

Electronically Filed
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Elizabeth A. Brown
Clerk of Supreme Court

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DEANNA L. FORBUSH, ESQ.

Nevada Bar No. 6646

dforbush@foxrothschild.com

COLLEEN E. MCCARTY, ESQ.

Nevada Bar No. 13186

cmccarty@foxrothschild.com

FOX ROTHSCHILD LLP

1980 Festival Plaza Drive, Suite 700

Las Vegas, Nevada 89135

Telephone: (702) 262-6899

Facsimile: (702) 597-5503

Attorneys for Plaintiff

Nevada Policy Research Institute

DISTRICT COURT

CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

NEVADA POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE, a
Nevada domestic nonprofit corporation,

Plaintiff,

vs.

NICOLE J. CANNIZZARO, an individual engaging
in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate
and Clark County District Attorney; KASINA
DOUGLASS-BOONE, an individual engaging in
dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly
and Clark County School District; JASON
FRIERSON, an individual engaging in dual
employment with the Nevada State Assembly and
Clark County Public Defender; OSVALDO FUMO,
an individual engaging in dual employment with the
Nevada State Assembly and University of Nevada,
Las Vegas; HEIDI SEEVERS GANSERT, an
individual engaging in dual employment with the
Nevada State Senate and University of Nevada,
Reno; GLEN LEAVITT, an individual engaging in
dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly
and Regional Transportation Commission;
BRITTNEY MILLER, an individual engaging in
dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly
and Clark County School District; DINA NEAL, an

Case No.: A-20-817757-C

Dept. No.: VIII

NOTICE OF APPEAL

individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Nevada State College; JAMES OHRENSCHALL, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate and Clark County Public Defender; MELANIE SCHEIBLE, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate and Clark County District Attorney; TERESA BENITEZ-THOMPSON, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and University of Nevada, Reno; and SELENA TORRES, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Clark County School District,

Defendants,

and Legislature of the State of Nevada,

Intervenor-Defendant.

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that Plaintiff, Nevada Policy Research Institute (“NPRI”), by and through its attorneys of record, Deanna L. Forbush, Esq. and Colleen E. McCarty, Esq., of Fox Rothschild LLP, hereby appeals to the Supreme Court of Nevada from the Order granting dismissal of this matter and denying other requested relief, entered in this action on January 4, 2023 and noticed on January 5, 2023.

Dated this 6th day of January, 2023.

FOX ROTHSCHILD LLP

By: /s/ Deanna L. Forbush

DEANNA L. FORBUSH

Nevada Bar No. 6646

COLLEEN E. MCCARTY

Nevada Bar No. 13186

1980 Festival Plaza Drive, Suite 700

Las Vegas, Nevada 89135

Telephone: (702) 262-6899

Attorneys for Plaintiff

Nevada Policy Research Institute

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Pursuant to NRCP 5(b), I certify that I am an employee of Fox Rothschild LLP and that on this 6th day of January, 2023, the foregoing document entitled **NOTICE OF APPEAL** was caused to be served upon each of the parties, listed below, via electronic service through the Eighth Judicial District Court's Odyssey E-File and Serve system.


Berna L. Rhodes-Ford, General Counsel
Nevada State College
1300 Nevada State Drive, RSC 374
Henderson, Nevada 89002
Email: berna.rhodes-ford@nsc.edu
Attorney for Defendant Dina Neal

Jonathan D. Blum, Esq.
Wiley Petersen
1050 Indigo Drive, Suite 200B
Las Vegas, Nevada 89145
Email: jblum@wileypetersenlaw.com
Attorney for Defendant James Ohrenschall

Bradley Schrager, Esq.
Royi Moas, Esq.
Daniel Bravo, Esq.
Wolf, Rifkin, Shapiro, Schulman & Rabkin, LLP
3773 Howard Hughes Parkway, Suite 590 South
Las Vegas, Nevada 89169
Email: bschrager@wrslawyers.com
Email: rmoas@wrslawyers.com
Email: dbravo@wrslawyers.com
*Attorneys for Defendants Brittney Miller and
Selena Torres*

Kevin C. Powers, General Counsel
Legislative Counsel Bureau, Legal Division
401 S. Carson Street
Carson City, Nevada 89701
Email: kpowers@lcb.state.nv.us
Attorney for Nevada Legislature

/s/ Deborah L. Pressley
An Employee of Fox Rothschild LLP



ASTA

DEANNA L. FORBUSH, ESQ.

Nevada Bar No. 6646

dforbush@foxrothschild.com

COLLEEN E. MCCARTY, ESQ.

Nevada Bar No. 13186

cmccarty@foxrothschild.com

FOX ROTHSCHILD LLP

1980 Festival Plaza Drive, Suite 700

Las Vegas, Nevada 89135

Telephone: (702) 262-6899

Facsimile: (702) 597-5503

Attorneys for Plaintiff

Nevada Policy Research Institute

DISTRICT COURT

CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

NEVADA POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE, a
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Plaintiff,

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NICOLE J. CANNIZZARO, an individual engaging
in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate
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Nevada State Assembly and University of Nevada,
Las Vegas; HEIDI SEEVERS GANSERT, an
individual engaging in dual employment with the
Nevada State Senate and University of Nevada,
Reno; GLEN LEAVITT, an individual engaging in
dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly
and Regional Transportation Commission;
BRITTNEY MILLER, an individual engaging in
dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly
and Clark County School District; DINA NEAL, an

Case No.: A-20-817757-C

Dept. No.: VIII

CASE APPEAL STATEMENT

individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Nevada State College; JAMES OHRENSCHALL, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate and Clark County Public Defender; MELANIE SCHEIBLE, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate and Clark County District Attorney; TERESA BENITEZ-THOMPSON, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and University of Nevada, Reno; and SELENA TORRES, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Clark County School District,

Defendants,

and Legislature of the State of Nevada,

Intervenor-Defendant.

Plaintiff Nevada Policy Research Institute (“NPRI” or “Appellant”), by and through its attorneys of record, Deanna L. Forbush, Esq. and Colleen E. McCarty, Esq., of Fox Rothschild LLP, hereby submits its Case Appeal Statement, pursuant to Rule 3(f) of the Nevada Rules of Appellate Procedure, as follows:

1. Name of appellant filing this case appeal statement:

Nevada Policy Research Institute

2. Identify the judge issuing the decision, judgment, or order appealed from:

The Honorable Jessica K. Peterson.

3. Identify each appellant and the name and address of counsel for each appellant:

Appellant is Nevada Policy Research Institute.

Deanna L. Forbush, Esq.
Colleen E. McCarty, Esq.
Fox Rothschild LLP
1980 Festival Plaza Drive, Suite 700
Las Vegas, Nevada 89135
Attorneys for Appellant

1 **4. Identity of each respondent and the name and address of appellate counsel, if**
2 **known, for each respondent (if the name of a respondent's appellate counsel is unknown,**
3 **indicate as much and provide the name and address of that respondent's trial counsel):**

4 Respondents are Brittney Miller, Dina Neal, James Ohrenschall, Selena Torres, and the
5 Legislature of the State of Nevada.

6 Berna L. Rhodes-Ford, General Counsel
7 Nevada State College
8 1300 Nevada State Drive, RSC 374
9 Henderson, Nevada 89002
Attorney for Defendant, Dina Neal

10 Bradley Schrager, Esq.
11 Royi Moas, Esq.
12 Daniel Bravo, Esq.
13 Wolf, Rifkin, Shapiro, Schulman & Rabkin, LLP
14 3556 E. Russell Road, Second Floor
Las Vegas, Nevada 89120
Attorneys for Defendants Brittney Miller and Selena Torres

15 Jonathan D. Blum, Esq.
16 Wiley Petersen
17 1050 Indigo Drive, Suite 200B
Las Vegas, Nevada 89145
Attorneys for Defendant James Ohrenschall

18 Kevin C. Powers, General Counsel
19 Legislative Counsel Bureau, Legal Division
20 401 S. Carson Street
Carson City, Nevada 89701
Attorneys for Legislature of the State of Nevada

21 **5. Indicate whether any attorney identified above in response to question 3 or 4 is not**
22 **licensed to practice law in Nevada and, if so, whether the district court granted that attorney**
23 **permission to appear under SCR 42 (attach a copy of any district court order granting such**
24 **permission):**

25 Not applicable.

26 **6. Indicate whether appellant was represented by appointed or retained counsel in the**
27 **district court:**

28 Retained counsel represented Appellant in the district court.

1 **7. Indicate whether appellant is represented by appointed or retained counsel on**
2 **appeal:**

3 Retained counsel represents Appellant on appeal.

4 **8. Indicate whether appellant was granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis, and the**
5 **date of entry of the district court order granting such leave:**

6 Not applicable.

7 **9. Indicate the date the proceedings commenced in the district court (e.g., date**
8 **complaint, indictment, information, or petition was filed):**

9 NPRI filed its Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, the second
10 dismissal of which is the subject of the current appeal, on July 28, 2020.

11 **10. Provide a brief description of the nature of the action and result in the district court,**
12 **including the type of judgment or order being appealed and the relief granted by the district**
13 **court:**

14 Appellant, NPRI, filed the underlying Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive
15 Relief (“Amended Complaint”) in the public interest to address the ongoing constitutional violations
16 pursuant to Nevada Const. Art. 3, §1, ¶1, by Defendants, and each of them, for engaging in dual
17 employment by simultaneously holding elected offices in the Nevada State Legislature and paid
18 positions with Nevada State or local governments. Art. 3, §1, ¶1 prohibits those “persons charged
19 with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one” branch of government from “exercising any
20 functions appertaining to either of the others.” The Amended Complaint alleges that Defendants’
21 dual employment expressly violates the Separation of Powers requirement of Nevada Const. Art. 3,
22 §1, ¶1 and undermines the ethics of their legislative service by creating conflicts, concentrating
23 power, and diluting the separation of powers.

24 The Honorable Jim Crockett initially dismissed the district court litigation on December 8,
25 2020, based on a finding that NPRI lacked standing to bring the lawsuit. NPRI appealed the district
26 court’s first dismissal, and the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the matter on April 21, 2022,
27 after electing to apply the public-importance exception and confer standing on NPRI, finding NPRI
28 is an appropriate party and the issue in this case implicates separation of powers under the Nevada

1 Constitution, is likely to recur, and is of such significant public importance as to require resolution
2 for future guidance.

3 Upon remand, the four (4) remaining Defendants, whom the district court identified as either
4 an educator or a public defender, filed motions to dismiss and joinders thereto, seeking a second
5 dismissal of the litigation on various procedural grounds. NPRI sought to strike the motions to
6 dismiss and joinders as successive and impermissible. Two Defendants also sought to have their
7 claims severed. The district court denied the motion to strike substantively and denied the motion to
8 sever as moot, but granted the motions to dismiss and joinders thereto, finding the allegations in
9 NPRI's Amended Complaint insufficient to establish the elements of a claim for relief. In lieu of
10 addressing the specific arguments of the parties, the Honorable Jessica K. Peterson now presiding,
11 made a *sua sponte* merits determination based on the legal conclusion that Nevada has no specific
12 constitutional or statutory prohibition against dual public employment and, thus, required the
13 evaluation of three (3) factors, inclusive of the common law doctrine of "incompatible offices,"
14 whether the executive branch employment is with a state entity or local political subdivision, and, if
15 the employment is with a state entity, whether the position is that of an employee or an officer.

16 Based on its analysis of the factors it identified, the district court held that: (1) no officer or
17 employee of a state or local government may also serve as a state legislator if the roles are not
18 compatible, and it is the purview of the court to determine compatibility; (2) those employed by local
19 government entities are not a part of the state executive branch and therefore may serve in the
20 legislative branch providing the roles are compatible; and (3) public officers of the state executive
21 branch may not serve in the legislature; however, those who are public employees may, providing
22 the roles are compatible. Applying these holdings to dismiss the remaining Defendants, then, the
23 district court first found that there is no common law incompatibility issue for an individual to be
24 employed as a county public school teacher, a public defender, or a professor at a state college and
25 simultaneously serve as a state legislator, as there is no conflict between the positions and no
26 prejudice suffered by NPRI based on the dual employment. Further, the district court determined
27 Nevada's separation-of-powers clause does not apply to an employee of local political subdivision
28 who does not hold an incompatible dual position, or to an employee of a state entity who does not

1 exercise a sovereign function of the executive branch.

2 This appeal of the district court's final judgment dismissing NPRI's Amended Complaint
3 follows on the pure question of law now ripe for appellate determination of whether Defendants'
4 dual employment violates Nevada's separation-of-powers clause, Nev. Const. Art. 3, § 1(1).

5 **11. Indicate whether the case has previously been the subject of an appeal to or**
6 **original writ proceeding in the Supreme Court and, if so, the caption and Supreme Court**
7 **docket number of the prior proceeding:**

8 This case has previously been the subject of an appeal in Supreme Court Docket No. 82341.

9 **12. Indicate whether this appeal involves child custody or visitation:**

10 Not applicable.

11 **13. Indicate whether this appeal involves the possibility of settlement:**

12 No. This matter seeks to enforce a public official's compliance with Nevada's separation-of-
13 powers clause and will not benefit from a settlement conference.

14 Dated this 6th day of January, 2023.

15 **FOX ROTHSCHILD LLP**

16
17 By: /s/ Deanna L. Forbush

18 DEANNA L. FORBUSH

19 Nevada Bar No. 6646

20 COLLEEN E. MCCARTY

21 Nevada Bar No. 13186

22 1980 Festival Plaza Drive, Suite 700

23 Las Vegas, Nevada 89135

24 Telephone: (702) 262-6899

25 Attorneys for Plaintiff

26 Nevada Policy Research Institute

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Pursuant to NRCP 5(b), I certify that I am an employee of Fox Rothschild LLP and that on this 6th day of January, 2023, the foregoing document entitled **CASE APPEAL STATEMENT** was caused to be served upon each of the parties, listed below, via electronic service through the Eighth Judicial District Court's Odyssey E-File and Serve system.

Berna L. Rhodes-Ford, General Counsel
Nevada State College
1300 Nevada State Drive, RSC 374
Henderson, Nevada 89002
Email: berna.rhodes-ford@nsc.edu
Attorney for Defendant Dina Neal

Jonathan D. Blum, Esq.
Wiley Petersen
1050 Indigo Drive, Suite 200B
Las Vegas, Nevada 89145
Email: jblum@wileypetersenlaw.com
Attorney for Defendant James Ohrenschall

Bradley Schrager, Esq.
Royi Moas, Esq.
Daniel Bravo, Esq.
Wolf, Rifkin, Shapiro, Schulman & Rabkin, LLP
3773 Howard Hughes Parkway, Suite 590 South
Las Vegas, Nevada 89169
Email: bschrager@wrslawyers.com
Email: rmoas@wrslawyers.com
Email: dbravo@wrslawyers.com
*Attorneys for Defendants Brittney Miller and
Selena Torres*

Kevin C. Powers, General Counsel
Legislative Counsel Bureau, Legal Division
401 S. Carson Street
Carson City, Nevada 89701
Email: kpowers@lcb.state.nv.us
Attorney for Nevada Legislature

/s/ Deborah L. Pressley
An Employee of Fox Rothschild LLP

CASE SUMMARY**CASE NO. A-20-817757-C**

Nevada Policy Research Institute, Plaintiff(s)
 vs.
 Nicole Cannizzaro, Defendant(s)

§
 §
 §
 §
 §
 §

Location: **Department 8**
 Judicial Officer: **Peterson, Jessica K.**
 Filed on: **07/09/2020**
 Case Number History:
 Cross-Reference Case **A817757**
 Number:
 Supreme Court No.: **82341**

CASE INFORMATION**Statistical Closures**

12/28/2020 Involuntary Dismissal

Case Type: **Other Civil Matters**

Case
 Status: **12/28/2020 Dismissed**

DATE**CASE ASSIGNMENT****Current Case Assignment**

Case Number A-20-817757-C
 Court Department 8
 Date Assigned 01/04/2021
 Judicial Officer Peterson, Jessica K.

PARTY INFORMATION**Plaintiff**

Nevada Policy Research Institute

Lead Attorneys

McCarty, Colleen E.
Retained
 702-262-6899(W)

Defendant

Benitez-Thompson, Teresa
 Removed: 09/17/2020
 Dismissed

Cannizzaro, Nicole J.

Douglass-Boone, Kasina
 Removed: 09/29/2020
 Dismissed

Frierson, Jason
 Removed: 06/10/2022
 Dismissed

Fumo, Osvaldo
 Removed: 11/16/2020
 Dismissed

Gansert, Heidi Seevers
 Removed: 12/08/2020
 Dismissed

Leavitt, Glen
 Removed: 12/28/2020
 Dismissed

Miller, Brittney
 Removed: 12/08/2020
 Dismissed

Miller, Brittney





Rhodes-Ford, Berna L.
Retained
 702-680-1750(W)

Rhodes-Ford, Berna L.
Retained
 702-680-1750(W)

Schrager, Bradley S.
Retained
 702-341-5200(W)















Schrager, Bradley S.
Retained
 702-341-5200(W)

CASE SUMMARY**CASE NO. A-20-817757-C****Neal, Dina**Removed: 12/08/2020
Dismissed**Rhodes-Ford, Berna L.***Retained*
702-680-1750(W)**Neal, Dina**Removed: 01/04/2023
Dismissed**Ohrenschall, James**Removed: 12/28/2020
Dismissed**Ohrenschall, James**Removed: 01/04/2023
Dismissed**Scheible, Melanie**Removed: 06/10/2022
Dismissed**Seevers Gansert, Heidi**Removed: 12/08/2020
Dismissed**Tolles, Jill**Removed: 06/22/2022
Dismissed**Torres, Selena**Removed: 12/28/2020
Dismissed**Schrager, Bradley S.***Retained*
702-341-5200(W)**Torres, Selena****Schrager, Bradley S.***Retained*
702-341-5200(W)**Intervenor
Defendant****Nevada Legislature**Removed: 12/28/2020
Dismissed**Powers, Kevin C.**
*Retained***Nevada Legislature****Powers, Kevin C.**
Retained

DATE	EVENTS & ORDERS OF THE COURT	INDEX
	<u>EVENTS</u>	
07/09/2020	 Complaint Filed By: Plaintiff Nevada Policy Research Institute <i>[1] Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief</i>	
07/09/2020	 Initial Appearance Fee Disclosure Filed By: Plaintiff Nevada Policy Research Institute <i>[2] Initial Appearance Fee Disclosure</i>	
07/09/2020	 Summons Electronically Issued - Service Pending Party: Plaintiff Nevada Policy Research Institute <i>[3] Summons</i>	
07/09/2020	 Summons Electronically Issued - Service Pending Party: Plaintiff Nevada Policy Research Institute <i>[4] Summons</i>	















CASE SUMMARY

CASE NO. A-20-817757-C

07/09/2020	 Summons Electronically Issued - Service Pending Party: Plaintiff Nevada Policy Research Institute <i>[5] Summons</i>
07/09/2020	 Summons Electronically Issued - Service Pending Party: Plaintiff Nevada Policy Research Institute <i>[6] Summons</i>
07/09/2020	 Summons Electronically Issued - Service Pending Party: Plaintiff Nevada Policy Research Institute <i>[7] Summons</i>
07/09/2020	 Summons Electronically Issued - Service Pending Party: Plaintiff Nevada Policy Research Institute <i>[8] Summons</i>
07/09/2020	 Summons Electronically Issued - Service Pending Party: Plaintiff Nevada Policy Research Institute <i>[9] Summons</i>
07/09/2020	 Summons Electronically Issued - Service Pending Party: Plaintiff Nevada Policy Research Institute <i>[10] Summons</i>
07/09/2020	 Summons Electronically Issued - Service Pending Party: Plaintiff Nevada Policy Research Institute <i>[11] Summons</i>
07/28/2020	 Amended Complaint Filed By: Plaintiff Nevada Policy Research Institute <i>[12] Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief</i>
08/03/2020	 Summons Electronically Issued - Service Pending Party: Plaintiff Nevada Policy Research Institute <i>[13] Summons</i>
08/03/2020	 Summons Electronically Issued - Service Pending Party: Plaintiff Nevada Policy Research Institute <i>[14] Summons</i>
08/03/2020	 Summons Electronically Issued - Service Pending Party: Plaintiff Nevada Policy Research Institute <i>[15] Summons</i>
08/03/2020	 Summons Electronically Issued - Service Pending Party: Plaintiff Nevada Policy Research Institute <i>[16] Summons</i>
08/03/2020	 Summons Electronically Issued - Service Pending Party: Plaintiff Nevada Policy Research Institute <i>[17] Summons</i>
08/03/2020	 Summons Electronically Issued - Service Pending <i>[18] Summons</i>















CASE SUMMARY

CASE NO. A-20-817757-C

08/03/2020	 Summons Electronically Issued - Service Pending Party: Plaintiff Nevada Policy Research Institute <i>[19] Summons</i>
08/03/2020	 Summons Electronically Issued - Service Pending Party: Plaintiff Nevada Policy Research Institute <i>[20] Summons</i>
08/03/2020	 Summons Electronically Issued - Service Pending <i>[21] Summons</i>
08/03/2020	 Summons Electronically Issued - Service Pending Party: Plaintiff Nevada Policy Research Institute <i>[22] Summons</i>
08/03/2020	 Summons Electronically Issued - Service Pending Party: Plaintiff Nevada Policy Research Institute <i>[23] Summons</i>
08/03/2020	 Summons Electronically Issued - Service Pending Party: Plaintiff Nevada Policy Research Institute <i>[24] Summons</i>
08/03/2020	 Summons Electronically Issued - Service Pending <i>[25] Summons</i>
09/16/2020	 Notice of Appearance Party: Defendant Miller, Brittney <i>[26] Notice of Appearance of Counsel</i>
09/16/2020	 Initial Appearance Fee Disclosure Filed By: Defendant Miller, Brittney <i>[27] Initial Appearance Fee Disclosure</i>
09/16/2020	 Peremptory Challenge Filed by: Defendant Miller, Brittney <i>[28] Peremptory Challenge of Judge</i>
09/16/2020	 Affidavit of Service Filed By: Plaintiff Nevada Policy Research Institute <i>[29] Affidavit of Service</i>
09/16/2020	 Affidavit of Service <i>[30] Affidavit of Service</i>
09/16/2020	 Affidavit of Service Filed By: Plaintiff Nevada Policy Research Institute <i>[31] Affidavit of Service</i>
09/16/2020	 Affidavit of Service Filed By: Plaintiff Nevada Policy Research Institute <i>[32] Affidavit of Service</i>

CASE SUMMARY

CASE NO. A-20-817757-C

09/17/2020	 Notice of Voluntary Dismissal Filed By: Plaintiff Nevada Policy Research Institute <i>[33] Notice of Voluntary Dismissal of Defendant Teresa Benitez-Thompson</i>
09/17/2020	 Notice of Department Reassignment <i>[34] Notice of Department Reassignment</i>
09/18/2020	 Motion to Dismiss Filed By: Defendant Miller, Brittney <i>[35] Defendant Brittney Miller's Motion to Dismiss Complaint</i>
09/18/2020	 Clerk's Notice of Hearing <i>[36] Notice of Hearing</i>
09/22/2020	 Affidavit of Service Filed By: Plaintiff Nevada Policy Research Institute <i>[37] Affidavit of Service</i>
09/22/2020	 Peremptory Challenge Filed by: Plaintiff Nevada Policy Research Institute <i>[38] Peremptory Challenge of Judge</i>
09/22/2020	 Notice of Department Reassignment <i>[39] Notice of Department Reassignment</i>
09/24/2020	 Notice of Appearance Party: Defendant Torres, Selena <i>[40] Notice of Appearance of Counsel</i>
09/24/2020	 Initial Appearance Fee Disclosure Filed By: Defendant Torres, Selena <i>[41] Initial Appearance Fee Disclosure</i>
09/24/2020	 Motion to Dismiss Filed By: Defendant Fumo, Osvaldo; Defendant Gansert, Heidi Seevers; Defendant Neal, Dina <i>[42] Motion to Dismiss</i>
09/24/2020	 Joinder To Motion Filed By: Defendant Seevers Gansert, Heidi; Defendant Fumo, Osvaldo; Defendant Neal, Dina <i>[43] NSHE Defendants Fumo, Gansert, and Neal's Joinder in Defendant Brittnew Miller's Motion to Dismiss Complaint</i>
09/25/2020	 Clerk's Notice of Nonconforming Document <i>[44] Clerk's Notice of Nonconforming Document</i>
09/25/2020	 Motion to Disqualify Attorney Filed By: Plaintiff Nevada Policy Research Institute <i>[45] Plaintiff's Motion to Disqualify the Official Attorneys from Representing Defendants Osvaldo Fumo, Heidi Seevers Gansert and Dina Neal on Order Shortening Time</i>
09/28/2020	 Clerk's Notice of Hearing

CASE SUMMARY

CASE NO. A-20-817757-C

[46] Notice of Hearing

09/28/2020



Motion to Dismiss

Filed By: Defendant Seevers Gansert, Heidi; Defendant Fumo, Osvaldo; Defendant Neal, Dina

[47] Defendants Osvaldo Fumo, Heidi Seevers Gansert, and Dina Neal's Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to NRCP 12(b)(5) and NRCP 12(b)(6)

09/28/2020



Notice of Voluntary Dismissal

Filed By: Plaintiff Nevada Policy Research Institute

[49] Notice of Voluntary Dismissal of Defendant Kasina Douglass-Boone

09/29/2020



Clerk's Notice of Hearing

[48] Notice of Hearing

09/29/2020



Notice of Department Reassignment

[50] Notice of Department Reassignment

09/29/2020



Clerk's Notice of Nonconforming Document

[51] Clerk's Notice of Nonconforming Document

09/29/2020



Motion for Order

Filed By: Plaintiff Nevada Policy Research Institute

[52] Plaintiff's Motion for Order to Serve by Publication Defendants Glen Leavitt, James Ohrenschall, and Melanie Scheible

09/29/2020



Clerk's Notice of Hearing

[53] Notice of Hearing

09/30/2020



Motion to Intervene

Party: Intervenor Defendant Nevada Legislature

[54] Nevada Legislature's Motion to Intervene as Defendant

09/30/2020



Clerk's Notice of Nonconforming Document and Curative Action

[55] Clerk's Notice of Curative Action

09/30/2020



Clerk's Notice of Hearing

[56] Notice of Hearing

09/30/2020



Motion to Dismiss

[57] Conforming Filing

10/02/2020



Opposition to Motion to Dismiss

Filed By: Plaintiff Nevada Policy Research Institute

[58] Plaintiff's Opposition to Motion to Dismiss Filed by Defendant Brittney Miller, and the Joinder Thereto Filed by Defendants Osvaldo Fumo, Heidi Seevers Gansert, and Dina Neal

10/02/2020



Notice of Non Opposition

[59] Notice of Non Opposition

10/05/2020





Motion to Dismiss

Filed By: Defendant Frierson, Jason

[60] Defendant Jason Frierson's Motion to Dismiss

CASE SUMMARY

CASE NO. A-20-817757-C

10/05/2020	 Initial Appearance Fee Disclosure Filed By: Defendant Frierson, Jason <i>[61] Defendant Jason Frierson's Initial Appearance Fee Disclosure</i>
10/05/2020	 Notice of Non Opposition Filed By: Defendant Frierson, Jason <i>[62] Defendant Jason Frierson's Notice of Non-Opposition to Defendant Nevada Legislature's Motion to Intervene as Defendant</i>
10/05/2020	 Joinder To Motion Filed By: Defendant Frierson, Jason <i>[63] Defendant Jason Frierson's Joinder to Defendants Osvaldo Fumo, Heidi Seevers Gansert, and Dina Neal's Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to NRCP 12(b)(5) and NRCP 12(b)(6)</i>
10/05/2020	 Joinder To Motion Filed By: Defendant Frierson, Jason <i>[64] Defendant Jason Frierson's Joinder to Defendant Brittney Miller's Motion to Dismiss Complaint</i>
10/06/2020	 Joinder To Motion Filed By: Defendant Torres, Selena <i>[65] Defendant Selena Torres's Joinder to Brittney Miller's Motion to Dismiss Complaint</i>
10/06/2020	 Joinder To Motion Filed By: Defendant Miller, Brittney <i>[66] Defendants Brittney Miller and Selena Torres s Joinder to Defendants Osvaldo Fumo, Heidi Seevers Gansert, and Dina Neal s Motion to Dismiss</i>
10/06/2020	 Joinder To Motion Filed By: Defendant Miller, Brittney <i>[67] Defendants Brittney Miller and Selena Torres s Joinder to Defendant Jason Frierson s Motion to Dismiss</i>
10/06/2020	 Clerk's Notice of Hearing <i>[68] Notice of Hearing</i>
10/06/2020	 Notice of Department Reassignment <i>[69] Notice of Department Reassignment</i>
10/08/2020	 Opposition to Motion to Dismiss Filed By: Plaintiff Nevada Policy Research Institute <i>[70] Plaintiff's Opposition to Motion to Dismiss Filed by Defendants Osvaldo Fumo, Heidi Seevers Gansert, and Dina Neal and Joinders Thereto filed by Defendants Jason Frierson, Brittney Miller, and Selena Torres</i>
10/09/2020	 Opposition to Motion <i>[71] Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion to Disqualify</i>
10/13/2020	 Peremptory Challenge Filed by: Plaintiff Nevada Policy Research Institute <i>[72] Peremptory Challenge of Judge</i>
10/14/2020	 Notice of Department Reassignment <i>[73] Notice of Department Reassignment</i>

