IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

ANTHONY CHRIS ROBERT MARTINEZ, Appellant, vs.	Electronically Filed CASE NO. 8375 Mar 24 2022 02:29 p.m Elizabeth A. Brown Clerk of Supreme Court
THE STATE OF NEVADA,	
Respondent.	

Appeal from the Fourth Judicial District Court County of Elko, State of Nevada The Honorable Alvin R. Kacin, District Judge

APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF

MATTHEW PENNELL Elko County Public Defender 569 Court Street Elko, NV 89801 NV Bar Number 13298 AARON D. FORD Nevada Attorney General 100 North Carson Street Carson City, NV 89701 NV Bar Number 7704

TYLER J. INGRAM
Elko County District Attorney
540 Court Street
Elko, NV 89801
NV Bar Number 11819

Attorneys for Appellant

Attorneys for Respondent

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIESi-ii
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION1
ROUTING STATEMENT1
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES1
STATEMENT OF THE CASE2-6
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS6-12
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT12
ARGUMENT12-20
 The Evidence was Insufficient to Convict Mr. Martinez13-16 The District Court Errored By Denying the Defenses' Request to Have the Jury Instructed that Law Enforcement Was Grossly Negligent when It Failed to Gather Evidence
CONCLUSION20
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE21-22
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE23

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

2	
3	<u>Cases:</u>
4 5	Barnier v. State, 119 Nev. 129, 67 P.3d 320(Nev. 2003)
6	Bearden v. Boulder City, 89 Nev. 106, 507 P.2d 1034, 1035(Nev. 1979)17
7	Brooks v. State, 124 Nev. 203, 180 P.3d 657(Nev. 2008)
9	Daniels v. State, 114 Nev. 261, 956 P.2d 111(Nev. 1998)16-17
10	Hernandez v. State, 118 Nev. 513, 50 P.3d 1100(Nev. 2002)
12	Jackson v. State, 128 Nev. 598, 291 P.3d 1274(Nev. 2012)
13	Keys v. State, 104 Nev. 736, 766 P.2d 270(Nev. 1988)
15	Mendoza v. State, 122 Nev. 267, 130 P.3d 176(Nev. 2006)
16 17	Randolph v. State, 117 Nev. 970, 36 P.3d 424(Nev. 2001)16
18	Silks v. State, 92 Nev. 91, 545 P.2d 1159(Nev. 1976)
19	Somee v. State, 124 Nev. 434, 187 P.3d 152(Nev. 2008)
21	State v. Milosovich, 42 Nev. 263,175 P. 139(Nev. 1918)
22	Wright v. State, 94 Nev. 415, 581 P.2d 442(Nev. 1978)
24	
25	Rules:
26	NRAP 4(b)(1)(A)1
28	NRAP 17(b)(2)(A)1
29	

1	NRAP 28(e)(1)22
3	NRAP 32(a)(4)21
4 5	NRAP 32(a)(5)21
6	NRAP 32(a)(6)21
8	NRAP 32(a)(7)21
9	Statutes:
11	Nev. Rev. Stat. § § 177.015
13	Nev. Rev. Stat. § § 193.33013
15	Nev. Rev. Stat. § § 200.010
17	Nev. Rev. Stat. § § 200.02013
19 20	Nev. Rev. Stat. § § 200.030
21	Nev. Rev. Stat. § § 200.310
23	Nev. Rev. Stat. § § 200.33014
25 26	Nev. Rev. Stat. § § 177.01514
27	d d
28	
29	

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The District Court entered its judgment of conviction on October 7, 2021.

Joint Appendix (hereinafter abbreviated "App.") 103-106. The Appellant filed notice of appeal on October 18, 2021. App. 144-145. Since Appellant filed the notice of appeal within thirty (30) days from the entry of the written judgment, notice of appeal is timely per NRAP 4(b)(1)(A) and Nev. Rev. Stat. § \$ 177.015(3) provides this Court with jurisdiction to review the judgment of conviction that Anthony Chris Robert Martinez ("Mr. Martinez") now appeals.

