## IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

ZION WOOD OBI WAN TRUST AND SHAWN WRIGHT AS TRUSTEE OF THE ZION WOOD OBI WAN TRUST

Appellant

VS.

MMAWC, LLC d/b/a WORLD SERIES OF FIGHTING a Nevada Limited Liability Company; MMAX INVESTMENT PARTNERS d/b/a PROFESSIONAL FIGHTERS LEAGUE; NANCY and BRUCE DEIFIK FAMILY PARTNERSHIP, LLP., a Colorado limited liability partnership Supreme Court Case No:

85051

District Court Case No:

A-17-764118-C

Respondents

## APPEAL

From the Eighth Judicial District Court
Department I
Clark County Nevada
HONORABLE NANCY ALF
APPELLANTS' APPENDIX VOL 3

Law Offices of Byron Thomas Byron Thomas, Esq. Bar no: 8906

The state of the s	Filing Date	Page Numbers	Volume
Amended Complaint	6/3/2019	AA453-473	III
Amended Notice of Entry of Order Re: MMAWC, LLC's Motion to Dismiss And To Compel Arbitration	3/14/2018	AA207 – AA210	I
Clerk's Certificate and Judgment	10/7/2019	AA496-507	IV
Commissioner's Decision on Request for Exemption	6/6/2019	AA474-475	III
Complaint	11/3/2017	AA002 - AA023	I
Defendant Carlos Silva's Answer to Complaint	3/15/2019	AA425-450	III
Defendant MMAX Investment Partners Inc.'s Answer to Complaint	3/11/2019	AA396- A424	

Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law and Order Granting Motion to Lift Default of Keith Redmond and to Quash Purported Service of Process and for Attorney Fees	01/16/2019	AA358-368	III
Joint Motion for Attorney Fees Per 38.243	7/1/2022	A-639-680	V
Joint Motion to Reopen This Matter and to Confirm Arbitration Awards in Favor of Defendants and for Judgment Thereon	4/4/2022	AA515-580	IV
Joint Reply in Support of Defendants' Joint Motion to Reopen This Matter and to Confirm Arbitration Awards in Favor of Defendants and for Judgment Thereon (Publicly Filed Version)	5/6/2022	AA587-596	IV
Joint Reply in Support of Motion for Attorney Fees	7/29/2022	AA707-714	V
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Motion to Dismiss And To Compel Arbitration	1/8/2018	AA024 - AA115	I

Motion to Dismiss And To Compel Arbitration By Defendants Bruce Deifik and Nancy And Bruce Deifik Family Partnership, LLLP	3/23/2018	AA211 – AA225 AA- 226 - AA337	I & II
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Notice of Appeal By Defendants MMAWC, LLC, Bruce Deifik and Nancy And Bruce Deifik Family Partnership, LLLP	4/11/2018	AA338 – AA339	II
Notice of Entry of Order and Judgment Granting MMAWC and MMAX's Joint Motion for Attorney Fees Pursuant to NRS 38.243	8/17/2022	AA720- AA727	V
Notice of Entry of Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law and Order Granting Motion to Lift Default of Keith Redmond and to Quash Purported Service of Process and for Attorney Fees	01/16/2019	AA369-381	III
Notice of Entry of Order  (1) Granting in Part and Denying in part Defendant Carlos Silva's Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Nevada Rule of Civil Procedure 12(B)(5); and	11/19/2018	AA348-352	III

(2) Granting in Part and Denying in Part Plaintiffs' Countermotion for Leave			
Notice of Entry of Order	11/19/2018		
(1) Granting in Part and Denying in part Defendant MMAX Motion to Quash Service of Process and to Dismiss Pursuant NRCP 4(i); and		AA353-357	III
(2) Granting in Part and Denying in Part Countermotion to Enlarge Time for Service			
Notice of Entry of Order Granting MMAWC and MMAX's Joint Motion to Confirm Arbitration Awards	6/14/2022	AA634-638	V
Notice of Entry of Order and Judgment Awarding Defendant Keith Redmond his Reasonable Attorneys' Fees and Costs	2/4/2019	AA384-388	III
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Notice of Entry of Order Granting Defendants' Joint Motion to File Exhibit Attached to Joint Reply in Support of Defendants' Joint Motion to Reopen This Matter and Confirm Arbitration Awards in Favor of Defendants and For	6/9/2022	AA616-626	IV

A TOTAL TOTA			
Judgment Thereon Under Seal			
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Notice of Entry of Order Granting	2/11/2019	AA391-95	
in Part and Denying in Part			III
Defendant MMAX Investment			111
Partner's Motion to Dismiss			
Pursuant to Nevada Rule of Civil Procedure 12(B)(5)	!		
Duplicate Order after NOE			
Notice of Entry of Order	7/1/2019	AA480-485	IV
Stipulation and Order The			
Plaintiff's Pleading Filed on			
6/13/19 Captioned As "Amended			
Complaint" is Plaintiff's More			
Definite Statement as to its Claims Against Defendant Keith			ì
Redmond and the other			
Defendants do not Have to			
Respond			
Opposition to Defendant MMAWC,	2/2/2018	AA116 -	I
LLC d/b/a World Series of Fighting	2, 2, 20 , 0	AA1481	
Motion to Dismiss			
	9.111.11		
Opposition to Joint Motion for		AA701-706	V
Attorney Fees			
Opposition to Joint Motion to	4/28/2022	AA581-586	IV
Confirm Arbitration			
TO CONTRACT VIRIAL VIRI			-

Order	THE STATE OF THE S	11/19/2018	AA342-343	
(1)(	Granting in Part and Denying in part Defendant MMAX Motion to Quash Service of Process and to Dismiss Pursuant NRCP 4(i); and		and AA346- 347	III
(2)	Granting in Part and Denying in Part Countermotion to Enlarge Time for Service			
Order	The second distriction of the second distric	11/19/2018	WA A	WARRANCE LARVEY CONT. L.L.
(1)G	ranting in Part and Denying in part Defendant Carlos Silva's Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Nevada Rule of Civil Procedure 12(B)(5); and		AA344-345	III
(2)	Granting in Part and Denying in Part Plaintiffs' Countermotion for Leave to Amend			
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Order and Judgment Granting MMAWC and MMAX's Joint Motion for Attorney Fees Pursuant to NRS 38.243	8/16/2022	AA715-719	V
Order Dismissing Claims Against Keith Redmond Without Prejudice	8/27/2019	AA486-492	IV
Order Granting Defendants' Joint Motion to File Exhibit Attached to Joint Reply in Support of Defendants' Joint Motion to Reopen This Matter and Confirm Arbitration Awards in Favor of Defendants and For Judgment Thereon Under Seal	6/09/2022	AA610-615	IV
Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendant MMAX Investment Partner's Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Nevada Rule of Civil Procedure 12(B)(5)	2/8/2019	AA389-390	III
Order Granting MMAWC and MMAX's Joint Motion to Confirm Arbitration Awards	6/13/2022	AA627-633	V

Order on Motion to Quash Service of Process and to Dismiss Pursuant to Nevada Rule of Civil Procedure 4(i)	8/28/2018	AA340-341	III
Order Re: MMAWC, LLC's Motion To Dismiss And To Compel Arbitration	3/13/2018	AA205 – AA206	I
Order to Statistically Close Case	10/8/2019	AA508	IV
Reply In Support Of Motion to Dismiss And To Compel Arbitration	2/15/2015	AA149 – AA197	I
Stipulation and Order The Plaintiff's Pleading Filed on 6/13/19 Captioned As "Amended Complaint" is Plaintiff's More Definite Statement as to its Claims Against Defendant Keith Redmond and the other Defendants do not Have to Respond	7/1/2019	AA476-479	
Stipulation and Order to Extend the Deadlines to File Opposition and Reply to Defendants' Joint Motion for Attorney Fees	7/14/2022	AA681-685	V
Stipulation to Vacate Hearing on Keith Redmond's Motion for a More Definite Statement and to Allow Plaintiffs to File a More	5/17/2019	AA451-452	III

Definite Statement		acting the extraction consistency and the extraction of the extrac	and the second s
Summons	12/7/2017	AA001 AA002	I
Transcript of Hearing	02/21/2018	AA198 – AA204	I

CLERK OF THE COURT ORDD LAW OFFICES OF BYRON THOMAS 2 BYRON THOMAS Nevada Bar No. 8906 3275 S. Jones Bivd. Stc. 104 3 Las Vegas, Nevada 89146 Phone: 702 747-3103 4 Facsimile: (702) 543-4855 Attorneys for Plaintiffs 5 б EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 7 ZION WOOD OB! WAN TRUST and SHAWN 8 WRIGHT as trustee of ZION WOOD OBI WAN CASE NO.: A-17-764118-C TRUST; WSOF GLOBAL LLC, a Wyoming 9 DEPT No.: 27 limited liability company 10 Plaintiffs, ORDER ON MOTION TO 11 QUASH SERVICE OF PROCESS AND TO VS. DISMISS PURSUANT TO NEVADA 12 RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 4(i) MMAWC, LLC d/b/a WORLD SERIES OF FIGHTING a Nevada limited liability company; 13 MMAX INVESTMENT PARTNERS INC. d/b/a LEAGUE, FIGHTERS PROFESSIONAL 14 Hearing Date: May 23, 2018 corporation; BRUCE DEIFIK. Delaware Hearing Time: 10:00 a.m. individual; SILVA, individual; CARLOS ап 15 BRUCE DEIFIK FAMILY NANCY AND PARTNERSHIP LLLP, Colorado limited liability 16 limited partnership; KEITH REDMOND, an individual; DOES I through X, inclusive; and ROE 17 Corporations XX through XXX, inclusive, 18 19 Defendants. 20 This matter having come on for hearing on May 23, 2018 at 10:00 a.m., Byron E. Thomas, 21 Esq. appearing on behalf of Plaintiffs and Christian T. Spaulding, Esq. appearing on behalf of 22 Defendant Carlos Silva, the Court having reviewed the papers and pleadings on file, the argument of 23 Counsel, good cause appearing therefore, and for the reasons set forth by the Court on the record: 24 25 26 27 28

Page 1 of 2

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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant Carlos Silva's Motion to Quash Service of Ĭ Process and to Dismiss Pursuant to Nevada Rule of Civil Procedure 4(i) is hereby DENIED. 2 IT IS SO ORDERED. 3 Dated this June, 2018 4 5 6 7 8 Submitted by: 9 LAW OFFICES OF BYRON/THOMAS 10 11 Byron E. Thomas, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 8906 12 3275 S. Jones Blvd. Ste. 104 Las Vegas, Nevada 89146 Phone: (702) 749-761-4945 13 Attorney for Plaintiffs 14 Approved by: 15 DICKSON WRIGHT PLLC 16 17 Michael N. Feder 18 Nevada Bar No. 7332 Email: mfeder@dickinson-wright.com 19 Christian T. Spaulding Nevada Bar No. 14277 20 Email: cspaulding@dickinson-wright.com 8363 West Sunset Road, Suite 200 21 Las Vegas, Nevada 89113-2210 Tel: (702) 550-4400 22 Attorneys for Defendant Carlos Silva 23 24 25 26 27

28

DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

AF

Electronically Filed 11/19/2018 9:09 AM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT

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Attorneys for Defendants Carlos Silva and

MMAX Investment Partners, Inc. dba

Professional Fighters League

## DISTRICT COURT

## CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

11 12 13 ZION WOOD OBI WAN TRUST and SHAWN WRIGHT as trustee of ZION WOOD OBI WAN TRUST; WSOF GLOBAL, LLC, a Wyoming limited liability company

CASE NO: A-17-764118-C Dept. No.: 27

### Plaintiffs.

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MMAWC, LLC d/b/a WORLD SERIES OF FIGHTING, a Nevada limited liability company; MMAX INVESTMENT PARTNERS INC. dba PROFESSIONAL FIGHTERS LEAGUE, Delaware 8 corporation, BRUCE DEIFIK, an individual; CARLOS SILVA, an individual; NANCY BRUCE AND DEIFIK FAMILY PARTNERSHIP LLLP, Colorado limited liability partnership; KEITH REDMOND, an individual; DOES I through X, inclusive; and ROE Corporations XX through XXX, inclusive.

Defendants.

### ORDER:

- (1) GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT MMAX INVESTMENT PARTNERS, INC.'S MOTION TO QUASH SERVICE OF PROCESS AND TO DISMISS PURSUANT TO NRCP 4(i); and
- (2) GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFFS' COUNTERMOTION TO ENLARGE TIME FOR SERVICE

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Defendant MMAX Investment Partners, Inc.'s ("Defendant") Motion to Quash Service of Process and to Dismiss Pursuant to NRCP 4(i) (the "Motion") and Plaintiffs' Opposition and Countermotion to Enlarge Time for Service ("Countermotion") came before this Court on October

17, 2018 with Christian T. Spaulding appearing on behalf of Defendant and Byron E. Thomas appearing on behalf of Plaintiffs. The Court having considered Defendant's Motion and Plaintiffs' Countermotion; having heard argument of counsel; and good cause appearing, and for the reasons set forth on the record HEREBY ORDERS:

- Defendant's Motion to Quash is GRANTED.
- 2. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is DENIED without prejudice.
- Defendant's request for attorneys' fees is DENIED.
- 4. Plaintiffs' Countermotion is granted in that Plaintiffs have until November 7, 2018 to reserve Defendant.\_

DATED this \_\_\_\_\_\_ day of November 2018.

District Court Judge

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Submitted by:

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Michael N. Feder Nevada Bar No. 7332

Christian T. Spaulding Nevada Bar No. 14277

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Attorneys for Defendants Carlos Silva and

MMAX Investment Partners, Inc. dba 23

Professional Fighters League

Approved as to Form and Content:

Byron E. Thomas 3275 S. Jones Blvd., Ste. 104 Las Vegas, NV 89146 Byronthomaslaw@gmail.com Attorney for Plaintiffs

**Electronically Filed** 11/19/2018 9:04 AM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT

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### ORDR DICKINSON WRIGHT PLLC

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Attorneys for Defendants Carlos Silva and

MMAX Investment Partners, Inc. dba

Professional Fighters League

DISTRICT COURT

CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

ZION WOOD OBI WAN TRUST and SHAWN WRIGHT as trustee of ZION WOOD OBI WAN TRUST; GLOBAL, LLC, a Wyoming limited liability |

WSOF

company

Plaintiffs.

VŞ.

MMAWC, LLC d/b/a WORLD SERIES OF FIGHTING, a Nevada limited liability company; MMAX INVESTMENT **PARTNERS** INC. dba PROFESSIONAL **FIGHTERS** LEAGUE. Delaware corporation, BRUCE DEIFIK, an individual: CARLOS SILVA, an individual; NANCY ANDBRUCE DEIFIK FAMILY PARTNERSHIP LLLP, Colorado limited liability partnership; KEITH REDMOND, an individual; DOES I through X, inclusive; and ROE Corporations XX through XXX, inclusive.

Defendants.

CASE NO: A-17-764118-C Dept. No.: 27

ORDER:

(1) GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT CARLOS

SILVA'S MOTION TO DISMISS PURSUANT TO NEVADA RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 12(B)(5); AND

(2) GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFFS' COUNTERMOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND

Defendant Carlos Silva's ("Defendant") Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Nevada Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(5) (the "Motion") and Plaintiffs' Opposition and Countermotion for Leave to Amend ("Countermotion") came before this Court on October 17, 2018 with Christian T.

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7	Performance are dismissed with prejudic
	3. Plaintiffs' claims for (1)
8	Advantage; (2) Tortious Interference wi
9	prejudice with leave to amend.
10	4. Defendant's Motion is DE
11	5. Plaintiffs' Countermotion
12	(30) days after the Notice of Entry of this
13	rulings above.
	DATED this day of Nove
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20	Submitted by:
21	DICKINSON WRIGHT PLLC
22	Michael N. Feder
23	Nevada Bar No. 7332
24	Christian T. Spaulding Nevada Bar No. 14277
25	8363 West Sunset Road, Suite 200 Las Vegas, Nevada 89113-2210
26	Tel: (702) 550-4400
27	Fax: (702) 382-1661 Attorneys for Defendants Carlos Silva and
28	MMAX Investment Partners, Inc. dba Professional Fighters League

Spaulding appearing on behalf of Defendant and Byron E. Thomas appearing on behalf of Plaintiffs. The Court having considered Defendant's Motion and Plaintiffs' Countermotion; having heard argument of counsel; and good cause appearing, and for the reasons set forth on the record, HEREBY ORDERS:

- 1. Defendant's Motion is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART as follows:
- 2, Plaintiffs' claims for: (1) Breach of Contract - Settlement Agreement; (2) Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing; (3) Declaratory Relief; and (4) Specific dice.
- (1) Intentional Interference with Prospective Economic with Contract; and (3) Civil RICO are dismissed without
  - DENIED as to Plaintiffs' remaining claims.
- on is GRANTED only to the extent Plaintiffs have thirty this Order to file an amended complaint consistent with the

ovember 2018.

Approved as to Form and Content:

Byron E. Thomas 3275 S. Jones Blvd., Stc. 104 Las Vegas, NV 89146 Byronthomaslaw@gmail.com Attorney for Plaintiffs

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Professional Fighters League

## DISTRICT COURT

## CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

ZION WOOD OBI WAN TRUST and SHAWN WRIGHT as trustee of ZION WOOD IBO WAN TRUST: WSOF GLOBAL, LLC, a Wyoming limited liability company

Plaintiffs,

V5.

MMAWC, LLC d/b/a WORLD SERIES OF FIGHTING. a Nevada limited liability **MMAX** INVESTMENT company; PARTNERS INC. dba PROFESSIONAL Delaware FIGHTERS LEAGUE, а corporation, BRUCE DEIFIK, an individual; CARLOS SILVA, an individual; NANCY BRUCE DEIFIK FAMILY ANDPARTNERSHIP LLLP, Colorado limited liability partnership; KEITH REDMOND, an individual; DOES I through X, inclusive; and ROE Corporations XX through XXX, inclusive,

Defendants.

CASE NO: A-17-764118-C

Dept. No.: 27

### ORDER:

- (1) GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT MMAX INVESTMENT PARTNERS. INC.'S MOTION TO QUASH SERVICE OF PROCESS AND TO DISMISS PURSUANT TO NRCP 4(i); and
- (2) GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFFS' COUNTERMOTION TO ENLARGE TIME FOR SERVICE

Defendant MMAX Investment Partners, Inc.'s ("Defendant") Motion to Quash Service of Process and to Dismiss Pursuant to NRCP 4(i) (the "Motion") and Plaintiffs' Opposition and Countermotion to Enlarge Time for Service ("Countermotion") came before this Court on October

17, 2018 with Christian T. Spaulding appearing on behalf of Defendant and Byron E. Thomas				
appearing on behalf of Plaintiffs. The Court having considered Defendant's Motion and Plaintiffs'				
Countermotion; having heard argument of counsel; and good cause appearing, and for the reasons				
set forth on the record HEREBY ORDERS:				
1. Defendant's Motion to Quash is GRANTED.				
2. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is DENIED without prejudice.				
3. Defendant's request for attorneys' fees is DENIED.				
4. Plaintiffs' Countermotion is granted in that Plaintiffs have until November 7, 2018 to 1				
serve Defendant.				
serve Defendant.  DATED this day of November 2018.				
District Court Judge				
water court adage				

Submitted by:

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Professional Fighters League

Approved as to Form and Content:

4

Byron E. Thomas 3275 S. Jones Blvd., Ste. 104 Las Vegas, NV 89146 Byronthomaslaw@gmail.com Attorney for Plaintiffs

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# DICKINSON/WRIGHTING

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and (2) Granting in Part and Denying in Part Plaintiffs' Countermotion for Leave to Amend was entered by the Clerk of the Court on November 19, 2018, a copy of which is attached hereto.

DATED this 19th day of November, 2018.

## DICKINSON WRIGHT PLLC

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Attorneys for Defendants Carlos Silva and MMAX Investment Partners, Inc. dba Professional Fighters League

## DICKINSON/WRIGHTelic

8363 West Sunset Road, Suite 2003 Las Vetast, Nevada 89113-2210 I

## CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned, an employee of Dickinson Wright PLLC, hereby certifies that on the 19<sup>th</sup> day of November 2018, he caused a copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF ENTRY OF ORDER (1) GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT CARLOS SILVA'S MOTION TO DISMISS PURSUANT TO NEVADA RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 12(B)(5); AND (2) GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFFS' COUNTERMOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND to be transmitted by electronic service in accordance with Administrative Order 14.2, to all interested parties, through the Court's Odyssey E-File & Serve system addressed to:

Byron E. Thomas, Esq. 3275 S. Jones Blvd., Ste. 104 Las Vegas, NV 89146

<u>Byronthomasiaw@gmail.com</u>

Attorney for Plaintiffs

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mcouvillier@kclawnv.com
Attorneys for Defendants MMAWC, LLC,
Bruce Deifik and The Nancy And Bruce Deifik
Family Partnership LLLP

An employee of Dickinson Wright PLLC

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Attorneys for Defendants Carlos Silva and MMAX Investment Partners, Inc. dba

Professional Fighters League

DISTRICT COURT

CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

ZION WOOD OBI WAN TRUST and SHAWN WRIGHT as trustee of ZION WOOD OBI WAN TRUST: WSOF GLOBAL, LLC, a Wyoming limited liability company

Plaintiffs.

V3.

inclusive,

MMAWC, LLC d/b/a WORLD SERIES OF FIGHTING, a Nevada limited liability company: MMAX INVESTMENT PARTNERS INC. dba PROFESSIONAL FIGHTERS LEAGUE. a Delaware corporation, BRUCE DEIFIK, an individual; CARLOS SILVA, an individual; NANCY AND BRUCE DEIFIK FAMILY PARTNERSHIP LLLP, Colorado limited liability partnership; KEITH REDMOND, an individual; DOES I through X, inclusive; and ROE Corporations XX through XXX,

(1) GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT CARLOS SILVA'S MOTION TO DISMISS PURSUANT TO NEVADA RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 12(B)(5); AND

CASE NO: A-17-764118-C

Dept. No.: 27

ORDER:

(2) GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFFS' COUNTERMOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND

Defendants.

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Defendant Carlos Silva's ("Defendant") Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Nevada Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(5) (the "Motion") and Plaintiffs' Opposition and Countermotion for Leave to Amend ("Countermotion") came before this Court on October 17, 2018 with Christian T.

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Spaulding appearing on behalf of Defendant and Byron E. Thomas appearing on behalf of Plaintiffs. The Court having considered Defendant's Motion and Plaintiffs' Countermotion: having heard argument of counsel; and good cause appearing, and for the reasons set forth on the record, HEREBY ORDERS: 1. Defendant's Motion is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART as follows: 2.

- Plaintiffs' claims for: (1) Breach of Contract Settlement Agreement; (2) Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing; (3) Declaratory Relief; and (4) Specific Performance are dismissed with prejudice.
- 3. Plaintiffs' claims for (1) Intentional Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage; (2) Tortious Interference with Contract; and (3) Civil RICO are dismissed without prejudice with leave to amend.
  - 4. Defendant's Motion is DENIED as to Plaintiffs' remaining claims.
- Plaintiffs' Countermotion is GRANTED only to the extent Plaintiffs have thirty (30) days after the Notice of Entry of this Order to file an amended complaint consistent with the rulings above.

DATED this \_\_\_\_ day of November 2018.

