IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

EDWARD MICHAEL ADAMS,

Appellant,

v.

THE STATE OF NEVADA,

Respondent.

Electronically Filed Jun 15 2022 02:10 p.m. Elizabeth A. Brown Clerk of Supreme Court

Case No. 83917

RESPONDENT'S APPENDIX

JAMES A. ORONOZ, ESQ. Nevada Bar #006769 Oronoz & Ericsson, LLC 1050 Indigo, Suite 120 Las Vegas, Nevada 89145 (702) 878-2889 STEVEN B. WOLFSON Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #001565 Regional Justice Center 200 Lewis Avenue Post Office Box 552212 Las Vegas, Nevada 89155-2212 (702) 671-2500 State of Nevada

AARON D. FORD Nevada Attorney General Nevada Bar # 007704 100 North Carson Street Carson City, Nevada 89701-4717 (775) 684-1265

Counsel for Appellant

Counsel for Respondent

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify and affirm that this document was filed electronically with the Nevada Supreme Court on 15th day of June, 2022. Electronic Service of the foregoing document shall be made in accordance with the Master Service List as follows:

AARON D. FORD Nevada Attorney General

JAMES A. ORONOZ, ESQ. Counsel for Appellant

JONATHAN E. VANBOSKERCK Chief Deputy District Attorney

/s/ J. Hall

Employee, Clark County District Attorney's Office

JV/Maricel Leon/jh

DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

Felony/Gross Misdemeanor

COURT MINUTES

October 15, 2012

08C241003

The State of Nevada vs Edward M Adams

October 15, 2012

8:15 AM

State's Request to Appoint Counsel

HEARD BY:

Barker, David

COURTROOM: RJC Courtroom 11B

COURT CLERK:

: Tia Everett

RECORDER:

Cheryl Carpenter

PARTIES

Kelly Williams, Deputy District Attorney, present on behalf of the State. Defendant

PRESENT:

not present in custody with Nevada Department of Corrections.

JOURNAL ENTRIES

- Kelly Williams, Deputy District Attorney, present on behalf of the State. Defendant not present in custody with Nevada Department of Corrections.

Ms. Williams advised the State is seeking to have the Court appoint counsel based on the fact that the Supreme Court continues to remand cases in which Defendants are serving lengthy sentences. Court noted on 8/30/2012 the Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and Defendant filed his post conviction writ on 9/12/2012. COURT ORDERED, State's Request GRANTED and matter SET for Appointment of Counsel. FURTHER ORDERED, all upcoming hearings set for 11/21/2012 VACATED and will be addressed with new counsel.

NDC

10/22/2012 8:15 AM APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL

	١ ٠		09/04/2015 03:05:06 PM	
· •	1 2	ORDR JAMES A. ORONOZ, ESQ Nevada Bar No. 6769	Alun D. Column	
	3	ORONOZ & ERICSSON LLC 700 SOUTH 3RD STREET	CLERK OF THE COURT	
	4	Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 Telephone: (702) 878-2889		
	5	Facsimile: (702) 522-1542		
	6	jim@oronozlawyers.com Attorney for Defendant		
	7	DISTRIC	CT COURT	
	8	CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA		
	9		}	
	10	THE STATE OF NEVADA, Plaintiff,		
242	11	vs.	CASE NO. 08C241003	
89101) 522-1542	12	EDWARD ADAMS,	DEPT. NO. XIX	
SON Nevada Ile (702	13	Defendant.		
& ERICSSON	14			
ಸು. ಕ⊗	15	EX PARTE ORDER (OF APPOINTMENT	
ORONOZ h Third Stre 72) 878-28	16	IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT Theodore N. Hariton MD., is appointed to review		
7 1 1 1 1	17	medical records and investigate issues pertaining to the alleged sexual assault in the above-		
700 So Telephone (18	captioned case.		
	19	IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Dr. Hariton's fees are not to exceed the amount of		
	20			
	21	\$5,000.00 without further order of the court. AUG 3 1 2015		
	22	DATED this day of, 20	15. V .	
	23	_	JUDGE WILLIAM KEPHART	
	24	D		
	25	Prepared & Submitted By:	for Judge William Kephart	
	26	- Con		
	27	JAMES A. ORØNOZ, ESQ.		
	28	· ·		

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1	MOT	Alm to Chim	
2	JAMES A. ORONOZ, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 6769	CLERK OF THE COURT	
3	ORONOZ, ERICSSON & GAFFNEY, LLC 1050 Indigo Drive, Suite 120		
4	Las Vegas, Nevada 89145 Telephone: (702) 878-2889		
	jim@oronozlawyers.com		
5	Attorney for Petitioner		
6	DISTR	RICT COURT	
7	CLARK CO	OUNTY NEVADA	
8			
9	EDWARD ADAMS,		
10	Petitioner,) CASE NO.: 08C241003	
	VS.) DEPT: XIX	
11	THE STATE OF NEVADA, Respondent.		
12	Respondent.		
13			
14		FOR THE PURPOSE OF OBTAINING SANE	
15	EXAM PHOTOGRAPHS FROM	THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE	
16	COMES NOW, Petitioner, EDWARI	D ADAMS, by and through his attorney, JAMES A.	
17	ORONOZ, ESQ., and hereby requests that the	ne above-entitled matter be placed on the Court's	
18	calendar for the purpose of obtaining the SANE exam photographs from the District Attorney's		
19	office in order to file the Petitioner's Supple	mental Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Post-	
20	Conviction).		
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This Motion is made and based on the pleadings and papers on file herein, as well as any 1 oral arguments of counsel adduced at the time of hearing. 2 DATED this 5th day of May, 2016. 3 /s/ James A. Oronoz 4 JAMES A. ORONOZ, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 6769 5 1050 Indigo Drive, Suite 120 Las Vegas, Nevada 89145 6 Attorney for Petitioner 7 **NOTICE OF MOTION** 8 YOU, AND EACH OF YOU, will please take notice that the undersigned will bring the 9 foregoing MOTION TO PLACE ON CALENDAR FOR THE PURPOSE OF 10 11 **OBTAINING SANE EXAM PHOTOGRAPHS FROM THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE** on for hearing on the 16 day of May, 2016, at the Clark 12 County Courthouse, 200 Lewis Avenue in District Court, Department XIX at the hour of 13 8: 30 a.m. or as soon thereafter as Counsel may be heard. 14 **MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES** 15 In order to investigate Mr. Adams' claims thoroughly, counsel requests that this Court 16 direct the district attorney's office to produce the SANE exam photographs in this case. As this 17 Court is aware, Dr. Theodore N. Hariton, MD, has been appointed to review records and assist 18 in the investigation necessary to support Mr. Adams' post-conviction claims. However, 19 20 Counsel has been unable to obtain the color photographs of the SANE examination, which are 21 key to Dr. Hariton's review. 22 23 24

1	WHEREFORE, Petitioner prays that this Honorable Court grant this Motion, and direct	
2	the State to provide Counsel with the color photographs of the victim's SANE examination.	
3		
4	DATED this 5th day of May, 2016.	
5	Respectfully submitted,	
6	/s/ James A. Oronoz	
7	JAMES A. ORONOZ, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 6769	
8	1050 Indigo Drive, Suite 120 Las Vegas, Nevada 89145	
9	Attorney for Petitioner	
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify and affirm that this document was filed electronically with the Nevada State District Court in Clark County, Nevada on May 5, 2016. Electronic service of the foregoing document shall be made in accordance with the Master Service List as follows:

STEVEN WOLFSON Clark County District Attorney 200 Lewis Avenue Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 Motions@clarkcountyda.com

RYAN MACDONALD
Deputy District Attorney
200 Lewis Avenue
Las Vegas, Nevada 89101
ryan.macdonald@clarkcountyda.com

By: /s/ Rachael Stewart
An employee of Oronoz, Ericsson & Gaffney, LLC

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CLERK OF THE COURT

OPPS 1 STEVEN B. WOLFSON Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #001565 JAMES R. SWEETIN 3 Chief Deputy District Attorney Nevada Bar #005144 4 200 Lewis Avenue 5 Las Vegas, Nevada 89155-2212 (702) 671-2500 Attorney for Plaintiff 6

DISTRICT COURT

CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

THE STATE OF NEVADA,

Plaintiff,

-VS-

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EDWARD ADAMS, #1969904

Defendant.

CASE NO: **08C241003**

DEPT NO: XIX

STATE'S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO PLACE ON CALENDAR FOR THE PURPOSE OF OBTAINING SANE EXAM PHOTOGRAPHS FROM THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE

DATE OF HEARING: MAY 16, 2016 TIME OF HEARING: 8:30 AM

COMES NOW, the State of Nevada, by STEVEN B. WOLFSON, Clark County District Attorney, through JAMES R. SWEETIN, Chief Deputy District Attorney, and hereby submits the attached Points and Authorities in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Place on Calendar for the Purpose of Obtaining Sane Exam Photographs from the District Attorney's Office.

This opposition is made and based upon all the papers and pleadings on file herein, the attached points and authorities in support hereof, and oral argument at the time of hearing, if deemed necessary by this Honorable Court.

POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On February 12, 2008, the State filed an Information charging Defendant Edward Adams as follows: Count 1 – First Degree Kidnapping with Use of a Deadly Weapon (Felony – NRS 200.310, 200.320, 193.165), Count 2 – Battery with Intent to Commit a Crime with Use of a Deadly Weapon (Felony – NRS 200.400, 193.165), Counts 3 through 11 – Sexual Assault with a Minor Under Fourteen Years of Age with Use of a Deadly Weapon (Felony – NRS 200.364, 200.366, 193.165), and Count 12 – Open or Gross Lewdness (Gross Misdemeanor – NRS 201.210). On October 28, 2009, the State filed an Amended Information with the same charges.

On November 2, 2009, Defendant's jury trial commenced. On November 4, 2009, the jury found Defendant guilty of Count 1 – First Degree Kidnapping, Count 2 – Battery with Intent to Commit Sexual Assault, Counts 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 11 – Sexual Assault, and Count 12 – Open or Gross Lewdness. The jury found Defendant not guilty of Counts 9 and 10.

On January 13, 2010, the district court sentenced Defendant as follows: Count 1 – to 60 months to life and \$,2932.00 in restitution; Count 2 – to 60 months to life, consecutive to Count 1; Count 3 – to 120 months to life, consecutive to Count 2; Count 4 – to 120 months to life, consecutive to Count 3; Count 5 – to 120 months to life, consecutive to Count 4; Count 6 – to 120 months to life, consecutive to Count 5; Count 7 – to 120 months to life, consecutive to Count 8 – to 120 months to life, consecutive to Count 7; Count 11 – to 120 months to life, consecutive to Count 8; and Count 12 – to 12 months, concurrent with all other counts. The court also imposed a special sentence of Lifetime Supervision to commence upon release from any term of imprisonment, probation, or parole. The court also ordered Defendant to register as a sex offender after any release from custody. The court entered the Judgment of Conviction on February 2, 2010.

Defendant filed his Notice of Appeal on February 22, 2010. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's Judgment of Conviction on July 26, 2012. Remittitur issued on August 21, 2012.

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On September 11, 2012, Defendant filed a Post-Conviction Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. On October 15, 2012, the court appointed counsel for Defendant. On September 4, 2015, this Court entered an Ex Parte Order of Appointment to appoint Dr. Hariton to "review medical records and investigate issues." On May 5, 2016, Defendant filed a Motion to Place on Calendar for the Purpose of Obtaining SANE Exam Photographs from the District Attorney's Office ("Motion"). The State herein responds to Defendant's Motion.

ARGUMENT

I. Defendant's discovery request must be denied because Defendant is not entitled to discovery at this juncture.

Defendant requests that this Court direct the District Attorney's Office to produce the SANE exam photographs in order for Dr. Theodore N. Hariton to review the records and assist in the investigation. Mot. at 2. However, this Court should deny Defendant's request because he is not entitled to discovery at this juncture. Rules regarding post-conviction discovery are found in NRS 34.780:

- 1. The Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure, to the extent that they are not inconsistent with NRS 34.360 to 34.830, inclusive, apply to proceedings pursuant to NRS 34.720 to 34.830, inclusive.
- 2. After the writ has been granted and a date set for the hearing, a party may invoke any method of discovery available under the Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure if, and to the extent that, the judge or justice for good cause shown grants leave to do so.
- 3. A request for discovery which is available under the Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure must be accompanied by a statement of the interrogatories or requests for admission and a list of any documents sought to be produced.

(emphasis added). As articulated in the statute, any motions for discovery in the context of post-conviction must occur *after* a writ has been granted, an evidentiary hearing has been set, and only on the condition that good cause is shown.

