IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

TULY LEPOLO,

Appellant,

VS.

STATE OF NEVADA,

Respondent,

Supreme Court Case Electronically Filed Nov 13 2023 10:31 PM Elizabeth A. Brown District Court Case Noter 20 Subject Court

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

1 2 3 TULY LEPOLO, 4 Supreme Court Case No.: 85631 5 Appellant, District Court Case No.: C-20-345911-1 6 7 VS. 8 STATE OF NEVADA, 9 Respondent, 10 11 12 13 **ARGUMENT** 14 I. **THIS** COURT SHOULD CONSIDER 15 **NEITHER** THE STATEMENT OF FACTS IN THE STATE'S ANSWERING 16 **NOR** APPELLANT'S **PRESENTENCE** BRIEF 17 INVESITGATION REPORT 18 This Court has stated that "[c]ontentions unsupported by specific 19 20 argument or authority should be summarily rejected on appeal." State v. 21 22 Haberstroh, 119 Nev. 173, 187, 69 P.3d 676, 685-86 (2003), citing Mazzan v. 23 Warden, 116 Nev. 48, 75, 993 P.2d 25, 42 (2000). 24 25 In its Answering Brief, the State improperly copied and pasted the 26 27 synopsis of the event from the Presentence Investigation Report ("PSI") as 28

its Statement of Facts. Answering Brief ("AB") 2-5. Furthermore, the State moved this Court for an order directing the district court to transmit Appellant's PSI, which contains unfavorable facts about his criminal history that are irrelevant to the issues raised in his Opening Brief.

The synopsis in the PSI is not part of the trial record. It is a synopsis written by a third party and does not contain witness testimony or any evidence from trial. It appears to contain only information gleaned from police reports, which is not evidence presented to a jury. Therefore, this Court should not consider the State's Statement of Facts section in its Answering Brief or Appellant's PSI as dispositive of or material to any issue raised on appeal.

II. THE STATE DID NOT RESPOND TO APPELLANT'S ARGUMENT REGARDING THE VOLUNTARINESS OF HIS STATEMENT TO DETECTIVES

Appellant argued that the district court committed error when it determined that he did not have any intellectual deficits or lack education because he was "very responsive to the questioned asked, answers appropriately and asked appropriate questions back" as part of the

voluntariness Opening Brief ("OB") 16 citing to 5 AA 881 This determination was made as part of the legal analysis the district court conducted in determining the voluntariness of Appellant's statement to detectives.

Appellant went on to argue in his Opening Brief that his inability to finish a sentence, his non-responsiveness at times, and the slurring of his words combined with his failure to understand some simple concepts all indicate that he is lacking intelligence and education. OB 16-17.

Not only did the State fail to address any of the voluntariness factors when discussing this issue at trial¹, it failed to respond to this specific argument, discussed *supra*, in its Answering Brief. In it's brief, the State did nothing more than reiterate what the district court's analysis was on the factors to be considered as part of totality of the circumstances when ruling on a Motion to Suppress based upon the voluntariness of a statement. AB 9-10. The State did not address Appellant's specific argument regarding the district court's error in finding him intelligent and not lacking in education

¹ AA 838-40.

simply based upon his responsiveness in a short conversation. This constitutes confession of error.² Polk v. State, 126 Nev. Adv. Op. 19, ____, 233 P.3d 357, 361 (2010); see also NRS 49.005(3).

III. APPELLANT'S CASE IS DISTINGUISHABLE FROM <u>HARTE V. STATE</u> AND <u>DIETZ V. STATE</u>

In response to Appellant's argument that he invoked his Fifth Amendment Right to Counsel, the State cites to <u>Harte v. State</u>³ and <u>Dietz v. State</u>⁴, cases in which this Court found the defendant's request for an attorney to be ambiguous and equivocal, to support the argument that Appellant's statement did not constitute an unequivocal and unambiguous request for an attorney. Appellant disagrees with this assertion.

² <u>See Bates v. Chronister</u>, 100 Nev. 675, 681–82, 691 P.2d 865, 870 (1984) (treating the respondent's failure to respond to the appellant's argument as a confession of error); <u>see also A Minor v. Mineral Co. Juv. Dep't</u>, 95 Nev. 248, 249, 592 P.2d 172, 173 (1979) (determining that the answering brief was silent on the issue in question, resulting in a confession of error); <u>see also Moore v. State</u>, 93 Nev. 645, 647, 572 P.2d 216, 217 (1977) (concluding that even though the State acknowledged the issue on appeal, it failed to supply any analysis, legal or otherwise, to support its position and "effect[ively] filed no brief at all," which constituted confession of error), overruled on other grounds by <u>Miller v. State</u>, 121 Nev. 92, 95–96, 110 P.3d 53, 56 (2005).

