IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

EDGEWORTH FAMILY TRUST; AND AMERICAN GRATING, LLC,

APPELLANTS,

VS.

DANIEL S. SIMON; THE LAW OFFICE OF DANIEL S. SIMON,

RESPONDENTS.

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Dist. Ct. Case No. A-18-767242-C Consolidated with A-16-738444-C

EDGEWORTH APPELLANTS' APPENDIX TO OPENING BRIEF

VOLUME I BATES AA0001-AA0223

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DATE	DOCUMENT TITLE	VOL	BATES
			NOS.
2018-08-27	Excerpts of Evidentiary Hearing Transcript (Day 1)	Ι	AA0001-06
2018-08-30	Excerpts of Evidentiary Hearing Transcript (Day 4)	Ι	AA0007-22
2018-10-11	Decision and Order on Motion to Adjudicate Lien (original)	I	AA0023-48
2018-11-19	Decision and Order on Motion to Adjudicate Lien (Amended)	Ι	AA0049-71
2020-12-30	Nevada Supreme Court Order Affirming in Part, Vacating in Part Remanding	I	AA0072-86
2021-03-16	Second Amended Decision and Order on Motion to Adjudicate Lien	Ι	AA0087-111
2021-03-30	Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration of Lien & Attorney's Fees & Costs Orders and Second Amended Decision and Order on Motion to Adjudicate Lien	I/II	AA0112-406
2021-04-13	Nevada Supreme Court Clerk's Certificate Judgment Affirmed	II	AA0407-423
2021-04-13	Opposition to Motion to Reconsider & Request for Sanctions; Counter Motion to Adjudicate Lien on Remand	III	AA0424-626
2021-04-19	Third Amended Decision and Order on Motion to Adjudicate Lien	IV	AA0627-651

DATE	DOCUMENT TITLE	VOL	BATES
			NOS.
2021-05-03	Plaintiffs' Renewed Motion for Reconsideration of Third-Amended Decision and Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Simon's Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs, and Motion for Reconsideration of Third Amended Decision and Order on Motion to Adjudicate Lien	IV	AA0652-757
2021-05-13	Edgeworths' Motion for Order Releasing Client Funds and Requiring Production of Complete Client File	IV	AA0758-832
2021-05-13	Opposition to the Second Motion to Reconsider Counter Motion to Adjudicate Lien on Remand	V	AA0833-937
2021-05-20	Edgeworths' Reply ISO Motion for Reconsideration of Amended Decision and Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Simon's Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs, and Third Amended Decision and Order on Motion to Adjudicate Lien	V	AA0938-978
2021-05-20	Opposition to Edgeworths' Motion for Order Releasing Client Funds and Requiring Production of File	V	AA0979-1027
2021-05-21	Reply ISO Edgeworths' Motion for Order Releasing Client Funds and Requiring Production of Complete Client File	V	AA1028-1047

DATE	DOCUMENT TITLE	VOL	BATES
			NOS.
2021-05-24	Notice of Entry of Order Re Second Amened Decision and Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Simon's Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs	VI	AA1048-1056
2021-05-27	Transcript of 05-27-21 Hearing Re- Pending Motions	VI	AA1057-1085
2021-06-18	Notice of Entry of Order of Decision & Order Denying Plaintiffs' Renewed Motion for Reconsideration of Third Amended Decision and Order on Motion to Adjudicate Lien and Denying Simon's Counter Motion to Adjudicate Lien on Remand	VI	AA1086-1093
2021-07-22	Notice of Appeal	VI	AA1094-1265
2021-08-13	Docketing Statement (83260)	VII	AA1266-1277
2021-08-16	Docketing Statement (83258)	VII	AA1278-1289
2021-09-19	Amended Docketing Statement	VII	AA1290-1301
2021-12-13	Order Consolidating and Partially Dismissing Appeals	VII	AA1302-1306
2022-09-16	Order on Edgeworths' Writ Petition (Case No. 84159)	VII	AA1307-1312
2022-09-16	Order Vacating Judgment and Remanding (Case No. 83258-83260)	VII	AA1313-1317
2022-09-27	Fourth Amended Decision & Order on Motion to Adjudicate Lien	VII	AA1318-1343
2022-09-27	Order to Release to the Edgeworth's Their Complete Client File	VII	AA1344-1347
2022-12-15	Remittitur (signed and filed)	VII	AA1348-1351

DATE	DOCUMENT TITLE	VOL	BATES
			NOS.
2023-02-09	Simon's Motion for Adjudication Following Remand	VII	AA1352-1376
2023-02-23	Edgeworths' Response to Motion for	VII/VI	AA1377-1649
	Adjudication Following Remand	II	
2023-03-14	Reply ISO Motion for Adjudication Following Remand	VIII	AA1650-1717
2023-03-28	Fifth Amended Decision and Order on Motion to Adjudicate Lien	IX	AA1718-1748
2023-04-24	Notice of Entry of Fifth Amended Decision and Order on Motion to Adjudicate Lien	IX	AA1749-1781
2023-05-24	Notice of Appeal	IX	AA1782-1784

EDGEWORTH FAMILY TRUST, ET AL. vs. DANIEL S. SIMON; THE LAW OFFICE OF DANIEL S. SIMON SUPREME COURT CASE NO. .

