IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

LEQUANA BROWN,

Appellant,

STATE OF NEVADA,

v.

Respondent.

Electronically Filed Feb 03 2022 09:29 a.m. Elizabeth A. Brown Clerk of Supreme Court

CASE NO: 84042

APPELLANT'S APPENDIX

Volume 1

STEVEN S. OWENS, ESQ. Nevada Bar #004352 Steven S. Owens, LLC 1000 N. Green Valley #440-529 Henderson, Nevada 89074 (702) 595-1171

STEVEN B. WOLFSON Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #001565 200 Lewis Avenue Post Office Box 552212 Las Vegas, Nevada 89155-2212 (702) 671-2500

AARON D. FORD Nevada Attorney General Nevada Bar #007704 100 North Carson Street Carson City, Nevada 89701-4717 (775) 684-1265


Counsel for Appellant

Counsel for Respondent

ALPHABETICAL INDEX TO APPELLANT'S APPENDIX

Vol	Pleading	Page
1	Amended Guilty Plea Agreement	235
1	Amended Indictment	200
1	Court Minutes (10-17-19)	101
1	Court Minutes (10-24-19)	108
1	Court Minutes (11-19-19)	118
1	Court Minutes (12-5-19)	131
1	Court Minutes (12-10-19)	132
2	Court Minutes (2-5-21)	306
2	Court Minutes (2-25-21)	307
2	Court Minutes (3-9-21)	310
2	Court Minutes (4-13-21)	311
2	Court Minutes (8-26-21)	346
2	Court Minutes (9-2-21)	347
2	Court Minutes (9-9-21)	350
1	Guilty Plea Agreement	190
1	Indictment	102
2	Judgment of Conviction	266
2	Motion for Appointment of Counsel	284
2	Motion to Withdraw Counsel	288
2	Notice of Appeal	435
2	Notice of Change of Hearing	348
2	Notice of Entry of Findings of Fact	414
2	Order Appointing Counsel	308
2	Order for Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus	292
2	Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus	268
1	Recorder's Transcript of Hearing (1-3-20)	134
1	Recorder's Transcript of Hearing (3-12-20)	147
1	Recorder's Transcript of Hearing (4-30-20)	202
1	Recorder's Transcript of Hearing (5-7-20)	206
1	Recorder's Transcript of Hearing (5-28-20)	210
1	Recorder's Transcript of Hearing (6-4-20)	213
1	Recorder's Transcript of Hearing (6-11-20)	217
1	Recorder's Transcript of Hearing (6-16-20)	227
2	Recorder's Transcript of Hearing (6-18-20)	245
2	Recorder's Transcript of Hearing (11-4-21)	351
1	Reply to State's Motion to Consolidate	119

Reply to State's Response to Supplemental Brief	339
Reporter's Transcript of Proceeding (GJ Vol 1 10-16-19)	1
Reporter's Transcript of Proceeding (GJ Vol 2 10-16-19)	92
State's Motion to Consolidate	109
State's Notice of Intent to Seek Punishment as a Habitual Criminal	145
State's Response to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus	294
State's Response to Supplemental Brief	323
Supplemental Brief in Support of Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus	312
	Reporter's Transcript of Proceeding (GJ Vol 1 10-16-19) Reporter's Transcript of Proceeding (GJ Vol 2 10-16-19) State's Motion to Consolidate State's Notice of Intent to Seek Punishment as a Habitual Criminal State's Response to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus State's Response to Supplemental Brief



12:00	1	GRAND JURORS PRESENT ON OCTOBER 16, 2019
	2	
	3	STEVE LURVEY, FOREPERSON
	4	TIARA COSENTINO, Deputy Foreperson
12:00	5	MARLA SMITH, Secretary
	6	KATHERINE FORRED, Assistant Secretary
	7	JOHN FINKOWSKI
	8	PAUL GILLENWATER
	9	MARK GOODMAN
12:00	10	JEFFREY GRUBER
	11	CRISTAL HINOJOSH CRUZ
	12	PAUL KOSLUCHER
	13	WILLIAM LISTON
	14	FLORA MCCLINTON-MCFARLING
12:00	15	GERALD REID
	16	DANIEL STACK
	17	NOEL WELLMAN
	18	WALTER ZUKOWSKI
	19	
12:00	20	
	21	Also present at the request of the Grand Jury:
	22	Brandon Albright, Deputy District Attorney
	23	Stephanie Getler, Deputy District Attorney
	24	
	25	

1		INDEX OF WITNESSES
2		Examined
3		
4	KELSEY MESTRE	7
5	JAVON KAMANUWAI	18
6	BRIAN AKITA	34
7	ERIK PERKETT	49
8		
9		
10		
11		
12		
13		
14		
15		
16		
17		
18		
19		
20		
21		
22		
23		
24		
25		

INDEX OF EXHIBITS Grand Jury Exhibits Identified 1 - PROPOSED INDICTMENT 2 - INSTRUCTIONS 3 - PHOTOGRAPH 4 - PHOTOGRAPH 5 - PHOTOGRAPH 6 - PHOTOGRAPH 7 - PHOTOGRAPH 8 - PHOTOGRAPH 9 - PHOTOGRAPH 10 - PHOTOGRAPH 11 - PHOTOGRAPH 12 - PHOTOGRAPH 13 - PHOTOGRAPH

12:00 1 LAS VEGAS, NEVADA, OCTOBER 16, 2019 2 3 4 DANETTE L. ANTONACCI, 12:00 5 having been first duly sworn to faithfully and accurately transcribe the following 6 7 proceedings to the best of her ability. 8 9 THE FOREPERSON: Let the record reflect 08:16 10 that I have canvassed the waiting area and no one has 11 appeared in response to Notice of Intent to Seek 12 Indictment. 13 MS. GETLER: Ladies and gentlemen of the 14 Grand Jury, my name is Stephanie Getler and with me will 08:35 15 be my co-counsel Brandon Albright. We are presenting 16 Grand Jury case number 19BGJ023AB&C, State of Nevada 17 versus Fink, Gonzalez and Brown. The record will 18 reflect that we have marked a copy of the proposed 19 Indictment as Exhibit Number 1 and that all Grand Jury 08:35 20 members have a copy of it. We have also marked a copy 2.1 of the elements of these charges and the instructions 22 regarding these charges as Exhibit Number 2 for your 23 review. 24 The defendants in this case are charged 08:35 25 with conspiracy to commit robbery, robbery with use of a

08:35	1	deadly weapon, burglary, grand larceny, and then
	2	defendant Brown is charged with obtaining and using
	3	personal identifying information of another and
	4	defendant Gonzalez is charged with carrying a concealed
08:36	5	pneumatic gun. Today we will only be presenting and
	6	deliberating on Counts 13 through 16 and Counts 24 to
	7	28. That was 13 to 16 and 24 to 28.
	8	Our first witness is Kelsey Mestre.
	9	THE FOREPERSON: Raise your right hand.
08:37	10	You do solemnly swear the testimony you are
	11	about to give upon the investigation now pending before
	12	this Grand Jury shall be the truth, the whole truth, and
	13	nothing but the truth, so help you God?
	14	THE WITNESS: I do.
08:37	15	THE FOREPERSON: Have a seat.
	16	You are advised that you are here today to
	17	give testimony in the investigation pertaining to the
	18	offenses of conspiracy to commit robbery, robbery with
	19	use of a deadly weapon, burglary, obtaining and using
08:37	20	personal identifying information of another, grand
	21	larceny, robbery, grand larceny, carrying a concealed
	22	pneumatic gun, involving the named defendants of Mark
	23	Anthony Fink, Sarah Gonzalez, Lequana Brown.
	24	Do you understand this advisement?
08:37	25	THE WITNESS: I do.

08:38	1	THE EODEDED CON. Diagram at at a mount of mot
08:38	1	THE FOREPERSON: Please state your first
	2	and last name, spell both for the record.
	3	THE WITNESS: My name is Kelsey Mestre.
	4	K-E-L-S-E-Y, M-E-S-T-R-E.
08:38	5	MS. GETLER: May I proceed?
	6	THE FOREPERSON: Yes.
	7	<u>KELSEY MESTRE</u> ,
	8	having been first duly sworn by the Foreperson of the
	9	Grand Jury to testify to the truth, the whole truth,
08:38	10	and nothing but the truth, testified as follows:
	11	<u>EXAMINATION</u>
	12	
	13	BY MS. GETLER:
	14	Q. Kelsey, how are you employed?
08:38	15	A. I work for Champ Sports.
	16	Q. And on June 4th of 2019, were you working
	17	at the location at 10975 Sage Park Drive?
	18	A. I was.
	19	Q. And is that in Clark County, Nevada?
08:38	20	A. It is.
	21	Q. What position do you hold at Champs?
	22	A. I'm an assistant manager.
	23	Q. What types of responsibilities do you have
	24	in that position?
08:38	25	A. I open and close the store. I do daily

08:38	1	activities. I am in the store in charge by myself
	2	often.
	3	Q. Are you also able to review video
	4	surveillance on your video surveillance system?
08:39	5	A. I am.
	6	Q. And are you also familiar with the pricing
	7	of different merchandise in your store?
	8	A. I am.
	9	Q. Okay. On June 4, 2019, were you working?
08:39	10	A. I was.
	11	Q. And around 6:30 p.m. did a black female and
	12	black male enter the store?
	13	A. They did.
	14	Q. Can you describe both of them for the grand
08:39	15	jurors?
	16	A. I can. The woman was bigger build. She
	17	was taller than I was. She had brown hair, glasses.
	18	She was wearing a white shirt with black and white
	19	shoes. The male had braids, a do-rag, a black shirt and
08:39	20	gray pants.
	21	Q. Okay. And you said the woman was taller
	22	than you. How tall are you?
	23	A. I'm 5'2".
	24	Q. So about how tall do you think she was?
08:39	25	A. Like 5'5", 5'6".

08:39 1 Q. Okay. Once they entered the store, did you 2 go over to assist them? 3 Yes, we greet them as soon as they walk in. Α. And what did you do with the two of them? 4 0. 08:40 5 So as soon as they walked in, me and my 6 associate, we started to assist them. We greeted them, 7 hi, welcome in. They started to look through our clothes to find matching outfits, like Nike pants, Nike 8 pants, Adidas shirts to Adidas pants, putting outfits 08:40 10 together, finding matching shoes. Through the time of 11 them being in our store we found them matching outfits with shoes and clothing together. 12 13 Q. And did the woman say anything in 14 particular to you while you were helping her? 08:40 15 Α. Throughout their time in our store they 16 talked, she directly talked about how they had won money 17 at the casino. They were looking to get items for their 18 family members, for themselves. 19 Okay. And you mentioned they were looking Q. at Nike and Adidas stuff. Do you remember any other 08:40 20 21 specific brands they were looking at? 22 They obtained Nike, Jordan, Adidas, CSG Α.

23

24

25

08:41

- which is our Champs brand, all of the time of being in our store.
 - Q. About how long were you assisting them?

- 08:41 08:41 08:41 08:42 08:42 08:42
- A. About 45 minutes.
- Q. At some point did they appear ready to check out to you?
- A. They did. So throughout them going through our store, everything that they had picked out we organized behind our counter to prepare to ring it up. As they were finishing up finding everything that they had wanted to purchase, we had everything prepared at the register and we started to ring it up through our cash register. At that point we started to organize it through bags for them to pay and then they didn't pay.
- Q. So while you were ringing them up, did one of them start to leave?
- A. So as I was ringing them up, she inclined that she wanted an additional shirt. As I went to go grab the shirt, the male in our store had picked up two handfuls of the merchandise that was already in the bags and walked out of the door. At that time I turned around to see the woman walking towards the door as my associate motioned to me that they did not pay.
- Q. Okay. So at the time that the woman began walking towards the door, what did you do?
- A. So I approached her and asked her if she had paid. She said she had left the card on the counter and I informed her she did not pay so she could not

leave the store with our merchandise. 08:42 1 2 Q. What happened then? 3 Α. At that time she started to motion towards 4 the door. At this point my back was towards the door 08:42 5 and she was facing me towards the exit. At that time 6 she started to walk towards me, so I grabbed the bag 7 that she had secured in her arm, which was the merchandise that she had not paid for. At this time she had adjusted her position to where her back was towards 08:43 10 the door and I was facing out the door and at this time 11 I had my hand on the bag and that's when she reached into her bra and grabbed the knife. 12 13 Okay. Where did she -- you said she 14 grabbed the knife from her bra? 08:43 15 Uh-huh. Α. What did it look like? 16 0. 17 It was a black knife. It was about five to Α. 18 six inches long. 19 Q. And once she pulled the knife out, what did she do? 08:43 20 2.1 Α. The knife was open and she motioned towards 22 my hand that had the bag in my hand. 23 Okay. So you said it was open. Was it 0. 24 like a folding knife? 08:43 25 Α. Yes, it was like a, I don't want to say a

08:43	1	pocket knife because it was larger than that.
	2	Q. But some type of folding knife?
	3	A. Yes.
	4	Q. So she had it in her hand and you said she
08:43	5	motioned it toward your hand. Was that the hand that
	6	you had on the bag of merchandise?
	7	A. Yes.
	8	Q. About how close did she get the knife to
	9	your hand?
08:44	10	A. It was, if I didn't move my hand she would
	11	have stabbed me.
	12	Q. At that point did you pull your hand away?
	13	A. Yes.
	14	Q. Did she say anything when this was going
08:44	15	on?
	16	A. She said you don't want to do this, we're
	17	not going to do this, something along those lines.
	18	Q. After you pulled your hand away, what
	19	happened?
08:44	20	A. After I released my hand from the bag she
	21	walked away.
	22	Q. And which way did she go?
	23	A. She exited our store to the right.
	24	Q. Was the male already out of the store at
08:44	25	that point in time?

08:44	1	Α.	Yes.
	2	Q.	Did the merchandise leave the store with
	3	them?	
	4	Α.	Yes.
08:44	5	Q.	Do you remember approximately how many bags
	6	they had com	pined?
	7	Α.	Fifteen to 20.
	8	Q.	And as the assistant manager you mentioned
	9	you're famil	iar with pricing of merchandise in the
08:44	10	store?	
	11	Α.	Yes.
	12	Q.	And you were present when the merchandise
	13	that went in	to those bags was being rung up?
	14	Α.	Yes.
08:44	15	Q.	Do you recall what the total value of that
	16	merchandise	was?
	17	Α.	It was approximately \$3000.
	18	Q.	Do you remember if it was slightly less
	19	than that?	
08:45	20	Α.	It was about \$2700.
	21	Q.	You also mentioned in your position you are
	22	able to revi	ew video surveillance?
	23	Α.	Yes.
	24	Q.	And are you familiar with how your video
08:45	25	surveillance	system works?

08:45	1	A. Yes.
	2	Q. Can you describe it a little bit?
	3	A. So our video surveillance system, our home
	4	base is located in our back office. We have cameras
08:45	5	throughout our store. Our camera system is set up where
	6	it records the whole entire time. We can go back and
	7	witness any of the cameras by searching the time and
	8	date and clicking a camera.
	9	Q. Okay. And does it also have time stamps on
08:45	10	it that you can view?
	11	A. It does.
	12	Q. After this incident did you go back and
	13	view some video surveillance?
	14	A. We did.
08:45	15	Q. And did you provide that video surveillance
	16	to police?
	17	A. I did.
	18	Q. Okay. I'm going to show you a couple
	19	photos. They are Exhibits 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7. Can you
08:46	20	flip through these and tell me if you recognize them?
	21	A. I do recognize them.
	22	Q. How do you recognize them?
	23	A. These are snapshots of the video
	24	surveillance footage I gave to police and these are the
08:46	25	two people who stole our merchandise.

08:46	1	Q. And this is from the Champs Sports store
	2	we've been discussing from June 4th; is that right?
	3	A. Yes.
	4	Q. And are these fair and accurate depictions
08:46	5	of what happens that day?
	6	A. Yes.
	7	Q. Okay. Thank you.
	8	Publish Number 3. Can you describe what's
	9	in this photo?
08:46	10	A. So in this photo, this is the position I
00.10	11	explained previously where my back was to the door and
	12	she was facing out.
	13	Q. So sorry to cut you off. Is the woman in
	14	the white shirt the person that we have been discussing
08:47	15	that did these things that day?
	16	A. Yes.
	17	Q. And the other person in the photo, is that
	18	you?
	19	A. Yes.
08:47	20	Q. And this is near the front door of the
	21	business?
	22	A. Yes.
	23	Q. And were those bags some of the bags of
	24	merchandise that she took?
08:47	25	A. Yes.

08:47	1	Q. And showing Exhibit Number 4. What about
	2	this picture?
	3	A. This photo is when we were ringing up and
	4	organizing the merchandise.
08:47	5	Q. And that is the same woman we've been
	6	talking about?
	7	A. Yes.
	8	Q. And Number 5, is that the same thing you
	9	were just describing?
08:47	10	A. It is.
	11	Q. Is this other person in the photo to the
	12	right hand side of the woman the man we've been talking
	13	about?
	14	A. It is.
08:47	15	Q. Okay. And Number 6, is that kind of the
	16	same thing you just described?
	17	A. It is.
	18	Q. And Number 7, what about this picture?
	19	A. That's the man leaving with the majority of
08:48	20	the bags.
	21	MS. GETLER: I have no further questions
	22	for this witness. Are there any questions by the Grand
	23	Jury members?
	24	THE FOREPERSON: Any questions?
08:48	25	By law, these proceedings are secret and

08:48	1	you are prohibited from disclosing to anyone anything
	2	that has transpired before us, including evidence and
	3	statements presented to the Grand Jury, any event
	4	occurring or statement made in the presence of the Grand
08:48	5	Jury, and information obtained by the Grand Jury.
	6	Failure to comply with this admonition is a
	7	gross misdemeanor punishable by up to 364 days in the
	8	Clark County Detention Center and a \$2,000 fine. In
	9	addition, you may be held in contempt of court
08:48	10	punishable by an additional \$500 fine and 25 days in the
	11	Clark County Detention Center.
	12	Do you understand this admonition?
	13	THE WITNESS: I do.
	14	THE FOREPERSON: Thank you.
08:48	15	THE WITNESS: Thank you.
	16	MR. ALBRIGHT: Our next witness is Javon
	17	Kamanuwai.
	18	MS. GETLER: Just for the record, the first
	19	witness's name is spelled K-E-L-S-E-Y, M-E-S-T-R-E, the
08:49	20	second witness's name is spelled J-A-V-O-N,
	21	K-A-M-A-N-U-W-A-I.
	22	THE FOREPERSON: Raise your right hand
	23	please.
	24	You do solemnly swear the testimony you are
08:49	25	about to give upon the investigation now pending before

08:49 1 this Grand Jury shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God? 2 3 THE WITNESS: Yes. THE FOREPERSON: You can sit down. 4 08:50 5 You are advised that you are here today to 6 give testimony in the investigation pertaining to the 7 offenses of conspiracy to commit robbery, robbery with use of a deadly weapon, burglary, obtaining and using 8 9 personal identifying information of another, grand 08:50 10 larceny, robbery, grand larceny, carrying concealed 11 pneumatic gun, with the defendants of Mark Fink, Sarah 12 Gonzalez, Lequana Brown. 13 Do you understand this advisement? 14 THE WITNESS: Yes. 08:50 15 THE FOREPERSON: Please state your first 16 and last name and spell both for the record. 17 THE WITNESS: My name is Javon Kamanuwai. 18 J-A-V-O-N, K-A-M-A-N-U-W-A-I. 19 MR. ALBRIGHT: Just for the Grand Jury's 08:50 20 edification, the next couple witnesses, including Javon, 21 will be testifying as to Counts 24 through 28. 2.2 JAVON KAMANUWAI, 23 having been first duly sworn by the Foreperson of the 24 Grand Jury to testify to the truth, the whole truth, 08:51 25 and nothing but the truth, testified as follows:

08:51	1	EXAMINATION
	2	
	3	BY MR. ALBRIGHT:
	4	Q. All right. Javon am I saying that
08:51	5	right?
	6	A. Yes.
	7	Q. I'm going to use Javon instead of your last
	8	name. Is that all right?
	9	A. Yes.
08:51	10	Q. Javon, tell us where you work.
	11	A. I work at Big 5 Sporting Goods on
	12	Charleston and Lamb.
	13	Q. Is the physical address 4275 East
	14	Charleston?
08:51	15	A. Yes.
	16	Q. Is that within Clark County, Nevada?
	17	A. Yes.
	18	Q. And were you on duty at that location on
	19	June 23, 2019 at approximately 2:30 in the afternoon?
08:51	20	A. Yes, I was.
	21	Q. What's your position there at the store?
	22	A. I'm a sales associate.
	23	Q. And do you recall who else was working with
	24	you on that afternoon?
08:51	25	A. That afternoon was, it was myself, it was

```
08:51
         1
            my manager Brian Akita and a cashier Fabian.
         2
                    Q.
                          Fabian?
         3
                    Α.
                          Yes.
                          Is his last name Calvillo?
         4
                    0.
08:52
         5
                         I believe so.
                    Α.
         6
                       Calvillo being C-A-L-V-I-L-L-O? Does that
                    Q.
         7
            sound correct, Javon?
         8
                    Α.
                          Yes.
                          At approximately 2:30 do you recall a white
         9
                    Q.
08:52
        10
            female entering the store that ultimately leads to the
        11
            reason you're here today?
        12
                    Α.
                          Yes.
        13
                    Q.
                          Can you describe what that woman looked
        14
            like?
08:52
        15
                          She's about 5'7", wearing, maybe 5'7", 5'8,
                    Α.
        16
            gray top and gray cargo pants.
        17
                          And what kind of build?
                    Ο.
                       Medium build.
        18
                    Α.
        19
                          Okay. Do you recall what color her hair
                    Q.
08:52
        20
            was?
        21
                    Α.
                          It was brown.
        22
                          In your position as a sales associate, do
                    Q.
        23
            you go and try to help this woman?
        24
                          Yeah. Yeah, I greet her and ask her if I
                    Α.
08:52
        25
            can help her find anything and she lets me know that
```

08:53	1	she's just browsing.
	2	Q. What happens next?
	3	A. Next. So I leave her, I find the other
	4	woman. I'm not sure how to pronounce her name.
08:53	5	Q. So when you say another woman, has another
	6	woman entered the store at that point?
	7	A. Yes. So she entered, I didn't personally
	8	see her enter, but I did greet her and try to offer my
	9	services to her as well.
08:53	10	Q. What does the second female look like?
	11	A. The second female is about 5'3", 5'4",
	12	heavyset, she's wearing a black top and I believe black
	13	or dark gray pants.
	14	Q. What ethnicity is this woman?
08:53	15	A. She's black.
	16	Q. Do you offer your help to her?
	17	A. Yes, I ask her if I can help her find
	18	anything.
	19	Q. And do you ultimately come to believe that
08:53	20	these two women are there together?
	21	A. At that moment, no.
	22	Q. When does that occur?
	23	A. At, shortly after I offered my services to
	24	both of them, they kind of grouped in the shoe
08:54	25	department and brought the things that they were

carrying around all to that one spot and that's when I 08:54 1 2 knew that they were together. 3 What if anything does the black female tell 4 you in regards to why she's there? 08:54 So once they go to the shoe department, 5 6 which is my department, they start asking me to bring 7 them shoes. She tells me that she won a great deal of money the night before at a casino and that she was here just to, you know, spend her winnings. 08:54 10 Do they stay in the shoe department or what Ο. 11 happens next? After I bring them out everything that 12 13 they're asking, I start taking it personally from the 14 shoe department up to the cash register just to keep it 08:54 15 all together and stay on top of it because it was a lot 16 of stuff. 17 Q. When you say a lot of stuff, was it all 18 shoes? 19 No, because they had things that they had already grabbed from around the store, plus the shoes 08:54 20 21 that I was bringing out for them. 22 Did you bring the additional stuff up to Q. 23 the cash register too? 24 Yes. Yeah. Α. 08:55 25 Who was working the cash register at that Q.

08:55 1 point? 2 Α. Fabian. 3 Ultimately do these two women go to the Q. 4 cash register to check out? 08:55 No. As I'm kind of taking the stuff back 5 6 and forth they're still grabbing more stuff, they're 7 still grabbing more merchandise from around the store. 8 0. Okay. What happens next? 9 Finally once I kind of have been taking 08:55 10 everything from them and it's all pilled up in one great 11 pile at the front, they go up to check out, and I continue walking around the store as a sales associate. 12 13 After a few minutes of them being up there I get paged 14 to the front and I was requested to check them out 08:55 1.5 instead of Fabian. 16 Who pages you to the front? 17 Fabian pages me to the front and let me 18 know that they want to switch out. 19 So do you then continue to cash them out Ο. 08:56 20 instead of Fabian? 2.1 Α. Yes. 22 What happens next? Q. 23 So I continue to process the, you know, the Α. 24 shoes and clothes and everything, and as I'm doing so 08:56 25 I'm setting it inside the cash register but they

continue to ask for me to hand it to them so they can 08:56 1 2 sort through it and kind of divide it up. 3 Do you allow them to do that? Q. At first no. At first I do a good job of 4 08:56 5 keeping all of it on my side, but as it starts piling up 6 they start slipping bags on their end. Do you say anything when they do that? 7 Q. 8 Α. Yeah, I tell them I need the bags back. 9 They don't give them back. Yes. 08:56 10 While this is happening, you mentioned your 0. 11 manager Brian Akita, where is he located? 12 He is at the cash register the entire time 13 from what I know. Even before I get there he's up there 14 watching the entire purchase. 08:56 15 When you say the cash registers, you mean Q. 16 the one you're at, he's right next to you? 17 Α. Yes. Yes. But he's not behind it, he's on 18 the outside of it overlooking everything. 19 What happens next? Q. 08:57 20 Α. After I've gotten a lot of things bagged, 21 most of the merchandise bagged, the white girl starts 22 exiting the store with some of the bags to which my 23 manager is telling her she can't and I'm trying to stay 24 on top of the entire situation.

Let me ask you this. When the white woman

08:57

25

Q.

AA 0024

08:57 1 leaves with the merchandise, has any of it been paid for 2 at that point? 3 No. I'm actually still scanning things as Α. 4 she's leaving, yes. 08:57 5 When she's told she can't leave, does she 6 stop or keep going? 7 Α. No, she keeps going. Does she ever come back? 8 0. 9 She does. So she leaves with some bags, 08:57 10 she comes back in, not with those bags, but she does 11 come in with someone else, a third party. 12 Who's with her at that point? 13 So it's a man, he's about 6'2", heavyset, Α. 14 about 200 plus pounds, he had a tank top and shorts I 08:58 15 believe. 16 Do you recall his ethnicity? 0. 17 He looked to be black or Hispanic. Α. 18 And what does that person do? Q. 19 He comes in and he's kind of just telling Α. 08:58 20 us that we need to treat them better as customers and 21 that, you know, they're going to pay for the things, 22 that they just want to start packing it into the car. 23 He goes back and forth with my manager who tells him he 24 can't leave with the stuff. 08:58 25 Q. Okay. When you say he can't leave with the

08:58	1	stuff, does the male eventually try to leave with
	2	anything?
	3	A. Eventually. At that time no, he's just
	4	kind of talking, but yes, eventually he does.
08:58	5	Q. And what happens next?
	6	A. So he asks to be let into the restroom.
	7	Q. When you say he, who is he?
	8	A. The male. So he asked to be let into the
	9	restroom and my manager shows him to the restroom.
08:59	10	Q. Let me ask you something. When you say be
	11	let into the restroom, is there a restroom for
	12	customers?
	13	A. No, there is no public restroom in the
	14	store, it's an employees only restroom. And it's kind
08:59	15	of, it's not locked but it's at our discretion as to who
	16	we let in the back.
	17	Q. But he asks to use the restroom?
	18	A. He asks, yes.
	19	Q. And he's shown back to the restroom by
08:59	20	Mr. Akita?
	21	A. Yes.
	22	Q. What happens next?
	23	A. As far as that situation, I don't know.
	24	I'm still at the cash register. Eventually he comes
08:59	25	back to the front of the store. He grabs some of the

bags and he exits with some bags as well.

- Q. When you say he, who are we talking about?
- A. The same gentleman who entered the store and was led to restroom. After he returns from the back of the store to the front, he takes some more bags. I don't have a name for --
 - Q. Do you tell him he can't take those bags?
- A. At that time my manager starts going back and forth with him again, but they exit the store. He exits the store and the white girl also exits the store.
- Q. If those two have exited, where now is the black female?
- A. So now there's only the black woman and she's still at the cash register with me still claiming to want to pay for everything but still asking for more things to be brought to the front as well.
 - Q. What happens next?
- A. So next she asks my manager Akita for a speaker or something and at that time when he turns his back, when his attention is distracted, she turns around and she exits the store with what she has in her hands.
 - Q. What do you do at that point?
- A. At that point I jump the counter, I alert my manager that she's, she and I are both leaving the store and we exit the store.

09:01	1	Q.	And where are the three individuals at this
	2	point from w	hat you can see?
	3	Α.	That entered that were
	4	Q.	Yes, the three individuals we've been
09:01	5	talking abou	t.
	6	Α.	Yes.
	7	Q.	Are they standing outside of the store?
	8	Α.	So at this point when we leave the store
	9	the other tw	o individuals are already in a car.
09:01	10	Q.	Do you recall what kind of car that was?
	11	Α.	It was a Nissan Altima.
	12	Q.	What color?
	13	Α.	White.
	14	Q.	Do you recall if there was any damage to
09:01	15	the car?	
	16	Α.	No.
	17	Q.	So at that point the white female and the
	18	male are in	the car?
	19	Α.	Correct.
09:01	20	Q.	Where is the black female?
	21	Α.	She is heading for the car. She's walking
	22	out. I'm st	anding back just trying to get an angle so I
	23	can see a li	cense plate number.
	24	Q.	Okay. Do you get a license plate number?
09:01	25	Α.	Yes.

09:01	1	Q. Do you recall if that number was 5WSK749?
	2	A. That sounds familiar, yes.
	3	Q. Do you recall what state that was from?
	4	A. It was a California license plate.
09:02	5	Q. And why at that point are you trying to
	6	memorize the license plate?
	7	A. With the intention of reporting it to the
	8	police. At the time when we went out of the store, I
	9	planned to get the license plate number and come back in
09:02	10	and call the police and when I went back in they were
	11	already on the phone so I was able to give it to them
	12	right away.
	13	Q. Okay. So does the black female eventually
	14	make her way into the vehicle?
09:02	15	A. Yes. At that time she walks out and she
	16	doesn't get to get into the vehicle because my manager
	17	is blocking the door and he keeps telling her that she
	18	can't leave with the stuff, she can't put the stuff in
	19	the car until they pay for it.
09:02	20	Q. Let me stop you.
	21	Ladies and gentlemen, so what you've just
	22	heard in regards to what Mr. Akita said would be
	23	hearsay, so you're not to regard that or accept that for
	24	the truth of the matter, only for what it caused Javon
09:03	25	to do next. Do you guys understand that?

09:03 1 A JUROR: Yes. 2 MR. ALBRIGHT: Okay. 3 So he's not letting her in the car. What Q. 4 does she do? 09:03 She's just kind of, you know, they're 5 6 bickering, they're going back and forth. This is the 7 time of which I'm able to get the license plate number cause the car is just parked there. After they, he denies her getting in the car, she kind of says that 09:03 10 she'll go back in the store and pay for it but he needs 11 to lead the way and she tries to draw him away from the 12 store by kind of walking towards the store and then she 13 says, you know what, forget it, and she throws her debit 14 card that she had in her hand at the store. And after 09:03 15 that she goes around, at that time they were standing on 16 the passenger side of the car, the rear passenger door, 17 she goes around to the driver's side rear seat where 18 someone was sitting and she hops in on their lap and 19 while the door is open my manager Akita, he grabs one of 09:04 20 the bags, he pulls one out, and they pull off. 2.1 Q. And then you mentioned after that you go 22 inside but someone has already called the police; is 23 that correct? 24 Fabian is already on the phone with the 25 09:04 police when I go back in the store.

09:04	1	Q. Do police respond to the scene?
	2	A. Yes.
	3	Q. Do you give them that license plate?
	4	A. Yes.
09:04	5	Q. Is there an accounting done of what is
	6	missing in the store?
	7	A. Yes.
	8	Q. And are you involved in that process?
	9	A. Just in terms of gathering the things. I
09:04	10	didn't do anything as far as the paperwork or the back
	11	office stuff.
	12	Q. Brief indulgence.
	13	I have no further questions for this
	14	witness. Any questions?
09:04	15	BY A JUROR:
	16	Q. That debit card that she threw out, was
	17	that debit card actually her debit card?
	18	A. No, after we recovered it, it did not
	19	belong to her.
09:05	20	Q. Is that store policy that you guys chase
	21	after that stuff or
	22	A. No.
	23	BY A JUROR:
	24	Q. Do you have a turnstile to get in and out
09:05	25	of the store?

09:05	1	A. Turnstile? Oh, no, no. Like in front of
	2	the door you mean or is it just a plain entrance?
	3	Q. Yeah, just open entrance.
	4	A. It's an open entrance.
09:05	5	BY MR. ALBRIGHT:
	6	Q. Is it a mechanical door that opens, like an
	7	electric?
	8	A. No.
	9	Q. No. Okay. It's a swinging door?
09:05	10	A. Correct.
	11	Q. Okay.
	12	THE FOREPERSON: Any other questions?
	13	By law, these proceedings are secret and
	14	you are prohibited from disclosing to anyone anything
09:05	15	that has transpired before us, including evidence and
	16	statements presented to the Grand Jury, any event
	17	occurring or statement made in the presence of the Grand
	18	Jury, and information obtained by the Grand Jury.
	19	Failure to comply with this admonition is a
09:05	20	gross misdemeanor punishable by up to 364 days in the
	21	Clark County Detention Center and a \$2,000 fine. In
	22	addition, you may be held in contempt of court
	23	punishable by an additional \$500 fine and 25 days in the
	24	Clark County Detention Center.
09:05	25	Do you understand this admonition?

0.0.0.5	_	
09:06	1	THE WITNESS: Yes.
	2	THE FOREPERSON: Thank you, sir.
	3	MR. ALBRIGHT: Our next witness is Brian
	4	Akita. Akita is A-K-I-T-A. Brian is B-R-I-A-N.
09:06	5	A JUROR: Can I use the restroom real
	6	quick.
	7	(Recess.)
	8	THE FOREPERSON: Raise your right hand
	9	please.
09:11	10	You do solemnly swear the testimony you are
	11	about to give upon the investigation now pending before
	12	this Grand Jury shall be the truth, the whole truth, and
	13	nothing but the truth, so help you God?
	14	THE WITNESS: Yes.
09:11	15	THE FOREPERSON: Be seated.
	16	You are advised that you are here today to
	17	give testimony in the investigation pertaining to the
	18	offenses of conspiracy to commit robbery, robbery with
	19	use of a deadly weapon, burglary, obtaining and using
09:11	20	personal identifying information of another, grand
	21	larceny, robbery, grand larceny, carrying concealed
	22	pneumatic gun, involving Mark Fink, Sarah Gonzalez,
	23	Lequana Brown.
	24	Do you understand this advisement?
09:12	25	THE WITNESS: Yes.

09:12	1	THE FOREPERSON: Please state your first
03.12	2	and last name, spell both for the record.
	3	THE WITNESS: Brian Akita. B-R-I-A-N,
	4	A-K-I-T-A.
09:12	5	BRIAN AKITA,
	6	having been first duly sworn by the Foreperson of the
	7	Grand Jury to testify to the truth, the whole truth,
	8	and nothing but the truth, testified as follows:
	9	<u>EXAMINATION</u>
09:12	10	
	11	BY MR. ALBRIGHT:
	12	Q. Good morning, Mr. Akita.
	13	A. Good morning.
	14	Q. What do you do for a living?
09:12	15	A. I am the store manager of Big 5 Sporting
	16	Goods.
	17	Q. Specifically the location at 4275 East
	18	Charleston?
	19	A. Correct.
09:12	20	Q. Is that in Clark County, Las Vegas, Nevada?
	21	A. It is.
	22	Q. And were you working in that capacity on
	23	June 23, 2019 at approximately 2:00 to 3:00 p.m.?
	24	A. Yes.
09:12	25	Q. As store manager are you aware is there a

09:12	1	video survei	llance system in the store?
	2	Α.	Yes.
	3	Q.	And are you aware of where the cameras are
	4	located?	
09:12	5	Α.	Yes.
	6	Q.	Are you aware and trained on how to use
	7	that video s	urveillance system?
	8	Α.	Yes.
	9	Q.	Are you able to, if needed, recall and
09:12	10	watch past v	ideo and download that?
	11	Α.	Yes.
	12	Q.	Okay. I want to draw your attention to the
	13	date I just 1	mentioned, June 23, 2019. Were you working
	14	or did you h	ave sales associates there that day by the
09:13	15	name of Javo:	n Kamanuwai?
	16	Α.	Yes.
	17	Q.	And Fabian Calvillo?
	18	Α.	Yes.
	19	Q.	And at some point was Javon helping some
09:13	20	individuals,	two females, check out?
	21	Α.	Correct.
	22	Q.	And when do you become aware of any sort of
	23	situation the	at you take notice of as your position of
	24	manager?	
09:13	25	Α.	So I did not see them come in but I was at

09:13 1 the register with Fabian and Javon brought a stack of 2 shoes to the front and I asked him what was going on and 3 he said these two ladies here said they won some money on a jackpot and they were going to spend some of their 4 09:13 5 money and he was just making a pile at the register. I 6 said okay. He left, went to go help them. I talked to 7 Fabian and Fabian's like got this, no problem, start 8 checking sizes and everything so he knew what was going 9 on.

- Q. When you say checking sizes, of the shoes to make sure the right shoes are in the right box?
 - A. Correct, yeah. Uh-huh.
 - Q. What happens next?

A. So they bring some more stuff up to the front and Fabian starts to bag the stuff, put it, you know, on the ground, and at which point they asked Fabian hey, I need to see what's in the bag, I don't know if I want that, I don't know if I need this or whatever. Fabian then tells them hey, I can't give you the bags, if you want to look at it you need to come around and you can look down here. At that point they get irritated and they tell Fabian we don't like your attitude so where's that other guy, why don't you bring him up here. So Fabian doesn't want to make an argument out of it, so Fabian voids the transaction and he goes

09:14

09:14

09:14

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

```
09:14
         1
            back, switches with Javon. And I'm at the register, on
         2
            the outside of the register just standing there and I
         3
            said that's fine. So Javon comes up --
                         Let me stop you there, Mr. Akita.
         4
                   0.
09:15
         5
                          So ladies and gentlemen, just to admonish
         6
            you. There was a little bit of testimony in regards to
         7
            things that Fabian said and/or Javon. I will admonish
            you that is hearsay although you may have even
         8
            already heard from Javon, that should not be taken for
09:15
        10
            the truth of the matter, just for what it made Mr. Akita
        11
            do by hearing it.
        12
                          Let me ask you this, Mr. Akita. We're
        13
            talking about two females; correct?
        14
                   Α.
                          Correct.
09:15
        15
                         Can you describe them for me?
        16
                          Yes. So one of them was medium build,
        17
            about 5-foot 6, white, female, and the other one was
        18
            about 5-foot 4, heavyset black female.
        19
                         And do you recall at all what the white
                   Q.
09:15
        20
            female was wearing?
        2.1
                   Α.
                          Yeah, she was wearing all gray.
        22
                   Q.
                         And the black female?
        23
                         All black.
                   Α.
        24
                         All black you said?
                   Q.
09:15
        25
                          Yes.
                   Α.
```

09:15 1 Q. Okay. After Javon takes over checking them 2 out, are you still standing nearby? 3 Still standing in the same spot. So Javon, Α. 4 they're doing the same thing with Javon, telling him 09:16 5 hey -- while he's talking to the black lady, the white 6 lady is grabbing more stuff, piling more stuff at the register. So Javon is just trying to figure everything 7 out. We are kind of busy so at some point I do have to 8 go to the other register and start ringing people. So 09:16 10 my back is turned to them, I'm kind of just turning 11 around, but I can hear everything they're saying. At 12 this point my assistant manager Jenny comes in the door 13 and she starts helping Javon. So at that point as we're 14 ringing and then they're grabbing stuff and I can hear 09:16 15 her say hey, you can't leave with the stuff, you haven't 16 paid for anything. The black lady keeps saying we're 17 going to pay for it, we're going to a pay for it. Jenny 18 told her that doesn't, you know, you can't do that, that 19 doesn't change, you haven't paid for it. 09:16 20 0. When you say she says we're going to pay 21 for it, who says that? 22 The black lady says that. Α. 23 What happens next? Q. 24 So at that point I'm done ringing, I go Α. 25 09:17 back to the same spot I was outside the register, and

09:17 1 then Jenny's still helping Javon ring. At some point 2 the white lady had left the store with some bags. 3 went to the car and she comes back with herself and another gentleman, a black gentleman. He's probably 4 09:17 like 6-foot 2, heavy built guy. He comes in --5 Do you recall what the male is wearing? 6 I don't. I know he had a hat and a tank 7 8 One of those like sun hats, those circle hats. 9 What if anything does the male gentleman Q. 09:17 10 do? 11 So he's standing there. He then starts, Α. 12 she starts passing him, the while female starts passing 13 him some bags and I said hey, you can't leave, you guys 14 haven't paid for this, you need to drop the bags. At 09:17 15 that point he then tells us hey, you guys need to act 16 better, you can't come at people like this, it's not 17 right. And I was like okay, you can't leave, you 18 haven't paid for it. She says we're going to pay for 19 it, again the black lady says. I go that doesn't change 20 09:18 the fact that you haven't paid for it. So at that point 21 he goes okay, I'm not going to leave, I'm just going to 22 stand here with the bags in my hands. I said I need you 23 to drop the bags. He said I'm not going to do that. 24 Okay, fine. At that point he then realizes that I'm not 25 09:18 leaving so he thens asks me hey, do you guys have a

09:18 1 restroom and I said yes. So Fabian then shows him where 2 the restroom is. He goes to the back. He then comes 3 out after a few minutes and he says hey, I want to look 4 at a BB gun. So Fabian helps him behind the counter 09:18 5 showing him BB gun pistols, because we don't sell 6 handguns. So he decides on one, he brings it to the register, and while this is happening I'm kind of 7 8 watching him and Fabian, but while this is happening I 9 quess the white lady is still grabbing more bags and taking it out to the car. At some point she goes to the 09:18 10 11 car and doesn't come back. So now it's just him and the 12 black lady in the store. At that point after he decides 13 what gun he wants, he gives it to the, Fabian gives it 14 to Javon to put in the pile and then he leaves and now 09:19 15 it's just --

Q. When you say he leaves, who is he?

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

09:19

09:19

A. The black male leaves. He leaves, doesn't come back. At that point the black female is the only one left in the store. She then asks me hey, what is that and I say that's an outdoor speaker and it's on top on our high Coke machine, she goes I want one of those too, I says okay. So I grab one and as I'm grabbing it she leaves. Javon then says hey, she's leaving. He then follows her outside and then I follow Javon. When we get outside —

09:19 1 Q. At this point are you aware whether or not any of this merchandise has been paid for? 2 3 No, I realize it has not been paid for. Α. 4 Okay. What happens when you follow her 0. 09:19 outside? 5 I follow her outside, I said hey, come in 6 and pay for the stuff. She says I'm going to drop this 7 stuff off and I'm going to come in and pay for it and I say no, you need to come back in and pay for it, you 09:19 10 haven't paid for anything, I need you to come back in 11 there. When I come outside there's a white car out 12 there ready to drive away with the passenger side, it's 13 a four door car, so the back door is open. 14 Q. When you say ready to drive away, is it 09:20 15 backed into the parking spot? 16 No, it's actually out. Like it's out ready 17 to go. Like it's not even in a parking spot. It's 18 ready to go. The door in the backside is open and I, I 19 don't touch her, I block her from getting in the door. 09:20 20 I said I need you to go back in the store. She's like 21 I'm going to come back. I said if you're not going to 22 come back then I need my stuff back. So as I look to my 23 left, I see that all the bags are sitting on the back 24 seat, so I grab some and I start throwing them into the 25 09:20 parking lot and I said if you're not going to go pay for

this stuff I'm just going to take my stuff back. At 09:20 1 2 that point --3 When you say the bags, were these bags that Q. 4 say Big 5? 09:20 5 They are Big 5 bags, yes. They're all Big 6 5 bags. 7 Q. With the door open were you able to see into the car to see who was driving? 8 9 Yes. So the black male is driving, the 09:21 10 white female is in the passenger side in the front, and 11 in the back there is a Hispanic male on the driver's side in the back seat. 12 13 Q. What happens after you start taking your 14 stuff out of the car? 09:21 15 So then she says fine, I'm going to pay for Α. 16 it. I said okay, I said then let's go. And then she 17 goes lead the way. I said no, I need you to lead the 18 way. And she says okay. She's like no, you go. I said 19 no, you're going to go. So she goes, she gets upset, 09:21 20 stops after a few steps, looks at me, looks at Javon, 21 throws the credit card at the wall towards the trash can 22 and said you guys can pay for your damn self. And then 23 she tries to get back in the car. I block her again, 24 again I don't touch her. She does have one of those 25 09:21 inexpensive like tote bags, so as she's getting, now she

09:21 1 goes around to the driver's side in the back seat and as the guy opens the door for her, the Hispanic male --2 3 When you say he opens it, has he gotten out of the car or did he reach back and --4 09:21 I did not see him get out of the car. At 5 6 the time that I saw him he was in the car. So he gets 7 in, she, as she's getting in I grab her bag, again I don't touch her, I grab the bag, and she kind of lays on his lap. As I'm grabbing the bag and pulling back, I 09:22 10 look up at the driver who is pointing a, what looks like 11 to me a weapon, a gun, at me. And then I let go -- oh. 12 She lets -- I'm sorry. She let's go of the bag, I have 13 the bag, and then they drive off. 14 Q. When you go inside have the police been notified? 09:22 15 16 Yes, Fabian is talking to the police 17 currently as I walk back into the store. 18 Do you do an accounting of what is missing? Q. 19 Yes, we do. Jenny is going back into the Α. 20 09:22 computer and printing receipts of everything that was 21 potentially taken. 22 Q. Do you recall an approximate value of all 23 that stuff? 24 It was thousands of dollars, yeah. Α. 09:22 25 Q. Do you recall -- some of the stuff though

you said you had thrown back out of the car? 09:23 1 2 Α. Unfortunately most of the stuff I threw 3 back out was more of the less expensive stuff like candy 4 and chips, stuff that probably doesn't total much. 09:23 Do you eventually learn however that 5 6 included among the stuff that was not taken was the BB 7 qun? I did not realize that at the moment. 8 Α. 9 Q. Do you learn that at some point? 09:23 10 I learn that later that the BB gun, which Α. 11 at the time when he pointed at me I assumed that's what 12 it was. I learned later that it could be, could not be, 13 because the BB gun that he picked is sitting on the 14 floor behind the register. 09:23 15 Still in the store? Q. 16 Still in the store. Α. 17 A JUROR: Okay. 18 BY MR. ALBRIGHT: 19 You mentioned earlier that you're familiar Q. 09:24 with the video surveillance system; is that correct? 20 2.1 Α. Correct. 22 I'm showing you Exhibits 8, 9 and 10. Q. 23 Α. Okay. 24 Do you recognize those? Q. 09:24 25 Α. Yes, that is my store.

00.24	1	
09:24	1	Q. So you recognize the shelves here and some
	2	of the different display cases?
	3	A. Correct.
	4	Q. And does this fairly and accurately depict
09:24	5	shots from video from the event that we've been
	6	describing today?
	7	A. Yes.
	8	Q. In fact I see on Exhibit 10 there's a date
	9	stamp that says June 23rd. That was the day we're
09:24	10	talking about; correct?
	11	A. Correct.
	12	Q. Okay. And on Exhibit 10 does that appear
	13	to be the black male with the hat that you talked about?
	14	A. Yes.
09:24	15	Q. And in Exhibit 9, is that the white female?
	16	A. Yes.
	17	Q. And her hands are full of bags?
	18	A. Correct.
	19	Q. And in Exhibit 8, is that the white female
09:24	20	and it's also the black female?
	21	A. Yes.
	22	Q. Is this the tote bag that you described
	23	earlier?
	24	A. Yes.
09:24	25	Q. That red and white bag?

09:25	1	A. Uh-huh.
	2	MR. ALBRIGHT: Nothing further from this
	3	witness.
	4	THE FOREPERSON: By law, these proceedings
09:25	5	are secret and you are prohibited from disclosing to
	6	anyone anything that has transpired before us, including
	7	evidence and statements presented to the Grand Jury, any
	8	event occurring
	9	MR. ALBRIGHT: Do we have a question? I
09:25	10	apologize.
	11	BY A JUROR:
	12	Q. So the gun that the defendant pulled on
	13	you
	14	A. Uh-huh.
09:25	15	Q. That wasn't that BB gun?
	16	A. Correct. It could have been. It could
	17	have been a real
	18	MR. ALBRIGHT: Let me clarify.
	19	Q. You don't know, correct?
09:25	20	A. I don't know.
	21	MR. ALBRIGHT: And at this juncture that
	22	would be speculation.
	23	THE FOREPERSON: Any other questions?
	24	MR. ALBRIGHT: I appreciate it. Thank you,
09:25	25	sir.

09:25 1 Oh, one more. 2 BY A JUROR: 3 Do you have a procedure for once Q. 4 merchandise is purchased you place it behind the 09:25 5 counter, then does the merchant take it once they've 6 bagged the material? 7 Correct. We place everything on the floor, 8 especially, most of the items there were high end items like Nike, Adidas, Under Armour. So when that happens, 09:26 10 and it was a wide array of things from shoes to Corn 11 Nuts so that seems a little weird. If you work long 12 enough in retail it seems very bizarre that you're going 13 to buy the most randomness things. And so we put -- but 14 either way it doesn't matter. That is our procedure, we 09:26 15 put it behind the counter and then we give it to them 16 after the transaction has gone through. 17 So they went behind the counter then? Ο. 18 Correct. I mean, well, at some point it was 19 just so much stuff that we run out of space on the floor 09:26 20 to be honest. And it's just a lot of bags, a lot of 21 bags. 2.2 THE FOREPERSON: Go ahead. 23 BY A JUROR: 24 So basically you could tell from what they 09:26 25 were grabbing this was a set up to steal because people

09:26 1 don't come in --2 I mean it's potential. I don't know that Α. 3 for 100 percent sure but it's potential, yeah. 4 0. Right. 09:26 5 THE FOREPERSON: Any other questions? By law, these proceedings are secret and 6 you are prohibited from disclosing to anyone anything 7 that has transpired before us, including evidence and 8 9 statements presented to the Grand Jury, any event 09:26 10 occurring or statement made in the presence of the Grand 11 Jury, and information obtained by the Grand Jury. 12 Failure to comply with this admonition is a gross misdemeanor punishable by up to 364 days in the 13 14 Clark County Detention Center and a \$2,000 fine. In 09:26 15 addition, you may be held in contempt of court 16 punishable by an additional \$500 fine and 25 days in the 17 Clark County Detention Center. 18 Do you understand this admonition? 19 THE WITNESS: Yes. 09:27 20 THE FOREPERSON: Thank you, sir. THE WITNESS: Thank you. 2.1 22 MS. GETLER: Our next and final witness is 23 Detective Perkett. 24 You do solemnly swear the testimony you are 09:28 25 about to give upon the investigation now pending before

00-00	1	this Count Types shall be the touth the stall touth and
09:28	1	this Grand Jury shall be the truth, the whole truth, and
	2	nothing but the truth, so help you God?
	3	THE WITNESS: I do.
	4	THE FOREPERSON: You can sit down.
09:28	5	THE WITNESS: Thank you.
	6	THE FOREPERSON: You are advised that you
	7	are here today to give testimony in the investigation
	8	pertaining to the offenses of conspiracy to commit
	9	robbery, robbery with use of a deadly weapon, burglary,
09:28	10	obtaining and using personal identifying information of
	11	another, grand larceny, robbery, grand larceny, carrying
	12	concealed pneumatic gun.
	13	THE WITNESS: Yes.
	14	THE FOREPERSON: Of the defendants Mark
09:28	15	Fink, Sarah Gonzalez, Lequana Brown.
	16	Do you understand this advisement?
	17	THE WITNESS: Yes.
	18	THE FOREPERSON: Please state your first
	19	and last name and spell both for the record.
09:29	20	THE WITNESS: Erik, E-R-I-K, Perkett,
	21	P-E-R-K-E-T-T.
	22	ERIK PERKETT,
	23	having been first duly sworn by the Foreperson of the
	24	Grand Jury to testify to the truth, the whole truth,
09:29	25	and nothing but the truth, testified as follows:

09:29	1	<u>EXAMINATION</u>
	2	
	3	BY MS. GETLER:
	4	Q. How are you employed?
09:29	5	A. Currently I'm a sergeant assigned to the
	6	Convention Center Area Command. Prior to that I was a
	7	robbery detective for two years assigned to the
	8	commercial robbery section with Las Vegas Metropolitan
	9	Police Department.
09:29	10	Q. And how long have you worked with Metro?
	11	A. Ten years.
	12	Q. In June of 2019 was your assignment the
	13	robbery position?
	14	A. Yes.
09:29	15	Q. And in June of 2019 did you become involved
	16	in the case that you're here today to testify about?
	17	A. Yes.
	18	Q. How did you become involved in that case?
	19	A. At the time I was assigned to the robbery
09:29	20	section, we were notified that a robbery had occurred at
	21	a Big 5 Sporting Goods store in the northeast part of
	22	the Las Vegas valley. A detective was assigned to that
	23	case. During the case we learned that a white Nissan
	24	Altima with California plates had been observed by a
09:30	25	victim or witness at the scene and they gave patrol and

our dispatch the plate number for the vehicle. Myself 09:30 1 2 and another detective used a law enforcement data base 3 to research that license plate to see if the license 4 plate had been targeted or photographed anywhere in the 09:30 5 Las Vegas valley. And upon doing that did you discover 6 0. someplace that that vehicle may be? 7 Yes, we found that the vehicle had recently 8 9 been photographed in the parking lot of the Siegel 09:30 10 Suites at 4055 Swenson. 11 Q. And is that located in Clark County, 12 Nevada? 13 Α. Yes. 14 Q. Did you then respond to that address? Yes. 09:30 15 Α. 16 Who else was with you? Q. 17 It was myself, Detective Joseph Parra, 18 Detective Ted Weirauch, we set up plain clothes, 19 unmarked police vehicle surveillance, once we got into 09:31 20 the parking lot we noticed near the southwest corner of 21 the complex a white Nissan Altima with California plates 22 and the same license plate given by the victim witnesses 23 of the robbery. 24 At that point did you believe that that was 25 09:31 the vehicle that you were looking for?

09:31 1 Α. Yes. It had damage that matched the 2 description also given by the victims along with the 3 license plate. Also in the front driver's seat we 4 noticed there was a male matching the description of one 09:31 of the robbery suspects wearing the same clothing and 5 shoes. So at that time we did believe that that could 6 7 be the car used in the robbery. Do you recall what that description was of 8 Q. 9 the male? 09:31 10 He was wearing a boonie style hat, it's Α. 11 like a fisherman style hat, and a camo tank top and sandals. I can't remember what color. 12 13 Were there anybody else in or around the 14 vehicle at that time? 09:32 15 In the back seat there was a, we didn't Α. 16 know what gender or ethnicity the male was in the back 17 seat. Also there was a very young child that was 18 approaching the vehicle. The male in the back seat was 19 handing the child shoes and the child was trying on 09:32 20 shoes that were being handed to him by the male in the 21 back seat. 22 And at this point are you and the other Q. 23 detectives still conducting surveillance and just 24 watching what's going on?

09:32

25

Α.

Yes.

09:32	1	Q. Was another person you believed to be
	2	involved in the robbery approaching that vehicle at some
	3	point?
	4	A. Yes. A white female was also described as
09:32	5	a suspect in the robbery. She approached the driver's
	6	side, spoke to the driver of the white Nissan Altima.
	7	The female was wearing the same clothing observed in the
	8	video surveillance from the robbery.
	9	Q. And do you recall what the description of
09:33	10	her was?
	11	A. It was a white female adult wearing a gray
	12	tank top.
	13	Q. What did you do at that point?
	14	A. At that point she entered the vehicle, we
09:33	15	decided since they were going to possibly leave the area
	16	to get patrol officers in marked uniforms, in marked
	17	patrol vehicles, to come in and detain the subjects for
	18	an investigation.
	19	Q. Is that what was done?
09:33	20	A. Yes.
	21	Q. Once you came into contact with the people
	22	who are currently in the vehicle, did you determine that
	23	male matching the description of the robbery to be known
	24	as Mark Finks?
09:33	25	A. Yes.

09:33	1	Q. And the white female to be known as Sarah
	2	Gonzalez?
	3	A. Yes.
	4	Q. Did anything happen when they were being
09:33	5	taken into custody?
	6	A. As Sarah Gonzalez was being taken into
	7	custody, the white female with the gray tank top, the
	8	uniformed officer was calling her back and was placing
	9	her into handcuffs to detain her for the investigation,
09:34	10	she uttered to the officer "I have a firearm in my bra."
	11	Q. Was anything asked of her before she said
	12	that?
	13	A. No.
	14	Q. She just said it on her own?
09:34	15	A. Yes.
	16	Q. At that point did any officers look to see
	17	if she had a firearm on her?
	18	A. Yes. Officers removed a black
	19	semi-automatic style firearm from her bra area and that
09:34	20	was placed in an area so that could be impounded and
	21	seized.
	22	Q. Okay. And was that firearm looked at later
	23	to determine anything about it?
	24	A. Yes.
09:34	25	Q. What was determined?

09:35

25

- A. It was determined that it was a replica style firearm, pneumatic firearm. A pneumatic firearm is a air or gas compressed firearm which uses that to power the projectile which could be a plastic or metal BB. The BB is typically a small caliber that can be used to cause substantial bodily harm or death because of the amount of compressed air and gas in the firearm.
- Q. What does it mean to be a replica style firearm?
- A. It's a replica style firearm because they typically fashion them to look exactly like the firearm that they are mimicking. A person without experience or knowledge of firearms would think that it's actually a firearm, one that police or someone could buy at a sporting goods store.
- Q. Earlier you mentioned that there were Big 5 bags in the car as well?
- A. Yes. After we detained everybody from the vehicle, I approached the vehicle, the doors of the vehicle were open, I noticed in the back seat that there were numerous Big 5 shopping bags in the back seat.
 - Q. What happened after that?
- A. After that, my role is I went back to our headquarters with the suspects and I interviewed a black female adult.

09:35	1	Q. Was the black female adult in the vehicle
	2	with the other, with Fink and Gonzalez?
	3	A. No.
	4	Q. How did you come into contact with her?
09:36	5	A. Other detectives on scene, Joseph Parra and
	6	Ted Weirauch, gained information on scene that the black
	7	female adult involved in the robbery was possibly
	8	upstairs in an apartment and they went to that apartment
	9	on property in the same building where the car was
09:36	10	parked where we detained them and located a female who
	11	identified herself as Mia Jones.
	12	Q. And then at some point was she also brought
	13	down to the parking lot where the other two suspects
	14	were?
09:36	15	A. Yes.
	16	Q. After that did you say that the three of
	17	them were brought to somewhere else?
	18	A. They were brought to LVMPD headquarters to
	19	be interviewed.
09:36	20	Q. And you went there as well?
	21	A. Yes.
	22	Q. Okay. And then you mentioned that you had
	23	the opportunity to interview the suspect that you
	24	believed to be Mia Jones?
09:36	25	A. Yes.

09:36	1	Q. What did Mia Jones look like?
	2	A. She was a heavyset black female adult.
	3	Q. And did she also match the description of
	4	someone involved in the robbery at the Big 5?
09:37	5	A. Yes, she was wearing the clothing observed
	6	on video surveillance.
	7	Q. Do you recall the description of her?
	8	A. Of the clothing?
	9	Q. Yes.
09:37	10	A. I don't recall.
	11	Q. Okay. At some point later did you learn
	12	that Mia Jones was not her name?
	13	A. Yes.
	14	Q. What was her actual name?
09:37	15	A. Lequana Brown.
	16	Q. When you interviewed her, did you read her
	17	her Miranda rights?
	18	A. Yes.
	19	Q. Did she indicate that she understood those?
09:37	20	A. Yes.
	21	Q. And did she agree to speak with you?
	22	A. Yes.
	23	Q. While you were interviewing her, did she
	24	acknowledge that she was involved in the incident at the
09:37	25	Big 5 at 4275 East Charleston?

09:37	1	A. Yes.
	2	Q. And that was the incident that took place
	3	on June 23rd?
	4	A. Yes.
09:37	5	Q. And then did she also match the description
	6	of another incident that took place at a Champs Sports
	7	store?
	8	A. Yes.
	9	Q. Did you also ask her about that?
09:37	10	A. Yes.
	11	Q. Did she acknowledge that she was involved
	12	in that incident was well?
	13	A. Yes.
	14	Q. That was the incident that took place at
09:38	15	10975 Sage Park Drive on June 4th?
	16	A. Yes.
	17	Q. Did you show her surveillance video from
	18	both of those incidents?
	19	A. I showed her still photographs of the video
09:38	20	surveillance to her during the interview.
	21	Q. Okay. So did you obtain the surveillance
	22	video from both of those incidents?
	23	A. Yes. Well, I didn't personally obtain it,
	24	no, but I had access to the video surveillance to get
09:38	25	stills to show Miss Jones later known as Miss Brown.

09:38	1	Q. So someone else obtained it and then you
	2	had access to it?
	3	A. Yes.
	4	Q. And you then took stills from that video?
09:38	5	A. Yes.
	6	Q. And then you showed her those photos during
	7	the interviews?
	8	A. Yes.
	9	Q. Okay. Did she also agree that it was her
09:38	10	in the surveillance from the Big 5 incident?
	11	A. Yes.
	12	Q. And did she also agree that it was her in
	13	the surveillance from the Champs incident?
	14	A. Yes.
09:39	15	Q. Okay. I am first going to show you
	16	Exhibits 3 through 7. Can you flip through these and
	17	tell me if you recognize those.
	18	A. Yes.
	19	Q. How do you recognize them?
09:39	20	A. It's video surveillance from the Champs
	21	store, that was a robbery that occurred on June 4th.
	22	Q. And are these fair and accurate depictions
	23	of that video?
	24	A. Yes.
09:39	25	Q. And is the woman in this video who you
09:39	16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	Exhibits 3 through 7. Can you flip through these and tell me if you recognize those. A. Yes. Q. How do you recognize them? A. It's video surveillance from the Champs store, that was a robbery that occurred on June 4th. Q. And are these fair and accurate depictions of that video? A. Yes.

09:39	1	determined to be Lequana Brown?		
	2	A. Yes.		
	3	Q. And this is the video that she indicated		
	4	this is her in the video; correct?		
09:39	5	A. That's correct.		
	6	Q. And now showing you 10, I'm sorry, 8, 9 and		
	7	10. Can you flip through these and tell me if you		
	8	recognize those?		
	9	A. Yes.		
09:40	10	Q. How do you recognize them?		
	11	A. It's video surveillance that was taken from		
	12	the Big 5 on June 23, 2019.		
	13	Q. Okay. And you showed Miss Brown Exhibit		
	14	Number 8 and this was a photo that she identified		
09:40 15 herself in; is that right?		herself in; is that right?		
	16	A. Yes.		
	17	Q. Okay. And showing you Exhibit 11. Do you		
	18	recognize this?		
	19	A. Yes, that is the female that identified		
09:40 20 herself initially as Mia Jones, late		herself initially as Mia Jones, later identified as		
	21	Lequana Brown.		
	22	Q. Publishing for the Grand Jury members.		
	23	And now showing you Exhibit 12. Do you		
	24	recognize this person?		
09:40	25	A. Yes.		

09:40	1	Q. Who is that?			
	2	A. Sarah Gonzalez.			
	3	Q. Publish for the Grand Jury members.			
	4	And showing you Exhibit 13. Do you			
09:40	5	recognize this person?			
	6	A. Yes.			
	7	Q. Who is that?			
	8	A. That's Mark Finks.			
	9	Q. And publishing for the Grand Jury members.			
09:41	10	When Miss Brown identified herself as Mia			
	11	Jones, did she also give you additional information for			
	12	that person such as a birth date or anything like that?			
	13	A. Yes, she provided her name and date of			
	14	birth and provided additional information that we could			
09:41	15	use to identify her. When we ran her up in our system			
	16	we did find a Mia Jones that matched the physical			
	17	descriptors of the woman that we were interviewing so at			
	18	the time we did believe that that was her because she			
	19	was being cooperative. However later down the road she			
09:41	20	openly admitted prior to being booked into Clark County			
	21	Detention Center that she lied to detectives and that			
	22	she was actually Lequana Brown.			
	23	Q. Was the birth date and the information she			
	24	gave for Mia Jones different than the information that			
09:42	25	actually belonged to her?			

09:42	1	A. Yes.
	2	MS. GETLER: I have no further questions
	3	for this witness. Are there any questions by the Grand
	4	Jury members?
09:42	5	THE FOREPERSON: Yes.
	6	BY A JUROR:
	7	Q. Perception, when someone pulls a gun on, a
	8	defendant pulls a gun on someone, whether it's a BB gun
	9	or whether it's a real gun, it's taken equally as a
09:42	10	threat, right?
	11	A. Yes.
	12	MS. GETLER: Okay, I'm
	13	MR. ALBRIGHT: I guess do you have the
	14	instructions in front of you? Is your question is the
09:42	15	severity because it was a BB gun different than if it
	16	was a real gun?
	17	A JUROR: Right. Right.
	18	MR. ALBRIGHT: So we'll just point out in
	19	the instructions it does define a deadly weapon as a BB
09:42	20	gun, pneumatic gun or a firearm. If that answers your
	21	question.
	22	A JUROR: That does.
	23	THE FOREPERSON: Any other questions?
	24	Okay. By law, these proceedings are secret
09:43	25	and you are prohibited from disclosing to anyone

09:43	1	anything that has transpired before us, including			
	2	evidence and statements presented to the Grand Jury, any			
	3	event occurring or statement made in the presence of the			
	4	Grand Jury, and information obtained by the Grand Jury.			
09:43	5	Failure to comply with this admonition is a			
	6	gross misdemeanor punishable by up to 364 days in the			
	7	Clark County Detention Center and a \$2,000 fine. In			
	8	addition, you may be held in contempt of court			
	9	punishable by an additional \$500 fine and 25 days in the			
09:43	10	Clark County Detention Center.			
	11	Do you understand this admonition?			
	12	THE WITNESS: Yes.			
	13	THE FOREPERSON: Thank you, sir.			
	14	THE WITNESS: Thank you.			
09:43	15	MS. GETLER: That is the State's conclusion			
	16	of the presentation of evidence in this matter. At this			
	17	time as I mentioned in the beginning today we are only			
	18	asking you to deliberate on Counts 13 through 16, and 24			
	19	to 28. Thank you.			
09:43	20	(At this time, all persons, other than			
	21	members of the Grand Jury, exit the room at 9:43 a.m.			
	22	and return at 9:47 a.m.)			
	23	THE FOREPERSON: Mr. District Attorney, by			
	24	a vote of 12 or more grand jurors a true bill has been			
09:47	25	returned against the defendants charging the crimes of			

09:47	1	conspiracy to commit robbery, robbery with use of a
	2	deadly weapon, burglary, obtaining and using personal
	3	identifying information of another, grand larceny,
	4	robbery, grand larceny, carrying a concealed pneumatic
09:47	5	gun. We instruct case number 19BGJ023AB&C. We
	6	instruct you to prepare an Indictment in conformance
	7	with the proposed Indictment previously submitted to us.
	8	MR. ALBRIGHT: Thank you, ladies and
	9	gentlemen.
09:47	10	MS. GETLER: Thank you.
	11	(Proceedings concluded.)
	12	00000
	13	
	14	
	15	
	16	
	17	
	18	
	19	
	20	
	21	
	22	
	23	
	24	
	25	

09:47	1	REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE
	2	
	3	STATE OF NEVADA)
	4	COUNTY OF CLARK)
09:47	5	
	6	I, Danette L. Antonacci, C.C.R. 222, do
	7	hereby certify that I took down in Shorthand (Stenotype)
	8	all of the proceedings had in the before-entitled matter
	9	at the time and place indicated and thereafter said
09:47	10	shorthand notes were transcribed at and under my
	11	direction and supervision and that the foregoing
	12	transcript constitutes a full, true, and accurate record
	13	of the proceedings had.
	14	Dated at Las Vegas, Nevada,
09:47	15	October 17, 2019.
	16	
	17	/s/ Danette L. Antonacci
	18	Danette L. Antonacci, C.C.R. 222
	19	
09:48	20	
	21	
	22	
	23	
	24	
	25	

09:48	1	AFFIRMATION				
	2	Pursuant to NRS 239B.030				
3 4						
		The undersigned does hereby affirm that the preceding TRANSCRIPT filed in GRAND JURY CASE NUMBER				
09:48	5	19BGJ023ABC:				
	6					
	7					
	8	\underline{X} Does not contain the social security number of any person,				
	9	F = 2 = 1.7				
09:48	10	-OR-				
	11	<pre> Contains the social security number of a person as required by:</pre>				
	12					
	13	A. A specific state or federal law, to- wit: NRS 656.250.				
	14	-OR-				
09:48	15	B. For the administration of a public program or for an application for a federal or				
	16	state grant.				
	17					
	18	/s/ Danette L. Antonacci 				
	19	Signature Date				
09:48	20					
	21	Danette L. Antonacci Print Name				
	22					
	23	Official Court Reporter Title				
	24					
	25					

	_	23 [4] 19/19
A JUROR: [5]	00000 [11 64/12	34/23 35/13 60/12 239B.030 [1] 66/2
29/25 33/4 44/16	-OR [2] 66/10	239B.030 [1] 66/2
62/16 62/21	66/14	23rd [2] 45/9
BY A JUROR: [6]		58/3
31/14 31/22 46/10	<u>/</u>	24 [4] 6/6 6/7
47/1 47/22 62/5	/s [2] 65/17	18/21 63/18
BY MR. ALBRIGHT:	66/18	25 [4] 17/10
[4] 19/1 32/4	1	32/23 48/16 63/9
34/9 44/17	10 [5] 44/22 45/8	28 [4] 6/7 6/7
BY MS. GETLER:	45/12 60/6 60/7	
[2] 7/11 50/1	10-17-19 [1]	2:00 [1] 34/23
MR. ALBRIGHT:	66/10	2:30 [1] 19/19
[12] 17/15 18/18	100 percent [1]	2:30 do [1] 20/9
30/1 33/2 46/1	48/3	3
46/8 46/17 46/20	10975 [2] 7/17	364 [4] 17/7
46/23 62/12 62/17	58/15	32/20 48/13 63/6
64/7	11 [1] 60/17	3:00 p.m [1]
MS. GETLER: [9]	12 [2] 60/23	34/23
5/12 7/4 16/20	63/24	4
17/17 48/21 62/1	13 [4] 6/6 6/7	
62/11 63/14 64/9	61/4 63/18	4055 [1] 51/10
THE FOREPERSON:	16 [6] 1/15 2/1	4275 [3] 19/13 34/17 57/25
[28]	5/1 6/6 6/7 63/18	45 [1] 10/1
THE WITNESS: [21] 6/13 6/24 7/2	17 [1] 65/15	4th [4] 7/16 15/2
17/12 17/14 18/2	19 [1] 66/18	58/15 59/21
18/13 18/16 32/25	19BGJ023AB [2]	
33/13 33/24 34/2	3/10 04/3	5
48/18 48/20 49/2	19BGJ023ABC [2]	5'2 [1] 8/23
49/4 49/12 49/16	1/7 66/5	5'3 [1] 21/11
49/19 63/11 63/13	2	5'4 [1] 21/11
	20 [1] 13/7	5'5 [1] 8/25
\$	200 [1] 25/14	5'6 [1] 8/25
\$2,000 [4] 17/8	2019 [12] 1/15	5'7 [2] 20/15
32/21 48/14 63/7	2/1 5/1 7/16 8/9	20/15
\$2700 [1] 13/20	19/19 34/23 35/13	5'8 [1] 20/15
\$3000 [1] 13/17	50/12 50/15 60/12	J = 1000 [Z]
\$500 [4] 17/10	(5/15	3//10
32/23 48/16 63/9	222 [3] 1/25 65/6	ZWOK/49 [I] ZY/1
	65/18	

6		air [2] 55/3 55/7
6-foot [1] 39/5	10/15 17/10 22/22	aka [2] 1/8 1/9
656.250 [1] 66/13	32/23 48/16 61/11	Akita [14] 20/1
6:30 p.m [1] 8/11	01/14 03/9	24/11 20/20 2//10
	address [2] 19/13	
8	51/14	33/4 34/3 34/5
8:35 [1] 1/16	Adidas [5] 9/9	34/12 37/4 37/10
9	9/9 9/20 9/22	
9:43 [1] 63/21		Albright [2] 2/22
9:47 [1] 63/22	adjusted [1] 11/9	
3.47 [1] 03/22	administration [1]	
A	66/15	all [18] 5/19
A-K-I-T-A [2]	admitted [1]	
33/4 34/4		22/1 22/15 22/17
a.m [3] 1/16	admonish [2] 37/5	
63/21 63/22	37/7	37/21 37/23 37/24
ability [1] 5/7	admonition [8]	
able [6] 8/3	17/6 17/12 32/19	
13/22 29/11 30/7	32/25 48/12 48/18	
35/9 42/7	63/5 63/11	along [2] 12/17
about [29]	, • •	52/2
accept [1] 29/23	55/25 56/1 56/7	already [8] 10/17
access [2] 58/24	57/2	12/24 22/20 28/9
59/2		29/11 30/22 30/24
accounting [2]	18/5 33/16 49/6	
31/5 43/18	advisement [4]	also [19] 2/21
accurate [3] 15/4	6/24 18/13 33/24	5/20 8/3 8/6
59/22 65/12	1 47/10	13/21 14/9 27/10
accurately [2]	affirm [1] 66/4	
5/6 45/4		52/17 53/4 56/12 57/3 58/5 58/9
acknowledge [2]		59/9 59/12 61/11
57/24 58/11	_ =	
act [1] 39/15	afternoon [3] 19/19 19/24 19/25	although [1] 37/8
activities [1]	again [5] 27/9	
8/1	39/19 42/23 42/24	1
actual [1] 57/14		8/8 19/4 34/15
actually [6] 25/3	against [11 63/25	59/15
31/17 41/16 55/13	against [1] 00/20	among [1] 44/6
61/22 61/25	59/9 59/12	amount [1] 55/7
addition [4] 17/9	ahead [1] 47/22	and/or [1] 37/7
32/22 48/15 63/8	aneau [1] 1//22	

A	appeared [1] 5/11	50/7 50/19 50/22
angle [1] 28/22		assignment [1]
another [12] 6/3	66/15	50/12
6/20 18/9 21/5	appreciate [1]	assist [2] 9/2
21/5 33/20 39/4	46/24	9/6
49/11 51/2 53/1	approached [3]	assistant [4] 2/6
59/6 61/3	10/23 53/5 55/19	7/22 13/8 38/12
answers [1] 62/20	approaching [2]	assisting [1]
ANTHONY [3] 1/8] 32/10 33/2	9/25
1/8 6/23	approximate [1]	associate [5] 9/6
Antonacci [7]	43/22	10/20 19/22 20/22
1/25 5/4 65/6	• • • • •	23/12
65/17 65/18 66/18		associates [1]
66/21	20/9 34/23	35/14
any [21] 9/20	are [63]	assumed [1] 44/11
14/7 16/22 16/24	area [5] 5/10	attention [2]
17/3 25/1 28/14		27/20 35/12
31/14 32/12 32/16	54/20	attitude [1]
35/22 41/2 46/7	argument [1]	36/23
46/23 48/5 48/9		Attorney [3] 2/22
54/16 62/3 62/23		2/23 63/23
63/2 66/8	Armour [1] 47/9	automatic [1]
anybody [1] 52/13	around [13] 8/11	54/19
anyone [5] $17/1$	10/19 22/1 22/20 23/7 23/12 27/20	aware [5] 34/25
32/14 46/6 48/7	30/15 30/17 36/21	
62/25	38/11 43/1 52/13	away [7] 12/12
anything [20]	array [1] 47/10	12/18 12/21 29/12
9/13 12/14 17/1	as [57]	30/11 41/12 41/14
20/25 21/18 22/3	ask [7] 20/24	
24/7 26/2 31/10	21/17 24/1 24/25	B
32/14 38/16 39/9	26/10 37/12 58/9	B-R-I-A-N [2]
41/10 46/6 48/7	asked [5] 10/23	33/4 34/3
54/4 54/11 54/23	26/8 36/2 36/16	back [59]
61/12 63/1	[E // 1 1	backed [1] 41/15
anywhere [1] 51/4	asking [4] 22/6	backside [1]
apartment [2]	22/13 27/15 63/18	41/18
56/8 56/8	asks [6] 26/6	bag [14] 11/6
apologize [1]	26/17 26/18 27/18	11/11 11/22 12/6
46/10	20/25 40/10	12/20 36/15 36/17
appear [2] 10/2	assigned [4] 50/5	43/7 43/8 43/9
45/12		
	<u> </u>	<u> </u>

В	24/17 40/4 44/14	58/22
bag [4] 43/12	47/4 47/15 47/17	box [1] 36/11
43/13 45/22 45/25	being [10] 9/11	bra [4] 11/12
bagged [3] 24/20	9/23 13/13 20/6	11/14 54/10 54/19
24/21 47/6	23/13 52/20 54/4	braids [1] 8/19
bags [35]	54/6 61/19 61/20	brand [1] 9/23
base [2] 14/4	believe [7] 20/5	
51/2	21/12 21/19 25/15	
basically [1]	51/24 52/6 61/18	
47/24	believed [2] 53/1	
BB [11] 40/4 40/5	56/24	
44/6 44/10 44/13	belong [1] 31/19	
46/15 55/5 55/5		Brief [1] 31/12
62/8 62/15 62/19	61/25	
be [36]	best [1] 5/7	22/12 22/22 36/14
because [11] 12/1	better [2] 25/20	36/23
1 22/15 22/10 20/16	39/10	pringing [1]
40/5 44/13 47/25	bickering [1]	22/21
55/6 55/10 61/18	30/6	brings [1] 40/6
62/15	Big [12] 19/11	brought [6] 21/25
become [3] 35/22		27/16 36/1 56/12
50/15 50/18	42/5 50/21 55/16	56/17 56/18
been [22] 5/5 7/8	55/21 5//4 5//25	brown [17] 1/9
1 15/2 15/14 16/5	39/10 00/12	1/9 5/17 6/2 6/23
16/12 18/23 23/9	bigger [1] 8/16	
25/1 28/4 34/6	bill [1] 63/24	
41/2 41/3 43/14	birth [3] 61/12	
45/5 46/16 46/17	1	60/21 61/10 61/22
49/23 50/24 51/4	l .	browsing [1] 21/1
51/9 63/24	bizarre [1] 47/12	
before [13] 6/11	black [34]	building [1] 56/9
17/2 17/25 22/8		built [1] 39/5
24/13 32/15 33/11	blocking [1]	burglary [6] 6/1
46/6 48/8 48/25	DIOCKING [1]	6/19 18/8 33/19
54/11 63/1 65/8	bodily [1] 55/6	
before-entitled	booked [1] 61/20	
[1] 65/8	boonie [1] 52/10	
began [1] 10/21	both [9] 7/2 8/14	
beginning [1]	18/16 21/24 27/24	_
63/17	34/2 49/19 58/18	
behind [7] 10/6		

С	5/24 50/16 50/18	
C-A-L-V-I-L-C	50/23 50/23 64/5	checking [3] 36/8
[1] 20/6	66/4	36/10 38/1
C.C.R [3] 1/25	cases [1] 45/2	child [3] 52/17
65/6 65/18	cash [11] 10/10	52/19 52/19
C344112 [11 1/7	22/14 22/23 22/25	chips [1] 44/4
caliber [1] 55/5	23/4 23/19 23/25	circle [1] 39/8
California [3]	24/12 24/15 26/24)
29/4 50/24 51/21	27/14	27/14
call [1] 29/10	cashier [1] 20/1	clarify [1] 46/18
called [1] 30/22		CLARK [15] 1/2
77.	22/8	7/19 17/8 17/11
Calvillo [3] 20/4	cause [2] 30/8	19/16 32/21 32/24
20/6 35/17	55/6	34/20 48/14 48/1/
came [1] 53/21	caused [1] 29/24	
camera [2] 14/5	Center [10] 17/8	
14/8	1	clicking [1] 14/8
cameras [3] 14/4	48/14 48/17 50/6	close [2] 7/25
14/7 35/3	61/21 63/7 63/10	12/8
camo [1] 52/11	CERTIFICATE [1]	clothes [3] 9/8
can [25]	65/1	23/24 51/18
can't [14] 24/23	_	clothing [5] 9/12
25/5 25/24 25/25		52/5 53/7 57/5
27/7 29/18 29/18	Champs [6] 7/21	57/8
36/19 38/15 38/18	9/23 15/1 58/6	co [1] 5/15
39/13 39/16 39/17	39/13 39/20	co-counsel [1]
52/12	change [2] 30/13	Coke [1] 40/21
candy [1] 44/3		color [3] 20/19
canvassed [1]	charged [3] 5/24	
5/10	6/2 6/4	combined [1] 13/6
capacity [1]	charges [2] 5/21	come [19] 21/19
34/22	5/22	25/8 25/11 29/9
car [26]	charging [1]	35/25 36/20 39/16
card [6] 10/24	(2/25	40/11 40/18 41/6
30/14 31/16 31/17	Charleston [4]	41/8 41/9 41/10
31/17 42/21	19/12 19/14 34/18	
cargo [1] 20/16	57/25	48/1 53/17 56/4
carrying [7] 6/4	chase [1] 31/20	comes [8] 25/10
6/21 18/10 22/1		25/19 26/24 37/3
33/21 49/11 64/4	23/4 23/11 23/14	
case [8] 5/16	, , , , , ,	, , , , ,
		l .

