IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

TED MICHAEL DONKO, Appellant(s),

VS.

THE STATE OF NEVADA, Respondent(s), Electronically Filed Sep 14 2022 02:32 p.m. Elizabeth A. Brown Clerk of Supreme Court

Case N<u>o</u>: A-22-852928-W Docket N<u>o</u>: 85261

RECORD ON APPEAL

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT TED DONKO #1080899, PROPER PERSON

1200 PRISON RD. LOVELOCK, NV 89419 ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT

STEVEN B. WOLFSON, DISTRICT ATTORNEY 200 LEWIS AVE. LAS VEGAS, NV 89155-2212 Ted Donko, Plaintiff(s) vs. State of Nevada, Defendant(s)

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A-22-852928-W Ted Donko, Plaintiff(s) vs. State of Nevada, Defendant(s)

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1 Case No. A-22-852928-W Dept. 17 2 FILED Dept. No. 3 MAY 2 0 2022 4 5 JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA IN THE 8⁷ 6 7 IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLACK COUNTY 8 9 TED Michael Donko Petitioner, 10 PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 11 - VS -(POST-CONVICTION) The state of Nevana 12 Respondent. 13 14 INSTRUCTIONS: 15 (1) This petition must be legibly handwritten or typewritten, signed by the petitioner and verified. 16 (2) Additional pages are not permitted except where noted 17 or with respect to the facts which you rely upon to support your grounds for relief. No citation of authorities need be 18 furnished. If briefs or arguments are submitted, they should be submitted in the form of a separate memorandum. 19 (3) If you want an attorney appointed, you must complete 20 the Affidavit in Support of Request to Proceed in Forma Pauperis. You must have an authorized officer at the prison 21 complete the certificate as to the amount of money and securities on deposit to your credit in any account in the 22 institution. 23 (4) You must name as respondent the person by whom you are confined or restrained. If you are in a specific institution of 24 the Department of Corrections, name the warden or head of the institution. If you are not in a specific institution of the 25 Department but within its custody, name the Director of the 2**E** Department of Corrections. 2022 갩 (5) You must include all grounds or claims for relief which you may have regarding your conviction or sentence. Failure to CIERK OF raise all grounds in this petition may preclude you from filing MAY

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1	future petitions challenging your conviction and sentence.				
2	(6) You must allege specific facts supporting the claims in				
3	the petition you file seeking relief from any conviction or				
4	conclusions may cause your petition to be dismissed. If your				
5	that claim will operate to waive the attorney-client privilege for the proceeding in which you claim your counsel was ineffective.				
6					
7	(7) When the petition is fully completed, the original and one copy must be filed with the clerk of the state district court for the county in which you were convicted. One copy must				
8	be mailed to the respondent, one copy to the Attorney General's Office, and one copy to the district attorney of the county in				
- 9	which you were convicted or to the original prosecutor if you are challenging your original conviction or sentence. Copies				
10	must conform in all particulars to the original submitted for filing.				
11	PETITION				
12	1. Name of institution and county in which you are presently				
13	1. Name of institution and county in which you are proven y imprisoned or where and how you are presently restrained of your liberty: Lovelock Correctional Center, Pershing County, Nevada.				
14	Name and location of court which entered the judgment of				
15 16	conviction under attack: My Department XXV Clark County Eights Judical District				
	3. Date of judgment of conviction: <u>02-13-2020</u>				
17	4. Case number: <u>C-/9-345594-1</u>				
18	5. (a) Length of sentence: 14 to 36 years				
19					
20	(b) If sentence is death, state any date upon which execution is scheduled: N/A	1			
21 22	6. Are you presently serving a sentence for a conviction other than the conviction under attack in this motion?				
23	Yes No X .				
24					
25	served at this time: 2-Bothy will being with beauty harm, 3-Atten at Nor With any mapor, 1-15th B. Bachy wards, 7 205 cut the treatment of or mis Ou was Structure; with the Arctic of anter oranter, 7-Daniership or possistent of Firearn by Prohibited Person.	-			
26	1 7 Nature of offense involved in conviction being charlenged.				
27	BALLIY With Deadly Wesper Resulting in Bodily harm, Atteapt Muster with D/w, Assalt with a DIW, Discharge Flickann Atoriate or capied structure with Aircrarty water crerty owner Jhip or possesses of Ficharm by frembed Person	-			
28	8. What was your plea? (check one)				
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2	(a) Not guilty X (b) Guilty
3	<pre>(c) Guilty but mentally ill (d) Nolo contendere</pre>
4	9. If you entered a plea of guilty or guilty but mentally ill
5	to one count of an indictment or information, and a plea of not guilty to another count of an indictment or information, or if a
6	plea of guilty or guilty but mentally ill was negotiated, give
7	details:
8	
0 . 9	10. If you were found guilty or guilty but mentally ill after a plea of not guilty, was the finding made by: (check one)
9 10	(a) Jury (b) Judge without a jury
11	11. Did you testify at the trial? Yes \times NO
12	12. Did you appeal from the judgment of conviction?
13	Yes <u>X</u> No
14	13. If you did appeal, answer the following:
15	(b) Case number or citation: C-(4-3+3537.
16	(d) Date of result: 4-20-22
17	
18	
19	15. Other than a direct appeal from the judgment of conviction
20	and sentence, have you previously filed any petitions, applications or motions with respect to this judgment in any
21	court, state or federal? Yes NO
22	16. If your answer to No. 15 was "yes," give the following information:
23	(a) (1) Name of court:
24	(2) Nature of proceeding:
25	
26	6 (3) Grounds raised:
27	
28	(4) Did you receive an evidentiary hearing on your petition, application or motion? Yes <u>No</u>
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1 Result: (5) 2 Date of result: (6) 3 If known, citations of any written opinion or (7) date of orders entered pursuant to such result: 4 5 (b) As to any second petition, application or motion, 6 give the same information: 7 Name of court: (1)8 Nature of proceeding: ______ (2)- 9 Grounds raised: (3) 10 11 Did you receive an evidentiary hearing on your (4)petition, application or motion? Yes ____ No X____ 12 13 Result: _____ (5)14 Date of result: (6) If known, citations of any written opinion or 15 (7) date of orders entered pursuant to such result: _____ 16 (c) As to any third or subsequent additional applications 17 or motions, give the same information as above, list them on a 18 separate sheet and attach. (d) Did you appeal to the highest state or federal court 19 having jurisdiction, the result or action taken on any petition, 20 application or motion? (1) First petition, application or motion? 21 Yes No X 22 Citation or date of decision: 23 Second petition, application or motion? (2)24 Yes No <u>No</u> Citation or date of decision: _____ 25 Third or subsequent petitions, applications or 26 (3) motions? Yes ____ No 🖳 27 Citation or date of decision: 28 -4-

1 If you did not appeal from the adverse action on any (e) petition, application or motion, explain briefly why you did 2 not. (You must relate specific facts in response to this question. Your response may be included on paper which is 8 1/2 by 11 inches attached to the petition. Your response may not 3 exceed five handwritten or typewritten pages in length.) 4 5 Has any ground being raised in this petition been 6 17. previously presented to this or any other court by way of petition for habeas corpus, motion, application or any other 7 postconviction proceeding? If so, identify: 8 (a) Which of the grounds is the same: - 9 The proceedings in which these grounds were raised: 10 (b) 11 (c) Briefly explain why you are again raising these grounds. (You must relate specific facts in response to this 12 question. Your response may be included on paper which is 8 1/2 by 11 inches attached to the petition. Your response may not 13 exceed five handwritten or typewritten pages in length.) 14 15 If any of the grounds listed in Nos. 23(a), (b), (c) and 16 18. (d), or listed on any additional pages you have attached, were not previously presented in any other court, state or federal, 17 list briefly what grounds were not so presented, and give your reasons for not presenting them. (You must relate specific facts 18 in response to this question. Your response may be included on paper which is 8 1/2 by 11 inches attached to the petition. Your 19 response may not exceed five handwritten or typewritten pages in 20 length.) 21 Are you filing this petition more than 1 year following 22 19. the filing of the judgment of conviction or the filing of a decision on direct appeal? If so, state briefly the reasons for 23 the delay. (You must relate specific facts in response to this question. Your response may be included on paper which is 8 1/2 24 by 11 inches attached to the petition. Your response may not exceed five handwritten or typewritten pages in length.) 25 26 27 Do you have any petition or appeal now pending in any court, either state or federal, as to the judgment under attack? 20. 28 -5-

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2	Yes No χ
3	If yes, state what court and the case number:
4	21. Give the name of each attorney who represented you in the
5	proceeding resulting in your conviction and on direct appeal: $\rho = 0.05 = 0.000$
6	
7	22. Do you have any future sentences to serve after you complete the sentence imposed by the judgment under attack? Yes No
8 9	If yes, specify where and when it is to be served, if you know:
0	23. State concisely every ground on which you claim that you
11 12	are being held unlawfully. Summarize briefly the facts supporting each ground. If necessary you may attach pages stating additional grounds and facts supporting same.
13	(a) Ground one: The courts Did wit Ask for The Red Shirt to
14	
15	Supporting FACTS (Tell your story briefly without citing cases or law.): f an being Accused as being The Should They
16	gut a Rep Shirt in evidence That was asky in friat with an ONR ON the Shirt
17	was tested and come back departure for GSR 14 works clear the as a second
18	Should be Frested because 17 could clear Donko as The Skuder
19	NRS 34.830
20	
21	
22	(b) Ground two: <u>Ineffective Assistute of Councel</u>
23	
24	Supporting FACTS (Tell your story briefly without citing cases or law.): <u>Device Astep Annelous Times Por Austhons to</u> <u>be askep with his Attorney Actor dit Device askep to fire his Attorney And</u>
25	the Judge Soid be will have to Repeart himself if he does Dunto Dees not Know The Law So be continued with frigh Donto feels Like his Attorey
26	DiDat Fight for him.
27	
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1 2 3 Ground three: The Judge lot a in-court indepetedation unrelate (c)happen incont 4 Supporting FACTS (Tell your story briefly without 5 citing cases or law.): woods GANS multiple Differt Discriptions of A shocker he also changed his Discription of shocker and SAID The shocker here 6 No Tathing Donky had tottons all over his Body he also stated he is only 7 45 0% sie mat Dunyo War a Shouter The other building said he can't say it was Dunko because he Didat get 8 a good have At him he got as The stand and left The court Auna And DA Followed him out and be came back in got back on The Stand - 9 and Then said It was Dinko Dunto Atturney Objected and asked for 10 million HLESDORED. 11 Ground four: 1 Tainted Jury 12 (d) 13 Supporting FACTS (Tell your story briefly without 14 citing cases or law.): must Jury wire hispanic victims in crime Were hispanic The Jury was 90 40 hispanic The Jury and QUO Jaroted by DA During trial. Durko Also Askad At Jury pick for certain Jury but his 15 16 Atturney Abuild him Not too. 17 18 19 20 WHEREFORE, petitioner prays that the court grant petitioner 21 relief to which he may be entitled in this proceeding. 22 EXECUTED at Lovelock Correctional Center on the _/__ day of _____ of the year 20<u>22</u>. 23 the month of MAL 24 #1030899 TED DUNKO Lóvelock Correctional Center 25 1200 Prison Road Lovelock, Nevada 89419 26 Petitioner In Pro Se 27 28 -7-

GROUND Five: The District courts Violated 1 2 Donkos Double Geperady Rights 3 Supporting Facts, Donko got Sentenced to 12 to 31 years 5 At sentencing The Court went back After Donto Started his 6 Time and changed his sentence to 14 to 36 years Donko's could have gotten Less of a time. 8 q GROUND Six: CHMULATIVE error Warrents Γ, 0 Revusal of These convictions under The fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth 11 Amenyments and The Nevada constitution. 12 13 Supporting Facts, Donko had cumuative errors in his 14 take Trial with caused him his Rights to a Fair Trial 15 multiple Times DID witnesses get on Stand and give Different 16 Discriptions of Shouter and Different Versions of The Crime Alleast Donle 17 shout get a Retrial. 18 19 GROUND Seven. The state committed Misconduct, Violating (G)20 The Fifth, sixth, and four-tearth Amendments and The Nevata constitues. 21 22 Supporting Facts Donks WAS Deprived of a Fair Trial The 23 state engaget in impermissible burder shifting by stating books 24 had to failed to sufficiently explain certain evidence The state 25 Kept Saying That Darko 15 Guilty because he can't Explain how The Figger prist of Red Shirt WAS found.

1	(H) GROUND Eight, The court violated The firth, Sixth,
	and Europeanth Amendments and The Nevada constitution by Reducting
	proposed defesse instructions.
4	
5	Supporting Facts, The defense Requested Substitution
6	OF The word yaless in The Reasonable doubt instruction in place
7	OF "Until" In proposed Instruction. The court Rejected The
B	proposed defense Instructions Donko 15 entitled to Not only The
<u> </u>	presumption of Indicence but also TO indicin OF Languese tonocence
6	Donto Atturney Requested proposed Instructions with Dere all
	Denied.
12	
3	
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		1	VERIFICATION
		2	Under penalty of perjury, the undersigned declares that he
,		3	is the petitioner named in the foregoing petition and knows and
		4	knowledge, except as to those matters stated on information and belief, and as to such matters he believes them to be true.
		5	TED DONTO
)	Lovelock Correctional Center
		6	1200 Prison Road
		7	Lovelock, Nevada 89419
		8	Petitioner In Pro Se
		9	CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE BY MAIL
			I, $\frac{7\epsilon p Pont v}{5(b)}$, hereby certify, pursuant to
		11	MALL af the year 2072 I mailed a true and correct
		12	copy of the foregoing PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS addressed to:
			Warden
	• •	13	Lovelock Correctional Center
		14	1200 Prison Road Lovelock, Nevada
		15	Adam Aaron D. Ford
		16	State of Nevada Office of Attorney General
		17	100 N. Carson Street Carson City, Nevada 89701-4717
		18	County District Attorney
		19	
·		20	, Nevada 89
			(District Attorney of County of Conviction)
		22	TED DONKO
		23	1CD DONTO # 108-099
		24	1200 Prison Road
		25	Lovelock, Nevada 63415
	-		Petitioner In PIO Se
		26	
		27	
		28	
			-8-40
			10

AFFIRMATION Pursuant to NRS 2398.030

The undersigned does hereby affirm that the preceding _ HABEAS COSPUS (Title of Document) filed in District Court Case number <u>C-19-345584-1</u> Does not contain the sodal security number of any person. -OR-Contains the social security number of a person as required by: A. A specific state or federal law, to wit: (State specific law) -06-B. For the administration of a public program or for an application for a federal or state grant. Signature Date <u>TED DUNKO #108089</u>A Mint Name <u>HABEAS COIPUS</u> Print Name HABEAS COIPUS

ED Donko 200 Prison RD -OVELOCK, NEValDa, 894/9

668080

LOVELOCK CORRECTIONAL CENTER

US POSTAGE --- ATTLEY BONE

2⁴¹⁹ \$ 003.16⁰



Regional Justice Center Eighth Judicial District 200 Lewis Ave 3rd Floor Las Vegas, NV, 89155

I MOT TED Michael Douko # 108089A 2 Lovelock Correctional Center 1200 Prison Road 3 Lovelock, Nevada 89419 4 Petitioner In Pro Se 5 6 DISTRICT COURT 7 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 8 9 TED Michael Donko 10 Petitioner, Case No. A-22-852928-W 11 -vs-Dept. 17 Dept. No. 12 The state of Neurada 13 Respondent. 14 15 MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL 16 COMES NOW Petitioner, <u>IED Donto</u>, in pro se, 17 and moves the Court for an order appointing counsel in the 18 instant petition for writ of habeas corpus (post-conviction). 19 This motion is based upon NRS 34.750; all papers and 20 documents on file herein; and the points and authorities below. 21 POINTS AND AUTHORITIES 22 Petitioner is unable to afford counsel. See Application to 23 Proceed In Forma Pauperis on file herein. 24 The substantive issues and procedural requirements of this 25 case are difficult and incomprehensible to Petitioner. 26 Petitioner, due to his incarceration, cannot investigate, 27 take depositions or otherwise proceed with discovery herein. 28 Petitioner's sentence is: <u>14 to 36 years</u>

There _____ are ____ are not additional facts in support of this motion attached hereto on separate page(s).

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Counsel would assist Petitioner with a clearer presentation of his issues before this Court and would likewise facilitate and ease this Court's task of discerning the issues and adjudicating same upon their merits.

7 Discretion lies with the Court to appoint counsel under NRS 8 34.750. <u>Crump v. Warden</u>, 113 Nev. 293, 934 P.2d 247, 254 9 (1997). The Court is to consider: (1) the complexity of the 10 issues; (2) whether Petitioner comprehends the issues; (3) 11 whether counsel is necessary to conduct discovery; and (4) the 12 severity of Petitioner's sentence. NRS 34.750(1)-(1)(c).

13 Under similar discretionary standards, Federal courts are 14 encouraged to appoint counsel when the interests of justice so 15 require - a showing which increases proportionately with the 16 increased complexities of the case and the penalties involved in 17 the conviction. Chaney y. Lewis, 801 F.2d 1191, 1196 (9th Cir. 18 1986). Attorneys should be appointed for indigent petitioners 19 who cannot "adequately present their own cases." Jeffers y. 20 Lewis, 68 F.3d 295, 297-98 (9th Cir. 1995).

21 Although Petitioner need meet but one (1) of the enumerated 22 criteria of NRS 34.750 in order to merit appointment of counsel, 23 he meets all of them. He also presents a classic example of one 24 meriting counsel under the interest of justice test bespoken by 25 the Ninth Circuit. Indeed, Petitioner's sentence, coupled with 26 the other factors set forth above, demonstrate that appointment 27 of counsel to him would not only satisfy justice, but 28 fundamental fairness, as well.

