SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA

85398

Electronically Filed Jan 23 2023 09:22 PM Elizabeth A. Brown Clerk of Supreme Court

Edward Honabach, Appellant,

VS.

The State of Nevada, Respondent.

Appeal of Denial of Post-Conviction Relief
Eighth Judicial District Court

Appendix to Appellant's Opening Brief

Jim Hoffman, Esq.

PO Box 231246

Las Vegas, NV 89105

(702) 483-1816

Attorney for Appellant Edward Honabach

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1	INFM STEVEN B. WOLFSON		Den b. Emm
2	Clark County District Attorney		CLERK OF THE COURT
3	Nevada Bar #001565 JACOB J. VILLANI		
4	Chief Deputy District Attorney Nevada Bar #011732		
5	200 Lewis Avenue Las Vegas, Nevada 89155-2212		
6	(702) 671-2500 Attorney for Plaintiff		
7		CT COURT	
8	10:00 AM CLARK COU J. PALLARES, ESQ.	NTY, NEVADA	
9	THE STATE OF NEVADA,	0.450.210	
10	Plaintiff,	CASE NO:	C-16-314092 – 1-2-3-4
11	-vs-	DEPT NO:	IV
12	LUIS ANGEL CASTRO, #1918366,		
13	EDWARD HONABACH aka Edward Joseph Honabach, #7029816,	INFO	RMATION
14	FABIOLA JIMENEZ, #1957068, LIONEL KING, #1983132	11110	
15	Defendant.		
16	STATE OF NEVADA)		
17	COUNTY OF CLARK		
18	STEVEN B. WOLFSON, District Att	torney within and for	r the County of Clark State
19	of Nevada, in the name and by the authority of		
20	That LUIS ANGEL CASTRO, E		
21	Honabach, FABIOLA JIMENEZ and LIONE		Social services New Colors Group Petrocky organization Heritage State Heritage Stat
22	committed the crimes of CONSPIRACY TO		
23	200.010, 200.030, 199.480 - NOC 50038		
24	DEADLY WEAPON (Category B Felony - 1	5.7.	
25	50031); MAYHEM WITH USE OF A DE		
26	200.280, 193.165 - NOC 50045); BATTE		
	1 200.200, 193.103 - NOC 300431, DATTE	TEL MILLI OPP O	I I DUNDLI WENTON

RESULTING IN SUBSTANTIAL BODILY HARM (Category B Felony - NRS 200.481 -

NOC 50226); FIRST DEGREE KIDNAPPING WITH USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON RESULTING IN SUBSTANTIAL BODILY HARM (Category A Felony - NRS 200.310, 200.320, 193.165 - NOC 50056); EXTORTION WITH USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON (Category B Felony - NRS 205.320, 193.165 - NOC 50620); ROBBERY WITH USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON (Category B Felony - NRS 200.380, 193.165 - NOC 50138) and FIRST DEGREE ARSON (Category B Felony - NRS 205.010 - NOC 50414), on or about the 7th day of March, 2016, within the County of Clark, State of Nevada, contrary to the form, force and effect of statutes in such cases made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the State of Nevada,

COUNT 1 - CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT MURDER

did willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously conspire with each other to commit murder, by the Defendants committing the acts as set forth in Count 2, said acts being incorporated by this reference as though fully set forth herein.

COUNT 2 - ATTEMPT MURDER WITH USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON

did willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and with malice aforethought attempt to kill JOSE ORTIZ-SALAZAR, a human being, with use of a deadly weapon, to-wit: a machete and/or knife, by stabbing the said JOSE ORTIZ-SALAZAR about the body and/or by cutting the said JOSE ORTIZ-SALAZAR's throat with said a machete and/or knife, the Defendant(s) being criminally liable under one or more of the following principles of criminal liability, to-wit: (1) by directly committing this crime; and/or (2) by aiding or abetting in the commission of this crime, with the intent that this crime be committed, by counseling, encouraging, hiring, commanding, inducing and/or otherwise procuring the other to commit the crime; and/or (3) pursuant to a conspiracy to commit this crime, with the intent that this crime be committed, Defendants aiding or abetting and/or conspiring to murder JOSE ORTIZ-SALAZAR, Defendants acting in concert throughout.

COUNT 3 – MAYHEM WITH USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON

did willfully, maliciously, and feloniously deprive a person, to-wit: JOSE ORTIZ-SALAZAR, of a body member and/or did disfigure or render a body member useless, to-wit:

a finger and/or fingernails, with use of a deadly weapon, to-wit: a machete and/or knife and/or wire cutters, by severing the said JOSE ORTIZ-SALAZAR'S finger and/or removing his fingernails, the Defendants being criminally liable under one or more of the following principles of criminal liability, to-wit: (1) by directly committing this crime; and/or (2) by aiding or abetting in the commission of this crime, with the intent that this crime be committed, by counseling, encouraging, hiring, commanding, inducing and/or otherwise procuring the other to commit the crime; and/or (3) pursuant to a conspiracy to commit this crime, with the intent that this crime be committed, Defendants aiding or abetting and/or conspiring, Defendants acting in concert throughout.

COUNT 4 - BATTERY WITH USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON RESULTING IN SUBSTANTIAL BODILY HARM

did willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously use force or violence upon the person of another, to-wit: JOSE ORTIZ-SALAZAR, with use of a deadly weapon, to-wit: a machete and/or knife, by stabbing the said JOSE ORTIZ-SALAZAR about the body with said a machete and/or knife, resulting in substantial bodily harm to JOSE ORTIZ-SALAZAR, the Defendants being criminally liable under one or more of the following principles of criminal liability, to-wit: (1) by directly committing this crime; and/or (2) by aiding or abetting in the commission of this crime, with the intent that this crime be committed, by counseling, encouraging, hiring, commanding, inducing and/or otherwise procuring the other to commit the crime; and/or (3) pursuant to a conspiracy to commit this crime, with the intent that this crime be committed, Defendants aiding or abetting and/or conspiring, Defendants acting in concert throughout.

$\underline{\text{COUNT 5}}$ - FIRST DEGREE KIDNAPPING WITH USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON RESULTING IN SUBSTANTIAL BODILY HARM

did willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, seize, confine, inveigle, entice, decoy, abduct, conceal, kidnap, or carry away JOSE ORTIZ-SALAZAR, a human being, with the intent to hold or detain the said JOSE ORTIZ-SALAZAR against his will, and without his consent, for the purpose of committing murder and/or robbery, with use of a deadly weapon,

to-wit: a machete and/or knife and/or wire cutters, resulting in substantial bodily harm to JOSE ORTIZ-SALAZAR, the Defendants being criminally liable under one or more of the following principles of criminal liability, to-wit: (1) by directly committing this crime; and/or (2) by aiding or abetting in the commission of this crime, with the intent that this crime be committed, by counseling, encouraging, hiring, commanding, inducing and/or otherwise procuring the other to commit the crime; and/or (3) pursuant to a conspiracy to commit this crime, with the intent that this crime be committed, Defendants aiding or abetting and/or conspiring, Defendants acting in concert throughout.

COUNT 6 - EXTORTION WITH USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON

did then and there willfully, feloniously and unlawfully make a verbal demand directed to one JOSE ORTIZ-SALAZAR, for payment to Defendants of the sum of \$300.00 lawful money of the United States, which demand was accompanied by threats to do injury to the person or property of JOSE ORTIZ-SALAZAR, and said threats being made with the intent to extort and gain the above mentioned sum of money, with use of a deadly weapon, to-wit: a machete and/or knife and/or wire cutters, the Defendants being criminally liable under one or more of the following principles of criminal liability, to-wit: (1) by directly committing this crime; and/or (2) by aiding or abetting in the commission of this crime, with the intent that this crime be committed, by counseling, encouraging, hiring, commanding, inducing and/or otherwise procuring the other to commit the crime; and/or (3) pursuant to a conspiracy to commit this crime, with the intent that this crime be committed, Defendants aiding or abetting and/or conspiring, Defendants acting in concert throughout.

COUNT 7 - ROBBERY WITH USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON

did willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously take personal property, to-wit: cigarettes, from the person of JOSE ORTIZ-SALAZAR, or in his presence, by means of force or violence, or fear of injury to, and without the consent and against the will of JOSE ORTIZ-SALAZAR, with use of a deadly weapon, to-wit: a machete and/or knife, the Defendants being criminally liable under one or more of the following principles of criminal liability, to-wit: (1) by directly committing this crime; and/or (2) by aiding or abetting in the commission of this crime, with

the intent that this crime be committed, by counseling, encouraging, hiring, commanding, inducing and/or otherwise procuring the other to commit the crime; and/or (3) pursuant to a conspiracy to commit this crime, with the intent that this crime be committed, Defendants aiding or abetting and/or conspiring, Defendants acting in concert throughout.

COUNT 8 - FIRST DEGREE ARSON

did willfully, unlawfully, maliciously, and feloniously set fire to, burn, and/or cause to be burned, a certain residence, located at 1901 East Oakey Boulevard, Las Vegas, Clark County, Nevada, by use of open flame and flammable and/or combustible materials, and/or by manner and means unknown, the Defendants being criminally liable under one or more of the following principles of criminal liability, to-wit: (1) by directly committing this crime; and/or (2) by aiding or abetting in the commission of this crime, with the intent that this crime be committed, by counseling, encouraging, hiring, commanding, inducing and/or otherwise procuring the other to commit the crime; and/or (3) pursuant to a conspiracy to commit this crime, with the intent that this crime be committed, Defendants aiding or abetting and/or conspiring, Defendants acting in concert throughout.

STEVEN B. WOLFSON
Clark County District Attorney
Novada Day #001565

BY

Chief Deputy District Attorney Nevada Bar #011732

I	Names of witnesses known to the District Attorney's Office at the time of filing this		
2	Information are as follows:		
3	NAME	ADDRESS	
4	CUSTODIAN OF RECORDS OR DESIGNEE	Clark County Detention Center, 330 S. Casino Center Blvd., Las Vegas, NV	
5	OR DESIGNEE	550 S. Casino Center Bivd., Las Vegas, IV	
6	CUSTODIAN OF RECORDS OR DESIGNEE	LVMPD Communications	
7	OR DESIGNED		
8	CUSTODIAN OF RECORDS OR DESIGNEE	LVMPD Dispatch	
9	OR DESIGNED		
10	CUSTODIAN OF RECORDS OR DESIGNEE	LVMPD Records, 400 S. Martin Luther King Blvd, Las Vegas, NV	
11	ON BESIGNEE	Lab v ogas, 11 v	
12	CUSTODIAN OF RECORDS OR DESIGNEE	LVMPD Project Management & Video Bureau	
13			
14	CUSTODIAN OF RECORDS OR DESIGNEE	Las Vegas Fire Department	
15	on Baranez		
16	CUSTODIAN OF RECORDS OR DESIGNEE	Sunrise Hospital, 3186 Maryland Pkwy., Las Vegas, NV	
17			
18	CUSTODIAN OF RECORDS OR DESIGNEE	Clark County School District	
19			
20	ALEXANDER, M.	LVMPD P#15223	
21	ALLEN, Z.	Las Vegas Fire Department #204	
22	AUSCHWITZ, J.	LVMPD P#5932	
23	CHOCK, STEFAN M.D.	Sunrise Hospital, 3186 Maryland Pkwy., Las Vegas, NV	
24	COURT INTERPRETER	200 Lewis Ave., Las Vegas, NV	
25	DEVITO, A.	LVMPD P#15274	
26	FASULO, T.	LVMPD P#13459	
27	GRIFFIN, TIM	C/O Clark County District Attorney's Office	
28	GUTIERREZ, AMADA	C/O Clark County District Attorney's Office	
	I		

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1	HALL, D.	Clark County School District Police #256
2	HERRING, N.	LVMPD P#9725
3	HEVEL, R.	Las Vegas Fire Department/Arson Investigation
4	KELVINGTON, A.	LVMPD P#8878
5	KING, C.	LVMPD P#14372
6	KWIATKOWSKI, TERRANCE M.D.	Sunrise Hospital, 3186 Maryland Pkwy., Las Vegas, NV
7	LACAZE, WILLIAM	C/O Clark County District Attorney's Office
8	LANDING, KHALIAH	C/O Clark County District Attorney's Office
9	LARINGTON, D.	LVMPD P#7858
10	LOVEETTE, J.	Las Vegas Fire Department #204
11	MAIORANA, DAVID	C/O Clark County District Attorney's Office
12	MARTINEZ, FRANCISCO	C/O Clark County District Attorney's Office
13	MARTINEZ, ROSIO	C/O Clark County District Attorney's Office
14	MENDEZ, ANTONIO	C/O Clark County District Attorney's Office
15	MENDOZA, A.	LVMPD P#15245
16	MURRAY, T.	LVMPD P#13458
17	NOGLE, K.	LVMPD P#8051
18	ORTEGA, MARCELO	C/O Clark County District Attorney's Office
19	ORTIZ-SALAZAR, JOSE	C/O Clark County District Attorney's Office
20	REZENDIS, YOSELIN	C/O Clark County District Attorney's Office
21	ROSARIO, NELSON	C/O Clark County District Attorney's Office
22	SALAZAR, GUADALUPE	C/O Clark County District Attorney's Office
23	SCHREIBER, P.	LVMPD P#13986
24	SCLIMENTI, M.	LVMPD P#6239
25	SHEPARD, DAVID	C/O Clark County District Attorney's Office
26	SPARKMAN, CHARLES	C/O Clark County District Attorney's Office
27	THEOBALD, R.	LVMPD P#6468
28	TOMASO, B.	LVMPD P#9488

ORIGINAL AINF FILED IN OPEN COURT STEVEN B. WOLFSON STEVEN D. GRIERSON 2 Clark County District Attorney CLERK OF THE COURT Nevada Bar #001565 3 **MEGAN THOMSON** FEB 0 4 2019 Chief Deputy District Attorney 4 Nevada Bar #011002 200 Lewis Avenue 5 Las Vegas, Nevada 89155-2212 (702) 671-2500 6 Attorney for Plaintiff C-18-314092-2 7 DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA Amended Information 4813596 8 9 THE STATE OF NEVADA, 10 Plaintiff, CASE NO. C-16-314092-2 11 DEPT NO. XXX 12 LUIS ANGEL CASTRO, #1918366, EDWARD HONABACH **AMENDED** 13 aka Edward Joseph Honabach, #7029816, FABIOLA JIMENEZ, #1957068, INFORMATION 14 LIONEL KING, #1983132 15 Defendant. 16 STATE OF NEVADA SS: 17 COUNTY OF CLARK 18 of Nevada, in the name and by the authority of the State of Nevada, informs the Court: 19 That LUIS ANGEL CASTRO, EDWARD HONABACH aka Edward Joseph 20 21

STEVEN B. WOLFSON, District Attorney within and for the County of Clark, State

Honabach, FABIOLA JIMENEZ, and LIONEL KING, the Defendant(s) above named, having committed the crime of FIRST DEGREE KIDNAPPING RESULTING SUBSTANTIAL BODILY HARM (Category A Felony - NRS 200.310, 200.320 - NOC 50052), on or about the 7th day of March, 2016, within the County of Clark, State of Nevada, contrary to the form, force and effect of statutes in such cases made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the State of Nevada, did willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, seize, confine, inveigle, entice, decoy, abduct, conceal, kidnap, or carry away JOSE ORTIZ-SALAZAR, a human being, with the intent to hold or detain JOSE ORTIZ-SALAZAR against

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his will, and without his consent, for the purpose of committing murder and/or robbery, resulting in substantial bodily harm to JOSE ORTIZ-SALAZAR, the Defendants being criminally liable under one or more of the following principles of criminal liability, to-wit: (1) by directly committing this crime; and/or (2) by aiding or abetting in the commission of this crime, with the intent that this crime be committed, by counseling, encouraging, hiring, commanding, inducing and/or otherwise procuring the other to commit the crime; and/or (3) pursuant to a conspiracy to commit this crime, with the intent that this crime be committed, Defendants aiding or abetting and/or conspiring, Defendants acting in concert throughout.

STEVEN B. WOLFSON Clark County District Attorney

Nevada Bar #001565

BY

MEGAN THOMSON

Chief Deputy District Attorney

Nevada Bar #011002

DA#16F03770X /cc/L4 LVMPD EV#1603072804 (TK)

ORIGINAL

14 **GPA** FILED IN OPEN COURT STEVEN B. WOLFSON STEVEN D. GRIERSON 2 Clark County District Attorney CLERK OF THE COURT Nevada Bar #001565 3 **MEGAN THOMSON** FEB 0 4 2019 Chief Deputy District Attorney 4 Nevada Bar #011002 200 Lewis Avenue Las Vegas, NV 89155-2212 (702) 671-2500 5 6 Attorney for Plaintiff 7 DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 8 9 THE STATE OF NEVADA, 10 Plaintiff. 11 -VS-CASE NO: C-16-314092-2 **EDWARD HONABACH** 12 DEPT NO: XXX aka Edward Joseph Honabach, 13 #7029816 14 Defendant. 15 **GUILTY PLEA AGREEMENT** I hereby agree to plead guilty to: FIRST DEGREE KIDNAPPING RESULTING IN 16 SUBSTANTIAL BODILY HARM (Category A Felony - NRS 200.310, 200.320 - NOC 17 50052), as more fully alleged in the charging document attached hereto as Exhibit "1". 18 My decision to plead guilty is based upon the plea agreement in this case which is as 19 20 follows: This offer is conditional upon all four (4) Defendants accepting their respective 21 22 negotiations and being sentenced. All Parties agree the State will have the right to argue for 23 Life without the possibility of Parole, and the Defense will argue for Life with the possibility 24 of Parole after fifteen (15) years. All Parties agree that no one will seek the term of years. I agree to the forfeiture of any and all weapons or any interest in any weapons seized 25 and/or impounded in connection with the instant case and/or any other case negotiated in 26 C-16-314092-2 whole or in part in conjunction with this plea agreement. 27 GPA **Gullty Plea Agreement** 28 111

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I understand and agree that, if I fail to interview with the Department of Parole and Probation, fail to appear at any subsequent hearings in this case, or an independent magistrate, by affidavit review, confirms probable cause against me for new criminal charges including reckless driving or DUI, but excluding minor traffic violations, the State will have the unqualified right to argue for any legal sentence and term of confinement allowable for the crime(s) to which I am pleading guilty, including the use of any prior convictions I may have to increase my sentence as an habitual criminal to five (5) to twenty (20) years, life without the possibility of parole, life with the possibility of parole after ten (10) years, or a definite twenty-five (25) year term with the possibility of parole after ten (10) years.

Otherwise I am entitled to receive the benefits of these negotiations as stated in this plea agreement.

CONSEQUENCES OF THE PLEA

I understand that by pleading guilty I admit the facts which support all the elements of the offense(s) to which I now plead as set forth in Exhibit "1".

I understand that as a consequence of my plea of guilty The Court must sentence me to imprisonment in the Nevada Department of Corrections for a minimum term of not less than FIFTEEN (15) years and a maximum term of not more than FORTY (40) years, OR for a minimum term of not less than FIFTEEN (15) years and a maximum term of LIFE. OR LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE. I understand that the law requires me to pay an Administrative Assessment Fee.

I understand that, if appropriate, I will be ordered to make restitution to the victim of the offense(s) to which I am pleading guilty and to the victim of any related offense which is being dismissed or not prosecuted pursuant to this agreement. I will also be ordered to reimburse the State of Nevada for any expenses related to my extradition, if any.

I understand that I am not eligible for probation for the offense to which I am pleading guilty.

I understand that I must submit to blood and/or saliva tests under the Direction of the Division of Parole and Probation to determine genetic markers and/or secretor status.

I understand that if I am pleading guilty to charges of Burglary, Invasion of the Home, Possession of a Controlled Substance with Intent to Sell, Sale of a Controlled Substance, or Gaming Crimes, for which I have prior felony conviction(s), I will not be eligible for probation and may receive a higher sentencing range.

I understand that if more than one sentence of imprisonment is imposed and I am

I understand that if more than one sentence of imprisonment is imposed and I am eligible to serve the sentences concurrently, the sentencing judge has the discretion to order the sentences served concurrently or consecutively.

I understand that information regarding charges not filed, dismissed charges, or charges to be dismissed pursuant to this agreement may be considered by the judge at sentencing.

I have not been promised or guaranteed any particular sentence by anyone. I know that my sentence is to be determined by the Court within the limits prescribed by statute.

I understand that if my attorney or the State of Nevada or both recommend any specific punishment to the Court, the Court is not obligated to accept the recommendation.

I understand that if the offense(s) to which I am pleading guilty was committed while I was incarcerated on another charge or while I was on probation or parole that I am not eligible for credit for time served toward the instant offense(s).

I understand that if I am not a United States citizen, any criminal conviction will likely result in serious negative immigration consequences including but not limited to:

- 1. The removal from the United States through deportation;
- 2. An inability to reenter the United States;
- 3. The inability to gain United States citizenship or legal residency;
- 4. An inability to renew and/or retain any legal residency status; and/or
- 5. An indeterminate term of confinement, with the United States Federal Government based on my conviction and immigration status.

Regardless of what I have been told by any attorney, no one can promise me that this conviction will not result in negative immigration consequences and/or impact my ability to become a United States citizen and/or a legal resident.

I understand that the Division of Parole and Probation will prepare a report for the sentencing judge prior to sentencing. This report will include matters relevant to the issue of sentencing, including my criminal history. This report may contain hearsay information regarding my background and criminal history. My attorney and I will each have the opportunity to comment on the information contained in the report at the time of sentencing. Unless the District Attorney has specifically agreed otherwise, the District Attorney may also comment on this report.

WAIVER OF RIGHTS

By entering my plea of guilty, I understand that I am waiving and forever giving up the following rights and privileges:

- The constitutional privilege against self-incrimination, including the right 1. to refuse to testify at trial, in which event the prosecution would not be allowed to comment to the jury about my refusal to testify.
- 2. The constitutional right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury, free of excessive pretrial publicity prejudicial to the defense, at which trial I would be entitled to the assistance of an attorney, either appointed or retained. At trial the State would bear the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt each element of the offense(s) charged.
- 3. The constitutional right to confront and cross-examine any witnesses who would testify against me.
- 4. The constitutional right to subpoena witnesses to testify on my behalf.
- 5. The constitutional right to testify in my own defense.
- 6. The right to appeal the conviction with the assistance of an attorney, either appointed or retained, unless specifically reserved in writing and agreed upon as provided in NRS 174.035(3). I understand this means I am unconditionally waiving my right to a direct appeal of this conviction, including any challenge based upon reasonable constitutional, jurisdictional or other grounds that challenge the legality of the proceedings as stated in NRS 177.015(4). However, I remain free to challenge my conviction through other post-conviction remedies including a habeas corpus petition pursuant to NRS Chapter 34.

VOLUNTARINESS OF PLEA

I have discussed the elements of all of the original charge(s) against me with my attorney and I understand the nature of the charge(s) against me.

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I understand that the State would have to prove each element of the charge(s) against me at trial.

I have discussed with my attorney any possible defenses, defense strategies and circumstances which might be in my favor.

All of the foregoing elements, consequences, rights, and waiver of rights have been thoroughly explained to me by my attorney.

I believe that pleading guilty and accepting this plea bargain is in my best interest, and that a trial would be contrary to my best interest.

I am signing this agreement voluntarily, after consultation with my attorney, and I am not acting under duress or coercion or by virtue of any promises of leniency, except for those set forth in this agreement.

I am not now under the influence of any intoxicating liquor, a controlled substance or other drug which would in any manner impair my ability to comprehend or understand this agreement or the proceedings surrounding my entry of this plea.

My attorney has answered all my questions regarding this guilty plea agreement and its consequences to my satisfaction and I am satisfied with the services provided by my attorney.

DATED this day of February, 2019.

aka Edward Joseph Honabach

Defendant

AGREED TO BY:

Chief Deputy District Attorney Nevada Bar #011002

CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL:

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I, the undersigned, as the attorney for the Defendant named herein and as an officer of the court hereby certify that:

- I have fully explained to the Defendant the allegations contained in the charge(s) to which guilty pleas are being entered.
- 2. I have advised the Defendant of the penalties for each charge and the restitution that the Defendant may be ordered to pay.
- 3. I have inquired of Defendant facts concerning Defendant's immigration status and explained to Defendant that if Defendant is not a United States citizen any criminal conviction will most likely result in serious negative immigration consequences including but not limited to:
 - The removal from the United States through deportation;
 - b. An inability to reenter the United States;
 - c. The inability to gain United States citizenship or legal residency;
 - d. An inability to renew and/or retain any legal residency status; and/or
 - e. An indeterminate term of confinement, by with United States Federal Government based on the conviction and immigration status.

Moreover, I have explained that regardless of what Defendant may have been told by any attorney, no one can promise Defendant that this conviction will not result in negative immigration consequences and/or impact Defendant's ability to become a United States citizen and/or legal resident.

- All pleas of guilty offered by the Defendant pursuant to this agreement are consistent with the facts known to me and are made with my advice to the Defendant.
- 5. To the best of my knowledge and belief, the Defendant:
 - Is competent and understands the charges and the consequences of pleading guilty as provided in this agreement,
 - Executed this agreement and will enter all guilty pleas pursuant hereto voluntarily, and
 - c. Was not under the influence of intoxicating liquor, a controlled substance or other drug at the time I consulted with the Defendant as certified in paragraphs 1 and 2 above.

Dated: This day of February, 2019.

ROBERT BECKETT, ESQ.

cc/L4

4 AINF STEVEN B. WOLFSON 2 Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #001565 3 MEGAN THOMSON Chief Deputy District Attorney 4 Nevada Bar #011002 200 Lewis Avenue 5 Las Vegas, Nevada 89155-2212 (702) 671-2500 6 Attorney for Plaintiff 7 DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 8 9 THE STATE OF NEVADA, 10 Plaintiff, CASE NO. C-16-314092-2 11 -VS-DEPT NO. XXX 12 LUIS ANGEL CASTRO, #1918366, EDWARD HONABACH AMENDED 13 aka Edward Joseph Honabach, #7029816, FABIOLA JIMENEZ, #1957068, INFORMATION 14 LIONEL KING, #1983132 15 Defendant. 16 STATE OF NEVADA SS: 17 COUNTY OF CLARK STEVEN B. WOLFSON, District Attorney within and for the County of Clark, State 18 of Nevada, in the name and by the authority of the State of Nevada, informs the Court: 19 That LUIS ANGEL CASTRO, EDWARD HONABACH aka Edward Joseph 20 Honabach, FABIOLA JIMENEZ, and LIONEL KING, the Defendant(s) above named, having 21 22 committed the crime of FIRST DEGREE KIDNAPPING RESULTING IN SUBSTANTIAL BODILY HARM (Category A Felony - NRS 200.310, 200.320 - NOC 23 50052), on or about the 7th day of March, 2016, within the County of Clark, State of Nevada, 24 contrary to the form, force and effect of statutes in such cases made and provided, and against 25 the peace and dignity of the State of Nevada, did willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, seize, 26 confine, inveigle, entice, decoy, abduct, conceal, kidnap, or carry away JOSE ORTIZ-27

SALAZAR, a human being, with the intent to hold or detain JOSE ORTIZ-SALAZAR against

his will, and without his consent, for the purpose of committing murder and/or robbery, resulting in substantial bodily harm to JOSE ORTIZ-SALAZAR, the Defendants being criminally liable under one or more of the following principles of criminal liability, to-wit: (1) by directly committing this crime; and/or (2) by aiding or abetting in the commission of this crime, with the intent that this crime be committed, by counseling, encouraging, hiring, commanding, inducing and/or otherwise procuring the other to commit the crime; and/or (3) pursuant to a conspiracy to commit this crime, with the intent that this crime be committed, Defendants aiding or abetting and/or conspiring, Defendants acting in concert throughout.