NRS 34.780 is adopted from federal law.¹ A habeas petitioner does not enjoy the presumptive entitlement to discovery of a traditional civil litigant. <u>Bracy v. Gramley</u>, 520 U.S. 899, 903-05, 117 S. Ct. 1793, 1796-97 (1997). Under the "good cause" standard, a court

¹ <u>See</u> Testimony in regards to Assembly Bill 571, before the Senate Judiciary Committee, 63rd Nev. Leg. Session (1985), Testimony of Brian Hutchins, Attorney General, and Assemblyman Robert Sader.

should grant leave to conduct discovery in habeas corpus proceedings only "where specific allegations before the court show reason to believe that the petitioner may, if the facts are more fully developed, be able to demonstrate that he is . . . entitled to relief" <u>Id.</u> at 908-909, 117 S. Ct. at 1799. In habeas proceedings discovery is only available "in the discretion of the court and for good cause shown" and is not "meant to be a fishing expedition for habeas petitioners to explore their case in search of its existence." <u>See Rich v. Calderon</u>, 187 F.3d 1064, 1067-68 (9th Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks omitted). Applying the identical good cause standard in federal habeas proceedings, federal circuit courts of appeal "will not find that a district court erred by denying a fishing expedition masquerading as discovery." <u>Stanford v. Parker</u>, 266 F.3d 442, 460 (6th Cir. 2001).

Here, Defendant is not entitled to discovery because this Court has not granted a post-conviction petition. Moreover, Defendant has not obtained this Court's leave to do so after a showing of good cause. Therefore, Defendant's discovery request should be denied.

CONCLUSION

Based upon the foregoing, the State respectfully request that this Court denies Defendant's Motion to Place on Calendar for the Purpose of Obtaining SANE Exam Photographs from the District Attorney's Office.

DATED this 10th day of May, 2016.

Respectfully submitted,

STEVEN B. WOLFSON Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #001565

BY /s/ JAMES R. SWEETIN

JAMES R. SWEETIN

Chief Deputy District Attorney
Nevada Bar #005144

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that service of the above and foregoing was made this 10th day of MAY 2016, to:

JAMES ORONOZ, ESQ. jim@oronozlawyers.com

BY /s/ HOWARD CONRAD
Secretary for the District Attorney's Office Special Victims Unit

hjc/SVU

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1 **ORDR** STEVEN B. WOLFSON 2 Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #001565 3 JAMES R. SWEETIN Chief Deputy District Attorney 4 Nevada Bar #005144 200 Lewis Avenue 5 Las Vegas, NV 89155-2212 (702) 671-2500 6 Attorney for Plaintiff 7 8 9 10 11

CLERK OF THE COURT

DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

THE STATE OF NEVADA,

Plaintiff,

-VS-

EDWARD ADAMS, #1969904

Defendant.

CASE NO:

08C241003

DEPT NO:

XIX

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION OF MAY 16, 2016

DATE OF HEARING: MAY 16, 2016 TIME OF HEARING: 8:30 A.M.

THIS MATTER having come on for hearing before the above entitled Court on the 16TH day of MAY, 2016, the Defendant not being present, IN PROPER PERSON, the Plaintiff being represented by STEVEN B. WOLFSON, District Attorney, through NOREEN DEMONTE, Chief Deputy District Attorney, without argument, based on the pleadings and good cause appearing therefor,

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1	IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO PLACE ON		
2	CALENDAR FOR THE PURPOSE OF OBTAINING SANE EXAM PHOTOGRAPHS		
3	FROM THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE, shall be, and is, DENIED.		
4	DATED this 23 day of May, 2016.		
5	Will Kats		
6	DISTRICT JUDGE		
7	STEVEN B. WOLFSON Clark County District Attorney		
8	Nevada Bar #001565		
9			
10	BY for NOREEN DEMONTE		
11	Chief Deputy District Attorney Nevada Bar #008213		
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1	MOT JAMES A. ORONOZ, ESQ.	Alun S. Elmin
2	Nevada Bar No. 6769 ORONOZ, ERICSSON & GAFFNEY, LLC	CLERK OF THE COURT
3	1050 Indigo Drive, Suite 120 Las Vegas, Nevada 89145	
5	Telephone: (702) 878-2889 jim@oronozlawyers.com Attorney for Petitioner	
6		CT COURT
7	CLARK COU	JNTY NEVADA
8		
9	EDWARD ADAMS,	
10	Petitioner,) CASE NO.: 08C241003
10	VS.	DEPT: XIX
11	THE STATE OF NEVADA,	
12	Respondent.	
13		
14 15	OBTAINING SANE EXAM PHOTOGRA	CALENDAR FOR THE PURPOSE OF PHS FROM THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S FICE
16	COMES NOW, Petitioner, EDWARD	ADAMS, by and through his attorney, JAMES A.
17	ORONOZ, ESQ., and hereby requests that the	above-entitled matter be placed on the Court's
18	calendar for the purpose of obtaining the SANI	E exam photographs from the District Attorney's
19	office in order to file the Petitioner's Suppleme	ental Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Post-
$\begin{bmatrix} 20 \\ 21 \end{bmatrix}$	Conviction).	
21 22	///	
$\begin{bmatrix} 22 \\ 23 \end{bmatrix}$		
24	///	
- •	///	
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1	This Motion is made and based on the pleadings and papers on file herein, as well as any		
2	oral arguments of counsel adduced at the time of hearing.		
3	DATED this 31st day of August, 2016.		
4	/s/ James A. Oronoz		
5	JAMES A. ORONOZ, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 6769		
6	1050 Indigo Drive, Suite 120 Las Vegas, Nevada 89145		
7	Attorney for Petitioner		
8	NOTICE OF MOTION		
9	YOU, AND EACH OF YOU, will please take notice that the undersigned will bring the		
10	foregoing MOTION TO PLACE ON CALENDAR FOR THE PURPOSE OF		
11	OBTAINING SANE EXAM PHOTOGRAPHS FROM THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S		
12	OFFICE on for hearing on the day ofSEPTEMBER, 2016, at the Clark		
13	County Courthouse, 200 Lewis Avenue in District Court, Department XIX at the hour of		
14	8:30 a.m. or as soon thereafter as Counsel may be heard.		
15	MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES		
16	Although a habeas petitioner is not presumptively entitled to discovery like a traditional		
17	civil litigant, this Court may grant leave to conduct discovery upon a finding of good cause. See,		
18	NRS 34.780; <u>Bracy v. Gramley</u> , 520 U.S.899, 908-909, 117 S.Ct. 1793, 138 L.Ed.2d 97 (1997).		
19	Here, Mr. Adams shows good cause for this Court to grant his request to order the		
20	district attorney's office to provide digital color photographs of the victim's SANE examination.		
21	Mr. Adams submits that the digital color photographs are necessary to determine the viability of		
22	his argument that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request that an independent expert		
23	review the SANE exam evidence prior to trial. Mr. Adams currently seeks to have Theodore N.		
24	Hariton, MD, review the digital color photographs to determine the likelihood that consensual		

sex occurred between Mr. Adams and the victim, which if true, could have provided support for Mr. Adams' consent defense at trial.

To date, Counsel for Mr. Adams has tried diligently to obtain the photographs from the SANE exam by various means, but he has been completely unable to obtain them.¹ Now, Mr. Adams requests that this Court find good cause to order the district attorney's office to produce the digital color photographs.

On May 5, 2016, Mr. Adams filed a Motion to Place on Calendar for the Purpose of Obtaining SANE Exam Photographs from the District Attorney's Office. In that motion, Mr. Adams requested that this Court direct the district attorney's office to produce the digital color photographs of the victim's SANE exam. At that time, this Court had already appointed Theodore N. Hariton, MD, to review the records and assist Counsel in investigating Mr. Adams' post-conviction claims. Although Counsel provided Dr. Hariton copies of the black and white SANE exam photographs, Dr. Hariton could not see the victim's injuries clearly enough to make any determinations or be of any assistance in reviewing the evidence.

On May 16, 2016, this Court denied Mr. Adams' Motion and orally directed Counsel to visit the evidence vault to obtain the required photographs. Counsel subsequently followed the Court's instructions and reviewed all of the evidence in the vault. However, the evidence vault does not have any of the photographs in its possession.

Now, Mr. Adams renews his request for this Court to order the district attorney's office to produce the digital color photographs of the victim's SANE exam. Until Counsel is able to obtain the photographs, he cannot effectively assist Mr. Adams in his post-conviction proceedings because Dr. Hariton cannot review the evidence and provide an opinion as to whether the injuries sustained by the victim could have been the result of consensual sex.

¹ Counsel contacted previous counsel, and he visited the evidence vault.

CONCLUSION WHEREFORE, Petitioner prays that this Honorable Court grant this Motion, and direct the State to provide Counsel with the color photographs of the victim's SANE examination. DATED this 31st day of August, 2016. Respectfully submitted, /s/ James A. Oronoz JAMES A. ORONOZ, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 6769 1050 Indigo Drive, Suite 120 Las Vegas, Nevada 89145 Attorney for Petitioner

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE	
I hereby certify and affirm that this document was filed electronically with the Nevada	
State District Court in Clark County, Nevada on August 31, 2016. Electronic service of the	
foregoing document shall be made in accordance with the Master Service List as follows:	
STEVEN WOLFSON Clark County District Attorney	
200 Lewis Avenue Las Vegas, Nevada 89101	
Motions@clarkcountyda.com	
JAMES SWEETIN Chief Deputy District Attorney	
200 Lewis Avenue Las Vegas, Nevada 89101	
james.sweetin@clarkcountyda.com	
By: <u>/s/ Rachael Stewart</u> An employee of Oronoz, Ericsson & Gaffney, LLC	
All employee of Oronoz, Ericsson & Garmey, LLC	

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OPPS 1 STEVEN B. WOLFSON Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #001565 JAMES R. SWEETIN 3 Chief Deputy District Attorney Nevada Bar #005144 4 200 Lewis Avenue 5 Las Vegas, Nevada 89155-2212 (702) 671-2500 Attorney for Plaintiff 6

CLERK OF THE COURT

DISTRICT COURT

CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

THE STATE OF NEVADA,

Plaintiff,

-VS-

EDWARD ADAMS, #1969904

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Defendant.

CASE NO: **08C241003**

DEPT NO: XIX

STATE'S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S SECOND MOTION TO PLACE ON CALENDAR FOR THE PURPOSE OF OBTAINING SANE EXAM PHOTOGRAPHS FROM THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE

DATE OF HEARING: SEPTEMBER 12, 2016 TIME OF HEARING: 8:30 AM

COMES NOW, the State of Nevada, by STEVEN B. WOLFSON, Clark County District Attorney, through JAMES R. SWEETIN, Chief Deputy District Attorney, and hereby submits the attached Points and Authorities in Opposition to Defendant's Motion Second Motion to Place on Calendar for the Purpose of Obtaining Sane Exam Photographs from the District Attorney's Office.

This opposition is made and based upon all the papers and pleadings on file herein, the attached points and authorities in support hereof, and oral argument at the time of hearing, if deemed necessary by this Honorable Court.

POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On January 31, 2008, the State filed an Information charging Defendant Edward Adams as follows: Count 1 – First Degree Kidnapping with Use of a Deadly Weapon (Felony – NRS 200.310, 200.320, 193.165), Count 2 – Battery with Intent to Commit a Crime with Use of a Deadly Weapon (Felony – NRS 200.400, 193.165), Counts 3 through 11 – Sexual Assault with a Minor Under Fourteen Years of Age with Use of a Deadly Weapon (Felony – NRS 200.364, 200.366, 193.165), and Count 12 – Open or Gross Lewdness (Gross Misdemeanor – NRS 201.210). On October 28, 2009, the State filed an Amended Information with the same charges.

On November 2, 2009, Defendant's jury trial commenced. On November 4, 2009, the jury found Defendant guilty of Count 1 – First Degree Kidnapping, Count 2 – Battery with Intent to Commit Sexual Assault, Counts 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 11 – Sexual Assault, and Count 12 – Open or Gross Lewdness. The jury found Defendant not guilty of Counts 9 and 10.

On January 13, 2010, the district court sentenced Defendant as follows: Count 1 – to 60 months to life; Count 2 – to 60 months to life, consecutive to Count 1; Count 3 – to 120 months to life, consecutive to Count 2; Count 4 – to 120 months to life, consecutive to Count 3; Count 5 – to 120 months to life, consecutive to Count 4; Count 6 – to 120 months to life, consecutive to Count 5; Count 7 – to 120 months to life, consecutive to Count 6; Count 8 – to 120 months to life, consecutive to Count 7; Count 11 – to 120 months to life, consecutive to Count 8; and Count 12 – to 12 months, concurrent with all other counts.

The court also imposed a special sentence of Lifetime Supervision to commence upon release from any term of imprisonment, probation, or parole. The court also ordered Defendant to register as a sex offender after any release from custody. The court entered the Judgment of Conviction on February 2, 2010.

Defendant filed his Notice of Appeal on February 22, 2010. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's Judgment of Conviction on July 26, 2012. Remittitur issued on August 21, 2012.

On September 11, 2012, Defendant filed a Post-Conviction Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. On October 15, 2012, the court appointed counsel for Defendant. On September 4, 2015, this Court entered an Ex Parte Order of Appointment to appoint Dr. Hariton to "review medical records and investigate issues." On May 5, 2016, Defendant filed a Motion to Place on Calendar for the Purpose of Obtaining SANE Exam Photographs from the District Attorney's Office ("Motion"). On May 10, 2016, the State filed its opposition and the Court denied Defendant's motion on May 16, 2016. The Court entered its order denying Defendant's Motion on June 1, 2016.

On August 31, 2016, Defendant filed a Second Motion to Place on Calendar for the Purpose of Obtaining SANE Exam Photographs from the District Attorney's Office ("Second Motion"). The State's response to Defendant's Second Motion follows.