-2-

1	CONCLUSION			
2				
3	counsel to represent Petitioner in and for all further			
4	proceedings in this habeas corpus action.			
5	Dated this \underline{H} day of $\underline{MA_{M}}$, 2022.			
6	TED Durto			
7	Lovelock Correctional Center			
8	1200 Prison Road Lovelock, Nevada 89419			
9	Petitioner In Pro Se			
10	CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE			
11	I do certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the			
12	12 foregoing MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL to the below addre			
13	14 in the U.S. Mail via prison law library staff:			
14				
16				
17	Attorney For Respondent			
18 19				
20				
20	Petitioner In Pro Se			
21	AFFIRMATION PURSUANT TO NRS 2398.030			
23	The undersigned does hereby affirm that the preceding			
24	MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL DOES not contain the social			
25	security number of any person.			
26	Dated this $\parallel \parallel$ day of $M_{\Delta y}$, 2022.			
27	TFO DUMU HOPOSAA			
28	Petitioner In Pro Se			
1	-3-			

THIS SEALED DOCUMENT, NUMBERED PAGE(S) 16 - 19 WILL FOLLOW VIA U.S. MAIL

	Electronically Filed 05/23/2022 2:18 PM CLERK OF THE COURT			
1	PPOW			
2				
3	DISTRICT COURT			
4	CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA			
5	Ted Michael Donko,			
6	Petitioner, Case No: A-22-852928-W Department 17			
7	vs. State of Nevada,			
8	ORDER FOR PETITION FOR Respondent, WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS			
9				
10	J			
11	Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Post-Conviction Relief) on			
12	May 20, 2022. The Court has reviewed the Petition and has determined that a response would assist the			
13	Court in determining whether Petitioner is illegally imprisoned and restrained of his/her liberty, and good			
14	cause appearing therefore,			
15	IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Respondent shall, within 45 days after the date of this Order,			
16	answer or otherwise respond to the Petition and file a return in accordance with the provisions of NRS			
17	34.360 to 34.830, inclusive.			
18	IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED that this matter shall be placed on this Court's			
19	July 27, 2022 at 9:00 A.M.			
20	Calendar on the <u>day of</u>			
21				
22	o ⁻ ctock for further proceedings.			
23	Dated this 23rd day of May, 2022			
24	Man 10			
25	District Court Judge			
26	169 426 0E47 AE50			
27	Michael Villani District Court Judge			
28				
	-1-			
	20			

1 CSERV 2 DISTRICT COURT 3 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 4				
3 DISTRICT COURT 3 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 4 5 5 6 6 Ted Donko, Plaintiff(s) CASE NO: A-22-852928-W				
4 5 6 Ted Donko, Plaintiff(s) CASE NO: A-22-852928-W				
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6 Ted Donko, Plaintiff(s) CASE NO: A-22-852928-W				
8 State of Nevada, Defendant(s)				
9				
11				
$\begin{array}{c c} \hline \\ \hline $	Court's			
13				
If indicated below, a copy of the above mentioned filings were also set via United States Postal Service, postage prepaid, to the parties listed below a	If indicated below, a copy of the above mentioned filings were also served by mail via United States Postal Service, postage prepaid, to the parties listed below at their last			
15 known addresses on 5/24/2022	a mon fast			
Ted Donko #1080899				
LCC 1200 Prison Road				
Lovelock, NV, 89419				
19				
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THIS SEALED DOCUMENT, NUMBERED PAGE(S) 22 - 22 WILL FOLLOW VIA U.S. MAIL

				Electronically Filed 5/24/2022 3:54 PM		
1		DISTRICT COURT CLERK OF THE COURT				
2	CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA			Atump. Arum		
3	Ted Donko, P	Ted Donko, Plaintiff(s) Case No.: A-22-852928-W				
4	VS. State of Nevro	la, Defendant(s)	Department 17			
5		ia, Derendani(s)				
6		NOTICE OI	F HEARING			
7						
8	Please be	advised that the Plaintiff's Mot	ion for Appointment of C	ounsel in the above-		
9	entitled matter	is set for hearing as follows:				
10	Date:	July 27, 2022				
11	Time:	8:30 AM				
	Location:	RJC Courtroom 11A				
12		Regional Justice Center 200 Lewis Ave.				
13	Las Vegas, NV 89101					
14	NOTE: Unde	er NEFCR 9(d), if a party is 1	not receiving electronic a	service through the		
15	Eighth Judic	ial District Court Electronic	Filing System, the mo	ovant requesting a		
16	hearing must serve this notice on the party by traditional means.					
17	STEVEN D. GRIERSON, CEO/Clerk of the Court					
18						
19	By: /s/ Michelle McCarthy					
20	Deputy Clerk of the Court					
21		CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE				
22		I hereby certify that pursuant to Rule 9(b) of the Nevada Electronic Filing and Conversion				
23	Rules a copy of this Notice of Hearing was electronically served to all registered users on this case in the Eighth Judicial District Court Electronic Filing System.					
24						
25		By: /s/ Michelle McCarthy				
26		Deputy Clerk of the Court				
27						
27						
28						
		23				
	Case Number: A-22-852928-W					

			Electronically Filed 7/6/2022 2:28 PM Steven D. Grierson		
	CLERK OF THE COU				
	RSPN STEVEN B. WOLFSON		Atumb. Atum		
2 3	Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #001565				
3 4	JOHN AFSHAR Deputy District Attorney Nevada Bar #014408				
4 5	200 Lewis Avenue				
6	Las Vegas, Nevada 89155-2212 (702) 671-2500				
7	Attorney for Respondent				
8		CT COURT NTY, NEVADA			
9	TED MICHAEL DONKO, #2668752				
10	#2008/32 Petitioner,	CASE NO	A-22-852928-W		
11	-vs-	Child Ho.	C-19-345584-1		
12	THE STATE OF NEVADA,	DEPT NO:			
13	Respondent.	DELT NO.			
14					
15	STATE'S RESPONSE TO DONKO'S PET (POST-CONVICTION) AND MOTIO				
16 17	DATE OF HEARING: JULY 27, 2022 TIME OF HEARING: 8:30 AM				
17	COMES NOW, the State of Nevada		WOLFSON Clark County		
18 19	District Attorney, through JOHN AFSHAR, I	-	-		
20	attached Points and Authorities in Response to				
20	(Post-Conviction) and Motion for Appointme				
22	This Response and Motion is made and		papers and pleadings on file		
23	herein, the attached points and authorities in support hereof, and oral argument at the time of				
24	hearing, if deemed necessary by this Honorable Court.				
25	//				
26	//				
27	1/				
28	1/				
	24 Case Number: A-22-{	352928-14/			

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POINTS AND AUTHORITIES STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On December 19, 2019, TED MICHAEL DONKO (hereinafter "Petitioner") was charged by way of Information as follows: Counts 1 and 2 – Battery with Use of a Deadly Weapon Resulting in Substantial Bodily Harm (Category B Felony – NRS 200.481); Counts 3, 4, and 5 – Attempt Murder with Use of a Deadly Weapon (Category B Felony – NRS 200.010, 200.030, 193.330, 193.165); Count 6 – Assault with a Deadly Weapon (Category B Felony - NRS 200.471 - NOC 50201); Count 7 – Discharging Firearm At or Into Occupied Structure, Vehicle, Aircraft, or Watercraft (Category B Felony – NRS 202.285); and Count 8 – Ownership or Possession of Firearm by Prohibited Person (Category B Felony – NRS 202.360).

On February 10, 2020, the State filed an Amended Information whereby it severed Count 8 – Ownership or Possession of Firearm by Prohibited Person. Petitioner's jury trial commenced that same day. On February 13, 2020, the State filed a Second Amended Information that reflected the bifurcated charge of Ownership or Possession of Firearm by Prohibited Person.

On February 13, 2020, after four (4) days of trial, the jury found Petitioner guilty of the following: Counts 1 and 2 – Battery with Use of a Deadly Weapon; Counts 3, 4, and 5 – Attempt Murder with Use of a Deadly Weapon; Count 6 – Assault with a Deadly Weapon; and Count 7 – Discharging Firearm At or Into Occupied Structure, Vehicle, Aircraft, Watercraft. After reaching this verdict, the second phase of the trial, involving solely Petitioner's bifurcated charge Ownership or Possession of Firearm by Prohibited Person, commenced. V AA 949. The jury also found Petitioner guilty of such charge.

On April 20, 2020, the district court adjudicated Petitioner guilty of all charges and orally pronounced the following terms of years for his sentence to the Nevada Department of Corrections ("NDOC"): Count 1 - 24 to 60 months; Count 2 - 24 to 60 months, concurrent with Count 1; Count 3 - 36 to 96 months, consecutive to Counts 1 and 2, plus 12 to 30 months for the Use of a Deadly Weapon, consecutive to Count 3;1 Count 4 - 36 to 96 months, plus a

consecutive term of 12 to 30 months for the Use of a Deadly Weapon, to run consecutive to Count 3; Count 5 – 36 to 96 months, plus 12 to 30 months for the Use of a Deadly Weapon, to run consecutive to Count 4; Count 6 – 12 to 30 months, to run concurrent; Count 7 – 12 to 30 months, to run concurrent; and Count 8 – 12 to 30 months, to run concurrent.

The Court further clarified that the only sentences that would run consecutive were "the three Attempt Murders with Use of a Deadly Weapon," Petitioner would receive an aggregate sentence of 12 to 31.5 years, including the deadly weapon enhancements, the District Court would retain jurisdiction over the restitution, and he would receive 150 days credit for time served. The Judgment of Conviction was filed on April 28, 2020, provided the aforementioned sentences, and clarified more fully that Count 3 would run consecutive to Counts 1 and 2, but listed the aggregate total sentence, including the deadly weapon enhancements, as 144 to 378 months, and the aggregate sentence, not including the deadly weapon enhancements, as 108 to 288 months.

On June 3, 2020, the State filed a Notice of Motion and Motion to Address Aggregate Sentence Calculations, wherein the State argued that the appropriate aggregate sentence, based upon the charges at sentencing, was 168 to 438 months. On November 24, 2020, the District Court explained by way of Minute Order that while it made a clerical error in calculating the aggregate sentence, it appropriately held that the weapons enhancements would run consecutive to the Attempt Murder charges, and Count 3 would run consecutive to Counts 1 and 2. Accordingly, the District Court found that the appropriate aggregate sentence was 168 to 438 months and ordered that an Amended Judgment of Conviction be filed.

The Amended Judgment of Conviction was filed on May 25, 2021. Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal on June 1, 2021. Judgment of Conviction was affirmed on April 20, 2022. Remittitur issued on May 16, 2022.

On May 20, 2022, Petitioner filed the instant Petition and a Motion for Appointment of Attorney.

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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

On October 1, 2019, at around 12:15 PM, Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department ("LVMPD") officers responded to a shooting at 56 North Linn Lane in Clark County, Nevada. The 911 call described the shooter as a Hispanic male, about 5 foot 11, and wearing red. Additionally, a gray Toyota Corolla was seen fleeing the scene of the shooting.

When officers arrived at the crime scene, they saw the two male shooting victims lying on the ground next to a truck. One of the men, Jonathan Sanchez-Loza, had been shot in the leg, while the other, Fernando Espinoza, had been shot in the abdomen and the hand. Officers also observed bullet impacts on the truck and the garage bay door of the residence as well as eight shell casings in the street.

Sanchez-Lopez testified that on the day of the shooting, he received a call at around 11:30 AM from Espinoza. Eventually, he met up with Espinoza, a man named Gilbert, a man named DeAndre Woods, and the owner of the home to take trash to the dump. Ultimately, however, he helped moved furniture into the white truck that was at the scene. At about 12:00 PM he recalled someone saying "Hey, where's Shorty?" Sanchez-Loza then looked over in the direction of the voice and saw the passenger of a Toyota, with the passenger door open, pointing a firearm at him. Sanchez-Loza was then shot and dropped to the ground. While lying on the ground, he recalled seeing Espinoza fall into the back of the truck and, while in and out of consciousness, he called his uncle who lived up the street. Sanchez-Lopez heard about ten gunshots total.

The next thing Sanchez-Lopez remembered was waking up in the hospital. He had been shot in the right thigh and left thigh. As of the day of his trial testimony, he still had a bullet lodged in his left leg and had to walk with a cane. Sanchez-Lopez further testified that he had undergone surgery in his leg, still had pain, and had scars from the injuries.

Espinoza confirmed that he too was at the residence moving furniture using his brother's vehicle. However, Espinoza testified that while he was facing the street at the time of the shooting, he did not know from where the shots originated. Espinoza also testified that he almost did not come to court because he did not want to testify and only participated because

he was under subpoena. However, LVMPD Detective Jason Marin testified that when he interviewed Espinoza at UMC the day after the shooting, Espinoza told him that while Espinoza was at the address of the shooting on October 1, 2019, an older model Toyota pulled up to the residence. He further explained to Detective Marin that he saw a passenger get out of the vehicle and had either asked about Shorty or said, "Fuck Shorty." However, Espinoza stated he did not get a good look at the shooter.

The day before the shooting, on September 30, 2019, Woods recalled sitting on a chair at his ex-girlfriend's house when two young men pulled up in an older Toyota. The two men, one wearing a black shirt and the other wearing a red shirt, came up to Woods and asked if he knew someone named Shorty. Woods responded to the men that he did not know who Shorty was and the men left.

At the time of the shooting on the following day, Woods testified that he was sitting on a chair while the other men were moving furniture to the truck. While sitting, Woods saw the same Toyota pull up. Woods then saw the same white male wearing a red shirt that had asked him who Shorty was on the previous day, and that he later identified as Petitioner, exit the vehicle and point a gun at the person in front of Woods. Petitioner then said, "Fuck Shorty" and started shooting. The Toyota subsequently fled from the scene. Woods, appearing scared, later described the shooter to responding officers. He described the shooter as a Hispanic male, about 5 foot 11, 200 pounds, had nearly bald hair, and was wearing a red t-shirt.

Genaro Ramos, who was down the street working on his mother's vehicle at her home, heard about eight to ten gunshots. A couple of minutes later, he noticed a vehicle driving quickly down the street. Ramos recalled that the vehicle he saw speeding was an older model, gold, sand colored, Toyota Corolla. After the Toyota sped by, he saw the vehicle stop, and then saw a person, wearing a red shirt, exit the vehicle, look around suspiciously, and search his pockets. The person then tried to go back to the vehicle, but then started running or walking down the street. Ramos described this person as a white male in his 30s. Although Ramos did not initially identify Petitioner as the individual he saw at trial, after he was excused and the State explained he was free to leave, Ramos indicated to the State that he was nervous. When

the State asked why that was, Ramos stated it was his first time testifying and that the man he saw in court was the man he saw exiting the Toyota on the day of the shooting. Based on this new information, the State recalled Ramos who nervously identified Petitioner as the man he saw wearing a red shirt, parking the Toyota Corolla, and walking up the street on the day of the shooting.

After LVMPD officers responded to the crime scene, they canvassed the surrounding streets for evidence. Eventually, officers found a vehicle matching the description provided, an unregistered, gray or silver, four-door Toyota Corolla, in the same neighborhood as the shooting. When officers brought Ramos to view the Toyota Corolla, he told them it was the same vehicle he saw speed by after he heard the gunshots. After locating the vehicle, investigators processed the vehicle for fingerprints and recovered a license plate, a .40 caliber cartridge, as well as a bullet that had a head stamp that matched the casings found at the scene. The latent prints that were removed from the license plate that was recovered were later determined to be a match to Petitioner's left middle finger.

Officers also found a red shirt which appeared to have been laid on the side of the road in the same neighborhood as the crime scene. The DNA buccal swab that was later obtained from Petitioner matched the DNA that was swabbed from the red shirt. Officers also recovered surveillance video from a resident that depicted an individual matching the description of the shooting suspect who was wearing a red shirt and had nearly bald hair in the video. The suspect in the video was seen walking in the direction where the red shirt was eventually found.

Later, officers conducted a photograph lineup with Woods. They showed Woods six photographs, including one of Petitioner. Complying with routine practice, all of the men in the photographs met the same description as Petitioner as far as height, weight, skin tone, and hair style. LVMPD Detective Jason Marin, who had conducted the photo lineup, provided the directions to Petitioner and after Petitioner signed the form stating he understood the instructions for the photo lineup, Woods wrote down that the man in photo number five was the shooter and he was 95% sure. Petitioner was photo number five. Woods testified that the reason he was 95% sure as opposed to 100% was because when he had previously seen the shooter his hair was shorter which made him only 95% sure. Further, when asked whether
learning later that Petitioner was white instead of Hispanic changed his mind on his
identification, he stated no. Moreover, seeing that Petitioner did not have tattoos did not change
Woods' mind about Petitioner being the shooter because Woods was not focused on the tattoos
when he was trying to get out of the crossfire on the day of the shooting.

Detective Marin testified at trial that it did not change the officers' investigation when Woods originally described the shooter as a Hispanic male because he could have interpreted it differently since he had such a brief interaction with the shooter. In fact, a race mix up is common. Notably, Detective Marin also testified that after Petitioner was apprehended the first time, he only noticed Petitioner's tattoos was when he was sitting two feet from him because Petitioner's tattoos were not immediately apparent.

When Detective Marin later interviewed Petitioner, Petitioner stated that he knew Shorty, but there was no evidence that Petitioner and Woods knew each other. When Detective Marin asked Petitioner about his fingerprint in the vehicle, Petitioner said he was the passenger in the vehicle, which he described as an older model sedan, the night before the shooting. Petitioner testified he met Woods in the past and hung out with him.

ARGUMENT

I. PETITIONER'S CLAIMS ARE OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF A PETITION

Petitioner raises several claims that are outside the scope of a Petition, either because the claims are waived for failure to raise on direct appeal or barred by case of the law doctrine. Petitioner claims: (1) "The court did not ask for the red shirt to get tested for GSR 'gunshot residue' (Petition at 6); (2) the Court allowed an unreliable in-court identification (Petition at 7); (3) "tainted jury" where the jury consisted of 90% Hispanics (Petition at 7); (4) the District Court violated Petitioner's double jeopardy rights (Petition at 7a); (5) prosecutorial misconduct when the State allegedly shifted the burden to Petitioner; and (6) the district court erred in denying the defense's jury instructions (Petition at 7b).