Nacy L-A11+ rict Cover Judge

Submitted by:

DICKINSON WRIGHT P

22 Michael N. Feder

Nevada Bar No. 7332 23

Christian T. Spaulding Nevada Bar No. 14277

8363 West Sunset Road, Suite 200 Las Vegas, Nevada 89113-2210

Tel: (702) 550-4400 Fax: (702) 382-1661

Attorneys for Defendants Carlos Silva and MMAX Investment Partners, Inc. dba

Professional Fighters League

Approved as to Form and Content:

Byron E. Thomas 3275 S. Jones Blvd., Ste. 104 Las Vegas, NV 89146 Byronthomaslaw@gmail.com Attorney for Plaintiffs

1 NEOJ **DICKINSON WRIGHT PLLC** 2 Michael N. Feder Nevada Bar No. 7332 3 Email: mfeder@dickinson-wright.com Christian T. Spaulding 4 Nevada Bar No. 14277 Email: cspaulding@dickinson-wright.com 8363 West Sunset Road, Suite 200 Las Vegas, Nevada 89113-2210 6 Tel: (702) 550-4400 Fax: (844) 670-6009 7 Attorneys for Defendants Carlos Silva and MMAX Investment Partners, Inc. dba 8 Professional Fighters League 9 DISTRICT COURT 10 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 11 ZION WOOD OBI WAN TRUST and CASE NO: A-17-764118-C 12 SHAWN WRIGHT as trustee of ZION Dept. No.: 27 13 WOOD OBI WAN TRUST: WSOF GLOBAL, LLC, a Wyoming limited liability 14 company 15 Plaintiffs. 16 VS. PART 17 INVESTMENT MMAWC, LLC d/b/a WORLD SERIES OF 18 FIGHTING, a Nevada limited liability **MMAX** company: INVESTMENT 19 TO NRCP 4(i); and PARTNERS INC. dba PROFESSIONAL 20 FIGHTERS LEAGUE, а Delaware corporation, BRUCE DEIFIK, an individual; IN PART 21 CARLOS SILVA, an individual; NANCY AND BRUCE DEIFIK **FAMILY** 22 FOR SERVICE PARTNERSHIP LLLP, Colorado limited liability partnership; KEITH REDMOND, an 23 individual; DOES I through X, inclusive; and 24 ROE Corporations XX through XXX, inclusive. 25 Defendants. 26 27

Electronically Filed 11/19/2018 2:39 PM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT

NOTICE OF ENTRY OF ORDER: (1) GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN DEFENDANT MMAX PARTNERS, INC.'S MOTION TO QUASH SERVICE OF PROCESS AND TO DISMISS PURSUANT

(2) GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING PLAINTIFFS' COUNTERMOTION TO ENLARGE TIME

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that an Order: (1) Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendant MMAX Investment Partners, Inc.'s Motion to Quash Service of Process and to Dismiss

## DICKINSON/WRIGHTING

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Pursuant to NRCP 4(i); and (2) Granting in Part and Denying in Part Plaintiffs' Countermotion to Enlarge Time for Service was entered by the Clerk of the Court on November 19, 2018, a copy of which is attached hereto.

DATED this 19th day of November, 2018.

## DICKINSON WRIGHT PLLC

Michael N. Feder Nevada Bar No. 7332 Christian T. Spaulding Nevada Bar No. 14277 8363 West Sunset Road, Suite 200 Las Vegas, Nevada 89113-2210

Tel: (702) 550-4400 Fax: (844) 670-6009

Attorneys for Defendants Carlos Silva and MMAX Investment Partners, Inc. dba Professional Fighters League

## DICKINSON/WRIGHTING

## \$363 West Sunset Road, Suite 2003 Fast Veers, Neviral 89113-2210

## CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned, an employee of Dickinson Wright PLLC, hereby certifies that on the 19th day of November, 2018, he caused a copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF ENTRY OF ORDER (1) GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT MMAX INVESTMENT PARTNERS, INC.'S MOTION TO QUASH SERVICE OF PROCESS AND TO DISMISS PURSUANT TO NRCP 4(i); AND (2) GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFFS' COUNTERMOTION TO ENLARGE TIME FOR SERVICE to be transmitted by electronic service in accordance with Administrative Order 14.2, to all interested parties, through the Court's Odyssey E-File & Serve system addressed to:

Byron E. Thomas, Esq. 3275 S. Jones Blvd., Ste. 104 Las Vegas, NV 89146

Byronthomaslaw@gmail.com

Attorney for Plaintiffs

Maximiliano D. Couvillier III
KENNEDY & COUVILLIER, PLLC
3271 E. Warm Spring Rd.
Las Vegas, Nevada 89120
mcouvillier@kclawnv.com
Attorneys for Defendants MMAWC, LLC,
Bruce Deifik and The Nancy And Bruce Deifik
Family Partnership LLLP

An employee of Dickinson Wright PLLC

**Electronically Filed** 11/19/2018 9:09 AM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT

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ORDR DICKINSON WRIGHT PLLC

Michael N. Feder Nevada Bar No. 7332

Email: mfeder@dickinson-wright.com

Christian T. Spaulding Nevada Bar No. 14277

Email: cspaulding@dickinson-wright.com

8363 West Sunset Road, Suite 200 Las Vegas, Nevada 89113-2210

Tel: (702) 550-4400 6

Attorneys for Defendants Carlos Silva and MMAX Investment Partners, Inc. dba

Professional Fighters League

DISTRICT COURT

CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

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ZION WOOD OBI WAN TRUST and CASE NO: A-17-764118-C SHAWN WRIGHT as trustee of ZION WOOD OBI TRUST: WAN WSOF GLOBAL, LLC, a Wyoming limited liability

company

Dept. No.: 27

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DICKINSON WRIGHT FILE

1963 West Surset Road, Suite 200

89113-2210

Plaintiffs.

VS.

MMAWC, LLC d/b/a WORLD SERIES OF FIGHTING, a Nevada limited liability company; MMAX INVESTMENT PARTNERS INC. dba PROFESSIONAL FIGHTERS LEAGUE. Delaware corporation, BRUCE DEIFIK, an individual: CARLOS SILVA, an individual; NANCY AND BRUCE DEIFIK FAMILY PARTNERSHIP LLLP, Colorado limited liability partnership; KEITH REDMOND, an individual; DOES I through X, inclusive; and ROE Corporations XX through XXX, inclusive.

ORDER:

- (1) GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT MMAX INVESTMENT PARTNERS, INC.'S MOTION TO QUASH SERVICE OF PROCESS AND TO DISMISS PURSUANT TO NRCP 4(i); and
- (2) GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART **PLAINTIFFS** COUNTERMOTION TO ENLARGE TIME FOR SERVICE

Defendants.

Defendant MMAX Investment Partners, Inc.'s ("Defendant") Motion to Quash Service of Process and to Dismiss Pursuant to NRCP 4(i) (the "Motion") and Plaintiffs' Opposition and Countermotion to Enlarge Time for Service ("Countermotion") came before this Court on October

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	<b>l</b> }					
1	17, 2018 with Christian T. Spaulding appe	earing on behalf of Defendant and Byron E. Thomas				
	ll .	having considered Defendant's Motion and Plaintiffs'				
2	Countermotion; having heard argument of c	ounsel; and good cause appearing, and for the reasons				
3	set forth on the record HEREBY ORDERS:					
4	1. Defendant's Motion to Quash is GR.	ANTED.				
5	Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is DENIED without prejudice.					
6	3. Defendant's request for attorneys' fe	es is DENIED.				
7	-	in that Plaintiffs have until November 7, 2018 to re-				
8	serve Defendant.					
9	DATED this day of Novemb	er 2018.				
		Nancial AIL				
10		District Court Judge				
11		<b>₽</b>				
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13						
14	Submitted by:	Approved as to Form and Content:				
15	-	takita a				
16	DICKINSON WRIGHT PLLC					
17	Michael N. Feder	D E Tianuan				
18	Nevada Bar No. 7332	Byron E. Thomas 3275 S. Jones Blvd., Ste. 104				
19	Christian T. Spaulding Nevada Bar No. 14277	Las Vegas, NV 89146 Byronthomasiaw@gmail.com				
-	8363 West Sunset Road, Suite 200	Attorney for Plaintiffs				
20	Las Vegas, Nevada 89113-2210 Tel: (702) 550-4400					
21	Fax: (702) 382-1661					
22	Attorneys for Defendants Carlos Silva and MMAX Investment Partners, Inc. dba					
23	Professional Fighters League					
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1	FFCL KENNEDY & COUVELLED BLAC
2	KENNEDY & COUVILLIER, PLLC Maximiliano D. Couvillier III. Esq.
3	Nevada Bar No. 7661 3271 E. Warm Springs Rd.
4	Las Vegas, Nevada 89120 Ph. (702) 605-3440
5	Fax (702) 625-6367 meouvillier/v kclawny com
6	Attorneys for Defendant Keith Redmond
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8	DISTRIC
9	CLARK COU
10	ZION WOOD OBI WAN TRUST and SHAWN
11	WRIGHT as trustee of ZION WOOD OB! WAN TRUST; WSOF GLOBAL, LLC, a Wyoming
12	limited liability company,
13	Plaintiffs,
14	v.
15	MMAWC, LLC d/b/a WORLD SERIES OF FIGHTING a Nevada limited liability company;
16	MMAX INVESTMENT PARTNERS, INC. dba
17	PROFESSIONAL FIGHTERS LEAGUE, a Delaware corporation; BRUCE DEIFIK, an
18	individual; CARLOS SILVA, an individual; NANCY AND BRUCE DEIFIK FAMILY
19	PARTNERSHIP LLLP, a Colorado limited
20	liability partnership; KEITH REDMOND. an individual; DOES I through X, inclusive; and
21	ROE Corporations XX through XXX, inclusive,
22	Defendants.
23	Derendants.
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**Electronically Filed** 1/16/2019 1:17 PM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT

## CT COURT

## NTY, NEVADA

CASE NO.: A-17-764118-C DISTRICT COURT DEPT: 27

FINDINGS OF FACT & CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO LIFT DEFAULT OF KEITH REDMOND AND TO QUASH PURPORTED SERVICE OF PROCESS AND FOR ATTORNEYS' FEES

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The Court heard defendant Keith Redmond's ("Redmond") Motion To Lift Default Of Keith Redmond And To Quash Purported Service Of Process And For Attorneys' Fees ("Motion") on December 13, 2018. Maximiliano D. Couvillier III, Esq. appeared on behalf of Redmond. Byron Thomas, Esq. appeared on behalf of the Plaintiffs. Christian Spaulding, Esq. appeared on behalf of defendants MMAX Investment Partners, Inc. and Carlos Silva. The Court has considered the Motion, all related briefs and documents on file, and the argument of counsel.

For good cause appearing the Court GRANTS Redmond's Motion for the following reasons:

## FINDINGS OF FACT

- ı. Plaintiffs Zion Wood Obi Wan Trust, Shawn Wright as Trustee of Zion Wood Obi Wan Trust, and WSOF Global, LLC (collectively "Plaintiffs") filed their Complaint in the above captioned action on November 3, 2017.
- 2. On November 6, 2018, Plaintiffs filed an Application For Default of Keith Redmond ("Default Application").
- 3. Plaintiffs' Default Application was based on the sworn Affidavit of Service of Antonio Campos ("Campos") dated February 7, 2018 ("2/7/18 Affidavit"), which Plaintiffs also filed separately with the Court on November 6, 2018.
- 4. Plaintiffs' counsel, Byron Thomas, Esq. ("Attorney Thomas"), did not inquire with counsel for Redmond (and co-defendant MMAWC, LLC), Maximiliano D. Couvillier III, Esq. ("Attorney Couvillier"), prior to seeking to default Redmond or filing the Default Application, as required by Rule 3.5A of the Nevada Rules of Professional Responsibility ("NRPC").
- 5. Attorney Thomas also failed to inquire with counsel for the other co-defendants, MMAX Investment Partners, Inc. ("MMAX") and Carlos Silva (Michael Feder, Esq. and Christian Spaulding, Esq.) prior to seeking to default Redmond or filing the Default Application, as required by NRPC 3.5A.
  - 6. Attorney Thomas knew or reasonably should have known that Attorney Couvillier

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was Redmond's counsel at the time Plaintiffs sought to default Redmond and filed the Default Application,

- 7. The parties here have a long history of litigation among them and Plaintiffs and Attorney Thomas unquestionably knew of the relationship and representation between Attorney Couvillier and Redmond.
- Among other things, when the parties negotiated and jointly drafted the settlement documents that are precisely at issue in this action (e.g., the "Settlement Agreement", "The Fourth Amended MMAWC, LLC Operating Agreement," and "Amended Licensing Agreement"), it was Plaintiffs and Attorney Thomas on one side, and Redmond, Attorney Couvillier and attorney Christopher Childs, Esq. ("Attorney Childs") on the other. Furthermore, last year, on April 7, 2017, Redmond alongside Attorney Couvillier participated adverse to Attorney Thomas and his clients in a JAMS mediation regarding MMAWC, LLC.
- 9. Thomas knew that Attorney Childs also represented Redmond from time-to-time in matters regarding MMAWC, LLC. Attorney Thomas, however, did not inquire with Attorney Childs prior to seeking to default Redmond or filing the Default Application, as required by NRPC 3.5A.
- 10. Moreover, at the time Plaintiffs sought to default Redmond and filed the Default Application, Thomas reasonably should have also inquired with Michael Feder, Esq. and Christian Spaulding, Esq. as to whether they may be representing Redmond. Plaintiffs named Redmond arising from his role as an officer in MMAX, which should have reasonably caused Attorney Thomas to inquire with Messrs. Feder and Spaulding because Attorney Thomas knew that Messrs. Feder and Spaulding represented co-defendant Carlos Silva, the other individual which Plaintiffs also named as a defendant from his role as an officer in MMAX.
- 11. Attorney Thomas had a reasonable amount of time within which to comply with NRPC 3.5A before seeking to default Redmond and filing the Default Application.
- 12. in his 2/7/18 Affidavit, Campos swears under oath that he personally served Redmond with the Summons and Complaint at 6:00 p.m., on December 18, 2017, at Redmond's

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residence in Henderson, Nevada ("Henderson Residence").

- 13. Campos' testimony and his 2/7/18 Affidavit are false.
- 14. Campos did not personally serve Redmond with the Summons and Complaint on December 18, 2017, or at any other time.
- 15. Redmond was not in Las Vegas, Henderson or anywhere in Nevada on December 18, 2017, and had been outside of Nevada since November 15, 2017.
  - 16. Redmond was in Aurora, Colorado on December 18, 2017.
- 17. Redmond's Henderson Residence is located within a guard-gated community and the security guard entry and exit logs between December 14, 2017 and December 19, 2017, do not show that Campos went to Redmond's Henderson Residence during that time period.
- 18. The veracity of Campos' sworn testimony regarding service was previously questioned in this action by defendants Carlos Silva (see Carlos Silva's 4/20/18 Motion To Quash Service of Process) and MMAX (MMAX Investment Partners, Inc.'s 9/12/18 Motion To Quash Service of Process).
- 19. Not only did Attorney Thomas fail to comply with NRPC 3.5A, but he also ignored Attorney Couvillier's meet and confer efforts to try to resolve the matter without the Court's intervention and the parties having to expend resources and incur attorneys' fees.
- 20. On November 6, 2018, after receiving service of Plaintiffs' Default Application, Attorney Couvillier immediately contacted Attorney Thomas on Redmond's' behalf, advised Attorney Thomas of his obligations under NRPC 3.5A and requested Attorney Thomas to withdraw Plaintiffs' Default Application.
- 21. Attorney Thomas, however, did not respond to Attorney Couvillier's communications.
- 22. On November 6, 2018, the Court Clerk entered a default against Redmond pursuant to Plaintiffs' Default Application.
- 23. On November 7, 2018, Attorney Couvillier followed up with Attorney Thomas with a voice mail and email, explicitly raising the urgency of a response, requesting to confer

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about the circumstances, and cautioning Attorney Thomas about unreasonably multiplying the proceedings.

- 24. Attorney Thomas, however, did not respond to Attorney Couvillier's November 7, 2018, communications.
- 25. Attorney Thomas was unreasonable in failing to respond to Attorney Couvillier's communications.
- 26. On November 9, 2018, Redmond filed his Motion, which was scheduled for hearing on December 13, 2018.
- 27. On December 3, 2018, Attorney Thomas finally contacted Attorney Couvillier about the matter, but it was only to request an extension to file Plaintiffs' Opposition and continuance of the December 13, 2018, hearing. Attorney Thomas, however, did not articulate any tangible grounds to support such request and Redmond's Motion was heard on December 13, 2018.<sup>1</sup>
- 28. On December 3, 2018, Plaintiffs' filed an Opposition ("Opposition") to Redmond's Motion.
- 29. Plaintiffs' Opposition was unreasonable, obviously frivolous, unnecessary or unwarranted.
- 30. Among other things, Plaintiffs' unreasonably and frivolously defended Campos and his 2/7/18 Affidavit when Campos admitted his 2/7/18 Affidavit was not accurate, and Plaintiffs' were aware of other issues and concerns regarding Campos' service of process in this action.
  - 31. Plaintiffs' 12/3/18 Opposition also included a December 3, 2018 Affidavit from

On December 3, 2018, Attorney Thomas requested a continuance of the December 13, 2018, hearing, representing to Attorney Couvillier that he had an "Arbitration hearing that has to go," When Attorney Couvillier asked for more information about that purported "Arbitration hearing," Attorney Thomas then said the Arbitration hearing was actually on December 12, 2018, but then claimed he purportedly had a "calendar call" on December 13, 2018, though he did not identify the matter and department. In any event, Attorney Couvillier agreed to continue the hearing to December 19 or 20, 2018 but Attorney Thomas never responded, and the hearing proceeded on December 13, 2018.

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Campos ("12/3/18 Affidavit"), in which Campos not only admitted that his 2/7/18 Affidavit was false, but gave an unreasonable explanation.

32. Specifically, Campos' 12/3/18 Affidavit states, in relevant part:

When I served the Complaint and Summons there was no gate guard. In addition, the language that I used in my affidavit was also inaccurate [sic]. I served an adult of suitable age at Mr. Redmond's residence, which is allowed by law and constitutes service on Mr. Redmond. However, I did not write her name down. So, I said I had served Mr. Redmond because I believed that he had been served pursuant to the law....

- 33. Campos' 12/3/18 Affidavit is unreasonable, false and a further fraud on the Court.
- 34. There has been a guard gate at the entrance to the community where Redmond's Henderson Residence is located for at least the 10 years that Redmond has resided there.
- 35. Furthermore, no one was at Redmond's residence on December 18, 2017, at or around 6:00 p.m., and there were no documents left behind at Redmond's residence on December 18, 2017.
- 36. Plaintiffs' defense of Campos' veracity and continuance to stand by him and his inaccurate affirmations was unreasonable and frivolous.
- 37. Campos engaged in what the Nevada Supreme Court previously coined as "sewer service" in connection with his purported service of the Summons and Complaint upon Redmond<sup>2</sup>.
- 38. By their actions and inactions, Plaintiffs and their counsel, Attorney Thomas, unreasonably and vexatiously multiplied the proceedings.
- 39. Redmond has never been served with a Summons and copy of Plaintiffs Complaint.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> "Sewer service" is "the practice of accepting summonses and complaints for service, failing to serve them, then falsely swearing in court-filed affidavits that service had been made when it was not." Principal Investments v. Harrison, 132 Nev. Adv. Op. 2, 366 P.3d 688, 690-91, cert. denied sub nom. Principal Investments, Inc. v. Harrison, 137 S. Ct. 67, 196 L. Ed. 2d 34 (2016)(emphasis added).

40.	All factual issues asserted by Redmond are true and correct and not disputed	, (
are resolved in	favor of Redmond.	

- Service of the Summons and Complaint was not made upon a Redmond within 41. 120 days after the filing of the Complaint.
- To the extent that any of the foregoing Findings of Fact may be construed as Conclusions of Law, they will also be interpreted as Conclusions of Law.

## CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

NRPC 3.5A provides: 1.

> When a lawyer knows or reasonably should know the identity of a lawyer representing an opposing party, he or she should not take advantage of the lawyer by causing any default or dismissal to be entered without first inquiring about the opposing lawyer's intention to proceed.

Id.

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- Attorney Thomas knew or reasonably should have known the identity of the 2. lawyer representing Redmond and he did not comply with NRCP 3.5A.
  - NRCP 55(c) provides that a court may set aside default for good cause. 3.
- As set forth here, there is good cause to set aside the default entered against 4. Redmond on or about November 6, 2018, and such default is hereby set aside.
- The purported service of the Summons and Complaint upon Redmond on or about 5. December 18, 2017, is hereby quashed.
  - NRS 7.085 (1)(b) and (2) provide, in relevant part: б.
    - If a court finds that an attorney has:
    - (b) Unreasonably and vexatiously extended a civil action or proceeding before any court in this State, the court shall require the attorney personally to pay the additional costs, expenses and attorney's fees reasonably incurred because of such conduct.
    - The court shall liberally construe the provisions of this section in favor of awarding costs, expenses and attorney's fees in all appropriate situations. It is the intent of the Legislature that the

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court award costs, expenses and attorney's fees pursuant to this section and impose sanctions pursuant to Rule 11 of the Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure in all appropriate situations to punish for and deter frivolous or vexatious claims and defenses because such claims and defenses overburden limited judicial resources, hinder the timely resolution of meritorious claims and increase the costs of engaging in business and providing professional services to the public.

- EDCR 7.60(b) provides for similar sanctions to either counsel or parties:
  - (b) The court may, after notice and an opportunity to be heard, impose upon an attorney or a party any and all sanctions which may, under the facts of the case, be reasonable, including the imposition of fines, costs or attorney's fees when an attorney or a party without just cause:
  - (1) Presents to the court a motion or an opposition to a motion which is obviously frivolous, unnecessary or unwarranted.
  - (3) So, multiplies the proceedings in a case as to increase costs unreasonably and vexatiously....
- 8. The Court has inherent authority to administrate its own procedures and to manage its own affairs, which includes incidental powers that are reasonable and necessary for, among other things, the administration of justice and to protect the dignity and decency of its proceedings.<sup>3</sup>
- 9. Pursuant to the Court's inherent authority, the Court may, *inter alia*, issue appropriate sanctions, orders or awards to prevent injustice and to preserve the integrity of the judicial process.<sup>4</sup>
- 10. For his conduct stated herein, Antonio Campos is sanctioned \$1,000.00 in favor of, and payable to, Redmond.
- 11. Notice of entry of this Order shall be provided to the State of Nevada Private Investigators Licensing Board to apprise the Board of, *inter alia*, the sanctions imposed upon Campos.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> See e.g., Halverson v. Hardcastle, 123 Nev. 245, 261–62, 163 P.3d 428, 440–41 (2007). <sup>4</sup> Id.

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12.	Plaintiffs	are provided	a	reasonable	enlargement	of	time	to	effectuate	service
upon Redmon	ıd.									

- Redmond is entitled to all his reasonable attorneys' fees and costs related to the 13. filing and prosecution of his Motion together with his reasonable attorneys' fees and costs incurred in obtaining entry of this Order and subsequent order awarding Redmond specific sums of reasonable fees and costs. The attorneys' fees and costs awarded to Redmond are not as sanction against Attorney Thomas, but will be borne equally, jointly and severally, by Plaintiffs and Attorney Thomas.
- The Court further advises Attorney Thomas that if he is ever in a similar situation, 14. the Court will make a complaint to the State Bar of Nevada.
- To the extent that any of the foregoing Conclusions of Law may be construed as 15. Findings of Fact, they will also be interpreted as Findings of Fact.

#### <u>ORDER</u>

For the foregoing reasons and good cause appearing, it is Ordered that:

- Redmond's Motion is GRANTED; Ĭ.
- The Default entered against Redmond on or about November 6, 2018 is hereby ĬĬ. SET ASIDE
- The purported service of the Summons and Complaint upon Redmond on or about III. December 18, 2017, is hereby QUASHED;
- Antonio Campos shall pay to Redmond \$1,000.00 on or before March / IV. 2019;
- Plaintiffs have until Match /, 2019, to effectuate service of the Summons V. and Complaint upon Redmond; \* or seek additional time
- Redmond is entitled an award against Plaintiffs and Attorney Thomas, jointly and VI. severally, of his reasonable attorneys' fees and costs in connection with his Motion and obtaining an entry of this Order and subsequent order awarding Redmond specific sums of reasonable fees and costs; and

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VII.

