

No. 8643Electronically Filed<br>Nov 032023 12:33 PM Elizabeth A. Brown Clerk of Supreme Court

No. 86817

## APPELLANT'S APPENDIX

## VOLUME 34

Robert L. Eisenberg, Esq. (SBN 950)
Lemons, Grundy \& Eisenberg 6005 Plumas Street, Third Floor
Reno, Nevada 89519
(775) 786-6868
rle@1ge.net
Counsel for Appellant

Todd E. Kennedy, Esq. (SBN 6014)
Kennedy \& Couvillier
3271 E. Warm Springs, Road
Las Vegas, Nevada 89120
(702) 605-3440
tkennedy@kclawnv.com
Counsel for Appellant

## CHRONOLOGICAL INDEX TO APPELLANT'S APPENDIX

NO.

1. Motion to Vacate Arbitration Award (NRS 38.241) and for Entry of Judgment

Exhibit 117: JAMS Final Award dated March 12, 2022

Exhibit 122: Operating Agreement of Green Valley Commerce, LLC
2. Appendix to Movant CLA

Properties, LLC's Motion to Vacate Arbitration Award (NRS 38.241) and for Entry of Judgment (Volume 1 of 18)

Note Regarding Incorrect Index
Index [Incorrect]
Exhibit 101: JAMS
Arbitration Demand Form dated February 7, 2020

Exhibit 102: Commencement of Arbitration dated March
2, 2020
Exhibit 103: Respondent's
Answer and Counter-Claim dated March 3, 2020

Exhibit 104: Report of Preliminary Arbitration Conference and Scheduling
Order dated April 30, 2020
Exhibit 105: Claimant Shawn
Bidsal's Answer to Respondent
CLA Properties, LLC's
Counterclaim dated
May 19, 2020
Exhibit 106: Notice of Hearing
1
191-195

NO. DOCUMENT
(Cont. 2) Exhibit 107: Notice of Hearing for February 17 through
February 19, 2021 dated
October 20, 2020
Exhibit 108: Claimant Shawn
Bidsal's First Amended Demand for Arbitration dated
November 2, 2020
Exhibit 109: Respondent's
Fourth Amended Answer and Counter-Claim to Bidsal's First Amended Demand dated January 19, 2021

Exhibit 110: Claimant Shawn Bidsal's Answer to Respondent
CLA Properties, LLC's Fourth Amended Counterclaim dated
March 5, 2021
Exhibit 111: Notice of Additional
Hearing for June 25, 2021
dated April 29, 2021
Exhibit 112: Notice of Additional
Hearing for September 29
through September 30,
2021 dated August 9, 2021
3. Appendix to Movant CLA

Properties, LLC's Motion to Vacate Arbitration Award
(NRS 38.241) and for Entry of Judgment (Volume 2 of 18)

Note Regarding Incorrect Index
Index [Incorrect] 1
Exhibit 113: Final Award

- Stephen E. Haberfeld,

Arbitrator dated April 5, 2019

2234

235-245
DATE VOL. PAGE NO.
1
196-199

1
200-203

1
204-214

215-220

221-226

227-232

233
6/22/22 1

246-267

NO. DOCUMENT
(Cont. 3) Exhibit 114: Order Granting
Petition for Confirmation of
Arbitration Award and Entry
of Judgment and Denying
Respondent's Opposition and
Counterpetition to Vacate the Arbitrator's Award dated December 5, 2019

Exhibit 115: Notice of Entry of Order Granting Petition for Confirmation of Arbitration Award and Entry of Judgment and Denying Respondent's
Opposition and Counterpetition to Vacate the Arbitration's Award dated December 16, 2019

Exhibit 116: Interim Award dated October 20, 2021

Exhibit 117: Final Award dated March 12, 2022
4. Appendix to Movant CLA

Properties, LLC's Motion to Vacate Arbitration Award (NRS 38.241) and for Entry of Judgment (Volume 3 of 18)

Note Regarding Incorrect Index
Index [Incorrect]
Exhibit 118: Agreement for Sale and Purchase of Loan dated May 19, 2011

Exhibit 119: Assignment
2
435-438
and Assumption of Agreements dated May 31, 2011

Exhibit 120: Final Settlement
Statement - Note Purchase dated June 3, 2011

Exhibit 121: GVC Articles of
2
441-442

NO. DOCUMENT
(Cont. 4) Exhibit 122: GVC Operating
Agreement
Exhibit 123: Emails regarding
Execution of GVC OPAG dated November 29, 2011 to December 12, 2011

Exhibit 124: Declaration of
CC\&Rs for GVC dated
March 16, 2011
Exhibit 125: Deed in Lieu
Agreement dated
September 22, 2011
Exhibit 126: Estimated
Settlement Statement - Deed
in Lieu Agreement dated
September 22, 2011
Exhibit 127: Grant, Bargain,
Sale Deed dated September 22, 2011
5. Appendix to Movant CLA

Properties, LLC's Motion to Vacate Arbitration Award (NRS 38.241) and for Entry of Judgment (Volume 4 of 18)

Note Regarding Incorrect Index
Index [Incorrect]
Exhibit 128: 2011 Federal Tax
6/22/22 3
584
3 579-583

Return dated December 31, 2011
Exhibit 129: Escrow Closing
Statement on Sale of Building
C dated September 10, 2012
Exhibit 130: Distribution
Breakdown from Sale of
Building C dated April 22, 2013
Exhibit 131: 2012 Federal Tax
Return dated September 10, 2013
DATE VOL. PAGE NO.
2 443-471

2
472-476

477-557

558-576
3

577-578
3
,




$$
585
$$

NO. DOCUMENT
(Cont. 5) Exhibit 132: Letter to CLA
Properties with 2012 K-1 dated August 8, 2013

Exhibit 133: Escrow
Settlement Statement for
Purchase of Greenway Property dated March 8, 2013
6. Appendix to Movant CLA

Properties, LLC's Motion to Vacate Arbitration Award (NRS 38.241) and for Entry of Judgment (Volume 5 of 18)

DATE VOL. PAGE NO.
3
639-646

3
647-649

Note Regarding Incorrect Index
3
Index [Incorrect]
3
651

Exhibit 134: Cost Segregation
4
Study dated March 15, 2013
7. Appendix to Movant CLA

Properties, LLC's Motion to Vacate Arbitration Award (NRS 38.241) and for Entry of Judgment (Volume 6 of 18)

Note Regarding Incorrect Index
4
793
Index [Incorrect]
Exhibit 135: 2013 Federal Tax
6/22/22 4
792 652-662

663-791
6/22/22 3650

4
794-804

Return dated September 9, 2014
Exhibit 136: Tax Asset Detail
4
805-826

2013 dated September 8, 2014
Exhibit 137: Letter to CLA
4
830-836
Properties with 2014 K-1 dated September 9, 2014

Exhibit 138: Escrow Closing
4
827-829

Statement on Sale of Building
E dated November 13, 2014
Exhibit 139: Distribution
4
839-842
Breakdown from Sale of
Building E dated November 13, 2014

NO. DOCUMENT
(Cont. 7) Exhibit 140: 2014 Federal Tax
Return dated February 27, 2015
Exhibit 141: Escrow Closing
Statement on Sale of Building B dated August 25, 2015

Exhibit 142: Distribution
Breakdown from Sale of
Building B dated August 25, 2015
Exhibit 143: 2015 Federal Tax Return dated April 6, 2016

Exhibit 144: 2016 Federal Tax
Return dated March 14, 2017
Exhibit 145: Letter to CLA
Properties with 2016 K-1 dated March 14, 2017

Exhibit 146: 2017 Federal Tax Return dated April 15, 2017

Exhibit 147: Letter to CLA Properties with 2017 K-1 dated April 15, 2017

Exhibit 148: 2018 Federal Tax Return dated August 2, 2019

Exhibit 149: Letter to CLA
Properties with 2018 K-1 dated April 10, 2018
8. Appendix to Movant CLA

Properties, LLC's Motion to Vacate Arbitration Award (NRS 38.241) and for Entry of Judgment (Volume 7 of 18)

Note Regarding Incorrect Index
Index [Incorrect]
Exhibit 150: 2019 Federal Tax Return (Draft) dated March 20,2020

DATE VOL. PAGE NO.
843-862

4 863-864

4
865-870

871-892
4

5
893-914

915-926

927-966

967-972
5

973-992

993-1003

1004
6/22/22 5
(Cont. 8) Exhibit 151: Letter to CLA
Properties with $2019 \mathrm{~K}-1$ dated March 20, 2020

Exhibit 152: Emails Regarding
CLA's Challenges to Distributions dated January 26 to April 22, 2016

Exhibit 153: Buy-Out
Correspondence - Bidsal Offer dated July 7, 2017

Exhibit 154: Buy-Out
Correspondence - CLA Counter dated August 3, 2017

Exhibit 155: Buy-Out
Correspondence - Bidsal
Invocation dated August 5, 2017
Exhibit 156: Buy-Out
Correspondence - CLA Escrow dated August 28, 2017

Exhibit 157: CLA Responses to First Set of Interrogatories dated June 22, 2020

Exhibit 158: GVC Lease and
6
Sales Advertising dated April 25, 2018

Exhibit 159: Property Information dated August 10, 2020
9. Appendix to Movant CLA

Properties, LLC's Motion to Vacate Arbitration Award (NRS 38.241) and for Entry of Judgment (Volume 8 of 18)

Note Regarding Incorrect Index6

Index [Incorrect] 6
Exhibit 160: Deposition
Transcript of David LeGrand dated March 20, 2018 (with Exhibits 1-39)

6/22/22 6

[^0]10. Appendix to Movant CLA Properties, LLC's Motion to Vacate Arbitration Award (NRS 38.241) and for Entry of Judgment (Volume 9 of 18)

Note Regarding Incorrect Index
Index [Incorrect]
Exhibit 161: Deed - Building C dated September 10, 2012

Exhibit 162: Deed Building E dated November 13, 2014

Exhibit 163: Email from Ben
Golshani to Shawn Bidsal
dated September 22, 2011
Exhibit 164: Deed of Trust
Notes (annotated) dated July 17, 2007

Exhibit 165: Assignment of Lease and Rents dated July 17, 2007

Exhibit 166: CLA Payment of
\$404,250.00 dated May 29, 2011
Exhibit 167: Operating Agreement
For Country Club, LLC dated June 15, 2011

Exhibit 168: Email from David LeGrand to Shawn to Bidsal and Bedn Gloshani dated
September 16, 2011
Exhibit 169: GVC General
Ledger 2011 dated December
31, 2011
Exhibit 170: Green Valley Trial Balance Worksheet, Transaction Listing dated June 7, 2012

6/22/22 $\quad 9$

1865

(Cont. 10) Exhibit 171: Correspondence from Lita to Angelo re Country Blub 2012 Accounting dated January 21, 2016

Exhibit 172: Email from Shawn Bidsal re Letter to WCICO dated January 21, 2016

Exhibit 173: GVC Equity
Balance Computation dated June 30, 2017

Exhibit 174: Email from Ben
Golshani to Jim Main dated July 21, 2017

Exhibit 175: Email
Communication between
Ben Golshani and Jim Main dated July 25, 2017

Exhibit 176: Email
9
Communication from James
Shapiro dated August 16, 2017
Exhibit 177: Email
Communication between
Ben Golshani and Shawn Bidsal dated August 16, 2017
Exhibit 178: Email
Communication between Rodney
T. Lewin and James Shapiro
Exhibit 178: Email
Communication between Rodney
T. Lewin and James Shapiro
Exhibit 178: Email
Communication between Rodney
T. Lewin and James Shapiro dated November 14, 2017

Exhibit 179: Letter from Ben
Golshani to Shawn Bidsal dated December 26, 2017

Exhibit 180: Letter from Shawn Bidsal to Ben Golshani dated December 28, 2017

Exhibit 181: Arbitration Final
Award dated April 5, 2019
Exhibit 182: Email from Ben
Golshani to Shawn Bidsal dated June 30, 2019

9

9

9

9

9

9

9

10
9

10

2014-2017

2018-2019


2020-2021

2022-2025

2026-2031

2032-2033

2038-2039
2036-2037
2034-2035

2062-2063

## NO. DOCUMENT

(Cont. 10) Exhibit 183: Email from Ben Golshani to Shawn Bidsal dated August 20, 2019

Exhibit 184: Email
Communication between CLA and Shawn Bidsal dated June 14, 2020

Exhibit 185: Claimant Shawn Bidsal's First Supplemental Responses to Respondent CLA Properties, LLC's First Set of Interrogatories to Shawn
Bidsal dated October 2, 2020
Exhibit 186: Claimant Shawn Bidsal's Responses to Respondent CLA Properties, LLC's Fifth Set of Requests for Production of Documents Upon Shawn Bidsal dated
February 19, 2021
11. Appendix to Movant CLA Properties, LLC's Motion to Vacate Arbitration Award (NRS 38.241) and for Entry of Judgment (Volume 10 of 18)

Note Regarding Incorrect Index
Index [Incorrect]
Exhibit 187: Claimant Shawn
Bidsal's Responses to
Respondent CLA Properties,
LLC's Sixth Set of Requests for
Production of Documents Upon
Shane Bidsal dated
February 22, 2021
Exhibit 188: 2019 Notes re
Distributable Cash Building C dated July 11, 2005

10
DATE VOL. PAGE NO.
10 2064-2065

10
2066-2067
$10 \quad$ 2068-2076

10
2077-2081

6/22/22 $10 \quad 2082$

10
10
10
2095-2097
2083
2084-2094

2098-2099

NO. DOCUMENT
(Cont. 11) Exhibit 189: Order Granting
Petition for Confirmation of Arbitration Award and Entry of Judgment and Denying Respondent's Opposition and Counterpetition to Vacate the Arbitrator's Award dated December 6, 2019

Exhibit 190: Plaintiff Shawn
Bidsal's Motion to Vacate
Arbitration Award dated
April 9, 2019
Exhibit 191: Notice of Appeal dated January 9, 2020

Exhibit 192: Case Appeal
Statement dated January 9, 2020
Exhibit 193: Respondent's
Motion for Stay Pending
Appeal dated January 17, 2020
12. Appendix to Movant CLA Properties, LLC's Motion to Vacate Arbitration Award (NRS 38.241) and for Entry of Judgment (Volume 11 of 18)

Note Regarding Incorrect Index
Index [Incorrect]
Exhibit 194: Notice of Entry of Order Granting Respondent's
Motion for Stay Pending Appeal dated March 10, 2020

Exhibit 195: Notice of Posting
Case in Lieu of Bond dated March 20, 2020

Exhibit 196: (LIMITED)
11
2350-2412

Arbitration \#1 Exhibits 23-42
(Portions of 198 admitted:
Exs. 26 and 40 within 198)

NO. DOCUMENT
(Cont. 12) Exhibit 197: Rebuttal Report Exhibit 1 Annotated (Gerety Schedule) dated July 11, 2005

DATE VOL. PAGE NO.

Schedules dated August 13, 2020
Exhibit 199: Rebuttal Report
Exhibit 3 dated December 31, 2017
Exhibit 200: Distribution
Breakdown dated November 13, 2014 and August 28, 2015

Exhibit 201: Respondent's 11
11
2435-2530
Motion to Resolve Member
Dispute Re Which Manager Should be Day to Day Manager and Memorandum of Points and Authorities and Declarations of Benjamin Golshani and Rodey T. Lewin in Support Thereof dated May 20, 2020
13. Appendix to Movant CLA
Properties, LLC's Motion to Properties, LLC's Motion to Vacate Arbitration Award (NRS 38.241) and for Entry of Judgment (Volume 12 of 18)

Note Regarding Incorrect Index
6/22/22 $\quad 12$
2548
2531-2547

Index [Incorrect]
Exhibit 202: Claimant Shawn
Bidsal's Opposition Respondent
CLA Properties, LLC's Motion
2549
to Resolve Member Dispute
Re Which Manager Should be
Day to Day Manager dated
June 10, 2020 (with Exhibits 1-62)
Exhibit 203: Request for Oral
14
3156-3158
Arguments: Respondent CLA
Properties, LLC's Motion to
Resolve Member Dispute Re
Which Manager Should be Day
to Day Manager dated
June 17, 2020
(Cont. 13) Exhibit 204: Respondent's Reply Memorandum of Point and Authorities and Declarations Benjamin Golshani and Rodney T. Lewin in Support of Motion to Resolve member Dispute Re Which Manager Should be Day to Day Manager dated June 24, 2020

Exhibit 205: Claimant Shawn
Bidsal's Supplement to
Opposition to Respondent CLA Properties, LLC's Motion to Resolve Member Dispute Re Which Manager Should be Day to Day Manager dated July 7, 2020

Exhibit 206: CLA’s Supplement
3194-3213
to Brief re Motion to Resolve Member Dispute Re Which
Manager Should be Day to Day
Manager - Tender Issue and
Declaration of Benjamin
Golshani in Support of Motion dated July 13, 2020

Exhibit 207: Order on Pending
14
Motions dated July 20, 2020
14. Appendix to Movant CLA Properties, LLC's Motion to Vacate Arbitration Award (NRS 38.241) and for Entry of Judgment (Volume 13 of 18)

Note Regarding Incorrect Index 14
Index [Incorrect] 14
Exhibit 208: CLA Properties,
14
15
Answers to First Set of Interrogatories to Shawn Bidsal dated July 16, 2020
(Cont. 14) Exhibit 209: Exhibits to CLA Properties, LLC's Motion to Compel Answers to First Set of Interrogatories to Shawn Bidsal dated July 16, 2020

Exhibit 210: Claimant's
Opposition to Respondent's
Motion to Compel Answers to
First Set of Interrogatories to
Shawn Bidsal and Countermotion
to Stay Proceedings dated
July 24, 2020
Exhibit 211: Respondent CLA
15
Properties, LLC Reply to
Opposition by Claimant (Bidsal) to
CLA's Motion to Compel Further
Answers to Interrogatories dated July 27, 2020

Exhibit 212: CLA Properties, LLC's
15
3465-3489
Reply in Support of Motion to
Compel Answers to First Set of Interrogatories and Opposition to Countermotion to Stay
Proceedings dated July 28, 2020
Exhibit 213: Order on
15
3490-3494
Respondent's Motion to
Compel and Amended
Scheduling Order dated
August 3, 2020
Exhibit 214: Claimant's 16
Emergency Motion to Quash
Subpoenas and for Protective Order dated June 25, 2020

Exhibit 215: CLA Properties, 16

3525-3536
LLC's Opposition to Emergency
Motion to Quash Subpoenas and for Protective Order
dated June 29, 2020
Exhibit 216: Claimant's Reply 16

3537-3539

NO. DOCUMENT
(Cont. 14) Exhibit 217: Order on Pending
Motions dated July 20, 2020
15. Appendix to Movant CLA

Properties, LLC's Motion to
Vacate Arbitration Award
(NRS 38.241) and for Entry
of Judgment (Volume 14 of 18)

> Note Regarding Incorrect Index

6/22/22 16
3548

Exhibit 218: CLA Properties, LLC's Motion to Compel Further Responses to First Set of Interrogatories to Shawn Bidsal and for Production of Documents dated October 7, 2020

Exhibit 219: Rodney Lewin and James Shapiro Email Chain dated October 19, 2020

Exhibit 220: Claimant's
Opposition to Respondent's Motion to Compel Further
Responses to First Set of Interrogatories to Shawn Bidsal
And for Production of Documents dated October 19, 2020

Exhibit 221: CLA Properties, LLC's Reply to Opposition to Motion to Compel Further Responses to First Set of Interrogatories to Shawn Bidsal and for Production of Documents dated October 22, 2020

Exhibit 222: Order on
Respondent's Motion to Compel Further Responses to First Set of Interrogatories to Shawn Bidsal and for Production of Documents dated November 9, 2020

## (Cont. 15) Exhibit 223: CLA Properties, LLC's Motion to Continue Proceedings dated November 5, 2020

Exhibit 224: Order on
Respondent's Motion to Continue Proceedings and Second Amended Scheduling Order dated November 17, 2020

Exhibit 225: Letter to Honorable David Wall (Ret.) Requesting Leave to Amend dated January 19, 2021

Exhibit 226: Respondent's 16

3677-3687
Fourth Amended Answer and Counterclaim to Bidsal's First Amended Demand dated January 19, 2021

Exhibit 227: Claimant's 16
Opposition to Respondent / Counterclaimant's Motion for Leave to file Fourth Amended Answer and Counterclaim dated January 29, 2021

Exhibit 228: Respondent /
16
3733-3736
Counterclaimant's Reply in Support of Motion for Leave to File Fourth Amended Answer and Counterclaim dated February 2, 2021

Exhibit 229: Order on Respondent's Pending Motions dated February 4, 2021

Exhibit 230: CLA Properties, LLC's Emergency Motion for Order Compelling the Completion of the Deposition of Jim Main, CPA dated January 26, 2021

16
3658-3663

16
3664-3669
$16 \quad 3670-3676$

3688-3732

[^1]
$\qquad$

(Cont. 15) Exhibit 231: Claimant's
Opposition to Respondent /
Counterclaimant's Emergency
Motion for Order Compelling the Completion of the Deposition of Jim Main, CPA dated January 29, 2021