C	Convention [1]	CRISTAL [1] 2/11
comes [1] 40/2	50/6	CRUZ [1] 2/11
Command [1] 50/6	cooperative [1]	CSG [1] 9/22
commercial [1]	61/19	currently [3]
50/8	copy [3] 5/18	43/17 50/5 53/22
commit [6] 5/25	5/20 5/20	custody [2] 54/5
6/18 18/7 33/18	Corn [1] 47/10	54/7
49/8 64/1	corner [1] 51/20	customers [2]
complex [1] 51/21	correct [21] 20/7	25/20 26/12
complex [1] 31/21 comply [4] 17/6	28/19 30/23 32/10	cut [1] 15/13
32/19 48/12 63/5	34/19 35/21 36/12	D
compressed [2]	37/13 37/14 44/20	<u> </u>
55/3 55/7	44/21 45/3 45/10	daily [1] 7/25
	45/11 45/18 46/16	damage [2] $28/14$
computer [1]	46/19 47/7 47/18	52/1
43/20	60/4 60/5	damn [1] 42/22
concealed [6] 6/4	COSENTINO [1] 2/4	Danette [7] 1/25
6/21 18/10 33/21	could [11] 10/25	5/4 65/6 65/17
49/12 64/4	44/12 44/12 46/16	1 65/10 66/10 66/01
concluded [1]	46/16 47/24 52/6	DANIEL [1] 2/16
64/11	54/20 55/4 55/14	dark [1] 21/13
conclusion [1]	61/14	data [1] 51/2
63/15		date [7] 14/8
conducting [1]	<pre>counsel [1] 5/15 counter [7] 10/6</pre>	l ,
52/23	10/24 27/23 40/4	61/13 61/23 66/19
conformance [1]		Dated [1] 65/14
64/6		day [4] 15/5
conspiracy [6]	Counts [4] 6/6	15/15 35/14 45/9
5/25 6/18 18/7	6/6 18/21 63/18	days [8] 17/7
33/18 49/8 64/1	COUNTY [15] 1/2	17/10 32/20 32/23
constitutes [1]	7/19 17/8 17/11	10/12 10/16 62/6
65/12	19/16 32/21 32/24	(2/0
contact [2] 53/21	34/20 48/14 48/17	DC [1] 1/7
56/4	51/11 61/20 63//	
contain [1] 66/8	63/10 65/4	deadly [7] 6/1 6/19 18/8 33/19
Contains [1]	couple [2] 14/18	
66/11	18/20	49/9 62/19 64/2
contempt [4] 17/9	court [6] 1/1	deal [1] 22/7
32/22 48/15 63/8	17/9 32/22 48/15	death [1] 55/6
	63/8 66/23	debit [4] 30/13
23/12 23/10 23/22	credit [1] 42/21	31/16 31/17 31/17
	crimes [1] 63/25	decided [1] 53/15
24/1		
	l .	L

D	51/2 51/17 51/18	
decides [2] 40/6		doing [3] 23/24
40/12	52/23 56/5 61/21	
defendant [4] 6/2		dollars [1] 43/24
6/4 46/12 62/8	1//8 1//11 32/21	don't [19] 11/25
defendants [6]	32/24 48/14 48/17	
1/10 5/24 6/22	61/21 63/7 63/10	
18/11 49/14 63/25	Getermine [2]	36/22 36/23 39/7
define [1] 62/19	33/22 34/23	40/5 41/19 42/24 43/8 46/19 46/20
deliberate [1]	determined [3] 54/25 55/1 60/1	48/1 48/2 57/10
63/18	did [61]	done [3] 31/5
deliberating [1]	didn't [6] 10/11	
6/6	12/10 21/7 31/10	door [22] 10/18
denies [1] 30/9	52/15 58/23	
department [6]	different [4] 8/7	
21/25 22/5 22/6		15/11 15/20 29/17
22/10 22/14 50/9 depict [1] 45/4	direction [1]	
depictions [2]	65/11	32/6 32/9 38/12
15/4 59/22	directly [1] 9/16	41/13 41/13 41/18
Deputy [3] 2/4	disclosing [5]	41/19 42/7 43/2
2/22 2/23	17/1 32/14 46/5	doors [1] 55/19
describe [5] 8/14	48/7 62/25	down [6] 18/4
14/2 15/8 20/13	discover [1] 51/6	
37/15	discretion [1]	61/19 65/7
described [3]	26/15	download [1]
16/16 45/22 53/4		35/10
describing [2]	15/2 15/14	draw [2] 30/11
16/9 45/6	dispatch [1] 51/1	l .
description [8]	display [1] 45/2 distracted [1]	
52/2 52/4 52/8	27/20	58/15
53/9 53/23 57/3	DISTRICT [4] 1/1	
57/7 58/5	2/22 2/23 63/23	
descriptors [1]		driver's [5]
61/17	1	30/17 42/11 43/1
detain [2] 53/17		52/3 53/5
54/9 detained [2]	does [25]	driving [2] 42/8
55/18 56/10	doesn't [9] 29/16	42/9
detective [6]	36/24 38/18 38/19	drop [3] 39/14
48/23 50/7 50/22	39/19 40/11 40/17	39/23 41/7

D	32/3 32/4	60/17
duly [5] 5/5 7/8	equally [1] 62/9	
18/23 34/6 49/23	Erik [2] 49/20	60/23
during [3] 50/23	49/22	Exhibit 13 [1]
58/20 59/6	especially [1]	61/4
duty [1] 19/18	47/8	Exhibit 8 [1]
E	ethnicity [3]	45/19
	even [3] 24/13	EXHIBITS [5] 4/1
earlier [3] 44/19		59/16
	event [6] 17/3	exit [4] 11/5
East [3] 19/13		27/9 27/25 63/21
	48/9 63/3	exited [2] 12/23
, ,		27/11
	26/1 26/3 26/4	exiting [1] 24/22
EIGHTH [1] 1/1		exits [4] 27/1
either [1] 47/14		27/10 27/10 27/21
electric [1] 32/7		expensive [1]
elements [1] 5/21	55/18	44/3
else [6] 19/23		experience [1]
25/11 51/16 52/13		55/12
	22/12 23/10 23/24	
	24/18 27/15 36/8	15/11
50/4	38/7 38/11 43/20	F
	47/7	Fabian [22] 20/1
26/14	evidence [6] 17/2	20/2 23/2 23/15
end [2] 24/6 47/8		23/17 23/20 30/24
• •	63/2 63/16	,,,, -
51/2	exactly [1] 55/11	36/15 36/17 36/19
enough [1] 47/12	EXAMINATION [4] 7/11 19/1 34/9	36/22 36/24 36/25
01/0	E 0 / 1	37/7 40/1 40/4
	E	40/8 40/13 43/16
21/6 21/7 27/3	Exhibit [11] 5/19	Fabian's [1] 36/7
20/2 52/1/	5/22 16/1 45/8	Iacing [3] II/J
ontoning [1]	15/12 15/15 15/19	11/10 15/12
20/10	60/13 60/17 60/23	Tact [2] 39/20
entire [4] 14/6	61/4	45/8
24/12 24/14 24/24		Failure [4] 17/6
entitled [1] 65/8		32/19 48/12 63/5
entrance [3] 32/2	Exhibit 11 [1]	fair [2] 15/4

F	53/24 61/8	25/23 27/9 30/6
fair [1] 59/22	firearm [14]	found [2] 9/11
fairly [1] 45/4	34/10 34/1/ 34/19	
faithfully [1]	54/22 55/2 55/2	four [1] 41/13
5/5	55/2 55/3 55/7	front [14] 15/20
familiar [5] 8/6		23/11 23/14 23/16
13/9 13/24 29/2		23/17 26/25 27/5
44/19		27/16 32/1 36/2
family [1] 9/18		36/15 42/10 52/3
far [2] 26/23	first [14] 5/5	
31/10	6/8 7/1 7/8 17/18	full [2] 45/1/
fashion [1] 55/11	18/15 18/23 24/4	65/12
fashion [1] 55/11 federal [2] 66/12	24/4 34/1 34/0	Turcher [4] 10/21
66/15		31/13 46/2 62/2
female [30]	fisherman [1]	G
females [2] 35/20	52/11 five [1] 11/17	gained [1] 56/6
37/13	flip [3] 14/20	gas [2] 55/3 55/7
few [3] 23/13	59/16 60/7	gathering [1]
40/3 42/20	floor [3] 44/14	31/9
Fifteen [1] 13/7	47/7 47/19	gave [3] 14/24
figure [1] 38/7	FLORA [1] 2/14	50/25 61/24
filed [1] 66/4	folding [2] 11/24	gender [1] 52/16
final [1] 48/22	10/0	gentleman [4]
Finally [1] 23/9	follow [3] 40/24	27/3 39/4 39/4
find [5] 9/8 20/25 21/3 21/17	1 11 / 1 1 / 6	
61/16	following [1] 5/6	gentlemen [4]
finding [2] 9/10	follows [5] 7/10]]/13 29/21 3//3
10/7	18/25 34/8 40/24	64/9
fine [111 17/0	49/25	GERALD [1] 2/15
17/10 32/21 32/23	foot [3] 37/17	get [17] 9/17
37/3 39/24 42/15	37/10 39/3	12/8 23/13 24/13 28/22 28/24 29/9
48/14 48/16 63/7	footage [1] 14/24	29/16 29/16 30/7
63/9	foregoing [1]	31/24 36/22 40/25
finishing [1]	65/11	42/23 43/5 53/16
10/7	FOREPERSON [6]	E0/04
FINK [7] 1/8 5/17	2/3 2/4 7/8 18/23	Getler [2] 2/23
6/23 18/11 33/22	34/6 49/23	5/14
49/15 56/2	forget [1] 30/13	gets [2] 42/19
FINKOWSKI [1] 2/7	forth [4] 23/6	43/6
Finks [3] 1/8	TOTCH [4] Z3/0	

G	gotten [2] 24/20	hand [17] 6/9
getting [4] 30/9	43/3	11/11 11/22 11/22
41/19 42/25 43/7	grab [5] 10/16	
GILLENWATER [1]	40/22 41/24 43/7	1
2/8	43/8	12/18 12/20 16/12
girl [2] 24/21	grabbed [4] 11/6	17/22 24/1 30/14
27/10	11/12 11/14 22/20	33/8
give [14] 6/11	grabbing [8] 23/6	handcuffs [1]
6/17 17/25 18/6	23/7 38/6 38/14	54/9
24/9 29/11 31/3	40/9 40/22 43/9	handed [1] 52/20
33/11 33/17 36/19	47/25	handfuls [1]
47/15 48/25 49/7	grabs [2] 26/25	10/17
61/11	30/19	handguns [1] 40/6
given [2] 51/22	grand [48]	handing [1] 52/19
52/2	grant [1] 66/16	hands [3] 27/21
gives [2] 40/13	gray [7] 8/20	39/22 45/17
40/13	20/16 20/16 21/13	happen [1] $54/4$
GJ [1] 1/7	37/21 53/11 54/7	happened [3] 11/2
glasses [1] 8/17	great [2] 22/7	12/19 55/22
go [27]	23/10	happening [3]
God [4] 6/13 18/2	greet [3] 9/3	24/10 40/7 40/8
33/13 49/2	20/24 21/8	happens [14] 15/5
goog [111 25/23	greeted [1] 9/6	21/2 22/11 23/8
30/15 30/17 36/25	gross [4] 17/7	23/22 24/19 26/5
20/21 /0/2 /0/10	32/20 40/13 63/6	26/22 27/17 36/13
40/21 42/17 42/19	ground [1] 36/16	38/23 41/4 42/13
43/1	grouped [1] 21/24	47/9
going [33]	GRUBER [1] 2/10	harm [1] 55/6
gone [11 47/16	guess [2] 40/9	has [15] 5/10
GONZALEZ [11] 1/9	62/13	17/2 21/5 25/1
1 5/17 6/1 6/22	yun [23]	27/21 30/22 32/15
18/12 33/22 49/15	guy [3] 36/23	41/2 41/3 43/3
54/2 54/6 56/2	39/5 43/2	46/6 47/16 48/8
61/2	guys [6] 29/25	63/1 63/24
good [3] 24/4	31/20 39/13 39/15	hat [4] 39/7
34/12 34/13	39/25 42/22	45/13 52/10 52/11
GOODMAN [1] 2/9	H	hats [2] 39/8
goods [4] 19/11		39/8
34/16 50/21 55/15	had [35]	have [31]
got [2] 36/7		haven't [6] 38/15
51/19	20/19	38/19 39/14 39/18

H	hereby [2]	65/7	I
haven't [2]	66/4		I'm [34]
39/20 41/10	herself [5] 39/3	I've [1] 24/20
having [5] 5/5	56/11 60/	15 60/20	identified [6]
7/8 18/23 34/6	61/10	26/17	4/3 56/11 60/14
49/23	hey [11]		60/19 60/20 61/10
he [63]	36/19 38/		identify [1]
he's [12] 24/13	39/13 39/ 40/3 40/1		61/15
24/16 24/17 24/17	40/3 40/1	9 40/23	identifying [6]
25/13 25/19 26/3	hi [1] 9/	7	6/3 6/20 18/9
26/19 30/3 38/5	high [2]		33/20 49/10 64/3
39/4 39/11	17/0	10,21	impounded [1]
heading [1] 28/21	him [18]	25/23	54/20
headquarters [2]	26/9 27/7		inches [1] 11/18
55/24 56/18	30/11 36/		incident [8]
hear [2] 38/11	38/4 39/1		14/12 57/24 58/2
38/14	40/1 40/4		58/6 58/12 58/14 59/10 59/13
heard [2] 29/22 37/9	40/8 40/1	1 43/5	incidents [2]
1	43/6 52/2	0	F0/10 F0/22
hearsay [2] 29/23	HINOJOSH [1] 2/11	inclined [1]
37/8	ITTO IOI 7	U / ¬	I 1 \(\) / 1 \(\)
heavy [1] 39/5	25/16 27/	19 27/20	included [1] 44/6
hoarrysot [1]	43/3		including [6]
21/12 25/13 37/18	Hispanic [3]	17/2 18/20 32/15
57/2	23/1/ 42/	11 43/2	46/6 48/8 63/1
held [4] 17/9	hold [1]		INDEX [2] 3/1 4/1
32/22 48/15 63/8	home [1]		indicate [1]
help [9] 6/13	honest [1]		57/19
18/2 20/23 20/25	hops [1]	30/18 7/1/	indicated [2]
21/16 21/17 33/13	8/22 8/24	9/16	60/3 65/9
36/6 49/2	9/25 12/8		INDICTMENT [5]
helping [4] 9/14	13/24 14/		4/4 5/12 5/19
35/19 38/13 39/1	35/6 50/4		64/6 64/7
helps [1] 40/4	50/18 56/		individuals [4]
her [77]	60/10		28/1 28/4 28/9 35/20
here [12] 6/16 18/5 20/11 22/8	however [2] 44/5	
33/16 36/3 36/21	61/19		<pre>indulgence [1] 31/12</pre>
36/24 39/22 45/1	huh [4] 1	1/15	inexpensive [1]
49/7 50/16	36/12 46/	1 46/14	42/25
			,

17/20 18/18 [2] 17/21 18/18	I	6/22 33/22	June 4 [1] 8/9
15/2 58/15 59/21 18/9 32/18 33/20 15 [113] 18/15 63/24 18/11 61/14 61/23 15 [113] 15/5 63/24 15/63/24 1	information [15]	_ = =	
18/9 32/18 33/20 48/11 49/10 56/6 61/11 61/14 61/23 it's [29] Jury [33] Jury Jury [31] Jury		36/22	15/2 58/15 59/21
## ## ## ## ## ## ## ## ## ## ## ## ##		is [113]	jurors [3] 2/1
61/11 61/14 61/23 it's [29] jury [33] jury [37] formed [1] 10/25 47/8 47/8 just [33] j		it [110]	8/15 63/24
State Stat		_ =	
10/25		items [3] 9/17	Jury's [1] 18/19
10/25		47/8 47/8	just [33]
17/20 18/18 [2] 17/21 18/18 30/22 43/14 Javon [26] 7/4 17/19 Jeffrey [1] 36/4 Javon [26] 7/4 17/19 Jeffrey [2] 38/17 43/19 Jeffrey [2] 22/14 John [1] 2/7 John [2] 56/23 58/20 Jenterviewing [2] 55/24 56/19 57/16 Jenterviewing [2] 57/23 61/17 John [2] 57/23 61/17 John [2] 57/23 61/17 John [2] 57/23 61/17 John [3] 38/13 43/2 35/15 John [3] 38/17 43/19 John [3] 38/10 40/17 43/19 John [3] 38/17 4		J	K
17/20 18/18 [2] 17/21 18/18	initially [1]	J-A-V-O-N [2]	K-A-M-A-N-U-W-A-I
inside [3] 23/25 30/22 43/14 instead [3] 19/7 23/15 23/20 instruct [2] 64/5 64/6 instructions [4] 4/5 5/21 62/14 62/19 Intent [1] 5/11 intention [1] 29/7 interview [2] 56/23 58/20 interviewing [2] 57/23 61/17 interviewing [2] 57/23 61/17 interviewing [2] 57/23 61/17 interviews [1] 59/7 50/12 50/15 58/3 58/15 59/21 60/12 50/12 50/15 58/3 58/15 59/21 60/12 50/12 50/15 58/3 58/15 59/21 60/12 50/12 50/15 58/3 58/15 59/21 60/12 50/12 50/15 58/3 58/15 59/21 60/12 50/12 50/15 58/3 58/15 59/21 60/12 50/12 50/15 58/3 58/15 59/21 60/12 50/12 50/15 58/3 58/15 59/21 60/12 50/12 50/15 58/3 58/15 59/21 60/12 50/12 50/15 58/3 58/15 59/21 60/12 50/12 50/15 58/3 58/15 59/21 60/12 50/12 50/15 58/3 58/15 59/21 60/12	60/20		
30/22 43/14 instead [3] 19/7 23/15 23/20 instruct [2] 64/5 64/6 instructions [4] 4/5 5/21 62/14 62/19 Intent [1] 5/11 intention [1] 29/7 interview [2] 56/23 58/20 interviewed [3] 55/24 56/19 57/16 interviewing [2] 57/23 61/17 interviews [1] 59/7 investigation [10] 6/11 6/17 17/25 18/6 33/11 33/17 48/25 49/7 53/18 54/9 involved [8] 31/8 50/15 50/18 53/2 56/7 57/4 57/24 58/11 Javon [26] JEFFREY [1] 2/10 JeffREY [1] 2/10 Jenny [3] 38/12 38/17 43/19 Jenny [5] 39/1 17/17 18/17 18/17 18/22 35/15 KATHERINE [1] 2/6 keep [2] 22/14 25/6 keeping [1] 24/5 keeps [3] 25/7 29/17 38/16 Kelsey [4] 6/8 7/3 7/7 7/14 kind [17] 16/15 20/17 21/24 23/5 23/9 24/2 25/19 26/4 26/14 28/10 30/5 30/9 30/12 38/8 38/10 40/7 43/8 knew [2] 22/2 36/8 knife [9] 11/12 11/21 11/24 12/1 11/21 11/24 12/1 11/21 11/24 12/1 11/21 11/24 12/1 11/22 12/8 34/23 35/13 60/12 June 23 [4] 19/19 34/23 35/13 60/12 June 23rd [2] 45/9 58/3	inside [3] 23/25		
instead [3] 19/7 23/15 23/20 instruct [2] 64/5 64/6 instructions [4] 4/5 5/21 62/14 62/19 Intent [1] 5/11 intention [1] 29/7 interview [2] 56/23 58/20 interviewed [3] 55/24 56/19 57/16 interviewing [2] 57/23 61/17 interviews [1] 59/7 investigation [10] 6/11 6/17 17/25 18/6 33/11 33/17 48/25 49/7 53/18 54/9 involved [8] 31/8 50/15 50/18 53/2 56/7 57/4 57/24 58/11 JEFFREY [1] 2/10 Jenny [3] 38/12 35/15 Jenny's [1] 39/1 Jobe [1] 24/4 John [1] 2/7 John [1] 9/22 Joseph [2] 51/17 56/5 Jr [1] 1/8 JUDICIAL [1] 1/1 jump [1] 27/23 juncture [1] 46/21 June [13] 7/16 8/9 15/2 19/19 34/23 35/13 45/9 50/15 50/18 53/2 56/7 57/4 57/24 58/11 June 23 [4] 19/19 34/23 35/13 60/12 June 23 [4] 19/19	30/22 43/14	10 0	
Jenny [3] 38/12 35/15 35/15 364/6 33/11 39/1 35/15 3	instead [3] 19/7		
instruct [2] 64/5	23/15 23/20	Tonn: [2] 30/12	17/17 10/17 10/22
instructions [4] 4/5 5/21 62/14 62/19 Intent [1] 5/11 intention [1] 29/7 interview [2] 56/23 58/20 interviewed [3] 55/24 56/19 57/16 interviewing [2] 57/23 61/17 interviews [1] 59/7 interviews [1] 50/5 50/5 50/5 50/5 50/10 5	instruct [2] 64/5	38/17 43/19	35/15
instructions [4] 4/5 5/21 62/14 62/19 Intent [1] 5/11 intention [1] 29/7 interview [2] 56/23 58/20 interviewed [3] 55/24 56/19 57/16 interviewing [2] 57/23 61/17 interviews [1] 59/7 interviews [1] 59/7 investigation [10] 6/11 6/17 17/25 18/6 23/3/11 33/17 48/25 49/7 53/18 54/9 involved [8] 31/8 50/15 50/18 53/2 56/7 57/4 57/24 58/11 job [1] 24/4 JOHN [1] 2/7 Jones [9] 56/11 56/24 57/1 57/12 56/24 57/1 57/12 56/24 57/1 57/12 56/24 57/1 57/12 56/24 57/1 57/12 56/24 57/1 57/12 56/24 57/1 57/12 56/24 57/1 57/12 56/24 57/1 57/12 56/24 57/1 57/12 56/24 57/1 57/12 56/24 57/1 57/12 56/24 57/1 57/12 56/24 57/1 57/12 56/24 57/1 57/12 56/24 57/1 57/12 58/25 60/20 61/11 56/24 57/1 57/12 58/25 60/20 61/11 59/17 56/24 57/1 57/12 58/25 60/20 61/11 56/24 57/1 57/12 58/25 60/20 61/11 56/24 57/1 57/12 58/25 60/20 61/11 56/24 57/1 57/12 58/25 60/20 61/11 56/24 57/1 57/12 56/24 57/1 57/12 56/24 57/1 57/12 58/25 60/20 61/11 56/24 57/1 57/12 58/25 60/20 61/11 56/24 57/1 57/12 58/25 60/20 61/11 56/24 57/1 57/12 58/25 60/20 61/11 56/24 57/1 57/12 58/25 60/20 61/11 56/24 57/1 57/12 58/25 60/20 61/11 56/24 57/1 57/12 58/25 60/20 61/11 56/24 57/1 57/12 58/25 60/20 61/11 56/24 57/1 57/12 58/25 60/20 61/11 56/24 57/1 57/12 58/25 60/20 61/11 56/24 57/1 57/12 58/25 60/20 61/11 56/24 57/1 57/12 58/25 60/20 61/11 56/24 57/1 57/12 58/25 60/20 61/11 56/24 57/1 57/12 58/25 60/20 61/11 56/24 57/1 57/12 58/25 60/20 61/11 56/24 57/1 57/12 58/25 60/20 61/11 50/26 61/12 50/26 61/10 56/24 57/1 57/12 58/25 60/20 61/11 56/24 57/1 57/12 58/25 60/20 61/11 56/24 57/1 57/12 58/25 60/20 61/11 50/26 61/14 50/26	04/0	Jenny's [1] 39/1	KATHERINE [1] 2/6
Solid 1 2 7		job [1] 24/4	keep [2] 22/14
Intent [1] 5/11 intention [1] 29/7 interview [2] 56/23 58/20 interviewed [3] 55/24 56/19 57/16 interviewing [2] 57/23 61/17 interviews [1] 59/7 investigation [10] 6/11 6/17 17/25 18/6 33/11 33/17 48/25 49/7 53/18 54/9 involved [8] 31/8 50/15 50/18 53/2 56/7 57/4 57/24 58/11 SONIES [9] 30/11 56/24 57/1 57/12 58/25 60/20 61/11 61/16 61/24 Joseph [2] 51/17 66/10 61/24 Joseph [2] 51/17 56/5 Jr [1] 1/8 JUDICIAL [1] 1/1 jump [1] 27/23 juncture [1] 46/21 June [13] 7/16 8/9 15/2 19/19 38/8 38/10 40/7 43/8 knew [2] 22/2 36/8 knife [9] 11/12 11/21 11/24 12/1 11/21 11/24 12/1 11/22 12/8 know [18] 20/25 22/9 23/18 23/23 24/13 25/21 26/23		JOHN [1] 2/7	25/6
intention [1] 29/7 interview [2] 56/23 58/20 interviewed [3] 55/24 56/19 57/16 interviewing [2] 57/23 61/17 interviews [1] 59/7 investigation [10] 6/11 6/17 17/25 18/6 33/11 33/17 48/25 49/7 53/18 54/9 involved [8] 31/8 50/15 50/18 53/2 56/7 57/4 57/24 58/11 58/25 60/20 61/11 61/16 61/24 Jordan [1] 9/22 Joseph [2] 51/17 56/5 Jr [1] 1/8 JUDICIAL [1] 1/1 1/1 1/1 1/1 1/1 1/1 1/1 1/		Jones [9] 56/11	keeping [1] 24/5
29/7 interview [2] 56/23 58/20 interviewed [3] 55/24 56/19 57/16 interviewing [2] 57/23 61/17 interviews [1] 59/7 investigation [10] 6/11 6/17 17/25 18/6 33/11 33/17 48/25 49/7 53/18 54/9 involved [8] 31/8 50/15 50/18 53/2 56/7 57/4 57/24 58/11 Solution [10] 61/16 61/24 Jordan [1] 9/22 Joseph [2] 51/17 56/5 Jr [1] 1/8 JUDICIAL [1] 1/1 jump [1] 27/23 30/5 30/9 30/12 30/5 30/9 30/12 30/5 30/9 30/12 30/5 30/9 30/12 30/5 30/9 30/12 38/8 38/10 40/7 43/8 knew [2] 22/2 36/8 knife [9] 11/12 11/21 11/24 12/1 12/2 12/8 know [18] 20/25 22/9 23/18 23/23 24/13 25/21 26/23		56/24 57/1 57/12	keeps [3] 25/7
interview [2] 56/23 58/20 interviewed [3] 55/24 56/19 57/16 interviewing [2] 57/23 61/17 interviews [1] 59/7 investigation [10] 6/11 6/17 17/25 18/6 33/11 33/17 48/25 49/7 53/18 54/9 involved [8] 31/8 50/15 50/18 53/2 56/7 57/4 57/24 58/11 51/10 61/24 Jordan [1] 9/22 Joseph [2] 51/17 56/5 Jr [1] 1/8 JUDICIAL [1] 1/1 jump [1] 27/23 juncture [1] 46/21 June [13] 7/16 8/9 15/2 19/19 36/8 knife [9] 11/12 11/24 12/1 12/2 12/8 14/13 25/21 26/23		58/25 60/20 61/11	29/17 38/16
Joseph 2 51/17 56/5 20/17 21/24 23/5 23/9 24/2 25/19 26/4 26/14 28/10 26/4 26/14 28/10 26/4 26/14 28/10 26/4 26/14 28/10 26/4 26/14 28/10 26/4 26/14 28/10 26/4 26/14 28/10 26/4 26/14 28/10 26/4 26/14 28/10 30/5 30/9 30/12 30/5 30/9 30/12 38/8 38/10 40/7 43/8 38/25 49/7 53/18 54/9 50/12 50/15 58/3 58/15 59/21 60/12 36/8 knife [9] 11/12 11/24 12/1 11/24 12/1 11/24 12/1 11/24 12/1 11/24 12/1 11/24 12/1 11/24 12/1 11/24 12/1 11/24 12/1 11/24 12/1 11/24 12/1 12/2 12/8 34/23 35/13 60/12 36/8 know [18] 20/25 22/9 23/18 23/23 24/13 25/21 26/23 24/13 25/21 26/23 24/13 25/21 26/23 24/13 25/21 26/23 24/13 25/21 26/23 24/13 25/21 26/23 24/13 25/21 26/23 24/13 25/21 26/23 24/13 25/21 26/23 24/13 25/21 26/23 26/23 24/13 25/21 26/23 24/13 25/21 26/23 24/13 25/21 26/23 24/13 25/21 26/23 24/13 25/21 26/23 26/23 24/13 25/21 26/23 24/13 25/21 26/23 26/23 26/23 24/13 25/21 26/23 26/23 24/13 25/21 26/23 26/23 24/13 25/21 26/23 2	·		
interviewed [3] 55/24 56/19 57/16 interviewing [2] 57/23 61/17 interviews [1] 59/7 investigation [10] 6/11 6/17 17/25 18/6 33/11 33/17 48/25 49/7 53/18 54/9 involved [8] 31/8 50/15 50/18 53/2 56/7 57/4 57/24 58/11 June [13] 7/16 8/9 15/2 19/19 34/23 35/13 45/9 50/15 50/18 53/2 56/7 57/4 57/24 58/11 SOSEPII [2] 31/17 20/17 21/24 23/5 23/9 24/2 25/19 26/4 26/14 28/10 30/5 30/9 30/12 38/8 38/10 40/7 43/8 knew [2] 22/2 36/8 knife [9] 11/12 11/21 11/24 12/1 12/2 12/8 know [18] 20/25 22/9 23/18 23/23 24/13 25/21 26/23			
55/24 56/19 57/16 interviewing [2] 57/23 61/17 interviews [1] 59/7 investigation [10] 6/11 6/17 17/25 18/6 33/11 33/17 48/25 49/7 53/18 54/9 involved [8] 31/8 50/15 50/18 53/2 56/7 57/4 57/24 58/11 30/5 30/9 30/12 26/4 26/14 28/10 30/5 30/9 30/12 38/8 38/10 40/7 43/8 knew [2] 22/2 36/8 knife [9] 11/12 11/14 11/17 11/19 11/21 11/24 12/1 11/21 11/24 12/1 11/22 12/8 know [18] 20/25 22/9 23/18 23/23 24/13 25/21 26/23		_	
JUDICIAL [1]	interviewed [3]	56/5	
57/23 61/17 interviews [1] 59/7 investigation [10] 6/11 6/17 17/25 18/6 33/11 33/17 48/25 49/7 53/18 54/9 involved [8] 31/8 50/15 50/18 53/2 56/7 57/4 57/24 58/11 SOPTEMB [1] 1/1 27/23 30/5 30/9 30/12 38/8 38/10 40/7 43/8 knew [2] 22/2 36/8 knife [9] 11/12 11/14 11/17 11/19 11/21 11/24 12/1 12/2 12/8 know [18] 20/25 11/14 11/17 11/19 11/21 11/24 12/1 12/2 12/8 know [18] 20/25 22/9 23/18 23/23 24/13 25/21 26/23	35/24 36/19 37/16		
interviews [1] 59/7 investigation [10] 6/11 6/17 17/25 18/6 33/11 33/17 48/25 49/7 53/18 54/9 involved [8] 31/8 50/15 50/18 53/2 56/7 57/4 57/24 58/11 June [13] 7/16 8/9 15/2 19/19 34/23 35/13 45/9 50/12 50/15 58/3 58/15 59/21 60/12 June 23 [4] 19/19 34/23 35/13 60/12 June 23 [4] 19/19 34/23 35/13 60/12 June 23rd [2] 45/9 58/3			
59/7 investigation [10] 6/11 6/17 17/25 18/6 33/11 33/17 48/25 49/7 53/18 54/9 involved [8] 31/8 50/15 50/18 53/2 56/7 57/4 57/24 58/11 June [13] 7/16 8/9 15/2 19/19 34/23 35/13 45/9 50/15 58/3 58/15 59/21 60/12 June 23 [4] 19/19 34/23 35/13 60/12 June 23 [4] 19/19 34/23 35/13 60/12 June 23rd [2] 45/9 58/3		1-	
investigation [10] 6/11 6/17 17/25 18/6 33/11 33/17 48/25 49/7 53/18 54/9 involved [8] 31/8 50/15 50/18 53/2 56/7 57/4 57/24 58/11 46/21 June [13] 7/16 8/9 15/2 19/19 36/8 knife [9] 11/12 11/24 11/17 11/19 11/21 11/24 12/1 12/2 12/8 know [18] 20/25 22/9 23/18 23/23 24/13 25/21 26/23		-	
6/11 6/17 17/25 18/6 33/11 33/17 48/25 49/7 53/18 54/9 involved [8] 31/8 50/15 50/18 53/2 56/7 57/4 57/24 58/9 15/2 19/19 30/8 8/9 15/2 19/19 50/15 50/15 58/3 58/15 59/21 60/12 June 23 [4] 19/19 34/23 35/13 60/12 36/8 knife [9] 11/12 11/21 11/24 12/1 12/2 12/8 34/23 35/13 60/12 June 23rd [2] 45/9 58/3 24/13 25/21 26/23			
18/6 33/11 33/17 48/25 49/7 53/18 54/9 involved [8] 31/8 50/15 50/18 53/2 56/7 57/4 57/24 58/11 33/17 34/23 35/13 45/9 50/15 50/15 58/3 58/15 59/21 60/12 11/21 11/24 12/1 12/2 12/8 know [18] 20/25 22/9 23/18 23/23 24/13 25/21 26/23		buile [13] // 10	
48/25 49/7 53/18 54/9 involved [8] 31/8 50/15 50/18 53/2 56/7 57/4 57/24 58/15 59/21 60/12 June 23 [4] 19/19 34/23 35/13 60/12 June 23rd [2] 45/9 58/3 24/13 25/21 26/23			
54/9 involved [8] 31/8 50/15 59/21 60/12 11/21 11/24 12/1 June 23 [4] 19/19 34/23 35/13 60/12 know [18] 20/25 June 23rd [2] 58/11 45/9 58/3 24/13 25/21 26/23			
involved [8] 31/8 50/15 50/18 53/2 56/7 57/4 57/24 58/11 June 23 [4] 19/19 34/23 35/13 60/12 June 23rd [2] 45/9 58/3 11/21 11/24 12/1 12/2 12/8 know [18] 20/25 22/9 23/18 23/23 24/13 25/21 26/23			
50/15 50/18 53/2 56/7 57/4 57/24 58/11			
56/7 57/4 57/24 58/11 June 23rd [2] 45/9 58/3 22/9 23/18 23/23 24/13 25/21 26/23		buile 25 [4] 19/19	
58/11 45/9 58/3 24/13 25/21 26/23			
involving [2]			
	involving [2]	13/3 30/3	77/13 23/21 20/23

lays [1] 43/8 lead [3] 30/11 28/23 28/24 29/4 46/19 46/20 48/2 leads [1] 20/10 13/3 51	K	51/2 62/24 66/12	letting [1] 30/3
36/18 38/18 39/7 46/19 46/20 48/2 52/16 knowledge [1] 55/13 known [3] 53/23 54/1 58/25 KOSLUCHER [1] 2/12 L L 1adies [5] 5/13 29/21 36/3 37/5 64/8 lady [8] 38/5 38/6 38/16 38/22 39/2 39/19 40/9 40/12 Lamb [1] 19/12 lap [2] 30/18 43/9 larceny [11] 6/1 6/21 6/21 18/10 18/10 33/21 33/21 49/11 49/11 64/3 64/4 larger [1] 12/1 Las [7] 1/14 5/1 18x [6] 7/2 18x [6] 7/	know [11] 30/5	lays [1] 43/8	
36/18 38/18 39/7	30/13 36/16 36/18	read [3]	
Second S	36/18 38/18 39/7	42/1/ 42/1/	
Addy	46/19 46/20 48/2		
learned [2]	52/16		
Solution	knowledge [1]		
Leatrice [1]			
Continue			
11/1 13/2 21/3 37/6 47/11 2/12 25/5 25/24 25/25 26/1 28/8 29/18 38/15 39/13 39/17 39/21 53/15 56/10 19/18 34/17 39/21 53/15 19/18 34/17 39/21 53/15 19/18 34/17 39/21 39/19 40/9 40/12 25/9 40/14 40/16 19/18 34/17 19/12 25/4 27/24 39/25 16/19 40/12 25/4 27/24 39/25 16/19 25/4 27/24 39/25 11/18 47/11 50/10 100k [11] 9/7 11/16 21/10 36/20 36/21 40/3 41/22 36/6 39/2 40/19 41/23 16/19 41/23 16/19 41/23 16/19 41/23 16/19 41/23 16/19 41/23 16/19 41/23 16/19 41/23 16/19 41/23 16/19 41/23 16/19 41/23 16/19 41/23 16/19 41/23 16/19 41/23 16/19 41/23 16/19 41/23 16/19 41/23 16/19			
25/5 25/24 25/25 1iving [1] 34/14 1adies [5] 5/13 38/15 39/13 39/17 56/10 19/18 34/17 56/10 19/18 34/17 19/18 34/18 19/18			
Ladies [5] 5/13 29/21 36/3 37/5 64/8 lady [8] 38/5 38/6 38/16 38/22 39/2 39/19 40/9 40/12 Lamb [1] 19/12 lap [2] 30/18 43/9 larceny [11] 6/1 6/21 6/21 18/10 18/10 33/21 33/21 49/11 49/11 64/3 64/4 larger [1] 12/1 Las [7] 1/14 5/1 34/20 50/8 50/22 51/5 65/14 last [6] 7/2 18/16 19/7 20/4 34/2 49/19 later [7] 44/10 44/12 54/22 57/11 58/25 60/20 61/19 law [7] 16/25 26/1 28/8 29/18 38/15 39/13 39/17 39/21 53/15 56/10 location [3] 7/17 19/18 34/17 10cked [1] 26/15 10cked [1] 26/15 11/18 47/11 50/10 look [11] 9/2 11/16 21/10 36/20 36/21 40/3 41/22 43/10 54/16 55/11 57/1 1coked [3] 20/13 25/17 54/22 looking [4] 9/17 9/19 9/21 51/25 looks [3] 42/20 42/20 43/10 lot [9] 22/15 22/17 24/20 41/25 47/20 47/20 51/9 51/26 43/12 let's [2] 42/16 43/12 lets [2] 20/25	2/12		
ladies [5] 5/13 29/21 36/3 37/5 64/8 leaves [7] 25/1 lady [8] 38/5 38/6 38/16 38/22 39/2 39/19 40/9 40/12 40/17 40/17 40/23 lamb [1] 19/12 40/23 lap [2] 30/18 led [1] 27/4 43/9 led [1] 27/4 look [1] 9/25 18/10 38/15 39/24 39/25 11/18 47/11 50/10 18/10 30/18 led [1] 27/4 10oked [1] 9/25 11/18 47/11 50/10 43/9 led [1] 27/4 16(21 36/6 39/2 40/19 41/23 11/16 21/10 36/20 36/21 40/3 41/22 43/10 57/1 10oked [3] 20/13 25/17 11/16 21/10 36/20 36/21 40/3 41/22 43/10 57/1 10oked [3] 20/13 25/17 57/1 10oked [3] 20/13 25/17 54/22 10oked [3]	L		_
39/21 36/3 37/5 64/8 1eaves [7] 25/1 1ocation [3] 7/17 1ady [8] 38/5 38/6 38/16 38/22 40/17 40/17 40/23 1eaving [5] 16/19 40/12 25/4 27/24 39/25 11/18 47/11 50/10 1ook [11] 9/7 11/16 21/10 36/20 36/21 40/3 41/22 1ay [2] 30/18 1ed [1] 27/4 1eft [5] 10/24 36/6 39/2 40/19 43/10 54/16 55/11 57/1 1ooked [3] 20/13 1ay [1] 49/11 49/11 64/3 64/4 33/23 49/15 57/15 1ooked [3] 20/13 25/17 54/22 1ooking [4] 9/17 11/16 21/10 36/20 36/21 40/3 41/22 1ooked [3] 20/13 25/17 54/22 1ooking [4] 9/17 25/	ladies [5] 5/13		
leaves [7] 25/1 25/1 19/18 34/17 38/6 38/16 38/22 39/2 39/19 40/9 40/12 25/4 27/24 39/25 11/18 47/11 50/10 100k [1] 9/7 11/16 21/10 36/20 36/21 40/3 40/19 41/23 164 19 18/10 33/21 33/21 49/11 49/11 64/3 64/4 18/10 34/20 50/8 50/22 51/5 65/14 1ast [6] 7/2 18/16 19/7 20/4 34/2 49/19 44/12 54/22 57/11 58/25 60/20 61/19 1aw [7] 16/25 16/25 16/25 14/16 18/10 19/18 34/17 19/18 34/17 19/18 34/17 100ked [1] 26/15 10/24 34/10 34/11 50/10 100k [11] 9/7 11/16 21/10 36/20 36/21 40/3 41/22 43/10 54/16 55/11 57/1 100ked [3] 20/13 25/17 54/22 100king [4] 9/17 9/19 9/21 51/25			
lady [8] 38/5 38/6 38/16 38/22 39/2 39/19 40/9 40/12 Lamb [1] 19/12 lap [2] 30/18 43/9 larceny [11] 6/1 6/21 6/21 18/10 18/10 33/21 33/21 49/11 49/11 64/3 64/4 larger [1] 12/1 Las [7] 1/14 5/1 34/20 50/8 50/22 51/5 65/14 last [6] 7/2 18/16 19/7 20/4 34/21 54/22 57/11 58/25 60/20 61/19 law [7] 16/25 25/9 40/14 40/16 40/17 40/17 40/23 19/18 34/17 10cked [1] 26/15 10ng [4] 9/25 11/18 47/11 50/10 10ok [11] 9/7 11/16 21/10 36/20 36/21 40/3 41/22 36/21 40/3 41/22 11/16 21/10 36/20 36/21 40/3 41/22 36/21 40/3 41/22 11/16 21/10 36/20 36/21 40/3 41/22 11/16 21/10 36/20 36/21 40/3 41/22 11/16 21/10 36/20 36/21 40/3 41/22 11/16 21/10 36/20			
38/6 38/16 38/22 39/2 39/19 40/9 40/12 Lamb [1] 19/12 lap [2] 30/18 43/9 let [5] 10/24 36/6 39/2 40/19 41/23 let [5] 10/24 36/21 18/10 18/10 33/21 33/21 49/11 49/11 64/3 64/4 larger [1] 12/1 Las [7] 1/14 5/1 34/20 50/8 50/22 51/5 65/14 last [6] 7/2 18/16 19/7 20/4 34/2 49/19 later [7] 44/10 44/12 54/22 57/11 58/25 60/20 61/19 leving [5] 16/19 40/23 looked [1] 26/15 10/24 36/21 40/11 50/10 10ok [11] 9/7 11/16 21/10 36/20 36/21 40/3 41/22 36/21 40/3 41/22 36/21 40/3 41/22 36/21 40/3 41/22 36/21 40/3 41/22 36/21 40/3 41/22 36/21 40/3 41/22 36/21 40/3 41/22 36/21 40/3 41/22 36/21 40/3 41/22 36/21 40/3 41/22 36/21 40/3 41/22 43/10 54/16 55/11 57/1 looked [3] 20/13 25/17 54/22 looking [4] 9/17 9/19 9/21 51/25 looks [3] 42/20 42/20 43/10 lot [9] 22/15 22/17 24/20 41/25 47/20 47/20 51/9 51/20 56/13 LURVEY [1] 2/3 LVMPD [1] 56/18 M H. E. C. T. D. T. [2] M. E. C. T. D. T. [2] 10/15 10/4 11/18 47/11 50/10 10/4 11/18 47/11 50/10 10/4 11/18 47/11 50/10 10/4 11/18 47/11 50/10 10/4 11/18 47/11 50/10 10/4 11/18 47/11 50/10 10/4 11/18 47/11 50/10 11/18 47/11 50/10 11/18 47/11 50/10 11/18 47/11 50/10 11/18 47/11 50/10 11/18 47/11 50/10 11/18 47/11 50/10 11/18 47/11 50/10 11/18 47/11 50/10 11/18 47/11 50/10 11/18 47/11 50/10 11/18 47/11 50/10 11/18 47/11 50/10 11/18 47/11 50/10 11/18 47/11 50/10 11/18 47/11 50/10 11/18 47/11 50/10 11/18 47/11 50/10 11/16 21/10 36/20 11/18 47/11 50/10 11/16 21/10 36/20 11/16 21/10 36/20 11/16 21/10 36/20 11/16 21/10 36/20 11/16 21/10 36/20 11/16 21/10 36/20 11/16 21/10 36/20 11/16 21/10 36/20 11/16 21/10 36/20 11/16 21/10 36/20 11/16 21/10 36/20 11/16 21/10 36/20 11/16 21/10 36/20 11/16 21/10 36/20 11/16 21/10 36/20 11/16 21/10 36/20 11/16 21/10 36/20 11/16 21/10 36/20 11/16 21/10 36/20 11/16	lady [8] 38/5		
Lamb [1] 19/12		40/17 40/17 40/23	locked [1] 26/15
Lamb [1] 19/12 40/23 led [1] 27/4 43/9 left [5] 10/24 36/21 40/3 41/22 43/10 54/16 55/11 57/1 49/11 49/11 64/3 64/4 43/23 49/15 57/15 44/3 42/20 44/3 43/2 49/19 44/3 44/12 54/22 57/11 58/25 60/20 61/19 lets [2] 20/25 Lets [2] 20/25 Lects [2] 20/25 Le	39/2 39/19 40/9	leaving [5] 16/19	long [4] 9/25
lap [2] 30/18 led [1] 27/4 36/20 36/21 40/3 41/22 36/21 18/10 36/6 39/2 40/19 43/10 54/16 55/11 57/1 18/10 33/21 33/21 1/9 6/23 18/12 33/23 49/15 57/15 1/9 6/23 18/12 33/23 49/15 57/15 1/9 6/23 18/12 1	40/12	25/4 27/24 39/25	11/18 47/11 50/10
43/9 larceny [11] 6/1 36/6 39/2 40/19 43/10 54/16 55/11 57/1 57/1 57/1 57/1 57/1 16/21 49/11 49/11 64/3 41/23 49/11 49/11 64/3 41/22 43/10 54/16 55/11 57/1 16/25 16/21 16	Lamb [1] 19/12		
larceny [11] 6/1 6/21 6/21 18/10 41/23 57/1 57/1 57/1 18/10 33/21 33/21 49/11 49/11 64/3 64/4 14/23 25/17 54/22 33/23 49/15 57/15 160king [4] 9/17 14 5/1 60/1 60/21 61/22 160king [4] 9/17 14 5/1 60/1 60/21 61/22 160king [4] 9/17 14/20 51/5 65/14 18/16 19/7 20/4 23/17 24/25 26/6 23/17 24/25 26/6 22/17 24/20 41/25 18/16 19/7 20/4 26/16 29/20 37/4 18/16 19/7 20/4 26/16 29/20 37/4 18/16 19/7 20/4 26/16 29/20 37/4 18/16 19/7 20/4 26/16 29/20 37/4 18/12 16/15 16/15 16/18 16/15 16/1	lap [2] 30/18		
6/21 6/21 18/10	•		
18/10 33/21 33/21 LEQUANA [10] 1/9 1/9 6/23 18/12 25/17 54/22 164/4 33/23 49/15 57/15 160king [4] 9/17 14 5/1 14 5/1 14 5/1 14 5/1 15 65/14 16 19/7 20/4 18/16 19/7 20/4 26/16 29/20 37/4 18/12 16/25 16/12 16/1			
49/11 49/11 64/3 1/9 6/23 18/12 25/17 54/22 64/4 33/23 49/15 57/15 looking [4] 9/17 larger [1] 12/1 60/1 60/21 61/22 9/19 9/21 51/25 Las [7] 1/14 5/1 less [2] 13/18 100ks [3] 42/20 34/20 50/8 50/22 44/3 100ks [3] 42/20 51/5 65/14 1et [13] 5/9 1ot [9] 22/15 18/16 19/7 20/4 23/17 24/25 26/6 22/17 24/20 41/25 34/2 49/19 26/16 29/20 37/4 47/20 47/20 51/9 34/2 49/19 26/16 29/20 37/4 51/20 56/13 1ater [7] 44/10 37/12 43/11 46/18 LURVEY [1] 2/3 44/12 54/22 57/11 43/12 1aw [7] 16/25 1ets [2] 20/25			
64/4			
larger [1] 12/1 60/1 60/21 61/22 9/19 9/21 51/25 Las [7] 1/14 5/1 less [2] 13/18 1ooks [3] 42/20 51/5 65/14 let [13] 5/9 lot [9] 22/15 18/16 19/7 20/4 26/8 26/10 26/11 47/20 47/20 51/9 34/2 49/19 26/16 29/20 37/4 51/20 56/13 later [7] 44/10 37/12 43/11 46/18 44/12 54/22 57/11 58/25 60/20 61/19 let's [2] 42/16 1aw [7] 16/25 lets [2] 20/25			
Las [7] 1/14 5/1 34/20 50/8 50/22 44/3 42/20 42/20 43/10 51/5 65/14 let [13] 5/9 lot [9] 22/15 23/17 24/25 26/6 22/17 24/20 41/25 26/8 26/10 26/11 26/16 29/20 37/4 31/2 44/12 54/22 57/11 58/25 60/20 61/19 lets [2] 42/16 43/12 lets [2] 20/25			
34/20 50/8 50/22			
1			
last [6] 7/2			
18/16 19/7 20/4 26/8 26/10 26/11 47/20 47/20 51/9 34/2 49/19 26/16 29/20 37/4 51/20 56/13 37/12 43/11 46/18 LURVEY [1] 2/3 44/12 54/22 57/11 let's [2] 42/16 43/12 lets [2] 20/25 M			
34/2 49/19 26/16 29/20 37/4 51/20 56/13 37/12 43/11 46/18 LURVEY [1] 2/3 44/12 54/22 57/11 58/25 60/20 61/19 43/12 lets [2] 20/25 M			
later [7] 44/10 37/12 43/11 46/18 LURVEY [1] 2/3 44/12 54/22 57/11 let's [2] 42/16 58/25 60/20 61/19 43/12 lets [2] 20/25 M			
44/12 54/22 57/11 let's [2] 42/16			
58/25 60/20 61/19 43/12 M 16/25 lets [2] 20/25 M R C R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R			
law [7] 16/25 lets [2] 20/25 M. R. G. M. D. R. [2]			
32/13 46/4 48/6 43/12 M-E-S-T-R-E [2]			
		43/12	M-E-S-T-R-E [2]

M	9/10 9/11 52/4	merchant [1] 47/5
M-E-S-T-R-E [2]	53/23	Mestre [3] 6/8
		7/3 7/7
machine [1] 40/21	matter [5] 29/24	metal [1] 55/4
	3//10 4//14 63/16	Metro [1] 50/10
32/17 37/10 48/10	65/8	Metropolitan [1]
63/3	may [7] 7/5 17/9	50/8
majority [1]	32/22 37/8 48/15	Mia [8] 56/11
16/10	51/7 63/8	56/24 57/1 57/12
make [3] 29/14	maybe [1] 20/15	
36/11 36/24	MCCLINTON [1]	
making [1] 36/5		mimicking [1]
male [20] 8/12	MCCLINTON-MCFARLIN	
8/19 10/16 12/24		minutes [3] 10/1
26/1 26/8 28/18		23/13 40/3
39/6 39/9 40/17	2/14	Miranda [1] 57/17
42/9 42/11 43/2	me [29]	misdemeanor [4]
45/10 50/4 50/0	mean [5] 24/15	17/7 32/20 48/13
52/16 52/18 52/20		63/6
53/23	55/8	Miss [4] 58/25
man [3] 16/12	mechanical [1]	58/25 60/13 61/10
16/10 05/10	32/6	Miss Brown [3]
manager [16] 7/22	medium [2] 20/18	58/25 60/13 61/10
1 1 2 / 0 2 0 / 1 2 4 / 1 1	1 3 / / 1 0	Miss Jones III
04/02 05/02 06/0	members [8] 5/20	58/25
27/8 27/18 27/24	9/18 16/23 60/22	missing [2] 31/6
29/16 30/19 34/15	01/3 01/9 02/4	43/18
34/25 35/24 38/12	63/21	moment [2] 21/21
many [1] 13/5	memorize [1] 29/6	
MARK [9] 1/8 1/8	mentioned [10]	
2/9 6/22 18/11	9/19 13/8 13/21	
33/22 49/14 53/24	24/10 30/21 35/13	
61/8	44/19 55/16 56/22	
marked [4] 5/18	63/17	36/14 38/6 38/6
5/20 53/16 53/16	merchandise [17]	
MARLA [1] 2/5	8/7 10/17 11/1	
match [2] 57/3	11/8 12/6 13/2	morning [2] 34/12
58/5	13/9 13/12 13/16	
matched [2] 52/1	14/25 15/24 16/4	most [4] 24/21
61/16		44/2 47/8 47/13
matching [5] 9/8	41/2 47/4	motion [1] 11/3

M	next [18] 17/16	
motioned [3]		Number 1 [1] 5/19
10/20 11/21 12/5	22/11 23/8 23/22	Number 2 [1] 5/22
move [1] 12/10	24/16 24/19 26/5	Number 4 [1] 16/1
Mr. [7] 26/20	26/22 27/17 27/18	
29/22 34/12 37/4	29/25 33/3 36/13	
37/10 37/12 63/23	38/23 48/22	numerous [1]
Mr. Akita [6]		55/21
26/20 29/22 34/12	Nike [5] 9/8 9/8	Nuts [1] 47/11
37/4 37/10 37/12	9/20 9/22 47/9	0
Mr. District [1]	Nissan [4] 28/11 50/23 51/21 53/6	observed [3]
63/23		50/24 53/7 57/5
much [2] 44/4	no [33] NOEL [1] 2/17	obtain [2] 58/21
47/19	northeast [1]	58/23
my [36]	50/21	obtained [6] 9/22
myself [4] 8/1	not [29]	17/5 32/18 48/11
19/25 51/1 51/17	notes [1] 65/10	59/1 63/4
N	nothing [9] 6/13	obtaining [6] 6/2
name [18] 5/14		6/19 18/8 33/19
	33/13 34/8 46/2	49/10 64/2
17/20 18/16 18/17		occur [1] 21/22
19/8 20/4 21/4	notice [2] 5/11	occurred [2]
27/6 34/2 35/15	35/23	50/20 59/21
49/19 57/12 57/14	noticed [3] 51/20	occurring [5]
61/13 66/21	52/4 55/20	1 1 / 4 32 / 1 / 40 / 0
named [1] 6/22	notified [2]	48/10 63/3
near [2] 15/20	43/15 50/20	October [4] 1/15
51/20		2/1 5/1 65/15
nearby [1] 38/2	17/25 27/11 27/13	OII [4] 15/13
10004 [13] 24/8	1 33/11 40/11 40/14	00/20 41/0 43/13
25/20 36/17 36/18	42/25 48/25 60/6	offenses [4] 6/18 18/7 33/18 49/8
36/20 39/14 39/15	60/23	offer [2] 21/8
39/22 41/9 41/10		21/16
41/20 41/22 42/17		offered [1] 21/23
needed [1] 35/9	number [19] 5/16	office [2] 14/4
needs [1] 30/10	5/19 5/22 15/8	
NEVADA [11] 1/2	16/1 16/8 16/15	officer [21 54/8
1/5 1/14 5/1 5/16	16/18 28/23 28/24	54/10
7/19 19/16 34/20		officers [3]
51/12 65/3 65/14	51/1 60/14 64/5	

0	28/9 32/12 36/23	56/10
officers[3]	37/17 38/9 46/23	parking [6] $41/15$
53/16 54/16 54/18	48/5 52/22 56/2	41/17 41/25 51/9
Official [1]	56/5 56/13 62/23	51/20 56/13
66/23	63/20	Parra [2] 51/17
often [1] 8/2	our [27]	56/5
oh [3] 32/1 43/11	out [36]	<pre>part [1] 50/21</pre>
47/1	outdoor [1] 40/20	particular [1]
okay [42]	outfits [3] 9/8	
once [8] 9/1		party [1] 25/11
11/19 22/5 23/9	outside [9] 24/18	_
47/3 47/5 51/19		30/16 30/16 41/12
53/21	40/24 40/25 41/5	
one [18] 5/10	41/6 41/11	
10/12 22/1 23/10	over [2] 9/2 38/1	
24/16 30/19 30/20	_	<pre>past [1] 35/10</pre>
37/16 37/17 39/8		<pre>patrol [3] 50/25</pre>
40/6 40/19 40/21		53/16 53/17
40/22 42/24 47/1		PAUL [2] 2/8 2/12
52/4 55/14	P-E-R-K-E-T-T [1]	pay [18] 10/11
only [6] 6/5	10/21	10/11 10/20 10/25
26/14 27/13 29/24	n m [2] 8/11	25/21 27/15 29/19
40/18 63/17	34/23	30/10 38/17 38/17
oo0oo [1] 64/12	packing [1] 25/22	38/20 39/18 41/7
open [10] 7/25	paged [1] 23/13	41/8 41/9 41/25
11/21 11/23 30/19	[2] 22/16	42/15 42/22
32/3 32/4 41/13	23/17	pending [4] 6/11
41/18 42/7 55/20	1 111 10/2/	17/25 33/11 48/25
openly [1] 61/20	11/8 25/1 38/16	people [5] 14/25
opens [3] 32/6	38/19 39/14 39/18	38/9 39/16 47/25
43/2 43/3	20/20 /1/2 /1/2	53/21
opportunity [1]	11/10	percent [1] 48/3
56/23	pants [6] 8/20	Perception [1] 62/7
organize [1]	0/0 0/0 0/0 20/16	
10/10	21/13	Perkett [3] 48/23
organized [1]		49/20 49/22
10/6	31/10	person [11] 15/14 15/17 16/11 25/18
organizing [1]	Park [2] 7/17	53/1 55/12 60/24
16/4	58/15	61/5 61/12 66/8
other [17] 9/20	<pre>parked [2] 30/8</pre>	66/11
15/17 16/11 21/3	-	OO/ II

P	placed [1] 54/20	
personal [6] 6/3	-	potentially [1]
6/20 18/9 33/20	plain [2] 32/2	
49/10 64/2		pounds [1] 25/14
personally [3]	Plaintiff [1] 1/6	I –
21/7 22/13 58/23	I —	preceding [1]
persons [1] 63/20	plastic [1] 55/4	66/4
pertaining [4]	plate [12] 28/23	<pre>prepare [2] 10/6</pre>
6/17 18/6 33/17	28/24 29/4 29/6	64/6
49/8		<pre>prepared [1] 10/8</pre>
phone [2] 29/11	1	<pre>presence [4] 17/4 32/17 48/10 63/3</pre>
30/24		present [3] 2/1
photo [6] 15/9	51/21	2/21 13/12
15/10 15/17 16/3	·	presentation [1]
16/11 60/14		63/16
PHOTOGRAPH [11]		presented [5]
4/6 4/7 4/8 4/9	plus [2] 22/20	17/3 32/16 46/7
4/10 4/11 4/12 4/13 4/14 4/15	25/14	48/9 63/2
4/16	pneumatic [9] 6/5	presenting [2]
photographed [2]	6/22 18/11 33/22	5/15 6/5
51/4 51/9	49/12 55/2 55/2	previously [2]
photographs [1]	62/20 64/4	15/11 64/7
58/19	pocket [1] 12/1	pricing [2] 8/6
photos [2] 14/19	T	13/9
59/6	<pre>pointed [1] 44/11</pre>	_ = =
physical [2]	_	printing [1]
19/13 61/16	43/10	43/20
<pre>picked [3] 10/5</pre>	police [12] 14/16	
10/16 44/13	14/24 29/8 29/10	
picture [2] 16/2	43/14 43/16 50/9	probably [2] 39/4
16/18	l .	problem [1] 36/7
<pre>pile [3] 23/11</pre>	policy [1] 31/20	
36/5 40/14	position [9] 7/21	_
piling [2] 24/5	7/24 11/9 13/21	
38/6	15/10 19/21 20/22	-
pilled [1] 23/10		1/20 5/7 16/25
pistols [1] 40/5	possibly [2]	32/13 46/4 48/6
place [6] 47/4 47/7 58/2 58/6	53/15 56/7	62/24 64/11 65/8
58/14 65/9	potential [2]	65/13
JU/ 14 UJ/ J		

P	47/15	receipts [1]
process [2] 23/23	<pre>putting [1] 9/9</pre>	43/20
31/8	Q	recently [1] 51/8
<pre>program [1] 66/15</pre>		Recess [1] 33/7
prohibited [5]	62/14 62/21	recognize [12]
17/1 32/14 46/5	questions [11]	14/20 14/21 14/22
48/7 62/25	16/21 16/22 16/24	44/24 45/1 59/17 59/19 60/8 60/10
projectile [1]	31/13 31/14 32/12	
55/4	46/23 48/5 62/2	record [8] 5/9
pronounce [1]	62/3 62/23	5/17 7/2 17/18
21/4	quick [1] 33/6	18/16 34/2 49/19
property [1] 56/9	R	65/12
proposed [3] 4/4		records [1] 14/6
5/18 64/7	rag [1] 8/19	recovered [1]
<pre>provide [1] 14/15 provided [2]</pre>	17/22 33/8	31/18
61/13 61/14	ran [1] 61/15	red [1] 45/25
public [2] 26/13		reflect [2] 5/9
66/15	47/13	5/18
Publish [2] 15/8	reach [1] 43/4	regard [1] 29/23
61/3	reached [1] 11/11	regarding [1]
publishing [2]	read [1] 57/16	5/22
60/22 61/9	ready [5] 10/2	regards [3] 22/4
pull [2] 12/12	41/12 41/14 41/16	29/22 37/6
30/20	41/18	register [19]
<pre>pulled [3] 11/19</pre>		10/9 10/10 22/14 22/23 22/25 23/4
12/18 46/12	46/17 62/9 62/16	23/25 24/12 26/24
pulling [1] 43/9	realize [2] 41/3	27/14 36/1 36/5
pulls [3] 30/20	44/8	37/1 37/2 38/7
	realizes [1]	38/9 38/25 40/7
punishable [8]		44/14
17/7 17/10 32/20		registers [1]
32/23 48/13 48/16	reason [1] 20/11	24/15
63/6 63/9	recall [18] 13/15	REID [1] 2/15
24/14	19/23 20/9 20/19	released [1]
purchased [1]	25/16 28/10 28/14	12/20
47/4	29/1 29/3 35/9	remember [4] 9/20
Pursuant [1] 66/2		13/5 13/18 52/12
put [5] 29/18	43/25 52/8 53/9	removed [1] 54/18
36/15 40/14 47/13		replica [3] 55/1

R	rights [1] 57/17	30/13 38/20 38/21
replica [2]	ring [3] 10/6	38/22 39/18 39/19
	10/9 39/1	40/3 40/22 40/23
Reported [1] 1/25	ringing [6] 10/12	41/7 42/15 42/18
Reporter [1]	1 10/14 10/3 30/3	45/5
66/23	38/14 38/24	scanning [1] 25/3
REPORTER'S [2]	road [1] 61/19	scene [4] 31/1
1/20 65/1	robbery [32]	50/25 56/5 56/6
reporting [1]	role [1] 55/23	searching [1]
29/7	room [1] 63/21	14/7
request [1] 2/21	run [1] 47/19	seat [12] 6/15
requested [1]	rung [1] 13/13	30/17 41/24 42/12
23/14	S	43/1 52/3 52/15
required [1]	Sage [2] 7/17	52/17 52/18 52/21
66/11	58/15	55/20 55/21
research [1] 51/3	said [30]	seated [1] 33/15
respond [2] 31/1	sales [4] 19/22	second [3] 17/20
51/14	20/22 23/12 35/14	21/10 21/11
response [1] 5/11	same [11] 16/5	secret [5] 16/25
responsibilities	16/8 16/16 27/3	32/13 46/5 48/6
[1] 7/23	38/3 38/4 38/25	62/24
restroom [13]	51/22 52/5 53/7	Secretary [2] 2/5
26/6 26/9 26/9	56/9	2/6
26/11 26/11 26/13	sandals [1] 52/12	section [2] 50/8
26/14 26/17 26/19	GRRAU FOI 1/0] 30/20
27/4 33/5 40/1	6/23 18/11 33/22	secured [1] 11/7
40/2	49/15 54/1 54/6	security [2] 66/8
retail [1] 47/12	61/2	66/11
return [1] 63/22	saw [1] 43/6	see [13] 10/19
returned [1]	say [22] 9/13	21/8 28/2 28/23
63/25	11/25 12/14 21/5	35/25 36/17 41/23
returns [1] 27/4	22/17 24/7 24/15	42/7 42/8 43/5
review [3] 5/23	25/25 26/7 26/10	45/8 51/3 54/16
8/3 13/22	27/2 36/10 38/15	Seek [1] 5/11
right [19] 6/9	38/20 40/16 40/20	seems [2] 47/11
12/23 15/2 16/12	41/9 41/14 42/3	4 / / 1 2
17/22 19/4 19/5	42/4 43/3 56/16	seized [1] 54/21
19/8 24/16 29/12	saying [3] 19/4	self [1] 42/22
33/8 36/11 36/11	38/11 38/16	sell [1] 40/5
39/17 48/4 60/15	says [14] 30/9	semi [1] 54/19
62/10 62/17 62/17		semi-automatic [1]
		54/19

S	58/17 58/25 59/15	
sergeant [1] 50/5	showed [3] 58/19	someone [8] 25/11
services [2] 21/9	59/6 60/13	30/18 30/22 55/14
21/23	showing [7] $16/1$	
set [3] 14/5	40/5 44/22 60/6	
17/05 51/10	60/17 60/23 61/4	someplace [1]
setting [1] 23/25	shown [1] 26/19	51/7
severity [1]	SHOWS [2] 20/3	something [3]
62/15	40/1	12/17 26/10 27/19
shall [4] 6/12	side [9] 16/12	
18/1 33/12 49/1	24/5 30/16 30/17	
she [122]	41/12 42/10 42/12	
she'll [1] 30/10	43/1 53/6	sorry [3] 15/13
she's [16] 20/15		43/12 60/6
21/1 21/12 21/15		sort [2] 24/2
22/4 25/4 25/5	66/19	35/22
27/14 27/24 28/21		sound [1] 20/7
30/5 40/23 41/20	sir [4] 33/2	sounds [1] 29/2
42/18 42/25 43/7	46/25 48/20 63/13	
shelves [1] 45/1	sit [2] 18/4 49/4	
shirt [5] 8/18	sitting [3] 30/18	
8/19 10/15 10/16	41/23 44/13	speak [1] 57/21
15/14	1	speaker [2] 27/19
shirts [1] 9/9	24/24 26/23 35/23	
shoe [4] 21/24	six [1] 11/18 six inches [1]	specific [2] 9/21
22/5 22/10 22/14	11/18	Specifically [1]
shoes [14] 8/19	sizes [2] 36/8	34/17
9/10 9/12 22/7	36/10	speculation [1]
22/18 22/20 23/24	slightly [1]	46/22
36/2 36/10 36/11	13/18	spell [4] 7/2
47/10 52/6 52/19	slipping [1] 24/6	
52/20		spelled [2] 17/19
shopping [1]		17/20
55/21	·	spend [2] 22/9
shorthand [2]	14/23	36/4
65/7 65/10 shortly [1] 21/23	so [86]	spoke [1] 53/6
shortly [1] 21/23 shorts [1] 25/14	social [2] 66/8	
shots [1] 45/5	66/11	19/11 34/15 50/21
should [1] 37/9	solemnly [4] 6/10	55/15
show [4] 14/18	17/24 33/10 48/24	Sports [3] 7/15


S	Stenotype [1]	swear [4] 6/10
Sports [2]	65/7	17/24 33/10 48/24
15/1 58/6	Stephanie [2]	Swenson [1] 51/10
spot [5] 22/1	2/23 5/14	swinging [1] 32/9
38/3 38/25 41/15	steps [1] 42/20	switch [1] 23/18
41/17	STEVE [1] 2/3	switches [1] $37/1$
	still [15] 23/6	sworn [5] 5/5 7/8
ss [1] 65/3 stabbed [1] 12/11	23/7 25/3 26/24	18/23 34/6 49/23
stack [2] 2/16		
36/1	38/2 38/3 39/1	
stamp [1] 45/9	40/9 44/15 44/16	
stamps [1] 14/9	52/23 58/19	61/15
stand [1] 39/22	stills [2] 58/25	T
standing [7] 28/7	59/4	take [4] 27/7
28/22 30/15 37/2	stole [1] 14/25	35/23 42/1 47/5
38/2 38/3 39/11	stop [3] 25/6	taken [8] 1/14
start [9] 10/13	29/20 37/4 stops [1] 42/20	37/9 43/21 44/6
22/6 22/13 24/6	stops [1] 42/20 store [60]	54/5 54/6 60/11
25/22 36/7 38/9	stuff [31]	62/9
41/24 42/13	style [6] 52/10	takes [2] 27/5
started [6] 9/6	52/11 54/19 55/2	38/1
9/7 10/9 10/10	55/8 55/10	taking [5] 22/13
11/3 11/6	subjects [1]	23/5 23/9 40/10
starts [8] 24/5	53/17	42/13
24/21 27/8 36/15 38/13 39/11 39/12		talked [4] 9/16
39/12	64/7	9/16 36/6 45/13
state [10] 1/5	substantial [1]	talking [9] 16/6
5/16 7/1 18/15	55/6	16/12 26/4 27/2
29/3 34/1 49/18	such [1] 61/12	28/5 37/13 38/5
65/3 66/12 66/16	Suites [1] 51/10	43/16 45/10
State's [1] 63/15	sun [1] 39/8	tall [2] 8/22
statement [4]	supervision [1]	8/24
17/4 32/17 48/10	65/11	taller [2] 8/17 8/21
63/3	sure [3] 21/4	tank [5] 25/14
statements [5]	36/11 48/3	39/7 52/11 53/12
17/3 32/16 46/7	surverriance [23]	54/7
48/9 63/2	suspect [2] 53/5	targeted [1] 51/4
stay [3] 22/10	56/23	Ted [2] 51/18
22/15 24/23	suspects [3] 52/5	56/6
steal [1] 47/25	55/24 56/13	

