#### IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

IN RE: D.O.T. LITIGATION

RURAL REMEDIES, LLC, Appellant,

and.

CLÁRK NATURAL MEDICINAL SOLUTIONS LLC; NYE NATURAL

MEDICINAL SOLUTIONS LLC; CLARK

NMSD, LLC; AND INYO FINE CANNABIS DISPENSARY LLC;

Appellants/Cross-Respondents.

VS.

NEVADA ORGANIC REMEDIES LLC; WELLNESS CONNECTION OF

NEVADA, LLC: THE STATE OF

NEVADA DEPÁRTMENT OF TAXATION; AND CANNABIS

COMPLIANCE BOARD,

Respondents,

and

DEEP ROOTS HARVEST, INC.,

Respondent/Cross-Appellant.

Electronically Filed Case No. Fe**8**6**25**12024 02:38 PM District Court Effe Abeth 7004 Brown Clerk of Supreme Court

#### APPEAL

From the Eighth Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada District Court Case No. A-19-787004-B

#### APPENDIX TO RESPONDENT DEEP ROOTS HARVEST, INC.'S ANSWERING AND OPENING BRIEF

#### VOLUME 4 OF 6

Submitted for Respondent / Cross-Appellant Deep Roots Harvest, Inc. by:

RICHARD D. WILLIAMSON, State Bar No. 9932 BRIANA N. COLLINGS, State Bar No. 14694 ROBERTSON, JOHNSON, MILLER & WILLIAMSON

50 West Liberty Street, Suite 600

Reno, Nevada 89501

(775) 329-5600

Attorneys for Respondent/Cross-Appellant Deep Roots Harvest, Inc.

#### **INDEX TO RESPONDENTS' APPENDIX**

#### **DOCUMENT**

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1st Amended Business Court Scheduling Order and Order Setting Civil Bench Trial and Calendar Call	12/11/2019	2	0343-0346
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Clark Natural Medicinal Solutions LLC, Nye Natural Medicinal Solutions LLC and Clark NMSD LLC's Joinder to Motions for Partial Summary Judgment	03/20/2020	4	0612-0613
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Defendant Deep Roots Medical LLC's Answer to First Amended Complaint and Petition for Judicial Review and/or Writs of Certiorari, Mandamus, and Prohibition	11/12/2019	2	0327-0333
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Summons (Deep Roots Medical LLC)	09/06/2019	1	0180-0185
Transcript of Proceedings, September 8, 2020	09/10/2020	4	0644-0753
Verified Memorandum of Costs	08/08/2022	5-6	0754-1027
Waiver of Service	10/1/2019	2	0186-0326

#### **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

I hereby certify that I am an employee of Robertson, Johnson, Miller & Williamson, over the age of 18, and not a party within this action.

I further certify that on the 23<sup>rd</sup> day of February 2024, I electronically filed the foregoing **APPENDIX TO RESPONDENT DEEP ROOTS HARVEST**, **INC.'S ANSWERING AND OPENING BRIEF** with the Clerk of the Court by using the electronic filing system, which served the same on all parties listed on the court's master service list.

/s/ Teresa W. Stovak
An Employee of Robertson, Johnson, Miller & Williamson

702-240-7979 • Fax 866-412-6992

**Electronically Filed** 3/13/2020 4:20 PM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT

#### PETER S. CHRISTIANSEN, ESQ.

Nevada Bar No. 5254

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WHITNEY J. BARRETT, ESQ.

Nevada Bar No. 13662 3

wbarrett@christiansenlaw.com

#### CHRISTIANSEN LAW OFFICES

810 S. Casino Center Blvd., Suite 104

Las Vegas, Nevada 89101

(702) 240-7979 Telephone: Facsimile: (866) 412-6992 Attorneys for Qualcan, LLC

#### **DISTRICT COURT**

#### **CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA**

IN RE: D.O.T. Case No.: A-19-787004-B Dept. No.: XI

Consolidated with:

A-19-787035-C A-18-785818-W A-18-786357-W A-19-786962-B A-19-787540-W A-19-787726-C A-19-801416-B

#### QUALCAN, LLC'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS TO THE DOT'S IMPROPER ISSUANCE OF MULTIPLE LICENSES TO A SINGLE APPLICANT IN THE SAME JURISDICTION

#### [ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED]

Plaintiff QUALCAN, LLC, by and through its attorneys of record, PETER S. CHRISTIANSEN, ESQ. and WHITNEY J. BARRETT, ESQ. of CHRISTIANSEN LAW OFFICES, hereby moves this Honorable Court for summary judgment in its favor. Specifically, entities with identical ownership structure applied for and received multiple licenses in Unincorporated Clark County. The allocation of multiple conditional licenses to these entities, which consist of the same "group of persons," was in direct violation of NAC 453D.272.

R.App. 0581

# CHRISTIANSEN LAW OFFICES

## 810 S. Casino Center Blvd. Suite 104 Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 702-240-7979 • Fax 866-412-6992

This Motion is made and based on the following Memorandum of Points and Authorities, the papers and pleadings already on file herein, and any oral argument the Court may permit at the hearing of this matter.

Dated this 13th day of March, 2020.

#### **CHRISTIANSEN LAW OFFICES**

PETER S. CHRISTIANSEN, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 5254 WHITNEY J. BARRETT, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 13662 Attorneys for Qualcan, LLC

# CHRISTIANSEN LAW OFFICES 810 S. Casino Center Blvd. Suite 104 Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 702-240-7979 • Fax 866-412-6992

#### MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

I.

#### **BACKGROUND**

Pursuant to the Recreational Marijuana Establishment License Application published by the DOT on July 6, 2018, "a person" holding a medical marijuana certificate may apply for one or more licenses, but "no applicant may be awarded more than 1 (one) retail store license in a jurisdiction/locality unless there are less applicants than licenses allowed in the jurisdiction." *See* Exhibit 1, attached.

#### LCB File No. Regulation R092-17:

On or before November 15, 2018, a person who holds a medical marijuana establishment registration
certificate may apply for one or more licenses, in addition to a license issued pursuant to section 77 of the
regulation, for a marijuana establishment of the same type or for one or more licenses for a marijuana
establishment of a different type.

No applicant may be awarded more than 1 (one) retail store license in a jurisdiction/locality, unless there are less applicants than licenses allowed in the jurisdiction.

The language of the application is consistent with the express anti-monopoly language contained in NAC 453D.272, which precludes "any person, group of persons or entity" from receiving more than one license to operate a retail marijuana store in any county whose population is 100,000 or more. Yet, the DOT allocated a total of four conditional licenses to Essence Henderson, LLC and Essence Tropicana, LLC (collectively "Essence") and Commerce Park Medical, LLC and Cheyenne Medical, LLC (collectively "Thrive"). *See* Exhibit 2, attached.

CLARK COUNTY- UNINCORPORATED CLARK COUNTY						
Rank	Business Name	DBA/LOGO	Score	Conditional License Yes / No		
1	ESSENCE TROPICANA, LLC	ESSENCE	227.84	Yes		
2	ESSENCE HENDERSON, LLC	ESSENCE	227.17	Yes		
3	NEVADA ORGANIC REMEDIES, LLC	THE SOURCE	222.66	Yes		
4	DEEP ROOTS MEDICAL, LLC	DEEP ROOTS HARVEST	222.49	Yes		
5	HELPING HANDS WELLNESS CENTER, INC	HELPING HANDS WELLNESS CENTER	218.50	Yes		
6	CHEYENNE MEDICAL, LLC	THRIVE	216.50	Yes		
7	GREENMART OF NEVADA NLV, LLC	HEALTH FOR LIFE	214.66	Yes		
8	LONE MOUNTAIN PARTNERS, LLC	ZENLEAF	214.50	Yes		
9	COMMERCE PARK MEDICAL, LLC	THRIVE	212.16	Yes		
10	CLEAR RIVER, LLC	KABUNKY	210.16	Yes		
11	WELLNESS CONNECTION OF NEVADA, LLC	CULTIVATE	208.50	No		
12	CIRCLE S FARMS, LLC	CIRCLE S	208.00	No		
13	QUALCAN, LLC	QUALCAN	207.66	No		
14	MM DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, INC	PLANET 13 / MEDIZIN	205.67	No		
15	3AP, INC	NATURES CHEMISTRY	202.83	No		

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	Bo	th Cheyenne Medical and Commerce Park (Thrive) are actually CPCM Holdings, LLC
Thus,	their	applications contained identical ownership structure:
	-	Mitchel Britten (owner)
	-	David Brown (owner)
	-	Edward Findlay (owner)
	-	Thomas Halbach (owner)
	_	Nickolas Mamula, Jr. (owner)

Similarly, Essence Henderson, LLC and Essence Tropicana, LLC (Essence), which is

Integral Associates, LLC, submitted applications with identical ownership:

Brian Greenspun (owner)

Julie Murray (owner)

Philip Peckman (owner)

- Alejandro Yemenidjian (owner)
- Armen Yemenidjian (owner)
- Alicia Abernathy (officer)
- Bert Adams (board member)
- Lesley Brousseau (officer)
- Anna Cohen (officer)
- J Dapper (board member)
- Courtney Lynch (officer)
- Sequoah Turner (officer)
  - Jennifer Wilcox (officer)

As Defendants in this litigation, these entities have appeared as follows: Integral Associates LLC d/b/a Essence Cannabis Dispensaries, Essence Tropicana, LLC, Essence Henderson, LLC and CPCM Holdings, LLC d/b/a Thrive cannabis Marketplace, Commerce Park Medical, LLC, and Cheyenne Medical, LLC. This is a tacit recognition that the Essence entities and the Thrive entities are one in the same.

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The DOT has taken the position that Essence and Thrive were permitted to receive multiple licenses in a single jurisdiction because their applications were submitted by separate entities. Former Deputy Director Jorge Pupo unilaterally made the decision to allow them to receive multiple licenses in Unincorporated Clark County because he believed them to be distinct applicants simply because they were separate entities. See Exhibit 3, Evidentiary Hearing Transcript, Day 9, 108:16 – 109:2; 114:3 – 118:14.<sup>1</sup>

The DOT's position flies in the face of the anti-monopoly provision precluding the same applicant from having multiple licenses in a jurisdiction. Witnesses on behalf of numerous plaintiffs, including the NRCP 30(b)(6) designees for TGIG and THC NV, have testified they understood each "ownership group" could apply for and potentially receive only one license in a jurisdiction, regardless of the existence of multiple entities. Thus, what was purportedly "obvious" to Jorge Pupo was anything but – perhaps this is because Mr. Pupo's position is nonsensical when looking at the clear intent of preventing monopolies.

According to Deonne Contine, former executive director of the DOT, an applicant with identical ownership applying for two licenses was expressly prohibited from obtaining more than one license in a jurisdiction:

O So if you had -- if an applicant with identical ownership structure who had applied for two licenses in unincorporated Clark County, they would only be given one license; right?

A I think so, yes.

Exhibit 4, Evidentiary Hearing Transcript, Day 14, 84:21-25.

Even more shocking, the Manpower graders looked at the financial contributions and taxes paid by Integral Associates, LLC in grading the applications for both Essence entities, as Essence Henderson and Essence Tropicana were only formed in late-2017. Thus, not only were these entities comprised of the same "group of purposes," but they are the "same applicant."

Qualcan finds it curious that only these two groups of 462 applicants learned of the Pupo loophole.

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II.

#### **LEGAL ARGUMENT**

NRCP 56(a) provides, in pertinent part, that a party seeking to recover upon a claim may move for a summary judgment in the party's favor upon all or any part thereof. Burnett v. C.B.A. Sec. Servs., 107 Nev. 787, 788, 820 P.2d 750, 751 (1991). Summary judgment is appropriate where the pleadings and affidavits on file show that there exists no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. NRCP 56(c); Montgomery v. Ponderosa Const. Inc., 101 Nev. 415 (1985). A genuine issue of material fact is one where the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party. Posadas v. City of Reno, 109 Nev. 448 (1993).

Here, Qualcan is entitled to judgment as a matter of law concerning the DOT's improper issuance of conditional licenses to Essence and Thrive in Unincorporated Clark County. NAC 453D.272 expressly precludes the allocation of multiple licenses to Thrive and Essence, providing as follows:

- To prevent monopolistic practices, the Department will ensure, in a county whose population is 100,000 or more, that the Department does not issue, to any person, group of persons or entity, the greater of:
- (a) One license to operate a retail marijuana store; or
- (b) More than 10 percent of the licenses for retail marijuana stores allocable in the county.

NAC453D.272(5). (emphasis added). This language mirrors the language of NRS 453A.326(2) concerning medical marijuana establishments. The clear intent was to prevent monopolistic practices within the marijuana industry.

There remains no genuine issue of fact surrounding the corporate structure of Essence and Thrive. They are comprised of the same "group of persons" as set forth under NAC 453D.272(5). The DOT's treatment of them as "separate" applicants in order to award a total of four conditional licenses in Unincorporated Clark County was in direct violation of the language contained in the regulations and the intent to restrict monopolies. Accordingly, Qualcan is entitled to judgment as a matter of law in its favor.

# CHRISTIANSEN LAW OFFICES

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#### III.

#### **CONCLUSION**

Therefore, Qualcan seeks an order from this court finding judgment in its favor concerning the conditional licenses improperly issued to Essence and Thrive in Unincorporated Clark County.

Dated this 13th day of March, 2020.

CHRISTIANSENLAW OFFICES

PETER S. CHRIST ANSEN, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 5254 WHITNEY J. BARRETT, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 13662

Attorneys for Qualcan, LLC

# 810 S. Casino Center Blvd. Suite 104 Las Vegas, Nevada 89101

#### **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

Pursuant to NRCP 5(b), I certify that I am an employee of CHRISTIANSEN LAW OFFICES, and that on this 13th day of March, 2020 I caused the foregoing document entitled QUALCAN LLC's MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS TO THE DOT'S IMPROPER ISSUANCE OF MULTIPLE LICENSES TO A SINGLE APPLICANT IN THE SAME JURISDICTION to be served upon those persons designated by the parties in the E-Service Master List for the above-referenced matter in the Eighth Judicial District Court eFiling System in accordance with the mandatory electronic service requirements of Administrative Order 14-2 and the Nevada Electronic Filing and Conversion Rules.

An employee of Christiansen Law Offices

### EXHIBIT 1



#### STATE OF NEVADA DEPARTMENT OF TAXATION

Web Site: https://tax.nv.gov

1550 College Parkway, Suite 115 Carson City, Nevada 89706-7937 Phone: (775) 684-2000 Fax: (775) 684-2020

LAS VEGAS OFFICE
Grant Sawyer Office Building, Suite1300
555 E. Washington Avenue
Las Vegas, Nevada 89101
Phone: (702) 486-2300 Fax: (702) 486-2373

RENO OFFICE 4600 Kietzke Lane Building L, Suite 235 Reno, Nevada 89502 Phone: (775) 687-9999 Fax: (775) 688-1303

HENDERSON OFFICE 2550 Paseo Verde Parkway, Suite 180 Henderson, Nevada 89074 Phone: (702) 486-2300 Fax: (702) 486-3377

#### Recreational Marijuana Establishment License Application Recreational Retail Marijuana Store Only

Release Date: July 6, 2018

Application Period: September 7, 2018 through September 20, 2018

(Business Days M-F, 8:00 A.M. - 5:00 P.M.)

For additional information, please contact:

Marijuana Enforcement Division

State of Nevada Department of Taxation

1550 College Parkway, Suite 115

Carson City, NV 89706

marijuana@tax.state.nv.us



BRIAN SANDOVAL
Governor
JAMES DEVOLLD
Chair, Nevada Tax Commission
WILLIAM D. ANDERSON
Executive Director

#### STATE OF NEVADA DEPARTMENT OF TAXATION

Web Site: https://tax.nv.gov

1550 College Parkway, Suite 115 Carson City, Nevada 89706-7937 Phone: (775) 684-2000 Fax: (775) 684-2020

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555 E. Washington Avenue
Las Vegas, Nevada 89101
Phone: (702) 486-2300 Fax: (702) 486-2373

RENO OFFICE 4600 Kietzke Lane Building L, Suite 235 Reno, Nevada 89502 Phone: (775) 687-9999 Fax: (775) 688-1303

HENDERSON OFFICE 2550 Paseo Verde Parkway, Suite 180 Henderson, Nevada 89074 Phone: (702) 486-2300 Fax: (702) 486-3377

#### 2. APPLICATION OVERVIEW

The Nevada State Legislature passed a number of bills during the 2017 session which affect the licensing, regulation and operation of recreational marijuana establishments in the state. In addition, the Department of Taxation has approved regulations effective February of 2018. Legislation changes relevant to this application include but are not limited to the following:

#### Assembly Bill 422 (AB422):

- Transfers responsibility for registration/licensing and regulation of marijuana establishments from the State of Nevada's Division of Public and Behavioral Health (DPBH) to the Department of Taxation.
- Adds diversity of race, ethnicity, or gender of applicants (owners, officers, board members) to the existing merit criteria for the evaluation of marijuana establishment registration certificates.

#### LCB File No. Regulation R092-17:

- On or before November 15, 2018, a person who holds a medical marijuana establishment registration certificate may apply for one or more licenses, in addition to a license issued pursuant to section 77 of the regulation, for a marijuana establishment of the same type or for one or more licenses for a marijuana establishment of a different type.

No applicant may be awarded more than 1 (one) retail store license in a jurisdiction/locality, unless there are less applicants than licenses allowed in the jurisdiction.

The Department is seeking applications from qualified applicants in conjunction with this application process for recreational marijuana retail store license. If a marijuana establishment has not received a final inspection within 12 months after the date on which the Department issued a license, the establishment must surrender the license to the Department. The Department may extend the period specified in R092-17, Sec. 87 if the Department, in its discretion, determines that extenuating circumstances prevented the marijuana establishment from receiving a final inspection within the period.

#### 3. APPLICATION TIMELINE

The following represents the timeline for this project. All times stated are in Pacific Time (PT).

Task Date/Time			
Request for application date	July 6, 2018		
Opening of 10-day window for receipt of applications	s September 7, 2018		
Deadline for submission of applications	September 20, 2018 – 5:00 p.m.		
Application evaluation period	September 7, 2018 – December 5, 2018		
Conditional licenses award notification	Not later than December 5, 2018		
Anticipated approximate fully operational deadline	12 months after notification date of conditional licer		

### EXHIBIT 2

#### 2018 Retail Marijuna Store Application Scores and Rankings

#### Revised 4 pm 5/14/2019

	CARSON CITY				
Rank	Business Name	DBA/LOGO	Score	Conditional License Yes / No	
1	ESSENCE HENDERSON, LLC	ESSENCE	227.17	Yes	
2	NEVADA ORGANIC REMEDIES, LLC	THE SOURCE	222.66	Yes	
3	LONE MOUNTAIN PARTNERS, LLC	ZENLEAF	214.50	No	
4	TRNVP098, LLC	GRASSROOTS	196.49	No	
5	CLARK NATURAL MEDICINAL SOLUTIONS, LLC	NUVEDA (THE GREEN SOLUTION)	191.67	No	
6	NYE NATURAL MEDICINAL SOLUTIONS, LLC	NUVEDA (THE GREEN SOLUTION)	191.67	No	
7	BIONEVA INNOVATIONS OF CARSON CITY, LLC	BIONEVA INNOVATIONS	188.00	No	
8	CLARK NMSD, LLC	NUVEDA (THE GREEN SOLUTION)	178.84	No	
9	D LUX, LLC	D LUX	150.49	No	
10	CN LICENSECO I, INC	CANA NEVADA	139.01	No	
11	CARSON CITY AGENCY SOLUTIONS, LLC	CARSON CITY AGENCY SOLUTIONS	128.67	No	

	CHURCHILL COUNTY				
Rank	Rank Business Name DBA/LOGO Score Conditional License Yes / No				
NO APPLICATIONS RECEIVED					

		CLARK COUNTY- HENDERSON		
Rank	Business Name	DBA/LOGO	Score	Conditional License Yes / No
1	ESSENCE TROPICANA, LLC	ESSENCE	227.84	Yes
2	NEVADA ORGANIC REMEDIES, LLC	THE SOURCE	222.99	Yes
3	DEEP ROOTS MEDICAL, LLC	DEEP ROOTS HARVEST	222.49	Yes
4	CHEYENNE MEDICAL, LLC	THRIVE	216.50	Yes
5	GREENMART OF NEVADA NLV, LLC	HEALTH FOR LIFE	213.33	Yes
6	CLEAR RIVER, LLC	KABUNKY	210.16	Yes
7	QUALCAN, LLC	QUALCAN	209.66	No
8	CIRCLE S FARMS, LLC	CIRCLE S	208.00	No
9	WSCC, INC	SIERRA WELL	201.50	No
10	VEGAS VALLEY GROWERS	KIFF PREMIUM CANNABIS	197.83	No
11	TRNVP098, LLC	GRASSROOTS	196.49	No
12	HARVEST of NEVADA, LLC	HARVEST	195.01	No
13	RED EARTH, LLC	RED EARTH	194.67	No
14	GRAVITAS NEVADA, LTD	THE APOTHECARIUM	194.66	No
15	CLARK NATURAL MEDICINAL SOLUTIONS, LLC	NUVEDA (THE GREEN SOLUTION)	191.67	No
16	NYE NATURAL MEDICINAL SOLUTIONS, LLC	NUVEDA (THE GREEN SOLUTION)	191.67	No
17	FRANKLIN BIO SCIENCE NV, LLC	BEYOND/HELLO	190.66	No
18	GREEN THERAPEUTICS, LLC	PROVISIONS	188.34	No
19	NV 3480 PARTNERS, LLC	EVERGEEN ORGANIX	188.00	No
20	SERENITY WELLNESS CENTER, LLC	OASIS CANNABIS	180.17	No
21	GBS NEVADA PARTNERS, LLC	SHOW GROW	180.17	No
22	CLARK NMSD, LLC	NUVEDA (THE GREEN SOLUTION)	178.84	No
23	ROMBOUGH REAL ESTATE, INC	MOTHER HERB	178.83	No
24	NEVADA GROUP WELLNESS, LLC	PRIME	178.18	No
25	WELLNESS & CAREGIVERS OF NEVADA NLV, LLC	MMD	172.16	No
26	GOOD CHEMISTRY NEVADA, LLC	GOOD CHEMISTRY	167.17	No
27	TWELVE TWELVE, LLC	12/12 DISPENSARY	166.67	No
28	GLOBAL HARMONY, LLC	TOP NOTCH	166.34	No
29	JUST QUALITY, LLC	PANACA CANNABIS (HUSH)	163.83	No
30	ETW MANAGEMENT GROUP, LLC	GASSERS	158.17	No
31	GREEN LEAF FARMS, LLC	PLAYERS NETWORK	148.51	No
32	LIBRA WELLNESS CENTER, LLC	LIBRA WELLNESS	134.17	No
33	NYE FARM TECH, LTD	URBN LEAF	133.34	No
34	GREENLEAF WELLNESS, INC	GREENLEAF WELLNESS	114.83	No
35	GREENWAY HEALTH COMMUNITY, LLC	GREENWAY HEALTH COMMUNITY	87.33	No

	CLARK COUNTY- LAS VEGAS					
Rank	Business Name	DBA/LOGO	Score	Conditional License Yes / No		
1	ESSENCE TROPICANA, LLC	ESSENCE	227.84	Yes		
2	NEVADA ORGANIC REMEDIES, LLC	THE SOURCE	222.66	Yes		
3	DEEP ROOTS MEDICAL, LLC	DEEP ROOTS HARVEST	222.49	Yes		
4	HELPING HANDS WELLNESS CENTER, INC	HELPING HANDS WELLNESS CENTER	218.50	Yes		
5	CHEYENNE MEDICAL, LLC	THRIVE	216.50	Yes		
6	LONE MOUNTAIN PARTNERS, LLC	ZENLEAF	214.50	Yes		
7	GREENMART OF NEVADA NLV, LLC	HEALTH FOR LIFE	212.33	Yes		
8	CLEAR RIVER, LLC	KABUNKY	210.16	Yes		
9	WELLNESS CONNECTION OF NEVADA, LLC	CULTIVATE	208.67	Yes		
10	CIRCLE S FARMS, LLC	CIRCLE S	208.00	Yes		
11	QUALCAN, LLC	QUALCAN	207.33	No		
12	MM DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, INC	PLANET 13 / MEDIZIN	204.01	No		
13	3AP, INC	NATURE'S CHEMISTRY	202.83	No		
14	WSCC, INC	SIERRA WELL	200.83	No		
15	ACRES MEDICAL, LLC	ACRES DISPENSARY	199.84	No		
16	LAS VEGAS WELLNESS & COMPASSION CENTER	PEGASUS NV	199.83	No		
17	VEGAS VALLEY GROWERS	KIFF PREMIUM CANNABIS	197.83	No		
18	NATURAL MEDICINE, LLC	NATURAL MEDICINE	197.17	No		
19	TGIG, LLC	THE GROVE	196.67	No		
20	TRNVP098, LLC	GRASSROOTS	196.49	No		
21	TRNVP098, LLC	GRASSROOTS	196.49	No		
22	GRAVITAS HENDERSON, LLC	BETTER BUDS	196.01	No		
23	D.H. FLAMINGO, INC	THE APOTHECARY SHOPPE	196.00	No		
24	HARVEST of NEVADA, LLC	HARVEST	195.01	No		
25	RED EARTH, LLC	RED EARTH	194.67	No		
26	STRIVE WELLNESS OF NEVADA, LLC	STRIVE	194.00	No		
27	CLARK NATURAL MEDICINAL SOLUTIONS, LLC	NUVEDA (THE GREEN SOLUTION)	191.67	No		
28	NYE NATURAL MEDICINAL SOLUTIONS, LLC	NUVEDA (THE GREEN SOLUTION)	191.67	No		
29	FRANKLIN BIO SCIENCE NV, LLC	BEYOND/HELLO	190.66	No		
30	LIVFREE WELLNESS, LLC	THE DISPENSARY	190.17	No		
31	INYO FINE CANNABIS DISPENSARY, LLC	INYO	189.68	No		
32	TRYKE COMPANIES SO NV, LLC	REEF	189.33	No		
33	NV 3480 PARTNERS, LLC	EVERGEEN ORGANIX	188.00	No		
34	AGUA STREET, LLC	CURALEAF	188.00	No		
35	GREEN THERAPEUTICS, LLC	PROVISIONS	187.67	No		
36	POLARIS WELLNESS CENTER, LLC	POLARIS MMJ	184.84	No		
37	HIGH SIERRA HOLISTICS, LLC	HSH	184.83	R. App. 0593		

