## IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

IN THE MATTER OF: D.O.T. LITIGATION

CLARK NATURAL MEDICINAL SOLUTIONS LLC; NYE NATURAL MEDICINAL SOLUTIONS LLC; CLARK NMSD, LLC; INYO FINE CANNABIS DISPENSARY LLC; AND RURAL REMEDIES, LLC,

Appellants/Cross-Respondents,

V.

THE STATE OF NEVADA
DEPARTMENT OF TAXATION;
CANNABIS COMPLIANCE BOARD;
AND INTEGRAL ASSOCIATES LLC
D/B/A ESSENES CANNABIS
DISPENSARIES, ESSENCE
TROPICANA LLC, ESSENCE
HENDERSON, LLC

Respondents,

Supreme Court Case No. 86276 illed
District Court Case 14,2023 01:34 PM
Elizabeth A. Brown
Clerk of Supreme Court

# APPELLANTS' APPENDIX VOLUME 5

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DISTRICT COURT
CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA
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IN RE D.O.T. LITIGATION

CASE NO. A-19-787004-B

DEPT NO. XI

IN RE D.O.T. LITIGATION

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

BEFORE THE HONORABLE JOANNA S. KISHNER, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE MONDAY, DECEMBER 19, 2022

#### TRANSCRIPT OF HEARING RE:

#### ALL PENDING MOTIONS

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RECORDED BY: LARA CORCORAN, COURT RECORDER TRANSCRIBED BY: JD REPORTING, INC.

#### APPEARANCES

FOR MM DEVELOPMENT AND NATHANAEL R. RULIS, ESO.

LIVFREE WELLNESS:

FOR THE ETW PLAINTIFFS: JAMES A. BECKSTROM, ESQ.

TGIG PLAINTIFFS: MARK S. DZARNOSKI, ESQ.

FOR QUALCAN: WHITNEY J. BARRETT, ESQ.

FOR HIGH SIERRA HOLISTICS: JAMES W. PUZEY, ESQ.

FOR INYO FINE CANNABIS AND THE NUVEDA ENTITIES: CRAIG D. SLATER, ESQ.

FOR HERBAL CHOICE: SIGAL CHATTAH, ESQ.

FOR DEPARTMENT OF TAXATION CRAIG A. NEWBY, ESQ.

AND CCB:

JORDAN T. SMITH, ESQ.

FOR INTEGRAL ASSOCIATES AND THE ESSENCE ENTITIES:

FOR CLEAR RIVER: J. RUSTY GRAF, ESQ.

FOR WELLNESS CONNECTION CHRISTOPHER L. ROSE, ESQ.

OF NEVADA:

FOR LONE MOUNTAIN PARTNERS: JOEL Z. SCHWARZ, ESQ.

FOR CPCM HOLDINGS: JEAN-PAUL HENDRICKS, ESQ.

JD Reporting, Inc.

Deputy Solicitor General

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FOR NATURAL MEDICINE: STEPHANIE J. SMITH, ESQ.

FOR NEVADA WELLNESS CENTER: THEODORE PARKER, III, ESQ.

JENNIFER A. DELCARMEN, ESQ.

FOR DEEP ROOTS HARVEST: RICHARD D. WILLIAMSON, ESQ.

FOR HELPING HANDS JARED B. KAHN, ESQ.

WELLNESS CENTER:

FOR NEVADA ORGANIC REMEDIES: DAVID R. KOCH, ESQ.

DANIEL C. TETREAULT, ESQ. FOR JORGE PUPO:

## LAS VEGAS, CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA, DECEMBER 19, 2022, 9:00 A.M.

THE COURT: Okay. So good morning on this Monday morning at 9:00 a.m. Calling Case 787004. In re: D.O.T. Litigation, pages 1 through 26.

Since we seem to have some new individuals or individuals don't show up on some of our listing, what I'm going to do is I'm going to first have the appearances here in court, and then I'm going to go through who is done on the chat. And if you haven't done on the chat, quickly do it so I can get to you at the end.

And then what we're going to do is I need to confirm something regarding Nevada Wellness before we get to your motions. And thank you for the three letters of the 13th and the status report of the 12th.

So without further ado, appearances first here in court. Counsel, go ahead, please.

MR. RULIS: Good morning, Your Honor. Nate Rulis on behalf of plaintiffs MM Development Company and LivFree Wellness. Bar Number 11259.

MS. BARRETT: Good morning, Your Honor. Whitney
Barrett, Bar Number 13662, on behalf of plaintiff Qualcan, LLC.

THE COURT: Okay. So would you go to the top of the chat. I'm just going to do it in order, however --

THE COURT RECORDER: I'm trying. I'm just -- I can't

Williamson, on behalf of Deep Roots Harvest, Inc.

THE COURT: Mr. Dzarnoski.

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And whoever's rattling papers, please, and we can see you typing and rattling papers. Please, till we call you, please keep yourselves on mute and because otherwise everyone has to hear that. Thank you so very much.

Sorry. Mr. Dzarnoski, did you start your appearance?

THE COURT: Go ahead, please.

MR. DZARNOSKI: Yes. Good morning.

MR. DZARNOSKI: Yes, good morning, Your Honor. Mark Dzarnoski on behalf of the TGIG plaintiffs. We filed our notice of appearance via video on 12/5.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Ms. Smith, please.

MS. SMITH: Good morning, Your Honor. Stephanie Smith, Bar Number 11280, on behalf of National Medicine. And we filed our notice of audiovisual appearance --

(Video interference.)

THE COURT: I'm not going to call you out by name, but there is a particular person who just logged in. You need to put yourself on mute. We'll get to you in just a second. Okay? It would be a party that was involved in the settlement conference on the 16th. Please make sure you're on mute, and we'll call you in a few -- in a moment or two because I'm doing it in order of how people logged into the chat. Okay.

And there's also a phone number, and so I'll have to address that because the Court sure didn't approve anyone for phones on this.

But let's continue on. Please put yourselves on mute. Those individuals who have not yet, there's two -- three actually. Please, Counsel, so I can continue, and we have -- I have all the noises in the background.

There's a phone number, a 314 phone number. Please put yourself on mute. Thank you so very much.

Okay. Let's try again. Ms. Smith, I think I heard you. Would you mind repeating it, and you were cutting in and out with people talking and not on mute. Sorry. Would you mind going again?

MS. SMITH: Good morning, Your Honor. Stephanie Smith on behalf of Natural Medicine, Bar Number 11280. And notice of audiovisual appearance was filed on December 8th, 2022.

THE COURT: Mr. Beckstrom.

MR. BECKSTROM: Good morning, Your Honor. James Beckstrom on behalf of the ETW plaintiffs. Notice of appearance was filed on 12/5 as well.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Mr. Smith.

MR. J. SMITH: Good morning, Your Honor. Jordan Smith on behalf of Integral Associates and the Essence

1 Entities, and we filed our notice of appearance on 12/5.

THE COURT: Ms. DelCarmen.

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MS. DELCARMEN: Good morning, Your Honor. Jennifer DelCarmen on behalf of Nevada Wellness Center.

THE COURT: Thank you. Do you have a co-counsel I see as well that would like to make his appearance?

MS. DELCARMEN: Yes. Teddy Parker is here as well.

I believe he checked in through the chat.

THE COURT: Thank you so much.

Okay. Mr. Slater.

MR. SLATER: Good morning, Your Honor. Craig Slater on behalf of the Inyo Fine Cannabis and the NuVeda entities.

THE COURT: Okay. I'm not going back to Mr. (indiscernible) and Mr. Dzarnoski. Thank you. You just put in

Mr. Rose.

MR. ROSE: Good morning. Christopher Rose for Wellness Connection of Nevada, 7500. We filed our notice of intent to appear also on December 5th.

THE COURT: Thank you.

your notice of appearance. Appreciate that.

Madam Court Recorder, can you scroll down under Mr. Rose. Okay. Okay. Mr. Puzey.

Mr. Kahn.

MR. KAHN: Good morning, Your Honor. Jared Kahn for Helping Hands Wellness Center.

1 THE COURT: Mr. Hendricks.

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MR. HENDRICKS: Good morning, Your Honor. JP
Hendricks for CPCM Holdings dba Thrive, Bar Number 10079. I
filed a notice of appearance on 12/5.

THE COURT: Mr. Newby.

MR. NEWBY: Good morning, Your Honor. Craig Newby, 8591, on behalf of State defendants. Notice of remote appearance was filed on December 5th.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Mr. Koch.

MR. KOCH: Yeah, David Koch for Nevada Organic Remedies.

THE COURT: I apologize for mispronouncing your name.

I've done that in the --

MR. KOCH: That's all right. I get it all the time. No worries.

THE COURT: Yeah, I do too. People had an R to my name in the middle of it.

Okay. Ms. Chattah.

MS. CHATTAH: Good morning, Your Honor. Sigal Chattah, Bar Number 8264, on behalf of Herbal Choice, and we filed our notice on December 5th as well.

THE COURT: Appreciate it. Thank you so very much.

Oh, I am mispronouncing it. Sorry. It's an early Monday

morning, although it was a long weekend on preparing for

you're feeling better.

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Okay. We've now taken everyone for their appearances. Okay. It looks like I have.

We've got, obviously, we've got some In re: D.O.T., Department of Taxation, we have some motions for taxing fees and costs in just a moment, but let's get through two other matters briefly. The first is I understand from minutes and being notified that there was a resolution that impacts the trial at least for -- I don't -- wait.

Is there anyone on Pupo? I don't -- I didn't see anyone for Pupo. They're still in the case until there's a stip. Sending an email on Friday does not excuse you from today's hearing.

Is someone subtly texting or emailing them so that I can move forward with this?

Well, I'll go to the one that doesn't necessarily -well indirectly impacts them, but I'll go to the other issue so we're not wasting people's time because I need them on the line, and I'm sure a couple of parties know that, right.

So anyway, with regards to the trial that is still currently on, and the reason why the trial is still currently on is, remember, I do not have a stipulation that says takes care of everyone. I understand that there's minutes on the record between Nevada Wellness and the State of Nevada. We're going to go to that in just a second. I'm waiting until I get

Pupo's counsel to go to that portion of it.

But for everybody else, I appreciate there was that oral request. But, as you know, since that hearing was not — it was on only certain matters and I said didn't have everybody present potentially that we did need a stipulation because this Court needs to know by agreement of all the parties because right now, despite there being over 3,500-plus entries in these various cases, the Court doesn't see that there's stips to dismiss various people and/or corporate entities and/or LLCs and/or anything. So, as you can appreciate, right now everything is ripe for trial.

So please, as you probably also know, the calendar call for this -- oh, let's go to the calendar call since I don't have it immediately handy. Calendar call 12/20. That means tomorrow. So unless you all are appearing here tomorrow with all your documentations, 2.67 through 2.69, there better be a stip; right? It's not even a judicial day, folks, today.

THE COURT RECORDER: Judge, they've logged on for Pupo as well.

THE COURT: We have someone who came, decided to appear late.

Who just appeared late?

MR. TETREAULT: Dan Tetreault on behalf of Mr. Pupo. Your Honor, I'm sorry. I had the wrong BlueJeans information. My apologies.

THE COURT: Okay. So, folks, as you know, please feel free to read the EDCR about whether or not a hearing can be changed less than one judicial day.

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So right now I'm planning on seeing each and every one of you all in person with all exhibits and all everything, right, unless, because I have no stipulation that says if anyone is going to.

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Your Honor.

THE COURT: The short answer is I don't have a stipulation. I really don't want to hear a discussion, okay. You all, I gave you warnings last week, gave you warnings last month, gave you warnings months ago. Nobody wishes to give me a stipulation. Feel free to show where there's -- and appreciate some people have certain things under EDCR 7.50, but right now that's not the way the captions read. That's not the way all the various cases read.

So as you can appreciate, there will be order to show causes tomorrow, and I don't really want to go there, but realistically, folks, come on, it's a simple stipulation that should have been done and provided to the Court so we can get you all taken care of, or you can tell your clients that you chose not to do a few-minute stipulation, okay. So that's that part.

Now let's go to some specifics. Nevada Wellness,
Pupo and the State of Nevada, I understand and I saw minutes to

the effect, but since it was just the State of Nevada and Nevada Wellness for those minutes in front of Judge Bell, soon to be Justice Bell, on 12/16, I understand that was an EDCR 7.50 memorialization on the record that there was a full and complete resolution between the State of Nevada, Pupo and Nevada Wellness. Is that — and the terms, material terms were placed on the record as set forth in the minutes.

Is that correct, Nevada Wellness?

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MR. PARKER: Good morning, Your Honor. Theodore
Parker on behalf of Nevada Wellness. That is correct, Your
Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. So was there any issues from Nevada Wellness's perception that need to go forward for trial in January or at all?

MR. PARKER: Nothing. Nothing on behalf of Nevada Wellness Center, Your Honor.

THE COURT: State of Nevada, is it your understanding there's a full and final resolution between Nevada Wellness, Pupo and the State of Nevada? And is there anything that you assert needs to move forward for trial, January or any time in the future?

MR. NEWBY: Your Honor, again, Craig Newby for the State of Nevada. Yes, there is a settlement of all issues involving the State, Mr. Pupo, and Nevada Wellness Center. And I do not believe there are any remaining issues to be tried

regarding the State of Nevada for the upcoming January 9th trial.

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appreciate you were not there on the 16th, at least the minutes do not reflect that you were there. I do appreciate that there was an email sent, but I need, right, under EDCR 7.50, is there a full and final resolution so that there are no issues involving your client for the trial set for January or any future time?

MR. TETREAULT: Good morning, Your Honor. Dan Tetreault on behalf of defendant Jorge Pupo. I was -- we were not present on the December 16th. Nevertheless, from Mr. Pupo's perspective, there was no -- all material terms have been agreed to. There were no remaining issues to be litigated as to Mr. Pupo, and he understands that there is a full and complete settlement which fully releases him as a result of that resolution between Nevada Wellness and the State of Nevada.

THE COURT: Okay. And is that an agreement, since I don't have your magic words under EDCR 7.50 placed on the record as if it were memorialized in writing?

MR. TETREAULT: Yes, Your Honor. Mr. Pupo absolutely agrees.

THE COURT: Thank you.

State of Nevada, with regards to Mr. Pupo -- I'm just

doing that since he was not part of those minutes on the 16th -- is that correct what counsel for Pupo said, and is that an EDCR 7.5 placed on the record as if it were memorialized in writing?

MR. NEWBY: Yes, Your Honor.

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THE COURT: Mr. Parker, on behalf of Nevada Wellness, is that correct with regards to --

MR. PARKER: That is correct, Your Honor.

THE COURT: -- Mr. Pupo under 7.50? Thank you. Go ahead, please.

MR. PARKER: That is correct, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Okay. So now at this juncture the Court is going to vacate the trial with regards to Pupo, the State of Nevada for purposes of Nevada Wellness Center.

As you know, I can't do anything with all the rest of you all until I have a stipulation.

So I'm going to vacate the calendar call with regards to Pupo, Nevada Wellness and the State of Nevada with regards to State of Nevada regarding Nevada Wellness and Pupo, but I can't do anything else about all the rest without a stipulation. Do realize I don't get a stipulation by noon, I mean, I'll waive the one day till noon, but if I don't have a stip signed by everyone by noon, I will be seeing everybody else here tomorrow. Everybody understands that. I'm sure you

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Please do not not show up fully prepared under EDCR 2.69 or send the Court something that shows that there actually is this dismiss — stipulation to dismiss if you're a party because you can appreciate the Court is not going to go back looking through over 3,500 entries to try and find what somebody may be considering that. Okay? So feel free to do that.

I appreciate I've got some letters from the 13th. I appreciate I've got a status report from the 12th. But I don't have anyone providing me any documentation. So please get that cleared up. As much as we would love to see you, I'm sure you might want to be doing something else tomorrow rather than addressing this case. So there, that takes care of that part.

The next part is, and Ms. Chattah, I do happen to notice a withdrawal of counsel that's not set till the 30th. The Court's inclination was to complete potentially the hearing today and then see if parties were amenable that that could be advanced and potentially granted or not.

But I need counsel for the 30th, is there a reason you would like to remain through the rest of these hearings, or they have no impact on your client? What I just don't want to do is ask parties if they want to advance and grant something if it matters the order by which I hear things today. So...

MS. CHATTAH: There's -- Judge, are (video

interference) addressing (video interference) or the rest of the attorneys (video interference)?

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THE COURT: Counsel, I am addressing your motion to withdraw for 12/30/2022 that's currently set, but as much as I know who's speaking, our record doesn't unless you, right, state your name again, please, and the party you represent.

So my question really is I can address this administratively. I can today if the parties are all wishing me to do so. I can do it before the substantive motions unless it makes an impact that I should do it after the substantive motions.

So I'm really just asking you if you are requesting under EDCR 2.23 since the time has passed and I do not see any opposition; and then the timing, if you are requesting that it be advanced to today. If you want it stayed on the 30th, I'll stay it on the 30th -- keep it on the 30th.

But so, Counsel, would you like to set forth your position?

MS. CHATTAH: Sure. Sigal Chattah here, again on behalf of Herbal Choice. I would appreciate the Court address this today. There's really (video interference) on these hearings at this juncture.

THE COURT: Okay. Is your client impacted at all by any of these hearings?

MS. CHATTAH: No, Your Honor.

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THE COURT: Okay. And you understand I just didn't want to advance some — address something in advance if it made an impact, right. So, okay. So is that a request that you wish me to advance the hearing from 12/30, the motion to withdraw as counsel, your motion to withdraw as counsel to advance it to today and grant it as unopposed? Or are you requesting something different?

MS. CHATTAH: I'm requesting that the Court grants (video interference) 2.23 as unopposed.

THE COURT: Okay. Since I have all the other parties here, does anybody object to it being advanced under EDCR 2.23? If so, speak now.

I'm going to ask first here in Court, if you are, standing up, stand up. I don't see anyone standing up.

Anyone remotely? Unmute yourself so we'll see a green box.

MR. SCHWARZ: Your Honor.

THE COURT: Go ahead, Your Honor.

MR. SCHWARZ: Joel Schwarz on behalf of Lone Mountain Partners, LLC. We don't oppose Ms. Chattah withdrawing on behalf of her client. The only issue I would note is that there are — at least my client is one of the parties seeking costs as to this party, and I want to make sure that we're not going forward and awarding costs against an unrepresented party that's a corporate entity that should have counsel for that.

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And I don't want that to delay the proceedings. And as such, I would suggest that it might make sense to wait until after there's been a substantive decision with regard to any costs being awarded as to that entity before she is allowed to withdraw.

THE COURT: So in light of Mr. Schwarz's comments, would you like me to defer that till the end of the hearing today?

MS. CHATTAH: That's -- that's fine, Your Honor. We can defer until the end of this hearing.

THE COURT: Okay. Then we'll do that.

And now we'll just move to substance hearings. Okay. I do appreciate I got the 12/12 status report regarding Lone Mountain, TGIG.

I have letters from 12/12 as well, although they show up on the record -- they're dated 12/12; they show up on Odyssey as 12/13, so whichever date you want to utilize with regards to outstanding matters from the Robertson Johnson firm, the Kemp Jones firm and Maier Gutierrez firm. So those are what I have as background for what is currently pending.

While I'm appreciative of this, I do not see that the parties have agreed to any particular order that you want things. So it seems to me I'm going to address the substantive motions and then do the finalization on some of the, shall we say, amounts, the math-type aspects or the reasonableness-type

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aspects, do that at the end because after you hear the oral argument and the other matters that may impact people's viewpoints. It seems to me that's probably the cleanest way to do that unless there is some other document that I am not aware of other than those four that has some agreement of the order. So I will see if there is.

Mr. Rulis, you're standing up. So...

MR. RULIS: Yes, Your Honor. Nate Rulis for the record, on behalf of MM and LivFree. While we didn't have a stipulation or agreement, I did have -- we included a suggestion on order in our letter, starting with -- considering we left off I think at the last hearing with Wellness Connection, our suggestion was we pick up there and complete the adjudication of the motions to retax Wellness Connection's costs and then address Clear River and Deep Roots.

THE COURT: Right. I did read that at the end, but that's the reason -- realistically, it seemed to me it made the most sense to go through the other one substantively because just in case somebody's going to try and trigger something or then say, wait a second, I didn't think about that because then it came up afterwards. In light of you all's overlapping in discussions, it seemed to me I should get through that.

I understand where you're going. Finish off the numbers before I go to the new ones, but it seems to me you all have referenced other things in some of these prior hearings,

so it seemed to me I would get to the substance, get far as there and then clean off the numbers.

MR. RULIS: Understood.

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THE COURT: So, yeah, I did see your last paragraph of your letter, but, okay.

So the substantive motions, realistically, it looks to me like I was going to start with Deep Harvest. Any reason not to start with Deep Harvest? Deep Roots Harvest. I misspoke the title.

MR. RULIS: That's fine, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. So motion to retax and settle costs regarding Deep Roots Harvest, Memorandum 2922, on August 11, [indiscernible], reply 3082. And then obviously the memo of costs was back to August 8th.

So the first question is with regards to Deep Roots Harvest, Inc., always hopeful, I'll ask if there was any resolution or if it needs to be heard? Since I'm seeing counsel stand up, I'm assuming it needs to be heard.

So, Counsel for Deep Roots Harvest, motion to retax.

MR. WILLIAMSON: Good morning, Your Honor. Richard Williamson on behalf of Deep Roots Harvest. Yeah, I think there are motions to retax our cost memorandum, so I'm happy to speak to our cost memorandum briefly if the Court would prefer that we start.

THE COURT: Well, realistically, we would do it for

the motion first, right, because motion and then you get opposition, and we have a reply unless there's agreement differently from the parties. So I would go to the movant on the motion first, right, since they would have the burden to retax.

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So, Counsel for the movant on the motion to retax for Deep Roots Harvest memorandum of costs.

MR. RULIS: Thank you, Your Honor. Nate Rulis on behalf of MM and LivFree. We filed, as you said, our motion to retax was filed on August 11th, 2022. And that's Document ID 2922. And I'll try to shorten this up.

Obviously, we have spent a lot of time discussing various concepts, but, you know, specifically, last time we were here we were talking about figuring out the triggering date for when costs could be requested. Obviously, we have submitted supplemental briefing on that issue. Your Honor, that certainly applies to Deep Roots Harvest as it did to Wellness Connection.

And so I would say as to MM and LivFree, Deep Roots had filed its first answer in response to claims made by MM and LivFree on February 12th, 2020. So that would be a triggering date, and I believe that's document ID Number 356 is Deep Roots Harvest's first answer.

Now, that would mean that when going through Deep Roots's verified memorandum of costs that there would be a

total of \$9,143.74 that were incurred prior to February 12th, 2020. So we would specifically be requesting that the Court retax that amount as incurred prior to becoming a party to the litigation and for all the reasons that we discussed at the last hearing dealing with Wellness Connection.

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Now, there are additional costs and categories of costs that Deep Roots Harvest has included as part of its memo that should be -- it should be retaxed under Nevada law. And on that I will try to list those out specifically for Your Honor.

And that is in Deep Roots's verified memorandum, they have included photocopies totaling \$4,718 where only the date and cost of each copy were provided. I do not believe that that complies with the Nevada law, Berosini and Cadle and those, that they have not submitted sufficient evidence and supporting documentation to be entitled to those costs.

Additionally, we have — they have asked for \$292.43 in long distance phone calls. We discussed that issue. As far as Essence goes, I believe that as we talked about at that point that with access to cell phone and, frankly, the fact that I don't know that many people actually charge for long distance anymore I would not call those a necessary charge.

Additionally, Deep Roots has included the total amount of \$13,355.24 for travel and lodging. While I commend Mr. Williamson for including lots of receipts, there's -- it

is -- that's it. There are receipts. It's no -- there's no connection to why they were -- those amounts of charges were reasonable, necessary or how they were incurred and why.

Additionally, they have included --

THE COURT: Can I stop you there for one quick second?

MR. RULIS: Yes.

THE COURT: When you say they weren't -- and I saw it in your briefing -- reasonable, necessary, or why, are you saying there wasn't like a depo out of state? I just need a little bit more of a clarification of what you mean, why they were --

MR. RULIS: Sure. So there were -- I don't believe that there were any depositions that were taken out of state, and, frankly, I believe most of the -- you know, I have it here.

THE COURT: Most of yours were by Zoom, but that's why I'm trying to figure out --

MR. RULIS: They were, and I think, if I recall correctly, most of the travel and lodging that Deep Roots has included as part of its costs are for time that they spent in Southern Nevada. Now, Mr. Williamson can certainly correct me if I'm wrong, but I believe his firm is primarily based out of Reno. And so to the extent they traveled down here, they have included the -- it's the costs as far as travel coming down to

Las Vegas from Reno and related to that.

But it's the dates and the receipts that were presented, it's unclear as to what those are tied to, if they were specific to hearings. It's essentially a mass of receipts that just says, Here's our travel and lodging.

So as far as -- that's the -- I don't believe that there's sufficient documentation as to the why each of those was incurred under Nevada law.

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THE COURT: Okay.

MR. RULIS: They've asked for \$1,339.28 for mediation. I would say that that's a -- a mediation is a charge to each party for the, to the extent that they were involved in it, and it's not a recoverable cost.

They've also included \$1,472.93 for computerized legal research. Again, there is no descriptions of what was researched or why. It is simply put in the description in the memo of costs as, quote, computerized online research through Westlaw and LexisNexis, and that does not comply with Nevada law under *Berosini*, *Cadle*, *Fairway Chevrolet*, as we have previously talked about.

They've also included about \$5,000 in trial. It's \$5,075 for trial services that Your Honor I think has previously addressed that in other motions. So I'm not going

to go through that, just as that's -- we have an objection to that as a -- as not a reasonable and necessary cost but as one that should be borne by them.

So essentially, there is a total of \$26,252.88 that MM and LivFree is saying should be retaxed.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. RULIS: And I guess just to clarify, that is separate from the time frame cutoff there. There is admittedly some overlap.

THE COURT: So wait. Does the \$9,143.74, is that included in the 26,252.88 or not?

MR. RULIS: It is not.

THE COURT: Okay. That's what I needed.

MR. RULIS: Yeah. And it may be that if Your Honor is willing to rule on the categories of costs that are recoverable, then I could have a discussion, or the parties could have a discussion because we'll have to go through and try to figure out if there are categories, such as computerized legal research, what the overlap is between that and what was incurred prior to February 12th, 2020.

THE COURT: Okay. Counsel, you have a different perspective. Go ahead, please.

MR. WILLIAMSON: Thank you, Your Honor. And should I -- was that the only moving party we're going to hear from? I just didn't know if there were other moving parties (video

inclination earlier. I think it's important in this to remember a couple things. Number one, as soon as a lawsuit is filed affecting a party's rights, that party then is on notice that their rights may be adjudicated and needs to do certain things. That becomes then all the more important.

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When, for instance, on August 23rd, 2019, my client was expressly referenced in the preliminary injunction order that Judge Gonzalez issued. It was referenced to say we did everything right, but nonetheless it became more of, you know, it went from being an amorphous concern we were watching to my client's name has been invoked in this litigation. Our documents, our applications have been requested. And so our rights are being directly affected, so we need to actively participate even if we haven't yet filed an answer.

Going forward, then there was a mediation in this case with Judge Togliatti and certainly a proceeding in this case that was October 11th, 2019. But, yes, we hadn't yet filed an answer, but we are asked to participate. I would say a mediation expense is a reasonable and necessary expense, and so once we are asked to help participate in the resolution of this case, we are a party. Unfortunately, that mediation was unsuccessful, but so certainly we should not be retaxed just because our answer was in February when we'd been named in an order before that, we had been participating in a mediation before that, and then certainly we were named as a defendant

even prior to being served and filing an answer. Certainly once you're named as a defendant and absolutely once you've been served, a party starts incurring costs. So I just, I think it's really important to focus on that.

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Yes, our answer was not until February, but we were actively participating in the case, actively being asked to participate in the case, and in fact had been named, expressly named in this case. So I don't think February is the right date. Again, I would say the clear date is when the complaints were filed, but at the very least, once we were named in Judge Gonzalez's order in August of 2019, any costs incurred after that, we were a party.

Moving on to the specific items, I won't, obviously, I won't belabor the issue on photocopies. I disagree but understand certainly what the Supreme Court's ruling is in that regard. We don't just have a bulk photocopy. We have individual month by month photocopy allocations that coincide with events in this case, but I acknowledge we don't and I don't think it was cost effective for and it's not reasonable and necessary for a party to expressly say these two pages are for this letter; these five pages are for that motion —

THE COURT: But doesn't Supreme Court --

MR. WILLIAMSON: -- I think then that would undercut the purpose.

THE COURT: -- in Cadle say you have to?

MR. WILLIAMSON: Yeah, it does, Your Honor. No, it absolutely does, and that's why --

THE COURT: And don't I, as a District Court judge, have to follow Supreme Court precedent?

MR. WILLIAMSON: We'll see. Maybe this case will provide that opportunity. But again, I don't know that it's cost effective to do that.

On the long distance charges, however, those are expressly required under 18.005. There is no Supreme Court order saying a lawyer has to use their personal cell phone in a case. And so that actually would be groundbreaking precedent to say despite what NRS 18.005 states, that a party in fact must use their personal cell phone and cannot charge for long distance calls despite that being provided under Subsection 13 of the rule. So I would say the long distance charges are appropriate.

The travel expenses, and this is probably the largest of all the items, Your Honor, Mr. Rulis is correct. Some of those were for depositions down in Las Vegas. The bulk of that expense was for trial, and the dates correspond with trial. And, in fact, our memorandum of costs expressly states that it's for discovery and trial is what is in our memorandum of costs.

THE COURT: Is it trial predating settlement with the settling parties, or is it trial after the date of the settling

parties, or is it a combination thereof?

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MR. WILLIAMSON: I guess it is a combination thereof, but the bulk of trial was before the effective date of the settlements, Your Honor. The trial — trial began in July, I want to say July 10th if my memory serves correctly, or July 11th. And those settlements I think were effective July — the first one was maybe effective July 30th or 31st. So we were in the middle of trial. I was down there. I was at the lovely Residence Inn across from the Convention Center.

