	t		Electronic	ally Filed		
	1	SERENITY PROSPERITY 748 N. RaInbow A106	06/17/20			
	2	Las Vegas, Nevada 89137 702-353-9722	Aluns	-		
	3	PLAINTIFF/ IN PROPER PERSON	CLERK OF	THE COURT		
	4	2.		Electronically Filed		
	5	DISTRIC	TCOURT	Jun 22 2022 01 21 p.m.		
	6		NTY, NEVADA	Elizabeth A. Brown Clerk of Supreme Court		
	7		1			
	8	SERENITY PROSPERITY				
	9	Plaintiff(s),				
	10		CASE NO.: A-20-817408 DEPT. NO.: XXX	3-C		
	11	JENNIFER INSLEY MICHERI, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 10089				
	12	Jinsley-micheri@dennettwinspear.com 3301 N. Buffalo Drive, Suite 195 Las	SSP CRIDERCO PLANTI	FF'S NOT ICE		
	13	Vegas, Nevada 89129 Telephone: (702) 839-1100 Facsimile:	TO APPEAL COURT			
	14	(702) 839-1113 Attorneys for Defendant,	BASED UPON F FIND MISLEAPLN	ALSE EVIDENCE		
J	15	Jamie Combs	PRESENTED -	OTHE		
-	16		COURT.			
	17	Defendant(s).				
	18		-			
	19	INTRODUCTION ORDER RE: PLAINTIFF MOTION TO				
	20	APPEAL				
	21	Plaintiff, CASE NO.: A-20-817408-C DEPT. NO.: XXX vs.) JAMIE COMBS, individually)				
	222 TT					
17 2022		The above-referenced matter was scheduled for a hearing on February 2, 2022, with regard to Defendant, Jamie Combs' Renewed Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to NRCP 12(b)(5). Pursuant to the Administrative Orders of this Court, and EDCR 2.23, this matter may be decided with or without oral argument. This Court has determined that it would be appropriate to decide this matter on the pleadings, and consequently, this				
	. C	FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTO	<u>PRY</u> dent. which occurred on	May 18 2020		
	32/7 33280	This matter stems from a motor vehicle accident, which occurred on May 18, 2020. Defendant alleges Plaintiff filed a complaint on 7/1/20 alleging injuries resulting from that motor vehicle accident, allegedly caused by Defendants. This complaint was not filled on 7 /1/20. It was filled on June 22, 20. The Complaint was originally filed against				
			Docket 84907	Document 2022-19728		
				1		

ŗ

JUN 17 2022 CLERK OF THE COURT

Defendant Progressive Insurance and Shellie Bandy, Case Manager because Plaintiff could not remember the Defendants name and Shellie Bandy refuse to relinquish the Defendants name. Instead Shellie Bandy told Plaintiff to file the court complaint in her name. It was clear that the Plaintiff was alleging that Bandy was not the negligent driver but a case manager for Progressive. Plaintiff was attempting to make a claim against the insurance carrier and Jamie Combs.

On June 18, 2021, the Court entered an Order regarding Plaintiff's Pro Per Motion to Extend Time to Serve Summons and Complaint. In pertinent part the Order states:

The Defendant states Complaint is unclear as to whether she is alleging Bandy is the negligent driver and also a case manager for Progressive or if she is attempting to only make a claim against the insurance carrier. In any event, the Complaint is at best confusing. It was made clear that the Plaintiff never said Bandy was the driver.

- 9 It was stated that Service by the Sherriff was filed in the case on 10/29/21, which stated the Progressive office was vacant. The 120 days for service expired on or about 11/1/20.
 10 On 4/6/21 Plaintiff filed the subject Motion to Extend Time for Service of the Summons and Complaint, wherein she references "trouble serving Defendant," and that the Sherriff attempted service but due to COVID the office was closed.
- Service by the Sherriff was filed in the case on 9/23/20 and served on 9/28/20. The dates above that were presented to the Judge to make a just decision were incorrect.
- Consequently, when this matter came on the Court's calendar on 5/12/21, the Court issued a minute order on 5/7/21, advising the Plaintiff that her Motion failed to establish good cause for the untimely filing of the request for an extension of time to
- 15 serve and did not include a *Scrimer* analysis, and consequently, the Court has no
 16 information upon which to base a finding of good cause to extend the time for service of
 the Summons and Complaint. The Court requested that Plaintiff file an Amended or
- Supplemental Motion, or an Addendum to the original Motion, and include a Scrimer analysis (Scrimer v. Dist. Ct., 116 Nev. 507, 998 P.2d 1190 [2000]), and to demonstrate good cause pursuant to Saavedra- Sandoval v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 245 P.3d 1198, 1201 (Nev. 2010). Such supplemental or amended pleading was to be filed at least ten (10) days prior to the next hearing (which was set for 6/23/21). Attorney for Plaintiff was to handle this matter not the Plaintiff.

21

22

CONCLUSION

Plaintiff hired Paul A. Shpirt, Esq.who told Plaintiff to file an amended complaint with 23 the correct name Jamie Combs and he would take care of everything else. The 24 argument above was to be handled by this attorney and know longer by the Plaintiff. Plaintiff has requested fill of this case and has not received Plaintiff file from the 25 Attorney. Plaintiff received this document DEFENDANT JAMIE COMBS' REPLY IN SUPPORT OF RENEWED MOTION TO DISMISS PURSUANT TO NRCP 12(b)(5) this 26 document was emailed from Attorney to Plaintiff, Due to the fact that the dates were incorrect and other information in this document are incorrect Plaintiff would need the 27 file in order to appeal this case correctly. Plaintiff is asking the court to grant Plaintiff Justicandreconize governor Sisolak 140 day extension 28

SERENITY PROSPERITY 748 N. Rainbow A106 Las Vegas, Nevada 89137 702-353-9722 DATED this_2_ day of March 2022 SERENITY PROSPERITY PLAINTIFE/IN PROPER PERSON roon SERENITY PROSPERITY 748 N. Rainbow A106 Las Vegas, Nevada 89137 702-353-9722

		Electronically Filed 6/21/2022 10:54 AM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT	
1 2	ASTA	Atumb. An	man -
2			
4			
5			
6	IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAI	L DISTRICT COURT OF THE	
7		ADA IN AND FOR	
8	THE COUNT	TY OF CLARK	
9			
10	SERENITY PROSPERITY,	Case No: A-20-817408-C	
11	Plaintiff(s),	Dept No: XXX	
12	vs.		
13	JAMIE COMBS,		
14	Defendant(s),		
15 16			
10	CASE APPEAL	L STATEMENT	
18			
19	1. Appellant(s): Serenity Prosperity		
20	2. Judge: Jerry A. Wiese		
21	3. Appellant(s): Serenity Prosperity		
22	Counsel:		
23	Serenity Prosperity 748 N. Rainbow, A106		
24	Las Vegas, NV 89137		
25	4. Respondent (s): Jamie Comba		
26	Counsel:		
27 28	Ryan L. Dennett, Esq. 3301 N. Buffalo Dr., Ste 195 Las Vegas, NV 89129		
		-1- : A-20-817408-C	

1	5. Appellant(s)'s Attorney Licensed in Nevada: N/A			
2	Permission Granted: N/A			
3 4	Respondent(s)'s Attorney Licensed in Nevada: Yes Permission Granted: N/A			
5	6. Has Appellant Ever Been Represented by Appointed Counsel In District Court: No			
6	7. Appellant Represented by Appointed Counsel On Appeal: N/A			
7	8. Appellant Granted Leave to Proceed in Forma Pauperis**: Yes, March 3, 2022			
8 9	** <i>Expires 1 year from date filed</i> Appellant Filed Application to Proceed in Forma Pauperis: N/A Date Application(s) filed: N/A			
10	9. Date Commenced in District Court: July 1, 2020			
11	10. Brief Description of the Nature of the Action: NEGLIGENCE - Auto			
12	Type of Judgment or Order Being Appealed: Dismissal			
13	11. Previous Appeal: No			
14	Supreme Court Docket Number(s): N/A			
15	12. Child Custody or Visitation: N/A			
16	13. Possibility of Settlement: Unknown			
17 18	Dated This 21 day of June 2022.			
10	Steven D. Grierson, Clerk of the Court			
20				
21	/s/ Amanda Hampton			
22	Amanda Hampton, Deputy Clerk 200 Lewis Ave			
23	PO Box 551601 Las Vegas, Nevada 89155-1601			
24	(702) 671-0512			
25	cc: Serenity Prosperity			
26	cc: Selenity Prosperity			
27				
28				
	A-20-817408-C -2-			

Electronically Filed 06/17/2022 X.e SPERITY 1 CLERK OF THE COURT 2 3 4 (Telephone, 5 ☑ Plaintiff/ □ Defendant, Pro Se 6 EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 7 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 8 Case No.: 1-1-20-817-408-C 9 Dept. No.: 10 Plaintiff(s), 11 VS 12 Date of Hearing: 13 3 Defendant(s). Time of Hearing: 14 OMBS 15 **CERTIFICATE OF MAILING** I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the <u>21</u> day of <u>JUNE</u>, 20, I placed a true 16 ASED UPON FALSE EUDENCE FNDMISLEADING 17 18 in the United States Mail, with first-class postage prepaid, addressed to the following: 19 5Q #10059 BAR JENNIFERT 20 5 BILF N. BUFFA 15 21)EGAS 22 839 - [[00 23 24 Per NRS 53.045, I declare under penalty of perjury N that the foregoing is true and correct. (signature) (print name) □ Defendant, Pro Se Plaintiff 28 Page 1 © 2009 Civil Law Self-Help Center Clark County, Nevada

CLERK OF THE COURT

Eighth Judicial District Court CASE SUMMARY CASE NO. A-20-817408-C

		CASE NO. A-20-0	017 4 00-C	
Serenity Pros vs. Shellie Bandy,	perity, Plaintiff(s) , Defendant(s)	\$ \$ \$ \$ \$		
		CASE INFORMA	ATION	
Statistical Closu 02/01/2022 N	ires Aotion to Dismiss by the Defendar	nt(s)	Case Type:	Negligence - Auto
			Case Status:	02/01/2022 Dismissed
DATE		CASE ASSIGNM	AENT	
	Current Case Assignment Case Number Court Date Assigned Judicial Officer	A-20-817408-C Department 30 07/01/2020 Wiese, Jerry A.		
		PARTY INFORM	ATION	
Plaintiff	Prosperity, Serenity			Shpirt, Paul <i>Retained</i> 702-800-6000(W)
Defendant	Bandy, Shellie R			
	Combs, Jamie Removed: 02/01/2 Dismissed	2022		
	Combs, Jamie			Insley-Micheri, Jennifer <i>Retained</i> 7028391100(W)
DATE]	Events & Orders of	THE COURT	INDEX
	EVENTS			
07/01/2020	Complaint With Jury Dem [1] Complaint and Prayer for			
07/01/2020	Application to Proceed in Filed By: Plaintiff Prosper [2] Application to Proceed	ity, Serenity		
07/01/2020	Summons Electronically In [3] Summons	ssued - Service Pending		
07/08/2020	Granted for: Plaintiff Prosp [4] Order to Proceed In Forma [4] Order to Proceed In Formation	perity, Serenity		
10/29/2020	Affidavit of Attempted Se [5] Not Found Affidavit	rvice		

Eighth Judicial District Court CASE SUMMARY CASE NO. A-20-817408-C

1	
04/06/2021	 Motion to Extend Time to Serve [6] Motion to Extend Time to Serve Summons and Complaint
06/18/2021	Order [7] ORDER
06/22/2021	Order [8] Order to Show Cause
06/23/2021	Amended Complaint Filed By: Plaintiff Prosperity, Serenity [9] Amended Complaint
08/10/2021	Notice of Association of Counsel Filed By: Plaintiff Prosperity, Serenity [10] Notice of Association of Counsel
08/11/2021	Summons Electronically Issued - Service Pending Party: Plaintiff Prosperity, Serenity [11] Summons
08/19/2021	Affidavit of Service Filed By: Plaintiff Prosperity, Serenity Party Served: Defendant Bandy, Shellie R [12] Affidavit of Service
09/08/2021	Motion to Dismiss Filed By: Defendant Combs, Jamie [13] Defendant Jamie Combs' Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to NRCP 12(b)(5)
09/08/2021	Appendix Filed By: Defendant Combs, Jamie [14] Appendix to Defendant Jamie Combs' Motion to Dismiss
09/08/2021	Initial Appearance Fee Disclosure Filed By: Defendant Combs, Jamie [15] Initial Appearance Fee Disclosure
09/09/2021	Clerk's Notice of Hearing [16] Notice of Hearing
09/22/2021	Opposition Filed By: Plaintiff Prosperity, Serenity [17] Plaintiff s Opposition To Defendant s Motion To Dismiss Pursuant To NRCP 12(B)(5)
10/06/2021	Reply in Support Filed By: Defendant Combs, Jamie [18] Defendant Jamie Combs' Reply in Support of Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to NRCP 12(b) (5)
10/15/2021	Order [19] Order

EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT CASE SUMMARY CASE NO. A-20-817408-C

.