CASE SUMMARY

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10/14/2020	 Notice of Change of Hearing <i>[74] Notice of Change of Hearings</i>
10/14/2020	 Notice of Non Opposition <i>[75] Notice of Non-Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Order to Serve by Publication Defendants Glen Leavitt, James Ohrehschall, and Melanie Scheible</i>
10/14/2020	 Opposition to Motion Filed By: Plaintiff Nevada Policy Research Institute <i>[76] Plaintiff's Opposition to Nevada Legislature's Motion to Intervene as Defendant</i>
10/16/2020	 Reply to Opposition <i>[77] NSHE'S REPLY TO NPRI'S OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO DISMISS</i>
10/16/2020	 Affidavit of Service Filed By: Plaintiff Nevada Policy Research Institute <i>[78] Affidavit of Service</i>
10/17/2020	 Ex Parte Order <i>[79] Plaintiff's Ex Parte Application for Order and Order Shortening Time to Hear Motion to Disqualify-C2</i>
10/19/2020	 Opposition to Motion to Dismiss Filed By: Plaintiff Nevada Policy Research Institute <i>[80] Plaintiff's Opposition to Motion to Dismiss Filed by Defendant Jason Frierson and Joinders Thereto Filed by Brittney Miller and Selena Torres</i>
10/19/2020	 Motion to Dismiss Filed By: Defendant Cannizzaro, Nicole J. <i>[81] Defendant Nicole Cannizzaro's Motion to Dismiss</i>
10/19/2020	 Initial Appearance Fee Disclosure Filed By: Defendant Cannizzaro, Nicole J. <i>[82] Defendant Nicole Cannizzaro's Initial Appearance Fee Disclosure</i>
10/19/2020	 Joinder To Motion Filed By: Defendant Cannizzaro, Nicole J. <i>[83] Defendant Nicole Cannizzaro's Joinder to Defendant Brittney Miller's Motion to Dismiss Complaint</i>
10/19/2020	 Joinder To Motion Filed By: Defendant Cannizzaro, Nicole J. <i>[84] Defendant Nicole Cannizzaro's Joinder to Defendants Osvaldo Fumo, Heidi Seevers Gansert, and Dina Neal's Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to NRCP 12(b)(5) and NRCP 12(b)(6)</i>
10/20/2020	 Ex Parte Motion for Enlargement of Time Filed By: Plaintiff Nevada Policy Research Institute <i>[85] Plaintiff's Ex Parte Motion for Enlargement of Time to Serve Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and for an Order Allowing Service by Publication of Defendants Glen Leavitt, James Ohrehschall, and Melanie Scheible</i>
10/20/2020	 Notice of Change of Hearing <i>[86] Notice of Change of Hearing</i>

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10/20/2020	 Clerk's Notice of Hearing <i>[87] Clerk's Notice of Hearing</i>
10/21/2020	 Clerk's Notice of Hearing <i>[88] Notice of Hearing</i>
10/21/2020	 Opposition <i>[89] DEFENDANTS OSVALDO FUMO, HEIDI SEEVERS GANSERT, AND DINA NEAL S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF S EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR ORDER SHORTENING TIME TO HEAR MOTION TO DISQUALIFY OFFICIAL ATTORNEYS AND TO RE-SET ALL OTHER PENDING MATTERS</i>
10/21/2020	 Reply in Support <i>[90] Nevada Legislature's Reply in Support of Motion to Intervene as Defendant</i>
10/22/2020	 Errata Filed By: Plaintiff Nevada Policy Research Institute <i>[91] Errata to Plaintiff's Opposition to Nevada Legislature's Motion to Intervene as Defendant</i>
11/02/2020	 Opposition to Motion to Dismiss Filed By: Plaintiff Nevada Policy Research Institute <i>[92] Plaintiff's Opposition to Motion to Dismiss Filed by Defendant Nicole Cannizzaro</i>
11/02/2020	 Opposition <i>[93] Plaintiff's Opposition to Joinders to Defendant Brittney Miller's Motion to Dismiss Complaint Filed by Defendants Jason Frierson, Selena Torres, and Nicole Cannizzaro</i>
11/02/2020	 Opposition Filed By: Plaintiff Nevada Policy Research Institute <i>[94] Plaintiff's Opposition to Joinder to Defendants Osvaldo Fumo, Heidi Seevers Gansert, and Dina Neal's Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to NRCP 12(B)(5) and NRCP 12(B)(6) filed by Defendant Nicole Cannizzaro</i>
11/04/2020	 Notice of Non Opposition Filed By: Plaintiff Nevada Policy Research Institute <i>[95] Notice of Non-Opposition to Plaintiff's Ex Parte Motion for Enlargement of Time to Serve Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and For an Order Allowing Service by Publication of Defendants Glen Leavitt, James Ohrenschall, and Melanie Scheible</i>
11/04/2020	 Order Granting Filed By: Plaintiff Nevada Policy Research Institute <i>[96] Order Granting Plaintiff's Motion for Enlargment of Time to Serve Amended Complaint and Order to Serve Publication Defendants Glen Leavitt, James Ohrenschall and Melanie Scheible</i>
11/12/2020	 Reply Filed by: Defendant Frierson, Jason <i>[97] Reply to Plaintiff's Opposition to Jason Frierson's Motion to Dismiss</i>
11/12/2020	 Reply Filed by: Defendant Cannizzaro, Nicole J. <i>[98] Reply to Plaintiff's Opposition to Nicole Cannizzaro's Motion to Dismiss</i>
11/12/2020	 Reply in Support

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	<p>Filed By: Plaintiff Nevada Policy Research Institute <i>[99] Plaintiff's Reply in Support of Motion to Disqualify the Official Attorneys from Representing Defendants Osvaldo Fumo, Heidi Seevers Gansert and Dina Neal</i></p>
11/12/2020	<p> Reply Filed by: Defendant Miller, Brittney; Defendant Torres, Selena <i>[100] Defendant Brittney Miller's Reply in Support of Motion to Dismiss, and Defendant Selena Torres' Joinder Thereto</i></p>
11/16/2020	<p> Notice of Voluntary Dismissal Without Prejudice Filed by: Plaintiff Nevada Policy Research Institute <i>[101] Notice of Voluntary Dismissal of Defendants Osvaldo Fumo and Jill Torres</i></p>
12/01/2020	<p> Motion for Clarification Filed By: Plaintiff Nevada Policy Research Institute <i>[102] Plaintiff's Motion for the Court's Clarification of Its Decision to Grant Defendants' Motions to Dismiss Based on Plaintiff's Lack of Standing On Order Shortening Time</i></p>
12/04/2020	<p> Order Denying Motion Filed By: Plaintiff Nevada Policy Research Institute <i>[103] Order Denying Plaintiff's Motion for Order to Serve by Publication Defendants Glen Leavitt, James Ohrenschall, and Melanie Scheible-C2</i></p>
12/07/2020	<p> Opposition and Countermotion Filed By: Intervenor Defendant Nevada Legislature <i>[104] Joint Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for the Court's Clarification of its Decision to Grant Defendants' Motions to Dismiss Based on Plaintiff's Lack of Standing and Joint Countermotion to Dismiss all Remaining Defendants Based on Plaintiff's Lack of Standing</i></p>
12/08/2020	<p> Order Granting Motion Filed By: Intervenor Defendant Nevada Legislature <i>[105] Proposed Order Granting Legislature's Motion to Intervene as Defendant</i></p>
12/08/2020	<p> Order Granting Motion <i>[106] Omnibus Order Granting Motion to Dismiss</i></p>
12/08/2020	<p> Notice of Entry Filed By: Defendant Cannizzaro, Nicole J.; Defendant Frierson, Jason <i>[107] Notice of Entry of Omnibus Order Granting Motions to Dismiss</i></p>
12/08/2020	<p> Notice of Entry of Order Filed By: Defendant Cannizzaro, Nicole J.; Defendant Frierson, Jason <i>[108] Notice of Entry of Order Granting Nevada Legislature's Motion to Intervene as Defendant</i></p>
12/09/2020	<p> Order Denying Motion <i>[109] ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO DISQUALIFY OFFICIAL ATTORNEYS</i></p>
12/09/2020	<p> Notice of Entry of Order Filed By: Plaintiff Nevada Policy Research Institute <i>[110] Notice of Entry of Order Denying Plaintiff's Motion to Serve by Publication Defendants Glen Leavitt, James Ohrenschall, and Melanie Scheible</i></p>
12/09/2020	<p> Notice of Entry of Order <i>[111] Notice of Entry of Order Denying Plaintiff's Motion to Disqualify Official Attorneys</i></p>















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12/09/2020	 Acceptance of Service Filed By: Plaintiff Nevada Policy Research Institute <i>[112] Acceptance of Service</i>
12/10/2020	 Affidavit of Publication of Summons <i>[113] Affidavit of Publication</i>
12/10/2020	 Affidavit of Publication of Summons <i>[114] Affidavit of Publication</i>
12/10/2020	 Affidavit of Publication of Summons <i>[115] Affidavit of Publication</i>
12/14/2020	 Reply in Support Filed By: Plaintiff Nevada Policy Research Institute <i>[116] Plaintiff Nevada Policy Research Institute's: (1) Notice of Non-Opposition to Joint Countermotion to Dismiss all Remaining Defendants Based on Plaintiff's Lack of Standing, and (2) Limited Reply in Support of Motion for the Court's Clarification of its Decision to Grant Defendants' Motions to Dismiss Based on Plaintiff's Lack of Standing</i>
12/16/2020	 Stipulation and Order <i>[117] Stipulation and Order to Vacate the Voluntary Dismissal of Defendant Jill Tolles Only and That The Parties Shall be Bound by The Court's Prior Rulings_Redacted-C1</i>
12/28/2020	 Order Filed By: Intervenor Defendant Nevada Legislature <i>[118] Order Denying Plaintiff's Motion for Clarification, Granting Joint Countermotion to Dismiss All Remaining Defendants Based on Plaintiff's Lack of Standing, and Entering Final Judgment in Favor of All Defendants Based on Plaintiff's Lack of Standing</i>
12/28/2020	 Notice of Entry of Order Filed By: Intervenor Defendant Nevada Legislature <i>[119] Notice of Entry of Order Denying Plaintiff's Motion for Clarification, Granting Joint Countermotion to Dismiss All Remaining Defendants Based on Plaintiff's Lack of Standing, and Entering Final Judgment in Favor of All Defendants Based on Plaintiff's Lack of Standing</i>
01/04/2021	Case Reassigned to Department 8 <i>Judicial Reassignment to Judge Jessica K. Peterson</i>
01/08/2021	 Notice of Appeal Filed By: Plaintiff Nevada Policy Research Institute <i>[120] Notice of Appeal</i>
01/11/2021	 Case Appeal Statement Filed By: Plaintiff Nevada Policy Research Institute <i>[121] Case Appeal Statement</i>
01/19/2021	 Notice of Posting Bond Filed By: Plaintiff Nevada Policy Research Institute <i>[122] Notice of Posting Bond</i>
02/19/2021	 Notice of Change of Address <i>[123] Notice of Change of Firm Address</i>

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05/11/2022	 Order <i>[124] ORDER TO APPEAR</i>
05/17/2022	 NV Supreme Court Clerks Certificate/Judgment -Remanded <i>[125] Nevada Supreme Court Clerk's Certificate/Remittitur Judgment - Reversed and Remand</i>
05/31/2022	 Notice of Change of Hearing <i>[126] Notice of Change of Hearing</i>
06/10/2022	 Stipulation and Order Filed by: Defendant Cannizzaro, Nicole J.; Defendant Frierson, Jason; Defendant Scheible, Melanie <i>[127] Stipulation and Order for Dismissal of Defendants Jason Frierson, Nicole J annizzaro and Melanie Scheible Only, without Prejudice</i>
06/13/2022	 Notice of Entry of Stipulation & Order for Dismissal Filed By: Defendant Cannizzaro, Nicole J. <i>[128] Notice of Entry of Stipulation and Order for Dismissal of Defendants Jason Frierson, Nicole J. Cannizzaro, and Melanie Scheible, Only, Without Prejudice</i>
06/14/2022	 Notice of Voluntary Dismissal Without Prejudice Filed by: Plaintiff Nevada Policy Research Institute <i>[129] Notice of Voluntary Dismissal of Defendant Glen Leavitt Without Prejudice</i>
06/17/2022	 Three Day Notice of Intent to Default Filed By: Plaintiff Nevada Policy Research Institute <i>[130] Three Day Notice of Intent to Take Default Against James Orenschall</i>
06/22/2022	 Stipulation and Order for Dismissal With Prejudice Filed By: Defendant Cannizzaro, Nicole J.; Defendant Tolles, Jill <i>[131] Stipulation and Order to Dismiss Defendant Jill Tolles Without Prejudice</i>
06/23/2022	 Notice of Entry of Stipulation and Order Filed By: Defendant Cannizzaro, Nicole J. <i>[132] Notice of Entry of Stipulation and Order To Dismiss Defendant Jill Toles Without Prejudice</i>
06/28/2022	 Motion to Sever Filed By: Defendant Miller, Brittney; Defendant Torres, Selena <i>[133] Defendants Brittney Miller and Selena Torres's Motion to Sever Pursuant to NRCP 21</i>
06/29/2022	 Clerk's Notice of Hearing <i>[134] Notice of Hearing</i>
06/30/2022	 Motion to Dismiss Filed By: Defendant Cannizzaro, Nicole J. <i>[135] NSHE Defendant Dina Neal's Motion To Dismiss Pursuant to NRCP 12(b)(5)</i>
06/30/2022	 Motion to Dismiss Filed By: Defendant Ohrenschall, James <i>[136] Defendant James Ohrenschall's Motion to Dismiss</i>
06/30/2022	 Initial Appearance Fee Disclosure Filed By: Defendant Ohrenschall, James

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[137] Defendant James Ohrenschall's Initial Appearance Fee Disclosure

06/30/2022



Joinder To Motion

Filed By: Defendant Miller, Brittney; Defendant Torres, Selena

[138] Defendants Brittney Miller and Selena Torres's Joinder to Defendant Dina Neal's Motion to Dismiss

06/30/2022



Joinder To Motion

Filed By: Defendant Miller, Brittney; Defendant Torres, Selena

[139] Defendants Brittney Miller and Selena Torres's Joinder to Defendant James Ohrenschall's Motion to Dismiss

06/30/2022



Joinder To Motion

[140] NSHE Defendant Dina Neal's Joinder to Defendant James Orenschall's Motion To Dismiss

07/01/2022



Clerk's Notice of Hearing

[141] Notice of Hearing

07/01/2022



Clerk's Notice of Hearing

[142] Notice of Hearing

07/01/2022



Motion to Dismiss

Filed By: Intervenor Defendant Nevada Legislature

[143] Nevada Legislature's Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief

07/01/2022



Joinder To Motion

Filed By: Defendant Cannizzaro, Nicole J.

[144] NSHE Defendant Dina Neal's Joinder to Legislative Counsel Bureau's Nevada Legislature's Motion To Dismiss Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief

07/01/2022



Joinder To Motion

Filed By: Defendant Miller, Brittney; Defendant Torres, Selena

[145] Defendants Brittney Miller and Selena Torres's Joinder to Nevada Legislature's Motion to Dismiss

07/01/2022



Motion to Sever

Filed By: Defendant Miller, Brittney; Defendant Torres, Selena

[146] Supplement to Defendants Brittney Miller and Selena Torres's Motion to Sever Pursuant to NRCP 21

07/01/2022



Clerk's Notice of Hearing

[147] Notice of Hearing

07/01/2022



Clerk's Notice of Hearing

[148] Notice of Hearing

07/01/2022



Clerk's Notice of Hearing

[149] Vacated Notice of Hearing

07/01/2022



Amended Certificate of Service

Party: Intervenor Defendant Nevada Legislature

[150] Nevada Legislature's Amended Certificate of Service for Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief

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07/06/2022	 Clerk's Notice of Hearing <i>[151] Amended Notice of Hearing</i>
07/07/2022	 Joinder Filed By: Defendant Ohrenschall, James <i>[152] Defendant James Ohrenschall's Joinder to NSHE Defendant Dina Neal's Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to NRCPC 12(b)(5)</i>
07/07/2022	 Joinder To Motion Filed By: Defendant Ohrenschall, James <i>[153] Defendant James Ohrenschall's Joinder in Part, to Legislature of the State of Nevada's Motion to Dismiss Complaint</i>
07/07/2022	 Joinder Filed By: Defendant Ohrenschall, James <i>[154] Defendant James Ohrenschall's Joinder in Part, to Legislature of the State of Nevada's Motion to Dismiss Complaint</i>
07/12/2022	 Order <i>[155] Order to Appear RE: All Pending Matters</i>
07/12/2022	 Stipulation and Order <i>[156] 2022_07-12_02_A-20-817757-C_Stipulation and Order re Briefing Schedule for Motions and Joinders Set for Hearing on Aug 4 2022</i>
07/13/2022	 Motion to Strike Filed By: Plaintiff Nevada Policy Research Institute <i>[157] Plaintiff's Motion to Strike: (1) NSHE Defendant Dina Neal's Motion to Dismiss pursuant to NRCPC 12(B)(5); Nevada Legislature's Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, and (3) All Joinders thereto</i>
07/14/2022	 Clerk's Notice of Hearing <i>[158] Notice of Hearing</i>
07/18/2022	 Opposition to Motion Filed By: Plaintiff Nevada Policy Research Institute <i>[159] Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendants Brittney Miller and Selena Torres's Motion to Server pursuant to NRCPC 21 and Supplement thereto</i>
07/18/2022	 Opposition to Motion to Dismiss Filed By: Plaintiff Nevada Policy Research Institute <i>[160] Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendant James Ohrenschall's Motion to Dismiss and All Joinders Thereto</i>
07/18/2022	 Opposition to Motion to Dismiss Filed By: Plaintiff Nevada Policy Research Institute <i>[161] Plaintiff's Opposition to Nevada Legislature's Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and all Joinders Thereto</i>
07/18/2022	 Opposition to Motion to Dismiss Filed By: Plaintiff Nevada Policy Research Institute <i>[162] Plaintiff's Opposition to NSHE Defendant Dina Neal's Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to NRCPC 12(B)(5) and all Joinders Thereto</i>











CASE SUMMARY

CASE NO. A-20-817757-C

07/27/2022	 Opposition to Motion Filed By: Defendant Cannizzaro, Nicole J. <i>[163] NSHE Defendant Dina Neal's Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion To Strike Motion To Dismiss Pursuant to NRC P 12(b)(5)</i>
07/27/2022	 Opposition to Motion Filed By: Intervenor Defendant Nevada Legislature <i>[164] Nevada Legislature's Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion to Strike the Legislature's Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief</i>
07/28/2022	 Joinder to Opposition to Motion Filed by: Defendant Cannizzaro, Nicole J. <i>[165] NSHE Defendant Dina Neal's Joinder To Nevada Legislature's Opposition To Plaintiff's Motion To Strike The Legislature's Motion To Dismiss Amended Complaint For Declaratory and Injunctive Relief</i>
07/28/2022	 Notice of Change of Hearing <i>[166] Notice of Change of Hearing</i>
07/28/2022	 Reply in Support Filed By: Defendant Cannizzaro, Nicole J. <i>[167] NSHE Defendant Dina Neal's Reply In Support Of Motion To Dismiss Pursuant to NRC P 12(b)(5)</i>
07/28/2022	 Reply Filed by: Defendant Miller, Brittney; Defendant Torres, Selena <i>[168] Defendants Brittney Miller and Selena Torres's Reply in Support of Their Motion to Sever</i>
07/28/2022	 Reply Filed by: Defendant Ohrenschall, James <i>[169] Defendant James Ohrenschall's Reply to Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendant James Ohrenschall's Motion to Dismiss and All Joinders Thereto</i>
07/28/2022	 Joinder to Opposition to Motion Filed by: Defendant Miller, Brittney; Defendant Torres, Selena <i>[170] Defendants Brittney Miller and Selena Torres's Omnibus Joinder</i>
07/28/2022	 Reply in Support Filed By: Intervenor Defendant Nevada Legislature <i>[171] Nevada Legislature's Reply in Support of the Legislature's Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief</i>
07/29/2022	 Notice of Non Opposition Filed By: Plaintiff Nevada Policy Research Institute <i>[172] Plaintiff's Notice of Non-Opposition by Brittney Miller and Selena Torres to Plaintiff's Motion to Strike their Joinder to NSHE Defendant Dina Neal's Motion to Dismiss and Partial Joinders to Intervenor-Defendant Nevada Legislature's and Defendant James Ohrenschall's Motions to Dismiss</i>
07/29/2022	 Notice Filed By: Defendant Miller, Brittney; Defendant Torres, Selena <i>[173] Defendants Brittney Miller and Selena Torres's Response to Plaintiff's Notice of Non-Opposition</i>
08/01/2022	 Reply in Support

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	<p>Filed By: Plaintiff Nevada Policy Research Institute <i>[174] Plaintiff Nevada Policy Research Institute's Reply in support of Motion to Strike: (1) NSHE Defendant Dina Neal's Motion to Dismiss pursuant to NRCP 12(B)(5); (2) Nevada Legislature's Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, and (3) All Joinders thereto</i></p>
08/19/2022	<p> Court Recorders Invoice for Transcript <i>[175] All Pending Motions August 4, 2022</i></p>
08/22/2022	<p> Recorders Transcript of Hearing <i>[176] Recorders Transcript of Hearing Re: 08/04/22</i></p>
08/22/2022	<p> Recorders Transcript of Hearing <i>[177] Recorder's Transcript of Hearing: All Pending Motions August 4, 2022</i></p>
09/23/2022	<p> Supplemental Brief Filed By: Defendant Neal, Dina <i>[178] Defendant Dina Neal's Supplemental Brief In Support of Her Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to NRCP 12(B)(5)</i></p>
09/23/2022	<p> Supplemental Brief Filed By: Plaintiff Nevada Policy Research Institute <i>[179] Plaintiff's Supplemental Brief Confirming NSHE Defendant Dina Neal's Executive Branch Employment and Request for Sanctions</i></p>
09/23/2022	<p> Declaration Filed By: Plaintiff Nevada Policy Research Institute <i>[180] Declaration of Colleen E. McCarty Esq. in support of NPRI's Supplemental Brief</i></p>
09/23/2022	<p> Supplemental Brief Filed By: Plaintiff Nevada Policy Research Institute <i>[181] Plaintiff's Supplemental Brief Confirming NSHE Defendant Dina Neal's Executive Branch Employment and Request for Sanctions</i></p>
09/23/2022	<p> Supplemental Brief Filed By: Intervenor Defendant Nevada Legislature <i>[182] Nevada Legislature's Supplemental Brief Regarding Status of Nevada System of Higher Education as Part of Executive Branch of State Government</i></p>
12/15/2022	<p> Motion for Leave to File <i>[183] Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint and to Amend Caption in Conformity Therewith</i></p>
12/16/2022	<p> Clerk's Notice of Hearing <i>[184] Notice of Hearing</i></p>
12/19/2022	<p> Order Shortening Time Filed By: Plaintiff Nevada Policy Research Institute <i>[185] Application for Order Shortening Time to Hear Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint and to Amend Caption in Conformity Therewith</i></p>
12/20/2022	<p> Notice of Entry of Order Filed By: Plaintiff Nevada Policy Research Institute <i>[186] Notice of Entry of Order Regarding Application for Order Shortening Time to Hear Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint and to Amend Caption in</i></p>

CASE SUMMARY

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Conformity Therewith

12/21/2022	 Opposition Filed By: Defendant Miller, Brittney; Defendant Torres, Selena <i>[187] Defendants Brittney Miller and Selena Torres's Limited Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion to Amend</i>
12/29/2022	 Opposition and Countermotion Filed By: Intervenor Defendant Nevada Legislature <i>[188] Nevada Legislature's Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint and Countermotion to Dismiss Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint</i>
12/29/2022	 Joinder to Opposition to Motion Filed by: Defendant Neal, Dina <i>[189] NSHE Defendant Dina Neal's Joinder to Legislative Counsel Bureau's Nevada Legislative Counsel Bureau's Nevada Legislature's Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint and Countermotion to Dismiss Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint</i>
12/30/2022	 Joinder to Opposition to Motion Filed by: Defendant Ohrenschall, James <i>[190] Defendant James Ohrenschall's Joinder to Nevada Legislature's Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint and Countermotion to Dismiss Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint</i>
01/04/2023	 Order <i>[191] Order</i>
01/05/2023	 Notice of Entry of Order Filed By: Defendant Miller, Brittney; Defendant Torres, Selena <i>[192] Notice of Entry of Order</i>
01/06/2023	 Case Appeal Statement <i>[193] Case Appeal Statement</i>
01/06/2023	 Notice of Appeal <i>[194] Notice of Appeal</i>

DISPOSITIONS




09/17/2020	Dismissal Pursuant to NRCP 41 (Judicial Officer: Holthus, Mary Kay) Debtors: Teresa Benitez-Thompson (Defendant) Creditors: Nevada Policy Research Institute (Plaintiff) Judgment: 09/17/2020, Docketed: 09/25/2020
09/28/2020	Dismissal Pursuant to NRCP 41 (Judicial Officer: Israel, Ronald J.) Debtors: Kasina Douglass-Boone (Defendant) Creditors: Nevada Policy Research Institute (Plaintiff) Judgment: 09/28/2020, Docketed: 10/06/2020
12/08/2020	Order of Dismissal (Judicial Officer: Crockett, Jim) Debtors: Nevada Policy Research Institute (Plaintiff) Creditors: Nicole J. Cannizzaro (Defendant), Jason Frierson (Defendant), Brittney Miller (Defendant), Heidi Seevers Gansert (Defendant), Dina Neal (Defendant) Judgment: 12/08/2020, Docketed: 12/08/2020
12/16/2020	Amended Dismissal Pursuant to NRCP 41 (Judicial Officer: Crockett, Jim) Debtors: Osvaldo Fumo (Defendant), Jill Tolles (Defendant)

CASE SUMMARY


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	<p>Creditors: Nevada Policy Research Institute (Plaintiff) Judgment: 12/16/2020, Docketed: 12/02/2020 Comment: Vacated as to Jill Tolles ONLY</p>
12/28/2020	<p>Order of Dismissal (Judicial Officer: Crockett, Jim) Debtors: Nevada Policy Research Institute (Plaintiff) Creditors: Nicole J. Cannizzaro (Defendant), Glen Leavitt (Defendant), James Ohrenschall (Defendant), Melanie Scheible (Defendant), Selena Torres (Defendant), Jill Tolles (Defendant), Nevada Legislature (Intervenor Defendant) Judgment: 12/28/2020, Docketed: 12/29/2020</p>
12/28/2020	<p>Judgment (Judicial Officer: Crockett, Jim) Debtors: Nevada Policy Research Institute (Plaintiff) Creditors: Nicole J. Cannizzaro (Defendant), Glen Leavitt (Defendant), James Ohrenschall (Defendant), Melanie Scheible (Defendant), Selena Torres (Defendant), Jill Tolles (Defendant), Nevada Legislature (Intervenor Defendant) Judgment: 12/28/2020, Docketed: 12/29/2020 Comment: Certain Claims</p>
05/17/2022	<p>Clerk's Certificate (Judicial Officer: Peterson, Jessica K.) Debtors: Nevada Policy Research Institute (Plaintiff) Creditors: Nicole J. Cannizzaro (Defendant) Judgment: 05/17/2022, Docketed: 05/17/2022 Comment: Supreme Court No. 82341 "Reversed and remanded"</p>
06/10/2022	<p>Order of Dismissal Without Prejudice (Judicial Officer: Peterson, Jessica K.) Debtors: Nevada Policy Research Institute (Plaintiff) Creditors: Nicole J. Cannizzaro (Defendant), Jason Frierson (Defendant), Melanie Scheible (Defendant) Judgment: 06/10/2022, Docketed: 06/13/2022</p>
06/22/2022	<p>Order of Dismissal Without Prejudice (Judicial Officer: Peterson, Jessica K.) Debtors: Nevada Policy Research Institute (Plaintiff) Creditors: Jill Tolles (Defendant) Judgment: 06/22/2022, Docketed: 06/23/2022 Comment: 12/16/20 Deft was Reinstated After Being Previously Dismissed</p>
01/04/2023	<p>Order of Dismissal (Judicial Officer: Peterson, Jessica K.) Debtors: James Ohrenschall (Defendant), Dina Neal (Defendant) Creditors: Nevada Policy Research Institute (Plaintiff) Judgment: 01/04/2023, Docketed: 01/05/2023</p>

HEARINGS

09/29/2020	<p> Minute Order (10:45 AM) (Judicial Officer: Holthus, Mary Kay) Minute Order - No Hearing Held; Journal Entry Details: <i>As this Court is familiar with one of the parties, in accordance with Rule 2.11(a), and to avoid the appearance of impropriety and implied bias, this Court hereby disqualifies itself and ORDERS this case be REASSIGNED at random.;</i></p>
10/02/2020	<p> Minute Order (8:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Cory, Kenneth) Minute Order - No Hearing Held; Journal Entry Details: <i>The Court previously worked with one of the named Defendants and considers them a close friend. Therefore, the Court must recuse from this case and the matter shall be randomly reassigned.;</i></p>
10/05/2020	<p> Minute Order (3:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Hardy, Joe) <i>Minute Order: Recusal</i></p>