ARGUMENT

I. DEFENDANT'S SECOND MOTION IS BARRED BY THE DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA

Defendant's Second Motion is barred by the doctrine of res judicata. In fact, most of the instant motion is identical to his previous Motion to Place on Calendar for the Purpose of Obtaining SANE Exam Photographs from the District Attorney's Office filed on May 5, 2016. Defendant repeatedly alleges that he needs the color photographs from the SANE exam so that his expert can review them to help determine if his prior counsel was ineffective. Defendant's petition was heard and denied by the court on May 16, 2016. Defendant's Second Motion is pending with this court but is not cognizable as Defendant failed to request leave of the court to file such motion. As such, Defendant is further estopped from raising these claims again pursuant to the principles of res judicata. See Mason v. State, 206 S.W.3d 869, 875 (Ark. 2005) (recognizing the doctrine's applicability in the criminal context); see also York v. State, 342 S.W.3d 528, 553 (Tex. Crim. Appl. 2011). Accordingly, by simply continuing to file motions with the same arguments, his motion is barred by the doctrine of res judicata. Id.; Hall v. State, 91 Nev. 314, 316, 535 P.2d 797, 799 (1975). Therefore, this Court should deny Defendant's Second Motion.

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II. DEFENDANT'S DISCOVERY REQUEST MUST BE DENIED BECAUSE DEFENDANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO DISCOVERY AT THIS JUNCTURE.

Defendant again requests that this Court direct the District Attorney's Office to produce the SANE exam photographs in order for Dr. Theodore N. Hariton to review the records and assist in the investigation. Mot. at 2-3. However, this Court should deny Defendant's newest request because he is still not entitled to discovery at this juncture. Rules regarding post-conviction discovery are found in NRS 34.780, which in pertinent part states:

2. After the writ has been granted and a date set for the hearing, a party may invoke any method of discovery available under the Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure if, and to the extent that, the judge or justice for good cause shown grants leave to do so.

(emphasis added). As articulated in the statute, any motions for discovery in the context of post-conviction must occur *after* a writ has been granted, an evidentiary hearing has been set, and only on the condition that good cause is shown.

NRS 34.780 is adopted from federal law.¹ A habeas petitioner does not enjoy the presumptive entitlement to discovery of a traditional civil litigant. Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899, 903-05, 117 S. Ct. 1793, 1796-97 (1997). Under the "good cause" standard, a court should grant leave to conduct discovery in habeas corpus proceedings only "where specific allegations before the court show reason to believe that the petitioner may, if the facts are more fully developed, be able to demonstrate that he is . . . entitled to relief" Id. at 908-909, 117 S. Ct. at 1799. In habeas proceedings discovery is only available "in the discretion of the court and for good cause shown" and is not "meant to be a fishing expedition for habeas petitioners to explore their case in search of its existence." See Rich v. Calderon, 187 F.3d 1064, 1067-68 (9th Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks omitted). Applying the identical good cause standard in federal habeas proceedings, federal circuit courts of appeal "will not find that a district court erred by denying a fishing expedition masquerading as discovery." Stanford v. Parker, 266 F.3d 442, 460 (6th Cir. 2001).

¹ <u>See</u> Testimony in regards to Assembly Bill 571, before the Senate Judiciary Committee, 63rd Nev. Leg. Session (1985), Testimony of Brian Hutchins, Attorney General, and Assemblyman Robert Sader.

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Here, Defendant's request has no merit, demonstrates no good cause, and is untimely under NRS 34.780 because this Court has not examined Defendant's claims and determined, if true, that he would be entitled to relief. Until that determination has occurred, Defendant's request is untimely and should not be considered by the Court. Moreover, if the Court determines that Defendant is not entitled to relief, then there will be no evidentiary hearing, nor discovery ordered. See NRS 34.770(1); 34.780(2).

Additionally, Defendant's claim that color photos will help him determine whether he and the victim engaged in consensual sex is based on a false premise. The presence or absence of injuries does not demonstrate consent or non-consent. Indeed, SANE nurse Amy Coe testified to that fact at trial. Reporter's Transcript (RT), 84 (November 4, 2009). Over 90% of sexual assault examinations result in no findings of injury, even when the victim is a child. Furthermore, there were more than physical findings from the SANE examination that showed the victim's lack of consent:

- An independent witness saw Defendant physically forcing the victim into his apartment. RT 101-103 (November 3, 1. 2009).
- There was no prior relationship between Defendant and his 2. victim. RT 27, 47-48 (November 3, 2009).
- Defendant used tape to bind his victim, which was found at 3. the crime scene. RT 37-38, 54, 114 (November 3, 2009).
- Defendant disabled victim's cell phone, which was 4. corroborated by her mother's inability to contact her. RT 26, 44, 114-115 (November 3, 2009).
- There was blood in the victim's pants corresponding to 5. injuries to her vagina. RT 76 (November 4, 2009).

See also, Declaration of Arrest, attached as State's Exhibit 1. Thus, even if this Court were inclined to grant discovery and the requested material somehow supported Defendant's proposed claim, he would still not be entitled to relief in a post-conviction context based on the totality of the evidence. Therefore, Defendant cannot establish prejudice from the lack of such discovery. Moreover, Defendant is not entitled to discovery because this Court has not granted a post-conviction petition and Defendant has not obtained this Court's leave to do so

1	after a showing of good cause. Indeed, Defendant fails to demonstrate a scintilla of good cause.	
2	Therefore, Defendant's Second Motion should be denied.	
3	<u>CONCLUSION</u>	
4	Based upon the foregoing, the State respectfully request that this Court denies	
5	Defendant's Second Motion to Place on Calendar for the Purpose of Obtaining SANE Exam	
6	Photographs from the District Attorney's Office.	
7	DATED this 6th day of September, 2016.	
8	Respectfully submitted,	
9	STEVEN B. WOLFSON	
10	Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #001565	
11	BY /s/ JAMES R. SWEETIN	
12	JAMES R. SWEETIN	
13	Chief Deputy District Attorney Nevada Bar #005144	
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18	<u>CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE</u>	
19	I hereby certify that service of the above and foregoing was made this 6th day of	
20	SEPTEMBER 2016, to:	
21	JAMES ORONOZ, ESQ. jim@oronozlawyers.com	
22	Jiii egoronozia w y ers. eo iri	
23	BY /s/ HOWARD CONRAD	
24	Secretary for the District Attorney's Office Special Victims Unit	
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28	hjc/SVU	

EXHIBIT "1"

ID#: <u>1969904</u> EVENT: <u>071214-1983</u>

TRUE NAME:	DATE OF ARREST:	TIME OF ARREST:
ADAMS, EDWARD	01/12/08	1445 Hours

OTHER CHARGES RECOMMENDED FOR CONSIDERATION:

THE UNDERSIGNED MAKES THE FOLLOWING DECLARATIONS SUBJECT TO THE PENALTY FOR PERJURY AND SAYS: That I am a peace officer with the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department, Clark County, Nevada, being so employed for a period of 10 YEARS.

That I learned the following facts and circumstances which lead me to believe that ADAMS, EDWARD committed (or was committing) the offense of 6cts. SEXUAL ASSAULT VICTIM UNDER 14 YEARS; 1 ct. KIDNAP 1ST DEGREE; 1 ct. Battery with Intent To Commit Sexual Assault; 1 ct. Open and Gross Lewdness at the location of 1111 WARBONNET (#1/204) WAY LAS VEGAS, NEVADA 89117.

That the offense occurred at approximately 1430 hours-1545 hours on the 14th day of December, 2007.

That on December 14th, 2007 at approximately 1556 hours, LVMPD dispatch received a call from a, Louise Valles. Valles was reporting that her thirteen year old daughter, Amber Valles had just been kidnaped and sexually assaulted while coming home from school. Valles described that Amber was walking home from school and was approached by a White Male Adult who told her he had a gun.

LVMPD Officers arrived at 7221 Roe Court Las Vegas, NV 89145 and made contact with thirteen year old Amber Valles, DOB: 10/12/1994 and her mother Louise Valles, DOB: 01/20/1972. Officer J. Riddle P#9306 then learned the following information from Amber:

ON 12/14/07 AMBER VALLES; DOB: 10/12/94 STATED THAT SHE BECAME THE VICTIM OF A SEXUAL ASSAULT WHEN AN UNKNOWN MALE FORCED HER TO HIS APARTMENT AND FORCED HER TO DIGITAL AND VAGINAL INTERCOURSE.

AMBER STATED SHE HAD CALLED HER MOTHER FROM SCHOOL, JOHNSON MIDDLE SCHOOL LOCATED AT 7701 DUCHARME AND ASKED IF SHE COULD WALK HOME TODAY. AMBER STATED THAT SHE INTENDED TO WALK TO A FRIEND'S HOUSE. PLAY BASKETBALL AND STAY THE NIGHT. THE FRIEND'S PARENTS TOLD AMBER THAT TONIGHT WAS NOT A GOOD NIGHT. SCHOOL LETS OUT AT 1415 HRS AND AT APPROXIMATELY 1430 HRS AMBER BEGAN TO WALK HOME. WHILE ON ALTA EAST OF BUFFALO SHE WAS APPROACHED BY WMA WHO GRABBED AMBER BY THE HAND AND STATED, "DON'T SCREAM, DON'T RUN. I HAVE A GUN." THE SUSPECT THEN TOLD AMBER THAT HE NEEDED HELP CARING FOR A BABY BECAUSE HIS NIECE JUST YELLS AT IT. THEY BOTH THEN WALKED APPROXIMATELY 20 MINUTES TO AN UNKNOWN APARTMENT EAST OF CIMARRON ON THE SOUTH SIDE OF CHARLESTON, AMBER STATED THAT WHEN THEY ARRIVED AT THE, WHAT APPEARED TO BE VACANT APARTMENT, THE SUSPECT USED NO KEY AND WALKED RIGHT IN. IN THE APARTMENT, AMBER ONLY SAW A COUCH AND CANDLES. THE SUSPECT THEN LIT ONE CANDLE AND FORCED AMBER TO THE GROUND AND BEGAN PENETRATING HER VAGINA WITH HIS FINGERS. THE SUSPECT THEN ATTEMPTED SEVERAL TIMES TO PENETRATE AMBER'S VAGINA WITH HIS PENIS AND AMBER STATED, "BUT IT WASN'T WORKING". AMBER STATED THE SUSPECT TOOK HER PHONE BATTERY OUT AND THREW IT ON THE COUCH. THE SUSPECT MADE AMBER BEND OVER AND ATTEMPTED TO INSERT HIS PENIS AGAIN. AMBER STATED THAT SHE WAS NOT SURE IF HE EVER MADE PENETRATION WITH

ID#: 1969904_ EVENT: 071214-1983

HIS PENIS BUT MADE A STATEMENT THAT INSINUATED HE HAD. THE SUSPECT THEN WET A TOWEL AND TOLD AMBER TO WIPE HER VAGINA. THE SUSPECT TOLD AMBER TO CALL HIM "FRED." THE SUSPECT THEN TOLD AMBER TO LEAVE AND NOT TO CALL ANYONE UNTIL SHE GOT TO MCDONALD'S (LOCATED AT 7851 W. CHARLESTON). AMBER COMPLIED CALLING HER MOTHER WHO THEN CALLED THE POLICE.

Officer J. Riddle transported Amber to UMC (1800 W. Charleston) to conduct a S.A.N.E. exam.

Patrol Officers made contact with Jonathan Cerbani; DOB: 09/07/1995 who stated that he recalls seeing Amber walking with a white male, who was holding Amber by the right arm, "one hand in his pocket like he had a gun." Jonathan described that the guy was wearing a gray sweatshirt, light blue pants and he had something hanging from the top of his left eye. He described him as bald but had some hair around his head. Jonathan described that Amber had a scared look on her face.

That I, Detective G. Lebario P#5849 along with Sgt. B. Smith P#4991 responded to UMC and conducted the follow-up interview with Amber and her mother, Louise Valles.

That we first conducted a recorded interview with Amber who stated the following; which is not verbatim:

That on December 14th, 2007 she got out of school at 1415 hours. She was talking with her friend Sierra and they were talking about her possibly spending the night at Sierra's house. Amber states she called her mother and asked for permission to walk home from school. Amber states her momtold her that it would be fine. Amber states Sierra's mom then told them "no" because they had other plans that evening. Amber then states she walked home and was walking east bound on Alta from Buffalo when she was approached by a white male adult who had also crossed Alta from Buffalo with her. Amber stated the male followed her, then came up from behind her and told her that "he has a gun and if she did not do everything he told her, he would kill her." Amber states that he then grabbed her hand and turned around and walked back up to Alta and crossed over to Buffalo. Amber states that they walked to Charleston and Buffalo on the left side of the street (east side of Buffalo walking southbound). Amber states she saw her friend Jonathan and attempted to whisper to him for "help". Amber states she then asked the suspect, "what are you doing with me?" and he told her that he was just taking her to his house with his niece and his 1 year old son so that she could help him with his son because his niece just yells at him. Amber states she asked if she could just go home and he told her to stop asking him because that was just making him mad. Amber states they walked to an apartment complex called the "Eleven/Eleven". She states they walked to an unknown building and went up to the second floor.