ROUTING STATEMENT

This case involves a direct appeal from a judgment of conviction based on a jury verdict. Per NRAP 17(b)(2)(A), a judgment of conviction based on a jury verdict from a Category B felony is exempt from presumptive assignment to the Nevada Court of Appeals. As such, this case is presumptively assigned to the Supreme Court's routing discretion.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

The issues on appeal in this case are: (1) if there was sufficient evidence to convict of attempted murder and second-degree kidnapping; (2) if the District Court erred when it refused to instruct the jury on gross negligence for law enforcement's failure to gather evidence; and (3) if the District Court errored by substituting its own conclusions for the jury's when sentencing in this case.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The pertinent facts for this case occurred on or about November 17, 2016.

App. 111-117. The State filed the criminal complaint against Mr. Martinez on

November 18, 2016, charging him with the following: Count 1: Attempted Murder

with the Use of a Deadly Weapon, a Category B Felony; Count 2: Attempted Murder

with the Use of a Deadly Weapon, a Category B Felony; Count 3: Possession of an

Explosive or Incendiary Device in or Near Certain Public or Private Areas, a

Category D Felony. App. 1-8.

On January 26, 2017, the State filed an amended criminal complaint, including: Count 1: Attempted Murder with the Use of a Deadly Weapon, a Category B Felony; Count 2: Attempted Murder with the Use of a Deadly Weapon, a Category B Felony; Count 3: Possession of an Explosive or Incendiary Device in or Near Certain Public or Private Areas, a Category D Felony Count 4: Battery with a Deadly Weapon, a Category B Felony; Count 5: Assault with a Deadly Weapon, a Category B Felony; Count 6: Assault with a Deadly Weapon, a Category B Felony; Count 7: Attempted Robbery with the Use of a Deadly Weapon, a Category B Felony; Count 8: Discharging a Firearm Within a Structure in a Populated Area, a Category B Felony; Count 9: Eluding a Police Officer in a Manner Posing Danger to Persons or Property, a Category B Felony; Count 10: Possession of a Firearm by a Person Previously Convicted of a Felony Offense, a Category B Felony; and Count 11:

Possession of a Firearm by a Person Previously Convicted of a Felony Offense, a Category B Felony; Count 12: Possession of a Firearm by a Person Previously Convicted of a Felony Offense, a Category B Felony; Count 13: Possession of a Firearm by a Person Previously Convicted of a Felony Offense, a Category B Felony; Count 14: Possession of a Firearm by a Person Previously Convicted of a Felony Offense, a Category B Felony. *App. 9-17*.

The State filed a Second Amended Criminal Complaint on November 6, 2018. App. 18-28. This complaint alleged the same offenses as the Amended Criminal Complaint, but added Count 15: Kidnapping, First Degree, with the use of a deadly weapon, a category A Felony. *Id.*

After bind-over, the State filed a Criminal Information on December 21, 2018.

App. 33-41. The charges in the Criminal Information mirrored those from the Second Amended Criminal Complaint. *Id*.

On July 15, 2019, Mr. Martinez filed a motion to consolidate Counts 10 through 14. *App. 45-52*. The State Opposed the motion. The District Court granted the motion, and the State filed a writ to this court. *State v. Fourth Judicial Dist. Court of Nev.*, 481 P.3d 848, 137 Nev. Adv. Rep. 4.(Nev. 2021). This Court denied the State's petition. *Id*.

On March 9, 2021, the State filed an Amended Criminal Information consolidating Counts 11 through 14 into a single count, with Count 15 becoming count 11. *App.* 78-85.

On May 20, 2021, Mr. Martinez filed a Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative Require a Jury Instruction Favorable to the Defense. App. 86-103. Mr. Martinez asked the District Court to dismiss or instruct on gross negligence for several counts, but the only conviction relevant for this appeal is Kidnapping in the 2nd degree with the Use of a Deadly Weapon. App. 90(the remaining counts at issue in the Motion being moot because of acquittals and dismissals prior to sentencing, and the jury convicting Mr. Martinez of the lesser-included-offense of Kidnapping in the 2nd Degree rather than Kidnapping in the 1st degree). The State filed its Opposition on June 1, 2021. App. 104-110. The District Court held a hearing on the motion on June 10, 2021. App. 188-127. The District Court initially denied the motion App. 128-132. At the close of evidence at trial, Mr. Martinez renewed the motion in part, asking for an instruction for gross negligence regarding law enforcement's failure to gather evidence, which the court denied. App. 531-533. On May 21, 2021, Mr. Martinez filed a Motion to Suppress Evidence. See,