Redmond shall file with the Court an affidavit or declaration of counsel in support of his reasonable attorneys' fees and costs by January 4, 2019. Any opposition or response must be filed by January 11, 2019. The Court will consider the matter on its January 22, 2019, IT IS SO ORDERED. Nanaj Alf

District Court Judge

Dated: 1919

Electronically Filed 1/16/2019 1:32 PM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT

#### DISTRICT COURT

#### CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

CASE NO.: A-17-764118-C DISTRICT COURT DEPT: 27

> NOTICE OF ENTRY OF FINDINGS OF FACT & CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO LIFT DEFAULT OF KEITH REDMOND AND TO QUASH PURPORTED SERVICE OF PROCESS AND FOR ATTORNEYS' FEES

Page 1 of 2

**AA369** 

Case Number: A-17-764118-C

KENNEDY & COUVILLIER, PLLC

www.kdawmy.com

Please take Notice that on January 16, 2019, the Court entered FINDINGS OF FACT &
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO LIFT DEFAULT
OF KEITH REDMOND AND TO QUASH PURPORTED SERVICE OF PROCESS AND
FOR ATTORNEYS' FEES. A copy is attached here as Exhibit 1.

Dated: January 16, 2019

Respectfully Submitted By,

#### KENNEDY & COUVILLIER, PLLC

Maximiliano D. Couvillier III

Maximiliano D. Couvillier III, Esq., Bar #7661

mcouvillier@kclawnv.com

Attorneys for Defendant Keith Redmond

#### CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that on <u>January 16, 2019</u>, I electronically filed the foregoing Notice with the Court's electronic filing and service system, which provides electronic service to the following registered users:

Byron Thomas, Esq. (Bar 8906) 3275 S. Jones Blvd., Ste. 104 Las Vegas, NV 89146 Byronthomaslaw@gmail.com Attorney for Plaintiffs

Michael Feder, Esq.
Christian Spaulding, Esq.
DICKINSON WRIGHT, PLLC
MFeder@dickinson-wright.com
CSpaulding@dickinson-wright.com
Attorneys for MMAX Investment Partners, Inc. and Carlos Silva

/s/ Maximiliano D. Couvillier III
An Employee of Kennedy & Couvillier, PLLC

Page 2 of 2

### **EXHIBIT 1**

**Electronically Filed** 1/16/2019 1:17 PM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT

DISTRICT COURT

#### CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

CASE NO.: A-17-764118-C DISTRICT COURT DEPT: 27

FINDINGS OF FACT & CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO LIFT DEFAULT OF KEITH REDMOND AND TO QUASH PURPORTED SERVICE OF PROCESS AND FOR ATTORNEYS' FEES

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The Court heard defendant Keith Redmond's ("Redmond") Motion To Lift Default Of Keith Redmond And To Quash Purported Service Of Process And For Attorneys' Fees ("Motion") on December 13, 2018. Maximiliano D. Couvillier III, Esq. appeared on behalf of Redmond. Byron Thomas, Esq. appeared on behalf of the Plaintiffs. Christian Spaulding, Esq. appeared on behalf of defendants MMAX Investment Partners, Inc. and Carlos Silva. The Court has considered the Motion, all related briefs and documents on file, and the argument of counsel.

For good cause appearing the Court GRANTS Redmond's Motion for the following reasons:

#### FINDINGS OF FACT

- 1. Plaintiffs Zion Wood Obi Wan Trust, Shawn Wright as Trustee of Zion Wood Obi Wan Trust, and WSOF Global, LLC (collectively "Plaintiffs") filed their Complaint in the above captioned action on November 3, 2017.
- On November 6, 2018, Plaintiffs filed an Application For Default of Keith Redmond ("Default Application").
- 3. Plaintiffs' Default Application was based on the sworn Affidavit of Service of Antonio Campos ("Campos") dated February 7, 2018 ("2/7/18 Affidavit"), which Plaintiffs also filed separately with the Court on November 6, 2018.
- 4. Plaintiffs' counsel, Byron Thomas, Esq. ("Attorney Thomas"), did not inquire with counsel for Redmond (and co-defendant MMAWC, LLC), Maximiliano D. Couvillier III, Esq. ("Attorney Couvillier"), prior to seeking to default Redmond or filing the Default Application, as required by Rule 3.5A of the Nevada Rules of Professional Responsibility ("NRPC").
- 5. Attorney Thomas also failed to inquire with counsel for the other co-defendants. MMAX Investment Partners, Inc. ("MMAX") and Carlos Silva (Michael Feder, Esq. and Christian Spaulding, Esq.) prior to seeking to default Redmond or filing the Default Application, as required by NRPC 3.5A.
  - 6. Attorney Thomas knew or reasonably should have known that Attorney Couvillier

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was Redmond's counsel at the time Plaintiffs sought to default Redmond and filed the Default Application.

- 7. The parties here have a long history of litigation among them and Plaintiffs and Attorney Thomas unquestionably knew of the relationship and representation between Attorney Couvillier and Redmond.
- 8. Among other things, when the parties negotiated and jointly drafted the settlement documents that are precisely at issue in this action (e.g., the "Settlement Agreement", "The Fourth Amended MMAWC, LLC Operating Agreement," and "Amended Licensing Agreement"), it was Plaintiffs and Attorney Thomas on one side, and Redmond, Attorney Couvillier and attorney Christopher Childs, Esq. ("Attorney Childs") on the other. Furthermore, last year, on April 7, 2017, Redmond alongside Attorney Couvillier participated adverse to Attorney Thomas and his clients in a JAMS mediation regarding MMAWC, LLC.
- 9. Thomas knew that Attorney Childs also represented Redmond from time-to-time in matters regarding MMAWC, LLC. Attorney Thomas, however, did not inquire with Attorney Childs prior to seeking to default Redmond or filing the Default Application, as required by NRPC 3.5A.
- 10, Moreover, at the time Plaintiffs sought to default Redmond and filed the Default Application, Thomas reasonably should have also inquired with Michael Feder, Esq. and Christian Spaulding, Esq. as to whether they may be representing Redmond. Plaintiffs named Redmond arising from his role as an officer in MMAX, which should have reasonably caused Attorney Thomas to inquire with Messrs. Feder and Spaulding because Attorney Thomas knew that Messrs. Feder and Spaulding represented co-defendant Carlos Silva, the other individual which Plaintiffs also named as a defendant from his role as an officer in MMAX.
- 11. Attorney Thomas had a reasonable amount of time within which to comply with NRPC 3.5A before seeking to default Redmond and filing the Default Application.
- 12. In his 2/7/18 Affidavit, Campos swears under oath that he personally served Redmond with the Summons and Complaint at 6:00 p.m., on December 18, 2017, at Redmond's

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residence in Henderson, Nevada ("Henderson Residence").

- 13. Campos' testimony and his 2/7/18 Affidavit are false.
- 14. Campos did not personally serve Redmond with the Summons and Complaint on December 18, 2017, or at any other time.
- 15. Redmond was not in Las Vegas, Henderson or anywhere in Nevada on December 18, 2017, and had been outside of Nevada since November 15, 2017.
  - 16. Redmond was in Aurora, Colorado on December 18, 2017.
- 17. Redmond's Henderson Residence is located within a guard-gated community and the security guard entry and exit logs between December 14, 2017 and December 19, 2017, do not show that Campos went to Redmond's Henderson Residence during that time period.
- The veracity of Campos' sworn testimony regarding service was previously 18. questioned in this action by defendants Carlos Silva (see Carlos Silva's 4/20/18 Motion To Quash Service of Process) and MMAX (MMAX Investment Partners, Inc.'s 9/12/18 Motion To Quash Service of Process).
- 19. Not only did Attorney Thomas fail to comply with NRPC 3.5A, but he also ignored Attorney Couvillier's meet and confer efforts to try to resolve the matter without the Court's intervention and the parties having to expend resources and incur attorneys' fees.
- 20. On November 6, 2018, after receiving service of Plaintiffs' Default Application, Attorney Couvillier immediately contacted Attorney Thomas on Redmond's' behalf, advised Attorney Thomas of his obligations under NRPC 3.5A and requested Attorney Thomas to withdraw Plaintiffs' Default Application.
- 21. Attorney Thomas, however, did not respond to Attorney Couvillier's communications.
- On November 6, 2018, the Court Clerk entered a default against Redmond 22. pursuant to Plaintiffs' Default Application.
- 23. On November 7, 2018, Attorney Couvillier followed up with Attorney Thomas with a voice mail and email, explicitly raising the urgency of a response, requesting to confer

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about the circumstances, and cautioning Attorney Thomas about unreasonably multiplying the proceedings.

- Attorney Thomas, however, did not respond to Attorney Couvillier's November 24. 7, 2018, communications.
- Attorney Thomas was unreasonable in failing to respond to Attorney Couvillier's 25. communications.
- On November 9, 2018, Redmond filed his Motion, which was scheduled for 26. hearing on December 13, 2018.
- On December 3, 2018, Attorney Thomas finally contacted Attorney Couvillier 27. about the matter, but it was only to request an extension to file Plaintiffs' Opposition and continuance of the December 13, 2018, hearing. Attorney Thomas, however, did not articulate any tangible grounds to support such request and Redmond's Motion was heard on December 13, 2018.<sup>1</sup>
- On December 3, 2018, Plaintiffs' filed an Opposition ("Opposition") to 28. Redmond's Motion.
- Plaintiffs' Opposition was unreasonable, obviously frivolous, unnecessary or 29. unwarranted.
- 30. Among other things, Plaintiffs' unreasonably and frivolously defended Campos and his 2/7/18 Affidavit when Campos admitted his 2/7/18 Affidavit was not accurate, and Plaintiffs' were aware of other issues and concerns regarding Campos' service of process in this action.
  - Plaintiffs' 12/3/18 Opposition also included a December 3, 2018 Affidavit from 31.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> On December 3, 2018, Attorney Thomas requested a continuance of the December 13, 2018, hearing, representing to Attorney Couvillier that he had an "Arbitration hearing that has to go." When Attorney Couvillier asked for more information about that purported "Arbitration hearing," Attorney Thomas then said the Arbitration hearing was actually on December 12, 2018, but then claimed he purportedly had a "calendar call" on December 13, 2018, though he did not identify the matter and department. In any event, Attorney Couvillier agreed to continue the hearing to December 19 or 20, 2018 but Attorney Thomas never responded, and the hearing proceeded on December 13, 2018.

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Campos ("12/3/18 Affidavit"), in which Campos not only admitted that his 2/7/18 Affidavit was false, but gave an unreasonable explanation.

32. Specifically, Campos' 12/3/18 Affidavit states, in relevant part:

When I served the Complaint and Summons there was no gate guard. In addition, the language that I used in my affidavit was also inaccurate [sic]. I served an adult of suitable age at Mr. Redmond's residence, which is allowed by law and constitutes service on Mr. Redmond. However, I did not write her name down. So, I said I had served Mr. Redmond because I believed that he had been served pursuant to the law....

- 33. Campos' 12/3/18 Affidavit is unreasonable, false and a further fraud on the Court.
- 34. There has been a guard gate at the entrance to the community where Redmond's Henderson Residence is located for at least the 10 years that Redmond has resided there.
- 35. Furthermore, no one was at Redmond's residence on December 18, 2017, at or around 6:00 p.m., and there were no documents left behind at Redmond's residence on December 18, 2017.
- 36. Plaintiffs' defense of Campos' veracity and continuance to stand by him and his inaccurate affirmations was unreasonable and frivolous.
- 37. Campos engaged in what the Nevada Supreme Court previously coined as "sewer service" in connection with his purported service of the Summons and Complaint upon Redmond<sup>2</sup>.
- 38. By their actions and inactions, Plaintiffs and their counsel, Attorney Thomas, unreasonably and vexatiously multiplied the proceedings.
- 39. Redmond has never been served with a Summons and copy of Plaintiffs Complaint.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> "Sewer service" is "the practice of accepting summonses and complaints for service, failing to serve them, then falsely swearing in court-filed affidavits that service had been made when it was not." Principal Investments v. Harrison, 132 Nev. Adv. Op. 2, 366 P.3d 688, 690-91, cert. denied sub nom. Principal Investments, Inc. v. Harrison, 137 S. Ct. 67, 196 L. Ed. 2d 34 (2016)(cmphasis added).

40.	All factual	l issues a	sserted by	Redmond	are true	and	correct	and not	t disputed,	or
are resolved in	favor of R	edmond								

- 41. Service of the Summons and Complaint was not made upon a Redmond within 120 days after the filing of the Complaint.
- 42. To the extent that any of the foregoing Findings of Fact may be construed as Conclusions of Law, they will also be interpreted as Conclusions of Law.

#### CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

I. NRPC 3.5A provides:

> When a lawyer knows or reasonably should know the identity of a lawyer representing an opposing party, he or she should not take advantage of the lawyer by causing any default or dismissal to be entered without first inquiring about the opposing lawyer's intention to proceed.

Id.

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- 2. Attorney Thomas knew or reasonably should have known the identity of the lawyer representing Redmond and he did not comply with NRCP 3.5A.
  - 3. NRCP 55(c) provides that a court may set aside default for good cause.
- 4. As set forth here, there is good cause to set aside the default entered against Redmond on or about November 6, 2018, and such default is hereby set aside.
- 5. The purported service of the Summons and Complaint upon Redmond on or about December 18, 2017, is hereby quashed.
  - б. NRS 7.085 (1)(b) and (2) provide, in relevant part:
    - 1. If a court finds that an attorney has:
    - (b) Unreasonably and vexatiously extended a civil action or proceeding before any court in this State, the court shall require the attorney personally to pay the additional costs, expenses and attorney's fees reasonably incurred because of such conduct.
    - The court shall liberally construe the provisions of this section in favor of awarding costs, expenses and attorney's fees in all appropriate situations. It is the intent of the Legislature that the

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court award costs, expenses and attorney's fees pursuant to this section and impose sanctions pursuant to Rule 11 of the Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure in all appropriate situations to punish for and deter frivolous or vexatious claims and defenses because such claims and defenses overburden limited judicial resources, hinder the timely resolution of meritorious claims and increase the costs of engaging in business and providing professional services to the public.

- 7. EDCR 7.60(b) provides for similar sanctions to either counsel or parties:
  - (b) The court may, after notice and an opportunity to be heard, impose upon an attorney or a party any and all sanctions which may, under the facts of the case, be reasonable, including the imposition of fines, costs or attorney's fees when an attorney or a party without just cause:
  - (1) Presents to the court a motion or an opposition to a motion which is obviously frivolous, unnecessary or unwarranted.
  - (3) So, multiplies the proceedings in a case as to increase costs unreasonably and vexatiously....
- 8. The Court has inherent authority to administrate its own procedures and to manage its own affairs, which includes incidental powers that are reasonable and necessary for, among other things, the administration of justice and to protect the dignity and decency of its proceedings.3
- 9. Pursuant to the Court's inherent authority, the Court may, inter alia, issue appropriate sanctions, orders or awards to prevent injustice and to preserve the integrity of the judicial process.4
- 10. For his conduct stated herein, Antonio Campos is sanctioned \$1,000.00 in favor of, and payable to, Redmond.
- Notice of entry of this Order shall be provided to the State of Nevada Private 11. Investigators Licensing Board to apprise the Board of, inter alia, the sanctions imposed upon Campos.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> See e.g., Halverson v. Hardcastle, 123 Nev. 245, 261-62, 163 P.3d 428, 440-41 (2007).

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	12.	Plaintiffs	are	provided	8	reasonable	enlargement	of	time	to	effectuate	service
upon R	edmone	<b>1</b> .										

- 13. Redmond is entitled to all his reasonable attorneys' fees and costs related to the filing and prosecution of his Motion together with his reasonable attorneys' fees and costs incurred in obtaining entry of this Order and subsequent order awarding Redmond specific sums of reasonable fees and costs. The attorneys' fees and costs awarded to Redmond are not as sanction against Attorney Thomas, but will be borne equally, jointly and severally, by Plaintiffs and Attorney Thomas.
- 14. The Court further advises Attorney Thomas that if he is ever in a similar situation, the Court will make a complaint to the State Bar of Nevada.
- 15. To the extent that any of the foregoing Conclusions of Law may be construed as Findings of Fact, they will also be interpreted as Findings of Fact.

#### ORDER

For the foregoing reasons and good cause appearing, it is Ordered that:

- I. Redmond's Motion is GRANTED;
- II. The Default entered against Redmond on or about November 6, 2018 is hereby SET ASIDE
- III. The purported service of the Summons and Complaint upon Redmond on or about December 18, 2017, is hereby QUASHED;
- Antonio Campos shall pay to Redmond \$1,000.00 on or before March / IV. 2019:
- Plaintiffs have until Maich / , 2019, to effectuate service of the Summons V. and Complaint upon Redmond; + or seek add Hunal time
- VΙ, Redmond is entitled an award against Plaintiffs and Attorney Thomas, jointly and severally, of his reasonable attorneys' fees and costs in connection with his Motion and obtaining an entry of this Order and subsequent order awarding Redmond specific sums of reasonable fees and costs; and

# KENNEDY & COUVILLIER, PLLC 3271 E. Warm Sayings 84. 🌲 Las Vegas, NV 89120 Ph. [702] 605-3440 . FAX: (702) 625-6367

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i	VII. Redmond shall file with the Court an affidavit or declaration of counsel in support					
2	of his reasonable attorneys' fees and costs by January 4, 2019. Any opposition or response					
3	must be filed by January 11, 2019. The Court will consider the matter on its January 22, 2019,					
4	Chambers calendar.					
5	IT IS SO ORDERED.					
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7	Managar Mc					
8	District Court Judge					
9	Dated: //9/19					
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12	Respectfully Submitted By,					
13	KENNEDY & COUVILLIER, PLLC					
i 4						
15	Mea Dan					
16	Maximiliano D. Couvillier III, Esq., Bar #7661 meouvillier a te tavny conf					
17	Attorneys for Defendant Keith Redmond					
18						
19	Approved As To Form And Content,					
20						
21	Byron Thomas, Esq. (Bar 8906)					
22	3275 S. Jones Blvd., Ste. 104					
23	Las Vegas, NV 89146  Byrouthomaslay (/gmail.com)					
24	Attorney for Plaintiffs					
25						
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Page 10 of 10

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KENNEDY & COUVILLIER, PLLC

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**Electronically Filed** 2/1/2019 2:48 PM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT

ORDR KENNEDY & COUVILLIER, PLLC Maximiliano D. Couvillier III, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 7661 3271 E. Warm Springs Rd. Las Vegas, Nevada 89120 Ph. (702) 605-3440 Fax (702) 625-6367

Attorneys for Defendant Keith Redmond

mcouvillier@kclawnv.com

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#### DISTRICT COURT

#### CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

ZION WOOD OBI WAN TRUST and SHAWN WRIGHT as trustee of ZION WOOD OBI WAN TRUST; WSOF GLOBAL, LLC, a Wyoming limited liability company,

Plaintiffs.

MMAWC, LLC d/b/a WORLD SERIES OF FIGHTING a Nevada limited liability company; MMAX INVESTMENT PARTNERS, INC. dba PROFESSIONAL FIGHTERS LEAGUE, a Delaware corporation; BRUCE DEIFIK, an individual; CARLOS SILVA, an individual; NANCY AND BRUCE DEIFIK FAMILY PARTNERSHIP LLLP, a Colorado limited liability partnership; KEITH REDMOND, an individual; DOES I through X, inclusive; and ROE Corporations XX through XXX, inclusive,

CASE NO.: A-17-764118-C DISTRICT COURT DEPT: 27

ORDER & JUDGMENT AWARDING DEFENDANT KEITH REDMOND HIS REASONABLE ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS

Defendants.

On January 16, 2019, the Court entered its FINDINGS OF FACT & CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO LIFT DEFAULT OF KEITH REDMOND AND TO QUASH PURPORTED SERVICE OF PROCESS AND FOR ATTORNEYS' FEES ("Order") in which it found, among other things, that defendant Keith Redmond ("Redmond") should be

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awarded his reasonable attorneys' fees and costs in connection with his Motion To Lift Default Of Keith Redmond And To Quash Purported Service Of Process And For Attorneys' Fees ("Motion") together with his reasonable attorneys' fees and costs incurred in obtaining entry of the Order and subsequent order awarding Redmond specific sums of reasonable fees and costs.

The Court restates the findings and conclusions set forth in its Order establishing a basis for awarding Redmond his reasonable attorneys' fees and costs.

After further reviewing, considering and evaluating: (a) the Court's record; (b) the DECLARATION OF MAXIMILIANO D. COUVILLIER III, ESQ. IN SUPPORT OF AWARD OF REASONABLE ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS and supporting Exhibits thereto; (c) the factors set forth in Brunzell v. Golden Gate Nat. Bank, 85 Nev. 345, 349, 455 P.2d 31, 33 (1969); (d) the Plaintiffs' response/opposition; and (e) for good cause appearing,

It is ORDERED that Plaintiffs and their counsel, Byron Thomas, Esq., shall, jointly and severally, pay to Redmond:

> Redmond's reasonable attorneys' fees in the sum of \$ 11,062.50; and (1)

Redmond's reasonable costs in the sum of \$ 190-90 **(2)** It is SO ORDERED.

Nancy AH District Court Judge

Dated: //28/19

Respectfully submitted by

KENNEDY & COUVILLIER, PLLC

/s/ Maximiliano D. Couvillier III

Maximiliano D. Couvillier III, Esq. (NSB 7661)

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Attorneys for Defendant Keith Redmond

Page 2 of 2

Electronically Filed 2/4/2019 8:22 AM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT

DISTRICT COURT

#### CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

CASE NO.: A-17-764118-C DISTRICT COURT DEPT: 27

NOTICE OF ENTRY OF ORDER & JUDGMENT AWARDING DEFENDANT KEITH REDMOND HIS REASONABLE ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS

Page 1 of 2

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Please take Notice that on February 1, 2019, the Court entered ORDER & JUDGMENT AWARDING DEFENDANT KEITH REDMOND HIS REASONABLE ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS. A copy is attached here as Exhibit 1.

Dated: February 4, 2019

Respectfully Submitted By,

#### KENNEDY & COUVILLIER, PLLC

Maximiliano D. Couvillier III Maximiliano D. Couvillier III, Esq., Bar #7661 mcouvillier@kclawnv.com Attorneys for Defendant Keith Redmond

#### CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that on February 4, 2019, I electronically filed the foregoing Notice with the Court's electronic filing and service system, which provides electronic service to the following registered users:

> Byron Thomas, Esq. (Bar 8906) 3275 S. Jones Blvd., Ste. 104 Las Vegas, NV 89146 Byronthomaslaw@gmail.com Attorney for Plaintiffs

Michael Feder, Esq. Christian Spaulding, Esq. DICKINSON WRIGHT, PLLC MFeder@dickinson-wright.com CSpaulding@dickinson-wright.com Attorneys for MMAX Investment Partners, Inc. and Carlos Silva

> /s/ Maximiliano D. Couvillier III An Employee of KENNEDY & COUVILLIER, PLLC

Page 2 of 2

## **EXHIBIT 1**

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V.

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ORDR KENNEDY & COUVILLIER, PLLC Maximiliano D. Couvillier III, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 7661 3271 E. Warm Springs Rd. Las Vegas, Nevada 89120 Ph. (702) 605-3440 Fax (702) 625-6367 mcouvillier@kclawnv.com

Attorneys for Defendant Keith Redmond

#### DISTRICT COURT

#### CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

ZION WOOD OB! WAN TRUST and SHAWN WRIGHT as trustee of ZION WOOD OBI WAN TRUST; WSOF GLOBAL, LLC, a Wyoming limited liability company,

Plaintiffs,

MMAWC, LLC d/b/a WORLD SERIES OF FIGHTING a Nevada limited liability company; MMAX INVESTMENT PARTNERS, INC. dba PROFESSIONAL FIGHTERS LEAGUE, a Delaware corporation; BRUCE DEIFIK, an individual; CARLOS SILVA, an individual; NANCY AND BRUCE DEIFIK FAMILY PARTNERSHIP LLLP, a Colorado limited liability partnership; KEITH REDMOND, an individual; DOES I through X, inclusive; and ROE Corporations XX through XXX, inclusive,

CASE NO.: A-17-764118-C DISTRICT COURT DEPT: 27

ORDER & JUDGMENT AWARDING DEFENDANT KEITH REDMOND HIS REASONABLE ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS

Defendants.