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NRS 34.810(1) reads: 1 2 The court shall dismiss a petition if the court determines that: 3 (a) The petitioner's conviction was upon a plea of guilty or guilty but mentally ill and the petition was apon a plan of gamp of gamp that the plea was involuntarily or unknowingly or that the plea was entered without effective assistance of counsel. 4 5 (b) The petitioner's conviction was the result of a trial and the grounds for the petition could have been: 6 (2) Raised in a direct appeal or a prior petition for a writ of habeas 7 corpus or postconviction relief. The Nevada Supreme Court has held that "challenges to the validity of a guilty plea and claims" 8 9 of ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel must first be pursued in post-conviction proceedings.... [A]ll other claims that are appropriate for a direct appeal must be pursued on 10 direct appeal, or they will be *considered waived in subsequent proceedings*." Franklin v. State, 11 110 Nev. 750, 752, 877 P.2d 1058, 1059 (1994) (emphasis added) (disapproved on other 12 grounds by Thomas v. State, 115 Nev. 148, 979 P.2d 222 (1999)). "A court must dismiss a 13 habeas petition if it presents claims that either were or could have been presented in an earlier 14 proceeding, unless the court finds both cause for failing to present the claims earlier or for 15 raising them again and actual prejudice to the petitioner." Evans v. State, 117 Nev. 609, 646-16 47, 29 P.3d 498, 523 (2001). 17 Accordingly, claims one and three are waived for failure to raise on direct appeal. The 18 remaining claims – two, four, five, and six - fail because they are outside the scope of a post-19 20conviction proceeding. The only claims permissible on a petition are those "challenges to the validity of a guilty plea and claims of ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel." 21 Franklin v. State, 110 Nev. 750, 752, 877 P.2d 1058, 1059 (1994) (emphasis added) 22 (disapproved on other grounds by Thomas v. State, 115 Nev. 148, 979 P.2d 222 (1999)). 23 24 Additionally, these claims are also barred by the law of the case doctrine. "The law of a first appeal is law of the case on all subsequent appeals in which the facts 25

"The law of a first appeal is law of the case on all subsequent appeals in which the facts are substantially the same." <u>Hall v. State</u>, 91 Nev. 314, 315, 535 P.2d 797, 798 (1975) (<u>quoting</u> <u>Walker v. State</u>, 85 Nev. 337, 343, 455 P.2d 34, 38 (1969)). "The doctrine of the law of the case cannot be avoided by a more detailed and precisely focused argument subsequently made

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after reflection upon the previous proceedings." <u>Id.</u> at 316, 535 P.2d at 799. Under the law of
the case doctrine, issues previously decided on direct appeal may not be reargued in a habeas
petition. <u>Pellegrini v. State</u>, 117 Nev. 860, 879, 34 P.3d 519, 532 (2001) (citing <u>McNelton v.</u>
<u>State</u>, 115 Nev. 396, 414-15, 990 P.2d 1263, 1275 (1999)). Furthermore, this Court cannot
overrule the Nevada Supreme Court. NEV. CONST. Art. VI § 6. Petitioner's claims fail because
Petitioner raised these claims on direct appeal wherein the Nevada Court of Appeals denied
the claims on the merits.

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i. Alleged unreliable in-court identification

Petitioner claims Ramos's in-court identification after he was re-called to testify was improper. Petition at 7. The Nevada Court of Appeals held Petitioner's claim without merit:

Donko's counsel said that the identification was "improper," given that Ramos failed to identify Donko during his initial testimony. Donko's counsel asked the court to strike the identification. The State responded by indicating that there was nothing objectionable about Ramos's testimony concerning the hallway conversation with the prosecutor as it was accurate and with his identification of Donko. The district court stated that defense counsel's objection to Ramos's incourt identification was "not a legal objection," that there was nothing inadmissible about Ramos's testimony, and that Danko's counsel would be able to cross-examine Ramos regarding the identification. Donko's counsel then orally requested a mistrial for the same reasons previously discussed. The district court denied the oral motion.

 First, Donko argues that the district court abused its discretion by admitting Ramos's in-court identification testimony because Ramos failed to identify
 Donko as the shooter during his initial testimony and the admission of Ramos's in-court identification when he was recalled as a witness deprived Donko of due
 process.

We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Ramos's in-court identification of Donko. Ramos did not make a pretrial identification of Danko, but rather Ramos identified Donko during his testimony after he was recalled as a witness at trial. Accordingly, the credibility and weight of Ramos's testimony is 11within the province of the jury." <u>Wise</u>, 92 Nev. at 183, 547 P.2d at 315. Donko, through counsel, cross-examined Ramos, thus satisfying due process as to Ramos's in court identification of Danko.

²⁷ Donko v. State, Order of Affirmance COA-83037 p. 3, 7-8.

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ii. Double Jeopardy

Petitioner claims the District Court violated his Double Jeopardy rights by changing his aggregate sentence after he started serving his sentence. Petition at 7a. The Nevada Court of Appeals denied Petitioner's claim:

Second, Donko argues that the district court abused its discretion in amending Donko's judgment of conviction after he started serving his sentence, thereby improperly increasing his aggregate sentence and violating his protection from double jeopardy. A claim that a conviction violates the Double Jeopardy Clause generally is subject to de novo review on appeal. <u>Davidson v. State</u>, 124 Nev. 892, 896, 192 P.3d 1185, 1189 (2008); <u>Ebeling v. State</u>, 120 Nev. 401, 404, 91 P.3d 699, 601 (2004). NRS 176.566 states that "(c]lerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of the record and errors in the record arising from oversight or omission may be corrected by the court at any time and after such notice, if any, as the court orders."

Here, the district court did not amend the sentence on any individual conviction, but simply corrected a clerical error pertaining to the calculation of the aggregate sentence. Donko's argument that this error is not a "clerical error" is unpersuasive. <u>See Devlin v. State</u>, No. 78518, 2019 2019 WL 4892531, at *1 (Nev. Sept. 12, 2019) (Order of Affirmance) (holding that a district court can correct such clerical mistakes, when a district court entered an amended judgment of convicti9n correcting an aggregate sentence from 11 years to 12 years). Here, the district court modified the aggregate sentence language to comport with the individual sentences originally imposed at sentencing. Therefore, the district court corrected its previous miscalculation of the aggregate sentence to be consistent with the individual sentences set forth in the judgment of conviction. Thus, we are not persuaded that the district court abused its discretion in amending Donko's judgment of conviction to correct the aggregate sentence.

- 22 Donko v. State, Order of Affirmance COA-83037 p. 8-9.
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iii. Alleged Prosecutorial Misconduct

Petitioner claims the State committed prosecutorial misconduct by shifting the burden to Donko by stating that Petitioner failed to "explain how the fingerprint [sic] or red shirt was found." Petition at 7a. The Nevada Court of Appeals heard and rejected this claim:

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Fifth, Donko contends that the district court erred in allowing the State to commit prosecutorial misconduct, through improper burden-shifting, when the State argued in closing that during cross-examination Donko failed to provide an explanation for his DNA being present on the red shirt found at the scene and for his fingerprint being found on a license plate located inside the Toyota vehicle. When reviewing claims of prosecutorial misconduct, this court considers whether the conduct was improper and, if it was, whether it warrants reversal or was harmless. ...

Here, Donko testified in his defense and the State properly cross-examined him about his DNA being identified on the red shirt and his fingerprint lifted from a license plate located inside the vehicle found near the scene. Donko attempted to suggest that he was not the shooter, but he did not persuasively refute the physical evidence suggesting otherwise during cross-examination, resulting in the State arguing during closing that Donko "(glives no viable explanation" for the physical evidence obtained at the scene. The State was permitted to comment on the defendant's failure to explain physical evidence that directly tied him to the shooting. See Evans, 117 Nev. at 630, 28 P.3d at 513 (noting that the State may comment on the credibility of witnesses based on the evidence presented and "comment on the failure of the defense to counter or explain evidence presented"). The State here simply commented on the lack of support or explanation for Donko's assertion that he was not the shooter. Further, the jury was properly instructed that the State had the burden of proof. Accordingly, the State did not impermissibly shift the burden of proof or engage in prosecutorial misconduct during closing.

- Donko v. State, Order of Affirmance COA-83037 p. 12-13
 - iv. Jury Instructions

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Petitioner claims the District Court violated his rights by rejecting Petitioner's claim

to replace the word "unless" for "until" in the Reasonable Doubt Instruction. Petition at 7b.

Fourth, Donko contends that the district court abused its discretion when it rejected his proposed jury instructions and revision to the verdict form.
Specifically, he states that the district court should have permitted instructions that (1) modified the reasonable doubt instruction ...

NRS 175.211 provides the statutorily mandated language for a reasonable doubt instruction, which does not include the language requested by Donko. To the extent Donko argues under Crawford the district court abused its discretion when it rejected his proffered other negatively-worded or inverse instructions, we note "the district court may refuse a jury instruction on the defendant's theory of the case which is substantially covered by other instructions." <u>Runion. v. State</u>, 116 Nev. 1041, 1050, 13 P.3d 52, 58 (2000). Donko fails to demonstrate that his

proposed inverse instructions went to a specific theory of his case and were not merely duplicative of the court-approved instructions. Additionally, district courts do not err by refusing to accept duplicitous, misleading, or inaccurate jury instructions. <u>Carter v. State</u>, 121 Nev. 759, 765, 121 P.3d 592,596 (2005); <u>see also McDermott v. State</u>, No. 79296, 2020 WL 6743121 (Nev. Nov. 13, 2020) (Order of Affirmance) (concluding that because the proffered instruction was otherwise covered by the reasonable-doubt instruction, there was no abuse of discretion by the district court in refusing to give it). Although the district court could have properly given the inverse instructions, we cannot conclude that the court reversibly erred. The instructions it did give were accurate and any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. <u>See Guitron v. State</u>, 131 Nev. 215, 229-31, 350 P.3d 93, 102-03 (Ct. App. 2016).

Donko's contention that the district court also abused its discretion in denying his request to place "Not Guilty" before "Guilty" is also unpersuasive, as the Nevada Supreme Court has affirmatively rejected this argument. See Yandell v. State, No. 78259, 2020 WL 4333604, at *4 (Nev. July 27, 2020) (Order of Affirmance) (rejecting the appellant's argument that "not guilty" should have been listed first on verdict form because there was no case adopting the "position that the 'not guilty' [option] must be listed before the 'guilty' option on a verdict sheet" (internal quotation marks omitted)).

Donko v. State, Order of Affirmance COA-83037 p. 10-11

Because all these claims have been adjudicated and denied on the merits by the Nevada

Court of Appeals, they are barred by law of the case doctrine and should all be denied.

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II. PETITIONER RECEIVED EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

Petitioner claims his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to ask the questions Petitioner requested. Petition at 6. Petitioner implies an ineffective assistance of counsel regarding counsel's failure to test the red t-shirt for gunshot residue. Petition at 6.

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that, "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense." The United States Supreme Court has long recognized that "the right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel." <u>Strickland v. Washington</u>, 466 U.S. 668, 686, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2063 (1984); <u>see also State v. Love</u>, 109 Nev. 1136, 1138, 865 P.2d 322, 323 (1993).

To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, a defendant must prove he was denied "reasonably effective assistance" of counsel by satisfying the two-prong test of <u>Strickland</u>, 466 U.S. at 686-87, 104 S. Ct. at 2063-64. <u>See also Love</u>, 109 Nev. at 1138, 865
P.2d at 323. Under the <u>Strickland</u> test, a defendant must show first that his counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and second, that but for counsel's errors, there is a reasonable probability that the result of the proceedings would have been different. 466 U.S. at 687-88, 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2065, 2068; <u>Warden, Nevada State Prison v. Lyons</u>, 100 Nev. 430, 432, 683 P.2d 504, 505 (1984) (adopting the <u>Strickland</u> two-part test). "[T]here is no reason for a court deciding an ineffective assistance claim to approach the inquiry in the same order or even to address both components of the inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on one." <u>Strickland</u>, 466 U.S. at 697, 104 S. Ct. at 2069.

The court begins with the presumption of effectiveness and then must determine whether the defendant has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that counsel was ineffective. <u>Means v. State</u>, 120 Nev. 1001, 1011, 103 P.3d 25, 32 (2004). "Effective counsel does not mean errorless counsel, but rather counsel whose assistance is '[w]ithin the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases." <u>Jackson v. Warden</u>, 91 Nev. 430, 432, 537 P.2d 473, 474 (1975).

Counsel cannot be ineffective for failing to make futile objections or arguments. <u>See</u> <u>Ennis v. State</u>, 122 Nev. 694, 706, 137 P.3d 1095, 1103 (2006). Trial counsel has the "immediate and ultimate responsibility of deciding if and when to object, which witnesses, if any, to call, and what defenses to develop." <u>Rhyne v. State</u>, 118 Nev. 1, 8, 38 P.3d 163, 167 (2002).

Based on the above law, the role of a court in considering allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel is "not to pass upon the merits of the action not taken but to determine whether, under the particular facts and circumstances of the case, trial counsel failed to render reasonably effective assistance." Donovan v. State, 94 Nev. 671, 675, 584 P.2d 708, 711 (1978). This analysis does not mean that the court should "second guess reasoned choices between trial tactics nor does it mean that defense counsel, to protect himself against allegations of inadequacy, must make every conceivable motion no matter how remote the possibilities are of success." Id. To be effective, the constitution "does not require that counsel

do what is impossible or unethical. If there is no bona fide defense to the charge, counsel cannot create one and may disserve the interests of his client by attempting a useless charade." <u>United States v. Cronic</u>, 466 U.S. 648, 657 n.19, 104 S. Ct. 2039, 2046 n.19 (1984).

"There are countless ways to provide effective assistance in any given case. Even the best criminal defense attorneys would not defend a particular client in the same way." <u>Strickland</u>, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S. Ct. at 689. "Strategic choices made by counsel after thoroughly investigating the plausible options are almost unchallengeable." <u>Dawson v. State</u>, 108 Nev. 112, 117, 825 P.2d 593, 596 (1992); <u>see also Ford v. State</u>, 105 Nev. 850, 853, 784 P.2d 951, 953 (1989). In essence, the court must "judge the reasonableness of counsel's challenged conduct on the facts of the particular case, viewed as of the time of counsel's conduct." <u>Strickland</u>, 466 U.S. at 690, 104 S. Ct. at 2066.

Even if a defendant can demonstrate that his counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, he must still demonstrate prejudice and show a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the result of the trial would have been different. <u>McNelton v. State</u>, 115 Nev. 396, 403, 990 P.2d 1263, 1268 (1999) (citing <u>Strickland</u>, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at 2064). "A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." <u>Id. (citing Strickland</u>, 466 U.S. at 687-89, 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2064-65, 2068).

The Nevada Supreme Court has held "that a habeas corpus petitioner must prove the disputed factual allegations underlying his ineffective-assistance claim by a preponderance of the evidence." <u>Means v. State</u>, 120 Nev. 1001, 1012, 103 P.3d 25, 33 (2004). Furthermore, claims of ineffective assistance of counsel asserted in a petition for post-conviction relief must be supported with specific factual allegations, which if true, would entitle the petitioner to relief. <u>Hargrove v. State</u>, 100 Nev. 498, 502, 686 P.2d 222, 225 (1984). "Bare" and "naked" allegations are not sufficient, nor are those belied and repelled by the record. <u>Id.</u> NRS 34.735(6) states in relevant part, "[Petitioner] *must* allege specific facts supporting the claims in the petition[.]... Failure to allege specific facts rather than just conclusions may cause your petition to be dismissed." (emphasis added).

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Petitioner claims his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to ask the questions Petitioner requested. Petition at 6. This claim fails as bare and naked. Petitioner does not identify what those questions were or who the questions should have been asked of. As such, Petitioner fails to show that counsel's performance was deficient. Petitioner also fails to show prejudice as he does not state why the result of his trial would have been different had counsel asked those questions. Additionally, which questions to ask a witness are virtually unreviewable strategic decisions. Therefore, Petitioner fails to demonstrate deficiency or

Petitioner implies an ineffective assistance of counsel regarding counsel's failure to test the red t-shirt for gunshot residue. Petition at 6. To the extent Petitioner raises an ineffective assistance of counsel claim regarding the t-shirt not being tested for gunshot residue ("GSR"), this claim also fails for failure to show deficiency and prejudice. Petitioner cannot show counsel's performance was deficient because gunshot residue testing has been deemed unreliable as there is a high probability of cross contamination. At the 2005 Federal Bureau Investigation Laboratory's Gunshot Residue Symposium in 2005, "[a]ll participants agreed that GSR sampling should be done at the scene, where permissible, and as expeditiously as possible." FBI Laboratory's Gunshot Residue Symposium, May 31-June 3, 2005.¹ The probability of cross contamination is very high such that someone can have GSR on their clothing despite never having direct contact with a firearm. Okorie Okorocha, The Art of Gunshot Residue Testing, Toxicology, Oct. 26, 2018, https://www.okoricokorocha.com/thcart-of-gunshot-residue-testing/ (Last Accessed July 6, 2022). Notably, GSR testing has decreased to such degree that even the FBI no longer conducts GSR testing. Id.; see also U.S. Department of Justice, Forensic Science: Gunshot Residue Tests, Criminal Law Bulletin Vol. 27 Issue 6 1991 ("even GSR tests are not conclusive.")² Studies have found that only 50% of known self-inflicted gunshot suicides tested positive for GSR when tested by scanning electron microscopy with energy-dispersive x-ray spectroscopy. Molina DK, Martinez M, Garcia J,

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¹ Summary accessible at: https://archives.fbi.gov/archives/about-us/lab/forensic-science-

communications/fsc/july2006/research/2006_07_research01.htm (Last Accessed July 6, 2022.)

² Accessible at: Forensic Science: Gunshot Residue Tests Office of Justice Programs (ojp.gov) (Last Accessed: July 6, 2022)

DiMaio VJ. Gunshot Residue Testing in Suicides: Part I: Analysis by Scanning Electron Microscopy with Energy-Dispersive X-ray., The American Journal of Forensic Medicine and Pathology, Sept. 28, 2007.³ Moreover, the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department Forensic Lab, nor any other lab in Nevada, conduct GSR testing. As such, trial counsel was not deficient in not having the t-shirt tested for GSR.

Likewise, Petitioner cannot show prejudice given the overwhelming evidence of his guilt. Police found a car matching the description of the shooter's car a few blocks from the shooting. The car was impounded and a license plate, bullet, and unspent round of ammunition was found. When tested, Petitioner's fingerprint was found on the license plate and the cartridge found in the car was the same type of shell casings found at the scene of the shooting. Additionally, the shooter was described as wearing red, and the t-shirt Petitioner highlights, is the one found near the shooting. The t-shirt was tested and Petitioner's DNA was found on the shirt. Further, at trial two witnesses identified Petitioner as the shooter. Thus, Petitioner cannot satisfy Strickland.

Accordingly, Petitioner's claims must be denied.

III.

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NO CUMULATIVE ERROR

Petitioner asserts a claim of cumulative error including in the context of ineffective assistance of counsel. Petition at 7a. The Nevada Supreme Court has never held that instances of ineffective assistance of counsel can be cumulated; it is the State's position that they cannot. However, even if they could be, it would be of no moment as there was no single instance of ineffective assistance in Petitioner's case. See United States v. Rivera, 900 F.2d 1462, 1471 (10th Cir. 1990) ("[A] cumulative-error analysis should evaluate only the effect of matters determined to be error, not the cumulative effect of non-errors.").

