IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA

RIVER GLIDER AVENUE TRUST

Appellant,

v.

HARBOR COVER HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION; and NEVADA ASSOCIATION SERVICES, INC. Supreme Court Case No. 83689

Electronically Filed Mar 02 2022 02:29 p.m. Elizabeth A. Brown Clerk of Supreme Court

APPELLANT'S APPENDIX

VOLUME 1

Respondents.

Counsel for Appellant:

Roger P. Croteau, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 4958 ROGER P. CROTEAU & ASSOCIATES, LTD. 2810 W. Charleston Blvd., Ste. 75 Las Vegas, Nevada 89102 Tel: (702) 254-7775 Fax: (702) 228-7719 Email: croteaulaw@croteaulaw.com

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1	СОМР	Electronically Filed 8/18/2020 2:32 PM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT
2	ROGER P. CROTEAU, ESQ.	Crime 1
3	Nevada Bar No. 4958 CHET GLOVER, ESQ.	CASE NO: A-20-819781-C
4	Nevada Bar No. 10054 ROGER P. CROTEAU & ASSOCIATES, LTD	Department 20
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9	DISTRICT	COURT
10	CLARK COUNT	
11		Case No:
12	RIVER GLIDER AVENUE TRUST,	Dept No:
13	Plaintiff,	
14	VS.	COMPLAINT
15	HARBOR COVE HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION; and NEVADA	
16	ASSOCIATION, and NEVADA ASSOCIATION SERVICES, INC.,	
17	Defendants.	
18		
19	Plaintiff River Glider Avenue Trust ("Plai	ntiff"), by and through its attorneys, Roger P.
20	Croteau & Associates, Ltd., hereby complains and a	alleges as follows:
21	PARTIES AND JU	JRISDICTION
22	At all times relevant to this matter, Plaintiff y	vas and is a Nevada trust, licensed to do business
23 24	and doing business in the County of Clark, State of	
25		al property located at 8112 Lake Hills Drive
26	Las Vegas, Nevada 89128 (APN: 138-16-213-034)	
27	2	(are repercy).
28		
	1	
	Case Number: A-20-819781-	c l

• 2810 West Charleston Blvd, Suite 75 • Las Vegas, Nevada 89102 • Telephone: (702) 254-7775 • Facsimile (702) 228-7719 ROGER P. CROTEAU & ASSOCIATES, LTD.

1 2. Plaintiff acquired title to the Property by and through a Grant, Bargain, Sale Deed 2 from Lake Hills Drive Trust, which acquired the Property via Foreclosure Deed following a 3 homeowners' association lien foreclosure sale conducted on May 11, 2012 (the "HOA Foreclosure 4 Sale"), by Defendant Nevada Association Services, Inc., a Nevada company, authorized to do 5 business and doing business in Clark County, State of Nevada (the "HOA Trustee"), on behalf of 6 Defendant Harbor Cove Homeowners Association, a Nevada domestic non-profit corporation (the 7 8 "HOA"). 9 3. The Foreclosure Deed was recorded in the Clark County Recorder's Office on May 10 17, 2012 (the "HOA Foreclosure Deed"). 11 4. Upon information and belief, HOA is a Nevada common interest community 12 association or unit owners' association as defined in NRS 116.011, is organized and existing under 13 the laws of the State of Nevada, and transacts business in the State of Nevada. 14 15 5. Upon information and belief, HOA Trustee is a debt collection agency doing 16 business in the State of Nevada and is organized and existing under the laws of the State of 17 Delaware. 18 6. Venue is proper in Clark County, Nevada pursuant to NRS 13.040. 19 7. The exercise of jurisdiction by this Court over the parties in this civil action is proper 20 pursuant to NRS 14.065. 21 22 **GENERAL ALLEGATIONS** 23 8. Under Nevada law, homeowners' associations have the right to charge property 24 owners residing within the community assessments to cover association expenses for maintaining 25 or improving the community, among other things. 26 27 28 2

AA002

9. When the assessments are not paid, a homeowners' association may impose a lien against real property which it governs and thereafter foreclose on such lien.

10. NRS 116.3116 makes a homeowners' association's lien for assessments junior to a first deed of trust beneficiary's secured interest in the property, with one limited exception; a homeowners' association's lien is senior to a deed of trust beneficiary's secured interest "to the extent of any charges incurred by the association on a unit pursuant to NRS 116.310312 and to the extent of the assessments for common expenses based on the periodic budget adopted by the association pursuant to NRS 116.3115 which would have become due in the absence of acceleration during the 9 months immediately preceding institution of an action to enforce the lien." NRS 116.3116(2)(c).

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 11. In Nevada, when a homeowners' association properly forecloses upon a lien
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 15. Containing a superpriority lien component, such foreclosure extinguishes a first deed of trust.

15 12. On or about April 19, 2005, Thomas D. Miller (the "Former Owner") purchased the
Property. Thereafter, the Former Owner obtained a loan for the Property from Cameron Financial
Group, Inc. ("Lender"),¹ that was evidenced by a promissory note and secured by a deed of trust
between the Former Owner and Lender, recorded against the Property on March 27, 2007, for the
loan amount of \$631,000.00 (the "Deed of Trust").

13. The Deed of Trust indicated that Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc.("MERS") "is acting solely as a nominee for Lender and Lender's successors and assigns."

14. The Former Owner also executed a Planned Unit Development Rider along with the Deed of Trust.

¹ This term applies to the Lender and any assignees of the Deed of Trust.

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15. Upon information and belief, the Former Owner of the Property failed to pay to the HOA all amounts due pursuant to the HOA's governing documents.

3 16. On July 26, 2010, HOA Trustee, on behalf of HOA, recorded a Notice of Delinquent 4 Assessment Lien (the "NODAL"). The NODAL stated that the amount due to the HOA was 5 \$1,032.01, plus continuing assessments, interest, late charges, costs, and attorney's fees (the "HOA Lien").

17. On September 3, 2010, HOA Trustee, on behalf of HOA, recorded a Notice of Default and Election to Sell Under Homeowners Association Lien (the "NOD"). The NOD stated that the HOA Lien amount was \$2,110.87.

18. Upon information and belief, in April 2011, the Former Owner offered a settlement 12 of the HOA Lien in the amount of \$1,232.88, which was accepted by the HOA. The Former Owner 13 made the payment by check dated May 27, 2011 (the "Attempted Payment"). Of the Former 14 15 Owner's Attempted Payment, the HOA credited \$500.00 to his assessment account on June 11, 2011 16 and \$400.00 to his assessment account on August 30, 2011, which cured the amount of the HOA 17 Lien entitled to priority over the Deed of Trust ("Super-Priority Lien Amount").

19. On March 30, 2012, MERS assigned the Deed of Trust to Aurora Bank FSB 19 ("Aurora") via Corporation Assignment of Deed of Trust, which was recorded against the Property 20 on April 19, 2012. 21

22 20. On April 16, 2012, HOA Trustee, on behalf of the HOA, recorded a Notice of 23 Foreclosure Sale against the Property ("NOS"). The NOS stated that the total amount due the HOA 24 was \$3,346.53 and set a sale date for the Property of May 11, 2012, at 10:00 a.m., to be held at 25 Nevada Legal News. 26

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21. On August 27, 2012, the Deed of Trust was assigned to Nationstar Mortgage, LLC ("**Nationstar**") via Assignment of Deed of Trust, which was recorded against the Property on August 31, 2012.

Despite the Former Owner's Attempted Payment, on May 11, 2012, HOA Trustee
then proceeded to non-judicial foreclosure sale on the Property and recorded the HOA Foreclosure
Deed, which stated that the HOA Trustee sold the HOA's interest in the Property to Lake Hills Drive
Trust at the HOA Foreclosure Sale for the highest bid amount of \$5,500.00.

23. The HOA Foreclosure Deed states that HOA Trustee "has complied with all requirements of law ..."

In none of the recorded documents, nor in any other notice recorded with the Clark
County Recorder's Office, did HOA and/or HOA Trustee specify or disclose that any individual or
entity, including but not limited to the Former Owner, had attempted to pay any portion of the HOA
Lien in advance of the HOA Foreclosure Sale.

16 25. Neither HOA nor HOA Trustee informed or advised the bidders and potential bidders
17 at the HOA Foreclosure Sale, either orally or in writing, that any individual or entity had attempted
18 to pay the Super-Priority Lien Amount.

20 26. Upon information and belief, the debt owed to Lender by the Former Owner of the
21 Property pursuant to the loan secured by the Deed of Trust significantly exceeded the fair market
22 value of the Property at the time of the HOA Foreclosure Sale.

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27. Upon information and belief, Lender alleges that the Former Owner's Attempted
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27. Upon information and belief, Lender alleges that the Former Owner's Attempted
28. Payment of the Super-Priority Lien Amount served to satisfy and discharge the Super-Priority Lien
29. Amount, thereby changing the priority of the HOA Lien vis a vis the Deed of Trust.

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28. Upon information and belief, Lender alleges that as a result of the Former Owner's Attempted Payment of the Super-Priority Lien Amount, the purchaser of the Property at the HOA Foreclosure Sale acquired title to the Property subject to the Deed of Trust. 4 29. Upon information and belief, if the bidders and potential bidders at the HOA

Foreclosure Sale were aware that an individual or entity had attempted to pay the Super-Priority Lien Amount and/or by means of the Attempted Payment prior to the HOA Foreclosure Sale and that the Property was therefore ostensibly being sold subject to the Deed of Trust, the bidders and potential bidders would not have bid on the Property.

30. Had the Property not been sold at the HOA Foreclosure Sale, HOA and HOA Trustee would not have received payment, interest, fees, collection costs and assessments related to the Property and these sums would have remained unpaid.

31. HOA Trustee acted as an agent of HOA.

32. HOA is responsible for the actions and inactions of HOA Trustee pursuant to the doctrine of respondeat superior.

17 33. HOA and HOA Trustee conspired together to hide material information related to 18 the Property: the HOA Lien; the Attempted Payment of the Super-Priority Lien Amount; the 19 acceptance of such payment or Attempted Payment; and the priority of the HOA Lien vis a vis the 20 Deed of Trust, from the bidders and potential bidders at the HOA Foreclosure Sale. 21

34. The information related to any Attempted Payment or payments made by the Former Owner, Lender, or others to the Super-Priority Lien Amount, was not recorded and would only be known by the Former Owner, Lender, the HOA, and HOA Trustee.

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35. Upon information and belief, HOA and HOA Trustee conspired to withhold and hide the aforementioned information for their own economic gain and to the detriment of the bidders and potential bidders at the HOA Foreclosure Sale.

36. As part of Plaintiff's practice and procedure in both NRS Chapter 107 and NRS Chapter 116 foreclosure sales, Plaintiff would call the foreclosing agent/HOA Trustee and confirm whether the sale was going forward on the scheduled date; and in the context of an NRS Chapter 116 foreclosure sale, Plaintiff would ask if anyone had paid anything on the account.

9 37. Plaintiff would contact the HOA Trustee prior to the HOA Foreclosure Sale to
10 determine if the Property would in fact be sold on the date stated in the NOS, obtain the opening
11 bid, so Plaintiff could determine the amount of funds necessary for the auction and inquire if any
13 payments had been made; however, Plaintiff never inquired if the "Super-Priority Lien Amount"
14 had been paid.

38. At all times relevant to this matter, if Plaintiff learned of a "tender" or payment either having been attempted or made, Plaintiff would not purchase the Property offered in that HOA Foreclosure Sale.

39. Iyad Haddad was the trustee of the Lake Hills Drive Trust and Plaintiff at all relevant
times and the conveyance of title ownership of the Property from Lake Hills Drive Trust to Plaintiff
was done for estate planning purposes. As such, there has always been a unity of interest between
Lake Hills Drive Trust, Plaintiff, and the Property such that Plaintiff can raise the claims in this
Complaint.

40. Plaintiff reasonably relied upon the HOA and/or HOA Trustee's material omission
of "tender" of the Super-Priority Lien Amount and/or the Attempted Payment when Plaintiff
purchased the Property.

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41. Lender first disclosed the Attempted Payment by the Former Owner in Lender's First
Supplemental Disclosure of Witnesses and Documents served on Plaintiff on August 24, 2017,
("Discovery") in Clark County Case No. A-13-683467-C (the "Case").
FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(Intentional, or Alternatively Negligent, Misrepresentation)
42. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each and every allegation contained above as if set
forth fully herein.
43. At no point in time did Defendants disclose to the bidders and potential bidders at
the HOA Foreclosure Sale the fact that any individual or entity had attempted to pay the Super-
Priority Lien Amount or provided the Attempted Payment.
44. By accepting the Attempted Payment of the Super-Priority Lien Amount from the
Former Owner, HOA Trustee provided itself with the opportunity to perform and profit from many
additional services on behalf of HOA related to the Property and proceedings related to the HOA
Foreclosure Sale.
45. By accepting the Attempted Payment of the Super-Priority Lien Amount from the
Former Owner, HOA received funds in satisfaction of the entire HOA Lien, rather than only the
Super-Priority Lien Amount.
46. Consequently, HOA and HOA Trustee received substantial benefit as a result of their
acceptance of the Attempted Payment of the Super-Priority Lien Amount from the Former Owner
and intentionally failing to disclose that information to Plaintiff or the other bidders.
47. Neither HOA nor HOA Trustee recorded any notice nor provided any written or oral
disclosure to the bidders and potential bidders at the HOA Foreclosure Sale regarding any Attempted
Payment of the Super-Priority Lien Amount by the Former Owner or any individual or entity.
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1 48. HOA and HOA Trustee desired that the bidders and potential bidders at the HOA 2 Foreclosure Sale believe that the HOA Lien included amounts entitled to superpriority over the 3 Deed of Trust and that the Deed of Trust would thus be extinguished as a result of the HOA 4 Foreclosure Sale for their own economic gain. 5

49. As a result of their desire that the bidders and potential bidders at the HOA 6 Foreclosure Sale believed that the HOA Lien included amounts entitled to priority over the Deed of Trust, and that the Deed of Trust would thus be extinguished as a result of the HOA Foreclosure Sale, HOA and HOA Trustee intentionally failed to disclose material information related to the Attempted Payment of the Super-Priority Lien Amount by the Former Owner and did so for their own economic gain.

50. Alternatively, HOA and HOA Trustee were grossly negligent by failing to disclose material information related to the Attempted Payment of the Super-Priority Lien Amount.

51. Upon information and belief, if HOA Trustee and/or HOA had disclosed the Attempted Payment of the Super-Priority Lien Amount to the bidders and potential bidders at the HOA Foreclosure Sale, such bidders and potential bidders would not have bid upon the Property at the HOA Foreclosure Sale.

52. Given the facts of this case now known to Plaintiff, Lake Hills Drive Trust would not have bid on the Property.

53. Upon information and belief, if the Property had not been sold at the HOA Foreclosure Sale, HOA would not have received funds in satisfaction of the HOA Lien.

54. Upon information and belief, if the Property had not been sold at the HOA 25 Foreclosure Sale, HOA Trustee would not have received payment for the work that it performed on 26 behalf of HOA in association with the HOA Foreclosure Sale and related proceedings. 27

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55. Lake Hills Drive Trust attended the sale as a ready, willing, and able buyer without knowledge of the Attempted Payment.

56. Lake Hills Drive Trust would not have purchased the Property if it had been informed that any individual or entity had paid or attempted to pay the Super-Priority Lien Amount or any amount in advance of the HOA Foreclosure Sale.

57. As a direct result of HOA and HOA Trustee's acceptance of the Attempted Payment of the Super-Priority Lien Amount, and their subsequent intentional or grossly negligent failure to advise the bidders and potential bidders at the HOA Foreclosure Sale of the facts related thereto, Lake Hills Drive Trust presented the prevailing bid at the HOA Foreclosure Sale and thereby purchased the Property.

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16 59. HOA and HOA Trustee materially misrepresented the facts by hiding and failing to
17 advise bidders and potential bidders at the HOA Foreclosure Sale of information known solely to
18 the HOA and/or HOA Trustee that was not publicly available which ostensibly changed the priority
20 of Deed of Trust vis a vis the HOA Lien.

60. HOA and HOA Trustee solely possessed information related to the Attempted
 Payment of the Super-Priority Lien Amount prior to and at the time of the HOA Foreclosure Sale,
 and they intentionally withheld such information for their own economic gain.

Alternatively, HOA and HOA Trustee were grossly negligent when they withheld
information from the bidders and purchaser at the HOA Foreclosure Sale related to the Attempted
Payment of the Super-Priority Lien Amount.

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62. Plaintiff reasonably relied upon HOA and HOA Trustee's intentional or grossly negligent failure to disclose the Attempted Payment of the Super-Priority Lien Amount.

63. HOA and HOA Trustee intended that the bidders and potential bidders at the HOA Foreclosure Sale would rely on the lack of notice of the Attempted Payment of the Super-Priority Lien Amount at the time of the HOA Sale and that their failure to disclose such information promoted the sale of the Property.

8 64. HOA and HOA Trustee further intended that their failure of refusal to inform bidders
 9 and potential bidders at the HOA Foreclosure Sale of the Attempted Payment of the Super-Priority
 10 Lien Amount would lead such bidders and potential bidders to believe that the Deed of Trust was
 11 subordinate to the HOA Lien and not being sold subject to the Deed of Trust.

65. The HOA and the HOA Trustee had a duty to disclose the Attempted Payment of the Super-Priority Lien Amount.

66. The HOA and the HOA Trustee breached that duty to disclose to Lake Hills Drive Trust the Attempted Payment by the Former Owner.

67. As a result of the HOA and HOA Trustee's breach of their duties of care, honesty in fact, good faith, and candor to bidders at the HOA Foreclosure Sale for their own economic gain, Plaintiff has been economically damaged in many aspects.

68. If the Property is subject to the Deed of Trust, the funds paid by Lake Hills Drive
Trust and Plaintiff to purchase, maintain, operate, and/or litigate various cases and generally manage
the Property would be lost along with the opportunity of purchasing other available property offered
for sale where a superpriority payment had not been attempted, thereby allowing Lake Hills Drive
Trust the opportunity to purchase a property free and clear of the deed of trust and all other liens.

1	69. As a direct and proximate result of the actions of Defendants, it has become necessary				
2	for Plaintiff to retain the services of an attorney to protect its rights and prosecute this Claim.				
3	70. Plaintiff reserves the right to amend this Complaint under the Nevada Rules of Civil				
4	Procedure as further facts become known.				
5	SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF				
6 7	(Breach of the Duty of Good Faith)				
8	71. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each and every allegation contained above as if set				
9	forth fully herein.				
10	72. NRS 116.1113 provides that every contract or duty governed by NRS Chapter 116,				
11					
12	Nevada's version of the Uniform Common-Interest Ownership Uniform Act ("UCIOA"), must be				
13	performed in good faith in its performance or enforcement.				
14	73. A duty of good faith includes within that term a duty of candor in its dealings.				
15	74. Pursuant to the drafter's comments of the UCIOA, Section 1-113 of the UCIOA,				
16	codified as NRS 116.1113, provides that:				
17	SECTION 1-113. OBLIGATION OF GOOD FAITH. Every contract or duty				
18	governed by this [act] imposes and obligation of good faith in its performance or enforcement:				
19 20	this section sets forth a basic principle running throughout this Act: in transactions				
20	involving common interest communities, good faith is required in the performance and enforcement of all agreements and duties. Good faith, as [used sic] in this Act,				
22	means observance of two standards: "honesty in fact," and observance of reasonable standards of fair dealing While the term is not defined, the term is derived from and				
23	used in the same manner as in Section 1-201 of the Uniform Simplification of Land Transfer Act, and Sections 2-103(i)(b) and 7-404 of the Uniform Commercial Code.				
24					
25	75. Prior to the HOA Foreclosure Sale of the Property, the Former Owner paid the Super-				
26	Priority Lien Amount to HOA or HOA Trustee by the Attempted Payment.				
27	76. Upon information and belief, HOA Trustee, acting on behalf of HOA, accepted the				
28	Attempted Payment.				
	12				
	A A 012				

1 77. HOA and HOA Trustee's acceptance of the Attempted Payment and subsequent 2 failure and refusal to inform the bidders and potential bidders at the HOA Foreclosure Sale served 3 to breach their duty of good faith, fair dealings, honesty in fact, and candor pursuant to NRS Chapter 4 116. 5 78. HOA and the HOA Trustee owed a duty of good faith, fair dealings, honesty in fact, 6 and candor to Lake Hills Drive Trust. 7 8 79. By virtue of their actions and inactions, HOA and HOA Trustee substantially 9 benefitted economically to the detriment of Lake Hills Drive Trust and Plaintiff. 10 80. As a direct and proximate result of the actions of Defendants, it has become necessary 11 for Plaintiff to retain the services of an attorney to protect its rights and prosecute this Claim. 12 81. Plaintiff reserves the right to amend this Complaint under the Nevada Rules of Civil 13 Procedure as further facts become known. 14 15 THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF 16 (Conspiracy) 17 82. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges each and every allegation contained above as if set 18 forth fully herein. 19 83. Defendants knew or should have known of the Attempted Payment of the Super-20 Priority Lien Amount. 21 22 84. Upon information and belief, acting together, Defendants reached an implicit or 23 express agreement amongst themselves whereby they agreed to withhold from bidders and potential 24 bidders at the HOA Foreclosure Sale the information concerning the Attempted Payment of the 25 Super-Priority Lien Amount. 26 27 28 13

AA013

1 85. Defendants knew or should have known that their actions and omissions would 2 economically harm the successful bidder and purchaser of the Property and benefit Defendants. To 3 further their conspiracy, upon information and belief, Defendants accepted the Attempted Payment 4 for the purpose of obtaining more remuneration than they would have otherwise obtained at a sale 5 of the subpriority portion of the HOA Lien. 6 86. As a direct and proximate result of the actions of Defendants, it has become necessary 7 8 for Plaintiff to retain the services of an attorney to protect its rights and prosecute this Claim. 9 87. Plaintiff reserves the right to amend this Complaint under the Nevada Rules of Civil 10 Procedure as further facts become known. 11 FOURTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF 12 (Violation of NRS Chapter 113) 13 Plaintiff repeats and realleges each and every allegation contained above as if set 88. 14 15 forth fully herein. 16 89. Pursuant to NRS Chapter 113, Defendants must disclose the Attempted Payment 17 and/or any payments made or attempted to be made by Lender, the Former Owner, or any agents of 18 any other party to the bidders and Plaintiff at the HOA Foreclosure Sale. 19 90. Defendants were required, but failed, to provide a Seller's Real Property Disclosure 20 Form ("SRPDF") to the "Purchaser," as defined in NRS Chapter 116, at the time of the HOA 21 22 Foreclosure Sale. 23 91. Defendants were a "seller" under NRS Chapter 113. 24 92. NRS Chapter 116 foreclosure sales are not exempt from the disclosure mandates of 25 NRS Chapter 113. 26 27 28 14

1	93. Defendants were required, but failed, to complete and answer the questions posed in
2	the SRPDF in its entirety, but specifically, Section 9, Common Interest Communities, disclosures
3	(a) - (f), and Section 11, that provide as follows:
4	9. Common Interest Communities: Any "common areas" (facilities like pools, tennis
5 6	courts, walkways or other areas co-owned with others) or a homeowner association which has any authority over the property?
7	(a) Common Interest Community Declaration and Bylaws available?
8	(b) Any periodic or recurring association fees?
9 10	(c) Any unpaid assessments, fines or liens, and any warnings or notices that may give rise to an assessment, fine or lien?
10	(d) Any litigation, arbitration, or mediation related to property or
12	common areas?
13	(e) Any assessments associated with the property (excluding property tax)?
14	(f) Any construction, modification, alterations, or repairs made without
15	required approval from the appropriate Common Interest Community board or committee?
16	
17 18	11. Any other conditions or aspects of the property which materially affect its value or use in an adverse manner? (Emphasis added)
19	See SRPDF, Form 547, attached hereto as Ex. 1.
20	94. Section 11 of the SRPDF relates directly to information known to Defendants that
21	materially affects the value of the Property, and in this case, if the Super-Priority Lien Amount is
22 23	paid, or if the Attempted Payment is rejected/accepted, it would have a material, adverse effect on
23 24	the overall value of the Property, and therefore, must be disclosed to the Purchaser in the SRPDF
25	by Defendants.
26	
27	
28	
	15

ROGER P. CROTEAU & ASSOCIATES, LTD. • 2810 West Charleston Blvd, Suite 75 • Las Vegas, Nevada 89102 • Telephone: (702) 254-7775 • Facsimile (702) 228-7719 ROGER P. CROTEAU & ASSOCIATES, LTD. • 2810 West Charleston Blvd, Suite 75 • Las Vegas, Nevada 89102 • Telephone: (702) 254-7775 • Facsimile (702) 228-7719

1	95. Defendants' response to Section 9(c) - (e) of the SRPDF would have provided notice				
2	to Lake Hills Drive Trust of any payments made by Lender, Former Owner, or others on the HOA				
3	Lien.				
4					
5	96. Defendants' response to Section 11 of the SRPDF generally deals with the disclosure				
6	of the condition of the title to the Property related to the status of the Deed of Trust and the				
7	Attempted Payment that would only be known by Defendants.				
8	97. Nevada Real Estate Division's ("NRED"), Residential Disclosure Guide (the				
9	"Guide"), Ex. 2, provides at page 20 that Defendants shall provide, even in an NRS Chapter 107				
10	foreclosure sale, the following to the purchaser/Plaintiff at the HOA Foreclosure Sale:				
11	The content of the disclosure is based on what the seller is aware of at the time. If,				
12	after completion of the disclosure form, the seller discovers a new defect or notices that a previously disclosed condition has worsened, the seller must inform the				
13	purchaser, in writing, as soon as practicable after discovery of the condition, or				
14	before conveyance of the property.				
15 16	The buyer may not waive, and the seller may not require a buyer to waive, any of the requirements of the disclosure as a condition of sale or for any other purpose.				
17 18	In a sale or intended sale by foreclosure, the trustee and the beneficiary of the deed of trust shall provide, not later than the conveyance of the property to, or upon request from, the buyer:				
19	• written notice of any defects of which the trustee or beneficiary is aware				
20	98. If Defendants fail to provide the SRPDF to the Plaintiff/purchaser at the time of the				
21	HOA Foreclosure Sale, the Guide explains that:				
22	A Buyer may rescind the contract without penalty if he does not receive a fully and				
23	properly completed Seller's Real Property Disclosure form. If a Buyer closes a transaction without a completed form or if a known defect is not disclosed to a Buyer,				
24	the Buyer may be entitled to treble damages, unless the Buyer waives his rights under				
25	NRS 113.150(6).				
26	99. Pursuant to NRS 113.130, Defendants were required, but failed, to provide the				
27	information set forth in the SRPDF to Lake Hills Drive Trust at the HOA Foreclosure Sale.				
28					
	16				

100.	Defendants did not provide an SRPDF to Lake Hills Drive Trust prior to, or at, the					
HOA Foreclosure Sale.						
101.	As a result of Defendants' failure to provide Plaintiff with the mandated SRPDF, and					
disclosures r	equired therein, that were known to Defendants, Plaintiff has been economically					
damaged						
_	As a direct and proximate result of the actions of Defendants, it has become necessary					
for Plaintiff to	o retain the services of an attorney to protect its rights and prosecute this Claim.					
103.	Plaintiff reserves the right to amend this Complaint under the Nevada Rules of Civil					
Procedure as	further facts become known.					
WHE	REFORE, Plaintiff prays for relief as follows:					
1.	For damages to be proven at trial in excess of \$15,000;					
2.	For punitive damages in an amount to be determined at trial;					
3.	3. For an award of reasonable attorneys' fees as special damages, and otherwise under					
	Nevada law;					
4.	For pre-judgment and post-judgment interest at the statutory rate of interest; and					
5.	For such other and further relief that the Court deems just and proper.					
	Dated this 18th day of August, 2020.					
	ROGER P. CROTEAU & ASSOCIATES, LTD					
	<u>/s/ Chet A. Glover</u> Roger P. Croteau, Esq.					
	Nevada Bar No. 4958 Chet A. Glover, Esq.					
	Nevada Bar No. 10054 2810 W. Charleston Blvd., Ste. 75					
	Las Vegas, Nevada 89102					
	Attorney for Plaintiff					
	17					
	17					
	HOA Foreclo 101. disclosures r damaged. 102. for Plaintiff t 103. Procedure as WHE 1. 2. 3. 4.					

EXHIBIT 1

EXHIBIT 1

AA018

SELLER'S REAL PROPERTY DISCLOSURE FORM

In accordance with Nevada Law, a seller of residential real property in Nevada must disclose any and all known conditions and aspects of the property which materially affect the value or use of residential property in an adverse manner (see NRS 113.130 and 113.140).

Date____

Property address

Do you currently occupy or have you ever occupied this property? Effective October 1, 2011: A purchaser may not waive the requirement to provide this form and a seller may not require a purchaser to waive this form. (NRS 113.130(3))

Type of Seller: Bank (financial institution); Asset Management Company; Owner-occupier; Other:

Purpose of Statement: (1) This statement is a disclosure of the condition of the property in compliance with the Seller Real Property Disclosure Act, effective January 1, 1996. (2) This statement is a disclosure of the condition and information concerning the property known by the Seller which materially affects the value of the property. Unless otherwise advised, the Seller does not possess any expertise in construction, architecture, engineering or any other specific area related to the construction or condition of the improvements on the property or the land. Also, unless otherwise advised, the Seller has not conducted any inspection of generally inaccessible areas such as the foundation or roof. This statement is not a warranty of any kind by the Seller or by any Agent representing the Seller in this transaction and is not a substitute for any inspections or warranties the Buyer may wish to obtain. Systems and appliances addressed on this form by the seller are not part of the contractual agreement as to the inclusion of any system or appliance as part of the binding agreement.

Instructions to the Seller: (1) ANSWER ALL QUESTIONS. (2) REPORT KNOWN CONDITIONS AFFECTING THE PROPERTY. (3) ATTACH ADDITIONAL PAGES WITH YOUR SIGNATURE IF ADDITIONAL SPACE IS REQUIRED. (4) COMPLETE THIS FORM YOURSELF. (5) IF SOME ITEMS DO NOT APPLY TO YOUR PROPERTY, CHECK N/A (NOT APPLICABLE). EFFECTIVE JANUARY 1, 1996, FAILURE TO PROVIDE A PURCHASER WITH A SIGNED DISCLOSURE STATEMENT WILL ENABLE THE PURCHASER TO TERMINATE AN OTHERWISE BINDING PURCHASE AGREEMENT AND SEEK OTHER REMEDIES AS PROVIDED BY THE LAW (see NRS 113.150).

YES	NO	<u>N/A</u>		YE		<u>N/A</u>	
Electrical System			Showe	er(s)			
Plumbing			Sink(s)	D		
Sewer System & line			Sauna	/ hot tub(s)			
Septic tank & leach field			Built-i	n microwave			
Well & pump			Range	/ oven / hood-fan			
Yard sprinkler system(s)	Π	D	Dishw	asher	D		
Fountain(s)			Garba	ge disposal			
Heating system			Trash	compactor			
Cooling system			Centra	l vacuum			
Solar heating system			Alarm	system			
Fireplace & chimney			owi	ned 🖸 leased 🗖			
Wood burning system			Smoke	e detector			
Garage door opener.			Interco	om	D		
Water treatment system(s) D			Data C	Communication line(s)			
owned 🛛 leased 🗍			- Satelli	te dish(es)			
Water heater				ned 🗋 🗍 leased 🗖			
Toilet(s)			Other		\Box		
Bathtub(s)			-				

Systems / Appliances: Are you aware of any problems and/or defects with any of the following:

EXPLANATIONS: Any "Yes" must be fully explained on page 3 of this form.

Seller(s) Initials

Buyer(s) Initials

Nevada Real Estate Division Replaces all previous versions Page 1 of 5

Seller Real Property Disclosure Form 547 Revised 07/25/2017

Property conditions, improvements and additional information: <u>YES</u> Are you aware of any of the following?:	<u>NO</u>	<u>N/A</u>
1. Structure:		
(a) Previous or current moisture conditions and/or water damage?		
(c) Any construction, modification, alterations, or repairs made without		
required state, city or county building permits?		
(d) Whether the property is or has been the subject of a claim governed by NRS 40.600 to 40.695 (construction defect claims)?		
(If seller answers yes, FURTHER DISCLOSURE IS REQUIRED)	1	
2. Land / Foundation:		
(a) Any of the improvements being located on unstable or expansive soil?	Π	
(b) Any foundation sliding, settling, movement, upheaval, or earth stability problems		
that have occurred on the property?		
(c) Any drainage, flooding, water seepage, or high water table?		
(d) The property being located in a designated flood plain?		
(c) Whether the property is located next to or near any known future development?		
(f) Any encroachments, casements, zoning violations or nonconforming uses?		
(g) Is the property adjacent to "open range" land?		
(If seller answers yes, FURTHER DISCLOSURE IS REQUIRED under NRS 113.065)		
3. Roof: Any problems with the roof?		
4. Pool/spa: Any problems with structure, wall, liner, or equipment.		
5. Infestation: Any history of infestation (termites, carpenter ants, etc.)?		
6. Environmental:		
(a) Any substances, materials, or products which may be an environmental hazard such as		
but not limited to, asbestos, radon gas, urea formaldehyde, fuel or chemical storage tanks,	1000	
contaminated water or soil on the property?		
(b) Has property been the site of a crime involving the previous manufacture of Methamphetamine		
where the substances have not been removed from or remediated on the Property by a certified	1001	
entity or has not been deemed safe for habitation by the Board of Heath?		
7. Fungi / Mold: Any previous or current fungus or mold?		
8. Any features of the property shared in common with adjoining landowners such as walls, fences,		
road, driveways or other features whose use or responsibility for maintenance may have an effect		
on the property?	لنتنا	
other areas co-owned with others) or a homeowner association which has any		
authority over the property?	۵	
(a) Common Interest Community Declaration and Bylaws available?		
(b) Any periodic or recurring association fees?	ō	
(c) Any unpaid assessments, fines or liens, and any warnings or notices that may give rise to an	-	
assessment, fine or lien?		
(d) Any litigation, arbitration, or mediation related to property or common area?		
(e) Any assessments associated with the property (excluding property taxes)?		
(f) Any construction, modification, alterations, or repairs made without		
required approval from the appropriate Common Interest Community board or committee?		
10. Any problems with water quality or water supply?		
11. Any other conditions or aspects of the property which materially affect its value or use in an		
adverse manner?		
12. Lead-Based Paint: Was the property constructed on or before 12/31/77?		
(If yes, additional Federal EPA notification and disclosure documents are required)		
13. Water source: Municipal 🗖 Community Well 🗖 Domestic Well 🗖 Other 🗖		
If Community Well: State Engineer Well Permit # Revocable 🛛 Permanent 🗂 Cancelled 🗖		
Use of community and domestic wells may be subject to change. Contact the Nevada Division of Water Resources		
for more information regarding the future use of this well.		
14. Conservation Easements such as the SNWA's Water Smart Landscape Program: Is the property a participant? 🔲		
15. Solar panels: Are any installed on the property?		
If yes, are the solar panels: Owned 🗋 _ Leased 📮 or Financed 📮		
16.Wastewater disposal: Municipal Sewer 🖸 Septic System 🗊 Other 🗊		
17. This property is subject to a Private Transfer Fee Obligation?		
EVDI ANATIONS. Any West was the fully applained on page 2 of this form		

EXPLANATIONS: Any "Yes" must be fully explained on page 3 of this form.

Seller(s) Initials

.....

Buyer(s) Initials

Nevada Real Estate Division Replaces all previous versions

5. 1

Page 2 of 5

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Seller Real Property Disclosure Form 547 Revised 07/25/2017 EXPLANATIONS: Any "Yes" to questions on pages 1 and 2 must be fully explained here. Attach additional pages if needed.

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		Seller(s) Initials		Buyer(s) Initials
	Nevada Real Estate Division Replaces all previous versions		Page 3 of 5	Seller Real Property Disclosure Form 547 Revised 07/25/2017

Buyers and sellers of residential property are advised to seek the advice of an attorney concerning their rights and obligations as set forth in Chapter 113 of the Nevada Revised Statutes regarding the seller's obligation to execute the Nevada Real Estate Division's approved "Seller's Real Property Disclosure Form". For your convenience, Chapter 113 of the Nevada Revised Statutes provides as follows:

CONDITION OF RESIDENTIAL PROPERTY OFFERED FOR SALE

NRS 113.100 Definitions. As used in <u>NRS 113.100</u> to <u>113.150</u>, inclusive, unless the context otherwise requires:

1. "Defect" means a condition that materially affects the value or use of residential property in an adverse manner.

2. "Disclosure form" means a form that complies with the regulations adopted pursuant to NRS 113.120.

3. "Dwelling unit" means any building, structure or portion thereof which is occupied as, or designed or intended for occupancy as, a residence by one person who maintains a household or by two or more persons who maintain a common household.

4. "Residential property" means any land in this state to which is affixed not less than one nor more than four dwelling units.

5. "Seller" means a person who sells or intends to sell any residential property.

(Added to NRS by 1995, 842; A 1999, 1446)

NRS 113.110 Conditions required for "conveyance of property" and to complete service of document. For the purposes of <u>NRS 113.100</u> to <u>113.150</u>, inclusive:

1. A "conveyance of property" occurs:

(a) Upon the closure of any escrow opened for the conveyance; or

(b) If an escrow has not been opened for the conveyance, when the purchaser of the property receives the deed of conveyance.

2. Service of a document is complete:

(a) Upon personal delivery of the document to the person being served; or

(b) Three days after the document is mailed, postage prepaid, to the person being served at his last known address.

(Added to NRS by 1995, 844)

NRS 113.120 Regulations prescribing format and contents of form for disclosing condition of property. The Real Estate Division of the Department of Business and Industry shall adopt regulations prescribing the format and contents of a form for disclosing the condition of residential property offered for sale. The regulations must ensure that the form:

1. Provides for an evaluation of the condition of any electrical, heating, cooling, plumbing and sewer systems on the property, and of the condition of any other aspects of the property which affect its use or value, and allows the seller of the property to indicate whether or not each of those systems and other aspects of the property has a defect of which the seller is aware.

2. Provides notice:

(a) Of the provisions of NRS 113.140 and subsection 5 of NRS 113.150.

(b) That the disclosures set forth in the form are made by the seller and not by his agent.

(c) That the seller's agent, and the agent of the purchaser or potential purchaser of the residential property, may reveal the completed form and its contents to any purchaser or potential purchaser of the residential property.

(Added to NRS by 1995, 842)

NRS 113.130 Completion and service of disclosure form before conveyance of property; discovery or worsening of defect after service of form; exceptions; waiver.

1. Except as otherwise provided in subsection 2:

(a) At least 10 days before residential property is conveyed to a purchaser:

(1) The seller shall complete a disclosure form regarding the residential property; and

(2) The seller or the seller's agent shall serve the purchaser or the purchaser's agent with the completed disclosure form.

(b) If, after service of the completed disclosure form but before conveyance of the property to the purchaser, a seller or the seller's agent discovers a new defect in the residential property that was not identified on the completed disclosure form or discovers that a defect identified on the completed disclosure form has become worse than was indicated on the form, the seller or the seller's agent shall inform the purchaser or the purchaser's agent of that fact, in writing, as soon as practicable after the discovery of that fact but in no event later than the conveyance of the property to the purchaser. If the seller does not agree to repair or replace the defect, the purchaser may:

(1) Rescind the agreement to purchase the property; or

(2) Close escrow and accept the property with the defect as revealed by the seller or the seller's agent without further recourse.

2. Subsection 1 does not apply to a sale or intended sale of residential property:

(a) By foreclosure pursuant to chapter 107 of NRS.

(b) Between any co-owners of the property, spouses or persons related within the third degree of consanguinity.

(c) Which is the first sale of a residence that was constructed by a licensed contractor.

(d) By a person who takes temporary possession or control of or title to the property solely to facilitate the sale of the property on behalf of a person who relocates to another county, state or country before title to the property is transferred to a purchaser.

3. A purchaser of residential property may not waive any of the requirements of subsection 1. A seller of residential property may not require a purchaser to waive any of the requirements of subsection 1 as a condition of sale or for any other purpose.

4. If a sale or intended sale of residential property is exempted from the requirements of subsection 1 pursuant to paragraph (a) of subsection 2, the trustee and the beneficiary of the deed of trust shall, not later than at the time of the conveyance of the property to the purchaser of the residential property, or upon the request of the purchaser of the residential property, provide:

(a) Written notice to the purchaser of any defects in the property of which the trustee or beneficiary, respectively, is aware; and

(b) If any defects are repaired or replaced or attempted to be repaired or replaced, the contact information of any asset management company who provided asset management services for the property. The asset management company shall provide a service report to the purchaser upon request.

5. As used in this section:

(a) "Seller" includes, without limitation, a client as defined in NRS 645H.060.

(b) "Service report" has the meaning ascribed to it in NRS 645H.150.

(Added to NRS by 1995, 842; A 1997, 349; 2003, 1339; 2005, 598; 2011, 2832)

Seller(s) Initials

Buyer(s) Initials

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Seller Real Property Disclosure Form 547 Revised 07/25/2017 NRS 113.135 Certain sellers to provide copies of certain provisions of NRS and give notice of certain soil reports; initial purchaser entitled to rescind sales agreement in certain circumstances; waiver of right to rescind.

1. Upon signing a sales agreement with the initial purchaser of residential property that was not occupied by the purchaser for more than 120 days after substantial completion of the construction of the residential property, the seller shall:

(a) Provide to the initial purchaser a copy of NRS 11.202 to 11.206, inclusive, and 40.600 to 40.695, inclusive;

(b) Notify the initial purchaser of any soil report prepared for the residential property or for the subdivision in which the residential property is located; and

(c) If requested in writing by the initial purchaser not later than 5 days after signing the sales agreement, provide to the purchaser without cost each report described in paragraph (b) not later than 5 days after the seller receives the written request.

2. Not later than 20 days after receipt of all reports pursuant to paragraph (c) of subsection 1, the initial purchaser may rescind the sales agreement.

3. The initial purchaser may waive his right to rescind the sales agreement pursuant to subsection 2. Such a waiver is effective only if it is made in a written document that is signed by the purchaser.

(Added to NRS by 1999, 1446)

NRS 113.140 Disclosure of unknown defect not required; form does not constitute warranty; duty of buyer and prospective buyer to exercise reasonable care.

1. <u>NRS 113,130</u> does not require a seller to disclose a defect in residential property of which he is not aware.

2. A completed disclosure form does not constitute an express or implied warranty regarding any condition of residential property.

3. Neither this chapter nor chapter 645 of NRS relieves a buyer or prospective buyer of the duty to exercise reasonable care to protect himself. (Added to NRS by 1995, 843; A 2001, 2896)

NRS 113.150 Remedies for seller's delayed disclosure or nondisclosure of defects in property; waiver.

1. If a seller or the seller's agent fails to serve a completed disclosure form in accordance with the requirements of <u>NRS 113.130</u>, the purchaser may, at any time before the conveyance of the property to the purchaser, rescind the agreement to purchase the property without any penalties.

2. If, before the conveyance of the property to the purchaser, a seller or the seller's agent informs the purchaser or the purchaser's agent, through the disclosure form or another written notice, of a defect in the property of which the cost of repair or replacement was not limited by provisions in the agreement to purchase the property, the purchaser may:

(a) Rescind the agreement to purchase the property at any time before the conveyance of the property to the purchaser; or

(b) Close escrow and accept the property with the defect as revealed by the seller or the seller's agent without further recourse.

3. Rescission of an agreement pursuant to subsection 2 is effective only if made in writing, notarized and served not later than 4 working days after the date on which the purchaser is informed of the defect:

(a) On the holder of any escrow opened for the conveyance; or

(b) If an escrow has not been opened for the conveyance, on the seller or the seller's agent.

4. Except as otherwise provided in subsection 5, if a seller conveys residential property to a purchaser without complying with the requirements of <u>NRS 113.130</u> or otherwise providing the purchaser or the purchaser's agent with written notice of all defects in the property of which the seller is aware, and there is a defect in the property of which the seller was aware before the property was conveyed to the purchaser and of which the cost of repair or replacement was not limited by provisions in the agreement to purchase the property, the purchaser is entitled to recover from the seller treble the amount necessary to repair or replace the defective part of the property, together with court costs and reasonable attorney's fees. An action to enforce the provisions of this subsection must be commenced not later than 1 year after the purchaser discovers or reasonably should have discovered the defect or 2 years after the conveyance of the property to the purchaser, whichever occurs later.

5. A purchaser may not recover damages from a seller pursuant to subsection 4 on the basis of an error or omission in the disclosure form that was caused by the seller's reliance upon information provided to the seller by:

(a) An officer or employee of this State or any political subdivision of this State in the ordinary course of his or her duties; or

(b) A contractor, engineer, land surveyor, certified inspector as defined in <u>NRS 645D.040</u> or pesticide applicator, who was authorized to practice that profession in this State at the time the information was provided.

6. A purchaser of residential property may waive any of his or her rights under this section. Any such waiver is effective only if it is made in a written document that is signed by the purchaser and notarized.

(Added to NRS by 1995, 843; A 1997, 350, 1797)

The above information provided on pages one (1), two (2) and three (3) of this disclosure form is true and correct to the best of seller's knowledge as of the date set forth on page one (1). SELLER HAS DUTY TO DISCLOSE TO BUYER AS NEW DEFECTS ARE DISCOVERED AND/OR KNOWN DEFECTS BECOME WORSE (See NRS 113.130(1)(b)).

Seller(s):	Date:
Seller(s):	Date:

BUYER MAY WISH TO OBTAIN PROFESSIONAL ADVICE AND INSPECTIONS OF THE PROPERTY TO MORE FULLY DETERMINE THE CONDITION OF THE PROPERTY AND ITS ENVIRONMENTAL STATUS. Buyer(s) has/have read and acknowledge(s) receipt of a copy of this Seller's Real Property Disclosure Form and copy of NRS Chapter 113.100-150, inclusive, attached hereto as pages four (4) and five (5).

Buyer(s):	Date:
Buyer(s):	Date:


Nevada Real Estate Division Replaces all previous versions Page 5 of 5


Seller Real Property Disclosure Form 547 Revised 07/25/2017

EXHIBIT 2

EXHIBIT 2


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A few things you need to know before buying or selling a home in Nevada.





State of Nevada Department of Business & Industry Real Estate Division

Introduction

L he Department of Business and Industry—Nevada Real Estate

Division has developed this booklet to increase consumer awareness and understanding of disclosures that may be required by a buyer or seller during the sale or purchase of a residential property in the State of Nevada.

In almost every real estate transaction, some form of written disclosure is required. For example, real estate licensees must disclose if they are related to a party in the transaction or affiliated with the lender involved in approving the loan for that particular transaction. Sellers, for instance, are responsible for disclosing material facts, data and other information relating to the property they are attempting to sell. And buyers, in some cases, must disclose if they are choosing to waive their 10-day opportunity to conduct a risk assessment of lead hazards.

These are only a few examples of what must be disclosed during a real estate transaction. While it is not possible to outline which disclosures are needed in every situation, as each real estate transaction is unique, this booklet contains discussions on the most commonly required state, federal and local disclosures.

References to real estate licensees and the sale of residential properties in this booklet apply only to the state of Nevada. This guide, however, does not specifically address vacant land or commercial properties.

We hope that you will find this booklet helpful and that it becomes a valuable resource during your real estate transaction. For more information, please visit our website at <u>http://red.nv.gov</u>.

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\Rightarrow Purpose of Disclosure

The purpose of the information statement required when purchasing a home or unit in a common-interest community or a condominium hotel is to make the buyer aware of all rights, obligations and other aspects related to owning a unit within a common-interest community (also known as a homeowner's association) or a condominium hotel. The statement makes buyers aware that use of their units can be restricted by the Declaration or CC&R's. It also alerts buyers that foreclosure of the unit is possible for failure to pay assessments.

\Rightarrow Who must provide the disclosure?

The seller must, at seller's expense, provide an information statement with the sale of any unit within a common-interest community or condominium hotel. The statement is entitled "BEFORE YOU PURCHASE PROPERTY IN A [COMMON-INTEREST COMMUNITY] [CONDOMINIUM HOTEL] DID YOU KNOW..."

\Rightarrow When is it due?

In a transaction requiring a public offering statement (further detailed below), the information statement is part of the public offering statement and is due no later than the date an offer to purchase becomes binding on the buyer. If the unit has not been inspected by the buyer, the buyer will have 5 calendar days to cancel the contract from the date of execution.

In a resale transaction, the information statement is part of the resale package. A buyer has 5 calendar days to cancel the contract after receipt of the resale package. It is good practice to provide the information statement no later than 5 days before the contract becomes binding on the buyer in any type of transaction.

⇒ Additional Information

Public Offering Statement

If the property is a new unit in a common-interest community or a condominium hotel, or if the community is subject to any developmental rights, or contains converted buildings or contains units which may be in a time share, or is registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission, the buyer must also be provided with a **Public Offering Statement** disclosing applicable information, including:

- development rights of contractors
- construction schedule
- description of proposed improvements
- mechanical & electrical installations
- initial or special fees
- number & identity of units in timeshare

Unless the buyer has personally inspected the unit, the buyer may cancel the contract to purchase, by written notice, until midnight of the fifth calendar day following the date of execution of the contract. This provision must be stated in the contract.

Resale Package

In transactions involving the resale of a unit previously sold by the developer, a resale package must be provided to the buyer at the expense of the seller. In addition to the information statement, the resale package includes the following: the declaration, bylaws, rules and regulations, monthly assessments, unpaid assessments of any kind, current operating budget, financial statement, reserve summary, unsatisfied judgments, and status of any pending legal actions.

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Transfer Fees

Do not pertain to Condominium Hotels

The resale package for a home or unit in a commoninterest community must also include a statement of any transfer fees, transaction fees or any other fees associated with the resale of a unit.

Unpaid Obligations

Do not pertain to Condominium Hotels

The resale package for a home or unit in a commoninterest community must also include a statement from the association setting forth the amount of the monthly assessment for common expenses and any unpaid obligations that are due from the selling unit's owner, including management fees, transfer fees, fines, penalties, interest, collection costs, foreclosure fees and attorney's fee. Please be advised that while the resale package includes this information, changes to the law in 2013 no longer allow a seller or buyer to rely on this statement as accurate. The seller must obtain a "statement of demand" which is separate from the resale package.

Delivery of Resale Package

An association or hotel unit owner has 10 days to provide the resale package after a request. If the documents are not provided within 10 days the buyer is not liable for any delinquent assessment. The resale package should be delivered as soon as practicable. Unless the buyer has accepted conveyance of the unit, the buyer may cancel the contract to purchase, by written notice, until midnight of the fifth calendar day following receipt of the resale package. This provision must be stated in the contract.

Statement of Demand

Does not pertain to Condominium Hotels

The statement of fees and assessments in the resale package may not be relied upon. It is necessary for any seller to purchase a statement of demand from the association and provide it to the buyer. The statement of demand may be requested by the unit owner, his or her representative or the holder of a security interest on the unit. A statement of demand from the association sets forth the current outstanding assessments, fees and unpaid obligations, including foreclosure fees and attorney's fees due from the seller. The statement of demand remains effective for the period specified in the demand which must not be less than 15 business days from the date of delivery by the association to the seller. The association may provide a corrected statement of demand prior to the sale. Payment of the amount set forth in the statement of demand constitutes full payment of the amount due from the seller.

[NRS 116 governs Common-Interest Communities; NRS 116B governs Condominium Hotels]

For more information:

Form: <u>Before You Purchase Property in a Common-Interest Community Did</u> You Know... or <u>Before You Purchase Property in a Condominium Hotel</u> Did_You Know...

Website: <u>http://red.nv.gov/uploadedFiles/rednvgov/Content/Forms/584.pdf</u> or <u>http://red.nv.gov/uploadedFiles/rednvgov/Content/Forms/584a.pdf</u>

NRS: <u>116.4101-116.412;</u> NAC: <u>116.151, 116.465, 116.470</u> NRS: <u>116B.725-116B.795;</u> NAC: <u>116B.500-116B.530</u>

Consent to Act

\Rightarrow Purpose of Disclosure

The purpose of the Consent to Act form is for the licensee to obtain the written consent to act for more than one party in a transaction.

\Rightarrow Who must provide the disclosure?

The licensee must provide this form to all parties in the transaction if he seeks to act for more than one party.

\Rightarrow When is it due?

If a licensee makes such a disclosure, the consent must be obtained from all parties before the licensee may continue to act in his capacity as an agent.

⇒ Additional Information

The written consent must include:

- 1. A description of the real estate transaction;
- 2. A statement that the licensee is acting for two or more parties to the transaction and that, in acting for these parties, the licensee has a conflict of interest;
- 3. A statement that the licensee will not disclose any confidential information for 1 year after the revocation or termination of the brokerage agreement unless he is required to do so per court order or he is given written permission by that party;
- 4. A statement that a party is not required to consent to the licensee acting on his behalf;
- 5. A statement that the party is giving his consent without coercion and understands the terms of the consent given.

For more information:

Form: Consent to Act

Website: http://red.nv.gov/uploadedFiles/rednvgov/Content/Forms/524.pdf NRS: <u>645.252-254</u>

Construction Defects

⇒ Purpose of Disclosure

The purpose of disclosures relating to construction defects is to make the buyer aware of any construction defects in the property.

⇒ Who must provide the disclosure?

If there is a construction defect, the contractor must disclose the information in understandable language that is underlined and in bold-faced type with capital letters. If the property is or has been the subject of a construction defect claim or lawsuit, the seller must provide the following information to the buyer:

- copies of all notices given to contractor
- expert opinions obtained by claimant
- terms of settlement or order of judgment
- detailed report of all repairs

⇒ When is it due?

Construction defects must be disclosed to the buyer before purchase of the residence. If the property is or has been the subject of a defect claim or lawsuit, the information must be disclosed 30 days before close of escrow, or if escrow is less than 30 days, then immediately upon signing the sales agreement. If a claim is made while in escrow, the disclosure must be made within 24 hours of notice of complaint.

⇒ Additional Information

If the property is located within a common-interest community and is the subject of a defect claim or lawsuit, this information must be disclosed in the buyer's **resale package** (see Common-Interest Communities).

For more information:

NRS: <u>40.640</u>, <u>40.688</u>

Duties Owed By a Nevada Real Estate Licensee

⇒ Purpose of Disclosure

The purpose of the Duties Owed form is to make the buyer or seller aware of obligations owed by a real estate licensee to all parties involved in the transaction.

⇒ Who must provide the disclosure?

A licensee who acts as an agent in a real estate transaction must disclose to each party for whom the licensee is acting as an agent and any unrepresented party all duties owed to the parties and the licensee's relationship as an agent to each party in the transaction.

⇒ When is it due?

The disclosure form must be presented to the client before any documents are signed by the client.

Additional Information

A Nevada licensee who has entered into a brokerage agreement to represent a client in a real estate transaction shall:

- Exercise reasonable skill and care to carry out the terms of the brokerage agreement and the licensee's duties in the brokerage agreement;
- 2. Not disclose, except to the licensee's broker, confidential information relating to a client for 1 year after the revocation or termination of the brokerage agreement, unless licensee is required to do so by court order or the client gives written permission;
- 3. Seek a sale, purchase, option, rental or lease of real property at the price and terms stated in the brokerage agreement or at a price acceptable to the client;
- 4. Present all offers made to or by the client as soon as practicable, unless the client chooses to waive the duty of the licensee to present all offers and signs a waiver of the duty on a form prescribed by the Division;

Duties Owed By a Nevada Real Estate Licensee

- 5. Disclose to the client material facts of which the licensee has knowledge concerning the real estate transaction;
- 6. Advise the client to obtain advice from an expert relating to matters which are beyond the expertise of the licensee; and
- 7. Account to the client for all money and property the licensee receives in which the client may have an interest.

⇒ Waiver of Duty to Present All Offers Authorization to Negotiate Directly with Seller

A client may choose to waive the broker's duty to present all offers by signing a waiver on a form, the "Waiver Form," prescribed by the Division. Concurrent with the option of a client to waive the duty of his/her broker to present all offers is the form "Authorization to Negotiate Directly with Seller," which gives permission in writing to authorize a licensee to negotiate a sale or lease directly with a seller. Both forms must be utilized and signed by a client who waives the duty to present all offers. Otherwise, a licensee for a buyer does not have the permission of the seller's broker to present offers or negotiate with the sellers directly.

For more information: Form: Duties Owed By a Nevada Real Estate Licensee Website: <u>http://red.nv.gov/uploadedFiles/rednvgov/Content/Forms/525.pdf</u> NRS: <u>645.193; 645.252-645.254</u>

Impact Fees

\Rightarrow Purpose of Disclosure

The seller of any property must give notice of any impact fees that may be imposed upon the buyer.

An impact fee is a charge imposed by a local government on new development (i.e., the construction, reconstruction, redevelopment, conversion, alteration, relocation or enlargement of any structure which increases the number of service units) to finance some of the costs attributable to the new development.

⇒ Who must provide the disclosure?

A seller who has knowledge of the impact fee must give written notice to the buyer, including the amount of the impact fee and the name of the local government imposing the fee.

\Rightarrow When is it due?

The notice must be provided to the buyer before the property is conveyed.

⇒ Additional Information

If the seller fails to give this notice, the seller is liable to the buyer for the amount of the impact fee.

For more information: NRS: <u>278B.320</u>

Lien for Deferred Taxes

\Rightarrow Purpose of Disclosure

If there are deferred taxes that have not been paid at the time the property is sold or transferred, the buyer must be notified in writing that there is a lien for deferred taxes on the property.

⇒ Who must provide the disclosure?

The seller must notify the buyer of the lien.

⇒ When is it due?

The lien must be disclosed at the time the property is sold or transferred.

⇒ Additional Information

The owner of the property on the date the deferred taxes become due is liable for the deferred taxes.

For more information: NRS: <u>361A.290</u>

Manufactured Housing— Used Manufactured/Mobile Homes

\Rightarrow Purpose of Disclosure

The purpose of the Used Manufactured/Mobile Home disclosure is to make the buyer aware that a used manufactured or mobile home that has not been converted to real property is personal property and subject to personal property taxes.

⇒ Who must provide the disclosure?

The real estate licensee shall provide the form to the purchaser as soon as practicable, but before title is transferred.

\Rightarrow Additional Information

This disclosure also informs the purchaser that title will not pass unless the county assessor's endorsement is placed on the face of the title, verifying that taxes have been paid in full.

The disclosure also instructs the consumer to submit certain documents to Nevada's Manufactured Housing Division and the county assessor within 45 days after the sale is complete and before a certificate of ownership will be issued.

For more information:

Form: <u>Used Manufactured/Mobile Home Disclosure</u> Website: <u>Manufactured Housing Division</u> NRS: <u>645.258</u>, <u>489.521</u>, <u>489.531</u>, <u>489.541</u>

Manufactured Housing— Manufactured Home Parks

\Rightarrow Purpose of Disclosure

The purpose of the disclosure relating to placing or buying a manufactured or mobile home in a manufactured home park is to make the buyer aware that he may be subject to approval by the landlord of the manufactured home park if the manufactured or mobile home will remain in the park.

⇒ Who must provide the disclosure?

If the landlord requires approval of a prospective buyer and tenant, the landlord must post a sign which is clearly readable at the entrance of the park which advises consumers that before a manufactured home in the park is sold, the buyer and tenant must be approved by the landlord.

⇒ Additional Information

If the property will remain in the manufactured home park, make sure you have a lease agreement with the park manager and that you know the park's rules and regulations.

Remember: the seller or a manufactured home dealer cannot promise that you'll be accepted as a tenant in a particular manufactured home park. You must apply for the lease yourself and should do so before finalizing the purchase of your home. The landlord must approve or deny a completed application from a prospective buyer and tenant within 10 days after the date the application is submitted.

For more information:

Website: <u>Manufactured Housing Division—Placing or Buying Your Home in a</u> Rental Community

NRS: <u>118B.170</u>

Open Range Disclosure

\Rightarrow Purpose of Disclosure

The purpose of the Open Range Disclosure is to inform the prospective buyer of a home or an improved or unimproved lot adjacent to open range that livestock are permitted to graze or roam on the property. Open range means all unenclosed land outside of cities and towns upon which cattle, sheep or other domestic animals by custom, license, lease or permit are grazed or permitted to roam. It also serves to inform the prospective buyer that the parcel may be subject to county or State claims of right-of-way, (commonly referred to as R.S. 2477 rights-of-way) including rights -of-way that may be unrecorded, undocumented or unsurveyed; and used by miners, ranchers, hunters or others, for access or recreational use, in a manner which interferes with the use and enjoyment of the parcel.

\Rightarrow Who must provide the disclosure?

A seller must disclose, in writing, to a potential buyer of property adjacent to open range, that livestock grazing on the open range are permitted to enter the property; and that the parcel may be subject to county or State claims of right-of-way.

⇒ When is it due?

The disclosure must be provided to the potential buyer, with the requirement that the buyer sign the disclosure form acknowledging the date of receipt of the original disclosure document, before the sales agreement is signed.

Open Range Disclosure

⇒ Additional Information

The disclosure acknowledges fencing the property to keep livestock out and recognizes the property owner's entitlement to damages if livestock enter a fenced property but warns against harming roaming livestock even on a fenced property.