Exhibit 232: Jim Main's
Opposition and Joinder to Claimant's Opposition to Respondent / Counterclaimant's Emergency Motion for Order Compelling the Completion of the Deposition of Jim Main, CPA dated February 1, 2021

Exhibit 233: CLA Properties, LLC's Reply in Support of Emergency Motion for Order Compelling the Completion of the Deposition of Jim Main, CPA dated February 3, 2021

Exhibit 234: Order on Respondent's Pending Motions dated February 4, 2021

| 16. | Appendix to Movant CLA <br> Properties, LLC's Motion to <br> Vacate Arbitration Award <br> (NRS 38.241) and for Entry <br> of Judgment (Volume 15 of 18) | $6 / 22 / 22$ | 18 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |

Motion for Orders (1) Compelling
Claimant to Restore/Add CLA to
all Green Valley Bank Accounts;
(2) Provide CLA with Keys to all of Green Valley Properties; and (3) Prohibiting Distributions to the Members until the Sales of the Membership Interest in
Issue in this Arbitration is
Consumated and the Membership
Interest is Conveyed dated
February 5, 2021
(Cont. 16) Exhibit 236: Claimant's
Opposition to Respondent /
Counterclaimant's Motion for Orders (1) Compelling Claimant
To Restore / Add CLA to All
Green Valley Bank Accounts;
(2) Provide CLA with Keys to All Green Valley Properties; and (3) Prohibiting Distributions to The Members until the Sale of The Membership Interest in
Issue in this Arbitration is
Consummated and the
Membership Interest is Conveyed dated February 19, 2021

Exhibit 237: Order on
Respondent's Motion for Various
Orders dated February 22, 2021
Exhibit 238: CLA Motion in
Limine re Bidsal's Evidence re
Taxes dated March 5, 2021
Exhibit 239: Claimant's
Opposition to CLA's Motion in Limine Regarding Bidsal's
Evidence re Taxes dated
March 11, 2021
Exhibit 240: Ruling -
18
4230-4231
Arbitration Day 1 p. 11 dated March 17, 2021

Exhibit 241: CLA Properties,
LLC's Motion in Limine
Re Failure to Tender dated
March 5, 2021
Exhibit 242: Claimant Shawn
19
Bidsal's Opposition to
Respondent CLA Properties, LLC's Motion in Limine Re Failure to Tender dated
March 11, 2021
Exhibit 243: CLA Properties,
19
LLC's Reply to Shawn Bidsal's
Opposition Re Failure to
Tender dated March 12, 2021

18
4102-4208

18 4209-4215

NO. DOCUMENT
(Cont. 16) Exhibit 244: Ruling -
Arbitration Day 1 pp 15-17
dated March 17, 2021
Exhibit 245: CLA's Motion to
Withdrawal Exhibit 188 dated March 26, 2021

Exhibit 246: Claimant's
Opposition to CLA's Motion to Withdraw Exhibit 188 dated March 31, 2021

Exhibit 247: CLA's Reply to
Bidsal's Opposition to the Motion to Withdraw Exhibit 188 dated March 31, 2021

Exhibit 248: Order on Respondent's Motion to Withdraw Exhibit 188 dated April 5, 2021
17. $\begin{aligned} & \text { Appendix to Movant CLA } \\ & \text { Properties, LLC's Motion to } \\ & \text { Vacate Arbitration Award } \\ & \text { (NRS 38.241) and for Entry } \\ & \text { of Judgment (Volume 16 of 18) }\end{aligned}$

Note Regarding Incorrect Index 19
6/22/22 $\quad 19$
4446

Index [Incorrect] 19
Exhibit 249: CLA Properties, LLC's Brief Re: (1) Waiver of the Attorney-Client Privilege; and
(2) Compelling the Testimony of David LeGrand, Esq. dated
May 21, 2021
Exhibit 250: Claimant Shawn Bidsal's Brief Regarding the Testimony of David LeGrand dated June 11, 2021

Exhibit 251: CLA's Properties,

20 20

4447
4448-4458
4459-4474
19

4475-4569

4570-4577

LLC Supplemental Brief Re:
(1) Waiver of the Attorney-Client Privilege; and (2) Compelling the
Testimony of David LeGrand, Esq. dated July 9, 2021
(Cont. 17) Exhibit 252: Claimant Shawn Bidsal's Supplemental Brief Regarding the Testimony of David LeGrand dated July 23, 2021

Exhibit 253: Order Regarding
Testimony of David LeGrand dated September 10, 2021

Exhibit 254: Claimant Shawn
Bidsal's Application for Award of Attorney's Fees and Costs dated November 12, 2021

Exhibit 255: Respondent /
Counterclaimant CLA Properties, LLC's Opposition to Claimant Bidsal's Application for Attorney's Fees and Costs dated December 3, 2021

Exhibit 256: Claimant's Reply in Support of Claimant Shawn Bidsal's Application for Attorney's Fees and Costs dated December 17, 2021

Exhibit 257: Respondent /
21
Counterclaimant CLA Properties, LCC's Supplemental Opposition to Claimant's Application for Attorney's Fees and Costs dated December 23, 2021

Exhibit 258: Response to CLA 21
Properties' Rogue Supplemental Opposition dated
December 29, 2021
Exhibit 259: Claimant Shawn 21 4847-4930
Bidsal's Supplemental
22

4578-4595
20

4596-4604

4605-4687
20

4688-4757

4758-4806

4807-4838

Application for Award of
Attorney's Fees and Costs
dated January 12, 2022

NO. DOCUMENT
(Cont. 17) Exhibit 260: Respondent's Second Supplemental Opposition to Application for Attorney's Fees and Costs dated January 26, 2022

Exhibit 261: Claimant's Second
Supplemental Reply in Support of Claimant Shawn Bidsal's Application for Award of Attorney Fees and Costs dated February 15, 2022
18. Appendix to Movant CLA

Properties, LLC's Motion to
Vacate Arbitration Award
(NRS 38.241) and for Entry
of Judgment (Volume 17 of 18)

| Note Regarding Incorrect Index | 22 | 5054 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Index [Incorrect] | 22 | $5055-5065$ |
| Exhibit 262: Transcript of | 23 | $5066-5287$ |
| Proceedings - Honorable |  |  |
| Stephen E. Haberfeld <br> Volume 1 dated May 8, 2018 |  |  |
| Exhibit 263: Transcript of | 23 | $5288-5313$ |
| Proceedings - Honorable | 24 | $5314-5549$ |
| Stephen E. Haberfeld <br> Volume 2 dated May 9, 2018 |  |  |
| Exhibit 264: Arbitration | 25 | $5550-5797$ |
| Hearing Transcript Day 1 | 26 | $5798-5953$ |
| dated March 17, 2021 |  |  |
| Exhibit 265: Arbitration | 26 | $5954-6046$ |
| Hearing Transcript Day 2 | 27 | $6047-6260$ |
| dated March 18, 2021 | 28 | $6261-6341$ |
| Exhibit 266: Arbitration | 28 | $6342-6505$ |
| Hearing Transcript Day 3 | 29 | $6506-6705$ |
| dated March 19, 2021 | 30 | $6706-6798$ |
| Exhibit 267: Arbitration | 30 | $6799-6954$ |
| Hearing Transcript Day 4 | 31 | $6955-7117$ |

NO. DOCUMENT
19. Appendix to Movant CLA Properties, LLC's Motion to Vacate Arbitration Award (NRS 38.241) and for Entry of Judgment (Volume 18 of 18)

Note Regarding Incorrect Index
Index [Incorrect]
Exhibit 268: Arbitration
Hearing Transcript Day 5 dated April 27, 2021

Exhibit 269: Reporter's
Transcript dated June 25, 2021
Exhibit 270: Remote Transcript of Proceedings dated August 5, 2021

Exhibit 271: Transcript of
Proceedings Arbitration dated September 29, 2021

Exhibit 272: Transcript of Hearing Proceedings dated January 5, 2022

Exhibit 273: Transcript of
34
Telephonic Hearing
Proceedings dated
February 28, 2022
Exhibit 274: Appellant Shawn
35
Bidsal's Opening Brief
(Supreme Court of Nevada, Appear from Case No. A-19-795188-P, District
Court, Clark County, NV dated November 24, 2020

Exhibit 275: Respondent's 35

7119
7120-7130
7131-7202
7203-7358

7359-7410

7411-7531

7532-7657
7658-7783

7784-7814

7815-7859

7860-7934

7935-7975

Opposition to CLA's Petition for Confirmation of Arbitration Award and Entry of Judgment and Counterpetition to Vacate Arbitration Award (Case No. A-19-795188-P, District Court, Clark County, NV) dated
July 15, 2019
(Cont. 19) Exhibit 276: Order of
Affirmance (In Re: Petition of
CLA Properties, LLC C/W 80831
Nos. 80427; 80831, Order of Affirmance, unpublished
Deposition) dated March 17, 2022
Exhibit 277: 2011-2019 Green $\quad 35 \quad$ 7982-7984
Valley Commerce Distribution
20. Bidsal's Opposition to CLA

Properties, LLC's Motion to Vacate Arbitration Award
(NRS 38.241) and for Entry
of Judgment and Bidsal's
Countermotion to Confirm
Arbitration Award
Exhibit 1: Declaration of
35
Shawn Bidsal in Support of
Claimant Shawn Bidsal's
Opposition to Respondent
CLA Properties, LLC Motion
to Resolve Member Dispute
Re Which Manage Should
be Day to Day Manager
dated June 10, 2020
Exhibit 2: Affidavit of

Benjamin Golshani in
Opposition to Respondent's
Motion for Stay Pending
Appeal dated January 31, 2020
Exhibit 3: Articles of
Organization for Green Valley
Commerce, LLC dated
May 26, 2011
Exhibit 4: Final Settlement
Statement for Green Valley
Commerce, LLC dated
September 3, 2011
Exhibit 5: Grant, Bargain and
35
8028-8041
8017-8027
7985-8016
35
7976-7981

9/1/22 35

Sale Deed dated September 22, 2011

Exhibit 6: Estimated Settlement 35

NO. DOCUMENT
(Cont. 20) Exhibit 7: Declaration of
Covenants, Conditions and
Restrictions and Reservation of
Comments for Green Valley
Commerce Center dated
March 16, 2012
Exhibit 8: Seller's Closing 8134-8136
Statement - Final dated
September 10, 2012

$$
\text { Exhibit 9: Operating Agreement } 36
$$ for Green Valley Commerce, LLC

Exhibit 10: Schedule with
8166-8169
Check of Distributions sent from Shawn Bidsal to Benjamin Golshani

## Exhibit 11: Seller's Closing

8170-8171
Statement - Final dated
November 14, 2014

$$
\text { Exhibit 12: Schedule of } 36
$$

8172-8175
Distributions
Exhibit 13: Seller's
36
8176-8177
Settlement Statement dated
August 31, 2015
Exhibit 14: CLA Properties, LLC's Election to Purchase Membership Interest dated August 3, 2017

Exhibit 15: Correspondence
8180-8184 from Rodney T. Lewin to James E. Shapiro Re Proof of Funds to Purchase
Membership Interest
Exhibit 16: Demand for
36
8185-8190
Arbitration Form dated
September 26, 2017
Exhibit 17: JAMS Arbitration

## NO. DOCUMENT

(Cont. 20) Exhibit 18: Demand for
Arbitration Form dated
February 7, 2020
Exhibit 19: Respondent's
Answer and Counter-Claim dated March 4, 2020

Exhibit 20: JAMS Final Award dated March 12, 2022

Exhibit 21: Order of Affirmance dated March 17, 2022

Exhibit 22: Remittitur from
Supreme Court of the State of Nevada dated June 10, 2022

Exhibit 23: Correspondence
from James E. Shapiro to Benjamin Golshani Re
Offer to Purchase Membership Interest dated July 7, 2017

Exhibit 24: Cashier's Check 36
21. CLA's Reply in Support of

Motion to Vacate (Partially)
Arbitration Award
22. CLA's Opposition to Shawn

Bidsal's Countermotion to
Confirm Arbitration Award
Exhibit 1: Motion to Vacate
Arbitration Award (NRS 38.241) and for Entry of Judgment dated
June 17, 2022
Exhibit 2: CLA's Reply in
Support of Motion to Vacate [Partially] Arbitration Award dated October 7, 2022
23. Bidsal's Reply in Support of

Bidsal's Countermotion to
Confirm Arbitration Award

36

10/7/22 37
8322-8323

37
8360-8445 37
DATE VOL. PAGE NO.
36 8213-8247

8248-8276

8277-8308

8309-8314

8315-8319

8320-8321

8324-8356

8357-8359
10/7/22 37

$$
8500-8445
$$

8446-8479

10/31/22 37
8480-8505

## NO. DOCUMENT

(Cont. 23) Exhibit 25: Arbitration
Hearing Partial Transcript
Day 3 dated March 19, 2021
24. Order Granting Bidsal's

Countermotion to Confirm
Arbitration Award and Denying
CLA Properties, LLC's Motion
to Vacate Arbitration Award
25. Notice of Entry of Order
\{Order Granting Bidsal's
Countermotion to Confirm
Arbitration Award and Denying
CLA Properties, LLC's Motion
to Vacate Arbitration Award dated March 20, 2023\}
26. Transcript of Hearing Re:

Motion to Vacate Arbitration
Award (NRS 38.241) and
for Entry of Judgment dated
February 7, 2023
27. CLA Properties, LLC's Notice of Appeal
28. CLA Properties, LLC's Motion Award in Full and for Order Preserving Appeal Rights as to the Fees and Right to Return if Appeal is Successful and Request for Order Shortening Time

Exhibit A: Declaration of
Todd Kennedy, Esq. dated April 27, 2023
29. $\quad$ Bidsal's Opposition to CLA Approve Payment of Fees Award in Full and for Order Preserving Appeal Right as to the Fees and Right to Return if Appeal is Successful on Order Shortening Time

DATE VOL. PAGE NO.
37 8506-8511

3/20/23 37
8512-8521

3/21/23 37
8522-8533

8534-8660

4/17/23 38 8661-8672

5/4/23
38
8673-8680

8681-8684
38

5/8/23
38
8685-8692

NO. DOCUMENT
(Cont. 29) Exhibit 1: Transcript of
Proceedings Re Motion to
Vacate Arbitration Award (NRS 38.241) and for Entry of Judgment dated April 11, 2023

Exhibit 2: JAMS Final Award dated March 12, 2022
30. Recorder's Transcript of Pending Motions dated May 9, 2023
31. Recorder's Transcript of Pending Motion dated May 11, 2023
32. Order Regarding Bidsal's Motion to Reduce Award to Judgment and for an Award for Attorney Fees and Costs and Judgment
33. Order Denying CLA Properties, LLC's Motion to Approve Payment of Fees Award in Full and for Order Preserving Appeal Rights as to the Fees and Right to Return if Appeal is Successful
34. Notice of Entry of Order Denying CLA Properties, LLC's Motion to Approve Payment of Fees Award in Full and for Order Preserving Appeal Rights as to the Fees and Right to Return if Appeal is Successful
35. Notice of Entry of Order Regarding Bidsal's Motion to Reduce Award to Judgment and for an Award for Attorney Fees and Costs and Judgment
36. CLA Properties, LLC's

Supplemental Notice of Appeal
37. CLA Properties, LLC's Errata to

Supplemental Notice of Appeal

DATE VOL. PAGE NO.
8693-8782
8783-8802

8803-8834

5/12/23 39
8835-8878

5/15/23 39
8879-8888

5/24/23 39
8889-8893

5/24/23 39
8894-8898

5/24/23
39
8899-8905

5/25/23 39
8906-8915

8916-8917

8918-8931

Page 1506
after deducting the cost of Building $C$ is the actual cost of Greenway as shown on Exhibit 17, which I believe -- I don't have the exhibit right in front of me. I believe it's $\$ 846,560.18$.

Now, in determining COP, we have the issue of the common area for the parking lot. Mr. Gerrard originally told Your Honor that the cost of -- the costs of using the parcels that were sold stating that as to each of these parcels were sold off, as Mr. Bidsal did, he took the basis associated with each of these properties as an allocable share of the original purchase of the note, and on that basis he divided the money divided from the proceeds of the sale. That statement was untrue. The cost Mr. Bidsal divided 70/30 included no part of the common area as Parcel 57, which I'm going to call the parking lot for convenience. You can look at Exhibits 14, 23, and 26 for that.

In his analysis, Mr. Wilcox concluded that a portion of the value of the parking lot should be deducted from COP on account of the nonexclusive easements that were granted in conjunction with the sale of the Buildings B -- C, B, and E. That's in his Schedule 5 on Exhibit 201. Mr. Wilcox only included a portion of that cost, in other words, $\$ 253,676$ instead of the actual allocated value of the parking lot of

Page 1507
1 \$369,957. The fact that all -- in fact, as I said, all that was transferred was a grant of a nonexclusive easement for the use of which the grantee has some payment obligations.

Now, in looking at COP, I just want to point out that Mr. Wilcox gets all of his calculations for COP in Schedule 3, which, in turn, relies on his Schedule 2. He there show -- he, there, shows two sections of cost. The first section shows what he's relying on, in part, is the 2011 tax asset detail and then the 2013 cost segregation study, which was, again, allowed to -for -- so that appreciated depreciate -- so that accelerated depreciation would be able to be taken.

No one, and I repeat no one, has ever contended that depreciation has the slightest relevance in determining COP. What is important about this is that he's using the original cost of the note as modified with the cost segregation study as the foundation for his conclusion.

Nowhere in those schedules, by the way, does he mention that he's deducted what he -- the amount that he claims toward the nonexistent sale of the common area. Now, Mr. Wilcox -- and I know you'll -- maybe you'll remember -- it's been a long time -- but he repeatedly claimed reliance on how a matter was treated in the tax

1 returns for the company.
And as a matter of fact, at page 612 at line 23, he testified he did not need to speak with people because he could rely on the tax returns; however, when it came to the parking lot, all of a sudden Mr. Wilcox claims that a portion of the parking lot had been sold and contradicting the tax returns will show that no part of the common area has ever been sold and no part of the cost allocated has ever been included in the cost of sales by showing the cost of sales. That's at page 913. And he contradicts Mr. Bidsal's accounting records as well as he likewise never reduced the cost of the common area by reason of the sales. Indeed, if we look for the accounting given CLA for the 2014 -- 2014 and 2015 sales, there is not one dime of cost allocated to the common area included as a return -- as the return of capital.

Now, Mr. Gerety confirmed that in the tax returns there's no reduction of the tax basis for the common area. That's at page 913, lines 12 through 21, where he said there's no -- where he said at line 18, quote:
"There was no allocation of the common area to the basis of Property C, B, and E upon the sale of those assets on the tax return."

Page 1509 Moreover, at page 7- -- 574, Mr. Wilcox conceded that Mr . Bidsal did not include parts -- costs of the parking lot as part of the distribution of the costs allocated $70 / 30$ on any of the sales.

Would you please put up Document 16.
THE ARBITRATOR: Mr. Lewin, how much more do you have, do you think?

MR. LEWIN: I have -- I have quite a bit, actually. I have minimally another hour or more.

THE ARBITRATOR: Really? I mean, I want to give everybody the opportunity, but I never -- I just never envisioned five hours of closing argument. I have just -- I mean, I did -- I was there, and I did review, you know, and hear everything. I just -- I never envisioned that.

MR. LEWIN: I guess, Your Honor, I -- the issue -- I know, but it's been quite a while since you were -- since you were there.

THE ARBITRATOR: I know. But, I mean, I have all my notes and exhibits. I mean, I'll let you go. I mean, I -- really another hour? Can we just kind of hit the high points of what we need to -- what we're really here to determine?

MR. LEWIN: Sure, Your Honor. Well, I think this is a part of it because we're talking about the

Page 1510
allocation of the parking lot information. Let me -Spencer, take this document down, will you please? I'll just paraphrase it and make it go faster. THE ARBITRATOR: Appreciate that. Appreciate it.

MR. LEWIN: I've lost my document, however. Oh. Picking up where I was and the -- where I was, at page 574, Mr. Wilcox conceded that the costs of the parking lot were not included in any of the costs that Mr. Bidsal allocated as part of the cost of the sales.

So even -- but even if Mr. Wilcox was right about the parking lot, his calculations would be wrong. At least you would think that he would try to be consistent with Mr. Bidsal's distribution of the cost of the parcels sold. If Mr. Wilcox believed that the effect of the easements was a sale, then the -- and that Mr . Bidsal was returning the costs for those -- of the parking lot, that amount should have been included in -in Mr. Bidsal's own approach and distributed 70/30 instead of 50/50. In other words, Mr. Bidsal took the cost of the parking lots and distributed 50/50.

So if -- if the cost of the parking lots is not included as part of the cost -- as part of COP, then Mr. Bidsal has to be charged with the return of capital

Page 1511
1 for the portion of the parking lot that he distributed
2 to himself instead of allocating it to the cost of
3 the -- of the properties.
I'm having a little bit of a technical problem here. If I can -- one second.

Okay. So in terms of -- in calculating COP, taking all the matters into account, this is how we think COP should be calculated. It should be the original cost of the note, subtract the cost of the sold properties, add back the cost of Greenway, and include in that the actual cost of the parking lot. It's not a reduction. It should not be deducted from COP.