³ 116 Nev.1054, 13 P.3d 420 (2000).

⁴ 124 Nev. 1462, 238 P.3d 806 (2008).

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In <u>Harte</u>, the defendant made numerous statements about an attorney but each one contained modifiers, such as, "when," "should," and "they told me." which made the statements equivocal and ambiguous. <u>Harte</u>, 116 Nev. 1062-63, 13 P.3d at 426.

Here, Appellant made a very simple statement: "It's time to get a lawyer." No questioning, modifiers, request for clarification of rights, or temporal uncertainty. *See*, *e.g.*, <u>Alvarez v. Gomez</u>, 185 F.3d 995, 998 (9th Cir. 1999); <u>People v. Harris</u>, 191 Colo. 234, 552 P.2d 10, 11-13 (Colo. 1976); <u>See Smith v. Endell</u>, 860 F.2d 1528, 1531 (9th Cir. 1988).

In <u>Harte</u>, following the first mention of lawyer with the statement, "Just out of curiosity, when do I get to talk to a lawyer?" the questioning officers asked follow-up questions to clarify his statement as permitted by <u>Edwards v. Arizona</u>, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981).

DEPUTY: .. okay. Well, that's the whole idea of the rights there if you don't ..

HARTE: Yeah.

DEPUTY: .. want to talk to us that's fine. Yeah. You know, that . . that's the whole idea of the rights. That's why.

HARTE: Yeah, yeah, I...

DEPUTY: If you wanna talk to us or.

Harte, 116 Nev. 1062-63, 13 P.3d at 426.

Here, Appellant stated, "It's time to get a lawyer," and then stopped speaking. Detectives do not ask any follow up question to clarify the statement and instead Detective Sanborn simply responded in the affirmative, "yeah." Appellant made one more statement reiterating what he previously had said about not remembering anything because he was intoxicated. See Recording at 12:37. At 13:06, a mere twenty-seven seconds after he invoked his right to counsel, detectives begin questioning Appellant again. See Recording at 13:06. Detective conducted no clarification questioning.

In <u>Harte</u>, this Court also came to the conclusion that the defendant chose not to invoke those rights during the interviews based on his perception of how much incriminating evidence law enforcement already possessed. This portion of the <u>Harte</u> decision was not mentioned by the State in its Answering Brief:

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"It is apparent that he chose not to invoke those rights during the interview based on his assessment of how much incriminating evidence deputies already possessed. For instance, following the above-emphasized statements, Harte told deputies that if they wished "to get to the bottom of things," they should state two specific facts that only Sirex would know. Deputies told Harte that they knew about a body microphone that he wore during the crime and knew that Babb was following the taxicab and listening during the crime. When Harte later made a full confession, he stated that he would tell deputies what happened since they knew more than they could without being told by one of the participants and that Harte had to make sure deputies "got" him before he "blabbed." Afterward, Harte acknowledged that he felt better talking about the crime. Thus, our review of the record does not demonstrate any real confusion regarding his rights, but instead shows that he was contemplating his options with regard to exercising those rights."

Harte, 116 Nev. 1064, 13 P.3d at 427.

Here, Appellant did not make any statement indicating that he wanted to tell detectives what happened; that he thought there was a significant amount of evidence against him; or that he felt better after talking to detectives.

The State also cites to <u>Dietz</u> in support of its argument that "it's time to get an attorney," does not constitute an unequivocal and

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unambiguous request for an attorney. ⁵ In <u>Dietz</u>, the defendant asked two questions regarding an attorney to which the detective responded with clarification of his rights:

Dietz: It's all right. Should I have an attorney here?

Detective: Huh?

Dietz: Should I have an attorney?

Detective: It's up to you.

Dietz: Cuz, I don't know what I'm doing.

Detective: If you don't want to speak with us anymore,

that's your right.

Dietz, 124 Nev. 1462, 238 P.3d 806 (2008).