And this was a lawsuit not just challenging licenses issued in Clark County, Your Honor. As the Court knows, this was challenging the entire licensing regime that the State put in place statewide affecting all 17 counties. And so it is entirely reasonable and necessary. When you sue parties that have operations in other counties, when you sue parties that have officers and attorneys in other counties, and when you are affecting business outside of Clark County, it is both expected and anticipated that you will be drawing people in from other parts of the state. And it's reasonable and necessary certainly to travel and appear at trial, which is what those travel were.

So any in-person depositions are expressly covered under NRS 18.005. And likewise, any trial expenses are also reasonable and necessary and covered under 18.005. So all of those travel expenses are necessary and appropriate for both

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Mr. Rulis is correct. I think some of the experts, as I recall, may have been located out of state, but all those were by Zoom. All of our travel expenses were solely to -- for depositions in Las Vegas and for trial that was in (video interference).

The mediation I spoke about a little earlier. Again, that was the October 11th, 2019, mediation with Judge Togliatti in Las Vegas. A mediation expense is a reasonable, necessary and recoverable expense. So that should be covered.

And then legal research, again, legal research is a known and anticipated part of the case. It's a reasonable and necessary cost under subsection 17 of NRS 18.005, and it's appropriate to be recovered as well, Your Honor.

And unless the Court has any other questions, those would be my responses on all (video interference).

THE COURT: Okay. The Court does. Your computer legal research, is that articulated for this particular case versus a specific allocation? Just like I don't want to call it bulk billing, but I can't really think of something more precise to call it. But is it percentage allocation or is this actually a fee charged for each of the research items for this particular case that was not readily available in the public domain?

MR. WILLIAMSON: Very good question, Your Honor, and

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the answer is yes. If you look at our — it's pages Stamp 262 and 263 in our memorandum of costs. They are legal research charges expressly billed to this client, so not just divvying up my firm's, generally speaking. It is cost to this client for this case, and in fact it states it is broken out by month rather than by specific date, but it shows every month in which we incur legal research charges in this case and some months when we didn't. Obviously, there was some months where the work on this case didn't require us to conduct legal research into cases, into rulings on other things, and maybe we can just review the NRS that's freely available online.

But all of those legal research charges were necessarily incurred in this action and directly billed to my client.

THE COURT: Okay. You started to give me, you said 263, 264, and that would be your -- is that August 8th?

MR. WILLIAMSON: Yes, Your Honor. So the -- and I want to point out this was no -- no party raised this issue. We filed our verified memorandum of costs on August 8th. We realized we did not comply with the appendix rule, and then so filed an errata on August 18th that has all those page numbers, if that helps, Your Honor.

MR. RULIS: Your Honor, if I might, I have Exhibit 9, which is their computerized legal research of their memo of costs.

THE COURT: Which is attached to their errata to verify memorandum, Document 2995, from 8/18.

MR. RULIS: Correct.

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THE COURT: Yeah, if you have it. Yeah, I'm just going to take a quick look at it.

Marshal, thank you so much.

Okay. Counsel, did you complete --

MR. WILLIAMSON: Thank you, Your Honor.

And thank you, Mr. Rulis, for that. And I just want to --

MR. RULIS: Your Honor, it's double sided, just so you know.

MR. WILLIAMSON: -- and I just want to, Your Honor, for the record, this exhibit was also attached to our verified memorandum of costs --

THE COURT: Right. Right.

MR. WILLIAMSON: -- but --

THE COURT: No, I understand that. But when I was looking at this, and that's why I was asking the question, I just was trying to get it, is you have pay to explanation, computerized legal research charges, and then you have a client name, and you have a reference, and you have computer.

But what I was -- what it did not seem to have is -- let's go -- now I'm going to say something very 1990s, folks, okay, but some of you may not have been practicing then. The

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very first beginning is you used to do like a per search charge; right? You had to put in a client number. You spent a per search charge or a per hour charge or a per whatever.

Okay.

Then things got to global charges for like a month for unlimited resources. Some people did that, some people still kept it on a per client basis. Some then got a, not even like a per month charge, they just basically have a generalized access charge, and if [indiscernible] you access certain levels of other types of resources, you may get charged a premium charge.

I didn't see an explanation. How did you come up with, take for example, the entry -- well, you've got some 1/20/19. So I'm going to have the argument of before and after the time period, but let's take April 1, 2020, right. There's a charge for \$313.20, and these are monthly charges. So how is it -- break that down for me. How is it done in your --

MR. WILLIAMSON: Sure. Yeah. Happy to, Your Honor. Good question. Yeah. When we are charged by -- I think when this case started, our contract was with Lexis, and then we switched over to Westlaw part way through. But I believe under both, yes, we are charged a flat fee per month. And then based on how much research is done per client in that given month, the cost is allocated amongst those clients.

So rather than just us passing through our entire

charge, it is divided up based on usage among the clients that incurred legal research that month if that answers the question.

THE COURT: So do you then, hypothetically -- and let's make my math real easy. You've spent a hundred minutes totally for the month of, this is just a hypothetical, April 2020, and on the Deep Roots case, you checked to see if you spent 10 percent of those hundred minutes, so -- or is it.

MR. WILLIAMSON: That's my --

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THE COURT: -- client billed or --

MR. WILLIAMSON: I have to admit, Your Honor, this is a part of my business that I'm not intimately involved with. We have administrative folks that break this out amongst parties each month.

But, yeah, I believe that's why, for instance, one month there's only say 90 cents charged is because probably there was a whole lot of legal research on a whole lot of different client files that month. And so my client's proportion, Deep Roots's proportionate share was much smaller that month and likewise probably required less legal research that month as I think the case was basically we were just waiting for the rulings. And so, yeah. So if that answers it, correct, it is divided up amongst the clients that incurred legal research in a given month.

But if a client didn't -- if say there was a month

where Deep Roots in this case didn't require any legal research, we would obviously not attribute any portion of that bill to Deep Roots in that month if that (video interference).

THE COURT: Okay. And the fact that I -- there's two reasons I asked that question, and thanks for the quick short. Because when I first read through this, if you look on the last page, it says page 1, it's the Robertson Johnson Client Cost Journal, January 4th, 2022, to July 18th, 2022, right. And the last section has the report selections, client cost journals. Okay. And it says:

Include accounts payable entries. Yes.

Include expense recoveries. Yes.

Include general check allocations. Yes.

Show user name. No.

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Summary by responsible lawyer. No.

And particularly, when I saw Summary by Responsible Lawyer, it raised in this Court's mind how that could be allocated to this particular case, right.

MR. WILLIAMSON: It's the client matter number, Your Honor. So, yeah. Good — that is the — those questions are not, that's not like a Westlaw report, for instance. That's our firm's just internal billing system, so — is what those questions you were just referencing, but if you look at Matter Number 1794-19, Client Name Deep Roots Harvest, so that's like the middle column.

THE COURT: Right. Is that inputted every time you do a research for the case?

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MR. WILLIAMSON: For this case, correct. As opposed to say there might be another Deep Roots file that has a different matter number other than 1794.

THE COURT: So it may be Client Number 1794, matter number is 19. It could be 20 for a different Deep Roots or something like that.

MR. WILLIAMSON: Well, yeah, no, it's -- 1794 is the specific matter number for Deep Roots. That, dash, 19 signifies that we opened the file in 2019.

THE COURT: Oh, okay. And hate to ask you this, but I didn't -- I'm hearing what you're saying now and explaining at the time of the hearing, but was that before the Court in your memorandum of costs through any declaration or anything that the Court can take into account versus questions I'm asking at the time of the hearing?

MR. WILLIAMSON: Sure. Yeah. Good question. I mean, so, yes. If you look at page 262, that's included in the verified memorandum of costs, right. This is a document I signed under oath with a notary, and it includes my statement of computerized legal research. These costs were incurred primarily for research conducted online through LexisNexis and Westlaw.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. WILLIAMSON: So that is me saying, yeah, I did this in this file. These incurred these charges.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you so much.

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So, Counsel, I don't know if you need your Exhibit 9 back for your response, but feel free.

Marshal, I guess, whoever is feeding me -- whoever is wanting to come forward. Whoever is good.

Okay. So I'm going to give you a brief last word.

And you appreciate I've asked some of these more generalized questions because I'm going to be asking them for the others, and realistically I think it's helpful for everyone if I ask them so I don't have to keep repeating, and you all can probably include part of your summaries when we get to yours.

Go ahead, Counsel. Your final words on these.

MR. RULIS: Thank you, Your Honor. Nate Rulis for MM Development and LivFree for the record.

On the time frame, one other thing that I, just going back to that, that let me mention before I forget it, which is so the answer was filed February 12th, 2020. Mr. Williamson talked about the settlement date. Just for the record, Your Honor, as was previously in the briefs, the settlement was July -- we believe the correct date for that's July 29th, 2020. So anything after that.

And then as far as -- I'm not going to rehash all the

categories. Let me just talk about the legalized or computerized legal research. And on that one I would just refer back to the Fairway Chevrolet versus Kelley. That's 484 P.3d 276, which specifically rejected legal research costs because internal ledger provided did not document what research was conducted and how long it was last — how long it lasted, thereby making it impossible to determine whether each incidence of research was reasonable and necessary, as is required under Nevada law. And so I would say this internal ledger does not comply. And so those fees — or costs would not be recoverable under Nevada law.

THE COURT: Okay. So here's Court's ruling. The Court's ruling is going to be, there is a series of Nevada Supreme Court cases in a plethora of different areas that do talk about when there is, quote, an action, right, and when a party becomes part of an action. The Court really finds that those cases have been clear, right. In fact, there has been a recent, right, reversal of certain fees that were pre-action provided. So I think the law is clear in the area that the starting date for the cost has to be the date of the answer.

There's been nothing prevent -- provided to this

Court that somehow the party was not able to provide an answer

earlier. If you're aware of a case and you want to all of a

sudden do an answer or accept service, you could have done it

earlier if you want to start triggering different things,

different costs and things like that.

So in this, February 12th, 2020, is the agreed-upon date in which the answer was filed. That is when costs can be triggered specifically because that's when you're part of the case.

To the extent you're monitoring things, I mean, gosh, oh, golly, we have people in here all the time sitting in court, right. They don't make, quote, formal appearances because they're not in a case yet. They want to monitor. There's nothing you could keep any track of anything, nor is there any case law that says monitoring somehow would trigger something different.

And if there was an objection to participating in the mediation for not being a part of the case, obviously that could have been raised by the then trial judge. I did not see anybody who was asserting that that happened. So can't say it's pursuant to some court order. And so therefore you've got the date of the answer in this case.

So I'm going to be referring a lot for my analysis, so I might as well say some cases and I'm going to just repeat them. So it's going to be, obviously, looking at some of the analysis, there's top four, well, not only the NRS, right, but we are going to be looking at Cadle versus Woods & Erickson, In re Dish Network, Bobby Berosini — these aren't in any date order — Fairway Chevrolet as well as there's some even more

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And of course, if anybody's asking for anything with regards to experts in travel, you all know that there is a whole analysis that needs to be done with that expert.

So I've given you the date.

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Now let's go to copies. Copies. That's a pure Cadle, okay. And other case law says if they are not fully articulated you don't get them. So that needs to be reduced.

Now let's go to long distance calls. Now, let's be clear. The Court is not saying something is not recoverable. The Court has to analyze each of these and is analyzing these, right. Is it reasonable, necessarily and — reasonable, necessary and actually incurred.

With regards to the charge for \$292, there is nothing that's been provided to this Court that that was reasonable in this case, that it was necessary in this case. Even to the extent that it could be viewed as, quote, actually incurred, but even actually incurred has its own issues with regards to how that billing was done with long distance calls in kind of just a generic manner. So therefore, that item cannot be included and that is retaxed.

We then go to travel and lodging. This one, the Court actually is going to need -- you all are going to need to discuss some math here, okay. To the extent there is travel and lodging that predates the answer, obviously that is

excluded. It would be retaxed.

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To the extent that there is any travel or lodging that postdates the date of the settlement, July 29th, 2020, is what the Court's been utilizing consistently, so after that would be retaxed and excluded.

Now, to the extent that there was for purposes of trial, here the Court has to look at because counsel has offices by their choice in Reno with a trial here, and the client determined to select counsel up in Reno, would the attorney get their actual charges to come here when there could have been other counsel retained in the area? Nothing negative, and I appreciate this is all a State of Nevada case, and that's really where I get a carveout here.

Because this involved licenses with the entire State of Nevada, with just a location of a trial, I can't say the fact that a firm has chosen to reside in Reno and the client has chosen to reside in Reno that somehow that globally would preclude it because the nature of this case is unique with a whole bunch of different cases combined, a whole bunch of cases that involved a licensing procedure that was a statewide licensing procedure. So I do see a carveout there.

The challenge I then have with that caveat is that the Court really would find is how narrowly, and since these were not done in the alternative, I've got certain dates that the Court would find that they are reasonable, necessary, and

actually incurred for certain trial dates. But I don't have somebody who's done that math for this Court to have that alternative. So I'm going to say that is a carveout blank.

You all figure out the math. If you think you have two different dates and your reasoning in a proposed order, you're going to put a red line, right, that's going to submit to the Court. Although, given your billable rates and everything, you might be able to agree upon that when you look at what the underlying math is, right, okay.

But so the Court is going to find trial dates that were -- and this is trial dates. I'm about to give you a different with regards to depos. With regards to the trial dates, trial dates because of a state and unique aspect of this being multiple cases combined with a statewide nature of case, the Court would find it's appropriate to give reasonable costs.

And given where you stayed and given you, well, [indiscernible] first class, the actual airfare, not change fees, not upgrading to, you know, 1 to 15 boarding, et cetera, right, those would be granted, okay, with one little, small little issue.

To the extent that the flight, and I'd have to double check this in the breadth of all the documentation, I do not think this applies, but might as well say it now, is I saw there was a series of flights to and from, and they really don't have an issue where you came before the 29th and then

flew back after the 29th, but the Court still would find even if a flight itself was after the 29th, you've got to get back to where you were. And I don't really think that that's an issue. I would find that reasonable and necessary for that one, right, return flight up to Reno.

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So now let's go to depos. Realistically, I don't see how any of those depos it was necessary to travel in this light these were done partly by Zoom. People had a full opportunity by Zoom. I don't see that there was [indiscernible] hasn't been provided that there was specific questioning that was done versus really an observation capacity. So I'm going to give you each two minutes to walk through the depos because you're saying depos.

I look through this appendices, and I really can't specifically carve it out. So point the Court to where you say that there is a depo that is reasonable and necessary.

MR. RULIS: And, Your Honor, if I might, Nate Rulis for the record. I don't -- I'll leave it to Mr. Williamson. I'm not aware if he even traveled for depos or not. So...

THE COURT: In his oral argument he said he [indiscernible], which is why I was saying I didn't see it in the appendix --

MR. RULIS: Right.

THE COURT: -- in all the documentation. So that's why I was asking.

1 Mr. Williamson, can you point me to something that 2 shows a charge for where you traveled for a depo so I can 3 address that specifically. 4 MR. WILLIAMSON: Yes, Your Honor, I can actually. 5 THE COURT: Okay. Sure. 6 MR. WILLIAMSON: So if you look in page --7 THE COURT: On your 274-page errata. 8 MR. WILLIAMSON: -- 231 --9 THE COURT: So which page of that, please? 10 MR. WILLIAMSON: (Video interference). So our 11 errata, Your Honor, Richard Williamson for Deep Roots. 12 Bates -- or not Bates number, but you know, bottom-right 13 corner, page 231 ---14 THE COURT: Sure. Just one second. 15 MR. WILLIAMSON: -- was a flight in on February 7th. 16 Well, I guess this then goes to the pre-answer issue, but we 17 attended a deposition --18 THE COURT: No, that's --19 MR. WILLIAMSON: -- on February 7th --2.0 THE COURT: That doesn't count to the extent you 21 chose to observe something before you were in the case for your 22 own strategic reasons, you're not part of the action, that 23 cannot be included. 24 Is there anything after?

JD Reporting, Inc.

MR. WILLIAMSON: Next date, Your Honor,

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time entries, in fact, right now, Your Honor.

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THE COURT: Because page 233 is different than page 233, as you know, because page 233, do you see that has a 1/13/2020 on your receipt from the top?

MR. WILLIAMSON: Yeah. That was the -- that was a prior thing, 233.

THE COURT: Okay. Well, I'm sure between -- you all don't need me to hold up everybody else for that one airplane receipt that doesn't actually have an amount. It just has date on it, right. You all can work that --

MR. WILLIAMSON: We will sort it out, and if I don't have a receipt for that date, for that flight, then obviously -- in my appendix, it will be excluded.

THE COURT: Okay. Is that -- okay. So that is the travel component. So I've gone through the date component. I've gone through the copying components. I've gone through long distance. I've gone through travel and lodging.

So now we go to mediation costs. The mediation at issue here predated February answer date. So that would be retaxed and excluded. See analysis that I just said a few moments ago, okay, and I do not see that somebody has stated that — this is where I was talking about I don't see that somebody was ordered to go, anything in the record that somebody was ordered to go to a mediation before they were a party. And even if that were the case, I don't see where

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anybody has objected to that and saying that the Court couldn't do anything. So whether you chose to observe or you voluntarily went because you wanted to do it in your own best interest -- a lot of people do preresolution mediations -- can't find that would be a taxable charge under the statute for which you're seeking costs. So that's retaxed.

Now let's get to computer research. Okay. Computer research. Counsel's got the direct analysis under Fairway Chevrolet. I mean, he's reading straight from the case. I don't see how you get that. Because while I appreciate that that may be your process of doing it and I appreciate your explanation therein, and that's why I went to some further detail there because it really was comparing the language in Fairway Chevrolet and also came up in In re Dish Network, but Fairway Chevrolet is newer, is I wanted to see if it could comply or didn't comply.

The plain language of Fairway Chevrolet says it doesn't, so it has to be retaxed and deleted. So therefore, I can't give the exact amounts at this juncture because I appreciate counsel said that there's some overlap between the 9,143.74 with the 26,252.88, and since you all are going to figure out some of the travel costs, that would be trial travel costs, post-answer/pre-settlement, and then if the Court needs to address that minor issue, then the Court will.

But I really think the more prudent way to do that is

if you can't come to an agreement you provide the Court, in addition to the proposed order, a redline of what the two alternatives are and a reference to whereas the appendix that is supported or the brief where it is opposed, and if the Court needs — and leave it as a blank. And if I have to address a few hundred dollars, at best what it seems to be it may be, I'll be glad to do so.

Anything else with regards to Deep Roots Harvest, Counsel for movant?

MR. RULIS: Your Honor, the only other thing that I've raised -- sorry. Nate Rulis for the record -- was the trial services.

THE COURT: Ah, yes.

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MR. RULIS: The \$5,000 -- \$5,075.

THE COURT: Okay. The Court is inclined for trial services, because that is a charge that you need to do for purposes of the trial, did not know it was going to resolve, did not -- it is a post-answer date, and realistically that is what's shown is a set charge, so it couldn't, quote, all of a sudden just stop, I don't see like there's realtime something that's happened after July 29th, so I really see it's articulated, is a necessary tool, particularly in a complex case such as this, that you would need trial services.

If any of you would like to tell me that for your firm never in the future would you ever ask me for trial

services costs, please let me know now.

2.0

Counsel, I offer that, you know what I mean? But everyone in today's day and age, with multi-party litigation, trial services are anticipated [indiscernible] statute. There is case law where they have fully been supported in a lot larger numbers.

Here, in this particular case, I do see the complexity of the case, the nature of the case, this was not something that could easily just be done by a single counsel without some trial services because the nature, realize that the volume of documentation that you all were utilizing and the volume of the multi-party components, et cetera.

So I do find that that portion of the motion to retax should be denied, and that amount is an allowable cost against your clients, okay, in its proportion to everybody else. So you don't get the lump total of it, your proportional, which it's going to be interesting.

But, okay. So now let's deal with joinder parties. Okay. So joinder parties on the motion to retax, who would like to go next?

MR. BECKSTROM: Your Honor, on behalf of the ETW plaintiffs, this is Mr. Beckstrom. I think this one is fairly quick for the Court. We have the identical arguments as Mr. Rulis, and we have the same date of answer, which I hope makes it easy for the Court, as the Deep Roots.

1 THE COURT: Right. Counsel, before I --

MR. BECKSTROM: So I don't have anything additional.

THE COURT: Yours is its own motion though, not a joinder to Deep Roots, correct, by my little chart?

MR. BECKSTROM: No. It was the same argument. It was a joinder to the motion to retax and then the joint reply, Your Honor.

THE COURT: But your joint reply covered a variety of different things.

Okay. So adopting -- what is left differently from your position with regards to your client because you do have the same date of answer? Do you wish to be heard with regards to your joinder separate and apart from the Court's ruling thus far on behalf of Mr. Rulis's clients?

MR. BECKSTROM: No, Your Honor. The date of the answer is the same. So I think the Court's analysis has been properly stated. We objected to the same reasonableness factor. So I don't have anything additional to add.

THE COURT: Okay. Counsel, Mr. Williamson, do you wish to respond?

MR. WILLIAMSON: Thank you, Your Honor. No. I would just readopt all my same arguments for Mr. (video interference). That's fine.

THE COURT: Okay. The Court is going to find that it is appropriate with the same analysis. And what I did not see

in the joinder, slash, joint reply is that there was some additional specific argument that has been presented to the Court that would be in addition to what the Court has already ruled upon.

And can you all work together on your math so that you're coming to? Because you're going to be having to do the same math; right?

MR. BECKSTROM: Correct, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Is anybody requesting the Court rule today or -- and hold up everybody else, or are you okay working with yourselves on the math?

MR. BECKSTROM: We're happy to work together.

THE COURT: Mr. Williamson, are you okay working --

MR. PARKER: Your Honor -- oh, I'm sorry. I'm sorry, Your Honor.

MR. WILLIAMSON: Your Honor, in answer your question, Richard Williamson, yes, I'm more than happy to work with Mr. Beckstrom and Mr. Rulis.

THE COURT: Okay. So now let's go to the next joinder party.

MR. PARKER: Your Honor, this is Teddy Parker on behalf of Nevada Wellness Center.

THE COURT: And I have a question. Yeah, go ahead, Mr. Parker.

MR. PARKER: We did a supplement pursuant to the

Court's request, which was filed on November 4th, 2022, when the Court asked us to do so in an abbreviated brief, and we attached to it as Exhibit 1 a chart of the costs and those costs that would come between February 12th, 2020, and July 29th, 2020. I don't have to go over it because I believe the Court's addressed 99 percent of it.

The only thing that we found that was not addressed were there -- there were some charges in travel and lodging that looks like groceries and deodorant and maybe even beer or something like that, and I don't think those charges should be allowed and should be retaxed.

I think everything else is about the same.

THE COURT: Okay.

2.0

MR. PARKER: And the only other thing I recall, Your Honor, unfortunately, during the trial, I was in contact with someone with COVID. Fortunately, I didn't have it, but I had to participate in the trial for the first two or three days by Zoom. And so I don't know how many days Mr. Williamson actually questioned the witness or participated in the trial than simply being there, but we were also allowed to participate by Zoom at trial. So that's the only comment that I don't believe anyone addressed thus far, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. PARKER: That may warrant a reduction. But to do so, we'd have to look through and see again, what days he

actually participated in trial in the form of questioning witnesses or presenting witnesses. But I don't -- I know that I had to do two or three days by Zoom during the trial.

THE COURT: Okay. All right.

2.0

MR. PARKER: And that's the only other thing I would mention, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. So let me just address that. And I -- sorry. I thought I did it by inference.

My distinction when I was giving my analysis with regards to deposition versus trial, the Court is fully appreciative, for purposes of trial, trial counsel often want to be there in person unless there's a reason that they can't be. That is why the Court would find that the travel would be appropriate. Well, everything I said about the statewide, et cetera.

So while somebody may have an option to appear by Zoom, the Court can't find that it wouldn't be reasonable for an attorney to wish to be present in person. There's a variety of different reasons, and you all know that. In fact, the reason why you were probably here in person for different things and why I have certain counsel here in person today right. There's certain things that can be brought forward. There's certain things that sometimes come up that are easier to address in person versus remotely.

And, remember, remote is something that you have to

specifically request and then approved by the Court. The default viewpoint is in person with a carveout during a particular time that you all might be saying applies, right, for this particular case. But even with that carveout, people had the opportunity to come in person. There was no preclusion from people wanting to do so. There was no preclusion that did that. This is not a case where it was required that it be all by Zoom, and someone was saying they were traveling here anyway. And so the Court doesn't find that that's appropriate.

When the Court was giving the travel and the hotel, it was travel and hotel. It's not chips, beer, antiperspirant or anything like that. To the extent the Court wasn't directly clear on that, I was Residence Inn for overnight, right, for example, and the Southwest flight. So that's why the Court did the carveout. It's not for the inclusion up to business class or doing up to 1 through 15 or anything like that. It is the actual charge would be reasonable and necessary, not the, you know, on a short flight to Reno, and the actual hotel.

So to the extent that if they were living in Las

Vegas they could go to Target and have to buy their own chips,

antiperspirant, et cetera, you can't tax it to the other

parties. So to the extent that wasn't clear on the prior one,

it's clear here.

Mr. Parker, does that address your additional issues?
MR. PARKER: Yes, it does, Your Honor. Thank you.

Yes, Your -- yes, it does, Your Honor. Thank you so much.

THE COURT: Okay.

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MR. WILLIAMSON: Your Honor, Richard Williamson. May I be heard since that was a new -- I just want to clarify the Court's ruling.

THE COURT: Sure. Go ahead, Counsel. Yes.

MR. WILLIAMSON: Thank you, Your Honor. Richard Williamson for Deep Roots.

So is the Court's ruling that no meals at all during deposition and trial are recoverable? I (video interference) --

THE COURT: I have not found that -- sure.

MR. WILLIAMSON: -- I don't even know if there's antiperspirant. I'll take Mr. Parker's word for it. But what about the food?

THE COURT: Okay. Well, meals. Okay. This is my
Nacho Daddy example. Sorry, that's from another case, right.
Nacho Daddy, craft steak -- I've gotten some -- Carversteak. I
have gotten some amazing bills for food.

Realistically, no one -- you have not demonstrated in your memorandum of costs that those meals were reasonable, necessarily -- and necessary. Different than why you couldn't have, if you were living here, packed your own lunch or dinner or that you're not eating, if you were. There's nothing that is shown that either, A, a trial day was such that it precluded

parties from bringing their own food, the same cost they would incur if they were not in trial.

If you choose to eat three meals a day, five meals a day, two meals a day, or zero meals a day, those will all be appropriate, right, that you'd have to incur that cost anyway. So I don't see how it falls within the NRS or any of the case law because this is not a situation that has been presented to this Court in this specific case.

And this is only an example that I'm giving, is that, for example, that there was some type of hearing that you all decided to go straight through lunch, and maybe, like we've had a case where the parties and everyone decided and the jury likely took a half hour instead of the hour and maybe bought the jury lunch and all decided that everyone was staying in there because you were dealing with Court business. None of that has been presented in this type of case. So this is a generalized situation where you have to eat. And if you want to eat, as you would on any other day, and so there's not any reasonableness or necessity to have any other party absorb those food costs.

If you can point me to something that shows that there is some day in which there was a specific requirement that precluded from getting normal food, as you would, and eat as you wish to, then please let the Court know. But I did look through all of that because meals, okay.

So does that address your issue, Mr. Williamson? Is there anything?

MR. WILLIAMSON: That does, Your Honor. I mean, I, again, yeah, no, that -- that's fine, Your Honor. I understand the Court's ruling.

THE COURT: No. Okay. Because this, like I said...

Okay. So have I -- any other joinder parties or

we're moving on?

MR. SLATER: Your Honor, this is Craig Slater. We had filed a joinder, and I, again, I brought this issue up a few times. It's a very specific issue. My clients only asserted judicial review claims. All of the costs that were incurred were primarily related to the trial, which we attended, but we did not participate in. I just want that made clear for the record, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. And herein lies the same challenge. If you recall, last time you presented that, right, it's been a few months, had a few matters in the intervening time, there was a difference of opinion about the level of participation with regards to your client in the non-judicial review proceeding.

So I'll give you a few moments if you wish to articulate your position, and then I will give Mr. Williamson an opportunity to respond. Okay?

MR. SLATER: Yes. So again, Craig Slater. Your

Honor, I was there at the Convention Center. I sat in the very last row. I observed the trial. At no point and during the trial did I ever question a witness, did I ever speak, did I ever address the court during trial. I was there merely observing.

Quite honestly, I don't think I would've been allowed to participate in the trial because I -- my clients did not assert any of the claims that were being tried in that matter. You know, it -- it would be very unusual for the Court to allow a non-party to come participate in the trial, and that's what we were in that phase of the trial.

THE COURT: So, Counsel --

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MR. SLATER: -- as I have made clear --

THE COURT: Okay. Are you not -- are you saying that you are not listed as a defendant and you never filed any pre-trial memorandum, either directly or joined to any?

MR. SLATER: That is accurate, Your Honor. We did not participate in the trial. We filed motions in the case because our claims, the judicial review claims, were consolidated with all of the other claims. But we did not participate in the trial. There was no -- I believe it was a joint pretrial memo filed on behalf of all the parties that participated. I do not believe I was a signator to that. But it -- there is no dispute or doubt that we did not participate in the trial. We could not have.

THE COURT: Hold on one second. Let's get the date of the joint pretrial memo then, Counsel. Do you have that date?

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MR. SLATER: I don't, Your Honor. I'm frantically looking through my files because I'm at my computer for that.

THE COURT: Does anyone else have it handy?

Okay. Well, Mr. Williamson, while I'm looking up
that, do you want to address Mr. Slater's response on behalf of
his client?

MR. WILLIAMSON: Yeah. Yes, Your Honor. Yeah.

THE COURT: Go ahead, please.