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	<p>Minute Order - No Hearing Held; Journal Entry Details: <i>Although the Court could, and would, rule fairly and without bias, the COURT FINDS that RECUSAL is appropriate in this matter pursuant to Canon 2.11(A) of the Nevada Code of Judicial Conduct, in order to avoid the appearance of impartiality or implied bias because of the Court's personal and financial relationship with one of the named Defendants. CLERK'S NOTE: This Minute Order was electronically served by Courtroom Clerk, Kristin Duncan, to all registered parties for Odyssey File & Serve. (KD 10/5/2020);</i></p>
10/19/2020	<p> Minute Order (3:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Crockett, Jim) Minute Order - No Hearing Held; Journal Entry Details: <i>The Court finds that the 9/29/20 Plaintiff's Motion for Order to Serve by Publication Defendants Glen Leavitt, James Ohrenschall, and Melanie Scheible cannot be granted as Plaintiff's Motion is not accompanied by the requisite Motion for Enlargement of Time. The attempted Publication would conclude beyond the 120 day time period in which to effectuate personal service. Plaintiff's new Motion must also include a discussion of the Scrimmer factors and good cause why the Amended Complaint was not timely served. Lastly, the attached Affidavits of Due Diligence are titled Affidavits, but do not include a Notary Seal, and instead, appear to be Declarations. The titles of the attached Exhibits should all be corrected upon resubmission as part of Plaintiff's new Motion. Therefore, it is hereby ordered, 9/29/20 Plaintiff's Motion for Order to Serve by Publication Defendants Glen Leavitt, James Ohrenschall, and Melanie Scheible is denied. COURT ORDERED, status check SET for the filing of the Order. 11/19/2020 STATUS CHECK: FILING OF ORDER (CHAMBERS) CLERK'S NOTE: This Minute Order was electronically served to all registered parties for Odyssey File & Serve. /rl 10/19/2020;</i></p>
10/28/2020	<p>CANCELED Joinder (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Cory, Kenneth) <i>Vacated - Duplicate Entry Defendant Jason Frierson's Joinder to Defendant Brittney Miller's Motion to Dismiss Complaint</i></p>
11/18/2020	<p>Motion to Dismiss (3:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Crockett, Jim) <i>Defendant Brittney Miller's Motion to Dismiss Complaint</i> Peremptory Challenge Filed 9-22-20</p>
	<p>Minute Order - No Hearing Held;</p>
11/18/2020	<p>Joinder (3:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Crockett, Jim) <i>NSHE Defendants Fumo, Gansert, and Neal's Joinder in Defendant Brittney Miller's Motion to Dismiss Complaint</i></p>
	<p>Minute Order - No Hearing Held;</p>
11/18/2020	<p>Motion to Disqualify Attorney (3:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Crockett, Jim) <i>Plaintiff's Motion to Disqualify the Official Attorneys from Representing Defendants Osvaldo Fumo, Heidi Seevers Gansert and Dina Neal on Order Shortening Time</i> Minute Order Dated 09-29-2020</p>
	<p>Minute Order - No Hearing Held;</p>
11/18/2020	<p>Motion to Dismiss (3:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Crockett, Jim) <i>Defendants Osvaldo Fumo, Heidi Seevers Gansert, and Dina Neal's Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to NRCP 12(b)(5) and NRCP 12(b)(6)</i></p>
	<p>Minute Order - No Hearing Held;</p>
11/18/2020	<p>Motion to Intervene (3:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Crockett, Jim) <i>Nevada Legislature's Motion to Intervene as Defendant</i></p>
	<p>Minute Order - No Hearing Held;</p>
11/18/2020	<p>Motion to Dismiss (3:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Crockett, Jim) <i>Defendant Jason Frierson's Motion to Dismiss</i></p>
	<p>Minute Order - No Hearing Held;</p>

CASE SUMMARY

CASE NO. A-20-817757-C

11/18/2020	<p>Joinder (3:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Crockett, Jim) <i>Defendant Jason Frierson's Joinder to Defendants Osvaldo Fumo, Heidi Seevers Gansert, and Dina Neal's Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to NRCP 12(b)(5) and NRCP 12(b)(6)</i> Minute Order - No Hearing Held;</p>
11/18/2020	<p>Joinder (3:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Crockett, Jim) <i>Defendant Jason Frierson's Joinder to Defendant Brittney Miller's Motion to Dismiss Complaint</i> Minute Order - No Hearing Held;</p>
11/18/2020	<p>Joinder (3:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Crockett, Jim) <i>Defendant Selena Torres's Joinder to Brittney Miller's Motion to Dismiss Complaint</i> Minute Order - No Hearing Held;</p>
11/18/2020	<p>Joinder (3:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Crockett, Jim) <i>Defendants Brittney Miller and Selena Torres s Joinder to Defendants Osvaldo Fumo, Heidi Seevers Gansert, and Dina Neal s Motion to Dismiss</i> Minute Order - No Hearing Held;</p>
11/18/2020	<p>Joinder (3:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Crockett, Jim) <i>Defendant Jason Frierson's Motion to Dismiss</i> Minute Order - No Hearing Held;</p>
11/18/2020	<p>Joinder (3:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Crockett, Jim) <i>Defendant Nicole Cannizzaro's Joinder to Defendant Brittney Miller's Motion to Dismiss Complaint</i> Minute Order - No Hearing Held;</p>
11/18/2020	<p>Joinder (3:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Crockett, Jim) <i>Defendant Nicole Cannizzaro's Joinder to Defendants Osvaldo Fumo, Heidi Seevers Gansert, and Dina Neal's Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to NRCP 12(b)(5) and NRCP 12(b)(6)</i> Minute Order - No Hearing Held;</p>
11/18/2020	<p>Motion to Dismiss (3:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Crockett, Jim) <i>Defendant Nicole Cannizzaro's Motion to Dismiss</i> Minute Order - No Hearing Held;</p>
11/18/2020	<p>Motion (3:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Crockett, Jim) <i>Plaintiff's Ex Parte Motion for Enlargement of Time to Serve Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and for an Order Allowing Service by Publication of Defendants Glen Leavitt, James Ohrenschall, and Melanie Scheible</i> Minute Order - No Hearing Held;</p>
11/18/2020	<p> All Pending Motions (3:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Crockett, Jim) Minute Order - No Hearing Held; Journal Entry Details: <i>Plaintiff's Motion to Disqualify the Official Attorneys from Representing Defendants Osvaldo Fumo, Heidi Seevers Gansert and Dina Neal on Order Shortening Time Pursuant to EDCR 2.23 (c) and (d), this matter is being decided on the briefs and pleadings filed by 11/16/2020 by the parties without oral argument since the court deems oral argument unnecessary. Plaintiff says Official Attorneys should be disqualified because Defendants were not sued based upon anything they did in their official capacity but instead are sued for alleged violation of constitution prohibition against dual employment in violation of Article 3 of the Nevada Constitution. 10/9/20 Opposition says Nevada Policy Research Institute lacks standing to even bring this Motion because it cannot demonstrate particularized harm beyond that of any ordinary taxpayer and since standing is a jurisdictional matter, this motion must be denied. Opposition further contends that it is by virtue of the fact that Defendants are government employees that they were sued and Official attorneys are not prohibited from representing them and may choose to represent if so requested. . The simple fact is that Official Attorney is a</i></p>

CASE SUMMARY**CASE NO. A-20-817757-C**

duly authorized legal counsel who is not prohibited from representing the Defendants so this Motion to Disqualify is DENIED. Defendants to submit the Order. COURT FURTHER ORDERED, 11/19/20 hearing VACATED and matter SET for Status Check. Defendant Nicole Cannizzaro's Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to EDCR 2.23 (c) and (d), this matter is being decided on the briefs and pleadings filed by 11/16/2020 by the parties without oral argument since the court deems oral argument unnecessary. Standing is the controlling issue here and while other issues are discussed, standing is the determinative issue above all else. Nevada Policy Research Institute simply lacks standing to bring this suit. It is an organization, rather than a particularly-aggrieved individual, harmed by any alleged dual employment. It is quite clear that Nevada Policy Research Institute does not allege any particularized harm beyond that of any ordinary taxpayer and that is simply not enough to give standing to Nevada Policy Research Institute to bring this suit. Nevada Policy Research Institute's Opposition does not make persuasive arguments regarding standing, suggesting that an evidentiary hearing would need to be conducted but not offering any theory as to how an evidentiary hearing would demonstrate particularized harm or otherwise lead to a finding that Nevada Policy Research Institute has standing to pursue this case against Defendants. And the court is not persuaded that Nevada Policy Research Institute comes within the recent Schwartz exception. And, it cannot be ignored that Nevada Policy Research Institute blows hot and cold on whether or not it is suing the Defendants as legislators. Historically, Nevada Policy Research Institute has demonstrated that it has been able to enlist individuals who might provide a more colorable claim of particularized harm but have simply opted not to do so in this case to enhance the possibility of finding that counsel represents someone with actual standing. The court finds that the Reply brief puts the matter to rest. Nevada Policy Research Institute clearly lacks standing to bring this suit and thus the Motion to Dismiss must be GRANTED. The Joinders of the other Defendants are also GRANTED. Counsel for Defendant to submit the order granting the Motion to Dismiss as to the moving Defendant and all Defendants who filed Joinders to this Motion to Dismiss. COURT FURTHER ORDERED, 11/19/20 hearing VACATED and matter SET for Status Check. Defendant Jason Frierson's Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to EDCR 2.23 (c) and (d), this matter is being decided on the briefs and pleadings filed by 11/16/2020 by the parties without oral argument since the court deems oral argument unnecessary. Standing is the controlling issue here and while other issues are discussed, standing is the determinative issue above all else. Nevada Policy Research Institute simply lacks standing to bring this suit. It is an organization, rather than a particularly-aggrieved individual, harmed by any alleged dual employment. It is quite clear that Nevada Policy Research Institute does not allege any particularized harm beyond that of any ordinary taxpayer and that is simply not enough to give standing to Nevada Policy Research Institute to bring this suit. Nevada Policy Research Institute's Opposition does not make persuasive arguments regarding standing, suggesting that an evidentiary hearing would need to be conducted but not offering any theory as to how an evidentiary hearing would demonstrate particularized harm or otherwise lead to a finding that Nevada Policy Research Institute has standing to pursue this case against Defendants. And the court is not persuaded that Nevada Policy Research Institute comes within the recent Schwartz exception. And, it cannot be ignored that Nevada Policy Research Institute blows hot and cold on whether or not it is suing the Defendants as legislators. Historically, Nevada Policy Research Institute has demonstrated that it has been able to enlist individuals who might provide a more colorable claim of particularized harm but have simply opted not to do so in this case to enhance the possibility of finding that counsel represents someone with actual standing. The court finds that the Reply brief puts the matter to rest. Nevada Policy Research Institute clearly lacks standing to bring this suit and thus the Motion to Dismiss must be GRANTED. The Joinders of the other Defendants are also granted. Counsel for Defendant to submit the order granting the Motion to Dismiss as to the moving Defendant and all Defendants who filed Joinders to this Motion to Dismiss. COURT FURTHER ORDERED, 11/19/20 hearing VACATED and matter SET for Status Check. Defendant Brittney Miller's Motion to Dismiss Complaint Pursuant to EDCR 2.23 (c) and (d), this matter is being decided on the briefs and pleadings filed by 11/16/2020 by the parties without oral argument since the court deems oral argument unnecessary. Standing is the controlling issue here. Defendant argues that NPRI simply lacks standing to bring this suit. It is an organization, rather than a particularly-aggrieved individual, harmed by any alleged dual employment. It is quite clear that NPRI does not allege any particularized harm beyond that of any ordinary taxpayer and that is simply not enough to give standing to NPRI to bring this suit. NPRI's 10/2/20 Opposition does not make persuasive arguments regarding standing, suggesting that an evidentiary hearing would need to be conducted but not offering any theory as to how an evidentiary hearing would demonstrate particularized harm or otherwise lead to a finding that NPRI has standing to pursue this case against Defendant Miller (or the other Defendants for that matter). And the court is not persuaded that NPRI comes within the recent Schwartz exception. And, it cannot be ignored that NPRI blows hot and cold on whether or not it is suing the Defendants as legislators. Historically, NPRI has demonstrated that it has been able to enlist individuals who might provide a more colorable claim of particularized harm but have simply opted not to do

CASE SUMMARY

CASE NO. A-20-817757-C

so in this case to enhance the possibility of finding that counsel represents someone with actual standing. The court finds that the Reply brief puts the matter to rest. NPRI clearly lacks standing to bring this suit and thus the Motion to Dismiss must be GRANTED. The Joinders of Fumo, Gansert and Neal and Frierson and Canizzaro are also granted. Counsel for Defendant Miller to submit the order granting the Motion to Dismiss as to Defendant Miller and all Defendants who filed a Joinder to her Motion to Dismiss. Defendants Osvaldo Fumo, Heidi SeEVERS Gansert, and Dina Neal's Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to NRCp 12(b)(5) and NRCp 12(b)(6) Pursuant to EDCR 2.23 (c) and (d), this matter is being decided on the briefs and pleadings filed by 11/16/2020 by the parties without oral argument since the court deems oral argument unnecessary. Standing is the controlling issue here and while other issues are discussed, standing is the determinative issue above all else. Nevada Policy Research Institute simply lacks standing to bring this suit. It is an organization, rather than a particularly-aggrieved individual, harmed by any alleged dual employment It is quite clear that Nevada Policy Research Institute does not allege any particularized harm beyond that of any ordinary taxpayer and that is simply not enough to give standing to Nevada Policy Research Institute to bring this suit. Nevada Policy Research Institute's Opposition does not make persuasive arguments regarding standing, suggesting that an evidentiary hearing would need to be conducted but not offering any theory as to how an evidentiary hearing would demonstrate particularized harm or otherwise lead to a finding that Nevada Policy Research Institute has standing to pursue this case against Defendants. And the court is not persuaded that Nevada Policy Research Institute comes within the recent Schwartz exception. And, it cannot be ignored that Nevada Policy Research Institute blows hot and cold on whether or not it is suing the Defendants as legislators. Historically, Nevada Policy Research Institute has demonstrated that it has been able to enlist individuals who might provide a more colorable claim of particularized harm but have simply opted not to do so in this case to enhance the possibility of finding that counsel represents someone with actual standing. The court finds that the Reply brief puts the matter to rest. Nevada Policy Research Institute clearly lacks standing to bring this suit and thus the Motion to Dismiss must be GRANTED. The Joinders of the other Defendants are also granted. Counsel for Defendants to submit the order granting the Motion to Dismiss as to the moving Defendants and all Defendants who filed Joinders to this Motion to Dismiss. COURT FURTHER ORDERED, 11/19/20 hearing VACATED and matter SET for Status Check. Nevada Legislature's Motion to Intervene as Defendant Pursuant to EDCR 2.23 (c) and (d), this matter is being decided on the briefs and pleadings filed by 11/16/2020 by the parties without oral argument since the court deems oral argument unnecessary. The LCB/State of Nevada says it wishes to intervene because it has a real and substantial interest in the issues here since it has historically rendered opinions supporting the kind of employment that the Defendants are alleged to have and providing legal reassurance to the Defendants that such employment is entirely legal and constitutional. Nevada Policy Research Institute opposes saying the Nevada Legislature does not have the right to intervene and that permissive intervention, which is discretionary, should not be permitted. Nevada State Legislature's Reply Brief is very persuasive and the court is persuaded that the Nevada Legislature is entitled to intervene as a matter of right and that even if it were only entitled to permissive intervention, the court chooses to exercise its discretion to find that the Nevada Legislature is also allowed to intervene permissively. Nevada Legislature's Motion to Intervene as Defendant is granted. Nevada Legislature is directed to prepare the order which includes for the court's findings the headlined points contained in the Reply Brief. COURT FURTHER ORDERED, matter SET for Status Check. 12/17/20 9:00 AM STATUS CHECK: FILING OF ORDERS (11/17/20) CLERK'S NOTE: This Amended Minute Order was electronically served to all registered parties for Odyssey File & Serve. /rl 11/18/2020;

11/19/2020



Status Check (3:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Crockett, Jim)

Status Check: Filing of Order Denying Plaintiff's Motion for Order to Serve by Publication (10/19)

Vacated Per 11/3/20 PL Order

Matter Continued;

order filed 12/4/20

Journal Entry Details:

Status Check: Filing of Order Denying Plaintiff's Motion for Order to Serve by Publication (10/19) COURT NOTED as of 8:00 am this morning the Order had not been filed. COURT ORDERED, matter CONTINUED. CONTINUED TO: 12/10/2020 9:00 AM CLERK'S NOTE: This Minute Order was electronically served to all registered parties for Odyssey File & Serve. /rl 11/19/2020;


11/19/2020

CANCELED Motion for Order (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Cory, Kenneth)

Vacated

CASE SUMMARY

CASE NO. A-20-817757-C

	<i>Plaintiff's Motion for Order to Serve by Publication Defendants Glen Leavitt, James Ohrenschall, and Melanie Scheible</i>
12/15/2020	Motion for Clarification (3:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Crockett, Jim) <i>Plaintiff's Motion for the Court's Clarification of Its Decision to Grant Defendants' Motions to Dismiss Based on Plaintiff's Lack of Standing On Order Shortening Time</i> Denied;
12/15/2020	Opposition and Countermotion (3:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Crockett, Jim) <i>Joint Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for the Court's Clarification of its Decision to Grant Defendants' Motions to Dismiss Based on Plaintiff's Lack of Standing and Joint Countermotion to Dismiss all Remaining Defendants Based on Plaintiff's Lack of Standing</i> MINUTES Granted;
	SCHEDULED HEARINGS CANCELED Status Check (01/14/2021 at 3:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Crockett, Jim) <i>Vacated - Case Closed</i> <i>Status Check: Filing of Order from 12/15/20</i>
12/15/2020	 All Pending Motions (3:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Crockett, Jim) Decision Made; Journal Entry Details: PLAINTIFF S MOTION FOR THE COURT S CLARIFICATION OF ITS DECISION TO GRANT DEFENDANTS MOTIONS TO DISMISS BASED ON PLAINTIFF S LACK OF STANDING ON ORDER SHORTENING TIME JOINT OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF S MOTION FOR THE COURT S CLARIFICATION OF ITS DECISION TO GRANT DEFENDANTS MOTIONS TO DISMISS BASED ON PLAINTIFF S LACK OF STANDING AND JOINT COUNTERMOTION TO DISMISS ALL REMAINING DEFENDANTS BASED ON PLAINTIFF S LACK OF STANDING Pursuant to EDCR 2.23 (c) and (d), this matter is being decided on the briefs and pleadings filed by the parties without oral argument since the court deems oral argument unnecessary. Although Plaintiff styles this motion as a Motion for Clarification of the Court's Decision, there is no order that has been signed and filed yet and thus the motion is premature since one cannot clarify what does not exist. Plaintiff's Reply brief does not provide any additional justification or authority for clarification. Motion for Clarification must be DENIED. Counsel for Defendant to prepare and submit order to court for signature w/in 14 days per EDCR 7.21. Calendar status check for filing of order. Defendants have filed a Countermotion to dismiss all of Plaintiff's claims on the basis that Plaintiff lacks standing to bring this suit. Standing is the controlling issue here and while other issues are discussed, standing is the determinative issue above all else. The court finds that the Countermotion to Dismiss is most persuasive. NPRI clearly lacks standing to bring this suit and the court is inclined to grant the countermotion to dismiss . On 12/14/20 NPRI filed its Reply and Non-Opposition to Grant Defendants Motion to Dismiss on behalf of all remaining Defendants due to lack of Standing. Counsel for Defendant to submit the order granting the Counter Motion to Dismiss. COURT FURTHER ORDERED, matter SET for status check; 12/17/20 hearing VACATED. 1/14/20 (CHAMBERS) STATUS CHECK: FILING OF ORDER CLERK'S NOTE: The Court is in receipt of Counsel for Plaintiff's Letter to the Court dated 12/16/20, which has been Left Side filed into the case. Prior to issuing the 12/15/20 Minute Order, the Court had reviewed and considered the 12/14/20 Plaintiff's Reply and the Orders referenced therein, and which were also on file in this case. However, the Court is of the view that the issue of Standing needs no further clarification and is entirely dispositive of the arguments raised by Plaintiff. CLERK'S NOTE: This Minute Order was electronically served by Courtroom Clerk, Nicole McDevitt, to all registered parties for Odyssey File & Serve. /nm 12/16/2020;
12/17/2020	CANCELED Status Check (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Crockett, Jim) <i>Vacated</i> STATUS CHECK: FILING OF ORDERS (11/17/20)
01/14/2021	CANCELED Status Check (3:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Crockett, Jim) <i>Vacated - Case Closed</i> <i>Status Check: Filing of Order from 12/15/20</i>

EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

CASE SUMMARY

CASE NO. A-20-817757-C

06/09/2022	 Further Proceedings (8:30 AM) (Judicial Officer: Peterson, Jessica K.) <i>Further Proceedings: Supreme Court Remand</i> Off Calendar; Journal Entry Details: APPEARANCES CONTINUED: <i>Burna Rose-Ford, on behalf of Dina Neal and Jill Tolles, Bradler Schrager, on behalf of Selena Torres and Brittney Miller, and Kevin Powers, on behalf of the Legislature of Nevada, also present. Colloquy regarding the status of the case.</i> COURT ORDERED <i>matter OFF CALENDAR until further progress is made in the case.;</i>
08/04/2022	Motion (2:00 PM) (Judicial Officer: Peterson, Jessica K.) <i>Defendants Brittney Miller and Selena Torres's Motion to Sever Pursuant to NRCP 21</i> Under Advisement;
08/04/2022	Motion to Dismiss (2:00 PM) (Judicial Officer: Peterson, Jessica K.) <i>Defendant James Ohrenschall's Motion to Dismiss</i> Under Advisement;
08/04/2022	Motion to Dismiss (2:00 PM) (Judicial Officer: Peterson, Jessica K.) <i>NSHE Defendant Dina Neal's Motion To Dismiss Pursuant to NRCP 12(b)(5)</i> Under Advisement;
08/04/2022	Joinder (2:00 PM) (Judicial Officer: Peterson, Jessica K.) <i>Defendants Brittney Miller and Selena Torres's Joinder to Defendant James Ohrenschall's Motion to Dismiss</i> Under Advisement;
08/04/2022	Joinder (2:00 PM) (Judicial Officer: Peterson, Jessica K.) <i>Defendants Brittney Miller and Selena Torres's Joinder to Defendant Dina Neal's Motion to Dismiss</i> Under Advisement;
08/04/2022	Motion to Dismiss (2:00 PM) (Judicial Officer: Peterson, Jessica K.) <i>Nevada Legislature's Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief</i> Under Advisement;
08/04/2022	Joinder (2:00 PM) (Judicial Officer: Peterson, Jessica K.) <i>Defendants Brittney Miller and Selena Torres's Joinder to Nevada Legislature's Motion to Dismiss</i> Under Advisement;
08/04/2022	Joinder (2:00 PM) (Judicial Officer: Peterson, Jessica K.) <i>NSHE Defendant Dina Neal's Joinder to Legislative Counsel Bureau's Nevada Legislature's Motion To Dismiss Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief</i> Under Advisement;
08/04/2022	Joinder (2:00 PM) (Judicial Officer: Peterson, Jessica K.) <i>Defendant James Orenschall's Joinder to NSHE Defendant Dina Neal's Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to NRCP 12(B)(5)</i> Under Advisement;
08/04/2022	Joinder (2:00 PM) (Judicial Officer: Peterson, Jessica K.) <i>[153] Defendant James Ohrenschall's Joinder in Part, to Legislature of the State of Nevada's Motion to Dismiss Complaint</i> Under Advisement;
08/04/2022	Motion to Strike (2:00 PM) (Judicial Officer: Peterson, Jessica K.) <i>Plaintiff's Motion to Strike: (1) NSHE Defendant Dina Neal's Motion to Dismiss pursuant to NRCP 12(B)(5); Nevada Legislature's Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, and (3) All Joinders thereto</i> Under Advisement;

CASE SUMMARY

CASE NO. A-20-817757-C

08/04/2022



All Pending Motions (2:00 PM) (Judicial Officer: Peterson, Jessica K.)

Matter Heard;

Journal Entry Details:

Berna Rhoades-Ford, Esq., Bradley Schrager, Esq. and Kevin Powers, Esq. present via Bluejeans video conference. DEFENDANTS BRITTNEY MILLER AND SELENA TORRES'S JOINDER TO NEVADA LEGISLATURE'S MOTION TO DISMISS...NSHE DEFENDANT DINA NEAL'S JOINDER TO LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL BUREAU'S NEVADA LEGISLATURE'S MOTION TO DISMISS AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF... DEFENDANTS BRITTNEY MILLER AND SELENA TORRES'S JOINDER TO DEFENDANT JAMES OHRENSCHALL'S MOTION TO DISMISS...DEFENDANTS BRITTNEY MILLER AND SELENA TORRES'S JOINDER TO DEFENDANT DINA NEAL'S MOTION TO DISMISS...DEFENDANT JAMES OHRENSCHALL'S JOINDER TO NSHE DEFENDANT DINA NEAL'S MOTION TO DISMISS PURSUANT TO NRCP 12(B)(5)...DEFENDANT JAMES OHRENSCHALL'S JOINDER IN PART, TO LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF NEVADA'S MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINT Court advised it reviewed all Motions and would hear argument at the instant hearing; thereafter, all matters would be taken under advisement. PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO STRIKE: (1) NSHE DEFENDANT DINA NEAL'S MOTION TO DISMISS PURSUANT TO NRCP 12(B)(5); NEVADA LEGISLATURE'S MOTION TO DISMISS AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF, AND (3) ALL JOINDERS THERETO Statements by Ms. McCarty requesting that all Motions be denied. Arguments by Mr. Powers. Court advised it would make a decision on the instant Motion and if it decided to strike it, it would deny the Motion to Dismiss. COURT ORDERED, matter taken UNDER ADVISEMENT. NEVADA LEGISLATURE'S MOTION TO DISMISS AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF Statements by Mr. Powers in support of the instant Motion. Arguments by Ms. McCarty. COURT ORDERED, matter taken UNDER ADVISEMENT. DEFENDANT JAMES OHRENSCHALL'S MOTION TO DISMISS Statements by Mr. Blum in support of the instant Motion. Arguments by Ms. McCarty. Court advised that it wasn't clear and indicated it may need additional time to render it's decision. COURT ORDERED, matter taken UNDER ADVISEMENT. NSHE DEFENDANT DINA NEAL'S MOTION TO DISMISS PURSUANT TO NRCP 12(B)(5) Arguments by counsel. COURT ORDERED, matter taken UNDER ADVISEMENT. DEFENDANTS BRITTNEY MILLER AND SELENA TORRES'S MOTION TO SEVER PURSUANT TO NRCP 21 Statements by Mr. Schrager in support of the instant Motion. COURT ORDERED, matter taken UNDER ADVISEMENT. Court advised parties it would like everyone to provide the Court with their proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law in order for the Court to try and utilize some of the arguments. Additionally, Court indicated it's inclination was to deny the Motion to Dismiss for the employers to be brought in. Court noted it wanted to go back an look at everything, and would issue a written decision as soon as possible; however, would like the findings as soon as possible. Court further advised Mr. Schrager that it would most likely deny the Motion to Sever; however, it would still look at everything and make a written decision. Mr. Schrager inquired if they could still have the 14 days to file the proposed Order, which the Court concurred, just requested it as soon as possible. COURT ORDERED, matters taken UNDER ADVISEMENT for sixty days. ;

08/16/2022

CANCELED Motion (10:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Peterson, Jessica K.)

Vacated - Set in Error

Supplement to Defendants Brittney Miller and Selena Torres's Motion to Sever Pursuant to NRCP 21

01/17/2023

Motion for Leave (10:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Peterson, Jessica K.)

Events: 12/15/2022 Motion for Leave to File

Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint and to Amend Caption in Conformity Therewith

01/17/2023

Opposition and Countermotion (10:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Peterson, Jessica K.)

Events: 12/29/2022 Opposition and Countermotion

Nevada Legislature's Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint and Countermotion to Dismiss Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint

01/17/2023

Joinder (10:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Peterson, Jessica K.)

Events: 12/29/2022 Joinder to Opposition to Motion

NSHE Defendant Dina Neal's Joinder to Legislative Counsel Bureau's Nevada Legislative

EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

CASE SUMMARY

CASE NO. A-20-817757-C

01/17/2023	<p><i>Counsel Bureau's Nevada Legislature's Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint and Countermotion to Dismiss Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint</i></p> <p>Joinder (10:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Peterson, Jessica K.)</p> <p>Events: 12/30/2022 Joinder to Opposition to Motion</p> <p><i>[190] Defendant James Ohrenschall's Joinder to Nevada Legislature's Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint and Countermotion to Dismiss Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint</i></p>	
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DATE

FINANCIAL INFORMATION

Defendant Frierson, Jason	Total Charges	223.00
Total Payments and Credits	223.00	
Balance Due as of 1/10/2023		0.00
Defendant Miller, Brittney	Total Charges	1,123.00
Total Payments and Credits	1,123.00	
Balance Due as of 1/10/2023		0.00
Defendant Neal, Dina	Total Charges	0.00
Total Payments and Credits	0.00	
Balance Due as of 1/10/2023		0.00
Defendant Ohrenschall, James	Total Charges	223.00
Total Payments and Credits	223.00	
Balance Due as of 1/10/2023		0.00
Defendant Torres, Selena	Total Charges	30.00
Total Payments and Credits	30.00	
Balance Due as of 1/10/2023		0.00
Defendant Cannizzaro, Nicole J.	Total Charges	681.20
Total Payments and Credits	681.20	
Balance Due as of 1/10/2023		0.00
Plaintiff Nevada Policy Research Institute	Total Charges	1,242.00
Total Payments and Credits	1,242.00	
Balance Due as of 1/10/2023		0.00
Plaintiff Nevada Policy Research Institute	Appeal Bond Balance as of 1/10/2023	500.00

DISTRICT COURT CIVIL COVER SHEET

County, Nevada

Case No. _____

(Assigned by Clerk's Office)

CASE NO: A-20-817757-C
Department 2

I. Party Information *(provide both home and mailing addresses if different)*

Plaintiff(s) (name/address/phone): <p style="text-align: center;">Nevada Policy Research Institute</p>	Defendant(s) (name/address/phone): <p style="text-align: center;">Nicole J. Cannizzaro; Kasina Douglass-Boone; et al.</p>
Attorney (name/address/phone): <p style="text-align: center;">Deanna L. Forbush (Bar No. 6646)</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Fox Rothschild LLP</p> <p style="text-align: center;">1980 Festival Plaza Drive, Suite 700, Las Vegas, NV 89135</p> <p style="text-align: center;">(702) 262-6899</p>	Attorney (name/address/phone):

II. Nature of Controversy *(please select the one most applicable filing type below)*

Civil Case Filing Types

Real Property Landlord/Tenant <input type="checkbox"/> Unlawful Detainer <input type="checkbox"/> Other Landlord/Tenant Title to Property <input type="checkbox"/> Judicial Foreclosure <input type="checkbox"/> Other Title to Property Other Real Property <input type="checkbox"/> Condemnation/Eminent Domain <input type="checkbox"/> Other Real Property	Negligence <input type="checkbox"/> Auto <input type="checkbox"/> Premises Liability <input type="checkbox"/> Other Negligence Malpractice <input type="checkbox"/> Medical/Dental <input type="checkbox"/> Legal <input type="checkbox"/> Accounting <input type="checkbox"/> Other Malpractice	Torts Other Torts <input type="checkbox"/> Product Liability <input type="checkbox"/> Intentional Misconduct <input type="checkbox"/> Employment Tort <input type="checkbox"/> Insurance Tort <input type="checkbox"/> Other Tort
Probate Probate <i>(select case type and estate value)</i> <input type="checkbox"/> Summary Administration <input type="checkbox"/> General Administration <input type="checkbox"/> Special Administration <input type="checkbox"/> Set Aside <input type="checkbox"/> Trust/Conservatorship <input type="checkbox"/> Other Probate Estate Value <input type="checkbox"/> Over \$200,000 <input type="checkbox"/> Between \$100,000 and \$200,000 <input type="checkbox"/> Under \$100,000 or Unknown <input type="checkbox"/> Under \$2,500	Construction Defect & Contract Construction Defect <input type="checkbox"/> Chapter 40 <input type="checkbox"/> Other Construction Defect Contract Case <input type="checkbox"/> Uniform Commercial Code <input type="checkbox"/> Building and Construction <input type="checkbox"/> Insurance Carrier <input type="checkbox"/> Commercial Instrument <input type="checkbox"/> Collection of Accounts <input type="checkbox"/> Employment Contract <input type="checkbox"/> Other Contract	Judicial Review/Appeal Judicial Review <input type="checkbox"/> Foreclosure Mediation Case <input type="checkbox"/> Petition to Seal Records <input type="checkbox"/> Mental Competency Nevada State Agency Appeal <input type="checkbox"/> Department of Motor Vehicle <input type="checkbox"/> Worker's Compensation <input type="checkbox"/> Other Nevada State Agency Appeal Other <input type="checkbox"/> Appeal from Lower Court <input type="checkbox"/> Other Judicial Review/Appeal
Civil Writ Civil Writ <input type="checkbox"/> Writ of Habeas Corpus <input type="checkbox"/> Writ of Mandamus <input type="checkbox"/> Writ of Quo Warrant <input type="checkbox"/> Writ of Prohibition <input type="checkbox"/> Other Civil Writ		Other Civil Filing Other Civil Filing <input type="checkbox"/> Compromise of Minor's Claim <input type="checkbox"/> Foreign Judgment <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Other Civil Matters

Business Court filings should be filed using the Business Court civil coversheet.