Rank	Business Name	DBA/LOGO	Score	Conditional License Yes / No
	GTI NEVADA, LLC	RISE	184.33	No
	GTI NEVADA, LLC	RISE	184.33	No
	GTI NEVADA, LLC	RISE	184.33	No
	TRYKE COMPANIES RENO, LLC	REEF	182.00	No
	SILVER SAGE WELLNESS, LLC	+ VIBES	181.99	No
	CW NEVADA, LLC	CANOPI	181.67	No
44	TRYKE COMPANIES RENO, LLC	REEF	181.33	No
	MATRIX NV, LLC	MATRIX NV	180.67	No
46	SERENITY WELLNESS CENTER, LLC	OASIS CANNABIS	180.17	No
47	GBS NEVADA PARTNERS, LLC	SHOW GROW	180.17	No
48	GBS NEVADA PARTNERS, LLC	SHOW GROW	180.17	No
49	ROMBOUGH REAL ESTATE, INC	MOTHER HERB	179.83	No
50	CLARK NMSD, LLC	NUVEDA (THE GREEN SOLUTION)	178.84	No
51	NEVADA GROUP WELLNESS, LLC	PRIME	178.18	No
52	WAVESEER OF NEVADA, LLC	JENNY'S DISPENSARY	176.34	No
53	NLVG, LLC	DESERT BLOOM WELLNESS CENTER	173.83	No
54	MEDI FARM IV, LLC	BLUM	173.50	No
55	NEVADA HOLISTIC MEDICINE, LLC	NHM	172.50	No
56	WELLNESS & CAREGIVERS OF NEVADA NLV, LLC	MMD	172.16	No
57	LUFF ENTERPRISES NV, INC	SWEET CANNABIS	171.33	No
58	THC NEVADA, LLC	CANNA VIBE	170.99	No
59	THE HARVEST FOUNDATION, LLC	THE HARVEST FOUNDATION	170.50	No
60	MALANA LV, LLC	MALANA LV	168.66	No
61	WEST COST DEVELOPMENT NEVADA, LLC	SWEET GOLDY	168.17	No
62	GOOD CHEMISTRY NEVADA, LLC	GOOD CHEMISTRY	167.17	No
63	TWELVE TWELVE, LLC	12/12 DISPENSARY	166.67	No
64	GLOBAL HARMONY, LLC	TOP NOTCH	166.34	No
65	NEVADA PURE, LLC	SHANGO LAS VEGAS	164.83	No
	FSWFL, LLC	GREEN HARVEST (Have A Heart)	164.83	No
67	NEVADA MEDICAL GROUP, LLC	THE CLUBHOUSE DISPENSARY	164.32	No
68	JUST QUALITY, LLC	PANACA CANNABIS (HUSH)	163.83	No
	SOUTHERN NEVADA GROWERS, LLC	BOWTIE CANNABIS	163.17	No
	GREENPOINT NEVADA, INC	CHALICE FARMS	160.84	No
	ETW MANAGEMENT GROUP, LLC	GASSERS	158.17	No
	NEVADA WELLNESS CENTER, LLC	NWC	156.51	No
	ALTERNATIVE MEDICINE ASSOCIATION, LLC	ALTERNATIVE WELLNESS	154.67	No
	YMY VENTURES, LLC	STEM	154.16	No
	SOLACE ENTERPRISES	THALLO	153.67	No
	MMOF VEGAS RETAIL, INC	MEDMEN	152.67	No
	NULEAF INCLINE DISPENSARY, LLC	NULEAF	152.50	No
	YMY VENTURES, LLC	STEM	152.16	No No
	NEVCANN, LLC	NEVCANN	150.67	No No
	NEVCANN, LLC	NEVCANN DI AVEDS NETWORK	150.67	No No
	GREEN LEAF FARMS, LLC	PLAYERS NETWORK	150.51	No No
	WENDOVERA, LLC FOREVER GREEN, LLC	WENDOVERA FOREVER GREEN	145.66 144.01	No No
	RELEAF CULTIVATION, LLC	RELEAF CULTIVATION	143.83	No
	HERBAL CHOICE, INC	HERBAL CHOICE	143.63	No
	PARADISE WELLNESS CENTER, LLC	LAS VEGAS RELEAF	143.31	No
	PURE TONIC CONCENTRATES, LLC	THE GREEN HEART	142.99	No
	CN LICENSECO I, INC	CANA NEVADA	139.01	No
	DIVERSIFIED MODALITIES MARKETING, LTD	DIVERSIFIED MODALITIES MARKETING	138.66	No
	ECONEVADA LLC	MARAPHARM LAS VEGAS	137.33	No
	ECONEVADA LLC ECONEVADA LLC	MARAPHARM LAS VEGAS  MARAPHARM LAS VEGAS	137.33	No
	PHENOFARM NV LLC	MARAPHARM LAS VEGAS	137.33	No
	DP HOLDINGS, INC	COMPASSIONATE TEAM OF LAS VEGAS	134.82	No
	DP HOLDINGS, INC	COMPASSIONATE TEAM OF LAS VEGAS  COMPASSIONATE TEAM OF LAS VEGAS	134.82	No
	LIBRA WELLNESS CENTER, LLC	LIBRA WELLNESS	134.17	No
	NYE FARM TECH, LTD	URBN LEAF	133.34	No
	NYE FARM TECH, LTD	URBN LEAF	133.34	No
	BLOSSUM GROUP, LLC	HEALING HERB	125.50	No
	GB SCIENCES NEVADA, LL	GB SCIENCES	125.00	No
			125.00	
99	RURAL REMEDIES, LLC	DOC'S APOTHECARY	119 16	No
99 100	RURAL REMEDIES, LLC GREENLEAF WELLNESS, INC	DOC'S APOTHECARY  GREENLEAF WELLNESS	119.16 115.16	No No
99 100 101	RURAL REMEDIES, LLC GREENLEAF WELLNESS, INC RG HIGHLAND	DOC'S APOTHECARY  GREENLEAF WELLNESS  TWEEDLEAF	119.16 115.16 113.00	No No No

Rank	Business Name	DBA/LOGO	Score	Conditional License Yes / No		
	CLARK COUNTY- MESQUITE					
Rank	Rank Business Name DBA/LOGO Score Conditional License Yes / No					
NO ALLOCATION						

	CLARK	COUNTY- NORTH LAS VEGAS		
Rank	Business Name	DBA/LOGO	Score	Conditional License Yes / No
1	ESSENCE HENDERSON, LLC	ESSENCE	227.17	Yes
2	NEVADA ORGANIC REMEDIES, LLC	THE SOURCE	222.99	Yes
3	DEEP ROOTS MEDICAL, LLC	DEEP ROOTS HARVEST	222.49	Yes
4	HELPING HANDS WELLNESS CENTER, INC	HELPING HANDS WELLNESS CENTER	218.50	Yes
5	LONE MOUNTAIN PARTNERS, LLC	ZENLEAF	214.50	Yes
6 7	GREENMART OF NEVADA NLV, LLC	HEALTH FOR LIFE	213.33	No
8	COMMERCE PARK MEDICAL, LLC CLEAR RIVER, LLC	THRIVE KABUNKY	212.33	No No
9	QUALCAN, LLC	QUALCAN	209.00	No
10	CIRCLE S FARMS, LLC	CIRCLE S	208.00	No
11	MM DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, INC	PLANET 13 / MEDIZIN	204.01	No
12	3AP, INC	NATURE'S CHEMISTRY	202.83	No
13	WSCC, INC	SIERRA WELL	201.50	No
14	ACRES MEDICAL, LLC	ACRES DISPENSARY	199.84	No
15	VEGAS VALLEY GROWERS	KIFF PREMIUM CANNABIS	198.50	No
16 17	NATURAL MEDICINE, LLC TGIG, LLC	NATURAL MEDICINE THE GROVE	197.17 196.67	No No
18	TRNVP098, LLC	GRASSROOTS	196.49	No
19	GRAVITAS HENDERSON, LLC	BETTER BUDS	196.01	No
20	HARVEST of NEVADA, LLC	HARVEST	195.68	No
21	D.H. FLAMINGO, INC	THE APOTHECARY SHOPPE	195.67	No
22	RED EARTH, LLC	RED EARTH	194.67	No
23	ZION GARDENS, LLC	ZION GARDENS	194.17	No
24	GREENSCAPE PRODUCTIONS, LLC	HERBAL WELLNESS CENTER	192.83	No
25	CLARK NATURAL MEDICINAL SOLUTIONS, LLC	NUVEDA (THE GREEN SOLUTION)	191.67	No No
26 27	NYE NATURAL MEDICINAL SOLUTIONS, LLC LIVFREE WELLNESS. LLC	NUVEDA (THE GREEN SOLUTION) THE DISPENSARY	191.67 190.54	No No
28	FRANKLIN BIO SCIENCE NV, LLC	BEYOND/HELLO	190.34	No
29	INYO FINE CANNABIS DISPENSARY, LLC	INYO	189.68	No
30	TRYKE COMPANIES SO NV, LLC	REEF	189.33	No
31	FIDELIS HOLDINGS, LLC	PISOS	189.00	No
32	FIDELIS HOLDINGS, LLC	PISOS	189.00	No
33	GREEN THERAPEUTICS, LLC	PROVISIONS	188.67	No
34	NV 3480 PARTNERS, LLC	EVERGEEN ORGANIX	188.00	No
35	AGUA STREET, LLC	CURALEAF	185.50	No
36 37	POLARIS WELLNESS CENTER, LLC GTI NEVADA, LLC	POLARIS MMJ RISE	185.17 184.33	No No
38	MATRIX NV, LLC	MATRIX NV	181.00	No
39	SERENITY WELLNESS CENTER, LLC	OASIS CANNABIS	180.17	No
40	GBS NEVADA PARTNERS, LLC	SHOW GROW	180.17	No
41	ROMBOUGH REAL ESTATE, INC	MOTHER HERB	178.83	No
42	NEVADA GROUP WELLNESS, LLC	PRIME	178.18	No
43	WAVESEER OF NEVADA, LLC	JENNY'S DISPENSARY	176.34	No
44	NLVG, LLC	DESERT BLOOM WELLNESS CENTER	173.83	No
45 46	WELLNESS & CAREGIVERS OF NEVADA NLV, LLC THC NEVADA, LLC	MMD CANNA VIBE	172.16 170.99	No No
47	MALANA LV, LLC	MALANA LV	169.00	No
48	TWELVE TWELVE, LLC	12/12 DISPENSARY	166.67	No
49	GLOBAL HARMONY, LLC	TOP NOTCH	166.34	No
50	EUPHORIA WELLNESS, LLC	EUPHORIA WELLNESS	165.16	No
51	NEVADA MEDICAL GROUP, LLC	THE CLUBHOUSE DISPENSARY	164.32	No
52	SOUTHERN NEVADA GROWERS, LLC	BOWTIE CANNABIS	163.17	No
53	GREENPOINT NEVADA, INC	CHALICE FARMS	161.84	No
54	NEVADA WELLNESS CENTER, LLC SOLACE ENTERPRISES	NWC THALLO	156.51	No No
55 56	PHYSIS ONE, LLC	THALLO LV FORTRESS	153.67 153.00	No No
57	NULEAF INCLINE DISPENSARY, LLC	NULEAF	152.50	No No
58	NEVCANN, LLC	NEVCANN	150.67	No
59	HEALTHCARE OPTIONS for PATIENTS ENTERPRISES, LLC	SHANG0	150.33	No
60	PURE TONIC CONCENTRATES, LLC	THE GREEN HEART	146.99	No
61	WENDOVERA, LLC	WENDOVERA	145.66	No
62	RELEAF CULTIVATION, LLC	RELEAF CULTIVATION	143.83	No
63	HERBAL CHOICE, INC	HERBAL CHOICE	143.51	No No
64 65	FOREVER GREEN, LLC CN LICENSECO I, INC	FOREVER GREEN CANA NEVADA	141.34 139.01	No No
66	DIVERSIFIED MODALITIES MARKETING, LTD	DIVERSIFIED MODALITIES MARKETING	139.01	No No
67	GREEN LEAF FARMS, LLC	PLAYERS NETWORK	137.51	No
68	ECONEVADA LLC	MARAPHARM LAS VEGAS	137.33	No
69	PHENOFARM NV LLC	MARAPHARM LAS VEGAS	137.33	No
70	LIBRA WELLNESS CENTER, LLC	LIBRA WELLNESS	134.17	No
71	BLOSSUM GROUP, LLC	HEALING HERB	125.50	No
72	LYNCH NATURAL PRODUCTS, LLC	LNP	124.00	No
73	RURAL REMEDIES, LLC NLV WELLNESS, LLC	DOC'S APOTHECARY ETHCX	120.16	No No
7.4		ILLIE A	109.67	No
74 75	MM R&D, LLC	SUNSHINE CANNABIS	64.66	No

CLARK COUNTY- UNINCORPORATED CLARK COUNTY				
Rank	Business Name	DBA/LOGO	Score	Conditional License Yes / No
1	ESSENCE TROPICANA, LLC	ESSENCE	227.84	Yes
2	ESSENCE HENDERSON, LLC	ESSENCE	227.17	Yes
3	NEVADA ORGANIC REMEDIES, LLC	THE SOURCE	222.66	Yes
4	DEEP ROOTS MEDICAL, LLC	DEEP ROOTS HARVEST	222.49	Yes
5	HELPING HANDS WELLNESS CENTER, INC	HELPING HANDS WELLNESS CENTER	218.50	Yes
6	CHEYENNE MEDICAL, LLC	THRIVE	216.50	Yes
7	GREENMART OF NEVADA NLV, LLC	HEALTH FOR LIFE	214.66	Yes
8	LONE MOUNTAIN PARTNERS, LLC	ZENLEAF	214.50	Yes
9	COMMERCE PARK MEDICAL, LLC	THRIVE	212.16	Yes
10	CLEAR RIVER, LLC	KABUNKY	210.16	Yes
11	WELLNESS CONNECTION OF NEVADA, LLC	CULTIVATE	208.50	No
12	CIRCLE S FARMS, LLC	CIRCLE S	208.00	No
13	QUALCAN, LLC	QUALCAN	207.66	No
14	MM DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, INC	PLANET 13 / MEDIZIN	205.67	No
15	3AP, INC	NATURE'S CHEMISTRY	202.83	No
16	WSCC, INC	SIERRA WELL	200.83	No
17	LAS VEGAS WELLNESS & COMPASSION CENTER	PEGASUS NV	200.16	R <sub>M</sub> pp. 0595

Rank	Business Name	DBA/LOGO	Score	Conditional License Yes / No
18	ACRES MEDICAL, LLC	ACRES DISPENSARY	198.67	No
19	NATURAL MEDICINE, LLC	NATURAL MEDICINE	197.17	No
20	VEGAS VALLEY GROWERS	KIFF PREMIUM CANNABIS	197.17	No
21	TGIG, LLC	THE GROVE	196.67	No
22	TRNVP098, LLC	GRASSROOTS	196.49	No
23	GRAVITAS HENDERSON, LLC	BETTER BUDS	196.01	No
24	D.H. FLAMINGO, INC	THE APOTHECARY SHOPPE	195.67	No
25	HARVEST of NEVADA, LLC	HARVEST	195.01	No
26	RED EARTH, LLC	RED EARTH	195.00	No
27	GRAVITAS NV	THE APOTHECARIUM ZION GARDENS	194.66 194.17	No No
29	ZION GARDENS, LLC GREENSCAPE PRODUCTIONS, LLC	HERBAL WELLNESS CENTER	194.17	No No
30	CLARK NATURAL MEDICINAL SOLUTIONS, LLC	NUVEDA (THE GREEN SOLUTION)	192.63	No
31	CLARK NATURAL MEDICINAL SOLUTIONS, LLC	NUVEDA (THE GREEN SOLUTION)	191.67	No
32	NYE NATURAL MEDICINAL SOLUTIONS, LLC	NUVEDA (THE GREEN SOLUTION)	191.67	No
33	NYE NATURAL MEDICINAL SOLUTIONS, LLC	NUVEDA (THE GREEN SOLUTION)	191.67	No
34	FRANKLIN BIO SCIENCE NV, LLC	BEYOND/HELLO	190.66	No
35	LIVFREE WELLNESS, LLC	THE DISPENSARY	190.17	No
36	INYO FINE CANNABIS DISPENSARY, LLC	INYO	189.68	No
37	TRYKE COMPANIES SO NV, LLC	REEF	189.33	No
38	FIDELIS HOLDINGS, LLC	PISOS	189.33	No
39	FIDELIS HOLDINGS, LLC	PISOS	189.00	No
40	LVMC C&P, LLC	CANNA COPIA	188.50	No
41	GREEN THERAPEUTICS, LLC	PROVISIONS	187.67	No
42	AGUA STREET, LLC	CURALEAF	187.17	No
43	AGUA STREET, LLC	CURALEAF	186.50	No
44	CWNEVADA, LLC	CANOPI	184.34	No
45	TRYKE COMPANIES RENO, LLC	REEF	181.33	No
46	MATRIX NV, LLC	MATRIX NV	180.33	No No
47	SERENITY WELLNESS CENTER, LLC	OASIS CANNABIS	180.17	No
48	GBS NEVADA PARTNERS, LLC	SHOW GROW	180.17	No No
50	ROMBOUGH REAL ESTATE, INC CLARK NMSD, LLC	MOTHER HERB NUVEDA (THE GREEN SOLUTION)	179.50 178.84	No No
51	NEVADA GROUP WELLNESS, LLC	PRIME	178.18	No
52	WAVESEER OF NEVADA, LLC	JENNY'S DISPENSARY	176.34	No
53	NLVG, LLC	DESERT BLOOM WELLNESS CENTER	173.83	No
54	MEDI FARM IV, LLC	BLUM	173.50	No
55	WELLNESS & CAREGIVERS OF NEVADA NLV, LLC	MMD	172.16	No
56	LUFF ENTERPRISES NV, INC	SWEET CANNABIS	171.33	No
57	WEST COST DEVELOPMENT NEVADA, LLC	SWEET GOLDY	168.17	No
58	GOOD CHEMISTRY NEVADA, LLC	GOOD CHEMISTRY	167.17	No
59	TWELVE TWELVE, LLC	12/12 DISPENSARY	166.67	No
60	GLOBAL HARMONY, LLC	TOP NOTCH	166.34	No
61	NEVADA PURE, LLC	SHANGO LAS VEGAS	165.83	No
62	EUPHORIA WELLNESS, LLC	EUPHORIA WELLNESS	165.16	No
63	FSWFL, LLC	GREEN HARVEST (Have A Heart)	164.83	No
64	NEVADA MEDICAL GROUP, LLC	THE CLUBHOUSE DISPENSARY	164.32	No
65	JUST QUALITY, LLC	PANACA CANNABIS (HUSH)	163.83	No
66	SOUTHERN NEVADA GROWERS, LLC	BOWTIE CANNABIS	163.17	No
67	GREENPOINT NEVADA, INC	CHALICE FARMS	160.84	No
68	ETW MANAGEMENT GROUP, LLC	GASSERS	158.17	No
69	NEVADA WELLNESS CENTER, LLC	NWC	155.18	No
70	YMY VENTURES, LLC	STEM	153.83	No
71	MMOF VEGAS RETAIL, INC	MEDMEN NULLEAE	152.67	No No
72	NULEAF INCLINE DISPENSARY, LLC	NULEAF NEVCANN	152.50	No No
73 74	NEVCANN, LLC PURE TONIC CONCENTRATES, LLC	THE GREEN HEART	150.67 146.99	No No
75	WENDOVERA, LLC	WENDOVERA	146.99	No No
76	NCMM, LLC	NCMM	145.66 144.16	No No
77	NCMM, LLC	NCMM NCMM	144.16	No No
78	RELEAF CULTIVATION, LLC	RELEAF CULTIVATION	144.16	No No
79	HERBAL CHOICE, INC	HERBAL CHOICE	143.83	No
80	CN LICENSECO I, INC	CANA NEVADA	139.01	No
81	DIVERSIFIED MODALITIES MARKETING, LTD	DIVERSIFIED MODALITIES MARKETING	138.66	No
82	PHENOFARM NV LLC	MARAPHARM LAS VEGAS	137.33	No
83	GREEN LEAF FARMS, LLC	PLAYERS NETWORK	135.84	No
84	DP HOLDINGS, INC	COMPASSIONATE TEAM OF LAS VEGAS	134.82	No
85	LIBRA WELLNESS CENTER, LLC	LIBRA WELLNESS	134.17	No
86	NYE FARM TECH, LTD	URBN LEAF	133.34	No
87	GFIVE DISPENSARY, LLC	G5	128.83	No
88	BLOSSUM GROUP, LLC	HEALING HERB	125.50	No
89	GB SCIENCES NEVADA, LL	GB SCIENCES	125.00	No
90	KINDIBLES, LLC	AREA 51	117.50	No
91	KINDIBLES, LLC	AREA 51	117.50	No
92	KINDIBLES, LLC	AREA 51	117.50	No
93	KINDIBLES, LLC	AREA 51	117.50	No
94	NLV WELLNESS, LLC	ETHCX	109.67	No
95	GREENWAY MEDICAL, LLC	GREENWAY MEDICAL	101.00	No
	MILLER FARMS, LLC	LUCID	88.66	No
96 97	MM R&D, LLC	SUNSHINE CANNABIS	64.66	No

		DOUGLAS COUNTY		
Rank	Business Name	DBA/LOGO	Score	Conditional License Yes / No
1	LONE MOUNTAIN PARTNERS, LLC	ZENLEAF	214.50	Yes
2	GREEN THERAPEUTICS, LLC	PROVISIONS	188.34	Yes
3	POLARIS WELLNESS CENTER, LLC	POLARIS MMJ	184.84	No
4	GREEN LEAF FARMS, LLC	PLAYERS NETWORK	148.51	No
5	PURE TONIC CONCENTRATES, LLC	THE GREEN HEART	146.99	No
6	WENDOVERA, LLC	WENDOVERA	145.66	No
7	NCMM, LLC	NCMM	144.16	No

	ELKO COUNTY					
Rank	Business Name	DBA/LOGO	Score	Conditional License Yes / No		
1	CHEYENNE MEDICAL, LLC	THRIVE	216.50	Yes		
2	GREENMART OF NEVADA NLV, LLC	HEALTH FOR LIFE	213.53	No		
3	QUALCAN, LLC	QUALCAN	209.66	No		
4	HARVEST of NEVADA, LLC	HARVEST	195.01	No		
5	JUST QUALITY, LLC	PANACA CANNABIS (HUSH)	163.83	No		
6	WENDOVERA, LLC	WENDOVERA	145.66	No		
7	H&K GROWERS, CORP	H&K GROWERS	125.83	No		
8	LYNCH NATURAL PRODUCTS, LLC	LNP	124.00	No		

Rank	Business Name	DBA/LOGO	Score	Conditional License Yes / No	
		•			
	ESMERALDA COUNTY				
Rank	Business Name	DBA/LOGO	Score	Conditional License Yes / No	
1	LONE MOUNTAIN PARTNERS, LLC	ZENLEAF	214.50	Yes	
2	POLARIS WELLNESS CENTER, LLC	POLARIS MMJ	185.17	Yes	
	DI HE COVOTE DANCH LLC	DI HE COVOTE DANCH	100.02	NI -	

		EUREKA COUNTY		
Rank	Business Name	DBA/LOGO	Score	Conditional License Yes / No
1	LONE MOUNTAIN PARTNERS, LLC	ZENLEAF	214.50	Yes
2	EUREKA NEWGEN FARMS, LLC	EUREKA NEWGEN FARMS	97.67	Yes

	I			
Rank	Business Name	DBA/LOGO	Score	Conditional License Yes / No
1	TRNVP098, LLC	GRASSROOTS	196.49	Yes
2	PURE TONIC CONCENTRATES, LLC	THE GREEN HEART	146.99	Yes
3	LYNCH NATURAL PRODUCTS, LLC	LNP	124.00	No
4	RURAL REMEDIES, LLC	DOC'S APOTHECARY	119.16	No
5	MILLER FARMS, LLC	LUCID	88.66	No

		LANDER COUNTY		
Rank	Business Name	DBA/LOGO	Score	Conditional License Yes / No
1	LONE MOUNTAIN PARTNERS, LLC	ZENLEAF	214.50	Yes
2	TRNVP098, LLC	GRASSROOTS	196.49	Yes
3	HARVEST of NEVADA, LLC	HARVEST	195.01	No
4	DIVERSIFIED MODALITIES MARKETING, LTD	DIVERSIFIED MODALITIES MARKETING	138.66	No
5	RURAL REMEDIES, LLC	DOC'S APOTHECARY	119.16	No

		LINCOLN COUNTY		
Rank	Business Name	DBA/LOGO	Score	Conditional License Yes / No
1	LONE MOUNTAIN PARTNERS LLC	ZENI EAE	214 50	Ves

Rank	Business Name	DBA/LOGO	Score	Conditional License Yes / No
		LYON COUNTY		
Rank	Business Name	DBA/LOGO	Score	Conditional License Yes / No
1	TRNVP098, LLC	GRASSROOTS	196.49	Yes
2	LIVFREE WELLNESS, LLC	THE DISPENSARY	190.17	No
3	HIGH SIERRA HOLISTICS, LLC	HSH	184.83	No
4	5SEAT INVESTMENTS, LLC	KANNA	162.00	No
5	GREEN LEAF FARMS, LLC	PLAYERS NETWORK	143.17	No
6	FOREVER GREEN, LLC	FOREVER GREEN	141.01	No
7	LYNCH NATURAL PRODUCTS, LLC	LNP	124.00	No
8	MILLER FARMS, LLC	LUCID	88.66	No
9	INTERNATIONAL SERVICES AND REBUILDING, INC	VOODOO WELLNESS	56.00	No