11/01/2021	Notice of Entry of Order Filed By: Plaintiff Prosperity, Serenity [20] Notice of Entry of Order
11/16/2021	Motion to Dismiss Filed By: Defendant Combs, Jamie [21] Defendant Jamie Combs' Renewed Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to NRCP 12(b)(5) - Hearing Requested
11/16/2021	Appendix Filed By: Defendant Combs, Jamie [22] Appendix to Defendant Jamie Combs' Renewed Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to NRCP 12 (b)(5)
11/18/2021	Clerk's Notice of Hearing [23] Notice of Hearing
11/30/2021	Opposition to Motion Filed By: Plaintiff Prosperity, Serenity [24] Plaintiff s Opposition To Defendant s Renewed Motion To Dismiss Pursuant To NRCP 12 (B)(5)
12/14/2021	Reply in Support Filed By: Defendant Combs, Jamie [25] REPLY IN SUPPORT OF RENEWED MOTION TO DISMISS
02/01/2022	Order [26] Order Re: Defendant's Renewed Motion to Dismiss
02/02/2022	Notice of Entry of Order Filed By: Defendant Combs, Jamie [27] Notice of Entry of Order (Granting) Re: Defendant's Renewed Moiton to Dismiss
03/02/2022	Application to Proceed in Forma Pauperis Filed By: Plaintiff Prosperity, Serenity [28] Application to Proceed in Forma Pauperis
03/02/2022	Motion Filed By: Plaintiff Prosperity, Serenity [29] Plaintiff's Motion to Appeal for Extended Time
03/02/2022	Certificate of Mailing Filed By: Plaintiff Prosperity, Serenity [30] Certificate of Mailing
03/03/2022	Order to Proceed In Forma Pauperis Granted for: Plaintiff Prosperity, Serenity [31] Order to Proceed In Forma Pauperis
03/16/2022	Opposition to Motion Filed By: Defendant Combs, Jamie [32] Specially Appearing Jamie Combs Opposition to Serenity Prospereity's Motion for Extended Time

Eighth Judicial District Court CASE SUMMARY CASE NO. A-20-817408-C

04/04/2022	Motion Filed By: Plaintiff Prosperity, Serenity [33] Plaintiff's Motion to Appeal For Extended Time not to Be Dismissed
04/04/2022	Certificate of Mailing Filed By: Plaintiff Prosperity, Serenity [34] Certificate of Mailing
04/06/2022	Change of Address Filed By: Plaintiff Prosperity, Serenity [35] Notice of Change of Address
04/18/2022	Opposition to Motion Filed By: Defendant Combs, Jamie [36] Defendants Opposition to Plaintiffs Second Motion for Extended Time
05/17/2022	Order [37] ORDER REGARDING SERENITY PROSPERITY'S MOTION FOR EXTENDED TIME
05/17/2022	Notice of Entry Filed By: Defendant Combs, Jamie [38] Notice of Entry of Order Regarding Serenity Prosperity's Motion for Extended Time
06/17/2022	Notice of Appeal Filed By: Plaintiff Prosperity, Serenity [39] Plaintiff's SSP Notice to Appeal Court Decision
06/17/2022	Certificate of Mailing Filed By: Plaintiff Prosperity, Serenity [40] Certificate of Mailing
06/21/2022	Case Appeal Statement Case Appeal Statement
02/01/2022	DISPOSITIONS Order of Dismissal (Judicial Officer: Wiese, Jerry A.) Debtors: Jamie Combs (Defendant) Creditors: Serenity Prosperity (Plaintiff) Judgment: 02/01/2022, Docketed: 02/02/2022
	HEARINGS
05/07/2021	 Minute Order (3:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Wiese, Jerry A.) Minute Order - No Hearing Held; Journal Entry Details: The above-referenced matter is scheduled for a hearing on 5/12/21 with regard to "Motion to Enlarge Time for Service." Pursuant to the Administrative Orders of the Court, and pursuant to EDCR 2.23, this matter may be decided with or without oral argument. NRCP 4(e)(3) reads: "If a plaintiff files a motion for an extension of time before the 120-day service period or any extension thereof expires and shows that good cause exists for granting an extension of the service period, the court must extend the service period and set a reasonable date by which service should be made." In order to determine whether good cause exists, however, the court must analyze the case pursuant to the Scrimer factors. Scrimer v. Eighth Judicial District, 116 Nev. 507 (2000). In Nevada, the application of NRCP 4 is a two pronged test. First, the Court must make a determination of whether a motion to enlarge time for service was properly made. If not, the court can only move on to the second determination "upon a showing of good cause

Eighth Judicial District Court CASE SUMMARY CASE NO. A-20-817408-C

	CASE 110. A-20-01/400-C
	to file an untimely motion to enlarge time." Saavedra-Sandoval v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 245 P.3d 1198, 1201 (Nev. 2010). In this case, the motion was not timely filed and the Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate good cause for the filing of an untimely motion. The second prong provides that the Court must dismiss the action unless the party raising the motion can show good cause for the delay in service. In Scrimer v. Dist. Ct., 116 Nev. 507, 513, the Nevada Supreme Court set forth the analysis to be used in determining whether a complaint must be dismissed pursuant to NRCP 4(i) for failure to show good cause why such service was not made within the period. The factors include: (1) difficulties in locating the defendant; (2) the defendant's efforts at evading service or concealment of improper service until after the 120 day period has lapsed; (3) the plaintiff's diligence in attempting to serve the defendant; (4) difficulties encountered by counsel (5) the running of the applicable statute of limitations (6) the parties' good faith attempts to settle the litigation during the 120 day period; (7) the lapse of time between the end of the 120 day period and the actual service of process on the defendant; (8) the prejudice to the defendant caused by the plaintiff's delay in serving process; (9) the defendant's knowledge of the existence of the lawsuit; and (10) any extensions of time for service granted by the district court. Id. at 516. "Underlying these considerations is the policy behind Rule 4(i)-to encourage the diligent prosecution of complaints. Rule 4(i) was not adopted, however, to become an automatic sanction when a plaintiff fails to serve the complaint within 120 days of filing. When making a determination under NRCP 4(i), the district court should recognize that "good public policy dictates that cases be adjudicated on their merits." Id. at 516-517 (internal cite omitted). The Court finds that Plaintiff's Motion failed to establish good cause for the untimely filing of the request for an extension of
06/23/2021	CANCELED Motion (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Wiese, Jerry A.) Vacated Plaintiff's Pro Per Motion to Extend Time to Serve Summons and Complaint
07/08/2021	Show Cause Hearing (10:30 AM) (Judicial Officer: Wiese, Jerry A.) Matter Heard; Journal Entry Details: <i>Court stated Ms. Prosperity filed a Motion to Extend the Time to Serve, and the Court</i> <i>requested additional information before the Court can Grant that kind of request. However,</i> <i>the information was not provided, and Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint against a</i> <i>completely different Deft. The Statute of Limitations may have already expired against that</i> <i>Defendant, but it is not for the Court to decide. Argument by Ms. Prosperity; Plaintiff</i> <i>confirmed the Amended Complaint is against the Driver of the car that hit Ms. Prosperity.</i> <i>Argument by Ms. Prosperity regarding her attempts to serve Ms. Bandy when Ms. Bandy</i> <i>would not provide an address. COURT ORDERED, the claim is DISMISSED against Shellie</i> <i>Bandy and Progressive Insurance; on the Amended Complaint against Jamie Combs, the claim</i> <i>is not dismissed, but Ms. Prosperity must serve Ms. Combs. CLERK'S NOTE: Minute Order</i> <i>created from JAVS on 10-6-2021. J. Lott;</i>
10/27/2021	CANCELED Motion to Dismiss (3:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Wiese, Jerry A.) Vacated Defendant Jamie Combs' Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to NRCP 12(b)(5)
02/02/2022	CANCELED Motion to Dismiss (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Wiese, Jerry A.) Vacated - per Order Defendant Jamie Combs' Renewed Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to NRCP 12(b)(5)
05/13/2022	Motion (3:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Wiese, Jerry A.) <i>Plaintiff's Motion to Appeal for Extended Time</i> Minute Order - No Hearing Held; Journal Entry Details:

EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT CASE SUMMARY CASE NO. A-20-817408-C

The above-referenced matter is scheduled for a decision on the Chambers Calendar for 5/13/22 with regard to Plaintiff's Motion to Appeal Time for Extended Time Not to be Dismissed. Pursuant to the Administrative Orders of the Court, as well as EDCR 2.23, this matter may be decided with or without oral argument. This Court has determined that it would be appropriate to decide this matter on the pleadings, and consequently, this minute order issues. The Court has reviewed Plaintiff s Motion to Appeal Time for Extended Time Not to be Dismissed, filed on 3/2/22, Plaintiff s Motion to Appeal for Extended Time Not Be Dismissed, filed on 4/4/22, and the Oppositions thereto. Although only the Motion filed on 3/2/22 is set for a decision, the Court will address both herein. The Court finds that Plaintiff's Motions are confusing at best. To the extent that Plaintiff requests additional time to file an Appeal, the Nevada Rules of Appellate Procedure do not provide the District Court with the authority to grant an extension. See Walker v. Scully, 99 Nev. 45, 657 P.2d 94 (1983). Based on the foregoing, the Court will take no action. The Court requests that counsel for Jamie Combs prepare an Order consistent with the Court s findings and submit it to the Court within 10 days. CLERK'S NOTE: Minute order electronically served to parties via Odyssey File & Serve. //5-13-22/dy;

DATE

FINANCIAL INFORMATION

Defendant Combs, Jamie Total Charges Total Payments and Credits Balance Due as of 6/21/2022	223.00 223.00 0.00
Plaintiff Prosperity, Serenity Total Charges Total Payments and Credits Balance Due as of 6/21/2022	272.00 272.00 0.00

