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14	STEFANKO AND JONES, LTD., d/b/a RUBY CREST EMERGENCY		
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# 1 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA 2 UNITED HEALTHCARE INSURANCE COMPANY, a Connecticut corporation; UNITED HEALTHCARE SERVICES, INC., d/b/a UNITEDHEALTCARE, a Minnesota corporation; UMR, INC., 5 d/b/a UNITED MEDICAL RESOURCES, a Delaware corporation; SIERRA HEALTH AND LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., a Nevada corporation; and HEALTH PLAN OF NEVADA, INC., a Nevada 8 corporation, Appellants, 9 VS. 10 FREMONT EMERGENCY 11 SERVICES (MANDAVIA), LTD., a Nevada professional corporation; 12 TEAM PHYSICIANS OF NEVADA-MANDAVIA, P.C., a Nevada 13 professional corporation; CRUM STEFANKO AND JONES, LTD., d/b/a RUBY CREST EMERGENCY 14 MEDICINE, a Nevada professional 15 corporation, Respondents. 16 17 18 19 20

Supreme Court No. 85525 District Court No. A7292978

**OPPOSITION TO UNITED'S** MOTION TO EXTEND STAY **OF DISTRICT COURT'S** ORDER UNSEALING CERTAIN TRIAL EXHIBITS AND **TRANSCRIPTS** 

# Opposition to United's Motion to Extend Stay of District Court's Order Unsealing Certain Trial Exhibits and Transcripts

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After a five-week trial, a Clark County jury found that United engaged in unfair practices by systematically underpaying emergency-care providers who provide life-saving medical treatment to all patients seeking care, regardless of coverage status or ability to pay. During this public trial, livestreamed over the Internet, the jury listened to exhaustive witness testimony and viewed hundreds of exhibits, then found United guilty of oppression, fraud, and malice in its treatment of the plaintiff Health Care Providers. Now, United wants to delay as long as possible the public's access to the documents and testimony that support the jury's verdict.

This is nothing new. United's conduct in this case has been marked by persistent overuse of confidentiality designations. Of the approximately 61,000 documents United produced to the Health Care Providers, it designated more than 38,000 of them—over 63%—as attorneys' eyes only, and by doing so increased trial costs. *See* 1 App 4–5.<sup>1</sup>

United's overuse of confidentiality designations extended to its sealing efforts. In its motion to seal in the district court, United made no effort to meet

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Citations to "App" refer to Appellants' appendix. Citations to "Resp App" refer to Respondents' appendix.

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its burden by tying specific documents to actual trade secrets or other protectible information. Rather, United relied on broad generalizations to justify its request to seal over 100 exhibits, including documents that United itself had introduced in open court and discussed extensively without any effort to preserve confidentiality. See 3 App 455–58; 3 App 466–89; 1 App 9–10.

What's more, United asks this Court to seal trial transcripts that United originally did not try to seal at all. After ten months of post-judgment motion practice regarding United's effort to seal 123 trial exhibits during which United never moved to seal trial **transcripts**, United reversed course and suddenly requested redaction of the court record as well. 1 App 141; see 1 App 134.

The district court thoroughly and thoughtfully reviewed the material United sought to seal over the course of several hearings. After weighing United's interests and the countervailing interests of the public in open courts, the court issued a detailed order granting United's motion in part and denying it in part. 1 App 161–250; 2 App 251–98. There is no need to undo that work now, even temporarily.

Although United characterizes the district court's order as "unsealing" the trial record, these documents were never sealed in the first place. The district court denied in part United's motion to seal, and United is appealing that order. See 1 App. 88 (exhibits were "locked" during trial, not sealed). In other words,

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United's motion is a request to seal documents that United failed to establish should be sealed under the Nevada Rules for Sealing and Redacting Court Records. It should be viewed through that lens.

#### I. LEGAL STANDARD

### **Motion to Seal**

The open courts presumption in Nevada is well-established. Del Papa v. Steffen, 112 Nev. 369, 374, 915 P.2d 245, 248 (1996) (recognizing that the public has a right to access proceedings in civil cases under state law and the U.S. Constitution). Unless otherwise provided by law, the "sitting of every court of justice shall be public." NRS 1.090. "Every trial on the merits must be conducted in open court." NRCP 77(b). This Court has recognized this strong policy in the Nevada Rules for Sealing and Redacting Court Records: "All court records in civil actions are available to the public, except as otherwise provided in these rules or by statute." SRCR 1(3).