PETITIONERS' APPENDIX

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2021-09-19	Amended Docketing Statement	VII	AA1290-1301
2018-11-19	Decision and Order on Motion to Adjudicate Lien (Amended)	I	AA0049-71
2018-10-11	Decision and Order on Motion to Adjudicate Lien (original)	I	AA0023-48
2021-03-30	Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration of Lien & Attorney's Fees & Costs Orders and Second Amended Decision and Order on Motion to Adjudicate Lien	I/II	AA0112-406
2021-08-16	Docketing Statement (83258)	VII	AA1278-1289
2021-08-13	Docketing Statement (83260)	VII	AA1266-1277
2021-05-13	Edgeworths' Motion for Order Releasing Client Funds and Requiring Production of Complete Client File	IV	AA0758-832
2021-05-20	Edgeworths' Reply ISO Motion for Reconsideration of Amended Decision and Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Simon's Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs, and Third Amended Decision and Order on Motion to Adjudicate Lien	V	AA0938-978
2023-02-23	Edgeworths' Response to Motion for Adjudication Following Remand	VII/VIII	AA1377-1649
2018-08-27	Excerpts of Evidentiary Hearing Transcript (Day 1)	I	AA0001-06
2018-08-30	Excerpts of Evidentiary Hearing Transcript (Day 4)	I	AA0007-22

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			NOS.
2023-03-28	Fifth Amended Decision and Order	IX	AA1718-1748
	on Motion to Adjudicate Lien		
2022-09-27	Fourth Amended Decision & Order	VII	AA1318-1343
2021 01 12	on Motion to Adjudicate Lien		4 4 0 4 0 7 4 2 2
2021-04-13	Nevada Supreme Court Clerk's	II	AA0407-423
2020-12-30	Certificate Judgment Affirmed	т	AA0072-86
2020-12-30	Nevada Supreme Court Order Affirming in Part, Vacating in Part	I	AA0072-00
	Remanding		
2021-07-22	Notice of Appeal	VI	AA1094-1265
2023-05-24	Notice of Appeal	IX	AA1782-1784
2023-04-24	Notice of Entry of Fifth Amended	IX	AA1749-1781
	Decision and Order on Motion to		
	Adjudicate Lien		
2021-06-18	Notice of Entry of Order of Decision	VI	AA1086-1093
	& Order Denying Plaintiffs'		
	Renewed Motion for		
	Reconsideration of Third Amended		
	Decision and Order on Motion to Adjudicate Lien and Denying		
	Simon's Counter Motion to		
	Adjudicate Lien on Remand		
2021-05-24		VI	AA1048-1056
	Amened Decision and Order	V 1	
	Granting in Part and Denying in		
	Part Simon's Motion for Attorney's		
	Fees and Costs		
2021-05-20	Opposition to Edgeworths' Motion	V	AA0979-1027
	for Order Releasing Client Funds		
	and Requiring Production of File		

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	& Request for Sanctions; Counter		
	Motion to Adjudicate Lien on Remand		
2021-05-13	Opposition to the Second Motion to	V	AA0833-937
2021-03-13	Reconsider Counter Motion to	V	AA0033-737
	Adjudicate Lien on Remand		
2021-12-13	Order Consolidating and Partially	VII	AA1302-1306
	Dismissing Appeals	,	
2022-09-16	Order on Edgeworths' Writ Petition	VII	AA1307-1312
	(Case No. 84159)		
2022-09-27	Order to Release to the Edgeworth's	VII	AA1344-1347
2022-09-16	Their Complete Client File	T 777	AA1313-1317
2022-09-16	Order Vacating Judgment and Remanding (Case No. 83258-83260)	VII	AA1313-1317
2021-05-03	Plaintiffs' Renewed Motion for	IV	AA0652-757
	Reconsideration of Third-Amended	-	
	Decision and Order Granting in Part		
	and Denying in Part Simon's Motion		
	for Attorney's Fees and Costs, and		
	Motion for Reconsideration of Third		
	Amended Decision and Order on		
2022-12-15	Motion to Adjudicate Lien Remittitur (signed and filed)	X / I I	AA1348-1351
	, 0	VII	
2021-05-21	Reply ISO Edgeworths' Motion for	V	AA1028-1047
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	Requiring Production of Complete Client File		
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	Following Remand		
2021-04-19	Third Amended Decision and Order	IV	AA0627-651
	on Motion to Adjudicate Lien		
2021-05-27	Transcript of 05-27-21 Hearing Re-	VI	AA1057-1085
	Pending Motions		

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CLERK OF THE COURT RTRAN 1 2 3 4 **DISTRICT COURT** 5 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 6 **EDGEWORTH FAMILY TRUST;** 7 CASE#: A-16-738444-C AMERICAN GRATING, LLC, 8 DEPT. X Plaintiffs, 9 vs. 10 LANGE PLUMBING, LLC, ET AL., 11 Defendants. 12 CASE#: A-18-767242-C EDGEWORTH FAMILY TRUST; 13 AMERICAN GRATING, LLC, DEPT. X 14 Plaintiffs, 15 VS. 16 DANIEL S. SIMON, ET AL., 17 Defendants. 18 BEFORE THE HONORABLE TIERRA JONES, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 19 MONDAY, AUGUST 27, 2018 20 **RECORDER'S TRANSCRIPT OF EVIDENTIARY HEARING - DAY 1** 21 **APPEARANCES:** 22 ROBERT D. VANNAH, ESQ. For the Plaintiff: JOHN B. GREENE, ESQ. 23 JAMES R. CHRISTENSEN, ESQ. For the Defendant: 24 PETER S. CHRISTIANSEN, ESQ. 25 RECORDED BY: VICTORIA BOYD, COURT RECORDER - 1 -

1	Q	What were you billing at per hour?
2	А	\$150
3	Q	That's what I said. I'm sorry, I said buck-fifty.
4	А	That's not what you said that I was doing. You said I billed
5	on the ca	se on \$150 an hour. Just to clarify what I billed on.
6	Q	And in fact and if you want to look at what you think
7	attorneys	should be paid at, I mean, you're paying very fine lawyers, Mr.
8	Greene a	nd Mr. Vannah 975 bucks an hour, right?
9		THE COURT: 925, Mr
10		MR. CHRISTIANSEN: 925. Sorry. My eyes are terrible,
11	Judge. I	apologize.
12		THE WITNESS: Correct.
13		MR. CHRISTIANSEN: Mr. Vannah wishes it was 975.
14		MR. VANNAH: Probably should be, but I'm not trying to get
15	quantum	meruit here.
16	BY MR. C	HRISTIANSEN:
17	Q	Now, you're willing to pay lawyers to come sort of button up
18	a settlem	ent at 925 an hour, fair?
19	А	When somebody threatens me, yes.
20	Q	Okay. And that wasn't litigating a complex product case,
21	fair?	
22	А	Pardon me?
23	Q	Mr. Vannah and Mr. Greene didn't come in to litigate a
24	complex	products defect case. Isn't that true?
25	Α	They're litigating a pretty complicated case.

