: As used in this title, unless the context otherwise requires:
- 1. "Challenge school" has the meaning ascribed to it in NRS 388D.305.
- 2. "Charter school" means a public school that is formed pursuant to the provisions of chapter 388A of NRS.
- 3. "Department" means the Department of Education.
- 4. "English learner" has the meaning ascribed to it in 20 U.S.C. § 7801(20).
- 5. "Homeschooled child" means a child who receives instruction at home and who is exempt from compulsory attendance pursuant to NRS 392.070.
- 6. "Local school precinct" has the meaning ascribed to it in NRS 388G.535.
- 7. "Opt-in child" means a child for whom an education freedom account has been established pursuant to section 9 of this act, who is not enrolled full-time in a public or private school and who receives all or a portion of his or her instruction from a participating entity, as defined in section 6 of this act.
- [7] 8. "Public schools" means all kindergartens and elementary schools, junior high schools and middle schools, high schools, charter schools and any other schools, classes and educational programs which receive their support through public taxation and, except for charter schools, whose textbooks and courses of study are under the control of the State Board.
- [8] 9. "School bus" has the meaning ascribed to it in NRS 484A.230.
- [9] 10. "School counselor" or "counselor" means a person who holds a license issued pursuant to chapter 391 of NRS and an endorsement to serve as a school counselor issued pursuant to regulations adopted by the

Commission on Professional Standards in Education or who is otherwise authorized by the Superintendent of Public Instruction to serve as a school counselor.

- [40] 11. "School psychologist" or "psychologist" means a person who holds a license issued pursuant to chapter 391 of NRS and an endorsement to serve as a school psychologist issued pursuant to regulations adopted by the Commission on Professional Standards in Education or who is otherwise authorized by the Superintendent of Public Instruction to serve as a school psychologist.
- [44] 12. "School social worker" or "social worker" means a social worker licensed pursuant to chapter 641B of NRS who holds a license issued pursuant to chapter 391 of NRS and an endorsement to serve as a school social worker issued pursuant to regulations adopted by the Commission on Professional Standards in Education or who is otherwise authorized by the Superintendent of Public Instruction to serve as a school social worker.
- [12] 13. "State Board" means the State Board of Education.
- [13] 14. "University school for profoundly gifted pupils" has the meaning ascribed to it in NRS 388C.040.
- Sec. 19. NRS 219A.140 is hereby amended to read as follows: To be eligible to serve on the Youth Legislature, a person:
- 1. To be eligible to serve on the Youth Legislature, a person:
- (a) Must be:
  - (1) A resident of the senatorial district of the Senator who appoints him or her;
  - (2) Enrolled in a public school or private school located in the senatorial district of the Senator who appoints him or her; or
  - (3) A homeschooled child who is otherwise eligible to be enrolled in a public school in the senatorial district of the Senator who appoints him or her;
- (b) Except as otherwise provided in subsection 3 of NRS 219A.150, must be:
  - (1) Enrolled in a public school or private school in this State in grade 9, 10 or 11 for the first school year of the term for which he or she is appointed; or
  - (2) A homeschooled child who is otherwise eligible to enroll in a public school in this State in grade 9, 10 or 11 for the first school year of the term for which he or she is appointed; and
- (c) Must not be related by blood, adoption or marriage within the third degree of consanguinity or affinity to the Senator who appoints him or her or to any member of the Assembly who collaborated to appoint him or her.
- 2. If, at any time, a person appointed to the Youth Legislature changes his or her residency or changes his or her school of enrollment in such a manner as to render the person ineligible under his or her original appointment, the person shall inform the Board, in writing, within 30 days after becoming aware of such changed facts.
- 3. A person who wishes to be appointed or reappointed to the Youth Legislature must submit an application on the form prescribed pursuant to subsection 4 to the Senator of the senatorial district in which the person resides, is enrolled in a public school or private school or, if the person is a homeschooled child[5] or opt-in child, the senatorial district in which he or she is otherwise eligible to be enrolled in a public school. A person may not submit an application to more than one Senator in a calendar year.

4. The Board shall prescribe a form for applications submitted pursuant to this section, which must require the signature of the principal of the school in which the applicant is enrolled or, if the applicant is a homeschooled child[5] or opt-in child, the signature of a member of the community in which the applicant resides other than a relative of the applicant.

Sec. 20 NRS 219A.150 is hereby amended to read as follows:

- 1. A position on the Youth Legislature becomes vacant upon:
- (a) The death or resignation of a member.
- (b) The determination of the Chair or Vice Chair of the Board, as applicable, that a member has accrued, for any reason, any combination of:
  - (1) Absences from meetings or event days of the Youth Legislature; or
  - (2) Incompletions of any other activities that are assigned to him or her by the Board as a member of the Youth Legislature,
- → if the combination of absences or incompletions amounts to three or more missed or unsuccessful activity credits during his or her term, unless the absences or incompletions are excused, in whole or in part, by the Chair or Vice Chair of the Board, as applicable.
- (c) A change of residency or a change of the school of enrollment of a member which renders that member ineligible under his or her original appointment.
- 2. In addition to the provisions of subsection 1, a position on the Youth Legislature becomes vacant if:
- (a) A member of the Youth Legislature graduates from high school or otherwise ceases to attend public school or private school for any reason other than to become a homeschooled child *or opt-in child*; or
- (b) A member of the Youth Legislature who is a homeschooled child *or opt-in child* completes an educational plan of instruction for grade 12 or otherwise ceases to be a homeschooled child *or opt-in child* for any reason other than to enroll in a public school or private school.
- 3. A vacancy on the Youth Legislature must be filled:
- (a) For the remainder of the unexpired term in the same manner as the original appointment, except that, if the remainder of the unexpired term is less than 1 year, the member of the Senate who made the original appointment may appoint a person who:
  - (1) Is enrolled in a public school or private school in this State in grade 12 or who is a homeschooled child *or opt-in child* who is otherwise eligible to enroll in a public school in this State in grade 12; and
  - (2) Satisfies the qualifications set forth in paragraphs (a) and (c) of subsection 1 of NRS 219A.140.
- (b) Insofar as is practicable, within 30 days after the date on which the vacancy occurs.
- 4. As used in this section:
- (a) "Activity credit" means a credit, or any fractional portion thereof, that the Board has determined a member is eligible to earn for:
  - (1) Attending meetings or event days of the Youth Legislature; or

- (2) Completing, in the manner required by the Board, any other activities that are assigned to him or her by the Board as a member of the Youth Legislature.
- (b) "Event day" means any single calendar day on which an official, scheduled event of the Youth Legislature is held, including, without limitation, a course of instruction, a course of orientation, a meeting, a seminar or any other official, scheduled activity.

#### Sec. 21. NRS 385B.060 is hereby amended to read as follows:

- 1. The Nevada Interscholastic Activities Association shall adopt rules and regulations in the manner provided for state agencies by chapter 233B of NRS as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this chapter. The regulations must include provisions governing the eligibility and participation of homeschooled children and opt-in children in interscholastic activities and events. In addition to the regulations governing eligibility, a homeschooled child who wishes to participate must have on file with the school district in which the child resides a current notice of intent of a homeschooled child to participate in programs and activities pursuant to NRS 388D.070.
- 2. An opt-in child who wishes to participate must have on file with the school district in which the child resides a current notice of intent of an opt-in child to participate in programs and activities pursuant to section 30 of this act.
- [2] 3. The Nevada Interscholastic Activities Association shall adopt regulations setting forth:
- (a) The standards of safety for each event, competition or other activity engaged in by a spirit squad of a school that is a member of the Nevada Interscholastic Activities Association, which must substantially comply with the spirit rules of the National Federation of State High School Associations, or its successor organization; and
- (b) The qualifications required for a person to become a coach of a spirit squad.
- [3] 4. If the Nevada Interscholastic Activities Association intends to adopt, repeal or amend a policy, rule or regulation concerning or affecting homeschooled children, the Association shall consult with the Northern Nevada Homeschool Advisory Council and the Southern Nevada Homeschool Advisory Council, or their successor organizations, to provide those Councils with a reasonable opportunity to submit data, opinions or arguments, orally or in writing, concerning the proposal or change. The Association shall consider all written and oral submissions respecting the proposal or change before taking final action.
- [4] 5. As used in this section, "spirit squad" means any team or other group of persons that is formed for the purpose of:
- (a) Leading cheers or rallies to encourage support for a team that participates in a sport that is sanctioned by the Nevada Interscholastic Activities Association; or
- (b) Participating in a competition against another team or other group of persons to determine the ability of each team or group of persons to engage in an activity specified in paragraph (a).

#### Sec. 22. NRS 385B.150 is hereby amended to read as follows:

1. A homeschooled child must be allowed to participate in interscholastic activities and events in accordance with the regulations adopted by the Nevada Interscholastic Activities Association pursuant to NRS 385B.060 if a notice of intent of a homeschooled child to participate in programs and activities is filed for the child with the school district in which the child resides for the current school year pursuant to NRS 388D.070.

- 2. An opt-in child must be allowed to participate in interscholastic activities and events in accordance with the regulations adopted by the Nevada Interscholastic Activities Association pursuant to NRS 385B.060 if a notice of intent of an opt-in child to participate in programs and activities is filed for the child with the school district in which the child resides for the current school year pursuant to section 28 of this act.
- [2] 3. The provisions of this chapter and the regulations adopted pursuant thereto that apply to pupils enrolled in public schools who participate in interscholastic activities and events apply in the same manner to homeschooled *and opt-in* children who participate in interscholastic activities and events, including, without limitation, provisions governing:
- (a) Eligibility and qualifications for participation;
- (b) Fees for participation;
- (c) Insurance;
- (d) Transportation;
- (e) Requirements of physical examination;
- (f) Responsibilities of participants;
- (g) Schedules of events;
- (h) Safety and welfare of participants;
- (i) Eligibility for awards, trophies and medals;
- (j) Conduct of behavior and performance of participants; and
- (k) Disciplinary procedures.

Sec. 23. NRS 385B.160 is hereby amended to read as follows:

No challenge may be brought by the Nevada Interscholastic Activities Association, a school district, a public school or a private school, a parent or guardian of a pupil enrolled in a public school or a private school, a pupil enrolled in a public school or private school, or any other entity or person claiming that an interscholastic activity or event is invalid because homeschooled *or opt-in* children or children of a military family who transferred schools pursuant to the provisions of chapter 388F of NRS are allowed to participate in the interscholastic activity or event.

Sec. 24. NRS 385B.170 is hereby amended to read as follows:

A school district, public school or private school shall not prescribe any regulations, rules, policies, procedures or requirements governing the:

- 1. Eligibility of homeschooled children, *opt-in children* or children of a military family who transferred schools pursuant to the provisions of chapter 388F of NRS to participate in interscholastic activities and events pursuant to this chapter; or
- 2. Participation of homeschooled children, *opt-in children* or children of a military family who transferred schools pursuant to the provisions of chapter 388F of NRS in interscholastic activities and events pursuant to this chapter,

→ that are more restrictive than the provisions governing eligibility and participation prescribed by the Nevada Interscholastic Activities Association pursuant to NRS 385B.060 and 385B.130.

#### Sec. 25. NRS 388A.471 is hereby amended to read as follows:

- 1. Except as otherwise provided in subsection 2, upon the request of a parent or legal guardian of a child who is enrolled in a public school of a school district or a private school, or a parent or legal guardian of a homeschooled child or opt-in child, the governing body of the charter school shall authorize the child to participate in a class that is not otherwise available to the child at his or her school or homeschool or from his or her participating entity, as defined in section 6 of this act, or participate in an extracurricular activity at the charter school if:
- (a) Space for the child in the class or extracurricular activity is available;
- (b) The parent or legal guardian demonstrates to the satisfaction of the governing body that the child is qualified to participate in the class or extracurricular activity; [and]
- (c) The child is a homeschooled child and a notice of intent of a homeschooled child to participate in programs and activities is filed for the child with the school district in which the child resides for the current school year pursuant to NRS 388D.070[-]; and
- (d) The child is an opt-in child and a notice of intent of an opt-in child to participate in programs and activities is filed for the child with the school district in which the child resides for the current school year pursuant to section 30 of this act
- 2. If the governing body of a charter school authorizes a child to participate in a class or extracurricular activity pursuant to subsection 1, the governing body is not required to provide transportation for the child to attend the class or activity. A charter school shall not authorize such a child to participate in a class or activity through a program of distance education provided by the charter school pursuant to NRS 388.820 to 388.874, inclusive.
- 3. The governing body of a charter school may revoke its approval for a child to participate in a class or extracurricular activity at a charter school pursuant to subsection 1 if the governing body determines that the child has failed to comply with applicable statutes, or applicable rules and regulations. If the governing body so revokes its approval, neither the governing body nor the charter school is liable for any damages relating to the denial of services to the child.
- 4. The governing body of a charter school may, before authorizing a homeschooled child to participate in a class or extracurricular activity pursuant to subsection 1, require proof of the identity of the child, including, without limitation, the birth certificate of the child or other documentation sufficient to establish the identity of the child.

#### Sec. 26. NRS 388.850 is hereby amended to read as follows:

- 1. A pupil may enroll in a program of distance education if:
- (a) Pursuant to this section or other specific statute, the pupil is eligible for enrollment or the pupil's enrollment is not otherwise prohibited;
- (b) The program of distance education in which the pupil wishes to enroll is offered by the school district in which the pupil resides or a charter school or, if the program of distance education

in which the pupil wishes to enroll is a full-time program of distance education offered by a school district other than the school district in which the pupil resides, the program is not the same or substantially similar to a program of distance education offered by the school district in which the pupil resides;

- (c) The pupil satisfies the qualifications and conditions for enrollment adopted by the State Board pursuant to NRS 388.874; and
- (d) The pupil satisfies the requirements of the program of distance education.
- 2. A child who is exempt from compulsory attendance and is enrolled in a private school pursuant to chapter 394 of NRS or is being homeschooled is not eligible to enroll in or otherwise attend a program of distance education, regardless of whether the child is otherwise eligible for enrollment pursuant to subsection 1.
- 3. If a pupil who is prohibited from attending public school pursuant to NRS 392.264 enrolls in a program of distance education, the enrollment and attendance of that pupil must comply with all requirements of NRS 62F.100 to 62F.150, inclusive, and 392.251 to 392.271, inclusive.
- 4. A pupil who is enrolled in grade 12 in a program of distance education and who moves out of this State is eligible to maintain enrollment in the program of distance education until the pupil graduates from high school.
- 5. An opt-in child who is exempt from compulsory attendance is not eligible to enroll in or otherwise attend a program of distance education, regardless of whether the child is otherwise eligible for enrollment pursuant to subsection 1, unless the opt-in child receives only a portion of his or her instruction from a participating entity as authorized pursuant to section 9 of this act.
- Sec. 27. Chapter 392 of NRS is hereby amended by adding thereto the provisions set forth as sections 28, 29 and 30 of this act.
- Sec. 28. As used in this section and sections 29 and 30 of this act, unless the context otherwise requires, "parent" has the meaning ascribed to it in section 5 of this act.
- Sec. 29. 1. The parent of an opt-in child shall provide notice to the school district where the child would otherwise attend that the child is an opt-in child as soon as practicable after entering into an agreement to establish an education freedom account pursuant to section 9 of this act. Such notice must also include:
- (a) The full name, age and gender of the child; and
- (b) The name and address of each parent of the child.
- 2. The superintendent of schools of a school shall accept a notice provided pursuant to subsection 1 and shall not require any additional assurances from the parent who filed the notice.
- 3. The school district shall provide to a parent who files a notice pursuant to subsection 1, a written acknowledgement which clearly indicates that the parent has provided the notification required by law and that the child is an opt-in child. The written acknowledgment shall be deemed proof of compliance with Nevada's compulsory school attendance law.
- 4. The superintendent of schools of a school district shall process a written request for a copy of the records of the school district or any information contained therein relating to an opt-in child not later than 5 days after receiving the request. The superintendent of schools may only release such records or information:

- (a) To the Department, the Budget Division of the Department of Administration and the Fiscal Analysis Division of the Legislative Counsel Bureau for use in preparing the biennial budget;
- (b) To a person or entity specified by the parent of the child, or by the child if the child is at least 18 years of age, upon suitable proof of identity of the parent or child; or
- (c) If required by specific statute.
- 5. If an opt-in child seeks admittance or entrance to any public school in this State, the school may use only commonly used practices in determining the academic ability, placement or eligibility of the child. If the child enrolls in a charter school, the charter school shall, to the extent practicable, notify the board of trustees of the resident school district of the child's enrollment in the charter school. Regardless of whether the charter school provides such notification to the board of trustees, the charter school may count the child who is enrolled for the purposes of NRS 387.123. An opt-in child seeking admittance to public high school must comply with NRS 392.033.
- 6. A school shall not discriminate in any manner against an opt-in child or a child who was formerly an opt-in child.
- 7. Each school district shall allow an opt-in child to participate in all college entrance examinations offered in this State, including, without limitation, the SAT, the ACT, the Preliminary SAT and the National Merit Scholarship Qualifying Test. Each school district shall upon request, provide information to the parent of an opt-in child who resides in the school district has adequate notice of the availability of information concerning such examinations on the Internet website of the school district maintained pursuant to NRS 389.004.
- Sec. 30. 1. The Department shall develop a standard form for the notice of intent of an opt-in child to participate in programs and activities. The board of trustees of each school district shall, in a timely manner, make only the form developed by the Department available to parents of opt-in children.
- 2. If an opt-in child wishes to participate in classes, activities, programs, sports or interscholastic activities and events at a public school or through a school district, or through the Nevada Interscholastic Activities Association, the parent of the child must file a current notice of intent to participate with the resident school district.
- Sec. 31. NRS 392.033 is hereby amended to read as follows:
- 1. The State Board shall adopt regulations which prescribe the courses of study required for promotion to high school, including, without limitation, English, mathematics, science and social studies. The regulations may include the credits to be earned in each course.
- 2. Except as otherwise provided in subsection 4, the board of trustees of a school district shall not promote a pupil to high school if the pupil does not complete the course of study or credits required for promotion. The board of trustees of the school district in which the pupil is enrolled may provide programs of remedial study to complete the courses of study required for promotion to high school.
- 3. The board of trustees of each school district shall adopt a procedure for evaluating the course of study or credits completed by a pupil who transfers to a junior high or middle school from a junior high or middle school in this State or from a school outside of this State.
- 4. The board of trustees of each school district shall adopt a policy that allows a pupil who has not completed the courses of study or credits required for promotion to high school to be placed on academic probation and to

enroll in high school. A pupil who is on academic probation pursuant to this subsection shall complete appropriate remediation in the subject areas that the pupil failed to pass. The policy must include the criteria for eligibility of a pupil to be placed on academic probation. A parent or guardian may elect not to place his or her child on academic probation but to remain in grade 8.

- 5. A homeschooled child or opt-in child who enrolls in a public high school shall, upon initial enrollment:
- (a) Provide documentation sufficient to prove that the child has successfully completed the courses of study required for promotion to high school through an accredited program of homeschool study recognized by the board of trustees of the school district [:] or from a participating entity, as applicable;
- (b) Demonstrate proficiency in the courses of study required for promotion to high school through an examination prescribed by the board of trustees of the school district; or
- (c) Provide other proof satisfactory to the board of trustees of the school district demonstrating competency in the courses of study required for promotion to high school.
- 6. As used in this section, "participating entity" has the meaning ascribed to it in section 6 of this act.

Sec. 32. NRS 392.070 is hereby amended to read as follows:

- 1. Attendance of a child required by the provisions of NRS 392.040 must be excused when:
- (a) The child is enrolled in a private school pursuant to chapter 394 of NRS; [or]
- (b) A parent of the child chooses to provide education to the child and files a notice of intent to homeschool the child with the superintendent of schools of the school district in which the child resides in accordance with NRS 392.700 [-]; or
- (c) The child is an opt-in child and notice of such has been provided to the school district in which the child resides or the charter school in which the child was previously enrolled, as applicable, in accordance with section 29 of this act.

Sec. 33. NRS 392.074 is hereby amended to read as follows:

- 1. Except as otherwise provided in subsection 1 of NRS 392.072 for programs of special education and related services, upon the request of a parent or legal guardian of a child who is enrolled in a private school or a parent or legal guardian of a homeschooled child *or opt-in child*, the board of trustees of the school district in which the child resides shall authorize the child to participate in any classes and extracurricular activities, excluding sports, at a public school within the school district if:
- (a) Space for the child in the class or extracurricular activity is available;
- (b) The parent or legal guardian demonstrates to the satisfaction of the board of trustees that the child is qualified to participate in the class or extracurricular activity; [and]
- (c) If the child is a homeschooled child, a notice of intent of a homeschooled child to participate in programs and activities is filed for the child with the school district for the current school year pursuant to NRS 388D.070[-]; and
- (d) if the child is an opt-in child, a notice of intent of an opt-in child to participate in programs and activities is filed for the child with the school district for the current school year pursuant to section 30 of this act.

- → If the board of trustees of a school district authorizes a child to participate in a class or extracurricular activity, excluding sports, pursuant to this subsection, the board of trustees is not required to provide transportation for the child to attend the class or activity. A homeschooled child *or opt-in child* must be allowed to participate in interscholastic activities and events governed by the Nevada Interscholastic Activities Association pursuant to chapter 385B of NRS and interscholastic activities and events, including sports, pursuant to subsection 3.
- 2. The board of trustees of a school district may revoke its approval for a pupil to participate in a class or extracurricular activity at a public school pursuant to subsection 1 if the board of trustees or the public school determines that the pupil has failed to comply with applicable statutes, or applicable rules and regulations of the board of trustees. If the board of trustees revokes its approval, neither the board of trustees nor the public school is liable for any damages relating to the denial of services to the pupil.
- 3. In addition to those interscholastic activities and events governed by the Nevada Interscholastic Activities Association pursuant to chapter 385B of NRS, a homeschooled child *or opt-in child* must be allowed to participate in interscholastic activities and events, including sports, if a notice of intent of a homeschooled child *or opt-in child* to participate in programs and activities is filed for the child with the school district for the current school year pursuant to NRS 388D.070 *or section 30 of this act, as applicable*. A homeschooled child *or opt-in child* who participates in interscholastic activities and events at a public school pursuant to this subsection must participate within the school district of the child's residence through the public school which the child is otherwise zoned to attend. Any rules or regulations that apply to pupils enrolled in public schools who participate in interscholastic activities and events, including sports, apply in the same manner to homeschooled children *and opt-in children* who participate in interscholastic activities and events, including, without limitation, provisions governing:
- (a) Eligibility and qualifications for participation;
- (b) Fees for participation;
- (c) Insurance;
- (d) Transportation;
- (e) Requirements of physical examination;
- (f) Responsibilities of participants;
- (g) Schedules of events;
- (h) Safety and welfare of participants;
- (i) Eligibility for awards, trophies and medals;
- (j) Conduct of behavior and performance of participants; and
- (k) Disciplinary procedures.
- 4. If a homeschooled child *or opt-in child* participates in interscholastic activities and events pursuant to subsection 3:
- (a) No challenge may be brought by the Association, a school district, a public school or a private school, a parent or guardian of a pupil enrolled in a public school or a private school, a pupil enrolled in a public school

or a private school, or any other entity or person claiming that an interscholastic activity or event is invalid because the homeschooled child *or opt-in child* is allowed to participate.

- (b) Neither the school district nor a public school may prescribe any regulations, rules, policies, procedures or requirements governing the eligibility or participation of the homeschooled child *or opt-in child* that are more restrictive than the provisions governing the eligibility and participation of pupils enrolled in public schools.
- 5. The board of trustees of a school district:
- (a) May, before authorizing a homeschooled child *or opt-in child* to participate in a class or extracurricular activity, excluding sports, pursuant to subsection 1, require proof of the identity of the child, including, without limitation, the birth certificate of the child or other documentation sufficient to establish the identity of the child.
- (b) Shall, before allowing a homeschooled child *or opt-in child* to participate in interscholastic activities and events governed by the Nevada Interscholastic Activities Association pursuant to chapter 385B of NRS and interscholastic activities and events pursuant to subsection 3, require proof of the identity of the child, including, without limitation, the birth certificate of the child or other documentation sufficient to establish the identity of the child.

#### Sec. 34. NRS 392.466 is hereby amended to read as follows:

- 1. Except as otherwise provided in this section, any pupil who commits a battery which results in the bodily injury of an employee of the school or who sells or distributes any controlled substance while on the premises of any public school, at an activity sponsored by a public school or on any school bus and who is at least 11 years of age shall meet with the school and his or her parent or legal guardian. The school shall provide a plan of action based on restorative justice to the parent or legal guardian of the pupil or if the pupil is an unaccompanied pupil, the pupil. The pupil may be suspended or expelled from the school, in which case the pupil shall:
- (a) Enroll in a private school pursuant to chapter 394 of NRS or be homeschooled or an opt-in child; or
- (b) Enroll in a program of independent study provided pursuant to NRS 389.155 for pupils who have been suspended or expelled from public school or a program of distance education provided pursuant to NRS 388.820 to 388.874, inclusive, if the pupil qualifies for enrollment and is accepted for enrollment in accordance with the requirements of the applicable program.
- 2. An employee who is a victim of a battery which results in the bodily injury of an employee of the school may appeal to the school the plan of action provided pursuant to subsection 1 if:
- (a) The employee feels any actions taken pursuant to such plan are inappropriate; and
- (b) For a pupil with a disability who committed the battery, the board of trustees of the school district or its designee has reviewed the circumstances and determined that such an appeal is in compliance with the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400 et seq.
- 3. Except as otherwise provided in this section, any pupil of any age, including, without limitation, a pupil with a disability, who is found in possession of a firearm or a dangerous weapon while on the premises of any public school, at an activity sponsored by a public school or on any school bus must, for the first occurrence, be expelled from the school for a period of not less than 1 year, although the pupil may be placed in another kind of school for a period not to exceed the period of the expulsion. For a second occurrence, the pupil must be permanently expelled from the school.

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- 4. If a school is unable to retain a pupil in the school pursuant to subsection 1 for the safety of any person or because doing so would not be in the best interest of the pupil, the pupil may be suspended, expelled or placed in another school. If a pupil is placed in another school, the current school of the pupil shall explain what services will be provided to the pupil at the new school that the current school is unable to provide to address the specific needs and behaviors of the pupil. The school district of the current school of the pupil shall coordinate with the new school to create a plan of action based on restorative justice for the pupil and to ensure that any resources required to execute the plan of action based on restorative justice are available at the new school.
- 5. Except as otherwise provided in this section, if a pupil is deemed a habitual disciplinary problem pursuant to NRS 392.4655, the pupil is at least 11 years of age and the school has made a reasonable effort to complete a plan of action based on restorative justice with the pupil, based on the seriousness of the acts which were the basis for the discipline, the pupil may be:
- (a) Suspended from the school;

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- (b) Expelled from the school under extraordinary circumstances as determined by the principal of the school.
- 6. If the pupil is expelled, or the period of the pupil's suspension is for one school semester, the pupil must:
- (a) Enroll in a private school pursuant to chapter 394 of NRS or be homeschooled *or become an opt-in child*; or
- (b) Enroll in a program of independent study provided pursuant to NRS 389.155 for pupils who have been suspended or expelled from public school or a program of distance education provided pursuant to NRS 388.820 to 388.874, inclusive, if the pupil qualifies for enrollment and is accepted for enrollment in accordance with the requirements of the applicable program.
- 7. The superintendent of schools of a school district may, for good cause shown in a particular case in that school district, allow a modification to a suspension or expulsion pursuant to subsections 1 to 5, inclusive, if such modification is set forth in writing. The superintendent shall allow such a modification if the superintendent determines that a plan of action based on restorative justice may be used successfully.
- 8. This section does not prohibit a pupil from having in his or her possession a knife or firearm with the approval of the principal of the school. A principal may grant such approval only in accordance with the policies or regulations adopted by the board of trustees of the school district.
- 9. Except as otherwise provided in this subsection and subsection 3, a pupil who is less than 11 years of age must not be permanently expelled from school. In extraordinary circumstances, a school may request an exception to this subsection from the board of trustees of the school district. A pupil who is at least 11 years of age may be suspended, expelled or permanently expelled from school pursuant to this section only after the board of trustees of the school district or its designee has reviewed the circumstances and approved this action in accordance with the procedural policy adopted by the board for such issues.
- 10. Except as otherwise provided in subsection 3, a pupil with a disability who is at least 11 years of age may, in accordance with the procedural policy adopted by the board of trustees of the school district for such matters and only after the board of trustees of the school district or its designee has reviewed the circumstances and determined that the action is in compliance with the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400 et seq., be:

- (a) Suspended from school pursuant to this section for not more than 5 days. Such a suspension may be imposed pursuant to this paragraph for each occurrence of conduct proscribed by subsection 1.
- (b) Expelled from school pursuant to this section.
- (c) Permanently expelled from school pursuant to this section.
- 11. A homeless pupil or a pupil in foster care who is at least 11 years of age may be suspended or expelled from school pursuant to this section only if a determination is made that the behavior that led to the consideration for suspension or expulsion was not caused by homelessness or being in foster care. The person responsible for making a determination of whether or not the behavior was caused by homelessness or being in foster care unless the person determines that the behavior was not caused by homelessness or being in foster care pursuant to this subsection. A determination that the behavior was not caused by homelessness must be made in consultation with the local educational agency liaison for homeless pupils designated in accordance with the McKinney-Vento Homeless Assistance Act of 1987, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11301 et seq., or a contact person at a school, including, without limitation, a school counselor or school social worker. A determination that the behavior was not caused by being in foster care must be made in consultation with an advocate for pupils in foster care at the school in which the pupil is in enrolled or the school counselor of the pupil.
- 12. The provisions of chapter 241 of NRS do not apply to any hearing or proceeding conducted pursuant to this section. Such hearings or proceedings must be closed to the public.
- 13. As used in this section:
- (a) "Battery" has the meaning ascribed to it in paragraph (a) of subsection 1 of NRS 200.481.
- (b) "Dangerous weapon" includes, without limitation, a blackjack, slungshot, billy, sand-club, sandbag, metal knuckles, dirk or dagger, a nunchaku or trefoil, as defined in NRS 202.350, a butterfly knife or any other knife described in NRS 202.350, a switchblade knife as defined in NRS 202.265, or any other object which is used, or threatened to be used, in such a manner and under such circumstances as to pose a threat of, or cause, bodily injury to a person.
- (c) "Firearm" includes, without limitation, any pistol, revolver, shotgun, explosive substance or device, and any other item included within the definition of a "firearm" in 18 U.S.C. § 921, as that section existed on July 1, 1995.
- (d) "Foster care" has the meaning ascribed to it in 45 C.F.R. § 1355.20. (e) "Homeless pupil" has the meaning ascribed to the term.
- (e) "Homeless children and youths" in 42 U.S.C. § 11434a(2).
- (f) "Permanently expelled" means the disciplinary removal of a pupil from the school in which the pupil is currently enrolled:
  - (1) Except as otherwise provided in subparagraph (2), without the possibility of returning to the school in which the pupil is currently enrolled or another public school within the school district; and
  - (2) With the possibility of enrolling in a program or public school for alternative education for pupils who are expelled or permanently expelled after being permanently expelled.
- (g) "Restorative justice" has the meaning ascribed to it in NRS 392.472.

- (h) "Unaccompanied pupil" has the meaning ascribed to the term "unaccompanied youth" in 42 U.S.C. §1434a(6).
- 14. The provisions of this section do not prohibit a pupil who is suspended or expelled from enrolling in a charter school that is designed exclusively for the enrollment of pupils with disciplinary problems if the pupil is accepted for enrollment by the charter school pursuant to NRS 388A.453 or 388A.456. Upon request, the governing body of a charter school must be provided with access to the records of the pupil relating to the pupil's suspension or expulsion in accordance with applicable federal and state law before the governing body makes a decision concerning the enrollment of the pupil.
- Sec. 35. Nothing herein shall require the Legislature to appropriate money to fund education freedom accounts or any expenses related thereto.
- Sec. 36. If any provision or part of this act be declared invalid, or the application thereof to any person, thing or circumstance is held invalid, such invalidity shall not affect the remaining provisions or application of this act which can be given effect without the invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions of this act are declared to be severable. This subsection shall be construed broadly to preserve and effectuate the declared purpose of this act.
- Sec. 37. The provisions of this act become effective upon an appropriation by the Legislature to fund the education freedom accounts.

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### **DESCRIPTION OF EFFECT**

The Petition establishes an education freedom account program under which parents will be authorized to establish an account for their child's education. The parent of any child required to attend public school who has been enrolled in a public school in Nevada during the entirety of the immediately preceding school year or whose child is eligible to enroll in kindergarten may establish an account for the child. Money in the accounts may be used to pay certain educational expenses including, but not limited to, tuition and fees at participating entities. Participating entities may include eligible private schools, a program of distance education not operated by a public school and parents, among others.

The maximum available grant is 90 percent of the statewide base per pupil funding amount. For Fiscal Year 2021-2022, that statewide base per pupil funding amount is \$6,980 per pupil, and for Fiscal Year 2022-2023 it is \$7,074 per pupil. That said, nothing in the initiative requires the Legislature to appropriate money to fund the accounts. If no money is appropriated, no funding will be available for the accounts. Funding the accounts, however, could necessitate a tax increase or reduction of government services.

(Only registered voters of this county may sign below)

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Place Affidavit on last page of document.

## THE FOLLOWING AFFIDAVIT MUST BE COMPLETED AND SIGNED:

### **AFFIDAVIT OF CIRCULATOR**

(TO BE SIGNED BY CIRCULATOR)

STATE OF NEVADA	)		
COUNTY OF	)		
Ι,	, (print name), be	ing first duly sworn under penalty of perjury	, depose and say: (1)
that I reside at			
(print street, city and state); (2	) that I am 18 years of age or	older; (3) that I personally circulated this d	locument; (4) that all
signatures were affixed in my I	presence; (5) that the number	r of signatures affixed thereon is	; and (6)
that each person who signed h	nad an opportunity before sig	gning to read the full text of the act or reso	olution on which the
initiative or referendum is dem	nanded.		
Subscribed and sworn to or aff	irmed before me this	Signature of Circulator	
day of	,, by	<u> </u>	
Notary Public or person author	ized to administer oath		

EL501C Revised 8/2019



REC'D & FILED

BRADLEY S. SCHRAGER, ESQ. (NSB 10217) JOHN SAMBERG, ESQ. (NSB 10828) DANIEL BRAVO, ESQ. (NSB 13078)
WOLF, RIFKIN, SHAPIRO, SCHULMAN & RABKIN, LLP 3773 Howard Hughes Parkway, Suite 590 South Las Vegas, Nevada 89169 (702) 341-5200/Fax: (702) 341-5300 bschrager@wrslawyers.com jsamberg@wrslawyers.com dbravo@wrslawyers.com 6 7 Attorneys for Plaintiffs 8 9 10 11 BEVERLY ROGERS, an individual: 12 RORY REID, an individual, Plaintiffs, 13 14 vs. 15 BARBARA CEGAVSKE, in her official 16 capacity as NEVADA SÉCRETARY OF STATE, 17 Defendant. 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

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2022 FEB 22 PM 1: 36

DEPUTY

IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA IN AND FOR CARSON CITY

> Case No.: 3300 CROS) (1) Dept.:

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF CHALLENGING INITIATIVE PETITION S-02-2022 PURSUANT TO NRS 295.061(1)

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### PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

Plaintiffs Beverly Rogers and Rory Reid, (collectively "Plaintiffs") submit this Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of the Complaint in this action.

#### I. INTRODUCTION

Nevada Statutory Initiative Petition S-02-2022 (the "Petition") seeks to enact a statute that would upend Nevada's public education system by using state money to fund education savings accounts—referred to as "education freedom accounts" ("EFAs")—diverting the State's education resources away from Nevada's public school system. This Petition is legally flawed, however, and cannot be presented to voters for signature, for the following reasons:

First, the Petition's statutorily-required description of effect is misleading, confusing, and deceptive, in that it fails to fairly present enough information for a potential signer to make an informed decision about whether to support the initiative. The description, among other things, erroneously suggests that under existing law, parents are precluded from setting up savings accounts to be used to fund their children's education; fails to inform signatories that certain children could be barred from attending public school as a result of their parents' early termination of an EFA agreement; misleadingly suggests that EFA funds can be used to supplement a child's public school education, when in fact the initiative expressly bars parents from using EFA funds in this manner; and fails to inform potential signatories that any funds appropriated for these EFA's would inevitably be diverted from Nevada's public school system.

Second, the Petition fails to impose taxes or otherwise raise revenue to pay for the grants used to fund the EFA's or the numerous regulatory and administrative obligations placed on the State Treasurer and other agencies by the initiative, and therefore runs afoul of Article 19, Section 6 of the Nevada Constitution.

Third, while initiatives may propose policy, it is beyond the initiative power reserved under the Constitution for such initiatives to dictate administrative details.

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Here, however, the Petition improperly seeks to dictate a host of administrative details (page after page of them), rendering the Petition invalid.

#### II. THE INITIATIVE PETITION

#### A. The EFAs Contemplated By The Petition

On or about January 31, 2022, the Petition was filed with the Nevada Secretary of State. See Exhibit 1, a true and accurate copy of Notice of Intent to Circulate Statewide Initiative or Referendum Petition associated with Statutory Initiative Petition S-02-2022. If passed, this initiative would cause a wholesale revision of Nevada's education finance system by permitting parents of school age children to establish EFAs, funded by the State and then used to pay for educational expenses outside Nevada's constitutional uniform system of common public schools.

An EFA would be established when a parent enters into an agreement with the State Treasurer. If a parent enters into an agreement with the State Treasurer for the creation of an EFA, and if the Legislature has appropriated money to fund grants to such EFAs, a grant of money on behalf of the child is to be deposited into the child's EFA in an amount equal to 90 percent of the statewide base per pupil funding amount. Id. at 3, §§ 10.1-10.3. An EFA agreement is valid for one school year but may be terminated early.  $\mathit{Id}$ . at 3,  $\S$  8.4. When a parent terminates an EFA agreement before the end of a school year, that parent's child "may not receive instruction from a public school in this state until the end of the period for which the last deposit was made into the [EFA]." Id., at 3, § 4.