July 9, 2020

Date

/s/ Deanna L. Forbush

Signature of initiating party or representative

See other side for family-related case filings.


CLERK OF THE COURT

1 **ORDR**

2
3 DISTRICT COURT
4 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

5
6 NEVADA POLICY RESEARCH
7 INSTITUTE, a Nevada domestic
8 nonprofit corporation,

9 Plaintiff,

10 vs.

11 BRITTNEY MILLER, an individual
12 engaging in dual employment with the
13 Nevada State Assembly and Clark County
14 School District; DINA NEAL, an
15 individual engaging in dual employment with
16 the Nevada State Senate and Nevada State
17 College and College of Southern Nevada;
18 JAMES OHRENSCHALL, an individual
19 engaging in dual employment with the
20 Nevada State Senate and Clark County Public
21 Defender; and SELENA TORRES, an
22 individual engaging in dual employment with
23 the Nevada State Assembly and a Clark
24 County Public Charter School,

25 Defendants,

26 and

27 Legislature of the State of Nevada,

28 Intervenor-Defendant.

CASE NO: A-20-817757-C

DEPT NO: VIII

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On April 21, 2022, the Nevada Supreme Court reversed the district court’s order, narrowly expanding the public-importance exception laid out in Schwartz v. Lopez, 132 Nev. 732, 382 P.3d 886 (2016), applying the exception to “cases where a party seeks to protect the essential nature of a government in which the three distinct departments, . . . legislative, executive, and judicial, remain within the bounds of their constitutional powers.” Nevada Policy Research Institute, Inc. v. Cannizzaro, 507 P.3d 1203 (2022); *citing* State ex rel. Coll v. Johnson, 990 P.2d 1277, 1284 (N.M. 1999). The case was remanded to this Court for further proceedings on the claims.

Between June 28, 2022 and August 1, 2022 the following Motions, Oppositions and Replies were filed: (1) Defendants Brittney Miller and Selena Torres's Motion to Sever Pursuant to NRCp 21; (2) Nevada Legislature's Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief; (3) Defendant James Ohrenschall's Motion to Dismiss; (4) NSHE Defendant Dina Neal's Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to NRCp 12(b)(5); (5) Defendants Brittney Miller and Selena Torres's Joinder to Nevada Legislature's Motion to Dismiss; (6) NSHE Defendant Dina Neal's Joinder to Legislative Counsel Bureau's Nevada Legislature's Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief; (7) Defendants Brittney Miller and Selena

1 Torres's Joinder to Defendant James Ohrenschall's Motion to Dismiss; (8) Defendants Brittney
2 Miller and Selena Torres's Joinder to Defendant Dina Neal's Motion to Dismiss; (9) Defendant
3 James Ohrenschall's Joinder to NSHE Defendant Dina Neal's Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to
4 NRCP 12(b)(5); and (10) Defendant James Ohrenschall's Joinder in Part, to Legislature of the
5 State of Nevada's Motion to Dismiss Complaint; (11) Plaintiff's Motion to Strike NSHE
6 Defendant Dina Neal's Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to NRCP 12(b)(5); (12) Plaintiff's Motion to
7 Strike Nevada Legislature's Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint for Declaratory and
8 Injunctive Relief; and(13) Plaintiff's Motion to Strike All Joinders Thereto. On August 4, 2022
9 the Court heard oral argument on all of the foregoing Motions, Oppositions and Replies thereto.
10 Counsel present at the hearing were Colleen E. McCarty, Esq. and Deanna Forbush, Esq. for the
11 Plaintiff; Bradley S. Schrager, Esq., Jonathan D. Blum, Esq., and Berna L. Rhoades-Ford, Esq. for
12 the Defendants; and Kevin C. Powers, Esq. for the Intervenor Defendant.
13

14 The Court took the matters under advisement and now issues the following Findings of
15 Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order.
16

17 ***Current Parties***

18 The Defendants in the case have changed as individuals have left public employment or
19 have chosen not to run for reelection. Currently, the Defendants to the case, based on the Amended
20 Complaint, are (1) Brittney Miller, who is a member of the Nevada State Assembly and holds a
21 paid teaching position with Clark County School District; (2) Selena Torres, who is a member of
22 the Nevada State Assembly and holds a paid teaching position with Clark County School District;
23 (3) Dina Neal, who is a member of the Nevada State Senate and holds a paid position as an adjunct
24 professor with Nevada State College; (4) James Ohrenschall, who is a member of the Nevada State
25 Senate and holds a paid position as a deputy public defender in Clark County. The Nevada State
26 Legislature filed a Motion to Intervene, which was granted in December 2020 on the same day the
27 Court granted the Omnibus Motion to Dismiss.
28

1 ***Nevada Legislature's Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive***
2 ***Relief***
3

4 Intervenor-Defendant Legislature of the State of Nevada moved to dismiss NPRI's
5 Amended Complaint. The Intervenor alleges that the court does not have subject matter
6 jurisdiction under NRCP 12(b)(1) because NPRI failed to comply with NRS Chapter 41 in that it
7 did not invoke the conditional waiver of sovereign immunity. The Intervenor further alleges that
8 the Plaintiff should have also brought suit against the appropriate State entity or political
9 subdivision pursuant to NRS 41.031, NRS 41.0337, and NRS 41.039. In addition, the Intervenor
10 alleges that NPRI's claims should be dismissed because NPRI failed to join all necessary parties
11 pursuant to NRCP 12(b)(6), and NRCP 19, which requires the joinder of all persons who qualify
12 as necessary parties and who are needed for a just adjudication of the litigation. Specifically, the
13 Legislature argued that it would be necessary to join all of the Judges who serve as professors at
14 UNLV and UNR because arguably if Senators and Assemblypersons are violating the separation
15 of powers doctrine by teaching and serving in that capacity then Judges would be as well.

16 This Court finds that Intervenor Nevada Legislature is mistaken in its reference to NRS 41
17 in the case at hand. NRS 41.031 refers to liability in relation to a tort claim and this case is one of
18 equity, with the Plaintiff seeking declaratory and injunctive relief related to constitutional questions
19 and not damages related to tort liability. Therefore, the Court finds the argument regarding a lack
20 of subject matter jurisdiction in relation to NRS Chapter 41 to be without merit.

21
22 ***Defendant James Ohrenschall's Motion to Dismiss***

23 Defendant Ohrenschall, a Nevada State Senator and Public Defender for Clark County,
24 moves to dismiss the Amended Complaint pursuant to NRCP 12(b)(5) and 12(b)(6) for failure to
25 state a claim and failure to join required parties under NRCP 19. In addition, Ohrenschall has also
26 joined the other parties' motions to dismiss. Defendant Ohrenschall's first argument is that the
27 Nevada Constitution separation-of-powers clause does not apply to local government employees,
28

1 citing both case law and an opinion published by the Nevada Attorney General. Ohrenscha
2 further alleges that even if the separation-of-powers doctrine were to apply to local governments,
3 his role as a Public Defender in the Juvenile Division is not one of a public officer, but rather a
4 public employee.
5

6
7 ***Defendant Dina Neal’s Motion to Dismiss***

8 Defendant Dina Neal, who serves as an adjunct professor at Nevada State College (“NSC”)
9 while also serving as a Nevada State Senator, alleges that she does not exercise any powers of the
10 executive branch by virtue of her employment with NSC and therefore is not in violation of the
11 separation-of-powers clause and moves for dismissal based on NRCP 12(b)(5). Neal alleges that
12 the issue is whether her position with NSC is one of a public officer or a public employee and she
13 is a public employee because she does not exercise sovereign duties of the executive branch nor
14 was her position created by law. Neal alleges that because the Amended Complaint does not allege
15 that Neal is a public official or that she exercises sovereign or constitutional powers, and there are
16 no factual allegations from which such conclusions might reasonably be drawn, it does not state a
17 claim upon which relief may be granted.
18

19 ***Defendants Brittney Miller and Selena Torres’s Motion to Sever Pursuant to NRCP 21¹***

20 Defendants Miller and Torres (“Teacher Defendants”), both of whom are public school
21 teachers, filed their motion seeking to sever themselves from the lawsuit because they allege that
22 they should not be subject to trial alongside public employees of widely differing classifications
23 as there is no one-size-fits-all analysis that can be applied to all defendants in this action. Teacher
24 Defendants rely on NRCP 21 as the legal basis for their argument and cite to A Cab, LLC v.
25 Murray, 501 P.3d 961, 974 (Nev. 2021) regarding the Nevada Supreme Court’s guidance as to
26 when severance is proper. Teacher Defendants argue that it will require focused, factual inquiries
27

28 ¹ As the Court is granting the Motions to Dismiss to which Miller and Torres joined, the Court will deny the Motion to Sever as it is moot.

1 into the employment status, duties, and activities of each individual to resolve this case. They
2 further allege that the claims against them do not arise out of the same transactions or occurrences
3 as they do for the other defendants, and they do not present common questions of law or fact.
4 Finally, Teacher Defendants allege that judicial economy would be facilitated by the severance
5 and their claims would require different witnesses and documentary proof due to their unique
6 status from other defendants.
7

8
9 ***Plaintiff's Motion to Strike: (1) NSHE Defendant Dina Neal's Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to***
10 ***NRCP 12(b)(5); (2) Nevada Legislature's Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint for***
11 ***Declaratory and Injunctive Relief; and (3) All Joinders thereto***

12 In response to the aforementioned motions, Plaintiff NPRI filed a motion to strike
13 Defendant Neal's motion to dismiss, the Intervenor's motion to dismiss, and all joinders thereto.
14 NPRI alleges that under NRCP 12(g)(2), the only party who is eligible to move for dismissal is
15 Defendant Ohrenschall because he did not previously move for dismissal and the other parties are
16 not allowed to make another motion raising a defense or objection that was available to the party
17 but omitted from its earlier motion. NPRI did not include Ohrenschall's motion to dismiss in its
18 motion to strike.

19 After Judge Crockett dismissed the case due to lack of standing, he did not have jurisdiction
20 to address the other arguments raised in the motions. However, all but one of the issues were raised
21 in the various motions to dismiss that were considered by Judge Crockett.² Therefore, the Motion
22 to Strike is without merit as the arguments were all raised in the Defendants' initial Motions to
23 Dismiss and NRCP 12(g)(2) does not apply. Moreover, "[u]pon remand from an appellate court,
24 the lower court is required to proceed from the point at which the error occurred." Giancola v.
25 Azem, 109 N.E.3d 1194, 1200 (Ohio 2018) (quoting State ex rel. Douglas v. Burlew, 833 N.E.2d
26

27 ² The issue that was not raised in the first round of motions to dismiss was the Nevada Legislature's argument
28 relating to NRS 41. As the Court explained earlier, the argument was without merit as the statute deals with tort
liability, not constitutional questions.

1 293, 295 (Ohio 2005)). Therefore, the parties are returned to the position they were in and this
2 Court the Court is doing as the Nevada Supreme Court instructed and is reviewing the case on the
3 merits, particularly whether the law supports the claims in the Amended Complaint and whether
4 there is a claim upon which relief may be granted.
5

6 DISCUSSION

7
8 A complaint must set forth sufficient facts to establish all necessary elements of a claim
9 for relief. Hay v. Hay, 100 Nev. 196, 198 678 P.2d 672, 674 (1984). A motion to dismiss is properly
10 granted when even where it appears to a certainty that taking all of the allegations in the Complaint
11 as true, the allegations are insufficient to establish the elements of a claim for relief. *See* Brent G.
12 Theobald Const., Inc., v. Richardson Const., Inc., 122 Nev. 1163, 1166, 147 P.3d 238, 241
13 (2006)(*abrogated on other grounds by* Buzz Stew, LLC v. City of N. Las Vegas, 124 Nev. 224
14 (2008)).

15 The Amended Complaint in this case seeks declaratory and injunctive relief precluding
16 anyone who serves as an educator or a public defender³ from serving as a paid legislator. After
17 reviewing the Motions, Oppositions, Replies and Joinders thereto, listening to the arguments of
18 Counsel, and a thorough review of all of the cases cited therein plus additional multijurisdictional
19 research, and for the reasons stated below, the Court finds that the allegations in Plaintiffs
20 Complaint are insufficient to establish the elements of a claim for relief and therefore, GRANTS
21 the Defendants' Motions.

22 The issue before the Court is whether it is a violation of the separation-of-powers clause of
23 the Nevada State Constitution for an individual to serve in the Nevada Legislature while
24 concurrently employed by a state or local government entity. ⁴
25

26 ³ As stated above, the Defendants have changed and thus those are the only two positions currently at issue. The
27 Court notes that the Plaintiffs are seeking Leave to Amend their Complaint to add additional Defendants, for the
28 reasons stated herein, that Motion will likely become moot based upon the Court's decision in this matter.

⁴ Although the Nevada Legislature also sought dismissal for failure to join necessary parties, as the Court is finding
that there is not a violation of the separation-of-powers, the Court declines to address the Rule 19 issues.

1 While many states have specific constitutional or statutory prohibitions against dual public
2 employment, Nevada is not one of those states. Therefore, in order to answer this question the
3 Court has reviewed the words of and intent behind the Nevada Constitution and existing case law
4 both from this jurisdiction and other jurisdictions whose Constitution mirrors the language used
5 by the Nevada framers. This Court finds that three factors must be evaluated to determine whether
6 an individual's dual employment violates the separation-of-powers clause of the Constitution.
7 First, the Court must deem whether the dual roles are incompatible based on the common law
8 doctrine of incompatible offices. Next, the Court must look at whether the individual legislator's
9 employment is with a state entity or a local political subdivision. Finally, if the roles are compatible
10 and the individual works for a state entity, then the Court must determine whether the position
11 with the state entity is that of an employee or an officer.
12

13 14 **Common Law Doctrine of "Incompatible Offices"**

15 To date, Nevada courts have not dealt directly with the common law doctrine of
16 incompatible offices; however, other states have. The New Jersey Supreme Court explained in
17 Schear v. City of Elizabeth, 41 N.J. 321, 326, 196 A.2d 774, 776 (1964), that the doctrine of
18 incompatible public offices was developed through the common law. The Court went on to say
19 "[i]ncompatibility exists when there is a conflict or inconsistency in the functions of the two
20 offices, i.e., where 'one office is subordinate to another, or subject to its supervision or control, or
21 the duties clash, inviting the incumbent to prefer one obligation to another.'" Id. citing Reilly v.
22 Ozzard, 33 N.J. 529, 543, 166 A.2d 360, 367 (1960). In Schear, property owners and taxpayers of
23 the City of Elizabeth challenged a resolution of the Planning Board, which was formed based on a
24 state statute, alleging that there was an incompatibility of office issue resulting from the fact that
25 one member of the Planning Board was also the City Attorney. The Plaintiffs in Schear argued
26 that the duty of a member of the Planning Board to participate fully and fairly in the determination
27 of a blight problem was inconsistent with his obligation as City Attorney to provide independent
28

1 and impartial advice regarding the issue. In this case, the Court looked at the Statute and
2 determined that the legislature contemplated a person such as the City Attorney may serve on the
3 Planning Board and that no incompatibility existed between the positions. The Court analyzed the
4 specific facts of the case when it upheld the lower court's ruling that there was not conflict. After
5 the Planning Board decision was reached, the City Attorney did not give legal advice to the
6 governing body about the matter nor did the City Council seek his opinion regarding the legality
7 of the Board's action. The trial court relied on the restrictive provision of the statute and the
8 common law in finding no conflict existed and therefore the plaintiffs suffered no prejudice.
9

10 The Hawaii Supreme Court has also addressed the common law doctrine of incompatible
11 offices. In In re Water Use Permit Applications, 94 Haw. 97, 120, 9 P.3d 409, 432 (2000), the
12 Court stated that the doctrine of incompatible public offices "applies where the functions of the
13 offices concerned are inherently inconsistent, as where there are conflicting interests, or where
14 public policy dictates that one person may not retain both offices."⁵ In reaching its decision in
15 Water Use, the Court looked to State v. Villeza, 85 Haw. 258, 942 P.2d 522 (1997), which
16 explained the common law doctrine of incompatible offices as prohibiting an individual from
17 serving in dual capacity "[i]f one office is subordinate to the other or the functions of the offices
18 are inherently inconsistent and repugnant to each other." Whether one office is incompatible with
19 another depends on the rights, duties, or obligations connected with or flowing from the offices. If
20 one office is subordinate to the other or the functions of the offices are inherently inconsistent and
21 repugnant to each other, the offices are incompatible. Id. at 270, 534 (internal citations omitted).

22 In Villeza, the defendant alleged that because the sentencing judge was appointed to and
23 served as the administrative director for the court that the doctrine of incompatible offices resulted
24 in him automatically vacating the first office [of judge], therefore relinquishing his authority to
25 sentence the defendant. The Villeza Court stated that an office would be incompatible with the
26 office of judge if it created a conflict of interest or a lack (or appearance) of impartiality,
27

28 ⁵ See also Mott v. Horstmann, 36 Cal. 2d 388, 391-92, 224 P.2d 11, 13 (1950).

1 specifically it would be incompatible if it challenged judicial integrity and offended traditional
2 notions of the necessary impartiality of the judiciary. The Villeza Court held that the offices of
3 circuit court judge and administrative director were not incompatible at common law because
4 judicial integrity was not threatened in the case.
5

6 Aside from any specific constitutional or statutory prohibitions, incompatibility depends
7 on the character and relation of the offices and not on the matter of physical inability to discharge
8 the duties of both of them. The question is whether one office is subordinated to the other, or the
9 performance of one interferes with the performance of the duties of the other, or whether the
10 functions of the two are inherently inconsistent or repugnant, or whether the occupancy of both
11 offices is detrimental to the public interest. Polley v. Fortenberry, 268 Ky. 369, 105 S.W.2d 143,
12 144–45 (1937).⁶ In Polley, the Kentucky Supreme Court analyzed whether the positions of
13 maintenance supervisor for the state highway department and member of the county board of
14 education were incompatible under the common law. The Court first determined that they were
15 both offices, but there was no constitution or statutory authority that would prevent the plaintiff
16 Polley from serving in both roles. Kentucky law required that if a person accepts an office
17 incompatible with the one he already occupies that he must vacate the first office when assuming
18 the second. Therefore, the Court looked to the common law of incompatible offices to determine
19 if the two roles were incompatible. The Court found that neither position was subordinate to the
20 other nor would the performance of one position require the person to “pass upon the validity of
21 his acts” in the other position. The Court held that it was clear that the two positions were not
22 inherently inconsistent or repugnant nor a detriment to the public interest.

23 It varies by jurisdiction whether the common law rule against incompatibility applies to
24 only offices or includes public employment as well.⁷ Due to the public policy issues of
25

26 ⁶ See also Russell v. Worcester Cnty., 323 Mass. 717, 719, 84 N.E.2d 123, 124 (1949).

27 ⁷ See Dupras v. Cnty. of Clinton, 213 A.D.2d 952, 953, 624 N.Y.S.2d 309, 309 (1995)(New York recognizes that the
28 doctrine of incompatible offices applies to employees as well as officers.); Eldridge v. Sierra View Loc. Hosp. Dist.,
224 Cal. App. 3d 311, 319, 273 Cal. Rptr. 654, 660 (Ct. App. 1990)(California declined to extend the doctrine to a
scenario where one position is a public office and the other employment.)

1 incompatible public office and public employment being coupled that may arise, this Court finds
2 that the common law doctrine applies to public offices as well as public employment in
3 determining whether an individual employed by a public entity may serve as a state legislator.
4

5
6 ***It is the Role of the Court to Determine if Offices Are Incompatible.***

7 “Whether two public offices are incompatible is a question of law to be determined by this
8 Court upon examining the nature of the offices and their relationship to one another.” Felkner v.
9 Chariho Reg'l Sch. Comm., 968 A.2d 865, 873 (R.I. 2009).⁸

10 In State v. Second Jud. Dist. Ct. in & for Cnty. of Washoe, 134 Nev. 783, 787–88, 432
11 P.3d 154, 159 (2018), the Supreme Court reaffirmed, based on the Nevada Constitution separation
12 of powers doctrine, that it is prohibited for one branch of government to impinge on the functions
13 of another.” *See* Nev. Const. art. 3, § 1(1). In the decision, the Court noted that a prosecutor acts
14 within the executive realm in making charging decisions based on violation of the State’s laws. *Id.*
15 *citing* Stromberg v. Second Jud. Dist. Ct. of State ex rel. Cnty. of Washoe, 125 Nev. 1, 200 P.3d
16 509 (2009). A District Attorney’s Office brings charges on behalf of the State against those who
17 have allegedly violated the laws of the State and the Legislature enacts such laws. Therefore,
18 serving in the Legislature while simultaneously employed as a member of a county district
19 attorney’s office is incompatible based on the common law doctrine. In the case at hand, both of
20 the named Defendants who were identified as being employed by the Clark County District
21 Attorney’s Office, Nicole Cannizzaro and Melanie Scheible, have since left their public
22 employment, therefore they are no longer parties to the case.

23 As for the current Defendants, this Court finds that there is no common law incompatibility
24 issue for an individual to be employed as a county public school teacher, a public defender, or a
25 professor at a state college and simultaneously serve as a state legislator. Based on Schear, the
26

27 ⁸ *See also* LaGrange City Council v. Hall Bros. Co. of Oldham Cnty., 3 S.W.3d 765, 769 (Ky. Ct. App. 1999);
28 Reilly, 33 N.J. 529, 166 A.2d 360; People, on Complaint of Chapman, v. Rapsey, 16 Cal. 2d 636, 641, 107 P.2d
388, 391 (1940); Tarpo v. Bowman Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 232 N.W.2d 67, 71 (N.D. 1975).

1 Court finds that there is no conflict between the positions nor does the Plaintiff suffer prejudice
2 based on their dual employment. After analyzing the holding in Villeza, the Court finds that the
3 integrity of the legislative and executive branches is not threatened by a public school teacher, a
4 public defender, or a professor simultaneously serving as a legislator. And, a public school teacher,
5 a public defender, nor a professor have the discretionary power to review the actions of a legislator
6 and a legislator does not have the discretionary power to review the actions taken by an educator
7 or a public defender. Therefore, the dual employment of Defendants Miller, Torres, Ohrenschall,
8 and Neal are found not to be incompatible under the common law doctrine.
9

10
11 **Historical Guidance Regarding the Applicability of the Nevada Separation-of-Powers Clause**
12 **to Local Political Subdivisions**

13 Nevada's separation-of-powers clause, contained in Article 3, Section 1 of the Nevada
14 Constitution, provides that “[t]he powers of the Government of the State of Nevada shall be divided
15 into three separate departments,—the Legislative,—the Executive and the Judicial; and no persons
16 charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these departments shall exercise
17 any functions, appertaining to either of the others, except in the cases expressly directed or
18 permitted in this constitution.” The Nevada Supreme Court has held that the separation of powers
19 doctrine is the most important foundation for preserving and protecting liberty by preventing the
20 accumulation of power in any one branch of government. Secretary of State v. Nevada State
21 Legislature, 120 Nev. 456, 466, 93 P.3d 746, 753 (2004). The Constitution further embodies this
22 concept of limited government by specifically delineating the powers granted to the three distinct
23 and coequal branches of government, as set forth in Article 4 (legislative), Article 5 (executive),
24 and Article 6 (judicial). *See* Comm'n on Ethics v. Hardy, 125 Nev. 285, 292, 212 P.3d 1098, 1103
25 (2009).
26
27
28

1 ***The Nevada Constitution Was Based on the California Constitution and California Courts Have***
2 ***Decided That the Constitutional Separation-of-Powers Clause Does Not Apply to Employees of***
3 ***Local Government Entities***
4

5 In 2001, the Nevada Supreme Court recognized that the rules of statutory construction
6 apply when interpreting constitutional provisions. “[W]hen a statute is derived from a sister state,
7 it is presumably adopted with the construction given it by the highest court of the sister state.”
8 Thus, since Nevada relied upon the California Constitution as a basis for developing the Nevada
9 Constitution, it is appropriate for us to look to the California Supreme Court's interpretation of [the
10 same provisions] in the California Constitution. State ex rel. Harvey v. Second Jud. Dist. Ct., 117
11 Nev. 754, 763, 32 P.3d 1263, 1269 (2001). In fact, Article 3, Section 1 of the Nevada Constitution
12 is identical to the original separation-of-powers clause contained in Article 3, Section 1 of the
13 California Constitution,⁹ so this Court will look to California Court decisions regarding whether
14 the separation-of-powers clause applies to local governments.

15 In People ex rel. Attorney General v. Provines, (34 Cal. 520) (1868), the California
16 Supreme Court analyzed the issue of whether the separation-of-powers clause applied to local
17 political subdivisions. The Court held that the Constitution was formed for the purpose of
18 establishing a State Government, contrasting it to local, county or municipal governments.¹⁰
19 Simply put, the Court found that the framers of the California Constitution did not contemplate
20 that the state government executive branch included local government. Therefore, California's
21 separation of powers doctrine did not apply to local governments or its employees.

22 The Nevada Attorney General’s Office (“AG”) and the Nevada Legislative Counsel Bureau
23 (“LCB”) have both issued multiple opinions relevant to the matter at hand. AG Sandoval
24 recognized that the Supreme Court has not addressed this specific issue but has emphasized the
25

26 ⁹ The State of California slightly amended their separation-of-powers clause in 1972 after voters approved
27 Proposition 1A, which transformed California legislators from citizen legislators to full time employees of the
Legislative Branch. *See* California Proposition 1A, 1966.

28 ¹⁰ The Court explained that local governments are necessary; however, the Constitution does not of itself create or
establish any local or municipal governments. Provines, 34 Cal. at 520.

1 importance of the separation-of-powers doctrine in Galloway v. Truesdell, 83 Nev. 13, 422 P.2d
2 237 (1967) and Whitehead v. Comm'n on Jud. Discipline, 110 Nev. 874, 879, 878 P.2d 913 (1994).
3 In Galloway, the Nevada Supreme Court analyzed what constitutes legislative, executive, and
4 judicial powers in order to determine whether a statute (NRS 122.070) required a district judge to
5 perform non-judicial powers. The Court held that the statute in question required a member of the
6 judicial branch to perform legislative functions and was therefore unconstitutional as it violated
7 the separation-of-powers clause of the Nevada Constitution. Galloway, 83 Nev. at 31, 422 P.2d at
8 249. In Whitehead, the Court addressed the issue of whether the State Attorney General serving as
9 counsel for the Nevada Commission on Judicial Discipline violated the constitutional separation-
10 of-powers provision. Petitioner Whitehead argued that the Attorney General is an elected,
11 constitutional officer of the executive branch and therefore not permitted by the separation-of-
12 powers clause of the Constitution to represent the Commission in the exercise of its powers related
13 to judicial discipline. The Court agreed with Petitioner and held that there were multiple instances
14 of conflict of interest and it was unconstitutional for an elected officer of the executive branch to
15 represent the Commission in judicial discipline matters nor “prosecute” a judge before the
16 Commission. The Court relied on its decision in Galloway in holding that “one department cannot
17 exercise the power of the other two” without violating the separation-of-powers clause of the
18 Constitution. Whitehead, 110 Nev. at 880, P.2d. at 917. In the case at hand, this Court recognizes
19 the importance of the separation-of-powers clause raised by the Galloway and Whitehead Courts;
20 however, it distinguishes Galloway as the issue at hand is not whether one branch is being required
21 to perform powers constitutionally granted to another branch and Whitehead is dealing with an
22 elected officer of the executive branch encroaching upon the powers of the judicial branch. While
23 these cases provide valuable insight into the importance of the separation-of-powers clause, they
24 do not directly inform the concern of dual employment at issue in this case.
25
26
27
28

1 Returning to the AG Opinions,¹¹ two of them were in direct conflict regarding whether a
2 school district employee may simultaneously serve in the state legislature; however, the second
3 opinion, published in 1971, overrode the previous decision, which was not supported by legal
4 authority.¹² The AG Opinions have provided that, based on the intent of the framers of the Nevada
5 Constitution, employees of local political subdivisions are not in violation of the separation-of-
6 powers clause when they serve as state legislators. See Op. Nev. Att'y Gen. No. 401 (April 20,
7 1967); Op. Nev. Att'y Gen. No. 71-4 (January 11, 1971). However, there is conflict between the
8 opinions of the AG and the LCB when it comes to state employees and in 2004, the Nevada
9 Secretary of State asked then Attorney General Brian Sandoval to provide guidance as to whether
10 a state or local government employee is eligible to simultaneously serve as a member of the Nevada
11 State Legislature (dual service) without violating the Nevada Constitution's separation of powers
12 doctrine in order to try to parse out the conflicting opinions between the AG and LCB. 2004 Nev.
13 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 03 (Mar. 1, 2004). AG Sandoval also observed that [o]ther states are not
14 consistent in their regulation, prohibition, and allowance of dual service. They address dual service
15 through various combinations of constitutional, statutory, and common-law restrictions, making
16 this a complex and conflicting issue of law and policy.