Amber states the suspect just opened the door without a key. She states as she walked in she saw a black leather couch along with candles. She states he lit the candles with matches he removed from his pockets. He then told her to take off her clothes and stand up, he then put her on the floor and got on top of her. He then tried to put his "private" in hers. His clothes were on the floor and she noticed that he had a bruise on the side of his stomach. She states she was laying on her back and she said he took his "private" and "tried to stick it in hers" with his hands. She kept telling him to "stop" and he would not say anything he just laid on top of her and made "like bouncing motions." The suspect then told her to sit on the couch, got on top of her and tried the same thing. She states he got on top of her and again was putting his "private" into her "private." She states during this time he just kept his hands on the couch and lasted about three minutes. She states she continued to ask him to "stop" but he would tell her to "shut up" and he threatened to tape her mouth shut, which he did with blue tape that was on the counter. She states this happened while she was on the couch. She states after he was done he grabbed a white towel from the floor and told her to wipe herself and put her clothes on. She states she put her underwear and bra in her back pack and walked out of the apartment. She

ID#: 1969904 EVENT: <u>071214-1983</u>

states the suspect told her to call him, "Fred." She stated that the suspect actually took her cell phone from her and took the battery out when they walked into the apartment. Amber states she was missing for one hour and was finally able to call her mom when she left the apartment.

Amber described the male as a white adult; 5' 7" between 25-45 years of age, bald with a band aid across the left side of his forehead. She said he had crooked teeth and a red goatee. He was wearing a black hooded sweatshirt and blue "silky pants." She described that he was wearing a black string around his neck. She described his shoes to be "crappy", "dirty", black and white in color and possibly Nike's. She noticed that the male had a bruise and hair on his stomach.

She states when she was leaving he told her that he would go to jail so she better not call the cops or anybody. She then left and called her mom around 1536 hours and told her to pick her up at McDonald's.

After the interview with Amber a SANE exam was performed by Amy Coe, NP, SANE-A, at UMC. The following comes from the Nurse Notes:

Amber is a 13 year old female who states she was sexually assaulted by an unknown white adult male at approximately 1510 hours, 12/14/07.

She was walking home from school when she was approached and led by the suspect to his apartment. He ordered her to take off her clothes. She denies struggling or physical assault.

He grabbed her by the neck to restrain her. He digitally penetrated her vagina for approximately 30 seconds. Then he vaginally penetrated her with his penis for 30 seconds. Then he digitally penetrated her again for 15 seconds and vaginally penetrated her with his penis for 25 seconds. The whole time she is telling him "to stop," "it hurts," and "get off of me."

He removes his penis from inside the vagina for approximately 15 seconds. He masturbates himself. She continued to tell him "No." He told her to shut up. He taped her mouth and hands close. After less than a minute she tears off the tape.

Then he digitally penetrates her anus and penetrates her anally with his penis for approximately 10 seconds. He gets up off of her and he tells her to put her clothes on and leave. He told her "not to tell anybody."

Amber also disclosed to Coe that the suspect had tied her wrist with blue tape and used lotion for lubrication with digital and penile penetration.

(Please see Rose Heart Report Case # 071214-1983) Coe noted that Amber did have an abrasion at 6 o'clock posterior fourchette; she noted oozing from abrasion. Used toluidine dye; she used balloon method to visualize hymenal laceration at 6 o'clock with bleeding; anal laceration at 6 o'clock.

That I then conducted a recorded interview with Amber's mom, Louise Valles. Valles stated that she picked Amber up at McDonald's and she told her that a man had forced her into an apartment and had done "sexual acts" and "raped" her. She states she had been continually been trying to call her on her cell phone and it would just ring or go to voice mail. She stated that on today's date Amber had called her after school and asked for permission to walk home from school with her friend. She sates amber shoul;d have been home by 1445 hours and when she did not return home by 1520 hours she started to worry. She states she just started calling and calling her cell phone. She states that she

ID#: 1969904

finally got a hold of her around 1540 hours and Amber sounded upset and told her that she was scared to just pick her up at the McDonald's. She said she finally picked her up at the Sinclair Gas Station, located at Buffalo and Charleston.

She said after she picked up Amber she disclosed that she was approached by an unknown male who told her that he had a gun and walked her over to an unknown apartment. Amber told Valles, "he put his thing in me, mom." She states that when she picked Amber up she did not have all her clothes on. She said Amber was just crying and sobbing when she picked her up.

That after we left UMC hospital Amber along with her mother, Valles directed Detectives to 1111 Warbonnet Way, Las Vegas, NV, 89117 (Eleven/Eleven Condos). Amber described that she walked into a building that was right off of Charleston Blvd.. She remembered the complex was not gated and remembered walking through some rocks. Amber pointed out a certain building but could not confirm it was the building or apartment where the sexual assault had taken place.

On 12/15/07 Detectives returned to 1111 Warbonnet and made contact with the property manager. The Property manager remembered a vacant apartment on the complex that she distinctly remembered had a black leather couch and candles. She stated the building was had sustained fire a few months prior and was uninhabited. Property Manager then directed us to Building #1 / Apartment #204 and gave written consent to process the apartment for evidence.

That on 12/15/07 at approximately 1730 hours, Crime Scene Analyst J. Fried P# 8174 and R. McPhail P#3326 arrived to process the apartment. The following is a summary of the Crime Scene Report prepared by CSI R. McPhail P# 3326:

THE SCENE: The scene was located inside apartment #204, on the second floor of building #1, in the southwest corner of the building. The building had sustained fire damage at some point in time and appeared to be uninhabited. There was no obvious electricity inside the building and apartment #204 had no lights, heating, or water service. The lock to the front (south facing) entry door to the residence was disabled with paper wedge inside the receiver for the lock tongue of the doorknob, making entry possible by simply pushing the door inward. When entry was made a lit candle was observed in a glass jar, on the floor of the living room in front of the couch. There was very little fire damage inside apartment# 204 but there was water damage to the ceiling in the northwest (master) bedroom.

The residence was void of all furnishings except for a black leather couch which was located on the south side of the living room, a set of drawers located on the north side of the south bedroom, and there was a dining table with blue colored masking tape around it, securing the leafs of the table, located inside the patio area on the west side of the living room.

THE LIVING ROOM:

In addition to the couch on the south side of the living room other items of interest included a dirty, white colored bath towel located on the floor at the east end of the couch; a pair of white colored Nike sports shoes, with spider webs inside of them, located on the floor near the candle in front of the couch; a black colored nylon pouch with a white colored stain on it, located on the couch (east end); and a pair of white colored house slippers and a wad of blue colored masking tape located on the floor in front of the couch.

PHOTOGRAPHY:

Digital photos were exposed showing the scene location and overall condition of the apartment. The locations of the recovered items of evidence and the locations of the recovered latent prints.

1D#: 1969904 EVENT: 071214-1983

That on 01/12/08 Detectives located Edward Adams; ID# 1969904 at 3150 Meade Las Vegas, NV 89102, under event# 080112-1887.

That Adams was taken into custody and brought back to the ISD office located 4750 W. Oakey Las Vegas, NV 89102.

That I Detective Lebario P#5849 along with Detective R. Jaeger P# 5587 conducted a recorded interview with Adams. Adams initially was under the impression that we were investigating a Domestic Dispute that was reported by his wife under event# 080108-1828. While being transported by Detectives Jaeger P#5587 and Davis P#5163 Adams was asked to consent to a Buccal Swab to collect DNA. Adams replied, "DNA, do you think I raped someone." Adams was advised that we needed the DNA to compare with DNA found on a door that had been punched in. Adams stated he would consent to the collection of a Buccal Swab. Prior to the interview Adams was advised of his Miranda rights and he stated that he wanted to clear things up reference the allegations his wife had made.

I then informed Adams that we not really there to investigate the Domestic Dispute but rather a sexual assault involving a young girl. Adams did not deny the allegations but rather said I did not hurt no little girl. Adams stated, "I am invoking my rights to an Attorney." At which point we terminated the interview and advised Adams that he was under arrest.

Adams was charged with **one count of Kidnaping/ First Degree** due to the fact that he did willfully seize, confine, entice, decoy, abduct, conceal or carry away, thirteen year old Amber Valles for the purpose of sexually assaulting her. By threatening that he had a gun and coercing her to go with by threats to her life if she should run or try to get away.

Six counts of Sexual Assault Victim Under 14 Years due to the fact that he sexually assaulted thirteen year old. Amber Valles against her will. By digitally penetrated her vagina for approximately 30 seconds (1 ct.); Vaginally penetrated her with his penis for 30 seconds (1 ct.); digitally penetrated her with his penis for 25 seconds (1 ct.); digitally penetrates her anally with his penis for approximately 10 seconds (1 ct.).

One count of Battery with The Intent to Commit Sexual Assault due to the fact that he grabbed her by the neck to restrain her and after sexually assault her.

Open and Gross Lewdness due to the fact that he did masturbate himself in front of Amber.

Wherefore, Declarant prays that a finding be made by a magistrate that probable cause exists to hold said person for preliminary hearing (if charges are a felony or gross misdemeanor) or for trial (if charges are misdemeanor).

Declarant

G. LEBARIO

Electronically Filed 9/26/2019 1:56 PM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT

1 **RSPN** STEVEN B. WOLFSON 2 Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #001565 3 TALEEN PANDUKHT Chief Deputy District Attorney 4 Nevada Bar #005734 200 Lewis Avenue 5 Las Vegas, Nevada 89155-2212 (702) 671-2500 6 Attorney for Plaintiff

CLARK (

THE STATE OF NEVADA,

11 Plaintiff,

13 EDWARD ADAMS

#1969904

-VS-

Defendant.

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DISTRICT COURT
CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

CASE NO: **08C241003**

DEPT NO: XIX

STATE'S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S SUPPLEMENTAL PETITION

FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS (POST-CONVICTION)

DATE OF HEARING: **NOVEMBER 13, 2019** TIME OF HEARING: **8:30 AM**

COMES NOW, the State of Nevada, by STEVEN B. WOLFSON, Clark County District Attorney, through TALEEN PANDUKHT, Chief Deputy District Attorney, and hereby submits the attached Points and Authorities in this State's Response to Defendant's Supplemental Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Post-Conviction).

This response is made and based upon all the papers and pleadings on file herein, the attached points and authorities in support hereof, and oral argument at the time of hearing, if deemed necessary by this Honorable Court.

RA031

Case Number: 08C241003

POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On February 12, 2008, the State filed an Information charging Defendant Edward Adams as follows: Count 1 – First Degree Kidnapping with Use of a Deadly Weapon (Felony – NRS 200.310, 200.320, 193.165), Count 2 – Battery with Intent to Commit a Crime with Use of a Deadly Weapon (Felony – NRS 200.400, 193.165), Counts 3 through 11 – Sexual Assault with a Minor Under Fourteen Years of Age with Use of a Deadly Weapon (Felony – NRS 200.364, 200.366, 193.165), and Count 12 – Open or Gross Lewdness (Gross Misdemeanor – NRS 201.210). On October 28, 2009, the State filed an Amended Information with the same charges.

On November 2, 2009, Defendant's jury trial commenced. On November 4, 2009, the jury found Defendant guilty of Count 1 – First Degree Kidnapping, Count 2 – Battery with Intent to Commit Sexual Assault, Counts 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 11 – Sexual Assault, and Count 12 – Open or Gross Lewdness. The jury found Defendant not guilty of Counts 9 and 10.

On January 13, 2010, the district court sentenced Defendant as follows: Count 1 – to 60 months to life and \$2932.00 in restitution; Count 2 – to 60 months to life, consecutive to Count 1; Count 3 – to 120 months to life, consecutive to Count 2; Count 4 – to 120 months to life, consecutive to Count 3; Count 5 – to 120 months to life, consecutive to Count 4; Count 6 – to 120 months to life, consecutive to Count 5; Count 7 – to 120 months to life, consecutive to Count 8 – to 120 months to life, consecutive to Count 7; Count 11 – to 120 months to life, consecutive to Count 8; and Count 12 – to 12 months, concurrent with all other counts. The court also imposed a special sentence of Lifetime Supervision to commence upon release from any term of imprisonment, probation, or parole. The court also ordered Defendant to register as a sex offender after any release from custody. The court entered the Judgment of Conviction on February 2, 2010.

Defendant filed his Notice of Appeal on February 22, 2010. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's Judgment of Conviction on July 26, 2012. Remittitur issued on August 21, 2012.

On September 11, 2012, Defendant filed a Post-Conviction Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. On October 15, 2012, the court appointed counsel for Defendant. On September 4, 2015, the Court entered an Ex Parte Order of Appointment to appoint Dr. Hariton to "review medical records and investigate issues." On May 5, 2016, Defendant filed a Motion to Place on Calendar for the Purpose of Obtaining SANE Exam Photographs from the District Attorney's Office ("Motion"). The State filed an opposition to the motion on May 10, 2016. The Court denied Defendant's motion on May 16, 2016. The order denying the motion was filed on June 1, 2016.

On August 31, 2016, Defendant filed a second Motion to Place on Calendar for the Purpose of Obtaining SANE Exam Photographs from the District Attorney's Office ("Second Motion"). The State filed an opposition to the second motion on May 10, 2016. The Court denied Defendant's motion on September 6, 2016. The order denying the motion was filed on June 1, 2016. On September 12, 2016, the Court granted the motion in part and ordered the State to provide the photographs in their possession.