The EFA program requires participating students to receive instruction from one or more "participating entities," which include private schools, universities, programs of distance education, tutors, and parents. Id. at 2,5, §§ 4, 13.1 Under the proposed initiative, the EFA funds may be spent on authorized educational expenses, such as private school tuition and fees, textbooks, tutoring, etc. Id. at 4, § 11.1.

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#### B. The State Treasurer And Other Agencies And Officials Are Required To Set Up, Administer And Monitor The Contemplated EFA Program

The proposed initiative purports to impose numerous regulatory and administrative obligations on the State Treasurer, as well as other state and local governmental entities, in order to effectuate the Petition's EFA program. For example, if enacted, the State Treasurer would be required to develop an application process for parents to enter into EFA agreements with the State Treasurer and make the applications available online, (Exhibit 1, at 3, § 9.8), and provide parents with "a written explanation of the authorized uses... of the money in an [EFA] and the responsibilities of the parent and the State Treasurer." *Id.*, § 9.9. Additionally:

- The State Treasurer would be required to "qualify one or more private financial management firms to manage EFAs," and establish fees for the management of EFAs education freedom accounts." *Id.*, at 5, § 12.1. These EFAs would be required to be "audited randomly each year by a certified or licensed public accountant," and may be subject to additional audits, as determined by the State Treasurer. *Id.*, §12.2.
- The State Treasurer would be required to receive and evaluate applications for institutions to become "participating entities" under the program and to "approve an application... or request additional information to demonstrate that the person meets the criteria to serve as a participating entity." *Id.*, §§ 13.1, 13.2. The State Treasurer would also be required to "annually make available a list of participating entities, other than any parent of a child." *Id.*, at 7, § 15.1.
- The State Treasurer would also be required to prescribe regulations for participating entities that are "reasonably expected... [to] receive, from payments made from [EFAs], more than \$50,000 during any school year" to post surety bonds in the amounts expected to be received, or to "[p]rovide evidence satisfactory to the State Treasurer that the participating entity

otherwise has unencumbered assets sufficient to pay to the State Treasurer such amounts. *Id.*, at 5-6, § 13.3.

- The State Treasurer would be required to police the participating entities to ensure that they do not engage in improper conduct, and, if they do, may refuse them to continue to participate in the program. *Id.*, at 6, § 13.5. The State Treasurer would be required to "provide immediate notice" of any participating entities not permitted to continue participating in the program "to each parent of a child receiving instruction from" such entities. *Id.*, § 13.6.
- The State Treasurer would be required to "administer an annual survey of parents who enter into or renew an agreement," to determine their relative satisfaction with and opinions regarding the program. *Id.*, § 14.3. Separately, the Department of Education would be required to aggregate the results of examinations taken by children participating in the program and make such aggregated data available on the internet. *Id.*, § 14.2.

#### C. The Proposed Initiative Does Not Impose Any Taxes Or Otherwise Generate Revenue To Pay For The Contemplated Program

The proposed initiative does not provide for any taxes or other means of raising revenue to fund the grants deposited into the EFAs. Instead, the appropriation of these funds—without which the program cannot exist—is left entirely to the Legislature's discretion. "Nothing herein shall require the Legislature to appropriate money to fund the grants described in this section. The availability of grants is subject to the availability of funds as determined by the Legislature." Id., at 3, § 10.2 (emphasis added). See also id. at 20, § 35 ("Nothing herein shall require the Legislature to appropriate money to fund education freedom accounts or any expenses related thereto."). Neither does the proposed initiative impose any taxes or otherwise raise any revenue to pay for the significant expenses that will necessarily have to be incurred in carrying out the initiative's numerous regulatory and administrative obligations.

#### III. ARGUMENT

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### A. The Petition's Description Of Effect Is Legally Insufficient

Nevada law requires that every initiative "[s]et forth, in not more than 200 words, a description of the effect of the initiative or referendum if the initiative or referendum is approved by the voters." NRS 295.009(1)(b). The purpose of the description is to "prevent voter confusion and promote informed decisions." Nevadans for Nev. v. Beers, 122 Nev. 930, 939, 142 P.3d 339, 345 (2006). "The importance of the description of effect cannot be minimized, as it is what the voters see when deciding whether to even sign a petition." Coalition for Nevada's Future v. RIP Commerce Tax, Inc., 132 Nev. 956 (2016) (unpublished disposition) (citing Educ. Initiative PAC v. Comm. to Protect Nev. Jobs, 129 Nev. 35, 37, 293 P.3d 874, 876 (2013).

Although a description of effect need not "explain hypothetical effects" or "mention every possible effect" of the initiative, "a description of effect must be straightforward, succinct, and non-argumentative, and it must not be deceptive or misleading." Educ. Initiative PAC, 129 Nev. at 37. In reviewing the description of effect, the Court must analyze "whether the information contained in the description is correct and does not misrepresent what the initiative will accomplish and how it intends to achieve those goals." Id., 129 Nev. at 35. At the very least, the description of effect must fairly present enough information for a potential signer to make an informed decision about whether to support the initiative. See Nev. Judges Ass'n v. Lau, 112 Nev. 51, 59, 910 P.2 898, 903 (1996) (rejecting initiative description for "failure to explain [certain] ramifications of the proposed amendment," which "renders the initiative and its explanation potentially misleading").

Here, the Petition's description of effect is deceptive, confusing, and misleading. Most importantly, the description fails to alert potential signatories of an important lack of flexibility in the terms of the measure: Under section 4 of the proposed initiative, when a parent terminates an EFA agreement before the end of a school year, that parent's child "may not receive instruction from a public school in

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 this state until the end of the period for which the last deposit was made into the EFA. Id., at 3, § 4. Nowhere does the Description inform potential signatories that if passed, Nevada children would be barred from attending public school under certain circumstances. The rights of school-age children to receive public education in Nevada is inviolate, and the notion that this Petition would—under circumstance of financial stress or calamity, for example—deny that right to a child and his or her family is, one would think, a crucial aspect of its proposed operation. This omission is highly misleading, and, if disclosed, would likely deter a number of potential signatories from signing the petition or, at the very least, inform one's decision to sign the Petition.

The Description further misleadingly informs potential signatories that "Money in the accounts may be used to pay certain educational expenses including, but not limited to, tuition and fees at participating entities." This makes it seem that if passed, parents would be able to establish an EFA to supplement their child's public education, by, for example, signing their child up for after-school tutoring, when, in fact, an EFA cannot be established for any child "who will remain enrolled full-time in a public school." *Id.*, § 10. Again, this omission is highly misleading.

While stating that "nothing in the initiative requires the Legislature to appropriate money to fund the accounts[, and] [i]f no money is appropriated, no funding will be available for the accounts," the description fails to inform potential signatories that **none** of the provisions of the proposed initiative come into effect unless the Legislature makes an appropriation to fund the EFA. See id., at 20, § 37. This is a clear bait-and-switch, also not appropriate for a description.

The Description also misleadingly fails to inform potential signatories that any funding appropriated for this program will inevitably reduce the funding otherwise available to public schools. This follows from the provisions of the proposed initiative, which bases the amount of the grants on "the statewide base per pupil funding amount (id., at 3, § 3). Given that these grants are required to be used for educational

by the Legislature for this purpose, they would inevitably result in a reduction of public school funding (as was the case with the proposed initiative's predecessor, SB 320, which resulted in its invalidation by the Nevada Supreme Court in Schwartz v. Lopez, 132 Nev. 732, 382 P.3d 886 (2016)). Certainly, many potential signatories would refrain from signing the Petition if the description informed them of its impact on Nevada's public school system.

expenses, it is far from hypothetical to conclude that if funds were to be appropriated

Because the description of effect is therefore misleading and confusing, it is legally insufficient, and this Court should not permit the Petition to proceed.

# B. The Petition Violates The Nevada Constitution's Prohibition On Initiatives That Mandate Unfunded Expenditures

The Petition is also invalid because it mandates numerous expenditures without providing reciprocal revenues in violation of Article 19, Section 6 of the Nevada Constitution. That provision prohibits any initiative that "makes an appropriation or otherwise requires the expenditure of money, unless such statute or amendment also imposes a sufficient tax, not prohibited by the Constitution, or otherwise constitutionally provides for raising the necessary revenue." Nev. Const. art. 19, § 6. "Section 6 applies to all proposed initiatives, without exception, and does not permit any initiative that fails to comply with the stated conditions." Rogers, supra at 173. "If the Initiative does not comply with section 6, then the Initiative is void" in its entirety, and the offending provision cannot be severed to render it constitutional. Id. at 173, 177-78. Compliance with Article 19, Section 6's appropriation or expenditure provision is a "threshold content restriction" that may be raised in a pre-election challenge. Herbst Gaming, Inc. v. Heller, 122 Nev. 877, 884, 890, n. 38 141 P.3d 1224, 1229 (2006) (quoting Rogers, 117 Nev. at 173).

The proposed initiative fails to impose any taxes or otherwise provide for funding to pay for the grants to be used to fund the EFAs on which the entire contemplated statutory amendment is premised. "Nevada Constitution article 19,

section 6 states that the initiative must impose 'a sufficient tax ... or otherwise constitutionally provide[] for raising the necessary revenue.' We must give this provision its plain meaning unless the language is ambiguous." Rogers, supra at 176. Under a plain reading of this constitutional prohibition, the proposed initiative's failure to raise moneys for the grants on which the entire statutory scheme contemplated by the initiative is premised is a fatal flaw, rendering the Petition void in its entirety.

It may be argued that the proposed initiative does not create an unfunded mandate, because it only comes into effect if the Legislature appropriates funding for the grants. But this argument fails for several reasons. With some small exceptions, the proposed initiative largely tracks the provisions of Senate Bill (SB) 302 (2015), which the Nevada Supreme Court struck down in *Schwartz v. Lopez*, 132 Nev. 732 (2016) on the grounds that SB 302 failed to appropriate funds for the EFAs contemplated by the bill and that moneys appropriated for K–12 public education could not properly be used for this purpose. The Petition's proponents are obviously attempting to circumvent the lack of funding which led to SB 302 being struck down by sidestepping this issue and passing the buck to the Legislature to appropriate the necessary funding for the EFA grants. In doing so, however, the proponents have plainly run afoul of Article 19, section 6 of the Constitution, which prohibits any initiative which requires the expenditure of money, without providing for the necessary revenue to cover such expenditures. This proposed initiative, like its predecessor SB 302, is thus doomed to invalidity.

Separately, under the Nevada constitution the initiative power only extends to actual statutes which impose real obligations. The initiative power does not extend to purported pronouncements of law that only come into effect upon the happening of some future event, such as the Legislature enacting the necessary funding for the EFA grants. See Nev. Const. art. 19, § 1 ("the people reserve to themselves the power to propose, by initiative petition, statutes and amendments to statutes and

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 amendments to this Constitution, and to enact or reject them at the polls.") By providing that the statutory scheme contemplated only becomes effective upon the Legislature appropriating funding for the EFA grants, which may or may not happen, the proposed initiative cannot properly be considered to be a "statute" and is therefore beyond the initiative power granted by the Constitution.

Putting aside its failure to provide for the appropriation of moneys to pay the grants contemplated by the initiative—itself a fatal defect—the initiative, if passed, would obligate the State Treasurer to essentially set up, administer, run the program, and monitor the use of the EFAs and the performance of the financial institutions managing such EFAs. See § II.B, supra. The initiative does not impose any taxes or otherwise raise any revenue to pay for the substantial expenses that will necessarily be incurred in carrying out these foregoing numerous and burdensome tasks.

# C. The Proposed Initiative Improperly Includes Administrative Details

"[R]egardless whether an initiative proposes enactment of a new statute or ordinance, or a new provision in the constitution or city charter, or an amendment to any of these types of laws, it must propose policy—it may not dictate administrative details." Nevadans for the Prot. of Prop. Rts., Inc. v. Heller, 122 Nev. 894, 913, 141 P.3d 1235, 1248 (2006). This is because "[t]he people's initiative power is 'coequal, coextensive, and concurrent' with that of the Legislature; thus, the people have power that is legislative in nature," (id. at 914), and administrative details are determined not by the Legislature, "but by [other] entities with rule-making authority, which fill in administrative details pertaining to the policy articulated in legislation." Id.

The proposed initiative goes far beyond the articulation of policy, and, as laid out in detail both in section II.B, above and in Paragraph 27 of the Complaint, it imposes a host of administrative duties on the State Treasurer and Department of Education. Those details are here incorporated, for purposes of brevity under FJDCR 3.23(b). This is well beyond the initiative power, and renders the Petition invalid.

### 1 **I**V. CONCLUSION Based upon the foregoing, the Court should grant Plaintiffs' requested relief, 2 striking Initiative Petition C-04-2022 and issuing an injunction prohibiting the Secretary from taking further action upon it. 5 6 **AFFIRMATION** 7 The undersigned hereby affirm that the foregoing document does not contain the 8 social security number of any person. 9 DATED this 22d day of February, 2022 10 11 WOLF, RIFKIN, SHAPIRO, SCHULMAN & RABKIN, LLP 12 By: 13 BRADLEÝ S. SCHRAGER, ESQ. (NSB 10217) JOHN SAMBERG, ESQ. (NSB 10828) DANIEL BRAVO, ESQ. (NSB 13078) 3773 Howard Hughes Parkway, Suite 590 South 14 15 Las Vegas, Nevada 89169 16 (702) 341-5200/Fax: (702) 341-5300 bschrager@wrslawyers.com 17 jsamberg@wrslawyers.com dbravo@wrslawyers.com 18 Attorneys for Plaintiff 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27

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## State of Nevada - Initiative Petition - Statewide Statutory Measure

EXPLANATION: Matter in **bolded italics** is new; matter between brackets [omitted material] is material to be omitted.

#### The People of the State of Nevada do enact as follows:

- **Section 1.** Chapter 385 of NRS is hereby amended by adding thereto the provisions set forth as sections 2 to 17, inclusive, of this act.
- Sec. 2. As used in sections 2 to 17, inclusive, of this act, unless the context otherwise requires, the words and terms defined in sections 3 to 8, inclusive, of this act have the meanings ascribed to them in those sections.
- Sec. 3. "Education freedom account" means an account established for a child pursuant to section 9 of this act.
- Sec. 4. "Eligible institution" means: 1. A university, state college or community college within the Nevada System of Higher Education; or 2. Any other college or university that: (a) Was originally established in, and is organized under the laws of, this State; (b) Is exempt from taxation pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3); and (c) Is accredited by a regional accrediting agency recognized by the United States Department of Education.
- Sec. 5. "Parent" means the parent, custodial parent, legal guardian or other person in this State who has control or charge of a child and the legal right to direct the education of the child.
- Sec. 6. "Participating entity" means a private school that is licensed pursuant to chapter 394 of NRS or exempt from such licensing pursuant to NRS 394.211, an eligible institution, a program of distance education that is not offered by a public school or the Department, a tutor or tutoring agency or a parent that has provided to the State Treasurer the application described in subsection 1 of section 13 of this act.
- Sec. 7. "Program of distance education" has the meaning ascribed to it in NRS 388.829.
- Sec. 8. "Resident school district" means the school district in which a child would be enrolled based on his or her residence.
- Sec. 9. 1. Except as otherwise provided in subsection 10, the parent of any child required by NRS 392.040 to attend a public school who was enrolled in a public school in this State during the entirety of the school year immediately preceding the establishment of an education freedom account pursuant to this section or is eligible to enroll in kindergarten may establish an education freedom account for the child by entering into a written agreement with the State Treasurer, in a manner and on a form provided by the State Treasurer. The agreement must provide that:
- (a) The child will receive instruction in this State from a participating entity for the school year for which the agreement applies;
- (b) The child will receive a grant, in the form of money deposited pursuant to section 10 of this act in the education freedom account established for the child pursuant to subsection 2;
- (c) The money in the education freedom account established for the child must be expended only as authorized by section 11 of this act; and

- 2. If an agreement is entered into pursuant to subsection 1, an education freedom account must be established by the parent on behalf of the child. The account must be maintained with a financial management firm qualified by the State Treasurer pursuant to section 12 of this act.
- 3. The failure to enter into an agreement pursuant to subsection 1 for any school year for which a child is required by NRS 392.040 to attend a public school does not preclude the parent of the child from entering into an agreement for a subsequent school year.
- 4. An agreement entered into pursuant to subsection 1 is valid for 1 school year but may be terminated early. If the agreement is terminated early, the child may not receive instruction from a public school in this State until the end of the period for which the last deposit was made into the education freedom account pursuant to section 10 of this act, except to the extent the pupil was allowed to receive instruction from a public school under the agreement or the participating entity providing education to the child ceases to lawfully operate.
- 5. An agreement terminates automatically if the child no longer resides in this State. In such a case, any money remaining in the education freedom account of the child reverts to the State General Fund.
- 6. An agreement may be renewed for any school year for which the child is required by NRS 392.040 to attend a public school. The failure to renew an agreement for any school year does not preclude the parent of the child from renewing the agreement for any subsequent school year.
- 7. A parent may enter into a separate agreement pursuant to subsection 1 for each child of the parent. Not more than one education freedom account may be established for a child.
- 8. Except as otherwise provided in subsection 10, the State Treasurer shall enter into or renew an agreement pursuant to this section with any parent of a child required by NRS 392.040 to attend a public school who applies to the State Treasurer in the manner provided by the State Treasurer. The State Treasurer shall make the application available on the Internet website of the State Treasurer.
- 9. Upon entering into or renewing an agreement pursuant to this section, the State Treasurer shall provide to the parent who enters into or renews the agreement a written explanation of the authorized uses, pursuant to section 11 of this act, of the money in an education freedom account and the responsibilities of the parent and the State Treasurer pursuant to the agreement and sections 2 to 17, inclusive, of this act.
- 10. A parent may not establish an education freedom account for a child who will be homeschooled, who will receive instruction outside this State or who will remain enrolled full-time in a public school, regardless of whether such a child receives instruction from a participating entity. A parent may establish an education freedom account for a child who receives a portion of his or her instruction from a public school and a portion of his or her instruction from a participating entity.
- Sec. 10. 1. Subject to the limitations described in subsection 2, if a parent enters into or renews an agreement pursuant to section 9 of this act and the Legislature has appropriated money to fund grants described in this section, a grant of money on behalf of the child must be deposited in the education freedom account of the child.
- 2. Nothing herein shall require the Legislature to appropriate money to fund the grants described in this section. The availability of grants is subject to the availability of funds as determined by the Legislature.
- 3. Except as otherwise provided in subsections 4, 5 and 6, the grant required by subsection 1 must, for the school year for which the grant is made, be in an amount equal to 90 percent of the statewide base per pupil funding amount.

- 4. If the Treasurer determines that there are not sufficient funds to provide grants in the amounts described in subsection 3, the Treasurer shall apportion the amount of available grants equally in relation to the amount of available funds and the number of agreements entered into pursuant to Section 9. If the Legislature declines to appropriate money to fund the grants described in subsection 1, no grants shall be made.
- 5. If a child receives a portion of his or her instruction from a participating entity and a portion of his or her instruction from a public school, for the school year for which the grant is made, the grant required by subsection 1 must be in a pro rata based on amount the percentage of the total instruction provided to the child by the participating entity in proportion to the total instruction provided to the child.
- 6. The State Treasurer may deduct not more than 4 percent of each grant for the administrative costs of implementing the provisions of sections 2 to 17, inclusive, of this act.
- 7. The State Treasurer shall deposit the money for each grant in quarterly installments pursuant to a schedule determined by the State Treasurer.
- 8. Any money remaining in an education freedom account:
- (a) At the end of a school year may be carried forward to the next school year if the agreement entered into pursuant to section 9 of this act is renewed.
- (b) When an agreement entered into pursuant to section 9 of this act is not renewed or is terminated, because the child for whom the account was established graduates from high school or for any other reason, reverts to the State General Fund at the end of the last day of the agreement.
- Sec. 11. 1. Money deposited in an education freedom account must be used only to pay for:
- (a) Tuition and fees at a school that is a participating entity in which the child is enrolled;
- (b) Textbooks required for a child who enrolls in a school that is a participating entity;
- (c) Tutoring or other teaching services provided by a tutor or tutoring facility that is a participating entity;
- (d) Tuition and fees for a program of distance education that is a participating entity;
- (e) Fees for any national norm-referenced achievement examination, advanced placement or similar examination or standardized examination required for admission to a college or university;
- (f) If the child is a pupil with a disability, as that term is defined in NRS 388.417, fees for any special instruction or special services provided to the child;
- (g) Tuition and fees at an eligible institution that is a participating entity;
- (h) Textbooks required for the child at an eligible institution that is a participating entity or to receive instruction from any other participating entity;
- (i) Fees for the management of the education freedom account, as described in section 12 of this act;
- (j) Transportation required for the child to travel to and from a participating entity or any combination of participating entities up to but not to exceed \$750 per school year; or
- (k) Purchasing a curriculum or any supplemental materials required to administer the curriculum.
- 2. A participating entity that receives a payment authorized by subsection 1 shall not:

- (a) Refund any portion of the payment to the parent who made the payment, unless the refund is for an item that is being returned or an item or service that has not been provided; or
- (b) Rebate or otherwise share any portion of the payment with the parent who made the payment.
- 3. A parent who receives a refund pursuant to subsection 2 shall deposit the refund in the education freedom account from which the money refunded was paid.
- 4. Nothing in this section shall be deemed to prohibit a parent or child from making a payment for any tuition, fee, service or product described in subsection 1 from a source other than the education freedom account of the child.
- Sec. 12. 1. The State Treasurer shall qualify one or more private financial management firms to manage education freedom accounts and shall establish reasonable fees, based on market rates, for the management of education freedom accounts.
- 2. An education freedom account must be audited randomly each year by a certified or licensed public accountant. The State Treasurer may provide for additional audits of an education freedom account as it determines necessary.
- 3. If the State Treasurer determines that there has been substantial misuse of the money in an education freedom account, the State Treasurer may:
- (a) Freeze or dissolve the account, subject to any regulations adopted by the State Treasurer providing for notice of such action and opportunity to respond to the notice; and
- (b) Give notice of his or her determination to the Attorney General or the district attorney of the county in which the parent resides.
- Sec. 13. 1. The following persons may become a participating entity by submitting an application demonstrating that the person is:
- (a) A private school licensed pursuant to chapter 394 of NRS or exempt from such licensing pursuant to NRS 394.211;
- (b) An eligible institution;
- (c) A program of distance education that is not operated by a public school or the Department;
- (d) A tutor or tutoring facility that is accredited by a state, regional or national accrediting organization; or
- (e) The parent of a child.
- 2. The State Treasurer shall approve an application submitted pursuant to subsection 1 or request additional information to demonstrate that the person meets the criteria to serve as a participating entity. If the applicant is unable to provide such additional information, the State Treasurer may deny the application.
- 3. If it is reasonably expected that a participating entity will receive, from payments made from education freedom accounts, more than \$50,000 during any school year, the participating entity shall annually, on or before the date prescribed by the State Treasurer by regulation:
- (a) Post a surety bond in an amount equal to the amount reasonably expected to be paid to the participating entity from education freedom accounts during the school year; or

- (b) Provide evidence satisfactory to the State Treasurer that the participating entity otherwise has unencumbered assets sufficient to pay to the State Treasurer an amount equal to the amount described in paragraph (a).
- 4. Each participating entity that accepts payments made from education freedom accounts shall provide a receipt for each such payment to the parent who makes the payment.
- 5. The State Treasurer may refuse to allow an entity described in subsection 1 to continue to participate in the grant program provided for in sections 2 to 17, inclusive, of this act if the State Treasurer determines that the entity:
- (a) Has routinely failed to comply with the provisions of sections 2 to 17, inclusive, of this act; or
- (b) Has failed to provide any educational services required by law to a child receiving instruction from the entity if the entity is accepting payments made from the education freedom account of the child.
- 6. If the State Treasurer takes an action described in subsection 5 against an entity described in subsection 1, the State Treasurer shall provide immediate notice of the action to each parent of a child receiving instruction from the entity who has entered into or renewed an agreement pursuant to section 9 of this act and on behalf of whose child a grant of money has been deposited pursuant to section 10 of this act.
- Sec. 14. 1. Each participating entity that accepts payments for tuition and fees made from education freedom accounts shall:
- (a) Ensure that each child on whose behalf a grant of money has been deposited pursuant to section 10 of this act and who is receiving instruction from the participating entity takes:
- (1) Any examinations in mathematics and English language arts required for pupils of the same grade pursuant to chapter 389 of NRS; or
- (2) Norm-referenced achievement examinations in mathematics and English language arts each school year;
- (b) Provide for value-added assessments of the results of the examinations described in paragraph (a); and
- (c) Subject to the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974, 20 U.S.C. § 1232g, and any regulations adopted pursuant thereto, provide the results of the examinations described in paragraph (a) to the Department or an organization designated by the Department pursuant to subsection 4.
- 2. The Department shall:
- (a) Aggregate the examination results provided pursuant to subsection 1 according to the grade level, gender, race and family income level of each child whose examination results are provided; and
- (b) Subject to the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974, 20 U.S.C. § 1232g, and any regulations adopted pursuant thereto, make available on the Internet website of the Department:
- (1) The aggregated results and any associated learning gains; and
- (2) After 3 school years for which examination data has been collected, the graduation rates, as applicable, of children whose examination results are provided.
- 3. The State Treasurer shall administer an annual survey of parents who enter into or renew an agreement pursuant to section 9 of this act. The survey must ask each parent to indicate the number of years the parent has entered into or renewed such an agreement and to express:

- (a) The relative satisfaction of the parent with the grant program established pursuant to sections 2 to 17, inclusive, of this act; and
- (b) The opinions of the parent regarding any topics, items or issues that the State Treasurer determines may aid the State Treasurer in evaluating and improving the effectiveness of the grant program established pursuant to sections 2 to 17, inclusive, of this act.
- 4. Subject to available funding, the Department may arrange for a third-party organization to perform the duties of the Department prescribed by this section.
- Sec. 15. 1. The State Treasurer shall annually make available a list of participating entities, other than any parent of a child.
- 2. Subject to the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974, 20 U.S.C. § 1232g, and any regulations adopted pursuant thereto, the Department shall annually require the resident school district of each child on whose behalf a grant of money is made pursuant to section 10 of this act to provide to the participating entity any educational records of the child.
- Sec. 16. Except as otherwise provided in sections 2 to 17, inclusive, of this act, nothing in the provisions of sections 2 to 17, inclusive, of this act, shall be deemed to limit the independence or autonomy of a participating entity or to make the actions of a participating entity the actions of the State Government.
- Sec. 17. The State Treasurer shall adopt any regulations necessary or convenient to carry out the provisions of sections 2 to 17, inclusive, of this act.
- **Sec. 18.** NRS 385.007 is hereby amended to read as follows: As used in this title, unless the context otherwise requires:
- 1. "Challenge school" has the meaning ascribed to it in NRS 388D.305.
- 2. "Charter school" means a public school that is formed pursuant to the provisions of chapter 388A of NRS.
- 3. "Department" means the Department of Education.
- 4. "English learner" has the meaning ascribed to it in 20 U.S.C. § 7801(20).
- 5. "Homeschooled child" means a child who receives instruction at home and who is exempt from compulsory attendance pursuant to NRS 392.070.
- 6. "Local school precinct" has the meaning ascribed to it in NRS 388G.535.
- 7. "Opt-in child" means a child for whom an education freedom account has been established pursuant to section 9 of this act, who is not enrolled full-time in a public or private school and who receives all or a portion of his or her instruction from a participating entity, as defined in section 6 of this act.
- [7] 8. "Public schools" means all kindergartens and elementary schools, junior high schools and middle schools, high schools, charter schools and any other schools, classes and educational programs which receive their support through public taxation and, except for charter schools, whose textbooks and courses of study are under the control of the State Board.
- [8] 9. "School bus" has the meaning ascribed to it in NRS 484A.230.
- [9] 10. "School counselor" or "counselor" means a person who holds a license issued pursuant to chapter 391 of NRS and an endorsement to serve as a school counselor issued pursuant to regulations adopted by the

Commission on Professional Standards in Education or who is otherwise authorized by the Superintendent of Public Instruction to serve as a school counselor.

- [10] 11. "School psychologist" or "psychologist" means a person who holds a license issued pursuant to chapter 391 of NRS and an endorsement to serve as a school psychologist issued pursuant to regulations adopted by the Commission on Professional Standards in Education or who is otherwise authorized by the Superintendent of Public Instruction to serve as a school psychologist.
- [44] 12. "School social worker" or "social worker" means a social worker licensed pursuant to chapter 641B of NRS who holds a license issued pursuant to chapter 391 of NRS and an endorsement to serve as a school social worker issued pursuant to regulations adopted by the Commission on Professional Standards in Education or who is otherwise authorized by the Superintendent of Public Instruction to serve as a school social worker.
- [12] 13. "State Board" means the State Board of Education.
- [13] 14. "University school for profoundly gifted pupils" has the meaning ascribed to it in NRS 388C.040.
- **Sec. 19.** NRS 219A.140 is hereby amended to read as follows: To be eligible to serve on the Youth Legislature, a person:
- 1. To be eligible to serve on the Youth Legislature, a person:
- (a) Must be:
  - (1) A resident of the senatorial district of the Senator who appoints him or her;
  - (2) Enrolled in a public school or private school located in the senatorial district of the Senator who appoints him or her; or
  - (3) A homeschooled child who is otherwise eligible to be enrolled in a public school in the senatorial district of the Senator who appoints him or her;
- (b) Except as otherwise provided in subsection 3 of NRS 219A.150, must be:
  - (1) Enrolled in a public school or private school in this State in grade 9, 10 or 11 for the first school year of the term for which he or she is appointed; or
  - (2) A homeschooled child who is otherwise eligible to enroll in a public school in this State in grade 9, 10 or 11 for the first school year of the term for which he or she is appointed; and
- (c) Must not be related by blood, adoption or marriage within the third degree of consanguinity or affinity to the Senator who appoints him or her or to any member of the Assembly who collaborated to appoint him or her.
- 2. If, at any time, a person appointed to the Youth Legislature changes his or her residency or changes his or her school of enrollment in such a manner as to render the person ineligible under his or her original appointment, the person shall inform the Board, in writing, within 30 days after becoming aware of such changed facts.
- 3. A person who wishes to be appointed or reappointed to the Youth Legislature must submit an application on the form prescribed pursuant to subsection 4 to the Senator of the senatorial district in which the person resides, is enrolled in a public school or private school or, if the person is a homeschooled child[7] or opt-in child, the senatorial district in which he or she is otherwise eligible to be enrolled in a public school. A person may not submit an application to more than one Senator in a calendar year.

4. The Board shall prescribe a form for applications submitted pursuant to this section, which must require the signature of the principal of the school in which the applicant is enrolled or, if the applicant is a homeschooled child[5] or opt-in child, the signature of a member of the community in which the applicant resides other than a relative of the applicant.

Sec. 20 NRS 219A.150 is hereby amended to read as follows:

- 1. A position on the Youth Legislature becomes vacant upon:
- (a) The death or resignation of a member.
- (b) The determination of the Chair or Vice Chair of the Board, as applicable, that a member has accrued, for any reason, any combination of:
  - (1) Absences from meetings or event days of the Youth Legislature; or
  - (2) Incompletions of any other activities that are assigned to him or her by the Board as a member of the Youth Legislature,
- → if the combination of absences or incompletions amounts to three or more missed or unsuccessful activity credits during his or her term, unless the absences or incompletions are excused, in whole or in part, by the Chair or Vice Chair of the Board, as applicable.
- (c) A change of residency or a change of the school of enrollment of a member which renders that member ineligible under his or her original appointment.
- 2. In addition to the provisions of subsection 1, a position on the Youth Legislature becomes vacant if:
- (a) A member of the Youth Legislature graduates from high school or otherwise ceases to attend public school or private school for any reason other than to become a homeschooled child or opt-in child; or
- (b) A member of the Youth Legislature who is a homeschooled child *or opt-in child* completes an educational plan of instruction for grade 12 or otherwise ceases to be a homeschooled child *or opt-in child* for any reason other than to enroll in a public school or private school.
- 3. A vacancy on the Youth Legislature must be filled:
- (a) For the remainder of the unexpired term in the same manner as the original appointment, except that, if the remainder of the unexpired term is less than 1 year, the member of the Senate who made the original appointment may appoint a person who:
  - (1) Is enrolled in a public school or private school in this State in grade 12 or who is a homeschooled child *or opt-in child* who is otherwise eligible to enroll in a public school in this State in grade 12; and
  - (2) Satisfies the qualifications set forth in paragraphs (a) and (c) of subsection 1 of NRS 219A.140.
- (b) Insofar as is practicable, within 30 days after the date on which the vacancy occurs.
- 4. As used in this section:
- (a) "Activity credit" means a credit, or any fractional portion thereof, that the Board has determined a member is eligible to earn for:
  - (1) Attending meetings or event days of the Youth Legislature; or

- (2) Completing, in the manner required by the Board, any other activities that are assigned to him or her by the Board as a member of the Youth Legislature.
- (b) "Event day" means any single calendar day on which an official, scheduled event of the Youth Legislature is held, including, without limitation, a course of instruction, a course of orientation, a meeting, a seminar or any other official, scheduled activity.

#### Sec. 21. NRS 385B.060 is hereby amended to read as follows:

- 1. The Nevada Interscholastic Activities Association shall adopt rules and regulations in the manner provided for state agencies by chapter 233B of NRS as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this chapter. The regulations must include provisions governing the eligibility and participation of homeschooled children and opt-in children in interscholastic activities and events. In addition to the regulations governing eligibility, a homeschooled child who wishes to participate must have on file with the school district in which the child resides a current notice of intent of a homeschooled child to participate in programs and activities pursuant to NRS 388D.070.
- 2. An opt-in child who wishes to participate must have on file with the school district in which the child resides a current notice of intent of an opt-in child to participate in programs and activities pursuant to section 30 of this act.
- [2] 3. The Nevada Interscholastic Activities Association shall adopt regulations setting forth:
- (a) The standards of safety for each event, competition or other activity engaged in by a spirit squad of a school that is a member of the Nevada Interscholastic Activities Association, which must substantially comply with the spirit rules of the National Federation of State High School Associations, or its successor organization; and
- (b) The qualifications required for a person to become a coach of a spirit squad.
- [3] 4. If the Nevada Interscholastic Activities Association intends to adopt, repeal or amend a policy, rule or regulation concerning or affecting homeschooled children, the Association shall consult with the Northern Nevada Homeschool Advisory Council, or their successor organizations, to provide those Councils with a reasonable opportunity to submit data, opinions or arguments, orally or in writing, concerning the proposal or change. The Association shall consider all written and oral submissions respecting the proposal or change before taking final action.
- [4] 5. As used in this section, "spirit squad" means any team or other group of persons that is formed for the purpose of:
- (a) Leading cheers or rallies to encourage support for a team that participates in a sport that is sanctioned by the Nevada Interscholastic Activities Association; or
- (b) Participating in a competition against another team or other group of persons to determine the ability of each team or group of persons to engage in an activity specified in paragraph (a).

#### Sec. 22. NRS 385B.150 is hereby amended to read as follows:

1. A homeschooled child must be allowed to participate in interscholastic activities and events in accordance with the regulations adopted by the Nevada Interscholastic Activities Association pursuant to NRS 385B.060 if a notice of intent of a homeschooled child to participate in programs and activities is filed for the child with the school district in which the child resides for the current school year pursuant to NRS 388D.070.

- 2. An opt-in child must be allowed to participate in interscholastic activities and events in accordance with the regulations adopted by the Nevada Interscholastic Activities Association pursuant to NRS 385B.060 if a notice of intent of an opt-in child to participate in programs and activities is filed for the child with the school district in which the child resides for the current school year pursuant to section 28 of this act.
- [2] 3. The provisions of this chapter and the regulations adopted pursuant thereto that apply to pupils enrolled in public schools who participate in interscholastic activities and events apply in the same manner to homeschooled *and opt-in* children who participate in interscholastic activities and events, including, without limitation, provisions governing:
- (a) Eligibility and qualifications for participation;
- (b) Fees for participation;
- (c) Insurance;
- (d) Transportation;
- (e) Requirements of physical examination;
- (f) Responsibilities of participants;
- (g) Schedules of events;
- (h) Safety and welfare of participants;
- (i) Eligibility for awards, trophies and medals;
- (j) Conduct of behavior and performance of participants; and
- (k) Disciplinary procedures.

Sec. 23. NRS 385B.160 is hereby amended to read as follows:

No challenge may be brought by the Nevada Interscholastic Activities Association, a school district, a public school or a private school, a parent or guardian of a pupil enrolled in a public school or a private school, a pupil enrolled in a public school or private school, or any other entity or person claiming that an interscholastic activity or event is invalid because homeschooled *or opt-in* children or children of a military family who transferred schools pursuant to the provisions of chapter 388F of NRS are allowed to participate in the interscholastic activity or event.

Sec. 24. NRS 385B.170 is hereby amended to read as follows:

A school district, public school or private school shall not prescribe any regulations, rules, policies, procedures or requirements governing the:

- 1. Eligibility of homeschooled children, *opt-in children* or children of a military family who transferred schools pursuant to the provisions of chapter 388F of NRS to participate in interscholastic activities and events pursuant to this chapter; or
- 2. Participation of homeschooled children, *opt-in children* or children of a military family who transferred schools pursuant to the provisions of chapter 388F of NRS in interscholastic activities and events pursuant to this chapter,

→ that are more restrictive than the provisions governing eligibility and participation prescribed by the Nevada Interscholastic Activities Association pursuant to NRS 385B.060 and 385B.130.

