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No. 86817

## APPELLANT'S APPENDIX

## VOLUME 27

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## CHRONOLOGICAL INDEX TO APPELLANT'S APPENDIX

NO.

1. Motion to Vacate Arbitration Award (NRS 38.241) and for Entry of Judgment

Exhibit 117: JAMS Final Award dated March 12, 2022

Exhibit 122: Operating Agreement of Green Valley Commerce, LLC
2. Appendix to Movant CLA

Properties, LLC's Motion to Vacate Arbitration Award (NRS 38.241) and for Entry of Judgment (Volume 1 of 18)

Note Regarding Incorrect Index
Index [Incorrect]
Exhibit 101: JAMS
Arbitration Demand Form dated February 7, 2020

Exhibit 102: Commencement of Arbitration dated March
2, 2020
Exhibit 103: Respondent's
Answer and Counter-Claim dated March 3, 2020

Exhibit 104: Report of Preliminary Arbitration Conference and Scheduling
Order dated April 30, 2020
Exhibit 105: Claimant Shawn
Bidsal's Answer to Respondent
CLA Properties, LLC's
Counterclaim dated
May 19, 2020
Exhibit 106: Notice of Hearing
1
191-195

NO. DOCUMENT
(Cont. 2) Exhibit 107: Notice of Hearing for February 17 through
February 19, 2021 dated
October 20, 2020
Exhibit 108: Claimant Shawn
Bidsal's First Amended Demand for Arbitration dated
November 2, 2020
Exhibit 109: Respondent's
Fourth Amended Answer and Counter-Claim to Bidsal's First Amended Demand dated January 19, 2021

Exhibit 110: Claimant Shawn Bidsal's Answer to Respondent
CLA Properties, LLC's Fourth Amended Counterclaim dated
March 5, 2021
Exhibit 111: Notice of Additional
Hearing for June 25, 2021
dated April 29, 2021
Exhibit 112: Notice of Additional
Hearing for September 29
through September 30,
2021 dated August 9, 2021
3. Appendix to Movant CLA

Properties, LLC's Motion to Vacate Arbitration Award
(NRS 38.241) and for Entry of Judgment (Volume 2 of 18)

Note Regarding Incorrect Index
Index [Incorrect] 1
Exhibit 113: Final Award

- Stephen E. Haberfeld,

Arbitrator dated April 5, 2019

2234

235-245
DATE VOL. PAGE NO.
1
196-199

1
200-203

1
204-214

215-220

221-226

227-232

233
6/22/22 1

246-267

NO. DOCUMENT
(Cont. 3) Exhibit 114: Order Granting
Petition for Confirmation of
Arbitration Award and Entry
of Judgment and Denying
Respondent's Opposition and
Counterpetition to Vacate the Arbitrator's Award dated December 5, 2019

Exhibit 115: Notice of Entry of Order Granting Petition for Confirmation of Arbitration Award and Entry of Judgment and Denying Respondent's
Opposition and Counterpetition to Vacate the Arbitration's Award dated December 16, 2019

Exhibit 116: Interim Award dated October 20, 2021

Exhibit 117: Final Award dated March 12, 2022
4. Appendix to Movant CLA

Properties, LLC's Motion to Vacate Arbitration Award (NRS 38.241) and for Entry of Judgment (Volume 3 of 18)

Note Regarding Incorrect Index
Index [Incorrect]
Exhibit 118: Agreement for Sale and Purchase of Loan dated May 19, 2011

Exhibit 119: Assignment
2
435-438
and Assumption of Agreements dated May 31, 2011

Exhibit 120: Final Settlement
Statement - Note Purchase dated June 3, 2011

Exhibit 121: GVC Articles of
2
441-442

NO. DOCUMENT
(Cont. 4) Exhibit 122: GVC Operating
Agreement
Exhibit 123: Emails regarding
Execution of GVC OPAG dated November 29, 2011 to December 12, 2011

Exhibit 124: Declaration of
CC\&Rs for GVC dated
March 16, 2011
Exhibit 125: Deed in Lieu
Agreement dated
September 22, 2011
Exhibit 126: Estimated
Settlement Statement - Deed
in Lieu Agreement dated
September 22, 2011
Exhibit 127: Grant, Bargain,
Sale Deed dated September 22, 2011
5. Appendix to Movant CLA

Properties, LLC's Motion to Vacate Arbitration Award (NRS 38.241) and for Entry of Judgment (Volume 4 of 18)

Note Regarding Incorrect Index
Index [Incorrect]
Exhibit 128: 2011 Federal Tax
6/22/22 3
584
3 579-583

Return dated December 31, 2011
Exhibit 129: Escrow Closing
Statement on Sale of Building
C dated September 10, 2012
Exhibit 130: Distribution
Breakdown from Sale of
Building C dated April 22, 2013
Exhibit 131: 2012 Federal Tax
Return dated September 10, 2013
DATE VOL. PAGE NO.
2 443-471

2
472-476

477-557

558-576
3

577-578
3
,




$$
585
$$

NO. DOCUMENT
(Cont. 5) Exhibit 132: Letter to CLA
Properties with 2012 K-1 dated August 8, 2013

Exhibit 133: Escrow
Settlement Statement for
Purchase of Greenway Property dated March 8, 2013
6. Appendix to Movant CLA

Properties, LLC's Motion to Vacate Arbitration Award (NRS 38.241) and for Entry of Judgment (Volume 5 of 18)

DATE VOL. PAGE NO.
3
639-646

3
647-649

Note Regarding Incorrect Index
3
Index [Incorrect]
3
651

Exhibit 134: Cost Segregation
4
Study dated March 15, 2013
7. Appendix to Movant CLA

Properties, LLC's Motion to Vacate Arbitration Award (NRS 38.241) and for Entry of Judgment (Volume 6 of 18)

Note Regarding Incorrect Index
4
793
Index [Incorrect]
Exhibit 135: 2013 Federal Tax
6/22/22 4
792 652-662

663-791
6/22/22 3650

4
794-804

Return dated September 9, 2014
Exhibit 136: Tax Asset Detail
4
805-826

2013 dated September 8, 2014
Exhibit 137: Letter to CLA
4
830-836
Properties with 2014 K-1 dated September 9, 2014

Exhibit 138: Escrow Closing
4
827-829

Statement on Sale of Building
E dated November 13, 2014
Exhibit 139: Distribution
4
839-842
Breakdown from Sale of
Building E dated November 13, 2014

NO. DOCUMENT
(Cont. 7) Exhibit 140: 2014 Federal Tax
Return dated February 27, 2015
Exhibit 141: Escrow Closing
Statement on Sale of Building B dated August 25, 2015

Exhibit 142: Distribution
Breakdown from Sale of
Building B dated August 25, 2015
Exhibit 143: 2015 Federal Tax Return dated April 6, 2016

Exhibit 144: 2016 Federal Tax
Return dated March 14, 2017
Exhibit 145: Letter to CLA
Properties with 2016 K-1 dated March 14, 2017

Exhibit 146: 2017 Federal Tax Return dated April 15, 2017

Exhibit 147: Letter to CLA Properties with 2017 K-1 dated April 15, 2017

Exhibit 148: 2018 Federal Tax Return dated August 2, 2019

Exhibit 149: Letter to CLA
Properties with 2018 K-1 dated April 10, 2018
8. Appendix to Movant CLA

Properties, LLC's Motion to Vacate Arbitration Award (NRS 38.241) and for Entry of Judgment (Volume 7 of 18)

Note Regarding Incorrect Index
Index [Incorrect]
Exhibit 150: 2019 Federal Tax Return (Draft) dated March 20,2020

DATE VOL. PAGE NO.
843-862

4 863-864

4
865-870

871-892
4

5
893-914

915-926

927-966

967-972
5

973-992

993-1003

1004
6/22/22 5
(Cont. 8) Exhibit 151: Letter to CLA
Properties with $2019 \mathrm{~K}-1$ dated March 20, 2020

Exhibit 152: Emails Regarding
CLA's Challenges to Distributions dated January 26 to April 22, 2016

Exhibit 153: Buy-Out
Correspondence - Bidsal Offer dated July 7, 2017

Exhibit 154: Buy-Out
Correspondence - CLA Counter dated August 3, 2017

Exhibit 155: Buy-Out
Correspondence - Bidsal
Invocation dated August 5, 2017
Exhibit 156: Buy-Out
Correspondence - CLA Escrow dated August 28, 2017

Exhibit 157: CLA Responses to First Set of Interrogatories dated June 22, 2020

Exhibit 158: GVC Lease and
6
Sales Advertising dated April 25, 2018

Exhibit 159: Property Information dated August 10, 2020
9. Appendix to Movant CLA

Properties, LLC's Motion to Vacate Arbitration Award (NRS 38.241) and for Entry of Judgment (Volume 8 of 18)

Note Regarding Incorrect Index6

Index [Incorrect] 6
Exhibit 160: Deposition
Transcript of David LeGrand dated March 20, 2018 (with Exhibits 1-39)

6/22/22 6

[^0]10. Appendix to Movant CLA Properties, LLC's Motion to Vacate Arbitration Award (NRS 38.241) and for Entry of Judgment (Volume 9 of 18)

Note Regarding Incorrect Index
Index [Incorrect]
Exhibit 161: Deed - Building C dated September 10, 2012

Exhibit 162: Deed Building E dated November 13, 2014

Exhibit 163: Email from Ben
Golshani to Shawn Bidsal
dated September 22, 2011
Exhibit 164: Deed of Trust
Notes (annotated) dated July 17, 2007

Exhibit 165: Assignment of Lease and Rents dated July 17, 2007

Exhibit 166: CLA Payment of
\$404,250.00 dated May 29, 2011
Exhibit 167: Operating Agreement
For Country Club, LLC dated June 15, 2011

Exhibit 168: Email from David LeGrand to Shawn to Bidsal and Bedn Gloshani dated
September 16, 2011
Exhibit 169: GVC General
Ledger 2011 dated December
31, 2011
Exhibit 170: Green Valley Trial Balance Worksheet, Transaction Listing dated June 7, 2012

6/22/22 $\quad 9$

1865

(Cont. 10) Exhibit 171: Correspondence from Lita to Angelo re Country Blub 2012 Accounting dated January 21, 2016

Exhibit 172: Email from Shawn Bidsal re Letter to WCICO dated January 21, 2016

Exhibit 173: GVC Equity
Balance Computation dated June 30, 2017

Exhibit 174: Email from Ben
Golshani to Jim Main dated July 21, 2017

Exhibit 175: Email
Communication between
Ben Golshani and Jim Main dated July 25, 2017

Exhibit 176: Email
9
Communication from James
Shapiro dated August 16, 2017
Exhibit 177: Email
Communication between
Ben Golshani and Shawn Bidsal dated August 16, 2017
Exhibit 178: Email
Communication between Rodney
T. Lewin and James Shapiro
Exhibit 178: Email
Communication between Rodney
T. Lewin and James Shapiro
Exhibit 178: Email
Communication between Rodney
T. Lewin and James Shapiro dated November 14, 2017

Exhibit 179: Letter from Ben
Golshani to Shawn Bidsal dated December 26, 2017

Exhibit 180: Letter from Shawn Bidsal to Ben Golshani dated December 28, 2017

Exhibit 181: Arbitration Final
Award dated April 5, 2019
Exhibit 182: Email from Ben
Golshani to Shawn Bidsal dated June 30, 2019

9

9

9

9

9

9

9

10
9

10

2014-2017

2018-2019


2020-2021

2022-2025

2026-2031

2032-2033

2038-2039
2036-2037
2034-2035

2062-2063

## NO. DOCUMENT

(Cont. 10) Exhibit 183: Email from Ben Golshani to Shawn Bidsal dated August 20, 2019

Exhibit 184: Email
Communication between CLA and Shawn Bidsal dated June 14, 2020

Exhibit 185: Claimant Shawn Bidsal's First Supplemental Responses to Respondent CLA Properties, LLC's First Set of Interrogatories to Shawn
Bidsal dated October 2, 2020
Exhibit 186: Claimant Shawn Bidsal's Responses to Respondent CLA Properties, LLC's Fifth Set of Requests for Production of Documents Upon Shawn Bidsal dated
February 19, 2021
11. Appendix to Movant CLA Properties, LLC's Motion to Vacate Arbitration Award (NRS 38.241) and for Entry of Judgment (Volume 10 of 18)

Note Regarding Incorrect Index
Index [Incorrect]
Exhibit 187: Claimant Shawn
Bidsal's Responses to
Respondent CLA Properties,
LLC's Sixth Set of Requests for
Production of Documents Upon
Shane Bidsal dated
February 22, 2021
Exhibit 188: 2019 Notes re
Distributable Cash Building C dated July 11, 2005

10
DATE VOL. PAGE NO.
10 2064-2065

10
2066-2067
$10 \quad$ 2068-2076

10
2077-2081

6/22/22 $10 \quad 2082$

10
10
10
2095-2097
2083
2084-2094

2098-2099

NO. DOCUMENT
(Cont. 11) Exhibit 189: Order Granting
Petition for Confirmation of Arbitration Award and Entry of Judgment and Denying Respondent's Opposition and Counterpetition to Vacate the Arbitrator's Award dated December 6, 2019

Exhibit 190: Plaintiff Shawn
Bidsal's Motion to Vacate
Arbitration Award dated
April 9, 2019
Exhibit 191: Notice of Appeal dated January 9, 2020

Exhibit 192: Case Appeal
Statement dated January 9, 2020
Exhibit 193: Respondent's
Motion for Stay Pending
Appeal dated January 17, 2020
12. Appendix to Movant CLA Properties, LLC's Motion to Vacate Arbitration Award (NRS 38.241) and for Entry of Judgment (Volume 11 of 18)

Note Regarding Incorrect Index
Index [Incorrect]
Exhibit 194: Notice of Entry of Order Granting Respondent's
Motion for Stay Pending Appeal dated March 10, 2020

Exhibit 195: Notice of Posting
Case in Lieu of Bond dated March 20, 2020

Exhibit 196: (LIMITED)
11
2350-2412

Arbitration \#1 Exhibits 23-42
(Portions of 198 admitted:
Exs. 26 and 40 within 198)

NO. DOCUMENT
(Cont. 12) Exhibit 197: Rebuttal Report Exhibit 1 Annotated (Gerety Schedule) dated July 11, 2005

DATE VOL. PAGE NO.

Schedules dated August 13, 2020
Exhibit 199: Rebuttal Report
Exhibit 3 dated December 31, 2017
Exhibit 200: Distribution
Breakdown dated November 13, 2014 and August 28, 2015

Exhibit 201: Respondent's 11
11
2435-2530
Motion to Resolve Member
Dispute Re Which Manager Should be Day to Day Manager and Memorandum of Points and Authorities and Declarations of Benjamin Golshani and Rodey T. Lewin in Support Thereof dated May 20, 2020
13. Appendix to Movant CLA
Properties, LLC's Motion to Properties, LLC's Motion to Vacate Arbitration Award (NRS 38.241) and for Entry of Judgment (Volume 12 of 18)

Note Regarding Incorrect Index
6/22/22 $\quad 12$
2548
2531-2547

Index [Incorrect]
Exhibit 202: Claimant Shawn
Bidsal's Opposition Respondent
CLA Properties, LLC's Motion
2549
to Resolve Member Dispute
Re Which Manager Should be
Day to Day Manager dated
June 10, 2020 (with Exhibits 1-62)
Exhibit 203: Request for Oral
14
3156-3158
Arguments: Respondent CLA
Properties, LLC's Motion to
Resolve Member Dispute Re
Which Manager Should be Day
to Day Manager dated
June 17, 2020
(Cont. 13) Exhibit 204: Respondent's Reply Memorandum of Point and Authorities and Declarations Benjamin Golshani and Rodney T. Lewin in Support of Motion to Resolve member Dispute Re Which Manager Should be Day to Day Manager dated June 24, 2020

Exhibit 205: Claimant Shawn
Bidsal's Supplement to
Opposition to Respondent CLA Properties, LLC's Motion to Resolve Member Dispute Re Which Manager Should be Day to Day Manager dated July 7, 2020

Exhibit 206: CLA’s Supplement
3194-3213
to Brief re Motion to Resolve Member Dispute Re Which
Manager Should be Day to Day
Manager - Tender Issue and
Declaration of Benjamin
Golshani in Support of Motion dated July 13, 2020

Exhibit 207: Order on Pending
14
Motions dated July 20, 2020
14. Appendix to Movant CLA Properties, LLC's Motion to Vacate Arbitration Award (NRS 38.241) and for Entry of Judgment (Volume 13 of 18)

Note Regarding Incorrect Index 14
Index [Incorrect] 14
Exhibit 208: CLA Properties,
14
15
Answers to First Set of Interrogatories to Shawn Bidsal dated July 16, 2020
(Cont. 14) Exhibit 209: Exhibits to CLA Properties, LLC's Motion to Compel Answers to First Set of Interrogatories to Shawn Bidsal dated July 16, 2020

Exhibit 210: Claimant's
Opposition to Respondent's
Motion to Compel Answers to
First Set of Interrogatories to
Shawn Bidsal and Countermotion
to Stay Proceedings dated
July 24, 2020
Exhibit 211: Respondent CLA
15
Properties, LLC Reply to
Opposition by Claimant (Bidsal) to
CLA's Motion to Compel Further
Answers to Interrogatories dated July 27, 2020

Exhibit 212: CLA Properties, LLC's
15
3465-3489
Reply in Support of Motion to
Compel Answers to First Set of Interrogatories and Opposition to Countermotion to Stay
Proceedings dated July 28, 2020
Exhibit 213: Order on
15
3490-3494
Respondent's Motion to
Compel and Amended
Scheduling Order dated
August 3, 2020
Exhibit 214: Claimant's 16
Emergency Motion to Quash
Subpoenas and for Protective Order dated June 25, 2020

Exhibit 215: CLA Properties, 16

3525-3536
LLC's Opposition to Emergency
Motion to Quash Subpoenas and for Protective Order
dated June 29, 2020
Exhibit 216: Claimant's Reply 16

3537-3539

NO. DOCUMENT
(Cont. 14) Exhibit 217: Order on Pending
Motions dated July 20, 2020
15. Appendix to Movant CLA

Properties, LLC's Motion to
Vacate Arbitration Award
(NRS 38.241) and for Entry
of Judgment (Volume 14 of 18)

> Note Regarding Incorrect Index

6/22/22 16
3548

Exhibit 218: CLA Properties, LLC's Motion to Compel Further Responses to First Set of Interrogatories to Shawn Bidsal and for Production of Documents dated October 7, 2020

Exhibit 219: Rodney Lewin and James Shapiro Email Chain dated October 19, 2020

Exhibit 220: Claimant's
Opposition to Respondent's Motion to Compel Further
Responses to First Set of Interrogatories to Shawn Bidsal
And for Production of Documents dated October 19, 2020

Exhibit 221: CLA Properties, LLC's Reply to Opposition to Motion to Compel Further Responses to First Set of Interrogatories to Shawn Bidsal and for Production of Documents dated October 22, 2020

Exhibit 222: Order on
Respondent's Motion to Compel Further Responses to First Set of Interrogatories to Shawn Bidsal and for Production of Documents dated November 9, 2020

## (Cont. 15) Exhibit 223: CLA Properties, LLC's Motion to Continue Proceedings dated November 5, 2020

Exhibit 224: Order on
Respondent's Motion to Continue Proceedings and Second Amended Scheduling Order dated November 17, 2020

Exhibit 225: Letter to Honorable David Wall (Ret.) Requesting Leave to Amend dated January 19, 2021

Exhibit 226: Respondent's 16

3677-3687
Fourth Amended Answer and Counterclaim to Bidsal's First Amended Demand dated January 19, 2021

Exhibit 227: Claimant's 16
Opposition to Respondent / Counterclaimant's Motion for Leave to file Fourth Amended Answer and Counterclaim dated January 29, 2021

Exhibit 228: Respondent /
16
3733-3736
Counterclaimant's Reply in Support of Motion for Leave to File Fourth Amended Answer and Counterclaim dated February 2, 2021

Exhibit 229: Order on Respondent's Pending Motions dated February 4, 2021

Exhibit 230: CLA Properties, LLC's Emergency Motion for Order Compelling the Completion of the Deposition of Jim Main, CPA dated January 26, 2021

16
3658-3663

16
3664-3669
$16 \quad 3670-3676$

3688-3732

[^1]
$\qquad$

(Cont. 15) Exhibit 231: Claimant's
Opposition to Respondent /
Counterclaimant's Emergency
Motion for Order Compelling the Completion of the Deposition of Jim Main, CPA dated January 29, 2021

Exhibit 232: Jim Main's
Opposition and Joinder to Claimant's Opposition to Respondent / Counterclaimant's Emergency Motion for Order Compelling the Completion of the Deposition of Jim Main, CPA dated February 1, 2021

Exhibit 233: CLA Properties, LLC's Reply in Support of Emergency Motion for Order Compelling the Completion of the Deposition of Jim Main, CPA dated February 3, 2021

Exhibit 234: Order on Respondent's Pending Motions dated February 4, 2021

| 16. | Appendix to Movant CLA <br> Properties, LLC's Motion to <br> Vacate Arbitration Award <br> (NRS 38.241) and for Entry <br> of Judgment (Volume 15 of 18) | $6 / 22 / 22$ | 18 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |

Motion for Orders (1) Compelling
Claimant to Restore/Add CLA to
all Green Valley Bank Accounts;
(2) Provide CLA with Keys to all of Green Valley Properties; and (3) Prohibiting Distributions to the Members until the Sales of the Membership Interest in
Issue in this Arbitration is
Consumated and the Membership
Interest is Conveyed dated
February 5, 2021
(Cont. 16) Exhibit 236: Claimant's
Opposition to Respondent /
Counterclaimant's Motion for Orders (1) Compelling Claimant
To Restore / Add CLA to All
Green Valley Bank Accounts;
(2) Provide CLA with Keys to All Green Valley Properties; and (3) Prohibiting Distributions to The Members until the Sale of The Membership Interest in
Issue in this Arbitration is
Consummated and the
Membership Interest is Conveyed dated February 19, 2021

Exhibit 237: Order on
Respondent's Motion for Various
Orders dated February 22, 2021
Exhibit 238: CLA Motion in
Limine re Bidsal's Evidence re
Taxes dated March 5, 2021
Exhibit 239: Claimant's
Opposition to CLA's Motion in Limine Regarding Bidsal's
Evidence re Taxes dated
March 11, 2021
Exhibit 240: Ruling -
18
4230-4231
Arbitration Day 1 p. 11 dated March 17, 2021

Exhibit 241: CLA Properties,
LLC's Motion in Limine
Re Failure to Tender dated
March 5, 2021
Exhibit 242: Claimant Shawn
19
Bidsal's Opposition to
Respondent CLA Properties, LLC's Motion in Limine Re Failure to Tender dated
March 11, 2021
Exhibit 243: CLA Properties,
19
LLC's Reply to Shawn Bidsal's
Opposition Re Failure to
Tender dated March 12, 2021

18
4102-4208

18 4209-4215

NO. DOCUMENT
(Cont. 16) Exhibit 244: Ruling -
Arbitration Day 1 pp 15-17
dated March 17, 2021
Exhibit 245: CLA's Motion to
Withdrawal Exhibit 188 dated March 26, 2021

Exhibit 246: Claimant's
Opposition to CLA's Motion to Withdraw Exhibit 188 dated March 31, 2021

Exhibit 247: CLA's Reply to
Bidsal's Opposition to the Motion to Withdraw Exhibit 188 dated March 31, 2021

Exhibit 248: Order on Respondent's Motion to Withdraw Exhibit 188 dated April 5, 2021
17. $\begin{aligned} & \text { Appendix to Movant CLA } \\ & \text { Properties, LLC's Motion to } \\ & \text { Vacate Arbitration Award } \\ & \text { (NRS 38.241) and for Entry } \\ & \text { of Judgment (Volume 16 of 18) }\end{aligned}$

Note Regarding Incorrect Index 19
6/22/22 $\quad 19$
4446

Index [Incorrect] 19
Exhibit 249: CLA Properties, LLC's Brief Re: (1) Waiver of the Attorney-Client Privilege; and
(2) Compelling the Testimony of David LeGrand, Esq. dated
May 21, 2021
Exhibit 250: Claimant Shawn Bidsal's Brief Regarding the Testimony of David LeGrand dated June 11, 2021

Exhibit 251: CLA's Properties,

20 20

4447
4448-4458
4459-4474
19

4475-4569

4570-4577

LLC Supplemental Brief Re:
(1) Waiver of the Attorney-Client Privilege; and (2) Compelling the
Testimony of David LeGrand, Esq. dated July 9, 2021
(Cont. 17) Exhibit 252: Claimant Shawn Bidsal's Supplemental Brief Regarding the Testimony of David LeGrand dated July 23, 2021

Exhibit 253: Order Regarding
Testimony of David LeGrand dated September 10, 2021

Exhibit 254: Claimant Shawn
Bidsal's Application for Award of Attorney's Fees and Costs dated November 12, 2021

Exhibit 255: Respondent /
Counterclaimant CLA Properties, LLC's Opposition to Claimant Bidsal's Application for Attorney's Fees and Costs dated December 3, 2021

Exhibit 256: Claimant's Reply in Support of Claimant Shawn Bidsal's Application for Attorney's Fees and Costs dated December 17, 2021

Exhibit 257: Respondent /
21
Counterclaimant CLA Properties, LCC's Supplemental Opposition to Claimant's Application for Attorney's Fees and Costs dated December 23, 2021

Exhibit 258: Response to CLA 21
Properties' Rogue Supplemental Opposition dated
December 29, 2021
Exhibit 259: Claimant Shawn 21 4847-4930
Bidsal's Supplemental
22

4578-4595
20

4596-4604

4605-4687
20

4688-4757

4758-4806

4807-4838

Application for Award of
Attorney's Fees and Costs
dated January 12, 2022

NO. DOCUMENT
(Cont. 17) Exhibit 260: Respondent's Second Supplemental Opposition to Application for Attorney's Fees and Costs dated January 26, 2022

Exhibit 261: Claimant's Second
Supplemental Reply in Support of Claimant Shawn Bidsal's Application for Award of Attorney Fees and Costs dated February 15, 2022
18. Appendix to Movant CLA

Properties, LLC's Motion to
Vacate Arbitration Award
(NRS 38.241) and for Entry
of Judgment (Volume 17 of 18)

| Note Regarding Incorrect Index | 22 | 5054 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Index [Incorrect] | 22 | $5055-5065$ |
| Exhibit 262: Transcript of | 23 | $5066-5287$ |
| Proceedings - Honorable |  |  |
| Stephen E. Haberfeld <br> Volume 1 dated May 8, 2018 |  |  |
| Exhibit 263: Transcript of | 23 | $5288-5313$ |
| Proceedings - Honorable | 24 | $5314-5549$ |
| Stephen E. Haberfeld <br> Volume 2 dated May 9, 2018 |  |  |
| Exhibit 264: Arbitration | 25 | $5550-5797$ |
| Hearing Transcript Day 1 | 26 | $5798-5953$ |
| dated March 17, 2021 |  |  |
| Exhibit 265: Arbitration | 26 | $5954-6046$ |
| Hearing Transcript Day 2 | 27 | $6047-6260$ |
| dated March 18, 2021 | 28 | $6261-6341$ |
| Exhibit 266: Arbitration | 28 | $6342-6505$ |
| Hearing Transcript Day 3 | 29 | $6506-6705$ |
| dated March 19, 2021 | 30 | $6706-6798$ |
| Exhibit 267: Arbitration | 30 | $6799-6954$ |
| Hearing Transcript Day 4 | 31 | $6955-7117$ |

NO. DOCUMENT
19. Appendix to Movant CLA Properties, LLC's Motion to Vacate Arbitration Award (NRS 38.241) and for Entry of Judgment (Volume 18 of 18)

Note Regarding Incorrect Index
Index [Incorrect]
Exhibit 268: Arbitration
Hearing Transcript Day 5 dated April 27, 2021

Exhibit 269: Reporter's
Transcript dated June 25, 2021
Exhibit 270: Remote Transcript of Proceedings dated August 5, 2021

Exhibit 271: Transcript of
Proceedings Arbitration dated September 29, 2021

Exhibit 272: Transcript of Hearing Proceedings dated January 5, 2022

Exhibit 273: Transcript of
34
Telephonic Hearing
Proceedings dated
February 28, 2022
Exhibit 274: Appellant Shawn
35
Bidsal's Opening Brief
(Supreme Court of Nevada, Appear from Case No. A-19-795188-P, District
Court, Clark County, NV dated November 24, 2020

Exhibit 275: Respondent's 35

7119
7120-7130
7131-7202
7203-7358

7359-7410

7411-7531

7532-7657
7658-7783

7784-7814

7815-7859

7860-7934

7935-7975

Opposition to CLA's Petition for Confirmation of Arbitration Award and Entry of Judgment and Counterpetition to Vacate Arbitration Award (Case No. A-19-795188-P, District Court, Clark County, NV) dated
July 15, 2019
(Cont. 19) Exhibit 276: Order of
Affirmance (In Re: Petition of
CLA Properties, LLC C/W 80831
Nos. 80427; 80831, Order of Affirmance, unpublished
Deposition) dated March 17, 2022
Exhibit 277: 2011-2019 Green $\quad 35 \quad$ 7982-7984
Valley Commerce Distribution
20. Bidsal's Opposition to CLA

Properties, LLC's Motion to Vacate Arbitration Award
(NRS 38.241) and for Entry
of Judgment and Bidsal's
Countermotion to Confirm
Arbitration Award
Exhibit 1: Declaration of
35
Shawn Bidsal in Support of
Claimant Shawn Bidsal's
Opposition to Respondent
CLA Properties, LLC Motion
to Resolve Member Dispute
Re Which Manage Should
be Day to Day Manager
dated June 10, 2020
Exhibit 2: Affidavit of

Benjamin Golshani in
Opposition to Respondent's
Motion for Stay Pending
Appeal dated January 31, 2020
Exhibit 3: Articles of
Organization for Green Valley
Commerce, LLC dated
May 26, 2011
Exhibit 4: Final Settlement
Statement for Green Valley
Commerce, LLC dated
September 3, 2011
Exhibit 5: Grant, Bargain and
35
8028-8041
8017-8027
7985-8016
35
7976-7981

9/1/22 35

Sale Deed dated September 22, 2011

Exhibit 6: Estimated Settlement 35

NO. DOCUMENT
(Cont. 20) Exhibit 7: Declaration of
Covenants, Conditions and
Restrictions and Reservation of
Comments for Green Valley
Commerce Center dated
March 16, 2012
Exhibit 8: Seller's Closing 8134-8136
Statement - Final dated
September 10, 2012

$$
\text { Exhibit 9: Operating Agreement } 36
$$ for Green Valley Commerce, LLC

Exhibit 10: Schedule with
8166-8169
Check of Distributions sent from Shawn Bidsal to Benjamin Golshani

## Exhibit 11: Seller's Closing

8170-8171
Statement - Final dated
November 14, 2014

$$
\text { Exhibit 12: Schedule of } 36
$$

8172-8175
Distributions
Exhibit 13: Seller's
36
8176-8177
Settlement Statement dated
August 31, 2015
Exhibit 14: CLA Properties, LLC's Election to Purchase Membership Interest dated August 3, 2017

Exhibit 15: Correspondence
8180-8184 from Rodney T. Lewin to James E. Shapiro Re Proof of Funds to Purchase
Membership Interest
Exhibit 16: Demand for
36
8185-8190
Arbitration Form dated
September 26, 2017
Exhibit 17: JAMS Arbitration

## NO. DOCUMENT

(Cont. 20) Exhibit 18: Demand for
Arbitration Form dated
February 7, 2020
Exhibit 19: Respondent's
Answer and Counter-Claim dated March 4, 2020

Exhibit 20: JAMS Final Award dated March 12, 2022

Exhibit 21: Order of Affirmance dated March 17, 2022

Exhibit 22: Remittitur from
Supreme Court of the State of Nevada dated June 10, 2022

Exhibit 23: Correspondence
from James E. Shapiro to Benjamin Golshani Re
Offer to Purchase Membership Interest dated July 7, 2017

Exhibit 24: Cashier's Check 36
21. CLA's Reply in Support of

Motion to Vacate (Partially)
Arbitration Award
22. CLA's Opposition to Shawn

Bidsal's Countermotion to
Confirm Arbitration Award
Exhibit 1: Motion to Vacate
Arbitration Award (NRS 38.241) and for Entry of Judgment dated
June 17, 2022
Exhibit 2: CLA's Reply in
Support of Motion to Vacate [Partially] Arbitration Award dated October 7, 2022
23. Bidsal's Reply in Support of

Bidsal's Countermotion to
Confirm Arbitration Award

36

10/7/22 37
8322-8323

37
8360-8445 37
DATE VOL. PAGE NO.
36 8213-8247

8248-8276

8277-8308

8309-8314

8315-8319

8320-8321

8324-8356

8357-8359
10/7/22 37

$$
8500-8445
$$

8446-8479

10/31/22 37
8480-8505

## NO. DOCUMENT

(Cont. 23) Exhibit 25: Arbitration
Hearing Partial Transcript
Day 3 dated March 19, 2021
24. Order Granting Bidsal's

Countermotion to Confirm
Arbitration Award and Denying
CLA Properties, LLC's Motion
to Vacate Arbitration Award
25. Notice of Entry of Order
\{Order Granting Bidsal's
Countermotion to Confirm
Arbitration Award and Denying
CLA Properties, LLC's Motion
to Vacate Arbitration Award dated March 20, 2023\}
26. Transcript of Hearing Re:

Motion to Vacate Arbitration
Award (NRS 38.241) and
for Entry of Judgment dated
February 7, 2023
27. CLA Properties, LLC's Notice of Appeal
28. CLA Properties, LLC's Motion Award in Full and for Order Preserving Appeal Rights as to the Fees and Right to Return if Appeal is Successful and Request for Order Shortening Time

Exhibit A: Declaration of
Todd Kennedy, Esq. dated April 27, 2023
29. $\quad$ Bidsal's Opposition to CLA Approve Payment of Fees Award in Full and for Order Preserving Appeal Right as to the Fees and Right to Return if Appeal is Successful on Order Shortening Time

DATE VOL. PAGE NO.
37 8506-8511

3/20/23 37
8512-8521

3/21/23 37
8522-8533

8534-8660

4/17/23 38 8661-8672

5/4/23
38
8673-8680

8681-8684
38

5/8/23
38
8685-8692

NO. DOCUMENT
(Cont. 29) Exhibit 1: Transcript of
Proceedings Re Motion to
Vacate Arbitration Award (NRS 38.241) and for Entry of Judgment dated April 11, 2023

Exhibit 2: JAMS Final Award dated March 12, 2022
30. Recorder's Transcript of Pending Motions dated May 9, 2023
31. Recorder's Transcript of Pending Motion dated May 11, 2023
32. Order Regarding Bidsal's Motion to Reduce Award to Judgment and for an Award for Attorney Fees and Costs and Judgment
33. Order Denying CLA Properties, LLC's Motion to Approve Payment of Fees Award in Full and for Order Preserving Appeal Rights as to the Fees and Right to Return if Appeal is Successful
34. Notice of Entry of Order Denying CLA Properties, LLC's Motion to Approve Payment of Fees Award in Full and for Order Preserving Appeal Rights as to the Fees and Right to Return if Appeal is Successful
35. Notice of Entry of Order Regarding Bidsal's Motion to Reduce Award to Judgment and for an Award for Attorney Fees and Costs and Judgment
36. CLA Properties, LLC's

Supplemental Notice of Appeal
37. CLA Properties, LLC's Errata to

Supplemental Notice of Appeal

DATE VOL. PAGE NO.
8693-8782
8783-8802

8803-8834

5/12/23 39
8835-8878

5/15/23 39
8879-8888

5/24/23 39
8889-8893

5/24/23 39
8894-8898

5/24/23
39
8899-8905

5/25/23 39
8906-8915

8916-8917

8918-8931

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    1 the page, depreciation.
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Q. Okay.
A. So I'm just saying that number isn't exactly the difference between net income and distributions, but that is the reason why there's more cash than there is net income. You don't write a check to get to deduct depreciation.
Q. Now, let's -- one more quick question. On your review of the tax returns and the accounting records for the company, did you see any evidence that the security deposits that had been originally received had ever been distributed?
A. No.
Q. All right, sir. So you've explained how you arrived at many of your opinions. Let's talk about -THE ARBITRATOR: Is this a good time to take a break?
MR. GERRARD: Yes. Absolutely. Perfect time. THE ARBITRATOR: All right. Let's take a 10-minute break.
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(RECESS TAKEN FROM 11:00 A.M. TO 11:17 A.M.) ***
THE ARBITRATOR: Mr. Wilcox, you realize that you're still under oath?
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THE WITNESS: Yes.
BY MR. GERRARD:
Q. All right. Mr. Wilcox, you were asked in this case to determine what -- from your review of the operating agreement and the company's accounting records, what the cost of purchase would be using the formula in the operating agreement that we just looked at a few minutes ago in Exhibit 5 at -- I believe it was page 11. Do you recall that formula?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. Did you come to an opinion about what the cost of purchase --

THE ARBITRATOR: You're just talking about the COP $\qquad$
MR. GERRARD: Just now. Right now.
BY MR. GERRARD:
Q. Did you determine what the cost of purchase as defined in the operating agreement should be?
A. Yes, I did.
Q. What number do you believe the cost of purchase should be?
A. The cost of purchase should be $\$ 3,136,431$.
Q. Could you explain how you arrived at that number?
A. So I took the original allocation by Mr. Main -the original allocation of the purchase of the note,

1 Page 413
1 applied that to the properties as subdivided, and then
2 adjusted that number to agree with the cost segregation
3 study to arrive at the cost of purchase as allocated to
4 each of the separate properties and the parking lot.
5 Then I took away from that cost of purchase Building B and Building E. And we can -- I've got a schedule that might make sense to help walk through that.

MR. GERRARD: Can you put that up, Jim?
THE WITNESS: Why don't you go straight to Schedule 3, Jim.

MR. LEWIN: Are we going to mark this as an exhibit?

MR. GERRARD: The schedule?
MR. LEWIN: Yeah.
MR. GERRARD: We can.
THE ARBITRATOR: All right.
MR. GERRARD: I don't know what the next in order is, but -- did we have a break in our numbers or did we just pick up with his?

MR. SHAPIRO: We went straight to his.
THE ARBITRATOR: There's blanks on this form, but I don't think the numbers --

MR. SHAPIRO: We probably should go to 201. At the next break, I can get copies of these printed out and punched and inserted.

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MR. LEWIN: What schedule? It's on his report?
THE WITNESS: Schedule 3.
MR. GERRARD: Do you want to just go to the end, Judge?
THE ARBITRATOR: Did yours end at 81?
MR. SHAPIRO: We have identified kind of generic all documents in 80 and 81. We could insert it.
THE ARBITRATOR: I just want to make sure. He started at 82 so --
MR. LEWIN: The next one would be 201, Your Honor.
THE ARBITRATOR: 201. All right. So we'll call it 201.
MR. GERRARD: Okay. So this is Schedule 3 to your report?
THE WITNESS: Correct.
MR. SHAPIRO: So I've got it blown up, but I don't know if this is the portion that you wanted to view.
THE WITNESS: This is fine.
MR. GERRARD: Okay. Go ahead.
THE WITNESS: So what this schedule is -- the top three lines of this schedule are from the cost segregation study. So this is how the purchase price of 3,967,182 --
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THE ARBITRATOR: Let me stop you there. Let's go off the record. (Discussion off the record.) THE ARBITRATOR: Back on the record. You were explaining numbers. THE WITNESS: Okay. Good to go? MR. GERRARD: Go ahead. THE WITNESS: So the top section is the cost of the properties pursuant to the cost segregation study done in March 2013. The next section is the -- you can see the same numbers fall down, but there's some blanks. There's a blank on Building $B$ and $a$ blank on Building E. The reason there's a blank on Building $B$ and $E$ is because those were sold. They're gone. The reason that the 399,000 under Greenway that was -- used to be Building $C$, is that's a carryover of the allocated basis.

And then the other number that changes in the middle section is the very last column, the parking lot. The price -- the purchase price that was allocated to the parking lot was the 369,956 . That has been reduced by the purchase -- the parking lot allocable to the three buildings that are gone. BY MR. GERRARD:
Q. Can you explain why?
A. Well, because those three buildings were sold, that they're -- what we did is we took and allocated a piece of the parking lot to each of the buildings based on the square footage of each building.

THE ARBITRATOR: So it's not 5/8; it's based on square footage?

THE WITNESS: Exactly. It's not 5/8; it's based on square footage. And the percentage ends up being 68.6 percent. So the inverse of that is 32 -- or 31.4 percent of the square footage in the terms of building has been sold. So we reduced -- we took that portion of the parking lot out as well.

So the bottom line represents what is still owned by Green Valley Commerce as of September 2, 2017, and you can see those numbers just all fall down from the top line with the exception of the parking lot. And we end up with the $3,136,436$, the first number on the left -- or the bottom number on the left column. Pretty simple allocation. BY MR. GERRARD:
Q. Now, when we look back at the formula in Exhibit 5, there's also the one element of that formula has to do with the capital contributions of the offering member at the time of the purchase of the property. Do you remember we talked about that earlier?

```
A. Yes.
Q. And you said that if we use that exact language the way that it exactly appears there, that number would be \(\$ 1,215,000\); correct?
A. Correct.
Q. Did you come to an opinion of what you thought that number should be, the capital -- the "plus capital contribution of the offering member" part of the formula --
A. Yes, I did.
Q. -- to determine what that should be under your analysis that you described earlier of what you think is reasonable?
What number did you come to for that?
A. The net capital contribution of Shawn Bidsal would be \(\$ 957,226\).
Q. Can you explain to The Judge how you came to that number?
A. It would probably be easier -- could we have one more exhibit, Schedule 4?
MR. GERRARD: Sure.
Could we just take a quick break, Judge? I think what we'll do is copy these schedules and put them all in as one exhibit.
MR. SHAPIRO: I actually have them all right
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    1 here.
MR. LEWIN: Put them all as 201 then?
THE ARBITRATOR: That's fine.
MR. GERRARD: Can we substitute this for 201, Judge? Have it be all schedules?
THE ARBITRATOR: Yes.
BY MR. GERRARD:
Q. So what we looked at last time, Mr. Wilcox, was Schedule 2; correct?
A. No. I think we looked at No. 3.
Q. No. 3, okay. So which schedule would you like us
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## to look at now?

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A. No. 4.
Q. Okay.
A. So Schedule No. 4 is just simply a summation of
``` the original capital contribution and the distributions that Mr. Bidsal allocated to a return of capital. So in 2011, you see that Mr. Bidsal contributed 1,215,000. That's in the first column. And then the next number is 2,834,250. That's what CLA Properties contributed.

In 2012, there was no return of capital or additional contributions. In 2013, there was a \(\$ 28,000\) distribution from the sale of Building C. I think it was \(\$ 95,000\) approximately that was allocated 70-30. And then in 2014, there was an additional distribution which
\begin{tabular}{ll}
1 & was allocated to return of capital by Mr. Bidsal that \\
2 & was allocated \(70-30\) again. This was based on the basis \\
3 & of the company plus closing costs, which was allocated \\
4 & as a return of capital. \\
5 & And then we had the same transaction in 2015 when \\
6 & Building B was sold. Again, there was a \(30-70\) \\
7 & distribution. And after that 2015 distribution, the \\
8 & capital -- the remaining capital in the company by both \\
9 & parties is -- doesn't change through 2019 . And that \\
10 & number is the \$957, 226.
\end{tabular}

11 Q. Thank you. Now, you were also asked to determine

14 formula based -- formula in the operating agreement; correct?
A. Correct.
Q. Basing it upon a fair market value number of \$5 million; correct?
A. Correct.
Q. And did you arrive at a conclusion or an opinion about that?
A. I did. I -- my opinion is that the purchase price that should be paid to Mr. Bidsal is \(\$ 1,889,010\).
Q. And is that as of a specific date?
A. Yes. That is as of September 22 nd -- as of

1 September 2, 2017.
Q. And would that number change if the payment had not been made on September 2, 2017?
A. Well, if the payment wasn't made and he -- if the sale had closed and no payment was made, he would be entitled to interest on that payment.
Q. Okay. So if we assume that the sale actually closed on September 2, 2017, but the payment was never made, it seems inconsistent; right?
A. Correct.
Q. If the payment was never made and -- but we still assume that there was a closing as of that date, did you determine what the interest would be on the purchase price from that point forward?
A. Yes, I did. The interest based on Nevada Revised Statute 99.040, as published therein, the interest would be \(\$ 413,496\).
Q. Do you have a schedule that shows that computation?
A. I do. That's Schedule 6.
Q. So let's take a look at Schedule 6 in Exhibit 201. Can you show us what's on this schedule?
A. Sure. So I took the -- what the purchase price is -- and the second line is an interest rate of 6.25 , 6.5, 7 percent. That interest rate is adjusted -- I
```

    1 believe it's every six months. And so every time the
    2 interest rate adjusted, I just -- I calculated the
    3 interest. And it's a simple interest for the period
    4 that that interest rate was in effect to arrive at total
    5 interest due of 413,000 as shown in the far right
    ```
``` corner, second number down.
Q. Okay. So the interest rate you used was from NRS 99.040; is that correct?
A. Correct.
Q. Which is the legal rate of interest?
A. Correct.
Q. And let's go back to your Schedule 5 in Exhibit 201 for a minute.
A. Okay.
Q. Your Schedule 5, is this the calculation you just testified about a minute ago that shows how you arrived at the fair market value -- excuse me -- at the purchase price for Mr . Bidsal's membership interest?
A. Correct.
Q. So why don't you walk us through that?
A. So I used the fair market value of \(\$ 5\) million. I used the cost of purchase for the properties that were still in existence as of the day of the assumed sale.
Q. That's the number you just testified about earlier?
```

A. That is correct. That's the number from Schedule 3.
Q. Okay.
A. And that arrives -- the next line item is the number of fair market value less cost of purchase, which really, another term for that is appreciation. 50 percent of that appreciation for the operating agreement is allocable to Mr. Bidsal. To that number, I added his unreturned original and contributed capital -capital that had been returned.
Q. Okay. And that's the number that you just testified about a few minutes ago that was also on your --
A. Schedule 4.
Q. Schedule 4, okay.
A. And so his share of the increase in value of 931,784.71 plus his originally contributed capital not yet returned was $957,225.64$ to arrive at $\$ 1,889,010$-\$11 -- \$10. 35 .
Q. So if we look now at Schedule 6 where you've calculated the interest, if we assume that the purchase was supposed to have closed and did close on September 2, 2017, but no payment made, and you add the interest that you calculated of $\$ 413,496$ through what date?

```
A. I calculated that through December 1st, the date of my report.
Q. Okay. So -THE ARBITRATOR: '20? 2020? THE WITNESS: Yes. 2020. BY MR. GERRARD:
Q. So since then we have another approximately four months?
A. Yeah. Four and a half months.
Q. Okay. Of interest. All right. But based upon that number through December, you also calculated a per diem; correct?
A. It was three and a half months. Correct.
Q. What was the per diem that you calculated that would be the daily per diem from that point to now?
A. Well, through December 31st, that per diem would be \(\$ 270.96\). I did not --
Q. Per day?
A. Per day, yeah. That would be through the end of December. I did not check to see if the interest rates changed January 1st. If the interest rates are still the same, then that number would still be the same.
Q. So if you include the interest that you assume would be paid -- would have calculated or accrued on the unpaid money from September 2nd through the end of
```

1 December -- September 2, 2017, through December 1, 22020 -- what was the purchase price you came up with in total?
A. Purchase price, including interest, would be \$2,302,506.15.
MR. LEWIN: Where is that located?
THE WITNESS: Schedule 6. Far right-hand column. Last number.
MR. LEWIN: Thank you.
BY MR. GERRARD:
Q. Now, this interest figure that you have calculated of $\$ 413,496$ through December 1, 2020, you made an assumption to calculate that number; correct?
A. I did. I assumed that the sale was made effective as of that date.
Q. Okay. If the sale wasn't effective because no purchase money was ever paid and Mr. Bidsal continued to be a member up until the time he actually gets paid, would he be entitled to this interest amount?
A. No. He would still own the property, so he would not be entitled to the interest.
Q. Okay. And so he would still, under that theory, be entitled to his distributions from the general operations of the company?
A. Exactly. Yes.

```
Q. Okay.
THE ARBITRATOR: Can I interject something?
MR. GERRARD: Please.
THE ARBITRATOR: You also presumed 0 for prorated labilities?
THE WITNESS: I'm sorry? Presumed what?
THE ARBITRATOR: 0 for prorated liabilities in the formula.
THE WITNESS: I did. I assumed no outside labilities.
MR. GERRARD: And I was going to ask that question next, so.
THE ARBITRATOR: Sorry.
MR. GERRARD: You're good. You're headed right where I'm headed.
THE ARBITRATOR: I don't know if that's good.
MR. GERRARD: It's good for me.
BY MR. GERRARD:
Q. So if we go back to the formula, the last step of that formula is to "minus prorated liabilities"; correct?
A. Correct.
Q. And you -- from your review of the records of the company, did you determine that there were some labilities that needed to be subtracted?
```

A. No, I did not.
Q. And did Mr. Gerety in his report determine that there were liabilities that needed to be prorated?
A. Yes. He wanted to subtract the tenant deposits.
Q. Okay. So he wanted to take whatever the liability was for the deposits that would be owed to tenants and treat those as a liability?
A. As a -- yes.
Q. Okay. But does the company have all the money for those deposits?
A. Well -- and that's the reason I didn't subtract it, is that money -- the deposit money would be in the bank account of the company. And so it's -- if you're going to subtract that liability, then you would need to add back the bank account or just that amount.
Q. So because they net out, you didn't include any prorated liabilities?
A. Exactly.
Q. And in looking at the -- and I asked you this question earlier -- but you looked over all the books and records of the company. Have you seen that the company has at all times maintained those security deposit monies in their accounts?
A. Yeah. It appears to me that there's always sufficient money in the company bank account to cover

1 those security deposits.
Q. So the security deposits have never been

## distributed?

A. Not that I could see.

MR. GERRARD: Now, Your Honor, I'm just going to inform you that one of the opinions we asked him to write about is the value of management services based upon Mr. Bidsal's sweat equity that we're not going to cover now because we're bifurcating that for another time.

MR. LEWIN: You don't want to cover that now?
MR. GERRARD: No. If it becomes necessary, we can bring --

MR. LEWIN: It's a very short item.
MR. GERRARD: No. We're not planning to cover that because it's irrelevant unless the court makes a decision.

THE ARBITRATOR: All right. We're bifurcated, so if that's all right -- I mean, it's their witness; it's their expert. If they're okay with the potential of having to have Mr. Wilcox come back either live or by Zoom if that becomes necessary, then they take that on. BY MR. GERRARD:
Q. Now, we also asked you to run a calculation that made an assumption that the sale should have closed

1 September 2, 2017, and what would have been the
2 appropriate distributions that would have belonged to

3 Mr. Bidsal and his membership interest if we treat it as if his membership interest terminated on September 2, 2017. Do you recall that?
A. I do.
Q. And what opinion did you arrive at with respect to that? So in other words, we asked you to determine what amount of the distributions from that year of 2017 Mr. Bidsal would have still been entitled to even if we treat it as if his membership interest had been sold on that date; correct?
A. Correct.
Q. Okay. And what opinion did you arrive at with respect to that?
A. I arrived that he had -- he was entitled to -well, let's go to Schedule 10. That might make it a little easier to go through this.
Q. All right.
A. There were basically two distributions made in 2017. There were two distributions made in 2017. The first distribution took place on February 9th, and that distribution was a total of 112,000. Money was paid out of Green Valley Commerce Center and paid out of Greenway Village. So it shows two distributions. They were both

1 Page 429
1 made on the same day; they just came out of two
2 different bank accounts. The total amount of that
3 distribution was 112,000. And I looked at that
4 distribution and I asked myself, Okay, where did
5 \$112,000 come from? Well, that was done on the ninth
6 day of the second month of the year. Pretty reasonable
 to assume that that money was accumulated in the prior year.

And so I took -- I don't know how else you could argue differently, but $I$ 'm saying that money was clearly earned and distributed to Mr. Bidsal from 2016 earnings, maybe a little January of 2017 earnings. Clearly, that happened while he was still an owner of the company, assuming that the sale took place -- takes place on the 2nd of September '17.

Okay? So in my opinion, there's -- he's completely entitled to 50 percent of that distribution. There was no capital transaction, so there would be no 70-30 allocation. It was all distribution of ordinary income generated -- cash generated from ordinary income or ordinary operations. Okay?

The second distribution in November poses a little bit of a different situation because that distribution would have taken place after the assumed sale date, so some of that cash probably was earned

1 after Mr. Bidsal no longer had his interest.
Q. Under that assumption?
A. Under that assumption.
Q. Right.
A. And so all I did is I said, All right, I'm assuming we distributed everything that we could distribute on February 9th. How many days was it from February 9th to November 20th? That happened to be 284 days. Of those 284 days, how many days did Mr. Bidsal -- under the assumption that he sold his property, how many days did he own it? That's the 205 days.

So he owned his interest, under this assumption, for 72.2 percent of the time. And I simply applied that 72 percent to the distribution that was made to him, and came to the conclusion that he was really only entitled to about a $\$ 104,665$ of that distribution.
Q. If it's assumed that the transaction was properly completed?
A. Based on the assumption that the transaction closed on that date.
Q. Okay. We also asked you to make a determination of what the gross receipts were that were earned by this company from September 3, 2017, through August 13th of 2020; correct?

```
A. Correct.
MR. LEWIN: Doesn't that only go to the management fees?
MR. GERRARD: It does, but it's just a number. It's just a gross receipts number. We're not tying it to any services or anything like that. We could do it later if you want.
THE ARBITRATOR: If it's not relevant to anything other than that, don't --
MR. GERRARD: All right.
BY MR. GERRARD:
Q. Let's move on to your last opinion that we asked you to originally draw. This has to do with distributions; correct?
A. Correct.
Q. We asked you to determine what the total distributions were that were made to each of the members and to offer an opinion about whether the distributions that were made were appropriate under the operating agreement. Did you reach opinions on that?
A. I did. My opinion is that the operate -- the distributions as made on -- by the accountant by Mr. Bidsal over the last -- since 2011, that those distributions are in conformity. Well, as we talked about, they're really not in conformity with the
```

    1 operating agreement if you apply the -- if you apply all
    2 of the exact language of the agreement. But
    3 nonetheless, the distributions made were reasonable
    4 based on Mr. Bidsal's interpretation of the agreement.
    operating agreement if you apply the -- if you apply all of the exact language of the agreement. But nonetheless, the distributions made were reasonable based on Mr. Bidsal's interpretation of the agreement.
Q. And were those distributions that were made consistent with what was shown in all the tax returns and all of the distribution schedules?
A. Yes.
Q. And is it your understanding and did you assume the fact that all of those distribution schedules and all of the tax returns were provided to CLA?
A. Yes. By law, they're required to be.
Q. Okay. So is it your -- did you assume for purposes of this opinion -- well, strike that. Go ahead and finish your analysis.
A. So the analysis I'm looking at is Schedule 12. MR. LEWIN: These are all attached to your report; right? The same schedules?
THE WITNESS: Yes. Yes.
So year by year, I went through and just calculated the distributions and allocated them between return of capital and just distribution of profits. And the bottom line is that over the course of -- through the end of 2019, Mr. Bidsal received distributions totaling $\$ 2,321,142.20$, and CLA Properties received

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    1 distributions of $2,664,841.07. In my opinion, those
    2 distributions -- while not in the strict conformance of
    3 the operating agreement -- are certainly reasonable and
    4 equitable.
    5 BY MR. GERRARD:
    6 Q. And if you apply the strict language of the
```

``` operating agreement, whose benefit would that inure to?
A. It would inure to CLA.
Q. Well, the way that Mr . Bidsal did it inured to benefit CLA; correct?
A. I'm sorry. If you applied the strict interpretation, it would be to Mr. Bidsal's benefit; the way it was done, it was made to CLA's benefit.
Q. Okay. And when you discussed this -- the way the distributions were done -- with Mr. Bidsal, did Mr. Bidsal inform you that he had discussed how the distributions would be made from the sale of all these properties, given the ambiguities in Exhibit B -- that he had discussed that with Mr. Golshani?
A. Yeah. It was my understanding that the schedules we reviewed earlier where they had calculated distributions, that those were provided. And then as far as distributions of operating profits, I don't recall specifically distributing -- discussing that, but it was done consistently through the entire period.
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1
Q. Okay. And if you looked at the tax returns that were provided with the Schedule $K-1 s$ and the Schedule $K$ of each tax return, you would have been able to determine how all the distributions were made from those documents as well; correct?
A. Yes.
Q. All right. Now, you were also asked to respond to some opinions that have been rendered by Dan Gerety; correct?
A. Correct.
Q. And do you know who Mr. Gerety is?
A. I do.
Q. Okay. Is he an accountant that also conducts business in Clark County?
A. He is.

THE ARBITRATOR: G-A-R-R-I-T-Y?
MR. GERRARD: G-E-R-E-T-Y.
BY MR. GERRARD:
Q. Now, the Gerety report expresses essentially two opinions. The first one that $\$ 777,086$ of distributions were paid to Mr . Bidsal in excess of what was due him under the Green Valley operating agreement; correct?
A. Correct.
Q. And that the price that CLA should pay to Bidsal is $\$ 1,598,169$; correct?
A. Correct.
Q. Did you offer opinions about those two conclusions drawn by Mr . Gerety?
A. I did. I do.
Q. So let's first talk about your opinion with respect to Mr . Gerety's first opinion that $\$ 777,086$ of distributions were paid to Mr. Bidsal in excess of what was due to him. Do you agree with that opinion?
A. I do not.
Q. Can you explain why?
A. Well, the first problem with the opinion is that it -- or with his number is that included in that is distributions from '18 and '19, which are really -we're either entitled to those or we're not entitled to them. Either the sale closed and he's not entitled to them or the sale didn't close and he is entitled to them. So that's one challenge we have to get around. The other is that the rent that was received when the building was foreclosed on or the deed in lieu of foreclosure was executed, he wants to allocate that 70-30, which I disagree with. That is ordinary income. It should be 50-50.

And then the third issue is that Mr. Gerety is taking a position that -- we talked about ordinary income and how ordinary income for the tax return will
1 be different than the cash generated from ordinary
2 operations. We talked about that earlier. He's taken
3 the position that that delta -- the difference between
4 ordinary income and the distribution -- that that should
5 be allocated 70-30, which I disagree with.
Q. Why do you disagree with that?
A. Well, it's a component of ordinary income.
Q. And that's -- essentially, we're talking about depreciation; right?
A. We're talking about depreciation, right. It's that conversation we had about depreciation.
Q. Does the operating agreement in Exhibit A very clearly state how depreciation is allocated?
A. It says that it should be allocated based on the operating agreement in Exhibit A. And then you go to B, and B says that it's allocated 50-50 as part of ordinary income.
Q. Now, Mr. Gerety takes a position that somehow depreciation is a capital transaction. How do you respond to that?
A. I just think it's incorrect. Frankly, I'm not sure how he's getting to that conclusion because depreciation is a component of ordinary income.
Q. And that's generally accepted accounting principles; right?
A. That is under the tax law, and under generally accepted accounting principles.
Q. What other problems did you find with this number that Mr . Gerety had come up with of distributions that were paid to Mr. Bidsal in excess of what was due to him? You mentioned those first two problems.
A. I think I hit them all the first -- I think there were just three.
Q. Okay. Did you also -- did you agree with Mr. Gerety's conclusion about what constitutes a capital transaction? Isn't that also a part of this analysis?
A. Yeah. And I did not agree with that one.
Q. How does Mr. Gerety treat this -- determining what is a capital transaction triggering the special allocation language as opposed to what you described earlier?
A. So he has taken the position that the sale of the buildings is a capital transaction, and that that would trigger the waterfall which would trigger the 70-30 allocation.
Q. And in coming to that conclusion, is he using a definition of capital transaction from the operating agreement, or is he using a definition of capital transaction from the tax code?
A. Well, it's not from the operating agreement, so

1 Page 438 I'm assuming he must be thinking of the tax code. It's definitely not the operating agreement.
Q. If you were just to look at this from a strict tax perspective and we had no operating agreement that described what a capital transaction was supposed to be, under the tax code, what would be a capital transaction?
A. So Section 1221 describes a capital transaction as the sale of any property that's not inventory or royalties or depreciable. So it describes a capital transaction negative anything that's not inventory, royalty or a depreciable property. So right there, we're saying depreciation. There's -- you look up 1221 and it's very clear. So depreciation is not part of that capital transaction.
Q. Okay.
A. So I'm not sure where he's going with his assumption.
Q. Now, let's talk for a minute about the Exhibit B language in the operating agreement that talks about nonreoccurring events. Do you remember that?
A. Yes.
Q. In the last paragraph of Exhibit B, it talks about capital transactions or nonreoccurring events such as a sale of all or a substantial portion of the company's assets or cash out financing.
A. Yes.
Q. From a company operation and tax perspective, what is a nonreoccurring event?

MR. LEWIN: I'm sorry. I'm not sure that I understand the question. It's vague and ambiguous. What a company and tax -- seems like it's two questions in one.

MR. GERRARD: Your Honor, I think the question is perfectly understandable.

THE ARBITRATOR: If the perspectives are different -- why don't you rephrase?

MR. GERRARD: Okay. I understand what he's saying. That's fine.

BY MR. GERRARD:
Q. From a company operational perspective, does the way that a company operates have something to do with whether something is a reoccurring event or a nonreoccurring event, if you're talking about a sale of something?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. So let's assume that we're talking about a car dealership.
A. Okay.
Q. If a car dealership sells a car, would that be

1 reoccurring event or a nonreoccurring event?
A. That would be a reoccurring event. You can't -yeah, that would be a reoccurring event.
Q. And explain that.
A. Well, that's what that dealership is in the business of doing, is selling cars. So that's its business, selling cars. And it's going to do it day in and day out, day in and day out.
Q. Now, under Mr. Gerety's approach, he said that if you sell a car, since you can never sell that same car again, that that's a nonreoccurring event; correct?
A. That is basically the approach he's taking.
Q. Do you agree with that approach?
A. Well, no.
Q. Same thing with this company. This company ultimately owned nine parcels of property; correct?
A. Correct.
Q. If the company sells one parcel of that property, is that a reoccurring event or a nonreoccurring event?
A. That would have to be a nonreoccurring event. That's not the business that the company's in.
Q. What if the company then sells two pieces of property? Would that still be a nonreoccurring event, or would that be a reoccurring event?
A. The only way that it could be a reoccurring event

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    1 is if you did all of those at one time. If you're Page 441
    2 spreading them out over a period of years, it would be a
    3 nonreoccurring event. I'm sorry. It would be
    4 nonreoccurring event. I'm sorry. It would be -- if you
    5 sold multiple properties like -- are we talking about
    6 like what we did here?
    Q. Yes.
    A. Okay. So that would be a reoccurring event in
    that case.
Q. Okay. Because you're selling more than one property?
A. Right.
Q. It's not -- so is it based upon what's being sold or what the business of the company is?
A. It's based on what the business of the company is.
Q. Okay. So if in the business of the company, if it sells more than one piece of property, it can no longer be a nonreoccurring event; right?
A. Yeah.
Q. Okay. So let's go back to what we were talking about before about the distributions. You testified that you disagree with Mr. Gerety's trying to characterize the -- trying to characterize the sales of each of the buildings as a capital transaction to
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    1 trigger the special allocation language; correct?
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A. I disagree with that.
Q. And did we cover -- I'm sorry -- did we cover the rents issue?
A. Yes, we did. The rent pursuant to the deed in lieu?
Q. Correct. Okay. We did cover that.
All right. So then the second opinion that
Mr. Gerety had come to is that CLA should pay Bidsal
\(\$ 1,598,169\). How does your number differ from Mr. Gerety's number?
A. So there's basically two -- well, there are two differences between my calculation and Mr. Gerety's calculation. The primary difference -- our difference is 549 -- I'm sorry. That's not true.
The difference is \(\$ 290,000\).
MR. GERRARD: Jim, can you put up that chart? Just that portion of his rebuttal report that is just the charts on page 11? It would be easier for the judge to follow.
MR. LEWIN: Are we going to mark this? Is this the same chart?
MR. GERRARD: No.
THE ARBITRATOR: It's demonstrative?
MR. GERRARD: Yeah.
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MR. LEWIN: If he's going to use some piece of evidence, I'd like to have it in my hand so I can question the witness about it.

MR. GERRARD: It's just a demonstrative exhibit. If you want us to make a photocopy, we can do that during the break.

THE ARBITRATOR: Let's do it now. I might need to write on it.
(RECESS TAKEN FROM 12:04 P.M. TO 12:07 P.M.)

THE ARBITRATOR: Back on the record.
MR. GERRARD: Go ahead, Mr. Wilcox.
THE WITNESS: Put the top schedule up. That would be easiest.

So all this schedule does is contrast my calculation of the purchase price and Gerety's calculation. We both start at $\$ 5$ million. The cost of purchase is -- there's a pretty good size difference there, about 549,000, which I'll go through here in just a minute. And then we have -- our capital contributions number is very close. His number's $\$ 18,000$ different than mine. So the primary difference in our calculations is up at the cost of purchase.

So let's put the next -- just scroll down to the

1 next section.

The difference in the cost of purchase -- there's basically two differences. In my cost of purchase, I'm using the rollover basis from Building $C$ rather than using the purchase price of Greenway property. BY MR. GERRARD:

## Q. Explain why that is the case.

A. Well, so the whole purpose behind a 1031, which this was subject -- Building $C$ was sold as part of the 1031 exchange to acquire Greenway. The whole purpose behind that is to defer that gain. Rather than pay tax now, let's take the money out of this one, go buy a new piece of property, defer the gain to the future.

Mr. Gerety is taking and saying that he thinks it's appropriate to use the purchase price of the Greenway property as part of the cost of purchase formula, and it just inexplicably takes away Mr. Bidsal's opportunity to participate in that gain.

I'm not sure that there's -- I don't understand his logic on that one, because all he's doing is he's saying -- I guess he's reading the operating agreement, which says you got to refer to the escrow statement purchase price. And so he's taking that literal reading. Well, if you take that literal reading, then $I$ need to change my calculation to only include the

1 Greenway properties since that's the only escrow statement we really have. I don't -- I'm not proposing that because that's illogical as well.
Q. Basically what you're saying is Mr. Gerety is picking and choosing when he wants to apply the exact language of the cost of purchase definition and when not to?
A. Yeah. It appears that way. I mean, it makes absolutely no sense. If you're going to do it the way that Gerety did, then Mr. Bidsal would never ever have consented to a 1031 exchange because it has denied him his share of that gain.
Q. Of the appreciation?
A. Of the appreciation. Why would you do that? Unless, I guess, he didn't understand his own operating agreement.
Q. What other differences are there?
A. The other difference is the parking lot. In Mr. Gerety's report, he takes the full value of the parking lot and adds it to the cost of purchase. I just think that's erroneous. And the reason it's an error is because we've sold off three of those buildings. So when you sell the building, the value of the parking lot attributable or allocable to those buildings, it's no -it just makes no sense. When does Green Valley Commerce

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1 ever get to deduct the value Page 446
ever get to deduct the value allocable to those Phree buildings that were sold -- the parking lot attributable to those three buildings that were sold? You never get it, so.
Q. So let's make sure we understand that. So there is a set of CC\&Rs for this property; correct?
A. That's correct.
Q. And did you look at the CC\&Rs?
A. I did.
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Q. And I'm not asking you to remember word for word what the CC\&Rs say, but did you see that the CC\&Rs attribute or give rights -- property rights, easement interest rights? Property rights to each owner of each of the buildings? They each have property rights in the parking lot?
A. Yeah, I don't know the specific words. But it was something equivalent to noncancelable easement or rights to -- something like that, yes.
Q. So as each building is sold off, the owner of that new building owns rights in the parking lot that used to be exclusively controlled by Green Valley Commerce, the company; correct?
A. Yes.
Q. So are there any other large differences between your number and Mr. Gerety's number?
A. No. Those are the only two differences.
Q. Then we also had that prorated labilities number;

## correct?

A. And the prorated labilities, yeah.
Q. So that's approximately $\$ 34,500 ;$ right?
A. Correct.
Q. And he deducts that even though that money is still in the bank account; correct?
A. Yes. And that's the reason I did not deduct it.
Q. Okay.

MR. GERRARD: Your Honor, is this a good time to stop for lunch? I've got -- I just want to review to make sure that there's nothing else I need to ask him, because I think I'm done.

THE ARBITRATOR: That's fine.
You all right with that?
MR. LEWIN: That's fine.
(RECESS TAKEN FROM 12:15 P.M. TO 12:59 P.M.)
(Daniel Gerety now present via Zoom.)
THE ARBITRATOR: Back on the record.
You've completed your direct exam?
MR. GERRARD: I have, your Honor. I pass the witness. I move for --

| 1 | THE ARBITRATOR: 201 will be admitted without Page 448 |
| :---: | :---: |
| 2 | objection. |
| 3 | MR. LEWIN: That's correct. |
| 4 | THE ARBITRATOR: Okay. Now, for purposes of |
| 5 | cross, you want to publish the deposition of Mr. Wilcox; |
| 6 | right? |
| 7 | MR. GERRARD: No objection. |
| 8 | MR. LEWIN: Right. Taken on February 17, 2021. |
| 9 | THE ARBITRATOR: Okay. You can go ahead and open |
| 10 | that then. What was the date? |
| 11 | MR. LEWIN: February 17, 2021. |
| 12 | THE ARBITRATOR: All right. |
| 13 | EXAMINATION |
| 14 | BY MR. LEWIN: |
| 15 | Q. Mr. Wilcox, we just handed you your original |
| 16 | deposition. Do you recall we took your deposition on |
| 17 | February 17, 2021? |
| 18 | A. Yes. |
| 19 | Q. And you were sworn to tell the truth? |
| 20 | A. Yes. |
| 21 | Q. And you did tell the truth that day? |
| 22 | A. I did. |
| 23 | Q. And have you -- you were provided with an |
| 24 | opportunity to review the deposition? |
| 25 | A. I was. |

Q. Did you make any changes?
A. I did not.
Q. Now, you've testified about -THE ARBITRATOR: Today? MR. LEWIN: Today. BY MR. LEWIN:
Q. You testified about your communications with Mr. Bidsal and about how he created the schedules, allocated the purchase price on the properties. But the fact is in your deposition you said you didn't rely on anything Mr. Bidsal told you. Isn't that true?
A. I did -- I did state that I didn't rely on -- I didn't rely solely on what he told me, yes. I believe I said $I$ corroborated that with the additional documents, is the way $I$ remember it.
Q. Actually, let me read from your deposition. MR. GERRARD: Where you at, Rod? MR. LEWIN: Page 12, line 21 through 23. Actually, I'm going to read from line 12 through 23. BY MR. LEWIN:
Q. "Question: In connection with your opinions in this case, did you rely on any documents other than what is stated in your expert report or your rebuttal report?
"Answer: No.
"Question: Did you rely on communications with

| 1 | any of Mr. Bidsal's attorneys? $\quad$ Page 450 |
| :---: | :---: |
| 2 | "Answer: No. We had communications to discuss, |
| 3 | but I relied on the documents. |
| 4 | "Question: Did you rely on communications with |
| 5 | Mr. Bidsal? |
| 6 | "Answer: No," end quote. |
| 7 | Now -- |
| 8 | MR. GERRARD: Is there a question? |
| 9 | THE ARBITRATOR: It's coming. |
| 10 | MR. LEWIN: It's coming. |
| 11 | BY MR. LEWIN: |
| 12 | Q. You did, however, rely on a portion of what |
| 13 | Mr. Bidsal's affidavit said; right? |
| 14 | A. Yes. I quoted in my report what we talked about. |
| 15 | Q. And the part that you quoted with Mr. Bidsal was |
| 16 | the part that related to the reason for his disparate |
| 17 | percentage? |
| 18 | A. Correct. |
| 19 | Q. And what Mr. Bidsal said in his affidavit that |
| 20 | you relied on was that he received a greater percentage |
| 21 | interest because he was going to be using his knowledge |
| 22 | and expertise in the area of finding deals on property, |
| 23 | purchasing property and converting those into fee simple |
| 24 | properties if needed, subdividing the properties, and |
| 25 | managing the properties; correct? |


| 1 | A. Correct. Page 451 |
| :---: | :---: |
| 2 | Q. So "deals" is plural; right? |
| 3 | A. Yeah. |
| 4 | Q. And the agreement that Mr. Bidsal had with |
| 5 | Mr. Golshani about getting a greater interest was |
| 6 | because there was -- it was in anticipation that they |
| 7 | were going to buy more than one property; right? |
| 8 | A. I don't know that. I only know that it said |
| 9 | "deals." But I don't know what the mindset was at the |
| 10 | time. |
| 11 | Q. But "deals" to you means more than one? |
| 12 | A. Yeah. "Deals" would indicate more than one. |
| 13 | Q. Okay. But in connection with your opinions that |
| 14 | you've given in your report and in this case, you did |
| 15 | not assume that Green Valley was going to purchase more |
| 16 | than one property; right? |
| 17 | A. I did not assume that Green Valley was going to |
| 18 | purchase more than one property? |
| 19 | Q. Yes. |
| 20 | A. I'm not sure -- I'm not sure that that's a |
| 21 | correct statement. I didn't know what they were going |
| 22 | to do at the time. |
| 23 | Q. Okay. So let me read from your deposition at |
|  | page 15, line 2 through 6. |
| 25 | So just to be -- quote, "So just to be clear, in |

1 connection with your opinions in this case, you did not 2 assume that Green Valley was going to purchase more than one property; is that correct?
"Answer: That is correct," end quote.
A. That is what I said.
Q. And that was true at the time you gave your deposition; right?
A. Yeah.
Q. Well, and the point I'm getting at here is that as we get into this, one of the -- one of your opinions in this case is based on the fact that -- let me strike that.

It is your testimony that Exhibit B under the terms of the operating agreement was only triggered in a liquidation. Isn't that true?
A. I did make that comment. I think I clarified it a little later on, but $I$ did make that comment in my deposition.
Q. So that -- and that's why the issue -- that's why when you gave your testimony, you said that you were only assuming that they had -- they were only going to buy one property; right?
A. I guess I assumed the facts as they stood at the time.
Q. Well, how about standing on the facts that you

1 testified to? You said that you did not assume that Green Valley was going to purchase more than one property. I think you're talking about -- are you talking about at the time the operating agreement was signed?
A. I don't recall exactly.
Q. Okay. I'm trying to juxtapose the fact that you recognized that Mr. Bidsal's contribution was that he was going to find deals for Green Valley. But yet you're saying just a couple pages later that you assume that they were never going to buy more than one property. Can you explain that?
A. Yes. So what I said right before that is I said you -- I said that that really wasn't relevant. I didn't really consider what they were -- whether they were going to find more property or not.
Q. And so --
A. I didn't find that relevant, whether they were going to get more property or not.
Q. So in giving your opinions regarding Exhibit B in terms of what constitutes a capital transaction, there was no consideration of yours whatsoever that they may be buying more properties. Is that true?
A. Like I said in my deposition, I guess I didn't really consider that to be relevant at that -- as part

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1 of what I was asked to do.
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Q. That's not my question. My question is you've now -- you've given your interpretation of Exhibit B to the operating agreement.
A. Okay.
Q. And if I understand your testimony, what you said is you interpret Exhibit \(B\) as only being triggered on either -- you said earlier a "liquidation," but either that or a sale of substantially all of its properties; is that correct?
A. Correct.
Q. Which never took place.
A. I'm sorry?
Q. Which never took place.
A. Okay.
Q. And you remember we talked about the fact that Exhibit B -- that it referred to in the beginning paragraph, sale of asset -- "sale of company asset." Do you remember that?
A. Uh-huh.
THE ARBITRATOR: Is that a yes?
THE WITNESS: Yes. I'm sorry.
THE ARBITRATOR: For her benefit.
THE WITNESS: Yup, I know. Yes.

1 BY MR. LEWIN:
Q. And you remember, I asked you if you thought that that was a typo, that it should have said "sale of a company asset."

And do you remember what you said about that?
A. I probably said I cannot -- the document speaks for itself. I don't recall exactly what I said.
Q. Now, you took accounting in college?
A. I did.
Q. And did you take English courses?
A. I did.
Q. And you don't know the difference between a conjunctive and a disjunctive. Is that true?
A. Not off the top of my head. Probably if you told me what it was, I would say, Oh, yeah, I know that.

But I'm not an English professor so no, I couldn't tell you what it is.
Q. Let me just read your testimony. Maybe this will refresh your recollection. Page 18, line 21 through 23.

Quote, "Question: For example, do you know the difference between a conjunctive and a disjunctive?
"Answer: No. English is not my strong suit," end quote.

And do you remember that we talked about the -in Exhibit B, the use of the word "or."

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Please turn to Exhibit 5 and turn to Exhibit B in it where it says "It is the express intent of the parties that, quote, 'cash distributions of profits,' end quote, refers to distributions generated from operations resulting in ordinary income in contrast to cash distributions arising from capital transactions or nonrecurring events such as a sale of all or a substantial portion of the company's assets or cash out financing."

Do you understand that the word "or" is a disjunctive?
A. If you tell me that, I would take your word on it. I have no reason to believe you'd lead me astray.
Q. In other words, it's either -- it's one thing or something else; right?
A. That's not the way \(I\) would read that.
Q. Do you understand what a disjunctive is? In other words, it's a contrast.

MR. GERRARD: I'm going to object to the question. Obviously, this is outside the scope of his opinions. He's already testified he's not --

THE ARBITRATOR: I'll allow it. But \(I\) mean, we kind of covered it.

MR. LEWIN: Okay. / / /

1 BY MR. LEWIN:
Q. Also, the words "such as." Do you think that -is it your interpretation that the words "such as" is not by way of giving an example?
A. I think what \(I\) said is that that was an example. We discussed that further. I said "such as" is the finding or modifying explaining what the capital transaction or nonreoccurring event is.
Q. Well, it's an example of some possible capital transactions as opposed to the whole universe of them?
A. Yeah. I don't think I testified that it was the universe of possible capital transactions.
Q. So "such as" -- in this context, you interpret the words "such as" as a way of an example of "these are some of the possible nonrecurring events"?
A. Sure.
Q. Right? Is that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. Thank you. Now, in terms of Dan Gerety, you've known him for a long time; right?
A. I have.
Q. And you would trust Mr. Gerety to do your own tax returns; right?
A. I think Dan Gerety is a good CPA, yes.
Q. So you would trust him to do your own tax
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1 returns; right?
A. If I needed him to, I would.
Q. Now, in terms of deciding -- interpreting the
operating agreement, you as a CPA -- when someone mails
you an operating agreement and says, "We'd like you to
do our accounting work" -- you take it upon yourself to
contact the principal parties to talk to them about
terms that you may not understand; right?
A. Yes.
Q. If possible, you would try to contact the person
who drafted the agreement if there's some confusion, if
you thought it was not clear; right?
A. Yes.
Q. If some other CPA had been doing work, you'd try to call that person; right?
A. Sure.
Q. Now, have you ever spoken to David LeGrand about this operating agreement?
A. No, I have not.
Q. Have you ever read any of David LeGrand's testimony?
A. No.
Q. Have you ever spoken to Jim Main about this operating agreement?
A. Specifically, no.

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\begin{tabular}{|c|c|}
\hline 1 & Q. Have you ever spoken to him about this case? \({ }^{\text {Page }} 459\) \\
\hline 2 & A. No. \\
\hline 3 & Q. Have you ever reviewed any portion of his \\
\hline 4 & deposition? \\
\hline 5 & A. No. \\
\hline 6 & Q. Has anyone told you what Mr. Main said in his \\
\hline 7 & deposition? \\
\hline 8 & A. Not that I recall. \\
\hline 9 & Q. Have you read any portions of Mr. Bidsal's \\
\hline 10 & deposition testimony? \\
\hline 11 & A. No. \\
\hline 12 & Q. Have you read any portions of Mr. Bidsal's \\
\hline 13 & testimony in the prior arbitration? \\
\hline 14 & A. No. \\
\hline 15 & Q. Have you ever spoken to an accountant named \\
\hline 16 & Danielle Pena? \\
\hline 17 & A. No. \\
\hline 18 & Q. Were you told by anyone that you shouldn't talk \\
\hline 19 & to these people? \\
\hline 20 & A. No. \\
\hline 21 & Q. Were you -- did you ever try to contact \\
\hline 22 & Mr. Golshani to see if he would subject himself to an \\
\hline 23 & interview? \\
\hline 24 & A. No. \\
\hline 25 & Q. Did anything stop you from talking to any of \\
\hline
\end{tabular}

1 these people that I just mentioned?
A. No. THE ARBITRATOR: Well, now, come on. MR. LEWIN: Talking about Mr. Golshani? THE ARBITRATOR: Yes. MR. LEWIN: He could have asked for an interview. And you know how cooperative I am. THE ARBITRATOR: In the normal course, yes, speaking to your client without your knowledge, without your consent would be out of bounds.

MR. LEWIN: Exactly. I think my question was did he ever ask if he could interview Mr. Golshani.

THE ARBITRATOR: You said, Nothing prevented you from speaking to any of those individuals.

MR. LEWIN: Okay. You're right.
BY MR. LEWIN:
Q. Except for Mr. Golshani, which you'd have to get permission to interview, nothing prevented you from speaking to the list of -- all the people on the list that I mentioned; right?
A. No.
Q. And by the way, you've apparently had some substantial communications with Mr. Bidsal. Do you have any notes of those communications?
A. No.

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Q. Can you tell us how long you spoke to Mr. Bidsal for?
A. I'm sorry. How long?
Q. In terms of time.
A. I probably had conversations when Mr. Gerrard and Shapiro were on the line with also Mr. Bidsal, two or three hours.
Q. But no notes about anything that was said in those conversations?
A. No, I did not take notes.
Q. My brother's a CPA. He takes notes about everything. That's not part of your common practice?
A. I take notes, but not in this kind of a case.
Q. Why not in this kind of a case?
A. It's just easier not to have notes.
Q. What do you mean? Because it might contradict what you say under oath?

MR. GERRARD: Objection. Argumentative. THE ARBITRATOR: I'm going to sustain that. BY MR. LEWIN:
Q. You wouldn't want those notes to become part of the record in the case, is that the reason you don't take notes?
A. I don't take notes because I don't need to take notes.
    1 Q. Okay. Now, have you -- you've indicated that
Q. Okay. Now, have you -- you've indicated that part of your job as a CPA is that you review operating agreements. That's a fair statement; right?
A. Yes.
Q. You have to figure out how do things tax-wise; right?
A. Yes.
Q. Have you ever taken over some accounting work from another accountant, when you've looked at it and you've said, Oh, this is not done right.
A. Yes.
Q. For example, one of your claims is that the money that was received in the deed in lieu, that it was recorded in the general ledger \(\$ 311,000\) of interest; right?
A. Yes.
Q. That was also reflected in the tax return of Green Valley; right?
A. That is correct.
Q. And who prepared those tax returns?
A. Jim Main.
Q. So sometimes you have found that the records -the accounting records or tax returns that one person prepares are not correct. Everyone makes mistakes; right?
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A. Sure.
Q. You think that Mr . Main made a mistake when he set forth the $\$ 311,000$ of interest from the money that was received on -- from the deed in lieu transaction?
A. I did not agree with it being interest.
Q. And you thought that was a mistake?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, have you ever been hired to interpret an operating agreement other than this case?
A. Every time I prepare an income tax return, I need to interpret that operating agreement, as you mentioned a few minutes ago.
Q. I just mean but specifically as an expert, have you ever been hired to interpret an operating agreement?
A. Not that I recall specifically. There have been operating agreements. I don't recall that I was hired to -- specifically to interpret the agreement, no.
Q. By the way --
A. Answer is no.
Q. Did you read any part of Mr . Golshani's testimony in this case or in his prior arbitration?
A. I did not.
Q. Has anyone told you what he testified about?
A. I don't recall being told, no.
Q. Now, the operating agreement has an effective

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1 date of June 15, 2011, but we know that it wasn't signed
2 until -- I think the evidence is going to show
3 December 12 -- 11 or 12,2011 . Assume that that's true.
A. I agree.
Q. Were your opinions influenced by the date that the agreement was effective as opposed to signed?
A. No. I don't -- I think if it would have been signed the same day as it was effective, I would have had the same opinions.
Q. Is there some tax consequence as to the effective date of the operating agreement?
A. Not that I'm aware of.
Q. Is there some economic effect as to the effective date of the operating agreement between the members?
A. No.
Q. As of June 15, 2011, what did Green Valley own?
A. I believe the -- if memory serves me correctly, they purchased the note around June 9 th or 6 th. So at that point, they would have owned the note.
Q. What else did they purchase when they bought the note?
A. Based on the closing statement, I believe they bought the note. There was some fees and costs, but I don't believe there was anything other than the note on that.

1
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Q. So when you made your decision -- when you testified about the rents in the -- that were transferred in the -- as part of the deed in lieu agreement, did you consider -- strike that. Let me start over with that.
When you testified about the rents being rents, not interest or anything else, in connection with the \$295,000 that was transferred as part of the deed in lieu agreement, did you know that there was an assignment of leases and rents dated July 17, 2007. THE ARBITRATOR: 2007?
MR. LEWIN: 2007.
A. As part of the trust deed and the original note transaction.
BY MR. LEWIN:
Q. So the note came with a package of documents that gave an interest to the lender in the borrower's property; right?
A. Correct.
Q. Turn to Exhibit 8, please. Do you see, the deed in lieu agreement sets forth what part -- what was part of the loan package; right?
A. Correct.
Q. Okay. Now, you've never read the deed of trust note; right?

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1 A. At the time of my deposition, that was true. \({ }^{\text {Page }}{ }^{466}\) did request those documents subsequent to my deposition and reviewed them.
Q. Okay. But at the time you gave your deposition, you knew you had to be prepared to give all of your opinions in this case; right?
A. As I said, I had not read it at the time of my deposition.
Q. But I'm also saying at the time you gave your deposition, you knew that you had to be prepared to give all of your opinions in this case? That's a yes or no.
A. Yes.
Q. And you knew in order to give opinions about the deed in lieu agreement -- which I think you read; right?
A. I did read the deed in lieu agreement.
Q. You knew that there was other documents that were part of the note package; right?
A. I did know those documents were there. I did not think it was relevant. Still don't, in my opinion.
Q. Well, first of all, when you gave your deposition, you couldn't -- you could not have an opinion on how they're relevant because you hadn't read them; right?
A. That's correct.
Q. Now, at the time of your deposition, you knew
    1 that there was a deed of trust -- assignments of Page 467 security agreement, and fixture filing dated July 17, 2007; right? That's called a deed of trust?
A. Right.
Q. You knew that; right?
A. I knew because it was in this document.
Q. But you hadn't read that either?
A. I had not.
Q. And you also knew that there was an assignment of leases and rents dated July 17, 2007, but at the time of your deposition, you hadn't read that either?
A. Correct.
Q. But you do know -- you do have an idea of what an assignment of leases and rents is, don't you?
A. I do.
Q. Have you since read the assignment of leases and rents?
A. I have read through it, yes.
Q. You do know that the assignment of leases and rents gives the lender an interest in the leases and rents; right?
A. That's correct.
Q. You do know that the deed of trust gives the lender an interest in the real property; right?
A. Yes.
Q. And so does the security agreement; right? \({ }^{\text {Page }}\) Did you read the security agreement?
A. I did.
Q. And the fixture filing; right?
A. The -- which one?
Q. The fixture filing. The deed of trust has a security agreement and fixture filing as part of it.
A. Yeah.
Q. So at the time that Green Valley acquired the note, it acquired a package of all kinds of other interests in real property; right?
A. Correct.
Q. And when -- this deed in lieu agreement, you've never seen an escrow for this deed in lieu agreement pertaining to the transfer of conveyance of title; right?
A. I have not.
Q. As a matter of fact, isn't it your opinion that what took place is that the deed of trust was converted to a fee interest by virtue of this deed in lieu agreement?
A. That is my understanding.
Q. That is why there's no -- therefore, it wasn't a purchase; it was a conversion from the existing purchase to title; right?
A. That's correct.
Q. Okay. So that's why there's no escrow for the -per se for the title aspect; is that correct?
A. Yeah.
Q. Isn't that what Mr. Bidsal told you?
A. I don't think Mr. Bidsal told me that.
Q. Did you ever ask him why there wasn't an escrow for the deed in lieu agreement?
A. I didn't think it was necessary to ask him why there wasn't an escrow.
Q. So -- as a matter of fact, isn't it your opinion -- since you're giving opinions about some of this stuff -- that this deed in lieu agreement actually constitutes a conveyance pursuant to the deed of trust?
A. That's my understanding.
Q. So the purchase -- the escrow document that really applies to the conversion of the deed of trust into fee title is actually the escrow statement for the purchase of the note; right?
A. The escrow statement for the purchase of the note is the statement showing how they acquired the note which ultimately became the property.
Q. That escrow statement would be the statement that is called for by the formula because it is in fact -they did receive interest in title at the time they
purchased the note by virtue of these documents. Isn't that true?

MR. GERRARD: Objection. That calls for a legal conclusion, and it's an incorrect statement of law. There is no interest in title that is transferred as a result of a deed of trust. That's clear black-letter Nevada law.

MR. LEWIN: Actually, there's an interest in property.

MR. GERRARD: An interest in property, that's not what you said. You said an interest in title. There's a difference between title, which is an estate, and a security interest, which is an interest in property. They're very different concepts.

THE ARBITRATOR: So it's not within this witness's expertise, I don't believe. But if you want him to attempt to answer it --

MR. LEWIN: I'll re-ask the question. BY MR. LEWIN:
Q. So the opinion that you formed based on review of these documents now that you've had a chance to read them is that the deed of trust was actually converted to fee title; right?

MR. GERRARD: Objection. Misstates the document.
MR. LEWIN: I'm asking about his opinion.
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|}
\hline 1 & MR. GERRARD: You just asked if after reading the \\
\hline 2 & documents if the documents convert the lien into title. \\
\hline 3 & That is exactly -- \\
\hline 4 & MR. LEWIN: This is coaching. We don't want \\
\hline 5 & Mr. Gerrard to testify. \\
\hline 6 & MR. GERRARD: I appreciate that. But you can't \\
\hline 7 & misstate what the document says if your question is you \\
\hline 8 & read the document and that's what it says. \\
\hline 9 & MR. LEWIN: I'm asking what his opinion was \\
\hline 10 & after -- \\
\hline 11 & THE ARBITRATOR: All right. Let's rephrase the \\
\hline 12 & question. \\
\hline 13 & MR. GERRARD: I didn't hear that as the question. \\
\hline 14 & I'm sorry, Rob. \\
\hline 15 & BY MR. LEWIN: \\
\hline 16 & Q. When you use the word -- you used the word \\
\hline 17 & "conversion" earlier; right? Do you remember that? \\
\hline 18 & A. Okay. \\
\hline 19 & Q. And when you talked about conversion, you were \\
\hline 20 & talking about conversion converting the interest that \\
\hline 21 & Green Valley had by virtue of the deed of trust and the \\
\hline 22 & assignment of rents into fee title; right? \\
\hline 23 & A. Correct. \\
\hline 24 & Q. Okay. And so that gives rise to -- I'll move on. \\
\hline 25 & Now, in terms of -- well, now, in terms of -- \\
\hline
\end{tabular}

Page 472
1 were all the terms you needed to consider for your
2 opinion defined in the operating agreement?
A. No.
Q. Was there a definition of what constituted property?
A. What constituted property, I don't believe so. Maybe there was. I don't recall.
Q. But you do agree that the promissory note is promissory -- the note in the security package is property?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. Now, in the accounting profession, there is a generally accepted definition of what constitutes a capital transaction; right?
A. In the Internal Revenue Code, there is a definition of a capital transaction.
Q. And what is the definition under the Internal Revenue Code of a capital transaction?
A. A capital transaction is defined as the sale or exchange of property that is not inventory, rents, royalties, and depreciable property. There might be a couple of other things, but those are the three primary.
Q. Is it correct that the sale -- that the sale of property held for investment, that would be a capital asset?
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A. Under the Internal Revenue Code, that would be a capital asset, yes.
Q. And is there a definition of what constituted a capital transaction in the operating agreement?
A. Well, you've got the definition which we've already talked about on Exhibit B.
Q. Exhibit -- the definition that we just talked about, which was a...
A. So the definition is capital transaction, and then it gives some examples or such as sale of all or substantially all -- or a substantial portion of the company's assets or cash out financing.
Q. But a capital transaction in connection with Green Valley could be the sale of one property; right?
MR. GERRARD: Objection to the form of the question. It's vague and ambiguous. So whether he's asking for purposes of the tax code or whether he's asking for purposes of the operating agreement.
MR. LEWIN: Again, that's -- I don't think that's an appropriate way to object. I think that's testifying.
THE ARBITRATOR: What do you mean, it's not appropriate? You've asked him about a definition of capital transaction as it relates to the IRS code and you've asked him about how it's defined in the operating

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1 agreement. So when you ask your question -- because
2 they're different, apparently, in this witness's
3 testimony -- you've got to specify which one you're
4 talking about.
5 BY MR. LEWIN:
6 Q. Is there anything -- what part of this operating agreement do you believe defines capital transaction as other than what is defined in the IRS tax code?
A. There's tax code --
Q. Just point me to the words.
MR. GERRARD: I think I have to object. The witness is allowed to answer the question. You didn't ask a yes or no question.
MR. LEWIN: I'll withdraw the question. THE ARBITRATOR: All right.

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BY MR. LEWIN:
Q. Point out the words in this Schedule B or anywhere else in this operating agreement that define capital transaction?
A. The final paragraph of Exhibit B, as well as the first paragraph of Exhibit \(B\) uses the term "capital transactions." In the first paragraph, it says "capital transactions shall be distributed," and then it goes "upon refinancing event" or "sale of company asset, cash is distributed according to a step-down." So I'm

``` assuming that's referring to capital transactions.
Then you go down to Exhibit B, final paragraph, and it says -- talks about "distributions of profits in contrast to distributions from capital transactions or nonrecurring events." And then it to goes on to modify or explain what those two items are, "such as a sale of all or a substantial portion of the company assets or cash out financing."
Q. It gives you examples of what those transactions could be; right?
A. It does modify them, yeah. It tells you what we're talking about.
Q. So this is the entire list of noncapital transactions. Is that your testimony?
A. I already established that I didn't -- I'm not opining that this is the entirety.
Q. Okay. So it's examples; right?
A. Yeah.
Q. Okay. So the bottom line is that if -- in terms of under the operating agreement, would it be pertinent to determine how the transactions were booked on the tax returns?
A. Well --
Q. Yes or no? That's a yes or no. I'm talking about the sale transaction.
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A. Would it be pertinent?
Q. Yes.
A. The operating agreement controls, yes.
Q. Would it be pertinent to look at the tax returns if you're trying to figure out if a sale was a capital transaction to see how they were booked on the tax returns?
A. No.
Q. How were the sales of the three properties booked on the Green Valley tax returns? How were they characterized?
A. They were categorized as capital transactions because --
Q. That's the answer.
THE ARBITRATOR: You can let him finish his answer.
MR. GERRARD: You can't cut him off in the middle of his answer.
MR. LEWIN: I just asked him --
MR. GERRARD: You didn't ask him a yes or no question.
MR. LEWIN: I did. I asked him how they were characterized --
MR. GERRARD: No, you didn't -- I'm not going to argue with you.
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| 1 | Judge? Page 477 |
| :---: | :---: |
| 2 | THE ARBITRATOR: How were they characterized is |
| 3 | not -- |
| 4 | MR. LEWIN: Okay. |
| 5 | BY MR. LEWIN: |
| 6 | Q. You want to finish your answer? |
| 7 | A. My point was the operating agreement dictates how |
| 8 | it's going to be reported on the tax return. It's not |
| 9 | the tax return that tells -- that was my only point. |
| 10 | Q. Okay. So the operating agreement required that |
| 11 | the sale of the three properties be reported to the |
| 12 | Internal Revenue Service as capital transactions, yes or |
| 13 | no? |
| 14 | A. No. |
| 15 | Q. But they were reported as capital transactions on |
| 16 | the tax returns; right? |
| 17 | A. They were reported as capital transactions. |
| 18 | Q. We talked about nonrecurring events. And you |
| 19 | gave the example of a car dealership, where a car was |
| 20 | sold every day virtually; right? |
| 21 | A. Yes. |
| 22 | Q. Green Valley is not in the business of selling |
| 23 | properties every day; right? |
| 24 | A. That is correct. |
| 25 | Q. They've sold -- in the last ten years, they've |

1 sold three properties?
A. Three.
Q. Three properties. Would you -- but you would say that the sale of those properties are recurring events for purposes of reporting them on the tax forms?
A. No. I would say they're nonrecurring.
Q. Okay. As a matter of fact, you sell a property, it's gone forever; right?
A. It's gone forever.
Q. It's a nonrecurring event, the sale; right?
A. Just like the car that the car dealership sold is a nonrecurring event. It's gone forever.
Q. But there's a difference. The car dealership is in the business of selling properties; Green Valley is not; right? Excuse me.
The car dealership is in the business of selling cars on a daily basis. Week after week, they want to sell as many cars as possible. Green Valley is not in the business of selling properties. Isn't that true?
A. That is true.
Q. You understood that Mr. Bidsal was always in charge of the accounting for Green Valley?
A. That is my understanding.
Q. And did you ever ask -- going back to that -- the interest -- the reporting of interest that we talked

| 1 | about? |
| :--- | :--- |
| 2 | A. Yes. |
| 3 | Q. Just to put it in perspective, Green Valley got |
| 4 | \$295, 000 plus some security deposits at the time they |
| 5 | did the deed in lieu agreement; right? |
| 6 | A. Correct. |
| 7 | Q. That money was reported as interest on the tax |
| 8 | return? |
| 9 | A. Yes, it was. |
| 10 | Q. It was reported as interest in the books and |
| 11 | records of Green Valley? |
| 12 | A. Yes. |
| 13 | Q. Did you ever ask Mr. Bidsal why he reported that |
| 14 | income as interest income on the 2011 tax return? |
| 15 | A. No. |
| 16 | Q. You think Mr. Bidsal is a very smart man, don't |
| 17 | you? |
| 18 | A. Other than this, I don't know. But I assume he's |
| 19 | an intelligent man. He knows how to make good deals. |
| 20 | Q. Well, in your two or three hours of conversations |
| 21 | with him, you formed the opinion that's he's very |
| 22 | sophisticated about property management? |
| 23 | A. I would agree with that, yes. |
| 24 | Q. So who do you think would be better equipped to |
| 25 | determine what that money was in -- that was received as |

1 Page 480

2 reported it on the general ledgers and provided 3 documents to Jim Main, and --

THE ARBITRATOR: I need to stop you, because part of the factual part of your question is contrary to some of the testimony we had already, so. The testimony wasn't that he -- the testimony so far is not that he inserted that on the general ledger, that that was still American what?

MR. GERRARD: American Nevada.
THE ARBITRATOR: American Nevada.
MR. LEWIN: My view is as the managing member, he's responsible for what's on that general ledger.

THE ARBITRATOR: I'm just saying your question presupposed a fact that I'm not sure was --

MR. LEWIN: Yeah. I'll rephrase it.
BY MR. LEWIN:
Q. Did you ask Mr. Bidsal if he reviewed the tax returns before they were submitted to the United States government?
A. I don't -- no, I did not ask that specific question.
Q. But given your relationship with Mr. Bidsal in the two or three hours that you spent -- time spent with him, is it your understanding and belief that he

1 reviewed the tax returns before they were submitted?
A. It is, yes.
Q. So in terms of your opinion that interest was not proper, can you -- who do you think would be better -in a better position to judge that, Mr. Bidsal and Mr. Main on one hand, or you?
A. I think I'm in a good position because I've had the opportunity to review all the documents and to make a conclusion specific to that issue that they probably did not focus on.
Q. Okay. So let me -- I have sort of a different thing in mind, however. At the time Green Valley purchased the note and got all the security package, the note was in default; right?
A. Correct.
Q. And the note was -- did you ever make an attempt to find out how much in default it was?
A. No.
Q. Did you ask Mr. Bidsal how much was the past due?
A. No.
Q. Do you have any idea how much the past due was?
A. I do not know.
Q. There's nowhere in all the books and records that you have been provided access to that would indicate how much was in arrears on the note on the date that they

1 purchased it?
A. I never asked the question as it wasn't really relevant to anything I was asked to do.
Q. You were asked to figure out what might be distributed 50-50 and what might be a return of capital that's to be distributed 70-30?
A. Correct.
Q. Right?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, if Green Valley bought a note -- I'm just going to use the hypothetical because we don't really have the information. But if Green Valley bought a note for $\$ 4$ million on July 3, 2011, and $\$ 1$ million was in arrears, so there's past due interest and principal due of $\$ 1$ million, the basis -- the part that's in arrears as of the date of the purchase of the note constitutes part of the basis of that note; right?
A. If the cost of that note was $\$ 4$ million, that's -- yes.
Q. But I'm talking about the part that -- what Green Valley bought was a portion of the note that's already in arrears. In other words, past due amount. There's already an amount that was due. Not amount due in the future.
A. Okay. In your example, yes.

| 1 | Q. So that becomes part of the -- in terms of |
| :---: | :---: |
| 2 | accounting for Green Valley, past due amounts that it |
| 3 | buys constitutes part of the principal; right? |
| 4 | MR. GERRARD: Object -- go ahead. |
| 5 | A. So. |
| 6 | BY MR. LEWIN: |
| 7 | Q. The part of the principal of the asset is what |
| 8 | I'm talking about. |
| 9 | MR. GERRARD: Now I'm going to object because |
| 10 | that's vague and ambiguous. I have no idea what the |
| 11 | "principal of the asset" means. |
| 12 | THE ARBITRATOR: Maybe the accountant does. |
| 13 | THE WITNESS: I'm sorry? |
| 14 | THE ARBITRATOR: Maybe you do. You can answer |
| 15 | the question if you can. |
| 16 | THE WITNESS: Okay. So the reason I hesitate is |
| 17 | we spent -- we -- Green Valley spent \$4 million buying a |
| 18 | note. If the note's in default by, you know -- by -- by |
| 19 | default -- if the note's in default, then there has to |
| 20 | be an amount that is due. There's probably unpaid |
| 21 | principal under the terms of the note; there's interest |
| 22 | under the terms of the note. What they bought was a |
| 23 | \$4 million note. If somebody gave them -- if somebody |
| 24 | came in and gave them $\$ 5$ million for the note, then |
| 25 | their basis -- their principal balance on that note |

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1 would be $4 million. Whether it's made up of principal or interest, the amount they paid is \(\$ 4\) million. BY MR. LEWIN:
Q. So that's their basis, \(\$ 4\) million?
A. Yeah.
Q. Okay. So when they get paid -- if they got paid a part of the note -- let's say they got paid \(\$ 295,000\).
``` Would that be a return of capital?
A. No. That's rent that they were able to -- that they were entitled to.
Q. Assume for the purpose that we're talking about here that it's back due interest. Okay? Or part of the -- or back due principal. Let me start over.

THE ARBITRATOR: And the problem is you used the exact amount of the part that was listed in the deed in lieu agreement as rents when you did your example. BY MR. LEWIN:
Q. By the way, the fact that it's designated as rents doesn't necessarily mean that it was actually rents that was being transferred; right?
A. If the deed in lieu agreement says that's what it is --
Q. But who was in charge of that deed in lieu agreement, Mr. Bidsal or Mr. Golshani?
A. Who was in charge of the deed in lieu agreement?

1 Mr. Bidsal.
Q. That's right. And so -- and Mr. Bidsal had a greater interest in characterizing funds received from the -- funds received under the note as rents because he got a 50-50 split on that as opposed to return of capital; right?
A. Under your scenario, sure. That's -- that is correct. If it was classified as return of capital, then it would be a 30-70.
Q. So assuming -- if we were to assume that the rents that were being transferred were part of principal -- in other words, part of the basis that -that return to Green Valley because they're forgiving the rest of the note, that would be a return of capital; right?
A. Under the facts as you lay them out. But that's not the facts of the case.
Q. You knew -- you know that there was an assignment of leases and rents. Now, you've read it?
A. Is that a question?
Q. Yeah. Is that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. And you know that under the terms of the documents you've now read that the borrower was holding money that -- the rents that were due to the lender
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|}
\hline 1 & under the note? Page 486 \\
\hline 2 & A. Correct. \\
\hline 3 & Q. And whether you characterize those monies as \\
\hline 4 & rents or you characterize them as interest, they were \\
\hline 5 & monies that were due the lender under the promissory \\
\hline 6 & note and deed of trust; right? \\
\hline 7 & MR. GERRARD: Objection. Misstates the \\
\hline 8 & documents. \\
\hline 9 & THE ARBITRATOR: Overruled. I'll allow him to \\
\hline 10 & answer if he knows. \\
\hline 11 & A. So the 295- was part of what was paid to Green \\
\hline 12 & Valley Commerce under the deed in lieu. It was paid as \\
\hline 13 & rent. Maybe I misunderstood the question. \\
\hline 14 & BY MR. LEWIN: \\
\hline 15 & Q. The payment of rent and the conveyance of title \\
\hline 16 & under this document -- under this deed in lieu took \\
\hline 17 & place concurrently; right? \\
\hline 18 & A. Okay. \\
\hline 19 & Q. Was Green Valley entitled to collect any rent \\
\hline 20 & from the borrower other than pursuant to the assignment \\
\hline 21 & of rents and leases before the deed in lieu? \\
\hline 22 & A. No. \\
\hline 23 & Q. So the only thing that Green Valley was entitled \\
\hline 24 & to was getting paid interest and principal; right? \\
\hline 25 & A. Until they executed the deed in lieu, that's \\
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\end{tabular}
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1 correct.

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correct.
Q. Under the assignment of rents and leases, the borrower was required to not -- to hold -- not -- to pay whatever those rents were to the lender; right?
MR. GERRARD: Objection. Best evidence rule. Let's see the document. He's telling us what the document says, but we don't know that that's what the document says.
THE ARBITRATOR: He's asking the witness who has apparently reviewed that document, so I'll allow it.
A. Yes. BY MR. LEWIN:
Q. So except for the fact that the $\$ 295,000$ is characterized as rent, you would have considered that to be a payment of interest in principal on the past due -on the arrearages owed to the lender. Isn't that true?
A. No, that's not true. That's not what the document says.
Q. Okay. Isn't it true that your experience in advising your clients regarding investing in limited liability companies or partnerships where they're putting up a disproportionate amount of capital, that it's common that the capital is returned first before profits are distributed?
A. That is true that there's typically some

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Page 488 provision to get the capital returned.
Q. Well, my question -- are you going to answer my question? It's really a yes or no.
A. Well, the premise of the question boxes in that that's not the way most agreements are written. There's easily some -- there's some return of the operating money and there's also provisions to return the capital.
Q. I'd like to read from your deposition at page 45, line 11 through line 22.

Quote, "Isn't it true that in your experience in advising your clients regarding investing in LLCs or partnerships where they are putting up disproportionate amounts of capital that it is common that the capital is returned to the first before profits are distributed; right?
"Answer: Yes.
"Question: And that is -- in effect, that is what is taking place in these first step through final step allocations on Exhibit B; right?
"Answer: Correct. The third step is to return capital."

MR. GERRARD: Your Honor, I'm going to just raise one objection as a continuing objection. I've listened now four times to him use the deposition testimony. And under the rules, he's not properly using the -- he's not

Page 489
1 allowed just to read in testimony from the deposition. It has to be tied to a question, and it never is. He just asked a question, there was an answer, then he reads from the transcript, and then he moves on. There's supposed to be a question based upon whatever he reads in. That's the way the deposition testimony is supposed to be used. So I'm just going to leave it to Your Honor. I'm just making one continuing objection. I don't think it's being properly used.

THE ARBITRATOR: The last example he asked the question, got an answer. From what \(I\) gleaned, \(I\) took it as an inference that he was refreshing his recollection about what he said as a prior inconsistent statement in the deposition on the exact same question. I'll allow it.

MR. GERRARD: You understand my objection; right?
THE ARBITRATOR: I do.
MR. GERRARD: Because that's never happened. He's never asking the predicate questions, and he's never following up with the questions, so -- and that's just a continuing objection.

MR. LEWIN: Actually, that's not true.
THE ARBITRATOR: There's been times where he said, Didn't you testify differently in your deposition?

MR. GERRARD: But he asked that before he reads
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    1 the testimony, and then there's no follow-up question. MR. LEWIN: No. Wait a second. The way I do this is I ask the question that -- usually I try to ask the same question. If \(I\) don't get the -- if \(I\) get an inconsistent answer, then \(I\) read the deposition. That's what I'm trying to do here.
    THE ARBITRATOR: I haven't found it to be unacceptable to this point.
BY MR. LEWIN:

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Q. So under Exhibit B, there's a specific paragraph that talks about cash distributions of profits from operations. Do you see it? It says "Cash distributions of profits from operations shall be allocated and distributed 50 percent to Shawn Bidsal and 50 percent to CLA Properties, LLC."

And the operations here for Green Valley were for rental properties; right?
A. Okay. Yes.
Q. And maybe getting some interest on the rent and the rent revenue; right?
A. Right.
Q. Those are the only operations; correct?
A. Correct.
Q. Now, if -- these words have some meaning -- in other words, they are to describe when Mr . Bidsal gets

150 percent as opposed to 30 percent; right?
A. Correct.
Q. And if capital transactions did not include any sales of anything else, why would you need -- in other words, Mr . Bidsal -- let me strike that and start over. In other words, if Mr . Bidsal had a 50 percent interest in all profits, you wouldn't need this paragraph, would you?
A. You wouldn't need that paragraph?
Q. That's right. It's a yes or no.
A. I don't know that it says anywhere --
Q. It's a yes or a no, sir.
A. Answer would be we still need that paragraph, yes.
Q. Why would you need it if -- why would you need it?
A. Because really nowhere else -- number one, the preferred allocation paragraph, that language doesn't come into play until something happens -- something special happens that gets us into the special allocations. So take away the first, second, third, and final step, you have nothing that says how cash distributions from profits are going to be allocated. That sentence tells us how they're going to be allocated. That's why you need it.
Q. But this sentence is limited to cash distributions of profits from operations; right?
A. Yeah. Yes.
Q. So it doesn't say cash distributions from gain on the sale of properties, does it? Yes or no.
A. It does not.
Q. And if the idea was that Mr . Bidsal was going to get 50 percent of the profits on all transactions unless there was a liquidation, you wouldn't have to have this -- the limitation that it's only from operations; right? Again, yes or no.
A. I -- can you ask the question one more time? MR. LEWIN: Can we have it re-read? THE WITNESS: Please.
(Page 492, Lines 7 through 11 were read.) THE WITNESS: So are you talking about the limitation cash distribution of profits? That paragraph? That sentence? BY MR. LEWIN:
Q. Cash distributions of profits from operations.
A. You're talking about the cash distribution of profits from operations sentence?
Q. Yes.
A. Well, again --
Q. Please answer my question. The question was if Mr. Bidsal was supposed to get 50 percent of all profits regarding sales of property, anything else, unless there's a liquidation, you wouldn't need this whole sentence limiting his 50 percent to operations. Isn't that true?
A. I can agree -- yes, I can agree with that.
Q. And if a company is selling a capital asset that is not in the normal course of business, that would not be considered to be income from operations. Isn't that true?
A. That is true.
Q. And the business of Green Valley was to purchase, maintain, rent, and derive income from rentals; right?
A. Correct.
Q. Now, does the operating agreement differentiate between short-term capital gains and long-term capital gains?
A. No.
Q. Can we turn to Exhibit A under the operating agreement? I know that sometimes people complain about legal documents. Would you expect an ordinary person to be able to fully understand the meaning of these tax provisions in Exhibit A?
A. No, I would not.
Q. Okay. That's why you guys are kept in business;
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|}
\hline 1 & right? \(\quad\) Page 494 \\
\hline 2 & A. Yes. That is true. \\
\hline 3 & Q. So actually I want to turn to the paragraph that \\
\hline 4 & starts with 5.1. That's on page 23. That's the \\
\hline 5 & allocation of profits and losses tax and accounting \\
\hline 6 & matters. \\
\hline 7 & Now, we've talked about allocations and \\
\hline 8 & distributions. And allocations and distributions are \\
\hline 9 & two different things; right? \\
\hline 10 & A. Yes. \\
\hline 11 & Q. For example, in this case, the tax provisions \\
\hline 12 & call for allocations sometimes to be 50-50 even though \\
\hline 13 & the distributions are supposed to go 70-30; right? \\
\hline 14 & A. So can I clarify, allocations of income and \\
\hline 15 & distributions of cash? I want to make sure that we're \\
\hline 16 & talking about the same thing. \\
\hline 17 & Q. Exactly. Thank you. As I said, I'm one of those \\
\hline 18 & people who don't necessarily understand -- \\
\hline 19 & A. No, I just wanted to make sure I understood what \\
\hline 20 & you were asking. \\
\hline 21 & Q. Okay. So allocations of income and distributions \\
\hline 22 & of cash are two different issues? \\
\hline 23 & A. Agreed. \\
\hline 24 & Q. So you could have -- as it is here -- the income \\
\hline 25 & is supposed to be -- the income and losses is supposed \\
\hline
\end{tabular}

1 to be divided how?
A. They're divided -MR. GERRARD: Just a second. Objection. Vague and ambiguous as to the word "divided." Are you talking about allocations or are you talking about distributions?

BY MR. LEWIN:
Q. Allocated. I'm sorry. Allocated.
A. Okay. So income and losses are to be allocated pursuant to \(B\), which says 50-50.
Q. Okay. But distributions are supposed to be as shown on the annual federal income tax return prepared by the company's accountants or as finally determined by the United States Internal Revenue Service; right?
A. I'm not sure I agree with the way you've interpreted that. So what I read when I say that is that each member's distributive share of income, gain, loss, deduction, or credit of the company as reported on the company's tax return -- so what's reported on the company's tax return prepared by the accountants is determined by the United States Internal Revenue Service.
Q. The word I'm focused on is the word -- well, it's actually more. Maybe it's like six words. "Each member's distributive share of income," et cetera. That
1 refers to each member's distributions are supposed to match up with the tax return; right?
A. Okay. So that's referring to each member's -I'm going to use the word "allocation" here. Each member's allocable share of income, gain, or loss. That number, while it says "distributive," is not referring to distributions of cash.
Q. Okay. Just to make it clear, the promissory note is a capital asset; right?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, going back to Exhibit B. In that paragraph, we talked about Mr. Bidsal getting 50 percent of the cash distributions of operations. And then if we go down below that, it says -- and I'm only going to read part of this sentence -- "It is the express intent of the parties that cash distributions of profits refers to distributions generated from operations resulting in ordinary income as opposed to cash distributions."
Now, what it's referring to is the term "cash distributions" up in the paragraph right above that Mr. Bidsal gets 50 percent of; right?
A. I agree.
Q. Okay. Now, the -- and then it's talking about distributions from operations resulting in ordinary income?
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|}
\hline & Page 497 \\
\hline 1 & A. Correct. \\
\hline 2 & Q. And is "ordinary income" a tax term? \\
\hline 3 & A. It is. \\
\hline 4 & Q. Does ordinary income on a tax return always equal \\
\hline 5 & cash flow from operations? \\
\hline 6 & A. No. \\
\hline 7 & Q. The use of the term "ordinary income" would mean \\
\hline 8 & that -- on this paragraph, would mean you'd have to look \\
\hline 9 & at what was the ordinary income on the tax return to \\
\hline 10 & determine what Mr. Bidsal's getting 50 percent of; \\
\hline 11 & right? \\
\hline 12 & A. The -- \\
\hline 13 & Q. Yes or no? \\
\hline 14 & A. Yes. You'd have to look at all the items of \\
\hline 15 & ordinary income. \\
\hline 16 & Q. And ordinary income -- the determination of \\
\hline 17 & ordinary income includes a deduction for things like \\
\hline 18 & amortization or depreciation; right? \\
\hline 19 & A. Correct. \\
\hline 20 & Q. Because typically there's not any cash associated \\
\hline 21 & with those two items, so that means ordinary income \\
\hline 22 & would be less than cash flow; right? \\
\hline 23 & A. Correct. \\
\hline 24 & Q. Now, is there anything in the operating agreement \\
\hline 25 & that says the amounts that -- of the cash flow that are \\
\hline
\end{tabular}

1 not included in ordinary income -- you following me so far?
A. Uh-huh.
Q. That was a yes?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. That the amounts that are deducted from ordinary income -- strike that. The amounts that are deducted from the cash flow to make ordinary income, is there anything in the operating agreement that says that those get distributed 50-50?
A. As you have described it, no.
Q. Did you ask Mr. Bidsal if he had any conversations with anybody about what the meaning was of ordinary income?
A. No.
Q. Did you make any efforts to find out if there was any documents that gave a definition of ordinary income between the parties?
A. No.
Q. I'd like to now talk to you about valuation. You indicated earlier, and you -- that you -- and you read the documents where Mr Bidsal had offered to purchase CLA's interest -- membership interest in Green Valley. You read that offer; right?
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|}
\hline 1 & A. Yes, I did. Page 499 \\
\hline 2 & Q. And you read the response where CLA elected not \\
\hline 3 & to sell, but to buy; right? \\
\hline 4 & A. Yes, I did. \\
\hline 5 & Q. And you talked earlier about membership interest \\
\hline 6 & and how there'd be a discount and sometimes the income \\
\hline 7 & is spread out beforehand. Those are all negotiated \\
\hline 8 & agreements; right? \\
\hline 9 & A. Yes. \\
\hline 10 & Q. And when you're in a buy/sell where someone says, \\
\hline 11 & "I'll buy you out for \$10," you either buy or sell for \\
\hline 12 & that price; right? \\
\hline 13 & MR. GERRARD: Objection. Incomplete \\
\hline 14 & hypothetical. \\
\hline 15 & THE ARBITRATOR: I'll allow it. \\
\hline 16 & A. Yeah. \\
\hline 17 & BY MR. LEWIN: \\
\hline 18 & Q. So in this case, Mr. Bidsal -- there's a formula, \\
\hline 19 & and Mr. Bidsal said, "I'm going to buy you out based on \\
\hline 20 & the formula for \$5 million"; right? \\
\hline 21 & MR. GERRARD: Objection. Misstates the \\
\hline 22 & documents. \\
\hline 23 & MR. LEWIN: Okay. It's the essence of the \\
\hline 24 & document. \\
\hline 25 & / / / \\
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\end{tabular}
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    1 BY MR. LEWIN:
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BY MR. LEWIN:
Q. Mr. Bidsal made on offer to purchase CLA's membership interest based on a fair market value -valuation of $\$ 5$ million?
A. I agree with that.
Q. When you're talking about an estimated company valuation, you're talking about the valuation of the entire company; is that correct?
A. Correct.
Q. And the company's valuation includes the valuation of all the company's assets as of that date; right?
MR. GERRARD: I'm going to object to the question. It misstates --
THE ARBITRATOR: You're talking about a general company valuation, not the application of the formula in our operating agreement?
MR. LEWIN: Well, I'm going to get to that in a second.
THE ARBITRATOR: Okay. So as long as we understand there's a distinction, sure.
Do you want to answer that?
MR. LEWIN: Let me rephrase -- restate the question.

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BY MR. LEWIN:
Q. A company's valuation is a value of all the company's assets as of a date certain; right?

MR. GERRARD: Again, I'm going to object as vague and ambiguous. I'm not sure if he's asking about under the operating agreement or if he's asking about in general.

THE ARBITRATOR: Your asking generally?
MR. LEWIN: It's general. It's talking about valuation.

THE ARBITRATOR: All right. Generally.
You may answer.
A. Okay. So in general, the company valuation will be based on -- in this case, the assets of the company. But I also stated that things such as cash would be -BY MR. LEWIN:
Q. Sir, that's not the question \(I\) asked you. I asked you a specific question. As a matter of fact, I'm reading it right from my script here, with what you said. So I'm going to ask it again.

A company's valuation is a value of all the company's assets as of a date certain; right?

MR. GERRARD: Again, this is a general -- in general? Not under the operating agreement?

THE ARBITRATOR: Right. In general.
A. Correct.

BY MR. LEWIN:
Q. And when Mr. Bidsal offered to buy CLA's interest in Green Valley based on an estimated company value of 5 million -- hold on. Strike that.

I'm -- in this case, I'm referring to one of your statements that you made in your report. Your report's not in evidence, but \(I\) just want -- we had your report when we took your deposition. Because the question doesn't make any sense unless I tell you that.

When you use -- in your report, when you use the term -- that Bidsal offered to buy CLA's interest in Green Valley based on an estimated company valuation of 5 million, what did you mean by the term "estimated company valuation"?
A. To save me the trouble of looking it up, can you tell me the page on that report?
Q. I don't have the page in the report listed.
A. It's all right. I'll find it.
Q. I can give you the page of your testimony if you'd rather look at that.
A. I want to look at the report. THE ARBITRATOR: Do we need the question immediately before that to direct him to a part of his report?
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MR. LEWIN: I don't think so.
BY MR. LEWIN:
Q. It's -- I think it's in your historical narrative.
A. Ask me the question again -- or tell me the page in the deposition.
Q. Let me see if $I$ can find it here.
It's here on page 3, and it's in your second full
paragraph. You say "On July 7, 2017" --
THE ARBITRATOR: It's not the deposition?
MR. LEWIN: I'm reading -- no.
BY MR. LEWIN:
Q. I'm reading on your report now.
A. Thank you.
Q. You say "On July 7, 2017, Bidsal offered to purchase CLA's interest in GVC based on an estimated company valuation of $\$ 5$ million."
And you reference that to the offer to purchase membership interest. So let me repeat the question again.
Do you have it? You see what we're talking about now?
A. Yup.
Q. Okay. So when you use the -- when you said that Bidsal offered to buy CLA's interest in Green Valley

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1 Page 504
1 based on an estimated company valuation of \(\$ 5\) million, what did you mean by the term "estimated company valuation"?
A. Well, what \(I\) was referring to is that's the price that had been approved or had been stipulated to by the prior arbitrator that -- that it was -- the purchase price was \(\$ 5\) million.
Q. Now, the question --
A. And that's -- that Bidsal was offering to buy out CLA's membership interest for \(\$ 5\) million.
Q. This is -- we're talking about a time period before there was an arbitration. We're talking about when Mr. Bidsal -- in your report, you're talking about when Mr. Bidsal made an offer --
A. No, that's the reason \(I\) just put that last part, that Mr. Bidsal offered to buy CLA's interest at \$5 million.
Q. So the question is, what did you mean by the term "estimated company valuation"?
A. That that was what Mr. Bidsal had deemed the company to be worth.
Q. As a matter of fact, that was -- you believe that what Mr. Bidsal had estimated the company -- the LLC and the assets within the LLC -- to be that value; right?
A. He estimated that CLA's membership interest was

1 worth \(\$ 5\) million.

THE ARBITRATOR: Can \(I\) just interject here?
MR. LEWIN: Yes.
THE ARBITRATOR: Kind of give me a road map as to
how that part -- this whole line of questioning is relevant to what I have to determine.

MR. LEWIN: I will. So one of the big items in this issue has to do with the value of Greenway. Okay?

MR. GERRARD: The value of it?
MR. LEWIN: Right. The cost of purchase for Greenway.

MR. GERRARD: Okay. That's different. THE ARBITRATOR: And how it factors into the formula?

MR. LEWIN: And how it factors into the formula. THE ARBITRATOR: Okay.

MR. LEWIN: So what happens here -- and if I go through this testimony, you're going to find out that Mr. Wilcox agrees with me -- is that when Mr. Bidsal made his offer of \(\$ 5\) million, that was an offer for the value --

MR. GERRARD: Can we stop saying an offer of \(\$ 5\) million? He never offered \(\$ 5\) million. He used the fair market value number of \(\$ 5\) million.

MR. LEWIN: No, it's an offer based on a

1 valuation of \(\$ 5\) million.
Page 506

THE ARBITRATOR: His offer of July 7, 2017, plugged \(\$ 5\) million as the fair market value component of the formula?

MR. LEWIN: That's right. It's an offer to buy using the \(\$ 5\) million as an estimate of value.

THE ARBITRATOR: So when he did that --
MR. LEWIN: When he did that, the evidence is going to be clear that that offer necessarily included all of the assets of the company as of that date. The value of Greenway as of that date was -- they bought it for -- what? -- they bought it for 8- --

THE ARBITRATOR: 790.
MR. LEWIN: 790-. Let's say 800,000 just for talking. The gain was built in -- the gain is built into his offer. In other words, if he's valuing the assets -- if his offer includes all of the assets, includes the fair market value of all the properties, that would necessarily include the fair market value of Greenway. Because when he makes the offer -- when he makes the offer, he's trying to get his 50 percent share of the appreciation.

So the -- so he uses the value of Greenway -that's part of the \(\$ 5\) million. Not the cost, for reasons that we'll go into shortly. But that is the

1 issue.

So let me put it a little bit differently. When they sold Building \(C\), let's say that there's half a million dollars of gain, just for argument purposes. They use a tax deferred tax break not to have to pay taxes on that gain.

THE ARBITRATOR: Part of the 1031 exchange?
MR. LEWIN: As part of the 1031 exchange. That does not affect the value of Greenway. The value of Greenway is the value of Greenway. So when he's valuing the company's assets that he needs take into account -I want to get that gain; \(I\) want the fair market value; I'm going to estimate the fair market value of all the assets. That's why it's called fair market value. So I then end up -- I end up with -- the seller, in theory, will get paid for his half of the gain of the assets. That's why this is pertinent.

MR. GERRARD: Now let me respond. I'll tell you why it's completely irrelevant. It's irrelevant because the fair market value number has been fixed at \(\$ 5\) million. And what Mr. Lewin is really arguing is that -- about the assets of the company. This wasn't a sale of the assets of the company. Mr. Bidsal didn't say, "I'm offering -- I'm saying that the value of all the company assets is \(\$ 5\) million and that's why I'm

Page 508
1 making an offer of \(\$ 5\) million to buy these company
2 assets."

It's a value of the membership interest that was being sold. He's valuing what he thinks the membership interest is, and it doesn't matter what Mr. Wilcox thinks was in Mr. Bidsal's mind about how he arrived at that value. All that was being bought is a membership interest, not assets of the company. So Mr. Lewin's argument is completely irrelevant because we're not talking about a sale of assets.

THE ARBITRATOR: Is there going to be evidence that establishes some sort of not-very-tenuous link between Mr. Bidsal's determination of fair market value for purposes of the formula in 2017 as \(\$ 5\) million and a part of that being the appreciation of the Greenway property?

MR. LEWIN: Your Honor -- yes. But I think it's incumbent in the offer itself. When you're buying a 50 percent membership interest, you're buying -- and when I get to his testimony, you'll see how he describes it.

THE ARBITRATOR: "His" being Mr. Bidsal?
MR. LEWIN: Mr. Wilcox. And probably
Mr. Bidsal's also. We have his testimony. But in terms of what he's doing, he's buying -- he's buying

1 Mr. Bidsal's half interest in the company. Mr. Bidsal 2 made an offer valuing the value of the company. The 3 value of the company is comprised --

MR. GERRARD: Where's any evidence of that? He never made a value of the company.

MR. LEWIN: That is --
MR. GERRARD: It's a value of the membership.
THE ARBITRATOR: One at a time, please. Let him finish.

MR. GERRARD: I'm sorry.
MR. LEWIN: Hold on a second.
MR. GERRARD: Look at the definition.
MR. LEWIN: He's offering -- look, he could offer to buy it for 10 million; he could offer to buy it for 1 million. What he's buying -- he has the opportunity to make a valuation of what that membership is worth, and the membership is worth the value of the assets.

So when you -- if I -- for example, if they owned a bank, and the bank had \(\$ 1\) million in the bank, and Mr. Bidsal offered \(\$ 2\) million for it, he's making a bad deal. If he offered \(\$ 800,000\) to buy \(\$ 1\) million worth of cash, he'd be making a great deal if that was accepted.

In this case, the value -- the valuation of the company -- I'm just looking at the definitions here -is -- I think it's pretty clear. He's making an offer

Page 510
1 based on the valuation -- his estimated valuation of the
2 company -- of the value of the company, in essence.

THE ARBITRATOR: Okay. But I have certain terms within the formula to interpret, and the expert forensic accountants are assisting in that. One of them that they need to help me determine is not fair market value, because that's 5 million.

MR. LEWIN: Right. Exactly.
THE ARBITRATOR: So then there's cost of purchase. And Mr. Wilcox has testified that for purposes of that number, it's more reasonable to use the basis in the cost segregation report for Building \(C\) for the Greenway property because of how it was transferred in the 1031 exchange, and it allows both sides, including Mr. Bidsal, to reap the benefit of that exchange and appreciation. Okay. I got that. There isn't really anywhere else in the formula that the value of Greenway is relevant.

MR. LEWIN: But it is because in terms of -- what Mr. Wilcox is going to testify is that the valuation Mr. -- value -- had estimated the value of the company including its assets. Okay? And that means at the time he made his estimated 5 million -- his \(\$ 5\) million estimate, that he included -- and he should have included if he didn't -- but he should have -- he

1 Page 511
1 included the appreciated value of Greenway. That's how 2 we get --

THE ARBITRATOR: I just don't think it matters to the formula.

MR. LEWIN: But it does because COP with respect to Greenway, they want -- what they want to use is the cost of it, and it's not the cost of it; it's the value at the time. It's the value -- the purchase price. It's the purchase price at the time.

MR. GERRARD: So that doesn't have anything to do with the fair market value --

MR. LEWIN: Hold on a second. I think it will become clearer.

THE ARBITRATOR: I'll give you a little latitude. I'm just telling you \(I\) don't see it. I don't see the connection. But if you want to continue a little bit and change my mind, I suppose you could try. At some point, though, we've got to differentiate between fair market value of the company and fair market value of the interest to be purchased.

MR. LEWIN: Okay. Right.
MR. GERRARD: He's also just asking for pure speculation. He's laid no foundation that Mr. Wilcox would ever know what Mr. Bidsal looked at to come up with this fair market value number.
 Mr. Bidsal looked at. He made the offer, and the offer is a valuation of the company's assets.

THE ARBITRATOR: I'll let you go a little further. And --

MR. GERRARD: Can I make one response to that?
THE ARBITRATOR: Sure.
MR. GERRARD: I just want to make sure we're clear. The question that he asked a minute ago was, Do you agree that Mr. Bidsal's offer of \(\$ 5\) million was based upon all the assets of the company?

That's speculation. There's no foundation that this witness ever talked to Mr. Bidsal to derive how he arrived at that \(\$ 5\) million number. And that's the whole premise of his question. So it's --

THE ARBITRATOR: We're moving on to the next question.

MR. GERRARD: Thank you.
THE ARBITRATOR: I'm not dealing with this as a continuing objection. Jump in contemporaneously.

MR. GERRARD: I will. I'll listen to the next question.

THE ARBITRATOR: All right.
Mr. Wilcox, here's how it's going to go. If somebody objects, for the benefit of the court reporter
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|}
\hline & and for me, stand down until I say, "Yes, you can Page 513 \\
\hline 2 & answer" or "No, you can't." All right? \\
\hline 3 & THE WITNESS: Got it. \\
\hline 4 & THE ARBITRATOR: Mr. Lewin. \\
\hline 5 & BY MR. LEWIN: \\
\hline 6 & Q. Take a look at Section 4.2 of the operating \\
\hline 7 & agreement. \\
\hline 8 & THE ARBITRATOR: Page 10 or 11? \\
\hline 9 & MR. LEWIN: Page 10. \\
\hline 10 & BY MR. LEWIN: \\
\hline 11 & Q. It says "Any member (offering member) may give \\
\hline 12 & notice to the remaining member that he or it is ready \\
\hline 13 & and willing to purchase remaining members' interests for \\
\hline 14 & a price the offering member thinks is the fair market \\
\hline 15 & value." \\
\hline 16 & When you're talking about -- how did you \\
\hline 17 & interpret "fair market value" there? Did you interpret \\
\hline 18 & that as meaning the value of the company's assets? \\
\hline 19 & A. I interpreted fair market value as being \\
\hline 20 & 5 million. That's what I was told to use for that \\
\hline 21 & number. \\
\hline 22 & Q. My question is in this operating agreement -- \\
\hline 23 & forgetting about what the offer was, looking at this \\
\hline 24 & independently -- isn't it true you believe that this \\
\hline 25 & refers to a valuation of all of the -- of the membership \\
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\end{tabular}
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    1 interest, which would include a valuation of the
    2 company's assets?
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``` company's assets?
A. Yes.
MR. GERRARD: Objection.
THE ARBITRATOR: I'll allow it.
MR. GERRARD: I didn't finish my objection. I was going to say misstates the document, what the language actually says.
MR. LEWIN: It doesn't misstate the document.
THE ARBITRATOR: All right. Next question. BY MR. LEWIN:
Q. Did you see anything in the operating agreement that would exclude the valuation of any asset in connection with the initial offer to buy pursuant to the buy/sell agreement?
A. No.
Q. And when you saw Mr. Bidsal's offer, you construed it as including a valuation of the company including the assets; right?
MR. GERRARD: Objection. Lack of foundation. Calls for speculation.
THE ARBITRATOR: I don't think it's relevant what Mr. Wilcox thought.
MR. LEWIN: Here's my point: He's basically saying that Mr. Bidsal would be denied the gain if the
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    1 cost of -- if the Greenway cost is used -- I mean the cost of \(C\) is used as opposed to the cost of Greenway. And I'm saying, No, that value -- when he makes a valuation of company assets, he's including the gain or he should be including the gain, because that's how he's valuing the membership interest. So that would include possible gain. So I mean, let me -- let's assume that. I'll go on. I'm just telling you how \(I\) see it.
THE ARBITRATOR: Okay.
BY MR. LEWIN:
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Q. So you testified that you thought that Mr. Bidsal would be deprived of the gain on the sale of Building $C$ if the cost of purchase -- the COP for Greenway was used. Do you remember that testimony?
A. That is my testimony.
Q. Now, if the valuation of -- the $\$ 5$ million valuation that Mr . Bidsal gave for the company, wouldn't that include the increased value from the building -the gain in Building $C$ that's attributed to Greenway? MR. GERRARD: Objection. MR. LEWIN: I'm going to rephrase it. MR. GERRARD: Misstates -THE ARBITRATOR: He's going to rephrase. BY MR. LEWIN:
Q. If Mr. Bidsal's valuing the company's assets to

1 make a -- strike that.

If Mr. Bidsal is putting a valuation on the company, were you informed that he did not include the cost of purchase of Greenway in that valuation?

MR. GERRARD: Objection. Lack of foundation. Misstates what is in the offer and misstates what is in the operating agreement.

MR. LEWIN: I don't know why this is so complicated.

THE ARBITRATOR: How does it misstate what's in the document?

MR. GERRARD: Well, the operating agreement very clearly says that fair market value -- which is what the offer is based upon, FMV -- if you read the definition in Section 4.1, it says "FMV means fair market value obtained as specified in 4.2."

If you read 4.2, it says "Any member (offering member) may give notice to remaining member that he or it is willing and able to purchase the remaining members' interests for a price the offering member thinks is the fair market value."

THE ARBITRATOR: Of the interest?
MR. GERRARD: Yeah. It's the value of the interest; it's not a value of all the assets of the company, which is what Mr. Lewin has repeatedly for the

Page 517
1 last 15 minutes tried to get Mr. Wilcox to say that it 2 is. He's trying to get him to say that this fair market 3 value number for the use of the formula that was offered

4 somehow is a value of all the company's assets. And 5 that's not what the operating agreement says, and it's 6 not what Mr. Bidsal's offer says.

MR. LEWIN: This is -- that's entirely from left field, because the fair market value is not the fair market value of the CLA membership interest. It's the valuation of the company, and that's how you derive the value of the membership interest.

THE ARBITRATOR: Okay. Here's the thing. We're going to start with a basic foundational question, which is -- I'm going to ask. All right?

Mr. Wilcox, did you have any conversations with Mr. Bidsal about how he reached the $\$ 5$ million FMV number that's in his July 2017 correspondence?

THE WITNESS: No, I did not.
THE ARBITRATOR: All right.
Because your question asked him if he received that -- if he actually -- did Mr. Bidsal tell you that he didn't include the increased value of Greenway in his 5 million. And that, for a foundational purpose, presupposes that he had a conversation with Mr. Bidsal about that. He didn't.

``` you're going, and I'll deal with it a little bit differently.
THE ARBITRATOR: Okay.
BY MR. LEWIN:
Q. Do you have any information that leads you to believe that Mr. Bidsal did not -- strike that.
You know there's this definition of COP in this formula; right?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you have any information -- strike that.
Did Mr. Bidsal ever tell you that he did not include the COP for Greenway, which is 790,000 plus some closing costs, when he made his \(\$ 5\) million valuation?
MR. GERRARD: First of all --
THE ARBITRATOR: That just goes back to my question, which is he didn't have any conversations with Mr. Bidsal about the \(\$ 5\) million valuation.
MR. LEWIN: I'm now trying to find out does he have any information that he didn't include it.
MR. GERRARD: He's already said he didn't talk to him about it, so how can --
MR. LEWIN: I want to find out if he has any information that the \(\$ 5\) million did not include the actual value of Greenway. Because COP is a defined
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    1 term.
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THE ARBITRATOR: All right. Rephrase the question if you would.
And Mr. Wilcox, wait for me to assess it. BY MR. LEWIN:
Q. Do you have any information from any source that indicates that Mr . Bidsal when he made his \(\$ 5\) million valuation of the company's value -- it's what it says here.
MR. GERRARD: That's not what it says.
BY MR. LEWIN:
Q. That he did not include the actual cost of purchase of Greenway? And I'm talking about the actual purchase price.
MR. GERRARD: Objection. Misstates what's in the offer and misstates what FMV means under the operating agreement. And also, lack of foundation.
THE ARBITRATOR: I'm going to start with the foundation.
Do you have any information at all about what Mr. Bidsal considered when he made the \(\$ 5\) million fair market value assessment in his July letter?
THE WITNESS: No, I do not.
THE ARBITRATOR: All right. So then do you have any information from any source about why he put that
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1 number in there?
    THE WITNESS: No.
    THE ARBITRATOR: All right.
    So to ask him, Did you have any information that
    he didn't include Greenway without asking the
    foundational question is, at the very least, misleading.
    MR. LEWIN: Okay.
    THE ARBITRATOR: All right.
    BY MR. LEWIN:
    Q. But it is clear under the operating agreement
    that if Mr. Bidsal sold his interest to Greenway -- to
    CLA, that he would be selling all of his interest in all
    of the assets for whatever their value was at the time;
    right?
    MR. GERRARD: Objection. Misstates the document.
    He doesn't have an interest in any assets. He only owns
    a membership interest.
    MR. LEWIN: As a membership interest, they have
    an indirect interest in the assets.
MR. GERRARD: Absolutely not --
MR. SHAPIRO: It's contrary to Nevada law --
MR. GERRARD: It's contrary to Nevada Chapter 86. You cannot -- members expressly under the law have zero interest in the assets of the company. They only have an ownership interest in the company.
``` THE ARBITRATOR: You mean they have no ownership interest in the property?

MR. GERRARD: In any of the assets of the company. They only own their interest in the company. THE ARBITRATOR: I'm going to sustain the objection for the way it was phrased.

MR. LEWIN: Okay.
MR. SHAPIRO: We've been going for an hour and a half. Would this be a good time for a quick break? MR. LEWIN: Let me just finish up with this section if you don't mind.

MR. SHAPIRO: Okay.
THE ARBITRATOR: Perfect.
BY MR. LEWIN:
Q. It was your understanding when you did your report and you formed your opinions that the \(\$ 5\) million offer was for the assets of the company; isn't that correct?

MR. GERRARD: Again, same objection. We're just asking the same question in a different way.

THE ARBITRATOR: His report doesn't, for my purposes, have any effect on the FMV number in the formula.

MR. GERRARD: Or what it includes.
THE ARBITRATOR: Correct.

1 BY MR. LEWIN:
Q. Did you have an opinion as to what the \(\$ 5\) million FMV meant?

THE ARBITRATOR: That's a yes or no question. THE WITNESS: Okay. Yes, I do. BY MR. LEWIN:

\section*{Q. And what was your opinion?}
A. My opinion is that the \(\$ 5\) million was Mr. Bidsal's estimate of the fair market value of the company. To do as you have suggested, he would have had to say, Well, the company is worth \(4,500,000\), but let's say I haven't gotten my benefit of the gain on Green Valley, so I'm going to jump it up to 5 million.

I don't think that's what he did. I think he felt like the value of the assets was \(\$ 5\) million. That's what he -- I'm sorry. The value of the membership interest was 5 million; that's what he offered, never expecting the cost of purchase to be inflated by 500,000 on the Greenway property. That's my opinion.
Q. But you don't -- is it -- in effect, it's your opinion, in setting the fair market value of a membership interest, a reasonable person would not consider the value of -- the fair market value of the
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1 assets? That's a yes or no.

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assets? That's a yes or no.
A. A reasonable person would have considered the fair market value of underlying assets.
Q. And one of those assets is cash in the bank; right?
A. One of those assets would be cash in the bank.
Q. And you --
A. He would have considered that. He would have considered if it was going to get distributed as well.
Q. That was a yes or no.
A. I'm sorry.
Q. A reasonable person would have considered in setting the fair market value of a membership interest the amount of cash in the bank; right?
A. They would have done that.
MR. LEWIN: You know what, he wants to take a break. We can take a break.
THE ARBITRATOR: Okay. All right. We'll take about ten minutes.
(RECESS TAKEN FROM 2:33 P.M. TO 2:50 P.M.) ***
THE ARBITRATOR: All right. Mr. Wilcox, you realize you're still under oath?
THE WITNESS: Yes.

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\begin{tabular}{|c|c|}
\hline 1 & THE ARBITRATOR: All right. Page 524 \\
\hline 2 & Mr. Lewin, you may continue. \\
\hline 3 & BY MR. LEWIN: \\
\hline 4 & Q. Mr. Wilcox, did you acquire any information that \\
\hline 5 & either CLA or Mr. Bidsal had any need or desire for \\
\hline 6 & space in one of the buildings at Green Valley? \\
\hline 7 & A. That? \\
\hline 8 & Q. That they were going to use -- that either \\
\hline 9 & Mr. Bidsal or CLA was going to use -- utilize space -- \\
\hline 10 & one of the rental spaces for their own use? \\
\hline 11 & THE ARBITRATOR: At what point in time? \\
\hline 12 & MR. LEWIN: After the purchase was finished. \\
\hline 13 & THE ARBITRATOR: Okay. \\
\hline 14 & MR. GERRARD: After the purchase was finished? \\
\hline 15 & THE ARBITRATOR: After September of 2017. \\
\hline 16 & MR. LEWIN: After September, right. \\
\hline 17 & THE WITNESS: So the question is did I have any \\
\hline 18 & information that they were going to use space in the \\
\hline 19 & property? \\
\hline 20 & MR. LEWIN: Yes. \\
\hline 21 & THE WITNESS: No. \\
\hline 22 & BY MR. LEWIN: \\
\hline 23 & Q. Is it fair to say then that both Mr. Bidsal and \\
\hline 24 & CLA was offering to buy an interest in a company that \\
\hline 25 & had a stream of payments? \\
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\end{tabular}
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A. A stream of payments? Rental payments, yes.
Q. An income stream?
A. Yes.
Q. And if you allocate distributions to -- if you were to allocate part of the proceeds, the income stream, after September 2nd, would -- then you would be depriving CLA of a portion of that income stream; right?
MR. GERRARD: Objection. Assumes facts not in evidence.
THE ARBITRATOR: I'm not sure I understood the question.
MR. LEWIN: He's allocated distributions both -from cash on hand as of the date of the offer and then cash that was earned afterwards -- after the date of the offer.
BY MR. LEWIN:
Q. So my -- the question I'm asking is that if you allocate distributions -- cash that was earned after September 2nd, you would be depriving CLA of that income stream; right?
MR. GERRARD: Objection. Assumes a fact not in evidence.
THE ARBITRATOR: If the sale went through on September 7, 2017.
MR. LEWIN: That's right. Yes.

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\begin{tabular}{|c|c|}
\hline 1 & MR. GERRARD: And they had been paid. Page 526 \\
\hline 2 & THE ARBITRATOR: Right. \\
\hline 3 & You may answer. \\
\hline 4 & A. Bidsal would not have a right to an income stream \\
\hline 5 & after he ceased to be an owner. \\
\hline 6 & THE ARBITRATOR: Hold on right there. \\
\hline 7 & MR. LEWIN: Okay. \\
\hline 8 & (Pause in proceedings.) \\
\hline 9 & BY MR. LEWIN: \\
\hline 10 & Q. Regardless of how the \$5 million valuation came \\
\hline 11 & about, it is fixed at a point in time; right? \\
\hline 12 & A. That was the value the day it was made, I assume. \\
\hline 13 & Q. That would be July 7th, I think. Is it July 7th? \\
\hline 14 & The date of his offer? \\
\hline 15 & A. Right. \\
\hline 16 & Q. Okay. Looking at the formula -- we're on \\
\hline 17 & page 11. This is the formula that sets forth the manner \\
\hline 18 & in which they calculate the purchase price; right? \\
\hline 19 & A. Correct. \\
\hline 20 & Q. Is there any part of this formula that involves \\
\hline 21 & adding back cash on hand? \\
\hline 22 & A. No. \\
\hline 23 & Q. But it is a formula that describes how to \\
\hline 24 & calculate the purchase price; right? \\
\hline 25 & A. Yes. \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|}
\hline 1 & Q. And the formula only includes the valuation of \\
\hline 2 & the fair market value by the offering member or the \\
\hline 3 & remaining member, as the case may be -- let me rephrase \\
\hline 4 & it. \\
\hline 5 & And the formula only includes the valuation of \\
\hline 6 & fair market value by the offering member; isn't that \\
\hline 7 & right? \\
\hline 8 & MR. GERRARD: I'm going to object unless you're \\
\hline 9 & talking about as defined in the agreement. \\
\hline 10 & THE ARBITRATOR: You're talking about as defined \\
\hline 11 & in the agreement? \\
\hline 12 & MR. LEWIN: Yeah, I'm talking about the formula. \\
\hline 13 & THE ARBITRATOR: Okay. \\
\hline 14 & A. Yes. \\
\hline 15 & BY MR. LEWIN: \\
\hline 16 & Q. Do you have any basis to assume based on the \\
\hline 17 & documents that you've seen that Mr. Bidsal did not take \\
\hline 18 & into account the cash on hand in making the \(\$ 5\) million \\
\hline 19 & valuation? \\
\hline 20 & THE ARBITRATOR: That's the same objection I \\
\hline 21 & sustained before -- \\
\hline 22 & MR. GERRARD: Yeah. \\
\hline 23 & THE ARBITRATOR: -- so I'll sustain it. \\
\hline 24 & BY MR. LEWIN: \\
\hline 25 & Q. According to the formula, in determining COP, \\
\hline
\end{tabular}

1 you're supposed to evaluate what the cost was pursuant
2 to the settlement statement; right?
A. Right.
Q. And it's like an escrow closing statement?
A. Correct.
Q. The sale of Building \(C\)-- the 1031 exchange is just a tax deferral. It has nothing to do with the sale per se; is that correct?
A. Correct.
Q. So the sale of \(C\) is a sale on its own two feet; right?
A. Yes.
Q. And there's a tax deferral to use so you don't have to pay the tax on the gain when you buy another property and you invest the proceeds of that sale into that property?
A. Correct.
Q. And any part of the proceeds that you don't invest, it's commonly termed in your business as "boot"; right?
A. Correct.
Q. Boot means part of the -- and in this case, CLA invested more than the cost basis of the property; right?
A. Correct.
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|}
\hline 1 & Q. So it deferred the taxes on a portion of the Page 529 \\
\hline 2 & gain; right? \\
\hline 3 & A. Correct. \\
\hline 4 & Q. And that document that we saw earlier with the \\
\hline 5 & \$95,000, that was boot that was then distributed; right? \\
\hline 6 & A. Correct. \\
\hline 7 & Q. That boot was the unused gain on the -- from the \\
\hline 8 & sale of Property C; right? \\
\hline 9 & A. Correct. \\
\hline 10 & Q. They could have invested -- I guess if they found \\
\hline 11 & a more valuable property, they could have invested it \\
\hline 12 & all in the property. But you can make a decision not to \\
\hline 13 & invest -- to reinvest the money yourself? \\
\hline 14 & In other words, in a 1031 exchange, you don't \\
\hline 15 & have to invest all your money; you can invest part of it \\
\hline 16 & and pay taxes on the rest; right? \\
\hline 17 & A. Yes. \\
\hline 18 & Q. And still that part that we're talking about is \\
\hline 19 & boot? \\
\hline 20 & A. Right. \\
\hline 21 & Q. The part you have to pay taxes on? \\
\hline 22 & A. Okay. \\
\hline 23 & Q. Is that right? \\
\hline 24 & A. Yes. \\
\hline 25 & Q. So the \$95,000 -- you said that Mr. Bidsal did \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
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1 not -- that nothing triggered Exhibit B. But in fact,

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``` Mr. Bidsal distributed the boot on Building \(C\) of \(\$ 95,000\) according to the step-down waterfall; right?
A. That is what he did.
Q. And have you seen -- and that was the first sale; right?
A. Correct.
Q. The sale closest in time to signing the operating agreement?
A. Correct.
Q. And the only information that you have to rely on that Mr. Bidsal did not think that Exhibit B was triggered was something he said to you; right?
A. No. I mean, something he said to me may have -I'm trying to think. I don't think I relied on Mr. Bidsal to decide that Exhibit B, the waterfall, was triggered -- it was or wasn't triggered.
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Q. But Mr. Bidsal distributed it according to the waterfall?
A. No --
Q. Excuse me. It's a yes or a no. He distributed it 70-30?

THE ARBITRATOR: What?
MR. LEWIN: The boot on Building C. That's the $\$ 95,000$.

THE ARBITRATOR: Right.
BY MR. LEWIN:
Q. Mr. Bidsal distributed the boot in accordance with the waterfall; right?
A. So he --
Q. Yes or no?
A. Yes. The answer is yes, it was 70-30. I don't know what was in his mind and whether he said, Oh, I'm going to do it according to the waterfall.

I don't know that.
Q. Did you ask him why he distributed it 70-30?
A. No.
Q. You're only -- I'll leave it at that.

Would you take a look at the escrow closing statement, the purchase of the note, Exhibit 3.

I'm sorry. Before we go there, I just forgot to follow up on the question.

So the purchase of exhibit -- the sale of $C$ stands on itself, and the purchase of Greenway stands on itself. It's a separate purchase; right?

MR. GERRARD: Objection. Vague and ambiguous. I don't know what it means, "stands on itself."

MR. LEWIN: Well, he said that earlier.
BY MR. LEWIN:
Q. The sale of Greenway was a sale independent of

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1 whether or not there's a }1031\mathrm{ tax deferral; right?
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A. The sale of Building \(C\) ?
Q. The sale.
A. The sale of Building \(C\) is a separate transaction from the purchase of Greenway. The two are combined because they're part of the same 1031 exchange.
Q. That only has to do with tax deferral business; right?
A. That has to do with tax deferral.
Q. As a matter of fact, when Greenway is sold, the deferred gain has to be paid at that time; right?
A. That is correct.
Q. So it's recaptured?
A. It's not recaptured. It is triggered. That deferred gain, that realized gain, is recognized on the sale of Greenway.
Q. So let's assume -- how much was the gain that was deferred in --
A. 550,000 .
Q. Say it's 550,000. Let's say CLA ends up buying the membership interest.
A. Correct.
Q. Mr. Bidsal's membership interest. And decides to sell Greenway. Who's going to have to be responsible for paying the deferred gain?
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MR. GERRARD: Paying the deferred gain or paying the taxes on --

MR. LEWIN: Paying the taxes. Paying the taxes on the deferred gain.
A. The answer to your question is CLA. But that's only part of the answer, so. If you want the full -BY MR. LEWIN:

## Q. What's the other part?

A. When CLA buys them out, there will be a purchase price that will get -- because CLA is now taking money and buying out Mr. Bidsal. That is a new asset for CLA which will result in a stepped up basis. Whoever does CLA's tax returns is going to have to go in and allocate what they paid to Mr. Bidsal to the buildings, which is going to increase the basis in the buildings.

THE ARBITRATOR: Including Greenway?
THE WITNESS: Including Greenway, yeah. It's going to -- Greenway is going to get a big chunk -yeah. I mean, it's just common -- it's called a 743 -734 (b) adjustment. You've heard of 754 adjustments? Doesn't matter. That's what it is. BY MR. LEWIN:
Q. Is that adjustment going to be sufficient to pay the -- to defer the entire amount of deferred gain that the taxes have to be paid on?
A. No. It will be enough to -- under my calculation, Mr. Bidsal will receive enough that he receives his share of that gain. So when CLA allocates the purchase price to all of those six -- well, actually seven assets -- a big chunk of that will be allocated to Greenway. It will not offset the built-in gain that CLA has. So basically it will wipe out Mr. Bidsal's gain, but CLA will only pay tax on their share of the gain because of that basis adjustment.
Q. Okay. Going to No. 3. According to the final settlement statement, the cost of the note was \$4,048,969; right?
A. Yeah.
Q. That includes the actual cost of the note plus other costs; right?
A. Correct.
Q. Did you ever find out why that number was not used as the cost -- as the cost for Greenway? Sorry. Did you ever find out why that cost of $4,048,000$ was not actually used for the cost segregation study?
A. I never looked into why they were off about $\$ 50,000$.
Q. It's actually about $\$ 82,000$.
A. Is it 82-? I never looked into it.
Q. Well, the original cost segregation study was
$1 \quad \$ 3,967,182$.
A. Yeah. About 82,000.
Q. And you never investigated to find out what the difference was and what happened to that missing 82,000; is that correct?

MR. GERRARD: Objection. Asked and answered.
A. I did not.

MR. GERRARD: Go ahead. He's already answered.
THE ARBITRATOR: He answered; I did not.
I overrule the objection.
BY MR. LEWIN:
Q. Do you know whether that $\$ 82,000$ was distributed?
A. I saw no evidence of it being distributed.
Q. If there was a distribution of anything above $\$ 3,967,182$, that would be a return of capital; right?

MR. GERRARD: Again, objection. Based upon what? For tax purposes or for the operating agreement allocation purposes?

MR. LEWIN: Based under any purpose. It was to be a return of capital. They put up 4,048,000 and ended up --

MR. GERRARD: That's not the question you asked. You asked if it was a return of capital. And there's a difference between how capital -- what a capital transaction is for purposes of the operating agreement

1 Page 536
1 than what it is for purposes of what you pay taxes on.

MR. LEWIN: Now I object to the way the objection is being framed. He's basically -- he's making a speaking objection. My question was very simple. BY MR. LEWIN:
Q. Would the difference of the $\$ 82,000$--

MR. GERRARD: Hold on, Mr. Lewin. I haven't heard any --

THE ARBITRATOR: I know. I'm waiting for the question.

MR. GERRARD: Oh, okay. BY MR. LEWIN:
Q. My question was if the $\$ 82,000$ was distributed, would that be a return of capital?

MR. GERRARD: So there hasn't been a ruling on the objection.

THE ARBITRATOR: That's a yes or no question. Here's the thing: I have -- and always -- protect a party's right on cross-examination to ask closed-ended questions. Yes, no. So to a yes/no question, your options are kind of the following: Yes, no, I don't know, I don't recall, or $I$ can't answer that yes or no, or $I$ don't understand the question.

Those are pretty much the options. So to that question, closed-ended as it is, even though it doesn't

1 differentiate the way Mr. Gerrard requested, I'm going to allow the question to stand if you can answer it.
A. And I don't know without understanding -- I'm sorry. I don't know. BY MR. LEWIN:
Q. What would you have to understand to know?
A. Thank you. So I'd need to understand what was behind the distribution. If it was as simple as you said, we put whatever the number is -- 4 point -$\$ 4$ million into the company, and we didn't need all the money, and we just distributed it back, then that would be a return of capital. But $I$ don't know that that is or isn't what happened.
Q. Forgive me if I asked you this before. Did you ever ask anyone what happened to the $\$ 82,000$ ?
A. As I stated before, I did not.
Q. But when the transaction was recorded, the basis or cost of the note dropped from 4,048,969 to 3,967,182; right?
A. That is correct.
Q. And one of your assignments was to determine COP of Green Valley's property. You never bothered to determine whether or not the $4,048,969$ should have been used as the COP; right?
A. Is that a yes or no?

| 1 | Q. | Yes. Page 538 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 2 | A. | Well, that was my assignment. |
| 3 | Q. | Take a look at Exhibit 95. There should be a |
| 4 | binder | there. |
| 5 | A. | Here it is. |
| 6 | Q. | Have you ever seen this ledger before? |
| 7 | A. | Yes. |
| 8 | Q. | Where did you see it? |
| 9 | A. | It's part of the documents that were produced. |
| 10 | Q. | Given to you by Mr. Bidsal? |
| 11 | A. | We got all of our documents through the law |
| 12 | office. |  |
| 13 | Q. | Did you ever talk to Mr. Bidsal about this? |
| 14 | A. | Generally, yeah. |
| 15 | Q. | What did he tell you this was? |
| 16 | A. | That this was a general ledger that I believe |
| 17 | that was | as prepared by Capital One. Yeah, general ledger |
| 18 | prepare | d by Capital One. Not Capital One. Somebody -- |
| 19 | the orig | ginal lender. |
| 20 | 2. | Take a look at account number 30 -- 30,000. |
| 21 |  | THE ARBITRATOR: What was it? |
| 22 |  | MR. LEWIN: Account number 30,000. It's on the |
| 23 | first p | page. |
| 24 |  | THE WITNESS: Okay. |
| 25 | / / / |  |

BY MR. LEWIN:
Q. What does it say the opening equity balance is?
A. It shows the open equity balance of 0 .
Q. How about the deposit?
A. It shows...
Q. It shows an opening balance of $\mathbf{\$ 4 , 0 4 9 , 2 5 6 ; ~ i s ~}$ that correct?
A. Oh, I'm sorry. I was looking at the total 3-0 down below. Pardon me. The opening equity balance is 0 , but there is a deposit of $\$ 4,049,250$.
Q. That matches the initial contributions from the -- from Mr. Bidsal and CLA; right?
A. That is correct.
Q. Did you notice that there was two reductions of principal after that?

MR. GERRARD: Two reductions of principal? I'm sorry. Where are you looking, Rod?

THE ARBITRATOR: Are you looking at the distributions under --

MR. LEWIN: I'm looking at the distributions.
THE ARBITRATOR: 30 -- 30700?
MR. LEWIN: Yes.
MR. GERRARD: I'm sorry. Could you read the question back, Mia? What did he say? Return of what?
(Page 539, Lines 14 through 15 were read.)

| 1 | MR. GERRARD: "Reductions of principal"? Page 540 |
| :---: | :---: |
| 2 | THE REPORTER: Yeah. |
| 3 | MR. GERRARD: I'm going to object to the |
| 4 | question. It misstates the document. |
| 5 | THE ARBITRATOR: Overruled. I'll allow it. |
| 6 | THE WITNESS: So it appears there were two |
| 7 | distributions. Is that what you're referring to? |
| 8 | BY MR. LEWIN: |
| 9 | Q. Yes. There's two -- do you know where the funds |
|  | came from for those distributions? |
| 11 | A. No, I do not. I was -- I do not know. |
| 12 | Q. Did you -- is it fair to say that the reason why |
| 13 | you used the amounts in the cost segregation study was |
|  | because that was the amount that had been historically |
|  | used by Green Valley in all of its accounting and -- in |
| 16 | its accounting and tax returns? |
| 17 | A. Yes. |
| 18 | Q. And if you went back to adjust the cost basis of |
| 19 | the properties, you wouldn't want to have to readjust |
| 20 | all the tax returns; right? |
| 21 | A. Well, those tax returns are beyond the statute, |
| 22 | so that wouldn't be possible. |
| 23 | Q. But the tax returns -- the adjustments to the tax |
| 24 | returns really had nothing to do with the determination |
| 25 | of COP; right? |


|  | Page 541 <br> A. I utilized what was reported in the tax returns |
| :---: | :---: |
| 2 | because that's what the company has been reporting for |
| 3 | the last -- since 2011. So it seemed like a |
| 4 | reasonable -- reasonable that that would be the number |
| 5 | to use. |
| 6 | Q. So looking at the formula, it seems -- is it fair |
| 7 | to say that there's two ways to interpret it? One is |
| 8 | use original cost -- COP for the cost of -- maybe |
| 9 | there's more than two ways. But one way would be to use |
| 10 | the original cost attributed -- paid for the note which |
| 11 | was converted into the property, and use Mr. Bidsal's |
| 12 | initial capital. That would be one way; right? |
| 13 | A. Okay. |
| 14 | Q. That would not -- logically, that would not take |
| 15 | into account property that had been sold? |
| 16 | A. Correct. |
| 17 | Q. But that's one interpretation of it. The other |
| 18 | interpretation would be to provide for the sales of the |
| 19 | properties that are no longer there -- right? -- and |
| 20 | reduce the COP by those properties, and then -- and to |
| 21 | reduce the remaining capital by the capital |
| 22 | distributions. That's the other way; right? |
| 23 | A. Right. |
| 24 | Q. And that's what -- that last version is the |
| 25 | version that you took because you felt that was the most |

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    1 appropriate?
    A. That's correct.
    Q. Because it didn't make any sense to be valuing
    something that's no longer there?
    A. I'm sorry. Say that one more time.
    Q. It doesn't make any sense to be -- to try to --
        in assuming that the valuation of assets has -- is
        valuing assets that are no longer there?
    A. Yes.
    Q. So your reasoning -- your reasoning in doing that
        was that because three of the properties had been sold
        so you wouldn't think that would be in COP; right?
    A. Three properties -- two of the properties should
        not be part of the COP.
    Q. Two of the properties. The one -- and there's
        another -- we have Greenway, which is a horse of a
        different color.
        And you discussed that agreement with Mr. Bidsal,
        and he agreed with your analysis; right?
    A. He does.
    Q. As a matter of fact, they didn't like it, but
        they agreed; right?
    A. There might have been a better way to go for his
        benefit, but this is what I felt was the more
        appropriate way.
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1
Q. Now, talking about the -- going back to the depreciation issue. I was a little confused when you were explaining it to Judge Wall.

Let's say we have -- the way the depreciation was handled here, it was distributed as though it was operating income; right?
A. The way I handled depreciation.
Q. It was -- the way you handled it is that -- you handled the depreciation as though it were ordinary income from operations; right?
A. It is a deduction as part of ordinary income from operations.
Q. That was a yes or no question. I have a very specific point here.

The way you handled depreciation was -- it was though it was ordinary income from operations; right?
A. I handled -- depreciation is a -- the way the question is being asked --

THE ARBITRATOR: If you can't answer it yes or no, say you can't answer --
A. I can't answer it yes or no. BY MR. LEWIN:
Q. You've seen that -- one of the problems that Mr . Gerety pointed out is that there was distributions equal to the amount of depreciation that was distributed

| 1 | 50-50; right? Page 544 |
| :---: | :---: |
| 2 | A. Correct. |
| 3 | Q. Okay. And we've already talked about earlier |
| 4 | today that depreciation is not part of -- is not |
| 5 | ordinary income. It is -- ordinary income is gross |
| 6 | income less depreciation and maybe some other stuff; |
| 7 | right? |
| 8 | A. So we talked about -- |
| 9 | Q. That's a yes or no. |
| 10 | A. So depreciation is a deduction to arrive at |
| 11 | ordinary income. So the answer, I believe, to the |
| 12 | question is yes. |
| 13 | Q. So I have two issues then. The first issue, I |
| 14 | was just trying to figure out what you were explaining |
| 15 | to Judge Wall. Assume that all the income is |
| 16 | distributed every year, and assume that of that |
| 17 | income -- of that income that is distributed, there is |
| 18 | cash flow that's part of the -- that's part of the |
| 19 | gross -- the income before -- if the cash -- let me |
| 20 | rephrase. |
| 21 | We talked earlier about there's a difference |
| 22 | between cash flow and ordinary income? |
| 23 | A. Yes. |
| 24 | Q. Okay. Mr. Bidsal distributed cash flow, and part |
| 25 | of that cash flow was an amount equal to depreciation; |

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1 right?
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A. Correct.
Q. Assuming that everything -- assuming that the income was all distributed 50-50, so the income comes in -- comes into the capital account, is depreciation -does depreciation reduce the capital account?
A. Yes.
Q. So they would come in 50-50, the depreciation would be 50-50; right?
A. Yes.
Q. And then there's an equal amount of distributions. Wouldn't the capital account always stay in -- in -- consistent?
A. No.
Q. Why not?
A. As I explained before -- if we could go back through the same example we had before -- if you had a \$900,000 -- I'm sorry.
Use \(\$ 1\) million of capital. Start out 30 -300,000 here and 700,000 over here. Right? Net income would be -- let's call it 200,000. Well, let's call it 300,000. 150,000 gets allocated equally between both of them. Part of that net income is a depreciation deduction. If that depreciation deduction was \(\$ 100,000\), cash flow from ordinary operations would be 300,000 .
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| 1 | I'm sorry. It would be 400,000 . $\$ 300,000$ of income, 546 |
| :--- | :--- |
| 2 | add back the $\$ 100,000$ of depreciation, which is a |
| 3 | noncash item. That would mean that there was $\$ 400,000$ |
| 4 | of cash that could be distributed. That would be |
| 5 | distributed $50-50$. |
| 6 | If Mr. Bidsal had a $\$ 300,000$ capital account, it |
| 7 | would increase by $150-$ for the income; it would decrease |
| 8 | by 200,000 for the cash that was distributed. So now |
| 9 | his capital account is $250,000$. |

Q. So if the accounts were $50-50$, everything would stay 50-50; right?
A. If the accounts were 50-50 and all of the income and everything was distributed, then yeah.
Q. All distributions, all income, everything's 50-50, the accounts always should match up; right?
A. Right.
Q. The issue here is that it's 70-30, and that as you -- as we've discussed, depreciation is not -- cash flow is different than ordinary income from operations; right?
A. Correct.
Q. So when Mr . Bidsal distributes the depreciation 50-50 instead of 70-30, that is what is causing the difference in the capital accounts; right?
A. You're -- I can't answer the question the way

1 you've asked it.
Q. Isn't the causation of the variations in the capital account -- his account going up, his account going down -- because Mr. Bidsal is distributing something that should have been distributed 70-30 50-50?
A. That is not my opinion. I do not agree with that statement.
Q. But you do agree that depreciation is not part of ordinary income from operations; right?
A. I don't agree with that statement.
Q. You just -- we just went over this. So I want to know. A minute ago, you said it was, and now you're saying it's not. Let's go through it again.

THE ARBITRATOR: No. He said it was a deduction from ordinary operations expenses.

MR. LEWIN: Well, I think he said it a little bit different, so let me just clear it up so we all know.

THE ARBITRATOR: This last question was it's a part of ordinary income. BY MR. LEWIN:
Q. Depreciation, according to the formula -- excuse me -- according to the Schedule B, Mr. Bidsal's entitled to cash distributions from profits from operations that result in ordinary income; right?
A. Yes.

1
Q. And ordinary income is not -- is different than cash flow. It doesn't include amounts of -- part of the cash flow that -- there's a deduction for depreciation; right?
A. To arrive at ordinary income, you deduct depreciation.
Q. Okay. So if I had -- all right. So where in the operating agreement does Mr. Bidsal -- is Mr. Bidsal entitled to receive distributions on a 50-50 basis from depreciation?
A. It does not specifically say that in the operating agreement.
Q. Not only does it not specifically say it, it doesn't say it all; right?
A. It does not say that he's entitled --
Q. Yes or no? Doesn't say it at all?
A. Correct. Yes.
Q. The only time he's entitled to a 50-50 distribution is like the rental income, ordinary income as per tax purposes from the operations; right?
A. I don't agree with that statement, no.
Q. You said that the purchase of -- the sale of Building $C$ and the purchase of Greenway were two separations -- two different transactions; right?
A. Correct.

1
Q. And according to the closing statement, the cost of Greenway was $\$ 846,560$ ?
A. Correct.
Q. What the purchase price is is not affected by the fact that it's a 1030 exchange; right?
A. That is correct.
Q. Looking at Schedule B again, the term -- never mind. I withdraw the question.

Well, do you believe there's any ambiguity in the step-down allocations? I mean the part that goes from 1 to the final step?
A. I think those three -- those four steps are clear.
Q. And it's -- in your opinion, is it true the sale of a capital asset triggers the waterfall? Right?

MR. GERRARD: Objection. Vague and ambiguous. He keeps using a word that has a defined term in the operating agreement that's different from -- for tax purposes. So, again, unless he says for which purpose he's asking the question, we're never going to know how --

THE ARBITRATOR: You're talking about under the operating agreement?

BY MR. LEWIN:
Q. Under the operating agreement, don't you agree

1 that the sale of a capital asset triggers the waterfall?
A. Yes.
Q. And there's nothing in this document that indicates, as you testified earlier, that the -- that anything -- that only a liquidation would trigger the waterfall; right?
A. No. In my deposition, I made the statement that the waterfall could be triggered only by a liquidation. Subsequent to that, I corrected myself, that other transactions could trigger the waterfall. I said that in my deposition.
Q. And you agree that what actually took place with Green Valley's business was different than what was stated in the operating agreement; right?
A. I would agree that what took place in Green Valley Commerce --
Q. That's a yes or no. Just -THE ARBITRATOR: I didn't really understand the question. What took place with Green Valley Commerce was different than what's in the operating agreement? BY MR. LEWIN:
Q. The Schedule B was never -- strike that. With the exception of the sale of Building $C$, the -- Exhibit B was never followed by Mr. Bidsal; isn't that correct?

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A. No. That's not correct.
Q. Was it followed with respect to the sale of Building B ?
A. Building E?
Q. B.
A. B.
Q. That's a yes or a no.
A. No.
Q. Was it followed with respect to Building E?
A. No.
Q. But in Building \(C\), he did distribute it 70-30; right?
A. Yes, he did.
Q. Looking at the definition of COP that's on page 10.
MR. SHAPIRO: Exhibit 5.
THE WITNESS: Thank you.
MR. GERRARD: Where are you looking? I'm sorry.
MR. LEWIN: Page 10 of Exhibit 5.
BY MR. LEWIN:
Q. It says "COP means costs of purchase as it is specified in the escrow closing statement at the time of purchase of each property owned by the company."
Now, do you agree that that contemplates more than one property being owned by the company?
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| 1 | A. Yes. It seems to say that. Page 552 |
| :---: | :---: |
| 2 | Q. So when we looked at Schedule B -- and remember I |
| 3 | asked you before -- on the paragraph that starts the |
| 4 | "Preferred allocation and distribution schedule," it |
| 5 | says "Cash distributions from capital transactions" |
| 6 | note the plural -- "capital transactions shall be |
| 7 | distributed per the following method between the members |
| 8 | of the LLC." |
| 9 | And here's the part I'm coming to: "Upon any |
| 10 | refinancing event, and upon the sale of company asset, |
| 11 | cash is distributed" -- pursuant to -- "according to a |
| 12 | step-down allocation." |
| 13 | Remember I asked you before whether you thought |
| 14 | that it was missing a word there. Instead of saying |
| 15 | "sale of company asset," you would agree it's not -- at |
| 16 | best, it's very poor grammar; right? |
| 17 | A. Yeah. |
| 18 | Q. But wouldn't you agree that it makes more sense |
| 19 | if it were to say "sale of a company asset"? |
| 20 | A. I can't read anybody's mind. I don't know. I'm |
| 21 | not going to agree with that statement. |
| 22 | Q. Was your interpretation of the words "sale of |
| 23 | company asset" important to you in making your opinions |
| 24 | about whether or not sales of individual properties |
| 25 | triggered the waterfall? Was that important to you? |

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A. Yes.
Q. Would it have made -- but you never asked Mr. Bidsal if it's missing a letter, did you? THE ARBITRATOR: A word? BY MR. LEWIN:
Q. A word. A word. You never asked him if it was missing a word, did you?
A. We had conversations regarding it. He was part of those conversations. I don't recall specifically saying, "Are we missing a word here," so.
Q. Did you ask him if it was missing a word here?
A. I did not -- I do not recall specifically asking him that question.
Q. Do you know David LeGrand?
A. I do not.
Q. But you know he was the lawyer who represented Green Valley not only in the deed in lieu, but in drafting these documents; right?
A. Correct.
Q. Would it have made sense for you to call him up and say, "Listen, is this a typo?" Or "What did you mean by this?" Or "Is it missing a word?"
In reflection, do you think you should have done
that?
A. No.
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1
Q. So you would prefer to not -- not to really know what it meant; right?

MR. GERRARD: Objection. Argumentive.
THE ARBITRATOR: Sustained.
A. Not at all. I --

THE ARBITRATOR: I've sustained the objection.
MR. SHAPIRO: That means no question pending. BY MR. LEWIN:
Q. How do you reconcile the fact that the first sentence -- I'll drop it. I'll withdraw.

When the document says "a substantial portion of the company's assets," were you informed what Mr. Bidsal testified what he thought a sale of a substantial amount of company assets were?
A. No.

THE ARBITRATOR: You're talking about in his deposition?

BY MR. LEWIN:
Q. In his deposition.
A. Okay. No.
Q. What do you think -- so how do you interpret -would it have been important for you to find out what he thought that provision meant in forming your opinions?
A. My opinion is the documents -- the allocation schedule spoke for itself. He didn't feel like it was

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substantial or he wouldn't have done the allocations the way he did.
Q. Move to strike. That's not really what I asked. That doesn't answer my question. I'm asking questions that really need to be answered directly, and I don't want to be -THE ARBITRATOR: All right. Let's just ask it. BY MR. LEWIN:
Q. The question was did you think what Mr . Bidsal thought a substantial amount of the company's assets was would be important in forming your opinions?
A. No.
Q. Did you think what you thought would be a
``` substantial portion was important?
A. Yes.
Q. Why is your -- why is what you thought different than what he thought when he's the person who signed the agreement?
A. Because I was asked to provide an expert opinion based on the documents that \(I\) had to work with.
Q. You think it's -- you think it's -- he's 50 percent or more; right?
A. I think I testified that 50 percent or more would be in the realm, yes.
Q. That was a yes or no question.
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A. Yes.
Q. In a company that owns eight buildings and a parking lot, is a sale of one property a substantial sale, $1 / 8$ of its entire ownership?
A. Are you referring specific to Green Valley?
Q. Yeah, Green Valley.
A. I would say no.
Q. How about two?
A. Probably not.
Q. When you say "probably not," that means --
A. No.
Q. -- it's on the fence? It's a wobbler?
A. No.
Q. Okay. Let's assume that -- strike that. Did you ever ask why that phrase is in this

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document?

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document?
        THE ARBITRATOR: Ask who?
        MR. LEWIN: Ask anybody.
        MR. GERRARD: Ask what is in the document?
        MR. LEWIN: The phrase "a substantial" -- "such
        as a sale" -- the example of "such as a sale of all or a
        substantial portion of the company's assets."
        MR. GERRARD: I don't see any words in here that
        say "as an example."
        MR. LEWIN: He's already testified that it was.
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THE ARBITRATOR: All right. We know which provision he's talking about.
A. No, I did not. BY MR. LEWIN:
Q. Okay. Let me give you a hypothetical. First of all, Mr. Bidsal clearly is entitled to 50 percent of the rents; right?
A. Correct.
Q. Let's say that there's accounts receivable of \$500,000 from tenants for whatever reasons -- the pandemic -- whatever the reasons are, there's accounts receivable of \(\$ 500,000\), and there's an offer to buy the entire property -- there's an offer to buy Green Valley for \(\$ 5\) million. Do you have those numbers in mind?
A. Okay.
Q. Now, the offer contemplates and takes into consideration that there's \(\$ 500,000\) of debt that's owed to it. That's another factor; correct?
A. Okay. Yes.
Q. Under those circumstances, the way this paragraph is phrased --
MR. GERRARD: What paragraph?
BY MR. LEWIN:
Q. The part that we're talking about, "a sale of all or a substantial portion of the company's assets,"
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1 Mr. Bidsal would receive only his share of the proceeds

2
3 of the sale pursuant to the waterfall. He wouldn't get anything for the debt that's being acquired. Do you see what I'm talking about?

MR. GERRARD: I'm sorry. I don't understand what you're talking about because I didn't hear anything about a debt.

THE ARBITRATOR: That's the accounts receivable. MR. GERRARD: But that's not a debt.

MR. LEWIN: It's a debt that's owed to the company.

THE ARBITRATOR: It is to who's supposed to pay it.

MR. GERRARD: Owed to the company by a third party?

MR. LEWIN: By a third party. By tenants. It's rent that's owed.

THE ARBITRATOR: All right. If you can answer the question. BY MR. LEWIN:
Q. So under those circumstances, that would be a sale of all or substantially all of the company's assets. Mr. Bidsal's recovery would be subject to the waterfall; right?

MR. GERRARD: Objection. Vague and ambiguous.

1 Incomplete hypothetical.

THE ARBITRATOR: I'll overrule the objection. Mr. Wilcox, if you can answer the question as stated. BY MR. LEWIN:
Q. Do you have the assumed facts in mind?
A. No, I got the facts. I just want to clarify. You are saying $\$ 500,000$ receivable. Somebody has offered to buy the entire company, everything, for \$5 million?
Q. Right.
A. And the question is would that trigger the waterfall?
Q. Yes.
A. And the answer is yes.
Q. Okay. Now, let's assume one more fact. Let's assume Mr . Bidsal says, Wait a second. Those are rents. I'm not only entitled to my share from the sale, but I should get a disproportionate allocation of the debt because that -- those accounts receivable arise from rents which I have a 50 percent interest in as opposed to a 30 percent interest.

Do you have that fact in mind?
A. Uh-huh.
Q. Under the facts as I've presented them, he would

1 Page 560
1 still -- the waterfall would still be triggered and he
2 would not have any income -- any additional 20 percent
3 credit for the debt that's being acquired; right?

4 sale are, so we don't know where the waterfall would end. We don't have enough information to answer that question.

MR. LEWIN: I'm sorry. You're right. I just mean he would not have any claim for 50 percent based on the fact that the debt is rent that is being sold -debt arising from rent.

THE ARBITRATOR: I'll allow it if you can answer, Mr. Wilcox.

THE WITNESS: So is this a yes or no question?
BY MR. LEWIN:
Q. No. You can answer. I just want to make sure 18 you understand the facts. The facts are that -- there's 19 this dichotomy. There's a half a million dollars' worth 20 of rent that Mr . Bidsal has a greater percentage 21 interest in.
A. He has a 50 percent in the rent versus a 30 percent.
Q. And on the other hand, it's a sale of all the assets that triggers a waterfall. So if it's a sale of

1 all the assets, his 50 percent claim, it's assumed and 2 the waterfall triggered; right?
A. The waterfall -- yes. What happens in the waterfall, the first thing, Step 3, is that we get everybody's capital accounts paid back. It really doesn't matter whether that $\$ 500,000$ receivable is -- it just is going to be part of what's paid back in the total scheme of it.
Q. Now, let's say that we were in 2008 again, revisited, and instead of $\$ 5$ million for the company, someone only offers $\$ 2.5$ million. And we don't -- and we still have the same amount that's owed. At that point in time, Mr. Bidsal still -- the money is scheduled -- the waterfall is triggered, and his claim for the 50 percent is assumed in the sale of the company's -- the company; right?
A. No, I don't agree with that. Under that scenario, the distribution would come out 70-30, assuming there was not enough to get to the next step -the final step.
Q. Right. That's right. That's what I'm saying. You and I are agreeing now for a change.
A. Okay. We're in agreement.
Q. I said it's 70-30 because it's a sale of substantial -- of the assets, and it goes down the

1 waterfall.
A. Agreed.
Q. And Mr. Bidsal's claim for 50 percent of the debt is assumed in that waterfall distribution?
A. Correct.
Q. Okay. And so does that now give you an explanation of why this provision is in this specific intent paragraph?

MR. GERRARD: Objection. Calls for speculation as to what the parties' intent was at the time they --

THE ARBITRATOR: Yeah. And the way it's phrased, I'm going to sustain the objection. BY MR. LEWIN:
Q. Do you believe that's a possible explanation for -- as to why the part -- they talk about the sale of a substantial portion of the company's assets?

MR. GERRARD: Same objection.
BY MR. LEWIN:
Q. To cover that eventuality? THE ARBITRATOR: I'll allow it.
A. That could be one reason. BY MR. LEWIN:
Q. I just want to make sure $I$ covered this already. You read the assignment of leases and you read the deed of trust. It was your opinion that the amount of rents
1 that the borrower was accumulating and holding, that
2 those rents actually -- the lender had an interest in those and the borrower was holding those on behalf of the lender; right?
A. Correct.
Q. So when the borrower paid the $\$ 295,000$ to -- as part of the deed in lieu, it was actually transferring money that the lender already had the rights to; right?
A. Yes.
Q. Let's say -- this is an example. We're in Las Vegas. Someone goes -- wins -- someone makes a lot of money playing poker. And he owes you some money, and he pays you $\$ 10,000$ from his poker winnings paying off your debt --

MR. GERRARD: Paying off what debt? You're assuming there's a debt?

BY MR. LEWIN:
Q. Let's say someone who owes you $\$ 10,000$ for your services wins money at poker. This is gambling money; right? And then he pays you that $\$ 10,000$ from that gambling money. That doesn't change the nature of what he's paying you. He's paying you money; he's not paying you gambling money. The fact that it's gambling money doesn't make any difference; right?
A. That fact that it's gambling money doesn't

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1 matter.
Q. In other words, the name of how you -- how you characterize something doesn't necessarily define what it is; right?
A. In your example --
MR. GERRARD: Just a second.
Objection. Incomplete hypothetical.
THE ARBITRATOR: I'm going to sustain that objection.
BY MR. LEWIN:
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Q. Let me phrase that a little bit differently. If a client of yours wins at blackjack and turns over the cash to you to pay your bill for accounting services, is what you received considered gambling income or accounting income?
A. It's called accounting income.
Q. And if a borrower turns over rents to -- if a borrower turns over money that it collected as rents to a lender, it doesn't mean that it's rent money; it's just money that was owed to the lender; right?

MR. GERRARD: Same objection. It's an incomplete hypothetical. We don't know enough facts to answer that question.

THE ARBITRATOR: I'm going to sustain the objection because it's just -- it presupposes that

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1 there's not any agreement between the lender and the borrower that rents have to be forwarded in this bucket and principal has to be forwarded in this bucket and interest has to be forwarded in this bucket. So I don't understand the question.
BY MR. LEWIN:
Q. So prior to the deed in lieu agreement and the assignment of leases and rents, the borrower was
``` accumulating money that it had not paid to the lender towards the debt owed under the note. That's how you understand it; right?
A. That's what the deed in lieu agreement says, yes.
Q. Okay. And those -- the borrower owed that money as interest or principal under the note; right?
A. You say "that money" --
Q. Well, any money. All rent money. Under the assignment of leases, all rents collected were being held by the borrower for the benefit of the lender?
A. Yes.
Q. Not as payment of rent, as payment of -- of payments under the note; right?

MR. GERRARD: Objection. Incomplete
hypothetical. Calls for speculation. There's no foundation.

THE ARBITRATOR: If you know.
\begin{tabular}{|cc|}
\hline 1 & I mean, I kind of want -- you've kind of plowed 566 \\
2 & this ground, but I'll let you have a little more. \\
3 & MR. LEWIN: Okay. If I get a quick answer, I'll \\
4 & get out of it. \\
5 & BY MR. LEWIN: \\
6 & Q. So my question is the borrower was holding money \\
7 & under -- you've read all the loan documents now; right? \\
8 & A. Yes. \\
9 & Q. Okay. Including the assignment of leases and \\
10 & rents? \\
11 & THE ARBITRATOR: We covered that. \\
12 & BY MR. LEWIN:
\end{tabular}
Q. Okay. So my point is when the borrower was holding money, he was accumulating rents, but the money that -- to be paid to the lender was payments under the note, which would be principal and interest; right? Before the deed in lieu agreement.
A. Yeah.
Q. So the fact that -- in the deed in lieu agreement, they talk about amounts of rents that had not been paid to the lender. The only thing that the borrower owed to the lender was principal and interest; right?
A. At that point.
Q. And the concurrent closing of the deed in lieu

Page 567
1 agreement where there's a conveyance and the rent -- the
2 amounts that have been accumulated as rent are payouts to each other doesn't change the nature of what those monies were. In other words, they were rents that were being accumulated for the benefit of the lender; right? MR. GERRARD: Objection. Lack of foundation. THE ARBITRATOR: I'm going to sustain the objection and ask that we move on. MR. LEWIN: Okay. Very well. THE ARBITRATOR: Thanks. BY MR. LEWIN:
Q. Now, we talked about security deposits. You said security deposits were not prorated liabilities; right?
A. I did not include -- yes. I did not include them in the liabilities.
Q. If the financial statements of Green Valley are -- if their security deposits are shown as a liability, then they are a liability; right?
A. Yes. Under the -- as you described it, yes.
Q. Well, under generally accepted accounting principles, regardless of whether or not the landlord has money in the bank to pay the security deposits, the obligation to pay the security deposits is still a liability; right?
A. Correct.
Q. And that is why the amount of security deposits -- if there is any -- should be shown on the financial statements; right?
A. Correct.
Q. And on Green Valley there is an amount that is shown on the financial statements; right?
A. Correct.
Q. And if -- and the security deposits, if there are distributions that take into account -- that include the amount of money that was transferred from the borrower as a security deposit -- I think it was \(\$ 74,000\) at one point; right?
A. Yes.
Q. If there were -- if there were distributions that would have -- that would include amounts attributable to those security deposits, that would be what kind of distribution? Would that be income from operations or would that be a capital distribution?
A. That one would be -- if you're distributing those security deposits, it almost feels like you're taking them into income. So then \(I\) would say it would be a 50-50 -- it should be a 50-50. Otherwise, why would you be distributing them? You have a liability there. So I guess I could argue either way on that one.
Q. Okay. Well, let's see how you argue it in the
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1 deposition.

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deposition.
Would a distribution of security deposits if it is carried as a liability on the books of the company be ordinary income?
A. No.
Q. Okay. It would be then a capital distribution; right?
A. If the security deposit is kept on the books of the company?
Q. Right.
A. It would not be ordinary income. And that -that would be an argument that it could be a capital -return of capital.
Q. Okay. So you have ordinary income is one bucket; right?
A. Uh-huh.
Q. And that's -- we've talked about what ordinary income consists of. Is it correct that if there's -any income -- any distribution that's not a distribution of ordinary income is by definition a distribution of capital unless it's a capital return?
MR. GERRARD: Objection.
MR. LEWIN: I'll rephrase the question.
BY MR. LEWIN:
Q. Is it correct that any distributions other than

```1 what would be considered profit distributions from --2 from operations from ordinary income -- anything over3 and above -- any distributions other than that would be a return of capital; right?
A. No. That's not what I've testified to.
Q. Well, I didn't ask you what you testified to. I asked you if that's the truth. What would it be?
MR. GERRARD: I'm going to move to strike the first part of the answer, which is argumentive.
THE ARBITRATOR: That will be granted.
But what would it be?
A. It would be -- if there was no capital transaction, it would be a distribution subject to the 50-50 because it would be a distribution resulting from income of the operations. So it would be a 50-50 distribution.
BY MR. LEWIN:
Q. Well, we just talked about the security deposits. What would that be, if that's not -- that's not an a income from operations?
A. So I agreed with --
MR. GERRARD: Here. I'm just going to object on the basis of relevance because there's no indication, no evidence, not a scrap that the security deposits have ever been distributed. So why are we even talking about
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1 this?
MR. LEWIN: Distribution doesn't have to do anything with prorated labilities. We just heard --
MR. GERRARD: That's not my objection.
MR. LEWIN: We just heard Mr. Wilcox on this. I have a point I'm trying to make here. Let me see if I can get it without an objection.
THE ARBITRATOR: All right.
BY MR. LEWIN:
Q. The only distributions that Mr. Bidsal is entitled to on a 50-50 basis are cash distributions of profits from operations that -- resulting in ordinary income. You agree with that?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. If there's a distribution that is not a distribution of profits generated from operations resulting in ordinary income, then it has to be something -- it has to be a capital distribution. Isn't that true?
MR. GERRARD: Objection. Misstates what the document says. We've been over this like four or five times already.
MR. LEWIN: No, this is a whole different question.
MR. GERRARD: You've asked these same questions

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1 already. You already asked if it's capital --
MR. LEWIN: Okay. Can we just have the objection ruled on?
THE ARBITRATOR: All right. To me, it's an incomplete question because I don't really understand -MR. LEWIN: I guess I'm not making the question clear.
THE ARBITRATOR: All right. Let's try then.
BY MR. LEWIN:

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Q. Here's the point I'm getting to -- maybe I phrased it wrong.

As I said before, Mr. Bidsal -- we've talked about when Mr. Bidsal's entitled to 50-50. Any distribution to where Mr . Bidsal's not entitled to a 50-50 distribution of profits needs to be distributed 70-30 according to the operating agreement; isn't that correct?
A. If he's not entitled to 50-50, he's entitled -it should be 70-30.
Q. Okay.

MR. LEWIN: Thank you, Doug. Finally got my point across clearly.

BY MR. LEWIN:
Q. Okay. Let's talk about the parking lot. Looking at your schedule, you say, Look, the parking lots --
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1 there were easements that were given when the properties

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``` there were easements that were given when the properties were sold, so effectively the properties -- a portion of those parking lots had been sold, because Green Valley doesn't have any -- those rights are only (inaudible). THE REPORTER: I'm sorry. I didn't hear you. MR. LEWIN: It only has rights subject to the easements.
And he said...
THE WITNESS: Yes.
BY MR. LEWIN:
Q. Okay. And therefore, you say -- but just to be clear, there's been no deed conveying fee title interest to any portion of the parking lot; right?
A. That is correct.
Q. Okay. So Green Valley is still the owner of the common area; right?
A. Correct.
Q. And you say what Mr. Bidsal did when he sold these -- when he sold \(B\) and \(E\), and perhaps even \(C\), was -- there was a cost allocation. C didn't make any difference because that was rolled over, but with B and E, he allocated what the cost was and then divided the gain -- allocated the cost 70-30, the gain 50-50?
A. Yes.
Q. You with me so far?
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Q. But that cost that he used did not include the allocated cost of the parking lots; is that correct?
A. That's correct.
Q. In other words -- let's use round numbers. If he sold two properties and he allocated costs of $\$ 300,000$ for each property, but the cost -- the allocable share of the parking lot was 50,000 he should have used -- got another $\$ 50,000$ to distribute $70-30$; right?
A. If that's what he did, yeah, I agree with you.
Q. Isn't that one of the reasons why -- one of the disagreements between you and Mr. Gerety? Mr. Gerety says, Look, he hasn't sold it and he hasn't allocated the cost on it, so we have to use the COP from the parking lot as it is, because he's never given him his share of the cost that was on the sales? That's really the disagreement; right?
A. That is one of our disagreements, but you're mixing apples and oranges.
Q. Okay. So if we were to use your number, then Mr. -- use your number taking the allocable share of the COP for the two parking lots -- two buildings in the parking lots -- three, actually -- then CLA should get credit or get some kind of additional distribution for that part that has not been allocated in the

1 distribution of proceeds; right?
A. Yeah, I would agree with that.
Q. Did you ever ask Mr. Bidsal why he didn't allocate a portion of the parking lot on these transfers when he was considering cost?
A. No, just like I didn't ask him why he included cost of sales as part of his return in capital. I didn't agree with that either.
Q. Just to make it clear, your reducing the $C O P$ by the reason of the sales relating to the parking lots included a part of the common area as though it had been sold; right?
A. That is correct.
Q. If we were to -- I don't want to go back to this 295-, but $I$ have a question here because I don't think I covered it.

If we were to assume that the $\$ 295,000$ was for the payment of past due interest for periods that are set forth in the deed in lieu agreement, would it be right that the portion of interest payment that precedes Green Valley's acquisition of the note should be treated as a return of capital?
A. No. I disagree with that.
Q. Well, let me read your answer to that. I just read the question.
A. Okay.
Q. Let me read your answer. It's at page 154, line 23. The whole question and answer is at 154, line 23 through 155, line 11. I'm not going to repeat the question because $I$ read it verbatim.
"Answer: If the portion of the interest prior to that, I'd have to see the calculation of it. Was that interest? Was there a default interest rate? I mean, all of those things could come into it, but I could see that that would be -- that I could see that would be -the answer to that question would be yes just dependent on the facts."

It correctly recorded that you said yes; right?
MR. GERRARD: That's not what you said. You said, Yes, depends on the facts.
A. It's only half the answer.

BY MR. LEWIN:
Q. But the facts are -- you need to see the facts to be able to determine how much was interest for the period before the acquisition of the note; right?
A. Correct.
Q. And if you could determine that the payment was for interest before the note was acquired, that -without anything else, then that would be a return of capital?
A. Based on those limited facts, yes.
Q. Okay. Let's talk about the interest that you calculated. You said you calculated the interest pursuant to NRS -- I think you said 90.040; is that correct?
A. I believe it's 090.
Q. Okay. In fact, you used a varying amount of interest; right? In other words, you recalculated interest as though it were postjudgment interest; right?
A. Correct.
Q. So do you know what the prime interest rate, or -- strike that.

What interest rates did you use? What was your source of interest rates?
A. What was the source of the interest rate?
Q. Yes.
A. NRS -- I believe it's 090.
Q. So -- and that sets forth what the interest rate's to be calculated on judgments; right?
A. Right.
Q. What was the interest rate -- strike that. When did you believe that the contract had been entered into in order to begin the start period?
A. I based my calculation on what the attorneys might -- told me to assume that that was -- to assume

1 2
that that was the date the interest started accruing.
Q. What was that date?
A. I believe it was September 2nd.
Q. September 2?
A. Pardon me?
Q. Is it September 2?
A. September 2. I think it was September 2 .
Q. My question was did you give any consideration as to the date when the contract was entered into? THE ARBITRATOR: What contract?
MR. LEWIN: The agreement -- the election to -CLA's election to buy would be the date -- I think that would be the date -- the date that the agreement was formed.
THE ARBITRATOR: August 3rd?
MR. LEWIN: August 3rd.
MR. GERRARD: So I obviously have to object to the question because it misstates the evidence and it misstates the operating agreement. It doesn't say there is a new contract that exists on that date. The contract was in the operating agreement.
MR. LEWIN: Well, I'm going to get to that.
THE ARBITRATOR: If you think the August 3rd date is more appropriate, I'm going to go with that -- or do you have an opinion?

| 1 | THE WITNESS: You know, I didn't make an Page 579 |
| :---: | :---: |
| 2 | don't have an opinion on that. I used the date that I |
| 3 | was asked to use. |
| 4 | BY MR. LEWIN: |
| 5 | Q. Is there a reason why you used the postjudgment |
| 6 | interest rate? |
| 7 | A. Again, I was told to assume -- |
| 8 | MR. GERRARD: I'm sorry. You're calling it a |
| 9 | postjudgment interest rate rather than just the Nevada |
| 10 | legal rate of interest? |
| 11 | MR. LEWIN: Yes. |
| 12 | MR. GERRARD: Okay. I'm going to object to the |
| 13 | question. It mischaracterizes what the statute says. |
| 14 | THE ARBITRATOR: I'm going to sustain that |
| 15 | objection. It's one of the things we use it for, but |
| 16 | it's not a postjudgment rate. |
| 17 | MR. LEWIN: The interest rate -- there's two ways |
| 18 | those interests are calculated. I don't want -- do I |
| 19 | need -- I don't want to go into it now, but our position |
| 20 | is that his calculation of the interest rate is wrong. |
| 21 | THE ARBITRATOR: Okay. |
| 22 | BY MR. LEWIN: |
| 23 | Q. So in any case, you used the portion of the -- |
| 24 | you calculated on interest with a varying amount of |
| 25 | interest every six months? |

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A. That is correct.
Q. Okay. Did you discuss -- never mind. Did you discuss whether or not it was appropriate to -- do you know what money could have been earned if Mr. Bidsal had gotten paid and put it into a bank as opposed to using the legal rate of interest? MR. GERRARD: Objection. Calls for speculation. THE ARBITRATOR: Well, if the question is, Do you know.
A. Generally. Maybe half a percent. Maybe 1 or 2 percent if he got a long-term CD. BY MR. LEWIN:
Q. Let's say between --
A. Was the question what would he have earned had the money been put in the bank?
Q. That's right.
MR. GERRARD: Okay. Not what could have been earned if -- I understand. I misunderstood the question. I'm sorry. BY MR. LEWIN:
Q. If he got a long-term -- the interest rates that he could have received at financial institutions is less than the interest rate he could have received under the Nevada rate of interest -- right? -- legal rate of interest.
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A. Yeah. I agree with that.
Q. And did you have any discussions with anybody of whether or not it was appropriate that Mr. Bidsal should be rewarded for breaching the contract by getting -- by refusing to consummate the sale and getting a larger amount of interest than he could have obtained elsewhere?
MR. GERRARD: Objection. Argumentative.
THE ARBITRATOR: Sustained.
MR. LEWIN: Nothing else.
THE ARBITRATOR: All right. Before we take a break and then do redirect -- I hesitate to ask questions because I'm afraid it's going to open up a whole new can of worms, but.
FURTHER EXAMINATION
BY THE ARBITRATOR:
Q. I need you to kind of square with me your opinion in terms of interpretation of the operating agreement.
A. Okay.
Q. Take a look at Exhibit B. It says near the bottom "Cash distributions of profits from operations shall be allocated and distributed 50-50"; right?
A. Correct.
Q. And then there's a paragraph talking about what the express intent of the parties mean when it says
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| 1 | "cash distributions of profits"; right? |
| :--- | :--- |
| 2 | A. Correct. |
| 3 | Q. And it says it "refers to distributions generated |
| 4 | from operations resulting in ordinary income"? |
| 5 | A. Correct. |
| 6 | Q. That defined "cash distributions of profits"; |
| 7 | right? |
| 8 | A. Okay. |
| 9 | Q. In Exhibit B. Are you with me? |
| 10 | A. Yup. I'm with you. |
| 11 | Q. Okay. Is that -- do you read Exhibit B to say |
| 12 | "only" cash distributions of profits as defined in that |
| 13 | following paragraph -- that's the only thing that's |
| 14 | divided $50-50 ?$ |
| 15 | And in fairness, I want you to square that with |
| 16 | Exhibit A, 5.1.1 that says "items of income, gain, loss, |
| 17 | deduction, or credit shall be allocated among the |
| 18 | members in proportion to their percentage interests" -- |
| 19 | which is the 50-50 -- "subject to the preferred |
| 20 | allocation." |
| 21 | So does my question make sense, I guess? Square |
| 22 | those two with me in terms of whether Exhibit B says to |
| 23 | you, "The only thing that's separated $50-50$ is cash |
| 24 | distributions of profits as defined in the paragraph |
| 25 | below, or if it's broader than that based on Exhibit A? |

A. Okay. So 5.1.1.1, that's -- just to be clear, that's talking about the allocation of income amongst the partners, not the distribution of cash. But it's talking about the allocation of income amongst the partners.
Q. Okay.
A. And it's basically saying there, as you just read, all of those things -- income, gain, loss, deductions -- all of those items are going to be allocated to the members. Again, not distributions, but that's what's going to show up on your $\mathrm{K}-1$ as income.
Q. All right.
A. And then it says "as set forth in B" -obviously -- "subject to the preferred allocations contained in Exhibit B."
Q. Right.
A. So we're going to do -- this just says, Okay, all these things are going to get allocated. Now we're going to go over to Exhibit B.

Exhibit B, the first thing is -- that we look at is the question of when does the preferred allocation kick in. Nothing new there; right?
Q. Right.
A. And my opinion is that the preferred allocation doesn't necessarily kick in here because we haven't sold

1 Page 584
1 the company asset. Or -- then further clarifies
2 substantially all -- or all of the assets or a
3 substantial portion. So, you know, you kind of square
4 those two together.

So my interpretation of this is number one, we never get to the waterfall. That is clearly my belief. You never get to the preferred allocation because of that.

Then we go down to what your original question was, and that is cash distributions of profits from operations. There's just really a lot of ambiguity there. Because we got cash distributions of profits from operations. Well, cash distributions of profits from operations, that is cash that is generated by operations. Rent minus property taxes minus whatever --

## Q. Depreciation?

A. And minus depreciation.

So we're going to end up with more cash than we have profits. Now, the thing that -- the big reason that $I$ believe that that 50 percent applies to all of the distributions generated from -- or distributions of cash generated by operations is because -- the big argument is depreciation. Does -- do we -- part of those -- part of the cash that we have -- the reason that cash to distribute is in excess of net income is

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    1 because of depreciation. We've established that.
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So what do we do with that now? Is that going to be a 50-50 or a 30-70? Well, income -- the net income gets allocated 50-50 -- the income from operations. So why -- unless we were in a situation where we would sell all our assets, why would we distribute that depreciation -- that cash that is made available because of the depreciation deduction, why would we distribute that 70-30 when really it's allocated to everyone on a 50-50 basis? Now --
Q. Allocated under 5.1.1.1?
A. Right. Exactly.
Q. And are we conflating terms when we call -- take what Mr. Bidsal did with Properties B and E, distributed the portion of the proceeds equal to the basis in the cost segregation report --
A. Right.
Q. -- 70-30, and the rest, which we have called "gain" --
A. Right.
Q. -- is that different? There's "gains" also referenced in the allocation provision of 5.1.1.1, which is to be distributed pursuant to the membership's interest. Is that the --
A. Yup. You got it.
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Q. It's gain either way?
A. Yeah.
Q. Or is it a different definition of gain?
A. No, that's -- that's the gain I think it's talking about.
Q. Okay. Because in that allocation provision, $I$ mean, there's income, but the way the business is set up, there's no other gain; right? Or is there?
A. No, this business is going to have gain from income or gain from two sources: Sale of property or rent minus expenses.
Q. That's income, though; right?
A. Yeah. And here's another reason why I believe that you have to allocate the distribution that's coming from depreciation -- you know, that excess cash over and above income -- when the property is sold, that depreciation has to get recaptured. And it gets allocated -- again, going back to 5.1.1.1 -- it gets allocated 50-50. Otherwise, you just get a result that makes no sense.

THE ARBITRATOR: All right. So let's take a break.
(RECESS TAKEN FROM 4:17 P.M. TO 4:32 P.M.)

| 1 | THE ARBITRATOR: Mr. Wilcox, you realize you are 587 |
| :---: | :---: |
| 2 | still under oath? |
| 3 | THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. |
| 4 | THE ARBITRATOR: All right. |
| 5 | Mr. Gerrard? |
| 6 | FURTHER EXAMINATION |
| 7 | BY MR. GERRARD: |
| 8 | Q. As usual, the judge anticipated the very |
| 9 | questions I was going to ask. I know you've been here a |
| 10 | long time, and I know you're tired. And I want to make |
| 11 | sure we get this right, and it's clear. |
| 12 | So when you look at the operating agreement in |
| 13 | Section 5.1.1.1 that the judge talked about -- let's |
| 14 | open up to that. This is Exhibit A to Exhibit 5. |
| 15 | A. Okay. |
| 16 | Q. And we start -- the language at the beginning of |
| 17 | 5.1 says that "Each member's distributive share of all |
| 18 | the income, gain, loss, deduction, or credit," and at |
| 19 | the end of that paragraph says "shall be determined as |
| 20 | follows"; correct? |
| 21 | A. Correct. |
| 22 | Q. Okay. So we start from premise that |
| 23 | everything -- that any distributions that they get -- |
| 24 | their share of all income, gain, loss, deduction, or |
| 25 | credit -- is going to be determined by the following, |

1 and then it goes to 5.1.1.1; correct?
A. Correct.
Q. And you just read through that with the judge where it says "items of income, gain, loss, deduction, or credit shall be allocated among the members in proportion to their percentage interests as set forth in Exhibit B."

You see where I'm reading?
A. Yes.
Q. All right. And what is the percentage interest in Exhibit B?
A. 50-50.
Q. Okay. So according to this Section 5.1 and 5.1.1.1, what is the general rule for this company?
A. The general rule is that income will be allocated 50-50.
Q. And gain; correct?
A. And gain.
Q. Doesn't it say "gain"?
A. All of these items: Income, gain, loss, deduction. So all -- yeah.
Q. All right. So even the gain from any sale of property is supposed to be allocated and distributed 50-50 unless this special allocation language in Exhibit B is triggered; correct?

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A. That is correct.
Q. Okay. So this concept -- let's go back to Exhibit B. Do you see that -- the one sentence that was read to you by Mr. Lewin that says "Cash distributions of profits from operations shall be allocated and distributed 50 percent to Shawn Bidsal and 50 percent to CLA Properties, LLC."
Do you see that?
A. Yes.
MR. LEWIN: That's not exactly what it says.
THE ARBITRATOR: That's exactly what it says. He just read it.
MR. GERRARD: I just read it verbatim. BY MR. GERRARD:
Q. Does that sentence somehow change the general rule of allocations and distributions set forth in Section 5.1.1.1 of the operating agreement?
A. No. No.
Q. Okay. So if I'm understanding this correctly, everything is distributed, and all gain -- not just profits from operations, but all gain of any kind -- and all deductions, which would include depreciation -- all those things are all allocated and distributed on a 50-50 basis unless this special allocation step-down allocation language is triggered?
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A. Correct.
Q. So if that's the case, then is it your opinion -am I understanding what your testimony was -- that this -- that you looked to the step-down allocation to see if what it is that's being sold is a capital transaction under the definition of the operating agreement?
A. Correct.
Q. And if it is, then is that a 70-30 split?
A. If it falls under the -- if it's preferred -- if it falls under the special allocations, the preferred allocation, then it would be 70-30.
Q. Okay. So meaning if it is a capital transaction as defined in the operating agreement, it is a 70-30 split?
A. Correct.
Q. And if it is not a capital transaction as defined in the operating agreement, what would the split be of the gain?
A. It would be a 50-50 split.
Q. Okay. And that would apply even if it was a sale of what for tax purposes is a capital asset; correct?
A. Correct.
Q. So if you sold a piece of real property, which for tax purposes -- in other words, when the company
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    1 pays taxes -- the IRS calls that a capital asset;
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A. That's correct.
Q. And it determines what the taxes are for a capital asset as distinguished from ordinary income; correct?
A. Right. Yes.
Q. There's different tax rates for those two different things?
A. Correct.
Q. Assuming it's a long-term capital gain; right?
A. Correct.
Q. So if there is a sale by this company of a building which results in the company paying taxes on capital gain taxes, meaning the IRS calls it a capital transaction, does that mean that the step-down allocation language has been triggered?
A. No, it does not.
Q. And that is because why?
A. That is because that doesn't meet the definition of a capital transaction from the operating agreement.
Q. All right. So to be clear, and just to make sure I can move off of this forever, the general rule is 50-50 everything -- gains from sale of capital -- what the IRS would call a capital asset included; correct?
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A. Correct.
Q. The only exception to that is if it's a capital transaction as defined in the operating agreement, Exhibit B?
A. I agree.
Q. Okay. Now, while we're on this, Mr. Lewin asked you if there was any place in the operating agreement -he asked you this twice -- where it talked about allocating depreciation 50-50 between the members. And I thought you said no. Is that still your testimony?
A. No. That -- 5.1.1.1 talks about income, gain, loss, deductions -- so that would fall under the 50-50 allocation.
Q. Okay. Because depreciation is a?
A. Deduction.
Q. Deduction, okay. Let's move off of that. Let's talk about the interest again. I hate to do this to you, but let's take a look at Exhibit 11. You weren't here for this, but there was testimony earlier that -- there's an email on the second page of Exhibit 11. I'm sorry. Let me get you to the right place.

On the second page of Exhibit 11, there's an email from something called dgllawyer@hotmail.com to chrischilds@anclv.com. Do you see where I'm looking?

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A. Yes.
Q. And you weren't here for this testimony, but there was testimony that was given that Chris Childs was the attorney that represented the former owner of the property before the deed in lieu. Okay?
A. Okay.
Q. And this email says "Chris, we calculate the total forgiveness on the deed in lieu as follows: The principal forgiveness is \(\$ 7,994,582\) minus 4 million. Total principal forgiven is 3,994,582."
And the next paragraph is a little hard to read because something's on there. It says "Looks like interest forgiven is March 6th to September 6, 2011, 49,695.99 per month plus the 16 days per diem."
So then it says -- basically it's talking about interest being forgiven is like \(\$ 311,265.12\).
MR. LEWIN: I can't read that.
MR. GERRARD: I know. I'm going to show you something that will make it clearer. BY MR. GERRARD:
Q. Do you see the number?
A. Yes.
Q. Turn to the first page of Exhibit 11. This is a 1099-C, sometimes referred to as a 1099-COD. Do you know what that is?
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| 1 | MR. SHAPIRO: The first page of Exhibit ${ }^{\text {Page }} 11$ S94 ${ }^{\text {Or }}$ |
| :---: | :---: |
| 2 | you mean the page before? |
| 3 | MR. GERRARD: No. The first page. |
| 4 | BY MR. GERRARD: |
| 5 | Q. What is the purpose of a 1099-COD? |
| 6 | A. It is to report when debt has been canceled. |
| 7 | Q. Okay. So this matches up with the email we just |
| 8 | saw, which shows that there was a cancellation of debt |
| 9 | of \$311,265.12 for interest and \$3,994,582. Do you see |
| 10 | that? |
| 11 | A. Yes. |
| 12 | Q. Okay. So according to this document, all of the |
| 13 | accrued interest that was owed on the note originally |
| 14 | was forgiven; correct? |
| 15 | A. According to this document, yes. |
| 16 | Q. And reported to the IRS as forgiven; correct? |
| 17 | A. Yes. |
| 18 | Q. Okay. And all of the principal of the loan was |
| 19 | forgiven; correct? |
| 20 | A. Not all of the principal. |
| 21 | Q. Well, yeah. All -- it shows the amount that was |
| 22 | forgiven, 3.9, almost 4 -- |
| 23 | A. Almost 4 million in principal was forgiven. |
| 24 | Q. Okay. Now, let's once again go back to the deed |
| 25 | in lieu agreement. Let's make this quick. That is |


| 1 | exhibit number... Page 595 |
| :---: | :---: |
| 2 | A. 8 . |
| 3 | Q. Yup. All right. Now, couple of things I want to |
| 4 | cover with you. |
| 5 | First of all, do you remember you were asked a |
| 6 | question where you were asked, Did the property interest |
| 7 | that was held by Green Valley Commerce as a lender -- |
| 8 | meaning as deed of trust lender -- right? -- did that |
| 9 | property interest -- was it converted into title to the |
| 10 | property? Do you remember being asked that? |
| 11 | A. Yeah. |
| 12 | Q. Okay. And Mr. Lewin was very specific about |
| 13 | saying that that interest was converted into title. So |
| 14 | let's take a look at what happened to the actual |
| 15 | interest pursuant to this agreement. |
| 16 | Let's look at page 2 of the agreement, which is |
| 17 | Bidsal 1430. Let's look at Section 2.2 -- well, first |
| 18 | of all, 2.1 says that the borrower was going to transfer |
| 19 | all of its right, title, and interest in the property |
| 20 | through an absolute conveyance; correct? |
| 21 | A. Correct. |
| 22 | Q. All right. And that conveyance is the document |
| 23 | that we see as Exhibit 10; correct? |
| 24 | A. Yes. |
| 25 | Q. So they actually provided a deed -- a conveyance |

1 of all of their rights to this property; correct?
A. Correct.
Q. Now let's go back to Section 2.2 of the deed in lieu agreement, which is Exhibit 8. And look at Section A. It says the borrower and lender acknowledge and agree as follows: The liens -- which is a defined term if we look at the...

THE ARBITRATOR: 1B?
MR. GERRARD: Do you see it, Judge? Oh, there it is.

BY MR. GERRARD:
Q. So if you look at 1B on the first page, "liens" is a defined term, which says "under the terms of a loan made by lender's predecessor to borrower on or about July 17, 2007, called the loan, the property is subject to certain liens, assignments, and security interest."

Okay? Collectively, the liens. Do you see that?
A. Yes.
Q. So that takes into account the assignment of rents that Mr . Lewin was talking about, any other liens that they had -- which would include the deed of trust -- any security interest, which obviously would include the deed of trust -- everything.

So let's look now at 2.2 A on the next page. It says "The liens are not released or relinquished in any

1 Page 597
1 manner or respect whatsoever, but rather shall remain valid and continuous and in full force and effect unless and until released by a written instrument executed and filed for record in the public records of Clark County, Nevada."

> Do you see that?
A. Yes.
Q. And then the next paragraph says "There shall be no merger of the liens with the title of the lender to the property by virtue of the conveyance evidenced by the transfer documents as defined below and the liens on one hand and title to the property on the other shall remain nonmerged, separate, and distinct."

Do you see that?
A. I do.
Q. Does that look to you like there was a conversion of these liens into a real property interest? Into title to the property, I should say?
A. No.
Q. Okay. Now, let's talk about the security deposits for just a minute. You acknowledge that for purposes of accounting, those deposits are properly shown on the company's books and records as a liability of the company; correct?
A. Correct.

1
Q. The obligation to repay those security deposits remains as an ongoing liability of the company; correct?
A. Correct.
Q. Is there any offsetting credit on the company's books and records that offset that obligation?
A. Yeah. The cash.
Q. Okay.
A. The cash collected from the security deposit.
Q. Okay. And so in a real world sense, is there any actual liability -- not an accounting lability, but an actual lability -- that the company has related to those security deposits?
A. As long as the company has the cash, there is no liability.
Q. And again I ask you the same question I asked you earlier: Did you ever see any evidence that the deposits have ever been distributed in any manner?
A. No.
Q. Okay. Back to the agreement we were just looking at just one more time -- the deed in lieu agreement, Section 2.10. Mr. Lewin asked you if these rents had been collected by the borrower on behalf of the lender. Let's look at what 2.10 actually says. It says -- without reading the whole introductory paragraph, it talks about the number. It says the

1 borrower will transfer lender the amount of $\$ 295,258.93$,
2 quote, "which amount represents the net rents from the property that have not previously been paid to lender or lender's predecessors in interest."

Does it say anywhere in this paragraph that the owner of the property was collecting these rents on behalf of the borrower?
A. No.
Q. Now, I ask you once again: Were these rents that were being held by the borrower, were they paid to Green Valley Commerce, who was lender at the time that Green Valley Commerce obtained the note?
A. No, they were not.
Q. When were these monies that are called rents in the deed in lieu agreement -- when were these monies transferred to Green Valley Commerce?
A. Once Green Valley Commerce obtained fee simple title to the property.
Q. Okay. So when Green Valley Commerce became the owner of the property; correct?
A. Right.
Q. And again, look at Exhibit 9. In the escrow statement that -- where the money was actually transferred, what are they called?
A. Net rents.

1 $\quad$ Q. Does it say anywhere in here "payment of interest | Page 600 |
| :--- |
| 2 | on prior loan where all the interest was forgiven"?

14 September 16, 2011. Do you see that?

| 1 | A. At that point in time, the -- as of what date? ${ }^{\text {Page }}$ |
| :---: | :---: |
| 2 | September? The note. |
| 3 | Q. September 16th. |
| 4 | A. The note. |
| 5 | Q. Is it fair to say that on September -- as of |
| 6 | September 16, 2011, the company only held an asset -- |
| 7 | one asset -- a note? |
| 8 | A. That is true. |
| 9 | Q. Now, Mr. Lewin tried to characterize the deed of |
| 10 | trust and the assignment of rents and all those things |
| 11 | as assets, but under the terms of those agreements -- |
| 12 | you reviewed them -- those are security documents; |
| 13 | correct? |
| 14 | A. Correct. |
| 15 | Q. The actual asset is the note -- the obligation to |
| 16 | pay -- that's what's carried on the books as an asset; |
| 17 | correct? |
| 18 | A. Correct. |
| 19 | Q. You don't carry on the books of the company a |
| 20 | deed of trust as an asset, do you? |
| 21 | A. No. |
| 22 | Q. Now, there was a question asked of you which I |
| 23 | think just because it's a long day and you're tired, |
| 24 | maybe you didn't catch. So I'm going to ask you again. |
| 25 | There was a question asked to you by Mr. Lewin. |

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    1 He said -- he was asking you if Exhibit B was not
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THE ARBITRATOR: And you're back to the operating agreement?
MR. GERRARD: Yes, operating agreement. BY MR. GERRARD:
Q. This is a simple question. When you were answering his questions about whether Exhibit \(B\) was followed or not followed, were you thinking whether the special allocation language was triggered or not, or were you actually thinking whether all of Exhibit B was followed or not?
A. Was Exhibit B being followed? No. In general, because the special allocation language had not been triggered.
Q. Okay. Is it fair to say that for all testimony that you've given in this case, that you've never changed your opinion on that issue?
MR. LEWIN: Objection. His testimony speaks for itself.
THE ARBITRATOR: The question is whether he's changed his opinion on that topic.
MR. LEWIN: Does that mean we're going to go back over all his testimony? Because that's what's -THE ARBITRATOR: Maybe.
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A. I have not changed my opinion.

BY MR. GERRARD:
Q. Okay. So it remains your opinion that the special allocation language was never triggered at any time?
A. That is correct.
Q. And so do you believe that this -- let me ask the same question Mr . Lewin asked, but in a different way. Do you believe that the special allocation language of Exhibit $B$ has at all times been complied with?
A. Yes. Yes. It's never been triggered, so yeah.
Q. You were also asked a question about -- that there was a difference between the cost of the note on the purchase escrow statement for the note and what the cost segregation study picked up as that number. Do you remember?
A. I do.
Q. And Mr. Lewin said it was around 80-something thousand dollars. Do you recall that?
A. I do.
Q. Okay. If -- and he was asking you hypothetical questions about if that money had been distributed, would that result in a capital transaction. And my question is very simple.

1 to segregate in your mind between what is a capital transaction for the operating agreement and what is a capital transaction for tax purposes. Okay?
A. Okay.
Q. So if that money that makes up the difference -if it had been distributed at any time, would that have triggered the special allocation language, meaning was it a capital transaction, or would it have been a capital transaction for purposes of the operating agreement?
A. If it was distributed as a -- it would not be distributed pursuant to a capital transaction because there hadn't been a capital transaction.
Q. Okay. But for purposes of tax law -- in other words, how it has to be shown on the tax return -- would you consider any portion of that -- if that money had been distributed, would you consider any of that to be subject to capital gains treatment on a tax return?
A. No.
Q. Okay. Mr. Lewin also asked you about the formula that's at the heart of what we're here for in Exhibit 5. And the question that he asked you was, Does that formula reference adding back cash in hand. Do you remember him asking you that?

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A. Yes.
Q. Okay. And there's nothing -- it doesn't say anything about adding back cash in hand; correct?
A. Correct.
Q. And isn't that because the value that we're talking about in the formula -- the FMV value -- is for a membership interest, not for assets owned by the company?
A. That is correct. It is for the membership interest.
Q. So you wouldn't expect there to be anything adding back in an asset that belonged to the company; correct?
A. Correct.
Q. And on the same topic -- we covered this, I thought, but Section 4.2 -- because it was extensively referenced -- what is your understanding of what the word "FMV" or "fair market value" is pertaining to according to the definitions in 4.1 and 4.2? Is it pertaining to the members' membership interest, or -that's being purchased -- or to all the assets of the company?
A. It's related to the membership interest.
Q. Okay. Now, I think you acknowledge that a member, to determine what the value of the other
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1 member's membership interest is, would likely be looking at the assets of the company to try to come up with what that value is; correct?
A. Right.
Q. But the definition is talking about just membership interest; correct?
A. Yes, just membership interest.

THE ARBITRATOR: But both of them?
MR. GERRARD: It just talks about the one interest being sold.

THE ARBITRATOR: Both membership interests together is what I understood the FMV to mean, because then we're subtracting out $C O P$ and then dividing it in half; right?

THE WITNESS: Correct. Correct.
MR. GERRARD: Yes -- no. Let's look at the actual definition. That's not what it says. BY MR. GERRARD:
Q. Let's take a look. The words say "Any member may give notice to the remaining member that he or it is ready, willing, and able to purchase the remaining members' interests for a price the offering member thinks is the fair market value."
A. Okay.
Q. Making reference to the interest being purchased;

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1 correct?
A. Correct.
Q. Okay. Now, let's talk about this whole reoccurring and nonreoccurring thing. I think we can cover it in one question.
For this company, when it sold the first property, was that a nonreoccurring event at that point in time?
A. Yes.
Q. As soon as it sold a second property, or any properties thereafter, would the sale of a piece of property be a nonreoccurring event?
A. It would be a nonrecurring event.
Q. It would be a reoccurring event or a non --
A. A nonreoccurring event. If you sell -- if you sell a property, the first property sale would be nonreoccurring -- would be nonrecurring.
Q. And then as soon as you sell a second one, so now it's happened a second time, would the second sale be nonreoccurring or reoccurring?
A. So the second sale would be a -- if you talked about -- if you talked about making all those sales right at the same time, they would be recurring. But if it's a -- if it's spread out, it would be nonrecurring events. They would be -- if you do it all at the
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1 same -- if you -- I'm sorry.
    Ask me the question one more time.
    Q. I know it's been a long day.
    If you sell one piece of property and that's all
    that was ever sold, would that be a nonreoccurring event
    for the company?
    A. That would be a nonrecurring event.
    Q. If the company sells two pieces of property so
    there's been one sale and then later another sale, would
    the second sale be considered nonreoccurring?
    A. Yes. That's correct. It would be considered
    nonreoccurring.
    Q. Wouldn't it be considered reoccurring?
    MR. LEWIN: Objection. Argumentive. He's
    arguing with his own witness.
    THE ARBITRATOR: That's not argumentive. I think
        he's trying to clarify.
        BY MR. GERRARD:
    Q. Wouldn't it be considered reoccurring because now
        you have more than one sale?
    A. So the way I'm trying to answer this is that
        the -- if we have reoccurring events --
            THE ARBITRATOR: Let me stop right here.
            MR. GERRARD: Okay.
            THE ARBITRATOR: I don't know if there's a
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    1 difference between "reoccurring" and "recurring," which
    2 is what Exhibit B says. But they're different words.
    3 So I don't know if we're intentionally using them
    4 interchangeably or not.
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difference between "reoccurring" and "recurring," which is what Exhibit B says. But they're different words.
So I don't know if we're intentionally using them interchangeably or not.
MR. GERRARD: I'm glad you pointed that out because I didn't notice that. So let me use the right word.
THE ARBITRATOR: So it's not "reoccurring," as in occurred again; it's "recurring"; right?
MR. GERRARD: Right.
THE ARBITRATOR: Okay. All right. I don't know if that changes anything, but.
THE WITNESS: Okay. So -BY MR. GERRARD:
Q. So if you sell -- if a company is in the business -- is in business, and if it sells a piece of property -- only engages in a sale of property one time, would you agree with me that that is nonreoccurring because it's never happened before?
A. That is a nonrecurring event.
Q. Okay. So if the company then sells a second piece of property and a third piece of property, would those be recurring events because they've now happened multiple times?
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MR. LEWIN: Your Honor, the question's been asked

1 Page 610
1 and answered. He asked the question, he didn't like the 2 answer, now he's trying to get him to answer 3 differently.

MR. GERRARD: I'm trying to get him to clarify.
THE ARBITRATOR: I think there's some confusion on this issue, but all right.

THE WITNESS: Under this operating agreement? BY MR. GERRARD:
Q. Yes.
A. Under the operating agreement, would that be a -so the operating agreement basically says nonrecurring events such as a sale of substantially all the property. So under the operating agreement, it would be -- if it didn't constitute -- basic operating agreement explains nonrecurring as a sale of all or substantially all.
Q. Okay. So do you believe that the sales that occurred in this case were nonrecurring events?
A. I do.
Q. Under the definition you just gave in the operating agreement?

MR. LEWIN: Objection. Again, he's arguing with his own witness, Your Honor.

THE ARBITRATOR: Understood.
A. "Cash distributions arising from capital transactions or nonrecurring events" -- that would be a

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    1 capital transaction; right? Not "right." I'm not
    2 asking you that.
    3 BY MR. GERRARD:
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Q. Well, that's what I'm asking. I'm trying to understand this. I'm trying to understand what -because you just referred to the definition and you said under the definition that a nonrecurring event is the sale of all or substantially all of the assets of the company?
A. Right.
Q. So did that happen? Was there ever a sale of all --
A. No. There was not ever a sale of substantially all or all of the assets of the company.
Q. So then by definition, has there been a nonreoccurring event?
A. No.
Q. Okay. You were also asked if Mr. Main made a mistake in the preparation of the tax return based upon this characterization of the rents as interest. Do you remember that?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you think it's Mr. Main that characterized the rents as interest, or was it whoever prepared the general ledger that we looked at?
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| 1 | MR. LEWIN: Objection. Calls for speculation. 612 |
| :---: | :---: |
| 2 | THE ARBITRATOR: If he knows. |
| 3 | A. I know the general ledger characterized it as |
| 4 | interest, so I'm assuming Mr. Main just followed the |
| 5 | general ledger. |
| 6 | BY MR. GERRARD: |
| 7 | Q. Okay. Now, you were asked an interesting series |
| 8 | of questions at the very beginning -- and this will be |
| 9 | my last thing I want to cover. |
| 10 | You were asked if you thought you needed to speak |
| 11 | with a whole list of people that Mr. Lewin identified in |
| 12 | order to arrive at your opinions. Do you remember that? |
| 13 | A. I do. |
| 14 | Q. Why didn't you believe you needed to speak with |
| 15 | those people to arrive at your opinions? |
| 16 | A. I had documentation to rely upon. |
| 17 | Q. Okay. So is your -- are your opinions based upon |
| 18 | the records of the company and the operating agreement? |
| 19 | A. They are. |
| 20 | Q. And did those documents tell you what has |
| 21 | actually transpired? |
| 22 | A. I believe they did, yes. |
| 23 | Q. Do the tax returns describe exactly what happened |
| 24 | with all of the distributions and allocations that have |
| 25 | been done? |


| 1 | A. Yes. Page 613 |
| :---: | :---: |
| 2 | Q. Did you believe that you needed to ask somebody |
| 3 | what those documents were telling you to explain to you |
| 4 | what those documents were telling you? |
| 5 | A. No. |
| 6 | MR. GERRARD: Okay. I have nothing further. |
| 7 | THE ARBITRATOR: All right. Anything else, |
| 8 | Mr. Lewin? |
| 9 | MR. LEWIN: I have a few more questions. |
| 10 | THE ARBITRATOR: All right. |
| 11 | FURTHER EXAMINATION |
| 12 | BY MR. LEWIN: |
| 13 | Q. So essentially the determination by His Honor of |
| 14 | what constitutes a capital transaction is -- will be |
| 15 | determinative of whether or not in your opinion the |
| 16 | sales of property -- a sale of a property is subject to |
| 17 | Schedule B or not; right? That's the primary issue? |
| 18 | A. Correct. |
| 19 | Q. And the only definition -- the only place where |
| 20 | there's any sort of a definition of a capital |
| 21 | transaction for the purpose of Exhibit $B$ is in |
| 22 | Exhibit B; right? |
| 23 | A. It's in Exhibit B. |
| 24 | Q. Mr. Gerrard just asked you a question looking at |
| 25 | Exhibit 91 about there was only one asset of the |

1 company. Can you turn back to that for a second? And
2 I'm presuming he did that to indicate -- I don't want to
3 presume what he did, but -- do you have Exhibit 91?
4 It's in the black book.
A. Exhibit 91 is the draft operating agreement.
Q. That's right. Exactly. Just turn to the page that's Bates stamped 1083. It's the last page. If you remember -MR. GERRARD: Hang on. The witness is not ready. THE WITNESS: Okay.

BY MR. LEWIN:
Q. So he was asking you whether -- there was only assets -- there was only one asset as of September 16th. You said yes, the note; right?
A. That would be my -- yeah.
Q. But --
A. That was my answer, yes.
Q. But the schedule here -- the preferred allocation schedule contemplates that there's going to be more than one asset; right?
A. Well, the preferred allocation schedule only refers to the company asset.
Q. It says -- we're talking about "the sale of company asset"?
A. Yeah.

| 1 | Q. Okay. |
| :--- | :---: | :--- |
| 2 | A. If you look at just that phrase, it says "company |
| 3 | asset." |
| 4 | Q. But you see that it added the term "from capital |
| 5 | transactions," plural. |
| 6 | Do you see that? That was added. |
| 7 | A. I do see that. |
| 8 | Q. And then at the bottom, it says "a substantial |
| 9 | portion of the company's assets." |
| 10 | Do you see that? At the bottom, the last page, |
| 11 | the part that was added in. |
| 12 | A. Okay. |
| 13 | Q. Do you see that? It says "assets"; right? |
| 14 | A. "Substantial portion of the company's assets," |
| 15 | yes. |

Q. So this was designed to -- with the contemplation that there's going to be more than one asset, possibly more than one capital transaction; right?
A. Yeah, maybe.
Q. That's the way you read it; right?
A. Yeah. It refers to the sale of a substantial portion of the company's assets.
Q. Assets, plural. Capital transactions, plural. Does that give you any further information as to whether or not there's a word missing where it says "sale of

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company asset"?
MR. GERRARD: Objection. Calls for speculation.
THE ARBITRATOR: Well --
MR. LEWIN: His opinion.
THE ARBITRATOR: Right.
A. No. Eleven years, and -- no. Doesn't change my opinion.
BY MR. LEWIN:
Q. Then \(I\) just -- I'm going to go through this fast. My explanation is probably going to take more time.
Mr. Gerrard asked you about the deed in lieu agreement. And if you could turn -- first of all, he said, Well, there's nowhere in this document that says that they're holding the rent for the lender. Do you remember you said, Yes, that's true?
MR. GERRARD: I don't think that's what I said, but that's okay. I said they collected from the lender. BY MR. LEWIN:
Q. But you did read the assignment of leases and rents, which specifically says when the borrower is in default, it's collecting the rents for the benefit of the lender and holding it for the lender -- right? -for payments of interest and principal. Right?
A. I read that, yes.
MR. GERRARD: I have to object. Mr. Lewin has
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Page 617
1 been testifying nonstop about what he thinks this assignment of rents agreement says, and he's not stating the language the way the agreement says. It doesn't say they're holding it for payment of principal and interest, which is what he just said.

THE ARBITRATOR: I haven't seen it, so --
MR. GERRARD: Yeah, so I objected earlier, and I said best evidence rule.

MR. LEWIN: But he's seen it, and he's the one who's testifying.

MR. GERRARD: You're asking him --
MR. LEWIN: Look, we all know -- really, Doug, you've read the assignment of rents and leases. You've seen the security agreement. You know the purpose --

THE ARBITRATOR: You're testifying now, so.
MR. LEWIN: Well, so is he.
MR. GERRARD: No, I just said you're reciting the language. We don't have that language, and it doesn't say that.

MR. LEWIN: I'm asking him. It's cross-examination. He read the documents.

MR. GERRARD: All right. Go ahead.
THE ARBITRATOR: Next question.
BY MR. LEWIN:
Q. Look at paragraph 317.


1 BY MR. LEWIN:
Q. Looking quickly at Exhibit 10, the deed. Both the -- there's an escrow closing statement on September 22nd, the deed was recorded September 22 nd, and the deed in lieu agreement was signed September -- I think it was recorded --

MR. GERRARD: They're all the same date. We'll stipulate.

BY MR. LEWIN:
Q. It says "The consideration for the deed being full satisfaction of the obligations secured by the certain deed of trust, assignment of rent, security agreement, and fixture filing" --
A. I'm sorry. Where are you reading from? THE ARBITRATOR: You're going to have to do that again. We didn't get that.

BY MR. LEWIN:
Q. In the second paragraph, it says "This deed is an absolute conveyance, grantor having sold the property to grantee for the fair, adequate consideration. In addition to the above, recited in full satisfaction of the obligations under the loan documents."

It sets forth what the loan documents are.
A. Okay.
Q. So did you -- doesn't that -- what was the

```
    1 consideration that is given? It's for $1 plus release of the loan documents; isn't that correct?
MR. GERRARD: Hold on for a second. I have to object to your question was broader than what the language was you just read. It doesn't say release of the loan documents. One of the loan documents by definition is the deed of trust. And it doesn't say the deed of trust being released.
MR. LEWIN: It says satisfaction of the obligations.
MR. GERRARD: Secured by.
MR. LEWIN: Secured by.
MR. GERRARD: Right.
Was there a question?
MR. LEWIN: I withdraw that.
BY MR. LEWIN:
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Q. The last area. We talked about the allocations under 5.1. His Honor asked you some questions about it; Mr. Gerrard asked you some questions about it. And you talked about the fact that there was some income that was -- such as depreciation or gain that was allocated 50-50 that under the waterfall would be distributable 70-30. Do you understand? We had that conversation. MR. GERRARD: I'm going to object to that. That's not what the witness's testimony was.

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THE ARBITRATOR: That's not the conversation I had with him.
BY MR. LEWIN:
Q. Well, let me ask you a question. It is not uncommon where -- it's not uncommon in your experience where there's different allocations of income and different distribution schedules; right?
A. That can happen, yes.
Q. In your experience, especially when there's a
``` disproportionate amount of capital, that is usually the case; right?
A. Yes, that can happen.
Q. It is usually the case; right? MR. GERRARD: Objection. Calls for speculation. BY MR. LEWIN:
Q. In your experience? THE ARBITRATOR: In his experience. You may answer.
A. Yeah, that's common.

BY MR. LEWIN:
Q. And part of the reason why there's disproportionate allocations of distributions when there's disproportionate capital contributions is to ameliorate some risk to the person who's putting up more money; right?

MR. GERRARD: Now I have to object. That calls for speculation as to why the parties would ever include that language.

THE ARBITRATOR: If you know.
A. And I really don't. It depends on the circumstances, so.

BY MR. LEWIN:
Q. In other words, it's negotiated?
A. It's negotiated.
Q. And the document -- is there any indication in this document that that was not -- that the disproportionate distributions was not negotiated?
A. I can't speak to that. I don't know.
Q. I'm just saying, did you see anything in the document that indicates that it wasn't?
A. No.
Q. Okay. So --
A. Let me correct that. Although it does appear there is some negotiation because of Exhibit 91. There was some back and forth, so apparently there was some negotiation.

MR. LEWIN: Okay. I don't have anything further.
MR. GERRARD: Nothing further.
THE ARBITRATOR: I think you're done.
(The proceedings concluded at 5:16 p.m.)
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|}
\hline 1 & CERTIFICATE OF REPORTER Page 623 \\
\hline 2 & STATE OF NEVADA ) \\
\hline 3 & COUNTY OF CLARK ) \\
\hline 4 & I, MIA C. O'SULLIVAN, Certified Shorthand \\
\hline 5 & Reporter, do hereby certify that I took down in \\
\hline 6 & shorthand (Stenotype) all of the proceedings had in the \\
\hline 7 & before-entitled matter at the time and place indicated; \\
\hline 8 & and that thereafter said shorthand notes were \\
\hline 9 & transcribed into typewriting at and under my direction \\
\hline 10 & and supervision, and the foregoing transcript \\
\hline 11 & constitutes a full, true, and accurate record of the \\
\hline 12 & proceedings had. \\
\hline 13 & IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto affixed \\
\hline 14 & my hand this 26 th day of March, 2021. \\
\hline 15 & \\
\hline 16 & \\
\hline 17 & \\
\hline 18 & MIA C. O'SULLIVAN, RPR, NV CCR \#964 \\
\hline 19 & \\
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[^1]:    $\qquad$