1	Q	And for that they're fudging or disputing with you what Mr.
2	Vannah's v	worth. You're willing to pay him 925 an hour?
3	А	I had little choice.
4	Q	And Mr. Greene as well?
5	А	Correct.
6	Q	And as I read your first affidavit, Mr. Edgeworth because
7	you took it	out of the second two in your first affidavit, you told Her
8	Honor that	the case blossomed in the fall of 2017, right?
9	А	Late summer.
10	Q	I'm sorry?
11	А	Yeah, later summer, early fall.
12	Q	That's not what you said. You said fall.
13	А	Okay.
14	Q	Did you say fall, or did you say summer?
15	А	I don't know. Why don't we look? I'm not sure.
16	Q	I mean, it's convenient today you're trying to make it
17	summer, b	pecause in the affidavit, you said fall, right?
18	А	Can I see the words, please?
19	Q	Just tell me if you remember what you said.
20	А	No, I do
21	Q	I'll show them to you.
22	А	not remember.
23	Q	All right. Paragraph 11, I think is the
24		THE COURT: And which affidavit, is this Mr. Christiansen.
25		MR. CHRISTIANSEN: This the February 2nd one, Your
	ĺ	

	Q	There's nothing on this document that you created that
refle	cts wh	at you were compensating Danny Simon for, during the
mon	ths fro	m December, when you got the first bill, through March,
whe	n you	prepared this?

- A No.
- Q No, there is not? It's not on the document, correct?
- A I do not see it on the document. No, it's not there.
- Q And, sir, that day was March the 6th, and the next day -- MR. CHRISTIANSEN: This 87, John.

BY MR. CHRISTIANSEN:

- Q -- you, through your lawyer, sent an offer of judgment to Lange Plumbing for a \$1 million, correct?
 - A Correct.
- Q All right. So, if I went back and showed you your spreadsheet, the value you had determined for past and future damages was just a little bit more to the million. You authorized Mr. Simon to offer Lange, the plumber that installed the sprinklers, to pay you \$1 million to settle the entire case?
 - A Correct.
- Q And you knew, because Mr. Simon explained it to you, that if Lange were to accept that offer of judgment, they would have made you give your claim against Viking to Lange as part of the settlement, right?
 - A I'm sorry?
 - Q Sure. You had a claim against Lange?
 - A Lange Plumbing, yeah. They --

1	MR. CHRISTENSEN: Thank you, Your Honor.
2	THE COURT: See you guys tomorrow.
3	[Proceedings concluded at 4:33 p.m.]
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18	ATTEST: I do hereby certify that I have truly and correctly transcribed the
19	audio-visual recording of the proceeding in the above entitled case to the
20	best of my ability.
21	Junia B. Cahill
22	June P. Comerc
23	
24	Maukele Transcribers, LLC Jessica B. Cahill, Transcriber, CER/CET-708
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RTRAN 1 2 3 4 5 **DISTRICT COURT** CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 6 7 **EDGEWORTH FAMILY TRUST;** AMERICAN GRATING, LLC, CASE#: A-16-738444-C 8 Plaintiffs, DEPT. X 9 VS. 10 LANGE PLUMBING, LLC, ET AL., 11 Defendants. 12 **EDGEWORTH FAMILY TRUST;** CASE#: A-18-767242-C 13 AMERICAN GRATING, LLC, DEPT. X 14 Plaintiffs, 15 VS. 16 DANIEL S. SIMON, ET AL., 17 Defendants. 18 BEFORE THE HONORABLE TIERRA JONES, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 19 THURSDAY, AUGUST 30, 2018 20 **RECORDER'S TRANSCRIPT OF EVIDENTIARY HEARING - DAY 4** 21 **APPEARANCES:** 22 For the Plaintiff: ROBERT D. VANNAH, ESQ. JOHN B. GREENE, ESQ. 23 For the Defendant: JAMES R. CHRISTENSEN, ESQ. 24 PETER S. CHRISTIANSEN, ESQ. 25 RECORDED BY: VICTORIA BOYD, COURT RECORDER

- 1 -

1	INDEX
2	INDEX
3	Testimony6
4	
5	
6	WITNESSES FOR THE PLAINTIFF
7	DANIEL SIMON
8	Direct Examination by Mr. Christensen 6
9	Cross-Examination by Mr. Vannah 59
10	Redirect Examination by Mr. Christensen 149
11	Recross Examination by Mr. Vannah166
12	Further Redirect Examination by Mr. Christensen172
13	
14	WILLIAM KEMP
15	Direct Examination by Mr. Christensen
16	Cross-Examination by Mr. Vannah
17	Redirect Examination by Mr. Christensen
18	Recross Examination by Mr. Vannah222
19	Further Redirect Examination by Mr. Christensen224
20	
21	
22	
23	
24	
25	