The differences between the Gerety calculation of COP and Wilcox were discussed by Mr. Wilcox and explained that -- and that he -- he took -- that there's a difference in what they considered the COP for Greenway. Mr. Wilcox used 399,193.81; Mr. Gerety used the actual cost of Greenway. The COP --

THE ARBITRATOR: Mr. Lewin, are you using a formula with a calculation that's different than Mr. Gerety's?

MR. LEWIN: No, Your Honor. No. It -- well, actually, what I'm -- I was describing how Mr. Wilcox described his differences.

THE ARBITRATOR: No, I know. But I don't think

Page 1512

Mr . Gerety used the price of the note to formulate COP.
MR. LEWIN: Yes. That's right. As I mentioned both he and Mr. Wilcox missed the 81,000.

THE ARBITRATOR: So you're adding 81,000 onto the Gerety number under either Alternative A or B.

MR. LEWIN: That's correct.
THE ARBITRATOR: Okay.
MR. LEWIN: That's because --
THE ARBITRATOR: Here's the thing. I'm -- I don't want to -- I don't want to restrict anybody's argument, but I don't -- I've read everything in the arbitration brief. I know all the calculations that Mr. Gerety made. I know all the calculations that Mr. Wilcox made in their -- in their numbers. I've got all that. So I just -- I don't want to restrict anybody's argument, but I don't want to really have people repeat what's in the arbitration briefs and what's in those two calculations, at least on those issues. If it's something different, if it's something new, hey, I want to hear about it, but I really just don't want to hear the -- the -- either side regurgitate kind of what's in the arbitration brief because I get it. I got it. All right.

MR. LEWIN: Okay. So -- well, I was going -- I was actually going to -- I was actually going to go to

Page 1513
1 the return -- to the returned capital part of my
2 presentation because that's the -- Mr. Gerrard spent quite a bit of time on this issue that -- that there -that only -- that all proceeds except -- except the proceeds from Building $C$ under the operating agreement -- the -- should -- were properly distributed $50 / 50$. I think that in order for -- in order for you to decide that, you need to decide what the -- what the returned capital was.

So would you want -- would you want to -- are you planning on taking a break for lunch, Your Honor? Because if you are, I think we can take a short break, and I can sort of look on my notes and see what I -- how I --

THE ARBITRATOR: I mean, I wasn't. I wasn't planning on doing that.

MR. LEWIN: Okay. Well, all right. Then I'll continue. I'll just continue. I've got my document up now on here.

So in terms of -- in terms of what the intent of the parties was for the -- even before the -- this arbitration was that -- I think it's important to look at Mr. Bidsal's testimony about how he believed the formula was to work. Now, we've all agreed -- it's been agreed -- and I'm not going to belabor the point again that the -- the -- the idea that using the initial capital contributed by the parties as it was has been abandoned by Mr. Bidsal and abandoned by Mr. Wilcox in their schedules.

Mr. Gerety provided two alternatives, but I suggest that the proper way to look at this is to -- is to take what the returned capital is and the -- and I recall Mr. Bidsal's testimony at page 802 through 803, quote --

Spencer, put up Document 28A.
I'll just quote it. I'm going to quote this because I think it's important. It says, quote:
"Question: Your understanding of how the
formula worked was that you returned the
capital, the remaining capital, and the balances left over you divided up 50/50; right?
"Answer: You return the remaining capital,
that's okay, and whatever the fair market value is, you deduct the cost basis, divide by two, and then you add the remaining capital.
"Question: So the remaining capital, you mean
that's the unreturned capital?
"Question:" --
There's some -- there's some colloquy, and it goes down to a question at the beginning -- at page 803,

```
line 6:
```

"If the remaining capital is the unreturned capital --
"Answer: The remaining cash --
"Cash contribution, yes. The amount of your
initial cash contribution minus whatever
capital had been returned; right?
"Answer: Yeah."
And that was agreed to by Mr. -- that was agreed to by Mr. Wilcox, who felt that that was the reasonable approach.

So the approach taken by everyone here is to take -- is to take the original -- his original capital contribution and deduct some of the distributions arising from the properties.

Mr. Bidsal, in his schedule, deducted -- he deducted the -- in 2013 the -- he -- he took -- he deducted $\$ 28,581.79$, which was the -- 30 percent of the $\$ 95,000$ that was distributed as the profit, and he only deducted on a 70/30 basis for the remaining two sales the cost. That's what Mr. -- that's how Mr. Wilcox used it all.

So -- so Mr. Wilcox only deducts $\$ 257,774$ to arrive at the end returned capital, but we know that from the 2016 tax return that's Exhibit 28 and

1 Mr. Gerety's Exhibit 200, that at the -- that at the end 2 of 2016, Mr. Bidsal's stated capital account was around himself in three ways. And in -- and with one exception

Page 1517

First, as I mentioned, he -- while he distributed profits on the sale of Building C on a 70/30 basis, he didn't do it on -- he did not distribute the profits on $B$ and $E$ at the same basis. He only did it on a 50/50 basis.

Second, he distributed cash in excess of that which -- of which was generated from operations resulting in ordinary income on a 50/50 basis. That included cash that was distributed that was made available as a result of the depreciation deduction.

And lastly, he made distributions after his offer of July 7, which cash was part of the company value that was included by Mr. Bidsal by necessity in Mr. Bidsal's offer despite being advised by CLA not to do that.

So in order to avoid these distributions, Mr. Bidsal has asserted an interpretation of Exhibit $B$ that I think is, at best, frivolous. His claim is that the waterfall is not for you to accept unless sale of all or substantially all of Green Valley's assets on a capital refinancing, cash-out financing. I assert that this is convoluted and, to quote Judge Haberfeld, an outcome-determinative interpretation of Exhibit B. of the most important witnesses, Mr. LeGrand, from block -- has been blocked who claimed -- by Mr. Bidsal who claimed attorney-client privilege.

I would disagree with that ruling and wonder why Mr. Bidsal would not want to have Mr. LeGrand testify. Your Honor is left with the test- -- only the testimony of Mr. Golshani about what the understanding was they had reached before June 3rd, 2011, and what he and Mr. Bidsal told Mr. LeGrand what they agreed was to be in the agreement.

And this is very important because if he's -this is the only testimony about instructions that were given to LeGrand, and since LeGrand's not testifying, this is it.

Mr. Golshani said in pages 10 -- pages 1009 through 1001 -- 11, what -- and at pages 1014 through 1016 and at page 1015 and at page 1016. I'm going to summarize this. I have the testimony, but I'm going to summarize it. That -- that LeGrand was -- I'm sorry, that's the wrong one. That's wrong. That's -- that's the wrong citation.

Mr. Golshani testified about his -- the discussions and instructions to LeGrand at page 1049, line 18, through 1051, line 21. And what he told him --

Page 1519
what they -- what they both told Mr. LeGrand was they basically repeated the understandings that they had reached before that Mr. Golshani had already testified about. They talked about the percentage and that, according to Mr. Golshani, they told LeGrand -- he told LeGrand that "I" -- quote:
"I needed to get that money back, you know, through money other than net rent, and the proceeds from the net rent would divide 50/50." And then -- and also they told LeGrand -- I'm going to quote Mr. Golshani again. I'm going to quote the question and answer at page 1051, line 17, quote: "Go ahead. What was said to LeGrand about that?
"Answer: We said that we first -- we first distribute the rent money, the net rent money. Whatever is left, we distribute according to the prorated share of the capital apartments" [sic], end quote.

So that's what LeGrand was told about, and if there's anything -- LeGrand is the person who drafted the agreement. So we -- there's nothing that indicates that LeGrand was not following his instructions. So an interpretation of Exhibit B, I think that's very important testimony.

Page 1520

And so we know what Bidsal's understanding was. Just take a look at the first transaction, Building C, and how he dealt with distributing the money. He distributed it 70/30. Not only the profit -- not only the cost, but the profit.

THE ARBITRATOR: Well, there wasn't any profit because Building C was the one that turned into a 1031 exchange, and there was only about 95,000 or so, I think -- 75- or 95,000 at the end of the day, and he distributed that 70/30; right?

MR. LEWIN: That's right. That was profit, Your Honor. That was profit. The boot -- that was boot. That was the -- as far as escrow.

THE ARBITRATOR: Okay.
MR. LEWIN: There was a purchase of -- they used the costs of the property to buy -- the cost to buy Greenway. The 95,000 that was distributed was profit.

THE ARBITRATOR: All right. Again, I understand.

All right. Is this a good time to take about a five-minute break?

MR. LEWIN: Sure.
THE ARBITRATOR: All right. We'll take about a five-minute break, and then we'll hopefully get close to wrapping things up. All right. Five minutes.

Page 1521 (A recess was taken from 12:33 a.m. to 12:40)

THE ARBITRATOR: All right. Back on the record. Mr. Lewin, you may continue.

MR. LEWIN: Thank you, Your Honor.
And in context of the prior discussion, Your Honor, I'm going to try to go through some of my points. I have a number of points I need to make. THE ARBITRATOR: Okay. MR. LEWIN: I'll try to do it in as -- as efficiently as possible. THE ARBITRATOR: Okay.

MR. LEWIN: The -- so we were talking about the sales of Buildings $B$ and $E$ and -- and the fact that the -- the way that was handled by Mr. Bidsal was different than Building C. And you can look through Exhibit $B$ and, for that matter, the rest of the operating agreement. You can find no justification to distinguish the costs of the portion of the proceeds of sale, which is profit.

You can look through the entirety of Exhibit B and the entirety of the operating agreement, and you are not going to find any reason to distinguish -- to -- to the cost -- to distribute cost in a different way than you distribute profit. Exhibit B makes no such

Page 1522
1 distinction. It refers to cash distributions from a capital transaction.

So rather than try to address that, what Mr. Bidsal has done is to -- is to place their entire stack of cards on their attempt to change the words, quote, "sale of company asset" to a sale of all company assets and implicitly claim that Mr. Bidsal is to be canonized as a nice guy for -- for distributing Building C as 70 -- Building $C$ as $70 / 30$ when he didn't have to do that.

So -- so in essence, their claim is that the waterfall is not distributed and that the only exception is the 50/50 distribution of cash. The only exception to that is if the company sold all the assets or refinanced. But the first paragraph of Exhibit B begins cash distributions from capital transactions, in the plural, shall be distributed. It means more than one transaction, obviously. And by definition, there cannot be plural sales of all or substantially all the assets or plural cash-out refinancing. Each only happens once. But as I just read, the first sentence of Exhibit B applies the waterfall to capital transactions in the plural. Therefore, the waterfall logically cannot be by varied terms restricted to what Mr. Bidsal claims.

Also -- also, in Article 4, Section 2H requires

Page 1523
1 that the manager obtain a 90 percent approval to sell or transfer any assets. This -- this, again, is in the plural, and it shows that more than one asset was contemplated.

More than that, as I mentioned earlier, before the operating agreement was signed, the Henderson property had been subdivided. And shortly after that in August 2012, I think, that Mr. -- and by Exhibit 50, three of the -- some of the properties were listed.

Now, Mr. Gerrard said, well, that's a year later. The fact of the matter is he also said and pointed out that the CC\&Rs were not recorded until March of 2012. So realistically there's not much time difference between March of 2012 and August -- the August listing dates, if that, in fact, was the date of listing.

Again, the -- the -- Mr. Bidsal claims that the words, quote, "sale of company asset" asserts -- to assert that the meaning that -- that the term "capital transactions" has no meaning and that the waterfall is only triggered by a sale of all the assets ignoring and making, I think, an absurd argument about the lack of grammatical sense.

Mr. Gerrard also argued since the effective date is in June before title was obtained in the

Page 1524
property, the words "sale of capital assets" controls the exhibit -- the interpretation of Exhibit B. He construes what the words "effective date" means. That date may impact rights and obligations, but it had no -(The court reporter interrupts for clarification of the record.)

MR. LEWIN: He construes what that -- he construes -- he misconstrues the word -- what the words "effective date" means. That date might affect in -it might impact rights and obligations, but it has no impact on what the parties actually knew when the contract is signed or their intentions.

So Mr. Gerrard and Mr. Bidsal would have you believe that when the language of Exhibit B was finalized, there was no contemplation of subdividing and certainly no contemplation of selling. That agreement was not finalized until December and that -- there were changes made to it. But the plan was always to subdivide the property and the only -- the only evidence that there was -- that the parties had -- were going to agree only to sell all in one package was only provided by Mr. Bidsal. He has not provided one shred of paper that indicates that.

Now, according to Mr. Golshani, the plan was to sell some of the properties and try to get some of the

Page 1525
1 money back. That is -- that certainly is not an unreasonable -- unreasonable assumption from the account of the parties.

Now, if there -- the reference to -- there can't really be any dispute that the sale of the three properties were a capital transaction. Even Wilcox, you know, Mr. Wilcox would agree that the sale of the property was a capital transaction, and certainly Mr. Main agreed with that.

Now, there's more reasons about why Mr. Bidsal's argument -- that you only get -- there's -the only distributions that are capital transactions would only occur on the sale of all the assets are capital refinance. And we can go to the specific language in the specific intent paragraph which states that the capital distributions of profits from operations shall be allocated and distributed 50/50.

So that paragraph tells us what capital distributions of profits are and what the -- and it also tells us both what they are and then the residual of what they're not. They are distributions resulting in ordinary income and then they -- and then the paragraph concludes with two categories of what cash distributions and profits are not.

First, they are not distributions arising from

1 capital transactions. Second, they're not distributions arising from nonrecurring events. And then the -- and the second -- and then the second of these residual classifications about what are not cash distributions of profits give some examples and begin "such as," which can only be read to mean examples are not the entire universe. And even if capital -- even if nonrecurring events was limited to the sale of substantial portion of the company's assets or cash-out financing, those limitations do not apply to the first residual classification that is a capital transaction.

What Mr. Bidsal wants you to do is ignore what the document says in black and white and asks you to find that -- there has to -- there has to be a sale of everything or cash refinancing before anybody -Mr. Golshani starts to get his money out. That's -- and as you correctly asked questions about, under that defin- -- and what Mr. Wilcox admitted, that definition doesn't really work. At the end -- at the end it means that -- that Mr. Golshani may never get his -- may never get his capital account returned and Mr. -- and -- and that could not have been the intent of the parties. The whole reason for the waterfall is that -is to -- is to -- when you have a disproportionate amount of capital is to try to even that capital out.

Page 1527
1 And the only way that occurs is if on capital transactions the money is distributed 70/30. Mr. Bidsal gets to keep his $50 / 50$ share of the operations, but on the capital transaction, the money should have been distributed on a 70/30 basis.

And two things I want to point out: There's no -- there is no dispute as to what constitutes ordinary income in this case. Mr. Wilcox, Mr. Gerety, and Mr. Main all agree that the determination of ordinary income includes a deduction for things like amortization or depreciation. The deduction is in -is -- is -- it's a tax -- you know what depreciation is. It's a tax benefit that allows people to -- to essentially -- it's an expense that allows people to put -- to account for the cost for reduction and the -the depreciation of the real property assets.

Mr. Wilcox agreed to this in his testimony at 496 through 498. I'm not going to quote it at length. And he also agreed that the provision for 50/50 distributions does not say gain from sale are distributed 50/50, just the ordinary income from operations.

If -- why would you -- what is the purpose of having the specific definition of what -- of where Mr. Bidsal gets a 50/50 distribution if there -- if

Page 1528 anything outside of that -- anything outside of ordinary incomes and operations is not distributed 70/30?

THE ARBITRATOR: How do you square that with 5.1.1 on all income, gains, losses, deductions to be allocated or distributed -- I can't remember which it says -- on the basis of the members' percentage interest, which is 50/50?

MR. LEWIN: First of all, 5.1.1.1. And it says all items as you just described it, income, gain, loss, deduction of credit allocated to the proportion of percentage interest subject to a preferred allocation schedule contained in Exhibit B. So -- so number one.

Number two, as a -- as a -- as Mr. Main testified, that -- and as I mentioned earlier, that there's a difference in allocation for tax purposes and a difference in allocations of cash. Mr. Main said -and I have -- I was coming to that. I was actually coming to that. He testified -- and Mr. Wilcox and Mr. Gerety, I think, all agree with this -- is that cash flow is different than allocation for tax purposes.

The only way -- the only -- so what happens is that if you have $\$ 100,000$ of income and it's allocated 50/50 but you have a preferred -- a preferred -- a preferred distribution schedule, the money is allocated on the tax returns. That's -- and that's the way it's

Page 1529
1 supposed to do. And that's what -- and as a matter of fact, what Mr. Main said, contrary to what Mr. Gerrard said, he said they allocated the money correctly under the tax returns.

We're not claiming that they didn't allocate the money correctly on the tax returns. But what he -but what he also said is that -- he also said is that we don't control the cash. We don't write the checks. The allocations for tax purposes are different for distributions.

So what happens in the end is that -- the way that -- the way that these capital accounts get reduced to zero is -- the only way that they -- that that happens is that if the -- if the income is allocated $50 / 50$ but the -- but the distributions are $70 / 30$, sooner or later those -- the capital accounts get reduced to zero and therefore -- and that is the way the operating agreement -- that is the way Exhibit $B$ is set up.

All right. I want to -- I want to get -- since we are talking about this issue, I want to quote Mr. Main specifically.

Spencer, put up -- put up Exhibit -- I'll just read it. We don't have to put it up.

In his testimony at 1319 to 1320, Mr. Gerrard asks him a question:

1 "Okay. What I'm asking -- let me ask the
2 question a little bit differently, Mr. Main.
3 In looking at the documents that were provided,
4 the financial records provided to you by
5 Mr. Bidsal or his staff in connection with
6 Green Valley, in order for you to make issued proper K-1s. Did you consider the allocations and distribution schedule contained in Exhibit B of the operating agreement?" His answer is at 1320, line 11:
"Answer: What we did is when there was a -from -- not from -- a distribution standpoint, because we had nothing to do with the distribution. Okay? But the allocation of the -- the accounting effects of the sale of the capital transaction, we allocated the gain from the sale of the transaction on the basis of 50/50. The distributions had nothing to do with -- so the distributions were done by -- by Mr. Bidsal. When we were accounting for the transaction, the capital transaction, we allocated the gain from the capital transactions 50/50, okay, from the accounting standpoint. Cash is something different."

You can take that down, Spence.
So that's -- and that is -- that is the
dichotomy of the Bidsal position and ours. They have tried to repeatedly focus you on Exhibit A saying Exhibit A says this, Exhibit A says that, but that's not the way this agreement works. The party -- under the -under Exhibit A, it sets forth how things are to be booked on that, from an accounting standpoint on the tax returns, but they don't -- that has nothing to do with cash flow.

Now, there was a -- a -- there was a -- a --
Spence, I'd like you to put up Exhibit --
There was a discussion between you and Mr. Wilcox regarding allocations, and you asked more or less the same question that --

THE ARBITRATOR: Right. No, I recall. I have notes on that.

MR. LEWIN: And Mr. Wilcox, during that discussion, agreed that allocations for tax purposes are different than distributions. I'm just going to read a portion of it. This is at 583, line 1. This is you asking the question. Pardon me. It's actually 582, line 21.
"So my -- that -- Question: So my question
makes sense, I guess, where are those two with
me in terms of whether Exhibit B says to you the only thing that's separated 50/50 is cash distributions of profits as defined in paragraph -- in the paragraph below or if it's broader than that based on Exhibit A?
"Answer: Okay. So 5.1.1.1, that's -- just to be clear, that's talking about allocations of income amongst the partners, not distribution of cash. But it's talking about allocations of income amongst the partners.
"Question: Okay.
"Answer: And it's basically saying there, as you just read, all those things, income, gain, loss, deductions, all of those things are going to be allocated to the members. Again, not distributions, but that's what's going to be showing up on your $\mathrm{K}-1$ as income.
"Question: All right.
"Answer: And then it says as set forth in B obviously 'subject to the preferred allocations contained in Exhibit B.'"

Take that down, Spencer.
Oh. Okay. So we had a -- I think this is important because -- because it's -- it has to do with your interpretation. Bidsal's -- Bidsal's claim as to

Page 1533 what the specific intent paragraph violates -- violates an accepted rule of interpretation limiting qualifications such as examples to the closest antecedent. It can perhaps be made most clear by substituting the phrase "office building" -- I'm going to give an example now -- "office buildings or residential structures such as single-family homes."

Mr. Bidsal would urge that the phrase "single-family homes" not only exemplifies residential structures but also office buildings as he has done in that last paragraph. Only if you would conclude that single-family homes and office -- are our office buildings can you accept that contention. Otherwise, the proper interpretation of the sale of all or a substantial portion of the company's assets is just an example of a nonrecurring event. It has nothing to do with what is a capital transaction.

Finally, the last paragraph of -- of the -- on Exhibit B I think provides match point. It's -- it's clear not only from -- from this -- this section but also the specific intention paragraph of Exhibit 4.2 -that Mr. Gerrard didn't mention when he was discussing, you know, how to respond to an offer -- that what Mr. LeGrand was doing, even though he wrote what he probably figured was complete, but to avoid disputes, he

Page 1534
tried to provide what is specifically 4.2 as the specific intent and here of what Exhibit B intended. In other words, no matter what else was stated, the deal is, and the deal cannot be clearer, cash distributions arising from operations is 50/50. Cash distributions from capital transactions is 70/30. Capital transactions has a much broader meaning than -than just a -- you know, a sale of all the assets.