STEVEN B. WOLFSON Clark County District Attorney

Nevada Bar #001565

BY

MEGAN THOMSON

Chief Deputy District Attorney

Nevada Bar #011002

DA#16F03770X /cc/L4 LVMPD EV#1603072804 (TK) **JOCP**

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Electronically Filed 3/28/2019 8:38 AM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT

DISTRICT COURT

CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

THE STATE OF NEVADA,

Plaintiff,

-VS-

EDWARD HONABACH aka Edward Joseph Honabach #7029816

Defendant.

CASE NO. C-16-314092-2

DEPT. NO. XXX

JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION (PLEA OF GUILTY)

The Defendant previously appeared before the Court with counsel and entered a plea of guilty to the crime of FIRST DEGREE KIDNAPPING RESULTING IN SUBSTANTIAL BODILY HARM (Category A Felony) in violation of NRS 200.310, 200.320; thereafter, on the 26th day of March, 2019, the Defendant was present in Court for sentencing with counsel ROBERT BECKETT, ESQ., and good cause appearing,

THE DEFENDANT IS HEREBY ADJUDGED guilty of said offense and, in addition to the \$25.00 Administrative Assessment Fee and \$150.00 DNA Analysis Fee

Nolle Prosequi (before trial)
Dismissed (after diversion)
Diemicood (hafora trial)

Bench (Non-Jury) Trial ☐ Dismissed (during trial)

☐ Acquittal Guilty Plea with Sent (before trial) Guilty Plea with Sent. (during trial)

Transferred (before/during trial) Other Manner of Disposition

☐ Conviction

PICR 19

Case Number: C-16-314092-2

including testing to determine genetic markers plus \$3.00 DNA Collection Fee, the Defendant is sentenced as follows: LIFE WITHOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF PAROLE in the Nevada Department of Corrections (NDC).

DATED: 27 day of March, 2019.

JERRY A. WIESE Vm.
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

1 2 3 4 5	PCHC THE LAW OFFICE OF TRAVIS AKIN Travis Akin, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 13059 8275 S. Eastern Ave., Suite 200 Las Vegas, NV 89123 Phone: (702) 510-8567 Fax: (702) 778-6600 Former Attorney of Petitioner	Electronically Filed 3/27/2020 4:19 PM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT CASE NO: A-20-812948-V Department 2
6 7	DISTRI	ICT COURT UNTY, NEVADA
8	***	*****
9	EDWARD HONABACH Plaintiff,)))
10 11 12 13	vs. WILLIAM GITTERE, Defendant.	CASE NO.: DEPT. NO.: PETITIONER'S POST-CONVICTION WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
14 15	PETITIONER'S POST-CONVIC	TION WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
16	COMES NOW, Petitioner EDWARD	HONABACH, by and through his former counsel,
17 18	Travis Akin, Esq., hereby submits Petitioner's	PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION WRIT OF
19	HABEAS CORPUS. Counsel was originally	appointed to handle Petitioner's appeal. Counsel
20	agreed with Petitioner that an appeal was not p	proper due to the guilty plea agreement, and Counsel

Travis Akin, Esq., hereby submits Petitioner's PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS. Counsel was originally appointed to handle Petitioner's appeal. Counsel agreed with Petitioner that an appeal was not proper due to the guilty plea agreement, and Counsel dismissed Petitioner's appeal. Shortly thereafter, Petitioner moved to have Counsel withdrawn from this case. Out of an abundance of caution, Counsel calendared the deadline to file the instant petition. After checking the docket, it appears that Petitioner did not ask for and was not appointed a new attorney. Counsel now files the instant writ of habeas corpus for his former client to preserve the one year timebar and asks this Court to appoint a replacement attorney to file a supplement.

In addition to all documents, pleadings, and oral arguments in this case, Petitioner asserts:

1. Name of institution and county in which you are presently imprisoned or where and

1	how you are presently restrained of your liberty: Ely State Prison
2	2. Name and location of court which entered the judgment of conviction under attack:
3	Eighth Judicial District Court Department 30, Clark County, NV
4	3. Date of judgment of conviction: March 28, 2019
5	4. Case number: C-16-314092-2
6	5. (a) Length of sentence: LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE
7	(b) If sentence is death, state any date upon which execution is scheduled: N/A
8	6. Are you presently serving a sentence for a conviction other than the conviction under
9 10	attack in this motion? No
11	If "yes," list crime, case number and sentence being served at this time: N/A
12	7. Nature of offense involved in conviction being challenged: FIRST DEGREE
13	KIDNAPPING RESULTING IN SUBSTANTIAL BODILY HARM (NRS 200.310, 200.320
14	- NOC 50052)
15	8. What was your plea? (check one)
16	
17	(a) Not guilty
18	(b) Guilty X
19	(c) Guilty but mentally ill
20	(d) Nolo contendere
21	9. If you entered a plea of guilty or guilty but mentally ill to one count of an indictment or
22	information, and a plea of not guilty to another count of an indictment or information, or if a plea
23	
24	of guilty or guilty but mentally ill was negotiated, give details: Guilty Plea was negotiated.
25	10. If you were found guilty or guilty but mentally ill after a plea of not guilty, was the
26	finding made by: (check one)
27	(a) Jury: N/A
28	(b) Judge without a jury: N/A

1	11. Did you testify at the trial? N/A
2	12. Did you appeal from the judgment of conviction? N/A
3	13. If you did appeal, answer the following:
4	(a) Name of court: Nevada Supreme Court
5	(b) Case number or citation: 78694
6	(c) Result: Voluntary Dismissal
7 8	(d) Date of result: August 23, 2019
9	(Attach copy of order or decision, if available.)
10	14. If you did not appeal, explain briefly why you did not: Conviction a result of plea deal.
11	15. Other than a direct appeal from the judgment of conviction and sentence, have you
12	previously filed any petitions, applications or motions with respect to this judgment in any court,
13	state or federal? No
14	16. If your answer to No. 15 was "yes," give the following information:
15 16	(a) (1) Name of court: N/A
17	(2) Nature of proceeding: N/A
18	(3) Grounds raised: N/A
19	(4) Did you receive an evidentiary hearing on your petition, application or motion? N/A
20	(5) Result: N/A
21	(6) Date of result: N/A
22	(7) If known, citations of any written opinion or date of orders entered pursuant to such
2324	result: N/A
25	(b) As to any second petition, application or motion, give the same information:
26	(1) Name of court: N/A
27	(2) Nature of proceeding: N/A
28	(3) Grounds raised:

1	(4) Did you receive an evidentiary hearing on your petition, application or motion? N/A
2	(5) Result:
3	(6) Date of result:
4	(7) If known, citations of any written opinion or date of orders entered pursuant to such
5	result:
6	
7 8	(c) As to any third or subsequent additional applications or motions, give the same
9	information as above, list them on a separate sheet and attach.
10	(d) Did you appeal to the highest state or federal court having jurisdiction, the result or action
11	taken on any petition, application or motion?
12	(1) First petition, application or motion? N/A
13	Citation or date of decision: N/A
14	(2) Second petition, application or motion? N/A
15 16	Citation or date of decision: N/A
17	(3) Third or subsequent petitions, applications or motions? N/A
18	Citation or date of decision: N/A
19	(e) If you did not appeal from the adverse action on any petition, application or motion
20	explain briefly why you did not. (You must relate specific facts in response to this question. Your
21	response may be included on paper which is 8 1/2 by 11 inches attached to the petition. Your
22	response may not exceed five handwritten or typewritten pages in length.) N/A
23	17. Has any ground being raised in this petition been previously presented to this or any
24	other court by way of petition for habeas corpus, motion, application or any other postconviction
25 26	proceeding? If so, identify: No
2627	
28	(a) Which of the grounds is the same: None
	(b) The proceedings in which these grounds were raised: N/A

- (c) Briefly explain why you are again raising these grounds. (You must relate specific facts in response to this question. Your response may be included on paper which is 8 1/2 by 11 inches attached to the petition. Your response may not exceed five handwritten or typewritten pages in length.) N/A
- 18. If any of the grounds listed in Nos. 23(a), (b), (c) and (d), or listed on any additional pages you have attached, were not previously presented in any other court, state or federal, list briefly what grounds were not so presented, and give your reasons for not presenting them. (You must relate specific facts in response to this question. Your response may be included on paper which is 8 1/2 by 11 inches attached to the petition. Your response may not exceed five handwritten or typewritten pages in length.) This post-conviction claim was not available on appeal as it comes from a conviction resulting from a plea agreement.
- 19. Are you filing this petition more than 1 year following the filing of the judgment of conviction or the filing of a decision on direct appeal? If so, state briefly the reasons for the delay. (You must relate specific facts in response to this question. Your response may be included on paper which is 8 1/2 by 11 inches attached to the petition. Your response may not exceed five handwritten or typewritten pages in length.) **No**
- 20. Do you have any petition or appeal now pending in any court, either state or federal, as to the judgment under attack? **No**

If yes, state what court and the case number: N/A

- 21. Give the name of each attorney who represented you in the proceeding resulting in your conviction and on direct appeal: **Robert S. Beckett**
- 22. Do you have any future sentences to serve after you complete the sentence imposed by the judgment under attack? **No**

If yes, specify where and when it is to be served, if you know: N/A

23. State concisely every ground on which you claim that you are being held unlawfully.

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Summarize briefly the facts supporting each ground. If necessary you may attach pages stating additional grounds and facts supporting same:

- A. Petitioner entered his plea agreement involuntarily, unintelligently, and unknowingly because he did not know that he could receive life without parole pursuant to the guilty plea agreement, therefore, the guilty plea is invalid; Petitioner was under the understanding that he would have, at minimum, a chance at parole;
- B. Counsel was ineffective for failing to advise Petitioner that he could receive a life without parole sentence on his guilty plea; Petitioner was under the understanding that he would have, at minimum, a chance at parole;
- C. Cumulative error.

CONCLUSION

Former counsel has not had an opportunity to investigate these claims has he has not been counsel for the last 6 months. Counsel did meet with Petitioner prior to being withdrawn and Petitioner did communicate to Counsel that Petitioner did not believe that his guilty plea contemplated a life-without parole sentence. Former Counsel now files the instant writ of habeas corpus to preserve Petitioner's timebar and asks the Court to appoint counsel to investigate these claims and file supplemental briefs.

Dated this 27th day of March, 2020.

Respectfully submitted by:

THE LAW OFFICE OF TRAVIS AKIN

/s/ Travis Akin

Travis Akin, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 13059 8275 S. Eastern Ave., Suite 200 Las Vegas, NV 89123

Phone: (702) 510-8567 Fax: (702) 778-6600

1	Former Attorney for Petitioner		
2	<u>VERIFICATION</u>		
345	STATE OF NEVADA COUNTY OF CLARK)) SS:)	
6 7	I, TRAVIS AKIN verify and o	declare under penalty of perjury:	
8	1. That I am former coun	sel for the petitioner EDWARD HONABACH in the above-	
9	entitled action;		
10	2. That I have read the fo	regoing Writ of Habeas Corpus (Post Conviction);	
11	3. I know the contents the	ereof, and that the same is true of my own knowledge except	
12	for those matters stated on informatio	n and belief and as to those matters I believe to be true;	
13	4. That my former client,	EDWARD HONABACH is detained in the Ely State Prison	
14	and it is therefore unable to personally	y verify this petition.	
15 16	FURTHER DECLARANT SA	AYETH NAUGHT	
17		THE LAW OFFICE OF TRAVIS AKIN	
18		/s/ Travis Akin	
19		Travis Akin, Esq.	
20		Nevada Bar No. 13059 8275 S. Eastern Ave., Suite 200	
21		Las Vegas, NV 89134 Phone: (702) 510-8567	
22		Fax: (702) 778-6600 Former Attorney for Petitioner	
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1	<u>CERTIFICATE</u> (OF SERVICE
2	I hereby certify that on the 27 th day of March, 2020, I served a true and correct copy of the	
3	above and foregoing SUPPLEMENTAL PETITION FOR POST CONVICTION WRIT OF	
4	HABEAS CORPUS electronically and via mail addressed to the following:	
5	CLARK COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY	
6	200 Lewis Avenue Las Vegas, Nevada 89101	
7	Attorney for the State of Nevada	
8	NEVADA ATTORNEY GENERAL	
9	Adam Paul Laxalt 100 North Carson Street	
10	Carson City, Nevada 89701-4717	
11		/s/ Travis Akin
12		
13		Travis Akin, Esq.
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Electronically Filed 07/21/2020 11:29 AM CLERK OF THE COURT

1 FCL STEVEN B. WOLFSON Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #001565 3 KAREN MISHLER Deputy District Attorney 4 Nevada Bar #013730 200 Lewis Avenue Las Vegas, Nevada 89155-2212 5 (702) 671-2500 Attorney for Plaintiff 6 DISTRICT COURT 7 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 8 9 THE STATE OF NEVADA, Plaintiff, 10 11 -VS-CASE NO: A-20-812948-W EDWARD HONABACH, aka, 12 DEPT NO: XXXEdward Joseph Honabach, #7029816 13 Defendant. 14 15

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER

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THIS CAUSE having come before the Honorable JERRY WEISE, District Judge, on the 18th day of May, 2020, the Court having concluded that pursuant to Administrative Order 20-01 and subsequent Administrative Orders, this matter is "non-essential" and thus may be decided on the papers. The Court having considered the matter, including briefs, transcripts, and documents on file herein, now therefore, the Court makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law:

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On April 12, 2016, the State filed an Information charging Petitioner Edward Honabach ("Petitioner") with Conspiracy to Commit Murder (Category B Felony - NRS 200.010, 200.030, 199.480); Attempt Murder With Use of a Deadly Weapon (Category B Felony - NRS 200.010, 200.030, 193.330, 193.165); Mayhem With Use of a Deadly Weapon (Category B

 Felony – NRS 200.280, 193.165); Battery With Use of a Deadly Weapon Resulting in Substantial Bodily Harm (Category B Felony – NRS 200.481); First Degree Kidnapping With Use of a Deadly Weapon Resulting in Substantial Bodily Harm (Category A Felony – NRS 200.310, 200.320, 193.165); Extortion With Use of a Deadly Weapon (Category B Felony – NRS 205.320, 193.165); Robbery With Use of a Deadly Weapon (Category B Felony – NRS 200.380, 193.165); and First Degree Arson (Category B Felony – NRS 205.010).

On April 14, 2016, Petitioner was arraigned on the Information, at which time he entered a plea of not guilty and waived his right to a speedy trial. On February 4, 2019, pursuant to negotiations, the State filed an Amended Information charging Petitioner with one count of First Degree Kidnapping Resulting in Substantial Bodily Harm (Category A Felony – NRS 200.310, 200.320). On that same date, Petitioner pleaded guilty to the charge contained in the Amended Information, and the State filed a Guilty Plea Agreement in open court.

On March 26, 2019, Petitioner was sentenced to a life without the possibility of parole in the Nevada Department of Corrections. The Judgment of Conviction was filed on March 28, 2019. On April 26, 2019, Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal. On August 13, 2019, Appellant filed a Notice of Withdrawal of Appeal. On August 23, 2019, the Nevada Supreme Court dismissed the appeal. No remittitur issued.

On March 27, 2020, Petitioner filed the instant post-conviction Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.

<u>ANALYSIS</u>

Petitioner claims he did not enter into the Guilty Plea Agreement voluntarily, intelligently, and knowingly, because he did not know that he could receive a sentence of life without the possibility of parole. He also claims that his plea counsel was ineffective for failing to advise him that he could receive a sentence of life without the possibility of parole. Both of these claims are clearly belied by the record. The Guilty Plea Agreement in this case clearly states that "the State will have the right to argue for Life without the possibility of Parole, and the Defense will argue for Life with the possibility of Parole after fifteen (15) years." Additionally, during the plea canvass on February 4, 2019, the Court accepted Petitioner's plea

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1	of guilty, and concluded that his guilty plea was made freely and voluntarily, and that he	
2	understood the nature of the offense and the consequences of his plea.	
3	Petitioner's only other claim is of cumulative error. As all of Petitioner's claims are	
4	clearly belied by the record, there is no suggestion or evidence of any cumulative error.	
5	<u>ORDER</u>	
6	THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus	
7	shall be, and it is, hereby denied. Dated this 21st day of July, 2020	
8	DATED this day of July, 2020.	
9	DISTRICT JUDGE	
11	STEVEN B. WOLFSON Clark County District Attorney 318 764 021C 7440	
12	Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #001565 Series Strict Court Judge 318 764 021C 7440 Jerry A. Wiese District Court Judge	
13		
14	BY /s/KAREN MISHLER KAREN MISHLER	
15	Deputy District Attorney Nevada Bar #013730	
16		
17	2	
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19	CERTIFICATE OF MAILING	
20	I hereby certify that service of the above and foregoing was made this day of	
21	July, 2020, by depositing a copy in the U.S. Mail, postage pre-paid, addressed to:	
22	EDWARD HONABACH #1214257	
23	ELY STATE PRISON 4569 N. STATE ROUTE 490	
24	ELY, NV, 89301	
25	BY	
26	Jimenez Secretary for the District Attorney's Office	
27		
28	km/L3	
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

EDWARD JOSEPH HONABACH, Appellant, vs. WILLIAM A. GITTERE, WARDEN, Respondent. No. 81402 FILE DEC 1 7 2021

> A. BROWN UPREME COURT

DEPU CLERK

ORDER OF REVERSAL AND REMAND

This is a pro se appeal from a district court order denying Edward Honabach's postconviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; Jerry A. Wiese, Judge. We conclude that the district court erred in resolving the petition filed by counsel which had not been authorized by Honabach and had been filed after his counsel had withdrawn from representing him.

On March 28, 2019, the district court convicted Honabach, pursuant to a guilty plea, of one count of first-degree kidnapping resulting in substantial bodily harm and sentenced Honabach to life in prison without the possibility of parole. Honabach filed a timely notice of appeal. Trial counsel withdrew from representation shortly after the judgment was entered, and the district court appointed Travis Akin as appellate counsel. Akin subsequently filed a notice of withdrawal of appeal, stating that he had explained the consequences of withdrawing the appeal and that Honabach consented to the voluntary dismissal. Based on this notice, this court granted the request and dismissed the appeal. *Honabach v. State*, No. 78694, 2019 WL 4013641 (Nev. Aug. 23, 2019) (Order Dismissing Appeal). Several months later, Honabach wrote to this court complaining that he had not consented to the withdrawal of his direct appeal. Akin responded that he was still the attorney of record, that he sought to dismiss the appeal for reasons discussed with his client, and that he was planning on filing a

SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA

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postconviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Because the dispute over whether Akin advised Honabach of the consequences of withdrawing the appeal and whether Honabach agreed to the withdrawal involved claims of ineffective assistance of counsel that had to be raised in the district court in the first instance, this court determined that the appeal should remain dismissed. *Honabach v. State*, Docket No. 78694 (Order, March 11, 2020). On March 1, 2020, while this court was considering Honabach's letter and Akin's response, Akin filed a motion to withdraw as counsel in the district court citing an insurmountable conflict of interest and that he had taken a job at a law firm and no longer had the time to represent Honabach. The district court considered the motion on March 12, 2020, but for reasons not apparent in the record, determined that the motion to withdraw was moot as it had been previously granted.'

Subsequently, on March 27, 2020, Akin filed a postconviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus purportedly on behalf of Honabach. On the face of the petition, Akin noted a withdrawal motion had been filed but that he was filing the petition out of an abundance of caution given the one-year time limit to file a petition. Akin, referring to Honabach as his former client, further requested that the court replace him with a new attorney to supplement the petition. The petition prepared by Akin raised two claims: that Honabach's guilty plea was invalid because he did not know he would receive a sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole, and that his counsel was ineffective for not advising him of the maximum sentence. Akin did not raise any claims relating to the dismissal of the appeal. The

'It appears the district court may have confused Akin's motion to withdraw with Honabach's earlier October 2019 motion relating to his trial counsel's withdrawal from representation.

SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA

district court denied the petition without clarifying whether counsel was authorized to file the petition after he had withdrawn, appointing new counsel, or allowing Honabach to supplement the petition. This appeal followed. 2

Honabach argues that the district court improperly considered the petition filed by Akin, which he did not authorize to be filed and which was filed after Akin had withdrawn from representing him. Honabach argues the district court should have allowed him to supplement the petition after the appointment of new counsel.

NRS 34.730(1) provides that if counsel verifies a petition in place of a petitioner, he must verify that "the petitioner personally authorized counsel to commence the action." Here, Akin acknowledged on the face of the petition that he had already withdrawn as counsel when he submitted the petition. While Akin's concern about the running clock on Honabach's time to file a petition is commendable, it does not supplant the authorization requirement in NRS 34.730(1).3

And given Akin's actions in filing the petition and requesting the appointment of new counsel, it is

²The State argues that this court is without jurisdiction because Honabach makes the same arguments he raised in a motion to reconsider that he filed in district court. We disagree. Honabach appealed from the order denying the postconviction habeas petition, which is an appealable order pursuant to NRS 34.575(1).

³We note that both Akin and the district court believed that a petition had to be filed within one year from entry of the judgment of conviction. But as we made clear in the order dismissing Honabach's timely direct appeal, he had one year from that order to file a timely postconviction habeas petition. *See Honabach*, 2019 WL 4013641, at *1 n.1 CBecause no remittitur will issue in this matter, *see* NRAP 42(b), the one-year period for filing a post-conviction habeas corpus petition under NRS 34.726(1) shall commence to run from the date of this order.").

SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA understandable and reasonable that Honabach did not file a pro se petition or motion for appointment of counsel. *See Hathaway v. State*, 119 Nev. 248, 254, 71 P.3d 503, 507 (2003) (recognizing that a petitioner would reasonably not file a petition when he believed counsel was pursuing a direct appeal). In these circumstances, rather than resolving the petition submitted by Akin, the district court should have clarified whether Honabach wanted to proceed on the petition submitted by Akin, supplement the petition, or request the appointment of postconviction counsel pursuant to NRS 34.750(1).4 Accordingly, we

ORDER the judgment of the district court REVERSED AND REMAND this matter to the district court for proceedings consistent with this order. 5

A.adt ,C.J.
Hardesty

J. Sr.J.

Sr.J.

⁴Despite the problems with the authorization, we conclude that the petition filed by Akin stopped the clock on the deadline to file a timely postconviction petition such that any supplemental pleadings would be timely in this case. *See State v. Powell*, 122 Nev. 751, 756-58, 138 P.3d 453, 457-58 (2006) (recognizing that a supplemental petition relates back to the filing date of the original petition); *Miles v. State*, 120 Nev. 383, 387, 91 P.3d 588, 590 (2004) (holding that the failure to verify a petition is an amendable defect).

⁵The Honorable Mark Gibbons, Senior Justice, participated in the decision of this matter under a general order of assignment.

cc: Hon. Jerry A. Wiese, District Judge Edward Joseph Honabach Attorney General/Carson City Clark County District Attorney Eighth District Court Clerk

SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA

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APET

2 Jim Hoffman

Nevada State Bar 13896

3 PO Box 231246

Las Vegas, NV 89105

(702) 483-1816

Jim.Hoffman.Esq@gmail.com

Attorney for Edward Honabach

EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

EDWARD HONABACH,	Case No.: A-20-812948-W	
Petitioner,		
vs.	Department 30	
STATE OF NEVADA,	AMENDED PETITION FOR POST-	
Respondent	CONVICTION RELIEF	
EDWARD HONABACH, by and through his counsel JIM HOFFMAN,		
ESQ., hereby brings this Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. This		
Amended Petition is based on the original Petition, as well as the attached		
Argument, Exhibits, and all other pleadings on file in this case.		
DATED: 4/28/22		
	/s/ Jim Hoffman	
	Jim Hoffman, Esq	

AMENDED PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF - 1

I. Factual and Procedural Background

Along with three co-defendants, Edward Honabach was charged in 2016 with various offenses related to the attempted murder of Jose Ortiz-Salazar.

Information. Before trial, the State negotiated a plea agreement with Edward and the other defendants, where each agreed to plead to one count of kidnapping with substantial bodily harm. Plea Agreement 1. This Court then sentenced Mr. Honabach (along with the other defendants) to life without parole. Transcript of Sentencing, March 26, 2019.¹

Mr. Honabach filed a timely direct appeal. Notice of Appeal. However, his appellate counsel withdrew the appeal, stating that he had explained the situation to Mr. Honabach and Mr. Honabach consented to withdrawing the appeal. Notice of Withdrawal of Appeal. However, Edward had not actually consented or even been aware of the withdrawal. Letter to Supreme Court. The Supreme Court ordered appellate counsel to respond to the letter, and appellate counsel did, filing a copy of a letter that he had allegedly sent to Edward (after the withdrawal). Order to Respond; Response to Letter. The Supreme Court then reaffirmed its dismissal of

¹ The sentencing transcript, as well as the change of plea transcript, were originally prepared for a co-defendant's case, C-16-314092-1. However, both transcripts also pertain to Mr. Honabach and are thus cited here. They are also attached as exhibits for the convenience of the parties and the Court.

AMENDED PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION BELIEF - 2

the appeal, notwithstanding Edward's follow-up letter disputing the assertion that he had received any such letter. Order; Letter to Court.

Meanwhile, appellate counsel filed a shell petition for post-conviction relief and then withdrew from the case. Post-Conviction Petition. Eventually, the undersigned was appointed to represent Mr. Honabach and this amended petition follows.

II. Appellate Counsel Was Ineffective Under the Sixth Amendment.

The most obvious violation of Mr. Honabach's constitutional rights was due to his appellate counsel's withdrawal of his appeal without consent. This is clear ineffective assistance of counsel. In addition, counsel's failure to raise the arguments described in Section III also constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel. On this ground, the Court should allow Edward a chance to actually argue his appeal.

The Sixth Amendment to the US Constitution guarantees the right to counsel. "[T]he right to counsel is the right to effective assistance of counsel." *McMann v. Richardson*, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n. 14 (1970). The application of this right is governed by *Strickland v. Washington*, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).

To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner must demonstrate that his trial counsel's performance "fell below an objective standard AMENDED PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF - 3

of reasonableness" at the time of trial and "that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." *Id.* at 688, 694. In other words, there are two prongs of the Strickland test: deficient performance and prejudice.

In order to obtain relief, petitioner need only demonstrate the underlying facts by a preponderance of the evidence. *Means v. State*, 120 Nev. 1001, 1012, 103 P.3d 25, 33 (2004). Petitioners are entitled to an evidentiary hearing if they raise claims supported by sufficient factual allegations that, if true, would entitle them to relief. *Hargrove v. State*, 100 Nev. 498, 502-03, 686 P.2d 222, 225 (1984).

A. Appellate Counsel Was Ineffective in Withdrawing Edward's Appeal Without His Consent.

i. Factual background

After his sentence by this Court, Edward filed a timely pro se notice of appeal. Travis Akin was appointed as his appellate counsel. However, he then filed a notice of withdrawal of appeal with the Nevada Supreme Court in August 2019. In conformance with the Nevada Rules of Appellate Procedure, the withdrawal recited that Mr. Akin "explained and informed Edward Honabach of the legal consequences" of the withdrawal and that "Having so been informed, Edward Honabach hereby consents to a voluntary dismissal of the above-

AMENDED PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF - 5

mentioned appeal."² Notice of Withdrawal of Appeal 1. Shortly thereafter, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal. Order, 8/23/19.

In January 2020, Mr. Honabach wrote a letter to the Supreme Court, stating "I have not heard from him [Akin] in about 7 or 8 months, he has not answerd any of my letters or phone calls." Edward then obtained his docket sheet from the court "and found out that my lawyer has canceled my direct appeal without my knowledge or consent. I was never notified by my lawyer or the court of this either befor or after this was done." He also expressed confusion about whether Akin was even still his lawyer. Letter to Supreme Court, 1/13/20.