		MINERAL COUNTY		
Rank	Business Name	DBA/LOGO	Score	Conditional License Yes / No
1	LONE MOUNTAIN PARTNERS, LLC	ZENLEAF	214.50	Yes
2	TRNVP098, LLC	GRASSROOTS	196.49	Yes

		NYE COUNTY		
Rank	Business Name	DBA/LOGO	Score	Conditional License Yes / No
1	NEVADA ORGANIC REMEDIES, LLC	THE SOURCE	222.99	Yes
2	GREENMART OF NEVADA NLV, LLC	HEALTH FOR LIFE	213.33	No
3	COMMERCE PARK MEDICAL, LLC	THRIVE	212.16	No
4	MM DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, INC	PLANET 13 / MEDIZIN	204.01	No
5	TGIG, LLC	THE GROVE	196.67	No
6	TRNVP098, LLC	GRASSROOTS	196.49	No
7	CLARK NATURAL MEDICINAL SOLUTIONS, LLC	NUVEDA (THE GREEN SOLUTION)	191.67	No
8	NYE NATURAL MEDICINAL SOLUTIONS, LLC	NUVEDA (THE GREEN SOLUTION)	191.67	No
9	LIVFREE WELLNESS, LLC	THE DISPENSARY	190.50	No
10	GREEN LIFE PRODUCTIONS, LLC	GREEN LIFE PRODUCTIONS	180.68	No
11	SERENITY WELLNESS CENTER, LLC	OASIS CANNABIS	180.17	No
12	CLARK NMSD, LLC	NUVEDA (THE GREEN SOLUTION)	178.84	No
13	GLOBAL HARMONY, LLC	TOP NOTCH	166.34	No
14	5SEAT INVESTMENTS, LLC	KANNA	161.67	No
15	NYE FARM TECH, LTD	URBN LEAF	133.34	No
16	NLV WELLNESS, LLC	ETHCX	109.67	No
17	MILLER FARMS, LLC	LUCID	88.66	No
18	MM R&D, LLC	SUNSHINE CANNABIS	64.66	No

	PERSHING COUNTY				
Rank	Business Name	DBA/LOGO	Score	Conditional License Yes / No	
1	TRNVP098, LLC	GRASSROOTS	196.49	Yes	

		STOREY COUNTY		
Rank	Business Name	DBA/LOGO	Score	Conditional License Yes / No
1	TRNVP098, LLC	GRASSROOTS	196.49	Yes
2	PURE TONIC CONCENTRATES, LLC	THE GREEN HEART	146.99	Yes

WHITE PINE COUNTY				
Rank	Business Name	DBA/LOGO	Score	Conditional License Yes / No
1	LONE MOUNTAIN PARTNERS, LLC	ZENLEAF	214.50	Yes
2	TRNVP098, LLC	GRASSROOTS	196.49	Yes
3	DIVERSIFIED MODALITIES MARKETING, LTD	DIVERSIFIED MODALITIES MARKETING	138.66	No

Rank	Business Name	DBA/LOGO	Score	Conditional License Yes / No
		•		

WASHOE COUNTY- RENO				
Rank	Business Name	DBA/LOGO	Score	Conditional License Yes / No
1	ESSENCE TROPICANA, LLC	ESSENCE	227.84	Yes
2	NEVADA ORGANIC REMEDIES, LLC	THE SOURCE	222.99	Yes
3	DEEP ROOTS MEDICAL, LLC	DEEP ROOTS HARVEST	222.49	Yes
4	CHEYENNE MEDICAL, LLC	THRIVE	216.50	Yes
5	LONE MOUNTAIN PARTNERS, LLC	ZENLEAF	214.50	Yes
6	GREENMART OF NEVADA NLV, LLC	HEALTH FOR LIFE	213.66	Yes
7	COMMERCE PARK MEDICAL, LLC	THRIVE	212.16	No
8	QUALCAN, LLC	QUALCAN	209.66	No
9	WELLNESS CONNECTION OF NEVADA, LLC	CULTIVATE	208.33	No
10	CIRCLE S FARMS, LLC	CIRCLE S	208.00	No
11	MM DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, INC	PLANET 13 / MEDIZIN	204.01	No
12	WSCC, INC	SIERRA WELL	201.50	No
13	ACRES MEDICAL, LLC	ACRES DISPENSARY	199.84	No
14	TGIG, LLC	THE GROVE	196.67	No
15	TRNVP098, LLC	GRASSROOTS	196.49	No
16	CLARK NATURAL MEDICINAL SOLUTIONS, LLC	NUVEDA (THE GREEN SOLUTION)	191.67	No
17	NYE NATURAL MEDICINAL SOLUTIONS, LLC	NUVEDA (THE GREEN SOLUTION)	191.67	No
18	FRANKLIN BIO SCIENCE NV, LLC	BEYOND/HELLO	190.66	No
19	LIVFREE WELLNESS, LLC	THE DISPENSARY	190.50	No
20	INYO FINE CANNABIS DISPENSARY, LLC	INYO	189.68	No
21	GREEN THERAPEUTICS, LLC	PROVISIONS	188.34	No
22	BIONEVA INNOVATIONS OF CARSON CITY, LLC	BIONEVA INNOVATIONS	187.67	No
23	HIGH SIERRA HOLISTICS, LLC	HSH	184.83	No
24	GTI NEVADA, LLC	RISE	184.33	No
25	HIGH SIERRA CULTIVATION, LLC	HIGH SIERRA	183.33	No
26	SERENITY WELLNESS CENTER, LLC	OASIS CANNABIS	180.17	No
27	CLARK NMSD, LLC	NUVEDA (THE GREEN SOLUTION)	178.84	No
28	ROMBOUGH REAL ESTATE, INC	MOTHER HERB	178.50	No
29	NEVADA GROUP WELLNESS, LLC	PRIME	178.18	No
30	WAVESEER OF NEVADA, LLC	JENNY'S DISPENSARY	175.67	No
31	WELLNESS & CAREGIVERS OF NEVADA NLV, LLC	MMD	172.16	No
32	THC NEVADA, LLC	CANNA VIBE	170.99	No
33	HELIOS NV, LLC	HYDROVIZE	167.17	No
34	MMNV2 HOLDINGS I, LLC	MEDMEN	166.83	No
35	GLOBAL HARMONY, LLC	TOP NOTCH	166.34	No
36	FSWFL, LLC	GREEN HARVEST (Have A Heart)	164.83	No
37	NEVADA MEDICAL GROUP, LLC	THE CLUBHOUSE DISPENSARY	164.32	No
38	GREENPOINT NEVADA, INC	CHALICE FARMS	159.84	No
39	NEVADA WELLNESS CENTER, LLC	NWC	155.18	No
40	NULEAF INCLINE DISPENSARY, LLC	NULEAF	152.50	No
41	NEVCANN, LLC	NEVCANN	150.67	No
42	D LUX, LLC	D LUX	149.83	No
43	PURE TONIC CONCENTRATES, LLC	THE GREEN HEART	141.83	No
44	CN LICENSECO I, INC	CANA NEVADA	139.01	No
45	LIBRA WELLNESS CENTER, LLC	LIBRA WELLNESS	134.17	No
46	H&K GROWERS, CORP	H&K GROWERS	126.50	No
47	BLOSSUM GROUP, LLC	HEALING HERB	125.50	No
48	LYNCH NATURAL PRODUCTS, LLC	LNP	124.00	No
49	RURAL REMEDIES, LLC	DOC'S APOTHECARY	120.16	No
50	NEVADA BOTANICAL SCIENCE, INC	VIGOR DISPENSARIES	115.34	No
51	NV GREEN, INC	NV GREEN	105.84	No
52	MILLER FARMS, LLC	LUCID	88.66	No
53	MM R&D, LLC	SUNSHINE CANNABIS	64.66	No

WASHOE COUNTY- SPARKS				
Rank	Business Name	DBA/LOGO	Score	Conditional License Yes / No
1	ESSENCE HENDERSON, LLC	ESSENCE	227.17	Yes
2	NEVADA ORGANIC REMEDIES, LLC	THE SOURCE	222.99	No
3	LONE MOUNTAIN PARTNERS, LLC	ZENLEAF	214.50	No
4	GREENMART OF NEVADA NLV, LLC	HEALTH FOR LIFE	213.33	No
5	TGIG, LLC	THE GROVE	196.67	No
6	TRNVP098, LLC	GRASSROOTS	196.49	No
7	CLARK NATURAL MEDICINAL SOLUTIONS, LLC	NUVEDA (THE GREEN SOLUTION)	192.01	No
8	NYE NATURAL MEDICINAL SOLUTIONS, LLC	NUVEDA (THE GREEN SOLUTION)	191.67	No
9	SERENITY WELLNESS CENTER, LLC	OASIS CANNABIS	180.17	No
10	CLARK NMSD, LLC	NUVEDA (THE GREEN SOLUTION)	178.84	No
11	ROMBOUGH REAL ESTATE, INC	MOTHER HERB	178.83	No
12	GREENPOINT NEVADA, INC	CHALICE FARMS	161.17	No
13	NULEAF INCLINE DISPENSARY, LLC	NULEAF	152.33	No
14	D LUX, LLC	D LUX	149.83	No
15	CN LICENSECO I, INC	CANA NEVADA	139.01	No
16	RURAL REMEDIES, LLC	DOC'S APOTHECARY	120.16	No

WASHOE COUNTY- UNINCORPORATED WASHOE				
Rank	Business Name	DBA/LOGO	Score	Conditional License Yes / No
NO ALLOCATION				

### EXHIBIT 3

Electronically Filed 6/25/2019 12:25 PM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT

TRAN

#### DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

\* \* \* \* \*

SERENITY WELLNESS CENTER LLC,. et al.

Plaintiffs . CASE NO. A-19-786962-B

VS.

STATE OF NEVADA DEPARTMENT OF. DEPT. NO. XI

TAXATION

Defendant . Transcript of Proceedings

BEFORE THE HONORABLE ELIZABETH GONZALEZ, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

#### EVIDENTIARY HEARING - DAY 9 VOLUME II

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 19, 2019

COURT RECORDER: TRANSCRIPTION BY:

JILL HAWKINS FLORENCE HOYT

District Court Las Vegas, Nevada 89146

Proceedings recorded by audio-visual recording, transcript produced by transcription service.

- Q In Clark County?
- A Oh, Clark County. It says 41. Unincorporated, 47 in Clark County.
- Q Your records indicate that there were 47 licenses already issued at the time that you opened up the application process, and yet you only issued 31?
- A Yeah. I don't know what this document -- when it was made or who made it or whatever. It's my understanding that 80 licenses were issued or have been issued, either conditional or final in Clark County.
- Q But there's no doubt about that requirement, so if there weren't 80 licenses issued, then that would have been an error; correct?
  - A Yes.
- 15 Q Okay.

- MR. MILLER: All right. Turn to Exhibit Number 5 and let's go to page 8. Go to the red letter.
- 18 BY MR. MILLER:
- 19 Q Can you read that red letter to us?
  - A "No applicant may be awarded more than one retail store license in a jurisdiction/locality unless there are less applicants than licenses allowed in the jurisdiction."
  - Q And where is the Department's authority, either in statute or regulation, that they gave you the authority to impose that rule?

MR. KOCH: Objection. Legal conclusion.

THE COURT: Overruled.

THE WITNESS: There is no specific authority but there's no prohibition, either, that I can find.

#### BY MR. MILLER:

Q So because you couldn't find a prohibition on it, you thought you could just issue a rule on the application that the applicants would have to abide by?

A I did consult with the AG's Office. I had several discussions regarding this.

MR. SHEVORSKI: Sir, I want to caution you not to reveal attorney-client privileged communications.

THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: But you can say yes or no as to when you consulted with them. So thank you for that.

#### BY MR. MILLER:

Q Following that consultation, you put on this application in two places in red lettering this rule. Did you expect the applicants to adhere to it?

A Yes.

Q You understood that they would read that rule and understand that it should be given meaning and that they shouldn't apply for more than one retail license in a jurisdiction/locality in that jurisdiction because they couldn't be awarded those licenses; correct?

whether or not they identified common ownership. 1 2 Okay. 3 Do you see Duplicate Ownership Identified? 0 4 Essence Tropicana and Henderson it says Yes; correct? 5 Yes. Α Do you recognize that they referenced the 6 7 application numbers that correspond? 8 Α Yes. 9 So it's the same owners for Essence Tropicana and 10 Essence Henderson, is that right? 11 Α Yes. 12 All right. And Cheyenne Medical and Commerce Park Medical? 13 14 Α Yes. 15 The same owners; right? 16 Α Yes. And yet the rule you just read me, you admitted that 17 18 there was nothing in the law authorizing, told applicants in 19 red letters twice that they couldn't obtain more than one 20 license in a locality, is that correct? 21 Yes, and we didn't. 22 How are they not? 23 Two different applicants. 24 "No applicant may be awarded more than one retail 25 store license in a jurisdiction/locality unless there are less applicants than licenses allowed in the jurisdiction." Will you tell me your interpretation of that is?

A So I think applicant is defined in the application as an entity or individual because you can -- I don't know why anyone would, but you can apply as a sole proprietor. So when I look at this, I see Essence Tropicana versus Essence Henderson is -- are two different entities, two different applicants --

Q I see.

- A -- with common ownership.
- Q So you identified those having duplicate ownership; correct? Is that what that criteria says?
- A For common ownership, yeah, duplicate ownership.
  - Q It says duplicate ownership; right?
- 15 A Yes, that's what it says.
  - Q That what it says, duplicate ownership identified, and it says yes, okay. And you're telling me that the distinction that allows them to get around the rule is that that same -- those same duplicate owners have created different LLCs?
    - A Yeah, they're separate entities.
  - Q Oh. So in order to eat all the licenses up, up to the 10 percent for a monopoly, all anybody had to know was they had to just create different LLCs with the same application, is that right?

MR. GRAF: Objection, Your Honor. Incomplete hypothetical.

THE COURT: Overruled.

MR. GRAF: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE WITNESS: I don't know if they've gone and created them. I know several -- I believe several applicants applied under different entities with the same ownership. Not all got awarded licenses.

#### BY MR. MILLER:

- Q Okay. But other licensees, right, may have applied more than once in a jurisdiction with different proposed physical addresses; correct?
  - A Wait, say that again.
- Q Other proposed licensees that applied multiple times in the same jurisdiction may have provided different proposed physical addresses; correct?
- A May have, yes.
- Q Okay. We heard testimony from Mr. Jolley that he submitted identical applications in this regard. If any of those -- if either Essence or Thrive submitted identical applications that were then evaluated, do you think that rule would have been violated? If the only thing that was creating any distinction in the criteria here was the fact that it was labeled under a separate LLC, do you think that they could have still obtained more than once license in a jurisdiction

or locality?

A I'm not sure I'm getting your question. The applicant is a separate entity. That's what the definition says in the application. Entity slash individual, I believe it says. So ownership interest or ownership is one thing and the entity is another.

Q So an applicant with the same owners -- you have identical applications and lists the same proposed physical address but a different entity name was an LLC, they could get more than one license in that jurisdiction?

THE COURT: You're asking if each of those separate LLCs could receive a separate license?

MR. MILLER: Thank you, Judge. Yes.

THE COURT: All right.

THE WITNESS: Yes.

16 BY MR. MILLER:

Q Do you recall any questions about this rule and how it would be applied?

A No.

Q You don't know how the industry may have been interpreting that rule; right?

A No, I don't.

Q And unlike the regulations that were subject to public workshops and arguably approved before the legislative commission, there would have been no public testimony that we

can look to in order to figure out what his provision means; 1 2 right? 3 Α No. 4 0 You didn't provide any additional guidance anywhere 5 in the application as to how that rule was going to be interpreted or applied; correct? 6 7 I think to me it was clear. It says no -- you No. 8 know, no one applicant. If you looked at -- if you reviewed your application and looked at the definition of applicant, it would be clear that an applicant is an entity or an 10 11 individual. 12 It's clear to you because you wrote it; right? It could be. I mean, you know, some people don't 13 14 read the entire application packet. 15 Okay. I'm going to ask you a series of hypotheticals based off of some slides I've prepared. Some of these are 16 17 familiar. We've used at least one of these in your prior 18 testimony. All right. So if had, for the sake of argument, 19 Dr. Evil's Wellness Center application; right? 20 THE COURT: Where's Mr. Kemp? Okay, because he says 21 this is a classic, so we have to all give him credit. 22 MR. KEMP: I'm paying attention, Your Honor.

I.T. TECHNICIAN: Yeah, sorry. One moment.

MR. MILLER: Did you lose it, Shane?

THE COURT: Mr. Rulis, are you okay?

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### EXHIBIT 4

**Electronically Filed** 7/16/2019 2:23 PM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT

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#### DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

\* \* \* \* \*

SERENITY WELLNESS CENTER LLC, . et al.

Plaintiffs

CASE NO. A-19-786962-B

VS.

STATE OF NEVADA DEPARTMENT OF. DEPT. NO. XI

TAXATION

Transcript of Proceedings

Defendant

BEFORE THE HONORABLE ELIZABETH GONZALEZ, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

#### EVIDENTIARY HEARING - DAY 14

FRIDAY, JULY 12, 2019

COURT RECORDER: TRANSCRIPTION BY:

JILL HAWKINS FLORENCE HOYT

Las Vegas, Nevada 89146 District Court

Proceedings recorded by audio-visual recording, transcript produced by transcription service.

that.

Q I understand you weren't involved, but you drafted the regulations and that's where the authority to impose rules come from, do they not?

A Right. But I wasn't involved in kind of how it was put together and what was in that, so I don't know the thinking behind putting it together this way or any of that. I think it means that you're just notifying people that you're not necessarily entitled to more than one license.

- Q Not necessarily entitled to more than one license? That's the way you interpret that provision?
  - A Uh-huh.
- Q It says, "No applicant may be awarded." That's a strict requirement, isn't it?
  - A Yeah. And so jurisdiction/locality, I guess that would apply to the different jurisdictions within the county.
  - Q So would you interpret that to mean that an applicant could not obtain more than --
  - A Yeah, so like one in Henderson, one in Vegas, one in Clark County, one in North Las Vegas.
  - Q So if you had -- if an applicant with identical ownership structure who had applied for two licenses in unincorporated Clark County, they would only be given one license; right?
- 25 A I think so, yes.

Electronically Filed 3/20/2020 12:06 PM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT

NTC 1 CRAIG D. SLATER, ESQ. 2 Nevada Bar No. 8667 **LUH & ASSOCIATES** 3 8987 W. Flamingo Road, Suite 100 Las Vegas, NV 89147 4 T: (702) 367-8899 F: (702) 384-8899 5 cslater@luhlaw.com CLARK NATURAL MEDICINAL SOLUTIONS LLC, NYE NATURAL MEDICINAL SOLUTIONS LLC, and CLARK NMSD LLC. 7 8 DISTRICT COURT 9 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 10 \* \* \* \* IN RE: D.O.T. LITIGATION **CASE NO.**: A-19-787004-B 11 Consolidated with A-785818 A-786357 12 A-786962 A-787035 13 A-787540 A-787726 14 A-801416 DEPT. NO.: 9 15 16 CLARK NATURAL MEDICINAL SOLUTIONS LLC, NYE NATURAL MEDICINAL 17 SOLUTIONS LLC AND CLARK NMSD LLC'S JOINDER TO MOTIONS FOR PARTIAL **SUMMARY JUDGMENT** 18 COMES NOW, Plaintiff CLARK NATURAL MEDICINAL SOLUTIONS LLC, NYE 19 20 NATURAL MEDICINAL SOLUTIONS LLC, and CLARK NMSD LLC by and through their counsel 21 of record, CRAIG D. SLATER, ESQ. of the law firm LUH & ASSOCIATES, and hereby files this 22 Joinder to Motions for Partial Summary Judgment. Specifically, movants join in the following motions: 23 1.) Qualcan, LLC's Motion for Summary Judgment As To The DOT'S Improper Issuance of 24 Multiple Licenses To A Single Applicant In The Same Jurisdiction – filed on March 13, 25 26 2020.

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2.) ETW Management Group, LLC's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment – filed on March

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13, 2020.

- Nevada Wellness Center, LLC's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Second Claim for Relief – Filed on March 13, 2020
- 4.) Nevada Wellness Center, LLC's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on First Claim for Relief Filed on March 13, 2020

Pursuant to EDCR 2.20(d), the parties designated above incorporate and join the facts and law cited in the motions identified herein as though fully set forth herein. This Joinder is based upon the papers and pleadings on file herein and any oral argument of counsel the Court may entertain at the time of the hearing of this matter.

DATED this 20th day of March, 2020.

#### **LUH & ASSOCIATES**

/s/ Craig D. Slater

CRAIG SLATER, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 8667 8987 W. Flamingo, Suite 100 Las Vegas, NV 89147

Electronically Filed 8/21/2020 4:39 PM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT

A-19-787004-B

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**DISTRICT COURT** 

**CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA** 

Case No.:

Department:

A-19-801416-B

CONSOLIDATED WITH:

A-19-787035-C; A-18-785818-W A-18-786357-W; A-19-786962-B

A-19-787540-W; A-19-787726-C

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DEFENDANT DEEP ROOTS MEDICAL, LLC'S ANSWERING BRIEF IN

OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW

Defendant DEEP ROOTS MEDICAL LLC ("Deep Roots"), by and through its undersigned counsel of record, the law firm of Robertson, Johnson, Miller & Williamson, hereby submits its Answering Brief in Opposition to Petition for Judicial Review. This answering brief is supported by the following memorandum of points and authorities, the papers and pleadings on file herein, and any oral argument that this Court may choose to hear. For the reasons set forth below, the Court should affirm the actions of Nevada Department of Taxation ("DOT") and deny all plaintiffs' petitions for judicial review.

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Robertson, Johnson, Miller & Williamson 50 West Liberty Street, Suite 600 Reno, Nevada 89501

R.App. 0614

Case Number: A-19-787004-B

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Suite 600 Reno, Nevada 89501

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#### **MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES**

#### I. JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

Plaintiffs TGIG, LLC, Nevada Holistic Medicine, LLC, GBS Nevada Partners, Fidelis Holdings, LLC, Gravitas Nevada, Nevada Pure, LLC, Medifarm, LLC, Medifarm IV, LLC, and other remaining plaintiffs (collectively, "Plaintiffs") seek judicial review of the DOT's denial of their recreational marijuana dispensary applications. Yet, this Court does not have jurisdiction over any petition for judicial review because there was no contested case. "Courts have no inherent appellate jurisdiction over official acts of administrative agencies except where the legislature has made some statutory provision for judicial review." Crane v. Cont'l Tel. Co. of California, 105 Nev. 399, 401, 775 P.2d 705, 706 (1989).

Judicial review is reserved for a party to an administrative proceeding that is "aggrieved by a final decision *in a contested case*." NRS 233B.130 (emphasis added). The Nevada Supreme Court, in considering the availability of judicial review for licensing decisions, recently "held that when the statutory scheme governing an administrative proceeding fails to require notice and opportunity for a hearing, the agency's final decision in that proceeding was not made in a contested case and thus was not subject to judicial review." <u>State Dep't of Health & Human Services</u>, <u>Div. of Pub. & Behavioral Health Med. Marijuana Establishment Program v. Samantha Inc.</u> ("<u>Samantha</u>"), 133 Nev. 809, 813, 407 P.3d 327, 330 (2017). Indeed, as the <u>Samantha</u> Court emphasized, the "Legislature codified this interpretation in the context of judicial review of licensing procedures." <u>Id</u>.

NRS 233B.121 to 233B.150 "do not apply to the grant, denial or renewal of a license unless notice and opportunity for hearing are required by law to be provided to the applicant before the grant, denial or renewal of the license." NRS 233B.127. The legislative history of NRS 233B.127 goes on to clarify that "[t]here are some instances where people think once they have been denied a license, they can bring it up to the district court for review. That is simply not the case . . . ." See Minutes of the Meeting of the Assembly Committee on Government Affairs, Seventy-Eighth Session, February 13, 2015 at 17.

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Plaintiffs' Opening Brief in Support of Petition for Judicial Review ("Brief") cites to the Defendant/Intervenor, Clear River, LLC's, Order Denying Its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the Petition for Judicial Review Cause of Action filed November 7, 2019 ("Order") to justify the Court's jurisdiction over any petition for judicial review. (See Brief at 1:3-2:2.)¹ Notwithstanding Plaintiffs' position, however, the application process does not constitute a contested case. The application process did not call for notice and opportunity for a hearing prior to awarding the conditional licenses (or at any time). Therefore, the application process cannot be a "contested case." NRS 233B.032; Samantha, 133 Nev. at 815, 407 P.3d at 331; Private Investigator's Licensing Bd. v. Atherley, 98 Nev. 514, 654 P.2d 1019 (1982).

When an agency's decision is not the result of a contested case, judicial review is unavailable as a remedy for those parties disappointed in the decision. See Atherly, 98 Nev. 514, 654 P.2d 1019 (citing Southwest Gas Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 92 Nev. 48, 546 P.2d 219 (1976)). Accordingly, the Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over the Plaintiffs' petition. See generally Washoe Cty. v. Otto, 128 Nev. 424, 434, 282 P.3d 719, 726–27 (2012) (demonstrating that statutory requirements under the APA pertain to subject matter jurisdiction).<sup>2</sup>

Accordingly, since the Plaintiffs cannot meet the contested case requirement, their petition must be denied and no further inquiry into the Plaintiffs' specious arguments on the merits is necessary. Nevertheless, Deep Roots will also dispose of those arguments below.

#### II. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

- (1) Whether the DOT's grading process for awarding conditional recreational marijuana licenses to applicants constitutes a "contested case" for purposes of NRS 233B, *et seq.*
- (2) If so, whether the DOT's grants and denials of conditional recreational marijuana licenses to applicants, which was based on the rankings resulting from an impartial and numerically-scored competitive bidding process, should now be set aside for some reason.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> The body of Plaintiffs' Brief does not line up with the numbered lines. Deep Roots has used its best judgment to cite to lines within the Brief as accurately as possible.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> A challenge to the Court's subject matter jurisdiction can be raised by the parties at any time, or *sua sponte* by a court of review, and cannot be conferenced by the parties. <u>See Landreth v. Malik</u>, 251 P.3d 163, 166 (2011). Subject matter jurisdiction may never be waived. See Mainor v. Nault, 120 Nev. 750, 101 P.3d 308 (2005).