App. 111-117. On June 1, 2021, the State filed a Reply to Motion to Suppress and Motion to Dismiss Count 3 of the Amended Criminal Information. *Id.* The District

20

19

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

Court ordered that evidence suppressed and dismissed Count 3 at the hearing for the motion on June 10, 2021. *App. 118-120*.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

The State filed a Second Amended Criminal Information on June 16, 2021. App. 111-117. The Counts were as follows: 1: Attempted Murder with the Use of a Deadly Weapon, a Category B Felony (Officer Pantelakis); Count 2: Attempted Murder with the Use of a Deadly Weapon, a Category B Felony (Officer Sanchez); Count 3: Battery with a Deadly Weapon, a Category B Felony; Count 4: Assault with a Deadly Weapon, a Category B Felony; Count 5: Assault with a Deadly Weapon, a Category B Felony; Count 6: Attempted Robbery with the Use of a Deadly Weapon, a Category B Felony; Count 7: Discharging a Firearm Within a Structure in a Populated Area, a Category B Felony; Count 8: Eluding a Police Officer in a Manner Posing Danger to Persons or Property, a Category B Felony; Count 9: Possession of a Firearm by a Person Previously Convicted of a Felony Offense, a Category B Felony; Count 10: Kidnapping, First Degree, with the use of a deadly weapon, a category A Felony, a Category B Felony. *Id.*

The trial commenced on July 6, 2021. *App. 158-272*. Before the reading of jury instructions to the jury, the State moved to dismiss Count 7: Discharging a Firearm Within a Structure in a Populated Area. *App. 534*. The District Court dismissed the charge. *Id*. After the parties concluded arguments, the jury convicted Mr. Martinez of Counts 1, 3, 4, 8, and the lesser-included offense of Second-Degree

Kidnapping with a Deadly Weapon in Count 10. The jury acquitted Mr. Martinez of Counts 2, 5, and 6. *App. 551-552*. Rather than proceed with the second part of the bifurcated trial, the State moved to dismiss Count 9 (Possession of a Firearm by a Person Previously Convicted of a Felony Offense). *Id*.

On July 19, 2021, Mr. Martinez filed a motion for new trial (regarding Counts 3 and 4). *App. 133-135*. In response, the State submitted a Motion and Order for Dismissal of Two Counts and Non-Opposition (regarding counts 3 and 4) which the District Court granted on October 6, 2021. *App. 140-143*.

On October 1, 2021, the District Court sentenced Mr. Martinez on Count 1
Attempted Murder with a Deadly Weapon, Count 8 Eluding a Police Officer in a
Manner Posing Danger to Persons or Property, and Count 10 Second-Degree
Kidnapping with a Deadly Weapon to eight-hundred-and-forty (840) months
imprisonment in the Nevada Department of Corrections with the minimum aggregate
term of imprisonment being three-hundred-and-thirty-six (336) months. *App. 136-139*. As of October 1, 2021, Mr. Martinez had served one-thousand-two-hundred-and-eight (1208) days. *Id*.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

On November 17, 2021, Anthony Martinez came to the Southern X-Posure strip club located in West Wendover, Nevada. *App. 283-284,301-302*. Rosendo Herrera, a security guard at Southern X-Posure, met Mr. Martinez at the front door

around 7 P.M. App. 283-284. Mr. Herrera testified that Mr. Martinez returned between 8:30 P.M. and 9:00 P.M. App. 285. Both Mr. Herrera and the manager of Southern X-Posure, Manuel Ruiz Barbosa, met Mr. Martinez near the front door. App. 285-286, 301-302. Mr. Herrera testified that Mr. Martinez had a gun. App. 285-286. Mr. Herrera testified that Mr. Martinez and Mr. Ruiz Barbosa went outside, came back, and stopped after coming in the front entrance. *Id.* Mr. Herrera and Mr. Barbosa testified that Mr. Martinez then pointed a gun at Mr. Herrera and Mr. Ruiz Barbosa. App. 285-286, 303-304. Id. Mr. Herrera testified that Mr. Ruiz Barbosa grabbed Mr. Martinez' gun, and then both Mr. Ruiz Barbosa and Mr. Martinez went back outside a second time. Id. Mr. Herrera testified that Mr. Ruiz Barbosa and Mr. Martinez did this a second and third time. Id. When Mr. Martinez came back inside, Mr. Herrera claimed that Mr. Martinez hit him in the back of the head with the gun. App. 287. At this point, Mr. Ruiz Barbosa left the room and did not see anything else that transpired inside the club. App. 303.