After receiving this letter, the Supreme Court ordered Mr. Akin to respond to it. Order, 1/16/20. Akin then filed a letter with the court dated February 14, 2020, stating "I did dismiss your Supreme Court appeal for the reasons that we spoke about at High Desert State Prison." Letter to Supreme Court, 2/14/20. The

² Mr. Akin did not explain the basis for the withdrawal of the appeal, but it was presumably due to the fact that Edward's guilty plea contained the following waiver: "The right to appeal the conviction with the assistance of an attorney, either appointed or retained, unless specifically reserved in writing and agreed upon as provided in NRS 174.035(3). I understand this means I am unconditionally waiving my right to a direct appeal of this conviction, including any challenge based upon reasonable constitutional, jurisdictional or other grounds that challenge the legality of the proceedings as stated in NRS 177.015(4). However, I remain free to challenge my conviction through other post-conviction remedies including a habeas corpus petition pursuant to NRS Chapter 34." Plea Agreement 4.

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Supreme Court then filed an order reaffirming its dismissal, on the grounds that "Whether appellant was advised of the consequences and agreed to the withdrawal of his appeal involves claims of ineffective assistance of counsel that must be raised in the district court in the first instance and requires factual determinations that need to be resolved through an evidentiary hearing." Order, 3/11/20.

Mr. Honabach wrote again to the Supreme Court stating that even though Akin's February letter was addressed to him, "I never reseved any letter" from Mr. Akin, and that "I have writen several letters to Mr. Akin with know response." He again asked the court whether Akin was still his attorney, and asked the court for a copy of the February letter. Letter to Supreme Court, 3/18/20. In response, the Supreme Court again reaffirmed the dismissal. Order, 3/24/20.

Mr. Honabach reiterated these same facts in a declaration pursuant to this Amended Petition. "As far as Mr. Akin, he withdrew my appeal without my consent. He said that I consented to do this, but I never did. In addition, I never received a letter from him, even though he told the Supreme Court he sent me one. I wanted to file an appeal and am upset that the appeal was withdrawn." Declaration of Edward Honabach.³

³ The declaration is not attached to the Petition. Counsel typed up Mr. Honabach's statement and mailed it to him for signature, but has not yet received it back. The declaration will be filed with the Court as soon as it is received. Counsel apologizes for any delay.

ii. Legal background

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"Counsel must file an appeal when a convicted defendant's desire to challenge the conviction is reasonably inferable from the totality of the circumstances." Burns v. State, 455 P.3d 840 (Nev. 2020). "Counsel's duty to file a notice of appeal when one is requested is not affected by the perceived merits of the defendant's claims on appeal." *Id.* Even where a defendant explicitly waives his right to appeal, appellate counsel is still required to prosecute the appeal anyway if that is what the defendant wants. Garza v. Idaho, 139 S. Ct. 738, 742, 203 L.Ed.2d 77 (2019); see also Toston v. State, 267 P.3d 795, 127 Nev. Adv. Op. 87 (Nev. 2011). Failure to file an appeal when requested is error under *Strickland*, and prejudice is presumed. Garza, 139 S. Ct. at 742; Lozada v. State, 110 Nev. 349, 354-57, 871 P.2d 944, 947-49 (Nev. 1994).

In Mitchell v. State, 381 P.3d 642 (Nev. 2012) the Court voluntarily dismissed an appeal based on not just counsel's statement that the appeal waiver foreclosed it, but also a "Consent to Voluntary Dismissal" that was signed by the defendant. This is not something that the Supreme Court per se requires, but it is a way to verify that the defendant actually consents that was not present in Mr. Honabach's case.

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AMENDED PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF - 7

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iii. Analysis

The caselaw here is simple: where a defendant wants to appeal, their attorney is required to appeal. Even if there is an appeal waiver, the defendant retains the ultimate decision about whether or not to pursue the matter. If an attorney fails to appeal, prejudice is presumed according to both the Nevada and U.S. Supreme Courts. Thus, there is only a factual question remaining of whether or not Mr. Akin actually obtained Edward's consent to withdraw the appeal or not.

The weight of the evidence suggests that Edward did not consent to withdraw the appeal. He has repeatedly maintained that he did not, in his letters to the Supreme Court and in his declaration pursuant to this Petition. When the Supreme Court ordered Akin to respond to these allegations, he did so by pointing to a letter which he stated that he sent *after* withdrawing the appeal, in which he references a conversation that happened at some unspecified point in time, without saying whether that conversation happened before or after the withdrawal. The letter also simply states that "we spoke about" the dismissal, which does not actually establish that Edward consented to the dismissal. Even if the Court takes the letter at face value, the evidence still supports the proposition that Edward did not consent.

⁴ See also Nevada Rules of Professional Conduct 1.2(a): "[A] lawyer shall abide by

a client's decision concerning the objectives of representation[.]"" AMENDED PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF - 8

Additionally, Mr. Akin has previously been the subject of a reprimand from the State Bar. The reprimand was due to the fact that Akin had three other cases before the Nevada Supreme Court (in 2020, just a few months after Mr. Honabach's) where he failed to file any briefs. Despite Supreme Court sanctions, for whatever reason he could not get his work done and so that Court removed him as counsel. Bar Reprimand. It is not a leap of logic to suggest that if Mr. Akin failed in his duty to represent other appellants before the Supreme Court, he failed to do so in the instant case as well. The inference here is that he withdrew Mr. Honabach's appeal for the same reason that he never filed briefs in the other cases. The withdrawal was not because Mr. Honabach consented, it was because he was unable to diligently perform his duties.

The record in this case is arguably enough to order a new direct appeal for Mr. Honabach, where he can have the effective assistance of counsel. Alternately, as the Supreme Court suggested, this Court could hold an evidentiary hearing with Mr. Akin in order to evaluate these claims. Either way, appellate counsel's failure to file an appeal was clear error, from which prejudice must be presumed. This was a violation of Mr. Honabach's Sixth Amendment right, and this Court should therefore grant the Petition on this ground.

B. Appellate Counsel Was Ineffective in Failing to Challenge the Voluntariness of Edward's Plea.

As stated in his declaration, Edward did not actually want to accept the plea deal. He did so because he felt pressured into taking the deal by his counsel, as well as the condition of the offer that all four codefendants would have to plead guilty in order for the offer to go into effect. Declaration; Plea Agreement 1. In addition, his decision to plead was based on the advice of counsel who had not adequately reviewed the discovery materials. Declaration.

To be constitutionally valid under the Fifth Amendment, a guilty plea must be entered knowingly, willingly, and understandingly. *North Carolina v. Alford*, 400 U.S. 25, 37-38 (1971). A plea is only voluntary if counsel's advice in giving the plea was effective – ineffective assistance of counsel vitiates the plea. *Hill v. Lockhart*, 474 U.S. 52, 56-60, 106 S. Ct. 366, 370 (1985).

Edward's plea was not voluntary, as he was pressured into it. In addition, counsel's failure to review the discovery was ineffective assistance of counsel which rendered the plea involuntary. See Section III-B below. This was a violation of Mr. Honabach's Sixth Amendment rights and so the Court should grant relief on this claim.

C. Appellate Counsel's Errors Cumulated to Create Prejudice.

Even if no one error is sufficient to constitute a violation justifying reversal, cumulative error can take on constitutional dimensions. *Parle v*.

AMENDED PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF - 10

Runnels, 505 F.3d 922, 927 (9th Cir. 2007); Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 290 n.3, 93 S. Ct. 1038, 1043 (1973). This also applies to ineffective assistance of counsel. "Where no single error or omission of counsel, standing alone, significantly impairs the defense, the district court may nonetheless find unfairness and thus, prejudice emanating from the totality of counsel's errors and omissions." Ewing v. Williams, 596 F.2d 391, 396 (9th Cir. 1979). Taken separately or together, appellate counsel's errors constitute prejudice and therefore ineffective assistance of counsel.

III. Trial Counsel Was Ineffective Under the Sixth Amendment.

In addition to the prejudicial errors discussed above, Edward's trial counsel was also ineffective under the Sixth Amendment. First, he failed to review all discovery before advising Edward to accept the plea, rendering it non-knowing and voluntary. Next, he failed to adequately prepare for sentencing. Finally, while each of these errors constituted prejudice by itself, they also cumulated to constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. The Court should therefore reverse Mr. Honabach's conviction on these grounds, hold an evidentiary hearing, or other such relief as it believes proper.

A. Trial Counsel Failed to Review Discovery Before Advising Edward to Accept the Plea Offer.

As Mr. Honabach stated in his declaration, "I never got to see the discovery in my case. I was especially concerned about seeing the statements of my co-

__

defendants and other witnesses. I found out right before sentencing that Mr.

Beckett hadn't seen most of the discovery either. He told me that he had talked to the lawyers for the other defendants and that was good enough." Declaration.

The right to effective assistance of counsel extends to the plea bargaining process. *Lafler v. Cooper*, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1384 (2012). To show prejudice where a plea bargain has been accepted, defendants must demonstrate a reasonable probability that they would have gone to trial absent counsel's errors. *Hill v. Lockhart*, 474 U.S. 52, 59, 106 S. Ct. 366, 370 (1985).

"Counsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations." *Strickland v. Washington*, 466 U.S. 668, 691 (1984). "Although trial counsel is typically afforded leeway in making tactical decisions regarding trial strategy, counsel cannot be said to have made a tactical decision without first procuring the information necessary to make such a decision." *Reynoso v. Giurbino*, 462 F.3d 1099, 1112 (9th Cir. 2006).

"Because an intelligent assessment of the relative advantages of pleading guilty is frequently impossible without the assistance of an attorney, counsel have a duty to supply criminal defendants with necessary and accurate information." *Iaea v. Sunn*, 800 F.2d 861, 865 (9th Cir. 1986) (internal citations and quotations

⁵ See note 3 *supra*.

AMENDED PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF - 12

omitted). Failure to review discovery before advising a client as to a plea offer falls well outside prevailing professional norms and is therefore error under *Strickland. Williams v. Washington*, 59 F.3d 673, 680-81 (7th Cir. 1995).

To be constitutionally valid, a guilty plea must be entered knowingly, willingly, and understandingly. *North Carolina v. Alford*, 400 U.S. 25, 37-38 (1971). A plea is only voluntary under this standard if counsel's advice in giving the plea was effective – ineffective assistance of counsel vitiates the plea. *Hill v. Lockhart*, 474 U.S. 52, 56-60, 106 S. Ct. 366, 370 (1985).

In the instant case, trial counsel's failure to review all of the discovery before advising Mr. Honabach to accept the plea was erroneous. It was additionally prejudicial – as Edward stated in his declaration, he did not want to take the deal in the first place and only did so on the advice of his trial counsel. He would not have done so if he were aware that counsel had failed to review all the discovery. This establishes prejudice. Mr. Honabach's Sixth Amendment right was violated, and this Court should therefore reverse his conviction on this ground.

B. Trial Counsel Failed to Adequately Prepare for Sentencing.

At sentencing, a substantial disparity was revealed between the amount of preparation that Edward's lawyer did and the preparation that the other defendants' counsel engaged in. For instance, counsel for codefendant Angel Castro submitted a sentencing memorandum asking the Court for leniency, along with a substantial AMENDED PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF - 13

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number of letters from Mr. Castro's family. Transcript of Sentencing, 3/26/19, 5-10. By contrast, Mr. Honabach's counsel did not submit a sentencing memorandum (although the State did) and only submitted one letter, from Edward's parents. *Id.* at 4; Declaration. Trial counsel also failed to prepare Edward to speak at his sentencing. Declaration.

This was prejudicial error under *Strickland*. Failing to prepare for sentencing was deficient performance below the standard expected of a lawyer, as demonstrated by the co-defendant's counsel. It was also prejudicial, as there was a reasonable probability of a different result if counsel had done a better job of presenting mitigation evidence to the Court. Trial counsel's actions constituted ineffective assistance of counsel and so the Court should reverse on this ground.

C. Trial Counsel's Errors Cumulated to Create Prejudice.

Even if no one error is sufficient to constitute a violation justifying reversal, cumulative error can take on constitutional dimensions. *Parle v. Runnels*, 505 F.3d 922, 927 (9th Cir. 2007); *Chambers v. Mississippi*, 410 U.S. 284, 290 n.3, 93 S. Ct. 1038, 1043 (1973). This also applies to ineffective assistance of counsel. "Where no single error or omission of counsel, standing alone, significantly impairs the defense, the district court may nonetheless find unfairness and thus, prejudice emanating from the totality of counsel's errors and

omissions." *Ewing v. Williams*, 596 F.2d 391, 396 (9th Cir. 1979). Taken separately or together, trial counsel's errors constitute prejudice and therefore ineffective assistance of counsel.

IV. Mr. Honabach's Guilty Plea Was Not Voluntary in Violation of the Fifth Amendment.

As stated in his declaration, Edward did not actually want to accept the plea deal. He did so because he felt pressured into taking the deal by his counsel, as well as the condition of the offer that all four codefendants would have to plead guilty in order for the offer to go into effect. Declaration; Plea Agreement 1. In addition, his decision to plead was based on the advice of counsel who had not adequately reviewed the discovery materials. Declaration.

To be constitutionally valid under the Fifth Amendment, a guilty plea must be entered knowingly, willingly, and understandingly. *North Carolina v. Alford*, 400 U.S. 25, 37-38 (1971). A plea is only voluntary if counsel's advice in giving the plea was effective – ineffective assistance of counsel vitiates the plea. *Hill v. Lockhart*, 474 U.S. 52, 56-60, 106 S. Ct. 366, 370 (1985).

Edward's plea was not voluntary, as he was pressured into it. In addition, counsel's failure to review the discovery was ineffective assistance of counsel which rendered the plea involuntary. See Section III-B above. This was a

violation of Mr. Honabach's Fifth Amendment rights and so the Court should grant relief on this claim.⁶

CONCLUSION

Edward Honabach's appellate counsel failed to maintain his appeal, despite an uncontroverted record which shows that Edward did not consent to withdrawal. This was clear error under *Strickland*, and prejudice is presumed. In addition, both appellate and trial counsel made other errors. Taken altogether, these prejudicial errors constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. Mr. Honabach respectfully requests that the Court reverse his conviction, allow him to file a new appeal, hold an evidentiary hearing to further evaluate these claims, or grant whatever other relief the Court finds to be appropriate.

DATED: 4/28/22

/s/ Jim Hoffman

Jim Hoffman, Esq

⁶ Under NRS 34.810, a claim which could have been raised on direct appeal is barred from consideration in a post-conviction petition unless the petitioner shows cause and prejudice to excuse the procedural default. In this case, cause and prejudice are established by appellate counsel's failure to raise the claim on direct appeal. See Section I-B *supra*.

Index of Exhibits to Amended Post-Conviction Relief Petition

Name	Ex
Transcript of Change of Plea, 2/4/19	1
Transcript of Sentencing, 3/26/19	2
Notice of Withdrawal of Appeal, 8/13/19	3
Order, 8/23/19	4
Letter to Court, 1/13/20	5
Order, 1/16/20	6
Letter to Court, 2/15/20	7
Order, 3/11/20	8
Letter to Court, 3/18/20	9
Order, 3/24/20	10
Reprimand of Travis Akin	11

Exhibit 1

Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COUR 1 DISTRICT COURT 2 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 3 4 STATE OF NEVADA, 5 Plaintiff, CASE NO. C314092 DEPT. NO. XXX 6 VS. 7 LUIS ANGEL CASTRO, 8 Defendant. 9 10 11 REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS ENTRY OF PLEA 12 13 BEFORE THE HONORABLE JERRY A. WIESE, II 14 MONDAY, FEBRUARY 4, 2019 AT 10:20 A.M. 15 16 LAS VEGAS, NEVADA 17 18 For the State: MEGAN S. THOMSON, ESQ. 19 For the Defendants: 20 WARREN GELLER, ESQ. 21 ROBERT BECKETT, ESQ. 22 MACE YAMPOLSKY, ESQ. 23 CARL ARNOLD, ESQ. 24 25 REPORTED BY: KIMBERLY A. FARKAS, NV CCR No. 741

Kimberly A. Farkas, RPR, CRR
(702) 671-3633 • realtimetrialslv@gmail.com

LAS VEGAS, NEVADA, MONDAY, FEBRUARY 4, 2019

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P R O C E E D I N G S

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THE COURT: This is Case No. C314092, State of Nevada v. Luis Angel Castro, Edward Honabach, Fabiola Jimenez, and Lionel King. It's on today for jury trial start, but my understanding is the case has pled.

Somebody want to put the negotiations on the record?

MS. THOMSON: My understanding is today that each of these defendants will be entering a guilty plea for first degree kidnapping resulting in substantial bodily harm. The negotiation is contingent upon all four both entering the plea and proceeding through sentencing. The parties agree that no one will argue for the term of years in the 15 to 48-year term. defense will have the opportunity to argue that the Court should sentence each of these individuals to a term of life with the possibly of parole at 15 years. And the State will have the opportunity to argue that the Court should sentence to a term of life without the possibility of parole. Those are the two statutorily mandated sentencing structures that each of the parties

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    have agreed are appropriate in this case.
              I believe that is the totality.
 2.
 3
              MR. GELLER: On behalf of Defendant Castro,
 4
    Tom Geller.
                 That's correct.
 5
              MR. YAMPOLSKY: On behalf of Defendant King,
    Mace Yampolsky. That's accurate.
 6
              MR. BECKETT: On behalf of Defendant
 7
    Honabach, that's correct.
 8
 9
              MR. ARNOLD: On behalf of Ms. Jimenez, that's
10
    correct, Your Honor.
11
              THE COURT: Okay. I've got to do a plea
12
    canvas with each of you individually. I'm just going
13
    to do them in the order that they're in the pleadings.
14
    So We'll do Luis Angel Castro first. The rest of you
15
    can sit down if you want.
16
              Mr. Castro, give me your full legal.
17
              THE DEFENDANT: Luis Angel Castro Morales.
              THE COURT: How old are you, sir?
18
19
              THE DEFENDANT:
                              32.
2.0
              THE COURT: How far did you go in school.
21
              THE DEFENDANT: Tenth grade.
22
              THE COURT: Do you read, write, and
2.3
    understand the English language?
24
              THE DEFENDANT: The best I can.
25
              THE COURT: What does that mean?
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1
              THE WITNESS: Yes.
 2.
              THE COURT: Have you seen a copy of the
 3
    amended information in this case charging you with
 4
    first degree kidnapping resulting in substantial bodily
 5
    harm, which is a category A. Have you seen that?
              THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
 6
 7
              THE COURT: Did you have a chance to read
 8
    that and discuss it with your attorney?
 9
              THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I have.
              THE COURT: With regard to that charge, first
10
11
    degree kidnapping resulting in substantial bodily harm,
12
    how do you plead, quilty or not quilty?
              THE DEFENDANT: Guilty.
13
14
              THE COURT: Before I can accept your plea of
15
    quilty, I have to be convinced that your plea is freely
16
    and voluntarily made. Are you making your plea freely
17
    and voluntarily?
18
              THE DEFENDANT:
                             Yes, I am, sir.
19
              THE COURT: Has anybody forced you or coerced
20
    you to enter that plea?
21
              THE DEFENDANT: No, sir.
22
              THE COURT: Are you making that plea because
23
    you're, in fact, guilty of that charge?
24
              THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
25
              THE COURT: Has anybody made any promises or
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1
    quarantees to you other than what's been stated in open
 2.
    court and what's contained in the guilty plea
 3
    agreement?
 4
              THE DEFENDANT:
                              No, sir.
 5
                          In looking at the guilty plea
              THE COURT:
    agreement, it looks like you signed this on page 5.
 6
 7
    It's dated February 4. Did you read and sign that
 8
    today?
 9
              THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
              THE COURT: Did you understand it before you
10
11
    signed it?
12
              THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
13
              THE COURT: You had a chance to discuss it
14
    with your attorney, and he answered any questions you
15
    might have had about it?
16
              THE DEFENDANT:
                              Yes, I have.
17
              THE COURT: You understand that by signing
18
    it, you're agreeing that you read and understood it;
19
    correct?
              THE DEFENDANT:
20
                              That is correct.
21
              THE COURT: Also by signing that document,
22
    you're agreeing to waive certain important
2.3
    constitutional rights like the right to be able to
24
    confront your accuser, go to trial and put on evidence
25
    on your own behalf. You understand that?
```

1 THE DEFENDANT: I understand, sir. THE COURT: Are you currently suffering from 2. 3 any emotional or physical distress that's caused you to 4 enter this plea? 5 THE DEFENDANT: No, sir. THE COURT: Are you currently under the 6 7 influence on any alcohol, medication, narcotics or any 8 substance that might affect your ability to understand 9 these documents or the process that we're going 10 through? 11 THE DEFENDANT: No, sir. 12 THE COURT: Do you understand that in the 13 quilty plea agreement it says that the possibility of 14 sentence is 15 to 40 years or for minimum of 15 years 15 and a maximum of life or life without parole? Do you 16 understand that those are the options? 17 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 18 **THE COURT:** Do you understand that sentencing 19 is strictly up to the Court, and nobody can promise you 2.0 probation, leniency, or any kind of special treatment; 21 correct? 22 THE DEFENDANT: That's correct. 23 THE COURT: Do you have any questions that 24 you want to ask of myself or the State or your counsel 25 before we proceed?

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1
              THE DEFENDANT:
                              No, sir.
              THE COURT:
 2
                         Has your attorney made any
 3
    promises to you that are not contained in the guilty
 4
    plea agreement?
 5
                              No, sir.
              THE DEFENDANT:
              THE COURT: Based on all the facts and
 6
 7
    circumstances, are you satisfied with the services of
 8
    your attorney?
 9
              THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
10
              THE COURT:
                         Are you a U.S. citizen?
11
              THE DEFENDANT:
                             No, sir.
12
              THE COURT: Do you understand that there are
13
    some charges that have adverse immigration consequences
14
    and may result in deportation?
15
              THE DEFENDANT: That is correct.
16
              THE COURT: Have you had the chance to
17
    discuss any immigration issues with your attorney, and
18
    he's answered any questions you have?
              THE DEFENDANT: To this point, yes and no,
19
    but I'll just say yes.
20
21
              MR. GELLER:
                           Judge, I can represent to the
22
    Court, I've been in touch with his immigration
2.3
    attorney, and we've been in communication.
                                                 I did let
24
    my client know today, as well as previously, that
25
    there's a substantial probability he'll be deported
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1
    after he serves a period of incarceration.
 2.
              THE COURT:
                          Do you understand that?
 3
              THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
              THE COURT: You still agree with the terms as
 4
    set forth in the quilty plea agreement?
 5
              THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
 6
 7
              THE COURT: So I have to go through the
 8
    amended information with you to make sure that there's
 9
    a factual basis for your plea.
10
              According to the information, it says that,
11
    "On or about the 7th day of March 2016 in Clark County,
12
    Nevada, contrary to the laws of the State of Nevada,
13
    you did willfully, unlawfully, feloniously seize,
14
    confine, inveigle, entice, decoy, abduct, conceal,
15
    kidnap, or carry away Jose Ortiz Salazar, a human
16
    being, with the intent to hold or detain Jose Ortiz
17
    Salazar against his will and without his consent for
18
    the purpose of committing murder and/or robbery with
19
    substantial bodily harm. The defendants being
2.0
    criminally liable under one or more of the following
21
    principals of criminal liability, to wit: One, by
22
    directly committing the crime or by; two, aiding or
    abetting in the commission of the crime with the intent
2.3
24
    that the crime be committed by counseling, encouraging,
25
    hiring, commanding, inducing or otherwise procuring the
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other to commit the crime; and/or, three, pursuant to
 1
 2.
    conspiracy to commit the crime with the intent that the
 3
    crime be committed, the defendants aiding or abetting
 4
    or conspiring, defendants acting in concert
 5
    throughout."
              Is that what you did?
 6
 7
              THE DEFENDANT: According to this, yes.
 8
              THE COURT: The question is, is that what you
 9
    did?
10
              THE DEFENDANT:
                              Yes.
11
              THE COURT: Okay. Because, I mean, if you
12
    don't think that's what you did, then you can't be
13
    freely and voluntarily accepting the plea.
14
              THE DEFENDANT:
                             Yes.
15
              THE COURT: You agree that's what you did;
16
    correct?
17
              THE WITNESS: Yes.
18
              THE COURT: All right. The Court hereby
19
    finds the defendant's plea of guilty is freely and
2.0
    voluntarily made. He appears to understand the nature
21
    of the offense and the consequences of the plea.
22
    therefore accept your plea of quilty. We'll refer this
2.3
    to the Division of Parole and Probation for preparation
24
                 We'll set for sentencing hearing for --
    of the PSI.
25
              THE CLERK: March 26th, 8:30.
```

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1
                          Thank you, sir. You can sit.
              THE COURT:
              We'll go to Edward Honabach.
 2.
 3
              Mr. Honabach, can you please state your full
 4
    legal name.
 5
              THE DEFENDANT:
                             Edward Joseph Honabach.
              THE COURT: How old are you, sir?
 6
 7
              THE DEFENDANT:
                              31.
              THE COURT: How far did you go in school?
 8
 9
              THE DEFENDANT: Eleventh grade.
10
              THE COURT: Do you read, write, and
11
    understand the English language?
              THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
12
13
              THE COURT: You've received a copy of the
    amended information in this case; correct?
14
15
              THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor.
16
              THE COURT: You've had a chance to discuss
17
    that with your attorney, and he answered any questions
18
    you had about it?
19
              THE DEFENDANT:
                             Yes.
              THE COURT: In that amended information it
20
21
    charges you with first degree kidnapping resulting in
22
    substantial bodily harm, a category A felony. With
2.3
    regard to that charge, how do you plea, quilty or not
24
    quilty?
25
              THE DEFENDANT: Guilty.
```

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1
              THE COURT: Before I can accept your plea of
 2.
    quilty, I have to be convinced that your plea is freely
 3
    and voluntarily made. Are you making your plea freely
 4
    and voluntarily?
 5
              THE DEFENDANT:
                             Yes, Your Honor.
 6
              THE COURT: Has anybody forced you or coerced
 7
    to accept that plea?
 8
              THE DEFENDANT:
 9
              THE COURT: Are you making that plea of
    quilty because you are, in fact, quilty of that charge?
10
11
              THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor.
12
              THE COURT: Has anybody made any promises or
13
    quarantees to you other than what's been stated in open
14
    court and what's contained in the guilty plea
15
    agreement?
              THE DEFENDANT:
16
                              No.
17
              THE COURT: In looking the the guilty plea
    agreement, it looks like you signed this on page 5.
18
19
    It's dated, looks like, the 4th day of February, 2019.
2.0
    Did you read this and sign it today?
21
              THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor.
22
              THE COURT: Did you have a chance to discuss
23
    it with your attorney; he answered any questions you
2.4
    had about it?
              THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
25
```

THE COURT: You understood the terms before 1 2. you signed it? THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 3 4 THE COURT: You understand that by signing 5 this, you're agreeing that you read it and understood 6 it; correct? 7 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. THE COURT: Also by signing it, you're giving 8 9 up important rights, like the right to confront your 10 accuser, the right to go to trial, and the right to 11 present evidence on your own behalf? You understand 12 that? THE DEFENDANT: 13 Yes. 14 THE COURT: Are you currently under the 15 influence of any alcohol, medication, narcotics or 16 substance that might affect your ability to understand 17 these documents or the process that we're going 18 through? 19 THE DEFENDANT: No. 20 THE COURT: Are you currently suffering from 21 any emotional or physical distress that's caused you to 22 enter this plea? 2.3 THE DEFENDANT: No. 24 THE COURT: You understand that the range of 25 punishment for this, according to the law, is 15 to 40

```
years or for a minimum of no less than 15 years and a
 1
 2.
    maximum of life or life without parole? Do you
 3
    understand those are the options?
              THE DEFENDANT:
 4
                             Yes.
 5
              THE COURT: You understand that sentencing is
    strictly up to the Court. Nobody can promise you any
 6
 7
    type of leniency or any special treatment?
 8
    understand that?
 9
              THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
10
              THE COURT: Do you have any questions that
    you want to ask of myself, your attorney, or the State
11
12
    before we go forward?
                             No, Your Honor.
13
              THE DEFENDANT:
14
              THE COURT: Has your attorney made any
15
    promises to you that are not contained in the guilty
16
    plea agreement?
17
              THE DEFENDANT:
                              No.
18
              THE COURT: Based on all the facts and
19
    circumstances, are you satisfied with the services of
2.0
    your attorney?
21
              THE DEFENDANT: Yes
22
              THE COURT: Are you a U.S. citizen?
2.3
              THE DEFENDANT:
                             Yes.
              THE COURT: All right. So I'm going to go
24
25
    through the information. This is going to be
```

redundant. You guys are going to hear this four times. I've got to go through it with each of you.