A court may only seal records after finding that "the specific sealing or redaction is justified by identified compelling privacy or safety interests that outweigh the public interest in access to the court record." SRCR 3(4). Grounds supporting sealing include that the "sealing or redaction is necessary to protect intellectual proprietary or property interests such as trade secrets as defined in NRS 600A.030(5)" or other compelling circumstances. SRCR3(4). If a court

seals records, it must use the least restrictive means and duration. SRCR 3(6).

### **B.** Motion to Stay

When considering motions to stay, this Court considers the following factors: (1) whether the object of the appeal will be defeated if the stay is denied; (2) whether the appellant will suffer irreparable or serious injury if the stay is denied; (3) whether the respondent will suffer irreparable or serious injury if the stay is granted; and (4) whether the appellant is likely to prevail on the merits in the appeal. NRAP 8(c). As discussed below, these factors weigh against granting United's requested stay.

### II. ARGUMENT

### A. United is unlikely to prevail on the merits.

Fundamentally, United's motion to extend the stay should be denied because United provided insufficient evidence to overcome the presumption of an open court and open trial record in the first instance.

## 1. The public interest in this trial was significant.

The public took a significant interest in this trial. Two media requests were granted and the public audience sometimes stretched the livestreaming software to its limit. 1 App 3–4; 3 App 449. Based on the trial record alone, the internet audience ranged from 41 (the entire capacity of the physical courtroom, pursuant to fire marshal restrictions) to 198. 1 App 4.

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#### 2. United asks to protect stale, outdated information.

The information United wants to shield from public view cannot have proprietary or trade-secret value because it is stale. See, e.g., United States v. Int'l Bus. Mach. Corp., 67 F.R.D. 40, 46 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (noting that "disclosure of two-and-a-half-year-old sales data" will not result in a "clearly defined, serious injury"). Even a matter of months can render information stale. See, e.g., Katch, LLC v. Sweetser, 143 F. Supp. 3d 854, 869 (D. Minn. 2015) (information over a month old was stale or would soon become so); Lexis-Nexis v. Beer, 41 F. Supp. 2d 950, 959 (D. Minn. 1999) (noting four-month-old information would be of little value and thus not a trade secret).

By the time of trial, the majority of the exhibits United sought to seal were well over two years old; many were five to fifteen years out of date. 1 App 6; 1 App 18–19. Since then, yet another year has passed. It is United's burden to explain "why the information contained [within these old documents] is not already so stale as to no longer be proprietary and/or harmful." Talking Rain Beverage Co., Inc. v. DS Servs. of Am., Inc., No. 15-cv-1804, 2017 WL 2806831, at \*2 (W.D. Wash. June 29, 2017); see also Glob. Material Techs., Inc. v. Dazheng Metal Fibre Co., 133 F. Supp. 3d 1079, 1085 (N.D. Ill. 2015) (finding that the party seeking to prevent disclosure bears the burden of "establish[ing] good cause and explain[ing] with particularity why the information is not stale").

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Indeed, "the lapse of time" since the creation of these documents "makes it highly unlikely that any exposure" to their contents could be used to United's detriment. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co. v. Am. Dairy & Food Consulting Lab'ys, Inc., No. 09-cv-0914, 2010 WL 2510999, at \*6 (E.D. Cal. June 17, 2010).

Instead of providing evidence to meet that burden, however, United provided only conclusory declarations and vague descriptions of "commercially sensitive" information. 3 App 466–89; 3 App 509–13. None of the evidence addressed how years'-old information is relevant in today's market.

#### **3.** United is not pursuing the least restrictive means.

Under the Nevada Rules for Sealing and Redacting Court Records, a court must use the least restrictive means and duration for any sealing or redacting order. SRCR 3(5)–(6). United's request, on the other hand, seeks to hide broad swaths of information.