2

3

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

Mr. Herrera testified that Mr. Martinez forced him to walk inside the club. *Id*. Hr. Herrera then testified that Mr. Martinez hit him with the gun again, demanded money, and shot a bullet past his left ear. *Id*. Ruta Murphy, a dancer at the club, saw Mr. Martinez hit Mr. Herrera. *App. 298-299*. Ms. Murphy did not see anything else after that. *Id*. But she did hear a shotgun fire before leaving through the emergency exit. *App. 299*

Mr. Herrera said that he offered Mr. Martinez money, placing it on the club stage. *App. 287-288*. Mr. Herrera testified that lights in the club started flashing and an alarm sounded. *Id.* Mr. Herrera told Mr. Martinez, "[t]he cops are coming." *App. 288*. After that Mr. Martinez apparently forced Mr. Herrera to leave the club. *Id.* Before leaving the building, Mr. Martinez struck Mr. Herrera with the gun near the front desk. *Id.* Mr. Martinez forced Mr. Herrera to put his hands down. *App. 288-289*. Both men left the club side-by-side. *App. 289*. Mr. Herrera testified that Mr. Martinez still had his gun drawn when they left the club. *App. 293-294*.

But Mr. Herrera admitted that when he testified at a previous hearing, when his memory of the event was better, that Mr. Martinez already had his gun in his pocket when they left the club. *App. 294*. Also, Mr. Herrera testified that when they left the club, Mr. Martinez did not point a gun at him, Mr. Martinez did not fire the gun, Mr. Martinez did not yell at him, and Mr. Martinez did not physically grab him. *Id*. Mr. Herrera ran away, and Mr. Martinez did not chase him. *Id*.

Mr. Martinez left the club in his car. *App. 474*. Officers chased Mr. Martinez down the main boulevard of West Wendover. *App. 322-323*. During the chase, Mr. Martinez crashed his car into a guard rail in front of the Rainbow Casino. *App. 323*, 474. Mr. Martinez was dazed and in and out of consciousness. *App. 474*. He only remembers opening the car door, being told to keep his hands up, and trying to keep his "guts" inside his body. *App. 474-475*.

Officer Pantelakis testified that he was following Mr. Martinez and parked his vehicle about 30 yards behind the now crashed vehicle. *App. 324*. Officer Pantelakis got out of his vehicle, drew his weapon, and walked towards Mr. Martinez's vehicle. *Id.* Officer Pantelakis saw the driver side of the car open, watched Mr. Martinez exit the vehicle, and saw him making punching movements. *Id.* Less than a second later, Officer Pantelakis was firing at Mr. Martinez *App. 327*. Officer Pantelakis fired shots while walking backwards, fired more as he fell to the ground, and fired more after getting back up. *App. 328*. Officer Pantelakis had a body-worn camera and a dash-camera in his vehicle. *App. 326-327*. Neither device captured any moment of the pursuit or shooting. *Id.*

Officer Alejandro Sanchez was involved in the pursuit, and after the crash, he parked his car in the median to the left of Officer Pantelakis' parked car. *App. 378*, 384. Officer Sanchez saw Officer Pantelakis walk toward the crashed car. *Id.* Officer Sanchez heard gunshots. *App. 379*. Officer Sanchez claimed that he was being shot at. *App. 335*. Officer Sanchez pointed his service rifle at Mr. Martinez and fired. Id. Mr. Martinez had three bullet wounds: one to his abdomen, one that blew his calf off, and a wound to the other calf. *App 387-388*.

At trial, Officer Sanchez listened to an interview with a detective and himself that occurred the day after the shooting. *App. 379-383*. Officer Sanchez admitted that during that interview he never mentioned that Mr. Martinez' arm was extended

towards him, he never mentioned seeing Mr. Martinez' gun, and never mentioned Mr. Martinez firing his gun at him. *Id*. The jury acquitted Mr. Martinez of the attempted murder charge with Officer Sanchez as the listed victim.