On June 28, 2019 Defendant filed a Supplemental Post-Conviction Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. The State responds herein.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

On December 14, 2007, thirteen-year-old A.V. was released from school at 2:15 p.m. <u>Jury Trial Transcript Day 2</u>, November 3, 2009, at 4. After plans to spend the night at a friend's house had fallen through, she decided to walk home. <u>Id</u>. at 5. Her house was only a few blocks from the school. <u>Id</u>. at 8. At some point between the school and her house, A.V. came into contact with Defendant. <u>Id</u>. at 11. He was sitting on a wall across the street from A.V. smoking a cigarette when she first noticed him. <u>Id</u>. at 12. A.V. did not consider him to be attractive. <u>Id</u>. She described Defendant as mostly bald with a goatee, crooked teeth, and a band-aid over his eyebrow. <u>Id</u> at 14-15. He was wearing a black hooded sweatshirt and blue pants. <u>Id</u>. at 14.

A.V. crossed the street but did not walk towards Defendant. <u>Id</u>. at 13. However, he began to walk to her side of the street and started following behind her. <u>Id</u>. A.V. felt scared and continued to walk. <u>Id</u>. Defendant came up behind her, put his arm on her shoulder and

turned her towards him. <u>Id</u>. at 15. He told her not to scream or yell because he had a gun. <u>Id</u>. A.V. complied because she was afraid he would kill her. <u>Id</u>. at 17. Defendant's left hand was in his pocket, and it appeared as if he had a gun. <u>Id</u>. He then grabbed A.V. by the hand and started leading her back towards the school. Id. at 17-18.

As Defendant was taking A.V. down the street, they passed two of A.V.'s schoolmates. Id. at 18. Jonathan C. saw Defendant dragging A.V. up the street by her wrist. Id. at 101. A.V. had a scared look on her face. Id at 102. Defendant's hand was in his pocket holding something. Id. at 103. Jonathan thought it may have been a gun. Id. at 105. As they passed by A.V. mouthed the words "help me" to Jonathan. Id. at 19. Angela A. also saw Defendant holding A.V.'s hand and thought it looked as if they were trying to avoid her as they walked by. Id. at 129.

Defendant took A.V. to an abandoned apartment unit on the second floor of the building. <u>Id</u>. at 23. The apartment had been damaged by a fire and all utilities had been disconnected. <u>Id</u>. at 151. Defendant had never leased the apartment. <u>Id</u>. at 152. A.V. noticed a black couch, several lit candles, a black bag, and a pair of Nike shoes. <u>Id</u>. at 24-25. After locking the apartment door, Defendant told A.V. to sit on the black couch. <u>Id</u>. at 26. He also took the battery out of A.V.'s cell phone so she could not call for help. <u>Id</u>. A.V. also saw Defendant take something out of his pocket and wedge it underneath the couch cushions. <u>Id</u>. at 28.

Defendant made A.V. remove her clothes and get on the floor. <u>Id</u>. at 28-29. He then removed his own clothes, got on top of her, and digitally penetrated her vagina. <u>Id</u>. at 29. A.V. had never had any kind of sexual contact before. <u>Id</u>. at 27. She told Defendant that what he was doing was causing her pain. <u>Id</u>. at 30. However, he told her to shut up. <u>Id</u>. Defendant then penetrated A.V.'s vagina with his penis, which caused her further pain. <u>Id</u>.

Defendant stopped having intercourse with A.V. and made her sit on the couch again. <u>Id</u>. As she was sitting up, he digitally penetrated her. <u>Id</u>. at 31. She again told him that it was painful and asked him to stop. <u>Id</u>. Defendant then penetrated A.V.'s vagina again. <u>Id</u>. He then stopped and made A.V. move back to the floor. <u>Id</u>.

Defendant placed himself on top of A.V. again and penetrated her vagina with his penis. Id. at 32. He also digitally penetrated her vagina. Id. Defendant then proceeded to force A.V. to bend over the couch. Id. As she was bent over, he digitally penetrated her anus while standing behind her. Id. at 32-33. Defendant had also rubbed his penis in front of A.V. and put lotion on to his penis as he was touching himself. Id. at 56. Defendant put lotion on his penis both while he was touching himself and prior to penetrating her. Id. Defendant had also used blue painter's tape to bind A.V.'s hands and to tape her mouth shut. Id. at 37. Defendant did not use a condom. Id. at 35. A.V. continually told Defendant that he was hurting her and asked him to stop throughout the ordeal. Id. at 39.

After Defendant was finished sexually assaulting A.V., he told her to get dressed. <u>Id</u>. He then went into the kitchen and retrieved a damp towel which he told A.V. to use to wipe herself off. <u>Id</u>. at 37. Defendant told her she could leave and threw her phone back at her. <u>Id</u>. at 43. He also warned her not to call the police and to wait until she got to a nearby McDonald's restaurant before she called for someone to pick her up. Id.

A.V.'s mother, Louise, had been trying to call A.V. when she noticed that she was late. <u>Id</u>. at 44. A.V. finally answered and asked her to come pick her up. <u>Id</u>. A.V. was crying, her hair was messy, and she did not have all of her clothing on. <u>Id</u>. A.V. told her mother what had happened, and Louise called 911. <u>Id</u>.

A.V. was taken to the hospital and was given a sexual assault exam. <u>Jury Trial Transcript Day 3</u>, <u>November 4</u>, <u>2009</u>, at 53-54. A.V. had abrasions in her vagina consistent with how she described the encounter and her hymen was lacerated. <u>Id</u>. at 69. A.V. had experienced bleeding from her vagina which stained the crotch of her pants. <u>Id</u>. a 76. There was also a discharge from her anus and injuries to her anus. <u>Id</u>.

A.V. could not remember exactly where the apartment was located, however eventually the correct apartment was found. <u>Jury Trial Transcript Day 2</u>, <u>November 3</u>, <u>2009</u>, at 228-230. When crime scene analysts arrived at the apartment, they found the opened package of hand lotion, candles, blue painter's tape, and the shoes A.V. had described. <u>Id</u>. at 161-69. Defendant was eventually identified as the perpetrator because his fingerprints were found in the

apartment. <u>Id</u>. at 234. Defendant's prints were found on an open lotion packet, two glass candle jars, and the interior sliding glass door. <u>Jury Trial Transcript Day 3</u>, <u>November 4</u>, <u>2009</u>, at 47-49. A.V.'s prints were found on the interior front door. Id. A gun was not found. Id. at 178.

A DNA analysis was conducted on the sexual assault kit. <u>Id</u>. at 8. Defendant's sperm was detected on the vaginal and cervical swabs. <u>Id</u>. at 8-9. Defendant's sperm was also detected on the rectal and anal swabs. <u>Id</u>. at 8-10. Both A.V.'s and Defendant's DNA were found on the towel located in the apartment. <u>Id</u>. at 12-14. Defendant's DNA was also located on A.V.'s pants and shirt. <u>Id</u>. at 18-19. Finally, both A.V.'s and Defendant's DNA was found on the couch cushions. Id. at 19-21.

Defendant's defense at trial was that this was a consensual sexual encounter. <u>Jury Trial Transcript Day 1</u>, <u>November 2</u>, <u>2009</u>, at 242. He elicited testimony from Jonathan C. that A.V. had not said anything to him as she passed by with Defendant and that he had not called the police. <u>Jury Trial Transcript Day 2</u>, <u>November 3</u>, <u>2009</u>, at 107-08. Defendant also elicited testimony from Angela A. that she had previously told police that A.V. appeared to be chasing after Defendant and that she had also not called the police. <u>Id</u>. at 138. Witness Andre Randle testified that he saw A.V. and Defendant walk into the vacant apartment. <u>Jury Trial Transcript Day 3</u>, <u>November 4</u>, <u>2009</u>, at 28-33. He testified he thought it was strange, but A.V did not appear to be angry, crying, or screaming. <u>Id</u>. Defendant also presented several character witnesses who testified that he was not a violent person. Id. at 110-117.

ARGUMENT

I. PETITIONER RECEIVED EFFECTIVE ASSITANCE OF COUNSEL

A. Standard Of Review

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that, "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense." The United States Supreme Court has long recognized that "the right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel." <u>Strickland v. Washington</u>, 466 U.S. 668, 686, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2063 (1984); <u>see also State v. Love</u>, 109 Nev. 1136, 1138, 865 P.2d 322, 323 (1993).

To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, a defendant must prove he was denied "reasonably effective assistance" of counsel by satisfying the two-prong test of Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686-87, 104 S. Ct. at 2063-64. See also Love, 109 Nev. at 1138, 865 P.2d at 323. Under the Strickland test, a defendant must show first that his counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and second, that but for counsel's errors, there is a reasonable probability that the result of the proceedings would have been different. 466 U.S. at 687-88, 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2065, 2068; Warden, Nevada State Prison v. Lyons, 100 Nev. 430, 432, 683 P.2d 504, 505 (1984) (adopting the Strickland two-part test). "[T]here is no reason for a court deciding an ineffective assistance claim to approach the inquiry in the same order or even to address both components of the inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on one." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697, 104 S. Ct. at 2069.

The court begins with the presumption of effectiveness and then must determine whether the defendant has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that counsel was ineffective. Means v. State, 120 Nev. 1001, 1011, 103 P.3d 25, 32 (2004). "Effective counsel does not mean errorless counsel, but rather counsel whose assistance is '[w]ithin the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases." Jackson v. Warden, 91 Nev. 430, 432, 537 P.2d 473, 474 (1975).

Counsel cannot be ineffective for failing to make futile objections or arguments. <u>See Ennis v. State</u>, 122 Nev. 694, 706, 137 P.3d 1095, 1103 (2006). Trial counsel has the "immediate and ultimate responsibility of deciding if and when to object, which witnesses, if any, to call, and what defenses to develop." <u>Rhyne v. State</u>, 118 Nev. 1, 8, 38 P.3d 163, 167 (2002).

Based on the above law, the role of a court in considering allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel is "not to pass upon the merits of the action not taken but to determine whether, under the particular facts and circumstances of the case, trial counsel failed to render reasonably effective assistance." <u>Donovan v. State</u>, 94 Nev. 671, 675, 584 P.2d 708, 711 (1978). This analysis does not mean that the court should "second guess reasoned choices between trial tactics nor does it mean that defense counsel, to protect himself against

allegations of inadequacy, must make every conceivable motion no matter how remote the possibilities are of success." <u>Id.</u> To be effective, the constitution "does not require that counsel do what is impossible or unethical. If there is no bona fide defense to the charge, counsel cannot create one and may disserve the interests of his client by attempting a useless charade." United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 657 n.19, 104 S. Ct. 2039, 2046 n.19 (1984).

"There are countless ways to provide effective assistance in any given case. Even the best criminal defense attorneys would not defend a particular client in the same way." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. at 689. "Strategic choices made by counsel after thoroughly investigating the plausible options are almost unchallengeable." Dawson v. State, 108 Nev. 112, 117, 825 P.2d 593, 596 (1992); see also Ford v. State, 105 Nev. 850, 853, 784 P.2d 951, 953 (1989). In essence, the court must "judge the reasonableness of counsel's challenged conduct on the facts of the particular case, viewed as of the time of counsel's conduct." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, 104 S. Ct. at 2066.

Even if a defendant can demonstrate that his counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, he must still demonstrate prejudice and show a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the result of the trial would have been different. McNelton v. State, 115 Nev. 396, 403, 990 P.2d 1263, 1268 (1999) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at 2064). "A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Id. (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-89, 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2064-65, 2068).