The law requires that the seller retain a copy of the disclosure document that has been signed by the buyer acknowledging the date of receipt of the document, provide a copy to the buyer, and record the original disclosure document containing the buyer's signature and the seller's notarized signature in the office of the county recorder in the county where the property is located.

For more information: Form: <u>Open Range Disclosure</u> Website: <u>http://red.nv.gov/uploadedFiles/rednvgov/Content/Forms/551.pdf</u> NRS: <u>113.065</u>; <u>568.355</u>

Private Transfer Fee Obligation

\Rightarrow Purpose of Disclosure

The purpose of the disclosure is to make the buyer aware that the property is subject to a Private Transfer Fee Obligation (PTFO) which will require the buyer, upon conveyance of the property by the seller, to pay either a one-time fixed amount or a one-time percentage of the purchase price to a third party payee.

⇒ Who Must Provide the Disclosure?

The seller of a property that is subject to a PTFO must provide the disclosure as a written statement that discloses the existence of and describes the PTFO, and includes language substantially similar to the legislatively-prescribed notice informing the buyer that the PTFO may lower the value of the property and that the laws of this State prohibit the enforcement of certain PTFOs created on or after May 20, 2011.

\Rightarrow When is it due?

The disclosure must be provided to the potential buyer before the conveyance of the property.

⇒ Additional Information

The notice regarding the existence of a PTFO in the seller's disclosure must be in substantially the following form:

A private transfer fee obligation has been created with respect to this property. The private transfer fee obligation may lower the value of this property. The laws of this State prohibit the enforcement of certain private transfer fee obligations that are created on or after May 20, 2011 and impose certain notice requirements with respect to private transfer fee obligations that were created before May 20, 2011.

For more information:

NRS: <u>111.825</u>-<u>111.880</u>

Seller's Real Property Disclosure

⇒ Purpose of Disclosure

The purpose of the Seller's Real Property Disclosure form is to make the buyer aware of the overall condition of the property before it is transferred. This disclosure is not a guarantee nor does it take the place of an inspection. In some cases a Seller has never lived on the property and may have no knowledge of the condition of the property. The Buyer is advised to obtain an independent inspection performed by a properly licensed home inspector. This form is not required for new home sales.

\Rightarrow Who must provide the disclosure?

The seller must complete the "Seller's Real Property Disclosure" form, detailing the condition of the property, known defects, and any other aspects of the property which may affect its use or value. A real estate licensee, unless he is the seller of the property, may not complete this form.

The form must be fully and properly completed. If the seller has no knowledge, "no" is an appropriate answer to the "Are you aware ..." questions. Each question must be answered with a mark in the corresponding "yes", "no" or in some cases "n/a" box. Explanations of any "yes" answers, and a properly executed signature by the seller, are also required. The buyer may only sign the form after full and proper completion by the seller.

A Buyer may rescind the contract without penalty if he does not receive a fully and properly completed Seller's Real Property Disclosure form. If a Buyer closes a transaction without a completed form or if a known defect is not disclosed to a Buyer, the Buyer may be entitled to treble damages, unless the Buyer waives his rights under NRS 113.150(6).

(Continued on next page ...)

Seller's Real Property Disclosure

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\Rightarrow When is it due?

The disclosure must be delivered to the buyer at least 10 days prior to conveyance of the property.

\Rightarrow Additional Information

The content of the disclosure is based on what the seller is aware of at the time. If, after completion of the disclosure form, the seller discovers a new defect or notices that a previously disclosed condition has worsened, the seller must inform the purchaser, in writing, as soon as practicable after discovery of the condition, or before conveyance of the property.

The buyer may not waive, and the seller may not require a buyer to waive, any of the requirements of the disclosure as a condition of sale or for any other purpose.

In a sale or intended sale by foreclosure, the trustee and the beneficiary of the deed of trust shall provide, not later than the conveyance of the property to, or upon request from, the buyer:

• written notice of any defects of which the trustee or beneficiary is aware; and

• the contact information of any asset management company who provided asset management services, if any defects are repaired or replaced or attempted to be repaired or replaced. The asset management company shall provide a service report to the purchaser upon request.

Seller's Real Property Disclosure

If a Seller requests a Buyer to waive his rights or legal remedies under NRS 113.150 or otherwise, the Buyer should contact an attorney for advice regarding the legal consequences. A real estate licensee cannot explain the legal consequences of waiving a Buyer's legal rights or remedies.

EFFECTIVE JULY, 2017 the form includes the following 2 additional disclosures:

• whether solar panels are installed on the subject property. If yes, then disclose whether the solar panels are leased, owned or financed.

• whether the property is a participant in any conservation easement such as the Southern Nevada Water Authority's Water Smart Landscape Program. Seller shall inform the buyer about conservation easements or the potential for other types of conservation easements as required by the statutory language below:

Conservation Easements: The subject property _____ is OR ______ is not subject to a Restrictive Covenant and Conservation Easement established by Nevada Revised Statute 111.390-440 such as the Southern Nevada Water Authority's Water Smart Landscape Program.

For more information: Form: <u>Seller's Real Property Disclosure</u> Website: <u>http://red.nv.gov/uploadedFiles/rednvgov/Content/Forms/547.pdf</u> NRS: <u>113.130</u>; <u>113.140</u>; <u>113.150</u> NRS: <u>111.390-440</u>

Water & Sewer Rates

\Rightarrow Purpose of Disclosure

The purpose of the disclosure relating to water and sewer rates is to inform the buyer of a previously unsold home or improved lot of public utility rates when service is for more than 25 but fewer than 2,000 customers.

\Rightarrow Who must provide the disclosure?

The seller must post a notice, which shows the current or projected rates, in a conspicuous place on the property.

\Rightarrow When is it due?

The notice must be posted and a copy provided to the buyer before the home is sold.

⇒ Additional Information

The notice must contain the name, address and telephone number of the public utility and the Division of Consumer Complaint Resolution of the Public Utilities Commission of Nevada.

For more information: NRS: <u>113.060</u>

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Lead-Based Paint

\Rightarrow Purpose of Disclosure

The purpose of the lead-based paint disclosure is to make the buyer aware that the residential property (if built prior to 1978) may present exposure to lead.

\Rightarrow Who must provide the disclosure?

Federal law requires that the seller disclose any known presence of lead-based paint hazards and provide the buyer with the EPA disclosure booklet, "Protect Your Family From Lead in Your Home," along with any other available records and/or reports.

⇒ When is it due?

The disclosure is on a federally prescribed form and must be made as a condition of the sale before conveyance of the property.

⇒ Additional Information

On the disclosure form, the buyer must acknowledge receipt of the EPA disclosure booklet and copies of lead reports, if available. Additionally, the buyer will receive a 10-day opportunity to conduct a risk assessment or may choose to waive this opportunity.

For more information:

Form: <u>Disclosure of Information on Lead-Based Paint</u> Website: <u>Environmental Protection Agency (Lead)</u> Phone: National Lead Information Center 1-800-424-LEAD

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Pool Safety and Drowning Prevention Disclosure

\Rightarrow Purpose of Disclosure

The purpose of the Southern Nevada Health District's pool safety and drowning prevention disclosure is to make the buyer aware of the risk of death by drowning in private and public pools particularly for children 4 years or younger.

\Rightarrow Who must provide the disclosure?

The information is provided by the Nevada Real Estate Division (NRED) in agreement with the Southern Nevada Health District (SNHD) to promote SNHD's efforts to inform the public on drowning prevention.

⇒ When is it due?

The disclosure will be provided to the buyer before the sales agreement is signed by way of the Residential Disclosure Guide in which it is contained. The buyer is advised to visit SNHD's website:

http://www.southernnevadahealthdistrict.org/health-topics/ drowning-prevention.php.

⇒ Additional Information

Drowning is the leading cause of unintentional injury death in Clark County for children four years of age and under. The majority of drowning deaths occur in the family pool. Preventable mistakes include leaving a child unattended near a body of water in which a child's nose and mouth can be submerged.

More information on drowning facts, preventable mistakes, how to be prepared to prevent a drowning, pool security, drowning statistics, adult supervision and more can be obtained at SNHD's website at <u>http://</u> <u>www.southernnevadahealthdistrict.org/health-topics/</u> <u>drowning-prevention.php</u> and <u>http://www.gethealthyclarkcounty.org/be-safe/index.php</u>.

Depending upon the transaction, the following disclosures may also be required from a buyer, seller or licensee:

⇒ AIRPORT NOISE

Buyers should investigate the impact of airport flight paths and the noise levels at different times of the day over that property.

⇒ BUILDING & ZONING CODES

The purpose of the building and zoning disclosure is to inform the buyer of transportation beltways and/or planned or anticipated land use within proximity of the subject property of which the seller has knowledge.

For more information on building and zoning codes, contact your local jurisdiction.

⇒ ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS

Although the seller is required to disclose the presence of environmental hazards, a statement that the seller is not aware of a defect or hazard does not mean that it does not exist. **It is the buyer's responsibility to be informed and take additional steps to further investigate.** Some potential hazards that may be found in Nevada include:

- Radon (www.epa.gov/radon)
- Floods (<u>http://www.floodsmart.gov</u>)
- Methamphetamine Labs (NRS 40.770 & 489.776)
- Wood-Burning Devices (<u>http://www.epa.gov/iaq/</u> pubs/combust.html)

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- Underground Storage Tanks (<u>http://epa.gov/</u> oust/index.htm)
- Septic Systems (<u>http://water.epa.gov/</u> infrastructure/septic/)
- Wells (<u>http://water.epa.gov/drink/info/well/</u> index.cfm)
- Land and Cleanup (<u>http://www2.epa.gov/learn-issues/learn-about-land-and-cleanup</u>)
- Groundwater (<u>http://water.epa.gov/drink/</u> resources/topics.cfm)
- Public Pools & Spas (<u>http://www.poolsafely.gov/</u>)
- Molds and Moisture (http://www.epa.gov/mold/)

For more information on environmental hazards, visit: <u>www.epa.gov</u>.

⇒ GAMING Initial Purchaser in New Construction Only

If there is a gaming district near the property, the seller must disclose information which includes a copy of the most recent gaming enterprise district map, the location of the nearest gaming enterprise district, and notice that the map is subject to change. This disclosure is required for Nevada counties with population over 400,000.

The information must be provided at least 24 hours before the seller signs the sales agreement. The buyer may waive the 24-hour period.

The seller must retain a copy of the disclosure.

For more information on gaming, see: NRS 113.080

\Rightarrow HOME INSPECTIONS

When obtaining an FHA-insured loan, this disclosure informs the buyer about the limits of the Federal Housing Administration appraisal inspection and suggests the buyer obtain a home inspection to evaluate the physical condition of the property prior to purchase. The form is entitled, "For Your Protection: Get a Home Inspection."

For more information on FHA home inspections, visit: <u>www.hud.gov</u>.

\Rightarrow MILITARY ACTIVITIES

The purpose of the Military Activities Disclosure is to make the purchaser of residential property aware of planned or anticipated military activity within the proximity of the property. Counties in which the military files Military Activities Plans include Clark County, Washoe County, Churchill County and Mineral County.

For more information on military activities plans in these counties, contact the local municipal jurisdiction or the Public Information Officer of the Military Installation in your county.

\Rightarrow LICENSEE DISCLOSURES

In addition to the "Consent to Act" and the "Duties Owed by a Nevada Real Estate Licensee" forms (see pages 8 & 10), a real estate licensee is required to disclose other information such as his relationship to one or more parties in the transaction and/or having a personal interest in the property.

For more information regarding duties and disclosures owed by a licensee, see: <u>NRS 645.252</u>-645.254, <u>NAC 645.637</u> and <u>NAC 645.640</u>.

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⇒ ROAD MAINTENANCE DISTRICT

The sale of residential property within a road maintenance district is prohibited unless the seller provides notice to the purchaser, including the amount of assessments for the last two years. If the district has been in existence for less than 2 years before notice is provided to the purchaser, then the amount of assessments shall be given for the period since the district was created.

For more information, see: NRS 320.130.

\Rightarrow SOIL REPORT (New Construction Only)

If the property has not been occupied by the buyer more than 120 days before completion, the seller must give notice of any soil report prepared for the property or for the subdivision in which the property is located.

The seller must provide such notice upon signing the sales agreement.

Upon receiving the notice, the buyer must submit a written request within 5 days for a copy of the actual report. The seller must provide a free report to the buyer within 5 days of receiving such request.


Upon receiving the soil report, the buyer has 20 days to rescind the sales agreement. This rescission right may be waived, in writing, by the buyer.

For more information, see: NRS 113.135.

Contact Information

Nevada Real Estate Division (LV)	Nevada Real Estate Division (CC)
3300 W Sahara Avenue, Suite 350	1818 E. College Parkway, Suite 110
Las Vegas, NV 89102	Carson City, NV 89706-7986
Phone: (702) 486-4033	Phone: (775) 684-1900
Fax: (702) 486-4275	Fax: (775) 687-4868
Email: realest@red.nv.gov	Email: realest@red.nv.gov
Website: <u>http://red.nv.gov</u>	Website: <u>http://red.nv.gov</u>
Manufactured Housing	Manufactured Housing
Division (LV)	Division (CC)
3300 W Sahara Avenue, Suite 320	1830 E. College Pkwy., #120
Las Vegas, NV 89102	Carson City, Nevada 89706
Phone: (702) 486-4135	Phone: (775) 684-2940
Fax: (702) 486-4309	Fax: (775) 684-2949
Email: nmhd@mhd.state.nv.us	Email: nmhd@mhd.state.nv.us
Website: http://mhd.nv.gov	Website: http://mhd.nv.gov
Ombudsman Office (Common-Interest Communities) 3300 W Sahara Avenue, Suite 325 Las Vegas, NV 89102 Phone: (702) 486-4480 Toll Free: (877) 829-9907 Fax: (702) 486-4520 Email: CICOmbudsman@red.nv.gov Website: http://red.nv.gov/cic/	U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1200 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. Washington, DC 20460 Phone: (202) 272-0167 Website: <u>www.epa.gov</u>
National Lead Information Center	Department of Health and Human
422 South Clinton Avenue	Services – Center for Disease Control &
Rochester, NY 14620	Prevention
Phone: (800) 424-LEAD	1600 Clifton Road
Fax: (585) 232-3111	Atlanta, GA 30333
Website: http://www2.epa.gov/lead/forms/lead-	Phone: 800-CDC-INFO (800-232-4636)
hotline-national-lead-information-center	Website: www.cdc.gov
U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission 4330 East West Highway Bethesda, MD 20814 Phone: (301) 504-7923 Fax: (301) 504-0124 Website: <u>www.cpsc.gov</u>	

Nevada Real Estate Division



July 2017

622

Nevada Real Estate Division



RESIDENTIAL DISCLOSURE GUIDE

State of Nevada Department of Business & Industry Real Estate Division

I/We acknowledge that I/we have received a copy of the Residential Disclosure Guide.

DATE _____

Client-Print Name

Client—Signature

Client—Print Name

Client—Signature

Make copy of page for additional signatures.

Retain original or copy in each transaction file.

Electronically Filed 10/20/2020 2:47 PM Steven D. Grierson AFFT 1 CLERK OF THE COURT Roger P. Croteau & Associates, Ltd. Roger P. Croteau, Esq. 2 2810 W. Charleston Blvd., #75 3 Las Vegas, NV 89102 State Bar No.: 4958 4 Attorney(s) for: Plaintiff 5 DISTRICT COURT 6 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 7 **River Glider Avenue Trust** Case No.: A-20-819781-C 8 Plaintiff(s). Dept. No.: 20 9 VS Date: 10 Time: Harbor Cove Homeowners Association, et al. 11 Defendant(s). AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE 12 13 I, Brigham Moody, being duly sworn deposes and says: That at all time herein Affiant was and is a citizen of the United States, over 18 years of age, licensed to serve civil process in the State of Nevada 14 under license #1926, and not a party to or interested in the proceeding in which this Affidavit is made. The Affiant received 1 copy of the: Summons; Complaint; Exhibit 1 - 2 on the 16th day of October, 15 2020 and served the same on the 19th day of October, 2020 at 4:16pm by serving the Defendant, Nevada Association Services, Inc., by personally delivering and leaving a copy at New Address of 16 Resident Agent, Chris Yergensen, Esq., 6625 S. Valley View Blvd., C300, Las Vegas, NV 89118 with Stacy Dominguez, Front Desk, pursuant to NRS 14.020 as a person of suitable age and discretion at 17 the above address, which address is the address of the resident agent as shown on the current certificate of designation filed with the Secretary of State. 18 19 LAURA MITZ Notary Public, State of Nevada 20 Appointment No. 13-10685-1 My Appt. Expires Apr. 24, 2021 21 22 23 State of Nevada, County of Clark 24 SIGNED AND SWORN to before me on this 20th day of October , 2020 25 Affiant: Brigham Moody Bv: Brigham Moody #: R-2019-10677 26 27 J & L Process Service, License #1926 tary Public Work Order No: 20-11909 28 J & L Process Service 420 N. Nellis Blvd., A3-197. Las Vegas, NV 89110 (702-883-5725 1 of 1 JLProcessSvc@gmail.com

Case Number: A-20-819781-C

1	AFFT Roger P. Croteau & Associates, Ltd.	Electronically Filed 10/20/2020 2:47 PM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT
2	Roger P. Croteau, Esq. 2810 W. Charleston Blvd., #75	Otime S. Ann
3	Las Vegas, NV 89102	
4	State Bar No.: 4958 Attorney(s) for: Plaintiff	
5	DISTRICT COURT	
6	CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA	
7		
8	River Glider Avenue Trust	Case No.: A-20-819781-C
9	Plaintiff(s),	Dept. No.: 20
10	vs.	Date:
31	Harbor Cove Homeowners Association, et al.	Time:
11	Defendant(s).	AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE
12		
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VEILSON P.C. Cross Drive, Suite 120 c, Nevada 89144 5, Nevada 89144 6 8 1	2 3 4 5 6 7 8	LIPSON NEILSON P.C. KALEB D. ANDERSON, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 7582 PETER E. DUNKLEY, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 11110 9900 Covington Cross Drive, Ste. 120 Las Vegas, Nevada 89144 (702) 382-1500 phone (702) 382-1512 fax kanderson@lipsonneilson.com pdunkley@lipsonneilson.com Attorneys for Defendant, Harbor Cove Homeowners Association	Electronically Filed 11/10/2020 2:34 PM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT	
	10	CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA		
	11	CLARR COUNTT, NEVADA		
	12	RIVER GLIDER AVENUE TRUST,	CASE NO.: A-20-819781-C DEPT. NO.: 20	
	13	Plaintiff,		
	VS.	Hearing Requested		
	15	HARBOR COVE HOMEOWNERS		
	16	ASSOCIATON; and NEVADA ASSOCIATION SERVICES, INC.,	HARBOR COVE HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION'S MOTION TO DISMISS	
	17	Defendants.	OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT	
	18			
	19	COMES NOW, Defendant Harbor Cove Homeowners Association (the "HOA"),		
	20	by and through its counsel of record, LIPSON NEILSON, P.C., and hereby submit this		
	21	Motion to Dismiss.		
	22	This Motion is made and based on the following Memorandum of Points and		
	23	Authorities, the pleadings and papers on file, and any oral arguments the Court may		
	24	consider in this matter.		
	25	///		
	26	///		
	27	///		
	28	///		
		Page 1 of 18		
Case Number: A-20-819781-C				

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

Ι. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

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3 This is the epilogue to one of the books in the series of HOA foreclosure 4 litigation. The property is located at 8112 Lake Hills Drive, Las Vegas, Nevada 89128 (APN: 138-16-213-034) (the "Property"). The Plaintiff is suing the HOA (and the 5 6 collection agent) because Plaintiff's acquisition of the Property after a nonjudicial 7 foreclosure sale, for \$5,500.00,¹ resulting in ownership via nonwarranty deed, did not 8 result in the title to the Property being free and clear of an existing deed of trust.

9 The effect of the nonjudicial foreclosure sale has already been litigated in case A-13-683467 (the "Prior Litigation").² The nonjudicial foreclosure sale was valid and 10 conveyed the Property to the Plaintiff subject to the existing deed of trust. A copy of the Order Granting Summary Judgment in favor of the lender, is attached hereto, as Exhibit A.

According to the District Court's Order, the following is established:

1. Before the nonjudicial foreclosure sale, the prior owner of the Property had satisfied the super-priority portion of the HOA's lien. Exhibit A, p. 3 ¶ 10, p. 5¶ 5.

2. The valid nonjudicial foreclosure sale occurred on May 11, 2012 ("HOA Sale"). See Exhibit A, p. 4 ¶ 14. (See also, Complaint, ¶ 2 (same).)

3. River Glider Avenue Trust purchased the Property for \$5,500.00. Exhibit A, p. 4, at ¶ 15; Complaint ¶ 22.

21 4. "River Glider Avenue Trust purchased the Property subject to [a] deed of 22 trust." (*Id.*, at p. 5 ¶ 6.)

23 The District Court's Order was appealed but ultimately affirmed. A copy of the 24 Order of Affirmance is attached as **Exhibit B**. The Plaintiff petitioned for rehearing,

¹ According to Zillow.com, the current value of the property is \$587,540.00 (accessed November 5, 2020). 27 ² The Court may take judicial notice of facts: "Generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court; or (b) Capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot 28 reasonably be questioned, so that the fact is not subject to reasonable dispute." NRS 47.130.

9900 Covington Cross Drive, Suite 120 Las Vegas, Nevada 89144 (702) 382-1500 FAX: (702) 382-1512 LIPSON NEILSON P.C.

which was denied on July 1, 2020. A copy of the Order Denying Rehearing is attached 2 as Exhibit C.

3 Plaintiff is attempting to re-litigate the outcome of the *nonjudicial* foreclosure sale, 4 turned into a judicial action (the Prior Litigation) which went all the way through appeal. This second bite at the apple is based on theories through which Plaintiff 5 6 recharacterizes the same issues from the Prior Litigation, apparently to avoid the 7 outcome of the Prior Litigation. Plaintiff has already appealed and lost. The Complaint 8 should be dismissed because the issues have already been litigated. To the extent the 9 Complaint attempts to state new claims, each of which fail as a matter of law and should 10 be dismissed with prejudice, or because there are no genuine facts at issue, summary 11 judgment granted in favor of the HOA.

12 II.

13

1

LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Motion to Dismiss

14 A motion to dismiss is warranted when a complaint fails "to state a claim upon 15 which relief can be granted." NRCP 12(b)(5). "When considering a motion to dismiss 16 made under NRCP 12(b)(5), a district court must construe the complaint liberally and 17 draw every fair reference in favor of the plaintiff." Cohen v. Mirage Resorts, Inc., 119 18 Nev. 1, 22, 62 P.3d 720, 734 (2003). The complaint should be dismissed if it "appears" 19 beyond a doubt that it could prove no set of facts, which if true, would entitle [the 20 plaintiff] to relief." Buzz Stew, LLC v. City of N. Las Vegas, 124 Nev. 224, 228, 181 P.3d 21 670, 672 (2008). However, merely vague, conclusory and general allegations will not 22 overcome a Rule 12(b) motion. See Romero v. State, No. 52420, 2009 Nev. Unpub. 23 LEXIS 1, at *2 (July 29, 2009) (affirming dismissal of "naked" and "conclusory" claims.); 24 see also Foster Poultry Farms, Inc. v. Suntrust Bank, 355 F. Supp. 2d 1145. 1148 (D. 25 Nev. 2004) (stating that when deciding a Rule 12(b) motion, the court is not required "to 26 accept as true allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, 27 or unreasonable inferences.").

28 ///

Page 3 of 18

AA060

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The Court is "not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation." *Papasan v. Allain*, 478 U.S. 265, 286, 106 S. Ct. 2932, 2944 (1986).

And even in a "notice pleading" jurisdiction, Plaintiff must still set forth sufficient facts to establish every element of each claim for relief. *See Johnson v. Travelers Ins. Co.*, 89 Nev. 467, 472, 515 P.2d 68, 71 (1973) ("Although we are mindful that a motion to dismiss admits all material and issuable facts *properly pleaded*, the complaint must, in any event, allege facts sufficient to establish all necessary elements of the claim for relief...") (emphasis added).

9 The Court may consider "documents attached to the complaint, documents 10 incorporated by reference in the complaint, or matters of judicial notice [] without 11 converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment." *U.S. v. Ritchie*, 12 342 F.3d 903, 908 (9th Cir. 2003).

B. Summary Judgment

"Summary judgment is appropriate under NRCP 56 when the pleadings, 14 15 depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, and affidavits, if any, that are 16 properly before the court demonstrate that no genuine issue of material fact exists, and 17 the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Wood v. Safeway, Inc., 121 18 Nev. 724, 731, 121 P.3d 1026, 1031 (2005). The party moving for summary judgment 19 bears the initial burden of production to show the absence of a genuine issue of material 20 fact. Cuzze v. Univ. & Comm. College System of Nevada, 172 P.3d 131, 134 (Nev. 21 2007). Where "the nonmoving party will bear the burden of persuasion at trial, the party 22 moving for summary judgment may satisfy the burden of production by either (1) 23 submitting evidence that negates an essential element of the nonmoving party's claim, 24 or (2) 'pointing out . . . that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving 25 party's case." Id. (citations omitted).

To survive a motion for summary judgment, the non-moving party "may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of [its] pleadings," *Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.*, 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986), nor may it "simply show there is some metaphysical doubt as

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to the material facts." *Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co.*, 475 U.S. at 586. Rather, it is the nonmoving party's burden to "come forward with specific facts showing that there is a
genuine issue for trial." *Id.* at 587 (emphasis added); *See also Wood v. Safeway, Inc.*,
121 Nev. 724 (2005), *citing Pegasus v. Reno Newspapers, Inc.*, 118 Nev. 706, 713, 57
P.3d 82 (2002).

6 An issue is only genuine if there is a sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable 7 jury to return a verdict for the non-moving party. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248 (1986). 8 Further, a dispute will only preclude the entry of summary judgment if it could affect the 9 outcome of the suit under governing law. Id. "The amount of evidence necessary to 10 raise a genuine issue of material fact is enough to require a judge or jury to resolve the 11 parties' differing versions of the truth at trial." Id. at 249. In evaluating a summary 12 judgment, a court views all facts and draws all inferences in a light most favorable to the non-moving party. Wood v. Safeway, Inc., 121 Nev. 724, 729 (2005). If there are no genuine issues of fact, the movant's burden is not evidentiary because the facts are not disputed, but the court has the obligation to resolve the legal dispute between the parties as a matter of law. Gulf Ins. Co. v. First Bank, 2009 WL 1953444 *2 (E.D.Cal.2009) (citing Asuncion v. Dist. Dir. of U.S. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 18 427 F.2d 523, 524 (9th Cir.1970)).

III. REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE

20 This court may take judicial notice of matters of fact that are generally known or 21 that are "[c]apable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose 22 accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned' when requested by a party. NRS 47.130; 23 NRS 47.150. Records of other courts are sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably 24 be questioned. Occhiuto v. Occhiuto, 97 Nev. 143, 145, 625 P.2d 568, 569 (1981). A 25 court may take judicial notice of records from other cases if there is a close relationship 26 between the cases, and issues within the case justify taking judicial notice of the prior 27 case. Id. Here, the HOA requests that the Court take judicial notice of the District 28 Court's Order in the Prior Litigation (Exhibit A) as that case is closely related to this case

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in that the prior case involves the same foreclosure sale and made express findings
 regarding issues raised in this lawsuit.

IV. LEGAL ARGUMENT

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4 The complaint should be dismissed or summary judgment granted in favor of the 5 HOA because the Prior Litigation, established the character of the Property's title through a valid nonjudicial foreclosure sale. Plaintiff is attempting to navigate the no 6 7 man's land between the Prior Litigation's result that Plaintiff obtained title to the 8 Property, and attempting to insert conditions, such as fraud, that would essentially result 9 in an invalid sale divesting Plaintiff of title to the Property. There was no defect in the 10 foreclosure; there was no fraud or procedural error which would invalidate the sale. The 11 time and place to litigate the alleged issues in this complaint was in the Prior Litigation.

Plaintiff's claims are: (1) misrepresentation, (2) breach of duty of good faith, (3) conspiracy, and (4) violation of NRS 113. Each of the claims fail and should be dismissed with prejudice, or because there is no genuine issue of material fact, the Court may grant summary judgment in favor of the HOA.

A. <u>MISREPRESENTATION CLAIM FAILS BECAUSE THE HOA HAD NO</u> OBLIGATION TO DISCLOSE PAYMENTS

Plaintiff's misrepresentation claim fails because an HOA had no duty to disclose 18 19 the former owner's payment. The elements for a claim of negligent misrepresentation 20 are: (1) defendant supplied information while in the course of its business; (2) the 21 information was false; (3) the information must was supplied for the guidance of the plaintiff in its business transactions; (4) defendant must have failed to exercise 22 23 reasonable care or competence in obtaining or communicating the information; (5) 24 plaintiff must have justifiably relied upon the information by taking action or refraining 25 from it; and (6) plaintiff sustained damage as a result of his reliance upon the accuracy of the information. NJI 9.05; Barmettler v. Reno Air, Inc., 114 Nev. 441, 449, 956 P.2d 26 27 1382, 1387 (1998).

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1 Similarly, the elements for a claim of intentional misrepresentation are: (1) 2 defendant makes a false representation or misrepresentation as to a past or existing 3 fact; (2) defendant made the statement with knowledge or belief that the representation 4 is false or that defendant lacks sufficient basis of information to make the 5 representation; (3) defendant intended to induce plaintiff to act in reliance on the 6 representation; (4) plaintiff justifiably relied upon the representation; (5) causation and 7 damages to plaintiff as a result of relying on misrepresentation; and (6) must be proved 8 by clear and convincing evidence and be pled with specificity. NRCP 9; NJI 9.01; 9 Jordan v. State ex rel. Dep't of Motor Vehicles & Pub. Safety, 121 Nev. 44, 75, 110 P.3d 10 30, 51 (2005).

11 Plaintiff's claim fails because an HOA is required to comply with NRS 116 and 12 NRS 116 did not require any such disclosure of a tender or payment made prior to the 13 nonjudicial foreclosure date. An HOA's nonjudicial foreclosure process is a creature of 14 statute. SFR Invs. Pool 1 v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 130 Nev. 742, 744, 334 P.3d 408, 410 15 (2014). Pursuant to the statute, some HOAs have superpriority liens, while other HOAs 16 do not. See MCM Capital Partners, LLC v. Saticoy Bay LLC Series 6684 Coronado 17 Crest, No. 215CV1154JCMGWF, 2018 WL 4113332, at *3 (D. Nev. Aug. 29, 2018) 18 (finding limited-purpose associations may be exempt from many portions of NRS 116, 19 including the superpriority portion, thus leaving them without a split lien and only a subpriority lien), see also Bank of Am., N.A. v. Aspen Meadows - Fernley Flood Control 20 21 Facility Maint. Ass'n, No. 316CV00413MMDWGC, 2019 WL 2437453, at *3 (D. Nev. 22 June 10, 2019) (finding the HOA "never had a superpriority lien on the Property"). 23 Nevertheless, regardless of the type of HOA or foreclosure, NRS 116 did not require 24 any HOA to make a declaration at the sale, or in their foreclosure notices, regarding the 25 character of the nonjudicial sale, i.e., whether the sale was a super-priority or sub-26 priority lien sale.

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i. <u>The HOA had no obligation to disclose it was foreclosing on a</u> <u>superpriority lien</u>

An HOA does not have to disclose whether or not there is a superpriority lien, but 3 rather must state the total delinquency being foreclosed upon. 4 See NRS 5 116.31162(1)(c) (2013) (stating that the total amount of the HOA lien "includ[es] costs, 6 fees and expenses incident to its enforcement"). As the Nevada Supreme Court stated, 7 because the foreclosure notices go to all lien holders, whether junior or senior, "it was 8 appropriate to state the total amount of the lien." SFR Invs. Pool 1, LLC. v. U.S. Bank, 9 N.A., 130 Nev. 742, 757, 334 P.3d 408, 418 (2014). There is no allegation that the 10 notices were incorrect. Accordingly, there is no basis for any misrepresentation claim.

ii. <u>The HOA has no obligation to disclose a prior payment of the</u> <u>superpriority lien</u>

Plaintiff's misrepresentation claim³ is based on an alleged failure to disclose the former owner's partial payment prior to the nonjudicial foreclosure sale. (Compl. ¶ 43.) However, there is no such duty or obligation, and thus no misrepresentation. In *Noonan v. Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC*, 438 P.3d 335 (Nev. 2019) (unpublished), the Foreclosure Purchaser argued that the foreclosure agent had a duty to disclose a preforeclosure tender. The Nevada Supreme Court found no such duty exists, stating:

Summary judgment was appropriate on the negligent misrepresentation claim because Hampton neither made an affirmative false statement nor omitted a material fact it was bound to disclose. See Halcrow, Inc. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 129 Nev. 394, 400, 302 P.3d 1148, 1153 (2013) (providing the elements for a negligent misrepresentation claim); *Nelson v. Heer*, 123 Nev. 217, 225, 163 P.3d 420, 426 (2007) ("[T]he suppression or omission of a material fact which a party is bound in good faith to disclose is equivalent to a false representation." (internal quotation marks omitted)). *Compare* NRS 116.31162(1)(b)(3)(II) (2017) (requiring an HOA to disclose if tender of the superpriority portion of the lien has been made), with NRS 116.31162 (2013) (not requiring any such disclosure).

³ Also characterized as negligent claims. (Compl. ¶ 50.) However, because there is no duty to disclose the payment, whether sounding in negligence or misrepresentation, the claim fails.

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Noonan v. Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC, 438 P.3d 335 (Nev. 2019) (emphasis added). 1 2 Therefore, according to the Noonan case, there was no duty to disclose a 3 preforeclosure payment until NRS 116 was amended in 2017 to require such a 4 disclosure. The Nevada Supreme Court continues to rule accordingly, albeit in unpublished cases: (1) Saticoy Bay v. Genevieve Court Homeowners Ass'n, No. 80135, 5 6 2020 Nev. Unpub. LEXIS 1000, at *1 (Oct. 16, 2020) (no duty to disclose); Saticoy Bay 7 v. Silverstone Ranch Cmty. Ass'n, No. 80039, 2020 Nev. Unpub. LEXIS 993, at *1 (Oct. 8 16, 2020) (no duty to disclose, and NRS 113 does not apply to create such a 9 disclosure).

10 At the time of this nonjudicial foreclosure sale, there was no duty to disclose a 11 payment. As stated in SFR and its progeny, the Nevada Supreme Court still finds the 12 HOA's duties are to comply with NRS 116. After the HOA's foreclosure sale on May 11, 13 2012, the Legislature substantially revised NRS 116. See 2015 Nev. Stat., Ch. 266. 14 However, the version that applies in this case is the version that was in effect at the time 15 of the events giving rise to this action. See generally Sandpointe Apts. v. Eighth Jud. 16 Dist. Ct., 313 P.3d 849, 853 (Nev. 2013) ("Substantive statutes are presumed to only 17 operate prospectively, unless it is clear that the drafters intended the statute to be 18 applied retroactively."); see also Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 114 S. Ct. 1483, 1487, 19 511 U.S. 244, 245 (U.S. Tex. 1994) ("The presumption against statutory retroactivity is 20 founded upon elementary considerations of fairness dictating that individuals should 21 have an opportunity to know what the law is and to conform their conduct accordingly."). 22 Unlike the current version of NRS 116, the version of NRS 116 at the time of the sale in 23 2012 contained no disclosure requirements.

Because there was no disclosure duty in NRS 116 on the date of this nonjudicial foreclosure, May 11, 2012, the claim fails, whether or not it is based on an intentional or a negligent misrepresentation. The Court should dismiss this claim with prejudice, or grant summary judgment in favor of the HOA.

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iii. The foreclosure deed cannot create liability against the HOA

The Court may also dismiss the Complaint with prejudice, grant summary 3 judgment in favor of the HOA because the HOA cannot be held liable for the character 4 of title to the Property because the only deed permitted by NRS 116 is a deed without warranty. NRS 116.31164(3) states: "After the sale, the person conducting the sale 5 6 shall: (a) Make, execute and, after payment is made, deliver to the purchaser, or 7 his or her successor or assign, a deed without warranty which conveys to the grantee 8 all title of the unit's owner to the unit" (emphasis added). The non-warranty deed vests 9 title "without equity or right of redemption." NRS 116.31166(3).

10 A non-warranty deed is the same as a quitclaim deed, which: "is sufficient to 11 convey whatever interest the grantor had in the property at the time the conveyance 12 was made," Brophy Min. Co. v. Brophy & Dale Gold & Silver Min. Co., 15 Nev. 101, 107 13 (1880). A quitclaim deed "neither warrants nor professes that the title is valid." Black's 14 Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). For more than 100 years, a non-warranty deed has 15 protected a grantor from liability from deed warranties because the deed conveys only 16 that which the grantor holds and promises nothing more. See Oliver v. Piatt, 44 U.S. 17 333, 11 L. Ed. 622 (1845) ("A purchaser by a deed of guitclaim without any covenant of 18 warranty, is not entitled to protection in a court of equity as a purchaser for a valuable 19 consideration, without notice; and he takes only what the vendor could lawfully 20 convey.") See also, e.g., Platner v. Vincent, 194 Cal. 436, 444, 229 P. 24, 27 (1924) 21 ('Appellant [w]ould have [been] protected [] from liability as a cograntor by executing a 22 quitclaim deed [because s]uch deeds do not carry covenants of warranty.") See also, 23 Greek Catholic Congregation of Borough of Olyphant v. Plummer, 347 Pa. 351, 353–54, 24 32 A.2d 299, 300 (1943) ("One quit-claiming his interest in a property is creating no 25 liability against himself and the real owner of that property: See Power v. Foley, 26 Newfoundland Reports, 1897-1903, p. 540; England v. Cowley, L. R. 8 Ex. 126; and 27 Owen v. Legh, 3 B. & Ald. 470."). See also, Lowe v. Ragland, 156 Tex. 504, 516, 297 28 S.W.2d 668, 675–76 (1957) ("All of the title which the grantor owned or had the power

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to convey passes under the conveyance, but there is no liability on the warranty for any
 impairment of title resulting from the prior conveyance.")

3 Under NRS 116, the HOA cannot provide a nonjudicial foreclosure deed with any 4 deed warranties because NRS 116 expressly requires that the type of deed conferred is 5 a "deed without warranty." The Nevada Supreme Court has concluded that the HOA 6 has "little autonomy in taking extra-statutory efforts" under the "elaborate" requirements 7 of NRS 116. Nationstar Mortg., LLC v. Saticoy Bay LLC Series 2227 Shadow Canyon, 8 405 P.3d 641, 645 (Nev. 2017), reh'g denied (Dec. 13, 2017), reconsideration en banc 9 denied (Feb. 23, 2018). In the Prior Litigation, there was no defect in the underlying 10 non-judicial foreclosure sale. As the Nevada Supreme Court has said:

The language in the Notice of Sale clearly and accurately explained that the winning bidder <u>would receive a deed without warranty</u>, see NRS 116.31164(3)(a) (2005) (requiring the person conducting the foreclosure sale to deliver to the purchaser a deed without warranty), and <u>it [a deed without warranty] cannot reasonably be construed as</u> suggesting that a first deed of trust would survive the foreclosure sale.

First Mortg. Corp. v. Saticoy Bay LLC Series 1828 La Calera, 432 P.3d 189 (Nev. 2018) (table) (emphasis added). In other words, the HOA grants without any warranty, whatever interest it holds, nothing more and nothing less. The deed does not include a representation that the HOA will defend the grantee's (Plaintiff's) title and does not include a right to sue the grantor (the HOA or trustee) under a theory that the deed included warranties or representations which cannot exist as a matter of law. The claim fails.

Similarly, in *A Oro, LLC v. Ditech Financial LLC*, 2019 WL 913129, 434 P.3d 929 (Nev. 2019) (unpublished disposition), the Nevada Supreme Court concluded that the district court correctly granted summary judgment to the HOA on the appellant foreclosure purchaser's fraudulent nondisclosure claim. In *A Oro*, the foreclosure purchaser challenged the district court's entry of summary judgment in favor of the lender on the tender issues. *Id.* The foreclosure purchaser had also asserted claims against the association based upon fraudulent non-disclosure of the lender's tender.

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1 However, the district court awarded summary judgment in favor of the association on 2 the foreclosure purchaser's claim. Id. In upholding the district court decision, the 3 Supreme Court determined (among other reasons) that there was no evidence that the 4 association intended to induce appellant into placing the winning bid at the foreclosure 5 sale, as the association was unaware of appellant's assumptions regarding the legal 6 effect of the sale. See id., citing Nelson v. Heer, 123 Nev. 217, 225, 163 P.3d 420, 426 7 (2007) (setting forth the elements of a fraudulent nondisclosure claim). As an additional 8 reason why the claim had no merit, the Nevada Supreme Court noted, "that appellant 9 has provided no legal support for the **unorthodox proposition** that the winning bidder 10 at a foreclosure sale can bring a fraud claim against the auctioneer [or the HOA] when 11 the auctioneer's foreclosure notices have disclaimed any warranties as to the title 12 being conveyed." Id. at n.2 (emphasis added).

Here too, the Court should reject Plaintiff's unorthodox and unsubstantiated proposition that it is entitled to bring misrepresentation claims against the HOA where the Foreclosure Deed expressly disclaimed any warranties as to the quality of title being conveyed.

B. BREACH OF DUTY OF GOOD FAITH FAILS AS A MATTER OF LAW

18 Plaintiff alleges that the HOA breached its duty of good faith under NRS 19 116.1113 by failing to disclose the prior owner's payment. Compl. ¶ 77. This allegation is without merit. While NRS 116.1113 imposes a duty of good faith in the performance 20 21 of every contract or duty governed by the statute, the only "duties" owed are 22 outlined in sections 116.3116 through 116.31168. Here, the HOA fully complied with 23 these duties by complying with all notice and recording requirements set forth in NRS 24 116 as it existed at the time of the sale. As established by the Prior Litigation, the nonjudicial foreclosure sale was valid, meaning there was no defect in the underlying 25 26 sale. See generally, Exhibit A.

Additionally, nothing in NRS 116.1113, in effect at the time of the nonjudicial foreclosure sale imposed a duty to disclose a payment. *See* Section A, *supra*.

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Compare, NRS 116.31162(1)(b)(3)(11) (2017) (requiring an HOA to disclose if tender of
 the superpriority portion of the lien) with NRS 116.31162 (2005) (no disclosure
 requirement).⁴

The HOA was not required to disclose the existence of a pre-sale payment. Further, it was specifically prohibited from giving any purchaser at the auction a socalled warranty deed—the only type of deed it could give to any purchaser was one made "without warranty" pursuant to NRS 116.31164(3)(a). Accordingly, Plaintiff's claim for breach of good faith based on a nonexistent duty which did not exist in NRS 116 fails as a matter of law. The Court should dismiss the claim, with prejudice, or grant summary judgment in favor of the HOA.

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C. <u>PLAINTIFF'S CONSPIRACY CLAIM FAILS AS A MATTER OF LAW</u>

A nonjudicial foreclosure, and the procedures therein, are expressly authorized by statute, and are not unlawful. Accordingly, Plaintiff's conspiracy claim fails as a matter of law because there was no unlawful objective by the HOA in its attempt to collect past due assessments from the prior homeowner, through a publicly noticed and conducted auction.

To establish a claim for civil conspiracy, a plaintiff must show (1) defendants, by acting in concert, intended to accomplish an unlawful objective for the purpose of harming plaintiff; and (2) plaintiff sustained damages resulting from defendants' act or acts. *See Consol. Generator-Nevada, Inc. v. Cummins Engine Co.*, 114 Nev. 1304, 971 P.2d 1251 (1999); *see also Dow Chemical Co. v. Mahlum*, 114 Nev. 1468, 970 P.2d 98 (1998). Plaintiff cannot meet this evidentiary burden. Even in the context of a nonjudicial foreclosure, a conspiracy claim requires unlawful conduct.⁵

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⁵ See for additional persuasive authority: Mann St. v. Elsinore Homeowners Ass'n, 466 P.3d 540 (Nev. 2020) (where breach of contract and breach of duty of good faith fail, "civil conspiracy claim necessarily fails. See Consol. Generator-Neu., Inc. v. Cummins Engine Co., 114 Nev. 1304, 1311, 971 P.2d 1251,

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⁴ See the following decisions, cited only for their persuasive authority: *Cypress v. Foothills at Macdonald Ranch Master Ass'n*, No. 78849, 2020 Nev. Unpub. LEXIS 999, at *2 (Oct. 16, 2020) (no duty to disclose tender of payment); *Tangiers Drive Tr. v. Foothills at Macdonald Ranch Master Ass'n*, No. 78564, 2020 Nev. Unpub. LEXIS 996, at *3 (Oct. 16, 2020) (same); *Ln Mgmt. Llc Series 4980 Droubay v. Squire Silver Springs Cmty. Ass'n*, No. 79035, 2020 Nev. Unpub. LEXIS 1009, at *2 (Oct. 16, 2020) (same).

Plaintiff's conclusory allegations are insufficient to show that the HOA intended to 1 2 accomplish an unlawful objective for the purpose of harming plaintiff. See Romero v. 3 State, No. 52420, 2009 Nev. Unpub. LEXIS 1, at *2 (July 29, 2009) (affirming dismissal 4 of "naked" and "conclusory" claims). The nonjudicial foreclosure sale was a public 5 auction where anyone present could have bid (including the HOA). Additionally, the 6 winning bidder would obtain a nonwarranty deed, which makes no promises (or 7 representations or effects anything unlawful) regarding the quality of title of the Property 8 passed through the sale. Additionally, during the Prior Litigation, there was no finding 9 which could show the HOA intended to harm Plaintiff by merely complying with the 10 requirements of NRS 116 to perform a valid nonjudicial foreclosure sale. See Exhibit A, 11 (District Court Order holding the nonjudicial foreclosure sale validly conveyed title of the 12 Property to the Plaintiff). See also Exhibit B, Nevada Supreme Court order of affirmance 13 of the District Court Order. The HOA's nonjudicial foreclosure sale complied with NRS 14 116 and did what NRS 116 permitted, it conveyed property to the highest bidder through 15 the nonwarranty foreclosure deed. A valid nonjudicial foreclosure sale is not an 16 unlawful act which satisfies the required elements of a conspiracy claim.

17 Finally, there can be no conspiracy under the preclusive weight of the intra-18 corporate conspiracy doctrine, which stands for the proposition that "agents and 19 employees of a corporation cannot conspire with their corporate principal or employer 20 where they act in their official capacities on behalf of the corporation and not as 21 individuals for their individual advantage." See Collins v. Union Federal Sav. & Loan 22 Ass'n, 662 P.2d 610, 622, 99 Nev. 284, 303 (Nev., 1983). Therefore, to sustain a claim 23 for conspiracy against agents and their corporation, a plaintiff must show that one or 24 more of the agents acted outside of the scope of their employment "to render them a

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1256 (1998) (providing that a civil conspiracy requires, among other things, a concerted action, intend[ed] to accomplish an unlawful objective for the purpose of harming another") (internal quotes omitted); see also, Bay v. Travata & Montage at Summerlin Ctr. Homeowners' Ass'n, No. 80162, 2020 Nev. Unpub. LEXIS 994, at *2-3 (Oct. 16, 2020) (affirming dismissal of conspiracy, in absence of unlawful conduct).

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separate person for the purposes of conspiracy." *See Faulkner v. Arkansas Children's Hosp.*, 69 S.W.3d 393, 407, 347 Ark. 941, 962 (Ark.,2002).

3 Plaintiff has not plead facts sufficient to meet this standard. The Complaint lacks 4 any specific allegations that the HOA acted outside of its scope as stated in NRS 116. 5 Even if the Complaint was properly plead with specificity, it would be disingenuous and 6 inconsistent with the District Court's Order from the Prior Litigation. The logical outcome 7 of pleading a nonjudicial foreclosure defect (conspiracy) would necessarily result in 8 finding the nonjudicial foreclosure sale void or setting it aside, with Plaintiff losing the 9 Property—probably not what the Plaintiff wants to happen. The Prior Litigation and the 10 Nevada Supreme Court has already ruled a valid foreclosure took place. Based upon 11 the foregoing reasons, the conspiracy claim must be dismissed with prejudice, or 12 alternatively, summary judgment should be entered in the HOA's favor.

D. <u>NRS 113 DOES APPLY AND DOES NOT CREATE A DUTY FOR AN HOA TO</u> <u>DISCLOSE A PREFORECLOSURE PAYMENT</u>

15 The Court should dismiss the violation of NRS 113 claim because NRS 113 does 16 not apply to a nonjudicial foreclosure under NRS 116, nor does NRS 113 require 17 disclosure of preforeclosure payments. See Saticoy Bay v. Silverstone Ranch Cmty. 18 Ass'n, No. 80039, 2020 Nev. Unpub. LEXIS 993, at *2 (Oct. 16, 2020) (NRS 113 19 requires disclosure of "defects" not "superpriority tenders"). In As noted ad nauseam 20 above, an HOA's duty in a nonjudicial foreclosure sale is to comply with NRS 116. NRS 21 116 does not incorporate or reference NRS 113, nor does NRS 113 incorporate or 22 reference NRS 116. Injecting the requirements of NRS 113 makes no sense in a 23 nonjudicial foreclosure sale context.

Other district courts agree, and though not mandatory authority, decisions in thisdistrict have concluded:

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[NRS] § 113 [is] inapplicable here as NRS § 116 provides different procedures and rights in HOA foreclosure sales. Specifically, for example, NRS § 116 does not require an SRPD, or recording of a subordination of a lien. *See, SFR Invs. Pool 1. LLC*, 427 P.3d 113. For this same reason, the NRED handbook is inapplicable because it specifically discusses the SPRD under NRS § 113, not NRS § 116.

Moreover, pursuant to NRS § 113.1100 (s), a seller is a person who sells or intends to sell any residential property. Pursuant to NRS § 116, the HOA was a foreclosing association and not a seller as defined under NRS § 113.130. NRS § 116 precludes the requirement of NRS § 113 for a SRPD as the foreclosure auction process does not follow the sale process referenced in NRS § 113 and the Investors claim for violation of NRS § 113 must be dismissed.

Saticoy Bay LLC Series 9076 Quarrystone v. Md. Pebble at Silverado Homeowners
Ass'n, 2019 Nev. Dist. LEXIS 1009, *4 (Eighth Judicial District, Sept. 23, 2019). See
also Hitchen v. S. Valley Ranch Cmty. Ass'n, 2020 Nev. Dist. LEXIS 277, *15 (same).

Additionally, even if NRS 113 applies, (which it does not) the claim is time-barred because NRS 113 sets forth a one or two year statute of limitation. See NRS 113.150(4): "[a]n action to enforce the provisions of this subsection must be commenced not later than 1 year after the purchaser discovers or reasonably should have discovered the defect or 2 years after the conveyance of the property to the purchaser, whichever occurs later."

In this case, based on the date of the conveyance, the nonjudicial foreclosure
occurred on May 11, 2012 (Compl. ¶ 2). Thus, Plaintiff had two years, or until May 11,
2014 to bring a claim. The Complaint was filed on August 20, 2020, more than eight
years past the conveyance and more than six years past the expiration of the statute of
limitation.

Alternatively, based on the discovery of the alleged defect (which is not a defect),
Plaintiff alleges the disclosure of the alleged defect (a payment) occurred on August 24,
2017 (Compl. ¶ 41). Accordingly, the statute of limitation expired one year after the
disclosure, on August 24, 2018. The complaint was filed on August 20, 2020, nearly
two years too late.

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The claim fails substantively or procedurally. Thus, the Court may dismiss the complaint with prejudice, or grant summary judgment in favor of the HOA.

V. <u>CONCLUSION</u>

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Based on the foregoing, the Court should dismiss the complaint, with prejudice,
or alternatively, the Court may grant summary judgment in favor of the HOA because
none of the allegations state claims upon which relief can be granted. The Plaintiff has
already established the character of the title it obtained through the District Court's
Order in the Prior Litigation. The claims fail and there is no genuine factual issue.

Dated this <u>10th</u> day of November, 2020.

LIPSON NEILSON P.C.

/s/Peter E. Dunkley

By:

KALEB D. ANDERSON, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 7582 PETER E. DUNKLEY, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 11110 9900 Covington Cross Drive, Suite 120 Las Vegas, Nevada 89144

Attorneys for Defendant, Harbor Cove Homeowners Association

Page 17 of 18

LIPSON NEILSON P.C. 9900 Covington Cross Drive, Suite 120 Las Vegas, Nevada 89144 (702) 382-1500 FAX: (702) 382-1512

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


EXHIBIT A

EXHIBIT A

AKERMAN LLP 1635 VILLAGE CENTER CIRCLE, SUITE 200 1635 VILLAGE CENTER CIRCLE, SUITE 200 LAS VEGAS, NEVADA 89134 TEL.: (702) 634-5000 - FAX: (702) 380-8572 1 [1 [1 [1] 1] 1] 1] 1] 1] 1]	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28		Electronically Filed 7/12/2018 10:34 AM Steven D. Grierson C. L. W. Steven D. Grierson C. L. W. Steven D. Grierson C. L. W. Steven D. Grierson C. Steven D. Steven D
		45755441;1 Case Number: A-13-	1 -683467-C

TO ALL PARTIES AND TO THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD: 1 PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that an ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT/ 2 NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE COUNTERCLAIMANT LLC'S **MOTION** FOR 3 SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DENYING PLAINTIFF/COUNTER-DEFENDANT 4 RIVER GLIDER AVENUE TRUST'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT has been 5 entered by this Court on the 11th day of July, 2018, in the above-captioned matter. A copy of 6 said Order is attached hereto as Exhibit A. 7 Dated this 12th day of July, 2018 8 **AKERMAN LLP** 9 /s/ Donna M. Wittig 10 MELANIE D. MORGAN, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 8386 1635 VILLAGE CENTER CIRCLE, SUITE 200 LAS VEGAS, NEVADA 89134 TEL.: (702) 634-5000 – FAX: (702) 380-8572 11 DONNA M. WITTIG, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 11015 12 1635 Village Center Circle, Suite 200 Las Vegas, Nevada 89134 13 Attorneys for defendant/counterclaimant, 14 Nationstar Mortgage, LLC 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 2 45755441;1


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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 13 14 10 10 11 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 13 14 12 12 13 13 14 15 16 17 16 17 16 17 16 17 16 17 16 17 17 16 17 16 17 17 16 17 17 16 17 16 17 17 16 17 17 16 17 17 16 17 17 16 17 17 16 17 17 16 17 17 16 17 17 16 17 17 16 17 17 18 19 20 21 17 16 17 17 16 17 17 18 19 20 21 17 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 26 27 20 27 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 20 27 20 27 20 27 20 27 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 20 27 20 27 20 27 20 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 20 27 20 27 20 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 20 27 20 27 20 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 20 20 21 25 26 27 20 27 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20	CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I HEREBY CERTIFY that I am an employee of AKERMAN LLP, and that on this 12 th day of July, 2018, I caused to be served a true and correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF ENTRY OF ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT/COUNTERCLAIMANT NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE LLC'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DEFENDANT RIVER GLIDER AVENUE TRUST'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, in the following manner: (ELECTRONIC SERVICE) Pursuant to Administrative Order 14-2, the above- referenced document was electronically filed on the date hereof and served through the Notice of Electronic Filing automatically generated by the Court's facilities to those parties listed on the Court's Master Service List as follows: LIPSON, NELSON, COLE, SELTZER & GARIN, P.C. Mathe Anderson Maring/@glipsonneilson.com Julie Funai Julie Funai Jipsonneilson.com NEVADA ASSOCIATION SERVICES, INC. Chris@gas-inc.com Susan F. Moses Susan F. Moses Susan B. Moses susan'inc.com Susan F. Moses
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	3 45755441;1 AA079

EXHIBIT A

EXHIBIT A

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1635 VILLAGE CENTER CIRCLE, SUITE 200 LAS VEGAS, NEVADA 89134 TEL.: (702) 634-5000 – FAX: (702) 380-8572

AKERMAN LLP

Defendant/counterclaimant, Nationstar Mortgage LLC (Nationstar)'s motion for summary judgment (Nationstar's motion) regarding tender and statutorily defective foreclosure sale, plaintiff/counter-defendant River Glider Avenue Trust (plaintiff)'s motions for summary judgment (plaintiff's motion) and defendant/counter-defendant Harbor Cove Homeowners Association (Harbor Cove)'s limited joinder to plaintiff's motion for summary judgment came before the Court on December 7, 2017 at 9:00 a.m. Rock Jung, Esq. appeared on behalf of Nationstar and Adam R. Trippiedi appeared on behalf of plaintiff. The Court ordered the parties to submit supplemental briefing and continued the hearing to February 8, 2018. Specifically, plaintiff's supplemental brief was due January 15, 2018 and Nationstar's reply brief was due January 29, 2018.

The motions and supplemental briefing came on for hearing before the Court on February 8, 2018 at 9:00 a.m. Donna M. Wittig appeared on behalf of Nationstar; Michael F. Bohn appeared on behalf of plaintiff; and Karen Kao appeared on behalf of Harbor Cove. The Court continued the hearing to April 12, 2018 pending the Supreme Court's determination whether they will grant the motion for reconsideration in *Saticoy Bay LLC Series 2141 Golden Hill v. JP Morgan Chase Bank*, No. 71246, 408P.3d 558 (Nev. Dec. 22, 2017) (unpublished) and if no decision rendered prior to the continued hearing, the Court would provide a decision at the April 12, 2018 hearing.

The motions again came on for hearing on April 12, 2018. Natalie L. Winslow, Esq. appeared on behalf of Nationstar; Michael F. Bohn, Esq. appeared on behalf of plaintiff and Julie Funai, Esq. appeared on behalf of Harbor Cove. The Court, having reviewed Nationstar and plaintiff's motions, joinder, the oppositions, replies, supplemental briefing, the exhibits, all papers and pleadings, and oral argument of counsel, and for good cause appearing, makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law.

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		1	FINDINGS OF FACT
		2	1. On or about April 19, 2005, Miller purchased the Property.
		3	2. The Deed of Trust executed by Miller identified Cameron Financial Group, Inc.
		4	DBA 1 st Choice Mortgage as the Lender, Fidelity National Title as the Trustee and secured a
		5	loan in the amount of \$631,000.00 (hereinafter the "Miller Loan").
		6	3. On April 19, 2012, a Corporate Assignment of Deed of Trust was recorded
		7	which assigned all beneficial interest under the Deed of Trust to Aurora Bank FSB.
		8	4. On August 31, 2012, an Assignment of Deed of Trust was recorded by which
		9	Aurora Bank FSB assigned all its beneficial interest under the Deed of Trust to Nationstar.
		10	5. Mr. Miller defaulted on his obligation to pay HOA assessments beginning in
	SUITE 200 134) 380-8572	11	December 2008.
	E, SUITE 20 89134 12) 380-8572	12	6. On July 26, 2010, a Notice of Delinquent Assessment Lien was recorded against
AKERMAN LLP	CIRCL /ADA 8 AX: (70	13	the Property by NAS, with a lien amount of \$1,032.01.
RMAJ	NTER .S, NEV 000 – F,	14	7. In 2009 and 2010, the HOA assessments were \$70.00 per month.
AKEI	.GE CE : VEGA : 034-5(15	8. On September 3, 2010, a Notice of Default and Election to Sell under
	VILLAGE LAS VE : (702) 634	16	Homeowners Association Lien was recorded against the Property by HOA Trustee on behalf of
	1635 TEL	17	HOA, with a lien amount of \$2,110.87.
		18	9. On March 31, 2011, a Notice of Foreclosure Sale was recorded against the
		19	Property by HOA the Trustee, with a lien amount of \$3,451.55.
		20	10. In April 2011, Mr. Miller offered a settlement of his HOA assessments of
		21	\$1,232.88, which was \$69.43 less than what Mr. Miller owed. Harbor Cove accepted Mr.
		22	Miller's settlement offer, waiving the balance of \$69.43. Mr. Miller made the required
		23	payment by check dated May 27, 2011. Of Mr. Miller's payment, Harbor Cove credited
		24	\$500.00 to his assessment account on June 11, 2011, and credited two \$200.00 payments (total
		25	\$400.00) to his assessment account on August 30, 2011.
		26	11. Mr. Miller continued to accrue assessments, and he never satisfied NAS's fees
		27	and costs in full.
		28	12. Harbor Cove, through NAS, proceeded to foreclose.
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13. On April 16, 2012, a second Notice of Foreclosure Sale was recorded against the Property by HOA Trustee, with a lien amount of \$3,346.53.

3 14. A non-judicial foreclosure sale occurred on May 11, 2012 (hereinafter the 4 "HOA Sale").

15. River Glider Avenue Trust purchased the Property for \$5,500.00.

6 16. If any of these findings of fact are more properly considered conclusions of law, 7 they should be so construed.

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AKERMAN LLP

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1. Summary judgment is proper when there is no issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Nev. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Wood v. Safeway, Inc., 121 P.3d 1026, 1030 (Nev. 2005). After the movant has carried its burden to identify issues where there is no genuine issue of material fact, the non-moving party must "set forth specific facts demonstrating the existence of a genuine issue for trial or have summary judgment entered against him." Wood, 121 Nev. at 732. Summary judgment is particularly appropriate where issues of law are controlling and dispositive of the case. American Fence, Inc. v. Wham, 95 Nev. 788, 792, 603 P.2d 274, 277 (1979).