Several law enforcement officers continued the investigation. Officer

Fernando Uribe, went to the Southern-Xposure to "preserve any type of evidence."

App 313. Officer Uribe met the club manager, Mr. Ruiz-Barbosa. Id. Officer Uribe testified that it was his duty to investigate any crimes that occurred at the Southern-XPosure. App 313-314. Officer Uribe was aware that the club had video surveillance.

App. 314. Officer Uribe was aware the Southern-Xposure had a surveillance system that covered most of the club. App 315. Officer Uribe knew based on his training and experience that the surveillance videos were important to his investigation, that they could get erased or lost, and that he needed to obtain and preserve them as soon as possible. Id. Officer Uribe did not obtain any of the surveillance footage from any camera. Id.

Detective Jonathon Moore and Detective Mike Marshowsky of the Elko Police department also participated in the investigation at Southern-XPosure. *App 395-398*. Detective Moore knew that collecting video surveillance there was important, especially since it was part of his training as a detective to do so. *App. 396*. Neither Detective Moore nor Detective Marshowsky asked any club employee about obtaining surveillance. *App 395-398*. Both detectives agreed that these types of clubs

often have surveillance systems and that it would be unusual for them not to. *Id*.

Neither Detective Moore nor Detective Marshowsky collected video surveillance. *Id*.

Mr. Ruiz Barbosa testified that the club did have a surveillance system with approximately twenty-four cameras. *App 304, 308*. Those cameras covered nearly every part of the club save for the private areas. *App 308*. Importantly, that on November 17, 2021, he had access to the system. *Id.* He also said that not a single law enforcement officer asked him for any surveillance footage that day. *Id.* Mr. Ruiz Barbosa did later provide two abridged videos and two photographs from the surveillance system from two different cameras. *App 304-305, 308*. Mr. Ruiz Barbosa erased the full videos from the two cameras that caught some video and all the footage from the other twenty-two cameras. *App. 305, 308*.

Not a single law enforcement officer ever approached Mr. Ruiz Barbosa with a request for the surveillance footage despite him interacting with several officers with several officers. *App. 308*. This despite at least three officers being on scene to collect evidence. This despite approximately thirteen officers from the West Wendover Police Department being part of the response and investigation. *App. 315*. This despite officers from the Elko Police Department, the Elko County Sherriff's Office, Nevada Highway Patrol, the Nevada Division of Investigation, and the Utah Highway Patrol responding and assisting the West Wendover Police Department. *App. 315-316*.

At sentencing, the District Court judge stated, "now I realize the defendant was not convicted of attempting to murder Sanchez, but the fact of the matter is that guy was there taking fire from Mr. Martinez." *App. 586*. Even though the District Court judge admitted that Officer Sanchez was not a victim and Sanchez did not submit a victim impact statement, the judge determined that the Court had already seen a victim impact statement based on the testimony at trial and how upsetting the experience was to Officer Sanchez. *Id*.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

The jury had insufficient evidence to convict Mr. Martinez of attempted murder and second-degree kidnapping. The District Court erred when it refused to instruct the jury that law enforcement's failure to gather evidence was grossly negligent. The District Court abused its discretion by usurping the jury's authority to find the existence of any fact the law makes essential for punishment.

ARGUMENT

A. Standard of Review

On appeal, this Court reviews a District Court's legal conclusions de novo while reviewing factual findings for clear error. *Somee v. State*, 124 Nev. 434, 441, 187 P.3d 152, 157-158(Nev. 2008). The Court can reverse a jury verdict when substantial evidence does not support the verdict. *Hernandez v. State*, 118 Nev. 513, 531, 50 P.3d 1100, 1112(Nev. 2002). The standard of reviewing the sufficiency of

the evidence is to determine if the jury, acting reasonably, could have been convinced by competent evidence of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. *Id.* This Court reviews the District Court's refusal to grant a jury instruction for abuse of discretion. *Brooks v. State*, 124 Nev. 203, 206, 180 P.3d 657, 658-659(Nev. 2008). Abuse of discretion is the standard to review a District Court's sentencing decision. *Goodson v. State*, 98 Nev. 493, 495-496, 654 P.2d 1006, 1007(Nev. 1982).