DIS	STRICT COURT CIVIL		0474
		Dunty, Nevada CASE NO: A-20-	-
	Case No (Assigned by Clerk's Of	Depa	rtme
. Party Information (provide both h			
laintiff(s) (name/address/phone)		Defendant(s) (name/address/phone)	
Serenity Pro		Shellie R. Bandy	
P.O. Box 3		4080 Boulder Highway	
Las Vegas, N		Las Vegas NV 89121	
702-353-		702-680-2014 Fax 702-680-2059	
Attorney (name/address/phone)		attorney (name/address/phone)	
I. Nature of Controversy (please s	select the one most applicable filing type be	low)	
Civil Case Filing Types		T	
Real Property Landlord/Tenant	Negligence	Torts Other Torts	
Unlawful Detainer	Auto	Product Liability	
Other Landlord/Tenant	Premises Liability	Intentional Misconduct	
Title to Property	Other Negligence	Employment Tort	
Judicial Foreclosure	Malpractice		
Other Title to Property	Medical/Dental	Other Tort	
Other Real Property			
Condemnation/Eminent Domain			
Other Real Property	Other Malpractice		
Probate	Construction Defect & Contrac	t Judicial Review/Appeal	
Probate (select case type and estate value)	Construction Defect	Judicial Review	
Summary Administration	Chapter 40	Foreclosure Mediation Case	
General Administration	Other Construction Defect	Petition to Seal Records	
Special Administration	Contract Case	Mental Competency	
Set Aside	Uniform Commercial Code	Nevada State Agency Appeal	
Trust/Conservatorship	Building and Construction	Department of Motor Vehicle	
Other Probate		Worker's Compensation	
Estate Value		Other Nevada State Agency	
Over \$200,000	Collection of Accounts	Appeal Other	
Between \$100,000 and \$200,000	Employment Contract	Appeal from Lower Court	
Under \$2,500	Other Contract	Other Judicial Review/Appeal	
	l Writ	Other Civil Filing	
Civil Writ			
Writ of Habeas Corpus	Writ of Prohibition	Other Civil Filing Compromise of Minor's Claim	
Writ of Mandamus	Other Civil Writ	Foreign Judgment	
Writ of Quo Warrant		Other Civil Matters	
	ourt filings should be filed using the B		
/lay 18, 2020		Contraction of the second	
Date	RECEIVED	Signature of initiating party or representative	
	See other side for family-relate	d case filings.	
	JUN Z 2 2020		
Nevada AOC - Research Statistics Unit Pursuant to NRS 3 275	CLERK OF THE CC	JUN Form	n PA 201 Rev 3 1

Electronically Filed 02/01/2022 2:32 PM CLERK OF THE COURT

DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA -000-

SERENITY PROSPERITY,
Plaintiff,
vs.
JAMIE COMBS, individually
Defendant.

CASE NO.: A-20-817408-C DEPT. NO.: XXX

ORDER RE: DEFENDANT'S RENEWED MOTION TO DISMISS

INTRODUCTION

The above-referenced matter is scheduled for a hearing on February 2, 2022, with regard to Defendant, Jamie Combs' Renewed Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to NRCP 12(b)(5). Pursuant to the Administrative Orders of this Court, and EDCR 2.23, this matter may be decided with or without oral argument. This Court has determined that it would be appropriate to decide this matter on the pleadings, and consequently, this Order issues.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This matter stems from a motor vehicle accident which occurred on May 18, 2020. Plaintiff filed a complaint on 7/1/20 alleging injuries resulting from that motor vehicle accident, allegedly caused by Defendants. The Complaint was originally filed against Defendant Progressive Insurance and Shellie Bandy, Case Manager. It was unclear whether the Plaintiff was alleging that Bandy was the negligent driver and also a case manager for Progressive or if she was attempting to only make a claim against the insurance carrier.

On June 18, 2021, the Court entered an Order regarding Plaintiff's Pro Per Motion to Extend Time to Serve Summons and Complaint. In pertinent part the Order states:

The Complaint is unclear as to whether she is alleging Bandy is the negligent driver and also a case manager for Progressive or if she is attempting to only make a claim against the insurance carrier. In any event, the Complaint is at best confusing. An Affidavit of Attempted

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

Service by the Sherriff was filed in the case on 10/29/21, which stated the Progressive office was vacant. The 120 days for service expired on or about 11/1/20. On 4/6/21 Plaintiff filed the subject Motion to Extend Time for Service of the Summons and Complaint, wherein she references "trouble serving Defendant," and that the Sherriff attempted service but due to COVID the office was closed.

Consequently, when this matter came on the Court's calendar on 5/12/21, the Court issued a minute order on 5/7/21, advising the Plaintiff that her Motion failed to establish good cause for the untimely filing of the request for an extension of time to serve and did not include a *Scrimer* analysis, and consequently, the Court has no information upon which to base a finding of good cause to extend the time for service of the Summons and Complaint. The Court requested that Plaintiff file an Amended or Supplemental Motion, or an Addendum to the original Motion, and include a *Scrimer* analysis (*Scrimer v. Dist. Ct.*, 116 Nev. 507, 998 P.2d 1190 [2000]), and to demonstrate good cause pursuant to *Saavedra-Sandoval v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.*, 245 P.3d 1198, 1201 (Nev. 2010). Such supplemental or amended pleading was to be filed at least ten (10) days prior to the next hearing (which was set for 6/23/21).

See, "Order" dated June 18, 2021.

Because the Plaintiff had not filed a supplemental or amended pleading, the Court found that Plaintiff's Motion failed to establish good cause for the untimely filing of the request for an extension of time to serve. Therefore the Plaintiff's Motion to Extend Time for Service was denied. Additionally, pursuant to NRCP 4(e)(2), the Court issued an Order to Show Cause on June 22, 2021, requiring Plaintiff appear for a hearing on July 8, 2021, to show cause why the Defendants should not be dismissed. The next day, the Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint, in proper person, naming Jamie Combs, as a Defendant.

On July 8, 2021, the Plaintiff appeared via BlueJeans for the Show Cause hearing. At the hearing, the Court first noted that the Plaintiff filed a Motion to Extend the Time to Service and did not provide the court with the information requested in the May 7, 2021 Minute Order. The Court noted that Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint against a completely different Defendant and that the statute of limitations may have already expired against that Defendant (Jamie Combs), but that was not the issue before the Court at that time. After argument by Plaintiff, the Court dismissed Plaintiff's claim against Shellie Bandy and Progressive Insurance. As for the Amended Complaint against Jamie Combs, the Court stated it would not dismiss the Amended Complaint at that time, and noted that it was unclear whether Plaintiff attempted to serve Ms. Combs.

On August 10, 2021, Paul A. Shpirt, Esq. of Dimopoulos Injury Law filed a Notice of Association of Counsel. On August 11, 2021, Mr. Shpirt caused an electronic summons to be issued on Jamie Combs. An Affidavit of Service was filed on August 19, 2021, reflecting that Jamie Combs's husband, Ryan Combs, accepted service at their residence on August 18, 2021. Defendant Jamie Combs then filed a Motion to Dismiss on September 9, 2021. The Court denied the Motion. The Court previously indicated the following:

> Although the Court has serious concerns about the timeliness of the Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, and whether the allegations contained therein against Defendant, Combs, relate back to the filing of the original Complaint, the Defendant has failed in her burden of establishing that dismissal is required under NRCP 12, and consequently, the Motion must be denied.

The Court noted that neither party had addressed NRCP 10 or NRCP 15 and/or the "relation back" doctrine.

On November 16, 2021, Defendant Combs filed a Renewed Motion to Dismiss. On November 30, 2021, Plaintiff filed an Opposition, and on 12/14/21, Defendant filed a Reply.

SUMMARY OF FACTUAL AND LEGAL ARGUMENTS

Defendant Combs again requests that the Court enter an Order dismissing Plaintiff's claims against her with prejudice, pursuant to NRCP 12(b)(5). Defendant previously argued that Plaintiff's claims are barred by the statute of limitations, which expired on May 18, 2020. NRS 11.190(4)(e). Not only was Plaintiff's original Complaint filed nearly two months late, but the operative Amended Complaint was filed more than 13 months later. Defendant argues that there is no evidence that Plaintiff attempted to serve or completed service of the original Complaint, on any person at any time. The Court ultimately dismissed the original Complaint as to the original parties therein. Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint subsequent to the expiration of the statute of limitations (10/29/20), on June 23, 2021, and purportedly served the Amended Complaint on August 19, 2021. Defendant argues that no prior or

current party had "actual notice" of either complaint within the statutory period, and consequently, the case should be dismissed.

Defendant argues that there is no evidence that Plaintiff attempted to effectuate service on any person until August of 2021, and the statute of limitations expired on 10/29/20. This Court concluded that the statute of limitations was tolled from 4/1/20 through 6/30/20 (91 days), with the original Complaint filed 7/1/20, and the Amended Complaint filed 7/23/21.

Defendant argues that the original Complaint should have been served within 120 days, which would have been by 10/29/20. This Court previously held that even with the addition of the time tolled (91 days), the 120 days would have expired long before the 6/23/21 Amended Complaint filing date.

Defendant cites to the case of *Echols v. Summa Corporation*, 95 Nev. 720, 601 P.2d 716 (1979), which held that when a Defendant has actual notice of the action before the expiration of the two year period (statute of limitations), it was neither misled nor prejudiced by the subsequent amendment. Defendant argues that the facts in this case are distinguishable, and in our case, neither the original Defendants, nor Defendant Combs, had actual notice of the Complaint within the applicable statute of limitations period, and as such, Defendant was misled and prejudiced by the Amended Complaint, which was filed after the statutory period. Consequently, Defendant cannot use the "relation-back" doctrine to obviate her duty to serve the Defendant within the statutory period.

Defendant argues that the parties exchanged information at the scene of the accident in May of 2018, and Plaintiff was represented by counsel, who was aware of the identity of Ms. Combs, prior to the filing of the original Complaint, and prior to the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations. Further, Plaintiff did not file a Complaint, which provided any Does or Roes, so no relation back or substitution is possible.

Defendant argues that this Court previously found that the statute of limitations expired on 10/29/20, long before the June 23, 2021 Amended Complaint was filed. Defendant argues that Plaintiff's amendment after the expiration of the statute of limitations was improper under NRCP 15. Further, Defendant argues that the doctrine of "laches" resulted in an unreasonable delay

in pursuing the claim against Ms. Combs more than three years after the accident.

Defendant points out that there was no mistake concerning the proper party's identity as Ms. Combs provided details of her identity when the accident occurred in 2018, and additionally, Plaintiff failed to plead any Doe or Roe Defendants. Consequently, relation back under NRCP 10 or 15 are not available to Plaintiff. Defendant asserts that in Nevada, the "fictitious defendant rule" is only applicable where there is uncertainty as to the defendant's name, and that was not the case here. *Hill v. Summa Corp.*, 90 Nev., at 81, 518 P.2d at 1095 (1974).

Defendant also argues that in order to determine whether or not the amendment is proper and can survive a motion to dismiss under the relationback doctrine, the Court analyzed a 3-factor test, as set forth in *Servatius v. United Resort Hotels*, 85 Nev. 371, 455 P.2d 621 (1969). In *Servatius*, the Court held that "a proper defendant may be brought into the action after the statute of limitations has run if the proper defendant (1) receives actual notice of the action; (2) knows that it is the proper party; and (3) has not been misled to its prejudice by the amendment." *Id.* Defendant emphasizes that she did not have actual notice of the action during the statutory time period.