1	Q	This was entitled Letter of Direction?
2	Α	Yes.
3		THE COURT: What exhibit is that, Mr. Christensen?
4		MR. CHRISTENSEN: That's the Office Exhibit 43.
5		THE COURT: 43. And what is the date on that? Can you
6	push it dov	wn a little bit? Okay, thank you.
7		MR. CHRISTENSEN: Woops. November 29, 2017.
8		THE COURT: And this is a fax? Okay, I see it at the top.
9		MR. CHRISTENSEN: It has a fax header on it.
10		THE COURT: Yeah, I see it at the top. Okay.
11	BY MR. CH	IRISTENSEN:
12	Q	The fax header actually indicates that it was sent on
13	November	30, 2017, at 9:35 a.m., assuming that was calibrated correctly.
14	Mr. Simon	, what did you think this letter meant when you read it?
15	А	I was fired.
16	Q	Why did you think that?
17	А	Because in the practice of law when your clients go and meet
18	with other	attorneys and then you get a letter saying hey, the other
19	attorney is	involved in this case, it pretty much means that I'm not the
20	attorney a	nymore.
21	Q	I'd like to show you what's been marked as Office Exhibit 90.
22	This has b	een previously discussed. This is the fee agreement between
23	Vannah an	d Vannah and Brian Edgeworth. I don't see Angela's
24	signature o	on here, but at least Brian signed it. The highlighted
25	paragraph	indicates, client retains attorneys to represent him as his

attorneys regarding Edgeworth Family Trust and American Grating, The All Viking Entities, all damages, including, but not limited to, all claims in this matter and empowers him to do all things, and it goes on, to effect a compromise in said matter or to institute such legal action as may be advisable in their judgment and agrees to pay them on some conditions.

The sprinkler case that we've been referring to, the case in which there's an offer for \$6 million from Viking, that was the American Grating versus all Viking entities case, correct?

- A Yes.
- Q When you saw this, what did this do to your belief of what the November 29th letter meant?

A This made it crystal clear that I was fired as of November 30th when I received notice of his Letter of Direction, because he's now retained these lawyers for the exact action in which I was representing them for.

- Q Now, there were still a lot of things going on in the case at this time; is that correct?
 - A A lot.
- Q Well, for example, we're not going to spend a whole lot of time on it, but Office Exhibit 80, re bate 4552, is an email from Mr.

 Nelson that seems to be sent to you, lead counsel, at least he thought, for the Edgeworth's and Janet Pancoast, who was lead counsel for Viking at the time?
 - A Yes.
 - Q And attached to this was Mr. Parker's letter of November 29,

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again addressed to the same parties, re bate 4553, and this was a letter addressing discovery and some other issues?

- Α Yes.
- Q Can you sum up that letter and --

Α This letter basically confirms that Mr. Parker and myself, ever since his appearance, have been talking about this case and how we're going to proceed with him and his client, Lange Plumbing. From day one of his coming into the case, he wanted to extend the trial, continue the trial, extend discovery, so he could get (a) caught up. He's made that argument and, you know, representation to the Court on a few appearances.

And I've known Teddy for 20 plus years. I've worked with him on many cases. We have mutual respect for each other. And as far as us reopening discovery, now that we were finalizing the Viking settlement, that's what we were going to do. And it only benefitted my claim and Mr. Edgeworth's claim against Lange Plumbing if we decided to pursue it.

- Q Now, even though in your mind you'd been fired, that puts you in a tough position with the client, correct?
 - Α Yes.
- Q You can't do anything to torpedo the settlement, for example?
 - Α Obviously.
- Q I mean you're going to have to carry on to a certain extent, correct?

1	А	Correct.
2	Q	Okay. There was a Settlement Agreement between
3	Edgeworth	Family Trust, American Grating, LLC, and Viking?
4	А	Yes.
5	Q	That's Office Exhibit Number 5. This is the lead page, which
6	is bate I	believe the Bate is 36; do you see that?
7	Α	Yes.
8	Q	Now, on page 4 of the release, which is bates number 39 of
9	Exhibit 5, t	here's a paragraph E. Obviously, that paragraph mentions
10	Vannah an	d Vannah as attorneys for the Edgeworth's; fair to say?
11	Α	Yes. Can you show me the date of this release? I think it's
12	December	1st, but I just want to confirm.
13	Q	On page 42 of Exhibit 5 I'm sorry, bate 42 of Exhibit 5, I
14	can show	you the dates that both Brian and Angela signed the release,
15	December	1 of 2017; is that correct?
16	А	Yes.
17	Q	So after that and that's after the date you felt after the
18	date that y	ou felt you had been fired, correct?
19	А	Yeah. So, if I can just explain briefly. I get back on 9-20 or
20	11-27. I an	n basically negotiating, not torpedoing any settlement, not
21	making an	y threats. I'm basically getting this release where they omitted
22	the confide	entiality clause and preserved the Lange claim, and I get the
23	Edgeworth	ns, which is a very uncommon term, as a mutual release
24	because th	is case was so contentious, all right?

And Mr. Edgeworth was I'm going to use the word scared,

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nervous, you know, whatever you want to use, he was very nervous that Viking was ultimately going to come after him if they had some type of opportunity. So that's why the confidentiality clause was not a good idea, and we wanted to preserve the Lange claim, as well, and I got a mutual release, I think, for them, on or about 11-27.

THE COURT: And you got the mutual release on 11-27?

THE WITNESS: Right in that range, yeah. It was -- it was before I got the Letter of Direction, and I was out of the case.

BY MR. CHRISTENSEN:

Q Did Mr. -- a Viking sprinkler flooded Mr. Edgeworth's house that he was building as an investment, and he thought Viking was going to sue him?

A If they had -- if they had some type of basis, they probably would have.

Q Okay. Now, you did reach out to Mr. Edgeworth on December 5?

THE COURT: Okay, and I'm sorry, Mr. Christensen, before you move on, on December 1, when that Settlement Agreement is signed, the one that's Exhibit 5, how did you -- when's the first time you saw that document?

THE WITNESS: That was a prior one that was proposed.

THE COURT: That had the confidentiality and all that?

THE WITNESS: Yeah, it had all of that.

THE COURT: Okay.