A. The Evidence was Insufficient to Convict Mr. Martinez.

Attempted murder requires the State to show an intent to kill, malice aforethought, and failure to complete the crime of murder. Nev. Rev. Stat. § 193.330, 200.010, 200.020, 200.030, *Jackson v. State*, 128 Nev. 598, 607, 291 P.3d 1274, 1280(Nev. 2012). Additionally, malice aforethought must be express rather than implied. *Keys v. State*, 104 Nev. 736, 740-742, 766 P.2d 270, 273-274(Nev. 1988)(ruling that one cannot attempt to kill another with implied malice because attempt, by nature, is a failure to accomplish what one intended to do; thus one cannot attempt to be negligent or attempt to have general malignant recklessness contemplated by the legal concept of implied malice). And, though, deliberation does not itself constitute an element of murder, its existence helps determine whether someone committed the crime with express malice. *State v. Milosovich*, 42 Nev. 263, 277, 175 P. 139, 142(Nev. 1918).

There was insufficient evidence to show that Mr. Martinez had the intent to kill Officer Pantelakis. The testimony was not supported by any video from Officer

Pantelakis' body-worn camera or dash-cam. Given how rapidly the events unfolded after the car crash, there is almost no way to tell who fired their gun first. Officer Pantelakis testified that within a second of seeing punching movements, he fired his gun. It is not possible to discern beyond a reasonable doubt if Mr. Martinez was shooting first or simply reacting to gun fire. That is coupled with the fact that Mr. Martinez was dazed, slipping in and out of consciousness, and holding his innards inside his body. Attempted murder makes if very specific that a person must have express malice before a conviction for attempted murder can stand. Also, deliberation helps assist the trier of fact to determine if express malice exists, and here, the combination of being discombobulated and rapidly unfolding events cannot support the idea that Mr. Martinez deliberated or possessed the state of mind necessary to show he acted with express malice.

Second-degree kidnapping requires the State to show that Mr. Martinez willfully, unlawfully, and with specific intent seized (*et seq.*) Mr. Herrera to either secretly imprison him, convey him outside the State of Nevada, or in any manner service or detain him against his will. Nev. Rev. Stat. § 200.310, 200.330, *Wright v. State*, 94 Nev. 415, 581 (Nev. 1978), *Mendoza v. State*, 122 Nev. 267, 130 P.3d 176(Nev. 2006). But movement or restraint incidental to an underlying offense where restraint or movement is inherent does not expose a defendant to criminal liability for both kidnapping and the underlying offense. *Mendoza v. State*, 122

Nev. 267, 274-275, 130 P.3d 176, 180(Nev. 2006)(articulating a number of underlying offenses: "i.e., robbery, extortion, battery resulting in substantial bodily harm or sexual assault"). That is, unless the movement or restraint substantially increases the risk of harm to the victim over and above that necessarily present in an associated offense or where the seizure, restraint, or movement of the victim substantially exceeds that required to complete the associated offense. *Id*.

There was no evidence, nor did the State argue, that Mr. Martinez specifically intended to seize Mr. Herrera to secretly imprison him or convey him outside of the State of Nevada. There also was insufficient evidence to show that Mr. Martinez detained Mr. Herrera in a manner that was not incidental to the offenses the jury convicted Mr. Martinez for. Those relevant for this inquiry being assault with a deadly weapon and battery with a deadly weapon.

If Mr. Herrera's claims are true, then Mr. Martinez assaulted and battered him at the front entrance, again in the club, and once more before leaving the club. Importantly, the State's charging documents show that the State's theory on the battery charge included striking Mr. Barbosa with the handgun one or more times. The plain language makes it clear that the State wanted to tie the initial assault and battery together and bind it factually to the other two times Mr. Martinez battered Mr. Herrera. The State clearly wanted to present the greatest number of opportunities to convict Mr. Martinez of battery with a deadly weapon.

The confines produced by the charging language make any forced movement or restraint during the initial assault through the final battery incidental to the actions necessary to convict on those two separate charges. The completed offense of battery, according to the charging language, only ended with the final strike upon Mr. Herrera near the front entrance. At that point, Mr. Martinez put away his gun, and both men left the club side-by-side. Mr. Herrera ran back into the club shortly after. Mr. Martinez did not point the gun at Mr. Herrera, did not fire the gun at him, did not yell at him, did not physically grab him, nor did he chase after Mr. Herrera as he ran away. This brief moment in time did not substantially increase the risk of harm to Mr. Herrera over and above that necessarily present in the battery and did not substantially exceed the movement beyond the actions of the completed offense of battery. If anything, it provided Mr. Herrera an opportunity to escape danger, which he did.