Defendants also cite to the case of *Hayes v. Lyon Cty.*, 2018 WL 2041533 (unpublished), 134 Nev. 948, citing to *Garvey v. Clark County*, 91 Nev. 127, 129 (1975), where the court found that because appellants conceded that they elected not to name a party as a defendant when they filed the action, that party was an added and not substituted party so the statute of limitations barred appellants claims. The Court has also held that when a Plaintiff failed to exercise reasonable diligence in ascertaining the identity of the proper defendant, the Amended Complaint did not "relate back" to the filing of the original Complaint. *Sparks v Alpha Tau Omega Fraternity, Inc.*, 127 Nev. 287, 295, 255 P.3d 238 (2011). Defendant argues that the case of *Costello v. Casler*, 127 Nev. 436 (2011) is distinguishable, because in that case, the Plaintiff did not know the identity of the Defendant, but in this case, the Plaintiff did have that information.

In Opposition, Plaintiff argues that Defendant's Renewed Motion to Dismiss is actually an untimely motion to reconsider. Plaintiff argues that Defendant seeks dismissal on the same grounds as previously litigated, in violation of EDCR 2.24(a). Because Defendant did not seek leave of court before filing the Motion, Plaintiff argues that the Court must deny Defendant's Motion as it is procedurally deficient. Even if the Court ignores the improper "Renewed" Motion and instead, sua sponte, converts the instant Motion into a Motion for Reconsideration pursuant to NRCP 60, it still fails, as it does not present any new Court decision, new law or facts that were not considered by this Court in making its original Order.

EDCR 2.24(b) requires a motion for reconsideration be filed within 14 days after service of written notice of the order or judgment unless the time is shortened or enlarged by order. Here, the Notice of Entry of Order was filed on November 1, 2021 and the "Renewed" Motion was filed on November 16, 2021, 15 days after the Notice. In addition to untimeliness, Plaintiff argues that Defendant's Motion fails as a matter of law, pursuant to NRCP 60(a) and (b). Plaintiff notes that Defendant does not attempt to correct any clerical mistakes or oversights, as there are none. Similarly, Defendant does not argue any excusable neglect or any "newly discovered evidence that, with a reasonable diligence, could not have been discovered..." Defendant also does not claim fraud or other reason besides, "the Court of this one wrong," argument. Accordingly, NRCP 60 (a) and (b) are inapplicable.

The Plaintiff's Opposition is based entirely on procedural issues, and not factual issues. It does not address Rules 10 or 15 or the relation-back doctrine.

As the Defendant noted in the Reply, when a Motion is decided, as the Defendant's initial Motion to Dismiss was, and denied "without prejudice," it means that it is denied with the ability to reassert the Motion, as the Court suggested, by addressing the applicable law.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

As this Court set forth previously, "a complaint must set forth sufficient facts to establish all necessary elements of a claim for relief." *Hay v. Hay*, 100 Nev. 196, 198 (1984). NRCP 12(b)(5) provides that a Defendant can request a

dismissal by motion for the failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Such motions are proper where it appears to a certainty that the Plaintiff is entitled to no relief under any set of facts that could be proved in support of the claim. See *Bratcher v. City of Las Vegas*, 1123 Nev. 502 (1997).

For the purpose of considering a Rule 12(b)(5) motion, the charge of the complaint is accepted as true. See *Conway v. Circus Circus Casinos, Inc.*, 116 Nev. 870, 873 (2000). However, the Court is "not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation." *Papasan v. Allain*, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986); see also *George v. Morton*, 2007 WL 680787, at *6 (D. Nev. March 1, 2007) (stating that conclusory legal allegations and unwarranted inferences will not prevent dismissal). Therefore, dismissal is proper where the allegations are insufficient to establish the elements of a claim for relief. See *Brent G. Theobald Const., Inc., v. Richardson Const., Inc.,* 122 Nev. 1163, 1166 (2006) (abrogated on other grounds by 124 Nev. 224 (2008)).

When considering the issue of whether a statute of limitations has expired, a determination must be made as to when the figurative clock for that action commenced, or started to accrue. "An action accrues when the litigant discovers, or should have discovered, the existence of damages, not the exact numerical extent of those damages." *Gonzales v. Stewart Title*, 111 Nev. 1350, 1353 (1995)(overruled by *Kopicko v. Young* on other grounds)(emphasis in original).

On April 1, 2020, Governor Sisolak entered a Declaration of Emergency Directive 009 indicating that "Any specific time limit set by state statute or regulation for the commencement of any legal action is hereby tolled from the date of this Directive until 30 days from the date the state of emergency declared on March 12, 2020 is terminated.

Declaration of Emergency Directive 026, issued on June 29, 2020, indicated in part that "Directive 009 (Revised) shall terminated on June 30, 2020 at 11:59 pm. All time tolled by Section 2 shall recommence effective July 31, 2020 at 11:59 pm.

Based upon the above-referenced Emergency Directives, it appears that the statute of limitations in this case, and others, was tolled from 4/1/20

through 6/30/20 (total of 91 days). The Complaint alleges that the subject motor vehicle accident occurred on 5/18/18 and consequently, pursuant to the dictates of NRS 11.190(4)(e), the Complaint needed to be filed by 5/18/20. If we add the 91 days during which the Statute of Limitations was tolled by the Governor, the statute would have required the filing of the Complaint by August 19, 2018. The original Complaint was filed 7/1/20. The Amended Complaint was filed 6/23/21.

Pursuant to NRCP 15(a), "a party may amend its pleading once as a matter of course within: A) 21 days after serving it, or B) if the pleading is one to which a responsive pleading is required, 21 days after service of a responsive pleading or 21 days after service of a motion under Rule 12 . . . whichever is earlier.. . . In all other cases, a party may amend its pleading only with the opposing party's written consent or the court's leave." When the Plaintiff filed her Amended Complaint, she had not yet served any Defendants, nor had any of the Defendants filed a Motion. Consequently, pursuant to NRCP 15(a), she was free to file her Amended Complaint. The real question is whether or not the Amended Complaint "related back" to the original Complaint, for purposes of analyzing the statute of limitations.

NRCP 10(d) indicates the following:

Rule 10. Form of Pleadings

(d) Using a Fictitious Name to Identify a Defendant. If the name of a defendant is unknown to the pleader, the defendant may be designated by any name. When the defendant's true name is discovered, the pleader should promptly substitute the actual defendant for a fictitious party.

NRCP 10.

NRCP 15(c) provides as follows:

(c) **Relation Back of Amendments**. An amendment to a pleading relates back to the date of the original pleading when:

(1) the amendment asserts a claim or defense that arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set out - or attempted to be set out - in the original pleading; or

(2) the amendment changes a party or the naming of a party against whom a claim is asserted, if Rule 15(c)(1) is satisfied and if, within the period provided by Rule 4(e) for serving the

28

summons and complaint, the party to be brought in by amendment:

(A) received such notice of the action that it will not be prejudiced in defending on the merits; and

(B) knew or should have known that the action would have been brought against it, but for a mistake concerning the proper party's identity.

NRCP 15.

In evaluating the requirements of NRCP 10 and 15, the Court notes that there were no fictitious Defendants identified in the Complaint, so NRCP 10 would not apply. There is also no evidence that the requirements of NRCP 15 have been met.

In addressing the "relation back" doctrine, the Nevada Supreme Court has indicated the following:

An amended pleading adding a defendant that is filed after the statute of limitations has run will relate back to the date of the original pleading under NRCP 15(c) if "the proper defendant (1) receives actual notice of the action; (2) knows that it is the proper party; and (3) has not been misled to its prejudice by the amendment." *Echols v. Summa Corp.*, 95 Nev. 720, 722, 601 P.2d 716, 717 (1979). NRCP 15(c) is to be liberally construed to allow relation back of the amended pleading where the opposing party will be put to no disadvantage. See E.W. French & Sons, Inc. v. General Portland Inc., 885 F.2d 1392, 1396 (9th Cir.1989) ("[C]ourts should apply the relation back doctrine of [Federal] Rule 15(c) liberally."); University & Cmty. Coll. Sys. v. Sutton, 120 Nev. 972, 988, 103 P.3d 8, 18–19 (2004) (noting the liberal policy underlying NRCP 15). Modern rules of procedure are intended to allow the court to reach the merits, as opposed to disposition on technical niceties. See Schmidt v. Sadri, 95 Nev. 702, 705, 601 P.2d 713, 715 (1979) ("The [L]egislature envisioned that [the Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure] would serve to simplify existing judicial procedures and promote the speedy determination of litigation upon its merits."). A plaintiff's right to have his or her claim heard on its merits despite technical difficulties, however, must be balanced against "a defendant's right to be protected from stale claims and the attendant uncertainty they cause." Pargman v. Vickers, 208 Ariz. 573, 96 P.3d 571, 576 (App.2004).

Costello v. Casler, 127 Nev. 436, 24 P.3d 631 (2011).

The Court has further analyzed the difference in "substituting" the identity of a Defendant, and the "addition" of a new Defendant, as follows:

The rule allowing the amendment as to a defendant's identity subsequent to the running of the statute of limitations was designed to apply in the situation where the plaintiff is cognizant of the identity or description of the fictitiously named defendant, but not his true name. State ex rel. Dep't Hwys v. District Court, 95 Nev. 715, 717, 601 P.2d 710, 711 (1979). Accordingly, we have held that when a plaintiff has relied on NRCP 10(a), properly alleging contemplated defendants and uncertainty as to their names, subsequently providing their true names in an amended pleading, a substitution is effected, not an addition of a party defendant. Hill v. Summa Corporation, 90 Nev. at 81, 518 P.2d at 1095. Attempts to broaden our fictitious defendant practice to encompass situations where the plaintiff was ignorant not only of the defendant's name, but also of his identity or even his involvement have been unsuccessful. See Garvey v. Clark County, 91 Nev. 127, 532 P.2d 269 (1975); Knight v. Witco Chemical Co., 89 Nev. 586, 517 P.2d 792 (1973). We have recognized the problem of allowing new parties to be brought in after the expiration of the period of limitation. Servatius v. United Resort Hotels, 85 Nev. 371, 455 P.2d 621 (1969). Accordingly, we have interpreted the fictitious defendant rule as providing a narrow exception, allowing the pleading of fictitious defendants only where there is an uncertainty as to their names. Hill v. Summa Corporation, 90 Nev. at 81, 518 P.2d at 1095.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Lunn v. American Maintenance Corp., 96 Nev. 787, 790, 618 P.2d 343 (1980).

In *Lunn*, the Court held that the proposed amendment "brought in a new party defendant and did not merely correctly identify a party defendant already before the court," and consequently, the previously filed pleadings "did not toll the statute of limitations." *Id.*, at 791.

In an unpublished case, the Nevada Court of Appeals considered the interaction between NRCP 10 and NRCP 15, and the application of the *Nurenberger* case, as they relate to the proposed addition or substitution of a party. Although it is not controlling, the analysis is helpful. The Court held as follows:

Turning to Howell's contention that the district court erred in concluding that the relation back provision of NRCP 15 did not apply to his request, we agree. The district court, citing *Nurenberger*, concluded that NRCP 15(c) has no application to situations where a plaintiff seeks to add or substitute parties under NRCP 10(a), as NRCP 15(c) applies only when seeking to add claims or defenses. See 107 Nev. at 882, 822 P.2d at 1106. But the supreme court later specifically disavowed that conclusion as dicta and held that "the relation back effect of NRCP 15(c) does apply to the addition or substitution of parties." *Costello*, 127 Nev. at 440 n.4, 254 P.3d at 634 n.4. And consistent with that holding, the advisory committee note to the current version of NRCP 15 acknowledges that "if a fictitiousparty replacement does not meet the [what is now codified as] Rule 10(d) test, it may be treated as an amendment to add a party under Rule 15 if the standards in Rule 15 are met." NRCP 15 advisory committee's note to 2019 amendment. Accordingly, the district court erred when it concluded otherwise and declined to reach Howell's arguments with respect to NRCP 15.