Well, does that mean -- does that result in making what appears before unnecessary? Absolutely. But a court shouldn't interpret a contract as to make its provisions meaningless. I refer to Phillips vs. Mercer at 94 Nev. 279 and Musser vs. Bank of America:
"A basic" -- quote:
"A basic rule of contract interpretation is
that every word must be given effect, if at all possible."

But that is exactly why in the final paragraph the statements of specific intent were included. By the way, Musser is 114 Nev. 945.

Now, last point. The sales -- the sales were reported to the IRS as capital transactions. And Mr. -and that -- but Mr. Bidsal would say that they're not capital transactions here, but they were on the tax returns.

Page 1535

And then there's this issue of what they call a nonrecurring event. Mr. Gerrard has offered the prospect that the business was either -- the business of the -- of Green Valley was to sell. Either they were going to hold everything and sell it all at once, or they were going to sell all the assets like a car dealership.

Well, that -- I questioned Mr. Wilcox on that at page 478, and I asked him would the -- would the sale of the three properties be recurring events for purposes of reporting them on the tax forms. And Mr. Wilcox said, "No, I would say they're nonrecurring." And the question was:
"As a matter of fact, you sell a property, it's gone forever; right?
"Answer: It's gone forever."
You can take that down, Spence.
I hope you remember there was somewhat of a forceful exchange between Mr. Gerrard and Mr. Wilcox trying to get him to say that it was reoccurrent- -they weren't -- they weren't nonrecurring events, but --

THE ARBITRATOR: Well, I recall some confusion on his part about what was a recurring event or a nonrecurring event, but...

MR. LEWIN: Well, it's my -- it's my

Page 1536 recollection that Mr . Gerrard almost had to throttle him to get him to withdraw the concession that he had made that the three sales were nonrecurring events. That was my -- that's my recollection of it.

So he asked him repeatedly -- repeatedly, and then he got the same answer that he gave me. Got him -repeated it again, same answer he gave me. He finally asked after -- I think there it was a third time, he said nonrecurring. But after, again, for the fourth time, he finally said the sales were recurring.

So there was another discussion that you had with Mr. Wilcox where -- where Mr. Wilcox admitted that Mr. Bidsal's interpretation about what triggers the waterfall doesn't work. And that's at 378, line 4, through 381, line 21. And there's -- it goes on for many pages there, but the -- but at the end -- and I'm not going to read them because it's going to take too much time, and I'm concerned about that. But during -in this discussion, Mr. Wilcox admits that -- in essence that what Mr. -- that Mr. Bidsal's interpretation of Exhibit B doesn't work.

As a matter of fact -- as a matter of fact, that testimony -- the -- let me -- let me just read it, a portion of it. Do you want me to read it? Because I can read a portion of it here beginning at page 379,

Page 1537
1 line 6 where you point out the fact that -- the question 2 was:
"You can't sell all eight and distribute all
the sales proceeds 50/50 because the assets are gone, and the member who has the
disproportionately higher capital contribution is never -- never is able to recoup that. So
at what point in that hypothetical would the special allocation have been triggered so that the member with the higher capital contribution would be able to recoup it? Does that question make sense?
"Answer: Yeah, I understand the question. And that really gets to the heart of why there is -- the operating agreement simply isn't clear. There's ambiguity in it. Because the operating agreement says -- on its face says distribute the assets. If you sell one a year, you never get to -- you never get to substantially all the assets. I mean, when do you get to that? So that's really your question --
"Question: Right.
"Answer: -- is when does it get triggered.
"Question: You're the accountant for this, and

Page 1538
there's a sale of one a year.
"Answer: So under that scenario, at some point in time you've got to step back and say, well, this doesn't work. It doesn't work."

I'm going to leave it at that, but --
THE ARBITRATOR: What's the rest of the answer?
I didn't see the rest of the answer.
MR. LEWIN: Put up the -- put up the rest -put it up again. It would be 380, line -- line 5.

THE ARBITRATOR: I mean, you don't have to read it to me. But, yeah, just leave it up for a second, and I can read it.

No, go back.
MR. LEWIN: To page 380. That's right.
THE ARBITRATOR: All right. All right.
MR. LEWIN: I actually think we ought to read the rest of the testimony on this. We should read it all into --

THE ARBITRATOR: Well, $\operatorname{I}$ mean --
MR. LEWIN: You can read it.
THE ARBITRATOR: We can just refer to pages 380 and 381 of the record. I don't know that we have to read it into the record, frankly, but I would like to just take 30 seconds and read it.

MR. LEWIN: Would you like to read your entire

Page 1539
1 dialogue with him? We can put it back.

THE ARBITRATOR: No, I saw the rest. MR. LEWIN: Okay.

THE ARBITRATOR: You had it up there. Okay. You can go to 381.

Okay. All right. You can go on.
MR. LEWIN: I want to make sure that you --
that when we had up page -- the page 379, that you were able to see the predicate of this question.

THE ARBITRATOR: No, you had it up there. You had them all up there while you were talking.

MR. LEWIN: Very well.
THE ARBITRATOR: 378, 379, 380, 381. All right. But thank you.

MR. LEWIN: So if all the buildings were sold for the allocated cost and only the cost was allocated $70 / 30$, CLA would lose 70 percent of the portion
allocated to the common --
(The court reporter interrupts for
clarification of the record.)
MR. LEWIN: I'm sorry. I'm going to start over. And, Dawn, just let me know if I'm talking too fast.

If all of the buildings were sold for their allocated cost on the cost segregation schedule, and

1 only that cost, CLA -- and allocated 70/30, CLA would lose 70 percent of the portion allocated to the common area, which would -- which could not be sold for much of anything. And as you -- and as you pointed out in the -- in your questions, not treating each sale as a capital event calling for application of the waterfall would result in CLA never recovering its larger investment.

Now -- and I want to point -- I want to focus in on that. Here's what happens. Let's say this -- and Mr. Gerety talked about this. This property -- let's -as I mentioned earlier, there's no termination date on this LLC and if you're -- if you can only -- if you're only going to allocate 70/30 -- only going to allocate 50/50 until there's a sale of all the assets, what will happen is that because Mr. Bidsal is getting a 50 percent allocation on -- on profits, his capital account is going down and Mr. -- and Mr. Golshani's capital account is going up. And that's really what -- what called Mr. Golshani's attention to the fact that the money is not being distributed properly.

So you end up with a situation where
Mr. Golshani gets all of -- Mr. Bidsal gets all of his money back, and Mr. Golshani is still at -- is basically still at his original capital investment. That -- I

Page 1541
1 submit that cannot be the intent of the parties or a 2 proper interpretation of this agreement. what happened, though; right? I mean, for $B$ and E, they were sold for an amount in excess of their -- their value attributed to them on the cost segregation report, and 70 percent of that cost segregation amount was distributed back to Mr. Golshani. So -- and then the gain, the profit beyond that amount, was distributed 50/50. So it didn't really -- I mean, there's a hypothetical where it could occur the way you just talked about and the way that I brought up with Mr. Wilcox, but at least as to those two properties -and we'll set aside the 1031 for now -- it didn't really happen that way; right?

MR. LEWIN: That's true, it didn't happen. But we all remember, I'm sure -- I'm sure you remember 2008 in Nevada --

THE ARBITRATOR: I know --
MR. LEWIN: -- and so we have to look at what the parties intended when they went into the agreement, and what they intended was Mr. Golshani wanted to get his money back as quickly as possible.

So -- so the deal was you -- we're going to split -- the money that you were earning by managing the

Page 1542
1 properties, the rent and the -- and the interest you get the 50 percent of, but if there's a capital transaction, we start -- we start to reduce the capital disparity between us.

THE ARBITRATOR: Right. And that goes back to the argument it's sort of presupposing that there was an intent not to just treat this as rental property throughout but to treat it as -- as, you know, properties that we could parcel out and sell.

MR. LEWIN: Right. And then you have -- and you have Mr. Bidsal who says now we never -- we are going to sell them all as a unit, and we have Mr. Golshani says -- who says -- who says he gave the instructions to LeGrand uncontroverted that -- I mean, you know, my -- other than the money was supposed to be on capital transactions --

THE ARBITRATOR: Okay.
MR. LEWIN: -- distributed.
THE ARBITRATOR: I understand. Okay.
MR. LEWIN: Okay. Thank you.
And I want to point out that Mr. Bidsal, who said -- Mr. Bidsal -- confirmed by Mr. Main that Mr. Bidsal never asked Mr. Main how to distribute funds, what constituted capital transactions. He made all of those decisions about what to distribute -- about --

Page 1543 about making the distributions by himself. And that is shown in the testimony of Mr. Main at 1319 through 1320 and Mr. Bidsal's -- and Mr. Bidsal's testimony at 778, lines 5 through 12, and Mr. Main's testimony at 1348 through 1349 and 1350.

Okay. I read that. Okay. So I've gone over the -- I've gone over the sales. I've gone over the -let's see, I'd like to talk about depreciation. Under the -- under Exhibit 8, depreciation was allocated 50/50, and we contend that one of the overdistributions that Mr. Bidsal made was that he -- he distributed cash that was made available by virtue of a depreciation expense 50/50 instead of 70/30. So we're not really distributing the depreciation, we're -- it's actually the depreciation is an -- is an expense. There's no disagreement about that. And that -- and that -- that this frees up more cash, more cash that's -- that is not ordinary in- -- not ordinary part of operations, but it's something else.

Depreciation is an accounting recordation of events. The -- and the exception for depreciation is in the real world results -- means that money that would ordinarily be available to restore property because it is wearing out over time, you need money to make those capital expenses -- to make those capital improvements.

What Mr. Bidsal did instead of putting the money towards -- into making capital improvements or holding in reserve, he distributed the money. So -- and that -- and the -- I think it's generally accepted that the depreciation expense is the recordation of a capital event or a decline in -- from usage in real property is recognized.

Now, Mr. Main -- Mr. Main said at page 1325 that -- and I'm just going to read -- I'm just going to -- this is a question asked by Mr. Gerrard that -- he says that, quote:
"Is depreciation an ordinary income item or a capital item?
"And a -- and depreciation is a reduction of ordinary income, rental income. So it's actually an ordinary deduction. And when you sell the property, it actually gets recognized as part of the gain, and there's a recapture." You can take that down, Spence.

And as I read earlier, and Mr. Wilcox testified, that ordinary income is different than cash flow. So in order to arrive at ordinary income, you deduct appreciation. That's at 476, line 11.

So what happens, the depreciation reduced the amount that ordinarily would have been distributed on a

Page 1545
1 50/50 basis as ordinary income from operations. Because it's not. Because depreciation reduces the amount of ordinary income.

You can take that down, Spence. I'm okay.
And there's -- and Mr. Wilcox admitted that there's nothing in the operating agreement that says that -- that -- that says that the -- let me start and then say again.

Mr. Wilcox testified that cash is not part of the ordinary income since ordinary income is after depreciation. He said that twice. He said it at 497, line 7, through 498, line 12, and he said it at 547, line 20, through 548 line 17. And in that last passage, he admitted that there's nowhere in the operating agreement that -- where it says that Mr. Bidsal is entitled to receive distributions on a 50/50 basis from depreciation. He said it clear out.

So if you were going to -- if you were going to distrib- -- if you were going to allow cash that becomes available on account of depreciation, it takes virtually --

Spencer, I don't need that anymore.
-- it vitiates the whole meaning of the -- of the specific definition of what is profit from -- what constitutes profit if it's distributed 50/50. And in

Page 1546 this context I want to -- I want to focus on something. Mr. Wilcox and Mr. Main both said the depreciation gets recaptured. So if you have $\$ 100,000$ of expense, you have $\$ 100,000$ of profit on a sale, that depreciation -you got to -- you got to account for that, and you have to pay taxes on it. And as long as Mr. -- as long as CLA and Bidsal were partners or members of CLA, the recapture would affect them equally in the way that the depreciation was allocated, again, for tax purposes.

THE ARBITRATOR: Just for the record, members of GVC, not members of CLA.

MR. LEWIN: Right. Members of Green Valley. But what Mr. Wilcox ignores in connection with his conclusions on depreciation is what happens after CLA buys Mr. Bidsal's interest? That means that when that -- when that depreciation expense is recaptured in the sale, CLA is going to be -- is going to have to pay the taxes on the interest because Mr. Bidsal is no longer a member.

So it makes sense -- it makes sense that that -- that depreciation -- the monies that are made available by way of depreciation are not considered profits from -- from ordinary income divided from operations. Because otherwise under this context -- and I don't -- I don't know whether the parties thought

Page 1547
1 about this or not. I'd say they probably didn't. But in this context the depreciation -- the depreciation would be -- the recapture would be totally CLA's responsibility. And, again, Bidsal never sought advice from Main as to how to distribute the cash made available on account of the depreciation deduction. That's -- that's by Main's testimony at 1352, line 21 through 25.

So now we come down to -- and in Mr. Gerety's schedules, he accounts for the -- all of the distributions relating to depreciation, and I submit that if you -- if you don't allow those -- if you don't acknowledge that those -- those -- that money should have been distributed 70/30, then CLA's got a double whammy. On one hand it's -- it's not getting the 70 -it's not -- Mr. Bidsal is getting 20 percent more of the distribution than he should have been entitled to. And number two, CLA is going to have to pay the taxes on the recapture.

I'd like to talk -- and I'm really -- I'm skipping a lot of pages here.

THE ARBITRATOR: And, I mean, we've been going about two hours on yours. So -- and that's about what Mr. -- Mr. Gerrard used. So are we getting to the finish?

Page 1548

MR. LEWIN: I have probably -- I have -- we're getting closer there. I don't think it's going to go more than 20, 30 minutes. Probably less.

THE ARBITRATOR: An extra 20 or 30 minutes?
MR. LEWIN: I have -- probably another -- yes, somewhere in that range, Your Honor. Look, I'm attempting to give you -- to provide you with the evidence that I think is important.

I want to talk about -- briefly about the 311,000. What Mr. Gerrard didn't mention is that that was reported as interest, but both accountants said Mr. Main, who Mr. Gerrard wants to hold up as the epitome, as the pinnacle, of accounting expertise, didn't do it right. He allocated his interest. Be that as it may, it doesn't make any -- the issue is under the deed in lieu agreement, a portion of the, quote, rent is alloca- -- is paid for periods before CLA acquired the note. Not CLA. Green Valley acquired the note. And it is that period -- it is that -- only that amount that is subject to the 70/30 because as Mr. -- as Mr. Wilcox acknowledged that -- that -- and Mr. Gerety acknowledged, the -- the portion of rent which is allocable to a period before they acquired the note would be a return of capital, period.

So in Mr. Gerety's schedule, he's allocated a

Page 1549
1 portion of that 311,000 as a -- only for that period that is prior to acquiring the note. We agree that whether it be interest or rent, it makes no difference, after the acquisition of the note, Mr . Bidsal gets 50 percent of that. But before -- the period -- before June 3rd, it is allocable.

And the statute of limitations with that issue -- I think I mentioned before that the statute of limitations has no bearing on the issue of the -- of the determ- -- at this point on -- on this point in the determination of what is unreturned capital. It's not like -- it's -- this formula is being decided now. And we have previously provided you with some law on what we think is the issue having to do with the statute of limitations. I'm not going to repeat.

Regarding prorations, it had to do with the security deposits. Mr. Wilcox just made -- made that analysis up. There's no accounting principle that allows a liability to be reduced by cash on hand. Mr. -- Mr. Wilcox's theory was, well, we have a -- we had a $\$ 68,000$ liability, but they always had -- the already -- always had money. There was nothing that would -- there's nothing that -- there's just no accounting principle that accounts for it.

And Mr. Wilcox agreed at -- at -- and

Page 1550 Mr. Wilcox agreed at page 567 at line 12 through 568, line 7, that security deposits are shown as a liability on the financial statements of Green Valley, and under generally [sic] accounting principles, regardless of whether or not the landlord has money in the bank to pay the security deposits, the obligation to pay the security deposits is still a liability. The answer is "yes." And he's de- -- and he ends up that the amount of security deposits should be shown on the financial statements, if any, and the answer is "correct." And they are shown on the Green Valley financial statements. So I think that that addresses that.

Now, the -- Mr. Gerety has provided you with schedule -- with scheduling, his Exhibits 200 and 202. 200 is the three pages we talked about earlier this morning.

THE ARBITRATOR: Right.
MR. LEWIN: It goes on a year-by-year basis and he --

Well, you don't have to put the -- don't put this up, Spence. I don't need it.

But on a year-by-year basis, he goes through what the distributions -- what the distributions were -are pursuant to the tax return, what they should have been under the operating agreement, and what the

Page 1551
difference is in the context whether there's an overdistribution or not. Interestingly, Mr. Gerrard doesn't mention this. He doesn't give any explanation. I mean, there's -- let me -- let me start over.

Even using the tax return financial statements shows that Mr. Bidsal's capital account as of -- as of the end of 2016 was -- had been reduced to $\$ 730,000$, roughly. Mr. Gerety gives him more credit for that. He -- he gives him -- he actually adds back -- he actually adds back money -- assume that he adds back -he actually adds money back, apparently, because he comes up to a figure of --

THE COURT REPORTER: Repeat the figure, please. MR. LEWIN: \$840,643.

But that assumes -- that -- but with that, that assumes that Mr. Bidsal returns $\$ 289,351$, which is the amount of his overdistribution as of that date. So that means that -- that means that he has to submit a -- that in order to have credit for the 840- -- 840,643, he has to return back 289,000 and some change.

Then he addresses the post -- the post-sale distribution or the post-2000, September 2000 distributions. And he -- those -- those total for an additional $\$ 505,000$, and that does not include any of the distributions that were made -- it's $\$ 56,000$, which

Page 1552
you actually pointed out during the discussion with Mr. Gerety.

So if you decide -- if you determine -- and if you determine -- I'm not going to go -- I wasn't going to go through -- I'm not going to go through year by year because it's set forth on the schedule, and I think it's pretty self-explanatory, unless you had some questions about any of these -- any of the particular items. But I think you'll find that they're all consistent with what I've been discussing.

Now, one of the -- one of the -- one of the principal bases from Mr. Gerety, however, is to determine what is a capital transaction. And Mr. Gerety didn't substitute his own interpretation of the capital transaction as Mr. Gerrard suggested. There is no definition of what a capital transaction is. So if you don't -- if there is no definition of a capital transaction, you have to look -- you have to look at what's accepted under the general -- or generally accepted accounting principles.

And you have two issues with respect to cash transaction: You have sales of property, and you have distributions over ordinary income, both of which Mr. Gerety said were capital transactions. And I can quote you -- I can find his testimony about that, if you

Page 1553
1 need it, but -- but he said -- but he said specifically that -- that any distribution in excess of ordinary income by virtue would be, in essence -- would be, in essence, a return of a capital transaction and a return of income. And that's how he has -- that's how he has -- those are some of the calculations he did in preparing his Exhibit 200.

Now, you had a discussion with him at page 918, line 10, through 919, line 22, when you were asking him about his two alternatives. And he -- and he basically -- he basically explained, and I think it's pretty clear, that Alternative A was using the capital account at the time of the sale and accounting for all the return -- all of the returned capital, and B was using the initial capital -- or C, I guess it is, the way it's labeled. C is labeled as the initial capital contributed by the parties allocated to the various properties that were still in existence.

It makes no -- the last part using the initial capital -- using the initial capital doesn't make -doesn't really make any sense. But no one is -- and no one -- no one has suggested that that would be a reasonable approach.

I want to talk -- I just want to talk briefly on a -- on the -- a couple of other issues. Remember,

Page 1554 Your Honor, I wanted to brief some of this stuff, but you didn't want a brief on it. I understand why. But we have two issues, a couple issues.

One, CLA is entitled to interest. CLA would be entitled to interest on the wrongful distributions that he made to himself. Seemingly, once you -- if you determine that the distributions were in excess of what was allowed, then CLA would be entitled to interest on that because it should have been -- had that money.

The interest rate should be determined by the case under Kerala Properties, K-e-r-l-a [sic] Properties vs. Familian, 122 Nev. 601, and should be calculated from the date of each distribution.

THE ARBITRATOR: Do you agree that if I don't find that the effective date is September 2nd, 2017, that as a member Mr. Bidsal is entitled to the distributions that occurred thereafter?

MR. LEWIN: Yes.
THE ARBITRATOR: Okay. And so there wouldn't be any interest on that.

MR. LEWIN: No. There wouldn't be any interest on that, although --

THE ARBITRATOR: Okay.
MR. LEWIN: -- I think you have a couple
different dates you could go from. You could go from

Page 1555
1 the date of the September 2. You can go from the date
2 of arbitra- -- the judgment. But if that's -- if that is the effective date -- I'm going to touch on that in a minute because I think that's a very important issue, and it has to do with a lot of money.

THE ARBITRATOR: Where are we at with the Supreme Court?

MR. LEWIN: The matter has been briefed. It's been briefed. I expect -- I think we're going to -- you know, I have talked to -- I have talked to Jim a couple of times. I think we're probably looking at six to eight --

THE ARBITRATOR: What?
(The court reporter interrupts for
clarification of the record.)
MR. LEWIN: I think we're probably looking at six to eight months before that gets -- but it -- it's been fully briefed.

THE ARBITRATOR: All right. All right. Go
ahead. I mean, maybe hit that issue. We have about four and a half hours of argument on about three and a half days of testimony.