T	9/18	thousands [1]
tell [9] 14/20	then [36]	43/24
19/10 22/3 24/8	thens [1] 39/25	threat [1] 62/10
27/7 36/22 47/24		three [3] 28/1
59/17 60/7	there's [3] 27/13	28/4 56/16
telling [4] 24/23	41/11 45/8	threw [2] 31/16
25/19 29/17 38/4	thereafter [1]	44/2
tells [4] 22/7	65/9	through [14] 6/6
25/23 36/19 39/15	these [19] 5/21	9/7 9/10 10/4
Ten [1] 50/11	14/24 15/4 15/15	10/9 10/11 14/20
terms [1] 31/9	16/25 21/20 23/3	l l
testified [4]	32/13 36/3 42/3	l l
7/10 18/25 34/8		
49/25	59/22 60/7 62/24	throughout [3] 9/15 10/4 14/5
testify [5] 7/9	they [60]	throwing [1]
18/24 34/7 49/24	they're [10]	41/24
50/16	22/13 23/6 23/6	thrown [1] 44/1
testifying [1]	25/21 30/5 30/6	throws [2] 30/13
18/21	38/4 38/11 38/14	42/21
testimony [9]	42/5	TIARA [1] 2/4
6/10 6/17 17/24	they've [1] 47/5	time [30]
18/6 33/10 33/17	thing [3] 16/8	Title [1] 66/23
37/6 48/24 49/7	16/16 38/4	today [9] 6/5
than [7] 8/17	things [111 15/15	6/16 18/5 20/11
8/22 12/1 13/19 61/24 62/15 63/20	21/25 22/19 24/20	33/16 45/6 49/7
m1 1 - 1101 1 - 17	43/3 43/41 41/10	50/16 63/17
17/14 17/15 33/2	31/9 37/7 47/10	together [5] 9/10
46/24 48/20 48/21	47/13	9/12 21/20 22/2
49/5 63/13 63/14	think [2] 8/24	22/15
63/19 64/8 64/10	55/13	told [2] 25/5
that [274]	third [1] 25/11	38/18
that's [8] 11/11	this [71]	too [2] 22/23
16/19 22/1 37/3	those [17] 12/17	
40/20 44/11 60/5	13/13 15/23 25/10	
61/8	27/7 27/11 39/8	
their [5] 9/15	39/8 40/21 42/24	
9/17 24/6 30/18	44/24 57/19 58/18	-
36/4		21/12 22/15 24/24
them [47]	60/8	25/14 39/8 40/20
themselves [1]	though [1] 43/25	52/11 53/12 54/7

T	27/20	17/25 33/11 48/25
total [2] 13/15	turnstile [2]	51/6
44/4	31/24 32/1	upset [1] 42/19
tote [2] 42/25	two [12] 9/4	upstairs [1] 56/8
45/22		us [9] 17/2 19/10
touch [3] 41/19	23/3 27/11 28/9	25/20 32/15 39/15
42/24 43/8	35/20 36/3 37/13	
toward [1] 12/5	50/7 56/13	64/7
towards [10]	type [1] 12/2	use [11] 5/25
10/19 10/22 11/3	types [1] 7/23	6/19 18/8 19/7 26/17 33/5 33/19
11/4 11/5 11/6	typically [2] 55/5 55/11	35/6 49/9 61/15
11/9 11/21 30/12		64/1
42/21	U	used [3] 51/2
trained [1] 35/6	Uh [4] 11/15	52/7 55/6
transaction [2]	36/12 46/1 46/14	uses [1] 55/3
36/25 47/16	Uh-huh [4] 11/15	using [6] 6/2
transcribe [1]	36/12 46/1 46/14	6/19 18/8 33/19
5/6	ultimately [3]	49/10 64/2
transcribed [1] 65/10	20/10 21/19 23/3	uttered [1] 54/10
	under [2] 47/9	\mathbf{v}
transcript [3] 1/20 65/12 66/4	65/10	
transpired [5]	undersigned [1]	valley [2] 50/22
17/2 32/15 46/6	66/4	51/5
48/8 63/1	understand [9]	value [2] 13/15
trash [1] 42/21	6/24 17/12 18/13 29/25 32/25 33/24	
treat [1] 25/20	48/18 49/16 63/11	_
tries [2] 30/11	understood [1]	50/22 51/5 65/14
42/23	57/19	vehicle [16]
true [2] 63/24	Unfortunately [1]	I
65/12	44/2	51/7 51/8 51/19
truth [26]	uniformed [1]	51/25 52/14 52/18
try [3] 20/23	54/8	53/2 53/14 53/22
21/8 26/1	uniforms [1]	55/19 55/19 55/20
trying [5] 24/23	53/16	56/1
28/22 29/5 38/7	unmarked [1]	vehicles [1]
52/19	51/19	53/17
turned [2] 10/18	until [1] 29/19	versus [1] 5/17
38/10	up [28]	very [2] 47/12
turning [1] 38/10	upon [5] 6/11	52/17
turns [2] 27/19		
	L	

V	37/12 38/13 38/16	
victim [2] 50/25	38/17 38/20 39/18	56/10 56/13
51/22	45/9	where's [1] 36/23
victims [1] 52/2	we've [5] 15/2	whether [3] $41/1$
video [26]	16/5 16/12 28/4	62/8 62/9
view [2] 14/10	45/5	which [10] 9/23
14/13	weapon [8] $6/1$	
voids [1] 36/25		24/22 30/7 36/16
vote [1] 63/24	43/11 49/9 62/19	
	64/2	while [9] 9/14
<u>W</u>		10/12 24/10 30/19
	20/15 21/12 37/20	
	37/21 39/6 52/5	
•		white [26]
walked [3] 9/5		who [19] 14/25
	Wednesday [1]	19/23 22/25 23/16
walking [5] 10/19		25/23 26/7 26/15
10/22 23/12 28/21	1	27/2 27/3 38/21
	51/18 56/6	40/16 42/8 43/10
		51/16 53/22 56/10
wall [1] 42/21		59/25 61/1 61/7
WALTER [1] 2/18	well [8] 21/9	Who's [1] 25/12
want [11] 11/25		whole [9] 6/12
	55/17 56/20 58/12	
27/15 35/12 36/18		18/24 33/12 34/7
	WELLMAN [1] 2/17	
40/21		why [3] 22/4 29/5
		36/23
·	36/6 39/3 47/17	wide [1] 47/10
	55/23 56/8 56/20	will [5] 5/14
was [136]	• •	5/17 6/5 18/21
		37/7
		WILLIAM [1] 2/13
watching [3]		winnings [1] 22/9
		wit [1] 66/13
	36/19	within [1] 19/16
29/14 30/11 42/17		without [1] 55/12
42/18 47/14	where [15] 11/9	witness [10] 6/8
we [55]		14/7 16/22 17/16
	19/10 24/11 27/11	
we're [8] 12/16	28/1 28/20 30/17	40/22 50/25 62/3

W	your	[29]			
witness's [2]	Z				
17/19 17/20	ZUKOW	ISKI	[1]	2/18	
witnesses [3] 3/1					
18/20 51/22					
woman [18] 8/16 8/21 9/13 10/19					
10/21 15/13 16/5					
16/12 20/13 20/23					
21/4 21/5 21/6					
21/14 24/25 27/13					
59/25 61/17					
women [2] 21/20 23/3					
won [3] 9/16 22/7 36/3					
work [4] 7/15					
19/10 19/11 47/11					
worked [1] 50/10					
working [6] 7/16					
8/9 19/23 22/25					
34/22 35/13 works [1] 13/25					
would [4] 12/10					
29/22 46/22 55/13					
Y					
yeah [9] 20/24					
20/24 22/24 24/8					
32/3 36/12 37/21					
43/24 48/3					
years [2] 50/7 50/11					
yes [124]					
you [288]					
you're [10] 13/9					
20/11 24/16 29/23 41/21 41/25 42/19					
44/19 47/12 50/16					
you've [1] 29/21					
young [1] 52/17					



12:00	1	GRAND JURORS PRESENT ON OCTOBER 16, 2019
	2	
	3	STEVE LURVEY, FOREPERSON
	4	TIARA COSENTINO, Deputy Foreperson
12:00	5	MARLA SMITH, Secretary
	6	KATHERINE FORRED, Assistant Secretary
	7	BARBARA ALESSI (Does not deliberate.)
	8	JOHN FINKOWSKI
	9	PAUL GILLENWATER
12:00	10	MARK GOODMAN
	11	JEFFREY GRUBER
	12	CRISTAL HINOJOSH CRUZ
	13	PAUL KOSLUCHER
	14	WILLIAM LISTON
12:00	15	FLORA MCCLINTON-MCFARLING
	16	GERALD REID
	17	DANIEL STACK
	18	NOEL WELLMAN
	19	WALTER ZUKOWSKI
12:00	20	
	21	
	22	Also present at the request of the Grand Jury:
	23	Ashley Lacher, Deputy District Attorney
	24	
12:00	25	

1	INDEX OF EXHIBITS	
3	Grand Jury Exhibits	Identified
4	1A - AMENDED PROPOSED INDICTMENT	4
5	2A - INSTRUCTIONS	5
6	15 - TRANSCRIPT	5
7		
8		
9		
10		
11		
12		
13		
14		
15		
16		
17		
18		
19		
20		
21		
22		
23		
24		
25		

12:00 1 LAS VEGAS, NEVADA, OCTOBER 16, 2019 2 3 4 DANETTE L. ANTONACCI, 12:00 5 having been first duly sworn to faithfully and accurately transcribe the following 6 7 proceedings to the best of her ability. 8 9 MS. LACHER: Good morning ladies and 09:58 10 gentlemen of the Grand Jury. My name is deputy district 11 attorney Ashley Lacher. I'm covering this case for 12 deputy district attorney Nima Afshar who was here at the 13 first presentment back on October 9, 2019. This is the 14 continued presentation of case number 19BGJ020X. 09:58 15 record will reflect that we have a marked copy of the 16 proposed Indictment as Grand Jury Exhibit 1A. 17 Previously you were given Grand Jury Exhibit Number 1 18 proposed Indictment. Grand Jury Exhibit 1A is what 19 we're going to ask you to deliberate on and it has a 20 09:58 total of eight counts that we're going to be asking to 2.1 deliberate on. 2.2 As a result of those additional charges 23 there is also updated Grand Jury instructions that I'm 24 going to ask you to review. Those are marked and 09:59 25 everybody has available for them as Grand Jury

09:59 1 Exhibit 2A. Additionally in the event that you need to refresh your recollection of anything that was presented 2 3 on the October 9, 2019 presentment, a copy of that transcript is also marked as Grand Jury Exhibit 3A. 4 10:00 5 We're going to renumber the Grand Jury 6 transcript from October 9, 2019. It's not going to be 7 3A, it's going to be the next in line marked as Grand 8 Jury Exhibit Number 15. That correction is going to be 9 made here. And so if any of the grand jurors need to 10:00 10 review that transcript, I believe some of you already 11 have prior, if you weren't here at the earlier 12 presentment and if you need to see it, that's available 13 to you. 14 The defendant in this case, the total 10:00 15 charges that we're going to ask you to deliberate on is 16 Count 1, battery resulting in substantial bodily harm 17 constituting domestic violence; Count 2, the same, 18 battery resulting in substantial bodily harm 19 constituting domestic violence; Count 3, first degree 10:01 20 kidnapping resulting in substantial bodily harm; 21 Count 4, battery with use of a deadly weapon resulting 22 in substantial bodily harm constituting domestic 23 violence; Count 5 and 6, the same; Count 7, battery with 24 use of a deadly weapon constituting domestic violence;

and Count 8, battery with intent to kill constituting

25

10:01

10:01 1 domestic violence.

2 Again

10:01

10:01

10:07

10:07

10:07

Again the instructions that reflect those updated charges are available for your review and if you have any questions please let me know. I will be waiting outside and I'll be happy to answer the questions you might have.

With that the State has concluded its presentation of evidence in this matter and it's submitted for your deliberation. Thank you.

(At this time, all persons, other than voting members of the Grand Jury, exit the room at 10:01 a.m. and return at 10:07 a.m.)

THE FOREPERSON: Mrs. District Attorney, by a vote of 12 or more grand jurors a true bill has been returned against defendant charging the crime of battery resulting in substantial bodily harm constituting domestic violence, first degree kidnapping resulting in substantial bodily harm, battery with use of a deadly weapon resulting in substantial bodily harm constituting domestic violence, battery with use of deadly weapon constituting domestic violence, and battery with intent to kill constituting domestic violence. We instruct you to prepare — excuse me. Case number will be 19BGJ020X. We instruct you to prepare an Indictment in conformance with the proposed Indictment previously submitted to us.

10:07 1	MS. LACHER: Thank you.
2	THE FOREPERSON: Thank you.
3	(Proceedings concluded.)
4	00000
5	
6	
7	
8	
9	
10	
11	
12	
13	
14	
15	
16	
17	
18	
19	
20	
21	
22	
23	
24	
25	

10:07	1	REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE
	2	
	3	STATE OF NEVADA)
	4	COUNTY OF CLARK)
10:07	5	
	6	I, Danette L. Antonacci, C.C.R. 222, do
	7	hereby certify that I took down in Shorthand (Stenotype)
	8	all of the proceedings had in the before-entitled matter
	9	at the time and place indicated and thereafter said
10:07	10	shorthand notes were transcribed at and under my
	11	direction and supervision and that the foregoing
	12	transcript constitutes a full, true, and accurate record
	13	of the proceedings had.
	14	Dated at Las Vegas, Nevada,
10:07	15	October 17, 2019.
	16	
	17	/s/ Danette L. Antonacci
	18	Danette L. Antonacci, C.C.R. 222
	19	
10:07	20	
	21	
	22	
	23	
	24	
	25	

10:07	1	AFFIRMATION
	2	Pursuant to NRS 239B.030
	3	
	4	The undersigned does hereby affirm that the preceding TRANSCRIPT filed in GRAND JURY CASE NUMBER
10:07	5	19BGJ020X:
	6	
	7	
	8	\underline{X} Does not contain the social security number of any person,
	9	person,
10:07	10	-OR-
	11	<pre> Contains the social security number of a person as required by:</pre>
	12	A. A specific state or federal law, to-
	13	wit: NRS 656.250.
	14	-OR-
10:07	15	B. For the administration of a public program or for an application for a federal or
	16	state grant.
	17	
	18	/s/ Danette L. Antonacci 10-17-19
	19	Signature Date
10:07	20	
	21	<u>Danette L. Antonacci</u> Print Name
	22	
	23	Official Court Reporter Title
	24	
	25	

DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

Felony/Gross Misdemeanor COURT MINUTES October 17, 2019

C-19-344112-3 State of Nevada

vs

Lequana Brown

October 17, 2019 11:00 AM Grand Jury Indictment

HEARD BY: Bell, Linda Marie COURTROOM: RJC Courtroom 17A

COURT CLERK: Estala, Kimberly RECORDER: Vincent, Renee

REPORTER:

PARTIES PRESENT:

Peter I. Thunell Attorney for Plaintiff

State of Nevada Plaintiff

JOURNAL ENTRIES

Tiara Cosentino Grand Jury Foreperson, stated to the Court that at least twelve members had concurred in the return of the true bill during deliberation, but had been excused for presentation to the Court. State presented Grand Jury Case Number 19BGJ023C to the Court. COURT ORDERED, the Indictment may be filed and is assigned Case Number C-19-344112-3, Department XVII.

State requested a warrant, argued bail, and advised Deft is in custody. COURT ORDERED, \$75,000.00 BAIL; INDICTMENT WARRANT ISSUED, and matter SET for Arraignment.

Upon Court's inquiry, the State advised there are no material witness warrants to quash. COURT FURTHER ORDERED, Exhibits 1-13 to be lodged with the Clerk of the Court; Las Vegas Justice Court case no. 19F12727C, 19F13435X, and 19F13575A DISMISSED per the State's request. In addition, a Pre-Trial Risk Assessment will be prepared if one was not previously done.

I.W. (CUSTODY)

10/24/19 8:30 A.M. INITIAL ARRAIGNMENT (DEPT XVII)

Printed Date: 10/18/2019 Page 1 of 1 Minutes Date: October 17, 2019

Prepared by: Kimberly Estala

ORIGINAL

1 IND STEVEN B. WOLFSON Clark County District Attorney 2 Nevada Bar #001565 3 **BRANDON ALBRIGHT** Deputy District Attorney 4 Nevada Bar #14158 STEPHANIE GETLER 5 Deputy District Attorney Nevada Bar #14203 6 200 Lewis Avenue Las Vegas, Nevada 89155-2212 (702) 671-2500 7 Attorney for Plaintiff 8 DISTRICT COURT 9 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 10 THE STATE OF NEVADA, 11 Plaintiff, CASE NO: 12 DEPT NO: -VS-13 MARK ANTHONY FINK, aka, Mark Anthony Finks, Jr. #7766797, SARAH GONZALEZ #2864241, 14 LEQUANA BROWN, aka, 15 Lequana Leatrice Brown, #2651822 16 Defendant(s). 17 18 STATE OF NEVADA) ss. COUNTY OF CLARK 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26

FILED IN OPEN COURT STEVEN D. GRIERSON CLERK OF THE COURT

OCT 1, 7 2519

KIMBERLY ESTALA, DEPUTY

C-19-344112-3

XVII

INDICTMENT

The Defendant(s) above named, MARK ANTHONY FINK, aka, Mark Anthony Finks, Jr., SARAH GONZALEZ, LEQUANA BROWN, aka, Lequana Leatrice Brown, accused by the Clark County Grand Jury of the crime(s) of CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT ROBBERY (Category B Felony - NRS 200.380, 199.480 - NOC 50147); ROBBERY WITH USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON (Category B Felony - NRS 200.380, 193.165 - NOC 50138); BURGLARY (Category B Felony - NRS 205.060 - NOC 50424); GRAND LARCENY (Category C Felony - NRS 205.220.1, 205.222.2 - NOC 56004); OBTAINING AND USING PERSONAL IDENTIFYING INFORMATION OF ANOTHER (Category C Felony - NRS 205.463 - NOC 50691) and CARRYING CONCEALED PNEUMATIC GUN (Category C

C-19-344112-3 IND Indictment

27

28

Felony - NRS 202.350 - NOC 51459), committed at and within the County of Clark, State of Nevada, on or between June 4, 2019 and June 23, 2019, as follows:

COUNT 1 - CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT ROBBERY

Defendant LEQUANA BROWN, aka, Lequana Leatrice Brown, did on or about June 4, 2019, willfully and unlawfully conspire with an unidentified individual, to commit a robbery, by the defendant and/or unidentified co-conspirator committing the acts as set forth in Count 2, said acts being incorporated by this reference as though fully set forth herein.

COUNT 2 - ROBBERY WITH USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON

Defendant LEQUANA BROWN, aka Lequana Leatrice Brown, and an unidentified individual, on or about June 4, 2019, did willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously take personal property, to wit: clothing, from the person of KELSEY TRISTRE, or in her presence, by means of force or violence, or fear of injury to, and without the consent and against the will of KELSEY TRISTRE, with use of a deadly weapon, to wit: a knife, Defendant using force or fear to obtain or retain possession of the property, to prevent or overcome resistance to the taking of the property, and/or to facilitate escape; the Defendant(s) and/or unidentified co-conspirator being criminally liable under one or more of the following principles of criminal liability, to wit: (1) by directly committing this crime; and/or (2) by aiding or abetting in the commission of this crime, with the intent that this crime be committed, by counseling, encouraging, hiring, commanding, inducing and/or otherwise procuring the other to commit the crime; and/or (3) pursuant to a conspiracy to commit this crime, with the intent that this crime be committed, Defendants aiding or abetting and/or conspiring by Defendants acting in concert throughout.

COUNT 3 - BURGLARY

Defendant LEQUANA BROWN, aka, Lequana Leatrice Brown, did on or about June 4, 2019 willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously enter a building, owned or occupied by CHAMPS SPORTS STORE, located at 10975 Sage Park Drive, Las Vegas, Clark County, Nevada, with intent to commit larceny and/or robbery and/or a felony; the Defendant(s) and/or unidentified co-conspirator being criminally liable under one or more of the following

principles of criminal liability, to wit: (1) by directly committing this crime; and/or (2) by aiding or abetting in the commission of this crime, with the intent that this crime be committed, by counseling, encouraging, hiring, commanding, inducing and/or otherwise procuring the other to commit the crime; and/or (3) pursuant to a conspiracy to commit this crime, with the intent that this crime be committed, Defendants aiding or abetting and/or conspiring by Defendants acting in concert throughout.

COUNT 4 - GRAND LARCENY

Defendant LEQUANA BROWN, aka, Lequana Leatrice Brown, did on or about June 4, 2019 then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously with intent to deprive the owner permanently thereof, steal, take and carry away, lead away or drive away property owned by CHAMPS SPORTS STORE, having a value of \$650.00 or more, to wit: miscellaneous merchandise including shirts and/or shorts and/or shoes; the Defendant(s) and/or unidentified co-conspirator being criminally liable under one or more of the following principles of criminal liability, to wit: (1) by directly committing this crime; and/or (2) by aiding or abetting in the commission of this crime, with the intent that this crime be committed, by counseling, encouraging, hiring, commanding, inducing and/or otherwise procuring the other to commit the crime; and/or (3) pursuant to a conspiracy to commit this crime, with the intent that this crime be committed, Defendants aiding or abetting and/or conspiring by Defendants acting in concert throughout.

COUNT 5 - CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT ROBBERY

Defendants MARK ANTHONY FINK, aka, Mark Anthony Finks, Jr. and SARAH GONZALEZ, and LEQUANA BROWN, aka, Lequana Leatrice Brown, did on or about the 23rd of June, willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously conspire with each other, to commit a robbery, by the defendants committing the acts as set forth in Count 6, said acts being incorporated by this reference as though fully set forth herein.

COUNT 6 - ROBBERY WITH USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON

Defendants MARK ANTHONY FINK, aka, Mark Anthony Finks, Jr. and SARAH GONZALEZ, and LEQUANA BROWN, aka, Lequana Leatrice Brown, did on or about the

23rd of June, willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously take personal property, to wit: merchandise, from the person of BRIAN AKITA, or in his presence, by means of force or violence, or fear of injury to, and without the consent and against the will of BRIAN AKITA, with use of a deadly weapon, to wit: a firearm, Defendant using force or fear to obtain or retain possession of the property, to prevent or overcome resistance to the taking of the property, and/or to facilitate escape; the Defendant(s) being criminally liable under one or more of the following principles of criminal liability, to wit: (1) by directly committing this crime; and/or (2) by aiding or abetting in the commission of this crime, with the intent that this crime be committed, by counseling, encouraging, hiring, commanding, inducing and/or otherwise procuring the other to commit the crime; and/or (3) pursuant to a conspiracy to commit this crime, with the intent that this crime be committed, Defendants aiding or abetting and/or conspiring by Defendants acting in concert throughout.

COUNT 7 - BURGLARY

Defendants MARK ANTHONY FINK, aka, Mark Anthony Finks, Jr. and SARAH GONZALEZ, and LEQUANA BROWN, aka, Lequana Leatrice Brown, did on or about the 23rd of June, willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously enter a building, owned or occupied by BIG 5, located at 4275 East Charleston, Las Vegas, Clark County, Nevada, with intent to commit larceny and/or robbery, and/or a felony; the Defendant(s) being criminally liable under one or more of the following principles of criminal liability, to wit: (I) by directly committing this crime; and/or (2) by aiding or abetting in the commission of this crime, with the intent that this crime be committed, by counseling, encouraging, hiring, commanding, inducing and/or otherwise procuring the other to commit the crime; and/or (3) pursuant to a conspiracy to commit this crime, with the intent that this crime be committed, Defendants aiding or abetting and/or conspiring by Defendants acting in concert throughout.

COUNT 8 - OBTAINING AND USING PERSONAL IDENTIFYING INFORMATION OF ANOTHER

Defendant LEQUANA BROWN, aka, Lequana Leatrice Brown, did on or about the 23rd of June, then and there willfully, unlawfully, knowingly, and feloniously obtain personal

1	Names of Witnesses and testifying before the Grand Jury:
2	AKITA, BRIAN - c/o CCDA, 200 Lewis Avenue, LV, NV 89101
3	KAMANLIWAI, JABON - c/o CCDA, 200 Lewis Avenue, LV, NV 89101
4	MESTRE, KELSEY – c/o CCDA, 200 Lewis Avenue, LV, NV 89101
5	PERKETT, ERICK - LVMPD
6	Additional Witnesses known to the District Attorney at time of filing the Indictment:
7	CUSTODIAN OF RECORDS - CCDC
8	CUSTODIAN OF RECORDS - LVMPD COMMUNICATIONS
9	CUSTODIAN OF RECORDS - LVMPD RECORDS
10	
11	
12	
13	
14	
15	
16	
17	
18	
19	
20	
21	
22	
23	
24	19BGJ023A-C/19F12727A-C/19F13435X/19F13575A-B/cl-GJ
25	LVMPD EV# 190600109274; 190600017813;
26	190499999757; 190499999400; 190499999359; 190699999764; 190699999624; 190699999602;
27	19069999354; 190600104412 (TK7)

DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

Felony/Gross Misdemeanor COURT MINUTES October 24, 2019

C-19-344112-3 State of Nevada

vs

Lequana Brown

October 24, 2019 08:30 AM All Pending Motions

HEARD BY: Villani, Michael COURTROOM: RJC Courtroom 11A

COURT CLERK: Black, Olivia

RECORDER: Georgilas, Cynthia

REPORTER:

PARTIES PRESENT:

Carl E. Arnold Attorney for Defendant

Lequana Brown Defendant

Sarah Overly Attorney for Plaintiff

State of Nevada Plaintiff

JOURNAL ENTRIES

Adam Gill, Esq. present on behalf of Co- Defendant Fink and Co- Defendant Gonzalez for Martin Hart, Esq.

INDICTMENT WARRANT RETURN...INITIAL ARRAIGNMENT

DEFT. BROWN ARRAIGNED, PLED NOT GUILTY, and INVOKED the 60-DAY RULE. Upon Court's inquiry, Defendant confirmed she was willing to waive three weeks for trial. COURT ORDERED, matter set for trial. COURT FURTHER ORDERED, pursuant to Statute, Counsel has 21 days from today for the filing of any Writs; if the Preliminary Hearing Transcript has not been filed as of today, Counsel has 21 days from the filing of the Transcript.

CUSTODY

12/10/19 8:30 AM CALENDAR CALL

01/06/20 9:00 AM JURY TRIAL

Printed Date: 10/29/2019 Page 1 of 1 Minutes Date: October 24, 2019

Electronically Filed 11/8/2019 3:55 PM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT 1 MOT STEVEN B. WOLFSON 2 Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #001565 3 STEPHANIE GETLER Deputy District Attorney 4 Nevada Bar #014203 200 Lewis Avenue 5 Las Vegas, Nevada 89155-2212 (702) 671-2500 6 Attorney for Plaintiff 7 DISTRICT COURT 8 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 9 THE STATE OF NEVADA. 10 Plaintiff. 11 CASE NO: C-19-344112-3 -VS-12 DEPT NO: LEQUANA BROWN, aka, XVII Leguana Leatrice Brown #2651822, 13 14 Defendant. 15 STATE'S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO CONSOLIDATE CASE C-19-344268-1-2 INTO THE INSTANT 16 CASE 17 DATE OF HEARING: TIME OF HEARING: 8:30 A.M. 18 19 COMES NOW, the State of Nevada, by STEVEN B. WOLFSON, Clark County 20 District Attorney, through STEPHANIE GETLER, Deputy District Attorney, and files this 21 Notice of Motion and Motion to Consolidate Case C-19-339903-1 into The Instant Case. 22 This Motion is made and based upon all the papers and pleadings on file herein, the 23 attached points and authorities in support hereof, and oral argument at the time of hearing, if 24 deemed necessary by this Honorable Court. 25 // 26 // 27 // 28 //

w:\2019\2019F\127\27\19F12727-NOTM-(Brown_Lequana)-001.docx

NOTICE OF HEARING

YOU, AND EACH OF YOU, WILL PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the undersigned will bring the foregoing motion on for setting before the above entitled Court, in Department XVII thereof, on Tuesday, the 19th day of November, 2019, at the hour of 8:30 A.M., or as soon thereafter as counsel may be heard.

DATED this And day of November, 2019.

STEVEN B. WOLFSON Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #001565

STEPHANIE GETLER Deputy District Attorney Nevada Bar #014203

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

I. INTRODUCTION

Case C344112 involves Defendants LeQuana Brown, Sarah Gonzalez, and Mark Fink, and is currently set for trial in this department on January 6, 2019. Case C344268 involves Defendants Brown and Gonzalez, and is currently set for trial in this department on January 6, 2019—the same date as the other case.

A. C344268

On April 3, 2019, Brown entered Victoria's Secret, located at 6543 S. Las Vegas Boulevard, wherein she grabbed approximately 20 pairs of leggings. When the store clerk asked Brown where she was going, she replied "out the door bitch." Brown exited the store and got into a vehicle that was waiting for her. Brown took approximately \$1,199.00 worth of merchandise.

On April 15, 2019, Brown entered a Victoria's Secret, located at 6543 S. Las Vegas Boulevard, wherein she grabbed approximately 30 pairs of leggings. Brown ran out of the store and got into a vehicle that was waiting for her. Brown took approximately \$1,948.50 worth of merchandise.

On April 23, 2019, Brown entered Victoria's Secret, located at 2035 Festival Plaza Drive, wherein she grabbed approximately 10 pairs of leggings. When the store clerk asked Brown if she needed a fitting room, she replied "no I fittin' to walk out with these. . .do you want to get stabbed or killed?" The clerk then backed away from Brown. Brown exited the store and got into a vehicle that was waiting for her. Brown took approximately \$699.50 worth of merchandise.

On May 28, 2019, Brown entered Victoria's Secret, located at 6543 S. Las Vegas Boulevard, wherein she grabbed approximately 85 pairs of leggings. Two unidentified people were with Brown. A store clerk was attempting to assist them and Brown told the unidentified accomplices that "if this white bitch tries to stop you, fuck her up." Brown and the other two people exited the store and got into a vehicle that was waiting for them. Brown took approximately \$5,520.75 worth of merchandise.

On May 30, 2019, Brown entered Victoria's Secret, located at 2035 Festival Plaza Drive, wherein she grabbed approximately 57 pairs of leggings. Brown exited the store. Brown took approximately \$3,856.85 worth of merchandise.

On June 10, 2019, Brown entered Victoria's Secret, located at 3680 South Maryland Parkway, wherein she grabbed approximately 14 pairs of leggings, 8 tank tops, and 1 pair of shorts. Brown exited the store. Brown took approximately \$738.85 worth of merchandise.

On June 16, 2019, Brown and Gonzalez entered Victoria's Secret, located at 6543 S. Las Vegas Boulevard. Brown grabbed approximately 43 PINK brand items and Gonzalez grabbed 1 item. Brown and Gonzalez entered the store together, walked around together, and exited together. Brown and Gonzalez got into a vehicle that was waiting for them and fled the scene. Brown and Gonzalez took approximately \$2,154.85 worth of merchandise.

On June 22, 2019, Brown entered Victoria's Secret, located at 3680 South Maryland Parkway, wherein she grabbed approximately 12 pairs of leggings and 10 tank tops. As an employee approached Brown, she said "touch me and I will stick you." Brown exited the store and got into a vehicle that was waiting for her. Brown took approximately \$918.90 worth of merchandise.

Brown is charged with several counts of Burglary, Grand Larceny, and Robbery. Gonzalez is charged with Burglary and Grand Larceny. Trial is set for January 6, 2019.

B. C344112

On June 4, 2019, Brown and an unidentified person entered Champs Sports Store, located at 10975 Sage Park Drive. Brown began looking at merchandise and told a store clerk that she has just won big at the Red Rock Casino and wanted to spend her winnings. A store clerk assisted her in matching outfits and shoes and select items. The clerk then brought the merchandise over to the register to begin checking them out. During check out, the unknown person carried about 6-8 bags of merchandise out of the store. Brown then attempted to leave with additional merchandise, prior to paying. The clerk attempted to block her exit, at which point, Brown pulled out a knife and said, "we're not going to do this" and attempted to stab the clerk. Brown was able to leave the store and fled in a vehicle that was waiting for her. Brown took approximately \$2,758.58 worth of merchandise.

On June 23, 2019, Brown and Gonzalez entered a Big 5, located at 4275 East Charleston. They began looking at merchandise. Brown told a store clerk that she has just won big at the Palace Station Casino and wanted to spend her winnings. A store clerk assisted them in matching outfits and shoes and select items. The clerk then brought the merchandise over to the register to begin checking them out. Prior to paying, Gonzalez took some of the merchandise out of the store. Fink then entered the Big 5 and told them he wanted to buy a pellet gun. Fink then began assisting Gonzalez in carrying bags of merchandise out of the store. Brown threw a Citibank card at the store clerk, which did not have her name on it, and told the clerks to use that to pay. As Brown, Gonzalez, and Fink were all out at the vehicle attempting to leave with the merchandise, the store manager approached them and attempted to recover it. Fink pulled a firearm on the victim.

On June 23, 2019, after the Big 5 incident, officers located a vehicle matching the description of the vehicle from the Big 5 incident. Officers noticed a male matching the description, later identified as Fink, and a female matching the description, later identified as Gonzalez. A concealed weapon was located in Gonzalez's bra. Brown was located in a nearby

apartment but identified herself as Mia Jones. She was later discovered to be Brown. Brown was interviewed, shown surveillance stills, and acknowledged her involvement in each event, for both cases.

Brown was charged with Robbery with a Deadly Weapon, Burglary, Grand Larceny, Conspiracy to Commit Robbery, and Obtaining and Using Personal Identifying Information of Another. Gonzalez was charged with Robbery with Conspiracy to Commit Robbery, Robbery with Use of a Deadly Weapon, Burglary, and Carrying Concealed Pneumatic Gun. Fink was charged with Conspiracy to Commit Robbery, Robbery with Use of a Deadly Weapon, and Burglary. Trial is set for January 6, 2019.

II. ARGUMENT

A. Legal Standard for Consolidation and Cross-Admissibility

1. Standard for Consolidation

NRS 174.155 addresses consolidation of charging documents. It states in pertinent part:

The court may order two or more indictments or information or both to be tried together if the offenses...could have been joined in a single indictment or information. The procedure shall be the same as if the prosecution were under such single indictment or information.

Additionally, Section 173.115 of the Nevada Revised Statutes provides:

Two or more offenses may be charged in the same indictment or information in a separate count for each offense if the offenses charged, whether felonies or misdemeanors or both, are: (1) Based on the same act or transaction; or (2) Based on two or more acts or transactions connected or constituting parts of a common scheme or plan.

In considering whether to allow consolidation, courts examine the conflicting policies of economy and efficiency in judicial administration (looking to control courts' calendars in avoidance of multiple trials), and any resulting prejudice to the defendant which might arise from being prosecuted at trial by presentation of evidence of other crimes flowing from a

common plan or scheme. <u>United States v. Fletcher</u>, 195 F. Supp. 634 (D. Conn. 1960), <u>aff'd</u>, 319 F.2d 604 (4th Cir. 1963).¹

Joinder of two or more Indictments or Informations is within discretion of the trial court and its action will not be reversed absent abuse of discretion. <u>Lovell v. State</u>, 92 Nev. 128 (1976).

Eighth Judicial District Court Rule 3.10, and NRS 174.155, promote judicial economy. EDCR 3.10 provides:

(a) When an indictment or information is filed against a defendant who has other criminal cases pending in the court, the new case may be assigned directly to the department wherein a case against that defendant is already pending.
(b) Unless objected to by one of the judges concerned, criminal

(b) Unless objected to by one of the judges concerned, criminal cases, writs or motion may be consolidated or reassigned to any

department for trial, settlement or other resolution.

2. Cross-Admissibility

As this court is well aware, section 48.045(2) of the Nevada Revised Statutes provides:

Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.

In applying NRS 48.045(2), courts must assess whether the probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by a risk of prejudice. Significantly, however, courts have recognized a distinction between evidence that is incriminating versus evidence that is actually prejudicial. For instance, in <u>United States v. Harrison</u>, 679 F.2d 942 (D.C. Cir. 1982), the prosecution presented evidence that the defendant had been engaged in drug dealing in the past over a period of time in order to establish motive, intent, preparation, and absence of mistake on his current drug charges. The court held that allowing the admission of the extrinsic evidence was proper. It explained:

 $/\!/$

¹ Since Nevada's consolidation statute, section 174.155 of the Nevada Revised Statutes, is the same as the federal consolidation rule, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 8(B), <u>Fletcher</u>, which discusses the federal statute, is also persuasive with regard to our state statute.

There is nothing "unfair" in admitting direct evidence of the defendant's past acts by an eyewitness thereto that constituted substantive proof of the relevant intent alleged in the indictment. The intent with which a person commits an act on a given occasion can many times be best proven by testimony or evidence of his acts over a period of time prior thereto . . .

Id. at 948. Further, in People v. Johnson, 185 Cal.App.4th 520, 534 (2010), the court held that:

"Prejudicial" is not synonymous with "damaging." Rather, evidence is unduly prejudicial...only if it "uniquely tends to evoke an emotional bias against the defendant as an individual and...has very little effect on the issues" or if it invites the jury to prejudge "a person or cause on the basis of extraneous factors." Painting a person faithfully is not, of itself, unfair. (Emphasis added.)

Therefore, while certain evidence may increase the likelihood of conviction and thus be incriminating, such evidence may not unfairly cast the defendant in a bad light and therefore would not be impermissibly prejudicial.

In <u>Fields v. State</u>, 125 Nev. 785, 220 P.3d 709 (2009), the Nevada Supreme Court affirmed the District Court Judge's determination to admit evidence that the Defendant owed debts to the victim and that he had previously engaged in a conversation about killing a man to whom he owed money. The Nevada Supreme Court agreed with the District Court's decision that such evidence was admissible as proof of motive, to disprove his contention that he was just an innocent bystander to his wife's scheme, and to prove identity.

Likewise, in <u>Gallego v. State</u>, 101 Nev. 782, 711 P.2d 856 (1985), the Nevada Supreme Court noted how a defendant's prior murders could be relevant in establishing a common plan, intent, identity, and motive in a subsequent murder case. In <u>Gallego</u>, the defendant was charged with kidnapping, assaulting, and killing two young women by bludgeoning them with a hammer. The trial court permitted the State to introduce evidence that Gallego had previously kidnapped two young women from a shopping mall and shot and killed them. <u>Id</u>. at 789, 711 P.2d at 861. On appeal, Gallego challenged the introduction of such evidence.

The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and introduction of the evidence on several grounds within NRS 48.045(2). The court noted that the evidence was relevant to Gallego's intent and motive, because both instances were prompted by a "sex slave" fantasy

//

//

//

//

on the part of Gallego. The court also commented that the evidence was relevant because the prior murders were "not remote in time from the killings here considered" and that "substantial similarities" were shown to exist between the two events, suggesting that the evidence was relevant to issues of identity as well as a common scheme or plan. See id.

Finally, it should be noted that the admissibility of prior bad acts is within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be overturned on appeal unless the decision is manifestly wrong. Canada v. State, 104 Nev. 288, 291-293, 756 P.2d 552, 554 (1988).

B. Consolidation is Appropriate

Here, the Court should consolidate case C344268 into case C344112 because both cases flow from a common plan or scheme. Brown committed a series of commercial burglaries between April 3, 2019 and June 23, 2019. Gonzalez was involved in two of those events (one in each case) and Fink was involved in one event. Brown acts in a similar manner in each event.

There is little danger of unfair prejudice to Defendants. There is nothing unfairly prejudicial regarding Defendants' trial rights or potential trial strategies. There is also nothing that would be confusing to the jury or distract them from the facts of one case by focusing on the facts of the other, because they are events in one crime spree and presenting all events to one jury would allow that one jury to hear the entire story. Instead, it would be less confusing for the jury by showing the complete story related to both cases. The only true outcome of consolidation would be a substantial savings on judicial resources.

Therefore, the cases are essentially a continuation of one another, because the facts that apply to each would be cross-admissible, and because Defendants would not be unfairly prejudiced, the Court should consolidate the cases and prevent the parties from having to present the same evidence in front of two different juries.

1	III. CONCLUSION	
2	Accordingly, the State respectfully requests that the Motion be granted, and the Court	
3	consolidate case C344268 into case C344112.	
4	DATED this day of November, 2019.	
5	STEVEN B. WOLFSON Clark County District Attorney	
6	Nevada Bar #001565	
7	BY	
8	STEPHANIE GETLER Deputy District Attorney Nevada Bar #014203	
9	Nevada Bar #014203	
10		
11	CERTIFICATE OF ELECTRONIC MAIL	
12	I hereby certify that service of Notice of Motion and Motion To Consolidate Case C-	
13	19-344268-2 Into The Instant Case, was made this 340 day of November, 2019, by e-	
14	mail to:	
15		
16	CARL ARNOLD, ESQ. Lvcegal@yahoo.com	
17	<u>= , v g, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , </u>	
18	$A \setminus A$	
19	BY: NOW HOWER FOR	
20	Secretary for the District Attorney's Office	
21		
22		
23		
24	•	
25		
26		
27		
28	19F12727C/SG/rmj/L-3	

DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

Felony/Gross Misdemeanor COURT MINUTES November 19, 2019

C-19-344112-3 State of Nevada

vs

Lequana Brown

November 19, 2019 08:30 AM All Pending Motions

HEARD BY: Villani, Michael COURTROOM: RJC Courtroom 11A

COURT CLERK: Black, Olivia; Jackson, Carolyn

RECORDER: Georgilas, Cynthia

REPORTER:

PARTIES PRESENT:

Lequana Brown Defendant State of Nevada Plaintiff

Stephanie M. Getler Attorney for Plaintiff

JOURNAL ENTRIES

Martin Hart, Esq. present on behalf of Defendant for Carl Arnold, Esq.

STATE'S MOTION TO CONSOLIDATE CASE C-19-34428-1 INTO THE INSTANT CASE...STATE'S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO RE-SET TRIAL DATE

Mr. Hart noted the State wanted time to respond in writing. Court noted Co- Defendant Gonzalez opposition came in yesterday evening and the Court did not have an opportunity to review it. Upon Court's inquiry, Ms. Getler requested to continue the motions to December 5, 2019. Mr. Hart had no objection. COURT ORDERED, Motions CONTINUED. Ms. Getler noted she extended an offer to Defendant Brown to plead to a Robbery with Use of a Deadly Weapon, one in each of the two cases and stipulate to a six to fifteen year sentence in the Nevada Department of Corrections. Ms. Getler advised the offer would expire on December 5, 2019. Upon Court's inquiry, Mr. Hart advised he was recently given additional video.

CUSTODY

12/05/19 8:30 AM STATE'S MOTION TO CONSOLIDATE CASE C-19-34428-1 INTO THE INSTANT CASE...STATE'S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO RE-SET TRIAL DATE

Printed Date: 11/20/2019 Page 1 of 1 Minutes Date: November 19, 2019

11/27/2019 2:35 PM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT 1 MOT STEVEN B. WOLFSON 2 Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #001565 3 STEPHANIE GETLER Deputy District Attorney 4 Nevada Bar #014203 200 Lewis Avenue 5 Las Vegas, Nevada 89155-2212 (702) 671-2500 6 Attorney for Plaintiff 7 DISTRICT COURT 8 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 9 THE STATE OF NEVADA, 10 Plaintiff. 11 CASE NO: C-19-344112-3 -VS-12 LEQUANA BROWN, aka, DEPT NO: XVII Lequana Leatrice Brown #2651822, 13 14 Defendant. 15 REPLY TO STATE'S MOTION TO CONSOLIDATE AND OPPOSITION TO **DEFENDANT GONZALEZ'S MOTION TO SEVER** 16 DATE OF HEARING: DECEMBER 5, 2019 17. TIME OF HEARING: 8:30 A.M. 18 COMES NOW, the State of Nevada, by STEVEN B. WOLFSON, Clark County 19 District Attorney, through STEPHANIE GETLER, Deputy District Attorney, and files this 20 Reply to State's Motion to Consolidate and Opposition to Defendant Gonzalez's Motion to 21 Sever. This Motion is made and based upon all the papers and pleadings on file herein, the 22 23 attached points and authorities in support hereof, and oral argument at the time of hearing, if 24 deemed necessary by this Honorable Court. // 25 26 // 27 // 28 //

w:\2019\2019F\127\27\19F12727-NOTM-(Gonzalez_Sarah)-002.docx

Electronically Filed

I. REPLY TO STATE'S MOTION TO CONSOLIDATE

NRS 174.155 addresses consolidation of charging documents. It states in pertinent part:

The court may order two or more indictments or information or both to be tried together if the offenses...could have been joined in a single indictment or information. The procedure shall be the same as if the prosecution were under such single indictment or information.

Additionally, Section 173.115 of the Nevada Revised Statutes provides:

Two or more offenses may be charged in the same indictment or information in a separate count for each offense if the offenses charged, whether felonies or misdemeanors or both, are: (1) Based on the same act or transaction; or (2) Based on two or more acts or transactions connected together or constituting parts of a common scheme or plan.

In considering whether to allow consolidation, courts examine the conflicting policies of economy and efficiency in judicial administration (looking to control courts' calendars in avoidance of multiple trials), and any resulting prejudice to the defendant which might arise from being prosecuted at trial by presentation of evidence of other crimes flowing from a common plan or scheme. <u>United States v. Fletcher</u>, 195 F. Supp. 634 (D. Conn. 1960), <u>affd</u>, 319 F.2d 604 (4th Cir. 1963).¹

Joinder of two or more Indictments or Informations is within discretion of the trial court and its action will not be reversed absent abuse of discretion. <u>Lovell v. State</u>, 92 Nev. 128 (1976).

Eighth Judicial District Court Rule 3.10, and NRS 174.155, promote judicial economy. EDCR 3.10 provides:

(a) When an indictment or information is filed against a defendant who has other criminal cases pending in the court, the new case may be assigned directly to the department wherein a case against that defendant is already pending.(b) Unless objected to by one of the judges concerned, criminal

(b) Unless objected to by one of the judges concerned, criminal cases, writs or motion may be consolidated or reassigned to any department for trial, settlement or other resolution.

¹ Since Nevada's consolidation statute, section 174.155 of the Nevada Revised Statutes, is the same as the federal consolidation rule, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 8(B), <u>Fletcher</u>, which discusses the federal statute, is also persuasive with regard to our state statute.

20

21

22 23

24

25

26

27 28

It appears that Defendant Gonzalez argues that she will be prejudiced because Brown is charged with more counts than she is, and the jury will hold that against Gonzalez. See Opposition at 5 - 6. This is not prejudicial and will not confuse the jury. The Indictment and evidence at trial will make clear that each Defendant is only charged with the respective counts they are charged with. Based upon the fact that Gonzalez is not charged in all the counts, she makes a ridiculous conclusion that she "will be required to defend against involvement in eight different burglaries and three associated robberies that she is not charged for." Opposition at 6. This is patently incorrect. Gonzalez will only be required to defend against the charges for which she is charged. Further, as NRS 173.135 provides, "[t]wo or more defendants may be charged in the same indictment or information. . .and all of the defendants need not be charged in each count." (emphasis added).

Rather, the Court should consolidate the cases because both cases flow from a common plan or scheme. Brown committed a series of commercial burglaries between April 3, 2019 and June 23, 2019. Gonzalez was involved in two of those events (one in each case) and Fink was involved in one event. Brown acts in a similar manner in each event. There is little danger of unfair prejudice to Defendants. There is nothing unfairly prejudicial regarding Defendants' trial rights or potential trial strategies. The only true outcome of consolidation would be a substantial savings on judicial resources.

DEFENDANT IS NOT LEGALLY ENTITLED TO A SEVERANCE II.

A. Defendant has not established mutually antagonistic defenses

Defendant Gonzalez has filed a motion asking for severance from Defendants Brown and Fink. The sole basis for his request is "antagonistic defenses." The Defendants are properly joined in the instant case.

NRS 173.135 provides for the joinder of defendants by stating:

Two or more defendants may be charged in the same indictment or information if they are alleged to have participated in the same act or transaction or in the same series of acts or transactions constituting an offense or offenses. Such defendants may be charged in one or more counts together or separately and all of the defendants need not be charged in each count.

Additionally, case law in Nevada has held that persons who have been jointly indicted should be tried jointly, absent compelling reasons to the contrary. <u>Jones v. State</u>, 111 Nev. 848, 853, 899 P.2d 544 (1995).

NRS 174.165 provides that "[i]f it appears that a defendant or the State of Nevada is prejudiced by a joinder of offenses or of defendants in an indictment or information . . . the court may . . . grant a severance of defendants or provide what other relief justice requires." In order to obtain a severance, a defendant must demonstrate that substantial prejudice would result from a joint trial. The decision to sever is left to the discretion of the trial court and such decision will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. Amen v. State, 106 Nev. 749, 801 P.2d 1354 (1990). Broad allegations of prejudice are not enough to require a trial court to grant severance. United States v. Baker, 10 F.3d 1374, 1389 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 934, 115 S. Ct. 330 (1994), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Nordby, 225 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. 2000). Finally, even if prejudice is shown, the trial court is not required to sever; rather, it must grant relief tailored to alleviate the prejudice. See, e.g., Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 540-41, 113 S. Ct. 933 (1993).

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has stated that the presumption is heavily in favor of joint trials. "[C]o-defendants jointly charged, are, prima facie, to be jointly tried." <u>United States v. Gay</u>, 567 F.2d 916, 919 (9th Cir.), <u>cert. denied</u>, 435 U.S. 999, 98 S. Ct. 1655 (1978); <u>United States v. Silla</u>, 555 F.2d 703, 707 (9th Cir. 1977) ("compelling circumstances" are generally necessary to show need for separate trials). The trial court has the broad discretion to join or sever trials and severance is not required unless a joint trial would be manifestly prejudicial. *See* <u>Gay</u>, 567 F.2d at 919. Federal appellate courts review a denial of a motion to sever for abuse of discretion and "[t]o satisfy this heavy burden, an appellant must show that the joint trial was so prejudicial as to require the exercise of the district judge's discretion in only one way: by ordering a separate trial." <u>United States v. Ford</u>, 632 F.2d 1354, 1373 (9th Cir. 1980), <u>cert. denied</u>, 450 U.S. 934, 101 S. Ct. 1399 (1981), <u>overruled on other grounds</u>, <u>United States v. DeBright</u>, 730 F.2d 1263 (9th Cir. 1984).

In both the state and federal system, the general rule favoring joinder has evolved for a specific reason—there is a substantial public interest in joint trials of persons charged together because of judicial economy. <u>Jones</u>, 111 Nev. at 854, 899 P.2d at 547. Joint trials of persons charged with committing the same offense expedites the administration of justice, relieves trial docket congestion, conserves judicial time, lessens the burden on citizens called to sacrifice time and money while serving as jurors, and avoids the necessity of calling witnesses more than one time. <u>Id</u>. at 853-54, 899 P.2d at 547, *see also* <u>United States v. Brady</u>, 579 F.2d 1121 (9th Cir. 1978), <u>cert. denied</u>, 439 U.S. 1074, 99 S. Ct. 849 (1979). Therefore, the legal presumption is in favor of a joint trial among co-defendants.

The Nevada Supreme Court has commented that "while there are situations in which inconsistent defenses may support a motion for severance, the doctrine is a very limited one." Jones v. State, 111 Nev. 848, 854, 899 P.2d 544, 547 (1995). The United States Supreme Court has also stated that "mutually antagonistic defenses are not prejudicial *per se.*" See Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 538, 113 S.Ct. 933 (1993). The Court in Zafiro rejected the defendants' claim noting that they did not "articulate any specific instances of prejudice." See id. at 539, 113 S.Ct. 933. While an important element of a fair trial is that a jury considers only relevant and competent evidence bearing on the issue of guilt or innocence, a fair trial does not include the right to exclude relevant and competent evidence. Id. at 540, 113 S.Ct. at 938.

Severance is not warranted or justified simply because each defendant seeks to blame the other for the crime. Marshall v. State, 118 Nev. 642, 56 P.3d 376 (2002). In Marshall, codefendants Marshall and Currington were tried and convicted together of first degree murder, robbery, and conspiracy to commit robbery. At trial, Marshall's strategy was to exclusively blame Currington; Currington's strategy was to blame Marshall. Id. at 644-45, 56 P.3d at 377-78.

On appeal, Marshall claimed that the district court erred in not severing his trial from Currington's. <u>Id</u>. at 645, 56 P.3d at 378. He maintained that he and Currington had "antagonistic defenses" in that each argued that the other was responsible for the murder. <u>Id</u>., 56 P.3d at 378. Marshall relied on the standard the Nevada Supreme Court articulated in

 Rowland v. State, 118 Nev. 31, 39 P.3d 114 (2002). In Rowland, the Nevada Supreme Court stated that "defenses must be antagonistic to the point that they are 'mutually exclusive' before they are to be considered prejudicial" and necessitate severance. Id. at 45, 39 P.3d at 122. The court further noted in Rowland that defenses are mutually exclusive when the core of the codefendant's defense is so irreconcilable with the core of the defendant's own defense that the acceptance of the co-defendant's theory by the jury precludes acquittal of the defendant. Id. at 45, 39 P.3d at 123.

Significantly, the Nevada Supreme Court specifically held that antagonistic defenses are a factor, but not, in themselves, sufficient grounds upon which to grant severance. Indeed, in Marshall, even though the defenses offered by Marshall and co-defendant Currington were antagonistic and each one accused the other, the Nevada Supreme Court held that the joinder of the defendants at trial was proper. Id. at 648, 56 P.3d at 378. Finding Marshall's assertion that his and Currington's defenses were prejudicial by virtue of their antagonistic nature unpersuasive, the court explained that to prevail on the ground that severance was warranted, Marshall had to show that the "joint trial compromised a specific trial right or prevented the jury from making a reliable judgment about guilt or innocence." Id. at 648, 56 P.3d at 380. The court also noted that the State's case was not dependent on either defendant's statement and did not use joinder to unfairly bolster a marginal case. Id., 56 P.3d at 380. Moreover, the State argued both defendants were guilty and presented evidence to establish their separate guilt. Id., 56 P.3d at 380. The court affirmed Marshall's conviction.

The United States Supreme Court conducted a similar analysis in Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 113 S. Ct. 933 (1993). In that case, petitioners contended that a joint trial was prejudicial whenever two defendants each claim innocence and accuse the other of the crime. Id. at 538, 113 S. Ct at 938. The United States Supreme Court rejected this contention, holding that "mutually antagonistic defenses are not prejudicial per se." Id., 113 S. Ct. at 938. The Court explained that severance should only be granted if there is a serious risk that a joint trial would compromise a specific trial right of one of the defendants or prevent the jury from making a reliable judgment about guilt or innocence. Id. at 539, 113 S. Ct. at 938. It is not

prejudicial for a co-defendant to introduce relevant, competent evidence that would be admissible against defendant at a severed trial. <u>Id.</u> at 540, 113 S. Ct. at 938. The Court also noted that the trial court can cure any potential prejudice by properly instructing the jury that it must consider the case against each defendant separately. <u>See id.</u> at 540-41, 113 S. Ct. at 939.

As cited by the defense, the Nevada Supreme Court addressed antagonistic defenses again in Chartier v. State, 191 P.3d 1182 (2008). However, the analysis dedicated to the case in Defendant's motion fails to bring to light important parts of the holding, and the specific reasons the Court found antagonistic defenses in that case merited severance. In Chartier, codefendants John Douglas Chartier and David Wilcox were tried together in the murders of Rachel Bernat and her father, Carlos Aragon. See id. at 1184. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed Chartier's conviction finding cumulative error on issues related to the joinder of the defendants' trials. However, the facts of Chartier are distinguishable from the facts of the instant case and severance is not required in the instant case.

In addressing the mutually antagonistic defense presented by Chartier and Wilcox, the Court began by quoting its prior decision in Marshall v. State, 118 Nev. 642, 56 p.2d 376 (2002), where the Court stated, "Antagonistic defenses are a relevant consideration but are not, in themselves, sufficient grounds for concluding that joinder of defendants is prejudicial."

See Chartier, 191 P.3d at 1186, quoting Marshall, 118 Nev. at 648, 56 P.2d at 379. The Court described Chartier's defense as being that "he was not involved in the crime at any stage of planning or execution and that Wilcox committed the murders of his own volition out of a misguided desire to 'help' Chartier." See Chartier at 1186. In contrast, Wilcox's defense was that "Chartier was not only the mastermind but that he was present at the scene and Wilcox acted at Chartier's direction." See id. The Court went on to find that the defenses were mutually antagonistic because "Wilcox claimed that Chartier was present at the scene and was the attacker despite a lack of evidence to support this theory and despite [witness] Taylor's testimony that the attacker she saw was definitively not Chartier." See id.

In distinguishing <u>Chartier</u> and <u>Marshall</u>, the Court relied on the fact that Wilcox's defense was based on arguing that Chartier was at the scene when there was little to no evidence to prove that he was at the scene. In <u>Marshall</u>, the Court had found that although the defenses were mutually antagonistic, that the co-defendant "presented no evidence against [the defendant] and the State's case was not in the least dependent on either defendant's testimony." See Marshall at 648, 56 P.3d at 380.

The Nevada Supreme Court's ruling in <u>Chartier</u> does not change the fact that in order to require severance, there must be a showing that a fundamental trial right was infringed. The defense has failed to show that a fundamental trial right of his will be infringed. Therefore, the Court should not sever the trial.

Here, the Defendant makes broad, unsupported claims that because Brown confessed to the aight burglary events at the Victoria's Secret stores, their trials must be severed. However, Defendant has not shown how the defenses are mutually antagonistic. This case is different from <u>Chartier</u> because there IS evidence that places Defendant at the scene, independent of Defendant Brown's statement. Specifically, regarding the Victoria's Secret charge, there is video showing Defendant in the store. Regarding the Big 5 incident, several employees were present and saw Defendant in the store. Moreover, Gonzalez made a statement to officers, as well, and acknowledged her presence at both scenes.

It is Defendant's burden to demonstrate what prejudice she contends she will face by a joint trial and in meeting the burden necessary to cause the Court to grant a severance. Here, Defendant's argument for severance fails. Defenses only become "mutually exclusive" when "the core of the codefendant's defense is so irreconcilable with the core of [the defendant's] own defense that the acceptance of the codefendant's theory by the jury precludes acquittal of the defendant." <u>United States v. Throckmorton</u>, 87 F.3d 1069, 1072 (9th Cir. 1996) (cited with approval in <u>Rowland v. State</u>, 118 Nev. 31, 39 P.3d 114 (2002)). Defendant failed to even explain what mutually antagonistic defenses are anticipated to be, and merely states that she "anticipates antagonistic defenses. . ." See Opposition at 11. These are not mutually exclusive defenses as set out in the applicable case law. Even if Defendants Fink and Brown were to

 point the finger at Defendant Gonzalez, that alone is insufficient for severance as there is other evidence placing Gonzalez at the scene.

B. Bruton does not entitle Defendant to a severance

Severance is required where the statement of one non-testifying defendant to be admitted at trial directly inculpates a co-defendant. See Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 137, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968). This is so, as Bruton and its progeny make clear, because admitting such a statement violates the co-defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confront and cross examine the non-testifying declarant. While Bruton made clear that "facially incriminatory" statements must be excluded, it left open whether and what kind of redactions of a statement might avoid a Sixth Amendment violation. Thus, the Supreme Court revisited Bruton on two later occasions to determine the scope of the rule announced in that case with regard to redactions.

In <u>Richardson v. Marsh</u>, 481 U.S. 200, 107 S.Ct. 1702, 95 L.Ed.2d 176 (1987), the Supreme Court held that the admission of a defendant's confession, accompanied by a limiting instruction, does not violate a co-defendant's confrontation right if "the confession is redacted to eliminate not only the co-defendant's name, but any reference to his or her existence." <u>Id.</u> at 211, 107 S.Ct. 1702. And this is so even when other evidence properly admitted at trial otherwise links the co-defendant to the statement. <u>See id.</u> at 208-211, 107 S.Ct. 1702. In other words, under <u>Richardson</u>, a defendant's statement redacted to eliminate the co-defendant's name and any reference to his or her existence does not run afoul of <u>Bruton</u> even if there is other evidence in the case linking the co-defendant to the statement.

Notably, <u>Richardson</u> raised, but did not resolve, another question left open in <u>Bruton</u>, namely whether a statement redacted such that the co-defendant's name is replaced with a neutral pronoun, such as "person," "individual," or "associate," may be admitted under <u>Bruton</u>. <u>See Richardson</u>, 481 U.S. at 208-09, 107 S.Ct. 1702; <u>Bruton</u>, 391 U.S. at 134 n. 10, 88 S.Ct. 1620. One aspect of this question was addressed in <u>Gray v. Maryland</u>, 523 U.S. 185, 118 S.Ct. 1151 (1998). There, the Supreme Court concluded that it is not enough to replace the co-defendant's name "with an obvious blank, the word 'delete,' a symbol, or similarly notify the

jury that a name has been deleted," such that it is nonetheless "facially incriminatory" and "directly accusatory"; such a redacted statement still falls within the <u>Bruton</u> rule and is inadmissible. <u>Id</u>. at 193-95, 88 S.Ct. at 1620. <u>Gray</u> did not, however, address whether redactions that replace the co-defendant's name with a neutral pronoun, instead of a deletion or blank space, might, in some circumstances, be constitutionally permissible where other independent evidence might permit the jury to conclude that the co-defendant is the person referenced in the redacted statement.

Statements of defendants can be introduced in multiple defendant cases if properly redacted. Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 107 S.Ct. 1702 (1987). Nothing about proper redactions would "facially incriminate" the defendant. The Nevada Supreme Court has specifically embraced the rule of <u>Bruton</u> to permit the introduction of redacted statements that do not "facially incriminate" a co-defendant. <u>Ducksworth v. State</u>, 114 Nev. 951, 954 (1998); see also <u>Lisle v. State</u>, 113 Nev. 679, 692-93 (1997); <u>Richardson v. Marsh</u>, 481 U.S. 200, 208, 107 S.Ct. 1702 (1987); <u>United States v. Enriquez-Estrada</u>, 999 F.2d 1355, 1359 (9th Cir. 1993).

The vast majority of federal courts have approved the use of redacted statements that are not facially incriminatory even though additional evidence is admitted that "links up" the redacted statements to identify that person.

[T]he government may offer other independent evidence that may lead the jury to conclude that the unnamed 'individual' is in fact [the defendant], but that does not render the statement inadmissible; the Supreme Court has explicitly stated that this possibility does not render an otherwise properly redacted statement constitutionally inadmissible. Thus, the Fourth Circuit, like the majority of circuits, has explicitly extended the Bruton line of cases to permit admission of redacted statements that replace a co-defendant's name with "a symbol or neutral pronoun" such that the statement is not facially incriminatory, "even though the statement's application to [the co-defendant] is linked up by other evidence properly admitted against the defendant."

<u>U.S. v. Reyes</u>, 384 F.Supp.2d 926, 931 -932 (E.D.Va., 2005) (emphasis added).

As the United States Supreme Court has stated, "While an important element of a fair trial is that a jury consider *only* relevant and competent evidence bearing on the issue of guilt

I

or innocence, a fair trial does not include the right to exclude relevant and competent evidence." Zafiro, 506 U.S. at 540, 113 S.Ct. at 938 (internal citations omitted).

Here, there is evidence linking each Defendant to the crime independent of the Defendants' statements. The State is aware of the need to redact any statement admitted so that assertions which facially incriminate co-defendants are removed and intends to do so at trial if necessary, thus eliminating the need for severance. Furthermore, Defendant Gonzalez made statements placing herself at the events, so Defendant Brown's admissions do not implicate Gonzalez, only herself. Therefore, severance should not be granted upon this ground.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, the State respectfully requests that the Motion to Consolidate be GRANTED and Defendant Gonzalez's Motion to Sever be DENIED.

DATED this 26th day of November, 2019.

STEVEN B. WOLFSON Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #001565

STEPHANIE GETLER Deputy District Attorney Nevada Bar #014203

CERTIFICATE OF ELECTRONIC FILING

I hereby certify that service of Reply to State's Motion to Consolidate and Opposition to Defendant Gonzalez's Motion to Sever, was made this 26th day of November 2019, by Electronic Filing to:

CARL ARNOLD, ESQ. Lycegal@yahoo.com

Secretary for the District Attorney's Office

19F12727C/SG/rmj/L3

DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

Felony/Gross Misdemeanor COURT MINUTES December 05, 2019

C-19-344112-3 State of Nevada

vs

Lequana Brown

December 05, 2019 08:30 AM All Pending Motions

HEARD BY: Villani, Michael COURTROOM: RJC Courtroom 11A

COURT CLERK: Black, Olivia

RECORDER: Georgilas, Cynthia

REPORTER:

PARTIES PRESENT:

Carl E. Arnold Attorney for Defendant

Lequana Brown Defendant
State of Nevada Plaintiff

Stephanie M. Getler Attorney for Plaintiff

JOURNAL ENTRIES

Martin Hart, Esq. present on behalf of Co- Defendant Gonzalez

STATE'S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO CONSOLIDATE CASE C-19-344268-1-2 INTO THE INSTANT CASE...STATE'S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO RE-SET TRIAL DATE

Upon Court's inquiry, Mr. Arnold advised he had not filed an opposition or joined in the Motion. MATTER TRAILED.

MATTER RECALLED. All parties present as before. Mr. Hart now present. Court advised there was an error as it believed there was going to be an opposition filed. COURT ORDERED, matter CONTINUED. Ms. Getler advised at the previous hearing November 19th, the State placed the different offers on the record and noted the offer was going to be revoked today if they weren't accepted. Ms. Getler further advised Defendant Brown rejected the offer. Upon Court's inquiry, Defendant confirmed she was rejecting the offer. Ms. Getler advised all the offers were being revoked. Mr. Hart noted Defendant Gonzalez wanted the offer; however, Mr. Hart further noted it was a contingent offer. At the request of the Court, Mr. Hart placed the offer on the record.

CUSTODY

CONTINUED TO: 12/10/19 8:30 AM

Printed Date: 12/6/2019 Page 1 of 1 Minutes Date: December 05, 2019

DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

Felony/Gross Misdemeanor COURT MINUTES December 10, 2019

C-19-344112-3 State of Nevada

vs

Lequana Brown

December 10, 2019 08:30 AM All Pending Motions

HEARD BY: Villani, Michael COURTROOM: RJC Courtroom 11A

COURT CLERK: Black, Olivia; Reid, Shannon

RECORDER: Georgilas, Cynthia

REPORTER:

PARTIES PRESENT:

Brandon B. Albright Attorney for Plaintiff
Carl E. Arnold Attorney for Defendant

Lequana Brown Defendant
State of Nevada Plaintiff

JOURNAL ENTRIES

Martin Hart, Esq. present on behalf of Co- Defendant Gonzalez, Adam Gill, Esq. present on behalf of Co- Defendant Fink

CALENDAR CALL...STATE'S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO CONSOLIDATE CASE C-19-344268-1-2 INTO THE INSTANT CASE...STATE'S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO RE-SET TRIAL DATE

Mr. Gill advised he was joining the Motion to Consolidate. Court noted case number C344268 had Defendant Brown and Defendant Gonzalez and C344112 had all three Defendants. Mr. Albright concurred and stated the alleged facts of the case and argued the jury instructions would clarify what each Defendant was being accused of and what charges were pertinent to each Defendant. Mr. Albright further argued to have one jury trial it was judicial economy. Mr. Albright noted the reason there were two cases was the State prepared to go to Grand Jury and a single witness from Victoria Secret was not available and instead of not going to the Grand Jury the State presented what they could and got bound up and indicted on the charges they could at that time thereafter did the remainder when the victim witness was available. Mr. Albright further noted the State's intention was to do them together. Mr. Hart argued Defendant Gonzalez and Defendant Fink were accused of one event at Big Five and Defendant Gonzalez at one event at Victoria Secret. Mr. Hart further argued throughout all the events Defendant Brown was with other people and was not charged in the other events which made it more confusing. Mr. Hart argued the overwhelming number of cases coming in with Defendant Brown would be a problem. As to Defendant's Gonzalez Motion to Server, Mr. Hart argued there were eight incidents with multiple people involved in all of them and Defendant Gonzalez was involved in one. Mr. Albright cited NRS 173.135 and argued Counsel would be able to confer to the Jury that Defendants were only being charged with certain charges. Further argument by Mr. Hart. Mr. Gill argued the two Defendants were out of custody and one Defendant in custody and it didn t need to be three trials there could be two. Mr. Gill further argued there could be an appellate issue that could arise if Defendant Fink had to explain to a jury he had two counts out of sixteen. Mr. Gill argued it was prejudicial and there

Printed Date: 12/11/2019 Page 1 of 2 Minutes Date: December 10, 2019

was no way in getting around that this situation is what the Nevada Supreme Court tried to avoid. Mr. Gill further argued the unknown co- conspirator's language was alarming and that spillover effect parties were entitled to a severance. Further argument by Mr. Albright. Mr. Arnold argued he was opposed to the Motion to Server as Defendant Brown didn't commit the crimes alone. Court noted in C344268 there were eighteen counts and Defendant Gonzalez was involved in Counts 15 & 16. Court expressed concern regarding Defendant Fink as to C344112 case. COURT stated its FINDINGS and ORDERED, State's Motion to Consolidate DENIED. COURT FURTHER ORDERED, Defendant's Motion to Server DENIED. As to C344268, COURT ORDERED, Calendar Call CONTINUED. Mr. Albright noted this case was Overflow eligible. As to C344112, COURT FURTHER ORDERED, Trial date VACATED and RESET.

CUSTODY

03/24/20 8:30 AM CALENDAR CALL

03/30/20 9:00 AM JURY TRIAL

Printed Date: 12/11/2019 Page 2 of 2 Minutes Date: December 10, 2019

Electronically Filed 5/5/2020 12:52 PM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT

1	RTRAN	Ottomb.
2		
3	DISTRICT	COURT
4	CLARK COUN	TY, NEVADA
5		
6)
7	THE STATE OF NEVADA,	CASE: C-19-344112-1
8		C-19-344112-2 C-19-344112-3
9	VS.	
10) DEPT. XVII
11	Anthony Finks, Jr. SARAH GONZALEZ	
12	LEQUANA BROWN, aka, Lequana Leatrice Brown,	}
13	Defendants.	}
14)
15		
16	BEFORE THE HONORABLE MICHAE	L VILLANI, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
17	FRIDAY, JANI	JARY 3, 2020
18	RECORDER'S TRANSCRIPT OF HEARING: ENTRY OF PLEA (ALL)	
19		
20	APPEARANCES:	
21		RANDON ALBRIGHT, ESQ.
22		STEPHANIE GETLER, ESQ. Deputy District Attorneys
23		MARTIN HART, ESQ.
24		,
25	APPEARANCES CONTINUED ON F	PAGE 2

For Defendant Brown: ROBERT BECKETT, ESQ. For Defendant Gonzalez: MARTIN HART, ESQ. RECORDED BY: CYNTHIA GEORGILAS, COURT RECORDER

Page 2

1	Las Vegas, Nevada, Friday, January 3, 2020	
2	[Hearing begins at 9:58 a.m.]	
3	THE MARSHAL: Page 3, 4, and 5 and 7.	
4	THE COURT: Fink, Gonzalez, and Brown.	
5	MS. GETLER: It doesn't appear that any of the Defendants	
6	are present yet.	
7	THE COURT: All right. It's just 10:00 o'clock now. We'll wait a	
8	few minutes.	
9	MR. BECKETT: Okay.	
10	[Pause in proceedings]	
11	THE COURT: I'll just – call me, Marshal, when the people	
12	show up.	
13	THE MARSHAL: All rise.	
14	[Matter trailed at 9:58 a.m.]	
15	[Matter recalled at 10:12 a.m.]	
16	THE COURT: All right, Counsel, we're on for Fink, Gonzalez,	
17	and Brown. Is Ms. Brown here? Let's bring her in.	
18	[Brief pause in proceedings]	
19	THE COURT: Okay. Where did Mr. Hart go?	
20	THE MARSHAL: He went to go get the other clients.	
21	[Brief pause in proceedings]	
22	THE COURT: All right, this is the time set for possible entry of	
23	plea. Are the parties – where – Mr. Hart, I know you're here on behalf of	
24	Mr. Gill and Mr. Arnold, Mr. Hart, what is the status of –	
25	MR. HART: Your Honor, I thought we had a negotiation but its	

contingent on everybody, so I guess we're waiting to find out. We'll start with Ms. Brown and see where we're at.

THE COURT: All right, Ms. Brown, are you inclined to accept the negotiations?

MR. BECKETT: Well, Judge, first of all, she would like to make a motion to see if she can get on house arrest or electronic monitoring pending sentencing so she can get her personal affairs in order. I told her that the Court will probably require a written motion and we can go from there. And then, with that said, I think she probably has some representations she'd like to make. I'm appearing for Carl Arnold.

THE COURT: Okay. All right, thank you, Mr. Becker -

DEFENDANT BROWN: Well, um -

THE COURT: -- Mr. Beckett.

DEFENDANT BROWN: -- my son is 5 years old and my sister has him and she has Lupus and she's up for the kidney transplant but I don't live – I wasn't living out here and I moved out here – so she has to be transported to the hospital. My mom can't do that 'cause she got – she just got her leg amputated so its a lot going on. If I could get the ankle monitor to get my affairs in order and pack up my house and put stuff in storage and I'm willing to sign for the deal today and then come back for sentencing, if that's not the case I feel like I'm losing everything so I might as well just go to trial and just [indiscernible].

THE COURT: Okay, ma'am, [indiscernible] request for release from custody, okay, --

DEFENDANT BROWN: It could be high level ankle

monitoring.

1

2

3

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

THE COURT: Hang on. Hang on. It's not my requirement. It's the rules requirement that it must be in writing, okay, and the request is not in writing; okay? And also, even if it was in writing, I don't know that I would grant it. I mean I would have to read the motion, read any opposition that the State would file, and then make a determination because I don't make determinations on the fly. I want to make sure I have all the information possible. I look at someone's criminal history if they have one. I look at the negotiations. I look at the possible penalties of the negotiations. And I take all that into consideration after I hear from everybody and then I make a decision. I don't want anyone to enter negotiations just to get out of custody because then people come back and say, well, I only did it just to get out of custody. I didn't really mean it. I didn't do it. I was pressured, coerced into entering the negotiations. So, I don't allow that to occur. I mean if you're going to plead guilty, if you're taking responsibility, that's fine. If you don't want to take responsibility, then that's fine as well. Then we go to trial on all the charges. So, I don't want you – like I said, it – I'm not going to have my hands tied to say I'll only take a deal if you let me out today. That – I'm not – I don't work that way.