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

B. The District Court Errored By Denying the Defenses' Request to Have the Jury Instructed that Law Enforcement Was Grossly Negligent when It Failed to Gather Evidence.

Failing to gather exculpatory evidence may warrant sanctions against the State. *Randolph v. State*, 117 Nev. 970, 987, 36 P.3d 424, 435(Nev. 2001). Although law enforcement generally has no duty to collect all potential evidence, this rule is not absolute. *Daniels v. State*, 114 Nev. 261, 268, 956 P.2d 111, 115, (Nev. 1998).

In review, this Court must answer two questions to decide if a remedy is available to Mr. Martinez by law enforcement failing to gather the video evidence in his case; Mr. Martinez must show materiality of evidence and that law enforcement was grossly negligent in collecting that evidence. *Id.* Materiality exists if there is reasonable probability that, had the evidence been available to the defense, the result of the proceedings would have been different. *Id.*

Gross negligence is the failure to exercise even a slight degree of care. *Bearden v. Boulder City*, 89 Nev. 106, 109, 507 P.2d 1034, 1035-1036(Nev. 1979). It is an act or omission of a legal duty aggravated by a lack of even slight diligence. *Id.* It is the indifference to duty and indifference to the legal obligations that affect the legal rights of other people. *Id.* When gross negligence is involved, the defense is entitled to a presumption that the evidence would have been unfavorable to the State. *Daniels* 114 Nev at 268, 115. A defendant has the burden of proof to show both materiality and gross negligence by a preponderance of the evidence. *Id.*

The surveillance videos would have provided a panoramic and continuous view of Mr. Martinez' entry into the club, his actions while inside the club, and the actions of others inside the club. This is related and material to Mr. Martinez' argument that the evidence was insufficient to convict him of second-degree kidnapping. The footage could have shown more clearly if the movement of Mr. Herrera was incidental to the other charged acts, if the movement substantially

increased a risk of harm, or if the movement substantially exceeded the movement of the other related charges.

At least three police officers were tasked with investigating the Southern-XPosure. Officer Uribe was personally familiar with the surveillance system and Mr. Barbosa-Ruiz. Yet, he failed to take even the slightest initiative to gather the video footage from any of the twenty-four cameras in the club. Detectives Moore and Marshowsky were seasoned detectives with the training and experience to know that the Southern-Xposure was the kind of business that would have surveillance video. Yet, neither of them bothered to even check if they could collect surveillance footage. Mr. Barbosa Ruiz said that not a single officer approached him about the video, despite multiple law enforcement agencies assisting with investigation. The dereliction of duty here is more than ample and preponderating to show that law enforcement acted in a grossly negligent manner that affected Mr. Martinez' rights to a fair trial.

This court evaluates appellate claims concerning jury instructions using a harmless error standard of review. *Barnier v. State*, 119 Nev. 129, 132, 67 P.3d 320, 322(Nev. 2003). Considering how closely related the claims of insufficient evidence for second-degree kidnapping and failing to instruct on law enforcement's failure to gather surveillance footage are, this failure clearly prejudiced Mr. Martinez' ability to hold the State to its burden of proof; this error

contributed beyond a reasonable doubt to the jury's erroneous conviction for second-degree kidnapping.

C. The District Court Errored When It Treated Officer Sanchez as a Victim During Sentencing Despite the Jury Acquitting the Defendant of the Charge Related to That Witness.

A defendant's Sixth Amendment rights are violated when a judge imposes a sentence that is not solely based on facts reflected in a jury verdict or admitted by the defendant. *United States v. Booker*, 543 U.S. 220, 232, 125 S. Ct. 738, 749, (2005). That holds true because a defendant has the right to have the jury find the existence of any fact the law makes essential for punishment. *Id.* Specifically, the Constitution protects every defendant against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact and element necessary to convict a defendant of the charged crimes. *Id.* at 230, 748. These basic precepts, firmly rooted in the common law, form the foundation for properly interpreting modern criminal statutes and sentencing procedures. *Id.*

Sentencing is not a second trial. *Silks v. State*, 92 Nev. 91, 93-94, 545 P.2d 1159, 1161(Nev. 1976). Though the District Court can consider facts and circumstances not admissible at trial during sentencing, those facts and circumstances cannot be impalpable or highly suspect. *Goodson* 98 Nev at 495-496, 1007. In other words, the District Court cannot usurp the jury's findings of fact by substituting its own conclusions and inferences to determine a fact essential for punishment.