MR. WILLIAMSON: I do want to, and I'm actually glad because I was the one in the prior hearing that pointed out Mr. Slater had entered an appearance. Not to put him on the spot, but just to clarify the record, and I think Mr. Slater was doing the appropriate and prudent thing by doing that. And the reason is all these claims between Phase 1 and Phase 2 and all the discovery that led up to it and all the motion practice that led up to it were entirely intertwined. And so Mr. Slater rightly to represent his client made an appearance at trial as a party plaintiff. And so Phase 1 and Phase 2 cannot just be easily severed.

I, in fact, although there are no claims pending against my client for the Phase 3 trial, and no one has asserted any claims against my client for the Phase 3 trial, I

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understand the Court's ruling that the Court needs a stipulation to avoid Phase 3 as to all parties. And so I would say the corollary of defendants not being able to incur costs until they have answered and appeared in the case also applies to a plaintiff.

If you have appeared in the case, if you have made an appearance at trial and you are maintaining an adverse position from the ultimately prevailing parties, you're a plaintiff.

And so, so, yeah. I think the fact that the bulk of

Mr. Slater's clients, their claims were to be heard in Phase 1,
which was the second thing we did, the second part of trial,
doesn't change the analysis because all the testimony is the
same, all the exhibits are the same, all the legal research is
the same, all the depositions are the same.

And really the ruling in Phase 1 was an outgrowth of the more substantial evidentiary trial that occurred in Phase 2 that was heard first. So they are just too intertwined, and certainly anyone -- so I think that would apply regardless of whether someone appeared. But certainly if you appeared in the Phase 2 trial, even if most of your claims were for Phase 1, you were an adverse party in the Phase 2 trial.

THE COURT: Okay. So, Counsel, cite me to where you show Mr. Slater. See, here's part of the challenge, right.

The Court is appreciative, I mean, if you look at

September 16th, 2020, right, the permanent injunction signed by

Judge Gonzalez, 9/22/2020, 9:20 a.m., electronically filed right, that was the notice of entry of judgment with regards to the judgment from the 16th day of September, right.

There, Mr. Williamson. You're there. Mr. Slater is there. You're all there, okay.

In fact, Mr. Slater, you're on page 2 of 12, okay, so on behalf of your clients.

Then there is looking at the -- well, even take as of today, right, and the clerk -- and that's, remember how many times this Court has asked you all, if you don't think you're part of this case, get the caption cleared up; right? Get yourself taken off through Odyssey. So far none of y'all have done that. So you still show in this case under the Consolidated Case Number 787004.

So, Mr. Slater, the challenge this Court is having with what your statement is is -- I don't want to go to it looks like a duck analogy, right, but is if you look at the Odyssey record, your name appears all the time on behalf of your clients, including up until today where you still show in part of In re: D.O.T. Litigation, Case 787004.

I do not see any motions for carve out, bifurcation, anything that says your client should not be treated as a party to, as you're saying, the litigation versus the judicial review and that there's any distinction therein. I've yet to have that be pointed out to the Court even in your opposition. I

have you making an assertion that you were there observing, not doing witnesses. Remember, just not doing witnesses doesn't mean that you're not still a party. That happens all the time even in, you know, people -- let's give the easy example.

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In an automobile situation, sometimes the party representing a driver, if they even have separate counsel versus if they have separate counsel for the insurance company, right, a Cumis counsel situation out of California adopted by Nevada in its own case law, but in any event, they may not say anything, right, but they're still in the case and in as a defendant.

So here, I am not seeing anything that shows your client being treated in any capacity or being requested to be treated in any capacity to only be part of the judicial review concept versus all of these being consolidated under one case number, 787004.

So, Mr. Slater, if you can point me to something.

That's why I was trying to go for the joint pretrial memo. I was trying to see if there was anything since I didn't see it in the pleadings whether I can take it into account or not, even going for the broader scope that it may be a pleading.

Can you point me to anything, Mr. Slater?

MR. SLATER: I can, Your Honor. And, unfortunately, I'm looking for it as we speak, but Judge Gonzalez -- and I recognize this is prior to your involvement. You inherited

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this massive case.

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Judge Gonzalez entered an order setting forth the trial protocol. In Judge Gonzalez's order, she specifically understood that this case involved numerous cases that were all consolidated and not all of the parties in each of the -- not all of the parties that were in this consolidated matter had asserted the same claims. Very much like Mr. Parker's clients are asserting the civil rights violations that would've been heard subject I believe January 9th, my clients only asserted certain claims. So in recognition of that, Judge Gonzalez entered an order setting the trial protocol.

And in that trial protocol, she specifically addressed the dec -- the judicial review claims that my clients asserted and determined that those would be heard as part of Phase 1, which timewise were heard second after the major trial. So that would be the authority that I would point this Court to.

And as I'm talking, I'm scanning, trying to find that --

THE COURT: Well, let's go to your brief.

MR. SLATER: -- and I'm unable to --

THE COURT: Right. But, right. But, Mr. Slater, let's go to the brief before the Court for purposes of today, right. Is it in that brief? Is it attached as an exhibit? Is there something that is actually before the Court; right?

Motion? Joinder?

2.0

MR. SLATER: My joinder specifically says that:

The operative complaint asserted the following claim for relief: Petition for judicial review, petition for writ of cert, petition for writ of mandamus, and petition for writ of prohibition. None of these claims were heard during the five-week trial conducted in this matter as Phase 2.

I recognize that's slightly different than what you're asking me, but --

THE COURT: Yeah.

MR. SLATER: But I made it abundantly clear at all times that my clients did not participate in the trial because they asserted no claims that were heard during that trial.

THE COURT: And, Counsel, I'm hearing what you're saying. What I'm -- you are correct. Your answer, and I appreciate as a good lawyer you're answering it the way you'd like -- your clients would like you to answer it, but it doesn't really address is how does the actual, right, because these were consolidated cases, and I did not see, okay, you're saying there's a trial protocol that specifically articulates that you're not part of it. I would've presumed that that would've been part of your joinder referencing that specific document. Because as you can appreciate, the Court doesn't --

can't go fish, particularly 3,500-plus entries and say, eh, this may be someone's argument, right. Can't advocate on behalf of anyone. Doesn't -- do not advocate on behalf of anyone and never would, right. I'm the fair and neutral judge.

So if you're saying it's part of your joinder, please point me to the page where it references that you were -- I appreciate what you referenced on the complaint, but I'm talking the complaint predates the consolidation.

MR. SLATER: Craig Slater. To answer your question, Your Honor, no, I did not cite to that specific trial protocol order issued by Judge Gonzalez.

THE COURT: Okay. Even taking the benefit of the doubt that it's part of the record, I'm not saying I can take it into account, I'm going to let Mr. Williamson respond, but can you at least point me to what date you're referencing that that took place.

MR. SLATER: I am frantically scanning for that as we speak, and just because of the sheer number of filings in this case --

THE COURT: Really?

MR. SLATER: -- I'm having a difficult time finding it, but I'm looking.

THE COURT: So you can appreciate the Court wouldn't have the liberty to have any idea what you didn't put in a brief, right, that I somehow -- you know, I've looked at a lot

of different things to try and address different things and looked at all the orders to see if anything, but I don't see anything in any of the orders.

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In fact, I see there's a whole bunch of joinders, right, and motion practice that overlaps with the litigation.

If somebody else knows the date of the pretrial memo and wants to point it out to the Court, you can. And if you don't, I'm going to have to wait a moment to give counsel an opportunity.

MR. SLATER: Your Honor, if you're waiting for me, I do not want to hold this up. It's a very minor issue. At the very least, I just — I believe that if Mr. Williamson and I discuss this issue, maybe we can reach an agreement on it. I think it's a fairly straightforward issue, but I certainly don't want to hold up the proceedings.

THE COURT: Okay. Well, then you can appreciate I need to make a ruling, right. So I have to make a ruling based on what is actually in the pleadings before the Court in this matter in reference to the pleadings.

Based on the pleadings, I would find what is presented, and I say the pleadings, the pleadings before the Court and specifically mentioned, right, and not being provided, and given a chance to say, look, if there's something else you say that's in here, then you — your joinder would be subject to the Court's ruling with the retaxing components and

the denial of the retaxing components and subject to the math analysis to see realistically what you're getting to anyway.

Okay. So that's going to be the Court's --

MR. SLATER: Your Honor, the trial protocol order was entered on March 13th, 2020, at 2:19 p.m.

THE COURT: March. Let's go back to that, okay. And wasn't there amendments thereto though?

MR. SLATER: Perhaps, but --

THE COURT: There was.

2.0

MR. SLATER: There's an amended protocol filed on June 23rd, 2020.

THE COURT: Wasn't there some more? Because wasn't there OSTs and things on protocols?

MR. SLATER: Those are the only two protocols that I'm seeing signed by the Court.

THE COURT: Okay. You said June 23rd. Excuse me. I have to click back through.

And, Mr. Williamson, I'm going to give you a moment or two to respond about whether I can even consider this document, but let's at least get to the document and see what it says first since it's coming up for the first time at the time of the hearing.

MR. SLATER: And the import of the protocol for my purposes --

THE COURT: Hold on a sec, Counsel. Counsel --

MR. SLATER: -- the conduct of trial, the phasing.

THE COURT: Okay. So you're talking 6/20- 6/23/2020. Is it Document 672? Because, as you know, there's also exhibits to that amended protocol. There's -- there is also OSTs and things after that, at least I saw one. Okay.

And actually just FYI, Mr. Parker, Subparagraph F on page 2 also addresses your kind of Zoom argument; right?

Counsel may approach a witness. You can't do that if you're on remote. So it's -- right. It says, K, Counsel may appear by alternate means upon request. And so that's generally the way it is with trial, but here it is actually in the protocol. So more of a reason that people would've had to appear in person because nobody pointed out there was requests.

Counsel, where am I referencing? Please go to the page you want me on this protocol to look at, Mr. Slater.

MR. SLATER: Okay.

THE COURT: Because I can't quess what --

MR. SLATER: Section 6 on page 9, the conduct of trial. The trial will be conducted in phases where Judge Gonzalez explains the phases.

THE COURT: Right. And where does it show any carveout for your client anywhere in here? I see terms parties, right. Parties can do this. Parties can do that. I don't see any.

MR. SLATER: Well, Your Honor if the phases, as

discussed also on page 12 through 13, the first phase, petition for judicial reviews, that would be the phase that involved my clients.

So the second phase, which is discussed on page 14, the legality of the 2018 recreational marijuana application process, claims for equal protection, due process, declaratory relief, and intentional interference, if my clients didn't assert those claims, why would we be involved in the second phase?

THE COURT: But, Counsel --

MR. SLATER: Which is the phase that went to trial.

THE COURT: But, Counsel, did you ever object to any of this? I did not see anything on any objection. Because, as you can appreciate, this protocol uses the global term each party, right. Parties. In fact, parties --

MR. SLATER: Correct.

THE COURT: -- utilize the JAVS court recording system, which will be the official record, right. The parties equally split, and it's not done by Phase 1 or Phase 2 about equally splitting the JAVS cost or anything like that I'm seeing.

And once again, you can appreciate, in fact, 16 pages, I'm quickly looking at this because you brought up for the first time in oral argument, but while I'm seeing what you're saying about certain phasings, I'm not seeing where

there's any carveout that only certain parties will be viewed as being -- I mean, in a bifurcated case, you still would have costs and things like that. And so I'm really not --

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Mr. Williamson, let me let you respond, and then the Court's going to make a determination.

MR. WILLIAMSON: Thank you, Your Honor. Yeah. I want to make a few points. First, the Court is exactly right. Neither this specific amended trial protocol nor any of the prior iterations have been expressly attached to or included in the prior briefing. So I'd object on that basis.

But there's a couple other important points. First, in fact, the conduct of trial discusses both the group of parties seeking affirmative relief and limitations on the group of parties not seeking affirmative relief in any given phase. So it contemplates that there are parties that may not be particularly active in a phase, but they are still part of the overall trial.

One other important thing, just to clarify, and Mr. Slater can correct me if I'm wrong, but when there is reference to the D.H. Flamingo parties at various times, I believe that includes Mr. Slater's clients. They had originally been part of D.H. Flamingo's complaint. That, again, expressly named Deep Roots.

In fact, Deep Roots's answer to the D.H. Flamingo complaint was in -- was on November 12th, 2019, so three, four

months prior to -- I guess three months, Your Honor, prior to the answer to the settling parties. And so affirm -- there were affirmative claims that NuVeda and Mr. Slater's other clients made against my client. Again, those were all intertwined in this case.

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And, in fact, Judge Gonzalez even acknowledged at the bottom of 15 that testimony from one phase could be used in another phase. And I think that's sort of a critical point. It goes to Your Honor's I think correct argument that these things were so intertwined it's not feasible to say, hey, you can, you know, you can sort of tap out of the trial on this date, and nothing will be held against you. Because every day in trial something was happening that was affecting other parts of the trial, and every pretrial hearing leading up to the trial discussed all three phases, discussed what was happening on any given day.

And so it was all truly inextricably intertwined, which is why I think Mr. Slater was doing his job, and it was wise for him and every other party plaintiff to be there throughout both Phase 1 and Phase 2 because it was really all one trial.

THE COURT: Okay. Counsel, given all the other parties I still need to address and we've already been an hour and 35 minutes with you all, we're moving on. The Court is going to make a ruling.

Mr. Slater, to the -- the Court -- your joinder is going to be treated the same as -- well, your joinder on behalf of your client, the Court gives you the same analysis on what will or will not be retaxed. And the Court will give you the same opportunity to work out the math.

With regards to your additional argument that you should not be -- have any responsibility whatsoever, the Court makes two rulings. First, since it was objected to by Mr. Williamson on behalf of his client to bring up a new issue, albeit even if you're saying it's a pleading, at the time of oral argument and actually at the end of oral argument because the Court had already given rulings on certain things, and now I was dealing with the joinders, the Court would find that is untimely and can't consider it.

Second alternative, even the Court fully considering the trial protocol for its alternative ruling, the Court doesn't find the trial protocol that you have referenced supports your position because in the language itself, it says, even page 12, slash, 13, the last sentence of that paragraph:

Each phase may begin with an opening statement restricted the issues to be litigated in that phase. It may end with the closing statement. If all issues related to a particular phase have been resolved, the parties will proceed to the next phase with the

remaining issues.

And then it even -- it contemplates, as you know, in this one, judicial review goes first and then the Phase 2, right, and then it talks about it will deliberate with regards to each of these phases. Then it goes to the third phase, which by the way, this re-supports part of the Court's analysis from last week.

And for the parties, that would be Mr. Parker, the State, and Pupo. Feel free to take a look at C and who the parties were, and it does include the State for the Phase 3, but you all know.

And the duplication of testimony can be utilized. And it also, the term "defendants" is used consistently throughout here, and I do not see any carveout for your clients.

Plus, it also offers the opportunity in miscellaneous issues, subparagraph 9, right, Roman Numeral IX:

The Court may amend this order upon good cause shown. Any party upon application of the Court for showing good cause may seek relief from the Court from any provision of this order.

There is nothing that shows, Mr. Slater, on behalf of your clients there was any request to either amend the order on behalf of your clients to show that there's any carveout that they're not part of anything; or, B, that there's any

application showing good cause, may seek relief from any provision of the order. So you're bound to the totality of the order, which does not make a distinction for your client as you're articulating in the oral argument.

And so therefore the Court does not find that there is support even taking into account the protocol from June 23rd, 2020, that you referenced the Court to. And so therefore any portions of the joinder not consistent with the Court's prior ruling would be denied with regards to your clients.

Anybody else in their joinders? I think I've taken care of everyone, but I'm just making sure. Anybody else?

MR. PUZEY: Your Honor.

THE COURT: Go ahead.

MR. PUZEY: Your Honor, this is Jim Puzey. High Sierra Holistics. I do not -- I'm not joinder to this. I do have a separate motion to retax and settle costs. I just want to make sure that will be able to be heard as well.

THE COURT: We're getting there. I'm just giving, as you notice.

MR. PUZEY: I just want to make sure.

THE COURT: We're on day whatever we are on this, making sure everyone gets fully heard on every penny that they're wanting to be heard on.

Okay. So the next one we're going to --

So that has taken care of the motion to retax and settle costs regarding Deep Roots Harvest memorandum of costs, and the joinders thereto. The Court has granted in part, denied in part, and the only part that the Court is considering a deferral is to some of the actual mathematical calculations in light of the Court's ruling for the parties to agree upon. And if the parties do not agree upon, then the Court has stated that the proposed order, we need to have a redline on the two amounts, and the reference to each of those.

So you still would submit, Movants, since I've granted in part, you still would submit your traditional order to the order inbox. Either, A, it's going to be signed by all parties with their authorization; or, B, you're going to make a note that a competing order and redline is going to be submitted. And that would go still to the DC -- well, that would then go, that competing order still gets submitted to the DC 31 inbox in a nonredline form, but the redline form would be sent to my JEA but a CC to all parties specifically stating that it's the redline based on the hearing from today.

And if I need to resolve, like I said, we're talking appears possibly a few hundred dollars, then the Court will do so. Okay? It's not any time for any new argument, but that should take care of everything.

And that goes for all of the joinders since, and remember, this is joinders are with relationships to the

ruling. The Court is not giving anyone double, triple, quadruple recovery or charging anyone double, triple, or quadruple for their portion.

Now, the next motion, motion to retax and settle costs regarding Clear River LLC's memorandum of costs, which is Document 2923, filed on August 11th, 2022; corresponding reply, Document 3084. And that memorandum of costs was also filed on August 8th, 2022, 2876 and 2877.

Counsel, yes, you can tell I'm going from your letter first because you articulated an order. So we're just doing those first, and then we'll go through anything else.

Go ahead, your motion with regards to Clear River.

MR. RULIS: Appreciate that, Your Honor. Nate --

MR. PUZEY: Your Honor.

I apologize, Mr. Rulis for interrupting, but this is Jim Puzey with High Sierra Holistics. Are we then going to revisit High Sierra's motion to retax against Mr. Williamson's clients?

THE COURT: Since you filed a separate motion, you're asking to be heard for your motion before I move on to a different party. Is that right, Mr. Puzey?

MR. PUZEY: Correct. Against Deep Roots, and it's a very, very short argument, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. You actually are correct. I should have done yours next. My apologies. Sorry. Go ahead.

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MR. PUZEY: Thank you. The only thing I wanted to do, and we've heard all the arguments, and we've heard what's the Court's position has been as far as things, I just wanted it to be reflected on the record that within my motion to to retax at page 9 there is — was never an intervention by Deep Roots. There was never an answer filed. So the discussions concerning of when the starting dates start for this particular matter, they never intervened, they never made an appearance.

They did after the order granting a joint motion to consolidate on December 6th of 2019, they did file an answer to ETW's plaintiff's third complaint, MM Development Company and LivFree Wellness's Second Amended Complaint. They answered Nevada Wellness's amended complaint. They answered Rural Remedies' complaint in intervention, and they answered Serenity plaintiff's second amended complaint.

But there was not an amended complaint filed by High Sierra Holistics to which they could appear. They never appeared in High Sierra's case and High Sierra took no position throughout any of this against Mr. Williamson's clients or any of the other defendants who were alleging costs of this case. And the reason for it is mentioned in my briefing; is High Sierra Holistics also had pending cases in Lyon County and Washoe County, where there was not any attempt to intervene by any party. And for that reason, those particular cases, we could address what needed to be done solely in the situation of

dealing High Sierra versus Department of Transportation [sic]. And that is what we kept -- High Sierra chose to keep this particular matter was was High Sierra versus Department of Taxation. So there was never an amended complaint that anyone could answer in the High Sierra situation.

Thank you, Your Honor.

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THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Williamson.

MR. WILLIAMSON: Thank you, Your Honor. Richard Williamson on behalf of defendant Deep Roots. Mr. Puzey is right that his client never directly sued my clients, never served my clients, and we've never attempted to intervene.

I guess the only thing I'd say in response with respect to High Sierra Holistics only is again these were consolidated cases intertwined. Mr. Puzey participated in both Phase 1 and Phase 2, appeared, and the relief he was seeking certainly could have affected my client's license.

THE COURT: Could have or did.

MR. WILLIAMSON: Well, the relief he was seeking did or was aimed to, but -- there was no relief obtained against my client.

THE COURT: But -- okay. Are you telling this Court that there's any discovery between the two respective sets of clients? Any anything between the respective sets of clients?

MR. WILLIAMSON: I don't --

MR. PUZEY: Your Honor, this is --

THE COURT: Sorry. Mr. Williamson.

MR. PUZEY: Your Honor, this is Jim Puzey.

THE COURT: No. It's Mr. Williamson. It's

Mr. Williamson's question, please.

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MR. PUZEY: I'm sorry.

MR. WILLIAMSON: Thank you, Your Honor. Richard Williamson. I don't believe so, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. So then how would they be responsible; right? Once again, how would they -- albeit the party analysis, right, and consistent with the Court's prior ruling, right, you had to have filed an answer, right, to be in an action with them, even if it's a consolidated action. So how would they be under the Supreme Court's analysis with regards to an action vis-a-vis your client in that scenario?

MR. WILLIAMSON: Yeah. We did not file an answer. It would just be the consolidated nature, I think, is the only point the Court would need to decide as vis-a-vis High Sierra and Deep Roots.

THE COURT: But in order to even get here, right, under NRS 18, which was where the Court went, and your like first hearing, right, was the prevailing party analysis, I'm not seeing how you -- how there's any prevailing party?

Motion to retax granted. You're not a party. You're not a prevailing party. You're not an NRS 18 for them to seek their memorandum of costs against you. There is not part of an

action under Supreme Court case law with regards to your client. So at this juncture, since you're never part of the HSH case, the mere consolidation of that, let's give my Pupo example.

Pupo is not involved in many other cases, the Court takes no position on anything Pupo could have potentially have said, right, because the matter's been fully resolved. But Pupo was not named in other parts, and so Pupo was being treated with regards to things that Mr. Pupo was involved in.

So your motion is granted. Provide me an order. Got it.

MR. PUZEY: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: You're giving the detailed analysis.

Okay. So --

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MR. DZARNOSKI: Your Honor, excuse me. This is Mark Dzarnoski for TGIG. We also filed a separate motion to retax for Deep River [sic]. My argument is even shorter than Mr. Puzey's if you want to entertain mine and try and finish up Deep Roots.

THE COURT: Sure. Since I've done two, we'll do a third. Go ahead, please. I just -- sorry.

MR. DZARNOSKI: Yes, Your Honor. We filed our motion to retax on August 11th, 2022. The basis for our motion was that we felt we were the prevailing party. The other side was not. We also argued therein that no costs should be awarded

for judicial review. I do not -- I don't recall specifically if you've ruled on that in another matter or not, whether any costs --

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THE COURT: I did. Just Mr. -- remember Mr. Slater's arguments a few moments ago.

MR. DZARNOSKI: Okay. Very -- then up until today, you hadn't.

And the final point I wanted to make or the second to final is that the answer to our complaint was filed on February 12th of 2020. So we don't believe that any costs prior to that should be assessed against us.

And as to every other argument, I'm willing to rest on the record.

THE COURT: Okay. So with regards to TGIG, right, and Deep Roots, how would that be different than the Court's prior ruling on your prevailing party analysis?

MR. DZARNOSKI: Oh, I don't think it is. I don't think it is. I'm not here to argue with you.

THE COURT: Okay. No, I'm not asking. I'm just, I did not see anything. Here's the way -- I appreciate I need to rule motion by motion, but I was being -- making sure that you were not asserting that there was some issue that the Court had not addressed in the prior prevailing party analysis that you need the Court to address today. I'm just walking through your arguments.

MR. DZARNOSKI: Yes. No, Your Honor, there is not. I understand what you said before. I'm not arguing or quibbling with you. Nothing new.

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THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Williamson, would you like to respond to TGIG's motion to retax, which is Document 2918.

MR. WILLIAMSON: Yes, Your Honor. Thank you.

Richard Williamson on behalf of defendant Deep Roots. I agree.

I don't think we -- I think we can -- I would incorporate my arguments in the prior motions.

The only point I just want to make sure is clear with respect to TGIG is since they are not a settling party there would be no end date as there was with the settling parties.

THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Dzarnoski, would you like to address the end date issue raised by Mr. Williamson or anything else because you get final word? It's your motion to retax.

MR. DZARNOSKI: Thank you, Your Honor. No. Mr. -- I agree with Mr. Williamson. Nothing further.

THE COURT: Okay. So with regards to TGIG's motion to retax, I believe that's Document 2918, filed 8/11/2022. The Court's ruling on the prevailing party analysis, please see the Court's prior analysis with regards to the prevailing party. The Court is incorporating that for purposes of today's ruling and rules the same

With regards to the judicial review argument set forth, the Court is adopting what I stated previously on

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judicial review and also what I stated today with regards to judicial review and even referencing on the two-prong analysis that, one, this Court doesn't see that it was — that there was evidence raised that that judicial review should be taken separately. Even giving you the same benefit of the doubt that I gave Mr. Slater on behalf of his clients and looking at the trial protocol, the Court doesn't see that that would support it. So those two analyses that I gave with Mr. Slater on behalf of his clients would equally apply to your clients. And so I'm adopting it for that regards.

With regards to the end date concepts, and since your client is not a settling party, the Court would adopt its analysis on the distinction between the settling parties and the nonsettling parties and incorporate your agreement that there is a distinction there and so therefore would not have the July 26th, 2020, end date.

So now let's walk through the actual reasonable, customary and necessity. Everything that the Court has analyzed with regards to the costs that go through the July 26th is going to equally apply here. The same analysis with the date of the answer February 12th, 2020, is going to equally apply.

Mr. Dzarnoski, is there anything else from after July 26th, 2020, that's in your pleading that you think the Court has not addressed on the reasonable, necessity, or

actually incurred aspect of the charges asserted in the memorandum of costs as applies to your client, TGIG?

MR. DZARNOSKI: No, Your Honor.

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THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Williamson, I'll let you address to the extent of the post July 26th, 2020, anything you need to address with regards to those costs that have occurred after that date?

MR. WILLIAMSON: No, nothing further other than just to state, as expressed in our verified memorandum, Your Honor, I believe they were all necessarily (video interference).

THE COURT: Okay. Let me go back. I'm going to double check one thing with regards to Document 2918. Give me one second, please.

Okay. 2918 was the reference document.

Okay. Mr. Dzarnoski, I do not see in your seven-page document that there is any specific numbers that show that you're seeking to be retaxed after July 26th, 2020. Are you contending that there is something that the Court may have missed?

MR. DZARNOSKI: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Then I will -- Court will have to view it waived if there's not anything specific with regards, so just would follow with regards to that was not raised in the motion to retax [indiscernible] memo of the costs from July 26th, 2020, consistent therewith.

1 (Pause in the proceedings.)

THE COURT: Okay. High Sierra Holistics, we've dealt with yours.

Okay. Now I think I have completed Deep Roots. Does anyone think I have not completed all the Deep Roots?

(No audible response.)

THE COURT: Okay. So consistent, we're now going to go to Clear River, and then what we'll do is, since Mr. Rulis is here in Court and [indiscernible] first, we're going to take care of his first, and then we're going to do similar to what I do with Deep Roots. I will go to joinders to finish all of the Clear River.

Go ahead, Counsel. And we're going to have be a little bit more efficient on this if we want to get you taken care of and everyone else be heard this morning. We're almost at the two-hour mark, and we are going to take a break in about 10 minutes just to let you know for my team to get a break. Okay?

MR. RULIS: Thank you, Your Honor. Nate Rulis on behalf of MM and LivFree for the record. I'll try to be quick on this one.

I believe the same analysis that we have just spent plenty of time going through on Deep Roots applies to Clear River I would say that. As to MM and LivFree, Clear River filed its first answer in response to claims by MM and LivFree

on April 21st, 2020. That's Document ID Number 1145. And so we would -- we believe that your -- the costs that have been included in memo of costs prior to April 21st, 2020, should be retaxed.

That amount totals \$29,294.84. So in addition to the pre April 21st, 2020, costs I just want to go through a few categories that we've provided objections to and think that under Nevada law should be retaxed.

And that's the photocopies. Clear River has included photocopies, but the only --

THE COURT: Counsel, can I -- I'm going to stop you one quick second.

MR. RULIS: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Because, and I appreciate you didn't do the original memo on this one, right, because I'm looking at page 5 of 10.

MR. RULIS: The original motion?

THE COURT: The original motion.

MR. RULIS: I think that's correct, Your Honor. I think it was we were part of the joint motion.

THE COURT: Yeah. Okay. The reason why I'm asking is because you put in the motion, page 5, as soon as you said that 29 was going back to the document, because I had written down you put 37,194.47. So is the 29- going to be part of that 37-, or are we dealing with different numbers?

MR. RULIS: So, yes. I think thirty-seven, one, nine, ninety-four, I think is the total amount of costs that they have actually requested. And I can be a little bit more specific today after having the advantage of some of your client -- some of Your Honor's inclinations.

THE COURT: Okay. Because I'm paralleling what you put in your motion pages, right, 5 and 6 to what you're arguing today.

Go ahead, please.

MR. RULIS: So specifically, of the total amount of costs requested, they've requested photocopies. Again, as we talked about earlier with Deep Roots under *Berosini*, *Cadle*, host of Nevada law, the only thing they've provided are dates and costs. And that's not sufficient. So the total amount of photocopies requested in the memo of costs is \$10,588.80. That entire amount should be retaxed.

They've included Westlaw research fees. Again, the only description being that it's Westlaw online research and the date it was done. Under *Fairway Chevrolet*, *Berosini*, *Cadle*, et al., the total of \$6,291.37 should be retaxed.

So essentially there are also parking fees, mediation, and trial services that have been included.

Granted, all of those, almost all of those amounts are pre

April 21st, 2020. And so, Your Honor, I did the math as I was sitting here. And in Clear River's memo of costs, taking out

photocopies and Westlaw research fees, there are a total of \$195.13 in post April 21st, 2020, costs that are included that are, I guess, not specifically being objected to.

That would be filing fees totaling \$136.50, parking fees of \$39, and postage of \$19.63.

THE COURT: That are or are not?

MR. RULIS: Are not objected to. That I -- that it arguably could be recoverable as post.

THE COURT: Then I have to look at -- okay. Because the numbers you're saying overlap.