DEFENDANT BROWN: Well, I been asking for it but um, he said that he had asked for it or something but I didn't have proof that he asked for it so I asked, I guess, the minute order of what they say in court or whatever.

THE COURT: It has to be a motion.

25

1	DEFENDANT BROWN: So the motion was never filed?	
2	THE COURT: I don't have one on calendar for today.	
3	DEFENDANT BROWN: [Indiscernible].	
4	MR. BECKETT: What do you want to do? You want to take	
5	the deal today? You signed the plea agreement. Do you want to go	
6	through – forward with	
7	DEFENDANT BROWN: No.	
8	MR. BECKETT: the plea or no? Tell the Judge.	
9	DEFENDANT BROWN: No.	
10	THE COURT: Okay. And its contingent on the other	
11	Defendants?	
12	MS. GETLER: Correct.	
13	THE COURT: Okay. And it looks like we do have a – now, we	
14		
15	MR. ALBRIGHT: I think this –	
16	THE COURT: did not consolidate so we have –	
17	UNKNOWN SPEAKER: March.	
18	THE COURT: so for these – so we just have Ms. Brown and	
19	was it –	
20	MS. GETLER: Ms. Gonzalez.	
21	THE COURT: Gonzalez? Okay. And who is here on behalf	
22	of Ms. Gonzalez?	
23	MR. HART: I am, Your Honor.	
24	THE COURT: Okay. And I'm assuming the parties were going	
25	to be ready for today so – and I know it's called of and so its not an issue	

1	with that so – and the reason why I brought that up is I'm assuming the
2	parties were ready to go forward to trial so how much time do you
3	actually need to gear up again for trial and get new subpoenas out?
4	MR. ALBRIGHT: Did you want to do it Wednesday? When's
5	the other case set, Your Honor?
6	THE COURT: That's –
7	MS. GETLER: The other case is set –
8	MR. ALBRIGHT: In March?
9	THE COURT: March 30 th .
10	MS. GETLER: March 30 th .
11	[Colloquy between State Counsel]
12	MS. GETLER: Do you have something in the beginning of
13	February?
14	THE COURT: February 3 rd ; it will give you a month.
15	MR. HART: I have jury duty the last week of January, who
16	knows if I do or don't.
17	MS. GETLER: And, Your Honor, just so my schedule is clear
18	to you, I do have several other trials set on February 3 rd . I'm not sure at
19	this point if any of them are going forward or not.
20	THE COURT: Okay. We just try to go by the oldest case. Do
21	you know what – do you have the case numbers?
22	MS. GETLER: I don't off the top of my head, but this one I
23	think is not the oldest.
24	THE COURT: We – and the next regular criminal stack would
25	be March 16 th .

1	MR. ALBRIGHT: And that's when the other one is set?
2	MS. GETLER: The other one. March 30 th , yeah.
3	THE COURT: Oh, the other one is; okay.
4	MR. ALBRIGHT: Oh, March 30. Okay, within that stack.
5	THE COURT: March 30 th . That way you can sort of –
6	MR. ALBRIGHT: We can do them back to back.
7	THE COURT: Yeah.
8	MS. GETLER: Okay.
9	THE COURT: We're here.
10	MR. ALBRIGHT: That works.
11	THE COURT: Is that good, Mr. Hart? And Mr. Beckett is here
12	on Mr. Arnold's behalf; I understand.
13	MR. HART: What the heck's going on with my calendar?
14	MS. GETLER: While he is looking this up, Your Honor, I would
15	just like to make a brief record.
16	THE COURT: Sure.
17	MS. GETLER: The offers that are currently on the table today
18	have already been revoked previously. When Mr. Arnold told us that Ms.
19	Brown was interested in the offer, since I was going to be out of town
20	next week for my honeymoon, I decided to re-extend that offer just for
21	this instant based upon the circumstances, but if the offers aren't being
22	entered into today it will again be revoked.
23	THE COURT: I'm assuming, Ms. Brown, you understand that
24	and Mr. Hart will you communicate that to all the clients, please.
25	MR. HART: Yeah. Well, I've explained to them – we've played

this game back and forth about – we've always been ready to –

THE COURT: I understand.

MR. ALBRIGHT: And, Your Honor, as far as some representations that Ms. Brown made, she wanted to know if Mr. Arnold had requested the O.R., I don't believe it was in writing but he certainly came to Ms. Getler and I and asked as part of the negotiation, the 6 to 15 then an 8 to 20, that whatever it was going to be that there would be an O.R. at entry of plea. We adamantly were opposed to that based on obviously the case itself, the fact that she's stipping to substantial time, the fact that the case history shows that every time she's out of custody she picks up new cases, so we were not willing to agree to that, but Mr. Arnold did ask us multiple times if we would agree to that.

THE COURT: And, Ms. Brown, normally when the negotiations call for mandatory prison, which is robbery with use of a deadly weapon is mandatory prison, I do not grant O.R.'s. There are exceptions to the rule. I'm just telling you normally I would not, even if he had filed a motion.

DEFENDANT BROWN: Okay, well, um, I never got in trouble so I never caught any cases.

THE COURT: But, ma'am, that – I'm just telling you.

DEFENDANT BROWN: And I never – okay, I'm --

THE COURT: If you don't wish -

DEFENDANT BROWN: -- I'm replying to what he said though,

THE COURT: Okay; it doesn't --

- 1	
1	DEFENDANT BROWN: so I'm speaking.
2	THE COURT: matter because we're going to – we've got a
3	new trial date for you and we'll go to trial on all the original charges; all
4	right? And so, here's your calendar call date.
5	THE CLERK: March 24 th , 2020.
6	THE COURT: And then so trial is March 30 th then?
7	THE CLERK: Yes, Judge.
8	MR. ALBRIGHT: That's the same day as the other trial.
9	THE COURT: Oh. No, we were going to do this on the 16 th .
10	THE CLERK: On the 16 th ?
11	THE COURT: For trial.
12	THE CLERK: Okay, so your calendar call will be March 10,
13	2020 and that would be at 8:30.
14	THE COURT: All right, we'll see you at calendar call. And for
15	the other Defendants, please – you were not here yesterday at 8:30.
16	Okay, I don't know if there was a communication break down between
17	you and the attorneys, okay, I don't know if there was. I'm just saying
18	stay in touch. Do not miss any further court dates.
19	DEFENDANT GONZALEZ: Okay.
20	THE COURT: Okay?
21	DEFENDANT GONZALEZ: Thank you, Your Honor.
22	THE COURT: All right. Thank you.
23	DEFENDANT BROWN: Thank you, Your Honor.
24	THE COURT: All right, we've got a hearing at 11:00. I'll be
25	back on the bench at 11:00.

1	MR. ALBRIGHT: Thank you, Your Honor.
2	[Hearing concludes at 10:22 a.m.]
3	* * * * * *
4	
5	
6	
7	
8	
9	
10	
11	
12	
13	
14	
15	
16	
17	
18	
19	
20	
21	ATTEST: I do hereby certify that I have truly and correctly transcribed
22	the audio/video recording in the above-entitled case to the best of my ability.
23	
24	Cynthia Georgilas
25	CYNTHIA GEORGILAS Court Recorder/Transcriber

District Court Dept. XVII

Electronically Filed 3/4/2020 12:01 PM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT

1 NOTC STEVEN B. WOLFSON 2 Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #001565 3 STEPHANIE GETLER Chief Deputy District Attorney Nevada Bar #014203 4 200 Lewis Avenue Las Vegas, Nevada 89155-2212 5 (702) 671-2500 Attorney for Plaintiff 6

> DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

8

7

9

11

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

THE STATE OF NEVADA,

-VS-

10

LEOUANA BROWN, aka,

12 Leuana Leatrice Brown, #2651822

Defendant.

Plaintiff,

C-19-344268-2/ CASE NO: C-19-344112-3

DEPT NO:

IIVX

STATE'S NOTICE OF INTENT TO SEEK PUNISHMENT AS A HABITUAL CRIMINAL

LEQUANA BROWN, aka, Leuana Leatrice Brown, Defendant; and TO:

CARL ARNOLD, ESQ., Counsel of Record: TO:

YOU, AND EACH OF YOU, WILL PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that pursuant to NRS 207.010, the STATE OF NEVADA will seek punishment of Defendant LEQUANA BROWN, aka, Leuana Leatrice Brown, as a habitual criminal in the event of a felony conviction in the above-entitled action.

That in the event of a felony conviction in the above-entitled action, the STATE OF NEVADA will ask the court to sentence Defendant LEQUANA BROWN, aka, Leuana Leatrice Brown as a habitual criminal based upon the following felony convictions, to-wit:

That on or about 2003, the Defendant was convicted in the State of 1. California, for the crime of Transport/Sell Narcotics (felony).

27

III28

///

AA 0145

Case Number: C-19-344112-3

- 11	
1	2. That on or about 2009, the Defendant was convicted in the State of
2	California, for the crime of Second Degree Robbery (felony).
3 4	STEVEN B. WOLFSON Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #001565
5	
	STEPHANIE GETLER
6 7	Chief Deputy District Attorney Nevada Bar #014203
8	
9	
10	CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
11	I certify that on the day of March, 2020, I mailed a copy of the foregoing Notice
12	to:
13	CARL ARNOLD, ESQ. <u>Lvcegal@yahoo.com</u>
14	<u>Lvcegal(ayanoo.com</u>
15	BY DAY
16	R. JACKSON Secretary for the District Attorney's Office
17	Secretary for the District Attorney's Office
18	
19	
20	
21	
22	
23	
24	
25	
26	
27	
28	rmj/L3

Electronically Filed 5/5/2020 1:13 PM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT

RTRAN	Ottom &
2	
DISTRICT	COURT
CLARK COUNT	Y, NEVADA
5	
5)
, THE STATE OF NEVADA,) CASE: C-19-344112-2
Plaintiff,) C-19-344112-3)
oll vs.) DEPT. XVII
MARK ANTHONY FINK, aka, Mark	
LEQUANA BROWN, aka, Lequana Leatrice Brown,	
Defendants.	
)
5 BEFORE THE HONORABLE MICHAEL	VILLANI, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
THURSDAY, MA	RCH 12, 2020
ENTRY OF PLEA (GUNZA	ALEZ & BROWN UNLY)
APPEARANCES:	
For the State: VI	VIAN LONG, ESQ.
De	EPHANIE GETLER, ESQ. eputy District Attorneys
For Defendant Brown:	ARL ARNOLD, ESQ.
3	· ·
	ARTIN HART, ESQ.
	ILAS, COURT RECORDER
222233333333333333333333333333333333333	DISTRICT CLARK COUNT THE STATE OF NEVADA, Plaintiff, vs. MARK ANTHONY FINK, aka, Mark Anthony Finks, Jr., SARAH GONZALEZ LEQUANA BROWN, aka, Lequana Leatrice Brown, Defendants. BEFORE THE HONORABLE MICHAEL THURSDAY, MA RECORDER'S TRANSO ENTRY OF PLEA (GONZA APPEARANCES: For the State: VIN ST De For Defendant Brown: CA

1	Las Vegas, Nevada, Thursday, March 12, 2020
2	[Hearing begins at 9:34 a.m.]
3	THE COURT: Sarah Gonzalez.
4	MR. HART: Good morning, Your Honor. Marty Hart appearing
5	with Ms. Gonzalez.
6	MS. GETLER: Stephanie Getler for the State, Your Honor.
7	MR. HART: We're going to ask the Court if there's any
8	availability this afternoon. The co-defendant, it is our understanding, –
9	but he's gone – that from Mr. Arnold, wanted to enter a plea. It was set
10	for trial on Monday and if she's entering that plea then the plea offered to
11	my client would revert back to the original offers in negotiation.
12	MS. GETLER: That's correct.
13	MR. HART: But we'd have to get her transported.
14	THE COURT: Do you know when Mr. Arnold – was he
15	assuming it was going to be this afternoon?
16	MS. GETLER: He – I let him know we would try and get it on
17	this afternoon. He said he'd be around and would go talk to the client
18	before then so I would just let him know what time Your Honor had
19	available.
20	[Colloquy between Court and Law Clerk]
21	THE COURT: All right, let's come back at 1:30 this afternoon.
22	MS. GETLER: Thank you.
23	THE COURT: And what's the other Defendant's name?
24	MS. GETLER: Lequana Brown.
25	THE COURT: All right

1	MS. GETLER: Do you need an ID number?
2	[Colloquy between Court and Law Clerk]
3	THE COURT: Do you have an ID number for the officer here?
4	MS. GETLER: Yes, its 2651822.
5	THE COURT: Officer, can we get her here at 1:30, Ms.
6	Brown?
7	THE CORRECTION OFFICER: Yes. She was here. I
8	[Colloquy between Correction Officers]
9	THE COURT: All right, we'll have everybody back at 1:30.
10	MS. GETLER: Thank you so much.
11	MR. HART: Thank you, Your Honor.
12	THE COURT: Thank you.
13	[Hearing concludes at 9:36 a.m.]
14	[Hearing resumes at 1:47 p.m.]
15	THE COURT: Pages 2 and 3. Page 2 is Sarah Gonzalez.
16	Mr. Hart, is this matter resolved?
17	MR. HART: I certainly hope so, Your Honor.
18	MS. GETLER: I think it would be best if we went through the
19	other Defendants first.
20	THE COURT: All right, we'll go with Ms. Lequana Brown which
21	is page 3. Mr. Arnold, is this matter resolved?
22	MR. ARNOLD: Yes, Your Honor.
23	THE COURT: What's the resolution?
24	MR. ARNOLD: My client's going to plead guilty to robbery with
25	use of a deadly weapon, a category B felony in this case. In case

1	C-19-344112-3, she will also be pleading guilty to robbery with use of a
2	deadly weapon. The parties stipulate to a sentence of 4 to 10 years on
3	each count, to run consecutive to each other. The offer is contingent
4	upon Michael Fink and Sarah Gonzalez accepting their respective
5	negotiations.
6	THE COURT: Is that –
7	MR. ARNOLD: Are we doing restitution?
8	MS. GETLER: Yes, Your Honor.
9	MR. ARNOLD: The Defendant agrees to pay full restitution.
10	THE COURT: All right.
11	Ms. Brown, is that your understanding of the negotiations?
12	[Pause in proceedings - colloquy between Defense Counsel and
13	Defendant]
14	DEFENDANT BROWN: I need time to think about it.
15	THE COURT: All right, its set for jury trial Monday, 9 a.m.
16	That's how much time you have to think about it.
17	MS. GETLER: And, Your Honor, at this point, the State's
18	going to revoke the offer. We have a pre-trial at 2:00 o'clock. We've
19	already pre-trialed several people. If she wants to take it now, like I told
20	Mr. Arnold earlier, she can have it right now, otherwise its going to be
21	revoked and there won't be any other offers made.
22	THE COURT: All right. And Mr. Hart's client, Ms. Gonzalez,
23	was contingent on Ms. Brown?
24	MS. GETLER: She had an offer contingent on Ms. Brown but

she had another offer to accept if Ms. Brown didn't accept her offer.

THE COURT: So, are we going forward on – I'm sorry, I didn't understand that. Is Ms. Gonzalez – is she still allowed to take a negotiation?

MS. GETLER: There's a separate negotiation that she can take; yes.

MR. HART: Yeah.

MR. ARNOLD: She's going to take it, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right, Ms. Brown, we've done this two or three times, okay. I have all next week open, all week, and I'll try this case and we'll –

DEFENDANT BROWN: Well, actually, I signed off on the [indiscernible] 'cause I told you remember on whatever you all call this loud, the speaker, that I needed time and they didn't bring me back. I already signed off on it so I was trying to – since I signed off on it I thought I'd come back and just put it on, [indiscernible] like said yeah, that I wanted to say yeah but they never brought me back.

MS. GETLER: Your Honor, that's not what happened. We had an entry of plea on January 3rd and a trial date set the next week and I have reluctantly re-offered her the 6 to 15 on that date. When we came in for the entry of plea she decided she didn't want it and the offer was revoked at that point and was set for this trial date.

DEFENDANT BROWN: Well, that's not true because he said

THE COURT: Okay, wait. I don't care – ma'am, I don't care if you accept it or not. I'm free next week.

1	DEFENDANT BROWN: Okay, but can I –
2	THE COURT: We'll go to trial –
3	DEFENDANT BROWN: say something?
4	THE COURT: on all the original charges and then if you're
5	not guilty then you walk out. If you're guilty, then I'll sentence you on it
6	looks like 10 or 12, 13 – or 17, 18 charges.
7	DEFENDANT BROWN: Okay, so –
8	THE COURT: Okay, you have the right to go to trial. I will not
9	rush you into any negotiations.
10	DEFENDANT BROWN: Well, when I was –
11	THE COURT: If you don't want them that's –
12	DEFENDANT BROWN: here last time and I said I needed
13	time you asked me, you asked me [emphasis added]
14	THE COURT: Okay, do you want to accept this negotiation?
15	DEFENDANT BROWN: Yes.
16	THE COURT: Okay. Are you absolutely certain?
17	DEFENDANT BROWN: Yeah.
18	THE COURT: Is that a yes?
19	DEFENDANT BROWN: Yes.
20	THE COURT: Okay, here it says here that you're going to
21	plead in this case and you're going to plead in C344112; is that correct,
22	ma'am?
23	DEFENDANT BROWN: Yeah.
24	THE COURT: Yes?
25	DEFENDANT BROWN: Yes.

1	THE COURT: Okay, that's also a robbery with use of a deadly
2	weapon; correct?
3	DEFENDANT BROWN: Yes.
4	THE COURT: Okay. And for each case it's a total of 4 to 10
5	years for each case.
6	MS. GETLER: Consecutive; yes, Your Honor.
7	THE COURT: Okay. So, if I go along with the negotiation you
8	would get a 4 to 10 sentence in this case. You would get a 4 to 10
9	sentence in case number C344112. Is that your understanding, ma'am?
10	DEFENDANT BROWN: Yeah.
11	THE COURT: Are you sure?
12	DEFENDANT BROWN: Yeah, yeah.
13	THE COURT: Okay. And you understand that these two cases
14	are going to run consecutive? That means one after another. Is that your
15	understanding?
16	DEFENDANT BROWN: Yes.
17	THE COURT: Are you sure?
18	DEFENDANT BROWN: Yes.
19	THE COURT: Okay, do you want to go forward with the
20	negotiations?
21	DEFENDANT BROWN: Yes.
22	THE COURT: Okay, for the record what is your true name?
23	DEFENDANT BROWN: Lequana Brown.
24	THE COURT: How old are you?
25	DEFENDANT BROWN: 39.

1	THE COURT: How far did you go in school?
2	DEFENDANT BROWN: I graduated high school.
3	THE COURT: Do you read, write, and understand the English
4	language?
5	DEFENDANT BROWN: Yes.
6	THE COURT: And, ma'am, are you pleading guilty in this case
7	to the charge of robbery with use of a deadly weapon?
8	DEFENDANT BROWN: Yes.
9	THE COURT: And are you also agreeing to plead guilty to
10	robbery with use of a deadly weapon in case number C344112?
11	DEFENDANT BROWN: Yes.
12	THE COURT: Before I can accept your plea of guilty in this
13	case I must make sure it is freely and voluntarily entered, is anyone
14	forcing you to plead guilty?
15	DEFENDANT BROWN: No.
16	THE COURT: Has anyone threatened you or anyone closely
17	associated with you in order to get you to plead guilty?
18	DEFENDANT BROWN: No.
19	THE COURT: Do you understand that the sentencing range of
20	robbery with use of a deadly weapon is its 2 to 15 years for the
21	underlying robbery charge and for the deadly weapon its 1 to 5 years in
22	the Nevada Department of Corrections and I must run the deadly
23	weapon sentence consecutive to the underlying robbery charge; do you
24	understand that?
25	11111

1	charges. I can run them all consecutive, all concurrent.
2	MS. GETLER: And, Your Honor, she's also small habitual
3	eligible and I did file that notice.
4	DEFENDANT BROWN: So if I was to take it to trial you would
5	try me on each, um –
6	THE COURT: All 19 charges.
7	DEFENDANT BROWN: separately?
8	THE COURT: Well, at the same time, not we're not 19 trials.
9	It would be all in one trial, 19 separate charges in front of a jury.
10	[Pause in proceedings - colloquy between Defense Counsel and
11	Defendant]
12	DEFENDANT BROWN: Yes.
13	THE COURT: Sorry?
14	MR. ARNOLD: She said yes she understood.
15	THE COURT: Okay, I'll go over it again. That the negotiations
16	are that the State is agreeing that you would receive 4 to 10 years in this
17	case. You're agreeing to that and Mr. Arnold is agreeing to that, okay?
18	The final decision is mine. And then when you plead guilty in the other
19	case you're agreeing to 4 to 10 in that case.
20	DEFENDANT BROWN: So if there's no weapon can they –
21	can I get – I'm lost because in one of them is supposed to be a weapon
22	and one is not supposed to be a weapon.
23	THE COURT: Counsel, because in this case, which is 268, I
24	don't see any of the charges with a weapon. Was there a weapon used
25	in this case?

1	MS. GETLER: No, Your Honor.
2	THE COURT: But she's pleading to a deadly weapon.
3	MS. GETLER: Correct.
4	MR. HART: Well, I thought – wasn't there in one of these –
5	there was on one of these counts.
6	MS. LONG: That's the offer that we're offering. If she wants to
7	take the 8 to 20, then she will have to plead to these two charges. That's
8	the offer that we're offering. She doesn't have to take it if she doesn't
9	want to. We're ready for trial.
10	MR. ARNOLD: So bottom line, they're trying to say its
11	fictitional in regards to the weapon in this case. And so, but to get the
12	amount of time that they're looking for that's the charge that she would
13	plead to.
14	MS. LONG: That's correct, Your Honor.
15	THE COURT: Would it be clean if this – if all the parties want
16	a 4 to 10, would it be cleaner just to have a robbery case and you
17	stipulate to a 4 to 10?
18	MS. LONG: She can take this as it is and waive the defects or
19	we can go to trial. This is the third time for entry of plea, so this is what
20	we offered her.
21	THE COURT: Can I have Counsel approach, please?
22	[Bench conference recorded – not transcribed]
23	THE COURT: All right, ma'am, what we're going to do is we're
24	going to get the other Guilty Plea Agreement for the other case so we
25	can just take care of it all today. And I understand that in this case

1	instead of robbery with use of a deadly weapon its just going to be a
2	robbery in this case, no deadly weapon, but you would still be stipulating
3	to 4 to 10. Do you understand that, ma'am? There won't be a deadly
4	weapon in this case.
5	MR. ARNOLD: Say yes.
6	DEFENDANT BROWN: Yes.
7	THE COURT: Are you sure?
8	DEFENDANT BROWN: Yes.
9	THE COURT: Okay. They're going to get the paperwork
10	straightened out. I don't want you to rush in any decision here. But if
11	you're saying there wasn't a deadly weapon here, they're going to strike
12	that language and just do a robbery but this deal is still 4 to 10. Do you -
13	are you inclined to take this negotiation?
14	DEFENDANT BROWN: Is it 4 to 10?
15	THE COURT: 4 to 10 on each case.
16	[Colloquy in courtroom]
17	DEFENDANT BROWN: So does that change the category?
18	THE COURT: No, it's still going to be a robbery, it would be a
19	category B.
20	MR. HART: They'll still be B felonies.
21	DEFENDANT BROWN: Okay. But, um, in one of them – well,
22	technically in both of them, one it wasn't a weapon. In the other one,
23	when he pulled the weapon, I was not in the car when he pulled it, the
24	BB gun.
25	MR. HART: That's

1	THE COURT: Wait, where did Mr. Arnold go?
2	[Brief pause in proceedings]
3	THE COURT: All right, Counsel, in the other case, 344112,
4	was there a deadly weapon in that case?
5	MS. GETLER: Yes.
6	MR. HART: Your Honor, there were two events in that case.
7	One was a robbery of a Big 5 that my client is also charged in
8	THE COURT: Okay.
9	MR. HART: as long as – as well as Mr. Finks, who is Mr.
10	Gill's. In that, there was allegations of a gun that was pulled out by Mr.
11	Finks. When they went to the car to get away as they were trying to get
12	things with the credit cards that didn't work.
13	THE COURT: Was Ms. Brown part of that – part of the case?
14	MR. HART: Yes, when they were grabbing Ms. Brown getting
15	in the car. There was another event at a different sporting goods store a
16	little earlier and that one it was alleged that a knife was pulled out. It was
17	not a gun.
18	MS. GETLER: That's correct.
19	DEFENDANT BROWN: It was no knife – it was no weapon.
20	THE COURT: How about the first one, the gun?
21	DEFENDANT BROWN: Yes. When I – when they left off the
22	store,
23	MR. ARNOLD: [Indiscernible].
24	DEFENDANT BROWN: Oh, no. When they left out the store,
25	they was already in the car. As I'm outside with the manager and the –

and he pulled the BB gun. But I wasn't in the car when he pulled the BB gun and I had [indiscernible] –

THE COURT: Were you working with these people to steal things?

DEFENDANT BROWN: Yes.

THE COURT: Okay. Do you – because as an aider and abettor, you understand that you're liable for everything they do and they're liable for what you do as well as part of the conspiracy to commit this crime? Do you understand that?

DEFENDANT BROWN: Yeah.

THE COURT: Okay, are you going to enter these pleas today, ma'am? I don't have time to play games here. They'll redo the paperwork. They're only going to allege a robbery here, robbery with use in the other case, 4 to 10 on each case, consecutive. Do you understand that?

DEFENDANT BROWN: Yes.

THE COURT: Do you want to go forward? It's not Mr. Arnold's decision, its not mine, its yours.

DEFENDANT BROWN: Yes.

THE COURT: Are you sure?

DEFENDANT BROWN: Yes.

THE COURT: Okay. They're going to get the paperwork fixed and then Mr. Arnold will go over those again with you. And if not, like I said, I'm ready for trial Monday on 19 charges and if you're found guilty I'll sentence you on 19. If you're found guilty on one, I'll sentence you on

1	one, or any combination thereof. If you're found not guilty, then you walk
2	out the door. Do you understand that?
3	DEFENDANT BROWN: Yeah.
4	[Matter trailed at 2:06 p.m.]
5	[Matter recalled at 3:15 p.m.]
6	THE MARSHAL: All rise, Department 17 is back in session.
7	Please be seated and come to order.
8	THE COURT: Mr. Arnold, are we ready?
9	MR. ARNOLD: Yes. Which one are we doing first, the robbery,
10	this case?
11	THE COURT: Sure.
12	MR. ARNOLD: Okay. In regards to C-19-344268-2, my client
13	will be pleading guilty to one count robbery. In case 344112-3, she'll be
14	pleading one count robbery with use of a deadly weapon. Parties
15	stipulate to a sentence of 4 to 10 years on each count to run consecutive
16	to each other. The offer is contingent upon Michael Fink and Sarah
17	Gonzalez accepting their respective negotiations. The Defendant agrees
18	to pay full restitution. And she agreed and signed a forfeiture as set forth
19	in a Stipulation for Compromise of Seized Property, which is attached as
20	Exhibit 2.
21	THE COURT: Is that correct, State?
22	MS. GETLER: Yes, Your Honor.
23	THE COURT: All right, Ms. Brown, your attorney set forth the
24	negotiations. Do you wish to accept these negotiations?
25	DEFENDANT BROWN: Yes.

1	THE COURT: I'm going to go over the case, C344268 first. Do
2	you have that document in front of you, ma'am?
3	DEFENDANT BROWN: Yes.
4	THE COURT: Okay. For the record, what is your true name?
5	DEFENDANT BROWN: Lequana Leatrice Brown.
6	THE COURT: How old are you?
7	DEFENDANT BROWN: 39.
8	THE COURT: How far did you go in school?
9	DEFENDANT BROWN: 12 th grade.
10	THE COURT: I'm sorry?
11	DEFENDANT BROWN: 12 th grade.
12	THE COURT: Do you read, write, and understand the English
13	language?
14	DEFENDANT BROWN: Yes.
15	THE COURT: And, ma'am, are you pleading guilty to the
16	charge of robbery?
17	DEFENDANT BROWN: Yes.
18	THE COURT: Before I can accept your plea of guilty I must
19	make sure it is freely and voluntarily given, is anyone forcing you to
20	plead guilty?
21	DEFENDANT BROWN: No.
22	THE COURT: Has anyone threatened you or anyone closely
23	associated with you in order to get you to plead guilty?
24	DEFENDANT BROWN: No.
25	THE COURT: Do you understand that the sentencing range of

1	this robbery charge is that the Court could sentence you to a maximum
2	term of 15 years, minimum term of 2 years in the Nevada Department of
3	Corrections; do you understand that?
4	MR. ARNOLD: Yes.
5	DEFENDANT BROWN: Yes.
6	THE COURT: Are you – ma'am do you understand its – look
7	at page 2 of the Guilty Plea Agreement. You have that in front of you. Go
8	to line 18, 19, and 20. Did you read that, ma'am?
9	DEFENDANT BROWN: Yes.
10	THE COURT: And it says 2 to 15; right?
11	DEFENDANT BROWN: Mm-hmm. Yes.
12	THE COURT: Okay, so do you understand that the Court
13	could sentence you to no more than 15 years and no less than 2 years
14	in the Nevada Department of Corrections?
15	MR. ARNOLD: Yes.
16	DEFENDANT BROWN: Yes.
17	THE COURT: Ma'am, Mr. Arnold's assisted you with your
18	answers. I want to make sure they're coming from you. Do you
19	understand that is the potential sentencing range?
20	DEFENDANT BROWN: Yes.
21	THE COURT: Do you understand that sentencing is strictly up
22	to the Court, no one can promise you probation, leniency, or any special
23	treatment?
24	DEFENDANT BROWN: Yes.
25	THE COURT: Is one of the reasons you are pleading guilty to

1	this robbery count is in truth and fact you are guilty of this robbery
2	charge?
3	DEFENDANT BROWN: Yes.
4	THE COURT: I have a copy of the Guilty Plea Agreement in
5	front of me and you have one in front of you as well. Is that your
6	signature –
7	DEFENDANT BROWN: Yes.
8	THE COURT: on page 5?
9	DEFENDANT BROWN: Yes.
10	THE COURT: Did you read and understand everything
11	contained within this agreement?
12	DEFENDANT BROWN: Yes.
13	THE COURT: If you had any questions, were they answered
14	by Mr. Arnold?
15	DEFENDANT BROWN: Yes.
16	THE COURT: Based upon all the facts and circumstances of
17	your case, are you satisfied with the services of Mr. Arnold?
18	DEFENDANT BROWN: Yes.
19	THE COURT: Ma'am, are you a U.S. citizen?
20	DEFENDANT BROWN: Yes.
21	THE COURT: Okay, ma'am, if you go to the end of the
22	agreement there it has an amended indictment. Do you have that in front
23	of you, ma'am?
24	DEFENDANT BROWN: Mm-hmm.
25	THE COURT: Okay, I'm going to read the allegation against

you. You can follow along, please and then when I'm done reading I'm going to ask you if you committed that offense, okay?

Did you on or between April 3rd, 2019, and June 22nd, 2019, here in Clark County, Nevada, willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously take personal property, to-wit: merchandise from the persons of Jamie Lyn Woodworth, and/or Aspen Hammer, and/or Ross Nohara, or in their presence, without the consent and against the will of Jamie Lyn Woodworth, and/or Aspen Hammer, and/or Ross Nohara, by means of force or violence or fear of injury, immediate of future, to their person, the person of a member of his family or anyone in his company at the time of the robbery, that you using force or fear to obtain or retain possession of the property, to prevent or overcome resistance to the taking of the property, and/or to facilitate escape. Did you do those things, ma'am?

[Colloquy between Defense Counsel and Defendant]

THE COURT: Ma'am, did you do those things I just read to you?

DEFENDANT BROWN: I took the stuff, but I – yes.

THE COURT: Okay, did you use – were the clerks afraid?

DEFENDANT BROWN: No.

THE COURT: They were happy to give you the stuff?

DEFENDANT BROWN: They -

MR. ARNOLD: There was one incident, Your Honor, we watched the video yesterday where there was a clerk that she told her to put the stuff down. She did have additional items in the bag. The clerk

1	was standing in front of the door to block her entry and my client used
2	her forearm to move her out of the way to get out the door. She would
3	agree with that.
4	THE COURT: Is that true, ma'am?
5	DEFENDANT BROWN: Yes.
6	THE COURT: Is that force? Did you use your forearm to push
7	the clerk to the side?
8	DEFENDANT BROWN: No, I didn't.
9	THE COURT: Did you use your forearm to force her to move
10	out of the way?
11	DEFENDANT BROWN: No, I didn't.
12	MR. HART: Okay.
13	THE COURT: Did she – did you just walk over her?
14	DEFENDANT BROWN: I – she was standing in front of the
15	door and I – she didn't try to stop me. She was like trying to get the bag.
16	She didn't try to stop me.
17	THE COURT: Did she – she grabbed the bag?
18	DEFENDANT BROWN: I set the bags down actually.
19	THE COURT: So you didn't take anything?
20	DEFENDANT BROWN: No.
21	THE COURT: Did any of the people you were with take
22	anything?
23	DEFENDANT BROWN: Yes.
24	THE COURT: You were with them?
25	DEFENDANT BROWN: Yes.

1	THE COURT: Did you arrive with those other people?
2	DEFENDANT BROWN: Yes.
3	THE COURT: Did you at least go into the store with one of
4	them?
5	DEFENDANT BROWN: Yes.
6	THE COURT: Did you leave with all of them or at least with
7	one of them?
8	DEFENDANT BROWN: No.
9	THE COURT: You didn't leave with any of them?
10	DEFENDANT BROWN: No.
11	THE COURT: Did you drive away in a car with them
12	DEFENDANT BROWN: I got a separate car and
13	[indiscernible].
14	THE COURT: Okay. Was there a plan to go in there and steal
15	some items?
16	DEFENDANT BROWN: Yes.
17	THE COURT: You planned with these other people?
18	DEFENDANT BROWN: I planned by myself to go in there.
19	THE COURT: And these people just happen to be there by
20	coincidence?
21	DEFENDANT BROWN: She gave me a ride.
22	MR. ARNOLD: But did they agree to go with you to do the
23	robbery?
24	DEFENDANT BROWN: Yes.
25	THE COURT: Did they know that you were going to steal

1	deadly. For this case, in the robbery, the allegations are is that she
2	made a comment to the clerk, like, back off, or you know, I'll stab you, or
3	something like that, and that was the threat or force that was used in this
4	case.
5	THE COURT: Is that correct, ma'am?
6	DEFENDANT BROWN: No, that's not correct. I told her I'm
7	gonna set the bags down and I'm gonna walk the fuck out of –
8	MR. ARNOLD: No, she's saying in a different –
9	DEFENDANT BROWN: Oh.
10	MR. ARNOLD: in a different case, not – the video.
11	MS. LONG: These ones right here are the Victoria Secret
12	incidence of a robbery.
13	MR. HART: This is a Victoria Secret, not the sporting goods.
14	DEFENDANT BROWN: Oh, in the Victoria Secret they never
15	tried to stop me with the bags. I never came – encounter with no one.
16	MS. LONG: Okay, that's fine. We can just prove it at trial.
17	THE COURT: All right, 19 charges; we'll go to trial –
18	DEFENDANT BROWN: No.
19	THE COURT: Monday morning.
20	DEFENDANT BROWN: No.
21	MR. ARNOLD: You have to say that –
22	DEFENDANT BROWN: [Indiscernible].
23	MR. ARNOLD: you used –
24	MR. HART: Hey.
25	MR. ARNOLD: force to get –

1	DEFENDANT BROWN: [Indiscernible].
2	MR. ARNOLD: out of it.
3	THE MARSHAL: All rise.
4	MR. HART: Thank you.
5	DEFENDANT BROWN: I said yes.
6	THE MARSHAL: Court is adjourned.
7	THE COURT: If she's ready to take a plea, I'll be back,
8	otherwise I'm done.
9	[Hearing concludes at 3:25 p.m.]
10	[Case recalled at 3:29 p.m.]
11	THE COURT: Okay, where are we at, Mr. Arnold?
12	MR. ARNOLD: Your Honor, we were at a factual basis in
13	regard to what was the force or threat of force used to go ahead and
14	commit the robberies at the Victoria Secrets in the first plea agreement.
15	THE COURT: What did you do, ma'am?
16	[Colloquy between Defense Counsel and Defendant]
17	THE COURT: What did you do? Did you walk out, have a nice
18	day, hug your kids? Did you see the TV show last night? Was that the
19	conversation you had with this clerk?
20	[Colloquy between Defense Counsel and Defendant]
21	MR. ARNOLD: What force did you use
22	THE COURT: Or fear?
23	MR. ARNOLD: to get out of there?
24	DEFENDANT BROWN: I used force.
25	THE COURT: How?

DEFENDANT BROWN: I told her if she touched me – I said if she touched me when she come I'll beat her ass. That's what –

THE COURT: Okay, isn't that sort of scaring someone, putting them in fear?

DEFENDANT BROWN: Yes.

THE COURT: Are you sure you did that?

DEFENDANT BROWN: Yes.

THE COURT: I'm going to read the allegation again. Did you within Clark County, State of Nevada, between April 3rd and June 22nd, 2019, willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously take personal property, to-wit: merchandise from the person of Jamie Lyn Woodworth, and/or Aspen Hammer, and/or Ross Nohara, or in their presence without the consent and against the will of Jamie Lyn Woodworth, and/or Aspen Hammer, and/or Ross Nohara, by means of force or violence or fear of injury, immediate or future, to the person or persons or a member of their family or anyone in their company at the time of the robbery, you using force or fear to obtain or retain possession of the property or to prevent or overcome resistance to the taking of the property and to facilitate escape, so when the clerk went to the font door you said something along the lines of move or I'll beat your ass; is that correct? Is that what you said something along those lines?

MR. HART: How about do you want to get stabbed or killed? DEFENDANT BROWN: No.

[Colloquy between Defense Counsel and Defendant]
DEFENDANT BROWN: Yes. Yes.

1	THE COURT: What did you say, ma'am?
2	DEFENDANT BROWN: If she tried to stop me I'll beat her ass.
3	THE COURT: Okay. Do you think that might have scared her?
4	DEFENDANT BROWN: Yeah. Yes.
5	THE COURT: Are you entering your plea freely and
6	voluntarily?
7	DEFENDANT BROWN: Yes.
8	THE COURT: Okay.
9	Now, we're going to go to the other case which is C – you
10	have the paperwork in front you – 344112; and which stores are this
11	one?
12	MS. GETLER: This is a Champs Sports store and a Big 5.
13	THE COURT: Okay. Do you remember those, ma'am,
14	Champs Sports and Big 5?
15	DEFENDANT BROWN: Yes.
16	THE COURT: Hang on one second. Let's – Mr. Arnold, can
17	you go back to the 344268?
18	MR. ARNOLD: Yes, Your Honor.
19	THE COURT: Okay, ma'am, attached to that document is a
20	Stipulation for Compromise of Seized Property. Do you see that?
21	DEFENDANT BROWN: Yes.
22	THE COURT: Did you read that document or have it read to
23	you?
24	DEFENDANT BROWN: Yes.
25	THE COURT: And is that your signature on page 2 of the

23

24

25

DEFENDANT BROWN: Yes.

THE COURT: Did you sign that document freely and

DEFENDANT BROWN: Yes.

THE COURT: And you understood what's contained in that

DEFENDANT BROWN: Yes.

THE COURT: And if you had any questions regarding the document were they answered by Mr. Arnold?

DEFENDANT BROWN: Yes.

THE COURT: Okay.

So now we're going to go to 344112. And are you entering a guilty – now, ma'am, I'm going to go over the allegations here as well and this one is robbery with use; okay? I'm going to ask you what you did. If you play games we're done. I'm not – I'm telling all Counsel here I am not coming back. We'll go to trial on 19 counts on Monday. If you're found not guilty then you walk out the door. If you're found guilty then you stay in jail until we sentence you and I'll sentence you accordingly. Do you understand that, ma'am?

DEFENDANT BROWN: Yes.

THE COURT: Okay, the deal is on 344112, robbery with use of a deadly weapon, the parties stipulate to 4 to 10 years to run consecutive to one another. And also you've signed a Stipulation for Compromise of Seized Property which we will go over.

1	So, ma'am, are you entering, in this case, and you have the
2	paperwork in front of you, are you pleading guilty to robbery with use of
3	a deadly weapon?
4	DEFENDANT BROWN: Yes.
5	THE COURT: And for the record, in this case, what is your
6	true name?
7	DEFENDANT BROWN: Lequana Leatrice Brown.
8	THE COURT: How old are you?
9	DEFENDANT BROWN: 39.
10	THE COURT: How far did you go in school?
11	DEFENDANT BROWN: 12 th grade.
12	THE COURT: Do you read, write, and understand the English
13	
14	DEFENDANT BROWN: Yes.
15	THE COURT: language? Is that a yes?
16	DEFENDANT BROWN: Yes.
17	THE COURT: And you're pleading guilty to the robbery with
18	use of a deadly weapon; correct?
19	DEFENDANT BROWN: Yes.
20	THE COURT: Before I can accept your plea of guilty I must
21	make sure it is freely and voluntarily given, is anyone forcing you to
22	plead guilty?
23	DEFENDANT BROWN: No.
24	THE COURT: Has anyone threatened you or anyone closely
25	associated with you to get you to plead quilty?

DEFENDANT BROWN: No.

THE COURT: You understand that the sentencing range of the robbery with use of a deadly weapon is as follows: for the underlying robbery charge – this is on page 2 – the Court could sentence you to a maximum term of 15 years, a minimum term of 2 years in the Nevada Department of Corrections. Do you understand that? That is for the underlying robbery charge.

DEFENDANT BROWN: Yes.

THE COURT: And for the weapons enhancement, the Court must sentence you to a consecutive term of no more than 15 years and no less than 1 year in the Nevada Department of Correction; do you understand that, ma'am?

DEFENDANT BROWN: Yes.

THE COURT: You understand that sentencing is strictly up to the Court, no one can promise you probation, leniency, or any special treatment?

DEFENDANT BROWN: Yes.

THE COURT: Is one of the reasons you are pleading guilty to the robbery with use of a deadly weapon in this case is in truth and fact you are guilty of that charge?

DEFENDANT BROWN: Yes.

THE COURT: Ma'am, I have a copy of the Guilty Plea Agreement in this case. Is that your signature of page 5 of the agreement?

DEFENDANT BROWN: Yes.

1	THE COURT: Did you read and understand everything
2	contained within the agreement?
3	DEFENDANT BROWN: Yes.
4	THE COURT: If you had any questions, were they answered
5	by your attorney?
6	DEFENDANT BROWN: Yes.
7	THE COURT: I'm sorry?
8	DEFENDANT BROWN: Yes.
9	THE COURT: Based upon all the facts and circumstances of
10	your case, are you satisfied with the services of your attorney?
11	DEFENDANT BROWN: Yes.
12	THE COURT: And, ma'am, are you a U.S. citizen?
13	DEFENDANT BROWN: Yes.
14	THE COURT: Okay, I'm going to go over the allegation
15	contained in the amended indictment. Mr. Arnold will flip to that page for
16	you.
17	All right, and again, the stores for this case?
18	MS. GETLER: Champs Sports store and Big 5.
19	THE COURT: You understand that, ma'am?
20	DEFENDANT BROWN: Yes.
21	THE COURT: Okay, did you – follow along. I'm on page 1. Did
22	you, here in Clark County, on or between June 4 th and June 23 rd , 2019,
23	willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously take personal property, to-wit:
24	merchandise and/or clothing from the person of Brian Akita and/or
25	Kelsey Tristre, or in their presence without the consent and against the

will of Brian Akita and/or Kelsey Tristre, by means of force, or violence, or fear of injury, immediate or future, to their person, the person of a member of their family, or anyone in their company at the time of the robbery, you using force or fear to obtain or retain possession of the property, to prevent or overcome resistance to the taking of the property, and/or facilitate escape with use of a deadly weapon, to-wit: a firearm, and/or a knife, Defendant being criminally liable under one or more of the following principles of criminal liability, to-wit: by directly committing the crime, and/or 2) by aiding or abetting in the commission of the crime, with the intent that the crime be committed by counseling, encouraging, hiring, commanding, inducing, and/or otherwise procuring the other to commit the crime, and/or 3) pursuant to conspiracy to commit the crime with the intent that this crime be committed, Defendants aiding or abetting, and/or conspiring by Defendants acting in concert throughout. Did you do those things, ma'am?

DEFENDANT BROWN: Yes.

THE COURT: Are you entering your plea in this case freely and voluntarily?

DEFENDANT BROWN: Yes.

THE COURT: Mr. Arnold, if you can turn to the next couple of pages, there's a document called Stipulation for Compromise of Seized Property. Ma'am, did you read and understand that document?

DEFENDANT BROWN: Yes.

THE COURT: And is that your signature on page 2 – DEFENDANT BROWN: Yes.

1	THE COURT: of the document?	
2	DEFENDANT BROWN: Yes.	
3	THE COURT: Did you sign this document freely and	
4	voluntarily?	
5	DEFENDANT BROWN: Yes.	
6	THE COURT: And are you entering your plea to this case	
7	freely and voluntarily?	
8	DEFENDANT BROWN: Yes.	
9	THE COURT: Court so finds, sets this matter for sentencing	
10	on the following day.	
11	THE CLERK: That will be April – oh, excuse me, that will be	
12	May 14 th , 8:30 a.m.	
13	THE COURT: Okay, we'll turn now to Ms. Gonzalez. What are	
14	the negotiations, Mr. Hart?	
15	MR. HART: Today my client will be pleading guilty to one	
16	count of conspiracy to commit robbery in case 344112-2 and one count	
17	of grand larceny in C344268. The State will have no opposition to	
18	probation but we'll both be stipulating to an underlying sentence of 24 to	
19	60 in both cases.	
20	THE COURT: Is that correct, State?	
21	MR. HART: And that's consecutive.	
22	MS. GETLER: That's correct, Your Honor.	
23	MR. HART: Sorry, consec –	
24	THE COURT: All right.	
25	Ms. Gonzalez, is that your understanding on the negotiations	

1	for case number 344268?	
2	DEFENDANT GONZALEZ: Yes.	
3	THE COURT: Is that also your understanding of the	
4	negotiations in 344112?	
5	DEFENDANT GONZALEZ: Yes, I do.	
6	THE COURT: Okay, ma'am, I'm going to go over the first one	
7	is 344268. Do you have that one in front of you, Mr. Hart?	
8	MR. HART: I do, Your Honor.	
9	THE COURT: Okay, can you hold that and show that to Ms.	
10	Gonzalez as I go over it?	
11	MR. HART: I'll give her a copy.	
12	THE COURT: All right.	
13	Ma'am, for the record, what is your true name?	
14	DEFENDANT GONZALEZ: Sarah Gonzalez.	
15	THE COURT: How old are you?	
16	DEFENDANT GONZALEZ: 29.	
17	THE COURT: How far did you go in school?	
18	DEFENDANT GONZALEZ: 12 th grade.	
19	THE COURT: Do you read, write, and understand the English	
20	language?	
21	DEFENDANT GONZALEZ: Yes, I do.	
22	THE COURT: And in case number, its at the top part of the	
23	page, 344268, are you entering a guilty plea to the charge of grand	
24	larceny?	
25	DEFENDANT GONZALEZ: Yes.	

1	THE COURT: Before I can accept your plea of guilty I must	
2	make sure it is freely and voluntarily given, is anyone forcing you to	
3	plead guilty?	
4	DEFENDANT GONZALEZ: No.	
5	THE COURT: Has anyone threatened you or anyone closely	
6	associated with you in order to get you to plead guilty?	
7	DEFENDANT GONZALEZ: No.	
8	THE COURT: You understand that the sentencing range of	
9	the grand larceny charge is that the Court could sentence you to a	
10	maximum term of 5 years, a minimum term of 1 year in the Nevada	
11	Department of Corrections and you can also be fined up to \$5,000.00?	
12	DEFENDANT GONZALEZ: Yes.	
13	THE COURT: You understand that sentencing is strictly up to	
14	the Court, no one can promise you probation, leniency, or any special	
15	treatment?	
16	DEFENDANT GONZALEZ: Yes.	
17	THE COURT: Is that – you understand that?	
18	DEFENDANT GONZALEZ: I understand that, yes.	
19	THE COURT: Is one of the reasons you are pleading guilty is	
20	in truth and fact you are guilty of this charge?	
21	DEFENDANT GONZALEZ: Yes, it is.	
22	THE COURT: Ma'am, I have a copy of the Guilty Plea	
23	Agreement in front of me and you have one as well. Is that your	
24	signature on page 5 of the agreement?	
25	DEFENDANT GONZALEZ: Yes.	

1	THE COURT: Did you read and understand everything		
2	contained within the agreement?		
3	DEFENDANT GONZALEZ: Yes, I do.		
4	THE COURT: If you had any questions, were they answered		
5	by your attorney?		
6	DEFENDANT GONZALEZ: Yes.		
7	THE COURT: Based upon all the facts and circumstances of		
8	your case are you satisfied with the services of your attorney?		
9	DEFENDANT GONZALEZ: Yes.		
10	THE COURT: Ma'am, are you a U.S. citizen?		
11	DEFENDANT GONZALEZ: Yes, I am.		
12	THE COURT: Okay, ma'am, if you can turn to the page right		
13	after page 6, look at page – all right, it says Amended Indictment. Do		
14	you see that document, ma'am?		
15	MR. HART: At the very end; yes.		
16	DEFENDANT GONZALEZ: Over there? Yes.		
17	MR. HART: Right there.		
18	DEFENDANT GONZALEZ: Yes.		
19	THE COURT: Okay, I'm going to read the allegation against		
20	you and ask you if you committed this offense.		
21	Did you on or between April 3 rd and June 22 nd , 2019, here in		
22	Clark County, Nevada, willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously with the intent		
23	to deprive the owner permanently thereof, steal, take, and carry away,		
24	lead away, or drive away property owned by Jamie Lyn Woodworth,		
25	and/or Aspen Hammer, and/or Ross Nohara, or in their presence without		

1	the consent and against the will of Jamie Lyn Woodworth, and/or Aspen	
2	Hammer, and/or Ross Nohara, having a value of \$650.00 or more, to-	
3	wit: miscellaneous – to-wit: excuse me, merchandise and/or clothing; did	
4	you do those things, ma'am?	
5	DEFENDANT GONZALEZ: Yeah.	
6	THE COURT: Are you entering your plea freely and	
7	voluntarily?	
8	DEFENDANT GONZALEZ: Mm-hmm, yes.	
9	THE COURT: Okay, and if you can turn to the next page	
10	there's a document called Stipulation for Compromise of Seized	
11	Property. Do you see that, ma'am?	
12	DEFENDANT GONZALEZ: Mm-hmm.	
13	THE COURT: Is that a yes?	
14	DEFENDANT GONZALEZ: Yes, sorry.	
15	MR. HART: It's got to be yes and no.	
16	DEFENDANT GONZALEZ: Sorry.	
17	THE COURT: Okay, did you read and understand this	
18	document?	
19	DEFENDANT GONZALEZ: Yes.	
20	THE COURT: And is that your signature on page 2 of the	
21	document?	
22	DEFENDANT GONZALEZ: Yes.	
23	THE COURT: Did you sign that document freely and	
24	voluntarily?	
25	DEFENDANT GONZALEZ: Yes.	

1	THE COURT: And you entered your plea here freely and	
2	voluntarily; is that correct?	
3	DEFENDANT GONZALEZ: Yes.	
4	THE COURT: Court so finds.	
5	All right, now I'm going to read – I'm going to go over the cas	
6	number, Mr. Hart will have that in front of you, 344112, do you have tha	
7	document, ma'am?	
8	DEFENDANT GONZALEZ: Yes, I do.	
9	MR. HART: Right here.	
10	THE COURT: Okay. And I understand from Mr. Hart told me,	
11	you are pleading guilty to conspiracy to commit robbery; is that correct?	
12	DEFENDANT GONZALEZ: Yes.	
13	THE COURT: For the record, what is your true name?	
14	DEFENDANT GONZALEZ: Sarah Gonzalez.	
15	THE COURT: And how old are you?	
16	DEFENDANT GONZALEZ: 29.	
17	THE COURT: How far did you go in school?	
18	DEFENDANT GONZALEZ: 12 th grade.	
19	THE COURT: Do you read, write, and understand the English	
20	language?	
21	DEFENDANT GONZALEZ: Yes.	
22	THE COURT: And are you pleading guilty to the charge of	
23	conspiracy to commit robbery?	
24	DEFENDANT GONZALEZ: Yes.	
25	THE COURT: Before I can accept your plea of quilty. I must	

1	make sure it is freely and voluntarily given.	
2	DEFENDANT GONZALEZ: Yes.	
3	THE COURT: Is anyone forcing you to plead guilty?	
4	DEFENDANT GONZALEZ: No.	
5	THE COURT: Has anyone threatened you or anyone closely	
6	associated with you in order to get you to plead guilty?	
7	DEFENDANT GONZALEZ: No.	
8	THE COURT: Do you understand that the sentencing range of	
9	the charge of conspiracy to commit robbery is that the Court could	
10	sentence you to a maximum term of 6 years, a minimum term of 1 year	
11	in the Nevada Department of Corrections and you can also be fined up	
12	to \$5,000.00?	
13	DEFENDANT GONZALEZ: Yes, I understand.	
14	THE COURT: Okay. Do you understand that sentencing is	
15	strictly up to the Court, no one can promise you probation, leniency or	
16	any special treatment, do you understand that, ma'am?	
17	DEFENDANT GONZALEZ: Yes.	
18	THE COURT: Now, although the negotiations say that the	
19	State has no opposition to probation, which means they're going to tell	
20	me that at the time of sentencing, you are probably going to tell me you	
21	want probation, and Mr. Hart's going to tell me you want probation, okay	
22	that you should get probation.	
23	DEFENDANT GONZALEZ: Yes.	
24	THE COURT: Final decision's mine; do you understand that?	
25	DEFENDANT GONZALEZ: I understand that.	

1	THE COURT: Okay. And ma'am, did you read the entire Guilty	
2	Plea Agreement in this case?	
3	DEFENDANT GONZALEZ: Yes.	
4	THE COURT: Did you understand everything contained	
5	therein?	
6	DEFENDANT GONZALEZ: Yes.	
7	THE COURT: If you had any questions were they answered	
8	by Mr. Hart?	
9	DEFENDANT GONZALEZ: Yes.	
10	THE COURT: Based upon all the facts and circumstances of	
11	your case are you satisfied with his services?	
12	DEFENDANT GONZALEZ: Yes.	
13	THE COURT: Are you a U.S. citizen?	
14	DEFENDANT GONZALEZ: Yes.	
15	THE COURT: Okay, ma'am, if you can turn to Exhibit 1 which	
16	is at the back –	
17	DEFENDANT GONZALEZ: Okay.	
18	THE COURT: of the Guilty Plea Agreement and I'm going to	
19	read the allegation that's been filed. Please follow along and I'm going to	
20	ask you if you committed this offense.	
21	DEFENDANT GONZALEZ: Okay.	
22	THE COURT: All right. Did you within Clark County, State of	
23	Nevada, on or about June 23 rd , 2019, willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously	
24	conspire with Mark Anthony Fink, aka Mark Anthony Fink, Jr. and	
25	Leguana Brown, aka Leguana Leatrice Brown, to commit a robbery, did	

1	you do those things, ma'am?	
2	DEFENDANT GONZALEZ: Yeah.	
3	THE COURT: Are you entering your plea freely and	
4	voluntarily?	
5	DEFENDANT GONZALEZ: Yes, I am.	
6	THE COURT: Court so finds. If you can turn to the next page	
7	with is Stipulation for Compromise of Seized Property, did you read and	
8	understand that document?	
9	DEFENDANT GONZALEZ: Yes.	
10	THE COURT: And is that your signature on page 2 of the	
11	document?	
12	DEFENDANT GONZALEZ: Yes.	
13	THE COURT: Did you sign that document freely and	
14	voluntarily?	
15	DEFENDANT GONZALEZ: Yes.	
16	THE COURT: Court so finds, sets this matter for sentencing	
17	on the following day.	
18	THE CLERK: Do you want the same day as –	
19	THE COURT: Same day.	
20	THE CLERK: Okay, that will be May 14 th , 8:30.	
21	THE COURT: All right, ma'am, its late in the day here. Either	
22	go today or tomorrow to the Department of Parole and Probation and	
23	sign up for your interview.	
24	DEFENDANT GONZALEZ: Okay.	
25	THE COURT: Okay?	

DEFENDANT GONZALEZ: Okay. Thank you.		
THE COURT: Now, just – you understand, ma'am, that the		
State is going to recommend to me or have no opposition to you		
receiving probation, but if you fail to go down to P&P today or tomorrow,		
you fail to show up for sentencing, or if you go out there and commit new		
crimes, then they're –		
DEFENDANT GONZALEZ: I totally –		
THE COURT: going to argue for prison. Do you understand		
that?		
DEFENDANT GONZALEZ: I totally understand all of this,		
yeah.		
THE COURT: Okay. See you back		
MR. HART: And, Your Honor,		
THE COURT: on that day.		
DEFENDANT GONZALEZ: I understand.		
MR. HART: for a housekeeping matter, Mr. Finks, although		
not my client, he is currently in custody at CCDC with a trial set for two		
weeks, so I'm thinking maybe that should happen on Tuesday.		
MS. GETLER: I would agree with that if that's a possibility.		
THE COURT: All right, so bring him back here on Tuesday?		
MR. HART: Well,		
MS. GELTER: Yes.		
MR. HART: I don't know that they have to bring everybody		
back.		
THE COURT: No, just him.		

I		
1	MS. GETLER: Just Mr. Fink for –	
2	THE COURT: And who is his attorney again?	
3	MS. GETLER: Adam Gill.	
4	MR. HART: Adam Gill.	
5	THE COURT: Okay.	
6	MR. HART: I've been in – we've been in contact with Mr. Gill	
7	about this –	
8	THE COURT: If –	
9	MR. HART: going down previously.	
10	THE COURT: We will contact him as well, but if anyone	
11	happens to see him can you please tell him that we're going to put his	
12	client's –	
13	MS. GETLER: Yes.	
14	THE COURT: case on calendar –	
15	MS. GETLER: I'll let him know.	
16	THE COURT: for Tuesday.	
17	MS. GETLER: Thank you –	
18	THE COURT: Thank you.	
19	MS. GETLER: so much, Your Honor.	
20	11111	
21	11111	
22	11111	
23	11111	
24	11111	
25	11111	

THE COURT: Sure. [Hearing concludes at 3:46 p.m.] ATTEST: I do hereby certify that I have truly and correctly transcribed the audio/video recording in the above-entitled case to the best of my ability. Court Recorder/Transcriber

District Court Dept. XVII

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

I hereby agree to plead guilty to: ROBBERY WITH USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON (Category B Felony - NRS 200.380, 193.165 - NOC 50138), as more fully alleged in the charging document attached hereto as Exhibit "1".

I hereby also agree to plead guilty to: ROBBERY (Category B Felony - NRS 200.380 - NOC 50137) in Case No. C-19-344268-1.

My decision to plead guilty is based upon the plea agreement in this case which is as follows:

The parties stipulate to a sentence of four (4) to ten (10) years on each count to run consecutive to each other. This offer is contingent upon Michael Fink and Sarah Gonzalez accepting their respective negotiations. The Defendant agrees to pay full restitution. I agree to the forfeiture as set forth in the Stipulation for Compromise of Seized Property which is attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference as Exhibit "2".

I agree to the forfeiture of any and all weapons or any interest in any weapons seized

and/or impounded in connection with the instant case and/or any other case negotiated in whole or in part in conjunction with this plea agreement.

I understand and agree that, if I fail to interview with the Department of Parole and Probation, fail to appear at any subsequent hearings in this case, or an independent magistrate, by affidavit review, confirms probable cause against me for new criminal charges including reckless driving or DUI, but excluding minor traffic violations, the State will have the unqualified right to argue for any legal sentence and term of confinement allowable for the crime(s) to which I am pleading guilty, including the use of any prior convictions I may have to increase my sentence as an habitual criminal to five (5) to twenty (20) years, life without the possibility of parole, life with the possibility of parole after ten (10) years, or a definite twenty-five (25) year term with the possibility of parole after ten (10) years.

Otherwise I am entitled to receive the benefits of these negotiations as stated in this plea agreement.

CONSEQUENCES OF THE PLEA

I understand that by pleading guilty I admit the facts which support all the elements of the offense(s) to which I now plead as set forth in Exhibit "1".

I understand that as a consequence of my plea of guilty the Court must sentence me to imprisonment in the Nevada Department of Corrections for a minimum term of not less than TWO (2) years and a maximum term of not more than FIFTEEN (15) years for the Robbery, PLUS a consecutive ONE (1) to FIFTEEN (15) years for the Deadly Weapon enhancement. The minimum term of imprisonment may not exceed forty percent (40%) of the maximum term of imprisonment. I understand that the law requires me to pay an Administrative Assessment Fee.

I understand that, if appropriate, I will be ordered to make restitution to the victim of the offense(s) to which I am pleading guilty and to the victim of any related offense which is being dismissed or not prosecuted pursuant to this agreement. I will also be ordered to reimburse the State of Nevada for any expenses related to my extradition, if any.

I understand that I am not eligible for probation for the offense to which I am pleading

guilty.

I understand that I must submit to blood and/or saliva tests under the Direction of the Division of Parole and Probation to determine genetic markers and/or secretor status.

I understand that if I am pleading guilty to charges of Burglary, Invasion of the Home, Possession of a Controlled Substance with Intent to Sell, Sale of a Controlled Substance, or Gaming Crimes, for which I have prior felony conviction(s), I will not be eligible for probation and may receive a higher sentencing range.

I understand that if more than one sentence of imprisonment is imposed and I am eligible to serve the sentences concurrently, the sentencing judge has the discretion to order the sentences served concurrently or consecutively.

I understand that information regarding charges not filed, dismissed charges, or charges to be dismissed pursuant to this agreement may be considered by the judge at sentencing.

I have not been promised or guaranteed any particular sentence by anyone. I know that my sentence is to be determined by the Court within the limits prescribed by statute.

I understand that if my attorney or the State of Nevada or both recommend any specific punishment to the Court, the Court is not obligated to accept the recommendation.

I understand that if the offense(s) to which I am pleading guilty was committed while I was incarcerated on another charge or while I was on probation or parole that I am not eligible for credit for time served toward the instant offense(s).

I understand that if I am not a United States citizen, any criminal conviction will likely result in serious negative immigration consequences including but not limited to:

- 1. The removal from the United States through deportation;
- 2. An inability to reenter the United States;
- 3. The inability to gain United States citizenship or legal residency;
- 4. An inability to renew and/or retain any legal residency status; and/or
- 5. An indeterminate term of confinement, with the United States Federal Government based on my conviction and immigration status.

//

28 //

Regardless of what I have been told by any attorney, no one can promise me that this conviction will not result in negative immigration consequences and/or impact my ability to become a United States citizen and/or a legal resident.

I understand that the Division of Parole and Probation will prepare a report for the sentencing judge prior to sentencing. This report will include matters relevant to the issue of sentencing, including my criminal history. This report may contain hearsay information regarding my background and criminal history. My attorney and I will each have the opportunity to comment on the information contained in the report at the time of sentencing. Unless the District Attorney has specifically agreed otherwise, the District Attorney may also comment on this report.

WAIVER OF RIGHTS

By entering my plea of guilty, I understand that I am waiving and forever giving up the following rights and privileges:

- 1. The constitutional privilege against self-incrimination, including the right to refuse to testify at trial, in which event the prosecution would not be allowed to comment to the jury about my refusal to testify.
- 2. The constitutional right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury, free of excessive pretrial publicity prejudicial to the defense, at which trial I would be entitled to the assistance of an attorney, either appointed or retained. At trial the State would bear the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt each element of the offense(s) charged.
- 3. The constitutional right to confront and cross-examine any witnesses who would testify against me.
- 4. The constitutional right to subpoena witnesses to testify on my behalf.
- 5. The constitutional right to testify in my own defense.
- 6. The right to appeal the conviction with the assistance of an attorney, either appointed or retained, unless specifically reserved in writing and agreed upon as provided in NRS 174.035(3). I understand this means I am unconditionally waiving my right to a direct appeal of this conviction, including any challenge based upon reasonable constitutional, jurisdictional or other grounds that challenge the legality of the proceedings as stated in NRS 177.015(4). However, I remain free to challenge my conviction through other post-conviction remedies including a habeas corpus petition pursuant to NRS Chapter 34.

2

4 5

6 7

8

1011

13 14

12

15 16

17

18

19

21

20

2223

24

25

26

27 28

VOLUNTARINESS OF PLEA

I have discussed the elements of all of the original charge(s) against me with my attorney and I understand the nature of the charge(s) against me.

I understand that the State would have to prove each element of the charge(s) against me at trial.

I have discussed with my attorney any possible defenses, defense strategies and circumstances which might be in my favor.

All of the foregoing elements, consequences, rights, and waiver of rights have been thoroughly explained to me by my attorney.

I believe that pleading guilty and accepting this plea bargain is in my best interest, and that a trial would be contrary to my best interest.

I am signing this agreement voluntarily, after consultation with my attorney, and I am not acting under duress or coercion or by virtue of any promises of leniency, except for those set forth in this agreement.

I am not now under the influence of any intoxicating liquor, a controlled substance or other drug which would in any manner impair my ability to comprehend or understand this agreement or the proceedings surrounding my entry of this plea.

My attorney has answered all my questions regarding this guilty plea agreement and its consequences to my satisfaction and I am satisfied with the services provided by my attorney.

DATED this 12 day of March, 2020.

ECHANA BROWN, aka,

Lequana Leatrice Brown Defendant

AGREED TO BY:

STEPHANIE GETLER Deputy District Attorney Nevada Bar #014203

1 CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL: 2 I, the undersigned, as the attorney for the Defendant named herein and as an officer of the court hereby certify that: 3 I have fully explained to the Defendant the allegations contained in the 1. 4 charge(s) to which guilty pleas are being entered. 5 2. I have advised the Defendant of the penalties for each charge and the restitution that the Defendant may be ordered to pay. 6 3. I have inquired of Defendant facts concerning Defendant's immigration status 7 and explained to Defendant that if Defendant is not a United States citizen any criminal conviction will most likely result in serious negative immigration 8 consequences including but not limited to: 9 a. The removal from the United States through deportation; 10 b. An inability to reenter the United States; 11 The inability to gain United States citizenship or legal residency; c. 12 d. An inability to renew and/or retain any legal residency status; and/or 13 e. An indeterminate term of confinement, by with United States Federal Government based on the conviction and immigration status. 14 Moreover, I have explained that regardless of what Defendant may have been 15 told by any attorney, no one can promise Defendant that this conviction will not result in negative immigration consequences and/or impact Defendant's ability 16 to become a United States citizen and/or legal resident. 17 4. All pleas of guilty offered by the Defendant pursuant to this agreement are consistent with the facts known to me and are made with my advice to the 18 Defendant. 19 5. To the best of my knowledge and belief, the Defendant: 20 Is competent and understands the charges and the consequences of a. pleading guilty as provided in this agreement, 21 b. Executed this agreement and will enter all guilty pleas pursuant hereto 22 voluntarily, and 23 Was not under the influence of intoxicating liquor, a controlled c. substance or other drug at the time I consulted with the Defendant as 24 certified in paragraphs 1 and 2 above. Dated: This 12 day of March, 2020. 25 26 27

rmj/L3

28

1	AIND STEVEN B. WOLFSON	Grand & St. D. D. D. Comp.
2	Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #001565	EXHIBIT " 1"
3	STEPHANIE GETLER Deputy District Attorney	
4	Nevada Bar #014203 200 Lewis Avenue	
5	Las Vegas, Nevada 89155-2212	
6	(702) 671-2500 Attorney for Plaintiff	
7	DISTRICT COURT	
8	CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA	
9	THE STATE OF NEVADA,	
10	Plaintiff,	CASE NO: C-19-344112-3
11	-VS-	DEPT NO: XVII
12	LEQUANA BROWN, aka, Lequana Leatrice Brown, #2651822,	
13	•	AMENDED
14	Defendant(s).	INDICTMENT
15	STATE OF NEVADA)	
16	COUNTY OF CLARK ss.	

The Defendant(s) above named, LEQUANA BROWN, aka, Lequana Leatrice Brown, accused by the Clark County Grand Jury of the crime(s) of ROBBERY WITH USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON (Category B Felony - NRS 200.380, 193.165 - NOC 50138); committed at and within the County of Clark, State of Nevada, on or between June 4, 2019 and June 23, 2019, as follows: did willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously take personal property, to wit: merchandise and/or clothing, from the person of BRIAN AKITA and/or KELSEY TRISTRE, or in their presence, without the consent and against the will of BRIAN AKITA and/or KELSEY TRISTRE, by means of force or violence or fear of injury, immediate or future, to his person, the person of a member of his family, or of anyone in his company at the time of the robbery, defendant using force or fear to obtain or retain possession of the property, to prevent or overcome resistance to the taking of the property, and/or to facilitate escape, with use of a deadly weapon, to wit: a firearm and/or a knife; the Defendant(s) being criminally

liable under one or more of the following principles of criminal liability, to wit: (1) by directly committing this crime; and/or (2) by aiding or abetting in the commission of this crime, with the intent that this crime be committed, by counseling, encouraging, hiring, commanding, inducing and/or otherwise procuring the other to commit the crime; and/or (3) pursuant to a conspiracy to commit this crime, with the intent that this crime be committed, Defendants aiding or abetting and/or conspiring by Defendants acting in concert throughout.

DATED this 12 day of March, 2020.

STEVEN B. WOLFSON Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #001565

BY

STEPHANIE GETLER Deputy District Attorney Nevada Bar #014203

19BGJ023A-C/19F12727A-C /19F13435X/19F13575A-B/rmj/L3 LVMPD EV# 190600109274; 190600017813; 190499999757; 190499999400; 190499999359; 190699999764; 190699999624; 190699999602; 190699999354; 190600104412 (TK7)

STIPULATION FOR COMPROMISE OF SEIZED PROPERTY

2651822

CRIMINAL CASE# C-19-344112-3

m#

I FOLIANA BROWN aka

179.1185.

DEFEIND	Laguana Lastrica I	
Cololo o I o	Lequana Leatrice I	
	vent Number 190600109274	s Vegas Metropolitan Police Department; 190499999757; 190499999400; 190499999359; 190699999764; 190699999624; 190699999354; 190600104412
his undersig the aforement the aforement	gned Deputy, and the Defendan entioned criminal case(s) pertain entioned event number(s), as followed	GREED by and between STEVEN B. WOLFSON, Clark County District Attorney through that a stipulation for compromise be entered into and resolved as part of the negotiations in ning to property impounded or seized by the aforementioned law enforcement agency under llows: HE APPROPRIATE PARAGRAPHS:
<u>X</u>		That Defendant agrees to release and waive any and all right, title and interest in said property seizing law enforcement agency and subject to disposition pursuant to Nevada Revised 18 and 179.1185.
	Property To Be Forfeited:	Any and all property and/or money seized under Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department Event numbers 190600109274; 190499999757; 190499999400; 190499999359; 190699999764; 190699999624; 190699999602; 190699999354; 190600104412
_	agrees to release to the I aforementioned property of the seized property as	E: Within the guidelines and policies of the seizing law enforcement agency, the prosecution Defendant or his designee the above-described property. That in exchange for release of the Defendant agrees to release and waive any and all right, title and interest in the remainder being forfeited to the seizing law enforcement agency and subject to disposition pursuant to 179.1175, 179.118 and 179.1185.
	Property To Be Forfeited:	
	Property To Be Returned:	
	agrees to release and w	E: Said property includes, but is not limited to, a motor vehicle whereby the Defendant aive any and all right, title and interest in said motor vehicle as being forfeited to the seizing and subject to disposition pursuant to Nevada Revised Statutes 179.1175, 179.118 and

- 2. That the Defendant hereby authorizes the District Attorney's Office and the seizing law enforcement agency to take such action as is necessary, including, but not limited to, using this agreement to secure a judgment or an ex-parte order in any contemplated or pending companion forfeiture proceeding in order to give full force and effect to this agreement.
- 3. That the parties agree that this forfeiture, or any subsequent action taken to secure full force and effect of this agreement, does not and will not be considered as putting the Defendant in jeopardy of life, limb or property for the same offense under the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution and under Section Eight of Article One of the Nevada Constitution; and, that this forfeiture, or any subsequent action taken to secure full force and effect of this agreement, does not or will not constitute an excessive fine under the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution and under Section Six of Article One of the Nevada Constitution.
- 4. That the parties agree that any breach, withdrawal, repeal, rejection or any other abrogation of the negotiations in the aforementioned criminal case(s) shall not have any effect upon the finality of this stipulation; and, that any breach, withdrawal, repeal, rejection or any other abrogation of this stipulation shall not have any effect upon the finality of the negotiations in the aforementioned criminal case(s).

EXHIBIT "2"

- 5. That this Stipulation for Compromise shall incorporate all of the protections attendant to such stipulations as contemplated under the provisions of NRS 48.105 as to all parties named herein; and, this Stipulation for Compromise shall not be construed in any fashion as an admission pertaining to any criminal charges, and shall not and does not constitute an admission of civil liability or fault on the part of any of the undersigned parties, or their present or former agents, servants, employees or others.
- 6. That the parties agree to accept these terms in full settlement and satisfaction of any and all civil claims and demands which each party or assignees may have against each other, agents and employees on account of the seizure or impoundment of said property.
- 7. That this Stipulation for Compromise shall forever, and completely bar any action or claim in any tribunal in any matter whatsoever, whether State, Federal or otherwise by the Defendant herein concerning the forfeiture of said property.
- 8. That the respective parties bear their own civil costs and attorney's fees which may have been occasioned and occurred as a result of the seizure and forfeiture of said property.