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Mr. Honabach, according to the amended information charging you with first degree kidnapping resulting in substantial bodily harm, it says that, "On or about March 7th, 2016, in Clark County, Nevada contrary to the laws of the State of Nevada, you did willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously seize, confine, inveigle, entice, decoy, abduct, conceal, kidnap or carry away Jose Ortiz Salazar, a human being, with the intent to hold or detain Jose Ortiz Salazar against his will and without his consent for the purpose of committing murder and/or robbery resulting in substantial bodily harm to Jose Ortiz Salazar. The defendants being criminally liable under one or more of the following principles of criminal liability: directly committing the crime and/or, two, by aiding or abetting in the commission of the crime with the intent that the crime be committed by counseling, encouraging, hiring, commanding, inducing and/or otherwise procuring the other to commit the crime, and/or, three, pursuant to a conspiracy to commit the crime with the intent that the crime be committed, the defendants aiding or abetting or conspiring, defendants acting in concert throughout."

```
1
              Is that what you did?
 2
              THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor.
 3
              THE COURT: All right. The Court hereby
 4
    finds the defendant's plea of guilty is freely and
 5
    voluntarily made. He appears to understand the nature
    of the offense and the consequences of the plea.
 6
 7
    therefore accept your plea of guilty, and we'll refer
    this to the Division of Parole and Probation for
 8
 9
    preparation of a PSI. And we'll set your sentencing
10
    hearing for --
11
              THE CLERK:
                         March 26th, 8:30.
12
              THE DEFENDANT: Thank you, Your Honor.
13
              THE COURT:
                          Thank you. Fabiola Jimenez.
14
              Ms. Jimenez, can you give me your full legal?
              THE DEFENDANT: Yes. Fabiola Jimenez.
15
              THE COURT: How old are you, ma'am?
16
17
              THE DEFENDANT:
                              43.
              THE COURT: How far did you go in school?
18
19
              THE DEFENDANT: Eleventh.
20
              THE COURT: Do you read, write, and
21
    understand the English language?
22
              THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
2.3
              THE COURT: Have you received a copy of the
24
    amended information in this case which charges you with
25
    first degree kidnapping resulting in substantial bodily
```

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1
    harm?
 2.
              THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
 3
              THE COURT: You've had a chance to review
 4
    that with your attorney; he answered any questions you
 5
    had about it?
              THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
 6
 7
              THE COURT: With regard to that charge, how
 8
    do you plead, guilty or not guilty?
 9
              THE DEFENDANT: Guilty.
              THE COURT:
                         Before I can accept your plea of
10
11
    quilty, I have to be convinced that your plea is freely
12
    and voluntarily made. Are you making your plea freely
13
    and voluntarily?
14
              THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
15
              THE COURT: Has anybody forced you or coerced
16
    to accept that plea?
17
              THE DEFENDANT:
                              No, sir.
18
              THE COURT: Are you making the plea of guilty
19
    because you're, in fact, quilty of that charge.
2.0
              THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
21
              THE COURT:
                         Has anybody made any promises or
22
    quarantees to you other than what's been stated in open
2.3
    court and what's contained in the guilty plea
24
    agreement?
25
              THE DEFENDANT: No, sir.
```

```
1
              THE COURT:
                          In looking at the guilty plea
 2.
    agreement, it appears that you signed this on page 5.
 3
    It's dated February 4th. Did you read it and sign it
 4
    today?
 5
              THE DEFENDANT:
                              Yes, sir.
              THE COURT: Did you understand it before you
 6
 7
    signed it?
 8
              THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
 9
              THE COURT: You had a chance to talk to your
10
    attorney about it; he answered any questions you might
11
    have had about it?
12
              THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
13
              THE COURT: You understand that by signing
14
    it, you're agreeing that you read it and understood it;
    correct?
15
16
              THE DEFENDANT:
                             Yes, sir.
17
              THE COURT: Also by signing that, you're
    giving up important rights like the right to confront
18
19
    your accuser, the right to go to trial, and the right
20
    to present evidence on your own behalf? Do you
21
    understand that?
22
              THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
23
              THE COURT: Are you currently under the
24
    influence of any alcohol, medication, narcotics, or any
25
    substance that might affect your ability to understand
```

```
1
    these documents or the process that we're going
 2.
    through?
 3
              THE DEFENDANT:
                             No, sir.
 4
              THE COURT: Are you currently suffering from
 5
    any emotional or physical distress that's caused you to
 6
    enter the plea?
 7
              THE DEFENDANT: No, sir.
 8
              THE COURT: Do you understand that the range
 9
    of punishment for this is 15 to 40 years or minimum of
10
    no less than 15 years and a maximum of life or life
11
    without parole? You understand that those are the
12
    options?
13
              THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
14
              THE COURT: Do you understand that sentencing
15
    is strictly up to the Court. Nobody can promise you
16
    probation, leniency or any special treatment; right?
17
              THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
18
              THE COURT: Do you have any questions you
19
    want to ask of myself, your attorney, or the State
2.0
    before we go forward?
21
              THE DEFENDANT: No, sir.
22
              THE COURT: Did your attorney make any
23
    promises to you that are not contained in the guilty
24
    plea agreement?
25
              THE DEFENDANT: No, sir.
```

THE COURT: Based on all the facts and circumstances, are you satisfied with the services of your attorney?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

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THE COURT: Are you a U.S. citizen?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: All right. Let me go through the amended information with you and make sure there's a factual basis. According to the information it says, "On or about the 7th day of March 2016, in Clark County, Nevada, contrary to the laws of the State of Nevada, you did willfully, unlawfully, feloniously seize, confine, inveigle, entice, decoy, abduct, conceal, kidnap, or carry away Jose Ortiz Salazar, a human being, with the intent to hold or detain Jose Ortiz Salazar against his will and without his consent for the purpose of committing murder and/or robbery resulting in substantial bodily harm to Jose Ortiz Salazar. The defendants being criminally liable under one or more of the following principles of criminal liability, to wit: one, by directly committing the crime; and/or, two, by aiding or abetting in the commission of the crime with the intent that the crime be committed, by counseling, encouraging, hiring, commanding, inducing, or otherwise procuring the other

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to the commit the crime; and/or, three, pursuant to a
 1
 2.
    conspiracy to commit the crime with the intent that the
 3
    crime be committed, defendants aiding or abetting or
 4
    conspiring, defendants acting in concert throughout."
 5
              Is that what you did?
              THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
 6
              THE COURT: All right. The Court hereby
 7
 8
    finds the defendant's plea of guilty is freely and
 9
    voluntarily made. She appears to understand the nature
10
    of the offense and the consequences of the plea.
11
    therefore, accept your plea of guilty. We'll refer
12
    this matter to the Division of Parole and Probation for
13
    preparation of a PSI. We'll set your sentencing
14
    hearing date for --
15
              THE CLERK: March 26th, 8:30.
              THE COURT: All right. Lionel king.
16
17
              Mr. King, can you please give me your full.
              THE DEFENDANT: Lionel Anthony King.
18
              THE COURT: How old are you, sir?
19
              THE DEFENDANT:
2.0
                              32.
21
              THE COURT: How far did you go in school?
              THE DEFENDANT: Tenth grade.
22
2.3
              THE COURT: Do you read, write, and
24
    understand the English language?
25
              THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
```

```
1
                         Have you received a copy of the
              THE COURT:
 2.
    amended information in this case which charges you with
 3
    first degree kidnapping resulting in substantial bodily
 4
    harm?
              THE DEFENDANT:
 5
                              I have.
 6
              THE COURT: You reviewed that with your
 7
    attorney; he answered any questions you had about it?
 8
              THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
 9
              THE COURT: With regard to that charge, how
    do you plead, quilty or not quilty?
10
11
              THE DEFENDANT: Guilty.
12
              THE COURT: Before I can accept your plea of
13
    quilty, I have to be convinced that your plea is freely
14
    and voluntarily made. Are you making your plea freely
15
    and voluntarily?
16
              THE DEFENDANT:
                              Yes, sir.
17
              THE COURT: Has anybody forced you or coerced
18
    you to accept that plea?
19
              THE DEFENDANT: No, sir.
20
              THE COURT: Are you making the plea of guilty
21
    because you're, in fact, quilty of that charge?
22
              THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
23
              THE COURT: Has anybody made any promises or
24
    guarantees to you other than what's been stated in open
25
    court?
```

1 THE DEFENDANT: No. 2. THE COURT: In looking at the guilty plea 3 agreement, it looks like it's signed on page 5, dated 4 February 4. Did you read and sign this today? THE DEFENDANT: 5 I did. THE COURT: Did you understand it before you 6 7 signed it? 8 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 9 THE COURT: You had a chance to discuss it 10 with your attorney; he answered any questions you might 11 have had about it? 12 THE DEFENDANT: Um-hum. Yes. 13 THE COURT: You understand that by signing 14 this, you're agreeing that you read and understood it; 15 correct? THE DEFENDANT: Correct, sir. 16 17 THE COURT: Also by signing it, you're giving up important constitutional rights, like the right to 18 19 confront your accuser, the right to go to trial and 2.0 present evidence on your own behalf? Do you understand 21 that? 22 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor. 23 THE COURT: Are you currently under the 24 influence of any alcohol, medication, narcotics, or any 25 substance that might affect your ability to understand

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1
    these documents or the process that we're going
 2.
    through?
 3
              THE DEFENDANT: No, Your Honor.
 4
              THE COURT: Are you currently suffering from
 5
    any emotional or physical distress that's caused you to
    enter this plea?
 6
 7
              THE DEFENDANT:
                              No.
              THE COURT: You understand that the range of
 8
    punishment for this charge is 15 to 40 years or for a
 9
10
    minimum of 15 years and a maximum of life or life
11
    without parole? Do you understand that those are the
12
    options?
13
              THE DEFENDANT:
                             Yes, Your Honor.
14
              THE COURT: You understand that sentencing is
15
    strictly up to the Court. Nobody can promise you any
16
    type of leniency or any special treatment?
17
              THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
              THE COURT: Do you have any questions that
18
19
    you want to ask of myself, your attorney, or the State
2.0
    before we go forward?
21
              THE DEFENDANT: I do not, sir.
22
              THE COURT: Has your attorney made my
23
    promises to you that are not contained in the guilty
24
    plea agreement?
25
              THE DEFENDANT: No, sir.
```

THE COURT: Based on all the facts and circumstances in the case, are you satisfied with the services of your attorney?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I am, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Are you a U.S. citizen?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

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THE COURT: Let me go through the information with you to make sure that there's a factual basis for your plea. It says that, "On or about the 7th day of March 2016, in Clark County, Nevada, contrary to the laws of the state of Nevada, you did willfully, unlawfully, feloniously seize, confine, inveigle, entice, decoy, abduct, conceal, kidnap, or carry way Jose Ortiz Salazar, a human being, with the intent to hold or detain Jose Ortiz Salazar against his will and without his consent for the purpose of committing murder and/or robbery resulting in substantial bodily harm to Jose Ortiz Salazar, the defendant being criminally liable under one or more of the follow principles of criminal liability: One, by directly committing the crime; and/or, two, by aiding or abetting in the commission of the crime with the intent that the crime be committed by counseling, encouraging, hiring, commanding, inducing and/or otherwise procuring the other to commit the crime; and/or, three, pursuant

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to a conspiracy to commit the crime with the intent
 1
 2.
    that the crime be committed, the defendants aiding or
 3
    abetting and/or conspiring, defendants acting in
 4
    concert throughout."
 5
              Is that what you did?
              THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor.
 6
 7
              THE COURT: All right. Court hereby finds
 8
    the defendant's plea is freely and voluntarily made.
 9
    He appears to understand the nature of the offense and
10
    the consequences of his plea. I'll, therefore, accept
11
    your plea of guilty. We'll refer this to the Division
12
    of Parole and Probation for preparation of a PSI, and
13
    we'll set your sentencing hearing date for --
14
              THE CLERK: March 26th, 8:30.
15
              THE COURT: All right. Thanks, guys.
              MS. THOMSON: Thank you, Your Honor.
16
17
              THE COURT: That resolves the case.
                                                    We will
18
    see you at sentencing. We'll excuse your jurors.
19
              (Proceedings concluded at 10:39 A.M.)
20
                             -000-
21
    ATTEST:
             FULL, TRUE, AND ACCURATE TRANSCRIPT OF
22
    PROCEEDINGS.
2.3
24
25
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	CASTRI	J, LUIS ANGEL • C314092 •	2/4/19	
	abetting [8] 8/23 9/3		С	confine [4] 8/14 14/8
MR. ARNOLD: [1]	14/18 14/24 19/22 20/3 24/22 25/3	any [37] anybody [8] 4/19	C314092 [2] 1/5 2/5	19/13 24/12 confront [4] 5/24
3/8	ability [4] 6/8 12/16	4/25 11/6 11/12 16/15	can [15] 3/15 3/24	12/9 17/18 22/19
MR. BECKETT: [1]	17/25 22/25	16/21 21/17 21/23	4/14 6/19 7/21 10/1	consent [4] 8/17
3/6	able [1] 5/23	appears [5] 9/20	10/3 11/1 13/6 15/14	14/12 19/16 24/16
MR. GELLER: [2] 3/2	about [12] 5/15 8/11	15/5 17/2 20/9 25/9	16/10 18/15 20/17	consequences [5]
7/20 MR. YAMPOLSKY:	10/18 11/24 14/6 16/5		21/12 23/15	7/13 9/21 15/6 20/10
MR. YAMPOLSKY: [1] 3/4	17/10 17/11 19/10	are [41]	can't [1] 9/12 canvas [1] 3/12	25/10
MS. THOMSON: [2]	21/7 22/11 24/9	argue [3] 2/17 2/19	CARL [1] 1/23	conspiracy [4] 9/2
2/11 25/15	accept [11] 4/14	2/22	carry [4] 8/15 14/10	14/22 20/2 25/1
THE CLERK: [4] 9/24	9/22 11/1 11/7 15/7	ARNOLD [1] 1/23	19/14 24/13	conspiring [4] 9/4
15/10 20/14 25/13	16/10 16/16 20/11	as [3] 7/24 7/24 8/4	case [10] 1/5 2/5 2/8	14/24 20/4 25/3
THE COURT: [115]	21/12 21/18 25/10	ask [4] 6/24 13/11 18/19 23/19	3/1 4/3 10/14 15/24	constitutional [2] 5/23 22/18
THE DEFENDANT:	accepting [1] 9/13 according [5] 8/10	ATTEST [1] 25/21	21/2 24/2 25/17	contained [7] 5/2 7/3
[107]	9/7 12/25 14/3 19/9	attorney [21] 4/8	CASTRO [6] 1/7 2/6	11/14 13/15 16/23
THE WITNESS: [2]	accurate [2] 3/6	5/14 7/2 7/8 7/17 7/23	3/3 3/14 3/16 3/17	18/23 23/23
3/25 9/16	25/21	10/17 11/23 13/11	category [2] 4/5	contingent [1] 2/15
-	accuser [4] 5/24	13/14 13/20 16/4	10/22 caused [4] 6/3 12/21	contrary [4] 8/12
- o0o [1] 25/20	12/10 17/19 22/19	17/10 18/19 18/22	18/5 23/5	14/7 19/11 24/10
,	acting [4] 9/4 14/24	19/3 21/7 22/10 23/19	CCR [1] 1/25	convinced [4] 4/15
<u>/</u>	20/4 25/3	23/22 24/3	certain [1] 5/22	11/2 16/11 21/13
/S[1] 25/24	adverse [1] 7/13	away [3] 8/15 14/10	chance [8] 4/7 5/13	copy [4] 4/2 10/13
1	affect [4] 6/8 12/16	19/14	7/16 10/16 11/22 16/3	15/23 21/1
	17/25 22/25 after [1] 8/1	В	17/9 22/9	correct [14] 3/4 3/8 3/10 5/19 5/20 6/21
10:20 [1] 1/15 10:39 [1] 25/19	against [4] 8/17	Based [4] 7/6 13/18	charge [9] 4/10 4/23	6/22 7/15 9/16 10/14
15 [10] 2/18 2/21	14/11 19/16 24/15	19/1 24/1	10/23 11/10 16/7	12/6 17/15 22/15
6/14 6/14 12/25 13/1	agree [3] 2/17 8/4	basis [3] 8/9 19/9	16/19 21/9 21/21 23/9	22/16
18/9 18/10 23/9 23/10	9/15	24/8	charges [4] 7/13 10/21 15/24 21/2	counsel [1] 6/24
<u> </u>	agreed [1] 3/1	be [17] 2/13 4/15	charging [2] 4/3 14/4	counseling [4] 8/24
2	agreeing [5] 5/18	5/23 7/25 8/24 9/3	circumstances [4]	14/19 19/24 24/23
2016 [4] 8/11 14/6	5/22 12/5 17/14 22/14	9/12 11/2 13/25 14/19 14/23 16/11 19/24	7/7 13/19 19/2 24/2	COUNTY [5] 1/2 8/11
19/10 24/10 2019 [3] 1/14 2/1	agreement [13] 5/3 5/6 6/13 7/4 8/5 11/15	20/3 21/13 24/23 25/2	citizen [4] 7/10 13/22	14/6 19/11 24/10 court [16] 1/1 2/20
11/19	11/18 13/16 16/24	because [5] 4/22	19/5 24/5	2/23 5/2 6/19 7/22
26th [4] 9/25 15/11	17/2 18/24 22/3 23/24	9/11 11/10 16/19	CLARK [5] 1/2 8/11	9/18 11/14 13/6 15/3
20/15 25/14	aiding [8] 8/22 9/3	21/21	14/6 19/10 24/10	16/23 18/15 20/7
<u> </u>	14/17 14/23 19/22	BECKETT [1] 1/21	client [1] 7/24 coerced [4] 4/19	21/25 23/15 25/7
3	20/3 24/21 25/2	been [6] 5/1 7/22	11/6 16/15 21/17	crime [24] 8/22 8/23
31 [1] 10/7	alcohol [4] 6/7 12/15	7/23 11/13 16/22	commanding [4]	8/24 9/1 9/2 9/3 14/17
32 [2] 3/19 20/20	17/24 22/24	21/24	0/25 14/20 10/25	14/18 14/19 14/21
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Kimberly A. Farkas, RPR, CRR

(4) understood... - your

Exhibit 2

CLERK OF THE COUR 1 DISTRICT COURT 2 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 3 4 STATE OF NEVADA, Plaintiff, 5 CASE NO. C314092 DEPT. NO. XXX 6 VS. 7 LUIS ANGEL CASTRO, 8 Defendant. 9 10 11 REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS 12 SENTENCING 13 BEFORE THE HONORABLE JERRY A. WIESE, II 14 TUESDAY, MARCH 26, 2019 AT 9:57 A.M. 15 16 LAS VEGAS, NEVADA 17 18 For the State: MEGAN THOMSON, ESQ. 19 For the Defendants: 20 WARREN GELLER, ESQ 21 ROBERT BECKETT, ESQ. 22 MACE YAMPOLSKY, ESQ. 23 CARL ARNOLD, ESQ. 24 25 REPORTED BY: KIMBERLY A. FARKAS, NV CCR No. 741

Kimberly A. Farkas, RPR, CRR
(702) 671-3633 • realtimetrialslv@gmail.com

1 LAS VEGAS, NEVADA, TUESDAY, MARCH 26, 2019 2. 3 PROCEEDINGS 4 5 6 THE MARSHAL: You may remain seated. Please 7 come to order. Pages 11 12, 13, 14. Page 11, Luis 8 Castro, C314092; page 12, Edward Honabach, C314092; 9 page 13, Fabiola Jimenez, C314092; page 14, Lionel 10 King, Case No. C314092. 11 MR. GELLER: Warren Geller on behalf of Luis 12 He's present in custody this morning. Castro. 13 MR. BECKETT: Bob Beckett appearing with 14 Mr. Honabach. MR. ARNOLD: Good morning, Your Honor. 15 Carl 16 Arnold on behalf of Fabiola Jimenez. 17 MR. YAMPOLSKY: Mace Yampolsky on behalf of 18 Lionel King. 19 MS. THOMSON: Megan Thomson for the State. 20 THE COURT: It's on for sentencing today. 21 Any reason we should not go forward? 22 MR. GELLER: On behalf of Defendant Castro, 2.3 there is one stipulated correction to his PSI. I don't 24 believe there's any reason we wouldn't be able to put 25 that on the record and then proceed.

```
THE COURT: Let's do that now. What's the
 1
 2.
    issue?
              MR. GELLER: With respect to page 2, there
 3
 4
    are three boxes which the PSI author can check in this
 5
    case with an X, indicating age at first arrest.
    Mr. Castro's PSI, it's checked "19 or younger."
 6
                                                      That's
 7
    not substantiated by his arrest history later in the
 8
    report. The parties have agreed to have that removed.
 9
    And I believe a "24 and older" would be the appropriate
10
    box that should have been checked in that instance.
11
              MS. THOMSON:
                            I agree.
12
              THE COURT: Okay. That doesn't rise to the
13
    level of a Stockmeier issue, I don't believe.
14
              MR. GELLER: I don't believe either,
15
    Your Honor.
16
              THE COURT:
                          Okay. Mr. Beckett.
17
              MR. BECKETT:
                            Judge, we're ready to proceed.
              THE COURT: You've reviewed the PSI with your
18
19
    client.
             Are there any issues.
20
              MR. BECKETT: No, Judge.
21
              THE COURT: Mr. Arnold?
22
              MR. ARNOLD: Yes, Your Honor. We've gone
23
    through the PSI, and there's no issues. We're ready
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    for sentencing.
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              THE COURT: Mr. Yampolsky?
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MR. YAMPOLSKY: We reviewed the PSI. There's no issues.

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THE COURT: All right. I have received sentencing memos from the State on all four defendants. I did receive a sentencing memo from Mr. Geller with regard to Mr. Castro. And I also received a letter yesterday from Mr. Honabach's parents. So I've reviewed all of that.

Let me go through here and as far as the guilty plea agreement is concerned, I'm just going to do it combined. So each of you are -- I'm adjudicating you guilty pursuant to the guilty plea agreement of first degree kidnapping resulting in substantial bodily harm. It's a category A felony. That being said, what does the State want to tell me more?

MS. THOMSON: Just briefly, Your Honor. I believe that I've outlined it well within each of the sentencing memos, but, ultimately, it's the State's position that each of these individuals, while they may be separately situated in terms of their active participation in the crime, their prior criminal convictions and the other cases that were pending at the time it all balances out that each of them should receive a term of life in prison without the possibility of parole, given the amount of torture, the

danger that this crime posed to the community, and the danger that each of these individuals poses to the community in the future.

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THE COURT: Start with Mr. Geller.

MR. GELLER: Judge, a couple things I'd like to emphasize. I know that the Court doesn't want counsel to reiterate and reread the sentencing memorandum. I do want to sort of hit the high points from that document that I submitted to the Court.

As I've indicated with Mr. Castro's biography, the majority of his life up until his late 20s was crime free. I do concede in there during his teen years and early 20s he was committing, obviously he wasn't caught for it, but possessory drug crimes. Mentioned in the memorandum that he suffered some trauma as a young man or a young boy. It looks like, at least with respect to the report that was prepared by Dr. Sharon Jones Forester that I attached as an exhibit, that he may have been self-medicating through much of his youth associated with some of that trauma.

I'm not going to suggest to the Court that that somehow makes it okay to be involved in the awful things that Your Honor obviously saw in the photographs attached to Ms. Thomson's memorandum. But I do think it's important that I emphasize to the Court a little

context.

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I think it's easy in these circumstances to kind of zero in and laser in on just the awful things that happened. And I think it's important to really look at a human being in the course of their entire life. Obviously, there's a lot of people that love and care for Luis. He's got a large support group here. Pretty much everybody other than the media that's sitting right in this area, there's his brother, mother, father, nieces, nephews, cousins. There's extensive support from them.

THE COURT: I think I got letters from every one of them.

MR. GELLER: I think you did, Your Honor. I don't know that I've ever had a case where there were more letters of support. Again, I realize that even if he had a thousand letters and a family of a thousand people, it's not going to undue the horrible things that happened, but I do think it does speak to some degree to his character when he's sober.

Now, Ms. Thomson did do an excellent job of pointing out some of the things. Like, there was, I guess, a fight in CCDC. I did point out in the sentencing memorandum the District Attorney's office never charged him for that. When I showed that to my

client, he was a little bit frustrated insofar as he never went through the adjudicated process in court where he was able to say who started it. The DA's office, I guess, didn't feel it was appropriate to charge him with that. I did want to mention that as well.

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With respect to what I believe the PSI is recommending, the PSI is not asking the Court to say he needs to be out, back on the streets or back with his family, whatever the case may be in 15 years. I think what they're suggesting and what the defense is suggesting just give the parole board the option to where he can have parole at some point in his life.

As you saw in my sentencing memorandum, when he was an infant, he was brought to the United States. So he is subject to removal. There is an ICE hold. If, let's say, the Court, for instance, granted the defense's request for parole eligibility at 15 years, that doesn't mean he gets out in 15 years less his credit. That means let's say one day he's a 70-year-old man in a wheelchair in the Nevada Department of Corrections. The parole board would have the option to say, you know what, federal government, now you can take Mr. Castro and deport him to Mexico.

If the Court sentences him to life without,

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no matter what the circumstances are, we're always going to be paying for his incarceration, even if he's a 70 or 80-year-old man. If he is a model inmate, if there's no incidents, and if at least parole commissioners, after examining the same facts that Your Honor is examining, determine that he is ripe for removal from the United States, they can put that in a motion by having him turned over to federal custody, and he'll be deported to Mexico.

I'm not in any way, shape or form suggesting that because he's got the family, because he's got the trauma, and because he had a drug addiction, that means that the crime wasn't awful. I know it's got to be one of the worst ones Your Honor has ever seen. We're just asking the Court to allow the parole board to have the discretion, maybe when he's an elderly man, to consider releasing him in light of the fact that he's not somebody that was out on a criminal rampage his whole life. He's not someone that in my mind and the minds of the family and friends who are here to support him that's completely unredeemable.

He did everything he could to try to persuade the Court and to try to persuade the State that he never actually was one of the people that handled the weapon. I completely concede that the victim in this

case does say that he handled the weapon and used it on him.

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His DNA wasn't found on the weapon. He asked to take a polygraph test on that issue. When the police grilled him excessively about that issue, he was adamant that he never touched a weapon or never struck the victim or did any of the things associated with the photographs. He does concede he made bad judgment; he did encourage the victim to go over to the abandoned He's quilty of that. He's responsible for I know that that's an issue in contension, whether he ever personally used the weapon on the victim, but everything that we tried to gather up and muster up is to demonstrate to the Court that he was trying to prove that he didn't. But it certainly wasn't worth going to trial over on that one issue because he has criminal liability for everything else that happened.

Again, with respect to him leaving and going to the convenient store, I know Your Honor has the screenshots that I took from the surveillance video.

Again, Ms. Thomson is correct in her memorandum; he did return to the scene of the crime. I'm not suggesting that because he left and went to the 7-11, that means that he had no responsibility or no culpability. What

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I am suggesting is that he did, in fact, leave because he was feeling very uneasy about things. And he was asking the police to take a polygraph on that issue. Again, State's completely within its rights to say no, but he wanted to take a polygraph even if it was with a Metro polygrapher to prove that he left because he was getting queazy and uncomfortable and that he didn't touch a weapon.
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So in summation, Judge, really what I'm just asking the Court is, not to endorse the conduct, not to say that the allegations are only worth 15 years in custody, but rather to just say, parole board, maybe one day when he's an old man, you have the authority to consider releasing him for deportation to Mexico. And that's it. We're not asking for the Court to endorse anything that went on here. We're just asking for the parole board to have that option at some point in his life because I do think that, notwithstanding what happened, he is an otherwise redeemable person. I'd submit with that, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Castro, anything else you want to tell me?