On January 16, 2019, the Court entered its FINDINGS OF FACT & CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO LIFT DEFAULT OF KEITH REDMOND AND TO QUASH PURPORTED SERVICE OF PROCESS AND FOR ATTORNEYS' FEES ("Order") in which it found, among other things, that defendant Keith Redmond ("Redmond") should be

Page 1 of 2

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awarded his reasonable attorneys' fees and costs in connection with his Motion To Lift Default Of Keith Redmond And To Quash Purported Service Of Process And For Attorneys' Fees ("Motion") together with his reasonable attorneys' fees and costs incurred in obtaining entry of the Order and subsequent order awarding Redmond specific sums of reasonable fees and costs.

The Court restates the findings and conclusions set forth in its Order establishing a basis for awarding Redmond his reasonable attorneys' fees and costs.

After further reviewing, considering and evaluating: (a) the Court's record; (b) the DECLARATION OF MAXIMILIANO D. COUVILLIER III, ESQ. IN SUPPORT OF AWARD OF REASONABLE ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS and supporting Exhibits thereto; (c) the factors set forth in Brunzell v. Golden Gate Nat. Bank, 85 Nev. 345, 349, 455 P.2d 31, 33 (1969); (d) the Plaintiffs' response/opposition; and (e) for good cause appearing,

It is ORDERED that Plaintiffs and their counsel, Byron Thomas, Esq., shall, jointly and severally, pay to Redmond:

- Redmond's reasonable attorneys' fees in the sum of \$\_\_//, 062.50; and (I)
- Redmond's reasonable costs in the sum of \$ 190.90 (2) It is SO ORDERED.

Nanan AH

District Court Judge

Dated: //23/19

Respectfully submitted by

KENNEDY & COUVILLIER, PLLC

<u>/s/ Maximiliano D. Couvillier III</u>

Maximiliano D. Couvillier III, Esq. (NSB 7661)

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Attorneys for Defendant Keith Redmond

Page 2 of 2

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2 Michael N. Feder Nevada Bar No. 7332 3

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6 Tel: (702) 550-4400

Attorneys for Defendants Carlos Silva and

MMAX Investment Partners, Inc. dba

Professional Fighters League

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8363 West Sunset Road, Suite 200 Las Vegas, Nevada 89113-2210

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DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

ZION WOOD OBI WAN TRUST and SHAWN WRIGHT as trustee of ZION WOOD OBI WAN TRUST: WSOF GLOBAL, LLC, a Wyoming limited liability company

Plaintiffs,

VS.

MMAWC, LLC d/b/a WORLD SERIES OF FIGHTING, a Nevada limited liability **MMAX** INVESTMENT company; PARTNERS INC. dba PROFESSIONAL **FIGHTERS** LEAGUE, a Delaware corporation, BRUCE DEIFIK, an individual; CARLOS SILVA, an individual; NANCY BRUCE DEIFIK ANDFAMILY PARTNERSHIP LLLP, Colorado limited liability partnership; KEITH REDMOND, an individual; DOES I through X, inclusive; and ROE Corporations XX through XXX, inclusive.

Defendants.

CASE NO: A-17-764118-C

Dept. No.: 27

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING **PART** DEFENDANT IN MMAX INVESTMENT PARTNER'S MOTION TO DISMISS PURSUANT TO NEVADA RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 12(B)(5)

Defendant MMAX Investment Partners Inc.'s ("Defendant") Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Nevada Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(5) (the "Motion") came before this Court on December 27, 2018 with Christian T. Spaulding appearing on behalf of Defendant and Byron E. Thomas

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appearing on behalf of Plaintiffs. The Court having considered Defendant's Motion and Plaintiffs' ì Opposition thereto; having heard argument of counsel; and good cause appearing, and for the 2 reasons set forth on the record, HEREBY ORDERS: 3 Ι. Defendant's Motion is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART as follows: 2. 4 Plaintiffs' claim for Civil RICO is dismissed with prejudice. 3. Defendant's Motion is DENIED as to Plaintiffs' remaining claims. 5 DATED this day of February, 2019. 6 Nancy L A() (-District Courf Judge 7 8 9 10 11 Submitted by: 12 DICKINSON WRIGHT PLLC 13 14 Michael N. Feder 15 Nevada Bar No. 7332 Christian T. Spaulding 16 Nevada Bar No. 14277 17 8363 West Sunset Road, Suite 200 Las Vegas, Nevada 89113-2210 18 Tel: (702) 550-4400 Fax: (702) 382-1661 19 Attorneys for Defendants Carlos Silva and MMAX Investment Partners, Inc. dba 20 Professional Fighters League

#### Approved as to Form and Content:

Byron E. Thomas 3275 S. Jones Blvd., Ste. 104 Las Vegas, NV 89146 Byronthomaslaw@gmail.com Attorney for Plaintiffs

Electronically Filed 2/11/2019 10:16 AM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT

#### NEOJ DICKINSON WRIGHT PLLC

2 Michael N. Feder Nevada Bar No. 7332

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Christian T. Spaulding Nevada Bar No. 14277

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8363 West Sunset Road, Suite 200 Las Vegas, Nevada 89113-2210

Tel: (702) 550-4400 Attorneys for Defendants Carlos Silva and MMAX Investment Partners, Inc. dba

Professional Fighters League

#### DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

ZION WOOD OBI WAN TRUST and SHAWN WRIGHT as trustee of ZION WOOD OBI WAN TRUST; WSOF GLOBAL, LLC, a Wyoming limited liability company

Plaintiffs.

VS.

MMAWC, LLC d/b/a WORLD SERIES OF a Nevada limited liability FIGHTING, MMAX INVESTMENT company; PARTNERS INC. dba PROFESSIONAL LEAGUE, FIGHTERS a Delaware corporation, BRUCE DEIFIK, an individual; CARLOS SILVA, an individual; NANCY AND BRUCE DEIFIK **FAMILY** PARTNERSHIP LLLP, Colorado limited liability partnership; KEITH REDMOND, an individual; DOES I through X, inclusive; and ROE Corporations XX through XXX, inclusive.

Defendants.

CASE NO: A-17-764118-C Dept. No.: 27

NOTICE OF ENTRY OF ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT MMAX INVESTMENT PARTNER'S MOTION TO DISMISS PURSUANT TO NEVADA RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 12(B)(5)

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on the 8th day of February 2019, the Order Granting In Part and Denying In Part Defendant MMAX Investment Partner's Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to

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#### DATED this 11th day of February 2019.

#### DICKINSON WRIGHT PLLC

#### /s/ Michael N. Feder

Michael N. Feder Nevada Bar No. 7332 Christian T. Spaulding Nevada Bar No. 14277 8363 West Sunset Road, Suite 200 Las Vegas, Nevada 89113-2210

Tel: (702) 550-4400 Fax: (702) 382-1661

Attorneys for Defendants Carlos Silva and MMAX Investment Partners, Inc. dba Professional Fighters League

# DICKINSON/WRIGHTHIC

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#### CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned, an employee of Dickinson Wright PLLC, hereby certifies that on the 11th day of February 2019, he caused a copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF ENTRY OF ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT MMAX INVESTMENT PARTNER'S MOTION TO DISMISS PURSUANT TO NEVADA RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 12(B)(5) to be transmitted by electronic service in accordance with Administrative Order 14.2, to all interested parties, through the Court's Odyssey E-File & Serve system addressed to:

Byron E. Thomas, Esq. 3275 S. Jones Blvd., Ste. 104 Las Vegas, NV 89146 byronthomaslaw@gmail.com Attorney for Plaintiffs

Maximiliano D. Couvillier III KENNEDY & COUVILLIER, PLLC 3271 E. Warm Spring Rd. Las Vegas, Nevada 89120 mcouvillier@kclawnv.com Attorneys for Defendants MMAWC, LLC, Bruce Deifik and The Nancy And Bruce Deifik Family Partnership LLLP

/s/ Max Erwin

An employee of Dickinson Wright PLLC

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#### ORDR DICKINSON WRIGHT PLLC

Michael N. Feder Nevada Bar No. 7332

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Attorneys for Defendants Carlos Silva and MMAX Investment Partners, Inc. dba

Professional Fighters League

#### DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

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DICKINSON/WRIGHTMLC

SJ63 West Sunset Road, Suite 200 Las Vegas, Nevada 89113-2210 ZION WOOD OBI WAN TRUST and SHAWN WRIGHT as trustee of ZION WOOD OBI WAN TRUST; WSOF GLOBAL, LLC, a Wyoming limited liability company

Plaintiffs,

VS.

MMAWC, LLC d/b/a WORLD SERIES OF FIGHTING. a Nevada limited liability MMAX INVESTMENT company; PARTNERS INC. dba PROFESSIONAL **FIGHTERS** LEAGUE, а Delaware corporation, BRUCE DEIFIK, an individual; CARLOS SILVA, an individual; NANCY BRUCE DEIFIK **FAMILY** ANDPARTNERSHIP LLLP, Colorado limited liability partnership; KEITH REDMOND, an individual; DOES I through X, inclusive; and ROE Corporations XX through XXX, inclusive,

Defendants.

CASE NO: A-17-764118-C

Dept. No.: 27

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT MMAX INVESTMENT PARTNER'S MOTION TO DISMISS PURSUANT TO NEVADA RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 12(B)(5)

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27 28 Defendant MMAX Investment Partners Inc.'s ("Defendant") Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Nevada Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(5) (the "Motion") came before this Court on December 27, 2018 with Christian T. Spaulding appearing on behalf of Defendant and Byron E. Thomas

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appearing on behalf of Plaintiffs. The Court having considered Defendant's Motion and Plaintiffs' Opposition thereto; having heard argument of counsel; and good cause appearing, and for the reasons set forth on the record, HEREBY ORDERS:

- Defendant's Motion is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART as follows:
- 2. Plaintiffs' claim for Civil RICO is dismissed with prejudice.
- 3. Defendant's Motion is DENIED as to Plaintiffs' remaining claims.

DATED this Q day of February, 2019.

Nucli L A() F District Court Judge



#### Submitted by:

#### DICKINSON WRIGHT PLLC

Michael N. Feder Nevada Bar No. 7332 Christian T. Spaulding Nevada Bar No. 14277 8363 West Sunset Road, Suite 200 Las Vegas, Nevada 89113-2210

Tel: (702) 550-4400 Fax: (702) 382-1661

Attorneys for Defendants Carlos Silva and MMAX Investment Partners, Inc. dba

Professional Fighters League

Approved as to Form and Content:

Byron E. Thomas 3275 S. Jones Blvd., Ste. 104 Las Vegas, NV 89146 Byronthomaslaw@gmail.com Attorney for Plaintiffs

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#### DICKINSON WRIGHT PLLC

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Attorneys for Defendants Carlos Silva and

MMAX Investment Partners, Inc. dba

Professional Fighters League

DISTRICT COURT
CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

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DICKINSON WRIGHTING

8363 West Sunset Road, Suite 200 Las Veras, Nevada 89113-2210

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ZION WOOD OBI WAN TRUST and SHAWN WRIGHT as trustee of ZION WOOD OBI WAN TRUST; WSOF GLOBAL, LLC, a Wyoming limited liability company

Plaintiffs,

VS.

MMAWC, LLC d/b/a WORLD SERIES OF FIGHTING, a Nevada limited liability company; MMAX INVESTMENT PARTNERS INC. dba PROFESSIONAL FIGHTERS LEAGUE. Delaware corporation, BRUCE DEIFIK, an individual; CARLOS SILVA, an individual; NANCY ANDBRUCE DEIFIK **FAMILY** PARTNERSHIP LLLP, Colorado limited liability partnership; KEITH REDMOND, an individual; DOES I through X, inclusive; and ROE Corporations XX through XXX. inclusive,

Defendants.

CASE NO: A-17-764118-C

Dept. No.: 27

DEFENDANT MMAX INVESTMENT PARTNERS, INC.'S ANSWER TO COMPLAINT

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Defendant MMAX Investment Partners, Inc. ("MMAX"), by and through its attorneys of record, the law firm of Dickinson Wright PLLC, hereby answers Plaintiffs Zion Wood Obi Wan Trust and Shawn Wright's ("Plaintiffs") Complaint as follows:

#### PARTIES1

As to Unnumbered Paragraph No. 1, MMAX lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to whether SHAWN WRIGHT, as trustee of ZION WOOD OBI WANT TRUST, is a Utah resident whose principal place of business is located in Clark County, Nevada, and therefore denies the same.

As to Unnumbered Paragraph No. 2, MMAX lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to whether ZION WOOD OBI WANT TRUST, is a trust organized under the State of Nevada, and therefore denies the same.

As to Unnumbered Paragraph No. 3, MMAX lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to whether WSOF GLOBAL LLC is a limited liability company organized pursuant to the laws of the state of Wyoming and conducting business in Clark County, Nevada, and therefore denies the same.

As to Unnumbered Paragraph No. 4, MMAX lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to whether MMAWC, LLC., is a limited liability company organized pursuant to the laws of the state of Nevada and conducting business in Clark County, Nevada, and therefore denies the same.

As to Unnumbered Paragraph No. 5, MMAX admits that it is a corporation organized pursuant to the laws of the state of Delaware and that it conducts business in Clark County, Nevada.

As to Unnumbered Paragraph No. 6, MMAX lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to whether BRUCE DEIFIK is an individual believed to reside in the State of Colorado and conducting business in Clark County, Nevada, and therefore denies the same.

As to Unnumbered Paragraph No. 7, MMAX lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to whether NANCY AND BRUCE DEIFIK FAMILY PARTNERSHIP LLLP, is

In the Complaint, the paragraphs pertaining to the Parties do not contain numbers. As such, each paragraph is addressed in order in this Answer and referred to as "Unnumbered Paragraph".

a limited liability company organized pursuant to the laws of the state of Colorado and conducting business in Clark County, Nevada, and therefore denies the same.

As to Unnumbered Paragraph No. 8, MMAX lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to whether CARLOS SILVA is an individual residing in the State of Maryland and conducting business in Clark County, Nevada, and therefore denies the same.

As to Unnumbered Paragraph No. 9, MMAX lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to whether KEITH REDMOND is an individual believed to reside in the state of Nevada and conducting business in Clark County, Nevada, and therefore denies the same.

#### GENERAL ALLEGATIONS

- 1. MMAX lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations, and therefore denies the allegations contained in paragraph No. 1.
- 2. MMAX lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations, and therefore denies the allegations contained in paragraph No. 2.
- 3. MMAX lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations, and therefore denies the allegations contained in paragraph No. 3.
- 4. MMAX lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations, and therefore denies the allegations contained in paragraph No. 4.
- 5. MMAX lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations, and therefore denies the allegations contained in paragraph No. 5. By way of further response, the written agreements referenced in paragraph No. 5 are documents of independent legal significance and MMAX denies any and all allegations inconsistent therewith.
- 6. MMAX lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations, and therefore denies the allegations contained in paragraph No. 6. By way of further response, the written agreements referenced in paragraph No. 6 are documents of independent legal significance and MMAX denies any and all allegations inconsistent therewith.
- 7. MMAX lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations, and therefore denies the allegations contained in paragraph No. 7. By way of

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further response, the record in that case contains documents of independent legal significance and MMAX denies any and all allegations inconsistent therewith.

- In response to the allegations of paragraph No. 8, the Settlement Agreement is a document of independent legal significance and MMAX denies any and all allegations inconsistent therewith.
- 9. In response to the allegations of paragraph No. 9, the Settlement Agreement is a document of independent legal significance and MMAX denies any and all allegations inconsistent therewith.
- 10. In response to the allegations of paragraph No. 10, the Settlement Agreement and any attachment thereto are documents of independent legal significance and MMAX denies any and all allegations inconsistent therewith.
- 11. In response to the allegations of paragraph No. 11, the Settlement Agreement is a document of independent legal significance and MMAX denies any and all allegations inconsistent therewith.
- 12. MMAX admits that it operates as the Professional Fighters League, or PFL. MMAX denies the remaining allegations in paragraph No. 12.
- 13. MMAX lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations, and therefore denies the allegations contained in paragraph No. 13.
- 14. In response to the allegations of paragraph No. 14, the press releases are documents of independent legal significance and MMAX denies any and all allegations inconsistent therewith.
- 15. The allegations contained in paragraph No. 15 are legal conclusions and therefore no response is required from MMAX. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations are denied. By way of further response, the Settlement Agreement is a document of independent legal significance and MMAX denies any and all allegations inconsistent therewith.
- 16. MMAX admits only that Silva and Sefo are employed with MMAX. MMAX denies the remaining allegations in paragraph No. 16.

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17.	The allegations contained in paragraph No. 17 are legal conclusions and therefore
no response	e is required from MMAX. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations
are denied.	

- In response to the allegations of paragraph No. 18, the press releases are documents 18. of independent legal significance and MMAX denies any and all allegations inconsistent therewith.
- MMAX lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth 19. of the allegations, and therefore denies the allegations contained in paragraph No. 19.
- Denied. By way of further response, MMAX lacks knowledge or information 20. sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations, and therefore denies the allegations contained in paragraph No. 20.
- Denied. By way of further response, the allegations contained in paragraph No. 21 21. are legal conclusions and therefore no response is required from MMAX. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations are denied.
- MMAX lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth 22. of the allegations, and therefore denies the allegations contained in paragraph No. 22.
- Denied. By way of further response, the Settlement Agreement is a document of 23. independent legal significance and MMAX denies any and all allegations inconsistent therewith.
- Denied. By way of further response, the allegations contained in paragraph No. 24 24. are legal conclusions and therefore no response is required from MMAX. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations are denied.
- In response to the allegations contained in paragraph No. 25, the Form D is a 25. document of independent legal significance and MMAX denies any and all allegations inconsistent therewith.
- In response to the allegations contained in paragraph No. 26, the Form D is a 26. document of independent legal significance and MMAX denies any and all allegations inconsistent therewith.
- MMAX lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth 27. of the allegations, and therefore denies the allegations contained in paragraph No. 27.

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- The allegations contained in paragraph No. 29 are legal conclusions and therefore 29. no response is required from MMAX. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations are denied. By way of further response, MMAX lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations, and therefore denies the allegations contained in paragraph No. 29.
- 30. Denied. By way of further response, the allegations contained in paragraph No. 30 are legal conclusions and therefore no response is required from MMAX. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations are denied. In addition, the documents referenced in paragraph No. 30 are documents of independent legal significance and MMAX denies any and all allegations inconsistent therewith.
- 31. Denied. By way of further response, the allegations contained in paragraph No. 31 are legal conclusions and therefore no response is required from MMAX. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations are denied.
- MMAX lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth 32. of the allegations, and therefore denies the allegations contained in paragraph No. 32.
- 33. MMAX lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations, and therefore denies the allegations contained in paragraph No. 33. By way of further response, the press statements are documents of independent legal significance and MMAX denies any and all allegations inconsistent therewith.
- MMAX lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth 34. of the allegations, and therefore denies the allegations contained in paragraph No. 34.
- 35. In response to the allegations of paragraph No. 35, the Settlement Agreement and Operating Agreement are documents of independent legal significance and MMAX denies any and all allegations inconsistent therewith.

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- 37. Denied. By way of further response, the allegations contained in paragraph No. 37 are legal conclusions and therefore no response is required from MMAX. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations are denied.
- 38. Denied. By way of further response, the allegations contained in paragraph No. 38 are legal conclusions and therefore no response is required from MMAX. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations are denied.
- 39. Denied. By way of further response, the allegations contained in paragraph No. 39 are legal conclusions and therefore no response is required from MMAX. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations are denied.
- 40. Denied. By way of further response, the allegations contained in paragraph No. 40 are legal conclusions and therefore no response is required from MMAX. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations are denied.

#### NYC EVENT

- 41. In response to the allegations of paragraph No. 41, MMAX only admits that an MMA event took place in New York City on December 31, 2016. As to the remaining allegations, they are legal conclusions and therefore no response is required from MMAX. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations are denied.
- 42. MMAX lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations, and therefore denies the allegations contained in paragraph No. 42. By way of further response, the New York State Department of Taxation and Finance form is a document of independent legal significance and MMAX denies any and all allegations inconsistent therewith.
- 43. MMAX lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations, and therefore denies the allegations contained in paragraph No. 43. By way of further response, the New York State Department of Taxation and Finance form is a document of independent legal significance and MMAX denies any and all allegations inconsistent therewith.

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- 45. MMAX lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations, and therefore denies the allegations contained in paragraph No. 45. By way of further response, the internal financial report is a document of independent legal significance and MMAX denies any and all allegations inconsistent therewith.
- 46. Denied. By way of further response, the remaining allegations are legal conclusions and therefore no response is required from MMAX. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations are denied.
- 47. MMAX lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations, and therefore denies the allegations contained in paragraph No. 47.

### LICENSING RIGHTS

- 48. MMAX lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations, and therefore denies the allegations contained in paragraph No. 48. By way of further response, the master license agreement is a document of independent legal significance and MMAX denies any and all allegations inconsistent therewith.
- 49. MMAX lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations, and therefore denies the allegations contained in paragraph No. 49. By way of further response, the master license agreement is a document of independent legal significance and MMAX denies any and all allegations inconsistent therewith.
- 50. MMAX lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations, and therefore denies the allegations contained in paragraph No. 50. By way of further response, the master license agreement and any assignment thereof are documents of independent legal significance and MMAX denies any and all allegations inconsistent therewith.
- 51. MMAX lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations, and therefore denies the allegations contained in paragraph No. 51.

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- 53. In response to the allegations of paragraph No. 53, the Settlement Agreement and the Master License Agreement are documents of independent legal significance and MMAX denies any and all allegations inconsistent therewith.
- In response to the allegations of paragraph No. 54, the Amended License Agreement is a document of independent legal significance and MMAX denies any and all allegations inconsistent therewith.
- 55. The allegations contained in paragraph No. 55 are legal conclusions and therefore no response is required from MMAX. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations are denied. By way of further response, the Amended License Agreement and the Settlement Agreement are documents of independent legal significance and MMAX denies any and all allegations inconsistent therewith.
- MMAX lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth 56. of the allegations, and therefore denies the allegations contained in paragraph No. 56.
- 57. MMAX lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations, and therefore denies the allegations contained in paragraph No. 57.
- 58. MMAX lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations, and therefore denies the allegations contained in paragraph No. 58.
- 59. MMAX lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations, and therefore denies the allegations contained in paragraph No. 59.
- MMAX lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations, and therefore denies the allegations contained in paragraph No. 60. By way of further response, the referenced "naked" license agreement is a document of independent legal significance and MMAX denies any and all allegations inconsistent therewith

- 62. The allegations contained in paragraph No. 62 are legal conclusions and therefore no response is required from MMAX. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations are denied.
- 63. In response to the allegations of paragraph No. 63, MMAX only admits that MMAX operates as the "Professional Fighters League." As to the remaining allegations, MMAX lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the remaining allegations, and therefore denies the remaining allegations contained in paragraph No. 63. By way of further response, the referenced email is a document of independent legal significance and MMAX denies any and all allegations inconsistent therewith
- 64. In response to the allegations of paragraph 64, the press releases and Settlement Agreement are documents of independent legal significance and MMAX denies any and all allegations inconsistent therewith.
- 65. MMAX lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations, and therefore denies the allegations contained in paragraph No. 65.
- 66. Denied. By way of further response, the remaining allegations are legal conclusions and therefore no response is required from MMAX. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations are denied.
- 67. MMAX lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations, and therefore denies the allegations contained in paragraph No. 67.
- 68. MMAX lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations, and therefore denies the allegations contained in paragraph No. 68.
- 69. The allegations contained in paragraph No. 69 are legal conclusions and therefore no response is required from MMAX. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations

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are denied. By way of further response, the Settlement Agreement is a document of independent legal significance and MMAX denies any and all allegations inconsistent therewith.