2. 17 The super-priority portion of the HOA's lien is equal to the amount of 18 assessments that "would have become due in the absence of acceleration during the nine months immediately preceding institution of an action to enforce the lien" 19 See NRS 116.3116(2). A party has instituted "an action to enforce the lien" for purposes of NRS 20 116.3116(6) when it provides the notice of delinquent assessment. Saticoy Bay LLC Series 21 2021 Gray Eagle Way 338 P.3d at 231. Here, the HOA provided its notice of delinquent 22 23 assessment on July 26, 2010.

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3. The superpriority, as calculated from the nine months preceding the recording 25 of the notice of delinquent assessment lien, was \$630.00 (\$70.00 x 9 months).

4. 26 The HOA's super-priority lien was extinguished by the homeowner's satisfaction of the super-priority. Saticoy Bay LLC Series 2141 Golden Hill v. JP Morgan 27 Chase Bank, No. 71246, 408P.3d 558 (Nev. Dec. 22, 2017) (unpublished). Payments made by 28

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the homeowner are held to have been applied first to the super-priority portion of the HOA's 1 2 lien as a matter of law. 5. The homeowner's satisfaction of the super-priority portion of the HOA's lien 3 preserved Nationstar's deed of trust. 4 5 6. River Glider Avenue Trust purchased the property subject to Nationstar's deed of trust. 6 7 7. Because the homeowner's super-priority satisfaction is dispositive of the case, 8 the court does not address the remaining issues. 9 8. If any of these conclusions of law are more properly considered findings of fact, 10 they should be so construed. **ORDER** 11 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that Nationstar's 12 Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED, and plaintiff River Glider Avenue Trust's 13 Motion for Summary Judgment is **DENIED**; 14 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that Harbor Cove's 15 limited joinder in plaintiff River Glider Avenue Trust's Motion for Summary Judgment is 16 **DENIED;** 17 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the super-18 priority portion of the HOA's lien, recorded on or about July 26, 2010, was discharged and 19 extinguished prior to the HOA foreclosure sale; 20 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that River Glider 21 Avenue Trust purchased an interest in the Property, commonly known as 8112 Lake Hill 22 Drive, Las Vegas, Nevada 89128, APN Number 138-16-213-034, subject to the deed of trust 23 recorded on February 14, 2006 as Document Number 20070327-0004833; 24 . . . 25 . . . 26 27 28 5

1635 VILLAGE CENTER CIRCLE, SUITE 200 LAS VEGAS, NEVADA 89134 TEL.: (702) 634-5000 – FAX: (702) 380-8572

AKERMAN LLP

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that all remaining 1 claims not specifically mentioned, including all remaining claims in the complaint and 2 counterclaims, are dismissed with prejudice. 3 2018 Dated: 4 5 RTJUDGE 6 Submitted by: 7 AKERMAN LLP 8 MELANIE D. MORGAN, ESQ. 9 Nevada Bar No. 8386 DONNA M. WITTIG, ESQ. 10 Nevada Bar No. 11015 1635 VILLAGE CENTER CIRCLE, SUITE 200 LAS VEGAS, NEVADA 89134 TEL.: (702) 634-5000 – FAX: (702) 380-8572 1635 Village Center Circle, Suite 200 11 Las Vegas, Nevada 89134 12 defendant/counterclaimant, Attorneys for Nationstar Mortgage, LLC 13 Approved as to form and content by: 14 Dated: May 30, 2018 Dated: April __, 2018 15 16 LAW OFFICES OF MICHAEL F. BOHN, LIPSON, NEILSON, COLE, SELTZER & GARIN, Esq., LTD P.C. 17 18 refused to sign MICHAEL F. BOHN, ESQ. KALEB D. ANDERSON, ESQ. 19 Nevada Bar No. 1641 Nevada Bar No. 7582 ADAM R. TRIPPIEDI, ESQ. JULIE A. FUNAI, ESQ. 20 Nevada Bar No. 8752 Nevada Bar No. 12294 2260 Corporate Circle, Suite 480 9900 Covington Cross Dr., Suite 120 21 Henderson, NV 89074 Las Vegas, NV 89144 22 Attorneys for plaintiff/counter-defendant defendant/counter-defendant Attorneys for River Glider Avenue Trust Harbor Cove Homeowners Association 23 24 25 26 27 28 6 44910670;2


AKERMAN LLP

EXHIBIT B

EXHIBIT B

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

RIVER GLIDER AVENUE TRUST, Appellant, vs. NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE, LLC, Respondent.



ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE

This is an appeal from a district court summary judgment in an action to quiet title. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; Timothy C. Williams, Judge. Reviewing the summary judgment de novo, *Wood v. Safeway, Inc.*, 121 Nev. 724, 729, 121 P.3d 1026, 1029 (2005), we affirm.¹

After the HOA foreclosure agent issued a notice of delinquent assessments, the homeowner entered into settlement agreements with both the HOA and the HOA's foreclosure agent. The homeowner paid the HOA the agreed-upon amount in order to settle the money owed to it for delinquent assessments and any late fees, and entered into a payment plan with the foreclosure agent to settle the amounts owed for the foreclosure agent's fees and costs. The district court concluded that the homeowner's payment to the HOA cured the superpriority default, such that the purchaser at the later foreclosure sale took title to the property subject to respondent's first deed of trust.

We recently held in 9352 Cranesbill Trust v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 136 Nev., Adv. Op. 8, 459 P.3d 227, 232 (2020), that payments made

¹Pursuant to NRAP 34(f)(1), we have determined that oral argument is not warranted in this appeal.

SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA

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by a homeowner could cure the default on the superpriority portion of an HOA lien such that the HOA's foreclosure sale would not extinguish the first deed of trust on the subject property. Whether a homeowner's payments actually cure a superpriority default, however, depends upon the actions and intent of the homeowner and the HOA and, if those cannot be determined, upon the district court's assessment of justice and equity. See *id.* at 231 (explaining that "[i]f neither the debtor nor the creditor makes a specific application of the payment, then it falls to the [district] court to determine how to apply the payment").

In this case, the district court correctly determined that the homeowner's payments could cure the default on the superpriority portion of the HOA's lien. The district court also correctly determined, based on the evidence before it, that the HOA and the homeowner intended for the homeowner's payment to cure the delinquent assessments incurred before the notice of delinquent assessments. Indeed, the emails between the homeowner, foreclosure agent, and HOA, and the foreclosure agent's testimony, leaves no doubt that the HOA and the homeowner intended for the homeowner's payment to cure the amounts in the notice of delinquent assessment,² which would include the nine months of assessments comprising the superpriority default amount. *See* NRS 116.3116(2) (2012) (describing the superpriority component of an HOA's lien as "the

SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA

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²Because the HOA and the homeowner's settlement was premised on the agreement that the homeowner's payment would cure the delinquent assessments comprising the amount in the notice of delinquent assessments, we are not concerned with how the HOA or foreclosure agent actually applied the homeowner's payment to the amounts owed. See 9352 Cranesbill, 459 P.3d at 231 (recognizing that a debtor may direct how his payment is applied to various debts).

assessments for common expenses...which would have become due...during the 9 months immediately preceding institution of an action to enforce the lien"); Saticoy Bay LLC Series 2021 Gray Eagle Way v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (Gray Eagle), 133 Nev. 21, 25-26, 388 P.3d 226, 231 (2017) (recognizing that, under the pre-2015 version of NRS 116.3116, serving a notice of delinquent assessments constitutes institution of an action to enforce the lien). And, because the homeowner's payment cured the superpriority default, the district court correctly determined that any purchaser at a later foreclosure sale would purchase the property subject to the first deed of trust on the property. See 9352 Cranesbill, 459 P.3d at 229.

Although appellant correctly points out that there were new unpaid monthly assessments at the time of the sale, these unpaid monthly assessments could not have comprised a new superpriority lien absent a new notice of delinquent assessment. See NRS 116.3116(2) (2012) (limiting the monthly assessments subject to superpriority status as those incurred "during the 9 months immediately preceding institution of an action to enforce the lien"); Gray Eagle, 133 Nev. at 25-26, 388 P.3d at 231 (holding that serving the notice of delinquent assessments institutes proceedings to enforce the HOA's lien); cf. Prop. Plus Invs., LLC v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 133 Nev. 462, 466-67, 401 P.3d 728, 731-32 (2017) (observing that an HOA must restart the foreclosure process in order to enforce a second superpriority lien). And foreclosure fees and costs are never part of an HOA's superpriority lien. See NRS 116.3116(2) (2009); Horizons at Seven Hills Homeowners Ass'n v. Ikon Holdings, LLC, 132 Nev. 362, 373, 373 P.3d 66, 73 (2016) (holding that a superpriority lien "does not include an additional amount for the collection fees and foreclosure costs" incurred preceding a foreclosure sale). We also need not address appellant's

SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA purported bona-fide-purchaser status when, as here, the superpriority default is cured before the foreclosure sale.³ See Bank of Am., N.A. v. SFR Invs. Pool 1, LLC, 134 Nev. 604, 612, 427 P.3d 113, 121 (2018) (providing that a party's status as a bona fide purchaser is irrelevant when the superpriority default is cured before the foreclosure sale).

Based on the foregoing, we

ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.

Gibbons

J.

Stiglich Silver J.

Silver

Hon. Timothy C. Williams, District Judge cc: Janet Trost, Settlement Judge Law Offices of Michael F. Bohn, Ltd. Akerman LLP/Las Vegas **Eighth District Court Clerk**

³We also decline to address appellant's arguments that equitable considerations did not warrant ruling in respondent's favor when the district court's decision was not based in equity.

ME COURT OF NEVADA (O) 1947A

EXHIBIT C

EXHIBIT C

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

ORDER DENYING REHEARING

RIVER GLIDER AVENUE TRUST, Appellant, VS. NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE, LLC, Respondent.

No. 76683

FILED

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It is so ORDERED.

Rehearing denied. NRAP 40(c).

J. Gibbons

Stiglich J.

J.

Silver

Hon. Timothy C. Williams, District Judge cc: Law Offices of Michael F. Bohn, Ltd. Akerman LLP/Las Vegas Eighth District Court Clerk

SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA (O) 1947A

1	JOIN	Electronically Filed 11/10/2020 4:15 PM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT
1 2	BRANDON E. WOOD Nevada State Bar Number 12900	
2	NEVADA ASSOCIATION SERVICES, INC. 6625 S. Valley View Blvd. Suite 300	
4	Las Vegas, NV 89118 Telephone: (702) 804-8885	
5	Facsimile: (702) 804-8887 Email: brandon@nas-inc.com	
6	Attorney for Defendant Nevada Association Services, Inc.	
7		
8	DISTRICT COURT FOR THE	STATE OF NEVADA
9	IN AND FOR THE COUN	TY OF CLARK
10	RIVER GLIDER AVENUE TRUST,	
11	Plaintiff,	SE NO.: A-20-819781-C
12		PT. NO.: XX
13		EVADA ASSOCIATION SERVICES,
14	ASSOCIATION SERVICES, INC.,	C.'S JOINDER TO DEFENDANT ARBOR COVE HOMEOWNERS
15 16	Defendants. AS	SOCIATION'S MOTION TO DISMISS IN THE ALTERNATIVE FOR
17	SU	MMARY JUDGMENT
18		
19	COMES NOW, NEVADA ASSOCIATION S	ERVICES, INC. (hereinafter "NAS"), and
20	hereby submits its Joinder to MOTION TO DISMI	SS RIVER GLIDER AVENUE TRUST'S
21	Complaint. NAS incorporates the arguments, points	and authorities, and Exhibits set forth by
22	HARBOR COVE HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION as	s though fully set forth herein.
23	CONCLUSI	<u>ON</u>
24	For all the reasons set forth in its Mo	tion, HARBOR COVE HOMEOWNERS
25	ASSOCIATION'S Motion to Dismiss RIVER GLIDER	AVENUE TRUST'S Complaint should be
26	///	
27	///	
28	///	
	JOINDER	
	JOINDER	
	Case Number: A-20-8197	31-C

1	GRANTED as to HARBOR COVE HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION and NAS.
2	Dated this 10 th day of November, 2020.
3	
4 5	By: <u>/s/Brandon E. Wood</u> BRANDON E. WOOD Nevada State Bar Number 12900
6	NEVADA ASSOCIATION SERVICES, INC. 6625 S. Valley View Blvd. Suite 300
7	Nevada State Bar Number 12900 NEVADA ASSOCIATION SERVICES, INC. 6625 S. Valley View Blvd. Suite 300 Las Vegas, NV 89118 Attorney for Defendant Nevada Association Services, Inc.
8	Services, Inc.
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	JOINDER

1	CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
2	I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 10 th day of November, 2020, and pursuant to N.R.C.P. 5(b), I
3	served a true and correct copy of the foregoing Nevada Association Services, Inc.'s Joinder to
4	Defendant Harbor Cove Homeowners Association's Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative for
5	Summary Judgment upon the parties listed below and all parties/counsel set up to receive notice via
6	electronic service in this matter in the following manner:
7	[] Hand Delivery
8	[] Facsimile Transmission
9	[] U.S. Mail, Postage Pre-Paid
10	[X] Served upon opposing counsel via the Court's electronic service system to the following counsel of record:
11	Roger Croteau, Esq. Croteau Admin
12	<u>croteaulaw@croteaulaw.com</u>
13	Peter Dunkley, Esq.
14	Lipson Neilson pdunkley@lipsonneilson.com
15	
16	/s/Susan E. Moses
17	Employee of Nevada Association Services, Inc.
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	JOINDER

		Electronically Filed 11/24/2020 3:18 PM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT
1	OPPS	Atums. Frum
2	ROGER P. CROTEAU, ESQ.	
3	Nevada Bar No. 4958 RAYMOND JEREZA, ESQ.	
4	Nevada Bar No. 11823 ROGER P. CROTEAU & ASSOCIATES, LTD	
5	2810 W. Charleston Blvd., Ste. 75	
6	Las Vegas, Nevada 89102 (702) 254-7775	
7	(702) 228-7719 (facsimile) croteaulaw@croteaulaw.com	
8	ray@croteaulaw.com	
9	Attorneys for Plaintiff	
10	DISTRIC	CT COURT
11	CLARK COU	JNTY, NEVADA
12	RIVER GLIDER AVENUE TRUST,	Case No: A-20-819781-C
13	Plaintiff,	Dept No: 20
14	VS.	
15		PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO
16	HARBOR COVE HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION; and NEVADA	HARBOR COVE HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION'S MOTION TO
17	ASSOCIATION SERVICES, INC.,	DISMISS OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND
18	Defendants.	NEVADA ASSOCIATION SERVICES,
19		INC.'S JOINDER THERETO
20		
21		
22		
23	COMES NOW, Plaintiff, RIVER GLID	ER AVENUE TRUST, by and through its
24	attorneys, ROGER P. CROTEAU & ASSOCIA	TES, LTD., and hereby presents its Opposition to
25	Harbor Cove Homeowners Association Motion	to Dismiss (the "HOA's Motion") and Nevada
26	Association Services, Inc.'s Joinder (the "HOA	Trustee's Motion"). This Opposition is made and
27	based upon the attached Memorandum of Points	s and Authorities, the papers and pleadings on file
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		1

• 2810 West Charleston Blvd, Suite 75 • Las Vegas, Nevada 89102 • Telephone: (702) 254-7775 • Facsimile (702) 228-7719

ROGER P. CROTEAU & ASSOCIATES, LTD.

herein, and any oral argument that this Honorable Court may entertain at the time of hearing of

this matter.

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DATED this 24th day of November, 2020.

ROGER P. CROTEAU & ASSOCIATES, LTD.

/s/ Raymond Jereza Roger P. Croteau, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 4958 Raymond Jereza, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 11823 2810 W. Charleston Blvd., Ste. 75 Las Vegas, Nevada 89102 Attorneys for Plaintiff

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

I. INTRODUCTION

13 Nevada law, NRS 116 et seq., governs the collection of assessments, charges, fines and 14 other sums that may be due in a common ownership interest community or homeowners' 15 association concerning real property that comprise the members of the homeowners' association. 16 In such a scheme, the developer generally establishes the Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions 17 ("CC&Rs"), along with the general governing documents that are recorded when the common-18 interest community is formed and run with the real property so long as the homeowner's 19 association is in existence. The filing and recording of the CC&Rs establishes the priority date of 20 collection subject to NRS 116.3116. As such, homeowners' associations have the right to charge 21 real property owners within the common-interest community for assessments to cover the 22 homeowner's associations' expenses as outlined in the CC&Rs for maintaining, governing and/or 23 improving the community among other things. When the sums due pursuant to the CC&Rs are not 24 paid, such as assessments and other expenses, the homeowner's association under NRS 116 et seq. 25 may impose a lien against the real property which it governs, and thereafter foreclose upon that 26 real property subject to the CC&Rs in a non-judicial foreclosure sale. 27

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Though non-judicial foreclosure sales in the State of Nevada are generally governed by 1 2 NRS 107 et seq.; however, the legislature in 1991 enacted NRS 116, as amended, to specifically address the special needs of homeowners' associations to enforce their liens against real property 3 owners in the common-interest community to ensure the survival of the homeowner's association. 4 Pursuant to NRS 116, certain unique modifications to the general statutory scheme of NRS 107 5 6 were enacted by the legislature. It is the unique features of NRS 116 et seq. that prompted Plaintiff's Complaint; specifically, the bifurcation of the Deed of Trust priority into two pieces 7 creating two very different legal and economic implications: (1) super-priority portion and (2) sub-8 9 priority portion of the Deed of Trust secured by the Property. 10

In the pre-2015 version of NRS 116.3116 effective at the relevant time in this case, it provides, in pertinent part:

NRS 116.3116 Liens against units for assessments.

1. The association has a lien on a unit for any construction penalty that is imposed against the unit's owner pursuant to NRS 116.310305, any assessment levied against that unit or any fines imposed against the unit's owner from the time the construction penalty, assessment or fine becomes due. Unless the declaration otherwise provides, any penalties, fees, charges, late charges, fines and interest charged pursuant to paragraphs (j) to (n), inclusive, of subsection 1 of NRS 116.3102 are enforceable as assessments under this section. If an assessment is payable in installments, the full amount of the assessment is a lien from the time the first installment thereof becomes due.

2. A lien under this section is prior to all other liens and encumbrances on a unit except:

(a) Liens and encumbrances recorded before the recordation of the declaration and, in a cooperative, liens and encumbrances which the association creates, assumes or takes subject to;

(b) A first security interest on the unit recorded before the date on which the assessment sought to be enforced became delinquent or, in a cooperative, the first security interest encumbering only the unit's owner's interest and perfected before the date on which the assessment sought to be enforced became delinquent; and
(c) Liens for real estate taxes and other governmental assessments or charges against the unit or cooperative.

The lien is also prior to all security interests described in paragraph (b) to the extent of any charges incurred by the association on a unit pursuant to NRS 116.310312 and to the extent of the assessments for common expenses based on

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the periodic budget adopted by the association pursuant to NRS 116.3115 which would have become due in the absence of acceleration during the 9 months immediately preceding institution of an action to enforce the lien, unless federal regulations adopted by the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation or the Federal National Mortgage Association require a shorter period of priority for the lien. If federal regulations adopted by the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation or the Federal National Mortgage Association require a shorter period of priority for the lien, the period during which the lien is prior to all security interests described in paragraph (b) must be determined in accordance with those federal regulations, except that notwithstanding the provisions of the federal regulations, the period of priority for the lien must not be less than the 6 months immediately preceding institution of an action to enforce the lien. This subsection does not affect the priority of mechanics' or materialmen's liens, or the priority of liens for other assessments made by the association.

In SFR Investments Pool 1 v. U.S. Bank, 334 P.3d 408 (Nev. 2014) the Nevada Supreme

Court stated:

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As to first deeds of trust, NRS 116.3116(2) thus splits an HOA lien into two pieces, a superpriority piece and a subpriority piece. The superpriority piece, consisting of the last nine months of unpaid HOA dues and maintenance and nuisance-abatement charges, is "prior to" a first deed of trust. The subpriority piece, consisting of all other HOA fees or assessments, is subordinate to a first deed of trust. See SFR Investments Pool 1 v. U.S. Bank, 334 P.3d at 411 ("SFR Investments").

16 NRS 116.3116(2)(b) makes a homeowner's association's lien for assessments junior to a 17 Deed of Trust beneficiary's secured interest in the real property; with one limited exception, 18 provided for in NRS 116.3116(2)(c), a homeowner's association's lien is senior in priority to a 19 Deed of Trust beneficiary's secured interest "to the extent of any charges incurred by the 20 association on a unit pursuant to NRS 116.310312 and to the extent of the assessments for common expenses based on the periodic budget adopted by the association pursuant to NRS 22 116.3115 which would have become due in the absence of acceleration during the 9 months 23 immediately preceding institution of an action to enforce the lien. ..." NRS 116.3116(2)(c). In 24 Nevada, when a homeowners association properly forecloses upon a lien containing a 25 superpriority lien component, such foreclosure extinguishes a Deed of Trust. If the homeowner's 26 association does not properly foreclose on a super-priority homeowner's association lien or the 27 28

super-priority portion is paid before the foreclosure sale, the homeowner's association foreclosure
 sale does not extinguish the Deed of Trust.

3 The facts as alleged in this Complaint create an issue of first impression in the State of Nevada. As the court is aware, the statutory foreclosure scheme of NRS 116.3116 and related 4 sections creates unique bifurcated priority liens related to the Deed of Trust. Under NRS 107, non-5 6 judicial foreclosure sales where the bidders at NRS 107 sales have available public information regarding the priority of the deed of trust being foreclosed, the priority of the Deed of Trust at the 7 8 homeowner's association foreclosure sale cannot be determined by a bidder at the homeowner's 9 association foreclosure sale from a review of public information, record searches, title reports or other means commonly and regularly relied upon by bidders in NRS 107 sales. 10

Generally, foreclosure trustees in NRS 107 sales have limited duty to the bidders of the property being foreclosed upon. The body of common law has developed from the precept that information exists in the public domain to conduct reasonable due diligence under the circumstances to properly inform a potential bidder, however, that information is not available under any circumstances to the bidder in a NRS 116 sale.

16 This case focuses on the duties and obligations owed by a homeowner's association by and through its agent, the foreclosure trustee to inform the bidders at the foreclosure sale as to the 17 bifurcated status of the Deed of Trust secured by the property. The question is with or without 18 19 inquiry from an NRS 116 bidder and certainly to the actual purchaser of the homeowner's foreclosure sale, does that homeowner's association and/or its foreclosure trustee have an 20 obligation of good faith and candor to the NRS 116 foreclosure bidders to disclose any attempted 21 and/or actual tender of the super-priority lien amounts, thereby rendering the sale subject to the 22 Deed of Trust or not? 23

II. STATEMENT OF FACTS

On or about April 19, 2005, Thomas D. Miller (the "Former Owner") purchased the Property.
 Thereafter, the Former Owner obtained a loan for the Property from Cameron Financial
 Group, Inc. ("Lender"), that was evidenced by a promissory note and secured by a deed of

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1		trust between the Former Owner and Lender, recorded against the Property on March 27,
2	2	2007, for the loan amount of \$631,000.00 See Complaint ¶12.
3	3 2	. The Former Owner executed a Planned Unit Development Riders along with the Deed of
2	1	Trust. <u>See</u> Complaint ¶14.
4	5 3	. The Former Owner of the Property failed to pay to the HOA all amounts due pursuant to the
(5	HOA's governing documents. See Complaint ¶15.
-	7 4	. Accordingly, on July 26, 2010, Nevada Association Services, Inc. ("HOA Trustee"), on behalf
8	3	of Harbor Cove Homeowners Association ("HOA"), recorded a Notice of Delinquent
, Ç)	Assessment Lien (the "NODAL"). The NODAL stated that the amount due to the HOA was
i 10)	\$1,032.01, plus continuing assessments, interest, late charges, costs, and attorney's fees (the
ہ 11 خ		"HOA Lien"). <u>See</u> Complaint ¶16.
12	2 5	. On September 3, 2010, HOA Trustee, on behalf of HOA, recorded a Notice of Default and
13	3	Election to Sell Under Homeowners Association Lien (the "NOD"). The NOD stated that the
2 14	1	HOA Lien amount was \$2,110.87. See Complaint ¶17.
15	5 6	. Upon information and belief, in April 2011, the Former Owner offered a settlement of the
16	5	HOA Lien in the amount of \$1,232.88, which was accepted by the HOA. The Former Owner
17	7	made the payment by check dated May 27, 2011 (the "Attempted Payment"). Of the Former
18	3	Owner's Attempted Payment, the HOA credited \$500.00 to his assessment account on June
19)	11, 2011 and \$400.00 to his assessment account on August 30, 2011, which cured the amount
20)	of the HOA Lien entitled to priority over the Deed of Trust ("Super-Priority Lien Amount").
21	7	. On March 30, 2012, MERS assigned the Deed of Trust to Aurora Bank FSB ("Aurora") via
22	2	Corporation Assignment of Deed of Trust, which was recorded against the Property on April
23	3	19, 2012. <u>See</u> Complaint ¶19.
24	1 8	. On April 16, 2012, HOA Trustee, on behalf of the HOA, recorded a Notice of Foreclosure
25	5	Sale against the Property ("NOS"). The NOS stated that the total amount due the HOA was
26	5	\$3,346.53 and set a sale date for the Property of May 11, 2012, at 10:00 a.m., to be held at
27	7	Nevada Legal News. <u>See</u> Complaint ¶20.
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1	9. On August 27, 2012, the Deed of Trust was assigned to Nationstar Mortgage, LLC
2	("Nationstar") via Assignment of Deed of Trust, which was recorded against the Property on
3	August 31, 2012. <u>See</u> Complaint ¶21.
4	10. Despite the Former Owner's Attempted Payment, on May 11, 2012, HOA Trustee then
5	proceeded to non-judicial foreclosure sale on the Property and recorded the HOA Foreclosure
6	Deed, which stated that the HOA Trustee sold the HOA's interest in the Property to Lake Hills
7	Drive Trust at the HOA Foreclosure Sale for the highest bid amount of \$5,500.00. See
8	Complaint ¶22.
9	11. The HOA Foreclosure Deed states that HOA Trustee "has complied with all requirements of
10	law" ¶23.
11	12. In none of the recorded documents, nor in any other notice recorded with the Clark County
12	Recorder's Office, did HOA and/or HOA Trustee specify or disclose that any individual or
13	entity, including but not limited to the Former Owner, had attempted to pay any portion of the
14	HOA Lien in advance of the HOA Foreclosure Sale. See Complaint ¶24.
15	13. Neither HOA nor HOA Trustee informed or advised the bidders and potential bidders at the
16	HOA Foreclosure Sale, either orally or in writing, that any individual or entity had attempted
17	to pay the Super-Priority Lien Amount. See Complaint ¶25.
18	14. The debt owed to Lender by the Former Owner of the Property pursuant to the loan secured by
19	the Deed of Trust significantly exceeded the fair market value of the Property at the time of the
20	HOA Foreclosure Sale. <u>See</u> Complaint ¶26.
21	15. Lender alleges that its Attempted Payment of the Super Priority Lien Amount served to satisfy
22	and discharge the Super Priority Lien Amount, thereby changing the priority of the HOA Lien
23	vis a vis the Deed of Trust. <u>See</u> Complaint ¶32.
24	16. Lender alleges that the Former Owner's Attempted Payment of the Super-Priority Lien
25	Amount served to satisfy and discharge the Super-Priority Lien Amount, thereby changing the
26	priority of the HOA Lien vis a vis the Deed of Trust. See Complaint ¶27.
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1	17. Lender alleges that as a result of the Former Owner's Attempted Payment of the Super-Priority	
2	Lien Amount, the purchaser of the Property at the HOA Foreclosure Sale acquired title to the	
3	Property subject to the Deed of Trust. See Complaint ¶28.	
4	18. If the bidders and potential bidders at the HOA Foreclosure Sale were aware that an individual	
5	or entity had attempted to pay the Super-Priority Lien Amount and/or by means of the	
6	Attempted Payment prior to the HOA Foreclosure Sale and that the Property was therefore	
7	ostensibly being sold subject to the Deed of Trust, the bidders and potential bidders would not	
8	have bid on the Property. See Complaint ¶29.	
9	19. Had the Property not been sold at the HOA Foreclosure Sale, HOA and HOA Trustee would	
10	not have received payment, interest, fees, collection costs and assessments related to the	
11	Property and these sums would have remained unpaid. See Complaint ¶30.	
12	20. HOA Trustee acted as an agent of HOA. See Complaint ¶31.	
13	21. HOA is responsible for the actions and inactions of HOA Trustee pursuant to the doctrine of	
14	respondeat superior. <u>See</u> Complaint ¶32.	
15	22. HOA and HOA Trustee conspired together to hide material information related to the	
16	Property: the HOA Lien; the Attempted Payment of the Super-Priority Lien Amount; the	
17	acceptance of such payment or Attempted Payment; and the priority of the HOA Lien vis a vis	
18	the Deed of Trust, from the bidders and potential bidders at the HOA Foreclosure Sale. See	
19	Complaint ¶33.	
20	23. The information related to any Attempted Payment or payments made by the Former Owner,	
21	Lender, or others to the Super-Priority Lien Amount, was not recorded and would only be	
22	known by the Former Owner, Lender, the HOA, and HOA Trustee. See Complaint ¶34.	
23	24. HOA and HOA Trustee conspired to withhold and hide the aforementioned information for	
24	their own economic gain and to the detriment of the bidders and potential bidders at the HOA	
25	Foreclosure Sale. <u>See</u> Complaint ¶35.	
26	25. As part of Plaintiff's practice and procedure in both NRS Chapter 107 and NRS Chapter 116	
27	foreclosure sales, Plaintiff would call the foreclosing agent/HOA Trustee and confirm whether	
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1	the sale was going forward on the scheduled date; and in the context of an NRS Chapter 116
2	foreclosure sale, Plaintiff would ask if anyone had paid anything on the account. See
3	Complaint ¶36.
4	26. Plaintiff would contact the HOA Trustee prior to the HOA Foreclosure Sale to determine if the
5	Property would in fact be sold on the date stated in the NOS, obtain the opening bid, so
6	Plaintiff could determine the amount of funds necessary for the auction and inquire if any
7	payments had been made; however, Plaintiff never inquired if the "Super-Priority Lien
8	Amount" had been paid. See Complaint ¶37.
9	27. At all times relevant to this matter, if Plaintiff learned of a "tender" or payment either having
10	been attempted or made, Plaintiff would not purchase the Property offered in that HOA
11	Foreclosure Sale. <u>See</u> Complaint ¶38.
12	28. Iyad Haddad was the trustee of the Lake Hills Drive Trust and Plaintiff at all relevant times
13	and the conveyance of title ownership of the Property from Lake Hills Drive Trust to Plaintiff
14	was done for estate planning purposes. As such, there has always been a unity of interest
15	between Lake Hills Drive Trust, Plaintiff, and the Property such that Plaintiff can raise the
16	claims in this Complaint. <u>See</u> Complaint ¶39.
17	29. Plaintiff reasonably relied upon the HOA and/or HOA Trustee's material omission of "tender"
18	of the Super-Priority Lien Amount and/or the Attempted Payment when Plaintiff purchased
19	the Property. See Complaint ¶40.
20	30. Lender first disclosed the Attempted Payment by the Former Owner in Lender's First
21	Supplemental Disclosure of Witnesses and Documents served on Plaintiff on August 24, 2017,
22	("Discovery") in Clark County Case No. A-13-683467-C (the "Case"). See Complaint ¶41.
23	III. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
24	In the Case, Plaintiff did not sue the HOA, nor the HOA Trustee. In the Case, Plaintiff
25	sued Nationstar for quiet title and declaratory relief. Plaintiff did not elect to sue the HOA and/or
26	the HOA Trustee in the Case. None of the allegations set forth in this Complaint would require a
27	compulsory claim by Plaintiff in the Case. Plaintiff filed this Complaint on August 18, 2020 to
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ROGER P. CROTEAU & ASSOCIATES, LTD. • 2810 West Charleston Blvd, Suite 75 • Las Vegas, Nevada 89102 • Telephone: (702) 254-7775 • Facsimile (702) 228-7719 1 preserve its three (3) year statute of limitations pursuant to NRS 11.190 (a)-(d).

IV. LEGAL ARGUMENT

A. Statement of the Law

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4 A complaint should not be dismissed for insufficiency, for failure to state a cause of action, 5 unless it appears to a certainty that the Plaintiff is entitled to no relief under any set of facts which 6 could be proven in support of the claim. Zalk-Josephs Co. V. Wells Cargo, Inc., 81 Nev. 163, 400 7 P.2d 621 (1965). On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim for relief, the trial court, and the 8 Supreme Court must draw every fair intendment in favor of the plaintiff. Merluzi v. Larson, 96 Nev. 9 409, 610 P.2d 739 (1980), overruled on the other grounds, 106 Nev. 568, 796 P.2d 592 (1990). When tested by a subdivision (b)(5) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief 10 11 can be granted the allegations of the complaint must be accepted as true. Hynds Plumbing & Heating Co. V. Clark County School District, 94 Nev. 776, 587 P.2d 131 (1978). A trial court may dismiss 12 13 a complaint only if it appears to a certainty that a plaintiff can prove no set of facts which would entitle him to relief; all allegations pled must be accepted as true. Bergmann v. Boyce, 109 14 15 Nev. 670, 856 P.2d 560 (1993) (Emphasis added). In the event that a motion asserting NRCP 16 12(b)(5) presents matters outside the pleading which are not excluded by the court, the motion shall 17 be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in NRCP 56. See NRCP 12(b). Pursuant to N.R.C.P. 56, two substantive requirements must be met before a Court may grant 18 19 a motion for summary judgment: (1) there must be no genuine issue as to any material fact; and, (2) the moving party must be entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fyssakis v. Knight Equipment 20 21 Corp., 108 Nev. 212, 826 P.2d 570 (1992). Summary judgment is appropriate under NRCP 56 when the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, and affidavits, if any, that are 22 23 properly before the court demonstrate that no genuine issue of material fact exists, and the moving 24 party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Wood v. Safeway, 121 Nev. Adv. Op. 73, 121 P.3d 1026 (October, 2005) citing Pegasus v. Reno Newspapers, Inc., 118 Nev. at 713, 57 P.3d at 87 25 (2003). In deciding whether these requirements have been met, the Court must first determine, in 26 the light most favorable to the non-moving party "whether issues of material fact exist, thus 27 28

precluding judgment by summary proceeding." National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh v. Pratt
 & Whitney Canada, Inc., 107 Nev. 535, 815 P.2d 601, 602 (1991).

The Nevada Supreme Court has indicated that Summary Judgment is a drastic remedy and 3 that the trial judges should exercise great care in granting such motions. Pine v. Leavitt, 84 Nev. 4 5 507, 445 P.2d 942 (1968); Oliver v. Barrick Goldstrike Mines, 111 Nev. 1338, 905 P.2d 168 (1995). 6 "Actions for declaratory relief are governed by the same liberal pleading standards that are applied in other civil actions." See Breliant v. Preferred Equities Corp., 109 Nev. 842, 846, 858 P.2d 1258, 7 1260-61 (1993). "The formal sufficiency of a claim is governed by NRCP 8(a), which requires only 8 9 that the claim, shall contain (1) a short and plan statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, and (2) a demand for judgment for the relief to which he deems himself entitled." 10 See *id*. (quoting NRCP 8(a)). 11

Based upon the facts asserted in Plaintiff's Complaint, which must be taken as true, the Court should deny the HOA's Motion and the HOA Trustee's Joinder. Further, should the Court conclude that the HOA's Motion should be evaluated as a Motion for Summary Judgment or Partial Summary Judgment, the Court should also deny the HOA's Motion as genuine issues of material fact remain and Defendants are not entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

B. Plaintiff's claim for misrepresentation does not fail as a matter of law

The HOA intentionally/negligently made the determination not to disclose the Attempted 18 19 Payment despite its actual knowledge to the contrary known only to the HOA, HOA Trustee and the Former Owner. The Court in Foster v. Dingwall, 126 Nev.56, 69 227 P.3d 1042,1052, 2010 20 LEXIS 5, 26, 126 Nev. Adv. Rep. 6 (2010) provided that the omission of a material fact such as the 21 BANA Attempted Payment of the HOA Lien may be deemed to be a false representation which the 22 Defendants are bound by the mandates of NRS 116.1113 and NRS 113.130 to disclose to potential 23 bidders under the obligation and duty of good faith and candor to disclose upon reasonable inquiry 24 from potential bidders at the HOA Foreclosure Sale and/or the party conducting the sale with actual 25 knowledge of certain material facts such intentional omission in not disclosing the Attempted 26 Payment is equivalent to a false representation under the facts of this case. 27

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Plaintiff has identified that the HOA, by and through its agent, the HOA Trustee, 1 2 intentionally did not disclose the Attempted Payment at the HOA Foreclosure Sale. Unlike NRS 107 et seq. sales, NRS 116 et seq. sales provide for a super and sub-priority lien portion of the Deed 3 of Trust. Absent of the recording of any notice of payment of the Super Priority Lien Amount, as is 4 5 mandated with the NRS 116 amendments in 2015, the only way Plaintiff and/or potential bidders at 6 the HOA Foreclosure Sale would know if any party tendered the Super Priority Lien Amount and/or 7 Attempted Payment is if the HOA and/or the HOA Trustee informs the bidders of the Attempted Payment. It is clear from the facts of this case that the HOA Trustee was aware of the Attempted 8 9 Payment.

Since the HOA Trustee is the disclosed agent of the HOA, the HOA is imputed with knowledge held by the HOA Trustee. In the Complaint, Plaintiff sets forth the duty, breach of that duty, improper purpose, failure to make a statement regarding the Attempted Payment, the material omission of the Attempted Payment, the breach of the obligation of good faith and candor, the failure to provide notice pursuant to NRS 113 *et seq.* and the damages suffered by Plaintiff.

15 In this case, the HOA, as principal for the HOA Trustee, are not guilty of a false 16 representation, but they are guilty of intentionally not disclosing a material fact regarding the payment of the Attempted Payment concerning the Deed of Trust that they are required to do and 17 thereby making a material omission of a fact subject to this claim. Mr. Haddad relied upon the non-18 19 disclosure of the Attempted Payment to indicate that no tender had been attempted or accomplished. The HOA and/or the HOA Trustee's actions leading up to and at the HOA Foreclosure Sale 20 intentionally obstructed Plaintiff's opportunity to conduct its own due diligence regarding the 21 22 Property and specifically the priority of the lien being foreclosed upon, and ultimately affected Plaintiff's decision whether to actually submit a bid on the Property or not. 23

It is not Plaintiff's duty to prove that the HOA Trustee believed it had a duty to disclose the existence of a tender or believed that the rejection of the tender/Attempted Payment had any impact on its statutory right to foreclose on its super-priority lien. It is Plaintiff's claim that the HOA and the HOA Trustee had a duty to the bidding public to disclose information known to it upon reasonable inquiry, so Plaintiff and the other bidders could decide whether to purchase the Property
 at the HOA Foreclosure Sale. The HOA and HOA Trustee intentionally, whether on a mistaken
 belief or not of the effectiveness of the tender, failed to disclose the Attempted Payment, so they
 would not chill the sale of the Property for their own economic gain.

5 Furthermore, it was Plaintiff's practice and procedure that when it would attend NRS 116 6 sales, by and through its Trustee, at all times relevant to this case, the Trustee would attempt to 7 ascertain whether anyone had attempted to or did tender any payment regarding the homeowner 8 association's lien.

9 Plaintiff presented the facts and argument that it sought to ascertain whether a tender had occurred, or been attempted, as this information would play a prominent role in determining whether 10 Plaintiff, through Mr. Haddad, would purchase an interest in any given property. The basis for this 11 factual scenario where Plaintiff inquired as to the status of a "tender" is set forth in the complaint 12 by the reference to Plaintiff's receipt of information from the HOA and HOA Trustee "either orally 13 or in writing," (emphasis added) showing that Plaintiff had not solely "relied upon the (written) 14 15 recitals in the foreclosure deed." Mr. Haddad's affirmative efforts indicate that some steps were 16 taken to obtain information regarding the sale via verbal communication. Thus, it is likely that Mr. Haddad inquired of any "tender" at the time of the HOA Sale. This factual scenario, wherein Mr. 17 Haddad verbally inquired as to the status of a "tender" in the matter, and a resulting response (or 18 19 lack thereof) from the HOA or HOA Trustee that did not disclose the "tender" by the holder of the First Deed of Trust, would result in a violation of NRS 113 and "supply[ing] false information" 20 pursuant to Halcrow, Inc. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 129 Nev. 294, 400, 302 P.3d 1148, 1153 21 22 (2013), or making "a false representation" pursuant to Nelson v. Heer, 123 Nev. 217, 225 (2007).

C. Defendants failed to conduct their obligations in good faith under NRS 116.1113

The Court should deny the HOA's Motion, because Plaintiff's Complaint adequately states claims for relief consistent with their obligation of good faith, honesty-in-fact, reasonable standards of fair dealing and candor pursuant to NRS 116.1113 and NRS 113.130. The HOA argues that Plaintiff fails to cite to any provision within NRS Chapter 116 that contains an obligation or duty of

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good faith to the Purchaser, thus alleging that NRS §116.1113 is not implicated. However, Plaintiff respectfully disagrees. NRS 116.1113 is not only implicated but clearly governs the parties' performance. Even if claims under NRS 113.130 are deemed to not be timely filed, the mandates of 3 NRS 113.130 constitute a breach of the HOA Foreclosure Deed wherein the HOA Trustee on behalf 4 of itself and its principal, the HOA, represents and warranties that the HOA Trustee "has complied with all requirements of law including, but not limited to ... "

NRS 116.1113 provides, "[e]very contract or duty governed by this chapter imposes an 7 obligation of good faith in its performance or enforcement." NRS 116.1113 provides that in "every 8 9 contract or duty governed by [NRS 116] the actions of the HOA and the HOA Trustee leading up to and including the HOA Foreclosure Sale provide that a duty of good faith as further clarified by 10 the comment to Section 1-113 infra regarding the HOA's performance in its enforcement of the 11 provisions included in NRS Chapter 116 that constitute the foreclosure sale and selling the Property 12 to a purchaser that will eventually be a member of the HOA. Plaintiff alleges that the HOA and the 13 HOA Trustee's actions were not conducted in good faith. See Complaint. Plaintiff further alleges 14 15 that the HOA and the HOA Trustee intentionally and/or negligently misrepresented the conditions 16 present at the time it conducted the HOA Foreclosure Sale. See Complaint. Plaintiff further alleges that the HOA and the HOA Trustee failed to disclose mandated information specifically known to 17 the HOA and the HOA Trustee regarding assessments and tender/Attempted Payment as mandated 18 19 by NRS 116.1113 and NRS 113.130.

The duties of good faith and fair dealing go hand and hand with the duty of candor. For 20 example, the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, § 205, expressly provides that "every contract 21 imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance and in its 22 enforcement." Restat. 2d of Contracts, § 205 (2nd 1981). Comment (d) to Section 205 further 23 suggests: "fair dealing may require more than honesty." Accordingly, the duty of candor is an 24 integral component of the duty of fair dealing. Though a contract interpretation, it has application 25 in the HOA Foreclosure Sale. 26

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Nevada's HOA lien statute, NRS Chapter 116.3116, is modeled after the Uniform Common
 Interest Ownership Act of 1982 (hereinafter "UCOIA"), § 3-116, 7 U.L.A., part II 121-24 (2009)
 (amended 1994, 2008), which Nevada adopted in 1991, see NRS 116.001. The purpose of the
 UCIOA is "to make uniform the law with respect to the subject of this chapter among states enacting
 it." NRS 116.1109(2). See *Carrington Mortg. Holdings, LLC v. R Ventures VIII, LLC*, 419 P.3d 703,
 2018 Nev. LEXIS 47, 134 Nev. Adv. Rep. 46, 2018 WL 3015114 (Nev. 2018).

7 In Carrington Mortg. Holdings, LLC, 419 P.3d at 705, the Nevada Supreme Court made 8 clear that it would turn to case law from other jurisdictions to support its conclusions interpreting 9 the UCOIA. The Nevada courts should follow the lead set by Minnesota in holding that the UCOIA imposed the duty of fair dealing which encompasses the duty of candor. For example, the Minnesota 10 Appeals Court stated that, under the Minnesota Common Interest Ownership Act, which is likewise 11 modeled after the UCOIA just as Nevada's NRS 116 et seq. good faith "means observance of two 12 standards: 'honesty in fact', and observance of reasonable standards of fair dealing." Horodenski v. 13 Lyndale Green Townhome Ass'n, Inc., 804 N.W.2d 366, 373 (Minn. App. 2011) (quoting UCOIA, 14 1982, § 1-113 & cmt.). See Dean v. CMPJ Enters., LLC, 2018 Minn. App. Unpub. LEXIS 642, 15 16 2018 WL 3614146 (Minn. App. 2018). Turning the UCOIA with comments from the drafters of the UCOIA; the UCOIA provides 17 comment to the provision that is exactly NRS 116.1113, that is at issue here: 18

SECTION 1-113. OBLIGATION OF GOOD FAITH. Every contract or duty governed by this [act] imposes an obligation of good faith in its performance or enforcement.

Comment

This section sets forth a basic principle running throughout this Act: in transactions involving common interest communities, good faith is required in the performance and enforcement of all agreements and duties. Good faith, as used in this Act, means observance of two standards: "honesty in fact," and observance of reasonable standards of fair dealing. While the term is not defined, the term is derived from and used in the same manner as in Section 1-201 of the Uniform Simplification of Land Transfers Act, and Sections 2-103(i)(b) and 7-404 of the Uniform Commercial Code.

26 Section 1-113 of the UCOIA became NRS 116.1113 verbatim. It is clear that the authors of

the UCOIA intended the definition of "good faith" to include two (2) standards: (1) honest-in-fact,

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these two standards create an obligation of candor has been adopted by other jurisdictions that have 2 3 adopted the UCOIA. The Nevada courts should further follow the lead of Delaware in recognizing that the duty 4 5 of fair dealing obviously includes the duty of candor. The Delaware courts have concluded that part 6 of "fair dealing" is the obvious duty of candor. 7 Part of fair dealing is the obvious duty of candor. Moreover, one possessing superior knowledge may not mislead any stockholder by use of corporate 8 information to which the latter is not privy. Lank v. Steiner, Del. Supr., 43 Del. Ch. 262, 224 A.2d 242, 244 (1966). Delaware has long imposed this duty even upon 9 persons who are not corporate officers or directors, but who nonetheless are privy to matters of interest or significance to their company. 10 See Weinberger v. Uop, 457 A.2d 701, (Del. 1983); see also, Brophy v. Cities Service Co., Del. Ch., 11 31 Del. Ch. 241, 70 A.2d 5, 7 (Del. 1949). 12 Part of fair dealing is the obvious duty of candor. Lynch v. Vickers Energy Corp., Del. Supr., 13 383 A.2d 278, 281 (Del. 1977) (Lynch I). See also, Weinberger v. Uop, 457 A.2d 701, 710, 1983 14 15 Del. LEXIS 371, *26 (Del. 1983). The duty of candor is one of the elementary principles of fair dealing. See Mills Acquisition Co. v. MacMillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1989 Del. LEXIS 149, Fed. 16 Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) P94,401 (Del. 1989). See also, Holten v. Std. Parking Corp., 98 F. Supp. 3d 17 444, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39152 (Conn. 2015). Compare Osowski v. Howard, 2011 WI App 155, 18 19 ¶ 17, 337 Wis. 2d 736, 807 N.W.2d 33 (WI App. Ct. 2011) where the Wisconsin Appeals Court noted that the duty of fair dealing is a guarantee by each party that he or she "will not intentionally 20 and purposely do anything to prevent the other party from carrying out his or her part of the 21 22 agreement, or do anything which will have the effect of destroying or injuring the right of the other party to receive the fruits of the contract." See Osowski v. Howard, 2011 WI App 155, ¶ 17, 337 23 Wis. 2d 736, 807 N.W.2d 33. See also, Tang v. C.A.R.S. Prot. Plus, Inc., 2007 WI App 134, ¶41, 24 301 Wis. 2d 752, 734 N.W.2d 169 (quoting Metropolitan Ventures, LLC v. GEA Assocs., 2006 WI 25

and (2) observance of reasonable standards of fair dealing. As other jurisdictions have addressed

26 71, ¶35, 291 Wis. 2d 393, 717 N.W.2d 58).

Moreover, the official comments by the drafters of the UCIOA provide important guidance 1 2 in construing NRS §116.1113. See Chase Plaza Condo. Ass'n v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 98 A.3d 166, 175, 2014 D.C. App. LEXIS 317, *20-21 (D.C. 2014). See generally, e.g., Alvord Inv., 3 LLC v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 282 Conn. 393, 920 A.2d 1000, 2007 Conn. LEXIS 193; 4 5 Cantonbury Heights Condominium Assn., Inc. v. Local Land Development, LLC, 273 Conn. 724, 6 739-40, 873 A.2d 898 (2005); W & D Acquisition, LLC v. First Union National Bank, 262 Conn. 704, 712-13, 817 A.2d 91 (2003); Platt v. Aspenwood Condo. Ass'n, Inc., 214 P.3d 1060, 1063-64 7 (Colo. App. 2009) (relying on drafters' comments to UCOIA for guidance in interpreting state 8 statute modeled on UCOIA; "We accept the intent of the drafters of a uniform act as the 9 [legislature's] intent when it adopts that uniform act.") (internal quotation marks omitted); Hunt 10 Club Condos., Inc. v. Mac-Gray Servs., Inc., 2006 WI App 167, 295 Wis. 2d 780, 721 N.W.2d 11 117, 123-25 (Wis. Ct. App. 2006)(official and published comments are "valid indicator" of 12 legislature's intent in enacting corresponding statute); Univ. Commons Riverside Home Owners 13 Ass'n v. Univ. Commons Morgantown, LLC, 230 W. Va. 589, 741 S.E.2d 613, 2013 W. Va. 14 LEXIS 264 *16; Will v. Mill Condo. Owners' Ass'n, 2004 VT 22, 176 Vt. 380, 848 A.2d 336, 2004 15 16 Vt. LEXIS 26 (turned to commentary to interpret state statute modeled on UCOIA). In the present matter, UCIOA § 1-113 cmt (1982) explicitly imposes a duty of good faith, which includes the 17 duty of candor, and this Court should rely upon the comment consistent with the above cited case 18 19 law.

Simply put, the HOA and/or the HOA Trustee could have made a simple announcement 20 that unequivocally stated that the Property was being sold subject to the Deed of Trust to all 21 potential bidders present and/or interested in bidding on the Property at the time of the HOA 22 Foreclosure Sale or even disclose the Attempted Payment. Conversely, the HOA Trustee could 23 have disclosed that the Super-Priority piece had been satisfied prior to the HOA Foreclosure Sale 24 by the Attempted Payment or at least provide information to the potential bidders of the HOA 25 26 Trustee's rejection of the Attempted Payment, but it did not. Neither the HOA nor the HOA Trustee did so. The HOA or the HOA Trustee could have provided notice to all potential bidders, 27

and/or the public at large, in their actions leading up to the HOA Foreclosure Sale, such as
 including a phrase concerning the absence of any super-priority portion of the HOA Lien being
 foreclosed upon within any and/or all of the notices recorded against the Property and/or
 advertising the sale, or it would have announced that fact at the sale. Similarly, neither the HOA
 nor the HOA Trustee did so, as that would have had the effect of chilling the sale.

6 At the time of the HOA Foreclosure Sale, only three parties knew of the Former Owner's 7 Attempted Payment; specifically, the HOA, the HOA Trustee and the Former Owner. Arguably, the HOA and the HOA Trustee knew that the Attempted Payment may be deemed to have satisfied 8 9 the HOA Lien, which was determined to extinguish any Super Priority Lien Amount piece of the HOA Lien. The HOA and the HOA Trustee knew that fact and intentionally failed to disclose that 10 material fact to the bidders at the HOA Foreclosure Sale. Frankly, the HOA and HOA Trustee 11 knew or should have known that such an omission would drastically affect the outcome of the 12 HOA Foreclosure Sale. An intentional failure to disclose the Former Owner's Attempted Payment 13 had the effect of causing the Property to sell at the HOA Foreclosure Sale. Therefore, Plaintiff has 14 15 alleged that the HOA and the HOA Trustee intentionally withhold information regarding the 16 Former Owner's Attempted Payment of the HOA Lien that effectively defraud the public and/or potential bidders concerning the HOA Foreclosure Sale. 17

The purpose underlying NRS 116 is to remove a nonperforming homeowner (meaning a 18 19 homeowner not paying his/her HOA dues) from a property and to replace him/her with a performing homeowner, thereby relieving the homeowners association and its members of the 20 burden of paying the obligations of the nonperforming individual. To accept the HOA's contention 21 22 that it did not intentionally or negligently misrepresent the HOA Foreclosure Sale by omitting the Attempted Payment by the Former Owner of the HOA Lien, with at a minimum an announcement, 23 and that it was under no contract or duty to operate under good faith and with candor to disclose 24 such a material fact when asked by potential bidders as mandated by NRS 116 et seq and/or NRS 25 113 et seq., would serve to emasculate NRS 116's mandate of good faith and render it completely 26 meaningless and ineffective. 27

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Why would any person or entity purchase a property at an HOA foreclosure sale knowing 1 2 that he or she would thereafter be stripped of ownership of the property upon foreclosure by a secured lender? Such a foreclosure could conceivably take place days or weeks after the HOA 3 foreclosure sale. In the vast majority of cases, the answer to this question is quite simply that he or 4 5 she would not. Thus, lacking any market for the sale of real property securing HOA liens, the 6 homeowners associations and their members would be forced to continue to support those homeowners who choose not to pay their HOA dues. Indeed, the homeowners association would 7 8 not have any reason to even credit bid the HOA lien at the time of sale. If the homeowners 9 association were to carry out a sale and acquire the subject property for a credit bid, there would still be no party paying the HOA dues. Furthermore, the homeowners association would thereafter 10 be required to pay for taxes, insurance and other maintenance related to the property. The payment 11 of these expenses would constitute a further burden for the homeowners association and its 12 members that they can ill afford. 13 The plain language of NRS 116.1113 does not limit the good faith obligation to those in 14 15 contractual privity. The HOA and/or HOA Trustee are not given authority to conceal material 16 facts from potential bidders in their efforts to sell the real property to reap the sale proceeds to fund their foreclosure expenses. 17 The obligations of good faith under NRS 116.1113 apply to a "Purchaser" at the 18 19 foreclosure sale. NRS 116.31166(3) provides that title vests in the Purchaser: 20 NRS 116.31166 Foreclosure of liens: Effect of recitals in deed: purchaser not responsible for proper application of purchase money; title vested in purchaser 21 without equity or right of redemption. 22 1. The recitals in a deed made pursuant to NRS 116.31164 of: 23 (a) Default, the mailing of the notice of delinquent assessment, and the recording of the notice of default and election to sell; 24 (b) The elapsing of the 90 days; and 25 (c) The giving of notice of sale, are conclusive proof of the matters recited. 26 2. Such a deed containing those recitals is conclusive against the unit's former 27 owner, his or her heirs and assigns, and all other persons. The receipt for the 28

1	purchase money contained in such a deed is sufficient to discharge the purchaser from obligation to see to the proper application of the purchase money.
23	3. The sale of a unit pursuant to NRS 116.31162, 116.31163 and 116.31164 vests in the purchaser the title of the unit's owner without equity or right of redemption.
4	(Emphasis added).
5	Purchaser is defined under NRS 116.3166 as follows:
6	NRS 116.079 "Purchaser" defined. "Purchaser" means a person, other than a
7	declarant or a dealer, who by means of a voluntary transfer acquires a legal or equitable interest in a unit other than a leasehold interest (including options to renew) of less than 20 years, or as security for an obligation.
8	The relationship of the HOA Trustee as an agent for the HOA created a new contract at the
9	HOA Foreclosure Sale for the sale of a "unit" to a "Purchaser" that as a result of its purchase shall
10	become a member of the HOA.
11	In the foreclosure section of NRS 116.3116 to NRS 116.3117, the term Purchaser refers to
12	buyers at an HOA Foreclosure Sale in addition to direct sales and as such the obligation of good
13	faith operates to encompass a successful bidder. NRS 116.1108 provides for the application of
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15	general principles of law to the HOA Foreclosure Sale and the Purchaser as stated below:
16 17	NRS 116.1108 Supplemental general principles of law applicable. The principles of law and equity, including the law of corporations, the law of unincorporated associations, the law of real property, and the law relative to capacity to contract,
18	principal and agent, eminent domain, estoppel, fraud, misrepresentation, duress, coercion, mistake, receivership, substantial performance, or other validating or
19	invalidating cause supplement the provisions of this chapter, except to the extent inconsistent with this chapter.
20	NRS 116.1108 actually cites the enumerated claims and issues raised in the Complaint as
21	"supplemental general principles of law applicable" to NRS 116 et seq. The concepts of "law and
22	equity," "law of real property," "principal and agent," "fraud, misrepresentation," "mistake" are all
23	at the basis of the claims asserted in the Complaint. Additionally, Plaintiff incorporates the
24	arguments regarding NRS 113 et seq. disclosures as further violations by the HOA and HOA
25	Trustee of their good faith and candor obligations.
26	a. Plaintiff Bay Relied Upon the Recital - the HOA Foreclosure Deed
27	The HOA Foreclosure Sale was performed pursuant to NRS 116.3116, Plaintiff reasonably
28	relied upon the recitals included in the HOA Foreclosure Deed that stated that the foreclosure was 20

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in compliance with NRS 116, et seq. See Nationstar Mortg., LLC v. SFR Investments Pool 1, LLC, 1 No. 70653, 2017 Nev. App. Unpub. LEXIS 229, 2017 WL 1423938, at *2 (Nev. App. Apr. 17, 2 2017) ("And because the recitals were conclusive evidence, the district court did not err in finding 3 that no genuine issues of material fact remained regarding whether the foreclosure sale was proper 4 5 and granting summary judgment in favor of SFR."). Therefore, pursuant to SFR Investments, NRS 6 116.3116, and the recorded HOA Foreclosure Deed in favor of SFR, the foreclosure sale was proper and extinguished the Deed of Trust. Bank of Am., N.A. v. Sonrisa Homeowners Ass'n, 2018 U.S. 7 8 Dist. LEXIS 118720 (July 17, 2018). Id.

9 Here, Plaintiff had no reason to question the recitals contained in the HOA Foreclosure Deed
10 and recorded documents. The foreclosure of the HOA Lien is presumably valid based upon the
11 recitations in the HOA Foreclosure Deed. In *Nationstar Mortgage*, the Nevada Supreme Court
12 explained the foreclosure procedure:

A trustee's deed reciting compliance with the notice provision of NRS 116.31162 through NRS 116.31168 "is conclusive" as to the recitals "against the unit's former owner, his or her heirs and assigns, and all other persons." NRS 116.31166(2). And, '[t]he sale of a unit pursuant to NRS 116.31162, 11631163 and 116.31164 vests in the purchaser the title of the unit's owner without equity or right of redemption." NRS 116.31166(3).

Id. at 411-412. (Emphasis added.) As such, there would have been no reason to question the
legitimacy of the foreclosure sale based exclusively upon the recorded documents. At foreclosure
sales conducted pursuant to NRS 116, bidders, potential bidders and buyers do not have access to
any more information than is recorded. Plaintiff's reliance on the recitations on the HOA
Foreclosure Deed was reasonable and foreseeable. Specifically, the HOA Foreclosure Deed
asserted that the HOA Trustee complied with "all requirements of law."
However, Defendants' lack of good faith and candor in conducting the HOA Foreclosure

24 Sale was not immediately evident. It was concealed. It was only upon receipt of the Case on the

25 Discovery, as asserted in the Complaint, that Plaintiff discovered the facts giving rise to its

26 Complaint. Accordingly, application of the discovery rule tolls the statute of limitations and

27 Plaintiff's claims are filed timely and are not time barred.

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The Plaintiff relied upon the recitals contained within the HOA Foreclosure Deed that were 1 included in the HOA Foreclosure Deed by the HOA and the HOA Trustee. Under Nevada law, the 2 HOA foreclosure sale and the resulting foreclosure deed are both presumed valid. NRS 47.250(16)-3 (18) (stating that disputable presumptions exist "that the law has been obeyed" "that a trustee or 4 5 other person, whose duty it was to convey real property to a particular person, has actually conveyed 6 to that person, when such presumption is necessary to perfect the title of such person or a successor in interest"; "that private transactions have been fair and regular"; and "that the ordinary course of 7 business has been followed."). Accordingly, the Plaintiff possessed a good faith belief that the HOA 8 9 and/or the HOA Trustee's actions taken in the ordinary course of business had been followed, and that the HOA Foreclosure Sale was fair and regular. Plaintiff has timely commenced this action 10 against the HOA and HOA Trustee pursuant to NRS §11.190(3)(d) and NRS 11.190(3)(a). 11

Here, Plaintiff is the Purchaser from the HOA Foreclosure Sale. The HOA and/or the HOA Trustee's actions leading up to and at the HOA Foreclosure Sale intentionally obstructed Plaintiff's opportunity to conduct its own due diligence regarding the Property, and ultimately affected Plaintiff's decision whether to actually submit a bid on the Property or not. Had Plaintiff known that it was purchasing the Property subject to the Deed of Trust, Plaintiff never would have submitted a bid in the first place, thus avoiding this entire controversy.