THE DEFENDANT: Yeah. First, I'm nervous.

Never been in no type of trouble in my life. But, you know, I do want to apologize to the victim. I don't

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know if he's here or not. I do want it out, to know
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    that I do apologize for putting him in this type of
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             It's going to be marked in his life as well.
    ordeal.
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    The situation is marked in mine as well because I am
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    paying as well for my consequences.
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              You know, I do apologize to my family, too
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    because -- for the embarrassment for all of this has
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    caused as well. Because they raised me better, to be a
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    better person, better man.
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              Due to the drugs, I got into the situation.
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    I got into this position. You know, whatever your
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    judgment is at the end, I'm gonna, you know, have my
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    head up high and deal with it, go forward. But the
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    only thing I do ask is give me one permission to be
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    back with my family, to my son, to them, you know,
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    because I'm gonna miss a lot of part of their life.
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    least let me turn into be still some part of it at
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    least at the end. That's what I want to say. Thank
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    you.
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              THE COURT:
                          Thank you, sir. Mr. Beckett.
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              MR. BECKETT: Yes, Judge.
                                         Thank you.
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Judge, as you read, of course, on page 4 of

on Mr. Honabach's PSI, looks like the last time he was in trouble was a while ago, in 2012. The question comes up, Judge, between then and when this crime was

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    committed, what happened. The facts are disturbing and
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    they're ugly. There's no way around that. And they've
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    been set forth in the PSI and set forth in
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    Ms. Thomson's sentencing memorandum. I'm not going to
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    even go to the facts. They are what they are.
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              The question comes up -- sometimes we want
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    answers -- how can something like this happen so we can
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    somehow make sense of it if possible. Well, talking
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    with Edward, what happened was meth happened. That's
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    an old story.
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              He was doing pretty well. He was working as
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    a flagger for a construction company, as Your Honor
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    knows. He was paying his bills. Life was going along.
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    And then he ran into meth.
              He started doing -- smoking, as he said, an 8
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    ball a day, which I find out now is like 3.5 grams a
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    day. On top of smoking 3.5 grams a day, he was also
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    doing what they call a meth ball. Now, I'm told that
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    you take a gram of meth, put it on a square toilet
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    paper, roll it up, twist it up and wash it down with
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    whatever. I'm surprised that that doesn't kill a
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    person. But he had been doing that for about four days
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    or so prior to this crime.
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              And he said that during that four days, of
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course, on the influence of meth, which is a very

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strong type of speed, is what I'm told, he wasn't eating. He wasn't sleeping. He wasn't drinking water. So he was dehydrated. He said he started hearing voices of sorts. He said he started seeing out of the corner of his eye shadow people.
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I'm surprised he didn't go into some sort of seizure or whatever, but he kept going. So that was what was going on when this occurred.

There's no excuse, Judge. It's not an excuse. But sometimes we can say, well, okay, he was under the influence of this horrible drug. Yes, he voluntarily ingested it in different forms. He's responsible for what happened. The law recognizes that. But that's what was going on. I can say that he was basically speeding out of his mind when this happened. No excuse, just facts.

Then we get to, okay, where is he at today?

He's been in custody about three years. Of course,

he's clean. And, of course, he's a different person

now when he's not on the drugs. I've seen that since

I've picked up the case, that he's been pretty

rational -- well, very rational. He's intelligent.

He's articulate. His father has, of course, seen the

difference in him today than when he was on meth, when

he was using meth years ago.

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What has he done with his time now that he's clean? He's gotten his GED. He's going forward. He's going to get his diploma. That's another step and that's important to him. He's looking forward to someday getting out.

I've got to be careful with this, Judge, because there's the old joke. Everybody in jail finds religion; okay. Well, sometimes it's sincere.

Sometimes it's not. Sometimes it's just a thing of the moment. He's been reading the bible a lot in addition to doing his studies, and he's finding a lot of comfort in that.

He's using that time constructively. What does he want to do? Where does he want to be if he's granted parole? What does he want to do with his life if he's granted parole and if he has a chance of getting out of prison? Well, his plans right now are maybe, because it's going to be limited with his record, because when some potential employer, especially if it's submitted online, there's going to be problems.

He does have strong family support. His father is here. His father has always been in contact with me. His father has been at every court appearance. His mother is here. She's had a number of

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health problems, she's here for him as well. They'll always be here for him, of course, Judge. He has family in different areas that can help him get a job, that can help him get started in some sort of labor job.
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He'd like some day, Judge, to have a life.

What does that mean? Have a job, maybe get a house,
maybe get married, might eventually have kids if he's
granted possibility of parole in this case. He's gonna
be a lot older than he is right now. He's probably
going to be a completely different person, of course,
than he was when this crime occurred, than he is today,
than he will be in 15 or so years when he gets paroled.

And when he gets paroled, is it just, have a nice life? No. He'll be on parole. He'll be watched. He'll be monitored. I'm sure with these type of crimes that occurred, that they're going to be extra diligent in supervising him.

Judge, I know Mr. Honabach wants to talk to you, wants to express how he feels, the remorse he has, and the disbelief of what actually happened. But he'd like a chance at life, eventually have a chance at some sort of life. And we ask you give him the chance of sentencing him to 15 to 20 with the possibility of parole.

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              THE COURT: Life with the possibility of
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    parole.
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              MR. BECKETT: Life with the possibility of
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    parole.
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              THE COURT:
                          Mr. Honabach, go ahead.
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              THE DEFENDANT: Your Honor, I'd first off
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    like to say that I am sorry for what I done.
                                                   I'm not
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    going to sit here and try to make excuses for it.
    There is no excuse. There's no way to say it's okay.
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    There's no way to lessen the effect.
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              It's affected my life, the victim's life, his
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    family's, my family's. And it's just such a tremendous
    and unforgivable way. There's no way I could ever
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    express my remorse. I can't even comprehend that it
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    was me that was involved in something like this.
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    just not me.
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              But I am sorry, Your Honor. I do take full
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    responsibility for it. And I am a different person
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    than when I first came in. Like my attorney said,
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    drugs are the devil's playground. And I regret -- they
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    change who you are. They change how you think, how you
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           They make it so you don't even recognize reality
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              You can't feel -- there's no way to explain
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    it to somebody who hasn't been there.
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              And I'm just, I'm very sorry, Your Honor.
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And I have taken this to heart. And I do apologize to the victim and to his family, to my family, to three of my co-defendants and their families, to everyone who was affected in this case, Your Honor. There's no excuse. I'm sorry.
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I have taken this to heart and changed my life around. I changed -- I have found God. And not just the jailhouse religion. I run Bible studies. I really have found God. I've actually gotten several certificates in Bible courses.

I'm involved with two missionaries, CNI and ANI, as well as taking courses with Moody Bible College to get degrees so if I am granted the possibility to get out one day, that I can help other people, just not do this. I want to help youth, talk to them. I've been there; I've done that; it ain't worth it; don't throw your life away; don't do it.

I'm sorry. But I'm not the same person I was when I got in here. And God's carried me through this far. God will carry me through further. I plan on continuing when I do go to prison to further help people there realize as well, you know, look at where we're at. Look at the lives we've ruined. Look at the hurt we've caused. Change it. Do something better. Find God. Listen to his word. He'll direct you on the

right path.

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And I just ask that I be given the chance to one day show that, not just to the people in jail, but to the world, that, you know, you can change, and I have. And thank you, Your Honor. That's all I have to say.

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Honabach.

Mr. Arnold.

MR. ARNOLD: Your Honor, on behalf of
Ms. Jimenez, she's also asking for a sentence of life
with the possibility of parole after 15 years. It's
been a big difference in her, Your Honor. I mean,
she's not the same person that she was when she came
in. She was also on meth, as all the co-defendant's in
the case. She went through a rash of disciplinary
problems in jail. I think those were outlined in the
sentencing memorandum, Your Honor.

And then there was a point in time -- in honesty, Your Honor, I think she just had given up. She really did not have any hope. And then she made a reconnection with her oldest daughter and started to have some hope, and decided, hey, I really need to get my life together. She started attending classes, Your Honor. And this was while we were still considering going to trial and, you know, trying to

offer a defense in this case.

2.

She's going to classes. She started anger management counseling, substance abuse counseling. And this is back in October of last year. Then she did successful release counseling, marriage and family counseling, to help with her daughter, parenting counseling, and life skills counseling, Your Honor. She's been taking a class a month trying to better herself.

She's going to continue to do this, regardless of what Your Honor offers because -- or what you sentence her to, for the simple reason is she knows that she does have something to live for. Even though right now she can't be with her family, she's asking for that opportunity, one time, you know, if she's ever paroled on this matter, to be out there with her family. I know she wants to say a couple of words to you, Your Honor, but we're requesting just give her that chance.

THE COURT: Ms. Jimenez.

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor. I would like to say, first of all, I apologize for everything. I take full responsibility for my part. I came in one person. I am now a totally different person. I've been doing a lot of classes, a lot of programming. I

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want to say I apologize to the families, to my
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    co-defendants also.
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              I don't know what else to say, Your Honor,
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    but that I apologize for my actions and I take full
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    responsibility for what I've done. And I ask you to
    please give me that opportunity to go back to my
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    daughter that I just got back. And I'm trying to get
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    my son back. And the only way to get them back is to
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    be able to have a second chance to go home so I can be
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    their mother and a grandmother to my kids, my
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    grandkids.
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              Right now nobody is talking to me.
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    Everybody's upset. And I get it, you know. And I'm
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    trying to get my kids back in my life. I got one at a
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    time. And if you please give me that second chance so
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    that I can be that mother to my kids that I have been
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    absent for a very long time due to meth. And, like I
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    said, I'm a different person now, you know.
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              I've also done Bible studies myself. And I
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    just -- I just ask for a second chance, Your Honor.
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              THE COURT: Okay.
                                 Thank you.
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              Mr. Yampolsky.
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              MR. YAMPOLSKY: Thank you, Your Honor.
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    be brief.
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As my co-counsel have all stated, it's an

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awful crime, no excuse. According to the terms of the plea agreement, I'm limited, that I can only argue for life. And, obviously, I'm arguing life with the possibility of parole. It's not a murder case. Murder cases are the absolute worst. And even in a murder case you're eligible for a term of years, 20 to 50 or 20 to life or, of course, life without. And I'm suggesting that this is not as bad as a murder case.
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Now, as I said, I'm limited as to what I can argue, but the PSI that sees thousands of people, they recommend 15 to 40. I'm not asking for that, but based on their recommendation, I believe it's appropriate for him to receive life with the possibility of parole.

THE COURT: Okay. Mr. King, anything you want to tell me?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor. As all the counsel's and the co-defendants said, it comes down to the facts. The facts is, yes, I did do it. Yes, I am sorry to the victim, to the family. Most important, the victim's family who had to bear witness to what we did, what our -- what we did. And there's no way around that.

The only thing I can do is better myself, and that's what I've been doing. It's all in black and white. I'm a model inmate. I got a job, plus six

months. You know, you show up. If you don't show up, you get fired. It's very strict.

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And I'm just doing the best I can. I'm on the waiting list to get my CSN so I can go to college after I do my GED. So in the future, if possible, Your Honor, if granted, you know, I have something with me when I get out and something that help me build myself into a better man that my kids need me to be, that my family knows me to be, raised me to be. And, Your Honor, that's all I ask is for that one chance. Thank you, sir.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

So here's the dilemma that I have, folks. I will generally try to be a merciful judge. I know as a Judge my job is to try to apply mercy and justice in a fair way to people. And I think most people would acknowledge that I try to give people probation when I have that opportunity, to give them at least one chance.

In this case I understand that drugs is a problem for most, if not all, of you, and that drugs and alcohol may have been the factor that caused some of these actions, but I don't know that I consider that an excuse. I don't know that I consider that a good reason to have committed horrific crimes.

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I want to be merciful, but at the same time, I know that justice has to be done. And we have a victim who, but for the fact that he lived against what you all thought -- my understanding is not only was he tortured and mutilated in this room for a period of time, for a period of hours, but that everybody thought he was dead, tried to burn the house down around him. And if you had been successful in this, this would have been a capital murder case and you all would be looking at potentially a capital sentence.

I have a hard time with the pictures that I've seen and the horrible injuries that were inflicted upon this poor victim. I understand that he is not the pillar of our community either, but that doesn't justify the things that were done to him over \$50. And that almost makes it worse because that was the basis for this, is him not being able to come up with \$50.

So each of you are going to be imposed a \$25 administrative assessment fee. Each of you has a \$150 DNA fee, if that's not been taken. I believe at least with a couple of you it's been taken so it would not apply. But if it hasn't been taken, you'd have that \$150 DNA fee. There's an additional \$3 DNA fee. I'm going to go ahead and sentence each of you to life in the Nevada Department of Corrections without the

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possibility of parole. I understand that that is a
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    difficult sentence for you to have to deal with.
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    a difficult sentence for me to have to give, but I
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    don't see any redeeming qualities.
                                         I would like to be
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    merciful, but I don't think that this is a crime
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    that -- I don't think the community wants you back out
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                                                      I don't
    on the streets. So that will be the sentence.
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    think credit time served matters.
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              Anything else on the record, counsel?
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              MS. THOMSON: No, Your Honor.
              MR. GELLER:
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                           No.
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              MR. BECKETT: No.
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              THE COURT: I hope you folks can get
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    programming while you're in prison. May God have mercy
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    on your souls.
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               (Proceedings concluded at 10:27 A.M.)
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             FULL, TRUE, AND ACCURATE TRANSCRIPT OF
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    PROCEEDINGS.
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MR. ARNOLD: [3]	5	22/21 23/4 23/9	attending [1] 18/23
MR. ARNOLD: [3]			
	50 [1] 21/6	allegations [1] 10/11	
2/14 3/21 18/8		allow [1] 8/15	attorney [1] 16/19
MR. BECKETT: [6]	7	almost [1] 23/16 along [1] 12/13	Attorney's [1] 6/24 author [1] 3/4
2/12 3/16 3/19 11/20	7-11 [1] 9/24	also [6] 4/6 12/17	authority [1] 10/13
16/2 24/11	70 [1] 8/3	18/10 18/14 20/2	away [1] 17/17
MR. GELLER: [7]	70-year-old [1] 7/21	20/19	awful [4] 5/22 6/3
	741 [1] 1/25	always [3] 8/1 14/23	8/13 21/1
6/13 24/10	8	15/2	
MR. YAMPOLSKY:	80-year-old [1] 8/3	am [8] 10/1 11/4	В
[3] 2/16 3/25 20/22 MS. THOMSON: [4]		16/7 16/17 16/18	back [10] 7/9 7/9
2/18 3/10 4/15 24/9	9	17/13 19/24 21/18	11/15 19/4 20/6 20/7
THE COURT: [20]	9:57 [1] 1/15	amount [1] 4/25	20/8 20/8 20/14 24/6
2/19 2/25 3/11 3/15	A	ANGEL [1] 1/7	bad [2] 9/8 21/8
3/17 3/20 3/24 4/2 5/3		anger [1] 19/2	balances [1] 4/23 ball [2] 12/16 12/18
6/11 10/20 11/19	A.M [2] 1/15 24/16	ANI [1] 17/12 another [1] 14/3	based [1] 21/11
15/25 16/4 18/6 19/19	abandoned [1] 9/9 able [4] 2/24 7/3	answers [1] 12/7	basically [1] 13/15
20/20 21/13 22/11	20/9 23/17	any [7] 2/21 2/24	basis [1] 23/16
24/12	about [4] 9/5 10/2	3/19 8/10 9/7 18/20	be [42]
THE DEFENDANT:	12/22 13/18	24/4	bear [1] 21/20
[4] 10/22 16/5 19/20	absent [1] 20/17	anymore [1] 16/23	because [17] 8/11
21/15	absolute [1] 21/5	anything [4] 10/16	8/11 8/12 9/17 9/24
THE MARSHAL: [1] 2/3	abuse [1] 19/3	10/21 21/14 24/9	10/1 10/6 10/18 11/4
2/3	According [1] 21/1	apologize [7] 10/25	11/7 11/8 11/16 14/7
\$	ACCURATE [1] 24/18		14/18 14/19 19/11
\$150 [2] 23/19 23/23	acknowledge [1]	20/1 20/4	23/16
\$25 [1] 23/18	22/17	appearance [1]	BECKETT [4] 1/21 2/13 3/16 11/20
\$3 [1] 23/23	actions [2] 20/4 22/23	14/25	been [23] 3/10 5/19
\$50 [2] 23/15 23/17	active [1] 4/20	appearing [1] 2/13 apply [2] 22/15 23/22	10/24 12/3 12/22
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VERIFICATION

I recognize that pursuant to N.R.A.P. 3C I am responsible for filing a notice of withdrawal of appeal and that the Supreme Court of Nevada may sanction an attorney for failing to file such a notice. I therefore certify that the information provided in this notice of withdrawal of appeal is true and complete to the best of my knowledge, information and belief.

DATED THIS 13th day of August, 2019.

THE LAW OFFICE OF TRAVIS AKIN

/s/ Travis Akin

Travis Akin, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 13059

9480 S. Eastern Ave., Suite 257

Las Vegas, NV 89123 Phone: (702) 510-8567 Fax: (702) 778-6600 Attorney for Appellant

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

EDWARD JOSEPH HONABACH,

Appellant,

No. 78694

FILED

VS.

THE STATE OF NEVADA,

Respondent.

AUG 2019

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BROWN RENE COURT ar. 411"..s....m,-

ORDER DISMISSING APPEAL

This is a direct appeal from a judgment of conviction. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; Jerry A. Wiese, Judge.

Appellant's counsel has filed a notice of voluntary withdrawal of this appeal. Counsel advises this court that he has informed appellant of the legal consequences of voluntarily withdrawing this appeal, including that appellant cannot hereafter seek to reinstate this appeal, and that any issues that were or could have been brought in this appeal are forever waived. Having been so informed, appellant consents to a voluntary dismissal of this appeal. Cause appearing, this court

ORDERS this appeal DISMISSED.'

Parraguirre

Cadish

'Because no remittitur will issue in this matter, see NRAP 42(b), the one-year period for filing a post-conviction habeas corpus petition under NRS 34.726(1) shall commence to run from the date of this order.

SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA

17 - 3S 3 7 2-

cc: Hon. Jerry A. Wiese, District Judge
The Law Office of Travis Akin
Attorney General/Carson City
Clark County District Attorney
Eighth District Court Clerk
Edward Joseph Honabach

FILED

Hello I am Edward Joseph Honabach

and I had Filed a direct appeal. I be begin berufelen appeal. I suppose the appeal of the supposited Travis Akins, Esq. as my appellant. Lawyer. I have not heard From him in about 7 or 8 months, He has not answered any of my Letters or Phone calls So I Then wrote To This court For a docket sheet which was reserved 6x This court on 12-23-19, I reserved The docket sheet and Found out That my lauger has canceled my direct appeal without my Knowledge or consent. I was Never notified by my lawyer or The court of This Bu either befor or after This was done. I do not even Know if I STill have a lawyer and have no Idea of what To do. I need This courts help please. I one I need To know if Travis Akins is Still my Lawyer. If not I need one To help with my appeal and my Habeas too corpus. Again I did not concent To The withdrawl of my appeal. I know nothing of Law or how To do anThing on my own I need help pleas. ODO I have a lauger 22 It not how do I get one. Dwhat can I do about my appeal: RECEPTIVEED a Case Summery Please.

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

EDWARD JOSEPH HONABACH,

No. 78694

Appellant,

vs.

THE STATE OF NEVADA,

Respondent.

JAN

ORDER

COUR

BY DEPUTY CLEPX

This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction entered pursuant to a guilty plea of kidnaping resulting in substantial bodily harm and a sentence of life without the possibility of parole. On August 23, 2019, this court dismissed this appeal pursuant to a motion for voluntary dismissal filed by Travis Akin, counsel for appellant. Appellant has filed in pro se a letter to this court asserting that he has not had contact with his appointed counsel, was unaware that his appeal had been dismissed, and that he did not consent to the dismissal of his appeal.

It appears that a response from counsel for appellant would assist this court in resolving appellant's claims. Travis Akin shall have 30 days from the date of this order to file and serve a response to appellant's letter.

It is so ORDERED.

4

, C.J.

cc: The Law Office of Travis Akin Attorney General/Carson City Clark County District Attorney Edward Joseph Honabach

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Electronically Filed Feb 15 2020 06:00 p.m. Elizabeth A. Brown Clerk of Supreme Court

February 14, 2020

Sent via First Class Mail:

Edward Honabach # 1214257 Ely State Prison Ely, Nevada 89301

Ms. Honabach:

I am in receipt of your letter. I am still your attorney on this matter. I did dismiss your Supreme Court appeal for the reasons that we spoke about at High Desert State Prison. I have also spoke with your father. He understands where we are in the process, and he told me that he has regular communication with you, so he can fill in some of the details. The Nevada Supreme Court is requesting that I file this letter, so I do not want to communicate to in-depth about the case.

I am still planning on filing a post-conviction writ of habeas corpus with the district court, as we discussed. I will come out to Ely to visit before the opening brief is due in late March to explain everything in-depth.

Thank you and have a great day.

Sincerely,

/s/Travis Akin

THE LAW OFFICE OF TRAVIS AKIN

Travis Akin, Esq. 9480 S. Eastern Ave., Suite 257 Las Vegas, NV 89123

Phone: (702) 510-8567 Fax: (702) 778-6600

Travisakin8@gmail.com

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

EDWARD JOSEPH HONABACH, No. 78694 Appellant, vs. $\mathbf{F}^{\mathrm{pm'}}$

Respondent.

ORDER

CLE

BY

DEPUTY CLERK—

This is a direct appeal from a judgment of conviction. On August 23, 2019, this court dismissed this appeal pursuant to a motion for voluntary dismissal filed by Travis Akin, counsel for appellant. On January 13, 2020, appellant filed, in pro se, a letter to this court asserting that he had not had contact with his appointed counsel, was unaware that his appeal had been dismissed, and that he did not consent to the dismissal of his appeal. This court directed Mr. Akin to respond to appellant's allegations. Mr. Akin has filed a copy of a letter he sent to appellant in which he indicates that he and appellant had confirmed the dismissal of the appeal and Mr. Akin's intent to file a postconviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of appellant.

Whether appellant was advised of the consequences and agreed to the withdrawal of his appeal involves claims of ineffective assistance of counsel that must be raised in the district court in the first instance and requires factual determinations that need to be resolved through an evidentiary hearing. *See* NRS 34.720-.810. This appeal shall remain dismissed.

It is so ORDERED.

cc: The Law Office of Travis Akin Attorney General/Carson City Clark County District Attorney Edward Joseph Honabach

SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA

(0) 1947A 41020. PCR 132 .1111 FMB

78694FILED

On 3/13/2020 I reserved a Letter From This COURT STATEING That Mr. AKIN FOLLOWS of a letter he says he sent me indicates That Mr Akin and appellant (myself) confirmed the dismissal of appeal I never regered This Any Letter When any inmate reserved reservese any Legal mail We have TO Sign For iT with one copy Staying With me and another going TO The Sender. Thierfor I request a copy of The LETTER and of proff proof of The Signed receip! STATING IT was reseaved by me. Also I STill have had know contacted with Mr. Akin and request That This court order him TO contact me so This matter can be resolved. Also the Letter This court Sent me States That Mr Akin Said he intends to file a writ of habeas corpus on my behalf. AS Far as I Know This has not been done to eather. I have writen Several letters TO Mr. AKin with Know responce. He has Told This court he is my Lawyer and I need contact to with him please help with this, my Time is and I have no legal expertises Sincerly MAR 18 2020 Edward Honabach. CLERK OF SUPSICE COURT
DEPUTY CLERK

20-106 PER 134

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

EDWARD JOSEPH HONABACH,

Appellant,

vs. THE STATE OF NEVADA,

Respondent.

No. 78694

FILED

MAR 2 II 2020

ELIZABETH A. E7f'.OWN CLER1 ØF SUPREMECOURT

DEeUr (

ORDER

This court takes no action regarding appellant's letter filed March 18, 2020. This appeal has been dismissed. It is so ORDERED.

The Law Office of Travis Akin cc: Attorney General/Carson City Clark County District Attorney

Edward Joseph Honabach

Case No.: OBC20-0848

FFB 2 4 2021

STATE BAR OF NEVADA

BY: B-Jelix

OFFICE OF BAR COUNSEL

STATE BAR OF NEVADA

SOUTHERN NEVADA DISCIPLINARY BOARD

STATE BAR OF NEVADA,)
Complainant,	<u> </u>
VS.	PUBLIC REPRIMAND
TRAVIS D. AKIN, ESQ.,	<u> </u>
Nevada Bar No. 13059,)
Respondent.) }

TO: TRAVIS D. AKIN, ESQ.

9480 S. Eastern Avenue, Suite 257

Las Vegas, Nevada 89123

In January 2020, the Eighth Judicial District Court appointed you as appellate counse defendants in their respective matters pending in the Nevada Supreme Court.

In all three appeals, briefing schedules were either established or reinstated, directed to file and serve various documents and/or pleadings in each case. However, de directives and warnings from the Supreme Court, you failed to file and serve documents of as ordered by the Supreme Court and required by the Nevada Rules of Appellate Procedu

In each case, the Supreme Court and its clerk's office sent you warnings that sancti be imposed if you did not comply with their orders and failed to file the required documer

an Opening Brief and Appendix in each matter. You also were warned that failure to comresult in your removal as counsel-of-record in the appeals and referral to the State Bar for investigations.

In June 2020, in all three appeals, the Supreme Court imposed conditional sawould be automatically vacated if you filed the required pleadings. However, you failed to did not further communicate with the Supreme Court.

Your failure to comply with judicial orders caused the Supreme Court to remappellate counsel in July 2020 for one case. The court removed you from the oth August 2020. All three appeals had to be remanded to the Eighth Judicial District appointment of new appellate counsel.

Your actions delayed the appeals of your clients and wasted the time and re Supreme Court and District Court.

In light of the foregoing, you violated Rule of Professional Conduct 1.3 (Diligence) as 3.4(c) (Fairness to Opposing Party and Counsel), and are hereby PUBLICLY REPRIMANDED

Kenneth E Hogan

Kenneth E Hogan (Feb 24, 2021 15:08 PST)

KENNETH HOGAN, Esq., Hearing Panel Chair Southern Nevada Disciplinary Board

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned hereby certifies a true and correct copy of the foregoing

PUBLIC REPRIMAND was served via electronic mail to:

- 1. Kenneth Hogan, Esq. (Panel Chair): ken@h2legal.com
- 2. Travis Akin, Esq (Respondent): travisakin8@gmail.com
- 3. Phil Pattee, Esq. (Assistant Bar Counsel): philp@nvbar.org

Dated this 25th day of February, 2021.

Sonia Del Rio Sonia Del Rio, an employee

of the State Bar of Nevada

Electronically Filed 5/26/2022 12:05 PM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT

1 RSPN STEVEN B. WOLFSON 2 Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #001565 3 JOHN AFSHAR Deputy District Attorney 4 Nevada Bar #14408 200 Lewis Avenue Las Vegas, Nevada 89155-2212 5

Attorney for Respondent

EDWARD HONABACH,

-VS-

aka Edward Joseph Honabach,

(702) 671-2500

#7029816

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DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

Petitioner,

THE STATE OF NEVADA,

Respondent.

CASE NO: A-20-812948-W

XXX

DEPT NO:

STATE'S RESPONSE TO PETITIONER'S AMENDED PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS (POST-CONVICTION)

DATE OF HEARING: June 28, 2022 TIME OF HEARING: 8:30 AM

COMES NOW, the State of Nevada, by STEVEN B. WOLFSON, Clark County District Attorney, through JOHN AFSHAR, Deputy District Attorney, and hereby submits the attached Points and Authorities in Response to Petitioner's Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Post-Conviction).