17
18 In coming to its decision that employees of local government entities are not bound by the
19 separation-of-powers clause, the AG first looked to the United States Supreme Court for the main
20 purpose of separation-of-powers, which is “[t]he fundamental necessity of maintaining each of the
21 three general departments of government entirely free from the control or coercive influence,
22 direct or indirect, of either of the others[.]” Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629,
23 55 S. Ct. 869, 874 (1935). The AG reasoned that [h]istorically the requirement of the separation
24 of powers was never applied to local governmental organizations. Thus, not only municipal
25 corporations but counties, townships, *school districts*, drainage districts, and the like are frequently
26

27 ¹¹ These Opinions were referenced in the Supreme Court decision, footnote 4. See Cannizzaro, 507 P.3d at 1209.

28 ¹² 2004 Nev. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 03 (Mar. 1, 2004), footnote 6.

1 organized with only a single commission with all the powers, legislative, executive, and judicial,
2 in the commission. The compelling argument in favor of this is that the closeness of local
3 authorities to popular control affords an adequate sanction and protection. Op. Nev. Att'y Gen. No.
4 401 (April 20, 1967).

5
6 In finding that employees of local school districts who also served in the legislature did not
7 violate the separation-of-powers clause,¹³ the AG reached its conclusion by relying on legal
8 precedent from California, Colorado, and Maryland, each with constitutional separation of powers
9 clauses almost identical to the Nevada Constitution. These cases¹⁴ each held that the separation of
10 powers clause of their respective constitutions did not apply to local government employees. Op.
11 Nev. Att'y Gen. No. 71-4 (January 11, 1971).

12 While the AG's Opinions are in no way binding, this Court agrees with the AG in its
13 analysis that the findings in Provines, as well as precedent from other jurisdictions with similar
14 constitutional separation-of-powers clauses, provide strong support for the contention that Article
15 3, Section 1 of the Nevada Constitution does not apply to local political subdivisions. Therefore,
16 as long as an individual employed by a local political subdivision does not hold an incompatible
17 dual position, their dual employment is not prohibited by the separation-of-powers clause of the
18 Nevada Constitution. In the case at hand, the Teacher Defendants, employed by Clark County
19 School District, and Defendant Ohrenschall, employed by the Clark County Public Defender's
20 Office, are not in violation of the separation-of-powers clause by operation of their dual
21 employment. However, if an individual is dually employed by a state entity, and the roles they
22

23 ¹³ Op. Nev. Att'y Gen. No. 71-4 effectively overruled Op. Nev. Att'y Gen. No. 59 (May 9, 1955), which concluded
24 that local school districts were part of the executive branch of government and therefore could not employ a member
25 of the legislative branch under NEV. CONST. art. 3 § 1.

26 ¹⁴ Mariposa Cnty. v. Merced Irr. Dist., 32 Cal. 2d 467, 476–77, 196 P.2d 920, 926 (1948) (Moreover it is settled that
27 the separation of powers provision of the constitution, art. 3, § 1, does not apply to local governments as
28 distinguished from departments of the state government.); Peterson v. McNichols, 128 Colo. 137, 142, 260 P.2d
938, 941 (1953) (The finding of the trial court that the ordinance usurps a judicial function and is contrary to Article
III of the Constitution of the State of Colorado is inept in application to this litigation. The constitutional provision
to which reference is made relates to state government and is not to be applied here in matters of purely local
concern . . .); and Pressman v. D'Alesandro, 193 Md. 672, 679, 69 A.2d 453, 454 (1949) (The constitutional
requirement of separation of powers is not applicable to local government.)

1 occupy are not incompatible under the common law, such as NSHE Defendant Neal, a third factor
2 must be considered, whether they are a public officer or a public employee.
3

4 **Treatment of Public Officers and Public Employees Under the Law When It Comes to** 5 **Separation-of-Powers** 6

7 The final factor in our analysis deals with how public officers and public employees are
8 treated differently under the law. There is a split of authority between other jurisdictions as well
9 as between our own AG and LCB when it comes to how to define a public officer. The key
10 differences lie in whether the court or advising entity look at the function or powers appertaining
11 to the position rather than the role (or classification) of it.
12

13 ***Function or Powers Appertaining To a Position***

14 The separation-of-powers clause of the Utah Constitution¹⁵ embodies the same language
15 as the Nevada Constitution, including the concepts of “powers properly belonging to” and
16 “functions appertaining to” found in the second part of the separation-of-powers clause, and in In
17 re Young, 1999 UT 6, 976 P.2d 581, the Utah Supreme Court examined the meaning behind these
18 phrases. The Young Court accurately noted that the second part of the clause is not plain in its
19 meaning, particularly when “considered in the context of the real world of government.” Id. at ¶11,
20 585. The Court noted that its case law over a century has not taken a serious look at this aspect of
21 the separation-of-powers clause, so it elected to provide meaning to it in Young. Id. at ¶ 12, 585.
22 After surveying the related cases decided by it, the Utah Supreme Court determined that “the most
23 that can be said categorically is that for powers or functions to fall within the reach of the [second
24 part of the separation-of-powers clause], they must be so inherently legislative, executive or
25

26 ¹⁵ The powers of the government of the State of Utah shall be divided into three distinct departments, the
27 Legislative, the Executive, and the Judicial; and no person charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging
28 to one of these departments, shall exercise any functions appertaining to either of the others, except in the cases
herein expressly directed or permitted. Utah Const. art. V, § 1.

1 judicial in character that they must be exercised exclusively by their respective departments.”¹⁶
2 And, the Court noted that when defining the functions or powers which are exclusive to one
3 department, that it had also used the terms “primary,” “core,” or “essential.” Id. at ¶ 14, 586. After
4 this analysis of the case law, the Court determined that there is a “necessary corollary to the
5 doctrine that some powers or functions belong exclusively to the members of one branch is that
6 there must be powers and functions which may, in appearance, have characteristics of an inherent
7 function of one branch but which may be permissibly exercised by another branch.” Id. (internal
8 citations omitted). Finally, the Court held that “when the power exercised or the function
9 performed is one that we determine is not exclusive to a branch, it is not “appertaining to” that
10 branch and does not fall within the reach of the [second part of the separation-of-powers clause].
11 Id.

12
13 In Halverson v. Hardcastle, 123 Nev. 245, 163 P.3d 428 (2007), the Nevada Supreme Court
14 spelled out the inherent powers of each branch of government, stating that the legislative power,
15 which is vested in the state Legislature, refers to the broad authority to enact, amend, and repeal
16 laws; the executive power, vested in the Governor, encompasses the responsibility to carry out and
17 enforce those laws (*i.e.*, to administrate); and the judicial power is vested in the state court
18 system carrying with it the capability or potential capacity to exercise a judicial function to hear
19 and determine justiciable controversies. Halverson, 123 Nev. at 260, 163 P.3d at 439.

20 In the case before this Court, it is clear to this Court that the powers “appertaining to” each
21 branch of the Nevada government are the inherent or primary powers as outlined in the
22 Constitution and Halverson. It is clear that the function of a public school teacher is not to
23 administrate the laws nor is it the function of a public defender to administrate the laws.¹⁷ Rather

24
25 ¹⁶ Citing Taylor v. Lee, 119 Utah 302, 315, 226 P.2d 531, 537 (1951).

26 ¹⁷ In Defendant Legislature’s Motion to Dismiss, they allege that pursuant to NRCP 19, judges serving as professors
27 must be included in the suit as necessary parties. When a judge serves in the role of professor, she is not performing
28 a primary duty of the executive branch of government, meaning she is not carrying out or enforcing the laws.
Therefore, there is no violation of the separation-of-powers clause when a member of the judiciary serves as a
professor at a NSHE institution. However, if a judge were to seek election as a legislator, it would clearly be
unconstitutional as it would violate the separation-of-powers clause as one individual would be carrying out the
primary function of two separate branches of state government.

1 the function of a teacher is to teach and the function of a public defender is to defend someone
2 charged with a crime. As such, neither is enacting, amending, or repealing laws in their roles as
3 educators or public defenders. Along this same line of reasoning, this Court finds that a member
4 of a district attorney's office would be in violation of the separation-of-powers clause as that
5 individual would be exercising the primary function of the legislative branch (enacting, amending,
6 and repealing laws) as well as the primary function of the executive branch (carrying out and
7 enforcing laws).
8

9 In State ex rel. Stratton v. Roswell Indep. Sch., 1991-NMCA-013, 111 N.M. 495, 806 P.2d
10 1085, the New Mexico Supreme Court decided an issue on point with the case at hand. In Roswell,
11 the Court had to determine if a public school teacher and administrator were state employees, based
12 on whether school districts were "arms of the state." The Court recognized that the state maintains
13 a great degree of control over local school districts; however, also noted that it would be absurd to
14 say that regulatory schemes could transform a political subdivision, business, or profession into
15 state government. Id. at 502, 1092. New Mexico is a sparsely populated state with a citizen
16 legislature, as is Nevada, and the Court looked to the New Jersey Supreme Court's holding in
17 Reilly, 33 N.J. 529, 166 A.2d 360, in holding that all citizen legislators, whether employed publicly
18 or privately, will likely confront a conflict of interest between their livelihood and a legislative
19 proposal at some time. In analyzing the separation-of-powers clause of New Mexico's
20 Constitution,¹⁸ the Court determined that the issue of whether the public school personnel
21 simultaneously serving as legislators violated the separation-of-powers clause could be resolved
22 by determining whether they were "charged with the exercise of powers." The New Mexico Court
23 then looked to a Montana Supreme Court decision in which the Court developed a separation of
24 powers analysis that distinguished between a public officer who is invested with sovereign powers
25 and a public employee who is not. State ex rel. Barney v. Hawkins, 79 Mont. 506, 257 P. 411
26

27 ¹⁸ "The powers of the government of this state are divided into three distinct departments, the legislative, executive
28 and judicial, and no person or collection of persons charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one
of these departments, shall exercise any powers properly belonging to either of the others, except as in this
constitution otherwise expressly directed or permitted." N.M. Const. art. III, § 1.

1 (1927). New Mexico adopted the five-part test to determine whether an employee is a public officer
2 as laid out in Hawkins in State v. Quinn, 1930-NMSC-065, 35 N.M. 62, 290 P. 786. The Montana
3 test adopted by New Mexico is “to constitute a position of public employment a public office of a
4 civil nature, it must be created by the Constitution or through legislative act; must possess a
5 delegation of a portion of the sovereign power of government to be exercised for the benefit of the
6 public; must have some permanency and continuity, and not be only temporary or occasional; and
7 its powers and duties must be derived from legislative authority and be performed independently
8 and without the control of a superior power, other than the law, except in case of inferior officers
9 specifically placed under the control of a superior officer or body, and be entered upon by taking
10 an oath and giving an official bond, and be held by virtue of a commission or other written
11 authority.” Id. at ¶ 5, 787. A latter New Mexico case stressed that the most important factor of the
12 Hawkins test is that to be a public officer, the person must be invested with sovereign power. State
13 ex rel. Gibson v. Fernandez, 40 N.M. 288, 292, 58 P.2d 1197, 1200 (1936).

14
15 In relying on the Hawkins test, the Roswell Court determined the separation-of-powers
16 clause of their constitution applied only to public officers, not employees. The Roswell Court
17 further held that public school teachers and administrators are not “public officers” because they
18 do not establish policy for the local school districts or for the state department of education.
19 Roswell, 1991-NMCA-013, ¶ 35, 111 N.M. at 505, 806 P.2d at 1095.

20 The separation-of-powers clause in the Nevada Constitution uses the same language as
21 New Mexico’s as it refers to one branch being prohibited from the “exercise of powers” of another
22 branch. Public school teachers, public defenders, and professors at an NSHE institutions are not
23 invested with sovereign powers and do not establish policy for their employers.

24 In the Roswell Court’s analysis of whether an individual is a public officer or a public
25 employee, one of the factors in the Hawkins test as well as an American Jurisprudence citation¹⁹

26
27 ¹⁹ 63A Am.Jur.2d *Public Officers and Employees* § 12, at 676 (1984) (“the characteristics of public office include
28 creation of the office by statute or constitution, exercise of some portion of the sovereign power, a continuing
position not occasional or contractual, a fixed term of office, an oath, liability for misfeasance or nonfeasance, and
independence beyond that of employees[;] a public employment, on the other hand, is a position in the public

1 indicate than the requirement to take an oath may be taken into consideration to determine if an
2 individual is a public officer. The Nevada Supreme Court addressed this in State v. Cole, 38 Nev.
3 215, 148 P. 551 (1915) when it stated that taking an oath is some indication by which to determine
4 if a position is an office; however, the Court held that based on the Nevada Constitution that all
5 officers shall take an oath. Id. at 215, 553. Nevada is one of fourteen states that constitutionally
6 requires an academic loyalty oath to be administered to public educators.²⁰ However, the oath
7 signed by an educator when they seek licensure references “office or position”²¹ and when this is
8 evaluated under Cole, this Court finds that the academic loyalty oath does not constitute the
9 position of public educator being classified as a public office.
10

11 The Nevada Supreme Court has laid out the characteristics of a public office, as opposed
12 to public employment, in multiple cases. In State ex rel. Mathews v. Murray, 70 Nev. 116, 120–
13 21, 258 P.2d 982, 984 (1953), the Court established that in Nevada it is the function of a position,
14 rather than its classification, that defines whether it is a public office or public employment. The
15 Court recognized that the nature of a public office as distinguished from mere employment is the
16 subject of a considerable body of authority, and many criteria of determination are suggested by
17 the courts. Upon one point at least, the authorities uniformly appear to concur. A public office is
18 distinguishable from other forms of employment in that its holder has by the sovereign been
19 invested with some portion of the *sovereign functions of government*. Id. at 120-21, 984 (emphasis
20 added). The Mathews Court relied on its decision in Cole, to further define a public office as one
21 that does not spring into existence spontaneously, rather it is brought into existence, either under
22 the terms of the Constitution, by legislative enactment, or by some municipal body, pursuant to

23 service which lacks sufficient of the foregoing elements or characteristics to make it an office.” Roswell, 1991-
24 NMCA-013, ¶ 34, 111 N.M. at 505, 806 P.2d at 1095.

25 ²⁰ Nev. Const. art. XI, § 5; Gabriel J. Chin & Saira Rao, Pledging Allegiance to the Constitution: The First
Amendment and Loyalty Oaths for Faculty at Private Universities, 64 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 431 (2003).

26 ²¹ Pursuant to NRS 391.080, all applicants for licensure as an educator must subscribe to the Oath of Office as
27 specified in the Nevada Constitution: I, _____, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support, protect and defend
the constitution and government of the United States, and the constitution and government of the State of Nevada
against all enemies, whether domestic or foreign, and that I will bear true faith, allegiance and loyalty to the same,
any ordinance, resolution or law of any state notwithstanding, and that I will well and faithfully perform all the
duties of the **office or position** on which I am about to enter, (if an oath) so help me God; (if an affirmation) under
the pains and penalties of perjury. Section 8, NV Educator License Application. (emphasis added)
28

1 authority delegated to it. Id. at 219, 552. The Mathews Court also recognized that the Cole Court
2 relied on secondary sources in its opinion to further define a public office in stating that “[a]ll
3 public offices must originally have been created by the sovereign as the foundation of
4 government”²² and “[t]he right, authority and duty conferred by law by which, for a given period,
5 either fixed by law or through the pleasure of the creating power of government, an individual is
6 invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised by him
7 for the benefit of the public. The warrant to exercise powers is conferred, not by contract, but by
8 law.”²³ Mathews, 70 Nev. at 121, 258 P.2d at 984.
9

10 11 ***Role or Classification of a Position***

12 While the separation-of-powers clause of the Nebraska Constitution²⁴ is similar to
13 Nevada’s, the Nebraska Supreme Court has interpreted whether a position is one of public office
14 or public employment by role or classification rather than function or power. In State ex rel. Spire
15 v. Conway, 238 Neb. 766, 472 N.W.2d 403 (1991), the issue in front of the Nebraska Supreme
16 Court was whether *quo warranto* was an appropriate means to challenge the right of an assistant
17 professor at a state college to hold his position while also serving as a member of the state
18 legislature. Id. at 769, 406. In order to determine if the remedy was appropriate, the court had to
19 determine if assistant professor at a state college holds or exercises a “public office” within the
20 meaning of their *quo warranto* statute.²⁵ The Court relied on its decision in Eason v. Majors, 111
21 Neb. 288, 196 N.W. 133 (1923) in stating that “[w]hen a position based upon a provision of law
22

23 ²² 3 Cruise's Dig. p. 109, § 5.

24 ²³ Wyman on Public Offices, § 44.

25 ²⁴ The powers of the government of this state are divided into three distinct departments, the legislative, executive,
26 and judicial, and no person or collection of persons being one of these departments shall exercise any power
27 properly belonging to either of the others except as expressly directed or permitted in this Constitution. Neb. Const.
28 art. II, § 1.

²⁵ An information may be filed against any person unlawfully holding or exercising any public office or franchise
within this state, or any office in any corporation created by the laws of this state, or when any public officer has
done or suffered any act which works a forfeiture of his office, or when any persons act as a corporation within this
state without being authorized by law, or if, being incorporated, they do or omit acts which amount to a surrender or
forfeiture of their rights and privileges as a corporation, or when they exercise powers not conferred by law. Neb.
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 25-21,121 (West).

1 carries with it continuing duties of public concern which involve some exercise of the sovereign
2 power in their proper performance, the position may be said to be an office public in character.
3 Spire, 238 Neb. at 770, 472 N.W.2d at 406. As we can see from this, the Court was viewing the
4 “character” of the position rather than the function. The dissent in Spire is more aligned with the
5 decisions of the Nevada Supreme Court in that it looks to whether the legislator is exercising some
6 degree of the sovereign power of the state. Spire, 238 Neb. at 792, 472 N.W.2d at 418. Therefore,
7 in reconciling the definition of “public officer” in relation to Spire, the Nevada Supreme Court
8 language in Mathews and Cole mirrors the dissent rather than the majority opinion.²⁶

9
10 In 1957, the Oregon Supreme Court decided the case of Monaghan v. Sch. Dist. No. 1,
11 Clackamas Cnty., 211 Or. 360, 315 P.2d 797 (1957), holding that a school teacher may not also
12 serve as a state legislator because it violates the separation-of-powers clause of the Oregon
13 Constitution.²⁷ The Oregon Court defined “function” in a broad sense in that it held that if a person
14 was classified as performing any role in a branch of government, they would be precluded from
15 performing any role in a different branch. Id. at 373, 804.

16 However, in 1958, the voters of the state passed a referendum amending the Constitution,
17 which superseded the decision in Monaghan. The Oregon Legislature proposed a further
18 amendment as Senate Joint Resolution 203, which was submitted to voters as Measure 87 and was
19 approved November 4, 2014. The amended Oregon Constitution specifically allows “(1) A person
20 employed by any board or commission established by law to supervise and coordinate the activities
21 of Oregon's institutions of post-secondary education, a person employed by a public university as
22 defined by law or a member or employee of any school board is eligible to serve as a member of
23 the Legislative Assembly, and membership in the Legislative Assembly does not prevent the
24 person from being employed by any board or commission established by law to supervise and
25

26 ²⁶ See Mathews, 70 Nev. at 120-21, 258 P.2d at 984; Cole, 38 Nev. at 219, 148 P. at 552.

27 ²⁷ The powers of the Government shall be divided into three separate branches, the Legislative, the Executive,
28 including the administrative, and the Judicial; and no person charged with official duties under one of these
branches, shall exercise any of the functions of another, except as in this Constitution expressly provided. Or. Const.
art. III, § 1.

1 coordinate the activities of Oregon's post-secondary institutions of education or by a public
2 university as defined by law, or from being a member or employee of a school board; and (2) A
3 person serving as a judge of any court of this state may be employed by the Oregon National Guard
4 for the purpose of performing military service or may be employed by any public university as
5 defined by law for the purpose of teaching, and the employment does not prevent the person from
6 serving as a judge.”²⁸ Both the Oregon voters and the Oregon Legislature made an implicit finding
7 that a school teacher serving as a state legislator does not violate the separation-of-powers clause
8 of the State Constitution.
9

10 What we have learned from Nebraska and Oregon is that some courts distinguish whether
11 a position is a public office rather than public employment is based on the role or classification
12 rather than the function or powers of the positions held. Oregon has also shown us that a voter-
13 enacted constitutional amendment may supersede the interpretation by a court.

14 In Nevada, there is disagreement between the AG and LCB when it comes to whether
15 public employees that fall under the executive branch of the state government are prohibited from
16 serving in the state legislature by the separation-of-powers clause. The AG provided guidance that
17 employees of the Nevada State Highway Patrol (“NSHP”) and Nevada Department of
18 Transportation (“NDOT”) would be precluded from service in the legislature;²⁹ however, the LCB
19 issued opinions that found that employees of the State Department of Agriculture (“DOA”) and
20 University and Community College System of Nevada (“NSHE”)³⁰ could serve in the legislature
21 as long as they were a public employee and not a public officer.³¹

22 The AG based its argument on its finding that the role of employee of the NSHP helps
23 perform the administrative functions of the state executive branch of government and, therefore,
24 he is a member of the executive branch and the separation-of-powers clause would preclude him
25

26
27 ²⁸ Or. Const. art. XV, § 8

²⁹ See Op. Nev. Att’y Gen. No. 168 (May 22, 1974); Ltr. Nev. Att’y Gen. (January 28, 2002).

³⁰ The University and Community College System of Nevada is now called the Nevada System of Higher Education.

³¹ Legislative Counsel Bureau Opinion - February 4, 2002; Legislative Counsel Bureau Opinion - January 23, 2003.

1 from serving in the legislature.³² While the AG did not issue an official opinion as to the NDOT
2 question, it did issue a letter in which it stated that it disagreed with the LCB's Opinion that the
3 NDOT employee could run for partisan office and maintain his employment.³³
4

5 The issue at the heart of the disagreement between the AG and LCB is one of function
6 versus classification. The LCB has opined that the separation-of-powers clause applies to public
7 officers but not public employees, therefore it is a matter of function, relying on the common law
8 doctrine of incompatible offices as well as NRS 281.044, NRS 284.770, and NRS 284.143.
9 However, the AG's opinions have relied on an argument that the classification of an employee that
10 falls under the umbrella of the executive branch is what triggers the separation-of-powers. Both
11 the AG and LCB have asked for judicial determination on this issue.

12 In relying on Matthews in its DOA Opinion, the LCB opined "the position of Senior
13 Petroleum Chemist with the DOA is a position created by administrative authority and discretion,
14 not by statute. Moreover, based on the statutory structure of the DOA, we believe that most
15 employees of the DOA do not exercise any of the sovereign functions of the state. Rather, those
16 employees simply implement the policies made by higher-ranking state officials."³⁴

17 The AG disagreed with the LCB in its use of Matthews because the Court never analyzed
18 whether Mr. Murray's dual employment violated Nevada's constitutional separation of powers
19 doctrine. However, the LCB relied on Matthews to define the parameters of a public employee
20 compared to a public official, not to determine the applicability of the separation-of-powers clause
21 to public employees. This Court, like LCB, relies on Matthews to provide guidance on
22 distinguishing public employees from public officers as a step in the analysis of whether a person
23 employed by the state is subject to the separation-of-powers clause of the Constitution.

24 Based on the classification instructions provided by the Mathews Court, this Court finds
25 that a professor at a NSHE institution is a public employee and not a public officer. Therefore,
26

27 ³² Attorney General's Opinion No. 183, dated July 9, 1952.

28 ³³ Ltr. Nev. Att'y Gen. (January 28, 2002).

³⁴ Legislative Counsel Bureau Opinion - February 4, 2002.

1 NSHE Defendant Neal’s simultaneous employment as an adjunct professor at NSC and her service
2 as a state legislator does not violate the separation-of-powers clause of the Nevada Constitution
3 because she does not exercise a sovereign function of the executive branch in her position as
4 Adjunct Professor at Nevada State College. This Court also finds that public school teachers and
5 public defenders employed by local political subdivisions are public employees and therefore the
6 Teacher Defendants and Defendant Ohrenschall’s employment with Clark County and service as
7 state legislators do not violate the separation-of-powers clause of the Constitution because they do
8 not exercise sovereign functions of the executive branch.
9

10 CONCLUSION

11
12 The Nevada Legislature has known of the Attorney General’s Opinion No. 71-4, which
13 stated that the separation-of-powers clause of the Nevada Constitution did not apply to local
14 government employees, for over fifty years. With this knowledge, it has chosen not to act on the
15 issue by enacting a statute that would ban dual employment as addressed in the Opinion. Therefore,
16 this Court views this inaction as the intent of the Legislature to not enact such a law. *See Roswell*,
17 1991-NMCA-013, ¶ 24, 111 N.M. at 502-03, 806 P.2d at 1092-93.³⁵

18 The legislatures of states such as Louisiana, Connecticut, and Massachusetts have enacted
19 statutes that prohibit dual employment.³⁶ Connecticut and South Carolina have even spelled a dual
20 job ban out in their constitution.³⁷ There are multiple examples of how other state legislatures
21 have confronted this issue and if it was the intent of the Nevada Legislature to ban dual
22 employment and override common law, it is in their power to do so. The New Jersey Supreme
23 Court came to the same conclusion when it held “that the common law did not bar the dual
24 officeholding involved in this case, and that the question whether it should be barred in the public
25

26 ³⁵ See also *Water Use*, 94 Haw. at 120, 9 P.3d at 432 (The legislature may nevertheless override this rule as it deems appropriate or necessary.).

27 ³⁶ See *Foti v. Holliday*, 2009-0093 (La. 10/30/09), 27 So. 3d 813, 819; *Stolberg v. Caldwell*, 175 Conn. 586, 604, 402 A.2d 763, 772–73 (1978); *Osetek v. City of Chicopee*, 370 Mass. 110, 112, 345 N.E.2d 897, 899 (1976).

28 ³⁷ See *Stolberg*, 175 Conn. at 604, 402 A.2d at 772–73; *S.C. Pub. Int. Found. v. S.C. Transp. Infrastructure Bank*, 403 S.C. 640, 646–48, 744 S.E.2d 521, 524–25 (2013).

1 interest reposes in the power and responsibility of the legislative department.” Reilly, 33 N.J. at
2 543, 166 A.2d at 372. Likewise, it is in the power of the voters of Nevada to amend the Constitution
3 if they desire to ban dual public employment.³⁸ Or, Nevada voters may follow the lead of Oregon
4 voters and amend the constitution to allow for various types of dual public employment.
5

6 Until either of these events occur, this Court finds that three factors must be evaluated to
7 determine whether an individual’s dual employment violates the separation-of-powers clause of
8 the Nevada Constitution. First, the Court must deem whether the dual roles are incompatible based
9 on the common law doctrine of incompatible offices. Next, the Court must look at whether the
10 individual legislator’s employment is with a state entity or a local political subdivision. Finally, if
11 the roles are compatible and the individual works for a state entity, then the Court must determine
12 whether the position with the state entity is that of an employee or an officer. Based on the analysis
13 of these factors, this Court holds that (1) no officer or employee of a state or local government may
14 also serve as a state legislator if the roles are not compatible and it is the purview of the court to
15 determine compatibility; (2) those employed by local government entities are not a part of the state
16 executive branch and therefore may serve in the legislative branch providing the roles are
17 compatible; and (3) public officers of the state executive branch may not serve in the legislature;
18 however, those who are public employees may, providing the roles are compatible.

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27 ³⁸ See also Ackerman Dairy Inc. v. Kandle, 54 N.J. 71, 75–76, 253 A.2d 466, 469 (1969)(The holding of
28 two offices which are incompatible under the common law may be permitted by a state constitution as a state’s
constitution overrides the common law.)

1 As a result of these findings and accepting the charge of the Plaintiff's Amended Complaint
2 as true, this Court finds that Plaintiff NPRI has not established elements of a claim that would
3 grant them relief.
4

5
6 BASED ON THE FOREGOING, the Court ORDERS that Defendant Ohrenschall's
7 Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED;

8 The Court FURTHER ORDERS that NSHE Defendant Neal's Motion to Dismiss is
9 GRANTED;

10 The Court FURTHER ORDERS that Defendant Nevada State Legislature's Motion to
11 Dismiss is DENIED for the reasons as indicated in footnote 4 above;

12 The Court FURTHER ORDERS that the Joinders filed by co-Defendants, to the extent that
13 they dealt with the separation-of-power issues are GRANTED;

14 The Court FURTHER ORDERS that the Motion to Sever filed by Teacher Defendants is
15 DENIED for the reasons as indicated in footnote 1 above; and

16 The Court FURTHER ORDERS that the Plaintiffs Motions to Strike are DENIED.
17

18 Dated this 4th day of January, 2023

19 
20

21 **959 84F BDA 670B**
22 Judge Jessica K. Peterson
District Court Judge

23 **AFFIRMATION**

Pursuant to NRS 239B.030

24 The undersigned does hereby affirm that the
preceding Order filed in District Court case number
25 A818973 **DOES NOT** contain the social security
number of any person.