MR. LEWIN: I don't have much -- I don't have much to say on this. All I'm saying is there's two -there's two interest rates that need to be -- that need

Page 1556 to be addressed here. Number one, there's the pre- -there's the prejudgment interest rate, which is controlled by Kerala. Number two is the -- there is a -- there's an interest rate under the statute which is -- which determines on the -- as -- is a postjudgment interest rate. And Mr. Wilcox used a wrong interest rate and so did Mr. Gerrard [sic] in his calculations.

So -- so the -- I believe that the proper interest rate to be applied would be 5 and a half percent except -- except with respect to the attorney's fees, which is subject to the postjudgment interest rate.

My next point is that CLA is entitled to an offset. If you -- when you go through -- when you -the way -- the way Mr. Gerety's -- I think he's taking Alternative A and -- and use that as the basis, add back the 80- -- add -- but using -- adding back the 81,767 to determine COP and then -- and then I think that -- and then adding -- and then subtracting the wrongful distributions plus interest from that purchase price and then depending on how you want to deal with credits could be -- addressing the post sale, the post sale distributions and attorney's fees and other things.

But we are -- but as a matter of law under -- I can't even pronounce this -- I'm just going to -- I'm

Page 1557
1 going to cite the Aviation Ventures case. It's Aviation 2 Ventures vs. Joan Morris, Inc., 121 Nev. 113, where the court stated:
"Setoff is an equitable remedy that should be granted when justice so requires to prevent inequity. Setoff is a form of a counterclaim which a defendant may urge by way of a defense or to obtain a judgment for whatever balance is due."

And it goes on about -- it goes on on that. So it -- the -- I think that -- and then -- well, I believe that we are entitled -- CLA is entitled to an offset, entitled to an offset for the -- I'm going to use the September 2 date for the -- the post-September 2 date distributions that you -- if you agree they need to be returned, plus interest, and for the attorney's fees that were awarded under the judgment in the event that the appeal is denied.

THE ARBITRATOR: Say that again. An offset for the attorney's fees that were awarded by --

MR. LEWIN: Well, we have -- under arbitration number one that's this -- nothing that we do here is really going to become final until that Nevada -- until that case -- the appeal is decided.

THE ARBITRATOR: Right.

Page 1558

MR. LEWIN: So in that case, in that matter, the CLA was awarded attorney's fees of $\$ 298,000$ and some change. I don't remember the --

THE ARBITRATOR: Right. So anything I do would be exclusive of any order that Judge Haberfeld made as to fees.

MR. LEWIN: That's right, but we -- but -but -- and anything you do is still going to be subject because they are only going to be final when the Supreme Court rules.

THE ARBITRATOR: Ahhh --
MR. LEWIN: Well, what I mean is -- is that -THE ARBITRATOR: -- yes and no. Yes and no. I mean, the -- the -- that's a good question. I hadn't thought about that. The arbitration provision, just like Judge Haberfeld interpreted it, has a fee provision. Obviously his award of fees would be conditioned upon the Supreme Court affirming that decision; right?

MR. LEWIN: Right.
THE ARBITRATOR: But there's a -- that fee provision would apply -- the fee provision in the operating agreement applies to this proceeding as well, and I'm not sure that if my job is to -- to sort of, among other things -- let's just narrow it down -- to

Page 1559
set a price for the transaction that Judge Haberfeld approved whether there's -- whether there's going to be a fee award one way or another for this proceeding and whether that is dependent at all or conditioned at all upon what the Supreme Court does. I'm not sure that it would.

If the Supreme Court affirms Judge Haberfeld, whatever fee award is in this -- is made in this proceeding, in my proceeding, gets tacked on or offset some way. If the Supreme Court reverses Judge Haberfeld long after I've reached a decision, there's an award which includes a fee award, I'm not sure that -- that the fees in my case would be dependent on what the Supreme Court does.

Does that make sense?
MR. LEWIN: I think that makes sense, Your Honor. My point is that the transaction can't be concluded now until the Supreme Court rules. If the Supreme Court upholds the award --

THE ARBITRATOR: I agree with that.
MR. LEWIN: -- and then -- then -- then your decision should make -- it should address as a possible offset the attorney's fees that were awarded to -because we can't close the transaction until then -should offset the attorney's fees that were awarded in

1 the case number one.

THE ARBITRATOR: I'm not sure it's an offset on the purchase price as much as it is there's just an order out there for fees.

MR. LEWIN: And that's my point. I think we're entitled to offset. And that's what -- I think the authority that I provided you. There's other authority as well. I'm going to -- the -- there is a U.S. Supreme Court decision. It's Studley vs. Boylston, B-o-y-l-s-t-o-n, National Bank, 229 U.S. 523. There's -- there's a number of -- but I think the -- I think the Nevada authority, which is also referred to, and their authority is more than persuasive, that authority also referred -- is also identified in -- by the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel in the case of In re RCS Capital Development, LLC, vs. RCS Capital Development, LLC, 213 WL, is Westlaw, 3618550, Ninth Circuit.

THE ARBITRATOR: All right.
MR. LEWIN: Okay. So I just want to touch on some of Mr. Bidsal's defenses.

First of all, the tender issue. As I mentioned at the outset, the tender issue is gone. It hasn't been -- it is -- it was subsumed in the judgment, and it was -- so was the claimed law relating to specific performance. It's gone. It's an issue that would have

Page 1561
been an appropriate -- would have had -- had to have been raised in the first arbitration and in -- and in the -- and in the -- and in connection with the judgment of the -- in the district court.

And even the -- but I just want to point out the authority -- the authority that Mr. Gerrard specifically referred to in the 7510 Perla Del Mar case, 458 P.3d 348 at 351 (2020). The Court stated:
"An actual tender is unnecessary where it is apparent the other party will not accept it. The law does not require one to do a vain" -(The court reporter interrupts for clarification of the record.) MR. LEWIN: The law does not -- let me start over.
"An actual tender is unnecessary where it is apparent the other party will not accept it. The law does not require one to do a vain and futile thing. Tender of an amount is waived when the party entitled to payment, by declaration or by conduct, proclaims that, if a tender of the amount due is made, an acceptance of it will be refused. A formal tender is not necessary where a party has shown by act or word that it would not be accepted if made."

Page 1562 Look, I'm not going to -- we have the whole -THE ARBITRATOR: Yeah. I mean, we've been through that a couple times, and it's been briefed, and I think it appears in one or two of my orders.

All right. Here's what we're going to do. We're going to take about a five-minute recess. After that -- it's been over two and a half hours, and I know some of it was my questions -- Mr. Lewin, I'm going to give you about five minutes to wrap up after that.

Mr. -- during the break, Mr. Gerrard, use that time to narrow the focus of any rebuttal to about ten minutes. And since the surrebuttal is only as to the counterclaim, I'll give another five minutes after that for Mr. Lewin. All right? So let's take five minutes.
(A recess was taken from 1:45 p.m. to 1:51 p.m.)

THE ARBITRATOR: All right. Ready to go back on the record. Same persons present. Mr . Lewin.

MR. LEWIN: Thank you, Your Honor.
So -- so to summarize, the -- if you decide
that you are going to award interest, Your Honor, as I said, the interest calculation presented by Mr. Wilcox and Mr . Gerrard is post judgment interest, and they're not entitled to interest before -- without -- before the

Page 1563 judgment, number one.

Number two, on the issue of the date, the closing date, this transaction should have closed in September. It should have closed -- the only reason why it didn't was Mr. -- Mr. Bidsal refused to proceed to close the deal. It would be manifestly unfair to allow Mr. Bidsal or any contracting party to breach a contract and then -- and then to continue to get benefits from that contract because he refuses to close the deal.

This is -- that is -- I don't know any -- I don't know -- I don't know any concept of law that either is -- is common law or equity, that allows a breaching party to benefit by his own wrongdoing. And that is what Mr. Gerrard and Mr. Bidsal are urging in this case.

THE ARBITRATOR: So are you saying that if I find the effective date to be, essentially, you know, when the Nevada Supreme Court would hypothetically affirm Judge Kishner, that whatever that amount, purchase price amount, is, that CLA is entitled to interest on that amount from September 2nd, 2017, forward?

MR. LEWIN: I'm talking about -- yes -- that's correct, Your Honor. The answer being -- the answer is because the transaction shall close, and if Mr. Bidsal

Page 1564 had been forthright and raised these issues in 2017 to begin with, it could have been -- it would have been resolved in 2017, maybe 2018.

THE ARBITRATOR: I mean, I -- what I'm having trouble with is let's say hypothetically I come up with a purchase price. I don't care. Pick out whatever it is. 1. -- I don't know, whatever, split the difference, 1.5 million. Okay. But that's an amount that CLA is going to pay Mr. Bidsal for his interest; right?

MR. LEWIN: That's correct.
THE ARBITRATOR: And that we should deduct from that, interest on a calculated annual basis to reduce that number.

MR. LEWIN: The interest --
THE ARBITRATOR: I don't understand the point of it. Because interest is supposed to be the other way.

MR. LEWIN: No, no, I --
THE ARBITRATOR: If Mr. Bidsal -- I mean, let's -- I guess the way I was -- let me change the hypothetical. Let me say -- let's say I accept everything that Mr . Gerety and you have put down, and the purchase price is whatever, 1 -- I forget -- I had his final number. Whatever it is, his final number, which might mean that -- that you might be the

Page 1565
1 prevailing party even, but anyway, for purposes of 2 interest, you're saying that I would take that amount and somehow calculate interest on that amount to act as an offset to what Mr. Golshani has to pay Mr. Bidsal for his interest?

MR. LEWIN: No, no, Your Honor. I've got two issues on this. No, that -- when I'm talking about interest is that it's on the -- on the distributions that Mr. Bidsal took that were the wrongful distributions. So distributions beforehand were 289,000. Those distributions, the interest should be calculated on that on a -- on -- from each date. The interest on the 500- -- 500- -- $\$ 500,500$, interest should be calculated on those from the date of those distributions. Not -- not -- so -- so let me give you an example.

THE ARBITRATOR: Okay.
MR. LEWIN: If the business of Green Valley was a bank, if Green Valley was a bank and it had a million dollars in cash -- it had a million dollars in cash and Mr. Bidsal -- and instead of closing on a date, Mr. Bidsal withdrew the money and then -- and then closed later, you wouldn't say that -- you wouldn't say that he was entitled to withdraw the money if we had a -- if we had a contract to buy the bank at a -- at

Page 1566
1 a -- his membership interest at a fixed price.

The same thing is here. He has devalued the asset that -- he has devalued the asset that -- that Green Valley -- sorry. He has devalued the membership interest that Green -- that CLA was buying by withdrawing cash out of the -- out of a bank --

THE ARBITRATOR: Right. But the --
MR. LEWIN: -- and the interest is only --
THE ARBITRATOR: -- part of my hypothetical was that I don't find that the effective date is September 2nd, 2017.

MR. LEWIN: If that -- if that's the case, then the interest should be -- should be calculated on the 289,000 because he was still a member -- he had -- as of -- as of $12 / 31 / 16$, he had wrongful distributions of 289,000.

THE ARBITRATOR: All right.
MR. LEWIN: That money he wrongfully distributed to himself, and there may be --

THE ARBITRATOR: All right.
MR. LEWIN: -- wrongfully distributed to
himself and then maybe -- and then Mr. -- as Mr. Gerety pointed out, there may be some adjustments on that 5- -on the 500,000 as well. The point is --

THE ARBITRATOR: All right. I think I

Page 1567
1 understand now.

MR. LEWIN: But I would think -- I would think the best way of handling that is to defer that, the interest calculations, until at some point when we know after your decision what's the wrongful distribution, what the end date is, things like that.

THE ARBITRATOR: All right.
MR. LEWIN: The other point that I was making is -- the point that I was really making is that the idea that Mr. Bidsal could breach the contract, not close -- and not close and then withdraw money and then -- and then to have -- to have the closing date deemed to be some date in the future is just unfair. That allows him to breach his contract and to benefit by it. It's -- how does that work? It doesn't -- every time it -- and now on top of it, he now said he -- oh, and now we get it -- we delayed the closing. Now we want you to pay us post judgment interest on it and want management fees even though -- on these things.

So the issue that I wanted to close with is the date of the sale. Regardless of the issue of what the purchase price is, remember, we wanted to change managers. We wanted to get Mr. Bidsal out. We wanted to -- you know, so he didn't have to -- he didn't have the obligation to manage the property. He didn't want

Page 1568 to be part of it. We wanted to have a third-party manager. He resisted every effort. And by doing so, he basically has built himself up to it -- not -- a claim -- all right. A claim -- I breached the contract. I'm not selling.

And this assumes, by the way, that we win the appeal. But I breached the contract. I'm not selling. In the meantime, I'm going to hold on. I'm going to earn interest on the money that -- that you owe me at a rate that's much higher than I could ever get in a bank. And by the way, I want management fees for the management that you didn't want to begin with.

This would be a travesty. It literally would be -- it would be allowing someone to breach a contract and then benefit from it. Sounds like a -- sounds like a good -- good business tactic, by the way. If I could do it myself, who knows, but it's not fair. It shouldn't -- and the date -- the date of the sale should -- sale should be September.

And by the way, I don't think that's unusual. A lot of times in specific performance cases when there's rent and things, those rents are allocated back to the date before the breaching party breached the contract.

So that's my closing statement. I just wanted

Page 1569
to make that. I'm sorry I took so long.
THE ARBITRATOR: All right. Mr. Gerrard.
MR. GERRARD: Your Honor, I'm going to do my very best to make it ten minutes, but he went --

THE ARBITRATOR: All right.
MR. GERRARD: -- two and a half hours; so it's going to be pretty tough.

THE ARBITRATOR: Understood.
MR. GERRARD: So listen, let's start with where Mr. Lewin ended because the -- the audacity of the statements you just heard are astounding.

To suggest my client breached any contract is ridiculous. The original arbitration that happened, you can search that award. We did it while you were talking. The word "breach" does not appear in that award anywhere. My client has never been determined by anyone to have breached any contract. All he did was exercise his rights under the agreement to say, Judge, in the first arbitration, what does the word "fair market value" mean? That was the only issue in the first arbitration. That was it. Because he didn't believe that fair market value could restrict his ability to have -- exercise his appraisal rights. That was it.

What has happened, though, is that there has

Page 1570
never been a performance by Mr. Golshani. You -- that cannot be overstated enough. You -- in the real world, if you don't perform, you lose your rights. And to suggest that Mr. Golshani for --

MR. LEWIN: I'm not hearing.
MR. GERRARD: -- five years --
MR. LEWIN: Is anyone hearing? I'm not
hearing.
THE ARBITRATOR: Yes, we're hearing him.
MR. GARFINKEL: I can hear you, Rod. I can
hear you.
MR. GERRARD: To suggest that --
THE ARBITRATOR: Go ahead.
MR. LEWIN: Still can't hear.
MR. GERRARD: To suggest that Mr. Golshani --
MR. LEWIN: Can you hear me? Am I being heard?
THE ARBITRATOR: Yes.
MR. LEWIN: I cannot hear. I cannot hear.
THE ARBITRATOR: Do you want to log back in?
What do you want to --
MR. LEWIN: I'm going to leave the room and rejoin and see if that works.

THE ARBITRATOR: Great idea. All right.
All right. Hold on, Mr. Gerrard. I'm not attributing this to your ten minutes.

Page 1571
(The Zoom connection of Mr. Lewin was disconnected, then reestablished.) MR. LEWIN: Can you hear me?

THE ARBITRATOR: Can you hear me?
MR. LEWIN: I'm still not hearing.
THE ARBITRATOR: Well, then it's an issue with his computer.

MR. LEWIN: Let me have my -- let me have another computer brought in here.
(A recess was taken for Zoom audio difficulties, 2:03 p.m. to 2:05 p.m.) THE ARBITRATOR: Okay. Mr. Gerrard. MR. GERRARD: Thank you.

So this fantastical idea that my client has somehow breached is really ridiculous. The only obligations under this agreement to my client is to perform by transferring his membership interest when a purchase price has been paid. Not only have they never identified a purchase price, which is why we had to file this arbitration, because they wouldn't even tell us what they thought it was that they were supposed to pay, let alone pay it. But they've never paid anything. The only breach of the agreement is on the part of Mr. Golshani and CLA. My client has done nothing to prevent it.

Page 1572 And I asked you at the beginning of this arbitration to listen carefully for any evidence that my client ever refused to perform. They just read case law saying, well, our tender would be excused if my client refused to perform. He never refused to perform. He simply said I don't know what your purchase price is. You've never given us a purchase price. You've never identified the purchase price. You've never made any attempt to pay at all. So this idea that my client has somehow breached the agreement is ridiculous.

So let's talk about the crux of this case and what we've learned. What we've learned is that the preferred allocation language, the waterfall provision in Exhibit B, was never triggered. How do we know that? Well, Mr. Bidsal said when these sales happened, I didn't think it had been triggered. So I had a conversation with Mr. Golshani about what to do because Exhibit $B$ does not take into account individual sales. Period. Underlined. Exclamation point. It does not contemplate that.

So the result of that is that he had to do what he believed was reasonable. Now, who else thought that the preferred allocation language had never been triggered? Mr. Main, the accountant, the CPA, Mr. Wilcox in reviewing this, and Mr. Golshani. How do

Page 1573
we know that Mr. Golshani didn't believe that the preferred allocation schedule or waterfall had been triggered. Because if he had, he would have said something.

Remember, every sale was completed and every tax return showed not just how the allocations were made but how the distributions were made, and they clearly show that the gain from every sale was being distributed $50 / 50$ and allocated 50/50. Mr. Lewin simply does not want to acknowledge or he doesn't understand the difference between allocations and distributions because his argument about that made zero sense.

The language of the operating agreement at Section 5.1.1 is really important, and I want you to look at it quickly, if I could figure out a share screen again.

THE ARBITRATOR: I have it in front of me. MR. GERRARD: Okay. Perfect.

So I have underlined or highlighted what I care about here. 5.1 says:
"Each member's distributive share of these things, income, gain, loss, deduction, or credit, shall be determined as follows:" You go to 5.1.1.1, or however many point ones there are there, and then it talks about:
"Items of gain, loss, deduction, or credit shall be allocated among the members in proportion to their percentage interests." So what we learn from this is that your distributions -- your distributive share and your allocations are both determined to be in accordance with the percentage interests unless there's a trigger of the preferred allocation language.

That couldn't be more clear. And this nonsensical argument you just heard from Mr. Lewin that somehow -- and he said this: He said, "We don't want to change what's on the tax returns." But their whole case has been about saying that what's on the tax returns was wrong. It was allocated 50/50, all gain from all sales on the tax returns.

And what did Mr. Golshani do? Nothing. Because he knew that that was what was intended by the parties, that there wasn't a sale of all the property, and so there was individual sales that were happening, and he had discussed it with Mr. Golshani and -- I'm sorry -- with Mr. Bidsal and he had come to an agreement that this -- I'm sorry? Yeah. Yeah -- that this is the way they were going to handle it. And each time that's what happened. It was so transparent. He sent a breakdown schedule each time, and he sent two checks

Page 1575 each time.

There's just no way to say Mr. Golshani didn't know what was going on. It's revisionist history. It's because he doesn't like where he's at in this and wants to find offsets, and so that's how they came up with all this.

You notice there was no argument that there -at the time that these offers were made back and forth about overdistributions and that the waterfall schedule hadn't been followed. Do you see anything in the back-and-forth communications then? No. Didn't exist. This all came up through Mr. Gerety. This all came up when they were trying to find a way to reduce the amount of money that Mr. Golshani would have to pay. That's all that this is about. That's all its ever been about. It has zero to do with what the operating agreement actually says or with what the parties understood that it meant at the time. Because at the time when it was all happening, Mr. Golshani never said a word. And he admitted that he was reviewing his tax returns to see what was going on with his capital account, how it was going up and how it was going down. And every allocation and every distribution shows up on his tax return and on his $K-1 s$, and he didn't say a word.

If he really believed that this was being done
wrong, he would have been all over this the minute that the first distributions were made from the sale of Building E even if he didn't understand it from the sale of Building C. It just makes no sense. And it's all revisionist history where they are trying to create an argument to create offsets.

So let's talk about the formula itself. I thought it was fascinating that Mr. Lewin went so far as to say that the language of this -- of the agreement was being ignored by Mr. Bidsal even though it's in black and white. That's what he said. He said Mr. Bidsal wants you to ignore the document -- the document says in black and white.

If we apply what the formula says in black and white, my client gets another $\$ 1,300,000$. And all of the testimony that Mr. Lewin referred to from Mr. Bidsal and from Mr. Wilcox during the arbitration was consistent with that. Each time they said this is the way we did it because this is what we thought was reasonable. They never said that that was what their understanding of what the agreement said. They never -that testimony never happened.

In fact, it's -- Mr. Lewin blatantly
mischaracterized the testimony of Mr. Wilcox. And Your Honor -- Your Honor asked him to, you know, put up the

Page 1577
1 page that he was talking about so you could read what it was that he was actually saying about how this formula should have worked and how Exhibit B should have worked.