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#### III. THE ADMINISTRATIVE RECORD AND THE PSUF

A petition for judicial review requires a record of the proceedings below to be transmitted to the reviewing court within a certain timeframe. NRS 233B.131. The record in such a case must include:

- (a) All pleadings, motions and intermediate rulings.
- (b) Evidence received or considered.
- (c) A statement of matters officially noticed.
- (d) Questions and offers of proof and objections, and rulings thereon.
- (e) Proposed findings and exceptions.
- (f) Any decision, opinion or report by the hearing officer presiding at the hearing.

NRS 233B.121(7).

Initially, the party petitioning for judicial review is to "transmit to the reviewing court an original or certified copy of the transcript of the evidence resulting in the final decision of the agency." <u>Id</u>. at 1(a). Subsequently, the agency rendering the decision is to "transmit to the reviewing court the original or a certified copy of the remainder of the record of the proceeding." <u>Id</u>. at 1(b). Virtually none of those things listed above exist (due to the application process not being a contested case in which such documents were necessary or required).

Separately, on May 7, 2020, Plaintiffs unilaterally filed a document entitled Plaintiffs' Statement of Undisputed Facts ("PSUF"). In the PSUF, Plaintiffs alleged 137 purportedly "undisputed" facts, and attach 16 lengthy, but incomplete exhibits to support those claims. (Id.) Plaintiffs offered no indication of the purpose of filing this document. In fact, it appears to be a rogue document. To the extent that Plaintiffs are now attempting to use the PSUF in an effort to supplement the administrative record, satisfy any duties that a plaintiff in a judicial review action may have, or otherwise use the PSUF in support of their claims for judicial review, Deep Roots hereby objects. Nonetheless, in an abundance of caution and without waiving its objections, Deep Roots will address the PSUF herein.

On June 12, 2020, the DOT submitted its Record on Review in Accordance with the Nevada Administrative Procedure Act, including documents showing certain applicants'

Robertson, Johnson, Miller & Williamson 50 West Liberty Street, Suite 600 Reno, Nevada 89501 applications<sup>3</sup>, the scoring sheets, and the tally sheets relating thereto, which are the evidence submitted to facilitate the DOT's decision. On June 26, 2020, the DOT filed a Supplement to Record on Review in Accordance with the Nevada Administrative Procedure Act. The documents contained within these two filings (collectively, the "Record") provides all relevant evidence that resulted in the DOT's final decision. NRS 233B.131(1)(a).

Plaintiffs argue in their Brief that the DOT's Record is insufficient because it fails to include evidence of several alleged wrongdoings. (See Brief at 3-4.) These categories of allegedly omitted documents, however, largely do not relate to the "contested case" which is to be reviewed by the Court. Instead, these categories of additional documents the Plaintiffs want to add include the confidential applications of successful applicants, how DOT determined certain aspects of the applicants would be scored, various communications between the DOT and some parties, and other documents. (See generally, id.) This information is irrelevant to the supposed "contested case" at issue: the actual scoring of Plaintiffs' applications and subsequent ranking thereof. Indeed, Plaintiffs state the issue in their Brief as "[w]hether the [DOT]'s decisions on granting and denying applications for conditional licenses under NRS Chapter 453D should be set aside." (Brief at 2.) Plaintiffs' own statement of the issue herein is limited to only the actual scoring of the applications and ranking thereof – not the process by which the DOT determined the application's contents, scoring criteria, or pre-deadline communications with applicants. (Id.)

The DOT relied upon the submitted applications when it scored the applications and ranked them according to NRS 453D.210(6). Accordingly – at most – only those applications and the scoresheets created based thereon would be relevant to the claims for judicial review. The Record produced by the DOT consists of various parties' applications for the conditional

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> According to the DOT, a great number of applications were excluded from the Record because the various parties did not agree to release these otherwise confidential documents.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> By mentioning the "contested case," those documents related thereto, and other aspects thereof, Deep Roots does not concede there was a "contested case." For ease of reading, Deep Roots will not qualify each and every mention of the "contested case."

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2.7 28 licenses, the scoring sheets for all applications, and the tally sheets for all applications. (See generally, Record.) Thus, the DOT's Record is the entire record on review.

If there was in fact a contested case – which there is not – Plaintiffs' Brief should only be considered to the extent the factual assertions therein are supported by the Record. NRS 233B.135(1)(b) ("Judicial review of a final decision of an agency must be . . . [c]onfined to the record."); NRAP 28(e)(1) ("every assertion in briefs regarding matters in the record shall be supported by a reference to the page and volume number, if any, of the appendix where the matter relied on is to be found."). Plaintiffs' Brief does not cite to the Record even once. Plaintiffs discuss briefly why the Record is insufficient, and argue the PSUF should be considered a supplement thereto. (See Brief at 2:16-5:8.) Plaintiffs' argument is futile because NRS 233B.135(1) explicitly limits when the record may be supplemented: only "in cases concerning alleged irregularities in procedure." Plaintiffs claim their PSUF is submitted "concerning alleged irregularities with the DOT's processes and procedures"; however, there can be no irregularities since there is no contested case and right to a hearing. (Brief at 5:5-8.)

Further, the PSUF concerns significantly more than the alleged irregularities, and, indeed, is the *only* record upon which Plaintiffs' Brief is based, despite numerous instances where the Record could provide evidentiary support (or, as is more often true, show a lack thereof). The PSUF is based upon evidence obtained after the petition was filed with this Court, and in some cases is not based on any evidence at all. (See, e.g., PSUF at ¶¶ 46 ("Kleuver citation to be supplied"), 60 ("Citations to be supplied"), 111 ("Gilbert citation to be supplied").) The PSUF lists 137 facts which Plaintiffs characterize as undisputed, but which the parties have always disputed. Deep Roots and the other defendants have always and do still dispute many of the alleged "facts" put forth in the PSUF.

The PSUF is also inappropriate because, according to the Court's Trial Protocol issued March 13, 2020, Plaintiffs' Brief was originally due on March 27, 2020. If Plaintiffs were unable to file their Brief at that time due to the DOT not filing the Record until June 13, 2020, Plaintiffs should have made the Court aware of this at that time. Alternatively, Plaintiffs could have proffered their PSUF under NRS 233B.131(1) prior to March 27, 2020. Yet, the Plaintiffs

did none of those things and did not even disclose the purpose for which they were filing their PSUF. Accordingly, the PSUF is improper and should not be considered.

Accordingly, Plaintiffs should not be allowed to rely upon their untimely and inappropriate PSUF to support any factual allegations made in their Brief. NRS 233B.135(1)(b).

Finally, but most importantly, the Court has since denied the Plaintiffs' motion to supplement the record. (See Minute Order dated August 14, 2020, filed and served on August 17, 2020, at 2.) Therefore, the PSUF is entirely inappropriate and should be stricken.

#### IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND BRIEF OF THE FACTS

In 2016, the legalization of recreational marijuana came before Nevada voters in the form of a ballot question. Voters approved the ballot question and the text thereof was codified as NRS 453D. Among other things, the newly codified statutes provided the process by which recreational marijuana licenses, which were limited, were to be awarded. To facilitate the distribution of these licenses, DOT created an application form and made the same available to the public in July 2018. DOT accepted applications from September 7, 2018 until September 20, 2018. In total, 463 applications were submitted to DOT to obtain 61 conditional recreational marijuana licenses. (Record at Part 22, p. 531.)

After each application was considered, assigned a score by six third-party graders, and then ranked by score within jurisdictions for which the applicant applied, DOT awarded the available licenses to the top-scoring applicants in each jurisdiction. Each of the Defendants are among those applicants who received the highest scores on their applications within certain jurisdictions, thereby earning a conditional license. (See generally, Record Part 72 (showing ranking within jurisdiction on final score sheets).) The Plaintiffs are among those applicants who did not receive sufficiently high scores to win a conditional license within a jurisdiction. (Id.; Brief at 6:24-26.)

Upon notice that their applications had not scored high enough to receive an available license, at least one Plaintiff submitted a request for reconsideration to the DOT. (Record at Part 22, 507-511.) DOT rejected this request as no appeal procedure of the scoring, ranking, and ultimate awarding of the conditional licenses was included in NRS 453D. (Id. at 506.)

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STANDARD OF REVIEW

in trial on Plaintiffs' other claims for approximately one week.

"Courts have no inherent appellate jurisdiction over official acts of administrative agencies." Fitzpatrick v. State ex rel., Dept. of Commerce, Ins. Div., 107 Nev. 486, 488, 813 P.2d 1004 (1991) (citing Crane, 105 Nev. 399, 775 P.2d 705). This appellate jurisdiction will only arise where the legislature has created statutory authority for the judicial review. Id. The statutory framework provides that judicial review is only available for a party who is "(a) [i]dentified as a party of record by an agency in an administrative proceeding; and (b) [a]ggrieved by a final decision in a contested case." NRS 233B.130(1). A contested case is "a proceeding . . . in which the legal rights, duties or privileges of a party are required by law to be determined by an agency after an opportunity for hearing, or in which an administrative penalty may be imposed." NRS 233B.032. Judicial review of an agency's final decision must be confined to the record. NRS 233B.135(1)(b).

Thereafter, Plaintiffs filed their complaints, which included claims for judicial review,

declaratory judgment, writ of mandate, and injunctive relief. Based on these additional causes of

action, the parties have engaged in substantial discovery, resulting in thousands of documents

produced and numerous depositions taken. At the time the Brief was filed, all parties had been

"The court [may] not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of evidence on a question of fact," but the agency's action may be set aside if the decision violated constitutional or statutory provisions, exceeded the agency's statutory authority, was made upon unlawful procedure, was affected by error of law, was clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record, or was arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion. NRS 233B.135(3). Agency action is only considered arbitrary or capricious if the agency relied on facts a state legislature did not intend the agency consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the issue at hand, offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before an agency, or issued a decision so implausible it could not be ascribed to a difference in view of the product of agency

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expertise. Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass'n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983).

The Nevada Supreme Court has "previously accepted the definitions of arbitrary and capricious, respectively, as 'baseless' or 'despotic' and 'a sudden turn of mind without apparent motive; a freak, whim, mere fancy." City of Reno v. Estate of Wells, 110 Nev. 1218, 1222, 885 P.2d 545, 548 (1994) (quoting City Council v. Irvine, 102 Nev. 277, 278-79, 721 P.2d 371, 372 (1986)). The court has also noted "the essence of the abuse of discretion of the arbitrariness or capriciousness of government action . . . is most often found in an apparent absence of any grounds or reason for the decision," or in other words, "[w]e did it just because we did it." Tighe v. Von Georken, 108 Nev. 440, 442-43, 883 P.2d 1135, 1136 (1992) (quoting Irvine, 102 Nev. at 280, 721 P.2d at 372.)

#### VI. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

Most critically, this Court cannot consider Plaintiffs' claims for judicial review without the requisite subject matter jurisdiction. See Otto, 128 Nev. at 431, 282 P.3d at 725 ("only those decisions falling within the [Administrative Proceeding Act]'s terms and challenged according to the APA's procedures invoke the district court's jurisdiction."). Under the APA, a court only has jurisdiction over a petition for judicial review if the petition derives from a "contested case." NRS 233B.130(1)(b). The Nevada Supreme Court *recently* considered whether the denial of a license relating to marijuana is a "contested case" under almost identical facts and found in the negative. See Samantha, 133 Nev. at 815-816, 407 P.3d at 332. There, the court held, "a disappointed applicant for a medical marijuana establishment registration certificate does not have a right to judicial review under the APA." Id. Samantha is critically on point and cannot be meaningfully distinguished in any way from the case at hand. Thus, because here, as in Samantha, the application process to obtain a license relating to the sale of marijuana does not constitute a "contested case" under NRS 233B.032's "plain language," the Court lacks authority and jurisdiction to consider Plaintiffs' claims for judicial review. Id. at 814, 407 P.3d at 331. This mandates the denial of the petition and ends the propriety of any further inquiry into the Plaintiffs' petition. The Court should summarily deny it accordingly.

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Furthermore, even if Plaintiffs' petition was proper and derived from a contested case, Plaintiffs' substantive arguments therein must also fail. Plaintiffs argue the DOT acted arbitrarily and capriciously or abused its discretion by interpreting the background check requirement to mean only those persons who were board members, directors, and owners of five percent or more of the applicant entities; by irregularly hiring and training the third parties who graded the applications; by engaging in favoritism and selectively sharing information with applicants; by disregarding the physical location of the applicants; by revising a section of the application without following certain procedures; and by disregarding the applicants' compliance with laws. (Brief at 9:9-12:18.) The Record produced by DOT – and even the PSUF produced by Plaintiffs – do not provide evidentiary support of any of these allegedly arbitrary and capricious actions. Further, evidence at trial has shown that the Plaintiffs were just as, if not more so, engaged in the very conduct they claim rendered the DOT's decisions arbitrary and Thus, even if the Court were to consider Plaintiffs' hypocritical substantive capricious. arguments, their petition must be denied. Indeed, as reflected in previous briefing, the Plaintiffs should be judicially estopped from making such arguments.

#### VII. ARGUMENT

A. <u>Samantha</u> Dictates that the Denial of Plaintiffs' Applications for Conditional

<u>Licenses Is Not a "Contested Case" Subject to Judicial Review</u>

As the Nevada Supreme Court's holding in <u>Samantha</u> has made clear, judicial review is not available to Plaintiffs because the DOT's process for awarding conditional licenses to sell recreational marijuana was not a "contested case." Plaintiffs may attempt to argue that the *scoring* of their applications can be a subject of judicial review even if other aspects of the application process cannot. Yet, the <u>Samantha</u> court does not allow for any such parsing of its holding. <u>See Samantha</u>, 133 Nev. at 815, 407 P.3d at 331 ("The statutory and regulatory provisions governing medical marijuana establishments do not envision any form of hearing regarding the Department's *decisions reviewing and ranking registration certificate applications*" (emphasis added)). On a practical note, the scoring of Plaintiffs' applications is certainly a part of the "application process." Plaintiffs cannot designate the entire process of

applying for the licenses as ineligible for judicial review, but piecemeal out a single step of the process, *i.e.*, the scoring, and argue it is indeed eligible for judicial review. This argument is similarly fallible and legally untenable because Plaintiffs' arguments within their complaint and the Brief relate primarily to portions of the process besides the scoring. (See generally, Brief.)

NRS 233B.121 to 233B.150 "do not apply to the grant, denial or renewal of a license *unless notice and opportunity for hearing are required by law to be provided* to the applicant before the grant, denial or renewal of the license." NRS 233B.127 (emphasis supplied); see also Atherley, 98 Nev. at 515, 654 P.2d at 1020. Accordingly, "the APA only provides for judicial review under NRS 233B.130 of final agency decisions in contested cases," and necessarily limits the "availability of judicial review for exercises of agency authority" which "is well-established as legislative prerogative." Samantha, 133 Nev. at 814, 407 P.3d at 330.

A thorough review of the legislative history of this statute also indisputably supports the conclusion that this Court does not have jurisdiction over any of the Plaintiffs' claims for judicial review. Namely, during the presentation of Assembly Bill 53, which later became NRS 233B.127, the Attorney General's office provided an example of when judicial review was not available. See Minutes of the Meeting of the Assembly Committee on Government Affairs, Seventy-Eighth Session, February 13, 2015 at pp. 14-31. This example depicts almost exactly the situation which has arisen here:

[NRS] 233B.010 through NRS 233B.150 is the Nevada Administrative Procedure Act. What that means is all of those provisions regarding the procedures at a district court level for the petitions for judicial review are not applicable to a situation where a board has granted, denied, or renewed a license. If I applied for a license from a board and it was denied due to a lack of experience to satisfy what the statute required, I have lost my application fee, and I do not have a license. I now cannot file a petition for judicial review and have a district court review that decision because it is not a contested case.

<u>Id.</u> at 18-19 (emphasis added). Indeed, in this case, the Plaintiffs and other unsuccessful applicants applied for conditional licenses from the DOT and those applications were denied due to various shortcomings in their applications. (<u>See</u> Record at Vol. 72.) Accordingly, because "it is only staff denying [the] license, [Plaintiffs are] not allowed to file a petition." <u>See</u> Minutes of

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the Meeting of the Assembly Committee on Government Affairs, Seventy-Eighth Session, February 13, 2015 at 19.

In fact, the regulations only allow judicial review in the very limited context of disciplinary hearings. See generally NAC 453D.900-453D.996. But, neither NRS 453D nor NAC 453D allow for judicial review in any other context. Certainly, both the legislature and the DOT know how to grant a right to judicial review. Therefore, the lack of judicial review in this context is no accident. Consistent with this intentional omission and the holding in Samantha, Plaintiffs have no right to seek judicial review of the DOT's denial of their applications for conditional licenses. "A disappointed applicant for a medical marijuana establishment registration certificate does not have a right to judicial review." Samantha, 133 Nev. at 815-16, 407 P.3d at 332.

If there is no statutory right to judicial review, a truly harmed party might be able to seek redress through mandamus, declaratory relief, or injunctive relief, if warranted. Samantha, 133 Nev. at 812, 816, 407 P.3d at 329, 332. But there is no dispute that a claim for judicial review is inappropriate and must be denied. Id. at 133 Nev. at 813, 407 P.3d at 330.

In Samantha, the court addressed the statutory scheme providing for medical marijuana registration certificates which allow holders to sell medical marijuana, among other things. Here, the Court is reviewing a decision relating to recreational marijuana conditional licenses, which allow holders to sell recreational marijuana, among other things. This single difference of medical marijuana versus recreational marijuana is insufficient to render Samantha noninstructive or non-binding. The Samantha court found the process by which the registration certificates were awarded was not a contested case because the statutes did not include any provision calling for judicial review. Samantha, 133 Nev. at 815, 407 P.3d at 331 (discussing NRS 453A and NAC 453A). This was primarily because the legislature, when enacting the applicable statutes in Samantha, did not address "such matters as notice and the opportunity to be heard, see NRS 233B.121(1) & (2), the creation of a reviewable record, see NRS 233.121(7), the issuance of a final agency decision, see NRS 233B.125, and the parties required to be included as respondents in district court, see NRS 233B.130(2)." Samantha, 133 Nev. at 815, 407 P.3d at

332. Similar to the legislature's decision to not consider these factors with respect to medical marijuana registration certificates, the legislature also did not consider or include these factors with respect to recreational marijuana licenses. See generally NRS 453D, et seq. Without these required elements of a "contested case," the process by which DOT accepted applications for recreational marijuana licenses, scored those applications, ranked the scored applications, and ultimately awarded the licenses cannot be considered a "contested case." NRS 233B.130(1), 233B.032.

The notice and opportunity to be heard requirement for a contested case may be fulfilled quite simply – which makes the lack thereof in this process all the more glaring. The Ninth Circuit, for example, has held that providing written notice of a proposed action (such as a revocation of a license) and a subsequent informal conference is sufficient to satisfy this requirement of notice and opportunity to be heard. Gilbert v. National Transp. Safety Bd., 80 F.3d 364, 367 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing Reid v. Engen, 765 F.2d 1457, 1463 (9th Cir. 1985); Greenwood v. FAA, 28 F.3d 971, 975 (9th Cir. 1994). Nothing in NRS 453D, however, required the DOT to issue any sort of notice to the applicants prior to awarding the licenses or to provide the applicants an opportunity to be heard on the proposed actions.

Furthermore, an application process does not generate the type of record that is amenable to judicial review. "When you do not have a hearing because staff denied the license, there are no transcripts or records." See Minutes of the Meeting of the Assembly Committee on Government Affairs, Seventy-Eighth Session, February 13, 2015 at 19. A record upon which a district court will consider a petition for judicial review "must include" pleadings, motions, and interim rulings made by the agency; evidence received or otherwise considered; statements of officially noticed matters; questions and offers of proof and objections, as well as rulings thereon; proposed findings and exceptions; and any decisions, opinions, or reports by the hearing officer who presides over the hearing. NRS 233B.121(7)(a)-(f). Upon a review of the Record produced by DOT (and the PSUF produced by Plaintiffs), only one of these categories of documents *may* be satisfied: evidence received and considered by DOT. Because no actual hearing was mandated to occur, nor did one occur, a significant portion of a required record

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simply does not exist. Thus, there was no reviewable record created during the DOT's application process from which this Court could conduct a judicial review.

At the end of a required hearing, after a reviewable record has been created, a final agency decision must be issued in order to create a proceeding which can be judicially reviewed. A final agency decision is one possessing four qualities: "(1) it is supported by a reviewable administrative record, (2) it is a definitive statement of the agency's position, (3) it has a direct and immediate effect on the day-to-day business on the party asserting wrongdoing, and (4) it envisions immediate compliance with the order's terms." MacLean v. Department of Homeland Sec., 543 F.3d 1145, 1149, 28 IER Cases 491 (9th Cir. 2008). The letter each of the Plaintiffs received from DOT informing them their applications had not scored highly enough to earn a conditional license is an agency decision, but not a "final agency decision" for purposes of judicial review. (See, e.g., Record at Part 22, p. 540 (form denial letter to Plaintiff Livfree Wellness, LLC).)

This letter cannot be considered a "final agency decision" sufficient to warrant judicial review by this Court. As discussed above, there is no reviewable administrative record, and the decision cannot be supported by a non-existent record (although those documents reviewed and produced certainly support the DOT's decision). The letter does not have a "direct and immediate effect on the day-to-day business" of Plaintiffs as Plaintiffs were simply not awarded licenses to expand their businesses. Their existing businesses, and day-to-day operations, were not altered by the Plaintiffs' failure to win a conditional recreational license.<sup>5</sup> Thus, this letter, while a definitive statement of the agency's position (that Plaintiffs' applications did not score high enough to earn a conditional license), is not a final agency decision due to the lack of administrative record and effect on Plaintiffs' day-to-day business.

The final requirement the Samantha court believed the legislature would have included in NRS 453A had it desired judicial review to be available for those unsuccessful applicants is the inclusion of the parties required to be named as respondents in a petition for judicial review.

Plaintiffs state they "were already operating licensed recreational retail marijuana stores" at the time the application process was taking place. (See Brief at 6:19-24.)

abundantly clear following the motion practice with respect to whether Plaintiffs were required to name each and every applicant in their petition. (See briefing on Clear River, LLC's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the Cause of Action for Petition for Judicial Review and Order (on file).) Courts should infer such omissions are purposeful under the construction canon expressio unius est exclusion alterius. Samantha, 133 Nev. at 815, 407 P.3d at 331 (citing 2A Normal J. Singer & Shambie Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction § 47.23 (7th ed. 2014)).

Because the application process – including the scoring of all applications – did not call

Samantha, 133 at 815, 407 P.3d at 331. This is entirely omitted from NRS 453D as is

Because the application process – including the scoring of all applications – did not call for notice and opportunity for a hearing prior to awarding the conditional licenses, did not create a reviewable record, did not result in an issuance of a final decision by the DOT, and did not address which parties were to be included as respondents in a petition for judicial review, there is no "contested case" for purposes of judicial review. NRS 233B.121(1); Samantha, 133 Nev. at 815, 407 P.3d at 331; Atherley, 98 Nev. at 515, 654 P.2d at 1019-20. When an agency's decision is not a contested case, judicial review is unavailable as a remedy for those parties to whom the decision is unfavorable. Atherley, 98 Nev. at 515, 654 P.2d at 1020 (citing Southwest Gas Corp., 92 Nev. 48, 546 P.2d 219 (1976)). Thus, Plaintiffs' petition must be denied as a matter of law.

#### B. No Facts Support Plaintiffs' Substantive Allegations in the Petition and Brief

Despite their best efforts, Plaintiffs have failed to show that the application process was fatally flawed. To the contrary, the highly-qualified graders carried out a lengthy, in-depth, and more than sufficient scoring process. <sup>6</sup> As a result, the application process satisfied the statutory requirement for a competitive and impartial scoring process and certainly was not carried out in an arbitrary and capricious manner.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> Judicial review under NRS 233B is to be restricted to the Record. NRS 233B.135(1)(b). Moreover, the Court has denied the Plaintiffs' motion to expand the record or add extraneous evidence. (See Minute Order dated August 14, 2020, filed and served on August 17, 2020, at 2.) Plaintiffs, however, cite to a huge amount of evidence outside the Record. (See PSUF.) To the extent that the Court considers any extraneous evidence or in the event that the Plaintiffs are later allowed to rely on any extraneous evidence, Deep Roots requests leave to provide counter-designations of additional evidence. Regardless, the Court need not consider the Record or any extraneous evidence since under Samantha and other controlling law, the Court should deny all claims for judicial review in this case.

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#### i. Owner Background Checks

Plaintiffs first contend DOT acted arbitrarily and capriciously when it decided background checks would only be conducted on those owners owning more than five percent of the entity applying for a conditional license. (Brief at 12:21-24.) NRS 453D.200(6) provides the DOT will conduct background checks of "each prospective owner, officer, and board member" of an applicant. NAC 453D.255(1), on the other hand, calls for background checks on all officers and board members, and only those owners "with an aggregate ownership interest of 5 percent or more" in the applicant entity. Plaintiffs argue this subsequent administrative rule was "arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of the DOT's discretion, and is fatal to the application process." (Brief at 14:24-27.)

First, there is no doubt that all parties knew of and accepted the regulations and application process now under attack. The regulations were subjected to a rigorous drafting and review process, which included meetings that were open to the public, during which there was no public dissent to the proposed five percent rule.

In addition, every plaintiff was aware of the regulations they now profess to attack. Upon receiving the applications in July 2018, neither Plaintiffs nor any of the other plaintiffs in this consolidated case challenged or lodged an objection as to the form or requirements of either the original, July 6, 2018 version of the application or the slightly-updated copy of the application issued on July 31, 2018 (collectively, the "Application"). To be sure, many Plaintiffs and some defendants apparently sought guidance from the DOT, but none of the Plaintiffs challenged the propriety of the application requirements – until they lost.