26 /s/ Jessica K Peterson
27
28

1 **CSERV**

2
3 DISTRICT COURT
CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

4
5
6 Nevada Policy Research
Institute, Plaintiff(s)

CASE NO: A-20-817757-C

7 vs.

DEPT. NO. Department 8

8
9 Nicole Cannizzaro, Defendant(s)

10
11 **AUTOMATED CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

12 This automated certificate of service was generated by the Eighth Judicial District
13 Court. The foregoing Order was served via the court's electronic eFile system to all
recipients registered for e-Service on the above entitled case as listed below:

14 Service Date: 1/4/2023

15 Bradley Schrager bschrager@wrslawyers.com

16 Dannielle Fresquez dfresquez@wrslawyers.com

17 Daniel Bravo dbravo@wrslawyers.com

18 Melissa Shield mshield@wrslawyers.com

19 Kevin Powers kpowers@lcb.state.nv.us

20 Sherry Harper sharper@foxrothschild.com

21 Deborah Pressley dpressley@foxrothschild.com

22 Deanna Forbush dforbush@foxrothschild.com

23 Colleen McCarty cmccarty@foxrothschild.com


24 Jonathan Blum jblum@wileypetersenlaw.com

25 Chastity Dugenia cdugenia@wileypetersenlaw.com

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Berna Rhodes-Ford	Berna.Rhodes-Ford@nsc.edu
Caitlin Pascal	cpascal@wileypetersenlaw.com
Emmanuel Ekigwe	Emmanuel.Ekigwe@nsc.edu



NEOJ
BRADLEY SCHRAGER, ESQ. (SBN 10217)
ROYI MOAS, ESQ. (SBN 10686)
DANIEL BRAVO, ESQ. (SBN 13078)
**WOLF, RIFKIN, SHAPIRO,
SCHULMAN & RABKIN, LLP**
3773 Howard Hughes Parkway, Suite 590 South
Las Vegas, NV 89169
(702) 341-5200/Fax: (702) 341-5300
bschrager@wrslawyers.com
rmoas@wrslawyers.com
dbravo@wrslawyers.com

*Attorneys for Defendants,
Brittney Miller and Selena Torres*

DISTRICT COURT
CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

NEVADA POLICY RESEARCH
INSTITUTE, a Nevada domestic nonprofit
corporation,

Plaintiff,

vs.

BRITTNEY MILLER, an individual engaging
in dual employment with the Nevada State
Assembly and Clark County School District;
DINA NEAL, an individual engaging in dual
employment with the Nevada State Assembly
and Nevada State College; JAMES
OHRENSCHALL, an individual engaging in
dual employment with the Nevada State
Senate and Clark County Public Defender;
SELENA TORRES, an individual engaging
in dual employment with the Nevada State
Assembly and Clark County School District;
and THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE
OF NEVADA,

Defendants,

and

LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF
NEVADA,

Intervenor-Defendant.

Case No. A-20-817757-C
Dept. No.: VIII

NOTICE OF ENTRY OF ORDER

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DATED this 5th day of January, 2023.

By: /s/ Bradley S. Schrager
BRADLEY SCHRAGER, ESQ. (SBN 10217)
ROYI MOAS, ESQ. (SBN 10686)
DANIEL BRAVO, ESQ. (SBN 13078)
3773 Howard Hughes Parkway, Suite 590 South
Las Vegas, NV 89169
(702) 341-5200/Fax: (702) 341-5300

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By: /s/ Danielle Fresquez
Danielle Fresquez, an Employee of
WOLF, RIFKIN, SHAPIRO, SCHULMAN &
RABKIN, LLP

EXHIBIT 1

EXHIBIT 1

1 **ORDR**

2
3 DISTRICT COURT
4 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

5
6 NEVADA POLICY RESEARCH
7 INSTITUTE, a Nevada domestic
8 nonprofit corporation,

9 Plaintiff,

10 vs.

11 BRITTNEY MILLER, an individual
12 engaging in dual employment with the
13 Nevada State Assembly and Clark County
14 School District; DINA NEAL, an
15 individual engaging in dual employment with
16 the Nevada State Senate and Nevada State
17 College and College of Southern Nevada;
18 JAMES OHRENSCHALL, an individual
19 engaging in dual employment with the
20 Nevada State Senate and Clark County Public
21 Defender; and SELENA TORRES, an
22 individual engaging in dual employment with
23 the Nevada State Assembly and a Clark
24 County Public Charter School,

25 Defendants,

26 and

27 Legislature of the State of Nevada,

28 Intervenor-Defendant.

CASE NO: A-20-817757-C

DEPT NO: VIII

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On April 21, 2022, the Nevada Supreme Court reversed the district court’s order, narrowly expanding the public-importance exception laid out in Schwartz v. Lopez, 132 Nev. 732, 382 P.3d 886 (2016), applying the exception to “cases where a party seeks to protect the essential nature of a government in which the three distinct departments, . . . legislative, executive, and judicial, remain within the bounds of their constitutional powers.” Nevada Policy Research Institute, Inc. v. Cannizzaro, 507 P.3d 1203 (2022); *citing* State ex rel. Coll v. Johnson, 990 P.2d 1277, 1284 (N.M. 1999). The case was remanded to this Court for further proceedings on the claims.

Between June 28, 2022 and August 1, 2022 the following Motions, Oppositions and Replies were filed: (1) Defendants Brittney Miller and Selena Torres's Motion to Sever Pursuant to NRCp 21; (2) Nevada Legislature's Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief; (3) Defendant James Ohrenschall's Motion to Dismiss; (4) NSHE Defendant Dina Neal's Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to NRCp 12(b)(5); (5) Defendants Brittney Miller and Selena Torres's Joinder to Nevada Legislature's Motion to Dismiss; (6) NSHE Defendant Dina Neal's Joinder to Legislative Counsel Bureau's Nevada Legislature's Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief; (7) Defendants Brittney Miller and Selena

1 Torres's Joinder to Defendant James Ohrenschall's Motion to Dismiss; (8) Defendants Brittney
2 Miller and Selena Torres's Joinder to Defendant Dina Neal's Motion to Dismiss; (9) Defendant
3 James Ohrenschall's Joinder to NSHE Defendant Dina Neal's Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to
4 NRCP 12(b)(5); and (10) Defendant James Ohrenschall's Joinder in Part, to Legislature of the
5 State of Nevada's Motion to Dismiss Complaint; (11) Plaintiff's Motion to Strike NSHE
6 Defendant Dina Neal's Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to NRCP 12(b)(5); (12) Plaintiff's Motion to
7 Strike Nevada Legislature's Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint for Declaratory and
8 Injunctive Relief; and (13) Plaintiff's Motion to Strike All Joinders Thereto. On August 4, 2022
9 the Court heard oral argument on all of the foregoing Motions, Oppositions and Replies thereto.
10 Counsel present at the hearing were Colleen E. McCarty, Esq. and Deanna Forbush, Esq. for the
11 Plaintiff; Bradley S. Schrager, Esq., Jonathan D. Blum, Esq., and Berna L. Rhoades-Ford, Esq. for
12 the Defendants; and Kevin C. Powers, Esq. for the Intervenor Defendant.

14 The Court took the matters under advisement and now issues the following Findings of
15 Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order.

16
17 ***Current Parties***

18 The Defendants in the case have changed as individuals have left public employment or
19 have chosen not to run for reelection. Currently, the Defendants to the case, based on the Amended
20 Complaint, are (1) Brittney Miller, who is a member of the Nevada State Assembly and holds a
21 paid teaching position with Clark County School District; (2) Selena Torres, who is a member of
22 the Nevada State Assembly and holds a paid teaching position with Clark County School District;
23 (3) Dina Neal, who is a member of the Nevada State Senate and holds a paid position as an adjunct
24 professor with Nevada State College; (4) James Ohrenschall, who is a member of the Nevada State
25 Senate and holds a paid position as a deputy public defender in Clark County. The Nevada State
26 Legislature filed a Motion to Intervene, which was granted in December 2020 on the same day the
27 Court granted the Omnibus Motion to Dismiss.

1 *Nevada Legislature's Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive*
2 *Relief*

3
4 Intervenor-Defendant Legislature of the State of Nevada moved to dismiss NPRI's
5 Amended Complaint. The Intervenor alleges that the court does not have subject matter
6 jurisdiction under NRCP 12(b)(1) because NPRI failed to comply with NRS Chapter 41 in that it
7 did not invoke the conditional waiver of sovereign immunity. The Intervenor further alleges that
8 the Plaintiff should have also brought suit against the appropriate State entity or political
9 subdivision pursuant to NRS 41.031, NRS 41.0337, and NRS 41.039. In addition, the Intervenor
10 alleges that NPRI's claims should be dismissed because NPRI failed to join all necessary parties
11 pursuant to NRCP 12(b)(6), and NRCP 19, which requires the joinder of all persons who qualify
12 as necessary parties and who are needed for a just adjudication of the litigation. Specifically, the
13 Legislature argued that it would be necessary to join all of the Judges who serve as professors at
14 UNLV and UNR because arguably if Senators and Assemblypersons are violating the separation
15 of powers doctrine by teaching and serving in that capacity then Judges would be as well.

16 This Court finds that Intervenor Nevada Legislature is mistaken in its reference to NRS 41
17 in the case at hand. NRS 41.031 refers to liability in relation to a tort claim and this case is one of
18 equity, with the Plaintiff seeking declaratory and injunctive relief related to constitutional questions
19 and not damages related to tort liability. Therefore, the Court finds the argument regarding a lack
20 of subject matter jurisdiction in relation to NRS Chapter 41 to be without merit.

21
22 *Defendant James Ohrenschall's Motion to Dismiss*

23 Defendant Ohrenschall, a Nevada State Senator and Public Defender for Clark County,
24 moves to dismiss the Amended Complaint pursuant to NRCP 12(b)(5) and 12(b)(6) for failure to
25 state a claim and failure to join required parties under NRCP 19. In addition, Ohrenschall has also
26 joined the other parties' motions to dismiss. Defendant Ohrenschall's first argument is that the
27 Nevada Constitution separation-of-powers clause does not apply to local government employees,
28

1 citing both case law and an opinion published by the Nevada Attorney General. Ohrenscha
2 further alleges that even if the separation-of-powers doctrine were to apply to local governments,
3 his role as a Public Defender in the Juvenile Division is not one of a public officer, but rather a
4 public employee.
5

6
7 ***Defendant Dina Neal’s Motion to Dismiss***

8 Defendant Dina Neal, who serves as an adjunct professor at Nevada State College (“NSC”)
9 while also serving as a Nevada State Senator, alleges that she does not exercise any powers of the
10 executive branch by virtue of her employment with NSC and therefore is not in violation of the
11 separation-of-powers clause and moves for dismissal based on NRCP 12(b)(5). Neal alleges that
12 the issue is whether her position with NSC is one of a public officer or a public employee and she
13 is a public employee because she does not exercise sovereign duties of the executive branch nor
14 was her position created by law. Neal alleges that because the Amended Complaint does not allege
15 that Neal is a public official or that she exercises sovereign or constitutional powers, and there are
16 no factual allegations from which such conclusions might reasonably be drawn, it does not state a
17 claim upon which relief may be granted.
18

19 ***Defendants Brittney Miller and Selena Torres’s Motion to Sever Pursuant to NRCP 21¹***

20 Defendants Miller and Torres (“Teacher Defendants”), both of whom are public school
21 teachers, filed their motion seeking to sever themselves from the lawsuit because they allege that
22 they should not be subject to trial alongside public employees of widely differing classifications
23 as there is no one-size-fits-all analysis that can be applied to all defendants in this action. Teacher
24 Defendants rely on NRCP 21 as the legal basis for their argument and cite to A Cab, LLC v.
25 Murray, 501 P.3d 961, 974 (Nev. 2021) regarding the Nevada Supreme Court’s guidance as to
26 when severance is proper. Teacher Defendants argue that it will require focused, factual inquiries
27

28 ¹ As the Court is granting the Motions to Dismiss to which Miller and Torres joined, the Court will deny the Motion to Sever as it is moot.

1 into the employment status, duties, and activities of each individual to resolve this case. They
2 further allege that the claims against them do not arise out of the same transactions or occurrences
3 as they do for the other defendants, and they do not present common questions of law or fact.
4 Finally, Teacher Defendants allege that judicial economy would be facilitated by the severance
5 and their claims would require different witnesses and documentary proof due to their unique
6 status from other defendants.
7

8
9 ***Plaintiff's Motion to Strike: (1) NSHE Defendant Dina Neal's Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to***
10 ***NRCP 12(b)(5); (2) Nevada Legislature's Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint for***
11 ***Declaratory and Injunctive Relief; and (3) All Joinders thereto***

12 In response to the aforementioned motions, Plaintiff NPRI filed a motion to strike
13 Defendant Neal's motion to dismiss, the Intervenor's motion to dismiss, and all joinders thereto.
14 NPRI alleges that under NRCP 12(g)(2), the only party who is eligible to move for dismissal is
15 Defendant Ohrenschall because he did not previously move for dismissal and the other parties are
16 not allowed to make another motion raising a defense or objection that was available to the party
17 but omitted from its earlier motion. NPRI did not include Ohrenschall's motion to dismiss in its
18 motion to strike.

19 After Judge Crockett dismissed the case due to lack of standing, he did not have jurisdiction
20 to address the other arguments raised in the motions. However, all but one of the issues were raised
21 in the various motions to dismiss that were considered by Judge Crockett.² Therefore, the Motion
22 to Strike is without merit as the arguments were all raised in the Defendants' initial Motions to
23 Dismiss and NRCP 12(g)(2) does not apply. Moreover, "[u]pon remand from an appellate court,
24 the lower court is required to proceed from the point at which the error occurred." Giancola v.
25 Azem, 109 N.E.3d 1194, 1200 (Ohio 2018) (quoting State ex rel. Douglas v. Burlew, 833 N.E.2d
26

27 ² The issue that was not raised in the first round of motions to dismiss was the Nevada Legislature's argument
28 relating to NRS 41. As the Court explained earlier, the argument was without merit as the statute deals with tort
liability, not constitutional questions.

1 293, 295 (Ohio 2005)). Therefore, the parties are returned to the position they were in and this
2 Court the Court is doing as the Nevada Supreme Court instructed and is reviewing the case on the
3 merits, particularly whether the law supports the claims in the Amended Complaint and whether
4 there is a claim upon which relief may be granted.
5

6 DISCUSSION

7
8 A complaint must set forth sufficient facts to establish all necessary elements of a claim
9 for relief. Hay v. Hay, 100 Nev. 196, 198 678 P.2d 672, 674 (1984). A motion to dismiss is properly
10 granted when even where it appears to a certainty that taking all of the allegations in the Complaint
11 as true, the allegations are insufficient to establish the elements of a claim for relief. *See* Brent G.
12 Theobald Const., Inc., v. Richardson Const., Inc., 122 Nev. 1163, 1166, 147 P.3d 238, 241
13 (2006)(*abrogated on other grounds by* Buzz Stew, LLC v. City of N. Las Vegas, 124 Nev. 224
14 (2008)).

15 The Amended Complaint in this case seeks declaratory and injunctive relief precluding
16 anyone who serves as an educator or a public defender³ from serving as a paid legislator. After
17 reviewing the Motions, Oppositions, Replies and Joinders thereto, listening to the arguments of
18 Counsel, and a thorough review of all of the cases cited therein plus additional multijurisdictional
19 research, and for the reasons stated below, the Court finds that the allegations in Plaintiffs
20 Complaint are insufficient to establish the elements of a claim for relief and therefore, GRANTS
21 the Defendants' Motions.

22 The issue before the Court is whether it is a violation of the separation-of-powers clause of
23 the Nevada State Constitution for an individual to serve in the Nevada Legislature while
24 concurrently employed by a state or local government entity. ⁴
25

26 ³ As stated above, the Defendants have changed and thus those are the only two positions currently at issue. The
27 Court notes that the Plaintiffs are seeking Leave to Amend their Complaint to add additional Defendants, for the
28 reasons stated herein, that Motion will likely become moot based upon the Court's decision in this matter.

⁴ Although the Nevada Legislature also sought dismissal for failure to join necessary parties, as the Court is finding
that there is not a violation of the separation-of-powers, the Court declines to address the Rule 19 issues.

1 While many states have specific constitutional or statutory prohibitions against dual public
2 employment, Nevada is not one of those states. Therefore, in order to answer this question the
3 Court has reviewed the words of and intent behind the Nevada Constitution and existing case law
4 both from this jurisdiction and other jurisdictions whose Constitution mirrors the language used
5 by the Nevada framers. This Court finds that three factors must be evaluated to determine whether
6 an individual's dual employment violates the separation-of-powers clause of the Constitution.
7 First, the Court must deem whether the dual roles are incompatible based on the common law
8 doctrine of incompatible offices. Next, the Court must look at whether the individual legislator's
9 employment is with a state entity or a local political subdivision. Finally, if the roles are compatible
10 and the individual works for a state entity, then the Court must determine whether the position
11 with the state entity is that of an employee or an officer.
12

13 14 **Common Law Doctrine of "Incompatible Offices"**

15 To date, Nevada courts have not dealt directly with the common law doctrine of
16 incompatible offices; however, other states have. The New Jersey Supreme Court explained in
17 Schear v. City of Elizabeth, 41 N.J. 321, 326, 196 A.2d 774, 776 (1964), that the doctrine of
18 incompatible public offices was developed through the common law. The Court went on to say
19 "[i]ncompatibility exists when there is a conflict or inconsistency in the functions of the two
20 offices, i.e., where 'one office is subordinate to another, or subject to its supervision or control, or
21 the duties clash, inviting the incumbent to prefer one obligation to another.'" Id. citing Reilly v.
22 Ozzard, 33 N.J. 529, 543, 166 A.2d 360, 367 (1960). In Schear, property owners and taxpayers of
23 the City of Elizabeth challenged a resolution of the Planning Board, which was formed based on a
24 state statute, alleging that there was an incompatibility of office issue resulting from the fact that
25 one member of the Planning Board was also the City Attorney. The Plaintiffs in Schear argued
26 that the duty of a member of the Planning Board to participate fully and fairly in the determination
27 of a blight problem was inconsistent with his obligation as City Attorney to provide independent
28

1 and impartial advice regarding the issue. In this case, the Court looked at the Statute and
2 determined that the legislature contemplated a person such as the City Attorney may serve on the
3 Planning Board and that no incompatibility existed between the positions. The Court analyzed the
4 specific facts of the case when it upheld the lower court's ruling that there was not conflict. After
5 the Planning Board decision was reached, the City Attorney did not give legal advice to the
6 governing body about the matter nor did the City Council seek his opinion regarding the legality
7 of the Board's action. The trial court relied on the restrictive provision of the statute and the
8 common law in finding no conflict existed and therefore the plaintiffs suffered no prejudice.
9

10 The Hawaii Supreme Court has also addressed the common law doctrine of incompatible
11 offices. In In re Water Use Permit Applications, 94 Haw. 97, 120, 9 P.3d 409, 432 (2000), the
12 Court stated that the doctrine of incompatible public offices "applies where the functions of the
13 offices concerned are inherently inconsistent, as where there are conflicting interests, or where
14 public policy dictates that one person may not retain both offices."⁵ In reaching its decision in
15 Water Use, the Court looked to State v. Villeza, 85 Haw. 258, 942 P.2d 522 (1997), which
16 explained the common law doctrine of incompatible offices as prohibiting an individual from
17 serving in dual capacity "[i]f one office is subordinate to the other or the functions of the offices
18 are inherently inconsistent and repugnant to each other." Whether one office is incompatible with
19 another depends on the rights, duties, or obligations connected with or flowing from the offices. If
20 one office is subordinate to the other or the functions of the offices are inherently inconsistent and
21 repugnant to each other, the offices are incompatible. Id. at 270, 534 (internal citations omitted).

22 In Villeza, the defendant alleged that because the sentencing judge was appointed to and
23 served as the administrative director for the court that the doctrine of incompatible offices resulted
24 in him automatically vacating the first office [of judge], therefore relinquishing his authority to
25 sentence the defendant. The Villeza Court stated that an office would be incompatible with the
26 office of judge if it created a conflict of interest or a lack (or appearance) of impartiality,
27

28 ⁵ See also Mott v. Horstmann, 36 Cal. 2d 388, 391-92, 224 P.2d 11, 13 (1950).

1 specifically it would be incompatible if it challenged judicial integrity and offended traditional
2 notions of the necessary impartiality of the judiciary. The Villeza Court held that the offices of
3 circuit court judge and administrative director were not incompatible at common law because
4 judicial integrity was not threatened in the case.
5

6 Aside from any specific constitutional or statutory prohibitions, incompatibility depends
7 on the character and relation of the offices and not on the matter of physical inability to discharge
8 the duties of both of them. The question is whether one office is subordinated to the other, or the
9 performance of one interferes with the performance of the duties of the other, or whether the
10 functions of the two are inherently inconsistent or repugnant, or whether the occupancy of both
11 offices is detrimental to the public interest. Polley v. Fortenberry, 268 Ky. 369, 105 S.W.2d 143,
12 144–45 (1937).⁶ In Polley, the Kentucky Supreme Court analyzed whether the positions of
13 maintenance supervisor for the state highway department and member of the county board of
14 education were incompatible under the common law. The Court first determined that they were
15 both offices, but there was no constitution or statutory authority that would prevent the plaintiff
16 Polley from serving in both roles. Kentucky law required that if a person accepts an office
17 incompatible with the one he already occupies that he must vacate the first office when assuming
18 the second. Therefore, the Court looked to the common law of incompatible offices to determine
19 if the two roles were incompatible. The Court found that neither position was subordinate to the
20 other nor would the performance of one position require the person to “pass upon the validity of
21 his acts” in the other position. The Court held that it was clear that the two positions were not
22 inherently inconsistent or repugnant nor a detriment to the public interest.

23 It varies by jurisdiction whether the common law rule against incompatibility applies to
24 only offices or includes public employment as well.⁷ Due to the public policy issues of
25

26 ⁶ See also Russell v. Worcester Cnty., 323 Mass. 717, 719, 84 N.E.2d 123, 124 (1949).

27 ⁷ See Dupras v. Cnty. of Clinton, 213 A.D.2d 952, 953, 624 N.Y.S.2d 309, 309 (1995)(New York recognizes that the
28 doctrine of incompatible offices applies to employees as well as officers.); Eldridge v. Sierra View Loc. Hosp. Dist.,
224 Cal. App. 3d 311, 319, 273 Cal. Rptr. 654, 660 (Ct. App. 1990)(California declined to extend the doctrine to a
scenario where one position is a public office and the other employment.)

1 incompatible public office and public employment being coupled that may arise, this Court finds
2 that the common law doctrine applies to public offices as well as public employment in
3 determining whether an individual employed by a public entity may serve as a state legislator.
4

5
6 ***It is the Role of the Court to Determine if Offices Are Incompatible.***

7 “Whether two public offices are incompatible is a question of law to be determined by this
8 Court upon examining the nature of the offices and their relationship to one another.” Felkner v.
9 Chariho Reg'l Sch. Comm., 968 A.2d 865, 873 (R.I. 2009).⁸

10 In State v. Second Jud. Dist. Ct. in & for Cnty. of Washoe, 134 Nev. 783, 787–88, 432
11 P.3d 154, 159 (2018), the Supreme Court reaffirmed, based on the Nevada Constitution separation
12 of powers doctrine, that it is prohibited for one branch of government to impinge on the functions
13 of another.” *See* Nev. Const. art. 3, § 1(1). In the decision, the Court noted that a prosecutor acts
14 within the executive realm in making charging decisions based on violation of the State’s laws. *Id.*
15 *citing* Stromberg v. Second Jud. Dist. Ct. of State ex rel. Cnty. of Washoe, 125 Nev. 1, 200 P.3d
16 509 (2009). A District Attorney’s Office brings charges on behalf of the State against those who
17 have allegedly violated the laws of the State and the Legislature enacts such laws. Therefore,
18 serving in the Legislature while simultaneously employed as a member of a county district
19 attorney’s office is incompatible based on the common law doctrine. In the case at hand, both of
20 the named Defendants who were identified as being employed by the Clark County District
21 Attorney’s Office, Nicole Cannizzaro and Melanie Scheible, have since left their public
22 employment, therefore they are no longer parties to the case.

23 As for the current Defendants, this Court finds that there is no common law incompatibility
24 issue for an individual to be employed as a county public school teacher, a public defender, or a
25 professor at a state college and simultaneously serve as a state legislator. Based on Schear, the
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27 ⁸ *See also* LaGrange City Council v. Hall Bros. Co. of Oldham Cnty., 3 S.W.3d 765, 769 (Ky. Ct. App. 1999);
28 Reilly, 33 N.J. 529, 166 A.2d 360; People, on Complaint of Chapman, v. Rapsey, 16 Cal. 2d 636, 641, 107 P.2d
388, 391 (1940); Tarpo v. Bowman Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 232 N.W.2d 67, 71 (N.D. 1975).

1 Court finds that there is no conflict between the positions nor does the Plaintiff suffer prejudice
2 based on their dual employment. After analyzing the holding in Villeza, the Court finds that the
3 integrity of the legislative and executive branches is not threatened by a public school teacher, a
4 public defender, or a professor simultaneously serving as a legislator. And, a public school teacher,
5 a public defender, nor a professor have the discretionary power to review the actions of a legislator
6 and a legislator does not have the discretionary power to review the actions taken by an educator
7 or a public defender. Therefore, the dual employment of Defendants Miller, Torres, Ohrenschall,
8 and Neal are found not to be incompatible under the common law doctrine.
9

10
11 **Historical Guidance Regarding the Applicability of the Nevada Separation-of-Powers Clause**
12 **to Local Political Subdivisions**

13 Nevada's separation-of-powers clause, contained in Article 3, Section 1 of the Nevada
14 Constitution, provides that “[t]he powers of the Government of the State of Nevada shall be divided
15 into three separate departments,—the Legislative,—the Executive and the Judicial; and no persons
16 charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these departments shall exercise
17 any functions, appertaining to either of the others, except in the cases expressly directed or
18 permitted in this constitution.” The Nevada Supreme Court has held that the separation of powers
19 doctrine is the most important foundation for preserving and protecting liberty by preventing the
20 accumulation of power in any one branch of government. Secretary of State v. Nevada State
21 Legislature, 120 Nev. 456, 466, 93 P.3d 746, 753 (2004). The Constitution further embodies this
22 concept of limited government by specifically delineating the powers granted to the three distinct
23 and coequal branches of government, as set forth in Article 4 (legislative), Article 5 (executive),
24 and Article 6 (judicial). *See* Comm'n on Ethics v. Hardy, 125 Nev. 285, 292, 212 P.3d 1098, 1103
25 (2009).
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1 ***The Nevada Constitution Was Based on the California Constitution and California Courts Have***
2 ***Decided That the Constitutional Separation-of-Powers Clause Does Not Apply to Employees of***
3 ***Local Government Entities***
4

5 In 2001, the Nevada Supreme Court recognized that the rules of statutory construction
6 apply when interpreting constitutional provisions. “[W]hen a statute is derived from a sister state,
7 it is presumably adopted with the construction given it by the highest court of the sister state.”
8 Thus, since Nevada relied upon the California Constitution as a basis for developing the Nevada
9 Constitution, it is appropriate for us to look to the California Supreme Court's interpretation of [the
10 same provisions] in the California Constitution. State ex rel. Harvey v. Second Jud. Dist. Ct., 117
11 Nev. 754, 763, 32 P.3d 1263, 1269 (2001). In fact, Article 3, Section 1 of the Nevada Constitution
12 is identical to the original separation-of-powers clause contained in Article 3, Section 1 of the
13 California Constitution,⁹ so this Court will look to California Court decisions regarding whether
14 the separation-of-powers clause applies to local governments.

15 In People ex rel. Attorney General v. Provines, (34 Cal. 520) (1868), the California
16 Supreme Court analyzed the issue of whether the separation-of-powers clause applied to local
17 political subdivisions. The Court held that the Constitution was formed for the purpose of
18 establishing a State Government, contrasting it to local, county or municipal governments.¹⁰
19 Simply put, the Court found that the framers of the California Constitution did not contemplate
20 that the state government executive branch included local government. Therefore, California's
21 separation of powers doctrine did not apply to local governments or its employees.

22 The Nevada Attorney General’s Office (“AG”) and the Nevada Legislative Counsel Bureau
23 (“LCB”) have both issued multiple opinions relevant to the matter at hand. AG Sandoval
24 recognized that the Supreme Court has not addressed this specific issue but has emphasized the
25

26 ⁹ The State of California slightly amended their separation-of-powers clause in 1972 after voters approved
27 Proposition 1A, which transformed California legislators from citizen legislators to full time employees of the
Legislative Branch. *See* California Proposition 1A, 1966.

28 ¹⁰ The Court explained that local governments are necessary; however, the Constitution does not of itself create or
establish any local or municipal governments. Provines, 34 Cal. at 520.