Furthermore, Petitioner's claim is without merit. "Relevant factors to consider in evaluating a claim of cumulative error are (1) whether the issue of guilt is close, (2) the quantity and character of the error, and (3) the gravity of the crime charged." Mulder v. State, 116 Nev. 1, 17, 992 P.2d 845, 855 (2000). Furthermore, any errors that occurred at trial were minimal

³ Accessible at: Gunshot residue testing in suicides: Part I: Analysis by scanning electron microscopy with energydispersive X-ray - PubMed (nih.gov) (Last Accessed: July 6, 2022)

in quantity and character, and a defendant "is not entitled to a perfect trial, but only a fair trial." 1 Ennis v. State, 91 Nev. 530, 533, 539 P.2d 114, 115 (1975). 2

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PETITIONER IS NOT ENTITLED TO APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL IV.

Petitioner requests appointment of counsel. Motion at 1-3. However, Petitioner fails to show that he is entitled to appointment of counsel.

Under the U.S. Constitution, the Sixth Amendment provides no right to counsel in postconviction proceedings. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 752, 111 S. Ct. 2546, 2566 (1991). The Nevada Supreme Court similarly observed that "[t]he Nevada Constitution...does not guarantee a right to counsel in post-conviction proceedings, as we interpret the Nevada Constitution's right to counsel provision as being coextensive with the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution." McKague v. Warden, 112 Nev. 159, 163, 912 P.2d 255, 258 (1996). McKague specifically held that with the exception of NRS 34.820(1)(a) (entitling appointed counsel when petitioner is under a sentence of death), one does not have "any constitutional or statutory right to counsel at all" in post-conviction proceedings. Id. at 164, 912 P.2d at 258.

The Nevada Legislature has, however, given courts the discretion to appoint postconviction counsel so long as "the court is satisfied that the allegation of indigency is true, and the petition is not dismissed summarily." NRS 34.750. NRS 34.750 reads:

> A petition may allege that the Defendant is unable to pay the costs of the proceedings or employ counsel. If the court is satisfied that the allegation of indigency is true and the petition *is not dismissed* summarily, the court may appoint counsel at the time the court orders the filing of an answer and a return. In making its determination, the court may consider, among other things, the severity of the consequences facing the petitioner and whether: (a) The issues are difficult; (b) The petitioner is unable to comprehend the proceedings; or

- (c) Counsel is necessary to proceed with discovery
- (emphasis added). Accordingly, under NRS 34.750, it is clear that the Court has discretion in 25 determining whether to appoint counsel.
- \equiv itioner's request should still be denied as he has failed to meet any of the additional 27 28 statutory factors under NRS 34.750. The issues Petitioner presents are not complex. Petitioner

does not identify any complex issues – six of the issues are outside the scope of a Petition, and 1 several of those are barred by law of the case doctrine. Both of Petitioner's ineffective 2 assistance of counsel claims are without merit. $|\equiv|$ claim regarding counsel's alleged failure 3 to ask questions Petitioner requested, does not allege any specific facts which, if true, would 4 entitle him to relief. Petitioner's implied ineffective assistance of counsel claim regarding the 5 GSR testing is not complex because studies have shown that GSR is unreliable. Cumulative 6 error does not apply to post-conviction and, even if it did, he has not demonstrated any error 7 in either of his two ineffective assistance of counsel claims. Petitioner appears to be able to 8 9 comprehend the proceedings, and there is no need for discovery. His motion is just a form that provides no additional details beyond what his Petition presents. Therefore, Petitioner's 10 request for appointment of counsel should be denied. 11 CONCLUSION 12 For the forgoing reasons, the State respectfully requests that Donko's Petition for Writ 13 of Habeas Corpus (Post-Conviction) and Motion for Appointment of Counsel be DENIED. 14 DATED this 6th day of July, 2022. 15 Respectfully submitted, 16 17 STEVEN B. WOLFSON Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #001565 18 19 BY /s/ JOHN AFSHAR 20 JOHN AFSHAR

Deputy District Attorney Nevada Bar #014408

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that service of the above and foregoing was made this 6th day of July,

24 2022, by depositing a copy in the U.S. Mail, postage pre-paid, addressed to:

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TED DONKO, BAC#1080899
LOVELOCK CORRECTIONAL CENTER
1200 PRISON ROAD
LOVELOCK, NEVADA 8941919F24531X/JN/ml/elm/GUBY /s/L.M.
Secretary for the District Attorney's Office

Electronically Filed 08/19/2022 9:19 AM

			CLERK OF THE COURT	
1	FFCO STEVEN B. WOLESON			
2	STEVEN B. WOLFSON Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #001565 JOHN AFSHAR			
3				
4	Deputy District Attorney Nevada Bar #014408			
5	200 Lewis Avenue Las Vegas, Nevada 89155-2212			
6	(702) 671-2500 Attorney for Respondent			
7				
8	DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA			
9	TED MICHAEL DONKO,			
10	#1080899 Petitioner,	CASE NO:	A-22-852928-W	
11	-vs-		(C-19-345584-1)	
12	THE STATE OF NEVADA,			
13	Respondent.	DEPT NO:	XVII	
14				
15	FINDINGS OF FAC	F , CONCLUSION	IS OF	
16		ID ORDER		
17	DATE OF HEARING: JULY 27, 2022 TIME OF HEARING: 8:30 AM			
18	THIS CAUSE having come on for hearing before the Honorable CAROLYN			
19	ELLSWORTH, District Judge, on the 27th da	y of July 2022, Pet	itioner not being present and	
20	in pro per, Respondent being represented by	STEVEN WOLF	SON, Clark County District	
21	Attorney, by and through JAMES PUCCINI	ELLI, Deputy Dist	rict Attorney, and the Court	
22	having considered the matter, including brief	s, transcripts, and c	locuments on file herein, the	
23	Court makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law:			
24	///			
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FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On December 19, 2019, TED MICHAEL DONKO (hereinafter "Petitioner") was charged by way of Information as follows: Counts 1 and 2 – Battery with Use of a Deadly Weapon Resulting in Substantial Bodily Harm (Category B Felony – NRS 200.481); Counts 3, 4, and 5 – Attempt Murder with Use of a Deadly Weapon (Category B Felony – NRS 200.010, 200.030, 193.330, 193.165); Count 6 – Assault with a Deadly Weapon (Category B Felony - NRS 200.471 - NOC 50201); Count 7 – Discharging Firearm At or Into Occupied Structure, Vehicle, Aircraft, or Watercraft (Category B Felony – NRS 202.285); and Count 8 – Ownership or Possession of Firearm by Prohibited Person (Category B Felony – NRS 202.360).

On February 10, 2020, the State filed an Amended Information whereby it severed Count 8 – Ownership or Possession of Firearm by Prohibited Person. Petitioner's jury trial commenced that same day. On February 13, 2020, the State filed a Second Amended Information that reflected the bifurcated charge of Ownership or Possession of Firearm by Prohibited Person.

On February 13, 2020, after four (4) days of trial, the jury found Petitioner guilty of the following: Counts 1 and 2 – Battery with Use of a Deadly Weapon; Counts 3, 4, and 5 – Attempt Murder with Use of a Deadly Weapon; Count 6 – Assault with a Deadly Weapon; and Count 7 – Discharging Firearm At or Into Occupied Structure, Vehicle, Aircraft, Watercraft. After reaching this verdict, the second phase of the trial, involving solely Petitioner's bifurcated charge Ownership or Possession of Firearm by Prohibited Person, commenced. V AA 949. The jury also found Petitioner guilty of such charge.

On April 20, 2020, the district court adjudicated Petitioner guilty of all charges and orally pronounced the following terms of years for his sentence to the Nevada Department of Corrections ("NDOC"): Count 1 - 24 to 60 months; Count 2 - 24 to 60 months, concurrent with Count 1; Count 3 - 36 to 96 months, consecutive to Counts 1 and 2, plus 12 to 30 months for the Use of a Deadly Weapon, consecutive to Count 3;1 Count 4 - 36 to 96 months, plus a

consecutive term of 12 to 30 months for the Use of a Deadly Weapon, to run consecutive to Count 3; Count 5 – 36 to 96 months, plus 12 to 30 months for the Use of a Deadly Weapon, to run consecutive to Count 4; Count 6 – 12 to 30 months, to run concurrent; Count 7 – 12 to 30 months, to run concurrent; and Count 8 – 12 to 30 months, to run concurrent.

The Court further clarified that the only sentences that would run consecutive were "the three Attempt Murders with Use of a Deadly Weapon," Petitioner would receive an aggregate sentence of 12 to 31.5 years, including the deadly weapon enhancements, the District Court would retain jurisdiction over the restitution, and he would receive 150 days credit for time served. The Judgment of Conviction was filed on April 28, 2020, provided the aforementioned sentences, and clarified more fully that Count 3 would run consecutive to Counts 1 and 2, but listed the aggregate total sentence, including the deadly weapon enhancements, as 144 to 378 months, and the aggregate sentence, not including the deadly weapon enhancements, as 108 to 288 months.

On June 3, 2020, the State filed a Notice of Motion and Motion to Address Aggregate Sentence Calculations, wherein the State argued that the appropriate aggregate sentence, based upon the charges at sentencing, was 168 to 438 months. On November 24, 2020, the District Court explained by way of Minute Order that while it made a clerical error in calculating the aggregate sentence, it appropriately held that the weapons enhancements would run consecutive to the Attempt Murder charges, and Count 3 would run consecutive to Counts 1 and 2. Accordingly, the District Court found that the appropriate aggregate sentence was 168 to 438 months and ordered that an Amended Judgment of Conviction be filed.

The Amended Judgment of Conviction was filed on May 25, 2021. Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal on June 1, 2021. Judgment of Conviction was affirmed on April 20, 2022. Remittitur issued on May 16, 2022.

On May 20, 2022, Petitioner filed the instant Petition and a Motion for Appointment of Attorney.

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FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On October 1, 2019, at around 12:15 PM, Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department ("LVMPD") officers responded to a shooting at 56 North Linn Lane in Clark County, Nevada. The 911 call described the shooter as a Hispanic male, about 5 foot 11, and wearing red. Additionally, a gray Toyota Corolla was seen fleeing the scene of the shooting.

When officers arrived at the crime scene, they saw the two male shooting victims lying on the ground next to a truck. One of the men, Jonathan Sanchez-Loza, had been shot in the leg, while the other, Fernando Espinoza, had been shot in the abdomen and the hand. Officers also observed bullet impacts on the truck and the garage bay door of the residence as well as eight shell casings in the street.

Sanchez-Lopez testified that on the day of the shooting, he received a call at around 11:30 AM from Espinoza. Eventually, he met up with Espinoza, a man named Gilbert, a man named DeAndre Woods, and the owner of the home to take trash to the dump. Ultimately, however, he helped moved furniture into the white truck that was at the scene. At about 12:00 PM he recalled someone saying "Hey, where's Shorty?" Sanchez-Loza then looked over in the direction of the voice and saw the passenger of a Toyota, with the passenger door open, pointing a firearm at him. Sanchez-Loza was then shot and dropped to the ground. While lying on the ground, he recalled seeing Espinoza fall into the back of the truck and, while in and out of consciousness, he called his uncle who lived up the street. Sanchez-Lopez heard about ten gunshots total.

The next thing Sanchez-Lopez remembered was waking up in the hospital. He had been shot in the right thigh and left thigh. As of the day of his trial testimony, he still had a bullet lodged in his left leg and had to walk with a cane. Sanchez-Lopez further testified that he had undergone surgery in his leg, still had pain, and had scars from the injuries.

Espinoza confirmed that he too was at the residence moving furniture using his brother's vehicle. However, Espinoza testified that while he was facing the street at the time of the shooting, he did not know from where the shots originated. Espinoza also testified that he almost did not come to court because he did not want to testify and only participated because

he was under subpoena. However, LVMPD Detective Jason Marin testified that when he interviewed Espinoza at UMC the day after the shooting, Espinoza told him that while Espinoza was at the address of the shooting on October 1, 2019, an older model Toyota pulled up to the residence. He further explained to Detective Marin that he saw a passenger get out of the vehicle and had either asked about Shorty or said, "Fuck Shorty." However, Espinoza stated he did not get a good look at the shooter.

The day before the shooting, on September 30, 2019, Woods recalled sitting on a chair at his ex-girlfriend's house when two young men pulled up in an older Toyota. The two men, one wearing a black shirt and the other wearing a red shirt, came up to Woods and asked if he knew someone named Shorty. Woods responded to the men that he did not know who Shorty was and the men left.

At the time of the shooting on the following day, Woods testified that he was sitting on a chair while the other men were moving furniture to the truck. While sitting, Woods saw the same Toyota pull up. Woods then saw the same white male wearing a red shirt that had asked him who Shorty was on the previous day, and that he later identified as Petitioner, exit the vehicle and point a gun at the person in front of Woods. Petitioner then said, "Fuck Shorty" and started shooting. The Toyota subsequently fled from the scene. Woods, appearing scared, later described the shooter to responding officers. He described the shooter as a Hispanic male, about 5 foot 11, 200 pounds, had nearly bald hair, and was wearing a red t-shirt.

Genaro Ramos, who was down the street working on his mother's vehicle at her home, heard about eight to ten gunshots. A couple of minutes later, he noticed a vehicle driving quickly down the street. Ramos recalled that the vehicle he saw speeding was an older model, gold, sand colored, Toyota Corolla. After the Toyota sped by, he saw the vehicle stop, and then saw a person, wearing a red shirt, exit the vehicle, look around suspiciously, and search his pockets. The person then tried to go back to the vehicle, but then started running or walking down the street. Ramos described this person as a white male in his 30s. Although Ramos did not initially identify Petitioner as the individual he saw at trial, after he was excused and the State explained he was free to leave, Ramos indicated to the State that he was nervous. When

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the State asked why that was, Ramos stated it was his first time testifying and that the man he saw in court was the man he saw exiting the Toyota on the day of the shooting. Based on this new information, the State recalled Ramos who nervously identified Petitioner as the man he saw wearing a red shirt, parking the Toyota Corolla, and walking up the street on the day of the shooting.

After LVMPD officers responded to the crime scene, they canvassed the surrounding streets for evidence. Eventually, officers found a vehicle matching the description provided, an unregistered, gray or silver, four-door Toyota Corolla, in the same neighborhood as the shooting. When officers brought Ramos to view the Toyota Corolla, he told them it was the same vehicle he saw speed by after he heard the gunshots. After locating the vehicle, investigators processed the vehicle for fingerprints and recovered a license plate, a .40 caliber cartridge, as well as a bullet that had a head stamp that matched the casings found at the scene. The latent prints that were removed from the license plate that was recovered were later determined to be a match to Petitioner's left middle finger.

Officers also found a red shirt which appeared to have been laid on the side of the road in the same neighborhood as the crime scene. The DNA buccal swab that was later obtained from Petitioner matched the DNA that was swabbed from the red shirt. Officers also recovered surveillance video from a resident that depicted an individual matching the description of the shooting suspect who was wearing a red shirt and had nearly bald hair in the video. The suspect in the video was seen walking in the direction where the red shirt was eventually found.

Later, officers conducted a photograph lineup with Woods. They showed Woods six photographs, including one of Petitioner. Complying with routine practice, all of the men in the photographs met the same description as Petitioner as far as height, weight, skin tone, and hair style. LVMPD Detective Jason Marin, who had conducted the photo lineup, provided the directions to Petitioner and after Petitioner signed the form stating he understood the instructions for the photo lineup, Woods wrote down that the man in photo number five was the shooter and he was 95% sure. Petitioner was photo number five. Woods testified that the reason he was 95% sure as opposed to 100% was because when he had previously seen the shooter his hair was shorter which made him only 95% sure. Further, when asked whether
learning later that Petitioner was white instead of Hispanic changed his mind on his
identification, he stated no. Moreover, seeing that Petitioner did not have tattoos did not change
Woods' mind about Petitioner being the shooter because Woods was not focused on the tattoos
when he was trying to get out of the crossfire on the day of the shooting.

Detective Marin testified at trial that it did not change the officers' investigation when Woods originally described the shooter as a Hispanic male because he could have interpreted it differently since he had such a brief interaction with the shooter. In fact, a race mix up is common. Notably, Detective Marin also testified that after Petitioner was apprehended the first time, he only noticed Petitioner's tattoos was when he was sitting two feet from him because Petitioner's tattoos were not immediately apparent.

When Detective Marin later interviewed Petitioner, Petitioner stated that he knew Shorty, but there was no evidence that Petitioner and Woods knew each other. When Detective Marin asked Petitioner about his fingerprint in the vehicle, Petitioner said he was the passenger in the vehicle, which he described as an older model sedan, the night before the shooting. Petitioner testified he met Woods in the past and hung out with him.