When it came to Exhibit B, he cuts off at the top of page 381 of his testimony, so what is at the bottom of that page? That's where Mr. Wilcox says what? First of all, Mr. Lewin said that Mr. Wilcox agreed with him that the way that Mr. Bidsal did it was wrong. That is not what Mr. Wilcox said. It's a blatant misrepresentation of what he said. What he said at the bottom of that page was, and I'll read it, he said:
"Look, so it seems from a practical standpoint there would be three ways to do it" -- again talking about how you get the return of capital.
"Way number one is the way Mr. Bidsal did it. Way number two is somewhere in between. In that scenario, sales 5 through 8 determine when we're close to -- close to the substantially all and allocate them in a way that returns the greater capital contribution.
"And then the third way would be to begin with the first property and allocate all of it 70/30 to begin with to settle the difference between the capital contributions. And you might be done by the middle of Property 3. We hope

Page 1578 eventually if we actually sell all eight, all three scenarios will get you to the same place."

That was his actual testimony. He didn't agree with Mr. Lewin, and he didn't agree that what Mr. Bidsal had done was wrong. What he said was what Mr. Bidsal did was a reasonable approach because the operating agreement did not contemplate individual sales.

So instead of trying to take advantage of what the operating agreement does say, which was that it would be split 50/50, what Mr. Bidsal did is tried to start returning capital, the portion of the capital attributable to each building sold on a 70/30 basis. What could be more fair than that? He wasn't trying to take advantage of Mr. Golshani. That's the thing that's so alarming about the position of Mr. Golshani throughout this whole case. He keeps trying to point the finger at Mr. Bidsal as if Mr. Bidsal did something wrong when all that Mr. Bidsal did was try to protect Mr. Golshani.

And all of this came up when? After the fact. Did it come up contemporaneously when these things were happening? Of course not. Because that's what they had agreed to. It came up when Mr. Golshani had to reach into his pocket and pay the money back to Mr. Bidsal

Page 1579
that he had to pay him under the formula for the operating agreement.

And did he pay anything? Never. The identified purchase price? Never. All he did was search for offsets, search for ways to reduce the amount that he should have to pay. It's consistent. You can see the pattern from beginning all the way through arbitration to now. It's all been about let's find a way to reduce the amount we have to pay.

And all this other -- all this other kind of peripheral stuff is just noise to the central issue. He talks about the missing 81,000. If you -- if you bothered to actually look at the accounting records, you would know the answer to that. It wasn't something that was at issue in Mr. Wilcox's report because he wasn't trying to find offsets against, you know, Mr. -- what would ultimately have to be paid to Mr . Bidsal.

Mr. Gerety comes up with it -- doesn't even come up with it. He starts with the same numbers. Who comes up with it? Mr. Lewin. Mr. Lewin, like, well, you know, there's this 81,000 that nobody's explained. Guess what? You can't capitalize all expenses from the purchase of this note and attribute it to the real property. Under the tax rules, it's not possible.

So some portion of the money paid for the note

Page 1580
1 can't be capitalized and can't be picked up in the cost 2 segregation study because those costs are not able to be 3 capitalized. It's a simple explanation. You'd think by 4 listening to Mr. Lewin that, you know, there was some 5 big nefarious thing going on where somebody was trying 6 to take advantage of his client. get the rent divided 70/30, don't you think he'd have been jumping up and down like a madman when -- when he didn't get them in the beginning back in 2011? Just -it's so ridiculous, the arguments that are being made now that somehow Mr. Golshani has been taken advantage of.

And this whole idea that -- that Mr. Golshani said from the beginning, that he should get all this money back. That was the big thing. Ah, you know, you just heard Mr. Lewin talk about it. From the beginning Mr. Golshani said I got to get my money back right away. Where is that in the operating agreement? Where does it say anywhere in there that the first thing that should happen is everybody gets their money back and then we make distributions after that? It would have been a simple way to draft it if that was really what was intended, but that's not what was intended.

Remember what the business was of Mr. Bidsal

Page 1581
1 that Mr. Golshani so desperately wanted to participate in because Mr. Bidsal was making a lot of money doing it. Mr. Bidsal doesn't buy property to sell it. He buys property that's income-producing, and he generates rent, and he makes a lot of money, and hopefully, if the markets stay the way that they normally do -- or even if they -- even if they take a dive, they always rebound eventually.

The value inherent in the property to begin with, meaning the purchase price of the property itself, is always still there. It's constant. What you are doing is you are realizing a tremendous return on your money over all these years.

What did -- according to Exhibit 201, Schedule 12 , Mr . Golshani received $\$ 2.6$ million over the eight years that distributions were made on this thing on a -on an original -- on an original investment of $\$ 2.8$ million. So in eight years he got a -- a 100 percent return on his money. And there's no suggestion that the remaining interest in this -- in this LLC is worth less than the amount of his outstanding capital either.

So all this nonsensical talk about he was at risk and he had all this, that's crazy talk. He wanted to get in this business because he was going to get a lot of money from rents. That was the whole idea behind

Page 1582
1 it. And now when he's trying to find offsets, that's the only time you hear this nonsensical argument about how he was insisting on getting his money back right away. Where is that in the operating agreement? To use Mr. Lewin's language, where is it in the black and white? It's not there because that was not the intent.

But as I pointed out in my closing, even if you accept their -- their current version to try to create offsets, it works against him because if that was the intent from day one, that we were just buying this property to flip it and to sell it, then it was inventoried from the beginning, and under the operating agreement in Exhibit B, second to the last paragraph, it says:
"Cash distributions of profits from operation shall be allocated and distributed 50 percent to Shawn Bidsal and 50 percent to CLA properties," meaning if their argument is accepted by Your Honor that that's really what this was about, was getting the money back right away and flipping the properties and selling them, it's still a distribution 50/50 under the language of Exhibit B.

THE ARBITRATOR: All right. I lost track of time when we had to reconnect so I don't know where we're at. I admit I dropped the ball.

MR. LEWIN: I think it's about 90 minutes.
THE ARBITRATOR: Let's wrap it up.
MR. GERRARD: I am trying to do that, Your
Honor. Like I said --
THE ARBITRATOR: All right.
MR. GERRARD: -- they've already had, like, 30
minutes more than us. So let me just quickly mention a couple of additional things.

THE ARBITRATOR: All right.
MR. GERRARD: First of all, there's no question that the operating agreement is ambiguous.

THE ARBITRATOR: They've agreed. They've conceded that.

MR. GERRARD: Now it's up to Your Honor to do what's reasonable under the circumstances. And Mr . Lewin's argument that losses were shared $70 / 30$ while everything else was 50/50 is not reflected in the tax returns, and it is not reflected in the operating agreement. It's just an outright fabrication.

So the parties did have an understanding of what they wanted to do, but certainly the buy/sell formula, which is where this whole thing ends, the buy/sell formula language, you can't with a straight face say that it -- what it actually says is what the parties wanted to actually have happen, because if it is, my client gets another $\$ 1.3$ million.

THE ARBITRATOR: Right. I know.
MR. GERRARD: And the point here is that not only do they not want to pay what the reasonable reinterpretation of that is, that Mr. Bidsal has never tried to take advantage of, they still have never paid anything. And they want these offsets through all those things as if they had performed.

So finally, Your Honor, I don't -- I don't think that -- let me just look really quick to see if there was anything else that was major.

THE ARBITRATOR: All right.
MR. GERRARD: Give me one second here. Because I had a lot of things I wanted to cover, but obviously I'm trying to cut it all completely down.

If we're going to do -- if we're going to do what's reasonable, I think, Your Honor, what we have to do is be consistent with what was done from the beginning. The tax returns show what was done from the beginning. That's the only record we have of consistency. Right? Because it was what was done. It's what was distributed to both sides. It's what they clearly understood was happening, and so it provides the only track record of what really was intended. Because the operating agreement language is so ambiguous, but

Page 1585
1 that -- but the records of the tax returns is not. It shows what was happening, and there is no way to argue that it was unreasonable, the position that Mr. Bidsal took.

Last point, the parking lot because they made a big issue out of the parking lot. It is true that the parking lot -- a piece of the parking lot was not sold to each member as an outright fee title interest. It's through the CC\&Rs that they get a part of the bundle of rights that is held by GVC in that parking lot.

THE ARBITRATOR: Not the members. You mean whoever bought $E$ and -- $E$ and $B$.

MR. GERRARD: The purchasers.
THE ARBITRATOR: Right. Okay.
MR. GERRARD: The purchasers that buy each building have an undivided right to use that parking lot through an easement, which is part of a bundle of rights that is held by the company. And while the company owns all of it, no big deal. But when it starts to be sold, then a portion of that right to use the parking lot goes with it. And that's why it's not reasonable, you know, to take the position that was taken by Mr. Gerety.

And the last thing I want to say is on the 1031 exchange. I do not understand the nonsensical example that was just used by Mr. Lewin when he said, well, what

Page 1586
1 if 180 days had gone by and the parties had not
2 completed the 1031 exchange? Well, then that means that -- you know, that all of our explanation is right and their explanation is wrong. If 180 days had gone by and they had not been able to complete the 1031 exchange because they had timed out, then the gain from the sale of Building $C$ would have been distributed on a 50/50 basis just like the rest of it was. And then Mr. Bidsal would have no complaint about losing out on his one-half of the appreciation from the sale of that property.

It only comes up because the 1031 exchange was completed, and it clearly is not contemplated by either the formula for COP or by the, you know, Exhibit B distributions.

Again, Your Honor, there's a lot more I can say, but you get it. You understand it. I know you've thought very carefully about it.

Do you have any questions for me?
THE ARBITRATOR: I don't.
MR. GERRARD: Okay.
THE ARBITRATOR: Mr. Lewin, I'll give you a couple minutes. I don't know how much of what Mr. Gerrard just said relates to the counterclaim, but that's, essentially, where your surrebuttal right lies. So I'll let you address anything in rebuttal as it

1 relates to the counterclaim.

MR. LEWIN: Okay. Well, I'm not -- hard to adjust -- I think I can.

THE COURT REPORTER: I'm having a hard time hearing you.

MR. LEWIN: Are you able to hear me?
THE COURT REPORTER: You need to slow down because there's a delay.

MR. LEWIN: All right. I will. Give me seven minutes, please.

Mr. Gerrard said I made up the issue about the losses. If you look on Exhibit B on Exhibit 5, it says -- it provides that the losses are allocated according to the capital accounts. Originally on Exhibit 91, the capital accounts, the percentage interest was $30 / 70$. That got changed to 50/50, but that -- the losses did not get changed, number one.

Number two, Mr. Gerrard failed to address the fact that it wasn't me who said -- it wasn't me who said that cash is different than tax allocations. That was every accountant in this case. So if he has a -- if the issue becomes, as I said, they want to focus on Exhibit A, the issue is Exhibit $A$ is different than cash distributions.

Now, I don't know where to go with tender. I

Page 1588
1 have a lot of evidence on Mr. Bidsal's refusal including
2 his refusal to open an escrow, his motions for stay, his appeal. Unless you think there's -- you want some specific reference, I'm not going to say any more about that.

What I said about black and white is I -- black and white has to do within Exhibit B. Exhibit B says in black and white and defines what cash, what the ordinary income, what profits are that are to be distributed $50 / 50$. And that's in black and white.

And in terms of -- and your job, as I understand it, Your Honor, is to determine whether the other references, in plural, to capital transactions, what those are, because clearly under Exhibit B, the only amounts that are set forth that Mr. Bidsal gets distributed are the 50 -- 50 percent of the rents are interest. If that didn't -- does not have meaning, what does? It is in black and white.

And the other issue is having to do with what capital transactions are. Also, as I said, every -- all distributions of money in excess of ordinary income and the sales, they're all capital transactions.

The -- I just want to talk about Mr. -Mr. Golshani. He started complaining -- you heard his testimony. He started complaining verbally to

Page 1589

Mr. Bidsal that he noticed that there were some slight differences in the capital accounts. This went on for a couple of years and only when the difference became more pronounced did he start taking more action.

Then he contacted Mr. Bidsal. Mr. Bidsal -Mr. Bidsal said, you know, talk to Nora, do this. You know, look, he did get the checks. He got these sheets, but he explained that in terms of his business, a lot of things that -- you know, he was traveling. He didn't see a lot of these items. The checks he never deposited. Those were deposited by -- by his -- by his office.

But the bottom line in connection with -- in connection with this, you know, the purchase, the issue is -- really is what are -- what is the proper way to distribute the money? And you can't determine -- when it says capital transactions with respect to the distributions from rents, there's that dichotomy. They don't meet otherwise unless you determine that capital transactions get distributed 70/30, rents and other interest get distributed 50/50.

I got two more points here.
This issue about offsets, there was years before Mr. -- Mr. Golshani didn't do anything. He didn't -- he wasn't looking to cheat Mr. Bidsal. He

Page 1590 wanted to -- he wanted to buy his membership based on a process that Mr. Bidsal negated at a lowball offer and then refused to sell Mr. -- unless Mr. Golshani paid him based on a number of not 5 million, fair market value, but 6.3 million. So who is -- how is that bad faith? How is that trying to take advantage?

And lastly -- I'm sorry. I'm having a hard time reading my number. Oh. The -- Mr. Gerrard's comments about the $\$ 81,767$, none of his explanations were offered into evidence. There's no evidence about that. It's just his argument. There is no evidence that was ever offered about the missing $\$ 81,000$.

Mr. Wilcox didn't do anything about it. Apparently Mr. Gerety didn't do anything about it. Mr. Bidsal never offered any testimony. So the issue is the fact that there's no evidence except that it's missing. And determination of COP is reasonable. Very reasonable to take the full price of the note, not -the price of the note minus $\$ 81,767$. And that's -that's it.

THE ARBITRATOR: All right. Thank you very much. Let me ask what -- Ms. Court Reporter, what's your timetable to be able to get even a rough out?
(A discussion was held off the
record.)

Page 1591

THE ARBITRATOR: Okay. Then I will leave it to whoever hired you, I suppose, to forward it to me.

All right. Let's go back on the record. MR. LEWIN: Well, if we're going to expedite the transcript, will Bidsal share the cost on it? Because I ordered -- I ordered the court reporter. MR. GERRARD: Yes, we'll pay half of it. MR. LEWIN: Fair enough. Okay. THE ARBITRATOR: All right. Expedited, it is. Here's the other thing. And I don't know -- I don't really recall what happened with Judge Haberfeld. In cases like these, it's my general protocol to issue some sort of interim award and then address any issue of fees -- which is -- if I remember right, are sort of mandatory in this arbitration provision in the operating agreement -- and then allow for briefing on fees and costs after the interim award. And then once that's done, then have a final award. I don't know if that's what you did with Judge Haberfeld or not.

MR. GARFINKEL: Yes, Your Honor. We -- that's what happened. There were a couple of interim orders and then -- you know, I believe there were a couple of them because there were a couple of different issues. And then --

THE ARBITRATOR: Okay.

Page 1592

MR. GARFINKEL: And then there was a final one.
THE ARBITRATOR: Okay. All right. So that -just so that we understand, once the interim award comes out, what I normally do is in the interim award I give -- I will identify what $I$ think is the prevailing party and why and pretty much set forth a briefing schedule right in the interim award for fees and then convene either a conference call or a Zoom conference, whatever you guys want, on that issue before issuing a final award. That's -- just so that we understand that would generally be my protocol. All right?

MR. GERRARD: Okay.
THE ARBITRATOR: All right. Thank you very
much. And like I said, it's going to take me probably 30 days before -- because I probably -- well, hopefully I can -- it will be a couple weeks, two weeks or so, before I get the award out. But it's good to know that I have the 30 .
(Proceedings concluded at 2:36 p.m.)

Page 1593

REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE

STATE OF NEVADA )

COUNTY OF WASHOE )

I, Dawn Bratcher Gustin, a duly certified court reporter licensed in and for the state of Nevada, do hereby certify:

That $I$ reported the taking of the proceedings at the time and place aforesaid;

That I thereafter transcribed my shorthand notes into typewriting and that the typewritten transcript of said proceedings is a complete, true, and accurate record of the proceedings to the best of my ability.

I further certify that $I$ am not a relative, employee, or independent contractor of counsel of any of the parties; nor a relative, employee, or independent contractor of the parties involved in said action; nor a person financially interested in the action; nor do I have any other relationship with any of the parties or with counsel of any of the parties involved in the action that may reasonably cause my impartiality to be questioned.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand in the County of Washoe, state of Nevada, this 5 th day of October 2021.







































## EXHIBIT 272

TRANSCRIPT OF HEARING PROCEEDINGS
Taken on January 5, 2022
at 8:01 a.m.
By a Certified Court Reporter
Las Vegas, Nevada

Stenographically reported by:
Heidi K. Konsten, RPR, CCR Nevada CCR No. 845 - NCRA RPR No. 816435 OASIS JOB NO. 47602

Page 2

APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL
The Arbitrator:
HON. DAVID T. WALL (Ret.), ESQ.
JAMS
3800 Howard Hughes Parkway
11th Floor
Las Vegas, Nevada 89169
dwall@jamsadr.com
For the Claimant/Counter-Respondent Shawn Bidsal:
JAMES E. SHAPIRO, ESQ.
Smith \& Shapiro, PLLC
3333 East Serene Avenue
Suite 130
Henderson, Nevada 89074 jshapiro@smithshapiro.com

DOUGLAS D. GERRARD, ESQ.
Gerrard Cox \& Larsen
2450 St. Rose Parkway
Suite 200
Henderson, Nevada 89074
dgerrard@gerrard-cox.com
For the Respondent/Counterclaimant CLA Properties, LLC:

RODNEY T. LEWIN, ESQ.
Law Offices of Rodney T. Lewin, APC
8665 Wilshire Boulevard
Suite 210
Beverly Hills, California 90211
rod@rtlewin.com


LAS VEGAS, NEVADA Wednesday, January 5, 2022

8:01 a.m.
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

*     *         *             *                 *                     * 

THE ARBITRATOR: Good morning. This is David Wall.

Who do I have on the line on behalf of Mr. Bidsal?

MR. BIDSAL: Your Honor, this is Shawn Bidsal.

MR. SHAPIRO: Good morning, Your Honor. Jim Shapiro.

MR. GERRARD: And Doug Gerrard.
THE ARBITRATOR: Okay. And on behalf of

## CLA?

MR. LEWIN: Good morning, Your Honor. Rodney Lewin. Louis Garfinkel is also on the line, and Mr. Golshani is also, as well.

MR. GARFINKEL: Judge, this is Louis Garfinkel. Good morning. I just wanted to let you know that I do have to leave here early. So I don't know how long the hearing is going to go, but I do have to participate in another matter.

THE ARBITRATOR: Okay. All right. But you're okay if we continue in your absence?

MR. GARFINKEL: Of course.
MR. LEWIN: And we ordered the court reporter.

THE ARBITRATOR: Okay. That's what I was going to ask, because I see on the screen that there is seven.

THE COURT REPORTER: Yes. This is Heidi Konsten. I'm the court reporter.

THE ARBITRATOR: Okay. All right. So
that will constitute the appearances.
This is on for a hearing on the application for fees and costs. I've obviously read and received the original application, the opposition, the reply brief, the supplemental opposition, and the -- let me get the title right -- response to CLA's rogue supplemental opposition.

Okay. So let me start with this issue of the actual statements from the law firms being submitted to me in camera. Generally not an unusual thing for me to have them submitted in

Page 6 camera. They were redacted somewhat, which is also not unusual.

But I want to start with the idea that Respondents need not receive even redacted bills and statements from the law firms in light of the case law that's been provided by Respondents. And I guess I'll start with a question for either Mr. Gerrard or Mr. Shapiro, whoever is going to handle it.

Is it -- is it not necessary for them to receive those only because of your position that no determination of the reasonableness of fees is an issue?

MR. GERRARD: Your Honor, this is Doug Gerrard. And before I answer your question, I just want to let you know that I, likewise, only have about 45 minutes this morning. So if I have to leave, Mr. Shapiro will certainly very capably take over.

But the answer to your question is that the -- the awarding of fees in this case, as has been the entire arbitration, is based 100 percent completely and solely upon the contractual language of the operating agreement. It is the operating agreement that creates the obligation

Page 7
for attorney's fees to be paid or awarded to the prevailing party.

And the arbitration has commenced under substantive law, you know, from the state of Nevada, but the procedural aspects of the case are based upon, you know, the rules of JAMS and the arbitration rules that we have, you know, briefed thoroughly in the past.

There's no place in the contract that requires that we produce our billing statements to the opposing party. As you mentioned, it's very common -- or at least, in your words, not unusual for -- at the conclusion of a case, if there are fees sought, for an in-camera review of the bills to be provided to the Court simply because you don't wish to have -- take any chance at all of waiving any of your work-product privilege or your attorney-client privilege.

And that's fairly common, and it's -you know, yes, could we go through all of the billing statements and try to redact every single thing that, you know, might waive that privilege or those privileges? Yes, that can be done. But in a case like this, there is no law that requires us to produce our billing statements to the

Page 8 opposing party.

They haven't cited any Nevada authority that says that, because there isn't any. The only authority that they provided deals with actual judicial proceedings, not arbitrations.

Arbitrations are unique. As Your Honor is well aware, there's a statute in Nevada that permits, you know, awards to be confirmed by a court, and there is a body of case law that interprets the statute as well that deals primarily with enforcement of the arbitration provision and when that will be enforced and when that will not be enforced.