#### Sec. 25. NRS 388A.471 is hereby amended to read as follows:

- 1. Except as otherwise provided in subsection 2, upon the request of a parent or legal guardian of a child who is enrolled in a public school of a school district or a private school, or a parent or legal guardian of a homeschooled child or opt-in child, the governing body of the charter school shall authorize the child to participate in a class that is not otherwise available to the child at his or her school or homeschool or from his or her participating entity, as defined in section 6 of this act, or participate in an extracurricular activity at the charter school if:
- (a) Space for the child in the class or extracurricular activity is available;
- (b) The parent or legal guardian demonstrates to the satisfaction of the governing body that the child is qualified to participate in the class or extracurricular activity; [and]
- (c) The child is a homeschooled child and a notice of intent of a homeschooled child to participate in programs and activities is filed for the child with the school district in which the child resides for the current school year pursuant to NRS 388D.070[-]; and
- (d) The child is an opt-in child and a notice of intent of an opt-in child to participate in programs and activities is filed for the child with the school district in which the child resides for the current school year pursuant to section 30 of this act
- 2. If the governing body of a charter school authorizes a child to participate in a class or extracurricular activity pursuant to subsection 1, the governing body is not required to provide transportation for the child to attend the class or activity. A charter school shall not authorize such a child to participate in a class or activity through a program of distance education provided by the charter school pursuant to NRS 388.820 to 388.874, inclusive.
- 3. The governing body of a charter school may revoke its approval for a child to participate in a class or extracurricular activity at a charter school pursuant to subsection 1 if the governing body determines that the child has failed to comply with applicable statutes, or applicable rules and regulations. If the governing body so revokes its approval, neither the governing body nor the charter school is liable for any damages relating to the denial of services to the child.
- 4. The governing body of a charter school may, before authorizing a homeschooled child to participate in a class or extracurricular activity pursuant to subsection 1, require proof of the identity of the child, including, without limitation, the birth certificate of the child or other documentation sufficient to establish the identity of the child.

#### Sec. 26. NRS 388.850 is hereby amended to read as follows:

- 1. A pupil may enroll in a program of distance education if:
- (a) Pursuant to this section or other specific statute, the pupil is eligible for enrollment or the pupil's enrollment is not otherwise prohibited;
- (b) The program of distance education in which the pupil wishes to enroll is offered by the school district in which the pupil resides or a charter school or, if the program of distance education

in which the pupil wishes to enroll is a full-time program of distance education offered by a school district other than the school district in which the pupil resides, the program is not the same or substantially similar to a program of distance education offered by the school district in which the pupil resides;

- (c) The pupil satisfies the qualifications and conditions for enrollment adopted by the State Board pursuant to NRS 388.874; and
- (d) The pupil satisfies the requirements of the program of distance education.
- 2. A child who is exempt from compulsory attendance and is enrolled in a private school pursuant to chapter 394 of NRS or is being homeschooled is not eligible to enroll in or otherwise attend a program of distance education, regardless of whether the child is otherwise eligible for enrollment pursuant to subsection 1.
- 3. If a pupil who is prohibited from attending public school pursuant to NRS 392.264 enrolls in a program of distance education, the enrollment and attendance of that pupil must comply with all requirements of NRS 62F.100 to 62F.150, inclusive, and 392.251 to 392.271, inclusive.
- 4. A pupil who is enrolled in grade 12 in a program of distance education and who moves out of this State is eligible to maintain enrollment in the program of distance education until the pupil graduates from high school.
- 5. An opt-in child who is exempt from compulsory attendance is not eligible to enroll in or otherwise attend a program of distance education, regardless of whether the child is otherwise eligible for enrollment pursuant to subsection 1, unless the opt-in child receives only a portion of his or her instruction from a participating entity as authorized pursuant to section 9 of this act.
- Sec. 27. Chapter 392 of NRS is hereby amended by adding thereto the provisions set forth as sections 28, 29 and 30 of this act.
- Sec. 28. As used in this section and sections 29 and 30 of this act, unless the context otherwise requires, "parent" has the meaning ascribed to it in section 5 of this act.
- Sec. 29. 1. The parent of an opt-in child shall provide notice to the school district where the child would otherwise attend that the child is an opt-in child as soon as practicable after entering into an agreement to establish an education freedom account pursuant to section 9 of this act. Such notice must also include:
- (a) The full name, age and gender of the child; and
- (b) The name and address of each parent of the child.
- 2. The superintendent of schools of a school shall accept a notice provided pursuant to subsection 1 and shall not require any additional assurances from the parent who filed the notice.
- 3. The school district shall provide to a parent who files a notice pursuant to subsection 1, a written acknowledgement which clearly indicates that the parent has provided the notification required by law and that the child is an opt-in child. The written acknowledgment shall be deemed proof of compliance with Nevada's compulsory school attendance law.
- 4. The superintendent of schools of a school district shall process a written request for a copy of the records of the school district or any information contained therein relating to an opt-in child not later than 5 days after receiving the request. The superintendent of schools may only release such records or information:

- (a) To the Department, the Budget Division of the Department of Administration and the Fiscal Analysis Division of the Legislative Counsel Bureau for use in preparing the biennial budget;
- (b) To a person or entity specified by the parent of the child, or by the child if the child is at least 18 years of age, upon suitable proof of identity of the parent or child; or
- (c) If required by specific statute.
- 5. If an opt-in child seeks admittance or entrance to any public school in this State, the school may use only commonly used practices in determining the academic ability, placement or eligibility of the child. If the child enrolls in a charter school, the charter school shall, to the extent practicable, notify the board of trustees of the resident school district of the child's enrollment in the charter school. Regardless of whether the charter school provides such notification to the board of trustees, the charter school may count the child who is enrolled for the purposes of NRS 387.123. An opt-in child seeking admittance to public high school must comply with NRS 392.033.
- 6. A school shall not discriminate in any manner against an opt-in child or a child who was formerly an opt-in child.
- 7. Each school district shall allow an opt-in child to participate in all college entrance examinations offered in this State, including, without limitation, the SAT, the ACT, the Preliminary SAT and the National Merit Scholarship Qualifying Test. Each school district shall upon request, provide information to the parent of an opt-in child who resides in the school district has adequate notice of the availability of information concerning such examinations on the Internet website of the school district maintained pursuant to NRS 389.004.
- Sec. 30. 1. The Department shall develop a standard form for the notice of intent of an opt-in child to participate in programs and activities. The board of trustees of each school district shall, in a timely manner, make only the form developed by the Department available to parents of opt-in children.
- 2. If an opt-in child wishes to participate in classes, activities, programs, sports or interscholastic activities and events at a public school or through a school district, or through the Nevada Interscholastic Activities Association, the parent of the child must file a current notice of intent to participate with the resident school district.
- Sec. 31. NRS 392.033 is hereby amended to read as follows:
- 1. The State Board shall adopt regulations which prescribe the courses of study required for promotion to high school, including, without limitation, English, mathematics, science and social studies. The regulations may include the credits to be earned in each course.
- 2. Except as otherwise provided in subsection 4, the board of trustees of a school district shall not promote a pupil to high school if the pupil does not complete the course of study or credits required for promotion. The board of trustees of the school district in which the pupil is enrolled may provide programs of remedial study to complete the courses of study required for promotion to high school.
- 3. The board of trustees of each school district shall adopt a procedure for evaluating the course of study or credits completed by a pupil who transfers to a junior high or middle school from a junior high or middle school in this State or from a school outside of this State.
- 4. The board of trustees of each school district shall adopt a policy that allows a pupil who has not completed the courses of study or credits required for promotion to high school to be placed on academic probation and to

enroll in high school. A pupil who is on academic probation pursuant to this subsection shall complete appropriate remediation in the subject areas that the pupil failed to pass. The policy must include the criteria for eligibility of a pupil to be placed on academic probation. A parent or guardian may elect not to place his or her child on academic probation but to remain in grade 8.

- 5. A homeschooled child *or opt-in child* who enrolls in a public high school shall, upon initial enrollment:
- (a) Provide documentation sufficient to prove that the child has successfully completed the courses of study required for promotion to high school through an accredited program of homeschool study recognized by the board of trustees of the school district [;] or from a participating entity, as applicable;
- (b) Demonstrate proficiency in the courses of study required for promotion to high school through an examination prescribed by the board of trustees of the school district; or
- (c) Provide other proof satisfactory to the board of trustees of the school district demonstrating competency in the courses of study required for promotion to high school.
- 6. As used in this section, "participating entity" has the meaning ascribed to it in section 6 of this act.

**Sec. 32.** NRS 392.070 is hereby amended to read as follows:

- 1. Attendance of a child required by the provisions of NRS 392.040 must be excused when:
- (a) The child is enrolled in a private school pursuant to chapter 394 of NRS; [or]
- (b) A parent of the child chooses to provide education to the child and files a notice of intent to homeschool the child with the superintendent of schools of the school district in which the child resides in accordance with NRS 392.700 [-]; or
- (c) The child is an opt-in child and notice of such has been provided to the school district in which the child resides or the charter school in which the child was previously enrolled, as applicable, in accordance with section 29 of this act.

Sec. 33. NRS 392.074 is hereby amended to read as follows:

- 1. Except as otherwise provided in subsection 1 of NRS 392.072 for programs of special education and related services, upon the request of a parent or legal guardian of a child who is enrolled in a private school or a parent or legal guardian of a homeschooled child *or opt-in child*, the board of trustees of the school district in which the child resides shall authorize the child to participate in any classes and extracurricular activities, excluding sports, at a public school within the school district if:
- (a) Space for the child in the class or extracurricular activity is available;
- (b) The parent or legal guardian demonstrates to the satisfaction of the board of trustees that the child is qualified to participate in the class or extracurricular activity; [and]
- (c) If the child is a homeschooled child, a notice of intent of a homeschooled child to participate in programs and activities is filed for the child with the school district for the current school year pursuant to NRS 388D.070[-]; and
- (d) if the child is an opt-in child, a notice of intent of an opt-in child to participate in programs and activities is filed for the child with the school district for the current school year pursuant to section 30 of this act.

- → If the board of trustees of a school district authorizes a child to participate in a class or extracurricular activity, excluding sports, pursuant to this subsection, the board of trustees is not required to provide transportation for the child to attend the class or activity. A homeschooled child *or opt-in child* must be allowed to participate in interscholastic activities and events governed by the Nevada Interscholastic Activities Association pursuant to chapter 385B of NRS and interscholastic activities and events, including sports, pursuant to subsection 3.
- 2. The board of trustees of a school district may revoke its approval for a pupil to participate in a class or extracurricular activity at a public school pursuant to subsection 1 if the board of trustees or the public school determines that the pupil has failed to comply with applicable statutes, or applicable rules and regulations of the board of trustees. If the board of trustees revokes its approval, neither the board of trustees nor the public school is liable for any damages relating to the denial of services to the pupil.
- 3. In addition to those interscholastic activities and events governed by the Nevada Interscholastic Activities Association pursuant to chapter 385B of NRS, a homeschooled child *or opt-in child* must be allowed to participate in interscholastic activities and events, including sports, if a notice of intent of a homeschooled child *or opt-in child* to participate in programs and activities is filed for the child with the school district for the current school year pursuant to NRS 388D.070 *or section 30 of this act, as applicable*. A homeschooled child *or opt-in child* who participates in interscholastic activities and events at a public school pursuant to this subsection must participate within the school district of the child's residence through the public school which the child is otherwise zoned to attend. Any rules or regulations that apply to pupils enrolled in public schools who participate in interscholastic activities and events, including sports, apply in the same manner to homeschooled children *and opt-in children* who participate in interscholastic activities and events, including, without limitation, provisions governing:
- (a) Eligibility and qualifications for participation;
- (b) Fees for participation;
- (c) Insurance;
- (d) Transportation;
- (e) Requirements of physical examination;
- (f) Responsibilities of participants;
- (g) Schedules of events;
- (h) Safety and welfare of participants;
- (i) Eligibility for awards, trophies and medals;
- (i) Conduct of behavior and performance of participants; and
- (k) Disciplinary procedures.
- 4. If a homeschooled child *or opt-in child* participates in interscholastic activities and events pursuant to subsection 3:
- (a) No challenge may be brought by the Association, a school district, a public school or a private school, a parent or guardian of a pupil enrolled in a public school or a private school, a pupil enrolled in a public school

or a private school, or any other entity or person claiming that an interscholastic activity or event is invalid because the homeschooled child *or opt-in child* is allowed to participate.

- (b) Neither the school district nor a public school may prescribe any regulations, rules, policies, procedures or requirements governing the eligibility or participation of the homeschooled child *or opt-in child* that are more restrictive than the provisions governing the eligibility and participation of pupils enrolled in public schools.
- 5. The board of trustees of a school district:
- (a) May, before authorizing a homeschooled child *or opt-in child* to participate in a class or extracurricular activity, excluding sports, pursuant to subsection 1, require proof of the identity of the child, including, without limitation, the birth certificate of the child or other documentation sufficient to establish the identity of the child.
- (b) Shall, before allowing a homeschooled child *or opt-in child* to participate in interscholastic activities and events governed by the Nevada Interscholastic Activities Association pursuant to chapter 385B of NRS and interscholastic activities and events pursuant to subsection 3, require proof of the identity of the child, including, without limitation, the birth certificate of the child or other documentation sufficient to establish the identity of the child.

#### Sec. 34. NRS 392.466 is hereby amended to read as follows:

- 1. Except as otherwise provided in this section, any pupil who commits a battery which results in the bodily injury of an employee of the school or who sells or distributes any controlled substance while on the premises of any public school, at an activity sponsored by a public school or on any school bus and who is at least 11 years of age shall meet with the school and his or her parent or legal guardian. The school shall provide a plan of action based on restorative justice to the parent or legal guardian of the pupil or if the pupil is an unaccompanied pupil, the pupil. The pupil may be suspended or expelled from the school, in which case the pupil shall:
- (a) Enroll in a private school pursuant to chapter 394 of NRS or be homeschooled or an opt-in child; or
- (b) Enroll in a program of independent study provided pursuant to NRS 389.155 for pupils who have been suspended or expelled from public school or a program of distance education provided pursuant to NRS 388.820 to 388.874, inclusive, if the pupil qualifies for enrollment and is accepted for enrollment in accordance with the requirements of the applicable program.
- 2. An employee who is a victim of a battery which results in the bodily injury of an employee of the school may appeal to the school the plan of action provided pursuant to subsection 1 if:
- (a) The employee feels any actions taken pursuant to such plan are inappropriate; and
- (b) For a pupil with a disability who committed the battery, the board of trustees of the school district or its designee has reviewed the circumstances and determined that such an appeal is in compliance with the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400 et seq.
- 3. Except as otherwise provided in this section, any pupil of any age, including, without limitation, a pupil with a disability, who is found in possession of a firearm or a dangerous weapon while on the premises of any public school, at an activity sponsored by a public school or on any school bus must, for the first occurrence, be expelled from the school for a period of not less than 1 year, although the pupil may be placed in another kind of school for a period not to exceed the period of the expulsion. For a second occurrence, the pupil must be permanently expelled from the school.

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- 4. If a school is unable to retain a pupil in the school pursuant to subsection 1 for the safety of any person or because doing so would not be in the best interest of the pupil, the pupil may be suspended, expelled or placed in another school. If a pupil is placed in another school, the current school of the pupil shall explain what services will be provided to the pupil at the new school that the current school is unable to provide to address the specific needs and behaviors of the pupil. The school district of the current school of the pupil shall coordinate with the new school to create a plan of action based on restorative justice for the pupil and to ensure that any resources required to execute the plan of action based on restorative justice are available at the new school.
- 5. Except as otherwise provided in this section, if a pupil is deemed a habitual disciplinary problem pursuant to NRS 392.4655, the pupil is at least 11 years of age and the school has made a reasonable effort to complete a plan of action based on restorative justice with the pupil, based on the seriousness of the acts which were the basis for the discipline, the pupil may be:
- (a) Suspended from the school;
- (b) Expelled from the school under extraordinary circumstances as determined by the principal of the school.
- 6. If the pupil is expelled, or the period of the pupil's suspension is for one school semester, the pupil must:
- (a) Enroll in a private school pursuant to chapter 394 of NRS or be homeschooled *or become an opt-in child*; or
- (b) Enroll in a program of independent study provided pursuant to NRS 389.155 for pupils who have been suspended or expelled from public school or a program of distance education provided pursuant to NRS 388.820 to 388.874, inclusive, if the pupil qualifies for enrollment and is accepted for enrollment in accordance with the requirements of the applicable program.
- 7. The superintendent of schools of a school district may, for good cause shown in a particular case in that school district, allow a modification to a suspension or expulsion pursuant to subsections 1 to 5, inclusive, if such modification is set forth in writing. The superintendent shall allow such a modification if the superintendent determines that a plan of action based on restorative justice may be used successfully.
- 8. This section does not prohibit a pupil from having in his or her possession a knife or firearm with the approval of the principal of the school. A principal may grant such approval only in accordance with the policies or regulations adopted by the board of trustees of the school district.
- 9. Except as otherwise provided in this subsection and subsection 3, a pupil who is less than 11 years of age must not be permanently expelled from school. In extraordinary circumstances, a school may request an exception to this subsection from the board of trustees of the school district. A pupil who is at least 11 years of age may be suspended, expelled or permanently expelled from school pursuant to this section only after the board of trustees of the school district or its designee has reviewed the circumstances and approved this action in accordance with the procedural policy adopted by the board for such issues.
- 10. Except as otherwise provided in subsection 3, a pupil with a disability who is at least 11 years of age may, in accordance with the procedural policy adopted by the board of trustees of the school district for such matters and only after the board of trustees of the school district or its designee has reviewed the circumstances and determined that the action is in compliance with the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400 et seq., be:

- (a) Suspended from school pursuant to this section for not more than 5 days. Such a suspension may be imposed pursuant to this paragraph for each occurrence of conduct proscribed by subsection 1.
- (b) Expelled from school pursuant to this section.
- (c) Permanently expelled from school pursuant to this section.
- 11. A homeless pupil or a pupil in foster care who is at least 11 years of age may be suspended or expelled from school pursuant to this section only if a determination is made that the behavior that led to the consideration for suspension or expulsion was not caused by homelessness or being in foster care. The person responsible for making a determination of whether or not the behavior was caused by homelessness or being in foster care unless the person determines that the behavior was not caused by homelessness or being in foster care pursuant to this subsection. A determination that the behavior was not caused by homelessness must be made in consultation with the local educational agency liaison for homeless pupils designated in accordance with the McKinney-Vento Homeless Assistance Act of 1987, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11301 et seq., or a contact person at a school, including, without limitation, a school counselor or school social worker. A determination that the behavior was not caused by being in foster care must be made in consultation with an advocate for pupils in foster care at the school in which the pupil is in enrolled or the school counselor of the pupil.
- 12. The provisions of chapter 241 of NRS do not apply to any hearing or proceeding conducted pursuant to this section. Such hearings or proceedings must be closed to the public.
- 13. As used in this section:
- (a) "Battery" has the meaning ascribed to it in paragraph (a) of subsection 1 of NRS 200.481.
- (b) "Dangerous weapon" includes, without limitation, a blackjack, slungshot, billy, sand-club, sandbag, metal knuckles, dirk or dagger, a nunchaku or trefoil, as defined in NRS 202.350, a butterfly knife or any other knife described in NRS 202.350, a switchblade knife as defined in NRS 202.265, or any other object which is used, or threatened to be used, in such a manner and under such circumstances as to pose a threat of, or cause, bodily injury to a person.
- (c) "Firearm" includes, without limitation, any pistol, revolver, shotgun, explosive substance or device, and any other item included within the definition of a "firearm" in 18 U.S.C. § 921, as that section existed on July 1, 1995.
- (d) "Foster care" has the meaning ascribed to it in 45 C.F.R. § 1355.20. (e) "Homeless pupil" has the meaning ascribed to the term.
- (e) "Homeless children and youths" in 42 U.S.C. § 11434a(2).
- (f) "Permanently expelled" means the disciplinary removal of a pupil from the school in which the pupil is currently enrolled:
  - (1) Except as otherwise provided in subparagraph (2), without the possibility of returning to the school in which the pupil is currently enrolled or another public school within the school district; and
  - (2) With the possibility of enrolling in a program or public school for alternative education for pupils who are expelled or permanently expelled after being permanently expelled.
- (g) "Restorative justice" has the meaning ascribed to it in NRS 392.472.

- (h) "Unaccompanied pupil" has the meaning ascribed to the term "unaccompanied youth" in 42 U.S.C. §1434a(6).
- 14. The provisions of this section do not prohibit a pupil who is suspended or expelled from enrolling in a charter school that is designed exclusively for the enrollment of pupils with disciplinary problems if the pupil is accepted for enrollment by the charter school pursuant to NRS 388A.453 or 388A.456. Upon request, the governing body of a charter school must be provided with access to the records of the pupil relating to the pupil's suspension or expulsion in accordance with applicable federal and state law before the governing body makes a decision concerning the enrollment of the pupil.
- Sec. 35. Nothing herein shall require the Legislature to appropriate money to fund education freedom accounts or any expenses related thereto.
- Sec. 36. If any provision or part of this act be declared invalid, or the application thereof to any person, thing or circumstance is held invalid, such invalidity shall not affect the remaining provisions or application of this act which can be given effect without the invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions of this act are declared to be severable. This subsection shall be construed broadly to preserve and effectuate the declared purpose of this act.
- Sec. 37. The provisions of this act become effective upon an appropriation by the Legislature to fund the education freedom accounts.

[The remainder of this page is blank.]

# **DESCRIPTION OF EFFECT**

The Petition establishes an education freedom account program under which parents will be authorized to establish an account for their child's education. The parent of any child required to attend public school who has been enrolled in a public school in Nevada during the entirety of the immediately preceding school year or whose child is eligible to enroll in kindergarten may establish an account for the child. Money in the accounts may be used to pay certain educational expenses including, but not limited to, tuition and fees at participating entities. Participating entities may include eligible private schools, a program of distance education not operated by a public school and parents, among others.

The maximum available grant is 90 percent of the statewide base per pupil funding amount. For Fiscal Year 2021-2022, that statewide base per pupil funding amount is \$6,980 per pupil, and for Fiscal Year 2022-2023 it is \$7,074 per pupil. That said, nothing in the initiative requires the Legislature to appropriate money to fund the accounts. If no money is appropriated, no funding will be available for the accounts. Funding the accounts, however, could necessitate a tax increase or reduction of government services.

(Only registered voters of this county may sign below)

County of

Peti	tion District	(Only re	egistered voters of the	nis petition district may s	ign below)
				This Space Fo Office Use O	
1	PRINT YOUR NAME (first name, initia	al, last name)	RESIDENCE ADDRESS		<u>.</u>
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# **DESCRIPTION OF EFFECT**

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				nis petition district may sign below  This Space For Office Use Only
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	YOUR SIGNATURE	DATE / /	CITY	COUNTY

Place Affidavit on last page of document.

# THE FOLLOWING AFFIDAVIT MUST BE COMPLETED AND SIGNED:

# **AFFIDAVIT OF CIRCULATOR**

(TO BE SIGNED BY CIRCULATOR)

STATE OF NEVADA	)		
COUNTY OF	)		
Ι,	, (print name),	, being first duly sworn under penalty of perjury	, depose and say: (1)
that I reside at			***************************************
(print street, city and state); (	2) that I am 18 years of ago	e or older; (3) that I personally circulated this c	locument; (4) that all
signatures were affixed in my	presence; (5) that the num	nber of signatures affixed thereon is	; and (6)
that each person who signed	had an opportunity before	e signing to read the full text of the act or reso	olution on which the
initiative or referendum is de	manded.		
Subscribed and sworn to or a	ffirmed before me this	Signature of Circulator	
day of	,, by	·································	
Notary Public or person author	orized to administer oath		

EL501C Revised 8/2019

Case No.: 22 OC 00027 1B

REC'D & FILEIM

2022 FEB 22 PM 2: 56

AUBREY ROWLATT

Dept. No.: 1

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VS.

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IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA IN AND FOR CARSON CITY

BEVERLY ROGERS, an individual; RORY REID, an individual,

Plaintiffs,

**ORDER TRANSFERRING CASE TO DEPARTMENT 2** 

BARBARA CEGAVSKE, in her official capacity as NEVADA SECRETARY OF STATE, Defendant.

This case, upon filing, was assigned to Department One of the First Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada, in and for Carson City, in which said department District Judge James T. Russell presides.

A conflict exists due to Jennifer Russell, the Public Information Officer for the Nevada Secretary of State, being Judge Russell's niece. Therefore, good cause appearing;

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the above-entitled matter be transferred to the Honorable JAMES E. WILSON, JR., District Judge, Department 2, for all further proceedings. Dated this **22**-day of February, 2022.

# **CERTIFICATE OF MAILING**

Pursuant to NRCP 5(b), I certify that I am an employee of the First Judicial District Court, and that on this 20day of February, 2022, I deposited for mailing at Carson City, Nevada, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order addressed as follows:

5 Bradley S. Schrager, Esq.

6 John Samberg, Esq.

Daniel Bravo, Esq.

Wolf, Rifkin, Shapiro, Schulman & Rabkin, LLP 3773 Howard Hughes Parkway, Suite 590 South

Las Vegas, NV 89169

Julie Harkleroad

Judicial Assistant, Dept. 1

-2-

1	BRADLEY S. SCHRAGER, ESQ. (NSB 10217)		
2	JOHN SAMBERG, ESQ. (NSB 10828) DANIEL BRAVO, ESQ. (NSB 13078)		HECTO & FILED
3	WOLF, RIFKIN, SHAPIRO, SCHULMAN & 3773 Howard Hughes Parkway, Suite 590 South	·	022 MAR -1 PM 3: 28
4	Las Vegas, Nevada 89169 (702) 341-5200/Fax: (702) 341-5300		AUBREY BOWL ATT
5	bschrager@wrslawyers.com jsamberg@wrslawyers.com	В	CJERK
6	dbravo@wrslawyers.com		DEPUTY
7	Attorneys for Plaintiffs		
8	IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT	COURT OF THE ST	CATE OF NEVADA
9	IN AND FOR C	CARSON CITY	
10	BEVERLY ROGERS, an individual, RORY REID, an individual,	Case No. 22-OC-	00027 1D
11	Plaintiff,	Dept. No. I	00027 IB
12	VS.	Dept. No. 1	
13			
14	BARBARA CEGAVSKE, in her official capacity as NEVADA SECRETARY OF STATE,		
15	Defendants.		
16			
17	<u>DECLARATION</u>	N OF SERVICE	
18	I, Dawn Calhoun, declare: That at all time	e herein Declarant wa	as and is a citizen of the
19	United States, over 18 years of age, licensed to se	erve civil process in th	e State of Nevada under
20	NV PILB LIC #2602, and not a party to or interest	sted in the proceeding	in which this declaration
21	is made. The Declarant received 1 copy of the S	ummons, Complaint	for Declaratory and
22	Injunctive Relief Challenging Initiative Petitio	n S-02-2022 Pursuar	nt to NRS 295.061(1),
23	Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Su	pport of Complaint f	or Declaratory and
24	Injunctive Relief Challenging Initiative Petitio	n S-02-2022 Pursuar	nt to NRS 295.061(1),
25	on the <b>22nd</b> day of <b>February</b> , <b>2022</b> and served the	ne same on the 22nd	lay of <b>February, 2022</b>
26	at 4:07 pm by serving a copy on The State of No	evada Office of the A	ttorney General by
27	personally delivering and leaving a copy at The	Office of the Attorney	y General, 100 N.
28	Carson Street, Carson City, Nevada 89701 with	h <mark>Connie Salerno, L</mark> e	egal Researcher.

C & H Couriers/Process Servers 301 Anderson St. Carson City, Nevada 89701 (775) 219-2871 info@candhcouriers.com

V

1	Pursuant to NRS 53.045, I declare under penalty of perjury under the law of the State of							
2	Nevada that the foregoing is true and correct.							
3	Pursuant to NRS 239B.030 this document does not contain the social security number of							
4	any person.							
5	Dated February 23, 2022	C & H COURIERS/PROCESS SERVERS						
6								
7		Affiant: DAWN CALHOUN						
8		Process Server – NV PILB LIC #2602 301 Anderson Street						
9		Carson City, Nevada 89701 (775) 219-2871						
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C & H Couriers/Process Servers 301 Anderson St. Carson City, Nevada 89701 (775) 219-2871 info@candhcouriers.com

# AARON D. FORD Attorney General

KYLE E. N. GEORGE First Assistant Attorney General

CHRISTINE JONES BRADY Second Assistant Attorney General



#### STATE OF NEVADA

JESSICA L. ADAIR Chief of Staff

LESLIE NINO PIRO General Counsel

HEIDI PARRY STERN
Solicitor General

# OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

100 North Carson Street Carson City, Nevada 89701

DATE RECEIVED: Z-72722 RECEIVED BY: (, SAUGENO
NAME OF ENTITY/PERSON SERVING: DAWN 1 COURIERS
CASE NAME: BEVERLY ROGERS; PORY REID V. BARBARA
CEGAVSKE
CASE NUMBER: 27 0002716 COURT: 151 JD
DOCUMENT(S) RECEIVED: SUMMONS; COMPLANT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF CHALLENGING INVITATIVE PETITION 5-02-2022 PURSUANT TONRS 295,061(1); MEMORANDUM OF P.A 150 COMPLANT; RANTHERS INITIAL APPEARANCE FEE DISCUSSURE
PURSUANT TO NRS 295,061(1); MEMORANDUM OFP, A 150 COMPLANAT;
PLANTIFF'S INITIAL APPEARANCE FEE DISCUSSURE
☐ Service of Process
PURSUANT TO STATUTE
NOTICE

COMPLAINT: NRS 41.031(2) provides in part that, in any action against the State of Nevada, the action must be brought in the name of the State of Nevada on relation of the particular department, commission, board or other agency of the state whose actions are the basis for the suit. In an action against the State of Nevada, the summons and a copy of the complaint must be served upon the Attorney General, at the Office of the Attorney General in Carson City and upon the person serving in the office of administrative head of the named agency. Service on the Attorney General or designee does not constitute service on any individual or administrative head.

This Receipt acknowledges that the documents described herein have been received by the Nevada Attorney General or the designee authorized by NRS 41.031(2)(a). This Receipt does not ensure that any party, person or agency has been properly served, nor does it waive any legal requirement for service.

□ SUBPOENA: Receipt of a subpoena by the Office of the Attorney General does not constitute valid service of the subpoena upon any individual or upon any state agency, with the exception of the Office of the Attorney General. Receipt of subpoena or any other process by the Attorney General or designee does not constitute service upon any individual, nor does it constitute service upon the administrative head of an agency pursuant to NRS 174.345.

□ <u>PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW</u>: NRS 233B.130(2)(c)(1) provides in part that all Petitions for Judicial Review of state agency decisions/judgments/orders must be served upon, the Attorney General, a person designated by the Attorney General or the Office of the Attorney General in Carson City.

This Receipt acknowledges that the documents described herein have been received by the Nevada Attorney General or the designee authorized by NRS 233B.130(2)(c)(1). This Receipt does not ensure that any party, person or agency has been properly served, nor does it waive any legal requirement for service.

MEC'D & FILED BRADLEY S. SCHRAGER, ESQ. (NSB 10217) JOHN SAMBERG, ESQ. (NSB 10828) 2022 MAR -1 PM 3: 27 DANIEL BRAVO, ESQ. (NSB 13078)

WOLF, RIFKIN, SHAPIRO, SCHULMAN & RABKIN, LLP
AUBREY, ROWNATT 3773 Howard Hughes Parkway, Suite 590 South Las Vegas, Nevada 89169 (702) 341-5200/Fax: (702) 341-5300 DEPUTY bschrager@wrslawyers.com jsamberg@wrslawyers.com dbravo@wrslawyers.com 6 Attorneys for Plaintiffs 7 8 IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 9 OF THE STATE OF NEVADA IN AND FOR CARSON CITY 10 Case No.: 3300 CW37 13 11 BEVERLY ROGERS, an individual; RORY REID, an individual, Dept.: 12 Plaintiffs, 13 **SUMMONS** vs. 14 BARBARA CEGAVSKE, in her official capacity as NEVADA SÉCRETARY OF STATE, 16 17 Defendant. 18 BARBARA CEGAVSKE, 19 in her official capacity as Nevada Secretary of State State Capitol Building 101 N. Carson Street, Suite 3 20 Carson City, Nevada 89701 21 THE STATE OF NEVADA SENDS GREETINGS TO THE ABOVE-22 NAMED DEFENDANT: 23 NOTICE!) YOU HAVE BEEN SUED. THE COURT MAY DECIDE 24 AGAINST YOU WITHOUT YOUR BEING HEARD UNLESS YOU RESPOND 25 WITHIN 20 DAYS. 26 27

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(a) Summons.

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- (1) Contents. A summons must:
  - (A) name the court, the county, and the parties;
  - (B) be directed to the defendant;
- (C) state the name and address of the plaintiff's attorney or if unrepresented of the plaintiff;
- (D) state the time within which the defendant must appear and defend under Rule 12(a) or any other applicable rule or statute;
- (E) notify the defendant that a failure to appear and defend will result in a default judgment against the defendant for the relief demanded in the complaint;
  - (F) be signed by the clerk;
  - (G) bear the court's seal; and
  - (H) comply with Rule 4.4(c)(2)(C) when service is made by publication.
  - (2) Amendments. The court may permit a summons to be amended.
- (b) **Issuance.** On or after filing a complaint, the plaintiff must present a summons to the clerk for issuance under signature and seal. If a summons is properly presented, the clerk must issue a summons under signature and seal to the plaintiff for service on the defendant. A summons or a copy of a summons that is addressed to multiple defendants must be issued for each defendant to be served.
  - (c) Service.
- (1) In General. Unless a defendant voluntarily appears, the plaintiff is responsible for:
  - (A) obtaining a waiver of service under Rule 4.1, if applicable; or
- (B) having the summons and complaint served under Rule 4.2, 4.3, or 4.4 within the time allowed by Rule 4(e).
- (2) **Service With a Copy of the Complaint.** A summons must be served with a copy of the complaint. The plaintiff must furnish the necessary copies to the person who makes service.
- (3) **By Whom.** The summons and complaint may be served by the sheriff, or a deputy sheriff, of the county where the defendant is found or by any person who is at least 18 years old and not a party to the action.
- (4) Cumulative Service Methods. The methods of service provided in Rules 4.2, 4.3, and 4.4 are cumulative and may be utilized with, after, or independently of any other methods of service.
- (d) **Proof of Service.** Unless a defendant voluntarily appears or waives or admits service, a plaintiff must file proof of service with the court stating the date, place, and manner of service no later than the time permitted for the defendant to respond to the summons.
- (1) **Service Within the United States.** Proof of service within Nevada or within the United States must be made by affidavit from the person who served the summons and complaint.
- (2) **Service Outside the United States.** Service not within the United States must be proved as follows:

(A) if made under Rule 4.3(b)(1)(A), as provided in the applicable treaty or convention; or

(B) if made under Rule 4.3(b)(1)(B) or (C), by a receipt signed by the addressee, or by other evidence satisfying the court that the summons and complaint were delivered to the addressee.

- (3) **Service by Publication.** If service is made by publication, a copy of the publication must be attached to the proof of service, and proof of service must be made by affidavit from:
- (A) the publisher or other designated employee having knowledge of the publication; and
- (B) if the summons and complaint were mailed to a person's last-known address, the individual depositing the summons and complaint in the mail.
  - (4) Amendments. The court may permit proof of service to be amended.
- (5) Failure to Make Proof of Service. Failure to make proof of service does not affect the validity of the service.
  - (e) Time Limit for Service.
- (1) In General. The summons and complaint must be served upon a defendant no later than 120 days after the complaint is filed, unless the court grants an extension of time under this rule.
- (2) **Dismissal.** If service of the summons and complaint is not made upon a defendant before the 120-day service period or any extension thereof expires, the court must dismiss the action, without prejudice, as to that defendant upon motion or upon the court's own order to show cause.
- (3) **Timely Motion to Extend Time.** If a plaintiff files a motion for an extension of time before the 120-day service period or any extension thereof expires and shows that good cause exists for granting an extension of the service period, the court must extend the service period and set a reasonable date by which service should be made.
- (4) Failure to Make Timely Motion to Extend Time. If a plaintiff files a motion for an extension of time after the 120-day service period or any extension thereof expires, the court must first determine whether good cause exists for the plaintiff's failure to timely file the motion for an extension before the court considers whether good cause exists for granting an extension of the service period. If the plaintiff shows that good cause exists for the plaintiff's failure to timely file the motion and for granting an extension of the service period, the court must extend the time for service and set a reasonable date by which service should be made.

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C & H Couriers/Process Servers 301 Anderson St. Carson City, Nevada 89701 (775) 219-2871 info@candhcouriers.com

#### **DECLARATION OF SERVICE**

I, Dawn Calhoun, declare: That at all time herein Declarant was and is a citizen of the United States, over 18 years of age, licensed to serve civil process in the State of Nevada under NV PILB LIC #2602, and not a party to or interested in the proceeding in which this declaration is made. The Declarant received 1 copy of the Summons, Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief Challenging Initiative Petition S-02-2022 Pursuant to NRS 295.061(1), Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief Challenging Initiative Petition S-02-2022 Pursuant to NRS 295.061(1), Plaintiff's Initial Appearance Fee Disclosure on the 22nd day of February, 2022 and served the same on the 22nd day of February, 2022 at 4:00 pm on Barbara Cegavske, in her official capacity as Nevada Secretary of State by personally delivering and leaving a copy at the Nevada Secretary of State Annex, 202 N. Carson Street, Carson City, Nevada 89701 with Colleen Metzger, Administrative Assistant 3.

Pursuant to NRS 53.045, I declare under penalty of perjury under the law of the State of Nevada that the foregoing is true and correct.

Dated February 23, 2022

C & H COURIERS/PROCESS SERVERS

Declarant: DAWN CALHOUN Process Server – NV PILB LIC #2602

301 Anderson Street

Carson City, Nevada 89701

(775) 219-2871

Work Order No. 361063

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
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
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Attorneys for Education Freedom PAC



# IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA IN AND FOR CARSON CITY

BEVERLY ROGERS, an individual; RORY REID, an individual,

Plaintiffs.