ANALYSIS

I. PETITIONER'S CLAIMS ARE OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF A PETITION

Petitioner raises several claims that are outside the scope of a Petition, either because the claims are waived for failure to raise on direct appeal or barred by case of the law doctrine. Petitioner claims: (1) "The court did not ask for the red shirt to get tested for GSR 'gunshot residue' (Petition at 6); (2) the Court allowed an unreliable in-court identification (Petition at 7); (3) "tainted jury" where the jury consisted of 90% Hispanics (Petition at 7); (4) the District Court violated Petitioner's double jeopardy rights (Petition at 7a); (5) prosecutorial misconduct when the State allegedly shifted the burden to Petitioner; and (6) the district court ///

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1	erred in denying the defense's jury instructions (Petition at 7b).	
2	NRS 34.810(1) reads:	
3	The court shall dismiss a petition if the court determines that:	
4	(a) The petitioner's conviction was upon a plea of guilty or guilty but montally ill and the petition is not based upon an allocation	
5	but mentally ill and the petition is not based upon an allegation that the plea was involuntarily or unknowingly or that the plea was entered without effective assistance of counsel.	
6	(b) The petitioner's conviction was the result of a trial and the grounds for the petition could have been:	
7	(2) Raised in a direct appeal or a prior petition for a writ of habeas	
8	corpus or postconviction relief.	
9	The Nevada Supreme Court has held that "challenges to the validity of a guilty plea and claims	
10	of ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel must first be pursued in post-conviction	
11	proceedings [A]Il other claims that are appropriate for a direct appeal must be pursued on	
12	direct appeal, or they will be considered waived in subsequent proceedings." Franklin v. State,	
13	110 Nev. 750, 752, 877 P.2d 1058, 1059 (1994) (emphasis added) (disapproved on other	
14	grounds by Thomas v. State, 115 Nev. 148, 979 P.2d 222 (1999)). "A court must dismiss a	
15	habeas petition if it presents claims that either were or could have been presented in an earlier	
16	proceeding, unless the court finds both cause for failing to present the claims earlier or for	
17	raising them again and actual prejudice to the petitioner." Evans v. State, 117 Nev. 609, 646-	
18	47, 29 P.3d 498, 523 (2001).	
19	Accordingly, claims one and three are waived for failure to raise on direct appeal. The	
20	remaining claims – two, four, five, and six - fail because they are outside the scope of a post-	
21	conviction proceeding. The only claims permissible on a petition are those "challenges to the	
22	validity of a guilty plea and claims of ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel."	
23	Franklin v. State, 110 Nev. 750, 752, 877 P.2d 1058, 1059 (1994) (emphasis added)	
24	(disapproved on other grounds by Thomas v. State, 115 Nev. 148, 979 P.2d 222 (1999)).	
25	Additionally, these claims are also barred by the law of the case doctrine.	
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26 "The law of a first appeal is law of the case on all subsequent appeals in which the facts
27 are substantially the same." <u>Hall v. State</u>, 91 Nev. 314, 315, 535 P.2d 797, 798 (1975) (<u>quoting</u>
28 <u>Walker v. State</u>, 85 Nev. 337, 343, 455 P.2d 34, 38 (1969)). "The doctrine of the law of the

case cannot be avoided by a more detailed and precisely focused argument subsequently made 1 after reflection upon the previous proceedings." Id. at 316, 535 P.2d at 799. Under the law of 2 the case doctrine, issues previously decided on direct appeal may not be reargued in a habeas 3 petition. Pellegrini v. State, 117 Nev. 860, 879, 34 P.3d 519, 532 (2001) (citing McNelton v. 4 State, 115 Nev. 396, 414-15, 990 P.2d 1263, 1275 (1999)). Furthermore, this Court cannot 5 overrule the Nevada Supreme Court. NEV. CONST. Art. VI § 6. Petitioner's claims fail because 6 Petitioner raised these claims on direct appeal wherein the Nevada Court of Appeals denied 7 the claims on the merits. 8

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i. Alleged unreliable in-court identification

Petitioner claims Ramos's in-court identification after he was re-called to testify was improper. Petition at 7. The Nevada Court of Appeals held Petitioner's claim without merit:

Donko's counsel said that the identification was "improper," given that Ramos failed to identify Donko during his initial testimony. Donko's counsel asked the court to strike the identification. The State responded by indicating that there was nothing objectionable about Ramos's testimony concerning the hallway conversation with the prosecutor as it was accurate and with his identification of Donko. The district court stated that defense counsel's objection to Ramos's incourt identification was "not a legal objection," that there was nothing inadmissible about Ramos's testimony, and that Danko's counsel would be able to cross-examine Ramos regarding the identification. Donko's counsel then orally requested a mistrial for the same reasons previously discussed. The district court denied the oral motion.

First, Donko argues that the district court abused its discretion by admitting Ramos's in-court identification testimony because Ramos failed to identify Donko as the shooter during his initial testimony and the admission of Ramos's in-court identification when he was recalled as a witness deprived Donko of due process.

We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Ramos's in-court identification of Donko. Ramos did not make a pretrial identification of Danko, but rather Ramos identified Donko during his testimony after he was recalled as a witness at trial. Accordingly, the credibility and weight of Ramos's testimony is 11 within the province of the jury." <u>Wise</u>, 92 Nev. at 183, 547 P.2d at 315. Donko, through counsel, cross-examined Ramos, thus satisfying due process as to Ramos's in court identification of Danko. Donko v. State, Order of Affirmance COA-83037 p. 3, 7-8.

ii. Double Jeopardy

Petitioner claims the District Court violated his Double Jeopardy rights by changing his aggregate sentence after he started serving his sentence. Petition at 7a. The Nevada Court of Appeals denied Petitioner's claim:

Second, Donko argues that the district court abused its discretion in amending Donko's judgment of conviction after he started serving his sentence, thereby improperly increasing his aggregate sentence and violating his protection from double jeopardy. A claim that a conviction violates the Double Jeopardy Clause generally is subject to de novo review on appeal. <u>Davidson v. State</u>, 124 Nev. 892, 896, 192 P.3d 1185, 1189 (2008); <u>Ebeling v. State</u>, 120 Nev. 401, 404, 91 P.3d 699, 601 (2004). NRS 176.566 states that "(c]lerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of the record and errors in the record arising from oversight or omission may be corrected by the court at any time and after such notice, if any, as the court orders."

Here, the district court did not amend the sentence on any individual conviction, but simply corrected a clerical error pertaining to the calculation of the aggregate sentence. Donko's argument that this error is not a "clerical error" is unpersuasive. <u>See Devlin v. State</u>, No. 78518, 2019 2019 WL 4892531, at *1 (Nev. Sept. 12, 2019) (Order of Affirmance) (holding that a district court can correct such clerical mistakes, when a district court entered an amended judgment of convicti9n correcting an aggregate sentence from 11 years to 12 years). Here, the district court modified the aggregate sentence language to comport with the individual sentences originally imposed at sentencing. Therefore, the district court corrected its previous miscalculation of the aggregate sentence to be consistent with the individual sentences set forth in the judgment of conviction. Thus, we are not persuaded that the district court abused its discretion in amending Donko's judgment of conviction to correct the aggregate sentence.

Donko v. State, Order of Affirmance COA-83037 p. 8-9.

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iii. Alleged Prosecutorial Misconduct

Petitioner claims the State committed prosecutorial misconduct by shifting the burden to Donko by stating that Petitioner failed to "explain how the fingerprint [sic] or red shirt was found." Petition at 7a. The Nevada Court of Appeals heard and rejected this claim: /// Fifth, Donko contends that the district court erred in allowing the State to commit prosecutorial misconduct, through improper burden-shifting, when the State argued in closing that during cross-examination Donko failed to provide an explanation for his DNA being present on the red shirt found at the scene and for his fingerprint being found on a license plate located inside the Toyota vehicle. When reviewing claims of prosecutorial misconduct, this court considers whether the conduct was improper and, if it was, whether it warrants reversal or was harmless. ...

Here, Donko testified in his defense and the State properly cross-examined him about his DNA being identified on the red shirt and his fingerprint lifted from a license plate located inside the vehicle found near the scene. Donko attempted to suggest that he was not the shooter, but he did not persuasively refute the physical evidence suggesting otherwise during cross-examination, resulting in the State arguing during closing that Donko "(g]ives no viable explanation" for the physical evidence obtained at the scene. The State was permitted to comment on the defendant's failure to explain physical evidence that directly tied him to the shooting. See Evans, 117 Nev. at 630, 28 P.3d at 513 (noting that the State may comment on the credibility of witnesses based on the evidence presented and "comment on the failure of the defense to counter or explain evidence presented"). The State here simply commented on the lack of support or explanation for Donko's assertion that he was not the shooter. Further, the jury was properly instructed that the State had the burden of proof. Accordingly, the State did not impermissibly shift the burden of proof or engage in prosecutorial misconduct during closing.

Donko v. State, Order of Affirmance COA-83037 p. 12-13

iv. Jury Instructions

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Petitioner claims the District Court violated his rights by rejecting Petitioner's claim to replace the word "unless" for "until" in the Reasonable Doubt Instruction. Petition at 7b. Fourth, Donko contends that the district court abused its discretion when it

rejected his proposed jury instructions and revision to the verdict form. Specifically, he states that the district court should have permitted instructions that (1) modified the reasonable doubt instruction ...

NRS 175.211 provides the statutorily mandated language for a reasonable doubt instruction, which does not include the language requested by Donko. To the extent Donko argues under Crawford the district court abused its discretion when it rejected his proffered other negatively-worded or inverse instructions, we note "the district court may refuse a jury instruction on the defendant's theory of the case which is substantially covered by other instructions." <u>Runion. v. State</u>, 116 Nev. 1041, 1050, 13 P.3d 52, 58 (2000). Donko fails to demonstrate that his proposed inverse instructions went to a specific theory of his case and were not

merely duplicative of the court-approved instructions. Additionally, district 1 courts do not err by refusing to accept duplicitous, misleading, or inaccurate jury instructions. Carter v. State, 121 Nev. 759, 765, 121 P.3d 592,596 (2005); see 2 also McDermott v. State, No. 79296, 2020 WL 6743121 (Nev. Nov. 13, 2020) 3 (Order of Affirmance) (concluding that because the proffered instruction was otherwise covered by the reasonable-doubt instruction, there was no abuse of 4 discretion by the district court in refusing to give it). Although the district court 5 could have properly given the inverse instructions, we cannot conclude that the court reversibly erred. The instructions it did give were accurate and any error 6 was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See Guitron v. State, 131 Nev. 215, 7 229-31, 350 P.3d 93, 102-03 (Ct. App. 2016). Donko's contention that the district court also abused its discretion in denying 8 his request to place "Not Guilty" before "Guilty" is also unpersuasive, as the Nevada Supreme Court has affirmatively rejected this argument. See Yandell v. 9 State, No. 78259, 2020 WL 4333604, at *4 (Nev. July 27, 2020) (Order of 10 Affirmance) (rejecting the appellant's argument that "not guilty" should have been listed first on verdict form because there was no case adopting the "position" 11 that the 'not guilty' [option] must be listed before the 'guilty' option on a verdict 12 sheet" (internal quotation marks omitted)). 13 Donko v. State, Order of Affirmance COA-83037 p. 10-11 14 Because all these claims have been adjudicated and denied on the merits by the Nevada 15 Court of Appeals, they are barred by law of the case doctrine and are all denied. 16 II. PETITIONER RECEIVED EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 17 Petitioner claims his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to ask the questions 18 Petitioner requested. Petition at 6. Petitioner implies an ineffective assistance of counsel 19 regarding counsel's failure to test the red t-shirt for gunshot residue. Petition at 6. 20 The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that, "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his 21 22 defense." The United States Supreme Court has long recognized that "the right to counsel is 23 the right to the effective assistance of counsel." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2063 (1984); see also State v. Love, 109 Nev. 1136, 1138, 865 P.2d 322, 323 24 (1993). 25 26 To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, a defendant must prove

To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, a defendant must prove he was denied "reasonably effective assistance" of counsel by satisfying the two-prong test of <u>Strickland</u>, 466 U.S. at 686-87, 104 S. Ct. at 2063-64. <u>See also Love</u>, 109 Nev. at 1138, 865

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P.2d at 323. Under the <u>Strickland</u> test, a defendant must show first that his counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and second, that but for counsel's errors, there is a reasonable probability that the result of the proceedings would have been different. 466 U.S. at 687-88, 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2065, 2068; <u>Warden, Nevada State Prison v. Lyons</u>, 100 Nev. 430, 432, 683 P.2d 504, 505 (1984) (adopting the <u>Strickland</u> two-part test). "[T]here is no reason for a court deciding an ineffective assistance claim to approach the inquiry in the same order or even to address both components of the inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on one." <u>Strickland</u>, 466 U.S. at 697, 104 S. Ct. at 2069.

The court begins with the presumption of effectiveness and then must determine whether the defendant has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that counsel was ineffective. <u>Means v. State</u>, 120 Nev. 1001, 1011, 103 P.3d 25, 32 (2004). "Effective counsel does not mean errorless counsel, but rather counsel whose assistance is '[w]ithin the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases." <u>Jackson v. Warden</u>, 91 Nev. 430, 432, 537 P.2d 473, 474 (1975).

Counsel cannot be ineffective for failing to make futile objections or arguments. <u>See</u> <u>Ennis v. State</u>, 122 Nev. 694, 706, 137 P.3d 1095, 1103 (2006). Trial counsel has the "immediate and ultimate responsibility of deciding if and when to object, which witnesses, if any, to call, and what defenses to develop." <u>Rhyne v. State</u>, 118 Nev. 1, 8, 38 P.3d 163, 167 (2002).

Based on the above law, the role of a court in considering allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel is "not to pass upon the merits of the action not taken but to determine whether, under the particular facts and circumstances of the case, trial counsel failed to render reasonably effective assistance." Donovan v. State, 94 Nev. 671, 675, 584 P.2d 708, 711 (1978). This analysis does not mean that the court should "second guess reasoned choices between trial tactics nor does it mean that defense counsel, to protect himself against allegations of inadequacy, must make every conceivable motion no matter how remote the possibilities are of success." Id. To be effective, the constitution "does not require that counsel do what is impossible or unethical. If there is no bona fide defense to the charge, counsel

cannot create one and may disserve the interests of his client by attempting a useless charade."
 <u>United States v. Cronic</u>, 466 U.S. 648, 657 n.19, 104 S. Ct. 2039, 2046 n.19 (1984).

"There are countless ways to provide effective assistance in any given case. Even the best criminal defense attorneys would not defend a particular client in the same way." <u>Strickland</u>, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S. Ct. at 689. "Strategic choices made by counsel after thoroughly investigating the plausible options are almost unchallengeable." <u>Dawson v. State</u>, 108 Nev. 112, 117, 825 P.2d 593, 596 (1992); <u>see also Ford v. State</u>, 105 Nev. 850, 853, 784 P.2d 951, 953 (1989). In essence, the court must "judge the reasonableness of counsel's challenged conduct on the facts of the particular case, viewed as of the time of counsel's conduct." <u>Strickland</u>, 466 U.S. at 690, 104 S. Ct. at 2066.

Even if a defendant can demonstrate that his counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, he must still demonstrate prejudice and show a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the result of the trial would have been different. <u>McNelton v. State</u>, 115 Nev. 396, 403, 990 P.2d 1263, 1268 (1999) (citing <u>Strickland</u>, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at 2064). "A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." <u>Id. (citing Strickland</u>, 466 U.S. at 687-89, 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2064-65, 2068).

The Nevada Supreme Court has held "that a habeas corpus petitioner must prove the disputed factual allegations underlying his ineffective-assistance claim by a preponderance of the evidence." Means v. State, 120 Nev. 1001, 1012, 103 P.3d 25, 33 (2004). Furthermore, claims of ineffective assistance of counsel asserted in a petition for post-conviction relief must be supported with specific factual allegations, which if true, would entitle the petitioner to relief. Hargrove v. State, 100 Nev. 498, 502, 686 P.2d 222, 225 (1984). "Bare" and "naked" allegations are not sufficient, nor are those belied and repelled by the record. Id. NRS 34.735(6) states in relevant part, "[Petitioner] *must* allege specific facts supporting the claims in the petition[.]... Failure to allege specific facts rather than just conclusions may cause your petition to be dismissed." (emphasis added).

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Petitioner claims his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to ask the questions Petitioner requested. Petition at 6. This claim fails as bare and naked. Petitioner does not identify what those questions were or who the questions should have been asked of. As such, Petitioner fails to show that counsel's performance was deficient. Petitioner also fails to show prejudice as he does not state why the result of his trial would have been different had counsel asked those questions. Additionally, which questions to ask a witness are virtually unreviewable strategic decisions. Therefore, Petitioner fails to demonstrate deficiency or

Petitioner implies an ineffective assistance of counsel regarding counsel's failure to test the red t-shirt for gunshot residue. Petition at 6. To the extent Petitioner raises an ineffective assistance of counsel claim regarding the t-shirt not being tested for gunshot residue ("GSR"), this claim also fails for failure to show deficiency and prejudice. Petitioner cannot show counsel's performance was deficient because gunshot residue testing has been deemed unreliable as there is a high probability of cross contamination. At the 2005 Federal Bureau Investigation Laboratory's Gunshot Residue Symposium in 2005, "[a]ll participants agreed that GSR sampling should be done at the scene, where permissible, and as expeditiously as possible." FBI Laboratory's Gunshot Residue Symposium, May 31-June 3, 2005.¹ The probability of cross contamination is very high such that someone can have GSR on their clothing despite never having direct contact with a firearm. Okorie Okorocha, The Art of Gunshot Residue Testing, Toxicolawgy, Oct. 26, 2018, https://www.okoricokorocha.com/thcart-of-gunshot-residue-testing/ (Last Accessed July 6, 2022). Notably, GSR testing has decreased to such degree that even the FBI no longer conducts GSR testing. Id.; see also U.S. Department of Justice, Forensic Science: Gunshot Residue Tests, Criminal Law Bulletin Vol. 27 Issue 6 1991 ("even GSR tests are not conclusive.")² Studies have found that only 50% of known self-inflicted gunshot suicides tested positive for GSR when tested by scanning electron microscopy with energy-dispersive x-ray spectroscopy. Molina DK, Martinez M, Garcia J,

¹ Summary accessible at: https://archives.fbi.gov/archives/about-us/lab/forensic-science-

communications/fsc/july2006/research/2006_07_research01.htm (Last Accessed July 6, 2022.)

² Accessible at: Forensic Science: Gunshot Residue Tests Office of Justice Programs (ojp.gov) (Last Accessed: July 6, 2022)

DiMaio VJ. Gunshot Residue Testing in Suicides: Part I: Analysis by Scanning Electron Microscopy with Energy-Dispersive X-ray., The American Journal of Forensic Medicine and Pathology, Sept. 28, 2007.³ Moreover, the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department Forensic Lab, nor any other lab in Nevada, conduct GSR testing. As such, trial counsel was not deficient in not having the t-shirt tested for GSR.

Likewise, Petitioner cannot show prejudice given the overwhelming evidence of his guilt. Police found a car matching the description of the shooter's car a few blocks from the shooting. The car was impounded and a license plate, bullet, and unspent round of ammunition was found. When tested, Petitioner's fingerprint was found on the license plate and the cartridge found in the car was the same type of shell casings found at the scene of the shooting. Additionally, the shooter was described as wearing red, and the t-shirt Petitioner highlights, is the one found near the shooting. The t-shirt was tested and Petitioner's DNA was found on the shirt. Further, at trial two witnesses identified Petitioner as the shooter. Thus, Petitioner cannot satisfy Strickland.

Accordingly, Petitioner's claims are denied.

III.