MR. RULIS: Yes.

THE COURT: But aren't the same as what's in the motion. So I need to know, are you waiving the other items in the motion? I hate to put you on the spot. I can read them.

MR. RULIS: I quess --

THE COURT: Let me read through them. You want me to read through them?

MR. RULIS: Sure. No, I'm not waiving it, and I guess -- so let me be clear. I think the parking fees, even though they're \$39, arguably are not sufficiently documented. Same with postage and filing fees, but...

THE COURT: I was actually going -- okay. You have page 5 of your motion.

MR. RULIS: Excuse me, Your Honor.

THE COURT: It says 10,588 in photocopies, which I

just heard you say, okay. You were objecting in the motion to \$3,074.18 in various Court filing fees. And I'm not suggesting that I -- if I didn't hear you say -- the challenge the Court has is, right, it's in a pleading, but it's not addressed in oral argument. That's the reason why I'm asking if it's waived. And I appreciate that you may be taking some of my inclinations and maybe only arguing certain things. I don't -- I can't read people's minds. So I don't know for sure, but I don't want to not address something is where I'm going.

So 3,074.18 in various Court filing fees.

MR. RULIS: Yes. I see where you're talking about, Your Honor.

THE COURT: See what I'm talking about?

MR. RULIS: Yes.

THE COURT: Pages 5 and 6. I'm going those item by items.

MR. RULIS: So sorry, I'm just --

THE COURT: If they're waived, I'm moving on.

MR. RULIS: If I can, I just want to cross-reference to their memo so I make sure that I get it correct because -- so right. \$3,074.18 is the total amount of filing fees that were included in their memo of costs. We objected. Those are not properly documented.

But also \$2,937.68 of those filing fees were pre-answer date.

1 THE COURT: Okay. We went through the Westlaw.

MR. RULIS: So the total of Westlaw being \$6,291.37 for which descriptions are Westlaw online research with a date for charge, and that's it.

THE COURT: Okay. Your parking costs, I thought I heard you say 155, but I see in the memo it says 1,555. And if I misspoke, I apologize.

MR. RULIS: Yes, Your Honor. The total is -- the total requested parking fees is \$1,555. Again, \$1,516 of those would be pre-answer costs. Hold on a second. And where would that be in your -- I'm going to your motion because the only one I see --

THE COURT: Do you have that broken down in your motion, Counsel?

MR. RULIS: I have that broken down. Pre-answer costs were not broken down in the motion. Those were broken down in the supplemental brief regarding time frame for allowable costs, which is Docket Number 3149.

THE COURT: That's where I'm going. Okay.

Okay. Counsel, Clear River, go ahead, please.

MR. GRAF: Yes, Your Honor. Obviously, we should address the date and timing of the costs first, I guess.

THE COURT: Can we start -- Mr. Graf, can we start with your name, please, on behalf of Clear River.

MR. GRAF: Oh, sorry, Your Honor. Rusty Graf

1 appearing on behalf of Clear River, LLC.

First and foremost, we need to talk about the date and timing of the appearance in the case. Our first appearance in this case officially as Her Honor is addressing it, it appears, was when we filed the motion to intervene on April 29th, 2019. Thereafter — and that motion sought the intervention as — as the reason being that the State could not properly represent our interest in the case.

Thereafter, we filed the first answer in this case, I believe, on May 16th, 2019. And thereafter, all of those cases were consolidated in December of 2019.

THE COURT: Okay. Counsel, the reason why I'm going to stop you for a quick second --

MR. GRAF: So, Your Honor --

THE COURT: Counsel.

MR. GRAF: Yes.

THE COURT: The reason why I'm just stopping you, sorry, I thought I heard counsel say it was April 21, 2020. So I just need you all to at least agree the date --

MR. GRAF: That's for MM --

THE COURT: -- the date of an answer, please, whichever date it is.

MR. GRAF: Your Honor, that is the answer that was filed as to MM and his other client. April 21st, 2020, was the first time that we filed an answer to that matter.

THE COURT: Okay?

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MR. GRAF: Our first answer in the consolidated cases was filed in May of 2019 -- May 16th, 2019.

Our motion to intervene was filed on April 29th, 2019. And we participated in the preliminary injunction hearing where they sought to enjoin the issuance of the final licenses for my client who had received three licenses. So that is the start of our -- that's the argument is to our start into these cases.

I understand what Her Honor is going to say, but then, Your Honor, then you're going to be doing an analysis on each and every answer that we filed in the case because we filed multiple answers in the case. So it's going to be a different timing analysis as to each one of those. So then if we're only getting fees and costs as to the first answer or the second answer or the third answer or the fourth or the fifth that we filed in the case, then that analysis has to be done.

THE COURT: Yes, it does.

MR. GRAF: So we believe that our substantial involvement in the case occurred when we filed the motion to intervene on an order shortening time that was then heard on May 6th, and the answers that were filed after that.

Mr. Rulis's law firm argued against our motion to intervene.

So if there was an interaction between counsel and the parties at that point in time, I don't know what is.

So, Your Honor, I don't think that there is in this case a yes or no black or white answer as to the timing or the involvement of the parties in the case as a whole because the parties and -- or, excuse me, the case was conducted as one, one case from early on, and there were multiple motions for injunctive relief. There were multiple motions for summary judgment. And there were multiple complaints and answers that were filed in the case.

And if Her Honor wants us to analyze that on a case-by-case answer-by-answer basis, then that hasn't been done yet by any of the parties in this case. But it is our opinion, it is Clear River's opinion that we started to participate in the case as a whole on April 29th, 2019, when our order shortening time was filed. And then it was heard on May 6th, 2019.

And, Your Honor, I can address each of the costs.

THE COURT: Yeah, go ahead.

MR. GRAF: The categories that were discussed by counsel.

THE COURT: Sure. Go ahead, please.

MR. GRAF: Your Honor. Same argument as

Mr. Williamson as to the photocopies. Our photocopying system

allows us to, when there's copies that are conducted on the

case, it is recorded by date, and you can then determine the

number of copies because all you do is have to divide by

30 cents. Those copies are then entered on a matter number. So they are specifically referenced as to this case. And we think that meets the requirements of *Berosini* and the other matters that talk about the specificity of the costs.

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As to Westlaw, Your Honor, same analysis as

Mr. Williamson. Our Westlaw costs are monitored by matter.

When you do the research, you have to enter a matter number.

That matter number is then categorized in our billing system,

which is Cleo (phonetic), and it is tracked according to that.

The information that was searched and that sort of thing, if it

is required by this Court, then that has not been provided.

The parking fees and everything else, again, Your Honor, goes to a timing instance. Those are all for Court appearances, every single one of them. And they are related, and they're recoverable by both counsel. As Mr. Rulis has his -- Mr. Kemp was attending most of these hearings prior, as was our office with Ms. Higgins. So the parking fees are reasonable and should be awarded in the amount of \$1,555.

The mediation and trial costs or trial fees, Your Honor, are recoverable. Those are, I believe what Mr. Rulis is arguing is that the timing of the answer is what is the cutoff. And again, we don't believe that that is the cutoff or the initiation date for incurring costs in a matter.

Then, Your Honor, as to the court filings, the -- I don't necessarily understand the argument by Mr. Rulis. Court

filings are all tracked by the court. You can go into Odyssey and look at the court filings and see those, and that's directly where we printed those from and where they're represented, and that's the documentation that was attached to our memo of costs. So I don't know what else, other information to provide to Her Honor regarding that.

THE COURT: His -- I believe his argument there was the timing, that he said it was a timing issue --

MR. GRAF: Yeah.

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THE COURT: -- is that it pre-answer. They should not -- he's not arguing on behalf of anybody else, but as to their statement, you were not a party vis-a-vis them until the time you filed your answer is what I understood the issue is, not the fact that he was challenging the fees charged by the court because the Court could take judicial notice of what the fee amounts are. They are what they are.

MR. GRAF: Yep. And, Your Honor, I just going back to the timing issue because it appears that that's going to be the major issue here, unless Her Honor does a separate analysis as to each case, that there's a separate date and a separate cutoff, then I guess that's what we do. And then we would have separate orders and separate findings as to each individual case.

But here's the thing, Your Honor. Every single one of these parties was in the same courtroom arguing the same set

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of facts on their side and on our side during the time of the preliminary injunction hearing, which was held the summer of ---or, excuse me, the spring and the summer of 2019. And it seems a little form over substance, let's call it, to say that we're not entitled to our costs after we prevailed after a preliminary injunction hearing, then after a trial that was held a year later, and that Her Honor's going to cut that off prior to that time. I don't think that was the intent of any of these rulings that Her Honor has discussed this morning.

The intent of those rulings was to say in a case where it's one -- one party versus another party or maybe one versus two that there should be a cutoff as to when the answers are. But procedurally, the interaction between these parties started April 29th, 2019, when the OST on the motion to intervene was filed, and those parties all participated in that process from that point forward.

So if Her Honor is awarding costs, those are the costs we should be awarded, is from that point.

THE COURT: Counsel, I do have a question for you, and it's going to be plain language of NRS, right, 18.020. How were you an adverse party as to Mr. Rulis's clients, right, prior to filing an answer? And where I was -- I'm looking at this as, okay, they wanted something from your clients; right?

MR. GRAF: Yes.

THE COURT: Could they have collected anything from

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    you until --
 1
 2
               THE WITNESS:
                            Yes.
 3
               THE COURT: -- you were actually adverse to them?
                          Your Honor, adversity is determined by the
 4
               MR. GRAF:
 5
    words that are spoken in Court. Mr. Rulis is not going to get
 6
     up and say that he wasn't adverse to Clear River in the
 7
    preliminary injunction hearing. Quite the opposite. They
 8
    tried to present evidence and testimony that the board that was
 9
    presented and identified in our application process was
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     improper and that our licenses should be then not finalized.
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               Your Honor, on that basis alone, they were adverse to
12
    us. That was argued at the hearings going well before
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    April 21st, 2020, Your Honor.
14
               And, Your Honor, Clear River was one of the parties
15
     that was arguing that in their PJR cause of action it was
16
     improper to go forward in a PJR cause of action without naming
17
     all of the parties. That order didn't happen until, and I
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     [indiscernible] to be corrected, Your Honor, sometime in
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     December of 2019 or January of 2020, where the Court then said,
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     yes, that's correct, all of the applicants have to be made a
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    party to the PJR if you're attacking the process.
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               THE COURT: But is --
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               MR. GRAF: And then slowly but surely --
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               THE COURT: Counsel. Counsel. Counsel.
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JD Reporting, Inc.

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Counsel.

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MR. GRAF: -- each of those parties then amended their complaints to address that issue and started naming all of the parties. So, Your Honor, we were fighting well months before that to say that they had improperly pled their claims and needed to bring in all of the parties to the application process to have that fully addressed. Because if they got their injunction and said, hey, Clear River, you can't go get a final license, that's potentially a taking. And I understand a [indiscernible], Your Honor, and everything else.

But the issue becomes whether or not and when Clear River started fighting for their licenses. We started fighting for our licenses with all of these plaintiffs participating in every single one of these hearings. They all got up in April 2019, in May 2019 and said, Clear River did bad things.

And I see Ms. Barrett shaking her head. I know Qualcan wasn't.

But, and there's -- there is a certain amount of that type of analysis, but as to MM, as to Serenity, as to ETW, as to all of those initial lead plaintiffs, Your Honor, that happened. I'm not misremembering anything. I know that happened. And what was going on was an argument and a contest and a fight over those three licenses that Clear River got.

So if Her Honor is asking me when did the fight start, the fight started even before April of 2019, but officially upon the filing by Clear River, April 29th, 2019.

THE COURT: Okay. Counsel, I've got to stop you and ask you a quick question.

MR. GRAF: Sure.

THE COURT: Did you cite anything in your pleading —did you cite anything in any of your pleadings where there's ever been a Nevada Supreme Court case where they have awarded costs, right, as you are seeking them under NRS 18.020 prior to a party filing an answer? Because there's a whole plethora of cases, including recently, right, where they say you can't do things until you're actually a party to the case.

MR. GRAF: Understood, Your Honor. And I circle back to the fact that we did file an answer in May of 2019 as to I believe it's the ETW case. But, Your Honor, I'm sorry, I don't have that at my fingertips right now.

THE COURT: No worries. I'm talking about --

MR. GRAF: It's TGIG.

THE COURT: -- this movant. I haven't gotten to ETW.

I'm talking about this movant. And as you realize --

MR. GRAF: It was TGIG, Your Honor, that we filed the answer to in May of 2019, and they were one of the main plaintiffs leading this case.

And, Your Honor, I get where you're coming from. I understand the fact that you want to have a date and a time that says after this date and time you can do whatever. But in all reality, Your Honor, this case was a fight for 63 different

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licenses by those parties that got awarded them. And all of those parties save and except some settlements where they voluntarily gave them up, we all kept those licenses. So the fight was begun by us on April 29th, 2019. And our answer that was filed May, I think it's May 16th, 2019, as to TGIG.

So that, if Her Honor wants to start it at that point in time, then fine. We get all of our costs from May of 2019 against TGIG going forward. And all of these other parties can argue and present that only the costs after such a date are they jointly and severally liable for those other costs. Okay. But, Your Honor --

THE COURT: Counsel, I've got to stop you. I've got multiple people, right. I've got to give people sufficient time. So I'll give you one minute to wrap up, please.

MR. GRAF: I'm wrapped, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Counsel, you get last word.

MR. RULIS: Thank you, Your Honor. So let me start with as far as Mr. Graf said, you know, the parties have to brief when the time frames are, I believe we did that. That's what the supplemental brief on the time frame was for. I referenced Your Honor to it. It's document ID number, I think it's 3149 as far as MM and LivFree goes where we laid out for Your Honor the dates of filings of answers that makes them a party to at least the litigation as to our clients.

And one other thing that Mr. Graf started referring

to that I think Your Honor was about to ask him about was, you know, the Rule 18.020, you mentioned talks about being a party to the litigation. And as you heard Mr. Graf say, they admittedly weren't parties to the litigation and were filing motions saying that they needed to be made a party to the litigation; otherwise, you couldn't get any sort of relief against them. And that's where we get to the analysis of when did they become a party to the litigation, when they answered the claims filed by MM and LivFree.

And as far as MM and LivFree goes, Clear River for the first time answered their claims on April 21st, 2020. They didn't -- you know what they did, you heard they filed a motion to intervene but not in MM and LivFree's case. Because at, by the way, at that point, they were not consolidated.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. RULIS: So they were separate cases. They could have. They clearly knew they could have and didn't, and then argued that they weren't a party and that we couldn't get relief because they weren't a party. So I would again go back to the analysis as we talked about in our supplemental brief, which is they became a party when they filed the answer on April 21st, 2020.

As far as some of the other specific costs that Mr. Graf talked about, I just reference, as far as photocopies go, I think *Berosini* is very clear that specifically rejecting

photocopies because only the date and cost of each copy was provided. That's all we have here.

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Fairway Chevrolet, I think, is specific on the legal research costs.

And then as far as mediation goes, not only is it prior to them becoming a party, but as Your Honor talked about with Deep Roots, there was nothing mandatory about it. They were not ordered to appear. They did so voluntarily, and I believe that those costs are not recoverable.

And unless Your Honor has any other questions, I'll sit down.

THE COURT: Clarification on your filing fees issue.

I just want to make sure --

MR. RULIS: Yes. Your --

THE COURT: -- that you and Mr. Graf are on the same page. Although you did have different opinions, just make sure you're on the same page.

MR. RULIS: Yes. Your Honor is correct in that as far as filing fees go that is a date issue, which is we do not believe that we are -- excuse me, let me rephrase that. The pre-answer filing fees should be retaxed as they were not a party to the MM and LivFree litigation prior to April 21st, 2020.

THE COURT: Thank you. Okay. [indiscernible] on one sec. I am...

MR. GRAF: And, Your Honor, I think that there were separate motions to retax that were filed.

THE COURT: There are. There are. Remember, I'm doing this one by one. So give me just a second. I have to look up one thing real quickly. Just one moment.

Okay. So --

MR. GRAF: Your Honor, I wanted to respond to Her Honor's comment about 18.020 if possible.

THE COURT: But you can't. You can't, Counsel.

Counsel. Counsel. You had your, right, motion, opposition, reply. So the Court, in fairness to everybody else who's patient waiting for their motions, their joinders, et cetera, we can't do that. Otherwise, it's back and forth, back and forth, back and forth.

The Court is just pausing for one quick second because I'm double checking one case and my understanding of what it said, and I just want to make sure I am correct. Just one second please.

Okay. One second, please. Hold on a second. Please don't speak. I'm just looking at one thing real quickly, please.

Okay. I -- correct. I thought I was.

Okay. So going to the first the macro issues, then the micro issues. With regards to the motion to retax costs, based on the date of the answer filed by Clear River component,

the Court is going to grant that component.

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The Court is also going to refer you all to Schouweiler versus Yancey, 101 Nevada 827, which was the case I was double checking. I was also checking a subsequent case, Semenza versus Caughlin Crafted Homes, 901 P.2d 684 (1995). And the reason why the Schouweiler case, because they're, albeit a construction defect, but, right, prevailed against three of the defendants and not the other three, and so the Court there does look at this — the Supreme Court looks at this on an individualized basis. It doesn't, okay, look at it — and by the way, that was a class action, right, but anyway, looks at it individualized basis. So the Court, this Court has to do it, and that's the plain language of the NRS.

Okay. The NRS does talk about an adverse party and a prevailing party against an adverse party because you can win against some and lose against others, and you only get to get things from certain portions of that. And I'm not getting into the third-party claims and fourth-party claims issues, which aren't at issue here.

So the Court has to take the date by which, and that's why this Court has analyzed these on answer date by answer date because I have to see who the parties are, what the action is to see whether or not there's the triggering of NRS, right, 18.010. And those cases I utilized are for example purposes, right, because they're factually a little bit

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But in any event, so the Court does have to go with April 21, 2020, the agreed-upon date by which the answer was filed with regards to the two parties for this particular motion. I'm going to get to your other motions and your joinders in just a second. Therefore, things before that date, and remember once again, Clear River could have gotten into this case earlier. They could have filed. They could have sought something to become a party. They also could have tried to amend. If you want to go back to the trial protocol, et cetera, they could have amended what they wanted to, and it didn't.

So anything before April 21, 2020, is retaxed and denied. With regards to anything after April -- and I'm saying on or after April 21, 2020. Let me be clear. When I'm saying the dates of answers, I'm taking it from midnight. So if there's some charge on that actual date, it is included. Court's not taking a distinction between if something was filed at 2:00 p.m. and the answer may have been filed at 2:15 because once again, we -- there's some time delay between the answers actually showing up on the record, and I think that is the appropriate analysis. Okay. So April 21, 2020, going forward is the date.

Now, we have to get to the specifics. Specifics with regards to the photocopies, while I appreciate law firms may

have systems in place, if your systems don't comply with the case law which your systems need to comply with in order to get the costs, realistically, you can evaluate whether you want to change your system. This Court has to look at what the case law says. The case law says certain things need to be there. It is not photocopies. Motion to retax granted with regards to the photocopies.

Court, similarly with the mediation, the mediation is granted, the motion to retax, and so that cost will be denied for two independent bases. One, it's prior to the April 21, 2020; so you were not an adverse party to be even a potential prevailing party until after April 21, 2020. And so therefore that would be inappropriate. And it doesn't even see that there's a basis specifically for that mediation, how it's reasonable and necessary under the language.

So let's go to --

MR. GRAF: Your Honor, before we leave the mediation issue real quick, are --

THE COURT: No, Counsel. Counsel, can I please finish with my ruling. Okay. If you keep interrupting --

MR. GRAF: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: -- you know, I can't get through these, and we're not going to have a nice clear record. So please give me the courtesy of letting me at least finish, okay.

Thank you so very much.

Okay. So now, okay, going back to, I have to go back to 2149. One second please.

So trial services denied for the same analysis the Court gave previously with regards to the trial services, mediation [indiscernible] for trial services.

So now we get to parking. Parking is going to be the date contingent because if you're not an adverse party you can't assess parking against the movant in this case.

So then we look at travel fees, and the Court has got to double check with it. I didn't see travel fees in there, but I got a notation for travel fees. So to the extent travel fees is articulating with regards to parking, I've already analyzed it.

So then we get to, and this is where we have runner fees. Runner fees, the Court was not -- it was addressed in the motion but was not addressed in oral argument. Runner fees, four, ninety-five, page 5 and 6, of the motion.

MR. RULIS: Yes.

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THE COURT: So with regards to the runner fees, it's denied with regards to the runner fees because it'd be appropriate during — we are talking COVID—type things. Things had to be done on certain equipment. Reasonable, necessary, actually incurred consistent with applicable case law and doesn't find that those are overcharged.

I need to get back to -- one second, please.

I've addressed that. I've addressed the photocopies.
I've addressed --

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Westlaw charges, consistent with the Court's prior ruling with regards to Westlaw charges, once again that's pure — that's pure case law. If it doesn't comply with the case law, the pure language of Fairway Chevrolet, In re Dish Network address those specifically. If you don't comply with it, it may be your company's system, but if it doesn't comply with the four corners of those cases — In re Dish network is an older case. Fairway Chevrolet is not brand, brand new. So the Court has to grant the motion to retax and deny the Westlaw charges as not being consistent with applicable case law of the appropriate documentation that is necessary.

And the Court -- I'm missing one item. Counsel, Mr. Rulis, go ahead.

MR. RULIS: So, Your Honor, there's a couple things. So I think the only thing that you haven't addressed yet is transcripts, although I believe the only requested costs for transcripts in here are pre-answer date.

THE COURT: The Court is going to deny it on transcripts because realistically those transcripts were utilized throughout the litigation. The Court really sees with regards to where you're going to the actual trial component, those needed to be ordered. Even though they're pre-trial transcripts, they were utilized as asserted for purposes of the

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actual trial and for the aspects that would've happened post-answer. So the Court would deny the motion to retax with regards to those because they were actually utilized as [indiscernible]. I don't see anything that shows that they weren't, that they were -- didn't come into play once they were into the case.

It'd be similar as like you demand for prior pleadings when you come into a case. You demand for prior pleadings, there may be a copying cost associated with those demand for prior pleadings. That would be a recoverable cost potentially. That's no advance ruling, but, okay.

MR. RULIS: Okay. So I guess I do have one quick or question on two of items.

THE COURT: Well, first -- okay. The Court has made its ruling. My only question is, do either party feel that I have not addressed one of the subcategories? That's -- we're not going back on my ruling right now. I will give both you and Mr. Graf an opportunity if you have questions at the end, but I just want to make sure I've covered all of the categories to be retaxed. If you think that there's not a category that the Court's addressed, just please tell me that category.

MR. RULIS: I believe you've addressed all of the categories, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. So then in fairness, Mr. Graf had a question first. So I'm going to let him ask his question

first, and then I'll ask -- let you ask your question.

Mr. Graf, you said you had a question?

MR. GRAF: Yes, Your Honor. In the mediation fees, you had said that there were two reasons. One was reasonableness and necessity was the second reason. The timing, I understand, Your Honor; I'm not going to beat that horse. But the reasonableness and necessity, you're not making that ruling as to other parties that we had filed answers with prior to the mediation --

THE COURT: No.

MR. GRAF: -- that is a fair statement or no?

THE COURT: That is a correct statement. The Court, that's why the Court said it was dealing first with the macro issues, right, the broader issues and then to the micro specific for this party as to what they have asserted. To the extent another party is asserting it on their joinder, I'm going to have to first analyze the macro issue before I get to the specific actual dollars for retaxing. Okay.

MR. GRAF: Yes.

THE COURT: Same way I've been doing with the other parties.

Okay. Does that answer your question, Mr. Graf?

MR. GRAF: It does.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.

Mr. Rulis, you had a question. Go ahead, please.

MR. RULIS: So, Your Honor, you had said as far as trial services and runner services that it was denied. But I just wanted to clarify because the entirety of both of those categories, both runner services and trial services, are pre-filing of the answer.

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THE COURT: Okay. Please point me to the page in your motion where it articulates that or in your supplemental brief since all parties were allowed to provide a supplemental brief on that.

MR. RULIS: Sure. So, Your Honor, as far as our supplemental brief goes again, it's Document Number 3149.

THE COURT: Let me go to it. Give me one second because remember, since, to my knowledge, I don't have the benefit of any courtesy copies. So I'm having to click document number by document number --

MR. RULIS: I have a copy if Your Honor would like me to approach.

THE COURT: Okay. Let [indiscernible]. Now, that was my subtle, not so subtle hint of how many times do I have to say please [indiscernible] the EDCR and provide courtesy copies. That's why part of this is taking so long because I'm having to click through over 3,500 entries.

Okay. Counsel, you're referring the Court to?

MR. RULIS: To the bottom of page 3 and top of page 4

of Document ID 3149 --

THE COURT: Just one second. Here --

MR. RULIS: -- and specifically on the top of 4, we list out the categories that are included as part of the costs that are pre-answer, which include runner services and trial services.

THE COURT: Right. I saw this. I didn't see it -okay. Let me look for your broken down. I didn't see that it
was -- [indiscernible] requested include. See, I didn't see if
it was broken down or if it was an overlap between dates, et
cetera. So Jury to Verdict Trial Services, how would that be a
pre?

MR. RULIS: So it --

THE COURT: Because once again, the Court appreciates, in anticipation of trial, even if you may not have a party yet in it, right, because parties can come in right before [indiscernible] trials, you may have paid all your experts, right. So the Court, I mean, by general analysis, not specific to this type of this case, you kind of have like a Capanna versus Orth. You can partition. Schouweiler, you can carve out partition, right.

But how would jury trial services not be applicable to your client even if they had to prepaid earlier but now your client is part of that trial?

MR. RULIS: Because they're not prepaid. They -- I believe what they were incurred for is they were incurred for

the injunction hearing prior to them becoming a party to our case. That's, if you go to their memo of costs, which is

Document Number 2876, and specifically I'm referring to --

THE COURT: Hold on second. As you know, I have to click entry by entry. Repeat that number please.

MR. RULIS: 2876, Your Honor.

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THE COURT: Okay. Just a second. Takes a second. Okay. What page please?

MR. RULIS: 15. It's the bottom of 15 and top of 16.

THE COURT: Okay. Let me ask Mr. Graf. Is the Jury to Verdict Trial Services entry amounts on the bottom of 15 to 16 for the -- for the trial portion or for some preliminary injunction hearing, et cetera? Was it utilized after you filed an answer in this case?

MR. GRAF: Your Honor, I don't have that in front of me right now. Our memo of costs has the dates as to each one of the entries. So if it is in the summer of 2020, I think it's for the trial. If it was for the summer or spring of 2019, it was for the preliminary injunction hearing.

THE COURT: Since everyone had the same --

MR. GRAF: There's a date on each one of our entries.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.

These are from 6/6/2019 to 8/28/2019. Are the dates on your entries on pages 15 and 16 .

MR. GRAF: So that's for the preliminary injunction

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THE COURT: Okay. Was there anything in any supplemental briefs that you're contending that you provided that addresses that this would've gone to something after you were a, with respect to only the parties I'm addressing now in their specific motion, after you were an adverse party to this party that these were utilized?

MR. GRAF: Your Honor, that -- you -- that was my argument previously, Your Honor, is the fact that those are costs that were incurred where we were in the same courtroom arguing against the preliminary injunction that Mr. Rulis's clients were seeking, and we were opposing it.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. GRAF: Her honor has said that is not a cost that was incurred after an answer that was filed as to this party.

I get that response, but I'm trying to be as accurate as I can.

THE COURT: Sure.

MR. GRAF: That's why I had argued that we were adverse to them because we were in that preliminary injunction hearing that they argued for.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. GRAF: So --

THE COURT: And I appreciate that, but realize, at that juncture, they were not an adverse party under the plain language of the statute. Your interest, I appreciate you may

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say your interest, but I'm looking plain statutory language. So then the Court is going to have to revise its inclination and grant the motion to retax as to the entries listed at lines 24 through 27 on page 15, and line 1 on page 16, where it shows a total amount of \$3,212.50 for items between June 6th, 2019, and August 28th, 2019.

Counsel, Mr. Rulis, you have a second part of your question. Go ahead, please.

MR. RULIS: And then -- yes. So starting on line 18 of page 13 and going to line 3 of page 15 is the runner services that Your Honor previously denied. But again, those dates are between May 7th of 2019, and February 13th of 2020, which would all be pre-answer.

THE COURT: So you gave the court back in 2019 courtesy copies, but not me courtesy copies, huh? Oh, okay.

Wait, counsel, I'm -- okay. Mr. Graf, I've got to ask you a question. 5/8/2019, runner service, courtesy copy, answer to complaint. What complaint? Is that the complaint in intervention?

MR. GRAF: That's the TGIG answer to the complaint, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Counsel for movant, were you part of that motion for summary judgment on 6/20/2019? I mean, were you -- for this party, was the summary judgment directed to you and did you respond? I'm only -- I'm looking at this

captioning. That's why I'm asking that question.

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MR. RULIS: Understood. I do not -- I don't know, honestly, as I sit here today, Your Honor. They were not, again, they were not a party to my suit at that point. At that point, so in July of 2019, they had not -- the cases had not yet been consolidated. They had not intervened nor answered in my case. And so, procedurally, I don't believe that they could have filed a motion for summary judgment against --

THE COURT: Yeah, I just -- and -- this is purely procedure. When I look at if you're not a party, you don't have to respond to a motion for -- some small caveats. I'm taking in [indiscernible]. I'm not taking petitions and certain other special exceptions. I'm not going to antiSLAPP or anything like that. And I'm talking about this type of case.

Those -- I do have to grant the motion to retax for those 2019 entries. The Court has looked at them, confirmed it wasn't the complaint with regards to this movant. And this is only for these movements, right, these two movements. It was not the summary judgment. You can't get summary judgment against somebody because you're not adverse to them yet because you're not -- while you can intervene into a case, realistically, that case it intervening was the Department of Taxation's conduct with regards to the licensing rather than the individual who -- two entities that are the movant in this

case, MM and LivFree. So those also would be granted for the retax, and they would be deducted from the cost with regards to MM and LivFree.