ITAS SO STIPULATED and AGREED	
Milliam Dimille	3/12/2020
Defendant () () ()	Date /
Carl E. A. Amild 8358	3/12/2020
Attorney for Defendant, Nevada Bar #	Date
	3.12.20
Clark County Deputy District Attorney, Nevada Bar #014203	Date

1 STEVEN B. WOLFSON 2 Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #001565 EVEN D. GRIERSON-3 STEPHANIE GETLER ERK OF THE COURT Deputy District Attorney 4 Nevada Bar #014203 MAR 12 2020 200 Lewis Avenue 5 Las Vegas, Nevada 89155-2212 (702) 671-2500 6 Attorney for Plaintiff C-19-344112-3 7 AIND DISTRICT COURT Amended Indictment CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 8 4903429 9 THE STATE OF NEVADA, 10 Plaintiff, CASE NO: C-19-344112-3 DEPT NO: 11 -VS-XVII 12 LEQUANA BROWN, aka, Lequana Leatrice Brown, #2651822, AMENDED 13 Defendant(s). INDICTMENT 14 15 STATE OF NEVADA SS. 16 COUNTY OF CLARK

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

The Defendant(s) above named, LEQUANA BROWN, aka, Lequana Leatrice Brown, accused by the Clark County Grand Jury of the crime(s) of ROBBERY WITH USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON (Category B Felony - NRS 200.380, 193.165 - NOC 50138); committed at and within the County of Clark, State of Nevada, on or between June 4, 2019 and June 23, 2019, as follows: did willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously take personal property, to wit: merchandise and/or clothing, from the person of BRIAN AKITA and/or KELSEY TRISTRE, or in their presence, without the consent and against the will of BRIAN AKITA and/or KELSEY TRISTRE, by means of force or violence or fear of injury, immediate or future, to his person, the person of a member of his family, or of anyone in his company at the time of the robbery, defendant using force or fear to obtain or retain possession of the property, to prevent or overcome resistance to the taking of the property, and/or to facilitate escape, with use of a deadly weapon, to wit: a firearm and/or a knife; the Defendant(s) being criminally

1	liable under one or more of the following principles of criminal liability, to wit: (1) by directly
2	committing this crime; and/or (2) by aiding or abetting in the commission of this crime, with
3	the intent that this crime be committed, by counseling, encouraging, hiring, commanding,
4	inducing and/or otherwise procuring the other to commit the crime; and/or (3) pursuant to a
5	conspiracy to commit this crime, with the intent that this crime be committed, Defendants
6	aiding or abetting and/or conspiring by Defendants acting in concert throughout.
7	DATED this 12 day of March, 2020.
8 9	STEVEN B. WOLFSON Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #001565
10	Nevada Bar #001565
11	DV
12	STEPHANIE GETLER
13	Deputy District Attorney Nevada Bar #014203
14	
15	
16	
17	
18	
19	
20	
21	
22	•
23	
24	
25	19BGJ023A-C/19F12727A-C /19F13435X/19F13575A-B/rmj/L3
26	LVMPD EV# 190600109274; 190600017813; 190499999757; 19049999400; 190499999359;
27	19069999764; 190699999624; 190699999602;

190699999354; 190600104412

28

(TK7)

Electronically Filed 5/5/2020 1:18 PM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT

1	RTRAN	Ottom b. a
2		
3	DISTRIC	CT COURT
4	CLARK COU	NTY, NEVADA
5		
6)
7	THE STATE OF NEVADA,	CASE: C-344112-3
8	Plaintiff,	
9	VS.) DEPT. XVII
10	LEQUANA BROWN, aka, Lequana	
11	Leatrice Brown	
12	Defendant.	
13		
14		
15		EL VILLANI, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE APRIL 30, 2020
16		ISCRIPT OF HEARING:
17	STATUS CHECK: M	OTION TO WITHDRAW
18		
19	APPEARANCES:	
20	For the State:	VILMENC FOO
21	For the State.	YU MENG, ESQ. Deputy District Attorney
22	For the Defendant:	ROGER BAILEY, ESQ.
23		, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,
24		
25		
	RECORDED BY: CYNTHIA GEOF	RGILAS, COURT RECORDER

1	Las Vegas, Nevada, Thursday, April 30, 2020
2	[Hearing begins at 10:35 a.m.]
3	[Colloquy in courtroom]
4	THE MARSHAL: Page 3 and 15.
5	THE COURT: All right, Ms. Brown, you had filed a motion to
6	dismiss counsel. You do have a sentencing May 14 th . So you're
7	requesting new counsel for your sentencing; is that correct, ma'am?
8	DEFENDANT BROWN: I been – I filed a motion at the
9	beginning of March. I don't know why it took so long to reach you.
10	Maybe the address I sent it to could have been wrong, I don't know, but
11	that's the address that I got from the Public Defender. And, yes, I've
12	been trying to fire him. I was under false and um – he gave me false
13	information about me going to – I was supposed to start trial basically
14	and then I had signed for a deal before this deal that I took. So I was
15	under the impression that I was coming to court to finish that deal cause
16	I had signed for it which that's not what I went to court for. I didn't know
17	about me taking – this going to – get the 8 years [indiscernible] –
18	THE COURT: Okay, ma'am, you didn't listen –
19	DEFENDANT BROWN: [indiscernible] -
20	THE COURT: Ma'am, listen to my question. Listen to my
21	question. Do you want another attorney for your sentencing or are you
22	seeking –
23	DEFENDANT BROWN: Yes.
24	THE COURT: to have your plea withdrawn?
25	DEFENDANT BROWN: Both.

1	THE COURT: Okay. Based upon the allegations in her motion,
2	we're going to have someone contact Drew's office. I think we've used
3	all the track attorneys and there's a conflict at the Public Defenders
4	Office, so we'll contact Drew's office and we'll come back next Thursday
5	with appointed counsel.
6	THE CLERK: May 7 th –
7	THE COURT: Okay, go ahead – and I am going to direct my
8	court clerk [sic] to start preparing all of the transcripts for the hearings
9	that we've had on Ms. Brown on this particular matter.
10	DEFENDANT BROWN: Thank you.
11	THE COURT: All right?
12	DEFENDANT BROWN: Thank you.
13	THE COURT: You're welcome.
14	[Hearing concludes at 10:37 a.m.]
15	[Case recalled at 10:38 a.m.]
16	THE COURT: Mr. Bailey, are you here on behalf of Mr.
17	Arnold?
18	MR. BAILEY: I am, Your Honor.
19	THE MARSHAL: Page 4.
20	THE COURT: Well, let me just go – we'll do page 4 and then
21	we'll go back to page 3 after.
22	[Case trailed at 10:38 a.m.]
23	[Case recalled at 10:40 a.m.]
24	THE COURT: Mr. Bailey, on page 3, we had previously called
25	the Lequana Brown matter and based upon the allegations she has

1	made against Mr. Arnold I am granting her motion to have Mr. Arnold
2	withdraw from the case, and so your office is off the hook on this case
3	and we're going to contact Drew's office for appointed counsel.
4	MR. BAILEY: Understood, Your Honor.
5	THE COURT: Okay. I just wanted to give you a heads up.
6	[Hearing concludes at 10:40 a.m.]
7	* * * * *
8	
9	
10	
11	
12	
13	
14	
15	
16	
17	
18	
19	
20	
21	ATTEST: I do hereby certify that I have truly and correctly transcribed
22	the audio/video recording in the above-entitled case to the best of my ability.
23	ability.
24	Cynthia GEORGII AS
25	CYN∫THIA GEOR∕GILAŚ Court Recorder/Transcriber
	District Court Dont VVII

District Court Dept. XVII

Electronically Filed 5/6/2021 7:55 AM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT

RTRAN 1 2 3 DISTRICT COURT 5 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 6 7 8 THE STATE OF NEVADA, CASE NO. C-19-344112-3 C-19-344268-2 9 Plaintiff, DEPT. NO. XVII 10 VS. 11 LEQUANA BROWN, 12 Defendant. 13 BEFORE THE HONORABLE MICHAEL VILLANI, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 14 THURSDAY, MAY 7, 2020 15 RECORDER'S TRANSCRIPT OF HEARING: 16 **CONFIRMATION OF COUNSEL** 17 APPEARANCES VIA VIDEO CONFERENCE: 18 For the State: ROBERT B. TURNER, ESQ. **Chief Deputy District Attorney** 19 20 D. MATTHEW LAY, ESQ. For the Defendant: 21 22 23 24 RECORDED BY: CYNTHIA GEORGILAS, COURT RECORDER 25

1

1

[Hearing commenced at 11:02 a.m.]

4

3

THE COURT: Page 17 and 18 is Lequana Brown. Do we have Matt Lay appearing, Attorney Matt Lay?

5 6

MR. LAY: I'm here, Your Honor.

7

THE COURT: All right, great. Counsel, can you accept the

8

9

MR. LAY: I can, Your Honor.

appointment on this -- on these two cases?

10

THE COURT: All right. Ms. Brown is making certain

11

allegations against Mr. Arnold. Just for your information, we had

12

numerous court dates where negotiations were discussed that fell

13

through one day. Next day there was more questions, et cetera. At our

14

last court appearance I had my court recorder to go ahead and

15

transcribe various court appearances so you will be up to speed on this

16

case. How long will it take you to review the materials and determine

17

whether or not she has a legal basis to seek to withdraw her plea?

18

MR. LAY: Your Honor, the only issue -- I downloaded all of

19

the information from the Justice Court and District Court cases. I've

20

reached out to Mr. Arnold to try and get the file yesterday afternoon. My

21

only concern is getting the file at this point. If the Court would be willing,

22

if we can set it for a week or two, a status check for me to get the file

from Mr. Arnold and set a briefing schedule at that time.

23

THE COURT: All right. Have you had the opportunity to

2425

speak with Ms. Brown?

1	THE COURT: Thank you. All right. Thank you.
2	
3	[Hearing concluded at 11:04 a.m.]
4	
5	
6	
7	
8	
9	
10	
11	
12	
13	
14	
15	
16	
17	
18	
19	
20	
21	ATTEST: I do hereby certify that I have truly and correctly transcribed the
22	audio/video proceedings in the above-entitled case to the best of my ability.
23	Junki II
24	
25	Toshiana Pierson Court Recorder/Transcriber

Court Recorder/Transcriber

Electronically Filed 5/6/2021 7:57 AM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT

RTRAN 1 2 3 DISTRICT COURT 5 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 6 7 8 THE STATE OF NEVADA, CASE NO. C-19-344112-3 C-19-344268-2 9 Plaintiff, DEPT. NO. XVII 10 VS. 11 LEQUANA BROWN, 12 Defendant. 13 BEFORE THE HONORABLE MICHAEL VILLANI, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 14 **THURSDAY, MAY 28, 2020** 15 RECORDER'S TRANSCRIPT OF HEARING: 16 STATUS OF CASE 17 APPEARANCES VIA VIDEO CONFERENCE: 18 For the State: YU MENG, ESQ. **Deputy District Attorney** 19 20 ROCHELLE T. NGUYEN, ESQ. For the Defendant: 21 22 23 24 RECORDED BY: CYNTHIA GEORGILAS, COURT RECORDER 25

1

1	Las Vegas, Nevada; Thursday, May 28, 2020
2	
3	[Hearing commenced at 10:41 a.m.]
4	THE COURT: Page 13 and 14 is Lequana Brown.
5	MS. NGUYEN: Good Morning, Your Honor, Rochelle Nguyen
6	appearing for Mr. Lay on behalf of the Defendant.
7	THE COURT: All right. This is status check on possibly filing
8	a motion to withdraw a guilty plea.
9	MS. NGUYEN: Your Honor, and we need one more week. I
10	know we obtained the file, I know there obviously were some difficulties
11	with quarantine and COVID-19. So we do have the file, Mr. Lay just
12	needs one week to be able to talk to her, the client about the possibility
13	of filing that motion.
14	THE COURT: All right.
15	MS. NGUYEN: So, I'd just ask for one week.
16	THE COURT: All right. Here is your next date.
17	THE COURT CLERK: June 4 th .
18	THE DEFENDANT: Tell him to answer the phone.
19	MS. NGUYEN: Thank you.
20	
21	
22	
23	
24	
25	

1	THE COURT: Thank you.
2	
3	[Hearing concluded at 10:42 a.m.]
4	
5	
6	
7	
8	
9	
10	
11	
12	
13	
14	
15	
16	
17	
18	
19	
20	
21	ATTEST: I do hereby certify that I have truly and correctly transcribed the
22	audio/video proceedings in the above-entitled case to the best of my ability.
23	Justin Ti
24	
25	Toshiana Pierson Court Recorder/Transcriber

Court Recorder/Transcriber

Electronically Filed 5/6/2021 7:59 AM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT

RTRAN 1 2 3 DISTRICT COURT 5 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 6 7 8 THE STATE OF NEVADA, CASE NO. C-19-344112-1 C-19-344112-3 9 Plaintiff, C-19-344268-2 10 DEPT. NO. XVII VS. 11 MARK ANTHONY FINK, LEQUANA BROWN, 12 Defendant. 13 BEFORE THE HONORABLE MICHAEL VILLANI, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 14 15 THURSDAY, JUNE 4, 2020 16 RECORDER'S TRANSCRIPT OF HEARING: STATUS CHECK: PLEA WITHDRAWAL 17 18 **APPEARANCES:** 19 For the State: SHANON L. CLOWERS, ESQ. **Chief Deputy District Attorney** 20 21 For Defendant Mark Fink: ADAM L. GILL, ESQ. 22 [via video conference] 23 For Defendant Leguana Brown: ROCHELLE T. NGUYEN, ESQ. [via video conference] 24

1

RECORDED BY: CYNTHIA GEORGILAS, COURT RECORDER

25

1	Las Vegas, Nevada; Thursday, June 4, 2020							
2	[Hearing commenced at 10:17 a.m.]							
3	THE MARSHAL: 15 and 16.							
4	THE COURT: 15 is Lequana Brown and 16 is also Lequana							
5	Brown.							
6	MS. NGUYEN: Good morning, Your Honor, Rochelle Nguyen							
7	appearing for Matt Lay on behalf of Ms. Brown. It's my understanding							
8	she is in Henderson.							
9	THE COURT: All right. Did you have an opportunity to speak							
10	with her regarding her desire to have her plea withdrawn?							
11	MS. NGUYEN: I did and she's actually prepared to go							
12	forward with sentencing.							
13	THE COURT: But she's not here today?							
14	MS. NGUYEN: Yep.							
15	THE COURT: Okay. We'll pass this next week.							
16	THE COURT CLERK: June 11 th .							
17	[Speaking simultaneously]							
18	THE COURT: Now we do have a PSI; is that correct?							
19	MS. NGUYEN: That's fine. I think there were some other							
20	MS. CLOWERS: Yes, Judge.							
21	THE COURT: Okay, we do have a PSI. Okay, we'll see you							
22	on next week. Thank you.							
23	MS. NGUYEN: Thank you.							
24	[Proceedings trailed at 10:18 a.m.]							
25	[Proceedings recalled at 10:54 a.m.]							

1	THE MARSHAL: 18.
2	THE COURT: 18 is Mark Fink. This is Mr. Gill, who I see on
3	camera.
4	DEFENDANT FINK: Hello, Your Honor.
5	THE COURT: Hello, sir.
6	And, Mr. Gill, you I don't think you were here at the 8:30
7	calendar. I think we were advised by Ms. Brown's is this the one with
8	Ms. Brown's a co-defendant?
9	MR. GILL: Yes, Your Honor.
10	THE COURT: Okay. Her new attorney said that she did want
11	to go forward on her sentencing. She was not seeking to withdraw her
12	plea and her sentencing date is.
13	THE COURT CLERK: June 11 th , 10:15 a.m.
14	THE COURT: Okay, so we'll set this for same time, Mr. Gill.
15	MR. GILL: And is that just because to make sure that she
16	goes through with it, Judge, or
17	THE COURT: No. We were advised that she is well.
18	THE COURT CLERK: She wasn't present.
19	THE COURT: She is not going to withdraw her plea. So, we'll
20	sentence her on
21	MR. GILL: Okay.
22	THE COURT: that date.
23	MR. GILL: Okay.
24	THE COURT: Okay. We'll so we'll see you back on that
25	time.

1	THE MARSHAL: 19.						
2	MR. GILL: Thank you, Your Honor.						
3	THE COURT: Thank you.						
4	DEFENDANT FINK: What was the date?						
5	MR. GILL: June 11 th , Mark. One week.						
6	THE COURT: June 11 th .						
7	DEFENDANT FINK: Do you think when you get a chance,						
8	you could give me a call on the phone or video visit or something?						
9	MR. GILL: Yes, sir. I'll see you before the 11 th .						
10	DEFENDANT FINK: Okay, thank you.						
11	[Hearing concluded at 10:55 a.m.]						
12	* * * * *						
13							
14							
15							
16							
17							
18							
19							
20							
21	ATTEST: I do hereby certify that I have truly and correctly transcribed the audio/video proceedings in the above-entitled case to the best of my						
22	ability.						
23	Stil						
24	SILL						
25	Angelica Michaux Court Recorder/Transcriber						

Electronically Filed 5/6/2021 8:14 AM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT

RTRAN 1 2 3 DISTRICT COURT 5 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 6 7 8 THE STATE OF NEVADA, CASE NO. C-19-344112-1 C-19-344112-3 9 Plaintiff, C-19-344268-2 10 DEPT. NO. XVII VS. 11 MARK ANTHONY FINK, LEQUANA BROWN, 12 Defendant. 13 BEFORE THE HONORABLE MICHAEL VILLANI, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 14 15 THURSDAY, JUNE 11, 2020 16 RECORDER'S TRANSCRIPT OF HEARING: **SENTENCING** 17 18 **APPEARANCES:** 19 ROBERT B. TURNER, ESQ. For the State: **Chief Deputy District Attorney** 20 21 For Defendant Mark Fink: ADAM L. GILL, ESQ. 22 [via video conference] 23 For Defendant Leguana Brown: ROCHELLE T. NGUYEN, ESQ. 24 25 RECORDED BY: CYNTHIA GEORGILAS, COURT RECORDER

1

1	Las Vegas, Nevada; Thursday, June 11, 2020							
2	[Hearing commenced at 10:56 a.m.]							
3	THE COURT: Mark Fink. This is Mr. Gill's case.							
4	MR. GILL: Good morning, Your Honor, present on BlueJeans.							
5	THE COURT: Well actually we need to handle the Lequana							
6	Brown matter, which is pages 15 and 16 first, okay.							
7	MR. GILL: Understood.							
8	THE COURT: And do we have Mr. Lay present? Is Mr. Lay							
9	has has he checked in BlueJeans or in person?							
10	THE MARSHAL: Not in person, Your Honor.							
11	THE COURT: All right, Ms. Brown, we're going to maybe							
12	your attorney is just en route right now, but we're going to call him to see							
13	if he is							
14	DEFENDANT BROWN: Yeah.							
15	THE COURT: in the building. All right, so hang on. Okay?							
16	We'll recall your case.							
17	[Proceedings trailed at 10:56 a.m.]							
18	[Proceedings resumed at 11:10 a.m.]							
19	THE MARSHAL: Recall 15 and 16.							
20	THE COURT: Lequana Brown.							
21	THE CORRECTIONS OFFICER: Ms. Brown.							
22	THE COURT: All right.							
23	Counsel, are you here on Ms. Brown?							
24	MS. NGUYEN: I am. I am here for Ms. Brown. Rochelle							
25	Nguyen for Matt Lay on behalf of Ms. Brown. This was nassed last time.							

because she was out in Henderson and we were going to be prepared to go forward with sentencing. However, I noticed that -- it's listed in the PSI, it obviously is like an older case, but she was just brought to Henderson on it and it -- it doesn't look like it's included as a part of this global package negotiations. So I don't believe the State has any objection to us like now looking into that to make sure and see if we can get it dismissed as a part of this negotiation, so she doesn't get sentenced on this case and then not have to come back and deal with that other case.

THE COURT: Mr. Turner, are you aware of the history of this case?

MR. TURNER: I am, Judge, and I just certainly don't oppose counsel's -- I know this case got closer to trial before it ultimately resolved.

DEFENDANT BROWN: Right.

MR. TURNER: And I -- but, I don't oppose counsel's efforts to reach out to the deputy. I'll refer the file to the deputy who negotiated it to see if they want to package that up.

MS. NGUYEN: And I did have the --

MR. GILL: Judge, if I can --

MS. NGUYEN: -- opportunity to speak with Ms. Brown. I know Mr. Gill is also on the line here, too. I think he represented her at one point on one of these cases.

DEFENDANT BROWN: Okay. Can I speak?

MR. GILL: I represent Mr. --

THE COURT: No, he has Mr. Fink.

MS. NGUYEN: Oh.

MR. GILL: Can I speak, please?

MS. NGUYEN: Yes.

THE COURT: Yes, go ahead, Mr. Gill.

DEFENDANT BROWN: Please, Adam.

MR. GILL: Judge, we passed Mr. Fink three times now if you're going to pass it again. Just -- just because of this Ms. Brown situation. I'd like to get him sentenced today or if we can come back Monday, Judge. I mean, enough is enough with Ms. Brown --

DEFENDANT BROWN: Right.

MR. GILL: -- continuing and going back and forth. It's time for Mr. Fink to at least be able to be sentenced. And I'll be quiet.

THE COURT: How soon --

DEFENDANT BROWN: Adam, I've been trying to get sentenced.

MS. NGUYEN: I know Ms. Brown wants to be sentenced today. I will put that out there. She wants to be sentenced. Last week, we were prepared for her to go forward with sentencing. And at that time that is when the State had her brought over on this older case from, I think, January or July of 2019, that for some reason wasn't packaged in here. I mean, it's -- it's like, I think it's like seven or eight charges that are over there in Henderson that I just -- I can't not do. I'm fine passing it 'til Monday. I will get in contact with the District Attorney to see if we can resolve it.

DEFENDANT BROWN: Can I speak? Because they said that -- when the -- I guess the last DA which was -- I can't see who it is right now, but they talked about this. Because this was the last thing that she didn't know that it was a -- in -- on this. She did not know that. So they has said that they talked about this. I'm with Adam on this. This is holding me up --

THE COURT: All right, Ms. --

DEFENDANT BROWN: -- like I'm ready to be sentenced.

THE COURT: All right, Ms. Brown, what we're going to do is -- Counsel, is if we pass this Tuesday because, you know, all of us have come back -- I mean, I'm here every day so it doesn't matter.

MS. NGUYEN: I know. I know.

THE COURT: But it's not fair to Mr. Fink, Mr. Gill and everybody.

Can you get this done by Tuesday?

MS. NGUYEN: I believe I can. As long as that I know that in talking with Mr. Turner he's going to refer that file, I will call again today. It's something -- it should have been in there. I mean, it's in the PSI so I think it was intended to be included in this. Like I said, Ms. Brown wants to go forward with this today.

MR. TURNER: And I'll speak with my deputy after court and inform her to expect a call on this case.

MS. NGUYEN: Do you have any other matters on calendar? I can always call right now. I don't know if I can get a hold of someone.

DEFENDANT BROWN: Right.

 THE COURT: I doubt we can get it wrapped up.

MS. NGUYEN: Yeah.

MR. TURNER: I doubt we can.

THE COURT: And I don't want -- especially with the history of this case, I don't want anything rushed, okay.

And so we'll come back on Tuesday, Mr. Gill. Hopefully, we can wrap this up. And also --

MR. GILL: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: -- Counsel, based upon some of the allegations

Ms. Brown made against Mr. Arnold regarding entering into the

negotiations.

MS. NGUYEN: I understand.

THE COURT: You need to talk to her because I'm going to inquire as to whether or not those were -- those things actually happened. Because then I'm concerned about going forward on the sentencing that she comes back, you know, a year from now and say we never addressed those allegations. If she comes and tells me on Tuesday, perhaps that she was just lashing out and making those allegations then that's a different story. But if she's saying -- if the allegations that she made in her pro per motion are accurate, then we need to have a full-blown hearing because I'm not going to relive this case five years from now.

MS. NGUYEN: Well I'm gonna -- with all candor to the Court, I have talked to Ms. Brown. I don't believe she is recanting any of the representations that she had -- and allegations that she had made in

them. However, we've spent a great deal of time talking about even in light of those like allegations, like her desire to withdraw her guilty plea based on those. She would still want to take the same recommendation and same negotiation after I thoroughly went over all of the like her rights and her case and like the negotiation with that. So --

DEFENDANT BROWN: Absolutely.

MS. NGUYEN: -- you know -- you know, she doesn't want to go through, you know, let's be careful what you ask for. Like she may have -- still have those same concerns about the representations of Mr. Arnold. However, after I have gone through and given her like the concerns and addressed any of the issues that she had laid out against her previous counsel, she still wants to go forward with the sentence. So I'm not sure how you want to address that under these circumstances.

THE COURT: What I'm going to do is --

DEFENDANT BROWN: Can I speak, Villani -- Mr. Villani -- Judge?

THE COURT: Ms. Brown, Ms. Brown? Please hang on. Because of the history of this case, Mr. Turner, I'm going to ask you to prepare two new GPAs with the same -- I'm assuming it's the same deal, okay. I'm going to re-arraign her on these cases. I don't know if I can -- I don't know what we're going to do on that third case, okay. But, we're going to do -- we're going to do the arraignment completely over, okay. And so you've represented, Counsel, that you've spoke to her about this facts and circumstances of her case, possible defenses and

1	we'll go over that on Tuesday. Hopefully, we can get this matter						
2	resolved but I'm going to re-arraign her on Tuesday based upon your						
3	representations on behalf of Ms. Brown, okay?						
4	MS. NGUYEN: Okay.						
5	THE COURT: Because like I said I foresee						
6	MS. NGUYEN: I understand						
7	THE COURT: us coming back.						
8	MS. NGUYEN: the Court's concern.						
9	THE COURT: Okay?						
10	MS. NGUYEN: But just for the record, you know, I know Ms.						
11	Brown is frustrated and she was ready to go forward with this today.						
12	Ms. Brown, give me a call. Can you give me a call tomorrow?						
13	DEFENDANT BROWN: Okay, Rochelle.						
14	MS. NGUYEN: Give me a call tomorrow morning because I						
15	have a meeting today at 1, so give me a call tomorrow. Any time						
16	tomorrow, really. Okay?						
17	DEFENDANT BROWN: Okay.						
18	MS. NGUYEN: Okay.						
19	DEFENDANT BROWN: Adam, if I could just let me co-						
20	defendants walk and take the time for all of this, I would. Sorry about						
21	the hold up.						
22	MR. GILL: You're fine. Take care, Lequana.						
23	DEFENDANT FINK: Adam, can you just give me a call						
24	maybe some time before Tuesday?						
25	MR. GILL: Yes, sir.						

1	DEFENDANT FINK: Okay, thank you.						
2	DEFENDANT BROWN: Thank you, Mr. Gill.						
3	MR. GILL: Yeah, we'll talk Monday, okay?						
4	DEFENDANT FINK: Okay.						
5	MS. NGUYEN: Thank you, Judge.						
6	THE COURT: All right. We'll see you on Tuesday.						
7	MS. NGUYEN: And I think that's probably the most						
8	THE COURT: And I'm going to go over						
9	MS. NGUYEN: cleanest record.						
10	THE COURT: I'm going to have a very thorough canvass.						
11	They're always thorough but it's going to be times five.						
12	MS. NGUYEN: I think that's a wise decision. Thank you.						
13	THE COURT: All right, thank you.						
14	MR. TURNER: And I'm sorry. What was the date?						
15	THE COURT: That's it.						
16	THE CORRECTIONS OFFICER: That's it? Thank you, Your						
17	Honor.						
18	THE COURT: Thank you.						
19	MR. TURNER: I missed it taking notes.						
20	THE COURT CLERK: No, you didn't miss it. It's June 16 th at						
21	10:15 a.m.						
22	MR. GILL: Did we get the 16 th for that one, Brad?						
23							
24							
25							

MR. TURNER: Yes, Adam, June 16th at 10:15. [Hearing concluded at 11:19 a.m.] ATTEST: I do hereby certify that I have truly and correctly transcribed the audio/video proceedings in the above-entitled case to the best of my ability. Angelica Michaux

Court Recorder/Transcriber

Electronically Filed 5/6/2021 8:12 AM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT

RTRAN 1 2 3 DISTRICT COURT 5 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 6 7 8 THE STATE OF NEVADA, CASE NO. C-19-344112-1 C-19-344112-3 9 Plaintiff, C-19-344268-2 10 DEPT. NO. XVII VS. 11 MARK ANTHONY FINK, LEQUANA BROWN, 12 Defendant. 13 BEFORE THE HONORABLE MICHAEL VILLANI, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 14 15 **TUESDAY, JUNE 16, 2020** 16 RECORDER'S TRANSCRIPT OF HEARING: ARRAIGNMENT AND SENTENCING 17 18 **APPEARANCES:** 19 STEPHANIE M. GETLER, ESQ. For the State: **Chief Deputy District Attorney** 20 21 For Defendant Mark Fink: DANIELLE M. PETKOVICH, ESQ. 22 23 For Defendant Leguana Brown: ROCHELLE T. NGUYEN, ESQ. 24 25 RECORDED BY: CYNTHIA GEORGILAS, COURT RECORDER

1

1	Las Vegas, Nevada; Tuesday, June 16, 2020							
2	[Hearing commenced at 11:13 a.m.]							
3	THE COURT: 22 is Lequana Brown. 23 is							
4	THE COURT CLERK: No, 24.							
5	THE COURT: 24 is Mark Fink and 25 is Lequana Brown.							
6	So we'll handle first page 22 and 25, which is two matters for Ms. Brown.							
7	Counsel, is any reason we cannot go forward							
8	MS. NGUYEN: I do not believe so.							
9	THE COURT: on Ms. Brown?							
10	MS. NGUYEN: The last I spoke with Ms. Brown, she was							
11	prepared to go forward with these negotiations again. I filed brand new							
12	Guilty Plea Agreements and forfeiture actions. After going over those							
13	with Ms. Brown and they are were filed.							
14	THE COURT: All right, we're going to print one out. We'll							
15	need it for both cases.							
16	MS. NGUYEN: There was a Henderson case that was always							
17	contemplated that it would be dismissed pursuant to the negotiation in							
18	this case. And just out of an abundance of caution, we actually included							
19	that in the Guilty Plea Agreement this time for clarity and conformity with							
20	the record.							
21	[Colloquy between the Court and the Clerk]							
22	THE COURT: Is that correct, Ms. Brown?							
23	DEFENDANT BROWN: Yeah. The Henderson case is the							
24	jury case is right, I guess, if I take time today then this get dismissed.							
25	THE COURT: Okay, but you want to go forward with the							

1	negotiations for these two cases; is that correct?					
2	DEFENDANT BROWN: Yeah.					
3	THE COURT: Okay. What I'm going to do, ma'am, because					
4	of the history of this case. I'm going to					
5	THE COURT CLERK: There's nothing filed in Odyssey.					
6	THE COURT: Oh, we don't have the GPA in Odyssey. Do					
7	you have a copy of it? The two GPAs or I don't know if they					
8	MS. NGUYEN: I emailed it					
9	MS. GETLER: I didn't get them.					
10	MS. NGUYEN: I emailed it to the State. I don't know if they					
11	printed out a copy of the the two that I filed. I filed them yesterday					
12	afternoon.					
13	MS. GETLER: I have yes, I do have a copy of the GPA. I					
14	don't have a copy of the signed, new forfeiture agreement so.					
15	THE COURT: Well I can					
16	MS. NGUYEN: I've attached it. I don't know if you got the					
17	email that I had sent with them, the fully executed ones?					
18	MS. GETLER: I did. I just didn't print it again after that.					
19	DEFENDANT BROWN: And she's not never ready, this is					
20	crazy.					
21	MS. GETLER: Can I approach with the GPAs?					
22	THE COURT: Do you have through the email, a signed					
23	copy of the GPA?					
24	MS. GETLER: Yes.					
25	THE COURT: Okay. And what you have here in court is not					

1	signed; is that correct?						
2	MS. GETLER: It's a signed GPA. It just doesn't have the						
3	signed forfeiture attached.						
4	THE COURT: Okay. And is it do we have two GPAs or just						
5	the one?						
6	MS. NGUYEN: There are two GPAs.						
7	THE COURT: Okay.						
8	MS. NGUYEN: I think I have the confirmation stuff about it						
9	being filed. I don't know if the State has access to her emails on her						
10	MS. GETLER: I do.						
11	MS. NGUYEN: phone and can maybe forward it to the						
12	Court.						
13	THE COURT: Okay. Well let me go over okay, Ms. Brown,						
14	I am going to handle page 22, which is case number C344268 and that						
15	charges you with robbery.						
16	Counsel, I don't have a information or indictment attached to						
17	either one of the GPAs.						
18	MS. NGUYEN: There wasn't. It was my understanding that						
19	the State had that indictment. It was previously						
20	MS. GETLER: It's the original.						
21	THE COURT: No, I don't have anything attached.						
22	MS. GETLER: Do you need me to give you a copy of that, as						
23	well?						
24	THE COURT: Yeah. I just						
25	DEFENDANT BROWN: Excuse me, Villani. I was in						

1	Henderson a month ago and they contacted the District Attorney and le							
2	them know about this case.							
3	MS. NGUYEN: Oh, no, we're fine with that, Ms. Brown, it's							
4	fine. That one's included. We're just							
5	DEFENDANT BROWN: I understand.							
6	MS. NGUYEN: getting the paperwork.							
7	THE COURT: Yeah, they're going to no, ma'am, it's in the							
8	- it's in the document that the Henderson case will be dismissed, okay?							
9	Ms. Brown, did you hear me?							
10	DEFENDANT BROWN: Yes, I know that.							
11	THE COURT: Okay. I was just looking for a response from							
12	you, ma'am. Do you understand that part of the negotiation or that the							
13	Henderson case will be dismissed?							
14	DEFENDANT BROWN: Yes.							
15	THE COURT: Thank you.							
16	[Colloquy between the Court and the Clerk]							
17	DEFENDANT BROWN: He didn't know that.							
18	[Colloquy between the Court and the Clerk]							
19	MS. NGUYEN: I'm sorry. Are they in Odyssey now or?							
20	THE COURT CLERK: Just the the one for 268 is in							
21	Odyssey. The one for 112 is not in Odyssey.							
22	MS. NGUYEN: Okay.							
23	THE COURT: But I need the I don't have the amended							
24	indictment attached.							
25	DEFENDANT BROWN: This is crazy							

THE CORRECTIONS OFFICER: Ma'am, focus forward.

[Colloquy between the Court and the Clerk]

MS. GETLER: Do you need me to email the GPAs?

THE COURT: Okay, ma'am, I have both of those amended indictments. The amended indictment for page 22 is case C344268 and that references -- it says here that there was a grand larceny, 268. And the calendar says robbery and this says grand larceny.

MS. GETLER: Is that the one for Sarah Gonzalez, maybe?

THE COURT: So is she pleading guilty to grand larceny --

MS. GETLER: No.

THE COURT: -- in 268

MS. GETLER: Court's indulgence.

THE COURT: You know what? Because of the tortured history of this case, I need to have all the documents together and I need to make sure that Ms. Brown has a complete set of the documents and so --

DEFENDANT BROWN: Thank you.

THE COURT: Okay because, you know, ma'am, I want to make sure you understand every single thing. I want you to have, you know, every single document in front of you.

So, Counsel, if you can provide Ms. Brown by Thursday the Guilty Plea Agreement with the amended indictment with anything attached thereto. This Thursday -- do you have enough time if we continue this until Thursday?

MS. NGUYEN: I will do that and I'm also emailing your clerk

the files, the sup that was filed. I think there's just a delay in the Clerk's 1 2 Office uploading. THE COURT: All right, ma'am, so we're going to come back 3 on Thursday. And I know Mr. Gill, there's someone from his office here, 4 we've -- you've been continued numerous times, but I don't want to 5 come back because there's any claim that Ms. Brown was confused. So 6 7 -- so I --DEFENDANT BROWN: Thank you, Judge. 8 THE COURT: You're welcome, Ms. Brown. 9 10 THE CLERK: June 18th. 11 THE MARSHAL: Thirteen. 12 THE COURT: Wait, hang on. Yes, Mr. Gill? 13 MS. PETKOVICH: No, I'm here for Mr. Gill, Your Honor. THE COURT: Oh, I'm sorry. All right, so we'll come back on 14 Thursday. Hopefully, once and for all, get this set up. So, again, I want 15 Ms. Brown to have all the documents, everything attached to the GPA 16 for both cases. 17 [Colloguy between the Court and the Clerk] 18 THE COURT: And the date is? 19 THE COURT CLERK: Oh sorry, June 18th. 20 21 MS. NGUYEN: Thank you. /// 22 23 /// 24 /// /// 25

THE COURT: Thank you. [Hearing concluded at 11:21 a.m.] ATTEST: I do hereby certify that I have truly and correctly transcribed the audio/video proceedings in the above-entitled case to the best of my ability. Angelica Michaux

Court Recorder/Transcriber

Electronically Filed 6/17/2020 3:48 PM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT

1 GPA

2

3

4

5

6

7

STEVEN B. WOLFSON

Clark County District Attorney

Nevada Bar #001565

STEPHANIE GETLER

Deputy District Attorney Nevada Bar #014203

200 Lewis Avenue

Las Vegas, NV 89155-2212

(702) 671-2500

Attorney for Plaintiff

DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

8

9

THE STATE OF NEVADA,

10 Plaintiff,

11 | -vs-

LEQUANA BROWN, aka, Leguana Leatrice Brown, #2651822

Defendant.

CASE NO:

C-19-344112-3

DEPT NO: XVII

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

12

13

AMENDED GUILTY PLEA AGREEMENT

I hereby agree to plead guilty to: ROBBERY WITH USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON (Category B Felony - NRS 200.380, 193.165 - NOC 50138), as more fully alleged in the charging document attached hereto as Exhibit "1".

I hereby also agree to plead guilty to: ROBBERY (Category B Felony - NRS 200.380 - NOC 50137) in Case No. C-19-344268-1.

My decision to plead guilty is based upon the plea agreement in this case which is as follows:

The parties stipulate to a sentence of four (4) to ten (10) years on each count to run consecutive to each other. This offer is contingent upon Michael Fink and Sarah Gonzalez accepting their respective negotiations. The Defendant agrees to pay full restitution. The State agrees to dismiss 19FH1954X after rendition of sentence. I agree to the forfeiture as set forth in the Stipulation for Compromise of Seized Property which is attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference as Exhibit "2".

W:\2019\2019F\127\27\19F12727-GPA-(BROWN LEQUANA)-001.DQCX

I agree to the forfeiture of any and all weapons or any interest in any weapons seized and/or impounded in connection with the instant case and/or any other case negotiated in whole or in part in conjunction with this plea agreement.

I understand and agree that, if I fail to interview with the Department of Parole and Probation, fail to appear at any subsequent hearings in this case, or an independent magistrate, by affidavit review, confirms probable cause against me for new criminal charges including reckless driving or DUI, but excluding minor traffic violations, the State will have the unqualified right to argue for any legal sentence and term of confinement allowable for the crime(s) to which I am pleading guilty, including the use of any prior convictions I may have to increase my sentence as an habitual criminal to five (5) to twenty (20) years, life without the possibility of parole, life with the possibility of parole after ten (10) years, or a definite twenty-five (25) year term with the possibility of parole after ten (10) years.

Otherwise I am entitled to receive the benefits of these negotiations as stated in this plea agreement.

CONSEQUENCES OF THE PLEA

I understand that hy pleading guilty I admit the facts which support all the elements of the offense(s) to which I now plead as set forth in Exhibit "1".

I understand that as a consequence of my plea of guilty the Court must sentence me to imprisonment in the Nevada Department of Corrections for a minimum term of not less than TWO (2) years and a maximum term of not more than FIFTEEN (15) years for the Robbery, PLUS a consecutive ONE (1) to FIFTEEN (15) years for the Deadly Weapon enhancement. The minimum term of imprisonment may not exceed forty percent (40%) of the maximum term of imprisonment. I understand that the law requires me to pay an Administrative Assessment Fee.

I understand that, if appropriate, I will be ordered to make restitution to the victim of the offense(s) to which I am pleading guilty and to the victim of any related offense which is being dismissed or not prosecuted pursuant to this agreement. I will also be ordered to reimburse the State of Nevada for any expenses related to my extradition, if any.

I understand that I am not eligible for probation for the offense to which I am pleading guilty.

I understand that I must submit to blood and/or saliva tests under the Direction of the Division of Parole and Probation to determine genetic markers and/or secretor status.

I understand that if I am pleading guilty to charges of Burglary, Invasion of the Home, Possession of a Controlled Substance with Intent to Sell, Sale of a Controlled Substance, or Gaming Crimes, for which I have prior felony conviction(s), I will not be eligible for probation and may receive a higher sentencing range.

I understand that if more than one sentence of imprisonment is imposed and I am eligible to serve the sentences concurrently, the sentencing judge has the discretion to order the sentences served concurrently or consecutively.

I understand that information regarding charges not filed, dismissed charges, or charges to be dismissed pursuant to this agreement may be considered by the judge at sentencing.

I have not been promised or guaranteed any particular sentence by anyone. I know that my sentence is to be determined by the Court within the limits prescribed by statute.

I understand that if my attorney or the State of Nevada or both recommend any specific punishment to the Court, the Court is not obligated to accept the recommendation.

I understand that if the offense(s) to which I am pleading guilty was committed while I was incarcerated on another charge or while I was on probation or parole that I am not eligible for credit for time served toward the instant offense(s).

I understand that if I am not a United States citizen, any criminal conviction will likely result in serious negative immigration consequences including but not limited to:

- 1. The removal from the United States through deportation;
- 2. An inability to reenter the United States;
- The inability to gain United States citizenship or legal residency;
- 4. An inability to renew and/or retain any legal residency status; and/or
- 5. An indeterminate term of confinement, with the United States Federal Government based on my conviction and immigration status.

28 //

Regardless of what I have been told by any attorney, no one can promise me that this conviction will not result in negative immigration consequences and/or impact my ability to become a United States citizen and/or a legal resident.

I understand that the Division of Parole and Probation will prepare a report for the sentencing judge prior to sentencing. This report will include matters relevant to the issue of sentencing, including my criminal history. This report may contain hearsay information regarding my background and criminal history. My attorney and I will each have the opportunity to comment on the information contained in the report at the time of sentencing. Unless the District Attorney has specifically agreed otherwise, the District Attorney may also comment on this report.

WAIVER OF RIGHTS

By entering my plea of guilty, I understand that I am waiving and forever giving up the following rights and privileges:

- 1. The constitutional privilege against self-incrimination, including the right to refuse to testify at trial, in which event the prosecution would not be allowed to comment to the jury about my refusal to testify.
- 2. The constitutional right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury, free of excessive pretrial publicity prejudicial to the defense, at which trial I would be entitled to the assistance of an attorney, either appointed or retained. At trial the State would bear the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt each element of the offense(s) charged.
- 3. The constitutional right to confront and cross-examine any witnesses who would testify against me.
- 4. The constitutional right to subpoena witnesses to testify on my behalf.
- 5. The constitutional right to testify in my own defense.
- 6. The right to appeal the conviction with the assistance of an attorney, either appointed or retained, unless specifically reserved in writing and agreed upon as provided in NRS 174.035(3). I understand this means I am unconditionally waiving my right to a direct appeal of this conviction, including any challenge based upon reasonable constitutional, jurisdictional or other grounds that challenge the legality of the proceedings as stated in NRS 177.015(4). However, I remain free to challenge my conviction through other post-conviction remedies including a habeas corpus petition pursuant to NRS Chapter 34.

3

4

6

8

10 11

12 13

14

15 16

17

18

19

20 21

22

2324

25

26

2728

VOLUNTARINESS OF PLEA

I have discussed the elements of all of the original charge(s) against me with my attorney and I understand the nature of the charge(s) against me.

I understand that the State would have to prove each element of the charge(s) against me at trial.

I have discussed with my attorney any possible defenses, defense strategies and circumstances which might be in my favor.

All of the foregoing elements, consequences, rights, and waiver of rights have been thoroughly explained to me by my attorney.

I believe that pleading guilty and accepting this plea bargain is in my best interest, and that a trial would be contrary to my best interest.

I am signing this agreement voluntarily, after consultation with my attorney, and I am not acting under duress or coercion or by virtue of any promises of leniency, except for those set forth in this agreement.

I am not now under the influence of any intoxicating liquor, a controlled substance or other drug which would in any manner impair my ability to comprehend or understand this agreement or the proceedings surrounding my entry of this plea.

My attorney has answered all my questions regarding this guilty plea agreement and its consequences to my satisfaction and I am satisfied with the services provided by my attorney.

DATED this 10th day of June, 2020. Leguana Brown
Signature affixed at direction of
Leguana Brown by Rochelle Nguyen 8205

LEQUANA BROWN, aka, Lequana Leatrice Brown, Defendant

AGREED TO BY:

STEPHANIE GETLER Deputy District Attorney Nevada Bar #014203

CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL:

I, the undersigned, as the attorney for the Defendant named herein and as an officer of the court hereby certify that:

- 1. I have fully explained to the Defendant the allegations contained in the charge(s) to which guilty pleas are being entered.
- 2. I have advised the Defendant of the penalties for each charge and the restitution that the Defendant may be ordered to pay.
- 3. I have inquired of Defendant facts concerning Defendant's immigration status and explained to Defendant that if Defendant is not a United States citizen any criminal conviction will most likely result in serious negative immigration consequences including but not limited to:
 - a. The removal from the United States through deportation;
 - b. An inability to reenter the United States;
 - c. The inability to gain United States citizenship or legal residency;
 - d. An inability to renew and/or retain any legal residency status; and/or
 - e. An indeterminate term of confinement, by with United States Federal Government based on the conviction and immigration status.

Moreover, I have explained that regardless of what Defendant may have been told by any attorney, no one can promise Defendant that this conviction will not result in negative immigration consequences and/or impact Defendant's ability to become a United States citizen and/or legal resident.

- 4. All pleas of guilty offered by the Defendant pursuant to this agreement are consistent with the facts known to me and are made with my advice to the Defendant.
- 5. To the best of my knowledge and belief, the Defendant:
 - a. Is competent and understands the charges and the consequences of pleading guilty as provided in this agreement,
 - b. Executed this agreement and will enter all guilty pleas pursuant hereto voluntarily, and
 - c. Was not under the influence of intoxicating liquor, a controlled substance or other drug at the time I consulted with the Defendant as certified in paragraphs 1 and 2 above.

Dated: This / O day of June, 2020.

ROCHELLE NGUYEN, ESQ.

rmj/L3

28

1	AIND					
2	STEVEN B. WOLFSON Clark County District Attorney					
	Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #001565					
3	STEPHANIE GETLER					
4	Deputy District Attorney Nevada Bar #014203					
5	200 Lewis Avenue Las Vegas, Nevada 89155-2212 (702) 671-2500					
6	Attorney for Plaintiff					
7	DISTRIC	T COIRT				
8	DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA					
9	THE STATE OF NEVADA,					
10	Plaintiff,	CASE NO:	C-19-344112-3			
11	-vs-	DEPT NO:	XVII			
12	LEQUANA BROWN, aka, Lequana Leatrice Brown, #2651822,					
13	Lequana Learnce Brown, #2651822,	A	MENDED			
	Defendant(s).	IN	DICTMENT			
14	·	***	DIOXIMENT			
15	STATE OF NEVADA)					
16	COUNTY OF CLARK) ss.					

The Defendant(s) above named, LEQUANA BROWN, aka, Lequana Leatrice Brown, accused by the Clark County Grand Jury of the crime(s) of ROBBERY WITH USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON (Category B Felony - NRS 200.380, 193.165 - NOC 50138); committed at and within the County of Clark, State of Nevada, on or between June 4, 2019 and June 23, 2019, as follows: did willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously take personal property, to wit: merchandise and/or clothing, from the person of BRIAN AKITA and/or KELSEY TRISTRE, or in their presence, without the consent and against the will of BRIAN AKITA and/or KELSEY TRISTRE, by means of force or violence or fear of injury, immediate or future, to his person, the person of a member of his family, or of anyone in his company at the time of the robbery, defendant using force or fear to obtain or retain possession of the property, to prevent or overcome resistance to the taking of the property, and/or to facilitate escape, with use of a deadly weapon, to wit: a firearm and/or a knife; the Defendant(s) being criminally

28

liable under one or more of the following principles of criminal liability, to wit: (1) by directly committing this crime; and/or (2) by aiding or abetting in the commission of this crime, with the intent that this crime be committed, by counseling, encouraging, hiring, commanding, inducing and/or otherwise procuring the other to commit the crime; and/or (3) pursuant to a conspiracy to commit this crime, with the intent that this crime be committed, Defendants aiding or abetting and/or conspiring by Defendants acting in concert throughout.

DATED this 10th day of June, 2020.

STEVEN B. WOLFSON Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #001565

BY

STEPHANIE GETLER Deputy District Attorney Nevada Bar #014203

19BGJ023A-C/19F12727A-C /19F13435X/19F13575A-B/rmj/L3 LVMPD EV# 190600109274; 190600017813;

19049999757: 190499999400: 190499999359:

190699999764; 190699999624; 190699999602;

190699999354; 190600104412 (TK7)

STIPULATION FOR COMPROMISE OF SEIZED PROPERTY

DEFENDANT	LEQUANA E	ROWN, aka,	ID#	2651822	CRIMINAL CASE#	C-19-344112-3
	Lequana Leat	rice Brown,				
Seizing Law Enforce	ement Agency	Las Vegas Metrop	olitan Police	e Department		
Seizure Event Numb	er 19060010	9274; 19049999975	7; 19049999	9400; 1904999	99359; 190699999764; 1	90699999624;
	19069999	9602: 19069999935	4: 19060010	4412		

IT IS HEREBY STIPULATED and AGREED by and between STEVEN B. WOLFSON, Clark County District Attorney through his undersigned Deputy, and the Defendant that a stipulation for compromise be entered into and resolved as part of the negotiations in the aforementioned criminal case(s) pertaining to property impounded or seized by the aforementioned law enforcement agency under the aforementioned event number(s), as follows:

- 1. PROSECUTOR CHECKS THE APPROPRIATE PARAGRAPHS:
- X a. TOTAL FORFEITURE: That Defendant agrees to release and waive any and all right, title and interest in said property as being forfeited to the seizing law enforcement agency and subject to disposition pursuant to Nevada Revised Statutes 179.1175, 179.118 and 179.1185.

Property To Be Forfeited: Any and all property and/or money seized under Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department Event numbers 190600109274; 190499999757; 1904999999400; 190499999359; 190699999764; 190699999624; 190699999602; 190699999354; 190600104412

b. PARTIAL FORFEITURE: Within the guidelines and policies of the seizing law enforcement agency, the prosecution agrees to release to the Defendant or his designee the above-described property. That in exchange for release of the aforementioned property, Defendant agrees to release and waive any and all right, title and interest in the remainder of the seized property as being forfeited to the seizing law enforcement agency and subject to disposition pursuant to Nevada Revised Statutes 179.1175, 179.118 and 179.1185.

Property To Be Forfeited:	 		
Property To Be Returned:			

- c. VEHICLE FORFEITURE: Said property includes, but is not limited to, a motor vehicle whereby the Defendant agrees to release and waive any and all right, title and interest in said motor vehicle as being forfeited to the scizing law enforcement agency and subject to disposition pursuant to Nevada Revised Statutes 179.1175, 179.118 and 179.1185.
- 2. That the Defendant hereby authorizes the District Attorney's Office and the seizing law enforcement agency to take such action as is necessary, including, but not limited to, using this agreement to secure a judgment or an ex-parte order in any contemplated or pending companion forfeiture proceeding in order to give full force and effect to this agreement.
- 3. That the parties agree that this forfeiture, or any subsequent action taken to secure full force and effect of this agreement, does not and will not be considered as putting the Defendant in jeopardy of life, limb or property for the same offense under the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution and under Section Eight of Article One of the Nevada Constitution; and, that this forfeiture, or any subsequent action taken to secure full force and effect of this agreement, does not or will not constitute an excessive fine under the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution and under Section Six of Article One of the Nevada Constitution.
- 4. That the parties agree that any breach, withdrawal, repeal, rejection or any other abrogation of the negotiations in the aforementioned criminal case(s) shall not have any effect upon the finality of this stipulation; and, that any breach, withdrawal, repeal, rejection or any other abrogation of this stipulation shall not have any effect upon the finality of the negotiations in the aforementioned criminal case(s).

EXHIBIT "2"

- 5. That this Stipulation for Compromise shall incorporate all of the protections attendant to such stipulations as contemplated under the provisions of NRS 48.105 as to all parties named herein; and, this Stipulation for Compromise shall not be construed in any fashion as an admission pertaining to any criminal charges, and shall not and does not constitute an admission of civil liability or fault on the part of any of the undersigned parties, or their present or former agents, servants, employees or others.
- That the parties agree to accept these terms in full settlement and satisfaction of any and all civil claims and demands
 which each party or assignees may have against each other, agents and employees on account of the seizure or
 impoundment of said property.
- 7. That this Stipulation for Compromise shall forever, and completely bar any action or claim in any tribunal in any matter whatsoever, whether State, Federal or otherwise by the Defendant herein concerning the forfeiture of said property.
- 8. That the respective parties bear their own civil costs and attorney's fees which may have been occasioned and occurred as a result of the seizure and forfeiture of said property.

Lequana Brown by Roth	affixed at divoction of elle Nguyen 6/15/20
Defendant	Date
Rochelle Nguyen 8:	205 4/15/20
Attorney for Defendant, Nevada Bar #	Date
	4.16.2020
Clark County Deputy District Attorney, Nevada Bar #014203	Date

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify and affirm that this document was filed electronically with the Nevada Supreme Court on February 3, 2022. Electronic Service of the foregoing document shall be made in accordance with the Master Service List as follows:

AARON FORD Nevada Attorney General

ALEXANDER CHEN
Chief Deputy District Attorney

/s/ Steven S. Owens STEVEN S. OWENS, ESQ.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

LEQUANA BROWN,

Appellant,

v. CASE NO: 84042

STATE OF NEVADA,

Respondent.

APPELLANT'S APPENDIX

Volume 2

STEVEN S. OWENS, ESQ. Nevada Bar #004352 Steven S. Owens, LLC 1000 N. Green Valley #440-529 Henderson, Nevada 89074 (702) 595-1171

STEVEN B. WOLFSON Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #001565 200 Lewis Avenue Post Office Box 552212 Las Vegas, Nevada 89155-2212 (702) 671-2500

AARON D. FORD Nevada Attorney General Nevada Bar #007704 100 North Carson Street Carson City, Nevada 89701-4717 (775) 684-1265

Counsel for Appellant

Counsel for Respondent

ALPHABETICAL INDEX TO APPELLANT'S APPENDIX

Vol	Pleading	<u>Page</u>
1	Amended Guilty Plea Agreement	235
1	Amended Indictment	200
1	Court Minutes (10-17-19)	101
1	Court Minutes (10-24-19)	108
1	Court Minutes (11-19-19)	118
1	Court Minutes (12-5-19)	131
1	Court Minutes (12-10-19)	132
2	Court Minutes (2-5-21)	306
2	Court Minutes (2-25-21)	307
2	Court Minutes (3-9-21)	310
2	Court Minutes (4-13-21)	311
2	Court Minutes (8-26-21)	346
2	Court Minutes (9-2-21)	347
2	Court Minutes (9-9-21)	350
1	Guilty Plea Agreement	190
1	Indictment	102
2	Judgment of Conviction	266
2	Motion for Appointment of Counsel	284
2	Motion to Withdraw Counsel	288
2	Notice of Appeal	435
2	Notice of Change of Hearing	348
2	Notice of Entry of Findings of Fact	414
2	Order Appointing Counsel	308
2	Order for Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus	292
2	Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus	268
1	Recorder's Transcript of Hearing (1-3-20)	134
1	Recorder's Transcript of Hearing (3-12-20)	147
1	Recorder's Transcript of Hearing (4-30-20)	202
1	Recorder's Transcript of Hearing (5-7-20)	206
1	Recorder's Transcript of Hearing (5-28-20)	210
1	Recorder's Transcript of Hearing (6-4-20)	213
1	Recorder's Transcript of Hearing (6-11-20)	217
1	Recorder's Transcript of Hearing (6-16-20)	227
2	Recorder's Transcript of Hearing (6-18-20)	245
2	Recorder's Transcript of Hearing (11-4-21)	351
1	Reply to State's Motion to Consolidate	119

Reply to State's Response to Supplemental Brief	339
Reporter's Transcript of Proceeding (GJ Vol 1 10-16-19)	1
Reporter's Transcript of Proceeding (GJ Vol 2 10-16-19)	92
State's Motion to Consolidate	109
State's Notice of Intent to Seek Punishment as a Habitual Criminal	145
State's Response to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus	294
State's Response to Supplemental Brief	323
Supplemental Brief in Support of Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus	312
	Reporter's Transcript of Proceeding (GJ Vol 1 10-16-19) Reporter's Transcript of Proceeding (GJ Vol 2 10-16-19) State's Motion to Consolidate State's Notice of Intent to Seek Punishment as a Habitual Criminal State's Response to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus State's Response to Supplemental Brief

Electronically Filed 5/6/2021 8:02 AM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT

RTRAN 1 2 3 **DISTRICT COURT** 5 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 6 7 THE STATE OF NEVADA, CASE NOS. C-19-344112-1 C-19-344112-3 8 Plaintiff, C-19-344268-2 VS. 9 DEPT. NO. XVII MARK ANTHONY aka 10 MARK ANTHONY FINKS, JR., 11 LEQUANA BROWN, aka LEQUANA LEATRICE BROWN. 12 Defendants. 13 14 BEFORE THE HONORABLE MICHAEL VILLANI DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 15 THURSDAY, JUNE 18, 2020 16 RECORDER'S TRANSCRIPT OF HEARING: ARRAIGNMENT AND SENTENCING 17 18 **APPEARANCES:** 19 For the State: STEPHANIE M. GETLER, ESQ. 20 **Deputy District Attorney** For the Defendants: 21 LEQUANA BROWN ROCHELLE T. NGUYEN, ESQ. 22 23 MARK FINK ADAM L. GILL, ESQ 24 25 RECORDED BY: CYNTHIA GEORGILAS, COURT RECORDER

1

AA 0245

_

Las Vegas, Nevada; Thursday, June 18, 2020

[Proceeding commenced at 10:49 a.m.]

THE MARSHAL: Sixteen, seventeen, and eighteen.

THE COURT: Sixteen is Mark Fink, Seventeen, Eighteen is Ms. Brown. We have --

[Staff talking to the Court]

THE COURT: Okay. We're going to handle Ms. Brown first, and it looks like we can hopefully get this wrapped up today. Okay. We're going to handle the page 17 matter first, and that is 344112. And I have a Guilty Plea Agreement in front of me on that case. Counsel, would you put on the record the negotiations, please.

MS. NGUYEN: I will, Your Honor. Today Ms. Brown in case C-19-344112-3, she will be pleading guilty to one count of robbery with use of a deadly weapon. She also agrees to plead guilty to robbery in case C-19-344268-1[sic]. Both parties stipulate to a sentence of 4 to 10 years on each count to run consecutive to each other. The offer is contingent upon Michael [sic] Fink and Sarah Gonzalez accepting their respective non negotiations, which they have done so far.

The Defendant also agrees to pay full restitution, and the State agrees to dismiss 19FH1954X after rendition of sentence. And she agrees to the forfeiture set forth and the stipulation of compromised seized property, which was attached as an exhibit. We did refile under an Amended Guilty Plea Agreement both in this case and the other one. I did sign that Guilty Plea Agreement as well as that forfeiture exhibit on behalf of my client at her direction.

1	THE COURT: State, is that a correct statement
2	DEFENDANT BROWN: I
3	THE COURT: of the negotiations?
4	MS. GETLER: Yes, Your Honor.
5	THE COURT: Ms. Brown, is that a correct statement of the
6	negotiations for this particular case?
7	DEFENDANT BROWN: Yeah, but I didn't get the plea
8	agreement that Rochelle supposed to give to me, I guess, due to the
9	mail or whatever, I didn't get it. That's why you pushed it off the other
10	day.
11	THE COURT: Say that again, ma'am. I couldn't hear you.
12	DEFENDANT BROWN: I didn't get the plea agreement. I
13	guess, that's why you pushed off so I can have the proper paperwork,
14	but I didn't get it. She said she sent it
15	THE COURT: You didn't get the plea agreement?
16	MS. NGUYEN: I will
17	DEFENDANT BROWN: She said she sent it yesterday. I
18	talked to her I think yesterday.
19	MS. NGUYEN: I've talked to Ms. Brown everyday for the past
20	week, but
21	DEFENDANT BROWN: Yes.
22	MS. NGUYEN: I will tell you that I did read it word for word.
23	I did
24	THE DEFENDANT: That I'm understanding.
25	MS. NGUYEN: hand deliver and dropped it off at Post 10

1	the day of court. And then I again brought it and put it in the mail that
2	day, too, so it was to be received to her two times. I personally walked it
3	over to Post 10 at the Clark County Detention Center. But I will say as is
4	customary with all the other cases in light of COVID-19 an inability to
5	receive paperwork from them, I did read both of these agreements to her
6	line by line, in fact, yesterday as well as last week prior to her signing
7	that and an original one as well.
8	THE COURT: Is that correct, Ms. Brown?
9	DEFENDANT BROWN: Yes.
10	THE COURT: She read everything to you?
11	DEFENDANT BROWN: Yes, she did.
12	THE COURT: Do you wish to go forward today?
13	DEFENDANT BROWN: Yes.
14	THE COURT: All right. So the negotiation is set forth by your
15	attorney, you wish you accept these negotiations?
16	DEFENDANT BROWN: Yes.
17	THE COURT: For the record what is your true name?
18	THE DEFENDANT: Lequana Leatrice Brown.
19	THE COURT: How old are you?
20	THE DEFENDANT: Thirty-nine.
21	THE COURT: How far did you go in school?
22	DEFENDANT BROWN: Twelfth grade.
23	THE COURT: Do you read, write, and understand the English
24	language?
25	DEFENDANT BROWN: Yes.

THE COURT: And, ma'am, are you entering a guilty plea to the charge of robbery with use of a deadly weapon, and again this is case number C344112?

DEFENDANT BROWN: Yes.

THE COURT: Before I can accept your plea of guilty, I must make sure it is freely and voluntarily given. Has anyone forced you to plead guilty?

DEFENDANT BROWN: No.

THE COURT: Has anyone threatened you or anyone closely associated with you in order to get you to plead guilty?

DEFENDANT BROWN: No.

THE COURT: You understand the sentencing range of this particular charge is that the Court could sentence you to a maximum term of 15 years, minimum term of two years in Nevada Department of Corrections for the underlying robbery charge? Do you understand that, ma'am?

DEFENDANT BROWN: Yes, I understand.

THE COURT: You understand that the Court must sentence you to a consecutive term of no more than 15 years, no less than 1 year in Nevada Department of Corrections for the weapons enhancement?

Do you understand that?

DEFENDANT BROWN: Yes.

THE COURT: You understand that sentencing is strictly up to the Court? No one can promise you probation, leniency, or any special treatment?

1	DEFENDANT BROWN: Yes.
2	THE COURT: Is one of the reasons you're pleading guilty to
3	the robbery with use of deadly weapon charge is in truth and fact you
4	are guilty of that charge?
5	DEFENDANT BROWN: Yes.
6	THE COURT: Ma'am, your attorney just advised me that after
7	she read the Guilty Plea Agreement to you that you authorized her to
8	sign on your behalf. Is that correct, ma'am?
9	DEFENDANT BROWN: Yes.
10	THE COURT: And, in fact, again we had previously
11	mentioned that she did read the entire Guilty Plea Agreement to you; is
12	that correct, ma'am?
13	DEFENDANT BROWN: Yes.
14	THE COURT: Did she also read to you the Amended
15	Indictment?
16	DEFENDANT BROWN: Uh-huh, yes.
17	THE COURT: And also there was a Stipulation for
18	Compromise of Seized Property. Did she read that to you?
19	DEFENDANT BROWN: Yes.
20	THE COURT: And did you authorize her to sign your name?
21	DEFENDANT BROWN: Yes.
22	THE COURT: Ma'am, when she read to you the Guilty Plea
23	Agreement and the Stipulation for Compromise of Seized Property, did
24	you have any questions regarding those two documents?
25	DEFENDANT BROWN: No.

THE COURT: I was going to ask you if you did have any questions were they answered for you. So you're saying you did not have any questions; correct?

DEFENDANT BROWN: Right.

THE COURT: And you did you understand those two documents?

DEFENDANT BROWN: Yes.

THE COURT: Ma'am, based upon all the facts and circumstances of your case, are you satisfied with your new attorney's representation of you?

DEFENDANT BROWN: Yes, I am.

THE COURT: All right. Ma'am, are you a US citizen?

DEFENDANT BROWN: Yes.

THE COURT: Okay, ma'am, I'm going to read to you the allegation of the crime -- charged -- charged crime against you and ask you if you committed this offense. Did you on or about or on or between June 4th and June 23rd, 2019, here in Clark County, Nevada, willfully, unlawfully, feloniously take personal property to wit: merchandise and/or clothing, from a person of Brian Akita and/or Kelsey Tristre, or in their presence, without their consent and against their will of Brian Akita and/or Kelsey Tristre, by means of force or violence or fear of injury, immediate or future, to their person -- to a person or a member of their family, or anyone else in their company at time of the robbery?

That, you, using force or fear to obtain or retain possession of the property, to prevent or overcome resistance with taking of the

property and/or to facilitate escape, with the use of a deadly weapon, to wit: a firearm and/or a knife. Defendant being criminally liable under one or more of the following principles of criminal liability to wit: 1, by directly committing the crime; and/or 2, by aiding or abetting in the commission of the crime with the intent that the crime be committed, by counseling, encouraging, hiring, commanding, inducing, and/or otherwise procuring the other to commit the crime; and/or 3, pursuant to conspiracy to commit the crime, with the intent that the crime be committed, that the Defendants aiding and abetting and/or conspiring with each other acting in concert throughout. And, ma'am, that is a document your attorney read to you; is that correct?

DEFENDANT BROWN: Yes.

THE COURT: Are you entering a guilty plea to that charge freely and voluntarily?

DEFENDANT BROWN: Yes.

THE COURT: All right. The Court so finds. And, ma'am, I'm going to -- we're going to go over the negotiations in case number C344268.

MS. NGUYEN: Your Honor, would you like me to put that on the record as well?

THE COURT: Yes, please.

MS. NGUYEN: Your Honor, in case C-19-344268-2, Ms. Brown will be pleading guilty to one count of robbery. Pursuant to the negotiations both parties stipulate to 4 to 10 years on each count to run consecutive to each other. The offer is contingent upon Michael [sic]

Fink and Sarah Gonzalez accepting their respective -- receptive negotiations -- respective, sorry.

The State also agrees to dismiss 19FH1954X after rendition of sentence, and she agrees to pay full restitution in all cases and counts including those to be dismissed and the forfeiture as set forth.

And, again, it sounds like she did not receive the physical copy that I dropped off personally at the Clark County Detention Center as well as the one I put in the mail. I did read this over along with the other Guilty Plea Agreement word for word with her. And pursuant to the orders in place regarding COVID-19 protections, I did sign that at her direction, both the forfeiture as well as the Guilty Plea Agreement.

THE COURT: All right. Ma'am, do you wish to accept the negotiations in this case?

DEFENDANT BROWN: Yes.

THE COURT: All right. Your attorney just stated to me that she read the Guilty Plea Agreement to you, the Amended Indictment, and the Stipulation for Compromise of Seized Property; is that correct?

DEFENDANT BROWN: Yes.

THE COURT: And did you also authorize her to sign both of those documents on your behalf?

DEFENDANT BROWN: Yes.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you. And for the record in this particular case, what is your true name?

DEFENDANT BROWN: Lequana Leatrice Brown.

THE COURT: How old are you?

1	DEFENDANT BROWN: Thirty-nine.
2	THE COURT: How far did you go in school?
3	DEFENDANT BROWN: Twelfth grade.
4	THE COURT: Do you read, write, and understand the English
5	language?
6	DEFENDANT BROWN: Yes.
7	THE COURT: And are you entering a guilty plea to the charge
8	of robbery?
9	DEFENDANT BROWN: Yes.
10	THE COURT: Before I can accept your plea of guilty, I must
11	make sure it's freely and voluntarily given; has anyone forced you to
12	plead guilty?
13	DEFENDANT BROWN: No.
14	THE COURT: Has anyone threatened you or anyone closely
15	associated with you in order to get you to plead guilty?
16	DEFENDANT BROWN: No.
17	THE COURT: You understand that the sentencing range of a
18	robbery charge that the Court can sentence you to a maximum term of
19	15 years, a minimum term of 2 years in Nevada Department of
20	Corrections?
21	DEFENDANT BROWN: Yes.
22	THE COURT: You understand that sentencing is strictly up to
23	the Court? No one can promise you probation, leniency, or special
24	treatment?
25	DEFENDANT BROWN: Yes

THE COURT: Is one of the reasons you're pleading guilty to this charge is in truth and in fact you are guilty of this charge?

DEFENDANT BROWN: Yes.

THE COURT: And, ma'am, when your attorney read to you the Amended Guilty Plea Agreement, did you have any questions for her?

DEFENDANT BROWN: No. Whatever questions I had was answered, so I understand everything.

THE COURT: Okay. Well, if you had any questions, were they answered by your attorney?

DEFENDANT BROWN: Yes.

THE COURT: Okay. Based upon all the facts and circumstances of your case, are you satisfied with the services of your attorney?

DEFENDANT BROWN: Yes.

THE COURT: And, ma'am, are you a US citizen?

DEFENDANT BROWN: Yes.

THE COURT: And, ma'am, I'm going to read the allegations against you and ask you if you committed this offense. Did you on or between April 3rd, 2019, and June 22nd, 2019, here in Clark County, Nevada, willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously take personal property to wit: merchandise from the person of Jaime Lyn Woodworth, and/or Aspen Hammer and/or Ross Nohara, or in their presence, without the consent and against their will of Jaime Lyn Woodworth and/or Aspen Hammer and/or Ross Nohara, by means of force or violence or fear of

1	injury, immediate or future, to their person, a person or a member of
2	their family or anyone else in the company at the time of the robbery.
3	That, you, using force or fear to obtain or retain possession of property,
4	or to prevent or overcome resistance to the taking of property, and/or
5	facilitate escape. Did you do those things, ma'am?
6	DEFENDANT BROWN: Yes.
7	THE COURT: Are you entering your pleas freely and your
8	plea freely and voluntarily?
9	DEFENDANT BROWN: Yes.
10	THE COURT: And also are you agreeing to the Stipulation for
11	Compromise of Seized Property freely and voluntarily?
12	THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
13	THE COURT: Court so finds. Ma'am, you wish to go let's
14	go ahead and get sentenced today, okay? All right. In case number
15	C344112
16	[Colloquy between Court and staff]
17	THE COURT: All right. The Court hereby adjudicates you
18	guilty of robbery with use of a deadly weapon? Any argument by the
19	State?
20	MS. GETLER: No, Your Honor, I'll submit it on the
21	negotiations.
22	THE COURT: All right. Ms. Brown, I am inclined to go along
23	with the negotiations. I'm more than happy to hear from you. Do you
24	have anything to say before I sentence you?
25	DEFENDANT BROWN: No.

- 1	
1	THE COURT: All right, Counsel.
2	MS. NGUYEN: Your Honor, I will submit.
3	THE COURT: Okay. So the negotiations are that if she would
4	stipulate to sentence to 4 to 10, which means 2 to 5 on the underlying
5	robbery and 2 to 5 for the weapons enhancement; is that correct?
6	MS. GETLER: Yes, Your Honor.
7	MS. NGUYEN: Yes, and then that would run consecutive to
8	the 4 to 10 on the other case.
9	THE COURT: On the other case well, right, for this one
10	here.
11	All right. Ma'am, as I've said, I will go along with the
12	negotiations. This was a robbery in a business. Other people could
13	have been around and been injured. This was at a store, correct, if I
14	recall? It's a lingerie store or –
15	MS. GETLER: This case was a Champs Sports store –
16	THE COURT: Yes.
17	MS. GETLER: and a Big 5 Sports store.
18	THE COURT: Okay. All right. Ma'am, so I'm go along with
19	the negotiations on the underlying robbery charge. I sentence you to a
20	maximum of 5 years, minimum term 2 years in the Nevada Department
21	of Corrections.
22	For the weapons enhancement, which must run consecutive,
23	maximum term 5 years, minimum term of 2 years.
24	You are ordered to pay \$25 administrative assessment fee, \$3
25	DNA Collection Fee. Does she have any priors? \$150 DNA Fee, submit

1	to DNA Testing, 250 to the indigent defense fund. And do we have a
2	credit in this particular case, an updated credit?
3	MS. NGUYEN: Your Honor, I was just thinking about that. I'm
4	getting my date difference calculator out here, Your Honor.
5	[Colloquy between Counsel]
6	MS. NGUYEN: Your Honor, I can calculate that if you want to
7	sentence her on the next one.
8	THE COURT: No, I'll wait. We're good.
9	MS. GETLER: Is, Your Honor, ordering any restitution on this
10	case?
11	THE COURT: Yes, we did have restitution in the amount of
12	I don't have that what was the amount of restitution? I have the other
13	PSI in front of me.
14	MS. NGUYEN: The date on the PSI, I think it was she was
15	scheduled to be sentenced here on May 14 th ; is that correct?
16	THE COURT: That is correct.
17	MS. NGUYEN: And so from May 14 th until today's date that's
18	an additional 36 days on top of what is included in that PSI.
19	THE COURT: So it should be 342 days; is that correct?
20	MS. NGUYEN: Thirty-six.
21	THE COURT: Fifty-two?
22	MS. NGUYEN: You're asking me to do math. That's why I
23	went to law school.
24	DEFENDANT BROWN: It's 352.
25	[Colloquy between Counsel]

1	MS. NGUYEN: 394; is that right? 327 plus 31.
2	THE COURT: Oh, she had 316 on May 14 th .
3	MS. GETLER: Your Honor, I'm asking
4	MS. GETLER: Oh, I show 327 in the PSI for a total of 358.
5	THE COURT: All right. 358 days credit for time served.
6	MS. GETLER: And the restitution looks like \$1,769.66 to Big
7	5.
8	MS. NGUYEN: And, Your Honor, I'd ask that be
9	THE COURT: Joint several.
10	MS. NGUYEN: joint several.
11	THE COURT: That is the order.
12	[Court colloquy with staff]
13	THE COURT: All right. Ready to go forward on the
14	sentencing for the second case?
15	MS. NGUYEN: Yes, Your Honor.
16	THE COURT: All right. She is adjudged guilty of just the
17	robbery.
18	MS. NGUYEN: I think they pulled her away. I think she needs
19	to come back.
20	THE COURT: All right. We do need Ms. Brown back for her
21	second case. And that on page 18. That's page 18.
22	All right. Ma'am, we just have ma'am, we need to go
23	through the sentencing for the second case. You are adjudged guilty of
24	just robbery.
25	MS. NGUYEN: That's correct.

THE COURT: Okay. Any argument by the State? 1 MS. GETLER: No, Your Honor. 2 THE COURT: Ma'am, do you have anything to say on this 3 robbery charge? And I am inclined to go along with the negotiations. 4 DEFENDANT BROWN: No. 5 THE COURT: Counsel? 6 7 MS. GETLER: Your Honor, I submit. 8 THE COURT: All right. Ma'am, I'm going to go along with the 9 negotiations on the underlying robbery charge and sentence you to a 10 maximum 5 years, minimum term 2 years, Nevada Department of Corrections. Weapons enhancement maximum term of 5 years, 11 12 minimum term of 2 years, per statute must run consecutive. And this case is to run consecutive to C344112. 13 MS. GETLER: And, Your Honor, I'm sorry. This case does 14 15 not have the weapon enhancement. 16 THE COURT: Oh, it did not. I apologize. MS. GETLER: So it will just be the 4 to 10. 17 THE COURT: Right, 4 to 10. Maximum term of 10 years, 18 minimum term of 4 years. 19 20 MS. GETLER: Yeah, same credit. 21 THE COURT: Again, this case is running consecutive to the 22 other case. You are ordered to a pay a \$25 Administrative Assessment 23 Fee, \$3 DNA Collection Fee, the 150 DNA Fee is waived, because I 24 ordered it in the other case, 250 to the Indigent Defense Fund. There's 25 restitution in the amount \$16,837.20 joint and severely, and who does

1	that go to?
2	MS. GETLER: Victoria Secret.
3	THE COURT: Victoria Secrets, okay. And do we have the
4	same credit for time served, or is there a different amount?
5	MS. NGUYEN: I believe it's the same, 353.
6	MS. GETLER: That is correct.
7	THE COURT: Okay. That's the order. All right. Thank you,
8	ma'am.
9	DEFENDANT BROWN: Uh-huh.
10	THE COURT: Okay. We're going to handle the Fink matter
11	MS. NGUYEN: Thanks, everyone.
12	THE COURT: Thank you. Mr. Gill, we're finally here.
13	MR. GILL: We're here, Judge. Thank you.
14	THE COURT: Okay. Mark Fink. Mr. Fink is
15	MR. GILL: And he's present at the podium, Judge.
16	THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Fink, is hereby adjudged guilty to
17	conspiracy to commit robbery. Argument by the State?
18	MS. GETLER: No, Your Honor.
19	THE COURT: All right. Mr. Fink, do you have anything to say
20	before I sentence you?
21	DEFENDANT FINK: Yes, Your Honor. First, I just want to
22	own my mistake even though it was a it was a terrible one, drug-
23	induced one, but, it still is my mistake. And I just want to ask Your
24	Honor if, you know, I just had a little girl. She was born on the 12 th . And
25	I just want to if I could get a shot at probation. Just one chance is all I

5

6

7

8

9 10

11

13

12

15

14

16

17 18

19

20 21

22

23

24 25 need to prove to everyone that I will make no mistakes like this again. I just want to be out there for my daughter, Your Honor. I don't have no interest in any kind of bad mistakes or decisions like I previously was on, and I apologize to anyone that I affected by the mistakes I did make. That's it.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you, Mr. Fink. Mr. Gill.