The Nevada Supreme Court has held "that a habeas corpus petitioner must prove the disputed factual allegations underlying his ineffective-assistance claim by a preponderance of the evidence." Means, 120 Nev. at 1012, 103 P.3d at 33. Furthermore, claims of ineffective assistance of counsel asserted in a petition for post-conviction relief must be supported with specific factual allegations, which if true, would entitle the petitioner to relief. Hargrove v. State, 100 Nev. 498, 502, 686 P.2d 222, 225 (1984). "Bare" and "naked" allegations are not sufficient, nor are those belied and repelled by the record. Id. NRS 34.735(6) states in relevant part, "[Petitioner] must allege specific facts supporting the claims in the petition[.]... Failure

1	to allege specific facts rather than just conclusions may cause your petition to be dismissed."				
2	(emphasis added).				
3 4	B. Petitioner's Counsel Was Not Ineffective For Allowing A Juror To Remain On The Panel Who Knew The Judge And One Witness Because The Juror Was Able To Remain Fair And Impartial.				
5	The Nevada Supreme Court has held that it is improper for Petitioner to make factual				
6	assertions without "adequately cit[ing] to the record in his briefs or provide this court with an				
7	adequate record." Thomas v. State, 120 Nev. 37, 43, 83 P.3d 818, 822 (2004). Here, Petitioner				
8	has failed to cite to any record in support of his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.				
9	Instead of supporting his assertions with the record, Petitioner just makes these assertions that				
10	because Juror 7 remained on the jury, it resulted in his conviction. This is not supported with				
11	any evidence from the record, and thus, should be rejected.				
12	Moreover, Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the juror was not fair and impartial.				
13	During voir dire, the juror acknowledges to the judge that she can be fair and impartial despite				
14	knowing him:				
15 16	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 156: Your Honor, I'm juror number 156. You and I have met socially several times over the past 20 years. I worked with your wife at the Attorney General's office back in the 1990s.				
17 18	THE COURT: Okay. Anything about that association or relation that might cause you to –				
19	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 156: No, sir.				
20	THE COURT: judge this case unfairly or be – you wouldn't				
21	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 156: No.				
22	THE COURT: affect your ability to be fair and impartial?				
23	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 156: No.				
24	THE COURT: All right. Thank you very much.				
25	Jury Trial Transcript Day 1, November 2, 2009, at 17-18.				
26	The juror then affirms again to the State that she can still remain fair and impartial				
27	despite knowing the judge:				
28					

1	MR. HENDRICKS: One last question. You said that you were familiar with Judge Barker and his wife.
2	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 156: Yes, yes.
3 4	MR. HENDRICKS: Is that going to affect you in any way in being able to make a just decision in regards to both defense and the State?
5 6	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 156: No.
7	Jury Trial Transcript Day 1, November 2, 2009, at 96-87.
8	Additionally, the juror acknowledges that she can be fair and impartial despite knowing
9	the State's witness, Shayla Joseph:
10	MR. HENDRICKS: Thank you, Judge. State calls Shayla Joseph.
11	JUROR NO. 7: Excuse me, your Honor. I realize I know Shayla Joseph. Just met her one time socially.
12 13	THE COURT: Okay.
14	JUROR NO. 7: I'm recognizing the name now.
15	THE COURT: Parties approach.
16	(Off-record bench conference).
17	THE COURT: Record should reflect we're outside the presence of
18	the jury. Record should further reflect that parties approached after Juror No. 7, Ms. Clayton, indicated that she had knowledge, independent familiarity with the previous witness, Ms. Joseph, that
19	was just called. And parties agreed to address this issue out – well, after the witness had completed her testimony.
20	It would be my inclination to call Ms. Clayton back in to – inquire
21	as to her – the base of her knowledge. I'll give each side an opportunity to inquire and make decisions on whether or not you
22	want to challenge her as consequence of this disclosure.
2324	MR. HENDRICKS: No, I think that's a great idea just to – just to have that on the record. Just to make sure Mr. Maningo and the defendant's rights are preserved just in case.
25	MR. MANINGO: Agreed.
26	THE COURT: That's exactly what I want to do. Could you go ask Danny to bring in Juror No. 7, please.
27	(Juror No. 7 present)
28	

1	THE COURT: Thank you. Record will reflect Ms. Clayton's returned to the courtroom, Juror No. 7.
2	Ms. Clayton, you indicated that you had some previous knowledge
3 4	or you know Ms. Joseph, the previous witness called, so we've taken you outside the presence of the rest the jury to inquire about how you know Ms. Joseph. Could you tell us a little bit about that
5	relationship?
6	JUROR NO. 7: When $I - since$ we're having crime scene examiners here, and I heard her name and I thought oh, my God,
7	I've met – we have a – Shayla and I have a mutual friend named Tim Speese (phonetic), who's a police officer. And I met Shalya
8	once, perhaps twice, over the summer socially at – I mean, at a bar, you know, just because we have mutual friends. And she and I
9	spoke a few minutes.
10	I don't even think she probably would have even recognized me, honestly. But she has a distinctive name. And again, when
11	(indiscernible) and again, she's not somebody that I consider to be you know, she is somebody that I met once, possibly twice and we have a very good mutual friend.
12	
13	THE COURT: All right. State, any inquiry of Ms. Clayton as a consequence of that disclosure?
14	MR. HENDRICKS: No. Thanks, Judge.
15 16	THE COURT: Ms. Clayton, anything about that contact, as you described with Ms. Joseph, that might affect your ability to be fair and impartial in this case?
17	JUROR NO. 7: No, not at all.
18	THE COURT: Mr. Maningo, any questions?
19	MR. MANINGO: Ms. Clayton, just because you have – you've met that witness in your social life, would you give her
20	testimony more weight than you would any other witnesses?
21	JUROR NO. 7: No, sir.
22	MR. MANINGO: Okay, then – I have no problem.
23	JUROR NO. 7: I apologize, Judge.
24	THE COURT: It's all right. That's what it's all about. Thank you. We'll be with you in just a few minutes.
25	
26	Jury Trial Transcript Day 2, November 3, 2009, at 199-200, 212-214 (emphasis added).
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There is nothing in the record that Petitioner cites to that demonstrates the juror could not remain fair and impartial despite knowing Judge Barker and the State's witness. Instead, the issue of knowing Judge Barker is brought to the Court's attention many times, and each time, the juror explains that she can remain fair and impartial to Petitioner. Moreover, when the juror realized that she had briefly met the State's witness only one time, she brought it to the Court's attention and again, affirmed that she could remain fair and impartial. Petitioner does not give any reason to indicate why she was not fair and impartial or why she would have been unable to remain fair and impartial. Therefore, this claim should be denied.

C. There Is No Support From The Record That Petitioner's Counsel Failed To Investigate The Case Or Was Not Prepared For Trial.

Petitioner contends that trial counsel failed to conduct adequate pretrial discovery, including but not limited to failing to fully, competently, investigate the facts, circumstances, and legal issues surrounding the offense. A defendant who contends that his attorney was ineffective because he did not adequately investigate must show how a better investigation would have rendered a more favorable outcome probable. Molina v. State, 120 Nev. 185, 87 P.3d 533 (2004). Such a defendant must allege with specificity what the investigation would have revealed and how it would have altered the outcome of the trial. United States v. Porter, 924 F.2d 395, 397 (1st Cir. 1991) (quoting United States v. Green, 882 F.2d 999, 1003 (5th Cir. 1989)).

Here, Petitioner's claim, which is not even addressed in the body of his Supplemental Petition, fails as he has not alleged with adequate specificity what further investigation or additional facts would have come to light and how this would have changed the outcome of the trial. He alleges that his counsel told him he was not properly prepared because he did not have a second chair and had to juggle" during trial. Supplemental Petition, at 27. This claim is not supported by the record, and there is no mention of any specific facts suggesting counsel was not prepared for trial. In fact, the record in this case demonstrates how prepared trial counsel was by filing many pre-trial motions, thoroughly cross-examining each of the State's witnesses, and even calling three (3) character witnesses to testify on behalf of Petitioner.

1	Petitioner argues the fact that counsel did not find Mr. Randall through a preliminary
2	investigation, but the District Attorney found him on the first day of trial. Petition for Writ of
3	Habeas Corpus (Post-Conviction), at 9. Again, this is a bare and naked allegation because
4	Randle still testified at trial, and counsel even had the opportunity to meet with Randle the
5	morning before his trial testimony. In fact, trial counsel even conducted a thorough cross-
6	examination of Detective Gabriel Lebario emphasizing that the detective did not do a report
7	of his interview with Randle or provide his name in his report:
8	Q (MR. MANINGO): Okay. And making reports is an important part of your job –
9	A (DETECTIVE LEBARIO): Yes.
10	Q: is that fair to say?
11	A: Yes, sir.
12 13	Q: Okay. You have to document when you do certain things or when you speak to people, correct?
14	A: Yes.
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16	Q: You spoke to another individual who – who lived in a nearby apartment building, correct?
17	A: Yes.
18	Q: Okay. And this is the person that – that you described as the
19	adult black male, correct?
20	A: Yes.
21	Q: And the reason we refer to this gentleman that way, in your report you don't list his name, correct?
22	A: Right.
23	Q: And that's because you had taken notes and kept those notes
24	separate, correct?
25	A: Well, written, yes.
26	Q: Okay. When you spoke to Mr. Randall, he gave a description of seeing two people together that matched the description of Mr.
27	Adams and Amber?
28	A: Yes.

1	Q: Okay. He also noted that the two individuals he saw were not touching one another, correct?			
2	A: Right.			
3 4	Q: And he noted that they were not emotional, and that the girl was not emotional?			
5	A: Correct.			
6	Q: He also noted that the girl did not appear to be in any distress.			
7	A: Correct.			
8				
9	Q: You just spoke to him about the two individuals that he saw that day?			
10	A: Yes.			
11	Q: Okay. I think you said earlier that there was no need to get a			
12	report from him at that time.			
13	A: At the time, yes.			
14	Q: Okay. You did, however, none of the details of what he told you in your – in your report, correct?			
15	A: Yes.			
16	Q: Okay.			
17	A: My case notes.			
18	Jury Trial Transcript Day 2, November 3, 2009, at 259-262.			
19	Therefore, counsel took the time to prepare by fully cross-examining the detective about			
20	not providing Randle's name or details of his interview with him, and counsel was able to meet			
21	with Randle before his testimony before cross-examining him at trial. Therefore, Petitioner's			
22	bare allegations do not and cannot demonstrate prejudice and, therefore, this claim is			
23	absolutely without merit. See Hargrove, 100 Nev. at 502, 686 P.2d at 225. As such, this claim			
24	should be denied.			
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 D. Petitioner's Counsel Was Not Ineffective For Failing To Investigate Or Challenge The State's Late Disclosure Of Witness Andre Randle Because, In Fact, Counsel Did Challenge The Late Disclosure In His Motion To Dismiss, And Cross-Examined Randle At Trial.

"Bare" and "naked" allegations are not sufficient to warrant post-conviction relief, nor are those belied and repelled by the record. <u>Hargrove v. State</u>, 100 Nev. 498, 502, 686 P.2d 222, 225 (1984). "A claim is 'belied' when it is contradicted or proven to be false by the record as it existed at the time the claim was made." <u>Mann v. State</u>, 118 Nev. 351, 354, 46 P.3d 1228, 1230 (2002).

In order to satisfy the <u>Strickland</u> standard and establish ineffectiveness for failure to investigate, a defendant must allege *in the pleadings* what information would have resulted from a better investigation or the substance of the missing witness' testimony. <u>Molina v. State</u>, 120 Nev. 185, 192, 87 P.3d 533, 538 (2004); <u>State v. Haberstroh</u>, 119 Nev. 173, 185, 69 P.3d 676, 684 (2003). It must be clear from the "record what it was about the defense case that a more adequate investigation would have uncovered." <u>Id</u>. A defendant must also show how a better investigation probably would have rendered a more favorable outcome. <u>Id</u>.

Here, Petitioner claims that trial counsel should have objected to the late disclosure of State's witness Andre Randle. In fact, counsel filed a Motion to Dismiss on October 20, 2009, (Petitioner's own Exhibit D) arguing that the State should turn over the "tall, physically fit, adult black male." Motion to Dismiss, at 3-4. Counsel argued in the Motion that the detectives did not follow up with the mystery witness, and that the state should produce the witness to testify at trial. Id. at 4. By counsel filing this motion prior to trial, he was objecting and challenging the fact that the State had not produced Mr. Randle.

Then, during trial, when the State did produce the witness, the State allowed counsel to not only cross-examine Mr. Randle, but also speak with him beforehand:

MR. HENDRICKS: Okay. Now, I don't think either one of us, I'm not sure though, has this – this black male adult listed on our witness list. But as you know, he was not interviewed at the time other than just what was reflected in his case notes. We've now contacted him. We tracked him down. We found him so he's available to defense counsel.

He's going to be here tomorrow morning at 10:00 a.m. My concern is this, is he's not on our witness list, but we would still like to call him. And I want to make sure that defense counsel doesn't have an objection because they're actually the ones who wanted him and made a motion to – to dismiss the whole case because they didn't have him. Now we have him. I want to make sure it's okay we can call him.

THE COURT: Defense position.

MR. MANINGO: Yeah, that's fine. I don't have an objection. I'm not worried about – I know that the reason he wasn't on the witness list at the time is because neither one with of us knew who this person was.

THE COURT: Well, hearing no objection from the defense, the State calling the witness, even though the witness wasn't identified on their witness list, so –

MR. HENDRICKS: And I'll make him available in the morning so Jeff can speak with him also beforehand just -- just to know what we're getting.

Jury Trial Transcript Day 2, November 3, 2009, at 276-77 (emphasis added).

Now, Petitioner is arguing that counsel should have expended all resources to find this unidentified witness. But then Petitioner argues that when the witness is actually produced at trial, counsel should have challenged the late disclosure of the witness and not agreed to let him testify. Petitioner's argument as to why counsel was ineffective at trial is based on the fact that he should have found this witness before trial, and the witness would have produced exculpatory evidence during his trial testimony. It is a roundabout argument to claim that counsel should have found him, then when the State actually did find him, counsel should have objected and not let him testify because he would testify to exculpatory evidence.

Moreover, it is utter speculation that Randle's testimony would have somehow been different at trial had counsel conducted a more in-depth pre-trial interview of the witness, when Petitioner admits that Randle's testimony was favorable to the defense. Trial counsel had time before Randle's testimony to discuss his testimony with him and essentially have a pre-trial interview. Counsel also had the opportunity to cross-examine Randle and question him indepth about how difficult it is to remember an event from two (2) years ago, that the witness did not write anything down or take any notes after the event, about his interactions with

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Petitioner and the victim, and about the Petitioner and the victim's demeanor entering the vacant apartment. See Jury Trial Transcript Day 3, November 4, 2009, at 31-33. Even on direct-examination, Randle testified that, "She didn't even look mad or nothing." Id. at 29. On cross-examination, he says. "They was just walking normal." Id. at 33. Therefore, there was no prejudice to Petitioner because, as Petitioner admits, Randle's testimony was favorable to the defense.