The 2015 Legislature did revise NRS 116 to codify what the case law has interpreted. For example, the jurisdictions utilizing the UCOIA have determined that candor is an additional requirement implicitly contained in the good faith mandate of NRS 116.1113. Prior to the amendments to NRS 116 in 2015, the HOA and the HOA Trustee were required to be truthful in their contracts and duties and to follow the law as set forth in NRS 116 *et seq.* and NRS 113 *et seq.* The 2015 amendments just made a bright line for the parties to rely upon by mandating that HOA/HOA Trustee record a substitution of the Super Priority Lien Amount.

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D. The HOA has a duty to disclose the attempted payment to the purchaser at an HOA foreclosure sale.

3 The Defendants have a duty to disclose the Attempted Payment to a Purchaser at an HOA Foreclosure Sale pursuant to NRS 116.1113 and NRS 113.130. At the time and place of the HOA 4 5 Foreclosure Sale, the HOA, by and through its agent, the HOA Trustee, enters into a sale contract 6 by the function of the auction conducted by the HOA. Inherently, the material aspects of the factors 7 affecting the lien priority of the secured debt that are only known solely to the HOA, HOA Trustee and the Former Owner are material to the HOA Lien being foreclosed upon and must be disclosed 8 to the HOA Foreclosure Sale bidders under both NRS 116.1113 and NRS 113.130. To infer 9 10 otherwise, would destroy the statutory scheme of NRS 116 sales.

The disclosure of the Attempted Payment is a material fact that the HOA and HOA Trust were obligated to disclose to the Plaintiff. As the Supreme Court of Nevada provided in its recent unpublished decision in *Noonan v. Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC,* 2019 Nev. Unpub. LEXIS 428 p. 2-3, 438 P.3d 335, 2019 WL 1552690 (April 8, 2019, Nevada) as follows:

Finally, the Noonans challenge the district court's summary judgment in favor of Hampton & Hampton Collections, LLC, on their negligent misrepresentation and deceptive trade practices claims. Summary judgment was inappropriate on the negligent misrepresentation claim because Hampton neither made an affirmative false statement nor omitted a material fact it was bound to disclose. See Halcrow, Inc. V. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 129 Nev 394, 400, 302 P.2d 1148, 1153 (2013) (providing the elements for a negligent misrepresentation claim); Nelson v. Heer, 123 Nev. 217, 225, 163 P.3d. 420, 426 (2007) ("[The suppression or omission of material fact which a party is bound in good faith to disclose is equivalent to a false quotation marks representation." (internal omitted)). Compare NRS 116.31162(1)(b)(3)(II) (2017) (requiring an HOA to disclosure if tender of the superpriority portion of the lien has been made), with NRS 116.31162 (2013)¹ (not requiring any such disclosure). The Noonans' deceptive trade practices claim fails under NRS 598.092(8) for the same reason.

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In this case, Plaintiff has alleged that it attempted to ascertain whether any tender payment of any

24 || type was made to the HOA and/or HOA Trustee before the HOA Foreclosure Sale, without any

25 success. The *Noonan* court stated that "...Hampton neither made an affirmative false statement nor

26 omitted a material fact it was bound to disclose." <u>Id.</u> This decision is based upon a factual

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¹This was the version of the statute in place at the time of the foreclosure sale.

determination of a material fact question; however, the present case facts as presented preclude
 dismissal at this point without discovery. The *Noonan* court does not consider the arguments
 reviewed and presented herein on NRS 116.1113 and NRS 113.130 and its relevant analysis.

In *Bank of America, N.A. v. SFR Invs. Pool 1, LLC*, 427 P.3d 113; 2018 Nev. LEXIS 73; 134 Nev. Adv. Rep. 72 (2018), the Nevada Supreme Court determined that a tendering bank has no obligation to disclose but that is not the case with the HOA and the HOA Trustee. *In Bank of America, N.A.*, the Court addressed the issue of whether the bank, the party making the tender, had a duty to record a partial reconveyance or other recorded document to be placed in the chain of title to the property of its secured lien to acknowledge the tender by the bank. *Id.* The Court opined as follows:

NRS 111.315 states that "[e] very conveyance of real property, and every instrument of writing setting forth an agreement to convey any real property, or whereby any real property may be affected, proved acknowledged and certified in the manner prescribed in this chapter . . . shall be recorded" NRS 111.010 defines conveyance as "every instrument in writing, except a last will and testament . . . by which any estate or interest in lands is created, alienated, assigned or surrendered." Thus, when an interest in land is created, alienated, assigned, or surrendered, the instrument documenting the transaction must be recorded.

By its plain text, NRS 111.315 does not apply to Bank of America's tender. Tendering the superpriority portion of an HOA lien does not create, alienate, assign, or surrender an interest in land. Rather, it preserves a pre-existing interest, which does not require recording. See Baxter Dunaway, Interests and Conveyances Outside Acts—Recordable Interests, 4 L. of Distressed Real Est. § 40:8 (2018) ("[D]ocuments which do not create or transfer interests in land are often held to be nonrecordable; the records, after all, are not a public bulletin board."). SFR's argument that the tender was an instrument affecting real property is unpersuasive.

NRS 111.315 pertains to written instruments "setting forth an agreement . . . whereby any real property may be affected . . . in the manner prescribed in this chapter" Emphasis added.) NRS Chapter 111 governs the creation, alienation, assignment, or surrendering of property interests, and their subsequent recording. Bank of America's tender did not bring about any of these actions, and therefore did not affect the property as prescribed in NRS Chapter 111. Accordingly, NRS 111.315 did not require Bank of America to record its tender.

NRS 106.220 provides that "[a]ny instrument by which any mortgage or deed of trust of, lien upon or interest in real property is subordinated or waived as to priority, must ... be recorded "The statute further states that "[t]he instrument is not enforceable under this chapter or chapter 107 of NRS unless and until it is recorded." HN10 NRS Chapter 106 does not define instrument as used in NRS 106.220, but Black's Law Dictionary defines the term as "[a] written [*120] legal

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document that defines rights, duties, entitlements, or liabilities, such as a statute, contract, will, promissory note, or share certificate." Instrument, Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). Thus, NRS 106.220 applies when a written legal document subordinates or waives the priority of a mortgage, deed of trust, lien, or interest in real property.

The changes in the lien priority caused by Bank of America's tender do not invoke NRS 106.220's recording requirements. Generally, the creation and release of a lien cause priority changes in a property's interests as a result of a written legal document. But Bank of America's tender cured the default and prevented foreclosure as to the superpriority portion of the HOA's lien by operation of law. See. NRS 116.3116; 53 C.J.S. Liens § 14 (2017) ("A statutory lien is created and defined by the legislature. The character, operation and [**12] extent of a statutory lien are ascertained solely from the terms of the statute."). NRS Chapter 116's statutory scheme allows banks to tender the payment needed to satisfy the superpriority portion of the HOA lien and maintain its senior interest as the first deed of trust holder. NRS 116.3116(1)-(3); see also Unif. Common Interest Ownership Act (UCIOA) § 3-116 cmt. (amended 2008), 7 pt. 2 U.L.A. 124 (2009) ("As a practical matter, secured lenders will most likely pay the [9] months' assessments demanded by the association rather than having the association foreclose on the unit."). Thus, under the split-lien scheme, tender of the superpriority portion of an HOA lien satisfies that portion of the lien by operation of law. Because the lien is not discharged by using an instrument, NRS Chapter 106 does not apply. Bank of America, N.A., 427 P.3d 119-120.

The concept dealt with by the Court in *Bank of America, N.A.* was that the bank need do nothing other than pay the Super Priority Lien Amount of the HOA Lien to preserve its interest as nothing changes at that point for the bank. In other words, the HOA Lien is not an event that occurs to divest the bank of its security interest in the Property if it pays the superpriority portion of the HOA Lien prior to the HOA Foreclosure Sale. The party that needs to acknowledge the Attempted Payment is the HOA and HOA Trustee as they are offering the Property for sale to the bidders at the HOA Foreclosure Sale.

E. An HOA foreclosure deed does make certain representations regardless of the "without warranty" limitation.

Defendant argues that the Property was sold at the HOA Foreclosure Sale "without warranty," pursuant to NRS 116.31164(3)(a)..." See HOA's Motion, page 10, lines 2-9. The HOA and HOA Trustee have an obligation of good faith, candor and complying with all applicable law

at the time of the HOA Foreclosure Sale which they collectively did not. The HOA and HOA 1 Trustee cannot intentionally withhold information known only to the Former Owner, the HOA and 2 HOA Trustee that materially, adversely affects, the Purchasers as defined under NRS 116 and NRS 3 113, Plaintiff, as to the value and nature of the bifurcated lien status of the Deed of Trust and the 4 assessments. Of matters not specifically known to the HOA and HOA Trustee at the time of the 5 6 HOA Foreclosure Sale that cannot be adduced by a public records review as occurs in NRS 107 foreclosure sales, Plaintiff would concede that Defendants would not be liable. However, in the 7 instant case, the HOA and HOA Trustee are the actual parties with the information regarding the 8 9 Attempted Payment and had an obligation to inform the Plaintiff. This fact alone constitutes sufficient proof of the HOA, by and through its agent, the HOA Trustee, to disclose the Attempted 10 Payment to the Plaintiff and failing to comply with all requirements of law. 11

The Defendants have a duty to disclose the Attempted Payment to a Purchaser, as defined 12 in NRS 116.079, at an HOA Foreclosure Sale pursuant to NRS 116.1113 and NRS 113.130. At the 13 time and place of the HOA Foreclosure Sale, the HOA, by and through its agent, the HOA Trustee, 14 15 enters into a sale governed by a statute, NRS 116, by the function of the auction conducted by the 16 HOA Trustee. Inherently, the material aspects of the factors affecting the lien priority of the secured debt that are only known solely to the HOA, HOA Trustee and Former Owner are material to the 17 HOA Lien being foreclosed upon and must be disclosed to the HOA Foreclosure Sale bidders. To 18 19 infer otherwise, would destroy the statutory scheme of NRS 116 sales.

A common argument among all parties to the HOA litigation has been the low prices 20 adduced at the HOA Foreclosure Sales for the real property sold. Typically, the low sales prices 21 22 have been driven by the mountain of litigation that has occurred over the last years seeking to define the rights and obligations of the various parties. To hold that the HOA does not have a duty to 23 disclose information know only to the HOA and the HOA Trustee that materially affects the value 24 of what a willing buyer would be willing to pay for the real property offered at auction that relates 25 directly to the status and priority of the Deed of Trust. Essentially, the Defendants are alleging that 26 the HOA will sell to the highest cash bidder the real property without any way for the bidder to 27

know if it will acquire the real property free and clear of the Deed of Trust or subject thereto. This 1 would effectively forever destroy the HOA foreclosure sale process under NRS 116.3116. 2 3 As additional proof of the intentional/negligent misrepresentation and its misrepresentation in the HOA Foreclosure Deed that provides that the HOA and the HOA Trustee complied with all 4 5 requirements of law, the HOA and HOA Trustee are obligated to follow the disclosures mandated 6 by NRS 113 et seq. The HOA asserts that NRS 116 governs the foreclosure and collection efforts of common-interest ownership communities and it does. NRS 113 is not in any manner generally 7 8 applicable to NRS 107 foreclosure sales but does have certain provisions that do apply in NRS 107 foreclosure sales. NRS 113 is not exempted from NRS 116 foreclosure sales, to the extent that the 9 10 HOA and the HOA Trustee, as agent for the HOA, have specific knowledge of the facts required for disclosure. If the legislature intended to exempt NRS 116 sales from the mandates of NRS 113, 11 it could have easily done so, but it did not! Pursuant to NRS 113, et seq., the HOA and the HOA 12 Trustee must disclose the Attempted Payment and/or any payments made or attempted to be made 13 by Lender, the Former Owners, or any agents of any other party to the bidders and Plaintiff at the 14 HOA Foreclosure Sale. NRS 113.130 provides as follows: 15 16 NRS 113.130 Completion and service of disclosure form before conveyance of property; discovery or worsening of defect after service of form; exceptions; 17 waiver. 1. Except as otherwise provided in subsection 2: 18 (a) At least 10 days before residential property is conveyed to a purchaser: (1) The seller shall complete a disclosure form regarding the 19 residential property; and (2) The selfer or the seller's agent shall serve the purchaser or the 20 purchaser's agent with the completed disclosure form. (b) If, after service of the completed disclosure form but before 21 conveyance of the property to the purchaser, a seller or the seller's agent discovers a new defect in the residential property that was not identified 22 on the completed disclosure form or discovers that a defect identified on the completed disclosure form has become worse than was indicated on 23 the form, the seller or the seller's agent shall inform the purchaser or the purchaser's agent of that fact, in writing, as soon as practicable after the 24 discovery of that fact but in no event later than the conveyance of the property to the purchaser. If the seller does not agree to repair or replace 25 the defect, the purchaser may: (1) Rescind the agreement to purchase the property; or 26 (2) Close escrow and accept the property with the defect as revealed by the seller or the seller's agent without further recourse. 27 2. Subsection 1 does not apply to a sale or intended sale of residential property: 28 27

(a) By foreclosure pursuant to chapter 107 of NRS. 1 (b) Between any co-owners of the property, spouses or persons related within the third degree of consanguinity. 2 (c) Which is the first sale of a residence that was constructed by a licensed 3 contractor. (d) By a person who takes temporary possession or control of or title to the property solely to facilitate the sale of the property on behalf of a person 4 who relocates to another county, state or country before title to the property is transferred to a purchaser. 5 6 3. A purchaser of residential property may not waive any of the requirements of subsection 1. A seller of residential property may not require a purchaser to waive any of the requirements of subsection 1 as a condition of sale or for any other 7 purpose. Telephone: (702) 254-7775 • Facsimile (702) 228-7719 8 4. If a sale or intended sale of residential property is exempted from the 9 requirements of subsection 1 pursuant to paragraph (a) of subsection 2, the trustee and the beneficiary of the deed of trust shall, not later than at the time of the conveyance of the property to the purchaser of the residential property, or upon 10 the request of the purchaser of the residential property, provide: (a) Written notice to the purchaser of any defects in the property of which 11 the trustee or beneficiary, respectively, is aware; and (b) If any defects are repaired or replaced or attempted to be repaired or 12 replaced, the contact information of any asset management company who provided asset management services for the property. The asset 13 management company shall provide a service report to the purchaser upon request. 14 5. As used in this section: (a) "Seller" includes, without limitation, a client as defined in NRS 15 645H.060. 16 (b) "Service report" has the meaning ascribed to it in NRS 645H.150. Emphasis added. 17 As used in NRS 113, the term "Defect" means a condition that materially affects the value 18 or use of the residential property in an adverse manner. NRS 113.100(1). 19 The HOA and HOA Trustee are required to and must provide a Seller's Real Property 20 Disclosure Form ("SRPDF") to the "Purchaser" as defined in NRS 116, et seq., at the time of the 21 HOA Foreclosure Sale; however, if it is deemed to be exempted, it still must provide information 22 known to it. NRS 116 et seq. foreclosure sales are not exempt from the mandates of NRS 113 et 23 seq. 24 To the extent known to the HOA, and the HOA Trustee, as the agent of the HOA, the 25 HOA and HOA Trustee must complete and answer the questions posed in the SRPDF in its 26 entirety, but specifically, Section 9, Common Interest Communities, disclosures (a) - (f), and 27 Section 11, that provide as follows: 28 28

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9. Common Interest Communities: Any "common areas" (facilities like pools,
tennis courts, walkways or other areas co-owned with others) or a homeowner association which has any authority over the property?
(a) Common Interest Community Declaration and Bylaws available?
(b) Any periodic or recurring association fees?(c) Any unpaid assessments, fines or liens, and any warnings or notices that may
give rise to an assessment, fine or lien? (d) Any litigation, arbitration, or mediation related to property or common areas?
(e) Any assessments associated with the property (excluding property taxes)?
(f) Any construction, modification, alterations, or repairs made without required approval from the appropriate Common Interest Community board or committee?
11. Any other conditions or aspects of the [P]roperty which materially affect its
value or use in an adverse manner? (Emphasis added)
See SRPDF, Form 547.
Section 11 of the SRPDF relates directly to information known to the HOA and the HOA
Trustee that materially affects the value of the Property and defined as a "defect" in NRS
113.100(1), that provides as follows: NRS 113.100(1). In this case, if the Super Priority Lien
Amount is paid, or if the Attempted Payment is rejected, it would have a materially adverse affect
on the overall value of the Property, and therefore, must be disclosed in the SRPDF by the HOA
and the HOA Trustee when the SRPDF is completed and disclosed to the purchaser/Plaintiff.
Section 9(c) - (e) of the SRPDF would provide notice of any payments made by Former
Owner or others on the HOA Lien.
Section 11 of the SRPDF generally deals with the disclosure of the condition of the title to
the Property that would only be known by the HOA and the HOA Trustee.
Pursuant to Nevada Real Estate Division's ("NRED"), Residential Disclosure Guide (the
"Guide"), the Guide provides at page 20 that the HOA and HOA Trustee shall provide the
following to the purchaser/Plaintiff at the HOA Foreclosure Sale:
The content of the disclosure is based on what the seller is aware of at the time. If,
after completion of the disclosure form, the seller discovers a new defect or notices that a previously disclosed condition has worsened, the seller must inform
the purchaser, in writing, as soon as practicable after discovery of the condition, or before conveyance of the property.
The buyer may not waive, and the seller may not require a buyer to waive, any of
the requirements of the disclosure as a condition of sale or for any other purpose. 29
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In a sale or intended sale by foreclosure, the trustee and the beneficiary of the deed of trust shall provide, not later than the conveyance of the property to, or upon request from, the buyer:

• written notice of any defects of which the trustee or beneficiary is aware

If the HOA and/or HOA Trustee fails to provide the SRPDF to the Plaintiff/purchaser at the time of the HOA Foreclosure Sale, the Guide explains that:

A Buyer may rescind the contract without penalty if he does not receive a fully and properly completed Seller's Real Property Disclosure form. If a Buyer closes a transaction without a completed form or if a known defect is not disclosed to a Buyer, the Buyer may be entitled to treble damages, unless the Buyer waives his rights under NRS 113.150(6).

Pursuant to NRS 113.130(4), the HOA and HOA Trustee are required to provide the information set forth in the SRPDF to Plaintiff at the HOA Foreclosure Sale and no later than the drop of the gavel.

The HOA and the HOA Trustee did not provide an SRPDF to the Plaintiff at the HOA Foreclosure Sale nor did it provide any information orally. The foregoing demonstrates that the HOA and the HOA Trustee's duty and obligation to disclose the Attempted Payment to the Purchaser, Plaintiff at the HOA Foreclosure Sale. Failure to make the foregoing disclosures is a breach of duty of good faith and candor and a duty owed by the HOA Trustee under NRS 116, *et seq.* The HOA and HOA Trustee's duty is codified pursuant to NRS 113 *et seq.* and was breached in this case.

As a result of the HOA and HOA Trustee's failure and breach of their duty of good faith and candor pursuant to NRS 116 in not disclosing the Attempted Payment and to provide Plaintiff with the mandated SRPDF and disclosures required therein that were known to the HOA and HOA Trustee, Plaintiff has been economically damaged.

Furthermore, while the unpublished orders set forth that the Property would still have the same "value" regardless of whether it is encumbered by the First Deed of Trust, Plaintiff believes this misapprehends the facts, as set forth by the complaint and the record in this matter. Plaintiff alleges that as "used in NRS 113, the term 'Defect' means a condition that materially affects the value or use of the residential property in an adverse manner." NRS 113.100. While Plaintiff

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contends that the "value" of the Property is impacted by it remaining encumbered by the First 1 2 Deed of Trust, Plaintiff did not abandon the remainder of the NRS 113 claim, namely, that the "use" of the residential property could be impacted, which in turn could affect the "value." 3 Thus, while the unpublished orders note that the "value" of the Property technically remains the 4 5 same whether encumbered or not, to the extent that it differs from a construction defect or other physical impairment that could decrease the value by a fixed amount for repairs of same, it fails to 6 account for the entirety of the definition of "Defect" set forth in NRS 113.100. If the First Deed of 7 Trust remains an encumbrance on the Property, Plaintiff, or any other buyer, cannot know 1) 8 when the First Deed of Trust will be foreclosed and the junior interest eliminated, 2) the price to 9 avert foreclosure under the First Deed of Trust (i.e. what the principal, interest, escrow, fees etc.. 10 are under the First Deed of Trust), and 3) the use during that time period (i.e. short-term rental, 11 long-term rental, sale, etc...). Thus, while the value of the Property as a *res* may remain 12 unchanged by an encumbrance, NRS 113 sets forth "value or use" which implies a more 13 extensive definition then merely the value of the Property as a collection of boards, pipes, and 14 wires. 15

F. Plaintiff's claim for special damages will be determined at the time of trial

The attorney fees and costs allegations as set forth in each cause of action references any 17 claims that may be able to be adduced from the discovery in this case and/or the CC&R's if the 18 HOA is successful in its argument under NRS 30.310. Pursuant to NRS 116.4117(6), "the court 19 may award reasonable attorney's fees to the prevailing party" if the matter is subject to the 20 CC&R's, which will be a factual determination by the Court.

G. Plaintiff's claims for punitive damages are not precluded in this case

As it relates to the HOA, punitive damages are allowed pursuant to NRS 116.4117 in certain cases as follows:

1. Subject to the requirements set forth in subsection 2, if a declarant, community manager or any other person subject to this chapter fails to comply with any of its provisions or any provision of the declaration or bylaws, any person or class of persons suffering actual damages from the failure to comply may bring a civil action for damages or other appropriate relief.

1	IV. CONCLUSION	
2		
2	Based upon the foregoing, the Opposition should be sustained and the HOA's Motion and HOA Trustee's Joinder should be denied.	
4	DATED this 24 th day of November, 2020.	
5	DATED uns 24 day of November, 2020.	
6	ROGER P. CROTEAU & ASSOCIATES, LTD.	
7	/s/ Raymond Jereza	
8	Roger P. Croteau, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 4958	
9	Raymond Jereza, Esq.	
9 10	Nevada Bar No. 11823 2810 W. Charleston Blvd., Ste. 75 Las Vegas, Nevada 89102	
11	Attorneys for Plaintiff	
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	AA129	

1	CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
2	I hereby certify that on November 24, 2020, a true copy of the foregoing was served via
3	electronic means on all persons and parties in the E-Service Master List in the Eighth Judicial
4	District Court E-Filing System, pursuant to EDCR 8.05(a).
5 6	/s/ Joe Koehle
7	An employee of ROGER P. CROTEAU & ASSOCIATES, LTD.
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		Electronically Filed 12/9/2020 2:54 PM Steven D. Grierson
1	LIPSON NEILSON P.C.	CLERK OF THE COURT
2	KALEB D. ANDERSON, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 7582	Column.
3	PETER E. DUNKLEY, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 11110	
4	9900 Covington Cross Drive, Ste. 120	
5	Las Vegas, Nevada 89144 (702) 382-1500 phone	
6	(702) 382-1512 fax <u>kanderson@lipsonneilson.com</u>	
7	pdunkley@lipsonneilson.com Attorneys for Defendants Harbor Cove Hom	eowners Association
8		
9	DISTRI	CT COURT
10	CLARK COU	JNTY, NEVADA
11		
12	RIVER GLIDER AVENUE TRUST,	CASE NO.: A-20-819781-C
13	Plaintiff,	DEPT. NO.: 20
14	VS.	
15	HARBOR COVE HOMEOWNERS	HARBOR COVE HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION'S REPLY IN SUPPORT
16	ASSOCIATON; and NEVADA ASSOCIATION SERVICES, INC.,	OF MOTION TO DISMISS OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, FOR SUMMARY
17		JUDGMENT
18	Defendants.	
19		
20		ove Homeowners Association (the "HOA"), by
21		IEILSON, P.C., and hereby submit this Reply in
22	Support of its Motion to Dismiss or in the alte	ernative, for Summary Judgment.
23	111	
24		
25	///	
26	///	
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	Page	e 1 of 13

LIPSON NEILSON, P.C. 9900 Covington Cross Drive, Suite 120, Las Vegas, Nevada 89144 Telephone: (702) 382-1500 Facsimile: (702) 382-1512

Case Number: A-20-819781-C

	1	This Reply is made and based on the following Memorandum of Points and
	2	Authorities, the pleadings and papers on file, and any oral arguments the Court may
	3	consider in this matter.
	4	Dated this 9 th day of December 2020.
	5	LIPSON NEILSON, P.C.
	6	/s/ Peter E. Dunkley
	7	By:
	8	KALEB D. ANDERSON, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 7582
_	9	PETER E. DUNKLEY, ESQ.
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SON, P.C. 120, Las Vegas, Nevada 8 Facsimile: (702) 382-1512	13	pdunkley@lipsonneilson.com
lLSON te 120, Fac	14	Attorneys for Defendants Harbor Cove Homeowners Association
LIPSON NEILSON, P.C. 9900 Covington Cross Drive, Suite 120, Las Vegas, Nevada 89144 Telephone: (702) 382-1500 Facsimile: (702) 382-1512	15	
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		Page 2 of 13

REPLY MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

INTRODUCTION

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I.

Plaintiff's introduction to its opposition ("Opposition") complicates a simple question: What is the duty of an HOA to bidders at a nonjudicial foreclosure sale under the HOA's NRS 116 lien? The simple answer is: The HOA must comply with NRS 116. The Nevada Supreme Court has said as much, multiple times in different contexts. For example: "because the relevant statutory scheme curtails an HOA's ability to dictate the method, manner, time, place, and terms of its foreclosure sale, an HOA has little autonomy in taking extra-statutory efforts to increase the winning bid at the sale." Nationstar Mortg., LLC v. Saticoy Bay LLC Series 2227 Shadow Canyon, 405 P.3d 641, 645 (Nev. 2017). Accordingly, an HOA's duty is to follow NRS 116, which provided the notice requirements for a nonjudicial foreclosure sale. The notices are mailed out and publicly recorded at the County Recorder's Office, which provides notice to the world. None of the provisions of NRS 116 required divulging a homeowner's payment history in any greater detail than providing the total lien amount indicated in the publicly available nonjudicial foreclosure notices. Again from the Nevada Supreme Court: "The [publicly recorded] notices went to the homeowner and other junior lienholders, not just [the bank], so it was appropriate to state the total amount of the lien." SFR Invs. Pool 1, LLC. v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 130 Nev. 742, 757, 334 P.3d 408, 418 (2014).

The facts of this case are still undisputed, and because there is no genuine factual dispute, the Court may rule as a matter of law.

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II.

THE MATERIAL FACTS ARE STILL UNDISPUTED

The former homeowner was delinquent in paying HOA assessments which resulted in the recording of nonjudicial foreclosure notices as set forth in NRS 116. (Opposition 6:5-14.)

In May of 2011, the former homeowner made a partial payment which "cured the amount of the HOA Lien entitled to priority over the Deed of Trust." (Opposition 6:15-20.)

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LIPSON NEILSON, P.C. 9900 Covington Cross Drive, Suite 120, Las Vegas, Nevada 89144 Telephone: (702) 382-1500 Facsimile: (702) 382-1512 About a year later, because an HOA Lien delinquency remained unpaid, a second nonjudicial foreclosure sale notice was recorded, and the former homeowner became the former homeowner when the Plaintiff purchased the home for \$5,500.00. (Opposition 7:4-8.)

Plaintiff obtained title to the property via nonwarranty nonjudicial foreclosure deed as mandated by NRS 116, which contained the recital that the HOA "complied with all requirements of law...." (Opposition 7:9-10.)

In prior litigation between the Plaintiff and the bank, the Court determined that the nonjudicial foreclosure sale did not extinguish the bank's Deed of Trust because the former homeowner's partial payment in May of 2011 discharged the superpriority portion of the HOA's Lien. *See generally*, Court's Order attached previously as Exhibit A to the HOA's Motion to Dismiss.

III. THE IMMATERIAL AND HYPOTHETICAL FACTS AND LEGAL CONCLUSIONS STILL DON'T MATTER

In Plaintiff's factual assertions in the Opposition, in paragraphs 12-29, Plaintiff recites "facts" many of which are hypothetical (¶ 18 (*if* bidders had known...)), or legal conclusions, (¶ 24 (The HOA conspired)), or unrelated to the HOA (¶ 15 ("Lender" alleges)). The recited "facts" do not allege that the HOA failed to follow any particular provision of NRS 116. The recited hypothetical "facts" and legal conclusions are immaterial for purposes of summary judgment. *See Wood v. Safeway, Inc.,* 121 Nev. 724, 730 (2005) (Only material facts that may affect the outcome may preclude summary judgment).

IV. REPLY ARGUMENT

A. MISREPRESENTATION CLAIM FAILS BECAUSE NRS 116 DOES NOT REQUIRE THE HOA TO DISCLOSE PAYMENT HISTORIES

Plaintiff's misrepresentation claim fails because NRS 116 did not require an HOA to disclose the former owner's payment history. Plaintiff argues that the HOA intentionally failed to disclose the partial payment so it "would not chill the sale of the Property for [the HOA's] economic gain." (Opposition 13: 2-4.) However, a common sense look at the facts

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belies the argument. First, in 2012, there was no requirement in NRS 116 to disclose payment histories of homeowners. The nonjudicial foreclosure notice provisions are spelled out in NRS 116, and in 2012, the correct amount of the lien in the notices was the total lien 3 amount, because the notices, which were publicly recorded, went to all record lien holders 4 so it was "appropriate to state the total amount of the lien." SFR Invs. Pool 1, LLC. v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 130 Nev. 742, 757, 334 P.3d 408, 418 (2014). 6

In other words, if the HOA varied from NRS 116 and disclosed payment histories to bidders, the HOA would be outside of the statutory notice requirements set forth in NRS 116, which the HOA is obligated to follow.

Second, under NRS 116, and HOA's best day at a nonjudicial foreclosure sale results in a sale in which the HOA is made whole. The HOA does not receive any benefit from a sale that results in proceeds exceeding the lien amount. See NRS 116.31164 providing how proceeds are distributed (excess to unit's owner). In other words, if the bidder bids \$1 million, the HOA gets to keep only the amount of the lien, and the rest (minus junior liens) goes to the former homeowner. There is no incentive for the HOA to either chill or pump-up the sale. The HOA's only objective is to collect the money it has already advanced due to the delinguent homeowner.

Third, it appears insincere that a purchaser of a \$600,000.00 house, for a payment of \$5,500.00, was induced by the HOA's alleged nondisclosure of the partial payment made by the former homeowner about a year before the nonjudicial foreclosure sale. It is undisputed that there were two notices of sale recorded, the first one in March of 2011, and the second in April of 2012. A more sincere source of chilling, if any, would be the public knowledge that the first nonjudicial foreclosure sale was called off, and a second one proceeded a year later.

On summary judgment, the non-moving party must come forward with admissible 25 evidence to avoid summary judgment. The Opposition provides none. The Court may 26 grant the HOA's Motion with respect to the misrepresentation claim. 27

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B. BREACH OF DUTY OF GOOD FAITH FAILS AS A MATTER OF LAW

Plaintiff alleges that the HOA breached an obligation of "good faith, honesty-in-fact, reasonable standards of fair dealing and candor pursuant to NRS 116.1113 and NRS 113.130." (Opposition p. 13: 24-26.) The argument fails to present a genuine factual issue.

As addressed in the HOA's MSJ, NRS 116.1113 imposes a duty of good faith *in the performance of every contract or duty governed by the statute*, the only "duties" owed are outlined in sections 116.3116 through 116.31168. Here, the HOA fully complied with these duties by complying with all notice and recording requirements set forth in NRS 116 as it existed at the time of the sale. As established by the Prior Litigation, the nonjudicial foreclosure sale was valid, meaning there was no defect in the underlying sale. Accordingly, logic dictates that, in the absence of a defect in the nonjudicial foreclosure sale, the HOA complied with NRS 116.

Additionally, nothing in the 2012 version of NRS 116.1113, imposed a requirement to disclose a payment or payment history. *Compare* the 2017 version of NRS 116.31162(1)(b)(3)(11) (2017) (requiring an HOA to disclose if tender of the superpriority portion of the lien) with NRS 116.31162 (2005) (no disclosure requirement).

The "candor, honesty, reasonable standards" language in the comments of the UCIOA, on which NRS 116 is based, does not change the analysis. A statute is public knowledge and thus, complying with the statute should be the public expectation. An example of the fairness of complying with a public statute is that NRS 116, even in the 2012 version of NRS 116, had the legal requirement mandating the type of deed resulting from a nonjudicial foreclosure sale—a deed "without warranty." NRS 116.31164(3)(a). Thus, according to the public statute and the public expectation, the HOA is specifically prohibited from giving any purchaser at the nonjudicial foreclosure auction a so-called warranty deed or making any promises or warranties regarding the physical condition of the property or the character of the title to the property.

Plaintiff claims reliance on the nonwarranty deed recitals, yet none of the recitals relate to the condition of the title of the property. The recitals are conclusive related to the

Page 6 of 13

nonjudicial foreclosure process: (1) default, mailing and recording of notices of delinguency and notice of default, (2) 90 days have passed, and (3) giving the notice of the sale. In other words, the deed recitals protect the HOA's nonjudicial foreclosure procedure. The 3 recitals do not convert a nonjudicial foreclosure nonwarranty deed into a warranty deed. 4

The only way the Plaintiff can feign a lack of candor on the part of the HOA is by not reading NRS 116, and unilaterally assuming the nonjudicial foreclosure deed is a warranty deed, which shifts the alleged omission from the HOA's nonexistent disclosure, to an omission more accurately described as the Plaintiff's willful ignorance to a nonwarranty deed expressly required by NRS 116.

Plaintiff's argument about what the HOA knew or should have known regarding the effect of the former homeowner's partial payment makes no sense, today, or in 2012. Not until the Nevada Supreme Court's 2014 ruling in the SFR Decision, two years after the nonjudicial foreclosure sale in this case, could anyone venture a prediction regarding priority, superpriority, tenders, etc., and yet here we are, still litigating six years later.

On summary judgment, the non-moving party must come forward with admissible evidence. The Opposition provides none that shows the HOA was not acting in good faith. The HOA was not required to disclose the existence of a pre-sale partial payment. Accordingly, Plaintiff's claim for breach of good faith based on an alleged duty which did not exist in the 2012 version of NRS 116 fails as a matter of law. The Court should dismiss the claim, with prejudice, or grant summary judgment in favor of the HOA.

C. THE HOA DID NOT NEED TO RECORD A NOTICE OF THE PARTIAL PAYMENT

Plaintiff argues that under the reasoning of Bank of America, N.A. v. SFR Invs. Pool 1, LLC, 427 P.3d 113; 2018 Nev. LEXIS 73; 134 Nev. Adv. Rep. 72 (2018), the HOA is obligated to acknowledge the partial payment to bidders at the nonjudicial foreclosure sale. (Opposition p. 25.) However, the reasoning should not apply. In the Bank of America decision, the Nevada Supreme Court analyzed the recording statutes and mortgage instrument statute, NRS 111 and NRS 106 respectively. The court concluded the bank did

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not have to record a preforeclosure tender for the tender to be effective, because the tender protected the superpriority portion of the lien by operation of law. *Bank of America, N.A.*, 427 P.3d 119-120. Plaintiff provides no authority or analysis on why it concludes: "The party that needs to acknowledge the [partial payment] is the HOA...." (Opposition 25:20-21.) The Court may disregard this argument.

D. NRS 113.130 STILL DOES NOT APPLY TO NONJUDICIAL FORECLOSURES

Plaintiff argues that NRS 113 applies to NRS 116 nonjudicial foreclosure sales. Plaintiff is incorrect. Plaintiff argues the legislature did not exempt NRS 116 from NRS 113's requirements. That's the Plaintiff's way of saying that NRS 113 does not cross-reference NRS 116, nor does NRS 116 cross-reference NRS 113. The absence of a reference to NRS 116 is conspicuous. Where NRS 116 invokes a different section of the NRS, it does so expressly. *See e.g.*, NRS 116.310312 (referencing NRS 40 and NRS 107); *see also* NRS 116.31032 (referencing NRS 119A). NRS 116 does not incorporate NRS 113, and NRS 113 does not incorporate NRS 116.

When construing statutes, the Court must look at the plain language and not alter or add language that is not there. *In re Aragon*, No. 79638, 136 Nev. Adv. Rep. 75, 2020 Nev. LEXIS 72, at *3 (Dec. 3, 2020) (plain language); *see also, Maxwell v. State Indus. Ins. Sys.*, 109 Nev. 327, 330, 849 P.2d 267, 269 (1993) (courts should not alter or add language). *See also*, the persuasive authority, *Res. Group v. Grapevine Villas Homeowners Ass'n*, 2020 Nev. Dist. LEXIS 404, *10 (Nev. Dist. Ct. May 13, 2020) ("the plain language of NRS 113, NRS Chapter 113 does not apply to foreclosure sales conducted pursuant to NRS Chapter 116").

In this case, there is no language in NRS 113 which referenced, incorporates, or relates to NRS 116. *See generally*, NRS 113. Thus, statutory construction does not require an HOA to provide an SRPD.

Additionally, as noted in the HOA's MSJ, other courts agree NRS 113 does not apply to NRS 116 nonjudicial foreclosures. See Saticoy Bay v. Silverstone Ranch Cmty. Ass'n,

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No. 80039, 2020 Nev. Unpub. LEXIS 993, at *2 (Oct. 16, 2020) (NRS 113 requires disclosure of "defects" not "superpriority tenders").

[NRS] § 113 [is] inapplicable here as NRS § 116 provides different procedures and rights in HOA foreclosure sales. Specifically, for example, NRS § 116 does not require an SRPD, or recording of a subordination of a lien. *See, SFR Invs. Pool 1. LLC*, 427 P.3d 113. For this same reason, the NRED handbook is inapplicable because it specifically discusses the SPRD under NRS § 113, not NRS § 116.

Moreover, pursuant to NRS § 113.1100 (s), a seller is a person who sells or intends to sell any residential property. Pursuant to NRS § 116, the HOA was a foreclosing association and not a seller as defined under NRS § 113.130. NRS § 116 precludes the requirement of NRS § 113 for a SRPD as the foreclosure auction process does not follow the sale process referenced in NRS § 113 and the Investors claim for violation of NRS § 113 must be dismissed.

Saticoy Bay LLC Series 9076 Quarrystone v. Md. Pebble at Silverado Homeowners Ass'n, 2019 Nev. Dist. LEXIS 1009, *4 (Eighth Judicial District, Sept. 23, 2019).

Plaintiff's opposition does not address the HOA's argument that any claim based on NRS 113 is time barred. Additionally, even if NRS 113 applies, (which it does not) the claim is time-barred because NRS 113 sets forth a one or two year statute of limitation. *See* NRS 113.150(4): "[a]n action to enforce the provisions of this subsection must be commenced not later than 1 year after the purchaser discovers or reasonably should have discovered the defect or 2 years after the conveyance of the property to the purchaser, whichever occurs later."

Based on the discovery of the pre-foreclosure payment (which is not a defect), Plaintiff alleges the disclosure occurred on August 24, 2017 (Compl. ¶ 41). Accordingly, the statute of limitation expired one year after the disclosure, on August 24, 2018. The complaint was filed on August 20, 2020, nearly two years too late.

The claim fails substantively or procedurally. Thus, the Court may dismiss the complaint with prejudice, or grant summary judgment in favor of the HOA.

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E. PLAINTIFF'S DOES NOT OPPOSE DISMISSAL OF CONSPIRACY CLAIM

Other than the conclusory factual allegations, (Opposition p. 8:15, 23) Plaintiff's Opposition does not address the HOA's conspiracy argument. Accordingly, the court may grant this portion of the HOA's motion as unopposed. *See* EDCR 2.20(e); *see also See Edwards v. Emperor's Garden Rest.*, 122 Nev. 317, 330 n.38, 130 P.3d 1280, 1288 n.38 (2006) (court need not address non-cogent argument).

F. PLAINTIFF IS NOT ENTITLED TO SPECIAL DAMAGES AND TO THE EXTENT THE PLAINTIFF IS SEEKING DAMAGES FOR VIOLATION OF THE CC&RS, THE CLAIMS SHOULD BE DISMISSED PURSUANT TO NRS 38.310¹

Plaintiff argues it is entitled to special damages "if the matter is subject to the CC&Rs." (Opposition 30:19-21.) However, the complaint does not reference the CC&Rs as a source of relief for the Plaintiff or as the basis of any alleged misdeeds by the HOA. To the extent the CC&Rs are implicated in this case, the complaint should be dismissed pursuant to NRS 38.310, which requires an NRED mediation prior to filing a civil action. The case should be dismissed and an NRED mediation is required even if the issue is raised for the first time on appeal:

[Even if an HOA raises this issue the for the first time on appeal] Under NRS 38.310(1)(a) (2011), "[n]o civil action based upon a claim relating to . . . [t]he interpretation, application or enforcement of [an HOA's CC&Rs] . . may be commenced in any court in this State unless the action has been submitted to mediation or arbitration." Additionally, NRS 38.310(2) provides that "[a] court shall dismiss any civil action which is commenced in violation of the provisions of subsection 1." *See also McKnight Family, LLP v. Adept Mgmt. Servs.*, 129 Nev. 610, 614, 310 P.3d 555, 558 (2013).

Aliante Master Ass'n v. Prem Deferred Tr., 414 P.3d 300 (Nev. 2018).

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¹ The undersigned understands NRS 38.310 was not raised as a basis for dismissal in the original motion—the complaint doesn't reference the CC&Rs as a source of the HOA's alleged wrongdoing. However, having raised the specter of a CC&R violation, for the first time in its opposition, the Court may consider this argument made for the first time in the reply. The HOA will not oppose a surreply solely on this issue.

In this case, the complaint did not cite to the CC&Rs nor allege that the HOA did not comply with the CC&Rs. In opposition to the HOA's Motion, the Plaintiff argues a factual determination will be made by the court. However, on summary judgment, the non-moving party cannot rely on the pleadings but must set forth admissible evidence establishing a genuine issue for trial. Plaintiff's Opposition includes none. There is no genuine fact issue. The Court may grant summary judgment in favor of the HOA or dismiss the claim pursuant to NRS 38.310.

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G. THERE IS NO BASIS FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES

The Opposition argues, without supporting facts or evidence, that punitive damages are available. (Opposition p. 32.) However, as noted by Plaintiff, punitive damages require "willful and material failure" to comply with NRS 116. The argument appears to be the Plaintiff trying to have his cake and eat it too. "One cannot have his cake and eat it too." *Ruppert v. Edwards*, 67 Nev. 200, 227, 216 P.2d 616, 629 (1950).

On the one hand, Plaintiff is arguing that the HOA is liable because the HOA should NOT have complied with NRS 116 by disclosing the payment history of the former homeowner. On the other hand, Plaintiff is arguing, IF there is "clear and convincing evidence" of willful and material noncompliance with NRS 116, then Plaintiff gets punitive damages. Thus, the HOA is wrong either way. But either way, on summary judgment, the "non-moving party may not rest upon general allegations and conclusions, but must, by affidavit or otherwise, set forth specific facts demonstrating the existence of a genuine factual issue." *Wood v. Safeway, Inc.*, 121 Nev. 724, 731, 121 P.3d 1026, 1030-31 (2005). Plaintiff's naked argument is insufficient. The Court may grant summary judgment in favor of the HOA.

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CONCLUSION V.

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Based on the foregoing, the Court should dismiss the complaint, with prejudice, or alternatively, the Court may grant summary judgment in favor of the HOA because Plaintiff 3 has not provided any admissible evidence of a genuine factual issue. Further, the Plaintiff 4 has already established the character of the title it obtained through the District Court's Order in the Prior Litigation. The complaint may be dismissed, or summary judgment 6 granted in favor of the HOA.

Dated this 9th day of December 2020.

LIPSON NEILSON, P.C.

/s/ Peter E. Dunkley

By:

KALEB D. ANDERSON, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 7582 PETER E. DUNKLEY, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 11110 9900 Covington Cross Drive, Ste. 120 Las Vegas, Nevada 89144 (702) 382-1500 phone (702) 382-1512 fax kanderson@lipsonneilson.com pdunkley@lipsonneilson.com Attorneys for Harbor Cove HOA

1	CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
2	I hereby certify that on the 9 th day of December 2020, an electronic copy of the
3	following HARBOR COVE HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION REPLY IN SUPPORT OF
4	MOTION TO DISMISS OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT was
5	filed and e-served via the Court's electronic service system to all persons who have
6	registered tor e-service in this case:
7	Roger P. Croteau, Esq. Raymond Jereza, Esq.
8	ROGER P. CROTEAU & ASSOCIATES, LTD.
9	2810 W. Charleston Blvd., Suite 75 Las Vegas, Nevada 89148
10	Attorney for Plaintiff
11	/s/ Renee M. Ríttenhouse
12	An Employee of LIPSON NEILSON, P.C.
13	An Employee of Eli Son NEILSON, F.C.
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2) 228-7719	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8	ROGER P. CROTEAU, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 4958 RAYMOND JEREZA, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 11823 ROGER P. CROTEAU & ASSOCIATES, LTD 2810 W. Charleston Blvd., Ste. 75 Las Vegas, Nevada 89102 (702) 254-7775 (702) 228-7719 (facsimile) croteaulaw@croteaulaw.com ray@croteaulaw.com Attorneys for Plaintiff	Electronically Filed 12/15/2020 8:22 AM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT		
	9	DISTRICT COURT			
	10	CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA			
Telephone: (702) 254-7775 • Facsimile (702) 228-7719	 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 	Plaintiff, vs. HARBOR COVE HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION; and NEVADA ASSOCIATION SERVICES, INC., Defendants.	Case No: A-20-819781-C Dept No: 20 PLAINTIFF'S ERRATA TO OPPOSITION TO HARBOR COVE HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION'S MOTION TO DISMISS OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND NEVADA ASSOCIATION SERVICES, INC.'S JOINDER THERETO		
	21222324	COMES NOW, Plaintiff, RIVER GLIDER AVENUE TRUST, by and through its attorneys, ROGER P. CROTEAU & ASSOCIATES, LTD., and hereby presents its Errata to			
	24	Opposition to Harbor Cove Homeowners Association Motion to Dismiss, which was inadvertently			
	25 26	not filed with the Opposition.			
	26 27				
	28	1 Core Number A 20 84078			
		Case Number: A-20-81978	1-C		

ROGER P. CROTEAU & ASSOCIATES, LTD. • 2810 West Charleston Blvd, Suite 75 • Las Vegas, Nevada 89102 •

	1	See attached Declaration of Eddie Ha	addad.
	2	DATED this 15 th day of December, 2020.	
	3		ROGER P. CROTEAU & ASSOCIATES, LTD.
	4		
	5		/s/ Roger P. Croteau Roger P. Croteau, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 4958
	6		Nevada Bar No. 4958 Raymond Jereza, Esg.
	7		Raymond Jereza, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 11823 2810 W. Charleston Blvd., Ste. 75
	8		Las Vegas, Nevada 89102 Attorneys for Plaintiff
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ROGER P. CROTEAU & ASSOCIATES, LTD. • 2810 West Charleston Blvd, Suite 75 • Las Vegas, Nevada 89102 • Telephone: (702) 254-7775 • Facsimile (702) 228-7719

1	CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
2	I hereby certify that on November 24, 2020, a true copy of the foregoing was served via
3	electronic means on all persons and parties in the E-Service Master List in the Eighth Judicial
4	District Court E-Filing System, pursuant to EDCR 8.05(a).
5 6	/s/ Joe Koehle
7	An employee of ROGER P. CROTEAU & ASSOCIATES, LTD.
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DECLARATION OF IYAD HADDAD

IYAD "EDDIE" HADDAD, being first duly sworn, deposes and says:

I, Iyad Haddad, being first duly sworn, deposes and says as follows: I am a resident of the State of Nevada. I am the Trustee of RIVER GLIDER AVENUE TRUST ("*River Glider*"). River Glider obtained its' interest in the Property from the HOA Foreclosure Sale. In my capacity as set forth above, I have reviewed the foregoing Opposition to HOA's Motion. Of the facts asserted therein, I know them to be true of my own knowledge or they are true to the best of my knowledge and recollection.

I further provide that it was my practice and procedure, as set forth herein, that prior to attending and/or at an HOA Foreclosure Sale pursuant to NRS 116 at all times relevant to this case, Would attempt to ascertain whether anyone had attempted to or did tender any payment regarding the homeowner association's lien. If I learned that a "tender" had either been attempted or made, I would not purchase the property offered in that foreclosure sale.

I would and did rely on whatever recital and/or announcements that were made at the HOA 17 Foreclosure Sale. I also relied on the HOA Foreclosure Deed that provided that the HOA and HOA 18 19 Trustee complied with all requirements of law. I reasonably relied upon the HOA and/or the HOA 20 Trustee's material omission of the tender and/or Attempted Payment of the Super Priority Lien 21 Amount and/or the Attempted Payment or any portion thereof upon prior inquiry when I purchased 22 the Property on behalf of the Plaintiff. As part of my practice and procedure in both NRS 107 and 23 NRS 116 foreclosure sales, I would call the foreclosing agent/HOA Trustee and confirm whether 24 the sale was going forward on the scheduled date; and in the context of an NRS 116 foreclosure 25 26 sale, I would ask if anyone had paid anything on the account. I would contact the HOA Trustee 27 prior to the HOA Foreclosure Sale to determine if the Property would in fact be sold on the date 28

stated in the NOS, obtain the opening bid, so I could determine the amount of funds necessary for the auction and inquire if any payments had been made; however, I never inquired if the "Super Priority Lien Amount" had been paid. I personally do all of the research on any and all properties that I purchased at the HOA Foreclosure Sales.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed this 14th day of December 2020..

<u>/s/</u>Eddie Haddad EDDIE HADDAD

	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8	LIPSON NEILSON P.C. KALEB D. ANDERSON, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 7582 PETER E. DUNKLEY, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 11110 9900 Covington Cross Drive, Ste. 120 Las Vegas, Nevada 89144 (702) 382-1500 phone (702) 382-1512 fax kanderson@lipsonneilson.com pdunkley@lipsonneilson.com Attorneys for Defendants Harbor Cove Homeowners Association	Electronically Filed 1/5/2021 6:46 PM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT			
9144	10	9 10 DISTRICT COURT				
vada 8 2-1512	11					
120, Las Vegas, Nevada 8 Facsimile: (702) 382-1512	12 13	RIVER GLIDER AVENUE TRUST,	CASE NO.: A-20-819781-C			
, 120, La Facsim	14	Plaintiff,	DEPT. NO.: 20			
e, Suite -1500	15	VS.				
9900 Covington Cross Drive, Suite 120, Las Vegas, Nevada 89144 Telephone: (702) 382-1500 Facsimile: (702) 382-1512	16 17	HARBOR COVE HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATON; and NEVADA ASSOCIATION SERVICES, INC.,	HARBOR COVE HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION'S ANSWER TO PLANTIFF'S COMPLAINT			
900 Coving Teleph	18 19	Defendants.				
0	20	COMES NOW, Defendant Harbor Cove Homeowners Association (the "HOA"), by				
	21	and through its counsel of record, LIPSON I	NEILSON, P.C., and hereby submit this Answer			
	22	to the Complaint as follows:				
	23	PARTIES ANI	D JURSIDICTION			
	24	1. Admit.				
	25	2. HOA is without knowledge or	information sufficient to form a belief about the			
	26	truth of the allegation and thus denies.				
	27	3. Admit.				
	28					
		Page	e 1 of 12			
		Case Number: A 20.81	0791 C			

LIPSON NEILSON, P.C.

Admit HOA is a common interest community subject to NRS 116. HOA
 denies the remainder.

5. This paragraph contains a legal conclusion. To the extent a response is
required, HOA is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the truth
of the allegation and thus denies.

6. This paragraph contains a legal conclusion which does not require a response.

7. This paragraph contains a legal conclusion which does not require a response.

GENERAL ALLEGATIONS

8. This paragraph contains a legal conclusion which does not require a response. HOA admits NRS 116 applies to community associations.

9. This paragraph contains a legal conclusion which does not require a response. HOA admits NRS 116 applies to community associations.

10. This paragraph contains a legal conclusion which does not require a response. HOA admits NRS 116 applies to community associations.

11. This paragraph contains a legal conclusion which does not require a response. HOA admits NRS 116 applies to community associations.

19 12. HOA is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the
 20 truth of the allegation and thus denies.

 HOA is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the truth of the allegation and thus denies.

14. HOA is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the
truth of the allegation and thus denies.

15. HOA admits the former homeowner became delinquent in the obligation to
 pay assessments. HOA denies the remainder.

16. HOA admits a notice of delinquent assessment lien was recorded on July 26,
28 2010 and admits the content thereof. HOA denies the remainder.

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17. HOA admits a notice of default and election to sell under homeowners association liens was recorded on September 3, 2010 and admits the content thereof. HOA denies the remainder.

HOA admits the former owner made a partial payment, the effect of which 18. was determined in prior litigation to have paid the portion of the delinquency entitled to priority over any first security interest. HOA denies the remainder.

19. HOA is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the truth of the allegation and thus denies.

20. HOA admits a second Notice of Foreclosure Sale was recorded on April 16, 2012 and admits the content thereof. HOA denies the remainder.

21. HOA is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the truth of the allegation and thus denies.

22. HOA admits the plaintiff's predecessor was the high bidder and paid \$5,500 to acquire title of the property through a nonwarranty foreclosure deed. HOA is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the truth of the remaining allegation and thus denies.

23. HOA admits the content of the foreclosure deed.

24. Deny. There were two notices of sale, the second of which indicated a payment had been made and applied because the second notice of sale, recorded a year after the first notice of sale, indicated a lesser amount due than the amount indicated on the first notice of sale.

25. Deny. There were two notices of sale, the second of which indicated a lesser 22 amount due than the first notice of sale. HOA admits that in 2012, it is unaware of any 23 notices, anywhere in Nevada, which included the nomenclature "Super-Priority Lien 24 Amount." 25

26. HOA is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the 26 truth of the allegation and thus denies. 27

Page 3 of 12

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27. HOA is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the truth of the allegation and thus denies.

28. HOA is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the truth of the allegation and thus denies.

29. HOA is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the truth of the hypothetical allegation and thus denies.

30. HOA is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the truth of the hypothetical allegation and thus denies.

31. This paragraph contains a legal conclusion which does not require a response. To the extent a response is required, HOA denies.

32. This paragraph contains a legal conclusion which does not require a response. To the extent a response is required, HOA denies.

33. This paragraph contains a legal conclusion which does not require a response. To the extent a response is required, HOA denies.

34. HOA is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the truth of the hypothetical allegation and thus denies.

35. This paragraph contains a legal conclusion which does not require a response. To the extent a response is required, HOA denies.

19 36. HOA is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the
20 truth of the hypothetical allegation and thus denies.

37. HOA is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the truth of the allegation and thus denies.

38. HOA is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the
truth of the hypothetical allegation and thus denies.

39. HOA is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the
truth of the allegation and thus denies.

40. This paragraph contains a legal conclusion which does not require a
response. To the extent a response is required, HOA denies.

Page 4 of 12

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1	41.	HOA is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the
2	truth of the a	allegation and thus denies.
3		FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF
4		Misrepresentation
5	42.	HOA repeats and realleges its responses above and incorporates them
6	herein.	
7	43.	Deny.
8	44.	Deny.
9	45.	Deny.
10	46.	Deny.
11	47.	Deny.
12	48.	Deny.
13	49.	Deny.
14	50.	Deny.
15	51.	Deny the hypothetical.
16	52.	HOA is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the
17	truth of the I	hypothetical allegation and thus denies.
18	53.	HOA is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the
19	truth of the I	hypothetical allegation and thus denies.
20	54.	HOA is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the
21	truth of the I	nypothetical allegation and thus denies.
22	55.	HOA is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the
23	truth of the a	allegation and thus denies.
24	56.	HOA is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the
25	truth of the I	nypothetical allegation and thus denies.
26	57.	Deny.
27	58.	Deny.
28	59.	Deny.
		Page 5 of 12

1	60.	Deny.
2	61.	Deny.
3	62.	Deny.
4	63.	Deny.
5	64.	Deny.
6	65.	Deny.
7	66.	Deny.
8	67.	Deny.
9	68.	HOA is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the
10	truth of the l	hypothetical allegation and thus denies.
11	69.	Deny.
12	70.	This paragraph does not require a response. To the extent a response is
13	required, H0	DA denies.
14		SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF
15		Breach of Duty of Good Faith
16	71.	HOA repeats and realleges its responses above and incorporates them
16 17	71. herein.	HOA repeats and realleges its responses above and incorporates them
		HOA repeats and realleges its responses above and incorporates them HOA admits NRS 116 et seq. applies. HOA denies any noncompliance with
17	herein.	
17 18	herein. 72.	
17 18 19	herein. 72. NRS 116. 73.	HOA admits NRS 116 et seq. applies. HOA denies any noncompliance with
17 18 19 20	herein. 72. NRS 116. 73.	HOA admits NRS 116 et seq. applies. HOA denies any noncompliance with HOA denies any noncompliance with NRS 116. HOA denies the term
17 18 19 20 21	herein. 72. NRS 116. 73. "candor" ap	HOA admits NRS 116 et seq. applies. HOA denies any noncompliance with HOA denies any noncompliance with NRS 116. HOA denies the term pears in any version of NRS 116 and therefore denies.
 17 18 19 20 21 22 	herein. 72. NRS 116. 73. "candor" ap	HOA admits NRS 116 et seq. applies. HOA denies any noncompliance with HOA denies any noncompliance with NRS 116. HOA denies the term pears in any version of NRS 116 and therefore denies. HOA is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the
 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 	herein. 72. NRS 116. 73. "candor" ap 74. truth of the a 75.	HOA admits NRS 116 et seq. applies. HOA denies any noncompliance with HOA denies any noncompliance with NRS 116. HOA denies the term pears in any version of NRS 116 and therefore denies. HOA is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the allegation and thus denies.
 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 	herein. 72. NRS 116. 73. "candor" ap 74. truth of the a 75. was determ	HOA admits NRS 116 et seq. applies. HOA denies any noncompliance with HOA denies any noncompliance with NRS 116. HOA denies the term pears in any version of NRS 116 and therefore denies. HOA is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the allegation and thus denies. HOA admits the former owner made a partial payment, the effect of which
 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 	herein. 72. NRS 116. 73. "candor" ap 74. truth of the a 75. was determ	HOA admits NRS 116 et seq. applies. HOA denies any noncompliance with HOA denies any noncompliance with NRS 116. HOA denies the term pears in any version of NRS 116 and therefore denies. HOA is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the allegation and thus denies. HOA admits the former owner made a partial payment, the effect of which ined in prior litigation to have paid the portion of the delinquency entitled to
 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 	herein. 72. NRS 116. 73. "candor" ap 74. truth of the a 75. was determ priority over 76.	HOA admits NRS 116 et seq. applies. HOA denies any noncompliance with HOA denies any noncompliance with NRS 116. HOA denies the term pears in any version of NRS 116 and therefore denies. HOA is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the allegation and thus denies. HOA admits the former owner made a partial payment, the effect of which ined in prior litigation to have paid the portion of the delinquency entitled to any first security interest. HOA denies the remainder.