THE WITNESS: And so, you know, the Edgeworth's were

1	pressing me, right. There's an email from while Brian's in well,
2	Brian's in China, unavailable, no phone calls, no emails with me. He now
3	has Angela stepping up, typing all these emails, saying hey, where's the
4	Viking Settlement Release, where is it, where is it, where is it, get it to us.
5	And I just got back in town from a vacation over Thanksgiving.
6	So right when I get back there was probably the, you know,
7	proposed release. And so, I went over to the office with Mr. Henriod,
8	who was Viking counsel, and I have a great relationship with him, and
9	we basically just hammered out the terms of the release right there. And
10	then I was done, I was out of it.
11	THE COURT: Okay. But you hammered out the terms of the
12	release of that final agreement?
13	THE WITNESS: Before I was fired, yeah.
14	THE COURT: Okay. So, this is before 11-30?
15	THE WITNESS: Yes.
16	THE COURT: And then were you present when the
17	Edgeworth's signed that document?
18	THE WITNESS: Nope.
19	THE COURT: Okay. So, when did you see the signed copy?
20	THE WITNESS: When Mr. Vannah's office delivered it to me
21	to then forward it to Viking counsel.
22	THE COURT: But you received it from Vannah's office?
23	THE WITNESS: Correct.
24	THE COURT: Okay.
25	THE WITNESS: And just one other note. I didn't explain any

1	of the term	s of the Viking release to the Edgeworth's because they
2	weren't tall	king to me anymore, and Mr. Vannah was their counsel.
3		THE COURT: Okay. So how did they get that document to
4	sign?	
5		THE WITNESS: I had forward it to him.
6		THE COURT: Okay. So, you forwarded it to the
7	Edgeworth's?	
8		THE WITNESS: No. I forwarded it to Mr. Vannah's office.
9		THE COURT: You forwarded that document to Vannah after
10	you got it from Viking's lawyers?	
11		THE WITNESS: Yeah.
12		THE COURT: You forward it to Vannah. And then the next
13	time you sa	aw it, it had the Edgeworth's signature on it being hand-
14	delivered to	o you to go back to Lange?
15		THE WITNESS: Correct.
16		THE COURT: Okay.
17	BY MR. CH	RISTENSEN:
18	Q	And just so that I understand this, a lot of times when you
19	were negot	tiating a release, you sent back proposed versions all the time
20	on email ar	nd people could track changes and all that stuff on it. What I
21	seemed to	hear you say is that you actually physically went to Mr.
22	Henriod's c	office, Joel's office, sat down with them and went through it
23	right there?	?
24	Α	Correct.
25	Q	Okay. And as a result of that meeting, that's what resulted in

and that represents my risk of loss right there.

Because during the pendency of the case -- I mean, there's at least 200 hours that could not be recovered in trying to recreate the bills in this super bill, to show this Court our time expended, and that was not included. And even at 550 an hour, that's \$700,000 that Mr. Edgeworth was not billed for during the case. That's some skin in the game, that's risk of loss to me. Because if this case doesn't turn out, that's time I ate.

But now that there is a recovery I expected to be paid a reasonable value of my service, which they refuse to do, which is why we're here today.

Q Let me give you a hypothetical. If you had fully billed Mr. Edgeworth for all the time expended in the case, including emails, what have you, at \$925 an hour, would you have suffered a risk of loss?

MR. VANNAH: Object as irrelevant, at \$925 an hour? There's been no evidence that he had an agreement for that amount.

MR. CHRISTENSEN: Judge, we're trying to set a reasonable fee here. We already have evidence in the case that the client's willing to pay 925. We have evidence in the case from their fee agreement, that working on the case, at least from some, at least from one point-of-view is worth 925 an hour, and I'm asking a question of Mr. Simon to determine where his risk of loss would end; 925 is a --

MR. VANNAH: And my --

MR. CHRISTENSEN: -- fair number.

MR. VANNAH: My objection, 925 an hour, there's been no evidence whatsoever --

THE COURT: Well, they have in evidence that they're paying 925.

MR. VANNAH: Yeah. They're paying me 925 an hour, and I'm not Danny Simon.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. VANNAH: And I'm not doing what Danny Simon was supposed to be doing. I'm in a completely different situation. There's lots of reasons my hourly fee is what it is, and it has nothing to do with him.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. VANNAH: Whatever I'm charging, and why I'm charging that, and whatever -- you know, for example, it's not great being here, Mr. Simon is a friend of mine, I've always considered him a friend. I don't think that -- I think our friendship has been damaged by this. I get referrals from other lawyers. I doubt I'd ever get a referral from Mr. Simon, they never would have anyway, but bottom line is, there are reasons I charge what I charge.

So, to take my fee, in this case, which shouldn't have been given to him anyway, but taking my fee in this case and saying that's a reasonable fee, because that's what I charge, I'm in a totally different situation. And it just it's -- it is not relevant to anything. There's no evidence that he ever was billing 925 an hour.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. VANNAH: He's --

THE COURT: He billed 550 an hour.

MR. VANNAH: Yeah. So, the idea to get my fee agreement was to show when they hired me, and now I see it being used in every way possible, that's way beyond what was relevant.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. VANNAH: I meant, it's just not relevant. Why not pick \$10,000 an hour, what maybe O.J. Simpson might have paid for somebody to get him off from killing somebody. Why not pick any number at all? But the bottom line there's no relevancy to those numbers, the number is 550 an hour, that's the only number we've got to work with.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. CHRISTENSEN: May I, Your Honor?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. CHRISTENSEN: Thank you, Your Honor.

It's not only Mr. Vannah being paid at 925 an hour, it's also Mr. Greene. So, it's a little bit broader than what he says. The issue concerning the relevancy at the outset upon production was that it had to do with timing and the issue of constructive discharge. Now that the document is produced and we were able to read the document, it's now apparent that the document has broader relevancy.

Because the agreement states that they were going to work on the Viking case. It's not just suing Danny Simon, and as a matter of fact that's not even mentioned in the agreement.

THE COURT: I've read the agreement.

