SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA

86247

Oscar Gomez, Appellant,

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VS.

The State of Nevada, Respondent.

Appeal of Denial of Post-Conviction Relief Eighth Judicial District Court

Appendix to Appellant's Opening Brief, Volume 2

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lawyer about his criminal charge of murder?

- A Since the first day, yes, I was.
- Q Since the first day. All right. Did you ever speak to her about what sentence he might be facing?

A She never brought it up because I used to always ask her what was -- what was going on his case and she would say, we don't have nothing -- nothing yet, nothing yet until he was sentenced here. That's when she brought up that the sentencing, it was 10 years and from 10 years that he could get probation and then he was still young and that's all she said that day.

- Q Okay. And by sentence, what do you -- do you mean the date where he --
- A That he was -- the trial was done right there and then, the last day.
 - Q Okay. Would that have been around April 2018?
- A Well, I don't remember the year, but yeah, it was the last sentence when he was sentenced. I just remember when he used to -- she used to call me and say just have your son take the deal, take the deal. And I go, well, you know, it's not up to me, it's my son's decision, so.
- Q But -- so did she tell you what the deal was before that day in court?
- A Never. She never mentioned what the deal was. She just used to say just have him take the deal.
 - Q Okay. Did you know what the deal was? Did Mr. Gomez talk

| 1 | to you a | bout the deal? |
|----|--|---|
| 2 | Α | He didn't really. It was like it was between them what the deal |
| 3 | was for | him to take. |
| 4 | Q | Okay, so |
| 5 | Α | Go to court or take the deal, but I don't remember the if you |
| 6 | know, no | o years, no nothing. |
| 7 | Q | So you didn't know that until this day in court? |
| 8 | А | Yes. |
| 9 | Q | And how did you find out about it? Did Ms. Levy talk to you |
| 10 | about it | then? |
| 11 | А | When the judge announced that it was 10 years. |
| 12 | Q | When the judge announced 10 years. |
| 13 | Α | Yes. |
| 14 | Q | That was your understanding. |
| 15 | А | Yes, that was my understanding and after when she took us to |
| 16 | the back room and told us, you know, this is what a 10 years when he | |
| 17 | done his | s 10 years then you can he can go for probation. He's still |
| 18 | young like she used to say. | |
| 19 | Q | And who is this she in that sentence? |
| 20 | Α | Ms. Levy. |
| 21 | Q | Ms. Levy. Thank you. So she told you that day |
| 22 | Α | Mm-hmm. |
| 23 | Q | 10 years and then probation? |
| 24 | Α | Yes. |
| 25 | Q | What did you understand about the weapon enhancement? |

A The weapon enhancement never -- I didn't never thought or anything about it because it wasn't mentioned to me that he was going to be charged more years for that.

Q Okay. And then how would you describe your relationship with Ms. Levy? Was it -- was there a lot of conflict? Excuse me.

A Well, since the first day when I met her, I did ask her about the situation of how my son's case was or how was it going? And I asked her what do you think his -- how is it? Is it really bad or if I could get another attorney that would help her -- would help him. So that's when we were sitting in the table and she just like threw her card -- her card at -- on top of the table and threw it in the top of the table. And she said, well, where I work we defended Mayweather and we got him out through what his problems were?

So since then I thought she, you know, that tension that she didn't like me saying that -- that conversation what I told her. And every time that I would call her and ask about how the situation in my son's case was, it was like it's the same, it's the same. That's the only thing I would hear from her.

- Q Okay. So you would say it was not a good relationship?
- A Not really.
- Q Okay.

MR. HOFFMAN: All right. I have nothing further.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you very much.

Cross-examination?

MR. PALAL: No, Your Honor.

| 1 | THE COURT: All right. Then I have no questions for you. |
|----|--|
| 2 | May we release this witness at this time? |
| 3 | MR. HOFFMAN: Yes. |
| 4 | THE COURT: All right. Thank you for being present. You |
| 5 | may step down and you're welcome to stay in the courtroom now that |
| 6 | you've already testified. |
| 7 | THE WITNESS: Okay. Can I add something? Is that okay or |
| 8 | no? |
| 9 | THE COURT: Maybe. I'll hear the question. |
| 10 | THE WITNESS: On another case well, that the same |
| 11 | thing is she had called me and told me that my son was gonna get |
| 12 | deported because he wasn't born here, that he was from Guatemala. |
| 13 | THE COURT: Okay. So I'm going to stop you there. There's |
| 14 | no question pending. |
| 15 | THE WITNESS: Oh, okay. |
| 16 | THE COURT: And that would be additional evidence being |
| 17 | received outside of the record. |
| 18 | THE WITNESS: Okay. Okay. It's fine. |
| 19 | THE COURT: Okay. So that's why I wanted to know what the |
| 20 | question was, but I can't consider that, okay. |
| 21 | THE WITNESS: Okay. |
| 22 | THE COURT: All right. You may step down. |
| 23 | THE WITNESS: Thank you. |
| 24 | THE COURT: Thank you very much. |
| 25 | Mr. Hoffman, you may call your next witness. |

| 1 | MR. HOFFMAN: Next, I would like to call Isabel Gomez. |
|----|---|
| 2 | THE COURT: Isabel Gomez. Thank you. |
| 3 | Good afternoon. Come on up, you're going to come up right |
| 4 | up to this chair here and if you can remain standing. |
| 5 | ISABEL GOMEZ |
| 6 | [having been called as a witness and being first duly sworn, testified as |
| 7 | follows:] |
| 8 | THE WITNESS: I do. |
| 9 | THE CLERK: Thank you. Please be seated. If you could |
| 10 | state and spell your name for the record, please. |
| 11 | THE WITNESS: Isabel Gomez. |
| 12 | THE COURT: And spell your name for us. |
| 13 | THE WITNESS: I-S-A-B-E-L, and then Gomez, G-O-M-E-Z. |
| 14 | THE COURT: All right. Thank you. And good afternoon, |
| 15 | again, just make sure you're speaking into that microphone and if we |
| 16 | have any questions, we'll follow up with you. |
| 17 | Mr. Hoffman, when you're ready. |
| 18 | MR. HOFFMAN: Thank you. |
| 19 | DIRECT EXAMINATION |
| 20 | BY MR. HOFFMAN: |
| 21 | Q So how are you related to Oscar Gomez? |
| 22 | A He's my brother. |
| 23 | Q He's your brother. And did you ever speak to his attorney |
| 24 | about his criminal case? |
| 25 | A No, that was mainly my mother and my sister. |

| 1 | Q | Okay. Did you speak with her on the day that he was pled |
|----|------------|--|
| 2 | guilty? | |
| 3 | Α | Yes. |
| 4 | Q | You did. Could you tell us about that well, did that |
| 5 | conversa | ation involve the deal, the sentence structure? |
| 6 | Α | No. It was about my pregnancy. |
| 7 | Q | It was about your pregnancy? |
| 8 | Α | Correct. |
| 9 | Q | What was it a was it a professional comment to make? |
| 10 | Α | No, it was not. |
| 11 | Q | Wasn't so did she tell you how long your brother was going |
| 12 | to do in p | orison? |
| 13 | Α | She said the max he would be doing is about 10 years and |
| 14 | then for | the gun enhancement at least 2 to 4 years. |
| 15 | Q | Okay. So she said there was a there was two separate |
| 16 | sentence | es? |
| 17 | Α | Correct. |
| 18 | Q | Did she say that they would run together or separately? |
| 19 | Α | That I don't recall. |
| 20 | Q | Okay. |
| 21 | | MR. HOFFMAN: That's all I have, Your Honor. I'm done. |
| 22 | | THE COURT: All right. Thank you very much. |
| 23 | | Mr. Palal, cross-examination? |
| 24 | | MR PALAL: Yes |

| 1 | | CROSS-EXAMINATION |
|----|---------------|--|
| 2 | BY MR. | PALAL: |
| 3 | Q | So your understanding of the sentence that your brother was |
| 4 | going to | get was that there was a 10 year sentence; is that right? |
| 5 | Α | Mm-hmm. |
| 6 | Q | Is that a yes? |
| 7 | Α | Correct. |
| 8 | Q | Okay. |
| 9 | Α | Sorry. |
| 10 | Q | And then that's okay. |
| 11 | | THE COURT: Thank you. |
| 12 | BY MR. PALAL: | |
| 13 | Q | And then there was a possible added time for the gun |
| 14 | enhance | ement? |
| 15 | А | Correct. |
| 16 | Q | Okay. In fact, you wrote a letter to try and help your brother |
| 17 | as part o | of his petition. Do you remember doing that? |
| 18 | Α | Correct. |
| 19 | | MR. PALAL: In fact, Your Honor, it's already, I imagine, part |
| 20 | of the re | cord because it's an attachment to the Defendant's petition, but |
| 21 | I want to | mark it if that's okay. |
| 22 | | THE COURT: That's fine. So this will be |
| 23 | | MR. HOFFMAN: Which C? |
| 24 | | MR. PALAL: Exhibit C. |
| 25 | | MR. HOFFMAN: Okay, thank you. |

| 1 | | THE COURT: State's Exhibit 1 for purposes of the |
|----|-----------|--|
| 2 | evidentia | ary hearing. And I'm sorry, what was the exhibit number for the |
| 3 | attachm | ent, it's C? |
| 4 | | MR. PALAL: C. |
| 5 | | THE COURT: C, that's right, okay, thank you. |
| 6 | | MR. PALAL: And may I approach, Your Honor? |
| 7 | | THE COURT: You may. |
| 8 | BY MR. | PALAL: |
| 9 | Q | And I wrote Exhibit C, but that's not you that wrote it, right? |
| 10 | That's n | ot you. |
| 11 | Α | No. |
| 12 | Q | Okay. But this is your letter; is that right? |
| 13 | Α | Correct. |
| 14 | Q | All right. And I just want to go it over with you. You said his |
| 15 | understa | anding, as was ours, is that he would be sentenced for 10 years, |
| 16 | plus an | added two for gun enhancement charges. |
| 17 | Α | Correct. |
| 18 | Q | And is that what your understanding was? |
| 19 | Α | Correct. |
| 20 | Q | And you say that it was his understanding and yours. When |
| 21 | you're s | aying his, you're talking about your brother? |
| 22 | Α | Correct. |
| 23 | Q | How did you know what his understanding was? |
| 24 | Α | We when he's talking when we'd speak over the phone, |
| 25 | he does | say the same thing we agreed on. That he was max 10 years. |