1	77. Deny.
2	78. HOA denies any noncompliance with NRS 116 and denies the remainder.
3	79. Deny.
4	80. Deny.
5	81. This paragraph does not require a response. To the extent a response is
6	required, HOA denies.
7	THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF
8	Conspiracy
9	82. HOA repeats and realleges its responses above and incorporates them
10	herein.
11	83. No response is necessary as this claim is dismissed. To the extent a
12	response is required, HOA denies.
13	84. No response is necessary as this claim is dismissed. To the extent a
14	response is required, HOA denies.
15	85. No response is necessary as this claim is dismissed. To the extent a
16	response is required, HOA denies.
17	86. No response is necessary as this claim is dismissed. To the extent a
18	response is required, HOA denies.
19	87. No response is necessary as this claim is dismissed. To the extent a
20	response is required, HOA denies.
21	FOURTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF
22	(Violation of NRS 113)
23	88. No response is necessary as this claim is dismissed. To the extent a
24	response is required, HOA denies.
25	89. No response is necessary as this claim is dismissed. To the extent a
26	response is required, HOA denies.
27	90. No response is necessary as this claim is dismissed. To the extent a
28	response is required, HOA denies.
	Page 7 of 12
•	A A 155

91. No response is necessary as this claim is dismissed. To the extent a response is required, HOA denies.

92. No response is necessary as this claim is dismissed. To the extent a response is required, HOA denies.

93. No response is necessary as this claim is dismissed. To the extent a response is required, HOA denies.

94. No response is necessary as this claim is dismissed. To the extent a response is required, HOA denies.

95. No response is necessary as this claim is dismissed. To the extent a response is required, HOA denies.

96. No response is necessary as this claim is dismissed. To the extent a response is required, HOA denies.

97. No response is necessary as this claim is dismissed. To the extent a response is required, HOA denies.

98. No response is necessary as this claim is dismissed. To the extent a response is required, HOA denies.

99. No response is necessary as this claim is dismissed. To the extent a response is required, HOA denies.

No response is necessary as this claim is dismissed. 100. To the extent a 19 response is required, HOA denies. 20

No response is necessary as this claim is dismissed. To the extent a 101. response is required, HOA denies. 22

102. No response is necessary as this claim is dismissed. To the extent a 23 response is required, HOA denies. 24

No response is necessary as this claim is dismissed. To the extent a 103. 25 response is required, HOA denies. 26

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1	AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
2	FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
3	The complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
4	SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
5	The claims are barred by the doctrine of laches, estoppel, waiver, unjust enrichment
6	and unclean hands.
7	THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
8	Plaintiff is barred from asserting any claims against Defendant HOA because the
9	alleged damages, if any, were the result of intervening, superseding conduct of others, over
10	whom the Defendant has no control.
11	FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
12	Plaintiff has failed to mitigate damages, if any.
13	FIFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
14	Plaintiff's claims are barred by contributory and comparative negligence.
15	SIXTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
16	Plaintiff's claims are reduced, modified and/or barred by the doctrines of collateral
17	estoppel or judicial estoppel.
18	SEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
19	Plaintiff failed to join one or more indispensable parties.
20	EIGHTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
21	HOA owed no duty to Plaintiff and breached no duty to Plaintiff.
22	NINTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
23	The nonjudicial foreclosure sale of the HOA lien complied with all the applicable
24	statutes.
25	TENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
26	Plaintiff's claims are barred by the applicable statute or statutes of limitation.
27	
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	Page 9 of 12

1	ELEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
2	It has been necessary for HOA to employ the services of an attorney to defend this
3	action and a reasonable sum should be allowed for attorney's fees and costs.
4	TWELFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
5	Plaintiff's complaint is an abuse of process and HOA reserves the right to file
6	counterclaims or separate complaint for abuse of process to recover damages.
7	THIRTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
8	HOA is not the proximate or legal cause of Plaintiff's damages, if any.
9	FOURTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
10	HOA reserves the right to amend or otherwise modify this Answer to assert
11	additional affirmative defenses as they become known through formal or informal
12	discovery.
13	FIFTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
14	HOA has no contractual relationship to Plaintiff to give rise to indemnification or
15	warranties, including deed warranties.
16	SIXTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
17	Plaintiff assumed the risk of the HOA foreclosure market and is not entitled to relief
18	against the HOA.
19	SEVENTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
20	The Foreclosure Deed is conclusive evidence the HOA complied with NRS 116.
21	EIGHTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
22	Plaintiff failed to attend mediation as required by NRS § 38.310 and thus the Court
23	lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this claim.
24	NINETEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
25	The HOA abided by NRS Chapter 116's requirements for the distribution of funds
26	from the HOA non-judicial foreclosure sale.
27	
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	Page 10 of 12
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1		PRAYER
2	WHE	REFORE, HOA respectfully requests that this Court enter judgment as follows:
3	1.	That Plaintiff take nothing by way of this complaint;
4	2.	That Plaintiff's remaining claims should be dismissed with prejudice;
5	3.	For an award of reasonable attorney's fees and costs of suit; and
6	4.	For such other and further relief as the Court may deem just and proper.
7		
8		DATED this 5 th day of January, 2021.
9		LIPSON NEILSON, P.C.
10		/s/ Peter E. Dunkley
11		By: KALEB D. ANDERSON, ESQ.
12		Nevada Bar No. 7582 PETER E. DUNKLEY, ESQ.
13		Nevada Bar No. 11110
14		9900 Covington Cross Drive, Ste. 120 Las Vegas, Nevada 89144
15		(702) 382-1500 phone (702) 382-1512 fax
16		kanderson@lipsonneilson.com pdunkley@lipsonneilson.com
17		Attorneys for Defendants Harbor Cove Homeowners
18		Association
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		Page 11 of 12

1	CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
1 2	I hereby certify that on the 5 th day of January 2021, an electronic copy of the
3	following HARBOR COVE HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION'S ANSWER TO PLANTIFF'S
4	COMPLAINT was filed and e-served via the Court's electronic service system to all
5	persons who have registered tor e-service in this case:
6	
7	Roger P. Croteau, Esq.
8	Raymond Jereza, Esq. ROGER P. CROTEAU & ASSOCIATES, LTD.
9	2810 W. Charleston Blvd., Suite 75 Las Vegas, Nevada 89148
10	Attorney for Plaintiff
11	
12 13	/s/ Renee M. Ríttenhouse
13	An Employee of LIPSON NEILSON, P.C.
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ANS	Atump. asu		
BRANDON E. WOOD Nevada State Bar Number 12900			
NEVADA ASSOCIATION SERVICES, INC. 6625 S. Valley View Blvd. Suite 300	X.		
Las Vegas, NV 89118 Telephone: (702) 804-8885			
Facsimile: (702) 804-8887 Email: brandon@nas-inc.com			
Attorney for Defendant Nevada Association Services, Inc.			
DISTRICT COURT FO	OR THE STATE OF NEVADA		
IN AND FOR TH	IE COUNTY OF CLARK		
RIVER GLIDER AVENUE TRUST,	CASE NO.: A-20-819781-C		
Plaintiff,	DEPT. NO.: XX		
vs. HARBOR COVE HOMEOWNERS			
ASSOCIATION; and NEVADA ASSOCIATION SERVICES, INC.,	NEVADA ASSOCIATION SERVICES, INC.'S ANSWER TO COMPLAINT		
Defendants.			
Detendants.			
COMES NOW, Defendant NEVAL	DA ASSOCIATION SERVICES, INC. (hereinafter		
	s it's Answer to RIVER GLIDER AVENUE TRUST'S		
Complaint as follows:			
	ND JURISDICTION		
	information sufficient to form a belief about the truth of		
the allegations in paragraph 1 and therefore m			
	information sufficient to form a belief about the truth of		
 the allegations in paragraph 2 and therefore must deny the allegation in its entirety. 3. Defendant lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the truth of 			
3. Defendant lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a bener about the truth of the allegations in paragraph 3 and therefore must deny the allegation in its entirety.			
Contract of the second se			
4. Defendant lacks knowledge or the allegations in paragraph 4 and therefore m			
nie anegations ni paragraph 4 and therefore in	and were's and other Grant and the same of the		
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1	5.	Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 5.
2	6.	Defendant lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the truth of
3	the allegation	s in paragraph 6 and therefore must deny the allegation in its entirety.
4	7.	Defendant lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the truth of
5	the allegation	s in paragraph 7 and therefore must deny the allegation in its entirety.
6		GENERAL ALLEGATIONS
7	8.	Defendant admits allegations in paragraph 8.
8	9.	Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 9.
9	10.	Defendant lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the truth of
10	the allegation	s in paragraph 10 and therefore must deny the allegation in its entirety.
11	11.	Defendant lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the truth of
12	the allegation	s in paragraph 11 and therefore must deny the allegation in its entirety.
13	12.	Defendant lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the truth of
14	the allegation	s in paragraph 12 and therefore must deny the allegation in its entirety.
15	13.	Defendant lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the truth of
16	the allegation	is in paragraph 13 and therefore must deny the allegation in its entirety.
17	14.	Defendant lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the truth of
18	the allegation	is in paragraph 14 and therefore must deny the allegation in its entirety.
19	15.	Defendant lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the truth of
20	the allegation	is in paragraph 15 and therefore must deny the allegation in its entirety.
21	16.	Defendant admits the allegation, "On July 26, 2010, HOA Trustee, on behalf of HOA,
22	recorded a N	lotice of Delinquent Assessment Lien (the "NODAL"). The NODAL stated that the
23	amount due	to the HOA was \$1,032.01, plus continuing assessments, interest, late charges, costs
24	(the "HOA L	ien")." Defendant lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the
25	truth of the r	emaining allegations in paragraph 16.
26	17.	Defendant admits the allegations in paragraph 17.
27	18.	Defendant lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the truth of
28	the allegation	is in paragraph 18 and therefore must deny the allegation in its entirety.
		2
		ANSWER

1	19.	Defendant lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the truth of
2	the allegations	in paragraph 19 and therefore must deny the allegation in its entirety.
3	20.	Defendant admits the allegations in paragraph 20.
4	21.	Defendant lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the truth of
5	the allegations	s in paragraph 21 and therefore must deny the allegation in its entirety.
6	22.	Defendant lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the truth of
7	the allegations	s in paragraph 22 and therefore must deny the allegation in its entirety.
8	23.	Defendant admits the allegations in paragraph 23.
9	24.	Defendant lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the truth of
10	the allegation:	s in paragraph 24 and therefore must deny the allegation in its entirety.
11	25.	Defendant lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the truth of
12	the allegation:	s in paragraph 25 and therefore must deny the allegation in its entirety.
13	26.	Defendant lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the truth of
14	the allegation	s in paragraph 26 and therefore must deny the allegation in its entirety.
15	27.	Defendant lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the truth of
16	the allegation	s in paragraph 27 and therefore must deny the allegation in its entirety.
17	28.	Defendant lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the truth of
18	the allegation	s in paragraph 28 and therefore must deny the allegation in its entirety.
19	29.	Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 29.
20	30.	Defendant lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the truth of
21	the allegation	s in paragraph 30 and therefore must deny the allegation in its entirety.
22	31.	Defendant admits the allegations in paragraph 31.
23	32.	Defendant lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the truth of
24	the allegation	s in paragraph 32 and therefore must deny the allegation in its entirety.
25	33.	Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 33.
26	34.	Defendant lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the truth of
27	the allegation	s in paragraph 34 and therefore must deny the allegation in its entirety.
28	35.	Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 35.
		3
		ANSWER

1 36. Defendant lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the truth of 2 the allegations in paragraph 36 and therefore must deny the allegation in its entirety.

37. Defendant admits the allegation, "Plaintiff would contact the HOA Trustee prior to the
HOA Foreclosure Sale to determine if the Property would in fact be sold on the date stated in the
NOS...however, Plaintiff never inquired if the "Super-Priority Lien Amount" had been paid."
Defendant lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the truth of the remaining
allegations in paragraph 37.

8 38. Defendant lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the truth of
9 the allegations in paragraph 38 and therefore must deny the allegation in its entirety.

39. Defendant lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the truth of
the allegations in paragraph 39 and therefore must deny the allegation in its entirety.

40. Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 40.

41. Defendant lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the truth of
the allegations in paragraph 41 and therefore must deny the allegation in its entirety.

FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF

42. NAS adopts and incorporates by reference its responses to the preceding paragraphs of
Plaintiff's complaint as if set forth fully herein.

43. Defendant lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the truth of
the allegations in paragraph 43 and therefore must deny the allegation in its entirety.

20

21

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44. Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 44.

45. Defendant lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the truth of

22 the allegations in paragraph 45 and therefore must deny the allegation in its entirety.

46. Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 46.

24 47. Defendant lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the truth of

25 the allegations in paragraph 47 and therefore must deny the allegation in its entirety.

- 48. Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 48.
- 49. Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 49.
- 27 28

- 50. Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 50.
 - 4

	5
72.	Defendant lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the truth o
Plaintiff's co	omplaint as if set forth fully herein.
71.	NAS adopts and incorporates by reference its responses to the preceding paragraphs o
	SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF
allegations i	n paragraph 70 and therefore must deny the allegations in its entirety.
is required D	Defendant lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the truth of th
70.	The allegations in paragraph 70 do not require a response. To the extent that a respons
69.	Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 69.
68.	Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 68.
67.	Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 67.
66.	Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 66.
65.	Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 65.
64.	Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 64.
63.	Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 63.
	Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 62.
	Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 61.
60.	Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 60.
	Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 59.
	Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 58.
	Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 57.
	Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 56.
	is in paragraph 55 and therefore must deny the allegation in its entirety.
	Defendant lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the truth of
	Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 54.
	is in paragraph 53 and therefore must deny the allegation in its entirety.
	Defendant lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the truth of
	Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 51. Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 52.
	54. 55. the allegation 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. is required D allegations in 71. Plaintiff's co

1	the allegation	is in paragraph 72 and therefore must deny the allegation in its entirety.		
2	73.	Defendant lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the truth of		
3	the allegations in paragraph 73 and therefore must deny the allegation in its entirety.			
4	74.	Defendant lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the truth of		
5	the allegation	is in paragraph 74 and therefore must deny the allegation in its entirety.		
6	75.	Defendant lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the truth of		
7	the allegation	is in paragraph 75 and therefore must deny the allegation in its entirety.		
8	76.	Defendant lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the truth of		
9	the allegation	is in paragraph 76 and therefore must deny the allegation in its entirety.		
10	77.	Defendant denies the allegations n paragraph 77.		
11	78.	Defendant denies the allegations n paragraph 78.		
12	79.	Defendant denies the allegations n paragraph 79.		
13	80.	Defendant denies the allegations n paragraph 80.		
14	81.	The allegations in paragraph 81 do not require a response. To the extent that a response		
15	is required D	efendant lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the truth of the		
16	allegations in	paragraph 81 and therefore must deny the allegations in its entirety.		
17		THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF		
18	82.	NAS adopts and incorporates by reference its responses to the preceding paragraphs of		
19	Plaintiff's co	mplaint as if set forth fully herein.		
20	83.	Defendant lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the truth of		
21	the allegation	is in paragraph 83 and therefore must deny the allegation in its entirety.		
22	84.	Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 84.		
23	85.	Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 85.		
24	86.	Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 86.		
25	87.	The allegations in paragraph 87 do not require a response. To the extent that a response		
26	is required D	efendant lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the truth of the		
27	allegations in	n paragraph 87 and therefore must deny the allegations in its entirety.		
28	111			
		6		
		ANSWER		

1			FOURTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF		
2		88.	NAS adopts and incorporates by reference its responses to the preceding paragraphs of		
3	Plaintiff's complaint as if set forth fully herein.				
4	89. Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 89.				
5		90.	Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 90.		
6		91.	Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 91.		
7	i i i	92.	Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 92.		
8		93.	Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 93.		
9		94.	Defendant lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the truth of		
10	the alle	gation	is in paragraph 94 and therefore must deny the allegation in its entirety.		
11		95.	Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 95.		
12		96.	Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 96.		
13		97.	Defendant lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the truth of		
14	the alle	gatior	is in paragraph 97 and therefore must deny the allegation in its entirety.		
15		98.	Defendant lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the truth of		
16	the alle	gatior	is in paragraph 98 and therefore must deny the allegation in its entirety.		
17		99.	Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 99.		
18	1.	100.	Defendant lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the truth of		
19	the alle	gatior	is in paragraph 100 and therefore must deny the allegation in its entirety.		
20		101.	Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 101.		
21		102.	Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 102.		
22		103.	The allegations in paragraph 103 do not require a response. To the extent that a		
23	respons	se is re	equired Defendant lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the		
24	111				
25	111				
26	111				
27	111				
28	111				
			7		
			ANSWER		

	d therefore must deny the allegations in its entirety.
Dated this 26 th day of January, 2021	
	6-5
	By:BRANDON E. WOOD
	Nevada State Bar Number 12900 NEVADA ASSOCIATION SERVICES, INC 6625 S. Valley View Blvd. Suite 300 Las Vegas, NV 89118 Attorney for Defendant Nevada Association
	6625 S. Valley View Blvd. Suite 300 Las Vegas, NV 89118
	Attorney for Defendant Nevada Association Services, Inc.
	8

1	1	NEVADA ASSOCIATION SERVICES, INC.'S
2		AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
3	1.	NAS affirmatively alleges that Plaintiff's Complaint fails to state a claim upon which
4	relief can be	granted.
5	2.	NAS owed no duty to Plaintiff.
6	3.	NAS has, and at all times herein, acted reasonably and in good faith in discharging their
7	obligations a	nd duties, if any, to Plaintiff.
8	4.	NAS acted properly and in good faith, and in accordance with all duties imposed by
9	law, without	malice, either express or implied, and without oppression.
10	5.	Upon information and belief, NAS affirmatively alleges Plaintiff failed to mitigate
11	damages.	
12	6.	Any damages claimed by Plaintiff are speculative, are not supported by proof and are
13	not compensation	able as a matter of law.
14	7.	NAS is informed, believes, and thereon alleges that if any contract, guarantee,
15	obligation or	amendment, as alleged in the Complaint on file herein, has been entered into, any duty
16	of performan	ce of NAS is excused by reason of frustration of purpose.
17	8.	NAS is informed, believes, and thereon alleges that if any contract, guarantee,
18	obligation or	amendment, as alleged in the Complaint on file herein, has been entered into, any duty
19	of performan	ce of NAS is excused by reason of breach of condition precedent by Plaintiff.
20	9.	NAS is informed, believes, and thereon alleges that if any contract, guarantee,
21	obligation or	amendment, as alleged in the Complaint on file herein, has been entered into, any duty
22	of performan	ce of NAS is excused by reason of breach of condition subsequent by Plaintiff.
23	10.	NAS is informed, believes, and thereon alleges that if any contract, guarantee,
24	obligation or	amendment, as alleged in the Complaint on file herein, has been entered into, any duty
25	of performan	nce of NAS is excused by reason of breach of an implied condition by Plaintiff.
26	11.	Plaintiff's own defaults, misfeasances, negligence, and/or intentional conduct
27	contributed t	o his damages, if any, so that Plaintiff should be barred by the Doctrine of Unclean Hands
28	from any rec	overy on any of his claims.
		9

1	12,	NAS did not make false material representation of fact which was not true, or if such
2	representatio	n was made, which NAS specifically denies, NAS did not make the representation with
3	the intent eit	her to deceive or to induce Plaintiff to act in reliance.
4	13.	Plaintiff has waived, by conduct or otherwise, any claim against NAS.
5	14.	Plaintiff's claims are barred, in whole or in part, by the doctrines of waiver,
6	acquiescence	and/or ratification.
7	15.	Plaintiff did not justifiably rely, in any fashion whatsoever, upon any statement,
8	representatio	n, advice, or conduct of NAS, and did not act upon any statement, representation, advice,
9	or conduct to	his damage.
10	16.	By virtue of Plaintiff's conduct, Plaintiff should be barred from prosecuting its claims
11	against NAS	by reason of the Doctrine of Estoppel.
12	17.	No actual, justiciable controversy exists between NAS and Plaintiff and, thus,
13	Plaintiff's cl	aims must be dismissed as to NAS.
14	18.	Plaintiff's claims are barred against NAS, to the extent that they are from an alleged
15	contract or c	ontracts with third parties which did not bind NAS.
16	19.	Plaintiff's claims and allegations are barred against NAS by the doctrine of laches.
17	20.	Plaintiff's claims and allegations are barred by its contributory and/or comparative
18	negligence.	
19	21.	Plaintiff's claims and allegations are barred by the applicable statute of limitation.
20	22.	Plaintiff's claims and allegations are barred by the Doctrine of Assumption of Risk.
21	23.	Plaintiff failed to plead any acts or omissions of NAS sufficient to warrant the
22	consideration	n of attorneys' fees or costs of suit, or a declaration that its deed of trust of Plaintiff
23	survived the	assessment lien foreclosure sale, or an order quieting title in favor of Plaintiff.
24	24.	Plaintiff is not entitled to equitable relief because it and its predecessors and
25	successors fa	ailed to avail themselves to the remedies expressly stated in its deed of trust.
26	25.	Plaintiff has failed to join one or more indispensable parties.
27	26.	Plaintiff's claims are barred because NAS complied with all applicable statutes,
28	requirement	s, and regulations necessary under Nevada law and Federal law.
		10
		ANSWER

i.	27. Plaintiff is not entitled to the requested relief because the request is based, either
2	whole or in part, on an erroneous interpretation of the applicable statutes, requirements, an
;	regulations under Nevada law and Federal law.
	28. The claims, and each of them, are barred by Nevada Revised Statute 11.190.
	Dated this 26 th day of January, 2021.
t)	
	By:
2	BRANDON E. WOOD Nevada State Bar Number 12900 NEVADA ASSOCIATION SERVICES, INC.
6	6625 S. Valley View Blvd. Suite 300 Las Vegas, NV 89118
	Attorney for Defendant Nevada Association Services, Inc.
	Services, Inc.
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,	
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<u>CER</u>	TIFICATE OF SERVICE		
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 1st	day of February, 2021, and pursuant to N.R.C.P. 5(b), I serve		
a true and correct copy of the foregoing	g Nevada Association Services, Inc.'s Answer to Complain		
upon the parties listed below and all pa	rties/counsel set up to receive notice via electronic service		
this matter in the following manner:			
[] Hand Delivery			
[] Facsimile Transmission			
 U.S. Mail, Postage Pre-Paid X] Served upon opposing counsel counsel of record: 	via the Court's electronic service system to the following		
Roger Croteau, Esq.	Croteau Admin		
croteaulaw@croteaulaw.com	receptionist@croteaulaw.com		
Peter Dunkley, Esq. Lipson Neilson pdunkley@lipsonneilson.com			
	<u>/s/Susan E. Moses</u> Employee of Nevada Association Services, Inc.		
Lipson Neilson			

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA

RIVER GLIDER AVENUE TRUST

Supreme Court Case No. 83689

Appellant,

v.

HARBOR COVER HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION; and NEVADA ASSOCIATION SERVICES, INC.

APPELLANT'S APPENDIX

VOLUME 2

Respondents.

Counsel for Appellant:

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11		
12	RIVER GLIDER AVENUE TRUST,	CASE NO.: A-20-819781-C
13	Plaintiff,	DEPT. NO.: 20
14	VS.	Hearing Requested
15	HARBOR COVE HOMEOWNERS	HARBOR COVE HOMEOWNERS
16 17	ASSOCIATON; and NEVADA ASSOCIATION SERVICES, INC.,	ASSOCIATION'S RENEWED, MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
18	Defendants.	Hearing Date:
19		Hearing Time:.
20	COMES NOW, Defendant Harbor C	ove Homeowners Association (the "HOA"), by
21	and through its counsel of record, LIPSC	ON NEILSON, P.C., and hereby submits this
22	Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment.	
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	Case Number A 20.84	10794 C

9900 Covington Cross Drive, Suite 120, Las Vegas, Nevada 89144 Telephone: (702) 382-1500 Facsimile: (702) 382-1512 LIPSON NEILSON, P.C.

	1	This Motion is made and based on the following Memorandum of	Points	and
	2	Authorities, the pleadings and papers on file, and any oral arguments the 2	Court	may
	3	3 consider in this matter.		
	4	Dated this 22 nd day of July 2021.		
	5	5 LIPSON NEILSON, P.C.		
	6	5 /s/ Peter E. Dunkley		
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	9	PETER E. DUNKLEY, ESQ.		
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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

This is the epilogue to one of the books in the series of HOA foreclosure litigation. The property is located at 8112 Lake Hills Drive, Las Vegas, Nevada 89128 (APN: 138-16-213-034) (the "Property"). The Plaintiff is suing the HOA (and the trustee, Nevada Association Services ("NAS")) because Plaintiff's acquisition of the Property, after a nonjudicial foreclosure sale, for \$5,500.00,¹ resulted in ownership of the Property subject to an existing deed of trust.

Plaintiff is still attempting to re-litigate the outcome of the *nonjudicial* foreclosure sale, turned into a *judicial* action (the Prior Litigation) which went all the way through appeal, and was affirmed. This second bite at the apple is based on theories through which Plaintiff recharacterizes the same issues from the Prior Litigation, apparently to avoid the outcome of the Prior Litigation.

Plaintiff has already appealed and lost, so Plaintiff's tactic here appears to be fabricating new facts in order to avoid losing again. However, in Nevada, one cannot invent facts in order to create a genuine factual issue for trial (or arbitration) to avoid summary judgment. The Nevada Supreme Court said it best:

The word "genuine" has moral overtones. We do not take it to mean a fabricated issue. Though aware that the summary judgment procedure is not available to test and resolve the credibility of opposing witnesses to a fact issue (*Short v. Hotel Riviera*, Inc., 79 Nev. 94, 378 P.2d 979), we hold that it may appropriately be invoked to defeat a lie from the mouth of a party against whom the judgment is sought, when that lie is claimed to be the source of a "genuine" issue of fact for trial.

²³ Aldabe v. Adams, 81 Nev. 280, 285, 402 P.2d 34, 37 (1965) (overruled on other grounds).

¹ According to Zillow.com, the current value is \$740,900.00.
 <u>https://www.zillow.com/homes/8112-Lake-Hills-Drive,-Las-Vegas,-Nevada-_rb/6936988_zpid/</u>
 (Accessed July 18, 2021). In other words, Plaintiff paid less than 1 penny on the dollar, i.e., \$5,500
 divided by \$740,900.00 equals: .007, which equals less than 1 percent.

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The U.S. Supreme Court is of the same accord: "When opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment." Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380, 127 S. Ct. 1769, 4 1776 (2007).

This matter is set for an arbitration to take place on September 15, 2021. However, given the undisputed facts, and the further development of authority in the state courts, and now federal courts, this Court may rule as a matter of law, "to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding." NRCP 1. See also, NAR 4(E) (dispositive motions may be filed no later than 45 days prior to the arbitration).

П. UNDISPUTED FACTS

The effect of the nonjudicial foreclosure sale has already been litigated in case A-13-683467-C (the "Prior Litigation").² According to the District Court's Order, affirmed on appeal, the following is established:

The nonjudicial foreclosure sale was valid and conveyed the Property to the 1. Plaintiff subject to the existing deed of trust. A copy of the Order Granting Summary Judgment in favor of the lender, is attached hereto, as Exhibit A.

2. Before the nonjudicial foreclosure sale, the prior owner of the Property had satisfied the super-priority portion of the HOA's lien. Exhibit A, p. 3 ¶ 10, p. 5¶ 5.

3. The valid nonjudicial foreclosure sale occurred on May 11, 2012 ("HOA Sale"). See Exhibit A, p. 4 ¶ 14. (See also, Complaint, ¶ 2 (same).)

4. River Glider Avenue Trust purchased the Property at the valid nonjudicial foreclosures sale for \$5,500.00. Exhibit A, p. 4, at ¶ 15; Complaint ¶ 22.

5. "River Glider Avenue Trust purchased the Property subject to [a] deed of 24 trust." (*Id.*, at p. 5 ¶ 6.) 25

² The Court may take judicial notice of facts: "Generally known within the territorial 27 jurisdiction of the trial court; or (b) Capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned, so that the fact is not subject to reasonable 28 dispute." NRS 47.130.

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6. The District Court's Order was affirmed on Appeal. A copy of the Order of Affirmance is attached as **Exhibit B**. The Plaintiff petitioned for rehearing, which was denied on July 1, 2020. A copy of the Order Denying Rehearing is attached as **Exhibit C**.

III. FABRICATED "FACT"

7. Plaintiff alleges³ he called NAS before the May 11, 2012, nonjudicial foreclosure sale to inquire regarding the Property, and NAS said nothing of the prior homeowner's preforeclosure payments and NAS had a duty to do so.

- a. This "fact" is not in the complaint but is asserted in Response to Interrogatory No. 2: "Identify the date of any communications YOU had with [NAS] prior to the HOA Foreclosure Sale." Plaintiff's response to Interrogatory No. 2, sets forth the substance of the alleged call which Plaintiff stated he"...would have contacted [NAS] on Thursday May 10 or Friday, May 11, 2012." A copy of Plaintiff's Interrogatory Responses is attached as Exhibit D.
- b. Plaintiff has no evidence to support this unsubstantiated "fact." See Response First Request for Production of Documents No. 3, "no written records would be kept" and Response to Second Request for Production of Documents No. 4, "no records" of "telephone records, invoices, or bills showing telephonic communications between [Plaintiff] and [NAS] between May 1, 2012 and May 12, 2012." A copy of Plaintiff's responses to Requests for Production of Documents, (First and Second), is attached here as Exhibits E-1 and E-2, respectively.
 - c. This "fact" is not actually a "fact" and is contradicted by NAS's Phone
 Notes which were produced in this case on March 4, 2021. A copy of
 Phone Notes is attached as Exhibit F.
- ³ The "fact" was not alleged in the Complaint.

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- d. NAS testified that every communication, including telephonic inquiries would have a corresponding entry in the Phone Notes. See Declaration of Moses at ¶¶ 2-3, attached as Exhibit G. The Declaration of Moses also authenticates Exhibit F, the attached Phone Notes (see Exhibit G at ¶ 8).
- e. There is no entry in the Phone Notes for the dates on which Plaintiff says he called NAS. See Exhibit F, Phone Notes (no entries between dates May 9, 2012 and May 17, 2012).
- f. The allegation of a pre-foreclosure sale phone call to NAS is a demonstrable change in Plaintiff's prior testimony, under oath, from other cases. On July 27, 2017, Plaintiff testified that he would <u>not</u> have contacted an HOA's trustee prior to the sale:⁴

Question: Prior to an HOA foreclosure sale, do you *ever* inquire from the HOA or the HOA's agent conducting the sale whether there was an attempt to pay the super priority portion of the liens prior to the sale?

Answer: No.

Question: Prior to purchasing a property, do you *ever* reach out to the HOA directly for information regarding the property?

Answer: No.

Question: What about the HOA trustee? So here that would be Alessi & Koenig.

Answer: No.

23 Deposition of Haddad, p. 9:7-11; p. 11:17-23, taken July 27, 2017, in federal case 2:16-cv-

03009-RFB-CWH, (emphasis added) a copy of the relevant portions of the transcript is
 attached as Exhibit H.

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 ⁴ The deposition transcript and trial transcript are admissible. *See* 51.035(2)(d) (transcript of testimony under oath not hearsay); NRS 50.135(2)(a) (admissible if the statement meets NRS 51.035(3), i.e., it's Haddad's statement).

Mr. Haddad's deposition testimony was consistent with his testimony at trial:

Question: Did you talk to anyone at Nevada Legal News, NAS, or the HOA about this property prior to the sale?

Answer: I would not recall, but that would not be proper protocol. We would, you know, stand around and wait for the announcements to be made.

Question: Did you talk to the HOA about this property before you bid on it?

Answer: No. I'm sure I would not have.

Trial Testimony of Haddad, p. 159:16-20, p. 173:23-174:1, November 15, 2017, Case No.

A707392. A copy of the relevant portions of the trial transcript is attached as **Exhibit I**.

IV. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

"Summary judgment is appropriate under NRCP 56 when the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, and affidavits, if any, that are properly before the court demonstrate that no genuine issue of material fact exists, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Wood v. Safeway, Inc., 121 Nev. 724, 731, 121 P.3d 1026, 1031 (2005). The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of production to show the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Cuzze v. Univ. & Comm. College System of Nevada, 172 P.3d 131, 134 (Nev. 2007). Where "the nonmoving party will bear the burden of persuasion at trial, the party moving for summary judgment may satisfy the burden of production by either (1) submitting evidence that negates an essential element of the nonmoving party's claim, or (2) 'pointing out . . . that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." Id. (citations omitted).

23 To survive a motion for summary judgment, the non-moving party "may not rest 24 upon the mere allegations or denials of [its] pleadings," Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 25 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986), nor may it "simply show there is some metaphysical doubt as to 26 the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 475 U.S. at 586. Rather, it is the non-27 moving party's burden to "come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine

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issue for trial." Id. at 587 (emphasis added); See also Wood v. Safeway, Inc., 121 Nev. 724 (2005), citing Pegasus v. Reno Newspapers, Inc., 118 Nev. 706, 713, 57 P.3d 82 (2002).

An issue is only genuine if there is a sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the non-moving party. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248 (1986). Further, a dispute will only preclude the entry of summary judgment if it could affect the outcome of the suit under governing law. Id. "The amount of evidence necessary to raise a genuine issue of material fact is enough to require a judge or jury to resolve the parties' differing versions of the truth at trial." Id. at 249. In evaluating a summary judgment, a court views all facts and draws all inferences in a light most favorable to the non-moving party. Wood v. Safeway, Inc., 121 Nev. 724, 729 (2005). If there are no genuine issues of fact, the movant's burden is not evidentiary because the facts are not disputed, but the court has the obligation to resolve the legal dispute between the parties as a matter of law. Gulf Ins. Co. v. First Bank, 2009 WL 1953444 *2 (E.D.Cal.2009) (citing Asuncion v. Dist. Dir. of U.S. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 427 F.2d 523, 524 (9th Cir.1970)).

As noted above, one cannot fabricate a "fact" to avoid summary judgment. Aldabe, 81 Nev. at 285, 402 P.2d at 37. And where there are two stories, but "one of which is 16 blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment." Scott, 550 U.S. at 380. Where claims are unsubstantiated, the Nevada Supreme Court has stated: "trial courts should not be reluctant in dispensing with such claims, as they are instructive of the type of litigation that summary judgment is meant to obviate." Boesiger v. Desert Appraisals, Ltd. Liab. Co., 444 P.3d 436, 440-41 (Nev. 2019).

V. **REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE**

This court may take judicial notice of matters of fact that are generally known or that 24 are "[c]apable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy 25 cannot reasonably be questioned' when requested by a party. NRS 47.130; NRS 47.150. 26 Records of other courts are sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned. 27 Occhiuto v. Occhiuto, 97 Nev. 143, 145, 625 P.2d 568, 569 (1981). A court may take 28

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judicial notice of records from other cases if there is a close relationship between the cases, and issues within the case justify taking judicial notice of the prior case. *Id.* Here, the HOA requests that the Court take judicial notice of the District Court's Order in the Prior Litigation (Exhibit A) as that case is closely related to this case in that the prior case involves the same foreclosure sale and made express findings regarding issues raised in this lawsuit. The HOA also requests that the Court take judicial notice of the transcripts of Haddad's prior testimony, Exhibits H and I.

VI. LEGAL ARGUMENT

This matter is ripe for summary judgment in favor of the HOA because the Prior Litigation, established the character of the Property's title through a valid nonjudicial foreclosure sale, and the prior testimony of Plaintiff establishes that there is no *genuine* issue of material fact. Plaintiff is attempting to change the facts in order to change who should pay for the sale. There was no defect in the foreclosure; there was no fraud or procedural error which would invalidate the sale. The time and place to litigate the alleged issues in this complaint was in the Prior Litigation.

Plaintiff's two remaining claims are: (1) misrepresentation, (2) breach of duty of good faith. Each of the claims fail and because there is no *genuine* issue of material fact, the Court should grant summary judgment in favor of the HOA.

A. <u>MISREPRESENTATION CLAIM FAILS BECAUSE THE HOA HAD NO</u> OBLIGATION TO DISCLOSE PAYMENTS

Plaintiff's misrepresentation claim fails because an HOA had no duty to disclose the former owner's payment. The elements for a claim of negligent misrepresentation are: (1) defendant supplied information while in the course of its business; (2) the information was false; (3) the information was supplied for the guidance of the plaintiff in its business transactions; (4) defendant must have failed to exercise reasonable care or competence in obtaining or communicating the information; (5) plaintiff must have justifiably relied upon the information by taking action or refraining from it; and (6) plaintiff sustained damage as a

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result of his reliance upon the accuracy of the information. NJI 9.05; Barmettler v. Reno Air, Inc., 114 Nev. 441, 449, 956 P.2d 1382, 1387 (1998).

Similarly, the elements for a claim of intentional misrepresentation are: (1) defendant makes a false representation or misrepresentation as to a past or existing fact; (2) defendant made the statement with knowledge or belief that the representation is false or that defendant lacks sufficient basis of information to make the representation; (3) defendant intended to induce plaintiff to act in reliance on the representation; (4) plaintiff justifiably relied upon the representation; (5) causation and damages to plaintiff as a result of relying on misrepresentation; and (6) must be proved by clear and convincing evidence and be pled with specificity. NRCP 9; NJI 9.01; Jordan v. State ex rel. Dep't of Motor Vehicles & Pub. Safety, 121 Nev. 44, 75, 110 P.3d 30, 51 (2005).

Plaintiff's claim fails because an HOA is required to comply with NRS 116 and NRS 116 did not require any such disclosure of a tender or payment made prior to the nonjudicial foreclosure date. An HOA's nonjudicial foreclosure process is a creature of 14 statute. SFR Invs. Pool 1 v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 130 Nev. 742, 744, 334 P.3d 408, 410 (2014). Pursuant to the statute, some HOAs have superpriority liens, while other HOAs do 16 not. See MCM Capital Partners, LLC v. Saticoy Bay LLC Series 6684 Coronado Crest, No. 215CV1154JCMGWF, 2018 WL 4113332, at *3 (D. Nev. Aug. 29, 2018) (finding limited-purpose associations may be exempt from many portions of NRS 116, including the superpriority portion, thus leaving them without a split lien and only a subpriority lien), see also Bank of Am., N.A. v. Aspen Meadows - Fernley Flood Control Facility Maint. Ass'n, No. 316CV00413MMDWGC, 2019 WL 2437453, at *3 (D. Nev. June 10, 2019) (finding the HOA "never had a superpriority lien on the Property").

Nevertheless, regardless of the type of HOA or foreclosure, in the year 2012, NRS 24 116 did not require any HOA (or NAS) to make a declaration at the sale, or before the 25 sale over the phone, or in their foreclosure notices, regarding the payment history on the 26 Property, or of the character of the nonjudicial foreclosure sale, i.e., whether the sale was 27 a super-priority or sub-priority lien sale. 28

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i. The HOA had no obligation to disclose it was foreclosing on a superpriority lien

An HOA does not have to disclose whether or not there is a superpriority lien, but rather must state the total delinquency being foreclosed upon. See NRS 116.31162(1)(c) (2013) (stating that the total amount of the HOA lien "includ[es] costs, fees and expenses incident to its enforcement"). As the Nevada Supreme Court stated, because the foreclosure notices go to all lien holders, whether junior or senior, "it was appropriate to state the total amount of the lien." *SFR Invs. Pool 1, LLC. v. U.S. Bank, N.A.*, 130 Nev. 742, 757, 334 P.3d 408, 418 (2014). There is no allegation that the notices were incorrect. Accordingly, there is no basis for any misrepresentation claim.

ii. The HOA has no obligation to disclose a prior payment of the superpriority lien

Plaintiff's misrepresentation claim⁵ is based on an alleged failure to disclose the former owner's partial payment prior to the nonjudicial foreclosure sale. (Compl. ¶ 43.) However, there is no such duty or obligation, and thus no misrepresentation. In *Noonan v. Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC*, 438 P.3d 335 (Nev. 2019) (unpublished), the Foreclosure Purchaser argued that the foreclosure agent had a duty to disclose a preforeclosure tender. The Nevada Supreme Court found no such duty exists, stating:

Summary judgment was appropriate on the negligent misrepresentation claim because [the Trustee] neither made an affirmative false statement nor omitted a material fact it was bound to disclose. *See Halcrow, Inc. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court,* 129 Nev. 394, 400, 302 P.3d 1148, 1153 (2013) (providing the elements for a negligent misrepresentation claim); *Nelson v. Heer,* 123 Nev. 217, 225, 163 P.3d 420, 426 (2007) ("[T]he suppression or omission of a material fact which a party is bound in good faith to disclose is equivalent to a false representation." (internal quotation marks omitted)). *Compare* NRS 116.31162(1)(b)(3)(II) (2017) (requiring an HOA to disclose if tender of the superpriority portion of the lien has been made), *with* NRS 116.31162 (2013) (not requiring any such disclosure).

⁵ Also characterized as negligent claims. (Compl. ¶ 50.) However, because there is no duty to disclose the payment, whether sounding in negligence or misrepresentation, the claim fails.

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Noonan v. Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC, 438 P.3d 335 (Nev. 2019) (emphasis added). Therefore, according to the *Noonan* case, there was no duty to disclose a preforeclosure payment until NRS 116 was amended in 2017 to require such a disclosure.

The Nevada Supreme Court continues to rule accordingly, albeit in unpublished cases: (1) Saticoy Bay v. Genevieve Court Homeowners Ass'n, No. 80135, 2020 Nev. Unpub. LEXIS 1000, at *1 (Oct. 16, 2020) (no duty to disclose); (2) Saticoy Bay v. Silverstone Ranch Cmty. Ass'n, No. 80039, 2020 Nev. Unpub. LEXIS 993, at *1 (Oct. 16, 2020) (no duty to disclose, and NRS 113 does not apply to create such a disclosure) (3) Saticoy Bay Llc Series 10007 Liberty View v. S. Terrace Homeowners Ass'n, 484 P.3d 276 (Nev. 2021) (same, issued April 16, 2021); (4), Bay v. Tripoly, 482 P.3d 699 (Nev. 2021) (same, issued March 26, 2021); (5) Saticov Bay Llc Series 3237 v. Aliante Master Ass'n, 480 P.3d 836 (Nev. 2021) (same, issued February 16, 2021); (6) Bay v. V., 478 P.3d 870 (Nev. 2021) (same, issued January 15, 2021).

14 The Nevada Supreme Court's decisions are consistent with those which are taking place in the U.S. District Court, District of Nevada, where the U.S. District Court granted summary judgment in favor of the HOA, "[b]ecause the HOA had no duty to disclose a 16 tender payment, Saticoy's cross-claim for failure to disclose fails as a matter of law." 17 Jpmorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Saticoy Bay Llc Series 741 Heritage Vista, No. 2:17-cv-18 02646-APG-NJK, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26484, at *5 (D. Nev. Feb. 14, 2020); see also, 19 Fannie Mae v. Saticoy Bay Llc Series 8324 Charleston & Fulton Park Unit Owners' Ass'n, 20 No. 2:17-cv-02051-APG-EJY, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103267, at *8 (D. Nev. June 11, 2020) ("[N]othing in the statute required the HOA to disclose or announce anything...") (in context of alleged Fannie Mae interest).

Thus, for any of the nonjudicial foreclosure sales which took place in May of 2012, 24 the undersigned can find no state or federal court in Nevada which finds a duty to 25 disclose a pre-foreclosure payment. As stated in SFR and its progeny, the Nevada 26 Supreme Court still finds the HOA's duties are to comply with NRS 116. 27

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After the HOA's foreclosure sale on May 11, 2012, the Legislature substantially revised NRS 116. See 2015 Nev. Stat., Ch. 266. However, the version of NRS 116 that applies in this case is the version that was in effect in May of 2012. See generally Sandpointe Apts. v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 313 P.3d 849, 853 (Nev. 2013) ("Substantive statutes are presumed to only operate prospectively, unless it is clear that the drafters intended the statute to be applied retroactively."); see also Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 114 S. Ct. 1483, 1487, 511 U.S. 244, 245 (U.S. Tex. 1994) ("The presumption against statutory retroactivity is founded upon elementary considerations of fairness dictating that individuals should have an opportunity to know what the law is and to conform their conduct accordingly.").

Unlike the current version of NRS 116, the version of NRS 116 at the time of the sale in 2012 contained no disclosure requirements. The prospective application of NRS 116's disclosure requirement is represented in each of the cases cited above.

Because NRS 116 contained no duty to disclose preforeclosure payments on May 11, 2012, the claim fails as a matter of law, whether or not it is based on an intentional or a negligent misrepresentation. The Court should grant summary judgment in favor of the HOA.

iii. The foreclosure deed cannot create liability against the HOA

The Court may grant summary judgment in favor of the HOA because the HOA 19 cannot be held liable for the character of title to the Property because the only deed 20 permitted by NRS 116 is a deed without warranty. NRS 116.31164(3) states: "After the 21 sale, the person conducting the sale shall: (a) Make, execute and, after payment is 22 made, deliver to the purchaser, or his or her successor or assign, a deed without 23 warranty which conveys to the grantee all title of the unit's owner to the unit" (emphasis 24 added). The non-warranty deed vests title "without equity or right of redemption." NRS 25 116.31166(3). 26

A nonwarranty deed is the same as a quitclaim deed, which: "is sufficient to convey whatever interest the grantor had in the property at the time the conveyance was made,"

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Brophy Min. Co. v. Brophy & Dale Gold & Silver Min. Co., 15 Nev. 101, 107 (1880). A guitclaim deed "neither warrants nor professes that the title is valid." Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). For more than 100 years, a non-warranty deed has protected a grantor from liability from deed warranties because the deed conveys only that which the grantor holds and promises nothing more. See Oliver v. Piatt, 44 U.S. 333, 11 L. Ed. 622 (1845) ("A purchaser by a deed of quitclaim without any covenant of warranty, is not entitled to protection in a court of equity as a purchaser for a valuable consideration, without notice; and he takes only what the vendor could lawfully convey.") See also, e.g., Platner v. Vincent, 194 Cal. 436, 444, 229 P. 24, 27 (1924) ('Appellant [w]ould have [been] protected [] from liability as a cograntor by executing a quitclaim deed [because s]uch deeds do not carry covenants of warranty.") See also, Greek Catholic Congregation of Borough of Olyphant v. Plummer, 347 Pa. 351, 353-54, 32 A.2d 299, 300 (1943) ("One guit-claiming his interest in a property is creating no liability against himself and the real owner of that property: See Power v. Foley, Newfoundland Reports, 1897-1903, p. 540; England v. Cowley, L. R. 8 Ex. 126; and Owen v. Legh, 3 B. & Ald. 470."). See also, Lowe v. Ragland, 156 Tex. 504, 516, 297 S.W.2d 668, 675-76 (1957) ("All of the title which the grantor owned or had the power to convey passes under the conveyance, but there is no liability on the warranty for any impairment of title resulting from the prior conveyance.")

Under NRS 116, the HOA *cannot* provide a nonjudicial foreclosure deed with any 19 deed warranties because NRS 116 expressly requires that the type of deed conferred is a 20 "deed without warranty." The Nevada Supreme Court has concluded that the HOA has 21 "little autonomy in taking extra-statutory efforts" under the "elaborate" requirements of NRS 22 116. Nationstar Mortg., LLC v. Saticoy Bay LLC Series 2227 Shadow Canyon, 405 P.3d 23 641, 645 (Nev. 2017), reh'g denied (Dec. 13, 2017), reconsideration en banc denied (Feb. 24 23, 2018). In the Prior Litigation, there was no defect in the underlying nonjuducial 25 foreclosure sale. As the Nevada Supreme Court has said: 26

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The language in the Notice of Sale clearly and accurately explained that the winning bidder <u>would receive a deed without warranty</u>, see NRS 116.31164(3)(a) (2005) (requiring the person conducting the foreclosure sale to deliver to the purchaser a deed without warranty), and <u>[a deed without warranty] cannot reasonably be construed as suggesting that a first deed of trust would survive the foreclosure sale.</u>

First Mortg. Corp. v. Saticoy Bay LLC Series 1828 La Calera, 432 P.3d 189 (Nev. 2018) (table) (emphasis added). In other words, the HOA grants a deed without any warranty, conveying whatever interest it holds, nothing more and nothing less. The deed does not include a representation that the HOA will defend the grantee's (Plaintiff's) title and does not include a right to sue the grantor (the HOA or trustee) under a theory that the deed should have included warranties or representations which cannot exist as a matter of law. The claim fails as a matter of law.

Similarly, in *A Oro, LLC v. Ditech Financial LLC*, 2019 WL 913129, 434 P.3d 929 (Nev. 2019) (unpublished disposition), the Nevada Supreme Court concluded that the district court correctly granted summary judgment to the HOA on the appellant foreclosure purchaser's fraudulent nondisclosure claim. In *A Oro*, the foreclosure purchaser challenged the district court's entry of summary judgment in favor of the lender on the tender issues. *Id.* The foreclosure purchaser had also asserted claims against the association based upon fraudulent non-disclosure of the lender's tender. However, the district court awarded summary judgment in favor of the association on the foreclosure purchaser's claim. *Id.* In upholding the district court decision, the Supreme Court determined (among other reasons) that there was no evidence that the association intended to induce appellant into placing the winning bid at the foreclosure sale, as the association was unaware of appellant's assumptions regarding the legal effect of the sale. *See id.*, citing *Nelson v. Heer*, 123 Nev. 217, 225, 163 P.3d 420, 426 (2007) (setting forth the elements of a fraudulent nondisclosure claim).

As an additional reason why the claim had no merit, the Nevada Supreme Court noted, "that appellant has provided no legal support for the <u>unorthodox proposition</u> that the winning bidder at a foreclosure sale can bring a fraud claim against the auctioneer [or

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the HOA] when the auctioneer's foreclosure notices have disclaimed any warranties as to the title being conveyed." Id. at n.2 (emphasis added).

Here too, the Court should reject Plaintiff's unorthodox and unsubstantiated proposition that it is entitled to bring misrepresentation claims against the HOA where the Foreclosure Deed expressly disclaimed any warranties as to the quality of title being conveyed.

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BREACH OF DUTY OF GOOD FAITH FAILS AS A MATTER OF LAW

Plaintiff alleges that the HOA breached its duty of good faith under NRS 116.1113 by failing to disclose the prior owner's payment. Compl. ¶ 77. This allegation is without merit. While NRS 116.1113 imposes a duty of good faith *in the performance of every contract or duty governed by the statute*, the only "duties" owed are outlined in sections 116.3116 through 116.31168. Here, the HOA fully complied with these duties by complying with all notice and recording requirements set forth in NRS 116 as it existed at the time of the sale. As established by the Prior Litigation, the nonjudicial foreclosure sale was valid, meaning there was no defect in the underlying sale. The HOA complied with its duties. *See generally*, Exhibit A.

Additionally, nothing in NRS 116.1113, in effect in May of 2012 imposed a duty to disclose any preforelcosure payments. *See* Section A, *supra*. Compare, NRS 116.31162(1)(b)(3)(11) (2017) (requiring an HOA to disclose if tender of the superpriority portion of the lien) with NRS 116.31162 (2005) (no disclosure requirement).⁶

The HOA was not required to disclose the existence of a pre-sale payment. Further, as noted above, the HOA was specifically prohibited from giving any purchaser at the auction a so-called warranty deed—the only type of deed it could give to any purchaser

⁶ See the following decisions, cited for their persuasive authority: *Cypress v. Foothills at Macdonald Ranch Master Ass'n*, No. 78849, 2020 Nev. Unpub. LEXIS 999, at *2 (Oct. 16, 2020)
(no duty to disclose tender of payment); *Tangiers Drive Tr. v. Foothills at Macdonald Ranch Master Ass'n*, No. 78564, 2020 Nev. Unpub. LEXIS 996, at *3 (Oct. 16, 2020) (same); *Ln Mgmt. Llc Series 4980 Droubay v. Squire Silver Springs Cmty. Ass'n*, No. 79035, 2020 Nev. Unpub. LEXIS 1009, at
*2 (Oct. 16, 2020) (same).

was one made "without warranty" pursuant to NRS 116.31164(3)(a). Accordingly, Plaintiff's claim for breach of good faith based on a nonexistent duty, which did not exist in NRS 116 fails as a matter of law. The Court should grant summary judgment in favor of the HOA.

C. THE ALLEGED PRE-SALE PHONE CALL DOES NOT CREATE A GENUINE ISSUE OF FACT

Plaintiff alleges that the HOA and NAS owed a duty to disclose the prior homeowner's pre-foreclosure payments when he allegedly called NAS before the nonjudicial foreclosure sale. Plaintiff is incorrect. The two circumstances where a pre-foreclosure disclosure would take place would be, (1) an announcement at the time of the nonjudicial foreclosure sale, or (2) an announcement over the phone in a preforeclosure sale conversation with NAS. As noted above, it is undisputed that there was no such announcement at the sale. As discussed *ad nauseam* above, neither the HOA nor NAS owed a duty under the statute to announce any pre-foreclosure payments under the version of NRS 116 on the date of the sale.

To the extent that Plaintiff alleges he placed a telephone call to NAS prior to the nonjudicial foreclosure sale and that NAS should have disclosed to Plaintiff whether the former homeowner had made any pre-foreclosure payments during the phone call, the analysis is the same. There was no duty under NRS 116 in May of 2012 to make such a disclosure.

Additionally, even assuming Plaintiff made such a phone call (and there is no reliable evidence Plaintiff did so) as established by the Declaration of Susan Moses, NAS would <u>not</u> have disclosed any preforeclosure information to an unauthorized person or entity, such as Plaintiff, because of the applicable federal statute which protects debtors' privacy. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1692c. NAS would not, and did not discuss the Property with Plaintiff in this case. See Exhibit G, Declaration of Moses at ¶ 12 (no disclosure without consent, court order, or to effect a judicial remedy).

Therefore, to the extent Plaintiff alleges he did make a preforeclosure phonecall to NAS (of which there is only contradicting evidence), the allegation, if true, still does not

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create a genuine issue for trial because, *whether or not Plaintiff called NAS, NAS would not have disclosed information about the Property.* Plaintiff would have no information to rely on whether or not he called. The call, or the absence of a call, would make no difference. Thus, whether actual, or fabricated, the alleged phone call from Plaintiff to NAS does not create a duty under NRS 116, for NAS to discuss the Property, which would then violate 15 U.S.C.A. § 1692c (prohibiting third-party communications about debtor).

The putative phone call does not create a genuine issue of fact which would require a trial. See *Aldabe v. Adams*, 81 Nev. at 285, 402 P.2d at 37 (cannot fabricate facts to create summary judgment); *Scott v. Harris*, 550 U.S. at 380. (should not adopt factual version contradicted by the record); *Boesiger v. Desert Appraisals, Ltd. Liab. Co.*, 444 P.3d at 440-41 (unsubstantiated claims should be dispensed on summary judgment). The Court should grant summary judgment in favor of the HOA.

D. THE CLAIMS FOR CONSPIRACY AND BREACH OF NRS 116.1113 FAIL

At the hearing on the HOA's initial motion to dismiss, which took place on December 15, 2020, the Court dismissed the claims for civil conspiracy and violation of NRS 116.1113. However, the parties agreed no written order would be required. The minutes of the hearing, do not reflect the dismissal of the two claims. Accordingly, the argument below is restated merely out of an abundance of caution.

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1. CONSPIRACY STILL FAILS

A nonjudicial foreclosure, and the procedures therein, are expressly authorized by statute, and are not unlawful. Accordingly, Plaintiff's conspiracy claim fails as a matter of law because there was no unlawful objective by the HOA in its attempt to collect past due assessments from the prior homeowner, through a publicly noticed and conducted auction.

To establish a claim for civil conspiracy, a plaintiff must show (1) defendants, by acting in concert, intended to accomplish an unlawful objective for the purpose of harming plaintiff; and (2) plaintiff sustained damages resulting from defendants' act or acts. *See Consol. Generator-Nevada, Inc. v. Cummins Engine Co.*, 114 Nev. 1304, 971 P.2d 1251 (1999); *see also Dow Chemical Co. v. Mahlum*, 114 Nev. 1468, 970 P.2d 98 (1998).

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Plaintiff cannot meet this evidentiary burden. Even in the context of a nonjudicial foreclosure, a conspiracy claim requires unlawful conduct.⁷

Plaintiff's conclusory allegations are insufficient to show that the HOA intended to accomplish an unlawful objective for the purpose of harming plaintiff. See Romero v. State, No. 52420, 2009 Nev. Unpub. LEXIS 1, at *2 (July 29, 2009) (affirming dismissal of "naked" and "conclusory" claims). The nonjudicial foreclosure sale was a public auction where anyone present could have bid (including the HOA). Additionally, the winning bidder would obtain a nonwarranty deed, which makes no promises (or representations or effects anything unlawful) regarding the quality of title of the Property passed through the sale. Additionally, during the Prior Litigation, there was no finding which could show the HOA intended to harm Plaintiff by merely complying with the requirements of NRS 116 to perform a valid nonjudicial foreclosure sale. See Exhibit A, (District Court Order holding the nonjudicial foreclosure sale validly conveyed title of the Property to the Plaintiff). See also Exhibit B, Nevada Supreme Court order of affirmance of the District Court Order. The HOA's nonjudicial foreclosure sale complied with NRS 116 and did what NRS 116 permitted, it conveyed property to the highest bidder through the nonwarranty foreclosure deed. A valid nonjudicial foreclosure sale is not an unlawful act which satisfies the required elements of a conspiracy claim.

Finally, there can be no conspiracy under the preclusive weight of the intra-corporate conspiracy doctrine, which stands for the proposition that "agents and employees of a corporation cannot conspire with their corporate principal or employer where they act in their official capacities on behalf of the corporation and not as individuals for their individual

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⁷ See for additional persuasive authority: Mann St. v. Elsinore Homeowners Ass'n, 466 P.3d
540 (Nev. 2020) (where breach of contract and breach of duty of good faith fail, "civil conspiracy
claim necessarily fails. See Consol. Generator-Neu., Inc. v. Cummins Engine Co., 114 Nev. 1304,
1311, 971 P.2d 1251, 1256 (1998) (providing that a civil conspiracy requires, among other things, a
concerted action, intend[ed] to accomplish an unlawful objective for the purpose of harming
another") (internal quotes omitted); see also, Bay v. Travata & Montage at Summerlin Ctr.
Homeowners' Ass'n, No. 80162, 2020 Nev. Unpub. LEXIS 994, at *2-3 (Oct. 16, 2020) (affirming
dismissal of conspiracy, in absence of unlawful conduct).

advantage." See Collins v. Union Federal Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 662 P.2d 610, 622, 99 Nev. 284, 303 (Nev.,1983). Therefore, to sustain a claim for conspiracy against agents and their corporation, a plaintiff must show that one or more of the agents acted outside of the scope of their employment "to render them a separate person for the purposes of conspiracy." See Faulkner v. Arkansas Children's Hosp., 69 S.W.3d 393, 407, 347 Ark. 941, 962 (Ark.,2002).

Plaintiff has not plead, and cannot establish facts sufficient to meet this standard. The Complaint lacks any specific allegations that the HOA acted outside of its scope as stated in NRS 116. Even if the Complaint was properly plead with specificity, it would be disingenuous and inconsistent with the District Court's Order from the Prior Litigation. The logical outcome of pleading a nonjudicial foreclosure defect (conspiracy) would necessarily result in finding the nonjudicial foreclosure sale void or setting it aside, with Plaintiff losing the Property—probably not what the Plaintiff wants to happen. The Prior Litigation and the Nevada Supreme Court has already ruled a valid foreclosure took place. Based upon the foregoing reasons, summary judgment should be entered in the HOA's favor.

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BREACH OF NRS 116.1113 STILL FAILS

The Court should dismiss or grant summary judgment on the alleged violation of 17 NRS 113 claim because NRS 113 does not apply to a nonjudicial foreclosure under NRS 18 116, nor does NRS 113 require disclosure of preforeclosure payments. The Nevada 19 Supreme Court authority continues to grow: See Saticoy Bay Llc Series 10007 Liberty View 20 v. S. Terrace Homeowners Ass'n, 484 P.3d 276 (Nev. 2021) (unpublished) (NRS 113 21 required disclosure of title "defects" not "superpriority tenders") (issued April 16, 2021); see 22 also Saticoy Bay v. Silverstone Ranch Cmty. Ass'n, No. 80039, 2020 Nev. Unpub. LEXIS 23 993, at *2 (Oct. 16, 2020) (same); see also, Bay v. Tapestry at Town Ctr. Homeowners 24 Ass'n, 480 P.3d 266 (Nev. 2021) (unpublished) (same, issued February 16, 2021); see 25 also, Saticoy Bay Llc Series 3237 v. Aliante Master Ass'n, 480 P.3d 836 (Nev. 2021) 26 (unpublished) (same, issued February 16, 2021). 27

As noted *ad nauseam* above, an HOA's duty in a nonjudicial foreclosure sale is to comply with NRS 116. NRS 116 does not incorporate or reference NRS 113, nor does NRS 113 incorporate or reference NRS 116. Injecting the requirements of NRS 113 makes no sense in a nonjudicial foreclosure sale context ruled by NRS 116.

Other district courts agree, and though not mandatory authority, decisions in this district have concluded:

[NRS] § 113 [is] inapplicable here as NRS § 116 provides different procedures and rights in HOA foreclosure sales. Specifically, for example, NRS § 116 does not require an SRPD, or recording of a subordination of a lien. *See, SFR Invs. Pool 1. LLC*, 427 P.3d 113. For this same reason, the NRED handbook is inapplicable because it specifically discusses the SPRD under NRS § 113, not NRS § 116.

Moreover, pursuant to NRS § 113.1100 (s), a seller is a person who sells or intends to sell any residential property. Pursuant to NRS § 116, the HOA was a foreclosing association and not a seller as defined under NRS § 113.130. NRS § 116 precludes the requirement of NRS § 113 for a SRPD as the foreclosure auction process does not follow the sale process referenced in NRS § 113 and the Investors claim for violation of NRS § 113 must be dismissed.

Saticoy Bay LLC Series 9076 Quarrystone v. Md. Pebble at Silverado Homeowners Ass'n,

2019 Nev. Dist. LEXIS 1009, *4 (Eighth Judicial District, Sept. 23, 2019). See also Hitchen

v. S. Valley Ranch Cmty. Ass'n, 2020 Nev. Dist. LEXIS 277, *15 (same).

Additionally, even if NRS 113 applies, (which it does not) the claim is time-barred because NRS 113 sets forth a one or two year statute of limitation. *See* NRS 113.150(4): "[a]n action to enforce the provisions of this subsection must be commenced not later than 1 year after the purchaser discovers or reasonably should have discovered the defect or 2 years after the conveyance of the property to the purchaser, whichever occurs later."

In this case, based on the date of the conveyance, the nonjudicial foreclosure occurred on May 11, 2012 (Compl. ¶ 2). Thus, Plaintiff had two years, or until May 11, 2014 to bring a claim. The Complaint was filed on August 20, 2020, more than eight years past the conveyance and more than six years past the expiration of the statute of limitation.

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Alternatively, based on the discovery of the alleged defect (which is not a defect),
 Plaintiff alleges the disclosure of the alleged defect (a payment) occurred on August 24,
 2017 (Compl. ¶ 41). Accordingly, the statute of limitation expired one year after the
 disclosure, on August 24, 2018. The complaint was filed on August 20, 2020, nearly two
 years too late.