MR. GILL: Yes, Your Honor. And sometimes it does take something like having a child to realize that you need to end -- end your ways and end the people that you hang out with. And I think that, along with the drug use at the time, is a combination of what -- what led Mark down this path.

He is somebody, Judge, who has been incredibly remorsefully and realizes what he has done, and what he could have done and what could have happened and what he put these people through. And he does have a job lined up for him at Marcos' detailing.

He'll also be living with his stepmother and brother at their home, and they're willing to provide any financial support that he might need above and beyond his car detailing job.

Now we are looking for a probationary grant here, Judge. And I think with the 1 to 6, you know, make Mr. Fink true to his word. If he's telling the Court today that he only needs one chance, give him that one chance to spend the max. He's a -- he was borderline candidate for probation. He has -- this will be his first felony conviction. He does have, I think, a couple of misdemeanors. And the Henderson's case was ultimately dismissed, or he did some time on it, and it was closed

Ü

and dismissed, Judge. So the misdemeanors that he -- he's got those other two misdemeanor cases.

And then again, this is his first -- first felony, and it's going to stick obviously as a felony. There's no drop down. There's no help in that regard. So, again, Judge, make him be that man and stick to his word. If he's serious, he does have the baby who was born a few days early, six days ago. He would obviously like to get home take care of mom, who is Ms. Gonzalez. I think she's set for sentencing on this case. She's one of the co-Defendants on July 14th, if my memory serves. So whatever order that the Court gives, I would ask that there be contact, because they do have the child in common.

And again, Judge, I do think a probationary grant here is appropriate with the max underlying and zero chances, just like Mr. Fink said. He doesn't need but one, and he will take advantage of it.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you. Sir, particularly concerning to me it's alleged here you're the one who pointed the BB gun or the firearm at the clerk; is that correct?

DEFENDANT FINK: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Sir, are you going to comply with all the conditions of probation if I take a chance on you? You understand P&P recommending prison for you?

DEFENDANT FINK: I do, Your Honor. And I will comply with everything.

THE COURT: Court's going to sentence you to confinement in Nevada Department of Corrections for a maximum term of 72 months,

minimum term 28 months. I'm going to suspend that sentence and place you on probation for a period not to exceed 3 years.

Besides all standard probation conditions, you have the following special conditions: comply with the imposed curfew, provide access to all your electronic devices, ordered to turn over the pass codes to those devices, not to have any contact or association with your co-Defendants in this matter.

Within 30 days from your release from custody, you're to obtain a control substance evaluation and enter a counseling program as deemed appropriate. If you're not working at least 30 hours per week, enter and complete a job search program. And during that time frame perform 15 hours of community service every month. You're not to enter any of the premises -- the victim's premises during the term of your probation, period. You're to pay restitution in amount of \$1,769.66 joint and severely. Who was that victim? Is that the Big 5?

MS. GETLER: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: The Big 5. You are ordered to pay \$25

Administrative Assessment Fee, \$3 DNA Collection Fee, \$150 DNA Fee, submit to DNA Testing, 250 to the Indigent Defense Fund.

Mr. Gill, how much credit does he have?

MR. GILL: I calculate 113 through today, Your Honor.

THE COURT: State, do you agree?

MS. GETLER: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. 113 days credit for time served. Sir, within 24 hours of your release from custody, you're to go down to the

Department of Parole and Probation and sign up with your officer.

Sir, these are very serious charges. The Probation

Department recommended to me that I send you to prison, and usually when someone is involving a firearm, you go to prison. But because of your age or lack of record, I'm giving you a chance here. Don't make your family look bad. Don't make me look bad, okay? Prove to yourself --

DEFENDANT FINK: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: -- even for your child that you're going to be a good productive citizen in our community. All right. If you have issues, you call your attorney, Mr. Gill. You speak to your probation officer. You probably heard other people getting revoked. Every single calendar there's always someone getting revoked. I'm taking a real chance on you, sir. Please comply, okay?

DEFENDANT FINK: I will. Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Good luck to you, sir.

MR. GILL: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you.

[Proceeding concluded at 11:15 a.m.]

* * * * * *

ATTEST: I do hereby certify that I have truly and correctly transcribed the audio/video proceedings in the above-entitled case to the best of my ability.

Deloris Scott

Court Recorder/Transcriber

write tre

Electronically Filed 6/22/2020 7:24 AM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT

JOCP 2 3 4 5 6 DISTRICT COURT 7 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 8 9 THE STATE OF NEVADA, 10 Plaintiff, 11 CASE NO. C-19-344112-3 12 -VS-DEPT. NO. XVII 13 LEQUANA BROWN aka Lequana Leatrice Brown #2651822 15 16 Defendant. 17 18 JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION 19 (PLEA OF GUILTY) 20 21

The Defendant previously appeared before the Court with counsel and entered a plea of guilty to the crime of ROBBERY WITH USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON (Category B Felony) in violation of NRS 200.380, 193.165; thereafter, on the 18th day of June, 2020, the Defendant was present in court for sentencing with counsel ROCHELLE NGUYEN, ESQ.,

Case Number: C-19-344112-3

☐ Nolle Prosequi (before trial)	Bench (Non-Jury) Trial
☐ Dismissed (after diversion)	Dismisses (during (rial)
☐ Dismissed (before trial)	☐ Acquittal
M Guilty Plea with Sent (before trial)	Guilty Plea with Sent. (during trial)
☐ Transferred (before/during trial)	☐ Conviction
Other Manner of Disposition	

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

and good cause appearing,

THE DEFENDANT IS HEREBY ADJUDGED guilty of said offense and, in addition to the \$25.00 Administrative Assessment Fee, \$250.00 Indigent Defense Civil Assessment Fee, \$1,769.66 Restitution payable to Big 5, jointly and severally with Co-Defendants Mark Fink and Sarah Gonzalez and \$150.00 DNA Analysis Fee including testing to determine genetic markers plus \$3.00 DNA Collection Fee, the Defendant is sentenced to the Nevada Department of Corrections (NDC) as follows: a MAXIMUM of FIVE (5) YEARS with a MINIMUM parole eligibility of TWO (2) YEARS plus a CONSECUTIVE term of a MAXIMUM of FIVE (5) YEARS with a MINIMUM parole eligibility of TWO (2) YEARS for the Use of a Deadly Weapon; with THREE HUNDRED FIFTY-EIGHT (358) DAYS credit for time served.

DATED this _____ day of June, 2020

MICHAEL VILLANI DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

Mun 1V

FILED

OCT 2 9 2020

FLORENCE MCCLURE WOMENS CORRECTIONAL CENTER 4370 Smiley Road Las Vegas, NV 89115

1

2

4		
5	IN THE STATE OF NEVADA	
6	In and for the COUNTY OF CLARK	
7	LeQuana Brown	
8	DI AINTIGE (DETITIONED	
9	THE SIME OF NEVADA,	
10	DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT	
11	A-20-823908-W PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS Dept.17	
12	(POST-CONVICTION)	1.
13	1. Name of the institution and county in which you are presently imprisoned or where and how you are	
14	presently restrained of your liberty: $FMWCC$	
15	2. Name and location of the court which entered the judgment of conviction under attack:	
16	8TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVAD	A
17	IN THE COUNTY OF CLARK	
18	3. Date of Judgment of Conviction: 7-17-2020	
19	4. Case Number: C-19-344112-3	
20	5. Length of sentence: 8TO 20 YEARS	
21	If sentence is death, state any date upon which execution is scheduled:	
22	6. Are you presently serving a sentence for a conviction other than the conviction under attack in this	
23	motion? YES NOX. If "YES", list the crime(s), case number(s) and sentence(s) being served a	t
24	this time:	_
25	Chark of 194 Chark.	-
26	7. Nature of offense involved in conviction being challenged: RODDERY WITH USE OF	-
27	DEADLY WEARUN	-

AA 0268

8.	What was your plea? (check one)
	a) Not guilty b) Guilty X c) Guilty but mentally ill (d) Nolo contendere
9.	If you entered a plea of guilty or guilty but mentally ill to one count of an indictment or information, and a plea of not guilty to another count of an indictment or information, or if a plea of guilty or guilty but mentally ill was negotiated, give details:
10.	If you were found guilty after a plea of not guilty, was the finding made by (check one):
	a) JURY (b) JUDGE WITHOUT A JURY NO
11.	Did you testify at the trial? YES NO NO
12.	Did you appeal from the judgment of conviction? YES NO NO
13.	If you do appeal, answer the following:
	(a) Name of Court:
	(b) Case Number/Citation:
	(c) Result:
	(d) Date of Result:
	** ATTACH A COPY OF ORDER/REMITTITUR/DECISION, IF AVAILABLE **
14.	If you DID NOT appeal, explain briefly why: PLEA GUILTY
15.	Other than a direct appeal from a judgment of conviction/ sentence, have you previously filed any petitions, applications or motions with respect to this judgment in state or federal court? YESNO

17.	SEC	OND PETITION FILED/APPLICATION/MOTION (if filed):
	(a)	Name of Court:
	(b)	Type of proceeding:
	(c)	Grounds raised:
	(d)	Did you receive an evidentiary hearing? YESNO
		Result of hearing: Date of result:
		Citations of any written opinion, date of orders entered pursuant to result (if known):
18.	тні	RD/SUBSEQUENT PETITIONS – list same information as in # 17 on separate sheet and attach.
19.		you appeal to the highest state or federal court having jurisdiction, the result or action taken on any ition, application or motion?
	1)	First petition, application, or motion? YES NO
	2)	Second petition, application, or motion? YES NO NO NO
	3)	Third petition, application or motion? YES NO NO Citation or date of decision:
	4)	IF YOU DID NOT APPEAL from the adverse action on any petition, application or motion, explain briefly why you did not. (You must relate specific facts in response to this question. Your response may be included on paper which is 8 ½ x 11 inches, attached to this petition. Your response may not exceed five (5) handwritten or typewritten pages in length).
		PLEA GUILTY
20.		s any ground being raised in this petition been previously presented to this or any other court by way petition for habeas corpus, motion, application or any other post-conviction proceeding? If so, identify
		Which of the grounds is the same:
		Proceedings in which these grounds were raised:
	qu	Briefly explain why you are raising these grounds. (You must relate specific facts in response to this estion. Your response may be included on paper which is 8 ½ x 11 inches, attached to this petition. our response may not exceed five (5) handwritten or typewritten pages in length).
	_	
	_	

21.	21. If any of the grounds listed in this petition, OR listed on any additional pages you have attack NOT previously presented in any other state court or federal court, list briefly what ground/presented, and give your reasons for not presenting them. (You must relate specific facts in this question. Your response may be included on paper which is 8 ½ x 11 inches, attached to Your response may not exceed five (5) handwritten or typewritten pages in length).		
	N/A		
22.	Are you filing this petition more than ONE (1) YEAR following the filing of the judgment of conviction or the filing of a decision on Direct Appeal? If so, state briefly the reasons for the delay. (You must relate specific facts in response to this question. Your response may be included on paper which is 8 ½ x 11 inches, attached to this petition. Your response may not exceed five (5) handwritten or typewritten pages in length).		
23.	Do you have any petition or appeal now pending in any state court or federal court as to the judgment under attack? YES NO		
24.	Give the name of EACH/EVERY attorney who represented you in the proceeding resulting in your conviction and on direct appeal: CARL E. ARONALD RUCHELLE NYUGURE		
	ROCHETTE MYUJUNE		
25.	Do you have any future sentences to serve after you complete the sentence imposed by the judgment under attack? YES NO		
26.	State concisely EVERY ground on which you claim that you are being held unlawfully. Summarize briefly the facts supporting each ground. If necessary, you may attach pages stating grounds and the facts supporting each ground.		
	A. GROUND ONE: SEE ATT'.		
	SUPPORTING FACTS: (Tell your story briefly, without citing cases or law)		

В.	GROUND TWO:
	SUPPORTING FACTS: (Tell your story briefly, without citing cases or law)
C.	GROUND THREE: SEE ATTIVITYS!
	SUPPORTING FACTS: (Tell your story briefly, without citing cases or law)
D.	GROUND FOUR:
	SUPPORTING FACTS: (Tell your story briefly, without citing cases or law)
etitioner a	sks that this court grant Petitioner relief to which s/he may be entitled in this proceeding.
	Dated this 25 day of 10 ptum 2020
	Respectfully submitted,
	Signature, Pro Se Litigant
	Print Name
	# 1235379

GROUND (continued)

I allege that my state court conviction and/or sentence are unconstitutional, in violation of my mendment Right to INSELECTION (USEL based on these facts:

Page ______ At A 0273

GROUND COMMUNE (continued)

GROUND COUNTY (continued)

I allege that my state court conviction and/or sentence are unconstitutional, in violation of my , based on these facts: Amendment Right to

GROUND CONTINUE. (continued)

1

2	(continued)
3	l allege that my state court conviction and/or sentence are unconstitutional, in violation of my, based on these facts:
4	AC NEMED MONEY WATERMANN WAS WENT ON
5	INTELL TIPE COURT ADDA TO THE PINE COLOR OF
6	THILL IN COULD INFO IN THE TO A STATE OF
7	AND SHE WO DID NOT FAME TIME TO GO OVER
8	my CASE THEY HOLD HER GET Cargnt
9	up and she told me to take the
10	Ple Deal AND IDID I was scared
11	And Bribe THIS MATTER NEEDS TO BE
12	Cockeel INTO
13	THANK YOU
14	
15	under VI Amendmen Course/ Failed
16	
17	my Rights Counsel become INEFFECTIVE
18	Comsel.
19	
20	
21	
22	
23	
24	
25	
26	
27	
28	
	Page 4 A/A 0276

GROUND 2

1	Petitioner alleges violation of the 5 Amendment Rights with regard
2	to DVF PRUVESS based on these facts:
3	
4	according NRS 34.724 PERSON WHO may File petition
5	"CHALLENGE TO VAILDITY OF GUILTY PLEA"
6	THE SUPPEME COUR WILL NO LONGER PERMIT A DEFENDANT TO
7	CHALLENGE THE VALIDITY OF A GUILTY PLEA ON DIRECT APPEAL
8	FROM THE Judgment OF Conviction; INSTEAD A DEFENDANT
9	MUST RISE A CHALLENGE TO THE VALIDITY OF HIS GUITY
10	PLEA IN THE DISTRICT COURT IN THE INSTANCE, FITHER BY
11	BRINGING A MOTTON TO WITHDRAW THE GUILTY PLFAS
12	OR BY INITIATING A PUST CONICTION PROCEEDING
13	UNDER NRS 34.360 OR THIS SECTION.
14	
15	NOWET NO VILLE MARK FUNKS EAKEND VINE MAN WENT 101
16	PHYCKS MY VOODS FENTAND WAR
17	I HAD WENT TO GO CHILL WITH SARAH CONCEALS AND
18	HER SON TOLD METHAT SHE WAS GONE WITH
19	MARK FINKS SO I HAD CAUED HER PHONE AND SHE
20	TOLD ME WHERE SHE WAS AND TOLD ME TO PAYER
21	MY CARD AND HER PLACE AND HER'S FINKS WILL
22	COME AND PICK ME UP WHICH THEY DID AND
23	THEN ME WENT TO PICK MY BUY FRIEND UP
24	AND THEN WE WENT TO TAKE BELL AS WE
25	WERE EATING WENTRE TALK ABOUT GOING
26	CAMPING WE HAD DEEN GETTING PREPAIRED
27	FOR I MONTH 1/2 SO THAT DAY WE WENT TO GO EAT
28	AT TACO MELL AND AFTER WE WERE DONE WE

Page ____ of ___ AA 0277

GROUND Q

1	Petitioner alleges violation of the Amendment Rights with regard	
	NIE DIZICES	
2	TO DUL 1700C33 based on these facts: WE NITCE THAT IT WAS A BIG 5 SPIRTING GOOD STORE	
3	80 WE WENT THERE TO SHOP WE HAD NO INTENT TO STEAL	
4		
5	ANYTHING WE WERE IN THE STORE SHOPPING SEPARALY	
6	MITH WE WERE DONE THEN WE GOTH WENT 10 THE	
7	CHEACK OUT STAND AND SARAH CONZALES TOLD THE	
8	STORE CLARK TO RING EVERYTHING UP TOGETHER	
9	ASTHE STORE CLARK WAS DUING THAT SARAH STARED	
10	TO TAKE EVERYTHING OUT TO THE CAR AS THE CLAR	K
11	TOLD HER NOT TO DO THAT UNTILL EVERYTING WAS	
12	PAID FOR SHE WENT OUT THE STIRE AND WENT AM)
13	COT HER BUY FRIEND THEN THEY STARD TAKING	
14	BAGS OUT OF THE STORED THEN I WENT OUT OF	
15	THE STORE AS I WAS TRYING TO GET IN THE CAR	P
16	THE MANGER FROM THE STOPE SLANED THE CAR	
17	DUZR3PUSHED ME AND TOLD ME TU COME PAY	1
18	FOR THE MERCHOISE AT THE TIME WHEN THE MANGER	1
19	PUSHED ME AND I FELD ON THE MOUSE GROUND	
20	THAT'S WHEN MARK FINK PULLED OUT THE BBGIN	1
21	AND TOLD THE MANCER TO MOVE AWAY FROM	
22	HIS CAR AND WHEN THE GLY MOVED AWAY IN	
23	THEN GOT IN AND WE LEFT I TOLD HIM TO CE.	-
24	ME NOT AND HE SAID THAT HE WAS NOT STOPIN	C
25	THE CAR UN I AM ABOUT TO DUEST YOU CIFE PO	
26	YOUN CAR	
27		
28		

Page 1 of 4

	GROUND_3
	XIV
1	Petitioner alleges violation of the VIII Amendment Rights with regard to Centel Of IVE FIVE
2	to Cemeelative Evror based on these facts:
3	- Jumy believes till the wallty of
4	errors as stated on my Habers Corpes
5	petition Due to the complexity of this case
6	and the gravity of the sentence on
7	the Interest of Sudicial economey,
8	and Juda mental faircess I Request
9	an evidentiary hearing and
10	appointment of proper, realors and
11	Comperlu couseil
12	
13	
14	
15	
16	
17	
18	
19	
20	
21	
22	
23	
24	
25	•
26	
27	
28	
	1 ,
	Page of
	AA 0279

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

- 1	CERTIFICATE OF MAIDING
2	STATE OF NEVADA COUNTY OF CLARK
3	/) I am the Plaintiff/Petitioner Defendant/Respondent
4	Tellianc Brown for case No: C-19-3-14112-3.
5	On this day of, 20, I mailed a copy of the
6	
7	Following document(s): MOTION TO WITHDRAW COUNSEL
8	2. MOTION APPOINMENT OF COUSEL
9	3. PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CURPUS
10	4. INFORMA PAUPERIS
11	5. FINACUE CERIFICT #5
12	By United States First Class Mail, to the following addresses:
13	1. CLERK OF COURT 2. ATTORNEY Coneral
14	8th Judicial District 100 N. Carson ST
15	2001-cuisave Carson City, NV 8970
16	LAS VEGAS NV 89155
17	3
18	3
19	
20	
21	
22	
23	Dated this 25 day of Sulland, 2020.
24	Respect Jully sugmitted,
25	Lellan Pr
26	Signature Signature
27	Printed Name
28	
	II

RECEIVED

Page 1 of 2

DECLARATION UNDER PENALTY OF PERJURY

I, the undersigned, understand that a false statement or answer to any question in this declaration will subject me to penalties of perjury.

I declare, under the penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of America, that the above and/or foregoing information is accurate, correct and true to the best of my knowledge, executed within the terms of ¹NRS 171.102 and ²NRS 408.165. See ³28 U.S.C. 1746 and 18 U.S.C. 1621.

Dated this 25 day of A

_,20<u>x</u>0 #1732378

Nevada Department of Corrections ID #

¹ NRS 171.102

² NRS 208.165

^{3 28} U.S.C.

^{\$1746.} Unsworn declarations under penalty of perjury 18 U.S.C.

^{§ 1621.} Perjury generally

LEQUANA PORDUN #12359928
4270 Smiley Road
Las Vecjas NV, 89115

5.30% \$2 18/5: 255

Contidential
Segal mail



ZIP 89101 011E12650516

CLERK OF COURT 8th Judicial District 200 Lewis AVE LAS Vegas NV, 89155

A-20-823908-W Dept.17

FILED

28

- 1	
1	Florence McClure Women's Correctional Center 4370 Smiley Rd.
2	Las Vegas, NV 89115
3	In the Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada
4	In and for the County of CARK
5	In the matter of:
6	Flaintiff/Petitioner) Case No: C-19-344112-3
7	"THE STATE OF NEVAOA) Dept No.: XVII
8	Defendant/Respondent
9	MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL
10	COMES NOW Petitioner, LAWANA DROWN, In Proper
11	Person and hereby moves this Honorable Court for an order to Appoint Counsel
12	in the above-entitled action, pursuant to NRS 34.720, with the Fundamental
13	Provisions of Art. I., Sec.'s 8 and 10, of the Nevada Constitution, and the
14	U.S. 1 st Amendment (Right to Petition for the Redress of Constitutional
15	Grievances), and the U.S. 14 th Amendment (Right to Due Process Clause)in the
16	Constitution of these United States.
17	This Motion is made and based upon all papers, pleadings, and exhibits
18	within Court records, the Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis and upon
19	Oral Arguments, if this Court deems it proper and necessary for the
20	disposition of the instant Motion.
21	
22	Dated this 25 day of Soptember , 2020
23	Respectfully submitted,
24	
25	Lelliandown
26	Signature
27	Print Name

GOT 19 TOP

CLERK OF THE LOUSE AA 0284

DECLARATION UNDER PENALTY OF PERJURY

I, the undersigned, understand that a false statement or answer to any question in this declaration will subject me to penalties of perjury.

I declare, under the penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of America, that the above and/or foregoing information is accurate, correct and true to the best of my knowledge, executed within the terms of ¹NRS 171.102 and ²NRS 208.165. See ³28 U.S.C. 1746 and 18 U.S.C. 1621.

Dated this 25 day of Apple 20 20

Signature 1235328

Nevada Department of Corrections ID Number

(Added to NRS by 1985, 1643)

§1746. Unsworn declarations under penalty of perjury

Wherever, under any law of the United States or under any rule, regulation, order, or requirement made pursuant to law, any matter is required or permitted to be supported, evidenced, established, or proved by the sworn declaration, verification, certificate, statement, oath, or affidavit, in writing of the person making the same (other than a deposition, or an oath of office, or an oath required to be taken before a specified official ather than a notary public), such matter may, with like force and effect, be supported, evidenced, established, or proved by the unsworn declaration, certificate, verification, or statement, in writing of such person which is subscribed by him, as true under penalty of perjury, and dated, in substantially the following form:

(1) If executed without the United States: "I declare (or certify, verify, or state) under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of America that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on (date). (Signature)".

(2) If executed within the United States, its territories, possessions, or commonwealths: "I declare (or certify, verify, or state) under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed an (date).(Signature)". (Added Pub. L. 94–550, §1(a), Oct. 18, 1976, 90 Stat. 2534.)

PRIOR PROVISIONS

A prior section 1746 was renumbered section 1745 of this title.

§ 1621. Perjury generally

Whoever-

(1) having taken an oath before a competent tribunal, officer, or person, in ony case in which a law of the United States authorizes an oath ta be administered, that he will testify, declare, depose, or certify truly, or that any written testimony, declaration, deposition, or certificate by him subscribed, is true, willfully and contrary to such oath states or subscribes any material matter which he does not believe to be true; or

(2) in any declaration, certificate, verification, or statement under penalty of perjury as permitted under section 1746 of title 28, United States Code, willfully subscribes as true any material matter which he does not believe to be true; is guilty of perjury and shall, except as otherwise expressly provided by law, be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both. This section is applicable whether the statement or subscription is made within or without the United States.

(June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 773; Pub. L. 88-619,§ 1, Oct. 3, 1964, 78 Stat. 995; Pub. L. 94-550, § 2,Oct. 18, 1976, 90 Stot. 2534; Pub. L. 103-322, title

XXXIII, § 330016(1)(I), Sept. 13, 1994, 108 Stat.2147.)

¹ NRS 171.102 Complaint defined; oath or declaration required. The complaint is a written statement of the essential facts constituting the public offense charged. It must be made upon:

^{1.} Oath before a magistrate or a notary public; or

Declaration which is made subject to the penalty for perjury. (Added to NRS by 1967, 1400; A 1969, 387; 1983, 446)

NRS 208.165 Execution of instrument by prisoner. A prisoner may execute any instrument by signing his or her name immediately following a declaration "under penalty of perjury" with the same legal effect as if he or she had acknowledged it or sworn to its truth before a person authorized to administer oaths. As used in this this section, "prisoner" means a person confined in any jail or prison, or any facility for the detention of juvenile offenders, in this state.

³ 28 U.S.C.

Florence McClure Women's Correctional Center 4370 Smiley Rd. 2 Las Vegas, NV 89115 3 The _____ Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada
In and for the County of _____ (LARK) In the matter of: 5 Case No: (-19-344112-3 6 Dept No.: XVII Defendant/Respondent 8 9 AFFIDAVIT 10 STATE OF NEVADA COUNTY OF CARK 11 12 1. I am the A Plaintiff/Petitioner Defendant/Respondent in the above entitled action. I have personal knowledge of the facts contained 13 in the above-entitled case and am competent to testify to these 14 2. My personal knowledge or personal observations of the situation is/are as follows: 15 HAVE IPPEN CALLING MY LAWYER ROCKELLE, AND 16 17 TOUCH WITH HER LEVEN 18 PACKER WARK THRAIC 19 20 TIRST APPOINTED TO 21 IN A MOTTON TO DISMISS COUNSEL. DUE TO ALUT 22 THE DUCKWENT SO YOU COULD READ WHAT'S PREEN THLEI). 23 EY APPUINTED ME NEW COUNSEL. ROCHELL 24 25 UP WERE HE NOW SHE HAD TO PICK SHE DIONE HAVE TIME TO LOOK 26 10 TAKETHE 27 WE 28 WAS MISSLEAD AS WELL REAL ROAD AND SUCH STORY NOTICE. I'AM ASKING TO BE Apprinted age 1 of 2 NUNCOUNSEL. DUE TO THE FATCH I HAVE BEEN REACHING OUT TO Pachelle Nyquite morning, NOON, Night Just as MY Family Has

I thave yet recived the paper work That I'vE REGUES AA DREGE

1	INSUFFICING TO MIE AND MY CASE. WHEN I UIT) TACK TO
2	HOR SHE TOW ME THAT SHE WOULD GET THE Documents
3	TO ME THAT HAS BEEN OVER A MORTH NO WOULDING
4	NO RESORN, NO DISCOVERY, NO COMMUCATION, NO Answ
5],
6	
7	
8	
9	
10	
11	Dated this 25 day of September, 2020.
12	Respectfully submitted,
13	Signature
14	LEPON PUNCH BYCHM
15	Printed Name
16	DECLARATION UNDER PENALTY OF PERJURY
17	I, the undersigned, understand that a false statement or answer to any question in this declaration will subject me to penalties of perjury.
18	I declare, under the penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of America, that the above and/or foregoing information is accurate, correct and true to the best of my knowledge, executed
19	within the terms of NRS 171.102 and 2NRS 208.165. See 328 U.S.C. 1746 and 18 U.S.C. 1621.
20	Dated this 25 day of September 20 20
21	Signature 125329 Nevada Department of Corrections ID #
22	Nevada Department of Corrections ID #
23	
24	
25	
26	¹ NRS 171.102 ² NRS 208.165
27	3 28 U.S.C. \$1746. Unsworn declarations under penalty of perjury 18 U.S.C.
28	§ 1621. Perjury generally

A-20-823908-W Dept.17

FILED

OCT 2 9 2020

lor	ence	McClu	re Women	's	Correctional	center
1370) Smil	ey Rd	•			
as	Vegas	, NV	89115			

2	4370 Smiley Rd. Las Vegas, NV 89115
3	In the
4	In and for the County of CLARK
5	In the matter of:
6	Plaintiff/Petitioner) Case No: C-19-344112-3
7	v. THE STATE OF MEADA Dept No.: XVII
8	Defendant/Respondent
9	MOTION TO WITHDRAW COUNSEL
10	COMES NOW Defendant, HOMAN DROWN, In Proper
11	Person and hereby moves this Honorable Court for an ORDER granting her
12	permission to withdraw her present counsel of record in the proceeding
13	action.
14	This Motion is made and based upon all papers, pleadings, and exhibits
15	on file with the Court which are hereby incorporated by this reference, the
16	Points and Authorities herein, and attached Affidavit of Defendant.
17	
18	Dated this 25 day of September, 2020
19	
20	Respectfully submitted,
21	\mathcal{L}_{n}
22	Signature Signature
23	140 nm BROUN
24	Print Name
25	
26	
27	RECEIVED
28	Figure 4 Conner

OCT 19 2020 Digos da pel bollor

POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

NRS 7.055 states in pertinent part:

- 1. An attorney who has been discharged by his client shall upon demand and payment of the fee due from the client, immediately deliver to the client all papers, documents, pleadings and items of tangible personal property which belong to or were prepared for that client.
- 2. ...If the court finds that an attorney has, without just cause, refused or neglected to obey its order given under this section, the court may, after notice and fine or imprison him until contempt purged. If the Court finds that the attorney has, without just cause, withheld the client's papers, documents, pleadings, or other property, the attorney is liable for costs and attorney's fees.

Counsel in the above-entitled case was court-appointed due to Defendant's indigence. Defendant does not owe counsel any fees.

WHEREFORE, Defendant prays this Honorable Court, GRANT her Motion to Withdraw Counsel and that counsel deliver Defendant all papers, documents, pleadings, discovery and any other tangible property which belong to or were prepared for the Defendant to allow Defendant the proper assistance that is needed to insure that justice is served.

Dated this 25 day of September , 2020

Respectfully submitted,

Signature

IIINIY

Print Name

	• ,	
1	Florence McClure Women's Correctional Center	
2	4370 Smiley Rd. Las Vegas, NV 89115	
. 3	In The Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada In and for the County of	
- 1	In the matter of:	
5	FOUNDA BROWN) Case No: C-19-344112-3	
7	THE STATE OF NEVADA Defendant/Respondent Dept No.: XVII	
9		
	AFFIDAVIT	
10	STATE OF NEVADA)	
1 1	COUNTY OF CLARK)	
12 13	1. I am the A Plaintiff/Petitioner D Defendant/Respondent in the above entitled action. I have personal knowledge of the facts contained	
14	in the above-entitled case and am competent to testify to these facts.	
15	2. My personal knowledge or personal observations of the situation is/are as follows:	
16	I HAVE MEEN CALLING MY LAWYER ROCHELLE NYGUROL	
17	MARNING NOON AND NIGHT JUST AS WELLAS MY FAMILY	Y
18	I HAVE NOT YET TAUK TO HER I'VE ALSO SEND	,
19	DOCUMENTS TELL HER THAT I WED MY DICOURCY	
20	MIUNTE URDER AND TRANSCRIPTS AND AUTHE FOOTA	LE .
21	WHICH THAT PUT MY COSE I THINK ON HOUD AND	
22	THAT MAKE HER IN SUFFICIAL ROCHELLE TOOKING	
23	CASE AFTER CAROL AVENAUD WAS DISSMISSED AND HAY)	ł
24	TO PICK UP WERE HE WAT OFF SO WEDIO NOT	
25	CET CALGUT UP ON THINGS MAN I HAVE ONLY TALK TO)
26	Recordle ONCE AND WHEN I DID TALK TO HER SHE TO	()
27	METHAT SHE WOULD GET Everithing wail at	
28	to pre and still howert there is no comme	cotio
	Line open at all. Page 1 of 2	

1	Rochell told ME THAT SHE HAD TO PICK UP WERE	E
2	MY OLD LAWYER I FAT UFF YES SHE DID.	
3	Examp things to me I felt like she didn't	-
4	have time to co over just case AND DUE.	
5	O an-19 LAKE OF TIMENDAS WELL COMMORAS	i
6	I Had Fixed MY LAST ATTORNEY AND Rappelle	
7	WAS Applinged to ME SHE DIDNIT GO IVER	
8	Edvience NOT UNIT THAT SHE HAD TO GET CAUGIST UP TO	
9	Speed which I feel like off stould Had tok Her	(
10	Kince and push the Date back INAS NOT NEVER CO	1
11	With the deal que to the fact I never that & mepon Dated this 25 day of september, 2020.	
12	Respectfully submitted,	
13	Te Clarke	
14	1 and 1000 1000	
15	Printed Name	
16	DEGLAR (TION LINE DE DEN LA TION OF DED WINN	
17	DECLARATION UNDER PENALTY OF PERJURY I, the undersigned, understand that a false statement or answer to any question in this declaration will	
18	subject me to penalties of perjury. I declare, under the penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of America,	
19	that the above and/or foregoing information is accurate, correct and true to the best of my knowledge, executed within the terms of ¹ NRS 171.102 and ² NRS 208.165. See ³ 28 U.S.C. 1746 and 18 U.S.C. 1621.	
20	Dated this 25 day of September 202020	
21/	Lellane 1235328	
22	Nevada Department of Corrections ID #	
23		
24		
25		
26	¹ NRS 171.102 ² NRS 208.165	
27	3 28 U.S.C. \$1746. Unsworn declarations under penalty of perjury	
28	18 U.S.C. § 1621. Perjury generally	

Electronically Filed 11/03/2020 9:13 AM CLERK OF THE COUR

PPOW

DISTRIC	CT COURT
CLARK COU	NTY, NEVADA
Lequana Brown,	
Petitioner,	Case No: A-20-823908-W
vs.	Department 17
State of Nevada,	ORDER FOR PETITION FOR
Respondent,	WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habea	as Corpus (Post-Conviction Relief) on
October 29, 2020. The Court has reviewed the Peti	tion and has determined that a response would assist
the Court in determining whether Petitioner is illega	ally imprisoned and restrained of his/her liberty, and
good cause appearing therefore,	
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Respond	lent shall, within 45 days after the date of this Order,
answer or otherwise respond to the Petition and file	a return in accordance with the provisions of NRS
34.360 to 34.830, inclusive.	
IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED	that this matter shall be placed on this Court's
Calendar on the day of	, 20, at the hour of
o'clock for further proceedings.	
1	Dated this 3rd day of November, 2020
	Mun 1V
	strict Court Judge 8DA DB4 861E 83B6 Michael Villani District Court Judge

-1-

Electronically Filed
12/17/2020 1:35 PM
Steven D. Grierson
CLERK OF THE COURT

1 **RSPN** STEVEN B. WOLFSON 2 Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #001565 3 JOHN NIMAN Deputy District Attorney 4 Nevada Bar #14408 200 Lewis Avenue 5 Las Vegas, Nevada 89155-2212 (702) 671-2500 6 Attorney for Plaintiff

> DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

LEQUANA BROWN, aka, Lequana Leatrice Brown, #2651822

Petitioner,

Respondent.

CASE NO:

A-20-823908-W

-VS-

C-19-344112-3

THE STATE OF NEVADA,

DEPT NO:

XVII

14

15

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

16 17

18

19

2021

23

24

22

2526

27

28

STATE'S RESPONSE TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS (POST-CONVICTION) and MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL

DATE OF HEARING: February 5, 2021 TIME OF HEARING: 10:00 AM

COMES NOW, the State of Nevada, by STEVEN B. WOLFSON, Clark County District Attorney, through JOHN NIMAN, Deputy District Attorney, and hereby submits the attached Points and Authorities in Response to Petitioner's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and the accompanying Motion for Appointment of Counsel.

This Response and Motion is made and based upon all the papers and pleadings on file herein, the attached points and authorities in support hereof, and oral argument at the time of hearing, if deemed necessary by this Honorable Court.

/// ///

2

3

4

5 6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22 23

24

25

26

27

28

POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On October 17, 2019, LEQUANA BROWN, aka Lequana Leatrice Brown (hereinafter "Petitioner") was charged by way of Indictment with two (2) counts of CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT ROBBERY (Category B Felony - NRS 200.380, 199.480); two (2) counts of ROBBERY WITH USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON (Category B Felony – NRS 200.380, 193.165); two (2) counts of BURGLARY (Category B Felony – NRS 205.060); one (1) count of GRAND LARCENY (Category C Felony – NRS 205.220.1, 205.222.2); and one (1) count of OBTAINING AND USING PERSONAL IDENTIFYING INFORMATION OF ANOTHER (Category C Felony – NRS 205.463) for actions on or between June 4, 2019 and June 23, 2019. On March 12, 2020, Petitioner pled guilty, pursuant to a Guilty Plea Agreement ("GPA"), to one (1) count of ROBBERY WITH USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON. Contemporaneous with the GPA, the State filed an Amended Indictment reflecting the single count to which Petitioner pled guilty.

Pursuant to the GPA, Petitioner agreed to plead guilty to ROBBERY in a separate case, and the parties stipulated that Petitioner would receive sentences of four (4) to ten (10) years on each count, consecutive to each other.

On June 17, 2020, Petitioner executed an Amended GPA, with the amendment being that the State agreed to dismiss a separate case against Petitioner after rendition of sentence in the instant underlying case. On June 18, 2020, the Court canvassed Petitioner regarding the Amended GPA and accepted Petitioner's guilty plea. The Court thereafter sentenced Petitioner to two (2) to five (5) years in the Nevada Department of Corrections for Robbery, with a consecutive two (2) to five (5) years for Use of a Deadly Weapon. Petitioner was given three hundred fifty-eight (358) days of credit for time served. Petitioner's Judgment of Conviction was filed on June 22, 2020.

Petitioner did not file a direct appeal. On October 29, 2020, Petitioner filed the instant Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. Petitioner included in her filed Petition a Motion for Appointment of Counsel.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

The Court relied on the following facts when sentencing Petitioner:

On June 23, 2019, officers learned of the following events from the victim and other employees of Big 5. They stated the co-defendant, Sarah Gonzalez, started shopping for various clothing items. Shortly after, defendant, Lequana Brown, entered the store with a canvas shopping bag and began selecting various shoes and other items. Store employee #1 attempted to help Ms. Gonzalez; however, she stated that she did not need help. Employee #1 noted Ms. Gonzalez and Ms. Brown began interacting with each other and that they were associated with one another. Ms. Brown told the employee she just won money and was engaging in some spending. Ms. Gonzalez then came to the register where employee #2 was ringing up her transaction.

As employee #1 was ringing up Ms. Brown's items, she told employee #2 she was in a hurry and needed to have her items rung up. Ms. Gonzalez then told employee #2 to ring all the items up on the same bill so that she and Ms. Brown can check out together. As employee #2 rung up the merchandize [sic], he set the bags behind the counter to prevent either defendant from walking out of the store before paying. Ms. Brown and Ms. Gonzalez drank PowerAid that was from the stores [sic] coolers and left them unfinished at the register.

Ms. Brown told employee #3 she wanted to look at the shoes to make sure they were the right sizes. Employee #2 became suspicious and showed the shoes to her without allowing her to take control of the property. Ms. Brown complained and requested employee #1 finish the transaction. As employee #1 began reringing all the items, the bags were set on the counter. Prior to the items being paid for, Ms. Gonzalez told him she also wanted to buy a pellet gun and the items were brought back inside Big 5. An additional co-defendant, identified as Mark Anthony Fink, aka, Mark Anthony Finks Jr, entered the store following Ms. Gonzalez and the victim. He then asked the victim if he could look at the pellet/BB guns. The victim and employee #2 showed Mr. Finks some of the guns until he chose a display model. Employee #2 put the gun and pellets into a plastic bag and the victim took the items to the register.

Once at the register, Mr. Finks and Ms. Gonzalez gathered a few items that were rung up and exited the store, without paying, with Ms. Brown following behind them. The victim yelled at the defendant to stop; however, Ms. Brown threw a debit card, that was not in her name, at him saying "here take this. [sic] The victim saw the defendants in a vehicle along with a fourth person. The victim attempted to retrieve one of the bags of property from Ms. Brown who was in the driver's side rear passenger. Mr. Finks pulled a gun on the victim which caused him to let go and the vehicle fled. Employee #1 noted the license plate while the victim called emergency services. The officers were informed a total \$2,251.91 worth of merchandise was stolen.

During the officer's investigation, the victim provided them with surveillance and the PowerAde drink bottles that were left. One of the officers located the vehicle used and noted Mr. Fink was in the driver's seat. A second male was handing shoes to a child who was trying them on. They then saw Ms. Gonzalez enter the passenger side. While they were arresting Ms. Gonzalez, she stated she had a gun in her bra and that Ms. Brown was in apartment 311. Additionally, officers observed Big 5 bags in the vehicle. The officers were able to recover \$481.34 worth of merchandise.

Officers went up to the third floor to locate Ms. Brown who was in the apartment; however, she was using an alias of Mia Jones. The stolen items record, 'ered were returned to Big 5. After being transported to the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department Headquarters, Ms. Brown was interviewed. She admitted she was the person at Big 5 and knew the other defendants. She observed Ms. Gonzalez and Mr. Finks nearby and entered the vehicle to go to Big 5 due to Ms. Gonzalez stating she had coupons. Once in the store, Ms. Brown picked out several shirts and handed them to Ms. Gonzalez who then began bagging up a large amount of clothing, along with the other merchandise before proceeding past all points of entry. Ms. Brown followed Mr. Finks out of the store and the employees followed after them. Mr. Finks then pointed a handgun at the employees. She admitted she never attempted to pay for the items she gave Ms. Gonzalez, nor did she make any attempts to notify police of the crime. Additionally. Ms. Brown admitted she was involved in another robbery of a Champs store on June 4, 2019, after being shown surveillance of that incident. When the officers interviewed Mr. Finks, he admitted he pointed a gun at the victim and told him to get the fuck away from the car due to him pulling on Ms. Brown. Ms. Gonzalez stated Ms. Brown told her she could pick out whatever she wanted, and she would pay lor it. She stated she had a feeling Ms. Brown was going to use a fake check and a debit card that would not work to pay for the items. When the commotion started at the car, Ms. Gonzalez stated that Ms. Brown told Mr. Finks to just drive.

Presentence Investigation Report, at 8-9.

22 ///

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

23 1///

24 | ///

25 | ///

26 ///

27 //

28 | ///

ARGUMENT

I. THE INSTANT PETITION IS OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF HABEAS PROCEEDINGS

NRS 34.810(1) reads:

The court shall dismiss a petition if the court determines that:

(a) The petitioner's conviction was upon a plea of guilty or guilty but mentally ill, and the petition is not based upon an allegation that the plea was involuntary or unknowingly entered or that the plea was entered without effective assistance of counsel.

(Emphasis added). The Nevada Supreme Court has held that "challenges to the validity of a guilty plea and claims of ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel must first be pursued in post-conviction proceedings...[A]ll other claims that are appropriate for a direct appeal must be pursued on direct appeal, or they will be *considered waived in subsequent proceedings*." Franklin v. State, 110 Nev. 750, 752, 877 P.2d 1058, 1059 (1994) (emphasis added) (disapproved on other grounds by Thomas v. State, 115 Nev. 148, 979 P.2d 222 (1999)).

Petitioner, in the instant Petition, includes a claim regarding her relationship with plea counsel. Petition at 6-9 (erroneously labeled Pages 1-4 of 4). She also includes a vague "due process" claim. Petition at 10-11 (erroneously labeled "Page 1 of 1" and "Page 1 of 2"). Petitioner concludes with a claim of cumulative error. Petition at 12 (erroneously labeled "Page 1 of 1"). Because these claims are outside the scope of cognizable habeas review, Petitioner's claims cannot entitle Petitioner to relief.

A. Petitioner was not Entitled to a Certain Relationship with Plea Counsel

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that, "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense." The United States Supreme Court has long recognized that "the right to counsel is

the right to the effective assistance of counsel." <u>Strickland v. Washington</u>, 466 U.S. 668, 686, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2063 (1984); <u>see also State v. Love</u>, 109 Nev. 1136, 1138, 865 P.2d 322, 323 (1993).

To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, a defendant must prove she was denied "reasonably effective assistance" of counsel by satisfying the two-prong test of Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686-87, 104 S.Ct. at 2063-64; see also Love, 109 Nev. at 1138, 865 P.2d at 323. Under Strickland, a defendant must show first that her counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and second, that but for counsel's errors, there is a reasonable probability that the result of the proceedings would have been different. 466 U.S. at 687-88, 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2065, 2068; Warden, Nevada State Prison v. Lyons, 100 Nev. 430, 432, 683 P.2d 504, 505 (1984) (adopting the Strickland two-part test). "[T]here is no reason for a court deciding an ineffective assistance claim to approach the inquiry in the same order or even to address both components of the inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on one." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697, 104 S.Ct. at 2069.

The U.S. Supreme Court has clarified that a defendant is not entitled to any particular "relationship" with her attorney. <u>Morris v. Slappy</u>, 461 U.S. 1, 14, 103 S.Ct. 1610, 1617 (1983). There is no requirement for any specific amount of communication so long as counsel is reasonably effective in his representation. <u>See id.</u>

The court begins with the presumption of effectiveness and then must determine whether the defendant has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that counsel was ineffective. Means v. State, 120 Nev. 1001, 1011, 103 P.3d 25, 32 (2004). "Effective counsel does not mean errorless counsel, but rather counsel whose assistance is '[w]ithin the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases." Jackson v. Warden, 91 Nev. 430, 432, 537 P.2d 473, 474 (1975).

Even if a defendant can demonstrate that his counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, he must still demonstrate prejudice and show a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the result of the trial would have been different. McNelton v. State, 115 Nev. 396, 403, 990 P.2d 1263, 1268 (1999) (citing

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. at 2064). "A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." <u>Id.</u> (citing <u>Strickland</u>, 466 U.S. at 687-89, 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2064-65, 2068). This portion of the test is slightly modified when the convictions occurs due to a guilty plea. <u>Hill v. Lockhart</u>, 474 U.S. 52, 59, 106 S.Ct. 366, 370-71 (1985); <u>Kirksey v. State</u>, 112 Nev. 980, 988, 923 P.2d 1102, 1107 (1996). For a guilty plea, a defendant "must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial." <u>Id.</u> (quoting <u>Hill</u>, 474 U.S. at 59).

The Nevada Supreme Court has held "that a habeas corpus petitioner must prove the disputed factual allegations underlying his ineffective-assistance claim by a preponderance of the evidence." Means v. State, 120 Nev. at 1012, 103 P.3d at 33. Furthermore, claims of ineffective assistance of counsel asserted in a petition for post-conviction relief must be supported with specific factual allegations, which if true, would entitle the petitioner to relief. Hargrove v. State, 100 Nev. 498, 502, 686 P.2d 222, 225 (1984). "Bare" and "naked" allegations are not sufficient, nor are those belied and repelled by the record. 1d. NRS 34.735(6) states in relevant part, "[Petitioner] must allege specific facts supporting the claims in the petition[.]...Failure to allege specific facts rather than just conclusions may cause your petition to be dismissed." (emphasis added).

A review of Petitioner's first claim shows that Petitioner takes umbrage with first plea counsel, Mr. Carl Arnold, Esq.'s failure to respond to numerous phone calls, and his alleged failure to speak with Petitioner at various court dates. See, e.g., Petition at 6 ("I also feel that if Mr. Arnold was more commute [sic] with me this matter would have never left Justic[e] Court"). However, this claim is squarely outside the scope of habeas review, as it does not claim that Petitioner's plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered. NRS 34.810(1).

Furthermore, any allegation that Petitioner's plea was entered absent effective assistance of counsel is belied by the record. NRS 34.810(1); <u>Hargrove</u>, 100 Nev. at 502, 686 P.2d at 225. Petitioner, by executing her GPA, specifically affirmed:

I have discussed with my attorney any possible defenses, defense strategies and circumstances which might be in my favor.

All of the foregoing elements, consequences, rights, and waiver of rights have been thoroughly explained to me by my attorney.

• • •

I am signing this agreement voluntarily, after consultation with my attorney...

...

My attorney has answered all my questions regarding this guilty plea agreement and its consequences to my satisfaction and I am satisfied with the services provided by my attorney.

GPA at 5 (emphasis added).

Further, when Petitioner was canvassed regarding her first GPA, Petitioner had the following exchange with the Court:

THE COURT: If you had any questions, were they answered by Mr. Arnold? DEFENDANT BROWN: Yes.

THE COURT: Based upon all the facts and circumstances of your case, are you satisfied with the services of Mr. Arnold?

DEFENDANT BROWN: Yes.

Recorder's Transcript of Hearing: Entry of Plea, dated March 12, 2020 (filed May 5, 2020) at 18. Because Petitioner's claims regarding plea counsel are belied by the record, they cannot entitle Petitioner to relief. <u>Hargrove</u>, 100 Nev. at 502, 686 P.2d at 225.

Moreover, Petitioner concedes that Mr. Arnold was not her counsel at the time she entered her Amended GPA. See, Petition at 9 (explaining, "...the Court appointed new counsel."). Therefore, anything related to Mr. Arnold, specifically, is rendered irrelevant, as Petitioner's judgment of conviction is based on Petitioner's Amended GPA. Anything related to Petitioner's "new counsel" is vague and unsubstantiated by any reference to relevant legal authority or cogent legal analysis. Therefore, Petitioner cannot demonstrate that her reference to "new counsel" should warrant relief. Hargrove, 100 Nev. at 502, 686 P.2d at 225.

Petitioner concludes her first claim with a conclusory statement that she was bribed. Petition at 9. However, this claim is likewise belied by the record. See, GPA at 5 ("I am signing this agreement voluntarily, after consultation with my attorney, and I am not acting under

duress or coercion..."); see also, Plea Transcript at 28 ("THE COURT: Before I can accept your plea of guilty I must make sure it is freely and voluntarily given, is anyone forcing you to plead guilty? DEFENDANT BROWN: No."), at 31 ("THE COURT: Are you entering your plea in this case freely and voluntarily? DEFENDANT BROWN: Yes.").

Because Petitioner's claim is outside the scope of habeas review, and because any inferred applicable habeas claims are belied by the record, the State respectfully requests that this Court deny Petitioner's first ground for habeas relief.

B. Petitioner's Vague "Due Process" Claim does not Entitle Petitioner to Relief

Petitioner's second claim alleges a violation of "due process." Petition at 10. However, Petitioner merely includes some language about moving to withdraw her guilty plea, then proceeds to give her own recounting of the events leading up to her arrest in the underlying case. <u>Id.</u> at 10-11. However, absent any cogent legal argument, Petitioner's claim does not warrant review.

A review of Petitioner's claim shows that Petitioner raises nothing that appears to relate to plea counsel's advice to plead guilty, nor to the voluntariness of Petitioner's entry of plea. Therefore, Petitioner's claim does not fall within the limited scope of habeas review after a guilty plea. <u>Kirksey</u>, 112 Nev. at 988, 923 P.2d at 1107. As such, Petitioner's claim is suitable only for dismissal under NRS 34.810(1)(a).

In the event Petitioner seeks to raise an actual "due process" claim, such a claim was appropriate for direct appeal; therefore, her claim is waived for her failure to raise it thus. Franklin v. State, 110 Nev. at 752, 877 P.2d at 1059.

Finally, in the event Petitioner seeks to raise an ineffective-assistance claim, the substance of her claim does not clarify what the actual ineffectiveness claim is, much less demonstrate that her claim falls within the scope of the current habeas review. As such, Petitioner has failed to plead "specific facts" sufficient to warrant review, much less relief. NRS 34.735(6); Hargrove, 100 Nev. at 502, 686 P.2d at 225.

27 | ///

28 | ///

19⁻

Because Petitioner's claim is bare and naked, and lacking any cogent argument, the State respectfully requests that Petitioner's claim be summarily dismissed. <u>Hargrove</u>, 100 Nev. at 502, 686 P.2d at 225.

C. Petitioner Fails to Show Cumulative Error

Petitioner's final claim attempts to allege cumulative error warranting an evidentiary hearing and appointment of counsel. Petition at 12. However, Petitioner fails to set forth the analysis for cumulative error, much less the respective analyses for either an evidentiary hearing or appointment of counsel. Further, even conducting the proper analysis, Petitioner's claim of cumulative analysis fails.

As a preliminary issue, Petitioner cannot be entitled to relief on a claim of cumulative error, as petitioner has failed to demonstrate any error, much less errors of a number or gravity that would warrant relief. See, United States v. Rivera, 900 F.2d 1462, 1471 (10th Cir. 1990) ("[A] cumulative-error analysis should evaluate only the effect of matters determined to be error, not the cumulative effect of non-errors.").

Further, the Nevada Supreme Court has explained that "[r]elevant factors to consider in evaluating a claim of cumulative error are (1) whether the issue of guilt is close, (2) the quantity and character of the error, and (3) the gravity of the crime charged." Mulder v. State, 116 Nev. 1, 17, 992 P.2d 845, 855 (2000). In the instant case, the issue of guilt was *not* close, as Petitioner solemnly admitted her guilt in open court. As stated above, Petitioner has failed to demonstrate any error. Finally, while a felony committed with a deadly weapon is grave indeed, Petitioner negotiated the consequences of her guilty plea, and received the favorable sentence for which she bargained. Therefore, the Mulder factors weigh against finding that Petitioner is entitled to relief.

Because Petitioner fails to demonstrate cumulative error warranting relief, the State respectfully requests that this Court deny Petitioner's third claim.

II. PETITIONER IS NOT ENTITLED TO APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL

Under the U.S. Constitution, the Sixth Amendment provides no right to counsel in post-conviction proceedings. <u>Coleman v. Thompson</u>, 501 U.S. 722, 752, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 2566

(1991). In McKague v. Warden, 112 Nev. 159, 163, 912 P.2d 255, 258 (1996), the Nevada Supreme Court similarly observed that "[t]he Nevada Constitution...does not guarantee a right to counsel in post-conviction proceedings, as we interpret the Nevada Constitution's right to counsel provision as being coextensive with the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution." McKague specifically held that, with the exception of NRS 34.820(1)(a) (entitling appointed counsel when petitioner is under a sentence of death), one does not have "any constitutional or statutory right to counsel at all" in post-conviction proceedings. Id. at 164, 912 P.2d at 258.

However, the Nevada Legislature has given courts the discretion to appoint post-conviction counsel in limited scenarios. Specifically, NRS 34.750 reads:

A petition may allege that the Defendant is unable to pay the costs of the proceedings or employ counsel. If the court is satisfied that the allegation of indigency is true and the petition is not dismissed summarily, the court may appoint counsel at the time the court orders the filing of an answer and a return. In making its determination, the court may consider whether:

- (a) The issues are difficult;
- (b) The defendant is unable to comprehend the proceedings; or
- (c) Counsel is necessary to proceed with discovery.

(emphasis added). Under NRS 34.750, it is clear that the court has discretion in determining whether to appoint counsel to assist in post-conviction proceedings.

In the instant case, the factors weigh against this Court's discretionary appointment of counsel. First, the issues raised by Petitioner are not difficult, and can easily be resolved, because they are outside the scope of habeas review, or are belied by the record. Second, Petitioner has demonstrated that she can comprehend the proceedings, as she has organized and filed her own habeas petition. Finally, Petitioner fails to allege that any further discovery is necessary, much less does she demonstrate that counsel is necessary to obtain such discovery. See, Petition at 6-12.

1	Because all of Petitioner's claims should be summarily denied, and because the factors
2	weigh against appointing counsel for Petitioner, the State respectfully requests that this Court
3	deny Petitioner's request for appointment of counsel.
4	<u>CONCLUSION</u>
5	For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests that this Court summarily
6	DENY Petitioner's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, and the accompanying Motion for
7	Appointment of Counsel.
8	DATED this day of December, 2020.
9	Respectfully submitted,
10	STEVEN B. WOLFSON Clark County District Attorney
11	Nevada Bar #001565
12	BY Mex X for
13	JOHN MIMAN
14	Deputy District Attorney Nevada Bar #14408
15	CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
16	
17	I hereby certify that service of the above and foregoing was made this The day of
18	December, 2020, by depositing a copy in the U.S. Mail, postage pre-paid, addressed to:
19	LEQUANA BROWN, NDC #1235328 FMWCC
20	4370 SMILEY ROAD LAS VEGAS, NV, 89115
21	
22	BY / DUST
23	Secretary for the District Attorney's Office
24	
25	
26	
27	
28	19F12727C/jj/JN/ckb/L3

A-20-823908-W

DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

Writ of Habeas Corpus COURT MINUTES February 05, 2021

A-20-823908-W Lequana Brown, Plaintiff(s)

VS.

State of Nevada, Defendant(s)

February 05, 2021 10:00 AM All Pending Motions

HEARD BY: Villani, Michael COURTROOM: RJC Courtroom 11A

COURT CLERK: Albrecht, Samantha RECORDER: Georgilas, Cynthia

REPORTER:

PARTIES PRESENT:

David L. Stanton Attorney for Defendant

State of Nevada Defendant

JOURNAL ENTRIES

PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS...PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL...PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO WITHDRAW COUNSEL

Defendant not present. COURT ORDERED, matters TAKEN UNDER ADVISEMENT. Court advised it was basing its decision on the pleadings on file herein, not accepting any oral argument and a written decision would be issued next week.

NDC

CLERK'S NOTE: A copy of this Minute Order was mailed to:

Leguana Brown #1235328

FMWCC

4370 Smiley Rd

Las Vegas, NV 89115 (2/11/2021 sa)

Printed Date: 2/12/2021 Page 1 of 1 Minutes Date: February 05, 2021

Prepared by: Samantha Albrecht

DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

Writ of Habeas Corpus

COURT MINUTES

February 25, 2021

A-20-823908-W

Leguana Brown, Plaintiff(s)

vs.

State of Nevada, Defendant(s)

February 25, 2021

3:00 AM

Minute Order

HEARD BY: Villani, Michael

COURTROOM: Chambers

COURT CEEKI

COURT CLERK: Samantha Albrecht

RECORDER:

REPORTER:

PARTIES PRESENT:

JOURNAL ENTRIES

- Petitioner's Motion for Appointment of Counsel and Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Post-Conviction) came before the Court, whereupon the Court took the matter under further advisement. After considering all pleadings and arguments, the Court renders its decision as follows: Based upon the nature of the allegations and the sentence imposed, Petitioner's Motion for Appointment of Counsel is GRANTED. Furthermore, THIS COURT ORDERS a Status Check: Appointment of Counsel SET for March 9, 2021, at 8:30 AM.

This Court ruling on Petitioner's Writ of Habeas Corpus is DEFERRED, as this Court is appointing counsel to supplement Petitioner's Pro Per Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. Therefore, THIS COURT ORDERS a Status Check: Briefing Schedule SET for March 9, 2021, at 8:30 AM.

CLERK'S NOTE: A copy of this Minute Order distributed to counsel by e-mail and mailed to:

Lequana Brown #1235328

FMWCC

4370 Smiley Rd

Las Vegas, NV 89115 (2/25/2021 sa)

PRINT DATE: 02/25/2021 Page 1 of 1 Minutes Date: February 25, 2021

Electronically Filed 03/04/2021 9:38 AM CLERK OF THE COURT

1	Florence McClure Women's Correctional Center 4370 Smiley Rd.
2	Las Vegas, NV 89115
3	In the Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada
4	In and for the County of CIAKK
5	In the matter of:
6	Plaintiff/Petitioner) Case No: C-19-344112-3
7	THE STATE OF NEVADA Dept No.
8	Defendant/Respondent A-20-823908-W Dept.17
9	ORDER APPONTING COUNSEL
10	The Proper Person Motion of Petitioner, requesting an Order for the
11	Appointment of Counsel to represent her in the above entitled action having
12	moved the Court on this day, and in good cause appearing.
13	Now, therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, that Steve Owens, Esq.
14	is appointed to represent the above-entitled Petitioner in said proceedings
15	at the expense of the State of Nevada.
16	
17	Dated thisday of, 20
18	
19	Dated this 4th day of March, 2021
20	Mun 1
21	DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
22	D19 A3B 5EE8 7B6E
23	Michael Villani District Court Judge
24	
25	
26	
27	
28	
	i e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e

DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

Writ of Habeas Corpus COURT MINUTES March 09, 2021

A-20-823908-W Lequana Brown, Plaintiff(s)

VS.

State of Nevada, Defendant(s)

March 09, 2021 08:30 AM All Pending Motions

HEARD BY: Villani, Michael COURTROOM: RJC Courtroom 11A

COURT CLERK: Albrecht, Samantha RECORDER: Georgilas, Cynthia

REPORTER:

PARTIES PRESENT:

State of Nevada Defendant

Steven S. Owens Attorney for Plaintiff
Vivian Luong Attorney for Defendant

JOURNAL ENTRIES

STATUS CHECK: APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL...STATUS CHECK: BRIEFING SCHEDULE

Upon Court's inquiry, Steven Owens CONFIRMED as counsel of record for the Defendant and noted he still needs the file. COURT ORDERED, matter SET for Status Check. Court advised Mr. Owens that there were 4 or 5 hearings before her entry of plea, however she backed out or had other questions and directed Mr. Owens to review those Court minutes.

NDC

4/13/2021 8:30 AM STATUS CHECK: FILE/SET BRIEFING SCHEDULE

Prepared by: Samantha Albrecht

A-20-823908-W

DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

Writ of Habeas Corpus COURT MINUTES April 13, 2021

A-20-823908-W Lequana Brown, Plaintiff(s)

VS.

State of Nevada, Defendant(s)

April 13, 2021 08:30 AM Status Check: File/Set Briefing Schedule

HEARD BY: Ballou, Erika COURTROOM: RJC Courtroom 12C

COURT CLERK: Hurtado, Ro'Shell RECORDER: Schofield, Susan

REPORTER:

PARTIES PRESENT:

David L. Stanton Attorney for Defendant Steven S. Owens Attorney for Plaintiff

JOURNAL ENTRIES

Steven Owens, Esq. and David Stanton, Esq. present via Bluejeans video conference.

Colloquy regarding briefing schedule. Following colloquy, COURT ORDERED, following Briefing Schedule SET: Supplemental Brief filed by June 14, 2021; Response Brief filed by August 2, 2021; Reply Brief filed by August 16, 2021; matter SET for argument.

NDC

08.24.2021 8:30 AM ARGUMENT

Prepared by: Ro'Shell Hurtado

Electronically Filed 6/14/2021 2:51 PM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT

SUPP

2

3 4

5

7

9

8

1011

12

1314

15 16

17

18

19

2021

22 23

24

25

2627

28

STEVEN S. OWENS, ESQ

Nevada Bar No. 4352

1000 N. Green Valley #440-529

Henderson, Nevada 89074 Telephone: (702) 595-1171 owenscrimlaw@gmail.com

Attorney for Petitioner Lequana Brown

DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

LEQUANA BROWN,

Petitioner,

VS.

THE STATE OF NEVADA; NEVADA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS; FLORENCE McCLURE WOMEN'S CORRECTIONAL CENTER, Warden.

Respondents.

CASE NO.: A-20-823908-W

DEPT NO.: XVII

SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS (POST-CONVICTION)

COMES NOW, Petitioner, LEQUANA BROWN, by and through her counsel of record, STEVEN S. OWENS, ESQ., and hereby submits her supplemental brief in support of Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Post-Conviction).

This Supplement is made and based upon the pleadings and papers on file herein, the Points and Authorities attached hereto, and any oral arguments adduced at the time of hearing this matter.

///

///

DATED this 14th day of June, 2021.

Respectfully submitted

/s/ Steven S. Owens, Esq.
STEVEN S. OWENS, ESQ.
Nevada Bar No. 4352
1000 N. Green Valley #440-529
Henderson, Nevada 89074
(702) 595-1171

Attorney for Petitioner LEQUANA BROWN

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On October 17, 2019, Lequana Brown was charged by way of grand jury indictment with multiple counts of conspiracy, burglary, and armed robbery. Brown pleaded not guilty on October 24, 2019 and received a speedy trial setting within 60 days for January 6, 2020. After a motion for consolidation with other cases in the system was denied, Brown eventually pleaded guilty on March 12, 2020. Shortly thereafter, Brown expressed a desire to withdraw her plea and for appointment of alternate counsel which was granted. New counsel, Matthew Lay, confirmed as counsel on May 7, 2020. Eventually, Brown proceeded with a new plea canvass and an amended guilty plea agreement on June 18, 2020. She was sentenced on that same date and the judgment of conviction was filed on June 22, 2020. No direct appeal was filed.

On October 29, 2020, Brown filed a pro se habeas petition and motion to appoint counsel for post-conviction relief. The State responded on December 17, 2020, and the court then entered a minute order on February 25, 2021, granting the appointment of counsel. Undersigned counsel confirmed on March 9, 2021, and the instant supplemental petition now follows.

///

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

The crime to which Brown pleaded guilty in the instant case involved a shoplifting incident during business hours at two different sporting goods stores, Champs Sports and Big 5, occurring on June 14th and 23rd, 2019, respectively. Co-defendants Sarah Gonzalez and Mark Anthony Finks were also involved by distracting store clerks and carrying some merchandise out of the store without paying for it. When store clerks forcibly attempted to detain Brown, they said she withdrew a small knife in one incident and co-defendant Finks pulled a pellet gun in the other incident to get away. No one was injured and Brown was eventually arrested.

ARGUMENT

I. MANIFEST INJUSTICE.

In this case, Brown submits a combination of factors, when viewed based upon the totality of the circumstances, entitle her to withdraw her plea and proceed to trial. NRS 176.165 provides as follows:

Except as otherwise provided in this section, a motion to withdraw plea of guilty, guilty but mentally ill or nolo contendere may be made only before sentence is imposed or imposition of sentence is suspended. To correct manifest injustice, the court after sentence may be set aside judgment of conviction and permit the defendant to withdraw the plea.

Generally, a post-conviction Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is the appropriate remedy to challenge the validity of a guilty plea after sentencing. *Harris v. State*, 130 Nev. Adv. Rep. 47, 329 P.3d 619, 628 (2014). "[T]he burden [is] on the defendant to establish that his plea was not entered knowingly and intelligently" or that it was a product of coercion. *Id.*; *Gardner v. State*, 91 Nev. 443, 446–47, 537 P.2d 469 (1975).

The district court may grant a post-conviction motion to withdraw a guilty plea that was not entered knowingly and voluntarily in order to correct a manifest injustice. *Rubio v. State*,

124 Nev. 1032, 1039, 194 P.3d 1224 (2008). Manifest injustice may also be demonstrated by a "failure to adequately inform a defendant of the consequences of his plea." *Id.* Citing *Paine v. State*, 110 Nev. 609, 619, 877 P.2d 1025, 1031 (1994) *overruled on other grounds by Leslie v. Warden*, 118 Nev. 773, 780–81, 59 P.3d 445–46 (2002).

"[A] guilty plea is a grave and solemn act to be accepted only with care and discernment." *Brady v. United States*, 397 U.S. 742, 748, 90 S. Ct. 1463, 25 L.Ed. 2d 747 (1970); *Parker v. State*, 100 Nev. 264, 265, 679 P.2d 1271 (1984) ("Entry of a guilty plea is a solemn process"). The longstanding test for determining the validity of a guilty plea has been "whether the plea represents a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action open to the defendant." *North Carolina v. Alford*, 400 U.S. 25, 31, 91 S. Ct. 160, 27 l. Ed. 2d 162 (1970); *Hill v. Lockhart*, 474 U.S. 52, 56, 106 S. Ct. 366, 88 L. Ed. 2d 203 (1985). [A] Plea cannot support a judgment of guilt unless it [is] voluntary in a constitutional sense." "A plea of guilty is more than a confession which admits that the accused did various acts; it is itself a conviction; nothing remains but to give judgment and determine punishment." *Boykin v. Alabama*, 395 U.S. 238, 242, 89 S. Ct. 1709, 23 L. Ed. 2d 274 (1969); *Kercheval v. United States*, 274 U.S. 220, 223, 47 S. Ct. 582, 71 L. Ed. 1009 (1927).

The Court must set aside a guilty plea when the record does not disclose that the defendant understood the elements of the offense and the defendant did not make a factual statement constituting admission to the charge. *Tiger v. State*, 98 Nev. 555, 558, 654 P.2d 1031 (1982); *Love v. State*, 99 Nev. 147, 148, 659 P.2d 876 (1983); *Barlow v. State*, 99 Nev. 197, 198, 660 P.2d 1005 (1983). "In reviewing an attack on a guilty plea a court must consider whether the plea was voluntarily entered as well as whether, considered as a whole, the process by which the plea was obtained was fundamentally fair." *Taylor v. Warden*, 96 Nev. 272, 274,

607 P.2d 587 (1980). Further, the Nevada Supreme Court has held the court should consider the "totality of the circumstances". *Rubio*, 124 Nev. at 1046. *See also Little v. Warden*, 117 Nev. 845, 851, 34 P.3d 540, 544 (2001).

When viewed based upon the totality of the circumstances, Brown submits she is entitled to withdraw her plea and proceed to trial due to a manifest injustice. The confusing and protracted process by which the plea in this case was entered undermines any conclusion that it was knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily given. Initially, the record reflects that by November 19, 2019, an offer was made by the State for Brown to plead guilty to two counts of robbery with use of a deadly weapon, one count in this case and the other count in another case¹, and stipulate to 6 to 15 years in prison. Additional offers were also made to codefendants, all contingent on one another, and all offers were eventually revoked on December 5, 2019. Yet, on January 3, 2020, there were additional negotiations with Brown agreeing to plead guilty if she could get house arrest, but the court denied this request. Confusingly, the offers that had been revoked on December 5, 2019, had apparently been re-offered before being revoked yet again. To punish Brown for holding up the global plea negotiation and to apply additional pressure to Brown, the State filed a notice of habitual criminal treatment, despite one of the priors being for drugs. Then, on March 12, 2020, apparently another offer had been extended and Brown said she needed time to think about it, but the prosecutor said she needed to plead guilty, "right now, otherwise its going to be revoked and there won't be any other offers made." In the midst of the plea canvass, Brown had questions about why there was a

¹ Presumably, the other case was C-19-344268-2 where Brown was charged with multiple counts of Burglary,

Grand Larceny, and Robbery along with a co-defendant.

²⁴

²⁵

²⁶

²⁷²⁸

deadly weapon enhancement when no weapon was used and the prosecutor revealed that part of the plea deal was fictional. The paperwork then had to be "straightened out" so it would instead be just a robbery in that case, no weapon, but still stipulating to four to ten years, and pleas in both cases would be taken at the same time. When Brown tried to explain her understanding of the weapon usage, the judge expressed frustration and said, "I don't have time to play games here." The paperwork was then "fixed," but during the plea colloquy on the other case Brown got confused about which robbery incident was being discussed and she insisted that she had not used any force in the taking of that property. After being pressured by her attorney and the judge, Brown finally capitulated that she had used force in the other case. Brown then pleaded guilty in the instant case.

Prior to sentencing, Brown sought to dismiss her counsel and was heard in court on April 30, 2020, where she said she wanted to withdraw her plea because she had been misled by counsel. On June 11, 2020, new counsel represented there was another case in Henderson that was listed in the PSI, but which needed to be included in the negotiations so two new guilty plea agreements were needed. On June 16, 2020, the paperwork still was not in order necessitating yet another continuance. Without first withdrawing from the prior plea or agreement, an amended guilty plea agreement was filed on June 17, 2020, which was signed by counsel Nguyen rather than by Brown herself. Finally, the next day on June 18, 2020, Brown pleaded guilty to one count of robbery with deadly weapon in the present case. Brown represented at that time that she had not received a copy of the amended guilty plea agreement which had already been signed by counsel for her and filed with the court without Brown ever having seen it. But the plea proceeded, nonetheless.

These facts and circumstances show that undue pressure and stress was placed upon Brown over an extended period of time in order to induce her guilty plea. Multiple changes in plea offers, continual revising of written plea agreements, incorrect paperwork, contingent offers designed to turn and pressure co-defendants against each other, frivolous filing of habitual charges, and the multiplicity of charges and cases combined to create a hopelessly confusing situation such that Brown's will was overborne, and the plea was not freely and voluntarily entered.

II. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL.

Brown submits she received ineffective assistance of counsel before, during, and after entry of plea. Defendants are entitled to effective assistance of counsel in the plea-bargaining process, and in determining whether to accept or reject a plea offer. *Lafler v. Cooper*, 556 U.S. 156, 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012); *see also McMann v. Richardson*, 397 U.S. 759, 771, 90 S. Ct. 1441, 1149 (1970) (Constitution guarantees effective counsel when accepting guilty plea). Similarly, a "defendant has the right to make reasonably informed decision whether to accept a plea offer." *Turner v. Calderon*, 281 F.3d 851, 880 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting *United States v. Day*, 969 F.2d 39, 43 (3rd Cir. 1992)).

To state a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel that is sufficient to invalidate a judgment of conviction, petitioner must demonstrate that: 1) counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and 2) counsel's errors were so severe that they rendered the verdict unreliable. *Lozada v. State*, 110 Nev. 349, 353, 871 P. 2d 944, 946 (1994). (Citing *Strickland v. Washington*, 466 U. S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 205, (1984)). In meeting the prejudice requirement of ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a defendant must show a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pled guilty. *See also*

27

28

Kirksey v. State, 112 Nev. 980, 923 P.2d 1102 (1997).

This case is unique in that it contains not one, but two, entries of guilty pleas. Soon after pleading guilty the first time, Brown sought to dismiss her counsel and was heard in court on April 30, 2020, where she said she wanted to withdraw her plea because she had been misled by counsel. Brown's attorney at the time, Carl Arnold, did not have sufficient contact with her and was generally unavailable for communication to answer questions she had about her case. He misrepresented that he had filed a motion for house arrest or bail reduction when he had not. Most egregiously, he had a created a conflict of interest by demanding that Brown solicit other clients for him within the prison in exchange for putting money on her books. In response, the court agreed to appoint new counsel and Matthew Lay confirmed as counsel on May 7, 2020. Lay was given just three weeks to get Brown's files from prior counsel and to speak with Brown in prison about withdrawing her plea. On May 28, 2020, Lay's associate Rochelle Nguyen appeared and represented that their office had the files but needed one more week to talk to Brown about filing a motion to withdraw plea. On June 4, 2020, Brown was not present in court, but Nguyen represented that Brown would **not** be withdrawing her plea and was prepared to go forward with sentencing instead. Given the complexity of the multiple plea deals and cases as set forth above, this was inadequate time for new counsel to have reviewed the entirety of all of the files of the several cases, to clear up any confusion, to explain the consequences and undo the effects of the pressure and stress that had been placed upon Brown throughout the history of the case. Instead of withdrawing the plea as Brown had requested, new counsel compounded the problem by talking their client back into accepting basically the same negotiation that Brown had already repeatedly rejected.

Had counsel not been deficient in the performance of their duties, the posture of the case

would have been different and Brown would not have pleaded guilty. This case has a built-in error of ineffective assistance of counsel that was not cured by discharging Carl Arnold and then appointing Matthew Lay for a new plea and sentencing. Brown was denied her opportunity to withdraw her guilty plea as she had demanded and was instead induced by counsel to proceed with a guilty plea with which she continually expressed dissatisfaction and confusion.