| 1 | plus the | two for the gun enhancement. |
|----|----------|---|
| 2 | Q | Okay. So he was when he talked to you, he was aware that |
| 3 | the gun | enhancement was consecutive? With plus the gun he had |
| 4 | to serve | some time for the gun enhancement. |
| 5 | Α | Well, the we took it as it was included with the 10 because |
| 6 | she said | l it as a max of 12 years, 10 to 12 years. |
| 7 | Q | Okay, so you took it as it would be part of the sentence, but it |
| 8 | was moi | re than going to be it was going to be more than 10 years. |
| 9 | Α | Correct. |
| 10 | Q | And that's what he was and you got that understanding from |
| 11 | your bro | ther; is that right? |
| 12 | Α | Mm-hmm. |
| 13 | Q | Is that a yes? |
| 14 | Α | Correct, yes, sorry. |
| 15 | Q | Because you didn't talk to Ms. Levy and you really didn't talk |
| 16 | about ar | ny types of sentencing? |
| 17 | Α | No, I didn't. |
| 18 | | MR. PALAL: State has nothing further. |
| 19 | | THE COURT: All right. Thank you. |
| 20 | | Mr. Hoffman, any redirect examination? |
| 21 | | MR. HOFFMAN: Yeah, just a little bit. |
| 22 | | REDIRECT EXAMINATION |
| 23 | BY MR. | HOFFMAN: |
| 24 | Q | I just want to make sure I have this clear. So Ms. Levy your |
| 25 | or so | rry, your understanding from your brother was that there was this |

| 1 | 10 year | sentence, 10 years plus sentence, for the murder and this 2 |
|----|---|---|
| 2 | years pl | us sentence for the gun enhancement charges? |
| 3 | Α | Correct. |
| 4 | Q | And you understood that those were to go one after the other |
| 5 | or togetl | ner? |
| 6 | Α | That I'm not too sure, we I took it as, you know, as together. |
| 7 | Q | Okay. So it wasn't really clear to you? |
| 8 | Α | Correct, no. |
| 9 | Q | Did it seem like it was clear to him? |
| 10 | Α | It sounded like he was sure of what she was sentencing him |
| 11 | with. | |
| 12 | Q | Okay. But he didn't use any words like consecutive, he didn't |
| 13 | clearly express to you that it was going to be one after the other? | |
| 14 | Α | No. |
| 15 | Q | Okay. |
| 16 | | MR. HOFFMAN: No further questions. |
| 17 | | THE COURT: All right. And any recross based on the follow |
| 18 | up ques | tions? |
| 19 | | MR. PALAL: No, Your Honor. But before I submit, I would |
| 20 | like to move State's Exhibit 1 into evidence. | |
| 21 | | THE COURT: Any objection, Mr. Hoffman? |
| 22 | | MR. HOFFMAN: What's that one again? |
| 23 | | MR. PALAL: It's the letter. It's the Exhibit C from the petition. |
| 24 | | MR. HOFFMAN: Oh, okay, Exhibit C. Yeah, no objection. |
| 25 | | THE COURT: All right. This will be so admitted. And of |

| 1 | course it is also part of the petition, so I can consider it in my decision |
|----|---|
| 2 | here today. |
| 3 | [STATE'S EXHIBIT 1 ADMITTED] |
| 4 | THE COURT: Thank you, Ms. Gomez; I have no questions for |
| 5 | you. You may step down and you're welcome to stay in the courtroom |
| 6 | now that you have finished testifying. |
| 7 | THE WITNESS: Thank you. |
| 8 | THE COURT: Do you have another witness to call? |
| 9 | MR. HOFFMAN: Yes. Maria Gomez. |
| 10 | THE COURT: Maria Gomez. All right. |
| 11 | MARIA GOMEZ |
| 12 | [having been called as a witness and being first duly sworn, testified as |
| 13 | follows:] |
| 14 | THE CLERK: Thank you. Please be seated. If you could |
| 15 | state and spell your name for the record, please. |
| 16 | THE WITNESS: Question? He called me by Gomez. Does it |
| 17 | matter my license because my license is different? |
| 18 | THE COURT: Do you go by Gomez? |
| 19 | THE WITNESS: Well, I'm in the process of changing that, so, |
| 20 | yeah. |
| 21 | THE COURT: Okay. That's fine. You can give both names, |
| 22 | it's no problem. Maria is that common spelling? |
| 23 | THE WITNESS: Maria Castro. |
| 24 | THE COURT: Castro. |
| 25 | THE WITNESS: And it's Maria Gomez. |

| 1 | | THE COURT: C-A-S-T-R-O? |
|----|----------|---|
| 2 | | THE WITNESS: Yes. |
| 3 | | THE COURT: All right. And/or Gomez. |
| 4 | | THE WITNESS: Yes. |
| 5 | | THE COURT: That's fine. No problem. |
| 6 | | So when you're ready, Mr. Hoffman, you may begin your |
| 7 | examina | tion. |
| 8 | | MR. HOFFMAN: Thank you. |
| 9 | | DIRECT EXAMINATION |
| 10 | BY MR. | HOFFMAN: |
| 11 | Q | So what is your relationship with Oscar Gomez? |
| 12 | Α | I'm his older sister. |
| 13 | Q | His older sister. Did you speak to his lawyer, Monti Levi about |
| 14 | his case | ? |
| 15 | Α | Yes. |
| 16 | Q | Were you one of the primary people speaking to her about the |
| 17 | case? | |
| 18 | Α | Yes. |
| 19 | Q | Did you ever discuss potential sentences he would receive? |
| 20 | Α | Yes. |
| 21 | Q | Okay. What was the content of those discussions? |
| 22 | Α | She said it was going to be 10 to 25, possibility of parole at |
| 23 | 10. For | the gun charges, she said 2 to 4 years. The maximum he would |
| 24 | do was 1 | 12 years, 12 to 14 years. |
| 25 | Q | Okay. So were those |

| 1 | | THE COURT: I'm sorry. 12 to what? |
|----|-------------|---|
| 2 | | THE WITNESS: 12 to 14 years. |
| 3 | | THE COURT: 14. Okay. |
| 4 | | I'm sorry to interrupt you. Go ahead. |
| 5 | | MR. HOFFMAN: Oh, no, it's fine. |
| 6 | BY MR. I | HOFFMAN: |
| 7 | Q | So were those 12 to 14 years, that's what she told you? |
| 8 | Α | Yeah, she said |
| 9 | Q | Were those specific words she used? |
| 10 | Α | Yeah, she said the max he would do would be 12 to 14 |
| 11 | because | he's still young. |
| 12 | Q | Okay. So you're what was your understanding of when he |
| 13 | would ge | t out? |
| 14 | Α | To me it was the 10 to 25 and maybe possibility of parole at |
| 15 | 10. | |
| 16 | Q | Okay. Okay. So you viewed as just one kind of lump sentence |
| 17 | is that fai | r? |
| 18 | Α | Yeah. |
| 19 | Q | Did you understand that it was two different sentences? |
| 20 | Α | No. Well, you see the thing there was the gun enhancement, |
| 21 | they told | me there was no evidence, so I didn't see why that would be |
| 22 | added to | the sentence. |
| 23 | Q | So then did you think that the 12 to 14 was just for the murder |
| 24 | charge? | |
| 25 | Α | No. With the guns the gun enhancement if |

| 1 | Q | with the gun enhancement. |
|----|---|--|
| 2 | Α | Yes. |
| 3 | Q | Okay. |
| 4 | Α | If there was that charge. |
| 5 | Q | Okay. |
| 6 | | THE COURT: I'm sorry. I want to make sure I have a clear |
| 7 | record he | ere. So you said there was no evidence, but someone told you |
| 8 | that? | |
| 9 | | THE WITNESS: Her detective, her in |
| 10 | | THE COURT: Oh, her investigator. |
| 11 | | THE WITNESS: investigator. |
| 12 | | THE COURT: And when you're saying her, you mean Monti |
| 13 | Levy? | |
| 14 | | THE WITNESS: Okay. Thank you. |
| 15 | | Go ahead, Mr. Hoffman. |
| 16 | BY MR. HOFFMAN: | |
| 17 | Q | Okay. Without going into specific examples, would you say |
| 18 | that your family had a good relationship with Ms. Levy or a difficult | |
| 19 | relationship? | |
| 20 | Α | Difficult. |
| 21 | Q | Difficult. Okay. |
| 22 | | MR. HOFFMAN: I have no further questions. |
| 23 | | THE COURT: All right. Cross-examination. |
| 24 | | MR. PALAL: Yes, Your Honor. |

| 1 | | CROSS-EXAMINATION |
|----|---|---|
| 2 | BY MR. | PALAL: |
| 3 | Q | Ma'am, do you prefer Ms. Gomez or Ms. Castro? |
| 4 | Α | Ms. Gomez is fine. |
| 5 | Q | Okay. Ms. Gomez, I just want to understand a little bit of what |
| 6 | you're sa | aying. So your understanding was your brother was going to |
| 7 | plead gu | uilty to second degree murder; is that fair? |
| 8 | Α | The second degree murder she didn't mention that to me. |
| 9 | Q | Okay. So you didn't know exactly what he was pleading to? |
| 10 | Α | Yeah, because to her well, she had told me it was first |
| 11 | degree murder. | |
| 12 | Q | Okay. |
| 13 | Α | So that was my understanding. |
| 14 | Q | Okay. So she had told you first degree murder? |
| 15 | Α | Mm-hmm. |
| 16 | Q | Is that a yes? |
| 17 | Α | Yes. Sorry. |
| 18 | Q | And your understanding was when the plea was done, he |
| 19 | would have to do 10 years, 10 to 25 years; is that right? | |
| 20 | Α | Yes. |
| 21 | Q | Okay. And then he would have to do an additional 2 or 4 |
| 22 | years? | |
| 23 | Α | Yes. |
| 24 | Q | So he would probably he'd be up for parole around 12 or 14 |
| 25 | years. | |