- 70. The allegations contained in paragraph No. 70 are legal conclusions and therefore no response is required from MMAX. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations are denied.
- 71. In response to the allegations of paragraph No. 71, the Amended License is a document of independent legal significance and MMAX denies any and all allegations inconsistent therewith.
- 72. The allegations contained in paragraph No. 72 are legal conclusions and therefore no response is required from MMAX. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations are denied. By way of further response, the Settlement Agreement and Amended License Agreement are documents of independent legal significance and MMAX denies any and all allegations inconsistent therewith.
- 73. In response to the allegations of paragraph No. 73, the email referenced is a document of independent legal significance and MMAX denies any and all allegations inconsistent therewith.
- 74. In response to the allegations of paragraph No. 74, the email referenced is a document of independent legal significance and MMAX denies any and all allegations inconsistent therewith. By way of further response, the allegations contained in paragraph No. 74 are legal conclusions and therefore no response is required from MMAX. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations are denied.
- 75. The allegations contained in paragraph No. 75 are legal conclusions and therefore no response is required from MMAX. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations are denied. By way of further response, the email referenced is a document of independent legal significance and MMAX denies any and all allegations inconsistent therewith.
- 76. MMAX lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations, and therefore denies the allegations contained in paragraph No. 76. By way of further response, the allegations contained in paragraph No. 76 are legal conclusions and therefore

no response is required from MMAX. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations are denied.

77. MMAX lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations related to Global's concerns, and therefore denies the allegations contained in paragraph No. 77. As to the remaining allegations, including that Global holds the licensing rights for "Professional Fighters League," these allegations are legal conclusions and therefore no response is required from MMAX. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations are denied.

### DEIFIK, SILVA AND ABDELAZIZ

- 78. MMAX admits the allegations contained in paragraph No. 78.
- 79. MMAX lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations, and therefore denies the allegations contained in paragraph No. 79.
- 80. MMAX lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations, and therefore denies the allegations contained in paragraph No. 80.
- 81. MMAX lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations, and therefore denies the allegations contained in paragraph No. 81.
- 82. MMAX lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations, and therefore denies the allegations contained in paragraph No. 82.
- 83. MMAX lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations, and therefore denies the allegations contained in paragraph No. 83.
- 84. MMAX lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations, and therefore denies the allegations contained in paragraph No. 84.
- 85. MMAX lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations, and therefore denies the allegations contained in paragraph No. 85.
- 86. MMAX lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations, and therefore denies the allegations contained in paragraph No. 86.

- 87. MMAX lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations about what Zion inferred or what was brought to Deifik's attention, and therefore denies those allegations contained in paragraph No. 87. All remaining allegations are denied.
- 88. MMAX lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations, and therefore denies the allegations contained in paragraph No. 88.
- 89. MMAX lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations, and therefore denies the allegations contained in paragraph No. 89. Moreover, the texts referenced in paragraph No. 89 are documents of independent legal significance and MMAX denies any and all allegations inconsistent therewith.
- 90. MMAX lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations, and therefore denies the allegations contained in paragraph No. 90. By way of further response, the alleged text messages referenced in paragraph No. 90 are documents of independent legal significance and MMAX denies any and all allegations inconsistent therewith.
- 91. MMAX lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations, and therefore denies the allegations contained in paragraph No. 91. By way of further response, the alleged text message referenced in paragraph No. 91 is a document of independent legal significance and MMAX denies any and all allegations inconsistent therewith.
- 92. MMAX lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations, and therefore denies the allegations contained in paragraph No. 92. By way of further response, the alleged text message referenced in paragraph No. 92 is a document of independent legal significance and MMAX denies any and all allegations inconsistent therewith.
- 93. MMAX lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations, and therefore denies the allegations contained in paragraph No. 93. By way of further response, the alleged text messages referenced in paragraph No. 93 are documents of independent legal significance and MMAX denies any and all allegations inconsistent therewith.
- 94. MMAX lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations, and therefore denies the allegations contained in paragraph No. 94.

	95.	MMAX lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth
of the	allegatio	ons, and therefore denies the allegations contained in paragraph No. 95.
	96	MMAY lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a helief as to the touth

- 96. MMAX lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations, and therefore denies the allegations contained in paragraph No. 96.
- 97. MMAX lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations, and therefore denies the allegations contained in paragraph No. 97.
- 98. MMAX lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations, and therefore denies the allegations contained in paragraph No. 98.
- 99. MMAX lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations, and therefore denies the allegations contained in paragraph No. 99.

### GLOBAL CHINA OPERATIONS

- 100. MMAX lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations, and therefore denies the allegations contained in paragraph No. 100.
- 101. MMAX lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations, and therefore denies the allegations contained in paragraph No. 101.
- 102. MMAX lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations, and therefore denies the allegations contained in paragraph No. 102.
- 103. MMAX lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations, and therefore denies the allegations contained in paragraph No. 103.
- 104. MMAX lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations, and therefore denies the allegations contained in paragraph No. 104.
- 105. Denied. By way of further response, the allegations contained in paragraph No. 105 are legal conclusions and therefore no response is required from MMAX. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations are denied.
- 106. Denied. By way of further response, the allegations contained in paragraph No. 106 are legal conclusions and therefore no response is required from MMAX. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations are denied.

107. Denied. By way of further response, the allegations contained in paragraph No. 107 are legal conclusions and therefore no response is required from MMAX. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations are denied.

### CLAIMS FOR RELIEF

### FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF

Breach of Contract - Settlement Agreement
(As against Defendants MMAWC, Deifik, DFP, PFL and Silva; hereinafter the "Settlement Defendants")

- 108. In response to the allegations of paragraph No. 108, MMAX realleges and incorporates the preceding paragraphs of this answer as if fully set forth herein.
- and therefore no response is required. To the extent a response is deemed required, MMAX lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations, and therefore denies the allegations contained in paragraph No. 109. By way of further response, the allegations contained in paragraph No. 109 are legal conclusions and therefore no response is required from MMAX. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations are denied.
- 110. The allegations contained in Plaintiffs' first claim are not asserted against MMAX and therefore no response is required. To the extent a response is deemed required, MMAX lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations, and therefore denies the allegations contained in paragraph No. 110. By way of further response, the allegations contained in paragraph No. 110 are legal conclusions and therefore no response is required from MMAX. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations are denied.
- 111. The allegations contained in Plaintiffs' first claim are not asserted against MMAX and therefore no response is required. To the extent a response is deemed required, MMAX lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations, and therefore denies the allegations contained in paragraph No. 111. By way of further response, the allegations contained in paragraph No. 111 are legal conclusions and therefore no response is required from MMAX. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations are denied.

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112. The allegations contained in Plaintiffs' first claim are not asserted against MMAX and therefore no response is required. To the extent a response is deemed required, MMAX lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations, and therefore denies the allegations contained in paragraph No. 112. By way of further response, the allegations contained in paragraph No. 112 are legal conclusions and therefore no response is required from MMAX. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations are denied.

- 113. The allegations contained in Plaintiffs' first claim are not asserted against MMAX and therefore no response is required. To the extent a response is deemed required, MMAX lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations, and therefore denies the allegations contained in paragraph No. 113. By way of further response, the allegations contained in paragraph No. 113 are legal conclusions and therefore no response is required from MMAX. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations are denied.
- 114. The allegations contained in Plaintiffs' first claim are not asserted against MMAX and therefore no response is required. To the extent a response is deemed required, MMAX lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations, and therefore denies the allegations contained in paragraph No. 114. By way of further response, the allegations contained in paragraph No. 114 are legal conclusions and therefore no response is required from MMAX. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations are denied.
- 115. The allegations contained in Plaintiffs' first claim are not asserted against MMAX and therefore no response is required. To the extent a response is deemed required, MMAX lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations, and therefore denies the allegations contained in paragraph No. 115. By way of further response, the allegations contained in paragraph No. 115 are legal conclusions and therefore no response is required from MMAX. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations are denied.

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### SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing (As against all Defendants)

- 116. In response to the allegations of paragraph No. 116, MMAX realleges and incorporates the preceding paragraphs of this answer as if fully set forth herein.
- 117. The allegations contained in paragraph No. 117 are legal conclusions and therefore no response is required from MMAX.
- 118. The allegations contained in paragraph No. 118 are legal conclusions and therefore no response is required from MMAX. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations are denied.
- 119. The allegations contained in paragraph No. 119 are legal conclusions and therefore no response is required from MMAX. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations are denied.
- 120. The allegations contained in paragraph No. 120 are legal conclusions and therefore no response is required from MMAX. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations are denied.
- 121. The allegations contained in paragraph No. 121 are legal conclusions and therefore no response is required from MMAX. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations are denied.

# THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF Declaratory Relief (As against all Defendants)

- 122. In response to the allegations of paragraph No. 122, MMAX realleges and incorporates the preceding paragraphs of this answer as if fully set forth herein.
- 123. The allegations contained in paragraph No. 123 are legal conclusions and therefore no response is required from MMAX. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations are denied.
- 124. The allegations contained in paragraph No. 124 are legal conclusions and therefore no response is required from MMAX. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations are denied.

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The allegations contained in paragraph No. 125 are legal conclusions and therefore 125. no response is required from MMAX. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations are denied.

- The allegations contained in paragraph No. 126 are legal conclusions and 126. therefore no response is required from MMAX. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations are denied.
- The allegations contained in paragraph No. 127 are legal conclusions and therefore 127. no response is required from MMAX. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations are denied.
- The allegations contained in paragraph No. 128 are legal conclusions and therefore 128. no response is required from MMAX. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations are denied.
- The allegations contained in paragraph No. 129 are legal conclusions and therefore 129. no response is required from MMAX. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations are denied.
- The allegations contained in paragraph No. 130 are legal conclusions and therefore 130. no response is required from MMAX. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations are denied.

### FOURTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF Intentional Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage (As against all Defendants)

- In response to the allegations of paragraph No. 131, MMAX realleges and 131. incorporates the preceding paragraphs of this answer as if fully set forth herein.
- The allegations contained in paragraph No. 132 are legal conclusions and therefore no response is required from MMAX. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations are denied.
- The allegations contained in paragraph No. 133 are legal conclusions and therefore 133. no response is required from MMAX. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations are denied.

134.	The allegations contained in paragraph No. 134 are legal conclusions and therefore
no response	is required from MMAX. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations
are denied	

- 135. The allegations contained in paragraph No. 135 are legal conclusions and therefore no response is required from MMAX. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations are denied.
- 136. The allegations contained in paragraph No. 136 are legal conclusions and therefore no response is required from MMAX. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations are denied.
- 137. The allegations contained in paragraph No. 137 are legal conclusions and therefore no response is required from MMAX. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations are denied.
- 138. The allegations contained in paragraph No. 138 are legal conclusions and therefore no response is required from MMAX. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations are denied.

## FIFTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF Tortious Interference with Contract (As against all Defendants)

- 139. In response to the allegations of paragraph No. 139, MMAX realleges and incorporates the preceding paragraphs of this answer as if fully set forth herein.
- 140. The allegations contained in paragraph No. 140 are legal conclusions and therefore no response is required from MMAX. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations are denied.
- 141. The allegations contained in paragraph No. 141 are legal conclusions and therefore no response is required from MMAX. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations are denied.
- 142. The allegations contained in paragraph No. 142 are legal conclusions and therefore no response is required from MMAX. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations are denied.

143. The allegations contained in paragraph No. 143 are legal conclusions and therefore no response is required from MMAX. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations are denied.

- 144. The allegations contained in paragraph No. 144 are legal conclusions and therefore no response is required from MMAX. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations are denied.
- 145. The allegations contained in paragraph No. 145 are legal conclusions and therefore no response is required from MMAX. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations are denied.
- 146. The allegations contained in paragraph No. 146 are legal conclusions and therefore no response is required from MMAX. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations are denied.

# SIXTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF Alter Ego Claim (As against MMAWC and Deifik Defendants)

- 147. In response to the allegations of paragraph No. 147, MMAX realleges and incorporates the preceding paragraphs of this answer as if fully set forth herein.
- 148. The allegations contained in Plaintiffs' sixth claim are not asserted against MMAX and therefore no response is required. To the extent a response is deemed required, MMAX lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations, and therefore denies the allegations contained in paragraph No. 148. By way of further response, the allegations contained in paragraph No. 148 are legal conclusions and therefore no response is required from MMAX. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations are denied.
- 149. The allegations contained in Plaintiffs' sixth claim are not asserted against MMAX and therefore no response is required. To the extent a response is deemed required, MMAX lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations, and therefore denies the allegations contained in paragraph No. 149. By way of further response, the allegations contained in paragraph No. 149 are legal conclusions and therefore no response is required from MMAX. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations are denied.

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150. The allegations contained in Plaintiffs' sixth claim are not asserted against MMAX and therefore no response is required. To the extent a response is deemed required, MMAX lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations, and therefore denies the allegations contained in paragraph No. 150. By way of further response, the allegations contained in paragraph No. 150 are legal conclusions and therefore no response is required from MMAX. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations are denied.

- The allegations contained in Plaintiffs' sixth claim are not asserted against MMAX 151. and therefore no response is required. To the extent a response is deemed required, MMAX lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations, and therefore denies the allegations contained in paragraph No. 151. By way of further response, the allegations contained in paragraph No. 151 are legal conclusions and therefore no response is required from MMAX. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations are denied.
- The allegations contained in Plaintiffs' sixth claim are not asserted against MMAX 152. and therefore no response is required. To the extent a response is deemed required, MMAX lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations, and therefore denies the allegations contained in paragraph No. 152. By way of further response, the allegations contained in paragraph No. 152 are legal conclusions and therefore no response is required from MMAX. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations are denied.
- 153. The allegations contained in Plaintiffs' sixth claim are not asserted against MMAX and therefore no response is required. To the extent a response is deemed required, MMAX lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations, and therefore denies the allegations contained in paragraph No. 153. By way of further response, the allegations contained in paragraph No. 153 are legal conclusions and therefore no response is required from MMAX. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations are denied.

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### SEVENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF Breach of Fiduciary Duty (As against Deifik, Silva and Redmond)

- 154. In response to the allegations of paragraph No. 154, MMAX realleges and incorporates the preceding paragraphs of this answer as if fully set forth herein.
- 155. The allegations contained in Plaintiffs' seventh claim are not asserted against MMAX and therefore no response is required. To the extent a response is deemed required, MMAX lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations, and therefore denies the allegations contained in paragraph No. 155. By way of further response, the allegations contained in paragraph No. 155 are legal conclusions and therefore no response is required from MMAX. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations are denied.
- 156. The allegations contained in Plaintiffs' seventh claim are not asserted against MMAX and therefore no response is required. To the extent a response is deemed required, MMAX lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations, and therefore denies the allegations contained in paragraph No. 156. By way of further response, the allegations contained in paragraph No. 156 are legal conclusions and therefore no response is required from MMAX. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations are denied.
- 157. The allegations contained in Plaintiffs' seventh claim are not asserted against MMAX and therefore no response is required. To the extent a response is deemed required, MMAX lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations, and therefore denies the allegations contained in paragraph No. 157. By way of further response, the allegations contained in paragraph No. 157 are legal conclusions and therefore no response is required from MMAX. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations are denied.
- 158. The allegations contained in Plaintiffs' seventh claim are not asserted against MMAX and therefore no response is required. To the extent a response is deemed required, MMAX lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations, and therefore denies the allegations contained in paragraph No. 158. By way of further response, the allegations contained in paragraph No. 158 are legal conclusions and therefore no response is required from MMAX. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations are denied.

159. The allegations contained in Plaintiffs' seventh claim are not asserted against MMAX and therefore no response is required. To the extent a response is deemed required, MMAX lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations, and therefore denies the allegations contained in paragraph No. 159. By way of further response, the allegations contained in paragraph No. 159 are legal conclusions and therefore no response is required from MMAX. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations are denied.

### EIGHTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF Civil RICO (As against all Defendants)

- 160. In response to the allegations of paragraph No. 160, MMAX realleges and incorporates the preceding paragraphs of this answer as if fully set forth herein.
- 161. Plaintiffs' eighth claim for Civil RICO was dismissed by this Court as to MMAX and therefore no response is required. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations are denied.
- 162. Plaintiffs' eighth claim for Civil RICO was dismissed by this Court as to MMAX and therefore no response is required. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations are denied.
- 163. Plaintiffs' eighth claim for Civil RICO was dismissed by this Court as to MMAX and therefore no response is required. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations are denied.
- 164. Plaintiffs' eighth claim for Civil RICO was dismissed by this Court as to MMAX and therefore no response is required. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations are denied.
- 165. Plaintiffs' eighth claim for Civil RICO was dismissed by this Court as to MMAX and therefore no response is required. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations are denied.
- 166. Plaintiffs' eighth claim for Civil RICO was dismissed by this Court as to MMAX and therefore no response is required. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations are denied.

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167.	Plaintiffs' eighth claim for Civil RICO was dismissed by this Court as to MMAX
and therefore	no response is required. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations
are denied	

- 168. Plaintiffs' eighth claim for Civil RICO was dismissed by this Court as to MMAX and therefore no response is required. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations are denied.
- 169. Plaintiffs' eighth claim for Civil RICO was dismissed by this Court as to MMAX and therefore no response is required. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations are denied.
- 170. Plaintiffs' eighth claim for Civil RICO was dismissed by this Court as to MMAX and therefore no response is required. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations are denied.
- 171. Plaintiffs' eighth claim for Civil RICO was dismissed by this Court as to MMAX and therefore no response is required. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations are denied.
- 172. Plaintiffs' eighth claim for Civil RICO was dismissed by this Court as to MMAX and therefore no response is required. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations are denied.
- 173. Plaintiffs' eighth claim for Civil RICO was dismissed by this Court as to MMAX and therefore no response is required. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations are denied.
- 174. Plaintiffs' eighth claim for Civil RICO was dismissed by this Court as to MMAX and therefore no response is required. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations are denied.

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### NINTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF Specific Performance (As against all Defendants)

- 182. In response to the allegations of paragraph No. 182, MMAX realleges and incorporates the preceding paragraphs of this answer as if fully set forth herein.<sup>2</sup>
- 183. The allegations contained in paragraph No. 183 are legal conclusions and therefore no response is required from MMAX. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations are denied.
- 184. The allegations contained in paragraph No. 184 are legal conclusions and therefore no response is required from MMAX. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations are denied.
- 185. The allegations contained in paragraph No. 185 are legal conclusions and therefore no response is required from MMAX. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations are denied.
- 186. The allegations contained in paragraph No. 186 are legal conclusions and therefore no response is required from MMAX. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations are denied.
- 187. The allegations contained in paragraph No. 187 are legal conclusions and therefore no response is required from MMAX. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations are denied.
- 188. The allegations contained in paragraph No. 188 are legal conclusions and therefore no response is required from MMAX. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations are denied.
- 189. The allegations contained in paragraph No. 189 are legal conclusions and therefore no response is required from MMAX. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations are denied.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> At this point in the Complaint, Plaintiffs' paragraph numbers jump from 174 to 182. The numbers of this Answer have been adjusted to reflect the same numbering.

### TENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF Unjust Enrichment (As to all Defendants)

- 190. In response to the allegations of paragraph No. 190, MMAX realleges and incorporates the preceding paragraphs of this answer as if fully set forth herein.
- 191. The allegations contained in paragraph No. 191 are legal conclusions and therefore no response is required from MMAX. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations are denied.
- 192. The allegations contained in paragraph No. 192 are legal conclusions and therefore no response is required from MMAX. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations are denied.
- 193. The allegations contained in paragraph No. 193 are legal conclusions and therefore no response is required from MMAX. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations are denied.
- 194. The allegations contained in paragraph No. 194 are legal conclusions and therefore no response is required from MMAX. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations are denied.

### AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES

- 1. Plaintiffs' claims are barred in whole or in part because Plaintiffs failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
- 2. Plaintiffs' claims are barred in whole or in part because Plaintiffs have suffered no damage in any amount, manner, or at all by reason of any alleged act by MMAX and the relief prayed for in the Complaint therefore cannot be granted.
- 3. Plaintiffs' claims are barred in whole or in part because any damages suffered by Plaintiffs were caused in whole or in part by the actions of others.
- 4. Plaintiffs' claims are barred in whole or in part because Plaintiffs failed to mitigate damages, if any such damages exist.
- 5. Plaintiffs claims are barred in whole or in part because MMAX has not breached any covenant of good faith and fair dealing allegedly owed to Plaintiffs.

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	(	5.	Plaintifi	s claims are	barred in who	ole (	or in part	because MM	AX is not a pa	rty to the
Settlement Agreement, as defined in the Complaint, or to any contract or agreement with Plaintiffs.										
	7	7,	Plaintiff	s claims are	barred in wh	ole	or in part	because MN	MAX has not i	nterfered
with	any	pro	spective	contractual	relationship	or	existing	contractual	relationships	between
Plaintiffs and any third parties.										

- 8. Plaintiffs' claims are barred in whole or in part because MMAX does not owe Plaintiffs any duty, including any fiduciary duty.
- 9. Plaintiffs' claims are barred in whole or in part because MMAX has not been unjustly enriched, nor has it accepted or retained any such benefits to the detriment of Plaintiffs.
- 10. Plaintiffs' claims are barred in whole or in part by the applicable statute of limitation, under the doctrines of laches, waiver and/or estoppel, or based upon privilege or justification.
- 11. Pursuant to NRCP 11 all possible affirmative defenses may not have been alleged herein insofar as sufficient facts were not available after reasonable inquiry and therefore MMAX reserves the right to amend this Answer to allege additional affirmative defenses if subsequent investigation warrants.

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# DICKINSON/WRIGHT PILLE

# 8361 West Sunset Road, Suite 200 Las Vegas, Nevada 89113-2210

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### PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, MMAX prays for judgment as follows:

- 1. Plaintiffs' Complaint, and all claims asserted therein, be dismissed with prejudice and that Plaintiffs take nothing thereby;
- 2. For its attorney's fees and costs of suit; and
- 3. For such other and further relief as this Court may deem just and proper.

DATED this 11th day of March 2019.