There is no body of law, either statutory or common law, in reported cases from the state of Nevada that governs how attorney fees are to be awarded and what are the requirements for the awarding of attorney fees in an arbitration. There's a simple reason for that. Arbitrations are based upon a contract. The contract is the language that controls.

This contract has one provision that deals with attorney fees. It's in Article 3, Section 14.1 of the operating agreement. It does not have anything in that provision that requires
the prevailing party to provide their billing statements to the party that didn't prevail.

It's very straightforward. It just simply says the arbitrator shall award costs and expenses, including the costs of the arbitration previously advanced and the fees and expenses of attorneys, accountants, and other experts to the prevailing party, end quote.

There's nothing that says that we have to have those bills evaluated for reasonableness, although we believe they're completely reasonable. It's not like we tried to pad our bills. I mean, our client had to pay these bills as they went forward. You're certainly not alleging after -go ahead.

THE ARBITRATOR: Let me stop you there.
And partly because everybody is -- I'm interrupting because everyone has time constraints.

MR. GERRARD: That's fine.
THE ARBITRATOR: So is it your position that no matter what the bills are, that -- I mean, look, here is what I -- my -- I'm thinking. Okay? I haven't fully decided this, but the language in the operating agreement makes the award of fees

Page 10
1 and costs somewhat mandatory. I don't have discretion to say, "Yeah, you know, I'm just not going to award fees, because this has been going on too long," something like that.

In terms of the amount, is it your position that whatever you submitted to me, because the operating agreement is worded the way it is, that there's no determination of reasonableness? That if you decided on this case that you were going to charge Mr. Bidsal 10,000 an hour, that -- and same for costs. If the accounting firm suddenly put -- you know, the bills show they had 14 people working on this and billed 3 million for the report, that I have -that I have no discretion to determine reasonableness of what the fees are?

Because that's sort of the position that you're taking, saying, "Look, you have no obligation, Mr. Arbitrator, to determine whether the fee is reasonable."

MR. GERRARD: Well, I don't think that that's the position we've taken. What we've stated is that the language of the operating agreement itself does not include any reasonableness standard. I mean, I think we can

Page 11
all agree that that language is not there.
Having said that, we have never taken the position in any of our pleadings that we think that Your Honor wouldn't have the discretion to conclude what's reasonable and what isn't. I mean, look, throughout this case, we've asked Your Honor to do what is reasonable. Right?

THE ARBITRATOR: I understand that. I mean, you said reasonable -- reasonableness is not an issue. That the reason they don't need to see the statements is because reasonableness is not an issue. You've said that.

Even though, on the flip side, you have given me all of the analysis of the Brunzell factors, and the Brunzell factors are only there to determine reasonableness.

MR. GERRARD: So let me just make this quick and easy. If Your Honor wants to give them the bills and wants them to have an opportunity to review them, we'll provide them. We're not going to provide them without Your Honor telling us that we have to, because we don't want to waive any potential privileges.

I think I made that pretty abundantly clear in the proceeding, that that's the primary

Page 12
1 reason. The primary reason we did not provide our
2 bills to them isn't because we think there's let me put this a different way.

I don't have any desire to force a waiver of any privilege. I think that Respondents would probably agree that providing redacted billing statements wouldn't open up any privilege and would be used only for the purpose of

Page 13
1 determining fees.

Here is my thing. I read Love versus Love, and I don't agree with Claimants that its application to this case is tenuous. I Shepardized it, however, and found a case called Golden Road Motor Inn, Inc., versus Islam, 132 Nevada 476, and it basically held the same thing, although it's a little unclear from the case. It's a commercial case where the entitlement to fees came in part from the contract.

Now, the language of the contract
isn't -- I didn't see it in the opinion. So all I really care about is getting this issue correct and being able to preserve the ruling on this issue, so --

MR. GERRARD: So to be clear, Your Honor, if you would like us to provide our billing statements to the other side -- redacted, of course -- we have no problem doing that if that's what Your Honor would ask us to do. We'll do it.

THE ARBITRATOR: Okay.
MR. GERRARD: The point here is we were not going to do it unless we had to do it, because there's no reason to do it.

Page 14

THE ARBITRATOR: Understood. I don't disagree with any of that.

Mr. Lewin and Mr. Garfinkel, you would agree that by providing those -- that these billing statements would not reopen or open up any attorney-client privilege such that there's some waiver of the attorney-client privilege in providing those to you; is that right?

MR. GERRARD: Or work product, Your Honor.

THE ARBITRATOR: Or work product.
MR. LEWIN: This is Rod Lewin.
Yes, typically when those are submitted, they don't open up a privilege, provided that they're narrowly redacted. We agree with that.

THE ARBITRATOR: Okay. All right. Give me a timetable.

MR. LEWIN: Well, before we go there, Your Honor, $I$ think that the issue is a little bit broader. I understand, you know, we had -- I think that there's an issue that we would like a hearing on -- a ruling on, as well.

We think that the -- that Mr. Bidsal made a conscious litigation decision that was tactical, and we suggested that in our opposition.

Page 15

That was a gamble that he took, and it's now too late to start over.

THE ARBITRATOR: No, I disagree. I disagree. They were submitted to me, and there's no -- even in your opposition, there wasn't any law suggesting that they had to provide those to you. It was only in the sort of rogue pleading, which I didn't even need to consider, frankly, and could have stricken because it was -- it was inconsistent with the briefing schedule that I had set out in the interim order -- or interim award, so --

MR. LEWIN: But that's really because the issue in the Brunzell case really controls this. And despite what Mr. Gerrard said, he said that the contract doesn't -- you know, the contract controls.

The contract doesn't say that they get all of their attorney fees like they said in their pleading. The contract doesn't say that the attorney fees and costs have to be -- doesn't have to be reasonable, because that's implied.

Brunzell controls that. Brunzell actually controls in this case. They know it. Nevada law controls, and the contract says it.

Page 16
1 And by them -- and they say -- the only issue that

Well, I don't think that is the law. I think that they have made -- I understand your -I understand what your position is, your ruling, but $I$ think that it's wrong in terms of giving them another bite at the apple when they made a conscious litigation decision not to submit the -not to submit their bills, redacted or otherwise, and they should be held to it.

THE ARBITRATOR: Well, my response would be twofold: One, they did submit them to me. Two, they did submit affidavits from counsel without the redacted billings to you. And, third, it was sort of your suggestion at the end of your opposition that if I'm going to allow further briefing by Claimants, that you should have an opportunity to respond.

And so I agree wholeheartedly with your suggestion at the end of your opposition. So -okay.

MR. LEWIN: But my suggestion was twofold. Number one, my suggestion was that their

Page 17
motion should be denied except for the time that they spent in front of you where you could independently -- and that we had the opportunity to -- to observe the work as opposed to the -THE ARBITRATOR: Right. Right.

MR. LEWIN: But, alternatively, and not waiving our rights to -- and our claim that their motion should be denied is the -- was the issue that, alternatively --

THE COURT REPORTER: I'm sorry. I'm not able to hear you.

MR. LEWIN: What part didn't you hear?
(Whereupon, the record was read.)
MR. LEWIN: Alternatively was our suggestion that if you weren't going to deny it, then we should have an opportunity to review and follow up with a pleading based on the bills and as they're submitted.

THE ARBITRATOR: Okay. Well, I'm not going to deny it, because $I$ don't think there's a -- there's an insufficiency that would require denial on its face.

I'm going to adopt your well-reasoned alternatives, Mr. Lewin, and allow for additional briefing and to give you the opportunity to could -- Mr. Gerrard, do you need a week for yours?

MR. GERRARD: Well, no, Your Honor. All that we're going to -- Mr. Shapiro already has all of the bills. So if we can submit all of the bills in a week, that's all we're going to do. We're not just going to --

THE ARBITRATOR: Right.
MR. GERRARD: -- make any additional briefings. We're just going to disclose the redacted bills.

THE ARBITRATOR: Okay. But I didn't know -- I didn't know he had yours.

MR. GERRARD: Yes.
THE ARBITRATOR: All right. So let's go January 12.

Now, having those bills, Respondent would be able to file an additional brief, and

Page 19
then I would -- I would anticipate a reply from -- from the Claimant.

MR. GERRARD: Correct.
THE ARBITRATOR: So, Mr. Lewin, Mr. Garfinkel, you receive the bills on the 12th.

Can you have a second supplemental opposition to me by, say, the 21st?

MR. LEWIN: Your Honor, that's -- that is short time for us. I think that we would like to -- at least -- at least two weeks.

THE ARBITRATOR: Okay. The 26th.
Mr. Shapiro, Mr. Gerrard, a supplemental reply brief.

MR. SHAPIRO: So I've got a trial that's scheduled to begin on Monday the 31st, and it's scheduled to go that week. So, I mean, assuming that week is out, we would have to have until February 16, because we're going to lose pretty much -- from the time we get the opposition through the 4 th is going to be black for us. THE ARBITRATOR: How about the 11th? MR. SHAPIRO: We'll do it by the 11th. THE ARBITRATOR: All right. And then let's set a new conference call date -- let's see. It's going to take me a minute to bring up my

Page 20 calendar.

So how about Friday, February 25th? And if we're going to do it that late, then I can give you until the 16th for that reply.

MR. GERRARD: Your Honor, this is Doug Gerrard. I'm going to be in a trial that day. THE ARBITRATOR: Okay. How about the 28th?

MR. GERRARD: That works for me, Your Honor.

THE ARBITRATOR: Is your trial ongoing?
MR. GERRARD: No. It's a two-day trial going the 24 th and the 25th. So I'm fine that next week.

THE ARBITRATOR: Okay. So let's do the 28th. Let's do 9:00 a.m. Pacific.

Does that work?
MR. GERRARD: Yes.
MR. LEWIN: I believe it does, yes.
MR. SHAPIRO: I'm just looking at my calendar, but I think that's fine, Your Honor. (Indiscernible crosstalk.)

MR. SHAPIRO: -- until the 16th?
THE ARBITRATOR: Yes. Yes, given that.
Now, there's no -- there's no -- here's

Page 21
1 what I have. I have the bills to be produced
2 January 12. I have Respondent's second ahead.

MR. GERRARD: I was going to say, to the extent that we need to stipulate, we're willing to stipulate, and I think we're fine. But we're willing to stipulate that we're fine.

Page 22

THE ARBITRATOR: I just don't remember the language of the operating agreement on this. MR. SHAPIRO: Well, we did require an expedited -- the JAMS expedited rule, but we waived that in the very beginning. And so we already, right out of the gate, waived the expedited procedures. So we're in the normal procedures and that -- that was by stipulation at the beginning.

THE ARBITRATOR: Okay. All right. Anything else we need to reach today?

MR. LEWIN: I don't think so. This is Rob Lewin.

MR. GERRARD: No, Your Honor.
THE ARBITRATOR: Okay. I will set a -go ahead, Mr. Garfinkel.

MR. GARFINKEL: I was going to say, Judge, thank you for your time.

THE ARBITRATOR: Oh, all right. Thank you.

I'll get something out. I'll get an e-mail out that has these dates in it. And then we'll reconvene on February 28. All right?

MR. LEWIN: Perfect. Thank you very much.

| 1 |  | THE | ARBITRATOR: All right. Thank | Page 23 you, |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 2 | everyone. |  |  |  |
| 3 |  | MR. | GERRARD: Have a great day. |  |
| 4 |  |  | (Whereupon, the proceedings |  |
| 5 |  |  | concluded at 8:25 a.m.) |  |
| 6 |  |  | * * * * * |  |
| 7 |  |  |  |  |
| 8 |  |  |  |  |
| 9 |  |  |  |  |
| 10 |  |  |  |  |
| 11 |  |  |  |  |
| 12 |  |  |  |  |
| 13 |  |  |  |  |
| 14 |  |  |  |  |
| 15 |  |  |  |  |
| 16 |  |  |  |  |
| 17 |  |  |  |  |
| 18 |  |  |  |  |
| 19 |  |  |  |  |
| 20 |  |  |  |  |
| 21 |  |  |  |  |
| 22 |  |  |  |  |
| 23 |  |  |  |  |
| 24 |  |  |  |  |
| 25 |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  | - $\rightarrow$ REPORTING SERVIGES |  |

STATE OF NEVADA )

$$
\text { ) } s s
$$

County of Clark )

I, Heidi K. Konsten, Certified Court
Reporter, do hereby certify:
That I reported in shorthand (Stenotype)
the proceedings had in the above-entitled matter at the place and date indicated.

That I thereafter transcribed my said shorthand notes into typewriting, and that the typewritten transcript is a complete, true, and accurate transcription of my said shorthand notes.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have set my hand in my office in the County of Clark, State of Nevada, this 17th day of January, 2022.







## EXHIBIT 273

| 1 | Page 1 <br> JAMS |
| :---: | :---: |
| 2 | BEFORE HONORABLE DAVID T. WALL (Ret.), ARBITRATOR |
| 3 |  |
| 4 |  |
| 5 | SHAWN BIDSAL, an individual, ) |
| 6 | Claimant/Counter-Respondent, ) |
|  | ) |
| 7 | vs. ) |
| 8 | CLA PROPERTIES, LLC, a ll JAMS REF NO. 1260005736 |
|  | California limited liability ) |
| 9 | company, ) |
|  | ( ) |
| 10 | Respondent/Counterclaimant. ) |
|  | R ) |
| 11 | ) |
|  | ) |
| 12 | ) |
|  | ) |
| 13 |  |
| 14 |  |
| 15 | TRANSCRIPT OF TELEPHONIC HEARING PROCEEDINGS |
| 16 | Taken on Monday, February 28, 2022 |
| 17 | At 8:02 a.m. |
| 18 | At 400 South Seventh Street |
| 19 | Las Vegas, Nevada |
| 20 |  |
| 21 |  |
| 22 |  |
| 23 |  |
| 24 | Job No. 48335, Firm No. 061F |
| 25 | Reported by: Tracy A. Manning, CCR 785 |
|  | $1 \rightarrow \underset{\text { REPORTING SERVICES }}{ }$ |