1 importance of the separation-of-powers doctrine in Galloway v. Truesdell, 83 Nev. 13, 422 P.2d
2 237 (1967) and Whitehead v. Comm'n on Jud. Discipline, 110 Nev. 874, 879, 878 P.2d 913 (1994).
3 In Galloway, the Nevada Supreme Court analyzed what constitutes legislative, executive, and
4 judicial powers in order to determine whether a statute (NRS 122.070) required a district judge to
5 perform non-judicial powers. The Court held that the statute in question required a member of the
6 judicial branch to perform legislative functions and was therefore unconstitutional as it violated
7 the separation-of-powers clause of the Nevada Constitution. Galloway, 83 Nev. at 31, 422 P.2d at
8 249. In Whitehead, the Court addressed the issue of whether the State Attorney General serving as
9 counsel for the Nevada Commission on Judicial Discipline violated the constitutional separation-
10 of-powers provision. Petitioner Whitehead argued that the Attorney General is an elected,
11 constitutional officer of the executive branch and therefore not permitted by the separation-of-
12 powers clause of the Constitution to represent the Commission in the exercise of its powers related
13 to judicial discipline. The Court agreed with Petitioner and held that there were multiple instances
14 of conflict of interest and it was unconstitutional for an elected officer of the executive branch to
15 represent the Commission in judicial discipline matters nor “prosecute” a judge before the
16 Commission. The Court relied on its decision in Galloway in holding that “one department cannot
17 exercise the power of the other two” without violating the separation-of-powers clause of the
18 Constitution. Whitehead, 110 Nev. at 880, P.2d. at 917. In the case at hand, this Court recognizes
19 the importance of the separation-of-powers clause raised by the Galloway and Whitehead Courts;
20 however, it distinguishes Galloway as the issue at hand is not whether one branch is being required
21 to perform powers constitutionally granted to another branch and Whitehead is dealing with an
22 elected officer of the executive branch encroaching upon the powers of the judicial branch. While
23 these cases provide valuable insight into the importance of the separation-of-powers clause, they
24 do not directly inform the concern of dual employment at issue in this case.
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1
2 Returning to the AG Opinions,¹¹ two of them were in direct conflict regarding whether a
3 school district employee may simultaneously serve in the state legislature; however, the second
4 opinion, published in 1971, overrode the previous decision, which was not supported by legal
5 authority.¹² The AG Opinions have provided that, based on the intent of the framers of the Nevada
6 Constitution, employees of local political subdivisions are not in violation of the separation-of-
7 powers clause when they serve as state legislators. See Op. Nev. Att'y Gen. No. 401 (April 20,
8 1967); Op. Nev. Att'y Gen. No. 71-4 (January 11, 1971). However, there is conflict between the
9 opinions of the AG and the LCB when it comes to state employees and in 2004, the Nevada
10 Secretary of State asked then Attorney General Brian Sandoval to provide guidance as to whether
11 a state or local government employee is eligible to simultaneously serve as a member of the Nevada
12 State Legislature (dual service) without violating the Nevada Constitution's separation of powers
13 doctrine in order to try to parse out the conflicting opinions between the AG and LCB. 2004 Nev.
14 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 03 (Mar. 1, 2004). AG Sandoval also observed that [o]ther states are not
15 consistent in their regulation, prohibition, and allowance of dual service. They address dual service
16 through various combinations of constitutional, statutory, and common-law restrictions, making
17 this a complex and conflicting issue of law and policy.

18 In coming to its decision that employees of local government entities are not bound by the
19 separation-of-powers clause, the AG first looked to the United States Supreme Court for the main
20 purpose of separation-of-powers, which is “[t]he fundamental necessity of maintaining each of the
21 three general departments of government entirely free from the control or coercive influence,
22 direct or indirect, of either of the others[.]” Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629,
23 55 S. Ct. 869, 874 (1935). The AG reasoned that [h]istorically the requirement of the separation
24 of powers was never applied to local governmental organizations. Thus, not only municipal
25 corporations but counties, townships, *school districts*, drainage districts, and the like are frequently
26

27 ¹¹ These Opinions were referenced in the Supreme Court decision, footnote 4. See Cannizzaro, 507 P.3d at 1209.

28 ¹² 2004 Nev. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 03 (Mar. 1, 2004), footnote 6.

1 organized with only a single commission with all the powers, legislative, executive, and judicial,
2 in the commission. The compelling argument in favor of this is that the closeness of local
3 authorities to popular control affords an adequate sanction and protection. Op. Nev. Att'y Gen. No.
4 401 (April 20, 1967).

5
6 In finding that employees of local school districts who also served in the legislature did not
7 violate the separation-of-powers clause,¹³ the AG reached its conclusion by relying on legal
8 precedent from California, Colorado, and Maryland, each with constitutional separation of powers
9 clauses almost identical to the Nevada Constitution. These cases¹⁴ each held that the separation of
10 powers clause of their respective constitutions did not apply to local government employees. Op.
11 Nev. Att'y Gen. No. 71-4 (January 11, 1971).

12 While the AG's Opinions are in no way binding, this Court agrees with the AG in its
13 analysis that the findings in Provines, as well as precedent from other jurisdictions with similar
14 constitutional separation-of-powers clauses, provide strong support for the contention that Article
15 3, Section 1 of the Nevada Constitution does not apply to local political subdivisions. Therefore,
16 as long as an individual employed by a local political subdivision does not hold an incompatible
17 dual position, their dual employment is not prohibited by the separation-of-powers clause of the
18 Nevada Constitution. In the case at hand, the Teacher Defendants, employed by Clark County
19 School District, and Defendant Ohrenschall, employed by the Clark County Public Defender's
20 Office, are not in violation of the separation-of-powers clause by operation of their dual
21 employment. However, if an individual is dually employed by a state entity, and the roles they
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23 ¹³ Op. Nev. Att'y Gen. No. 71-4 effectively overruled Op. Nev. Att'y Gen. No. 59 (May 9, 1955), which concluded
24 that local school districts were part of the executive branch of government and therefore could not employ a member
of the legislative branch under NEV. CONST. art. 3 § 1.

25 ¹⁴ Mariposa Cnty. v. Merced Irr. Dist., 32 Cal. 2d 467, 476–77, 196 P.2d 920, 926 (1948) (Moreover it is settled that
26 the separation of powers provision of the constitution, art. 3, § 1, does not apply to local governments as
27 distinguished from departments of the state government.); Peterson v. McNichols, 128 Colo. 137, 142, 260 P.2d
28 938, 941 (1953) (The finding of the trial court that the ordinance usurps a judicial function and is contrary to Article
III of the Constitution of the State of Colorado is inept in application to this litigation. The constitutional provision
to which reference is made relates to state government and is not to be applied here in matters of purely local
concern . . .); and Pressman v. D'Alesandro, 193 Md. 672, 679, 69 A.2d 453, 454 (1949) (The constitutional
requirement of separation of powers is not applicable to local government.)

1 occupy are not incompatible under the common law, such as NSHE Defendant Neal, a third factor
2 must be considered, whether they are a public officer or a public employee.
3

4 **Treatment of Public Officers and Public Employees Under the Law When It Comes to** 5 **Separation-of-Powers** 6

7 The final factor in our analysis deals with how public officers and public employees are
8 treated differently under the law. There is a split of authority between other jurisdictions as well
9 as between our own AG and LCB when it comes to how to define a public officer. The key
10 differences lie in whether the court or advising entity look at the function or powers appertaining
11 to the position rather than the role (or classification) of it.
12

13 ***Function or Powers Appertaining To a Position***

14 The separation-of-powers clause of the Utah Constitution¹⁵ embodies the same language
15 as the Nevada Constitution, including the concepts of “powers properly belonging to” and
16 “functions appertaining to” found in the second part of the separation-of-powers clause, and in In
17 re Young, 1999 UT 6, 976 P.2d 581, the Utah Supreme Court examined the meaning behind these
18 phrases. The Young Court accurately noted that the second part of the clause is not plain in its
19 meaning, particularly when “considered in the context of the real world of government.” Id. at ¶11,
20 585. The Court noted that its case law over a century has not taken a serious look at this aspect of
21 the separation-of-powers clause, so it elected to provide meaning to it in Young. Id. at ¶ 12, 585.
22 After surveying the related cases decided by it, the Utah Supreme Court determined that “the most
23 that can be said categorically is that for powers or functions to fall within the reach of the [second
24 part of the separation-of-powers clause], they must be so inherently legislative, executive or
25

26 ¹⁵ The powers of the government of the State of Utah shall be divided into three distinct departments, the
27 Legislative, the Executive, and the Judicial; and no person charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging
28 to one of these departments, shall exercise any functions appertaining to either of the others, except in the cases
herein expressly directed or permitted. Utah Const. art. V, § 1.

1 judicial in character that they must be exercised exclusively by their respective departments.”¹⁶
2 And, the Court noted that when defining the functions or powers which are exclusive to one
3 department, that it had also used the terms “primary,” “core,” or “essential.” Id. at ¶ 14, 586. After
4 this analysis of the case law, the Court determined that there is a “necessary corollary to the
5 doctrine that some powers or functions belong exclusively to the members of one branch is that
6 there must be powers and functions which may, in appearance, have characteristics of an inherent
7 function of one branch but which may be permissibly exercised by another branch.” Id. (internal
8 citations omitted). Finally, the Court held that “when the power exercised or the function
9 performed is one that we determine is not exclusive to a branch, it is not “appertaining to” that
10 branch and does not fall within the reach of the [second part of the separation-of-powers clause].
11 Id.

12
13 In Halverson v. Hardcastle, 123 Nev. 245, 163 P.3d 428 (2007), the Nevada Supreme Court
14 spelled out the inherent powers of each branch of government, stating that the legislative power,
15 which is vested in the state Legislature, refers to the broad authority to enact, amend, and repeal
16 laws; the executive power, vested in the Governor, encompasses the responsibility to carry out and
17 enforce those laws (*i.e.*, to administrate); and the judicial power is vested in the state court
18 system carrying with it the capability or potential capacity to exercise a judicial function to hear
19 and determine justiciable controversies. Halverson, 123 Nev. at 260, 163 P.3d at 439.

20 In the case before this Court, it is clear to this Court that the powers “appertaining to” each
21 branch of the Nevada government are the inherent or primary powers as outlined in the
22 Constitution and Halverson. It is clear that the function of a public school teacher is not to
23 administrate the laws nor is it the function of a public defender to administrate the laws.¹⁷ Rather

24
25 ¹⁶ Citing Taylor v. Lee, 119 Utah 302, 315, 226 P.2d 531, 537 (1951).

26 ¹⁷ In Defendant Legislature’s Motion to Dismiss, they allege that pursuant to NRCP 19, judges serving as professors
27 must be included in the suit as necessary parties. When a judge serves in the role of professor, she is not performing
28 a primary duty of the executive branch of government, meaning she is not carrying out or enforcing the laws.
Therefore, there is no violation of the separation-of-powers clause when a member of the judiciary serves as a
professor at a NSHE institution. However, if a judge were to seek election as a legislator, it would clearly be
unconstitutional as it would violate the separation-of-powers clause as one individual would be carrying out the
primary function of two separate branches of state government.

1 the function of a teacher is to teach and the function of a public defender is to defend someone
2 charged with a crime. As such, neither is enacting, amending, or repealing laws in their roles as
3 educators or public defenders. Along this same line of reasoning, this Court finds that a member
4 of a district attorney's office would be in violation of the separation-of-powers clause as that
5 individual would be exercising the primary function of the legislative branch (enacting, amending,
6 and repealing laws) as well as the primary function of the executive branch (carrying out and
7 enforcing laws).

8
9 In State ex rel. Stratton v. Roswell Indep. Sch., 1991-NMCA-013, 111 N.M. 495, 806 P.2d
10 1085, the New Mexico Supreme Court decided an issue on point with the case at hand. In Roswell,
11 the Court had to determine if a public school teacher and administrator were state employees, based
12 on whether school districts were "arms of the state." The Court recognized that the state maintains
13 a great degree of control over local school districts; however, also noted that it would be absurd to
14 say that regulatory schemes could transform a political subdivision, business, or profession into
15 state government. Id. at 502, 1092. New Mexico is a sparsely populated state with a citizen
16 legislature, as is Nevada, and the Court looked to the New Jersey Supreme Court's holding in
17 Reilly, 33 N.J. 529, 166 A.2d 360, in holding that all citizen legislators, whether employed publicly
18 or privately, will likely confront a conflict of interest between their livelihood and a legislative
19 proposal at some time. In analyzing the separation-of-powers clause of New Mexico's
20 Constitution,¹⁸ the Court determined that the issue of whether the public school personnel
21 simultaneously serving as legislators violated the separation-of-powers clause could be resolved
22 by determining whether they were "charged with the exercise of powers." The New Mexico Court
23 then looked to a Montana Supreme Court decision in which the Court developed a separation of
24 powers analysis that distinguished between a public officer who is invested with sovereign powers
25 and a public employee who is not. State ex rel. Barney v. Hawkins, 79 Mont. 506, 257 P. 411

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27 ¹⁸ "The powers of the government of this state are divided into three distinct departments, the legislative, executive
28 and judicial, and no person or collection of persons charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one
of these departments, shall exercise any powers properly belonging to either of the others, except as in this
constitution otherwise expressly directed or permitted." N.M. Const. art. III, § 1.

1 (1927). New Mexico adopted the five-part test to determine whether an employee is a public officer
2 as laid out in Hawkins in State v. Quinn, 1930-NMSC-065, 35 N.M. 62, 290 P. 786. The Montana
3 test adopted by New Mexico is “to constitute a position of public employment a public office of a
4 civil nature, it must be created by the Constitution or through legislative act; must possess a
5 delegation of a portion of the sovereign power of government to be exercised for the benefit of the
6 public; must have some permanency and continuity, and not be only temporary or occasional; and
7 its powers and duties must be derived from legislative authority and be performed independently
8 and without the control of a superior power, other than the law, except in case of inferior officers
9 specifically placed under the control of a superior officer or body, and be entered upon by taking
10 an oath and giving an official bond, and be held by virtue of a commission or other written
11 authority.” Id. at ¶ 5, 787. A latter New Mexico case stressed that the most important factor of the
12 Hawkins test is that to be a public officer, the person must be invested with sovereign power. State
13 ex rel. Gibson v. Fernandez, 40 N.M. 288, 292, 58 P.2d 1197, 1200 (1936).

14
15 In relying on the Hawkins test, the Roswell Court determined the separation-of-powers
16 clause of their constitution applied only to public officers, not employees. The Roswell Court
17 further held that public school teachers and administrators are not “public officers” because they
18 do not establish policy for the local school districts or for the state department of education.
19 Roswell, 1991-NMCA-013, ¶ 35, 111 N.M. at 505, 806 P.2d at 1095.

20 The separation-of-powers clause in the Nevada Constitution uses the same language as
21 New Mexico’s as it refers to one branch being prohibited from the “exercise of powers” of another
22 branch. Public school teachers, public defenders, and professors at an NSHE institutions are not
23 invested with sovereign powers and do not establish policy for their employers.

24 In the Roswell Court’s analysis of whether an individual is a public officer or a public
25 employee, one of the factors in the Hawkins test as well as an American Jurisprudence citation¹⁹

26
27 ¹⁹ 63A Am.Jur.2d *Public Officers and Employees* § 12, at 676 (1984) (“the characteristics of public office include
28 creation of the office by statute or constitution, exercise of some portion of the sovereign power, a continuing
position not occasional or contractual, a fixed term of office, an oath, liability for misfeasance or nonfeasance, and
independence beyond that of employees[;] a public employment, on the other hand, is a position in the public

1 indicate than the requirement to take an oath may be taken into consideration to determine if an
2 individual is a public officer. The Nevada Supreme Court addressed this in State v. Cole, 38 Nev.
3 215, 148 P. 551 (1915) when it stated that taking an oath is some indication by which to determine
4 if a position is an office; however, the Court held that based on the Nevada Constitution that all
5 officers shall take an oath. Id. at 215, 553. Nevada is one of fourteen states that constitutionally
6 requires an academic loyalty oath to be administered to public educators.²⁰ However, the oath
7 signed by an educator when they seek licensure references “office or position”²¹ and when this is
8 evaluated under Cole, this Court finds that the academic loyalty oath does not constitute the
9 position of public educator being classified as a public office.
10

11 The Nevada Supreme Court has laid out the characteristics of a public office, as opposed
12 to public employment, in multiple cases. In State ex rel. Mathews v. Murray, 70 Nev. 116, 120–
13 21, 258 P.2d 982, 984 (1953), the Court established that in Nevada it is the function of a position,
14 rather than its classification, that defines whether it is a public office or public employment. The
15 Court recognized that the nature of a public office as distinguished from mere employment is the
16 subject of a considerable body of authority, and many criteria of determination are suggested by
17 the courts. Upon one point at least, the authorities uniformly appear to concur. A public office is
18 distinguishable from other forms of employment in that its holder has by the sovereign been
19 invested with some portion of the *sovereign functions of government*. Id. at 120-21, 984 (emphasis
20 added). The Mathews Court relied on its decision in Cole, to further define a public office as one
21 that does not spring into existence spontaneously, rather it is brought into existence, either under
22 the terms of the Constitution, by legislative enactment, or by some municipal body, pursuant to

23 service which lacks sufficient of the foregoing elements or characteristics to make it an office.” Roswell, 1991-
24 NMCA-013, ¶ 34, 111 N.M. at 505, 806 P.2d at 1095.

25 ²⁰ Nev. Const. art. XI, § 5; Gabriel J. Chin & Saira Rao, Pledging Allegiance to the Constitution: The First
Amendment and Loyalty Oaths for Faculty at Private Universities, 64 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 431 (2003).

26 ²¹ Pursuant to NRS 391.080, all applicants for licensure as an educator must subscribe to the Oath of Office as
27 specified in the Nevada Constitution: I, _____, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support, protect and defend
the constitution and government of the United States, and the constitution and government of the State of Nevada
against all enemies, whether domestic or foreign, and that I will bear true faith, allegiance and loyalty to the same,
any ordinance, resolution or law of any state notwithstanding, and that I will well and faithfully perform all the
duties of the **office or position** on which I am about to enter, (if an oath) so help me God; (if an affirmation) under
the pains and penalties of perjury. Section 8, NV Educator License Application. (emphasis added)
28

1 authority delegated to it. Id. at 219, 552. The Mathews Court also recognized that the Cole Court
2 relied on secondary sources in its opinion to further define a public office in stating that “[a]ll
3 public offices must originally have been created by the sovereign as the foundation of
4 government”²² and “[t]he right, authority and duty conferred by law by which, for a given period,
5 either fixed by law or through the pleasure of the creating power of government, an individual is
6 invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised by him
7 for the benefit of the public. The warrant to exercise powers is conferred, not by contract, but by
8 law.”²³ Mathews, 70 Nev. at 121, 258 P.2d at 984.
9

10 11 ***Role or Classification of a Position***

12 While the separation-of-powers clause of the Nebraska Constitution²⁴ is similar to
13 Nevada’s, the Nebraska Supreme Court has interpreted whether a position is one of public office
14 or public employment by role or classification rather than function or power. In State ex rel. Spire
15 v. Conway, 238 Neb. 766, 472 N.W.2d 403 (1991), the issue in front of the Nebraska Supreme
16 Court was whether *quo warranto* was an appropriate means to challenge the right of an assistant
17 professor at a state college to hold his position while also serving as a member of the state
18 legislature. Id. at 769, 406. In order to determine if the remedy was appropriate, the court had to
19 determine if assistant professor at a state college holds or exercises a “public office” within the
20 meaning of their *quo warranto* statute.²⁵ The Court relied on its decision in Eason v. Majors, 111
21 Neb. 288, 196 N.W. 133 (1923) in stating that “[w]hen a position based upon a provision of law
22

23 ²² 3 Cruise's Dig. p. 109, § 5.

24 ²³ Wyman on Public Offices, § 44.

25 ²⁴ The powers of the government of this state are divided into three distinct departments, the legislative, executive,
26 and judicial, and no person or collection of persons being one of these departments shall exercise any power
27 properly belonging to either of the others except as expressly directed or permitted in this Constitution. Neb. Const.
28 art. II, § 1.

²⁵ An information may be filed against any person unlawfully holding or exercising any public office or franchise
within this state, or any office in any corporation created by the laws of this state, or when any public officer has
done or suffered any act which works a forfeiture of his office, or when any persons act as a corporation within this
state without being authorized by law, or if, being incorporated, they do or omit acts which amount to a surrender or
forfeiture of their rights and privileges as a corporation, or when they exercise powers not conferred by law. Neb.
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 25-21,121 (West).

1 carries with it continuing duties of public concern which involve some exercise of the sovereign
2 power in their proper performance, the position may be said to be an office public in character.
3 Spire, 238 Neb. at 770, 472 N.W.2d at 406. As we can see from this, the Court was viewing the
4 “character” of the position rather than the function. The dissent in Spire is more aligned with the
5 decisions of the Nevada Supreme Court in that it looks to whether the legislator is exercising some
6 degree of the sovereign power of the state. Spire, 238 Neb. at 792, 472 N.W.2d at 418. Therefore,
7 in reconciling the definition of “public officer” in relation to Spire, the Nevada Supreme Court
8 language in Mathews and Cole mirrors the dissent rather than the majority opinion.²⁶

9
10 In 1957, the Oregon Supreme Court decided the case of Monaghan v. Sch. Dist. No. 1,
11 Clackamas Cnty., 211 Or. 360, 315 P.2d 797 (1957), holding that a school teacher may not also
12 serve as a state legislator because it violates the separation-of-powers clause of the Oregon
13 Constitution.²⁷ The Oregon Court defined “function” in a broad sense in that it held that if a person
14 was classified as performing any role in a branch of government, they would be precluded from
15 performing any role in a different branch. Id. at 373, 804.

16 However, in 1958, the voters of the state passed a referendum amending the Constitution,
17 which superseded the decision in Monaghan. The Oregon Legislature proposed a further
18 amendment as Senate Joint Resolution 203, which was submitted to voters as Measure 87 and was
19 approved November 4, 2014. The amended Oregon Constitution specifically allows “(1) A person
20 employed by any board or commission established by law to supervise and coordinate the activities
21 of Oregon's institutions of post-secondary education, a person employed by a public university as
22 defined by law or a member or employee of any school board is eligible to serve as a member of
23 the Legislative Assembly, and membership in the Legislative Assembly does not prevent the
24 person from being employed by any board or commission established by law to supervise and
25

26 ²⁶ See Mathews, 70 Nev. at 120-21, 258 P.2d at 984; Cole, 38 Nev. at 219, 148 P. at 552.

27 ²⁷ The powers of the Government shall be divided into three separate branches, the Legislative, the Executive,
28 including the administrative, and the Judicial; and no person charged with official duties under one of these
branches, shall exercise any of the functions of another, except as in this Constitution expressly provided. Or. Const.
art. III, § 1.

1 coordinate the activities of Oregon's post-secondary institutions of education or by a public
2 university as defined by law, or from being a member or employee of a school board; and (2) A
3 person serving as a judge of any court of this state may be employed by the Oregon National Guard
4 for the purpose of performing military service or may be employed by any public university as
5 defined by law for the purpose of teaching, and the employment does not prevent the person from
6 serving as a judge.”²⁸ Both the Oregon voters and the Oregon Legislature made an implicit finding
7 that a school teacher serving as a state legislator does not violate the separation-of-powers clause
8 of the State Constitution.
9

10 What we have learned from Nebraska and Oregon is that some courts distinguish whether
11 a position is a public office rather than public employment is based on the role or classification
12 rather than the function or powers of the positions held. Oregon has also shown us that a voter-
13 enacted constitutional amendment may supersede the interpretation by a court.

14 In Nevada, there is disagreement between the AG and LCB when it comes to whether
15 public employees that fall under the executive branch of the state government are prohibited from
16 serving in the state legislature by the separation-of-powers clause. The AG provided guidance that
17 employees of the Nevada State Highway Patrol (“NSHP”) and Nevada Department of
18 Transportation (“NDOT”) would be precluded from service in the legislature;²⁹ however, the LCB
19 issued opinions that found that employees of the State Department of Agriculture (“DOA”) and
20 University and Community College System of Nevada (“NSHE”)³⁰ could serve in the legislature
21 as long as they were a public employee and not a public officer.³¹

22 The AG based its argument on its finding that the role of employee of the NSHP helps
23 perform the administrative functions of the state executive branch of government and, therefore,
24 he is a member of the executive branch and the separation-of-powers clause would preclude him
25

26
27 ²⁸ Or. Const. art. XV, § 8

²⁹ See Op. Nev. Att’y Gen. No. 168 (May 22, 1974); Ltr. Nev. Att’y Gen. (January 28, 2002).

³⁰ The University and Community College System of Nevada is now called the Nevada System of Higher Education.

³¹ Legislative Counsel Bureau Opinion - February 4, 2002; Legislative Counsel Bureau Opinion - January 23, 2003.

1 from serving in the legislature.³² While the AG did not issue an official opinion as to the NDOT
2 question, it did issue a letter in which it stated that it disagreed with the LCB's Opinion that the
3 NDOT employee could run for partisan office and maintain his employment.³³
4

5 The issue at the heart of the disagreement between the AG and LCB is one of function
6 versus classification. The LCB has opined that the separation-of-powers clause applies to public
7 officers but not public employees, therefore it is a matter of function, relying on the common law
8 doctrine of incompatible offices as well as NRS 281.044, NRS 284.770, and NRS 284.143.
9 However, the AG's opinions have relied on an argument that the classification of an employee that
10 falls under the umbrella of the executive branch is what triggers the separation-of-powers. Both
11 the AG and LCB have asked for judicial determination on this issue.

12 In relying on Matthews in its DOA Opinion, the LCB opined "the position of Senior
13 Petroleum Chemist with the DOA is a position created by administrative authority and discretion,
14 not by statute. Moreover, based on the statutory structure of the DOA, we believe that most
15 employees of the DOA do not exercise any of the sovereign functions of the state. Rather, those
16 employees simply implement the policies made by higher-ranking state officials."³⁴

17 The AG disagreed with the LCB in its use of Matthews because the Court never analyzed
18 whether Mr. Murray's dual employment violated Nevada's constitutional separation of powers
19 doctrine. However, the LCB relied on Matthews to define the parameters of a public employee
20 compared to a public official, not to determine the applicability of the separation-of-powers clause
21 to public employees. This Court, like LCB, relies on Matthews to provide guidance on
22 distinguishing public employees from public officers as a step in the analysis of whether a person
23 employed by the state is subject to the separation-of-powers clause of the Constitution.

24 Based on the classification instructions provided by the Mathews Court, this Court finds
25 that a professor at a NSHE institution is a public employee and not a public officer. Therefore,
26

27 ³² Attorney General's Opinion No. 183, dated July 9, 1952.

28 ³³ Ltr. Nev. Att'y Gen. (January 28, 2002).

³⁴ Legislative Counsel Bureau Opinion - February 4, 2002.

1 NSHE Defendant Neal’s simultaneous employment as an adjunct professor at NSC and her service
2 as a state legislator does not violate the separation-of-powers clause of the Nevada Constitution
3 because she does not exercise a sovereign function of the executive branch in her position as
4 Adjunct Professor at Nevada State College. This Court also finds that public school teachers and
5 public defenders employed by local political subdivisions are public employees and therefore the
6 Teacher Defendants and Defendant Ohrenschall’s employment with Clark County and service as
7 state legislators do not violate the separation-of-powers clause of the Constitution because they do
8 not exercise sovereign functions of the executive branch.
9

10 CONCLUSION

11
12 The Nevada Legislature has known of the Attorney General’s Opinion No. 71-4, which
13 stated that the separation-of-powers clause of the Nevada Constitution did not apply to local
14 government employees, for over fifty years. With this knowledge, it has chosen not to act on the
15 issue by enacting a statute that would ban dual employment as addressed in the Opinion. Therefore,
16 this Court views this inaction as the intent of the Legislature to not enact such a law. *See Roswell*,
17 1991-NMCA-013, ¶ 24, 111 N.M. at 502-03, 806 P.2d at 1092-93.³⁵

18 The legislatures of states such as Louisiana, Connecticut, and Massachusetts have enacted
19 statutes that prohibit dual employment.³⁶ Connecticut and South Carolina have even spelled a dual
20 job ban out in their constitution.³⁷ There are multiple examples of how other state legislatures
21 have confronted this issue and if it was the intent of the Nevada Legislature to ban dual
22 employment and override common law, it is in their power to do so. The New Jersey Supreme
23 Court came to the same conclusion when it held “that the common law did not bar the dual
24 officeholding involved in this case, and that the question whether it should be barred in the public
25

26 ³⁵ See also *Water Use*, 94 Haw. at 120, 9 P.3d at 432 (The legislature may nevertheless override this rule as it deems
appropriate or necessary.).

27 ³⁶ See *Foti v. Holliday*, 2009-0093 (La. 10/30/09), 27 So. 3d 813, 819; *Stolberg v. Caldwell*, 175 Conn. 586, 604,
402 A.2d 763, 772–73 (1978); *Osetek v. City of Chicopee*, 370 Mass. 110, 112, 345 N.E.2d 897, 899 (1976).

28 ³⁷ See *Stolberg*, 175 Conn. at 604, 402 A.2d at 772–73; *S.C. Pub. Int. Found. v. S.C. Transp. Infrastructure Bank*,
403 S.C. 640, 646–48, 744 S.E.2d 521, 524–25 (2013).

1 interest reposes in the power and responsibility of the legislative department.” Reilly, 33 N.J. at
2 543, 166 A.2d at 372. Likewise, it is in the power of the voters of Nevada to amend the Constitution
3 if they desire to ban dual public employment.³⁸ Or, Nevada voters may follow the lead of Oregon
4 voters and amend the constitution to allow for various types of dual public employment.
5

6 Until either of these events occur, this Court finds that three factors must be evaluated to
7 determine whether an individual’s dual employment violates the separation-of-powers clause of
8 the Nevada Constitution. First, the Court must deem whether the dual roles are incompatible based
9 on the common law doctrine of incompatible offices. Next, the Court must look at whether the
10 individual legislator’s employment is with a state entity or a local political subdivision. Finally, if
11 the roles are compatible and the individual works for a state entity, then the Court must determine
12 whether the position with the state entity is that of an employee or an officer. Based on the analysis
13 of these factors, this Court holds that (1) no officer or employee of a state or local government may
14 also serve as a state legislator if the roles are not compatible and it is the purview of the court to
15 determine compatibility; (2) those employed by local government entities are not a part of the state
16 executive branch and therefore may serve in the legislative branch providing the roles are
17 compatible; and (3) public officers of the state executive branch may not serve in the legislature;
18 however, those who are public employees may, providing the roles are compatible.