Otherwise, the District Court abuses its discretion. *Id*.(vacating the sentence when the District Court relied on unsubstantiated claims in the presentence investigation report).

The jury did not convict Mr. Martinez for attempting to murder Officer Sanchez. Despite the acquittal, the judge considered Officer Sanchez a victim and sentenced Mr. Martinez accordingly. The District Court abused its discretion by doing so, and Mr. Martinez suffered an improper sentence on his three convictions because the District Court usurped the jury's authority by substituting its own conclusions and inferences to determine a fact essential for punishment.

CONCLUSION

Mr. Martinez asks this court to vacate the jury's verdict and order a new trial. The jury had insufficient evidence to convict the defendant of attempted murder and second-degree kidnapping. Additionally, the District Court's refusal to instruct the jury on the presumption that the absence of the surveillance footage was unfavorable to the State's case merits a new trial. Mr. Martinez also asks this Court to vacate his sentence and reorder a sentencing on all three convictions since the District Court trespassed into the jury's exclusive right to form conclusions and inferences to determine a fact essential for punishment

///

20 | | ///

DATED this 24th day of March, 2022.

Matthew Pennell Elko County Public Defender 569 Court Street Elko, NV 89801

By: /s/ Matthew Pennell
Public Defender
Nevada Bar # 13298
775-738-2521
mpennell@elkocountynv.net

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

- 1. I hereby certify that this brief complies with the formatting requirements of NRAP 32(a)(4), the typeface requirements of NRAP 32(a)(5) and the type style requirements of NRAP 32(a)(6) because this brief has been prepared in a proportionally spaced typeface using Microsoft Word in size 14 Times New Roman font.
- 2. I further certify that this brief complies with the page or type-volume limitations of NRAP 32(a)(7) because, excluding the parts of the brief exempted by NRAP 32(a)(7)(C), it is either:
- [x] Proportionately spaced, has a typeface of 14 points or more, and contains 5,319 words; or
- [] Monospaced, has 10/5 or fewer characters per inch, and contains _____ words or ____ lines of text; or

[x] Does not exceed 30 pages.

3. Finally, I hereby certify that I have read this appellate brief, and to the best of my knowledge, information, and belief, it is not frivolous or interposed for any improper purpose. I further certify that this brief complies with all the applicable Nevada Rules of Appellate Procedure, in particular NRAP 28(e)(1), which requires every assertion in the brief regarding matters in the record to be supported by a reference to the page and volume number, if any, of the transcript or appendix where the matter relied on is found.

I understand that I may be subject to sanctions if the accompanying brief is not in conformity with the requirements of the Nevada Rules of Appellate Procedure.

DATED this 24th day of March, 2022.

Matthew Pennell Elko County Public Defender 569 Court Street Elko, NV 89801

By: /s/ Matthew Pennell
Public Defender
Nevada Bar # 13298
775-738-2521
mpennell@elkocountynv.net
775-738-2521

 $\underline{mpennell@elkocountynv.net}$

Ì

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

- (a) I hereby certify that this document was electronically filed with the Nevada Supreme Court on this 24th day of March 2022.
- (b) I further certify that on this 24th day of March 2022, electronic service of the foregoing document shall be made in accordance with the Master Service List to Aaron D. Ford, Nevada Attorney General; and Tyler J. Ingram, Elko County District Attorney.
- (c) I further certify that on this 24th day of March, 2022,

 I mailed, postage paid at Elko, Nevada, one (1) copy to ANTHONY

 CHRISTOPHER MARTINEZ, ELY STATE PRISON # 1249714, P.O. Box 1989,

 ELY, NV 89301.

DATED this 24th day of March, 2022.

SIGNED: /s/ Matthew Pennell

Employee of the Elko County Public Defender