VS.

BARBARA CEGAVSKE, in her official capacity as NEVADA SECRETARY OF STATE,

Defendant.

Case No. 22 OC 00027 1B

Dept. No. II

# ANSWER IN INTERVENTION TO COMPLAINT

COMES NOW, Intervenor EDUCATION FREEDOM PAC, a registered Nevada political action committee ("EFP"), by and through its attorney Lucas Foletta, Esq., of McDonald Carano LLP, and hereby responds to the Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief Challenging Initiative Petition S-02-2022 Pursuant to NRS 295.061(1) ("Complaint") of Plaintiffs as follows:

# **JURISDICTION AND VENUE**

1. The allegations in Paragraph 1 set forth legal conclusions to which no response is necessary, but should any answer be required, EFP denies the allegations in Paragraph 1.

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2. The allegations in Paragraph 2 set forth legal conclusions to which no response is necessary, but should any answer be required, EFP denies the allegations in Paragraph 2.

#### **PARTIES**

- 3. EFP is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations in Paragraph 3 and denies them on that basis.
- 4. EFP is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations in Paragraph 4 and denies them on that basis.
- EFP is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the 5. truth of the allegations in Paragraph 5 and denies them on that basis.

#### GENERAL FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

- 6. EFP denies the allegations in Paragraph 6, except admits that the statutory initiative petition designated as S-02-2022 ("Petition") and related Notice of Intent to Circulate Statewide Initiative or Referendum Petition ("Notice of Intent") was filed on January 31, 2022.
- 7. EFP denies the allegations in Paragraph 7, except admits that the text of the Petition is as stated in Exhibit 1 to the Complaint.
- EFP denies the allegations in Paragraph 8, except admits that the text of the 8. Petition is as stated in Exhibit 1 to the Complaint.
- EFP denies the allegations in Paragraph 9, except admits that the text of the 9. Petition is as stated in Exhibit 1 to the Complaint.
- 10. EFP denies the allegations in Paragraph 10, except admits that the text of the Petition is as stated in Exhibit 1 to the Complaint.
- 11. EFP denies the allegations in Paragraph 11, except admits that the text of the Petition is as stated in Exhibit 1 to the Complaint.
- EFP denies the allegations in Paragraph 12, except admits that the text of the 12. Petition is as stated in Exhibit 1 to the Complaint.
- EFP denies the allegations in Paragraph 13, except admits that the text of the 13. Petition is as stated in Exhibit 1 to the Complaint.

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- 14. The allegations in Paragraph 14 set forth legal conclusions to which no response is necessary, but should any answer be required, EFP denies the allegations in Paragraph 14, except admits that the text of the Petition is as stated in Exhibit 1 to the Complaint.
- 15. The allegations in Paragraph 15 set forth legal conclusions to which no response is necessary, but should any answer be required, EFP denies the allegations in Paragraph 13, except admits that the text of the Petition is as stated in Exhibit 1 to the Complaint.

#### FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION

#### ("Violation of Description of Effect Requirement, NRS 295.009(1)(b)")

- EFP repeats, re-alleges, and incorporates its responses in the foregoing 16. paragraphs, as if fully set forth herein.
- 17. EFP denies the allegations in Paragraph 17, except admits that the full text of NRS 295.009 is as follows:
  - Each petition for initiative or referendum must:
  - (a) Embrace but one subject and matters necessarily connected therewith and pertaining thereto; and
  - (b) Set forth, in not more than 200 words, a description of the effect of the initiative or referendum if the initiative or referendum is approved by the voters. The description must appear on each signature page of the petition.
  - For the purposes of paragraph (a) of subsection 1, a petition for initiative or referendum embraces but one subject and matters necessarily connected therewith and pertaining thereto, if the parts of the proposed initiative or referendum are functionally related and germane to each other in a way that provides sufficient notice of the general subject of, and of the interests likely to be affected by, the proposed initiative or referendum.
- 18. The allegations in Paragraph 18 set forth legal conclusions to which no response is necessary, but should any answer be required, EFP denies the allegations of Paragraph 18.
  - 19. EFP denies the allegations in Paragraph 19.
  - 20. EFP denies the allegations in Paragraph 20.
  - 21. EFP denies the allegations in Paragraph 21.

#### SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION

("Violation of Unfunded Expenditure Provision, Nev. Cost. Art. 19, Sec. 6")

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22.	EFP	repeats,	re-alleges,	and	incorporates	its	responses	in	the	foregoing
paragraphs, as if fully set forth herein.										

- 23. EFP denies the allegations in Paragraph 23, except admits that the full text of Nev. Const. Art. 19, Sec. 6 is as follows:
  - Sec. 6. Limitation on initiative making appropriation or requiring expenditure of money. This Article does not permit the proposal of any statute or statutory amendment which makes an appropriation or otherwise requires the expenditure of money, unless such statute or amendment also imposes a sufficient tax, not prohibited by the Constitution, or otherwise constitutionally provides for raising the necessary revenue.
- 24. The allegations in Paragraph 24 set forth legal conclusions to which no response is necessary, but should any answer be required, EFP denies the allegations of Paragraph 24.
  - 25. EFP denies the allegations in Paragraph 25.
  - 26. EFP denies the allegations in Paragraph 26.
  - 27. EFP denies the allegations in Paragraph 27.
  - 28. EFP denies the allegations in Paragraph 28.
  - 29. EFP denies the allegations in Paragraph 29.

# THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION

# ("Impermissible Inclusion of Administrative Details")

- 30. EFP repeats, re-alleges, and incorporates its responses in the foregoing paragraphs, as if fully set forth herein.
- 31. The allegations in Paragraph 31 set forth legal conclusions to which no response is necessary, but should any answer be required, EFP denies the allegations of Paragraph 31.
  - 32. EFP denies the allegations in Paragraph 32.
  - 33. EFP denies the allegations in Paragraph 33.

# **AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES**

As separate and affirmative defenses to the Complaint and to each cause of action, claim, and allegation therein, EFP alleges as follows:

1. Neither the Complaint nor any cause of action therein states a claim for which relief may be granted.

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- Estoppel and other equitable doctrines bar the allegations in the Complaint. 2.
- EFP may not have alleged all possible affirmative defenses herein insofar as 3. sufficient facts were unavailable upon the filing of the Answer. Therefore, EFP reserves the right to amend this Answer to allege additional affirmative defenses if subsequent investigation warrants.

# PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, EFP prays as follows:

- That the Petition is valid and complies with Nevada law; 1.
- 2. That judgment be entered in favor of EFP;
- 3. That Plaintiffs take nothing by way of their Complaint and it be dismissed with prejudice;
  - For an award of attorney fees and costs incurred in the defense of this action; and 4.
- For such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper under all the 5. circumstances of this matter.

# **AFFIRMATION**

The undersigned does hereby affirm that pursuant to NRS 239B.030, the preceding document does not contain the social security number of any person.

Dated: March/9, 2022

McDonald Carano

Lucas Foletta, Esq. (NSBN 12154)

McDonald Carano

100 West Liberty Street, 10th Floor

Reno, NV 89501

Attorneys for Education Freedom PAC

# McDONALD (M. CARANO 00 WEST LIBERTY STREET, TENTH FLOOR • RENO., NEVADA 89501 PHONE 775,788,2000 • FAX 775,788,2020

# **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

I hereby certify that I am an employee of McDonald Carano LLP, and that on the on the 15th day of March, 2022, that I caused the foregoing document to be filed with the Clerk of the Court via hand-delivery and filing by a McDonald Carano runner. On the same date I deposited a copy of the foregoing for mailing with the U.S. Postal Service at Reno, Nevada, with postage prepaid thereon, addressed as follows:

Bradley Schrager, Esq. Wolf, Rifkin, Shapiro, Schulman & Rabkin LLP. 3773 Howard Hughes Parkway, Suite 590 South Las Vegas, NV 89169

Craig Newby, Esq. State of Nevada 555 E. Washington Ave., Suite 3900 Las Vegas, NV 89101

Employee of McDonald Carano LLP

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Lucas Foletta, Esq. (NSBN 12154) McDonald Carano 100 West Liberty Street, 10th Floor Reno, NV 89501 (775) 788-2000 lfoletta@mcdonaldcarano.com

Attorneys for Education Freedom PAC

# 2022 MAR 15 PM 2: 14 AUBREY ROULATT

IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

# IN AND FOR CARSON CITY

BEVERLY ROGERS, an individual; RORY REID, an individual,

Plaintiffs,

VS.

BARBARA CEGAVSKE, in her official capacity as NEVADA SECRETARY OF STATE,

Defendant.

Case No. 22 OC 00027 1B

Dept. No. II

### EDUCATION FREEDOM PAC'S ANSWERING BRIEF IN RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF CHALLENGING INITIATIVE PETITION S-02-2022 PURSUANT TO NRS 295.061(1)

Intervenor EDUCATION FREEDOM PAC, a registered Nevada political action committee ("EFP"), by and through its attorney Lucas Foletta Esq. of McDonald Carano LLP, hereby submits its Answering Brief in Response to Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief Challenging Initiative Petition S-02-2022 Pursuant to NRS 295.061(1) ("Opening Brief" or "Op. Br."). This Answering Brief is supported by the following Memorandum of Points and Authorities, the pleadings and papers on file with the Court, and any oral argument entertained by the Court at a hearing in this matter.

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# McDONALD ( CARANO 100 WEST LIBERTY STREET TENTH FLOOR • RENO, NEVADA 89501 PHONE 775.788.2020

#### I. INTRODUCTION

In this case, EFP filed Initiative Petition S-02-2022 on ("Petition") on January 31, 2022. Thereafter, Plaintiffs filed the instant suit. Plaintiffs' complaint must be dismissed for four reasons. First, more than fifteen days have passed since the filing of the complaint without a hearing. Second, Plaintiffs' description of effect challenge is an inappropriate attempt to hijack a clear and straightforward description and mutate it into an opposition advocacy piece focusing on unrealistic worst-case hypothetical scenarios. Third, Plaintiffs' argument that the petition is an unfunded mandate is not supported by the plain language of the Petition; it does not go into effect unless the Nevada Legislature appropriates funding. Fourth, Plaintiffs' argument that the petition pertains to administrative details fails because the petition proposes policy and reasonable and necessary measures to implement that policy.

#### II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The Petition proposes to establish an education freedom account ("EFA") program pursuant to which parents will be authorized to establish accounts for their child's education. **Exhibit 1.** If enacted, the Petition would authorize parents to spend money in the accounts to pay for certain educational expenses including, but not limited to, tuition and fees at participating entities, including private schools. *Id.* The Petition includes the following description of effect ("Description"):

The Petition establishes an education freedom account program under which parents will be authorized to establish an account for their child's education. The parent of any child required to attend public school who has been enrolled in a public school in Nevada during the entirety of the immediately preceding school year or whose child is eligible to enroll in kindergarten may establish an account for the child. Money in the accounts may be used to pay certain educational expenses including, but not limited to, tuition and fees at participating entities. Participating entities may include eligible private schools, a program of distance education not operated by a public school and parents, among others.

The maximum available grant is 90 percent of the statewide base per pupil funding amount For Fiscal Year 2021-2022, that amount is \$6,980 per pupil. For Fiscal Year 2022-2023, that amount is \$7,074 per pupil. That said, nothing in the initiative requires the Legislature to appropriate money to fund the accounts. If no money is appropriated,

no funding will be available for the accounts. Funding the accounts, however, could necessitate a tax increase or reduction of government services.

Plaintiffs filed their Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief Challenging Initiative Petition S-02-2022 Pursuant to NRS 295.061(1) ("Complaint") on February 22, 2022. Plaintiffs included with their Complaint their Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief Challenging Initiative Petition S-02-2022 Pursuant to NRS 295.061(1). Plaintiffs, however, did not name EFP as a defendant in the action, necessitating EFP's intervention in this matter. The failure to name EFP as a defendant caused unnecessary delay in the administration of this case. What's more, Plaintiffs filed a peremptory challenge disqualifying Judge Wilson after Judge Russell recused, necessitating the appointment of a substitute judge. This caused further delay. To date, no hearing has been held in this matter despite the fact that NRS 295.061(1) requires that a hearing be held within fifteen days of the complaint being filed.

#### III. LEGAL STANDARD

Article 19, Section 2(1), of the Nevada Constitution enshrines the people's right to propose statutes and amendments to statutes. Specifically it states that "the people reserve to themselves the power to propose, by initiative petition, statutes and amendments to statutes . . . , and to enact or reject them at the polls." Nev. Const. art. 19, § (2)1. The Nevada Constitution further provides that the provisions of Article 19 are "self-executing but the legislature may provide by law for procedures to facilitate the operation thereof." *Id.* at art. 19, § 5. NRS 295.009(1)(b) provides that a petition must "[s]et forth, in not more than 200 words, a description of effect of the initiative . . . is approved by the voters." NRS 295.009(1)(a) provides that each petition must "[e]mbrace but one subject and matters necessarily connected therewith and pertaining thereto."

#### IV. ARGUMENT

Plaintiffs attempt to frustrate EFA's constitutional right to advance the Petition by making misleading and hyperbolic policy attacks that are untethered to its text and based on an erroneous reading of Nevada law. (Op. Br. at 1.) Indeed, Plaintiffs' policy critiques are better suited for the

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arguments against the Petition to be included in the ballot and for a political campaign against it than they are for a pre-election legal challenge. As such, the Court must reject their arguments.

### A. The Court failed to hold a hearing within the time required by law and therefore the case must be dismissed.

NRS 295.061(1) requires that in the case of ballot petition challenges "[t]he court shall set the matter for hearing not later than 15 days after the complaint is filed and shall give priority to such a complaint over all other matters pending with the court, except for criminal proceedings."2 In this case, Plaintiffs filed their challenge on February 22, 2022. (Compl. at 1.) The fifteen days in which to hold a hearing ran on March 9, 2022. To date, no hearing has been held.

The fact that no hearing has been held is partially the fault of Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs filed their suit on the last possible day. Under the statute, parties challenging ballot petitions have fifteen days from the date the petition is filed, excluding weekends and holidays, to file their challenge. NRS 295.061(1). The case was initially assigned to Judge Russell who recused resulting in the case being transferred to Judge Wilson the same day it was filed. Two days later, on February 24, 2022, Plaintiffs lodged a peremptory challenge of Judge Wilson. Plaintiffs did this with full knowledge that another judge of the First Judicial District Court was not available to hear the case. The peremptory challenge resulted in the need to appoint a substitute judge. Despite the 15-day hearing requirement, at no time has a hearing of any kind been held since Plaintiffs filed their complaint.

<sup>1</sup> Before an initiative petition can appear on the ballot, the Secretary of State must appoint two committees to draft arguments for and against the passage of the initiative petition. NRS 293.252(1). The arguments for and against the passage of the petition appear in sample ballots and are published prior to the election "in conspicuous display" in a newspaper of general circulation in each county. NRS 293.253(3).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Prior to 2007, a complaint challenging an initiative petition could be filed within 30 after the petition was filed with the Secretary of State, and a hearing was to be held within 30 days thereafter. In 2007, the Legislature shortened both temporal limitations to 15 days. Senator Beers explained that the shortened time period arose from a concern that opponents were attempting to delay litigation as long as possible, which "appears as a deliberate strategic tactic not to file any objection until the last day to do so." See Minutes of the Senate Committee on Legislative Operations and Elections, March 27, 2007, 28. The Deputy Secretary of State for Secretary Ross Miller supported the shortened time frames, noting that "the time for litigation is reduced from 30 to 15 days" which was important to ensure county clerks have adequate time to prepare ballots. Minutes of the Assembly Committee on Elections, Procedures, Ethics and Constitutional Amendments, May 1, 2007, 15.

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This delay has resulted in significant detriment to EFP for whose protection the procedural requirements of NRS 295.061 exist. EFP is on a tight timetable for gathering signatures to qualify the Petition for the ballot. EFP needs to gather 140,777 valid signatures, see Nev. Const. art. 19, § 2(2), by November 23, 2022, see NRS 295.056(2). Every day this matter is tied up in litigation is a day EFP loses in circulating a court-approved Petition. Signatures gathered on a petition deemed invalid by the courts are invalid. See Nevadans for Nev. v. Beers, 122 Nev. 930, 940, 142 P.3d 339, 345 (2006) (holding that an initiative petition without a compliant description of effect is not operative).

That the delay has worked harm upon EFP is underscored by the fact that the statutory scheme that governs ballot petition challenges contemplates expediency in all respects. Not only does it require a hearing to be held within 15 days, but it also requires that the challenging party include with its complaint "[a]ll affidavits and documents in support of the challenge." Id. at This requirement clearly reflects the Legislature's intent that ballot petition 295.061(1). challenges be ready for hearing almost immediately after being filed.

It should be noted that Plaintiffs created delay not only in choosing to preempt Judge Wilson knowing Judge Russell had already recused, but also by failing to name EFP as a defendant. Customarily, the party that filed the petition at issue is named as a defendant. See NRCP 19(a)(1) (required parties). In this case, Plaintiffs made the conscious decision not to name EFP as a party notwithstanding the fact that it is the real party in interest in this litigation; it is also well-known to Plaintiffs' counsel that the Secretary of State generally maintains neutrally in ballot petition litigation. Because Plaintiffs failed to name EFP as a defendant, EFP was forced to obtain a stipulation to intervene in this matter. The Court's own actions, respectfully, also contributed to the hearing not being held. As of Friday, March 11, a judge has yet to be appointed. Because a hearing was not held within the time allotted by statute, this matter must be dismissed.

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# B. The Description is neither misleading nor confusing because it describes what it will achieve and how it will achieve it.

Plaintiffs contend that the Description is misleading. (Op. Br. at 5-7.) In doing so, Plaintiffs attempt to persuade the Court to include reference to both hypothetical and non-existent effects, both of which are improper under the law. The Court should reject this attempt. However, if the Court is persuaded that some of the effects described by Plaintiffs should be referenced, the Court can amend the Description. See NRS 295.061(3).

The Nevada Supreme Court has stated that "[a] description of effect serves a limited purpose to facilitate the initiative process," Educ. Initi. v. Comm. to Protect Nev. Jobs, 129 Nev. 35, 37, 293 P.3d 874, 876 (2013), and that a description of effect should be reviewed with an eye toward that purpose, see id. Thus, while a description of effect need not "delineate every effect that an initiative will have," it "must be a straightforward, succinct, and nonargumentative statement of what the initiative will accomplish and how it will achieve those goals." *Id.* at 876. A description of effect cannot "be deceptive or misleading," id. at 49, 293 P.3d at 879, but it need not explain "hypothetical effects," id. at 43, 293 P.3d at 879.

In reviewing a description of effect, "it is inappropriate to parse the meanings of words and phrases used in a description of effect" as closely as a reviewing court would a statutory text. Id. at 48, 293 P.3d at 883. Such an approach "comes at too high a price in that it carries the risk of depriving the people of Nevada of their constitutional right to propose laws by initiative . . . . " Id. Thus, a reviewing court "must take a holistic approach" to the required analysis. Id. "The opponent of a ballot initiative bears the burden of showing that the initiative's description of effect fails to satisfy this standard." Id. at 42, 293 P.3d at 879.

Plaintiffs contend that the most important flaw in the Description is that it fails to inform parents that if a parent terminates an EFA agreement the child may not receive instruction from a public school until the end of the period for which the last EFA deposit was made. (Op. Br. at 5-6.) Plaintiffs then characterize this requirement as "barring" Nevada children from attending a public school and "denying" a right to a Nevada child. (Id. at 6.) This is not the case.

The Petition does not bar any child from attending a public school nor does it deny any child the ability to enroll in a public school. The Petition does, however, describe a system pursuant to which the State Treasurer will deposit EFA grant funds in individual EFAs on a quarterly basis. (Exhibit 1 at § 10(7)) ("The State Treasurer shall deposit the money for each grant in quarterly installments pursuant to a schedule determined by the State Treasurer.") The Petition further provides that if a parent establishes an EFA for their child by entering an EFA agreement, the child for whose benefit the EFA was established may not receive instruction from a public school until the end of the period for which the last deposit was made. (*Id.* at § 9(4).) However, the Petition also provides that an EFA agreement may be terminated at any time. (*Id.*)

Thus, while it is true that a child for whose benefit an EFA has been established *and funded* may not enroll in public school for the period for which the last EFA deposit was made, the prohibition would at most apply for a period of one quarter. Furthermore, it would only be triggered in the event the child's parent terminates the EFA after receiving EFA funds. Thus, the Petition does not bar any Nevada child from enrolling in a public school. Instead, it merely delays enrollment for children whose parents established EFAs for their benefit and who take advantage of funding available pursuant to the program. This approach reflects a common-sense policy of not allowing program participants to receive EFA funds while at the same time taking advantage of public funding available by way of a public education. Thus, Plaintiffs' characterization of the purported effect at issue is false and misleading.

More importantly, that the Description of effect does not specifically reference the impact of terminating an EFA agreement as it relates to the enrolment does not render it invalid. As stated above, the Description need not reference each and every possible effect. *Educ. Initi.*, 129 Nev. at 42, 293 P.3d at 879. Instead, it must describe the objective of the Petition and how it will achieve those objectives. *Id.* The mechanics of what occurs when a student's parents terminate an EFA is not the objective of the Petition, nor is it fundamental to how the Petition will achieve its objective. The objective is to establish an EFA program to allow parents to access public funds to pay for their child's education. The Description says exactly that. It also describes how the

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parents will set up EFAs, how they will be funded, and what they can be used for. It even describes the potential budgetary implications of funding them. It therefore clearly satisfies the law. *Id.* 

Plaintiffs cannot avoid this conclusion by identifying all the possible implications of the Petition and demanding they be referenced in the Description. See id. If they could, it would make articulating a description of effect in no more than 200 words impossible and eliminate the ability of initiative petition proponents to advance comprehensive policy measures to address complex public problems. What's more, it would allow challengers to hijack descriptions of effect and turn them into arguments against petitions. As Judge Wilson recently pointed out, it is improper to "attempt to use the description as an advocacy piece." Helton v. Nev. Voters First PAC, et al., Case No. 21 OC 00172, at \*13 (Nev. 1st Jud. Dist. Ct. Nev. Jan. 6, 2022). The Court should similarly reject that attempt here.

The Court should also reject Plaintiffs' contention that the Description's assertion that "[m]oney in the accounts may be used to pay certain educational expenses including, but not limited to, tuition and fees at participating entities" is misleading because it implies that a parent would be able to establish an EFA to pay for after-school tutoring while the child is enrolled full time in a public school. (Op. Br. at 6.) This not the case. The Description does not suggest in any way that a parent could establish an EFA to pay for after-school tutoring while their child is enrolled full time in public school. Plaintiffs' contention is based on their own mischaracterization of the Description.

The sentence cited by Plaintiffs is very specific, and it does not relate to the circumstances under which an EFA may be established. It also does not speak to using EFA funds for tutoring. Rather, it describes how money in an established EFA may be used. More importantly, it is entirely accurate. Section 11 of the Petition describes the appropriate use of money in EFAs and specifically provides that "[m]oney deposited in an education freedom account must be used only to pay for," among other things "[t]uition and fees at a school that is a participating entity in which the child is enrolled." (Exhibit 1 at § 11(1).) As such, the statement cited by Plaintiffs corresponds to the plain language of the Petition.

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Plaintiffs attempt to misconstrue this statement as suggesting that an EFA may be established for an impermissible purpose (to pay for after school tutoring of a child enrolled full time in a public school), but that is Plaintiffs' own misreading of the sentence. As stated above, the sentence does not speak to who can establish an EFA, but rather how EFA funds in lawfully established EFAs may be spent. So, while it is true that a parent cannot establish an EFA "for a child . . . who will remain enrolled full-time in a public school," (id. at § 10), that fact is not implicated by the sentence cited by Plaintiffs. Thus, Plaintiffs' assertion that the sentence is misleading is unsupported.

Moreover, there is no need to include in the Description reference to the fact that parents of children enrolled full-time in a public school are not eligible to establish an EFA. As stated above, the Description properly describes its purpose and how it will achieve it within the space allotted. Requiring more is merely to demand a recitation of the various mechanical details of the Petition plaintiffs want voters to know about to advance their advocacy. That is not the law. Educ. Initi., 129 Nev. at 42, 293 P.3d at 876; Helton, Case No. 21 OC 00172 1B, at \*13. Indeed, in this regard, there is simply no way one can reasonably argue that the information in the Description is anything other than "correct and does not misrepresent what the initiative will accomplish and how it intends to achieve those goals." Educ. Initi., 129 Nev. at 48, 293 P.3d at 883.

Plaintiffs also mischaracterize the Petition as reflecting a "bait-and-switch." (Op. Br. at 6.) Plaintiffs contend the Description should specifically state that effectiveness of its provisions are conditioned on the Legislature appropriating money to fund EFAs. (Op. Br. at 6.) Plaintiffs argue that the Description misleads on this point because it says that nothing requires the Legislature to appropriate money to fund the accounts and if no money is appropriated "no funding will be available for the accounts . . . . " (*Id.*) This argument is hard to understand.

It is true that the Petition provides that the EFA program is only effectuated if the Legislature funds EFAs; however, it is also true that if the Legislature fails to appropriate funds for EFAs, there will be no funding available for the accounts. (Exhibit 1 at §§ 37 and 10(4).) Thus, here again Plaintiffs seize on a factually accurate statement that describes a material aspect

That the Description is not written as Plaintiffs would prefer does not mean the Description effectuates a bait-and-switch. *Educ. Initi.*, 129 Nev. at 42, 293 P.3d at 876 (a description of effect need not reference every possible effect). Here again Plaintiffs' effort boils down to an attempt to have the Court order a description they prefer, not to fix legal deficiencies. The Description is factual correct and does not misrepresent what the initiative will achieve and how it will do it. What's more, Plaintiffs' argument as to the materiality of the fact that the EFA program will not be effectuated in the absence of a legislative appropriation overstates the importance of that facet of the Petition. Potential signatories are no doubt more interested in under what conditions fundings will be available for EFAs than they are whether other provisions of the Petition will come into effect, particularly where the other provisions have no relevance in the absence of funding for the EFAs themselves. Therefore, the Court should reject this argument.

The Court should also reject the claim that the Description "misleadingly fails to inform potential signatories that any funding appropriated for this program will inevitably reduce the funding otherwise available to public schools." (Op. Br. at 6.) Plaintiffs anticipate the appropriate response to this argument by contending that this claim is "far from hypothetical." (*Id.*) Yet that is exactly what it is. Nothing in the Petition requires funding the EFA program from money used to support the public schools. That this is the case is evidenced by the fact that Plaintiffs can point to no provision of the Petition that requires it. Instead, they say this fact "follows from" the Description's statement that grant amounts will be based on the statewide base per pupil funding amount. (*Id.*) However, the fact that EFA grants may be equal to up to 90% of the statewide base per pupil funding amount, (Exhibit 1 at § 10(3)), does not mean that money that would otherwise go to funding public schools will necessarily be routed to EFAs. The statewide base per pupil funding amount is merely the measuring stick by which the maximum available EFA grant amount will be established.

Plaintiffs attempt to close the logical gap in their argument by suggesting that the Nevada Supreme Court previously concluded that funding an EFA-like program would "inevitably result

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in a reduction of public school funding . . . . " (Op. Br. at 7.) However, that is decidedly not the case. At issue in Schwartz v. Lopez was the constitutionality of SB 302 (2015). 132 Nev. 732, 738, 382 P.3d 886, 891 (2016). The bill authorized the creation of education savings accounts. *Id.*; SB 302 available at https://www.leg.state.nv.us/App/NELIS/REL/78th2015/Bill/1857/Overview. SB 302 established a program similar to that being proposed in the Petition with an entirely different funding mechanism. Id. Under SB 302, once an education savings account was established, "the amount of money deposited by the Treasurer into an account for a child within a particular school district is deducted from that school district's apportionment of legislatively appropriated funds in the [Distributed School Account]." Schwartz, 132 Nev. at 741, 382 P.3d at 893. As the Supreme Court pointed out, the Legislature accomplished this by including language in SB 302 that specifically amended provisions of existing law to provide for a reduction in the apportionment to consistent with the amount of funds deposited in education savings accounts. The Court stated as follows:

Section 16 of SB 302 amended NRS 387.124(1) to provide that apportionment of funds from the DSA to the school districts, computed on a yearly basis, equals the difference between the basic support guarantee and the local funds available minus 'all the funds deposited in education savings accounts established on behalf of children who reside in the county pursuant to NRS 353B.700 to NRS 353B.930.

Ultimately, the Nevada Supreme Court concluded the diversion of DSA funds to education savings accounts violated Article 11, Section 2 of the Nevada Constitution because SB 515, which contained the appropriation to fund the Distributed School Account, did not specifically authorize the re-routing of funds. Id. at 755, 382 P.3d at 902. The Supreme Court then concluded that "because SB 302 does not provide an independent basis to appropriate money from the State General Fund and no other appropriation appears to exist, the education savings account program is without an appropriation to support its operation." Id. at 756, 382 P.3d at 902.

The Petition is different from SB 302 in that it does not require the diversion of DSA funds to support EFAs. Unlike SB 302, the Petition contains no language amending the provisions of law that apportion the DSA to account for funds appropriated to fund EFAs. To the contrary, SB

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302 contemplates an entirely separate and discreet funding appropriation. (See e.g., Exhibit 1 at § 37.) Thus, Plaintiffs' use of the Schwartz case to bolster their argument is misplaced. Plaintiffs' argument is in reality a policy critique they attempt to cloak as a criticism of the Description which seeks nothing more than an order from the Court requiring the proponents to describe a hypothetical effect to deter potential signatories from signing it. This is not appropriate. Educ. *Initi.*, 129 Nev. at 42, 293 P.3d at 876.

# C. The Petition does not violate the prohibition on unfunded mandates because it contains neither an appropriation nor a requirement to expend funds.

Plaintiffs contend that the Petition constitutes an unfunded mandate and thus violates Article 19, Section 6, of the Nevada Constitution. (Op. Br. at 7-9.) This is plainly not the case. Article 19, Section 6, provides as follows: "This Article does not permit the proposal of any statute or statutory amendment which makes an appropriation or otherwise requires the expenditure of money, unless such statute or amendment also imposes a sufficient tax, not prohibited by the Constitution, or otherwise constitutionally provides for raising the necessary revenue." In Rogers v. Heller, the Nevada Supreme Court stated that "an appropriation is the setting aside of funds, and an expenditure of money is the payment of funds." 117 Nev. 169, 173, 18 P.3d 1034, 1036 (2001).

The Petition neither contains an appropriation or an expenditure of money. As Plaintiffs themselves point out, the EFA program is contingent upon an appropriation by the Legislature to fund it; Section 37 of the Petition states specifically, "The provisions of this act become effective upon an appropriation by the Legislature to fund the education freedom accounts." (Exhibit 1 at § 37.) And Section 35 states that "[n]othing herein shall require the Legislature to appropriate money to fund education freedom accounts or any expenses related thereto." (Id. at § 35.) What's more, Section 10(2) states, "Nothing herein shall require the Legislature to appropriate money to fund the grants described in this section. The availability of grants is subject to the availability of funds as determined by the Legislature." (*Id.* at § 10(2).)

Thus, the Petition clearly does not contain an appropriation; there is no funding set aside to fund EFAs. It is also clear that the Petition does not contain an expenditure of funds. The

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effectiveness of the Petition, including undertaking any administrative tasks to establish the program, is conditioned on the appropriation of funds by the Legislature. Furthermore, the Petition conditions the availability of EFA grants on the availability of funds appropriated by the Legislature. Thus, the Petition does not require an expenditure of funds in any way.

Plaintiffs attempt to avoid this conclusion by again misleadingly citing to *Schwartz*. (Op. Br. at 8.) Plaintiffs contend that SB 302 was struck down in part because SB 302 "failed to appropriate funds for the EFAs contemplated by the bill . . . . " (Id.) Plaintiffs go on to claim that the Petition must fails as SB 302 did because it "run[s] afoul of Article 19, section 6 of the Constitution." (Id.) Plaintiffs argument is baseless. While on the surface, Plaintiffs attempt to suggest that not including an appropriation with the Petition is similar to the constitutional defect identified in SB 302, they quickly pivot to claiming that the reason the Petition is unconstitutional is that it violates Article 19, Section 6, of the Constitution. This is misleading because SB 302 was not struck down for failure to satisfy Article 19, Section 6; indeed, it could not have been since SB 302 was not enacted by initiative petition. SB 302 was deemed unconstitutional because SB 515 did not specifically contemplate using DSA funds to fund education savings accounts and SB 302 itself did not contain a funding source. Schwartz, 382 P.3d at 902. However, the fact that SB 302 did not contain a funding source was deemed to fail to satisfy Article 4, Section 19 of the Nevada Constitution. Id. Article 4, Section 19 provides that "[n]o money shall be drawn from the treasury but in consequence of appropriations made by law." Nev. Const. art. 4, § 19. Thus, the failing of SB 302 was not that it did not include an appropriation pursuant to Article 19, Section 6, but rather that it failed to include an appropriation while at the same time directing money to be drawn from the treasury, a violation of Article 4, Section 19. That is not the case with the Petition. Thus, Plaintiffs' reference to Schwartz is inapplicable.

The Court should also reject Plaintiffs' argument that the Petition does not constitute a "statute" within the meaning of Article 19, Section 1, of the Nevada Constitution. (Op. Br. at 8.) Plaintiffs support this argument with the unsupported assertion that "[t]he initiative power does not extend to purported pronouncements of law that only come into effect upon the happening of

some future event, such as the Legislature enacting the necessary funding for EFA grants." (*Id.*) But Article 19, Section 1, says nothing of the kind.

Article 19, Section 1, reserves to the people "the power to propose, by initiative petition, statues and amendments to statutes and amendments to this Constitution, and to enact or reject them at the polls." Nev. Const. art. 19, § 1. There is nothing in the article requiring or prohibiting certain substantive requirements—e.g., conditions of effectiveness—relating to such statutes. Moreover, the Petition is not a "purported pronouncement[] of law." If enacted, it will be a law, but a law the effectuation of which require an appropriation from the Legislature. This is not a constitutional defect, but rather a policy decision that will be reflected in statute.

Indeed, contrary to Plaintiffs' suggestion there are many statutes that are conditioned upon the occurrence of some future event. For example, NRS 278.024 relating to the power of the *Nevada* Tahoe Regional Planning Agency is "[e]ffective upon the proclamation by the Governor of this State of the withdrawal by the State of California from the Tahoe Regional Planning Compact or of a finding by the Governor of this State that the Tahoe Regional Planning Agency has become unable to perform its duties or exercise its powers." NRS 278.024 (emphasis added). Neither of these things has occurred and whether they will occur is unknown. In fact, there is an entire set of statutes establishing the "Nevada Tahoe Regional Planning Agency" all conditioned on the same set of circumstances occurring. NRS 278.792-794. Thus, the contention that the Petition is not a statute is meritless. *See Nevadans for the Protection of Prop. Rights, Inc. v. Heller*, 122 Nev. 894, 914, 141 P.3d 1235, 1248 (2006) (explaining that "the people's initiative power is 'coequal, coextensive, and concurrent' with that of the Legislature" (quoting *Gallivan v. Walker*, 54 P.3d 1069, 1080 (Utah 2002))). Presumably if conditioning the effectiveness of a statute on a future occurrence was unconstitutional, the Legislative Counsel Bureau would have refused to codify the various provisions of Nevada law that do just that.

The Court must also reject Plaintiffs' claims that the Petition would "obligate" the State Treasurer to "set up, administer, run the program, and monitor the use of the EFAs" without imposing a tax or otherwise providing for revenue to pay those substantial expenses. (Op. Br. at 9.) This argument fails because, as stated above, the State Treasurer will not be required to take

any action unless the Legislature funds the EFAs themselves. (Exhibit 1 at § 37.) Again, Section 37 specifically says the provisions of the Petition are effective only upon appropriation of the Legislature. (*Id.*) That said, once the Legislature appropriates funds, the Petition provides that "the State Treasurer may deduct no more than 4 percent of each grant for the administrative costs of implementing" the Petition. (*Id.* at § 10(6)). Thus, once effective, the Petition contains a mechanism by which the State Treasurer may receive revenue support for administering the program.

#### D. The Court can amend the Description.

The proponent of an initiative is afforded the opportunity to amend a description of effect to resolve any inadequacies identified by the Court. *See* NRS 295.061(3) ("If a description of the effect of an initiative or referendum required pursuant to NRS 295.009 is challenged successfully pursuant to subsection 1 and such description is amended in compliance with the order of the court, the amended description may not be challenged."). While the description of effect contained within the Petition is legally sufficient and holistically sound, in order to reach an amicable resolution and expedite the proceedings, EFP has proactively drafted alternative descriptions of effect for the Court's consideration. **Exhibit 2**. Should the Court determine that the Petition's description of effect requires amendment, EFP requests that the Court consider one of the alternative descriptions of effect or further revise the description of effect in accordance with the Court's findings. In no event is Plaintiff entitled to the requested relief of prohibiting the Petition from appearing on the ballot. Such a result would deny the people's right to propose amendments to their principal governing document may be honored.

E. The Petition does not include administrative details because it does not execute previously declared policies or enacted laws or direct a decision delegated to a governmental entity.

Plaintiffs contend that the Petition imposes administrative duties on the State Treasurer and Department of Education and therefore violates the rule against imposing administrative details by initiative petition. (Op. Br. at 9.) This is not the case.