The claim fails substantively or procedurally. Thus, the Court may dismiss the claim with prejudice, or grant summary judgment in favor of the HOA.

VII. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Court should grant summary judgment in favor of the HOA because there is no genuine issue of material fact for trial or arbitration. The Plaintiff has already established the character of the title it obtained through the District Court's Order in the Prior Litigation. Plaintiff should not be permitted to change its story in order to avoid summary judgment in this case, and attempt to have the HOA or NAS supplement its \$5,500.00 purchase of a \$700,000.00 property. The claims fail and there is no genuine factual issue.

Dated this 22nd day of July 2021.

LIPSON NEILSON, P.C.

/s/ Peter E. Dunkley

By:

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


EXHIBIT A

EXHIBIT A

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 123 125 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120		Electronically Filed 7/12/2018 10:34 AM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT UNTY, NEVADA Case No.: A-13-683467-C Dept. No: XVI NOTICE OF ENTRY OF ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT/ COUNTERCLAIMANT NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE LLC'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DENYING PLAINTIFF/COUNTER- DEFENDANT RIVER GLIDER AVENUE TRUST'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
	45755441;1	1

TO ALL PARTIES AND TO THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD: 1 PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that an ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT/ 2 NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE COUNTERCLAIMANT LLC'S **MOTION** FOR 3 SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DENYING PLAINTIFF/COUNTER-DEFENDANT 4 RIVER GLIDER AVENUE TRUST'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT has been 5 entered by this Court on the 11th day of July, 2018, in the above-captioned matter. A copy of 6 said Order is attached hereto as Exhibit A. 7 Dated this 12th day of July, 2018 8 **AKERMAN LLP** 9 /s/ Donna M. Wittig 10 MELANIE D. MORGAN, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 8386 1635 VILLAGE CENTER CIRCLE, SUITE 200 LAS VEGAS, NEVADA 89134 TEL.: (702) 634-5000 – FAX: (702) 380-8572 11 DONNA M. WITTIG, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 11015 12 1635 Village Center Circle, Suite 200 Las Vegas, Nevada 89134 13 Attorneys for defendant/counterclaimant, 14 Nationstar Mortgage, LLC 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 2 45755441;1


AKERMAN LLP

1	CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
2	I HEREBY CERTIFY that I am an employee of AKERMAN LLP, and that on this 12 th
3	day of July, 2018, I caused to be served a true and correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF
	ENTRY OF ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT/COUNTERCLAIMANT
4	NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE LLC'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND
5	DENYING PLAINTIFF/COUNTER-DEFENDANT RIVER GLIDER AVENUE
6	TRUST'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, in the following manner:
7	(ELECTRONIC SERVICE) Pursuant to Administrative Order 14-2, the above-
8	referenced document was electronically filed on the date hereof and served through the Notice
9	of Electronic Filing automatically generated by the Court's facilities to those parties listed on
10	the Court's Master Service List as follows:
11 SUITE 200 134 1380-8572	Lipson, Neilson, Cole, Seltzer & Garin, P.C.
MAN LLP TER CIRCLE, SUITE 20 NEVADA 89134 D. FAX: (702) 380-8572 7 1 7 1 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7	Kaleb Anderson kanderson@lipsonneilson.com
LLLP DA 89 DA 89 TCLE TCLE 13	Julie Funaijfunai@lipsonneilson.comDebra Marquezdmarquez@lipsonneilson.com
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Se F 17	Susan E. Moses susanm@nas-inc.com
18	LAW OFFICES OF MICHAEL F. BOHN, ESQ.
19	Eserve Contactoffice@bohnlawfirm.comMichael F Bohn Esqmbohn@bohnlawfirm.com
20	
21	
22	/s/ Carla Llarena
23	An employee of AKERMAN LLP
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EXHIBIT A

EXHIBIT A

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1635 VILLAGE CENTER CIRCLE, SUITE 200 LAS VEGAS, NEVADA 89134 TEL.: (702) 634-5000 – FAX: (702) 380-8572

AKERMAN LLP

Defendant/counterclaimant, Nationstar Mortgage LLC (Nationstar)'s motion for summary judgment (Nationstar's motion) regarding tender and statutorily defective foreclosure sale, plaintiff/counter-defendant River Glider Avenue Trust (plaintiff)'s motions for summary judgment (plaintiff's motion) and defendant/counter-defendant Harbor Cove Homeowners Association (Harbor Cove)'s limited joinder to plaintiff's motion for summary judgment came before the Court on December 7, 2017 at 9:00 a.m. Rock Jung, Esq. appeared on behalf of Nationstar and Adam R. Trippiedi appeared on behalf of plaintiff. The Court ordered the parties to submit supplemental briefing and continued the hearing to February 8, 2018. Specifically, plaintiff's supplemental brief was due January 15, 2018 and Nationstar's reply brief was due January 29, 2018.

The motions and supplemental briefing came on for hearing before the Court on February 8, 2018 at 9:00 a.m. Donna M. Wittig appeared on behalf of Nationstar; Michael F. Bohn appeared on behalf of plaintiff; and Karen Kao appeared on behalf of Harbor Cove. The Court continued the hearing to April 12, 2018 pending the Supreme Court's determination whether they will grant the motion for reconsideration in *Saticoy Bay LLC Series 2141 Golden Hill v. JP Morgan Chase Bank*, No. 71246, 408P.3d 558 (Nev. Dec. 22, 2017) (unpublished) and if no decision rendered prior to the continued hearing, the Court would provide a decision at the April 12, 2018 hearing.

The motions again came on for hearing on April 12, 2018. Natalie L. Winslow, Esq. appeared on behalf of Nationstar; Michael F. Bohn, Esq. appeared on behalf of plaintiff and Julie Funai, Esq. appeared on behalf of Harbor Cove. The Court, having reviewed Nationstar and plaintiff's motions, joinder, the oppositions, replies, supplemental briefing, the exhibits, all papers and pleadings, and oral argument of counsel, and for good cause appearing, makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law.

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		1	FINDINGS OF FACT
		2	1. On or about April 19, 2005, Miller purchased the Property.
		3	2. The Deed of Trust executed by Miller identified Cameron Financial Group, Inc.
		4	DBA 1 st Choice Mortgage as the Lender, Fidelity National Title as the Trustee and secured a
		5	loan in the amount of \$631,000.00 (hereinafter the "Miller Loan").
		6	3. On April 19, 2012, a Corporate Assignment of Deed of Trust was recorded
		7	which assigned all beneficial interest under the Deed of Trust to Aurora Bank FSB.
		8	4. On August 31, 2012, an Assignment of Deed of Trust was recorded by which
		9	Aurora Bank FSB assigned all its beneficial interest under the Deed of Trust to Nationstar.
		10	5. Mr. Miller defaulted on his obligation to pay HOA assessments beginning in
	SUITE 200 134) 380-8572	11	December 2008.
	E, SUITE 20 89134 12) 380-8572	12	6. On July 26, 2010, a Notice of Delinquent Assessment Lien was recorded against
AKERMAN LLP	CIRCL /ADA 8 AX: (70	13	the Property by NAS, with a lien amount of \$1,032.01.
RMAJ	NTER .S, NEV 000 – F,	14	7. In 2009 and 2010, the HOA assessments were \$70.00 per month.
AKEI	.GE CE : VEGA : 034-5(15	8. On September 3, 2010, a Notice of Default and Election to Sell under
	VILLAGE LAS VE : (702) 634	16	Homeowners Association Lien was recorded against the Property by HOA Trustee on behalf of
	1635 TEL	17	HOA, with a lien amount of \$2,110.87.
		18	9. On March 31, 2011, a Notice of Foreclosure Sale was recorded against the
		19	Property by HOA the Trustee, with a lien amount of \$3,451.55.
		20	10. In April 2011, Mr. Miller offered a settlement of his HOA assessments of
		21	\$1,232.88, which was \$69.43 less than what Mr. Miller owed. Harbor Cove accepted Mr.
		22	Miller's settlement offer, waiving the balance of \$69.43. Mr. Miller made the required
		23	payment by check dated May 27, 2011. Of Mr. Miller's payment, Harbor Cove credited
		24	\$500.00 to his assessment account on June 11, 2011, and credited two \$200.00 payments (total
		25	\$400.00) to his assessment account on August 30, 2011.
		26	11. Mr. Miller continued to accrue assessments, and he never satisfied NAS's fees
		27	and costs in full.
		28	12. Harbor Cove, through NAS, proceeded to foreclose.
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13. On April 16, 2012, a second Notice of Foreclosure Sale was recorded against the Property by HOA Trustee, with a lien amount of \$3,346.53.

3 14. A non-judicial foreclosure sale occurred on May 11, 2012 (hereinafter the 4 "HOA Sale").

15. River Glider Avenue Trust purchased the Property for \$5,500.00.

6 16. If any of these findings of fact are more properly considered conclusions of law, 7 they should be so construed.

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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1. Summary judgment is proper when there is no issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Nev. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Wood v. Safeway, Inc., 121 P.3d 1026, 1030 (Nev. 2005). After the movant has carried its burden to identify issues where there is no genuine issue of material fact, the non-moving party must "set forth specific facts demonstrating the existence of a genuine issue for trial or have summary judgment entered against him." Wood, 121 Nev. at 732. Summary judgment is particularly appropriate where issues of law are controlling and dispositive of the case. American Fence, Inc. v. Wham, 95 Nev. 788, 792, 603 P.2d 274, 277 (1979).

2. 17 The super-priority portion of the HOA's lien is equal to the amount of 18 assessments that "would have become due in the absence of acceleration during the nine months immediately preceding institution of an action to enforce the lien" 19 See NRS 116.3116(2). A party has instituted "an action to enforce the lien" for purposes of NRS 20 116.3116(6) when it provides the notice of delinquent assessment. Saticoy Bay LLC Series 21 2021 Gray Eagle Way 338 P.3d at 231. Here, the HOA provided its notice of delinquent 22 23 assessment on July 26, 2010.

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3. The superpriority, as calculated from the nine months preceding the recording 25 of the notice of delinquent assessment lien, was \$630.00 (\$70.00 x 9 months).

4. 26 The HOA's super-priority lien was extinguished by the homeowner's satisfaction of the super-priority. Saticoy Bay LLC Series 2141 Golden Hill v. JP Morgan 27 Chase Bank, No. 71246, 408P.3d 558 (Nev. Dec. 22, 2017) (unpublished). Payments made by 28

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the homeowner are held to have been applied first to the super-priority portion of the HOA's 1 2 lien as a matter of law. 5. The homeowner's satisfaction of the super-priority portion of the HOA's lien 3 preserved Nationstar's deed of trust. 4 5 6. River Glider Avenue Trust purchased the property subject to Nationstar's deed of trust. 6 7 7. Because the homeowner's super-priority satisfaction is dispositive of the case, 8 the court does not address the remaining issues. 9 8. If any of these conclusions of law are more properly considered findings of fact, 10 they should be so construed. **ORDER** 11 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that Nationstar's 12 Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED, and plaintiff River Glider Avenue Trust's 13 Motion for Summary Judgment is **DENIED**; 14 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that Harbor Cove's 15 limited joinder in plaintiff River Glider Avenue Trust's Motion for Summary Judgment is 16 **DENIED;** 17 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the super-18 priority portion of the HOA's lien, recorded on or about July 26, 2010, was discharged and 19 extinguished prior to the HOA foreclosure sale; 20 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that River Glider 21 Avenue Trust purchased an interest in the Property, commonly known as 8112 Lake Hill 22 Drive, Las Vegas, Nevada 89128, APN Number 138-16-213-034, subject to the deed of trust 23 recorded on February 14, 2006 as Document Number 20070327-0004833; 24 . . . 25 . . . 26 27 28 5

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that all remaining 1 claims not specifically mentioned, including all remaining claims in the complaint and 2 counterclaims, are dismissed with prejudice. 3 2018 Dated: 4 5 RTJUDGE 6 Submitted by: 7 AKERMAN LLP 8 MELANIE D. MORGAN, ESQ. 9 Nevada Bar No. 8386 DONNA M. WITTIG, ESQ. 10 Nevada Bar No. 11015 1635 VILLAGE CENTER CIRCLE, SUITE 200 LAS VEGAS, NEVADA 89134 TEL.: (702) 634-5000 – FAX: (702) 380-8572 1635 Village Center Circle, Suite 200 11 Las Vegas, Nevada 89134 12 defendant/counterclaimant, Attorneys for Nationstar Mortgage, LLC 13 Approved as to form and content by: 14 Dated: May 30, 2018 Dated: April __, 2018 15 16 LAW OFFICES OF MICHAEL F. BOHN, LIPSON, NEILSON, COLE, SELTZER & GARIN, Esq., LTD P.C. 17 18 refused to sign MICHAEL F. BOHN, ESQ. KALEB D. ANDERSON, ESQ. 19 Nevada Bar No. 1641 Nevada Bar No. 7582 ADAM R. TRIPPIEDI, ESQ. JULIE A. FUNAI, ESQ. 20 Nevada Bar No. 8752 Nevada Bar No. 12294 2260 Corporate Circle, Suite 480 9900 Covington Cross Dr., Suite 120 21 Henderson, NV 89074 Las Vegas, NV 89144 22 Attorneys for plaintiff/counter-defendant defendant/counter-defendant Attorneys for River Glider Avenue Trust Harbor Cove Homeowners Association 23 24 25 26 27 28 6 44910670;2


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EXHIBIT B

EXHIBIT B

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

RIVER GLIDER AVENUE TRUST, Appellant, vs. NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE, LLC, Respondent.



ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE

This is an appeal from a district court summary judgment in an action to quiet title. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; Timothy C. Williams, Judge. Reviewing the summary judgment de novo, *Wood v. Safeway, Inc.*, 121 Nev. 724, 729, 121 P.3d 1026, 1029 (2005), we affirm.¹

After the HOA foreclosure agent issued a notice of delinquent assessments, the homeowner entered into settlement agreements with both the HOA and the HOA's foreclosure agent. The homeowner paid the HOA the agreed-upon amount in order to settle the money owed to it for delinquent assessments and any late fees, and entered into a payment plan with the foreclosure agent to settle the amounts owed for the foreclosure agent's fees and costs. The district court concluded that the homeowner's payment to the HOA cured the superpriority default, such that the purchaser at the later foreclosure sale took title to the property subject to respondent's first deed of trust.

We recently held in 9352 Cranesbill Trust v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 136 Nev., Adv. Op. 8, 459 P.3d 227, 232 (2020), that payments made

¹Pursuant to NRAP 34(f)(1), we have determined that oral argument is not warranted in this appeal.

SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA

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by a homeowner could cure the default on the superpriority portion of an HOA lien such that the HOA's foreclosure sale would not extinguish the first deed of trust on the subject property. Whether a homeowner's payments actually cure a superpriority default, however, depends upon the actions and intent of the homeowner and the HOA and, if those cannot be determined, upon the district court's assessment of justice and equity. See *id.* at 231 (explaining that "[i]f neither the debtor nor the creditor makes a specific application of the payment, then it falls to the [district] court to determine how to apply the payment").

In this case, the district court correctly determined that the homeowner's payments could cure the default on the superpriority portion of the HOA's lien. The district court also correctly determined, based on the evidence before it, that the HOA and the homeowner intended for the homeowner's payment to cure the delinquent assessments incurred before the notice of delinquent assessments. Indeed, the emails between the homeowner, foreclosure agent, and HOA, and the foreclosure agent's testimony, leaves no doubt that the HOA and the homeowner intended for the homeowner's payment to cure the amounts in the notice of delinquent assessment,² which would include the nine months of assessments comprising the superpriority default amount. *See* NRS 116.3116(2) (2012) (describing the superpriority component of an HOA's lien as "the

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²Because the HOA and the homeowner's settlement was premised on the agreement that the homeowner's payment would cure the delinquent assessments comprising the amount in the notice of delinquent assessments, we are not concerned with how the HOA or foreclosure agent actually applied the homeowner's payment to the amounts owed. See 9352 Cranesbill, 459 P.3d at 231 (recognizing that a debtor may direct how his payment is applied to various debts).

assessments for common expenses...which would have become due...during the 9 months immediately preceding institution of an action to enforce the lien"); Saticoy Bay LLC Series 2021 Gray Eagle Way v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (Gray Eagle), 133 Nev. 21, 25-26, 388 P.3d 226, 231 (2017) (recognizing that, under the pre-2015 version of NRS 116.3116, serving a notice of delinquent assessments constitutes institution of an action to enforce the lien). And, because the homeowner's payment cured the superpriority default, the district court correctly determined that any purchaser at a later foreclosure sale would purchase the property subject to the first deed of trust on the property. See 9352 Cranesbill, 459 P.3d at 229.

Although appellant correctly points out that there were new unpaid monthly assessments at the time of the sale, these unpaid monthly assessments could not have comprised a new superpriority lien absent a new notice of delinquent assessment. See NRS 116.3116(2) (2012) (limiting the monthly assessments subject to superpriority status as those incurred "during the 9 months immediately preceding institution of an action to enforce the lien"); Gray Eagle, 133 Nev. at 25-26, 388 P.3d at 231 (holding that serving the notice of delinquent assessments institutes proceedings to enforce the HOA's lien); cf. Prop. Plus Invs., LLC v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 133 Nev. 462, 466-67, 401 P.3d 728, 731-32 (2017) (observing that an HOA must restart the foreclosure process in order to enforce a second superpriority lien). And foreclosure fees and costs are never part of an HOA's superpriority lien. See NRS 116.3116(2) (2009); Horizons at Seven Hills Homeowners Ass'n v. Ikon Holdings, LLC, 132 Nev. 362, 373, 373 P.3d 66, 73 (2016) (holding that a superpriority lien "does not include an additional amount for the collection fees and foreclosure costs" incurred preceding a foreclosure sale). We also need not address appellant's

SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA purported bona-fide-purchaser status when, as here, the superpriority default is cured before the foreclosure sale.³ See Bank of Am., N.A. v. SFR Invs. Pool 1, LLC, 134 Nev. 604, 612, 427 P.3d 113, 121 (2018) (providing that a party's status as a bona fide purchaser is irrelevant when the superpriority default is cured before the foreclosure sale).

Based on the foregoing, we

ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.

Gibbons

J.

Stiglich Sillin J.

Silver

Hon. Timothy C. Williams, District Judge cc: Janet Trost, Settlement Judge Law Offices of Michael F. Bohn, Ltd. Akerman LLP/Las Vegas **Eighth District Court Clerk**

³We also decline to address appellant's arguments that equitable considerations did not warrant ruling in respondent's favor when the district court's decision was not based in equity.

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EXHIBIT C

EXHIBIT C

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

ORDER DENYING REHEARING

RIVER GLIDER AVENUE TRUST, Appellant, VS. NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE, LLC, Respondent.

No. 76683

FILED

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It is so ORDERED.

Rehearing denied. NRAP 40(c).

J. Gibbons

J.

Stiglich J.

Silver

Hon. Timothy C. Williams, District Judge cc: Law Offices of Michael F. Bohn, Ltd. Akerman LLP/Las Vegas Eighth District Court Clerk

SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA (O) 1947A

EXHIBIT "D"

EXHIBIT "D"

	ELECTRONICALLY SE 6/17/2021 3:12 P		
1	ROGER P. CROTEAU, ESQ.		
2	Nevada Bar No. 4958		
3	CHRISTOPHER L. BENNER, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 8963		
4	ROGER P. CROTEAU & ASSOCIATES, LTD 2810 W. Charleston Blvd., Ste. 75		
5	Las Vegas, Nevada 89102 (702) 254-7775		
6	(702) 228-7719 (facsimile)		
7	croteaulaw@croteaulaw.com chris@croteaulaw.com		
8	Attorneys for Plaintiff River Glider Avenue Trust		
9	DISTRIC	CT COURT	
10			
11		NTY, NEVADA	
12	RIVER GLIDER AVENUE TRUST,	Case No: A-20-819781-C Dept No: 20	
13	Plaintiff,		
14	VS.	DI AINTHEE'S DESDONGES TO	
15	HARBOR COVE HOMEOWNERS	PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSES TO DEFENDANT HARBOR COVE	
16	ASSOCIATION; and NEVADA ASSOCIATION SERVICES, INC.,	HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES TO	
17	Defendants.	RIVER GLIDER AVENUE TRUST	
18	Detendants.		
19		J	
20	Plaintiff River Glider Avenue Trust ("P	laintiff"), by and through its attorneys of record,	
21	Roger P. Croteau & Associates, Ltd., subm	its its responses to Harbor Cove Homeowners	
22	Association's (the "HOA") First Set of Interroga	itories.	
23	GENERAL	OBJECTIONS	
24			
25		e purpose of, and in relation to, this action. Each	
26	response is given subject to all appropriate ob	jections (including, but not limited to, objections	
27	concerning competency, relevancy, materiality,	propriety and admissibility) which would require	
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the exclusion of any statement contained herein if the discovery request was asked of, or any statement contained herein were made by, a witness present and testifying in court. All such objections and grounds therefore are reserved and may be interposed at the time of trial. The party 4 on whose behalf the responses are given has not yet completed their investigation of the facts relating to this action, has not yet completed their discovery in this action, and has not yet completed their preparation for trial. Consequently, the following responses are given without prejudice to the responding party's right to produce, at the time of trial, subsequently-discovered material.

9 Except for the facts explicitly admitted herein, no admission of any nature whatsoever is to 10 be implied or inferred. The fact that any discovery request herein has been answered should not be 11 taken as an admission, or a concession, of the existence of any facts set forth or assumed by such 12 discovery request, or that such answer constitutes evidence of any facts set forth or assumed. All 13 responses must be construed as given on the basis of present recollection. 14

15 "YOU" as defined in these questions, and as represented below in the following responses 16 is understood to refer only to the answering party and to the agents, representatives, affiliates, 17 employees, attorneys and each person acting or purporting to act on behalf of the answering party 18 for this matter and does not extend to any other matter in which the agents, representatives, affiliates, 19 employees, attorneys or person may act for a related entity or trust. 20

INTERROGATORY NO. 1: 21

Identify the date of any communications YOU had with the HOA prior to the HOA Foreclosure Sale.

RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 1: 25

Plaintiff did not communicate with the HOA prior to the HOA Foreclosure Sale. **INTERROGATORY NO. 2:**

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Identify the date of any communications YOU had with the HOA Trustee prior to the HOA Foreclosure Sale.

RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 2:

Objection, "HOA Trustee" is not defined. Notwithstanding same, and assuming "HOA 5 Trustee" refers to co-defendant Nevada Association Services, Inc. as it is defined in the Complaint; 6 Mr. Haddad would call the foreclosing agent/HOA Trustee, and confirm whether the sale was going 7 8 forward on the scheduled date; and in the context of an NRS 116 foreclosure sale, Mr. Haddad 9 would ask if anyone had paid anything on the account. Mr. Haddad would contact the office of the 10 foreclosing agent/HOA Trustee, Mr. Haddad would ask the relevant questions to the employee who 11 answered the phone with the understanding that an employee who answered for the foreclosing 12 agent/HOA Trustee would be able to answer his questions, or direct Mr. Haddad to another, 13 appropriate, employee. Mr. Haddad would contact the HOA Trustee prior to the HOA Foreclosure 14 15 Sale to determine if the Property would in fact be sold on the date stated in the Notice of Sale, obtain 16 the opening bid, so Mr. Haddad could determine the amount of funds necessary for the auction and 17 inquire if any payments had been made; however, Mr. Haddad never inquired if the "Super Priority 18 Lien Amount" had been paid. Mr. Haddad, on behalf of Plaintiff, would reasonably rely on the 19 information provided by employee representatives of the foreclosing agent/HOA Trustee who was 20 charged with responding to his inquiries. Mr. Haddad would personally do all of the research on the 21 22 Property, including review of recorded documents. As the sale in this matter is defined as having 23 occurred on May 11, 2012, Plaintiff would have contacted the HOA trustee on Thursday, May 10 24 or Friday, May 11, 2012. 25

Discovery is ongoing and Plaintiff reserves the right to supplement this response.

27 IINTERROGATORY NO. 3:

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Describe the substance of any communications YOU had with the HOA or Trustee prior to the HOA Foreclosure Sale.

RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 3:

Objection, "Trustee" is not defined. Notwithstanding same, and assuming "Trustee" refers 5 to co-defendant Nevada Association Services, Inc. as it is defined in the Complaint; Mr. Haddad 6 would call the foreclosing agent/HOA Trustee, and confirm whether the sale was going forward on 7 8 the scheduled date; and in the context of an NRS 116 foreclosure sale, Mr. Haddad would ask if 9 anyone had paid anything on the account. Mr. Haddad would contact the office of the foreclosing 10 agent/HOA Trustee, Mr. Haddad would ask the relevant questions to the employee who answered 11 the phone with the understanding that an employee who answered for the foreclosing agent/HOA 12 Trustee would be able to answer his questions, or direct Mr. Haddad to another, appropriate, 13 employee. Mr. Haddad would contact the HOA Trustee prior to the HOA Foreclosure Sale to 14 15 determine if the Property would in fact be sold on the date stated in the Notice of Sale, obtain the 16 opening bid, so Mr. Haddad could determine the amount of funds necessary for the auction and 17 inquire if any payments had been made; however, Mr. Haddad never inquired if the "Super Priority 18 Lien Amount" had been paid. Mr. Haddad, on behalf of Plaintiff, would reasonably rely on the 19 information provided by employee representatives of the foreclosing agent/HOA Trustee who was 20 charged with responding to his inquiries. 21

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Discovery is ongoing and Plaintiff reserves the right to supplement this response.

INTERROGATORY NO. 4:

If You contend that the HOA or the HOA Trustee must announce at the foreclosure sale,
whether anyone or any entity has made payments toward the HOAs lien, prior to the HOA
Foreclosure Sale, Please explain the basis of Your contention.

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1 **RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 4:**

2 Objection, "HOA Trustee" is not defined. Notwithstanding same, and assuming "HOA Trustee" refers to co-defendant Nevada Association Services, Inc. as it is defined in the Complaint; 4 Plaintiff refers the HOA to Plaintiff's Complaint which describes the facts Plaintiff alleges support 5 its claims. Plaintiff's practice and procedure were that prior to attending and/or at an HOA Foreclosure Sale pursuant to NRS 116 at all times relevant to this case, Mr. Haddad, on the behalf 8 of Plaintiff would attempt to ascertain whether anyone had attempted to or did tender any payment regarding the homeowner association's lien. Mr. Haddad would ask if anyone had paid anything on the account. If Mr. Haddad learned that a "tender" had either been attempted or made, Mr. Haddad would not purchase the property offered in that foreclosure sale. Mr. Haddad would and did rely on whatever recital and/or announcements that were made at the HOA Foreclosure Sale. Mr. Haddad reasonably relied upon the HOA and/or the HOA's Trustee's material omission of the tender and/or 15 Attempted Payment of the Super Priority Lien Amount and/or the Attempted Payment or any portion 16 thereof upon prior inquiry when Mr. Haddad purchased the Property on behalf of the Plaintiff. 17

Discovery is ongoing and Plaintiff reserves the right to supplement this response

INTERROGATORY NO. 5:

Identify any of the cases in the Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County, Nevada in 20 which YOU or any of the entities or trusts YOU manage are a party, where the Court ruled that an 21 22 HOA has a duty to disclose a pre-foreclosure payment prior to an HOA's nonjudicial foreclosure 23 sale

RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 5: 25

Objection, this interrogatory does not seek factual information from Plaintiff, but solely legal 26 opinions and research and the production of public documents equally available to all parties. 27 28

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Subject to, and notwithstanding same; none. Discovery is ongoing and Plaintiff reserves the right to
 supplement this response.

INTERROGATORY NO. 6:

Identify any of the cases in the Nevada Supreme Court in which YOU or any of the entities or trusts YOU manage are a party, where the Nevada Supreme Court ruled that an HOA has a duty to disclose a pre-foreclosure payment prior to an HOA's nonjudicial foreclosure sale

8 **RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 6**:

Objection, this interrogatory does not seek factual information from Plaintiff, but solely legal opinions and research and the production of public documents equally available to all parties. Subject to, and notwithstanding same; none. Discovery is ongoing and Plaintiff reserves the right to supplement this response.

14 **INTERROGATORY NO. 7:**

Identify any of the cases in the U.S. District Court, District of Nevada, in which YOU or any of the entities or trusts YOU manage are a party, where the Court ruled that an HOA has a duty to disclose a pre-foreclosure payment prior to an HOA's nonjudicial foreclosure sale

RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 7:

Objection, this interrogatory does not seek factual information from Plaintiff, but solely
 legal opinions and research and the production of public documents equally available to all parties.
 Subject to, and notwithstanding same; none. Discovery is ongoing and Plaintiff reserves the right
 to supplement this response.

24 25 **INTERROGATORY NO. 8:**

Explain why YOU contend, in Paragraph 29 of YOUR complaint, that "if the bidders and potential bidders at the HOA Foreclosure Sale were aware that an individual or entity had

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attempted to pay the Super-Priority Lien Amount and/or by means of the Attempted Payment prior
to the HOA Foreclosure Sale and that the Property was therefore ostensibly being sold subject to
the Deed of Trust, the bidders and potential bidders would not have bid on the Property."

RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 8:

As set forth in the complaint, if the bidders and potential bidders were aware of a payment of the Super-Priority Lien Amount such that the interest purchased at the sale would be subject to the first deed of trust, then bidders and potential bidders would not have bid on the Property because the interest they would have acquired would have been subject to being eliminated when the first deed of trust holder foreclosed.

INTERROGATORY NO. 9:

In Paragraph 37 of YOUR Complaint, YOU allege YOU "would contact the HOA Trustee
prior to" the sale and would "inquire if any payments had been made…" Explain why YOU would
ask about payments as indicated in Paragraph 37 of YOUR Complaint.

¹⁶ **RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO.9**:

Objection, vague as to time and scope. Subject to, and notwithstanding same; assuming that 18 this interrogatory refers solely to the timing of this matter and this sale in May of 2012: Mr. Haddad 19 would ask if anyone had paid anything on the account. Mr. Haddad would contact the office of the 20 foreclosing agent/HOA Trustee, Mr. Haddad would ask the relevant questions to the employee who 21 22 answered the phone with the understanding that an employee who answered for the foreclosing 23 agent/HOA Trustee would be able to answer his questions, or direct Mr. Haddad to another, 24 appropriate, employee. Mr. Haddad would contact the HOA Trustee prior to the HOA Foreclosure 25 Sale to determine if the Property would in fact be sold on the date stated in the Notice of Sale, obtain 26 the opening bid, so Mr. Haddad could determine the amount of funds necessary for the auction and 27

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inquire if any payments had been made. Mr. Haddad, on behalf of Plaintiff, would reasonably rely on the information provided by employee representatives of the foreclosing agent/HOA Trustee who was charged with responding to his inquiries.

INTERROGATORY NO. 10:

If YOU contend YOU contacted the HOA trustee in this case, about the HOA Foreclosure Sale, please identify the date of the contact, and individual YOU contacted.

RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 10:

9 Objection, "HOA Trustee" is not defined. Notwithstanding same, and assuming "HOA 10 Trustee" refers to co-defendant Nevada Association Services, Inc. as it is defined in the 11 Complaint; Mr. Haddad would contact the HOA Trustee either the day of or the day prior, for this 12 matter either Thursday, May 10 or Friday, May 11 of 2012, and Mr. Haddad would ask the 13 relevant questions to the employee who answered the phone with the understanding that the 14 15 employee who answered for the foreclosing agent/HOA Trustee would be able to answer any 16 questions, or direct Mr. Haddad to another, appropriate, employee. 17

INTERROGATORY NO. 11:

Identify the amount of damages YOU are claiming.

RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO..11:

Plaintiff is claiming the economic loss set forth in paragraph 68 of the Complaint, namely,
" the funds paid by Lake Hills Drive Trust and Plaintiff to purchase, maintain, operate, and/or litigate
various cases and generally manage the Property would be lost along with the opportunity of
purchasing other available property offered for sale where a superpriority payment had not been
attempted, thereby allowing Lake Hills Drive Trust the opportunity to purchase a property free and

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clear of the deed of trust and all other liens." This amount is increasing as this matter is ongoing. Discovery is ongoing and Plaintiff reserves the right to supplement this response. **INTERROGATORY NO. 12:** Identify the bases of the damages which support the amount of damages YOU are claiming. **RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 12:** See response to Interrogatory 11. Discovery is ongoing and Plaintiff reserves the right to supplement this response. **INTERROGATORY NO. 13:** Identify any documents which indicate the damages YOU are claiming. **RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 13:** Profit and Loss statments, to be provided by supplement. Dated this June 17, 2021. /s/ Christopher L. Benner Roger P. Croteau, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 4958 Christopher L. Benner, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 8963 2810 W. Charleston Blvd., Ste. 75 Las Vegas, Nevada 89102 Attorneys for Plaintiff 9

	1	VERIFICATION	
	2	STATE OF NEVADA))ss:	
	3	COUNTY OF CLARK)	
	4	Eddie Haddad being first duly swom, deposes and says:	
	5	That he is the corporate designee for Plaintiff in the above-entitled action; that he has read	
• Ø	6 7	the foregoing answers to interrogatories and knows the contents thereof; that the same is true of his	L
Las Vegas, Nevada 89102 ámile (702) 228-7719	8	own knowledge and information, except as to those matters therein alleged on information and	
egas, Nevada E (702) 228-7719	9	belief, and as to those matters, he believes them to be true.	
gas, 1 02) 2	10		
is Vej ile (7	11	EDEDE HADDAD	
- 75 • Las V • Facsimile	12		
5 - 75 • F	13	SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me	
, Suìd 7775	14	this 17^{th} day of 10^{th} , 2021.	
Blvd 254-	15	A & A -	
West Charleston Blvd, Suite 75 Telephone: (702) 254-7775 • Fa	16 17	NÓTARY PUBLIC in and for said	
charle one:	18	County and State	
West Charl Telephone:	19		
2	20	KRISTI HEWES Notary Public, State of Nevada Appointment No. 15-3100-1	
• 28	21	My Appt. Expires Oct 1, 2023	
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ROGER P. CROTEAU & ASSOCIATES, LTD.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on June 17, 2021, a true copy of the foregoing was served via electronic means on all persons and parties in the E-Service Master List in the Eighth Judicial District Court E-Filing System, pursuant to EDCR 8.05(a).

/s/ Joe Koehle

An employee of ROGER P. CROTEAU & ASSOCIATES, LTD.

EXHIBIT "E-1"

EXHIBIT "E-1"

	ELECTRONICALLY SI 6/17/2021 3:12 P	
1	ROGER P. CROTEAU, ESQ.	
2	Nevada Bar No. 4958 CHRISTOPHER L. BENNER, ESQ.	
3	Nevada Bar No. 8963 ROGER P. CROTEAU & ASSOCIATES, LTD	
4	2810 W. Charleston Blvd., Ste. 75	
5	Las Vegas, Nevada 89102 (702) 254-7775	
6	(702) 228-7719 (facsimile) croteaulaw@croteaulaw.com	
7	chris@croteaulaw.com Attorneys for Plaintiff	
8	River Glider Avenue Trust	
9	DISTRIC	CT COURT
10	CLARK COU	NTY, NEVADA
11	RIVER GLIDER AVENUE TRUST,	Case No: A-20-819781-C
12	Plaintiff,	Dept No: 20
13		
14	VS.	PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSES TO
15	HARBOR COVE HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION; and NEVADA	DEFENDANT HARBOR COVE HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION FIRST
16 17	ASSOCIATION SERVICES, INC.,	SET OF REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS TO
17	Defendants.	RIVER GLIDER AVENUE TRUST
10		
20	Plaintiff River Glider Avenue Trust ("P	Plaintiff"), by and through its attorneys of record,
20		
22		its its responses to Harbor Cove Homeowners
23	Association's (the "HOA") First Set of Requests	s for Production of Documents.
24	<u>GENERAL</u>	OBJECTIONS
25	These responses are made solely for the	e purpose of, and in relation to, this action. Each
26	response is given subject to all appropriate ob	jections (including, but not limited to, objections
27	concerning competency, relevancy, materiality,	propriety and admissibility) which would require
28		1
		-

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ROGER P. CROTEAU & ASSOCIATES, LTD.

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the exclusion of any statement contained herein if the discovery request was asked of, or any statement contained herein were made by, a witness present and testifying in court. All such objections and grounds therefore are reserved and may be interposed at the time of trial. The party on whose behalf the responses are given has not yet completed their investigation of the facts relating to this action, has not yet completed their discovery in this action, and has not yet completed their preparation for trial. Consequently, the following responses are given without prejudice to the responding party's right to produce, at the time of trial, subsequently-discovered material.

Except for the facts explicitly admitted herein, no admission of any nature whatsoever is to be implied or inferred. The fact that any discovery request herein has been answered should not be taken as an admission, or a concession, of the existence of any facts set forth or assumed by such discovery request, or that such answer constitutes evidence of any facts set forth or assumed. All responses must be construed as given on the basis of present recollection.

"YOU" as defined in these questions, and as represented below in the following responses is understood to refer only to the answering party and to the agents, representatives, affiliates, employees, attorneys and each person acting or purporting to act on behalf of the answering party for this matter and does not extend to any other matter in which the agents, representatives, affiliates, employees, attorneys or person may act for a related entity or trust.

21 INTERROGATORY NO. 1:

Produce all documents which support all bases of your damages claims. Documents should include, but are not limited to receipts, ledgers, rent, maintenance expenses, financing or mortgage payments, and/or refurbishing costs and expenses.

26 RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 1:

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Plaintiff is in the process of gathering all such documents and will supplement this response.

Discovery is ongoing and Plaintiff reserves the right to supplement this response.

REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 2:

Produce all communications between YOU and the HOA prior to the HOA Foreclosure Sale.

|| RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 2:

Plaintiff did not communicate with the HOA prior to the HOA Foreclosure Sale

REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 3:

Produce all communications between YOU and the HOA Trustee prior to the HOA Foreclosure Sale.

RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 3:

Objection, overbroad as to scope, and vague as to "HOA Trustee" which is not defined. Notwithstanding same, and assuming "HOA Trustee" refers to co-defendant Nevada Association Services, Inc., as it is defined in the Complaint, and that this request is limited to this matter only and not as to Mr. Haddad or any other Saticoy LLC series entity; any communications would be telephonic, such that no written records would be kept.

Dated this June 17, 2021.

<u>/s/ Christopher L. Benner</u> Roger P. Croteau, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 4958 Christopher L. Benner, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 8963 2810 W. Charleston Blvd., Ste. 75 Las Vegas, Nevada 89102 Attorneys for Plaintiff

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ROGER P. (2810 West Charlest	Telephone: (7

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on June 17, 2021, a true copy of the foregoing was served via electronic means on all persons and parties in the E-Service Master List in the Eighth Judicial District Court E-Filing System, pursuant to EDCR 8.05(a).

/s/ Joe Koehle

An employee of ROGER P. CROTEAU & ASSOCIATES, LTD.

EXHIBIT "E-2"

EXHIBIT "E-2"

	ELECTRONICALLY SI 7/15/2021 12:31 F		
1	ROGER P. CROTEAU, ESQ.		
2	Nevada Bar No. 4958 CHRISTOPHER L. BENNER, ESQ.		
3	Nevada Bar No. 8963 ROGER P. CROTEAU & ASSOCIATES, LTD		
4	2810 W. Charleston Blvd., Ste. 75		
5	Las Vegas, Nevada 89102 (702) 254-7775		
6	(702) 228-7719 (facsimile) croteaulaw@croteaulaw.com		
7	chris@croteaulaw.com Attorneys for Plaintiff		
8	River Glider Avenue Trust		
9	DISTRIC	CT COURT	
10	CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA		
11 12	RIVER GLIDER AVENUE TRUST,	Case No: A-20-819781-C	
12	Plaintiff,	Dept No: 20	
14	VS.		
15	HARBOR COVE HOMEOWNERS	PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSES TO DEFENDANT HARBOR COVE	
16	ASSOCIATION; and NEVADA ASSOCIATION SERVICES, INC.,	HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION SECOND SET OF REQUESTS FOR	
17	Defendants.	PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS TO RIVER GLIDER AVENUE TRUST	
18	Defendants.	KIVER GLIDER AVENUE I KUSI	
19			
20	Plaintiff River Glider Avenue Trust ("P	Plaintiff"), by and through its attorneys of record,	
21	Roger P. Croteau & Associates, Ltd., subm	its its responses to Harbor Cove Homeowners	
22	Association's (the "HOA") Second Set of Reque	ests for Production of Documents.	
23	GENERAL	OBJECTIONS	
24 25	These responses are made solely for the	e purpose of, and in relation to, this action. Each	
23	response is given subject to all appropriate ob	jections (including, but not limited to, objections	
27		propriety and admissibility) which would require	
28	concerning competency, relevancy, materiality,	propriety and admissionity) which would require	
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the exclusion of any statement contained herein if the discovery request was asked of, or any statement contained herein were made by, a witness present and testifying in court. All such objections and grounds therefore are reserved and may be interposed at the time of trial. The party on whose behalf the responses are given has not yet completed their investigation of the facts relating to this action, has not yet completed their discovery in this action, and has not yet completed their preparation for trial. Consequently, the following responses are given without prejudice to the responding party's right to produce, at the time of trial, subsequently-discovered material.

Except for the facts explicitly admitted herein, no admission of any nature whatsoever is to be implied or inferred. The fact that any discovery request herein has been answered should not be taken as an admission, or a concession, of the existence of any facts set forth or assumed by such discovery request, or that such answer constitutes evidence of any facts set forth or assumed. All responses must be construed as given on the basis of present recollection.

"YOU" as defined in these questions, and as represented below in the following responses is understood to refer only to the answering party and to the agents, representatives, affiliates, employees, attorneys and each person acting or purporting to act on behalf of the answering party for this matter and does not extend to any other matter in which the agents, representatives, affiliates, employees, attorneys or person may act for a related entity or trust.

21 **REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 4:**

Produce all YOUR telephone records, invoices, or bills which show the telephonic communication between YOU and the Nevada Association Services, Inc. from May 1, 2012 and May 12, 2012.

 $_{26}$ **RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 4**:

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Objection, this request is burdensome and oppressive. Notwithstanding this objection, while Plaintiff conducted a search in an effort to respond, Plaintiff does not retain the "records, invoices, or bills" requested, and does not have a policy and procedure for maintaining records of this type for 9 years between the date requested and the date of this request. Dated this July 15, 2021. /s/ Christopher L. Benner Roger P. Croteau, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 4958 Christopher L. Benner, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 8963 2810 W. Charleston Blvd., Ste. 75 Las Vegas, Nevada 89102 Attorneys for Plaintiff

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on July 15, 2021, a true copy of the foregoing was served via electronic means on all persons and parties in the E-Service Master List in the Eighth Judicial District Court E-Filing System, pursuant to EDCR 8.05(a).

/s/ Joe Koehle

An employee of ROGER P. CROTEAU & ASSOCIATES, LTD.

EXHIBIT "F"

EXHIBIT "F"

AA236



8112 Lake Hills Drive



Nevada Association Services, Inc. 6224 W. Desert Inn Road, Suite A Las Vegas, NV 89146 Phone (702) 804-8885 Fax (702) 804-8887 Toll Free (888) 627-5544

Thomas Miller

Harbor Cove HOA N60025

000064-03

Special Note:

deed sent to record 5/16/2012 mb recorded deed mailed to new owner. 5/18/2012 mb

Date	By	Note
04/12/2011	cjarrard	Phone Note: Ho called, transferred to Elissas vm
04/12/2011	ehollander	Phone Note: returned call to HO - 300-2618 - miranda read - I went over the account with him and I went over the payment plan with him. He was out for a while as he travels for work and he didn't realize that his payments that were on auto pay were
04/12/2011	ehollander	not going thru. He is going to submit a settlement offer to our office and I told him that I will submit it to the association and I will get back to him with a response. I gave him my email address. He thanked me, call ended.
04/25/2011	ehollander	Phone Note: spoke with HO - I went over the payment plan with him again and he will be coming by the office to drop off his payment plan request and his deposit to our office. He thanked me, call ended.
04/26/2011	ehollander	Phone Note: Ho came into the office and he asked for the updated account balance. I advised him that I am going to have to update the account as it has not been updated since March. I told him that I will request the updated accounting ledger and I
04/26/2011	ehollander	will update the account and I will get back to him. He also had a check in his hand and a Settlement Offer and I advised him that if he wants to do the Settlement Offer I will have to see if the Management Company will approve it first before I
04/26/2011	ehollander	can accept his payment but his payment was not for the full amount of the Settlement offer and it was only fo half which I told him that we can accept as a partial payment and do a payment plan but he did not want to do that. He is going to
04/26/2011	ehollander	back to the office and he will email me his Settlement Offer and once I find out if it is accepted he will than bring back full payment. He thanked me and he left.
05/04/2011	ehollander	Phone Note: spoke with HO - he was following up with me in regards to his settlement offer. I advised him that I have sent another email to the management company and I am waiting to hear back but the HOA Sale has been postponed until 6/3/11. I
05/04/2011	ehollander	lold him that as soon as I hear something I will email him or call him back. He thanked me, call ended
05/23/2011	kjacoway	Phone Note: ho called, transferred to Elissa's vm
05/23/2011	ehollander	Phone Note: spoke with HO - I went over the account with him. I advised him that his Settlement Offer for the HOA Assessments was approved and his payment needs to be sent to our office within 5 days. I also advised him that he can set up a payment
05/23/2011	ehollander	plan for NAS Fees & Costs but he will need to send his request in writing and he needs to be specific on the amount of time that he is requesting for the payment plan and he can also include a certain day of the month that he prefers his payments
05/23/2011	ehollander	to fall. I advised him that NAS gave him a \$300.00 courtesy reduction as well. He said he is sending us his payment for the HOA Settlement and he will also email Shanel requesting the payment plan for NAS fees & costs. He thanked me, call ended.
06/01/2011	jgerber	Phone Note: *processed partial payment*
06/22/2011	smacias	Phone Note: The HO called and wanted to go over the PP with me. He didn't understand the amounts.He wanted to know if the assessments were included within the PP. He thanked me and ended the call.
07/29/2011	jgerber	Phone Note: *processed partial payment*
08/09/2011	cjarrard	Phone Note: Ho left message on gen vm, transferred to Elissas vm
08/09/2011	ehollander	Phone Note: returned call to HO - 300-2618 - miranda read - left message on voice mail
08/09/2011	jgerber	Phone Note: *processed partial payment*
08/10/2011	ehollander	Phone Note: spoke with HO - 300-2618 - he would like to make his final payment on the account. I advised him that I will need to request an updated accounting ledger from the management company and I will need to update his account and I can than
08/10/2011	ehollander	give him the balance. He asked me to email him the balance. His email address is tmiller@visionairlines.com. I told him that I will do that as soon as I receive the information that I need from the management company. He said that will be

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Page 1 of 2

NAS000223



8112 Lake Hills Drive

Phone Notes

Nevada Association Services, Inc. 6224 W. Desert Inn Road, Suite A Las Vegas, NV 89146 Phone (702) 804-8885 Fax (702) 804-8887 Toll Free (888) 627-5544

Thomas Miller

Harbor Cove HOA N60025

000064-03

Date	By	Note
08/10/2011	ehollander	great, he thanked me, call ended.
11/10/2011	ehollander	Phone Note: spoke with HO - He would like the balance on the account. I advised him that I will have to request an updated accounting ledger from the management and I will update the account for him and I can call him back with the balance or I can
11/10/2011	ehollander	email or fax him a copy of the breakdown. He said that he would prefer that I email it to him. His email address is tmiller@visionairlines.com. I told him that as soon as I have the information that I need I will send this over to him. He
11/10/2011	ehollander	thanked me, call ended.
05/09/2012	dkluska	Phone Note: Tom Kelly called. he wanted me to go over the procedures for going to sale. he wants to see the date down before confirming. I told him to email Misty to order the date down and then call him before giving the posting and pub co
05/09/2012	dkluska	instructions.
05/09/2012	mblanchard	Phone Note: called number above for homeowner and it is now out of service.
05/09/2012	mblanchard	Phone Note: no phone number on skip trace.
05/17/2012	jgerber	Phone Note: paid in full w/ cc - sold to 3rd party at HOA sale
07/16/2012	jgerber	Phone Note: Steven Marzullo, Esq. called about the excess proceeds he received. I explained that the property went to a 3rd party and the excess went to pay off some of the judgement that was owed to him. he said fantasic and thanked me.

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NAS000224

EXHIBIT "G"

EXHIBIT "G"

STATE OF N		
COUNTY O) ss. F CLARK)	
I, Susan Mos	es, declare:	
1.	I am designated by Nevada Association Services, Inc., ("NAS") as the Person Most	
Knowledgeat	ble regarding NAS's policies, procedures, and business practices.	
2.	NAS has a specific policy, procedure, and business practice for documenting when	
individuals o	or entities communicate with NAS regarding properties and accounts, including	
telephone cal	lls.	
3.	When NAS receives communications, including telephone calls, such	
communications are documented by entering notations in NAS's collection file as "Phone Notes."		
4,	NAS has a specific policy, procedure, and business practice for responding to	
individuals o	or entities who (1) contact NAS regarding properties and accounts, and (2) are no	
identified as	individuals or entities associated with the property (named on deed of trust) or who	
have not pre	eviously been identified, in writing, as individuals or entities authorized to discuss the	
account.		
5.	When individuals or entities who are not associated with a property (named on the	
deed of trus	st) or who have not previously been identified, in writing, as individuals or entitie	
authorized to	o discuss the account, contact NAS and inquire about the account, NAS informed such	
individuals of	or entities that NAS is prohibited by federal law from disclosing collection account	
details with	out receiving (1) written consent from the debtor to communicate with the third-party	
(2) express j	permission of a court of competent jurisdiction, or (3) unless reasonably necessary to	
effectuate a j	postjudgment judicial remedy. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1692c.	
6.	I am the Custodian of Records for NAS and in that capacity, I am the Custodian of	
Records for	the documents produced in case number: A-21-819781-C.	

- On or about March 4, 2021, NAS produced the entire collection file ("Collection 7. 1 File") Bates Stamped NAS0000001 through NAS000248, associated with the property commonly 2 known as: 8112 Lake Hills Drive, Las Vegas, NV 89128 (the "Subject Property"). 3
- I have reviewed the Collection File associated with the Subject Property in this case. 8. 4 The Collection File is a true and accurate copy of the original as it is kept in the regular course of 5 business. 6
- 7

The Collection File included Phone Notes at Bates Stamp NAS000218-NAS000219.

My review of the Collection File revealed that Mr. Eddie Haddad ("Haddad") or 10. 8 individuals on behalf of Lake Hills Drive Trust or of River Glider Avenue Trust (the "Trusts"), did 9 not contact NAS regarding the Subject Property, and did not inquire if any payments were made 10 prior to the nonjudicial foreclosure sale of the Subject Property. 11

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My review of the entire Collection File further revealed that Haddad or individuals on 11. behalf of the Trusts were not individuals or entities which were associated with the Subject Property, named on the deed of trust, or otherwise previously identified, in writing, as individuals or entities 14 authorized to discuss the account of the Subject Property with NAS. 15

If Haddad or any individuals on behalf of the Trusts attempted to inquire about the 12. 16 account of the Subject Property, NAS would have informed him/them that NAS is prohibited by 17 federal law from disclosing collection account details without first receiving (1) written consent 18 from the debtor to communicate with the third-party, (2) express permission of a court of competent 19 jurisdiction, or (3) unless reasonably necessary to effectuate a postjudgment judicial remedy. See 15 20 U.S.C.A. § 1692c. 21

I declare under the penalty of perjury under the law of the State of Nevada that the 13. foregoing is true and correct. EXECUTED this 19 day of July 2021.


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Page 2 of 2

EXHIBIT "H"

EXHIBIT "H"



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1	SATICOY BAY LLC SERIES 10777) VESTONE ST.,
2	Counterclaimant,
3) vs.)
4) U.S. BANK NATIONAL)
5	ASSOCIATION, AS TRUSTEE FOR) THE CERTIFICATEHOLDERS OF)
6	HARBORVIEW MORTGAGE LOAN) TRUST 2005-10, MORTGAGE LOAN)
7	PASSTHROUGH CERTIFICATES,) SERIES 2005-10,)
8) Counter-Defendant.
9)
10	
11	
12	
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16	DEPOSITION OF EDDIE HADDAD
17	30(b)(6) REPRESENTATIVE FOR SATICOY BAY, LLC
18	SERIES 10777 VESTONE ST.
19	Taken on Thursday, July 27, 2017
20	At 1:15 p.m.
21	Taken at 1160 North Town Center Drive
22	Suite 300
23	Las Vegas, Nevada
24	
25	
and the second second	

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
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DEPOSITION OF EDDIE HADDAD, 30(b)(6) REPRESENTATIVE FOR 1 SATICOY BAY LLC SERIES 10777 VESTONE ST., taken at 2 All-American Court Reporters, 1160 North Town Center 3 Drive, Suite 300, Las Vegas, Nevada, on Thursday, July 27, 4 2017, at 1:15 p.m., before Terri M. Hughes, Certified 5 Court Reporter, in and for the State of Nevada. 6 7 APPEARANCES: For the Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant: 8 DONNA M. WITTIG, ESQ. 9 Akerman LLP 1160 North Town Center Drive 10 Suite 330 Las Vegas, Nevada 89144 (702) 634-5000 11 12 For Caparola at Southern Highlands Homeowners Association: 13 PHIL W. SU, ESQ. Gordon & Rees LLP 14 300 South Fourth Street Suite 1550 15 Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 (702) 577-9300 16 For Saticoy Bay LLC Series 10777 Vestone St.: 17 MICHAEL F. BOHN, ESQ. 18 Law Offices of Michael F. Bohn 376 East Warm Springs Road 19 Suite 140 Las Vegas, Nevada 89119 (702) 642-3113 · 20 21 22 23 24 25

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Eddie Haddad ~ July 27, 2017 30(b)(6) Rep. for Saticoy Bay, LLC Series 10777 Vestone St.



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Do you normally keep notes or documentation of any 1 ο. of your research? 2 A. I do not. 3 Q. Do you normally request a title report before ۵ purchase? 5 A. No. 6 7 Q. Prior to an HOA foreclosure sale, do you ever inquire from the HOA or the HOA's agent conducting the 8 sale whether there was an attempt to pay the super 9 priority portion of the lien prior to the sale? 10 A. No. 11 Q. Were you the sole decisionmaker in the decision to 12 purchase this property? 13 A. Yes. 14 Q. Prior to the start of the bidding on a property, 15 do you have a maximum amount that you're willing to pay 16 for the property? 17 A. Yes. 18 19 Q. How do you come to that decision? A. That's my trade secret. 20 Q. Okay. Is it based on that research that you 21 conduct prior to the sale? 22 23 A. Yes. Q. When you're looking at the Clark County Website, 24 what information are you gathering from that Website? 25

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be really and the

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- 1	A. Anything of record. Anything that puts us on
2	notice.
3	Q. Notice of what?
4	A. Any foreclosure activity, if there's a first Deed
5	of Trust that's trying to foreclose, I'd have to hire my
6	attorney to block that sale. It is a race to foreclose
7	state, so
8	Q. When you bought this property back in 2015, did
9	you have an expectation that there would be litigation
10	with the first deed holder for priority title to this
11	property?
12	A. Reasonable expectation, yes.
13	Q. What do you mean by "reasonable expectation"? Why
14	did you qualify it with that word?
15	A. Because it's not a hundred percent. By this time
16	SFR decision had already come out, so
17	Q. So you believed it was a reasonable probability?
18	A. Oh, yeah, less than 20 percent probably.
19	Q. Less than 20 percent that there would be
20	litigation over it?
21	A. Yeah. Yeah.
22	Q. Can you tell me when the SFR decision came out in
23	relation to this property sale?
24	A. I can't exactly.
25	Q. Was that maybe six months prior, five months

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1	prior?
2	A. Sounds about right.
3	Q. Okay. If you could remember, if you can recall
4	back to the time, so about five months after that decision
5	came out, did you believe that the SFR decision resolved
6	the issues relating to the disputes between the lenders
7	and the HOA purchasers?
8	A. Yes.
9	Q. At that time did you believe that the first Deed
10	of Trust holders had any defenses to getting title in
11	first priority?
12	A. Not valid ones.
13	Q. Okay. Do you still own this property through this
14	trust?
15	A. The LLC Series owns it, yes.
16	Q. I meant to say the LLC, not the trust. Thank you.
17	Prior to purchasing a property, do you ever reach
18	out to the HOA directly for information regarding the
19	property?
20	A. No.
21	Q. What about the HOA trustee? So here that would be
22	Alessi & Koenig.
23	A. No.
24	Q. Prior to purchasing a property, is it normally
25	your practice to take a look at the CC&Rs that are

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EXHIBIT "I"

EXHIBIT "I"

	Electronically Filed 11/20/2017 1:26 PM Steven D. Grierson
1	RTRAN CLERK OF THE COURT
2	
3	DISTRICT COURT
4	CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA
5	PARADISE HARBOR TRUST PLACE,)
6	Plaintiff, CASE NO. A707392
7	vs.) DEPT, NO, XXVIII
8	US NATIONAL BANK ASSOCIATION,)
9	Defendant.
10	
11	
12)
13	BEFORE THE HONORABLE RONALD ISRAEL,
14	DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
15	WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 15, 2017
16	RECORDER'S TRANSCRIPT OF BENCH TRIAL - DAY 1
17	
18	
19	APPEARANCES:
	For the Plaintiffs: RICHARD VILKIN
20	
21	For the Defendants: DARREN BRENNER REX GARNER
22	
23	RECORDED BY: JUDY CHAPPELL, DISTRICT COURT
24	TRANSCRIBED BY: MATTHEW KENNEDY, CSR No. 13822

Case Number: A-14-707392-C

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1 A Yes, I did.

2 Q And how did you pay?

A Most likely would have been cashier checks. I
believe that's on page 431 and 432.

5 Q Prior to the time you purchased the property on that 6 date, did you have any information about the property other 7 than what was in the recorded documents that had been recorded 8 prior to the sale?

9 A Most likely I would have driven the property to take 10 a look at the outside of the property but not have access to 11 the inside of the property.

12 Q Okay. Other than driving by the property, did you 13 have any other information about the property other than what 14 was in the recorded documents?

15 A Nothing else besides the recorded documents.

16 Q Did you talk to anyone at *Nevada Legal News*, NAS, or 17 the HOA about this property prior to the sale?

18 A I would not recall, but that would not be proper 19 protocol. We would, you know, stand around and wait for the 20 announcements to be made.

21 Q In making your purchase that day, did you rely or 22 did you expect that the foreclosure agent was complying with 23 NRS 116 in --

24 A Absolutely.

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- 1-- him - 11-

1 Q So then if I were to ask you did you ask the HOA or 2 NAS if the bank had made any payment toward that lien, what 3 would your answer be?

A Well, first of all, I mean, when you say HOA or NAS, it would be an authorized agent that would have held the sale. I don't know who the authorized agent was at this time, so that authorized agent could have been an employee of *Nevada Legal News*. So possibly there's no way to ask an authorized agent that's doing a sale whether it's NRS 107 or 116 because they're just not going to have that information.

Q Okay.

11

A You wait for the announcement to be made and if it's made, you know, or if it's not made. And then also, you know, these sales go on and on. There's so many of the sales. You know, it's impossible to interrupt the auctioneer on any particular property and say, you know -- because nobody wants to get ejected from the sale for --

18 Q Let me try --

19 A -- disrupting the sale.

Q Let me try it a different way. Did you talk to
Nevada Legal News about this property before you bid on it?
A No. I'm sure -- I'm sure --

23 Q Did you talk to the HOA about this property before
24 you bid on it?

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А No. I'm sure I would not have. 1 2 0 Did you talk to NAS about this property before you 3 bid on it? A I'm not sure I would not have. 4 Q Okay. And the fact that you didn't have any 5 6 information other than what you gleaned from public records 7 did not prevent you from bidding because you were the winning 8 bidder. Yes, that is correct. 9 А Q And the -- the public records that you look at on 10 11 the Clark County Recorder's website, that also shows you 12 whether or not there is a deed of trust recorded on this 13 property; correct? A Yes, that is correct. 14 15 Q And if you want to get a copy of that deed of trust, 16 you know how to do that? 17 А Correct. 18 And this property was purchased for long-term rental 0 19 hold and possible resale; correct? A Investment purposes. 20 21 Q Has the property been rented to anyone during the 22 time that either Goldstone Avenue Trust or the Plaintiff here, 23 Paradise Harbor Trust, has owned it? 24 А Yes, I'm sure it has.