19 ///

20 ///

21 ///

22 ///

23 ///

24 ///

25 ///

26
27 ³⁸ See also Ackerman Dairy Inc. v. Kandle, 54 N.J. 71, 75–76, 253 A.2d 466, 469 (1969)(The holding of
28 two offices which are incompatible under the common law may be permitted by a state constitution as a state’s
constitution overrides the common law.)

1 As a result of these findings and accepting the charge of the Plaintiff's Amended Complaint
2 as true, this Court finds that Plaintiff NPRI has not established elements of a claim that would
3 grant them relief.
4

5
6 BASED ON THE FOREGOING, the Court ORDERS that Defendant Ohrenschall's
7 Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED;

8 The Court FURTHER ORDERS that NSHE Defendant Neal's Motion to Dismiss is
9 GRANTED;

10 The Court FURTHER ORDERS that Defendant Nevada State Legislature's Motion to
11 Dismiss is DENIED for the reasons as indicated in footnote 4 above;

12 The Court FURTHER ORDERS that the Joinders filed by co-Defendants, to the extent that
13 they dealt with the separation-of-power issues are GRANTED;

14 The Court FURTHER ORDERS that the Motion to Sever filed by Teacher Defendants is
15 DENIED for the reasons as indicated in footnote 1 above; and

16 The Court FURTHER ORDERS that the Plaintiffs Motions to Strike are DENIED.
17

18 Dated this 4th day of January, 2023

19 
20

21 **JUDGE JESSICA K. PETERSON**
22 **Jessica K. Peterson**
District Court Judge

23 **AFFIRMATION**

Pursuant to NRS 239B.030

The undersigned does hereby affirm that the
preceding Order filed in District Court case number
A818973 **DOES NOT** contain the social security
number of any person.

/s/ Jessica K Peterson

1 **CSERV**

2
3 DISTRICT COURT
CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

4
5
6 Nevada Policy Research
Institute, Plaintiff(s)

CASE NO: A-20-817757-C

7 vs.

DEPT. NO. Department 8

8
9 Nicole Cannizzaro, Defendant(s)

10
11 **AUTOMATED CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

12 This automated certificate of service was generated by the Eighth Judicial District
13 Court. The foregoing Order was served via the court's electronic eFile system to all
recipients registered for e-Service on the above entitled case as listed below:

14 Service Date: 1/4/2023

15 Bradley Schrager bschrager@wrslawyers.com

16 Dannielle Fresquez dfresquez@wrslawyers.com

17 Daniel Bravo dbravo@wrslawyers.com

18 Melissa Shield mshield@wrslawyers.com

19 Kevin Powers kpowers@lcb.state.nv.us

20 Sherry Harper sharper@foxrothschild.com

21 Deborah Pressley dpressley@foxrothschild.com

22 Deanna Forbush dforbush@foxrothschild.com

23 Colleen McCarty cmccarty@foxrothschild.com

24 Jonathan Blum jblum@wileypetersenlaw.com

25 Chastity Dugenia cdugenia@wileypetersenlaw.com

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Berna Rhodes-Ford	Berna.Rhodes-Ford@nsc.edu
Caitlin Pascal	cpascal@wileypetersenlaw.com
Emmanuel Ekigwe	Emmanuel.Ekigwe@nsc.edu

**DISTRICT COURT
CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA**

Other Civil Matters

COURT MINUTES

September 29, 2020

A-20-817757-C Nevada Policy Research Institute, Plaintiff(s)
vs.
Nicole Cannizzaro, Defendant(s)

September 29, 2020 10:45 AM Minute Order

HEARD BY: Holthus, Mary Kay

COURTROOM: Chambers

COURT CLERK: Dara Yorke

RECORDER:

REPORTER:

PARTIES

PRESENT:

JOURNAL ENTRIES

- As this Court is familiar with one of the parties, in accordance with Rule 2.11(a), and to avoid the appearance of impropriety and implied bias, this Court hereby disqualifies itself and ORDERS this case be REASSIGNED at random.

**DISTRICT COURT
CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA**

Other Civil Matters

COURT MINUTES

October 02, 2020

A-20-817757-C Nevada Policy Research Institute, Plaintiff(s)
vs.
Nicole Cannizzaro, Defendant(s)

October 02, 2020 8:00 AM Minute Order

HEARD BY: Cory, Kenneth **COURTROOM:** RJC Courtroom 16A

COURT CLERK: Jill Chambers

RECORDER:

REPORTER:

**PARTIES
PRESENT:**

JOURNAL ENTRIES

- The Court previously worked with one of the named Defendants and considers them a close friend. Therefore, the Court must recuse from this case and the matter shall be randomly reassigned.

**DISTRICT COURT
CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA**

Other Civil Matters

COURT MINUTES

October 05, 2020

A-20-817757-C Nevada Policy Research Institute, Plaintiff(s)
vs.
Nicole Cannizzaro, Defendant(s)

October 05, 2020

3:00 AM

Minute Order

HEARD BY: Hardy, Joe

COURTROOM: Chambers

COURT CLERK: Kristin Duncan

RECORDER:

REPORTER:

PARTIES

PRESENT:

JOURNAL ENTRIES

- Although the Court could, and would, rule fairly and without bias, the COURT FINDS that RECUSAL is appropriate in this matter pursuant to Canon 2.11(A) of the Nevada Code of Judicial Conduct, in order to avoid the appearance of impartiality or implied bias because of the Court's personal and financial relationship with one of the named Defendants.

CLERK'S NOTE: This Minute Order was electronically served by Courtroom Clerk, Kristin Duncan, to all registered parties for Odyssey File & Serve. (KD 10/5/2020)

**DISTRICT COURT
CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA**

Other Civil Matters

COURT MINUTES

October 19, 2020

A-20-817757-C Nevada Policy Research Institute, Plaintiff(s)
vs.
Nicole Cannizzaro, Defendant(s)

October 19, 2020 3:00 AM Minute Order

HEARD BY: Crockett, Jim **COURTROOM:** Phoenix Building 11th Floor
116

COURT CLERK: Rem Lord

RECORDER:

REPORTER:

PARTIES

PRESENT:

JOURNAL ENTRIES

- The Court finds that the 9/29/20 Plaintiff s Motion for Order to Serve by Publication Defendants Glen Leavitt, James Ohrenschall, and Melanie Scheible cannot be granted as Plaintiff s Motion is not accompanied by the requisite Motion for Enlargement of Time. The attempted Publication would conclude beyond the 120 day time period in which to effectuate personal service. Plaintiff's new Motion must also include a discussion of the Scrimmer factors and good cause why the Amended Complaint was not timely served. Lastly, the attached Affidavits of Due Diligence are titled Affidavits, but do not include a Notary Seal, and instead, appear to be Declarations. The titles of the attached Exhibits should all be corrected upon resubmission as part of Plaintiff's new Motion. Therefore, it is hereby ordered, 9/29/20 Plaintiff's Motion for Order to Serve by Publication Defendants Glen Leavitt, James Ohrenschall, and Melanie Scheible is denied. COURT ORDERED, status check SET for the filing of the Order.

11/19/2020 STATUS CHECK: FILING OF ORDER (CHAMBERS)

CLERK'S NOTE: This Minute Order was electronically served to all registered parties for Odyssey File & Serve. /rl 10/19/2020

**DISTRICT COURT
CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA**

Other Civil Matters

COURT MINUTES

November 18, 2020

A-20-817757-C Nevada Policy Research Institute, Plaintiff(s)
vs.
Nicole Cannizzaro, Defendant(s)

November 18, 2020 3:00 AM

All Pending Motions

HEARD BY: Crockett, Jim

COURTROOM: Phoenix Building 11th Floor
116

COURT CLERK: Rem Lord

RECORDER:

REPORTER:

PARTIES

PRESENT:

JOURNAL ENTRIES

- Plaintiff's Motion to Disqualify the Official Attorneys from Representing Defendants Osvaldo Fumo, Heidi Seevers Gansert and Dina Neal on Order Shortening Time

Pursuant to EDCR 2.23 (c) and (d), this matter is being decided on the briefs and pleadings filed by 11/16/2020 by the parties without oral argument since the court deems oral argument unnecessary. Plaintiff says Official Attorneys should be disqualified because Defendants were not sued based upon anything they did in their official capacity but instead are sued for alleged violation of constitution prohibition against dual employment in violation of Article 3 of the Nevada Constitution.

10/9/20 Opposition says Nevada Policy Research Institute lacks standing to even bring this Motion because it cannot demonstrate particularized harm beyond that of any ordinary taxpayer and since standing is a jurisdictional matter, this motion must be denied. Opposition further contends that it is by virtue of the fact that Defendants are government employees that they were sued and Official attorneys are not prohibited from representing them and may choose to represent if so requested. . The simple fact is that Official Attorney is a duly authorized legal counsel who is not prohibited from representing the Defendants so this Motion to Disqualify is DENIED. Defendants to submit the

Order. COURT FURTHER ORDERED, 11/19/20 hearing VACATED and matter SET for Status Check.

Defendant Nicole Cannizzaro's Motion to Dismiss

Pursuant to EDCR 2.23 (c) and (d), this matter is being decided on the briefs and pleadings filed by 11/16/2020 by the parties without oral argument since the court deems oral argument unnecessary. Standing is the controlling issue here and while other issues are discussed, standing is the determinative issue above all else. Nevada Policy Research Institute simply lacks standing to bring this suit. It is an organization, rather than a particularly-aggrieved individual, harmed by any alleged dual employment. It is quite clear that Nevada Policy Research Institute does not allege any particularized harm beyond that of any ordinary taxpayer and that is simply not enough to give standing to Nevada Policy Research Institute to bring this suit. Nevada Policy Research Institute's Opposition does not make persuasive arguments regarding standing, suggesting that an evidentiary hearing would need to be conducted but not offering any theory as to how an evidentiary hearing would demonstrate particularized harm or otherwise lead to a finding that Nevada Policy Research Institute has standing to pursue this case against Defendants. And the court is not persuaded that Nevada Policy Research Institute comes within the recent Schwartz exception. And, it cannot be ignored that Nevada Policy Research Institute blows hot and cold on whether or not it is suing the Defendants as legislators. Historically, Nevada Policy Research Institute has demonstrated that it has been able to enlist individuals who might provide a more colorable claim of particularized harm but have simply opted not to do so in this case to enhance the possibility of finding that counsel represents someone with actual standing. The court finds that the Reply brief puts the matter to rest. Nevada Policy Research Institute clearly lacks standing to bring this suit and thus the Motion to Dismiss must be GRANTED. The Joinders of the other Defendants are also GRANTED. Counsel for Defendant to submit the order granting the Motion to Dismiss as to the moving Defendant and all Defendants who filed Joinders to this Motion to Dismiss. COURT FURTHER ORDERED, 11/19/20 hearing VACATED and matter SET for Status Check.

Defendant Jason Frierson's Motion to Dismiss

Pursuant to EDCR 2.23 (c) and (d), this matter is being decided on the briefs and pleadings filed by 11/16/2020 by the parties without oral argument since the court deems oral argument unnecessary. Standing is the controlling issue here and while other issues are discussed, standing is the determinative issue above all else. Nevada Policy Research Institute simply lacks standing to bring this suit. It is an organization, rather than a particularly-aggrieved individual, harmed by any alleged dual employment. It is quite clear that Nevada Policy Research Institute does not allege any particularized harm beyond that of any ordinary taxpayer and that is simply not enough to give standing to Nevada Policy Research Institute to bring this suit. Nevada Policy Research Institute's Opposition does not make persuasive arguments regarding standing, suggesting that an evidentiary hearing would need to be conducted but not offering any theory as to how an evidentiary hearing would demonstrate particularized harm or otherwise lead to a finding that Nevada Policy Research Institute has standing to pursue this case against Defendants. And the court is not persuaded that

Nevada Policy Research Institute comes within the recent Schwartz exception. And, it cannot be ignored that Nevada Policy Research Institute blows hot and cold on whether or not it is suing the Defendants as legislators. Historically, Nevada Policy Research Institute has demonstrated that it has been able to enlist individuals who might provide a more colorable claim of particularized harm but have simply opted not to do so in this case to enhance the possibility of finding that counsel represents someone with actual standing. The court finds that the Reply brief puts the matter to rest. Nevada Policy Research Institute clearly lacks standing to bring this suit and thus the Motion to Dismiss must be GRANTED. The Joinders of the other Defendants are also granted. Counsel for Defendant to submit the order granting the Motion to Dismiss as to the moving Defendant and all Defendants who filed Joinders to this Motion to Dismiss. COURT FURTHER ORDERED, 11/19/20 hearing VACATED and matter SET for Status Check.

Defendant Brittney Miller's Motion to Dismiss Complaint Pursuant to EDCR 2.23 (c) and (d), this matter is being decided on the briefs and pleadings filed by 11/16/2020 by the parties without oral argument since the court deems oral argument unnecessary. Standing is the controlling issue here. Defendant argues that NPRI simply lacks standing to bring this suit. It is an organization, rather than a particularly-aggrieved individual, harmed by any alleged dual employment. It is quite clear that NPRI does not allege any particularized harm beyond that of any ordinary taxpayer and that is simply not enough to give standing to NPRI to bring this suit. NPRI's 10/2/20 Opposition does not make persuasive arguments regarding standing, suggesting that an evidentiary hearing would need to be conducted but not offering any theory as to how an evidentiary hearing would demonstrate particularized harm or otherwise lead to a finding that NPRI has standing to pursue this case against Defendant Miller (or the other Defendants for that matter). And the court is not persuaded that NPRI comes within the recent Schwartz exception. And, it cannot be ignored that NPRI blows hot and cold on whether or not it is suing the Defendants as legislators. Historically, NPRI has demonstrated that it has been able to enlist individuals who might provide a more colorable claim of particularized harm but have simply opted not to do so in this case to enhance the possibility of finding that counsel represents someone with actual standing. The court finds that the Reply brief puts the matter to rest. NPRI clearly lacks standing to bring this suit and thus the Motion to Dismiss must be GRANTED. The Joinders of Fumo, Gansert and Neal and Frierson and Canizzaro are also granted. Counsel for Defendant Miller to submit the order granting the Motion to Dismiss as to Defendant Miller and all Defendants who filed a Joinder to her Motion to Dismiss.

Defendants Osvaldo Fumo, Heidi Seevers Gansert, and Dina Neal's Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to NRCP 12(b)(5) and NRCP 12(b)(6)

Pursuant to EDCR 2.23 (c) and (d), this matter is being decided on the briefs and pleadings filed by 11/16/2020 by the parties without oral argument since the court deems oral argument unnecessary. Standing is the controlling issue here and while other issues are discussed, standing is the determinative issue above all else. Nevada Policy Research Institute simply lacks standing to bring

this suit. It is an organization, rather than a particularly-aggrieved individual, harmed by any alleged dual employment. It is quite clear that Nevada Policy Research Institute does not allege any particularized harm beyond that of any ordinary taxpayer and that is simply not enough to give standing to Nevada Policy Research Institute to bring this suit. Nevada Policy Research Institute's Opposition does not make persuasive arguments regarding standing, suggesting that an evidentiary hearing would need to be conducted but not offering any theory as to how an evidentiary hearing would demonstrate particularized harm or otherwise lead to a finding that Nevada Policy Research Institute has standing to pursue this case against Defendants. And the court is not persuaded that Nevada Policy Research Institute comes within the recent Schwartz exception. And, it cannot be ignored that Nevada Policy Research Institute blows hot and cold on whether or not it is suing the Defendants as legislators. Historically, Nevada Policy Research Institute has demonstrated that it has been able to enlist individuals who might provide a more colorable claim of particularized harm but have simply opted not to do so in this case to enhance the possibility of finding that counsel represents someone with actual standing. The court finds that the Reply brief puts the matter to rest. Nevada Policy Research Institute clearly lacks standing to bring this suit and thus the Motion to Dismiss must be GRANTED. The Joinders of the other Defendants are also granted. Counsel for Defendants to submit the order granting the Motion to Dismiss as to the moving Defendants and all Defendants who filed Joinders to this Motion to Dismiss. COURT FURTHER ORDERED, 11/19/20 hearing VACATED and matter SET for Status Check.

Nevada Legislature's Motion to Intervene as Defendant

Pursuant to EDCR 2.23 (c) and (d), this matter is being decided on the briefs and pleadings filed by 11/16/2020 by the parties without oral argument since the court deems oral argument unnecessary. The LCB/State of Nevada says it wishes to intervene because it has a real and substantial interest in the issues here since it has historically rendered opinions supporting the kind of employment that the Defendants are alleged to have and providing legal reassurance to the Defendants that such employment is entirely legal and constitutional. Nevada Policy Research Institute opposes saying the Nevada Legislature does not have the right to intervene and that permissive intervention, which is discretionary, should not be permitted. Nevada State Legislature's Reply Brief is very persuasive and the court is persuaded that the Nevada Legislature is entitled to intervene as a matter of right and that even if it were only entitled to permissive intervention, the court chooses to exercise its discretion to find that the Nevada Legislature is also allowed to intervene permissively. Nevada Legislature's Motion to Intervene as Defendant is granted. Nevada Legislature is directed to prepare the order which includes for the court's findings the headlined points contained in the Reply Brief. COURT FURTHER ORDERED, matter SET for Status Check.

12/17/20 9:00 AM STATUS CHECK: FILING OF ORDERS (11/17/20)

CLERK'S NOTE: This Amended Minute Order was electronically served to all registered parties for Odyssey File & Serve. /rl 11/18/2020

**DISTRICT COURT
CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA**

Other Civil Matters

COURT MINUTES

November 19, 2020

A-20-817757-C Nevada Policy Research Institute, Plaintiff(s)
vs.
Nicole Cannizzaro, Defendant(s)

November 19, 2020 3:00 AM Status Check

HEARD BY: Crockett, Jim **COURTROOM:** Phoenix Building 11th Floor
116

COURT CLERK: Rem Lord

RECORDER:

REPORTER:

**PARTIES
PRESENT:**

JOURNAL ENTRIES

- Status Check: Filing of Order Denying Plaintiff's Motion for Order to Serve by Publication (10/19)

COURT NOTED as of 8:00 am this morning the Order had not been filed. COURT ORDERED, matter CONTINUED.

CONTINUED TO: 12/10/2020 9:00 AM

CLERK'S NOTE: This Minute Order was electronically served to all registered parties for Odyssey File & Serve. /rl 11/19/2020

**DISTRICT COURT
CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA**

Other Civil Matters

COURT MINUTES

December 15, 2020

A-20-817757-C Nevada Policy Research Institute, Plaintiff(s)
vs.
Nicole Cannizzaro, Defendant(s)

December 15, 2020 3:00 AM All Pending Motions

HEARD BY: Crockett, Jim **COURTROOM:** Chambers

COURT CLERK: Jill Chambers
Nicole McDevitt

RECORDER:

REPORTER:

**PARTIES
PRESENT:**

JOURNAL ENTRIES

- PLAINTIFF S MOTION FOR THE COURT S CLARIFICATION OF ITS DECISION TO GRANT DEFENDANTS MOTIONS TO DISMISS BASED ON PLAINTIFF S LACK OF STANDING ON ORDER SHORTENING TIME

JOINT OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF S MOTION FOR THE COURT S CLARIFICATION OF ITS DECISION TO GRANT DEFENDANTS MOTIONS TO DISMISS BASED ON PLAINTIFF S LACK OF STANDING AND JOINT COUNTERMOTION TO DISMISS ALL REMAINING DEFENDANTS BASED ON PLAINTIFF S LACK OF STANDING

Pursuant to EDCR 2.23 (c) and (d), this matter is being decided on the briefs and pleadings filed by the parties without oral argument since the court deems oral argument unnecessary.

Although Plaintiff styles this motion as a Motion for Clarification of the Court's Decision, there is no order that has been signed and filed yet and thus the motion is premature since one cannot clarify what does not exist. Plaintiff's Reply brief does not provide any additional justification or authority for clarification. Motion for Clarification must be DENIED. Counsel for Defendant to prepare and submit order to court for signature w/in 14 days per EDCR 7.21. Calendar status check for filing of

order.

Defendants have filed a Countermotion to dismiss all of Plaintiff's claims on the basis that Plaintiff lacks standing to bring this suit. Standing is the controlling issue here and while other issues are discussed, standing is the determinative issue above all else. The court finds that the Countermotion to Dismiss is most persuasive. NPRI clearly lacks standing to bring this suit and the court is inclined to grant the countermotion to dismiss . On 12/14/20 NPRI filed its Reply and Non-Opposition to Grant Defendants Motion to Dismiss on behalf of all remaining Defendants due to lack of Standing. Counsel for Defendant to submit the order granting the Counter Motion to Dismiss. COURT FURTHER ORDERED, matter SET for status check; 12/17/20 hearing VACATED.

1/14/20 (CHAMBERS) STATUS CHECK: FILING OF ORDER

CLERK'S NOTE: The Court is in receipt of Counsel for Plaintiff s Letter to the Court dated 12/16/20, which has been Left Side filed into the case. Prior to issuing the 12/15/20 Minute Order, the Court had reviewed and considered the 12/14/20 Plaintiff s Reply and the Orders referenced therein, and which were also on file in this case. However, the Court is of the view that the issue of Standing needs no further clarification and is entirely dispositive of the arguments raised by Plaintiff.

CLERK'S NOTE: This Minute Order was electronically served by Courtroom Clerk, Nicole McDevitt, to all registered parties for Odyssey File & Serve. /nm 12/16/2020

**DISTRICT COURT
CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA**

Other Civil Matters

COURT MINUTES

June 09, 2022

A-20-817757-C Nevada Policy Research Institute, Plaintiff(s)
vs.
Nicole Cannizzaro, Defendant(s)

June 09, 2022 8:30 AM Further Proceedings

HEARD BY: Peterson, Jessica K. **COURTROOM:** Phoenix Building 11th Floor
116

COURT CLERK: David Gibson

RECORDER: Nancy Maldonado

REPORTER:

PARTIES

PRESENT: Blum, Jonathan D. Attorney
McCarty, Colleen E. Attorney

JOURNAL ENTRIES

- APPEARANCES CONTINUED: Burna Rose-Ford, on behalf of Dina Neal and Jill Tolles, Bradler Schrager, on behalf of Selena Torres and Brittney Miller, and Kevin Powers, on behalf of the Legislature of Nevada, also present.

Colloquy regarding the status of the case. COURT ORDERED matter OFF CALENDAR until further progress is made in the case.

**DISTRICT COURT
CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA**

Other Civil Matters

COURT MINUTES

August 04, 2022

A-20-817757-C Nevada Policy Research Institute, Plaintiff(s)
vs.
Nicole Cannizzaro, Defendant(s)

August 04, 2022

2:00 PM

All Pending Motions

HEARD BY: Peterson, Jessica K.

COURTROOM: Phoenix Building 11th Floor
116

COURT CLERK: Dara Yorke

RECORDER: Nancy Maldonado

REPORTER:

PARTIES

PRESENT:	Blum, Jonathan D.	Attorney
	Forbush, Deanna	Attorney
	McCarty, Colleen E.	Attorney
	Powers, Kevin C.	Attorney
	Schrager, Bradley S.	Attorney

JOURNAL ENTRIES

- Berna Rhoades-Ford, Esq., Bradley Schrager, Esq. and Kevin Powers, Esq. present via Bluejeans video conference.

DEFENDANTS BRITTNEY MILLER AND SELENA TORRES'S JOINDER TO NEVADA
LEGISLATURE'S MOTION TO DISMISS...NSHE DEFENDANT DINA NEAL'S JOINDER TO
LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL BUREAU'S NEVADA LEGISLATURE'S MOTION TO DISMISS
AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF... DEFENDANTS
BRITTNEY MILLER AND SELENA TORRES'S JOINDER TO DEFENDANT JAMES
OHRENSCHALL'S MOTION TO DISMISS...DEFENDANTS BRITTNEY MILLER AND SELENA
TORRES'S JOINDER TO DEFENDANT DINA NEAL'S MOTION TO DISMISS...DEFENDANT
JAMES ORENSCHALL'S JOINDER TO NSHE DEFENDANT DINA NEAL'S MOTION TO DISMISS
PURSUANT TO NRCP 12(B)(5)...DEFENDANT JAMES OHRENSCHALL'S JOINDER IN PART, TO
LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF NEVADA'S MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINT

Court advised it reviewed all Motions and would hear argument at the instant hearing; thereafter, all matters would be taken under advisement.

PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO STRIKE: (1) NSHE DEFENDANT DINA NEAL'S MOTION TO DISMISS PURSUANT TO NRCP 12(B)(5); NEVADA LEGISLATURE'S MOTION TO DISMISS AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF, AND (3) ALL JOINDERS THERETO

Statements by Ms. McCarty requesting that all Motions be denied. Arguments by Mr. Powers. Court advised it would make a decision on the instant Motion and if it decided to strike it, it would deny the Motion to Dismiss. COURT ORDERED, matter taken UNDER ADVISEMENT.

NEVADA LEGISLATURE'S MOTION TO DISMISS AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

Statements by Mr. Powers in support of the instant Motion. Arguments by Ms. McCarty. COURT ORDERED, matter taken UNDER ADVISEMENT.

DEFENDANT JAMES OHRENSCHALL'S MOTION TO DISMISS

Statements by Mr. Blum in support of the instant Motion. Arguments by Ms. McCarty. Court advised that it wasn't clear and indicated it may need additional time to render it's decision. COURT ORDERED, matter taken UNDER ADVISEMENT.

NSHE DEFENDANT DINA NEAL'S MOTION TO DISMISS PURSUANT TO NRCP 12(B)(5)

Arguments by counsel. COURT ORDERED, matter taken UNDER ADVISEMENT.

DEFENDANTS BRITTNEY MILLER AND SELENA TORRES'S MOTION TO SEVER PURSUANT TO NRCP 21

Statements by Mr. Schragger in support of the instant Motion. COURT ORDERED, matter taken UNDER ADVISEMENT.

Court advised parties it would like everyone to provide the Court with their proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law in order for the Court to try and utilize some of the arguments.

Additionally, Court indicated it's inclination was to deny the Motion to Dismiss for the employers to be brought in. Court noted it wanted to go back and look at everything, and would issue a written decision as soon as possible; however, would like the findings as soon as possible. Court further advised Mr. Schragger that it would most likely deny the Motion to Sever; however, it would still look at everything and make a written decision. Mr. Schragger inquired if they could still have the 14 days to file the proposed Order, which the Court concurred, just requested it as soon as possible. COURT ORDERED, matters taken UNDER ADVISEMENT for sixty days.



EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT CLERK'S OFFICE
NOTICE OF DEFICIENCY
ON APPEAL TO NEVADA SUPREME COURT

DEANNA L. FORBUSH, ESQ.
1980 FESTIVAL PLAZA DR., SUITE 700
LAS VEGAS, NV 89135

DATE: January 10, 2023
CASE: A-20-817757-C

RE CASE: NEVADA POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE vs. BRITNEY MILLER, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Clark County School District; et al.

NOTICE OF APPEAL FILED: January 6, 2023

YOUR APPEAL HAS BEEN SENT TO THE SUPREME COURT.

PLEASE NOTE: DOCUMENTS **NOT** TRANSMITTED HAVE BEEN MARKED:

- ☒ \$250 – Supreme Court Filing Fee (Make Check Payable to the Supreme Court)**
 - If the \$250 Supreme Court Filing Fee was not submitted along with the original Notice of Appeal, it must be mailed directly to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court Filing Fee will not be forwarded by this office if submitted after the Notice of Appeal has been filed.
- ☐ \$24 – District Court Filing Fee (Make Check Payable to the District Court)**
- ☒ \$500 – Cost Bond on Appeal (Make Check Payable to the District Court)**
 - NRAP 7: Bond For Costs On Appeal in Civil Cases
 - *Previously paid Bonds are not transferable between appeals without an order of the District Court.*
- ☐ Case Appeal Statement
 - NRAP 3 (a)(1), Form 2
- ☐ Order
- ☐ Notice of Entry of Order

NEVADA RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 3 (a) (3) states:

"The district court clerk must file appellant's notice of appeal despite perceived deficiencies in the notice, including the failure to pay the district court or Supreme Court filing fee. **The district court clerk shall apprise appellant of the deficiencies in writing**, and shall transmit the notice of appeal to the Supreme Court in accordance with subdivision (g) of this Rule with a notation to the clerk of the Supreme Court setting forth the deficiencies. Despite any deficiencies in the notice of appeal, the clerk of the Supreme Court shall docket the appeal in accordance with Rule 12."

Please refer to Rule 3 for an explanation of any possible deficiencies.

*****Per District Court Administrative Order 2012-01, in regards to civil litigants, "...all Orders to Appear in Forma Pauperis expire one year from the date of issuance." You must reapply for in Forma Pauperis status.***

Certification of Copy

State of Nevada }
County of Clark } SS:

I, Steven D. Grierson, the Clerk of the Court of the Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County, State of Nevada, does hereby certify that the foregoing is a true, full and correct copy of the hereinafter stated original document(s):

NOTICE OF APPEAL; CASE APPEAL STATEMENT; DISTRICT COURT DOCKET ENTRIES; CIVIL COVER SHEET; ORDER; NOTICE OF ENTRY OF ORDER; DISTRICT COURT MINUTES; NOTICE OF DEFICIENCY

NEVADA POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE,

Plaintiff(s),

vs.

BRITINEY MILLER, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Clark County School District; DINA NEAL, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Nevada State College; JAMES OHRENSCHALL, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate and Clark County Public Defender; SELENA TORRES, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Clark County School District,

Defendant(s),


Case No: A-20-817757-C

Dept No: VIII

now on file and of record in this office.

IN WITNESS THEREOF, I have hereunto Set my hand and Affixed the seal of the Court at my office, Las Vegas, Nevada This 10 day of January 2023.

Steven D. Grierson, Clerk of the Court



Heather Ungermann, Deputy Clerk