By the end of trial, counsel had the opportunity to present the exculpatory evidence through cross-examination because Randle ultimately testified during trial. Moreover, on direct-examination, Randle's testimony confirmed the victim's classmates, Jonathan and Angela's, testimony that they saw the two walking together. Even though counsel was unable to locate Randle prior to trial, counsel filed the Motion to Dismiss contesting the fact the State had not produced the witness, was still allowed the opportunity to cross-examine him during his trial testimony, and even discuss his testimony with him the morning before he testified. Therefore, there was no prejudice to Petitioner by Randle's testimony.

It simply cannot be said that trial counsel did not make sufficient inquiries into information about Randle and his testimony after having the opportunity to speak with him before his testimony and cross-examine him at trial. The record belies Petitioner's claim of failure to investigate and shows that counsel did everything Petitioner claims should have been done. Therefore, this claim is without merit and should be denied.

E. Claims 2 And 4-12 Are Waived Because They Should Have Been Raised On Direct Appeal.

NRS 34.810(1) reads:

The court shall dismiss a petition if the court determines that:

- (a) The petitioner's conviction was upon a plea of guilty or guilty but mentally ill and the petition is not based upon an allegation that the plea was involuntarily or unknowingly entered or that the plea was entered without effective assistance of counsel.
- (b) The petitioner's conviction was the result of a trial and the grounds for the petition could have been:

. . .

(2) Raised in a direct appeal or a prior petition for a writ of habeas corpus or postconviction relief.

unless the court finds both cause for the failure to present the grounds and actual prejudice to the petitioner.

The Nevada Supreme Court has held that "challenges to the validity of a guilty plea and claims of ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel must first be pursued in post-conviction proceedings.... [A]ll other claims that are appropriate for a direct appeal must be pursued on direct appeal, or they will be *considered waived in subsequent proceedings.*" Franklin v. State, 110 Nev. 750, 752, 877 P.2d 1058, 1059 (1994) (emphasis added) (disapproved on other grounds by Thomas v. State, 115 Nev. 148, 979 P.2d 222 (1999)). "A court must dismiss a habeas petition if it presents claims that either were or could have been presented in an earlier proceeding, unless the court finds both cause for failing to present the claims earlier or for raising them again and actual prejudice to the petitioner." Evans v. State, 117 Nev. 609, 646–47, 29 P.3d 498, 523 (2001).

Here, Petitioner's Claims 2 and 4-12 should have been raised on a direct appeal because they do not challenge the validity of a guilty plea or allege ineffective assistance of counsel. NRS 34.810(1); <u>Franklin</u>, 110 Nev. at 752, 877 P.2d at 1059. Petitioner does not allege good cause or prejudice for not bringing these claims on direct appeal and raising them for the first time in these habeas proceedings. Therefore, they are all waived and must be dismissed.

F. Petitioner's Pro Per Claims Fail Because They Should Have Been Raised On Appeal As Discussed Above

As discussed above, the Petitioner's Pro Per claims fail because they should have been raised on appeal and are therefore waived. Petitioner now raises these claims again in his Supplemental Petition, however, they are still waived for the exact reason stated above. Therefore, these same claims must be dismissed.

G. Cumulative Error Does Not Apply To Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel

Petitioner asserts a claim of cumulative error in the context of ineffective assistance of counsel. The Nevada Supreme Court has never held that instances of ineffective assistance of counsel can be cumulated; it is the State's position that they cannot. However, even if they

could be, it would be of no consequence as there was no single instance of ineffective assistance in Petitioner's case. See United States v. Rivera, 900 F.2d 1462, 1471 (10th Cir. 1990) ("[A] cumulative-error analysis should evaluate only the effect of matters determined to be error, not the cumulative effect of non-errors."). Furthermore, Petitioner's claim is without merit. "Relevant factors to consider in evaluating a claim of cumulative error are (1) whether the issue of guilt is close, (2) the quantity and character of the error, and (3) the gravity of the crime charged." Mulder v. State, 116 Nev. 1, 17, 992 P.2d 845, 855 (2000). Furthermore, any errors that occurred at trial were minimal in quantity and character, and a defendant "is not entitled to a perfect trial, but only a fair trial." Ennis v. State, 91 Nev. 530, 533, 539 P.2d 114, 115 (1975). There was no error in this case let alone cumulative error. Therefore, this claim must be denied.

H. Petitioner Is Not Entitled To An Evidentiary Hearing

A defendant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing only if his petition is supported by specific factual allegations, which, if true, would entitle her to relief. Marshall v. State, 110 Nev. 1328, 1331, 885 P.2d 603, 605 (1994). "The judge or justice, upon review of the return, answer and all supporting documents which are filed, shall determine whether an evidentiary hearing is required." NRS 34.770(1). Further, "[i]f the judge or justice determines that the petitioner is not entitled to relief and an evidentiary hearing is not required, the judge or justice shall dismiss the petition without a hearing." NRS 34.770(2).

Here, there is no reason to expand the record because Defendant's claims are not cognizable in a post-conviction petition and Defendant fails to present specific factual allegations that would entitle him to relief. Marshall, 110 Nev. at 1331, 885 P.2d at 605. As such, Defendant's request for an evidentiary hearing should be denied.

1	CONCLUSION
2	For the above reasons, the State respectfully requests that Defendant's Supplemental
3	Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus be DENIED in its entirety.
4	DATED this 26th day of September, 2019.
5	Respectfully submitted,
6	STEVEN B. WOLFSON
7	Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #001565
8	
9	BY /s/ TALEEN PANDUKHT TALEEN PANDUKHT
10	Chief Deputy District Attorney Nevada Bar #005734
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17	
18	<u>CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE</u>
19	I hereby certify that service of the above and foregoing was made this 26th day of
20	SEPTEMBER, 2019, to:
21	JAMES ORONOZ, ESQ. jim@oronozlawyers.com
22	jim@oronoziawyers.com
23	DW //HOWADD CONDAD
24	BY /s/ HOWARD CONRAD Secretary for the District Attorney's Office Special Victims Unit
25	Special Victims Unit
26	
27	
28	hjc/SVU

10/24/2019 2:35 PM Steven D. Grierson RPLY CLERK OF THE COURT 1 JAMES A ORONOZ, ESQ. 2 Nevada Bar No. 6769 RACHAEL E. STEWART, ESQ. 3 Nevada Bar No. 14122 ORONOZ & ERICSSON, LLC 4 1050 Indigo Drive, Suite 120 Las Vegas, Nevada 89145 5 Telephone: (702) 878-2889 6 Facsimile: (702) 522-1542 jim@oronozlawyers.com 7 Attorneys for Petitioner 8 DISTRICT COURT 9 **CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA** 10 EDWARD ADAMS, 11 Petitioner, CASE NO. 08C241003 12 13 DEPT. NO. XIX VS. 14 RENEE BAKER, in her official capacity as the Warden of the LOVELOCK 15 CORRECTIONAL CENTER; JAMES DZURENDA, in his official capacity as 16 Director of the Nevada Department of Corrections: and the STATE OF NEVADA 17 18 Respondents. 19 20 REPLY TO STATE'S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S SUPPLEMENTAL PETITION 21 FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS (POST-CONVICTION) 22 Petitioner, EDWARD ADAMS, by and through his counsel of record, JAMES A. 23 ORONOZ, ESQ., and RACHAEL E. STEWART, ESQ., hereby files this Reply to State's 24 Response to Defendant's Supplemental Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Post-Conviction) 25 pursuant to NRS Chapter 34. This Reply, including the following Points and Authorities, is made 26 upon the pleadings and papers already on file, and any evidentiary hearing and oral argument of 27

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counsel deemed necessary by the Court. Petitioner, EDWARD ADAMS, alleges that he is being

	1	held in custody in violation of the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution
	2	of the United States of America, as well as Articles I and IV of the Nevada Constitution.
	3	DATED this 24th day of October, 2019.
	4	/s/ James A. Oronoz
	5	James A. Oronoz, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 6769
	6	Rachael E. Stewart, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 14122
	7	1050 Indigo Drive, Suite 120
	8	Las Vegas, Nevada 89145 Attorneys for Petitioner
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ive, Suite 120 878-2889	15	
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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

I. Defense Counsel was ineffective for allowing Juror No. 7 to remain on the jury because she knew the trial judge and one of the State's witnesses. Juror No. 7 was not a fair and impartial juror.1

The State argues that Mr. Adams has failed to demonstrate that Juror No. 7 (aka Prospective Juror No. 156) was not fair and impartial. In support of its argument, the State provides the trial transcript texts where Juror No. 7, Mrs. Clayton, explained that she would be fair and impartial. Tr. November 2, 2009, at 17; Tr. November 2, 2009, at 96-87; Tr. November 3, 2009, at 199-200, 212-214. The State further argues that nothing in the record shows that "the juror could not remain fair and impartial despite knowing Judge Barker and the State's witness." Response, at 12.

Contrary to the State's assertions, the record is clear that Mrs. Clayton, Juror No. 7, had a close social relationship with the trial judge and knew one of the State's witnesses. The record is also clear that Defense Counsel did not question Mrs. Clayton, Juror No. 7, about her relationship with the judge. Instead, Defense Counsel relied on her representations to the judge and the prosecutor that she could be fair and impartial. Consequently, the trial record only contains Mrs. Clayton's representations to the judge and prosecutor because Defense Counsel did not even attempt to explore her potential biases.

Counsel caused a structural error in this case by not questioning Mrs. Clayton, Juror No. 7, and determining whether she could honestly be fair and impartial to Mr. Adams. Counsel took no measures to discern whether she was actually suitable to sit on the jury. Mrs. Clayton, Juror No. 7, admitted that she had known the trial judge socially for twenty (20) years, which

1 The State's Response does not track the claims as laid out in either Mr. Adams' Petition or the Supplemental Petition. For clarity's sake, this Reply will follow the order of the State's Response. The State did not respond to several of Mr. Adams' claims, so Mr. Adams hereby replies directly to the arguments set forth in the State's Response.

should have prompted Defense Counsel to explore the nature of that relationship. Tr. November 2, 2009, at 17, 93. Additionally, she explained that she had been a former prosecutor at the Office of the Attorney General and had worked there with the judge's wife. Tr. November 2, 2009, at 18, 93. This should have raised red flags for Defense Counsel. Defense Counsel did not explore whether Mrs. Clayton, Juror No. 7, could put aside her prosecutorial biases and consider the case impartially.

When Defense Counsel questioned Mrs. Clayton, Juror No. 7, he asked her about her experience at the Attorney General's office, asked about whether she would judge his performance, and asked about whether she was going to "peek behind the curtains" to find out more about the case than was presented at trial. Tr. November 2, 2009, at 133. Mrs. Clayton told Defense Counsel that his appearance and performance would not affect her ability to judge the case. Id. When she answered about whether she would want to "peek behind the curtains," and "think about what's going on at a bench conference," she answered: "Well, I think I would be thinking about that, but I don't think it would be —it's not a distraction." Id. She also told Defense Counsel that sitting on a jury would be "a good experience" for teaching and that she hoped to be on a jury. Id.

As for the State's witness, Shayla Joseph, Defense Counsel asked the Juror if she would give Ms. Joseph's testimony more weight than other witnesses. Tr. November 3, 2009, at 213-214. This was the extent of his examination. He did not ask any other questions that may uncover the nature of Mrs. Clayton's ability to be fair and impartial.

Defense Counsel did not explore Mrs. Clayton's relationship with the judge at all.

Essentially, Defense Counsel heard Mrs. Clayton, Juror No. 7, say that she could be fair and impartial, without probing the issue. Simply saying the magic words does not make a juror fair

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and impartial. Mrs. Clayton even admitted that she would be thinking about what was going on at the bench conferences and wanting to "peek behind the curtains."

Defense Counsel should have challenged her ability to be unbiased. He knew that she wanted to be on the jury. Mrs. Clayton, Juror No. 7, was an attorney who knew what she would have to say to remain on the jury. Given the nature of her long-term social relationship with the judge and his wife, her former occupation as a Deputy Attorney General, and her having known witness Shayla Joseph, Counsel should have challenged Mrs. Clayton's, Juror No. 7's, ability to be fair and impartial and sought her removal from the jury.

Therefore, Defense Counsel was ineffective and caused a structural error by failing to protect Mr. Adams' right to a fair and impartial jury. Counsel's failure caused Mr. Adams to proceed to trial with a juror who could not have been impartial, and Counsel did not challenge her presence on the jury. Therefore, a structural error exists because Counsel failed to protect Mr. Adams' constitutional right to have a fair and impartial jury. Thus, this Court should reverse Mr. Adams' conviction.

II. Defense Counsel failed to investigate the case and prepare for trial.

In this subsection, the State conflates and confuses many of Mr. Adams' arguments. The State argues that Mr. Adams has not addressed his claim in the body of the Supplemental Petition. The State's position is inaccurate. On pages 27-28 of the Supplemental Petition, Mr. Adams addressed his claim that Counsel failed to investigate the case and failed to prepare for trial. In fact, the State even cited to the pages of Mr. Adams' Supplemental Petition. Therefore, the State's contention lacks merit.

Next, the State argues that the record does not support Mr. Adams' claim that Counsel told him that he was not prepared for trial because he did not have a second chair and had to juggle. Response, at 12. The State's argument is misplaced. There would not be a record of a

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private conversation between Mr. Adams and Counsel. For this reason, the Court should grant Mr. Adams an evidentiary hearing so he can present evidence to support this claim.