III. EVIDENTIARY HEARING.

The Court has long recognized a petitioner's right to a post-conviction evidentiary hearing when the petitioner asserts claims supported by specific factual allegations not belied by the record that, if true, would entitle him to relief." Mann v. State, 118 Nev. 351, 354, 46 P.3d 1228, 1230 (2002), citing *Hargrove v. State*, 100 Nev. 498, 503, 686 P.2d 222, 225 (1984). Also, a petitioner is entitled to an evidentiary hearing where the petitioner raises a colorable claim of ineffective assistance. Smith v. McCormick, 914 F.2d 1153, 1170 (9th Cir.1990); Hendricks v. Vasquez, 974 F.2d 1099, 1103, 1109-10 (9th Cir.1992). See also Morris v. California, 966 F.2d 448, 454 (9th Cir.1991) (remand for evidentiary hearing required where allegations in petitioner's affidavit raise inference of deficient performance); Harich v. Wainwright, 813 F.2d 1082, 1090 (11th Cir.1987) ("[W]here a petitioner raises a colorable claim of ineffective assistance, and where there has not been a state or federal hearing on this claim, we must remand to the district court for an evidentiary hearing."); Porter v. Wainwright, 805 F.2d 930 (11th Cir. 1986) (without the aid of an evidentiary hearing, the court cannot conclude whether attorneys properly investigated a case or whether their decisions concerning evidence were made for tactical reasons).

26

25

In the instant case, Petitioner has raised specific factual allegations concerning the validity of the entry of plea and ineffectiveness of counsel's actions which are not belied by the record. An evidentiary hearing is necessary to expand the record concerning these claims. **CONCLUSION** Wherefore, Brown respectfully requests this Court grant her Petition due to the ineffective assistance of counsel and invalid plea, or alternatively to hold an evidentiary hearing to allow her an opportunity to establish her claims for relief. Dated this 14th day of June, 2021. Respectfully Submitted, /s/ Steven S. Owens, Esq. STEVEN S. OWENS, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 4352 1000 N. Green Valley #440-529 Henderson, Nevada 89074 (702) 595-1171 Attorney for Petitioner LEQUANA BROWN

Electronically Filed 7/29/2021 2:25 PM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT 1 **RSPN** STEVEN B. WOLFSON 2 Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #001565 3 JOHN NIMAN Deputy District Attorney 4 Nevada Bar #14408 200 Lewis Avenue 5 Las Vegas, Nevada 89155-2212 (702) 671-2500 6 Attorney for Plaintiff 7 DISTRICT COURT 8 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 9 LEQUANA BROWN, #2651822 10 Petitioner. CASE NO: A-20-823908-W 11 -VS-12 THE STATE OF NEVADA. DEPT NO: XVII 13 Respondent. 14 15 STATE'S RESPONSE TO SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS 16 CORPUS (POST-CONVICTION) 17 DATE OF HEARING: August 24, 2021 TIME OF HEARING: 10:00 AM 18 COMES NOW, the State of Nevada, by STEVEN B. WOLFSON, Clark County 19 District Attorney, through JOHN NIMAN, Deputy District Attorney, and hereby submits the 20 attached Points and Authorities in Response to Petitioner's Supplemental Brief in Support of 21 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. 22 This Response is made and based upon all the papers and pleadings on file herein, the 23 attached points and authorities in support hereof, and oral argument at the time of hearing, if 24 deemed necessary by this Honorable Court. 25 111 26 111 27 /// 28

POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On October 17, 2019, LEQUANA BROWN, aka Lequana Leatrice Brown (hereinafter "Petitioner") was charged by way of Indictment with two (2) counts of CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT ROBBERY (Category B Felony – NRS 200.380, 199.480); two (2) counts of ROBBERY WITH USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON (Category B Felony – NRS 200.380, 193.165); two (2) counts of BURGLARY (Category B Felony – NRS 205.060); one (1) count of GRAND LARCENY (Category C Felony – NRS 205.220.1, 205.222.2); and one (1) count of OBTAINING AND USING PERSONAL IDENTIFYING INFORMATION OF ANOTHER (Category C Felony – NRS 205.463) for actions on or between June 4, 2019 and June 23, 2019. On March 12, 2020, Petitioner pled guilty, pursuant to a Guilty Plea Agreement ("GPA"), to one (1) count of ROBBERY WITH USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON. Contemporaneous with the GPA, the State filed an Amended Indictment reflecting the single count to which Petitioner pled guilty.

Pursuant to the GPA, Petitioner agreed to plead guilty to ROBBERY in a separate case, and the parties stipulated that Petitioner would receive sentences of four (4) to ten (10) years on each count, consecutive to each other.

On June 17, 2020, Petitioner executed an Amended GPA, with the amendment being that the State agreed to dismiss a separate case against Petitioner after rendition of sentence in the instant underlying case. On June 18, 2020, the Court canvassed Petitioner regarding the Amended GPA and accepted Petitioner's guilty plea. The Court thereafter sentenced Petitioner to two (2) to five (5) years in the Nevada Department of Corrections for Robbery, with a consecutive two (2) to five (5) years for Use of a Deadly Weapon. Petitioner was given three hundred fifty-eight (358) days of credit for time served. Petitioner's Judgment of Conviction was filed on June 22, 2020.

Petitioner did not file a direct appeal. On October 29, 2020, Petitioner filed her Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. Petitioner included in her filed Petition a Motion for Appointment of Counsel. The State filed its Response to Petitioner's Petition and Motion on December 17,

2020. On February 25, 2021, the Court granted Petitioner's Motion for Appointment of Counsel.

On June 14, 2021, Petitioner – through counsel – filed the instant Supplemental Brief in Support of Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Post-Conviction).

STATEMENT OF FACTS

The Court relied on the following facts when sentencing Petitioner:

On June 23, 2019, officers learned of the following events from the victim and other employees of Big 5. They stated the co-defendant, Sarah Gonzalez, started shopping for various clothing items. Shortly after, defendant, Lequana Brown, entered the store with a canvas shopping bag and began selecting various shoes and other items. Store employee #1 attempted to help Ms. Gonzalez; however, she stated that she did not need help. Employee #1 noted Ms. Gonzalez and Ms. Brown began interacting with each other and that they were associated with one another. Ms. Brown told the employee she just won money and was engaging in some spending. Ms. Gonzalez then came to the register where employee #2 was ringing up her transaction.

As employee #1 was ringing up Ms. Brown's items, she told employee #2 she was in a hurry and needed to have her items rung up. Ms. Gonzalez then told employee #2 to ring all the items up on the same bill so that she and Ms. Brown can check out together. As employee #2 rung up the merchandize [sic], he set the bags behind the counter to prevent either defendant from walking out of the store before paying. Ms. Brown and Ms. Gonzalez drank PowerAid that was from the stores [sic] coolers and left them unfinished at the register.

Ms. Brown told employee #3 she wanted to look at the shoes to make sure they were the right sizes. Employee #2 became suspicious and showed the shoes to her without allowing her to take control of the property. Ms. Brown complained and requested employee #1 finish the transaction. As employee #1 began reringing all the items, the bags were set on the counter. Prior to the items being paid for, Ms. Gonzalez told him she also wanted to buy a pellet gun and the items were brought back inside Big 5. An additional co-defendant, identified as Mark Anthony Fink, aka, Mark Anthony Finks Jr, entered the store following Ms. Gonzalez and the victim. He then asked the victim if he could look at the pellet/BB guns. The victim and employee #2 showed Mr. Finks some of the guns until he chose a display model. Employee #2 put the gun and pellets into a plastic bag and the victim took the items to the register.

Once at the register, Mr. Finks and Ms. Gonzalez gathered a few items that were rung up and exited the store, without paying, with Ms. Brown following behind them. The victim yelled at the defendant to stop; however, Ms. Brown threw a debit card, that was not in her name, at him saying "here take this. [sic] The victim saw the defendants in a vehicle along with a fourth person. The victim

6

13

12

15

14

16 17

18 19

20

2122

23

24

2526

27 28 attempted to retrieve one of the bags of property from Ms. Brown who was in the driver's side rear passenger. Mr. Finks pulled a gun on the victim which caused him to let go and the vehicle fled. Employee #1 noted the license plate while the victim called emergency services. The officers were informed a total \$2,251.91 worth of merchandise was stolen.

During the officer's investigation, the victim provided them with surveillance and the PowerAde drink bottles that were left. One of the officers located the vehicle used and noted Mr. Fink was in the driver's seat. A second male was handing shoes to a child who was trying them on. They then saw Ms. Gonzalez enter the passenger side. While they were arresting Ms. Gonzalez, she stated she had a gun in her bra and that Ms. Brown was in apartment 311. Additionally, officers observed Big 5 bags in the vehicle. The officers were able to recover \$481.34 worth of merchandise.

Officers went up to the third floor to locate Ms. Brorvn who was in the apartment; however, she was using an alias of Mia Jones. The stolen items recovered were returned to Big 5. After being transported to the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department Headquarlers, Ms. Brown was interviewed. She admitted she was the person at Big 5 and knew the other defendants. She observed Ms. Gonzalez and Mr. Finks nearby and entered the vehicle to go to Big 5 due to Ms. Gonzalez stating she had coupons. Once in the store, Ms. Brown picked out several shirts and handed them to Ms. Gonzalez who then began bagging up a large amount of clothing, along with the other merchandise before proceeding past all points of entry. Ms. Brown followed Mr. Finks out of the store and the employees followed after them. Mr. Finks then pointed a handgun at the employees. She admitted she never attempted to pay for the items she gave Ms. Gonzalez, nor did she make any attempts to notify police of lhe crime. Additionally, Ms. Brown admitted she was involved in another robbery of a Champs store on June 4, 2019, after being shown surveillance of that incident. When the officers interviewed Mr. Finks, he admitted he pointed a gun at the victim and told him to get the fuck away from the car due to him pulling on Ms. Brown. Ms. Gonzalez stated Ms. Brown told her she could pick out whatever she wanted, and she would pay for it. She stated she had a feeling Ms. Brown was going to use a fake check and a debit card that would not work to pay for the items. When the commotion started at the car, Ms. Gonzalez stated that Ms. Brown told Mr. Finks to just drive.

Presentence Investigation Report, at 8-9.

<u>ARGUMENT</u>

I. PETITIONER FAILS TO DEMONSTRATE MANIFEST INJUSTICE

Pursuant to NRS 176.165, once a defendant has been sentenced, She may only withdraw a guilty plea "[t]o correct manifest injustice." See also, Baal v. State, 106 Nev. 69,

72, 787 P.2d 391, 394 (1990). Reviewing courts must view a guilty plea as presumptively valid, and the burden rests with the defendant to establish that her plea was not entered knowingly and intelligently. Bryant v. State, 102 Nev. 268, 272, 721 P.2d 364, 368 (1986) (superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Hart v. State, 116 Nev. 558, 1 P.3d 969 (2000)). Manifest injustice does not exist if the defendant entered her plea voluntarily. Baal, 106 Nev. at 72, 787 P.2d at 394 (given district court's canvassing and defendant's assertions of voluntariness, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's motion to withdraw guilty plea).

To determine the voluntariness of a guilty plea, a reviewing court considers the totality of the circumstances. <u>Bryant</u>, 102 Nev. at 271, 721 P.2d at 367. A proper plea canvas should reflect:

[T]he defendant knowingly waived his privilege against self-incrimination, the right to trial by jury, and the right to confront his accusers; (2) the plea was voluntary, was not coerced, and was not the result of a promise of leniency; (3) the defendant understood the consequences of his plea and the range of punishments; and (4) the defendant understood the nature of the charge, i.e., the elements of the crime.

Wilson v. State, 99 Nev. 362, 367, 664 P.2d 328, 331 (1983) (citing Higby v. Sheriff, 86 Nev. 774 476 P.2d 950 (1970)). The presence and advice of counsel is a significant factor in determining the voluntariness of a plea of guilty. Patton v. Warden, 91 Nev. 1, 2, 530 P.2d 107, 107 (1975).

Therefore, the court accepting a guilty plea must personally address the defendant at the time she enters her plea in order to determine whether she understands the nature of the charges to which she is pleading. Bryant, 102 Nev. at 271, 721 P.2d at 367. A written plea agreement, without some verbal interaction with the defendant, is insufficient. Id. However, the court need not conduct a ritualistic oral canvass. State v. Freese, 116 Nev. 1097, 13 P.3d 442 (2000). A guilty plea canvass does not "require the articulation of talismanic phrases." Heffley v. Warden, 89 Nev. 573, 575, 516 P.2d 1403, 1404 (1973). Instead, the record must

simply demonstrate that the defendant entered his guilty plea understandingly and voluntarily. Id.; see also, Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 747-48, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 1470 (1970).

Petitioner alleges that the circumstances surrounding her entry of plea constitute "manifest injustice," such that she should be allowed to withdraw her guilty plea. Supplement at 3-7. Petitioner summarizes the extent of plea negotiations, which she describes as "confusing and protracted," mentions the State's filing of a Notice of Intent to Seek Treatment as a Habitual Criminal ("despite one of the priors being for drugs"), and complains that her amended GPA was signed by counsel, rather than by Petitioner herself. <u>Id.</u> However, Petitioner's reliance on these "circumstances" is misguided, as Petitioner's qualms are belied by the record.

As a preliminary issue, the State would note that Petitioner's recounting of (and commentary on) the plea bargaining process is completely devoid of any citation to the record. See generally Supplement. Indeed, the record supports the presumption that Petitioner's negotiation process, and the resulting Amended GPA, were valid. Bryant, 102 Nev. at 272, 721 P.2d at 368.

Petitioner fails to provide any relevant legal authority to suggest that Petitioner was entitled to plea negotiations. See generally Supplement. Indeed, Petitioner could not, as the statute on point, NRS 174.035, is *permissive*, rather than compulsory. See NRS 174.035(2) ("If a plea of guilty...is made in a written plea agreement..." (emphasis added)). Therefore, whether the State extended *any* offer, or included *any* limitations on its offer, much less whether the State determined appropriate to revoke its offer, was permissible.

Moreover, each of Petitioner's proposed qualms with her underlying case are expressly belied by the record, and cannot entitle Petitioner to relief. See Hargrove v. State, 100 Nev. 498, 502, 686 P.2d 222, 225 (1984) ("bare" and "naked" allegations are not sufficient for relief, nor are allegations belied and repelled by the record). While Petitioner represents simply that the initial offer in Petitioner's case "were eventually revoked on December 5, 2019," the record demonstrates clearly that on November 19, 2019, the State placed the offer on the record, and advised all parties that the offer would expire on December 5, 2019. See Court

Minutes (Case No. C344112-3), dated November 19, 2019. Petitioner *rejected* that offer, and therefore the State withdrew it. <u>Compare</u> Supplement at 5:11-14 <u>with</u> Court Minutes (Case No. C344112-3), dated December 5, 2019. Thereafter, on January 3, 2020, Petitioner rejected negotiations *yet again*; however, the transcript of that proceeding provides context, which is not at all "confusing," as Petitioner entreats this Court to believe. <u>See</u> Recorder's Transcript of Proceedings, dated January 3, 2020 (filed May 5, 2020) ("RT 1.03.20"). To begin, Petitioner's claim that contingent negotiations, based on Petitioner's procurement of house arrest, occurred is patently false. At the January 3, 2020, hearing, Petitioner made an oral request for release on house arrest or electronic monitoring, providing the following explanation:

If I could get the ankle monitor to get my affairs in order and pack up my house and put stuff in storage and I'm willing to sign for the deal today and then come back for sentencing, if that's not the case I feel like I'm losing everything so I might as well just go to trial and just [indiscernible].

<u>Id.</u> at 4:18-22. However, the Court rejected Petitioner's request, explaining that such requests must be made in writing, and explaining:

I don't want anyone to enter negotiations just to get out of custody because then people come back and say, well, I only did it just to get out of custody. I didn't really mean it. I didn't do it. I was pressured, coerced into entering the negotiations. So, I don't allow that to occur. I mean if you're going to plead guilty, if you're taking responsibility, that's fine. If you don't want to take responsibility, then that's fine as well. Then we go to trial on all the charges. So, I don't want you – like I said, it – I'm not going to have my hands tied to say I'll only take a deal if you let me out today. That – I'm not – I don't work that way.

<u>Id.</u> at 5:11-20. Having been unsuccessful in her attempt, Petitioner reneged on the agreed-upon plea agreement. <u>Id.</u> at 6:4-9 (Petitioner had already signed the plea agreement, but told the Court she did not want to go through with it). Therefore, the record demonstrates that release from custody was *Petitioner's* condition – not a term of negotiations – and therefore is completely irrelevant to Petitioner's claim of manifest injustice.

While Petitioner attempts to frame the re-opening of plea negotiations as "confusing," the circumstances of those negotiations were placed on the record at the January 3, 2020, hearing:

9 10

11

12 13

14

15 16

17

18

19 20

21

22

23 24

25

26

27

28

[STATE]: The offers that are currently on the table today have already been revoked previously. When Mr. Arnold told us that Ms. Brown was interested in the offer, since I was going to be out of town next week for my honeymoon, I decided to re-extend that offer just for this instant based upon the circumstances, but if the offers aren't being entered into today it will again be revoked.

RT 1.03.20 at 8:17-22 (emphasis added). Therefore, the record makes clear that Petitioner came back to the negotiating table and initiated discussions; as such, there is nothing "manifestly injust" about the State being willing to engage with *Petitioner's request*.

Petitioner also attempts to frame the State's filing of a Notice of Intent to Seek Punishment as a Habitual Criminal as intended "[t]o punish Brown." Supplement at 5:17. However, Petitioner points to nothing in the record to support her claim of some nefarious purpose. See id. Rather, a review of that Notice shows that the convictions to which the State referred were from California. See Notice at 1-2. Thus, it is more likely that the State was simply waiting for those certified judgments, and confirming the status of potential negotiations, before proceeding with filing such a notice because it appeared the case was proceeding to trial.

Petitioner proceeds to assert that the State placed undue pressure on Petitioner by claiming that the State would not give Petitioner time to contemplate an offer. Supplement at 5:19-23. However, the transcript of the March 12, 2020, hearing belies Petitioner's assertion. See RT 3.12.20. The beginning of that hearing demonstrates that Petitioner's counsel indicated that Petitioner was ready to proceed with negotiations. See id. at 2:7-11 (counsel represented to co-defendant's counsel that Petitioner wanted to enter a plea), 3:20-4:10 (counsel representing to the Court that the matter had resolved). However, Petitioner requested additional time to "think about it." Id. at 4:14. Thereafter, the State explained its situation:

...Your Honor, at this point, the State's going to revoke the offer. We have a pre-trial at 2:00 o'clock, We've already pre-trialed several people. If she wants to take it now, like I told Mr. Arnold earlier, she can have it now, otherwise it's going to be revoked and there won't be any other offers made.

¹ Petitioner also puzzlingly submits that the State filed its Notice "despite one of the priors being for drugs." Supplement at 5:18-20. However, Petitioner does not challenge the habitual criminal statute, nor does she suggest that her drug conviction did not expressly qualify under that statute. See id.; see also NRS 207.010(1)(a) (including "[a]ny felony"). Therefore, again, this aside is irrelevant to Petitioner's claim of manifest injustice.

<u>Id.</u> at 4:17-21. The Court proceeded to assure Petitioner that it was not biased between a plea or trial, but did note Petitioner's back-and-forth throughout the proceedings. <u>Id.</u> at 5:8-10 ("All right, Ms. Brown, we've done this two or three times, okay..."), 5:24-25 ("I don't care – ma'am, I don't care if you accept [the negotiations] or not. I'm free next week."), 6:8-9 ("...you have the right to go to trial. I will not rush you into any negotiations.").

Thereafter, Petitioner changed her decision and decided to proceed with the guilty plea. RT 3.12.20 at 6:14-19. During that March 12, 2020, plea canvass, the issue regarding the "deadly weapon" charge arose. See id. at 10:23-11:14; see also Supplement at 5:23-6:2. However, the parties agreed to modify negotiations so that Petitioner would only be pleading to the use of a deadly weapon in a single case. Id. at 11:23-12:4. After the parties had agreed to modify negotiations, the Court had proceeded, yet again, with a plea canvass, Petitioner began to quibble about the *second* deadly weapon charge. Id. at 13:19-14:2. However, the Court explained to Petitioner how that charge could apply to her:

THE COURT: Were you working with these people to steal things?

DEFENDANT BROWN: Yes.

THE COURT: Okay. Do you – because as an aider and abettor, you understand that you're liable for everything they do and they're liable for what you do as well as part of the conspiracy to commit this crime? Do you understand that?

DEFENDANT BROWN: Yeah.

<u>Id.</u> at 14:3-10. Before the Court took a recess to allow the State to make the modifications, the Court asked a final time if Petitioner was certain of her decision:

THE COURT: Okay, are you going to enter these pleas today, ma'am? I don't have time to play games here. They'll redo the paperwork. They're only going to allege a robbery here, robbery with use in the other case, 4 to 10 on each case, consecutive. Do you understand that?

DEFENDANT BROWN: Yes.

THE COURT: Do you want to go forward? It's not Mr. Arnold's decision, its [sic] not mine, its [sic] yours.

DEFENDANT BROWN: Yes.

THE COURT: Are you sure?

14 15

13

16 17

18

19 20

21

2223

24

25

26

27

28

DEFENDANT BROWN: Yes.

THE COURT: Okay. They're going to get the paperwork fixed and then Mr. Arnold will go over those again with you. And if not, like I said, I'm ready for trial Monday on 19 charges and if you're found guilty I'll sentence you on 19. If you're found guilty on one, I'll sentence you on one, or any combination thereof. If you're found not guilty, then you walk out the door. Do you understand that?

DEFENDANT BROWN: Yeah.

<u>Id.</u> at 14:11-15:3. Therefore, the Court did *not* "express frustration" as Petitioner seeks now to present – instead, the Court was making sure the situation was clear, so that the matter could progress (whether to trial or to a guilty plea). As such, there was nothing "manifestly unjust" about this exchange.

Petitioner concludes her analysis of the March 12, 2020, hearing by asserting that she was "pressured by her attorney and the judge." Supplement at 6:9-11. This assertion is belied by the transcript of the plea canvass. When the Court asked Petitioner to confirm the factual basis for her plea, Petitioner equivocated. RT 3.12.20 at 19:3-22. Petitioner's attorney then submitted that there was video evidence that Petitioner had "used her forearm to move [a clerk] out of the way to get out the door." Id. at 19:23-20:3. When asked to confirm that submission, Petitioner agreed. Id. at 20:5. However, Petitioner disagreed that her action constituted force. Id. at 20:6-16. The Court then attempted to clarify the situation, and specify which facts Petitioner would admit. Id. at 20:13-22:23. The State then offered that Petitioner had told the clerk to "back off, or you know, I'll stab you, or something like that, and that was the threat or force that was used in this case..." Id. at 22:24-23:4. After Petitioner again equivocated, the Court ended its canvass and intended to proceed to trial. See id. at 23:24:8. Again, Petitioner's counsel called the Court back to proceed with the plea. Id. at 24:11-14. Rather than tell Petitioner what it wanted to hear, the Court simply asked, "What did you do, ma'am?" Id. at 24:15. Petitioner's counsel then clarified, "What force did you use...to get out of there?" Id. at 24:21-23. Petitioner then volunteered: "I told [the clerk] if she touched me - I said if she touched me when she come I'll beat her ass." Id. at 25:1-2. While co-defendant's counsel may

20 21

22 23

24

25

27

26

28

have interjected something to which Petitioner did not agree,² the transcript shows that Petitioner volunteered this element of robbery, without any coercion whatsoever. See id. at 26:1-7. Because the context shows that the Court and Petitioner's counsel each *clarified* the elements of the crime with which Petitioner was charged, and because Petitioner fails to offer any specific instance of pressure or coercion, this assertion likewise fails to meet Petitioner's burden.

Petitioner next makes much ado about the Amended GPA, asserting that it was filed "without first withdrawing from the prior plea or agreement" and that it was "signed by counsel Nguyen rather than by Brown herself." Supplement at 6:18-21. Petitioner also raises her representation at her entry of plea that "she had not received a copy of the amended guilty plea agreement." Id. at 16:22-23. However, these claims are easily dispensed with, as the record debunks each. First, the transcript of the June 16, 2020, hearing shows that that the extraneous Henderson case had been contemplated as part of the original plea agreement, and that the GPA was amended simply "for clarity and conformity." RT 6.16.20 at 2:16-20. Petitioner affirmed her understanding of the clerical change. <u>Id.</u> at 5:7-14. Thus, because the GPA was amended for a *clerical* change, and did not substantively change the negotiations, there was no "manifest injustice" in the Court proceeding with the Amended GPA.

Likewise, there is no "manifest injustice" to Petitioner's counsel having signed the Amended GPA, as the practice was mandated by COVID-19 procedures, and because the signature was affixed at Petitioner's direction. Specifically, in Administrative Order 20-10, the Chief Judge set out that a "guilty plea shall be signed by counsel in the following manner: 'Signature affixed by (insert name of defense counsel) at the direction of (insert name of defendant)." At 5:25-27. Moreover, Petitioner specifically affirmed that she authorized counsel to sign on her behalf. RT 6.18.20 at 6:6-13. Therefore, Petitioner cannot point to the signature on the Amended GPA as warranting relief.

² See RT 3.12.20 at 25:22-23 ("MR. HART: How about do you want to get stabbed or killed? DEFENDANT BROWN: No.").

Finally, there was no "manifest injustice" from Petitioner's lack of possession of a physical copy of her Amended GPA prior to her plea canvass. Out of an abundance of caution ("[b]ecause of the tortured history of this case") the Court wanted to have all of the documents together, and wanted Petitioner to have every document "in front of [her]" before proceeding. Id. at 6:13-20. When Petitioner indicated that she had not yet received such a copy, counsel indicated that she had left one with CCDC, but that the COVID-19 protocols were making it difficult for physical copies to get to inmates. Id. at 3:25-4:7. Counsel also made clear that she had reviewed the Amended GPA "word for word" with Petitioner. Id. at 3:22. The Court verified that with Petitioner:

THE COURT: Is that correct, Ms. Brown?

DEFENDANT BROWN: Yes.

THE COURT: She read everything to you?

DEFENDANT BROWN: Yes, she did.

THE COURT: Do you wish to go forward today?

DEFENDANT BROWN: Yes.

Id. at 4:8-13. The Court later reaffirmed counsel's review of the Amended GPA:

THE COURT: ...again we had previously mentioned that she did read the entire Guilty Plea Agreement to you; is that correct, ma'am?

DEFENDANT BROWN: Yes.

<u>Id.</u> at 6:10-13. Therefore, because the Court simply wanted Petitioner to have copies to prevent any misunderstandings, and because Petitioner had affirmed that she had been read – and had no questions about – the Amended GPA, there was no "manifest injustice" from Petitioner's lack of possession of a physical copy.

In sum, Petitioner offers only conspiratorial vagaries regarding the procedural history of her guilty plea, lacking any citation to the record or legal substantiation for her inferred deficiencies therein. See Supplement at 3-7. Therefore, Petitioner has failed to demonstrate "manifest injustice" warranting relief.

II. PETITIONER FAILS TO DEMONSTRATE INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that, "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense." The United States Supreme Court has long recognized that "the right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel." <u>Strickland v. Washington</u>, 466 U.S. 668, 686, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2063 (1984); <u>see also State v. Love</u>, 109 Nev. 1136, 1138, 865 P.2d 322, 323 (1993).

To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, a defendant must prove she was denied "reasonably effective assistance" of counsel by satisfying the two-prong test of Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686-87, 104 S.Ct. at 2063-64; see also Love, 109 Nev. at 1138, 865 P.2d at 323. Under Strickland, a defendant must show first that her counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and second, that but for counsel's errors, there is a reasonable probability that the result of the proceedings would have been different. 466 U.S. at 687-88, 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2065, 2068; Warden, Nevada State Prison v. Lyons, 100 Nev. 430, 432, 683 P.2d 504, 505 (1984) (adopting the Strickland two-part test). "[T]here is no reason for a court deciding an ineffective assistance claim to approach the inquiry in the same order or even to address both components of the inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on one." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697, 104 S.Ct. at 2069.

Even if a defendant can demonstrate that her counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, she must still demonstrate prejudice and show a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the result of the trial would have been different. McNelton v. State, 115 Nev. 396, 403, 990 P.2d 1263, 1268 (1999) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. at 2064). "A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Id. (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-89, 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2064-65, 2068). This portion of the test is slightly modified when the convictions occurs due to a guilty plea. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59, 106 S.Ct. 366, 370 (1985); Kirksey v. State, 112 Nev. 980, 988, 923 P.2d 1102, 1107 (1996). For a guilty plea, a

defendant "must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial." <u>Kirksey</u>, 112 Nev. at 998, 923 P.2d at 1107 (quoting <u>Hill</u>, 474 U.S. at 59, 106 S.Ct. at 370).

The court begins with the presumption of effectiveness and then must determine whether the defendant has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that counsel was ineffective. Means v. State, 120 Nev. 1001, 1011, 103 P.3d 25, 32 (2004). "Effective counsel does not mean errorless counsel, but rather counsel whose assistance is '[w]ithin the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases." Jackson v. Warden, 91 Nev. 430, 432, 537 P.2d 473, 474 (1975).

Here, Petitioner initially pled guilty, but then requested new counsel be appointed to look into withdrawing Petitioner's plea. See Court Minutes dated April 30, 2020. New counsel was confirmed on May 7, 2020. See Court Minutes dated May 7, 2020. However, at the status check on Petitioner's plea withdrawal, new counsel represented that she had spoken with Petitioner, and that Petitioner was instead "prepared to go forward with sentencing." RT 6.04.20 at 2:9-12. Indeed, on June 16, 2020, the Court confirmed with Petitioner that she no longer wished to withdraw her plea, but wished "to go forward with the negotiations for [her] two cases." RT 6.16.20 at 2:10-3:2 (Petitioner affirming that she wished to proceed). Therefore, because-Petitioner affirmed that *she* wished to forego her efforts to withdraw her guilty plea, Petitioner cannot demonstrate prejudice. Kirksey, 112 Nev. at 998, 923 P.2d at 1107. Furthermore, Petitioner's decision to proceed with sentencing precludes her plea for a finding of ineffectiveness here, as nothing in the record indicates that counsel had made a value judgment on the likelihood of success of a motion to withdraw, and Petitioner fails to provide any citations that support a finding of ineffectiveness. See Supplement at 7-9.

³ Indeed, Petitioner's assertion that she was "induced by counsel to proceed with [her] guilty plea" is bare and naked, as it is unsupported by any specific citation to the record, and is therefore insufficient to overcome the presumption of counsel's effectiveness. <u>Hargrove</u>, 100 Nev. at 502, 686 P.2d at 225; <u>Means</u>, 120 Nev. at 1011, 103 P.3d at 32.

 Because the record supports only the finding that Petitioner voluntarily abandoned her attempt to withdraw her plea, counsel's performance is not in question, and Petitioner is not entitled to relief.

III. AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING IS NOT NECESSARY

NRS 34.770 determines when a defendant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing. It reads:

- 1. The judge or justice, upon review of the return, answer and all supporting documents which are filed, shall determine whether an evidentiary hearing is required. A petitioner must not be discharged or committed to the custody of a person other than the respondent *unless an evidentiary hearing is held*.
- 2. If the judge or justice determines that the petitioner is not entitled to relief and an evidentiary hearing is not required, he shall dismiss the petition without a hearing.
- without a hearing.

 3. If the judge or justice determines that an evidentiary hearing is required, he shall grant the writ and shall set a date for the hearing.

(Emphasis added).

The Nevada Supreme Court has held that if a petition can be resolved without expanding the record, then no evidentiary hearing is necessary. Marshall v. State, 110 Nev. 1328, 885 P.2d 603 (1994); Mann v. State, 118 Nev. 351, 356, 46 P.3d 1228, 1231 (2002). A defendant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing if his petition is supported by specific factual allegations, which, if true, would entitle him to relief unless the factual allegations are repelled by the record. Marshall, 110 Nev. at 1331, 885 P.2d at 605; see also Hargrove, 100 Nev. at 503, 686 P.2d at 225 (holding that "[a] defendant seeking post-conviction relief is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing on factual allegations belied or repelled by the record"). "A claim is 'belied' when it is contradicted or proven to be false by the record as it existed at the time the claim was made." Mann, 118 Nev. at 354, 46 P.3d at 1230 (2002). Indeed, it is improper to hold an evidentiary hearing simply to make a complete record. See State v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 121 Nev. 225, 234, 112 P.3d 1070, 1076 (2005) ("The district court considered itself the 'equivalent of . . . the trial judge' and consequently wanted 'to make as complete a record as possible.' This is an incorrect basis for an evidentiary hearing.").

As set forth at length, *supra*, Petitioner's claims lack any citation to the record, and are instead belied by the record in this case. <u>See</u> Sections I-II, *supra*; <u>Hargrove</u>, 100 Nev. at 502, 686 P.2d at 225. Therefore, Petitioner's claims are suitable only for summary denial, and no

1	expansion of the record is necessary. Marshall, 110 Nev. 1328, 885 P.2d 603. Indeed		
2	Petitioner includes only a generic assertion that "[a]n evidentiary hearing is necessary to		
3	expand the record concerning these claims," but does not specify what needs to be expanded		
4	upon at such a hearing, or how that would alter Petitioner's belied claims. See Supplement a		
5	9-10.		
6	Because Petitioner fails to set forth any reasoning to support expanding the record, an		
7	because the instant Petition and Supplement may be resolved without any such expansion, the		
8	State respectfully requests that this Court deny Petitioner's request for an evidentiary hearing		
9	CONCLUSION		
10	For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests that this Court summarily		
11	DENY Petitioner's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, and his Supplement thereto.		
12	.0		
13	DATED this day of July, 2021.		
14	Respectfully submitted,		
15	STEVEN B. WOLFSON		
16	Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #001565		
١7			
18	JOHN NIMAN		
19	Deputy District Attorney Nevada Bar #14408		
20	CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE		
21	I certify that on the Affective day of July, 2021, I e-mailed a copy of the foregoing to:		
22	1 cortify that of the 0-4-4 day of July, 2021, 1 c-maned a copy of the fologoning to:		
23	NAME STEVEN OWENS, ESQ. E-Mail: <u>owenscrimlaw@gmail.com</u>		
24	E-Man: <u>owenscrimaw@gman.com</u>		
25	DV. A		
26	BY: Secretary for the District Attorney's Office		
27			
28	JN/mah/L3		

Electronically Filed 8/16/2021 7:47 AM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT

RPLY

2

3

5

7

8

10 11

12

13 14

15

1617

18

19 20

21

2223

24

///

///

///

25

26

27

28

STEVEN S. OWENS, ESQ

Nevada Bar No. 4352

1000 N. Green Valley #440-529

Henderson, Nevada 89074

Telephone: (702) 595-1171 owenscrimlaw@gmail.com

Attorney for Petitioner Lequana Brown

DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

LEQUANA BROWN,

Petitioner,

VS.

THE STATE OF NEVADA; NEVADA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS; FLORENCE McCLURE WOMEN'S CORRECTIONAL CENTER, Warden.

Respondents.

CASE NO.: A-20-823908-W

DEPT NO.: XVII

PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS (POST-CONVICTION)

COMES NOW, Petitioner, LEQUANA BROWN, by and through her counsel of record, STEVEN S. OWENS, ESQ., and hereby submits her Reply to State's Response to Supplemental Brief in Support of Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Post-Conviction).

This Reply is made and based upon the pleadings and papers on file herein, the Points and Authorities attached hereto, and any oral arguments adduced at the time of hearing this matter.

DATED this 16th day of August, 2021.

Respectfully submitted

/s/ Steven S. Owens, Esq.
STEVEN S. OWENS, ESQ.
Nevada Bar No. 4352
1000 N. Green Valley #440-529
Henderson, Nevada 89074
(702) 595-1171

Attorney for Petitioner LEQUANA BROWN

ARGUMENT

I. MANIFEST INJUSTICE.

The State first complains that the supplemental brief is "completely devoid of any citation to the record." State's Response, p. 6. While citations to the record may be required for an appeal, no such requirement is found for supplemental briefs in support of habeas petitions. See NRS 34.735, 34.750. Nonetheless, where appropriate, the supplemental brief generally references dates, transcripts, and hearings in support of the specific facts alleged.

Next, Petitioner does not claim that she was "entitled" to plea negotiations or that the State may never revoke an offer. The authority of the State is a non-issue. While the State is not required to extend any offer of negotiations, if it does so by repeatedly extending but then revoking multiple offers over time the effect can be coercive and confusing on the defendant as in the present case. The repeated extending and revoking of plea offers was a tactic designed to coerce Petitioner's plea.

Petitioner agrees that she made an oral request for release on house arrest prior to pleading guilty on January 3, 2020, and that such was not included as a term of the negotiations. The point is that it should have been and that was her understanding. Petitioner's confusion is apparent at that hearing where she was represented not be her attorney of record, but by some stand-in counsel who left her alone to make the oral request for release from custody. Petitioner represented to the court that her counsel of record had assured her that such a written motion for release had been filed, but she was surprised to learn that it had not been filed. This is also part of the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel claim below. The State responded to Petitioner's misunderstanding and lack of adequate legal representation by revoking the offer for the second time ("but if the offers aren't being entered into today it will again be revoked"). Transcript 1/3/20, p. 8. This was a false threat designed to coerce and rush Petitioner. True to form, the previously revoked offer was re-extended for a third time when the prosecutor almost immediately revoked it for a third time:

And, Your Honor, at this point, the State's going to revoke the offer. We have a pre-trial at 2:00 o'clock. We've already pre-trialed several people. If she wants to take it now, like I told Mr. Arnold earlier, she can have it right now, otherwise its going to be revoked and there won't be any other offers made.

Transcript 3/12/20, p. 4. Certainly, the State has authority to extend and revoke offers, but in this case it was a game and the State abused its power by strategically maneuvering and threatening Petitioner into pleading guilty.

In regard to the filing of habitual notice to punish Petitioner for not previously going through with negotiations, Petitioner does not dispute that only two prior convictions for "any felony" in theory can support habitual adjudication. *Arajakis v. State*, 108 Nev. 976, 983, 843 P.2d 800, 805 (1992) ("NRS 207.010 makes no special allowance for non-violent crimes or for the remoteness of convictions; instead, these are considerations within the discretion of the

district court."). However, when one of those prior convictions is for drugs and is 17 years old, the State knew it stood no realistic chance of obtaining a habitual adjudication that would stand up on appeal, which implies it was only filed to apply further pressure or coercion to get Petitioner to plead guilty.

As to the deadly weapon confusion, the State's argument highlights how the court misled Petitioner when it told her, "as an aider and abettor, you understand that you're liable for everything they do and they're liable for what you do as well as part of the conspiracy to commit this crime?" Transcript 3/12/20, p. 9. Actually, the law in Nevada is that a defendant must have 1) knowledge of the firearm, and 2) benefit from its use before there is aiding and abetting liability of an armed defendant. *Nelson v. State*, 123 Nev. 534, 170 P.3d 517 (2007). It is no wonder Petitioner did not understand the plea as the information given to her was inaccurate.

Finally, it remains fact that there are not one, but two, plea canvasses and guilty plea agreements filed in this case. Which one controls? Is it the first? The second? Both? Or neither? The State simply explains the sequence of events that led to this anomaly, but it remains that there is no legal authority or precedent for having two plea canvasses and two plea agreements in the record.

II. <u>INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL.</u>

Petitioner disagrees that new counsel was appointed to simply "look into withdrawing Petitioner's plea." State's Response, p. 14. Rather, Petitioner unequivocally expressed her need and desire for alternate counsel specifically to withdraw her plea because it had been falsely induced:

I was under false and um – he gave me false information about me going to – I was supposed to start trial basically and then I had signed for a deal before this

deal that I took. So I was under the impression that I was coming to court to finish that deal cause I had signed for it which that's not what I went to court for. I didn't know about me taking – this going to – get the 8 years –

Transcript 4/30/20, p. 2. Prior counsel's derelictions are set forth in much more detail in the pro se habeas petition filed on October 29, 2020.

Although new counsel represented on June 4, 2020, that Petitioner was prepared to go forward with "sentencing," Petitioner herself was not present and was never actually asked whether she had changed her mind about wanting to withdraw her guilty plea. Instead, at the next court hearing on June 16, 2020, the court simply asked Petitioner if she was prepared to go forward with "negotiations." Transcript 6/16/20, p. 2-3. After appointment of new counsel, Petitioner's expressed desire to withdraw from her guilty plea was simply not addressed again on the record.

III. EVIDENTIARY HEARING.

Petitioner agrees that a claim is "belied" when it is "contradicted or proven to be false by the record as it existed at the time the claim was made." State's Response, p. 15, *quoting Mann v. State*, 118 Nev. 351, 354, 46 P.3d 1228, 1230 (2002). However, Petitioner disagrees that the claims made in this case are proven wrong by the existing record. Rather, the record is wholly silent or conflicting as to whether and how new counsel talked Petitioner out of withdrawing her guilty plea. The existing record actually supports Petitioner's claim that her will was overborne by bad advice of counsel, multiple changes in plea offers, continual revising of written plea agreements, incorrect paperwork, contingent plea offers, frivolous habitual charges, and a multiplicity of cases.

Wherefore, Brown respectfully requests this Court grant her Petition due to the ineffective assistance of counsel and invalid plea, or alternatively to hold an evidentiary hearing to allow her an opportunity to establish her claims for relief. Dated this 16th day of August, 2021. Respectfully Submitted, /s/ Steven S. Owens, Esq. STEVEN S. OWENS, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 4352 1000 N. Green Valley #440-529 Henderson, Nevada 89074 (702) 595-1171 Attorney for Petitioner LEQUANA BROWN

1	<u>CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE</u>		
2	I hereby certify that on the 16 th day of August, 2021, I served a true and correct copy of		
3	the foregoing document entitled REPLY TO STATE'S RESPONSE TO SUPPLEMENTAL		
4	BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS (POST-		
5	CONVICTION) to the Clark County District Attorney's Office by sending a copy via		
6	electronic mail to:		
7			
8			
9	CLARK COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE		
10	Steve Wolfson		
11	Motions@clarkcountyda.com		
12			
13	BY:		
14 15	/s/ Steven S. Owens, Esq.		
16	STEVEN S. OWENS, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 4352		
17	1000 N. Green Valley #440-529		
18	Henderson, Nevada 89074 (702) 595-1171		
19	Attorney for Petitioner		
20	LEQUANA BROWN		
21			
22			
23			
24			
25			
26			
27			
28	7		

A-20-823908-W

DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

Writ of Habeas Corpus COURT MINUTES August 26, 2021

A-20-823908-W Lequana Brown, Plaintiff(s)

VS.

State of Nevada, Defendant(s)

August 26, 2021 10:00 AM Argument

HEARD BY: Villani, Michael COURTROOM: RJC Courtroom 11A

COURT CLERK: Albrecht, Samantha

RECORDER: Santi, Kristine

REPORTER:

PARTIES PRESENT:

Seleste A Wyse Attorney for Defendant

State of Nevada Defendant

Steven S. Owens Attorney for Plaintiff

JOURNAL ENTRIES

Defendant not present.

Mr. Owens advised Defendant was seeking to withdraw her plea based on manifest injustice and ineffectiveness of counsel. Argument by Mr. Owens. State submitted on their response. COURT ORDERED, Evidentiary Hearing to be SET for the second plea with Matthew Lay and Rochelle Nguyen present. Court stated it wanted to hear this Evidentiary Hearing before the reassignment on September 7th. Court advised the Law Clerk would reach out to the parties regarding an available date for the Evidentiary Hearing on either Friday or Monday and if the Court was unable to place the matter on calendar next week for the Evidentiary Hearing, case would be set for a Status Check regarding setting of the Evidentiary Hearing.

NDC

Printed Date: 9/1/2021 Page 1 of 1 Minutes Date: August 26, 2021

Prepared by: Samantha Albrecht

A-20-823908-W

DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

Writ of Habeas Corpus COURT MINUTES September 02, 2021

A-20-823908-W Lequana Brown, Plaintiff(s)

VS.

State of Nevada, Defendant(s)

September 02, 2021 08:30 AM Status Check: Scheduling Evidentiary Hearing

HEARD BY: Villani, Michael COURTROOM: RJC Courtroom 11A

COURT CLERK: Albrecht, Samantha

RECORDER: Santi, Kristine

REPORTER:

PARTIES PRESENT:

John T. Niman Attorney for Defendant

State of Nevada Defendant

Steven S. Owens Attorney for Plaintiff

JOURNAL ENTRIES

Defendant not present.

Mr. Owens advised they were unable to get the Defendant transported and the 2 witnesses, Matthew Lay and Rochelle Nguyen, were unavailable this week, therefore he requested an Evidentiary Hearing be set in 30 to 45 days per the prison's request. COURT ORDERED, Status Check CONTINUED. Court noted it was available, however Defendant was unable to be transported and the witnesses were unavailable.

NDC

CONTINUED TO: 9/9/2021 8:30 AM

Printed Date: 9/8/2021 Page 1 of 1 Minutes Date: September 02, 2021

Prepared by: Samantha Albrecht

Electronically Filed 9/4/2021 1:24 PM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT

NOCH

2

1

3

4

5

6

7

8 9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21 22

23

24

25

26 27

28

DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

Lequana Brown, Plaintiff(s)

VS.

State of Nevada, Defendant(s)

Case No.: A-20-823908-W

Department 19

NOTICE OF CHANGE OF HEARING

The hearing on the Status Check presently set for September 09, 2021, at 8:30 AM has been moved to the 9th day of September, 2021, at 8:30 AM and will be heard by Judge Crystal Eller.

STEVEN D. GRIERSON, CEO/Clerk of the Court

By: /s/ Tanjel Stowe

Tanjel Stowe

Deputy Clerk of the Court

AA 0348

Case Number: A-20-823908-W

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 1 2 I hereby certify that this 4th day of September, 2021 3 The foregoing Notice of Change of Hearing was electronically served to all registered 4 parties for case number A-20-823908-W. 5 I mailed, via first-class, postage fully prepaid, the foregoing Clerk of the Court, Notice 6 of Change of Hearing to: 7 Steven S Owens PO Box 552212 8 Las Vegas NV 89155-221 9 I placed a copy of the foregoing Notice of Change of Hearing in the appropriate 10 attorney folder located in the Clerk of the Court's Office: 11 Steven S. Owens David L. Stanton 12 Agnes M Botelho 13 Steven B Wolfson Vivian Luong 14 Seleste A Wyse 15 /s/ Tanjel Stowe Tanjel Stowe 16 Deputy Clerk of the Court 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27

A-20-823908-W

DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

Writ of Habeas Corpus COURT MINUTES September 09, 2021

A-20-823908-W Lequana Brown, Plaintiff(s)

VS.

State of Nevada, Defendant(s)

September 09, 2021 11:00 AM Status Check: Scheduling Evidentiary Hearing

HEARD BY: Eller, Crystal COURTROOM: RJC Courtroom 03E

COURT CLERK: Moleres, Cynthia RECORDER: Amoroso, Brittany

REPORTER:

PARTIES PRESENT:

John T. Niman Attorney for Defendant
Steven S. Owens Attorney for Plaintiff

JOURNAL ENTRIES

Counsel appeared via BlueJeans.

Defendant not present. Colloquy regarding hearing date. COURT ORDERED, evidentiary hearing SET.

IN CUSTODY

11/04/21 1:00 P.M. EVIDENTIARY HEARING

Printed Date: 9/10/2021 Page 1 of 1 Minutes Date: September 09, 2021

Prepared by: Cynthia Moleres

Electronically Filed 12/1/2021 5:04 PM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT

RTRAN 1 2 3 DISTRICT COURT 5 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 6 7 8 LEQUANA BROWN, CASE NO.: A-20-823908-W 9 DEPT. XIX Plaintiff, 10 VS. 11 STATE OF NEVADA, 12 Defendant. 13 BEFORE THE HONORABLE CRYSTAL ELLER, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 14 THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 4, 2021 15 RECORDER'S TRANSCRIPT OF HEARING RE: 16 **EVIDENTIARY HEARING** 17 18 APPEARANCES: 19 STEVEN S. OWENS, ESQ. For the Plaintiff: [Via Bluejeans] 20 For the Defendant: JOHN T. NIMAN, ESQ. 21 **Deputy District Attorney** 22 23 24 RECORDED BY: BRITTANY AMOROSO, COURT RECORDER 25

INDEX OF WITNESSES

3	PLAINTIFF WITNESSES:	<u>PAGE</u>
4	ROCHELLE NGUYEN	
5	Direct Examination by Mr. Owens	4
٦	Cross-Examination by Mr. Niman	13
6	Redirect Examination by Mr. Owens	23
7	LEQUANA BROWN	
	Direct Examination by Mr. Owens	26
8	Cross-Examination by Mr. Niman	33
9	Redirect Examination by Mr. Owens	48

1	Las Vegas, Nevada; Thursday, November 4, 2021	
2		
3	[Hearing commenced at 1:49 p.m.]	
4	THE COURT CLERK: Lequana Brown versus State of	
5	Nevada.	
6	MR. OWENS: Steve Owens present for Ms. Brown.	
7	MR. NIMAN: And John Niman on behalf of the State.	
8	MR. OWENS: And Ms. Brown is appearing via Bluejeans as	
9	am I.	
10	THE COURT: Ms. Brown?	
11	THE WITNESS: Ms. Brown right here. Yes.	
12	THE COURT: Okay. I see you.	
13	All right. This is the time we have set for Evidentiary Hearing	
14	with regard to writ of habeas corpus to withdraw a plea.	
15	I guess, Mr. Owens, do you want to begin?	
16	MR. OWENS: Certainly. Judge, we argued this briefed it	
17	and argued it previously to Judge Villani who ordered an Evidentiary	
18	Hearing so I've got two witnesses hear today, Rochelle Nguyen who	
19	was counsel for the plea and then Ms. Brown will testify.	
20	I'd like to start by calling Rochelle Nguyen.	
21	THE COURT: Thank you.	
22	THE COURT CLERK: Ms. Nguyen, can you raise your right	
23	hand for me?	
24	ROCHELLE NGUYEN	
25	[having been called as a witness and being first duly sworn testified as	

1	follows:]		
2	THE COURT CLERK: You're muted.		
3	THE WITNESS: Am I still muted?		
4	THE COURT CLERK: There you go. Thank you. Please		
5	state and spell your name		
6	THE WITNESS: I do.		
7	THE COURT CLERK: for the record.		
8	THE WITNESS: Rochelle Nguyen, R-O-C-H-E-L-L-E, last		
9	name is N as in Nancy, G-U-Y-E-N.		
10	DIRECT EXAMINATION		
11	BY MR. OWENS:		
12	Q Ms. Nguyen, you're partnered in a legal practice with attorney		
13	Matthew Lay; is that correct?		
14	A That's correct.		
15	Q And your office received the appointment to represent		
16	Lequana Brown in the underlying criminal case that's before the Court		
17	today; is that right?		
18	A That's correct. I believe we were appointed and confirmed as		
19	counsel on May 7 th , 2020.		
20	Q And between you and Matthew Lay, you were the one that		
21	predominantly made the court appearances and had interactions with		
22	Ms. Brown; is that right?		
23	A That's correct.		
24	Q So, on the date of your appointment, which you said was May		
25	7 th of 2020, do you recall the status of the case and what had gone on		

before then?

A We did have the opportunity to look at it. Usually we will get a little bit of advanced notice that we're being appointed to a case. And even when we don't have the file, it's my practice to kind of look through Odyssey and pull down the documents to kind of see what the procedural history of the case was.

So, it was my understanding that she had entered a plea previously with Mr. Arnold and was seeking to withdraw that plea.

Q Very good. Do you remember anything about her interactions with Mr. Arnold that caused him to be withdrawn as counsel?

A Prior to my appointment and prior to speaking with her, you could tell from the court records that she had questions even during the plea, just from the minutes. I saw some minutes that indicated that she would only take a deal if there was house arrest and the Judge, even in the minutes, said something about how he wasn't going to let her take a deal just to get out of custody.

So, I saw some of that and then it wasn't until I spoke with her that I realized what the issues were with Mr. Arnold.

Q Okay. And you're aware that she asked to withdraw Carl Arnold and wanted to withdraw her guilty plea when she appeared in court on May 30th? I guess that's just a week before your office was appointed. She had expressed to the judge she wanted to withdraw from that plea with Carl Arnold; is that right?

A Yes, that's correct. I knew that was her intention. She had made it very clear with the Court and so when I spoke with her, we

discussed that.

Q You never filed a motion to withdraw her plea; is that right?

A I did not.

Q And why is that?

A After speaking with her I had talked to her -- I'm sorry, just for clarification, Your Honor, has she -- I know that typically she's canvassed as a part of entering her petition, but I just wanted to make sure it was okay for me to speak about things that were client -- attorney client privilege before moving on to our -- talking about our conversations.

MR. NIMAN: That's a good point, Your Honor. As a part of a petition the Defendant needs to waive their attorney client privilege as to their previous counsel so that Counsel can testify as to any interactions that they had with their client because they're raising ineffective assistance of counsel claims.

MR. OWENS: And I certainly don't disagree with that. It's waived to the extent necessary so that she can -- challenge her plea here.

THE COURT: Thank you.

BY MR. OWENS:

A Thank you, Your Honor. I'm sorry. I will try not to ramble on. I had spoke with Ms. Brown over the phone. I know that at the time she had indicated to me that it was her understanding that Carl Arnold's father had recently passed away. And after that happened, Mr. Arnold just stopped communicating with Ms. Brown and that he didn't answer

.,

her telephone calls and he didn't talk to her, except for like in the minutes prior to court.

Q Okay.

A And she had also indicated to me that she had always believed that the offer being extended in her case was 6 to 15 years and she didn't understand the negotiation that she had entered into because Mr. Arnold had told her all of that.

Q All right. So are you aware that there was -- prior to the plea with Carl Arnold, there was an offer originally in this case that involved a 6 to 15 year exposure?

A It's my understanding in looking at the record and also talking with Ms. Brown that there had been.

Q Okay. And yet, what she entered with Carl Arnold was between two cases was amounting to an 8 to 20. Does that sound right?

A That sounds correct.

Q Okay. So, I'm showing that by June 4th, you came to the Court. The Defendant wasn't -- wasn't present in court at that time, she was out in Henderson. But you told the Judge that you had spoken with Defendant and that she was ready to proceed to sentencing. Can you tell me what predated that between the date of your appointment and this June 4th announcement that you're now ready to go forward with sentencing that caused you to not file the motion to withdraw a plea, but now proceed on the prior plea agreement that she had rejected?

A I spoke with Ms. Brown on several occasions. In fact, I

remember Ms. Brown just because she has a very unique personality and I like -- I remember her story about her life and I tend to get to know my clients even during the short period of time that I am in their lives.

So, I did talk to her several times over the telephone.

Probably multiple hours, honestly, if I'm being honest. I obviously got some information about her communication with Mr. Arnold. My first intent when I talked to her was -- how could we seek to withdraw her plea? What kind of ineffective assistance of counsel claims did we have against Mr. Arnold? Which I honestly believe that they did exist. And I was prepared to go forward filing that motion to withdraw a plea.

I did talk to her about what it meant to withdraw her plea because I thought it was very important for her to have that full understanding that withdrawing her plea and if she was successful, she would have to go to trial on all of the pending charges which were quite voluminous. And so, while she may not have received effective assistance of counsel from her prior attorney, I wanted to make sure that we went over all of her facts and details surrounding her case.

Going forward, if she was successful in withdrawing her plea, to see in fact if she wanted to withdraw her plea. So, we did have those conversations. And at the end of those conversations, it was clear that while she may not have had her questions answered by her prior attorney, that I had answered all of her questions going forward and that she still wanted to accept a negotiation because it was still in her best interest to go forward with the plea negotiation now that she understood all the facts and circumstances, if that makes sense.

- Q And it's fair to say there was a lot of incidents in several cases that were involved in this global negotiation; is that right?
 - A That's correct.
- Q And so this case dealt with an offense at Champs Sporting Goods and at Big 5. Also, there was another case that dealt with Victoria's Secret and then you had the Henderson case; is that right?
 - A That's correct.
- Q And there was in fact two co-defendants where the negotiations were contingent on everyone taking a deal; is that right?
 - A That's correct.
- Q And there was multiple plea agreements in this case. The 6 to 15 which we already referenced, the 8 to 20 aggregate sentence that she entered with Carl Arnold, and then a second plea agreement that you negotiated that was basically the same thing in terms of 8 to 20 years; is that right?
- A It was slightly different. It included the Henderson case that had either inadvertently been left out or Mr. Arnold wasn't aware of it. So, it was a slightly better negotiation.

As far as the -- 6 to 15 negotiation, I don't believe that was ever entered into.

- Q Okay, but there was -- you're aware that that type of negotiation was bounced around, in fact, there was a plea agreement, perhaps it was signed but never filed?
 - A That's my understanding, yes.
 - Q Okay. So, as attorneys we deal with these things all the time

but a lay individual might have some confusion over this number of counts and cases and guilty plea agreements and I don't know if we want to call it tortured history, but the case being on calendar several times for entry of plea and kept getting pushed back and put off to change things; is that right?

- A That's correct. Although, I wouldn't say that was unusual.
- Q Okay. And the prosecutor extended offers and then revoked offers. Does that sound familiar?
 - A It was but that's prior to my representation of Ms. Brown.
- Q Okay, but in your experience does that put some pressure on the client when the prosecutor extends and then revokes offers repeatedly?
- A I don't know. I'm assuming all of the -- I think being a part of the criminal process is probably a pressure filled thing. I can't speculate as to, you know, what Ms. Brown was feeling at that time.
 - Q Okay.
 - A And like I said, I did not represent her at that time.
- Q Considering the size of the cases involved, the number of counts and different incidents involved, do you feel like you had enough time to really get up to speed with the case before you talked to her out of withdrawing the plea and proceeding with basically the same plea agreement again?
- A Well, I didn't talk her out of withdrawing her plea. I just explained to her her options. I wanted to make sure that she was having all of the information before her before making a decision.

In talking with her it was super clear the Mr. Arnold had not had that level of communication prior to my appointment, either when the initial offer was accepted -- or rejected, that the 6 to 15 that you referenced. You know, I did see from the history with Mr. Arnold that it had gone back and forth and the offer had gotten worse as they had proceeded through the process.

By the time I was, you know, appointed to represent Ms.

Brown -- habitual notice had already been filed. The offer had previously been rejected. Her plea was there and I wanted to make sure she had all of that information.

As you are aware, Mr. Owens, majority of our cases resolve in that two weeks between arraignment and preliminary hearing. I think I heard last from the District Court that 95 percent of the cases are resolved in that fashion. So, in this case I actually had even more time to prepare than I previously had to prepare.

Q You mention that the State filed a habitual notice. That included just two prior convictions, one of which was for drugs and was 17 years old. How did that factor into your assessment of the merits of the plea agreement?

A Even despite the habitual criminal, like seeking habitual criminal, unfortunately I think in 2020 the new habitual statute had not taken place. It did not go into effect as a part of Assembly Bill 236 until July of 2020. But at that time, it was not in effect so it was an eligible felony conviction for purposes of habitual.

But I will tell you the sheer number of charges that she had

arising out of these three separate cases, which gave me greater concern for her. And so the negotiation in this case, while the habitual was one of the aspects that I took into consideration in advising her of this negotiation, there was also the sheer number of exposure that she had. I mean, it would be decades of time if she was convicted at trial on any one of these cases. So, it was one of the factors, but not just one of them, many of them.

Q Would you agree with me that although she was eligible technically for habitual, that was an unlikely scenario?

A I believed that it was a possibility just -- not habitual, but maybe unlikely. It was discretionary obviously and it went before Judge Villani. So, it was something that -- to be considered. I mean, anytime you have that habitual notice I think it's dependent on Counsel to advise them as the potential consequences.

But I -- like I said before, I think the bigger risk for Ms. Brown was the sheer number of counts involved in all of the three cases that she had pending before the Courts.

Q Now the guilty plea agreement that you entered into with Ms. Brown, do you recall from the plea time that she said that she did not actually ever get a physical copy of the plea agreement?

A Yes. I believe this was like, at the -- like the very onset of some of the, I guess, functions of our society shutting down because of Covid-19. We had protocol to sign things on her behalf. There wasn't a transfer of physical documents that was taking place in the courtrooms. So, it was definitely one of those things I did hand deliver to the Clark

County Detention Center during that time, a copy of it as well as put a copy in the mail.

And -- but furthermore, I remember going specifically line for line with Ms. Brown. I know that she was coming from a position where she had poor representation or inadequate representation and communication from Mr. Arnold, so I wanted to make sure that I went over everything extremely, like thoroughly with her.

And so, if there was any error in the guilty plea agreement, I asked for it to be corrected, not just by interlineation in court like sometimes happens, which I think is acceptable that under these circumstances I wanted to make sure everything was in writing so it was very clear.

Q Would you agree with me that hearing a lengthy plea agreement read to you over the telephone is not as conducive to a full understanding as having the written document actually in front of you that you can peruse at your own speed and pace?

A I think it depends on people's literacy and whether or not they're audible learners or they need to see something in writing, so I think that would be a question probably best answered by Ms. Brown.

MR. OWENS: Thank you. I don't have any further questions.

MR. NIMAN: Thank you.

CROSS EXAMINATION

BY MR. NIMAN:

- Q Ms. Nguyen, how long have you been an attorney?
- A I've been licensed since 2002.

Q And could you ballpark maybe how many cases, roughly, you've handled?

A I would a Clark County Public Defender for 3 years and I've held a contract as a court appointed attorney -- track attorney for, I don't know, since I think 2008, 2007. So, I don't know, hundreds.

Q And would it be fair to say that in those hundreds of cases the majority of the clients decide to accept the lesser -- charges and decide to plead guilty?

A Yes, that's the case within the Eighth Judicial District Court.

Q Sure. And then for the most part would you say that they end up with outcomes that are better than you think they would get at trial as one of the reasons they accept guilty pleas?

A That's one of the things I focus on in the guilty plea agreement. It's usually on the last page -- the voluntariness of the plea. It says you're accepting this plea bargain because you believe accepting this negotiation is better than going to trial on all the original charges, so yes, I do think so.

Q Okay, and so having so many clients and having so many of them enter into guilty pleas, you're aware of the importance of these pleas being fairly and voluntarily entered into?

- A Yes, of course.
- Q And it's -- well, strike that. Hang on.

So, you had mentioned that one of the things that you were concerned about in this particular case was the exposure; is that right?

A That's correct.

- Q And so, this case, the criminal case number was C344112. She was a co-defendant so it was -3. There were 9 felony counts; is that right?
 - A That's correct.
- Q And at least two of those were robbery with use, which would entail a -- a mandatory consecutive sentence as well; is that right?
 - A That's correct.
- Q Okay. Do you remember if at some point you tallied up the amount of possible exposure in this case?
- A I typically do that and then I will go over and explain the potential exposure that a client may have if they are convicted of the charges that they are looking at.
- Q Okay. So, if I said that the potential top end on this if everything was run consecutive with something like a 177 years, would that sound about right?
- A That sounds about right. Probably unlikely, but yes, that would be the maximum number.
- Q Sure. I mean, I would not be likely that all of that would be run consecutive, but it's not impossible under the law; right?
 - A No, it is not.
- Q Okay. And then there was another case, that one was C344268 and again, she was a co-defendant so it was -2, there was also part of these negotiations; is that correct?
 - A That's correct.
 - Q And that case, I believe as Mr. Owens had said, in both

Victoria's Secret and some other retail thefts, do you remember that that case had 19 felonies attached to it?

A Yes.

Q Okay. Did you talk about that other case since this was a combined plea agreement with her when you were discussing the potential of whether she should accept this plea or not?

A I did.

Q And do you recall if the exposure in that case was roughly the same as it was in this case?

A That's correct.

Q And it's also possible, although perhaps unlikely, that both of the cases could have been run consecutive to each other; is that right?

A That's correct.

Q Okay. You -- we had mentioned that there had been a prior offer. This was before you were involved. Did you talk with her or how did you find out that there had been 6 to 15 offer when Mr. Arnold was representing her?

A Looking at my notes prior to today's testimony, I saw that she had told me around like June 2nd, when we had talked on the phone about Mr. Arnold's prior representation of her. And so I was aware of it then and I believe there was some reference to it in some of the Court minutes as well.

Q Okay. But you had seen the minutes and you got the information from there and also in your conversations with her?

A That's correct. And I did reach out to the District Attorney to

11

21

25

behalf in representing your client; is that right? Oh, I'm sorry. I take that

back. Mr. --

A So, I don't believe I did on that first court appearance. I believe Mr. Lay did.

- Q And was it your understanding that although, I believe you testified that typically you get all of the files from Odyssey. You wanted to get the file itself from Mr. Arnold at that time?
 - A That's correct.
- Q Okay. And that was so that you could familiarize yourself with all of the records that Mr. Arnold had prepared and you could speak with your client about this offer?
 - A Yes. If he had any notes, which I don't believe he did.
- Q Okay. But you wanted to know what was there regardless either way.
 - A That's correct.
- Q Okay. So, you appeared in court again on June 4th of 2020; is that correct?
 - A That's correct.
- Q And at that time, Ms. Brown was not with you but you had testified previously you had had some conversations and at that time she wanted to accept the negotiation and no longer wanted to withdraw her plea; is that right?
- A That was my understanding on the -- based on the conversations that I had with her.
 - Q Okay. And you made that representation to the Court as well?
 - A I did. But Ms. Brown, I believe, was in Henderson on that day.

Q Right. You appeared in court again on June 11th of 2020; is that right?

A Sounds familiar.

Q Okay. And at that time, after you had had those conversations with Ms. Brown, was Ms. Brown prepared to be sentenced on June 11th?

A I don't remember. I remember we had some problems with the guilty plea agreement, either not including like a Henderson case or not being clear, so I think it was passed again. I don't believe she was sentenced at that time. We wanted to make sure.

Q Do you --

A Like, I remember -- I think -- I don't know if it was that date but there was one date where Judge Villani was very clear that he had asked if we were going to withdraw the plea and I said no. But he said are -- is Ms. Brown recanting her allegations about ineffective assistance of counsel? And I said no, we are not doing that either. And that's when he indicated that he wanted to make sure out of an abundance of caution that she entered into the -- a new plea agreement. And so, I think we had to prepare like a new guilty --- new guilty plea agreement.

Q Okay. And you said that you believed it was --

A I don't know if it was on that date. I'll be honest with you, I don't know if it was on that date. So, I think you guys would probably have those records in front of you.

Q If the record reflected it was on that date, you wouldn't have any reason to dispute it?

A No.

Q Okay. So, about five days later on June 16th, 2020 you appeared in court again with Ms. Brown; is that right?

A That sounds about right.

Q And this time, you had negotiated with the Deputy District Attorney to include the Henderson case; is that right?

A That sounds correct.

Q Okay. And the Henderson case, that had seven or eight additional felony counts on top of all of the felony counts that were in these two cases; is that right?

A That's correct. And I knew she had been in Henderson and that when this court date in early June, and so I wanted to make sure that she didn't accept a negotiation that didn't include that.

Q Okay. And so, with respect to the guilty plea at this point, it was exactly the same deal that she had been extended with Mr. Arnold, except it included the additional benefit of the dismissal of the Henderson charges; is that right?

A That's correct.

Q Okay. And do you recall if the Court -- well I guess not on that date -- pardon me, one second here.

At that time, I think, as Mr. Owens had said, Ms. Brown didn't have the documents in front of her despite the fact that you had handed it to CCDC and I -- do you recall that you -- stated to the Court that you mailed it to her twice as well?

A I did.

- Q Okay. But you also called her?
- A She did not have them physically.
- Q Right. But you had sent it twice and also walked it down to CCDC; is that right?

A That's correct. And I recall -- I recall something about how she received it, she just didn't bring it to court with her. Maybe that was it because they wouldn't let her bring the documents from the jail to court. So, I think she did have it she just didn't bring it to the physical courtroom.

- Q Okay. And you also had a phone conversation with Ms. Brown about the GPA; is that right?
 - A I did. I did go through that with her.
- Q In fact, you represented to the Court that you went through it line by line with her; is that correct?
 - A That's correct.
- Q And based on that conversation that you had with Ms. Brown, by the time you had gone through the guilty plea agreement with her, did you believe that she had any further questions or was confused in any way about the negotiation?

A I don't believe so. In fact, the phone hung up like many time because we're on like, timers. So, I know she had to call back, like numerous times -- you have to call back every 15 minutes because the phone will cut off at the jail for attorney calls.

Q Do you recall if she had some questions about the negotiation in that conversation with you?

21

believed that to be the case? 1 Yes, and I wouldn't have signed the guilty plea agreement if I 2 Α didn't think so. 3 MR. NIMAN: Okay. I don't have any further questions, Your 4 Honor. 5 THE COURT: Thank you. Any follow up? 6 7 MR. OWENS: I've got just a couple follow up. 8 THE COURT: Okay. REDIRECT EXAMINATION 9 10 BY MR. OWENS: 11 Q Ms. Nguyen, just to put some context to this 177 years that Mr. Niman came up with, all of these cases of the Defendant's that we're 12 13 talking about here, they're all retail shoplifting; is that right? Α That's correct. 14 15 Q There's a group of individuals of which Ms. Brown was alleged 16 to be one who'd go into a retail establishment and shoplift some 17 merchandise; right? Α That's correct. 18 And in many situations that's charged as a petty larceny. You 19 Q 20 ever had those kinds of cases before? 21 Α I have. But I believe there was like an allegation of a BB gun and like a knife in these cases. 22 23 Q Yeah, so there's two counts involving a deadly weapon. As 24 you said, one was a BB gun and that was in the possession of not Ms. 25 Nguyen, allegedly, but a co-defendant. Does that sound right?

A Well, hopefully it wasn't me, but I think you were referring to Ms. Brown.

Q I'm sorry. I get the names confused. The BB gun was in a codefendant's possession, not Ms. Brown's possession?

A That's correct, but as you know it was charged under the three theories of liability, either she directly committed the crime, aided and abetted, or pursuant to conspiracy.

Q Yeah, I'm familiar with those theories, but specifically when it comes to use of a deadly weapon, the State has to show that she knew the co-defendant had a weapon and would be using it in the incident, just by curious viability is not enough unless they can show knowledge of the weapon. So would you agree that that deadly weapon count at least was potentially defensible?

A Potentially.

Q And you mentioned the other deadly weapon was a -- an alleged knife that Ms. Brown had; right?

A I believe it was a knife, I can't remember exactly but I remember it being a knife or a box cutter or something like that.

Q And are you aware that there was a videotape of that incident and it did not show her brandishing any type of knife?

A And that was a potential defense that we had talked about.

Q So, despite the 177 years, these were at assets shoplifting charges that did carry some serious allegations here, but there were possible defenses to them; is that right?

A That's correct.

1	MR. OWENS: That's all I have.		
2	MR. NIMAN: I have no follow up, thank you.		
3	THE COURT: Nothing else?		
4	MR. NIMAN: Nothing else.		
5	THE COURT: All right. Thank you, Ms. Nguyen. I believe		
6	you're excused.		
7	THE WITNESS: Thank you are there any other questions?		
8	THE COURT: Nope.		
9	MR. NIMAN: Nope.		
10	THE WITNESS: Okay, thank you.		
11	THE COURT: Thank you.		
12	MR. NIMAN: Thank you.		
13	MR. OWENS: Thanks.		
14	THE COURT: Thank you for being here.		
15	MR. OWENS: Judge, I would next call my client, Ms. Brown,		
16	the Defendant.		
17	THE COURT: Okay. Ms. Brown, can you hear us?		
18	THE WITNESS: Yes, I can hear you.		
19	THE COURT: All right. My clerk's going to swear you in.		
20	THE COURT CLERK: Can you raise your right hand? The		
21	best you can. Thank you.		
22	LEQUANA BROWN		
23	[having been called as a witness and being first duly sworn testified as		
24	follows:]		
25	THE COURT CLERK: Please state and spell your name for		

the record.

THE WITNESS: Lequana Brown. L-E-Q-U-A-N-A, Brown, B-R-O-W-N.

DIRECT EXAMINATION

BY MR. OWENS:

- Q All right. Ms. Brown, you recognize the witness that testified just before you, Rochelle Nguyen?
 - A Yes.
- Q And she was your counsel after Mr. Carl Arnold; is that correct?
 - A Yes.
- Q Can you tell me some of the concerns you had with Carl Arnold that caused you to ask that he be removed from the case?

A Okay. So, when I was -- when Carl Arnold was appointed to me, for one, he always showed up to court late. I never talked to him, not one time over the phone. So we never talked over -- to discuss my case. It was always inside the courtroom and right before court started.

And I never talked to him and then once -- once I seen his investigator and she showed me the audio that was -- would be presented to the judge and the DA and everyone else. I kept telling him, which he was telling me to take the time, take the time. I was like, well why would I take the time when there was no weapon in no case. I never had a weapon.

So, once I seen the DVD and I assumed that everyone else would see the DVD, because that's what they pass out to everyone in

the courtroom that day, I was wondering -- I told him, well you supposed to be my lawyer and you're not fighting for me.

And not only that, I was getting upset because I was -- would call him and he would never answer the phone. It was -- I never had contact with him, it was only the investigator. And then on top of that, he has to list -- told me to find people in custody and he will put money on my books. He had -- and he said that he put money on the books and to find people in court. I just felt like, that what I was up against and what I knew that had happened and what was presented and what everyone would see -- the Judge, the DA, and everyone else in the courtroom that I was not comfortable with it -- what was going on. And I was not -- I've never understood anything with him. It was just --

Q And it was also something about a bail motion that he said he filed but you later found out there was none?

A Okay. So I asked him about the bail motion and the house arrest and he said that he filed it but they told him no. But through the process of it, I found out that he never filed for bail motion or ankle monitor.

Q All right. Now tell me about this offer that's in the record -- it's in the court minutes at November 19th of 2019, that there was an offer supposedly for 6 to 15 years. Do you remember that, Ms. Brown?

A Yeah, so we were at court and he had the DA -- the lady that told him it was a offer in the courtroom for 6 to 15 and he asked me did I want -- he has to come talk to me to see if I want to take the time. And at that time after he talked to me, I agreed to take the time. I want to

take the time, so I signed off on it.

But when -- after I signed off on it, the judge had walked off and then we come -- we came back and when I was supposed to finish, I told him I needed more time to think about it. So, it was no more court and then I didn't see him for a while and I thought my next court date, that would be the 6 to 15 -- that we were finishing the deal for a 6 to 15. Then, that I've never been in this situation before, I'm thinking that my lawyer -- it's for my best interest. So -- I didn't read over the plea agreement. I just assumed that there was a 6 to 15. So -- and that's why --

Q I'm sorry to interrupt. So you signed a guilty plea agreement for 6 to 15 but that was just never filed in court; is that right?

A Right. And before they brought me out to court, something just told me to go through my paperwork. I actually found the plea agreement for the 6 to 15. Whether they put it on record or not, I have -- you can't bring stuff with you to court, so they didn't let me bring it. But you guys, I'm assuming if I have that paperwork, they should have it too, whether it was filed or not.

Q And you never got the plea agreement that you entered into with Ms. Nguyen on -- let me get the dates right here. On June 17th you pled guilty but you said in court that you didn't have that physically, the paperwork in front of you, that it was just read to you over the phone, that you authorized your attorney to sign it but you never signed it yourself in person; is that right?