This Response is made and based upon all the papers and pleadings on file herein, the attached points and authorities in support hereof, and oral argument at the time of hearing, if deemed necessary by this Honorable Court.

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POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On April 12, 2016, the State filed an Information charging Petitioner Edward Honabach (hereinafter "Petitioner") with eight counts in Case No. C-16-314092-2. These included:

- Count 1 Conspiracy to Commit Murder (Category B Felony NRS 200.010, 200.030, 199.480 - NOC 50038):
- Count 2 Attempt Murder with Use of a Deadly Weapon (Category B Felony -
- NRS 200.010, 200.030, 193.330, 193.165 NOC 50031);
 Count 3 Mayhem with Use of a Deadly Weapon (Category B Felony NRS 200.280, 193.165 - NOC 50045);
- Count 4 Battery with Use of a Deadly Weapon Resulting in Substantial Bodily Harm (Category B Felony NRS 200.481 NOC 50226);
 Count 5 First Degree Kidnapping with Use of a Deadly Weapon Resulting in
- Substantial Bodily Harm (Category A Felony NRS 200.310, 200.320, 193.165 -NOC 50056);
- Count 6 Extortion with Use of a Deadly Weapon (Category B Felony NRS)
- 205.320, 193.165 NOC 50620); Count 7 Robbery with Use of a Deadly Weapon (Category B Felony NRS 200.380, 193.165 - NOC 50138);
- Count 8 First Degree Arson (Category B Felony NRS 205.010 NOC 50414).

Petitioner was one of four co-defendants.

On February 4, 2019, after four continued trial dates, Petitioner and his co-defendants ultimately pled guilty on the first day of trial. On that same date, an Amended Information and Guilty Plea Agreement ("GPA") was filed in open court, memorializing that Petitioner agreed to plead guilty to one count of First Degree Kidnapping Resulting in Substantial Bodily Harm (Category A Felony - NRS 200.310, 200.320 - NOC 50052).

On March 26, 2019, Petitioner was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole in the Nevada Department of Corrections. The Judgment of Conviction was filed on March 28, 2019.

On April 11, 2019, Petitioner's counsel, Mr. Robert S. Beckett, Esq., filed a Motion to Withdraw as Attorney of Record. The district court granted the Motion and Mr. Beckett was withdrawn on April 23, 2019. On that same day, Mr. Travis D. Akin, Esq. was appointed and confirmed as counsel.

Direct appeal from the Judgement of Conviction

On April 26, 2019, Petitioner, proceeding in pro se, filed a Notice of Appeal from the Judgment of Conviction in S.C. Case No. 78694. On May 15, 2019, the Nevada Supreme Court

ordered the district court to confirm whether Mr. Akin was appointed to represent Petitioner on appeal. On June 6, 2019, Mr. Akin was confirmed as Petitioner's counsel in open court and advised he had met with Petitioner to discuss potential options on appeal, and consequently, anticipated Petitioner voluntarily dismissing the appeal and moving forward on a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Post-Conviction). The district court minute order from the June 6, 2019 hearing was filed with the Court on June 11, 2019.

On August 13, 2019, Mr. Akin filed a Notice of Withdrawal of Appeal on behalf of Petitioner. On August 23, 2019, the Nevada Supreme Court dismissed the appeal pursuant to the motion for voluntary dismissal. No remittitur issued.

On January 13, 2020, Petitioner filed, in pro se, a letter to the Nevada Supreme Court asserting that he had not had contact with his appointed counsel [Mr. Akin], was unaware that his appeal had been dismissed, and did not consent to the dismissal of his appeal. The Court then directed Mr. Akin to respond to Petitioner's allegations on January 16, 2020. Mr. Akin filed a copy of a letter he sent to Petitioner, in which he indicates that he and Petitioner had confirmed the dismissal of the appeal and Mr. Akin's intent to file a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Post-Conviction) on behalf of Petitioner on February 15, 2020. On March 11, 2020, the Court ordered that the appeal would remain dismissed.

On March 18, 2020, Petitioner filed, in pro se, another letter to the Court asserting that he never received a letter from Mr. Akin, had not had contact with Mr. Akin, and was unaware if a petition had been filed. On March 24, 2020, the Court ordered that no action would be taken regarding Petitioner's second letter.

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Post-Conviction)

On March 1, 2020, Mr. Akin filed a Motion to Withdraw as Counsel, citing an insurmountable conflict of interest, and that he had taken a job at a law firm and no longer had

The Court held that "Whether appellant was advised of the consequences and agreed to the withdrawal of his appeal involves claims of ineffective assistance of counsel that must be raised in the district court in the first instance and requires factual determinations that need to be resolved through an evidentiary hearing. See NRS 34.720-.810." See No. 78694, Order (Mar. 11, 2020).

the time to represent Petitioner. The district court determined that the Motion had been previously granted, and therefore was moot, on March 12, 2020.²

On March 27, 2020, Mr. Akin, referring to himself as Petitioner's former counsel, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Post-Conviction) ("Petition") to stop the clock on the deadline to file a timely postconviction petition, and requested the district court appoint a replacement attorney to file a supplement in Case No. A-20-812948-W. On May 18, 2020, the district court issued a Minute Order denying the Petition.³

On June 10, 2020, Petitioner filed a Motion to Reconsider. On July 17, 2020, the State filed its Opposition to Petitioner's Motion to Reconsider. On July 23, 2020, the district court denied Petition's Motion to Reconsider.⁴

Appeal from the district court's order denying the Petition

On June 24, 2020, Petitioner filed, in pro se, a Notice of Appeal from the denial of his Petition in S.C. Case No. 81402. On December 7, 2020, Petitioner filed, in pro se, an Informal Brief. The Nevada Supreme Court then ordered the State to respond on October 6, 2021. On November 3, 2021, the State filed its Answering Brief.

On December 17, 2021, the Court reversed the district court's order and remanded the matter, holding that the district court erred in resolving the Petition filed by counsel which had not been authorized by Petitioner and had been filed after his counsel had withdrawn from representing him. The Court ruled that rather than resolving the petition submitted by Mr. Akin, the district court should have clarified whether Petitioner wanted to proceed on the Petition submitted by Mr. Akin, supplement the Petition, or request the appointment of postconviction counsel. Remittitur issued January 11, 2022.

Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Post-Conviction)

On March 3, 2022, Mr. Jim Hoffman, Esq., was appointed as Petitioner's counsel. On April 28, 2022, Petitioner filed an Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Post-Conviction) ("Amended Petition"). The State's Response now follows.

It appears the district court may have confused Mr. Akin's Motion to Withdraw as Counsel with Petitioner's earlier October 2019 Motion for Withdrawal of Attorney of Record relating to his trial counsel's, Mr. Beckett's, withdrawal.

The Court's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order ("Findings") was filed on July 21, 2020.
 The Court's Order denying Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration was filed on August 18, 2020.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

Petitioner's Pre-Sentence Investigation Report ("PSI") summarized the facts of the offense as follows:

On March 7, 2016, officers received a call in reference to a residential fire and of a male with a slit throat exiting the same residence. The caller reported that the victim was possibly tied up.

Paramedics arrived on the scene and advised there were several citizens around the victim attempting to provide first aid. The paramedics observed that the victim had both legs bound together by a cord at his ankles and knees. The paramedics removed the bindings. The victim had several injuries including: multiple stab wounds to his chest, back and right arm, his right pinky finger was partially amputated, his fingernails were pulled off from his right index and middle fingers, there was a laceration to his right thumb and a deep laceration to his throat/neck. The paramedics reported that it appeared that the victim was tortured. The victim was treated by paramedics and transported to a local hospital. The victim was unable to be interviewed the night of the incident as he was undergoing numerous surgeries and was heavily sedated.

Officers and detectives arrived on the scene and set a perimeter around the crime scene while firefighters battled the residential fire. Detectives interviewed each witness individually on scene. All witnesses confirmed that they noticed the residence on fire and when they pulled over to assist, they observed the victim with his legs bound, with several injuries. On March 8, 2016, detectives canvassed the area and spoke to surrounding neighbors. The neighbors advised seeing a pickup truck with two males and two females at the victim's residence.

Detectives arrived to the local hospital to attempt to speak to the victim. He was unable to speak due to his injuries; however, he was responsive and wished to attempt to provide information to the detectives. He was able to provide information regarding his identity and his girlfriend's identity. When asked how many suspects committed the crime against him. he raised four fingers. When asked who committed the crime against him, the victim mouthed the name Angel Castro, who was identified as a co-defendant Luis Angel Castro.

Detectives were able to make contact with the victim's girlfriend. She stated that on March 6, 2016, her vehicle had broken down while the victim was driving it and he asked his friend Angel Castro for a tow back to his girlfriend's home. The victim's girlfriend stated that the victim told her he was going to pay Mr. Castro \$50.00 in United States currency for the tow. She stated on March 7, 2016 the victim was still at her residence with a mechanic when Mr. Castro arrived in a pickup truck with two other males. Mr. Castro demanded the tow money from the victim and the other male made mention that he had a firearm inside the truck. The victim then agreed to leave with the three males in the truck. The victim's girlfriend reported that she had not heard from the victim for several hours so she attempted to contact several friends of his to see if anyone had heard from him. One of his friends told her that the victim had contacted him asking for \$300.00 in United States currency. He stated that he heard a female in the background apparently coaching him on what to say.

Detectives returned to the hospital and continued to interview the victim. The victim reported he was taken in a pickup truck to an unknown house. Once

at the home, Mr. Castro bound the victim's hands/wrists and ankles/knees. He stated that he remembers making three phone calls asking for \$300.00 in United States currency. The victim reported that one of the males cut his finger and hand with a machete and stabbed him multiple times about his body with a knife. He reported that all four suspects cut his throat/neck. The victim stated that he was tortured before, during and after he made the phone calls. He reported after the four suspects took turn cutting his throat/neck, the victim faked as if he died. After believing the victim was dead, the unknown male started the fire and all the suspects left the house. Once all the suspects left, the victim stated he was able to get out of the home, where he was assisted by people going by. The victim stated that the only thing the suspects took from him was a pack of cigarettes.

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During the course of the investigation, detectives were able to identify the defendant Edward Honabach as the driver of the pickup truck. Both the victim and his girlfriend were able to identify Angel Castro and Edward Honabach from a lineup. Detectives went to Mr. Honabach's residence and took Mr. Honabach and Mr. Castro into custody. Also, present at the residence were two females. One of the females was identified as the co-defendant Fabiola Jimenez. A photo lineup with Ms. Jimenez in it was presented to the victim who confirmed that Ms. Jimenez was present and involved in his torture. A search of Mr. Honabach's residence was completed where detectives found numerous knives inside the home and the vehicle. They also found a machete and twine inside the vehicle.

On March 10, 2016, detectives interviewed Ms. Jimenez. She confessed to being present during the brutal attempt murder and arson where the incident occurred. Her version of the incident was similar to the victim's account. She stated that on March 7, 2016, Mr. Honabach, Mr. Castro and an unknown male went to pick up the victim. Ms. Jimenez reported that the victim owed \$200.00 in United States currency for a drug debt. A short time later, Mr. Honabach, Mr. Castro and the unknown male arrived with the victim to the residence the incident occurred at. Ms. Jimenez was already present at the residence as Mr. Castro and Mr. Honabach had dropped her off prior to picking up the victim. Once inside the residence, Mr. Honabach and Mr. Castro confronted the victim about the money he owed them. The victim told them he was working on getting the money and asked Mr. Honabach and Mr. Castro for another week to pay off the debt. Mr. Honabach and Mr. Castro became physical with the victim and forced him into a chair and bound his hands and legs with rope found in the home. Ms. Jimenez reported that Mr. Honabach, Mr. Castro and the unknown male started punching the victim. Mr. Honabach then brandished a pocket knife and stabbed the victim three times in his right shoulder area. The victim pleaded for them to stop. Mr. Honabach asked Mr. Castro what he wanted to do and Mr. Castro stated "we have gone this far, let's finish it." At that point, Mr. Honabach pulled the victim's hair and Mr. Castro took the knife and cut the victim's throat. Ms. Jimenez advised that they all believed the victim to be dead so began to gather paper materials and household chemicals which they poured on the victim. Mr. Castro told Ms. Jimenez to leave the residence at that point and she did. She stated that before she left she saw Mr. Honabach and Mr. Castro with lighters in their hands. Once outside, Ms. Jimenez saw the flames coming from the house and that is when Mr. Honabach and Mr. Castro left the residence.

They then got into the vehicle and left. Ms. Jimenez reported she did not know where the unknown male had gone. She stated that she did believe the victim was dead and confirmed that she did not call the police to stop the brutal attack. Ms. Jimenez denied participating in the actual stabbing or setting the house on fire. Initially, she denied being with Mr. Castro and Mr. Honabach;

however, eventually did admit being present at the house during the attack and that she does not like the victim.

On March 10, 2016, Mr. Honabach was arrested and transported to Clark County Detention Center where he was booked accordingly.

PSI at 5-7.

ARGUMENT

I. PETITIONER FAILS TO DEMONSTRATE INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL UNDER STRICKLAND

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that, "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense." The United States Supreme Court has long recognized that "the right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel." <u>Strickland v. Washington</u>, 466 U.S. 668, 686, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2063 (1984); <u>see also State v. Love</u>, 109 Nev. 1136, 1138, 865 P.2d 322, 323 (1993).

To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, a Petitioner must prove he was denied "reasonably effective assistance" of counsel by satisfying the two-prong test of Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686–87, 104 S. Ct. at 2063–64. See also Love, 109 Nev. at 1138, 865 P.2d at 323. Under the Strickland test, a Petitioner must show first that his counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and second, that but for counsel's errors, there is a reasonable probability that the result of the proceedings would have been different. 466 U.S. at 687–88, 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2065, 2068; Warden, Nevada State Prison v. Lyons, 100 Nev. 430, 432, 683 P.2d 504, 505 (1984) (adopting the Strickland two-part test). "[T]here is no reason for a court deciding an ineffective assistance claim to approach the inquiry in the same order or even to address both components of the inquiry if the Petitioner makes an insufficient showing on one." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697, 104 S. Ct. at 2069.

The court begins with the presumption of effectiveness and then must determine whether the Petitioner has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that counsel was ineffective. Means v. State, 120 Nev. 1001, 1011, 103 P.3d 25, 32 (2004). "Effective counsel does not mean errorless counsel, but rather counsel whose assistance is '[w]ithin the range of

competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases." <u>Jackson v. Warden</u>, 91 Nev. 430, 432, 537 P.2d 473, 474 (1975).

The role of a court in considering allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel is "not to pass upon the merits of the action not taken but to determine whether, under the particular facts and circumstances of the case, trial counsel failed to render reasonably effective assistance." <u>Donovan v. State</u>, 94 Nev. 671, 675, 584 P.2d 708, 711 (1978). This analysis does not mean that the court should "second guess reasoned choices between trial tactics nor does it mean that defense counsel, to protect himself against allegations of inadequacy, must make every conceivable motion no matter how remote the possibilities are of success." <u>Id.</u> To be effective, the constitution "does not require that counsel do what is impossible or unethical. If there is no bona fide defense to the charge, counsel cannot create one and may disserve the interests of his client by attempting a useless charade." <u>United States v. Cronic</u>, 466 U.S. 648, 657 n.19, 104 S. Ct. 2039, 2046 n.19 (1984).

"There are countless ways to provide effective assistance in any given case. Even the best criminal defense attorneys would not defend a particular client in the same way." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S. Ct. at 689. "Strategic choices made by counsel after thoroughly investigating the plausible options are almost unchallengeable." Dawson v. State, 108 Nev. 112, 117, 825 P.2d 593, 596 (1992); see also Ford v. State, 105 Nev. 850, 853, 784 P.2d 951, 953 (1989). In essence, the court must "judge the reasonableness of counsel's challenged conduct on the facts of the particular case, viewed as of the time of counsel's conduct." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, 104 S. Ct. at 2066.

Even if a Petitioner can demonstrate that his counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, he must still demonstrate prejudice and show a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the result of the trial would have been different. McNelton v. State, 115 Nev. 396, 403, 990 P.2d 1263, 1268 (1999) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at 2064). "A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Id. (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-89, 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2064–65, 2068).

This portion of the test is slightly modified when a conviction occurs due to a guilty plea. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59, 106 S. Ct. 366, 370 (1985); Kirksey v. State, 112 Nev. 980, 988, 923 P.2d 1102, 1107 (1996). For a guilty plea, a Petitioner "must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial." Hill, 474 U.S. at 59; see also Kirksey v. State, 112 Nev. at 988; Molina v. State, 120 Nev. 185, 190-91, 87 P.3d 533, 537 (2004).

The Nevada Supreme Court has held "that a habeas corpus petitioner must prove the disputed factual allegations underlying his ineffective-assistance claim by a preponderance of the evidence." Means v. State, 120 Nev. 1001, 1012, 103 P.3d 25, 33 (2004). Furthermore, claims of ineffective assistance of counsel asserted in a petition for post-conviction relief must be supported with specific factual allegations, which if true, would entitle the petitioner to relief. Hargrove v. State, 100 Nev. 498, 502, 686 P.2d 222, 225 (1984). "Bare" and "naked" allegations are not sufficient, nor are those belied and repelled by the record. Id. NRS 34.735(6) states in relevant part, "[Petitioner] must allege specific facts supporting the claims in the petition[.]... Failure to allege specific facts rather than just conclusions may cause your petition to be dismissed." (emphasis added).

A defendant is entitled to effective assistance of counsel in the plea-bargaining process, and in determining whether to accept or reject a plea offer. Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 162, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1384 (2012); see also McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771, 90 S. Ct. 1441, 1449 (1970) (Constitution guarantees effective counsel when accepting guilty plea). Similarly, a "defendant has the right to make a reasonably informed decision whether to accept a plea offer." Turner v. Calderon, 281 F.3d 851, 880 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting United States v. Day, 969 F.2d 39, 43 (3rd Cir. 1992)). Importantly, the question is not whether "counsel's advice [was] right or wrong, but . . . whether that advice was within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases." Id., quoting McMann, 397 U.S. at 771, 90 S. Ct. at 1449. To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for advice regarding a guilty plea, a defendant must show "gross error on the part of counsel." Id. Further, the Nevada Supreme Court has held that a reasonable plea recommendation which hindsight reveals to be

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unwise is not ineffective assistance. <u>Larson v. State</u>, 104 Nev. 691, 694, 766 P.2d 261, 263 (1988). Similarly, the fact that a defense tactic is ultimately unsuccessful does not make it unreasonable. <u>Id.</u> Lastly, while it is counsel's duty to candidly advise a defendant regarding whether or not they believe it would be beneficial for a defendant to accept a plea offer, the ultimate decision of whether or not to accept a plea offer is the defendants. <u>Rhyne</u>, 118 Nev. at 8, 38 P.3d at 163.

Petitioner's claims are insufficiently pled pursuant to Hargrove v. State, 100 Nev. 498, 502, 686 P.2d 222, 225 (1984), and Maresca v. State, 103 Nev. 669, 673, 748 P.2d 3, 6 (1987). Indeed, a party seeking review bears the responsibility "to cogently argue, and present relevant authority" to support his assertions. Edwards v. Emperor's Garden Restaurant, 122 Nev. 317, 330 n.38, 130 P.3d 1280, 1288 n.38 (2006); Dept. of Motor Vehicles and Public Safety v. Rowland, 107 Nev. 475, 479, 814 P.2d 80, 83 (1991) (defendant's failure to present legal authority resulted in no reason for the district court to consider defendant's claim); Maresca v. State, 103 Nev. 669, 673, 748 P.2d 3, 6 (1987) (an arguing party must support his arguments with relevant authority and cogent argument; "issues not so presented need not be addressed"); Randall v. Salvation Army, 100 Nev. 466, 470-71, 686 P.2d 241, 244 (1984) (court may decline consideration of issues lacking citation to relevant legal authority); Holland Livestock v. B & C Enterprises, 92 Nev. 473, 533 P.2d 950 (1976) (issues lacking citation to relevant legal authority do not warrant review on the merits). Claims for relief devoid of specific factual allegations are "bare" and "naked," and are insufficient to warrant relief, as are those claims belied and repelled by the record. Hargrove v. State, 100 Nev. 498, 502, 686 P.2d 222, 225 (1984). "[Petitioner] must allege specific facts supporting the claims in the petition[.]...Failure to allege specific facts rather than just conclusions may cause [the] petition to be dismissed." NRS 34.735(6) (emphasis added).

A. Appellate Counsel Was Not Ineffective When the Plea Was Withdrawn

In Ground One, Petitioner claims appellate counsel was ineffective in withdrawing Petitioner's appeal without his consent. <u>Petition</u> at 3–9. Appellate counsel represented that he withdrew the appeal after explaining to, and obtaining the consent of, Petitioner, and Petitioner

 further recognizes that, when he pled guilty, he waived any right to appeal. <u>Petition</u> at 4-6. Petitioner mostly recites letters he sent to the Nevada Supreme Court arguing that he did not consent to the withdrawal of his appeal.⁵ <u>Id.</u>

Petitioner fails to demonstrate either deficiency or prejudice. The law cited by Petitioner relates to the requirement that counsel file a notice of appeal if a defendant requests an appeal. Petition at 7. There are two related problems with this. The first is the Petitioner does not assert, much less establish, that he requested that counsel file an appeal in the first place. The second is that counsel did timely file a notice of appeal, just not an opening brief.

"[T]here is no constitutional requirement that counsel must always inform a defendant who pleads guilty of the right to pursue a direct appeal." Thomas v. State, 115 Nev. 148, 150, 979 P.2d 222, 223 (1999). Thomas explicitly declined to extend Lozada, cited by Petitioner, to cases where a defendant pleads guilty. Id.; Lozada v. State, 110 Nev. 349, 871 P.2d 944 (1994); Petition at 7. When a defendant has pled guilty, an "attorney is not obliged to obtain consent not to file the appeal where the client does not express a desire to challenge the proceedings. However, if the client does express a desire to appeal, counsel is obligated to file the notice of appeal on the client's behalf." Davis v. State, 115 Nev. 17, 20, 974 P.2d 658, 660 (1999). (emphasis added). A defendant who pleads guilty waives much of their right to appeal but can appeal on some limited grounds. Id. at 19. Petitioner's citation to Burns is irrelevant because Burns is 1) unpublished, and 2) relates to the obligation of counsel to file an appeal where the defendant has been convicted via jury trial, not when a defendant pleads guilty. Petitioner cites to Toston v. State but fails to appreciate the holding thereof. 127 Nev. 971, 979, 267 P.3d 795, 801 (2011); Petition at 7.

In <u>Toston</u>, the Nevada Supreme Court held that "counsel has a duty to file a direct appeal when the client's desire to challenge the conviction or sentence can be reasonably inferred from the totality of the circumstances, focusing on the information that counsel knew or should have known at the time." <u>Id.</u> at 979. However, whether a defendant has pled guilty

⁵ Petitioner asserts that a declaration that counsel drafted was sent to Petitioner for his signature and will be filed "as soon as it is received." <u>Petition</u> at 6. As of the time the State's response is due, no declaration has been filed and, since any declaration was drafted by counsel and not adopted by Petitioner, the representations regarding what the declaration would say should not be considered.

is relevant to the totality of the circumstances analysis because "a guilty plea reduces the scope of potentially appealable issues and because such a plea may indicate that the defendant seeks an end to judicial proceedings." <u>Id.</u> "[W]hen the defendant has pleaded guilty, relevant circumstances may include whether the defendant received the sentence he bargained for as part of the plea (it would be reasonable to conclude that a defendant who received the bargained-for sentence would be satisfied with that sentence), whether the defendant reserved certain issues for appeal (the reservation of an issue for appeal reasonably indicates the defendant's desire to appeal), whether the defendant indicated a desire to challenge his sentence within the period for filing an appeal, and whether the defendant sought relief from the plea before sentencing (the filing of a presentence motion to withdraw a plea reasonably indicates dissatisfaction with the conviction)." <u>Id.</u> at 979-980.

Petitioner fails to undertake any of the analysis required by <u>Toston</u> to demonstrate that counsel should have known that Petitioner wanted to pursue a direct appeal. Petitioner agreed to a sentence of Life in prison, wherein the State would argue that he should not receive the possibility of parole, and the defense would argue that Petitioner should receive the possibility of parole after 15 years. <u>GPA</u> at 1. Petitioner received life without parole, one of the two potential sentences, and so received the sentence he bargained for as part of the plea. There is no indication that Petitioner reserved any issues for appeal, either in the Guilty Plea Agreement itself or in any of the record. Other than the notice of appeal that counsel timely filed, there is no indication that Petitioner indicated a desire to challenge his plea within the time period for filing an appeal. He did not, for instance, complain at sentencing or file any other post-sentencing motions. Nor did he seek relief from the plea in the approximately two months prior to sentencing. In sum, none of the <u>Toston</u> factors support a claim that counsel knew or should have known that Petitioner wanted to challenge his plea, and Petitioner does not argue otherwise. Because Petitioner fails to demonstrate that counsel knew or should have known that he wished to appeal, Petitioner fails to demonstrate that counsel was deficient.

Even if Petitioner had demonstrated that he wished to file an appeal, however, counsel was not necessarily deficient for withdrawing it, even without Petitioner's consent. Petitioner

doesn't identify any meritorious issues that he would have raised had the appeal been filed. Petitioner's complaints have only ever revolved around the supposed 'coercion' involved in obtaining Petitioner's plea, or the voluntariness of the plea. Assuming he wanted to challenge his plea, a Post-Conviction Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is the proper vehicle to do so, not a direct appeal. "[C]hallenges to the validity of a guilty plea and claims of ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel must be first pursued in post-conviction proceedings in the district court ..." Franklin v. State, 110 Nev. 750, 751-52, 877 P.2d 1058, 1059 (1994), disapproved of by Thomas, 115 Nev. 148, 979 P.2d 222. (Thomas, cited supra, explicitly disproved of Franklin to the extent that Franklin "suggest[s] that counsel has an absolute duty to advise a defendant who pleads guilty of the right to appeal." Thomas at 150.) Accordingly, assuming Petitioner wished to challenge his plea, counsel withdrawing the appeal to pursue a petition for writ of habeas corpus, either with Petitioner's consent as counsel claims, or without it as Petitioner claims, was not deficient because he was making the challenge in the correct forum. Counsel even filed a barebones habeas petition on Petitioner's behalf to ensure that Petitioner could raise his challenges in district court. Petitioner speculates about other reasons why counsel might have withdrawn the appeal, but "speculation does not demonstrate any prejudice." Browning v. State, 120 Nev. 347, 357, 91 P.3d 39, 47 (2004).

Petitioner only complains that his appeal was withdrawn without his consent. But, because he fails to demonstrate that 1) he asked for an appeal, 2) that counsel should have known that he wanted an appeal, and/or 3) that withdrawing the appeal was itself deficient, Petitioner's claim that counsel performed deficiently should be denied.

B. Appellate Counsel Was Not Ineffective For Failing to Challenge the Voluntariness of Petitioner's Plea On Direct Appeal

Petitioner claims appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to challenge the voluntariness of Petitioner's plea in Ground Two. <u>Petition</u> at 10.

There is a strong presumption that appellate counsel's performance was reasonable and fell within "the wide range of reasonable professional assistance." See United States v. Aguirre, 912 F.2d 555, 560 (2nd Cir. 1990); citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S. Ct. at

2065. A claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel must satisfy the two-prong test set forth by Strickland. Kirksey v. State, 112 Nev. 980, 998, 923 P.2d 1102, 1114 (1996). In order to satisfy Strickland's second prong, the defendant must show that the omitted issue would have had a reasonable probability of success on appeal. Id. For judges to second-guess reasonable professional judgments and impose on appointed counsel a duty to raise every 'colorable' claim suggested by a client would disserve the very goal of vigorous and effective advocacy." Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 754, 103 S. Ct. 3308, 3314 (1983).