Howell, 2020 WL 7828787, 478 P.3d 410 (Table) (unpublished, NV Ct. of App., 12/30/2020).

In Echols v. Summa Corp., a restaurant customer brought suit against the company he believed to own the restaurant where he was injured, as well as the manufacturer of the ketchup bottle which allegedly exploded in his hands. 95 Nev. 720, 601 P.2d 716 (1979). After the statute of limitations had expired, he amended his complaint to substitute the true owner of the restaurant as the defendant. The district court dismissed the action as barred by the statute of limitations, and the customer appealed. The customer argued that the amendment substituting the correct owner of the restaurant related back to the filing of the original complaint under NRCP 15(c), and therefore was not barred by the statute of limitations. The Court cited to the case of Servatius v. United Resort Hotels, 85 Nev. 371, 455 P.2d 621 (1969), in which the Court held that "a proper defendant may be brought into the action after the statute of limitations has run if the proper defendant (1) receives actual notice of the action; (2) knows that it is the proper party; and (3) has not been misled to its prejudice by the amendment. Echols at 720, citing Servatius v. United Resort Hotels, 85 Nev. 371, 455 P.2d 621 (1969).

The Court analyzed the three Servatius factors, and concluded that Summa (the new Defendant) received actual notice of the action before the expiration of the two year period of limitations, and it was clear to those operating the Frontier that the originally named Defendant was an error. Summa acknowledged that it was the proper Defendant. And finally, "Having actual notice of the action before the expiration of the two year period, Summa was neither misled nor prejudiced by the subsequent amendment." Consequently, in that case, the Court held that the amendment related back to the filing of the original complaint pursuant to NRCP 15. In the present case, there is no indication or evidence, which indicates that Jamie Combs (the new Defendant), had any knowledge of the action prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations. It appears, based upon the most recent pleadings, that Defendant was misled to her detriment or prejudice by the amendment, as the statute of limitations had expired before she ever received notice of the claim and she thought she was safe.

In considering the language of NRCP 15(c), it appears that the Plaintiff's amendment was untimely. NRCP 15(c)(2) provides as follows:

(c) **Relation Back of Amendments**. An amendment to a pleading relates back to the date of the original pleading when:

(1) the amendment asserts a claim or defense that arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set out — or attempted to be set out — in the original pleading; or

(2) the amendment changes a party or the naming of a party against whom a claim is asserted, if Rule 15(c)(1) is satisfied and if, within the period provided by Rule 4(e) for serving the summons and complaint, the party to be brought in by amendment:

(A) received such notice of the action that it will not be prejudiced in defending on the merits; and

(B) knew or should have known that the action would have been brought against it, but for a mistake concerning the proper party's identity.

In adding a party under this rule, the amendment relates back "if Rule 15(c)(1) is satisfied." In this case, it appears that the amendment does appear to assert a claim that was set out in the original pleading. The amendment, however, needs to be made "within the period provided by Rule 4(e) for serving the summons and complaint. . ." Rule 4(e) provides that service must be completed "no later than 120 days after the complaint is filed." Consequently, Rule 15(c) appears to indicate that the party seeking to amend by bringing in a new party, may do so only if the amendment is made within 120 days after the filing of the original Complaint. The original Complaint in this matter was filed on 7/1/20. 120 days later would have been 10/29/20. Even if we consider the time tolled by the Governor's Emergency Directives, the 120 days would have expired long before the 6/23/21 Amended Complaint filing date.

NRCP 15(c) indicates that within the above-referenced time frame (120 days from the filing of the original Complaint), the new Defendant had to have

received notice of the action so that she would not be prejudiced in defending on the merits; and she "knew or should have known" that the action would have been brought against her, but for a mistake concerning the proper party's identity.

There is no suggestion that the Defendant, Jamie Combs, was provided with such information within the relevant time period.

Because this Court is considering this matter on the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, the Court must "recognize all factual allegations in [the] Complaint as true and draw all inferences in [Plaintiff's] favor." *Buzz Stew, LLC v. City of North Las Vegas,* 124 Nev. 224, 228, 181 P.3d 670 (2008). Further, the Complaint may only be dismissed "if it appears beyond a doubt that [Plaintiff] could prove no set of facts, which, if true, would entitle it to relief." *Id.* Defendant has the "burden of proof" with regard to this Motion, and Defendant has sustained the obligation to establish that Defendant did not have notice of the action within the 120 days provided in NRCP 4, as applied by NRCP 15(c), and that the Defendant "would be prejudiced in defending on the merits," etc.

The Court finds that even viewing all allegations in favor of the Plaintiff, she failed to comply with the applicable statute of limitations, and the Court finds that the "relation back" doctrine cannot work to safe the Plaintiff's Complaint. Consequently, the Court has no choice but to grant the Defendant's Motion and Dismiss the Amended Complaint.

CONCLUSION/ORDER

Based upon the foregoing, and good cause appearing,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is hereby **GRANTED**, and the Amended Complaint is hereby **DISMISSED**.

The Court requests that counsel for Defendant prepare and timely process a Notice of Entry relating to this Order.

Because this matter has been decided on the pleadings, the hearing scheduled for 2/2/22 will be taken off calendar, and no parties nor attorneys need to appear.

13

Dated this 1st day of February, 2022

6AA CDC 36B4 E069 Jerry A. Wiese District Court Judge

1	CSERV					
2	DISTRICT COURT					
3	CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA					
4						
5						
6	Serenity Prosperity, Plaintiff	(s)	CASE NO: A-20-817408-C			
7	VS.		DEPT. NO. Department 30			
8	Shellie Bandy, Defendant(s)					
9						
10	AUTOMA	TED	CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE			
11	This automated certificate	e of se	ervice was generated by the Eighth Judicial D	District		
12	Court. The foregoing Order was	served	d via the court's electronic eFile system to all he above entitled case as listed below:			
13			ne above entitled case as listed below.			
14	Service Date: 2/1/2022					
15	Theresa Amendola	tamen	ndola@dennettwinspear.com			
16	Jennifer Micheri	jinsley	ey-micheri@dennettwinspear.com			
17	Ashley Marchant	amarc	chant@dennettwinspear.com			
18	Rosa Quarles	rq@st	stevedimopoulos.com			
19	Paul Shpirt	ps@st	stevedimopoulos.com			
20	Serenity Prosperity	Truth	n_1212@yahoo.com			
21	Tony Amendola	-	endola@dennettwinspear.com			
22		uuiiioi	naona@aonneet.winspear.com			
23	· · ·		ne above mentioned filings were also served b			
24	via United States Postal Service, postage prepaid, to the parties listed below at their last known addresses on 2/2/2022					
25						
26	Jennifer Insley-Micheri		3301 N. Buffalo Drive Suite 195			
27			Las Vegas, NV, 89129			
28						

1	Shellie Bandy 408	80 Boulder Highway
2	Las	80 Boulder Highway s Vegas, NV, 89121
3		
4		
5		
6		
7		
8		
9		
10		
11		
12		
13		
14 15		
15		
10		
18		
19		
20		
21		
22		
23		
24		
25		
26		
27		
28		

Electronically Filed 2/2/2022 10:39 AM Steven D. Grierson			
RYAN L. DENNETT, ESQ.			
RYAN L. DENNETT, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 005617			
rdennett@dennettwinspear.com JENNIFER INSLEY MICHERI, ESQ.			
Nevada Bar No. 10089 Jinsley-micheri@dennettwinspear.com			
DENNETT WINSPEAR, LLP 3301 N. Buffalo Drive, Suite 195			
Las Vegas, Nevada 89129 Telephone: (702) 839-1100			
Facsimile: (702) 839-1113 Attorneys for Defendant,			
Jamie Čombs			
DISTRICT COURT			
CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA			
SERENTY PROSPERITY, individually,			
Plaintiff, Case No: A-20-817408-C Dept. No: 30			
VS.			
JAMIE COMBS, individually,			
Defendants.			
NOTICE OF ENTRY OF ORDER (GRANTING) RE: DEFENDANT'S RENEWED MOTION TO DISMISS			
TO: ALL INTERESTED PARTIES AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD:			
YOU, AND EACH OF YOU will please take notice that an ORDER (GRANTING) RE:			
DEFENDANTS RENEWED MOTION TO DIMISS was entered on the 1 st day of February, 2022,			
a true and correct copy of which is attached hereto and incorporated herein by this reference.			
DATED this <u>2nd</u> day of February, 2022.			
DENNETT WINSPEAR, LLP			
By <u>/s/ Jennifer Insley Micheri</u> RYAN L. DENNETT, ESQ.			
Nevada Bar No. 005617 JENNIFER INSLEY MICHERI, ESQ.			
Nevada Bar No. 10089 3301 N. Buffalo Drive, Suite 195			
Las Vegas, Nevada 89129 Telephone: (702) 839-1100			
Attorneys for Defendant, Jamie Combs			

DENNETT WINSPEAR Attorneys at Law

1	CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE			
2	Pursuant to NRCP 5(b), EDCR 7.26 and N.E.F.C.R. 9, I certify that on this date, I served			
3	the foregoing ORDER (GRANTING) RE: DEFENDANT'S RENEWED MOTION TO DISMISS on			
4	all parties to this action by the following method:			
5				
6	Facsimile			
7				
8	Mail			
9	XX Electronic Service			
10	Paul A. Shpirt, Esq.			
11	Nevada Bar No. 10441 DIMOPOULOS INJURY LAW			
12	6671 S., Las Vegas Blvd., Suite 275 Las Vegas, Nevada 89119			
13	Telephone: 702-224-2114 Attorneys for Plaintiff,			
14	Serenity Prosperity			
15	DATED this <u>2nd</u> day of February, 2022.			
16	Diffed and <u>Line</u> day of Poblary, 2022.			
17	/s/ Theresa Amendola			
18	An Employee of DENNETT WINSPEAR, LLP			
19				
20				
21				
22				
23				
24				
25				
26				
27				
28				
	2			

DENNETT WINSPEAR

		EALLY SERVED 2 2:32 PM Electronically 02/01/2022 2:30	
1	DISTRIC	T COURT CLERK OF THE C	COURT
2	CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA -oOo-		
3			
4	SERENITY PROSPERITY,		
5) Plaintiff,)	CASE NO.: A-20-817408-C	
6		DEPT. NO.: XXX	
7	VS.)		
8	JAMIE COMBS, individually	ORDER RE: DEFENDANT'S	
9	Defendant.	RENEWED MOTION TO DISMISS	
10			

INTRODUCTION

The above-referenced matter is scheduled for a hearing on February 2, 2022, with regard to Defendant, Jamie Combs' Renewed Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to NRCP 12(b)(5). Pursuant to the Administrative Orders of this Court, and EDCR 2.23, this matter may be decided with or without oral argument. This Court has determined that it would be appropriate to decide this matter on the pleadings, and consequently, this Order issues.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This matter stems from a motor vehicle accident which occurred on May 18, 2020. Plaintiff filed a complaint on 7/1/20 alleging injuries resulting from that motor vehicle accident, allegedly caused by Defendants. The Complaint was originally filed against Defendant Progressive Insurance and Shellie Bandy, Case Manager. It was unclear whether the Plaintiff was alleging that Bandy was the negligent driver and also a case manager for Progressive or if she was attempting to only make a claim against the insurance carrier.