For example, United requested to seal DX4569, an exhibit that United moved into evidence and shared on the public courtroom screens without limitation. 1 App 9; 1 Resp App 6–14. In response to questions from United's counsel, United's witness explained the document, the basis for putting it together, and the business concerns related to the email. *Id.* Yet despite affirmatively introducing this evidence into the public trial proceedings, United now seeks to seal almost every percentage or number in the document (other than

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dates and Medicare references) without any particularized justification.

The same is true for DX4048, DX4478, DX4573, DX5505, DX5506, and DX5507. United moved each exhibit into evidence without any limitation on its use or mention of any confidentiality. 1 App 9–10; 1 Resp App 19. Likewise, United requests to seal documents relating to its nominal payments for ER services, an average of \$246 per claim, a figure United elicited from its own witness during trial. 1 Resp App 38–39. United is unlikely to succeed in its appeal of this order.

#### The sealing issue is peripheral to United's appeal. **B.**

Denying United's request to seal this non-confidential material will not affect the purpose of United's overall appeal. The jury awarded a \$62,450,182.29 verdict against United. 1 Resp App 21–30; 1 Resp App 31–32. In response, United filed a 147-page motion for new trial, a 38-page motion for judgment as a matter of law, and a 16-page motion for remittitur and to alter or amend the judgment, none of which even discussed the sealing issue. 1 Resp App 33–195; 2 Resp App 262–308; 2 Resp App 311–27. It is unlikely that United will devote significant attention to these documents on appeal, if it even addresses them at all.

#### Disclosing this stale information will not harm United. C.

The problem with United's harm argument is that United never established

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that the release of the material at issue would cause it harm in the first place. Instead, United simply relied then, as it does now, on generalizations and unsupported claims that the materials were competitively sensitive. The exhibits United seeks to protect include business plans and revenue projections for bygone years and other financial information that would be disclosed in SEC-mandated filings. See, e.g., 3 App 553–65 and 4 App 566–98 (DX4048); 4 App 604–17 (DX4478); 4 App 623–36 (DX4573); 5 App 845 (DX5504); 5 App 847–1065 and 6 App 1066–90 (DX5505); 6 App 1105–73 (DX5507). Simply claiming that these materials are "competitively sensitive" is not enough.

United's sole example of alleged harm is not even harm to United. United claims that the disclosure of certain documents during the trial caused non-party MultiPlan's stock to drop six points. Motion at 4–5. In fact, as the Health Care Providers explained to the trial court, within two weeks of the alleged damaging disclosure, MultiPlan's stock price was higher than it had been immediately before the documents were disclosed. 1 App 12. United cannot and does not show that MultiPlan's stock price was affected by anything other than normal market fluctuations. 1 App 12–13.

Other information United wishes to seal includes benefit information that is widely disseminated. For example, United's proposed reductions to PX473 seek to protect information including the allowed amount for members' claims,

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the amount actually paid to the provider, coinsurance amounts, and similar information. 1 App 11. These allowed amounts and related information were discussed extensively during trial without any confidentiality objection by United. See id. The only "harm" that United could suffer from disclosure of this trial information is the potential for the public to know how little United actually reimburses emergency-care providers.

As for the testimony United wishes to redact from the trial transcripts, this was testimony made in open court during a livestreamed trial to which United did not pose a contemporaneous objection. 3 App 319–20; 325–27. If United were truly at risk of irreparable harm, it would have objected at trial.

#### D. Further needless delay harms the public's interest in open courts.

United continues to tout a narrative that the Health Care Providers are "egregious billers" whose charges for lifesaving emergency medical care cause "financial hardship." 1 Resp App 164. There can be little doubt that United's continuing efforts to shroud the trial evidence in secrecy are designed to prevent the public from seeing proof that United's narrative is false. But the primary interest at issue is the interest of the public and the court system in maintaining openness and transparency. See SRCR 1(3). As long as United is able to withhold nonconfidential court documents from the public, that interest is harmed.

# III. CONCLUSION

United was unable to meet its burden to seal this information in the trial court. The public has an interest in accessing court records in a case about the important healthcare issue of emergency medical reimbursements. Plaintiff Health Care Providers respectfully request this Court to deny United's motion.

Dated this 10th day of November, 2022.

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