### DICKINSON WRIGHT PLLC

### /s/ Michael N. Feder

Michael N. Feder (NV Bar No. 7332) Christian T. Spaulding (NV Bar No. 14277) 8363 West Sunset Road, Suite 200

Las Vegas, Nevada 89113-2210

Tel: (702) 550-4400 Fax: (844) 670-6009

Attorneys for Defendants Carlos Silva and MMAX Investment Partners, Inc. dba Professional Fighters League

# DICKINSON WRIGHTING

# 8363 West Sunset Road, Suite 200 Las Vegas, Nevada 89113-2210

### CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned, an employee of Dickinson Wright PLLC, hereby certifies that on the 11<sup>th</sup> day of March 2019, he caused a copy of the foregoing DEFENDANT MMAX INVESTMENT PARTNERS, INC.'S ANSWER TO COMPLAINT to be transmitted by electronic service in accordance with Administrative Order 14.2, to all interested parties, through the Court's Odyssey E-File & Serve system addressed to:

Byron E. Thomas, Esq. 3275 S. Jones Blvd., Ste. 104 Las Vegas, NV 89146 byronthomaslaw@gmail.com
Attorney for Plaintiffs

Maximiliano D. Couvillier III
KENNEDY & COUVILLIER, PLLC
3271 E. Warm Spring Rd.
Las Vegas, Nevada 89120
mcouvillier@kelawnv.com
Attorneys for Defendants MMAWC, LLC,
Bruce Deifik and The Nancy And Bruce Deifik
Family Partnership LLLP

/s/ Max Erwin
An employee of Dickinson Wright PLLC

Electronically Filed 3/15/2019 11:50 AM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT ANS 1 DICKINSON WRIGHT PLLC Michael N. Feder Nevada Bar No. 7332 2 Email: mfeder@dickinson-wright.com 3 Christian T. Spaulding Nevada Bar No. 14277 Email: cspaulding@dickinson-wright.com 4 8363 West Sunset Road, Suite 200 Las Vegas, Nevada 89113-2210 5 Tel: (702) 550-4400 6 Fax: (844) 670-6009 Attornevs for Defendants Carlos Silva and 7 MMAX Investment Partners, Inc. dba Professional Fighters League 8 DISTRICT COURT 9 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 10 ZION WOOD OBI WAN TRUST and CASE NO: A-17-764118-C as trustee of ZION Dept. No.: 27 SHAWN WRIGHT 11 TRUST: WOOD OBI WAN WSOF DICKINSON WRIGHTRIC 8363 West Sunset Road, Suite 200 Las Vegas, Nevada 89113-2210 12 GLOBAL, LLC, a Wyoming limited liability company 13 Plaintiffs, SILVA'S 14 DEFENDANT CARLOS ANSWER TO COMPLAINT VS. 15 16 MMAWC, LLC d/b/a WORLD SERIES OF FIGHTING, a Nevada limited liability 17 MMAX INVESTMENT company; PARTNERS INC. dba PROFESSIONAL 18 LEAGUE, **FIGHTERS** Delaware corporation, BRUCE DEIFIK, an individual; 19 CARLOS SILVA, an individual; NANCY 20 AND BRUCE DEIFIK FAMILY PARTNERSHIP LLLP, Colorado limited 21 liability partnership; KEITH REDMOND, an individual; DOES I through X, inclusive; and 22 ROE Corporations XX through XXX. inclusive. 23 24 Defendants. 25 26 Defendant Carlos Silva ("Silva"), by and through his attorneys of record, the law firm of 27 Dickinson Wright PLLC, hereby answers Plaintiffs Zion Wood Obi Wan Trust and Shawn

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Wright's ("Plaintiffs") Complaint as follows:

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### PARTIES1

As to Unnumbered Paragraph No. 1, Silva lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to whether SHAWN WRIGHT, as trustee of ZION WOOD OBI WANT TRUST, is a Utah resident whose principal place of business is located in Clark County, Nevada, and therefore denies the same.

As to Unnumbered Paragraph No. 2, Silva lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to whether ZION WOOD OBI WANT TRUST, is a trust organized under the State of Nevada, and therefore denies the same.

As to Unnumbered Paragraph No. 3, Silva lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to whether WSOF GLOBAL LLC is a limited liability company organized pursuant to the laws of the state of Wyoming and conducting business in Clark County, Nevada, and therefore denies the same.

As to Unnumbered Paragraph No. 4, Silva lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to whether MMAWC, LLC, is a limited liability company organized pursuant to the laws of the state of Nevada and conducting business in Clark County, Nevada, and therefore denies the same.

As to Unnumbered Paragraph No. 5, Silva lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to whether MMAX INVESTMENT PARTNERS, INC., is a corporation organized pursuant to the laws of the state of Delaware and conducting business in Clark County, Nevada, and therefore denies the same.

As to Unnumbered Paragraph No. 6, Silva lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to whether BRUCE DEIFIK is an individual believed to reside in the State of Colorado and conducting business in Clark County, Nevada.

As to Unnumbered Paragraph No. 7, Silva lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to whether NANCY AND BRUCE DEIFIK FAMILY PARTNERSHIP LLLP, is a limited liability company organized pursuant to the laws of the state of Colorado and conducting

In the Complaint, the paragraphs pertaining to the Parties do not contain numbers. As such, each paragraph is addressed in order in this Answer and referred to as "Unnumbered Paragraph".

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business in Clark County, Nevada.

As to Unnumbered Paragraph No. 8, Silva admits that he is an individual residing in the State of Maryland and conducting business in Clark County, Nevada.

As to Unnumbered Paragraph No. 9, Silva lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to whether KEITH REDMOND is an individual believed to reside in the state of Nevada and conducting business in Clark County, Nevada.

### GENERAL ALLEGATIONS

- 1. Silva lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations, and therefore denies the allegations contained in paragraph No. 1.
- 2. Silva lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations, and therefore denies the allegations contained in paragraph No. 2.
- 3. Silva lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations, and therefore denies the allegations contained in paragraph No. 3.
- 4. Silva lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations, and therefore denies the allegations contained in paragraph No. 4.
- 5. Silva lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations, and therefore denies the allegations contained in paragraph No. 5. By way of further response, the written agreements referenced in paragraph No. 5 are documents of independent legal significance and Silva denies any and all allegations inconsistent therewith.
- 6. Silva lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations, and therefore denies the allegations contained in paragraph No. 6. By way of further response, the written agreements referenced in paragraph No. 6 are documents of independent legal significance and Silva denies any and all allegations inconsistent therewith.
- 7. Silva lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations, and therefore denies the allegations contained in paragraph No. 7. By way of further response, the record in that case contains documents of independent legal significance and Silva denies any and all allegations inconsistent therewith.

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- In response to the allegations of paragraph No. 8, the Settlement Agreement is a 8. document of independent legal significance and Silva denies any and all allegations inconsistent therewith.
- In response to the allegations of paragraph No. 9, the Settlement Agreement is a 9. document of independent legal significance and Silva denies any and all allegations inconsistent therewith.
- 10. In response to the allegations of paragraph No. 10, the Settlement Agreement and any attachment thereto are documents of independent legal significance and Silva denies any and all allegations inconsistent therewith.
- In response to the allegations of paragraph No. 11, the Settlement Agreement is a 11. document of independent legal significance and Silva denies any and all allegations inconsistent therewith.
- Silva lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of 12. the allegations, and therefore denies the allegations contained in paragraph No. 12.
- Silva lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of 13. the allegations, and therefore denies the allegations contained in paragraph No. 13.
- In response to the allegations of paragraph No. 14, the press releases are documents 14. of independent legal significance and Silva denies any and all allegations inconsistent therewith.
- The allegations contained in paragraph No. 15 are legal conclusions and therefore 15. no response is required from Silva. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations are denied. By way of further response, the Settlement Agreement is a document of independent legal significance and Silva denies any and all allegations inconsistent therewith.
- Silva admits only that he and Sefo served as part of the management team of WSOF 16. and had roles with the Successor Company. Silva denies the remaining allegations in paragraph No. 16.
- The allegations contained in paragraph No. 17 are legal conclusions and therefore 17. no response is required from Silva. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations are denied.

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18.	In response to the allegations of paragraph No. 18, the press releases are documents
of independen	it legal significance and Silva denics any and all allegations inconsistent therewith

- 19. Silva lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations, and therefore denies the allegations contained in paragraph No. 19.
- 20. Denied. By way of further response, Silva lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations, and therefore denies the allegations contained in paragraph No. 20.
- 21. Denied. By way of further response, the allegations contained in paragraph No. 21 are legal conclusions and therefore no response is required from Silva. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations are denied.
- 22. Silva lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations, and therefore denies the allegations contained in paragraph No. 22.
- 23. Denied. By way of further response, the Settlement Agreement is a document of independent legal significance and Silva denies any and all allegations inconsistent therewith.
- 24. Denied. By way of further response, the allegations contained in paragraph No. 24 are legal conclusions and therefore no response is required from Silva. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations are denied.
- 25. In response to the allegations contained in paragraph No. 25, the Form D is a document of independent legal significance and Silva denies any and all allegations inconsistent therewith.
- 26. In response to the allegations contained in paragraph No. 26, the Form D is a document of independent legal significance and Silva denies any and all allegations inconsistent therewith.
- 27. Silva lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations, and therefore denies the allegations contained in paragraph No. 27.
- 28. Silva lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations, and therefore denies the allegations contained in paragraph No. 28.
  - 29. The allegations contained in paragraph No. 29 are legal conclusions and therefore

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no response is required from Silva. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations are denied. By way of further response, Silva lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations, and therefore denies the allegations contained in paragraph No. 29.

- 30. Denied. By way of further response, the allegations contained in paragraph No. 30 are legal conclusions and therefore no response is required from Silva. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations are denied. In addition, the documents referenced in paragraph No. 30 are documents of independent legal significance and Silva denies any and all allegations inconsistent therewith.
- 31. Denied. By way of further response, the allegations contained in paragraph No. 31 are legal conclusions and therefore no response is required from Silva. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations are denied.
- 32. Silva lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations, and therefore denies the allegations contained in paragraph No. 32.
- Silva lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of 33, the allegations, and therefore denies the allegations contained in paragraph No. 33.
- 34. Silva lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations, and therefore denies the allegations contained in paragraph No. 34.
- In response to the allegations of paragraph No. 35, the Settlement Agreement and 35. Operating Agreement are documents of independent legal significance and Silva denies any and all allegations inconsistent therewith.
- 36. The allegations contained in paragraph No. 36 are legal conclusions and therefore no response is required from Silva. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations are denied.
- 37. Denied. By way of further response, the allegations contained in paragraph No. 37 are legal conclusions and therefore no response is required from Silva. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations are denied.
  - 38. Denied. By way of further response, the allegations contained in paragraph No. 38

are legal conclusions and therefore no response is required from Silva. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations are denied.

- 39. Denied. By way of further response, the allegations contained in paragraph No. 39 are legal conclusions and therefore no response is required from Silva. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations are denied.
- 40. Denied. By way of further response, the allegations contained in paragraph No. 40 are legal conclusions and therefore no response is required from Silva. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations are denied.

### NYC EVENT

- 41. In response to the allegations of paragraph No. 41, Silva only admits that an MMA event took place in New York City on December 31, 2016. As to the remaining allegations, they are legal conclusions and therefore no response is required from Silva. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations are denied.
- 42. Silva lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations, and therefore denies the allegations contained in paragraph No. 42. By way of further response, the New York State Department of Taxation and Finance form is a document of independent legal significance and Silva denies any and all allegations inconsistent therewith.
- 43. Silva lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations, and therefore denies the allegations contained in paragraph No. 43. By way of further response, the New York State Department of Taxation and Finance form is a document of independent legal significance and Silva denies any and all allegations inconsistent therewith.
- 44. Silva lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations, and therefore denies the allegations contained in paragraph No. 44. By way of further response, the internal financial report is a document of independent legal significance and Silva denies any and all allegations inconsistent therewith.
- 45. Silva lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations, and therefore denies the allegations contained in paragraph No. 45. By way of

further response, the internal financial report is a document of independent legal significance and Silva denies any and all allegations inconsistent therewith.

- 46. Denied. By way of further response, the remaining allegations are legal conclusions and therefore no response is required from Silva. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations are denied.
- 47. Silva lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations, and therefore denies the allegations contained in paragraph No. 47.

### LICENSING RIGHTS

- 48. Silva lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations, and therefore denies the allegations contained in paragraph No. 48. By way of further response, the master license agreement is a document of independent legal significance and Silva denies any and all allegations inconsistent therewith.
- 49. Silva lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations, and therefore denies the allegations contained in paragraph No. 49. By way of further response, the master license agreement is a document of independent legal significance and Silva denies any and all allegations inconsistent therewith.
- 50. Silva lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations, and therefore denies the allegations contained in paragraph No. 50. By way of further response, the master license agreement and any assignment thereof are documents of independent legal significance and Silva denies any and all allegations inconsistent therewith.
- 51. Silva lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations, and therefore denies the allegations contained in paragraph No. 51.
- 52. Silva only admits that there was a prior litigation that resulted in the Settlement Agreement. By way of further response, the pleadings in the prior litigation and the Settlement Agreement are documents of independent legal significance and Silva denies any and all allegations inconsistent therewith.
  - 53. In response to the allegations of paragraph No. 53, the Settlement Agreement and

the Master License Agreement are documents of independent legal significance and Silva denies any and all allegations inconsistent therewith.

- 54. In response to the allegations of paragraph No. 54, the Amended License Agreement is a document of independent legal significance and Silva denies any and all allegations inconsistent therewith.
- 55. The allegations contained in paragraph No. 55 are legal conclusions and therefore no response is required from Silva. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations are denied. By way of further response, the Amended License Agreement and the Settlement Agreement are documents of independent legal significance and Silva denies any and all allegations inconsistent therewith.
- 56. Silva lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations, and therefore denies the allegations contained in paragraph No. 56.
- 57. Silva lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations, and therefore denies the allegations contained in paragraph No. 57.
- 58. Silva lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations, and therefore denies the allegations contained in paragraph No. 58.
- 59. Silva lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations, and therefore denies the allegations contained in paragraph No. 59.
- 60. Silva lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations, and therefore denies the allegations contained in paragraph No. 60. By way of further response, the referenced "naked" license agreement is a document of independent legal significance and Silva denies any and all allegations inconsistent therewith
- 61. Silva lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations, and therefore denies the allegations contained in paragraph No. 61. By way of further response, the referenced email is a document of independent legal significance and Silva denies any and all allegations inconsistent therewith.
- 62. The allegations contained in paragraph No. 62 are legal conclusions and therefore no response is required from Silva. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations

are denied.

- 63. In response to the allegations of paragraph No. 63, Silva only admits that MMAX operates as the "Professional Fighters League." As to the remaining allegations, Silva lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the remaining allegations, and therefore denies the remaining allegations contained in paragraph No. 63. By way of further response, the referenced email is a document of independent legal significance and Silva denies any and all allegations inconsistent therewith
- 64. In response to the allegations of paragraph 64, the press releases and Settlement Agreement are documents of independent legal significance and Silva denies any and all allegations inconsistent therewith.
- 65. Silva lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations, and therefore denies the allegations contained in paragraph No. 65.
- 66. Silva lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations, and therefore denies the allegations contained in paragraph No. 66.
- 67. Silva lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations, and therefore denies the allegations contained in paragraph No. 67.
- 68. Silva lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations, and therefore denies the allegations contained in paragraph No. 68.
- 69. The allegations contained in paragraph No. 69 are legal conclusions and therefore no response is required from Silva. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations are denied. By way of further response, the Settlement Agreement is a document of independent legal significance and Silva denies any and all allegations inconsistent therewith.
- 70. The allegations contained in paragraph No. 70 are legal conclusions and therefore no response is required from Silva. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations are denied.
- 71. In response to the allegations of paragraph No. 71, the Amended License is a document of independent legal significance and Silva denies any and all allegations inconsistent therewith.

- 72. The allegations contained in paragraph No. 72 are legal conclusions and therefore no response is required from Silva. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations are denied. By way of further response, the Settlement Agreement and Amended License Agreement are documents of independent legal significance and Silva denies any and all allegations inconsistent therewith.
- 73. In response to the allegations of paragraph No. 73, the email referenced is a document of independent legal significance and Silva denies any and all allegations inconsistent therewith.
- 74. In response to the allegations of paragraph No. 74, the email referenced is a document of independent legal significance and Silva denies any and all allegations inconsistent therewith. By way of further response, the allegations contained in paragraph No. 74 are legal conclusions and therefore no response is required from Silva. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations are denied.
- 75. The allegations contained in paragraph No. 75 are legal conclusions and therefore no response is required from Silva. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations are denied. By way of further response, the email referenced is a document of independent legal significance and Silva denies any and all allegations inconsistent therewith.
- 76. Silva lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations, and therefore denies the allegations contained in paragraph No. 76. By way of further response, the allegations contained in paragraph No. 76 are legal conclusions and therefore no response is required from Silva. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations are denied.
- 77. Silva lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations related to Global's concerns, and therefore denies the allegations contained in paragraph No. 77. As to the remaining allegations, including that Global holds the licensing rights for "Professional Fighters League," these allegations are legal conclusions and therefore no response is required from Silva. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations are denied.

### DEIFIK, SILVA AND ABDELAZIZ

- Silva admits the allegations contained in paragraph No. 78.
- 79. Silva lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations, and therefore denies the allegations contained in paragraph No. 79.
- 80. Silva lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations, and therefore denies the allegations contained in paragraph No. 80.
- 81. Silva lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations, and therefore denies the allegations contained in paragraph No. 81.
- 82. Silva lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations, and therefore denies the allegations contained in paragraph No. 82.
- 83. Silva lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations, and therefore denies the allegations contained in paragraph No. 83.
- 84. Silva lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations, and therefore denies the allegations contained in paragraph No. 84.
- 85. Silva lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations, and therefore denies the allegations contained in paragraph No. 85.
- 86. Silva lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations, and therefore denies the allegations contained in paragraph No. 86.
- 87. Silva lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations about what Zion inferred or what was brought to Deifik's attention, and therefore denies those allegations contained in paragraph No. 87. All remaining allegations are denied.
- 88. Silva lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations, and therefore denies the allegations contained in paragraph No. 88.
- 89. Silva lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations, and therefore denies the allegations contained in paragraph No. 89. By way of further response, to the extent the conversation was with Silva's attorney, such discussions are protected by the attorney client privilege. Moreover, the texts referenced in paragraph No. 89 are documents of independent legal significance and Silva denies any and all allegations inconsistent

therewith.

- 90. Silva lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations, and therefore denies the allegations contained in paragraph No. 90. By way of further response, the alleged text messages referenced in paragraph No. 90 are documents of independent legal significance and Silva denies any and all allegations inconsistent therewith.
- 91. Silva lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations, and therefore denies the allegations contained in paragraph No. 91. By way of further response, the alleged text message referenced in paragraph No. 91 is a document of independent legal significance and Silva denies any and all allegations inconsistent therewith.
- 92. Silva lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations, and therefore denies the allegations contained in paragraph No. 92. By way of further response, the alleged text message referenced in paragraph No. 92 is a document of independent legal significance and Silva denies any and all allegations inconsistent therewith.
- 93. Silva lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations, and therefore denies the allegations contained in paragraph No. 93. By way of further response, the alleged text messages referenced in paragraph No. 93 are documents of independent legal significance and Silva denies any and all allegations inconsistent therewith.
- 94. Silva lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations, and therefore denies the allegations contained in paragraph No. 94.
- 95. Silva lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations, and therefore denies the allegations contained in paragraph No. 95.
  - 96. Silva denies the allegations contained in paragraph No. 96.
  - 97. Silva denies the allegations contained in paragraph No. 97.
  - 98. Silva denies the allegations contained in paragraph No. 98.
  - 99. Silva denies the allegations contained in paragraph No. 99.

### GLOBAL CHINA OPERATIONS

100. Silva lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations, and therefore denies the allegations contained in paragraph No. 100.

the allegations, and therefore denies the allegations contained in paragraph No. 101.

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105. Denied. By way of further response, the allegations contained in paragraph No. 105 are legal conclusions and therefore no response is required from Silva. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations are denied.

Silva lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of

Silva lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of

106. Denied. By way of further response, the allegations contained in paragraph No. 106 are legal conclusions and therefore no response is required from Silva. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations are denied.

107. Denied. By way of further response, the allegations contained in paragraph No. 107 are legal conclusions and therefore no response is required from Silva. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations are denied.

### CLAIMS FOR RELIEF

### FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF Breach of Contract — Settlement Agreement

(As against Defendants MMAWC, Deifik, DFP, PFL and Silva; hercinafter the "Settlement Defendants")

108. In response to the allegations of paragraph No. 108, Silva realleges and incorporates the preceding paragraphs of this answer as if fully set forth herein.

109. Plaintiffs' first claim for Breach of Contract - Settlement Agreement was dismissed by this Court as to Silva and therefore no response is required. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations are denied.

110. Plaintiffs' first claim for Breach of Contract - Settlement Agreement was dismissed by this Court as to Silva and therefore no response is required. To the extent a response is deemed

required, the allegations are denied.

- 111. Plaintiffs' first claim for Breach of Contract Settlement Agreement was dismissed by this Court as to Silva and therefore no response is required. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations are denied.
- 112. Plaintiffs' first claim for Breach of Contract Settlement Agreement was dismissed by this Court as to Silva and therefore no response is required. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations are denied.
- 113. Plaintiffs' first claim for Breach of Contract Settlement Agreement was dismissed by this Court as to Silva and therefore no response is required. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations are denied.
- 114. Plaintiffs' first claim for Breach of Contract Settlement Agreement was dismissed by this Court as to Silva and therefore no response is required. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations are denied.
- 115. Plaintiffs' first claim for Breach of Contract Settlement Agreement was dismissed by this Court as to Silva and therefore no response is required. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations are denied.

# SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing (As against all Defendants)

- 116. In response to the allegations of paragraph No. 116, Silva realleges and incorporates the preceding paragraphs of this answer as if fully set forth herein.
- 117. Plaintiffs' second claim for Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing was dismissed by this Court as to Silva and therefore no response is required. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations are denied.
- 118. Plaintiffs' second claim for Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing was dismissed by this Court as to Silva and therefore no response is required. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations are denied.
- 119. Plaintiffs' second claim for Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing was dismissed by this Court as to Silva and therefore no response is required. To the

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extent a response is deemed required, the allegations are denied.

- Plaintiffs' second claim for Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing was dismissed by this Court as to Silva and therefore no response is required. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations are denied.
- 121. Plaintiffs' second claim for Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing was dismissed by this Court as to Silva and therefore no response is required. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations are denied.

### THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF Declaratory Relief (As against all Defendants)

- 122. In response to the allegations of paragraph No. 122, Silva realleges and incorporates the preceding paragraphs of this answer as if fully set forth herein.
- Plaintiffs' third claim for Declaratory Relief was dismissed by this Court as to Silva and therefore no response is required. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations are denied.
- Plaintiffs' third claim for Declaratory Relief was dismissed by this Court as to Silva and therefore no response is required. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations are denied.
- Plaintiffs' third claim for Declaratory Relief was dismissed by this Court as to Silva 125. and therefore no response is required. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations are denied.
- 126. Plaintiffs' third claim for Declaratory Relief was dismissed by this Court as to Silva and therefore no response is required. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations are denied.
- Plaintiffs' third claim for Declaratory Relief was dismissed by this Court as to Silva 127. and therefore no response is required. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations are denied.
- Plaintiffs' third claim for Declaratory Relief was dismissed by this Court as to Silva 128. and therefore no response is required. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations

are denied.

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- 129. Plaintiffs' third claim for Declaratory Relief was dismissed by this Court as to Silva and therefore no response is required. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations are denied.
- 130. Plaintiffs' third claim for Declaratory Relief was dismissed by this Court as to Silva and therefore no response is required. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations are denied.

### FOURTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF Intentional Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage (As against all Defendants)

- 131. In response to the allegations of paragraph No. 131, Silva realleges and incorporates the preceding paragraphs of this answer as if fully set forth herein.
- 132. Plaintiffs' fourth claim for Intentional Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage was dismissed by this Court as to Silva and therefore no response is required by Silva. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations are denied.
- 133. Plaintiffs' fourth claim for Intentional Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage was dismissed by this Court as to Silva and therefore no response is required. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations are denied.
- 134. Plaintiffs' fourth claim for Intentional Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage was dismissed by this Court as to Silva and therefore no response is required. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations are denied.
- 135. Plaintiffs' fourth claim for Intentional Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage was dismissed by this Court as to Silva and therefore no response is required. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations are denied.
- 136. Plaintiffs' fourth claim for Intentional Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage was dismissed by this Court as to Silva and therefore no response is required. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations are denied.
- 137. Plaintiffs' fourth claim for Intentional Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage was dismissed by this Court as to Silva and therefore no response is required. To the

extent a response is deemed required, the allegations are denied.