A That's right. In court, when they asked me did I have it, I told

them that I didn't have it and I wanted to see it. She knew I didn't have it because that's when she said that she had delivered it -- hand delivered it to CCDC and that's when someone said, due to the Corona virus, I probably didn't receive it. And I said that I didn't receive it and I want to see it to understand.

There was so much going on with the case and one in Henderson, and back and forth. Not just with Carl but with another -- someone else that took the case named Roger Bradley or Bailey. Before when it took the case, I was looking at my paperwork, I seen that too. So, it was just -- it was all confusing.

And the Henderson case was always a part of it because they kept telling me when I went to Henderson that I couldn't go and plead guilty on the Henderson case because it was a part of the other case. So, for them to say that they didn't have the paperwork, I don't understand that -- how I didn't have it in the Henderson case if they all knew what was going on, so I don't understand that.

Q The dismissal in Henderson case was always contemplated by the negotiations, it just didn't make it into the written plea agreement and had to be -- the case continued for that purpose; is that right?

A Right.

Q In fact, there was -- you came to court many times to plead guilty and the offers kept getting extended to you and then revoked. Do you remember that happening?

A The offer was extended to me. I got the 6 to 15 and then I went back and I talked -- I tried to reach Carl and I couldn't reach him.

So, his investigator came and said that I was supposed to get the 6 to 15 on the next court date.

So, even though I had asked for the ankle monitor, I told him I would sign for the -- because it was the -- I knew what -- I can be accountable for what I did. So, I knew that I had took the stuff out of Victoria's Secret, so I was like, okay I'll sign for the 6 to 15. That was feasible for what I did. Then out of nowhere they came with the 8 to 20 and I didn't understand. I kept thinking that I didn't understand because it just came out of nowhere.

At the actual date that they offered the 8 to 20, that was not even my court date. They just pulled me that day into court and told me in the waiting area that that's what I was going to court for was the 8 to 20.

Q So, were you confused as to whether the deal was for 6 to 15 or 8 to 20?

A I was very confused, very stressed, and I didn't understand.

And I stated that, with Carl, with his investigator, with Rochelle
numerous of times. Rochelle had also told me when I talked to her, I
don't understand how when she got the case -- well, let me back it up.

So, by me going to court in Henderson, I would always get back late. So when I would come back, there would be a sticker on the door, said to call my attorney. I would reach out to Rochelle. I hadn't talked to Rochelle for -- first it was a guy. It said Matthew Lay, call him. So I called him and I couldn't get to him. So then it was just a sticker, said just call this number. So, it was a different number. So when she

answered it, she told me she was my attorney. I did not talk to her numerous of times. I talked to her two times and one time it was a long extent of a time because I was expressing to her that I didn't understand and she told me that I needed to go on with the deal and to sign for it because it was not going to get no better than that.

I always -- told her that I was not comfortable with the deal and it was not understood. I didn't understand it and I asked for paperwork.

Q You told the Court you didn't want to -- to go forward with the deal. You wanted to withdraw it and that's when Carl Arnold was removed as counsel; is that right?

A Right. Which I don't --

Q But with Rochelle Nguyen, you did go forward with an 8 to 20.

Can you explain that to me and why you went forward with that negotiation or whether you were still confused or what?

A I was still confused. And when I talked to Rochelle, I told her about the 6 to 15. That that's what I thought I signed for, like I said. Now today I know that being in the system, you have to read your own documents and not just go off what someone tells you because I thought that that was my lawyer and he had my best interest. So, the 6 to 15 I thought -- what I thought I was -- I never read over the plea agreement or whatever.

And I specifically told Rochelle that I thought I was getting 6 to 15 even when I started talking to her. And she said she was going to talk to the District Attorney about the 6 to 15. She never came back to me

and told me, oh the offer was rejected or refused or anything. I pressed and pressed and pressed about the issue.

It was all confusing and that being confusing, I would rather have the paper in my face to read it for myself. I never said that I got the paperwork. If you look on your records in the minute orders, I always said that I didn't get the paperwork. I said that -- in court. So, I'm assuming that's your minute order. So, I told them that I didn't receive the paper.

Q And you don't feel like you had adequate conversations with Rochelle Nguyen to really understand what all was involved in this plea agreement and how it was changing and evolving over time?

A Right. I feel like I didn't have adequate communication with Rochelle. I felt that every day I was at the court at least two or three times at Henderson, sometimes -- at least three times that week. So, when I did get a chance to talk to Rochelle, I told her I was not comfortable with it. And I wanted -- I asked Rochelle, well how can you -- I asked -- because I ask questions a lot if I don't understand. So I asked her, well why would you tell me to go ahead with the deal and that I need to sign it? If you're my lawyer I want you to see the DVD because I'm not comfortable with it because there was no weapon. I never had a weapon. And she told me that the deal -- I had already signed it and we need to proceed and go forward.

I always kept telling her I didn't understand, I didn't understand.

Q All right. Is there anything else we haven't covered that you

1	think im	paired your ability to really understand the nature of this plea	
2	agreem	ent? Or have we covered everything?	
3	A	Covered everything.	
4		MR. OWENS: Yeah, I think that's all I have in my notes, so I	
5	will pass the witness.		
6		THE COURT: Thank you.	
7		CROSS EXAMINATION	
8	BY MR. NIMAN:		
9	Q	Ms. Brown, you appeared in court November 19 th of 2019 and	
10	with Mr. Arnold; is that correct?		
11	A	Yes.	
12	Q	And that was when you say the 6 to 15 offer was made; is that	
13	right?		
14	A	Yes.	
15	Q	Okay. And you said that that was a written agreement that	
16	you signed. Is that what you testified to?		
17	A	I had the paperwork. Yes.	
18	Q	Okay. Did you attach that paperwork to your petition at all?	
19	A	They never told me to attach it. They when I prior counsel	
20			
21	Q	Okay. That's all right. Thank you.	
22		Now, you appeared again December 5 th of 2019; is that right?	
23	A	Right.	
24	Q	And at that time, did you tell the Court that you did not want	
25	that 6 to 15 order or 6 to 15 offer?		

A I told him I needed time to think about it.

Q Okay. So, if the court minutes indicate that you rejected the offer and that the Court confirm that with you and that you told the Court you didn't want the offer, would that surprise you?

A No, because when I said I needed to think about it they told me that it will be off the table. And I specifically said again that I needed time to think about it.

Q Okay. You appeared in court again on January 3rd of 2020; is that right?

A Right.

Q And at that point you insisted that you were only going to -enter into the negotiations if you were able to get out of custody; is that
right?

A Well, it was not about just getting out of custody. I felt like the time was feasible. And by me moving from California to here, I need to get my affairs order. So, yes.

Q Okay.

A It was about the time and about me getting my affairs order.

Q Okay. And so, when the Court said that it wasn't inclined to allow you to plead guilty just so you could get out of custody, and then you were asked if you wanted to take the deal today, you said no; is that right?

A If that's what the record says.

Q Okay.

A No.

- Q You appeared in court again a few months later on March 12th of 2020; is that right?
 - A Right.
- Q And at that time, did you enter into a plea agreement for a 4 to 10 in this case and a 4 to 10 in the other case, so for a total of 8 to 10?
 - A I always thought it was the 6 to 15.
 - Q Okay --
 - A I never -- okay.
- Q What I'm asking is, is the agreement that you entered into on that day, an agreement for 8 to 10 -- or excuse me, for a -- yeah -- sorry. I'm getting my numbers confused here. We'll strike that for a second.

So, Mr. Arnold put on the record that you were going to -- this is at page 3 of the transcript on March 12th of 2020.

My client's going to plead guilty to robbery with use of a deadly weapon, a category B felony in this case. In case C344112, she will be pleading guilty to robbery with use. The parties stipulate to a sentence of 4 to 10 years on each count to run consecutive to each other and the offer is contingent. Is that the offer that you were -- that was made to you on that day?

- A I don't remember --
- Q Okay.
- A -- the exact --
- Q And so, on that date, did you accept that offer or did you say that you needed time to think about it?
 - A I don't remember.

Q Okay. So if the record reflects on page 4 that you said that you needed time to think about it, do you have any reason to dispute that?

A If that's what the record is [indiscernible], but I don't remember.

Q Okay. And so, right afterwards, the Court said that the matter was going to get set for jury trial on Monday at 9 a.m. Does that sound right?

A I'm trying to remember. Right.

Q Okay. So you had a jury trial set up to go that Monday and the State revoked the offer at that point; is that right?

A Well, while I was in the courtroom, I -- that's when I was telling him that -- if you have the minute order about the 6 to 15 and that's what I thought I was there for and that I didn't understand where did the -- where did that deal went? And that's when the judge was getting upset.

He -- we were -- I was the last person to be heard. And he actually got off the bench and said, well you got the minute order of everything he said.

- Q You were set for jury trial at that point; is that right?
- A Right.
- Q Okay. Now, later the Court indicated that you could enter the plea. This is at page 14 and it asks if you're going to enter into the plea and you say yes. So, after the matter was set for trial, you decided that you wanted to enter into the plea; is that right?
 - A Is that when Carl was still my attorney? Yes.

Q Yes, it's on the same day.

A Okay because that's when he told me that they went through a break and he told me that he was talking about the 6 to 15. I never knew -- yes.

Q Okay, so -- if -- when the Court informed you and said they're only going to allege a robbery here. Robbery with use in the other case, 4 to 10 on each case consecutive, do you understand that? And you said yes. You understood it at that point; is that right?

A No, I didn't understand it. And I kept explaining to them when he addressed that to me that it would be a robbery and that's when I told him that, why would it be a robbery with a weapon if it was no weapon? I didn't understand where did the -- the time came in because Arnold told me the weapon was carrying the time.

Q Okay, so Mr. Arnold and the Court both were saying 4 to 10 and somehow you didn't understand 4 to 10; is that right?

A Well, the judge tried to explain to me about the weapon but --

Q Okay.

So, on page 16, you begin -- getting canvassed by the Court to enter into this guilty plea. And the Court asks, ma'am are you pleading -- this is on page 16 of that same transcript. Ma'am are you pleading guilty to the charge of robbery and you say yes. Does that sound familiar?

A I never understood exactly. So, I kept telling them that on audio.

Q Okay.

- A And I felt pressured.
- Q So, do you have any reason to object to the fact that the transcripts says that you said yes at that point?

A Well, with everything going on and the matters in the time and the Court system, I feel like I didn't have a choice but to say yes. I was pressured, it was so many court dates, and so many different pleas and so many different people that I was talking to. I didn't understand.

- Q Okay.
- A And they didn't want to hear --
- Q Okay, so immediately after that when the Court says -- this is still at page 16, same transcript. Before I can accept your plea of guilty, I must make sure it is freely and voluntarily given. Is anyone forcing you to plead guilty?
 - A I still didn't understand.
 - Q And -- and you --
 - A I didn't --
 - Q Okay.
 - A -- understand.
- Q You said that nobody was forcing you to plead guilty at that time. Were you lying to the Court at that point?
- A Oh, no one was forcing me to plead guilty. I just didn't understand.
 - Q Okay. So, when the -- this is at page --
- A And not just --
 - Q -- 16 to 17.

A -- and not just to the Judge -- I mean, not just to my attorney, I always spoke out and spoke loud that I didn't understand. And if you have the minute order, it was like -- it was pressure basically. Not just from my attorney, just from the judge too. He wasn't trying to hear that I felt pressured.

Q Ma'am, there's not a question pending.

THE COURT: Okay. Hold on. Ms. Brown, I need you to let the attorney finish the question before you answer it.

THE WITNESS: Okay.

THE COURT: Okay. I know that it's getting a little argumentative, so you're getting a little excited, but just try to take a breath, let him finish the question, think about what he's asking you, and then answer that.

THE WITNESS: Okay.

THE COURT: Okay. And then, Mr. Owens [sic], you're getting a little argumentative. So, please try to keep your questions neutral and professional.

MR. NIMAN: Just to be clear, you mean Mr. Niman.

THE COURT: I'm sorry.

MR. NIMAN: That's fair.

THE COURT: Yes. Looking at my notes wrong.

MR. OWENS: I'm just sitting here not saying anything.

THE COURT: Wrong Mr. Owens.

MR. NIMAN: Okay, so --

THE WITNESS: Am I -- Judge, am I able to talk to my

24

25

Α

had any questions were they answered by Mr. Arnold and you said yes;

would you disagree with that as well?

I did say that.

Q Okay.

A But like I said --

Q And you signed a guilty plea agreement on that day. It says the parties stipulate to a sentence of 4 to 10 years on each count to run consecutive to each other. And this included both this case and the other case, not the Henderson case; is that right? And I -- let me clean that up a little bit.

So, this included both case -- the instant case here C344112 and the other case being C344268. You signed that guilty plea agreement; is that right?

A Yes.

Q Okay. So, then you came back. This was April 30th of 2020 and you said that you wanted to withdraw your plea and you didn't want Mr. Arnold to be your attorney anymore; is that right?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And the Court in fact removed Mr. Arnold and Ms. Nguyen was appointed after that -- or Mr. Lay was appointed after that; is that right?

A Well, actually Roger Bailey was appointed and I never talked to him. The first two weeks, I'm assuming that he was the lawyer and then Matthew lay was appointed and I never talked to Matthew Lay.

And then Rochelle was appointed.

Q Okay, so in the transcript, just to clarify, Mr. Bailey appeared on behalf of Mr. Arnold, but Mr. Arnold was taken off the case. Does that sound right? And then Ms. Nguyen, Mr. Lay were appointed for

you?

- A Right.
- Q Okay. So there was few hearings later and we're going to go to June 11th of 2020. This was the date that you were appearing to enter into your plea; is that right?
 - A Yes.
 - Q Okay. And you wanted to be sentenced that day; is that right?
 - A Who was my attorney at that time?
 - Q At that time it was Ms. Nguyen.
- A Well I told Ms. Nguyen that I wasn't comfortable with the time and with the deal and that's what it was.
 - Q Okay.
- A I told her I don't understand how she had -- when I told her about that I wasn't comfortable, I don't understood [sic] how she had four days -- five days to catch up with the whole case when it was -- it took matters and paperwork and I expressed that to her.
- Q So, this is on page 5 of that same transcript. You're saying that the paperwork, meaning the paperwork of getting the Henderson case included with the guilty plea agreement was holing you up and you were ready to be sentenced that day. Does that sound familiar?
 - A I don't remember.
- Q Okay. So, the Court -- do you remember the Court indicating that the Court didn't want to rush anything on that day?
 - A Yes.
 - Q Okay. And you said that you understood that -- this is on

7

8

9 10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

page 7; is that right?

Α Yes.

Q Okay. So, at that point, Ms. Nguyen -- this is at page 6 to 7, was making representations to the Court. She said she talked to you, she doesn't believe you're recanting any of the allegations you had against Mr. Arnold -- I'm paraphrasing a little bit here. However, we, meaning she and you, had spent a great deal of time talking about even in light of those allegations, you know, your desire to withdraw the plea. You still want to take the same recommendation and the same negotiation and she thoroughly went over it with you and you said absolutely; is that right? Does that sound familiar?

Α I always stressed to her that I was not comfortable with taking a deal. She told me she was --

- Q Sorry. Does that sound like what you said in court that day?
- Α Say it again.
- Q So, she said that she had had a bunch of conversations with you. She didn't think that you were going to take back your allegations against Mr. Arnold but you still wanted to accept the negotiation and you said absolutely. Does that sound familiar?
 - Α No.
- Q Okay. So if the transcript indicates that, you would disagree with the transcript?
 - Α The transcript is not going to say that because I didn't say it.
 - Q Okay. Okay.
 - So, eventually on -- this is June 18th of 2020, you appeared

and you were at -- you entered into this negotiation again. Does that sound familiar?

- A Of 2020?
- Q June 18th of 2020?
- A Yeah.
- Q Okay. And so, Counsel put on the record here, this is at page 2 of that transcript. Ms. Brown, in case C-19-344112-3 will pleading guilty to one count of robbery with use of a deadly weapon. She also agrees to plead guilty to robbery in case C-19-344268. Both parties stipulate to a sentence of 4 to 10 years on each count to run consecutive to each other and also that Henderson case was going to be dismissed. That was the representation that was made in court?

A When I -- when that was represented -- set in court, I said that I didn't have the paperwork and that I didn't understand that day. If you have the records, then it should reflect that I said that.

- Q Okay. So, on page 3 when the Court asks, Ms. Brown, is that a correct statement of the negotiations for this particular case and you say yeah, you would disagree with that?
 - A Say that again.
- Q So, the Court -- this is on page 3, it says, Ms. Brown, is that a correct statement of the negotiations for this particular case? And you said, if the transcript reflects that you said yeah, would you disagree with that?
 - A I would agree with that.
 - Q Okay.

A But I don't remember.

Q Okay. So, Ms. Nguyen -- this is further down on page 3, represented to the Court, I've talked to Ms. Brown every day for the past week and you said yes. Would you agree with that?

A She said that she talked to me a couple of times over the week. I talked to her twice and one time was a extending length of time because the phone would hang up like she said.

Q Okay, so --

A I had lots of questions and a lot of confusion and I expressed that to her.

Q Okay, so this is at page 4 -- or sorry, page 3. Ms. Nguyen says, I'll tell you I did read it word for -- word for word. On page 4, the Court asks, is that correct Mr. Brown? And you say yes; is that right?

A I said she read it to me and I also told her that I didn't understand --

Q Okay.

A -- even though we had time on the phone and -- the call would hang up. I would have to hang up due to the -- [indiscernible] due to the Corona virus.

Q Okay.

A So --

Q So, the Court asks, do you wish to go forward today and you said yes, you wanted to go forward with the negotiation on that day; is that right?

A It that's what it reflects.

Q	Okay. And the Court asks again, so the negotiation is set
forth by y	our attorney. You wish to accept these negotiations and you
say yes;	is that right?

- A If that's the same day that you're talking about --
- Q This is all the same day. This is all June 18th of 2020.
- A I specifically said that I didn't understand and I didn't have the paperwork.
- Q Okay. So if the transcript reflects that, do you have a reason to disagree with the transcript?
 - A That's what the transcript said but I'm also saying what I said.
- Q Okay. So, the Court asks -- this is on page 5, before I can accept your plea of guilty, I must make sure it's freely and voluntarily given. Has anyone forced you to plead guilty and you said no, right?
 - A Right.
- Q Okay. Court asks -- this is on page 6. Ma'am your attorney just advised me that after she read the guilty plea agreement to you that you authorized her to sign on your behalf; is that correct? And you said yes; is that right?
 - A Right.
- Q Okay. And in fact, you -- you confirmed again that she read the entire guilty plea agreement to you; is that right?
- A I never said she didn't read it to me. I said that I didn't understand it and I never received it.
 - Q Okay.
 - A Yes, I had said that.

Q	Court asks, I was going to ask you if you did have any
questions,	were they answered for you? You're saying you didn't have
any questi	ons; is that right? And you said, right. Do you agree with
that?	

- A Right.
- Q And the Court says, do you understand those two documents and you say, yes. Do you agree with that?
 - A I think so.
- Q Okay. Court says, ma'am based on -- this is on page 7.

 Ma'am, based on all the facts and circumstances of your case, are you satisfied with your new attorney's representation with you? And you say, yes I am; is that right?
 - A Right.
- Q Okay. So, immediately after being canvassed in this case, do you recall being canvassed in the same manner in the second case?
 - A Do I remember being canvassed?
 - Q Right.
 - A I remember being talked to.
- Q So, this guilty plea agreement contemplated not only the case that we have today, C344112, but also C344268 because you were pleading to robbery with use here and robbery in the other case, and the Court canvassed you separately on each of those cases. Does that sound familiar?
- A Yeah, but it was a mix up with the paperwork and they had to stop court to fix the paperwork because the deals were different. And I

	1	
1	never	I through the whole thing, it was a lot of stress and I didn't
2	understa	and.
3	Q	Okay. So
4	A	I felt pressured
5	Q	I understand.
6	A	that I needed
7	Q	So, you said that you understood in the canvass to each of the
8	cases.	You said it twice. That wouldn't be correct?
9	A	I never I didn't understand, sir.
10	Q	Okay. I understand. I don't have any further questions.
11		THE COURT: Thank you.
12		MR. OWENS: Just a couple follow up.
13		REDIRECT EXAMINATION
14	BY MR.	OWENS:
15	Q	Ms. Brown, you don't have the transcripts there in front of you
16	to know	what was said in court verbatim each day, do you?
17	A	No, I don't.
18	Q	And during your testimony here today you've done the best to
19	state yo	ur recollection of what happened in court and how you were
20	feeling a	and what the status was of your understanding at any given date
21	and time	e; is that right?
22	A	Right. I was trying to understand and remember the dates
23	and wha	at was said and what took place. So, yes, you're right.
24	Q	And as you pointed out during the history of this case, you had
25	at least	four different attorneys who represented you at different times,

that being Carl Arnold, Roger Bailey, Matthew Lay, and Rochelle Nguyen; is that right?

- A Right.
- Q Did that add to your confusion a little bit?

A Yes, it did. It added to my confusion and a lot of stress. I had a lot of questions. I felt a lot of pressure and I -- I felt like as time was going that -- that I was -- that they were -- how could I say that? I felt as the time went on, that the time was going up because I didn't understand and I was just trying to understand everything. It was a lot of stress and I didn't understand.

Some paperwork I got, some paperwork I didn't due to the Corona virus, some she read to me, some I didn't understand. We stayed on the phone talking about it and even then, with her, like, it was just so much stress I didn't understand. It was like --

Q Was -- and there was restrictions on the normal procedures for interacting with Counsel and coming to court all because of the Corona virus protocols that were put into place, correct?

A Correct.

MR. OWENS: I don't have any further questions.

MR. NIMAN: I don't have any follow up.

THE COURT: All right. Ms. Brown?

THE WITNESS: Yes, ma'am.

THE COURT: So, I've been taking some notes and at some -several times you said there was a lot of confusion and that I was
confused. You've said I didn't understand. So, let's just go back to the

most recent hearing when your plea was taken -- when your guilty plea was taken on both of those separate cases. Okay?

THE WITNESS: Okay.

THE COURT: And as Counsel's reminded you that the judge asked you a series of questions about whether you understood what was happening today, and your answer was yes and whether you wanted to move forward with the plea, and your answer was, absolutely.

So, what I'd like to know is -- and I -- I know that sometimes when you're talking to a judge, you just answer what you're supposed to answer and it's not always necessarily true, just cause you said that. And that's why we're here today. We're here to find out if you really just answered because you were supposed to answer or for whatever reason, or if you answered because that's what you wanted to do that day and now, it's just not what you wanted to do anymore. You see the difference?

THE WITNESS: Yes, ma'am.

THE COURT: Okay. So that's what we're trying to figure out today. So, when you're saying I didn't understand, explain to me what you didn't understand or what you were confused about.

THE WITNESS: When they were offering me the time, I didn't understand. I was expressing that the reason why I didn't understand about the time that I was getting is because I didn't do it and he didn't want to hear that. So, he's like, just say yes or no, so that's what I said.

I always explained, like I'm explaining now, because I just didn't understand anything. I was confused and he didn't want to hear

that. He said it had to be a yes or no answer, so that's what I had to say.

THE COURT: So, what was it that you were confused about? What didn't you understand? You didn't understand the time that you were going to receive? You didn't understand what you were pleading to? What was it you didn't understand?

THE WITNESS: I didn't understand how my attorney was telling me one thing and then the judge was saying a other thing.

THE COURT: Okay. Let me stop you right there. What was your attorney telling you?

THE WITNESS: My attorney -- well Carl -- he told me 6 to 15 and with the paperwork, I didn't read over it. I signed it because I thought that's -- my lawyer was for my best interest. And when it got bound over to Rochelle, I expressed to her that I wasn't comfortable with taking the time and that I didn't want it. And she told me that if I didn't take the time that it would go up to a lot of time and that they had did some -- gave me the habitual.

And I told her that, well if you my lawyer, did you see the disc? And she told me she hadn't, so that's why I felt like -- well why would you tell me to take the time and we need to go forward with court if that's not -- if you didn't see the disc? I feel like she didn't have enough time to get caught up and I told her that.

And even when I went to court with Rochelle and we went in for court over the thing like I'm talking to you guys now, I even expressed to Villani that he didn't want to hear it. He said that I needed

to say -- it needs to be a yes or no answer. It's not time for that, so I had to say yeah. I said yeah.

THE COURT: So, Ms. Nguyen, your most recent attorney, when she talked to you about the possibility that there might be a lot more time and she talked to you about the habitual, it sounds like you understood what she was saying, that you -- you know, it's kind of a -- she was saying, this is what could happen that's worse than what you're -- we're talking about you pleading to instead of waiting for trial. That sounds like you understood that part. That you were looking at this -- you know you were going to get this much time or you could get worse, possibly.

So, it sounds like when you talked to Ms. Nguyen you understood that. Does that sound right?

THE WITNESS: I told her when she expressed that to me, just how kind of like you did, I told her that, well, I'm not comfortable with that because everyone got disses and if this is what -- I know what I did, and if this is what everyone's going to see, then I would like to take it to trial because it will prove that I didn't have no weapon.

THE COURT: Okay. Did she talk to you about the weapon and how that works with the law?

THE WITNESS: No, she actually didn't. The judge did one day when we were at court.

THE COURT: Okay. And what do you remember about the -- when the -- the plea -- the offers from the DA it sounds like changed from 6 to 15 to 8 to 20, but the explanation I've heard here today is that

there were 6, or 7, or 8 more cases from Henderson that were also dismissed and that sounds like that's why it went up. Did you -- what do you remember about those discussions, if any, from your attorneys?

THE WITESS: From the Henderson case, from my understanding, like I said, I was going to court quite a bit. In the beginning -- in the beginning it was time, like -- when I went to court for Henderson they were talking about whatever, but shortly after I started going to court for Henderson, the time never went up from the time in Henderson. The Henderson time -- I think I finally went to court two, or three, or four times and they kept just bounding it over and I -- it needs to get heard on the other cases.

THE COURT: Right.

THE WITNESS: But my -- [indiscernible] told me that the time was in there with those. It was exceeded amount of time and it was already in there so I just needed to -- do that first and then I would get -- that would be handled.

THE COURT: So those discussions took place in Henderson?

THE WITNESS: Yes.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. And I don't want to put words in your mouth, I'm trying to make sure I understand you. So, at the time, you were under the impression that no -- that the time here on these cases was going to be high enough that really, no matter what, the Henderson cases would be included anyway?

THE WITNESS: That's what -- from my --

THE COURT: Okay.

THE WITNESS: -- understanding, yes.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. That explains some of that confusion. Did you feel like when you spoke with Ms. Nguyen that she was able to answer your questions?

THE WITNESS: I felt like I had so many answers. She did answer some and I always expressed to her that I felt like that I want to proceed with trial because with the evidence that they had that will prove the -- basically the firearm carries the time and if that's what it shows on the thing which I know I did have a weapon, that's what I wanted to present to the DA and everyone else because it would show that I did have a weapon.

And she told me that -- it could be -- Corona virus and all that, it could be put off and that -- it was just so much, it was confusing and I could express that to Rochelle, too, over an and over again.

THE COURT: So, do you feel like if, whoever your attorney was had been able to answer your questions more thoroughly that you would have made a different decision?

THE WITNESS: Yes, ma'am.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. If you guys want to do any follow up after I asked those questions, that's fine.

Mr. Owens, any other follow up?

MR. OWENS: No, I don't have any.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. NIMAN: None from the State, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Niman -- the other Mr. Owens. All right. I think we're good on the evidence.

All right. I'm going to excuse you as a witness okay, Ms. Brown? Thank you for your time.

THE WITNESS: Okay.

MR. OWENS: I don't have any further testimony, Judge.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. NIMAN: No witnesses, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Anything from the State? All right. Do you guys want to just end it now? Do you want to make any kind of little closing arguments applying the law on all the evidence we have today or just have me make a decision?

MR. OWENS: Well, just briefly, Judge. I think you understand the case pretty well. You've heard the testimony. Ms. Brown simply doesn't feel she understood the plea bargain and that she had defensible charges at trial and/or could have gotten a better plea bargain if her attorney had pressed some of those points, like the deadly weapon.

These were basically shop lifting cases and she's doing 8 to 20. Of that range, 8 to 20 doesn't appear anywhere in the transcripts or the guilty plea agreement. It certainly says 4 to 10 consecutive, but doesn't come right out and say 8 to 20. And I think she had 6 to 15 locked in her mind at the beginning and was either trying to get back to that or thought she -- that that was still the deal and it was just really confusing for her. And so I think she wants to -- I know she wants to

withdraw the plea and go back and see what better she can do with better representation and let her understand any of the charges now.

THE COURT: Do you think it's significant that Ms. Nguyen hadn't had time to review the video, at least of the one case where it sounds like she was initially charged with having a deadly weapon in that case, which would have been a knife, but then the video is showing it wasn't a knife? Do you think that that's significant that Ms. Nguyen didn't have a chance to look at that before she made a recommendations?

MR. OWENS: Well, I don't remember exactly what Ms.

Nguyen said about that but there is a lot of cases, a lot of police reports.

I know it took me quite a while to go through. And so, I know that on May 7th, Matthew Lay appeared in court and said he still needed to get the file from Carl Arnold. And the next hearing on May 28th, Nguyen says that she has the file now from Arnold and just needs a week to talk to Defendant. So, with all of the cases going on, you know, apparently that wasn't quite enough time.

Certainly Ms. Brown that was a big issue about the deadly weapon. She never really could understand why she could be -- or how she could be charged with a BB gun that her co-defendant had that she didn't even know was used and a knife that she says she didn't have or use. That doesn't show up on the video tape and that would make a significant difference in the case if those charges went away.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.

MR. NIMAN: I mean, just briefly, Your Honor, and I think it's

pretty clear, if the Court reviews the transcripts, that Judge Villani canvassed her multiple times and usually on both cases at the same time. Usually she's saying that all of her questions were answered, that she's entering the plea freely and voluntarily two times, each time she's canvassed, one for each case.

You know, you had just asked if it was significant that Ms.

Nguyen didn't have an opportunity to review the video, but I don't think we know that that's the case. I don't think that Ms. Brown knows what Ms. Nguyen necessarily viewed or didn't view. And, you know, Ms.

Nguyen testified first, so we don't know from her that she did, but she has been an attorney for quite some time and she did testify that it would be very difficult for her -- you know, she would not recommend to somebody pleading without understanding what the evidence in the case is.

Were some of these charges defensible? Maybe. I mean, it's a judgment call. There's always some risk involved in going to trial and there was a lot of top end on this. You know, certainly and candor to the Court, she's not going to get 177 years, I understand that. But she might get 15, she might get 20, she might be habitual eligible, which is 5 to 20 by itself which we filed for.

So, certainly she could have gotten a much worse deal especially if you take into account the fact that this package, not just 2, but 3 cases together, one of which had 19 felonies, the other one had 7 or 8 different counts, and then this one had 9. So, you know, do you want to give a habitual status to somebody who has something like 35

felonies that shows up? Maybe. That's a lot of felonies. It's not impossible and there's a certain amount of risk that comes with that.

You know, I think that one of the things that I took at least from reading the transcripts is that she often would either accept and then want to go back on a deal. The 6 to 15 was offered, she said she didn't want it, at least according to the minutes that we have. So, then there was, you know, the 8 to 20 that was offered.

She says that she doesn't want that but then when the Court says, all right we'll set it for trial. We'll go to trial. You can have your trial, that's no problem. I don't have any preference between you taking a plea and you going to trial. All of a sudden, now she wants to plea again. And then a few weeks later, she decides not only does she want to withdraw the plea, she doesn't want that attorney anymore.

Then she gets a whole new attorney who's able to talk with her, not only about her allegations of ineffectiveness with Mr. Arnold but about whether she could withdraw her plea about trying to renegotiate an offer. Which, there's been some testimony that the Henderson case was always included, but that hasn't appeared anywhere in the record that I've seen. Now, it may well have, it may not have. I don't know. But it certainly wasn't in the plea agreement that she signed when Mr. Arnold represented her and it was in the plea agreement that she signed when Ms. Nguyen represented her. So, if it was going to have any legal effect, Ms. Nguyen got that for her, got her deal to be measurably better than it was.

You know, I was sitting here for a few minutes when I came in

and you were still working on the calendar, you've been taking pleas today. And there's a certain amount of having to accept the representation of the defendants when they say, yes I understand, yes my attorney answered my question that goes on. And I think when you review all of the transcripts that happen in this case, all of the various canvasses, repeatedly she says she doesn't -- or she does understand and then at some point later she goes back and says she doesn't want it or she wants something else and I think that's exactly what's happening here.

I think she understood what the potential negotiations were both the times she was actually canvassed by the Court on each of the cases. It was exactly the same deal. And she said each time that she understood. And now, she's coming in and saying she doesn't and I just don't think that that's credible testimony and I don't think the Court should credit it.

I believe based on the transcripts, it's pretty clear that she freely and voluntarily entered into her plea and Ms. Nguyen testified as to the services that she gave her, the amount of conversations she had with her, what she, you know, the reason why she thought it was a good idea to enter into the plea, and that all sounds like perfectly reasonable advice. So, based on that, I don't think there's any reason to withdraw the plea and I would ask you to -- the Court to deny the petition.

THE COURT: All right. Any final follow ups, Mr. Owens? MR. OWENS: No.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. Well, I'm glad we got to have

this evidentiary hearing and I know when I took over Mr. -- or Judge Villani's cases that he was concerned about this case and wanted to make sure that Ms. Brown was able to be heard and that's, you know, why he granted the evidentiary hearing. He wanted to make sure that all of her rights were protected. And so, again, I know that that was important to him and it's important to me as well.

However, based on Ms. Nguyen's testimony as well as Ms. Brown's, I'm finding that there's no reasonable reason why Ms. Brown did not understand and continue to stay confused, especially in light of the way she answered the canvassing questions.

I had a lot of defendants when I ask those canvassing questions hesitate, or say, well, I guess, you know, when they really weren't sure. And I've discussed it with them or I've continued the case to make sure they had more time to talk to their attorney. That's not what was indicated and I really do appreciate that there were breaks taken, that there were -- sounds like plea agreements that were updated, that this went to plea several times, and then there were couple different attorneys involved. But I do have concerns about Mr. Arnold's representation, but I do not have concerns about Ms. Nguyen's representation.

I think she testified very genuinely and that she represented Ms. Brown competently and thoroughly, that the taking into consideration the amount of charges that were resolved in this plea agreement, that her advice was not in any way neglectful or careless and that although the charges may have been defensible, her advice to

her client that this plea agreement was in her best interest is not unreasonable.

Ms. Brown testified that she did have a chance to talk to Ms. Nguyen, especially one particular time at length and at least have an opportunity to have all of her questions answered and I don't see in the testimony -- or in the portions of the transcript that were read, but specifically in the testimony today, why with the care that Ms. Nguyen was taking, why Ms. Brown still had questions.

I mean, at some point, we can kind of choose to stay confused. It doesn't really sound like 100 percent case of buyer's remorse here. I really do think there is some genuine confusion, but I think she had competent counsel and it doesn't amount to the standard that we would need in order to be able to grant the motion -- or petition to withdraw the plea, so it's going to be denied, and State, will you draft the order and -- we do that right?

MR. NIMAN: Yes, yes, we'll --

THE COURT: I'm so used to civil.

MR. NIMAN: We'll draft the order, Your Honor. I just want to be clear this --

THE COURT: Okay. And then please run it by Defense counsel and make sure the wording is consistent with what I said here today.

MR. NIMAN: I will, and this encompasses both the pro per petition and the supplement?

THE COURT: Yes.

1	MR. NIMAN: Okay.
2	THE COURT: Because they I believe the supplement was
3	considered a supplement not a new petition, so it'll be combined.
4	MR. NIMAN: Yes, that's correct. Yeah.
5	THE COURT: All right.
6	MR. OWENS: That's correct.
7	THE COURT: Thank you.
8	MR. OWENS: And Judge, may stay on the case for the
9	appeal if that's what my client desires to do?
10	THE COURT: Yes, I'll appoint you for the appeal, if there is
11	one. All right. Thank you.
12	MR. OWENS: And I think Ms. Brown expressed a desire to
13	speak to me on the phone. Could the Corrections Officers take her to
14	the phone so I can call her as soon as we're done here?
15	THE COURT: Okay. Jail, did you hear that?
16	THE CORRECTIONS OFFICER: Yes, she's on the phone
17	now, attorney.
18	THE COURT: Oh, she's already on the phone. She's already
19	with the phones.
20	THE CORRECTIONS OFFICER: Yes.
21	MR. OWENS: Okay.
22	THE COURT: Thank you.
23	MR. NIMAN: I guess it sounds like maybe both for the
24	purposes of the appeal, but also for drafting the order, would you like me
25	to submit an order for a transcript for today's hearing or would the Court
	1

1	just prepare one?
2	THE COURT: We'll go ahead and prepare one.
3	MR. NIMAN: Okay.
4	THE COURT: All right. Thank you.
5	MR. NIMAN: Thank you.
6	MR. OWENS: Thanks, Judge.
7	[Hearing concluded at 3:19 p.m.]
8	*****
9	
10	
11	
12	
13	
14	
15	
16	
17	
18	
19	
20	
21	ATTEST: I do hereby certify that I have truly and correctly transcribed
22	the audio/video proceedings in the above-entitled case to the best of my ability.
23	todam amouro
24	Brittany Amoroso
25	Court Recorder/Transcriber

Electronically Filed 1/4/2022 9:10 AM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COU

NEFF

2 3

4 5

6

7 8

9

10 11

12 13

14

15 16

17

18

19 20

21

22

23 24

25

26 27

28

DISTRICT COURT **CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA**

LEQUANA BROWN,

Petitioner,

VS.

STATE OF NEVADA,

Respondent,

Case No: A-20-823908-W

Dept No: XIX

NOTICE OF ENTRY OF FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on January 3, 2022, the court entered a decision or order in this matter, a true and correct copy of which is attached to this notice.

You may appeal to the Supreme Court from the decision or order of this court. If you wish to appeal, you must file a notice of appeal with the clerk of this court within thirty-three (33) days after the date this notice is mailed to you. This notice was mailed on January 4, 2022.

STEVEN D. GRIERSON, CLERK OF THE COURT

/s/ Amanda Hampton

Amanda Hampton, Deputy Clerk

CERTIFICATE OF E-SERVICE / MAILING

I hereby certify that on this 4 day of January 2022, I served a copy of this Notice of Entry on the following:

✓ By e-mail:

Clark County District Attorney's Office Attorney General's Office - Appellate Division-

☑ The United States mail addressed as follows:

Lequana Brown # 1235328 4370 Smiley Rd. Las Vegas, NV 89115

Steven S. Owens, Esq. 1000 N. Green Valley #440-529 Henderson, NV 89074

/s/ Amanda Hampton

Amanda Hampton, Deputy Clerk

Electronically Filed 01/03/2022 11:03 AM CLERK OF THE COURT

27

28

RSPN STEVEN B. WOLFSON

Clark County District Attorney

Nevada Bar #001565 JOHN AFSHAR

Deputy District Attorney

Nevada Bar #14408 200 Lewis Avenue

Las Vegas, Nevada 89155-2212

(702) 671-2500

Attorney for Plaintiff

DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

LEQUANA BROWN. #2651822

Petitioner,

Respondent.

CASE NO: A-20-823908-W

-VS-

THE STATE OF NEVADA.

DEPT NO:

XIX

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND ORDER

DATE OF HEARING: November 4, 2021 TIME OF HEARING: 1:30 PM

THIS CAUSE having come on for hearing before the Honorable CRYSTAL ELLER, District Judge, on the 4th day of November, 2021, the Defendant present via BlueJeans, represented by Steven S. Owens, Esq., present via BlueJeans, the Respondent being represented by STEVEN B. WOLFSON, Clark County District Attorney, by and through JOHN NIMAN, Deputy District Attorney, and the Court having considered the matter, including briefs, transcripts, arguments of counsel, testimony adduced at the evidentiary hearing, and documents on file herein, now therefore, the Court makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law:

POINTS AND AUTHORITIES STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On October 17, 2019, LEQUANA BROWN, aka Leguana Leatrice Brown (hereinafter "Petitioner") was charged by way of Indictment with two (2) counts of

CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT ROBBERY (Category B Felony – NRS 200.380, 199.480); two (2) counts of ROBBERY WITH USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON (Category B Felony – NRS 200.380, 193.165); two (2) counts of BURGLARY (Category B Felony – NRS 205.060); one (1) count of GRAND LARCENY (Category C Felony – NRS 205.220.1, 205.222.2); and one (1) count of OBTAINING AND USING PERSONAL IDENTIFYING INFORMATION OF ANOTHER (Category C Felony – NRS 205.463) for actions on or between June 4, 2019 and June 23, 2019.

On March 12, 2020, represented by Mr. Arnold, Esq., Petitioner pled guilty, pursuant to a Guilty Plea Agreement ("GPA"), to one (1) count of ROBBERY WITH USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON. Contemporaneous with the GPA, the State filed an Amended Indictment reflecting the single count to which Petitioner pled guilty. Petitioner further agreed to plead guilty to ROBBERY in a separate case, and the parties stipulated that Petitioner would receive sentences of four (4) to ten (10) years in each case, consecutive to each other.

On April 30, 2020, Petitioner represented that she wished to withdraw her plea and requested alternate counsel be appointed. The Court granted the motion to appoint alternate counsel, and Mr. Arnold was removed as counsel. On May 7, 2020, Matthew Lay, Esq., was appointed. Rochelle Nguyen, Esq (hereinafter "Counsel"), associated with Mr. Lay, primarily represented Petitioner. Recorder's Transcript of Hearing Re: Evidentiary Hearing, November 4, 2021, ("EH") at 4.

On June 4, 2020, Counsel represented that she had spoken with Petitioner and Petitioner no longer wished to withdraw her plea and wished to be sentenced.

On June 11, 2020, Petitioner's sentencing was continued to amend the GPA because Counsel noticed the GPA did not include another case that was to be dismissed pursuant to negotiations.

On June 17, 2020, Petitioner executed an Amended GPA, with the amendment being that the State agreed to dismiss that separate case against Petitioner after rendition of sentence in the instant underlying case. On June 18, 2020, the Court canvassed Petitioner

regarding the Amended GPA and accepted Petitioner's guilty plea. The Court thereafter sentenced Petitioner to two (2) to five (5) years in the Nevada Department of Corrections for Robbery, with a consecutive two (2) to five (5) years for Use of a Deadly Weapon. Petitioner was given three hundred fifty-eight (358) days of credit for time served. Petitioner's Judgment of Conviction was filed on June 22, 2020.

Petitioner did not file a direct appeal. On October 29, 2020, Petitioner filed her Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. Petitioner included in her filed Petition a Motion for Appointment of Counsel. The State filed its Response to the Petition and Motion on December 17, 2020. On February 25, 2021, the Court granted Petitioner's Motion for Appointment of Counsel.

On June 14, 2021, Petitioner – through counsel – filed a Supplemental Brief in Support of Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Post-Conviction). The State responded on July 29, 2021. Petitioner filed a reply on August 16, 2021. On August 26, 2021, this district court heard argument on the Petition and ordered an evidentiary hearing as to Petitioner's plea when she was represented by attorneys Matthew Lay and Rochelle Nguyen. The evidentiary hearing was conducted on November 4, 2021, wherein this Court denied the petition and supplemental petition.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

The Court relied on the following facts when sentencing Petitioner:

On June 23, 2019, officers learned of the following events from the victim and other employees of Big 5. They stated the co-defendant, Sarah Gonzalez, started shopping for various clothing items. Shortly after, defendant, Lequana Brown, entered the store with a canvas shopping bag and began selecting various shoes and other items. Store employee #1 attempted to help Ms. Gonzalez; however, she stated that she did not need help. Employee #1 noted Ms. Gonzalez and Ms. Brown began interacting with each other and that they were associated with one another. Ms. Brown told the employee she just won money and was engaging in some spending. Ms. Gonzalez then came to the register where employee #2 was ringing up her transaction.

¹ The initial post-conviction proceedings were conducted before the Honorable Judge Michael Villani. On September 7, 2021, the case was reassigned to the Honorable Judge Crystal Eller.

As employee #1 was ringing up Ms. Brown's items, she told employee #2 she was in a hurry and needed to have her items rung up. Ms. Gonzalez then told employee #2 to ring all the items up on the same bill so that she and Ms. Brown can check out together. As employee #2 rung up the merchandize [sic], he set the bags behind the counter to prevent either defendant from walking out of the store before paying. Ms. Brown and Ms. Gonzalez drank Powerade that was from the stores [sic] coolers and left them unfinished at the register.

Ms. Brown told employee #3 she wanted to look at the shoes to make sure they were the right sizes. Employee #2 became suspicious and showed the shoes to her without allowing her to take control of the property. Ms. Brown complained and requested employee #1 finish the transaction. As employee #1 began re-ringing all the items, the bags were set on the counter. Prior to the items being paid for, Ms. Gonzalez told him she also wanted to buy a pellet gun and the items were brought back inside Big 5. An additional co-defendant, identified as Mark Anthony Fink, aka, Mark Anthony Finks Jr, entered the store following Ms. Gonzalez and the victim. He then asked the victim if he could look at the pellet/BB guns. The victim and employee #2 showed Mr. Finks some of the guns until he chose a display model. Employee #2 put the gun and pellets into a plastic bag and the victim took the items to the register.

Once at the register, Mr. Finks and Ms. Gonzalez gathered a few items that were rung up and exited the store, without paying, with Ms. Brown following behind them. The victim yelled at the defendant to stop; however, Ms. Brown threw a debit card, that was not in her name, at him saying "here take this. [sic] The victim saw the defendants in a vehicle along with a fourth person. The victim attempted to retrieve one of the bags of property from Ms. Brown who was in the driver's side rear passenger. Mr. Finks pulled a gun on the victim which caused him to let go and the vehicle fled. Employee #1 noted the license plate while the victim called emergency services. The officers were informed a total \$2,251.91 worth of merchandise was stolen.

During the officer's investigation, the victim provided them with surveillance and the PowerAde drink bottles that were left. One of the officers located the vehicle used and noted Mr. Fink was in the driver's seat. A second male was handing shoes to a child who was trying them on. They then saw Ms. Gonzalez enter the passenger side. While they were arresting Ms. Gonzalez, she stated she had a gun in her bra and that Ms. Brown was in apartment 311. Additionally, officers observed Big 5 bags in the vehicle. The officers were able to recover \$481.34 worth of merchandise.

Officers went up to the third floor to locate Ms. Brown who was in the apartment; however. she was using an alias of Mia Jones. The stolen items recovered were returned to Big 5. After being transported to the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department Headquarters, Ms. Brown was interviewed. She admitted she was the person at Big 5 and knew the other defendants. She observed Ms. Gonzalez and Mr. Finks nearby and entered the vehicle to go to Big 5 due to Ms. Gonzalez stating she had coupons. Once in the store, Ms.

Brown picked out several shirts and handed them to Ms. Gonzalez who then began bagging up a large amount of clothing, along with the other merchandise before proceeding past all points of entry. Ms. Brown followed Mr. Finks out of the store and the employees followed after them. Mr. Finks then pointed a handgun at the employees. She admitted she never attempted to pay for the items she gave Ms. Gonzalez, nor did she make any attempts to notify police of the crime. Additionally, Ms. Brown admitted she was involved in another robbery of a Champs store on June 4, 2019, after being shown surveillance of that incident. When the officers interviewed Mr. Finks, he admitted he pointed a gun at the victim and told him to get the fuck away from the car due to him pulling on Ms. Brown. Ms. Gonzalez stated Ms. Brown told her she could pick out whatever she wanted, and she would pay for it. She stated she had a feeling Ms. Brown was going to use a fake check and a debit card that would not work to pay for the items. When the commotion started at the car, Ms. Gonzalez stated that Ms. Brown told Mr. Finks to just drive.

Presentence Investigation Report, at 8-9.

ARGUMENT

I. PETITIONER FAILS TO DEMONSTRATE MANIFEST INJUSTICE

Pursuant to NRS 176.165, once a defendant has been sentenced, she may only withdraw a guilty plea "[t]o correct manifest injustice." See also, Baal v. State, 106 Nev. 69, 72, 787 P.2d 391, 394 (1990). Reviewing courts must view a guilty plea as presumptively valid, and the burden rests with the defendant to establish that her plea was not entered knowingly and intelligently. Bryant v. State, 102 Nev. 268, 272, 721 P.2d 364, 368 (1986) (superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Hart v. State, 116 Nev. 558, 1 P.3d 969 (2000)). Manifest injustice does not exist if the defendant entered her plea voluntarily. Baal, 106 Nev. at 72, 787 P.2d at 394 (given district court's canvassing and defendant's assertions of voluntariness, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's motion to withdraw guilty plea).

To determine the voluntariness of a guilty plea, a reviewing court considers the totality of the circumstances. <u>Bryant</u>, 102 Nev. at 271, 721 P.2d at 367. A proper plea canvas should reflect:

[T]he defendant knowingly waived his privilege against self-incrimination, the right to trial by jury, and the right to confront his accusers; (2) the plea was voluntary, was not coerced, and was not the result of a promise of leniency; (3)

the defendant understood the consequences of his plea and the range of punishments; and (4) the defendant understood the nature of the charge, i.e., the elements of the crime.

Wilson v. State, 99 Nev. 362, 367, 664 P.2d 328, 331 (1983) (citing Higby v. Sheriff, 86 Nev. 774 476 P.2d 950 (1970)). The presence and advice of counsel is a significant factor in determining the voluntariness of a guilty plea. Patton v. Warden, 91 Nev. 1, 2, 530 P.2d 107, 107 (1975).

A court accepting a guilty plea must personally address the defendant at the time she enters her plea to determine whether she understands the nature of the charges to which she is pleading. Bryant, 102 Nev. at 271, 721 P.2d at 367. A written plea agreement, without some verbal interaction with the defendant, is insufficient. Id. However, the court need not conduct a ritualistic oral canvass. State v. Freese, 116 Nev. 1097, 13 P.3d 442 (2000). A guilty plea canvass does not "require the articulation of talismanic phrases." Heffley v. Warden, 89 Nev. 573, 575, 516 P.2d 1403, 1404 (1973). Instead, the record must simply demonstrate that the defendant entered his guilty plea understandingly and voluntarily. Id.; see also, Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 747-48, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 1470 (1970).

Petitioner alleges that the circumstances surrounding her entry of plea constitute "manifest injustice," such that she should be allowed to withdraw her guilty plea. Supplement at 3-7. Petitioner summarizes the extent of plea negotiations, which she describes as "confusing and protracted," mentions the State's filing of a Notice of Intent to Seek Treatment as a Habitual Criminal ("despite one of the priors being for drugs"), and complains that her amended GPA was signed by counsel, rather than by Petitioner herself. Id. However, Petitioner's reliance on these "circumstances" is misguided, as Petitioner's qualms are belied by the record.

Petitioner was not entitled to plea negotiations. NRS 174.035, is *permissive*, rather than compulsory. <u>See NRS 174.035(2)</u> ("*If* a plea of guilty...is made in a written plea agreement..." (emphasis added)). Therefore, whether the State extended *any* offer, or included *any* limitations on its offer, or revoked its offer, was within the discretion of the State.

Each of Petitioner's proposed qualms with her underlying case are expressly belied by the record and do not entitle Petitioner to relief. See Hargrove v. State, 100 Nev. 498, 502, 686 P.2d 222, 225 (1984) ("bare" and "naked" allegations are not sufficient for relief, nor are allegations belied and repelled by the record). While Petitioner represents that the initial offer in Petitioner's case "were eventually revoked on December 5, 2019," the record demonstrates that on November 19, 2019, the State placed the offer on the record, and advised all parties that the offer would expire on December 5, 2019. See Court Minutes (Case No. C344112-3), dated November 19, 2019. Petitioner rejected that offer, and therefore the State withdrew it. Compare Supplement at 5:11-14 with Court Minutes (Case No. C344112-3), dated December 5, 2019. Thereafter, on January 3, 2020, Petitioner rejected negotiations again. See Recorder's Transcript of Proceedings, dated January 3, 2020 (filed May 5, 2020) ("RT 1.03.20").

At the January 3, 2020, hearing, Petitioner made an oral request for release on house arrest or electronic monitoring, providing the following explanation:

If I could get the ankle monitor to get my affairs in order and pack up my house and put stuff in storage and I'm willing to sign for the deal today and then come back for sentencing, if that's not the case I feel like I'm losing everything so I might as well just go to trial and just [indiscernible].

<u>Id.</u> at 4:18-22. However, the Court rejected Petitioner's request, explaining that such requests must be made in writing, and explaining:

I don't want anyone to enter negotiations just to get out of custody because then people come back and say, well, I only did it just to get out of custody. I didn't really mean it. I didn't do it. I was pressured, coerced into entering the negotiations. So, I don't allow that to occur. I mean if you're going to plead guilty, if you're taking responsibility, that's fine. If you don't want to take responsibility, then that's fine as well. Then we go to trial on all the charges. So, I don't want you – like I said, it – I'm not going to have my hands tied to say I'll only take a deal if you let me out today. That – I'm not – I don't work that way.

<u>Id.</u> at 5:11-20. Having been unsuccessful in her attempt, Petitioner reneged on the agreed-upon plea agreement. <u>Id.</u> at 6:4-9 (Petitioner had already signed the plea agreement but told the Court she did not want to go through with it). The record demonstrates that release from

custody was Petitioner's condition – not a term of negotiations – and does not constitute manifest injustice.

Petitioner argues that re-opening plea negotiations was "confusing." On November 19, 2019, the State revoked its offer after Petitioner rejected the offer. On January 3, 2020, the State temporarily re-extended the offer:

[STATE]: The offers that are currently on the table today have already been revoked previously. When Mr. Arnold told us that Ms. Brown was interested in the offer, since I was going to be out of town next week for my honeymoon, I decided to re-extend that offer just for this instant based upon the circumstances, but if the offers aren't being entered into today it will again be revoked.

RT 1.03.20 at 8:17-22 (emphasis added). The record is clear that Petitioner initiated discussions, and there is nothing "manifestly injust" about the State being willing to engage with Petitioner's request. The State was clear that, while the offer had been previously revoked, it was being temporarily re-extended. Counsel (Mr. Beckett, Esq., on behalf of Mr. Arnold) asked Petitioner if she wanted to accept the offer, and she said no. <u>Id.</u> at 6:4-7. When Petitioner rejected the offer that second time, the State revoked it again.

Nor were the later offers made reasonably "confusing," especially given Counsel's efforts to ensure that Petitioner understood the negotiations. Petitioner believed that the offer being extended in her case was 6 to 15 years. EH at 7, 9, 16-17. Counsel testified that, despite the prior 6-to-15-year offer being revoked, an 8-to-20-year offer had been extended to Petitioner while she weas represented by Mr. Arnold. EH at 17. Petitioner eventually agreed to a virtually identical 8-to-20-year offer, except that Counsel negotiated the additional benefit of another case being dismissed. EH at 20. Prior to entering into the guilty plea, Counsel had delivered a copy of the GPA to CCDC, mailed Petitioner a copy of the GPA twice, and reviewed the GPA with Petitioner "line by line" over the phone. EH at 20-21. Counsel called back "numerous times," and was satisfied that Petitioner had no further questions about the GPA. EH at 21. Counsel answered whatever questions Petitioner asked. Id. at 21. When Petitioner represented that she had "freely and voluntarily entered into" the negotiations without being coerced on June 18, 2020, Counsel believed that to be true based

on their interactions. <u>Id.</u> at 22-23. While Petitioner testified generally that she remained confused about negotiations, this Court finds that any confusion which remained was not reasonable given Counsel's efforts to ensure Petitioner understood the negotiations. *See generally* EH 26-49. Petitioner testified that she was aware the 6-to-15-year offer was going to be revoked if she did not accept it at the December 5, 2019 hearing, and she did not accept it. EH 34. This Court finds Petitioner's testimony that she was confused about the negotiations after Counsel explained them to her is not credible in light of Counsel's testimony and the record as a whole.

Petitioner argues that the State's filing of a Notice of Intent to Seek Punishment as a Habitual Criminal was intended "[t]o punish Brown." <u>Supplement</u> at 5:17. However, that claim is not supported by the record.

Petitioner asserts that the State placed undue pressure on Petitioner by claiming that the State would not give Petitioner time to contemplate an offer. Supplement at 5:19-23. However, the transcript of the March 12, 2020, hearing belies Petitioner's assertion. See RT 3.12.20. The beginning of that hearing demonstrates that Petitioner's counsel indicated that Petitioner was ready to proceed with negotiations. See id. at 2:7-11 (counsel represented to co-defendant's counsel that Petitioner wanted to enter a plea), 3:20-4:10 (counsel representing to the Court that the matter had resolved). Petitioner requested additional time to "think about it." Id. at 4:14. Thereafter, the State explained its situation:

...Your Honor, at this point, the State's going to revoke the offer. We have a pre-trial at 2:00 o'clock, We've already pre-trialed several people. If she wants to take it now, like I told Mr. Arnold earlier, she can have it now, otherwise it's going to be revoked and there won't be any other offers made.

<u>Id.</u> at 4:17-21. The Court assured Petitioner that it was not biased between a plea or trial but did note Petitioner's back-and-forth throughout the proceedings. <u>Id.</u> at 5:8-10 ("All right, Ms. Brown, we've done this two or three times, okay..."), 5:24-25 ("I don't care – ma'am, I don't care if you accept [the negotiations] or not. I'm free next week."), 6:8-9 ("...you have the right to go to trial. I will not rush you into any negotiations.").

Thereafter, Petitioner changed her decision and decided to proceed with the guilty plea. RT 3.12.20 at 6:14-19. During that March 12, 2020, plea canvass, an issue regarding

1	the "deadly weapon" charge arose. See id. at 10:23-11:14; see also Supplement at 5:23-6:2.
2	However, the parties agreed to modify negotiations so that Petitioner would only be pleading
3	to the use of a deadly weapon in a single case. Id. at 11:23-12:4. After the parties had agreed
4	to modify negotiations, the Court had proceeded, yet again, with a plea canvass, Petitioner
5	began to quibble about the remaining deadly weapon charge. <u>Id.</u> at 13:19-14:2. However, the
6	Court explained to Petitioner how that charge could apply to her:
7	THE COURT: Were you working with these people to steal things?
8	DEFENDANT BROWN: Yes.
9	THE COURT: Okay. Do you – because as an aider and abettor, you
10	understand that you're liable for everything they do and they're liable for what you do as well as part of the conspiracy to commit this crime? Do you
11	understand that?
12	DEFENDANT BROWN: Yeah.
13	Id. at 14:3-10. Before the Court took a recess to allow the State to make the modifications,
14	the Court asked a final time if Petitioner was certain of her decision:
15	THE COURT: Okay, are you going to enter these pleas today, ma'am? I don't have time to play games here. They'll redo the paperwork. They're only
16	going to allege a robbery here, robbery with use in the other case, 4 to 10 on
17	each case, consecutive. Do you understand that?
18	DEFENDANT BROWN: Yes.
19	THE COURT: Do you want to go forward? It's not Mr. Arnold's decision, its [sic] not mine, its [sic] yours.
20	DEFENDANT BROWN: Yes.
21	THE COURT: Are you sure?
22	DEFENDANT BROWN: Yes.
23	THE COURT: Okay. They're going to get the paperwork fixed and
24	then Mr. Arnold will go over those again with you. And if not, like I said, I'm ready for trial Monday on 19 charges and if you're found guilty, I'll sentence
25	you on 19. If you're found guilty on one, I'll sentence you on one, or any combination thereof. If you're found not guilty, then you walk out the door. Do
26	you understand that?
27	DEFENDANT BROWN: Yeah.

<u>Id.</u> at 14:11-15:3. Therefore, the Court did not "express frustration" but instead was making sure the situation was clear, so that the matter could progress (whether to trial or to a guilty plea). There was nothing "manifestly unjust" about this exchange.

Petitioner asserts that she was "pressured by her attorney and the judge." Supplement at 6:9-11. This assertion is belied by the transcript of the plea canvass. When the Court asked Petitioner to confirm the factual basis for her plea, Petitioner equivocated. RT 3.12.20 at 19:3-22. Petitioner's attorney then submitted that there was video evidence that Petitioner had "used her forearm to move [a clerk] out of the way to get out the door." Id. at 19:23-20:3. When asked to confirm that submission, Petitioner agreed. Id. at 20:5. However, Petitioner disagreed that her action constituted force. Id. at 20:6-16. The Court then attempted to clarify the situation and specify which facts Petitioner would admit. Id. at 20:13-22:23. The State offered that Petitioner had told the clerk to "back off, or you know, I'll stab you, or something like that, and that was the threat or force that was used in this case..." Id. at 22:24-23:4. After Petitioner again equivocated, the Court ended its canvass and indicated it would proceed to trial. See id. at 23:24:8. Petitioner's counsel called the Court back to proceed with the plea. Id. at 24:11-14. Rather than tell Petitioner what it wanted to hear, the Court simply asked, "What did you do, ma'am?" Id. at 24:15. Petitioner's counsel clarified, "What force did you use...to get out of there?" Id. at 24:21-23. Petitioner said: "I told [the clerk] if she touched me – I said if she touched me when she come, I'll beat her ass." Id. at 25:1-2. While co-defendant's counsel may have interjected something to which Petitioner did not agree,² the transcript shows that Petitioner volunteered this element of robbery, without any coercion whatsoever. See id. at 26:1-7. Because the context shows that the Court and Petitioner's counsel each clarified the elements of the crime with which Petitioner was charged, and because Petitioner fails to offer any specific instance of pressure or coercion, this assertion likewise fails to meet Petitioner's burden.

26

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

2728

² <u>See</u> RT 3.12.20 at 25:22-23 ("MR. HART: How about do you want to get stabbed or killed? DEFENDANT BROWN: No.").

Moreover, Petitioner repeatedly asserted that she was no coerced when canvassed by the Court.

Petitioner asserts that the Amended GPA was filed "without first withdrawing from the prior plea or agreement" and that it was "signed by counsel Nguyen rather than by Brown herself." Supplement at 6:18-21. Petitioner also asserts that "she had not received a copy of the amended guilty plea agreement." <u>Id.</u> at 16:22-23. The transcript of the June 16, 2020, hearing shows that that the extraneous Henderson case had been contemplated as part of the original plea agreement, and that the GPA was amended simply "for clarity and conformity." RT 6.16.20 at 2:16-20. Petitioner affirmed her understanding of the clerical change. <u>Id.</u> at 5:7-14. Thus, because the GPA was amended for a *clerical* change, and did not substantively change the negotiations, there was no "manifest injustice" in the Court proceeding with the Amended GPA.

Likewise, there is no "manifest injustice" to Petitioner's counsel having signed the Amended GPA, as the practice was mandated by COVID-19 procedures, and because the signature was affixed at Petitioner's direction. Specifically, in Administrative Order 20-10, the Chief Judge set out that a "guilty plea shall be signed by counsel in the following manner: 'Signature affixed by (insert name of defense counsel) at the direction of (insert name of defendant)." At 5:25-27. Moreover, Petitioner specifically affirmed that she authorized counsel to sign on her behalf. RT 6.18.20 at 6:6-13. Therefore, Petitioner cannot point to the signature on the Amended GPA as warranting relief.

Finally, there was no "manifest injustice" from Petitioner's lack of possession of a physical copy of her Amended GPA prior to her plea canvass. Out of an abundance of caution ("[b]ecause of the tortured history of this case") the Court wanted to have all of the documents together and wanted Petitioner to have every document "in front of [her]" before proceeding. <u>Id.</u> at 6:13-20. When Petitioner indicated that she had not yet received such a copy, Counsel indicated that she had left one with CCDC, but that the COVID-19 protocols were making it difficult for physical copies to get to inmates. <u>Id.</u> at 3:25-4:7. Counsel mailed two copies to CCDC. EH 20-21. Counsel also made clear that she had reviewed the

Amended GPA "word for word" with Petitioner. RT 6.18.20 at 3:22. The Court verified that with Petitioner:

THE COURT: Is that correct, Ms. Brown?

DEFENDANT BROWN: Yes.

THE COURT: She read everything to you?

DEFENDANT BROWN: Yes, she did.

THE COURT: Do you wish to go forward today?

DEFENDANT BROWN: Yes.

<u>Id.</u> at 4:8-13. The Court later reaffirmed counsel's review of the Amended GPA:

THE COURT: ...again we had previously mentioned that she did read the entire Guilty Plea Agreement to you; is that correct, ma'am?

DEFENDANT BROWN: Yes.

<u>Id.</u> at 6:10-13. Because the Court simply wanted Petitioner to have copies to prevent any misunderstandings, and because Petitioner had affirmed that she had been read – and had no questions about – the Amended GPA, there was no "manifest injustice" from Petitioner's lack of possession of a physical copy.

In sum, Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that her plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered, and therefore has failed to demonstrate "manifest injustice" warranting withdrawal of her guilty plea.

II. PETITIONER FAILS TO DEMONSTRATE INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that, "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense." The United States Supreme Court has long recognized that "the right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel." <u>Strickland v. Washington</u>, 466 U.S. 668, 686, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2063 (1984); <u>see also State v. Love</u>, 109 Nev. 1136, 1138, 865 P.2d 322, 323 (1993).

To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, a defendant must prove she was denied "reasonably effective assistance" of counsel by satisfying the two-prong test of Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686-87, 104 S.Ct. at 2063-64; see also Love, 109 Nev. at 1138, 865 P.2d at 323. Under Strickland, a defendant must show first that her counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and second, that but for counsel's errors, there is a reasonable probability that the result of the proceedings would have been different. 466 U.S. at 687-88, 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2065, 2068; Warden, Nevada State Prison v. Lyons, 100 Nev. 430, 432, 683 P.2d 504, 505 (1984) (adopting the Strickland two-part test). "[T]here is no reason for a court deciding an ineffective assistance claim to approach the inquiry in the same order or even to address both components of the inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on one." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697, 104 S.Ct. at 2069.

Even if a defendant can demonstrate that her counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, she must still demonstrate prejudice and show a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the result of the trial would have been different. McNelton v. State, 115 Nev. 396, 403, 990 P.2d 1263, 1268 (1999) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. at 2064). "A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Id. (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-89, 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2064-65, 2068). This portion of the test is slightly modified when the convictions occur due to a guilty plea. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59, 106 S.Ct. 366, 370 (1985); Kirksey v. State, 112 Nev. 980, 988, 923 P.2d 1102, 1107 (1996). For a guilty plea, a defendant "must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial." Kirksey, 112 Nev. at 998, 923 P.2d at 1107 (quoting Hill, 474 U.S. at 59, 106 S.Ct. at 370).

The court begins with the presumption of effectiveness and then must determine whether the defendant has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that counsel was ineffective. Means v. State, 120 Nev. 1001, 1011, 103 P.3d 25, 32 (2004). "Effective counsel does not mean errorless counsel, but rather counsel whose assistance is '[w]ithin the

range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases." <u>Jackson v. Warden</u>, 91 Nev. 430, 432, 537 P.2d 473, 474 (1975).

Here, Petitioner initially pled guilty, but then requested new counsel be appointed to investigate withdrawing Petitioner's plea. See Court Minutes dated April 30, 2020. New counsel was confirmed on May 7, 2020. See Court Minutes dated May 7, 2020. However, at the status check on Petitioner's plea withdrawal, Counsel represented that she had spoken with Petitioner, and that Petitioner was instead "prepared to go forward with sentencing." RT 6.04.20 at 2:9-12. On June 16, 2020, the Court confirmed with Petitioner that she no longer wished to withdraw her plea but wished "to go forward with the negotiations for [her] two cases." RT 6.16.20 at 2:10-3:2 (Petitioner affirming that she wished to proceed). Because Petitioner affirmed that she wished to forego her efforts to withdraw her guilty plea, Petitioner cannot demonstrate prejudice. <u>Kirksey</u>, 112 Nev. at 998, 923 P.2d at 1107. Furthermore, Petitioner's decision to proceed with sentencing precludes a finding of ineffectiveness here, as nothing in the record indicates that Counsel had made a value judgment on the likelihood of success of a motion to withdraw. See Supplement at 7-9. At the evidentiary hearing, Counsel testified that she spoke with Petitioner many times, for "hours" on the phone, discussed the likelihood of a motion to withdraw plea, and explained the ramifications of withdrawing the plea, including the very lengthy potential sentences Petitioner faced if she was successful in withdrawing her plea, and that Petitioner ultimately decided that accepting the plea was in her best interest. EH at 6-8, 10-12, 14-16, 18-19.

This Court finds that Counsel represented Petitioner competently and thoroughly, that her advice was not in any way neglectful or careless, and that her advice to enter into this plea agreement was in petitioner's best interest and was not unreasonable.

ORDER

Therefore, Brown's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, and Supplement thereto, is DENIED.

DATED this	day of December,	2021.

28

1

2

3

4

5

6

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

DISTRICT JUDGE STA / COCC

Respectfully submitted, 3EA 4F0 946A 5AB0 Crystal Eller

STEVEN B. WOLFSON District Court Judge Clark County District Attorney

Nevada Bar #001565

BY /S John Afshar

JOHN AFSHAR

Deputy District Attorney Nevada Bar #14408

Yes, I approve of the attached findings as to form and content and approve of my electronic signature being affixed to that effect.

Steven S. Owens /s Steven S. Owens STEVEN S. OWENS COUNSEL FOR PETITIONER NEVADA BAR #4352

John Niman

From: Steve Owens <owenscrimlaw@gmail.com>
Sent: Thursday, December 9, 2021 3:58 PM

To: John Niman

Subject: Re: FW: A-20-823908-W FFCO-(BROWN, LEQUANA) **Attachments:** Brown, Lequana A823908 FOFCL - FINAL.docx

CAUTION: This email originated from an **External Source**. Please **use caution** before opening attachments, clicking links, or responding to this email. **Do not sign-in with your DA account credentials.**

John,

Yes, I approve of the attached findings as to form and content and approve of my electronic signature being affixed to that effect. Please re-submit to the court for filing and attach this email if necessary as to my approval. Thanks.

Steven S. Owens

On Thu, Dec 9, 2021 at 2:24 PM John Niman < John.Niman@clarkcountyda.com > wrote:

Hi Steve,

You reviewed it before and OK'd the filing, but I added a signature block to e-sign your approval as to form and content. Could you please email be back with your approval so I can submit it with the findings?

Thank you,

John Afshar
Deputy District Attorney
Clark County District Attorney's Office
P: 702-671-2630
E: john.niman@clarkcountyda.com

From: DC19Inbox < DC19Inbox@clarkcountycourts.us>

Sent: Thursday, December 9, 2021 1:57 PM

To: Margaret Hernandez < Margaret.Hernandez@clarkcountyda.com

Cc: Howard, Melody <HowardM@clarkcountycourts.us>; John Niman <John.Niman@clarkcountyda.com>;

'owenscrimlaw@gmail.com' <owenscrimlaw@gmail.com>
Subject: FW: A-20-823908-W FFCO-(BROWN, LEQUANA)

Importance: High

CAUTION: This email originated from an **External Source**. Please **use caution** before opening attachments, clicking links, or responding to this email. **Do not sign-in with your DA account credentials.**

Ms. Hernandez/Counsel,

The submitted Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law cannot be processed at this time. There is no indication that opposing counsel (Mr. Owens) was provided opportunity to review and countersign as to "form and content."

Please revise the signature blocks to include a section for Mr. Owens' signature (if electronically signed, please comply with the requirements of AO 21-04 for the electronic "signature of another person"). If Mr. Owens fails to respond, within 24 hours of given the opportunity, please attach as the last page(s) of the FFCO, all emails/correspondence demonstrating that he was provided an opportunity to review and sign as to "form and content," and declined/refused to do so.

If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact me.

Regards,



BRANDON M. THOMPSON, ESQ.

Eighth Judicial District Court | Department 19

Law Clerk to the Honorable Crystal Eller

Dept19LC@clarkcountycourts.us

702.671.4443

From: Margaret Hernandez [mailto:Margaret.Hernandez@clarkcountyda.com]

Sent: Thursday, December 9, 2021 11:12 AM

To: DC19Inbox **Cc:** John Niman

Subject: A-20-823908-W FFCO-(BROWN, LEQUANA)

Importance: High

[NOTICE: This message originated outside of Eighth Judicial District Court -- DO NOT CLICK on links or open attachments unless you are sure the content is safe.]

Please see attached Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order.

Thank you,



Margaret Hernandez

Legal Secretary II

Clark County District Attorney's Office

Criminal Division, Team L3

JC7, DC 17 & DC 19

(702) 671-2594 Direct

(702) 671-2670 Team

1 **CSERV** 2 DISTRICT COURT 3 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 4 5 Lequana Brown, Plaintiff(s) CASE NO: A-20-823908-W 6 DEPT. NO. Department 19 VS. 7 8 State of Nevada, Defendant(s) 9 10 **AUTOMATED CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE** 11 This automated certificate of service was generated by the Eighth Judicial District Court. The foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order was served via the 12 court's electronic eFile system to all recipients registered for e-Service on the above entitled 13 case as listed below: 14 Service Date: 1/3/2022 15 Department XVII Dept17LC@clarkcountycourts.us 16 Steven Owens owenscrimlaw@gmail.com 17 18 If indicated below, a copy of the above mentioned filings were also served by mail via United States Postal Service, postage prepaid, to the parties listed below at their last 19 known addresses on 1/4/2022 20 Steven Wolfson Clark County District Attorney 21 200 Lewis Avenue, 3rd Floor Las Vegas, NV, 89155 22 23 24 25 26 27

28

Electronically Filed 1/3/2022 11:45 AM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT

NOASC STEVEN S. OWENS, ESQ

2

3

4

5

6

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Nevada Bar No. 4352

1000 N. Green Valley #440-529

Henderson, Nevada 89074

Telephone: (702) 595-1171 owenscrimlaw@gmail.com

Attorney for Petitioner Lequana Brown

DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

LEQUANA BROWN,

Petitioner,

VS.

THE STATE OF NEVADA; NEVADA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS; FLORENCE McCLURE WOMEN'S CORRECTIONAL CENTER, Warden.

Respondents.

CASE NO.: A-20-823908-W

DEPT NO.: XIX

NOTICE OF APPEAL

TO: THE STATE OF NEVADA, et al. Respondents.

TO: DEPARTMENT XIX OF EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

Notice is hereby given that LEQUANA BROWN, Petitioner in the above-entitled action, appeals to the Nevada Supreme Court from the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, filed on January 3, 2022.

DATED this 3rd day of January 2021.

/s/ Steven S. Owens, Esq.
STEVEN S. OWENS, ESQ.
Nevada Bar No. 4352
1000 N. Green Valley #440-529
Henderson, Nevada 89074
(702) 595-1171
Attorney for Petitioner
LEQUANA BROWN

1

AA 0435

Case Number: A-20-823908-W

1	CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
2	I hereby certify that on the 3 rd day of January 2022, I served a true and correct copy of
3	the foregoing document entitled NOTICE OF APPEAL to the Clark County District
4	Attorney's Office by sending a copy via electronic mail to:
5 6	
7	CLARK COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE
8	Steve Wolfson
9	Motions@clarkcountyda.com
10	
11	BY:
12	/s/ Steven S. Owens, Esq.
13	STEVEN S. OWENS, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 4352
14	1000 N. Green Valley #440-529 Henderson, Nevada 89074
15 16	(702) 595-1171
17	Attorney for Petitioner
18	LEQUANA BROWN
19	
20	
21	
22	
23	
24	
25	
26 27	
28	2
	_

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify and affirm that this document was filed electronically with the Nevada Supreme Court on February 3, 2022. Electronic Service of the foregoing document shall be made in accordance with the Master Service List as follows:

AARON FORD Nevada Attorney General

ALEXANDER CHEN
Chief Deputy District Attorney

/s/ Steven S. Owens STEVEN S. OWENS, ESQ.