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NO CUMULATIVE ERROR

Petitioner asserts a claim of cumulative error including in the context of ineffective assistance of counsel. Petition at 7a. The Nevada Supreme Court has never held that instances of ineffective assistance of counsel can be cumulated; it is the State's position that they cannot. However, even if they could be, it would be of no moment as there was no single instance of ineffective assistance in Petitioner's case. See United States v. Rivera, 900 F.2d 1462, 1471 (10th Cir. 1990) ("[A] cumulative-error analysis should evaluate only the effect of matters determined to be error, not the cumulative effect of non-errors.").

Nonetheless, Petitioner's claim is without merit. "Relevant factors to consider in evaluating a claim of cumulative error are (1) whether the issue of guilt is close, (2) the quantity and character of the error, and (3) the gravity of the crime charged." Mulder v. State, 116 Nev. 1, 17, 992 P.2d 845, 855 (2000). Furthermore, any errors that occurred at trial were minimal

³ Accessible at: Gunshot residue testing in suicides: Part I: Analysis by scanning electron microscopy with energydispersive X-ray - PubMed (nih.gov) (Last Accessed: July 6, 2022)

in quantity and character, and a defendant "is not entitled to a perfect trial, but only a fair trial." <u>Ennis v. State</u>, 91 Nev. 530, 533, 539 P.2d 114, 115 (1975). Therefore, Petitioner's cumulative error claim is denied.

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IV. PETITIONER IS NOT ENTITLED TO APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL

Petitioner requests appointment of counsel. Motion at 1-3. However, Petitioner fails to show that he is entitled to appointment of counsel.

Under the U.S. Constitution, the Sixth Amendment provides no right to counsel in postconviction proceedings. <u>See Coleman v. Thompson</u>, 501 U.S. 722, 752, 111 S. Ct. 2546, 2566 (1991). The Nevada Supreme Court similarly observed that "[t]he Nevada Constitution...does not guarantee a right to counsel in post-conviction proceedings, as we interpret the Nevada Constitution's right to counsel provision as being coextensive with the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution." <u>McKague v. Warden</u>, 112 Nev. 159, 163, 912 P.2d 255, 258 (1996). <u>McKague</u> specifically held that with the exception of NRS 34.820(1)(a) (entitling appointed counsel when petitioner is under a sentence of death), one does not have "any constitutional or statutory right to counsel at all" in post-conviction proceedings. <u>Id.</u> at 164, 912 P.2d at 258.

The Nevada Legislature has, however, given courts the discretion to appoint postconviction counsel so long as "the court is satisfied that the allegation of indigency is true, and the petition is not dismissed summarily." NRS 34.750. NRS 34.750 reads:

> A petition may allege that the Defendant is unable to pay the costs of the proceedings or employ counsel. If the court is satisfied that the allegation of indigency is true and the petition *is not dismissed summarily*, the court may appoint counsel at the time the court orders the filing of an answer and a return. In making its determination, the court may consider, among other things, the severity of the consequences facing the petitioner and whether: (a) The issues are difficult; (b) The petitioner is unable to comprehend the proceedings; or

(c) Counsel is necessary to proceed with discovery

26 (emphasis added). Accordingly, under NRS 34.750, it is clear that the Court has discretion in

27 determining whether to appoint counsel.

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Petitioner's request is denied as he has failed to meet any of the additional statutory 1 2 factors under NRS 34.750. The issues Petitioner presents are not complex, otherwise this Court would have appointed counsel. Petitioner does not identify any complex issues – six of the 3 issues are outside the scope of a Petition, and several of those are barred by law of the case 4 doctrine. Both of Petitioner's ineffective assistance of counsel claims are without merit. The 5 claim regarding counsel's alleged failure to ask questions Petitioner requested, does not allege 6 any specific facts which, if true, would entitle him to relief. Petitioner's implied ineffective 7 assistance of counsel claim regarding the GSR testing is not complex because studies have 8 9 shown that GSR is unreliable. Cumulative error does not apply to post-conviction and, even if it did, he has not demonstrated any error in either of his two ineffective assistance of counsel 10 claims. Petitioner appears to be able to comprehend the proceedings, and there is no need for 11 discovery. His motion is just a form that provides no additional details beyond what his 12 Petition presents. Therefore, Petitioner's request for appointment of counsel is denied. 13 14 THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Donko's Petition for Writ of Habeas 15 Corpus (Post-Conviction) and Motion for Appointment of Counsel are DENIED. 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 STEVEN B. WOLFSON Clark County District Attorney 23 Nevada Bar #001565 24 BY /s/ JOHN AFSHAR 25 JOHN AFSHAR **Deputy District Attorney** Nevada Bar #014408 26 27 28

Dated this 19th day of August, 2022

and Unform

For Judge Ellsworth

128 F48 02CF 2983 Mark Gibbons District Court Judge

ORDER

	CERTIFICATE OF MAILING		
1	I hereby certify that service of the above and foregoing was made this 16th day of		
2	August, 2022, by depositing a copy in the U.S. Mail, postage pre-paid, addressed to:		
3	TED MICHAEL DONKO, BAC #1080899		
4	TED MICHAEL DONKO, BAC #1080899 LOVELOCK CORRECTIONAL CENTER 1200 PRISON ROAD		
5	LOVELOCK, NEVADA 89419		
6 7	DX /s/ Louis II.		
8	BY <u>/s/ Janet Hayes</u> Secretary for the District Attorney's Office		
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2	D	ISTRICT COURT		
3	CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA			
4				
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6	Ted Donko, Plaintiff(s)	CASE NO: A-22-852928-W		
7	VS.	DEPT. NO. Department 17		
8	State of Nevada, Defendant(s)			
9		-		
10	AUTOMATED	CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE		
11	This automated certificate of service was generated by the Eighth Judicial District			
12	all recipients registered for e-Service on the above entitled case as listed below:			
13 14	Service Date: 8/19/2022			
14	Dept 17 Law Clerk d	lept17lc@clarkcountycourts.us		
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	Electronically Filed 8/24/2022 10:53 AM			
	Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT			
1	NEFF Atump. Atum			
2	DISTRICT COURT			
3	CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA			
4				
5	TED DONKO, Case No: A-22-852928-W			
6	Petitioner, Dept No: XVII			
7	vs.			
8	STATE OF NEVADA,			
9	NOTICE OF ENTRY OF FINDINGS OF FACT,Respondent,CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER			
10				
11	PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on August 19, 2022, the court entered a decision or order in this matter, a			
12	true and correct copy of which is attached to this notice. You may appeal to the Supreme Court from the decision or order of this court. If you wish to appeal, you			
13	must file a notice of appeal with the clerk of this court within thirty-three (33) days after the date this notice is mailed			
14	to you. This notice was mailed on August 24, 2022.			
15	STEVEN D. GRIERSON, CLERK OF THE COURT			
16	6 /s/ Amanda Hampton Amanda Hampton, Deputy Clerk			
17				
18				
19	CERTIFICATE OF E-SERVICE / MAILING			
20	I hereby certify that on this 24 day of August 2022, I served a copy of this Notice of Entry on the following:			
21	\square By e-mail:			
22	Clark County District Attorney's Office Attorney General's Office – Appellate Division-			
23	Anomey General's Office - Appendic Division			
24	The United States mail addressed as follows: Ted Donko # 1080899			
25	1200 Prison Rd.			
26	Lovelock, NV 89419			
27	/s/ Amanda Hampton			
28	Amanda Hampton, Deputy Clerk			
	-1-			
	62			
	Case Number: A-22-852928-W			

Electronically Filed 08/19/2022 9:19 AM

			CLERK OF THE COURT	
1	FFCO STEVEN B. WOLFSON			
2	Clark County District Attorney			
3	Nevada Bar #001565 JOHN AFSHAR			
4	Deputy District Attorney Nevada Bar #014408			
5	200 Lewis Avenue Las Vegas, Nevada 89155-2212			
6	Las Vegas, Nevada 89155-2212 (702) 671-2500 Attorney for Respondent			
7				
8	DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA			
9	TED MICHAEL DONKO,			
10	#1080899 Petitioner,	CASE NO:	A-22-852928-W	
11	-vs-		(C-19-345584-1)	
12	THE STATE OF NEVADA,			
13	Respondent.	DEPT NO:	XVII	
14				
15	FINDINGS OF FAC	F , CONCLUSION	SOF	
16		ND ORDER		
17	DATE OF HEARING: JULY 27, 2022 TIME OF HEARING: 8:30 AM			
18	THIS CAUSE having come on for	r hearing before	the Honorable CAROLYN	
19	ELLSWORTH, District Judge, on the 27th da	y of July 2022, Pet	itioner not being present and	
20	in pro per, Respondent being represented by	/ STEVEN WOLF	SON, Clark County District	
21	Attorney, by and through JAMES PUCCINI	ELLI, Deputy Dist	rict Attorney, and the Court	
22	having considered the matter, including brief	s, transcripts, and c	locuments on file herein, the	
23	Court makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law:			
24	///			
25	///			
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27	///			
28	///			
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	03			

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On December 19, 2019, TED MICHAEL DONKO (hereinafter "Petitioner") was charged by way of Information as follows: Counts 1 and 2 – Battery with Use of a Deadly Weapon Resulting in Substantial Bodily Harm (Category B Felony – NRS 200.481); Counts 3, 4, and 5 – Attempt Murder with Use of a Deadly Weapon (Category B Felony – NRS 200.010, 200.030, 193.330, 193.165); Count 6 – Assault with a Deadly Weapon (Category B Felony - NRS 200.471 - NOC 50201); Count 7 – Discharging Firearm At or Into Occupied Structure, Vehicle, Aircraft, or Watercraft (Category B Felony – NRS 202.285); and Count 8 – Ownership or Possession of Firearm by Prohibited Person (Category B Felony – NRS 202.360).

On February 10, 2020, the State filed an Amended Information whereby it severed Count 8 – Ownership or Possession of Firearm by Prohibited Person. Petitioner's jury trial commenced that same day. On February 13, 2020, the State filed a Second Amended Information that reflected the bifurcated charge of Ownership or Possession of Firearm by Prohibited Person.

On February 13, 2020, after four (4) days of trial, the jury found Petitioner guilty of the following: Counts 1 and 2 – Battery with Use of a Deadly Weapon; Counts 3, 4, and 5 – Attempt Murder with Use of a Deadly Weapon; Count 6 – Assault with a Deadly Weapon; and Count 7 – Discharging Firearm At or Into Occupied Structure, Vehicle, Aircraft, Watercraft. After reaching this verdict, the second phase of the trial, involving solely Petitioner's bifurcated charge Ownership or Possession of Firearm by Prohibited Person, commenced. V AA 949. The jury also found Petitioner guilty of such charge.

On April 20, 2020, the district court adjudicated Petitioner guilty of all charges and orally pronounced the following terms of years for his sentence to the Nevada Department of Corrections ("NDOC"): Count 1 - 24 to 60 months; Count 2 - 24 to 60 months, concurrent with Count 1; Count 3 - 36 to 96 months, consecutive to Counts 1 and 2, plus 12 to 30 months for the Use of a Deadly Weapon, consecutive to Count 3;1 Count 4 - 36 to 96 months, plus a

consecutive term of 12 to 30 months for the Use of a Deadly Weapon, to run consecutive to Count 3; Count 5 – 36 to 96 months, plus 12 to 30 months for the Use of a Deadly Weapon, to run consecutive to Count 4; Count 6 – 12 to 30 months, to run concurrent; Count 7 – 12 to 30 months, to run concurrent; and Count 8 – 12 to 30 months, to run concurrent.

The Court further clarified that the only sentences that would run consecutive were "the three Attempt Murders with Use of a Deadly Weapon," Petitioner would receive an aggregate sentence of 12 to 31.5 years, including the deadly weapon enhancements, the District Court would retain jurisdiction over the restitution, and he would receive 150 days credit for time served. The Judgment of Conviction was filed on April 28, 2020, provided the aforementioned sentences, and clarified more fully that Count 3 would run consecutive to Counts 1 and 2, but listed the aggregate total sentence, including the deadly weapon enhancements, as 144 to 378 months, and the aggregate sentence, not including the deadly weapon enhancements, as 108 to 288 months.

On June 3, 2020, the State filed a Notice of Motion and Motion to Address Aggregate Sentence Calculations, wherein the State argued that the appropriate aggregate sentence, based upon the charges at sentencing, was 168 to 438 months. On November 24, 2020, the District Court explained by way of Minute Order that while it made a clerical error in calculating the aggregate sentence, it appropriately held that the weapons enhancements would run consecutive to the Attempt Murder charges, and Count 3 would run consecutive to Counts 1 and 2. Accordingly, the District Court found that the appropriate aggregate sentence was 168 to 438 months and ordered that an Amended Judgment of Conviction be filed.

The Amended Judgment of Conviction was filed on May 25, 2021. Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal on June 1, 2021. Judgment of Conviction was affirmed on April 20, 2022. Remittitur issued on May 16, 2022.

On May 20, 2022, Petitioner filed the instant Petition and a Motion for Appointment of Attorney.

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FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On October 1, 2019, at around 12:15 PM, Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department ("LVMPD") officers responded to a shooting at 56 North Linn Lane in Clark County, Nevada. The 911 call described the shooter as a Hispanic male, about 5 foot 11, and wearing red. Additionally, a gray Toyota Corolla was seen fleeing the scene of the shooting.

When officers arrived at the crime scene, they saw the two male shooting victims lying on the ground next to a truck. One of the men, Jonathan Sanchez-Loza, had been shot in the leg, while the other, Fernando Espinoza, had been shot in the abdomen and the hand. Officers also observed bullet impacts on the truck and the garage bay door of the residence as well as eight shell casings in the street.

Sanchez-Lopez testified that on the day of the shooting, he received a call at around 11:30 AM from Espinoza. Eventually, he met up with Espinoza, a man named Gilbert, a man named DeAndre Woods, and the owner of the home to take trash to the dump. Ultimately, however, he helped moved furniture into the white truck that was at the scene. At about 12:00 PM he recalled someone saying "Hey, where's Shorty?" Sanchez-Loza then looked over in the direction of the voice and saw the passenger of a Toyota, with the passenger door open, pointing a firearm at him. Sanchez-Loza was then shot and dropped to the ground. While lying on the ground, he recalled seeing Espinoza fall into the back of the truck and, while in and out of consciousness, he called his uncle who lived up the street. Sanchez-Lopez heard about ten gunshots total.

The next thing Sanchez-Lopez remembered was waking up in the hospital. He had been shot in the right thigh and left thigh. As of the day of his trial testimony, he still had a bullet lodged in his left leg and had to walk with a cane. Sanchez-Lopez further testified that he had undergone surgery in his leg, still had pain, and had scars from the injuries.

Espinoza confirmed that he too was at the residence moving furniture using his brother's vehicle. However, Espinoza testified that while he was facing the street at the time of the shooting, he did not know from where the shots originated. Espinoza also testified that he almost did not come to court because he did not want to testify and only participated because

he was under subpoena. However, LVMPD Detective Jason Marin testified that when he interviewed Espinoza at UMC the day after the shooting, Espinoza told him that while Espinoza was at the address of the shooting on October 1, 2019, an older model Toyota pulled up to the residence. He further explained to Detective Marin that he saw a passenger get out of the vehicle and had either asked about Shorty or said, "Fuck Shorty." However, Espinoza stated he did not get a good look at the shooter.

The day before the shooting, on September 30, 2019, Woods recalled sitting on a chair at his ex-girlfriend's house when two young men pulled up in an older Toyota. The two men, one wearing a black shirt and the other wearing a red shirt, came up to Woods and asked if he knew someone named Shorty. Woods responded to the men that he did not know who Shorty was and the men left.

At the time of the shooting on the following day, Woods testified that he was sitting on a chair while the other men were moving furniture to the truck. While sitting, Woods saw the same Toyota pull up. Woods then saw the same white male wearing a red shirt that had asked him who Shorty was on the previous day, and that he later identified as Petitioner, exit the vehicle and point a gun at the person in front of Woods. Petitioner then said, "Fuck Shorty" and started shooting. The Toyota subsequently fled from the scene. Woods, appearing scared, later described the shooter to responding officers. He described the shooter as a Hispanic male, about 5 foot 11, 200 pounds, had nearly bald hair, and was wearing a red t-shirt.

Genaro Ramos, who was down the street working on his mother's vehicle at her home, heard about eight to ten gunshots. A couple of minutes later, he noticed a vehicle driving quickly down the street. Ramos recalled that the vehicle he saw speeding was an older model, gold, sand colored, Toyota Corolla. After the Toyota sped by, he saw the vehicle stop, and then saw a person, wearing a red shirt, exit the vehicle, look around suspiciously, and search his pockets. The person then tried to go back to the vehicle, but then started running or walking down the street. Ramos described this person as a white male in his 30s. Although Ramos did not initially identify Petitioner as the individual he saw at trial, after he was excused and the State explained he was free to leave, Ramos indicated to the State that he was nervous. When

the State asked why that was, Ramos stated it was his first time testifying and that the man he saw in court was the man he saw exiting the Toyota on the day of the shooting. Based on this new information, the State recalled Ramos who nervously identified Petitioner as the man he saw wearing a red shirt, parking the Toyota Corolla, and walking up the street on the day of the shooting.

After LVMPD officers responded to the crime scene, they canvassed the surrounding streets for evidence. Eventually, officers found a vehicle matching the description provided, an unregistered, gray or silver, four-door Toyota Corolla, in the same neighborhood as the shooting. When officers brought Ramos to view the Toyota Corolla, he told them it was the same vehicle he saw speed by after he heard the gunshots. After locating the vehicle, investigators processed the vehicle for fingerprints and recovered a license plate, a .40 caliber cartridge, as well as a bullet that had a head stamp that matched the casings found at the scene. The latent prints that were removed from the license plate that was recovered were later determined to be a match to Petitioner's left middle finger.

Officers also found a red shirt which appeared to have been laid on the side of the road in the same neighborhood as the crime scene. The DNA buccal swab that was later obtained from Petitioner matched the DNA that was swabbed from the red shirt. Officers also recovered surveillance video from a resident that depicted an individual matching the description of the shooting suspect who was wearing a red shirt and had nearly bald hair in the video. The suspect in the video was seen walking in the direction where the red shirt was eventually found.