Plaintiffs first argue this decision by the DOT to implement NAC 453D.255(1) was arbitrary and capricious. (Brief at 14:22-27.) The arbitrary and capricious standard is "principally concerned with ensuring that the agency has examined the relevant data and articulated a satisfactory explanation for its action . . . ." Sierra Club v. U.S. E.P.A., 774 F.3d

 $<sup>^{7}</sup>$  It is important to note that Deep Roots complied with NRS 453D.200(6) and supplied information for a background check for "each prospective owner, officer, and board member of a marijuana establishment license applicant."

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383, 393 (7th Cir. 2014). The explanation should show "a rational connection between the facts found and the choice made, that the agency's condition was based on a consideration of the relevant factors, and that the agency has made no clear error of judgment." Id. This standard of review is narrow. National Parks Conservation Association v. Jewell, 62 F. Supp. 3d 7 (D.D.C. 2014).

"[S]olely being dissatisfied does not demonstrate the [DOT]'s decision was arbitrary and capricious." Mt. St. Helens Mining and Recovery Ltd. Partnership v. U.S., 384 F.3d 721, 730 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding an agency's reliance upon an appraisal which challenging party argued was based on the wrong date did not render agency's decision arbitrary and capricious). Thus, without more, Plaintiffs' argument that DOT's action in interpreting and implementing the five percent rule was arbitrary and capricious must fail.

To the extent Plaintiffs argue the DOT's five percent rule does not clear the rational basis test (Brief at 13:11), NAC 453D.255 is absolutely "rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose." Hamm v. Arrowcreek Homeowners' Assn., 124 Nev. 290, 301, 183 P.3d 895, 903 (2008). The rule attempts to appropriately balance the needs and interests of consumers, non-consumers, local governments, and the industry through efficient and effective regulation that is not unduly burdensome.

This rule is also consistent with other industries. To that end, both the administrative provision for medical marijuana (NAC 453A.302), the statutory provision for gaming (NRS 463.569), and now the statutory provision for recreational marijuana (NRS 678B.350) abide by a similar "5 percent ownership" rule, making plain that NAC 453D.255 was rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose; that is, being responsive to consumer, non-consumer, and governmental needs and issues, while simultaneously providing a rational rule that is reasonable and not overly burdensome on either applicants or the state agency.

Most importantly, any infirmities with the application of the five percent ownership rule with regard to any specific applications should not undermine the entire licensing process. The five percent ownership rule did not alter the scores in any way, and so did not harm the Plaintiffs or affect the rankings.

#### ii. Training and Hiring of Graders

Plaintiffs further argue the DOT acted arbitrarily and capriciously in its hiring and training of the application graders. Plaintiffs summarize their argument by stating that the "grading on wholesale subjectivity, rather than based upon an objective methodology, is the definition of arbitrary and capricious conduct and does not otherwise comply with NRS 453D.210(6)'s impartiality requirement." (Brief at 17:10-12.) This overgeneralized statement is both legally baseless and unsupported by any evidentiary support. Plaintiffs cite to selective excerpts of deposition transcripts in their PSUF, but nothing in the actual Record.<sup>8</sup>

Moreover, while Plaintiffs may disagree with the methodology, there is no doubt that the DOT and the graders followed clear and consistent scoring rubrics. Thus, their ultimate determinations cannot be classified as "baseless," "despotic," or "a sudden turn of mind without apparent motive." <u>Irvine</u>, 102 Nev. at 278-79, 721 P.2d at 372. Rather, their decisions were rational, based upon sound and reasonable logic, and fair to the applicants.

#### iii. Applicant Access (Favoritism or Corruption)

Plaintiffs' next argument claims the DOT acted arbitrarily and capriciously by acting in a way that benefitted "those applicants who had a relationship with Mr. [Jorge] Pupo and his staff." (Brief at 19:2-3.) To support their argument, Plaintiffs list ten "facts" with citations to their PSUF (which in many cases egregiously misrepresents the evidence cited), and then concludes these actions were arbitrary and capricious. (Id.) Plaintiffs fail to draw any connections between the alleged favoritism or corruption and their claim that the DOT acted arbitrarily and capriciously in the process by which the conditional licenses were awarded. Plaintiffs similarly fail to cite to any evidence which actually shows the actions claimed to be favoritism or corruption. Plaintiffs' half-baked argument must therefore be rejected.

Plaintiffs' first "fact" relates to "repeated" correspondence between Mr. Pupo and Ms. Amanda Connor. (Brief at 17:28-29.) Plaintiffs cite their PSUF to support this "favoritism and

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> Again, judicial review under NRS 233B is to be restricted to the Record. NRS 233B.135(1)(b). If the Court is inclined to consider any portion of the PSUF, then it should first grant Defendants leave to provide counter-designations of additional evidence.

corruption." (Id. (citing PSUF at ¶ 60).) However, Plaintiffs' PSUF at ¶ 60 states those "citations" supporting this statement "are to be supplied." Deep Roots is unaware of any supplemental citation provided by Plaintiffs. Instead, Plaintiffs have not only completely disregarded the statutory requirement that their petition is to be restricted to the Record, but in attempting to supplement the Record, they also fail to provide evidence supporting this statement. Plaintiffs' inflammatory accusation against the DOT (and Ms. Connor) must be disregarded entirely by the Court as no citations have been provided to support the statement. Allianz Ins. Co. v. Gagnon, 109 Nev. 990, 860 P.2d 720 (1993) (holding the court need not consider appellant's contentions when appellant's opening brief fails to cite to the record). Further, trial has shown the Plaintiffs to be hypocrites – engaging in the same conduct they repeatedly claim justifies their claims.

Plaintiffs' second fact, that Mr. Pupo allegedly met with representatives of an applicant outside of the DOT for four dinners and one coffee, is similarly not based in fact. (See Brief at 18:1-3.) Again, Plaintiffs cite to their PSUF, which in turn cites to evidence outside the Record. (Id.; PSUF at ¶¶ 61, 109.) Although Plaintiffs put forth two separate statements in the PSUF as supporting this fact, each statement is identical and provides identical citations. (See PSUF at ¶¶ 61, 109.) The cited transcript provides Mr. Pupo was *invited* to two dinners and two lunches with Ms. Connor, who represented some of the applicants. (PSUF Ex. 2, 6/20/19 Transcript at 61:10-64:25.) One such dinner included Ms. Connor's husband; one dinner was skipped by Mr. Pupo; one lunch Mr. Pupo could not recall; and the second lunch included the owner of Thrive. (Id.) This testimony does not show four dinners nor any coffee meetings with any person, let alone support Plaintiffs' claim that four dinners and one coffee meeting took place with the same

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> Each and every assertion in Plaintiffs' Brief "regarding matters in the record shall be supported by a reference." NRAP 28(e)(1). Plaintiffs have cited their PSUF to support these facts, which in turn cites to evidence. In this case, however, Plaintiffs' citation to their PSUF is wholly unsupported by citations to evidence. Instead, their PSUF indicates such citations are forthcoming. To date, no such citations have been produced. Plaintiffs are thus in violation of NRAP 28(e)(1).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> At none of these events did Mr. Pupo discuss the application with Ms. Connor. (PSUF Ex. 2, 6/20/19 Transcript at 61:10-64:25.)

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person. (Id.) Plaintiffs' second fact to support their allegations of favoritism and corruption also fails to find any support in the PSUF and certainly has no support in the Record.

Plaintiffs' eighth fact is similar: it alleges Mr. Steve Gilbert of DOT had four dinner meetings and one coffee meeting with a representative of Essence. (Brief at 18:14-19.) Plaintiffs again cite to their PSUF to support this allegation. (Id. (citing PSUF ¶ 111).) Like the misrepresented support for their first factual allegation, Plaintiffs here cite to a PSUF which states the "citation [is] to be supplied." (PSUF at ¶ 111.) This abject failure to cite any factual support for their allegations must be fatal to Plaintiffs' argument to this extent.

Plaintiffs' sixth fact relating to Mr. Pupo allegedly only sharing information regarding the physical location requirement with "select applicants" is similarly rooted in fiction. (Brief at 18: 10-12.) This fact cites to the PSUF, which in turn cites to the same report of invitations to dinners and lunches with Ms. Connor as the second fact discussed above. (PSUF ¶ 50 (citing 6/20/19 Transcript at 61:10-64:25).) Notably, Mr. Pupo was asked whether he discussed the application with the meeting attendees after being asked to the meetings. (Id.) Mr. Pupo affirmatively stated the application was not discussed. (See id. at 61:24-65:3; 64:7-10.) Thus Plaintiffs' citations to these transcripts are wholly misplaced as the cited evidence fundamentally disagrees with the claims Plaintiffs make.

Even more important than the disproven "facts" Plaintiffs put forth is that there was zero contact between any applicant (or their representatives) and the graders who scored the applications, and who would thus have been most likely to alter the outcome based on improper influence.

The DOT brought in outside graders specifically to ensure they would be impartial. And, to the extent Plaintiffs argue some applicants' contact with the DOT was unfair, all recreational marijuana applicants appear to have had equal access to the DOT leading up to the September 2018 application period, meaning there was no favoritism. (See PSUF Ex. 1, Steve Gilbert 30(b)(6) Deposition Transcript ("Gilbert Depo.") at 50:11-24, 51:17-53:23, 56:19-22, 170:8-20.) The DOT's apparent "open door" policy makes clear that all applicants were treated similarly,

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thereby disproving Plaintiffs' claims of favoritism. There was thus no arbitrary or capricious favoritism or corruption in the application process.

#### Incomplete Applications iv.

Plaintiffs make a confident proclamation that the "[e]vidence clearly demonstrates the DOT failed to comply with NAC 453.272(1)," which calls for DOT to ensure each application is complete and in compliance upon receipt. (Brief at 19:13-15.) Once again, the evidence does no such thing. By virtue of Plaintiffs' very word choice, this allegation should certainly have been based on the record which was produced by DOT, which would show whether those applications accepted by DOT were indeed complete and in compliance. (See, e.g., Record at Parts 61-64 (showing TGIG's various applications in redacted form).) Notably, Plaintiffs do not even argue or otherwise state their own applications were complete upon submission to the DOT. (See id.) Plaintiffs base their flimsy factual support for this argument on their PSUF which, again, misrepresents the cited evidence. (Brief at 19:9-20:7; PSUF at ¶ 21.)

Plaintiffs also seem to be not entirely convinced of their argument, as they state, after citing two paragraphs in their PSUF, that "[t]he record demonstrates that in evaluating whether an application was 'complete and in compliance' the DOT made no effort to verify owners, officers, or board members." (Brief at 19:28-20:2.) This is confounding because, on the one hand, Plaintiffs argue the DOT acted arbitrarily and capriciously in failing to "determine applications were 'complete and incompliance' [sic]," but on the other hand, argue that the DOT, while actively evaluating whether an application was complete and in compliance, failed to consider certain things. (Id. at 19:28-20:2.) These two statements are directly opposed and both cannot be true; however, Plaintiffs argue both in their Brief. (<u>Id.</u>) As Plaintiffs are apparently not wholly convinced of their argument, neither should the Court be so convinced. Instead, this argument must be denied because there is no credible evidence which supports any conclusion the DOT acted arbitrarily and capriciously with respect to the completeness of the applications.

#### Physical Address v.

Plaintiffs' next argument appears to be that the DOT acted arbitrarily and capriciously when it interpreted the physical location requirement contained in NRS 453D.255(5)(b). (Brief

at 20:8-12.) Plaintiffs argue this is because the DOT accepted and ranked applications which did not disclose the physical location of the proposed dispensary. (Id. at 20:20-22 (citing PSUF ¶ 106).) Tellingly, Plaintiffs again omit any citation to the Record evidencing the DOT's acceptance and ranking of applications which did not disclose such a location. The Record contains multiple applications from about 12 applicants. (See generally Record (where one application is so completely redacted, it is unclear whether it is one application or more).) Certainly, Plaintiffs could and should have found such an incomplete application therein to support this argument.

Plaintiffs further argue that DOT's revision of the language in the application with respect to the physical location was an adoption of a "regulation" by the DOT, which required adherence to NRS 233B. (Id. at 21:1-8.) Plaintiffs fail to explain just how this application, and subsequent amendment thereto, was a "regulation" under NRS 233B.038. (See id.) Furthermore, Plaintiffs also fail to explain how or why this amendment to the application was arbitrary or capricious. Without this reasoning, Deep Roots cannot adequately respond because the truth is clear and simple: the application and revision thereto were not "regulations" under NRS 233B.038 and thus did not require adherence to any specific procedures prior to distribution.

Moreover, each of the Plaintiffs knew about this "change" and had access to the Application several weeks *prior* to the Application process, yet failed to attack it until *after* the Application process was completed and they learned they were not awarded any conditional licenses. (See PSUF Ex. 1, Gilbert Depo. at 47:22-49:7; 58:2-11 (explaining that the later, revised version of the application as of July 31, 2018, along with the official announcement thereof, was available to every applicant on the LISTSERV website).) This invokes the doctrines of invited error, laches, estoppel, and waiver, all of which warrant the immediate denial of the entire argument regarding physical locations. Norgart v. Upjohn Co., 981 P.2d 79, 92 (Cal. 1999); Catholic Hous. Servs., Inc. v. State Dep't of Soc. & Rehab. Servs., 886 P.2d 835, 840 (Kan. 1994); accord Humbert/Birch Creek Const. v. Walla Walla Cty., 185 P.3d 660, 663 (Wash. Ct. App. 2008).

As explained in the July 31, 2018 Official Announcement about the *minor* changes to the Application, the second "box" on Attachment A on page 21 went from "Marijuana Establishment's Proposed Physical Address (this must be a Nevada address and cannot be a P.O. box)" in the original Application form, to "Marijuana Establishment's proposed physical address *if the applicant owns property or has secured a lease or other property agreement* (this must be a Nevada address and cannot be a P.O. box)." (Compare Supp. Record at P00772 with Supp. Record at DOT 021474 (emphasis added); see also Supp. Record at DOT021453.)

As explained by Mr. Gilbert, the DOT revised the Application in an effort to clarify the process, as the DOT was "getting a lot of questions on physical address." (PSUF Ex. 1, Gilbert Depo. at 50:20-24.) "The confusion was coming whether they needed to own or lease the building or just have a location or have an address. There was confusion out there on that." (Id. at 52:5-8.) Indeed, the updated Application form was the result of "information [the DOT] got and questions that [the DOT] got *from the industry, the applicants, potential applicants*." (Id. at 56:19-22; 53:20-23 (emphasis added).)

Importantly, the DOT determined that *both* versions of the application form complied with the regulations before publication, as each version satisfied the physical address component of NRS 453D.210(5)(b) and NAC 453D.265(1)(b)(3). (Id. at 45:4-15, 66:25-67:2.) Efforts by the DOT to add a sentence to the Application in an effort to assist and otherwise clarify the Application for all applicants are not arbitrary and capricious.

#### vi. Disregarding Compliance Records of Applicants

Plaintiffs finally argue the DOT acted arbitrarily and capriciously in "disregard[ing] the mandatory statutory and regulatory provisions by ignoring [the] compliance records of applicants." (Brief at 24:8-10.) In so arguing, Plaintiffs misconstrue the facts. Plaintiffs appear to base their argument on one applicant, Essence, having been "investigated for sales to minors." (Id.) Plaintiffs' cite to only favorable snippets of a deposition transcript and fail to consider the entire line of questioning to which they cite. (Brief at 23:15-24:7.) Therein, the DOT states it completed a compliance check by "look[ing] at the applications that were received versus the standing that the applicant had on record, [including] whether they were, you know, suspended

Robertson, Johnson, Miller & Williamson 50 West Liberty Street, Suite 600 Reno, Nevada 89501

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## 1 **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE** 2 Pursuant to NRCP 5(b), I hereby certify that I am an employee of Robertson, Johnson, 3 Miller & Williamson, 50 West Liberty Street, Suite 600, Reno, Nevada 89501, over the age of eighteen, and not a party within this action. I further certify that I e-filed and served the 4 5 foregoing DEFENDANT DEEP ROOTS MEDICAL, LLC'S ANSWERING BRIEF IN **OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW** to all parties listed on the Court's 6 7 Master Service List via the Clerk of the Court by using the electronic filing system on the 21st day of August, 2020. 8 DATED this 21st day of August, 2020. 9 /s/ Teresa Stovak 10 An Employee of Robertson, Johnson, Miller & Williamson 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

Robertson, Johnson, Miller & Williamson 50 West Liberty Street, Suite 600 Reno, Nevada 89501

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DISTRICT COURT
CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA
\* \* \* \* \*

IN RE D.O.T. LITIGATION

CASE NO. A-19-787004-B DEPT NO. XI

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

BEFORE THE HONORABLE ELIZABETH GONZALEZ, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 08, 2020

BENCH TRIAL - PHASE 1
PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW

SEE NEXT PAGE FOR APPEARANCES

RECORDED BY: JILL HAWKINS, COURT RECORDER TRANSCRIBED BY: JD REPORTING, INC.

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1	LAS VEGAS, CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA, SEPTEMBER 8, 2020, 9:01 A.M.
2	* * * *
3	THE COURT: Mr. Dzarnoski, your PowerPoint doesn't
4	have page numbers on it. How am I going to follow along with
5	you?
6	MR. DZARNOSKI: I'm sorry, Your Honor. I could not
7	hear you.
8	THE COURT: Mr. Dzarnoski, your PowerPoint does not
9	have page numbers on it. How am I going to follow along with
10	you.
11	MR. DZARNOSKI: Page numbers did you say?
12	UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Page numbers.
13	MR. DZARNOSKI: Oh, page numbers.
14	THE COURT: Page numbers or slide numbers.
15	Yeah. Okay. So we'll just give it our best shot.
16	Okay.
17	MR. DZARNOSKI: I can (indiscernible).
18	THE COURT: Nevermind, Mr. Dzarnoski. I can't fix it
19	now.
20	Mr. Parker, you had a request you want to make of us?
21	MR. PARKER: I did, Your Honor. I would ask only
22	because I will be on the plane tomorrow morning, but I land at
23	9:10. If we could start court at 9:30.
24	THE COURT: Does anyone have an objection?
25	Then I guess we'll start at 9:30 tomorrow,

JD Reporting, Inc.

JD Reporting, Inc.

THE COURT: Mr. Dzarnoski, did you circulate your

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It says, RE Conference Call. So it has the attached PowerPoint.

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MR. SHEVORSKI: Yeah, this is Steve Shevorski. I still don't have it, but obviously I work for the State. So it may be -- the problem may be on my end, but I don't have as of yet.

THE COURT: Do any of private counsel who do not work for the State of Nevada have the PowerPoint yet?

MR. WILLIAMSON: This is Rich Williamson. I do not.

THE COURT: Mr. Smith, what about you?

MR. J. SMITH: (No audible response.)

THE COURT: So only your internal emails got it, Mr. Dzarnoski. We're still waiting.

THE CLERK: Your Honor, I just received a PowerPoint from Mr. Slater. It was just sent to me. So I don't know --

THE COURT: Mr. Slater, you sent a PowerPoint to Dulce just now. It needs to be sent to all counsel.

MR. SLATER: I will address that upon receipt of Mr. Dzarnoski's. I will attach mine and send it all. I don't know that I will use the PowerPoint, but just in case, I want everyone to have it.

THE COURT: Thank you.

(Pause in the proceedings.)

THE COURT: So, Mr. Dzarnoski, we're going to mark as Court Exhibit 1. That means Mr. Slater's will be Court

1 Exhibit 2. We'll just go sequentially as you get more.

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So, Mr. Shevorski, I work for the county, and we don't have it -- or for a county computer system, and we don't have it yet over here either.

MR. SHEVORSKI: I still don't have it, Your Honor.

THE COURT: I know. But the County's web server hasn't gotten it yet either, Mr. Shevorski. So it's not just the State because Dulce doesn't have it yet.

MR. SHEVORSKI: That makes me feel a little better.

THE CLERK: Okay. I have one here that says,
"PowerPoint in new order. Use this one," from Mr. West. It's
now 82 pages. That one was 86 pages. It was just addressed to
me.

(Pause in the proceedings.)

MR. SLATER: Your Honor, Craig Slater. I just received Mr. Dzarnoski's email.

THE COURT: Does it have an attachment to it?

MR. SLATER: It does.

THE COURT: Lovely.

Everybody else have it now?

MR. SHEVORSKI: I do not, Your Honor. This is Steve Shevorski.

THE COURT: Dulce, have you gotten it yet?

THE CLERK: I have the new order one, the 82 --

THE COURT: But is it addressed to all counsel or

not addressed to anybody else, just to her. So she received a PowerPoint, "In new order. Use this one," but that's not the one that was sent to all counsel.

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MR. SHEVORSKI: There might be something going on with my server, Your Honor, because I think Jordan tried to send it to me as well. I have not received his email.

THE COURT: Well, it's important you have it. So give me your email address, Mr. Shevorski, and I will try and forward it to you as well.

(Pause in the proceedings.)

MR. SHEVORSKI: Got it, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Great. Mr. Dzarnoski, you may begin.

MR. DZARNOSKI: Okay. I think -- I think I

(indiscernible). So everybody -- I'm sorry, Your Honor. The

State got it. So you're saying go ahead. Is that correct?

THE COURT: That is correct.

MR. DZARNOSKI: Thank you, Your Honor. I apologize. It's a big list. Apparently it goes out slowly.

In any case, Your Honor, where I would like to begin is where this litigation actually all did began which was with the adoption of NRS 453D.02 -- or 453D through the ballot initiative, and I would like to highlight several of the statutes and regulations that I'll be discussing throughout my presentation. And so in my PowerPoint, what I have done is I have presented so people can see the relevant provisions of

that,

various statutes and regulations. It is edited to only include the areas that I wanted to highlight at this point of the presentation.

So I'm starting with NRS 453D.020. The portion that I wanted to highlight was the paragraph 3, which states that,

The people of the State of Nevada have proclaimed that marijuana should be regulated in a manner similar to alcohol.

And the important items were in subparagraph (b),

Business owners are subject to a review by the State of Nevada to confirm that the business owners and the business location are suitable to produce or sell marijuana.

Throughout this litigation, I think we spent a lot of time discussing the fact that all business owners are to be background checkeded — checked, but I wanted to also highlight the fact that the ballot initiative did discuss as part of the rationale of the findings and declarations the importance of a business location being suitable to produce and sell marijuana.

The next statute that I wanted to at least discuss was 453D.200, and again, I've included a brief synopsis or a brief edit of that next statute in my PowerPoint, and it indicates that obviously the Department is to approve or deny applications pursuant to 453D.210, and in so -- in paragraph 6,

the statutory statement that,

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The Department shall conduct a background check of each prospective owner, officer, and board member of a marijuana establishment applicant.

So moving to what the statute itself has indicated, the applications are to be guided by, which is NRS 453D.210, the Department was directed to send out applications, and I wanted to highlight subparagraph 4 because the issue of was a completed application, and it's going to weigh heavily in my presentation today and how the administrative record demonstrates that there were not completed applications that were submitted and ranked and scored, and that license was granted.

The subparagraph 4 -- or paragraph 4 453D.210 states that upon receipt of a completed -- a complete marijuana establishment license application that the Department then needs to issue its licenses within 90 days. And paragraph 5 specifically states that the Department shall approve the license application if the prospective marijuana establishment submitted an application in compliance with the regulations adopted by the Department and of course paid the application fee. And so the application again must be in compliance with the regulations in order for a license to be awarded.

Then in subparagraph 5B, it clearly states the

importance of the physical address stating the physical address where the proposed marijuana establishment will operate is owned by the applicant or the applicant has written permission of the property owner to operate on that property.

MR. SHEVORSKI: Your Honor, may I be heard briefly on this?

THE COURT: Yes.

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MR. SHEVORSKI: I apologize for interrupting oral argument, but I want to make sure that I am not trying an issue by consent.

The proceeding on judicial review, the only two parties are the Department of Taxation and the individual plaintiffs. The record on review consists of their applications only, and the contested case is the scoring of those applications pursuant to Your Honor's order. And to the extent that counsel seeks to expand that record and expand the issues upon judicial review, the State objects.

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Shevorski. I understand your objection, and I am going to limit my ruling in that fashion; however, I'm not going to interrupt Mr. Shevorski's (sic) argument. I have given the plaintiffs a day among themselves, and they can use it however they want.

Keep going --

MR. SHEVORSKI: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: -- Mr. Dzarnoski.

But your objection is noted, Mr. Shevorski, and it was contained in your briefing as well.

Mr. Dzarnoski, keep going.

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MR. DZARNOSKI: Thank you, Your Honor. Hopefully I will tie this all together by the end of the presentation so that even Mr. Shevorski will see that it is tied to the limited scope of the judicial review.

In any case, 453D.210 also in paragraph 6 sets up the concept that if there are competing applications, then for a limited number of spots that we get to or have to use an impartial and numerically scored competitive bidding process to determine which application or applications would be approved.

NRS 233D.135 is the statute -- is the administrative -- 233B.135, not D, that's a misprint on the PowerPoint. 233B.135 is the administrative procedure act, and the portion of that statute clearly states that in cases concerning alleged irregularities in the procedure before the agency that are not shown in the record, the Court may receive evidence concerning the irregularities.

Now, I know, and I do -- I know we filed a motion before the opening brief, Your Honor, requesting the opportunity to do just that. I respect your under -- understand and respect your decision in that regard; however, throughout the presentation today, I will be making an offer of proof at various locations to highlight the additional evidence

that was deduced or adduced through the trial record in the case in some instances that I believe would appropriately be considered in addition to the administrative record, and I don't expect your decision to change, but I will put my offer of proof on the record.

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Subparagraph 3 is what we're basically asking you to do. These are the things that you can do in paragraph 3 of 233B.135 if, based upon what you review on the administrative record, and it says that you can remand or affirm the final decision, set it aside in whole or in part if the substantial rights of petitioner or my clients have been prejudiced for any number of reasons.

Those reasons are outlined in the statute and include violation of constitutional or statutory provisions, the fact that the Department acted in excess of its statutory authority in connection with the (indiscernible), that it acted in an arbitrary or capricious fashion in establishing the overall system in the way my clients' application were scored and ranked, or were characterized by an abuse of discretion.

And I believe that both the administrative record as well as the offer of proof that I'll make certainly will establish that at least three grounds exist to challenge the agency decision here with respect to my clients.