The Nevada Supreme Court has broadly stated that "regardless of whether an initiative proposes enactment of a new statute or ordinance, or a new provision in the constitution or city charter, or an amendment to any of these types of laws, it must propose policy—it may not dictate administrative details." *Nevadans for the Protection of Prop. Rights, Inc. v. Heller*, 122 Nev. 894, 913, 141 P.3d 1235, 1248 (2006) (quoting *Citizens for Train Trench Vote v. Reno*, 118 Nev. 574, 583, 53 P.3d 387, 392 (2002) *overruled in part on other grounds by Gavin v. District Court*, 118 Nev. 749, 59 P.3d 1180 (2002)). The Supreme Court has also described the difference between policy and administrative details. A policy enactment "originates or enacts a permanent law or lays down a rule of conduct or course of policy for the guidance of the citizens or their offices,' whereas impermissible administrative matters simply 'put into execution previously-declared policies or previously-enacted laws or direct [ ] a decision that has been delegated to [a governmental body with that authority]." *Id.* (quoting *Train Trench*, 52 P.3d at 393-94).

In Nevadans for the Protection of Property Rights, the Nevada Supreme Court concluded that the petition at issue (to amend the Nevada Constitution) at last arguably dictated administrative details insofar as it directed decisions that were otherwise delegated to the courts. 122 Nev. at 916, 141 P.3d at 1249-50. The petition at issue dictated that "[u]npublished eminent domain judicial opinions or orders shall be null and void," declared that "[n]o Nevada state court judge or justice who has not been elected to a current term of office shall have the authority to issue any ruling in an eminent domain proceeding," and it provided that "[i]n all eminent domain actions, a property owner shall have the authority to preempt [sic] one judge at the district court level and one justice at each appellate court level." *Id.* at 916, 141 P.3d at 1249. The Nevada Supreme Court concluded that "[t]hese provisions concern the day-to-day operations of Nevada's court system and therefore direct decisions that have been delegated to the judiciary." *Id.* at 916, 141, P.3d at 1249-50.

In *Train Trench*, the petition at issue (a municipal initiative petition) specifically prohibited the City of Reno from constructing "a depressed trainway ('train trench') within the existing railroad right of way through the central portion of the City of Reno." 118 Nev. at 580, 53 P.3d at 390. It was put forward in response to a memorandum of understanding between the

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City of Reno and Union Pacific railroad that cleared the way for the construction of a railway trench through Reno. Id. at 578, 53 P.3d at 389. The Nevada Supreme Court held that the petition prohibited "the construction of a particular public work project, the train trench, in a particular location, the existing right of way through the city." Id. at 584, 53 P.3d at 393. It went on to say that "[t]he initiative does not prohibit the construction of a train trench in general, or the construction of a different type of grade separation project within the right of way. The initiative relates to a subject of very special character, not one of general character." Id.

The "administrative duties" Plaintiffs contend violate the rule against administrative details includes requiring the State Treasurer to qualify one or more financial management firms to manage EFAs and establish fees for eth management of EFAs. (Op. Br. at 3.) They also include requiring the State Treasurer to administer an annual survey of parents who enter or renew EFA agreements regarding their satisfaction with the program, and the fact that the Department of Education would be required to aggregate the results of certain exams taken by children participating in the program. (Id. at 4.) However, these are not administrative details within the meaning of the Nevada Supreme Court's case law; they are part and parcel of the policy reflected in the Petition.

As a threshold matter, it should be noted it does not appear the Nevada Supreme Court has applied the administrative details rule in relation to a statutory petition, and therefore the applicability of concept here is suspect. That said, even if it applies, the Petition clearly sets forth policy. Specifically, it establishes an EFA program, including the various mechanics by which it will function. Thus, it "enacts a permanent law" and "course of policy"—the EFA program itself. Insofar as the administration of the program is concerned, the policy set forth in the Petition, including the various obligations imposed on State actors and agencies, guides those entities in the administration of the program. It does so, by among other things, speaking to the selection of financial managers, the establishment of fees relating to the same, and the collection of certain testing data.

This does not in any way "put into execution previously-declared policies or previouslyenacted laws or direct [ ] a decision that has been delegated to [a governmental body with that 1

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authority]." Nevadan for the Protection of Prop. Rights, 122 Nev. at 915, 141 P.3d at 1249 (quoting Train Trench, 118 Nev. at 582, 53 P.3d at 392). Neither the State Treasurer nor Department of Education has authority to otherwise execute an EFA program in relation to which the Petition directs the exercise of their judgment. The actions required of the State Treasurer and Department of Education would not exist but for establishment of the program. Thus, the administration of the program by the State Treasurer and the Department of Education are part and parcel of the policy being enacted. The Petition, therefore, does not constitute the direction of pre-existing authority delegated to either entity or the execution of a pre-existing rule. Consequently, Plaintiffs' argument fails.

#### V. CONCLUSION

For all of the above reasons, the Court should deny Plaintiffs' attempt to keep the Petition off the ballot.

Dated this 15th day of March, 2022.

#### **AFFIRMATION**

The undersigned does hereby affirm that pursuant to NRS 239B.030, the preceding document does not contain the social security number of any person.

McDonald Carano LLP

By:

Lucas Foletta, Esq. (NSBN 12154)

McDonald Carano

100 West Liberty Street, 10th Floor

Reno, NV 89501

Attorneys for Education Freedom PAC

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#### **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

I hereby certify that I am an employee of McDonald Carano LLP, and that on the on the day of March, 2022, that I caused the foregoing document to be filed with the Clerk of the Court via hand-delivery and filing by a McDonald Carano runner. On the same date I deposited a copy of the foregoing for mailing with the U.S. Postal Service at Reno, Nevada, with postage prepaid thereon, addressed as follows:

Bradley Schrager, Esq. Wolf, Rifkin, Shapiro, Schulman & Rabkin LLP. 3773 Howard Hughes Parkway, Suite 590 South Las Vegas, NV 89169

Craig Newby, Esq. State of Nevada 555 E. Washington Ave., Suite 3900 Las Vegas, NV 89101

Employee of McDonald Carano LLP

# **EXHIBIT 1**

# **EXHIBIT 1**

# NOTICE OF INTENT TO CIRCULATE STATEWIDE INITIATIVE OR REFERENDUM PETITION

State of Nevada



Secretary of State Barbara K. Cegavske

Pursuant to NRS 295.015, before a petition for initative or referendum may be presented to registered ing

voters for signatures, the person who intends to circul information:	late the petition must provide the following
NAME OF PERSON FILING THE PETITION	
Education Freedom PAC	
NAME(S) OF PERSON(S) AUTHORIZED TO WITHDRAW OR AMEN	ID THE PETITION (provide up to three)
1. Erin Phillips	
2.	
3.	
NAME OF THE POLITICAL ACTION COMMITTEE (PAC) ADVOCAT REFERENDUM (if none, leave blank)	ING FOR THE PASSAGE OF THE INITIATIVE OR
Education Freedom PAC	Management of the second control of the seco
Please note, if you are creating a Political Action Committe passage of the initiative or referendum, you must complete	
Additionally, a copy of the initiative or referendum, including the Secretary of State's office at the time you submit this fo	
x 272	01/27/2022
Signature of Petition Filer	Date

# State of Nevada - Initiative Petition - Statewiue Statutory Measure

EXPLANATION: Matter in **bolded italics** is new; matter between brackets [omitted material] is material to be omitted.

#### The People of the State of Nevada do enact as follows:

- Section 1. Chapter 385 of NRS is hereby amended by adding thereto the provisions set forth as sections 2 to 17, inclusive, of this act.
- Sec. 2. As used in sections 2 to 17, inclusive, of this act, unless the context otherwise requires, the words and terms defined in sections 3 to 8, inclusive, of this act have the meanings ascribed to them in those sections.
- Sec. 3. "Education freedom account" means an account established for a child pursuant to section 9 of this act.
- Sec. 4. "Eligible institution" means: 1. A university, state college or community college within the Nevada System of Higher Education; or 2. Any other college or university that: (a) Was originally established in, and is organized under the laws of, this State; (b) Is exempt from taxation pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3); and (c) Is accredited by a regional accrediting agency recognized by the United States Department of Education.
- Sec. 5. "Parent" means the parent, custodial parent, legal guardian or other person in this State who has control or charge of a child and the legal right to direct the education of the child.
- Sec. 6. "Participating entity" means a private school that is licensed pursuant to chapter 394 of NRS or exempt from such licensing pursuant to NRS 394.211, an eligible institution, a program of distance education that is not offered by a public school or the Department, a tutor or tutoring agency or a parent that has provided to the State Treasurer the application described in subsection 1 of section 13 of this act.
- Sec. 7. "Program of distance education" has the meaning ascribed to it in NRS 388.829.
- Sec. 8. "Resident school district" means the school district in which a child would be enrolled based on his or her residence.
- Sec. 9. 1. Except as otherwise provided in subsection 10, the parent of any child required by NRS 392.040 to attend a public school who was enrolled in a public school in this State during the entirety of the school year immediately preceding the establishment of an education freedom account pursuant to this section or is eligible to enroll in kindergarten may establish an education freedom account for the child by entering into a written agreement with the State Treasurer, in a manner and on a form provided by the State Treasurer. The agreement must provide that:
- (a) The child will receive instruction in this State from a participating entity for the school year for which the agreement applies;
- (b) The child will receive a grant, in the form of money deposited pursuant to section 10 of this act in the education freedom account established for the child pursuant to subsection 2;
- (c) The money in the education freedom account established for the child must be expended only as authorized by section 11 of this act; and

- 2. If an agreement is entered into ursuant to subsection 1, an education edom account must be established by the parent on behalf of the child. The account must be maintained with a financial management firm qualified by the State Treasurer pursuant to section 12 of this act.
- 3. The failure to enter into an agreement pursuant to subsection 1 for any school year for which a child is required by NRS 392.040 to attend a public school does not preclude the parent of the child from entering into an agreement for a subsequent school year.
- 4. An agreement entered into pursuant to subsection 1 is valid for 1 school year but may be terminated early. If the agreement is terminated early, the child may not receive instruction from a public school in this State until the end of the period for which the last deposit was made into the education freedom account pursuant to section 10 of this act, except to the extent the pupil was allowed to receive instruction from a public school under the agreement or the participating entity providing education to the child ceases to lawfully operate.
- 5. An agreement terminates automatically if the child no longer resides in this State. In such a case, any money remaining in the education freedom account of the child reverts to the State General Fund.
- 6. An agreement may be renewed for any school year for which the child is required by NRS 392.040 to attend a public school. The failure to renew an agreement for any school year does not preclude the parent of the child from renewing the agreement for any subsequent school year.
- 7. A parent may enter into a separate agreement pursuant to subsection 1 for each child of the parent. Not more than one education freedom account may be established for a child.
- 8. Except as otherwise provided in subsection 10, the State Treasurer shall enter into or renew an agreement pursuant to this section with any parent of a child required by NRS 392.040 to attend a public school who applies to the State Treasurer in the manner provided by the State Treasurer. The State Treasurer shall make the application available on the Internet website of the State Treasurer.
- 9. Upon entering into or renewing an agreement pursuant to this section, the State Treasurer shall provide to the parent who enters into or renews the agreement a written explanation of the authorized uses, pursuant to section 11 of this act, of the money in an education freedom account and the responsibilities of the parent and the State Treasurer pursuant to the agreement and sections 2 to 17, inclusive, of this act.
- 10. A parent may not establish an education freedom account for a child who will be homeschooled, who will receive instruction outside this State or who will remain enrolled full-time in a public school, regardless of whether such a child receives instruction from a participating entity. A parent may establish an education freedom account for a child who receives a portion of his or her instruction from a public school and a portion of his or her instruction from a participating entity.
- Sec. 10. 1. Subject to the limitations described in subsection 2, if a parent enters into or renews an agreement pursuant to section 9 of this act and the Legislature has appropriated money to fund grants described in this section, a grant of money on behalf of the child must be deposited in the education freedom account of the child.
- 2. Nothing herein shall require the Legislature to appropriate money to fund the grants described in this section. The availability of grants is subject to the availability of funds as determined by the Legislature.
- 3. Except as otherwise provided in subsections 4, 5 and 6, the grant required by subsection 1 must, for the school year for which the grant is made, be in an amount equal to 90 percent of the statewide base per pupil funding amount.

- 4. If the Treasurer determines the there are not sufficient funds to prove grants in the amounts described in subsection 3, the Treasurer shall apportion the amount of available grants equally in relation to the amount of available funds and the number of agreements entered into pursuant to Section 9. If the Legislature declines to appropriate money to fund the grants described in subsection 1, no grants shall be made.
- 5. If a child receives a portion of his or her instruction from a participating entity and a portion of his or her instruction from a public school, for the school year for which the grant is made, the grant required by subsection 1 must be in a pro rata based on amount the percentage of the total instruction provided to the child by the participating entity in proportion to the total instruction provided to the child.
- 6. The State Treasurer may deduct not more than 4 percent of each grant for the administrative costs of implementing the provisions of sections 2 to 17, inclusive, of this act.
- 7. The State Treasurer shall deposit the money for each grant in quarterly installments pursuant to a schedule determined by the State Treasurer.
- 8. Any money remaining in an education freedom account:
- (a) At the end of a school year may be carried forward to the next school year if the agreement entered into pursuant to section 9 of this act is renewed.
- (b) When an agreement entered into pursuant to section 9 of this act is not renewed or is terminated, because the child for whom the account was established graduates from high school or for any other reason, reverts to the State General Fund at the end of the last day of the agreement.
- Sec. 11. 1. Money deposited in an education freedom account must be used only to pay for:
- (a) Tuition and fees at a school that is a participating entity in which the child is enrolled;
- (b) Textbooks required for a child who enrolls in a school that is a participating entity;
- (c) Tutoring or other teaching services provided by a tutor or tutoring facility that is a participating entity;
- (d) Tuition and fees for a program of distance education that is a participating entity;
- (e) Fees for any national norm-referenced achievement examination, advanced placement or similar examination or standardized examination required for admission to a college or university;
- (f) If the child is a pupil with a disability, as that term is defined in NRS 388.417, fees for any special instruction or special services provided to the child;
- (g) Tuition and fees at an eligible institution that is a participating entity;
- (h) Textbooks required for the child at an eligible institution that is a participating entity or to receive instruction from any other participating entity;
- (i) Fees for the management of the education freedom account, as described in section 12 of this act;
- (j) Transportation required for the child to travel to and from a participating entity or any combination of participating entities up to but not to exceed \$750 per school year; or
- (k) Purchasing a curriculum or any supplemental materials required to administer the curriculum.
- 2. A participating entity that receives a payment authorized by subsection 1 shall not:

- (a) Refund any portion of the pay ...ent to the parent who made the paym, junless the refund is for an item that is being returned or an item or service that has not been provided; or
- (b) Rebate or otherwise share any portion of the payment with the parent who made the payment.
- 3. A parent who receives a refund pursuant to subsection 2 shall deposit the refund in the education freedom account from which the money refunded was paid.
- 4. Nothing in this section shall be deemed to prohibit a parent or child from making a payment for any tuition, fee, service or product described in subsection 1 from a source other than the education freedom account of the child.
- Sec. 12. 1. The State Treasurer shall qualify one or more private financial management firms to manage education freedom accounts and shall establish reasonable fees, based on market rates, for the management of education freedom accounts.
- 2. An education freedom account must be audited randomly each year by a certified or licensed public accountant. The State Treasurer may provide for additional audits of an education freedom account as it determines necessary.
- 3. If the State Treasurer determines that there has been substantial misuse of the money in an education freedom account, the State Treasurer may:
- (a) Freeze or dissolve the account, subject to any regulations adopted by the State Treasurer providing for notice of such action and opportunity to respond to the notice; and
- (b) Give notice of his or her determination to the Attorney General or the district attorney of the county in which the parent resides.
- Sec. 13. 1. The following persons may become a participating entity by submitting an application demonstrating that the person is:
- (a) A private school licensed pursuant to chapter 394 of NRS or exempt from such licensing pursuant to NRS 394.211;
- (b) An eligible institution;
- (c) A program of distance education that is not operated by a public school or the Department;
- (d) A tutor or tutoring facility that is accredited by a state, regional or national accrediting organization; or
- (e) The parent of a child.
- 2. The State Treasurer shall approve an application submitted pursuant to subsection 1 or request additional information to demonstrate that the person meets the criteria to serve as a participating entity. If the applicant is unable to provide such additional information, the State Treasurer may deny the application.
- 3. If it is reasonably expected that a participating entity will receive, from payments made from education freedom accounts, more than \$50,000 during any school year, the participating entity shall annually, on or before the date prescribed by the State Treasurer by regulation:
- (a) Post a surety bond in an amount equal to the amount reasonably expected to be paid to the participating entity from education freedom accounts during the school year; or

- (b) Provide evidence satisfactory the State Treasurer that the participa gentity otherwise has unencumbered assets sufficient to pay to the State Treasurer an amount equal to the amount described in paragraph (a).
- 4. Each participating entity that accepts payments made from education freedom accounts shall provide a receipt for each such payment to the parent who makes the payment.
- 5. The State Treasurer may refuse to allow an entity described in subsection 1 to continue to participate in the grant program provided for in sections 2 to 17, inclusive, of this act if the State Treasurer determines that the entity:
- (a) Has routinely failed to comply with the provisions of sections 2 to 17, inclusive, of this act; or
- (b) Has failed to provide any educational services required by law to a child receiving instruction from the entity if the entity is accepting payments made from the education freedom account of the child.
- 6. If the State Treasurer takes an action described in subsection 5 against an entity described in subsection 1, the State Treasurer shall provide immediate notice of the action to each parent of a child receiving instruction from the entity who has entered into or renewed an agreement pursuant to section 9 of this act and on behalf of whose child a grant of money has been deposited pursuant to section 10 of this act.
- Sec. 14. 1. Each participating entity that accepts payments for tuition and fees made from education freedom accounts shall:
- (a) Ensure that each child on whose behalf a grant of money has been deposited pursuant to section 10 of this act and who is receiving instruction from the participating entity takes:
- (1) Any examinations in mathematics and English language arts required for pupils of the same grade pursuant to chapter 389 of NRS; or
- (2) Norm-referenced achievement examinations in mathematics and English language arts each school year;
- (b) Provide for value-added assessments of the results of the examinations described in paragraph (a); and
- (c) Subject to the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974, 20 U.S.C. § 1232g, and any regulations adopted pursuant thereto, provide the results of the examinations described in paragraph (a) to the Department or an organization designated by the Department pursuant to subsection 4.
- 2. The Department shall:
- (a) Aggregate the examination results provided pursuant to subsection 1 according to the grade level, gender, race and family income level of each child whose examination results are provided; and
- (b) Subject to the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974, 20 U.S.C. § 1232g, and any regulations adopted pursuant thereto, make available on the Internet website of the Department:
- (1) The aggregated results and any associated learning gains; and
- (2) After 3 school years for which examination data has been collected, the graduation rates, as applicable, of children whose examination results are provided.
- 3. The State Treasurer shall administer an annual survey of parents who enter into or renew an agreement pursuant to section 9 of this act. The survey must ask each parent to indicate the number of years the parent has entered into or renewed such an agreement and to express:

- (a) The relative satisfaction of the parent with the grant program established pursuant to sections 2 to 17, inclusive, of this act; and
- (b) The opinions of the parent regarding any topics, items or issues that the State Treasurer determines may aid the State Treasurer in evaluating and improving the effectiveness of the grant program established pursuant to sections 2 to 17, inclusive, of this act.
- 4. Subject to available funding, the Department may arrange for a third-party organization to perform the duties of the Department prescribed by this section.
- Sec. 15. 1. The State Treasurer shall annually make available a list of participating entities, other than any parent of a child.
- 2. Subject to the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974, 20 U.S.C. § 1232g, and any regulations adopted pursuant thereto, the Department shall annually require the resident school district of each child on whose behalf a grant of money is made pursuant to section 10 of this act to provide to the participating entity any educational records of the child.
- Sec. 16. Except as otherwise provided in sections 2 to 17, inclusive, of this act, nothing in the provisions of sections 2 to 17, inclusive, of this act, shall be deemed to limit the independence or autonomy of a participating entity or to make the actions of a participating entity the actions of the State Government.
- Sec. 17. The State Treasurer shall adopt any regulations necessary or convenient to carry out the provisions of sections 2 to 17, inclusive, of this act.
- Sec. 18. NRS 385.007 is hereby amended to read as follows: As used in this title, unless the context otherwise requires:
- 1. "Challenge school" has the meaning ascribed to it in NRS 388D.305.
- 2. "Charter school" means a public school that is formed pursuant to the provisions of chapter 388A of NRS.
- 3. "Department" means the Department of Education.
- 4. "English learner" has the meaning ascribed to it in 20 U.S.C. § 7801(20).
- 5. "Homeschooled child" means a child who receives instruction at home and who is exempt from compulsory attendance pursuant to NRS 392.070.
- 6. "Local school precinct" has the meaning ascribed to it in NRS 388G.535.
- 7. "Opt-in child" means a child for whom an education freedom account has been established pursuant to section 9 of this act, who is not enrolled full-time in a public or private school and who receives all or a portion of his or her instruction from a participating entity, as defined in section 6 of this act.
- [7] 8. "Public schools" means all kindergartens and elementary schools, junior high schools and middle schools, high schools, charter schools and any other schools, classes and educational programs which receive their support through public taxation and, except for charter schools, whose textbooks and courses of study are under the control of the State Board.
- [8] 9. "School bus" has the meaning ascribed to it in NRS 484A.230.
- [9] 10. "School counselor" or "counselor" means a person who holds a license issued pursuant to chapter 391 of NRS and an endorsement to serve as a school counselor issued pursuant to regulations adopted by the

Commission on Professional Standards in Education or who is otherwise a corized by the Superintendent of Public Instruction to serve as a school counselor.

- [10] 11. "School psychologist" or "psychologist" means a person who holds a license issued pursuant to chapter 391 of NRS and an endorsement to serve as a school psychologist issued pursuant to regulations adopted by the Commission on Professional Standards in Education or who is otherwise authorized by the Superintendent of Public Instruction to serve as a school psychologist.
- [44] 12. "School social worker" or "social worker" means a social worker licensed pursuant to chapter 641B of NRS who holds a license issued pursuant to chapter 391 of NRS and an endorsement to serve as a school social worker issued pursuant to regulations adopted by the Commission on Professional Standards in Education or who is otherwise authorized by the Superintendent of Public Instruction to serve as a school social worker.
- [42] 13. "State Board" means the State Board of Education.
- [13] 14. "University school for profoundly gifted pupils" has the meaning ascribed to it in NRS 388C.040.
- Sec. 19. NRS 219A.140 is hereby amended to read as follows: To be eligible to serve on the Youth Legislature, a person:
- 1. To be eligible to serve on the Youth Legislature, a person:
- (a) Must be:
  - (1) A resident of the senatorial district of the Senator who appoints him or her;
  - (2) Enrolled in a public school or private school located in the senatorial district of the Senator who appoints him or her; or
  - (3) A homeschooled child who is otherwise eligible to be enrolled in a public school in the senatorial district of the Senator who appoints him or her;
- (b) Except as otherwise provided in subsection 3 of NRS 219A.150, must be:
  - (1) Enrolled in a public school or private school in this State in grade 9, 10 or 11 for the first school year of the term for which he or she is appointed; or
  - (2) A homeschooled child who is otherwise eligible to enroll in a public school in this State in grade 9, 10 or 11 for the first school year of the term for which he or she is appointed; and
- (c) Must not be related by blood, adoption or marriage within the third degree of consanguinity or affinity to the Senator who appoints him or her or to any member of the Assembly who collaborated to appoint him or her.
- 2. If, at any time, a person appointed to the Youth Legislature changes his or her residency or changes his or her school of enrollment in such a manner as to render the person ineligible under his or her original appointment, the person shall inform the Board, in writing, within 30 days after becoming aware of such changed facts.
- 3. A person who wishes to be appointed or reappointed to the Youth Legislature must submit an application on the form prescribed pursuant to subsection 4 to the Senator of the senatorial district in which the person resides, is enrolled in a public school or private school or, if the person is a homeschooled child[5] or opt-in child, the senatorial district in which he or she is otherwise eligible to be enrolled in a public school. A person may not submit an application to more than one Senator in a calendar year.

4. The Board shall prescribe a norm for applications submitted pursuant to this section, which must require the signature of the principal of the school in which the applicant is enrolled or, if the applicant is a homeschooled child[5] or opt-in child, the signature of a member of the community in which the applicant resides other than a relative of the applicant.

Sec. 20 NRS 219A.150 is hereby amended to read as follows:

- 1. A position on the Youth Legislature becomes vacant upon:
- (a) The death or resignation of a member.
- (b) The determination of the Chair or Vice Chair of the Board, as applicable, that a member has accrued, for any reason, any combination of:
  - (1) Absences from meetings or event days of the Youth Legislature; or
  - (2) Incompletions of any other activities that are assigned to him or her by the Board as a member of the Youth Legislature,
- → if the combination of absences or incompletions amounts to three or more missed or unsuccessful activity credits during his or her term, unless the absences or incompletions are excused, in whole or in part, by the Chair or Vice Chair of the Board, as applicable.
- (c) A change of residency or a change of the school of enrollment of a member which renders that member ineligible under his or her original appointment.
- 2. In addition to the provisions of subsection 1, a position on the Youth Legislature becomes vacant if:
- (a) A member of the Youth Legislature graduates from high school or otherwise ceases to attend public school or private school for any reason other than to become a homeschooled child *or opt-in child*; or
- (b) A member of the Youth Legislature who is a homeschooled child *or opt-in child* completes an educational plan of instruction for grade 12 or otherwise ceases to be a homeschooled child *or opt-in child* for any reason other than to enroll in a public school or private school.
- 3. A vacancy on the Youth Legislature must be filled:
- (a) For the remainder of the unexpired term in the same manner as the original appointment, except that, if the remainder of the unexpired term is less than 1 year, the member of the Senate who made the original appointment may appoint a person who:
  - (1) Is enrolled in a public school or private school in this State in grade 12 or who is a homeschooled child *or opt-in child* who is otherwise eligible to enroll in a public school in this State in grade 12; and
  - (2) Satisfies the qualifications set forth in paragraphs (a) and (c) of subsection 1 of NRS 219A.140.
- (b) Insofar as is practicable, within 30 days after the date on which the vacancy occurs.
- 4. As used in this section:
- (a) "Activity credit" means a credit, or any fractional portion thereof, that the Board has determined a member is eligible to earn for:
  - (1) Attending meetings or event days of the Youth Legislature; or

- (2) Completing, in the manner required by the Board, any other actuaties that are assigned to him or her by the Board as a member of the Youth Legislature.
- (b) "Event day" means any single calendar day on which an official, scheduled event of the Youth Legislature is held, including, without limitation, a course of instruction, a course of orientation, a meeting, a seminar or any other official, scheduled activity.

#### Sec. 21. NRS 385B.060 is hereby amended to read as follows:

- 1. The Nevada Interscholastic Activities Association shall adopt rules and regulations in the manner provided for state agencies by chapter 233B of NRS as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this chapter. The regulations must include provisions governing the eligibility and participation of homeschooled children and opt-in children in interscholastic activities and events. In addition to the regulations governing eligibility, a homeschooled child who wishes to participate must have on file with the school district in which the child resides a current notice of intent of a homeschooled child to participate in programs and activities pursuant to NRS 388D.070.
- 2. An opt-in child who wishes to participate must have on file with the school district in which the child resides a current notice of intent of an opt-in child to participate in programs and activities pursuant to section 30 of this act.
- [2] 3. The Nevada Interscholastic Activities Association shall adopt regulations setting forth:
- (a) The standards of safety for each event, competition or other activity engaged in by a spirit squad of a school that is a member of the Nevada Interscholastic Activities Association, which must substantially comply with the spirit rules of the National Federation of State High School Associations, or its successor organization; and
- (b) The qualifications required for a person to become a coach of a spirit squad.
- [3] 4. If the Nevada Interscholastic Activities Association intends to adopt, repeal or amend a policy, rule or regulation concerning or affecting homeschooled children, the Association shall consult with the Northern Nevada Homeschool Advisory Council and the Southern Nevada Homeschool Advisory Council, or their successor organizations, to provide those Councils with a reasonable opportunity to submit data, opinions or arguments, orally or in writing, concerning the proposal or change. The Association shall consider all written and oral submissions respecting the proposal or change before taking final action.
- [4] 5. As used in this section, "spirit squad" means any team or other group of persons that is formed for the purpose of:
- (a) Leading cheers or rallies to encourage support for a team that participates in a sport that is sanctioned by the Nevada Interscholastic Activities Association; or
- (b) Participating in a competition against another team or other group of persons to determine the ability of each team or group of persons to engage in an activity specified in paragraph (a).

#### Sec. 22. NRS 385B.150 is hereby amended to read as follows:

1. A homeschooled child must be allowed to participate in interscholastic activities and events in accordance with the regulations adopted by the Nevada Interscholastic Activities Association pursuant to NRS 385B.060 if a notice of intent of a homeschooled child to participate in programs and activities is filed for the child with the school district in which the child resides for the current school year pursuant to NRS 388D.070.

- 2. An opt-in child must be allowed to participate in interscholastic activities and events in accordance with the regulations adopted by the Nevada Interscholastic Activities Association pursuant to NRS 385B.060 if a notice of intent of an opt-in child to participate in programs and activities is filed for the child with the school district in which the child resides for the current school year pursuant to section 28 of this act.
- [2] 3. The provisions of this chapter and the regulations adopted pursuant thereto that apply to pupils enrolled in public schools who participate in interscholastic activities and events apply in the same manner to homeschooled *and opt-in* children who participate in interscholastic activities and events, including, without limitation, provisions governing:
- (a) Eligibility and qualifications for participation;
- (b) Fees for participation;
- (c) Insurance;
- (d) Transportation;
- (e) Requirements of physical examination;
- (f) Responsibilities of participants;
- (g) Schedules of events;
- (h) Safety and welfare of participants;
- (i) Eligibility for awards, trophies and medals;
- (j) Conduct of behavior and performance of participants; and
- (k) Disciplinary procedures.

Sec. 23. NRS 385B.160 is hereby amended to read as follows:

No challenge may be brought by the Nevada Interscholastic Activities Association, a school district, a public school or a private school, a parent or guardian of a pupil enrolled in a public school or a private school, a pupil enrolled in a public school or private school, or any other entity or person claiming that an interscholastic activity or event is invalid because homeschooled *or opt-in* children or children of a military family who transferred schools pursuant to the provisions of chapter 388F of NRS are allowed to participate in the interscholastic activity or event.

Sec. 24. NRS 385B.170 is hereby amended to read as follows:

A school district, public school or private school shall not prescribe any regulations, rules, policies, procedures or requirements governing the:

- 1. Eligibility of homeschooled children, *opt-in children* or children of a military family who transferred schools pursuant to the provisions of chapter 388F of NRS to participate in interscholastic activities and events pursuant to this chapter; or
- 2. Participation of homeschooled children, *opt-in children* or children of a military family who transferred schools pursuant to the provisions of chapter 388F of NRS in interscholastic activities and events pursuant to this chapter,

→ that are more restrictive than the provisions governing eligibility and pa ipation prescribed by the Nevada Interscholastic Activities Association pursuant to NRS 385B.060 and 385B.130.

#### Sec. 25. NRS 388A.471 is hereby amended to read as follows:

- 1. Except as otherwise provided in subsection 2, upon the request of a parent or legal guardian of a child who is enrolled in a public school of a school district or a private school, or a parent or legal guardian of a homeschooled child *or opt-in child*, the governing body of the charter school shall authorize the child to participate in a class that is not otherwise available to the child at his or her school or homeschool *or from his or her participating entity, as defined in section 6 of this act*, or participate in an extracurricular activity at the charter school if:
- (a) Space for the child in the class or extracurricular activity is available;
- (b) The parent or legal guardian demonstrates to the satisfaction of the governing body that the child is qualified to participate in the class or extracurricular activity; [and]
- (c) The child is a homeschooled child and a notice of intent of a homeschooled child to participate in programs and activities is filed for the child with the school district in which the child resides for the current school year pursuant to NRS 388D.070[-]; and
- (d) The child is an opt-in child and a notice of intent of an opt-in child to participate in programs and activities is filed for the child with the school district in which the child resides for the current school year pursuant to section 30 of this act
- 2. If the governing body of a charter school authorizes a child to participate in a class or extracurricular activity pursuant to subsection 1, the governing body is not required to provide transportation for the child to attend the class or activity. A charter school shall not authorize such a child to participate in a class or activity through a program of distance education provided by the charter school pursuant to NRS 388.820 to 388.874, inclusive.
- 3. The governing body of a charter school may revoke its approval for a child to participate in a class or extracurricular activity at a charter school pursuant to subsection 1 if the governing body determines that the child has failed to comply with applicable statutes, or applicable rules and regulations. If the governing body so revokes its approval, neither the governing body nor the charter school is liable for any damages relating to the denial of services to the child.
- 4. The governing body of a charter school may, before authorizing a homeschooled child to participate in a class or extracurricular activity pursuant to subsection 1, require proof of the identity of the child, including, without limitation, the birth certificate of the child or other documentation sufficient to establish the identity of the child.
- Sec. 26. NRS 388.850 is hereby amended to read as follows:
- 1. A pupil may enroll in a program of distance education if:
- (a) Pursuant to this section or other specific statute, the pupil is eligible for enrollment or the pupil's enrollment is not otherwise prohibited;
- (b) The program of distance education in which the pupil wishes to enroll is offered by the school district in which the pupil resides or a charter school or, if the program of distance education

in which the pupil wishes to emoll is a full-time program of distance ducation offered by a school district other than the school district in which the pupil resides, the program is not the same or substantially similar to a program of distance education offered by the school district in which the pupil resides;

- (c) The pupil satisfies the qualifications and conditions for enrollment adopted by the State Board pursuant to NRS 388.874; and
- (d) The pupil satisfies the requirements of the program of distance education.
- 2. A child who is exempt from compulsory attendance and is enrolled in a private school pursuant to chapter 394 of NRS or is being homeschooled is not eligible to enroll in or otherwise attend a program of distance education, regardless of whether the child is otherwise eligible for enrollment pursuant to subsection 1.
- 3. If a pupil who is prohibited from attending public school pursuant to NRS 392.264 enrolls in a program of distance education, the enrollment and attendance of that pupil must comply with all requirements of NRS 62F.100 to 62F.150, inclusive, and 392.251 to 392.271, inclusive.
- 4. A pupil who is enrolled in grade 12 in a program of distance education and who moves out of this State is eligible to maintain enrollment in the program of distance education until the pupil graduates from high school.
- 5. An opt-in child who is exempt from compulsory attendance is not eligible to enroll in or otherwise attend a program of distance education, regardless of whether the child is otherwise eligible for enrollment pursuant to subsection 1, unless the opt-in child receives only a portion of his or her instruction from a participating entity as authorized pursuant to section 9 of this act.
- Sec. 27. Chapter 392 of NRS is hereby amended by adding thereto the provisions set forth as sections 28, 29 and 30 of this act.
- Sec. 28. As used in this section and sections 29 and 30 of this act, unless the context otherwise requires, "parent" has the meaning ascribed to it in section 5 of this act.
- Sec. 29. 1. The parent of an opt-in child shall provide notice to the school district where the child would otherwise attend that the child is an opt-in child as soon as practicable after entering into an agreement to establish an education freedom account pursuant to section 9 of this act. Such notice must also include:
- (a) The full name, age and gender of the child; and
- (b) The name and address of each parent of the child.
- 2. The superintendent of schools of a school shall accept a notice provided pursuant to subsection 1 and shall not require any additional assurances from the parent who filed the notice.
- 3. The school district shall provide to a parent who files a notice pursuant to subsection 1, a written acknowledgement which clearly indicates that the parent has provided the notification required by law and that the child is an opt-in child. The written acknowledgment shall be deemed proof of compliance with Nevada's compulsory school attendance law.
- 4. The superintendent of schools of a school district shall process a written request for a copy of the records of the school district or any information contained therein relating to an opt-in child not later than 5 days after receiving the request. The superintendent of schools may only release such records or information:

- (a) To the Department, the Budget Division of the Department of Administration and the Fiscal Analysis Division of the Legislative Counsel Bureau for use in preparing the biennial budget;
- (b) To a person or entity specified by the parent of the child, or by the child if the child is at least 18 years of age, upon suitable proof of identity of the parent or child; or
- (c) If required by specific statute.
- 5. If an opt-in child seeks admittance or entrance to any public school in this State, the school may use only commonly used practices in determining the academic ability, placement or eligibility of the child. If the child enrolls in a charter school, the charter school shall, to the extent practicable, notify the board of trustees of the resident school district of the child's enrollment in the charter school. Regardless of whether the charter school provides such notification to the board of trustees, the charter school may count the child who is enrolled for the purposes of NRS 387.123. An opt-in child seeking admittance to public high school must comply with NRS 392.033.
- 6. A school shall not discriminate in any manner against an opt-in child or a child who was formerly an opt-in child.
- 7. Each school district shall allow an opt-in child to participate in all college entrance examinations offered in this State, including, without limitation, the SAT, the ACT, the Preliminary SAT and the National Merit Scholarship Qualifying Test. Each school district shall upon request, provide information to the parent of an opt-in child who resides in the school district has adequate notice of the availability of information concerning such examinations on the Internet website of the school district maintained pursuant to NRS 389.004.
- Sec. 30. 1. The Department shall develop a standard form for the notice of intent of an opt-in child to participate in programs and activities. The board of trustees of each school district shall, in a timely manner, make only the form developed by the Department available to parents of opt-in children.
- 2. If an opt-in child wishes to participate in classes, activities, programs, sports or interscholastic activities and events at a public school or through a school district, or through the Nevada Interscholastic Activities Association, the parent of the child must file a current notice of intent to participate with the resident school district.
- Sec. 31. NRS 392.033 is hereby amended to read as follows:
- 1. The State Board shall adopt regulations which prescribe the courses of study required for promotion to high school, including, without limitation, English, mathematics, science and social studies. The regulations may include the credits to be earned in each course.
- 2. Except as otherwise provided in subsection 4, the board of trustees of a school district shall not promote a pupil to high school if the pupil does not complete the course of study or credits required for promotion. The board of trustees of the school district in which the pupil is enrolled may provide programs of remedial study to complete the courses of study required for promotion to high school.
- 3. The board of trustees of each school district shall adopt a procedure for evaluating the course of study or credits completed by a pupil who transfers to a junior high or middle school from a junior high or middle school in this State or from a school outside of this State.
- 4. The board of trustees of each school district shall adopt a policy that allows a pupil who has not completed the courses of study or credits required for promotion to high school to be placed on academic probation and to

enroll in high school. A pupil who is on academic probation pursuant to the absection shall complete appropriate remediation in the subject areas that the pupil failed to pass. The policy must include the criteria for eligibility of a pupil to be placed on academic probation. A parent or guardian may elect not to place his or her child on academic probation but to remain in grade 8.