As just noted, appellate counsel could not have been deficient for failing to challenge the voluntariness of Petitioner's plea on direct appeal because such a claim "must be first pursued in post-conviction proceedings in the district court ..." Franklin, 110 Nev. at 751–52. The Nevada Supreme Court routinely rejects claims asserting that a plea is not voluntary when raised on direct appeal. See, e.x. Bryant, v. State, 102 Nev. 268, 272, 721 P.2d 364, 368 (1986)("[W]e will no longer permit a defendant to challenge the validity of a guilty plea on direct appeal from the judgment of conviction."); Smith, v. State, 110 Nev. 1009, 1010-11 n.1, 879 P.2d 60, 61 n.1 (1994) (stating that unless error clearly appears from the record, a challenge to the validity of a guilty plea must first be raised in the district court in a motion to withdraw guilty plea or a postconviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus). Instead, the proper course is to pursue the challenge to the guilty plea in a post-conviction petition. And that's just what counsel did. Counsel filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Post-Conviction) on March 27, 2020, alleging the following:

- A. Petitioner entered his plea agreement involuntarily, unintelligently, and unknowingly because he did not know that he could receive life without parole pursuant to the guilty plea agreement, therefore, the guilty plea is invalid; Petitioner was under the understanding that he would have, at minimum, a chance at parole;
- B. Counsel was ineffective for failing to advise Petitioner that he could receive a life without parole sentence on his guilty plea; Petitioner was under the understanding that he would have, at minimum, a chance at parole;
- C. Cumulative error.

⁶ Most appeals from a guilty plea are decided by the Nevada Court of Appeals via unpublished order, but those cases are not citable.

See Petition (Mar. 27, 2020).

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This claim demonstrates that counsel's decision to withdraw the plea was reasonable, not deficient. Counsel properly raised the claim in a timely filed petition, rather than on direct appeal. Petitioner fails to demonstrate any reason why counsel was deficient for raising the claim in the proper place and fails to demonstrate deficiency because he does not argue that the Nevada Supreme Court would even have considered, much less granted any relief on, his claim if raised in direct appeal. He also fails to demonstrate prejudice because Petitioner's plea was knowingly and voluntarily entered into, and so even if the claim had been raised on direct appeal it would have been meritless.

C. Petitioner Knowingly and Voluntarily Entered His Plea

Petitioner claims that his plea was not voluntary for three reasons. First, he felt 'pressured into taking the deal by his counsel," second, he felt pressured by "the condition of the offer that all four co-defendants would have to plead guilty for the offer to go into effect," and third "his decision to plead was based on the advice of counsel who had not adequately reviewed the discovery materials." Petition at 15.7 Petitioner does not explain how, or in what manner, counsel "pressured" him into pleading guilty, and the claim is belied by the record. Petitioner affirmed in his GPA that he was satisfied with counsel:

VOLUNTARINESS OF PLEA

I have discussed the elements of all of the original charge(s) against me with my attorney and I understand the nature of the charge(s) against me.

I understand that the State would have to prove each element of the

charge(s) against me at trial.

have discussed with my attorney any possible defenses, defense strategies and circumstances which might be in my favor.

All of the foregoing elements, consequences, rights and waiver of rights have been thoroughly explained to me by my attorney.

I believe that pleading guilty and accepting this plea bargain is in my best interest, and that a trial would be contrary to my best interest.

I am signing this agreement voluntarily, after consultation with my attorney, and I am not acting under duress or coercion or by virtue of any promises of leniency, except for those set forth in this agreement.

I am not now under the influence of any intoxicating liquor, a controlled substance or other drug which would in any manner impair my ability to comprehend or understand this agreement or the proceedings surrounding my entry of this plea.

⁷ As noted in footnote 5, Petitioner's Declaration has not been filed as of the time the State's response is due and should not be considered if it is filed in the future.

My attorney has answered all my questions regarding this guilty plea agreement and its consequences to my satisfaction and I am satisfied with the services provided by my attorney.

GPA at 4–5 (emphasis added).

Petitioner signed and agreed to the terms of the GPA, affirming that he was satisfied with his counsel's representations and that he discussed all possible defenses with counsel. Id. at 5. Petitioner's counsel, Mr. Robert Beckett, as an officer of this Court, affirmed that he fully explained and advised Petitioner regarding the GPA. Id. at 6. After Petitioner signed his GPA, he was thoroughly canvassed by this Court, and again affirmed that he was satisfied with counsel and that he discussed all potential defenses with counsel:

THE COURT: Before I can accept your plea of guilty, I have to be convinced that your plea is freely and voluntarily made. Are you making your plea freely and voluntarily?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Has anybody forced you or coerced you to accept that plea?

THE DEFENDANT: No.

THE COURT: Are you making that plea of guilty because you are, in fact, guilty of that charge?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Has your attorney made any promise to you that are not contained in the guilty plea agreement?

THE DEFENDANT: No.

THE COURT: Based on all the facts and circumstances, are you satisfied with the services of your attorney? THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

Reporter's Transcript, Entry of Plea (Feb. 4, 2019) ("RT: EOP") at 13 (emphasis added).

Because Petitioner does not offer any specific facts about how counsel supposedly pressured him into accepting a negotiation, and because he expressly represented the contrary to the Court, this Court should deny that claim.

The Court should also deny the claim that Petitioner was pressured into taking a contingent plea bargain because such 'pressure" does not render a plea involuntary as a matter of law. Caruso v. State, 486 P.3d 1285 (Nev. 2021)(unpub)(citing United States v. Williams, 827 F.3d 1134, 1164-65 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (explaining that "a plea deal contingent on a codefendant's guilty plea" did not violate defendant's due process rights); United States v. Gonzalez-Vazquez, 219 F.3d 37, 43 (1st Cir, 2000) (explaining that a "package deal" would not violate the defendants' constitutional rights); United States v. Seligsohn, 981 F.2d 1418,

1426 (3d Cir. 1992) ("Package deal plea bargains, in which a prosecutor makes an agreement with one defendant contingent upon a co-defendant also pleading guilty, are permissible provided that the defendant's decision to forego a trial is otherwise voluntary."), superseded by statute for other reasons as stated in United States v. Corrado, 53 F.3d 620, 624 (3d Cir. 1995); United States v. Wheat, 813 F.2d 1399, 1405 (9th Cir. 1987) (declining to declare "package-deal" plea bargains" per se impermissible)). Even if it were not, Petitioner fails to provide any specific facts that the plea was coercive beyond its contingent nature, and Petitioner's representations to the court that he was not coerced or pressured into accepting the plea belie that claim.

Finally, Petitioner claims that the plea was not voluntary because plea counsel failed to review discovery before advising Petitioner to accept the plea offer. Petition at 11–13.8 However, this claim is nothing but a bare and naked assertion that is belied by the record suitable only for summary denial.

In signing the GPA, Petitioner confirmed that counsel "answered all of [Petitioner's] questions regarding [the] guilty plea agreement and its consequences to [Petitioner's] satisfaction and [Petitioner was] satisfied by the services provided by [his] attorney." GPA at 5. Petitioner acknowledged that he understood that he was waiving his right to a jury trial. GPA at 4. During the plea canvass, Petitioner confirmed that he was waiving his right to challenge the evidence at trial. RT: EOP at 12. Petitioner has failed to articulate what other investigation or challenge to the evidence counsel should have engaged in, prior to Petitioner's guilty plea that would have resulted in Petitioner asserting his right to a jury trial in lieu of a guilty plea. Petitioner fails to assert what discovery counsel failed to review, how that discovery would have changed counsel's advice, or why that discovery would have cause Petitioner to reject the plea and instead proceed to trial. Indeed, the limited evidence reviewed by this Court at sentencing was horrific – no doubt a jury would have believed so as well. Accordingly, Petitioner has not demonstrated that counsel's performance fell below an

⁸ Once again, the only purported evidence of this is the unfiled Declaration, referenced previously in fn. 5 and 7.

objective standard of reasonableness or a reasonable probability that he would have refused to plead guilty and would have insisted on proceeding to trial.

Because petitioner fails to demonstrate that his plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered into, the claim should be denied.

D. Trial Counsel Effectively Prepared for Sentencing

Petitioner claims that counsel was ineffective at sentencing because counsel did not file a sentencing memorandum and did not "prepare" Petitioner to speak at sentencing. Petition at 13-14.9 Petitioner fails to demonstrate that counsel was deficient because filing a sentencing memorandum is not required, particularly where, as here, the range of potential sentences is relatively narrow. He fails to identify anything that counsel should have included in the sentencing memorandum or demonstrate that he provided anything to counsel that was not presented at sentencing. Nor does he demonstrate prejudice. Of the four co-defendants, only Castro filed a sentencing memorandum. Sentencing Memorandum on Behalf of Luis Castro, filed March 24, 2019. Castro received exactly the same sentence. It was not the lack of mitigation, but the abhorrent nature of the crimes the defendants committed that resulted in that sentence:

THE COURT: So here's the dilemma that I have, folks. I will generally try to be a merciful judge. I know as a Judge my job is to try to apply mercy and justice in a fair way to people. And I think most people would acknowledge that I try to give people probation when I have that opportunity, to give them at least one chance.

In this case I understand that drugs is a problem for most, if not all, of you, and that drugs and alcohol may have been the factor that caused some of these actions, but I don't know that I consider that an excuse. I don't know that I consider that a good reason to have committed horrific crimes.

I want to be merciful, but at the same time, I know that justice has to be done. And we have a victim who, but for the fact that he lived against what you all thought -- my understanding is not only was he tortured and mutilated in this room for a period of time, for a period of hours, but that everybody thought he was dead, tried to burn the house down around him. And if you had been successful in this, this would have been a capital murder case and you all would be looking at potentially a capital sentence.

⁹ See fn. 5, 7, 8, regarding the Declaration.

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I have a hard time with the pictures that I've seen and the horrible injuries that were inflicted upon this poor victim. I understand that he is not the pillar of our community either, but that doesn't justify the things that were done to him over \$50. And that almost makes it worse because that was the basis for this, is him not being able to come up with \$50.

Sentencing Transcript, March 26, 2019, at 22-23.

In addition to failing to identify anything that counsel should have put into a mitigation packet, Petitioner fails to identify anything else counsel should have done to prepare for sentencing, or in what way counsel should have better prepared Petitioner to speak at sentencing. Counsel argued, at length, that Petitioner should be given the opportunity for parole, Id. at 11-16. Counsel brough Petitioner's parents to sentencing, and explained what Petitioner hoped for if he was granted a chance for parole. Id. at 14-16. He explained that Petitioner's meth use drove Petitioner's acts, and he explained what Petitioner had been doing in jail to become a better person if he were ever able to be released. Id. at 11-16. When Petitioner addressed the Court, he also explained what he had done in jail to become a better person and explained what he hoped he could do if released. Id. at 17-18. He claimed that he was sorry, that he was remorseful, and that he took 'full responsibility." Id. at 16. But now he claims that there was something his attorney could have prepared him to say that somehow would have resulted in a lesser sentence - but he doesn't say what that could have been.

Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that counsel's decision not to file a sentencing memorandum, counsel's presentation at sentencing, or counsel's preparation on Petitioner for sentencing were deficient or that they resulted in any prejudice. Accordingly, the claims should be denied.

INSTANCES OF INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL CANNOT BE II. CUMULATED

In Ground Three, Petitioner claims appellate counsel's errors cumulated to create prejudice. Petition at 10-11. Similarly, in Ground Six, Petitioner claims trial counsel's errors cumulated to create prejudice. Petition at 14-15. However, the Nevada Supreme Court has not endorsed application of its direct appeal cumulative error standard to the post-conviction Strickland context. McConnell v. State, 125 Nev. 243, 259, 212 P.3d 307, 318 (2009). Nor

should cumulative error apply on post-conviction review. Middleton v. Roper, 455 F.3d 838, 851 (8th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1134, 1275 S. Ct. 980 (2007) ("a habeas petitioner cannot build a showing of prejudice on series of errors, none of which would by itself meet the prejudice test.").

Even if applicable, a finding of cumulative error in the context of a Strickland claim is extraordinarily rare and requires an extensive aggregation of errors. See, e.g., Harris By and through Ramseyer v. Wood, 64 F.3d 1432, 1438 (9th Cir. 1995). In fact, logic dictates that there can be no cumulative error where the petitioner fails to demonstrate any single violation of Strickland. Turner v. Quarterman, 481 F.3d 292, 301 (5th Cir. 2007) ("where individual allegations of error are not of constitutional stature or are not errors, there is 'nothing to cumulate.") (quoting Yohey v. Collins, 985 F.2d 222, 229 (5th Cir. 1993)); Hughes v. Epps, 694 F.Supp.2d 533, 563 (N.D. Miss. 2010) (citing Leal v. Dretke, 428 F.3d 543, 552-53 (5th Cir. 2005)).

Here, Petitioner failed to show cumulative error because there were no errors to cumulate. Petitioner failed to show how any of the above claims constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. Instead, all of Petitioner's claims are meritless. As such, Petitioner has failed to establish cumulative error, and therefore, this Court should deny the Amended Petition.

III. PETITIONER IS NOT ENTITLED TO AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING

NRS 34.770 determines when a defendant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing. NRS 34.770 reads:

1. The judge or justice, upon review of the return, answer and all supporting documents which are filed, shall determine whether an evidentiary hearing is required. A petitioner must not be discharged or committed to the custody of a person other than the respondent unless an evidentiary hearing is held.

2. If the judge or justice determines that the petitioner is not entitled to relief

2. If the judge or justice determines that the petitioner is not entitled to relief and an evidentiary hearing is not required, he shall dismiss the petition without a hearing.

3. If the judge or justice determines that an evidentiary hearing is required, he shall grant the writ and shall set a date for the hearing.

The Nevada Supreme Court has held that if a petition can be resolved without expanding the record, then no evidentiary hearing is necessary. Marshall v. State, 110 Nev.

1328, 885 P.2d 603 (1994); Mann v. State, 118 Nev. 351, 356, 46 P.3d 1228, 1231 (2002). A defendant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing if his petition is supported by specific factual allegations, which, if true, would entitle him to relief unless the factual allegations are repelled by the record. Marshall, 110 Nev. at 1331, 885 P.2d at 605; see also Hargrove v. State, 100 Nev. 498, 503, 686 P.2d 222, 225 (1984) (holding that "[a] defendant seeking post-conviction relief is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing on factual allegations belied or repelled by the record"). "A claim is 'belied' when it is contradicted or proven to be false by the record as it existed at the time the claim was made." Mann, 118 Nev. at 354, 46 P.3d at 1230 (2002).

It is improper to hold an evidentiary hearing simply to make a complete record. See State v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 121 Nev. 225, 234, 112 P.3d 1070, 1076 (2005) ("The district court considered itself the 'equivalent of . . . the trial judge' and consequently wanted 'to make as complete a record as possible.' This is an incorrect basis for an evidentiary hearing."). Further, the United States Supreme Court has held that an evidentiary hearing is not required simply because counsel's actions are challenged as being unreasonable strategic decisions. Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 788 (2011). Although courts may not indulge post hoc rationalization for counsel's decision making that contradicts the available evidence of counsel's actions, neither may they insist counsel confirm every aspect of the strategic basis for his or her actions. Id. There is a "strong presumption" that counsel's attention to certain issues to the exclusion of others reflects trial tactics rather than "sheer neglect." Id. (citing Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 124 S. Ct. 1 (2003)). Strickland calls for an inquiry in the objective reasonableness of counsel's performance, not counsel's subjective state of mind. 466 U.S. 668, 688, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2065 (1994).

Here, Petitioner requests "the Court hold an evidentiary hearing to further evaluate these claims..." Petition at 16. However, an evidentiary hearing is unnecessary, as each of Petitioner's claims are without merit and. Petitioner has failed to make specific factual assertions which, if true, would entitle him to relief and he has likewise failed to demonstrate that the record needs to be expanded through an evidentiary hearing. Any hearing is unnecessary given that Petitioner is unable to show prejudice. Petitioner would not be entitled

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1	to relief even if counsel were deficient. Thus, Petitioner's request for an evidentiary hearing
2	should be denied.
3	CONCLUSION
4	For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests Petitioner's Amended Petition
5	for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Post-Conviction) be DENIED.
6	DATED this day of May, 2022.
7	Respectfully submitted,
8	STEVEN B. WOLFSON
9	Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #1565
10	BY Kolut Sa for
11	JOHN AFSHAR
12	Deputy District Attorney Nevada Bar #14408
13	
14	CERTIFICATE OF ELECTRONIC FILING
15	I hereby certify that service of the above and foregoing was made this 20th day of
16	May 2022 by electronic filing to:
17	,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
18	Jim Hoffman, Esq. Jim.Hoffman.Esq@gmail.com
19	
20	BY: Via Kenn
21	Secretary for the District Attorney's Office
22	
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Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT **RTRAN** 1 2 3 4 DISTRICT COURT 5 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 6 7 8 EDWARD HONABACH, CASE#: A-20-812948-W 9 Plaintiff, DEPT. VII 10 VS. 11 WILLIAM GITTERE, 12 Defendant. 13 BEFORE THE HONORABLE LINDA MARIE BELL, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 14 TUESDAY, AUGUST 16, 2022 15 RECORDER'S TRANSCRIPT OF HEARING: 16 **EVIDENTIARY HEARING** 17 APPEARANCES: 18 SELESTE WYSE, ESQ. For the State: 19 **Deputy District Attorney** 20 21 For the Defendant: JIM HOFFMAN, ESQ., 22 23 24 RECORDED BY: KIMBERLY ESTALA, COURT RECORDER 25

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Electronically Filed 12/2/2022 11:07 AM

1	Las Vegas, Nevada, Tuesday, August 16, 2022
2	
3	[Case called at 9:21 a.m.]
4	THE COURT: Okay, State of Nevada versus Edward
5	Honabach. He's present here from the prison and it's set today for an
6	evidentiary hearing. So I'm not super inclined to grant a continuance.
7	MR. HOFFMAN: We're ready to proceed but I'm fine with the
8	continuance if Your Honor is fine with it.
9	MS. WYSE: I mean that's can you trail this one, Your
0	Honor, and I'll speak with defense counsel
1	THE COURT: Yes.
2	MS. WYSE: About it.
3	[Proceedings concluded at 9:21 a.m.]
4	[Case recalled at 10:08 a.m.]
5	THE COURT: 948. All right, Ms. Wyse?
6	MS. WYSE: So, Your Honor, it sounds like the Court's not
7	inclined to continue the hearing today. I'll be ready to go forward after
8	THE COURT: Okay, great.
9	MS. WYSE: you're hearing the next calendar.
20	THE COURT: Thank you.
21	[Proceedings concluded at 10:08 a.m.]
22	[Case recalled at 11:58 a.m.]
23	THE COURT: hearing on Mr. Honabach's post-conviction
24	motion. Can I get everybody's appearance for the record? Sir, you can
25	sit.

1		MR. HOFFMAN: Jim Hoffman for Mr. Honabach, 13896.
2		MS. WYSE: Seleste Wyse on behalf of the State, bar number
3	14971.	
4		THE COURT: All right, so go ahead and call your first
5	witness.	
6		MR. HOFFMAN: Sorry?
7		THE COURT: Witness.
8		MR. HOFFMAN: Yes, Mr. Honabach is my witness.
9		THE COURT: Okay.
10		MR. HOFFMAN: And we've discussed waiving attorney client
11	privilege	
12		THE COURT MARSHAL: He's the attorney's only one, Your
13	Honor.	
14		THE COURT: He's the only witness?
15		MR. HOFFMAN: I'm sorry, Your Honor, I'm deaf in one ear.
16		THE COURT: It's okay. He's the only witness?
17		MR. HOFFMAN: The only witness that I have, yes,
18		THE COURT: Okay.
19		MR. HOFFMAN: That may be why the State was trying to
20	continue	it.
21		MS. WYSE: That's not may we approach? I can explain
22	why we v	vere seeking to continue. It was for a different reason.
23		THE COURT: Okay.
24		MR. HOFFMAN: My mistake.
25		MS_WYSE: Because we weren't planning on calling any

witnesses. 1 2 THE COURT: Okay. I mean it's your hearing so -- all right, you know what sir, we'll just have you testify from right there because it 3 looks like you have a little bit of mobility issue. So if you want to raise 4 your right hand the clerk will swear you in. 5 EDWARD HONABACH 6 7 [having been called as a witness and being first duly sworn testified as follows: 8 THE CLERK: Please state your full name and spell your first 9 10 and last name for the record. 11 THE WITNESS: Edward Joseph Honabach. E-D-W-A-R-D H-O-N-A-B-A-C-H. 12 13 THE COURT: You can sit if you'd like sir. Go ahead. DIRECT EXAMINATION OF EDWARD HONABACH 14 BY MR. HOFFMAN: 15 Q So Mr. Honabach before we start we discussed that since 16 17 your speaking about your previous attorney's you would need to waive 18 your right to attorney client confidentiality as it related to this. Is that correct? 19 20 Α [No audiable response] 21 Q And are you okay with that waiver? 22 Α [No audiable response] THE COURT RECORDER: I can't hear him. 23

THE COURT MARSHAL: You need to speak up.

24

25

Α

Yes.

1	Q	All right, thank you. Okay, so first I'd like to talk about your trial
2	lawyer. V	Vho was your lawyer during the trial?
3	Α	Mr. Beckett.
4	Q	Beckett. And what was his first name?
5	Α	I'm not sure what his first name
6	Q	Was it Bob?
7	Α	Bob Beckett, yes, Bob Beckett.
8		THE COURT: Do we have I'm having trouble hearing him
9	as well.	
10		THE COURT MARSHAL: You need to speak up louder.
11		THE COURT: Perhaps we could just
12		THE RECORDER: Switch them? We have mic's on that side.
13	I don't know if that's	
14		THE COURT: Yeah that might be better if we can just have
15	him go o	ver there where there's microphones.
16		MS. WYSE: Do you want us to switch as well, Your Honor?
17	No, okay	•
18		THE COURT: Unless you want to. Okay.
19	BY MR. I	HOFFMAN:
20	Α	Bob Beckett.
21		THE COURT: Much better.
22	Q	All right, so I'm going to ask you some questions now about
23	Mr. Beck	ett's representation of you. So this case involved a plea deal, is
24	that correct?	
25	Δ	Yes

1	Q	What were your feelings about the deal?
2	Α	That I didn't want to take it.
3	Q	You didn't want to take it. Could you expand on that please?
4	Α	I didn't want to take it. I felt like, like it wasn't a good idea from
5	the get of	go. But Mr. Beckett insisted that if I ever wanted to see my family
6	again th	is was the only shot I had and so forth.
7	Q	Okay.
8		MS. WYSE: And Your Honor, I would just note for the record
9	that my	objection that he's testifying to things that someone else said not
10	persona	Ily what his I just wanted to note that objection for the record.
11		THE COURT: Hearsay objection?
12		MS. WYSE: Yes, Your Honor.
13		THE COURT: Mr. Hoffman?
14		MR. HOFFMAN: I'll rephrase.
15	Q	Mr. Honabach would you please not state anything directly
16	that any	one said to you.
17	Α	Okay.
18	Q	So without going into that sort of statement
19		THE COURT: And just for the record the objection was
20	sustaine	ed.
21		MS. WYSE: Thank you.
22		MR. HOFFMAN: Thank you.
23	Q	So did you feel like you had a free choice to accept the plea?
24	А	No.
25	Q	And without going into what specifically he said did Mr.

1	Beckett	say things to you that made you feel like you didn't have a free
2	choice?	
3	A	Yes.
4	Q	Now you the plea deal it was what's called a package deal,
5	is that co	orrect?
6	Α	Yeah.
7	Q	So there were other defendant's that were dependent on you
8	pleading	in order to also get their plea deals?
9	Α	Correct.
10	Q	Okay, were you concerned about what would happen if the
11	Judge didn't agree with the deal?	
12	Α	Yes.
13	Q	And how do you mean that?
14	Α	Well I I even asked, you know, what happens if I sign this
15	deal and	I the Judge doesn't go along with it. And I was simply told that I
16	just I h	nad to take it.
17	Q	But without
18		MS. WYSE: I'm going to object to hearsay.
19	Q	Sorry, again without going into specifically what he said to
20	you, wha	at he may have said to you. But the bottom line is you felt
21	pressure	ed into taking the deal, is that correct?
22	Α	Yes.
23	Q	Okay. And then changing topics were you ever able to see the
24	discover	ry in your case?
25	Α	No.

1	Q	No. Were you ever able to see the statements specifically of
2	your co-	defendants?
3	Α	No.
4	Q	And would you have liked to see those things?
5	Α	Yes.
6	Q	Did you ask Mr. Beckett about those things?
7	Α	Repeatedly.
8	Q	Did he ever let you see them?
9	Α	No.
10	Q	Okay, to your knowledge, and again remember please don't
11	say anything specifically that Mr. Beckett said. To your knowledge had	
12	he seen any of the discovery?	
13	Α	No.
14		MS. WYSE: And, Your Honor, objection speculation.
15		THE COURT: Sustained.
16	Q	What knowledge did you have of whether he had seen your
17	discove	ry?
18	Α	I was told by my investigator that
19	Q	And I'm sorry remember
20	Α	Oh okay, to my knowledge he hadn't received any of it.
21	Q	Okay, and that was information that you understood after
22	speaking	g with the investigator?
23	Α	Yes.
24	Q	Okay. Let me switch gears now and ask about sentencing. Did
25	Mr. Bec	kett write a sentencing memo for you?

1	Α	No.
2	Q	Did you want him to?
3	Α	Yes.
4	Q	Did you ask him to?
5	Α	Yes.
6	Q	Okay but he didn't? What about did he prepare you to speak
7	in court a	t all on the sentencing?
8	Α	No.
9	Q	Did you want him to do that?
0	Α	Absolutely.
1	Q	Did you ask him to do that?
2	Α	Repeatedly.
3	Q	Okay is there anything that you'd like to add about Mr.
4	Beckett?	Any other issues you had with him, or concerns?
5	Α	I think that probably covers it.
6	Q	Okay and then who was the lawyer for your appeal?
7	Α	Travis Atkins, Esquire.
8	Q	Okay, now he the record shows that he filed an appeal and
9	then with	drew it. Did you consent to that withdrawal?
20	Α	No.
21	Q	No. Did you so you didn't tell him to withdraw it?
22	Α	No, I wasn't even aware that he had until after I got a notice
23	from the	court.
24	Q	Okay, now there's in the exhibits here I'm referring to Exhibits I
25	think 4, 5	, and 6. So there's these are some letters that you wrote to

1	that?	
2	Α	Yes.
3	Q	Okay. And that conversation happened before he dismissed
4	the appe	al, is that correct?
5	А	Yes.
6	Q	Okay. And so this letter is dated February 14 th , 2020
7	according	g to the letter. Did you receive it?
8	А	No.
9	Q	No. And then in Exhibit 9 there's a letter that you sent to the
10	Supreme	Court which states you never I never received any letter
11	when I	never received any letter is what it materially says. So again
12	you didn	t receive that letter?
13	А	No.
14	Q	So he knew that you wanted to keep doing the appeal, is that
15	correct?	
16		MS. WYSE: Objection, Your Honor. I would object to
17	speculati	on he can't testify to what the attorney knew.
18		THE COURT: Sustained.
19	Q	You believed that he knew?
20	Α	Yes.
21	Q	Okay. You had conveyed that to him? You had clearly told
22	that.	
23	Α	Yes.
24	Q	And you wanted to file the appeal? You wanted to keep going
25	with the	appeal?

1	Α	Yes.
2		MR. HOFFMAN: All right, that's all I have. No further
3	questions	s, Your Honor.
4		THE COURT: All right, Ms. Wyse.
5		CROSS EXAMINATION OF EDWARD HONABACH
6	BY MS. V	WYSE:
7	Q	And then Mr., and I apologize if I butcher your last name, Mr.
8	Honabac	h you remember signing a guilty plea agreement in this case,
9	correct?	
10	Α	Yes.
11	Q	And then at that time you also had an opportunity do you
12	also reme	ember pleading guilty in this particular case?
13	Α	Yes.
14	Q	And the Court asked you several questions?
15	Α	Yes.
16	Q	Do you remember the court asking you if you plea was freely
17	and volur	ntarily made?
18	Α	Yes.
19	Q	And you responded that yes it was?
20	Α	Yes.
21	Q	Do you remember the Court asking you that anyone forced
22	you or co	erced you to accept your plea?
23	Α	Yes.
24	Q	And then you responded that no, no one had?
25	Α	Yes.