One of the -- one of the things in terms of the agency acting beyond or in violation of constitutional or

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statutory provisions, of course comes from a decision that you already have made on summary judgment which was that the adoption of NAC 453D.255, which is more commonly known in our litigation as the 5 percent rule, that that constituted arbitrary and capricious deviation from the balloting initiative and that that was inappropriate.

And what we will see or what I will be able to demonstrate today is that part of the applicants in this warring pool that my clients were thrown into, in fact, did not have applications that were compliant because of application of NAC 453D.255, which you have already ruled as an arbitrary and capricious act.

NAC 453D.260, which I also have basically sets fourth, you know, what is step 1 in this process of review that we're looking at, and that is that this section that the Department is supposed to determine how many licenses to issue, and then the process really starts when a notice of a request for applications to operate the marijuana establishment — to operate a marijuana establishment is circulated in conformity with 453D.260, which means that according to Section 1A the Department was required to post on its Internet website the notice requesting applications.

Pursuant to subparagraph B, it was to post a copy of the request for applications at the principal office of the Department and, (c), to make notification of posting locations

using the electronic mailing list maintained by the Department for marijuana establishment information.

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I'm going to talk a little bit more detail about this in a moment, but the important thing is this doesn't say that it would be sufficient notice under 453D.260 to post an application or a notice solely on a Listserv. It's very specific as to where the Department is to make certain postings to advise people of the existence of the application and the process.

And then, of course, we get to 453D.268, and although I have this and may refer to it in the detail at a later time, all I need to do at the present time is to suggest that this really is the -- this is -- identifies and defines in Subsection 2 -- in paragraph 2, I'm sorry, that the -- what must be in the application, and this is -- this is going to be important in terms of how this interacts with the scoring process that we are challenging.

And the three things that I wanted to highlight at this point are the Subsection 2(e), which clearly states that the application must include the physical address of the proposed marijuana establishment. Under 2(f), I just wanted to point out that it also asks and requires a mailing address, and it puts those into different paragraphs. So obviously in adopting this, the physical address where the proposed marijuana establishment is to be located is separate and

distinct from a mailing address, which we will see many applicants used.

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There also is requirements for organizational charts showing all owners, officers and board members; a list of all owners, officers and board members; the race and ethnicity of each owner, officer, board member; and other items that I will probably come back to during the course of my presentation.

NAC 453D.272 sets forth what happens if more than one application for a license in a jurisdiction is made and that there's more applications than there are licenses to be granted. And in sub — in paragraph 1, of utmost importance is the regulation specifically said that the Department determines that more than one of the applications is complete and in compliance with this chapter in Chapter 453 NRS. And it states if — if one or more — more than one application is completed and in compliance, then and only then will the Department then rank the applications. And then and only then will the Department score applications and look at the content of the application. So there's the two-step process there dealing with a determination of completeness and compliance and then and only then going to scoring.

There are other portions of 272 that we may get to in a moment, buy I did want to highlight as well NAC 453D.312, which comes into play. And paragraph 1 of 453D.312 specifically commands, demands that the Department will deny an

application for issuance or renewal of a license if, A, the application for the marijuana establishment is not in compliance with any provision of this chapter or Chapter 453D. In other words, stated differently, if the application is incomplete because it does not include information that must be put in the application, then 453D.312 demands that that application be denied, and that can be denied without reference to whether it's gone into the scoring bin or not.

Also in subparagraph B, (b)(3), this regulation commands that a application be denied if an owner, officer or board member provides false or misleading information to the Department. And as we will see, as we go forward in this presentation, and as you saw during the trial, the applications of many of the individuals, applicants did, in fact, contain false information and misleading information specifically regarding the property location.

So I have created a slide, sort of a summary slide (indiscernible) process, and it identifies from these statutes and regs that I have just quickly gone through the five-step process that I think is under review in the judicial review.

(Indiscernible) Step 1, there's a notice of application period and the circulation of a legally compliant application. And that is -- derives from NAC 453D.260.

Step 2 is, that upon the submission of an application the D.O.T. needed to make a determination of whether it was

complete and in compliance with the regulations, and there's a string of regulations and statutes that I've cited where that step is discussed.

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Step 3 is, assuming that you have complete applications, to go through those that are complete, go through and impartially -- the D.O.T. is to impartially score the complete applications pursuant to the specified and required criteria.

Step 4 would be after the scoring is done, there is still the step of ranking. It has not really been addressed very much in this litigation that scoring and ranking are not treated the same by the regulatory scheme. The scoring is once an application is complete, there's certain things that are required to be scored. That score then comes out, but then the Department is to rank everything, not just by the score, but rank it considering the score and also considering the compliance history of the applicant.

Step 5 would be to give a notice of award to the localities.

And then I have at the bottom of that particular slide just summarized by saying, if the number of applicants is equal to or less than the number of licenses to be awarded in a jurisdiction, you award the license without scoring. But you do have to make sure that it is complete, and a completed application and in compliance with the regulatory framework.

If more applications are complete and in compliance, then licenses are awarded. The applications go to the impartial numerically scored system, but then ranked considering the score as well as considering other factors, including compliance.

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Now, we are (indiscernible) handicapped, but we are limited to looking at an administrative record. We certainly believe that the administrative record is incomplete. We don't believe that the administrative record supplies a judicial officer like yourself the ability to even — to even remotely evaluate whether or not the Department of Taxation acted in a way that was compliant with the law.

However, that being said, there are things in the administrative record that allow me to demonstrate to the Court how things went horribly wrong in this case.

From the -- I have a slide that is in evidence from -- and it's called From Administrative Record -- What Reached Scoring. And I wanted to point out here that there were two applications, two versions of an application that were ultimately circulated to applicants. One of those versions was Trial Exhibit 1005. That also has been made part of the administrative record by the Department of Taxation. Version 2 of the application was Trial Exhibit 1006. That too has been made part of the administrative record by the Department of Taxation in its supplemental filing.

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What I don't think or I don't remember us discussing at trial was whether or not applicants actually used both forms of the applications and had those both forms of the applications going into the scoring bin, and so the administrative record that has been provided by the Department shows that Nevada Wellness — and I have the score sheet for Nevada Wellness; the score sheet is RD312, part of the administrative record, and it shows that that is the summary of the scoring of that particular application submitted by Nevada Wellness for the Las Vegas jurisdiction.

Right behind -- right behind that page in the PowerPoint is page 21 of the application that was submitted by Nevada Wellness, and that is part of the administrative record. And if you look at box -- the second box of that, it says marijuana establishment's proposed physical address. It says this must be a Nevada address and cannot be a PO Box, and then there's an address in there.

We do know from trial that this is the first version of the application, and we also from the administrative record can determine that this is the first version because the administrative record does contain the Listserv notification about the second version coming out, and it highlights the additional language to be in the second version, and that additional language is not contained on page 21 of the application. So we know that RD312 was -- was an application

submitted on Version 1, and it was submitted. It was deemed complete, and it went to the scorers.

Similarly, we have applications that were submitted by Tryke Reno as RD416 and -- oops -- 416. It is the score sheet summarizing the application -- I mean, that one is NuLeaf again. I'm sorry, Your Honor. It was the second NuLeaf. I don't need to go in that NuLeaf was also submitted under the initial application.

RD251, the scoring sheet and then the PowerPoint, that is an application by Tryke Companies of Reno. It is for the Las Vegas jurisdiction. And right behind that is the Attachment A, page 21, of the application that identifies 5775 West Sahara as the street address. And again, you can tell from Box 1 that -- or Box 2, because it's asking for the proposed physical address, that that was, in fact, the original application. So we know from the administrative record again that that application was deemed complete, and it was deemed to go into the scoring bin and was, in fact, scored.

And then we have -- I have another example being RD254, which is the score sheet for Tryke Company of Southern Nevada for a jurisdiction of Las Vegas that we've submitted page 21, which again indicates that is an application, the first version of the application.

Now, because the administrative record does not have all applications in it, I cannot tell the Court how many

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applications on the Version 1 were actually submitted by applicants and were scored, but we do know from the record that at least these three applicants submitted using the applications and can presume that others must have as well.

Then Version 2 of the application, there's also evidence in the record again that some applicants in fact submitted applications on Version 2. And I have identified from the record Rural Remedies as one, Rural Remedies under RD473. The PowerPoint says 478. It is more appropriately 473.

RD473, the score sheet is attached to my PowerPoint. It's part of the administrative record. And page 21 which follows the score sheet shows in the second box on page 21 marijuana establishment's proposed physical address if the applicant owns property or has secured a lease or other property agreement. And then there's an address there, and we know because of the administrative record, because of the Listserv announcement that's part of the record that this is the second version of the application, and we know that in addition to scoring, accepting as complete the first version from some applicants, the Department accepted the second version from some applicants and scored them.

Interestingly, we have -- I have added NuLeaf, RD417, which is the score sheet showing that NuLeaf filed an application in unincorporated Clark County, that it was deemed complete, and it was scored. The attached page 21 shows that

no address, no address was put in blank 2, and instead it said TBD, to be determined, unincorporated Clark County. And because we have the score sheet summary, we do know that this application, using the second version of the application and not listing a proposed physical address went to scoring.

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In terms of Step 1, which was the development of an application, it is to me, maybe not to everyone, but when Step 1 calls for the Department to develop an application and to submit it to the individuals that were -- or not the individuals but to potential applicants, you would expect that there would be one application. You would expect that a scoring system that is designed to determine fairly and impartially that which application is superior that that scoring system is only effective if all the applications and all of the requirements are the same.

And what we -- what we definitely find is that they are not the same, and I would suggest to the Court that the difference between the applications is not some meaningless distinction, nor, as developed during the trial, the fact that the State waived or didn't determine completeness, didn't require the physical location of the premises, the proposed business location, is absolutely significant, and it's significant because those applications that did not list a physical location, a proposed physical location of a facility, a truthful proposed location were not complete, and they never

should have gone to scoring, and we're going to look at the numbers and volume of people submitting incomplete applications that went to scoring in a moment.

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And I know that you have indicated -- we asked that certain testimony be permitted, and that was denied. But I would like to make a proffer of some testimony, an offer of proof that is related to Step 1 in this process about creating an application.

THE COURT: All right. You may make your offer of proof, Mr. Dzarnoski.

MR. DZARNOSKI: Yes. Steve Gilbert's trial testimony and his deposition transcript, but in his trial testimony from Steve Gilbert, the designation that I think is relevant is pages 153, 1, through 261, line 23. But right now I'm going to highlight individual excerpts.

At page 161, lines 20 through 22 --

THE COURT: So, Mr. Dzarnoski, I need you to just make the offer of proof. Please don't cite to the particular pages. Just give me your offer of proof.

MR. DZARNOSKI: Okay. The testimony of Steve Gilbert on this particular area would be that the Department of Taxation knew that in creating its application that it was required to abide by the regulations. Mr. Gilbert also would have testified or did testify that no individual at the Department of Taxation had the ability to amend or modify the

regulations on their own and that the regulations needed to go through a rule-making process in order to be amended.

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Mr. William Anderson also testified, and as an offer of proof I will say that Mr. Anderson, who was the executive director --

THE COURT: So, Mr. Dzarnoski, you're supposed to be making an offer of proof now, not arguing what those witnesses' importance would be. You're supposed to be giving me factual information that if I permit it would supplement the record. That's all you're supposed to do.

MR. DZARNOSKI: Yes. Mr. Anderson would state that if changes were needed in any of the regulations that those changes would have to go to the Nevada Tax Commission. He would also testify that Mr. Pupo was given the authority to create an application, but that authority was limited to the authority to create an application that was consistent with the regulations set forth in NAC 453D.

He would testify that if an application violated -if Mr. Pupo had created an application or the Department had
created an application that violated 453D, then Mr. Pupo would
have gone beyond the authority that had been delegated to him.
He would testify that he did not give any authority to remove
compliance from terms of complying with the Nevada
Administrative Codes regulation from consideration during the
application process. He would testify he did not give Mr. Pupo

the authority to remove location from the application process.

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And so with those offers of proof that we believe should be allowed and entered into the record to supplement the administrative record, it will show that the -- that at the very first step of this process, the creation of an application was done in violation of the regulations; it was done in violation of the directives of the executive director of the Department of Taxation and that any applications, any scoring system that was used to score applications that were inconsistent with the regulations, they should have been ash canned before they ever got to the scoring system.

Now, Step 2 of this process, as I outlined earlier, was that upon submission of the applications, the Department was required to determine whether or not the applications were complete.

If the Court will recall, and I am making another offer, we believe that exhibit -- Trial Exhibit 3291 should be part of the administrative record and/or should be permitted to be used in these proceedings as extra record evidence.

If you recall, 3291 was this Excel spreadsheet that identified all of the companies and all of their applications. It listed their — the addresses they used. It put the scorers on them. In effect it is a compilation sheet that was a compilation of information as the application worked its way through the system.

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Also, Trial Exhibit 84 we believe should be admitted in these proceedings to supplement. Trial Exhibit 84 was the 2018 retail marijuana score application scores and rankings. And from those two documents, those two documents — and I am making another offer of proof, Your Honor. From those two documents, you can determine that a grand total of 109 applications that were denied listed TBD, to be determined as the physical location of the proposed marijuana facility.

From those two documents, you can derive that eight licenses, a minimum of eight licenses were granted -- granted to applicants who put TBD in as their address. And those four -- those eight granted licenses, one was to Circle S, two were to Pure Tonic, four were to Lone Mountain, and one was to GreenMart.

At trial it was suggested and argued that TBD was perfectly legitimate because in the cow counties you couldn't have licenses -- or you couldn't get properties. Well, an examination of Exhibits 3291 and Exhibit 84 shows that that simply is not the case.

RD272 was a license granted to Green Therapeutics in Douglas County, one of the counties that it was argued you couldn't get an address, and they gave an address, 607 Highway 50. A denied application in Douglas, Polaris -- from Polaris Wellness gave an address.

The denied application for Douglas County, Green Leaf

1 Farms gave an address.

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A granted application for TRNV098 in Lander, RD672 gave an address.

A granted license for NewGen, RD290 gave an address in Eureka.

And there are more. So whatever in anticipation of an argument that was similar to at trial that it is impossible to give an address, that is, if the Court were to admit Exhibits 3291 and 84, those clearly show that it is possible to do that.

Excuse me, Your Honor. I need to get a drink.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. DZARNOSKI: Next, Your Honor, is the issue of location in determining completeness. And again remember that this argument, the reason this argument is relevant to the judicial review as you've outlined is that at the end of this argument you're going to hear that 68.8 percent of the licenses that were granted through the scoring process never should have reached the scoring pool at all. And then my client — and the only reason that those applications that were granted made the scoring pool was because the Department acted arbitrarily and capriciously in not eliminating them in a completeness review.

And in modifying arbitrarily and capriciously the regulatory standards, the regulations, as we -- as I've already outlined for you, clearly states that the physical location

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must be in the application. There's no wiggle room, no wiggle room whatsoever, and it is clear from the trial, if not necessarily from the administrative record that applications were deemed complete when locations were not put in because it was to be determined or false information regarding the location was put in, which the Department knew or should have known was false at the time the applications were received.

Now, I have included a slide called, Proffer -- False Addresses, Trial Exhibits 3291 and 84. But it also is derived out of part 72 of the administrative record, which is the summary score sheet for all applications that do happen to say what the rank of the applicant was.

And this particular PowerPoint slide demonstrates or shows that for an address at 5130 South Fort Apache Road, Suite 215 dash something -- one, two, three, four, five, six -- seven different applicants, all of them clients of Amanda Connor used that one address as the proposed physical location of their facility, all of them.

RD316 used Suite 215-147.

RD320, CW Nevada used Suite 215-149.

RD329, Commerce Park Medical, Suite 215-155.

RD346, Essence Henderson, Suite 215-148.

And then we've got RD350, RD263 and RD215 also using the Suite 215 address.

Significantly, the applications using this address

were granted in one, two, three, four, five cases, five of the seven people using this application all used this — that had licenses granted using this address, and the Department knew or should have known when they looked at the applications that were coming in that there is no way seven stores, dispensaries would be opened at that address. They were on notice, particularly because all of these applications using the duplicate addresses were clients of one single lawyer who was identified on each of the applications.

And as you go through this offer of proof, you can see that on 9030 West Sahara, RD317, RD321, RD349, RD216, RD264 all were applications using that same address with just different numbers.

The Keystone address was used for RD318, RD331, RD353, RD265 and RD219.

The Eastern Avenue address was used by RD319, RD218, RD266.

Losee Road, was used by four applicants: RD330, RD345, RD354, RD217.

And then 150 South Highway 160, RD332, RD352 and RD221.

There is no way that any person using a modicum of common sense and are trying to discharge their responsibilities, even marginally, would miss the fact that there were multiple applicants that were using identical

addresses that could not possibly be the physical address of the proposed marijuana location which means two things from a completeness standpoint.

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One is, it's just downright incomplete because it doesn't conform to the regulation, which the Department of Taxation had no authority to modify. And, Number two, because those people who were Amanda Connor's clients, and perhaps others — we can't tell because we don't have all of the applications; they're not part of the administrative record — we don't know the total number that went into the scoring bin who used false addresses because we don't have that information.

But as an offer of proof, the testimony of Mitch Britten at trial clearly established — or my offer of proof is that it would establish that Mr. Britten was the one who did the applications for Commerce Park — Commerce Park Medical and Cheyenne Medical and that there were nine applications that were submitted. Every one of those nine applications used the UPS Store or some other mail drop as the address. Every one of them, he acknowledged, was not — never intended to be the proposed physical location of a store which means they lied. He lied on the application.

At trial people tried to spin this in a lot of different ways. Well, I put that information down because I was told that it wasn't going to be scored. Well, I was told

it was not going to be scored is not an acceptable reason for lying under oath. It simply isn't.

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This further offer of proof said that he did sign the attestation under oath saying everything in his application was truthful, but yet he did not indicate in any way, shape, or form that the information placed on his application was truthful.

Those nine applications should not have been deemed complete. They should have been incomplete and pursuant to the regulation requiring the location, it was incomplete, and pursuant to the regulation that says an application must be denied if an officer makes a false statement to the Department. It should have been tossed. Those nine applications should not have gone to scoring, and yet six of them — all nine did, and six of them were granted.

As a further offer of proof, Armen Yemenidjian's testimony at trial would have established, did establish that he believed that all of his applications for the Essence entities listed PO boxes on all eight applications that were submitted. He would have testified that he didn't list the physical addresses because it was his understanding that he didn't need to. He would testify that there are no locations at which he anticipated opening a marijuana dispensary that were listed on his application. He would testify — he would testify that all — that he did — he and Essence did have

locations that they wanted to use as physical locations. They had identified them in their own minds, but they did not list them on their applications, preferring instead to use UPS stores.

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Mr. Gilbert would testify that the Department in his testimony, and I am offering it, that -- let's see -- that if the application did not contain the property location, the physical address where the proposed marijuana establishment would be located, it still would have been considered a completed application by the Department, and it would have gone on to the scoring.

He also would acknowledge that the Department did not know whether the applicant submitted truthful information regarding the physical address and that the reason they didn't know or look in any further is the Department made a decision not to require a physical address.

Now, the decision not -- by the Department to not require a physical address, no one has an explanation. The administrative record doesn't contain anything in it that provides a rational explanation for why the Department chose not to require a physical location. We know that they changed the application not to require it from the administrative record, and we know that violates the regulation that requires the application to have it, and so even if they tried to prevent -- present any administrative reference, a rational

basis, it wouldn't matter because you have to follow the regulation. The only thing that they should have done or could have done would have been to change that regulation.

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The next aspect of completeness that may or may not be part of the record, but I'll make you an offer of proof as well, is the fact that certain applications made it through a completeness review, went into the scoring bin notwithstanding that they were owned in part or in full by publicly traded companies or public entities.

Court's Exhibit 3 to the preliminary injunction findings of fact and conclusions of law was a certification from Mr. Shevorski. I believe that in addition to the administrative record that the Court has the inherent ability to judicially recognize its own court docket and its own orders, and given the fact that that is an order and was part of the Court's docket that also includes a certification, I believe that it is appropriate for the Court to look at that certification as part of the record in determining whether or not the Department acted in an arbitrary and capricious fashion.

If I didn't say it, that Shevorski certification was also admitted at trial as Trial Exhibit 1302. And if the Court chooses not to take judicial notice of Court Exhibit 3 and its preliminary injunction findings, then I make an offer of proof that that Trial Exhibit 1302 should be considered as part of

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1 the judicial review process.

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THE COURT: That request is denied; however, I will take judicial notice of my findings of fact and conclusions of law and permanent injunction that were entered on September 3rd.

Keep going, Mr. Dzarnoski.

MR. DZARNOSKI: Okay. The offer of proof then is that in that certification itself, the Department of Taxation acknowledged or would acknowledge that Nevada Organic Remedies was an applicant that was acquired by a publicly traded company on or around September 4th, 2018, and that as a result of the fact that it was acquired by a publicly traded company on September 4th, 2018, it could not — the Department of Taxation did not and could not possibly have known or gotten information as to all of the owners.

At trial, and you indicated at trial that we did not need an expert to give an opinion with respect to how publicly traded companies' stocks are held and that this is common knowledge. And so I ask you to consider that common knowledge again as part of your evaluation, at least to the extent that you know that a publicly traded company, any stocks that are held in street name or held through the depository trust corporation, it is virtually impossible, virtually impossible for not only the issuer to know the beneficial — the identity of the beneficial owners, but it's also impossible for the

State to know the identity of all of the beneficial owners.

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Nevada Organic Remedies, pursuant to trial Exhibit 84, which I proffered, but also it can be derived from Part 72 of the administrative record, was actually granted licenses in Clark County, RD215; in Las Vegas, RD216; in North Las Vegas, RD217; in Henderson, RD218; in Washoe-Reno, RD219; in Nye County, RD221; in Carson City, RD 222.

GreenMart of Nevada, as a proffer, Court
Exhibit 3 and/or Trial Exhibit 1307 would show that the
Department of Taxation acknowledged that GreenMart was a
subsidiary of a publicly traded company -- or I'm sorry. A
subsidiary of a publicly traded company owned a membership
interest in the applicant at the time the applicant submitted
its application. So again, the fact that a publicly traded
company held membership interest prevented any ability for this
application to be considered complete because of the absence of
the ability of a full disclosure of owners.

Licenses granted to GreenMart of Nevada, RD504, Las Vegas; RD505, Clark County; RD 507, Reno; RD511, Henderson.

So not only did GreenMart's applications survive the completeness review when it shouldn't have, it was put into a -- they were put into the scoring bin where they shouldn't have been, and somehow or other they walked away with these licenses.

Lone Mountain Partners, as a proffer, Trial

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Exhibit 1302 or Court Exhibit 3 would prove that the Department could not determine whether Lone Mountain Partners was a subsidiary of an entity called Verona or was owned by the individual members that were listed on Attachment A with Verona being a public company.

Lone Mountain Partners, based upon part 72 of the record plus Trial Exhibit 84, was granted licenses in Clark County, RD590; Las Vegas, RD591; North Las Vegas, 592; Reno, RD593; Esmeralda, RD594; White Pine RD595; Lander, RD596; Lincoln, RD597; Douglas, RD598; Mineral, RD601; Eureka, RD602.

All of those were granted, as we have already -- what I've previously seen is Lone Mountain Partners actually has two strikes against it. One is that none of its applications to have been deemed complete and gone into the scoring bin by virtue of the fact that its owners couldn't be determined and not backgrounded; but second, because for many of these licenses that were granted, they didn't put in a property location.

Likewise, Nevada Organic Remedies, not only should they not have gone into the scoring bin and been scored because you couldn't determine who their owners were, but because they submitted false allegations — or false applications containing false addresses and propounding under oath in their application that those addresses were the proposed sites of their proposed marijuana facilities.

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Now, once you take this information into account, as an application analysis, there is a PowerPoint slide entitled Application Analysis, and it has A, it's an analysis for incomplete applications as a percentage of applications filed. Of the total applications that were filed per finding of fact, 48 of your most recent findings of fact, Your Honor, it was stated that 462 applications were made.

Part 72 of the administrative record actually has 461 score sheets to indicate 461 applications were in scoring.

That Exhibit 84, there's a little more — is inconsistent with 457 total applications. The different numbers is not significant. I mean, one — it's a difference of one application between 462 and 461 is not why I bring that up, but we have to have a number to start with.

Now, incomplete applications, there were 117 incomplete applications because the addresses were listed as to be determineds. 32, at least 32 applications had false addresses. These are the ones that we've already gone through that were Amanda Connor's clients. They have an -- where I have this listed as the owner here, there is an additional 25 applications that were submitted by individuals that the Department of Taxation has certified that it was unable to determine who the owners were.

That gives us a total of 174 of the applications should not even have been scored out of 462 submitted. That's

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38 percent of the applications should not have been scored. That's significant to my client because the argument is being made that my clients can't prove that they have a superior interest or would move up in the scoring if things were done correctly. Well, we don't know that at all from anything in the administrative record, nor do we know that from anything that was presented in the trial record. We don't because everything that has been presented to us that provides for a ranking includes 174 applications that never should have been scored.

We don't know if you take those 174 applications out of the mix where that would have left any of my individual clients on a scoring and a ranking. And the Department of Taxation has not presented a sufficient administrative record for you to try and decide whether or not the elimination of 174 of those applications from scoring would have changed anything, and they can't give you any rational or reasonable explanation for what they did.