Okay. That's taken care of every MM and LivFree. We need to move on, folks. I told you we were going to take a break --

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Your Honor.

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Your Honor.

THE COURT: I'm taking a ten-minute break.

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Your Honor --

THE COURT: My team needs --

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MR. GRAF: I get that, Your Honor, but I want to make sure that the record is clear. In that motion for summary judgment, it was directed at Mr. Rulis's clients, and they did, in fact, respond to the motion for summary judgment. And that's why I believe we were adverse to them at that time.

So I understand Her Honor's ruling, but I want to make sure at this juncture when somebody's looking at this transcript that they have that bit of information --

THE COURT: Where was it in the pleadings?

MR. GRAF: -- and that they can go back and take a look at the pleadings in the case.

THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Graf, where in your opposition to the motion to retax did you raise that issue? Because remember, the Court is confined by the pleadings that was

presented to the Court. Where either in your opposition or the opportunity to provide a supplement did you raise that issue rather than when the Court asked that question after I'd already made my ruling, but I was asked -- I was asked for a clarification on two issues.

MR. GRAF: So, Your Honor, in our supplemental brief, we provided the timeline that we provided in our motion for fees. And then in our reply to our motion for fees, all of these timelines were provided. The argument as to the motion for summary judgment was made, and the timing as to the motion for summary judgment was raised.

THE COURT: Okay. Counsel. Counsel, I'm going to need dates and document numbers. If you're saying it's in your supplement --

MR. GRAF: I don't have those at my fingertips, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Right.

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MR. GRAF: And I can provide them if Her Honor wants them.

THE COURT: Well, if you're saying that you --

MR. GRAF: But I don't have them at my fingertips.

THE COURT: Right. But, Counsel, if you're saying that you provided it to the Court in a pleading, I need to know the pleading and the page number, right, to cross-reference that. Similarly [indiscernible] I asked Mr. Rulis when he said

1 he did it, and he showed me it was in it. That's --

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MR. GRAF: Your Honor, I'll try and find that information before the end of the hearing today, and I'll supply it to Her Honor.

THE COURT: Well, I'm moving on. I've got to make my ruling and close it up, Counsel. I gave you each an opportunity --

MR. GRAF: Your Honor, I'm making a representation as an officer of this Court that those arguments were made.

Mr. Rulis, he can either get up and say that what I'm saying is inaccurate, but they're not. And those are pleadings that are in this case that previous judge ruled upon. And the fact that we were adverse to them in May of 2019 is not only a part of this record, but it is -- was readily apparent at the time. So I --

THE COURT: Counsel. Counsel.

MR. GRAF: So I get what Her Honor is saying --

THE COURT: Counsel. Counsel. Counsel.

MR. GRAF: -- and I will find those reference --

THE COURT: Counsel. You're doing additional.

Counsel, you're doing additional argument after the Court has ruled, and I'm sure you can appreciate everyone had a full opportunity, been doing it for, I guess I said it was -- well, had significant opportunity. Even gave the opportunity for supplemental briefing.

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If you don't have the benefit of having that document in front of you you can reference to the Court, you can appreciate you can't tell the Court go fish right in the middle of a hearing with over 3,600 entries over multi-year span and try and find what you're articulating. Right? You would have to be able to show when the Court asks a question if it was in the pleadings that it was in the pleadings and be able to point to the pleadings, Counsel. That's what you'd have to have in front of you, or if you've got it remotely or however you have it. So you can appreciate.

So the Court's ruling is going to stand based on what is in the pleadings and including the supplemental pleadings and including the opportunity through oral argument to be able to present and point out where something is in a pleading and taking that all into account. The Court has made its ruling.

It's 11:45. So, Counsel, we have two choices. We can break for lunch now, or I'm going to have to take at least a ten-minute break, and then I'm going to have to see how long everybody else wants because we're trying to give everyone their time. But you can appreciate, because people have taken significant amount of times in trying to answer and make sure everyone gets a full opportunity to be fully heard over and over and over again, we still have other matters, and I have to do the joinders, and I have to do the other cases. Then we have to deal with some of the other things that were not

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1	stipulated to.
2	So, you all, we can break for lunch now. You can
3	come back at 12:45, and we can continue; or we're going to have
4	to pick another day because I'll open up this afternoon cause
5	our COA moved, okay. So we can do at 12:45.
6	Do you all want to come back at 12:45? We'll get
7	this done with the other people that are not done. I said we'd
8	get through this with everyone. So we're here to get you taker
9	care of.
10	The next date I have available is the 29th of
11	December, which I can take care of you then if not today, but
12	realistically, this is middle of a hearing. I'll see you back
13	at 12:45, folks. Thank you.
14	We're going off the record. See you back at 12:45.
15	Appreciate it. And we do need people to clear the courtroom.
16	(Proceedings recessed at 11:45 a.m., until 12:52 a.m.)
17	THE COURT: Okay. So the continuation of the
18	hearing, folks. We left right before the lunch hour where we
19	had LivFree's, et cetera, motion. So now let's address the
20	joinders. With regards to Clear River, who wants to be heard
21	first on a joinder?
22	MS. BARRETT: May I, Your Honor?
23	THE COURT: You're here in court, you get to go
24	first. Go ahead, please.
25	MS. BARRETT: Thank you. Whitney Barrett on behalf

of Qualcan. I'll be very brief. I was part of the joint motion filed on behalf of the settling plaintiffs.

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

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MS. BARRETT: I just wanted for the record to note that Clear River did not file an answer to Qualcan's complaint which was filed on February 11th, 2020, and Qualcan did not participate in the preliminary injunction hearing, as Mr. Graf noted earlier today. And that's it. Do you have any questions for me?

THE COURT: Qualcan. Your client did not participate?

MS. BARRETT: Qualcan did not participate.

THE COURT: Yeah. Did not.

MS. BARRETT: Correct.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. BARRETT: Thank you.

THE COURT: And there was no answer.

MS. SMITH: Your Honor.

THE COURT: So let me hear from in response to that,

Mr. Graf, do you want to respond as to Qualcan?

MR. GRAF: We did not file an answer to Qualcan's

22 complaint, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Are you contending that there was any trial in which there was any ruling between your client and Oualcan?

MR. GRAF: Yes, Your Honor, we are. We're saying that the ruling applied to them and that the other arguments that we made previously as to the motion to intervene, the motion for summary judgment, all of the interaction between and amongst the counsel. But Qualcan has the unique difference, being that they weren't involved in the preliminary injunction hearing, they weren't involved in the previous motions for summary judgment.

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

MR. GRAF: So given Her Honor's previous rulings, I don't think we have the same types of arguments, so we did not file an opposition -- or, excuse me, file an answer to their complaint. So I think I know how Her Honor is going to rule, but those are the facts.

THE COURT: Okay. Well, maybe you have a crystal ball. I don't. Okay. So you get last word, it's your motion.

MS. BARRETT: I would just Your Honor to rule consistently with your order previously as to MM and LivFree, that costs are assessed after the date of filing an answer. Because there was no answer filed by Clear River, I'd ask that no costs be assessed against Qualcan.

THE COURT: Is there anything in any way that you all accepted service, did anything that somehow put you and Clear River as adverse parties from your position?

MS. BARRETT: No, Your Honor; other than filing the

asserting that they filed that said that your client was part of what relief they were seeking? I didn't see anything in your opposition that addressed that or the supplemental.

MR. GRAF: Nothing that was filed, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay.

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MR. GRAF: Nothing that was filed.

THE COURT: Okay. Well, then the plain language of the statute says you need to be an adverse party, right, in order to be a prevailing party. So you can't be a prevailing party when you're not a party. So consistent with everything the Court has said, and realistically you go more towards the arguments of other counsel, there being no answer, there being no document, no judicial admission that you all are parties, no agreement that you're parties, under the plain language of the statute Clear River cannot be an adverse party and cannot be a prevailing party under NRS, and so therefore the Court would have to grant your motion to retax in its entirety.

Its alternative ruling is even with that caveat there is nothing to even show that they were in the case. And then all the calculations that I've done on the micro-analysis would apply for you as an alternative secondary ruling. Okay?

MS. BARRETT: Understood. Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you. Okay. Next joinder. Somebody wanted to be heard. Go ahead.

MR. BECKSTROM: Your Honor, on behalf of ETW --

MS. SMITH: Your Honor, Stephanie Smith appearing for Natural Medicine.

THE COURT: Whoa, whoa. Hold on a second.

I've got multiples. I probably should not have opened it up

like that. Okay. The short thing is, is there anybody else -
well, I should do these in date order. Okay. Who says that

they -- I mean, without -- I can look it up. MM -- let's see.

Wellness Connection, you're -- well, no, these aren't in order. Hold on.

MR. SCHWARZ: Your Honor, before we broke -- this is Joel Schwarz. Before we broke I had asked as a courtesy from some of my colleagues if I could go shortly after the break because I have a deposition this afternoon.

THE COURT: Oh, okay. That's fine.

MR. SCHWARZ: This is for Lone Mountain.

THE COURT: That's fine, Mr. Schwarz. Go ahead.

COURT RECORDER: I'm struggling to hear him.

THE COURT: Once again, you have to realize once I said that the hearing was over, I left the bench. Things were gone. I have no idea what you all might have discussed. But, Mr. Schwarz, if you've got something and you need to go and needed priority, go ahead, please.

MR. SCHWARZ: Thank you, Your Honor. And I appreciate the other counsel for allowing this as well. So, Lone Mountain has a memorandum of costs. The TGIG plaintiffs

have a motion to retax that and there were a couple of joinders to that as well. So I think we can address that in relatively quick order, considering -- [inaudible].

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THE COURT: Oh, wait. Mr. Schwarz, do you want me to go out of order without finishing up the Clear -- okay, Clear River. Okay. I've got to get -- I've got --

MR. SCHWARZ: Your Honor, you can finish up the Clear River. I apologize. I thought Clear River was done.

THE COURT: Hold on a second. Mr. Schwarz, you're cutting in and out so much that I really am having difficulty hearing you, which is why I was asking that question. Okay. So you're talking Lone Mountain -- the motion to retax TGIG, which is you, Deep Roots, et cetera. Is that what you're asking, Counsel?

MR. SCHWARZ: It would be the TGIG motion to retax

Lone Mountain so that we can handle Lone Mountain's costs. But

if there are some matters, if Clear River can be done quickly,

I'll get back in line and I apologize. I thought that Clear

River was done.

THE COURT: Okay, hold on a second. Remember, this is coming as news to me, so I've got to get different documents in front of me. Hold on one second. So this -- okay, so I've got you, I've got High Sierra's, Lone Mountain, TGIG and MM and LivFree with some other joinders, High Sierra, Green Leaf and THC. Okay. Go ahead, counsel. Set forth, just so we have a

clear record, your party, and go ahead, please. You want -but you're Lone Mountain, so you want me to do -- whose do you
want me to do first?

MR. SCHWARZ: The TGIG motion to retax as to Lone Mountain and -- [inaudible].

THE COURT: Okay. That's Document 2919. TGIG's motion to retax Lone Mountain, Document 2919, filed on 8/11/22. They asked to retax the \$71,431.72. Go ahead, please. TGIG, go ahead. If somebody thinks they're speaking, we cannot hear you.

MR. DZARNOSKI: Yes. I'm sorry, Your Honor. This is Mark Dzarnoski. I needed to unmute.

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

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MR. DZARNOSKI: Our motion regarding Lone Mountain is similar to every other one that we filed, which is that we argued we were the prevailing party, they were not. There's nothing unique in the pleading as to Lone Mountain. I have nothing to direct you to to consider additional, other than what you've heard. We also raised the argument again that there was no judicial review or there shouldn't be award of costs for judicial review. You've already spoken as to that.

According to my records, I believe -- maybe

Mr. Schwarz can clear it up, but I think their answer was filed
in or around May of 2019. I was just searching for it but
couldn't find it. And since I have nothing additional to add

to any of the arguments that have been briefed, I'm willing to submit.

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THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Schwarz, on behalf of Lone Mountain. Mr. Schwarz, did you wish to be heard? You just went off. We lost your video.

MR. SCHWARZ: Sorry, Your Honor. I think I meant to mute -- or unmute my audio and I muted both instead. My apologies.

THE COURT: No worries. Go ahead, please.
Mr. Schwarz, you're up.

MR. SCHWARZ: Okay. With respect -- sure. Thank you, Your Honor. With respect to the TGIG motion to retax, there were joinders to that filed by THC Nevada, Herbal Choice and what we're calling the Green Leaf plaintiffs, and I'll address all of those. We attempted to --

THE COURT: I've got plaintiff -- wait, wait. To be clear, what I show is plaintiff Green Leaf Farms, Document 2927, Rural Remedies, Document 2929, THC and Herbal Choice, Document 2932, Clark Medicinal Solutions, Nye Natural Medicine, Clark NMSD, Inyo Fine Cannabis, 2934. And those were all filed on either 8/1 or 8 -- sorry, 8/11 or 8/12/2022.

MR. SCHWARZ: Correct, Your Honor. And to be clear for the record, of those -- of the movant and the joining parties, the parties that we are seeking costs against are the TGIG plaintiffs, THC Nevada, Herbal Choice, Inc. and the Green

Leaf plaintiffs. So as to the other parties that filed joinders, we are not seeking costs as to those parties.

THE COURT: So you're not seeking as to Rural Remedies, Document 2929; 8/12/2022.

MR. SCHWARZ: Correct.

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THE COURT: Is that correct?

MR. SCHWARZ: Correct, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And you're not seeking any costs against Clark Medicinal Solutions, LLC, Nye Natural Medicine, LLC, Clark NMSD, LLC and Inyo Fine Cannabis, Document 2934, filed on 8/12?

MR. SCHWARZ: That's correct. We're not.

THE COURT: Filed on 8/12/2022. Oh, and High Sierra Holistics, Document 2957, filed on 8/12?

MR. SCHWARZ: The same. We are not seeking costs as to High Sierra, either.

THE COURT: Okay, then go ahead.

MR. SCHWARZ: Okay. And so with that in mind, Your Honor, factually, based upon the rulings that the Court has previously made, Lone Mountain Partners filed its answer to the TGIG plaintiffs' complaint in Case A-19-786962-B on June 5th, 2019.

As to the remaining parties that Lone Mountain seeks costs against, that would be the Green Leaf plaintiffs, THC Nevada and Herbal Choice, Inc. Lone Mountain Partners filed

its answer to their second amended complaint in Case A-19-787004-B on June 7th, 2019.

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There has not been a substantive challenge to any item of Lone Mountain's costs in any of the motions to retax or joinders. The arguments were specifically that Lone Mountain is not a prevailing party as to the non-settling plaintiffs, which we've gone through ad nauseam with other parties. And I would respectfully submit that Lone Mountain, based upon the Court's prior rulings, is most definitely a prevailing party as to those non-settling plaintiffs.

And the amounts of the costs that were incurred by Lone Mountain from the date of its answer are -- with respect to the TGIG plaintiffs is \$65,787.83. With respect to the other three plaintiffs, because the answer on that one was filed two days later, the cost is \$65,321.45. We had circulated a proposed order to try to circumvent the need for a hearing on this today, since we're all in agreement on the principle of what the Court would rule on this.

I received word from counsel from THC Nevada last week, that's Amy Sugden, that confirmed that she approved the proposed form of order that we had attached to our status report that we filed on the 12th.

I received word from Mr. Donath on behalf of the Green Leaf plaintiffs on Friday, this past Friday. He also approved the proposed form of the order.

And so really the only parties that haven't weighed in on the proposed form of the order that sets all this forth were Mr. Dzarnoski on behalf of the TGIG plaintiffs, but I think we agree in principle that we are a prevailing party as to his clients and we've provided the date that the answer was filed. We've cross-referenced that against the amount set forth in a memorandum of costs and given a number.

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

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MR. SCHWARZ: And then I haven't heard anything from Ms. Chattah on behalf of Herbal Choice. But there's not a single challenge to an actual cost item in our cost memorandum and we've provided the Court now the math as to from the date of our answer.

The only other issue that was raised in the briefing was that perhaps we weren't seeking any costs from Phase I, as opposed to the Phase II trial, but our original memorandum of costs was filed before there was a Phase I trial. It did not contain any of those items. The memorandum of costs that we have resubmitted is the same. There are no Phase I costs in the memorandum of costs. It is all from the Phase II proceedings.

THE COURT: Okay. So I'm going to let Mr. Dzarnoski finish in response and then I'm going to go to the other parties. And, Ms. Chattah, I'm going to ask you, in light of your motion to withdraw but you're still counsel on -- well,

1 what you can say when I get to you.

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So, Mr. Dzarnoski, you get last word since it's your motion. Go ahead, please.

MR. DZARNOSKI: The last word is I have nothing further to offer, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. I did have an opportunity to review the order denying TGIG plaintiffs' motion to retax and settle costs and awarding costs to Lone Mountain Partners, LLC that was attached to the status report. Now, you can appreciate the Court is not going to look at that because I don't have all agreement of all the parties, so I can't view it as a stipulation. Obviously it wasn't on the record, so I don't have an EDCR 7.50, but it does exist and it's actually up on my screen right now.

So, Mr. Dzarnoski, do you have -- while you may or may not agree with the Court's ruling, is there anything in that order that you need to bring to the Court's attention?

Now, the Court hasn't yet made a ruling. Division of Family Services, Rust v. Clark County. But is there anything you need to bring to my attention with regards to that? If not, I'm moving on.

MR. DZARNOSKI: Your Honor, no. And, in fact, I guess I need to apologize to Mr. Schwarz. I've been working on several different orders and I agreed to one with Mr. Schwarz. Obviously it is not the one that he's bringing up now. I

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believe he had circulated two and I consented to one of the orders, but it's on a different matter. It's more of an oversight than having a challenge to anything in the order that Mr. Schwarz is speaking of.

THE COURT: Okay. So as I circle around to everyone else, can you take a look at that just to see if there's something else I should be looking at with regards to that? Because it's a unique situation where I have a proposed order here. And I'll circle around to everyone else on their substantive viewpoints and circle back to you before I go back.

MR. DZARNOSKI: Sure. Thank you for giving me a moment and I'll take a quick look and I'll be prepared to respond.

THE COURT: Sure. No worries.

Okay. Ms. Chattah, on behalf of your client. And I am appreciative that you are seeking to withdraw, but you're still counsel today. So your viewpoint on the motion. Go ahead, please. I don't see that she's back. Now, once again, it's kind of hard because I don't have faces. I have initials on certain people. I'm looking at the names underneath.

THE CLERK: She's not back up.

THE COURT: I don't see that she's back. Can someone reach out to her while I circle to other counsel and then we'll do this. I'm just trying to get you all taken care of folks.

Okay? Okay. So that means Green Leaf; right?

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## (No audible response)

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THE CLERK: Okay. Anybody else want to be heard from the joinder parties? I've already heard from Mr. Dzarnoski. Ms. Sugden, do you want to be heard for THC? Is she back? I don't see her, either.

Well, I'm not sure how the parties feel that they can not show up to a continued court hearing. That's an issue that's concerning. So I've given the opportunity for oral argument. You chose not to be here. Did not have any approval by the Court. So that one is waived for oral argument.

Green Leaf. Anybody on behalf of Green Leaf? Mr. Donath or somebody? Nobody? Basically I'm looking at the signature block in the proposed order and going through that and cross-referencing it with the other document.

Ms. Chattah? No?

Well, that means, Mr. Dzarnoski, I have to go back to you. Did I give you enough chance or do you still need a moment?

MR. DZARNOSKI: Your Honor, I think I'm through about three-quarters of it. Could I just have like two more minutes?

Sure. Of course. And if your position THE COURT: is that the Court should not be addressing the order right now during the hearing, you can feel free to say that as well. Once again, I'm just trying to see if that helps you all by taking a look at that to see if there was any other outstanding

issues that somebody is saying is maybe incorporated in a proposed order that's not part of what the motion before the Court is.

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But while you're looking at that, we'll pause for a moment. And if I have the other parties, Ms. Sugden or an attorney from Nick Donath's office, please speak. No.

MR. DZARNOSKI: This is Mr. Dzarnoski back with you, Your Honor. I appreciate the opportunity to review this. I'm sure you're aware it's probably costing more in attorney fees than the amount that we're arguing over on a lot of these things.

I've had the opportunity to review the proposed order from Mr. Schwarz that he referred to, and obviously while we disagree with the Court's findings, the order is Mr. Schwarz' usual fine work and I don't have an objection to it.

THE COURT: Okay. So here's what the Court -- the Court is actually going to do its ruling now. The only reason I was looking at the order, because if some -- I was giving you all the chance that if somehow you felt there was something in there that was outside the scope than what was being addressed at any of the hearings.

The Court does find that I have heard arguments from counsel September 16th, October 21, November 16th and today, so we can add December 19th. Okay. So the Court does find, because I already addressed the memorandum of costs was timely

filed by filing it beforehand. The Court is appreciative that this was filed -- refiled in accordance with certain rulings and statements. The Court does find that under NRS 18.110 it was timely filed. It does find that we had timely joinders.

We do find -- now, here the Court is doing it a little bit different. I am taking into account all the other joinders that were filed because, realistically, with the various time frames from the hearing and giving the opportunity of supplemental briefing, I think the fair thing to do is the Court is taking into account all the joinders that were filed.

So, Green Leaf, 2927, filed on 8/11.

Rural Remedies, 2929, filed on 8/12.

THC, 2932, filed 8/12.

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Clark Natural, NMSD, Inyo Fine Cannabis, 2934, 8/12.

High Sierra, 2957, 8/12.

parties there is not any costs being sought against them, the Court need not address that because there is no costs so therefore there's nothing for the Court to resolve, there is nothing ripe. And any proposed order should include that. With regards to the entities to which there was a joinder filed and which there is a claim for, the Court has had an opportunity — everyone had an opportunity to provide their oral argument.

This was a continued hearing. There was no request

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while we were on the record that this Court is aware of, anybody saying that they could not return, other than Mr. Schwarz, I guess, after the record told parties that he had a depo or something and so asked to be expedient, so we're trying to get him taken care of.

But we gave the parties an opportunity. I called around a couple of times to see if anybody has appeared even late for our continued hearing at 12:45, that being it. So therefore the Court has the benefit only of the pleadings with regards to those counsel who chose not to appear on their parties.

So the Court's ruling is there was prevailing parties. See the Court's analysis at the prior hearings for all the reasons stated and the Court is incorporating that. The Court finds it appropriate to incorporate that because that analysis does apply for each of those in accordance with everything that's been cited before for the global concept of prevailing party.

So then we walk into the timeliness. The Court has already found the timeliness is appropriate, in light of the circumstances and in light of when it was filed and how it was filed with regards to the parties. With regards to the parties in which the costs are being sought, the Court does note with regards to any of those parties there is not a breakdown as to any specific categories of costs that are being retaxed. In

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that absence, the Court really finds under EDCR 2.20 to be waived because it is not addressed specifically, other than the carveout which I already did separately for counsel who was already here in court, which was on Clear River anyway, so it wasn't even on this one. Sorry, the problem of combining these two.

So then we go to the fact that since there is no specification as to any of those underlying costs, the Court has to grant it consistent with the fact that you only become an adverse party under the NRS in this particular case when you actually are in one of the cases. The Court cannot take a global statement that just because there was a generalized case involving the Department of Taxation and which were not consolidated at certain junctures, et cetera, the Court does have to take when these parties actually became adverse because the only way you could become adverse — in order to be adverse it's a prerequisite, obviously, to be the prevailing party. And so therefore in this case we had the dates which is not contested of June 5th and June 7th, and so those will be the triggering dates.

Since no one is disagreeing with the math, the \$65,787.83 for the January 5th answer, TGIG. The other parties, January -- sorry, I said January. I meant to say June. My apologies. June 5th, 2019, \$65,787.83. June 7th, \$65,321.45.

The proposed order will need to be submitted to the Court. It is so ordered granted consistent with the Court's rulings therein. That takes care of some of those motions. However, Lone Mountain, we've got other motions that are still against you.

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I have a separate one by High Sierra, and I have a separate one from MM Development, LivFree, Qualcan, Natural, et cetera.

So since Mr. Rulis is standing up, we'll take his next. Go ahead.

MR. RULIS: Your Honor, I think those can be fairly quickly dealt with. Mr. Schwarz' office had filed a notice of nonopposition or at least an acknowledgment that they were not, in fact, seeking costs against settling plaintiffs and High Sierra. So based on that representation, I guess it could either be granted or denied as moot. Either one I think is effective.

THE COURT: Okay. Let me find out first if it's withdrawn. But, yes, that would apply to MM Development, LivFree, Qualcan, Natural Medicine, Nevada Wellness Center, correct, and High Sierra?

MR. RULIS: I believe those are the correct parties, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Schwarz, are you viewing this as you're withdrawing the motion, it's moot, or you wish the

Court to make a ruling? Where are you going with that?

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MR. SCHWARZ: And, Your Honor, right. Those other parties did file motions. And as we noted in our notice of nonopposition to those motions, we deemed them to be settling parties, against whom we are not entitled to be seeking or requesting any costs pursuant to the terms of the settlements. And therefore we noted that for the record and I agree with Mr. Rulis. I think either the motions can be denied as moot or they can be granted. Either way, the effect is the same because we agree on the record that we are not seeking costs as to those other parties.

THE COURT: Any of those other parties present wish to be heard?

(No audible response)

THE CLERK: Okay. What the Court is going to do is the Court is going to deny them as moot, okay, because realistically there's nothing that I'm granting. So I just have to, realistically, deny them as moot because since they are unopposed and there was nothing that was set forth in the memorandum of costs, really which is the predicate to go to a motion to retax that was intended to apply to those parties, that's why I have to deem this as moot. So you can view it as denied as moot, but I'm not finding that the denial of them as being moot in any way entitles anybody else to any costs or fees for said motions.

I find it's appropriate that the motions could have been filed and appreciate that they just needed a clarification that the cost issue which came out in the opposition as being unopposed.

Have I now taken care of all of Lone Mountain?

MR. SCHWARZ: I believe you have, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. So only if Ms. Chattah reappears, then I need to deal with the motion to withdraw. I now need to get back to Clear River and finish up Clear River, please.

MR. SCHWARZ: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you so very much. Okay. If you need to go, go for it, whatever you need.

MR. SCHWARZ: Thank you.

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THE COURT: Okay. So I only need the parties who are here on any other matters. If all of your matters have been taken care of, you don't need to stay onto this unless you are telling me that there is some stipulation, because I can't do an EDCR 7.50 if I don't have all my parties again. So let's walk through Clear River, the joinder parties. I've still got a couple more joinder parties. While I'm going back and grabbing that information, can we see who wants to be heard next on Clear River, please.

MR. PARKER: Your Honor. Your Honor, this is Teddy
Parker. If I could step in on behalf of Nevada Wellness
Center.

THE COURT: Sure, go ahead. Nevada Wellness Center.

And hold on, let me -- I just was trying to find your document number. Do you have your document number handy by chance?

MR. PARKER: You know, Your Honor, I wish I did. I don't have it in hand, but I don't think it's going to take very long in terms of my position on this, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Go ahead, please.

MR. PARKER: I believe Mr. Graf has already conceded this when we were arguing about his motion for fees. Clear River never answered -- I'm sorry, never filed an answer to Nevada Wellness Center's complaint. So I don't believe that any costs would be due against Nevada Wellness Center since they never filed an answer.

THE COURT: Okay. So yours was part of the joint motion to retax and settle costs, Clear River, Document 2923; 8/11/2023 (sic) with regards -- and I also have MM Development, LivFree, Qualcan, Natural Medicine and Nevada Wellness Center, so just so we have a reference for doc number. Okay. So your position is they never filed an answer; therefore, it doesn't apply to you because -- is that correct, counsel? Then I'm moving on to the next --

MR. PARKER: That is correct, Your Honor. And if for some reason Mr. Graf wants to argue it, we've attached to our supplemental papers, which was filed on November 4, 2022, a chart, which is Exhibit 2 to our supplemental brief, a chart

related to Clear River's charges. I think for the most part Mr. Rulis went through this already.

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And during the operative period of time that Mr. Graf's client would have been involved between May of 2020 and June 29, 2020, we show fees — I mean costs of roughly \$7,800. But again, the arguments that have come subsequent to the briefing included a concession by Mr. Graf that an answer was never filed to Nevada Wellness' complaint, and I have not found one in the system as well.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.

Okay. Mr. Graf, I'm going to have you be heard if you wish to. Go ahead, please.

MR. GRAF: Your Honor, the same argument as to Qualcan. Those statements by Mr. Parker were correct. However, on March 13th, 2020, NWC, Nevada Wellness, filed a motion for partial summary judgment. At Footnote 16 it stated that it was adverse to Clear River. And in a supplemental brief dated March 27, 2020, they also included argument as to being adverse to Clear River.

THE COURT: Okay. Was there ever an order --

MR. GRAF: So at a bare minimum --

THE COURT: I'm sorry, Counsel. I should have let you finish. My apology. I thought you had finished. Go ahead, please.

MR. GRAF: That's it, Your Honor. As a bare minimum

we would say that from those dates forward that fees and costs -- or, excuse me, costs should be awarded.

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THE COURT: Are you saying -- was there a specific order that mentioned Clear River by name with regards to those documents that you referenced with the Footnote 16?

MR. GRAF: Your Honor, I don't have the order in front of me. I looked at the pleadings and what they alleged. There was a very extensive order as to the motion for summary judgment. I don't know if it specifically references Clear River, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. I haven't seen it and I don't see how it can. And they're not a party unless there's some waiver. Okay. Sorry, counsel, go ahead, please.

MR. GRAF: Nothing further, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. I appreciate it. Well, the Court's ruling is going to have to be that because under the statute the statute does -- I'm paraphrasing what I said previously and obviously I've incorporated my rulings previously because it's the same conceptual analysis of the statutory plain language of the statute. And I've cited some cases that talk about how it parsed out to different parties it needs to be adverse.

And then you need to be a prevailing party. You can't be a prevailing party as to somebody who's not, quote, a party against you. To the extent that there are dates that

predate the consolidation, that would not have been appropriate to have included. To the extent that the answers have not been filed, then you can't be adverse in this type of case.