138. Plaintiffs' fourth claim for Intentional Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage was dismissed by this Court as to Silva and therefore no response is required. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations are denied.

# FIFTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF Tortious Interference with Contract (As against all Defendants)

- 139. In response to the allegations of paragraph No. 139, Silva realleges and incorporates the preceding paragraphs of this answer as if fully set forth herein.
- 140. Plaintiffs' fifth claim for Tortious Interference with Contract was dismissed by this Court as to Silva and therefore no response is required. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations are denied.
- 141. Plaintiffs' fifth claim for Tortious Interference with Contract was dismissed by this Court as to Silva and therefore no response is required. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations are denied.
- 142. Plaintiffs' fifth claim for Tortious Interference with Contract was dismissed by this Court as to Silva and therefore no response is required. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations are denied.
- 143. Plaintiffs' fifth claim for Tortious Interference with Contract was dismissed by this Court as to Silva and therefore no response is required. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations are denied.
- 144. Plaintiffs' fifth claim for Tortious Interference with Contract was dismissed by this Court as to Silva and therefore no response is required. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations are denied.
- 145. Plaintiffs' fifth claim for Tortious Interference with Contract was dismissed by this Court as to Silva and therefore no response is required. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations are denied.
- 146. Plaintiffs' fifth claim for Tortious Interference with Contract was dismissed by this Court as to Silva and therefore no response is required. To the extent a response is deemed

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required, the allegations are denied.

# SIXTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF Alter Ego Claim (As against MMAWC and Deifik Defendants)

- 147. In response to the aliegations of paragraph No. 147, Silva realleges and incorporates the preceding paragraphs of this answer as if fully set forth herein.
- 148. The allegations contained in Plaintiffs' sixth claim are not asserted against Silva and therefore no response is required. To the extent a response is deemed required, Silva lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations, and therefore denies the allegations contained in paragraph No. 148. By way of further response, the allegations contained in paragraph No. 148 are legal conclusions and therefore no response is required from Silva. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations are denied.
- 149. The allegations contained in Plaintiffs' sixth claim are not asserted against Silva and therefore no response is required. To the extent a response is deemed required, Silva lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations, and therefore denies the allegations contained in paragraph No. 149. By way of further response, the allegations contained in paragraph No. 149 are legal conclusions and therefore no response is required from Silva. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations are denied.
- and therefore no response is required. To the extent a response is deemed required, Silva lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations, and therefore denies the allegations contained in paragraph No. 150. By way of further response, the allegations contained in paragraph No. 150 are legal conclusions and therefore no response is required from Silva. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations are denied.
- 151. The allegations contained in Plaintiffs' sixth claim are not asserted against Silva and therefore no response is required. To the extent a response is deemed required, Silva lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations, and therefore denies the allegations contained in paragraph No. 151. By way of further response, the allegations contained in paragraph No. 151 are legal conclusions and therefore no response is required from

Silva. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations are denied.

- 152. The allegations contained in Plaintiffs' sixth claim are not asserted against Silva and therefore no response is required. To the extent a response is deemed required, Silva lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations, and therefore denies the allegations contained in paragraph No. 152. By way of further response, the allegations contained in paragraph No. 152 are legal conclusions and therefore no response is required from Silva. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations are denied.
- 153. The allegations contained in Plaintiffs' sixth claim are not asserted against Silva and therefore no response is required. To the extent a response is deemed required, Silva lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations, and therefore denies the allegations contained in paragraph No. 153. By way of further response, the allegations contained in paragraph No. 153 are legal conclusions and therefore no response is required from Silva. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations are denied.

# SEVENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF Breach of Fiduciary Duty (As against Deifik, Silva and Redmond)

- 154. In response to the allegations of paragraph No. 154, Silva realleges and incorporates the preceding paragraphs of this answer as if fully set forth herein.
- 155. The allegations contained in paragraph No. 155 are legal conclusions and therefore no response is required from Silva. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations are denied.
- 156. The allegations contained in paragraph No. 156 are legal conclusions and therefore no response is required from Silva. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations are denied.
- 157. Silva lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations, and therefore denies the allegations contained in paragraph No. 157. By way of further response, the allegations contained in paragraph No. 157 are legal conclusions and therefore no response is required from Silva. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations are denied.

158.	The allegations conta	ined in paragraph No. 1	58 are legal conclusions an	d therefore
no response is	required from Silva.	To the extent a respons	se is deemed required, the	allegations
are denied.				

159. The allegations contained in paragraph No. 159 are legal conclusions and therefore no response is required from Silva. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations are denied.

# EIGHTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF Civil RICO (As against all Defendants)

- 160. In response to the allegations of paragraph No. 160, Silva realleges and incorporates the preceding paragraphs of this answer as if fully set forth herein.
- 161. Plaintiffs' eighth claim for Civil RICO was dismissed by this Court as to Silva and therefore no response is required. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations are denied.
- 162. Plaintiffs' eighth claim for Civil RICO was dismissed by this Court as to Silva and therefore no response is required. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations are denied.
- 163. Plaintiffs' eighth claim for Civil RICO was dismissed by this Court as to Silva and therefore no response is required. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations are denied.
- 164. Plaintiffs' eighth claim for Civil RICO was dismissed by this Court as to Silva and therefore no response is required. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations are denied.
- 165. Plaintiffs' eighth claim for Civil RICO was dismissed by this Court as to Silva and therefore no response is required. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations are denied.
- 166. Plaintiffs' eighth claim for Civil RICO was dismissed by this Court as to Silva and therefore no response is required. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations are denied.

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	167.	Plaintiffs' eighth cl	aim for Civil RICO wa	as dismissed by this Co	urt as to Silva and
therefo	re no re	sponse is required.	To the extent a respon	se is deemed required,	the allegations are
denied.					

- 168. Plaintiffs' eighth claim for Civil RICO was dismissed by this Court as to Silva and therefore no response is required. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations are denied.
- 169. Plaintiffs' eighth claim for Civil RICO was dismissed by this Court as to Silva and therefore no response is required. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations are denied.
- 170. Plaintiffs' eighth claim for Civil RICO was dismissed by this Court as to Silva and therefore no response is required. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations are denied.
- 171. Plaintiffs' eighth claim for Civil RICO was dismissed by this Court as to Silva and therefore no response is required. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations are denicd.
- 172. Plaintiffs' eighth claim for Civil RICO was dismissed by this Court as to Silva and therefore no response is required. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations are denied.
- 173. Plaintiffs' eighth claim for Civil RICO was dismissed by this Court as to Silva and therefore no response is required. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations are denied.
- 174. Plaintiffs' eighth claim for Civil RICO was dismissed by this Court as to Silva and therefore no response is required. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations are denied.

### NINTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF Specific Performance (As against all Defendants)

182. In response to the allegations of paragraph No. 182, Silva realleges and incorporates Vegas, Nevada 89113-2210

the preceding paragraphs of this answer as if fully set forth herein.<sup>2</sup>

- 183. Plaintiffs' ninth claim for Specific Performance was dismissed by this Court as to Silva and therefore no response is required. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations are denied.
- 184. Plaintiffs' ninth claim for Specific Performance was dismissed by this Court as to Silva and therefore no response is required. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations are denied.
- 185. Plaintiffs' ninth claim for Specific Performance was dismissed by this Court as to Silva and therefore no response is required. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations are denied.
- 186. Plaintiffs' ninth claim for Specific Performance was dismissed by this Court as to Silva and therefore no response is required. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations are denied.
- 187. Plaintiffs' ninth claim for Specific Performance was dismissed by this Court as to Silva and therefore no response is required. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations are denied.
- 188. Plaintiffs' ninth claim for Specific Performance was dismissed by this Court as to Silva and therefore no response is required. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations are denied.
- 189. Plaintiffs' ninth claim for Specific Performance was dismissed by this Court as to Silva and therefore no response is required. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations are denied.

### TENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF Unjust Enrichment (As to all Defendants)

190. In response to the allegations of paragraph No. 190, Silva realleges and incorporates the preceding paragraphs of this answer as if fully set forth herein.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> At this point in the Complaint, Plaintiffs' paragraph numbers jump from 174 to 182. The numbers of this Answer have been adjusted to reflect the same numbering.

191.	The allegations conta	sined in paragraph No. 191 are legal conclusions and therefore
no response is	required from Silva.	To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations
are denied.		

- 192. The allegations contained in paragraph No. 192 are legal conclusions and therefore no response is required from Silva. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations are denied.
- 193. The allegations contained in paragraph No. 193 are legal conclusions and therefore no response is required from Silva. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations are denied.
- 194. The allegations contained in paragraph No. 194 are legal conclusions and therefore no response is required from Silva. To the extent a response is deemed required, the allegations are denied.

### AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES

- 1. Plaintiffs' claims are barred in whole or in part because Plaintiffs failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
- 2. Plaintiffs' claims are barred in whole or in part because Plaintiffs have suffered no damage in any amount, manner, or at all by reason of any alleged act by Silva and the relief prayed for in the Complaint therefore cannot be granted.
- 3. Plaintiffs' claims are barred in whole or in part because any damages suffered by Plaintiffs were caused in whole or in part by the actions of others.
- 4. Plaintiffs' claims are barred in whole or in part because Plaintiffs failed to mitigate damages, if any such damages exist.
- Plaintiffs' claims are barred in whole or in part because Silva does not owe
   Plaintiffs any fiduciary duty.
- To the extent Silva owed Plaintiffs any fiduciary duty, Silva did not breach or violate any such duty.
- 7. Plaintiffs' claims are barred in whole or in part because Silva has not been unjustly enriched, nor has he accepted or retained any such benefits to the detriment of Plaintiffs.

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	8.	Plaintiffs'	claims	are	barred	in	whole	OF	ín	part	by	the	applicable	statute	of
limitation	n or u	mder the do	ctrines o	of la	ches, wa	aive	er and/o	r es	stor	ppel.					

9. Pursuant to NRCP 11 all possible affirmative defenses may not have been alleged herein insofar as sufficient facts were not available after reasonable inquiry and therefore Silva reserves the right to amend this Answer to allege additional affirmative defenses if subsequent investigation warrants.

### PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Silva prays for judgment as follows:

- Plaintiffs' Complaint, and all claims asserted therein, be dismiss and that
   Plaintiffs take nothing thereby;
- 2. For his attorney's fees and costs of suit; and
- 3. For such other and further relief as this Court may deem just and proper.

DATED this 15th day of March 2019.

### DICKINSON WRIGHT PLLC

### /s/ Michael N. Feder

Michael N. Feder Nevada Bar No. 7332 Christian T. Spaulding Nevada Bar No. 14277 8363 West Sunset Road, Suite 200 Las Vegas, Nevada 89113-2210

Tel: (702) 550-4400 Fax: (844) 670-6009

Attorneys for Defendants Carlos Silva and MMAX Investment Partners, Inc. dba Professional Fighters League

# DICKINSON WRIGHTHE

# 8363 West Sunset Road, Suite 200 Las Vegas, Nevada 89113-2210

### CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned, an employee of Dickinson Wright PLLC, hereby certifies that on the 15<sup>th</sup> day of March 2019, he caused a copy of the foregoing DEFENDANT CARLOS SILVA'S ANSWER TO COMPLAINT to be transmitted by electronic service in accordance with Administrative Order 14.2, to all interested parties, through the Court's Odyssey E-File & Serve system addressed to:

Byron E. Thomas, Esq. 3275 S. Jones Blvd., Ste. 104 Las Vegas, NV 89146 byronthomaslaw@gmail.com
Attorney for Plaintiffs

Maximiliano D. Couvillier III
KENNEDY & COUVILLIER, PLLC
3271 E. Warm Spring Rd.
Las Vegas, Nevada 89120
mcouvillier@kclawnv.com
Attorneys for Defendants MMAWC, LLC,
Bruce Deifik and The Nancy And Bruce Deifik
Family Partnership LLLP

/s/ Max Erwin
An employee of Dickinson Wright PLLC

**Electronically Filed** 5/17/2019 1:29 PM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT Case No.: A-17-764118-C

BYRON E. THOMAS, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 8906 3275 S. Jones Blvd. Stc. 104 Las Vegas, Nevada 89146 Phone: 702 747-3103 byronthomaslaw@gmail.com Attorney for Plaintiff's

### DISTRICT COURT

### CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

ZION WOOD OBI WAN TRUST and SHAWN WRIGHT as trustee of ZION WOOD OBI WAN TRUST; WSOF GLOBAL LLC, a Wyoming limited liability company

Plaintiffs,

VS.

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MMAWC, LLC d/b/a WORLD SERIES OF FIGHTING a Nevada limited liability INVESTMENT MMAX company: PARTNERS INC. dba PROFESSIONAL FIGHTERS LEAGUE. Delaware а corporation; BRUCE DEIFIK, an individual; CARLOS SILVA, an individual; NANCY AND BRUCE DEIFIK FAMILY PARTNERSHIP LLLP, Colorado limited liability limited partnership; KEITH REDMOND, an individual; DOES I through X, inclusive; and ROE Corporations XX through XXX, inclusive,

Dept. No.: 27

STIPULATION TO VACATE HEARING ON KEITH REDMOND'S MOTION FOR A MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT AND TO ALLOW PLAITNIFFS TO FILE A MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT

Defendants.

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COMES NOW defendant Keith Redmond (hereafter referred to as "Redmond") and plaintiffs ZION WOOD OBI WAN TRUST and SHAWN WRIGHT as trustee of ZION WOOD OBI WAN TRUST. WSOF GLOBAL LLC (hereinafter referred to as "Plaintiffs") by and through their respective attorneys of record enter into the following Stipulation regarding Redmond's Motion For A More Definite Statement ("Motion").

- 1. The parties agree to Vacate the April 24, 2019, hearing on the Motion; and
- Plaintiff's shall have up to fifteen (15) calendar days from the date of entry of this Stipulation to file a more definite statement of their claims against Redmond.

Dated: April 22, 2019

LAW OFFICES OF BYRON THOMAS

Bryon Thomas, Esq.

Nevada Bar No. 8906 3275 S. Johes Blvd. Ste. 104 Las Vegas. Nevada 89146

Phone: (702)747-3103 Facsimile: (702) 543-4855

Email: byronthomaslaw@gmail.com

KENNEDY & COUVILLIER, PLLC

Maximiliano D. Colivellier III, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 7661 3271 E. Warm Springs Rd.

Las Vegas, NV 89120 Phone (702) 604-3550 meouvillier@kelawny.com

### ORDER

- 1. The hearing on Redmond's Motion set for April 24, 2019, is vacated; and
- Plaintiffs shall have up to lifteen (15) calendar days from the date of entry of this Stipulation & Order to file and serve a more definite statement of their claims against Redmond.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 23 day of April 2019

DISTRICT COLET JUDGE

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**Electronically Filed** 6/3/2019 10:34 PM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT

1 BYRON E. THOMAS, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 8906 2 3275 S. Jones Blvd. Ste. 104 Las Vegas, Nevada 89146 (702) 747-3103 3 Phone: byronthomaslaw@gmail.com

Attorney for Plaintiffs

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DISTRICT COURT

### CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

Case No.: A-17-764118-C

Dept. No.: 27

SHAWN WRIGHT as trustee of ZION WOOD OBI WAN TRUST: WSOF GLOBAL LLC, a Wyoming limited liability company

Plaintiffs,

VS.

MMAWC, LLC d/b/a WORLD SERIES OF FIGHTING a Nevada limited liability INVESTMENT company; MMAX PARTNERS INC. dba PROFESSIONAL FIGHTERS LEAGUE. Delaware corporation; BRUCE DEIFIK, an individual; CARLOS SILVA, an individual; NANCY BRUCE DEIFIK **FAMILY** ANDPARTNERSHIP LLLP, Colorado limited liability limited partnership; KEITH REDMOND, an individual; DOES I through X, inclusive; and ROE Corporations XX through XXX, inclusive,

Defendants.

AMENDED COMPLAINT

Plaintiffs, SHAWN WRIGHT, trustee of ZION WOOD OBI WAN TRUST and WSOF

GLOBAL LLC (hereinafter "Plaintiffs" by and through his undersigned counsel of record, Law

Offices of Byron Thomas complains and alleges against: MMAWC, LLC d/b/a WORLD SERIES

OF FIGHTING ("WSOF"), MMAX INVESTMENT PARTNERS INC dba PROFESSIONAL

FIGHTERS LEAGUE ("PFL"), BRUCE DEIFIK ("DEIFIK"), CARLOS SILVA ("SILVA"),

NANCY AND BRUCE DEIFIK FAMILY PARTNERSHIP LLLP ("DFP"), and KEITH

REDMOND ("REDMOND") (collectively "Defendants") as follows:

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Case Number: A-17-764118-C

SHAWN WRIGHT, as trustee of ZION WOOD OBI WAN TRUST, is a Utah resident

ZION WOOD OBI WAN TRUST, a trust organized under the laws of the State of Nevada.

WSOF GLOBAL LLC, is a limited liability company organized pursuant to the laws of the

Defendant MMAWC, LLC., is a limited liability company organized pursuant to the laws of

Defendant MMAX INVESTMENT PARTNERS INC., is a corporation organized pursuant to the laws of the State of Delaware and conducting business in Clark County, Nevada.

Defendant BRUCE DEIFIK is an individual believed to reside in the State of Colorado and

Defendant NANCY AND BRUCE DEIFIK FAMILY PARTNERSHIP LLLP, is a limited liability company organized pursuant to the laws of the state of Colorado and conducting business in

Defendant CARLOS SILVA is an individual believed to reside in the State of Maryland and

Defendant KEITH REDMOND is an individual believed to reside in the State of Nevada and

- Plaintiff Zion Wood Obi Wan Trust ("Zion") is a member of MMAWC, LLC d/b/a World Series of Fighting ("WSOF" or "MMAWC"). WSOF is a promoter of mixed martial arts events on
- WSOF experienced several financial shortfalls during 2012 to 2015.
- Zion had made extensive loans to WSOF to allow for the continued operation and management of

1081992v, į Page 2 of 21

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ownership interests.

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circumvent the Settlement Agreement and to deprive Plaintiffs of their rights and dilute their

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35. Zion has the right to inspect the books and records in accordance with the Settlement Agreement and Operating Agreement of WSOF.

34. Therefore, Zion also requested a review of the books and records of WSOF so as to ascertain

33. Zion has been relying on press statements to glean details of the final deals.

whether its interests had been protected.

36. DEFENDANTS have refused to allow Zion to inspect the books and records of WSOF in direct contravention of NRS 86.241.

1	37. Moreover, without a direct stake in the Successor Company, this is clearly dilutive of the Zion's
2	interest.
3	38. The Successor Company knew or should have known about the Settlement Agreement and the
4	obligations that it would incur to protect Zion's interest.
5	39. The actions of WSOF, the Successor Company, and all DEFENDANTS constitute a breach of the
6	Settlement Agreement and Zion has been damaged because of these breaches.
7	40. In addition, several other issues have been brought to Zion's attention that implicate
8	DEFENDANTS in schemes or artifice to defraud.
9	NYC EVENT
10	41. DEFENDANTS promoted an MMA event in New York City on December 31, 2016.
11	42. DEFENDANTS then filed a required New York State Department of Taxation and Finance form
12	to report all income from the event.
13	43. DEFENDANTS reported \$0 income from broadcasting rights to New York State.
14	44. DEFENDANTS then sent Zion an internal financial report for the event.
15	45. DEFENDANTS reported to Zion that they had \$190,000 in broadcasting revenue from NBC for
16	the NYC event.
17	46. Zion is under the belief that DEFENDANTS are either manipulating the financial statements to
18	deceive Zion and the investment public.
19	47. DEFENDANTS continue to refuse to allow Zion an inspection of the books and records.
20	<u>LICENSING RIGHTS</u>
21	48. On or about October 15, 2012 Vince Hesser had entered into a master licensed agreement with
22	WSOF.
23	49. The Master License Agreement gave Mr. Hesser the exclusive right to license the WSOF brand
24	outside of the United States.
25	50. Subsequently, Vince Hesser assigned the Master License Agreement to WSOF GLOBAL
26	LIMITED and its successor WSOF Global LLC ("GLOBAL").
27	51. DEFENDANTS previously attempted to falsely deny the Master License Agreement existed and
28	attempted to tortuously interfere in the rights and business of GLOBAL.

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52. A dispute arose over the terms of the license agreement and parties instituted litigation. The parties were able to reach a resolution of their disputes, and GLOBAL also became a party to the Settlement Agreement.

53. As a part of the Settlement Agreement the parties amended the Master License Agreement.

The Settlement Agreement and Amended License Agreement read as follows:

Paragraph 2 of the Settlement Agreement: The 10/15/12 Hesser License shall be reaffirmed and remain in full force and effect as of the date of this Agreement, as amended by the execution of the Amendment to Consulting and Master Licensing Agreement in the form attached hereto and incorporated herein as Exhibit B. The license is a material part of settlement on behalf of Hesser and Wright and is not subject to any modification, cancellation, assignment, pledge, lien, or encumbrance by WSOF or any of its creditors and shall survive any restructure, sale, receivership or bankruptcy of WSOF.

1	The Amended License Agreement paragraph 1 also states: "[t]his Agreement sha
2	be binding upon and shall survive any successors of MMA, or its ownership, tradenames o
3	trademarks."
4	Therefore, the Successor Company is obligated to comply with the terms and
5	conditions of the Amended License Agreement and the Settlement Agreement.
6	Over the following several months after settlement, GLOBAL executed
7	agreements for media content sharing rights from several MMA organizations from all over
8	the world on six continents based on the WSOF license branding.
9	57. GLOBAL's rights consist of over 100 international events per year, at a cost to
10	produce of tens of millions of dollars, which dwarf the mere 8-10 events per year organized
11	by DEFENDANTS.
12	58. WSOF initially complied with the Settlement Agreement and as documented in
13	a phone conversation, DEIFIK told DEFENDANTS to let GLOBAL do what they want to
14	and leave them alone.
15	59. GLOBAL attempted to keep WSOF informed of its upcoming events, but would
16	receive childish email responses from the chief officers of WSOF such as: "Hey idiot don't
17	send me your stupid emails again!!", or phone calls threatening violence against GLOBAL
18	employees. These same officers continue to operate the PFL brand.
19	60. GLOBAL continued to operate its business unfettered under this "naked"
20	license arrangement which helped promote the overall brand name.
21	61. Upon disclosure by DEFENDANTS that an asset transfer was about to take
22	place, Zion's principals received an email on December 16, 2016 from Chris Childs,
23	purported legal counsel for DEFENDANTS, representing and affirming that the apparent
24	Successor Company will be honoring the license
25	The Successor Company obviously knew or should have known it was bound by
26	the Agreements.
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1	To then add insult to injury, after the asset transfer, DEFENDANTS changed th
2	name of the company from "World Series of Fighting" to "Professional Fighters League
3	without any prior notice to its licensee GLOBAL, and reported such in a formal email to al
4	fighters from Mr. Ray Sefo.
5	64. DEFENDANTS publicly stated in press releases they have discontinued and
6	abandoned the license name ("World Series of Fighting") agreed to in the Settlemen
7	Agreement, and will now use the PFL name exclusively.
8	65. At no point did the Successor Company notify GLOBAL about any changes in
9	name or changes in business operation.
10	66. For a period of time, the Successor Company appeared to continue to operate as
11	in the past, even after the name change to PFL.
12	67. In a documented phone conversation, DEIFIK spoke with Mr. Vince Hesser of
13	GLOBAL and stated that he didn't make the decision, but Russ Ramsey, a PFL board
14	member, made the sole decision to change the company name which damaged GLOBAL
15	DEIFIK further stated "Ramsey has a f***ing ego the size of Texas and Ramsey was a
16	moron for changing the name."
17	68. Upon information and belief, and based on DEIFIK's past egregious behavior,
18	GLOBAL believes DEIFIK made the ultimate decision to change the name to purposefully
19	damage GLOBAL.
20	69. DEFENDANTS then improperly removed GLOBAL's required website link
21	from their homepage (and refused to comply with other terms) as required under the
22	Settlement Agreement.
23	70. DEFENDANTS actions were oppressive and made to directly damage
24	GLOBAL and its business.
25	71. Further, the Amended License states GLOBAL's rights to the Licensed Marks
26	are defined as follows:
27	"Licensed Marks" means, without limitation, any and all trademarks, service marks, logos,
28	insignias, designs, and all other commercial symbols which MMA now uses or hereafter adopts to identify the source and origin of its goods and services, including but not limited to.