The State also argues that Counsel prepared for trial by filing "many pre-trial motions." Response, at 12. This is inaccurate. Counsel filed the following motions prior to trial:

- 1. October 6, 2008: Motion to Continue Trial Date
- 2. October 21, 2009: Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Based Upon the State's Failure to Preserve Exculpatory Evidence, and Motion to Dismiss Due to the State's Failure to Provide Brady Material

As the record shows, Defense Counsel only filed two motions prior to trial. First, Counsel moved to continue the trial. Second, Counsel filed a Motion to Dismiss due to the State's failure to produce Andre Randle as a witness. During the motion hearing on October 27, 2009, Defense Counsel withdrew the Motion to Dismiss. Tr. October 27, 2009, at 3. Counsel did not file any other pre-trial motions on Mr. Adams' behalf. The State's argument on this issue is belied by the record.

The State then argues that Mr. Adams makes a "bare and naked allegation" that Counsel did not adequately investigate the case because the District Attorney found Andre Randle as a witness for trial. Response, at 13. The State argues that Randle testified at trial, and Counsel "had the opportunity to meet with Randle the morning before his trial testimony." Response, at 13. The State then argues that Counsel conducted a thorough cross-examination of Detective Gabriel Lebario at trial and asked him about the missing witness. Response, at 13.

None of the State's assertions shows that Defense Counsel took time to investigate the case. The State simply shows that Counsel cross-examined both Detective Lebario and Andre Randle at trial. This does not undermine Counsel's duty to investigate and prepare for trial. As explained fully in Mr. Adams' Supplemental Petition, producing a trial witness on the day of trial does not allow Counsel to prepare for the examination adequately. Therefore, Defense

Counsel should have requested a continuance of the trial to have time to interview Randle and prepare for his testimony.

For these reasons, Mr. Adams asks that the Court find Defense Counsel ineffective and reverse his conviction.

III. Defense Counsel was ineffective for both failing to investigate and failing to challenge the State's late disclosure of witness Andre Randle.

It is indisputable that "[c]ounsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 691, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Counsel is not required to be "errorless," but Counsel must conduct "careful factual and legal investigations" to make "informed decisions on his client's behalf both at the pleading stage and at trial." Rusling v. State, 96 Nev. 755, 758, 616 P.2d 1108 (1980).

The State argues that Counsel filed a Motion to Dismiss on October 20, 2009, arguing that the State should produce the "mystery witness." Response, at 15. The State then argues, "By counsel filing this motion prior to trial, he was objecting and challenging the fact that the State had not produced Mr. Randle." Response, at 15.

The State's argument is incorrect. Defense Counsel filed the Motion to Dismiss on October 21, 2009. *See*, Supplemental Petition, Exhibit D.

By October 22, 2009, Counsel had received the name of the witness from the State. *See*, Supplemental Petition, Exhibit B. Counsel had ample time to investigate or request a continuance of the trial at that point. However, Counsel neither located Randle nor requested a continuance.

Then, on October 27, 2009, Defense Counsel withdrew the Motion to Dismiss. *See*, Supplemental Petition, Exhibit C. Contrary to the State's assertion, Defense Counsel did not preserve the issue. Instead, he withdrew it. In fact, Counsel only effectively preserved one issue

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by way of motion in this case, which was the Motion to Continue Trial Date filed on October 6, 2008. There were no other motions filed in this case.

Next, the State argues that Counsel was not ineffective because the prosecutor "allowed counsel to not only cross-examine Mr. Randle, but also speak with him beforehand..."

Response, at 15. The State has missed the point of the issue at hand.

Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963) requires the prosecution to provide the defense with material evidence that is favorable to the accused upon request. This requirement is clear. As explained in the Supplemental Petition, the Ninth Circuit has held that a Brady violation may be cured by disclosing the evidence "at a time when disclosure would be of value to the accused." United States v. Gamez-Orduno, 235 F.3d 453, 461 (9th Cir. 2000); Tennison v. City and County of San Francisco, 570 F.3d 1078, 1093 (9th Cir. 2009).

It is irrelevant to this case that Counsel spoke with Andre Randle briefly before his testimony. The issue at hand is that the State disclosed a material witness and provided him for trial at a time where he would not be of value to Mr. Adams.

Mr. Adams does not dispute that Counsel agreed to Andre Randle testifying at trial. The issue is that Counsel should have objected to the late disclosure and asked for the available remedy of a continuance. A continuance at that point would have allowed Counsel and the investigator to interview Randle to determine the value of his testimony and determine whether Randle could lead to any additional exculpatory defense evidence. Because Counsel did not request a continuance when the State brought Randle to trial, Counsel failed to protect Mr. Adams' rights to due process and a fair trial.

Next, the State argues that Mr. Adams asserts that Counsel should have "expended all resources to find this unidentified witness." Response, at 16. The State further argues that:

"Moreover, it is utter speculation that Randle's testimony would have somehow been different at trial had counsel conducted a more in-depth pre-trial interview of the witness, when Petitioner admits that Randle's testimony was favorable to the defense. Trial counsel had time before Randle's testimony to discuss his testimony with him and essentially have a pre-trial interview." Response, at 16.

The State has completely misrepresented Mr. Adams' claim. It is indisputable that Counsel had a duty to investigate and prepare for trial. Part of preparing for trial is locating material witnesses. The record and case file are devoid of evidence that Counsel made any effort to locate Mr. Randle after checking into the address provided by the State on October 22, 2009. This does not mean that Counsel was required to expend "all resources." This means that Counsel was required to do his job diligently and make efforts to track down and interview a material witness.

To put the claim more simply, Counsel did not investigate and interview Andre Randle before trial. On October 21, 2009, eleven days before trial, Counsel filed a Motion to Dismiss the case because the State did not provide material evidence—the identity of Andre Randle. On October 22, 2009, Counsel learned Andre Randle's name. On October 27, 2009, without having located Randle, Counsel withdrew the Motion to Dismiss and made an agreement for "leeway" while questioning Detective Gabriel Lebario. On November 2, 2009, the parties proceeded to trial. On November 3, 2009, the State informed Defense Counsel that they located Andre Randle and planned to produce him as a witness on November 4, 2009. Tr. November 3, 2009, at 276-277. Counsel agreed to speak with Andre Randle before his testimony on November 4, 2009. Id. at 277. Counsel had no other contact with Andre Randle before he testified. Andre Randle testified favorably for Mr. Adams.

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Had Defense Counsel objected to the late disclosure and requested a continuance, he could have interviewed Andre Randle and investigated any additional leads that may have arisen. To be clear, the issue is not that Defense Counsel should have objected to Andre Randle as a witness. The issue is that Defense Counsel should have objected to the late disclosure and sought a remedy to protect Mr. Adams' rights.

The State's assertion that Defense Counsel had time to speak with Randle before he testified is irrelevant. By the last day of trial, the jury had already heard the majority of the evidence against Mr. Adams. Had Counsel located and interviewed Randle before trial, he could have cross-examined the other witnesses more effectively and used Randle's testimony to corroborate the cross-examinations.

At a very minimum, Counsel should have sought his one available remedy and requested a continuance of the trial so he could interview Randle in depth and determine whether Randle could lead him to any other exculpatory defense evidence. There is no way that Counsel could have effectively prepared to examine Randle having just met him on the day of his testimony.

Finally, the State argues that there was no prejudice to Mr. Adams because Randle's testimony was favorable to Mr. Adams. Again, the State misses the point of the claim.

There is a reasonable probability that the result of the trial would have been different had Counsel used Randle's testimony to build the entire defense theory. Had Counsel known the content of Randle's testimony, it is reasonably probable that Counsel could have used Randle's testimony to discredit the other State's witnesses. Of course, Randle testified at trial. The issue here is not whether Randle testified. The issue is that Defense Counsel did not request a continuance after the late disclosure to investigate and prepare for Randle's testimony.

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Had Defense Counsel located and interviewed Randle before trial, he could have subpoenaed him as a defense witness and prepared the theory of defense around Randle's testimony. Even after not doing this, Counsel should have objected to the late disclosure and requested a continuance so he could properly interview Randle and determine how to handle his testimony most effectively.

In sum, there is a reasonable probability that the result of the trial would have been different had Counsel located Randle before trial. At a minimum, Counsel should have requested a continuance to determine the value of Randle's testimony. Counsel's brief discussion with Randle before his testimony was not sufficient to protect Mr. Adams' rights to due process and a fair trial. Therefore, Counsel was ineffective, and this Court should reverse Mr. Adams' conviction.

IV. Claims Two and Four through Twelve are not waived.

The State argues that Mr. Adams' claims were not properly raised in his petition for writ of habeas corpus because they should have been raised on direct appeal. The State's argument is mistaken. The State incorrectly alleges that the only claims that can be raised in post-conviction habeas proceedings are "challenges to the validity of a guilty plea" and "claims of ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel." Response, at 18.

NRS 34.724 provides:

(1) Any person convicted of a crime and under sentence of death or imprisonment who claims that the conviction was obtained, or that the sentence was imposed, in violation of the Constitution of the United States or the Constitution or laws of this State, or who claims that the time the person has served pursuant to the judgment of conviction has been improperly computed, may, without paying the filing fee, file a postconviction petition for writ of habeas corpus to obtain relief from the conviction or sentence or to challenge the computation of time that the person has served.

The statutory language is clear. A petitioner may challenge an unconstitutional conviction. The statute does not limit post-conviction claims to "claims or ineffective assistance

of counsel." Ineffective assistance of counsel is merely one constitutional collateral challenge to a conviction. NRS 34.724 does not limit post-conviction claims to include only claims for ineffective assistance of counsel.

In the Response, the State cites Franklin v. State, 110 Nev. 750, 752, 877 P.2d 1058, 1059 (1994), to propose that claims that do not involve either a challenge to the validity of a guilty plea or ineffective assistance of counsel must be filed on direct appeal. In Franklin, the Nevada Supreme Court dealt with a case wherein the petitioner filed a post-conviction petition for habeas corpus because his plea counsel did not inform him of his ability to file a direct appeal. The Court also provided examples of situations where a defendant who pleaded guilty would need to appeal from his judgment of conviction and would be able to do so under Nevada law. The Franklin case *does not* provide that ineffective assistance of counsel is the *only* constitutional challenge to a conviction as the State suggests. NRS 34.724 expressly permits a petitioner to challenge a conviction that violates the Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of Nevada.

Here, Mr. Adams has raised several claims that challenge the constitutionality of his conviction under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. For this reason, all of Mr. Adams' claims have all been properly raised in his post-conviction proceedings.

Accordingly, the Court should note that the State failed to respond to the merits of several of Mr. Adams' claims. Mr. Adams requests that the Court find that his claims have properly been raised in these proceedings. Mr. Adams also requests that the Court treat the State's failure to respond to the claims as a confession of error and grant Mr. Adams' claims. *See generally*, Polk v. State, 126 Nev. 180, 233 P.3d 357 (2010); *see also*, EDCR 2.20(e).

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In sum, Mr. Adams requests that the Court grant the claims raised in his Petition and Supplement and reverse Mr. Adams' conviction.

V. Mr. Adams' pro per claims do not fail because they were not raised on direct appeal.

Here, the State argues that Mr. Adams' pro per claims fail because they should have been raised on appeal. This is the same argument that the State raised in its previous section. Here, the State has not identified which claims should have been raised on appeal and simply designates "Petitioner's Pro Per claims." For this reason, Mr. Adams requests that the Court disregard the State's argument, consider the merits of each of Mr. Adams' claims, and grant Mr. Adams' claims.

VI. Cumulative Error

The State argues that cumulative error analysis does not apply to ineffective assistance of counsel claims. Response, at 18. The State provides no legal authority to support this position.

Additionally, Mr. Adams has claimed cumulative error based on the numerous errors in this case—not just ineffective assistance of counsel. The State has not addressed any other error at all.

In Nevada, cumulative error analysis turns on the following factors: (1) whether the issue of guilt or innocence is close; (2) the quantity and character of the error; and (3) the gravity of the crime charged. Dechant v. State, 116 Nev. 918, 927, 10 P.3d 108 (2000).

As Mr. Adams has demonstrated in his Petition and Supplement, the issue of guilt or innocence was close, the errors were numerous, and the crimes charged were severe. Thus, Mr. Adams requests that this Court find cumulative error in this case and reverse Mr. Adams' conviction.

VII. Mr. Adams is entitled to an evidentiary hearing.

The State argues that there is no reason to expand the record because Mr. Adams' claims "are not cognizable in a post-conviction petition and Defendant fails to present specific factual allegations that would entitle him to relief." Response, at 19.

The State's argument is incorrect. Mr. Adams has, in fact, raised claims that would entitle him to relief in both his Petition and Supplemental Petition. Therefore, Mr. Adams requests that this Court grant him an evidentiary hearing to allow him to present evidence to support his claims.

CONCLUSION

Mr. Adams received ineffective assistance of counsel. Mr. Adams requests this Court grant his claims and vacate his conviction and sentence. In the alternative, Mr. Adams requests that this Court grant an evidentiary hearing to allow him to present evidence and expand the record in support of his claims.

DATED this 24th day of October, 2019.

/s/ James A. Oronoz
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