    For the Claimant/CounterRespondent:
    8
    9
    10
11
12
1 3
BY: DOUGLAS D. GERRARD, ESQ.
2450 St. Rose Parkway
14 Suite 200
Henderson, Nevada 89074
15 dgerrard@gerrard-cox.com
16
17 For the Respondent/Counterclaimant:
18 LAW OFFICES OF RODNEY T. LEWIN, APC
BY: RODNEY T. LEWIN, ESQ.
19 8665 Wilshire Boulevard
Suite 210
Beverly Hills, California 90211
rod@rtlewin.com
21
22
REISMAN SOROKAC
BY: LOUIS E. GARFINKEL, ESQ.
8965 South Eastern Avenue
Suite 382
Las Vegas, Nevada 89123
lgarfinkel@rsnvlaw.com

```
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|}
\hline 1 & APPEARANCES: & (Cont'd) & Page 3 \\
\hline 2 & Also present: & & \\
\hline 3 & Shawn Bidsal & & \\
\hline 4 & & & \\
\hline 5 & & & \\
\hline 6 & & & \\
\hline 7 & & & \\
\hline 8 & & & \\
\hline 9 & & & \\
\hline 10 & & & \\
\hline 11 & & & \\
\hline 12 & & & \\
\hline 13 & & & \\
\hline 14 & & & \\
\hline 15 & & & \\
\hline 16 & & & \\
\hline 17 & & & \\
\hline 18 & & & \\
\hline 19 & & & \\
\hline 20 & & & \\
\hline 21 & & & \\
\hline 22 & & & \\
\hline 23 & & & \\
\hline 24 & & & \\
\hline 25 & & & \\
\hline & &  & \\
\hline
\end{tabular}

MONDAY, FEBRUARY 28, 2022

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

ARBITRATOR WALL: Good morning. This is David Wall.

Who do I have on the line on behalf of Mr. Bidsal?

MR. SHAPIRO: James Shapiro, so far. Doug should be joining.

MR. GERRARD: Doug Gerrard.
ARBITRATOR WALL: And Mr. Bidsal's on.
All right. On behalf of CLA.
MR. LEWIN: Rod Lewin, Your Honor. Good morning.

ARBITRATOR WALL: Good morning.
MR. GARFINKEL: And Louis Garfinkel, Your
Honor. Good morning.
ARBITRATOR WALL: Good morning.
THE REPORTER: Your Honor, I'm Tracy
Manning. I'm the court reporter today.
ARBITRATOR WALL: Tracy, what's your last name?

THE REPORTER: Manning, M-a-n-n-i-n-g.

Page 5

ARBITRATOR WALL: All right. And is
Mr. Golshani on as well?
MR. LEWIN: No, Your Honor.
ARBITRATOR WALL: Okay. So this is everybody.

So it's the argument as to the application for fees. I have received since the last time we spoke on January 5th CLA's second supplemental opposition to the application for fees and costs. I received claimant's second supplemental reply in support of Mr. Bidsal's application for fees.

Mr. Gerrard or Mr. Shapiro, anything you want to add to what's in the brief?

MR. GERRARD: Well, this is Mr. Gerrard.
I think what we put in the brief is pretty self-explanatory. But I'm happy to make the arguments if you would like us to. I certainly will be making the same arguments that are in the briefs. I think there is one thing I would like to perhaps emphasize, if that's okay with you.

ARBITRATOR WALL: Uh-huh.
MR. GERRARD: The one thing that's clear about this is -- and the place where the analysis has to start as it does in every case is what is the controlling authority. And I have been quite

Page 6
surprised through this briefing to see that the other side's beliefs that some California common law somehow trumps the operating agreement, which is the only controlling authority in this matter. And when you look at the operating agreement, I want to focus the Court's attention on one thing. When you look at Section 14 of Article 3, which is on page 7 of the operating agreement, I'd like for Your Honor to look at the first sentence of Section 14, which is titled deadlock. Which is what gave rise to us being in front of Your Honor. There it says, in the event that members reach a deadlock that cannot be resolved with a respect to an issue that requires 90 percent vote for approval, that either member may compel arbitration of the disputed matter. So here in the first paragraph it talks about "an issue". When we look at Section 14.1 that follows, the first sentence of that section says that if there is this dispute or disagreement between the members as to what? The interpretation of any provision of this agreement, and then in parentheses, or the performance of obligations hereunder. That's what was before this tribunal. Was a dispute or disagreement between CLA and Bidsal

Page 7
about how to interpret certain provisions of the agreement, and the performance required under the agreement.

When you then turn to the next page of the operating agreement, which is still in that same Section 14.1, there is the language that controls, that says the fees and expenses of JAMS and the arbitrator shall be shared equally by the members in advance by them from time to time as required, provided that at the conclusion of the arbitration, the arbitrator shall award costs and expenses, including costs of the arbitration previously advanced, and the fees and expenses of attorneys, accountants, and other experts to the prevailing party.

Who is the prevailing party? It's the party that prevailed on the issues that were set before the Court for decision. Meaning the dispute about the interpretation of the agreement or the performance of the obligations under the agreement.

Not the discovery disputes, not the disputes over, you know, witnesses being allowed to testify or not testify. It's the dispute about the interpretation of the operating agreement and the obligations of the parties thereunder.

Page 8

And I just ask the Arbitrator, where in the controlling authority, which is the operating agreement, do such limitations appear? They do not appear.

And it's not California common law that we use to interpret this contract or the parties' performance. It's this language of this operating agreement which is clear, and Nevada law that discusses how you interpret a contract.

And the Nevada law that deals with interpreting a contract says that the contract must be (indiscernible) construed --

THE REPORTER: Must be --
MR. GERRARD: -- in accordance with the actual terms contained therein. Not what the other side wants to read into the agreement, but what's

Page 9
actually there. And the Court does not have the authority to interpolate into the contract things that are not there. But yet that's the entire argument. Is that we should read something into this that's not there, and we should try to apply some legal authority that certainly does not apply to this application for fees.

So that's what I wanted to emphasize to the Court. Because the rest of it -- the rest of the opposition is -- that we received is really kind of irrelevant.

You know, they argue about the David Legrand delay and the briefing. I remind the Court again, that doesn't matter under the standard that's set forth in the operating agreement. But if it did, it wasn't Mr. Bidsal's side that wanted to brief this issue and delay the arbitration, it was Mr. Golshani's side. And we certainly complied with what Your Honor asked us to do. But we did not ask for briefing. Your Honor had already made a decision at the trial and they did not like that decision as it related to Mr . Legrand's testimony and so they asked for time to brief it.

And then they -- when it came time for the hearing, they hadn't done what Your Honor asked them

Page 10 to do, so they asked for time to supplement their briefing. And ultimately that, you know, five or so months' delay resulted in a lot of extra work in terms of trying to go back and prepare for the closing of the trial.

I also point out, the CLA is not entitled under any authority to our unredacted bills. We didn't provide the bills to them in the first instance because there is no authority that says that we're required to. We only have to aver in an affidavit what the fees and costs were. We did provide the bills to Your Honor so that it would be clear what had been done, and Your Honor can make the review.

We later, as Your Honor requested, provided redacted bills to the other side. But again, there's a complaint about what was redacted. As if, you know, somehow they should be the arbiters of what privileged information they should be able to see.

You know, attorney-client privilege and attorney work product privilege in Nevada are very clear concepts. They're not hard to understand. And our bills are full of privileged information. Both attorney-client communications that are

Page 11 described in the billing references, and work product. The things that we were interested in, the things that we were concerned about show up in description in our billings.

And so again, we're not required to provide that information to them. And there's no authority that they've cited that said that we are. So, Your Honor, I think it's pretty straightforward. The fees we charged were certainly reasonable. You know, our fees are exactly in line with what the other side was charging, their fees as well. And we know that from previous billings in the first arbitration. We know what rates they were charging. You know, they were charging slightly more than what we were charging in this case in terms of hourly rates. But they're basically the same, and they're certainly within keeping of normal, reasonable hourly rates in the industry. If you looked at our bills, you'll see that there was no duplication of efforts. Mr. Shapiro's office primarily prepared all of the different pleadings and the motions and the things that were done. And my office, meaning just me, reviewed those things to make corrections that I thought were necessary before the final product was

Page 12 sent out. And I was involved obviously in kind of leading the trial or the evidentiary hearing. And certainly there was nothing unreasonable about that. So, Your Honor, based upon what we have presented, I see no basis for the Court not to comply, or the arbitrator not to comply, with the clear mandate of the arbitration agreement in awarding the fees and costs of \(\$ 444,225\) in fees and \(\$ 155,644.84\) in costs.

And I would point out that, you know, we appreciate that they pointed out a few billing errors in the bills that, of course, was inadvertent. We weren't trying to pass something off on them that we shouldn't have. But we reduced our fee application by the \(\$ 2,650\) that was incorrectly billed to this matter that should have been billed to other matters.

And so unless you have any questions, Your Honor, I think that that's really the points we want to emphasize. It's all laid out in the brief.

ARBITRATOR WALL: I do have a couple of questions.

One was the issue of a flat fee that I saw in the redacted billing records that was raised by respondent. I saw in your second supplemental brief

Page 13
that you indicate that there was no flat fee, and that -- and that all of the requested fees were actually paid by claimant and not handled on a flat fee basis.

There's reference to your amended affidavit, which is Exhibit 12, and Mr. Shapiro's, which is Exhibit 11. Your amended -- Mr. Gerrard, your amended affidavit reflects that it wasn't handled on a flat fee basis and that all of your fees were actually paid. I didn't see that in Mr. Shapiro's amended affidavit.

MR. SHAPIRO: Your Honor, Jim Shapiro. This is Jim Shapiro, and I can add some clarity. The amounts that are being billed or sought from Smith \& Shapiro, there are some of those invoices that are outstanding, and so I did not include that same statement. But I, as stated in that affidavit, did not bill this matter on a flat fee basis. And the attorney fees that we're seeking are attorney fees that were actually incurred. The flat fee, I think, probably showed up on my invoice. That's -- that is kind of a catchall issue where we address kind of unique billing issues. But certainly, this case was not a flat fee basis.

ARBITRATOR WALL: Okay. Is there

Page 14 somewhere in your amended affidavit that said that? MR. SHAPIRO: Says -- what part of what I said? I mean, yes, it should have. I mean, that's my recollection is it does say -- and I'm going to pull it up and look at it.

ARBITRATOR WALL: It will take me a minute to pull it up. Hold on a second.

It would be Exhibit 11 to your second supplemental.

MR. SHAPIRO: No. 6, the amounts constitute -- below constitute the amount -THE REPORTER: Excuse me, sir? Can you read that a little slower, please?

MR. SHAPIRO: Paragraph 6, the amounts contained below constitute the amount, to the best of my knowledge and belief, that have been incurred as a result of arbitration referenced in this caption.

And my apologies, Your Honor, I thought that it did address flat fee issue. I'm surprised that it's not there. My understanding was that it was in that amended affidavit, but somehow it did not make it in. It was an aversion. Certainly we can submit a supplemental affidavit or you can take my representation as an officer of the Court that is

Page 15
1 the case.

MR. GERRARD: One step beyond that, Your Honor, you have the bills. It's very -- that it was done on an hourly basis. I mean, there's nothing in there that shows this was billed on a flat rate basis. There might have been some entries that said flat rate where they were billing something at a flat rate. For instance, doing some sort of a -you know, some task that they billed at a flat rate, maybe one or two of those might show up in there somewhere. But if you look at the bills themselves, all of their time is billed hourly.

ARBITRATOR WALL: Okay. I will accept it as a statement by Mr. Shapiro as an officer of the Court. I mean, it's in the brief as well that way. I just didn't see it referenced in the second affidavit.

Another question. As it relates to costs. The total of \(\$ 85,423.70\) for Mr. Wilcox's firm -- is it pronounced Eide Bailly, E-i-d-e. I went through those. I don't know who Mr. Kur, K-u-r, is, although the bills referenced him as a director of the firm.
\(\$ 57,190\) of the 85,000 plus was incurred by Mr. Kur. He was never referenced in the testimony.

Page 16 I went back through Mr. Wilcox's entire arbitration testimony transcript. I didn't see references to, "we determined this," or that he had the assistance of any partner. Virtually every reference he makes was to what he did, what he saw, what he calculated, what he interpreted. For the most part, it was not we. So I don't know who Mr. Kur is, and I don't know what his contribution was.

There's -- there's about \(\$ 5,000\) by other people, including a Mr. -- I think it's Mr., I don't remember, Lawless, L-a-w-l-e-s-s, and a few minor entries of others. I get that there may be some assistants in his firm, but that's kind of different from Mr. Kur.

So am I incorrect that there's ever been a reference to Mr. Kur, or any contributions he made to Mr. Wilcox anywhere in the arbitration proceedings?

MR. GERRARD: This is Doug Gerrard speaking again.

I don't think that it was referenced in Mr. Wilcox's report, you know. Certainly, Mr. Kur is the director -- is a director in their litigation support part of the firm. Eide Bailly is a national accounting firm. And Chris Wilcox, who is a local

Page 17

But Mr. Kur was involved in the analysis in going through all of the records, all of the accounting records, and creating all of the schedules that Your Honor saw. He actually prepared all the schedules which were then verified by Mr. Wilcox and used by Mr. Wilcox for his opinions. But certainly, you know, just as I use an associate in my firm to do a lot of the legwork in a matter before I may be -- you know, handle a hearing or handle, you know, a substantive trial, it's the same concept. Mr. Kur worked with -- together with Mr. Shapiro and I very closely in -- and you can see that, also, in the billing records.

You know, obviously we redacted out things we were talking about, but you'll see lots of references in the billing records to communications between myself or Mr. Shapiro or Aimee Cannon at Mr. Shapiro's firm.

And Mr. Kur, while we were putting together and developing the arguments and the factual background of what actually happened. And, of course, as you know, we had to go back and look

Page 18
through -- because of the argument the other side was making about trying to recharacterize all these distributions that were done over the years, that's what Mr. Kur was primarily involved in, is going back really from the beginning of time.

He created an analysis that showed all distributions from the beginning. Whether they were right, whether they were wrong, you know, prepared all of the accounting information that later Mr. Wilcox, then, was able to review. And he made some corrections to the things that he thought needed to be corrected before the final schedules were prepared. And then he was ready to use those schedules in preparing his report.

Mr. Kur assisted him in drafting that report. Mr. Wilcox then made all the changes to the things that Mr. Kur had found in his review of the accounting records. And then -- and then put together his own opinions based upon all that information.

So a lot of the background information, or the -- kind of the data that is relied upon by Mr. Wilcox in his report and for his opinions, was compiled by Mr. Kur.

So that's basically what you see there.

Page 19
1 And although it might not -- his work -- his work may not be referenced by his name, you certainly can see in the billing records where, you know, that's where we were going to get a lot of information because he's the one that compiled all the information.

ARBITRATOR WALL: Okay. All right, Mr. Lewin or Mr. Garfinkel.

MR. LEWIN: Yes, Thank you, Your Honor. Just to get --

THE REPORTER: Who is this?
MR. LEWIN: This is Mr. Lewin.
On that last point, without looking at
Mr. Wilcox's testimony, I don't recall him saying that anyone but himself prepared the report or did the analysis. And I don't think that Mr. Gerrard's statement -- this motion hearing constituted other evidence to support 57,000 plus of charges by Mr. -ARBITRATOR WALL: To be fair, it's not an issue you raised. So there wouldn't have been any response to it in the second supplemental. It's just something I saw when I went through the billing.

MR. LEWIN: Your Honor, we raised the
issue of --

THE REPORTER: Excuse -- Mr. Lewin, you're breaking up.

MR. LEWIN: Is this better? Can you hear me better now?

THE REPORTER: Your volume was okay, you were just breaking up. Let's try it again.

MR. LEWIN: I moved to a different
location.
THE REPORTER: Great.
MR. LEWIN: Your Honor, you raised the issue -- we raised the issue of their failure to set forth reasonable evidence to justify the expert costs. That would have been included in it.

And so, on this same note, on that same token, we object to the -- those portions of the supplemental affidavits and verification of costs, to the extent that they add new evidence to support their burden of proof that could have been included in their moving papers.

What you ordered at the last hearing was that they provide the billing statements. I thought they were going to be unredacted except as to attorney-client communications, but we'll address that in a second. That was -- it did not permit, as I understand it, that they could add to their burden

Page 21 of proof requirements that were -- that was supposed to be satisfied in their motion by adding additional proof in their -- their reply -- their second reply, which we had no chance to oppose.

So I don't think -- I object to those portions of those -- of the two affidavits to the extent they attempt to add additional evidence supporting their burden of proof with respect to the attorneys' fees, their costs.

The issue concerning -- the primary issue that Mr. Gerrard has talked about, and it's in their moving papers, is that their claim is that you have no discretion whatsoever to -- except to order the payment of any fee or cost that they claim that they incurred in connection with this proceeding. Ignoring Brunsell and all the other authority we have cited.

So in theory, if they had attended the hearing and had ten lawyers working on it and ran up \$5 million in fees and costs, according to the Bidsal position, you have no authority to -- or discretion to challenge that or just -- you just have to do the arithmetic and order it paid. That's an absurd proposition. It ignores -- it ignores all the cases under the laws of Nevada or elsewhere.

Page 22
1 And the (indiscernible), which by itself incorporates the laws under the Nevada law. And the frivolousness of that is that contention is demonstrated by Nevada law in their motion. They continue to do this in their latest reply.

So I think that they have to meet the requirements of Brunsell, and they have to provide sufficient evidence to provide -- to determine whether or not the case was overstaffed, whether the time spent by attorneys were duplicative or reasonable, properly expended. For that reason, that's my response.

ARBITRATOR WALL: Why is it potentially overstaffed, when they had the same number of lawyers involved, maybe less, than you did?

MR. LEWIN: Well, the fact of the matter is, I'm not saying it's overstaffed in terms of some things. We can't tell exactly what lawyer did what in terms of things that were done in terms of paperwork and other things that were not done at the hearing.

But I just want to -- we had, for the most part -- the fact of the matter is to have two attorneys attend every hearing and every -- and arbitration. That would not necessarily mean that

Page 23
they're entitled to their payment --
THE REPORTER: To the payment of what?
MR. LEWIN: If they had two attorneys at every hearing, that would not necessarily mean that they are entitled to be compensated for two attorneys. The question is whether two attorneys present were reasonable. One example -ARBITRATOR WALL: Hold on, let me stop you for a second.

Mr . Lewin, are you somewhere where there's a landline?

MR. LEWIN: Yes.
ARBITRATOR WALL: You're -- it just seems like there's spotty cell service where you are.

MR. LEWIN: I'll call it right now.
ARBITRATOR WALL: All right. Perfect.
We'll take a brief break.
(Off record.)
ARBITRATOR WALL: Back on the record.
THE REPORTER: All right.
MR. LEWIN: So, if I put -- my point being is if they could have as many attorneys as they wanted at the hearings, for example, but that doesn't mean that it's reasonable or that they should be awarded the fees of two attorneys for the

Page 24
hearings. Unless Your Honor determines it was reasonable for them to do so.

And we know that at the hearings, Mr. Gerrard did everything except, I believe, the -putting up some documents and the direct examination of Mr. Bidsal, which, in fact, was done by Mr. Shapiro.

In connection with your other -- so if we had won the case and we had submitted for a claim for two attorneys, they would be justified in attacking that. Especially if we didn't show by competent evidence that two attorneys were necessary. And I think that is the point I was making there.

ARBITRATOR WALL: Well, I think they were necessary. I'll just tell you that right now. I think it was necessary, just as I think it was necessary for you. I mean, I know you did primarily most of the witnesses, but I know how important Mr. Garfinkel's contributions were, and we made sure to schedule things so that all four lawyers could be present.

In fact, with respect to the privilege issue, I mean, there was even another lawyer incorporated on your side. Which I recognize that

Page 25 being important. So that issue probably isn't going to have a lot of play with me.

MR. LEWIN: Very well. I'm done with my pitch on that issue, anyway.

So, with respect to the providing of competent evidence and redaction. The wholesale redactions that were -- that took place in the bills really deprived us from looking at and determining what work was done and work may have been duplicated. We can't tell. And as we pointed out, and I accept the fact that there were some mistakes in the bill, in the submission. Everyone makes mistakes, so not criticizing either Mr. Shapiro or Mr. Gerrard for having some billing entries that don't apply to this case.

But we can't determine what -- to the extent that -- how much time was spent on a particular issue in order to properly challenge it because of the redactions.

We specifically agreed that if they -that there would be no waiver of the attorney-client work product privilege at the last hearing. And I presumed that if there was going to be any redactions, there would be redactions related to communications between either Mr. Gerrard or Mr. Shapiro and their client, which would be normal.

But to redact everything -- virtually everything after the word regarding or ready, in order to deprive us of the opportunity to be able to properly review it and challenge it, is -- denies us due process and it's inappropriate.

And there's not -- that is the purpose of Brunsell, it is the burden of the people -- person seeking fees to be able to establish that.

Now, I want to point -- going back to the flat fee billing issue. Because I think the redaction on that issue is important to note. Not only did Mr. Shapiro's declaration or affidavit fail to say that he billed on an hourly basis, not on a flat fee basis, but he had basically said I billed for all the work that was done. Billed on a flat fee basis, that can be for all the work that was done, also.

But what he -- what they also did in connection with that is that they redacted the -they redacted the amount of the actual charges. So it's not only that -- it's not only that they redacted the flat fee issues, but they actually -the Smith \& Shapiro bills obliterate the amount actually being billed so we couldn't even tell what

Page 27
was being billed or what was being paid for. And I think that's a failure of the burden of proof in connection with that.

So again, according -- Mr. Gerrard says you have to award whatever they billed no matter what, but that's not the law. They didn't -- they shouldn't be compensated for matters that they didn't succeed on.

And those matters -- those matters include, for example, his tender issue, which they pursued at some length that they lost on. The interest issue, at some length, that they lost on. The motion to compel answers to interrogatories, the motion to continue, our motion to amend, the motion to -- adding CLA to the bank account, which they did after we filed the motion, and motion to withdraw Exhibit 188. All of these motions were basically contested and they lost. So there should be -there should be a -- there should be a -- they shouldn't be awarded fees or costs in connection with those matters.

And because of the massive redaction, it's no way to determine how much of the claim that they're seeking actually relate to these items that I just discussed.

Page 28

So, you know, I don't know how to -- how to address the redaction any more about -- the redaction issue, because it's hard -- if we had -if we are unable to look at what work they did by attorney to see if there's duplication or to see if there is perhaps over- -- work that was done on issues that don't relate -- don't relate to the matters at hand, that we're denied due process and the ability to properly challenge this fee motion. And I don't know how you address it in connection with -- in connection with their motion. I guess you do have -- you do have unredacted bills, which we don't have. But they've never challenged our arithmetic in connection with that. In connection with the redaction matters. Our arithmetic was that the Smith \& Shapiro billings account to about \(\$ 115,000\) worth of billing. And the -- Mr. Gerrard's billing is \(\$ 9840\).

Comes back to the Legrand motion, which the time -- the time -- during that time period was a total of 45,7- -- roughly \(\$ 700\). I complained at the time that the Legrand motion, this whole issue with David Legrand, we were sandbagged because it was brought up -- and Mr. Legrand, you know, was designated as an expert -- as a witness, was

Page 29 designated to come and testify, who talked about him testifying to the very beginning of the trial. There was no motion in limine concerning his testimony. And it wasn't until he actually was appearing for trial that this issue was raised. Had that been properly -- and there's a great deal of time, according to Mr. Gerrard, that was spent. Because the time lapse required -required them to revisit and, you know, reread things that they wouldn't have had to do if the matter proceeded without having that issue brought up.

I don't believe CLA should be charged with that time. They -- they caused that delay. We were justified in having the matter briefed and having the matter ruled on. Even if we don't agree with the ultimate ruling, it was justified for us to do so. And CLA should not be charged by the revisiting or redoing of time caused by that delay.

So, unless Your Honor has any questions, I believe I've said all I intend to say about this.

Oh, just one other thing. In their brief, they indicate that there's -- the issue of overlapping billing didn't really exist with respect to the first arbitration because it ended. But, in

Page 30 fact, it had ended. There are two appeals -- there are two appeals that are still pending and -they're still pending. We're expecting a ruling fairly quickly on that. But those matters were still in play, briefing was being done, research was being done. And we can't tell because of the redacted billing what -- what the time on that -what time might have been spent on that matter, on those appeal matters in the first arbitration simply because of the redactions.

With that I'll submit.
ARBITRATOR WALL: Okay. Thank you.
Mr. Gerrard, before you respond, just to give you all an idea of my position on certain of those issues so there may or may not be a need to respond.

I agree with the interpretation of the operating agreement as I set forth in the interim award, that the prevailing party is entitled to an award of fees.

I agree with what Mr. Lewin said, that the operating agreement incorporates Nevada law.

I agree that the Brunsell factors are ripe for my consideration in this case, that is a reasonable fee. Not only that Nevada law, but in

Page 31 your original motion, Mr . Gerrard, you cite to the Brunsell factors, which are based on an overarching concern for reaching a reasonable fee award. I don't have any problem with the Brunsell factors themselves as they relate to Mr. Gerrard, Mr. Shapiro, and their firms. So I believe that it is my obligation to award a reasonable fee, taking into consideration the Brunsell factors and all of the information that's been provided so far. With that backdrop, Mr. Gerrard, is there anything else you want to add?

MR. GERRARD: Thank you, Your Honor. Again, this is Doug Gerrard speaking. We have never argued that the Court does not have discretion. That's not an argument we've made. We have summarily pointed out that the operating agreement doesn't say that there is supposed to be some, you know, analysis, for instance, under even Brunsell, which, you know, is really addressed to attorney fee motions that are made under the statutes and/or, you know, offers of judgment in Nevada.

But we agree 100 percent that the choice of law provision in the operating agreement adopts Nevada law. That's why we made an argument under

Page 32

Brunsell. Because we think that it's appropriate for the Court to apply Brunsell. We're just pointing out, I don't know whether that's been actually adopted by the operating agreement standard that's set out, but that's never been an argument that we pressed.

We aren't saying Your Honor doesn't have discretion to do what you think is appropriate and reasonable. And if we were on the other side of this, we'd want you to be reasonable as well. Right? So we're not saying the Court shouldn't act reasonably; we think you should. But we don't think anything we've done is unreasonable. That's the point. We think the fees and costs are reasonable. And there's no Nevada law that says you're supposed to parse out, you know, motions that somebody in discovery working the case up for the trial, that there's -- you know, supposed to parse out things that you won on and things that you didn't. And the operating agreement, I think, is pretty clear on that. That it's who's the prevailing party on the issues that were presented to the Court for decision. And we were the prevailing party on those issues, according to Your Honor's order. So we believe that we are entitled
to all of our fees and costs.
Just one more comment on Mr. Kur's, you know, work that was done as it relates to the expert witness fee. We did provide Your Honor the complete billings for the -- for the Eide Bailly firm. You can see exactly what he did. And you know how much work would be required to go back and essentially run through all the accounting for this company for a period of almost ten years.

And so I think we're happy with what we presented to Your Honor. You've got all the bills, you've got everything that you would need to make a decision, and we're happy to accept whatever decision Your Honor makes.

ARBITRATOR WALL: Okay. Thank you. I'm going to take a second to look at some of these things. I'm going to prepare a final award that -that adds to the interim award a reasonable award of fees and costs to the prevailing party as provided for in the operating agreement.

A couple of things on my plate, so it may not get to you for about ten days or so. But I'm going to do my best to expedite that and get that out as quickly as possible.

Anything else that needs to come before me

17

MR. GERRARD: This is Mr. Gerrard. Not from our side.

MR. LEWIN: No, thank you, Your Honor. Have a nice day.

ARBITRATOR WALL: All right. Thank you all, very much. I appreciate it. And like I say, I'll try to get that out as quickly as \(I\) can. MR. GERRARD: Thank you.

MR. LEWIN: Thank you.
(Proceedings concluded at 8:45 a.m.)

That \(I\) reported the taking of the proceedings, at the time and place aforesaid;

That \(I\) thereafter transcribed my said shorthand notes into typewriting and that the typewritten transcript of said proceeding is a complete, true and accurate record of statements provided by the parties at said time to the best of my ability. employee, or independent contractor of counsel of any of the parties involved in said action; nor a person financially interested in the action; nor do I have any other relationship with any of the parties or with counsel of any of the parties involved in the action that may reasonably cause my impartiality to be questioned.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand in the County of Clark, State of Nevada, this \(21 s t\) day of March 2022.









```


[^0]:    

[^1]:    $\qquad$