Later, officers conducted a photograph lineup with Woods. They showed Woods six photographs, including one of Petitioner. Complying with routine practice, all of the men in the photographs met the same description as Petitioner as far as height, weight, skin tone, and hair style. LVMPD Detective Jason Marin, who had conducted the photo lineup, provided the directions to Petitioner and after Petitioner signed the form stating he understood the instructions for the photo lineup, Woods wrote down that the man in photo number five was the shooter and he was 95% sure. Petitioner was photo number five. Woods testified that the reason he was 95% sure as opposed to 100% was because when he had previously seen the shooter his hair was shorter which made him only 95% sure. Further, when asked whether
learning later that Petitioner was white instead of Hispanic changed his mind on his
identification, he stated no. Moreover, seeing that Petitioner did not have tattoos did not change
Woods' mind about Petitioner being the shooter because Woods was not focused on the tattoos
when he was trying to get out of the crossfire on the day of the shooting.

Detective Marin testified at trial that it did not change the officers' investigation when Woods originally described the shooter as a Hispanic male because he could have interpreted it differently since he had such a brief interaction with the shooter. In fact, a race mix up is common. Notably, Detective Marin also testified that after Petitioner was apprehended the first time, he only noticed Petitioner's tattoos was when he was sitting two feet from him because Petitioner's tattoos were not immediately apparent.

When Detective Marin later interviewed Petitioner, Petitioner stated that he knew Shorty, but there was no evidence that Petitioner and Woods knew each other. When Detective Marin asked Petitioner about his fingerprint in the vehicle, Petitioner said he was the passenger in the vehicle, which he described as an older model sedan, the night before the shooting. Petitioner testified he met Woods in the past and hung out with him.

ANALYSIS

I. PETITIONER'S CLAIMS ARE OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF A PETITION

Petitioner raises several claims that are outside the scope of a Petition, either because the claims are waived for failure to raise on direct appeal or barred by case of the law doctrine. Petitioner claims: (1) "The court did not ask for the red shirt to get tested for GSR 'gunshot residue' (Petition at 6); (2) the Court allowed an unreliable in-court identification (Petition at 7); (3) "tainted jury" where the jury consisted of 90% Hispanics (Petition at 7); (4) the District Court violated Petitioner's double jeopardy rights (Petition at 7a); (5) prosecutorial misconduct when the State allegedly shifted the burden to Petitioner; and (6) the district court ///

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1	erred in denying the defense's jury instructions (Petition at 7b).	
2	NRS 34.810(1) reads:	
3	The court shall dismiss a petition if the court determines that:	
4	(a) The petitioner's conviction was upon a plea of guilty or guilty but mentally ill and the petition is not based upon an allegation	
5	that the plea was involuntarily or unknowingly or that the plea was entered without effective assistance of counsel.	
6	(b) The petitioner's conviction was the result of a trial and the grounds for the petition could have been:	
7	(2) Raised in a direct appeal or a prior petition for a writ of habeas	
8	corpus or postconviction relief.	
9	The Nevada Supreme Court has held that "challenges to the validity of a guilty plea and claims	
10	of ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel must first be pursued in post-conviction	
11	proceedings [A]Il other claims that are appropriate for a direct appeal must be pursued on	
12	direct appeal, or they will be considered waived in subsequent proceedings." Franklin v. State,	
13	110 Nev. 750, 752, 877 P.2d 1058, 1059 (1994) (emphasis added) (disapproved on other	
14	grounds by Thomas v. State, 115 Nev. 148, 979 P.2d 222 (1999)). "A court must dismiss a	
15	habeas petition if it presents claims that either were or could have been presented in an earlier	
16	proceeding, unless the court finds both cause for failing to present the claims earlier or for	
17	raising them again and actual prejudice to the petitioner." Evans v. State, 117 Nev. 609, 646-	
18	47, 29 P.3d 498, 523 (2001).	
19	Accordingly, claims one and three are waived for failure to raise on direct appeal. The	
20	remaining claims – two, four, five, and six - fail because they are outside the scope of a post-	
21	conviction proceeding. The only claims permissible on a petition are those "challenges to the	
22	validity of a guilty plea and claims of ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel."	
23	Franklin v. State, 110 Nev. 750, 752, 877 P.2d 1058, 1059 (1994) (emphasis added)	
24	(disapproved on other grounds by Thomas v. State, 115 Nev. 148, 979 P.2d 222 (1999)).	
25	Additionally, these claims are also barred by the law of the case doctrine.	
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26 "The law of a first appeal is law of the case on all subsequent appeals in which the facts
27 are substantially the same." <u>Hall v. State</u>, 91 Nev. 314, 315, 535 P.2d 797, 798 (1975) (<u>quoting</u>
28 <u>Walker v. State</u>, 85 Nev. 337, 343, 455 P.2d 34, 38 (1969)). "The doctrine of the law of the

case cannot be avoided by a more detailed and precisely focused argument subsequently made 1 after reflection upon the previous proceedings." Id. at 316, 535 P.2d at 799. Under the law of 2 the case doctrine, issues previously decided on direct appeal may not be reargued in a habeas 3 petition. Pellegrini v. State, 117 Nev. 860, 879, 34 P.3d 519, 532 (2001) (citing McNelton v. 4 State, 115 Nev. 396, 414-15, 990 P.2d 1263, 1275 (1999)). Furthermore, this Court cannot 5 overrule the Nevada Supreme Court. NEV. CONST. Art. VI § 6. Petitioner's claims fail because 6 Petitioner raised these claims on direct appeal wherein the Nevada Court of Appeals denied 7 the claims on the merits. 8

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i. Alleged unreliable in-court identification

Petitioner claims Ramos's in-court identification after he was re-called to testify was improper. Petition at 7. The Nevada Court of Appeals held Petitioner's claim without merit:

Donko's counsel said that the identification was "improper," given that Ramos failed to identify Donko during his initial testimony. Donko's counsel asked the court to strike the identification. The State responded by indicating that there was nothing objectionable about Ramos's testimony concerning the hallway conversation with the prosecutor as it was accurate and with his identification of Donko. The district court stated that defense counsel's objection to Ramos's incourt identification was "not a legal objection," that there was nothing inadmissible about Ramos's testimony, and that Danko's counsel would be able to cross-examine Ramos regarding the identification. Donko's counsel then orally requested a mistrial for the same reasons previously discussed. The district court denied the oral motion.

First, Donko argues that the district court abused its discretion by admitting Ramos's in-court identification testimony because Ramos failed to identify Donko as the shooter during his initial testimony and the admission of Ramos's in-court identification when he was recalled as a witness deprived Donko of due process.

We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Ramos's in-court identification of Donko. Ramos did not make a pretrial identification of Danko, but rather Ramos identified Donko during his testimony after he was recalled as a witness at trial. Accordingly, the credibility and weight of Ramos's testimony is 11 within the province of the jury." <u>Wise</u>, 92 Nev. at 183, 547 P.2d at 315. Donko, through counsel, cross-examined Ramos, thus satisfying due process as to Ramos's in court identification of Danko. Donko v. State, Order of Affirmance COA-83037 p. 3, 7-8.

ii. Double Jeopardy

Petitioner claims the District Court violated his Double Jeopardy rights by changing his aggregate sentence after he started serving his sentence. Petition at 7a. The Nevada Court of Appeals denied Petitioner's claim:

Second, Donko argues that the district court abused its discretion in amending Donko's judgment of conviction after he started serving his sentence, thereby improperly increasing his aggregate sentence and violating his protection from double jeopardy. A claim that a conviction violates the Double Jeopardy Clause generally is subject to de novo review on appeal. <u>Davidson v. State</u>, 124 Nev. 892, 896, 192 P.3d 1185, 1189 (2008); <u>Ebeling v. State</u>, 120 Nev. 401, 404, 91 P.3d 699, 601 (2004). NRS 176.566 states that "(c]lerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of the record and errors in the record arising from oversight or omission may be corrected by the court at any time and after such notice, if any, as the court orders."

Here, the district court did not amend the sentence on any individual conviction, but simply corrected a clerical error pertaining to the calculation of the aggregate sentence. Donko's argument that this error is not a "clerical error" is unpersuasive. <u>See Devlin v. State</u>, No. 78518, 2019 2019 WL 4892531, at *1 (Nev. Sept. 12, 2019) (Order of Affirmance) (holding that a district court can correct such clerical mistakes, when a district court entered an amended judgment of convicti9n correcting an aggregate sentence from 11 years to 12 years). Here, the district court modified the aggregate sentence language to comport with the individual sentences originally imposed at sentencing. Therefore, the district court corrected its previous miscalculation of the aggregate sentence to be consistent with the individual sentences set forth in the judgment of conviction. Thus, we are not persuaded that the district court abused its discretion in amending Donko's judgment of conviction to correct the aggregate sentence.

Donko v. State, Order of Affirmance COA-83037 p. 8-9.

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iii. Alleged Prosecutorial Misconduct

Petitioner claims the State committed prosecutorial misconduct by shifting the burden to Donko by stating that Petitioner failed to "explain how the fingerprint [sic] or red shirt was found." Petition at 7a. The Nevada Court of Appeals heard and rejected this claim: /// Fifth, Donko contends that the district court erred in allowing the State to commit prosecutorial misconduct, through improper burden-shifting, when the State argued in closing that during cross-examination Donko failed to provide an explanation for his DNA being present on the red shirt found at the scene and for his fingerprint being found on a license plate located inside the Toyota vehicle. When reviewing claims of prosecutorial misconduct, this court considers whether the conduct was improper and, if it was, whether it warrants reversal or was harmless. ...

Here, Donko testified in his defense and the State properly cross-examined him about his DNA being identified on the red shirt and his fingerprint lifted from a license plate located inside the vehicle found near the scene. Donko attempted to suggest that he was not the shooter, but he did not persuasively refute the physical evidence suggesting otherwise during cross-examination, resulting in the State arguing during closing that Donko "(g]ives no viable explanation" for the physical evidence obtained at the scene. The State was permitted to comment on the defendant's failure to explain physical evidence that directly tied him to the shooting. See Evans, 117 Nev. at 630, 28 P.3d at 513 (noting that the State may comment on the credibility of witnesses based on the evidence presented and "comment on the failure of the defense to counter or explain evidence presented"). The State here simply commented on the lack of support or explanation for Donko's assertion that he was not the shooter. Further, the jury was properly instructed that the State had the burden of proof. Accordingly, the State did not impermissibly shift the burden of proof or engage in prosecutorial misconduct during closing.

Donko v. State, Order of Affirmance COA-83037 p. 12-13

iv. Jury Instructions

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Petitioner claims the District Court violated his rights by rejecting Petitioner's claim to replace the word "unless" for "until" in the Reasonable Doubt Instruction. Petition at 7b. Fourth, Donko contends that the district court abused its discretion when it

rejected his proposed jury instructions and revision to the verdict form. Specifically, he states that the district court should have permitted instructions that (1) modified the reasonable doubt instruction ...

NRS 175.211 provides the statutorily mandated language for a reasonable doubt instruction, which does not include the language requested by Donko. To the extent Donko argues under Crawford the district court abused its discretion when it rejected his proffered other negatively-worded or inverse instructions, we note "the district court may refuse a jury instruction on the defendant's theory of the case which is substantially covered by other instructions." <u>Runion. v. State</u>, 116 Nev. 1041, 1050, 13 P.3d 52, 58 (2000). Donko fails to demonstrate that his proposed inverse instructions went to a specific theory of his case and were not

merely duplicative of the court-approved instructions. Additionally, district 1 courts do not err by refusing to accept duplicitous, misleading, or inaccurate jury instructions. Carter v. State, 121 Nev. 759, 765, 121 P.3d 592,596 (2005); see 2 also McDermott v. State, No. 79296, 2020 WL 6743121 (Nev. Nov. 13, 2020) 3 (Order of Affirmance) (concluding that because the proffered instruction was otherwise covered by the reasonable-doubt instruction, there was no abuse of 4 discretion by the district court in refusing to give it). Although the district court 5 could have properly given the inverse instructions, we cannot conclude that the court reversibly erred. The instructions it did give were accurate and any error 6 was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See Guitron v. State, 131 Nev. 215, 7 229-31, 350 P.3d 93, 102-03 (Ct. App. 2016). Donko's contention that the district court also abused its discretion in denying 8 his request to place "Not Guilty" before "Guilty" is also unpersuasive, as the Nevada Supreme Court has affirmatively rejected this argument. See Yandell v. 9 State, No. 78259, 2020 WL 4333604, at *4 (Nev. July 27, 2020) (Order of 10 Affirmance) (rejecting the appellant's argument that "not guilty" should have been listed first on verdict form because there was no case adopting the "position" 11 that the 'not guilty' [option] must be listed before the 'guilty' option on a verdict 12 sheet" (internal quotation marks omitted)). 13 Donko v. State, Order of Affirmance COA-83037 p. 10-11 14 Because all these claims have been adjudicated and denied on the merits by the Nevada 15 Court of Appeals, they are barred by law of the case doctrine and are all denied. 16 II. PETITIONER RECEIVED EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 17 Petitioner claims his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to ask the questions 18 Petitioner requested. Petition at 6. Petitioner implies an ineffective assistance of counsel 19 regarding counsel's failure to test the red t-shirt for gunshot residue. Petition at 6. 20 The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that, "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his 21 22 defense." The United States Supreme Court has long recognized that "the right to counsel is 23 the right to the effective assistance of counsel." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2063 (1984); see also State v. Love, 109 Nev. 1136, 1138, 865 P.2d 322, 323 24 (1993). 25 26 To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, a defendant must prove

To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, a defendant must prove he was denied "reasonably effective assistance" of counsel by satisfying the two-prong test of <u>Strickland</u>, 466 U.S. at 686-87, 104 S. Ct. at 2063-64. <u>See also Love</u>, 109 Nev. at 1138, 865

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P.2d at 323. Under the <u>Strickland</u> test, a defendant must show first that his counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and second, that but for counsel's errors, there is a reasonable probability that the result of the proceedings would have been different. 466 U.S. at 687-88, 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2065, 2068; <u>Warden, Nevada State Prison v. Lyons</u>, 100 Nev. 430, 432, 683 P.2d 504, 505 (1984) (adopting the <u>Strickland</u> two-part test). "[T]here is no reason for a court deciding an ineffective assistance claim to approach the inquiry in the same order or even to address both components of the inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on one." <u>Strickland</u>, 466 U.S. at 697, 104 S. Ct. at 2069.

The court begins with the presumption of effectiveness and then must determine whether the defendant has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that counsel was ineffective. <u>Means v. State</u>, 120 Nev. 1001, 1011, 103 P.3d 25, 32 (2004). "Effective counsel does not mean errorless counsel, but rather counsel whose assistance is '[w]ithin the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases." <u>Jackson v. Warden</u>, 91 Nev. 430, 432, 537 P.2d 473, 474 (1975).

Counsel cannot be ineffective for failing to make futile objections or arguments. <u>See</u> <u>Ennis v. State</u>, 122 Nev. 694, 706, 137 P.3d 1095, 1103 (2006). Trial counsel has the "immediate and ultimate responsibility of deciding if and when to object, which witnesses, if any, to call, and what defenses to develop." <u>Rhyne v. State</u>, 118 Nev. 1, 8, 38 P.3d 163, 167 (2002).

Based on the above law, the role of a court in considering allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel is "not to pass upon the merits of the action not taken but to determine whether, under the particular facts and circumstances of the case, trial counsel failed to render reasonably effective assistance." Donovan v. State, 94 Nev. 671, 675, 584 P.2d 708, 711 (1978). This analysis does not mean that the court should "second guess reasoned choices between trial tactics nor does it mean that defense counsel, to protect himself against allegations of inadequacy, must make every conceivable motion no matter how remote the possibilities are of success." Id. To be effective, the constitution "does not require that counsel do what is impossible or unethical. If there is no bona fide defense to the charge, counsel

cannot create one and may disserve the interests of his client by attempting a useless charade."
 <u>United States v. Cronic</u>, 466 U.S. 648, 657 n.19, 104 S. Ct. 2039, 2046 n.19 (1984).

"There are countless ways to provide effective assistance in any given case. Even the best criminal defense attorneys would not defend a particular client in the same way." <u>Strickland</u>, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S. Ct. at 689. "Strategic choices made by counsel after thoroughly investigating the plausible options are almost unchallengeable." <u>Dawson v. State</u>, 108 Nev. 112, 117, 825 P.2d 593, 596 (1992); <u>see also Ford v. State</u>, 105 Nev. 850, 853, 784 P.2d 951, 953 (1989). In essence, the court must "judge the reasonableness of counsel's challenged conduct on the facts of the particular case, viewed as of the time of counsel's conduct." <u>Strickland</u>, 466 U.S. at 690, 104 S. Ct. at 2066.

Even if a defendant can demonstrate that his counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, he must still demonstrate prejudice and show a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the result of the trial would have been different. <u>McNelton v. State</u>, 115 Nev. 396, 403, 990 P.2d 1263, 1268 (1999) (citing <u>Strickland</u>, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at 2064). "A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." <u>Id. (citing Strickland</u>, 466 U.S. at 687-89, 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2064-65, 2068).

The Nevada Supreme Court has held "that a habeas corpus petitioner must prove the disputed factual allegations underlying his ineffective-assistance claim by a preponderance of the evidence." Means v. State, 120 Nev. 1001, 1012, 103 P.3d 25, 33 (2004). Furthermore, claims of ineffective assistance of counsel asserted in a petition for post-conviction relief must be supported with specific factual allegations, which if true, would entitle the petitioner to relief. Hargrove v. State, 100 Nev. 498, 502, 686 P.2d 222, 225 (1984). "Bare" and "naked" allegations are not sufficient, nor are those belied and repelled by the record. Id. NRS 34.735(6) states in relevant part, "[Petitioner] *must* allege specific facts supporting the claims in the petition[.]... Failure to allege specific facts rather than just conclusions may cause your petition to be dismissed." (emphasis added).

Petitioner claims his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to ask the questions 1 Petitioner requested. Petition at 6. This claim fails as bare and naked. Petitioner does not 2 identify what those questions were or who the questions should have been asked of. As such, 3 Petitioner fails to show that counsel's performance was deficient. Petitioner also fails to show 4 prejudice as he does not state why the result of his trial would have been different had counsel 5 asked those questions. Additionally, which questions to ask a witness are virtually 6 unreviewable strategic decisions. Therefore, Petitioner fails to demonstrate deficiency or 7 prejudice. 8 9 Petitioner implies an ineffective assistance of counsel regarding counsel's failure to test the red t-shirt for gunshot residue. Petition at 6. To the extent Petitioner raises an ineffective 10

assistance of counsel claim regarding the t-shirt not being tested for gunshot residue ("GSR"), this claim also fails for failure to show deficiency and prejudice. Petitioner cannot show counsel's performance was deficient because gunshot residue testing has been deemed unreliable as there is a high probability of cross contamination. At the 2005 Federal Bureau 14 Investigation Laboratory's Gunshot Residue Symposium in 2005, "[a]ll participants agreed that GSR sampling should be done at the scene, where permissible, and as expeditiously as possible." FBI Laboratory's Gunshot Residue Symposium, May 31-June 3, 2005.¹ The probability of cross contamination is very high such that someone can have GSR on their 18 clothing despite never having direct contact with a firearm. Okorie Okorocha, The Art of 19 20 Gunshot Residue Testing, Toxicolawgy, Oct. 26, 2018, https://www.okoricokorocha.com/thcart-of-gunshot-residue-testing/ (Last Accessed July 6, 2022). Notably, GSR testing has decreased to such degree that even the FBI no longer conducts GSR testing. Id.; see also U.S. Department of Justice, Forensic Science: Gunshot Residue Tests, Criminal Law Bulletin Vol. 27 Issue 6 1991 ("even GSR tests are not conclusive.")² Studies have found that only 50% of known self-inflicted gunshot suicides tested positive for GSR when tested by scanning electron 25 microscopy with energy-dispersive x-ray spectroscopy. Molina DK, Martinez M, Garcia J, 26

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¹ Summary accessible at: https://archives.fbi.gov/archives/about-us/lab/forensic-science-

communications/fsc/july2006/research/2006_07_research01.htm (Last Accessed July 6, 2022.)

² Accessible at: Forensic Science: Gunshot Residue Tests Office of Justice Programs (ojp.gov) (Last Accessed: July 6, 2022)

DiMaio VJ. Gunshot Residue Testing in Suicides: Part I: Analysis by Scanning Electron Microscopy with Energy-Dispersive X-ray., The American Journal of Forensic Medicine and Pathology, Sept. 28, 2007.³ Moreover, the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department Forensic Lab, nor any other lab in Nevada, conduct GSR testing. As such, trial counsel was not deficient in not having the t-shirt tested for GSR.

Likewise, Petitioner cannot show prejudice given the overwhelming evidence of his guilt. Police found a car matching the description of the shooter's car a few blocks from the shooting. The car was impounded and a license plate, bullet, and unspent round of ammunition was found. When tested, Petitioner's fingerprint was found on the license plate and the cartridge found in the car was the same type of shell casings found at the scene of the shooting. Additionally, the shooter was described as wearing red, and the t-shirt Petitioner highlights, is the one found near the shooting. The t-shirt was tested and Petitioner's DNA was found on the shirt. Further, at trial two witnesses identified Petitioner as the shooter. Thus, Petitioner cannot satisfy Strickland.

Accordingly, Petitioner's claims are denied.

III.

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NO CUMULATIVE ERROR

Petitioner asserts a claim of cumulative error including in the context of ineffective assistance of counsel. Petition at 7a. The Nevada Supreme Court has never held that instances of ineffective assistance of counsel can be cumulated; it is the State's position that they cannot. However, even if they could be, it would be of no moment as there was no single instance of ineffective assistance in Petitioner's case. See United States v. Rivera, 900 F.2d 1462, 1471 (10th Cir. 1990) ("[A] cumulative-error analysis should evaluate only the effect of matters determined to be error, not the cumulative effect of non-errors.").

Nonetheless, Petitioner's claim is without merit. "Relevant factors to consider in evaluating a claim of cumulative error are (1) whether the issue of guilt is close, (2) the quantity and character of the error, and (3) the gravity of the crime charged." Mulder v. State, 116 Nev. 1, 17, 992 P.2d 845, 855 (2000). Furthermore, any errors that occurred at trial were minimal

³ Accessible at: Gunshot residue testing in suicides: Part I: Analysis by scanning electron microscopy with energydispersive X-ray - PubMed (nih.gov) (Last Accessed: July 6, 2022)

in quantity and character, and a defendant "is not entitled to a perfect trial, but only a fair trial." <u>Ennis v. State</u>, 91 Nev. 530, 533, 539 P.2d 114, 115 (1975). Therefore, Petitioner's cumulative error claim is denied.

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IV. PETITIONER IS NOT ENTITLED TO APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL

Petitioner requests appointment of counsel. Motion at 1-3. However, Petitioner fails to show that he is entitled to appointment of counsel.

Under the U.S. Constitution, the Sixth Amendment provides no right to counsel in postconviction proceedings. <u>See Coleman v. Thompson</u>, 501 U.S. 722, 752, 111 S. Ct. 2546, 2566 (1991). The Nevada Supreme Court similarly observed that "[t]he Nevada Constitution...does not guarantee a right to counsel in post-conviction proceedings, as we interpret the Nevada Constitution's right to counsel provision as being coextensive with the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution." <u>McKague v. Warden</u>, 112 Nev. 159, 163, 912 P.2d 255, 258 (1996). <u>McKague</u> specifically held that with the exception of NRS 34.820(1)(a) (entitling appointed counsel when petitioner is under a sentence of death), one does not have "any constitutional or statutory right to counsel at all" in post-conviction proceedings. <u>Id.</u> at 164, 912 P.2d at 258.

The Nevada Legislature has, however, given courts the discretion to appoint postconviction counsel so long as "the court is satisfied that the allegation of indigency is true, and the petition is not dismissed summarily." NRS 34.750. NRS 34.750 reads:

> A petition may allege that the Defendant is unable to pay the costs of the proceedings or employ counsel. If the court is satisfied that the allegation of indigency is true and the petition *is not dismissed summarily*, the court may appoint counsel at the time the court orders the filing of an answer and a return. In making its determination, the court may consider, among other things, the severity of the consequences facing the petitioner and whether: (a) The issues are difficult; (b) The petitioner is unable to comprehend the proceedings; or

(c) Counsel is necessary to proceed with discovery

26 (emphasis added). Accordingly, under NRS 34.750, it is clear that the Court has discretion in

27 determining whether to appoint counsel.

28

///

Petitioner's request is denied as he has failed to meet any of the additional statutory 1 2 factors under NRS 34.750. The issues Petitioner presents are not complex, otherwise this Court would have appointed counsel. Petitioner does not identify any complex issues – six of the 3 issues are outside the scope of a Petition, and several of those are barred by law of the case 4 doctrine. Both of Petitioner's ineffective assistance of counsel claims are without merit. The 5 claim regarding counsel's alleged failure to ask questions Petitioner requested, does not allege 6 any specific facts which, if true, would entitle him to relief. Petitioner's implied ineffective 7 assistance of counsel claim regarding the GSR testing is not complex because studies have 8 9 shown that GSR is unreliable. Cumulative error does not apply to post-conviction and, even if it did, he has not demonstrated any error in either of his two ineffective assistance of counsel 10 claims. Petitioner appears to be able to comprehend the proceedings, and there is no need for 11 discovery. His motion is just a form that provides no additional details beyond what his 12 Petition presents. Therefore, Petitioner's request for appointment of counsel is denied. 13 ORDER 14 THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Donko's Petition for Writ of Habeas 15 Corpus (Post-Conviction) and Motion for Appointment of Counsel are DENIED. 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 STEVEN B. WOLFSON Clark County District Attorney 23 Nevada Bar #001565 24 BY /s/ JOHN AFSHAR 25 JOHN AFSHAR **Deputy District Attorney** Nevada Bar #014408 26 27 28 18

Dated this 19th day of August, 2022

For Judge Ellsworth

128 F48 02CF 2983

Mark Gibbons District Court Judge

and Unform

1	CERTIFICATE OF MAILING			
1	I hereby certify that service of the above and foregoing was made this 16th day of			
2	August, 2022, by depositing a copy in the U.S. Mail, postage pre-paid, addressed to:			
3	TED MICHAEL DONKO, BAC #1080899			
4 5	TED MICHAEL DONKO, BAC #1080899 LOVELOCK CORRECTIONAL CENTER 1200 PRISON ROAD			
5	LOVELOCK, NEVADA 89419			
6				
7	BY <u>/s/ Janet Hayes</u> Secretary for the District Attorney's Office			
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1	CSERV		
2	D	ISTRICT COURT	
3	CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA		
4			
5		1	
6	Ted Donko, Plaintiff(s)	CASE NO: A-22-852928-W	
7	vs.	DEPT. NO. Department 17	
8	State of Nevada, Defendant(s)		
9		_	
10	AUTOMATED	CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE	
П		ervice was generated by the Eighth Judicial District	
12	Court. The foregoing Final Accounting all recipients registered for e-Service o	g was served via the court's electronic eFile system to n the above entitled case as listed below:	
13	Service Date: 8/19/2022		
14		ant 171 a Caladra a sunta sa su	
15	Dept 17 Law Clerk d	ept17lc@clarkcountycourts.us	
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1 2 3 4 5	NOAS <u>TEO Donko</u> #/080844 Lovelock Correctional Center 1200 Prison Road Lovelock, Nevada 89419 In Pro Se
6	DISTRICT COURT
7	CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA
8	* * * *
9	TED Michael Donko ,)
10) Petitioner,) Case No. <u>A-22-852928-</u> W
11	-vs-) Dept. No. <u>/7</u>
12	THE STATE OF NEVADA,
13	Respondent.
14	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
15	NOTICE OF APPEAL
16	NOTICE IS GIVEN that Petitioner, <u>TED Michael Donks</u> ,
17	in pro se, hereby appeals to the Nevada Supreme Court the
18	Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order Denying /
19	Dismissing Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, as filed/entered
20	on or about the $\frac{18}{18}$ day of <u>August</u> , $20\frac{22}{5}$, in the above-
21 22	entitled Court.
22	Dated this 18 day of <u>August</u> , 2022.
2.4	
25	TEP Michael Domain # 1050543 Lovelock Correctional Center 1200 Prison Road
26	Lovelock, Nevada 89419
27	Petitioner In Pro Se
28	RECEIVED
	AUG 2 5 2022
	CLERK OF THE COURT

•			
]	CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE		
2	I do certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the		
2	foregoing NOTICE OF APPEAL to the below address(es) on this		
4	18 day of August, 2022, by placing same in the		
5	U.S. Mail via prison law library staff:		
6			
7			
8			
9			
10			
11	Atto incy General		
12	100 N. CAISON ST		
13	CArson City, Nr. 89701		
14			
15			
16			
17	TED MKhaci De NKO # 10808 Ag		
18	Lovelock Correctional Center 1200 Prison Road		
19			
20	Petitioner In Pro Se		
21			
22	AFFIRMATION PURSUANT TO NRS 239B.030		
23	The undersigned does hereby affirm that the preceding		
24	NOTICE OF APPEAL filed in District Court Case No. A-22-852.928-	/	
25	does not contain the social security number of any person.		
26	Dated this 3 day of August, 2022.		
27	•		
28	Petitioner In Pro Se		

١. X cc LoveLock, NV, 89419 200 PRISON RD **₹1080899** ED Donko Regional Justice Centr Regional Justice Centr Eignth Jubicial District 200 Lewis Ave 3RD Floor 200 Lewis Ave 3RD Floor LOVELOCK CORRECTIONAL CENTER Las Vegas, NU, 89155 1000369000 AUG 23 2022 85

		Electronically Filed 8/29/2022 12:42 PM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT	
1	ASTA	Atumb. Anum	
2			
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4 5			
6			
7	IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL STATE OF NEVA		
8	STATE OF NEVADA IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLARK		
9			
10	TED DONKO,	Case No: A-22-852928-W	
11	Plaintiff(s),	– Dept No: XVII	
12	VS.		
13	STATE OF NEVADA,		
14 15	Defendant(s),		
16			
17	CASE APPEAL	STATEMENT	
18	1. Appellant(s): Ted Donko		
19	2. Judge: Mark Gibbons		
20	3. Appellant(s): Ted Donko		
21 22	Counsel:		
22	Ted Donko #1080899		
24	1200 Prison Rd. Lovelock, NV 89419		
25	4. Respondent (s): State of Nevada		
26	Counsel:		
27	Steven B. Wolfson, District Attorney		
28	200 Lewis Ave. Las Vegas, NV 89155-2212		
	A-22-852928-W -1		
	8 Case Number: A		

1	5. Appellant(s)'s Attorney Licensed in Nevada: N/A			
2	Permission Granted: N/A			
3	Respondent(s)'s Attorney Licensed in Nevada: Yes Permission Granted: N/A			
5	6. Has Appellant Ever Been Represented by Appointed Counsel In District Court: No			
6	7. Appellant Represented by Appointed Counsel On Appeal: N/A			
7 8	 Appellant Granted Leave to Proceed in Forma Pauperis**: Yes, May 23, 2022 **Expires 1 year from date filed Appellant Filed Application to Proceed in Forma Pauperis: N/A 			
9	Date Application(s) filed: N/A			
10	9. Date Commenced in District Court: May 20, 2022			
11	10. Brief Description of the Nature of the Action: Civil Writ			
12	Type of Judgment or Order Being Appealed: Civil Writ of Habeas Corpus			
13	11. Previous Appeal: No			
14	Supreme Court Docket Number(s): N/A			
15	12. Child Custody or Visitation: N/A			
16 17	13. Possibility of Settlement: Unknown			
17	Dated This 29 day of August 2022.			
18 19	Steven D. Grierson, Clerk of the Court			
20				
21	/s/ Heather Ungermann Heather Ungermann, Deputy Clerk			
22	200 Lewis Ave PO Box 551601			
23	Las Vegas, Nevada 89155-1601			
24	(702) 671-0512			
25	cc: Ted Donko			
26				
27				
28				
	A-22-852928-W -2- 87			



EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT CLERK OF THE COURT

REGIONAL JUSTICE CENTER 200 LEWIS AVENUE, 3rd Fl. LAS VEGAS, NEVADA 89155-1160 (702) 671-4554

Steven D. Grierson Clerk of the Court Anntoinette Naumec-Miller Court Division Administrator

September 02, 2022

Attorney:Public DefenderCase Number:C-19-345584-1/
A-22-852928-WClark County Public Defender
309 S 3rd Street Suite #2
Las Vegas NV 89101Department:Department 17

Defendant: Ted Michael Donko

Attached are pleadings received by the Office of the District Court Clerk which are being forwarded to your office pursuant to Rule 3.70.

Pleadings: Notice Of Motion For Evidentiary Hearing


Rule 3.70. Papers which May Not be Filed

Except as may be required by the provisions of NRS 34.730 to 34.830, inclusive, all motions, petitions, pleadings or other papers delivered to the clerk of the court by a defendant who has counsel of record will not be filed but must be marked with the date received and a copy forwarded to the attorney for such consideration as counsel deems appropriate. This rule does not apply to applications made pursuant to Rule 7.40(b)(2)(ii).

Cordially yours, DC Criminal Desk # 27 Deputy Clerk of the Court

TED Michael Donko#1080899 2 1200 prison RD 3 Lovelock, NV, 89419 4 Lovelock correctional center 5 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF The State OF NEVADA 6 AAAA 7 8 TED Michael DONKO CASENO, <u>C-19-345584-1</u> 9 APPELLANT A-22-852928-W 10 V5. DEPT NO. THE STATE OF NEVADA 11 RespondENT. 12 NOTICE OF MOTION FOR EVIDENTIALARY HEARING 13 14 COMES NOW, TED MICHAEL DONKO, RESpectfully Refuests TO have a Evidentiarary hearing WHICH WAS NEVER DONE 15 DONKO ASKED ATTORNEY TO DO A MOTION FOI THIS 16 WHICH WAS NEVER DONG DONKO Also HAS THE RIGHT 17 TO PROVIDE EVIDENCE ON HIS BEHALF THAT CAN PROVO 18 HIS INNOCENSE IT WOULD ONLY BE FAIR FOR DONKS 19 TO GET AN ATTORNey AND HAVE A EVIDENTIALARY NEARING. 20 21 22 RECEIVED 23 AUG 2 5 2022 24 CLERK OF THE COURT 25 26 89 27

100369000 AUG 23 2022 \$ 001.44 Regional Justice Centri Eighth Judicial District 2 00 Lewis Ave 3RD Floor Las Vegas, NU, 89155 LOVELOCK CORRECTIONAL CENTER LOUELOCK, NU, 89419 1200 PRISON RD. N.CC TED Donko #1080899 90



DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

Writ of Habeas Co	rpus	COURT MINUTES	
A-22-852928-W	Ted Donko, Pla	intiff(s)	
	vs. State of Nevad	a, Defendant(s)	
July 27, 2022	08:30 AM	All Pending Motions	
HEARD BY:	Ellsworth, Carolyn	COURTROOM: RJC	Courtroom 11A
COURT CLERK:	Albrecht, Samantha		
RECORDER:	Santi, Kristine		
REPORTER:			
PARTIES PRESE	NT:		
James Andrew Puccinelli		Attorney for Defendant	
		JOURNAL ENTRIES	
PETITION FOR W	RIT OF HABEAS CC	RPUSPLAINTIFF'S MOTIC	ON FOR APPOINTMENT

Plaintiff not present.

Court noted the only issues raised in the post-conviction Petition, which were not raised in the appeal and rejected by the Supreme Court, were the gunshot residue and the ineffectiveness of counsel, and for the reasons in the State's Opposition, COURT ORDERED, Petition DENIED. Court FINDS the issues are not complex or it would have appointed counsel, therefore COURT FURTHER ORDERED, Plaintiff's Motion for Appointment of Counsel DENIED. State to prepare Findings of Facts, Conclusions of Law.

NDC

CLERK'S NOTE: A copy of this Minute Order was mailed to: Ted Michael Donko #1080899 1200 Prison Road Lovelock, NV 89419 (8/1/2022 SA)

Certification of Copy and Transmittal of Record

State of Nevada County of Clark SS:

Pursuant to the Supreme Court order dated September 9, 2022, I, Steven D. Grierson, the Clerk of the Court of the Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County, State of Nevada, do hereby certify that the foregoing is a true, full and correct copy of the complete trial court record for the case referenced below. The record comprises one volume with pages numbered 1 through 92.

TED MICHAEL DONKO,

Plaintiff(s),

vs.

STATE OF NEVADA,

Defendant(s),

now on file and of record in this office.

Case No: A-22-852928-W

Dept. No: XVII

CERTERIES OF IN WITNESS THEREOF, I have hereunto Set my hand and Affixed the seal of the Court at my office, Las Vegas, Nevada This 14 day of September 2022. Steven D. Grierson, Clerk of the Court Heather Ungermann, Deputy Clerk