1	Q	Did you also inform the Court that your attorney at the time
2	had ans	wered any questions that you had about the guilty plea
3	agreem	ent?
4	Α	I don't recall.
5	Q	I'm referring to the plea canvass. Looks like the Court had
6	asked y	ou did you have a change to discuss it with your attorney, has he
7	answere	ed your questions and you responded yes. Do you remember
8	that?	
9	Α	I'll go along with you, yes.
10	Q	And ultimately you did sign the guilty plea agreement in this
11	case?	
12	Α	Yes.
13		MS. WYSE: No further questions, Your Honor.
14		THE COURT: All right, anything else?
15		REDIRECT EXAMINATION OF EDWARD HONABACH
16	BY MR.	HOFFMAN:
17	Q	So, there seems to be a discrepancy there between what you
18	said just	t now in court and what is reflected in that transcript. How would
19	you exp	lain that discrepancy?
20	Α	Well because well I can't explain without saying that hey
21	certain p	people have told me that
22		MS. WYSE: And objection, Your Honor, hearsay.
23	Α	If I wanted any chance to see my family again, if I wanted any
24	hope at	life I had to do this and I had to even though I raised those
25	objectio	ns that I want to put it on the record that I'm not comfortable I

1	was told	I can not do that.
2	Q	So without
3		MS. WYSE: Your Honor, I'd ask that be struck from the
4	record.	
5	Q	So you
6		THE COURT: Mr. Hoffman, do you want to respond to the
7	objection	1?
8		MR. HOFFMAN: I agree the use of the way he phrased it is
9	specifica	ally a problem.
10		THE COURT: So I will disregard his last answer.
11		MS. WYSE: Thank you.
12	BY MR. HOFFMAN:	
13	Q	So again without explaining how you got this perception. You
14	had a pe	erception at this time that you had to sign the deal if you wanted
15	to see your family again, is that correct?	
16	Α	Yes.
17	Q	Okay. And so that's why you stated that you were fine with
18	Α	Yes.
19	Q	assistance you received and that it was voluntary?
20	Α	Yes.
21	Q	But was it voluntary?
22	Α	No.
23	Q	And were you fine with the assistance that you received?
24	Α	No.
25	Q	Okay, and then one final point. This colloquy happened during

1	the trial phase, is that correct?	
2	Α	Yes.
3	Q	So it was before any of the stuff with the appeal?
4	Α	Yes.
5	Q	It was before Mr. Akin was even appointed?
6	Α	Yes.
7		MR. HOFFMAN: Okay, no further questions.
8		THE COURT: All right. Anything else Ms. Wyse?
9		MS. WYSE: No, Your Honor.
10		THE COURT: And no additional witnesses?
11		MR. HOFFMAN: No, Your Honor.
12		THE COURT: And none from the State?
13		MS. WYSE: None from the State, Your Honor.
14		THE COURT: All right, argument. I did want to say just for the
15	record the sentencing transcript was prepared and it was filed but it was	
16	actually not filed in	
17		MR. HOFFMAN: It was filed in
18		THE COURT: the right case it was filed in the co-
19	defendant's case.	
20		MR. HOFFMAN: That's correct, Your Honor.
21		THE COURT: Is it the 2 or the which one is it, Kim? It was
22	filed in C-16-314092-1. What event number?	
23		THE COURT RECORDER: 37, 38, and 41.
24		THE COURT: I don't think that's right. Oh wait a minute there
25	it is. It's	so it looks like it was filed on June 18 th of 2019 in that case

under our docket number 38 is the sentencing. Mr. Hoffman?

MR. HOFFMAN: Argument, Your Honor?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. HOFFMAN: So the thing I really want to stress here is the issue with the appeal. Because it's very clear from his testimony that he wanted to keep going with the appeal, that Mr. Akin did not get his consent before withdrawing it. And if you look at the exhibits there was this issue where he wrote the Court and told them he didn't consent. And so Mr. Akin responded to that with a letter of which doesn't actually dispute his account in any way. It says that he dismissed the appeal for the reasons that we spoke about at High Desert State Prison. So that's not actually saying that Mr. Honabach consented. Also that letter is, kind of like post hoc thing, it happened after -- it happened like 6 months after he dismissed the appeal.

And then I also wanted to stress there is the bar reprimand, which is Exhibit 11. And it says that around the same time he just completely failed to file several appeals in the Nevada Supreme Court. So I think the inference here is that for whatever reason, work load or whatever, that he couldn't file those other cases he just withdrew in this case instead of actually doing the work. So that I think is the strongest claim that Mr. Honabach has here. As far as the trial level claims of Mr. Beckett go I think we can just submit those on the briefings.

THE COURT: All right, thank you. Ms. Wyse?

MS. WYSE: And Your Honor, I won't go into too much detail because ultimately based on what we've heard today I think this can

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largely be relied on the briefings that were submitted by defense counsel as well as the State. I do want to note -- just to pretty much start ultimately today the burden was on the defense to have witnesses testify and things of that nature. However, all we've heard from was defendant himself and that's concerning because he's just making these bare assertions without any support. And what we can only rely on now is evidence that's been submitted, were looking at the plea canvass, the sentencing canvass, as well. So, Your Honor, given that I'm just going to briefly walk through some of the highlights of our response and like I said I've tried not to go into too much detail because I think largely we can rely on that. But it looks like, Your Honor, overall defendant has failed to show that the counsel was ineffective. I do note it looks like Notice of Appeal, even though an appellate brief hadn't been filed a Notice was filed in the case. Mr. Akin also filed that letter as pointed out by defense counsel. He filed it to the Supreme Court knowing that there was a discussion between him and his client and ultimately decided to withdraw the plea, which, is not surprising because since he's contesting what happened during his plea canvass. The more appropriate route would have been to do a *Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus* which is ultimately what was done here.

Next, let's see --

THE COURT: I did know that Mr. Akin was appointed specifically for the appeal by the Court.

MS. WYSE: Let me double check, Your Honor.

MR. HOFFMAN: I believe that's correct.

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MS. WYSE: Yes, so he was -- he was confirmed and he was able to ultimately confirm as counsel in order to discuss the potential options on appeal. Let's see -- and ultimately I -- ultimately Your Honor defendants -- defendant has failed to meet the burden establishing the fact that -- actually let me move on from that point, Your Honor.

And I just want to highlight the fact that *Notice of Appeal* was ultimately filed for the defendant. Yes it was withdrawn and no opening brief had been submitted but the petition was still submitted for this Court. Next, Your Honor, focusing on our next response was the fact that appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to challenge a voluntary miss of his plea on direct appeal. As we noted in our response that appellate counsel could not have been deficient for doing so filing it in direct appeal because it would be something to be done at postconviction proceedings which is outlined in our response. I submit on the fact and on our pleadings that his plea was knowingly and voluntarily entered into. We do have the plea canvass where in response to the Judge's questions he did state that he was not coerced or forced things of that nature. He also did openly sign the guilty plea agreement and again we don't have the two -- it's on the defendant it's his burden today we didn't have any testimony from what we refer to as trial counsel although he did plead guilty in this case. So again all we have is these bare naked assertions without any support. And that's why we can definitely highly rely on the plea canvass and the guilty plea agreement itself.

There's also some concern with his counsel not preparing a

1	sentencing memorandum. I do note that it looks like there was extensive
2	argument by counsel at sentencing. There's no statute requiring that
3	defense attorney file a sentencing memorandum it's completely a
4	strategic decision that's up to them. So there's also no merit behind that
5	argument as well. And not to belabor the point, Your Honor, I do submit
6	on our response at this time.
7	THE COURT: All right, anything else Mr. Hoffman?
8	MR. HOFFMAN: No, Your Honor.
9	THE COURT: Thank you. The Court will issue a written order
10	and we'll set a status check in 2 weeks on that. Nobody no one needs
11	to appear for that. I'm sorry, so Mr. Honabach does not need to be
12	transported it's just a status check for the basically for the Court. And
13	we'll probably have something out before that anyway but just for your
14	own purposes.
15	MR. HOFFMAN: Thank you.
16	MS. WYSE: Thank you.
17	THE CLERK: September 1 st at 8:30.
18	THE COURT: Great, thank you.
19	[Proceedings concluded at 12:21 p.m.]
20	* * * * *
21	ATTEST: I do hereby certify that I have truly and correctly transcribed the
22	audio/video proceedings in the above-entitled case to the best of my ability.
23	J 108A1
24	Linibilgestala
25	Kimberly Estala Court Recorder/Transcriber

ELECTRONICALLY SERVED 9/15/2022 12:15 PM

Electronically Filed 09/15/2022 12:15 PM CLERK OF THE COURT

A-20-812948-W

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EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

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EDWARD HONABACH,

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Petitioner, vs.

THE STATE OF NEVADA,

Dept. No. VII

Case No.

Respondents.

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DECISION AND ORDER

Petitioner Edward Honabach filed an Amended Post-Conviction Petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus seeking relief from his conviction for First Degree Kidnapping. Mr. Honabach's claims are
based on ineffective assistance of counsel related to his guilty plea. The matter came before the
Court for an evidentiary hearing on August 16, 2022, and the Court heard testimony from Mr.
Honabach. After review of the Petition and other papers, the testimony of witnesses, and the oral
argument of the parties, the Court denies Mr. Honabach's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

On April 12, 2016, the State charged Petitioner Mr. Honabach with multiple offenses related to the abduction and serious injury to Jose Ismael Salazar-Ortiz. On February 4, 2019, Mr. Honabach along with his three co-defendants pled guilty. An Amended Guilty Plea Agreement was filed in open court and Mr. Honabach pled guilty to one count of First Degree Kidnapping Resulting in Substantial Bodily Harm. The plea negotiation allowed for the State to argue for life without the possibility of parole and for the defense to argue for life with the possibility of parole. On March 26, 2019, Mr. Honabach was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. After sentencing, Mr. Honabach's counsel, Mr. Robert S. Beckett, Esq., withdrew from the case. The Court appointed Mr. Travis D. Akin, Esq. to serve as Mr. Honabach's appellate counsel.

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Prior to Mr. Akin's appointment, Mr. Honabach filed a Notice of Appeal. On August 13, 2019, Mr. Akin filed a Notice of Withdrawal of Appeal on behalf of Mr. Honabach. Mr. Akin represented he had explained the consequences of withdrawing the appeal and that Mr. Honabach consented to the voluntary dismissal. As a result, the Nevada Supreme Court dismissed the appeal. Following the dismissal, Mr. Honabach sent a letter to the Nevada Supreme Court asserting he did not consent to the dismissal of his appeal, did not have contact with Mr. Akin, and had been unaware that his appeal was dismissed.

Based on Mr. Honabach's letter, the Nevada Supreme Court ordered Mr. Akin to respond. Mr. Akin filed a copy of a letter he sent to Mr. Honabach. This letter indicated Mr. Akin and Mr. Honabach communicated about the dismissal of the appeal and that Mr. Akin intended to file a post-conviction petition for writ of habeas corpus on behalf of Mr. Honabach. On March 11, 2020, the Nevada Supreme Court ordered that the appeal would remain dismissed. Mr. Honabach then wrote another letter to the Nevada Supreme Court stating that he was unaware whether a petition was filed on his behalf. The Court determined no action would be taken regarding the letter.

On March 27, 2020, Mr. Akin filed a post-conviction petition for writ of habeas corpus on behalf of Mr. Honabach and asked the district court to appoint a replacement attorney to file a supplement. The district court denied the petition without any supplement, and denied a subsequent Motion to Reconsider.

Mr. Honabach filed an appeal of the denial of his petition. He prevailed on his appeal, and the matter was remanded for an evidentiary hearing.

The District Court appointed new counsel for Mr. Honabach, who filed an amended petition. The State responded on May 15, 2022. The matter came before the Court for an evidentiary hearing on August 16, 2022. At the evidentiary hearing, the Court heard testimony from Mr. Honabach, as well as arguments from both parties.

II. Discussion

Mr. Honabach raises six claims for relief, all related to ineffective assistance of counsel and the voluntariness of his plea. A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is analyzed under the two-part test laid out in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Under Strickland, a defendant

alleging ineffective assistance of counsel must show (1) that their counsel's performance was deficient, and (2) that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. Id. at 687. The Court may consider the two test elements in any order and need not consider both prongs if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on either one. Id. at 697.

Counsel's performance is deficient when their representation amounted to incompetence under prevailing professional norms, "not whether it deviated from best practices or most common custom." Harrington v. Richter, 563 U.S. 86, 88 (2011). To find prejudice to the defense in the second half of the Strickland test, the defendant must show "that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different."

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. "A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Id.

There is a presumption of effectiveness and the defendant must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that counsel was ineffective. Means v. State, 103 P.3d 25, 32-33 (Nev. 2004). A post-conviction petition's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel must be supported with specific factual allegations which would entitle a petitioner to relief if true; "bare" or "naked" allegations are not sufficient to show ineffectiveness of counsel. Hargrove v. State, 686 P.2d 222, 225 (Nev. 1984). NRS 34.735(6) states in part, "[Petitioner] must allege specific facts supporting the claims in the petition[.]... Failure to allege specific facts rather than just conclusions may cause your petition to be dismissed." (emphasis added).

A. Mr. Honabach is not entitled to relief because Mr. Honabach has not shown that his counsel was ineffective under <u>Strickland</u>.

The amended petition argues that the Judgment of Conviction should be vacated on seven grounds. The first three grounds allege errors made by Mr. Honabach's appellate attorney Mr. Akin. Grounds Four, Five, and Six allege errors made by trial counsel Mr. Beckett which resulted in ineffective assistance of counsel. The final Ground alleges that Mr. Honabach's guilty plea was not voluntary violating the Fifth Amendment. The State filed a response to the amended petition on May 26, 2022. The State argues that Mr. Honabach's first six grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel are unmeritorious, and that the final ground should not be considered due to Mr. Honabach freely

 and voluntarily entering into his guilty plea. The Court finds that Mr. Honabach is not entitled to relief on all grounds of the Petition.

1. Mr. Honabach failed to establish appellate counsel was ineffective for withdrawing Mr. Honabach's appeal without his consent.

In his first Ground, Mr. Honabach argues that his appellate counsel, Mr. Akin, was ineffective by withdrawing Mr. Honabach's appeal without his consent. Mr. Akin represented that he withdrew the appeal after explaining to and obtaining consent from Mr. Honabach. In the evidentiary hearing, Mr. Honabach testified that he had asked Mr. Akins not to withdraw his appeal. However, the record indicates that Mr. Akins communicated with Mr. Honabach via letter about the dismissal of the appeal and that Mr. Akin's had intended to file a post-conviction petition for writ of habeas corpus on behalf of Mr. Honabach. Mr. Akins was not at the evidentiary hearing to confirm Mr. Honabach's claims that he indeed communicated to Mr. Akins that he did not want to have his appeal withdrawn.

Mr. Honabach has not established that he had an issue to raise on appeal and that he would have been successful. As represented in <u>Toston</u>, the Nevada Supreme Court held that "counsel has a duty to file a direct appeal when the client's desire to challenge the conviction or sentence can be reasonably inferred from the totality of the circumstances, focusing on the information that counsel knew or should have known at the time." <u>Toston v. State</u>, 127 Nev. 979,267 P.3d 795, 801 (2011). There is no indication that Mr. Honabach reserved any issues for appeal, either in the Guilty Plea Agreement itself or in any of the record. Furthermore, under <u>Hargrove</u>, Mr. Honabach has not provided the Court with specific factual allegations that would entitle him to relief. Mr. Honabach's naked allegations during the evidentiary hearing do not meet this standard.

The Court finds that Mr. Honabach failed to demonstrate that counsel should have known he wanted an appeal and that withdrawing the appeal itself was deficient. Therefore, Mr. Honabach's Petition is denied on this Ground.

2. Mr. Honabach failed to establish appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the voluntariness of Mr. Honabach's plea on direct appeal.

Mr. Honabach's second Ground is that appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to challenge the voluntariness of Mr. Honabach's plea. The Court finds that Mr. Akins was not

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Challenges to the validity of a guilty plea and claims of ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel must be first pursued in post-conviction proceedings in the district court. Franklin v. State, 110 Nev. 750, 751-52, 877 P.2d 1058, 1059 (1994). Appellate counsel cannot be ineffective for failing to raise a claim that is inappropriate on direct appeal. Therefore, Mr. Honabach's Petition is denied on this Ground.

3. Appellate counsel's errors did not constitute cumulative error.

In his third Ground, Mr. Honabach argues that his trial and appellate counsel's errors cumulated to create prejudice. A finding of cumulative error in the context of a Strickland claim is extraordinarily rare and requires an extensive aggregation of errors. See, e.g., Harris By and through Ramseyer v. Wood, 64 F.3d 1432, 1438 (9 th Cir. 1995). There can be no cumulative error because Mr. Honabach fails to demonstrate that his appellate counsel violated Strickland. Mr. Honabach failed to establish that his appellate counsel was ineffective because Mr. Honabach did not show what claim he would have raised and that he would have likely succeeded on the merits. Mr. Akins had properly raised Mr. Honabach's claims in a timely filed petition instead of a direct appeal. Therefore, the Court denies Mr. Honabach's petition on this Ground.

4. Mr. Honabach failed to establish trial counsel was ineffective when trial counsel failed to review discovery.

In Ground 4 Mr. Honabach argues that his trial counsel was ineffective because he had failed to review discovery before advising Mr. Honabach to accept the plea offer. At the evidentiary hearing the Court heard testimony from Mr. Honabach relating to the conversations he had with his trial counsel. Mr. Honabach then testified that he would not have taken the plea deal had he known his counsel had failed to review all of the discovery. A post-conviction petitioner's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must be supported with specific factual allegations which would entitle a petitioner to relief if true; "bare" or "naked" allegations are not sufficient to show ineffectiveness of counsel. Hargrove v. State, 686 P.2d 222, 225 (Nev. 1984).

Mr. Honabach testified that the investigator told him Mr. Beckett had not reviewed the discovery. It is impossible for the Court to know what Mr. Beckett did or did not review without the

benefit of Mr. Beckett's testimony. Failure to review discovery prior to advising a client would be deficient performance however, Mr. Honabach failed to establish Mr. Beckett did not have or review discovery. The Court only heard testimony from Mr. Honabach himself and not his trial attorney. These allegations made at the evidentiary hearing are not supported by specific facts and can be considered "bare" allegations which are not enough to support a post-conviction petitioner's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel under <u>Hargrove</u>. The Court therefore denies Mr. Honabach's claim that his trial counsel was ineffective in regards to this Ground.

5. Mr. Honabach failed to establish trial counsel was ineffective during sentencing.

In Ground 5, Mr. Honabach argues that his trial counsel was ineffective because he failed to prepare him for sentencing and did not file a sentencing memorandum. After looking at the record and reviewing the evidentiary hearing, the Court finds that Mr. Honabach's counsel was not ineffective during sentencing. In regards to the sentencing memorandum, Mr. Honabach has failed to demonstrate that there was a reasonable probability of a different outcome absent counsel's alleged error. See Molina v. State, 120 Nev. 185, 192, 87 P.3d 533, 538 (2004) (providing that a petitioner claiming counsel did not conduct an adequate investigation must allege what the results of a better investigation would have been and how it would have affected the outcome of the proceedings). Of the four co-defendants, only one filed a sentencing memorandum and the same co-defendant received the exact same sentence. Mr. Honabach fails to demonstrate the probability of a different outcome because it was not the lack of mitigation, but the nature of the crimes the defendants committed that resulted in the sentence that was given:

THE COURT: In this case I understand that drugs is a problem for most, if not all, of you, and that drugs and alcohol may have been the factor that caused some of these actions, but I don't know that I consider that an excuse. I don't know that I consider that a good reason to have committed horrific crimes.

Sentencing Transcript, March 26, 2019, at 22.

Furthermore, during sentencing Counsel presented testimony as to why Mr. Honabach should be given a sentence that allowed parole, explained mitigating factors that contributed to his actions, such as Mr. Honabach's history of drug use leading up to the crime, how his prolonged drug

use affected his decision making during the crime, what Mr. Honabach had been doing to improve himself while in jail, and also explained what Mr. Honabach's hopes were if granted the opportunity of parole. <u>Id.</u> at 11-16. Under <u>Strickland</u>, Mr. Honabach has failed to demonstrate that his Counsel was deficient during sentencing. Therefore, the Court denies Mr. Honabach's petition on this Ground.

6. Trial counsel's errors did not cumulate to create prejudice.

In his sixth ground, Mr. Honabach argues that his trial counsel's errors cumulated to create prejudice. A finding of cumulative error in the context of a Strickland claim is extraordinarily rare and requires an extensive aggregation of errors. See, e.g., Harris By and through Ramseyer v. Wood, 64 F.3d 1432, 1438 (9 th Cir. 1995). Where individual allegations of error are not of constitutional stature or are not errors, there is nothing to cumulate. Turner v. Quarterman, 481 F.3d 292, 301 (5 th Cir. 2007). Mr. Honabach has failed to demonstrate that his trial counsel was ineffective by failing to review discovery because his allegations are not supported by specific facts and can be considered "naked" allegations which are not enough to support a post-conviction peitioner's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel under Hargrove. Moreover, Mr. Honabach failed to demonstrate that counsel's performance during sentencing fell below an objective standard of reasonableness or a reasonable probability of a different outcome absent counsel's alleged errors. Therefore, the Court denies Mr. Honabach's petition on this Ground.

B. The record demonstrates Mr. Honabach entered into the guilty plea agreement voluntarily.

In Ground 7, Mr. Honabach argues that he did not want to accept the plea deal, and that he took the deal because he felt pressured by his trial counsel. To be constitutionally valid under the Fifth Amendment, a guilty plea must be entered knowingly, willingly, and understandingly. North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37-38 (1985). Mr. Honabach stated that he did not enter into the Guilty Plea Agreement voluntarily, intelligently, and knowingly, because he was unaware that he could receive a sentence of life without the possibility of parole. Mr. Honabach also claims that his plea counsel was ineffective due to failing to advise him that he could receive a sentence of life without the possibility of parole.

1	However, the record would suggest that Mr. Honabach voluntarily accepted the plea deal.
2	On July 21, 2020, the District Court denied a previous petition for writ of habeas corpus filed by Mr.
3	Honabach stating that the Guilty Plea Agreement in this case clearly pointed out that "the State will
4	have the right to argue for life without the possibility of parole, and the defense will argue for life
5	with the possibility of Parole after fifteen (15) years." Furthermore, on February 4, 2019, the Court
6	had accepted Petitioner's guilty plea and affirmed that Mr. Honabach was satisfied with his
7	counsel's representation and his guilty plea was made freely and voluntarily:
8	
9	THE COURT: Before I can accept your plea of guilty, I have to be convinced that your plea is freely and voluntarily made. Are you making your plea freely and voluntarily?
10	MR. HONABACH: Yes, Your Honor. THE COURT: Has anybody forced you or coerced you to accept that plea?
11	MR. HONABACH: No.
12	THE COURT: Has your attorney made any promise to you that are not contained in the guilty plea agreement?
13	MR. HONABACH: No.
14	THE COURT: Based on all the facts and circumstances, are you satisfied with the services of
15	your attorney? MR. HONABACH: Yes.
16	Reporter's Transcript, Entry of Plea (Feb. 4, 2019).
17	Therefore, the Court denies Mr. Honabach's Petition on this Ground because he voluntarily
18	and freely entered into his plea.
19	III. Conclusion
20	Mr. Honabach's claims related to ineffective assistance of counsel do not show that his
21	counsel was both deficient and that the deficiency prejudiced Mr. Honabach's defense. Therefore,
22	Grounds One through Six are denied. The Court also finds that Mr. Honabach voluntarily and freely
23	entered into his guilty plea. Therefore, Ground Seven is denied and the Court denies Mr. Honabach's
24	petition for writ of habeas corpus.
25	DATED this day of September, 2022.
26	Dated this 15th day of September, 2022
27	LINDA MARIE BALLO
28	DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

6DA E12 7F94 D622 Linda Marie Bell Sistrict Court Judge

1 **CSERV** 2 DISTRICT COURT 3 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 4 5 Edward Honabach, Plaintiff(s) CASE NO: A-20-812948-W 6 DEPT. NO. Department 7 VS. 7 William Gittere, Defendant(s) 8 9 10 **AUTOMATED CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE** 11 This automated certificate of service was generated by the Eighth Judicial District Court. The foregoing Decision and Order was served via the court's electronic eFile system 12 to all recipients registered for e-Service on the above entitled case as listed below: 13 Service Date: 9/15/2022 14 Travis Akin travis@avalonlg.com 15 Jim Hoffman jim.hoffman.esq@gmail.com 16 17 Clark County DA pdmotions@clarkcountyda.com 18 Jim Hoffman, Esq. Jim.Hoffman.Esq@gmail.com 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26

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Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT 1 **NOASC** Jim Hoffman, Esq. 2 Nevada Bar No. 13896 3 PO Box 231246 Las Vegas, NV 89105 4 (702) 483-1816 jim.hoffman.esq@gmail.com 5 ATTORNEY FOR EDWARD HONABACH 6 EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 7 8 **CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA** 9 EDWARD HONABACH, Case No.: A-20-812948-W 10 Petitioner, 11 VS. 12 Department VII 13 THE STATE OF NEVADA ET AL., 14 NOTICE OF APPEAL Respondents 15 Notice is hereby given that EDWARD HONABACH, by and through 16 his counsel JIM HOFFMAN, ESQ., appeals the denial of his petition for post-17 18 conviction relief issued by the Court on September 15, 2022. 19 DATED: September 21, 2022 20 21 22 /s/ Jim Hoffman 23 JIM HOFFMAN, ESQ. 24 25 26 27 NOTICE OF APPEAL - 1

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Attorney for Edward Honabach

EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

EDWARD HONABACH,

Petitioner,

vs.

Case No.: A-20-812948-W

DECLARATION OF EDWARD

Respondent

STATE OF NEVADA ET AL.,

EDWARD HONABACH, by and through his counsel JIM HOFFMAN, ESQ., hereby files this Declaration. The Declaration is an exhibit to the Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, filed April 28, 2022, which was inadvertently not filed until the present date.

HONABACH

DATED: 8/15/22

/s/ Jim Hoffman

Jim Hoffman, Esq

DECLARATION OF EDWARD HONABACH - 1

DECLARATION OF EDWARD HONABACHI

- I, Edward Honabach, hereby declare that the following statements are true, under the penalty of perfury under Nevada and federal law.
 - My name is Edward Honabach. I am currently incarcenated at High Desert State Prison.
 - 2. My trial lawyer was Bob Beckett and my appeal lawyer was Travis Akin. I feel like both of them made mistakes that hurt my case.
 - 3. I did not want to take a plea deal in the first place. However, Mr. Beckett leaned on me to take the deal offered by the prosecutors. I was concerned about what would happen if the judge didn't agree to the deal, but Mr. Beckett told me I would just have to accept it. I felt pressured into taking the deal even though I wasn't comfortable with it.
 - 4. In addition, I never got to see the discovery in my case. I was especially concerned about seeing the statements of my co-defendants and other witnesses. I found out right before sentencing that Nkr. Beckett hadn't seen most of the discovery either. He told me that he had talked to the lawyers for the other defendants and that was good enough.
 - 5. I also think that Mr. Beckett should have written a sentencing memo, but he did not. He also did not prepare me to speak in court at the sentencing.
 - 6. As far as Mr. Akin, he withdrew my appeal without my consent. He said that I consented to do this, but I never did. In addition, I never received a letter from him, even though he told the Supreme Court he sent me one. I wanted to file an appeal and am upset that the appeal was withdrawm.

Edward Honobach

Signed under penalty of perjury on $\sqrt{29}$, 20

EDWARD HONABACH