MR. CHRISTENSEN: What's mentioned in the agreement is

1	working o	n the Viking case, and that's what we're here to talk about.
2		THE COURT: Okay. I'll allow it. Mr. Vannah, your objection
3	is overrule	ed. Mr. Simon, do you remember what the question was?
4		THE WITNESS: He was referencing what my risk of loss
5	would be	if I was able to apply the 925 an hour.
6	BY MR. CI	HRISTENSEN:
7	Q	May I repeat it?
8	А	You may.
9	Q	Okay. If you had fully billed your time, all of your time,
10	including	late night phones that weren't captured, emails, everything, at
11	the rate of	\$925 an hour, would you have suffered a risk of loss?
12	Α	I think if I was able to include my time, even the several
13	hundred h	ours that I could not have recovered, it would be well over \$2.4
14	million.	
15	Q	Would you have suffered a risk of loss?
16	Α	No.
17	Q	Okay. There was some confusing questions concerning a
18	Federal ta	x burden that might be placed on any liquidation of Bitcoin
19	holdings k	by Mr. Edgeworth; do you recall that?
20	А	I recall the question.
21	Q	Are you familiar with the long-term capital gains' rate?
22	А	Not so much.
23	Q	Okay. The interest rate was 30 percent on the loans taken
24	out by Mr	. Edgeworth?
25	I ^	Closer to 35, 36 percent

Q If I told you the long-term capital gains rate, assuming a max rate, that Mr. Edgeworth would fall into the max rate, was 20 percent.

That would mean that the tax burden was less than the interest level, correct?

MR. VANNAH: Two --

THE WITNESS: Makes sense.

MR. VANNAH: Two objections.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. VANNAH: One, I don't remember qualifying him as a finance expert, a); b) what is the relevance? My client decided to borrow the money and he thought it was a better deal than a bit. Why are we getting into long-term, short-term capital gain, long-term capital gain, with an expert who has no familiarity that I know of. He's never offered as an expert. He's a fact witness. Why are we going there?

THE COURT: Mr. Christensen?

MR. CHRISTENSEN: Well, we're going there, because Mr. Vannah went there --

THE COURT: No.

MR. CHRISTENSEN: -- and he opened the door and I --

THE COURT: And I understand. But the line of questioning was, was there a reason, and Mr. Simon explained that basically the loans were taken out for other reasons besides just to pay his fees. And I think that was the clarification I was going after. So, as far as what the tax burden stuff is, I don't think that's relevant, so I'm going to ask you to move on.

1	MR. VANNAH: Thank you.
2	THE COURT: No problem.
3	MR. VANNAH: That's been great.
4	[Proceedings adjourned at 4:16 p.m.]
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19	ATTEST: I do hereby certify that I have truly and correctly transcribed the audio-visual recording of the proceeding in the above entitled case to the
20	best of my ability.
21	O - Po (1/1/
22	Simia B Cakell
23	
24	Maukele Transcribers, LLC
25	Jessica B. Cahill, Transcriber, CER/CET-708

Electronically Filed 10/11/2018 11:09 AM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT 1 ORD 2 3 DISTRICT COURT 4 **CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA** 5 6 EDGEWORTH FAMILY TRUST; and AMERICAN GRATING, LLC, 7 Plaintiffs, 8 CASE NO.: A-18-767242-C vs. DEPT NO.: XXVI 9 10 LANGE PLUMBING, LLC: THE VIKING CORPORATION, a Michigan Corporation; Consolidated with 11 SUPPLY NETWORK, INC., dba VIKING SUPPLYNET, a Michigan Corporation; and 12 DOES 1 through 5; and, ROE entities 6 through CASE NO.: A-16-738444-C 10; DEPT NO.: X 13 Defendants. 14 EDGEWORTH FAMILY TRUST; and 15 AMERICAN GRATING, LLC, 16 DECISION AND ORDER ON MOTION Plaintiffs, TO ADJUDICATE LIEN 17 VS. 18 DANIEL S. SIMON; THE LAW OFFICE OF 19 DANIEL S. SIMON, a Professional Corporation d/b/a SIMON LAW; DOES 1 through 10; and, 20 ROE entities 1 through 10; 21 Defendants. 22 DECISION AND ORDER ON MOTION TO ADJUDICATE LIEN 23 This case came on for an evidentiary hearing August 27-30, 2018 and concluded on 24 September 18, 2018, in the Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County, Nevada, the Honorable 25 Tierra Jones presiding. Defendants and movant, Daniel Simon and Law Office of Daniel S. Simon 26 27 d/b/a Simon Law ("Defendants" or "Law Office" or "Simon" or "Mr. Simon") having appeared in 28 Hon. Tierra Jones DISTRICT COURT JUDGE DEPARTMENT TEN LAS VEGAS, NEVADA 89155

Case Number: A-16-738444-C

person and by and through their attorneys of record, Peter S. Christiansen, Esq. and James Christensen, Esq. and Plaintiff Edgeworth Family Trust and American Grating, ("Plaintiff" or "Edgeworths") having appeared through Brian and Angela Edgeworth, and by and through their attorneys of record, the law firm of Vannah and Vannah, Chtd. Robert Vannah, Esq. and John Greene, Esq. The Court having considered the evidence, arguments of counsel and being fully advised of the matters herein, the **COURT FINDS**:

FINDINGS OF FACT

- 1. The Court finds that the Law Office of Daniel S. Simon represented the Plaintiffs, Edgeworth Family Trust and American Grating in the case entitled Edgeworth Family Trust and American Grating v. Viking, et al., case number A-16-738444-C. The representation commenced on May 27, 2016 when Brian Edgeworth and Daniel Simon Esq. met at Starbucks. This representation originally began as a favor between friends and there was no discussion of fees, at this point. Mr. Simon and his wife were close family friends with Brian and Angela Edgeworth.
 - 2. The case involved a complex products liability issue.
- 3. On April 10, 2016, a house the Edgeworths were building as a speculation home suffered a flood. The house was still under construction and the flood caused a delay. The Edgeworths did not carry loss insurance if a flood occurred and the plumbing company and manufacturer refused to pay for the property damage. A fire sprinkler installed by the plumber, and within the plumber's scope of work, caused the flood; however, the plumber asserted the fire sprinkler was defective and refused to repair or to pay for repairs. The manufacturer of the sprinkler, Viking, et al., also denied any wrongdoing.
 - 4. In May of 2016, Mr. Simon agreed to help his friend with the flood claim and to send

a few letters. The parties initially hoped that Simon drafting a few letters to the responsible parties could resolve the matter. Simon wrote the letters to the responsible parties, but the matter did not resolve. Since the matter was not resolved, a lawsuit had to be filed.