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GLOBAL had entered the China market and had its world press conference in the Great

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	1)
1	People's Hall in Tiananmen Square in Beijing, China. This was an extremely rare
2	accomplishment for a sports league, with several Chinese government officials in attendance
3	and was also announced on CCTV5 which airs to over 1 billion people.
4	102. GLOBAL was also working on a sports partnership to bring MMA content to several
5	cities in China with a State owned agency and sponsor partners.
6	103. GLOBAL had received an offer to invest over 100M rmb (about \$16M USD) to further
7 8	the promotion of WSOF in China and to promote foreign fighters in their events alongside
9	Chinese fighters.
10	104. Before the deal was consummated, DEFENDANTS then announced the name change to
11	"PFL" without notice to GLOBAL, and the discontinuance of WSOF.
12	105. DEFENDANTS further unilaterally refused to allow GLOBAL its contractual rights to
13	use the PFL name, and PFL has attempted to abandon its own contractual obligations in
14 15	breach of the Settlement Agreement.
16	106. Due to DEFENDANTS oppressive actions, the partnership is now at risk of loss.
17	107. GLOBAL has been damaged by the malicious actions, tortious business interference,
18	and breach of contract by DEFENDANTS.
19	CLAIMS FOR RELIEF
20	FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF Breach of Contract - Settlement Agreement
21	(As against Defendants MMAWC, Deifik, DFP, PFL and Silva; hereinafter the "Settlement Defendants")
22	108. Plaintiffs repeat, re-allege and incorporate by reference all preceding paragraphs of the
23	Complaint as though fully set-forth herein.
24	109. Plaintiffs entered into the Settlement Agreement with the Settlement Defendants.
25	110. The Settlement Defendants have breached the terms of the Settlement Agreement, by
26	attempting to dilute the terms of the settlement agreement concerning the non-dilution of it
27	interest and transfer of the assets of MMAWC to another entity PFL.
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AA465

1	111. The Settlement Defendants breached the Settlement Agreement as to WSOF Global by
2 3 4	breaching the terms of Licensing Agreement and diluting all economic value from the Licensin Agreement.
5	112. The Settlement Defendants have asserted an apparent repudiation or abandonment of its dutie
6	to perform pursuant to said agreement and have otherwise breached the terms of said agreement.
7	113. Therefore the Settlement Defendants have breached their contractual obligations, as stated
8	herein causing damage to Plaintiffs' damages.
9	114. As a result of the breaches described herein, Plaintiffs have suffered damages in excess or
10	\$10,000 and is entitled to an award as and for their damages incurred herein.
11	115. It has been necessary for Plaintiffs to retain the services of attorneys to prosecute this action and
12	therefore Plaintiffs are entitled to recover reasonable attorney's fees and costs incurred in
13	accordance with the law, including, without limitation, as special damages.
	[1]
14 15	SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing (As against all Defendants)
15 16	Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
15 16 17	Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing (As against all Defendants)
15 16 17 18	Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing (As against all Defendants)  116. The Plaintiffs repeat, re-allege and incorporate by reference all proceeding paragraphs of the
15 16 17 18 19	Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing (As against all Defendants)  116. The Plaintiffs repeat, re-allege and incorporate by reference all proceeding paragraphs of the Complaint as though fully set-forth herein.
15 16 17 18 19 20	Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing (As against all Defendants)  116. The Plaintiffs repeat, re-allege and incorporate by reference all proceeding paragraphs of the Complaint as though fully set-forth herein.  117. Implied in every contract in Nevada is the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
15 16 17 18 19 20 21	Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing (As against all Defendants)  116. The Plaintiffs repeat, re-allege and incorporate by reference all proceeding paragraphs of the Complaint as though fully set-forth herein.  117. Implied in every contract in Nevada is the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.  118. The Defendants have breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing (As against all Defendants)  116. The Plaintiffs repeat, re-allege and incorporate by reference all proceeding paragraphs of the Complaint as though fully set-forth herein.  117. Implied in every contract in Nevada is the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.  118. The Defendants have breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.  119. The Defendants have deprived Plaintiffs of the benefit of their bargain for the above outlined
15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing (As against all Defendants)  116. The Plaintiffs repeat, re-allege and incorporate by reference all proceeding paragraphs of the Complaint as though fully set-forth herein.  117. Implied in every contract in Nevada is the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.  118. The Defendants have breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.  119. The Defendants have deprived Plaintiffs of the benefit of their bargain for the above outlined reasons.
15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing (As against all Defendants)  116. The Plaintiffs repeat, re-allege and incorporate by reference all proceeding paragraphs of the Complaint as though fully set-forth herein.  117. Implied in every contract in Nevada is the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.  118. The Defendants have breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.  119. The Defendants have deprived Plaintiffs of the benefit of their bargain for the above outlined reasons.  120. The Plaintiffs have been injured in an amount in excess of \$10,000 as a direct and proximate
15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25	Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing (As against all Defendants)  116. The Plaintiffs repeat, re-allege and incorporate by reference all proceeding paragraphs of the Complaint as though fully set-forth herein.  117. Implied in every contract in Nevada is the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.  118. The Defendants have breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.  119. The Defendants have deprived Plaintiffs of the benefit of their bargain for the above outlined reasons.  120. The Plaintiffs have been injured in an amount in excess of \$10,000 as a direct and proximate cause of the actions of Defendants, Plaintiffs have performed all obligations due and owing under

THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF

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	Declaratory	Relief
(As	against all E	efendants)

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- 122. The Plaintiffs repeat, re-allege and incorporate by reference all proceeding paragraphs of the Complaint as though fully set-forth herein.
- 123. A justiciable controversy exists as Plaintiffs have asserted a claim of right as to the Property

  Interest in the Settlement Agreement.
- 124. Under N.R.S. § 30.010 et seq., the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act, any person interested under a written contract or other writings constituting a contract, or whose rights, status or other legal relations are affected by a contract, may have determined any question of construction or validity arising under the contract and obtain a declaration of rights, status or other legal relations thereunder.
- 125. The Settlement Defendants have thus far failed to demonstrate that they intend to continue to honor their obligations pursuant to the Settlement Agreement.
- 126. Accordingly, the controversy is between persons whose interests are adverse.
- 127. Note Plaintiffs have legally protectable interests in the controversy, i.e., their rights or interest in the property under Nevada law.
- 128. The issues involved in the controversy are ripe for judicial determination because there is a substantial controversy, among parties having adverse legal interests, of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment.
- 129. Plaintiffs therefore seek declaration(s) from this Court with respect to their interests in the property as contemplated by the Settlement Agreement.
- 130. Plaintiffs have been required to retain the services of counsel to prosecute this matter and, as such, are entitled to an award of their costs and reasonable attorneys' fees incurred herein.

### FOURTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF Intentional Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage (As against all Defendants)

- 131. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege each and every previous allegation contained herein as though set forth fully herein at length.
- 132. A prospective contractual relationship exists or existed between Plaintiffs and numerous third

1	parties including promotion companies, fighters and managers.
2	133. Defendants knew of these prospective relationships.
3	134. Defendants intended to harm Plaintiffs by preventing the relationships.
4	135. The interference was improper and/or unlawful.
5	136. Defendants had no privilege or justification.
6	137. Defendants' conduct resulted in actual harm to Plaintiff.
7	138. Plaintiffs have been required to retain the services of an attorney to prosecute this action and are
8	entitled to an award of attorney's fees and costs incurred herein.
9 10	FIFTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF Tortious Interference with Contract (As against all Defendants)
11	139. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege each and every previous allegation contained herein as though set
12	forth fully herein at length.
13	140. A contract existed between Plaintiffs and Defendants, as well as numerous third parties
14	including promotion companies, fighters and managers.
15	141. MMAX knew of these contractual relationships.
16	142. The actions of MMAX, as outlined above, were intentional and intended to interfere with these
17	contractual relations.
18	143. The interference was improper and/or unlawful and actually interfered with Plaintiffs
19	contractual relationships.
20	144. MMAX had no privilege or justification.
21	145. Defendants' conduct resulted in actual harm to Plaintiff.
22	146. Plaintiffs have been required to retain the services of an attorney to prosecute this action and are
23	entitled to an award of attorney's fees and costs incurred herein.
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## SIXTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF Alter Ego Claim (As against MMAWC and Deifik Defendants)

147. Plaintiffs repeats, re-allege, and incorporate by reference all proceedings paragraphs of the

148. There is a unity of interest between Defendant Deifik and Defendant Nancy and Bruce Deifik

149. Since Deifik's usurpation of control over MMAWC, there has existed, a unity of interest and

ownership such that any separateness between Defendant Deifik and Defendant Nancy and Bruce

Deifik Family Partnership LLLP and MMAWC has ceased to exist in that Deifik has completely

controlled, dominated, manipulated, managed and operated MMAWC since his usurpation for his

150. Defendants Deifik and Nancy and Bruce Deifik Family Partnership LLLP and MMAWC are,

and at all times mentioned here were, a mere shell, instrumentality and conduit through which

Defendant Deifik carried his own activities in the corporate name, exercising such complete

control and dominance over the activities of MMAWC and the Partnership to such an extent that

any individuality or separateness of said parties does not, and at all relevant times did not, exist.

151. Adherence to the fiction of the separate existence of Defendants Deifik and Nancy and Bruce

Deifik Family Partnership LLLP and MMAWC as entities distinct and apart from Defendant

Deifik would permit an abuse of the corporate privilege and would promote and sanction fraud,

injustice and an inequitable result in that Deifik has used MMAWC for the purpose of defrauding,

152. The use of Defendants Nancy and Bruce Deifik Family Partnership LLLP and MMAWC by

153. The Court should enter a judgment and declaration picroing the corporate veil of Bruce Deifik

Family Partnership LLLP and MMAWC as the alter ego of Deifik and MMAWC and personally

Defendant Deifik for the purposes of defrauding, misleading and injuring Counter-claimant is the

Family Partnership LLLP to the extent that Mr. Deifik is inseparable from said Partnership.

Complaint as though fully set-forth herein.

misleading and injuring Plaintiffs as set forth here.

proximate cause of Plaintiffs' damages as stated here.

responsible for their actions complained of here.

own personal benefit.

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	SEVENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF  Breach of Fiduciary Duty  (As against Deifik, Silva and Redmond)					
3	1154. Plaintiffs repeats, re-allege, and incorporate by reference all proceedings paragraphs of the					
4	Complaint as though fully set-forth herein.					
5	155. As alleged above Defendant Deifik, Silva, and Redmond are managers, directors, officer,					
6	and/or control persons of MMAWC and/or PFL.					
7	156. As managers, directors, officers and/or control persons, Defendants Deifik, Silva, and					
8	Redmond owed a fiduciary duty to Plaintiffs.					
9	157. Plaintiffs alerted Defendants Deifik, Silva, Redmond, and other Defendants to the breaches					
10	of the Settlement Agreement, and the existence of valid claims against the other Defenda					
11	Plaintiffs demanded that Defendants Deifik, Silva, and Redmond cause the board of directors they					
12	dominated to take action. However, Defendants dominated the board of directors and prevented					
13	MMAWC from taking actions in breach of their fiduciary duties.					
14	158. Defendants Deifik, Silva, and Redmond's actions were the direct and proximate cause of					
15	Plaintiffs' injuries.					
16	159. Plaintiff has been required to retain the services of an attorney to prosecute this matter					
17	and therefore, is entitled to an award of reasonable attorney's fees and costs incurred herein.					
18	EICHTE CE AND DELIE					
19	EIGHTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF Civil RICO (As against all Defendants)					
20						
21	Complaint as though fully set-forth herein.					
22	161. The conduct of Defendants as outlined above was a part of a fraudulent scheme designed					
23	to defraud Plaintiffs of money and property.					
24	162. The conduct of Defendants constitutes a "crime related to racketeering," the taking of					
25	property from another under circumstance not amounting to robbery pursuant to NRS 207.360(9)					
}	163. The conduct of Defendants constitutes a "crime related to racketeering" namely obtaining					
ł	possession of property valued at \$250.00.					
. [	164. Defendants engaged in at least two crimes related to racketeering they have engaged in					
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1	1 racketeering activity as defined by NRS 207.390.					
2	2 165. The racketeering activity of Defendants constitutes as criminal syndicate or enterprise					
3	pursuant to NRS 207.370 and NRS 207.380.					
4	166.	Defendants participated in racketeering activity in violation of NRS 207.400.				
5	167.	Defendants with criminal intent, received proceeds derived from racketeering activity in				
6	violation of NRS 207.400(1)(a).					
7	168.	Defendants acquired and maintained interest and/or control of the enterprise in violation				
8	of NRS 207.400(1)(b).					
9	169.	Defendants were associated with the enterprise to participate both directly and indirectly				
10	in the affairs of the enterprise through racketeering activity and or through the affairs of the					
11	enterprise in violation of NRS 207.400(1)(c).					
12	170.	Defendants intentionally organized, managed, directed, supervised, and or financed a				
13	criminal syndicate in violation of NRS 207.400(1)(d).					
14	171.	Defendants furnished assistance in the conduct of the affairs of the criminal syndicate				
15	with the intent to promote or further the criminal objectives of the syndicate in violation of NRS					
16	207.	400(1)(f).				
17	172.	Defendants actions as averred in this claim for relief were done either in conscious				
18	disregard for the rights of others, or in reckless disregard of the consequences of their actions, and					
19	were therefore done with either express or implied malice.					
20	173.	Defendants' actions were the direct and proximate cause of Plaintiffs' injuries.				
21	174.	Plaintiffs have been required to retain the services of an attorney to prosecute this matter				
22	and therefore, is entitled to an award of reasonable attorney's fees and costs incurred herein.					
23		NINTH CAUSE OF ACTION				
24	Specific Performance					
25		(As against all Defendants)				
26		Plaintiffs repeat, re-allege and incorporate by reference all proceeding paragraphs of the				
27	Complaint as though fully set-forth herein.					
28	183. A	At the time Plaintiffs and Defendants entered into the settlement agreement and license				

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1	agreement, the consideration Plaintiffs did proffer and perform under the agreements was adequate						
2	and the agreement is just and reasonable as to Defendants.						
3	184.	Plaintiffs have demanded that Defendants full perform and oblige their duties under the					
4	settlement and license agreements.						
5	185.	185. Defendants have refused and continue to refuse to perform as required by the terms of the					
6	agreen	agreements.					
7	186. Plaintiff has no adequate remedy at law to enforce the provisions of the agreements other						
8	than sp	than specific enforcement of the agreements.					
9	187. Plaintiff is entitled to specific performance of the terms, conditions, and provisions of the						
10	agreements by court decree.						
11	188.	Plaintiff is entitled to compensation incidental to a decree of specific performance.					
12	189.	Plaintiffs have been required to retain the services of an attorney to prosecute this matter an					
13	therefo	therefore, is entitled to an award of reasonable attorney's fees and costs incurred herein					
14		TENTH CAUSE OF ACTION					
15		Unjust Enrichment					
16		(As against all Defendants)					
17	Ì	Plaintiffs repeat, re-allege and incorporate by reference all proceeding paragraphs of the					
18	Compla	int as though fully set-forth herein.					
19	191.	These Defendants have knowingly obtained substantial benefits from their actions as					
20	described above.						
21	192.	It would be unjust for the Defendants to accept and retain such benefits without					
22	compensating Plaintiffs for the value of the benefits which they received.						
23	193.	As a direct and proximate result of Defendants' actions, it has become necessary for Plaintiffs					
24	to retain the services of an attorney to protect their rights and prosecute this Claim.						
25	194. F	Plaintiff reserves the right to amend this Complaint under the Nevada Rules of Civil					
26	Procedure as further facts become known.						
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### PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray for judgment against Defendants, and each of them, as follows:

- 1. For damages in an amount to be proven at the time of trial;
- 2. For prejudgment interest;
- 3. For punitive damages as may be applicable; without limitation, as special and/or punitive damages incurred;
- For the costs of suit herein incurred, including Plaintiffs' costs and attorneys' fees herein, as allowed by law;
- 5. For an Order granting declaratory and equitable relief including a determination by the Court that a valid and binding contract exits; that Plaintiffs performed in full; that Defendants are obliged to perform or otherwise as the Court deems proper; and
- 6. For such other and further relief as the Court deems proper and prudent.

Dated this 3rd day of June, 2019.

### LAW OFFICES OF BYRON THOMAS

/s/ Byron E. Thomas
BYRON E. THOMAS, ESQ.
Nevada Bar No. 8906
3275 S. Jones Blvd. Ste. 104
Las Vegas, Nevada 89146
Phone: (702) 747-3103
Facsimile: (702) 543-4855
Byronthomaslaw@gmail.com

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1	Electronically Filed 6/6/2019 8:39 AM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT  DISTRICT COURT					
2						
3	CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA					
4	Snawn wright as trustee of Zion wood On					
5	Wan Trust, Plaintiff(s) vs. CASE NO: A-17-764118-C					
6 MMAWC LLC, Defendant(s)  DEPT. NO: XXVII						
7						
8	COMMISSIONER'S DECISION ON REQUEST FOR EXEMPTION					
10						
11	REQUEST FOR EXEMPTION FILED ON: May 17, 2019					
12	EXEMPTION FILED BY: Plainatiffs OPPOSITION: No					
13	·					
14	FINDINGS					
15						
16						
17	Due to late filing of Request for Exemption, Plaintiff's counsel to pay \$150.00					
18	sanction to the Clark County Law Library within 30 days of this Decision.					
19	Plaintiffs' counsel to pay all fees and costs of Arbitrator.					
20						
21	<u>DECISION</u>					
22	Having reviewed the Request for Exemption, and all related pleadings, the Request					
23	for Exemption is hereby GRANTED.					
24	SYU.					
25	DATED this of June, 2019.					
16	ADR COMMISSIONER					
27	1					
- 11		1				

ADR COMMISSIONER EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

1 2 NOTICE Pursuant to Nevada Arbitration Rule 5(D), you are hereby notified you have five (5) days from the date you are served with this document within which to file written objections with the Clerk of Court and serve all parties. The Commissioner's Decision is deemed served three (3) days after the Commissioner's designee deposits a copy of the Decision in the U.S. Mail. Pursuant to NEFCR Rule 9(f)(2) an additional 3 days is not added to the time if served electronically (via e-service). 7 A copy of the foregoing ADR Commissioner's Decision was: 8 On June 6, 2019, a copy of the foregoing Commissioner's Decision 9 on Request for Exemption was electronically served, pursuant to N.E.F.C.R. Rule 9, to all registered parties in the Eighth Judicial District Court Electronic Filing Program. 10 11 If indicated below, a copy of the foregoing Commissioner's Decision on Request for Exemption was also: 12 ☐ Placed in the folder of counsel maintained in the Office of the Clerk of Court on 13 , 2019. 14 Mailed by United States Postal Service, Postage prepaid, to the proper parties listed below at their last known address(es) on \_\_\_\_\_\_, 2019. 15 16 17 Clark County Law Library 18 309 S. Third St., #400 Las Vegas, NV 89155-7340 19 20 21 22 Lisa Kaba ADR COMMISSIONER'S DESIGNEE 23 24 25 26

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COMMISSIONER
EIGHTH JUDICIAL
DISTRICT COURT

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### DISTRICT COURT

### CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

WRIGHT as trustee of ZION WOOD OBI WAN

CASE NO.: A-17-764118-C DISTRICT COURT DEPT: 27

STIPULATION AND ORDER THE PLAINTIFF'S PLEADING FILED ON 06/3/19 CAPTIONED AS "AMENDED COMPLAINT" IS PLAINTIFF'S MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT AS TO ITS CLAIMS AGAINST DEFENDANT KEITH REDMOND AND THE OTHER DEFENDANTS DO NOT HAVE TO RESPOND

Page 1 of 3

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Plaintiffs ZION WOOD OBI WAN TRUST; SHAWN WRIGHT; and WSOF GLOBAL, LLC, and defendants MMAWC, LLC; MMAX INVESTMENT PARTNERS, INC.; BRUCE DEIFIK; CARLOS SILVA; NANCY AND BRUCE DEIFIK FAMILY PARTNERSHIP LLLP; and KEITH REDMOND stipulate and agree as follows:

On May 17, 2019, the Court entered a Stipulation To Vacate Hearing on Keith Redmond's Motion for a More Definite Statement and to Allows Plaintiffs to File a More Definite Statement ("5/14/19 Stipulation"). Among other things, the 5/14/19 Stipulation provided for Plaintiffs to file a more definite statement of their claims against defendant Keith Redmond ("Redmond"), stating:

2. Plaintiffs shall have up to fifteen (15) calendar days from the date of entry of this Stipulation & Order to file and serve a more definite statement of their claims against Redmond.

Id. The 5/14/19 Stipulation did not provide for Plaintiffs to otherwise amend its complaint as to its claims against the other defendants. Id.

On June 3, 2019, Plaintiffs filed a pleading captioned Amended Complaint ("6/3/19 Amended Complaint") in response to the 5/14/19 Stipulation. To avoid any possible confusion, the parties stipulate as follows:

- (1) the 6/3/19 Amended Complaint is only a more definite statement of the Plaintiffs' claims against defendant Redmond;
- (2) the 6/3/19 Amended Complaint and amendments contained therein only concern the Plaintiffs' claims against defendant Redmond; and

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DICKINSON WRIGHT

Michael Feder, Esq. Nevada Bar No. Ph. (702) 550-4440 Ml eder a dickinsonwright.com

Attorneys for Defendants Carlos Silva and MMAX Investment Partners, Inc.

Respectfully Submitted By.

KENNEDY & COUVILLIER, PLLC

Makimiliano D. Coldillio III. Esq., Bar #7661

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(3) the other defendants do not have to respond to the 6/3/19 Amended Complaint and the orders on their respective motions to dismiss and their answers and affirmative defenses to the prior complaint shall apply to the Amended Complaint.

Dated: June 13, 2019.

LAW OFFICES OF BYRON	TRENNEDY & COUVILLIER	DICKINSON WRIGHT
THOMAS DAY ON	Makin Milano D. Coulviller III.	Catallia
Nevada'Bar No. 8906	Esq. V	Nevada Bar No.
Ph: (702)747-3103	Nevada Bar No. 7661	<sup>2</sup> Ph. (702) 550-4440
Extentilization is great com-	Ph; (702) 605-3440	Milly torganization of
Attorneys For Plaintiffs	Media illian içə d <u>iqəşi</u> ri səqi	wrgalitycom
	Attorneys for Defendants	
		Carlos Silva and MMAX
		: Investment Partners, Inc.
	Family Partnership LLLP;	
	and Katele Datement	*

### IT IS SO ORDERED.

District Court	Judge	•	
Dated:			

Respectfully Submitted By, KENNEDY & COUVILLIER, PLLC

Maximiliano D. Couvillier III. Esq., Bar #7661 arcouvillier a kejaway con: