### 1 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA 2 3 **Electronically Filed** 4 Case No Elizabeth A. Brown KEANDRE VALENTINE, 5 Petitioner, Clerk of Supreme Court Dist. Ct. C-16-316081-1 6 VS. 7 THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 8 COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA, 9 IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLARK, ) 10 AND THE HONORABLE JACQUELINE BLUTH, DISTRICT JUDGE, 11 12 Respondents, and 13 THE STATE OF NEVADA, 14 Real Party in Interest. 15 16 PETITIONER'S APPENDIX VOLUME II – PAGES 232-464 17 18 DARIN F. IMLAY STEVEN B. WOLFSON Clark County District Attorney 200 Lewis Avenue, 3<sup>rd</sup> Floor Clark County Public Defender 19 309 South Third Street Las Vegas, Nevada 89155 Las Vegas, Nevada 89155-2610 20 AARON D. FORD Attorney General 100 North Carson Street Attorney for Appellant 21 Carson City, Nevada 89701-4717 (702) 687-3538 22 23 Counsel for Respondent 24 25 26 27 28

#### 1 2 3 PAGE NO 4 Bench Brief for Evidentiary Hearing Being Held on 12/03/21: Documents Showing the History of Mungai 5 Motion Asking the Court Take Judicial Notice of the Mungai Case: And 6 Motion Seeking Findings That Systematic Exclusion is Inherent in the 7 Jury Selection Process Based on the Mungai Case and Based on the Jury Commissioner's Failure to Follow the Mandates Giving her Direction; and Motion to Reconsider Estoppel and Issue Preclusion 8 9 Motion Seeking An Order Granting A New Trial Based On Violations Of Due Progress, Prosecutorial Misconduct, And The 10 Right To A Speedy Appeal And/Or Trial filed 04/20/22 11 Order Denying Motion Seeking An Order Granting A New Trial Based On 12 Violations Of Due Progress, Prosecutorial Misconduct, And The 13 14 State's Opposition to Defendant's Motion Seeking an Order Granting A New Trial Based on Violations of Due Process, Prosecutorial 15 Supplement to Motion Seeking an Order Granting A New Trial 16 Based on Violations of Due Process, Prosecutorial Misconduct, and 17 18 19 TRANSCRIPTS 20 Recorder's Transcript of Proceedings: Motion Seeking An Order Granting A New Trial Based On 21 Violations Of Due Progress, Prosecutorial Misconduct, And The Right To A Speedy Appeal And/Or Trial 22 23 Transcript of Proceedings Re: 24 All Pending Motions Date of Hrg: 12/28/21......232-260 25 Transcript of Proceedings Re: Evidentiary Hearing 26 27 28

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TRAN 2 DISTRICT COURT 3 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 4 5 STATE OF NEVADA, 6 Plaintiff(s), Case No. C-16-316081-1 7 VS. Department VI 8 KEANDRE VALENTINE, 9 Defendant(s). 10 11 12 BEFORE THE HONORABLE JACQUELINE M. BLUTH, 13 DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 14 15 TUESDAY, DECEMBER 28, 2021 16 17 18 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS RE: **ALL PENDING MOTIONS** 19 (Via Audio Via BlueJeans) 20 21 22 (Appearances on page 2.) 23 24 RECORDED BY: DE'AWNA TAKAS, COURT RECORDER 25 Shawna Ortega • CET-562 • Certified Electronic Transcriber • 602.412.7667

> Case No. C-16-316081-1 Case Number: C-16-316081-1

APPEARANCES: For the State: AGNES M. BOTELHO, ESQ. **Chief Deputy District Attorney** For the Defendant(s): TYLER C. GASTON, ESQ. Deputy Public Defender SHARON G. DICKINSON, ESQ. Chief Deputy Public Defender 

## LAS VEGAS, NEVADA, TUESDAY, DECEMBER 28, 2021

[Proceeding commenced at 1:07 p.m.]

THE COURT: This is C-316081-1. Mr. Valentine is present in custody via BlueJeans.

Do I have Ms. Dickerson and/or Mr. Gaston on? Ms. Dickinson, I mean?

MR. GASTON: Yes, Your Honor. Tyler Gaston and Ms. Dickinson [indiscernible; audio distortion].

THE COURT: Thank you. Via BlueJeans, as well as Ms. Botelho via BlueJeans,

Okay, guys, so I have had an opportunity to read through -- or, sorry, not read through, to listen to the JAVS in front of Judge Scotti from the last court date, I can't remember what date it was. Maybe it was -- was it May of -- I can't remember, but you guys know which one I'm talking about.

So let's start with -- so let me start with the -- hold on, give me a second. Okay. So in regards to -- I'm going to go with the easiest to the one that'll require most argument on. In regards to the motion asking the Court to take judicial notice of the *Mungai* case and motion seeking findings, that whole thing, and the reconsideration, estoppel, and issue preclusion.

So in order -- in regards to the Motion for

Reconsideration, I -- there are no new facts that have presented,

no -- nor any law that has been presented that is going to make me

reconsider my previous decision in regards to *Mungai* or following Judge Spell's decision. So I'm happy to hear on the record if you'd like to say anything on the record in regards to that motion, but I've had the opportunity to read everything and I'm not going to reconsider it at this point in time. But, of course, I do understand that you need to lay a record. So if you'd like to do so, you may do so at this point.

MR. GASTON: Your Honor, I don't have anything to add as far as the law or argument [indiscernible; audio distortion] motion. I think the State's opposition -- omnibus opposition should be treated as a failure to respond. And other than that, I made a concession [indiscernible; audio distortion]. But other than that, I don't have any other additional argument to add.

THE COURT: Okay. And then --

MS. DICKINSON: Your Honor, if I could be heard.

There was one additional -- there were a couple of additional arguments in that motion that were not made at the other hearing. Specifically, one of the arguments that's in this motion has to do with [indiscernible; audio cut out] Valentine, allowing a court to use the transcript to make a decision on the Step 3. And the Court knows that this happens all the time in the courthouse. So that was not specifically raised last time.

And last time, I think, Mr. Gaston argued that estoppel and we've added an issue preclusion argument in here.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS, DICKINSON: And then the Court's -- just asking the Court to take judicial notice of the *Mungai*.

THE COURT: Yes. No, I understand. I -- so, I mean, technically, I guess, that isn't a Motion for Reconsideration in regards to those two aspects. But I do believe that -- I don't believe issue preclusion nor estoppel to be in line with what I have to do in this case. So I still stand by my initial rulings in regards to those specific arguments made by the defense.

So now I want to go -- oh, no, Mr. Gaston, I had a specific question. Because you cut out a little bit, I wanted to make sure I understood what you said. What did you say in regards to you wanted me to strike the State's opposition -- what did you say about that part?

Did Hose Mr. Gaston?

MS. DICKINSON: Your Honor, I think we may have lost him. I think that what he said was the State's opposition should be treated as a lack of response. And in that sense, the Court should grant our motion. They did not address any of the issues in any of our motions that we filed.

I see he's still on there.

Are you still there, Mr. Gaston?

THE COURT: I don't know, he's not -- yeah, I think we lost him. Well, it looks like he just unmuted.

Mr. Gaston, are you there? Okay.

Did you want me to wait, Ms. Dickinson, for him?

MS. DICKINSON: If you could just wait a few minutes, to see if he's gone. I'm texting.

Are you there, Mr. Gaston?

THE DEFENDANT: We could proceed without him. We don't have to do all this.

THE COURT: Okay. All right.

MS. DICKINSON: Whatever the Court wants to do.

THE COURT: Okay. Well, let's -- so in regards to -- I'm not going to strike the State's opposition. I mean, I think their position is, listen, all of this was clearly ruled upon. And so I'm not going to strike their opposition.

But I want to make sure that we're all on the same page. So in regards to this -- when I listened to Judge Scotti, he said, basically, three things. He said if any discovery issues arise, then the Court will entertain a Motion to Compel documents after a subpoena has been served. That was mainly towards the jury commissioner. That was the first thing.

And then the second thing was all witnesses can come to the hearing via BlueJeans, because of the situation we were in at that point in time.

And then the third thing he stated is all documents received thus far by the defense from the jury commissioner must be given over by June 10th of '20. All additional documents from the jury commissioner must be seasonably produced, and any documents from the jury commissioner that will used at the hearing

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must be provided no later than July 15th of 2021.

Ms. --

MS. DICKINSON: Excuse me, Your Honor, There wasn't anything about 2021 in that JAVS.

THE COURT: Oh, I probably -- sorry, I meant '20, probably meant '20. I'm just thinking of the year we were just in. I apologize.

Other than that, does that go along with your -- all right.

Mr. Gaston is now present.

Mr. Gaston, can you hear us now?

MR. GASTON: Yes, I can. I'm sorry about that.

THE COURT: Okay. That's okay.

So I was just going over that I had read the JAVS from Ms. -- from Judge Scotti and looked at his reasoning and what, exactly, it was that he was ordering the defense to turn over in regards to the documents received from the jury commissioner.

MS. DICKINSON: I think --

THE COURT: Go ahead.

MS. DICKINSON: Your Honor?

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

MS. DICKINSON: I was just going to add that with regard to the Motion to Compel, we ended up doing that. But it wasn't until 2021 that we finally filed a Motion to Compel. So that was the process that came about. So it wasn't till 2021 that the motion was heard and it was in front of another judge at that point, and we

...

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 were finally able to get through making documents.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. So in regards to the Motion for Clarification, basically, defense, if I understand your position, you really kind of argue three things.

Number one, you couldn't have violated the alleged order, is the wording you used, written by the clerk, because, number one, there was an unknown year.

But, number two, even if that was a deadline, the State waived any objection by continuing to accept the documents after July 15th of 2020.

And then, third, many of the documents were not received from the jury commissioner until after the 7/15/2020 deadline, so complying with that deadline would have been impossible.

Does that pretty much --

MS. DICKINSON: That is correct, Your Honor. And we also gave documents to the prosecutor when we received them.

THE COURT: Okay. And so, I mean, I think -- I believe the intent of Judge Scotti, especially after, you know, listening to the JAVS, is I really feel like it's consistent with my thoughts on this, is that when you guys come into court, whether it be the prosecutors or the defense, I just want everybody to have had the opportunity to look at what everybody else received, and what's going to be used at the hearing so that everybody comes in here, it's not a hearing by ambush, everybody feels completely prepared, and that we can go forward and not have any other continuances.

I mean, I think everybody wants to get this done. I've heard the State, when they were speaking to Judge Scotti, saying, please, like, can we please get this done as soon as possible. This is dragging along.

And so let's figure out here, in regard to the Motion for Clarification and Reconsideration, I -- what I'm getting from this is that the defense just wants to clarify whether or not there was a violation of the judge's order or of a discovery request in regards to the Motion for Clarification. Is that fair?

MS. DICKINSON: Your Honor, that's fair. And also, we were objecting to the order that the State proposed saying we had violated other statutes.

THE COURT: Right. Sorry. Yes, I agree.

So, Ms. Botelho, can you talk to me about your position in regards to -- well, okay, let me stop.

For the one argument, well, nobody knew what year we were talking about, I mean, I don't -- that one, I don't think, has a lot of teeth, right? And it was very clear in listening to the JAVS that what month everybody was talking about, because you guys had a hearing coming up. So I -- that one I'm not biting into.

But this whole part of, listen, they were still receiving documents up until, you know, whatever position, and then they were handing them over. So what do you have to say in regards to that?

MS. BOTELHO: Your Honor, I -- part of the reason that I

 filed the written objection or response in November of 2020 was because it felt like the defense was on this fishing expedition and they were after records which, either one, didn't exist, or two, couldn't be replicated, or three, weren't being produced to them in a certain manner or as quickly as they needed, you know, with COVID happening and everything like that.

And so my concern at that time was the defense just kind of casting this super wide net for any and all documents, for any year. And my concern at the time is, well, was them going outside the scope of what I believed the decision in Valentine allowed, which was limited to the ZIP code issue, as we discussed December3rd.

And so when I filed that written opposition, after all of the continuances, throughout the last two years, all of the continuances have been made by the defense, because they were trying to get these documents from the jury commissioner or these documents that their expert needed to look at, raw data, whatever other information, in order for the expert to properly testify at the hearing.

And so my position has always been whether it was Judge Scotti, whether it was Judge Eller, whether it was Judge Thompson sitting in for Judge Scotti, and then Judge Holthus, and now yourself, I've always been entitled to all of the data that they plan to present with the -- with -- during the evidentiary hearing.

And they acquiesced to that response or to that request

 because in multiple -- and I've gone, I had -- and asked my secretary to prepare an order for transcripts for all of our hearings, because I see where this is going in terms of, you know, trying to recreate history, it's -- I've asked them over and over, I'm going to need this underlying data, I'm going to need the master list, I need to be provided all of this information so that I can look at it, prepare for cross-examination, as well as determine whether I need to hire an expert,

In all of the minutes, the status checks, even some of the orders that have been prepared, the written orders prepared by Judge Eller or Judge Thompson or whomever, whichever judge it was in front of, Judge Holthus, the defense has always taken the position that I was entitled to these documents. And for them to now parse out, oh, well, I'm only required to, you know, disclose information or they're only required to disclose information concerning what the jury commissioner gave them, you know, is just -- it's disingenuous to be very, very, you know, kind in language, because they know they were ordered to produce -- just, even according to the minute entry from May 20th of 2020:

Any documents that will be presented at the evidentiary hearing must be produced to the State.

And this is what I argued on December 3rd.

The intent, Your Honor, even though the evidentiary hearing kept moving and moving and moving and moving, all at the defendant's requests, even though it kept moving, was so that I

got the documents, well, first, they get all the documents that they need to set forth their case, and then I get the documentation and I have adequate time to review that. That's always been the position.

And so for them to now -- I mean, contrary to even their own language, there are stipulations in orders filed in this case -- or, let's see, let me refer you to this -- the defendant's Motion to Continue Evidentiary Hearing October 28th of 2020. This is the one that I filed a written opposition for. On page 3, Header Number 8:

Based on the above, I'm asking the Court to continue the hearing until late December of January. This will give us enough time to collect the documents and for our expert to review them. It will also give the prosecutor time to review the documents for the hearing.

So for them to now say that they were not operating on some kind of order, understanding, some type of rule that required them or that led me to believe that they were going to disclose these items to me is just -- it's ridiculous. It is ridiculous.

Because not only -- and, of course, that precipitated me to file a response saying, hey, I want them to give me an offer of proof as to what these documents are, because I need -- and I put it in my opposition -- I need to know whether I need to hire a rebuttal expert, whether I need to file a Motion to Strike for it being outside the scope, whether I need to lodge an objection.

And then in a lot of their motions, you know, they filed since this 1240 hearing, they're talking about how -- why does the

State raise this at a different time? Why did -- I didn't raise it because I've been waiting for them to disclose all of the information, and when they disclose information to me, the night before or the afternoon before a scheduled hearing, that's going to -- that's a problem. That's a problem when the last two years, where it's minute entries, as well as Motions to Continue, as well as stipulations and order all indicate that the State always had the right --

MR. GASTON: Your Honor.

MS. BOTELHO: -- were always entitled to have the right to review these documents, this raw data that their expert was going to rely on.

It just -- It baffles my mind how this can be the position now, that they were not entitled -- that I'm not entitled to this somehow. I mean --

THE COURT: Okay. Ms. Botelho, just one second.

Mr. Valentine, you're -- I'm sorry, sir, are you having an issue?

THE DEFENDANT: Yeah, I'm having a issue right now.

Right? Like, I'm trying to -- my ride is going to leave in, like, two minutes. And I'm going to be stuck here all night, basically.

THE COURT: Okay. So, wait, let me ask you: Do you want to be here for this hearing or are you waiving your right to be here and you'll allow your attorneys to go on without you?

THE DEFENDANT: This is just posted for a status check,

7	right?	
2	THE COURT: No.	
3	THE DEFENDANT: Or, what	
4	THE COURT: They're arguing about basically, they're	
5	arguing about what discovery for the hearing we're going to have.	
6	THE DEFENDANT: Okay. I just want I didn't know all	
7	that. I just want to know that the next court date and I'll be at the	
8	next court date.	
9	THE COURT: Okay. So the next court hearing the next	
10	court date is going to be an evidentiary hearing on	
11	THE DEFENDANT: Uh-huh.	
12	THE COURT: we can either do Monday, February 7th, or	
13	Friday, February 11th, whichever the parties agree to.	
14	7th or the 11th, guys?	
15	MS. DICKINSON: 7th.	
16	THE COURT: Ms. Botelho?	
17	MS. BOTELHO: Brief indulgence, Your Honor. I have my	
18	calendar up. The 7th is fine.	
19	THE COURT: Okay. February 7th at 1:30.	
20	Mr. Valentine, if you'd like to go at this point in time, sir,	
21	you can, to catch your ride.	
22	THE DEFENDANT: Okay. Thank you very much.	
23	THE COURT: You're welcome, sir.	
24	Okay. So Ms. Dickinson or Mr. Gaston, your position in	
25	rebuttal to the points that Ms. Botelho's brought up in regards to	

the, you know, previous motions and orders that have been issued.

MS. DICKINSON: Your Honor, I'd like to respond.

THE COURT: Go ahead.

MS. DICKINSON: To make -- Sharon Dickinson, I'd like to respond to this.

You know, today, it's December, the end of

December 2021. And up until today the prosecutor has never filed a

written motion objecting or laying out any of her objections. Not
once.

She has now come into court and complained about something in November of 2020, I don't know what she's talking about. She's complained about something in October of 28, 2020. I don't have any reference, any way to respond, because she did not put anything in writing.

She's complained that she didn't get any of her evidence or her discoveries. She received it all. She received it when we got it. I filed a motion and let the Court know what she's given us. Nothing. And we asked for her to list what we've given her, because we don't want to come back in here to have her do what she did today and complain again, you never gave me anything. That's totally inaccurate.

I think part of the confusion is -- was getting the master list. The jury commissioner in the Eighth Judicial District Court does not keep a master list day to day. And it took us a while, because it was the first time the Court had ever been -- the jury

commissioner had ever been asked to turn this over. So that was one of the things that took a long time to vet. And when we got it — we don't even have it, actually. It's in a program that the jury commissioner has and all's we could get was a code to get into it. That's what we ended up getting to [indiscernible; audio distortion]. Prior to that, she received everything else that we had requested.

THE COURT: Okay. So let -- hold on. Ms. Dickinson, let me ask you a question.

Ms. Dickinson, on June -- hold on, let me get out my notes from Judge Scotti. So did you comply -- I know you guys are saying an order, because nothing was ever filed, but Judge Scotti did order certain things on the record. So did you guys turn over what you had received? It says: All documents Defendant received so forth from the jury commissioner must be given by June 10th. Did you do that? The ones that you had --

MS. DICKINSON: Yes, Your Honor. I did.

THE COURT: Okay. All additional documents from jury commissioner must be seasonably produced. Any documents from jury commissioner must be provided no later than mid July of 7/15/21. So at that point in time, before 7/15/21, had you given everything at that point in time that you had?

MS. DICKINSON: Yes. That -- yes. We gave everything as we received it, after the -- we went into that evidentiary hearing. We did not receive things right away. I remember one time we received something on a UBS [sic] stick and the prosecutor asked

Simms.

 And so absent the JAVS or the transcripts, which I've now ordered from all of these status checks, it's hard for the Court to get a flavor of just how continuing this obligation was supposed to be. And I understand now, yes, we're going to move forward. We're going to move forward. The Court ruled they can talk about DETR records.

You know, but what concerns the State is in one of their other motions, you know, Mr. Gaston says something about how, you know, well, I'm not limited to just talking about this. Okay. Now, the same way that they didn't receive any discovery from me, and I -- yes, they did not receive any discovery from me, because guess what? They had the burden of proof.

And so I'm entitled to look at it to see -- to look at their documentation, to look at their evidence and see if I have something in rebuttal or contrary to that.

And so it just -- it baffles my mind that, you know,
Ms. Dickinson, at this point in time, would say something to the
effect of, you know, hey, I'm lying because they were never ordered
and they were never asked to produce this stuff. And I just -- I don't
understand it, because it is in plain black and white, they disclosed
these other things to me very willingly. And so, of course there's a
flavor of --

THE COURT: So let me ask Ms. Dickinson, then, Ms. Botelho.

So, Ms. Dickinson, if you -- if Ms. Botelho is correct and

 you were going to always use the DETR records and always -- and had prepared for an expert, why weren't those handed over?

MS. DICKINSON: Well, Ms. Botelho is not correct. She is totally wrong, because it wasn't until we did *Mungai* and *Ortiz* came out in 2021 that we looked at DETR records. So Ms. Botelho is totally incorrect.

And if I understand her statements now, now we're no longer arguing about what we received from the jury commissioner, we're arguing about DETR records. So is she now saying yes, she received everything from the jury commissioner, but she's complaining she didn't get DETR records in 2020 when we had — we didn't even have DETR records at that time.

THE COURT: When did you guys get the DETR records?

MS. DICKINSON: The DETR records that we gave her, we received as soon as we got them, which was that day or the day after.

MS. BOTELHO: See, Your Honor? That is contradictory to what she just said prior to. She said they have this documentation in a different case and when they were preparing for the Valentine case, they said, hey, we better disclose these, because the prosecutor's going to want them.

Which leads the Court and myself to believe that they've had it in their possession, which I was going to point out is against what Ms. Dickinson told me when I called her Thursday, the Thursday before the December 3rd hearing, when I asked her, hey,

Sharon, what's going on with these? Do you guys plan to use these? She said, oh, in preparing for this hearing on Monday, we looked at it and we decided, oh, we've got the wrong records. So I requested the 2017 records, because that's the relevant records. And then I turned them over to you as soon as I could.

I mean, which is it at this point? Which is it?

MS. DICKINSON: Listen --

MS, BOTELHO: Did you have it?

MS. DICKINSON: Your Honor.

MS. BOTELHO: Did you have it and fail to disclose it, or did you request it the Monday before, as you told me, and as you've just very succinctly told the Court now?

This is the kind of gamesmanship that is infuriating because, as the Court pointed out, I have wanted this hearing to go forward since day one. And for Ms. Dickinson to sit here -- to sit there and tell me that I didn't acknowledge receipt of the discovery, you know, maybe they should read the transcripts. It's on page 19, when I actually say:

And so yes, Ms. Dickinson is correct, we did receive the voluminous master list records. We received that a week or so after they received it. And we had conversations about that level of discovery.

I mean, what — she seems so confused about what it is that's at issue here. I'm not saying that I didn't receive discovery. I'm saying I did not receive the total amount of discovery that was

 needed, that was going to be presented at the evidentiary hearing, because that is what your expert relied on.

That's exactly what I'm saying. That's what I said

December 3rd; that's what I'm saying now. My version is never
going to change. I'm not going to say, oh, I got it and then I didn't.

MS. DICKINSON: Your Honor, I want to say I'm tired of Ms. Botelho calling me a liar. She has been doing this since December 3rd and I resent it. It's not true. It's never been true.

THE COURT: Okay, Clarify.

MS. DICKINSON: It's never been true.

THE COURT: Clarify --

MS, DICKINSON: I've been accurate with her on everything I've said.

Now, the DETR records, I told her we received those DETR records that week. And we realized we needed them in 2021, when she did *Mungai*. I don't have the records from *Mungai*.

I'm not sure what else she's calling me a liar about. Does the Court want to send us to the state bar so she can call me a liar there? I did not make those statements to her in a private conversation. And the reason I filed the motions is because I will no longer have private conversations with her, because she misconstrues what I say.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. DICKINSON: She's calling me a liar, I resent it. I've been in the courtrooms for over 30 years and never had a

THE COURT: Right.

MS. BOTELHO: And I believe that date moved, because I asked for time to, you know, look at the records to see if we were going to be hiring an expert. Is there such a drop-dead deadline at this point in time?

THE COURT: I thought that we -- I don't have the minutes pulled. I thought that we had already put that drop-down date on the record, hadn't we?

MS. DICKINSON: Your Honor, my understanding, we had a date for her to come in and say if she was going to have an expert. She came into court and said she was not hiring an expert.

And with regard to the discovery, I asked the Court to clarify what the Court wanted, because the expert is, obviously, there's some privilege material also. Does the Court want us to turn over privilege work product or what exactly did the Court want us to turn over to the prosecutor?

THE COURT: Well, I trust that the parties know exactly what's privilege and what the State wouldn't be entitled to, I mean, work product. But I also trust -- I mean, I feel like everybody on this case is seasoned attorneys, right? So you know what each other are -- what your obligations are and what each other are entitled to.

So if there's work product, it's obviously not discoverable. But everything else needs to be turned over so that the State has the opportunity to review documents, graphs, charts, any of that and prepare for cross-examination.

MS. BOTELHO: The deadline that you initially gave, Your Honor, was 10 days from the date of the hearing. And then kind of talked about the expert stuff and I don't know if that date changed. That's -- I'm just asking for a clarification --

THE COURT: Sure.

MS. BOTELHO: - as to the deadline --

THE COURT: So --

MS. BOTELHO: -- whether that's passed,

THE COURT: So the date of the hearing is going to be February 7th. So if you guys want it 10 days -- if you want the drop-down date to be 10 days, that's fine. If you want it to be two weeks, that's fine. It's really what you guys need in order to prepare. I just want to make sure we have a drop-dead date so that when we come in here on February 7th, this thing is going forward.

MS. BOTELHO: Okay.

MS. DICKINSON: Your Honor, one other motion we had, and the State has no objection, giving us a list of everything that we've given to them so we're sure they have everything in their file. We don't want to come in on February 4th and be accused of withholding discovery. She did not file an objection to that. I asked for an order for that.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. BOTELHO: We talked about this very same issue, as I pointed out. I already told them and I told the Court on December 3rd, on page 19, what I've received. I think the proper

method to obtain some sort of documentation as to what the State received would be a receipt of copy filed with the Court with my -- with a signature from the State or a party indicating discovery receipt.

THE COURT: So --

MS. DICKINSON: Your Honor, she's been accepting things during the COVID without a receipt or copy because we couldn't have anybody come over. So I would just ask that she give us a copy of what she received and then we'll check our files.

THE COURT: Well, okay. Hold on. So do you,

Ms. Dickinson, do you have a printout of everything you believe
you've turned over?

MS. DICKINSON: No, I don't. But I could put one together. But I'd ask that she put it together, since she accepted it that way.

THE COURT: Well, no. No.

MS. DICKINSON: Okay.

THE COURT: I need you to do a piece of -- I need a document of everything that you believe you've turned over. Then I need Ms. Botelho to review that, and if she hasn't received everything, I need her to reach out to you and get another copy.

MS. DICKINSON: Okay.

THE COURT: Okay. All right, So, Ms. Botelho, is a 10-day drop off for the deadline before the hearing sufficient for preparation or do you believe 14 days is needed?

 MS. BOTELHO: Your Honor, actually, I was going to go with the -- I was going to ask the Court for your original intent, which appears to have been 10 days from December 3rd, You said:

I'm going to give both sides 10 days to review everything, make sure you have — pretend you're doing the hearing on the 7th day of the 10 days, that everything you're going to want to use on both sides or experts relied on on that tenth day and that you're going to give that over to each other.

THE COURT: Oh, I apologize.

MS. BOTELHO: And I'm precluding it.

THE COURT: When you were reading it, I thought you said 10 days from the hearing, meaning 10 days from the hearing we are going to have.

MS. BOTELHO: Oh.

THE COURT: Oh.

MS. BOTELHO: And I'm sorry, Your Honor.

THE COURT: No, no, no.

MS. BOTELHO: It was 10 days from our last hearing.

THE COURT: Okay. So it would have been the 13th, right? When did we have our -- when was the day we had our hearing?

MS. BOTELHO: December 3rd.

THE COURT: Okay. Yeah, everybody agreed to that. So, obviously, everybody -- so we're all on the same page. Everything should have been handed over then, because everybody nodded

 their heads and told me they agreed to that. So that was the order.

MS. BOTELHO: Okay. Thank you.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. DICKINSON: So you're saying that everything should have already been turned over. We have turned over some things that are in motion. So I would ask that those be included.

THE COURT: What --

MS. DICKINSON: The documents, they are court files. I mean, we don't have anything else from the jury commissioner if that's what the Court's asking.

THE COURT: I'm just — I just told everybody anything you want to present had to be turned over by the 13th. That was very clear. Everybody agreed, everybody told me that they agreed to it, so that was my order. So if something hasn't been turned over, it's not coming in.

MS. DICKINSON: Well, you're saying that all the documents that we filed in our motions will be prohibited from being introduced?

THE COURT: What motion? What documents?

MS. DICKINSON: Your Honor, we filed the agreement and request for information. I think she already has that, but I just want to make sure. We have the declarations from the jury commissioner. We filed all of those. We filed -- what else --

THE COURT: Well, what was the date you filed this?

MS. DICKINSON: The administrative order, which I'm

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32 Shawna Ortega - CET-562 - Certified Electronic Transcriber - 602,412,7667 Case No. C-16-316081-1

MR. GASTON: Thank you.

[Proceeding concluded at 1:51 p.m.]

ATTEST: I do hereby certify that I have truly and correctly transcribed the audio/video proceedings in the above-entitled case to the best of my ability. Please note: Technical glitches in the BlueJeans audio/video which resulted in distortion and/or audio cutting out completely were experienced and are reflected in the transcript. Shawna Ortega, CET\*562

Shawna Ortega • CET-562 • Certified Electronic Transcriber • 602.412.7667

Case No. C-16-316081-1

Electronically Filed 4/28/2022 5:38 PM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT

SUPP
DARIN F. IMLAY, PUBLIC DEFENDER
NEVADA BAR NO. 5674
TYLER C. GASTON, DEPUTY PUBLIC DEFENDER
NEVADA BAR NO. 13488
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309 South Third Street, Suite 226
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Attorneys for Defendant

# **DISTRICT COURT**

# CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

THE STATE OF NEVADA,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. C-16-316081-1

V.

DEPT. NO. VI

KEANDRE VALENTINE,

Defendant,

DATE: May 3, 2022

TIME: 9:30 a.m.

# SUPPLEMENT TO MOTION SEEKING AN ORDER GRANTING A NEW TRIAL BASED ON VIOLATIONS OF DUE PROCESS, PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT, AND THE RIGHT TO A SPEEDY APPEAL AND/OR TRIAL.

COMES NOW, the Defendant, KEANDRE VALENTINE, by and through Deputy Public Defenders TYLER C. GASTON and SHARON G. DICKINSON, Deputy Public Defenders and files this supplement to the Motion seeking an Order granting a new trial based on violations of due process, prosecutorial misconduct, and the right to a speedy appeal and/or trial.

DATED this 28th day of April, 2022.

DARIN F. IMLAY
CLARK COUNTY PUBLIC DEF.

By: /s/Tyler C. Gaston
TYLER C. GASTON, #13488
Deputy Public Defender

DARIN F. IMLAY
CLARK COUNTY PUBLIC DEF.

By: /s/Sharon G. Dickinson
SHARON G. DICKINSON, #3710
Chief Deputy Public Defender

# CERTIFICATE OF ELECTRONIC SERVICE

I hereby certify that service of the above and forgoing SUPPLEMENT TO MOTION was served via electronic e-filing to the Clark County District Attorney's Office at motions@clarkcountyda.com on this 28th day of April, 2022.

By: <u>/s/Carrie M. Connolly</u>
An employee of the
Clark County Public Defender's Office

# EXHIBIT A

#### DECLARATION

TYLER C. GASTON makes the following declaration:

- I am an attorney duly licensed to practice law in the State of Nevada; I am the Deputy Public Defender assigned to represent the Defendant in the instant matter, and I am familiar with the facts and circumstances of this case.
- 2. The emails attached to this exhibit are from me to the Court regarding scheduling the remainder of the evidentiary hearing for Keandre Valentine.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. (NRS 53.045).

EXECUTED this 28th day of April, 2022.

/s/Tyler C. Gaston TYLER C. GASTON

From: Tyler Gaston		
Sent: Monday, February 7, 2022 5:34 PM		
To: Jacobs, Krystal	>; Anna Clark <	Sharon
Dickinson <	Agnes Botelho (Agreed and Agreed)	>; Michael Dickerson
STATE OF THE PARTY		
Subject: Dates for Continued Valentine Hear	ring	

All,

As for Mondays and Fridays, I'm available on March 7<sup>th</sup> any time after 10:00 am. I'm available all day on March 11<sup>th</sup>. And then I'm most likely not available until March 28<sup>th</sup> when I'm available all day as well as on April 1<sup>th</sup>. I was only looking at Mondays and Fridays so let me know if I should look at other times or dates.

Best,

Tyler Gaston

Agnes & Mike-

These CDs have been received. Please feel free to stop by anytime.

Thanks! Krystal Jacobs Dept. 6 JEA

From: Tyler Gaston [mail: 1]

Sent: Tuesday, February 8, 2022 4:36 PM

To: Agnes Botelho, Michael Dickerson, Dickinson, Sharon, Clark, Anna, Jacobs, Krystal

Subject: Valentine Discovery

[NOTICE: This message originated outside of Eighth Judicial District Court - DO NOT CLICK on links or open attachments unless you are sure the content is safe.]

All,

The judge ordered us to disclose the 2017 master list from our expert. He created the 2017 list as a separate document now instead of simply doing the analysis from the 2020 list. He shared that with me on a google drive which I put onto a CD. As for duplicates, he created a list of the duplicates on another google drive which we put onto another cd. That way the state has the 2017 master list as well as the list of names that our expert determined were duplicates. I tried to contact the State today to organize on how to deliver the discovery to them directly and they didn't answer/contact me back, it seems like the safest option to ensure discovery to the State would be to bring the two discs over to the chambers of Department 6 and then the DAs can pick that information up directly from chambers. I'd also just remind everyone that at least one disc has almost 2.6 million names and personal information of citizens of Clark County on it hence my emphasis on making sure I disclose this material directly to the specific prosecutors or through the chambers so that the material doesn't get misplaced. I'm picking up those discs from my IT department and will deliver it to chambers in about 15 minutes.

Best,

**Tyler Gaston** 

From: Jacobs, Krystal
Sent: Thursday, March 3, 2022 11:15 AM  To: Tyler Gaston <
The state of the state</th
Sharon Dickinson ( Subject: RE: Keandre Valentine
We are trying so hard we have an Atkins hearing that we were supposed to hear tomorrow but we had to move it. I am wtg to hear back from the State and their witness on a good date for them. As soon as I have the Atkins hearing set I'll reach out to you all to get this one set.
Thanks! Krystal Jacobs Dept, 6 JEA
From: Tyler Gaston [ Sent: Thursday, March 3, 2022 8:25 AM To: Jacobs, Krystal; Agnes Botelho; Michael Dickerson; Dickinson, Sharon; Clark, Anna Subject: RE: Keandre Valentine
[NOTICE: This message originated outside of Eighth Judicial District Court - DO NOT CLICK on links or open attachments unless you are sure the content is safe.]
I just wanted to follow up and see if we were any closer to setting a date for the finishing of our evidentiary hearing in this case?
Tyler
From: Tyler Gaston <
Sharon Dickinson ( ); Michael Dickerson ( ); Anna Clark ( ); Subject: Re: Keandre Valentine
Thanks!
From: Jacobs, Krystal Sent: Monday, February 14, 2022 4:27 PM To: Tyler Gaston

From: Tyler Gaston

Sent: Thursday, March 3, 2022 12:06 PM
To: Jennifer Georges <
Subject: FW: Keandre Valentine

Continue to the sound of the	; Michael Dickerson <	- Noncettalous S
Sharon Dickinson <	Anna Clark	v>
Subject: RE: Keandre Valentine		

It's off calendar - or rather, I just moved it back to 2/7. Thanks for letting us know.

Thanks! Krystal Jacobs Dept. 6 JEA

From: Tyler Gaston

Sent: Monday, February 14, 2022 9:11 AM

To: Jacobs, Krystal; Agnes Botelho; Michael Dickerson; Dickinson, Sharon; Clark, Anna

Subject: Keandre Valentine

[NOTICE: This message originated outside of Eighth Judicial District Court - DO NOT CLICK on links or open attachments unless you are sure the content is safe.]

Ms. Jacobs,

I see that we have a hearing scheduled for 2/17 in Odyssey on the State's motion to strike our motion asking the Court to take Judicial Notice of our exhibits and our expert. We already argued these motions though at the evidentiary hearing. If nobody disagrees, can we vacate the court date currently scheduled for 2/17?

Thanks,

**Tyler Gaston** 

**Electronically Filed** 5/3/2022 6:57 AM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT

1 **OPPS** STEVEN B. WOLFSON 2 Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #001565 3 AGNES M. BOTELHO Chief Deputy District Attorney 4 Nevada Bar #11064 200 Lewis Avenue 5 Las Vegas, Nevada 89155-2212 (702) 671-2500 6 Attorney for Plaintiff

> DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

THE STATE OF NEVADA,

Plaintiff.

-VS-

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KEANDRE VALENTINE, #5090875

Defendant.

CASE NO: C-16-316081-1

DEPT NO:

## STATE'S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION SEEKING AN ORDER GRANTING A NEW TRIAL BASED ON VIOLATIONS OF DUE PROCESS, PROSECUTORIAL MISONCOUCT, AND THE RIGHT TO A SPEEDY APPEAL AND/OR TRIAL

DATE OF HEARING: May 3, 2021 TIME OF HEARING: 9:30 AM

COMES NOW, the State of Nevada, by STEVEN B. WOLFSON, Clark County District Attorney, through AGNES M. BOTELHO, Chief Deputy District Attorney, and hereby submits the attached Points and Authorities in Opposition to Defendant's Motion Seeking An Order Granting A New Trial Based On Violations Of Due Process, Prosecutorial Misoncduct, And The Right To A Speedy Appeal And/Or Trial.

This Opposition is made and based upon all the papers and pleadings on file herein, the attached points and authorities in support hereof, and oral argument at the time of hearing, if deemed necessary by this Honorable Court.

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\(\text{CLARKCOUNTYDA,NET\CRMCASE2\\2016\\242\\67\\2016\\242\\67\\COPPS\(KEANDRE\VALENTINE\) MTN FO R ORD OF NEW TRIAL\\-001\\DOCX

# I. MOTION SEEKING AN ORDER GRANTING A NEW TRIAL IS THE IMPROPER VEHICLE TO CHALLENGE A DISCRETIONARY RULING ORDERING DISCOVERY

In his motion, Defendant argues that:

"Keandre's rights were further violated by the court's 02/07/22 discovery order. After Keandre's expert testified on 02/07/22, the court ordered the Defense to use the master list given to all parties from the jury commissioner to create a sub-list for the prosecutor to use during her cross-examination of the expert. See Exhibit E: pp.165-178. The Defense followed the court's directive but objected that it was being forced to give the prosecutor its work-product. See Exhibit F: Notice."

Defendant's Motion Seeking Order Granting A New Trial, p. 3.

Under certain circumstances, a writ of mandamus may be issued to compel the district court to vacate or modify a discovery order. Okada v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 131 Nev. 834, 359 P.3d 1106 (2015). "[A]ny decision of the court in an intermediate order or proceeding, forming a part of the record, may be reviewed" by the appellate courts. Id.; see also NRAP 3B ("Appeals from district court determinations in criminal actions shall be governed by these Rules and by NRS 176.09183, NRS 177.015 to 177.305"). "The correct procedure for reviewing such discretionary decisions is by direct attack, by appeal . . . ." Sheriff v. Hatch, 100 Nev. 664, 666, 691 P.2d 449, 450 (1984).

Here, Valentine is essentially asking this Honorable Court to hear the appeal of its own order directing Valentine to produce discovery to the State. Such a request is not legally cogent and goes against the jurisdiction of Nevada's appellate courts to review decisions of the District Courts. This Court already heard Valentine's objection to the discovery order. It is antithetical to Nevada's Judicial hierarchy to request this Court to review its own order. Valentine confuses the proper procedures, therefore rendering his entire motion improper.

// // II. Motion Seeking An Order Granting A New Trial Is The Improper Vehicle To Challenge A Discretionary Ruling To Continue An Evidentiary Due to Valentine's Discovery Violations.

In his motion, Valentine argues that unreasonable delay in completing the evidentiary hearing denied Valentine the right to a timely appeal and trial. He further asserts that:

"It is important to note that much of the delay in holding the hearing was due to the Eighth Judicial District Court's jury commissioner delay in giving Keandre the discovery he requested. Keandre began requesting discovery in March of 2020, had to file a motion to compel discovery in January of 2021, and then had to litigate further when the jury commissioner objected to the order to compel. Also, the Eighth Judicial Court's Chief Judge transferred his case three times thereby making the setting of a hearing date difficult. And Department VI took the case off calendar numerous times."

Defendant's Motion Seeking Order Granting a New Trial, p. 10.

Here, as above, Valentine is once again improperly asking this Court to hear the appeal on the various district courts' decisions to continue the evidentiary hearing. However, a ruling on a continuance is intermediate and is in no way a final disposition or judgment. See NRS 177.045; State v. Nelson, 118 Nev. 399, 403, 46 P.3d 1232, 1235 (2002). When a party is

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1	aggrieved by an intermediate order or judgement of the District Court, the proper interlocutory
2	remedy is a direct appeal. See id. Thus, Defendant's Motion should be denied in its entirety
3	DATED this 3rd day of May, 2022.
4	Respectfully submitted,
5	STEVEN B. WOLFSON
6	Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #001565
7	DS7 - 4-7-4 3-6 - Fb 15
8	BY /s/ Agnes M. Botelho AGNES M. BOTELHO Chief Deputy District Attorney Nevada Bar #11064
10	Nevada Bar #11064
11	CERTIFICATE OF ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION
12	I hereby certify that service of the above and foregoing was made this 3rd day of May,
13	2022, by electronic transmission to:
14	TYLER GASTON
15	Tyler.gaston@clarkcountynv.gov
16	BY /s/ E. Del Padre
17	E. DEL PADRE Secretary for the District Attorney's Office
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Electronically Filed 05/18/2022 4:54 PM CLERK OF THE COURT

1	ORDR	CLERK OF THE CO							
2	DARIN F. IMLAY, PUBLIC DEFENDE	ER .							
3	NEVADA BAR NO. 5674 SHARON G. DICKINSON, CHIEF DEP NEVADA BAR NO. 3710	PUTY PUBLIC DEFENDER							
4	PUBLIC DEFENDERS OFFICE 309 South Third Street, Suite 226								
5	309 South Third Street, Suite 226 Las Vegas, Nevada 89155 Telephone: (702) 455-4685								
6	Facsimile: (702) 455-5112 dickinsg@clarkcountynv.gov Attorneys for Defendant								
7	Attorneys for Defendant								
8	DISTRIC	T COURT							
9	CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA								
10	THE STATE OF NEVADA,								
11	Plaintiff,	CASE NO. C-16-316081-1							
12	v. }	DEPT. NO. VI							
13	KEANDRE VALENTINE,	DATE: M. 0.000							
14	Defendant,	DATE: May 3, 2022 TIME: 9:30 a.m.							
15									
16		ING AN ORDER GRANTING A NEW F DUE PROCESS, PROSECUTORIAL							
17		D THE RIGHT TO A							
18	SPEEDY APPEAL	L AND/OR TRIAL							
19	THIS MATTER having con	ne before the Court on May 3, 2022, and							
20	good cause appearing therefor,								
21	IT IS HEREBY ORDERE	ED that the Motion Seeking an Order							
22	Granting a New Trial Based on Violations	s of Due Process, Prosecutorial							
23	///								
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1	Misconduct and the Right to a Speedy Appeal and/or Trial is denied based on the							
2	reasons announced by the Court at the May 3, 2022, hearing.							
3	DATED day of May, 2022. Please refer to transcript, once one is prepared, for details of the court's ruling.							
4	Dated this 18th day of May, 2022							
5 6	DISTRICT CORT JUDGE							
7	Submitted by:							
8								
9	DARIN F. IMLAY  CLARK COUNTY PUBLIC DEF.  Jacqueline M. Glint TY PUBLIC DEF.  District Court Judge							
10								
11								
12	By /s/Tyler C. Gaston By /s/Sharon G. Dickinson TYLER C. GASTON, #13488 SHARON G. DICKINSON, #3710							
13	Deputy Public Defender Chief Deputy Public Defender							
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# CERTIFICATE OF ELECTRONIC SERVICE

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ORDER	was s	served v	ia electr	onic	e-filing 1	to th	ne C	lark Co	unty	District A	ttorney's
Office at	moti	ons <i>w</i> cla	rkcount	yda.c	om on th	nis _		_ day o	f Ma	y, 2022	

By: /s/Carrie M. Connolly

An employee of the
Clark County Public Defender's Office

Case Name: Keandre Valentine
Case No.: C-16-316081-1

Dept. No.: VI

**CSERV** 

# DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

State of Nevada CASE NO: C-16-316081-1

vs DEPT, NO. Department 6

Keandre Valentine

#### **AUTOMATED CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

This automated certificate of service was generated by the Eighth Judicial District Court. The foregoing Order was served via the court's electronic eFile system to all recipients registered for e-Service on the above entitled case as listed below:

Service Date: 5/18/2022

"Tegan Machnich, DPD" . Tegan.Machnich@clarkcountynv.gov

PDMotions . Motions@clarkcountyda.com

Howard Brooks BrooksHS@clarkcountyNV.gov

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Agnes Botelho Agnes.Botelho@clarkcountyda.com

Tyler Gaston Tyler.Gaston@clarkcountynv.gov

Jennifer Georges Jennifer.Georges@clarkcountynv.gov

Sharon Dickinson dickinsg@ClarkCountyNV.gov

Dept Law Clerk dept06lc@clarkcountycourts.us

Yvette Sison sisony@clarkcountycourts.us

Krystal Jacobs jacobskr@clarkcountycourts.us

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**Electronically Filed** 5/18/2022 4:54 PM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COUR

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DISTRICT COURT

CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

DEPT. VI

CASE NO. C-16-316081-1

KEANDRE VALENTINE,

STATE OF NEVADA,

Defendant.

Plaintiff.

BEFORE THE HONORABLE JACQUELINE M. BLUTH, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE **TUESDAY, MAY 3, 2022** 

RECORDER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS: MOTION SEEKING AN ORDER GRANTING A NEW TRIAL BASED ON VIOLATIONS OF DUE PROCESS, PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT, AND THE RIGHT TO A SPEEDY APPEAL AND/OR TRIAL

APPEARANCES:

For the State:

AGNES M. BOTELHO, ESQ. Chief Deputy District Attorney

For Defendant:

SHARON G. DICKINSON, ESQ.

Public Defenders Office

RECORDED BY: DE'AWNA TAKAS, COURT RECORDER

 [Proceedings began at 10:51 a.m.]

THE COURT: -- Keandra Valentine, C316081. Mr. Valentine is presenting, in custody. Ms. Dickinson present on his behalf. Mr. Raman present -- or no, sorry, Ms. Botelho present on behalf of the State.

All right guys so let's -- I guess, Ms. Dickinson's I'll just turn it over to you and let you start. I did have the opportunity to read the State's opposition that was filed, I can't remember if it was last night or this morning, but I know I've had the opportunity to read it so.

MS. DICKINSON: Your Honor, before I start, I'd like to make the CDs that we gave to the Court and had Ms. Botelho pick-up from the Court part of this his record. I believe that Mr. Gaston had given the Court two copies, one was for the Court, we're not sure if it had been made a court exhibit at any time so I brought two extra copies that Mr. Gaston gave me. We'd like for it to be an exhibit

THE COURT: Sure.

MR. DICKINSON: — for this motion and Ms. Botelho would still have it. If I could approach?

THE COURT: Yes. Whoever. So those will be court's exhibits 1 and 2.

MS. DICKINSON: Your Honor, if I understand Ms. Botelho's motion correctly, she's not objecting to any of the facts that I put in our motion seeking a new trial. She's objecting to procedure. She says that what we're really doing is asking this court to rule as an appellate court. And that's not what we're doing. We filed a motion seeking a new trial, which is what the Nevada Supreme Court

allowed us to do when we were remanded more than two years ago. We we're going to have an evidentiary hearing, and we still have not completed that evidentiary hearing, and even today, we do not have a date to complete it.

Mr. Valentine is sitting in custody just in limbo without a court date. So we brought this motion based on the cumulative effects of what occurred during the two period. And we're asking the Court to just give us a new trial based on violations of due process, prosecutorial misconduct, his right to a speedy appeal and right to a trial. As the Court knows depending on the Court was going to rule on the evidentiary hearing, either he was going to get a new trial or we would have to start more appellate process.

THE COURT: Right.

MS. DICKINSON: As long as we're in limbo, none of that can happen.

THE COURT: So I just wanna stop you for a second because I have a few questions.

MS. DICKINSON: Sure.

THE COURT: So, I mean, obviously I can't really control -- I recognize I can rule on things, but I can't control what happened before it got to me. I mean I think we all agree with that. But in complete candor, I do feel like it's a bit disingenuous to act like this Court has been dragging its feet, or has taken an evidentiary hearing off calendar multiple times. I went back -- my staff went back and went through, every time we have canceled something, it has actually been a status check. We have never canceled the evidentiary hearing. We have cancelled status checks to see where the parties are at and the scheduling of an evidentiary hearing. But between September of 21 and March 3<sup>rd</sup>, we stopped counting at 22 e-mails between the Court and the parties in trying to get dates that

the parties would agree on.

So that's why I'm having a little bit of a difficult time with this motion. To act like -- quite honestly I have not bent over backwards for both the defense and the State in trying to make -- sure that each of you have had the discovery, each of you had the opportunity to be prepared, and walk into this courtroom and have an evidentiary hearing, I have even allowed this hearing to go beyond the parameters that the supreme court is allowing it. And I explained to the parties that the only reason I'm doing that it is because I'm trying to save time because I can see if we -- if I don't allow it beyond the parameters it's going to go back up, it's going to get remanded for me to go beyond the parameters of the original order. And so it was really hard for me to stomach this motion acting like this Court has ever tried to not work with the parties in getting Mr. Valentine his hearing.

Now, if you wanna talk about, you know, you feel like the Discovery Commissioner drug their feet, or -- but every single time this case has been on it's only been on for resetting to the hearing and we have, again, over 22 e-mails with the parties trying to get you guys to get dates that you agree. And so it's -- that was really frustrating to read I have to be quite honest.

MS. DICKINSON: Your Honor, this motion was not meant to blame this Court. This motion was meant to outline two years of what occurred. In fact, I say from March of 2020 to March 2021 the difficulties resulted from the jury commissioner not giving us the items we needed. In fact, as the Court knows we had to file a motion to compel. So I have included that as the first problem.

The second problem did not have to do with this Court; it had to do with our case being switched around to different courts. And I know, Your Honor, doesn't have control over that, we don't have control over that, but that made a lot

of confusion occur because we went to three different courts.

THE COURT: Right.

MS. DICKINSON: The part that talks about when things were taken off calendar that was the only the part that would refer to this specific Court.

THE COURT: I just want it to be clear thought, I mean I can print out the e-mails, it's not like hey it was just taken off calendar and Mr. Valentine's just going float in abyss of nothingness. It was the parties are constantly working together trying to work out dates. And, I mean, I think we can all be quite honest, the parties do not agree on, basically, anything; right? It's pretty contentious. And so working on trying to get either discovery to one side of you or the other one of you or picking dates, it's been difficult. And that's what I'm trying to say. Is, like, I feel like, especially my JEA, I feel like she is turning her wheels like trying to get everybody to get a date.

Listen I want this hearing to go forward. I understand it is a long process. I understand why you filed the motion. I just want always the record, to be, you know, completely clear, especially on something that I think is going to be looked at with a fine toothcomb because of the process of this case, or the procedure of this case thus far. And so that's why I'm kind of being a stickler in regards the record being laid of what this department is trying to do and having a multiple day hearing.

What I -- and I'll you put anything else on the record. I would like to turn more to the discovery aspect of it and the expert. But if there is anything you'd like to say, and of course, I'll give Ms. Botelho an opportunity to respond. Is there anything else you wanted to say in regards to the timing aspect of it?

MS. DICKINSON: Your Honor with regard to the e-mails between all

the parties and the Court, I'm not aware of 21. I'm sure the Court is accurate between all the parties. I know that any time the Court ask me to e-mail, I did. And I know the same thing with Mr. Gaston, he did. And when we did not hear back, and we know the Courts busy, he e-mailed again. And so we were not getting a date. And so I filed this motion -- we filed this motion because of that. So we're not saying that the Court has delayed it for two -- this particulate Court has delayed it for two years, were concerned about that process.

THE COURT: Okay. Let me hearing from Ms. Botelho in regards to the timing part. Ms. Botelho.

MS. BOTELHO: Yes Your Honor. I know you had an opportunity to read my opposition. And it is an opposition not so much on the merits; I can respond on the merits if the Court would like; however, I just think it's improper. Even though Ms. Dickinson said this morning that she doesn't take issue with Your Honor necessarily, or your conduct, I think that's belied by the allegations in their -- actual motion, the one that was filed April 20<sup>th</sup> of 2022.

Really in my opposition I parsed out the two the main issues that they are, you know, noting as the basis for Your Honor granting or seeking an order granting a new trial. The first was in regard to the discovery violation or the discovery order. And that is a decision Your Honor made in the middle of our February 7<sup>th</sup>, 2022 evidentiary hearing wherein, number 1, you found them in violation of the DETR -- of your order from, I believe, it was a month prior or two months prior where you ordered them to turn everything over to me, drop dead deadline I believe was somewhere January 13<sup>th</sup> or shortly after the -- December 3<sup>rd</sup>, 2021 evidentiary hearing. So think it was like December 13<sup>th</sup>, 2021 the drop dead deadline. You did find them in violation, but you ruled at that time, even after

Mr. Gaston indicated that they didn't have any sort of physical evidence to give to the State concerning the DETR record, and, you know, two or three pages past the transcripts their own expert said, hey I do have these graphs, I do have, you know, these numbers, I did have something printed. You found them in violation. However, you ruled that hey — I mean how can we have an evidentiary hearing if they don't get the DETR records in? I think the — this Court recognizes, you know, that at some point we need to have this evidentiary hearing and I — you are in a sticky predicament, because while you find them in violation it needs to go forward.

And so I will agree with the Court you have been just trying to balance all of these interest with giving us an opportunity to properly cross-examine and have access to the underlying data, which is the crux of this case when we're taking about absolute disparity etcetera etcetera. And I think you made it so clear from the December 3<sup>rd</sup>, 2021 hearing to the February 7<sup>th</sup>, 2022 hearing, the transcripts are available for both of those dates.

You wanted this evidentiary hearing to go forward, sooner rather than later. I believe in the December evidentiary hearing, Your Honor indicated that it made you super nervous that we were, you know, a year almost two years in and this evidentiary hearing -- hadn't been had. I think the Court was frustrated the same way the State was with the discovery issues that arose not just in December but also in February. We have to recognize that the reason the evidentiary hearing could not be completed in February was because the Court did order them to disclose, again, the Court ordered them again, because you did that in an actual written order that they turn over the underlying data concerning Mr. Martin's testimony.

And I think the defendant's motion is inaccurate in its depiction of your order. While there was not a new list recreated, certainly there was this underlying data, or underlying data consisting of a list which included or excluded certain people, and from the 2020 list and complied and actually compiled the data which would've been the most consistent with what they believe the 2017 master list to be. That's what the State wanted. That's what the State has been asking for all this time. You recognized that, because that's how the math computation is -- you know that's the basis of all of the math and in the disparity calculation, which are at the heart of this hearing.

And so essentially though what the defense is asking you to do, you're the one who issued that discovery order, you're the one who, you know, told them that they had to disclose these items to us, in fairness in a written order and orally during the hearing. And so what they're asking you to do in this motion is grant a new trial which they just -- Ms. Dickinson just admitted can't be granted until the evidentiary hearing is to be had. I mean that's directly what the Nevada Supreme Court argued -- or remanded this case for. We have to have this evidentiary hearing. If you find some sort of, you know, violation then yes they get a new trial. If you don't, you reinstate the judgment of conviction and we move on and they can start this appellate process again.

And so they're asking you, Your Honor, basically to review your own decisions and either reconsider, or on the case of the continuances, or the fact that its lasted two years, basically to review the record and all of the actions from the, you know, the jury commissioner, from the other district courts, and reverse yourself when you granted the continuance. The very limited continuances that you have had to grant, this department, department 6, you Judge Bluth, they're

asking you to overruled, or reverse, Judge Holthus, Judge Scotti, you know, any other judge who has had this for a short period of time and has had to move it, you're — they're asking you to review you own decisions and then reverse yourself and then go against the Nevada Supreme Court's remand order and just say, you know what the heck with the evidentiary hearing that we have — worked so hard to find — to have, and let's just set if for a new trial, you know?

They even acknowledge in their own motion, Your Honor, that a lot of the continuances don't even have anything do with the State. They don't have anything do with the Courts. And if you look at a bunch of the e-mails it was rescheduled, and status checks were moved, because the defense was not available for whatever reason or whatever date. And so I mean, you're in the homicide division, you're handing — you're in trial all the time. You have these hearings. The nature of this particular hearing involves setting aside an entire day, not just for actual testimony but just for arguments. And so I too think it's disingenuous.

A lot of what was stated here, you know, all though factually correct, you know, on page 8 they say, well the continuances due to obtaining, you know, discovery from the jury commission. But yet they're asking you, you, even though all of the record even by their own motion indicates that there wasn't even any kind of bad faith conduct by anyone in trying to have this. Certainly there was not bad faith or any kind of improper conduct by the State. I'm on record objecting and asking them to -- or asking Judge Scotti, or Judge Eller at the time, for the short that she had it, that we need to have this evidentiary, you know, hearing sooner rather than later. I think when we appeared before you in December the State indicated, look we have victims, were -- if we're gonna have to try this case again

we would be prepared to do it, but we want to go forward sooner rather than later. We do have some elder victims that we would like to, you know, be able to present in the event of a new trial.

And so really if you read through, you know, this motion and I responded and opposed the way that I did, because procedurally they're in correct. You don't ask the judge who decided to grant a continuance or the judge who — ordered discovery to review your own decisions and your own orders, reverse it, and then, you know, go to this extreme remedy of granting a new trial. I mean, Ms. Dickinson should know, she's part of their appellate division and she deals with this, that this is the improper vehicle. If they have a problem with Your Honor's decisions or with the other district courts decisions that's what the appellate court is for, and that's why I objected procedurally. If I have to, you know, respond on the merits, I can certainly can do that, but you know what that would consist of, just attaching the transcripts from December 3<sup>rd</sup>, 2021 and February 7<sup>th</sup> of 2022. We were all there. We know why that had to be continued. We know what caused those issues and the frustrations from all sides really.

And so this is an improper vehicle. The very nature -- even the labels wrong. I mean, I didn't see anything which indicated, you know, any kind of prosecutorial misconduct in their pleadings so I would ask that that actually be stricken from the title of their motion because I couldn't see where it was -- where it's alleged that we violated any kind of, you know, ethical obligation or that the State acted improperly. We asked for discovery we believed was right, which we believed should have been turned over to us. And Your Honor agreed the transcript is there. The basis of Your Honor decision is plain as day on -- words on paper. And so I don't -- I don't understand where this is coming from. I don't

understand why they're coming at this in this way. And that's the basis of our opposition.

THE COURT: Ms. Dickinson.

MS. DICKINSON: Your Honor I begin by saying that there were so many inaccuracies in some of the statements that she made with regard to factual accessions that I was not able to keep up with them. If Court wants me to address that I would need a transcript and go line-by-line.

However, I want to point out a couple things. She again claims a discovery violation and that was the reason for the continuance of the hearing. That's not exactly what occurred, we ran out of time. And the court was going to continue the hearing for her cross-examination. And then she stood up and asked for additional information and we object and the Court ordered us to give it to her. So for her to come in and say there was a discovery violation that required the continuances was — is inaccurate.

With regard to all the transcripts, I think I attached all those to my motion. I think they're all part of this record. She didn't cite to any transcripts for any of these facts that she's saying in her motion. In fact, my understanding is that because she didn't this Court may go ahead and disregard her arguments.

Nevada Rules of Criminal Procedure 8 subsection 4 subsection b requires that the party file written opposition within 10 days. Well this was 11 days, it was close. But if the Court looks at *Polk vs. State*, 126 Nevada 180, *Polk* says that when the State fails to address every issue raised, and it's an important issue we raised, some important issues here, the Court may construe that as being a concession. And so I would ask the Court to consider that.

But I will go ahead and address some of her statements. She indicates

that she does not see anywhere in here where we discussed prosecutorial misconduct. We discuss it on page 5 and 6 when we talk about us having to have our expert put together two CDs for her to look at and we argued that she shouldn't have even asked for them. She had the opportunity to hire her own expert to go ahead and do whatever she wanted with the master list. She has had the master list for, I think, almost a year if not more now, and she hadn't done anything with it as of February.

With regard to her saying this is an improper vehicle, this motion. The cases she cites *State vs. Nelson* and *Sheriff Clark County vs. Hatch* have nothing to do with what she's arguing they have to do with pretrial writs of habeas. And she's arguing for the Court to rely on those today that this improper. She hasn't presented the Court with any authority to show that this is improper. So I think that argument should fail.

As I said this has been a two year process. We have done everything we could to push the process through. And I realize part of it happened before this Court was ever involved. And it's not this Courts fault that it was transferred and then ended up here.

THE COURT: Can you help me out though because I am trying to understand the -- listen I don't ever want either side to ever feel like or be told they have to give up privilege work product. That's never my goal. And I think I've in I think words for the prosecutor are quite fair in that I really have been trying my best to balance for each side in both sides coming in here and feeling like they have what they need and feeling like they're prepared. What I was trying to do with the list is I really feel like a clear record needs to made on this evidentiary hearing in regards who had which documents, what list everybody was working off

of, and when we got in to that hearing and really got in to the weeds of that list, it became apparent to me, you know, even as the judge taking copious notes on it, how difficult it was to follow each of the points that the experts was going through and that's why if he was working off a different list, or if he was able to minimize the list like he said, you know, there were certain duplicates to me that didn't seem like work product it seemed like how would the State ever be able to, you know, work on -- even understanding where he was coming from without having that list. So I would like to just hear from you on the specific point of this is why we feel like it's privileged, this is why we feel like it's work product, and they shouldn't have been entitled to it.

MS. DICKINSON: Your Honor, both sides received the same list, -- THE COURT: Right.

MS. DICKINSON: -- the master list. We hired an expert, the State didn't. Our expert went in and he went through this list, which is all electronic, and he was able to determine through the records that we were giving, and we gave the State all of the other records also, where it is likely the master list would have been at the time the summons were sent out. He didn't create a report. He didn't create a separate list. He didn't do any of that. He was just able to -- this electronic version of his -- whatever he did, determine that. He also went through and looked through duplicate names.

THE COURT: Right.

MS. DICKINSON: So the reason we ended up giving you two CDs rather than one, is based on what the Court said to him, he thought the Court would want to know what the duplicates were. So that's why we have two CDs.

So one is, basically, okay here's where I did the cut off -- I'm being

very simplest.

THE COURT: I know.

MS. DICKINSON: Here's where I did the cut up on what everybody has. Now I went through in there and I found duplicates. So he created a separate CD based on what he thought the Court wanted, 'cause the Court wanted to know well what did you end up working off of.

THE COURT: Right.

MS. DICKINSON: And duplicates would need to be removed, so that's what we ended up with. So why is it privilege? It's privilege because we're paying this expert to go ahead and give us advise and look at things and now we're telling him now you need to go back and create something so that physical thing that you're creating is giving to the prosecutor to make it easier for her, you know, for cross-examination so she could use that against you. She could've had her own expert. She chose not to. She could've asked these questions on cross-examination. We haven't gotten there yet, you know, we're still sort of in limbo.

THE COURT: Sure.

MS. DICKINSON: So our expert did the best he could thinking of what the Court wanted. So I would compare it to an expert being required to write a report that the State could then use against him when he crosses -- when he's being cross-examined. And that again is a simple way of looking at it. So he was required to create something that wasn't in existence at the time, and we did it. We fell that's privileged. She could've asked him cross-examination; he could've said here's my cutoff date. She could've went from there. We had a lot of discussion about duplicates, and that was why he did the duplicate CD thing. She could've asked about that. So we feel it's privilege. 'Cause we are trying -- 'cause

basically we feel we are trying to give them ammunition against us. So you can use it.

THE COURT: Sure. I --

MS. DICKINSON: Or against our expert.

THE COURT: Sure, yeah. Let me ask you though, and I -- on black and white this may come off as like me being -- sardonic and I'm actually asking with -- honestly, if you do think I'm wrong on this discovery issue why not do a stay or take me up on that?

MS. DICKINSON: That would be the next step.

THE COURT: Okay. All right.

MS. DICKINSON: That would be the next --

THE COURT: Yeah, I mean, --

MS. DICKINSON: I mean --

THE COURT: -- I just wanted to know. And I see your -- first you're saying, hey were going to give, the Court, we're gonna give you the opportunity to --

MS. DICKINSON: Right.

THE COURT: -- you know, rectify this.

MS. DICKINSON: Right.

THE COURT: But I'm not going to change my mind on that just because I have been clear to both sides multiple times. I, you know, did written order in regards discovery. I want everybody to be on the same field in regards to having access to this information so that we can have a full and through hearing. I recognize that you disagree with me on that, and I think that at this point and time at this juncture if you think, you know, I'm totally wrong about it I think that the

proper thing to do is to probably take up and see if I'm right or if I'm wrong on it.

In regards to procedurally moving it forward I am happy -- we can set it right now if you guys want. I think its best probably to set it on a Monday, because that way I really have been -- I came on homicide in I think late August, I have been in -- just this year alone I think I'm already in my 7<sup>th</sup> trial, and it's May. So I -- if we get it on a Monday, hopefully, I won't have a trial starting till that Tuesday and then I can give you guys that entire day. What I am going to say though is in regards to argument because it's a multiday hearing and because I have so many notes on it, I will -- I'm going to have arguments submitted in writing with a 30 page limit, excluding exhibits, only because that will make it much easier for me to digest all of the information. So I just need to know how much time we need for the rest of the hearing knowing that arguments will not be done on that day. So from -- on your behalf Ms. Dickinson what would do -- what would you gauge timewise?

MS. DICKINSON: Your Honor, I'm not doing -- I'm doing part of the hearing, but not all of it --

THE COURT: Right.

MS. DICKINSON: -- and Mr. Gaston is not here. I do believe that he would like to do some more direct examination on Mr. Martin because we have this new issue --

THE COURT: Sure,

MS. DICKINSON: -- that came up. So I think he would want to lay a record on that. I --

THE COURT: Basically I should ask, do we need a half or full day, is really --

[Colloquy between The Court and The Court Staff]

THE DEFENDANT: Excuse me, Your Honor.

THE COURT: What Mr. Valentine?

THE DEFENDANT: When I get a chance, can I say something?

THE COURT: Yeah, of course.

[Colloquy between The Court and The Court Staff]

THE COURT: Go-ahead Mr. Valentine.

THE DEFENDANT: [indiscernible] you know I've been down a very long time.

THE COURT: I know.

THE DEFENDANT: I'm trying — if it's possible that I can get like a settlement conference or something settle out on deal or something? I've been here 6 years. I'm trying to go to back to prison.

THE COURT: I know. I know. I know. To be fair I do feel like -- I'm just hoping that Mr. Valentine and -- defense has been in contact -- been in communication. Because when he -- every time he has been here, he has been quite frustrated with the process and, you know, ultimately I know that you have spoken with him but it -- and I imagine that it's his decision to settle, to -- I mean, he's frustrated with the appellate process which I understand.

MS. DICKINSON: Your Honor, my understand -- well what happened previous to coming to this Court, is when we were in Judge Holthus courtroom and she actually had us all trying to settle it, and we had meetings. He has made some offers, and they have all been rejected by the State.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. DICKINSON: So I've -- the State is well aware -- I even prepared

a plea agreement at one point, I think it was a year ago, and submitted it in trying to settle this before we even had hearings.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. DICKINSON: And it was ignored. I never got a response --

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. DICKINSON: -- except when we were in front of Judge Holthus and my understanding was we were rejected. I mean if Ms. Botelho wants to reopen the discussion we are more than happy to do that.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. DICKINSON: But we want to get the date set.

THE COURT: Agreed. So why don't we do this, June 20<sup>th</sup> is the date for the hearing at 8:30. Ms. Botelho if there is a offer, or if there is a request for a settlement conference, if you could just let defense know or you could e-mail my JEA, cc defense; however I'll leave that between the parties, of course I don't want to get involved, 'cause I don't think it's appropriate.

I understand why you're frustrated. I'm really trying to get this case moving as fast as we possibly can. That's why I'm going to set that for June 20<sup>th</sup>. In the interim maybe you guys settle it, maybe you don't. June 20<sup>th</sup> we have that hearing. Then the parties are going to submit their arguments. And then I am either ordering a new trial or I'm ordering that it's stands as is; okay?

THE DEFENDANT: I got you.

THE COURT: So I feel like there's light at the end of the tunnel.

THE DEFENDANT: Okay.

THE COURT: All right?

MS. DICKINSON: Your Honor, if I could just say one more thing? Mr.

have been many -- there are many reasons on both sides, defense has asked for continuances, State has asked for continuances, defense has objected, State has objected, we had Covid, I have been working with the parties, I've done half of the evidentiary hearing, now I'm waiting for the other -- we're going to do the other half on June 20<sup>th</sup>.

As far as the protected work product, listen, I have said over and over again to both parties! want everybody to have access to all the information that they need in order to present a full case so that the Court can have a complete understanding. I understand that the defense disagrees with me in regards to that, and like! stated I'm never offended if they think I'm wrong to take me up and then we'll get a clear ruling from the supreme court, but that will be my order.

MS. DICKINSON: Thank you.

THE COURT: All right?

[Proceedings concluded at 11:27 a.m.]

\* \* \* \* \* \*

ATTEST: I do hereby certify that I have truly and correctly transcribed the audio/video proceedings in the above-entitled case to the best of my ability.

De'Awna Takas

Court Recorder/Transcriber

12/3/2021 11:54 AM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT BREF 1 DARIN F. IMLAY, PUBLIC DEFENDER NEVADA BAR NÓ. 5674 2 TYLER C. GASTON, DEPUTY PUBLIC DEFENDER NEVADA BAR NO. 13488 3 PUBLIC DEFENDERS OFFICE 309 South Third Street, Suite 226 Las Vegas, Nevada 89155 Telephone: (702) 455-4685 Facsimile: (702) 455-5112 4 5 Attorneys for Defendant 6 DISTRICT COURT 7 **CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA** 8 THE STATE OF NEVADA, 9 CASE NO. C-16-316081-1 Plaintiff, 10 DEPT. NO. VI ٧. 11 KEANDRE VALENTINE, 12 Defendant. 13 14 BENCH BRIEF FOR EVIDENTIARY HEARING BEING HELD ON 12/03/21: 15 DOCUMENTS SHOWING THE HISTORY OF MUNGAI 16 COMES NOW, the Defendant, KEANDRE VALENTINE, by and through his 17 attorneys, TYLER C. GASTON and SHARON G. DICKINSON, Chief Deputy Public 18 Defenders, and submits this Bench Brief containing the documents and history of the fair 19 cross-section litigation in Mungai, District Court Case C30675 and Nevada Supreme 20 Court Case 75247. 21 DATED this 3rd day of December, 2020. 22 DARIN F. IMLAY CLARK COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER 23 24 By: /s/ Tyler C. Gaston TYLER C. GASTON, #13488 25 CHIEF DEPUTY PUBLIC DEFENDER 26 By: /s/ Sharon G. Dickinson 27 SHARON G. DICKINSON, #3710 CHIEF DEPUTY PUBLIC DEFENDER 28

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## **COURT EXHIBIT**

MUNGAI – DISTRICT COURT C30675; NEVADA SUPREME COURT NO. 75247

- 1. Order of limited remand from NSC to District Court on 03/06/20
- 2. Evidentiary Hearing in District Court held on 04/08/21
- 3. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law filed on 04/20/21
- 4. Nevada Supreme Court's Decision filed on 09/28/21
- 5. Remittitur issued and case closed in the Nevada Supreme Court filing on 11/04/21

### IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

JAMES ALPHAXARD MUNGAI, Appellant,

VS.

THE STATE OF NEVADA,

Respondent.

No. 75247

FILED

MAR 0 6 2020

CLERK OF SUPREME COURT
BY DEPUTY CLERK

#### ORDER OF LIMITED REMAND

This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction, pursuant to a jury verdict, of sexual assault with use of a deadly weapon and battery resulting in substantial bodily harm constituting domestic violence. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; Susan Johnson, Judge.

Appellant James Alphaxard Mungai argues the district court erred by denying his fair-cross-section challenge without conducting an evidentiary hearing. A defendant "is entitled to a venire selected from a fair cross section of the community under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution." Williams v. State, 121 Nev. 934, 939, 125 P.3d 627, 631 (2005). In Williams, this court held that a defendant may establish a "prima facie violation of the fair-cross-section requirements" by showing

(1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a distinctive group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) that this underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury-selection process.

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Id. at 940, 125 P.3d at 631 (emphasis omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Here, Mungai objected to the 65-person venire based on an alleged violation of his fair-cross-section right because African Americans were not fairly and reasonably represented. The district court, relying on its recollection of prior testimony from the jury commissioner in another case, denied Mungai's request for a new venire and his subsequent request for an evidentiary hearing based on the systematic exclusion prong. Mungai then alleged the underrepresentation was caused by systematic exclusion because the system sent out an equal number of summonses to citizens located in each postal ZIP code, when minority populations were not equally distributed among ZIP codes. The district court then stated it would consider having the jury commissioner testify anew, which never occurred.

Mungai contends this constitutes structural error that warrants the reversal of his conviction. See Buchanan v. State, 130 Nev. 829, 833, 335 P.3d 207, 210 (2014) (reversing the defendant's conviction based on the appearance of judicial bias when the trial court "predetermined the [fair-cross-section] challenge"). We disagree. While the district court stated it would consider holding an evidentiary hearing, the record lacks an express finding that one was warranted. Thus, the record does not show the same appearance of judicial bias that we disapproved of in Buchanan.

We conclude, however, that the district court abused its discretion by denying Mungai's fair-cross-section challenge without holding an evidentiary hearing. See Valentine v. State, 135 Nev., Adv. Op. 62, 454 P.3d 709 (2019). Considering the third prong of a prima facie fair-cross-section violation, the district court found that the underrepresentation was

SUPPLEME COURT OF NEWADA

not due to systematic exclusion based on prior testimony from the jury commissioner. In Valentine, we explained that a district court's reliance on outdated evidence was misplaced. Id. at 715 n.3. Here, it does not appear the prior testimony referenced by the district court addressed Mungai's specific allegation of systematic exclusion—the ZIP code argument. Also, legislative amendments regarding the juror selection process took effect before Mungai's trial, rendering the prior testimony outdated. Therefore, we remand this matter to the district court for the limited purpose of conducting an evidentiary hearing with respect to Mungai's fair-cross-section challenge.<sup>1</sup>

The district court shall have 90 days from the date of this order to conduct the evidentiary hearing and enter its written findings of fact and conclusions of law. The district court clerk shall transmit the written order to the clerk of this court within 7 days after it is entered.

It is so ORDERED.

Pickering

Gibbons

Pickerup C.J

Parraguirre

cc: Hon, Susan Johnson, District Judge Clark County Public Defender Attorney General/Carson City Clark County District Attorney Eighth District Court Clerk

<sup>1</sup>We retain jurisdiction over all other issues raised in this appeal and defer ruling on those issues pending the district court's decision on remand.

Supreme Court OF Nevada

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Steven D. Grierson **RTRAN** 1 2 3 4 **DISTRICT COURT** 5 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 6 7 THE STATE OF NEVADA. CASE NO: C-15-306725-1 8 DEPT: XXIII Plaintiff, 9 VS. 10 JAMES ALPHAXARD MUNGAL 11 Defendant. 12 13 BEFORE THE HONORABLE JASMIN LILLY-SPELLS, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 14 THURSDAY, APRIL 8, 2021 15 RECORDER'S TRANSCRIPT OF HEARING RE: **EVIDENTIARY HEARING** 16 17 18 APPEARANCES: 19 For the State: ALEXANDER G. CHEN, ESQ. Chief Deputy District Attorney 20 For the Defendant: NADIA HOJJAT, ESQ. 21 Deputy Public Defender 22 23 24 RECORDED BY: MARIA GARIBAY, COURT RECORDER 25

1

Case Number: C-15-306725-1

# **INDEX OF WITNESSES**

**PAGE** 

59

99 115

2	
3	WITNESSES:
4	
5	MARIAH WITT
6	Direct Examination by Ms. Hojjat Cross-examination by Mr. Chen
7	Redirect Examination by Ms. Hojjat Questions by the Court
8	Further Redirect Examination by Ms. Hojjat Further Recross-Examination by Mr. Chen
9	Additional Redirect Examination by Ms. Hojjat
10	
11	MARIAH WITT RECALLED
12	Additional Direct Examination by Ms. Hojjat Additional Cross-Examination by Mr. Chen
13	
14	JEFFREY MARTIN
15	Direct Examination by Ms. Hojjat Cross-examination by Mr. Chen
16	Redirect Examination by Ms. Hojjat
17	
18	
19	
20	
21	
22	
23	
24	

STATES EXHIBITS:
None

DEFENSE EXHIBITS:
A Agreement and Request for Information B 16-07 Administrative Order

**PAGE** 

**PAGE** 

## Las Vegas, Nevada; Thursday, April 8, 2021

[Proceeding commenced at 1:40 p.m.]

THE RECORDER: State of Nevada versus Mungai, James Alphaxard. Case number C306725.

MS. HOJJAT: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Nadia Hojjat, number 12401 on behalf of Mr. Mungai. He has not been transported to the courtroom; he is present via the television. This was a case where we had previously made a record about the fact that due to the adversarial nature of this proceeding, due to the fact that this is a hearing that is actually technically, I think, a trial hearing, because it was a hearing that should have happened during trial, that we do need his physical presence. And so, at this time they didn't transport him. I'm prepared, like I'm ready to go forward, but I do believe that it deprives him of his right to be present pursuant to the United States and Nevada Constitutions to not have him in the courtroom able to consult with me during his hearing.

THE COURT: Mr. Chen, any response?

MR. CHEN: I don't have a position on this, thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you.

So, I completely understand the Defense's perspective and ideally we would have him present in the courtroom with a number of situations. The timing of this motion, the remand from the Supreme Court, the deadline in which the Motion and the Order has to be done,

the number of continuances, and quite frankly, the limit upon the Court with COVID. It simply would not be possible for him to be present. The only other -- the best case scenario with the options that we have right now, would be that he was transported to Lower Level, and honestly until about 12:50, when they came to get me, we thought that we were going to Lower Level and found out that Lower Level had --

MR. CHEN: Veteran's Court.

THE COURT: --some --exactly. Veteran's Court, and so that spot was taken. Even there, he would be behind the glass, not next to you. So, what we can do is if he needs an opportunity to speak with you, I have no problem with it, you know, us taking a time out, you calling over to the jail. If you need to use a phone within the courtroom, that's completely understandable, we'll give you whatever space you need to make sure that that communication is protected, and that there are not additional listeners to that communication. And he can raise his hand or let the officers know. But that is really the only feasible option that I can have with the circumstances here. We just -- within COVID I just had my staff reach out and call and make sure we were aware of all the rules. We don't have a way for him to physically be in this same room as you outside of Lower Level and my argument would be that that's still separated, it's not next to Counsel.

MS. HOJJAT: And, Your Honor, that was our understanding of what was going to occur too. And that was what the Defense had requested previously at the last court date, was that we be in Lower Level. I know Lower Level still has the glass, but at least he would

have access to me. And frankly, I could do the hearing from behind the glass. Like, I could be next to him, communicating through that microphone.

THE COURT: They won't -- they don't allow you to go in the back in Lower Level.

MS. HOJJAT: I mean, in that case, if that's the situation in Lower Level, then our position would be that we'd need one of the courtrooms that are equipped that Defendant's can sit next to their counsel and communicate with their counsel. I mean, this -- this is truly a trial proceeding. This was a proceeding that was supposed to be held originally mid-trial. It is -- I mean, our position is this is -- this falls under the categories of cases that are covered where the Defendant needs access to his attorney throughout the proceeding, not just during breaks and things of that nature.

I understand the Court's —I understand that this case has delayed and dragged in terms of having this hearing. A lot of that was outside of the ability of anybody to control, frankly. As Your Honor said, COVID has been quite a curve ball for all of us, that we've been adjusting. And there was also some issues, not the Jury Commissioner's fault, but, issues with the master list and obtaining — figuring out whether there was a copy of the master list, things of that nature that were — that took some time and took some communications to resolve, which is what has resulted in the delay.

What I will say and what I would request at this time -- I know it's not ideal, but I would request a continuance so that we can have the

 ability to have my client present. The Nevada Supreme Court has been accommodating in terms of giving us continuances to have this hearing. They have been understanding of the fact of COVID. I think if we sent a request to them explaining to them that we were all ready to go at the hearing and the Defendant was literally not transported to the courtroom, and thus, we need more time, I anticipate that they would be understanding of that and would give us another continuance. And that is the Defense request at this point, is another continuance, because I do believe it violates my client's constitutional right to be present — to go forward with this hearing without him here.

THE COURT: Thank you, Ms. Hojjat.

Mr. Chen, do you want to be heard with regard to the request for a continuance?

MR. CHEN: We'll submit it, Judge.

THE COURT: Thank you, Your Honor.

The request is noted for the record and will stand for the record the request at this time is going to be denied. I think that within the COVID restrictions, we've been doing things where we do sentencings and a bunch of other things via video. I don't believe at this time it is in violation of the Nevada Constitution or the United States Constitution. He has the ability to hear and see counsel. And as stated previously, the Court will provide whatever accommodations are necessary so that there can be communication between counsel and the Defendant. In a situation to where there is client confidentiality and attorney-client privilege, where no one is able to hear, or listen, or see,

 and if we need to vacate the courtroom so they can even see him on video or expressions, I am more than willing to do that.

Right now, even dates available for a potential hearing would be well into summer. So, that's just not a feasible option at this time. I think that we have to kind of do the best in what we can, given the situation just as we have done since everyone first found out about COVID.

Thank you. Go ahead and call your first witness.

MR. CHEN: Nadia, do you want to put the other thing on the record as well?

MS. HOJJAT: Oh, that's right, yes.

There was one additional thing we wanted to put on the record before --

THE COURT: Yes.

MS. HOJJAT: -- we proceeded with the hearing.

The State did make an offer earlier this week. Unfortunately, due to the prison's scheduling I was not able to talk to Mr. Mungai about it until just now. I stepped outside and called him once he arrived in the holding room. I did convey that offer to him. The offer was to plead guilty to two counts of attempt sexual assault, category B felonies. Each carrying 2 to 20 years in prison. Stipulate to consecutive time on the two counts for a total aggregate sentence of 16 to 40 years in the Nevada Department of Corrections. I did --

THE COURT: So, stipulate to the max on each charge -- MS. HOJJAT: Consecutive.

THE COURT: -- consecutive.

MS. HOJJAT: That's correct. For a total aggregate of 16 to 40 years in the Nevada Department of Corrections. I did advise Mr. Mungai that he is currently serving life in prison with parole eligibility beginning after 25 years. That is his current aggregate sentence. And I did advise him of the offer that has been made in this case.

THE COURT: Mr. Mungai.

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am.

THE COURT: Did Ms. Hojjat have an opportunity to discuss this offer with you?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am.

THE COURT: And did you have any questions for her? Yes, or no?

THE DEFENDANT: No.

THE COURT: Okay. Do you feel like you had sufficient time to discuss the offer and have any questions you may have had answered?

THE DEFENDANT: Yeah, I don't want nothing to do with the offer. I'm just here for the court proceeding.

THE COURT: Okay.

Any additional record by either counsel?

MR. CHEN: No, thank you.

THE COURT: is the offer revoked at this time?

MR. CHEN: For the record, sure, it is.

THE COURT: Okay.

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MS. HOJJAT: All right.

The defense calls Mariah Witt.

THE COURT: Good afternoon, miss. Go ahead and come

up.

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**MARIAH WITT** 

[having been called as a witness and being first duly sworn testified as follows:]

THE CLERK: State and spell both your first and last name for the record.

THE WITNESS: Mariah Witt, M-A-R-I-A-H W-I-T-T

MS. HOJJAT: And, Your Honor, before I begin the questioning, I did just want to make a record.

Another defense witness, Jeffrey Martin, is present via BlueJeans. He is an expert in mathematics and statistics. My understanding is the Exclusionary Rule is typically experts are allowed to remain on the line and hear testimony, but I just wanted to bring it to everybody's attention in case anybody had any objections.

THE COURT: Mr. Chen, any objection to the expert remaining on the line?

MR. CHEN: No objection.

THE COURT: He'll be allowed to remain.

MS. HOJJAT: Thank you.

**DIRECT EXAMINATION** 

BY MS. HOJJAT:

Q	Good Afternoon, Ms. Witt.
Α	Good Afternoon.
Q	How are you today?
Α	I'm well, and you?
Q	Doing good, thank you.
	How are you employed?
Α	I'm the Jury Commissioner for the Eighth Judicial District
Court.	
Q	And how long have you held that position?
Α	Since November of 2012.
Q	November of 2012.
	And, can you explain to us your job as a Jury Commissioner?
Α	I'm responsible for ensuring there are enough jurors to serve
on jury t	rials. I also, in general, take care of juror needs. I maintain their
attendar	nce and payroll and parking needs, that type of thing.
Q	Are you also responsible for making sure summonses are
sent out	to summon jurors to come serve for jury duty?
Α	Yes.
Q	Okay. And, how do you oversee that process?
Α	Well, we have a regular process that's been in place, since I
started.	We summon jurors six weeks in advance, so based on our trial
volume	we will prepare pools for a week at a time. Or a week's period o

time, but it's six weeks in advance. And so -- it's usually on Fridays.

number of jurors that are required, and the court location. We do have

And I will go in and I will just select the designated date, enter the

multiple locations because we have Eighth Judicial, we have Grand Jury, and then now we are servicing some of the lower courts too. So, we put in the court location for location 100 and the number of jurors and the date and just hit apply and the system creates the pool.

Q Okay. Are you also technically in charge of the master list from which jury summonses are issued?

A Indirectly. I mean, we have 3.5 million records in our master list, so that is something that has to be maintained on a computerized or automated basis, so I do coordinate with our IT division. And --

Q And let me clarify that. I understand. So, you're not in charge of the technical side of things.

A Correct.

Q But you are technically the individual who is in charge of maintaining the master list? Not the IT portion of it, but the master list itself?

A From the standpoint of making the records available and summoning jurors, yes. But as far as the master list portion itself, that really -- securing that is handled by Court Administration, because there are documents that -- with the outside agencies to procure those lists. And then they are provided in a technological manner through secure file transfer protocol.

Q I see. Okay. Thank you. Now I want to kind of call your attention to conversations that we have had about the case of Mungai v State or State v. Mungai.

A Okay.

I mean, it's the various sources are merged.

And I'm sorry, merged is the word.

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Yes.

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Q	Yes.

A And there are sources. But as far as smaller groups, no, I mean, it's like the different sources are merged.

Q I should clarify. There are multiple merges that occur per year, correct?

- A Normally two --
- Q Two merges per year.
- A -- per year.
- Q Correct?
- A They're scheduled.
- Q Okay.
- A Yes.
- Q And the scheduled merges result in individuals from the source list being added from the source list to the master list, correct?
  - A Yes, from the source list. Yes.
- Q And so the idea was that we could try to recreate the October of 2017 master list by looking at the most recent merge that occurred prior to October of 2017.
- A No, it's really not possible to recreate the list at any given point and time. There were queries, and that's different. It was an aggregate count as of a certain date.
  - Q Okay.
- A But the master list itself is an ever-changing document, so there's no way to recreate the master list at a given point and time. So, I believe it was explained to you that there were several caveats that —

what you were given was the current master list as of the date that that particular run of the master list was conducted.

Q' Right.

A And some of those people's statuses could have changed since 2017.

Q Okay, that's fine.

THE COURT: Okay, a point of clarification. And so when you indicate what counsel was given, you're indicating that the master list that was turned over to counsel pursuant to this hearing?

THE WITNESS: Yes.

THE COURT: Okay, and that was as close to the last merge or prior to October 2017?

THE WITNESS: No.

THE COURT: Okay.

THE WITNESS: It was the most current master list we have available.

THE COURT: Okay.

THE WITNESS: According to Nevada Supreme Court, Rules of Retention, we maintain the master list until superseded: So, what you were provided was the current list -- the most current list as of that date.

MS. HOJJAT: Right, and I understand that. You made that very clear, that you were providing us --

THE WITNESS: Okay.

MS. HOJJAT: — with the current master list.

THE COURT: As of what date?

Okay, but there was also conversation during that phone call

Q

There was only one merge?

Q

- Q Okay. Now I want to talk --
- A No, excuse me. In 2017 there wasn't a merge.
- Q There was no merge at all in 2017?

A There was no merge in 2017. The most recent merge would have been in — when we first set up the system in 2016, in March, so that would have been a merge at that time. And then the next merge was conducted in December, but it was after this trial. So, it would have been the March merge would have been the one that applies to this case. And then in 2017 there was no merge conducted.

- Q Okay, and to be clear this case was in 2017.
- A Correct.
- Q Yes. Okay.

THE COURT: Okay, so another point of clarification. Sorry.

THE WITNESS: Wait, am I getting confused here? Hang on a second, let me see.

THE COURT: Two mergers in 2016 --

THE WITNESS: Yeah, that's right.

THE COURT: One when it was set up in March and then you indicated there was another merger in December. But you said after this trial, but this trial would have been in 2017. So, is the second merger in December 2016 and then no mergers in 2017?

THE WITNESS: I'm sorry, yes. I'm sorry.

THE COURT: Okay.

THE WITNESS: So yes. There was the initial merge, March

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of 2016 when we transitioned to the new system. And then there was a merge in December 2016. And then the next merge was not conducted until March of 2018.

MS. HOJJAT: Okay.

THE WITNESS: So, there was no merge --

MS. HOJJAT: So, there was no merges in 2017?

THE WITNESS: Correct.

MS. HOJJAT: Okay.

THE WITNESS: So, the March 2016 - I mean, sorry,

December of 2016 merge would have been the most recent one prior to this case, sorry.

BY MS. HOJJAT.

- Q Okay. And then I want to talk to you about what occurred end of 2016.
  - A Okay.
- Q Well, let's back up. In 2016 you were using two sources for the master list?
- A Correct.
  - Q The two sources were NV Energy?
  - A Correct.
  - Q And the Nevada DMV?
- A Yes.
- Q Okay. And then in November of 2016, there was an
- Administrative Order issued in regards to the master list?

1	Α	Correct.
2	Q	Okay. And that was issued by then, Chief Judge Barker?
3	Α	Correct.
4	Q	And it was Administrative Order 16-07?
5	Α	If you say so, I don't remember the exact number.
6	Q	Okay.
7	Α	Yeah.
8	Q	But you do know which Administrative Order I'm talking
9	about?	
10	Α	I'm aware of the Order, yes.
11	Q	And the Administrative Order required that in addition to the
12	DMV and	d NV Energy that the master list also have as a source the Voter
13	Rolls, co	rrect?
14	Α	Correct.
15	Q	So registered voters in Clark County were to also be added to
16	the mast	er list?
17	Α	Correct.
18	Q	Okay. And this was November of 2016,
19	Α	If you say so. I don't remember the date of the Order.
20	Q	Would it refresh your recollection to see the copy of the
21	Order?	
22	Α	No, I'm sure what you're saying is correct.
23	Q	So you have no reason to dispute that it was November of
24	2016?	
25	Α	No. No.

Q	Okay.	So, November of '16 the Order was that Voter Roll
were to	oe adde	d to the master list?

- Correct.
- Now I want to move forward, -- well the purpose of this -backing up. The purpose of this Order was to ensure that a fair cross section of the community was being captured in our master list?
  - Correct.
- Right? And in fact, the Order specifically says that. That the purpose of this Order and the purpose of adding a source is to ensure that a fair cross section of our community was being captured in our
  - Correct.
  - Okay. Now I want to move forward to November of 2017.
  - Yes.
- That would be a full year after the Administrative Order was
  - Yes.
- In November of 2017, there was still only two sources being used for the master list?
  - Correct. Because the merge had not been conducted yet.
  - Okay. So, it was still just NV Energy?
  - Uh-huh.
  - And the DMV.
  - Α Yes.

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The Voter Rolls had not been added. Q

generally — you do not make it a practice to know the demographics of our county.

A I review them periodically, but as just a general point of reference, yes.

Q Okay. And as the Clark County Jury Commissioner, do you routinely — well you don't routinely look at the master list to make sure the master list is reflective of the demographics of the Clark County community?

A Well, I — we run a number of reports on a regular basis that give us those numbers as were going and they are available for selection and the information is retained within the system. So that information is available for —

Q Okay, but the system is doing that you said. The computer.

A Correct. I mean, there are 3.5 million names, I can't do that myself manually.

Q Sure, but you are not sitting down on a monthly basis saying what is the demographics of Clark County versus what are the demographics of my master list, do these demographics match up?

A No. I don't do that.

Q Okay.

MS. HOJJAT: I pass the witness, Your Honor

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. CHEN: Thank you, Your Honor.

**CROSS-EXAMINATION** 

BY MR. CHEN:

Q Jury Commissioner, when you just heard about, for instance, the Administrative Order that was signed by Judge Barker at the time, in 2016, you mentioned that by this trial in December of 2017 it still hadn't – his Order hadn't been incorporated yet?

- A Correct.
- Q Was there a reason that it hadn't been incorporated?
- A Yes. We had not done a merge yet. The we had just transitioned to a new jury management system in 2016. It was the first time we were doing a merge. And also, to add the additional sources, it's not just a simple process like flipping a switch. You can't just dump the names into the master list. It's a very complicated technological process that our vendor goes through to merge the sources.

And we also had to obtain those sources from those agencies which are outside the privy of the Court. They're not the actual Court themselves. So, I do know in specific the Department of Employment Training and Rehabilitation in particular was -- has intent to provide the list for reasons of confidentiality. And so that's the reason for the delay was we had to get those lists from the outside sources.

And then not only that, the new law mandated specific reporting requirements, which basically required our system to be reprogrammed with new categories. Up to that point, ethnicity had not been divided out, so that had to be added. So, it was a much more complex process where you couldn't just flip a switch and have it done, so it took some time.

Q And you actually mentioned that one of the agencies was

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cross and he'd have to direct because the witness is adverse to

THE COURT: All right, hold on. NRS 50 --

MS. HOJJAT: 50.115. I can approach with a copy.

THE COURT: That's okay. Give me one moment.

Mr. Chen, do you need a copy of it?

MR. CHEN: No, I can pull it up if needed, Your Honor

MS. HOJJAT: It's subsection 4(b).

THE COURT: Thank you.

So, my understanding of this statute specifically, is that the State would be allowed to do leading on cross -examination, but it does not prevent you from doing leading on direct examination as well, because this is an adverse witness. And it's speaking -- (4)(b) is speaking specifically with regard to the prosecution's ability, so I would permit you to do leading, but I don't think that that negates Mr. Chen's ability to lead.

MS. HOJJAT: So, if I may, Your Honor. Subsection (4) says, except that the prosecution may call the accused, a party -- so it talks to any party -- is entitled to call a witness identified with an adverse party and interrogate by leading questions. It then goes on to say, the attorney for the adverse party may employ leading questions in cross-examination the witness only to the extent permissible if the attorney had called that person on direct examination.

So, essentially the idea is that the prosecution can't fail to call a witness, force the Defense to call the witness and then obtain the ability to lead while we are stuck asking non-leading questions. The -- if it's an adverse witness to the defense and a friendly witness to the

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prosecution, the prosecution is still limited to leading questions only the extent permissible if they had called her on direct examination, and we are allowed to lead.

MR. CHEN: Your Honor, I do object to the classification that this is an adverse witness. She is the Jury Commissioner. There's been nothing set forth to indicate that she's anything but -- she's been anything but trying to answer the questions that are asked from either party. But certainly, she doesn't work for my office. She works as an independent person to bring in our juries. If there's an issue with that, certainly Miss Hojjat would point out that there's a problem with the process, but this witness doesn't and hasn't said anything to me, that's inherently adversarial.

MS. HOJJAT: And to be clear the witness doesn't have to be hostile, it's just the idea that this is a — this entire point of this hearing is that we are taking the position that the Jury Commissioner's Office was not doing what they were supposed to do. That is the entire purpose of this hearing. So, this is a witness that is adverse to us, and is friendly to the prosecution by definition.

THE COURT: Can you approach with your copy?

MS. HOJJAT: Yes, Your Honor.

It's the very last line on the bottom of the first page.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Okay, the Court does find that based upon the purpose of this hearing, it's arguable that Miss Witt is an adverse witness to the defense, so, based upon NRS 50.115(4) subsection (b), the State would

 Q Now, on these computer programs there -- are those the ones that keep the databases for you?

A Yes.

Q Is it easy to -- are there difficulties when an Administrative

Order, for instance, comes out and you need to add information to those databases?

A It's technologically complex, yes.

Q Can you describe some of those challenges to the Court, please?

A I couldn't give you all of the specific details, because it is — I just know that it's a random system and it's — there's an algorithm built within it. And then I think I mentioned when we — the reporting was changed, so the race categories and ethnicity had to be separated out. So, you can't — you've got previous records that were under the old categories and new records that would be under the new and trying to merge and get all of that together. I mean, there are just a lot of complexities involved. They have to deal with the duplication of names and then there are various sources that we're utilizing, so we have to make sure that there's no duplication. It's a very complex process that's way over my head.

Q Okay. One of the things that was mentioned on direct examination was that NV Energy records were part of the jury master list, is that correct?

A Yes.

Q Do you know if race is indicated on NV Energy's list that they

provide to you?

A My understanding, because I haven't visually seen it, because there's so much --

MS. HOJJAT: Objection, speculation.

THE COURT: Lay additional foundation, Mr. Chen.

Sustained.

BY MR. CHEN:

Q You are the one who was -- all right. Okay, so I asked you if you are aware if race is included. Do you know the answer to whether or not NV Energy provides the Jury Services with the race of their clientele?

- A My understanding, based on --
- Q I was going to ask what is your understanding based upon?

A Based on the -- there's like a renewal packet that we are sent from the outside entities that renews our use of that master list, and I believe the only thing that is provided is the names and addresses.

MS. HOJJAT: I'm going to object to speculation again. I'm just not sure that the witness has established that she knows or what her source of information is.

MR. CHEN: She has --

THE COURT: Do you want to ask any follow up? I mean, she has stated that this is information that she received in working with these partners about their databases. So, obviously she — I think she can rely upon the information received from the company in establishing her answer. Anything —

MS. HOJJAT: I think she can rely on if she's received the information, I'm just not sure that she actually — can I just ask like two follow up questions?

MR. CHEN: I thought she said that she's received it, but.

THE COURT: Ms. Witt, did you receive information from these partners?

THE WITNESS: Not from the partners. These were -- Court Administration executes those documents with the outside entities. I have seen copies of the renewal packets, which details -- and I don't remember the exact language -- requesting names and addresses. I didn't see any reference to race or anything of that nature on that particular document. So, to my knowledge and based on my conversations with IT and other court staff -- Court Administration, it is my understanding that it's only the names and addresses. We don't secure the race information from them, it's just names and addresses.

THE COURT: Okay, thank you.

Objection is overruled, but counsel you can follow up on cross examination.

MS. HOJJAT: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Or Renewed Direct, whatever we're calling it now.

MS. HOJJAT: Thank you, Your Honor.

## BY MR CHEN:

Q All right. So, is the same to your understanding, true, of other lists that are provided to your office?

A To the best of my knowledge, yes.

Q To the best of your knowledge, is that literally any list that's provided to you for potential jurors?

A Yes.

Q Okay. So, when sometimes we're in trial and when we receive a list, occasionally it will — when we're preparing for trial and we find out who's going to be in our courtroom as a potential juror, sometimes there are races listed on there. Where do those — where does that information come from?

A It's self-reported. So, it isn't until the jurors respond to the summons and respond to the questions that we know what their race is. Unless they have served before and it's in the record from the last time they served.

Q Okay. One of the issues in this particular case has to do with zip codes where summonses were sent. As the Jury Commissioner, do you know if -- do you know how it is that Summonses are issued to the individuals who may serve on a jury?

A I'm not sure I understand what you mean.

Q Sorry. Let me start over. This direct examination is throwing me off a little bit on this. So, are summons issued to potential jurors?

A Yes.

Q All right. Is that list randomly created?

A Yes.

Q How is it that those summons are sent? Like, if someone receives a summons in the mail, how is it that they received a

# summons?

A When I create the pool within the system the jury management system randomly selects them from the master list from all available records.

- Q Is this a computer program that does this?
- A It is.
- Q Does this computer program account for the race of any individual who's going to receive a summons?
  - A No.
- Q So -- in addition to the fact that it's random, is there any type thing on the program that would show that or that would indicate a certain number of summonses to particular zip codes?
  - A No.
- Q So, of all the people in Clark County that have entered your database because they qualify under either statute or Administrative Order, all the people who arrive are random, is that correct?
  - A Yes.
- Q Without paying attention to either where they live within Clark County or their race, is that a fair statement?
  - A Yes.
- Q Additionally, at any time, do you as the Jury Commissioner, try to prevent anyone who qualifies on the master list from serving on the jury?
  - MS. HOJJAT: Objection, relevance.
  - MR. CHEN: Your Honor, we're talking about a systemic

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 exclusion here, so if the Jury Commissioner isn't trying to systemically exclude anyone then I think that's relevant for the purposes of our hearing.

THE COURT: Overruled.

BY MR. CHEN:

Q Jury Commissioner, do you ever try to exclude particular groups that are qualifying in the master list?

THE COURT: But I will -- one moment, I will say this. It does need to be -- the question needs to be tailored to the time in which we are speaking, so --

MR. CHEN: Okay.

THE COURT: it is too broad, if we're speaking of in 2017, but not just ever as long as she's been a Jury Commissioner.

BY MR. CHEN:

- Q Okay. Well then, you've served since when as the Jury Commissioner?
  - A November 2012.
- Q Okay. So, I think it would be safe for you to speak at least in terms of the time that you've been Jury Commissioner from 2012 until this trial in 2017. Have you as Jury Commissioner ever try to preclude or systemically exclude people who are on that master list?
  - A No.
- Q Has it been the practice of your office to use the computer system that randomly selects individuals that qualify?

Α	Yes

Q Now, I want to go back to July of 2017 as well. That's the time that Ms. Hojjat mentioned NRS 6.045 changed and went into effect. Did those changes in the NRS did they automatically change your list on July 1, 2017 of potential jurors?

- A No.
- Q Can you explain to us why that is?

A Because it's not something that you can just dump additional sources into the master list. It's a technological process where those sources have to be merged into one master list.

Q For instance, with the unemployment list that was now part of NRS, did you reach out to that agency to inquire about obtaining their information?

- A I didn't. It was done through Court Administration.
- Q Okay. Do you oversee Court Administration?
- A No.
- Q Okay. Does Court Administration work with you in developing these lists?
  - A Yes, I serve at the direction of Court Administration.
- Q Okay. So, safe to say that in the course of your work as the Jury Commissioner, you communicate with Court Services?
  - A Yes.
- Q In the course of your communication with Court Services, were you able to get a list of the unemployment individuals in July of 2017?

A Well, our IT division eventually got it,
--

- Q Do you know when it is that that information was finally provided?
- A I'd looked at it earlier today, but I honestly don't remember because I know it wasn't on the next merge, it was on the subsequent one, so I don't think it was -- yeah, I don't remember the exact date.
- Q Based upon what you're saying though, is it safe to say that in July 2017 when this trial happened that you did not have that list?

MS. HOJJAT: Objection, leading.

MR. CHEN: I can rephrase, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Go ahead.

# BY MR. CHEN:

- Q In December 2017, did you have a list from the Unemployment Office?
  - A No.
- Q Is it safe to say -- well, if you did not have that list could you incorporate that into the master list of potential jurors?
  - A No.
- Q I'll ask the same question that I had earlier of you, with regards to NV Energy records. With regards to records from the Unemployment Division, do you know if they provide you with the race of the individuals to which -- that are going to be entered into your master list?
- A No. It's my understanding that all race and ethnicity information is self-reported by the jurors.

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Q	And then even - today for instance, if we were to have a Jury
Trial, wo	ould those names from that division be included in your master
list?	
Α	I'm sorry?

- If we had a Jury Trial today in 2021 --
- Would the information that's provided -- that was provided by the Unemployment Office, would that be in a master list for 2021?
  - If I created -- yes, it included at this time.
- At this time are the Summonses still randomly sent out to

MR. CHEN: Court's brief indulgence.

- Just because we have you here today, Jury Commissioner, in today's date if Summonses are issued for a Jury Trial, would you pay attention or would you make sure that every zip code is getting an equal
- So, again, based upon the population of potential jurors, are those randomly chosen by the computer system?

MR. CHEN: I will pass the witness, thank you.

1		REDIRECT EXAMINATION	
2	BY MS.	HOJJAT:	
3	Q	Hello again.	
4	Α	Hi.	
5	Q	So, you did not personally request the let's back up. The	
6	Departm	Department of Unemployment Training and Rehabilitation is colloquially	
7	referred to as DETR?		
8	Α	Yes.	
9	Q	Is that correct?	
10	Α	Yes.	
11	Q	Okay. So, when we talk about DETR that's what we're talking	
12	about?		
13	Α	Yes.	
14	Q	Okay You did not personally request the information from	
15	DETR?		
16	Α	No.	
17	Q	It's your understanding that the information was requested	
18	from DETR?		
19	Α	Yes, I've been told that it was requested, yes.	
20	Q	What date?	
21		MR. CHEN: Objection, hearsay.	
22		THE WITNESS: I don't know the exact date that it was	
23	requeste	ed.	
24		THE COURT: Sustained as to hearsay.	

BY MS. HOJJAT:

Q

	Q	The information well, have you received information about
	the requ	est in the course of your duties, as the Jury Commissioner?
	Α	Yes.
	Q	And it's your job to be reviewing these records, making sure
	the reco	rds are up to date as the Jury Commissioner, correct?
	Α	Yes. I mean, I again, I receive my direction from Court
	Administ	tration. So, it's really it's not me
	Q	Right.
	Α	going up the chain of command telling them. It's them
	telling m	e, this is what we're doing. We're getting the list, we're doing
	you knov	w, it comes down to me, not goes up.
l	Q	And I guess when you say Court Administration, who are you
	talking a	bout?
	Α	am talking about the Chief Judge, the Court Executive
	Officer, r	my immediate supervisor, the Assistant Court Administrator, and
	the Judg	es on the Executive Committee and whoever makes the
	decision	s about the operations of the Court.
	Q	Okay, so when you're receiving this information, you're
	receiving	this information from people like the Chief Judge?
	Α	Correct.
	Q	Okay. And you're receiving this information in the course of
	your dut	ies as the Jury Commissioner?
١	Α	Yes.

course of your duties as a Jury Commissioner?

And you're communicating with these individuals in your

responding to this request?

1	Α	Yes.	
2	Q	To ensure that your master list is containing information it's	
3	supposed to contain?		
4	Α	Yes.	
5	Q	Okay. So, when we're talking about you being told that the	
6	information was requested, who specifically told you the information was		
7	requeste	ed?	
8	Α	My immediate supervisor.	
9	Q	Okay, so not one of the Judges?	
10	Α	No, it was not a Judge.	
11	Q	Okay, and who was the one who made the request for the	
12	information from DETR?		
13	Α	I couldn't tell you specifically who in Court Administration	
14	made the request. I don't know. They work together as a team. So, it		
15	may have been my in the past I do know it was my the Assistant		
16	Court Administrator that I reported to at that time, Tim Andrews. And I		
17	can't I think he was still my supervisor in 2017. So, he would have		
18	requested it and coordinated it at that time. It would		
19	Q	I'm sorry, so let's talk about 2017 specifically. In 2017	
20	specifica	ally, it would have been the Assistant Court Administrator	
21	Α	Yes.	
22	Q	who would have requested the information?	
23	Α	Yes.	
24	Q	Okay. And then your position is that DETR was not	

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A res. that's my understandin	Α	Yes.	that's	my understanding
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- Q Okay. Are you aware that's because NRS 612.265 expressly says that only you or the Chief Judge can request the information, that they would not respond to the Assistant Court Administrator?
- A Well then, I would imagine that they would go through the Chief Judge, but I can't
  - Q Okay.
  - A say that.
- Q So, but it's your testimony today that it was the Assistant Court Administrator who submitted the request?
- A That executes the documents I think at the direction of the Chief Judge.
  - Q Okay.
  - A That's my understanding.
  - Q But you are the Jury Commissioner, right?
  - A Yes.
  - Q And you did not execute the request?
  - A I did not execute the request.
- Q Despite the fact that the statute actually provides you as one of only two individuals who could execute the request?
  - A Yes. I did not make the request.
- Q Okay. And then, I want to go back to—you said you have a general idea of when the request was executed. You don't know specifically, but generally when was the request executed?
  - A I have an idea of when it was included in the merge. The

actual date as to when they requested the list, I couldn't tell you. I don't know

- Q Okay. So, you can't sit here and tell us the law into effect July of 2017, August of 2017 this request was made?
  - A Right. I don't know the exact date.
- Q Okay. You can't sit here and tell us the law went into effect July of 2017, September of 2017 the request was made?
  - A No, I can't tell you that.
  - Q You can't tell us it was made in October of 2017?
  - A No.
- Q In fact, you can't provide us any assurance that a request was even made to DETR for these documents from them by the time the summonses were going out for Mr. Mungai's trial?
- A I can tell you that I asked about it, immediately, when the law was passed. I inquired up the chain of command and was told that it was in progress.
- Q I understand. But you cannot tell the Court today that by the time the summonses went out for Mr. Mungai's trial, any official who is actually authorized to make the request had specifically made the request of DETR for that information. Correct?
  - A I can't tell you. I have no reason to not believe them.
- Q Okay. But, you can't tell us this isn't a situation where you were specifically told the request was made prior to that date. You genuinely don't know when the request was made, right?
  - A Yes, I don't know.

Q

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Okay.

not that was provided historically or whether it was provided

- Q Right.
- A -- during this particular merge, but it's my understanding
- Q So let me ask --
- A -- it's all self-reported.
- Q Okay. But so, the answer is, you don't actually know who's providing race and who's not. You have things that you believe based on some stuff that you've seen, but you have not actually physically looked at it and seen who is providing race information and who is not providing race information.
  - A I've not seen the breakdown of the different sources, no.
  - Q Okay. Thank you.

And then, just to go back to the Administrative Order, that was from November of 2016, so that was a full eleven months before the -- or the summonses were sent out for Mr. Mungai's trial, correct?

- A Yes.
- Q Okay. And is it your testimony that the Voter Rolls were refusing to turn over information?
  - A I'm sorry?
- Q Is it your testimony that the Nevada Voter Rolls were refusing to turn over that information?
- A No, they just hadn't been included yet because we had not done a merge yet.
  - Q Okay, so you did have that information?
  - A I don't know at what point they obtained that information.

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THE WITNESS: I was probably referring to the race reports,

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but yes.

THE COURT: You did say that, on Direct / Defense first

Cross, there were some questions I believe about the master list and
you indicated that there were some reports that were generated that you
could review with regard to race, but you didn't -- there wasn't a specific
name for the report, so I don't know.

THE WITNESS: Oh, okay.

THE COURT: But you do believe you were generating reports back in 2017?

THE WITNESS: We've generated reports all along as much

THE COURT: Okay.

THE WITNESS: -- as we'd had the capability, yes.

THE COURT: Okay.

Ms. Hojjat, do you have any follow up questions based on the questions I asked?

MS. HOJJAT: Just a couple, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay.

# **FURTHER REDIRECT EXAMINATION**

BY MS. HOJJAT:

Q I want to clarify, are you generating reports based on the master list, or reports based on the jury panels that are being put together?

- A I am generating reports based on the pool --
- Q Okay.
- A -- which is somebody summoned for a day.

Q	Okay

A I am generating reports on people in attendance on a given day. And I am generating reports based on an actual case. And then the daily attendance reports are combined into a monthly and then the monthly are combined into an annual. So, they are numbers that we maintain on a regular basis.

Q I see. So, just to clarify, the reports all seem to be directed at individuals who are actually showing up, is that correct?

A Correct.

Q The reports are not categorizing how many summonses are being sent out to individuals or how many individuals are on the master list. They're all focused once individuals arrive at the courthouse?

A They're based on who was summoned, yes.

Q Okay.

A Yes.

Q Okay, but based on actual response to summonses —

A Yes --

Q -- not just --

A — because that's where we get the race information.

Q Okay. So, the reports are not based on Summonses sent.

A I'm sorry?

Q The reports are not based upon summonses sent, they're based on responses to summonses, correct?

A Yes.

Q Thank you.

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THE COURT: Mr. Chen.

# **FURTHER RECROSS EXAMINATION**

BY MR. CHEN:

Q So, Jury Commissioner, let me ask you this then. When in the process of sending Summonses, if I were to tell you that census says that the Asian population is roughly 9% in Clark County, would you be able to go into the potential list and find 9% of Asians, send summons to make sure that those people are going to be as part of the jury pool in any given trial?

A No.

Q All right. Are you able to do that for any potential ethnic or racial group within Clark County?

A No.

Q And so, as you mentioned a minute ago, the only way that you're capable of knowing even the race when you report the reports that are generated, it's because of self-reporting.

A Yes.

Q All right, thank you.

# ADDITIONAL REDIRECT EXAMINATION

BY MS. HOJJAT:

mind.

MS. HOJJAT: But again, so we're clear -- actually, never

THE COURT: Okay.

Ms. Witt, thank you for your time and your testimony today

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here as the witness in case she needed to be recalled after said

consultation.

MS. HOJJAT: Thank you, Your Honor. Yes, and there were two matters — well, yes, two matters that I wanted to bring up. One of them in relation to the consultation with Mr. Mungai. I realize that I didn't previously make this record and I just wanted to have it clear, because I know things are so different across courts right now. I wanted it to be clear that, for the record, that if Mr. Mungai were out of custody, that he would in fact be allowed to be present in the courtroom and sitting right next to me at counsel table, that we are having hearings for out of custody defendants where they are allowed in the courtroom. It is only in custody defendants that are being kept out of the courtroom and not being allowed to sit next to their counsel during these hearings. And that just goes to my earlier objection to his inability to be present. There is a difference right now in how out of custody defendants and in custody defendants are being allowed into the courtroom.

In addition to that, we do need to recall Ms. Witt.

THE COURT: Okav.

Ms. Witt, please go ahead and come back up. Thank you for your patience. You are still under the same oath --

MS. WITT: Okay.

THE COURT: --that you took and duty that you took.

#### MARIAH WITT

[Resumed the stand and testified further as follows:]

Go ahead, Ms. Hojjat.

MS. HOJJAT: Thank you, Your Honor

Yes.

# BY MS. HOJJAT:

And so, we're clear, in searching for any requests that were made to DETR pursuant to NRS 612.265, this was the only document that your attorney was able to find that you guys are aware of that is a written request to DETR from you, correct?

A Yes.

Q Thank you.

MS. HOJJAT: I will pass the witness.

THE COURT: Are you moving for admission of the stipulated documents?

MS. HOJJAT: I am so sorry, Your Honor, yes. The State has stipulated to both documents, move to admit both exhibits.

MR. CHEN: No objection to this. We just stipulate to admission of A and B.

THE COURT: Defense A and Defense B will be so admitted.

# [DEFENSE EXHIBITS A and B - ADMITTED] ADDITIONAL CROSS-EXAMINATION

# BY MR. CHEN:

Q Ms. Witt, this exhibit, Defendant Exhibit A, which is the agreement in request for information - it's titled as. Did you -- was there -- do you remember a history to the up of this document?

A I do now. It had completely skipped my mind because it had been a discussion back and forth. So, when the law was passed requiring the DETR list to be added, there was a statewide effort,

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actually, through the Administrative Office of the Courts to secure the list from DETR. And so, we were receiving emails and communications from the Administrative Office of the Courts that they were pounding out the details to try to reach some sort of an agreement so we could get the list. And then at the point that those issues had been resolved that's when I signed this document.

Q Okay. So, would I be correct in stating that this 2019 – it's signed March 8<sup>th</sup> 2019, this was not --

MS. HOJJAT: Objection, leading.

BY MR. CHEN:

Q Was this the beginning of the process of trying to get the information?

A No.

MR. CHEN: No further questions, thank you.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Anything further?

MS. HOJJAT: That's it, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay.

You are free to go, this time for real.

THE WITNESS: Okay. Thank you.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Defense, call your next witness, please.

MS. HOJJAT: Thank you, Your Honor.

The defense calls Jeffrey Martin, who is present via BlueJeans.

Α	Looked at jury lists since 1997	. I've looked at local lists, a
tate	Court type lists and jury lists from t	he Federal Courts.

- Q Okay. And when you're looking at these jury lists are you doing statistical analyses on these lists?
  - A Yes.
- Q Are you doing statistical analyses specific -- specifically with regards to demographic racial makeup of jury lists?
  - A Yes.
- Q And approximately how many jury lists would you estimate that you have analyzed in your career?
- A I don't know how many. I'm currently working on about 20 cases. I've looked at thousands of jury lists across the country.
- Q Okay. So, when you say you don't know how many, it's because it's such a high quantity?
  - A That's correct.
- Q Okay. And have you previously testified in regards to the analyses that you have done on jury lists?
  - A Yes.
- Q Approximately how many times would you estimate that you have testified regarding analyses of jury lists in your career?
- A Since 1997 I've testified hundreds of times. I couldn't give you a precise number, but hundreds of times.
- Q Okay. And these analyses and this testimony all relates back to your work as a Mathematician and Statistician and your analysis of jury lists in regards to that.

A That's correct. I've testified on other issues too, but hundreds of times in dealing with jury lists and jury composition issues.

MS. HOJJAT: At this time, I would ask the Court to qualify Mr. Martin as a expert Statistician and expert in data analysis as it relates to jury lists and jury composition issues.

THE COURT: State, do you wish to be heard on the issue?

MR. CHEN: I would stipulate that he's an expert in statistics.

I don't know specifically what questions Ms. Hojjat's going to get from him or answers she's going to get from him, but I do think he's qualified to testify about mathematics.

THE COURT: He will be so deemed to be an expert in those regards.

MS. HOJJAT: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: His testimony will be accepted.

MS. HOJJAT: Thank you, Your Honor.

## BY MS. HOJJAT:

- Q Mr. Martin, have you had the chance to review data that was provided to you prior to your testimony here today?
  - A Yes, I have.
  - Q Okay. So, what have you looked at?
- A I've looked at the current jury list that Ms. Witt was talking about. I've looked at other lists that are people summoned from that list. I've looked at census materials as it relates to Clark County, and I've looked at other documents that were provided to me, affidavits and notices and that type of thing.

- Q So, fair to say that everything the Jury Commissioner provided in response to the subpoenas that were sent to her, you've taken a look at?
  - A That's correct.
- Q Okay. Now, you mentioned looking at Census numbers. What census numbers did you look at?
- A So, I looked at -- since we're dealing with particularly the date October 2017 or November -- you know, late in the year 2017-- I looked at the benchmark census numbers that are released every year from the United States Bureau of Census about Clark County and about persons who are age 18 and above and our citizens of the United States. Specifically, those that are called the American Community Survey.

They are provided every year for every county in -- they're the benchmark for this type of analysis.

- Q Okay. So, you looked at the American Community Survey for which year specifically?
  - A 2017.
- Q Okay. And is that because that was the year that this trial occurred?
  - A That's correct.
- Q And when you're talking about looking at the eligible population of people over 18 who are citizens, are those the numbers that are used for this analysis in other State Courts and in Federal Court?
  - A Those are the benchmark numbers that are used, particularly

by the Federal Courts and then used in State Courts as well, depending on their particular circumstances, I guess.

Q Okay. So, according to those census numbers, what were the demographics of Clark County, with respect to individuals who identified as Black or African American in 2017?

A Okay. So, persons who identified as Black or African

American in 2017 in Clark County that was -- there are 12.60% of the population.

- Q 12.60%, correct?
- A That is correct.
- Q Okay. Now, when you were looking at these numbers and doing the statistical analysis of jury lists, which -- what list would you ideally be using when you're doing your statistical analysis?

A Usually the best list to look at is the list that is used to summon the jurors. And you know, I describe it as the big list or sometimes, as you're using, the determine the master list. So, it's the list that the computer randomly goes to and selects how many summons that the Jury Commissioner or Jury Clerk wants to send out.

- Q In this case did that list exist from October of 2017?
- A No, it was -- no.
- Q Okay. Did you make efforts to obtain that list?

A Yes. Of course. You know I asked you to request it. But we also were involved in phone call like Ms. Witt was talking about, with Ms. Witt and the folks at Avenue, who are the computer IT folks.

Q Okay. And what information was given to you during that

 A We went through a number of options to see how we could get the jury list or something close to it. And a couple of things were suggested, like Ms. Witt said; you know, backups and other backups both either at Avenue or within the Jury Commissioner's Office that, you know, would have been about that time. Those weren't found, so I've worked, you know, like I've said, for a certain period of time in this type of area. I'm familiar with a lot of these jury systems. And I was familiar with the folks at Avenue. And we could talk and discuss, you know, another way to recreate the list, which I've done in, you know, other places as well—

- Q Okay.
- A -- besides Clark County.
- Q And did Avenue discuss with you a possible way of recreating that list using the dates from previous merges?
- A Yeah, not using the dates from previous merges, but using particularly the participant number that's in the current jury file -- jury list.
- Q I see. Okay. So, was something eventually supplied to you based on the conversation with Avenue?
- A Right. So, I was supplied the current jury list and we talked about how to take that list and to pull out what would have been the 2017 recreation of the 2017 list.
- Q And what methodology was that, that was discussed and that you ultimately used?
  - A There's a certain amount of details here, but in general the

way the Avenue system works is very common. People are given a sequential participant number and when the jury list is updated and more people are added, the participant numbers start at where the last ones ended off and are added on. So, if you look at those participant numbers, you get a range at when groups of people are added to the jury list. And you see very specific breaks where — based on the people being summoned, you can see where new people are getting summoned.

Those breaks mirror what Ms. Witt was talking about. The first group -- if you want me to go there. The first group in 2017 started showing up in the January 2017 summons. So, they were put in before then, but they were getting summoned in January 2017. The next time that a big group gets added, or a group gets added, is in the summons that show up in May of 2018. So, those are consistent with what Ms. Witt was talking about, about when the jury list gets -- more people get added to the jury list.

- Q I see. So, based upon your viewing of the list and your analysis, it looked like no names were added to that list in 2017 at all?
  - A That's correct.
- Q Okay. And so, using this methodology, you did your best to recreate the October 2017 master jury list.
  - A Correct.
- Q Okay. Now, is this recreation that you were working off of an exact recreation of the October 2017 master jury list?
  - A Well, we don't have the exact 2017 jury list, so we can't say

for absolutely certain that it's exactly the same. So, we don't have anything to compare it against. This is with the data that we have. In my experience this is as close as we're going to get.

Q Okay. Are there potentially flaws to this methodology of recreating a list?

A Flaw meaning have we missed some people? Sure. Some people may have been taken out of the list. The -- you know, there's a number of things that could have happened. But if you look at it from sort of a crosschecking, maybe it was a way to look at it. All the people who --

THE COURT: A who?

## BY MS. HOJJAT:

- A were summoned in 2017 show up on this list.
- Q I'm sorry, Mr. Martin, I'm going to stop you for a second.
- A Sure.
- Q You cut out for a second, so can you start over?
- A Sure.
- Q I think you said if you look at it for maybe a crosschecking, is that what you said?

A Right. In terms of crosschecking the reliability of the list that we came up with, there's two things that you notice right away. One is all the people who are summoned in 2017 are on that list. And then secondly, if you look at the youngest person on the list, that should be consistent with you have to be 18 to be a juror. And of course, each of these times that we're adding people is a different date. The folks who

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are added right before 2017, they're born -- the youngest people are born in 1998, which would be consistent with turning 18 in 2016, and therefore -- and then the people added in 2018, their youngest people were born in 1999, consistent with turning 18 in 2018. So, those crosschecks, you know, what we've done with the recreation of the list.

- Q Okay. Obviously would it have been your preference to have the original list?
  - A Absolutely.
  - Q But was that something that was outside of your control?
  - A Yes.
  - Q And I'm so sorry, you're cutting out.
  - A I'm sorry, I'm right next to my router here.

THE COURT: Okay, that appears to be better. Thank you.

MS. HOJJAT: That's better, thank you.

THE WITNESS: Okay.

## BY MS. HOJJAT:

- Q So, was it outside of your control, having that master list?
- A Yes.
- Q Was that something that was outside of the control of the Defense completely in this case?
  - A Yes.
- Q Typically in cases who is the one who is responsible for keeping copies and backups of the master list?
- A Well, it's the you know, the Jury Clerk or the Clerk of Courts or the Administrative Office within the Court that keeps the jury list.

Q Okay. Thank you.

Now, I want to talk to you about the recreation of the October 2017 list, okay? And from here on out I'm just going to refer to that as the master list to be shorter, but I want you to know that what we're talking about is the recreation of the October 2017 list that you recreated. Okay?

A Okay.

Q All right. Were there duplicates that you observed on the master list?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And can you tell us just briefly --

THE COURT: I apologize, was that a yes?

THE WITNESS: Yes, I'm sorry. Yes.

THE COURT: Thank you.

BY MS. HOJJAT:

Q And can you tell us just briefly what a duplicate is?

A Well, as I defined it in this circumstance it was persons who were duplicated on the list. So, they would have the same first name, same last name, same date of birth. And then I also looked at persons who had the same first name, the same date of birth and the exact same address, including city and zip.

So, the first group, which is first name, last name, date of birth -- there were not very many of those duplicates, which is — which shows that the duplication procedure used by the Court — that's what they were centering on and they caught most of those duplicates.

The second group I'm talking about, where you have the first name, date of birth and address, catches another group of people. And what they are is what you most likely think of is persons who have changed their name, maybe through marriage, and that type of thing. That's some of them, but actually the most of those people are people who have hyphenated names — in other words one of the sources will have a hyphenated name and the other source will just have of those two hyphenated names. Or very, very minor misspellings —

- Q Okay.
- A -- of the lase name.
- Q So, basically what you're looking for in duplicates is you want to make sure that we're not looking at the same person twice?
  - A That's correct.
- Q Okay. So, if you see two Nadia Hojjat's with the exact same date of birth, you don't want me on that list twice.
  - A Right.
- Q And could I be on a jury panel twice? Could I be summoned, and could I be juror number 3 and juror number 40 in a jury panel?
- A That's a self-correcting problem. If you get set two Summons, only one of you is showing up.
- Q Right. So, I because a person cannot serve two positions on a jury, when you have duplicates you remove those duplicates from the equation, correct?
  - A Correct.
  - Q Okay. So, going forward I'm going to ask you to exclude

duplicates from your calculations, given that a person can only hold one position in a jury pool in a jury demand. Okay?

- A Okay.
- Q All right.

All right. So, excluding duplicates, what were the demographics of the reconstructed 2017 October master list with respect to individuals who self-identified as Black or African American?

- A Okay.. To be clear, when we talk about eliminating duplicates
- Q Yes.
- A -- I'm not eliminating both, I'm just eliminating one.
- Q Right.
- A If that makes any sense.
- Q Yes. Absolutely it does.
- A If you're on the list twice, I'm just eliminating you once, not eliminating you twice.
- Q Right, from the calculations. So, if you count the person once for the calculation, you don't count them twice for the calculation.
  - A That's correct.
  - Q Because they're only one person.
- A So, the -- on that recreated master list from 2017, African Americans made up 9.76% of the list.
- Q Okay. Did you also look at all the persons who were summoned in 2017?
  - A Yes.

Q	And	what	were	
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- A So, all the people who -- I'm sorry.
- Q What were the demographics of all the people who were summoned in 2017, with respect to individuals who self-identified as Black or African American?

A Right. Of the group that was summoned in 2017, 10.62% were Black or African American.

- Q Okay. And did you look at the persons in Mr. Mungai's trial venire?
  - A Yes.
- Q And what were the demographics of the persons in Mr.

  Mungai's trial venire who self-identified as Black or African American?
- A There were 6.15% of the venire was persons who selfreported as Black or African American.
- Q Okay. So now, as Statistician, we have our census data of what percentage of Clark County identifies as Black or African American. And then we have these numbers for our master list, our Summons, our venire, of individuals who identify as Black or African American. What kind of analysis do you do with these numbers?
- A The most common analysis is our two calculations. One is called Absolute Disparity and the other's called Comparative Disparity.
- Q Okay. And are these two types of calculations that are used by the courts nationwide in the United States?
- A Yes. I'm asked to present those type of calculations in every case that I'm asked to provide information on.

Absolute Disparity. What is Absolute Disparity?

A Well, Absolute Disparity as a formula is just a difference between the percentage a group is in the population and the percentage that same group is in the jury list. And you just subtract the two numbers -- it's always shown as a positive number, but it can represent under representation or over representation.

Q Okay. So, for example, in this case if we have 12.6% in our general population and 9.76% on our master list, you would subtract those two numbers to calculate the Absolute Disparity, is that correct?

A That's correct.

Q Okay. Now, lets talk about the second type of analysis you mentioned, Comparative Disparity. What is Comparative Disparity?

A Comparative Disparity is a rate mathematically. So, instead of just the absolute difference between the two numbers, it's the percentage difference between the two. So, for instance, if you calculated Comparative Disparity of 50%, what that's telling you is you're missing half of the group.

Q Okay. Why would somebody engage in looking at Comparative Disparity as opposed to Absolute Disparity?

A So, the problem, or the issue with absolute disparity is that it's very harsh on small groups. In other words, if you have a group in the population that makes up 10% of the population, if you're missing, you know, 5% of that group, the Absolute Disparity is still 5%, but you're really missing a large part of that group. Compared to if it was a larger portion of the population, say 75%. If you — if the jury list was 70% of

that group, you'd still have an Absolute Disparity of 5%, but obviously you're not missing as big a group — big a part of that group. It's just the difference between absolute numbers and rates of numbers. Rates take into account the size of the group that you're talking about, and so they're not as harsh on small groups. They treat small groups the same way they treat large groups.

Q Okay. So, is the point of looking at Comparative Disparity to make sure we're treating all groups the same when we're calculating whether somebody is missing?

A Yes.

Q Okay. So, you said that Comparative Disparity is calculated by dividing, is that correct?

A As a formula, Comparative Disparity is the Absolute Disparity divided by the population percentage.

Q I see. Okay. So, lets start looking at the numbers that we have in this case.

Looking at the Absolute Disparity, what was the Absolute

Disparity with respect to individuals who identified as Black or African

American on the jury list in 2017; the master jury list from October 2017?

- A That Absolute Disparity is 2.84% under representation.
- Q Okay.

A And the way you get that is the 12.6 that's the population minus 9.76. So, the end result is 2.84% under representation.

Q Okay. And then let's look at the Absolute Disparity with respect to Individuals who self-identified as Black or African American

who were summoned as a whole in 2017. What was that?

A So, looking at that group, the Absolute Disparity is 1.99% under representation.

Q Okay. And then looking at Mr. Mungai's venire specifically, what was the Absolute Disparity for individuals who identified as Black or African American for venire?

A Mr. Mungai's venire -- the Absolute Disparity is 6.45% under representation.

Q Okay. So, now I want to ask you about the Comparative Disparity, because you told us the Absolute Disparity is harsher on smaller groups because there already such small numbers.

THE COURT: Okay. One moment, point of clarification for the Court and we're getting some feedback. The 2.84%, what is that number representative of? It's not his venire and it's not the year of 2017, so what is it?

MS. HOJJAT: It was the master list.

THE COURT: Okay. Master list, thank you. And then the 1.99 was 2017?

MS. HOJJAT: Yes.

THE COURT: Okay, thank you.

BY MS. HOJJAT:

Q All right. So, now, you were saying Absolute Disparity is harsher on smaller groups, because they're already a smaller part of the population. So, let's talk about --

A That's correct.

Q	Comparative Disparity, okay? What was the Comparative
Disparity	with respect to individuals who identified as Black or African
American	on that 2017 master list?

- A The Comparative Disparity was 22.53% under representation.
- Q 22 --
- A So, as a translation when -- we're missing about a quarter of that group than we would have expected for African Americans -- Black or African Americans.
- Q Okay. So, 22.5% disparity between the number that should be on the list and the number that is actually on the list, correct?
  - A Right.
  - Q And that's an under representation?
  - A Right. Correct.
- Q So, as we just said, that's almost 1 in 4 African Americans who should be on the list who are not on the list, correct?
  - A Something between 1 in 4 and 1 in 5.
- Q Correct. Thank you. Now, I want to talk about the Comparative Disparity with respect to individuals who identified as Black or African American who were summoned in 2017. What was that Comparative Disparity?
  - A That Comparative Disparity was 15.76% under representation.
- Q Okay. And then I want to talk about Mr. Mungai's venire.

  What was the Comparative Disparity for Mr. Mungai's specific Venire?
- A Comparative Disparity for Mr. Mungai's venire was 51.16% under representation.

Q Okay. Now, I want to talk to you about these numbers, because we're seeing some variance. With the venire, which is the smaller number, we're at a 51% Comparative Disparity. But when we get to the master list, we're at a 22%, almost 23% Comparative Disparity. Can you explain to us why we might see differences between big groups and small groups?

A Well there's -- for a smaller group there's a more of a random variability that occurs and of course, you've -- well a smaller group the randomness allows for a wider range as it were than a bigger group.

Q Okay. When we see these numbers, should we be expecting the same 50% from the venire in the master list? Should we be saying if it's not 50% in the master list, well then it's not a big deal?

- A You had a lot of things in that question there, counselor
- Q Sorry, sorry, let me break that down.
- A Try that again.
- Q Yeah, let me break it down.

Actually, you know what, I'm going to move on, we'll come back to that question in a little bit.

Did you look at standard deviations at all?

- A Yes.
- Q Are standard deviations also a commonly accepted type of mathematical calculation?
  - A Yes.
- Q Okay. Explain to us what is a standard deviation from [indiscernible].

A So, standards deviations look at the randomness that's involved whenever you pick a group out of a larger group. So, we have the master list and we're going to summon some people from it. We're not going to summon everybody, we're going to summon some of the people from it. You know, just the way life is, if the master list is 10% of some group, say African Americans, when you draw a smaller group of it you wouldn't expect to get exactly 10%. There's some luck of the draw-some randomness that occurs. The question is — or what a statistician faces is, is that variance — that randomness, is it within the realms of what you would expect mathematically or is it something beyond the realm of something that just happened randomly?

So, standard deviations is a scientific method to determine whether when we get — you know, when we have a list that's 10% and we draw a list and it's 12%, is that something that we should have just expected randomly, or is it the result of some other effect?

Q So, how many standard deviations would you say is still -- or does the mathematical community say is still within the realm of accepted versus outside of what number are you looking at there's some other force causing issues with the numbers?

A Statisticians typically use either two or three standard deviations from expected. Two meaning that you get outside that range less than 5% of the time and three standard deviations, meaning you get outside of what you're expecting 0.5% of the time.

So, the other way of looking at it is, you're within two standard deviations 95% of the time just randomly. You're within three

 standard deviations 99.5% of the time roughly, just based on luck of the draw.

Q Okay. So, if you're outside of three standard deviations, would you say it's still random or would you say at that point there's something systemic going on?

A A statistician would say that's statistically significant, and that it would reflect that there's something systematic occurring other than just a random luck of the draw; there's something systematic.

Q Okay. So, outside of three standard deviations, a statistician would say is not random and is in fact systematic. Is that correct?

- A That's correct.
- Q Thank you.

Now, I want to talk to you about the standard deviations from expected in Mr. Mungai's case with respect to African Americans on the master list. How many standard deviations from expected were -- was the numbers with respect to individuals who self-identified as Black or African American on that 2017 master list?

- A Were more than 56 standard deviations to [indiscernible].
- Q Fifty-six standard deviations?
- A Correct.
- Q So, you said two or three could be random; outside of two or three something systemic is going on?
  - A Correct.
- Q On this list, it was 56 standard deviations below the expected number of African Americans on the list?

 A That's correct.

Q I want to talk to you about the standard deviations in regards to the summonses. What was the standard deviation from expected of individuals who self-identified as Black or African American who were summoned in total in 2017?

- A That group is 21 point -- well, 21 standard deviations too low.
- Q Twenty-one standard deviations too low. And I'm sorry, you cut off, can you repeat that?
  - A Twenty-one standard deviations too low.
- Q Okay. And I want to talk to you oh, let me ask you this. Why are we not looking at standard deviations for Mr. Mungai's jury venire of 65 people?

A Of course we could, but what standard deviations do, is it takes into account the size of the sample. The venire is a very, very small number compared to the master jury list, and therefore, the ranges are wider. And so, typically you don't look at getting a statistically significant result from a very, very, very small sample. Just because there's some randomness that occurs in small groups.

- Q Can you give us an example?
- A However --
- Q Oh I'm sorry. I was going to say can you give us an example -
- A Go ahead.
- Q that we would understand as laymen in terms of small versus big randomness?

 A Sure. It's my pleasure to talk about probabilities to a Court in Las Vegas.

If you have a coin – a fair coin I might add— and you flip it four times, you're either going to get zero heads, you know, 25% heads, one head, 50% heads, 25% tails, 100% tails. You know, you're going to get one of those. And you might, you know, if you flip coins, it's likely you're going to get three heads and one tail. That doesn't strike anybody as odd. And so, you're a little bit aways away from 50%.

However, if you flip that coin a thousand times, or even one hundred times, the chances that you'd be very far off of 50% are very low. So, that's what standard deviations is doing, is it's saying, you know, if we have a really large sample and we're off, then we should believe it.

Q I see. So, with small numbers randomness can have a big impact, because it's a small number. But when you're looking at huge numbers, like millions on a master list, you shouldn't be very off because it's such a huge number. Randomness should not a play a very large part?

A That's correct.

Q Okay. And that's what standards deviations measures is how much off of the normal you are?

A Yes.

Q Okay. So, let me ask you in this case, when we're talking about 56 standard deviations and a 22.5% Comparative Disparity, are these numbers statistically significant?

 A Statistically significant applies to standard deviation.

Q Okay.

A So, yes, on the standard deviation. On the — I guess the other number you were talking about Comparative Disparity —

THE COURT: Hold on one moment. I want to make sure we hear you. We're getting some feedback from the jail, please.

Okay, I think we're clear, thank you.

So, start again. Statistical significance applies to standard deviation was the last thing the Court heard.

## BY MS. HOJJAT:

A Yeah starting over. Statistical significance applies to the standard deviation analysis. The Comparative Disparity and Absolute Disparity are not the scientific type calculations that a standard deviation is. So, as a statistician I have to use my words carefully. When I say significant, I'm talking about statistically significant. And that means using a standard deviation type of analysis as opposed to Absolute Disparity and Comparative Disparity.

Q I apologize, I became a lawyer because I was bad at math.

This is kind of my worst case scenario, is an entire hearing about math.

So, the standard deviation in this case is it statistically significant?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And when we say statistically significant, what you are saying is this is systemic?

A That's correct.

Q And that is the mathematical term for this, that this

 underrepresentation of African Americans on a 2017 master list is systemic?

- A That's correct.
- Q Okay.

Now, I want to talk to you -- I mean, you have a lot of experience working with jury lists all across the country and doing these analysis on jury lists all across the country. What are the causes of systemic underrepresentation of a group on a master list?

A So, I like to think of it as sort of going chronologically through your process. So, you start with the population, right? And we know what -- from the Census Bureau what the population is in Clark County. And then you choose source lists to try to get you close to that population. Driver's lists is a very common source list. Electrical bills - less common, but not unheard of. Frankly, most courts use some version of the voter registration list, which we didn't use in 2017. And then, once again with the uninsured -- unemployment insurance list, that -- that's a less used, but not unheard of.

So, what you want to look it is -- look at is are those lists representative of the community? And as a statistician, I can tell you the more lists you have, the more closely you're going to represent the community. That's just -- that's what statisticians call law of large numbers, is the bigger group you get, the more likely you are to represent the community.

- Q So, in this case --
- A So, that's --

Q --sorry. So, in this case you heard the testimony that there was supposed to be, in 2017, four sources being used, but there were only two. Would that have an effect on the demographic representation of the master list?

A Sure. Yes.

Q Okay. And you said that in most places they use the Voter Rolls. But here in Nevada, in Clark County, they were not using the Voter Roll in 2017, correct?

A That's correct.

Q Okay. And in fact, you heard the testimony, and you had the chance to review the order. They were under order to use that Voter Roll.

A That's my understanding, that's correct.

Q Okay. Now, were you able to take a look at the demographics of Nevada's Voter Registration list?

A No. So, the -- no, but let me explain.

Q Yes.

A To register to vote in Nevada, you don't have to give your racial designation. I live in Georgia, when I register to vote I have to actually tell them my self-reported racial designation. But that's not true in Nevada. So, the voting list doesn't have your race on it, and so to—so it's a lot trickier to try to figure out what the demographics of that list are.

Q Okay. So, in this case you were not able to take a look at the specific demographics of the voter list. However, you told us that the

law of big numbers says that when you add massive lists, like the voter list, just by mathematics, the list becomes more representative of the population. Is that correct?

- A That's correct.
- Q Okay.
- A Assuming of course that you've handled the duplicates correctly.
  - Q Okay.
  - A But --
  - Q So --
  - A -- but --
  - Q Oh, go ahead.
- A my experience is that usually it goes the other way around.

  Usually, you start with a voting list that's a federal requirement and then you're allowed to add on the driver's license list. But to give you an idea, usually adding on the driver's license list adds an additional 20 or 30% of people. What it's saying is that there's 20 or 30% that aren't registered to vote but do have a driver's license or a personal identification card. There's some people who have a driver's license but aren't registered to there's some people who are registered to vote but don't have a driver's license or personal identification card, or it's expired.
  - Q Okay. So, it sounds like --
  - A So, the rule of thumb is to add about another 20 or 30%.
  - Q Twenty or thirty percent is what happens when you add the

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DMV list to the Voter Roll?

- A That's correct.
- Q But that's because most places start with the Voter Roll?
- A That's correct.
- Q In this case, the Voter Roll wasn't even included, correct?
- A That's correct.
- Q Okay. So, I mean, based on those numbers, the Voter Roll is a statistically significant tool that is supposed to be utilized in comply with these master lists?
- A Yeah, once again when I say statistically significant, I'm talking about standard deviation analysis.
  - Q I'm sorry. I'm so sorry. The --
  - A It adds a substantial portion onto the list, that's correct.
  - Q It is substantial. The Voter Rolls are substantial.
  - A That's correct.
  - Q And they play a substantial role in that master list?
  - A That's correct.
  - Q All right.

Now I want to talk to you about what we referred to as the DETR list. Did you have a chance to look at the self-published Nevada DETR information?

- A I was not able to look at the actual list. And taking a step back, what I would normally do is look at any of the sources to see whether a representative --
  - Q I'm sorry. Hold on one second sir, we are getting feedback.

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Hold on one second.

MS. HOJJAT: Is it possible for us to mute CCDC?

THE RECORDER: You want me to mute them? I can mute.

MS. HOJJAT: I'm just concerned about the feedback.

THE RECORDER: But he's not going to be able to hear you.

MS. HOJJAT: Oh, they can't hear us if we mute, them so they can't talk?

THE COURT: No, they would be able to hear, but they wouldn't be able to speak. So, if your client or the Officer need to get our attention then they wouldn't be able to speak. And unfortunately, right now -- well not unfortunately, but the way that the system works we're going to see Mr. Martin as [indiscernible] and not the jail, so. The jail is tiny, so I wouldn't be able to ascertain whether the Officer or your client --

MS. HOJJAT: Okay.

THE COURT: So, we'll try to work through it. If it gets a little more problematic, then we'll go from there.

MS. HOJJAT: Okay.

THE COURT: Um --

THE RECORDER: That vision -- that version.

MS. HOJJAT: I would prefer not because he's the one testifying, we need to be able to see him clearly.

THE COURT: Okay.

THE COURT: You're good to go now.

THE WITNESS: Please let me know if you can hear me or if I

need to stop.

MS. HOJJAT: You're fine.

BY MS. HOJJAT:

Q Okay. So, we were talking about what you were able to see from the self-published DETR information.

A Correct. So, I wasn't able to see the actual list that was used in 2017 -- well, it wasn't used in 2017. But I wasn't able to see the actual list. Fortunately the Department of Training - I believe ya'll called it the Department of --

Q Employment Training and Rehabilitation.

A That's correct. The Department of Employment Training and Rehabilitation publishes statistics on their website, going back -- currently right now back to March 2020. March 2020 is a pretty good date in the sense that whereas the pandemic had sort of started in March, it sort of reflects, you know, to the best that we can, what the numbers where like before the pandemic. The pandemic has had an effect on unemployment insurance claims.

Q Sure.

A But using those numbers form March 2020, they show that African Americans —

Q And I'm going to stop you for one second.

A -- sure.

Q I'm going to stop you for one second, because I want to talk to you about that for one more second.

So, fair to say the shutdowns and all the issues that started in

 Nevada in 2020 didn't start until the very end of March and so they wouldn't be reflected in the March unemployment numbers, they would start after March. They would start April and on would be what would reflect those issues that we encountered because of COVID, is that correct?

- A Yes. Certainly, the majority.
- Q Okay.
- A You know, there were some people getting sick before March, but --
  - Q Sure. But ---
  - A the big shutdown for employers incurred in March and after.
- Q Right. The end of March. So, in terms of looking the numbers that were available to you, the March of 2020 number would be the truest reflection of what Nevada looked like before COVID, because those claims wouldn't start rolling in until April, anybody who was affected, end of March. Correct?
  - A That's correct.
- Q Okay. Sorry. Okay, so go ahead. So, you were able to look at those March of 2020 numbers.
  - A Right.
  - Q Demographically, what did you see?
- A And so, they actually -- the Department of Employment

  Training and Rehabilitation collects racial information. And their figures show that 17.67% of the unemployment insurance claims were for persons who were Black or African American.

overrepresentation on the DETR list?

A So, if you do that calculation, Absolute Disparity is 8.12% overrepresentation of African Americans on the DETR list.

- Q Okay. And did you look at the Comparative Disparity?
- A The Comparative Disparity would be 85.11% overrepresentation.
- Q Okay. So, fair to say that African Americans are well represented on the DETR list?
- A Yeah. Statistically, what you would say is African Americans are disproportionately represented on the DETR list.
- Q Okay. So, when you got your master jury list from 2017, if that DETR list had been added in there and the names from the DETR list had been added in there, would that have proportionately increased the statistics and the demographics of African Americans on that master jury list?

MR. CHEN: Your Honor, I'm going to object to that question, that he can't answer, because these are 2020 statistics versus 2017 statistics. We don't know what the unemployment rate was in 2017 when we're trying to create this list. So, I think that we're comparing apples and oranges and having him answer that question.

MS. HOJJAT: He's an expert, he can do hypotheticals. I can rephrase the question slightly as a hypothetical.

THE COURT: Or lay additional foundation, otherwise the objection's sustained.

MS, HOJJAT: Okay.

 BY MS. HOJJAT:

Q Sir, let me clarify. We're going to do this hypothetically. You didn't have access. There was nothing published prior to March of 2020, correct?

- A There's nothing on the website prior to 2020 ---
- Q Okay.
- A -- March 2020.
- Q So, we're working with the March 2020 numbers because that's we had available to us, correct?
  - A That's correct.
- Q Okay. So, hypothetically, assuming that the numbers on the DETR list were relatively average throughout the year, that there wasn't some crazy spike or dip in any particular year, demographically.

  Assuming that the demographics were relatively even, is it fair to say that the DETR list has an overrepresentation of African Americans?

And I'm sorry, your sound didn't come through.

- A Yes.
- Q Okay. And is it fair to say that if you take a list that has an overrepresentation of a particular group and you add it to the master list that would increase the representation of that group on a master list?
- A Yes. There's two effects going on. First of all, adding a new source list in helps you get more people from Clark County, for instance on the list. And it should help you with your representation of all groups. But secondly, particularly in a list that is skewed in this way towards Black or African Americans, you would expect that it would increase the

 Black or African American representation in the master jury list.

Q Okay. So, is it a fair inference to reach that if the source that had been statutorily required, the DETR list, had been used in the 2017 master list, that it may have created — that it would have created, likely, a more representative master list?

- A That would be my expectation, yes.
- Q Is it fair to say that if the other source that was statutorily and by Court Order required to be used for the master list the Voter Rolls had been used for the master list, we would likely have had a master list that was more representative of our population?
  - A Yes. That would be my expectation.
- Q Okay. And this is as a Mathematician as a Statistician looking at the numbers, looking at the data -- this is your opinion?
  - A Yes.
  - Q Okay.

Now, I just briefly wanted to ask you one other question. In previous court hearings, Ms. Witt had testified about summonses being sent by zip code and zip code being some sort of determinate factor in who was receiving summonses. You had a chance to look at the master list. You had a chance to look at the summonses that were being sent. Did you see anything that reflected that?

MR. CHEN: Objection, --

THE WITNESS: To be clear --

MR. CHEN: — Your Honor. The only testimony that we had from Ms. Witt is that that's never happened. So, I think there's no basis

to ask him this question, because there's -- she was on the stand. I asked her specifically about zip codes and she said that it's never happened.

MS. HOJJAT: Your Honor, this was the entire basis of our objection down — at trial originally. So, I'm trying to clarify why — I mean the reality of the situation is, we objected. We put forward this reasoning based on prior testimony that Ms. Witt had give at other hearings. So, we put forward the reasoning. It's in the order, so I feel like I need to address it. I need to explain whether it panned out or not. The fact that we found other major discrepancies and major issues that I think are absolutely determinative of the issue here, is absolutely a separate issue, but we do actually need to address this issue. And so, this is the individual who looked at these things and can tell us whether that was accurate or not.

THE COURT: So, as the record is at this time, when you objected originally at the trial, Ms. Witt did not come and testify, her prior testimony had been utilized?

MS. HOJJAT: So, what happened at the original trial, is that we objected, and we asked for a hearing. The Judge denied it based on her memory of a previous hearing she had with Ms. Witt. What I explained was, that since that hearing that she had was with Ms. Witt, Ms. Witt had given a subsequent testimony at a different hearing where she specifically said zip codes are how these summonses are being sent out.

So, I need to address that, because that is a claim that I made

based on Ms. Witt's testimony in a different hearing. And that is one of the basis for this hearing being granted.

THE COURT: But that prior or alternate testimony regarding zip codes was not part of this record, because that transcript was not entered into as being part of the record -- it wasn't admitted, right?

MS. HOJJAT: No, it is part of the record in that I made those representations.

MR. CHEN: Which I understand she made those representations, Your Honor. That's the basis for having the hearing today, is because the Court said, look if there was additional information that Ms. Witt could have given in this trial, the Court should have entertained it. And that's the basis — that's the entire order is based upon this zip code argument, which she's now stated in those uncertain terms that that never happened.

MS. HOJJAT: No. Okay. So, we're clear, she didn't' say she never said that. She's now taken back her position and said, well that's not how they were being sent. You never asked her if she said it before.

MR. CHEN: She hasn't been impeached on it, which would be --

MS. HOJJAT: Nobody's impeaching on her. I'm not trying to call her a liar. I'm just trying to clarify why we're not talking about zip codes more during this hearing, because I'm confident the Supreme Court's going to be curious about it. And the reality is, she said it at a hearing, so I brought it up and I objected based on it in this case. My expert looked through the records — there's no basis for it. I mean, —

THE COURT: Hold on.

MS. HOJJAT: — I'm happy to give the Court the case number where she said it. I have that case name and number, because it was my case as well. I crossed her on that one too. She said it. So, I brought it up. I need to clarify that it's not accurate.

THE COURT: What's your specific question to him again?

MS. HOJJAT: My specific question is, when he looked at these summonses that were sent and he looked at the master list, does he find it to be accurate -- were zip codes involved in the sending of summons?

THE COURT: Okay. With regard to that question the objection is overruled.

BY MS. HOJJAT:

Q So, Mr. Martin, you had the opportunity to view the summonses that were sent. Did you find that zip codes played any part in that?

A Me, it looked like the summons were sent out randomly as regards to zip codes.

Q Okay.

A So, what I'm saying there is that there didn't seem to be a set or ordained pattern for which zip codes got summons and which ones didn't, and how many summons went to each zip code. It appeared to be random to me.

- Q Okay. So, it wouldn't be accurate to be --
- A Random in -- sorry.

Q

Go ahead.

were sent out randomly, correct?

- A Randomly in as far as zip codes go, that's correct.
- Q Okay. And that's consistent with the testimony that you heard Ms. Witt give earlier, was that these summonses are sent out randomly by computer, correct?
  - A That's correct.
- Q And you've worked with that company who's the computer company again that you mentioned earlier you work with?
  - A Avenue.
  - Q Yeah.
- A They've gone through a number of different name changes, but their current name is Avenue.
- Q Avenue stores the databases for the jury lists, is that fair to say?
- A I don't know if they stored it there. I imagine the databases are kept locally in Clark County.
  - Q Okay.
  - A But they create those databases.
- Q And the selection comes from those databases --the selections of jury pools come from those databases, right?
  - A That's correct.
- Q Okay. Now, this master list that you and Ms. Hojjat have been referencing this is the list is this a list in which you have to log in some information to be able to access all the names and information?
  - A I'm not sure exactly what you're asking for. Are you talking

 about the original download?

Q Exactly. Is this one that you have a paper copy of, this master list, or did it come in a form in which you had to log into like an online database or online sharing system to be able to access this master list?

A I believe so. I don't recall precisely, but it is a list of 3.5 million records, so and Avenue's a sophisticated computer place. I suspect you're right, I download it from their secure site.

Q Okay. The information then from that — you heard Ms. Witt testify that — about whether or not race is something that's provided to her by the organizations that provide to the list. You remember her testimony about that?

A Yes, I do.

Q So, in your experience and -- in looking at this list was there a race for every single person who was listed on the master list?

A No.

Q Okay. So, there are some people that would be on the list that could be African American, or Caucasian, or Asian or any other race, but they're not necessarily identified by the master list, is that a correct statement?

A Absolutely.

Q And so that would go towards your standard deviation as well, right?

A Not exactly. Or maybe -- that's a hard question to answer --

Q Let me follow up and see –

A -- specifically let me tell you how I would answer it.

 MS. HOJJAT: He's not done speaking.

THE WITNESS: Yeah.

MR. CHEN: I'm not trying to interrupt him.

## BY MR. CHEN:

Q But let me just try to clarify, because we're talking about a specific standard deviation maybe different from the one you're talking about. So, for instance, you testified earlier, right, that African Americans on the master list made up — what was your percentage for that?

A 9.76%.

Q Okay. That's not an absolute number is what I'm trying to say, is it?

A Well, if I'm trying to -- I'm trying to interpret your question.

Q Sure.

A That is 9.76% of the persons that we have their racial identification for. I think that's probably what you're getting at.

Q Exactly. So, if someone did not racially identify, they could fit into the percentage of people on the master list, you just wouldn't have any knowledge about that person?

A That's correct.

Q And were you, as a Statistician, able to come up with a standard deviation of that 9.7%? So, whether within 1 or 2% it would go either way that the list was maybe more like 11 or it was like possibly 7%? Like did you have any kind of calculation you were able to do in this list with regards to that?

 A Yes. That's the calculation we did. So, the 9.76 is 56 standard deviations too low.

Q Okay. All right. So, part of the problem too, with -- I guess I would say getting an accurate number was that you had to recreate the master list, right?

A That's correct.

Q So, we can assume that there's some type of error there. It's not going to be perfect, because you had to do the best you could do, correct?

A Correct. There was — there's potentially some error. So we're talking about, as I tried to explain, maybe not successfully. We wanted to make sure that we could cross reference it to some other sources, such as people who got summoned. Obviously if we were missing a whole bunch of those we would be concerned. We weren't missing any of them. Or if the dates of birth didn't align the way that we would have expected it.

Q Okay.

A But if your question is, do we know absolutely for certain if this is exactly the jury list as it was in 2017, unfortunately I can't tell you exactly if it is.

Q Exactly. Okay. And so, we can anticipate that there would be some error potentially in the numbers that you have. Not your fault at all, it's just the fact the list isn't exact to 2017?

A Yeah. No insult taken, but there's possibly some movement that we're talking about rather large numbers here. 3.5 million on the

 current list -- about 2.6 million on that 2017 list.

Q Okay.

A So, I wouldn't expect the numbers to do a lot of moving around statistically, but in terms of it moving maybe some, sure.

Q Okay. In terms of the Comparative Disparity that we were talking about, I believe you said in Mr. Mungai's case the Comparative Disparity was 51.16, is that right?

A That's correct.

Q Okay. And generally, since you deal with these issues a lot and you testify a lot on these issues, you know that in general 50% Comparative Disparity is kind of one of the benchmarks that a Court uses when determining whether there's been a systematic exclusion, right?

A So, you know, as I said before, I'm not a lawyer I don't want anyone to misinterpret my legal research or anything like that. I'm not a lawyer. There are different benchmarks that are used for all of these numbers. So, the one of the problems with Comparative Disparity is that people have different ideas of what Is — what is a big number and what isn't a number. So, that's where something like standard deviations comes into play, where there's a scientific basis behind it.

Q And the science can only be good as the data that's input into the science or the mathematics, right?

A Absolutely.

Q All right. And I appreciate that I know that you've clarified you're not an attorney, but we certainly all respect your mathematical

skills, sir.

- A Oh, thank you.
- Q So, when you were -- I think you testified in general that when you added the DETR statistics, the diversity of the master list changed.

  Is what you testified to?
- A Well we didn't add the DETR list, so I was just looking at if we had added it.
- Q Fair. Okay and did you do calculations for any other type of racial makeups from DETR? So, for instance did you look at Asians and what that would have done? Did you look at Hispanics and what that would have done? Had you did you perform those calculations?
  - A Uh no, but I could.
- Q Okay. Do you have statistics in front of you for the other racial groups that were reported by DETR?
  - A I could look them up on the website if you wanted me to.
  - Q If it's not too much trouble.
  - A I don't have that printed out in front of me.
- Q I'm just curious, I'm not -- not too much trouble. I couldn't find it myself, so maybe you could?
- A Sure. I -- if that's -- I want to do whatever's appropriate. I don't mind looking for it.
  - MS, HOJJAT: I'm -- I'll be honest I'm not sure the relevance.
- MR. CHEN: I think it matters in terms of -- we're trying to -- we've only asked about one particular group. I'd like to see what happens if you put other statistics into this what that would do to the jury

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list. So, that's the reason that I'm asking these questions.

THE COURT: The objection below was specific to African Americans and or Blacks?

MS. HOJJAT: Yes, Your Honor.

MR. CHEN: You know what, Judge --

THE COURT: It's not highly relevant, but I will allow it as to – not to every race, if you have, you know, one or two that you want to question, that's allowable.

MR. CHEN: Okay. I appreciate that, Your Honor. BY MR. CHEN:

Q Just wondering, sir, do you have the statistics easily available now that we've kind of been debating this for a bit? If not, it's no issue,

A I do have them in front of me now.

Q Could you just read off what the -- and this-- I won't go into depth with it, but if you could just read off what the makeup is of the people who are receiving unemployment insurance?

A Sure.

THE COURT: As well as the year and month if available as to where this data is coming from and specifically the website that you are on as well, so we have a clean record.

MR. CHEN: Thank you.

THE WITNESS: Okay.

THE COURT: And it is --

THE WITNESS: So, starting with --

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THE COURT: -- one moment. It's April 8<sup>th</sup>, 2021 at approximately 4:28 p.m. Pacific Standard Time.

A Okay. And, specifically, the website is Nevadaworkforce.com.

And then we've got a bunch of other things after that. But so those things are

/portals/197/ui%20monthly%20claims%20press%20release\dashboards/ ETA203.HTML. But I suspect that if you just went to Nevadaworkforce.com you could follow the links to get to this report. It's for March 2020. The same numbers we were using before. And break -- the racial breakdown they have is 2.4% for American Indian or Alaskan Native; 5.5% for Asian; 17.7% for Black or African American; 2.4% for Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander; and 53.5% for White persons.

- Q All right. So, thank you for doing that. And so just as an example --
  - A No problem.
- Q -- in this particular database so to speak, you mentioned

  African Americans were overrepresented by roughly 5%, is that right?
  - A 17.7 compared to about 10, so yeah --
  - Q And then --
  - A -- 7% or so.
- Q -- you just mentioned, I believe, that for instance, Asians were about 5% of the reported on DETR?
  - A That's correct.
  - Q So, the -- I don't know if you have the census statistics, but

that would -- if Asians made up closer to 9% of the population, then they would be underrepresented by this database?

A That's correct.

Q All right. So, other than the fact that by including this database, as you mentioned, the more names the more general diversity you get, that would be your only real takeaway about adding this list to the master list, right? So, basically, I'm just saying --

A It would be --

Q -- by adding this you're getting more names. By more names you're generally going to get more diversity?

A That's true too, but also if you add a list that is like this list, skewed demographically towards Black or African Americans, you would expect the representation of Black or African Americans to go up because you've included this list.

Q But if you've included this list, you would theoretically have less of a percentage of Asian Americans --

MS. HOJJAT: Objection, relevance.

MR. CHEN: Your Honor, I think the whole point is whether these lists are fair and systematic, so I'm trying to understand what would be fair or not.

MS. HOJJAT: But I think that's -- respectfully that's not the argument here. And I can absolutely understand, perhaps, in another venue that might be the argument and should be an argument that's made. But the Legislature has decided that this is a list that should be used for the master list. And the objection that we made down below

that specifically led to this hearing is whether African Americans are being underrepresented on our master jury list.

So, the question is whether we are excluding lists that we're supposed to be including that would lead to more African Americans on our master list. It's not a valid argument to say well but adding this list that's statutorily required would exclude other groups. That's just — that's not the point of this hearing in particular, if that makes sense.

THE COURT: It does make sense, and I understand what the particular argument is. The objection is going to be overruled, because it is with regard to systematic exclusion. So, I'll allow him to explain overall — I think that — I get the question, I get the argument, I get your thing. I think that there's some additional things that have been testified to, so I am going to allow him to explain.

MR. CHEN: And I think he did, Your Honor. I don't have anything further on that issue.

THE COURT: I didn't hear a response.

Did you hear a response, Ms. Hojjat?

MS. HOJJAT: To be completely frank, I'm not sure that there was a question. It was a little bit — I mean, what was the question?

BY MR. CHEN:

Q I think I basically said, sir. And if I could, Your Honor. That if we were able to use the representation of minority groups based upon this DETR list, Asians would be underrepresented in the potential jury pool, because they're underrepresented as a compared to the of Asians in Clark County on this list.

- A Is that a question to me?
- Q Yes, it is.

A Okay. That's not exactly how it works. In the sense that when you have — the goal of adding varied source lists is to make sure we capture everybody. So, you run into this issue of whether a voter also has a driver and whether a driver is also on the DETR list. Or whether someone on the DTR [sic] list is also on the utility list — Nevada electric and those type of things. So, what you want to do is add varied source lists that catch all the people that maybe one source list didn't catch, and those source lists did catch. In the situation we're in where we haven't caught a group of African Americans, then naturally you're going to look for a list that might have those folks on it. To the extent that Asian folks are already represented in the other list and would be represented — and would already be represented from the other lists as they are on the DETR list. You get into all those sorts of interactions.

So, the idea of multiple lists is, you're right. If you just did DETER list by itself that would probably be problematic because it overrepresents African Americans and as you were saying underrepresents Asian people. That would be a problem. So, by itself, it would be a problem. But in a context where you're adding multiple sources in, then it becomes an advantage.

And I'm sorry if I went on for a long period of time, I hope that made some sense.

Q Okay. And one thing I do want to also just clear up with you is both terms have been used, systematic and systemic. Is there a

 difference for you in the use of either term?

A No.

Q Okay. And so, if I'm hearing your testimony sir, basically you're saying that every juror — jury that was drawn in 2017 before DETR was added to that list, you're basically saying that every juror at that time was — would have most likely statistically been under-representative of groups of people. Is that ultimately your testimony?

MS. HOJJAT: Objection, misstates the testimony.

THE COURT: Sustained. One, as to relevance.

MR. CHEN: Well, Your Honor, respectfully, I thought the whole idea is whether our juries are fair or not. So, if 2017 every juror — jury was pulled the same way, if we're saying that the pools weren't fair, then ultimately, I just want to know that that's his testimony. That they're saying that these pools, no matter whether it was Mungai's trial or any other trial, it was systematically unfair. Because that's what they were saying. Systematically, they're underrepresented. Systematically, it's not a fair jury venire. So, I think it's a relevant question. It kind of goes to the issue that we're here, I thought.

MS. HOJJAT: But I think that misstates --

THE COURT: I also --

MS. HOJJAT: Oh, sorry go ahead.

THE COURT: I also don't know how he's able to answer that question. Because here what's been looked at is not only what was going on within the summons, but also specific to this jury venire. And so, the way that I understand the evidence — it's been a long time since I

took statistics, but I did take it — is that these things cannot be looked at singularly but are looked at kind of as a whole and that's why you have so many different parts. And so, by asking overall — you're one, asking I think for a legal conclusion in an expert — I think you're asking for a legal conclusion, but also without the additional information, how is he able to answer that question?

MR. CHEN: I think he's answering the question. I mean, maybe I misheard the testimony. But he was basically saying, either systemically or systematically, African Americans are being precluded because of the lists that the Jury Commissioner was using.

THE COURT: Okay, so is your question specific then, are you saying over the year 2017 looking at the summons that were sent out, African Americans were systematically excluded, or is your question, over the course of 2017 -- talking about like everyone, there's some systematic issue?

MR. CHEN: I'm asking him if his opinion is that African Americans for everyone who came from the 2017 list were systematically excluded.

MS. HOJJAT: And if I can respond to that.

THE COURT: Yes.

MS. HOJJAT: I think the issue is, Mr. Martin has not looked at every single venire from 2017. I think Your Honor hit it on the head. He hasn't looked at all the venires. And the reality is, as he's explained over and over again, you expect variants. You expect standard deviation from the norm. And so, the fact that by coincidence -- and

when we're talking about the small numbers in terms of venires -- four jurors versus eight jurors makes a huge difference in whether we've got adequate representation or underrepresentation.

So, when we are looking at under-representation in the summonses sent, that doesn't mean that every single individual venire necessarily was underrepresented. Some of them could have been overrepresented. Some of them significantly underrepresented. We don't know how the individuals were distributed amongst those venires. He hasn't seen any of those numbers. But —

MR. CHEN: I'm asking about the master list, though.

MS. HOJJAT: Right. But that wasn't the question, respectfully. If that's the question --

MR. CHEN: I'm asking the master list, which all jury venires come from the master list. And if the master list is defective, wouldn't it naturally lead to the conclusion that, yes, statistically one venire might be incredibly diverse. But that's not the issue -- it's not the dependent venire. We're talking about the list. The master list that he --

THE COURT: So, your question is specific as to his expert opinion as to what results would be rendered from the master list?

MR. CHEN: Exactly.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. CHEN: Which all trials, as we all know, come from the master list. That's his testimony.

THE COURT: As to that question, --

MS. HOJJAT: I feel like that's the part of the question I object

 THE COURT: -- then the objection is overruled.

MR. CHEN: All right. Great.

THE COURT: As to the master list. But, as to a conclusion that there -- okay. I think that you can lay some foundation and ask about the master list. And you can also -- he's an expert, you can also ask about his expert opinion based upon that information. I don't believe that he can come to the legal conclusion as to what occurred in absolutely every jury trial without --

MR. CHEN: Sure.

THE COURT: — those statistics or mathematical numbers to come to — to make the formula.

MR. CHEN: No, I under -- I understand.

BY MR. CHEN:

- Q So, sir, I guess I'll go back to you. You're basically saying the master list is flawed, right?
  - A That's correct. It underrepresents African Americans.
- Q Okay. And you don't know necessarily -- because you don't make the list, you don't know why it's flawed, but you would just say statistically it's your expert opinion that it's flawed. Right?
  - A That's correct.
- Q And so, it's your ultimately, you're just saying that if you were to draw from this list as Clark County trial courts did or may, you would just say that that's a flawed list to draw from. That's ultimately your testimony, right?

A You had a lot in there. But, yes, if the master list is flawed, then if you randomly draw from it, you're going to get the results that are based on that master list. Correct.

MR. CHEN: That's all I have, thank you.

MS. HOJJAT: Brief redirect, Your Honor?

THE COURT: Yes.

MS. HOJJAT: Thank you.

#### REDIRECT EXAMINATION

BY MS. HOJJAT:

Q Okay. To clarify, you are not issuing an opinion as -- right now, in this hearing -- as to any trial other than the venire that you looked at in James Mungai and the master list, correct?

A That's correct.

Q You're not issuing an opinion on any other case that went to trial in 2017 here today?

A That's correct.

Q Okay. Because you've talked about standard deviations, you've talked about randomness and chance. Just because there's a flawed master list doesn't mean every single venire was necessarily flawed.

A I guess what you're looking for is a philosophical answer as opposed to a statistical answer?

- Q No. Actually, that's a bad question --
- A Every -
- Q that's okay, you do not have to answer it.

four and one and five people who are supposed to be on it, that is a

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thing that will lead to a flawed venire like we had in James Mungai.

Correct?

- A That's correct.
- Q And when you are looking at numbers like twenty -- almost 23% underrepresentation, comparative underrepresentation, that is off by 56 standard deviations.
  - A Correct.
  - Q It is not random.
  - A [No audible response].

THE RECORDER: I can't hear him.

MS. HOJJAT: I'm sorry, that answer didn't come through.

# BY MS. HOJJAT:

- Q It is not random.
- A That's correct.
- Q Okay.
- A It is not random.
- Q It is what mathematicians and Statisticians would call systematic?
  - A That's correct.
  - Q Thank you.

Now, I want to talk to you for a minute about some of the things that Mr. Chen talked to you about in terms of some numbers being missing or potentially some people not reporting and the numbers potentially being a little bit off.

You said there were 2.6 million people on that master list in

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Mr. Martin, thank you very much for your testimony. You are

released ---

THE WITNESS: Thank you, I --

THE COURT: -- as a witness here.

THE WITNESS: Thank you. I appreciate it. I hope my internet didn't go in and out on you.

THE COURT: No.

THE WITNESS: And thank you very much for doing this remotely. I'm going to get my second vaccination shot tomorrow. And I appreciate ya'll being willing to allow me to testify remotely.

THE COURT; More than welcome, that is our preference in the Eighth Judicial District Court to ensure that we keep as many people safe as possible.

MS. HOJJAT: Thank you, Mr. Martin.

THE COURT: Okay. Counsel, argument.

MS. HOJJAT: And Your Honor, it is the Defense burden to show that by -- I want to say it's a preponderance of the evidence -- it is not a high burden that the exclusion of African Americans from Mr. Mungai's jury venire was not random. That it was systematic. That is literally the burden, is to demonstrate that the fact that -- and I shouldn't use the word exclusion -- I should use the word the underrepresentation. It is indisputable that there was a underrepresentation in his particular venire. The Supreme Court in their order of limited remand, I think made it pretty clear that we are having this hearing in response to the third prong.

There's three prongs for William. Prong one, that African

Americans -- or that whatever group we are challenging is a distinctive group. African Americans and individuals who self-identify as Black have recognized again and again as a distinctive group in our case law.

Prong two, that there was underrepresentation on the particular venire. We demonstrated that, and I think that the remand was not for that purpose. I think it's pretty clear we got over the 50% comparative disparity, which is the threshold here in Nevada.

So, then prong three was that we needed to demonstrate that it was not random. That African Americans were underrepresented on his venire. And that it was systematic. And I think that we have more than met that burden by a preponderance of the evidence.

I think the testimony was quite clear in this case. Our master list in 2017 was severely underrepresented in African Americans. We are talking about 20 -- nearly 23%. Over 22% under-representative of African Americans. When you have -- when you're drawing from a list that is so under-representative, of course you are going to end up with certain venires that are severely underrepresented in African Americans. That's just basic statistics, and that's precisely what our expert testified to here today. I don't think there was anything that came out in cross examination that really changed what he was saying. Changed the numbers. Changed the math.

Realistically, Your Honor, the burden is not -- and I want to be very clear on this -- the burden is not to show that it's deliberate. The burden is to show that it's systematic, and those are two very different things. Systematic just means that the way that the system is set up

and the way that the system is operating is causing this problem. And that's exactly what we have here. The way the system was set up and the way the system was operating is what caused this problem. We had -- we were not drawing from the corporate sources prior to 2017.

We had Judge Barker, our Chief Judge, recognize the problem in November of 2016 and say we need to add sources. We need to at the very least add our Voter Rolls, which is such a huge source. That is the primary source for most other jurisdictions. It is the primary source for the Federal System. And Judge Barker recognized that and issued an Executive Order in November of 2016.

Fast forward of October of 2017 when Mr. Mungai's summons are being sent and they still have not added that list. In fact, they did zero mergers in 2017, zero mergers. And the Jury Commissioner testified, it sounds like they had that data by 2017, before his summonses were sent out. They had it and they just didn't do a merger that year

And then above and beyond that, we had the Legislature stepping in and saying we are recognizing the, again, systematic problem that we have here of under-representation of jury pools that are not reflective of our community, are not a fair cross-section of our community. We are stepping in and requiring the DETR list and requiring the voter list. And again, neither one of those sources was being utilized in October of 2017 when the summonses in this case were sent out.

Frankly, Your Honor, I don't think it's even my burden to

 demonstrate that those two sources needed to be added and weren't. I think I have demonstrated it, but I don't think I needed to. I think a simple as the master list is under-representative, this is systematic, this is the way we are doing things is not working is the only burden I had. I demonstrated that. And we went one step further and demonstrated that this wasn't even some sort of situation where, gosh we didn't know anything was going on and we had no idea how to fix this problem. We knew there was a problem. It had been recognized by both the Courts and the Legislature that there was a problem. Solutions to the problem had been mandated and were not being implemented. And what we had was a master list severely underrepresentive of African Americans. And what Mr. Mungai got was a venire that was severely underrepresented in African Americans.

We have met our burden and Your Honor, at this point — I mean, our position at trial was that we were entitled to a new panel. The procedural posture of the case now is that if the Court agrees with us that we have demonstrated that this was systematic, we are entitled to a new trial. And that is what we are asking the Court for, because Mr. Mungai did not have a fair cross-section of his community on his panel and on his venire, and the reason for that is the systematic underrepresentation of African Americans on the master list.

I'll submit it.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Mr. Chen.

MR. CHEN: I can make it quick and brief, Your Honor.

So, essentially, what we're talking about here is like, what she said, the systematic exclusion. And the standard by the United States Supreme Court, the standard that the Nevada Supreme Court uses in Williams v. State 121 Nevada 934, is that the comparative disparity, it says there's likely there's problem with the list that you're generating if it's over 50%. We're at fifty-one point something for the comparative disparity. So, this isn't a perfect jury, I'm not saying that it was an absolutely representative jury, but that's not the standard.

Essentially, we've tried to create a master list. There's going to be some error in creating a master list. So, then when you compare it to the numbers that we have, we're right at the level that **Williams** is. That we're right around 50% and that's — there's going to be error as he said. In the jury venire you expect error because there's only 65 people potentially in it. So, just mathematically, I think we're in the range of a fair venire and per the standard using *Duran v. Missouri the United States Supreme Court Case* 439 U.S. 357, as used by *Williams v. State* 121 934, I think we're within that range here and that the trial verdict should stand.

MS. HOJJAT: And if I may briefly respond, Your Honor

THE COURT: Mr. Chen, were you finished?

MR. CHEN: I was.

THE COURT: Go ahead.

MS. HOJJAT: All right. And my response, Your Honor, is – I mean, I -- what Mr. Chen is discussing is prong two. My understanding is this hearing was a remand for prong three. I think we are already on

prong three. We are on the question of whether the decision that this venire was underrepresented has already been made. We never would have even gotten to the remand if the 51% was not sufficient. There never would have been new order for limited remand. The only reason we got to the order for limited remand was the 51% was sufficient and the burden was on the Defense to show that it was systematic.

Mr. Chen doesn't dispute that portion, because there was no disputing the numbers that were presented here today. They are overwhelming. The remand was not for the purpose of determining whether this venire was underrepresented, the remand was for the purpose of determining why this venire was underrepresented; whether it was random or whether it was systematic, we've demonstrated that it was systematic.

THE COURT: Mr. Chen, I do agree that the remand was with regard to prong three. I'm going to allow you an opportunity to make any additional arguments that you would like with regard to prong three.

MR. CHEN: I would say that the reason for the remand was it is prong three. Based upon this argument that I guess I would add that it was on the zip code argument. And if you read the order in Mungai, the entire reliance on granting today's hearing has to do with prong three as it relates to zip codes. So, I think there, as well, the testimony didn't come out that that's ever happened, and so, I can't add anything else to it. But the numbers are what they are. The evidence came out as it is, but I think that the order is very specific in terms of why the order was granted and how there would have been a systematic exclusion if this

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zip code argument was true. And it's stated in the order, so, I really think that was the purpose of today's hearing.

MS. HOJJAT: Can 1 --

THE COURT: Let me just make sure that I understand your argument.

Are you saying that the Court found that there was -- prong two was met based upon the zip code argument and had there been testimony that really there's no such thing as a zip code argument, then prong two would not have necessarily been met because you were right at the cusp or right on the standard that has been delineated in both U.S. Case Law and Nevada State Case Law?

MR. CHEN: Yeah. I think that's a good way of putting it, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Please, let me know if I'm incorrect.

MR. CHEN: No, no, no, no. I appreciate --

THE COURT: I just want to make sure I understand your argument very clearly.

MR. CHEN: Yeah, no, that's great, thank you.

THE COURT: So, I've been doing court since 8:30 this morning.

MS. HOJJAT: Wow.

THE COURT: So, look, if I miss something, no offense. But I want you to have an opportunity to make your argument and to clarify anything that needs to be.

MR. CHEN: No, I have nothing to clarify, Your Honor. Thank

 THE COURT: Okay.

MS. HOJJAT: Can | address --

THE COURT: You get the last words.

MS. HOJJAT: Thank you, Your Honor.

I would disagree that they -- the purpose of this hearing was just the zip codes. I think the Nevada Supreme Court was quite clear in the order; they were remanding it for a hearing on the issue of systematic exclusion and that the zip code argument that I've raised below was one factor, one consideration, one possible source of a systematic exclusion. They did not remand this solely for a hearing on zip codes.

They found -- prong two has nothing to do with zip codes, and I maybe misunderstood what Mr. Chen was saying here. Prong two has nothing to do with zip codes. Prong one is distinctive, prong two is underrepresentation, prong three is is that underrepresentation caused by systematic issues. Prong one is met. Prong two is met -- has nothing to do with zip codes. Prong three - the remand was for the hearing.

The remand was not simply an inquiry into zip codes and nothing else. I think the hearing is quite clear. They said, considering the third prong of a prima facie cross-section violation, the District 4 Court found the underrepresentation was not due to systematic exclusions based on prior testimony. In Valentine we explained that a District Court's reliance on outdated evidence is misplaced. Here it does

 not appear the prior testimony referenced addressed Mungai's specific allegation of a systematic exclusion- the zip code argument. Also, Legislative Amendments regarding the juror selection process took effect before Mungai's trial, rendering the prior testimony outdated. Therefore, we remand this matter to the District Court for the limited purpose of conducting an evidentiary hearing with respect to Mungai's fair cross-section challenge. They did not remand it for a hearing with respect to zip codes. It was the entire challenge that we made. They themselves went out of their way to list more than one issue, not just the zip code issue.

I, in full disclosure, in candor to the Court, that's why I questioned my own expert about the zip code issue. It ended up that whatever Ms. Witt had said at that prior hear, maybe it was a misunderstanding, maybe she misspoke. That wasn't the case. Zip codes have nothing to do with those summonses. But we discovered a huge problem and we discovered that the issue with the venire is absolutely systematic when we looked at it. When we looked at the master list, we discovered the systematic problem that is leading — that led to the issue with Mr. Mungai's venire. We presented it to this Court as appropriate, as allowed by this hearing.

I think we've met our burden. I don't think the State has -- I don't think that there's anything here, and I don't think even the State is arguing that this isn't systemic, because it just -- the numbers are so overwhelming that it is. The master list was flawed here.

THE COURT: Thank you both for arguments. Thank you

both for your professionalism. I thoroughly enjoyed having you in front of me. I think that you are great litigators. I'm taking this under submission. We'll be issuing our own order. The order to the Supreme Court is due by April 19<sup>th</sup>, so it will be completed by that date.

Go ahead and put this on my Chambers, please. Just so that my Law Clerk and I discuss it on Chambers for Thursday, next Thursday.

THE CLERK: The 15th?

THE COURT: Yes. Today's Thursday is over.

THE CLERK: I hope so.

Okay.

THE COURT: And I still have three more matters to get you for my Chambers.

MR. CHEN: Are we off record on this one?

THE RECORDER: No, hold on.

THE COURT: Off record please.

[Proceeding concluded at 5:05 p.m.]

\*\*\*\*

ATTEST: I do hereby certify that I have truly and correctly transcribed the audio/video proceedings in the above-entitled case to the best of my ability.

UNUMaldanado

Nancy Maldonado

Court Recorder/Transcriber

EXHIBIT(S) LIST

Case No.: C306725 Hearing Date:

Dept. No.: 23 Judge:

Court Clerk:

Plaintiff: State of Nevada

Recorder:

Counsel for Plaintiff:

Defendant: James Mungai

# HEARING BEFORE THE COURT

**DEFENDANT'S EXHIBITS** 

Exhibit Number Exhibit Description

Printed April 8, 2021

FILED

MI HOY 22 A 10: 49

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### EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

IN THE MATTER OF The Jury Master List

1 2

Administrative Order: 16-07

The July Waster List

WHEREAS, Rule 1.30 of the Rules of Practice for the Eighth Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada ("EDCR") charges the Chief Judge of the Eighth Judicial District Court ("Court") with various responsibilities, such as supervising the administrative business of the Court, ensuring the quality and continuity of its services, supervising its calendar, reassigning cases as convenience or necessity requires, assuring the Court's duties are timely and orderly performed, and otherwise facilitating the business of the Court;

WHEREAS, EDCR 6.10 requires the Court to utilize the list of licensed drivers as provided by the State of Nevada Department of Motor Vehicles and Public Safety ("DMV") in assembling a list of qualified jurors in Clark County ("Jury Master List") and further permits the Chief Judge to incorporate additional information sources in forming the Jury Master List;

WHEREAS, pursuant to EDCR 6.10, the Court currently utilizes the names and addresses of active licensed drivers obtained from the DMV, along with the names and addresses of active utilities subscribers obtained from Nevada Energy, Inc. in forming its Jury Master List;

1/4



WHEREAS, adding a third source of names and addresses for obtaining qualified jurors may further expand the Jury Master List and help ensure that the Jury Master List represents a fair cross section of the Clark County community.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, pursuant to EDCR Rule 1.30 and EDCR 6.10, that court administration shall obtain from Clark County the names and addresses of all active registered voters in Clark County and incorporate those names and addresses into the Court's Jury Master List on the next scheduled Jury Master List update.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, for all subsequent Jury Master List updates, court administration shall utilize names and addresses obtained from the DMV, Nevada Energy and active registered voters in Clark County in forming the Jury Master List.

Entered this ZZW day of Alguentar 2016

By:

DAVID BARKER Chief Judge

Eighth Judicial District Court

#### **AGREEMENT**

#### AND .

#### REQUEST FOR INFORMATION

Information as requested pursuant to this Agreement and Request for Information (agreement) below is requested pursuant to the provisions of Nevada Revised Statutes 612.265.

I certify that the Eighth Judicial District Court meets the definition prescribed in section 10 of NRS 612.265, that I have read the provisions of NRS 612.265 and that I am authorized to make this request and, thereby, enter into this agreement on behalf of the Eighth Judicial District Court. I understand that the information received from the Department of Employment, Training and Rehabilitation, Employment Security Division (ESD) as a result of this request for information is confidential and/or privileged and cannot be disclosed or be open to public inspection in any manner. I understand that such a disclosure or opening of such information to public inspection by me or any representative of my organization might constitute a gross misdemeanor pursuant to NRS 612.265(13).

I further certify that the Eighth Judicial District Court will take all steps reasonably required to ensure that information received from ESD as a result of this agreement is not disclosed in violation of NRS 612.265, and is safeguarded and stored in a place physically secure from access by unauthorized persons, and in such a manner so that unauthorized persons cannot obtain the information by any means. I further certify that the Eighth Judicial District Court personnel who receive this information on behalf of the Eighth Judicial District Court under this agreement will be limited to those with a need to access this information for the purposes limited by this agreement. I further certify that the Eighth Judicial District Court will undertake precautions to ensure that only authorized personnel are given access to information disclosed hereby which is stored in computer systems, and will require each recipient of information under this agreement to instruct all personnel having access to such data about the safeguard and confidentiality requirements of this agreement and NRS 612.265. I acknowledge that all such personnel of Eighth Judicial District Court will adhere to NRS 612.265 and the requirements of this agreement; and that all infractions will be reported promptly to BSD.



I further certify that the Elihth Judicial Di	strict Court will be subject to audit and/or on-
site inspection by ESD to ensure that the requ	airements of NRS 612.265 and this agreement are being
met	
On behalf of the Eighth Judicial District Co	ourt, I hereby request a single file with the
following information from ESD's files:	
Name, Address, and Date of Birth of person	s who recelve Unemployment Insurance benefits in
any county.	
This agreement may be terminated immedia	ately by ESD if changes in governing State or Federal
*	hereunder illegal, impracticable or impossible. This
	ne and by either party upon written notification. ESD is,
and remains, the custodian of record with	respect to the information provided pursuant to this
agreement.	
I further certify that I have authority to bind n	ny organization to the commitments set forth above.
Milled South	
2.73	03/08/2019
Signature	Date
Mariah Witt	702-671-4512
Printed name	Phone #
Jury Commissioner, Ei. htth Judicial Distr	ict Court
Title	
2 Yana	
wittm@clarkcountycourts.us	

Email Address

#### **NEVADA REVISED STATUTE 612.265**

#### Disclosure Of Information By Employment Security Division

NRS 612.265 Disclosure of information by Employment Security Division and Administrator; duty of Division of Industrial Relations of Department of Business and Industry to provide certain information to Administrator; penalty for improper use or dissemination of certain information.

- 1. Except as otherwise provided in this section and NRS 239.0115 and 612.642, information obtained from any employing unit or person pursuant to the administration of this chapter and any determination as to the benefit rights of any person is confidential and may not be disclosed or be open to public inspection in any manner which would reveal the person's or employing unit's identity.
- 2. Any claimant or a legal representative of a claimant is entitled to information from the records of the Division, to the extent necessary for the proper presentation of the claimant's claim in any proceeding pursuant to this chapter. A claimant or an employing unit is not entitled to information from the records of the Division for any other purpose.
- 3. The Administrator may, in accordance with a cooperative agreement among all participants in the statewide longitudinal data system developed pursuant to <u>NRS 400.037</u> and administered pursuant to <u>NRS 223.820</u>, make the information obtained by the Division available to:
- (a) The Board of Regents of the University of Nevada for the purpose of complying with the provisions of subsection 4 of NRS 396,531; and
- (b) The Director of the Department of Employment, Training and Rehabilitation for the purpose of complying with the provisions of paragraph (d) of subsection 1 of NRS 232,920.
- 4. Subject to such restrictions as the Administrator may by regulation prescribe, the information obtained by the Division may be made available to:
- (a) Any agency of this or any other state or any federal agency charged with the administration or enforcement of laws relating to unemployment compensation, public assistance, workers' compensation or labor and industrial relations, or the maintenance of a system of public employment offices;
  - (b) Any state or local agency for the enforcement of child support;
  - (c) The Internal Revenue Service of the Department of the Treasury,
  - (d) The Department of Taxation;
  - (e) The State Contractors' Board in the performance of its duties to enforce the provisions of charter 624 of NRS; and
- (f) The Secretary of State to operate the state business portal established pursuant to charter 75A of NRS for the purposes of verifying that data submitted via the portal has satisfied the necessary requirements established by the Division, and as necessary to maintain the technical integrity and functionality of the state business portal established pursuant to charter 75A of NRS.
- ▶ Information obtained in connection with the administration of the Division may be made available to persons or agencies for purposes appropriate to the operation of a public employment service or a public assistance program.

- 5. Upon written request made by the State Controller or a public officer of a local government, the Administrator shall furnish from the records of the Division the name, address and place of employment of any person listed in the records of employment of the Division. The request may be made electronically and must set forth the social security number of the person about whom the request is made and contain a statement signed by the proper authority of the State Controller or local government certifying that the request is made to allow the proper authority to enforce a law to recover a debt or obligation assigned to the State Controller for collection or owed to the local government, as applicable. Except as otherwise provided in NRS 239.0115, the information obtained by the State Controller or local government is confidential and may not be used or disclosed for any purpose other than the collection of a debt or obligation assigned to the State Controller for collection or owed to that local government. The Administrator may charge a reasonable fee for the cost of providing the requested information.
- 6. The Administrator may publish or otherwise provide information on the names of employers, their addresses, their type or class of business or industry, and the approximate number of employees employed by each such employer, if the information released will assist unemployed persons to obtain employment or will be generally useful in developing and diversifying the economic interests of this State. Upon request by a state agency which is able to demonstrate that its intended use of the information will benefit the residents of this State, the Administrator may, in addition to the information listed in this subsection, disclose the number of employees employed by each employer and the total wages paid by each employer. The Administrator may charge a fee to cover the actual costs of any administrative expenses relating to the disclosure of this information to a state agency. The Administrator may require the state agency to certify in writing that the agency will take all actions necessary to maintain the confidentiality of the information and prevent its unauthorized disclosure.
- 7. Upon request therefor, the Administrator shall furnish to any agency of the United States charged with the administration of public works or assistance through public employment, and may furnish to any state agency similarly charged, the name, address, ordinary occupation and employment status of each recipient of benefits and the recipient's rights to further benefits pursuant to this chapter.
- 8. To further a current criminal investigation, the chief executive officer of any law enforcement agency of this State may submit a written request to the Administrator that the Administrator furnish, from the records of the Division, the name, address and place of employment of any person listed in the records of employment of the Division. The request must set forth the social security number of the person about whom the request is made and contain a statement algued by the chief executive officer certifying that the request is made to further a criminal investigation currently being conducted by the agency. Upon receipt of such a request, the Administrator shall furnish the information requested. The Administrator may charge a fee to cover the actual costs of any related administrative expenses.
- 9. In addition to the provisions of subsection 6, the Administrator shall provide lists containing the names and addresses of employers, and information regarding the wages paid by each employer to the Department of Taxation, upon request, for use in verifying returns for the taxes imposed pursuant to chapters 363A, 363B and 363C of NRS. The Administrator may charge a fee to cover the actual costs of any related administrative expenses.

- 10. Upon the request of any district judge or jury commissioner of the judicial district in which the county is located, the Administrator shall, in accordance with other agreements entered into with other district courts and in compliance with 20 C.F.R. Part 603, and any other applicable federal laws and regulations governing the Division, furnish the name, address and date of birth of persons who receive benefits in any county, for use in the selection of trial jurors pursuant to NRS 6.045. The court or jury commissioner who requests the list of such persons shall reimburse the Division for the reasonable cost of providing the requested information.
- 11. The Division of Industrial Relations of the Department of Business and Industry shall periodically submit to the Administrator, from information in the index of claims established pursuant to NRS\_616B.018, a list containing the name of each person who received benefits pursuant to charges 616A to 616D, inclusive, or chapter 617 of NRS. Upon receipt of that information, the Administrator shall compare the information so provided with the records of the Employment Security Division regarding persons claiming benefits pursuant to this chapter for the same period. The information submitted by the Division of Industrial Relations must be in a form determined by the Administrator and must contain the social security number of each such person. If it appears from the information submitted that a person is simultaneously claiming benefits under this chapter and under chapters 616A to 616D, inclusive, or chapter 617 of NRS, the Administrator shall notify the Attorney General or any other appropriate law enforcement agency.
- 12. The Administrator may request the Comptroller of the Currency of the United States to cause an examination of the correctness of any return or report of any national banking association rendered pursuant to the provisions of this chapter, and may in connection with the request transmit any such report or return to the Comptroller of the Currency of the United States as provided in section 3305(c) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.
- 13. The Administrator, any employee or other person acting on behalf of the Administrator, or any employee or other person acting on behalf of an agency or entity allowed to access information obtained from any employing unit or person in the administration of this chapter, or any person who has obtained a list of applicants for work, or of claimants or recipients of benefits pursuant to this chapter, is guilty of a gross misdemeanor if he or she:
  - (a) Uses or permits the use of the list for any political purpose;
  - (b) Uses or permits the use of the list for any purpose other than one authorized by the Administrator or by law; or
  - (c) Fails to protect and prevent the unauthorized use or dissemination of information derived from the list.
- [4. All letters, reports or communications of any kind, and or written, from the employer or employee to each other or to the Division or any of its agents, representatives or employees are privileged and must not be the subject matter or basis for any lawsuit if the letter, report or communication is written, sent, delivered or prepared pursuant to the requirements of this chapter.

[Part 4:59:1941; A 1945, 119; 1955, 518] — (NRS A 1965, 115; 1967, 627; 1971, 749; 1983, 409, 858; 1987, 1463; 1989, 1170; 1991, 351, 2464, 2466; 1993, 534, 624, 657, 803, 1811; 1995, 579, 1580, 1997; 1997, 579; 1999, 1756; 2003, 20th Special Session, 214; 2007, 2123; 2013, 96, 2210; 2015, 136, 2674, 2705, 2934, 3373; 2017, 3584, 3882, 4327)

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Jesmin Lilly-Spells DISTRICT JUDGE

DEPARTMENT XXIII

# DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

THE STATE OF NEVADA	)		
	) Case No.	C-15-306725-1	
Plaintiff,	) Dept No.	XXIII	
-VS-	)		
IAMES ALPHAXARD MUNGAI	1	FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW	
Defendants	i		

# FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

This matter having come on for hearing on the 8th day of April, 2021, at the Hour of 1:30 p.m. before Department XXIII of the Eighth Judicial District Court, in and for Clark County, Nevada, with Judge Jasmin Lilly-Spells presiding, Plaintiff being represented by the STATE OF NEVADA, by and through, Alexander G. Chen, Esq., and Defendant James Alphaxard Mungai, represented by, the CLARK COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER, by and through, Nadia Hojjat.

The Court having conducted an evidentiary hearing, heard argument, reviewed pleadings and relevant law hereby makes the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law concerning the Defendant's Fair Cross Section challenge.

# FINDINGS OF FACT

James Alphaxard Mungai (hereafter "Mungai") was charged with Battery Resulting

in Substantial Bodily Harm Constituting Domestic Violence and Sexual Assault with Use of a Deadly Weapon Resulting in Substantial Bodily Harm.

Mungai's trial began on December 4, 2017 and concluded December 13, 2017. The jury returned a guilty verdict on all counts charged.

On January 30, 2018, the court imposed a minimum of twenty-four (24) months and a maximum of sixty (60) months for Count 1 and a minimum of fifteen (15) years to life for Count 2, to run concurrent with Count 1. The court imposed a minimum of eight (8) years and a maximum of twenty (20) years for deadly weapons enhancement consecutive to Count 2 for an aggregate total of a minimum of twenty-five (25) years to life with lifetime supervision pursuant to NRS 179D.460.

On February 27, 2018, Mungai filed a Notice of Appeal with The Supreme Court of Nevada.

On June 11, 2018, Mungai filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.

On March 6, 2020, The Supreme Court of Nevada filed an Order of Limited Remand finding that the district court abused its discretion by denying Mungai's fair-cross-section challenge without holding an evidentiary hearing and ordered the district court to conduct an evidentiary hearing addressing Mungai's argument that the 65-person venire violated his fair-cross-section right because African Americans were not fairly and reasonable represented, specifically due to systematic exclusion related to summonses sent disproportionately based on postal ZIP codes.

Upon remand, Mungai's case was set for an evidentiary hearing on July 28, 2020; however, the hearing was continued for COVID-19 related reasons which lasted until

Jesmin Lilly-Spells DISTRICT JUDGE

DEPARTMENT XXIII

January 2021

On January 4, 2021, the instant case was transferred to Department 23 of the Eighth Judicial District Court.

On January 6, 2021, Mungai filed a Motion for Court Order to Produce Documents, asking thr court to sign an order directing the Jury Commissioner to turn over an unredacted copy of the 2017 Prospective Juror Master List. The motion was continued two times to allow for the proper party of interest to be served and have an opportunity to respond.

On January 25, 2021, with no objection from counsel representing the Jury

Commissioner, the court GRANTED the Motion for Court Order to Produce Documents

with the condition that the defense sign a protective order.

On February 7, 2021, the State of Nevada, Mungai and the Jury Commissioner entered into a stipulation and agreement concerning the unredaction of juror information.

On April 8, 2021, this court held an evidentiary hearing as ordered by The Supreme Court of Nevada,

There were two defense witnesses, Jeffrey Martin and Mariah Witt, who provided testimony at the evidentiary hearing concerning the jury panel at the time of Mungai's trial and the overall process in obtaining a jury venires, as further discussed below.

Defense expert Martin qualifies as an expert Mathematician and Statistician expert as his testimony (1) is qualified in an area of technical or other specialized knowledge; (2) his testimony assists the trier of fact and (3) his testimony was limited to matters within his scope of specialized knowledge. See Hallmark v. Eldrige, 124 Nev. 492, 498, 189 P.3d

Jasmin Lilly-Speth

646, 650 (2008); See also NRS 52.075.

Ms. Witt serves as the Jury Commissioner for the Eighth Judicial District Court in Clark County, Nevada.

The Prospective Master List of Jurors is an ever changing document. The jury commissioner caused summons for defendant Mungai's trial to be sent out in October 2017. The 2017 master list of potential jurors no longer exists, as the requisite retention period is until the document is superseded. <sup>1</sup> Testimony of Jury Commissioner. Defendant Mungai, the Jury Commissioner and defense expert, Martin brainstormed ways to recreate the 2017 Master List of Prospective Jurors. (Testimony of Jury Commissioner and Jeffrey Martin).

In reviewing the current master list of potential jurors, Martin recreated a 2017 master list of prospective jurors by removing individuals who turned (18) eighteen after the original 2017 list was created, reviewing United States Census Bureau data and reviewing the sequential numbering system of how the software merges and adds prospective jurors. Additionally, Martin searched for and removed duplicate entries in recreating a 2017 master list. (Testimony of Jeffrey Martin).

The master list of prospective jurors is voluminous; containing approximately 3.5 million records. (Testimony of Jury Commissioner). Martin crosschecked the recreated 2017 list and noted that the recreated list contained every juror who received a summons in 2017 and that the youngest potential juror's birthdate coincided with the timing of the prior

Jasmin Lilly-Spalls DISTRICT JUDGE

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> The 2017 master list was superseded in March 2018. (Testimony of Jury Commissioner).

merger. (Testimony of Jeffrey Martin).

The electronic system currently in use was set up in March, 2016. There are approximately two mergers done each year to add additional eligible jurors to the list. There was a systematic merger in December, 2016. No mergers occurred in 2017. Two mergers occurred in 2018, with the first done in March 2018. (Testimony of Jury Commissioner).

In 2017, the master list was comprised from data from Nevada Energy and the Department of Motor Vehicles. In November of 2016, the District Court Chief Judge authored Administrative Order AO 16-07 requiring that that master list include voter registration data beginning with the next merger. (Testimony of Jury Commissioner; *See also* Evidentiary Hearing Exhibits). In February 2017, the Nevada Legislature drafted NRS 6.045 mandating that data from voter registration and the Department of Training and Rehabilitation (DETR) be added to increase the master list of potential voters. NRS 6.045 became effective on July 1, 2017. At time of Mungai's trial, the master list of potential voters did not include data from DETR or voter registration because (1) no mergers were conducted in 2017; (2) there was some difficulty in obtaining the necessary information from outside sources to add the data and (3) the program was not equipped to handle the implementation of NRS 6.045. (Testimony of Jury Commissioner).

The Jury Commission utilizes a computer program which auto generates summons by randomly selecting individuals from the list. The program does not account for race or zip codes. The Jury Commission tracks the race of individuals who appear for jury duty but is unaware whether the sources used to comprise the master list include racial

Jasmia Lilly-Spells DISTRICT JUDGE

Jesmin Lilly-Spells DISTRICT JUDGE

DEPARTMENT KXIII

demographics. (Testimony of Jury Commissioner)2.

Defense witness Martin is familiar with the program that the Eighth Judicial Court uses to store the master list and send out summonses. In the recreated 2017 master list, 10.62% of prospective jurors identified as Black or African American. In defendant's trial, 6.15% of prospective jurors identified as Black or African American. As a whole, the recreated 2017 master list had an absolute disparity of 2.84% underrepresentation for Blacks/African Americans. The 2017 summonses as a whole had an absolute disparity of 1.99% underrepresentation and the defendant, Mungai's trial had an absolute disparity of 6.45% underrepresentation of Blacks/African Americans. Regarding comparative disparity, the 2017 recreated master list had a comparative disparity of 22.53% underrepresentation of Blacks/African Americans. The defendant's trial had a comparative disparity of 51.16% underrepresentation of Blacks/African Americans. Martin found a statistical significance in the standard deviation here, noting that there were more than 56 standard deviations in defendant's trial, where a statistician would expect not more than 2 or 3 standard deviations. The federal courts and most state systems use some version of the voter registration polls to issue juror summons. (Testimony of Jeffrey Martin).

Utilizing pre-pandemic statistics from March 2020, as published on DETR's website, Martin opined that in March 2020, 17.67% of the individuals receiving

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> The Jury Commissioner suggested that the raw data has a category for racial demographics but that none of the sources used to generate the mater list independently track racial data. The Jury Commissioner testified that the racial data within the master list is maintained from information received upon jurors responding to the summonses. The court found this testimony speculative.

unemployment benefits within the entire state of Nevada were Black/African American.<sup>3</sup> Based upon this data, adding DETR records as a source of potential voters would have created a comparative disparity of 85.11% overrepresentation of Black/African American potential jurors within Clark County, thereby minimizing the underrepresentation of Blacks/African-Americans from the master list. (Testimony of Jeffrey Martin).

#### CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

The court having reviewed the pleadings, documents on file, relevant law, testimony from the evidentiary hearing and argument from the parties;

THE COURT FINDS that the record reflects that defendant Mungai established prongs one (1) and two (2) at trial and the remand was limited to conduct an evidentiary hearing on prong three (3).

THE COURT FINDS that the selection of a petit jury from a representative cross section of the community is an essential component of the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. *Taylor v. Louisiana*, 419 U.S. 522, 528, 95 S. Ct. 692, 697, 42 L. Ed. 2d 690 (1975).

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that community participation in the administration of the criminal law, moreover, is not only consistent with our democratic heritage but is also critical to public confidence in the fairness of the criminal justice system. Restricting jury service to only special groups or excluding identifiable segments playing major roles in the community cannot be squared with the constitutional concept of jury trial. 'Trial by

Jasmin Lilly-Spells DISTRICT JUDGE

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Martin testified that he did not have access to DETR data and used the closest in time data to 2017 from DETR that he could find.

jury presupposes a jury drawn from a pool broadly representative of the community as well as impartial in a specific case. . . . (T)he broad representative character of the jury should be maintained, partly as assurance of a diffused impartiality and partly because sharing in the administration of justice is a phase of civic responsibility.' *Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co.*, 328 U.S. 217, 227, 66 S.Ct. 984, 90 L.Ed. 1181 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).

THE COURT FINDS that "systematic exclusion" means "underrepresentation ... inherent in the particular jury-selection process utilized." Evans v. State, 112 Nev. 1172, 1186–87, 926 P.2d 265, 275 (1996) citing Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364, 99 S.Ct 664, 668 (1979).

THE COURT FINDS that "without an awareness of the makeup of the lists used to select the jury pool or the actual jury pool itself, a jury commissioner cannot adequately determine whether the jury pool or the jury lists reflect a fair cross section of the community. If the jury list does not produce jury pools that reflect a fair cross section of the community, then the jury commissioner should use more lists than mandated by statute."

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that "without having knowledge of the composition of jury pools and jury lists, an assertion that they provide juries comprising a fair cross section of the community is mere speculation." Williams v. State, 121 Nev. 934, 942, 125 P.3d 627, 632 (2005). The Court finds that at the time of the defendant's trial the

Jasmin Lilly-Spells DISTRICT JUDGE

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> In 2002, the Nevada Jury Improvement Commission recommended that at least three source lists be used to constitute jury pools. Jury Improvement Commission, Report of the Supreme Court of Nevada 10 (2002), available at <a href="http://www.nvsupremecourt.us/DOCS/reports/rpt\_0210\_jury.PDF">http://www.nvsupremecourt.us/DOCS/reports/rpt\_0210\_jury.PDF</a> Williams v. State, 121 Nev. 934, 942, 125 P.3d 627, 632 (2005).

Jury Commissioner was not aware of the racial makeup of the summoned jurors unless said juror had previously served as a juror in the Eighth Judicial District Court, which contravenes NRS 6.045(5).

THE COURT FINDS that the parties presented testimony at the evidentiary hearing with regard to prong two (2): "that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community." Williams v. State, 121 Nev. 934, 939, 125 P.3d 627, 631 (2005).

THE COURT FINDS the recreated 2017 master list to be valid reconstruction of the original list given the steps taken to recreate the document and the testimony of both the Jury Commissioner and witness Jeffery Martin.

THE COURT FINDS that Mr. Martin's testimony at the evidentiary hearing establishes that there was a comparative disparity of 51.16% underrepresentation in the defendant's trial.<sup>5</sup>

THE COURT FINDS that the Eighth Judicial District Court took steps through its Administrative Order 16-07 to enhance the potential juror master list.

THE COURT FINDS that after NRS 6.045 became effective, the Jury

Commissioner took steps to comply with the statutory requirements and add additional sources to the potential juror master list, but ultimately did not comply until mergers were conducted in 2018.

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that at all times the Jury Commissioner utilized a

Jasmin Lilly-Spells DISTRICT JUDGE

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> Appellant argues that the comparative disparity at trial was 63.12% or 50.08% depending on whether there were four or three Blacks/African Americans on the venire. The Respondent disputes this calculation in their brief at page 20,

random computerized system to send jury summons to potential jurors. The potential jurors were selected in a fair manner. See Sayedzada v. State, 134 Nev. 283, 134 Nev. Adv. Op. 38, 419 P.3d 184 (2018).

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that the Jury Commissioner did not intentionally or actively take any steps to exclude potential jurors of any racial makeup or otherwise.

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that the statistical significant deviation of 56 standard deviation points as well as the comparative disparity of 22.53% underrepresentation of Blacks/African Americans on the master list illustrates an underrepresentation of Blacks/African Americans as potential jurors in the 2017 master list utilized at the time of Mungai's trial.<sup>6</sup>

THE COURT FINDS that adding additional sources for potential jurors as recommended in AO 16-07 and mandated by NRS 6.045 would have created a more comprehensive potential juror pool.

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that the underrepresentation of Blacks/African Americans on the master list directly contributed to the disparity in defendant Mungai's trial.

THE COURT FINDS, that although unintentional, the system in place at the time of defendant Mungai's trial, which solely utilized Nevada Energy and Department of Motor

Jaumin Litty-Spetts DISTRICT JUDGE

Absolute disparity and comparative disparity measurements, courts have recognized, can be misleading when, as here, "members of the distinctive group comp[ose] [only] a small percentage of those eligible for jury service." Smith, 463 Mich., at 203-204, 615 N.W.2d, at 2-3. And to our knowledge, "[n]o court ... has accepted [a standard deviation analysis] alone as determinative in Sixth Amendment challenges to jury selection systems." *United States v. Rioux*, 97

1 Vehicles did not track the racial composition of summoned jurors and resulted in a 2 statistical significance of underrepresentation of Blacks/African Americans and thus did 3 not represent an accurate cross section of the community. 4 The COURT FUTHER FINDS that this underrepresentation of Blacks/African 5 6 Americans as was due to a systematic exclusion of the group in the jury selection process 7 because the sources utilized did not accurately capture potential jurors of Black/African 8 American racial makeup. 9 10 IT IS SO ORDERED. 11 Dated this 20th day of April, 2021 12 13 THE HONORABL MIN LILLY-SPELLS 14 DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 15 1A9 BBC DCCD 07F5 Jasmin Lilly-Spells 16 **District Court Judge** CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 17 I hereby certify that on or about the date signed I caused the foregoing 18 document to be electronically served pursuant to EDCR 8.05(a) and 8.05(f) through the Eighth 19 Judicial District Court's electronic filing system, with the date and time of the electronic service substituted for the date and place of deposit in the mail to and/or by fax and mail to: 20 21 22 23 24 Deborah A. Boyer
Deborah A. Boyer, JEA 25 26 27 28 Jasmin Lilly-Spails

DISTRICT JUDGE

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**CSERV** 

DISTRICT COURT
CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

State of Nevada

CASE NO: C-15-306725-1

1/

DEPT. NO. Department 23

James Mungai

## AUTOMATED CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

This automated certificate of service was generated by the Eighth Judicial District Court. The foregoing Finding of Fact and Conclusions of Law was served via the court's electronic eFile system to all recipients registered for e-Service on the above entitled case as listed below:

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JAMES ALPHAXARD MUNGAI, Appellant, vs. THE STATE OF NEVADA, Respondent. No. 75247

FILED

SEP 2 8 2021

GLE PREME COURT

### ORDER VACATING JUDGMENT AND REMANDING

This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction, pursuant to a jury verdict, of sexual assault with the use of a deadly weapon and battery resulting in substantial bodily harm constituting domestic violence. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; Susan Johnson, Judge.

Appellant James Mungai argued that the district court erroneously denied his fair-cross-section challenge without conducting an evidentiary hearing. Before voir dire commenced, Mungai objected to the 65-person venire because it contained only four African-Americans and thus did not represent a fair cross-section of the community. See Williams v. State, 121 Nev. 934, 939, 125 P.3d 627, 631 (2005) (explaining that a defendant "is entitled to a venire selected from a fair cross section of the community under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution"). The district court denied Mungai's claim without conducting an evidentiary hearing on the systematic exclusion allegations he made, instead relying on its recollection of prior testimony from the jury commissioner in another case on a similar allegation. This court issued an order of limited remand for the district court to conduct an evidentiary hearing on Mungai's claim. See Mungai v. State, Docket No. 75247, Order

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of Limited Remand at 3 (Mar. 6, 2020); Valentine v. State, 135 Nev. 463, 466, 454 P.3d 709, 714 (2019) (concluding that "an evidentiary hearing is warranted on a fair-cross-section challenge when a defendant makes specific allegations that, if true, would be sufficient to establish a prima facie violation of the fair-cross-section requirement").

After the hearing, the district court rejected Mungai's challenge in part but nevertheless found that systematic exclusion affected the composition of Mungai's venire and resulted in an underrepresentation of African Americans.1 Based on the district court's finding, Mungai would be entitled to relief. See Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 263 (1986) (providing that "when a petit jury has been selected upon improper criteria . . . we have required reversal of the conviction because the effect of the violation cannot be ascertained"); Cortinas v. State, 124 Nev. 1013, 1024, 195 P.3d 315, 322 (2008) (holding that structural errors are "intrinsically harmful... [and] necessarily render a trial fundamentally unfair" (internal quotation marks Thus, this court ordered the parties to submit responses omitted)). addressing the effect of the district court's order on the instant appeal without expressing an opinion on the merits. See Mungai, Docket No. 75247, Order to Show Cause at 2 (June 16, 2021). While the State does not concede the propriety of the district court's order, it acknowledges that Mungai is entitled to a new trial based on the finding of systematic exclusion in the jury selection process. Mungai agrees. Because the parties

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>The Honorable Jasmin D. Lilly-Spells, Judge, presided at the evidentiary hearing.

concur, and without expressing any opinion regarding the merits of the district court's order, we

ORDER the judgment of conviction VACATED AND REMAND this matter to the district court for proceedings consistent with this order.2

Cadish

Pickering

J.

Herndon

Hon. Susan Johnson, District Judge Hon, Jasmin D. Lilly-Spells, District Judge Clark County Public Defender Attorney General/Carson City Clark County District Attorney Eighth District Court Clerk

<sup>2</sup>Because relief is warranted on this basis, we need not reach Mungai's remaining contentions.

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JAMES ALPHAXARD MUNGAI, Appellant,

VS.

THE STATE OF NEVADA,

Respondent.

Supreme Court No. 75247 District Court Case No. C306725

FILED

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DEPLITY OF SOM

REMITTITUR

TO: Steven D. Grierson, Eighth District Court Clerk

Pursuant to the rules of this court, enclosed are the following:

Certified copy of Judgment and Opinion/Order. Receipt for Remittitur.

DATE: October 26, 2021

Elizabeth A. Brown, Clerk of Court

By: Sandy Young Deputy Clerk

cc (without enclosures):

Hon, Susan Johnson, District Judge

Clark County Public Defender \ Phillip J. Kohn

Clark County Public Defender \ Howard Brooks, Chief Deputy Public Defender

Clark County Public Defender \ William M. Waters, Chief Deputy Public Defender

Clark County Public Defender \ Nadia Hojjat

Clark County District Attorney \ Alexander G. Chen, Chief Deputy District

Attorney

Clark County District Attorney \ John T. Niman

#### RECEIPT FOR REMITTITUR

Deputy District Court Clerk

RECEIVED APPEALS OCT 28 2021

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NOV 0 3 2021

ELEABETH A. BROWN

CLERK OF SUPREME COURT

DEPUTY CLERK

PEPUTY CLERK

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about

JAMES ALPHAXARD MUNGAI, Appellant, vs. THE STATE OF NEVADA, Respondent. Supreme Court No. 75247 District Court Case No. C306725

## **CLERK'S CERTIFICATE**

STATE OF NEVADA, ss.

I, Elizabeth A. Brown, the duly appointed and qualified Clerk of the Supreme Court of the State of Nevada, do hereby certify that the following is a full, true and correct copy of the Judgment in this matter.

#### **JUDGMENT**

The court being fully advised in the premises and the law, it is now ordered, adjudged and decreed, as follows:

"ORDER the judgement of conviction VACATED AND REMAND this matter to the district court for proceedings consistent with this order."

Judgment, as quoted above, entered this 28th day of September, 2021.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have subscribed my name and affixed the seal of the Supreme Court at my Office in Carson City, Nevada this October 26, 2021.

Elizabeth A. Brown, Supreme Court Clerk

By: Sandy Young Deputy Clerk

## CERTIFICATE OF ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION

I hereby certify that service of the above and foregoing was made this 3rd day of December, 2021, by electronic transmission, through Odyssey eFileNV EfileAndServe, to:

DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE Email Address: motions@clarkcountyda.com

By: <u>/s/ Carrie Connally</u>
An employee of the
Clark County Public Defender's Office

1	IN THE SUPREME COURT	OF THE STATE OF NEVADA
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4	IZE ANIINDE XAA ENVEDIE	) Company
5	KEANDRE VALENTINE,   Petitioner,	) Case No.
6	,	) Dist. Ct. C-16-316081-1
7	VS.	)
8	THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT	)
9	COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLARK	
10	AND THE HONORABLE JACQUELINE	)
11	BLUTH, DISTRICT JUDGE,	
12	Respondents,	)
13	and	
14	THE STATE OF NEVADA, Real Party in Interest.	)
15		
16		_)
17	PETITIONER'S APPENDIX – V	
18	DARIN F. IMLAY Clark County Public Defender 309 South Third Street	STEVEN B. WOLFSON Clark County District Attorney 200 Lewis Avenue, 3 <sup>rd</sup> Floor Las Vegas, Nevada 89155
19	Las Vegas, Nevada 89155-2610	Las Vegas, Nevada 89155
20	Attorney for Appellant	AARON D. FORD Attorney General 100 North Carson Street
21		Carson City, Nevada 89701-4717 (702) 687-3538
22		Counsel for Respondent
23		
24	<u>CERTIFICATE</u>	OF SERVICE
25	I hereby certify that this document was filed electronically with the	
26	Nevada Supreme Court on the 26th day	-
27		
28		

1	foregoing document shall be made in accordance with the Master Service List as	
2	follows:	
3	AARON D. FORD SHARON G. DICKINSON	
4	ALEXANDER CHEN TYLER GASTON	
5	I further certify that I served a copy of this document via e-mail:	
6	HONORABLE JACQUELINE BLUTH	
7	DISTRICT COURT, DEPT. VI c/o dept06lc@clarkcountycourts.us	
8		
9	BY <u>/s/ Carrie M. Connolly</u> Employee, Clark County Public Defender's Office	
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