On June 18, 2021, the Court entered an Order regarding Plaintiff's Pro Per Motion to Extend Time to Serve Summons and Complaint. In pertinent part the Order states:

The Complaint is unclear as to whether she is alleging Bandy is the negligent driver and also a case manager for Progressive or if she is attempting to only make a claim against the insurance carrier. In any event, the Complaint is at best confusing. An Affidavit of Attempted Service by the Sherriff was filed in the case on 10/29/21, which stated the Progressive office was vacant. The 120 days for service expired on or about 11/1/20. On 4/6/21 Plaintiff filed the subject Motion to Extend Time for Service of the Summons and Complaint, wherein she references "trouble serving Defendant," and that the Sherriff attempted service but due to COVID the office was closed.

Consequently, when this matter came on the Court's calendar on 5/12/21, the Court issued a minute order on 5/7/21, advising the Plaintiff that her Motion failed to establish good cause for the untimely filing of the request for an extension of time to serve and did not include a *Scrimer* analysis, and consequently, the Court has no information upon which to base a finding of good cause to extend the time for service of the Summons and Complaint. The Court requested that Plaintiff file an Amended or Supplemental Motion, or an Addendum to the original Motion, and include a *Scrimer* analysis (*Scrimer v. Dist. Ct.*, 116 Nev. 507, 998 P.2d 1190 [2000]), and to demonstrate good cause pursuant to *Saavedra-Sandoval v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.*, 245 P.3d 1198, 1201 (Nev. 2010). Such supplemental or amended pleading was to be filed at least ten (10) days prior to the next hearing (which was set for 6/23/21).

See, "Order" dated June 18, 2021.

Because the Plaintiff had not filed a supplemental or amended pleading, the Court found that Plaintiff's Motion failed to establish good cause for the untimely filing of the request for an extension of time to serve. Therefore the Plaintiff's Motion to Extend Time for Service was denied. Additionally, pursuant to NRCP 4(e)(2), the Court issued an Order to Show Cause on June 22, 2021, requiring Plaintiff appear for a hearing on July 8, 2021, to show cause why the Defendants should not be dismissed. The next day, the Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint, in proper person, naming Jamie Combs, as a Defendant.

On July 8, 2021, the Plaintiff appeared via BlueJeans for the Show Cause hearing. At the hearing, the Court first noted that the Plaintiff filed a Motion to Extend the Time to Service and did not provide the court with the information requested in the May 7, 2021 Minute Order. The Court noted that Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint against a completely different Defendant and that the statute of limitations may have already expired against that Defendant (Jamie Combs), but that was not the issue before the Court at that time. After argument by Plaintiff, the Court dismissed Plaintiff's claim against Shellie Bandy and Progressive Insurance. As for the Amended Complaint against Jamie Combs, the Court stated it would not dismiss the Amended Complaint at that time, and noted that it was unclear whether Plaintiff attempted to serve Ms. Combs.

On August 10, 2021, Paul A. Shpirt, Esq. of Dimopoulos Injury Law filed a Notice of Association of Counsel. On August 11, 2021, Mr. Shpirt caused an electronic summons to be issued on Jamie Combs. An Affidavit of Service was filed on August 19, 2021, reflecting that Jamie Combs's husband, Ryan Combs, accepted service at their residence on August 18, 2021. Defendant Jamie Combs then filed a Motion to Dismiss on September 9, 2021. The Court denied the Motion. The Court previously indicated the following:

> Although the Court has serious concerns about the timeliness of the Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, and whether the allegations contained therein against Defendant, Combs, relate back to the filing of the original Complaint, the Defendant has failed in her burden of establishing that dismissal is required under NRCP 12, and consequently, the Motion must be denied.

The Court noted that neither party had addressed NRCP 10 or NRCP 15 and/or the "relation back" doctrine.

On November 16, 2021, Defendant Combs filed a Renewed Motion to Dismiss. On November 30, 2021, Plaintiff filed an Opposition, and on 12/14/21, Defendant filed a Reply.

SUMMARY OF FACTUAL AND LEGAL ARGUMENTS

Defendant Combs again requests that the Court enter an Order dismissing Plaintiff's claims against her with prejudice, pursuant to NRCP 12(b)(5). Defendant previously argued that Plaintiff's claims are barred by the statute of limitations, which expired on May 18, 2020. NRS 11.190(4)(e). Not only was Plaintiff's original Complaint filed nearly two months late, but the operative Amended Complaint was filed more than 13 months later. Defendant argues that there is no evidence that Plaintiff attempted to serve or completed service of the original Complaint, on any person at any time. The Court ultimately dismissed the original Complaint as to the original parties therein. Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint subsequent to the expiration of the statute of limitations (10/29/20), on June 23, 2021, and purportedly served the Amended Complaint on August 19, 2021. Defendant argues that no prior or

current party had "actual notice" of either complaint within the statutory period, and consequently, the case should be dismissed.

Defendant argues that there is no evidence that Plaintiff attempted to effectuate service on any person until August of 2021, and the statute of limitations expired on 10/29/20. This Court concluded that the statute of limitations was tolled from 4/1/20 through 6/30/20 (91 days), with the original Complaint filed 7/1/20, and the Amended Complaint filed 7/23/21.

Defendant argues that the original Complaint should have been served within 120 days, which would have been by 10/29/20. This Court previously held that even with the addition of the time tolled (91 days), the 120 days would have expired long before the 6/23/21 Amended Complaint filing date.

Defendant cites to the case of *Echols v. Summa Corporation*, 95 Nev. 720, 601 P.2d 716 (1979), which held that when a Defendant has actual notice of the action before the expiration of the two year period (statute of limitations), it was neither misled nor prejudiced by the subsequent amendment. Defendant argues that the facts in this case are distinguishable, and in our case, neither the original Defendants, nor Defendant Combs, had actual notice of the Complaint within the applicable statute of limitations period, and as such, Defendant was misled and prejudiced by the Amended Complaint, which was filed after the statutory period. Consequently, Defendant cannot use the "relation-back" doctrine to obviate her duty to serve the Defendant within the statutory period.

Defendant argues that the parties exchanged information at the scene of the accident in May of 2018, and Plaintiff was represented by counsel, who was aware of the identity of Ms. Combs, prior to the filing of the original Complaint, and prior to the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations. Further, Plaintiff did not file a Complaint, which provided any Does or Roes, so no relation back or substitution is possible.

Defendant argues that this Court previously found that the statute of limitations expired on 10/29/20, long before the June 23, 2021 Amended Complaint was filed. Defendant argues that Plaintiff's amendment after the expiration of the statute of limitations was improper under NRCP 15. Further, Defendant argues that the doctrine of "laches" resulted in an unreasonable delay

in pursuing the claim against Ms. Combs more than three years after the accident.

Defendant points out that there was no mistake concerning the proper party's identity as Ms. Combs provided details of her identity when the accident occurred in 2018, and additionally, Plaintiff failed to plead any Doe or Roe Defendants. Consequently, relation back under NRCP 10 or 15 are not available to Plaintiff. Defendant asserts that in Nevada, the "fictitious defendant rule" is only applicable where there is uncertainty as to the defendant's name, and that was not the case here. *Hill v. Summa Corp.*, 90 Nev., at 81, 518 P.2d at 1095 (1974).

Defendant also argues that in order to determine whether or not the amendment is proper and can survive a motion to dismiss under the relationback doctrine, the Court analyzed a 3-factor test, as set forth in *Servatius v. United Resort Hotels*, 85 Nev. 371, 455 P.2d 621 (1969). In *Servatius*, the Court held that "a proper defendant may be brought into the action after the statute of limitations has run if the proper defendant (1) receives actual notice of the action; (2) knows that it is the proper party; and (3) has not been misled to its prejudice by the amendment." *Id.* Defendant emphasizes that she did not have actual notice of the action during the statutory time period.

Defendants also cite to the case of *Hayes v. Lyon Cty.*, 2018 WL 2041533 (unpublished), 134 Nev. 948, citing to *Garvey v. Clark County*, 91 Nev. 127, 129 (1975), where the court found that because appellants conceded that they elected not to name a party as a defendant when they filed the action, that party was an added and not substituted party so the statute of limitations barred appellants claims. The Court has also held that when a Plaintiff failed to exercise reasonable diligence in ascertaining the identity of the proper defendant, the Amended Complaint did not "relate back" to the filing of the original Complaint. *Sparks v Alpha Tau Omega Fraternity, Inc.*, 127 Nev. 287, 295, 255 P.3d 238 (2011). Defendant argues that the case of *Costello v. Casler*, 127 Nev. 436 (2011) is distinguishable, because in that case, the Plaintiff did not know the identity of the Defendant, but in this case, the Plaintiff did have that information.

In Opposition, Plaintiff argues that Defendant's Renewed Motion to Dismiss is actually an untimely motion to reconsider. Plaintiff argues that Defendant seeks dismissal on the same grounds as previously litigated, in violation of EDCR 2.24(a). Because Defendant did not seek leave of court before filing the Motion, Plaintiff argues that the Court must deny Defendant's Motion as it is procedurally deficient. Even if the Court ignores the improper "Renewed" Motion and instead, sua sponte, converts the instant Motion into a Motion for Reconsideration pursuant to NRCP 60, it still fails, as it does not present any new Court decision, new law or facts that were not considered by this Court in making its original Order.

EDCR 2.24(b) requires a motion for reconsideration be filed within 14 days after service of written notice of the order or judgment unless the time is shortened or enlarged by order. Here, the Notice of Entry of Order was filed on November 1, 2021 and the "Renewed" Motion was filed on November 16, 2021, 15 days after the Notice. In addition to untimeliness, Plaintiff argues that Defendant's Motion fails as a matter of law, pursuant to NRCP 60(a) and (b). Plaintiff notes that Defendant does not attempt to correct any clerical mistakes or oversights, as there are none. Similarly, Defendant does not argue any excusable neglect or any "newly discovered evidence that, with a reasonable diligence, could not have been discovered..." Defendant also does not claim fraud or other reason besides, "the Court of this one wrong," argument. Accordingly, NRCP 60 (a) and (b) are inapplicable.

The Plaintiff's Opposition is based entirely on procedural issues, and not factual issues. It does not address Rules 10 or 15 or the relation-back doctrine.

As the Defendant noted in the Reply, when a Motion is decided, as the Defendant's initial Motion to Dismiss was, and denied "without prejudice," it means that it is denied with the ability to reassert the Motion, as the Court suggested, by addressing the applicable law.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

As this Court set forth previously, "a complaint must set forth sufficient facts to establish all necessary elements of a claim for relief." *Hay v. Hay*, 100 Nev. 196, 198 (1984). NRCP 12(b)(5) provides that a Defendant can request a

dismissal by motion for the failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Such motions are proper where it appears to a certainty that the Plaintiff is entitled to no relief under any set of facts that could be proved in support of the claim. See *Bratcher v. City of Las Vegas*, 1123 Nev. 502 (1997).

For the purpose of considering a Rule 12(b)(5) motion, the charge of the complaint is accepted as true. See *Conway v. Circus Circus Casinos, Inc.*, 116 Nev. 870, 873 (2000). However, the Court is "not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation." *Papasan v. Allain*, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986); see also *George v. Morton*, 2007 WL 680787, at *6 (D. Nev. March 1, 2007) (stating that conclusory legal allegations and unwarranted inferences will not prevent dismissal). Therefore, dismissal is proper where the allegations are insufficient to establish the elements of a claim for relief. See *Brent G. Theobald Const., Inc., v. Richardson Const., Inc.,* 122 Nev. 1163, 1166 (2006) (abrogated on other grounds by 124 Nev. 224 (2008)).