| 1 | Α | No, that's what I didn't understand. |
|----|--|---|
| 2 | Q | Oh, so you didn't understand exactly how it was all going to |
| 3 | work? | |
| 4 | Α | No, not after the 10 years, no, because she said the parole |
| 5 | would be | e at 10. |
| 6 | Q | Okay. |
| 7 | Α | So that's where I got confused and she didn't explain the rest. |
| 8 | Q | Okay. So you didn't understand, but you did think he like |
| 9 | there was the additional 2 or 4 years? | |
| 10 | Α | Yes. |
| 11 | Q | Okay. And that's and then you had some questions about |
| 12 | the gun | enhancement because you didn't think there you were told |
| 13 | there wasn't any evidence of a gun. | |
| 14 | Α | Yes. |
| 15 | Q | Okay. |
| 16 | | MR. PALAL: All right. That's all I have, thank you. |
| 17 | | THE COURT: All right. Thank you. |
| 18 | | Any redirect examination? |
| 19 | | MR. HOFFMAN: No, thank you. |
| 20 | | THE COURT: All right. Thank you very much. |
| 21 | | I don't have any questions for you, so you may step down. |
| 22 | And you're welcome to stay in the courtroom as you have now testified. | |
| 23 | | Mr. Hoffman, do you have any additional witnesses to call? |
| 24 | | MR. HOFFMAN: No, Your Honor. |
| 25 | | THE COURT: All right. Well. I'll briefly I've read all the |

briefing and I've heard the evidence here today. I'll hear brief argument. I'll start with Mr. Hoffman. This is your motion.

MR. HOFFMAN: Yes, Your Honor. So basically the theory that we have here is that Ms. Levy did a good job in most respects. Like she said, she's been doing this for a long time, but I -- there were some areas where they disagreed about what the conversation was and what happened. And our argument is that part of this was due to she's just filling in the blanks of her memory with how she usually does it; she usually does a good job, so she remembered doing a good job this time.

Part of it also I think they had a very difficult relationship with Mr. Gomez's family, there were some comments that Ms. Levy made that, you know, were eluded to and referenced in the letter. That's the State's Exhibit 1/Exhibit C. And so the other, kind of, point I would make is that I think Ms. Levy was sort of very eager to be done with this and just, sort of, didn't cross all of her T's and dot all of her I's in explaining the offer to Mr. Gomez.

And, specifically, it was this question of was it consecutive, was it concurrent, how did he understand that? Like she said she had to explain it to him a lot of times, he had never been in the prison system before; he didn't have a good education. He -- she should have done a better job of making sure that he understood the difference between consecutive and concurrent. I know that's sort of a fine point in what was otherwise mostly good work from her, but I think it was unfortunately a very crucial point that he did not have get.

And so that is ineffective assistance of counsel and I'd ask the

Court to vacate on that basis.

THE COURT: Let me ask you this question, Mr. Hoffman, understanding the arguments and then the theory that you're advancing. How do I rectify that theory with the record of the discussions and the actual plea itself that explains the consequences of the plea?

MR. HOFFMAN: So I think like Mr. Gomez said, he felt very pressured, he felt like he had to rush through it. He, you know, -- the Judge asked him 20 or 30 questions and he just had to say, yes, I understand to each of them. I would argue that that wasn't really a situation that would produce actual understanding on his point. You can see if you look at the record that, like, literally Mr. Palal had to run up and get a copy of the guilty plea agreement and then he had, you know, like, I think he just didn't have a lot of time to process it and actually understand it.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. Anything else you would like to argue?

MR. HOFFMAN: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Mr. Palal.

MR. PALAL: Yes, Your Honor, I'm not going to belabor the point, but there's a few points I would like to make. I think what the transcripts reflect is October 17th of 2017; an offer was made, put on the record, second with use -- second degree murder with use of a deadly weapon. So while there's this implication, you know, some kind of rush to understand this deal, this isn't a situation where the deal changed,

which sometimes this Court I'm sure has seen. You're at calendar call, there's some tweaks to a deal in order to get a deal down prior to trial.

In this instance, the offer on October 17th, 2017, was the same offer on April 19th, 2018. So we're talking about six months with the same offer standing. So I don't think it's plausible to say that there was no time to consider what the deal was. I mean, there may have been pressure because, hey, look, we're two days before trial and ultimately you have to make a decision, but that decision wasn't brought to him on that day, that decision was six months in the making.

This Court already mentioned reading the transcript. My interpretation of the transcript is very early on Judge Adair -- so before the GPA even arrives, Judge Adair canvases the Defendant on what the ranges of possibilities are. That's -- what I reference was on page seven of the April 19th, 2018 transcript, is where she goes over the time ranges and is specific, right, in terms a person can understand. The least amount of time I can give you on the bottom end is 11 years; the most amount of time I could give you on the top end is 18 years. He indicates he understands. And this is very early in the canvas, so this isn't after having waived all his constitutional rights, all the pro-formal language that this Court has to go through every time it enters a plea.

And then -- so then -- and that hearing gets trailed and that on page ten you'll see, the hearing gets trailed at 9:46 a.m. and it's resumed at 10:09 a.m. And that was, as defense counsel appropriately brings up, was the time that we were typing up the GPA, but the understanding of the sentence structure was discussed prior to that.

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And then he has another out, right, because then he's -- after the canvas is given about the sentence structure, there's 25 minutes. He can decide not to sign the GPA at that point, he can decide during the canvas, subsequent canvas, and say I'm not pleading guilty. So it's not -- these questions didn't have -- didn't happen consecutively. There's a 25 minute break where he could have just said, no, I'm feeling pressure or, no, I don't want this deal.

The last thing I want to talk about is what happened today, which is -- I understand defense counsel's argument that Ms. Levy is filling in the blanks because what her normal practice is versus what happened specifically here. And in some instances, in these types of hearings, that's true. But Ms. Levy appeared to have -- the record I think will reflect that Ms. Levy had a very specific recollection of this client because of, as Mr. Hoffman brings up, his lack of criminal history that she -- Ms. Levy said, she thought it was very important to review the sentencing ranges of him and she said in her words, it's the most she's gone over sentencing ranges with any client in her 19 years of experience. So that phrasing, I think, belies any notion that this is filling in the blanks, to -- I think clearly to that is an independent recollection.

And the very last thing I'll bring up, Your Honor, is that while Mr. Gomez sits here and says, you know, he was -- has absolute certainty that there was 10 years on the bottom, even his own witnesses lack that certainty, right. So I don't think there's any -- the record shows that there's no certainty when it comes to that. In fact the opposite, Ms. Levy says it's the opposite. The other witnesses say, no, we do not

indicate that 10 years was a certainty on the bottom, quite the contrary.

Now, the range may not be exactly 18, but certainly it's clear that there was an understanding that it's beyond that. So unless this Court has any further inquiry for the State, I'll submit.

THE COURT: I don't. I don't have any inquiry at this time.

So I would like to consider the testimony presented here today and,
again, go back and review the information provided through the petition.

So the family understands, I read, I prepare, I then go back and re-read before I make any decision on matters such as this and then I'll issue a minute order with my decision. I'm going to place this on my chamber's calendar -- actually, no -- yeah, I'm going to set this on for my -- actually, I'll set it on a regular Friday calendar.

Mr. Hoffman, if Mr. Gomez wants to be transported for purposes of that decision, he's welcome to or I can waive his presence for purposes of a decision and that'll be on Friday, September -- actually, I have another decision due on the ninth. So I'm going to issue my decision on or -- actually, on September 17th, 1:30 p.m. This will be set for decision.

Again, Mr. Gomez can be brought down or he can -- his presence can be waived and I'll pronounce my decision on the record and Mr. Hoffman can advise the family or they're welcome to come as well. And you'll also have the option of attending via BlueJeans, which is the online system that the attorney testified to as well. So you'll have some options. All right.

Anything else we need to address this afternoon?

| 1 | MR. PALAL: Nothing from the State, Your Honor. |
|----|---|
| 2 | THE COURT: Okay. All right. Thank you, all, very much. |
| 3 | Take care and safe travels to the family. |
| 4 | Mr. Gomez, you take care, all right. |
| 5 | THE DEFENDANT: Thank you. |
| 6 | THE COURT: Thank you. |
| 7 | [Proceeding concluded at 12:46 p.m.] |
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| 20 | ATTEST: I do hereby certify that I have truly and correctly transcribed |
| 21 | the audio/video proceedings in the above-entitled case to the best of my ability. Please note: Technical glitches in the BlueJeans audio/video, |
| 22 | which resulted in distortion and/or audio cutting out completely were experienced and are reflected in the transcript. |
| 23 | experienced and are remoted in the transcript. |
| 24 | Katum Tags |
| 25 | Robin Page Court Recorder/Transcriber |
| | |

DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

Writ of Habeas Corpus COURT MINUTES September 17, 2021

A-20-815035-W Oscar Gomez, Plaintiff(s)

VS.

State of Nevada, Defendant(s)

September 17, 2021 01:30 PM Decision

HEARD BY: Silva, Cristina D. COURTROOM: RJC Courtroom 11B

COURT CLERK: Schlitz, Kory RECORDER: Villani, Gina

REPORTER:

PARTIES PRESENT:

James I. Hoffman Attorney for Plaintiff

JOURNAL ENTRIES

Defendant not present and in custody in the Nevada Department of Corrections; Deputy District Attorney Michelle Fleck present on behalf of the State.

COURT ORDERED, Defendant's presence WAIVED as he requested not to be transported for the hearing. COURT STATED a hearing was conducted regarding the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, and the Court heard testimony in regards to whether the Defendant understood the terms of his negotiations, specifically the consecutive time to follow the second with use, and consecutive time with regards to the deadly weapon enhancement. COURT FURTHER STATED there was testimony from his prior attorney Monti Levy who testified she visited the Defendant over twenty times, discussed the sentence with the Defendant multiple times, and discussed sentencing ranges, adding she testified she wrote down the sentencing ranges in order to explain the consequences of the plea, and the explanation of the deadly weapon, and the consequences of the enhancement. COURT ADDITIONALLY STATED there was representations there was not a good relationship between Ms. Levy and the Defendant's family, however it did not impact her conveyance of offer; adding testimony was heard from Defendant, who testified Ms. Levy did not explain what the deadly weapon enhancement meant, and what it could run consecutive or concurrent, adding the sentence was no explained to Defendant. COURT ORDERED, Post Conviction Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus DENIED, and FINDS Ms. Levy's testimony to be credible, that the sentence and the consequences of the sentence were explained to the Defendant, not only prior to change of plea, however by Mr. Palal as well in terms of how the sentences would run. Mr. Hoffman stated the Defendant filed three Post Conviction Petitions and requested the Court include their rulings on the other aspects of the Petition when they prepare the order, not just regarding the evidentiary hearing.

NDC

Printed Date: 9/23/2021 Page 1 of 1 Minutes Date: September 17, 2021

Prepared by: Kory Schlitz

Electronically Filed
10/21/2021 5:43 PM
Steven D. Grierson
CLERK OF THE COURT

NOASC
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ATTORNEY FOR OSCAR GOMEZ

EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

| Plaintiff, | (C-16-316959-1) | | | |
|---|------------------|--|--|--|
| vs. | Department IX | | | |
| OSCAR GOMEZ, | | | | |
| Defendant | NOTICE OF APPEAL | | | |
| Notice is hereby given that OSCAR GOMEZ, by and through his | | | | |
| counsel JIM HOFFMAN, appeals the denial of his PCR petitions orally announced | | | | |

but not yet reduced to writing by the District Court on September 17, 2021.

DATED: October 21, 2021

/s/ Jim Hoffman

JIM HOFFMAN, ESQ.

NOTICE OF APPEAL - 1

PCR 271

ELECTRONICALLY SERVED 12/6/2021 4:51 PM

Electronically Filed 12/06/2021 4:51 PM CLERK OF THE COURT

DECN Judge Cristina D. Silva

Eighth Judicial District Court

Petitioner,

Respondent.

Department IX

Regional Justice Center

200 Lewis Avenue

Las Vegas, Nevada 89155

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EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

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OSCAR GOMEZ,

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-VS-

STATE OF NEVADA,

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CLĂRK COUNTY, NEVADA

CASE NO:

A-20-815035-W

DEPT NO:

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DECISION

On September 17, 2021, the Court orally pronounced its decision denying Omar Gomez's Post-Conviction Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Memorandum of Points and Authorities¹ (hereinafter referred to generally as the "Petition"). The Court hereby issues this written Order reflecting the Court's decision.

Summary of Facts and Relevant Procedural History I.

As a threshold matter, the Court adopts the summary of facts set forth in the Pre-Sentence Investigation report. See PSR at 4.

On April 19, 2018, Petitioner pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement to Murder (Second Degree) With Use of a Deadly Weapon. The State of Nevada retained the full right to argue at sentencing. See Guilty Plea Agreement ("GPA") at 1. The GPA set forth the potential penalties the Petitioner could face as a consequence of his plea. Id. at 2. The Defendant was sentenced on July 14,

¹Mr. Gomez filed the Memorandum of Points and Authorities as a supplement to his Post-Conviction Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

2018. During sentencing, the State of Nevada asked for the maximum potential sentence, this is 10 – life followed by another 8 – 20 for the deadly weapon enhancement. *See* Jul. 14, 2018 Sentencing Transcript at 2.

On June 14, 2018, Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal in the underlying case. On May 15, 2019, the Nevada Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner's Judgement of Conviction. Remittur issued on June 20, 2019.²

On May 14, 2020, Petitioner filed, pro per, a post-conviction writ of habeas corpus. In sum, Petitioner set forth four grounds for post-conviction relief. First, he argued that his guilty plea was invalid due to counsel's failure to investigate the case. *See generally* PWHC at 8. Second, Mr. Gomez argues that his guilty plea is invalid due to counsel's failure to fully explain his guilty plea agreement. *Id.* at 10. Third, Petitioner argued his guilty plea was the product of coercion at the hands of his attorney's actions, or lack thereof. *Id.* at 24. Fourth and related to the second ground set forth above, Petitioner finally claims that counsel was ineffective for failing to file a presentence Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea. *Id.* at 30-31. The Petition requested an evidentiary hearing to address the allegations set forth therein.

On October 13, 2020, Judge Valerie Adair issued a minute order advising an evidentiary hearing would be scheduled on the sole issue of whether counsel failed to inform Mr. Gomez that he faced consecutive time for the deadly weapon enhancement. A review of the docket reveals due to transport and remote appearance issues, an evidentiary hearing on that issue did not occur in 2020. This Court appointed counsel to assist Mr. Gomez in March of 2021. There were several attempts to schedule the evidentiary hearing throughout 2021, but factors including the Petitioner's desire to appear in-person for the hearing, caused additional delay. On August 20, 2021, the Court held the evidentiary hearing. Mr. Gomez was present for the hearing via BlueJeans video-conferencing from

² See Gomez. v. State Case No. 76487.

³ This Court was reassigned this matter following Judge Adair's retirement in January of 2021.

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the Clark County Detention Center for the hearing. The Court heard testimony from Mr. Gomez, Mr. Gomez's former attorney, Monti Levy, Mr. Gomez's mother, and Mr. Gomez's sister. The following is a summary of the testimony from the evidentiary hearing.

a. Monti Levy's Testimony

Monti Levy has been an attorney for almost 19 years. Transcript (hereinafter "T.") at 7; 26. She has spent almost her entire career practicing criminal law. Id. Ms. Levy was appointed to Mr. Gomez's case sometime in 2016. *Id.* She met with the petitioner numerous times during the time she represented him, noting she visited with the Petitioner over 20 times between the time she was appointed to time Gomez was sentenced. T. at 8. She recalled numerous meetings during which she met with the Petitioner either with investigator or with another attorney from her office. Id. Ms. Levy noted she met with the Petitioner more times that she had with any other defendant during her career. T. at 23-24. During the course of her representation, she received plea offers from the State, which she conveyed to the Petitioner. See generally T. at 10-13. She specifically testified regarding reviewing an offer within after October of 2017, during which she went over potential sentencing ranges, including the 40% rule, and that she would quiz the Petitioner to make sure he understood the potential consequences of accepting the offer. T. at 10-11; 18; 22-23; 27. Ms. Levy also testified she discussed the potential defenses with Petitioner, the "best" argument they could present if the matter proceeded to trial, and the possible outcomes if convicted at trial. See generally T. at 14-18; 20-22. To the best of Ms. Levy's recollection, she was prepared to announce ready for trial at calendar call, but Petitioner changed his mind and accepted the State's offer. T. at 19. Ms. Levy testified that the Petitioner "absolutely understood" the terms of the plea agreement. T. at 23-24. Ms. Levy testified Mr. Gomez has been going back and forth on whether or not to accept the State's offer. T. at 24-25. She further testified that she and the prosecutor discussed the terms of the

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plea with the Defendant in open court. T. at 25. Last, she noted that there was never a question about consecutive time. *Id.*

b. Oscar Gomez's Testimony

Mr. Gomez testified on his own behalf during the evidentiary hearing. Mr. Gomez agreed that Ms. Levy had met with him multiple times and that they had discussed a range of sentences. T. at 33-34. He testified that they discussed the potential sentence range for a plea to a 2nd degree murder with use a deadly woman charge, noting it was either a 10 – 25 year sentence, or 10 to life. T. at 34. He also testified he knew there was an enhancement for the deadly weapon enhancement. T. at 34. Mr. Gomez's testified Ms. Levy did not explain that the weapon's enhancement court run consecutive or concurrent. T. at 34. He further testified he that he would just have to do 10 years and then he would be eligible for "to go out on the streets." T. at 35. Petitioner recalled talking to the prosecutor about the offer in his case, and that he asked the prosecutor if he was willing to go down in terms of the offer, to which the prosecutor declined. T. at 37. Mr. Gomez denied that Ms. Levy ever quizzed him about sentencing ranges. T. at 36-37. Petitioner stated that he had a sentence of "10 years" in his head. T. at 39. He also testified he recalled that he could get 11 years at the bottom of his sentence. T. at 38. Towards the end of his testimony, he stated he really did not know what was going on. *Id*.

c. Laura Olivas' Testimony

Laura Olivas is the Petitioner's mother. T. at 40. Ms. Olivas testified she was involved in speaking with Mr. Gomez's attorney since the first day. T. at 41. Ms. Olivas testified that prior to sentencing Ms. Levy never brought up what sort of sentence Mr. Gomez might be facing. *Id.* According to Ms. Olivas the first time she brought up a potential sentence as at sentencing. *Id.* Ms. Olivas thought Mr. Gomez testified would be sentenced to a term of 10 years and then he would

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receive probation. T. at 41; 42. She admitted that Mr. Gomez did not discuss the terms of the plea agreement with her. T. at 42. Ms. Gomez further testified that the weapons enhancement was not discussed with her. T. at 43.

d. Isabel Gomez's Testimony

Isabel Gomez is Petitioner's sister. T. at 45. Isabel testified she did not speak with Ms. Levy until the day of sentencing. Id. She further testified Ms. Levy told her Oscar would receive a "max" sentence of 10 years and at least 2 to 4 years for the gun enhancement. T. at 45. Isabel agreed that Ms. Levy conveyed two separate sentences. Id. She could not recall if Ms. Levy explained whether the time would run consecutively or concurrently. Id. During cross-examination, Isabel agreed Ms. Levy explained there would be a minimum of a 10 year sentence with possible additional time for the gun enhancement. T. at 47. The State of Nevada introduced a letter written by Isabel that discussed Mr. Gomez's potential sentence. T. at 48; see also State's Exhibit C. The letter explained it was her understanding that Mr. Gomez would be sentenced to 10 years, plus an added two years for gun enhancement charges. Id. Isabel testified both she and Mr. Gomez believed he would be sentenced to 10 years followed by an additional two years in prison. T. at 48-49.

Maria Gomez's Testimony e.