There is a Section B, I believe, to this, which I am not immediately finding. I am searching for another slide, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. I'm going to let Ramsey go handle the people who are showing up for arraignment court even though we don't have arraignment court today in this courtroom. So hold on a second. And you can look for your slide while Ramsey

A-19-787004-B | In Re D.O.T. Litigation | 2020-09-08 | JR Day 1 does some administrative work. 1 2 (Pause in the proceedings.) 3 Did you find it, Mr. Dzarnoski? MR. DZARNOSKI: Not -- not quite yet, Your Honor. 4 5 am -- I know what it's called. I just haven't found it yet. 6 (Pause in the proceedings.) 7 MR. DZARNOSKI: Okay, Your Honor. Apparently it was 8 inadvertently omitted from my PowerPoint, but I have found it. 9 So I'm going to talk about it. 10 THE COURT: Okay. Keep going. 11 MR. DZARNOSKI: The second part of the application 12 analysis is the incomplete applications that were actually 13 granted as a percentage of all licenses that were granted. Per 14 Exhibit 84, and I think it is uncontested, Trial Exhibit 84, 15 there were 61 licenses that were granted, and I didn't -- at 16 least going over your order, most recent order, I didn't see the number of ordered licenses set forth, but I believe the 17 18 record is clear that it's 61. 19 So looking now at which applications were incomplete 2.0 and yet were granted licenses, eight incomplete licenses were 21 granted to applicants who used TBD, to be determined, as their 22 property location. Twenty-one licenses were granted. 23 going to say a minimum of 21 licenses were granted by

JD Reporting, Inc.

applicants who put in UPS addresses and mail drops as their

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25

address location.

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25 applications were granted to the entities listed on Court Exhibit 3, Trial Exhibit 1302, where they were public companies or complete ownership was not (indiscernible). So that is a grand total of 54 licenses were granted -- or 54 total. Now, there is some overlap between those categories. For instance, in the category of incomplete applications because of the lack of ownership, that's all of Lone Mountain. Lone Mountain also had four that were in the to-be-determined category and were incomplete for that reason. So there is some overlap.

There is an overlap of one with GreenMart because

Green Mart obtained one license for an address that was to be

determined, and it obtained -- and it also failed to have its

owners because of -- public owners disclosed because it was

publicly traded. And likewise, there is an overlap with Nevada

Organic Remedies because they had seven applications who

included a false address and also seven where they failed to

disclose their ownership because of public entities.

So that -- when you do the math, that all comes out, add to that 54 that I initially identified, if you take out the overlap for seven Nevada Organic Remedies, four Lone Mountain, one GreenMart, that's 12. The net total number of licenses granted for applications that were incomplete based upon the regulations is 42 out of 61, 68.8 percent of all granted applications were incomplete, and the significance of that,

again to the matters that you are judicially reviewing is that my clients, that the argument being made is my clients can't show that they would have had a different rank, or they would've had a different score, or they would've gotten a license, but for -- but for the problems that were cited, but for the arbitrary and capricious actions.

Well, I suggest to you, Your Honor, that if you take 42 of the people off the list who were granted licenses, that would first of all create 42 spots for new licenses to be awarded. And if you also take out the 178 or 174 incomplete applications that shouldn't be scored at all, you are now creating an entire new list where it is impossible for anybody to know that my clients wouldn't have obtained a license or could have obtained the license because the scoring in ranking is so flawed it is impossible for you as a judicial officer to look at this record and say, oh, yeah, we move up one person. What are you going to do? Are you going to try to say move up 42 people? And then are you going to look at the next 42 in line, and are you going to have to try and decipher how many of those had complete applications? I don't think so.

I think that's what the Department of Taxation was supposed to do to begin with, and they were supposed to present to you an administrative record so that we could look at the things that they actually did, and we can see exactly who -- why they allowed applications to go into scoring that were in

complete violation of the regulations which they had no 2 authority to change.

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Step 3 of the process as I outlined it, is that the D.O.T. had the responsibility to impartially score those applications on the required criteria, and again, we are now talking about -- we should be talking about a more limited number of applications to go to scoring because 174 of them sure shouldn't have gone there, and 42 licenses that were granted certainly should never have gone to scoring, but they did.

So now what's the impact of that on scoring? Well, in your findings of fact for your most recent order, Your Honor, just by way of argument here, Section or paragraph 100, that addressed the aspect of the actual physical address. in Finding of Fact 100, you stated,

> By selectively eliminating the requirement to disclose an actual physical address for each and every proposed retail recreational marijuana establishment, the D.O.T. limited the ability of the independent contractors to adequately assess created criteria, such as prohibited proximity to schools and certain other public facilities impact on the community, security, building plans and other material considerations

Well, had they not eliminated the requirement for an

proscribed by the regulation.

actual physical address, then those categories could have been scored and the physical location would have played a role in the score. And the scoring sheets that are listed in the administrative record themselves show that the physical location, the actual address was not a component in any of these categories that were required to be scored, at least not as applied by the Department.

So my -- the scoring of those people that should have been in there still would have required the Department to look at the physical location in connection with these required components which are the required scoring components.

You note in paragraph 93 of your -- I'm pulling it up:

Although not required to use a single point of contact process for questions related to the application, once D.O.T. adopted that process and published the appropriate process to all potential applicants, the D.O.T. was bound to follow that process.

I do not disagree with that finding. That finding could equally well be said about the Department's decision not to require a physical location and not to score the physical

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location and not to use the physical location as a component in scoring other required categories. You might otherwise have phrased it that the reg, although not required to adopt the regulation requiring an application to disclose the physical address, once the D.O.T. adopted the regulation and published it to all applicants, it created an application in conformity with that regulation. The D.O.T. was bound to follow that requirement.

It is a, per se, arbitrary and capricious violation for an agency of the State to take actions that are contrary to and inconsistent with their own regulation, just as it is arbitrary and capricious for the D.O.T. not to follow the process of a single point of contact once it was enacted. And the reason for that is that changing an internal rule that has been used and applied and/or changing the regulation or amending a regulation or not enforcing a regulation constitutes rule making in and of itself, and it's got to go through the rule-making procedure.

And in the case that we have, the administrative record provides no evidence whatsoever by which you as the judicial officer can assess whether or -- or how if at all the Department could justify not following the regulation.

As a proffer of what should be in the record, because I think this falls under the exclusion where we're challenging the overall methodology used, the framework and the process, we

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should be allowed to bring in evidence that deals with that process. Again I'm going to make a proffer from William Anderson's testimony, and in his testimony, he -- he would testify that -- sorry -- he would testify that the regulations and the applications, when it discussed compliance, referred to the historical compliance record of the applicant, that it was the previous compliance history of a licensee that would be looked at.

Karalin Cronkhite, as an offer of proof, from her deposition transcripts, the offer of proof is that she would state that no applicant was required to submit anything with respect to compliance history with the Department of Taxation as part of their application and that in evaluating the applications, the identified graders in their work were not allowed to evaluate the actual compliance history and compliance file maintained on the licensee.

She would testify that none of the unidentified graders looked at any of the actual historical compliance for any of the applications. She would testify that in the unidentified criteria, the graders did not consider or give points to any applicants based upon whether an applicant had demonstrated a record of operating their existing facility in compliance with the regulations.

And as the Court will recall, one of the regs that I read a portion of, that language come specifically from the

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regulation and says that the application should be evaluated based upon, and looking at the owners whether the applicant had demonstrated a record of operating. That can't be future oriented. It is backward oriented. She would -- Ms. Cronkhite would testify as an offer of proof, that she was part of the group at the D.O.T. who determined how points were to be awarded and that there never was any discussion as to whether or not to have any scoring or ranking based upon actual historical compliance history.

So, Your Honor, the fact that the administrative record is devoid of any evidence to show that there was a look at actual historical compliance, it is also devoid of any and all evidence to show that the Department of Taxation even considered including that as part of the scoring even though the regulations required it.

So as to compliance and the requirement of scoring, one more time, we simply cannot look at the administrative record as being sufficient to determine who was or was not an appropriate recipient of a license in that application process because they didn't consider compliance, and they didn't score it even though it's part of the regulatory requirement, and it was acknowledged to be such by the executive director.

As to ownership, clearly, clearly, Your Honor, you can't -- you cannot look at the actual way things were scored and say that my client definitively would not have received a

license but for these people being in the mix and getting licenses, as I said, 25 of them. 25 of them got licenses for when they couldn't demonstrate their current ownership.

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Well, in terms of how that impacts the actual scoring, look at diversity. The way diversity was scored, just look at each owner, and you would decide whether or not that owner is white, black, male, female, Asian or whatever persuasion, and you would put a checkmark next to it. And based upon the percentage, based upon the percentage of owners who fell into those diverse categories to the total number of owners, you got a diversity score. And each of these license grantees got a diversity score as well as everybody who submitted, all 462 applications got diversity scores.

Well, as to public companies, Your Honor, I suggest to you that is absolutely impossible. At trial you heard the testimony of Mike Nahass of MediFarm, I believe, and that was that he had thousands of shareholders. For any public company, any public company at all, if you have to first try and find out who the beneficial owners are, which I've already indicated is impossible, but if you did that, you would find that they have thousands of owners. There is nothing in the administrative record, looking at part 72, which is all the scores that would suggest that the Department of Taxation in evaluating and scoring diversity considered a thousand shareholders. They did not have the information. So they

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Then there is the scoring dealing with owners; the organizational chart is supposed to list all owners. It's supposed to give a background and experience, and your -- but the Department of Taxation is supposed to evaluate pursuant to NRS -- or I'm sorry, NAC 453D.272 whether all of the owners have operating experience such that it would help them operate a marijuana experience -- establishment.

If you don't know the owners, you can't give an adequate score. There's no basis for scoring. You're supposed to score — award points based on the educational achievement of the owners. One more time, if the application is incomplete because all owners were not disclosed, then the scoring is impacted. And we know that at least 25 grantees received scores for their owners for diversity, for experience, for educational achievements, and yet the Department doesn't even know who they are, nor did the applicants know who they were.

So those are additional ways that the -- the administrative record in this case clearly shows that the Department acted arbitrarily and capriciously in not scoring all owners, in not scoring property location or requiring the property location to even be disclosed and for not scoring a required category of historical compliance.

Step 4 of this overall process comes after the scoring. After the scorers have given a score, under this

statutory and regulatory scheme, that is not equivalent to the ranking. 453D.272(1) clearly says that you're to be ranked based upon compliance with both the statute, compliance with the regulation, and then by points awarded in the scoring system of the application. That wasn't done.

And again the only way I know of to demonstrate is to make an offer of proof as to the -- an offer of proof as to what was disclosed in the -- or learned in the trial regarding the Department's policies. And this would be -- this would be Mr. Gilbert again, as a proffer of Mr. Gilbert's testimonies -- a proffer of Mr. Gilbert's testimony. He would testify that nobody at the Department of Taxation who did have access to the disciplinary file of an applicant reviewed the applicant's -- the applications to determine whether or not a ranking adjustment should be made by the Department.

So while they're required by statute and regulation to rank and adjust the scoring or do a rank by a basis of adjustment scoring, they didn't. Pure and simple, there was no process put into place to adjust the ranking based upon compliance.

Mr. Gilbert would, also as a proffer, indicate that they didn't have the criteria or they couldn't come up with the criteria to judge compliance, and his statements more or less would be to the effect of it was too hard and too difficult to create a formula or a process that we would be able to evaluate

one person's compliance history with another applicant's compliance history.

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Respectfully, Your Honor, that -- the difficulty of -- the difficulty of the Department to comply with its regulation is not an acceptable reason for them to ignore their regulation.

And this has been a consistent theme, both in the scoring and the judicial review aspect of this case as well as in the trial. The theme being, hey, listen, it's impractical or it's impossible, or it's very difficult for us to do these things. They raised that same argument with respect to the 5 percent rule. Well, it would be impractical for us to have to evaluate all of the owners of a publicly traded company. So therefore we're not going to do it.

Likewise, the Department of Taxation's sole explanation throughout these proceedings to date as to why they did not look at the compliance, actual historical compliance record and rank applicants based upon that in part is because it was difficult. And I don't know how many times I heard someone say from the Department, Well, we only had 90 days to do something; making it really difficult.

You know, as a lawyer, the last thing I would ever advise a client to do is to say, hey, compliance with the law is difficult. It might be too difficult for you. So feel free to go ahead and violate the law. I mean, that is not an

acceptable way for society as a whole to behave, much less for the Department of Taxation to justify not doing something because it's difficult.

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As to the difficulty with respect to owners and the supposed impracticability of vetting a public company become an owner of a marijuana licensee under the old statutory scheme, I refer you to the gaming laws of this State. They're from 1930 something when gaming was first legalized by statute in the state of Nevada, all the way into 1960s. No public companies were gaming licensees in this State, and it was not because a statute or a regulation prohibited public companies from being gaming license holders.

What it was, was the gaming statutes and regulations required that every owner, all owners of a company or all owners of a company that wanted to be a licensee, a gaming licensee, all of those owners had to be licensed. So all of those owners had to go through suitability checks, and so just like the State in this case saying, hey, it's impractical or too difficult for public companies to get marijuana licenses here because of if you require all owners to be disclosed and backgrounded, well, that same thing could have applied in gaming. I mean, thank God the Department of Taxation wasn't doing gaming licensing back then and saying, hey, it doesn't matter if you're a public company. We're not going to force a public shareholder who owns less than 5 percent to be licensed.

So that is one example of how the State of Nevada has enacted its privilege licensing for things like gaming, alcohol, marijuana, and there is no reason to believe that enacting ballot initiatives, Ballot Question 2, in enacting 453D that the voters weren't cognizant that it might make it difficult for a public company to become an owner because of the background.

THE COURT: Mr. Dzarnoski, are you okay?

MR. DZARNOSKI: Yes, Your Honor. I am having an allergy moment for a second.

THE COURT: All right.

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MR. DZARNOSKI: Unfortunately, all I have is my facemask and no tissues with me.

A couple more pieces of testimony, Your Honor, that I would like to proffer.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. DZARNOSKI: Mr. Gilbert in his trial testimony, if permitted to present the testimony, would acknowledge that five or six applicants could use the same address and, in fact, did use the same address on their applications, but it did not make a whit of difference to the Department because they didn't look at the physical address of the proposed establishment.

And then as an additional proffer, he would testify -- interestingly, it came out of a Court question that was asked to him about he would testify that the only thing,

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the only sense that compliance was used by the Department of Taxation on a historical basis was that if an applicant was on suspension, then they would not be eligible to submit an application. And Mr. Gilbert would go on to say that — that he, even though he was part of the group, that he did not know how the Department came to the conclusion that that would be the only disqualifying events would be for a suspension.

And likewise, that is also from the administrative record. There is nothing to indicate any basis, rational or otherwise for the Department not to include in its scoring the compliance.

Your Honor, I may be done. I think I've been at this for about two hours. Could I have five minutes to look at my notes and see if I'm done?

THE COURT: Yes. We will take a five-minute recess. We will resume at 11:30 -- no, 11:20. 11:20.

All right. Take five, guys. Get up, walk around. Take your masks off for a little bit.

(Proceedings recessed at 11:12 a.m. until 11:19 a.m.)

(Pause in the proceedings.)

THE COURT: So we're done with our five-minute recess, Mr. Dzarnoski. Are you ready to proceed?

MR. DZARNOSKI: Yes, Your Honor. Thank you.

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

MR. DZARNOSKI: Your Honor, I've never felt that it

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is a good use of the Court's time or my time to try and simply reiterate arguments that have been made in the briefing. I've tried to take an approach today that is not necessarily just reiterating what we put in our opening brief, but I don't want the Court to believe that by me not reiterating the matters that we have argued and set forth in the brief that we're in any way waiving any of those arguments or anything.

I know how much you read all this stuff, and you don't -- once you've read it, you don't need to hear it from me is my attitude. So I just want to make it clear that if I haven't addressed anything in particular in our opening briefs that it's not a waiver, and it's just I don't want to be duplicative.

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Dzarnoski.

MR. DZARNOSKI: And second that -- I'm sorry?

THE COURT: Thank you. Keep going.

MR. DZARNOSKI: Second, in addition to responding or opposing, filing opposing briefs, some of the defendants — or the State and some of the intervenors, that's what I wanted to say, have filed opposing briefs and have raised certain issues regarding standing. I don't believe that they've asked for a reconsideration of your prior rulings on standing, and it has been briefed — I am thinking like three to five times that you've made decisions regarding standing on motions to dismiss, motions for summary judgment, and I don't suspect that your

decision will change on the issue of standing with respect to judicial review from your prior orders. So, I mean, I just want to highlight the fact that I do acknowledge that there has been the argument raised on standing.

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Again, I don't want this Court to feel because I am not addressing it again with the same arguments that we've used three or four times that we are waiving that. We are not.

And I would like to point out on that respect, if the Court feels that it needs additional briefing on standing, under the statute we were supposed to have 30 days to file a reply brief. You scheduled this hearing before that 30 days expired. If you have questions on standing that you would like me to address today, I would ask that you tell me that or tell me that you do think that there's additional briefing that needs to be done, and then we would get our reply brief filed within the statutory time frame. So I'm looking for some guidance from you there.

THE COURT: Mr. Dzarnoski, I read the briefing, and I don't need any additional information on standing. It's been briefed ad nauseam for the last year.

 $$\operatorname{MR}.\ \operatorname{DZARNOSKI}:\ I$$  thought that would be your answer, and I'm glad to hear that.

THE COURT: All right. Anything else?

MR. DZARNOSKI: No, Your Honor. I think I'm done.

THE COURT: All right. So, Mr. Dzarnoski, to the

extent that you have made proffers of evidence for me to consider that is outside of the current record, that request is denied, but it is of course preserved for purposes of your appellate record.

Any other plaintiffs wish to argue at this time?

Ms. Sugden? Ms. Chattah? Mr. Slater?

MS. SUGDEN: Your Honor, this is Amy Sugden. I do not have anything at this time.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MR. SLATER: Good morning, Your Honor. This is Craig Slater. I have just a very brief argument that will be very short.

THE COURT: Okay.

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MR. SLATER: My clients are in a unique position. I don't know that any of the other plaintiffs did what they did. Specifically, if you look at page 1 of the PowerPoint presentation, when my clients received news that they had not been awarded the recreational licenses, they followed the statute guidance of NRS 360.245 and they appealed the decision to the Tax Commission. If you look at Slide Number 2, specifically Subsection 1 of that statute is pointed out, and that reads as follows:

All decisions of the Executive Director or other officer of the Department made pursuant to this title are final unless

1 appealed to the Nevada Tax Commission.

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Upon appealing the decision to the Tax Commission, my clients were informed that the Department of Taxation, specifically Jorge Pupo, was rejecting their appeal. We believe that that clearly violates the statute, which the statute is clear on its face, and it creates a remedy. If the Department or the director of the Department takes an action that you disagree with, you appeal it to the Tax Commission.

Here, my clients have been deprived of their right and opportunity to go before the Tax Commission. So that is one of the errors that we believe has occurred in the process.

If you go to the fourth slide in my presentation, one of my clients is the NuVeda entities. They submitted numerous applications that were all identical. For whatever reason, one of their applications received more points than all of their others, despite the fact that they were identical. RD503 scored 192.01 points, whereas all of the other applications submitted by Clark Natural Medicinal Solutions received 191.67.

If you go to Slide Number 5 and 6, you can see the difference. On Slide 6, I highlighted the difference. The Care, Quality, Safekeeping component and the Non-Identified Criteria Score, those were slightly higher. Again, we have no idea how the graders would have come to different testing results when the applications were identical.

With respect to Slide Number 7, my other client,

Inyo, I just want to point out for the Court's attention and not belabor the point their application identified physical addresses for every location that they sought. My clients went out, in accordance with the terms of the -- or instructions of the application, they secured real property. They had letters of intent in place. They had negotiated leases. They had agreements in place for physical property, and they therefore identified that physical property on their application.

Conversely, NuVeda did that for a couple of their applications, but then in reliance upon the statement that a physical address was not needed, they disbanded that effort considering they had such a large number of applications. But both of my clients did have physical addresses: Inyo for every single location, and Nuveda for at least two or three of the locations on their applications.

That is all I wanted to point out. I don't want to repeat any of the points Mr. Dzarnoski has already made or repeat the briefing. Thank you for your time.

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Slater.

Any other plaintiffs wish to make an argument at this time?

(No audible response.)

THE COURT: Mr. Shevorski, how long do you -I'm sorry, was there another plaintiff that wished to
make an argument?

MR. GAMBLE: Your Honor, this is Clarence Gamble from Rural Remedies -- representing Rural Remedies. I'll just join in the arguments that were made by Mr. Dzarnoski.

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Gamble.

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Are there any other plaintiffs who wish to argue at this point?

(No audible response.)

THE COURT: Mr. Shevorski, how long is your argument?

MR. SHEVORSKI: Mercifully, Your Honor, it will be before lunch.

THE COURT: All right. You're up.

MR. SHEVORSKI: Thank you, Your Honor.

When I was listening to my friend's opening argument, I honestly thought I was at a different kind of proceeding.

What I heard a great deal of was essentially a motion for reconsideration — actually, two motions for reconsideration.

I heard a motion for reconsideration regarding the scope and the content of the record. Of course it had not been filed — a motion for reconsideration had not been filed. And I think Your Honor quite correctly determined that the offer of proof should be denied, certainly, as its basis would be under 2.24(a) of the Eighth Judicial District Court Rules.

I also heard a motion for reconsideration really on the legality of the 2018 retail marijuana store competition process, neither of which is appropriate for this particular

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phase of the proceeding. And I think it's telling, Your Honor, the last page of the TGIG plaintiffs' brief says, The D.O.T.'s decision on granting/denying applications for conditional licenses should be set aside. That is not what this Court is charged with doing under 233B.

This Court quite rightly determined that the proceeding under review is the Department's determination on the TGIG plaintiffs' license applications; that the record — the documents the Department considered in grading the applications, that the only parties to judicial review are the individual plaintiffs. The Court's role is to review a final decision in the contested case, and the contested case of course being the scoring of the Serenity application, the scoring of NuVeda's applications, the scoring of Inyo.

Other than Mr. Slater's argument where Mr. Slater addressed scoring discrepancies in what's believed to be identical applications, and we'll get to why that's not a basis for judicial review in a moment, you didn't hear anything about the scoring of the TGIG plaintiffs' application at all. The contested case, which is the first step in determining whether or not the final decision based on that contested case should be set aside, was never discussed at all. And for that reason alone we believe that the Court quite rightly should deny the petition for judicial review.

And oftentimes in this case I have mentioned

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something that I thought was important that the plaintiffs have left out, and, forgive me, but I'm going to do so again. The plaintiffs seeking judicial review, at least Mr. Dzarnoski's clients, are TGIG, LLC; Nevada Holistic Medicine, LLC; BGS Nevada Partners; Fidelis Holdings, LLC; Gravitas Nevada; Nevada Pure, LLC; MediFarm, LLC; MediFarm IV. You never heard those entities described. There was no citations to the record regarding their applications, let alone how they were scored, with the noteworthy exception, Your Honor, that MediFarm and TGIG's applications were attacked by Mr. Dzarnoski.

In the instance of TGIG, Mr. Dzarnoski of course attacked the applications of TGIG with respect to the physical address because TGIG of course had Amanda Connor as their consultant. With respect to MediFarm, MediFarm of course deemed being a publicly traded corporation, or owned by one, rather, and so to the extent that the plaintiffs, the TGIG plaintiffs, listened to Your Honor's charge in the trial protocol, it was essentially to divide or attack their own house. That is not a basis for seeking judicial review but rather is a basis for denying judicial review.

It's important to keep in mind the standards that we're here to consider. To the extent that any questions of fact were raised, I submit that there were none because they did not cite to the record but rather sought improperly to expand the record in derogation of Your Honor's ruling. The

Court should not substitute its judgment on those questions of fact.

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Importantly, the final decision of the agency here, the denial of the applications, shall be deemed reasonable and lawful until reversed or set aside. Most importantly, the Court cannot set aside an agency decision unless the substantial rights of the petitioner have been prejudiced. In other words, it has to — there has to be a nexus between the allegation regarding the agency's decision and the petitioner, and the petitioner has the burden to demonstrate that that decision essentially had a causal nexus to prejudice, and that is entirely lacking here, entirely lacking.

Indeed, the only time it was mentioned before -- that an individual applicant was mentioned of the TGIG plaintiffs was to attack that applicant. And surely the other plaintiffs aren't building their case based upon attacks to TGIG or MediFarm. The element of prejudice was entirely ignored. And to the extent it may have been mentioned in passing, it was to say -- Mr. Dzarnoski said that it would be impossible to know that the rankings were affected by this, that and the other, or you couldn't expect this to show. Well, that is not a reason for setting aside a final decision by an administrative agency, but rather it is a reason to affirm the decision because the plaintiff -- the petitioner, excuse me, who has the burden under 233B.135, Subsection 2, who has the burden simply has not

1 met that burden.

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THE COURT: Anything else, Mr. Shevorski?

MR. SHEVORSKI: Yeah, I'm fine, Your Honor. I'm going through my paper. I don't want to repeat myself or belabor points made in the brief.

And so to conclude on that point, Your Honor, the TGIG plaintiffs' arguments contain a significant procedural flaw in that they are essentially asking this Court to disregard the information before the agency at the time the final decision was made and also to assume prejudice. Neither is appropriate.

The Court does not have inherent appellate authority over the administrative agency according to the case law. The Court's review is confined to the record before the agency at the time. Based upon the total absence of any argument regarding the record before the agency, this Court should affirm that decision.

Touching upon briefly some of the arguments made with respect to the particular statutes, the first argument is one Your Honor has heard time and again, which is NAC 453D.255(1) as an impermissible modification of 453D.200, sub 6. Honestly, we believe the issue on that regulation is moot since it was repealed and replaced. But also, Your Honor, the arguments regarding that in the petition for judicial review are simply irrelevant because the TGIG plaintiffs never tied those

arguments to any kind of prejudice to them.

The background check is to protect the public. It is not something that a petitioner can use as a sword to attack the agency and seek to set aside the decision of a denial of their particular license. Indeed, the focus of that argument, Your Honor, is entirely on something that's not part of the administrative record in this case, which is other people's applications. The arguments regarding 453D.255(1), the Nevada Administrative Code, are simply irrelevant to this particular proceeding.

Secondly, Your Honor, the well-worn argument regarding physical address. Again, my friends are making that argument entirely outside the record. Never do they cite to the record itself to demonstrate their own compliance with that -- what they view of that provision of the Nevada Revised Statute. Obviously we point out in our brief that we believe they're misreading that statute. And the NuLeaf case, of course, we believe shows that, that the word "shall" doesn't mean that the Department shall disregard the application that may or may not have a physical address.