- 5. On June 14, 2016, a complaint was filed in the case of Edgeworth Family Trust; and American Grating LLC vs. Lange Plumbing, LLC; the Viking Corporation; Supply Network Inc., dba Viking Supplynet, in case number A-18-738444-C. The cost of repairs was approximately \$500,000. One of the elements of the Edgeworth's damages against Lange Plumbing LLC ("Lange") in the litigation was for reimbursement of the fees and costs that were paid by the Edgeworths.
- 6. On August 9, 2017, Mr. Simon and Brian Edgeworth traveled to San Diego to meet with an expert. As they were in the airport waiting for a return flight, they discussed the case, and had some discussion about payments and financials. No express fee agreement was reached during the meeting. On August 22, 2017, Brian Edgeworth sent an email to Simon entitled "Contingency." It reads as follows:

We never really had a structured discussion about how this might be done.

I am more that happy to keep paying hourly but if we are going for punitive we should probably explore a hybrid of hourly on the claim and then some other structure that incents both of us to win an go after the appeal that these scumbags will file etc.

Obviously that could not have been doen earlier snce who would have thought this case would meet the hurdle of punitives at the start.

I could also swing hourly for the whole case (unless I am off what this is going to cost). I would likely borrow another \$450K from Margaret in 250 and 200 increments and then either I could use one of the house sales for cash or if things get really bad, I still have a couple million in bitcoin I could sell.

I doubt we will get Kinsale to settle for enough to really finance this since I would have to pay the first \$750,000 or so back to Colin and Margaret and why would Kinsale settle for \$1MM when their exposure is only \$1MM?

(Def. Exhibit 27).

7. During the litigation, Simon sent four (4) invoices to the Edgeworths. The first invoice was sent on December 2, 2016, seven (7) months after the original meeting at Starbucks.

This invoice indicated that it was for attorney's fees and costs through November 11, 2016. (Def. Exhibit 8). The total of this invoice was \$42,564.95 and was billed at a "reduced" rate of \$550 per hour. <u>Id</u>. The invoice was paid by the Edgeworths on December 16, 2016.

- 8. On April 7, 2017 a second invoice was sent to the Edgeworths for attorney's fees and costs through April 4, 2017 for a total of \$46,620.69, and was billed at a "reduced" rate of \$550 per hour. (Def. Exhibit 9). This invoice was paid by the Edgeworths on May 3, 2017. There was no indication on the first two invoices if the services were those of Mr. Simon or his associates; but the bills indicated an hourly rate of \$550.00 per hour.
- 9. A third invoice was sent to the Edgeworths on July 28, 2017 for attorney's fees and costs through July 28, 2017 totaling of \$142,080.20. (Def. Exhibit 10). This bill identified services of Daniel Simon Esq. for a "reduced" rate of \$550 per hour totaling \$104,021.20; and services of Ashley Ferrel Esq. for a "reduced" rate of \$275 per hour totaling \$37,959.00. Id. This invoice was paid by the Edgeworths on August 16, 2017.
- 10. The fourth invoice was sent to the Edgeworths on September 19, 2017 in an amount of \$255,186.25 for attorney's fees and costs; with \$191,317.50 being calculated at a "reduced" rate of \$550 per hour for Daniel Simon Esq., \$60,981.25 being calculated at a "reduced" rate of \$275 per hour for Ashley Ferrel Esq., and \$2,887.50 being calculated at a "reduced" rate of \$275 per hour for Benjamin Miller Esq. (Def. Exhibit 11). This invoice was paid by the Edgeworths on September 25, 2017.
- 11. The amount of attorney's fees in the four (4) invoices was \$367,606.25, and \$118,846.84 in costs; for a total of \$486,453.09. These monies were paid to Daniel Simon Esq. and never returned to the Edgeworths. The Edgeworths secured very high interest loans to pay fees and

¹ \$265,677.50 in attorney's fees for the services of Daniel Simon; \$99,041.25 for the services of Ashley Ferrel; and \$2,887.50 for the services of Benjamin Miller.

costs to Simon. They made Simon aware of this fact.

- 12. Between June 2016 and December 2017, there was a tremendous amount of work done in the litigation of this case. There were several motions and oppositions filed, several depositions taken, and several hearings held in the case.
- 13. On the evening of November 15, 2017, the Edgeworth's settled their claims against the Viking Corporation ("Viking").
- 14. Also on November 15, 2017, Brian Edgeworth sent an email to Simon asking for the open invoice. The email stated: "I know I have an open invoice that you were going to give me at a mediation a couple weeks ago and then did not leave with me. Could someone in your office send Peter (copied here) any invoices that are unpaid please?" (Def. Exhibit 38).
- 15. On November 17, 2017, Simon scheduled an appointment for the Edgeworths to come to his office to discuss the litigation.
- 16. On November 27, 2017, Simon sent a letter with an attached retainer agreement, stating that the fee for legal services would be \$1,500,000 for services rendered to date. (Plaintiff's Exhibit 4).
- 17. On November 29, 2017, the Edgeworths met with the Law Office of Vannah & Vannah and signed a retainer agreement. (Def. Exhibit 90). On this date, they ceased all communications with Mr. Simon.