Ms. Gomez, who also goes by Ms. Castro, is the Petitioner's older sister. T. at 52. Maria testified that she was one of the primary persons who spoke with Ms. Levy about Petitioner's case. Id. Maria also testified that she and Ms. Levy did discuss potential sentences Mr. Gomez could receive. *Id.* One potential was "10 – 25, possibility of parole at 10" and for the gun charges Ms. Levy told her he could receive "2 to 4 years." Id. She further testified that the maximum Petitioner could receive was "12-14 years." Id.; T. at 53. Maria stated that understood to sentence would be 10 to 25 years with the possibility of parole. T. at 53. When asked about the possibility of a second sentence

⁴ The Court interprets the use of the word "probation" to mean parole.

for the gun enhancement, Maria testified she was told there was no evidence about the enhancement so she did not why that would be added to his sentence. *Id.* During cross-examination, Maria testified it was her understanding that his plea would require him to do 10 to 25 years, and then an additional 2-4 years. *Id.* at 54. She also testified she did not understand that he would up for parole around 12 or 14 years. *Id.* at 55-56.

III. Applicable Law

A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel presents a mixed question of law and fact. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (1984); Kirksey v. State, 112 Nev. 980, 987, 923 P.2d 1102, 1107 (1996). To establish that counsel's assistance was ineffective, a petitioner must satisfy a two-part test. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. at 2064; Warden v. Lyons, 100 Nev. 430, 683 P.2d 504 (1984) (adopting the two-part test). First, a petitioner must demonstrate that his trial or appellate counsel's performance was deficient. Specifically, a petitioner must show that counsel's petition fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Second, the petitioner must show prejudice as a result of that deficient performance. Both parts of the test do not need to be considered if an insufficient showing is made on either one. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697, 104 S. Ct. at 2069.

Where the claim involves trial counsel, prejudice is demonstrated by showing that, but for trial counsel's errors, there is a reasonable probability that the result of the proceedings would have been different. *Id.* at 694; *See Love*, 109 Nev. at 1139, 865 P.2d at 323. A "reasonable probability" is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of trial. *Id.* at 687–89, 694; *see also Dawson v. State*, 108 Nev. 112, 115, 825 P.2d 593, 595 (1992). There is a strong presumption that counsel's performance was reasonable and fell within "the wide range of reasonable professional assistance." *See United States v. Aguirre*, 912 F.2d 555, 560 (2nd Cir. 1990), citing *Strickland*, 466 U.S. at

689. The defendant carries the affirmative burden of establishing prejudice. *Strickland v. Washington*, 466 U.S. 668, 693, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2067–68 (1984).

Nevada applies the "reasonably effective assistance" standard articulated in *Strickland v. Washington*, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (1984), to determine whether a defendant received effective assistance of counsel. *Warden v. Lyons*, 100 Nev. 430, 432, 683 P.2d 504, 505 (1984). Specifically, a defendant who challenges the adequacy of counsel's representation must prove that he was denied reasonably effective assistance by satisfying a two-pronged test. *Strickland*, 466 U.S. at 686-87, 104 S.Ct. at 2063-64; *State v. Love*, 109 Nev. 1136, 1138, 865 P.2d 322, 323 (1993).

Under the *Strickland* test, the defendant must first show that his counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Then, the defendant must show that but for counsel's errors, there is a reasonable probability that the result of the proceedings would have been different. *Strickland*, 466 U.S. at 687-88, 104 S.Ct. at 2065. Counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to make futile objections, file futile motions, or for failing to make futile arguments. *Ennis v. State*, 122 Nev. 694, 706, 137 P.3d 1095, 1103 (2006). Moreover, this Court "need not consider both prongs of the test if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on either one." *Molina v. State*, 120 Nev. 185, 190, 87 P.3d 533, 537 (2004).

In considering whether trial counsel was effective, the Court must determine whether counsel made a "sufficient inquiry into the information . . . pertinent to his client's case." *Doleman v. State*, 112 Nev. 843, 848, 921 P.2d 278, 280 (1996) (citing *Strickland*, 466 U.S. at 690-91, 104 S.Ct. at 2066). Then, the Court will consider whether counsel made "a reasonable strategic decision on how to proceed with his client's case." *Id.* Counsel's strategic decision is a "tactical" decision and will be "virtually unchallengeable absent extraordinary circumstances." *Id.*; *see also Howard v. State*, 106 Nev. 713, 722, 800 P.2d 175, 180 (1990); *Strickland*, 466 U.S. at 691, 104 S.Ct. at 2066.

Even if a defendant can demonstrate that his counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, he must still demonstrate prejudice and show a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the result of the trial would have been different. *McNelton v. State*, 115 Nev. 396, 403, 990 P.2d 1263, 1268 (1999). "The defendant carries the affirmative burden of establishing prejudice." *Riley v. State*, 110 Nev. 638, 646, 878 P.2d 272, 278 (1994). "A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." *Strickland*, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068. "[O]verwhelming evidence of guilt is relevant to the question of whether a client had ineffective counsel." *Ford v. State*, 105 Nev. 850, 852, 784 P.2d 951, 952 (1989) (citing *Strickland*, 466 U.S. at 697, 10 S.Ct. at 2069).

Importantly, when raising a *Strickland* claim, the defendant bears the burden to demonstrate the underlying facts by a preponderance of the evidence. *Means v. State*, 120 Nev. 1001, 1012, 103 P.3d 25, 33 (2004). Moreover, claims asserted in a petition for post-conviction relief must be supported with specific factual allegations, which if true, would entitle the petitioner to relief. *Hargrove v. State*, 100 Nev. 498, 502, 686 P.2d 222, 225 (1984). "Bare" or "naked" allegations are not sufficient, nor are those belied and repelled by the record. *Id*.

Additionally, in reference to appellate counsel, there is a strong presumption that appellate counsel's performance was reasonable and fell within "the wide range of reasonable professional assistance." *See United States v. Aguirre*, 912 F.2d 555, 560 (2nd Cir. 1990); citing *Strickland*, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. at 2065. A claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel must satisfy the two-prong test set forth by *Strickland*. *Kirksey v. State*, 112 Nev. 980, 998, 923 P.2d 1102, 1114 (1996). In order to satisfy Strickland's second prong, the defendant must show that the omitted issue would have had a reasonable probability of success on appeal. *Id*.

IV. Analysis

Mr. Gomez fails to demonstrate that trial counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Ms. Levy testified that she discussed the various offers in this case to Mr. Gomez multiple times. T. at 10. Further, she testified during the time she represented him she would review potential sentencing ranges with him. *Id.* She testified that she explained the definition of a deadly weapon as it applied to the case against Mr. Gomez, and the fact a deadly weapon enhancement carried a consecutive sentence. *Id.* at 11. Not only did she explain the offer he ultimately accepted, which included the consecutive time for the deadly weapon enhancement, she testified other persons from her law office also explained the offer to him. *Id.* According to Ms. Levy, there was no question that Mr. Gomez understood the terms of the plea and the consequences thereof.

Ms. Levy's testimony is supported by witnesses Mr. Gomez called during the evidentiary hearing. Isabel and Maria Gomez both testified that the sentence for the murder charge would be at least 10 years, and both testified they understood there was a gun enhancement of at least two years. *Id.* at 19. The understanding that there would be an enhancement for gun was evidenced further by the letter written by Isabel. That letter, dated December 29, 2020, states that wrote it was Mr. Gomez well as his family's understanding that "he would be sentenced to ten years plus and [sic] added two for gun enhancement charges; which would then grant him eligibility for parole." *See* PWHC at Exhibit C.

The testimony of Ms. Levy, and Maria and Isabel Gomez, together undermines Mr. Gomez's argument that he did not understand the terms of the plea, to include the consecutive time for the deadly weapon enhancement. In fact, in a letter dated December 29, 2020, Isabel Gomez wrote it was Mr. Gomez and his family's understanding "that he would be sentenced to ten years plus and [sic] added two for gun enhancement charges; which would then grant him eligibility for parole."

| 1 | See PWHC at Exhibit C. Moreover, during Gomez's change of plea hearing, the Court specifically | | |
|----|---|--|--|
| 2 | advised him that the least amount of time he could be sentenced to at the bottom of the sentencing | | |
| 3 | range was ll years: | | |
| 4 | THE COURT: And, I mean, obviously nobody wants to plead guilty to second degree murder. And its full right to argue, is that right? | | |
| 5 | STATE: That's right. | | |
| 6 | THE COURT: And state the penalty – | | |
| 7 | STATE : With a deadly weapon, yeah. | | |
| 8 | | | |
| 9 | THE COURT: state the range of penalty on the record, please. | | |
| 10 | STATE: Yes, Your Honor. It would be either 10 to 25 or | | |
| 11 | 10 to life on the underlying sentence with a consecutive 2 to 20 for the deadly weapon enhancement. | | |
| 12 | MS. LEVY: One to 20. | | |
| 13 | STATE: One to 20. | | |
| 14 | THE COURT: So | | |
| 15 | MS. LEVY: One to 20 on the weapon enhancement. | | |
| 16 | THE COURT: One to 20? They keep changing everything all the time. | | |
| 17 | MS. LEVY: I believe it's 1 to 20. | | |
| 18 | THE COURT: So you understand it's up to the Court. The least amount of time the | | |
| 19 | very least amount of time I could give you on the bottom end is 11 years. Do you understand that? | | |
| 20 | DEFENDANT GOMEZ: I I understand. | | |
| 21 | THE COURT: The most amount of time I could give you on the bottom end is 18 | | |
| 22 | years. Do you understand that? | | |
| 23 | DEFENDANT GOMEZ: I understand. | | |
| 24 | THE COURT: And I could give you the most amount of time on the top end I could give you is life plus 20 years. All right. | | |
| 25 | DEFENDANT GOMEZ: Okay. | | |

THE COURT: The least amount of time I could give you on the bottom end is 25 years plus 30 months.

DEFENDANT GOMEZ: Okay.

THE COURT: Do you understand that?

DEFENDANT GOMEZ: Yes.

THE COURT: That's the least amount of time. Now Mr. Palal can argue for the maximum time, which is a 10 to life and a consecutive 8 to 20. And obviously your lawyers are going to argue for the least amount of time. And then it' going to be up to me to look at everything and determine what, in my opinion, a fair sentence is. Do you understand that?

DEFENDANT GOMEZ: I understand.

THE COURT: So you understand that those are the ranges?

DEFENDANT GOMEZ: Yes.

Transcript of Change of Plea at 6-8.

The evidence before the Court also demonstrates that trial counsel adequately and reasonably investigated the case and discussed the potential outcomes with the Petitioner. "Where counsel and the client in a criminal case clearly understand the evidence and the permutations of proof and outcome, counsel is not required to unnecessarily exhaust all available public or private resources." *Molina v. State*, 120 Nev. 185, 192, 87 P.3d 533, 538 (2004). However, an attorney must reasonably investigate in preparing for trial or reasonably decide not to. *Strickland*, 466 U.S. at 691; *Kirksey v. State*, 112 Nev. 980, 992, 923 P.2d 1102, 1110 (1996) (emphasis added). Defense counsel's "particular decision not to investigate must be directly assessed for reasonableness in all the circumstances." *Strickland*, 466 U.S. at 691. *Dawson v. State*, 108 Nev. at 117, 825 P.2d at 596 ("Strategic choices made by counsel after thoroughly investigating the plausible options are almost unchallengeable.").

As a threshold matter, Mr. Gomez stated that Ms. Levy answered all of his questions sufficiently, and that she and her co-counsel spent sufficient time reviewing the case and discovery with him.

THE COURT: Okay. And did your lawyers answer all your questions to your satisfaction?

DEFENDANT GOMEZ: They did.

THE COURT: Okay. Do you feel like Ms. Levy and her co-counsel have spent enough time with you explaining the discovery and going over the evidence and everything like that in this case?

DEFENDANT GOMEZ: Yeah.

T. at 10.

Further, in the guilty plea agreement ("GPA") he signed, Mr. Gomez acknowledged that he "discussed with my attorney any possible defenses, defense strategies and circumstances which might be in my favor" and that he was "satisfied with the services provided by my attorney." GPA at 4, 5. During the evidentiary hearing, Ms. Levy also testified that she discussed the potential defenses that could be raised if the case proceeded to trial. But in the Petition, Mr. Gomez admits that he was present during the shooting itself, and the shooting was on video. It calls into question the need to investigate an "alternate suspect," and Mr. Gomez provides no explanation how the investigation into an alternate suspect would have been successful. Mr. Gomez fails to explain how challenging the photo line-up would have changed the outcome of this case given he was identified and captured on video committing the murder. PWHC at 12.

There is no evidence to support Mr. Gomez's claims that he was coerced into accepting the plea or that his attorney abandoned him during the time he decided to enter into the GPA. Mr. Gomez acknowledged that he was entering into the guilty plea both freely and voluntarily, and after

⁵ Mr. Gomez did not raise this issue on appeal and is now considered waived for the purposes of this petition. *See Bolden v. State*, 99 Nev. 181, 659 P.2d 886 (1983) ("a claim that could have been raised on direct appeal from a judgment of conviction, but was not, is considered waived for purposes of a subsequent proceeding for post-conviction relief");

consultation with his attorney, during the plea hearing and when signing of the GPA. See GPA at 5. ("I am signing this agreement voluntarily, after consultation with my attorney, and I am not acting under duress or coercion..."); T. at II. Further, Mr. Gomez entered into the plea after discussing the GPA and other others with his counsel on several occasions, and after he had time to consider whether or not to accept it and to discuss potential defenses at the calendar call on April 19, 2018.

Finally, Mr. Gomez alleges that his counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to withdraw his guilty plea. There is no evidence that he requested Ms. Levy to file motion before sentencing in this case. At most, Mr. Gomez's provided evidence that he made such a request after he was sentenced. In an undated and unaddressed letter, Mr. Gomez wrote he wanted to withdraw his plea. Mr. Gomez claims this letter was mailed to Ms. Levy. The Court approaches this letter with extreme caution for a number of reasons. First, it is not dated or signed. And second, it is unclear is how Mr. Gomez has a copy of this handwritten letter if it was mailed to Ms. Levy. Even if the Court accepts the representations in the suspect letter as true, it would not support his allegations that Ms. Levy was ineffective at the time he took the plea. The letter was allegedly mailed after sentencing because it states he had been transferred to Arizona. The letter reflects regret for entering into the plea, as well as bare, naked allegations he was hurried into doing so. This suspect letter is insufficient to warrant relief. See Hargrove v. State, 100 Nev. 502, 686 P.2d 222, 225 (1984) ("bare" and "naked," and are insufficient to warrant relief, as are those claims belied and repelled by the record).

Finally, Mr. Gomez alleges that trial counsel was ineffective for never filing a direct appeal of his Judgment of Conviction and was further ineffective for failing to challenge the terms of restitution on direct appeal. *See* Memorandum of Points and Authorities at 12-13. On July 18, 2018, appellate counsel filed a Notice of Appeal on behalf of Mr. Gomez. Mr. Gomez did not provide any legal authority for the proposition that he was entitled to have any particular attorney file his direct

appeal. *Id.* at 12-13. Therefore, Mr. Gomez cannot demonstrate he was prejudiced by trial counsel's failure to file a notice of appeal on his behalf. Mr. Gomez's claim that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the terms of restitution in Mr. Gomez's Judgment of Conviction also fails. Mr. Gomez cites no applicable authority to support his arguments that there is an error with his judgment of conviction that warrant the relief he is seeking.

Related to his arguments regarding the alleged defects in his judgment of conviction, this Court denies Mr. Gomez's requested relief based on his claim that he is subject to cruel and unusual punishment based on the aforementioned defects. The Nevada Court of Appeals already addressed Mr. Gomez's sentencing on direct appeal, noting he did not demonstrate his sentence was cruel and unusual. See Order of Affirmance, filed May 15, 2019 (Dkt. No. 76487-COA) at 2-3. Further, this allegation seems unrelated to trial counsel's performance, and therefore, falls outside the scope of habeas proceedings. See NRS 34.810(1)(a).

Accordingly, Mr. Gomez did not demonstrate that the aforementioned claims had a reasonable likelihood of success if it had been appealed. *Kirksey*, 112 Nev. at 998, 923 P.2d at 1114. As such, Petitioner did not meet his burden under *Strickland*.

V. Conclusion

Therefore, for the reasons set forth Omar Gomez's Post-Conviction Petition for Writ of

Dated this 6th day of December, 2021

Habeas Corpus and Memorandum of Points and Authorities is hereby DENIED.

EC

48A E35 EC78 9910 Cristina D. Silva District Court Judge

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| 2 | DISTRICT COURT | | |
| 3 | CLAF | RK COUNTY, NEVADA | |
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| 5 | Oscar Gomez, Plaintiff(s) | CASE NO: A-20-815035-W | |
| 6 7 | vs. | DEPT. NO. Department 9 | |
| 8 | State of Nevada, Defendant(s) | BEI 1. Ito. Beparament | |
| 9 | State of Nevada, Defendant(s) | | |
| 10 | | | |
| 10 | AUTOMATE | O CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE | |
| 12 | This automated certificate of service was generated by the Eighth Judicial District Court. The foregoing Decision was served via the court's electronic eFile system to all | | |
| 13 | | the above entitled case as listed below: | |
| 13 | Service Date: 12/6/2021 | | |
| 15 | Jim Hoffman ji | m.hoffman.esq@gmail.com | |
| 16 | Dept 9 Law Clerk d | ept09lc@clarkcountycourts.us | |
| 17 | District Attorney F | DMotions@ClarkCountyDA.com | |
| 18 | Heather Ungermann u | ngermannh@clarkcountycourts.us | |
| 19 | Jennifer Garcia jo | ennifer.garcia@clarkcountyda.com | |
| 20 | Binu Palal b | inu.palal@clarkcountyda.com | |
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| 1 | RSPN STEVEN B. WOLFSON | | Atomb. Drum |
|--|---|-------------------------|---------------------------------|
| 2 | Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #001565 | | |
| 3 | KAREN MISHLER Chief Deputy District Attorney Nevada Bar #013730 | | |
| 4 | 200 Lewis Avenue | | |
| 5 | Las Vegas, Nevada 89155-2212 (702) 671-2500 | | |
| $\begin{bmatrix} 6 \\ 7 \end{bmatrix}$ | Attorney for Plaintiff | | |
| 7 8 | | CT COURT NTY, NEVADA | |
| 9 | OSCAR COMEZ IR also Oscar Comez | | |
| 10 | OSCAR GOMEZ, JR., aka Oscar Gomez, #5990519 | | |
| 11 | Petitioner, | CASE NO: | A-20-815035-W |
| 12 | -VS- | | C-16-316959-1 |
| 13 | THE STATE OF NEVADA, | DEPT NO: | II |
| $\begin{bmatrix} 13 \\ 14 \end{bmatrix}$ | Respondent. | | |
| 15 | STATE'S RESPONSE TO CLAIMS FO ORIGINAL PETITION FOR | | |
| 16 | DATE OF HEARING | S: NOVEMBER 9, | 2022 |
| 17 | TIME OF HEA | ARING: 9:30 AM | |
| 18 | COMES NOW, the State of Nevada | a, by STEVEN B. | WOLFSON, Clark County |
| 19 | District Attorney, through KAREN MISHLE | ER, Chief Deputy D | District Attorney, and hereby |
| 20 | submits the attached Points and Authorities in | n Response to Defer | ndant's Original Petition For |
| 21 | Writ Of Habeas Corpus. | | |
| 22 | This Response is made and based upor | n all the papers and | pleadings on file herein, the |
| 23 | attached points and authorities in support her | eof, and oral argum | nent at the time of hearing, if |
| 24 | deemed necessary by this Honorable Court. | | |
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POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On August 3, 2016, OSCAR GOMEZ, JR. (hereinafter "Petitioner") was charged by way of Information with one count of Murder With Use of a Deadly Weapon (Category A Felony – NRS 200.010, 200.030, 193.165) for actions committed on or about June 24, 2016.

On April 19, 2018, pursuant to negotiations, the State filed an Amended Information charging Petitioner with one count of Second Degree Murder With Use of a Deadly Weapon. A signed Guilty Plea Agreement was also filed in open court. On June 14, 2018, Petitioner was sentenced to ten years to life in the Nevada Department of Corrections, with a consecutive term of ninety-six (96) to two hundred forty (240) months for the use of a deadly weapon. Petitioner received 716 days credit for time served. The Judgment of Conviction was filed on June 22, 2018.

On July 18, 2018, Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal in the underlying case. On May 15, 2019, the Nevada Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner's Judgment of Conviction. Remittitur issued on June 20, 2019.

On May 14, 2020, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Post-Conviction). Petitioner contemporaneously filed a Motion for Appointment of Counsel and Request for Evidentiary Hearing. On June 23, 2020, the State filed its Response to Petitioner's pleadings.

On September 22, 2020, the Court considered the matter on the briefings, and stated that it rejected all of Petitioner's arguments, except for the argument about whether counsel adequately discussed concurrent or consecutive prison time with Petitioner. Thereafter, on October 13, 2020, the Court issued a Minute Order, scheduling an evidentiary hearing "on the sole issue of whether counsel informed [Petitioner] that he faced consecutive time for the deadly weapon enhancement."

On February 4, 2021, Petitioner filed an "Original" Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Post-Conviction). The Court construed Petitioner's this filing as a supplemental pleading to the Petition that he filed on May 14, 2020. On March 5, 2021, the Court granted Petitioner's

request for counsel, and Mr. James Hoffman, Esq. confirmed as counsel. On March 23, 2021, the State filed its Response to the "Original" Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.

On August 20, 2021, the Court held an evidentiary hearing on the aforementioned issue. On September 17, 2021, the Court denied the Petition. On October 21, 2021, Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal. On December 6, 2021, the Court filed its Decision and Order. On September 21, 2022, the Nevada Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal because the Court found that this Court's December 6, 2021 Order did not resolve all of the claims raised by Petitioner. Specifically, the Court of Appeals found that this Court's order did not resolve claims four through six raised in the "Original Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus" filed on February 4, 2021. See Gomez v. State, No. 83690-COA (Order Dismissing Appeal, Aug. 26, 2022). Thus, the Court of Appeals found the Order was not a final order, as it did not dispose of all claims raised. Id.

On October 12, 2022, this Court set the matter for argument regarding claims four through six raised in the "Original Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus" filed on February 4, 2021. The State sets forth its arguments on those grounds below.

ARGUMENT

I. CLAIMS FOUR, FIVE, AND SIX EXCEED THE SCOPE OF PERMISSIBLE CLAIMS WHEN A PETITIONER'S CONVICTION IS THE RESULT OF A GUILTY PLEA

Due to having entered a guilty plea, Petitioner is strictly limited regarding the types of claims he may raise when requesting habeas relief. Dismissal of a postconviction petition for writ of habeas corpus is mandatory when "[t]he petitioner's conviction was upon a plea of guilty or guilty but mentally ill and the petition is not based upon an allegation that the plea was involuntarily or unknowingly entered or that the plea was entered without effective assistance of counsel." NRS 34.810(1)(a). Claims Four through Six do not concern ineffectiveness of counsel or the voluntariness of Petitioner's guilty plea. Petition, at 21-23. Claims Four and Six challenge the validity of the deadly weapon enhancement statute. Claim Five alleges violations of Petitioner's rights under the Fourteenth and Ninth Amendments, and

the Privileges and Immunities clause. These claims must be summarily denied as they fall outside the parameters of NRS 34.810(1)(a). Furthermore, these claims could have been raised on direct appeal, and consequently are waived on habeas review. See Franklin v. State, 110 Nev. 750, 752, 877 P.2d 1058, 1059 (1994), overruled on other grounds by Thomas v. State, 115 Nev. 148, 979 P.2d 222 (1999).

II. PETITIONER'S CLAIMS ARE WITHOUT MERIT

Even if Petitioner's claims were not barred from consideration due to the restrictions of NRS 34.810(1)(a), Petitioner would not be entitled to relief because his claims lack merit. In Claim Four, Petitioner alleges that the imposition of the deadly weapon enhancement violates his due process rights. Petition, at 21. He appears to contend that NRS 193.165—the deadly weapon enhancement statute—is unconstitutionally vague. His sole attempt to support this claim appears to be a citation to a federal case relating to the validity of federal statute 18 U.S.C. 924(c). As Petitioner was not sentenced pursuant to any federal statute in this case, this case is obviously inapplicable. Furthermore, the Nevada Supreme Court has previously ruled that NRS 193.165 is not unconstitutionally vague. Woofter v. O'Donnell, 91 Nev. 756, 762, 542 P.2d 1396, 1400 (1975). Moreover, by entering into the Guilty Plea Agreement, Petitioner agreed to imposition of the deadly weapon enhancement. See Breault v. State, 116 Nev. 311, 313, 996 P.2d 888, 889 (2000) (stating that where a defendant enters a knowing and voluntary guilty plea, the Court "will not permit the defendant to manipulate the judicial system" by alleging error in the sentence imposed pursuant to the guilty plea agreement).

In Claim Five, Petitioner alleges violations of his rights under the Fourteenth and Ninth Amendments, as well as the Privileges and Immunities Clause. Petition, at 22. He offers no factual allegation as to how these rights were supposedly violated. This failure to set forth specific factual allegations requires summary dismissal of this claim. NRS 34.735. "A petitioner for post-conviction relief cannot rely on conclusory claims for relief but must make specific factual allegations that if true would entitle him to relief." <u>Colwell v. State</u>, 118 Nev. 807, 813, 59 P.3d 463, 467 (2002) (citing <u>Evans v. State</u>, 117 Nev. 609, 621, 28 P.3d 498, 507

1 (2001)). See also Hargrove v. State, 100 Nev. 498, 502-03, 686 P.2d 222, 225 (1984) (holding 2 that bare or naked allegations are insufficient to entitle a defendant to post-conviction relief). In Claim Six, Petitioner appears to allege that imposition of the deadly weapon 3 4 enhancement violates his Fifth Amendment protection against double jeopardy. Petition, at 5 23. The Nevada Supreme Court has previously held that the deadly weapon enhancement contained in NRS 193.165 does not violate double jeopardy. Nevada Dep't Prisons v. 6 Bowen, 103 Nev. 477, 479–81, 745 P.2d 697, 698–99 (1987); Woofter, 91 Nev. at 761–62, 7 8 542 P.2d at 1399–400. Therefore, this claim must be denied. 9 **CONCLUSION** 10 Petitioner's claims must be summarily denied for exceeding the scope of permissible 11 habeas claims under NRS 34.810(1)(a). Even if this statute did not bar his claims from 12 consideration, he would be entitled to no relief because his claims lack merit, and in some cases directly contradict rulings of the Nevada Supreme Court. Therefore, the State 13 14 respectfully requests that claims four through six of Petitioner's "Original Petition for Writ of 15 Habeas Corpus" be denied. 16 DATED this 20th day of October, 2022. 17 Respectfully submitted, 18 STEVEN B. WOLFSON Clark County District Attorney 19 Nevada Bar #001565 20 BY /s/KAREN MISHLER 21 KAREN MISHLER Chief Deputy District Attorney 22 Nevada Bar #013730 23 24 25 26 27 28

CERTIFICATE OF ELECTRONIC FILING I hereby certify that service of the foregoing, was made this 20th day of October, 2022, by Electronic Filing to: JIM HOFFMAN, Esquire E-mail Address: jim.hoffman.esq@gmail.com <u>/s/ Laura Mullinax</u> Secretary for the District Attorney's Office 16F10719A/KM/lm/GU

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| 1 | FFCO STEVEN B. WOLFSON | | |
| 2 | Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #001565 | | |
| 3 | KAREN MISHLER Chief Deputy District Attorney | | |
| 4 | Nevada Bar #013730 200 Lewis Avenue | | |
| 5 | Las Vegas, Nevada 89155-2212 (702) 671-2500 | | |
| 6 | Attorney for Plaintiff | | |
| 7 | | CT COURT NTY, NEVADA | |
| 8 | CLARK COO | NII, NEVADA | |
| 9 | OSCAR GOMEZ, JR., aka Oscar Gomez, #5990519 | | |
| 10 | Petitioner, | CASE NO: | A-20-815035-W |
| 11 | -VS- | CHSE IVO. | (C-16-316959-1) |
| 12 | THE STATE OF NEVADA, | DEPT NO: | (C-10-310 <i>)</i> 3 <i>)</i> -1) |
| 13 | Respondent. | DELT NO. | 11 |
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| 151617 | FINDINGS OF FAC LAW AN DATE OF HEARING TIME OF HEA | NĎ ORDER | |
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| 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 | DATE OF HEARING TIME OF HEARING COUNTY DISTRICT AUTONOMY TEPRESENTED BY JAMES I. HOFFMAN, the WOLFSON, Clark County District Attorney Deputy District Attorney, and the Court hearing transcripts, arguments of counsel, and documakes the following findings of fact and conditions. | S: NOVEMBER 9, 20 ARING: 9:30 AM earing before the Homber, 2022, the Peting Respondent being regy, by and through A aving considered the ments on file herein, | norable CARLI KIERNY, ationer not being present, presented by STEVEN B. USTIN C. BEAUMONT, at matter, including briefs, |
| 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 | DATE OF HEARING TIME OF HEARING THIS CAUSE having come on for he District Judge, on the 11th day of Nover represented by JAMES I. HOFFMAN, the WOLFSON, Clark County District Attorney Deputy District Attorney, and the Court he transcripts, arguments of counsel, and documakes the following findings of fact and condition. | S: NOVEMBER 9, 20 ARING: 9:30 AM earing before the Homber, 2022, the Peting Respondent being regy, by and through A aving considered the ments on file herein, | norable CARLI KIERNY, ationer not being present, presented by STEVEN B. USTIN C. BEAUMONT, at matter, including briefs, |

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FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On August 3, 2016, OSCAR GOMEZ, JR. (hereinafter "Petitioner") was charged by way of Information with one count of Murder With Use of a Deadly Weapon (Category A Felony – NRS 200.010, 200.030, 193.165) for actions committed on or about June 24, 2016.

On April 19, 2018, pursuant to negotiations, the State filed an Amended Information charging Petitioner with one count of Second-Degree Murder With Use of a Deadly Weapon. A signed Guilty Plea Agreement was also filed in open court. On June 14, 2018, Petitioner was sentenced to ten years to life in the Nevada Department of Corrections, with a consecutive term of ninety-six (96) to two hundred forty (240) months for the use of a deadly weapon. Petitioner received 716 days credit for time served. The Judgment of Conviction was filed on June 22, 2018.

On July 18, 2018, Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal. On May 15, 2019, the Nevada Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner's Judgment of Conviction. Remittitur issued on June 20, 2019.

On May 14, 2020, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Post-Conviction). Petitioner contemporaneously filed a Motion for Appointment of Counsel and Request for Evidentiary Hearing. On June 23, 2020, the State filed its Response.

On September 22, 2020, the Court considered the matter on the briefings, and stated that it rejected all of Petitioner's arguments, except for the argument about whether counsel adequately discussed concurrent or consecutive prison time with Petitioner. Thereafter, on October 13, 2020, the Court issued a Minute Order, scheduling an evidentiary hearing "on the sole issue of whether counsel informed [Petitioner] that he faced consecutive time for the deadly weapon enhancement."

On February 4, 2021, Petitioner filed an "Original" Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Post-Conviction). The Court construed Petitioner's this filing as a supplemental pleading to the Petition that he filed on May 14, 2020. On March 5, 2021, the Court granted Petitioner's ///

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request for counsel, and Mr. James Hoffman, Esq. confirmed as counsel. On March 23, 2021, the State filed its Response to the "Original" Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.

On August 20, 2021, the Court held an evidentiary hearing on the aforementioned issue— whether counsel adequately discussed concurrent versus consecutive prison time with Petitioner. On September 17, 2021, the Court denied the Petition. On December 6, 2021, the Court filed its Decision and Order.

On October 21, 2021, Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal. On September 21, 2022, the Nevada Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal due to finding that the Court's December 6, 2021 Order did not resolve all of the claims raised by Petitioner. Specifically, the Court of Appeals found that the Court's order did not resolve claims four through six raised in the "Original Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus" filed on February 4, 2021. See Gomez v. State, No. 83690-COA (Order Dismissing Appeal, Aug. 26, 2022).

On October 12, 2022, this Court set the matter for argument regarding claims four through six raised in the "Original Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus" filed on February 4, 2021. On October 20, 2022, the State filed its Response, which addressed claims four through six. On November 9, 2022, this Court denied claims four through six, for the reasons stated below.

ANALYSIS

I. CLAIMS FOUR, FIVE, AND SIX EXCEED THE SCOPE OF PERMISSIBLE CLAIMS WHEN A PETITIONER'S CONVICTION IS THE RESULT OF A **GUILTY PLEA**

Due to having entered a guilty plea, Petitioner is strictly limited regarding the types of claims he may raise when requesting habeas relief. Dismissal of a postconviction petition for writ of habeas corpus is mandatory when "[t]he petitioner's conviction was upon a plea of guilty or guilty but mentally ill and the petition is not based upon an allegation that the plea was involuntarily or unknowingly entered or that the plea was entered without effective assistance of counsel." NRS 34.810(1)(a). Claims Four through Six do not concern ineffectiveness of counsel or the voluntariness of Petitioner's guilty plea. Petition, at 21-23.

Claims Four and Six challenge the validity of the deadly weapon enhancement statute. Claim Five alleges violations of Petitioner's rights under the Fourteenth and Ninth Amendments, and the Privileges and Immunities clause. These claims are summarily denied due to falling outside the parameters of NRS 34.810(1)(a). Furthermore, these claims could have been raised on direct appeal, and consequently are waived on habeas review. See Franklin v. State, 110 Nev. 750, 752, 877 P.2d 1058, 1059 (1994), overruled on other grounds by Thomas v. State, 115 Nev. 148, 979 P.2d 222 (1999).

II. PETITIONER'S CLAIMS ARE WITHOUT MERIT

Even if Petitioner's claims were not barred from consideration due to the restrictions of NRS 34.810(1)(a), Petitioner would not be entitled to relief because his claims lack merit. In Claim Four, Petitioner alleges that the imposition of the deadly weapon enhancement violates his due process rights. Petition, at 21. He appears to contend that NRS 193.165—the deadly weapon enhancement statute—is unconstitutionally vague. His sole attempt to support this claim appears to be a citation to a federal case relating to the validity of federal statute 18 U.S.C. 924(c). As Petitioner was not sentenced pursuant to any federal statute in this case, this case is obviously inapplicable. Furthermore, the Nevada Supreme Court has previously ruled that NRS 193.165 is not unconstitutionally vague. Woofter v. O'Donnell, 91 Nev. 756, 762, 542 P.2d 1396, 1400 (1975). Moreover, by entering into the Guilty Plea Agreement, Petitioner agreed to imposition of the deadly weapon enhancement. See Breault v. State, 116 Nev. 311, 313, 996 P.2d 888, 889 (2000) (stating that where a defendant enters a knowing and voluntary guilty plea, the Court "will not permit the defendant to manipulate the judicial system" by alleging error in the sentence imposed pursuant to the guilty plea agreement). Accordingly, this claim is denied.


In Claim Five, Petitioner alleges violations of his rights under the Fourteenth and Ninth Amendments, as well as the Privileges and Immunities Clause. Petition, at 22. He offers no factual allegation as to how these rights were supposedly violated. This failure to set forth specific factual allegations requires summary dismissal of this claim. NRS 34.735. "A petitioner for post-conviction relief cannot rely on conclusory claims for relief but must make

| 1 | specific factual allegations that if true would entitle him to relief." <u>Colwell v. State</u> , 118 Nev | | |
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| 2 | 807, 813, 59 P.3d 463, 467 (2002) (citing Evans v. State, 117 Nev. 609, 621, 28 P.3d 498, 50' | | |
| 3 | (2001)). See also Hargrove v. State, 100 Nev. 498, 502-03, 686 P.2d 222, 225 (1984) (holding | | |
| 4 | that bare or naked allegations are insufficient to entitle a defendant to post-conviction relief) | | |
| 5 | Accordingly, this claim is denied. | | |
| 6 | In Claim Six, Petitioner appears to allege that imposition of the deadly weapo | | |
| 7 | enhancement violates his Fifth Amendment protection against double jeopardy. Petition, at 23 | | |
| 8 | The Nevada Supreme Court has previously held that the deadly weapon enhancement | | |
| 9 | contained in NRS 193.165 does not violate double jeopardy. Nevada Dep't Prisons v. | | |
| 10 | Bowen, 103 Nev. 477, 479–81, 745 P.2d 697, 698–99 (1987); Woofter, 91 Nev. at 761–62, | | |
| 11 | 542 P.2d at 1399–400. Accordingly, this claim is denied. | | |
| 12 | <u>ORDER</u> | | |
| 13 | THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that claims four through six of the | | |
| 14 | "Original Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus" filed on February 4, 2021, shall be, and are, | | |
| 15 | hereby denied. | | |
| 16 | Dated this 7th day of March, 2023 | | |
| 17 | Carei Kung | | |
| 18 | | | |
| 19 | STEVEN B. WOLFSON Clark County District Attorney 4EA 72B 935D 9BFC Carli Kierny | | |
| 20 | Nevada Bar #001565 District Court Judge | | |
| 21 | BY /s/ KAREN MISHLER | | |
| 22 | KAREN MISHLER | | |
| 23 | Chief Deputy District Attorney Nevada Bar #013730 | | |
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CERTIFICATE OF ELECTRONIC FILING I hereby certify that service of the foregoing, was made this 7th day of March 2023, by Electronic Filing to: JIM HOFFMAN, ESQ. E-mail: <u>Jim.hoffman.esq@gmail.com</u> /s/ Janet Hayes Secretary for the District Attorney's Office 16F10719A/KM/jh/GU

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| 1 | CSERV | | |
|----|-------------------------------|--|--|
| 2 | DISTRICT COURT | | |
| 3 | CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA | | |
| 4 | | | |
| 5 | Occasi Comor Plaintiff(a) | CASE NO. A 20 915025 W | |
| 6 | Oscar Gomez, Plaintiff(s) | CASE NO: A-20-815035-W | |
| 7 | VS. | DEPT. NO. Department 2 | |
| 8 | State of Nevada, Defendant(s) | | |
| 9 | | | |
| 10 | AUTOMATED | CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE | |
| 11 | | ervice was generated by the Eighth Judicial District | |
| 12 | | g was served via the court's electronic eFile system to on the above entitled case as listed below: | |
| 13 | Service Date: 3/7/2023 | | |
| 14 | | | |
| 15 | Jim Hoffman jir | n.hoffman.esq@gmail.com | |
| 16 | Dept 9 Law Clerk de | ept09lc@clarkcountycourts.us | |
| 17 | District Attorney PI | OMotions@ClarkCountyDA.com | |
| 18 | Heather Ungermann un | ngermannh@clarkcountycourts.us | |
| 19 | Jennifer Garcia je | nnifer.garcia@clarkcountyda.com | |
| 20 | Binu Palal bi | nu.palal@clarkcountyda.com | |
| 21 | | | |
| 22 | Dept 2 Law Clerk de | ept02lc@clarkcountycourts.us | |
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ATTORNEY FOR OSCAR GOMEZ

EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

THE STATE OF NEVADA,
Plaintiff,

Vs.

Department II

NOTICE OF APPEAL

Notice is hereby given that OSCAR GOMEZ, by and through his counsel JIM HOFFMAN, appeals the order denying his PCR petitions entered by the District Court on March 7, 2023.

DATED: March 9, 2023

NOTICE OF APPEAL - 1

JIM HOFFMAN, ESQ.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on July 20, 2023, I served this Appendix on all parties registered for eservice.

DATED: July 20, 2023

/s/ Jim Hoffman

JIM HOFFMAN, ESQ.

PROOF OF SERVICE - 1