But more importantly, Your Honor, in terms of this contested case, the address was not scored. And so there's no tie or nexus between the physical address and these particular contested cases, the scoring of the applications. It affected everyone equally in terms of this particular proceeding before

1 Your Honor.

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Regarding the Department's decision under 453D.272(1)(g), which is of course the compliance, again, they are making that argument out — based upon things that are outside the record. We believe they're also misreading the Nevada Administrative Code. But more importantly, Your Honor, they never demonstrate or attempt to demonstrate that their substantial rights were prejudiced based upon any interpretation the Department made regarding that particular version of the administrative code. And, Your Honor, in your findings of fact and conclusions of law, paragraph 25 determined that the decision was in the discretion of the Department of Taxation.

But to the extent that the petitioners are attempting to relitigate that matter, we believe they are foreclosed from doing so, and we would cite to the -- I can't pronounce the first name, but I think it's Alcalacta (sic). It's the Walmart decision dealing with issue preclusion. To the extent that my friends attempt to set aside the denial of their licensure based upon unequal communication, again, that argument is entirely based on material that is outside the administrative record. There is no argument that their substantial rights were prejudiced because of that. And, indeed, Your Honor found at paragraph 75 of the findings of fact and conclusions of law that there is no substantial likelihood that they would have

been successful in the rating process if there had been a different manner of communicating. And so we believe that to the extent they even attempt to raise that argument they are precluded from doing so.

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Mr. Dzarnoski spent a great deal of time on the idea that it was somehow inappropriate to have two applications. Again, there's no inherent appellate authority for a court to review the administrative processes of the agency. We're here to review the contested case, which is the scoring of the applications. And there's no argument and no evidence in the administrative record to demonstrate that the two applications had any impact globally on the scoring of the applications even if that was appropriate, which we believe it is not. But more importantly, since Mr. Dzarnoski doesn't even mention they were applications of his clients, there's no evidence in the record that the substantial rights of his clients were prejudiced by virtue of the two applications.

And so in dealing -- turning now, Your Honor, to NuVeda and Inyo, if NuVeda feels that it has an appeal, this is not the -- or Inyo -- this is not the appropriate forum for that particular challenge. Certainly they can file and seek mandamus to the extent it believes that the Department of Taxation has violated a mandatory duty. We believe that that's not correct, but that is not what we are here to do. That is not the contested case, and it is not the final decision under

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And to the extent that Mr. Slater seeks to expand the record, seeks to expand the subjects under review here, we would object to that and ask that those arguments be denied.

To the extent there are different scores on the applications, for example for NuVeda, that's not entirely to be unexpected. This is a human process; there could be error. The Court is not here under 233B.135 to substitute its judgment for the particular graders. But more importantly, there's no argument that any error in scoring prejudiced the rights of Mr. Slater's clients, no argument that they would have achieved a higher ranking and put into a winning position, and therefore no basis for seeking judicial review in the particular contested case before Your Honor.

Your Honor, I think these arguments that you've heard today consist almost entirely of attempts to relitigate issues before the Court in Phase 2 but under a different name. The legality of the 2018 process was decided by Your Honor. We respect that decision. We think it is inappropriate to relitigate it under a different name.

We ask that Your Honor deny the petitions for judicial review.

THE COURT: Thank you. I have one question for you, Mr. Shevorski.

MR. SHEVORSKI: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: How is Mr. Slater's request related to Mr. Pupo's rejection of the appeal different from the partial summary judgment I granted on May 22nd to M and M with respect to that same issue?

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MR. SHEVORSKI: I think there may be a question of fact, Your Honor, on timeliness and also whether or not it was served appropriately. I'd have to review that. Candidly, I'm not prepared at this time to determine that. But that decision was made on summary judgment where there was no genuine issue of material fact as to those particular appeals, and I don't think we're in a position here today to review and say there's no question of fact even if there's a properly perfected appeal, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you, Mr. Shevorski.

MR. SHEVORSKI: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Do any of the other defendants in intervention have very short arguments in 13 minutes or less, or should I break for lunch?

MR. BICE: Your Honor, this is Todd Bice on behalf of the Essence parties. The only point I would add will take less than one minute, which is on your last point. The questions about judicial or review by the Department of Tax, I would also add to what Mr. Shevorski said is that those arguments have now been waived. Mr. Slater's clients proceeded to trial on their legal claims. It did not seek that type of relief. And so you

THE COURT: Okay.

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MR. HONE: Your Honor, Eric Hone for Lone Mountain Partners. We have nothing to add either.

THE COURT: I'm getting a consensus from the defendant intervenors that none of you want to argue.

So, Mr. Dzarnoski, we are going to break for lunch, and then at 1:15 we will begin with your rebuttal argument.

Okay?

MR. DZARNOSKI: Okay. 1:15?

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THE COURT: All right. So I'll talk to you guys at 1:15.

(Proceedings recessed at 11:50 a.m. until 1:16 p.m.)

THE COURT: Good afternoon, Counsel.

Mr. Dzarnoski, your rebuttal.

MR. DZARNOSKI: Yes. Good afternoon. Thank you, Your Honor.

My rebuttal is going to be limited primarily to addressing Mr. Shevorski's comments regarding how my clients are aggrieved, and also to discuss briefly the remedy that is available here should we prevail.

First, it is the position, boiled down to its simplest form, of the D.O.T. that my clients did not get a license because their score was not high enough compared to other applications that were scored. I think that might be one thing that all counsel can agree upon as a premise for the — the argument made by the D.O.T.

As I brought out in my initial argument this morning that there is evidence that comes solely from the administrative record that shows that incomplete applications were scored, and those were those RD numbers that attached

pages 21 to them, and showed that even something that was to be determined, as an address, was included in the scoring (indiscernible).

Now, I -- I'd like to start this with an observation that I hope, again, would be uncontested, and that is that -- let's assume for a moment every other application submitted, out of the 462 or 461, if every one of those applications was incomplete for any reason -- whether it be the "to be determined" address, the false address, failure to disclose ownership -- if every one of those was incomplete, then my clients who submitted complete applications would have gotten a license award if this was administered properly.

Okay. I don't know how anybody can argue against that proposition. If my clients were the only ones to submit complete, compliant applications, regardless of whether they scored them or they didn't, if everything else was incomplete, my client should have won. That obviously would make them aggrieved.

THE COURT: But, Mr. Dzarnoski, don't you have to demonstrate a part of the record in this proceeding that each of your clients submitted a complete and compliant application?

MR. DZARNOSKI: Well, you know what, Your Honor, I think that at this stage of the proceedings, since my clients' applications were scored too, the Department made the determination, apparently, that they were complete, just like

everybody else's applications out there.

I mean, I -- my -- my clients, their applications aren't part of the administrative record. I haven't heard that -- I maintain those are complete. The Department has not stated a position that my clients' applications were incomplete. They haven't presented -- there's nothing in the administrative record that says my clients' applications are incomplete.

Their record is my clients' application. I can't go

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Their record is my clients' application. I can't go outside the record to bring any evidence in that my clients', outside the record, was complete. I've been barred from doing so. They've been barred from showing that they're incomplete.

So the question you ask is I -- it's a -- it's a darn good question. But given the rules of the game on judicial review, my clients aren't able to bring in any evidence apart from the application that was submitted.

THE COURT: So let's stop there for a minute. So, for instance, let's use your client, Fidelis, as an example. Fidelis's documents are in the record at what I believe are Volumes I through IV of the record on appeal. How do you demonstrate for me that those applications —

Is Fidelis one of your clients?

MR. DZARNOSKI: Yes.

THE COURT: Okay.

-- that those applications are complete? Since I've

1 got 73 --

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MR. DZARNOSKI: Your Honor, well --

THE COURT: -- volumes, it's a lot.

MR. DZARNOSKI: I'm sorry?

THE COURT: I have 73 volumes of the record. I have the index that I went through at lunch again. But I need you to point to me where in the record your clients have demonstrated that their applications were complete.

MR. DZARNOSKI: By filing the applications themselves. I'm at a loss. The record is the application. There is nothing else other than the application; right?

THE COURT: We are limited to the record that has been filed, all 73 volumes of it.

MR. DZARNOSKI: Okay. Then the only way that I can — then the only way is by implication because my — the only evidence that has been submitted as part of the administrative record by the Department of Taxation, which I think is — I mean, I understand your ruling. I just totally disagree with it because the volume of information that is presented totally by application and solely by the scoring sheets does not provide sufficient information for me to prove that my clients — outside of the fact that they submitted an application and it went to scoring, there is nothing else that they — is in the administrative record. But that's because the State has submitted an administrative record that is

limited solely to application and solely due to the ultimate score sheet. So, I mean, that is the conundrum I have.

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But on the one hand, the State is saying to you over and over again, hey, the administrative record is here. There is nothing wrong with the applications we granted. They all went to scoring. They're complete.

Well, where -- where is there anything in the record to say that those are complete or incomplete? I think I was very fortunate to find amongst the few applications relatively few applications that the D.O.T. submitted that I was actually able to find in the administrative record that clearly an incomplete application was submitted to scoring, and that being the one that had "TBD" in it.

Apart from having an address listed as "TBD," you can't tell whether a company is -- whether the -- it's a public company. You can't -- there's an address that's given. The only address that -- and I can't even -- I can't use that 3219 because you -- even though you and I and the whole world knows that TGIG used an address that was a maildrop because Amanda Connor told them to do that, just as she told her other clients. You know that; I know that; the D.O.T. knows that. But this administrative record does not contain anything that would allow someone to conclude that because all I have is the record.

And I am suggesting to you that this administrative

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record totally -- if this is acceptable, it totally eviscerates any meaningful judicial review that you can do, and it totally eviscerates the rights of my clients to be able to demonstrate to you that they would have gotten a license or should have gotten a license if you remove the incomplete application.

My -- again, if every one of them was incomplete,
Your Honor, my clients would have gotten a license if theirs
was complete. And -- and because we are being limited here to
not being able to go outside the applications of my clients and
other clients who were denied licenses, we cannot present to
you the applications that were in the scoring pool. We've been
precluded from doing that.

And that's where my clients are aggrieved, is they have no ability whatsoever to say to you or prove to you from what was submitted as an administrative record that these applications were incomplete which is why I had to make a proffer and to show you how 68.8 percent of the licenses that were granted should never have been scored at all. But right now we can't consider that.

But we can't consider whether my clients' applications were complete either without going outside the administrative record, and the only thing you can infer is that they are complete because they went into the scoring. And I'm telling you that that inference is -- is what has caused this entire process to be flawed.

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The State has allowed and assumed that everything in the application was -- that was submitted is true even when confronted with overwhelming evidence that what was submitted in the application could not be true. Yet they stand there and say, well, it's -- they swore it was true, and we have to accept it's true. Well, if that's the rules, my clients sworn that their applications -- they were scored, so there's your evidence. I mean, that's the best that I can do.

What the D.O.T. is saying is it does not have to give the Court, it does not have to give my clients an administrative record from which completeness can be determined. That's really where we are at right now. That record, you cannot make a determination of completeness one way or the other as to all of the applicants that were in the pool, all of the applicants that were scored.

But we do know from the record that there were incomplete applications that were in there, and that is not an appropriate -- it doesn't give you the tools, Your Honor, to conduct judicial review on that issue at all.

And I think that brings me to the remedy because I want to make it clear. I think Mr. Shevorski assumed that we were looking for the same do-over on the judicial review, but I don't think we necessarily specified that we were looking for a do-over on (indiscernible). So I certainly (indiscernible) say it in my argument.

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NRS 233B.135 provides you a wealth of remedies. It allows you to remand; it allows you to remand and ask them to do a fuller administrative record. It would allow you to in whole or in part overturn the D.O.T. But I'm not even necessarily suggesting that that's the appropriate remedy given the state of this administrative record.

Given the state of the administrative record, which is that the -- that the D.O.T. has not given you or I a sufficient record to determine how many of those applications that were scored were complete, that what -- and what you ought to do and what I'm asking you to do is to remand to the agency, and ask the agency on remand to develop a further -- a fuller administrative record vis-a-vis the Department of Taxation determining completeness of the applications that were actually scored as of the date of submission of the application. That way the D.O.T. will end up having an administrative record that will show that it looked at the completeness of the applications as of the time that it submitted them, and let the chips fall where they may.

If the D.O.T. ends up finding that, as I have set forth in here, that 68.8 percent of the licenses that were granted were pursuant to applications that were incomplete, well, the D.O.T. -- or now the CCB is going to have to make a decision about what to do about that. But absent a record showing completeness, you can't -- you can't do anything to

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1 help my client.

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But my client is entitled to know that it was in a fair process, that the process was administered according to the statute and the regulation. And all it is trying -- my clients are trying to do is to say, hey, listen, let's look at -- let's see what the -- the completeness of these applications are. Those that were not complete should not have been scored. They should not have been given licenses.

This would not require -- what I'm asking you right now wouldn't even require rescoring necessarily. I mean, if we don't deal with the fact that they didn't score compliance, let's leave that out of the mix. You don't need to rescore. It would use the same scores that were already developed by the Department of Taxation, but you would eliminate from the rankings the 60 -- the however many -- 174 or -- 174 applications that were incomplete. So you would just strike through the names and you could use the same scoring.

But the one issue that is totally outside the realm of judicial review and our ability to prove that our clients should have gotten the license is this issue of completeness. And so I am urging you to do the remand, have the State develop an administrative record.

They can put together a little checklist, and they could say -- they can put on that checklist did -- searched the address on Google. It's a UPS Store. First address here, it's

a UPS Store. Therefore, it's incomplete.

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They can look at the application and see TBD as an address. It's incomplete.

They make it on a checklist. This would not be an extensive project and undertaking for them to do.

It becomes a more extensive undertaking if, in fact, you -- we were asking for and on (indiscernible) ask for, I'm not sure it's necessary, that the scoring itself we obviously believe was inappropriate because it didn't account for things that we think the statute required. Well, so far we lost that determination on Thursday when you issued the order.

But nowhere have we lost an issue on completeness regarding the ownership or on the physical location of the scoring that is mandatorily required by regulation.

But I -- frankly, there -- there'd be no reason to have judicial review if the -- if all the State has to do is submit a record where important issues that -- that they needed to decide were just eliminated from the record, and nobody could go forward to the -- and you couldn't go forward and find out a rational basis for why they did something that is, per se, arbitrary and capricious.

If you have any more questions, I'd be happy to answer them.

THE COURT: So, Mr. Dzarnoski, some of your clients' applications that are part of the administrative record are

more highly redacted than others. In reviewing the administrative record, can you give me any guidance on how I should treat those applications for your clients that are very heavily redacted and those that are redacted very little?

MR. DZARNOSKI: Well, yes. Let -- I'm going to try and answer you first, and then I'd like to make a comment about it. It's always good to answer the question.

THE COURT: Okay.

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MR. DZARNOSKI: First, as to the redactions, the -- my answer is the same thing, I suppose, as it was to your earlier question where it's very closely akin.

The applications, as they were submitted to the Department of Taxation, obviously, were not redacted. So the Department of Taxation reviewed those applications in their unredacted form, and they determined that they were complete or must have assumed they were complete, whatever they did, because they went to scoring. And then they were scored based upon the information that is redacted.

Most of their redactions, by the way, Your Honor, are -- deal with the -- the unidentified portion of the application. And so I've -- we're not necessarily -- we're not challenging the particular score, and nor -- nor are we asking you to look at whether or not they should have given my client 28 points for community -- not community development -- community --

THE COURT: Community impact.

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MR. DZARNOSKI: -- impact. We're not saying my clients should have got 28 versus 30 points. What we're saying is that the guys who got granted licenses, 70 percent of them, 70 percent of them filed incomplete applications.

I don't need to compare my score, my clients' score against their scores. So the redacted information doesn't help you at all in the determination of whether something is complete or incomplete. And it's not an issue that is before you on judicial review that my scores should have been higher. We are not making that argument. So that's the -- I mean, that, I think, answers your question.

And the comment that I wanted to make is that the redactions are -- are entirely a product of the confidentiality rules that were imposed in the governing process, I guess, (indiscernible). I mean, I got applications, for instance, from -- from Essence that I remember looking at -- that somebody in my office -- Hey, I'd like to look at the whole application. I don't remember how many pages, I'm estimating. Mark, I've got 6,000 pages. I said, Okay. Well, maybe I don't want you to print 6,000 pages. Let me look. There's probably about 25 pages that are not redacted.

I mean, that -- at trial there was -- I recall there was a couple exhibits that we entered -- I introduced through, I believe, it was Mr. Britton or Mr. Plaskon, and I had told

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you that the exhibit that we submitted was well over 1,000 pages, and all I asked for was to have my IT person take out those pages that were not redacted. After, you know, 1,100 pages, pulled 21 that were unredacted. So, I mean, that -- the redaction is not somebody or is my client hiding anything meaningful from you. It's the process of this litigation that's been followed from day one [iindiescernible] just by every intervenor.

THE COURT: Well, Mr. Dzarnoski, the problem is -MR. DZARNOSKI: (Indiscernible) the State to produce
the redacted versions to you.

THE COURT: The problem is, Mr. Dzarnoski, you on -your firm on behalf of your clients made a decision as to what
redactions were appropriate or not and informed the Department
of Taxation about that prior to the production of the documents
in the litigation. Those redactions remain in the record as it
was filed on June 12th, 2020, which causes me concern in
evaluating your claims that your clients would have been
successful if I order review by the D.O.T. of what happened
because it's in a redacted form that I can't even draw heads or
tails from on most of.

MR. DZARNOSKI: Let me clarify that. I -- I am not telling you that each of my clients would be -- would get a license under this -- under what I am asking for a remedy. I think I'm specifically telling you I can't do that because the

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administrative record, apart from any redactions -- no redactions are going to change the fact that the administrative record that has been submitted does not allow you and it does not allow us to figure out whether or not the applications submitted by people who won and the people who ranked higher than my (telephonic interference) were complete. And that's the problem, and there's nothing in any redaction that my client has made that answers that question.

It is only if the Department is required on remand to develop a further record to show that they even considered completeness. And they do it, as I said, very, very simply. Here's the address. They can Google it, check it. And they will find, just as I found, that they are UPS Stores, Mail Box Etc. that are -- are covering a vast number of the applications that were granted.

So, you know, when -- when you say would my clients prevail, well, we know that 68 percent of the -- the applicants who were granted licenses are going to be cut off. So at least we're going down, and we need to fill those 68 slots with the next -- or the slots for that 68 percent with the next group of people, but those people have to have submitted complete applications.

And until you finish the completeness inquiry, there is no way to figure out what a reasonable and rational ranking would be for these people that was done in conformity with the

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I mean, I can't make it -- make the evidence up. But I don't want to mislead you. I am not telling you that if you take those redactions out that my client would end up -- each of my clients would end up getting a license. In fact, I -- I think I can tell you with some degree of certainty and some degree of candor that if it got remanded, TGIG in that remand and the further development of the record would probably be determined to have an incomplete application and not be part of the license pool or the scoring pool.

I can tell you that Medicare -- not Medicare -- I'm getting ready to apply.

So MediFarm, MediFarm, in all likelihood, upon a remand, because it is a public -- it is owned by a public company would fail a completeness review and wouldn't end up in the pot to be scored.

But I'm certainly not going to stand up here and try and persuade you or tell you that those two would get licenses. But I've got four or five other (telephonic interference) that are not public companies, that did not use addresses that were false and bogus. I can't prove they're not false and bogus because I'm not allowed to go outside the administrative record. But I can tell you that those clients that would not get out of the -- the completeness -- that would get out of the completeness pool, go into the scoring pool, once you remove

68 percent of the grantees and you eliminate --

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What did I come up with earlier? Like 174 that was just on addresses "to be determined."

-- once you start removing all those things, the list of people whose names appear above my clients on that list disappear, and my client goes up higher. And it's only after that is done that one could say this was a fair legitimate process that complied with the statute and the regulation.

And we're not asking you to make a decision to enjoin anyone. We're not asking you to award my client a license. We're asking you to look at this administrative record and recognize the problem, the problem being that it does not give adequate information to you or us to conduct any kind of meaningful judicial review. And that the only way to conduct that meaningful judicial review is to remand for further fact-finding and see what the D.O.T. comes up with.

If they match my numbers and they say these were all incomplete and they gave Essence and Thrive and some other people licenses pursuant to that when they shouldn't have, I'm -- I don't know that you would be the ultimate person to decide what to do under those circumstances. I suspect the first person -- or the first people that would look at it and develop the administrative record would be the CCB, and they'd say, okay, we granted these licenses, but we shouldn't have. What do we do now? And then two years from now, all of a

sudden there's a phone call, and we'll be back in Court with you to argue about that one problem.

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But -- but that's the remand, and that's the -- the way my client will not be aggrieved and the way that you can -- you can make sure that at a minimum this process was in substantial compliance (telephonic interference) compliance with the statutes and the regulation because we know that as the situation stands now and (indiscernible) everybody on this call and everybody who's read your Order knows that everything wasn't done in a fashion that anybody should be proud of.

And now you can -- you can help my client in giving a remedy simply by remanding for further factual findings on this one particular issue dealing with completeness insofar as it encompasses ownership disclosure, the "to be determined" licensing, and the -- or "to be determined" property location, and to do a search on Google to verify that these addresses that were used are not UPS Stores, P.O. boxes and the like. That's at the very, very minimal request.

It does not seem it would take much time for the D.O.T. It would at least let everybody know what would have happened if the -- if the process and the statutes had been followed. And then we'll -- government agencies and applicants and licensees will have to act accordingly after that remand and the new record is developed, and none of us can say what that way is.

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Dzarnoski.

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Mr. Slater, I've got one question, before you -- before you start your rebuttal portion of the argument.

In looking at the record on appeal that's been filed, all of your client's information is listed as attorney eyes only and is not in the appendix at least as far as I could find because I did not look in all 73 volumes. I looked on the index.

Can you tell me where within the record your client's request for an appeal to the Tax Commission and your rejection of that request for an appeal are located?

MR. SLATER: I can, Your Honor. They are not included in the appeal on record.

THE COURT: Okay. Okay. Is there anything else you want to tell me on the rebuttal?

MR. SLATER: Nothing on my end, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Ms. Sugden, Ms. Chattah, anything?

MS. CHATTAH: Nothing on our end, Judge. We're going to join, at least on my end. I'm going to join with Mr. Dzarnoski.

THE COURT: Ms. Sugden?

MS. SUGDEN: I join as well in -- in TGIG's arguments. But I do want to note that THC Nevada has submitted I believe their complete unredacted application which would show it's complete.

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1	THE COURT: Thank you.
2	MS. SUGDEN: It's listed on the index.
3	THE COURT: Thank you.
4	MS. SUGDEN: Thank you.
5	THE COURT: Anything else?
6	I believe the hearing on Phase I
7	MR. DONATH: Your Honor
8	THE COURT: is now completed. Is there anything
9	else anybody believes we need to do on Phase I?
10	MR. DONATH: Your Honor
11	THE COURT: Besides
12	MR. DONATH: Nick Donath, for Green Leaf Farms,
13	Green Therapeutics, NevCann and Red Earth. To the extent where
14	relevant and applicable, we'd like to join in Mr. Dzarnoski's
15	arguments today. Thank you.
16	THE COURT: Thank you.
17	Anyone else?
18	(No audible response.)
19	THE COURT: All right. The matter will stand
20	submitted.
21	Dulce, if you could put a status check on my chambers
22	calendar a week from Friday.
23	THE CLERK: September 18, chambers.
24	THE COURT: So the next issue for your thought
25	process and consideration relates to Phase 3 of the trial,

which is a jury trial. That is limited to certain 1983 claims that still exist.

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I would like for the State and the remaining plaintiffs who have those claims to give me a status report on what you believe we should do to try and schedule that portion of the trial. And I'm going to set that on the 18th as well for a status check. If you could give me a written status report, please.

And then this Friday, any objections to the release of bond are due. I anticipate there will be at least one objection based on the communications we had last week.

Does anyone think we need an evidentiary hearing as opposed to a hearing with a conference call?

MR. KAHN: Your Honor, this is Jared Kahn for Helping Hands Wellness Center. Thank you.

We are already preparing our objection, as you've noted. We'd like to be forthcoming.

At this stage, Your Honor, an evidentiary hearing may be necessary to determine the amount of damages unless we -- unless you would like to just limit it to the evidence and exhibits that were admitted in the record already in this phase.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. KAHN: Otherwise, we -- we can be prepared to proceed with an evidentiary hearing and schedule that for --

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you're located someplace else most of the time -- that we

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haven't had a jury trial in district court yet, and they're going to try and do some criminal jury trials, and they may try and do a civil jury trial, but they're not making much progress in getting anybody to take us up on the jury courtroom they built over at the Convention Center now that we're gone. So.

All right. Well, I will have a decision out for you, and you all remain well. Thank you again for your professionalism and for providing the information that I need to make a decision on this portion.

Be well. Thank you.

MS. SUGDEN: You as well, Your Honor. (Proceedings concluded at 1:54 p.m.)

## CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE FOREGOING IS A CORRECT TRANSCRIPT FROM THE AUDIO-VISUAL RECORDING OF THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE ABOVE-ENTITLED MATTER.

# **AFFIRMATION**

I AFFIRM THAT THIS TRANSCRIPT DOES NOT CONTAIN THE SOCIAL SECURITY OR TAX IDENTIFICATION NUMBER OF ANY PERSON OR ENTITY.

DANA L. WILLIAMS LAS VEGAS, NEVADA 89183

DANA L. WILLIAMS, TRANSCRIBER

09/08/2020

DATE

	<b>11:19 a.m [1]</b> 56/19	3	<b>68 percent [1]</b> 88/1	acknowledge [4] 35/12
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<b>MR. BICE: [2]</b> 9/4 71/19	<b>11:30</b> [1] 56/16	<b>3 is [2]</b> 15/6 20/4 <b>3 of [1]</b> 45/3	<b>68.8 percent [2]</b> 30/17	acknowledged [4]
MR. DONATH: [3] 91/7	<b>11:50</b> [1] 73/7	<b>30 [3]</b> 58/10 58/11 84/3	43/24	33/20 37/9 38/10 49/22
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MR. DZARNOSKI: [48]	<b>12th [1]</b> 85/17 <b>13 [1]</b> 71/17	<b>3219 [1]</b> 77/17	<b>70 [2]</b> 84/4 84/5	37/12 act [3] 14/15 16/12
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