Obviously that's not a global ruling on other types of cases.

And there's nothing that anyone has provided to this Court that shows that there's any order that somehow the Court prior to this judge taking over, or I know I didn't do it, has somehow assumed jurisdiction over an entity that was not a party to the case and coming into the case through an answer or other pleading, or there was some type of agreement that they could be viewed as a party under NRS 18.010. And so therefore the Court would have to grant the motion to retax with regards to Clear River as far as the parties that moved for saying that they did not file -- Clear River did not fie an answer against those parties in the underlying case numbers, even to the extent that they were consolidated in the present case number. It is so ordered.

Who else do I have left on Clear River?

MR. PUZEY: Your Honor, this is Jim Puzey on behalf of High Sierra Holistics.

THE COURT: High Sierra Holistics and Clear River?

MR. PUZEY: High Sierra Holistics filed --

[inaudible].

MS. SMITH: Your Honor, Stephanie Smith on behalf of [inaudible].

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THE COURT: Whoa, whoa, whoa. Folks, folks, I cannot have two people talking. If High Sierra was talking, please let High Sierra speak. If it's High Sierra Holistics, I will hear you. If it's not High Sierra/Clear River, then I'm going to have to finish up Clear River before I go anywhere else.

MR. PUZEY: Your Honor, I apologize. I think
Stephanie Smith was part of the joinder to the joint matter
that was going on with Clear River. So if she wants to finish,
I'm more than happy to allow her to go.

THE COURT: As I was saying, folks, we can't keep switching around to different ones. I did one to accommodate somebody for a depo, but let's finish up Clear River. Counsel, you're on Clear River. Go ahead, please.

MR. PUZEY: Thank you, Your Honor. This is Jim Puzey on behalf of High Sierra concerning Clear River. We filed a separate motion to retax and settle costs. It has the exact same structural components as what we just did earlier with Deep Roots. There was never an amended complaint; therefore it would be impossible for Clear River or anybody else to go ahead and answer because there was no amended complaint to answer.

THE COURT: Okay. Let me just make sure. Hold on a second. I know High Sierra, I haven't gotten to you yet because you're 2915 filed.

MR. PUZEY: Correct.

THE COURT: Okay. So I'm going to get to your document in one second. Let me just make sure because there were multiple parties on that joinder and I just wanted to make sure that all of them were taken care of. So let me clear that up first before I go back to you, Mr. Puzey. I did hear what you said and I'll let Mr. Graf respond in just one second. We just want to make sure — anybody else on the joinder?

MS. SMITH: Your Honor --

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MR. BECKSTROM: Your Honor, James Beckstrom on behalf of the ETW plaintiffs. And Ms. Smith is also part of the joinder, so she can go first and I'll follow if that's okay with the Court.

THE COURT: Sure. Ms. Smith, anything you need or you're fine with the Court's ruling? Do you want to change my mind?

MS. SMITH: Your Honor, no. I just wanted to clarify that I was in a similar position to Qualcan and also Nevada Wellness, Mr. Parker's client. Clear River did not file an answer to Natural Medicine's complaint in intervention which was filed on February 7th of 2020. I don't know if Rusty is asserting that he did file an answer or not. We also did not participate in the preliminary injunction or any mediation. I mean, the only involvement that my client had with Clear River was naming them in February of 2020 after the Court had ruled that all parties needed to be named and after the consolidation

THE COURT: Who's the "they"?

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MR. GRAF: They took actually three depositions of my clients.

THE COURT: Okay, wait. Hold on a second. Let's focus here on which party is the "they" in your statement, okay.

MR. GRAF: NWC and all of those parties were present during the deposition of my client.

THE COURT: Okay. There's a difference between being present versus like noticing a deposition. That's why this Court is really trying to -- was there any statement --

MR. GRAF: I think it was NWC that noticed the deposition. And there was a motion to compel. There were two or three motions to compel on various discovery issues.

THE COURT: By whom?

MR. GRAF: NWC.

THE COURT: Okay. Any other party that you're contending acted as if they had accepted your answer, even though it was not filed, it was just e-served, or just NWC?

MR. GRAF: Your Honor, I would just incorporate all those other arguments we made previously. I know Her Honor's decision on that. But I don't want to go through all of the what we think happened and the fact that everybody was adverse or the plaintiffs were adverse to Clear River. So if we can just incorporate those, Your Honor.

2.0

THE COURT: Sure. Counsel, my question was a little bit more specific. For the first time I'm hearing in the last few moments that there was an e-served answer; right? So what the Court was trying to get an understanding, because it's not just the actual — if somebody is contending that it's not the physical, proper filing but it was treated as if it were properly filed and waiving a Rule 4 or something issue, which I don't know if you are or not, that's why the Court asked the question.

If a party was acting as if they were fully a part of the case, then the Court has to evaluate that. But that is something new that's been brought up in the last few moments and no other party has brought that up in any of the Court's rulings thus far in the multiple hearings.

Now, I appreciate that's a distinct issue from, quote, participating in preliminary injunction hearings, showing up at mediations. What I'm saying is somebody who actually did in the litigation took advantage in a neutral sense. Take advantage is not to be negatively viewed, but just who utilized the litigation resources, such as a motion to compel, such as noticing a deposition as if they were a party. If that is being contended, this Court needs to know if you're saying that I should be addressing an argument to a particular party, because this is party by party by party by party by party; right? So if you're contending that I should be

treating a party in a particular way because how they acted as if they were part of the litigation, right, then I need to know that.

2.0

Mr. Graf, are you saying that or are you not saying that? Or are you saying that they should all be treated the same, such as the earlier parties?

MR. GRAF: Your Honor, the answers didn't get filed, so I understood Her Honor's ruling as it would be from the date of filing forward. If Her Honor is considering the fact that there were answers that were served but not filed, those are different. I can supply those dates to Her Honor.

But to be intellectually honest, Your Honor, I would probably fall back on the fact that they weren't filed, so I would prefer to argue that we were involved from the inception of our motion to intervene and the first answer in the case, as opposed to trying to argue that it's from the date of some service of an answer that wasn't filed.

THE COURT: Okay. And that's why I need to ask you.

I mean, if it's not an argument that the Court need not address, then the Court is not going to address something that's not before it, okay.

MR. GRAF: I wouldn't address it, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. GRAF: I would rest on our previous arguments.

And if we go anywhere from here, that's what I would prefer to

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2.0

THE COURT: Okay, that's fine. I just want to make sure. Okay. So, Ms. Smith, are you asserting from your position that the Court should be addressing the e-service but not filed issue, or are you fine with Mr. Graf's position? I'm just making sure everyone is literally on the same page of what I'm ruling on, folks. Ms. Smith, you may have disappeared. Ms. Smith?

MS. SMITH: I apologize, Your Honor. My Internet cut out.

THE COURT: Okay. Did you hear the Court's question?

MS. SMITH: I did not. I'm sorry.

THE COURT: No worries. Did you hear Mr. Graf's response? Mr. Graf -- to paraphrase what I understand, is Mr. Graf said he was not trying to make an additional argument or try and contend the fact that certain parties received an e-service but not a filing as a distinction that the Court should be considering in its ruling. Is that a correct paraphrasing, Mr. Graf?

MR. GRAF: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. So, Ms. Smith, I was just checking from your end. Do you for some reason think that the Court should be taking the additional contention, even though Mr. Graf says I shouldn't, of the e-service versus the filing? If you don't, I'm moving on.

MS. SMITH: I don't believe so, Your Honor. I believe that Mr. Graf already conceded that he didn't file an answer, so.

2.0

THE COURT: Okay. So there was one other counsel who wanted to be heard. Go ahead, please.

MR. BECKSTROM: Your Honor, James Beckstrom on behalf of the ETW plaintiffs. I followed the same timeline as Mr. Rulis, so I incorporate the same arguments there. The date of the answer filed in my case was 4/21/20 as well. I don't have anything additional to add. I just wanted to make a record of that.

THE COURT: Wait. Mr. Rulis with regards to -MR. BECKSTROM: Clear River. We were all -- it was a
joint brief motion to retax.

THE COURT: Okay, 4/21/20.

MR. BECKSTROM: Correct.

Correct or incorrect?

THE COURT: Same date. You were a part of the joint motion that went into the particular specifics of the underlying reasonable, necessary and actually incurred.

MR. BECKSTROM: Correct, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. So it was a joint motion, was it not, including your client?

MR. BECKSTROM: It included my client. Correct. But you said we were parsing out all the different parties.

THE COURT: Right, right.

2.0

MR. BECKSTROM: So I want to make clear what the answer date was.

THE COURT: Okay. I'm just -- without going back to the specific caption, okay, I'm making sure that those statements were correct because then you would get the same ruling because you were part of the same joint motion. You addressed all the underlying issues. As you know, some of the parties in some of the various cases -- again, some of the other parties or non-parties have asserted that they haven't broken it down by the reasonable, necessary and actually incurred. So those would be different.

But you were part of the joint motion that did, so you get the benefit of the same ruling as Mr. Rulis in your joint motion. It is so ordered.

Ms. Smith, I need a point for clarification for you. You're also part of that joint motion, correct, for Clear River?

MS. SMITH: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. So a joint movant would get the same benefit because you have the same date, the same information. You've addressed the same breaking it down with regards to the underlying costs as well, so you'd get that as to Clear River. Now, NWC, do you need to be heard?

MR. PARKER: Your Honor, I believe you've already

1 addressed our motion to retax -- [inaudible].

2.0

THE COURT: Okay. I thought I had as well, but since I was hearing some more, I was just making sure.

MR. PARKER: Thank you very much, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you. Did any -- the couple of parties who were not on previously, did they come back on? No. Okay. So now I should have addressed -- we should have already addressed Clear River, including the supplemental briefs, 3147, including the --

MR. GRAF: Your Honor, I believe TGIG had a motion to retax Clear River, also.

THE COURT: Give me one moment, please. I'm walking through each of these. High Sierra's we've dealt with, 2915.

We have dealt with the joinders of Green Leaf, 2927.

One second, please. Joinders to High Sierra, which included Green Leaf Farms, 2927; Rural Remedies, 2929; THC, 2932; Clark, 2934; and Natural Medicine, 2961.

Those would all be taken care of because the ruling would be consistent with the joinder parties, to the extent that they were joinder parties with regards to the underlying motion and addressing all those underlying issues. That all takes care of that.

TGIG's motion to retax Clear River is 2916, filed on 8/11/2022. Now, here they say \$37,194.47. So TGIG, what do you need to address?

2.0

MR. DZARNOSKI: Yes, Your Honor -- [inaudible]. Similar to the other motions we filed, as I've already said we argued about being a prevailing party, no judicial review. And I repeat those but I don't need to reargue them. There is nothing new in the motion for you to consider.

There is one quirk with respect to Clear River that does occur to me and I would like to be part of the record, and that is that in the early stages of the litigation, and this was slightly before I got involved so I don't have personal knowledge of this, maybe Mr. Graf can correct me if I'm in error, but it appears to me that it was May 7th of 2019 that Clear River filed what is styled a defendant in intervention's answer to the initial complaint that was filed by the TGIG plaintiffs.

And as you are aware, that initial complaint contained no allegations against Clear River and made no claims against Clear River. And it was the Court — the Court must have granted a motion to intervene and permitted the filing of the answer by Clear River on May 7th of 2019. However, the Court, as you know, then directed us to amend our complaint to name the parties and it wasn't until we filed our second amended complaint on November 26th of 2019 that we named Clear River as an opposing party.

And it wasn't until April 21 of 2020 that Clear River filed an answer to our second amended complaint, which would

1 have been the first time that we named Clear River as a party
2 to create the adversity that I think maybe you're looking for.

2.0

Now, I would argue that since we had no adverse allegations in the initial complaint that was filed against the D.O.T., that it wasn't until the second amended complaint was filed that we could be deemed adversarial to Clear River, and it wouldn't be until 4/21/2020 when they filed their answer to that second amended complaint that the costs should accrue.

That's the only additional information that I would supply.

THE COURT: Okay. The Court is going to have to ask a follow-up question. My understanding of the chronology is at that time in 2019 when you filed your complaint in intervention, these cases were not consolidated. Is that correct or not correct? Consolidation didn't happen until like December of 2019?

MR. DZARNOSKI: I'm sorry. Was that for Mr. Graf or was that for me?

THE COURT: That was for you. Sorry. Mr. Dzarnoski, the Court's understanding, May 7th, 2019, the cases were not consolidated at that juncture. Is that correct or incorrect?

MR. DZARNOSKI: That is my understanding. Yes.

THE COURT: Okay. So at the time that they were not consolidated, was there a case in which your client asserted that it had something adverse to Clear River versus did a

2.0

complaint in intervention in the underlying one against the State of Nevada with regards to licensing? I'm trying to get a distinction about whether you -- when the time you would be adverse under the statutory definition. I'm going -- really, this is pure statutory language, so.

MR. DZARNOSKI: Yes. Yes, I think I understand your question. And if I do understand your question, our initial complaint named only the Department of Taxation. It didn't name Clear River or anybody else. So it wasn't until the filing of the second amended complaint that we named Clear River or any of the other intervening parties.

THE COURT: Okay. That was the Court's -- that was the Court's understanding.

MR. DZARNOSKI: So it would be 11/26 of 2019 where I think that we created a case against Clear River through the filing of the second amended complaint. And it wouldn't be until they filed an answer that they could accrue their costs, which would be on April 21st of 2020.

THE COURT: Okay. Between November 2019 and April 2020, was there any acceptance of service, any agreement that you had things that were adverse or any waivers or anything the Court needs to take into account?

MR. DZARNOSKI: Not that I'm aware of, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay, thank you. Mr. Graf, would you like to respond to TGIG?

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MR. GRAF: Yes, Your Honor. The answer to TGIG was in response to the opposition that Clear River received to its motion to intervene. The answer, again, was filed on May 7th, 2019 to their complaint. There was no motion to dismiss that answer. There was no motion to strike that answer. It is still of record and valid.

THE COURT: Okay, wait, wait. Circle back. Circle back.

MR. GRAF: If this Court is basing --

THE COURT: Counsel, you cut out a little bit when you were starting to say your answer to an opposition. Go ahead, please.

MR. GRAF: I apologize, Your Honor. Our answer to the TGIG complaint was filed May 7th, 2019. There was no motion to strike it, there was no motion to dismiss it. In fact, again, Your Honor, there were a series of motion that were filed by Clear River seeking the fact the PJR required all of the applicants to be a party. That was our contention. That's why it was on file. It was filed and served against TGIG. There was no pleading, no objection, no procedural document that was done to remove that answer and that complaint. We were adverse to them on that date. And you will note that all of our costs were incurred after that date.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. GRAF: So, Your Honor, we -- as to that macro

issue that Her Honor addressed previously, that doesn't apply to TGIG, that any cost award should be granted.

THE COURT: Okay. With regards to TGIG --

MR. GRAF: Correct.

2.0

THE COURT: -- and the underlying complaint, the Court's got another question. You're saying you were named in the complaint in intervention and you answered the complaint in intervention. Was that -- at that stage are you contending that was just a petition for judicial review, or was there a litigation matter separate from the petition for judicial review that was the subject of that motion to intervene and which you responded to?

MR. GRAF: Your Honor, they had several causes of action in addition to the petition for judicial review.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. GRAF: The answer was filed as to all of them.

THE COURT: Okay. So let me circle back. Did you finish? Because I'm going to ask Mr. Dzarnoski to respond.

MR. GRAF: I did finish, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. So, Mr. Dzarnoski, with regards to TGIG, if they answered and nothing has been stricken as an improper answer, and if it includes not only the PJR but other affirmative claims for relief, why would it not be that their costs should start in that 2019 date from their answer, as distinguished from what's been raised by other parties?

2.0

MR. DZARNOSKI: Yes. To be clear, Your Honor, the first complaint, the operative complaint in the case was for judicial review and it was for other claims, and it named only the Department of Taxation as a defendant. No other person — there were no claims against any other party.

Now, I mean, I've got to confess this stretches me all the way back into law school and I've lost a lot over time, but when somebody asks to respond or files a motion to intervene in a case like this and they initially file their motion to intervene, it doesn't mean — what they're asking for is they're asking the Court for permission to defend the charges that were against the State of Nevada as an intervenor.

The basis of it, of course, would have been that they have some rights that would be impacted. But the adversarial party at the time of intervention was still the D.O.T. We had no grounds after the Court allowed the filing of the answer in intervention by the defendant Clear River, we didn't have a basis to say that — to file some kind of a motion challenging that. We challenged it at the stage of the intervention. But I don't think that makes them a party subject to an adverse claim at the point of intervention. It makes them not even a co-defendant because we can't get any relief against them by them filing this answer.

The only thing we can get relief against is the Department of Taxation. So they filed an answer to support the

defense by the Department of Taxation. And it wasn't until the Court ordered us to make them a party and we filed the second amended complaint that they were directly a party that had a claim made against them to which relief could be granted to us.

And so that would be the distinction that I am making between them getting the okay to file an answer to support the D.O.T. versus us having an adversarial relationship with them once we filed the second amended complaint.

Thank you, Your Honor.

2.0

THE COURT: All right. And remember, the Court is taking the term straight out of the statute. So to the extent that other people are using the term adversarial or adversary different than as stated in 18.010, this Court is taking it straight out of that and how that language is being utilized.

Okay. So, I'm going straight to the statutory interpretation. I'm trying to find -- and once again, you're now referencing something -- I'm having to click through -- well, I'm back to the 1900's. I'm not even at 2019 yet. Does anyone have a document number you're referencing, Mr. Graf, on the date of your filing?

MR. GRAF: I don't, Your Honor, but it's May 7th, 2019 that it was filed.

THE COURT: Well, I'm in June of 2020, because with no courtesy copies you all are making this incredibly challenging. I'm back to the declarations of service. You can

- 1 | appreciate I'm not even in -- I'm not even in 2019 yet.
- 2 Mr. Rulis, do you by chance have the May --
- MR. RULIS: I don't have it. I'm going to try to
  help, Your Honor. I want to be clear from what I heard is it
  was also filed under the TGIG matter, which is a different -which is probably under a different case number. And that
  would be -- I believe that's the A-19-786962-B matter.
  - THE COURT: Pre-consolidation. So you're saying it's not going to show up in the 787004. So my clicking through is not going to be of any help.
- 11 MR. RULIS: I don't believe so.
- 12 THE COURT: Gotcha. No, I appreciate it. Okay.
- 13 MR. RULIS: As far as things that were filed --
- MR. GRAF: What is that case number again, Nate?
- MR. RULIS: I think the TGIG was 786962-B. That's
- 16 A-19.

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- 17 THE COURT: I just froze up my system. Okay.
- 18 Mr. Graf, Mr. Dzarnoski, do you agree it was in the other case?
- 19 MR. GRAF: It is, Your Honor. It's Document
- 20 Number 52 in that case number.
  - THE COURT: One moment, please. It's trying to let me in. By the way, there's still filing fees due, folks. Make sure you get those taken care of; right?
- And yes, I did get the stipulation at 12:01 with a couple signatures missing, so I'm going to have to -- if

anybody did not sign off on the stipulation and you're here, which some of the names I don't see, put in the chat whether you concur with the stipulation. I'm going to have to circle around with that as well, folks, in a few moments.

2.0

May 17th you said, Mr. Graf; correct? Did you say May 7th or May 17th?

MR. GRAF: 7th, Your Honor. And it's Document Number 52 in that case.

THE COURT: Thank you. There we go, Document 52.

Okay. Black & LoBello. Clear River's answer to plaintiff's complaint. Okay. Mr. Graf, quick clarification. On page 1 of 18, under defendant you show applicant for intervention. See the caption, page 1?

MR. GRAF: Your Honor, I don't have the document in front of me. I was going off of the website.

THE COURT: Oh. If you click on it, doesn't it -okay. I clicked on it and it pops up. The title says, Clear
River, LLC's Answer to Plaintiff's Complaint. In the
captioning, Serenity Wellness Center, et cetera, et cetera, et
cetera, with not having Clear River in there but it does have
Tryke, Paradise, Fidelis, Gravitas, Nevada Pure, Medifarm, et
cetera. That says plaintiffs, okay. State of Nevada,
defendant. And then the next line says, Clear River, LLC, a
Nevada Limited Liability Company, Applicant in Intervention.

MR. GRAF: Yes, Your Honor, because on 4/29 in that

case, also, we filed the motion to intervene. We filed it in both cases.

2.0

THE COURT: But where I was trying to go is I was looking for your name on this. I'm not saying you didn't file an answer, I'm looking for seeing if you're part of the case. When I'm looking in the caption, the only place I saw your client's name was, like I said, at the bottom of the captioning; right?

And under the EDCR you've got to put the full, entire caption. The only thing I see Clear River, it says Applicant in Intervention. So while I see you filed a document called Clear River LLC's Answer to Plaintiff's Complaint, I don't see why you would be answering that if you're only an applicant in intervention at that stage.

So my question was, why are you answering it?

MR. GRAF: Because on May 6th, Your Honor, our motion to intervene was granted by the Court. And thereafter, if you look in the rest of the docket, we start objecting to documents and participating in the litigation, including on May --

THE COURT: Hold on a second. Okay, wait. Your motion to intervene was granted on 5/8. The order, this Document 55 --

MR. GRAF: Actually, it was granted on 5/2 in the minute order, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Right. Not valid, as you know. Division

2.0

of Family Services; Rust v. Clark County, until memorialized in writing with notice of entry thereof. So I don't even have a memorializing in writing until 5/8. That says -- and it's a handwritten May 8th signature, just to let you know. Motion to intervene, no opposition, good cause, is granted and Clear River shall intervene as a defendant real party in interest in the above-captioned case as a necessary -- oh, party to the action.

Mr. Dzarnoski. Mr. Graf. Okay. I've got an order here, unless somebody is going to tell me there's not an NEO and I'm not going to go fishing for one, okay. The order does say, Applicant's motion to intervene is granted and Clear River, LLC shall intervene as a defendant real party in interest in the above-captioned case as a necessary party to the action pursuant to NRCP 24 and NRS 12.130. So why, for purposes of this, since there is a clear order calling it a defendant real party in interest, and is a necessary party to that case and action, would their costs not start on or about May 8th?

I'd have to -- you would have to tell me when your NEO is, folks, in order for that. I'm not going to keep looking through all of these while I have other matters I've got to take care of. The motion to consolidate was 5/9, the following day anyway. That's was when it was filed, not when it was granted.

So, Mr. Dzarnoski, why would Clear River for TGIG only, right, in Case Number 786962, why would their memo of costs, because that case was then consolidated, so under the analysis that they're a prevailing party, why would their costs not start — you all are going to have to figure out when the NEO is. I'm going to say on or about May 8th because that's the order, right, making them a defendant in that action. And even though they filed their answer the day before, we do have the order memorializing the written pronouncement on May 8th, subject to the NEO.

MR. DZARNOSKI: Yes. Your Honor, the answer that I have or the only answer I have for you right now is that despite the language that you just cited, there are still no allegations against Clear River in the complaint. And so there was nothing for them to answer regarding allegations that were made by the TGIG plaintiffs at that point. And again, it gets back to my long understanding or belief, right or wrong, and faded memory that the intervention is granted to allow a non-party to become an intervenor, however you want to call that, in order to do something. And in this case the something was to intervene on the side of the Department of Taxation —

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

MR. DZARNOSKI: -- because they were a necessary party in Judge Gonzalez' opinion. I don't disagree with it. They were a necessary party because the case against the

Department of Taxation could have a negative impact on their interest.

2.0

But the question is, does that make them an adverse party to us to that complaint, or does it make them a participant in defending the claims we made against the D.O.T? Now, I'm suggesting to you that it's the latter and that they don't become an adverse party until we named them with the second amended complaint, which was the product of the Court ultimately having said that all these people are necessary parties because their interests are affected. That's my answer.

THE COURT: Sure. Counsel, TGIG --

MR. DZARNOSKI: I mean, it may not be the greatest one for you.

THE COURT: Did TGIG come in as a plaintiff or a defendant in intervention. Can you just refresh the Court's recollection? Because Clear River says you're a plaintiff.

MR. DZARNOSKI: We didn't come in -- we were an original plaintiff. We never did anything in intervention. We thought the D.O.T. did something wrong in giving the licenses so we sued them. And Clear River said to the Court, hey, listen, if you grant relief against the D.O.T., then our interests will suffer, so we would like to intervene on the defense side. Now, does that make them an adverse party to TGIG within the meaning of the allocation of costs? I'm

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What makes -- it still makes the D.O.T. the adverse party at that time, and not until there is a second amended complaint filed and an answer to that does Clear River become an adverse party for the purpose of awarding costs.

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THE COURT: And your citation to that would be what, counsel?

MR. DZARNOSKI: I don't have a case to cite to. Just interpreting the language of the statute. It seems to me you've been trying to find out when somebody becomes an adverse party in the case, and I am suggesting to you that they're not an adverse party until we name them. I mean, this case is for the history books, Your Honor, from start to finish.

THE COURT: Right. But I disagree with you,
Mr. Dzarnoski. I've got to look at the plain language of Judge
Gonzalez' order and the plain language of her order is law of
the case. So I'm just -- you know, when I look at the plain
language of that order and I look at how Clear River came into
this case in a defendant role because it wanted to protect its
three conditional licenses, as it says in its motion, Clear
River was awarded three conditional licenses; right? It says
that on page 9 of 13 of its motion. And Judge Gonzalez agrees.

So when your client was saying it wants the conditional licenses, it is under the statue adverse to Clear River in the unique circumstance in this case as to these

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So, yes, Mr. Graf, I am doing these party-by-party, as I said. So for purposes of TGIG and Clear River only, the date of the cost memorandum would be the date of the answer of May 7th, you agree, 2019, in Case 786962. And the Court's reasoning is you would be adverse. Who wants the license? Who gets the license? From the intervention there was an answer. That answer, clearly by the order, says it came in the defendant as a necessary party, as a real party in interest in a defendant's role. Other side of the V. The issues underlying it was who was going to get the conditional licenses.

The fact that then Case Number 786962 was consolidated into the main case number that I'm saying now doesn't negatively impact that related to that because those issues as far as determination of the licenses would start for specifically TGIG and Clear River for this unique intervention concept back on May 7th, 2019; there being a notice of entry of order, I think it was on the 13th. So realistically, though, I just said May 7th.

Realistically, I don't see how you come in until May 13th, but you all can fuss about -- decide whether it's May 7th or May 13th. But I'm going to say no later than May 13th. The reason why the Court really sees it's May 13th, not May 7th, is because the NEO on the motion for intervention which clearly

2.0

articulated exactly what your role was really was on the 13th. But there was no issue ever raised throughout this case to the present day that -- and you all have given me a stipulation that says there's no outstanding issues; right? And you have settlements, et cetera. So I don't see that there's any objection to you filing your answer before the technical notice of entry of order.

You all can agree or disagree whether or not there's any monies that are at issue between 5/7 and 5/13, submit a proposed order. But this motion to retax will be denied as to TGIG and Clear River only because -- denied in part and granted in part.

Granted for anything prior -- and I'm going to say you all get to decide between May 7th and May 13th. If the Court still needs -- do I really need to resolve between May 7th and May 13th, or can you two agree on one of those two dates, Counsel?

MR. GRAF: Your Honor, I'll talk to Mr. Dzarnoski. We'll agree on a date.

THE COURT: Okay. And if it involves \$200 -MR. DZARNOSKI: Your Honor, this is Mark Dzarnoski.

I'll be happy to speak with Mr. Graf and hopefully we can agree on a date.

THE COURT: Okay. If you can't agree upon a date, then you tell me what the number is for May 13th and you tell

me what the number is for May 7th, okay, and the Court will -MR. DZARNOSKI: Thank you.

2.0

THE COURT: -- will address that, okay. So the Court finds that that is really a minimal issue that can be evaluated without taking everyone's time at this juncture. And realistically, I think the parties can come to an agreement rather than having the Court do that. If not, the Court will do it.

Okay. So, granted in part, denied in part in accordance with the Court's ruling set forth herein.

Have I now taken care of all of Clear River? I'm not hearing anybody else saying anything on Clear River.

MR. PUZEY: Your Honor, this is Jim Puzey with High Sierra Holistics. I just volunteered to go ahead, like I did with Deep Roots, and prepare the order. I don't think that we heard that from the Court, but I'll be happy to give one to Mr. Graf.

THE COURT: Okay. That's fine. I really was going to do the preparing of the order at the end, but if you all are taking care of these in the intervening times, realistically folks, we need to get you for substance rather than, okay. So we've now done Clear River.

We're now moving to Wellness Connection of Nevada, starting with MM, et cetera, because it's Document 2966 and applies 3085 and supplements. So, motion to retax and settle

So I'm -- unless Your Honor is asking me to go back and address the triggering date, I'm just going to try to focus on the numbers of the specific costs that were addressed in the motion.

THE COURT: Okay.

2.0

MR. RULIS: So as far as legal research goes, they have included \$12,856.35 for online research, dash, Westlaw. As we've addressed multiple times now today, that does not comply with *Berosini*, *Cadle*, *Fairway Chevrolet*, et al., and so the entire amount as far as legal research should be retaxed. There are messenger services for \$179. I believe those don't have the backup documentation.

And then there are two sets of photocopies that also don't comply with *Berosini* and *Cadle*. There's photocopies which appear to be internal photocopies in which any sort of description on what the photocopies would be is entirely redacted. And then there's also in --

THE COURT: Are you referencing your Document 2966?

MR. RULIS: No. I want to bring up 2868. Excuse me,

I'm sorry. 2900, which is specifically Wellness Connection's

memo of costs.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. RULIS: There is on page 3 of 8 --

THE COURT: Give me a second to --

MR. RULIS: Yep.

THE COURT: You can appreciate it's loading all those entries because I had to switch over from the other case.

Okay. So 2900, Counsel. Is that correct?

MR. RULIS: Yes, Your Honor, 2900.

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THE COURT: Give me a ballpark date so I can --

MR. RULIS: It was filed on August 9th, 2022.