- 5. A homeschooled child or opt-in child who enrolls in a public high school shall, upon initial enrollment:
- (a) Provide documentation sufficient to prove that the child has successfully completed the courses of study required for promotion to high school through an accredited program of homeschool study recognized by the board of trustees of the school district [;] or from a participating entity, as applicable;
- (b) Demonstrate proficiency in the courses of study required for promotion to high school through an examination prescribed by the board of trustees of the school district; or
- (c) Provide other proof satisfactory to the board of trustees of the school district demonstrating competency in the courses of study required for promotion to high school.
- 6. As used in this section, "participating entity" has the meaning ascribed to it in section 6 of this act.

Sec. 32. NRS 392.070 is hereby amended to read as follows:

- 1. Attendance of a child required by the provisions of NRS 392.040 must be excused when:
- (a) The child is enrolled in a private school pursuant to chapter 394 of NRS; [or]
- (b) A parent of the child chooses to provide education to the child and files a notice of intent to homeschool the child with the superintendent of schools of the school district in which the child resides in accordance with NRS  $392.700 \, \frac{1}{10.00}$ ; or
- (c) The child is an opt-in child and notice of such has been provided to the school district in which the child resides or the charter school in which the child was previously enrolled, as applicable, in accordance with section 29 of this act.
- Sec. 33. NRS 392.074 is hereby amended to read as follows:
- 1. Except as otherwise provided in subsection 1 of NRS 392.072 for programs of special education and related services, upon the request of a parent or legal guardian of a child who is enrolled in a private school or a parent or legal guardian of a homeschooled child *or opt-in child*, the board of trustees of the school district in which the child resides shall authorize the child to participate in any classes and extracurricular activities, excluding sports, at a public school within the school district if:
- (a) Space for the child in the class or extracurricular activity is available;
- (b) The parent or legal guardian demonstrates to the satisfaction of the board of trustees that the child is qualified to participate in the class or extracurricular activity; [and]
- (c) If the child is a homeschooled child, a notice of intent of a homeschooled child to participate in programs and activities is filed for the child with the school district for the current school year pursuant to NRS 388D.070[-]; and
- (d) if the child is an opt-in child, a notice of intent of an opt-in child to participate in programs and activities is filed for the child with the school district for the current school year pursuant to section 30 of this act.

- → If the board of trustees of a school district authorizes a child to participate in a class or extracurricular activity, excluding sports, pursuant to this subsection, the board of trustees is not required to provide transportation for the child to attend the class or activity. A homeschooled child *or opt-in child* must be allowed to participate in interscholastic activities and events governed by the Nevada Interscholastic Activities Association pursuant to chapter 385B of NRS and interscholastic activities and events, including sports, pursuant to subsection 3.
- 2. The board of trustees of a school district may revoke its approval for a pupil to participate in a class or extracurricular activity at a public school pursuant to subsection 1 if the board of trustees or the public school determines that the pupil has failed to comply with applicable statutes, or applicable rules and regulations of the board of trustees. If the board of trustees revokes its approval, neither the board of trustees nor the public school is liable for any damages relating to the denial of services to the pupil.
- 3. In addition to those interscholastic activities and events governed by the Nevada Interscholastic Activities Association pursuant to chapter 385B of NRS, a homeschooled child *or opt-in child* must be allowed to participate in interscholastic activities and events, including sports, if a notice of intent of a homeschooled child *or opt-in child* to participate in programs and activities is filed for the child with the school district for the current school year pursuant to NRS 388D.070 *or section 30 of this act, as applicable*. A homeschooled child *or opt-in child* who participates in interscholastic activities and events at a public school pursuant to this subsection must participate within the school district of the child's residence through the public school which the child is otherwise zoned to attend. Any rules or regulations that apply to pupils enrolled in public schools who participate in interscholastic activities and events, including sports, apply in the same manner to homeschooled children *and opt-in children* who participate in interscholastic activities and events, including, without limitation, provisions governing:
- (a) Eligibility and qualifications for participation;
- (b) Fees for participation;
- (c) Insurance;
- (d) Transportation;
- (e) Requirements of physical examination;
- (f) Responsibilities of participants;
- (g) Schedules of events;
- (h) Safety and welfare of participants;
- (i) Eligibility for awards, trophies and medals;
- (j) Conduct of behavior and performance of participants; and
- (k) Disciplinary procedures.
- 4. If a homeschooled child *or opt-in child* participates in interscholastic activities and events pursuant to subsection 3:
- (a) No challenge may be brought by the Association, a school district, a public school or a private school, a parent or guardian of a pupil enrolled in a public school or a private school, a pupil enrolled in a public school

or a private school, or any other endty or person claiming that an interschedic activity or event is invalid because the homeschooled child or opt-in child is allowed to participate.

- (b) Neither the school district nor a public school may prescribe any regulations, rules, policies, procedures or requirements governing the eligibility or participation of the homeschooled child *or opt-in child* that are more restrictive than the provisions governing the eligibility and participation of pupils enrolled in public schools.
- 5. The board of trustees of a school district:
- (a) May, before authorizing a homeschooled child *or opt-in child* to participate in a class or extracurricular activity, excluding sports, pursuant to subsection 1, require proof of the identity of the child, including, without limitation, the birth certificate of the child or other documentation sufficient to establish the identity of the child.
- (b) Shall, before allowing a homeschooled child *or opt-in child* to participate in interscholastic activities and events governed by the Nevada Interscholastic Activities Association pursuant to chapter 385B of NRS and interscholastic activities and events pursuant to subsection 3, require proof of the identity of the child, including, without limitation, the birth certificate of the child or other documentation sufficient to establish the identity of the child.

#### Sec. 34. NRS 392.466 is hereby amended to read as follows:

- 1. Except as otherwise provided in this section, any pupil who commits a battery which results in the bodily injury of an employee of the school or who sells or distributes any controlled substance while on the premises of any public school, at an activity sponsored by a public school or on any school bus and who is at least 11 years of age shall meet with the school and his or her parent or legal guardian. The school shall provide a plan of action based on restorative justice to the parent or legal guardian of the pupil or if the pupil is an unaccompanied pupil, the pupil. The pupil may be suspended or expelled from the school, in which case the pupil shall:
- (a) Enroll in a private school pursuant to chapter 394 of NRS or be homeschooled or an opt-in child; or
- (b) Enroll in a program of independent study provided pursuant to NRS 389.155 for pupils who have been suspended or expelled from public school or a program of distance education provided pursuant to NRS 388.820 to 388.874, inclusive, if the pupil qualifies for enrollment and is accepted for enrollment in accordance with the requirements of the applicable program.
- 2. An employee who is a victim of a battery which results in the bodily injury of an employee of the school may appeal to the school the plan of action provided pursuant to subsection 1 if:
- (a) The employee feels any actions taken pursuant to such plan are inappropriate; and
- (b) For a pupil with a disability who committed the battery, the board of trustees of the school district or its designee has reviewed the circumstances and determined that such an appeal is in compliance with the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400 et seq.
- 3. Except as otherwise provided in this section, any pupil of any age, including, without limitation, a pupil with a disability, who is found in possession of a firearm or a dangerous weapon while on the premises of any public school, at an activity sponsored by a public school or on any school bus must, for the first occurrence, be expelled from the school for a period of not less than 1 year, although the pupil may be placed in another kind of school for a period not to exceed the period of the expulsion. For a second occurrence, the pupil must be permanently expelled from the school.

- 4. If a school is unable to retain a pupil in the school pursuant to subsect. 1 for the safety of any person or because doing so would not be in the best interest of the pupil, the pupil may be suspended, expelled or placed in another school. If a pupil is placed in another school, the current school of the pupil shall explain what services will be provided to the pupil at the new school that the current school is unable to provide to address the specific needs and behaviors of the pupil. The school district of the current school of the pupil shall coordinate with the new school to create a plan of action based on restorative justice for the pupil and to ensure that any resources required to execute the plan of action based on restorative justice are available at the new school.
- 5. Except as otherwise provided in this section, if a pupil is deemed a habitual disciplinary problem pursuant to NRS 392.4655, the pupil is at least 11 years of age and the school has made a reasonable effort to complete a plan of action based on restorative justice with the pupil, based on the seriousness of the acts which were the basis for the discipline, the pupil may be:
- (a) Suspended from the school;
- (b) Expelled from the school under extraordinary circumstances as determined by the principal of the school.
- 6. If the pupil is expelled, or the period of the pupil's suspension is for one school semester, the pupil must:
- (a) Enroll in a private school pursuant to chapter 394 of NRS or be homeschooled *or become an opt-in child*; or
- (b) Enroll in a program of independent study provided pursuant to NRS 389.155 for pupils who have been suspended or expelled from public school or a program of distance education provided pursuant to NRS 388.820 to 388.874, inclusive, if the pupil qualifies for enrollment and is accepted for enrollment in accordance with the requirements of the applicable program.
- 7. The superintendent of schools of a school district may, for good cause shown in a particular case in that school district, allow a modification to a suspension or expulsion pursuant to subsections 1 to 5, inclusive, if such modification is set forth in writing. The superintendent shall allow such a modification if the superintendent determines that a plan of action based on restorative justice may be used successfully.
- 8. This section does not prohibit a pupil from having in his or her possession a knife or firearm with the approval of the principal of the school. A principal may grant such approval only in accordance with the policies or regulations adopted by the board of trustees of the school district.
- 9. Except as otherwise provided in this subsection and subsection 3, a pupil who is less than 11 years of age must not be permanently expelled from school. In extraordinary circumstances, a school may request an exception to this subsection from the board of trustees of the school district. A pupil who is at least 11 years of age may be suspended, expelled or permanently expelled from school pursuant to this section only after the board of trustees of the school district or its designee has reviewed the circumstances and approved this action in accordance with the procedural policy adopted by the board for such issues.
- 10. Except as otherwise provided in subsection 3, a pupil with a disability who is at least 11 years of age may, in accordance with the procedural policy adopted by the board of trustees of the school district for such matters and only after the board of trustees of the school district or its designee has reviewed the circumstances and determined that the action is in compliance with the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400 et seq., be:

- (a) Suspended from school pursuant to this section for not more than 5 days. Such a suspension may be imposed pursuant to this paragraph for each occurrence of conduct proscribed by subsection 1.
- (b) Expelled from school pursuant to this section.
- (c) Permanently expelled from school pursuant to this section.
- 11. A homeless pupil or a pupil in foster care who is at least 11 years of age may be suspended or expelled from school pursuant to this section only if a determination is made that the behavior that led to the consideration for suspension or expulsion was not caused by homelessness or being in foster care. The person responsible for making a determination of whether or not the behavior was caused by homelessness or being in foster care unless the person determines that the behavior was not caused by homelessness or being in foster care pursuant to this subsection. A determination that the behavior was not caused by homelessness must be made in consultation with the local educational agency liaison for homeless pupils designated in accordance with the McKinney-Vento Homeless Assistance Act of 1987, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11301 et seq., or a contact person at a school, including, without limitation, a school counselor or school social worker. A determination that the behavior was not caused by being in foster care must be made in consultation with an advocate for pupils in foster care at the school in which the pupil is in enrolled or the school counselor of the pupil.
- 12. The provisions of chapter 241 of NRS do not apply to any hearing or proceeding conducted pursuant to this section. Such hearings or proceedings must be closed to the public.
- 13. As used in this section:
- (a) "Battery" has the meaning ascribed to it in paragraph (a) of subsection 1 of NRS 200.481.
- (b) "Dangerous weapon" includes, without limitation, a blackjack, slungshot, billy, sand-club, sandbag, metal knuckles, dirk or dagger, a nunchaku or trefoil, as defined in NRS 202.350, a butterfly knife or any other knife described in NRS 202.350, a switchblade knife as defined in NRS 202.265, or any other object which is used, or threatened to be used, in such a manner and under such circumstances as to pose a threat of, or cause, bodily injury to a person.
- (c) "Firearm" includes, without limitation, any pistol, revolver, shotgun, explosive substance or device, and any other item included within the definition of a "firearm" in 18 U.S.C. § 921, as that section existed on July 1, 1995.
- (d) "Foster care" has the meaning ascribed to it in 45 C.F.R. § 1355.20. (e) "Homeless pupil" has the meaning ascribed to the term.
- (e) "Homeless children and youths" in 42 U.S.C. § 11434a(2).
- (f) "Permanently expelled" means the disciplinary removal of a pupil from the school in which the pupil is currently enrolled:
  - (1) Except as otherwise provided in subparagraph (2), without the possibility of returning to the school in which the pupil is currently enrolled or another public school within the school district; and
  - (2) With the possibility of enrolling in a program or public school for alternative education for pupils who are expelled or permanently expelled after being permanently expelled.
- (g) "Restorative justice" has the meaning ascribed to it in NRS 392.472.

- (h) "Unaccompanied pupil" has the meaning ascribed to the term "unaccompanied youth" in 42 U.S.C. §1434a(6).
- 14. The provisions of this section do not prohibit a pupil who is suspended or expelled from enrolling in a charter school that is designed exclusively for the enrollment of pupils with disciplinary problems if the pupil is accepted for enrollment by the charter school pursuant to NRS 388A.453 or 388A.456. Upon request, the governing body of a charter school must be provided with access to the records of the pupil relating to the pupil's suspension or expulsion in accordance with applicable federal and state law before the governing body makes a decision concerning the enrollment of the pupil.
- Sec. 35. Nothing herein shall require the Legislature to appropriate money to fund education freedom accounts or any expenses related thereto.
- Sec. 36. If any provision or part of this act be declared invalid, or the application thereof to any person, thing or circumstance is held invalid, such invalidity shall not affect the remaining provisions or application of this act which can be given effect without the invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions of this act are declared to be severable. This subsection shall be construed broadly to preserve and effectuate the declared purpose of this act.
- Sec. 37. The provisions of this act become effective upon an appropriation by the Legislature to fund the education freedom accounts.

[The remainder of this page is blank.]

### DESCRIPTION OF EFT &CT

The Petition establishes an education freedom account program under which parents will be authorized to establish an account for their child's education. The parent of any child required to attend public school who has been enrolled in a public school in Nevada during the entirety of the immediately preceding school year or whose child is eligible to enroll in kindergarten may establish an account for the child. Money in the accounts may be used to pay certain educational expenses including, but not limited to, tuition and fees at participating entities. Participating entities may include eligible private schools, a program of distance education not operated by a public school and parents, among others.

The maximum available grant is 90 percent of the statewide base per pupil funding amount. For Fiscal Year 2021-2022, that statewide base per pupil funding amount is \$6,980 per pupil, and for Fiscal Year 2022-2023 it is \$7,074 per pupil. That said, nothing in the initiative requires the Legislature to appropriate money to fund the accounts. If no money is appropriated, no funding will be available for the accounts. Funding the accounts, however, could necessitate a tax increase or reduction of government services.

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### **DESCRIPTION OF EFFECT**

The Petition establishes an education freedom account program under which parents will be authorized to establish an account for their child's education. The parent of any child required to attend public school who has been enrolled in a public school in Nevada during the entirety of the immediately preceding school year or whose child is eligible to enroll in kindergarten may establish an account for the child. Money in the accounts may be used to pay certain educational expenses including, but not limited to, tuition and fees at participating entities. Participating entities may include eligible private schools, a program of distance education not operated by a public school and parents, among others.

The maximum available grant is 90 percent of the statewide base per pupil funding amount. For Fiscal Year 2021-2022, that statewide base per pupil funding amount is \$6,980 per pupil, and for Fiscal Year 2022-2023 it is \$7,074 per pupil. That said, nothing in the initiative requires the Legislature to appropriate money to fund the accounts. If no money is appropriated, no funding will be available for the accounts. Funding the accounts, however, could necessitate a tax increase or reduction of government services.

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Place Affidavit on last page of document.

## $\underline{\textbf{THE FOLLOWING AFFIDAVIT MUST BE COMPLE. ED AND SIGNED}};$

### **AFFIDAVIT OF CIRCULATOR**

(TO BE SIGNED BY CIRCULATOR)

STATE OF NEVADA )		
COUNTY OF )		
I,, (print name)	), being first duly sworn under penalty of perjury,	, depose and say: (1)
that I reside at		
(print street, city and state); (2) that I am 18 years of ag	ge or older; (3) that I personally circulated this d	ocument; (4) that all
signatures were affixed in my presence; (5) that the nur	nber of signatures affixed thereon is	; and (6)
that each person who signed had an opportunity before	e signing to read the full text of the act or reso	olution on which the
initiative or referendum is demanded.		
Subscribed and sworn to or affirmed before me this	Signature of Circulator	
day of,, by	·	
Notary Public or person authorized to administer oath		

EL501C Revised 8/2019

# EXHIBIT 2

EXHIBIT 2

#### **Alternative Description of Effect**

The Petition establishes an education freedom account program-under which parents will be authorized to establish an account for their child's education. The parent of any child required to attend public school who has been enrolled in a Nevada public school in Nevada during the entirety of the immediately preceding school year or whose child is eligible to enroll in kindergarten may establish an account for the child. Account funds Money in the accounts may be used to pay certain educational expenses including, but not limited to, tuition and fees at participating entities. Participating entities may include eligible private schools, a programs of distance education not operated by a public school and parents, among others. Parents may not use account funds if their child is in public school full time. If a parent receives funds then terminates their account agreement early, their child may not enroll in public school until the next quarter.

The maximum available grant is 90 percent of the statewide base per pupil funding-amount. For Fiscal Year 2021-2022, that amount is \$6,980 per pupil. For Fiscal Year 2022-2023, that amount is \$7,074 per pupil. That said, nNothing in the initiative requires the Legislature to appropriate money for to fund the accounts. If no money is appropriated, no funding will be available for the accounts. Funding the accounts, however, could necessitate a tax increase or reduction of government services, depending on the prerogative of the Legislature.

Lucas Foletta, Esq. (NSBN 12154) McDonald Carano 100 West Liberty Street, 10th Floor Reno, NV 89501 (775) 788-2000 (775) 788-2020 lfoletta@mcdonaldcarano.com

Attorneys for Intervenor Education Freedom PAC

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AUBREY REWLATT CLERK DEPUTY

# IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA IN AND FOR CARSON CITY

\* \* \*

BEVERLY ROGERS, an individual; RORY REID, an individual,

Plaintiffs,

VS.

BARBARA CEGAVSKE, in her official capacity as NEVADA SECRETARY OF STATE,

Defendant.

Case No. 22 OC 00027 1B

Dept. No. II

### INTERVENOR'S EX PARTE MOTION FOR HEARING PURSUANT TO NRS 295.061

Intervenor EDUCATION FREEDOM PAC, a registered Nevada political action committee ("EFP"), by and through its attorney Lucas Foletta, Esq., of McDonald Carano LLP, hereby requests that the Court issue an order setting the Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief Challenging Initiative Petition S-02-2022 Pursuant to NRS 295.061(1) ("Complaint") filed by Plaintiffs Beverly Rogers and Rory Reid ("Plaintiffs") in the abovecaptioned matter for hearing. This ex parte motion is made based upon the following memorandum of points and authorities, the pleadings and papers on file herein, and pursuant to NRS 295.061(2) and FJDCR 3.19 and 4.4.

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# McDONALD (M. CARANO) 100 WEST LIBERTY STREET, TENTH FLOOR • RENO. NEVADA 89501 PHONE 775.788.2000 • FAX 775.788.2020

#### POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

#### I. SHOWING OF EMERGENCY

This matter involves a challenge to Initiative Petition S-02-2022 ("Petition"). The Petition, filed by EFP on January 31, 2022, proposes to establish an education freedom account program under which parents will be authorized to establish accounts for their children's education. (*See* Exhibit 1 to Compl.) On February 22, 2022, Plaintiffs filed the Complaint, which was accompanied by a Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief Challenging Initiative Petition S-02-2022 Pursuant to NRS 295.061(1). NRS 295.061(1) provides:

Except as otherwise provided in subsection 3, whether an initiative or referendum embraces but one subject and matters necessarily connected therewith and pertaining thereto, and the description of the effect of an initiative or referendum required pursuant to NRS 295.009, may be challenged by filing a complaint in the First Judicial District Court not later than 15 days, Saturdays, Sundays and holidays excluded, after a copy of the petition is placed on file with the Secretary of State pursuant to NRS 295.015. All affidavits and documents in support of the challenge must be filed with the complaint. The court shall set the matter for hearing not later than 15 days after the complaint is filed and shall give priority to such a complaint over all other matters pending with the court, except for criminal proceedings.

NRS 295.061(1) (emphasis added). Here, Plaintiffs waited until the last possible day to file their suit challenging the Petition under NRS 295.061(2). (See Declaration of Lucas Foletta ("L. Foletta Decl.") ¶ 6, attached hereto as **Exhibit 1**.) They failed to name EFP as a defendant, requiring EFP's intervention in this matter and causing an unnecessary delay in the administration of this case. (Id. ¶ 10.) Plaintiffs also filed a peremptory challenge disqualifying Judge Wilson after Judge Russell recused, requiring the appointment of a senior or traveling judge. (Id. ¶¶ 7-9.) This caused further delay. To date no senior or traveling judge has been appointed. (Id. ¶ 9.) No hearing has been held or even scheduled on this matter despite the fact that NRS 295.061(1) requires a hearing to be within 15 days of the Complaint's filing, thereby necessitating the instant ex parte motion for hearing. (Id. ¶ 12.)

Any further delay in setting a hearing on this matter will result in further harm to EFP, for whose protection the procedural requirements of NRS 295.061 exist. EFP has a limited timeframe in which to qualify the Petition for the ballot. (*Id.*  $\P$  13.) EFP needs to gather 140,777

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FJDCR 4.4(a) provides that an order is required to set a hearing in non-criminal and non-family matters. FJDCR 4.4(b) further provides that the court may initiate the hearing setting process on its own initiative, or a party may file a motion for a hearing. With respect to complaints challenging initiative petitions, NRS 295.061(1) requires that the Court "shall give priority to such a complaint over all other matters pending with the court, except for criminal proceedings," underscoring the critical importance of a timely hearing. Nevertheless, the 15 days for holding a hearing pursuant to NRS 295.061 ran on March 9, 2022, and the Court has not set a hearing.

For the reasons set forth above in Section I *supra*, under FJDCR 3.19(a), an emergency exists that justifies the court setting the requested hearing without Plaintiffs being given notice or opportunity to respond. As this hearing is statutorily required by NRS 295.061(1), under which Plaintiffs have challenged the Petition, justice requires that this matter not be further delayed by granting Plaintiffs an opportunity to respond to EFP's motion for hearing.

#### III. <u>CONCLUSION</u>

Because the 15-day deadline for holding a hearing pursuant to NRS 295.061(1) has already passed, EFP respectfully requests that the Court issue an order setting a hearing on this matter as soon as possible in accordance with FJDCR 4.4(a).

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# McDONALD ( CARANO

#### **AFFIRMATION**

The undersigned does hereby affirm that pursuant to NRS 239B.030, the preceding document does not contain the social security number of any person.

By≱

Dated: March/5, 2022

McDonald Carano

Lucas Foletta, Esq. (NSBN 12154)

McDonald Carano 100 West Liberty Street, 10th Floor

Reno, NV 89501

Attorneys for Intervenor Education Freedom PAC

# McDONALD (M. CARANO) 100 WEST LIBERTY STREET TENTH FLOOR • RENO, NEVADA 89501 PHONE 775.788.2000 • FAX 775.788.2020

#### **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

I hereby certify that I am an employee of McDonald Carano LLP, and that on the on the day of March, 2022, that I caused the foregoing document to be filed with the Clerk of the Court via hand-delivery and filing by a McDonald Carano runner. On the same date I deposited a copy of the foregoing for mailing with the U.S. Postal Service at Reno, Nevada, with postage prepaid thereon, addressed as follows:

Bradley Schrager, Esq. Wolf, Rifkin, Shapiro, Schulman & Rabkin LLP. 3773 Howard Hughes Parkway, Suite 590 South Las Vegas, NV 89169

Craig Newby, Esq. State of Nevada 555 E. Washington Ave., Suite 3900 Las Vegas, NV 89101

Employee of McDonald Carano LLP

# **EXHIBIT 1**

# **EXHIBIT 1**

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Lucas Foletta, Esq. (NSBN 12154) McDonald Carano 100 West Liberty Street, 10th Floor Reno, NV 89501 (775) 788-2000 (775) 788-2020 lfoletta@mcdonaldcarano.com Attorneys for Intervenor

Education Freedom PAC

# IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA IN AND FOR CARSON CITY

BEVERLY ROGERS, an individual; RORY REID, an individual,

Plaintiffs,

VS.

BARBARA CEGAVSKE, in her official capacity as NEVADA SECRETARY OF STATE,

Defendant.

Case No. 22 OC 00027 1B

Dept. No. II

#### DECLARATION OF LUCAS FOLETTA IN SUPPORT OF INTERVENOR'S EX PARTE **MOTION FOR HEARING PURSUANT TO NRS 295.061**

I, Lucas Foletta, declare as follows:

- I am over the age of 18 years and a resident of Washoe County, Nevada. I make this declaration based upon personal knowledge, except where stated to be upon information and belief, and as to that information, I believe it to be true. If called upon to testify as to the contents of this declaration in a court of law, I am legally competent to do so.
- 2. I am an attorney duly licensed to practice law in the State of Nevada with McDonald Carano LLP, counsel of record for intervenor Education Freedom PAC ("EFP") in the above-captioned action.

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- 3. I submit this Declaration in support of EFP's Ex Parte Motion for Hearing Pursuant to NRS 295.061.
  - 4. This ex parte motion is made in good faith without dilatory motive.
  - 5. EFP filed Initiative Petition S-02-2022 (the "Petition") on January 31, 2022.
- 6. Plaintiffs Beverly Rogers and Rory Reid ("Plaintiffs") waited until February 22, 2022, to file the Complaint in this matter, which was the last day possible day to challenge the Petition under NRS 295.061(1).
- 7. The case was initially assigned to Judge Russell, who recused, resulting in the case being transferred to Judge Wilson the same day it was filed.
- 8. Two days later, on February 24, 2022, Plaintiffs lodged a peremptory challenge of Judge Wilson. Upon information and belief, Plaintiffs did this with full knowledge that another judge of the First Judicial District Court was not available to hear the case.
- 9. Based upon information and belief, no senior or traveling judge has been appointed.
- 10. Plaintiffs also failed to name EFP as a defendant, notwithstanding the fact that it is the real part in interest in this litigation and that the Secretary of State, who was named, generally maintains neutrality in ballot petition litigation.
- 11. Because Plaintiffs failed to name EFP as a defendant, EFP was forced to obtain a stipulation to intervene in this matter, causing unnecessary confusion and delaying EFP's participation in the case. The stipulation has yet to be acted upon.
- 12. Despite the requirement under NRS 295.061(1) that a hearing on a complaint challenging an initiative petition be held within 15 days of filing the complaint, the 15 days ran on March 9, 2022, and no hearing of any kind has been held in this matter to date.
- 13. This delay has resulted in significant detriment to EFP, which must gather 140,777 valid signatures by November 23, 2022, to qualify the Petition for the ballot.
- 14. EFP cannot circulate a non-court approved petition, as signatures gathered on a petition deemed invalid by the courts are invalid.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of Nevada that the foregoing is true and correct.

EXECUTED ON: March 5, 2022

Lucas Foletta, Esq.

# **EXHIBIT 1**

# **EXHIBIT 1**

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6	IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT	COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA
7	IN AND FOR	CARSON CITY
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9 10 11	BEVERLY ROGERS, an individual; RORY REID, an individual, Plaintiffs,	Case No. 22 OC 00027 1B  Dept. No. II
12	VS.	
13	BARBARA CEGAVSKE, in her official capacity as NEVADA SECRETARY OF STATE,	
14	Defendant.	
15		
16	[PROPOSED] ORDER GRANTING IN	FERVENOR'S <i>EX PARTE</i> MOTION FOR
17	HEARING PURSU	ANT TO NRS 295.961
18	Currently before the Court is Interven	or Education Freedom PAC's Ex Parte Motion
19	for Hearing Pursuant to NRS 295.961 filed or	n March 15, 2022.
20	Having considered the pleadings and p	papers filed therein, the Court finds as follows:
21	THEREFORE, good cause appearing,	it is hereby:
22	<b>ORDERED</b> that Intervenor's Ex Parte	Motion for Hearing Pursuant to NRS 295.061 is
23	GRANTED.	
24	DATED this day of	, 2022.
25		
26	Di	strict Judge
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1	Respectfully submitted by: McDONALD CARANO LLP
2	The state of the s
3	Lucas Foletta, Esq. (NSBN 12154)
4	100 West Liberty Street, 10th Floor Reno, NV 89501
5	lfoletta@mcdonaldcarano.com
6	Attorneys for Intervenor Education Freedom PAC
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
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Lucas Foletta, Esq. (NSBN 12154) McDonald Carano 100 West Liberty Street, 10th Floor Reno, NV 89501 (775) 788-2000 (775) 788-2020 Ifoletta@mcdonaldcarano.com

Attorneys for Education Freedom PAC

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# IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA IN AND FOR CARSON CITY

BEVERLY ROGERS, an individual; RORY REID, an individual,

Plaintiffs,

VS.

BARBARA CEGAVSKE, in her official capacity as NEVADA SECRETARY OF STATE,

Defendant.

Case No. 22 OC 00027 1B

Dept. No. II

#### **ANSWER IN INTERVENTION TO COMPLAINT**

COMES NOW, Intervenor EDUCATION FREEDOM PAC, a registered Nevada political action committee ("EFP"), by and through its attorney Lucas Foletta, Esq., of McDonald Carano LLP, and hereby responds to the Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief Challenging Initiative Petition S-02-2022 Pursuant to NRS 295.061(1) ("Complaint") of Plaintiffs as follows:

#### **JURISDICTION AND VENUE**

1. The allegations in Paragraph 1 set forth legal conclusions to which no response is necessary, but should any answer be required, EFP denies the allegations in Paragraph 1.

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2. The allegations in Paragraph 2 set forth legal conclusions to which no response is necessary, but should any answer be required, EFP denies the allegations in Paragraph 2.

#### **PARTIES**

- 3. EFP is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations in Paragraph 3 and denies them on that basis.
- 4. EFP is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations in Paragraph 4 and denies them on that basis.
- EFP is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the 5. truth of the allegations in Paragraph 5 and denies them on that basis.

#### **GENERAL FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS**

- 6. EFP denies the allegations in Paragraph 6, except admits that the statutory initiative petition designated as S-02-2022 ("Petition") and related Notice of Intent to Circulate Statewide Initiative or Referendum Petition ("Notice of Intent") was filed on January 31, 2022.
- 7. EFP denies the allegations in Paragraph 7, except admits that the text of the Petition is as stated in Exhibit 1 to the Complaint.
- 8. EFP denies the allegations in Paragraph 8, except admits that the text of the Petition is as stated in Exhibit 1 to the Complaint.
- 9. EFP denies the allegations in Paragraph 9, except admits that the text of the Petition is as stated in Exhibit 1 to the Complaint.
- 10. EFP denies the allegations in Paragraph 10, except admits that the text of the Petition is as stated in Exhibit 1 to the Complaint.
- 11. EFP denies the allegations in Paragraph 11, except admits that the text of the Petition is as stated in Exhibit 1 to the Complaint.
- 12. EFP denies the allegations in Paragraph 12, except admits that the text of the Petition is as stated in Exhibit 1 to the Complaint.
- EFP denies the allegations in Paragraph 13, except admits that the text of the 13. Petition is as stated in Exhibit 1 to the Complaint.

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- The allegations in Paragraph 14 set forth legal conclusions to which no response 14. is necessary, but should any answer be required, EFP denies the allegations in Paragraph 14, except admits that the text of the Petition is as stated in Exhibit 1 to the Complaint.
- 15. The allegations in Paragraph 15 set forth legal conclusions to which no response is necessary, but should any answer be required, EFP denies the allegations in Paragraph 13, except admits that the text of the Petition is as stated in Exhibit 1 to the Complaint.

#### FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION

#### ("Violation of Description of Effect Requirement, NRS 295.009(1)(b)")

- 16. EFP repeats, re-alleges, and incorporates its responses in the foregoing paragraphs, as if fully set forth herein.
- EFP denies the allegations in Paragraph 17, except admits that the full text of 17. NRS 295.009 is as follows:
  - 1. Each petition for initiative or referendum must:
  - (a) Embrace but one subject and matters necessarily connected therewith and pertaining thereto; and
  - (b) Set forth, in not more than 200 words, a description of the effect of the initiative or referendum if the initiative or referendum is approved by the voters. The description must appear on each signature page of the petition.
  - 2. For the purposes of paragraph (a) of subsection 1, a petition for initiative or referendum embraces but one subject and matters necessarily connected therewith and pertaining thereto, if the parts of the proposed initiative or referendum are functionally related and germane to each other in a way that provides sufficient notice of the general subject of, and of the interests likely to be affected by, the proposed initiative or referendum.
- 18. The allegations in Paragraph 18 set forth legal conclusions to which no response is necessary, but should any answer be required, EFP denies the allegations of Paragraph 18.
  - 19. EFP denies the allegations in Paragraph 19.
  - 20. EFP denies the allegations in Paragraph 20.
  - 21. EFP denies the allegations in Paragraph 21.

#### SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION

("Violation of Unfunded Expenditure Provision, Nev. Cost. Art. 19, Sec. 6")

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- 22. EFP repeats, re-alleges, and incorporates its responses in the foregoing paragraphs, as if fully set forth herein.
- EFP denies the allegations in Paragraph 23, except admits that the full text of 23. Nev. Const. Art. 19, Sec. 6 is as follows:
  - Sec. 6. Limitation on initiative making appropriation or requiring expenditure of money. This Article does not permit the proposal of any statute or statutory amendment which makes an appropriation or otherwise requires the expenditure of money, unless such statute or amendment also imposes a sufficient tax, not prohibited by the Constitution, or otherwise constitutionally provides for raising the necessary revenue.
- The allegations in Paragraph 24 set forth legal conclusions to which no response 24. is necessary, but should any answer be required, EFP denies the allegations of Paragraph 24.
  - 25. EFP denies the allegations in Paragraph 25.
  - 26. EFP denies the allegations in Paragraph 26.
  - 27. EFP denies the allegations in Paragraph 27.
  - 28. EFP denies the allegations in Paragraph 28.
  - 29. EFP denies the allegations in Paragraph 29.

#### THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION

#### ("Impermissible Inclusion of Administrative Details")

- 30. EFP repeats, re-alleges, and incorporates its responses in the foregoing paragraphs, as if fully set forth herein.
- 31. The allegations in Paragraph 31 set forth legal conclusions to which no response is necessary, but should any answer be required, EFP denies the allegations of Paragraph 31.
  - 32. EFP denies the allegations in Paragraph 32.
  - 33. EFP denies the allegations in Paragraph 33.

#### **AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES**

As separate and affirmative defenses to the Complaint and to each cause of action. claim, and allegation therein, EFP alleges as follows:

Neither the Complaint nor any cause of action therein states a claim for which 1. relief may be granted.

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3. EFP may not have alleged all possible affirmative defenses herein insofar as sufficient facts were unavailable upon the filing of the Answer. Therefore, EFP reserves the right to amend this Answer to allege additional affirmative defenses if subsequent investigation warrants.

#### PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, EFP prays as follows:

1. That the Petition is valid and complies with Nevada law;

By:

- 2. That judgment be entered in favor of EFP;
- 3. That Plaintiffs take nothing by way of their Complaint and it be dismissed with prejudice;
  - 4. For an award of attorney fees and costs incurred in the defense of this action; and
- 5. For such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper under all the circumstances of this matter.

#### **AFFIRMATION**

The undersigned does hereby affirm that pursuant to NRS 239B.030, the preceding document does not contain the social security number of any person.

Dated: March/4, 2022

McDonald Carano

Lucas Foletta, Esq. (NSBN 12154)

McDonald Carano

100 West Liberty Street, 10th Floor

Reno, NV 89501

Attorneys for Education Freedom PAC

#### **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

I hereby certify that I am an employee of McDonald Carano LLP, and that on the on the 15th day of March, 2022, that I caused the foregoing document to be filed with the Clerk of the Court via hand-delivery and filing by a McDonald Carano runner. On the same date I deposited a copy of the foregoing for mailing with the U.S. Postal Service at Reno, Nevada, with postage prepaid thereon, addressed as follows:

Bradley Schrager, Esq. Wolf, Rifkin, Shapiro, Schulman & Rabkin LLP. 3773 Howard Hughes Parkway, Suite 590 South Las Vegas, NV 89169

Craig Newby, Esq. State of Nevada 555 E. Washington Ave., Suite 3900 Las Vegas, NV 89101

Employee of McDonald Carano LLP

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By:

--FILED— Administrative Office of the Courts <u>Date: 3/23/2022</u>

By: Armani Johnson

# SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE COURTS

IN THE MATTER OF THE ASSIGNMENT OF A SENIOR JUDGE

Order No. 22-00686



# DE PO

#### **MEMORANDUM OF TEMPORARY ASSIGNMENT**

WHEREAS, the Honorable James E. Wilson, District Judge, Department 2, First Judicial District Court, will be unavailable and no other Judge in the District is available, now therefore,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Honorable Charles McGee, Senior Judge, shall hear any and all matters in the matter of *Beverly Rogers, Rory Reid v. Barbara Cegasvke*, Case Number 22 OC 00027 1B, and shall have authority to sign any orders arising out of this assignment. During this time, the Honorable Charles McGee, Senior Judge, may preside over any other matters as requested by the Chief or Presiding Judge.

ENTERED this 23rd day of March 2022.

**NEVADA SUPREME COURT** 

Tarray, Justice

Copy: The Honorable Charles McGee, Senior Judge The Honorable James E. Wilson, District Judge, First Judicial District Court

#### In the First Judicial District Court of the State of 2022 MAR 24 In and For Carson City AUBREY 53

**HEARING DATE MEMO** 

Case No.: 22 OC 00027 1B

Set PPDepartmer

BEVERLY ROGERS, an individual; RORY REID, an individual,

Plaintiff

Bradley Schrager, Esq. Plaintiff's Counse

VS.

BARBARA CEGAVSKE, in her offical capacity as NEVADA SECRETARY OF STATE,

Defendant(s)

Craig Newby Esq Attorney for Barbara Cegavske

Lucas Foletta, Esq Attorney for Education Freedom PAC

Other EVIDENTIARY HEARING

TO COMMENCE on the 29 day of MARCH, 2022 AT 1:00 o'clock P.M.

TIME ALLOWED 4 Hour(s)

Setting No 1

Written Consent Plaintiff's Counsel DATED March 24 2022

Written Consent

**Defendant's Counsel** 

Charles McGee Senior District Judge

Written Consent

Attorneys for Education Freedom PAC

#### **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

The undersigned, an employee of the Carson City Clerk/District Judge, hereby certifies that on March 2222

- ( ) Handing a copy thereof to the ¶ Plaintiff's attorney (x) Defendant's attorney (x) DA () Pro per () Other
- (X) Faxing and/or depositing a copy thereof in the U.S. Mail at Carson City, Nevada, postage paid, addressed as follows:

Bradley Schrager, Esq. 3773 Howard Hughes Parkway Suite 590 South Las Vegas, NV 89169 Craig Newby, Esq. 555 E. Washington Ave., Ste. 3900 Las Vegas, NV 89101

Leushadren

Lucas Foletta, Esq. McDonald Carano LLP 100 W. Liberty St., 10th Floor Reno, NV 89501

SUBSCRIBED and S	WORN to before me
his day of	, 2022
Aubrey Rowlatt, Clerk	
BY:	Deputy

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DEPUTY

#### IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA IN AND FOR CARSON CITY

BEVERLY ROGERS, an individual; RORY REID, an individual,

Plaintiffs,

vs.

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BARBARA CEGAVSKE, in her official capacity as the NEVADA SECRETARY OF STATE,

Defendant.

Case No. 22 OC 00027 1B

Dept. No. I

#### LIMITED RESPONSE TO MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF CHALLENGING INITIATIVE PETITION S-02-2022 **PURSUANT TO NRS 295.061(1)**

Defendant Barbara Cegavske, in her official capacity as the Nevada Secretary of State, submits the following Limited Response to Plaintiffs Beverly Rogers and Rory Reid's Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief Challenging Initiative Petition S-02-2022 Pursuant to NRS 295.061(1).

The Secretary of State does not take a position on the legality of the proposed initiative. This case was brought prior to the Secretary of State having the opportunity to consider certifying the proposed initiative as sufficient pursuant to NRS 295.061(2).

Plaintiffs and any intervenors will make those arguments, and the Secretary of State will comply with any final judgment in this case. The Secretary of State does not take a position on the policy merits of the proposed initiative. If deemed legal and qualified for the 2022 general election ballot, Nevadan voters will have that debate and make that policy decision.

Under such circumstances, no award of attorneys' fees or costs is appropriate against the Secretary of State.

#### **AFFIRMATION**

The undersigned does hereby affirm that the preceding Limited Response to Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief Challenging Initiative Petition S-02-2022 Pursuant to NRS 295.061(1) does not contain the social security number of any person.

DATED this 24th day of March, 2022.

AARON D. FORD Attorney General

By:

CRAIG A. NEWBY (Bar No. 8591)

Deputy Solicitor General

LAENA ST/JULES (Bar No. 15156)

Deputy Attorney General

Attorneys for Defendant Barbara Cegavske

#### CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that I am an employee of the State of Nevada, Office of the Attorney General, and that on this 24th day of March, 2022, I served a true and correct copy of the foregoing LIMITED RESPONSE TO MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF CHALLENGING INITIATIVE PETITION S-02-2022 PURSUANT TO NRS 295.061(1), by placing said document in the U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, addressed to:

Bradley S. Schrager, Esq. John Sambert, Esq. Daniel Bravo, Esq. WOLF, RIFKIN, SHAPIRO, SCHULMAN & RABKIN, LLP 3773 Howard Hughes Pkwy., Ste. 590 S. Las Vegas, NV 89169

Lucas Foletta, Esq. MCDONALD CARANO LLP 100 W. Liberty St., 10th Fl. Reno, NV 89501

An employee of the

Office of the Nevada Attorney General

# ORIGINAL

MEC'D & FILED

BRADLEY S. SCHRAGER, ESQ. (NSB 10217) JOHN SAMBERG, ESQ. (NSB 10828)
DANIEL BRAVO, ESQ. (NSB 13078)
WOLF, RIFKIN, SHAPIRO, SCHULMAN & RABKIN, LLP 3773 Howard Hughes Parkway, Suite 590 South Las Vegas, Nevada 89169 (702) 341-5200/Fax: (702) 341-5300 bschrager@wrslawyers.com jsamberg@wrslawyers.com dbravo@wrslawyers.com 6 Attorneys for Plaintiffs 8 9 10 11 BEVERLY ROGERS, an individual; RORY REID, an individual, 12 13 Plaintiffs, 14 vs. 15 BARBARA CEGAVSKE, in her official capacity as NEVADA SÉCRETARY OF 16 STATE, 17 Defendant. 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27

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AUGKEY

#### IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA IN AND FOR CARSON CITY

Case No.: 22 OC 00027 IB Dept.: II

REPLY MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF CHALLENGING INITIATIVE PETITION S-02-2022 PURSUANT TO NRS 295.061(1)

#### I. INTRODUCTION

The Petition at issue cannot properly be presented to voters for signature, because its description is confusing, deceptive and misleading; it improperly mandates unfunded expenditures; and it improperly imposes administrative details. Nothing submitted by intervenor Education Freedom PAC ("EFP") in its Answering Brief alters this conclusion.

First, there is no authority in NRS 295.061(1) or otherwise that supports EFP's request for the dismissal of the complaint because the Court did not set this matter for hearing within 15 days of the complaint's filing. This 15 day deadline is a directory, rather than a mandatory deadline; and it would be patently absurd to deny Plaintiffs the right to have their timely challenge heard on the merits, based on something entirely outside of their control, namely the Court's setting of the hearing.

Second, EFP fails to refute the numerous misleading and deceptive assertions and omissions in the description of effect that render the Petition invalid. To the contrary, EFP's Answering Brief largely confirms the misleading nature of numerous provisions of the description pointed to by Plaintiffs; and, in a tacit admission of the deficiency of its petition, even submits and alternative description that addresses some—but not all—of these deficiencies.

Third, the plain language of Article 19, Section 6 of the Nevada Constitution makes clear that any initiative must appropriate funds for expenditures that it mandates, and that this appropriation cannot be foisted on the Legislature as the Petition seeks to do. The Petition is separately deficient, because, putting aside its failure to appropriate grant moneys, it also fails to appropriate funds to cover the numerous and substantial other expenses imposed by the Petition.

Finally, even a casual reading of the Petition makes clear that it imposes pages and pages of improper administrative details and goes far beyond mere policy proposals. EFP's dismissal of these administrative details as mere proposals of policy is refuted by the language of the Petition itself.

#### II. ARGUMENT

## A. It Would be Improper to Dismiss This Action Because a Hearing Was Not Set Within the 15 Day Directory deadline of NRS 295.061.

As a preliminary matter, Plaintiff's complaint cannot properly be dismissed as a result of a hearing not being scheduled by the Court within the 15 day directory deadline set forth in NRS 295.061(1). There is no authority supporting such dismissal and NRS 295.061 itself does not provide for such a drastic remedy.

Absent a statutory provision requiring the dismissal of a complaint under these circumstances—and here there is none—it is clear that the requirement that the challenge be set for hearing within 15 days of the filing of the complaint is a directory—rather than a mandatory—deadline which can and should be excused. A "court may construe a statute as directory to prevent 'harsh, unfair or absurd consequences." Vill. League to Save Incline Assets, Inc. v. State ex rel. Bd. of Equalization, 124 Nev. 1079, 1087, 194 P.3d 1254, 1260 (2008).

In this case, construing the fifteen day hearing deadline as mandatory rather than directory would defeat the statutory intent and lead to the absurd consequence where a timely challenge could be effectively denied by a Court through inaction, without such challenge ever being addressed on its merits. This would be particularly unfair and inequitable, given that Plaintiffs obviously have no control over when a hearing on the Petition is set by the Court. As such, the fifteen day hearing deadline should be construed as directory, not mandatory, and EFP's attempt to avoid having Plaintiffs' timely challenge being heard on the merits should be denied.

#### B. The Petition's Description of Effect Is Fatally Misleading

For the reasons pointed out in Plaintiffs' supporting papers, the description of effect is deceptive and misleading, because, among other things, it fails to inform potential signers that under the proposed statute, children could be deprived of the right to attend public school for a period of time. The best that EFP can do is attempt to sugarcoat this harsh provision in an effort to excuse its glaring omission from the

description. But in doing so, EFP merely confirms that the proposed statute would deny access to the public school system to certain Nevada children for a period of time.

In this regard, EFP contends that "the Petition does not bar any Nevada child from enrolling in a public school[, but] . . . merely delays enrollment for children whose parents established EFAs for their benefit." Answering Brief at 7. Put differently, such children are barred from attending public school during the time of such "delay." Under applicable Nevada law, this important effect must be explained to a potential signatory in the description of effect. Its exclusion renders the description legally deficient.<sup>1</sup>

Likewise, the description misleadingly informs potential signers that "[m]oney in the accounts may be used to pay certain educational expenses including, but not limited to, tuition and fees at participating entities." In arguing that this portion of the description is not misleading, EFP points to the language of the proposed statute itself. See Answering Brief at 8. But that just makes clear why the description is impermissibly misleading. It promises that EFA funds can be used "to pay certain educational expenses including, but not limited to, tuition and fees at participating entities," without limitation, while the language of the proposed statute which EFP points to makes clear that this is not the case. A potential signer reading just the description might be misled into signing the petition based on a misunderstanding fostered by this misleading statement in the description, which is contradicted by the language of the proposed statute itself.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> In a tacit admission of the misleading nature of this omission, the "alternative" description submitted by EFP with its Answering Brief adds language stating that "[i]f a parent received funds then terminates their account agreement early, their child may not enroll in public school until the next quarter."

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Again, in a tacit admission of the misleading nature of this statement in the description, EFP's "alternative description of effect explains that EFA funds cannot be used if a parent's child is in public school full time.

Finally, the description plainly does not inform potential signers of the impact that this proposed statute would have on Nevada's public education system, by drawing funding away from public schools and into private schools, as will necessarily occur under the proposed statute. This omission, like the other deceptive and misleading statements in the description, renders the Petition fatally flawed. Notably, the "alternative" description of effect submitted by EFP fails to remedy this misleading omission, and is therefore similarly deficient.

## C. The Petition Violates The Nevada Constitution's Prohibition On Initiatives That Mandate Unfunded Expenditures

Article 19, Section 6 of the Nevada Constitution "does not permit the proposal of any statute or statutory amendment which makes an appropriation or otherwise requires the expenditure of money, unless such statute or amendment also imposes a sufficient tax, not prohibited by the Constitution, or otherwise constitutionally provides for raising the necessary revenue." Under the plain reading of this constitutional provision, the same statute that requires the expenditure of moneys must also appropriate the necessary moneys to fund such expenses. The necessary appropriation cannot be severed from the statutory provision requiring the expenses and foisted on the Legislature, as the Petition attempts to do, and the Petition is defective for this reason alone.

But even if the appropriation could be foisted onto the Legislature in this manner, as EFP argues, the Petition is still flawed, because it also fails to fund the numerous expenditures required by the proposed statute apart from the grant moneys themselves. In its Answering Brief, EFP relies on the provision of the statute which provides that "the State Treasurer may deduct no more than 4 percent of each grant for the administrative costs of implementing the program." See Answering Brief at 15. But this provision does not save the Petition, because there is no basis to conclude that 4% of the grant funds would be sufficient to cover the substantial costs of the contemplated program. Accordingly, the Petition does not pass muster under

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Article 19, section 6 of the Nevada Constitution.

# D. The Impermissible Administrative Details that Fill the Proposed Initiative Cannot Plausibly be Dismissed as Proposals of Policy

As noted in Plaintiffs' supporting papers, the proposed statute which is the subject of the Petition includes pages and pages of impermissible administrative details which the proposed statute purports to impose on the State Treasurer and Department of Education. See Plaintiff's Memorandum, at 3-4.

EFP's contention that these are not impermissible details, but rather proposals of policy, simply does not pass the smell test. In this regard, EFP contends that "the administration of the program by the State Treasurer and the Department of Education are part and parcel of the policy being enacted." Answering Brief at 18. This demonstrates the problem with the Petition as written. The proposed statute could have provided, for example, that "the program contemplated by this statute shall be administrated by the State Treasure and the Department of Education." That may well be an altogether proper proposal of policy. But that is not what the Petition does. Instead, the Petition goes far beyond such proposal of policy, and instead imposes on the State Treasurer and other government agencies pages and pages of administrative details, which fall well outside the scope of the People's administrative power, rendering the Petition invalid.

#### V. <u>CONCLUSION</u>

Based upon the foregoing, as well Plaintiffs' Memorandum in support of Complaint, the Court should grant Plaintiffs' requested relief, striking Initiative Petition C-04-2022 and issuing an injunction prohibiting the Secretary from taking further action upon it.

#### **AFFIRMATION**

The undersigned hereby affirm that the foregoing document does not contain the social security number of any person.

DATED this 24

\_ day of March, 2022

WOLF, RIFKIN, SHAPIRO, SCHULMAN& RABKIN, LLP

Bv:

BRADLEY S. SCHRAGER, ESQ. (NSB 10217) JOHN SAMBERG, ESQ. (NSB 10828) DANIEL BRAVO, ESQ. (NSB 13078) 3773 Howard Hughes Parkway, Suite 590 South Las Vegas, Nevada 89169 (702) 341-5200/Fax: (702) 341-5300 bschrager@wrslawyers.com jsamberg@wrslawyers.com dbravo@wrslawyers.com

Attorneys for Plaintiff

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1	CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE	
2	I hereby certify that on this 24th day of March, 2022, a true and correct cop	
3	of the REPLY MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN	
4	SUPPORT OF COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE	
5	RELIEF CHALLENGING INITIATIVE PETITIONS S-02-2022 PURSUANT	
6	TO NRS 295.061(1) was served upon all parties via U.S. Mail Las Vegas, Nevada,	
7	postage prepaid and via electronic mailing to the following:	
8 9	Craig A. Newby, Esq.  OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY  GENERAL  Lucas Foletta, Esq.  McDONALD CARANO, LLP  P.O. Box 2670	
10	555 E. Washington Avenue, Suite #3900 Las Vegas, NV 89101 Reno, Nevada 89505-2670 Ifoletta@mcdonaldcarano.com	
11	CNewby@ag.nv.gov  Attorneys for education Freedom PAC	
12	Attorney for Barbara Cegavske	
13 14	Jackie Tucker Judicial Assistant Honorable Charles M. McGee	
15	mcgeelegalassistant@gmail.com	
16	BShadron@carson.org	
17	By alle Lueza	
18	Alex Swezey, an Employee of	
19	WOLF, RIFKIN, SHAPIRO, SCHULMAN & RABKIN, LLP	
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AUBRE X CLERK

BY DEPRITY

Lucas Foletta (NSBN 12154) McDONALD CARANO LLP 100 W. Liberty St., 10th Floor Reno, Nevada 89501 Telephone: (775) 788-2000 Ifoletta@mdonaldcarano.com

Attorneys for Education Freedom PAC

#### IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

#### OF THE STATE OF NEVADA IN AND FOR CARSON CITY

BEVERLY ROGERS, an individual; RORY REID, an individual,

Plaintiffs,

VS.

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BARBARA CEGAVSKE, in her official capacity as NEVADA SECRETARY OF STATE,

Defendant.

Case No.: 22OC00027 1B

Dept. No.: IL

STIPULATION AND ORDER REGARDING INTERVENTION

Plaintiffs RORY REID and BEVERLY ROGERS, Defendant BARBARA CEGAVSKE in her official capacity as NEVADA SECRETARY OF STATE, and EDUCATION FREEDOM PAC ("EFP"), by and through their counsel, hereby submit this stipulation and order regarding the intervention of EFP in the instant litigation. As the circulator of record of the Statutory Initiative Petition S-02-2022 ("Initiative Petition") filed with the Nevada Secretary of State and the subject of this litigation, EFP claims an interest relating to the property or transaction that is the subject of the action and is so situated that disposing of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede EFP's ability to protect its interest.

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# MCDONALD CARANO 2000 WET SAMARA AVENUE, SUITE 1200 - LAX YESAS, MEWDA 69102 PHONE TREATS AND 19XX TOLATTS 9946

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1	The parties therefore agree and stipulate t	hat the Court should approve EFP's intervention in
2	this action.	
3		
4	Dated: February 28, 2022	Dated: February 28, 2022
5	McDONALD CARANO LLP	WOLF, RIFKIN, SHAPIRO, SCHULMAN & RABKIN, LLP
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7	+ vetta	0000
8	By:	By Schrager (NSBN 10217)
9	Lucas Foletta (NSBN 12754) McDONALD CARANO LLP	3773 Howard Hughes Parkway Suite 590 South
10	100 W. Liberty St., 10th Floor Reno, Nevada 89501	Las Vegas, Nevada 89169 Telephone: (702) 341-5200
11	Telephone: (775) 788-2000	bschrager@wrslawyers.com
12	lfoletta@mdonaldcarano.com	Attorneys for Rory Reid and Beverley Rogers
14	Attorneys for Education Freedom PAC	
15		STATE OF NEVADA
16	la-	
17		By: Kill #16368
18		Craig Newby (NSBN 8591)
19		6555 E. Washington Ave, Suite 3900 Las Vegas, Nevada 89101
20	•	Telephone: (702) 486-9246 cnewby@ag.nv.gov
21		Attorneys for Barbara Cegavske
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Page 2 of 3

Ĭ	The parties therefore agree and stipulate that the Court should approve EFP's intervention in		
2	this action.		
3			
4	Dated: February 28, 2022	Dated: February 28, 2022	
5	McDONALD CARANO LLP	WOLF, RIFKIN, SHAPIRO, SCHULMAN & RABKIN, LLP	
6		RADRIN, LU	
7			
8	By:	By Jahr Santes (SRN 10828) Bradley Schrager (NSBN 10217)	
9	Lucas Foletta (NSBN 12154) McDONALD CARANO LLP	3773 Howard Hughes Parkway Suite 590 South	
10	100 W. Liberty St., 10th Floor Reno, Nevada 89501	Las Vegas, Nevada 89169 Telephone: (702) 341-5200	
11	Telephone: (775) 788-2000	bschrager@wrslawyers.com	
12	Ifoletta@mdonaldcarano.com	Attorneys for Rory Reid and Beverley Rogers	
14	Attorneys for Education Freedom PAC		
15		STATE OF NEVADA	
16			
17			
18		By: Craig Newby (NSBN 8591)	
19		555 E. Washington Ave, Suite 3900 Las Vegas, Nevada 89101	
20		Telephone: (702) 486-9246 cnewby@ag.nv.gov	
21		Attorneys for Barbara Cegavske	
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# MCDONALD CARANO ZEED WEST SALMAR AVENUE, SATE 1200 - LAS VEGAS, NEVADA 671022 PRICE FROM SALING - FAX 722.872.8744

#### ORDER

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IT IS ORDE	RED:	
<b>0</b>	Granted in part:	_
	and Denied in part:	
0	Denied Declined to consider ex parte Declined to consider without a hearing Other:	
The second secon	March 30, 2022	
DISTRICT	COURT JUDGE	
Market or construction of the desired or construction of	The state of the s	
Respectfully	y submitted by:	
27	ta (NSBN 12154)	
McDONAL 100 W. Libe Reno, Neva Telephone:	D CARANO LLP  erty St., 10 <sup>th</sup> Floor	
Attorneys fo	or Education Freedom PAC	

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6	IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT (	COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA
7	IN AND FOR CARSON CITY	
8	* *	*
9	BEVERLY ROGERS, an individual; RORY REID, an individual,	
10		Case No. 22 OC 00027 1B
11		Dept. No. II
12	VS.	
13	BARBARA CEGAVSKE, in her official capacity as NEVADA SECRETARY OF	
14	STATE,	
15	Defendant.	
16	C M M	EDITEDIO DE DA DES MOTION FOD
17	HEARING PURSUA	ERVENOR'S EX PARTE MOTION FOR NT TO NRS 295.961
18	Currently before the Court is Intervenor	r Education Freedom PAC's Ex Parte Motion
19	for Hearing Pursuant to NRS 295.961 filed on	March 15, 2022.
20	Having considered the pleadings and pa	apers filed therein, the Court finds as follows:
21	THEREFORE, good cause appearing, it	is hereby:
22	ORDERED that Intervenor's Ex Parte N	Motion for Hearing Pursuant to NRS 295.061 is
23	GRANTED.	
24	DATED this 30 day of March	, 2022.
25	GRANTED.  DATED this 30 day of March  Dist	hite M. M. Ja
26	Dis	trict Judge
27		

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IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF THEVADA

**BEVERLY ROGERS, AN INDIVIDUAL.** 

AND RORY REID, AN INDIVIDUAL,

CASE NO.: 220C0027 1B

Plaintiffs,

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Vs.

BARBARA CEGAVSKE, in her Official capacity as NEVADA SECRETARY OF STATE,

Defendant,

**EDUCATION FREEDOM PAC,** 

Intervenor, aligned as Defendant.

DEPT. NO. II

PART A

DECISION INVALIDATING
PETITION TO CREATE A
STATUTE TO GOVERN FUTURE
APPROPRIATIONS TO AN
EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM
OUTSIDE THE SCHOOL
DISTRICTS.

PART B

INJUNCTION PREVENTING THE FORWARD PROGRESS OF THIS INITIATIVE

#### PART A:

#### DISCUSSION

This opinion presents the second of two Decisions addressing

two of three initiatives filed by the Intervenor, Education Freedom PAC ("EFP"), who are proposing sweeping changes in the way public education is administered here in the State of Nevada.

A Decision and Order has already been filed in the first case, which is captioned RORY REID, an individual; BEVERLY ROGERS, an individual, Plaintiffs versus BARBARA CEGAVSKE, in her official capacity as NEVADA SECRETARY OF STATE, Defendant; Case No. 22 OC 00028 1B ("Reid I").

EFP intervened and was joined as a party defendant in both cases.

The case at hand reverses the order of the Plaintiffs' names so that Beverly Rogers' name appears first.

Like it did in Reid I, Intervenor sought dismissal for claimed unnecessary delays which they attributed to the Plaintiffs. For the reasons set forth in the Reid I Decision, that motion MAY BE AND HEREBY IS DENIED.

So, while there are a host of similarities, these two cases have not been consolidated because <u>more</u> important differences exist than similarities.

The biggest difference is that the Education Freedom PAC was seeking a full-blown Constitutional Amendment in Reid I.

By contrast, the instant case proposes by initiative to bring into existence a very detailed statute and administrative plan which places the State Treasurer in a position where he or she, in the future, may be in charge of maintaining accounts and dispersing grants to educators given standing by the statute.

The statute itself is a full twenty-two (22) pages, single spaced, small font.

"EFP" filed the petition at the end of January and if eventually funded, it would authorize parents to earmark accounts for educational expenses outside the school district, including tuition and fees for participating entities and private schools.

To demonstrate the breadth of this legislation, the Court has edited more than a dozen of the headings by Section as follows:

Section 9.2 accounts maintained by a financial management firm;

Sec. 9.10 bars funding for home schooling; however, under Section 13.1(e) a parent can be an eligible entity;

Sec. 10.2 the funding is permissive within the Legislature;

- 1			
1	Sec. 10.3	if funded the percent is 90%;	
2	Sec. 10.6	4% set aside for administrative costs;	
3	Sec. 11	limitations on spending;	
5	Sec. 14	Testing and achievement examinations and Reporting;	
7	Sec. 16	Questionably effective anti-liability provisions;	
9	Sec. 19	an innovative proposal: Senate-centered Youth Legislature;	
1	Sec. 21	Interscholastic Activities made workable;	
2	Sec. 29.7	Eligibility for interscholastic activities;	
4	Sec. 34	Malfeasance and disciplines;	
5	Sec. 35	Yet another disclaimer, as follows:	
7		"Nothing herein shall require the	
0		Legislature to appropriate money to	
.8		fund education freedom accounts or	
.9		any expenses related thereto."	
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22	language in the requisite Declaration of Effect ("DOE"). Once again,		
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or, as Plaintiffs argue, whether or not it should be amended to add language making it clearer.

Unlike Reid I, and with one glaring impasse, this Court believes that if the Court and counsel would spend a day massaging the language of the DOE, there is a very realistic probability that the document could be revised in a manner that is satisfactory to both sides.

However, the glaring impasse with the DOE in this case, as in Reid I, is an insufficient explanation of the affect of the initiative on the budgets of all the school districts in the State and/or the need to draw revenues from the General Fund.

Before going further, the Court wishes to acknowledge that the intervenor, EFP, used somebody, or more likely a whole bunch of somebodies, who spent a heroic amount of time in an effort to forge a non-public school learning program under the auspices of an amended Chapter 385 of the Nevada Revised Statutes.

The Intervenor, EFP, feels that they have "sanitized" their initiative from claimed defects causing confusion in the language in the DOE, and should be allowed to proceed.

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As the argument goes, there cannot be an unfunded mandate because there is no funding, period!

Funding is left to the Legislature.

Quoted directly from the language in the proposed order submitted by EFP, on page 3, lines 7 through 15, EFP urges as follows:

"The Petition neither contains an appropriate or an expenditure of money. The EFA program is contingent upon an appropriation by the Legislature to fund it; Section 37 of the Petition states specifically, "[t]he provisions of this act become effective upon an appropriation by the Legislature to fund the educational freedom accounts." (Exhibit 1 at Sec. 37.) And Section 35 states that "[n]othing herein shall require the Legislature to appropriate money to fund education freedom accounts or any expenses related thereto." (Id. At Sec. 35.) What's more, Section 10(2) states "[n]othing herein shall require the Legislature to appropriate money to fund the grants described in this section. The availability of grants is subject to the availability of funds as determined by the Legislature." (Id. At Sec. 10(2).)

See page 4 above where Section 35 of the proposed statute is again quoted in full.

Put another way, the fact that the funding is entirely discretionary with a future Legislature, could mean that the State Treasurer would not award a single grant and Nevada would have a new law "on the books" so to speak, but also have a "toothless tiger," on the books, so to speak, because the plan goes nowhere without funding.

Finally, EFP submits, that the scheme does not constitute an unfunded mandate because there is <u>no</u> mandate at all.

And, if there isn't a mandate, it has to be "precatory", a wish or a request.

This author thinks the entire conversation begs the question and presents the very same kind of sleight of hand that was true for the proposed Constitutional Amendment in Reid I.

The Court sees no interpretation other than that the initiative contains the same defect posited in Reid I: it is a non-contemporaneous directive to the Legislature to consider funding the initiative at a later session, and, as such cannot withstand the scrutiny of the Constitution.

Once again, it is a <u>literal</u> read of Section 6, Article 9, of the Constitution which discloses the main flaw in the Petitioner's argument. Consider removing a few words, and emphasizing one key word, and Section 6 [the Constitution] reads like this:

"[This Section]...does not permit a proposal of any statute or statutory amendment which...recognizes the expenditure of money, unless SUCH statute...imposes a sufficient tax...or...otherwise...provides for raising the necessary revenues". (emphasis supplied)

It <u>says nothing</u> about the right or latitude to postpone funding to a date out in the future, which will require forging yet <u>another</u> statute.

What it does say, is that this Bill, any Bill, that creates a statute MUST <u>simultaneously</u>, impose a tax, or identify a legal revenue source!

The Intervenor's effort to amend Senate Bill 385 cannot be permitted because there is no contemporaneous identification of a finite revenue source to fund the proposal.

Put another way, Section 6 simply does <u>not</u> allow funding to be postponed until a future Legislature convenes and then look for a

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 revenue source, while it is trying to balance the rest of the State budget.

In this Judge's view, no other interpretation of the legislative scheme is plausible.

Three final issues must be addressed:

- 1. Pre-election Petition;
- 2. Administrative Matters Excluded;
- 3. Schwartz Reviewed;

### **PRE-ELECTION PETITION:**

The first issue addresses the caution contained in *Herbst Gaming Inc. v Secretary of State*, 122 Nev. 877, 141 P.3d 1224 (2006) that limits challenges available when contesting the scope of "pre-election" initiatives – that is, challenges coming in front of the actual ballot – which must implicate very narrow and specific constitutional requirements.

Other due process and equal protection claims are not ripe for challenge until the election itself has resulted in passage.

Here Article 6, Section 19, once again, legitimates a pre-emptive limited constitutional challenge requiring up front that the initiative

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Herbst, supra, can also be cited for the principle, urged by the Plaintiffs, that initiatives like the one under scrutiny are not to involve themselves in administrative matters as opposed to legislative acts, Id. 122 Nev. Pp. 883 et seq.

The Plaintiffs are right. The 22-page bill under scrutiny is replete with administrative criteria, which will have to be culled before going to the ballot.

In that sense, it is similar to the DOE previously discussed, which needs some serious editing to properly notice the financial impact before it is tendered to prospective voters.

So, the Court suggests that those shortcomings are both "curable" matters that require effort but can be "fixed".

Unfixable is the revenue source component.

## SCHWARTZ DISCUSSION

This case, which is factually closer to our case than any other, was handed down by the Nevada Supreme Court on September 29,

2016. Although it goes by *Schwartz v. Lopez*, 132 Nev. 732, 382 P.3d 386 (2016), the opinion actually subsumes two cases; the second is *Duncan v. State* which has almost identical issues.

In both cases, the Plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of a pair of bills enacted previously known as Senate Bill 302 and Senate Bill 515.

This legislation appropriated a Two Billion Dollar lump sun to be disbursed as in our case, through the office of the State Treasurer.

The State Treasurer took it all in, and on his own authority and interpretation concluded that the funding was sufficient to fund not only the earmarked public school system, but also could be available to fund educational savings accounts for parents to subsidize non-public educational opportunities similar to the ones in our case.

The High Court determined that Senate Bill 302 on its face, or in combination with Senate Bill 515 — by any inference — cannot be construed as an appropriation measure, specifically designed to be used to serve private schooling, tutoring and other non-public educational opportunities.

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Although the statutes under examination are markedly different from Senate Bill 385 in our case, the *Schwartz* Decision suggests that there is nothing impermissible about the Legislature funding a program for a so-called "sectarian purpose", like private schooling.

But an absolutely essential ingredient for inclusion in the statute is the specific directive to identify a revenue source by the Legislature contemporaneous with the establishment of the administrative program to use the funding.

To this extent, *Schwartz* is entirely consistent and represents a guidepost to come to a conclusion about <u>essential</u> issues that achieve a budget balance.

A specific directive to appropriate revenue for the educational programs proffered by the Intervenor/Defendants is essential to the viability of the statute.

The Schwartz case has very recently been modified to recognize that a "public importance" exception applies when a representative citizen sues to protect public funds by challenging a legislative appropriation.

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Nevada Policy Research Institution v. Cannizzaro, 138 Nev. Adv.

Op. 28, April 21, 2022.

Obviously, the issue in *Nevada Policy Research Institute, supra*, involve standing issues and separation of power issues that are not present in the instant case.

Accordingly, the *Schwartz* case is inapposite except that it may imply a duty that confirms that both Plaintiffs and Defendant in our case have been demonstrating a public-importance role that notches up the level of scrutiny when considering a specific provision in the Nevada Constitution.

The Intervenor/Defendant's challenge falls short of the mark.

The statute fails from the lack of a funding directive.

### PART B

# ORDER ENJOINING PETITION

Like its counterpart, REID I, the Intervenor has made an honest and thoughtful effort to create an opportunity for a substantial public forum to amend a statute that purports to administer and fund educational opportunities for children across the State whose parents

 wish, for whatever reason, to eschew participation in the traditional school district.

Unfortunately for the Intervenor, this initiative — the one they rely upon— impermissibly commands the Nevada Legislature to amend a scheme of education "status-900" and install an unproven program that violates the deliberative functions of the Legislature.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED and declared that Initiative Petition
C-04-2022 is legally deficient because of a glaring but curable
omission in the Declaration of Effect; and because it violates the
prohibition against imposing administrative functions, which also may
be curable.

What the Court finds and rules as incurable comes from the patently obvious command in Section 6 of Article 19 of the Nevada Constitution to contemporaneously link the proposal to a viable identified funding source in order to have Constitutional footing to go on with it.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED and declared that Intervenor-Defendant

Education Freedom PAC, its proponents, officers, or agents, are hereby

enjoined from collecting signatures in support of the Petition and from

submitting any signatures for verification pursuant to NRS 293.1276, and any signatures previously collected are declared invalid.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED and declared that Defendant Secretary of State Barbara Cegavske is enjoined from placing the Petition on the ballot.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED this  $25^{*}$  day of April, 2022.

CHARLES M. McGEE Senior Judge on Assignment

Chals M. Mig

## **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

I certify that I am an employee of the First Judicial District Court of Nevada; that on the April 2022, I served a copy of this document by placing a true copy in an envelope addressed to:

Lucas Foletta, Esq. 100 West Liberty St. 10 <sup>th</sup> Floor Reno, NV 89501	Craig Newby, Esq. State of Nevada 555 E. Washington Ave., Suite 3900 Las Vegas, NV 89101
Bradley Schrager, Esq. 3773 Howard Hughes Parkway, Suite 590 South Las Vegas, NV 89169	

the envelope sealed and then deposited in the Court's central mailing basket in the court clerk's office for delivery to the USPS at 1111 South Roop Street, Carson City, Nevada, for mailing.

Devin Earl Law Clerk

# ORIGINAL

BRADLEY S. SCHRAGER, ESQ. (NSB 10217)
JOHN SAMBERG, ESQ. (NSB 10828)
DANIEL BRAVO, ESQ. (NSB 13078)
WOLF, RIFKIN, SHAPIRO, SCHULMAN & RABKIN, LLP
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OFP

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Attorneys for Plaintiffs

jsamberg@wrslawyers.com dbravo@wrslawyers.com

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# IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA IN AND FOR CARSON CITY

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BEVERLY ROGERS, an individual; RORY REID, an individual

Plaintiffs,

vs.

BARBARA CEGAVSKE, in her official capacity as NEVADA SECRETARY OF STATE,

Defendant,

18 and

EDUCATION FREEDOM PAC

Intervenor Defendant.

Case No.: 22 OC 00027 1B

Dept.: II

NOTICE OF ENTRY OF ORDER

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NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the DECISION INVALIDATING
PETITION TO CREATE A STATUTE TO GOVERN FUTURE APPROPRIATIONS
TO AN EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM OUTSIDE THE SCHOOL DISTRICTS and
INJUNCTION PREVENTING THE FORWARD PROGRESS OF THIS INITIATIVE

27 was entered in the above-captioned matter on the 26th day of April, 2022.

A true and correct copy is attached hereto as Exhibit 1.

#### **AFFIRMATION**

The undersigned hereby affirm that the foregoing document does not contain the social security number of any person.

DATED this <u>30</u> day of April, 2022

WOLF, RIFKIN, SHAPIRO, SCHULMAN & RABKIN, LLP

BRADLEY S. SCHRAGER, ESQ. (NSB 10217) JOHN SAMBERG, ESQ. (NSB 10828) DANIEL BRAVO, ESQ. (NSB 13078) 3773 Howard Hughes Parkway, Suite 590 South

Las Vegas, Nevada 89169

(702) 341-5200/Fax: (702) 341-5300

bschrager@wrslawyers.com jsamberg@wrslawyers.com dbravo@wrslawyers.com

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

### CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this 3rd day of May, 2022, a true and correct copy of the **NOTICE OF ENTRY OF ORDER** was served upon all parties via U.S. Mail postage pre-paid, Las Vegas, Nevada and via electronic mailing to the following:

Craig A. Newby, Esq.
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL
555 E. Washington Avenue, Suite #3900
Las Vegas, NV 89101
CNewby@ag.nv.gov

Lucas Foletta McDONALD CARANO LLP 100 W. Liberty St., 10<sup>th</sup> Floor Reno, Nevada 89501 Telephone: (775) 788-2000 lfoletta@mdonaldcarano.com

Attorney for Barbara Cegavske

Attorneys for Education Freedom PAC

Jackie Tucker
Judicial Assistant
Honorable Charles M. McGee
mcgeelegalassistant@gmail.com

BShadron@carson.org

Ву

Dannielle Fresquez, an Employee of

WOLF, RIFKIN, SHAPIRO, SCHULMAN

& RABKIN, LLP

### INDEX OF EXHIBITS

Exhibit No.	Documents	Pages
1	Decision Invalidating Petition To Create A Statute To Govern Future Appropriations To An Educational System Outside The School Districts And Injunction Preventing The Forward Progress Of This Initiative	16

2526

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# EXHIBIT 1

# **EXHIBIT 1**

REC'D & FILED

2022 APR 26 AM 10: 30

AUBREY ROWL ST.

# IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF THEVADA IN AND FOR CARSON CITY

**BEVERLY ROGERS, AN INDIVIDUAL.** 

AND RORY REID, AN INDIVIDUAL,

**CASE NO.: 220C0027 1B** 

Plaintiffs,

Vs.