When considering the issue of whether a statute of limitations has expired, a determination must be made as to when the figurative clock for that action commenced, or started to accrue. "An action accrues when the litigant discovers, or should have discovered, the existence of damages, not the exact numerical extent of those damages." *Gonzales v. Stewart Title*, 111 Nev. 1350, 1353 (1995)(overruled by *Kopicko v. Young* on other grounds)(emphasis in original).

On April 1, 2020, Governor Sisolak entered a Declaration of Emergency Directive 009 indicating that "Any specific time limit set by state statute or regulation for the commencement of any legal action is hereby tolled from the date of this Directive until 30 days from the date the state of emergency declared on March 12, 2020 is terminated.

Declaration of Emergency Directive 026, issued on June 29, 2020, indicated in part that "Directive 009 (Revised) shall terminated on June 30, 2020 at 11:59 pm. All time tolled by Section 2 shall recommence effective July 31, 2020 at 11:59 pm.

Based upon the above-referenced Emergency Directives, it appears that the statute of limitations in this case, and others, was tolled from 4/1/20

1

through 6/30/20 (total of 91 days). The Complaint alleges that the subject motor vehicle accident occurred on 5/18/18 and consequently, pursuant to the dictates of NRS 11.190(4)(e), the Complaint needed to be filed by 5/18/20. If we add the 91 days during which the Statute of Limitations was tolled by the Governor, the statute would have required the filing of the Complaint by August 19, 2018. The original Complaint was filed 7/1/20. The Amended Complaint was filed 6/23/21.

Pursuant to NRCP 15(a), "a party may amend its pleading once as a matter of course within: A) 21 days after serving it, or B) if the pleading is one to which a responsive pleading is required, 21 days after service of a responsive pleading or 21 days after service of a motion under Rule 12 . . . whichever is earlier.. . . In all other cases, a party may amend its pleading only with the opposing party's written consent or the court's leave." When the Plaintiff filed her Amended Complaint, she had not yet served any Defendants, nor had any of the Defendants filed a Motion. Consequently, pursuant to NRCP 15(a), she was free to file her Amended Complaint. The real question is whether or not the Amended Complaint "related back" to the original Complaint, for purposes of analyzing the statute of limitations.

NRCP 10(d) indicates the following:

Rule 10. Form of Pleadings

(d) Using a Fictitious Name to Identify a Defendant. If the name of a defendant is unknown to the pleader, the defendant may be designated by any name. When the defendant's true name is discovered, the pleader should promptly substitute the actual defendant for a fictitious party.

NRCP 10.

NRCP 15(c) provides as follows:

(c) **Relation Back of Amendments**. An amendment to a pleading relates back to the date of the original pleading when:

(1) the amendment asserts a claim or defense that arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set out - or attempted to be set out - in the original pleading; or

(2) the amendment changes a party or the naming of a party against whom a claim is asserted, if Rule 15(c)(1) is satisfied and if, within the period provided by Rule 4(e) for serving the

28

summons and complaint, the party to be brought in by amendment:

(A) received such notice of the action that it will not be prejudiced in defending on the merits; and

(B) knew or should have known that the action would have been brought against it, but for a mistake concerning the proper party's identity.

NRCP 15.

In evaluating the requirements of NRCP 10 and 15, the Court notes that there were no fictitious Defendants identified in the Complaint, so NRCP 10 would not apply. There is also no evidence that the requirements of NRCP 15 have been met.

In addressing the "relation back" doctrine, the Nevada Supreme Court has indicated the following:

An amended pleading adding a defendant that is filed after the statute of limitations has run will relate back to the date of the original pleading under NRCP 15(c) if "the proper defendant (1) receives actual notice of the action; (2) knows that it is the proper party; and (3) has not been misled to its prejudice by the amendment." *Echols v. Summa Corp.*, 95 Nev. 720, 722, 601 P.2d 716, 717 (1979). NRCP 15(c) is to be liberally construed to allow relation back of the amended pleading where the opposing party will be put to no disadvantage. See E.W. French & Sons, Inc. v. General Portland Inc., 885 F.2d 1392, 1396 (9th Cir.1989) ("[C]ourts should apply the relation back doctrine of [Federal] Rule 15(c) liberally."); University & Cmty. Coll. Sys. v. Sutton, 120 Nev. 972, 988, 103 P.3d 8, 18–19 (2004) (noting the liberal policy underlying NRCP 15). Modern rules of procedure are intended to allow the court to reach the merits, as opposed to disposition on technical niceties. See Schmidt v. Sadri, 95 Nev. 702, 705, 601 P.2d 713, 715 (1979) ("The [L]egislature envisioned that [the Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure] would serve to simplify existing judicial procedures and promote the speedy determination of litigation upon its merits."). A plaintiff's right to have his or her claim heard on its merits despite technical difficulties, however, must be balanced against "a defendant's right to be protected from stale claims and the attendant uncertainty they cause." Pargman v. Vickers, 208 Ariz. 573, 96 P.3d 571, 576 (App.2004).

Costello v. Casler, 127 Nev. 436, 24 P.3d 631 (2011).

The Court has further analyzed the difference in "substituting" the identity of a Defendant, and the "addition" of a new Defendant, as follows:

The rule allowing the amendment as to a defendant's identity subsequent to the running of the statute of limitations was designed to apply in the situation where the plaintiff is cognizant of the identity or description of the fictitiously named defendant, but not his true name. State ex rel. Dep't Hwys v. District Court, 95 Nev. 715, 717, 601 P.2d 710, 711 (1979). Accordingly, we have held that when a plaintiff has relied on NRCP 10(a), properly alleging contemplated defendants and uncertainty as to their names, subsequently providing their true names in an amended pleading, a substitution is effected, not an addition of a party defendant. Hill v. Summa Corporation, 90 Nev. at 81, 518 P.2d at 1095. Attempts to broaden our fictitious defendant practice to encompass situations where the plaintiff was ignorant not only of the defendant's name, but also of his identity or even his involvement have been unsuccessful. See Garvey v. Clark County, 91 Nev. 127, 532 P.2d 269 (1975); Knight v. Witco Chemical Co., 89 Nev. 586, 517 P.2d 792 (1973). We have recognized the problem of allowing new parties to be brought in after the expiration of the period of limitation. Servatius v. United Resort Hotels, 85 Nev. 371, 455 P.2d 621 (1969). Accordingly, we have interpreted the fictitious defendant rule as providing a narrow exception, allowing the pleading of fictitious defendants only where there is an uncertainty as to their names. Hill v. Summa Corporation, 90 Nev. at 81, 518 P.2d at 1095.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Lunn v. American Maintenance Corp., 96 Nev. 787, 790, 618 P.2d 343 (1980).

In *Lunn*, the Court held that the proposed amendment "brought in a new party defendant and did not merely correctly identify a party defendant already before the court," and consequently, the previously filed pleadings "did not toll the statute of limitations." *Id.*, at 791.

In an unpublished case, the Nevada Court of Appeals considered the interaction between NRCP 10 and NRCP 15, and the application of the *Nurenberger* case, as they relate to the proposed addition or substitution of a party. Although it is not controlling, the analysis is helpful. The Court held as follows:

Turning to Howell's contention that the district court erred in concluding that the relation back provision of NRCP 15 did not apply to his request, we agree. The district court, citing *Nurenberger*, concluded that NRCP 15(c) has no application to situations where a plaintiff seeks to add or substitute parties under NRCP 10(a), as NRCP 15(c) applies only when seeking to add claims or defenses. See 107 Nev. at 882, 822 P.2d at 1106. But the supreme court later specifically disavowed that conclusion as dicta and held that "the relation back effect of NRCP 15(c) does apply to the addition or substitution of parties." *Costello*, 127 Nev. at 440 n.4, 254 P.3d at 634 n.4. And consistent with that holding, the advisory committee note to the current version of NRCP 15 acknowledges that "if a fictitiousparty replacement does not meet the [what is now codified as] Rule 10(d) test, it may be treated as an amendment to add a party under Rule 15 if the standards in Rule 15 are met." NRCP 15 advisory committee's note to 2019 amendment. Accordingly, the district court erred when it concluded otherwise and declined to reach Howell's arguments with respect to NRCP 15.

Howell, 2020 WL 7828787, 478 P.3d 410 (Table) (unpublished, NV Ct. of App., 12/30/2020).

In Echols v. Summa Corp., a restaurant customer brought suit against the company he believed to own the restaurant where he was injured, as well as the manufacturer of the ketchup bottle which allegedly exploded in his hands. 95 Nev. 720, 601 P.2d 716 (1979). After the statute of limitations had expired, he amended his complaint to substitute the true owner of the restaurant as the defendant. The district court dismissed the action as barred by the statute of limitations, and the customer appealed. The customer argued that the amendment substituting the correct owner of the restaurant related back to the filing of the original complaint under NRCP 15(c), and therefore was not barred by the statute of limitations. The Court cited to the case of Servatius v. United Resort Hotels, 85 Nev. 371, 455 P.2d 621 (1969), in which the Court held that "a proper defendant may be brought into the action after the statute of limitations has run if the proper defendant (1) receives actual notice of the action; (2) knows that it is the proper party; and (3) has not been misled to its prejudice by the amendment. Echols at 720, citing Servatius v. United Resort Hotels, 85 Nev. 371, 455 P.2d 621 (1969).

The Court analyzed the three Servatius factors, and concluded that Summa (the new Defendant) received actual notice of the action before the expiration of the two year period of limitations, and it was clear to those operating the Frontier that the originally named Defendant was an error. Summa acknowledged that it was the proper Defendant. And finally, "Having actual notice of the action before the expiration of the two year period, Summa was neither misled nor prejudiced by the subsequent amendment." Consequently, in that case, the Court held that the amendment related back to the filing of the original complaint pursuant to NRCP 15. In the present case, there is no indication or evidence, which indicates that Jamie Combs (the new Defendant), had any knowledge of the action prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations. It appears, based upon the most recent pleadings, that Defendant was misled to her detriment or prejudice by the amendment, as the statute of limitations had expired before she ever received notice of the claim and she thought she was safe.

In considering the language of NRCP 15(c), it appears that the Plaintiff's amendment was untimely. NRCP 15(c)(2) provides as follows:

(c) **Relation Back of Amendments**. An amendment to a pleading relates back to the date of the original pleading when:

(1) the amendment asserts a claim or defense that arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set out — or attempted to be set out — in the original pleading; or

(2) the amendment changes a party or the naming of a party against whom a claim is asserted, if Rule 15(c)(1) is satisfied and if, within the period provided by Rule 4(e) for serving the summons and complaint, the party to be brought in by amendment:

(A) received such notice of the action that it will not be prejudiced in defending on the merits; and

(B) knew or should have known that the action would have been brought against it, but for a mistake concerning the proper party's identity.

In adding a party under this rule, the amendment relates back "if Rule 15(c)(1) is satisfied." In this case, it appears that the amendment does appear to assert a claim that was set out in the original pleading. The amendment, however, needs to be made "within the period provided by Rule 4(e) for serving the summons and complaint. . ." Rule 4(e) provides that service must be completed "no later than 120 days after the complaint is filed." Consequently, Rule 15(c) appears to indicate that the party seeking to amend by bringing in a new party, may do so only if the amendment is made within 120 days after the filing of the original Complaint. The original Complaint in this matter was filed on 7/1/20. 120 days later would have been 10/29/20. Even if we consider the time tolled by the Governor's Emergency Directives, the 120 days would have expired long before the 6/23/21 Amended Complaint filing date.

NRCP 15(c) indicates that within the above-referenced time frame (120 days from the filing of the original Complaint), the new Defendant had to have

received notice of the action so that she would not be prejudiced in defending on the merits; and she "knew or should have known" that the action would have been brought against her, but for a mistake concerning the proper party's identity.