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	Electronically Filed 7/23/2021 11:14 AM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT
JOIN	Otimes, and
BRANDON E. WOOD Nevada State Bar Number 12900	
NEVADA ASSOCIATION SERVICES, INC. 6625 S. Valley View Blvd. Suite 300	
Las Vegas, NV 89118 Telephone: (702) 804-8885	
Facsimile: (702) 804-8887 Email: brandon@nas-inc.com	
Attorney for Defendant Nevada Association	
Services, Inc.	
DISTRICT COURT FO	R THE STATE OF NEVADA
IN AND FOR THE	COUNTY OF CLARK
RIVER GLIDER AVENUE TRUST,	CASE NO.: A-20-819781-C
Plaintiff,	DEPT. NO.: XX
vs. HARBOR COVE HOMEOWNERS	
ASSOCIATION; and NEVADA ASSOCIATION SERVICES, INC.,	NEVADA ASSOCIATION SERVICES, INC.'S JOINDER TO DEFENDANT
Defendants.	HARBOR COVE HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION'S RENEWED, MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
COMES NOW, NEVADA ASSOCIA	TION SERVICES, INC. (hereinafter "NAS"), and
hereby submits its Joinder to HARBOR CO	WE HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION'S Renewed
Motion for Summary Judgment. NAS incorpora	tes the arguments, points and authorities, and Exhibits
set forth by HARBOR COVE HOMEOWNERS	S ASSOCIATION as though fully set forth herein.
CON	CLUSION
For all the reasons set forth in	its Motion, HARBOR COVE HOMEOWNERS
ASSOCIATION'S Motion for Summary Judge	ment should be GRANTED as to HARBOR COVE
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J.	OINDER

Case Number: A-20-819781-C

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1	HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION and NAS.	
2	Dated this 23 rd day of July, 2021.	
3		a >>
	В	y:
5		BRANDON E. WOOD Nevada State Bar Number 12900
5		NEVADA ASSOCIATION SERVICES, INC. 6625 S. Valley View Blvd. Suite 300
,		BRANDON E. WOOD Nevada State Bar Number 12900 NEVADA ASSOCIATION SERVICES, INC. 6625 S. Valley View Blvd. Suite 300 Las Vegas, NV 89118 Attorney for Defendant Nevada Association Services, Inc.
3		Services, Inc.
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<u>CI</u>	ERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the	23 rd day of July, 2021, and pursuant to N.R.C.P. 5(b), I serve
true and correct copy of the foregoin	ng Nevada Association Services, Inc.'s Joinder to Defende
Harbor Cove Homeowners Association	on's Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment upon the part
listed below and all parties/counsel se	et up to receive notice via electronic service in this matter in
following manner:	
[] Hand Delivery	
[] Facsimile Transmission	
[] U.S. Mail, Postage Pre-Paid	
[X] Served upon opposing couns	el via the Court's electronic service system to the follow
counsel of record:	
Roger Croteau, Esq.	Croteau Admin
croteaulaw@croteaulaw.com	receptionist@croteaulaw.com
Peter Dunkley, Esq.	
Lipson Neilson	
pdunkley@lipsonneilson.com	
	<u>/s/Susan E. Moses</u> Employee of Nevada Association Services, Inc.
	3

LTD. ada 89102 • -7719	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	ROGER P. CROTEAU, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 4958 CHRISTOPHER L. BENNER, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 8963 ROGER P. CROTEAU & ASSOCIATES, LTD 2810 W. Charleston Blvd., Ste. 75 Las Vegas, Nevada 89102 (702) 254-7775 (702) 228-7719 (facsimile) croteaulaw@croteaulaw.com chris@croteaulaw.com Attorneys for Plaintiff	Electronically Filed 8/5/2021 2:45 PM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT
ES, I s, Nev ?) 228	10	CLARK COU	NTY, NEVADA
 ROGER P. CROTEAU & ASSOCIATES, LTD. 2810 West Charleston Blvd, Suite 75 • Las Vegas, Nevada 89102 Telephone: (702) 254-7775 • Facsimile (702) 228-7719 	 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 	RIVER GLIDER AVENUE TRUST, Plaintiff, vs. HARBOR COVE HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION; and NEVADA ASSOCIATION SERVICES, INC., Defendants.	Case No: A-20-819781-C Dept No: 20 PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO HARBOR COVE HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION'S RENEWED MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND NEVADA ASSOCIATION SERVICES, INC.'S JOINDER THERETO
	22 23	COMES NOW, Plaintiff, RIVER GLIDE through its attorneys, ROGER P. CROTEAU &	ER AVENUE TRUST, ("Plaintiff") by and ASSOCIATES LTD and hereby presents its
	23 24		iation's Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment
	25	(the "HOA's Motion") and Nevada Association	Services, Inc.'s Joinder thereto (the "HOA
	26	Trustee's Motion"). This Opposition is made and	d based upon the attached Memorandum of Points
	27		
	28	Case Number: A-20-819	1 781-C

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and Authorities, the papers and pleadings on file herein, and any oral argument that this Honorable
 Court may entertain at the time of hearing of this matter.

Court may entertain at the time of hearing of this m

DATED this August 5, 2021

ROGER P. CROTEAU & ASSOCIATES, LTD. <u>/s/Roger P. Croteau</u> Roger P. Croteau, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 4958 Christopher L. Benner, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 8963 2810 W. Charleston Blvd., Ste. 75 Las Vegas, Nevada 89102

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

Attorneys for Plaintiff

I. INTRODUCTION

The HOA goes to great lengths to interpret Plaintiff's statements as avoiding any inquiry into the attempted payment of the HOA lien by the beneficiary of the first deed of trust. Plaintiff's basis for this action, as set forth in the First Amended Compliant, is that Plaintiff would inquire as to payments towards the lien as part of his standard policy, but that those inquires would not result in informative replies. A close examination of the material presented by the HOA indicates that Plaintiff's prior testimony does not contradict, and indeed supports, Plaintiff's position. This failure to respond to Plaintiff's inquiry, withholding relevant information and ultimately misrepresenting the nature of the interest being sold, led to Plaintiff purchasing the subject property which was still encumbered by a first deed of trust. This negates the HOA's legal analysis as to the lack of a duty, as such analysis focuses upon the lack of an affirmative duty, as opposed to a reactive duty. Thus, there also remain questions as to the derivative claims of conspiracy and good faith. Taking account of the legal standard for a motion for summary judgment, thus making factual inferences in favor of Plaintiff, the Motion should be denied as there are significant questions of fact as to the issues set forth, requiring the matter to proceed to trial.

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1		II. STATEMENT OF FACTS
2	1.	On or about April 19, 2005, Thomas D. Miller (the "Former Owner") purchased the Property.
3		Thereafter, the Former Owner obtained a loan for the Property from Cameron Financial
4		Group, Inc. ("Lender"), that was evidenced by a promissory note and secured by a deed of
5		trust between the Former Owner and Lender, recorded against the Property on March 27,
6		2007, for the loan amount of \$631,000.00.
7	2.	The Former Owner executed a Planned Unit Development Riders along with the Deed of
8 9		Trust.
10	3.	The Former Owner of the Property failed to pay to the HOA all amounts due pursuant to the
11		HOA's governing documents.
12	4.	Accordingly, on July 26, 2010, Nevada Association Services, Inc. ("HOA Trustee"), on behalf
13		of Harbor Cove Homeowners Association ("HOA"), recorded a Notice of Delinquent
14		Assessment Lien (the "NODAL"). The NODAL stated that the amount due to the HOA was
15 16		\$1,032.01, plus continuing assessments, interest, late charges, costs, and attorney's fees (the
17		"HOA Lien").
18	5.	On September 3, 2010, HOA Trustee, on behalf of HOA, recorded a Notice of Default and
19		Election to Sell Under Homeowners Association Lien (the "NOD"). The NOD stated that the
20		HOA Lien amount was \$2,110.87.
21	6.	Upon information and belief, in April 2011, the Former Owner offered a settlement of the
22	0.	
23		HOA Lien in the amount of \$1,232.88, which was accepted by the HOA. The Former Owner
24		made the payment by check dated May 27, 2011 (the "Attempted Payment"). Of the Former
25		Owner's Attempted Payment, the HOA credited \$500.00 to his assessment account on June
26		11, 2011 and \$400.00 to his assessment account on August 30, 2011, which cured the amount
27		of the HOA Lien entitled to priority over the Deed of Trust ("Super-Priority Lien Amount").
28		3

1	7. On April 16, 2012, HOA Trustee, on behalf of the HOA, recorded a Notice of Foreclosure
2	Sale against the Property ("NOS"). The NOS stated that the total amount due the HOA was
3	\$3,346.53 and set a sale date for the Property of May 11, 2012, at 10:00 a.m., to be held at
4	Nevada Legal News.
5 6	8. On August 27, 2012, the Deed of Trust was assigned to Nationstar Mortgage, LLC
7	("Nationstar") via Assignment of Deed of Trust, which was recorded against the Property on
8	August 31, 2012.
9	9. Despite the Former Owner's Attempted Payment, on May 11, 2012, HOA Trustee then
10	proceeded to non-judicial foreclosure sale on the Property and recorded the HOA Foreclosure
11	Deed, which stated that the HOA Trustee sold the HOA's interest in the Property to Lake Hills
12 13	Drive Trust at the HOA Foreclosure Sale for the highest bid amount of \$5,500.00.
13	10. The HOA Foreclosure Deed states that HOA Trustee "has complied with all requirements of
15	law"
16	11. In none of the recorded documents, nor in any other notice recorded with the Clark County
17	Recorder's Office, did HOA and/or HOA Trustee specify or disclose that any individual or
18	entity, including but not limited to the Former Owner, had attempted to pay any portion of the
19	HOA Lien in advance of the HOA Foreclosure Sale.
20 21	12. Neither HOA nor HOA Trustee informed or advised the bidders and potential bidders at the
21	HOA Foreclosure Sale, either orally or in writing, that any individual or entity had attempted
23	to pay the Super-Priority Lien Amount.
24	
25	13. If the bidders and potential bidders at the HOA Foreclosure Sale were aware that an individual
26	or entity had attempted to pay the Super-Priority Lien Amount and/or by means of the
27	Attempted Payment prior to the HOA Foreclosure Sale and that the Property was therefore
28	4

1	ostensibly being sold subject to the Deed of Trust, the bidders and potential bidders would not
2	have bid on the Property.
3	14. Had the Property not been sold at the HOA Foreclosure Sale, HOA and HOA Trustee would
4	not have received payment, interest, fees, collection costs and assessments related to the
5 6	Property and these sums would have remained unpaid.
7	15. HOA Trustee acted as an agent of HOA.
8	16. HOA is responsible for the actions and inactions of HOA Trustee pursuant to the doctrine of
9	respondeat superior.
10	17. HOA and HOA Trustee conspired together to hide material information related to the
11	Property: the HOA Lien; the Attempted Payment of the Super-Priority Lien Amount; the
12	
13	acceptance of such payment or Attempted Payment; and the priority of the HOA Lien vis a vis
14	the Deed of Trust, from the bidders and potential bidders at the HOA Foreclosure Sale.
15	18. The information related to any Attempted Payment or payments made by the Former Owner,
16	Lender, or others to the Super-Priority Lien Amount, was not recorded and would only be
17	known by the Former Owner, Lender, the HOA, and HOA Trustee.
18 19	19. HOA and HOA Trustee conspired to withhold and hide the aforementioned information for
20	their own economic gain and to the detriment of the bidders and potential bidders at the HOA
21	Foreclosure Sale.
22	20. As part of Plaintiff's practice and procedure in both NRS Chapter 107 and NRS Chapter 116
23	foreclosure sales, Plaintiff would call the foreclosing agent/HOA Trustee and confirm whether
24	
25	the sale was going forward on the scheduled date; and in the context of an NRS Chapter 116
26	foreclosure sale, Plaintiff would ask if anyone had paid anything on the account. See Exhibit 1,
27	Declaration of Iyadd Haddad, page 4.
28	5

1	21. Plaintiff would contact the HOA Trustee prior to the HOA Foreclosure Sale to determine if the	
2	Property would in fact be sold on the date stated in the NOS, obtain the opening bid, so	
3	Plaintiff could determine the amount of funds necessary for the auction and inquire if any	
4	payments had been made; however, Plaintiff never inquired if the "Super-Priority Lien	
5 6	Amount" had been paid. See Exhibit 1, Declaration of Iyadd Haddad, page 4-5.	
7	22. Iyad Haddad was the trustee of the Lake Hills Drive Trust and Plaintiff at all relevant times	
8	and the conveyance of title ownership of the Property from Lake Hills Drive Trust to Plaintiff	
9	was done for estate planning purposes. As such, there has always been a unity of interest	
10	between Lake Hills Drive Trust, Plaintiff, and the Property such that Plaintiff can raise the	
11		
12	claims in this Complaint.	
13	23. Plaintiff reasonably relied upon the HOA and/or HOA Trustee's material omission of "tender"	
14	of the Super-Priority Lien Amount and/or the Attempted Payment when Plaintiff purchased	
15	the Property.	
16	24. Lender first disclosed the Attempted Payment by the Former Owner in Lender's First	
17	Supplemental Disclosure of Witnesses and Documents served on Plaintiff on August 24, 2017,	
18 19	("Discovery") in Clark County Case No. A-13-683467-C (the "Case").	
20	III. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND	
21	In the Case, Plaintiff did not sue the HOA, nor the HOA Trustee. In the Case, Plaintiff	
22	sued Nationstar for quiet title and declaratory relief. Plaintiff did not elect to sue the HOA and/or	
23	the HOA Trustee in the Case. None of the allegations set forth in this Complaint would require a	
24	compulsory claim by Plaintiff in the Case. Plaintiff filed this Complaint on August 18, 2020 to	
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26	preserve its three (3) year statute of limitations pursuant to NRS 11.190 (a)-(d).	
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IV. LEGAL ARGUMENT

A. STATEMENT OF THE LAW

Pursuant to N.R.C.P. 56, two substantive requirements must be met before a Court may grant a motion for summary judgment: (1) there must be no genuine issue as to any material fact; and, (2) the moving party must be entitled to judgment as a matter of law. *Fyssakis v. Knight Equipment Corp.*, 108 Nev. 212, 826 P.2d 570 (1992). Summary judgment is appropriate under NRCP 56 when the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, and affidavits, if any, that are properly before the court demonstrate that no genuine issue of material fact exists, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. *Wood v. Safeway*, 121 Nev. Adv. Op. 73, 121 P.3d 1026 (October, 2005) citing *Pegasus v. Reno Newspapers, Inc.*, 118 Nev. at 713, 57 P.3d at 87 (2003). In deciding whether these requirements have been met, the Court must first determine, in the light most favorable to the non-moving party "whether issues of material fact exist, thus precluding judgment by summary proceeding." *National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh v. Pratt & Whitney Canada, Inc.*, 107 Nev. 535, 815 P.2d 601, 602 (1991).

17 The Nevada Supreme Court has indicated that summary judgment is a drastic remedy and 18 that the trial judges should exercise great care in granting such motions. Pine v. Leavitt, 84 Nev. 19 507, 445 P.2d 942 (1968); Oliver v. Barrick Goldstrike Mines, 111 Nev. 1338, 905 P.2d 168 (1995). 20 21 "Actions for declaratory relief are governed by the same liberal pleading standards that are applied 22 in other civil actions." See Breliant v. Preferred Equities Corp., 109 Nev. 842, 846, 858 P.2d 1258, 23 1260-61 (1993). "The formal sufficiency of a claim is governed by NRCP 8(a), which requires only 24 that the claim, shall contain (1) a short and plan statement of the claim showing that the pleader is 25 entitled to relief, and (2) a demand for judgment for the relief to which he deems himself entitled." 26 See id. (quoting NRCP 8(a)). 27

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B. PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM FOR MISREPRESENTATION DOES NOT FAIL AS A MATTER OF LAW

In this case, Plaintiff asserts that the HOA and HOA Trustee intentionally/negligently made the determination not to disclose the Attempted Payment despite their actual knowledge to the contrary, and as such, the Attempted Payment was known only to the HOA, HOA Trustee, and the Former Owner. In *Nelson v. Heer*, the Court defined intentional misrepresentation as being established by demonstrating:

(1) a false representation that is made with either knowledge or belief that it is false or without a sufficient foundation, (2) an intent to induce another's reliance, and (3) damages that result from this reliance.

With respect to the false representation element, the suppression or omission of a material fact which a party is bound in good faith to disclose is equivalent to a false representation, since it constitutes an indirect representation that such fact does not exist." And, with respect to the damage element, this court has concluded that the damages alleged must be proximately caused by reliance on the original misrepresentation or omission. Proximate cause limits liability to foreseeable consequences that are reasonably connected to both the defendant's misrepresentation or omission and the harm that the misrepresentation or omission created.

123 Nev. 217, 225 (2007). The Court in *Nelson* provided that the omission of a material fact such

as the Attempted Payment of the HOA Lien is deemed to be a false representation which Defendants

are bound by the mandates of NRS 116.1113 and NRS 113.130 to disclose to potential bidders upon

reasonable inquiry from potential bidders at the HOA Foreclosure Sale, and such intentional

22 omission is equivalent to a false representation under the facts of this case.

Plaintiff has demonstrated that the HOA, by and through its agent, the HOA Trustee,
intentionally did not disclose the Attempted Payment to Plaintiff or the potential bidders at the HOA
Foreclosure Sale. Unlike NRS Chapter 107 sales, NRS Chapter 116 sales provide for a super and
subpriority lien portion related the Deed of Trust. Absent the recording of any notice of payment
of the Super Priority Lien Amount, as is mandated with the NRS Chapter 116 amendments in 2015,

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the only way Plaintiff and/or potential bidders at the HOA Foreclosure Sale would know if any party
tendered the Super Priority Lien Amount and/or Attempted Payment is if the HOA and/or the HOA
Trustee informed the bidders of the Attempted Payment, especially when asked. It is clear from
the facts of this case that the HOA Trustee was aware of the Attempted Payment and its rejection
by the HOA Trustee.

Since the HOA Trustee is the disclosed agent of the HOA, the HOA is imputed with knowledge held by the HOA Trustee. In the Complaint, Plaintiff sets forth the duty, breach of that duty, the improper purpose, and the resulting failure to make a statement regarding the Attempted Payment. The material omission of the Attempted Payment, the breach of the obligation of good faith and candor, and the failure to provide notice pursuant to NRS Chapter 116, led the damages suffered by Plaintiff.

In this case, Defendants are not guilty of an *affirmative* false representation, but they are 14 15 guilty of intentionally not disclosing a material fact regarding the payment of the Attempted 16 Payment concerning the Deed of Trust in response to Plaintiff's inquiry (with any question of fact 17 regarding Plaintiff's inquiry being viewed in a light favorable to Plaintiff). Thus, Defendants are 18 guilty of making a material omission of a fact subject to this claim. As Mr. Haddad sets forth in his 19 declaration (previously set forth in response to the Motion to Dismiss, filed on December 16, 2020 20 21 as "Plaintiff's Errata to Opposition to Harbor Cove Homeowners Association's Motion to Dismiss 22 or in the Alternative Summary Judgment and Nevada Association Services, Inc.'s Joinder thereto," 23 and attached hereto as Exhibit 1), he relied upon the non-disclosure of the Attempted Payment to 24 indicate that no tender had been attempted or accomplished. The discrepancy is underscored by the 25 fact that the HOA Trustee had a policy for responding to inquiries, as set forth in Exhibit "G" of the 26 Motion, the Declaration of Susan Moses of refusing to provide information, that would have directly 27

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1 led to preventing Mr. Haddad from obtaining information from the HOA Trustee. The fact that a 2 policy existed substantiates that inquiries were a regular occurrence, and thus was not an uncommon 3 occurrence. Furthermore, the response of the HOA Trustee, to refuse to provide information, clearly 4 shows that Plaintiff was not informed of the Attempted Tender. 5

As to the "practices and procedures" of Mr. Haddad, the Declaration states that Mr. Haddad "never inquired if the 'Super Priority Lien Amount' had been paid." The HOA need not present testimony from a deposition in another matter (See Exhibit H of HOA's Motion) as to this point; Plaintiff did not specifically ask for a "super Priority Lien Amount" and thus the declaration and 10 response are consistent. Likewise, as to the question "[d]o you ever reach out to the HOA directly for information regarding the property?" the previously supplied declaration does not state that Mr. 12 Haddad reached out to the HOA, but the HOA Trustee. Finally, the HOA's next quoted question, from a deposition regarding a different property "What about the HOA trustee? So here that would be Alessi & Koenig" shows that the question itself was limited immediately after being asked. Inferring that the broad question as to "ever reach out to the HOA" applies to the narrow question 17 which follows simply creates a question of fact, and not a "fabricated fact" as the HOA alleges. 18 Likewise, the trial testimony, from yet another matter regarding a different property, again quotes questions regarding the HOA, when the declaration of Mr. Haddad never states he would ask the HOA. HOA Motion page 7. Even in the abbreviated trial testimony presented by the HOA, Mr. 22 Haddad's response to the question "Did you talk to NAS about this property before you bid on it? Answer: I'm not sure I would have" is only further substantiated by the Declaration of Susan Moses, where she states that NAS would not have provided any information. Furthermore, this possible exchange creates an issue of fact regarding the NAS phone logs; Would NAS have a record of 26

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refusing to inform Mr. Haddad of the payments to the lien? NAS does forth it's policies; NAS does not set forth what is recorded if NAS refuses to reply to an inquiry.

This shows the HOA, by way of the HOA Trustee's actions, leading up to and at the HOA Foreclosure Sale, intentionally obstructed Plaintiff's opportunity to conduct its own due diligence regarding the Property and specifically the priority of the lien being foreclosed upon. This obstruction ultimately affected Plaintiff's decision whether to actually submit a bid on the Property or not. Had Mr. Haddad known that he was purchasing the Property subject to the Deed of Trust, he would have never submitted a bid in the first place, thus avoiding this entire controversy, as set forth in Mr. Haddad's Declaration, as previously submitted.

In the present case, at the time of the Foreclosure Sale, the HOA and HOA Trustee knew that the Former Owner had made the Attempted Payment of the HOA Lien but did not inform the bidders. Neither the HOA nor the HOA Trustee ever disclosed, or responded to Plaintiff's inquires, regarding the Attempted Tender. Indeed, there was a policy to *not* provide the information, as set forth in the declaration of Susan Moses for NAS, that the Former Owner had in fact made the Attempted Payment of the HOA Lien.

In support of it argument, the HOA relies on Noonan v. Bayview Loan Serv'g, 438 P.3d 335 19 (Nev. 2019) (unpublished disposition). However, the HOA's reliance on *Noonan* is misplaced, 20 21 because it is factually distinguishable from this case. It is true the Noonan court stated, "Hampton 22 neither made an affirmative false statement nor omitted a material fact it was bound to disclose," 23 Noonan, 438 P.3d at 335, certainly the HOA and the HOA Trustee were bound to tell the truth here 24 when Plaintiff inquired whether a tender/payment had been attempted or made. See Declaration of 25 Iyad Haddad attached herein. The Noonan decision is based upon a factual determination of whether 26 a material, factual, question had been asked and if it was answered or there was a material omission 27

of fact. The *Noonan* court did not consider the arguments presented in this matter about NRS 116.1113, NRS Chapter 113 (below), and their relevant analysis regarding Plaintiff's inquiry, and the HOA Trustee's unwillingness, to respond.

The HOA's reference to case law regarding an *affirmative* duty to disclose an attempted or rejected tender by a lender is irrelevant here. The HOA's reliance upon the unpublished orders fails to take account of this difference. The Order of Affirmance in *Saticoy Bay, Ltd. Liab. Co. v. Mountain Gate Homeowners' Ass'n,* 473 P.3d 1046 (Nev. 2020) addresses the requirement of a "proactive" duty to volunteer information. Plaintiff's argument does not require the HOA or HOA Trustee to "proactively" disclose the relevant information, but simply to respond to the inquiry of Mr. Haddad. As shown by the attached declaration of Susan Moses and the allegations of Plaintiff, included in Mr. Haddad's declaration as well, the HOA Trustee had a practice of refusing to provide the information, a very different issue then not volunteering the information.

The Plaintiff is not alleging that the HOA and HOA failed to *volunteer* the information, but that the HOA, through the HOA Trustee, failed to respond to Plaintiff's inquiry, and through this failure, misrepresented the interest sold. The HOA and HOA Trustee did not respond to inquiries, as the discovery responses also show. This difference, either taken as a fact pursuant to the motion to dismiss standard or as a disputed fact pursuant to the motion for summary judgment request, requires denial of the HOA's Motion.

The HOA relies on the *A Oro, LLC v. Ditech Financial LLC*, 434 P.3d 929 (Nev. 2019)
decision to support the HOA's argument that the district court should the misrepresentation claims,
and that the HOA could only provide a "deed without warranty." However, *A Oro* is distinguishable.
<u>First</u>, it should be noted that *A Oro* was based on an appeal of an order granting summary judgment. *See A Oro*, 434 P.3d at *1. In its Order, the Nevada Supreme Court affirmed summary judgment

1 for the homeowners' association and its foreclosure trustee, because "there is no evidence that Treo 2 intended to induce appellant into placing the winning bid at the foreclosure sale ..." Id. at *2 3 (emphasis added). In this matter, the refusal to respond to Mr. Haddad's, and the HOA Trustee's 4 policy not to respond to Mr. Haddad, created an inducement to bid. Second, A Oro, like Noonan, is 5 inapplicable, because there is no evidence that the winning bidder in A Oro asked the homeowners' 6 association or its foreclosing trustee about a tender/attempted payment, like happened here. Third, 7 8 the HOA's reliance on A Oro for the proposition that the HOA and HOA Trustee had no duties of 9 disclosure, because the HOA Foreclosure Deed was without warranty, is incorrect. The A Oro Court 10 did not consider the arguments presented here about NRS 116.1113, NRS Chapter 113, and their 11 relevant analysis as it applies to the HOA Foreclosure Deed. For example, the HOA Foreclosure 12 Deed states that the HOA Trustee has complied with "[a]ll requirements of law. However, as set 13 forth above, this is the very basis of Plaintiff's contention, that the refusal to respond to Mr. 14 15 Haddad's inquiry created a misrepresentation.

16 Plaintiff presented the facts and argument that it sought to ascertain whether a tender had 17 occurred, or been attempted, as this information would play a prominent role in determining whether 18 Plaintiff, through Mr. Haddad, would purchase an interest in any given property. The basis for this 19 factual scenario where Plaintiff inquired as to the status of a "tender" is set forth in the complaint 20 21 by the reference to Plaintiff's receipt of information from the HOA and HOA Trustee "either orally 22 or in writing," (emphasis added) showing that Plaintiff had not solely "relied upon the (written) 23 recitals in the foreclosure deed." Mr. Haddad's affirmative efforts indicate that some steps were 24 taken to obtain information regarding the sale via verbal communication. Thus, it is likely that Mr. 25 Haddad inquired of any "tender" at the time of the HOA Sale. This factual scenario, wherein Mr. 26 Haddad verbally inquired as to the status of a "tender" in the matter, and a resulting response (or 27

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1 lack thereof) from the HOA or HOA Trustee that did not disclose the "tender" by the holder of the 2 First Deed of Trust, would result in a violation of NRS 113 and "supply[ing] false information" 3 pursuant to Halcrow, Inc. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 129 Nev. 294, 400, 302 P.3d 1148, 1153 4 (2013), or making "a false representation" pursuant to Nelson v. Heer, 123 Nev. 217, 225 (2007). 5

C. PLAINTIFF'S TESTIMONY IS CONSISTENT

Plaintiff's discovery responses as set forth by the HOA, allegations in this matter, and testimony by way of the Declaration are consistent; the HOA and HOA Trustee are simply overeager in their reading of the responses, which they characterize as "fabricated facts." First, a simple point of clarification before going into the analysis; there is a difference between asking a question and receiving an answer, as Susan Moses' Declaration makes clear. Mr. Haddad can ask the HOA 12 Trustee regarding a sale; Susan Moses stated that it was the policy of the HOA Trustee that it would not respond. Thus, when Plaintiff's representative Mr. Haddad responded that it did not receive information on the Subject Property from the HOA or HOA Trustee other than that provided in the Notice of Foreclosure Sale prior to the HOA Sale, as set forth in Exhibit "D" and Exhibit "E" of the 17 HOA's motion, he was relating the exact problem; that Mr. Haddad requested information and was 18 denied information. Indeed, the fact that the HOA provides this testimony and now holds it up in their motion, in light of the Declaration of the HOA Trustee in a similar matter, proves that the HOA Trustee recognized Mr. Haddad *did in fact* ask and that they did not provide the information, 22 taking this matter beyond the prior case law of "affirmative" duty to produce the information and into "withholding" of information in response to an inquiry.

The various admissions, in the limited context of the questions asked, show that there was 25 no communication between the HOA and HOA Trustee and Plaintiff. However, the lack of 26 communication is shown to be due to the policies and procedures of the HOA Trustee; refusing to 27 respond to questions due to their interpretation of the law means that Plaintiff did not get the 28

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1 information Plaintiff sought, not that Plaintiff did not inquire. Furthermore, the fact that there was a 2 policy and procedure of not responding indicates that Mr. Haddad did inquire, so often in fact, that 3 there became a policy and procedure of how *not to respond* to him when he did inquire. Thus, the 4 inquiry by Mr. Haddad does illustrate a relevant factual question, with the response of the HOA 5 Trustee, or lack thereof, creating a factual question as to the factual underpinning of the HOA's 6 Motion. 7

D. PLAINTIFF PROPERLY SET FORTH THE CLAIM FOR RELIEF UNDER NRS 113.

10 As additional proof of the intentional/negligent misrepresentation, the HOA and HOA Trustee are obligated to follow the disclosures mandated by NRS Chapter 113. NRS Chapter 113 12 also requires disclosures by the HOA and HOA Trustee. NRS Chapter 113 is not generally applicable to NRS Chapter 107 foreclosure sales, but it does have certain provisions that do apply in NRS Chapter 116 foreclosure sales. NRS Chapter 116 foreclosure sales are not exempted from NRS Chapter 113's disclosure requirements to the extent that the HOA and the HOA Trustee, as 17 agent for the HOA, have specific knowledge of the facts required for disclosure. Pursuant to Chapter 18 113, the HOA and the HOA Trustee must disclose the Attempted Payment and/or any payments made or attempted to be made by the Former Owner, or any agents of any other party to the bidders and Plaintiff at the HOA Foreclosure Sale. NRS 113.130 provides as follows:

NRS 113.130 Completion and service of disclosure form before conveyance of property; discovery or worsening of defect after service of form; exceptions; waiver.

- 1. Except as otherwise provided in subsection 2:
- (a) At least 10 days before residential property is conveyed to a purchaser:
- (1) The seller shall complete a disclosure form regarding the residential property; and
- (2) The seller or the seller's agent shall serve the purchaser or the purchaser's agent with the completed disclosure form.

(b) If, after service of the completed disclosure form but before conveyance of the property to the purchaser, a seller or the seller's agent discovers a new defect in the residential property that was not identified on the completed disclosure form or discovers that a defect identified on the completed disclosure form has become worse than was indicated on the form, the seller or the seller's agent shall inform the purchaser or the purchaser's agent of that fact, in writing, as soon as practicable after the discovery of that fact but in no event later than the conveyance of the property to the purchaser. If the seller does not agree to repair or replace the defect, the purchaser may:

(1) Rescind the agreement to purchase the property; or

(2) Close escrow and accept the property with the defect as revealed by the seller or the seller's agent without further recourse.

2. Subsection 1 does not apply to a sale or intended sale of residential property:

(a) By foreclosure pursuant to chapter 107 of NRS.

(b) Between any co-owners of the property, spouses or persons related within the third degree of consanguinity.

(c) Which is the first sale of a residence that was constructed by a licensed contractor.

(d) By a person who takes temporary possession or control of or title to the property solely to facilitate the sale of the property on behalf of a person who relocates to another county, state or country before title to the property is transferred to a purchaser.

3. A purchaser of residential property may not waive any of the requirements of subsection 1. A seller of residential property may not require a purchaser to waive any of the requirements of subsection 1 as a condition of sale or for any other purpose.

4. If a sale or intended sale of residential property is exempted from the requirements of subsection 1 pursuant to paragraph (a) of subsection 2, the trustee and the beneficiary of the deed of trust shall, not later than at the time of the conveyance of the property to the purchaser of the residential property, or upon the request of the purchaser of the residential property, provide:

(a) Written notice to the purchaser of any defects in the property of which the trustee or beneficiary, respectively, is aware; and

(b) If any defects are repaired or replaced or attempted to be repaired or replaced, the contact information of any asset management company who provided asset management services for the property. The asset management company shall provide a service report to the purchaser upon request.

5. As used in this section:

(a) "Seller" includes, without limitation, a client as defined in NRS 645H.060.(b) "Service report" has the meaning ascribed to it in NRS 645H.150.

1 Id. (emphasis added). As used in Chapter 113, the term "defect" means a condition that 2 materially affects the value or use of the residential property in an adverse manner. NRS 113.100(1). 3 The HOA and HOA Trustee are required to, and must, provide a Seller's Real Property 4 Disclosure Form ("SRPDF") to the "Purchaser" as defined in NRS Chapter 116, at the time of the 5 HOA Foreclosure Sale. NRS Chapter 116 foreclosure sales are not exempt from the mandates of 6 NRS Chapter 113. To the extent known to the HOA, and the HOA Trustee, as the agent of the 7 8 HOA, the HOA and HOA Trustee must complete and answer the questions posed in the SRPDF in 9 its entirety, but specifically, Section 9, Common Interest Communities, disclosures (a) - (f), and 10 Section 11, that provide as follows: 11 9. Common Interest Communities: Any "common areas" (facilities like pools, 12 tennis courts, walkways or other areas co-owned with others) or a homeowner association which has any authority over the property? 13 Common Interest Community Declaration and Bylaws available? (a) 14 (b) Any periodic or recurring association fees? 15 Any unpaid assessments, fines or liens, and any warnings or notices (c) that may give rise to an assessment, fine or lien? 16 Any litigation, arbitration, or mediation related to property or (d) common areas? 17 Any assessments associated with the property (excluding property **(e)** tax)? 18 Any construction, modification, alterations, or repairs made without (f) 19 required approval from the appropriate Common Interest Community board or committee? 20 . . . 21 11. Any other conditions or aspects of the property which materially affect its 22 value or use in an adverse manner? 23 Id. (emphasis added). Section 11 of the SRPDF relates directly to information known to the 24 HOA and the HOA Trustee that materially affects the value of the Property and defined as a "defect" 25 in NRS 113.100(1). In this case, if the Super Priority Lien Amount is paid, or if the Attempted 26 Payment is rejected, it would have a materially adverse effect on the overall value of the Property, 27 and therefore, must be disclosed in the SRPDF by the HOA and the HOA Trustee. Section 9(c) -28 17

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1 (e) of the SRPDF would provide notice of any payments made by BANA or others on the HOA 2 Lien. 3 Section 11 of the SRPDF generally deals with the disclosure of the condition of the title to 4 the Property that would only be known by the HOA and the HOA Trustee. Pursuant to the Nevada 5 Real Estate Division's ("NRED"), Residential Disclosure Guide (the "Guide"), the HOA and HOA 6 Trustee shall provide the following to the purchaser/Plaintiff at the HOA Foreclosure Sale: 7 8 The content of the disclosure is based on what the seller is aware of at the time. If, after completion of the disclosure form, the seller discovers a new defect or notices 9 that a previously disclosed condition has worsened, the seller must inform the purchaser, in writing, as soon as practicable after discovery of the condition, or 10 before conveyance of the property. 11 The buyer may not waive, and the seller may not require a buyer to waive, any of 12 the requirements of the disclosure as a condition of sale or for any other purpose. 13 In a sale or intended sale by foreclosure, the trustee and the beneficiary of the deed of trust shall provide, not later than the conveyance of the property to, 14 or upon request from, the buver: 15 • written notice of any defects of which the trustee or beneficiary is aware. 16 (emphasis added). If the HOA and/or HOA Trustee fail to provide the SRPDF to the 17 Plaintiff/purchaser at the time of the HOA Foreclosure Sale, the Guide explains that: 18 A Buyer may rescind the contract without penalty if he does not receive a fully 19 and properly completed Seller's Real Property Disclosure form. If a Buyer closes 20 a transaction without a completed form or if a known defect is not disclosed to a Buyer, the Buyer may be entitled to treble damages, unless the Buyer waives his 21 rights under NRS 113.150(6). 22 Id. Pursuant to NRS 113.130(4), the HOA and HOA Trustee are required to provide the 23 information set forth in the SRPDF to the bidders at the HOA Foreclosure Sale and no later than the 24 drop of the gavel. The HOA and the HOA Trustee did not provide an SRPDF to the Plaintiff/Mr. 25 Haddad at the HOA Foreclosure Sale nor did they provide any information orally. The foregoing 26 27 demonstrates the HOA and the HOA Trustee's duty and obligation to disclose the Attempted 28 18

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1 Payment to the Plaintiff at the HOA Foreclosure Sale. Failure to make the foregoing disclosures is 2 a breach of duty of good faith and candor and a duty owed by the Defendants to Plaintiff under NRS 3 Chapter 116. The HOA and HOA Trustee's duty is codified pursuant to NRS Chapter 113 and was 4 breached in this case. 5 The HOA argues that Plaintiff's claims are time barred by NRS 113.150. However, the HOA 6 sets forth only a portion of NRS 113.150(4). The entire relevant portion is as follows: 7 8 [I]f a seller conveys residential property to a purchaser without complying with the requirements of NRS 113.130 or otherwise providing the purchaser or the 9 purchaser's agent with written notice of all defects in the property of which the seller is aware, and there is a defect in the property of which the seller was aware 10 before the property was conveyed to the purchaser and of which the cost of repair 11 or replacement was not limited by provisions in the agreement to purchase the property, the purchaser is entitled to recover from the seller treble the amount

necessary to repair or replace the defective part of the property, together with court costs and reasonable attorney's fees. An action to enforce the provisions of this subsection must be commenced not later than 1 year after the purchaser discovers or reasonably should have discovered the defect or 2 years after the conveyance of the property to the purchaser, whichever occurs later.

Plaintiff is not seeking to "recover from the seller treble the amount necessary to repair or replace the defective part of the property" as NRS 113.150(4) sets forth. Indeed, Plaintiff cannot repair the "defect" created by the HOA and HOA Trustee. Thus, Plaintiff is not seeking to enforce subsection NRS 113.150(4), and instead merely sets forth the violation of NRS 113 as a claim, in conjunction with the other claims of the Complaint, and is not seeking the treble damages prohibited by the statute of limitations set forth by NRS 113.150(4). Thus the HOA's arguments as to the time limitation on Plaintiff's claim are irrelevant.

Additionally, while the Nevada Supreme Court Orders cited in the HOA's briefing note that the "value" of the Property technically remains the same whether encumbered or not, to the extent that it differs from a construction defect or other physical impairment that could decrease the value by a fixed amount for repairs of same, it fails to account for the entirety of the definition of "Defect"

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1 set forth in NRS 113.100. If the First Deed of Trust remains an encumbrance on the Property, 2 Plaintiff, or any other buyer, cannot know 1) when the First Deed of Trust will be foreclosed and 3 the junior interest eliminated, 2) the price to avert foreclosure under the First Deed of Trust (i.e. 4 what the principal, interest, escrow, fees etc.. are under the First Deed of Trust), and 3) the use 5 during that time period (i.e. short-term rental, long-term rental, sale, etc...). Thus, while the value 6 of the Property as a res may remain unchanged by an encumbrance, NRS 113 sets forth "value or 7 8 use" which implies a more extensive definition then merely the value of the Property as a collection 9 of boards, pipes, and wires. Thus, the failure to make the disclosure did, indeed, impact the "value" 10 of the Property, and thus, Plaintiff's claims are properly brought and supported at this early juncture. 11

E. <u>PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM FOR CIVIL CONSPIRACY SHOULD BE SUSTAINED</u>

The Supreme Court of Nevada has recognized that co-conspirators, like the HOA and the HOA Trustee in this matter, are deemed to be each other's agents while acting in furtherance of the conspiracy. *Tricarichi v. Cooperative Rabobank, U.A.*, 440 P.3d 645, 653 (Nev. 2019) (observing in the context of a conspiracy claim for purposes of establishing personal jurisdiction, "co-conspirators are deemed to be each other's agents, the contacts that one co-conspirator made with a forum while acting in furtherance of the conspiracy may be attributed for jurisdictional purposes to the other co-conspirators."). Likewise, Plaintiff here contends that the HOA and the HOA Trustee were co-conspirators of one another in failing or refusing to disclose the Attempted Payment to Plaintiff.

The actions of one co-conspirator, those of the HOA Trustee, are properly attributable to the other co-conspirator, the HOA, and vice versa. *See id.* As the HOA and the HOA Trustee are separate legal entities, the legal bar which Defendants will likely assert exists to a conspiracy between the HOA Trustee and the HOA simply does not exist. *See, e.g., Nanopierce Techs. Inc. v. Depository Trust and Clearing Corp.*, 168 P.3d 73, 85 n.49 (Nev. 2007). The HOA's Motion should 20

1 be denied on this basis, as well. If the court deems the parties to be in an agency relationship, with 2 the HOA responsible pursuant to Respondeat Superior liability, then the conspiracy claim need not 3 lie, however, if the parties are deemed to not be liable for its agent, then the conspiracy claim stands. 4 **IV. CONCLUSION** 5 Based upon the foregoing, the Opposition should be sustained and the HOA's Motion and 6 HOA Trustee's Joinder should be denied. 7 DATED this August 5, 2021. 8 9 ROGER P. CROTEAU & ASSOCIATES, LTD. 10 /s/ Roger P. Croteau 11 Roger P. Croteau, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 4958 12 Christopher L. Benner Esq. 13 Nevada Bar No. 8963 2810 W. Charleston Blvd., Ste. 75 14 Las Vegas, Nevada 89102 Attorneys for Plaintiff 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 21

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this August 5, 2021, a true copy of the foregoing was served via electronic means on all persons and parties in the E-Service Master List in the Eighth Judicial District Court E-Filing System, pursuant to EDCR 8.05(a).

/s/ Joe Koehle

An employee of ROGER P. CROTEAU & ASSOCIATES, LTD.

EXHIBIT 1

EXHIBIT 1

2) 228-7719	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8	 ROGER P. CROTEAU, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 4958 RAYMOND JEREZA, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 11823 ROGER P. CROTEAU & ASSOCIATES, LTD 2810 W. Charleston Blvd., Ste. 75 Las Vegas, Nevada 89102 (702) 254-7775 (702) 228-7719 (facsimile) croteaulaw@croteaulaw.com ray@croteaulaw.com Attorneys for Plaintiff 	lectronically Filed 2/15/2020 8:22 AM teven D. Grierson LERK OF THE COURT	
	9	DISTRICT COURT		
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Telephone: (702) 254-7775 • Facsimile (702) 228-7719	 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 	2Plaintiff,Dept No: 203vs.PLAINTIFF'S ERRA4HARBOR COVE HOMEOWNERSOPPOSITION TO H5ASSOCIATION; and NEVADAHOMEOWNERS AS6ASSOCIATION SERVICES, INC.,MOTION TO DISMI7Defendants.JUDGMENT AND N8JOINDER THERET9Image: Series of the s	ATA TO ARBOR COVE SOCIATION'S SS OR IN THE MMARY EVADA VICES, INC.'S	
	 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 	COMES NOW, Plaintiff, RIVER GLIDER AVENUE TRUST, by and through attorneys, ROGER P. CROTEAU & ASSOCIATES, LTD., and hereby presents its Err Opposition to Harbor Cove Homeowners Association Motion to Dismiss, which was in not filed with the Opposition.		
		Case Number: A-20-819781-C		

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	1	See attached Declaration of Eddie Ha	addad.
	2	DATED this 15 th day of December, 2020.	
	3		ROGER P. CROTEAU & ASSOCIATES, LTD.
	4		
	5		/s/ Roger P. Croteau Roger P. Croteau, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 4958
	6		Nevada Bar No. 4958 Raymond Jereza, Esq.
	7		Raymond Jereza, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 11823 2810 W. Charleston Blvd., Ste. 75 Las Vegas, Nevada 89102 Attorneys for Plaintiff
	8		Las Vegas, Nevada 89102 Attorneys for Plaintiff
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1	CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
2	I hereby certify that on November 24, 2020, a true copy of the foregoing was served via
3	electronic means on all persons and parties in the E-Service Master List in the Eighth Judicial
4 5	District Court E-Filing System, pursuant to EDCR 8.05(a).
6	/s/ Joe Koehle
7	An employee of ROGER P. CROTEAU & ASSOCIATES, LTD.
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DECLARATION OF IYAD HADDAD

IYAD "EDDIE" HADDAD, being first duly sworn, deposes and says:

I, Iyad Haddad, being first duly sworn, deposes and says as follows: I am a resident of the State of Nevada. I am the Trustee of RIVER GLIDER AVENUE TRUST ("*River Glider*"). River Glider obtained its' interest in the Property from the HOA Foreclosure Sale. In my capacity as set forth above, I have reviewed the foregoing Opposition to HOA's Motion. Of the facts asserted therein, I know them to be true of my own knowledge or they are true to the best of my knowledge and recollection.

I further provide that it was my practice and procedure, as set forth herein, that prior to attending and/or at an HOA Foreclosure Sale pursuant to NRS 116 at all times relevant to this case, Would attempt to ascertain whether anyone had attempted to or did tender any payment regarding the homeowner association's lien. If I learned that a "tender" had either been attempted or made, I would not purchase the property offered in that foreclosure sale.

I would and did rely on whatever recital and/or announcements that were made at the HOA 17 Foreclosure Sale. I also relied on the HOA Foreclosure Deed that provided that the HOA and HOA 18 19 Trustee complied with all requirements of law. I reasonably relied upon the HOA and/or the HOA 20 Trustee's material omission of the tender and/or Attempted Payment of the Super Priority Lien 21 Amount and/or the Attempted Payment or any portion thereof upon prior inquiry when I purchased 22 the Property on behalf of the Plaintiff. As part of my practice and procedure in both NRS 107 and 23 NRS 116 foreclosure sales, I would call the foreclosing agent/HOA Trustee and confirm whether 24 the sale was going forward on the scheduled date; and in the context of an NRS 116 foreclosure 25 26 sale, I would ask if anyone had paid anything on the account. I would contact the HOA Trustee 27 prior to the HOA Foreclosure Sale to determine if the Property would in fact be sold on the date 28

stated in the NOS, obtain the opening bid, so I could determine the amount of funds necessary for the auction and inquire if any payments had been made; however, I never inquired if the "Super Priority Lien Amount" had been paid. I personally do all of the research on any and all properties that I purchased at the HOA Foreclosure Sales.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed this 14th day of December 2020..

<u>/s/</u>Eddie Haddad EDDIE HADDAD

		Electronically Filed 8/9/2021 4:04 PM Steven D. Grierson	
1	LIPSON NEILSON P.C.	CLERK OF THE COURT	
2	KALEB D. ANDERSON, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 7582	allun	
3	PETER E. DUNKLEY, ESQ.		
4	Nevada Bar No. 11110 9900 Covington Cross Drive, Ste. 120		
5	Las Vegas, Nevada 89144 (702) 382-1500 phone		
6	(702) 382-1512 fax		
7	kanderson@lipsonneilson.com pdunkley@lipsonneilson.com		
8	Attorneys for Defendants Harbor Cove Hom	eowners Association	
° 9	DISTRI	CT COURT	
10	CLARK COU	JNTY, NEVADA	
10			
	RIVER GLIDER AVENUE TRUST,	CASE NO.: A-20-819781-C	
12 13	Plaintiff,	DEPT. NO.: 20	
14	VS.		
15	HARBOR COVE HOMEOWNERS	HARBOR COVE HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION'S REPLY IN SUPPORT	
16	ASSOCIATON; and NEVADA ASSOCIATION SERVICES, INC.,	OF RENEWED, MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT	
17	Defendants.		
18			
19	COMES NOW, Defendant Harbor Cove Homeowners Association (the "HOA"), by		
20	and through its counsel of record, LIPSON	NEILSON, P.C., and hereby submits this Reply	
21	in Support of its Renewed Motion for Summ	ary Judgment.	
22	REPLY MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES		
23	I. INTRODUCTION		
24	Plaintiff's opposition ("Opposition") doubles down on its most recent "standard		
25	policy" of allegedly inquiring of NAS regarding lien payments prior to the nonjudicial		
26	foreclosure sale, with no evidence to corroborate the self-serving declaration alleging the		
27	policy of preforeclosure inquiry, which contradicts Haddad's prior trial and deposition		
28	testimony.		
	Page	e 1 of 13	

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Whether or not there was a prefore losure inquiry, (there wasn't), other than by providing the publicly recorded notice of default and the two notices of sale, which included the delinquency amounts, the HOA or NAS had no statutory obligation or duty of good faith to disclose a homeowner's payment history to a stranger on the phone, and no extrastatutory duty to prospective bidders at the sale. Accordingly, even it the court believes there is genuine issue of fact regarding whether Haddad inquired, and whether NAS responded, would not change the outcome-the sale has been ruled valid, for a mere \$5,500.00, Plaintiff rightfully and validly obtained title to the Property currently valued at approximately \$745,600.00¹. Any ruling to the contrary, that the HOA or NAS made an error would necessarily result in an invalid sale, and Plaintiff would lose the Property, an outcome that not even Plaintiff actually wants. See Bank of Am., N.A. v. SFR Invs. Pool 1, LLC, 134 Nev. 604, 612, 427 P.3d 113, 121 (2018) (seller passes no title if sale void).

There is still no genuine issue of material fact which would require an arbitration or a trial. Summary judgment in favor of the HOA is appropriate at this time.

II. **REPLY TO STATEMENT OF FACTS**

Most of the enumerated "facts" were adjudicated in the Prior Litigation, which found that the foreclosure sale was valid and the Plaintiff acquired title to the Property for \$5,500.00. See Order, attached to the HOA's Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment, at Exhibit A.² Other than alleging that Haddad called NAS on either May 10, or May 11, Plaintiff does not dispute any of the HOA's statement of undisputed facts.

However, beginning at paragraph 13 of the Opposition, the metaphorical wheels fall off Plaintiff's alleged "facts" bus. Plaintiff alleges the "fact" on behalf of himself, and all nonparty "bidders and potential bidders" that they would not have bid at the sale if they knew of 24

- According Zillow.com. \$740,900.00. to the current value is See 26 https://www.zillow.com/homes/8112-Lake-Hills-Drive,-Las-Vegas,-Nevada- rb/6936988 zpid/ (Accessed August 8, 2021). In other words, Plaintiff paid less than 1 penny on the dollar, i.e., \$5,500 divided by 27 \$745,600.00 equals: .007, which equals less than 1 percent.
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The HOA will not reattach the Exhibits previously filed with the Court. EDCR 2.27(e).

an "Attempted Payment prior to the HOA Foreclosure Sale. (Opposition p. 4 at¶ 13.) On its face, this hypothetical, i.e., speculative statement, posited on behalf of non-parties, does not state a "fact" or create a factual issue. *See Cuzze v. Univ. & Cmty. Coll. Sys.*, 123 Nev. 598, 603, 172 P.3d 131, 134 (2007) ("to defeat summary judgment, the nonmoving party must transcend the pleadings and, by affidavit or other *admissible evidence*, introduce specific facts that show a genuine issue of material fact") (emphasis added). *See also, Wood v. Safeway,Inc.* 121 Nev. at 732, 121 P.3d at 1031 (indicating that a party seeking to avoid summary judgment may not build a case on speculation).

What is actually an undisputed fact is that there were two notices of sale in this case, publicly recorded more than a year apart. The first notice was recorded on March 31, 2011, and indicated a lien amount of \$3,451.55. (See Order from Prior Litigation, Exhibit A to the Renewed MSJ, at p. 3: 18-19.) The second notice of sale was recorded more than a year later on April 16, 2012, and indicated a lien amount of \$3,346.53. (*Id.*, at 4:1-2.) Logic, common sense, and experience, strongly indicates that the delinquency amount in the second notice of sale, 13 months after the first notice of sale, would include additional assessments and fees, and would therefore increase from the delinquency amount in the first notice of sale. However, in this case, the amount of the delinquency indicated in the second notice of sale decreased from \$3,452.55 to \$3,346.53, which is less than the amount indicated in the first notice of sale. (*Id.*) The inescapable, unavoidable, undeniable conclusion is that the reduced delinquency amount indicated in the second notice of sale was because a payment or payments had been made by someone.

It is undisputed that both notices of sale were publicly recorded, and therefore actually reviewed by Plaintiff in this case. To the extent Plaintiff argues there was no disclosure of the payment by the HOA or NAS, the recording of the two notices of sale, imparts notice to the entire world, and has for more than 100 years in Nevada. See First *Nat'l Bank v. Meyers*, 40 Nev. 284, 293, 150 P. 308, 931, 161 P. 929, 931 (1916) (recording gives notice to the world). See also, SFR Invs, Pool 1, LLC v. First Horizon *Home Loans*, 134 Nev., Adv. Op. 4, 409 P.3d 891, 894 (2018) (observing that the purpose

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of Nevada's recording statutes is to "impart notice to all persons of the contents thereof" and that "subsequent purchasers and mortgagees shall be deemed to purchase and take with notice"").

Therefore, if Plaintiff claims he didn't have "notice" about the payment for the sequentially decreasing amounts in the notices of sale, it has to be because he didn't bother to look at the publicly recorded notices of sale. But Plaintiff testified, "I personally do all the research on any and all properties that I purchased at the HOA Foreclosure Sales." (Declaration of Haddad, p. 5:3-4.)

Whether or not Plaintiff looked at the notices, does not create any extra-statutory disclosure duties on the HOA or NAS. Nationstar Mortg., LLC v. Saticoy Bay LLC Series 2227 Shadow Canyon, 133 Nev. 740, 744, 405 P.3d 641, 645 (2017) ("the relevant statutory scheme curtails an HOA's ability to dictate the method, manner, time, place, and terms of its foreclosure sale, an HOA has little autonomy in taking extra-statutory efforts to increase the winning bid at the sale").

Accordingly, the speculative "fact" Plaintiff stated in paragraph 13 of the Opposition, is not a "fact" and does not create a genuine issue for trial.

Paragraphs 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, and 19, are also not "facts" but conclusions or pure speculation, none of which create a genuine issue for trial.

Which brings us to alleged facts of ¶¶ 20-23, which is based on the December 2020 Declaration of Iyad Haddad,³ in which he flatly contradicts himself when comparing his adopted policy of December 2020, to what he testified to during a deposition on July 27, 2017, and during a trial on November 14, 2017. See Exhibits H and I to the Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment.

Paragraph 24 relates to the Prior Litigation and does not factor into this case.

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- The Court should not consider those parts of the Declaration which are not factual but are instead, argument or conclusory. See, e.g., DRC 13(5) ("Affidavits shall contain only factual, evidentiary matter, shall conform
- 26 with the requirements of NRCP 56(e), and shall avoid mere general conclusions or argument. Affidavits substantially 27 defective in these respects may be stricken, wholly or in part.").
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As noted in the HOA's Renewed MSJ, the "facts" in the Declaration are uncorroborated by NAS's telephone records, and Plaintiff's discovery responses admit he does not have any phone records which would show that any such communication actually took place. *See* Plaintiff's discovery responses, relevant portions of which were attached to the Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment as Exhibits E, E-1, and E-2 (confirming no phone records).

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One cannot avoid summary judgment by fabricating "facts."

III. REPLY ARGUMENT

A. MISREPRESENTATION

Summary judgment is still appropriate on the misrepresentation claim because the HOA is not required to disclose attempted payments. *See* NRS 116 *et seq*. (notice requirements for nonjudicial foreclosure sales).

Plaintiff relies on *Nelson v. Heer* 123 Nev. 217, 225 (2007) for the position that the HOA was required to provide extra-statutory disclosure if asked. However, the nondisclosure in *Nelson v. Heer* was related to a seller's knowledge of water damage, which in "good faith" would require disclosure.

On the contrary, when an HOA forecloses on a property, the HOA is bound to comply with NRS 116, which expressly sets forth the notice requirements, which in 2012, did not require discussing any attempted payments. A comparison of the 2012 version of NRS 116 with the 2015 version confirms that the HOA, complying with NRS 116, did not disclose the information. *See also*, Order from the Prior Litigation finding valid sale. The Nevada Supreme Court, and many District Courts have not found misrepresentation in the circumstances alleged by Plaintiff:

[C]laims for misrepresentation and breach of NRS 116.1113 fail because respondents had no duty to proactively disclose whether a superpriority tender had been made. Compare NRS 116.31162(1)(b)(3)(II) (2017) (requiring an HOA to disclose if tender of the superpriority portion of the lien has been made), with NRS 116.31162 (2012) (not requiring any such disclosure); *see Halcrow, Inc. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court*, 129 Nev. 394, 400, 302 P.3d 1148, 1153 (2013) (providing the elements for a negligent misrepresentation claim, one of which is "supply [ing] false information"

Page 5 of 13

[*2] (internal quotation marks omitted)); *Nelson v. Heer*, 123 Nev. 217, 225, 163 P.3d 420, 426 (2007) (providing the elements for an intentional misrepresentation claim, one of which is making "a false representation").

Saticoy Bay Llc Series 10007 Liberty View v. S. Terrace Homeowners Ass'n, 484 P.3d 276 (Nev. 2021).

Additionally, even in *Nelson v. Heer*, the misrepresentation claim still failed because there was no evidence that the alleged nondisclosure was the cause of any damages. *Nelson v. Heer*, 123 Nev. at 226.

Thus, even if the 2012 version of NRS 116 required such a disclosure (it didn't), Plaintiff has not established that any nondisclosure caused any damages, e.g., Plaintiff acquired a house worth hundreds of thousands of dollars, for \$5,500.00, and then received rent revenues.⁴

An even bigger problem for Plaintiff is that he cannot establish that: (1) he ever spoke to NAS, and (2) that NAS ignored his purported call. In other words, let's not put the cart before the horse and assume that Plaintiff actually called and inquired. As discussed in more detail below, he did not. Without credible evidence of an actual inquiry or an actual injury, Plaintiff is asking the Court to find a duty or obligation that did not exist in 2012, and that not separately disclosing the payment history was required, even though the delinquency amounts in the consecutive notices of sale was decreasing, which provided notice that a payment was made. Plaintiff has not sufficiently established a claim for misrepresentation.

Plaintiff's attempt to distinguish the HOA's authority is unavailing and still relies on the assumption there was an actual inquiry (which there wasn't) and that if there was an inquiry, then NAS would should have provided the information (which it didn't have to).

The HOA (and NAS) complied with the disclosure requirements of NRS 116. The information provided to the world through the recorded notices of sale, demonstrated, if the world looked at them, that a payment had been made, reducing the delinquency amount.

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⁴ Plaintiff's disclosure alleges \$45,000 in damages, but attaches not one document, receipt, or cancelled check, to support the assertion.

Plaintiff cannot ignore the publicly recorded information and then attempt to blame the HOA or NAS for their respective compliance with NRS 116. There is no genuine issue of fact regarding the misrepresentation claim. The HOA is entitled to summary judgment.

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B. MISREPRESENTATION, PART DEUX

Plaintiff argues that the Declaration of Susan Moses confirms NAS's policy of "refusing to provide information." (Opposition 9:25-17.) The argument mischaracterizes the statement. What the Declaration actually says, is when someone like a representative of Plaintiff calls NAS: "NAS informed such individuals or entities that NAS is prohibited by federal law from disclosing collection account details without receiving (1) written consent from the debtor to communicate with the third-party, (2) express permission of a court of competent jurisdiction, or (3) unless reasonably necessary to effectuate a postjudgment judicial remedy." In other words, NAS responded to inquiries and provided people the information necessary for NAS to provide additional information. Plaintiff could have asked the homeowner or obtained the homeowner's consent, but did not, and does not allege to have tried. Plaintiff could have petitioned a court of competent jurisdiction to receive permission, but did not, and does not allege to have tried. Plaintiff did not claim to be effectuating a postjudgment remedy, and has not alleged to be doing so. This Court should not permit Plaintiff's failure to inquire, or follow NAS's instructions (if Plaintiff actual did inquire) as a misrepresentation claim against the HOA or NAS. If somebody calls NAS, and NAS provides the caller with information to obtain the information requested, the caller should not be permitted to claim that the HOA or NAS "obstructed Plaintiff's opportunity" to conduct due diligence. (Opposition 11:6-7.)

Plaintiff's mischaracterization of the Declaration of Moses is particularly glaring when
 considering the sequentially decreasing delinquency amounts indicated on the publicly
 recorded notices of sale. There was no obstruction, only compliance with 2012's NRS 116.

There is no genuine issue of fact. The Court may grant summary judgment in favor of the HOA.

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C. NRS 116.1113 DOES NOT CREATE AN ENHANCED DUTY TO DISCLOSE

Plaintiff appears to agree there is no "affirmative duty to disclose" but alleges a duty to "respond to the inquiry." (Opposition 12:10-12.) Plaintiff cites no authority in support of its position of an alleged duty to respond v. duty to disclose. *See Edwards v. Emperor's Garden Rest.*, 122 Nev. 317, 330 n.38, 130 P.3d 1280, 1288 n.38 (2006) (providing that the appellate courts need not consider claims unsupported by cogent argument or relevant authority).

To the contrary, as noted in the Renewed MSJ, the library of authority finding no such duty exists, continues to grow. See, e.g., Saticoy Bay Llc Series 10007 Liberty View v. S. Terrace Homeowners Ass'n, 484 P.3d 276 (Nev. 2021) ("breach of NRS 116.1113 fails because respondents had no duty to proactively disclose whether a superpriority tender had been made"). Plaintiff's argument regarding proactive disclosure as opposed to duty to respond does not create a genuine issue of fact for arbitration or trial because argument is not evidence. See Randolph v. State, 117 Nev. 970, 984, 36 P.3d 424, 433 (2001) (noting jury instruction "[s]tatements, arguments and opinions of counsel are not evidence in the case'''(alteration in original)); Greene v. State, 113 Nev. 157, 169, 931 P.2d 54, 61 (1997) (reiterating the district court's admonishment that "arguments of counsel are not evidence, as I've told you earlier, and neither are the personal beliefs of counsel as toas to the implications of that evidence"), overruled on other grounds by Byford v. State, 116 Nev. 215, 235, 994 P.2d 700, 713 (2000); Flanagan v. State, 112 Nev. 1409, 1420, 930 P.2d 691, 698 (1996) (highlighting the jury instruction that "[s]tatements, arguments and opinions of counsel are not evidence in the case" (alteration in original)); Bonacci v. State, 96 Nev. 894, 896-97, 620 P.2d 1244, 1246 (1980) (reiterating the district court's admonishment that "arguments of counsel are not evidence").