The question Dietz asked was whether or not he *should* get an attorney. This is markedly different from saying, "it's time to get an attorney." The former is asking for advice on what to do and the later is making a firm statement on what needs to be done. Additionally, the detective responded to <u>Dietz</u> asking for advice about getting an attorney with clarification of his rights whereas here, detective Sanbourn responded

⁵ It should be noted that the citation the State provided for <u>Deitz v. State</u> in its Answering Brief does not yield a decision in Lexis. The State also does not use any pinpoint citations for <u>Dietz</u> in its discussion of the case. Appellant's counsel attempted to locate the decision used various search terms and was unsuccessful. Appellant simply responds to the State's discussion and citation to Dietz on face value.

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with, "yeah."

Appellant's case is distinguishable from Harte and Dietz and therefore neither decision is dispositive of the question: Does "it's time to get an attorney," constitute an unequivocal and unambiguous request for an attorney pursuant to Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 458, 114 S. Ct. 2350, 129 (1994) and Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484-85.

It is clear that Appellant's statement was an unambiguous and unequivocal request for the assistance of counsel during questioning. There is no other reason why he would make such a statement while being questioned by detectives about whether or not he was the shooter in a murder case after being taken into custody and told that police had search warrants for his car and home. The district court agreed that Appellant requested an attorney. 5 AA 882-883. However the district court then said Appellant reinitiated it. Even if Appellant was re mirandized after he spoke another thought after his invocation, is of no consequence because his prior request for an attorney precluded any further interrogation under the circumstances presented. Carter v. State, 129 Nev. 244, 240, 299 P.3d 367

1	(2013). It was error for the district court to deny Appellant's Motion to		
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3	Suppress his statement and this prejudiced Appellant.		
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5	<u>CONCLUSION</u>		
6	Based upon the arguments herein, <i>supra</i> , TULY LEPOLO's conviction		
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8	should be REVERSED and his case REMANDED for a new trial.		
9	Dated this <u>13th</u> day of November, 2023.		
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13	Respectfully submitted,		
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15	<u>/s/ Jean J. Schwartzer</u> JEAN J. SCHWARTZER, ESQ		
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CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

2	1. I hereby certify that this brief complies with the formatting		
3	in Thereby certify that this pries complies with the formatting		
4	requirements of NRAP 32(a)(4), the typeface requirements of NRAP		
5 6	32(a)(5) and the type style requirements of NRAP 32(a)(6) because:		
7 8	[X] This brief has been prepared in a proportionally spaced typeface		
9	using Microsoft Word 2010 Edition in Palatino Linotype 14 point font; or		
10 11	[] This brief has been prepared in a monospaced typeface using [state		
12	name and version of word-processing program] with [state number of		
13 14	characters per inch and name of type style].		
15 16	2. This brief exceeds the with the page- or type-volume limitations of		
17	NRAP 32(a)(7) because, excluding the parts of the brief exempted by NRAF		
18 19	32(a)(7)(C), it is either:		
20	[] Proportionately spaced, has a typeface of 14 points or more, and		
21 22	contains words; or		
23	[] Monospaced, has or fewer characters per inch, and contains		
2425	words or lines of text; or		
2627	[X] Does not exceed 30 pages.		

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3. Finally, I hereby certify that I have read this appellate brief, and to the best of my knowledge, information, and belief, it is not frivolous or interposed for any improper purpose. I further certify that this brief complies with all applicable Nevada Rules of Appellate Procedure, in particular NRAP 28(e)(1), which requires every assertion in the brief regarding matters in the record to be supported by a reference to the page and volume number, if any, of the transcript or appendix where the matter relied on is to be found. I understand that I may be subject to sanctions in the event that the accompanying brief is not in conformity with the requirements of the Nevada Rules of Appellate Procedure.

DATED this <u>13th</u> day of November, 2023.

/s/ Jean J. Schwartzer

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 1 2 I HEREBY CERTIFY AND AFFIRM that this document was filed 3 4 electronically with the Nevada Supreme Court on the 13th of November, 5 2023. Electronic Service of the foregoing document shall be made in 6 7 accordance with the Master Service List as follows: 8 AARON FORD, ESQ. 9 Nevada Attorney General 10 ALEXANDER G. CHEN, ESQ. Chief Deputy District Attorney 11 12 I further certify that I served a copy of this document by mailing a 13 true and correct copy thereof, postage pre-paid, addressed to: 14 15 Tuly Lepolo 16 Inmate No: 1262001 High Desert Prison 17 P.O. Box 650 18 Indian Springs, Nevada 89070-0650 19 20 /s/ Jean J. Schwartzer 21 JEAN J. SCHWARTZER, ESO Nevada State Bar No. 11223 22 Law Office of Jean J. Schwartzer 23 411 E. Bonneville Avenue, Suite#360 24 Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 25 (702) 979-9941

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