There is no suggestion that the Defendant, Jamie Combs, was provided with such information within the relevant time period.

Because this Court is considering this matter on the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, the Court must "recognize all factual allegations in [the] Complaint as true and draw all inferences in [Plaintiff's] favor." *Buzz Stew, LLC v. City of North Las Vegas,* 124 Nev. 224, 228, 181 P.3d 670 (2008). Further, the Complaint may only be dismissed "if it appears beyond a doubt that [Plaintiff] could prove no set of facts, which, if true, would entitle it to relief." *Id.* Defendant has the "burden of proof" with regard to this Motion, and Defendant has sustained the obligation to establish that Defendant did not have notice of the action within the 120 days provided in NRCP 4, as applied by NRCP 15(c), and that the Defendant "would be prejudiced in defending on the merits," etc.

The Court finds that even viewing all allegations in favor of the Plaintiff, she failed to comply with the applicable statute of limitations, and the Court finds that the "relation back" doctrine cannot work to safe the Plaintiff's Complaint. Consequently, the Court has no choice but to grant the Defendant's Motion and Dismiss the Amended Complaint.

CONCLUSION/ORDER

Based upon the foregoing, and good cause appearing,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is hereby **GRANTED**, and the Amended Complaint is hereby **DISMISSED**.

The Court requests that counsel for Defendant prepare and timely process a Notice of Entry relating to this Order.

Because this matter has been decided on the pleadings, the hearing scheduled for 2/2/22 will be taken off calendar, and no parties nor attorneys need to appear.

13

Dated this 1st day of February, 2022

6AA CDC 36B4 E069 Jerry A. Wiese District Court Judge

1

1	CSERV				
2	DISTRICT COURT				
3	CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA				
4					
5					
6	Serenity Prosperity, Plaintiff	(s)	CASE NO: A-20-817408-C		
7	VS.		DEPT. NO. Department 30		
8	Shellie Bandy, Defendant(s)				
9					
10	AUTOMATED CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE				
11	This automated certificate of service was generated by the Eighth Judicial District				
12	Court. The foregoing Order was served via the court's electronic eFile system to all				
13	recipients registered for e-Service on the above entitled case as listed below:				
14	Service Date: 2/1/2022				
15	Theresa Amendola	tamen	ndola@dennettwinspear.com		
16	Jennifer Micheri	jinsley	ey-micheri@dennettwinspear.com		
17	Ashley Marchant	amarc	chant@dennettwinspear.com		
18	Rosa Quarles	rq@st	stevedimopoulos.com		
19	Paul Shpirt ps@stevedimopoulos.com				
20	Serenity Prosperity	Truth	n_1212@yahoo.com		
21	Tony Amendola aamendola@dennettwinspear.com				
22		uuiiioi	and one of the second		
23	If indicated below, a copy of the above mentioned filings were also served by mail				
24	via United States Postal Service, postage prepaid, to the parties listed below at their last known addresses on 2/2/2022			last	
25					
26	Jennifer Insley-Micheri		3301 N. Buffalo Drive Suite 195		
27			Las Vegas, NV, 89129		
28					

1	Shellie Bandy 408	80 Boulder Highway
2	Las	80 Boulder Highway s Vegas, NV, 89121
3		
4		
5		
6		
7		
8		
9		
10		
11		
12		
13		
14 15		
15		
10		
18		
19		
20		
21		
22		
23		
24		
25		
26		
27		
28		

DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

Negligence - Auto		COURT MINUTES	May 07, 2021	
A-20-817408-C	Serenity Prosp vs. Shellie Bandy,			
May 07, 2021	3:00 AM	Minute Order		
HEARD BY: Wiese,	Jerry A.	COURTROOM:	Chambers	
COURT CLERK: Lauren Kidd				
RECORDER:				
REPORTER:				
PARTIES PRESENT:				

JOURNAL ENTRIES

- The above-referenced matter is scheduled for a hearing on 5/12/21 with regard to "Motion to Enlarge Time for Service." Pursuant to the Administrative Orders of the Court, and pursuant to EDCR 2.23, this matter may be decided with or without oral argument.

NRCP 4(e)(3) reads: "If a plaintiff files a motion for an extension of time before the 120-day service period or any extension thereof expires and shows that good cause exists for granting an extension of the service period, the court must extend the service period and set a reasonable date by which service should be made." In order to determine whether good cause exists, however, the court must analyze the case pursuant to the Scrimer factors. Scrimer v. Eighth Judicial District, 116 Nev. 507 (2000).

In Nevada, the application of NRCP 4 is a two pronged test. First, the Court must make a determination of whether a motion to enlarge time for service was properly made. If not, the court can only move on to the second determination "upon a showing of good cause to file an untimely motion to enlarge time." Saavedra-Sandoval v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 245 P.3d 1198, 1201 (Nev. 2010). In this case, the motion was not timely filed and the Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate good cause for the filing of an untimely motion.

PRINT DATE: 06/21/2022

The second prong provides that the Court must dismiss the action unless the party raising the motion can show good cause for the delay in service. In Scrimer v. Dist. Ct., 116 Nev. 507, 513, the Nevada Supreme Court set forth the analysis to be used in determining whether a complaint must be dismissed pursuant to NRCP 4(i) for failure to show good cause why such service was not made within the period. The factors include:

(1) difficulties in locating the defendant;

(2) the defendant's efforts at evading service or concealment of improper service until after the 120 day period has lapsed;

- (3) the plaintiff's diligence in attempting to serve the defendant;
- (4) difficulties encountered by counsel
- (5) the running of the applicable statute of limitations
- (6) the parties' good faith attempts to settle the litigation during the 120 day period;

(7) the lapse of time between the end of the 120 day period and the actual service of process on the defendant;

- (8) the prejudice to the defendant caused by the plaintiff's delay in serving process;
- (9) the defendant's knowledge of the existence of the lawsuit; and
- (10) any extensions of time for service granted by the district court.

Id. at 516.

"Underlying these considerations is the policy behind Rule 4(i)-to encourage the diligent prosecution of complaints. Rule 4(i) was not adopted, however, to become an automatic sanction when a plaintiff fails to serve the complaint within 120 days of filing. When making a determination under NRCP 4(i), the district court should recognize that "good public policy dictates that cases be adjudicated on their merits." Id. at 516-517 (internal cite omitted).

The Court finds that Plaintiff's Motion failed to establish good cause for the untimely filing of the request for an extension of time to serve and did not include a Scrimer analysis, and consequently, the Court has no information upon which to base a finding of good cause to extend the time for service of the Summons and Complaint.

Based upon the foregoing, the Court will continue this matter until June 23, 2021 at 9:00 a.m. and request that Plaintiff file an Amended or Supplemental Motion, or an Addendum to the original Motion, to include a Scrimer analysis and to demonstrate good cause pursuant to Saavedra-Sandoval v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 245 P.3d 1198, 1201 (Nev. 2010). Such supplemental or amended pleading should be filed at least ten (10) days prior to the next hearing.

CLERK'S NOTE: A copy of the above minute order was distributed to all parties 05-07-21.//lk

DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

Negligence - Au	ıto	COURT MINUTES	July 08, 2021
A-20-817408-C	Serenity Prosper vs. Shellie Bandy, D		
July 08, 2021	10:30 AM	Show Cause Hearing	
HEARD BY: V	Viese, Jerry A.	COURTROOM:	RJC Courtroom 14A
COURT CLERK	: Lauren Kidd Jennifer Lott		
RECORDER:	Vanessa Medina		
REPORTER:			
PARTIES PRESENT:	Prosperity, Serenity	Plaintiff	
		IOUDNIAL ENTRIEC	

JOURNAL ENTRIES

- Court stated Ms. Prosperity filed a Motion to Extend the Time to Serve, and the Court requested additional information before the Court can Grant that kind of request. However, the information was not provided, and Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint against a completely different Deft. The Statute of Limitations may have already expired against that Defendant, but it is not for the Court to decide. Argument by Ms. Prosperity; Plaintiff confirmed the Amended Complaint is against the Driver of the car that hit Ms. Prosperity. Argument by Ms. Prosperity regarding her attempts to serve Ms. Bandy when Ms. Bandy would not provide an address. COURT ORDERED, the claim is DISMISSED against Shellie Bandy and Progressive Insurance; on the Amended Complaint against Jamie Combs, the claim is not dismissed, but Ms. Prosperity must serve Ms. Combs.

CLERK'S NOTE: Minute Order created from JAVS on 10-6-2021. J. Lott

DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

Negligence - Auto		COURT	MINUTES	May 13, 2022
A-20-817408-C	Serenity Prospe vs. Shellie Bandy, I	5		
May 13, 2022	3:00 AM	Motion		
HEARD BY: Wiese,	Jerry A.		COURTROOM:	RJC Courtroom 14A
COURT CLERK: Dara Yorke				
RECORDER:				
REPORTER:				
PARTIES PRESENT:				

JOURNAL ENTRIES

- The above-referenced matter is scheduled for a decision on the Chambers Calendar for 5/13/22 with regard to Plaintiff's Motion to Appeal Time for Extended Time Not to be Dismissed. Pursuant to the Administrative Orders of the Court, as well as EDCR 2.23, this matter may be decided with or without oral argument. This Court has determined that it would be appropriate to decide this matter on the pleadings, and consequently, this minute order issues.

The Court has reviewed Plaintiff s Motion to Appeal Time for Extended Time Not to be Dismissed, filed on 3/2/22, Plaintiff s Motion to Appeal for Extended Time Not Be Dismissed, filed on 4/4/22, and the Oppositions thereto. Although only the Motion filed on 3/2/22 is set for a decision, the Court will address both herein.

The Court finds that Plaintiff's Motions are confusing at best. To the extent that Plaintiff requests additional time to file an Appeal, the Nevada Rules of Appellate Procedure do not provide the District Court with the authority to grant an extension. See Walker v. Scully, 99 Nev. 45, 657 P.2d 94 (1983).

PRINT DATE: 06/21/2022

A-20-817408-C

Based on the foregoing, the Court will take no action. The Court requests that counsel for Jamie Combs prepare an Order consistent with the Court s findings and submit it to the Court within 10 days.

CLERK'S NOTE: Minute order electronically served to parties via Odyssey File & Serve. //5-13-22/dy

Certification of Copy

State of Nevada County of Clark SS:

I, Steven D. Grierson, the Clerk of the Court of the Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County, State of Nevada, does hereby certify that the foregoing is a true, full and correct copy of the hereinafter stated original document(s):

PLAINTIFF'S SSP NOTICE TO APPEAL COURT DECISION BASED UPON FALSE EVIDENCE AND MISLEADING INFORMATION PRESENTED TO THE COURT.; CASE APPEAL STATEMENT; CERTIFICATE OF MAILING; DISTRICT COURT DOCKET ENTRIES; CIVIL COVER SHEET; ORDER RE: DEFENDANT'S RENEWED MOTION TO DISMISS; NOTICE OF ENTRY OF ORDER (GRANTING) RE; DEFENDANT'S RENEWED MOTION TO DISMISS; DISTRICT COURT MINUTES

SERENITY PROSPERITY,

Plaintiff(s),

Case No: A-20-817408-C

Dept No: XXX

vs.

JAMIE COMBS,

Defendant(s),

now on file and of record in this office.

IN WITNESS THEREOF, I have hereunto Set my hand and Affixed the seal of the Court at my office, Las Vegas, Nevada This 21 day of June 2022. Steven D. Grierson, Clerk of the Court Amanda Hampton, Deputy Clerk