Factually, even if the Court assumes the unsupported allegation that Plaintiff called NAS, NAS would have responded to the caller and provided the instructions to Plaintiff, in order for NAS to provide information in addition to what was already public knowledge as contained in the publicly recorded notices of sale. (*See* Declaration of Moses, Renewed

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MSJ Exhibit G, at ¶ 5 (NAS informed inquirers of what NAS would need from the inquirers to provide additional information, i.e., homeowners consent to discuss, or court order). Just 2 because a response from NAS would not have included the information sought by a caller 3 does not mean NAS did not respond, it only means that Plaintiff didn't like the response it 4 received. 5

There is no genuine dispute that, if Plaintiff had called, NAS would have responded, with instructions for the caller to take further action to receive more information. Plaintiff's alleged unhappiness with NAS's response does not make a breach of NRS 116.1113 claim. The HOA is entitled to summary judgment.

D. **INCONSISTENT TESTIMONY DOES NOT CREATE A GENUINE ISSUE**

The Opposition argues that Plaintiff's testimony is consistent. However, Plaintiff still provides no corroborating evidence that a call from Haddad actually occurred. Plaintiff argues that the HOA's and NAS's evidence that establishes that Haddad did not contact NAS or the HOA, is somehow evidence that he "did in fact ask" but was not provided information. (Opposition 14:21.) The argument makes no sense in light of the undisputed facts:

- (1) This nonjudicial foreclosure sale took place in 2012.
- In 2017, Haddad testified, under oath, at trial and during deposition, that he (2) did not ever reach out to NAS or the HOA prior to the sale. See Renewed MSJ Exhibit H, and I.
- In 2020, Haddad testified that he called NAS (not the HOA) on "Thursday, (3) May 10 or Friday May 11, 2012. (Response to Interrogatory 2, Renewed MSJ Exhibit D.)
- NAS produced its Phone Notes, for this case, which does not show there was (4) a phone call from anyone on May 10 or May 11. (Phone Notes, Renewed MSJ, Exhibit F.)
- NAS testified that even if Haddad had called, in order to communicate with (5) third-parties regarding collection information, NAS would have informed

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Haddad that NAS would require the debtor's consent, court permission, or a post-judgment judicial remedy. (Declaration of Moses, Renewed MSJ, at Exhibit G, $\P 5$.) In other words, to avoid summary judgment, Plaintiff must do more than generically draft an affidavit that contradicts prior testimony. To survive a motion for summary judgment, the Plaintiff "may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of [its] pleadings,"

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986), nor may it "simply show there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 475 U.S. at 586. Rather, it is the non-moving party's burden to "come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Id. at 587 (emphasis added). Additionally:

[I]f the court finds that an affidavit constituted a "sham" produced for the sole purpose of falsely circumventing summary judgment, it can ignore the affidavit. See e.g., Nutton v Sunset Station, Inc., 131 Nev. 279, 294-95, 357 P.3d 966, 976-77 (Ct. App. 2015). In such situations, the court can find an affidavit to be a sham if it contains assertions that directly contradict other assertions previously made by that same witness during discovery and the contradiction cannot otherwise be legitimately reconciled as anything but manufactured. Id.

Cynthia Pickett, MSW, LCSW, LADC, Inc. v. McCarran Mansion, LLC, 2019 Nev. App.

Unpub. LEXIS 1091, *15, 2019 WL 7410795 (unpublished). Federal Courts invoke the

same rule:

A "party cannot create an issue of fact by an affidavit contradicting his prior deposition testimony." Yeager v. Bowlin, 693 F.3d 1076, 1080 (9th Cir. 2012) (quotation omitted). "This sham affidavit rule prevents a party who has been examined at length on deposition from rais[ing] an issue of fact simply by submitting an affidavit contradicting his own prior testimony, which would greatly diminish the utility of summary judgment as a procedure for screening out sham issues of fact." Id. (quotation omitted).

Tuttobene v. Trans Union, LLC, No. 2:19-cv-01999-APG-NJK, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24

101472, at *17-18 (D. Nev. May 28, 2021).

There are circumstances where a court may disregard a self-serving affidavit at the summary judgment stage. For example, a "conclusory, selfserving affidavit, lacking detailed facts and any supporting evidence, is insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact." Nilsson v. City of Mesa, 503 F.3d 947, 952 n.2 (9th Cir. 2007) (quotation omitted).

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Smith v. Albertsons LLC, No. 2:13-cv-01479-APG-CWH, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89274, at *5 (D. Nev. July 8, 2015

In this case, a contradictory affidavit, alleging "Plaintiff would have contacted the HOA trustee on Thursday, May 10 or Friday, May 11, 2012" (emphasis added) directly contradicts prior testimony that Plaintiff would not have contracted the HOA trustee, and is not a specific fact showing a genuine issue.

To avoid summary judgment, Plaintiff must do more than generically draft an affidavit that contradicts prior testimony; Plaintiff must do more than ask hypothetical, through irrelevant, questions, "Would NAS have a record of refusing to inform Mr. Haddad of the payments to the lien?" Ostensibly, the answer to the hypothetical is: YES. See Phone Logs (memorializing all phone calls).

In this case, a contradictory affidavit, alleging "Plaintiff would have contacted the HOA trustee on Thursday, May 10 or Friday, May 11, 2012" (emphasis added) directly contradicts prior testimony that he would not have contracted NAS, and is not a specific or supported fact showing a genuine issue to empanel a jury.

Summary judgment in favor of the HOA is still appropriate because argument of counsel, even creative argument, is not fact with which to avoid summary judgment. See Bonacci v. State, 96 Nev. 894, 896-97, 620 P.2d 1244, 1246 (1980) (reiterating the district court's admonishment that "arguments of counsel are not evidence").

Ε. CONSPIRACY AND NRS 113 CLAIMS WERE DISMISSED

The conspiracy claim and the claim for violation of NRS 113 were dismissed on December 15, 2020. Argument was included in an abundance of caution and because there are no new facts or law raised in the Opposition, which would revive the dismissed 23 claims, the HOA will not restate its argument and incorporates its argument from the 24 Renewed MSJ with regard to Plaintiff's arguments in Sections D and E. See Renewed 25 Motion for Summary Judgment; see also, HOA's answer, filed January 5, 2021 (indicating 26 dismissal of claims). 27

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LIPSON NEILSON, P.C.

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IV. CONCLUSION

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The Opposition does not present any facts which would create a genuine issue for arbitration or trial. The Plaintiff has already established the character of the title it obtained at the valid nonjudicial foreclosure, as conclusively determined, through the District Court's Order, affirmed on appeal, in the Prior Litigation. Plaintiff should not be permitted to try to change its story in order to avoid summary judgment in this case, and attempt to have the HOA or NAS supplement its \$5,500.00 purchase of a \$745,000.00 property.


Dated this 9th day of August 2021.

LIPSON NEILSON, P.C.

Peter E. Dunkley

By:

KALEB D. ANDERSON, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 7582 PETER E. DUNKLEY, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 11110 9900 Covington Cross Drive, Ste. 120 Las Vegas, Nevada 89144 (702) 382-1500 phone (702) 382-1512 fax kanderson@lipsonneilson.com pdunkley@lipsonneilson.com Attorneys for Harbor Cove HOA



LIPSON NEILSON, P.C.

		Electronically Filed 12/30/2021 9:35 AM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT
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5	DISTRICT COUF	RT
6	CLARK COUNTY, NE	VADA
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8	RIVER GLIDER AVENUE TRUST,	CASE NO. A-20-819781
9	Plaintiff,	DEPT. NO. XX
10	VS.	
11	HARBOR COVER HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, etc.,	
12	Defendants,	
13	BEFORE THE HONORABLE ERIC JOHNSO	
14	WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMB	
15	RECORDER'S TRANSCRIPT OF HEARING:	
16	HARBOR COVE HOMEOWNERS ASS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT	
17	SERVICES, INC.'S JOINDER TO DEFE	NDANT HARBOR COVE
18	HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATIONS' RI SUMMARY JUDGM	
19 20		
21		
22	SEE APPEARANCES ON PAGE 2	
23		
24		
25	RECORDED BY: SARAH RICHARDSON,	COURT RECORDER
-		
	Deres 4	
	Page 1 Case Number: A-20-819781-C	

1	APPEARANCES	
2	For the Plaintiff:	CHRISTOPHER L. BENNER, ESQ.
3		[Via BlueJeans]
4	For Defendant Nevada Association Services:	BRANDON E. WOOD, ESQ.
5		[Via BlueJeans]
6	For Defendant Harbor Cover:	PETER E. DUNKLEY, ESQ.
7		[Via BlueJeans]
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1	Las Vegas, Nevada, Wednesday, September 08, 2021
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3	[Hearing began at 9:06 a.m.]
4	THE COURT: River Glider Avenue Trust versus Harbor Cover
5	Homeowners Association, case number A819781. Counsel, please note
6	your appearances for the record.
7	MR. BENNER: Christopher Benner on behalf of River Glider
8	Avenue Trust, Plaintiff.
9	MR. DUNKLEY: Good morning, Your Honor. Peter Dunkley for
10	Harbor Cove HOA.
11	MR. WOOD: Good morning, Your Honor. Brandon Wood on behalf
12	of Defendant Nevada Association Services.
13	THE CLERK: That's it.
14	THE COURT: All right, very good. All right, we're here on Harbor
15	Cover Homeowners Association's Renewed Motion for Summary
16	Judgment and Nevada Association Services's Joinder to that motion. I
17	received the motion. I received the briefing.
18	Let me turn to Plaintiff; in looking at this, let me just make sure
19	I'm not missing I just see in terms of the factual allegations from your
20	side that, there was a call made to the homeowner's association or
21	actually the association services and asked if there was any payment
22	made by the homeowner toward the HOA lien and neither the
23	homeowner's association or NAS said anything.
24	Am I right that that's the extent you've got in terms of material
25	omission or misrepresentation?
	Page 3
I	

MR. BENNER: Christopher Benner for Plaintiffs, Your Honor. And
I'll make the correction now because I know that the defendants will set
this forth is that, it was the -- the declaration states that it was the client's
practice and procedure to make those communications. He was not
able to state or provide specific records of reaching out to the HOA
Trustee, NAS in this case, so I'll make that correction now because I
know defendant will set it forth.

But otherwise than that, yes, Your Honor. NAS included
their -- or NAS had a policy of not providing that information, so that's
not surprising that he did not receive any information regarding any
payments made towards the underlying lien.

12 THE COURT: Okay. I don't think that; until there was statutory 13 change was made that, there was any obligation on the homeowner's 14 association or NAS's part to make that information available. If there 15 isn't any obligation, and they didn't say anything, how was there a 16 material omission that your client should have relied upon?

MR. BENNER: Yes, Your Honor. There's no statutory requirement
for proactive response. And again -- not to steal defendant's thunder,
but there is a -- there's been some orders; no decisions from the Nevada
Supreme Court, but there's no proactive duty.

However, our argument at this juncture is that, with a policy and procedure of making a request and a -- and NAS's policy and procedure of not answering that request because of an alleged of requirements for protection of the homeowner's confidential information that that effectively prevented our client from obtaining the information regarding the underlying lien. Well the -- until 2015, there was no requirement per
statute to volunteer or proactively provide the information. I would
contest that's still a duty -- or still a breach of duty of good faith to not
respond to inquiries regarding any payments turning the underlying loan.
THE COURT: All right.

MR. BENNER: I'm sorry, Your Honor, underlying assessment lien.
I'm sorry, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Let me turn to Defendant, either side.
MR. DUNKLEY: Thank you, Your Honor. This is Peter Dunkley for
the HOA. So I think we're all in agreement that the statute doesn't
create a duty to provide this information. The statute also doesn't
include a duty to respond if an uninterested third party calls and ask, or
the HOA, prior to a foreclosure sale.

The issue that we have and the reason why I filed this motion 14 is rather than burn everyone's time at an arbitration. The facts really 15 don't matter because here's the allegation, and I appreciate Mr. Benner 16 17 stealing my -- stealing the thunder earlier. But there is no specific 18 factual allegation that River Glider called and asked. He says it was his policy and procedure to do so. That policy and procedure, as I put in my 19 20 briefing, as in direct contravention to prior policy and procedure as it suits the convenience of River Glider's principal, I guess. 21

NAS also has a policy and procedure, and it's policy and
procedure is to actually respond to inquiries. So the really -- the sole
issue for this Court and for -- if it gets sent to arbitration, which will waste
everyone's time, is -- was NAS's response sufficient? And here's what

1 NAS's policy and procedure is and has been, and it's never changed 2 and was supported by the declaration of Susan Moses is, if someone called and wanted information about this property and payment history; 3 they'd say, look, I can't give you this information unless you get the 4 5 homeowner's consent, a court order; or you're affecting a post judgment, 6 so that's -- that is a response. And so to the extent the plaintiff says 7 there's a duty to respond; the response is this is how we can help you; 8 you need to go get the homeowner's consent; otherwise, we expose ourselves to -- under the Fair Debt Collections Practices Act, and so 9 10 there was a response.

If there was a call -- there's no evidence of a call in this case. 11 The plaintiff is not, with confidence, saying there was; even in the 12 13 declaration, this is a practice of what they said. We have produced the phone records of NAS and a declaration of NAS saying that there was 14 no call on the dates; that if plaintiffs -- plaintiffs basically says, if I called, 15 it would've been on these two dates. We looked at the phone records, 16 there's no calls recorded. We know what NAS would've said if there 17 18 was a call which there wasn't.

So that's where we are, Judge. There's no genuine or
material fact. The fact dispute is, in my opinion, disingenuous. And
even if there was a call, it's immaterial. Because as the Court noted,
when -- the first thing, there's no statutory duty. And so -- in fact, the
Nevada Supreme Court had said, in a prior opinion, that the HOA's
duties are prescribed by NRS 116. And there's no statutory duty, you
can't go outside the statute to create an incentive forbidden at the sale.

Page 6

1 THE COURT: All right.

MR. DUNKLEY: So that's where we're at, Judge. There's no
genuine issue of material fact; you can grant summary judgment and -based on -- based on that. There's really no dispute, and that's all I got,
Your Honor. Thank you.

THE COURT: Thank you.

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Counsel for NAS, I'm not asking you to say anything. To be
honest, you probably could only hurt yourself.

MR. WOOD: Your Honor, we would -- we would -- yeah, we would
just echo what Mr. Dunkley stated as of the general issue of dispute
here and would request that the Court grant the motion for summary
judgment.

13 THE COURT: All right. It's not obviously your motion, Mr. Benner,14 but any final word?

MR. BENNER: Only to address two points that were raised there, 1) 15 was that if there was no -- if there was a policy and procedure of not 16 17 responding, then it seems a little bit suspicious to say that there would be no -- there would be a record of that. I don't know that many 18 institutions keep records of when they will not respond to something. 19 20 And I would say the policy and procedure of not responding itself is -- in the reply by the plaintiff. They set forth that as further evidence that the 21 22 clients in this case, Mr. Haddad, did not reach out and did not actually have a policy of reaching out and alleged to several other cases. 23 24 Just to correct one or two points there, 1) a lot of the

²⁵ interrogatory responses included were addressing the HOA that Mr.

1 Haddad would not reach out to the HOA because they weren't 2 conducting the sale. The other point being that in -- essentially in 3 reaching out during that timeframe, it's -- the question of fact of whether there would be a record -- any type of a record of not providing of 4 5 information. Those are the only two tentacle issues I'd provide and 6 underscore our previous argument that, yes, there's no affirmative duty 7 pursuant to the statute as the Court -- as Nevada Supreme Court has 8 set forth, but that's not our argument. And our argument is that there's --9 if there's a name inquiry, there's a responsibility to reply to that inquiry. 10 THE COURT: All right. Well I will grant the motion for summary 11 judgment. I find, as noted, I mean there's no definitive determination 12 that an inquiry was made. The response is, if in an inquiry was made, 13 they would've said that they couldn't respond to it. But ultimately, there's no representation being made by plaintiff that there was some 14 15 sort of representation, and I don't find anything in the statute that required a response. 16

If you don't get a response, I don't think you can make the
assumption that no payment was made by the homeowner. So I don't
find that there was a material omission here that was improperly made
or occurred, and so I will grant the motion for summary judgment on that
basis. I'll ask Defendant to prepare an order with detail findings of facts
and conclusion of law. Submit it in a Word form to my law clerk, so if I
want to make any changes to it, I can do that.

24 25 MR. DUNKLEY: Yes, Your Honor. Thank you.

MR. BENNER: Thank you, Your Honor.

MR. WOOD: Thank you, Your Honor. THE COURT: Thank you. [Hearing concluded at 9:18 a.m.] * * * * * * ATTEST: I do hereby certify that I have truly and correctly transcribed the audio/video proceedings in the above-entitled case to the best of my ability. Catirllo nail Angie Calvillo Court Recorder/Transcriber Page 9

ELECTRONICALLY SERVED 9/21/2021 3:47 PM

	9/21/2021 3:47	Electronically Filed	
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1	LIPSON NEILSON P.C.	CLERK OF THE COURT	
2	KALEB D. ANDERSON, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 7582		
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7	kanderson@lipsonneilson.com pdunkley@lipsonneilson.com		
,	Attorneys for Defendants Harbor Cove Homeowners Association		
8			
9	DISTRI	CT COURT	
10	CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA		
11			
12	RIVER GLIDER AVENUE TRUST,	CASE NO.: A-20-819781-C	
13	Plaintiff,	DEPT. NO.: 20	
14	VS.	[PROPOSED]	
15	HARBOR COVE HOMEOWNERS	ORDER ON HARBOR COVE	
16	ASSOCIATON; and NEVADA ASSOCIATION SERVICES, INC.,	HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION'S RENEWED, MOTION FOR SUMMARY	
17	Defendants.	JUDGMENT	
18 19	Delendants.	Hearing Date: September 8, 2021 Hearing Time:8:30 A.M.	
	Before the Court is Defendant Harbo	r Cove Homeowners Association's (the "HOA")	
20			
21	Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment, and Nevada Association Services, Inc.'s ("NAS") joinder. Plaintiff, River Glider Avenue Trust, filed a response. The HOA replied.		
22	On December 14, 2020, the Court dismissed claims for civil conspiracy and violation		
23	of NRS 113. The remaining claims, misrepresentation and violation of duty of good faith		
24	under NRS 116.1113 were subsequently sent to arbitration. After discovery, the HOA re		
25 26	filed the Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment.		
26 27	On September 8, 2021, the Renewed Motion for Summary judgment came up for		
27 28	hearing. The Court considered the pleadings, exhibits, including orders from case A-13-		
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	Pag	e 1 of 7	
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683467-C and Appeal No. 76683 (the "Prior Litigation"), as well as argument from counsel. In light of the Prior Litigation, the Court takes judicial notice of facts and law from the Prior Litigation. See NRS 47.130 (judicial notice may be taken of facts); NRS 47.140 (judicial notice may be taken of the Nevada Revised Statutes); NRS 47.150(2) (the court "shall 4 take judicial notice if requested by a party and supplied with the necessary information"). Andolino v. State, 99 Nev. 346, 351, 662 P.2d 631, 633 (1983) (mandatory judicial notice appropriate where necessary information related to prior decision and order made part of record). See also, Mack v. Estate of Mack, 125 Nev. 80, 91-92, 206 P.3d 98, 106 (2009) (providing the court may take judicial notice of facts in a different case when the moving party establishes a valid reason for doing so.) See also, United States v. Wilson, 631 F.2d 118, 119 (9th Cir. 1980) (explaining that "a court may take judicial notice of its own records in other cases"). This matter was set for an arbitration to take place on September 15, 2021. However, the HOA timely filed the Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment on July 14 22, 2021. See NAR 4(E) (dispositive motions may be filed no later than 45 days prior to the arbitration). The Court finds and rules as follows:

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. River Glider Avenue Trust purchased the Property at the valid nonjudicial 17 foreclosures sale for \$5,500.00 on May 11, 2012. 18

Before the nonjudicial foreclosure sale, the prior owner of the Property had 2. 19 satisfied the super-priority portion of the HOA's lien. 20

3. Thus, the nonjudicial foreclosure sale was valid and conveyed the Property to 21 the Plaintiff *subject to* the existing deed of trust. 22

4. Plaintiff alleges that its manager, on either May 10, 2012, or May 11, 2012, 23 called NAS to inquire regarding the status of the lien. Plaintiff admits it has no corroborating 24 records of the alleged call. 25

5. NAS testified, that when a third-party calls NAS about a homeowner's 26 account: "NAS informed such individuals or entities that NAS is prohibited by federal law 27 from disclosing collection account details without receiving (1) written consent from the 28

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debtor to communicate with the third-party, (2) express permission of a court of competent jurisdiction, or (3) unless reasonably necessary to effectuate a postjudgment judicial remedy." (Declaration of Susan Moses.) 3

6. NAS produced its telephone log, which confirmed that NAS did not receive any phone calls, from anyone regarding this Property, on May 10, 2012, or May 11, 2012.

If any findings of fact are more properly considered conclusions of law, they 7. should be so construed.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1. "Summary judgment is appropriate under NRCP 56 when the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, and affidavits, if any, that are properly before the court demonstrate that no genuine issue of material fact exists, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Wood v. Safeway, Inc., 121 Nev. 724, 731, 121 P.3d 1026, 1031 (2005). The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of production to show the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Cuzze v. Univ. & Comm. College System of Nevada, 172 P.3d 131, 134 (Nev. 2007). Where "the nonmoving party will bear the burden of persuasion at trial, the party moving for summary judgment may satisfy the burden of production by either (1) submitting evidence that negates an essential element of the nonmoving party's claim, or (2) 'pointing out . . . that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." Id. (citations omitted).

To survive a motion for summary judgment, the non-moving party "may not rest 21 upon the mere allegations or denials of [its] pleadings," Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 22 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986), nor may it "simply show there is some metaphysical doubt as to 23 the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 475 U.S. at 586. Rather, it is the non-24 moving party's burden to "come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine 25 issue for trial." Id. at 587 (emphasis added); See also Wood v. Safeway, Inc., 121 Nev. 724 26 (2005), citing Pegasus v. Reno Newspapers, Inc., 118 Nev. 706, 713, 57 P.3d 82 (2002). 27

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An issue is only genuine if there is a sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the non-moving party. *See Anderson*, 477 U.S. at 248 (1986). Further, a dispute will only preclude the entry of summary judgment if it could affect the outcome of the suit under governing law. *Id*. "The amount of evidence necessary to raise a genuine issue of material fact is enough to require a judge or jury to resolve the parties' differing versions of the truth at trial." *Id*. at 249. In evaluating a summary judgment, a court views all facts and draws all inferences in a light most favorable to the non-moving party. *Wood v. Safeway, Inc.*, 121 Nev. 724, 729 (2005). If there are no genuine issues of fact, the movant's burden is not evidentiary because the facts are not disputed, but the court has the obligation to resolve the legal dispute between the parties as a matter of law. *Gulf Ins. Co. v. First Bank*, 2009 WL 1953444 *2 (E.D.Cal.2009) (*citing Asuncion v. Dist. Dir. of U.S. Immigration & Naturalization Serv.*, 427 F.2d 523, 524 (9th Cir.1970)).

Where claims are unsubstantiated, the Nevada Supreme Court has stated: "trial courts should not be reluctant in dispensing with such claims, as they are instructive of the type of litigation that summary judgment is meant to obviate." *Boesiger v. Desert Appraisals, Ltd. Liab. Co.*, 444 P.3d 436, 440-41 (Nev. 2019).

2. Judicial Notice—as noted above, this court may take judicial notice of matters of fact that are generally known or that are "[c]apable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned' when requested by a party. NRS 47.130; NRS 47.150. Records of other courts are sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned. *Occhiuto v. Occhiuto*, 97 Nev. 143, 145, 625 P.2d 568, 569 (1981). A court may take judicial notice of records from other cases if there is a close relationship between the cases, and issues within the case justify taking judicial notice of the prior case. *Id.*

The Court finds the District Court's Order and the Nevada Supreme Court's Order of Affirmance, from the Prior Litigation, are closely related to this case in that the Prior Litigation involves the same Property, the same nonjudicial foreclosure sale, and made express findings regarding issues raised in this lawsuit, and therefore takes judicial notice

of the facts and law from the Prior Litigation.

MISREPRESENTATION

3. To prevail on a misrepresentation claim, Plaintiff must establish the following elements: (1) defendant supplied information while in the course of its business; (2) the information was false; (3) the information was supplied for the guidance of the plaintiff in its business transactions; (4) defendant must have failed to exercise reasonable care or competence in obtaining or communicating the information; (5) plaintiff must have justifiably relied upon the information by taking action or refraining from it; and (6) plaintiff sustained damage as a result of his reliance upon the accuracy of the information. *Barmettler v. Reno Air, Inc.*, 114 Nev. 441, 449, 956 P.2d 1382, 1387 (1998).

4. Here, the alleged misrepresentation was by omission. Plaintiff alleged he called NAS prior to the nonjudicial foreclosure sale, but that NAS did not respond.

5. However, in addition to the absence of competent evidence which would 13 establish an actual phone call, on the alleged *estimated* dates of the alleged phone call, 14 May 10 or May 11, 2012, NRS 116 did not require any extra-statutory disclosures beyond 15 the publicly recorded nonjudicial foreclosure notices. See Noonan v. Bayview Loan 16 Servicing, LLC, 438 P.3d 335 (Nev. 2019) (unpublished) (affirming summary judgment 17 because there was no "affirmative false statement nor omitted a material fact it was bound 18 to disclose." See also Saticoy Bay v. Genevieve Court Homeowners Ass'n, No. 80135, 19 2020 Nev. Unpub. LEXIS 1000, at *1 (Oct. 16, 2020) (no duty to disclose); see also, 20 Saticoy Bay v. Silverstone Ranch Cmty. Ass'n, No. 80039, 2020 Nev. Unpub. LEXIS 993, 21 at *1 (Oct. 16, 2020) (no duty to disclose, and NRS 113 does not apply to create such a 22 disclosure); see also, Saticoy Bay Llc Series 10007 Liberty View v. S. Terrace 23 Homeowners Ass'n, 484 P.3d 276 (Nev. 2021) (same, issued April 16, 2021); see also, Bay 24 v. Tripoly, 482 P.3d 699 (Nev. 2021) (same, issued March 26, 2021); see also, Saticoy Bay 25 Llc Series 3237 v. Aliante Master Ass'n, 480 P.3d 836 (Nev. 2021) (same, issued February 26 16, 2021); see also, Saticoy Bay v. Sunrise Ridge Master Homeowners Association, 478 27 P.3d 870 (Nev. 2021) (same, issued January 15, 2021). 28

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5. Therefore, because there was no duty to respond to a phone call in 2012, whether or not the alleged phone call happened is immaterial and cannot be a basis for a misrepresentation claim. See Wood v. Safeway, Inc., 121 Nev. 724, 730, 121 P.3d 1026, 1030 (2005) (only material fact disputes will preclude summary judgment). 4

VIOLATION OF GOOD FAITH UNDER NRS 116.1113

8. NRS 116.1113 states: "Every contract or duty governed by this chapter imposes an obligation of good faith in its performance or enforcement."

9. An HOA's duties are proscribed by NRS 116.

10. It is undisputed that there was no defect in the HOA's (or NAS's) compliance with NRS 116 regarding the nonjudicial foreclosure process. See generally, Prior Litigation.

11. Additionally, nothing in NRS 116.1113, in effect in May of 2012 imposed a duty to disclose any preforeclosure payments. See Misrepresentation discussion, supra. Compare, NRS 116.31162(1)(b)(3)(11) (2017) (requiring an HOA to disclose if tender of the superpriority portion of the lien) with NRS 116.31162 (2005) (no disclosure requirement).

12. Neither the HOA nor NAS was required to disclose the existence of a pre-sale payment. See NRS 116 (2005).

In the absence of a duty to disclose, there is no breach of a duty. See Bay v. 13. Tripoly, 482 P.3d 699 (Nev. 2021) (unpublished) (affirming dismissal of breach of duty of good faith claim).

14. Therefore, the claim fails.

15. If any conclusions of law are more properly considered findings of fact, they should be so construed.

ORDER

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED the claims for civil 24 conspiracy and violation of NRS 113 were **DISMISSED**, with prejudice, on December 14, 25 2020. With respect to the claims for misrepresentation and breach of duty of good faith, 26

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the HOA's Renewed 27 Motion for Summary Judgment is **GRANTED**, in favor of the HOA; 28

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	1	IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that NAS's Joinder is
	2	GRANTED, in favor of NAS.
	3	IT IS SO ORDERED.
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	5	Dated2021 Dated this 21st day of September, 2021
	6	$\langle A \rangle$
	7	DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
	8	F4B 0B7 8AAB 2238
	9	Submitted by: District Court Judge
89144	10	LIPSON NEILSON, P.C.
LIPSON NEILSON, P.C. 9900 Covington Cross Drive, Suite 120, Las Vegas, Nevada 89144 Telephone: (702) 382-1500 Facsimile: (702) 382-1512	11	/s/ Peter E. Dunkley
, Jas, Ne 702) 38	12	
P.C. as Vega mile: (70	13	By: KALEB D. ANDERSON, ESQ.
LIPSON NEILSON, ross Drive, Suite 120, La 702) 382-1500 Facsin	14	Nevada Bar No. 7582 PETER E. DUNKLEY, ESQ.
I NEIL , Suite 1500	15	Nevada Bar No. 11110 9900 Covington Cross Drive, Ste. 120
PSON s Drive 2) 382-	16	Las Vegas, Nevada 89144
n Cros le: (70	17	(702) 382-1500 phone (702) 382-1512 fax
LIPSON NEI Covington Cross Drive, Suit Telephone: (702) 382-1500	18	<u>kanderson@lipsonneilson.com</u> pdunkley@lipsonneilson.com
900 C	19	Attorneys for Harbor Cove HOA
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		Page 7 of 7

From:	Brandon Wood <brandon@nas-inc.com></brandon@nas-inc.com>
Sent:	Friday, September 17, 2021 1:07 PM
То:	Renee Rittenhouse; 'Chris Benner'
Cc:	Peter Dunkley
Subject:	RE: harbor cover Proposed Order

No objections. You may use my electronic signature.

Best,

Brandon E. Wood, Esq.

Nevada Association Services, Inc. 6625 S. Valley View Blvd. Suite 300 Las Vegas, NV 89118 702-804-8885 Office 702-804-8887 Fax

Our office hours are Monday – Thursday 9-5, Friday 9-4:30 and closed for lunch from 12-1 daily. There is a drop-box available for payments in front of our office during normal business hours and lunch.



PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL: Nevada Association Services, Inc. is a debt collector. Nevada Association Services, Inc. is attempting to collect a debt. Any information obtained will be used for that purpose. This message originates from Nevada Association Services, Inc. This message and any file(s) or attachment(s) transmitted with it are confidential, intended only for the named recipient, and may contain information that is a trade secret, proprietary, or is otherwise protected against unauthorized use or disclosure. Any disclosure, distribution, copying, or use of this information by anyone other than the intended recipient, regardless of address or routing, is strictly prohibited. Personal messages express only the view of the sender and are not attributable to Nevada Association Services, Inc.

From: Renee Rittenhouse <RRittenhouse@lipsonneilson.com>
Sent: Wednesday, September 15, 2021 2:03 PM
To: Brandon Wood <brandon@nas-inc.com>; 'Chris Benner' <chris@croteaulaw.com>
Cc: Peter Dunkley <PDunkley@lipsonneilson.com>
Subject: RE: harbor cover Proposed Order

Good Afternoon:

Please see the Proposed Order on Harbor Cove's Renewed MSJ. Please let our office know if you have corrections, comments, or would like to request revisions. If you are fine with the Order as attached, please confirm in an e-mail in order for us to send to the Judge for signature and filing.

Thank you,

LAW OFFICES



Renee M. Rittenhouse Legal Assistant to Janeen V. Isaacson, Esq. and Peter E. Dunkley, Esq. Lipson Neilson 9900 Covington Cross Drive, Suite 120 Las Vegas, NV 89144 (702) 382-1500 (702) 382-1512 (fax) E-Mail: <u>rrittenhouse@lipsonneilson.com</u> Website: <u>www.lipsonneilson.com</u> OFFICES IN NEVADA, MICHIGAN, ARIZONA & COLORADO

From: Peter Dunkley <<u>PDunkley@lipsonneilson.com</u>>
Sent: Thursday, September 9, 2021 12:57 PM
To: Brandon Wood <<u>brandon@nas-inc.com</u>>; 'Chris Benner' <<u>chris@croteaulaw.com</u>>
Cc: Renee Rittenhouse <<u>RRittenhouse@lipsonneilson.com</u>>
Subject: harbor cover Proposed Order

Hello,

The court wanted something in MS Word for red-lining. Please let me know if you have corrections, comments, or would like to request revisions.

Thanks!



Peter E. Dunkley, Esq. 1 E. Liberty Street, Suite 600 Reno, NV 89501 Telephone: (775) 420-1197 Fax: (702) 382-1512 E-Mail: <u>pdunkley@lipsonneilson.com</u> Website: <u>www.lipsonneilson.com</u> Offices in Nevada, Michigan, Arizona, and Colorado

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From:	Chris Benner < chris@croteaulaw.com>
Sent:	Friday, September 17, 2021 12:53 PM
То:	Renee Rittenhouse; Brandon Wood
Cc:	Peter Dunkley
Subject:	RE: harbor cover Proposed Order

You may add my e-signature.

Christopher L. Benner, Esq.

Roger P. Croteau & Associates 2810 Charleston Boulevard, No. H-75 Las Vegas, NV 89102 (702) 254-7775 <u>chris@croteaulaw.com</u>

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From: Renee Rittenhouse <RRittenhouse@lipsonneilson.com>
Sent: Wednesday, September 15, 2021 2:03 PM
To: Brandon Wood <brandon@nas-inc.com>; Chris Benner <chris@croteaulaw.com>
Cc: Peter Dunkley <PDunkley@lipsonneilson.com>
Subject: RE: harbor cover Proposed Order

Good Afternoon:

Please see the Proposed Order on Harbor Cove's Renewed MSJ. Please let our office know if you have corrections, comments, or would like to request revisions. If you are fine with the Order as attached, please confirm in an e-mail in order for us to send to the Judge for signature and filing.

Thank you,



Renee M. Rittenhouse Legal Assistant to Janeen V. Isaacson, Esq. and Peter E. Dunkley, Esq. Lipson Neilson 9900 Covington Cross Drive, Suite 120 Las Vegas, NV 89144 (702) 382-1500 (702) 382-1512 (fax) E-Mail: <u>rrittenhouse@lipsonneilson.com</u> Website: <u>www.lipsonneilson.com</u> OFFICES IN NEVADA, MICHIGAN, ARIZONA & COLORADO

From: Peter Dunkley <<u>PDunkley@lipsonneilson.com</u>> Sent: Thursday, September 9, 2021 12:57 PM To: Brandon Wood <<u>brandon@nas-inc.com</u>>; 'Chris Benner' <<u>chris@croteaulaw.com</u>> Cc: Renee Rittenhouse <<u>RRittenhouse@lipsonneilson.com</u>> Subject: harbor cover Proposed Order

Hello,

The court wanted something in MS Word for red-lining. Please let me know if you have corrections, comments, or would like to request revisions.

Thanks!



Peter E. Dunkley, Esq. 1 E. Liberty Street, Suite 600 Reno, NV 89501 Telephone: (775) 420-1197 Fax: (702) 382-1512 E-Mail: <u>pdunkley@lipsonneilson.com</u> Website: <u>www.lipsonneilson.com</u> Offices in Nevada, Michigan, Arizona, and Colorado


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1	CSERV		
2		DISTRICT COURT	
3		RK COUNTY, NEVADA	
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6	River Glider Avenue Trust, Plaintiff(s)	CASE NO: A-20-819781-C	
7	vs.	DEPT. NO. Department 20	
8	Harbor Cover Homeowners		
9	Association, Defendant(s)		
10			
11	AUTOMATED CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE		
12 13	This automated certificate of service was generated by the Eighth Judicial District		
13	Court. The foregoing Order Granting Summary Judgment was served via the court's electronic eFile system to all recipients registered for e-Service on the above entitled case as		
15	listed below:		
16	Service Date: 9/21/2021		
17	Susana Nutt	snutt@lipsonneilson.com	
18	Renee Rittenhouse	rrittenhouse@lipsonneilson.com	
19	Peter Dunkley	pdunkley@lipsonneilson.com	
20	Brandon Wood	brandon@nas-inc.com	
21	Roger Croteau	croteaulaw@croteaulaw.com	
22	Susan Moses	susanm@nas-inc.com	
23	Croteau Admin	receptionist@croteaulaw.com	
24	Sydney Ochoa	sochoa@lipsonneilson.com	
25	Charlie Luh	arbitration@luhlaw.com	
26		-	
27	Christopher Benner	chris@croteaulaw.com	
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	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8	LIPSON NEILSON P.C. KALEB D. ANDERSON, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 7582 PETER E. DUNKLEY, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 11110 9900 Covington Cross Drive, Ste. 120 Las Vegas, Nevada 89144 (702) 382-1500 phone (702) 382-1512 fax kanderson@lipsonneilson.com pdunkley@lipsonneilson.com Attorneys for Defendants Harbor Cove Hom	Electronically Filed 9/23/2021 8:39 AM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT Other Association CLERK OF THE COURT
44	9	CLARK COL	JNTY, NEVADA
ada 891 1512	10	RIVER GLIDER AVENUE TRUST,	
LIPSON NEILSON, P.C. 9900 Covington Cross Drive, Suite 120, Las Vegas, Nevada 89144 Telephone: (702) 382-1500 Facsimile: (702) 382-1512	11 12	Plaintiff,	CASE NO.: A-20-819781-C
, P.C as Vega nile: (70	12	VS.	DEPT. NO.: 20
SON 120, Lá Facsin	14	HARBOR COVE HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATON; and NEVADA	NOTICE OF ENTRY OF ORDER
LIPSON NEILSON, P.C. Dross Drive, Suite 120, Las Vega (702) 382-1500 Facsimile: (70)	15	ASSOCIATION, and NEVADA ASSOCIATION SERVICES, INC.,	
LIPSON NEI Covington Cross Drive, Sui Telephone: (702) 382-1500	16	Defendants.	
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		Pag	e 1 of 3

	DIFASE TAKE NOTICE that the ODDED ON HADDOD COVE HOMEOWNEDS	
1 2	PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the ORDER ON HARBOR COVE HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION'S RENEWED MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT filed with the court	
2	this 21 st day of September, 2021, a true and correct copy of which is attached hereto.	
4	Dated this 23 rd day of September, 2021.	
5	LIPSON NEILSON, P.C.	
6	By: /s/ Peter E. Dunkley	
7	KALEB D. ANDERSON, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 7582	
8	PETER E. DUNKLEY, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 11110	
9	9900 Covington Cross Drive, Ste. 120 Las Vegas, Nevada 89144	
10	(702) 382-1500 phone	
11	(702) 382-1512 fax <u>kanderson@lipsonneilson.com</u>	
12	pdunkley@lipsonneilson.com Attorneys for Defendants Harbor Cove HOA	
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	Page 2 of 3	



LIPSON NEILSON, P.C. 9900 Covington Cross Drive, Suite 120, Las Vegas, Nevada 89144 Telephone: (702) 382-1500 Facsimile: (702) 382-1512

AA324

ELECTRONICALLY SERVED 9/21/2021 3:47 PM

	9/21/2021 3:47	Electronically Filed
		09/21/2021 3:47 PM
1	LIPSON NEILSON P.C.	CLERK OF THE COURT
2	KALEB D. ANDERSON, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 7582	
3	PETER E. DUNKLEY, ESQ.	
4	Nevada Bar No. 11110 9900 Covington Cross Drive, Ste. 120	
5	Las Vegas, Nevada 89144 (702) 382-1500 phone	
6	(702) 382-1512 fax	
7	kanderson@lipsonneilson.com pdunkley@lipsonneilson.com	
8	Attorneys for Defendants Harbor Cove Hom	eowners Association
9		
10	DISTRI	CT COURT
10	CLARK COU	JNTY, NEVADA
		CASE NO.: A-20-819781-C
12	RIVER GLIDER AVENUE TRUST,	CASE NO.: A-20-819781-C
13	Plaintiff,	DEPT. NO.: 20
14	VS.	[PROPOSED]
15	HARBOR COVE HOMEOWNERS	ORDER ON HARBOR COVE
16	ASSOCIATON; and NEVADA ASSOCIATION SERVICES, INC.,	HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION'S RENEWED, MOTION FOR SUMMARY
17	Defendants.	JUDGMENT
18 19		Hearing Date: September 8, 2021 Hearing Time:8:30 A.M.
20	Before the Court is Defendant Harbo	r Cove Homeowners Association's (the "HOA"),
21	Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment, a	nd Nevada Association Services, Inc.'s ("NAS")
22	joinder. Plaintiff, River Glider Avenue Trust,	filed a response. The HOA replied.
23	On December 14, 2020, the Court dis	smissed claims for civil conspiracy and violation
24	of NRS 113. The remaining claims, misre	presentation and violation of duty of good faith
25	under NRS 116.1113 were subsequently s	ent to arbitration. After discovery, the HOA re
26	filed the Renewed Motion for Summary Judo	gment.
27	On September 8, 2021, the Renewe	ed Motion for Summary judgment came up for
28	hearing. The Court considered the pleading	gs, exhibits, including orders from case A-13-
	Pag	e 1 of 7

LIPSON NEILSON, P.C. 9900 Covington Cross Drive, Suite 120, Las Vegas, Nevada 89144 Telephone: (702) 382-1500 Facsimile: (702) 382-1512

683467-C and Appeal No. 76683 (the "Prior Litigation"), as well as argument from counsel. In light of the Prior Litigation, the Court takes judicial notice of facts and law from the Prior Litigation. See NRS 47.130 (judicial notice may be taken of facts); NRS 47.140 (judicial notice may be taken of the Nevada Revised Statutes); NRS 47.150(2) (the court "shall take judicial notice if requested by a party and supplied with the necessary information"). *Andolino v. State*, 99 Nev. 346, 351, 662 P.2d 631, 633 (1983) (mandatory judicial notice appropriate where necessary information related to prior decision and order made part of record). *See also, Mack v. Estate of Mack*, 125 Nev. 80, 91-92, 206 P.3d 98, 106 (2009) (providing the court may take judicial notice of facts in a different case when the moving party establishes a valid reason for doing so.) *See also, United States v. Wilson*, 631 F.2d 118, 119 (9th Cir. 1980) (explaining that "a court may take judicial notice of its own records in other cases"). This matter was set for an arbitration to take place on September 15, 2021. However, the HOA timely filed the Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment on July 22, 2021. *See* NAR 4(E) (dispositive motions may be filed no later than 45 days prior to the arbitration). The Court finds and rules as follows:

FINDINGS OF FACT

 River Glider Avenue Trust purchased the Property at the valid nonjudicial foreclosures sale for \$5,500.00 on May 11, 2012.

2. Before the nonjudicial foreclosure sale, the prior owner of the Property had
 satisfied the super-priority portion of the HOA's lien.

3. Thus, the nonjudicial foreclosure sale was valid and conveyed the Property to
 the Plaintiff *subject to* the existing deed of trust.

4. Plaintiff alleges that its manager, on either May 10, 2012, or May 11, 2012,
called NAS to inquire regarding the status of the lien. Plaintiff admits it has no corroborating
records of the alleged call.

5. NAS testified, that when a third-party calls NAS about a homeowner's account: "NAS informed such individuals or entities that NAS is prohibited by federal law from disclosing collection account details without receiving (1) written consent from the

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debtor to communicate with the third-party, (2) express permission of a court of competent jurisdiction, or (3) unless reasonably necessary to effectuate a postjudgment judicial remedy." (Declaration of Susan Moses.) 3

6. NAS produced its telephone log, which confirmed that NAS did not receive any phone calls, from anyone regarding this Property, on May 10, 2012, or May 11, 2012.

If any findings of fact are more properly considered conclusions of law, they 7. should be so construed.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1. "Summary judgment is appropriate under NRCP 56 when the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, and affidavits, if any, that are properly before the court demonstrate that no genuine issue of material fact exists, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Wood v. Safeway, Inc., 121 Nev. 724, 731, 121 P.3d 1026, 1031 (2005). The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of production to show the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Cuzze v. Univ. & Comm. College System of Nevada, 172 P.3d 131, 134 (Nev. 2007). Where "the nonmoving party will bear the burden of persuasion at trial, the party moving for summary judgment may satisfy the burden of production by either (1) submitting evidence that negates an essential element of the nonmoving party's claim, or (2) 'pointing out . . . that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." Id. (citations omitted).

To survive a motion for summary judgment, the non-moving party "may not rest 21 upon the mere allegations or denials of [its] pleadings," Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 22 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986), nor may it "simply show there is some metaphysical doubt as to 23 the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 475 U.S. at 586. Rather, it is the non-24 moving party's burden to "come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine 25 issue for trial." Id. at 587 (emphasis added); See also Wood v. Safeway, Inc., 121 Nev. 724 26 (2005), citing Pegasus v. Reno Newspapers, Inc., 118 Nev. 706, 713, 57 P.3d 82 (2002). 27

3900 Covington Cross Drive, Suite 120, Las Vegas, Nevada 89144 Telephone: (702) 382-1500 Facsimile: (702) 382-1512 LIPSON NEILSON, P.C.

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Page 3 of 7

An issue is only genuine if there is a sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the non-moving party. *See Anderson*, 477 U.S. at 248 (1986). Further, a dispute will only preclude the entry of summary judgment if it could affect the outcome of the suit under governing law. *Id*. "The amount of evidence necessary to raise a genuine issue of material fact is enough to require a judge or jury to resolve the parties' differing versions of the truth at trial." *Id*. at 249. In evaluating a summary judgment, a court views all facts and draws all inferences in a light most favorable to the non-moving party. *Wood v. Safeway, Inc.*, 121 Nev. 724, 729 (2005). If there are no genuine issues of fact, the movant's burden is not evidentiary because the facts are not disputed, but the court has the obligation to resolve the legal dispute between the parties as a matter of law. *Gulf Ins. Co. v. First Bank*, 2009 WL 1953444 *2 (E.D.Cal.2009) (*citing Asuncion v. Dist. Dir. of U.S. Immigration & Naturalization Serv.*, 427 F.2d 523, 524 (9th Cir.1970)).

Where claims are unsubstantiated, the Nevada Supreme Court has stated: "trial courts should not be reluctant in dispensing with such claims, as they are instructive of the type of litigation that summary judgment is meant to obviate." *Boesiger v. Desert Appraisals, Ltd. Liab. Co.*, 444 P.3d 436, 440-41 (Nev. 2019).

2. Judicial Notice—as noted above, this court may take judicial notice of matters of fact that are generally known or that are "[c]apable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned' when requested by a party. NRS 47.130; NRS 47.150. Records of other courts are sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned. *Occhiuto v. Occhiuto*, 97 Nev. 143, 145, 625 P.2d 568, 569 (1981). A court may take judicial notice of records from other cases if there is a close relationship between the cases, and issues within the case justify taking judicial notice of the prior case. *Id*.

The Court finds the District Court's Order and the Nevada Supreme Court's Order of Affirmance, from the Prior Litigation, are closely related to this case in that the Prior Litigation involves the same Property, the same nonjudicial foreclosure sale, and made express findings regarding issues raised in this lawsuit, and therefore takes judicial notice

of the facts and law from the Prior Litigation.

MISREPRESENTATION

3. To prevail on a misrepresentation claim, Plaintiff must establish the following elements: (1) defendant supplied information while in the course of its business; (2) the information was false; (3) the information was supplied for the guidance of the plaintiff in its business transactions; (4) defendant must have failed to exercise reasonable care or competence in obtaining or communicating the information; (5) plaintiff must have justifiably relied upon the information by taking action or refraining from it; and (6) plaintiff sustained damage as a result of his reliance upon the accuracy of the information. *Barmettler v. Reno Air, Inc.*, 114 Nev. 441, 449, 956 P.2d 1382, 1387 (1998).

4. Here, the alleged misrepresentation was by omission. Plaintiff alleged he called NAS prior to the nonjudicial foreclosure sale, but that NAS did not respond.

5. However, in addition to the absence of competent evidence which would 13 establish an actual phone call, on the alleged *estimated* dates of the alleged phone call, 14 May 10 or May 11, 2012, NRS 116 did not require any extra-statutory disclosures beyond 15 the publicly recorded nonjudicial foreclosure notices. See Noonan v. Bayview Loan 16 Servicing, LLC, 438 P.3d 335 (Nev. 2019) (unpublished) (affirming summary judgment 17 because there was no "affirmative false statement nor omitted a material fact it was bound 18 to disclose." See also Saticoy Bay v. Genevieve Court Homeowners Ass'n, No. 80135, 19 2020 Nev. Unpub. LEXIS 1000, at *1 (Oct. 16, 2020) (no duty to disclose); see also, 20 Saticoy Bay v. Silverstone Ranch Cmty. Ass'n, No. 80039, 2020 Nev. Unpub. LEXIS 993, 21 at *1 (Oct. 16, 2020) (no duty to disclose, and NRS 113 does not apply to create such a 22 disclosure); see also, Saticoy Bay Llc Series 10007 Liberty View v. S. Terrace 23 Homeowners Ass'n, 484 P.3d 276 (Nev. 2021) (same, issued April 16, 2021); see also, Bay 24 v. Tripoly, 482 P.3d 699 (Nev. 2021) (same, issued March 26, 2021); see also, Saticoy Bay 25 Llc Series 3237 v. Aliante Master Ass'n, 480 P.3d 836 (Nev. 2021) (same, issued February 26 16, 2021); see also, Saticoy Bay v. Sunrise Ridge Master Homeowners Association, 478 27 P.3d 870 (Nev. 2021) (same, issued January 15, 2021). 28

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5. Therefore, because there was no duty to respond to a phone call in 2012, whether or not the alleged phone call happened is immaterial and cannot be a basis for a misrepresentation claim. See Wood v. Safeway, Inc., 121 Nev. 724, 730, 121 P.3d 1026, 1030 (2005) (only material fact disputes will preclude summary judgment). 4

VIOLATION OF GOOD FAITH UNDER NRS 116.1113

8. NRS 116.1113 states: "Every contract or duty governed by this chapter imposes an obligation of good faith in its performance or enforcement."

9. An HOA's duties are proscribed by NRS 116.

10. It is undisputed that there was no defect in the HOA's (or NAS's) compliance with NRS 116 regarding the nonjudicial foreclosure process. See generally, Prior Litigation.

11. Additionally, nothing in NRS 116.1113, in effect in May of 2012 imposed a duty to disclose any preforeclosure payments. See Misrepresentation discussion, supra. Compare, NRS 116.31162(1)(b)(3)(11) (2017) (requiring an HOA to disclose if tender of the superpriority portion of the lien) with NRS 116.31162 (2005) (no disclosure requirement).

12. Neither the HOA nor NAS was required to disclose the existence of a pre-sale payment. See NRS 116 (2005).

In the absence of a duty to disclose, there is no breach of a duty. See Bay v. 13. Tripoly, 482 P.3d 699 (Nev. 2021) (unpublished) (affirming dismissal of breach of duty of good faith claim).

14. Therefore, the claim fails.

15. If any conclusions of law are more properly considered findings of fact, they should be so construed.

ORDER

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED the claims for civil 24 conspiracy and violation of NRS 113 were **DISMISSED**, with prejudice, on December 14, 25 2020. With respect to the claims for misrepresentation and breach of duty of good faith, 26

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the HOA's Renewed 27 Motion for Summary Judgment is **GRANTED**, in favor of the HOA; 28

AA330

3900 Covington Cross Drive, Suite 120, Las Vegas, Nevada 89144 Telephone: (702) 382-1500 Facsimile: (702) 382-1512 LIPSON NEILSON, P.C.

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	1	IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that NAS's Joinder is
	2	GRANTED, in favor of NAS.
	3	IT IS SO ORDERED.
	4	
	5	Dated2021 Dated this 21st day of September, 2021
	6	$\langle A \rangle$
	7	DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
	8	F4B 0B7 8AAB 2238
	9	Submitted by: District Court Judge
89144	10	LIPSON NEILSON, P.C.
LIPSON NEILSON, P.C. 9900 Covington Cross Drive, Suite 120, Las Vegas, Nevada 89144 Telephone: (702) 382-1500 Facsimile: (702) 382-1512	11	/s/ Peter E. Dunkley
, Jas, Ne 702) 38	12	
P.C. as Vega mile: (70	13	By: KALEB D. ANDERSON, ESQ.
LIPSON NEILSON, ross Drive, Suite 120, La 702) 382-1500 Facsin	14	Nevada Bar No. 7582 PETER E. DUNKLEY, ESQ.
I NEIL , Suite 1500	15	Nevada Bar No. 11110 9900 Covington Cross Drive, Ste. 120
PSON s Drive 2) 382-	16	Las Vegas, Nevada 89144
n Cros le: (70	17	(702) 382-1500 phone (702) 382-1512 fax
LIPSON NEI Covington Cross Drive, Suit Telephone: (702) 382-1500	18	<u>kanderson@lipsonneilson.com</u> pdunkley@lipsonneilson.com
900 C	19	Attorneys for Harbor Cove HOA
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		Page 7 of 7

AA331

From:	Brandon Wood <brandon@nas-inc.com></brandon@nas-inc.com>
Sent:	Friday, September 17, 2021 1:07 PM
То:	Renee Rittenhouse; 'Chris Benner'
Cc:	Peter Dunkley
Subject:	RE: harbor cover Proposed Order

No objections. You may use my electronic signature.

Best,

Brandon E. Wood, Esq.

Nevada Association Services, Inc. 6625 S. Valley View Blvd. Suite 300 Las Vegas, NV 89118 702-804-8885 Office 702-804-8887 Fax

Our office hours are Monday – Thursday 9-5, Friday 9-4:30 and closed for lunch from 12-1 daily. There is a drop-box available for payments in front of our office during normal business hours and lunch.



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Thank you,

LAW OFFICES



Renee M. Rittenhouse Legal Assistant to Janeen V. Isaacson, Esq. and Peter E. Dunkley, Esq. Lipson Neilson 9900 Covington Cross Drive, Suite 120 Las Vegas, NV 89144 (702) 382-1500 (702) 382-1512 (fax) E-Mail: <u>rrittenhouse@lipsonneilson.com</u> Website: <u>www.lipsonneilson.com</u> OFFICES IN NEVADA, MICHIGAN, ARIZONA & COLORADO

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Thanks!



Peter E. Dunkley, Esq. 1 E. Liberty Street, Suite 600 Reno, NV 89501 Telephone: (775) 420-1197 Fax: (702) 382-1512 E-Mail: <u>pdunkley@lipsonneilson.com</u> Website: <u>www.lipsonneilson.com</u> Offices in Nevada, Michigan, Arizona, and Colorado

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То:	Renee Rittenhouse; Brandon Wood
Cc:	Peter Dunkley
Subject:	RE: harbor cover Proposed Order

You may add my e-signature.

Christopher L. Benner, Esq.

Roger P. Croteau & Associates 2810 Charleston Boulevard, No. H-75 Las Vegas, NV 89102 (702) 254-7775 <u>chris@croteaulaw.com</u>

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From: Renee Rittenhouse <RRittenhouse@lipsonneilson.com>
Sent: Wednesday, September 15, 2021 2:03 PM
To: Brandon Wood <brandon@nas-inc.com>; Chris Benner <chris@croteaulaw.com>
Cc: Peter Dunkley <PDunkley@lipsonneilson.com>
Subject: RE: harbor cover Proposed Order

Good Afternoon:

Please see the Proposed Order on Harbor Cove's Renewed MSJ. Please let our office know if you have corrections, comments, or would like to request revisions. If you are fine with the Order as attached, please confirm in an e-mail in order for us to send to the Judge for signature and filing.

Thank you,



Renee M. Rittenhouse Legal Assistant to Janeen V. Isaacson, Esq. and Peter E. Dunkley, Esq. Lipson Neilson 9900 Covington Cross Drive, Suite 120 Las Vegas, NV 89144 (702) 382-1500 (702) 382-1512 (fax) E-Mail: <u>rrittenhouse@lipsonneilson.com</u> Website: <u>www.lipsonneilson.com</u> OFFICES IN NEVADA, MICHIGAN, ARIZONA & COLORADO

From: Peter Dunkley <<u>PDunkley@lipsonneilson.com</u>> Sent: Thursday, September 9, 2021 12:57 PM To: Brandon Wood <<u>brandon@nas-inc.com</u>>; 'Chris Benner' <<u>chris@croteaulaw.com</u>> Cc: Renee Rittenhouse <<u>RRittenhouse@lipsonneilson.com</u>> Subject: harbor cover Proposed Order

Hello,

The court wanted something in MS Word for red-lining. Please let me know if you have corrections, comments, or would like to request revisions.

Thanks!



Peter E. Dunkley, Esq. 1 E. Liberty Street, Suite 600 Reno, NV 89501 Telephone: (775) 420-1197 Fax: (702) 382-1512 E-Mail: <u>pdunkley@lipsonneilson.com</u> Website: <u>www.lipsonneilson.com</u> Offices in Nevada, Michigan, Arizona, and Colorado

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1	CSERV		
2		DISTRICT COURT	
3	CLAI	RK COUNTY, NEVADA	
4			
5	River Glider Avenue Trust,	CASE NO: A-20-819781-C	
6	Plaintiff(s)		
7	vs.	DEPT. NO. Department 20	
8 9	Harbor Cover Homeowners		
10	Association, Defendant(s)		
10			
12	AUTOMATED CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE		
13	This automated certificate of service was generated by the Eighth Judicial District		
14	Court. The foregoing Order Granting Summary Judgment was served via the court's electronic eFile system to all recipients registered for e-Service on the above entitled case as		
15	listed below:		
16	Service Date: 9/21/2021		
17	Susana Nutt	snutt@lipsonneilson.com	
18	Renee Rittenhouse	rrittenhouse@lipsonneilson.com	
19	Peter Dunkley	pdunkley@lipsonneilson.com	
20	Brandon Wood	brandon@nas-inc.com	
21	Roger Croteau	croteaulaw@croteaulaw.com	
22	Susan Moses	susanm@nas-inc.com	
23	Croteau Admin	receptionist@croteaulaw.com	
24	Sydney Ochoa	sochoa@lipsonneilson.com	
25	Charlie Luh	arbitration@luhlaw.com	
26		-	
27	Christopher Benner	chris@croteaulaw.com	
28			

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ROGER P. CROTEAU & ASSOCIATES, LTD. • 2810 West Charleston Blvd, Suite 75 • Las Vegas, Nevada 89102 • Telephone: (702) 254-7775 • Facsimile (702) 228-7719	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12		CT COURT					
SSOC • Las csimi	12 13		INTY, NEVADA					
& A e 75 • Fa	14	RIVER GLIDER AVENUE TRUST,	Case No: A-20-819781-C Dept No: 20					
'EAU I, Suit 7775	15	Plaintiff,						
ROT Blvd 254-	16	VS.						
P. C eston 702)	17	HARBOR COVE HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION; and NEVADA						
GER harle ne: (18	ASSOCIATION, and NEVADA ASSOCIATION SERVICES, INC.,	NOTICE OF APPEAL					
RO est C ephoi	19	Defendants						
10 W Tele	20							
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		Case Number: A-20-819	781-C					

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NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that Plaintiff RIVER GLIDER AVENUE TRUST, by and
 through its attorneys, Roger P. Croteau & Associates, Ltd., hereby appeals to the Supreme Court of
 Nevada the Order Granting Harbor Cove Homeowners Association's Renewed Motion for
 Summary Judgment, Nevada Association Services Joinder thereto, and all rulings and interlocutory
 orders giving rise to or made appealable by the final judgment.

Dated October 20, 2021.

ROGER P. CROTEAU & ASSOCIATES, LTD.

/s/ Christopher L. Benner Roger P. Croteau, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 4958 Christopher L. Benner, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 8963 2810 W. Charleston Blvd., Suite 75 Las Vegas, Nevada 89102 Plaintiff Daisy Trust

• 2810 West Charleston Blvd, Suite 75 • Las Vegas, Nevada 89102 • Telephone: (702) 254-7775 • Facsimile (702) 228-7719 ROGER P. CROTEAU & ASSOCIATES, LTD.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on October 20, 2021, I served the foregoing document on all persons and parties in the E-Service Master List in the Eighth Judicial District Court E-Filing System, by electronic service in accordance with the mandatory electronic service requirements of Administrative Order 14-1 and the Nevada Electronic Filing and Conversion Rules.

/s/ Joe Koehle

An employee of ROGER P. CROTEAU & ASSOCIATES, LTD.