BARBARA CEGAVSKE, in her Official capacity as NEVADA SECRETARY OF STATE,

Defendant,

EDUCATION FREEDOM PAC,

Intervenor, aligned as Defendant.

DEPT. NO. II

PART A

DECISION INVALIDATING PETITION TO CREATE A STATUTE TO GOVERN FUTURE APPROPRIATIONS TO AN EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM OUTSIDE THE SCHOOL DISTRICTS.

PART B

INJUNCTION PREVENTING THE FORWARD PROGRESS OF THIS INITIATIVE

### PART A:

### DISCUSSION

This opinion presents the second of two Decisions addressing

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two of three initiatives filed by the Intervenor, Education Freedom PAC ("EFP"), who are proposing sweeping changes in the way public education is administered here in the State of Nevada.

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A Decision and Order has already been filed in the first case, which is captioned RORY REID, an individual; BEVERLY ROGERS, an individual, Plaintiffs versus BARBARA CEGAVSKE, in her official capacity as NEVADA SECRETARY OF STATE, Defendant; Case No. 22 OC 00028 1B ("Reid I").

EFP intervened and was joined as a party defendant in both cases.

The case at hand reverses the order of the Plaintiffs' names so that Beverly Rogers' name appears first.

Like it did in Reid I, Intervenor sought dismissal for claimed unnecessary delays which they attributed to the Plaintiffs. For the reasons set forth in the Reid I Decision, that motion MAY BE AND HEREBY IS DENIED.

So, while there are a host of similarities, these two cases have not been consolidated because <u>more</u> important differences exist than similarities.

The biggest difference is that the Education Freedom PAC was seeking a full-blown Constitutional Amendment in Reid I.

By contrast, the instant case proposes by initiative to bring into existence a very detailed statute and administrative plan which places the State Treasurer in a position where he or she, in the future, may be in charge of maintaining accounts and dispersing grants to educators given standing by the statute.

The statute itself is a full twenty-two (22) pages, single spaced, small font.

"EFP" filed the petition at the end of January and if eventually funded, it would authorize parents to earmark accounts for educational expenses outside the school district, including tuition and fees for participating entities and private schools.

To demonstrate the breadth of this legislation, the Court has edited more than a dozen of the headings by Section as follows:

Section 9.2 accounts maintained by a financial management firm;

- Sec. 9.10 bars funding for home schooling; however, under Section 13.1(e) a parent can be an eligible entity;
- Sec. 10.2 the funding is permissive within the Legislature;

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1	Sec. 10.3	if funded the percent is 90%;
2	Sec. 10.6	4% set aside for administrative costs;
3 4	Sec. 11	limitations on spending;
5	Sec. 14	Testing and achievement examinations and Reporting;
7	Sec. 16	Questionably effective anti-liability provisions;
9	Sec. 19	an innovative proposal: Senate-centered Youth Legislature;
11	Sec. 21	Interscholastic Activities made workable;
12	Sec. 29.7	Eligibility for interscholastic activities;
14	Sec. 34	Malfeasance and disciplines;
15 16	Sec. 35	Yet another disclaimer, as follows:
17	•	"Nothing herein shall require the
18		Legislature to appropriate money to
19		fund education freedom accounts or
		any expenses related thereto."
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Before going further, the Court wishes to acknowledge that the intervenor, EFP, used somebody, or more likely a whole bunch of somebodies, who spent a heroic amount of time in an effort to forge a non-public school learning program under the auspices of an amended Chapter 385 of the Nevada Revised Statutes.

The Intervenor, EFP, feels that they have "sanitized" their initiative from claimed defects causing confusion in the language in the DOE, and should be allowed to proceed.

A critical related factor, also found in Reid I, urges a conclusion that the scheme does not represent an <u>unfunded mandate</u> and, that it is self-proving.

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The Plaintiffs are right. The 22-page bill under scrutiny is replete with administrative criteria, which will have to be culled before going to the ballot.

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Although the statutes under examination are markedly different from Senate Bill 385 in our case, the *Schwartz* Decision suggests that there is nothing impermissible about the Legislature funding a program for a so-called "sectarian purpose", like private schooling.

But an absolutely essential ingredient for inclusion in the statute is the specific directive to identify a revenue source by the Legislature contemporaneous with the establishment of the administrative program to use the funding.

To this extent, *Schwartz* is entirely consistent and represents a guidepost to come to a conclusion about <u>essential</u> issues that achieve a budget balance.

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The Schwartz case has very recently been modified to recognize that a "public importance" exception applies when a representative citizen sues to protect public funds by challenging a legislative appropriation.

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Nevada Policy Research Institution v. Cannizzaro, 138 Nev. Adv. Op. 28, April 21, 2022.

Obviously, the issue in *Nevada Policy Research Institute, supra*, involve standing issues and separation of power issues that are not present in the instant case.

Accordingly, the Schwartz case is inapposite except that it may imply a duty that confirms that both Plaintiffs and Defendant in our case have been demonstrating a public-importance role that notches up the level of scrutiny when considering a specific provision in the Nevada Constitution.

The Intervenor/Defendant's challenge falls short of the mark.

The statute fails from the lack of a funding directive.

#### PART B

### ORDER ENJOINING PETITION

Like its counterpart, REID I, the Intervenor has made an honest and thoughtful effort to create an opportunity for a substantial public forum to amend a statute that purports to administer and fund educational opportunities for children across the State whose parents

wish, for whatever reason, to eschew participation in the traditional school district.

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Unfortunately for the Intervenor, this initiative — the one they rely upon---- impermissibly commands the Nevada Legislature to amend a scheme of education "status-900" and install an unproven program that violates the deliberative functions of the Legislature.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED and declared that Initiative Petition
C-04-2022 is legally deficient because of a glaring but curable
omission in the Declaration of Effect; and because it violates the
prohibition against imposing administrative functions, which also may
be curable.

What the Court finds and rules as incurable comes from the patently obvious command in Section 6 of Article 19 of the Nevada Constitution to contemporaneously link the proposal to a viable identified funding source in order to have Constitutional footing to go on with it.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED and declared that Intervenor-Defendant Education Freedom PAC, its proponents, officers, or agents, are hereby enjoined from collecting signatures in support of the Petition and from

submitting any signatures for verification pursuant to NRS 293.1276, and any signatures previously collected are declared invalid.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED and declared that Defendant Secretary of State Barbara Cegavske is enjoined from placing the Petition on the ballot.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED this  $25^{\prime\prime\prime}$  day of April, 2022.

Chals M. Mig-

CHARLES M. McGEE Senior Judge on Assignment

# **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

6.

I certify that I am an employee of the First Judicial District Court of Nevada; that on the <u>Ske</u> day of April 2022, I served a copy of this document by placing a true copy in an envelope addressed to:

Lucas Foletta, Esq. 100 West Liberty St. 10 <sup>th</sup> Floor Reno, NV 89501	Craig Newby, Esq. State of Nevada 555 E. Washington Ave., Suite 3900 Las Vegas, NV 89101
Bradley Schrager, Esq. 3773 Howard Hughes Parkway, Suite 590 South Las Vegas, NV 89169	

the envelope sealed and then deposited in the Court's central mailing basket in the court clerk's office for delivery to the USPS at 1111 South Roop Street, Carson City, Nevada, for mailing.

Devin Earl Law Clerk

REC'D & FILED

2022 APR 26 AM 10: 30

AUBREY ROWL ATT

# IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA IN AND FOR CARSON CITY

**BEVERLY ROGERS, AN INDIVIDUAL.** 

AND RORY REID, AN INDIVIDUAL,

CASE NO.: 220C0027 1B

Plaintiffs,

Vs.

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BARBARA CEGAVSKE, in her Official capacity as NEVADA SECRETARY OF STATE,

Defendant,

**EDUCATION FREEDOM PAC,** 

Intervenor, aligned as Defendant.

DEPT. NO. II

PART A

DECISION INVALIDATING PETITION TO CREATE A STATUTE TO GOVERN FUTURE APPROPRIATIONS TO AN EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM OUTSIDE THE SCHOOL DISTRICTS.

**PART B** 

INJUNCTION PREVENTING THE FORWARD PROGRESS OF THIS INITIATIVE

### **PART A:**

#### DISCUSSION

This opinion presents the second of two Decisions addressing

 two of three initiatives filed by the Intervenor, Education Freedom PAC ("EFP"), who are proposing sweeping changes in the way public education is administered here in the State of Nevada.

A Decision and Order has already been filed in the first case, which is captioned RORY REID, an individual; BEVERLY ROGERS, an individual, Plaintiffs versus BARBARA CEGAVSKE, in her official capacity as NEVADA SECRETARY OF STATE, Defendant; Case No. 22 OC 00028 1B ("Reid I").

EFP intervened and was joined as a party defendant in both cases.

The case at hand reverses the order of the Plaintiffs' names so that Beverly Rogers' name appears first.

Like it did in Reid I, Intervenor sought dismissal for claimed unnecessary delays which they attributed to the Plaintiffs. For the reasons set forth in the Reid I Decision, that motion MAY BE AND HEREBY IS DENIED.

So, while there are a host of similarities, these two cases have not been consolidated because <u>more</u> important differences exist than similarities.

The biggest difference is that the Education Freedom PAC was seeking a full-blown Constitutional Amendment in Reid I.

By contrast, the instant case proposes by initiative to bring into existence a very detailed statute and administrative plan which places the State Treasurer in a position where he or she, in the future, may be in charge of maintaining accounts and dispersing grants to educators given standing by the statute.

The statute itself is a full twenty-two (22) pages, single spaced, small font.

"EFP" filed the petition at the end of January and if eventually funded, it would authorize parents to earmark accounts for educational expenses outside the school district, including tuition and fees for participating entities and private schools.

To demonstrate the breadth of this legislation, the Court has edited more than a dozen of the headings by Section as follows:

Section 9.2 accounts maintained by a financial management firm;

Sec. 9.10 bars funding for home schooling; however, under Section 13.1(e) a parent can be an eligible entity;

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or, as Plaintiffs argue, whether or not it should be amended to add language making it clearer.

Unlike Reid I, and with one glaring impasse, this Court believes that if the Court and counsel would spend a day massaging the language of the DOE, there is a very realistic probability that the document could be revised in a manner that is satisfactory to both sides.

However, the glaring impasse with the DOE in this case, as in Reid I, is an insufficient explanation of the affect of the initiative on the budgets of all the school districts in the State and/or the need to draw revenues from the General Fund.

Before going further, the Court wishes to acknowledge that the intervenor, EFP, used somebody, or more likely a whole bunch of somebodies, who spent a heroic amount of time in an effort to forge a non-public school learning program under the auspices of an amended Chapter 385 of the Nevada Revised Statutes.

The Intervenor, EFP, feels that they have "sanitized" their initiative from claimed defects causing confusion in the language in the DOE, and should be allowed to proceed.

A critical related factor, also found in Reid I, urges a conclusion that the scheme does not represent an <u>unfunded mandate</u> and, that it is self-proving.

As the argument goes, there cannot be an unfunded mandate because there is <u>no</u> funding, period!

Funding is left to the Legislature.

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Quoted directly from the language in the proposed order submitted by EFP, on page 3, lines 7 through 15, EFP urges as follows:

"The Petition neither contains an appropriate or an expenditure of money. The EFA program is contingent upon an appropriation by the Legislature to fund it; Section 37 of the Petition states specifically, "[t]he provisions of this act become effective upon an appropriation by the Legislature to fund the educational freedom accounts." (Exhibit 1 at Sec. 37.) And Section 35 states that "[n]othing herein shall require the Legislature to appropriate money to fund education freedom accounts or any expenses related thereto." (Id. At Sec. 35.) What's more, Section 10(2) states "Injothing herein shall require the Legislature to appropriate money to fund the grants described in this section. The availability of grants is subject to the availability of funds as determined by the Legislature." (Id. At Sec. 10(2).)

See page 4 above where Section 35 of the proposed statute is again quoted in full.

Put another way, the fact that the funding is entirely discretionary with a future Legislature, could mean that the State Treasurer would not award a single grant and Nevada would have a new law "on the books" so to speak, but also have a "toothless tiger," on the books, so to speak, because the plan goes nowhere without funding.

Finally, EFP submits, that the scheme does not constitute an unfunded mandate because there is <u>no</u> mandate at all.

And, if there isn't a mandate, it has to be "precatory", a wish or a request.

This author thinks the entire conversation begs the question and presents the very same kind of sleight of hand that was true for the proposed Constitutional Amendment in Reid I.

The Court sees no interpretation other than that the initiative contains the same defect posited in Reid I: it is a non-contemporaneous directive to the Legislature to consider funding the initiative at a later session, and, as such cannot withstand the scrutiny of the Constitution.

Once again, it is a <u>literal</u> read of Section 6, Article 9, of the Constitution which discloses the main flaw in the Petitioner's argument. Consider removing a few words, and emphasizing one key word, and Section 6 [the Constitution] reads like this:

"[This Section]...does not permit a proposal of any statute or statutory amendment which...recognizes the expenditure of money, unless **SUCH** statute...imposes a sufficient tax...or...otherwise...provides for raising the necessary revenues". (emphasis supplied)

It <u>says</u> <u>nothing</u> about the right or latitude to postpone funding to a date out in the future, which will require forging yet <u>another</u> statute.

What it does say, is that this Bill, any Bill, that creates a statute

MUST <u>simultaneously</u>, impose a tax, or identify a legal revenue

source!

The Intervenor's effort to amend Senate Bill 385 cannot be permitted because there is no contemporaneous identification of a finite revenue source to fund the proposal.

Put another way, Section 6 simply does <u>not</u> allow funding to be postponed until a future Legislature convenes and then look for a

revenue source, while it is trying to balance the rest of the State budget.

In this Judge's view, no other interpretation of the legislative scheme is plausible.

Three final issues must be addressed:

- 1. Pre-election Petition;
- 2. Administrative Matters Excluded;
- 3. Schwartz Reviewed;

# **PRE-ELECTION PETITION:**

The first issue addresses the caution contained in *Herbst Gaming Inc. v Secretary of State*, 122 Nev. 877, 141 P.3d 1224 (2006) that limits challenges available when contesting the scope of "pre-election" initiatives – that is, challenges coming in front of the actual ballot – which must implicate very narrow and specific constitutional requirements.

Other due process and equal protection claims are not ripe for challenge until the election itself has resulted in passage.

Here Article 6, Section 19, once again, legitimates a pre-emptive limited constitutional challenge requiring <u>up front</u> that the initiative

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must be tied to a revenue source to go forward. Thus, it falls into the range of permissible challenges.

# **ADMINISTRATIVE ISSUES**

Herbst, supra, can also be cited for the principle, urged by the Plaintiffs, that initiatives like the one under scrutiny are not to involve themselves in administrative matters as opposed to legislative acts, Id. 122 Nev. Pp. 883 et seq.

The Plaintiffs are right. The 22-page bill under scrutiny is replete with administrative criteria, which will have to be culled before going to the ballot.

In that sense, it is similar to the DOE previously discussed, which needs some serious editing to properly notice the financial impact before it is tendered to prospective voters.

So, the Court suggests that those shortcomings are both "curable" matters that require effort but can be "fixed".

Unfixable is the revenue source component.

# **SCHWARTZ DISCUSSION**

This case, which is factually closer to our case than any other, was handed down by the Nevada Supreme Court on September 29,

2016. Although it goes by *Schwartz v. Lopez*, 132 Nev. 732, 382 P.3d 386 (2016), the opinion actually subsumes two cases; the second is *Duncan v. State* which has almost identical issues.

In both cases, the Plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of a pair of bills enacted previously known as Senate Bill 302 and Senate Bill 515.

This legislation appropriated a Two Billion Dollar lump sun to be disbursed as in our case, through the office of the State Treasurer.

The State Treasurer took it all in, and on his own authority and interpretation concluded that the funding was sufficient to fund not only the earmarked public school system, but also could be available to fund educational savings accounts for parents to subsidize non-public educational opportunities similar to the ones in our case.

The High Court determined that Senate Bill 302 on its face, or in combination with Senate Bill 515 --- by any inference ---- cannot be construed as an appropriation measure, specifically designed to be used to serve private schooling, tutoring and other non-public educational opportunities.

Although the statutes under examination are markedly different from Senate Bill 385 in our case, the *Schwartz* Decision suggests that there is nothing impermissible about the Legislature funding a program for a so-called "sectarian purpose", like private schooling.

But an absolutely essential ingredient for inclusion in the statute is the specific directive to identify a revenue source by the Legislature contemporaneous with the establishment of the administrative program to use the funding.

To this extent, *Schwartz* is entirely consistent and represents a guidepost to come to a conclusion about <u>essential</u> issues that achieve a budget balance.

A specific directive to appropriate revenue for the educational programs proffered by the Intervenor/Defendants is essential to the viability of the statute.

The Schwartz case has very recently been modified to recognize that a "public importance" exception applies when a representative citizen sues to protect public funds by challenging a legislative appropriation.

Nevada Policy Research Institution v. Cannizzaro, 138 Nev. Adv. Op. 28, April 21, 2022.

Obviously, the issue in *Nevada Policy Research Institute, supra*, involve standing issues and separation of power issues that are not present in the instant case.

Accordingly, the *Schwartz* case is inapposite except that it may imply a duty that confirms that both Plaintiffs and Defendant in our case have been demonstrating a public-importance role that notches up the level of scrutiny when considering a specific provision in the Nevada Constitution.

The Intervenor/Defendant's challenge falls short of the mark.

The statute fails from the lack of a funding directive.

#### **PART B**

# **ORDER ENJOINING PETITION**

Like its counterpart, REID I, the Intervenor has made an honest and thoughtful effort to create an opportunity for a substantial public forum to amend a statute that purports to administer and fund educational opportunities for children across the State whose parents

wish, for whatever reason, to eschew participation in the traditional school district.

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Unfortunately for the Intervenor, this initiative — the one they rely upon---- impermissibly commands the Nevada Legislature to amend a scheme of education "status-900" and install an unproven program that violates the deliberative functions of the Legislature.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED and declared that Initiative Petition
C-04-2022 is legally deficient because of a glaring but curable
omission in the Declaration of Effect; and because it violates the
prohibition against imposing administrative functions, which also may
be curable.

What the Court finds and rules as incurable comes from the patently obvious command in Section 6 of Article 19 of the Nevada Constitution to contemporaneously link the proposal to a viable identified funding source in order to have Constitutional footing to go on with it.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED and declared that Intervenor-Defendant Education Freedom PAC, its proponents, officers, or agents, are hereby enjoined from collecting signatures in support of the Petition and from

submitting any signatures for verification pursuant to NRS 293.1276, and any signatures previously collected are declared invalid.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED and declared that Defendant Secretary of State Barbara Cegavske is enjoined from placing the Petition on the ballot.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED this  $25^{\prime\prime\prime}$  day of April, 2022.

Charles M. McGEE

CHARLES M. McGEE
Senior Judge on Assignment

# **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

I certify that I am an employee of the First Judicial District Court of Nevada; that on the  $2 \omega$  day of April 2022, I served a copy of this document by placing a true copy in an envelope addressed to:

Lucas Foletta, Esq.	Chaig Marshar E-
	Craig Newby, Esq.
100 West Liberty St. 10 <sup>th</sup> Floor	State of Nevada
Reno, NV 89501	555 E. Washington Ave., Suite 3900
	Las Vegas, NV 89101
Bradley Schrager, Esq.	
3773 Howard Hughes Parkway,	
Suite 590 South	
Las Vegas, NV 89169	

the envelope sealed and then deposited in the Court's central mailing basket in the court clerk's office for delivery to the USPS at 1111 South Roop Street, Carson City, Nevada, for mailing.

Devin Earl Law Clerk

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Case No.:

22 OC 00027 1B

Dept. No.: II

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AUSREY ROWLATT

DEPUTY

IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

IN AND FOR CARSON CITY

RORY REID, AN INDIVIDUAL.

BEVERLY ROGERS, AN INDIVIDUAL,

Plaintiffs,

NOTICE OF SUBSTITUTION OF

COUNSEL

BARBARA CEGAVSKE, in her Official capacity as NEVADA SECRETARY OF STATE,

Defendant,

EDUCATION FREEDOM PAC,

McDONALD CARANO.

Intervenors, aligned as Defendant.

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE Jason D. Guinasso, Esq., Alex R. Velto, Esq., and Astrid Perez, Esq., of Hutchison & Steffen are substituted as counsel for Intervenor, aligned as Defendant, EDUCATION FREEDOM PAC, in the place and stead of Lucas Foletta, Esq., of

DATED this 4 day of May, 2022.

EDUCATION FREEDOM PAC

I hereby consent to the above and foregoing substitution of counsel.

DATED this \_ day of May, 2022.

McDONALD CARANO

Lucas Foletta, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 12154 100 W. Liberty Street, 10<sup>th</sup> Floor Reno, NV 89501

I hereby accept the above and foregoing substitution of counsel for Intervenor aligned as Defendant, EDUCATION FREEDOM PAC.

DATED this 6 day of May, 2022.

HUTCHISON & STEFFEN, PLACE

Jason D. Guinasso, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 8478

Alex R. Velto, Esq.

Nevada Bar No. 14961

Astrid A Perez, Esq.

Nevada Bar No. 15977

500 Damonte Ranch Parkway, Suite 980

Reno, Nevada 89521

Attorneys for Intervenor, aligned as Defendant, EDUCATION FREEDOM PAC

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## **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

Pursuant to NRCP 5(b), I certify that I am an employee of the law firm of HUTCHISON & STEFFEN, PLLC and that on the \_\_\_\_\_ day of May, 2022, I caused service a true and correct copy of the to be completed by US Mail:

John Samberg, Esq.
Daniel Bravo, Esq.
Wolf, Rifkin, Shapiro, Schulman &
Rabkin, LLP

Lucas Foletta, Esq. McDonald Carano 100 W. Liberty Street, 10<sup>th</sup> Floor Reno, Nevada 89501

3773 Howard Hughes Pkway, Suite 590 South Las Vegas, Nevada 89169

getval

Employee of Hutchison & Steffen, PLLC

AA0221



2022 MAY 19 PM 12: 14

K-PETERSON,

DEPUTY

Jason D. Guinasso, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 8478
Alex R. Velto, Esq.

Nevada Bar No. 14961

Astrid A Perez, Esq.

Nevada Bar No. 15977

5371 Kietzke Ln

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Reno, Nevada 89511

jguinasso@hutchlegal.com

avelto@hutchlegal.com

aperez@hutchlegal.com

Attorneys for Intervenor, aligned as Defendant, EDUCATION FREEDOM PAC

IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

IN AND FOR CARSON CITY

BEVERLY ROGERS, AN INDIVIDUAL,

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Plaintiffs,

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Defendant,

EDUCATION FREEDOM PAC,

Intervenors, aligned as Defendant.

Case No.: 22 OC 00027 1B

Dept. No.: II

**NOTICE OF APPEAL** 

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: EDUCATION FREEDOM PAC,

Intervenors, aligned as Defendant above named, by and through their counsel of record Jason

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D. Guinasso, Esq., Alex R. Velto, Esq., and Astrid A. Perez, Esq., of HUTCHISON & STEFFEN, PLLC, hereby appeals to the SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA the final judgment from the Decision Invalidating Petition to Create a Statute to Govern Future Appropriations to an Educational System Outside the School Districts and Injunction Preventing the Forward Progress of this Initiative, entered in this action on April 26, 2022, attached hereto and incorporated herein as Exhibit "1."

### <u>AFFIRMATION</u>

The undersigned does hereby affirm that the preceding document, NOTICE OF APPEAL, filed in the First Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada, County of Washoe, does not contain the social security number of any person.

DATED this /8 day of May, 2022.

HUTCHISON & STEFFE

Jason D. Williasso, Esc

Nevada Bar No. 8478

Alex R. Velto, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 14961

Astrid A Perez, Esq.

Nevada Bar No. 15977

5371 Kietzke Ln

Reno, Nevada 89511

Attorneys for Intervenor, aligned as Defendant,

EDUCATION FREEDOM PAC

### **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

Pursuant to NRCP 5(b), I certify that I am an employee of the law firm of HUTCHISON & STEFFEN, PLLC and that on the day of May, 2022, I caused service a true and correct copy of the **NOTICE OF APPEAL** to be completed by US Mail to:

Bradley S. Schrager, Esq.
John Samberg, Esq.
Daniel Bravo, Esq.
Wolf, Rifkin, Shapiro, Schulman &
Rabkin, LLP
3773 Howard Hughes Pkway, Suite 590 South
Las Vegas, Nevada 89169
bschrager@wrslawyers.com
jsamberg@wrslawyers.com
dbravo@wrslawyers.com
dbravo@wrslawyers.com

Craig Newby, Esq.
State of Nevada
555 E. Washington Ave., Suite 3900
Las Vegas, NV 89101
cnewby@ag.nv.gov

Jackie Tucker
Judicial Assistant
Honorable Charles M. McGee
mcgeelegalassistant@gmail.com
BShadron@carson.org

Employee of Hutchison & Steffen, PLLC

AA0224

# **EXHIBIT INDEX**

Index No.	Document Title	No. of Pages*
Exhibit	Notice of Entry of Order of Decision Invalidating Petition to Create a Statute to Govern Future Appropriations to an	21
1	Educational System Outside the School Districts and Injunction Preventing the Forward Progress of this Initiative	21

\* Includes exhibit cover page

AA0225

# INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK EXHIBIT PAGE ONLY

# **EXHIBIT 1**



BRADLEY S. SCHRAGER, ESQ. (NSB 10217) JOHN SAMBERG, ESQ. (NSB 10828)
DANIEL BRAVO, ESQ. (NSB 13078)
WOLF, RIFKIN, SHAPIRO, SCHULMAN & RABKIN, LLP
3773 Howard Hughes Parkway, Suite 590 South
Las Vegas, Nevada 89169
(702) 341-5200/Fax: (702) 341-5300 bschrager@wrslawyers.com jsamberg@wrslawyers.com dbravo@wrslawyers.com 6 Attorneys for Plaintiffs 7 8 IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 9 OF THE STATE OF NEVADA IN AND FOR CARSON CITY 10 11 BEVERLY ROGERS, an individual; Case No.: 22 OC 00027 1B 12 RORY REID, an individual Dept.: II Plaintiffs, 13 NOTICE OF ENTRY OF ORDER 14 VS. 15 BARBARA CEGAVSKE, in her official capacity as NEVADA SÉCRETARY OF 16 STATE, 17 Defendant. 18 and 19 **EDUCATION FREEDOM PAC** 20 Intervenor Defendant. 21 22 23 NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the DECISION INVALIDATING PETITION TO CREATE A STATUTE TO GOVERN FUTURE APPROPRIATIONS TO AN EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM OUTSIDE THE SCHOOL DISTRICTS and INJUNCTION PREVENTING THE FORWARD PROGRESS OF THIS INITIATIVE 26 27 was entered in the above-captioned matter on the 26th day of April, 2022.

A true and correct copy is attached hereto as Exhibit 1.

#### **AFFIRMATION**

The undersigned hereby affirm that the foregoing document does not contain the social security number of any person.

DATED this <u>30</u> day of April, 2022

WOLF, RIFKIN, SHAPIRO, SCHULMAN & RABKIN, LLP

BRADLEY S. SCHRAGER, ESQ. (NSB 10217)
JOHN SAMBERG, ESQ. (NSB 10828)
DANIEL BRAVO, ESQ. (NSB 13078)
3773 Howard Hughes Parkway, Suite 590 South
Las Vegas, Nevada 89169
(702) 341,5200/Fay: (702) 341,5300

(702) 341-5200/Fax: (702) 341-5300 bschrager@wrslawyers.com

jsamberg@wrslawyers.com dbravo@wrslawyers.com

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

# CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this 3rd day of May, 2022, a true and correct copy of the NOTICE OF ENTRY OF ORDER was served upon all parties via U.S. Mail 4 postage pre-paid, Las Vegas, Nevada and via electronic mailing to the following:

5 | Craig A. Newby, Esq. OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 555 E. Washington Avenue, Suite #3900 Las Vegas, NV 89101

Lucas Foletta McDONALD CARANO LLP 100 W. Liberty St., 10th Floor Reno, Nevada 89501 Telephone: (775) 788-2000 Ifoletta@mdonaldcarano.com

Attorney for Barbara Cegauske

Attorneys for Education Freedom PAC

Jackie Tucker Judicial Assistant Honorable Charles M. McGee mcgeelegalassistant@gmail.com

BShadron@carson.org

CNewby@ag.nv.gov

Dannielle Fresquez, an Employee of WOLF, RIFKIN, SHAPIRO, SCHULMAN & RABKIN, LLP

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INDEX OF EXHIBITS

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	System Outside The School Districts And Injunction	
	Preventing The Forward Progress Of This Initiative	

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IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF THEVADA
IN AND FOR CARSON CITY

**BEVERLY ROGERS, AN INDIVIDUAL.** 

AND RORY REID, AN INDIVIDUAL,

CASE NO.: 220C0027 1B

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Vs.

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DEPT. NO. II

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DISCUSSION

This opinion presents the second of two Decisions addressing

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The Intervenor, EFP, feels that they have "sanitized" their initiative from claimed defects causing confusion in the language in the DOE, and should be allowed to proceed.

A critical related factor, also found in Reid I, urges a conclusion that the scheme does not represent an <u>unfunded mandate</u> and, that it is self-proving.

As the argument goes, there cannot be an unfunded mandate because there is no funding, period!

Funding is left to the Legislature.

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27 28 Quoted directly from the language in the proposed order submitted by EFP, on page 3, lines 7 through 15, EFP urges as follows:

"The Petition neither contains an appropriate or an expenditure of money. The EFA program is contingent upon an appropriation by the Legislature to fund it; Section 37 of the Petition states specifically, "[t]he provisions of this act become effective upon an appropriation by the Legislature to fund the educational freedom accounts." (Exhibit 1 at Sec. 37.) And Section 35 states that "[n]othing herein shall require the Legislature to appropriate money to fund education freedom accounts or any expenses related thereto." (Id. At Sec. 35.) What's more, Section 10(2) states "[n]othing herein shall require the Legislature to appropriate money to fund the grants described in this section. The availability of grants is subject to the availability of funds as determined by the Legislature." (Id. At Sec. 10(2).)

See page 4 above where Section 35 of the proposed statute is again quoted in full.

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 Put another way, the fact that the funding is entirely discretionary with a future Legislature, could mean that the State Treasurer would not award a single grant and Nevada would have a new law "on the books" so to speak, but also have a "toothless tiger," on the books, so to speak, because the plan goes nowhere without funding.

Finally, EFP submits, that the scheme does not constitute an unfunded mandate because there is <u>no</u> mandate at all.

And, if there isn't a mandate, it has to be "precatory", a wish or a request.

This author thinks the entire conversation begs the question and presents the very same kind of sleight of hand that was true for the proposed Constitutional Amendment in Reid I.

The Court sees no interpretation other than that the initiative contains the same defect posited in Reid I: it is a non-contemporaneous directive to the Legislature to consider funding the initiative at a later session, and, as such cannot withstand the scrutiny of the Constitution.

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Once again, it is a <u>literal</u> read of Section 6, Article 9, of the Constitution which discloses the main flaw in the Petitioner's argument. Consider removing a few words, and emphasizing one key word, and Section 6 [the Constitution] reads like this:

"[This Section]...does not permit a proposal of any statute or statutory amendment which...recognizes the expenditure of money, unless **SUCH** statute...Imposes a sufficient tax...or...otherwise...provides for raising the necessary revenues." (emphasis supplied)

It <u>says nothing</u> about the right or latitude to postpone funding to a date out in the future, which will require forging yet <u>another</u> statute.

What it does say, is that this Bill, any Bill, that creates a statute

MUST <u>simultaneously</u>, impose a tax, or identify a legal revenue

source!

The Intervenor's effort to amend Senate Bill 385 cannot be permitted because there is no contemporaneous identification of a finite revenue source to fund the proposal.

Put another way, Section 6 simply does <u>not</u> allow funding to be postponed until a future Legislature convenes and then look for a

revenue source, while it is trying to balance the rest of the State budget.

In this Judge's view, no other interpretation of the legislative scheme is plausible.

Three final issues must be addressed:

1. Pre-election Petition:

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- 2. Administrative Matters Excluded;
- 3. Schwartz Reviewed;

### PRE-ELECTION PETITION:

The first issue addresses the caution contained in *Herbst Gaming Inc. v Secretary of State*, 122 Nev. 877, 141 P.3d 1224 (2006) that limits challenges available when contesting the scope of "pre-election" initiatives – that is, challenges coming in front of the actual ballot – which must implicate very narrow and specific constitutional requirements.

Other due process and equal protection claims are not ripe for challenge until the election itself has resulted in passage.

Here Article 6, Section 19, once again, legitimates a pre-emptive limited constitutional challenge requiring up front that the initiative

must be tied to a revenue source to go forward. Thus, it falls into the range of permissible challenges.

## ADMINISTRATIVE ISSUES

Herbst, supra, can also be cited for the principle, urged by the Plaintiffs, that initiatives like the one under scrutiny are not to involve themselves in administrative matters as opposed to legislative acts, Id. 122 Nev. Pp. 883 et seq.

The Plaintiffs are right. The 22-page bill under scrutiny is replete with administrative criteria, which will have to be culled before going to the ballot.

In that sense, it is similar to the DOE previously discussed, which needs some serious editing to properly notice the financial impact before it is tendered to prospective voters.

So, the Court suggests that those shortcomings are both "curable" matters that require effort but can be "fixed".

Unfixable is the revenue source component.

## **SCHWARTZ DISCUSSION**

This case, which is factually closer to our case than any other, was handed down by the Nevada Supreme Court on September 29,

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2016. Although it goes by Schwartz v. Lopez, 132 Nev. 732, 382 P.3d 386 (2016), the opinion actually subsumes two cases; the second is Duncan v. State which has almost identical issues.

In both cases, the Plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of a pair of bills enacted previously known as Senate Bill 302 and Senate Bill 515.

This legislation appropriated a Two Billion Dollar lump sun to be disbursed as in our case, through the office of the State Treasurer,

The State Treasurer took it all in, and on his own authority and interpretation concluded that the funding was sufficient to fund not only the earmarked public school system, but also could be available to fund educational savings accounts for parents to subsidize nonpublic educational opportunities similar to the ones in our case.

The High Court determined that Senate Bill 302 on its face, or in combination with Senate Bill 515 - by any inference --- cannot be construed as an appropriation measure, specifically designed to be used to serve private schooling, tutoring and other non-public educational opportunities.

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Although the statutes under examination are markedly different from Senate Bill 385 in our case, the Schwartz Decision suggests that there is nothing impermissible about the Legislature funding a program for a so-called "sectarian purpose", like private schooling.

But an absolutely essential ingredient for inclusion in the statute is the specific directive to identify a revenue source by the Legislature contemporaneous with the establishment of the administrative program to use the funding.

To this extent, Schwartz is entirely consistent and represents a guidepost to come to a conclusion about essential issues that achieve a budget balance.

A specific directive to appropriate revenue for the educational programs proffered by the intervenor/Defendants is essential to the viability of the statute.

The Schwartz case has very recently been modified to recognize that a "public importance" exception applies when a representative citizen sues to protect public funds by challenging a legislative appropriation.

Nevada Policy Research Institution v. Cannizzaro, 138 Nev. Adv.
Op. 28, April 21, 2022.

Obviously, the issue in *Nevada Policy Research Institute, supra*, involve standing issues and separation of power issues that are not present in the instant case.

Accordingly, the Schwartz case is inapposite except that it may imply a duty that confirms that both Plaintiffs and Defendant in our case have been demonstrating a public-importance role that notches up the level of scrutiny when considering a specific provision in the Nevada Constitution.

The Intervenor/Defendant's challenge falls short of the mark.

The statute fails from the lack of a funding directive.

#### PART B

### ORDER ENJOINING PETITION

Like its counterpart, REID i, the intervenor has made an honest and thoughtful effort to create an opportunity for a substantial public forum to amend a statute that purports to administer and fund educational opportunities for children across the State whose parents

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wish, for whatever reason, to eschew participation in the traditional school district.

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Unfortunately for the Intervenor, this initiative — the one they rely upon---- impermissibly commands the Nevada Legislature to amend a scheme of education "status-900" and install an unproven program that violates the deliberative functions of the Legislature.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED and declared that Initiative Petition
C-04-2022 is legally deficient because of a glaring but curable
omission in the Declaration of Effect; and because it violates the
prohibition against imposing administrative functions, which also may
be curable.

What the Court finds and rules as incurable comes from the patently obvious command in Section 6 of Article 19 of the Nevada Constitution to contemporaneously link the proposal to a viable identified funding source in order to have Constitutional footing to go on with it.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED and declared that Intervenor-Defendant Education Freedom PAC, its proponents, officers, or agents, are hereby enjoined from collecting signatures in support of the Petition and from

submitting any signatures for verification pursuant to NRS 293.1276, and any signatures previously collected are declared invalid.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED and declared that Defendant Secretary of State Barbara Cegavske is enjoined from placing the Petition on the ballot.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED this  $25^{+-}$  day of April, 2022.

CHADLES M. MOGEE

CHARLES M. McGEE Senior Judge on Assignment

# **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

I certify that I am an employee of the First Judicial District Court of Nevada; that on the \_\_\_\_\_ day of April 2022, I served a copy of this document by placing a true copy in an envelope addressed to:

Control of the Contro	the control of the second of t
Lucas Foletta, Esq.	Craig Newby, Esq.
100 West Liberty St. 10th Floor	State of Nevada
Reno, NV 89501	
1 reno, 144 99201	555 E. Washington Ave., Suite 3900
	Las Vegas, NV 89101
Bradley Schrager, Esq.	<b>3</b> , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,
2772 Howard Hughes Parkway	
3773 Howard Hughes Parkway, Suite 590 South	
Serie 240 South	
Las Vegas, NV 89169	1.

the envelope sealed and then deposited in the Court's central mailing basket in the court clerk's office for delivery to the USPS at 1111 South Roop Street, Carson City, Nevada, for mailing.

Devin Earl/ Law Clerk