THE COURT: Okay. Just one second, it's opening up, and then you can reference me the page that you want me to look at. Go ahead, please.

MR. RULIS: Okay. So I'm starting on page 2 at line 10. There is a list for photocopies.

THE COURT: With a Footnote 3 to see Exhibit 3.

MR. RULIS: Right. And Exhibit 3 has dates and numbers and costs, but then it appears there should be a description, which is redacted. And as far as internal photocopies, that does not -- I would say that does not comply with Berosini and Cadle. That \$312 should be retaxed. Then if you go over to page 3 of 8 and specifically line 6, there's a separate entry for 7/9/20, copies, binders, \$986.92. There is not any backup documentation for that and that also does not comply with Nevada law and should be retaxed.

THE COURT: That was a confirmed date for trial; was it not?

MR. RULIS: I believe that's -- it's right around the beginning of trial. Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Go ahead. But it doesn't say that in the affidavit or any of the exhibits that I saw. Is that correct?

MR. RULIS: I did not --

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THE COURT: I'll ask Mr. Rose.

MR. RULIS: I did not see that anywhere.

THE COURT: Okay. So you have two sets of copies and you have the legal research. Go ahead.

MR. RULIS: And then as I said, I think the only other thing specifically to address was -- excuse me, Your Honor. I had -- I think that addresses the specific costs beyond -- at least that I have beyond the triggering date of the answer being filed.

THE COURT: Okay. So Westlaw, legal research, you're contesting the entire \$12,856.35, \$312 for internal copies and \$786.92 for the --

MR. RULIS: \$986.92 for the outside copies.

THE COURT: Nine. Okay. Mr. Rose, go ahead, please.

MR. ROSE: Yes. Thank you, Your Honor. Christopher Rose, for the record, representing Wellness Connection of Nevada. Just a few items to back up. As Mr. Rulis mentioned, we were here on November 16th and Your Honor had made a few rulings. One was that Wellness Connection was a prevailing party, and then the other one, the Court did make a ruling as to trigger dates.

The Court [inaudible] and analogized with or referenced NRCP 41A [video interference]. The Court had mentioned at that time that [inaudible] an answer or a motion [inaudible]. Then the Court referenced Rule 41.

THE COURT: Mr. Rose, just to let you know, you are cutting in and out. I'm not sure if you realize that.

MR. ROSE: Your Honor, I'm sorry. I did not realize that. So I'm not -- [inaudible].

THE COURT: Sorry. You're having issues?

COURT RECORDER: Yeah. I barely got five words of that.

THE COURT: Okay. My wonderful court recorder said she barely got five words of what you just said.

COURT RECORDER: Sorry.

THE COURT: And that's because it's coming -- we could hear a few words, then we hear a uh-uh-uh and then it pauses for a second and then we can hear a few more words. So what I have an understanding is you wanted me to look at Exhibit 2 to have the \$986.92, which was one of the coping costs. Go ahead, please.

MR. ROSE: Well, Your Honor, do I need to -- if you can't hear me, maybe I need to try to dial back in?

THE COURT: Wait. All of a sudden, as soon as you said that, we can now hear you. You were starting to say the Court already made certain rulings. I could hear parts of

that. But let's try again. Go ahead. It sounds like we can hear you. As soon as I said we can't hear you, now we can hear you. Go ahead, please.

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MR. ROSE: All right. I appreciate it. If at any time there's a problem, please let me know. So, on November 16th the Court had ruled that Wellness Connection was a prevailing party and ruled that the costs would begin from the date of the filing of an answer or the filing of a motion for summary judgment. The Court referenced NRCP 41A regarding that ruling. So, Your Honor, based on that, let me just mention a few additional items. We are not a party that intervened. We were named and brought into this by various plaintiffs. We did not choose to be here. We did not intervene.

Your Honor, a couple of other points. One is I want to mention, and I know we're dealing with -- well, I'll save TGIG for later. TGIG did not challenge any specific costs. I know we're dealing with MM and LivFree's motion, but I did want to mention that. As to the --

THE COURT: Counsel, you'll have a chance. Right now I'm dealing with MM Development, LivFree Wellness, Qualcan, Natural Medicine and Nevada Wellness Center's joint motion to retax and settle costs, which was Document 2966. But I'm dealing right now only with MM Development and LivFree because I haven't asked the other parties in the joint motion.

So right now, as you know, there's three entries that Mr. Rulis is saying are outstanding: legal research, \$12,856.35; two entries with regards to photocopies, internal ones \$312 and a vendor at \$986.92 on 7/9/20.

MR. ROSE: Yes, Your Honor. And I did want to go back because there was some argument earlier, and I didn't get a chance to weigh in on those since it was not my motion, regarding the start date if the Court would allow me. There's case law — the Court had asked earlier about whether there was any case law that a party can recover costs prior to filing an answer.

And, Your Honor, as you recall from the supplemental briefing that the parties were ordered to do, there was no case law presented by any party that dealt with that issue that either allowed or that disallowed costs to a party based on when they filed an answer. Your Honor, we cited the case — this is in our November 4th brief, 2022 — we cited a case. It's the LVMPD v. Blackjack case that defines what a prevailing party is, and that's a party that prevails on any significant issue and achieves some benefit.

So, Your Honor, based on that we would submit -- and I know the Court has made its ruling on this, but I just want for the record to state this, we would submit that costs are awarded to a prevailing party based on them being named in the case. There's no case law that says a party only gets costs

after they file a answer. They become a party when they're named.

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And if you think about it, Your Honor, think what happens. Once a party is named as a defendant in the case, they are automatically a party in that case because what happens? If they're served with a complaint and they don't do anything, they can have a default judgment entered against them. They can have a judgment entered against them if they don't respond to the complaint. Obviously, someone who is not a party cannot end up with a judgment against them. So, Your Honor, we submit that someone is a party for purposes of being an adverse party or a prevailing party once they are named as a defendant in the case.

But, Your Honor, I want to mention that. I know, again, there's been no case law cited that shows that costs are only awardable after someone files an answer. There was a case cited by MM and LivFree that they cited in their brief called the Goolsby case from 1994 in Pennsylvania. That did not deal with costs, didn't deal with an award of costs. Did not say that someone is only a party after they file an answer. That case dealt with a denial of a motion to amend the complaint.

So, Your Honor, I just want to point that out that we believe we're a party because we've been named in this case and that we became a party and therefore a prevailing party from the time that the various plaintiffs named Wellness Connection.

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And, Your Honor, going back to our November 4th brief, you can see from our briefing and the evidence we submitted we were treated as a party dating back to November of 2019 when we got an email from Judge Gonzalez' law clerk directing us to participate in a telephone call and to appear at the next hearing. That was November 18th and that hearing is when all the plaintiffs were granted leave to amend. So, Your Honor, I just wanted to mention that for the record.

Going to the costs directly, as to the research, Your Honor, the Fairway Chevrolet case says [inaudible] did not document that research was conducted and how long it lasted.

THE COURT: Counsel, you're turning sideways and now we've lost you again. Counsel, when you turned sideways we lost you.

MR. ROSE: Okay. Can you hear me now, Your Honor?

THE COURT: We can hear you now, just like the commercial.

MR. ROSE: So, Your Honor, the problem with that is our research is not billed by length of time. It's search specific. And so when you have a case here that says your legal research support has to state how long your research was conducted, that overlooks when research is billed per search. And, Your Honor, our billing system and the legal research charges that we have, that's by search, that's not by time frame. So we would submit that we've submitted the

documentation.

response on the legal research.

If you look at our memorandum of costs that was filed August 9th, 2022 at 2:44 p.m., if you look at Exhibit 2, the first page, it's got the matter number at the very top. That's the matter number for this client and this case. That's 118880.00003. And then the documentation shows the date of the research, the cost of the research. And then I submitted an affidavit, Your Honor, or a declaration with our memorandum talking about the necessity of the research. So that's the

As to the messenger, Your Honor, for \$179, as many times as we've been here I'm not going to dispute a charge of \$179. For the photocopy costs, Your Honor, on Exhibit 3 there is the backup for the costs. I understand there are some portions that are redacted. So, Your Honor, that's what we submitted for that.

I do want to point out for the next cost that counsel challenges, the \$986.92, there is backup for that. If you look at our Exhibit 5, it's the last page of Exhibit 5 right before you get to Exhibit 6. There's an invoice from Legal Copycats that talks about the copies, the binders, the tabs, and it has a total cost of \$986.92. So contrary to representations, I know it was inadvertent, there is backup for that. That was in preparation for trial. That is adequately supported and certainly necessary for this case.

So, Your Honor, we believe we're entitled to the costs that we've submitted in our memorandum, either all the costs that we've sought or alternatively from the date we filed the answer or a motion for summary judgment.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.

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Counsel, you get the last word. But the Court is just going to make a quick clarification of the record. I believe a few minutes ago I inadvertently said 18.010 when I meant to say — because that's attorney's fees — when I really meant to say costs, 18.020. So to the extent in the record previously when I inadvertently used 18.010, I really meant to say 18.020.

Go ahead. I think I said that probably a couple times inadvertently.

MR. RULIS: Thank you, Your Honor. Nate Rulis again, for the record. You know, I'll just -- I understand Mr. Rose is trying to reargue the same things we talked about last time when we were here as far as the triggering date. I guess if Your Honor has questions I can answer that, but the fact of the matter is I believe Wellness Connection didn't file an answer to MM and LivFree's action until June 29th, 2020, and so it would be -- that would be the triggering date for -- on or after that allowable costs could be incurred.

On the online research, you know, essentially under Exhibit 2 Mr. Rose's office hasn't provided any more

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information than what was provided by Deep Roots and Clear River. While they say it's on a by-search basis, frankly, I would imagine that that would mean that it would be easier to then provide what was being researched, which is also part of the Fairway Chevrolet. It's not just the amount of time but the amount of time and what was being researched is what is supposed to be provided in order to recover those costs.

And on the -- again, on the photocopies, even the last page of the external -- of Exhibit 5, and I appreciate I hadn't noticed that before, but it doesn't provide anything more than the number of copies and when they were made, which I think both *Berosini* and *Cadle* specifically say that is not sufficient documentation to recover those costs. Same for the internal copy costs. And so I think those should be retaxed.

And while Mr. Rose is saying today that those were for trial, it has not been part of the briefing previously. And as far as the time frame and case law, you know, he did reference what was in our supplemental brief. Again, I believe our supplemental brief was — I think it was — excuse me, Your Honor, 3194. I'll rely on what's in the brief as far as case law addressing the time frame and when costs are allowable. But that case did address when you become a party. The Goolsby case did address when you become a party. And that's what we're talking about, which is in order to recover costs you need to be a party.

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THE COURT: Okay. Here's the Court's ruling. The Court's ruling is, consistent with the Court's prior ruling the Court really finds that the -- yes, prevailing party, yes, it's triggered when there actually is under 18.020 you have the actual -- and the Court will say it right:

Costs must be allowed of course to the prevailing party against any adverse party against whom judgment is rendered in the following cases.

And then it goes to the following cases.

Realistically, as the Court said previously, that's pure statutory interpretation. You have to be a prevailing party. In order to be a prevailing party, it has to be against any adverse party against whom judgment is rendered. The Court has already stated with regards to the judgment is rendered. But in order for a person to be adverse and to be an adverse party, they actually have to be in the case.

How do they get in the case? Well, for these issues, subject to the little TGIG carveout, it is the answer. And so because at that juncture while people can be observing, people may be taking precautionary things, maybe looking into things, but they are not something in which you can get a judgment against. You can't -- just because you file a complaint, you can't just go and get a judgment; right? That's the whole process of a default and a default judgment prove-up if the

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person doesn't respond, or a trial on the merits or a summary judgment motion, you know, all sorts of different pleading practice or other aspects or determinations that they are viewed as being prevailing parties, including the facts in this particular case. So the Court disagrees with the concept that just because you file a complaint somehow that makes a time frame.

You really have to be a part of the case because you may never become a part of the case; right? If you never get served, you can get dismissed under 41, failing to prosecute, EDCR, right, 1.90, if you don't do it that way; all sorts of things. So, realistically, you have to do that. So that is the time frame.

So then what you have to look at is now look at the individualized costs. Realistically, Fairway Chevrolet is clear. While I appreciate there might be a little bit of a different process, feel free to read Fairway Chevrolet. It tells you the information the Court must have. The Court has to follow precedent. Precedent says what it needs to have. It does not have it, so therefore the Court grants the motion to retax the \$12,856.35.

The next part is the internal. The internal is redacted. The Court cannot make a determination on the redacted cost of the entries. Please see in regards to that, with regards to photocopies that's more Cadle v. Woods &

Erickson, but I will cite all four, Cadle, In re Dish Network, Fairway Chevrolet and Bobby Berosini, the first of the grouping, okay.

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And the statutory provision itself and some other case law. I think it's [indiscernible], there's another one that came up. So then the Court goes to the 7/9/20 documentation for binders and \$986.92. The Court denies the motion to retax on that.

The Court finds that the documentation is sufficient both in the exhibits attached and the declaration. And realistically, I have to take judicial notice of when the trial time frame is and this is right in the heart of the trial time frame. It says it's trial binders. It really is sufficient. It meets it under those particular standards. So therefore the Court denies the \$986, but grants the \$312 and grants the \$12,856.35.

Have I now addressed with regards to MM and LivFree and Wellness Connection?

MR. RULIS: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Rose?

MR. ROSE: I believe you have, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay? Thank you.

So now we're moving on. So I'm going to make it a little bit easier. I'm going to go first to the other joinder parties to that joint motion to retax with regards to Wellness

Connection before I go to the ones that filed their own independent. So with regards to those joint --

Counsel, it looks like I've got you standing up, so go ahead. I was going to name the parties. This is MM

Development, LivFree Wellness, Qualcan, Natural Medicine and Nevada Wellness Center's joint motion to retax Wellness

Connection. So those are the ones I'm going to next.

Go ahead.

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MS. BARRETT: Nothing to add to Mr. Rulis' argument, Your Honor.

THE COURT: On behalf of?

MS. BARRETT: On behalf of Qualcan. Whitney Barrett. Thank you.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Mr. Rose, do you wish to respond to that nothing to add?

MR. ROSE: I'll just say nothing to respond to.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.

Then the Court's ruling is going to be the same for the same analysis because it was a joint motion, same issues brought up specifically.

Okay. Does anyone else in that grouping from Document 2966 wish to be heard?

MR. PARKER: Your Honor, this is Teddy Parker, if I may, representing Nevada Wellness Center.

THE COURT: Go ahead.

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MR. PARKER: I attached as Exhibit 3 to our supplemental brief a chart outlining Wellness Connection's costs. It's my belief, based on when Wellness Connection answered Nevada Wellness's complaints that the amount during that time period would be roughly \$16,868.07, reduced by some of the comments the Court has already made, \$5,305.64. That's the time period between the time of the answer and the time Nevada Wellness Center settled and I believe that reflects what the appropriate amount should be, Your Honor.

I don't want to add any more. I think the Court has heard all of the arguments.

THE COURT: Okay. So let me get your top number because what I just need to know is, Mr. Parker, are you asserting that you added any other reductions other than the specific reductions that were set forth in the joint motion?

MR. PARKER: No, I think they're all the same. I just wanted to make sure the top period was reflected because I'm not sure that Wellness Connection filed its answer to Nevada Wellness Center's complaint the same time it filed an answer to MM and LivFree's complaint.

THE COURT: What date are you asserting?

MR. PARKER: And that's the only difference.

THE COURT: Are you saying it's different than June 29th, 2020?

MR. PARKER: June 29th. Yes, that's my -- it's June 29th, 2020, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Which is the same as LivFree and MM. And I didn't hear that --

MR. PARKER: Okay. So then --

THE COURT: I didn't hear that Qualcan was telling me it was a different date.

MR. PARKER: So then this record is the same.

THE COURT: Pardon?

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MR. PARKER: Then I think the [indiscernible] are the same, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Rose, do you wish to respond to Mr. Parker on behalf of his client, Nevada Wellness?

MR. ROSE: Yes, Your Honor. So just to clarify, is the Court's ruling that it's from the answer or is it from the answer or the motion for summary judgment? Because I think those are two different dates.

THE COURT: Well, you did not -- in this case you did not establish that there was a motion for summary judgment.

And I didn't rule with regards -- you're referencing what a concept was in part of the Court's analysis when you do a voluntary dismissal. The Court was not saying for purposes of triggering dates here is a motion for summary judgment, unless a party can specifically provide this Court that that motion for summary judgment impacted the direct same plaintiff and

defendant as to the substance as to what is being contended with regards to the costs.

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Here, it really has been focused on the answers because the answers have predated any motions for summary judgment because the summary judgments have taken place with regards to issues that were not when -- subject to TGIG -- not when various parties were actually under 18.020 a party to the case in adverse context.

So, yes, if your simple question is, is this Court going from June 29th, 2020, because that's the date so far all three of the parties have said that the answer was filed, yes, the Court is going from June 29th, 2020.

But because you have not established that there is any summary judgment in which you were already adverse to the party to the case, which is so far MM, LivFree and Qualcan, and I hadn't yet heard your answer on Nevada Wellness.

MR. ROSE: Okay. Your Honor, I'm sorry, I need to clarify that. So, yes, there were prior summary judgment motions that my client joined that applied to all of the plaintiffs, and I'm referencing our joinder that was filed on April 2nd, 2020, where we joined a number of dispositive motions that were filed.

THE COURT: How could you have filed a dispositive motion; right? We're going back to that issue. How -- that's why I asked, right, Mr. Graf and others to show me any order of

Judge Gonzalez where she specifically set forth it was against a party that had not yet answered in the case. Thus far nobody has been able to provide me said order.

Now, whether or not you choose to do something versus it actually being viewed as what is being done may be two different things. But in the absence of an order saying, look, there's an order against MM, LivFree, Nevada Wellness or Qualcan, the ones I've heard from so far, that they are bound by a summary judgment before they've even answered in a case, then you can appreciate from the Court's position I can't see how any earlier date than an answer date would be for an adverse party.

But if you think that there's an order, please tell me the order date.

MR. ROSE: Well, Your Honor, it's not an order. It's the rule that under 56 a party can file a motion for summary judgment at any time, even prior to filing an answer, and that's what we did. And so if we're going to go with the trigger dates, and as the Court mentioned the concepts or the principles that the Court discussed at the prior hearing —

THE COURT: Okay. So let's go to the order on the summary judgment.

MR. ROSE: -- that costs would start --

THE COURT: Counsel, let's go to the order on the summary judgment, right, because that's going to give me the

scope. Please give me the document number or the date of the order on the summary judgment that you're referencing that you joined.

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MR. ROSE: Your Honor, I didn't pull the -- I can go through the docket to pull it. I focused on pulling the date that we had joined the motion.

THE COURT: Okay. Give me the date. Sure. Give me the date of the order. I can look at the date of the order as well by clicking through.

MR. ROSE: I'm sorry, Your Honor. It will take me a moment to pull up the date of the order.

THE COURT: Because you can appreciate we get all the time where people add all sorts of parties and different things, right, which may or may not apply. So that's why this Court has to look at the order that takes those entities into account as being parties subject to the order, or whether or not they're parties subject to the order, because I haven't seen that actually they were served and all that other kind of good stuff.

MR. ROSE: Your Honor, I hate to -- as long as the Court -- I'm happy to go through the docket right now to locate that order. I hate to chew up the Court's time doing that right now.

THE COURT: Are you saying it's the order on Nevada Wellness' motion for summary judgment or alternative motion --

MR. ROSE: No. It would -- so, Your Honor, there's a number of motions that our client joined and I think the most pertinent here is we joined the Essence entities' motion for summary judgment against all plaintiffs. That motion was filed on March 27, 2020. Our joinder was April 2nd, 2020.

THE COURT: Which is why I have to look at an order because how were they plaintiffs if they're not answered in the case; right?

MR. ROSE: Well, they're plaintiffs --

THE COURT: I don't even know if it says that they're served, okay. That's why I'm going to the order.

MR. ROSE: They're plaintiffs because they filed their complaint.

THE COURT: Okay. Excuse me.

MR. ROSE: And they named us as defendants.

THE COURT: Okay. So you can file a motion for summary judgment before an answer. So walk me through to the order; right? Because if you're saying you conceded you were a part of the case and so you joined the motion, let's walk through where that order is.

MR. ROSE: And, Your Honor, that's -- I will mention, given the Court's comment right there, we conceded we were part of the case much earlier than that because we appeared prior to that time. We served our Rule 16 production -- and again, this is set forth in our supplemental -- [inaudible].

THE COURT: Right. Right.

MR. ROSE: We served our first disclosures pursuant to Rule 16.1, we served those on December 16th, 2019. And it's attached as Exhibit B to our supplemental brief filed on November 4th. No one came in and said why are you serving these supplemental disclosures, you're not a party. We served that on all of the plaintiffs.

And so I just wanted to address the Court's -- we're not contending that we only admitted we were a party after we joined the summary judgment motion. We became a party to this back in 2019 when we were directed by the Court to attend the hearings, to appear at the hearings and we had to serve our disclosures. So I understand that's not directly answering the Court's question, but I did want to clarify our participation and acknowledgment that we were in the case goes back to 2019 because we were sued originally in January 2019 and then in September 2019 by D.H. Flamingo.

But, Your Honor --

THE COURT: But, see, I've got to look at these parties; right? Remember, these parties, because --

MR. ROSE: Understood.

THE COURT: So that's why I'm asking. If you're saying it goes to all plaintiffs, the order goes to all plaintiffs, then I'd have to look to see if it includes these parties to address the issue of motion for summary judgment

Folks, it keeps on crashing  $my\ system\ every\ time\ I$ 

JD Reporting, Inc.

submitted the order, folks. This is intent to participate.

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try and click in and out of this and it goes, as you can appreciate, goes back.

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Now, is it even in this case number or was it in a prior case number?

 $$\operatorname{MR.}$$  ROSE: I'm looking at the consolidated case, Your Honor, that we're in.

THE COURT: Understand you all had the benefit of doing this, which is why I gave you a briefing schedule to do this argument and you all could reference whatever exhibits, right, pleadings and attach them. I'm not bringing up --

MR. ROSE: Your Honor, I understand that, and I have to apologize. After we submitted our supplemental brief on November 4th, that was when we became aware of the Court's ruling that costs would begin from the answer or a motion for summary judgment. So we didn't get a chance to supplement that into another brief since briefing was closed. But I understand the Court's frustration with the many pleadings in this.

THE COURT: No, I just -- my bigger concern is why absolutely no one gave me any courtesy copies under the EDCR. It's a huge issue because it means I'm having to click through every single one of these instead of looking like at tabs and documents and pages. The fact that this is the fourth hearing on this, at least the fourth hearing, and still I don't know how many times I've mentioned no courtesy copies, but still no courtesy copies. And still people are bringing up at the time

of hearing, the fourth hearing, new matters that aren't in any of the pleadings. So you are lucky the other matter this afternoon had to be continued, otherwise I would not --

If you all think that there's an order that applies to it, you've got to tell me. I mean, I've got attempted service galore on 6/19.

MR. ROSE: Yeah, I'm not locating the order yet, Your Honor. I do see -- obviously there was the motion and then our joinder, and then I believe it was ruled on on May 15th.

THE COURT: But that's -- right. But you understand that's argument. I've got to look at rulings. It's not Pure Tonic Concentrate's order; right?

MR. ROSE: I'd have to --

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THE COURT: I have D.H. Flamingo's and Surterra's. That's against you and MM. That's not the right one. These are going to be -- [indiscernible] is pending on all these.

MR. ROSE: I don't know if there are minutes from May 15th for the denial. It does say it was denied without prejudice on May 15th. That's, of course --

THE COURT: Counsel, I'm sure you can appreciate Division of Family Services, Rust v. Clark County; right? Minutes or pronouncements of the Court to memorialize in writing with a notice of entry of order thereof are not effective. Minutes are absolutely wonderful, but minutes done by our absolutely phenomenal clerks, and I am so fortunate to

work with the clerk that I do, are not intended to be complete analyses of everything that happened in court. It's supposed to be just a quick little snapshot of certain things, so.

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MR. ROSE: Understood, Your Honor. And I think -THE COURT: And it would be unlikely that a minutes
would say who are the parties; right? They just say the
parties that are present in a generalized ruling.

MR. ROSE: Right. I believe that the motion that was filed would address the scope of who it was aimed at.

arguments; right? All the time I get motions where people want rulings at the beginning of cases, right, before they've had discovery or anything like that. Sure, people -- maybe you're not surprised at the orders I get, proposed orders I get, including individuals that aren't part of cases. It might not even be the right case number. It might not even be the right caption, okay. It may include spouses and other things that aren't even part of a case. So I have to look at orders. Orders are actually written orders with notice of entry thereof.

MR. ROSE: Understood, Your Honor. I don't see the order right now. I think based on --

THE COURT: Does anyone say that there is an order that includes the parties?

Folks, if you all are aware of something and people

are just being silent, I mean, come on, let's get it correct.

Just give me the order number or the date. See, I don't even know if you all submitted an order.

MR. ROSE: And I don't know that, either, Your Honor. We joined.

THE COURT: Well, then it's an oral pronouncement from the bench; right?

MR. ROSE: Well, but if the triggering date is the filing of a motion, I would submit, Your Honor, that --

THE COURT: But it's not --

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MR. ROSE: -- what the Court ruled --

THE COURT: Counsel, where is -- counsel.

MR. ROSE: How the Court ruled on it -- I'm sorry.

THE COURT: Where is it by the filing of a motion? You can file a motion, right, and it could have nothing to do with what the facts of the case are. Gosh, oh, golly, could I show you motions that people have filed or documents that they call motions. And I know sophisticated counsel such as yourself would not be doing things potentially like that, but you may want to include people but that doesn't make them as included.

That's why I have to look at an order. The order says who it has impacted. A well-written order should detail who it includes and who it doesn't include, similar to Mr. Schwarz' order; right? His proposed order had certain

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things in it.

Well, Counsel on this, we've now had at least, what, 12 minutes. I'm trying to give you a chance that if you think that there is some order that's not in your pleadings, not in your -- and can't point me to it, I've got to move on to deal with everybody else in fairness; right? So --

MR. ROSE: I'm just stating based on the Court's rulings at the November 16th hearing that it was the date of the answer or a motion for summary judgment, and we did join in a motion that — the motion for summary judgment that was filed as to all plaintiffs.

THE COURT: Feel free to look at the written order. Remember, the Court is not -- I haven't even been provided certain orders as to that hearing. Some I have and I've got competing orders. So there is no written order of the Court memorializing; right? That's why this Court has been very clear when it's been making its rulings when I say I'm incorporating my analysis and the statements made at prior hearings; right?

I'm not referencing an order with a notice of entry thereof because they don't exist yet, some of which I haven't even gotten, folks, okay. I think I've gotten one with a competing order if my recollection is correct.

Do double check on that for those of you who are in violation of EDCR 7.21, but that's not where I'm going today.

MR. ROSE: Very good, Your Honor. I don't have anything else to respond to as far as Nevada Wellness. Oh, other than their summary that they attached to their November 4th supplemental brief, that's not consistent with this Court's ruling.

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If the Court is making its ruling as to what costs are recoverable and the dates that we're able to recover those costs, the costs need to be calculated based on that, not based on what Nevada Wellness came up with in its supplemental brief a month and a half ago or a couple of months ago.

THE COURT: Okay. Counsel, can you explain what you mean by that? And let's go back to what that one is so that we're clear because the Court allowed supplemental briefing for a trigger date because that was not an issue that was fully fleshed out in the first series of days; right? Because you each have different dates with different issues, as we've gone over for the various hours.

So, Mr. Rose, if you wouldn't mind clarifying what you mean, and let's go to Mr. Parker's document on behalf of his client, which now I have to click through the next 2,000 plus entries. Give me a second to get there.

Mr. Rose, by the way, are you contending that that motion for summary judgment granted anything or it was a pure denial and you're just using it as a trigger time frame?

MR. ROSE: I'm just using it as a trigger time frame,

Your Honor. If the trigger is the answer or a motion for summary judgment, then it's the filing of that that triggers the costs, it's not the ruling.

THE COURT: Well, it could --

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MR. ROSE: So I understand the Court's -- I'm sorry.

THE COURT: The Court isn't -- okay. I think you're misstating in a more generalized sense what the Court was looking at; right? You would need to have had a motion -- motions for summary judgment in some cases, yes, potentially could be filed in some cases, could potentially be filed before an answer. The Court would then have to have looked at said motion for summary judgment to see who actually the ruling on said motion for summary judgment was directed to.

That's the reason why I need to look at the order. It's not a global statement if you filed a motion for summary judgment because as Mr. Graf noted earlier, there were motions for partial summary judgment back in 2019, et cetera, with regards to certain aspects of the PJR and different entities, et cetera. So it was not a broad statement about a motion for summary judgment. And in the absence of showing this Court that there was something that a party actually was in the case under 18.020 -- which is really what I'm just looking at. When did 18.020 trigger for each and every party for each and every pending issue? And then an analysis based on that as to what would be the appropriate costs to be awarded.

So let's go to -- you want me to look at Mr. Parker's 11/4 supplement on behalf of his client; correct?

MR. ROSE: Your Honor, to your --

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THE COURT: I'm not there yet because I have to click through each one of these documents.

MR. ROSE: To your point that you just mentioned a moment ago when a party is in the case, I would submit that it's even before that. If we're looking at when a party files something and takes an adverse position, whether it's an answer, whether it's a motion for summary judgment, whether it's a motion to dismiss —

THE COURT: Counsel, the Court has already ruled on that. We need to move it forward. If you couldn't show me an order that somehow put in -- Nevada Wellness is what you're responding to, but even the others, that somehow put them in earlier in the case, that Judge Gonzalez said that they were an adverse party in the case. So in the absence of anybody showing me anything else, I have to go to the answer date.

If you all showed me something else in your supplementals, right, briefings, when you had all that time to do it, I would have looked at it. But no one did and no one gave me any case law that said it was anything different. So you have to take what would be the appropriate date because here we don't have, right -- you have to do when they're doing some kind of appearance when they're adverse because there's

was that counsel for Nevada Wellness Center, Mr. Parker, put

something different in his supplement, so I'm going to take a

Mr. Parker, do you recall the exact document?

MR. PARKER: No worries, Your Honor. What I was

THE COURT: Right. But you can appreciate there's a

THE COURT: So, Mr. Rose, to your statement, what are

looking at all these on 11/4. I'm just trying to parse through

each of these because not everyone titled them the same way.

referring to was Exhibit 3 to our supplemental brief, and it

was again filed on November 4, 2022 at 4:28 p.m. That's the

Okay, I found yours finally. Okay.

MR. PARKER: No worries, Your Honor.

you disagreeing with? The Court has made the ruling on the

retaxing from MM's -- their joint -- reducing the \$12,856.35,

reducing the \$312 for all the reasons stated, and denying it to

\$986.92. So what position are you saying that's different that

Nevada Wellness Center articulated that the Court needs to look

So now we're going to your second statement, which

1 nothing that anybody has shown me that it is any earlier date.

document I was referring to.

multitude of 11/4s.

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look at that.

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Go ahead, please.

MR. ROSE: So what I'm saying is that ruling that the

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Court made for MM, that should apply to Nevada Wellness as well. And what Nevada Wellness has included is costs such as jury to verdict trial [inaudible]. Those costs are clearly recoverable. That was not part of this Court's ruling as to MM and LivFree. There might be some other transcript costs. I don't have a calculator to crunch the numbers right now about how they would turn out.

But the Court's ruling that you just made as to MM and LivFree, that should be consistent and apply to Nevada Wellness as well. So I understand they submitted this summary, I understand why Mr. Parker referred to it, but this should not apply. The calculations could be done based on the rulings this Court has already made.

THE COURT: Okay. There's a two-prong aspect to the ruling. Without going into all my analyses, the two prongs were, one, since nobody has provided this Court any information that there's any earlier date in which the parties became adverse under NRS 18.020, the Court had to use the answer date, okay. No one has shown me any order or anything that would show any prior date in order to be adverse, restating the language directly from 18.020.

The Court's understanding is with regards to all parties who filed with regards to that joint document 2966 filed on 8/12/2022, all of them say that the answers were filed on June 29th, 2020, which would mean anything before June 29th,

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2020, would be out because they were not adverse under 18.020. Anything June 29, 2020, moving forward to the resolution date for the settling parties and not having a cutoff date for the non-settling parties would be subject to the reasonable, necessary and actually incurred analysis under Cadle, In re Dish Network, Bobby Berosini, Fairway Chevrolet and the other citations thereto, in addition to NRS 18.020. To that portion, there were only three items that were sought to be reduced.

The Court gave its analysis. I agreed with two of them to be reduced, i.e., eliminated with regards to the motion to retax, and not the third. If there is an additional item that was brought up for the first time in the supplement and it is after June 29th, 2020, then the motion to retax would be denied because you can't bring up something in a supplement which is only to address the time frame component as a new item that you want to be retaxed. To the extent that the item predates June 29th, 2020, then it would be precluded from being included in a memo of costs by the first prong of the Court's ruling as to when there would be the adverse party under 18.020. That's where the Court's ruling is. You all figure the math.

If there's a lack of clarity, like I said, give me a red line of what somebody is saying, the date and the point in your actual underlying briefing, not anything added for the first time in the supplement or during oral argument.

The Court has taken the opportunity to provide anybody the opportunity to provide me the documents in the 3,500, almost 3,600 documents if you think that there's something that does a different date for the answer. So far nobody has shown me anything, other than the one carveout with the TGIG which the Court has already addressed.

The Court has now concluded with regards to those parties and with regards to motion to retax Nevada Wellness Connection. I've got a couple other motions on Nevada Wellness Connection that has not yet been dealt with, but I want to make sure because I've heard from MM; I've heard from LivFree; I've heard from Qualcan; I've heard from Nevada Wellness Center. I have not heard yet from Natural Medicine.

Natural Medicine, do you have anything you wish to say?

Silence means no. Okay. We're moving on.

MS. SMITH: No, Your Honor, I don't have anything to add.

THE COURT: Pardon?

MR. ROSE: So, Your Honor --

THE COURT: Wait. Wait. I asked a specific question

of Natural Medicine. Yes or no?

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MS. SMITH: No, Your Honor. I don't have anything else to add.

THE COURT: And that's Ms. Smith; correct?

1 MS. SMITH: Yes.

THE COURT: Counsel, I just need you to state your name, please.

MS. SMITH: I'm sorry, Your Honor. Stephanie Smith for Natural Medicine. No, I don't have anything further to add.

THE COURT: Okay. That's why I said that's Ms. Smith; correct? Okay. So that is one motion which was 2966, and all the parties in that joint motion.

So now we're going to go to the other motions. I still have TGIG's motion. So now we're going to go to --

MR. ROSE: Your Honor --

THE COURT: Who keeps interrupting me?

MR. ROSE: Your Honor, I'm sorry. This is Chris Rose. As to Natural Medicine's motion, I assume the differing answer dates apply; right? For example, we answered Natural Medicine on June 16th.

THE COURT: Correct.

MR. ROSE: The different answer dates, even though they filed a joint motion those can be adjusted, correct, based on the date we answered?

THE COURT: You are correct because you have not shown me that there's any prior, earlier date that would view as an adverse party under 18.020. So, yes, I have to take the answer dates. Yes, if you answered earlier than that date.

So with regards to Natural Medicine, do you disagree with the June 16th stated by Mr. Rose?

MS. SMITH: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay.

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MS. SMITH: I mean, I'll take Mr. Rose's representation. I don't have it right in front of me.

THE COURT: It's the issue before the Court today.

Okay. So, Document 2966 and the responses thereto and the supplements thereto is addressed.

We are now moving on to TGIG's motion to retax Wellness Connection, 2921. TGIG, Mr. Dzarnoski, you're back up again. Go ahead, please.

MR. DZARNOSKI: Thank you, Your Honor. Good afternoon. The only thing again, to repeat, you do know that we're argued prevailing party. I have nothing further to add. No judicial review costs. I have nothing further to add.

The only thing I would like to say is that this is — this case is distinguishable from the one that we immediately did previously, you and I, anyway, with Clear River. As I understand the situation with Wellness Connection, is they were not an intervenor. They did not file a motion to intervene. They did not file any kind of answer in intervention. And as a result, as to them we filed our second amended complaint on November 26th of 2019.

And having reviewed the docket, it appears to me that

their answer to the second amended complaint where we named them was filed on February 14th of 2020 at 5:28 p.m. So that would be the date that I would suggest would be the date for rendering costs.

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Unless you have any questions, that's all I have, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you so very much. Mr. Rose, would you like to respond to TGIG's motion? And when I say to TGIG's motion, just to be clear, the Court is familiar that there is joinders of plaintiff Green Leaf Farms, Document 2927; Rural Remedies, 2929; THC, Document 2932; Clark Medicinal, 2934; High Sierra, 2957.

And then TGIG did do a reply, 3076, omnibus. But we're dealing with the initial motion first and then I'm going to see if any of the joinders.

So, Mr. Rose, anything with regards to TGIG's?

MR. ROSE: Yes, Your Honor, thank you. I appreciate the Court carving out TGIG as to the prior rulings because I do believe that they are not entitled to raise the same arguments that the settling plaintiffs raised. TGIG did not challenge costs, any specific costs or generally regarding when the costs start or when they're triggered. The only arguments they raised, as Mr. Dzarnoski acknowledged, is they thought they were the prevailing party and then they believed that costs should not be awarded as to the petition for judicial review.

This Court ruled on both of those issues and none of those affect the costs that we're seeking. So we believe that we're entitled to all of the costs that we're seeking as to TGIG.

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THE COURT: Mr. Dzarnoski, you get the last word. Go ahead, please.

MR. DZARNOSKI: Yes, Your Honor. I believe that you have not carved TGIG out from the overall scope of your observations as to when costs are triggered. And I believe you made rulings that that is a burden that Wellness Connection was required to sustain. And therefore, there's no reason why the date of the answer of February 14th, 2020, that that should not apply to TGIG as well as anyone else. Thank you.

THE COURT: Okay. The Court's carveout was specific for the facts of TGIG and Clear River. The Court, as it keeps stating, is doing these party by party and when people became a party to the aspect. Also looking at the date of consolidation and everything else that I've been saying for the last several hours at the several different hearings.

With regards to TGIG's motion to retax for Wellness Connection, Document 2921, the Court's ruling is as follows. Consistent with the Court's prior rulings, adopting its analysis on prevailing party, yes, it's a prevailing party. The Court is adopting its analysis with regards to the prior analysis in regards to preliminary injunction. The Court really at this juncture sees the outstanding issues are when is

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the date on when the costs can commence here because nothing has been, again, presented to the Court that there is any earlier date which would be an adverse party in order to become a prevailing party under 18.020 where it has to take the answer date.

So the answer date of TGIG, this is not a situation anyone is contending there was an intervention. There was a unique concept between Clear River and TGIG. It was not TGIG, you have to be treated differently. It was TGIG, Clear River, because of its unique circumstances. So TGIG, the date of the answer.

TGIG, unlike the joint motion, does not address some specific reductions for reasonableness, necessity and actually incurred, so the Court is not giving TGIG the benefit of the reductions of the legal research or the internal documentation because that was not brought up in their motion. It's the movant's role to bring up that they want any specific reductions. So therefore the date of the answer is the commencement date of when the costs can be, and you all can mathematically figure that out.

But there's not a reduction of the legal research and the internal copying costs because that was not sought in the original motion, nor was it sought in any of the joinders.

So the Court's inclination with regards to all the joinders to TGIG is that the ruling would apply to each of them

consistent with that, other than to the extent any of those joinder parties also were a joint movant in the MM, LivFree, then they get the benefit because they did specifically go for those reductions that the Court gave on the retax.

So if somebody filed a joinder both to TGIG's and was part of the joint motion, then obviously they get the benefit of their joint motion. They don't lose it because they did a joinder to TGIG for not mentioning it.

To the extent any of those parties added new things in their joinders, they couldn't have done so because that would have been their own motion, and so the Court can't address it.

Does any of the joinder parties need to be heard for TGIG?

No? Okay. Silence means no one wishes to be heard, so that's the Court's ruling.

So now we're at High Sierra's motion to retax and settle costs for Wellness Connection, Document 2941.

Wellness Connection, do you need to be heard? Go ahead.

MR. PUZEY: Thank you, Your Honor. This is Jim Puzey on behalf of High Sierra Holistics. We did file a separate motion to retax and settle costs. And on Document Number 3031, Wellness Connection of Nevada's omnibus opposition at page 2 in Footnote 3, it states that to the extent the HSH moving parties

did not allege claims against Wellness or name Wellness as a defendant, then Wellness is not seeking to recover its costs against the HSH moving parties.

I think that, combined with the fact that there was not like with the parties we've already talked about earlier today, there was not an amended complaint, therefore there was no answer to an amended complaint that would have brought them in, would mean that I would be happy to prepare an order that says that costs are not recoverable as to HSH.

Thank you, Your Honor.

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THE COURT: Sure. Wellness Connection, were you seeking costs against HSH?

MR. ROSE: Yeah, I don't believe we were, Your Honor. I understand they filed their motion as a cautionary measure, but I don't believe they alleged claims against us.

THE COURT: Okay. So I'm going to deny the motion as moot in light of the statement that costs are not being sought.

Does that meet your needs, Mr. Rose?

MR. ROSE: Yes, it does, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Puzey, does that meet your needs?

MR. PUZEY: Absolutely, Your Honor. Thank you.

THE COURT: Prepare an order, Mr. Puzey. Thank you.

That takes care of that one. That means I am -- making sure

I'm not missing one on Wellness Connection. Okay. Does anyone
think I missed one on Wellness Connection? No. Okay. So what

I show, I still have Thrive Organic Remedies and TGIG. I have a motion to retax TGIG. Motion to retax TGIG.

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Do you still show that is outstanding, Counsel for TGIG? I thought I dealt with it, but I'm just making sure.

Mr. Dzarnoski, do you think I've already addressed all the motions to retax against your client? Right or not?

MR. DZARNOSKI: I do. But, I mean, I recall this was one of the stipulations -- or, I'm sorry, one of the orders I think I signed with Mr. Gutierrez. And I thought an order had been submitted. I could be wrong.

THE COURT: Okay. What I have is a letter from Mr. Gutierrez, December 12, 2022:

Dear Honorable Judge Kishner, Pursuant to the Court's ruling on the November 16th hearing on the parties various memorandum of costs and motions to retax, counsel for Thrive and counsel for TGIG plaintiffs met and conferred and reached an agreement on the remaining issues contained in TGIG's motion to retax and Thrive's costs that were filed on August 11th at 3:11.

And it says the remaining issues. And then a proposed order regarding TGIG to retax Thrive's costs was enclosed.

And I just was reviewing it because, seriously, I got this on the 12th, you were coming in anyway in a few days. I

not settling parties, yes, we believe that costs should be applied to each of them.

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THE COURT: Hold on a second. The reason why I'm doing that is I've got joinders here. So that's what I'm trying to make sure what's left, folks.

Okay. So I had joinders by High Sierra. We've already addressed that. I had joinders by Green Leaf and I have a joinder by THC Nevada, Herbal Choice, too. And then I have MM, LivFree, Qualcan, Natural Medicine, Nevada Wellness Center's motion to retax.

MR. KOCH: And, Your Honor, that motion was simply, I believe, limited to the aspect that those were settling parties, and so the costs would not be applied to those settling parties.

THE COURT: Okay. So is it correct that everyone in the joint motion, MM, LivFree, Qualcan, Natural Medicine, Nevada Wellness, you're not seeking anything against? Is that correct or incorrect?

MR. KOCH: That is correct.

THE COURT: Okay. Does anyone think that there's any issues that I need to address with regards to MM Development, LivFree, Qualcan, Natural Medicine and Nevada Wellness' motion to retax and settle costs, Document 2948, because the Court's inclination to deny that is moot in light of the statement that nobody is seeking any costs.

Does that meet your needs, moving parties?

MR. RULIS: Your Honor, Nate Rulis, for the record.

I think your inclination is absolutely correct. Thank you.

THE COURT: Okay. You're LivFree and MM.

Qualcan?

MS. BARRETT: That's correct, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Once again, Counsel, as much as I know you said your name lots of times --

MS. BARRETT: Oh, I'm sorry. Whitney Barrett for Qualcan. Thank you.

THE COURT: Thank you. Natural Medicine, do you concur? Well, if you're not here then you have to concur because there's nothing to be addressed.

Nevada Wellness Center. Mr. Parker, are you still there or someone from your firm?

MR. PARKER: No, I'm still here, Your Honor. We do concur.

THE COURT: Okay. So that one is taken care of.

That means the only joinder that seems to be potentially at issue, since this is moot, THC Nevada, Herbal Choice, Document 3007. Without me having to go back to double check on 8/19, I believe yours was not a substantive joinder, so it usually would fall if the underlying motion is.

But is anyone from THC, slash, Herbal Choice saying that they have a motion that can stand on its own to retax

1 against Nevada Organic Remedies?

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(No audible response)

THE CLERK: No. Okay. Then the Court is including that as being moot.

Okay. So then that means that takes care of that one.

That means I do go back to TGIG. Mr. Dzarnoski, you and Nevada Organic Remedies, what needs to be addressed here? Your Document 2920.

MR. DZARNOSKI: I have nothing further to add to any of my arguments that I've made to date and submit.

THE COURT: Counsel for Organic Remedies, do you wish to be heard with regards to TGIG's motion to retax?

MR. KOCH: We believe that our motion, that the costs and requests were all timely. We were, frankly, the first party to intervene and answer in this case. And so -- and I think our costs are, frankly, the least of anybody's requested. There's \$22,000 that are related to filing fees, deposition transcripts and the Litigation Services costs that have been permitted by the Court. And all of those items were reasonable, documented, and our appearances and answers in this case were filed in early 2019. So on that basis we believe that those costs are appropriate and should be awarded.

THE COURT: Okay. You stated that you had intervened. So the Court is going to have to ask you the

analysis. Really, do you fall within the intervention where you actually are a party to the actual issues in the case versus coming — meaning, do I have a Clear River, TGIG, or do I have the other parties' issue with regards to intervention? What is your assertion?

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MR. KOCH: Your Honor, we moved to intervene in January of 2019. And Mr. Rose will tell you we came in first. We were admitted as a defendant in intervention. From that time forward we answered. We moved to consolidate. We filed an opposition to Serenity Wellness, which became TGIG's motion for preliminary injunction in May of 2019 as a defendant intervenor on the caption. And that document was filed May 9th, 2019, and throughout this we have been a defendant intervenor. There's no question about that.

Organic Remedies repeatedly. And the relief that it has sought directly relates to Nevada Organic Remedies. And for that reason the costs that we have sought are directly related to our status as a party in the case and has been from the very beginning. And again, the reasonableness of them in relation to the time frame and the amount sought we believe is more than appropriate in this case.

THE COURT: Okay. Counsel for TGIG, even though normally Organic Remedies would have the last word, since I did ask the question about the intervention, do you think --

anything you wish to address on that? Go ahead. 1

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MR. DZARNOSKI: Yes, Your Honor. This is Mark

Dzarnoski. I would disagree with Mr. Koch's representations regarding anything that might be on the record on appeal. And it's not important to you. It may have been an aside by him.

But the appellate papers stand on their own.

According to my records, the defendants in intervention filed an answer, including Mr. Koch's client, on May 7th of 2019. Subject to my argument that you have already ruled against that the intervention does not make them an adverse party, that's preserved, I believe.

I have nothing further to add. Thank you.

THE COURT: Okay. Well, remember, it's case by case, depending on what the actual order says with regards to the intervention. With Clear River there's a specific order. Are you asserting that that same order with regards to Clear River applied to -- Nevada Organic Remedies, what's the date of the order that you're asserting that puts you into this case as adverse under 18.020, please?

MR. KOCH: March 22nd, 2019.

THE COURT: Do you have it handy? Can you read the order portion? Because it's going to take me forever to get there.

> I do. This is March 22nd, 2019: MR. KOCH: Intervenor's motion to intervene is

granted. Nevada Organic Remedies shall intervene as a defendant in the above-captioned case as a necessary party.

It was signed by Judge Gonzalez.

THE COURT: And it was your complaint in intervention. And were you listed -- you came in as a defendant. Did you file an answer on a defendant at the time of that intervention? Similarly like Clear River, as you know, we had the 5/7 to 5/13 time frame. But, go ahead.

MR. KOCH: Yeah. I reference the opposition. That's the first document I pulled up. Opposition to Serenity Wellness, then TGIG's motion for preliminary injunction where we're on the caption as a defendant intervenor. That document date is May 9th, 2019. And Serenity did respond to that and we went through the preliminary injunction hearing for the next at

least several weeks, perhaps months at that point.

MR. KOCH: I do not have the answer. I believe it was, the reference, May 7th. Just before that.

THE COURT: When did you file your answer?

THE COURT: And you agree with Mr. Dzarnoski it was May 7th? Mr. Dzarnoski, do you agree? Are you all on the same page it was May 7th, 2019 for their answer?

MR. KOCH: I think that's the time frame. I don't have it in front of me, but that's the time frame and our opposition was filed two days later with us on the caption.

MR. DZARNOSKI: Your Honor, I think I have it somewhere open here, if you'd just bear with me and I can verify that.

prevailing party analysis.

THE COURT: Okay. Because where I'm going to go is
I'm going to say May 7th, unless you all tell me it's a
different date. And really the easier way to do it is to say
it's May 7th, 2019, based on the representations in open court.
However, if the parties agree that it really is a different
date for the answer, then you just need to drop that in a
footnote in your order, right, that the parties agree it was a
different date than the May 7th represented in open court.

Would that meet your needs, Mr. Dzarnoski?

MR. DZARNOSKI: Yes. Absolutely, Your Honor. Thank
you.

THE COURT: Mr. Koch, would that meet you needs?

MR. KOCH: Thank you, Your Honor. That's fine.

THE COURT: Okay. So then you have it from -- I'm going to say May 17th -- I mean, sorry, May 7th, 2019. The Court is going to adopt its ruling with regards to the

The Court adopts its rulings with regards to the preliminary injunction and permanent injunction, although the nuance here is the intervention by a specific court order that would then be adverse because the answer here would be different because of a specific court ruling that was

referenced and then the answer filed on or about May 7th, 2019.

That takes care of TGIG.

There were joinders to TGIG. Plaintiff Green Leaf Farms, Rural Remedies, THC, Clark Medicinal, slash, Nye Natural and High Sierra. Do any of those parties wish to be heard to the extent that they're not moot because they're not settling parties? I mean, they are settling parties, not non-settling parties, is what the Court meant to say.

Any of those parties wish to be heard?

(No audible response)

THE CLERK: Then the Court is going to adopt the ruling. It's going to be moot as to anybody who it's already been stated that Nevada Organic Remedies is not seeking against. And with regards to anybody that they are seeking against, it's going to be the date of the answer because no one — or a date of answer in intervention as set forth in their specific pleadings because the Court has not been provided there's any earlier date or any later date.

That should take care of TGIG's motion to retax and all the joinders thereto.

So consistent therewith, it's granted in part and denied in part as moot. There was not underlying analysis of some specific monetary amount, so therefore the Court is not going to go into that analysis of reductions of specific claims.

So now we go to High Sierra's. High Sierra, I believe High Sierra's is moot. Is that correct, counsel for Nevada Organics and High Sierra?

MR. KOCH: Yes. David Koch for Nevada Organic Remedies. Yes.

THE COURT: High Sierra, do you concur it's moot?

MR. PUZEY: I concur and I'd be happy to prepare an order to that effect.

THE COURT: And counsel, as much as I know who's speaking, our system does not have a voice identifier.

MR. PUZEY: Apologies, Your Honor. Jim Puzey on behalf of High Sierra Holistics. I concur with what Mr. Koch said, and I'd be happy to prepare an order.

THE COURT: Okay. So it's going to be denied as moot because Nevada Organics is not seeking against High Sierra.

And counsel for High Sierra is going to prepare it.

So what is left with regards to anybody as to Nevada Organic Remedies?

Nobody. Okay.

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MR. DZARNOSKI: Your Honor --

MR. KOCH: I think that's it.

THE COURT: Sorry.

MR. DZARNOSKI: Your Honor, this is Mark Dzarnoski.

I did find a reference date for you with regard to Nevada

Organic Remedies' date of filing an answer to TGIG's second

amended complaint. July 10th of 2020.

THE COURT: Okay. Counsel, do you concur or do you disagree on July?

MR. KOCH: David Koch. I don't -- that's the second amended complaint. I would have to look back. I think we can -- I can look back through the record to see if there was another answer. Or again, to a prior version of the complaint. I don't have that in front of me. I can work with Mr. Dzarnoski on that.

My position, however, is that the order date of March 22nd, 2019 ordered by the Court that Nevada Organic Remedies is a party defendant in intervention. And then we appeared with an opposition to the preliminary injunction motion on May 9th, 2019. And Serenity/TGIG responded to that that we were a party with respect to Serenity's claims at that time. There's no dispute or challenge to our status as a defendant intervenor on the caption; as the Court has indicated is something the Court would look to.

THE COURT: TGIG, did you acknowledge that they were a party prior to their answer, an adverse to you?

MR. DZARNOSKI: Your Honor, when I was doing my -- did my search through the index for the supreme court where I came upon the date, and Mr. Koch is correct, that's the answer for the second amended complaint. It didn't occur to me at the time I said that that perhaps they are in the same situation as

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And if they filed an answer after the intervention, I understand that they would be in the same situation as Clear River and Mr. Koch and I can work that out.

THE COURT: Okay. So what the Court is going to ask you to do is to please, if you can work it out, submit a proposed order. If you can't and there's a difference of opinion, then what I need you to do is since the movant is going to prepare the order. And then what you're going to do is you're going to have to say that there is a competing order.

Mr. Dzarnoski, you've got to do a competing order. And then you have to submit it to my JEA, cc'd to all parties, a redline of what the two differences are in the orders and give a reference to the document numbers that you're saying support your date versus the other party's date.

And I'm really sure you can get that worked out, but if not, there's the process.

Okay. So that now should take care of -- is there anybody saying there is any more motions for costs, or are we done with everybody?

I know you all are enjoying this so very, very much and you want to have more, but I am making sure. Last go-around. Does anyone think anybody has anything else outstanding?

Until I get to the stip. I'm going to get to the

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Anybody else? I'm not seeing green lights go on remotely and I'm not seeing anyone in court standing up. Okay, we are done with all your motions.

Okay. So what I'm going to do is because as much as I know you all want to spend your next week and a half of the holidays, the next 14 days getting this order into the Court, I am going to give everyone 30 days, unless somebody objects to me giving 30 days, extending the 7.21 by two weeks.

Does anyone object to said extension of time? If anybody objects and you want to do it over the holidays, let me know right now.

Happy Holidays. Anybody not want that time? (No audible response)

THE CLERK: Okay. You have an extension. Under 7.21 I find it's appropriate, another 14 days, so you have -- well, another 16 days, so you have 30 days from today's date to get all those orders in, okay, or stipulations.

Now, and we'll take a look at the couple ones we already have, but I wanted to make sure everyone had a full opportunity to be heard in case anything had to be changed.

Mr. Schwarz -- I know he's no longer on, but someone needs to reach out to him because that is going to need to be modified, including today's date and some of the things stated today. Okay. Stipulation and order to vacate trial.

1 Thank you so very much, we got it -- 12:01 counts.

Okay. I noticed there's a couple names -- is there anyone -- Mr. Donath's office, anyone from JK Legal & Consulting that I have by chance on the line? Because that's a name that was not on this. It was listed as "could not reach prior to the submission of the stipulation."

MR. KAHN: Your Honor, I'm still here.

THE COURT: Go ahead, please.

MR. KAHN: This is Jared Kahn for Helping Hands Wellness Center.

THE COURT: No, your name is on here, Mr. Kahn. The name I didn't have is anyone from JK -- Oh, that's you. Sorry. Yes.

MR. KAHN: Yeah.

THE COURT: Hold on a second. I misspoke. My apologies.

MR. KAHN: Okay.

THE COURT: From Mr. Donath's firm on behalf of Green Leaf, is what I meant to say.

Sorry, Mr. Kahn.

Anybody from Nick Donath's for Green Leaf and NEVCANN?

Does anyone have any reason to believe that Green

Leaf and NEVCANN feels that there's any outstanding trial issue

or have any of you had any communications with counsel where

they have confirmed that there's nothing that needs to go to trial?

Does anyone wish to be heard there, folks?

That's the only name I don't have on this, so I'd like to get it signed for you. Anybody have any communications at all that they think anyone from Mr. Donath's firm thinks that there's anything that needs to go to trial? Anyone affirmatively who can state that they've had conversations with Mr. Donath or anyone from his firm that they view that there is nothing going to trial?

MR. RULIS: Your Honor, Nate Rulis, for the record. I cannot affirmatively state I've had those conversations with Mr. Donath. I can say, though, that Mr. Donath's clients I believe were part of the same complaint as the ETW plaintiffs.

THE COURT: Okay.

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MR. RULIS: And would have the same claims, none of which include claims that are Section 1983 claims that were part of Phase 3.

THE COURT: Remember, Phase 3 wasn't just 1983.

Otherwise, we would not have had the whole state of Nevada.

Feel free to read the trial protocols on the scope of the Phase 3. But that being said -- okay. Mr. Parker, since you submitted this, you reached out to Mr. Donath's firm; correct?

Do we still have Mr. Parker?

THE CLERK: Yes.

THE COURT: I think you're trying to speak. It looks like we still have you, Mr. Parker, but I can't hear you.

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MR. PARKER: Here we go. Can you hear me now, Judge?

THE COURT: I can hear you now. Counsel, you reached out to them; right? Do you have any reason to believe that he thinks anything needs to go forward on behalf of Green Leaf and NEVCANN?

MR. PARKER: My associated, Jennifer DelCarmen, tried to reach Mr. Donath and was unable. But I didn't believe that there were any claims remaining for that party. I'm in a similar position as Mr. Rulis on this.

THE COURT: Okay. And that's really where the Court -- the Court in looking through the almost 3,600, didn't see -- I see that there's certain things. So the Court is signing. The only thing I may -- oh, you know what, I need to put May -- so you need this, Mr. Parker. You need your status check date in May.

MR. PARKER: Yes, Your Honor. Just on the payment of the settlement funds, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Do you want May 10th or May 17th?

MR. PARKER: And hopefully a settlement --

THE COURT: May 10th or May 17th, you and the State of Nevada and counsel for Pupo want for your status check? You can have May 10th or 17th. Which do you want?

MR. PARKER: I prefer the 10th, Your Honor.

THE COURT: State of Nevada, do you have a preference?

MR. TETREAULT: Your Honor, this is Dan Tetreault on behalf of Mr. Pupo. Mr. Newby told me that he had to step away for a deposition at 3:00 p.m., so I don't believe he's on the call.

THE COURT: Okay. Well, then he doesn't get to pick a date. How about you, Counsel for Mr. Pupo? Does the 10th work for you or not?

MR. TETREAULT: That's absolutely fine, Judge. Thank you.

THE COURT: Okay. The 10th at 8:30 a.m. That's being put in your order.

And if I have picked somebody's anniversary and they're out of the country or something, let me know, obviously, a time before then.

Okay. So the order is being signed. I've included that status check date for May 10th at 8:30.

Thank you so very much. Accepting -- make sure you get a notice of entry of order, please, in on this so we can have the -- I can just wish you happy holidays and say I don't need to see you tomorrow.

As much as I would love to see each and every one of you tomorrow, you might have other cases.

MR. PARKER: Thank you.

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1	THE COURT: That concludes. We're going off the
2	record. Appreciate it. Thank you.
3	(Proceedings concluded at 3:38 p.m.)
4	-000-
5	ATTEST: I do hereby certify that I have truly and correctly
6	transcribed the audio/video proceedings in the above-entitled
7	case to the best of my ability.
8	Dana O Wolliams
9	Jana 4. Williams
10	Dana L. Williams Transcriber
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12	ADDITIONAL TRANSCRIBER: Liz Garcia
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