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18. On the morning of November 30, 2017, Simon received a letter advising him that the Edgeworths had retained the Vannah Law Firm to assist in the litigation with the Viking entities, et.al. The letter read as follows:

"Please let this letter serve to advise you that I've retained Robert D. Vannah, Esq. and John B. Greene, Esq., of Vannah & Vannah to assist in the litigation with the Viking entities, et.al. I'm instructing you to cooperate with them in every regard concerning the litigation and any settlement. I'm also instructing you to give them complete access to the file and allow them to review whatever documents they request to review. Finally, I direct you to allow them to participate without limitation in any proceeding concerning our case, whether it be at depositions, court hearings, discussions, etc."

(Def. Exhibit 43).

- 19. On the same morning, Simon received, through the Vannah Law Firm, the Edgeworth's consent to settle their claims against Lange Plumbing LLC for \$25,000.
- 20. Also on this date, the Law Office of Danny Simon filed an attorney's lien for the reasonable value of its services pursuant to NRS 18.015. (Def. Exhibit 3). On January 2, 2018, the Law Office filed an amended attorney's lien for the sum of \$2,345,450, less payments made in the sum of \$367,606.25, for a net lien in the sum of \$1,977,843.80. This lien includes court costs and out-of-pocket costs advanced by the Law Office of Daniel S. Simon in the sum of \$76,535.93.
- 21. Mr. Edgeworth alleges that the fee agreement with Simon was only for an hourly express agreement of \$550 an hour; and that the agreement for \$550 an hour was made at the outset of the case. Mr. Simon alleges that he worked on the case always believing he would receive the reasonable value of his services when the case concluded. There is a dispute over the reasonable fee due to the Law Office of Danny Simon.
 - 22. The parties agree that an express written contract was never formed.
- 23. On December 7, 2017, the Edgeworths signed a Consent to Settle their claims against Lange Plumbing LLC for \$100,000.

2	24.	On Janu	ary 4, 2	2018,	the I	Edgeworth	Family	Trust	filed	a la	wsuit	against	Simon	in
Edgewo	rth Fan	nily Tru	st; Ame	rican (Grati	ng LLC v	s. Danie	l S. Si	mon,	the I	Law O	office of	Daniel	S.
Simon,	a Profes	ssional (Corporat	ion, ca	ase n	umber A-	18-76724	12-C.						

25. On January 24, 2018, the Law Office of Danny Simon filed a Motion to Adjudicate Lien with an attached invoice for legal services rendered. The amount of the invoice was \$692,120.00. The Court set an evidentiary hearing to adjudicate the lien.

CONCLUSION OF LAW

The Law Office Appropriately Asserted A Charging Lien Which Must Be Adjudicated By The Court

An attorney may obtain payment for work on a case by use of an attorney lien. Here, the Law Office of Daniel Simon may use a charging lien to obtain payment for work on case A-16-738444-C under NRS 18.015.

NRS 18.015(1)(a) states:

- 1. An attorney at law shall have a lien:
- (a) Upon any claim, demand or cause of action, including any claim for unliquidated damages, which has been placed in the attorney's hands by a client for suit or collection, or upon which a suit or other action has been instituted.

Nev. Rev. Stat. 18.015.

The Court finds that the lien filed by the Law Office of Daniel Simon, in case A-16-738444-C, complies with NRS 18.015(1)(a). The Law Office perfected the charging lien pursuant to NRS 18.015(3), by serving the Edgeworths as set forth in the statute. The Law Office charging lien was perfected before settlement funds generated from A-16-738444-C of \$6,100,000.00 were deposited, thus the charging lien attached to the settlement funds. Nev. Rev. Stat. 18.015(4)(a); Golightly & Vannah, PLLC v. TJ Allen LLC, 373 P.3d 103, at 105 (Nev. 2016). The Law Office's charging lien

2.7

is enforceable in form.

The Court has personal jurisdiction over the Law Office and the Plaintiffs in A-16-738444-C. Argentina Consolidated Mining Co., v. Jolley, Urga, Wirth, Woodbury & Standish, 216 P.3d 779 at 782-83 (Nev. 2009). The Court has subject matter jurisdiction over adjudication of the Law Office's charging lien. Argentina, 216 P.3d at 783. The Law Office filed a motion requesting adjudication under NRS 18.015, thus the Court must adjudicate the lien.

Fee Agreement

It is undisputed that no express written fee agreement was formed. The Court finds that there was no express oral fee agreement formed between the parties. An express oral agreement is formed when all important terms are agreed upon. See, Loma Linda University v. Eckenweiler, 469 P.2d 54 (Nev. 1970) (no oral contract was formed, despite negotiation, when important terms were not agreed upon and when the parties contemplated a written agreement). The Court finds that the payment terms are essential to the formation of an express oral contract to provide legal services on an hourly basis.

Here, the testimony from the evidentiary hearing does not indicate, with any degree of certainty, that there was an express oral fee agreement formed on or about June of 2016. Despite Brian Edgeworth's affidavits and testimony; the emails between himself and Danny Simon, regarding punitive damages and a possible contingency fee, indicate that no express oral fee agreement was formed at the meeting on June 10, 2016. Specifically in Brian Edgeworth's August 22, 2017 email, titled "Contingency," he writes:

"We never really had a structured discussion about how this might be done. I am more than happy to keep paying hourly but if we are going for punitive we should probably explore a hybrid of hourly on the claim and then some other structure that incents both of us to win an go after the appeal that these

scumbags will file etc. Obviously that could not have been done earlier snce who would have thought this case would meet the hurdle of punitives at the start. I could also swing hourly for the whole case (unless I am off what this is going to cost). I would likely borrow another \$450K from Margaret in 250 and 200 increments and then either I could use one of the house sales for cash or if things get really bad, I still have a couple million in bitcoin I could sell. I doubt we will get Kinsale to settle for enough to really finance this since I would have to pay the first \$750,000 or so back to colin and Margaret and why would Kinsale settle for \$1MM when their exposure is only \$1MM?"

(Def. Exhibit 27).

It is undisputed that when the flood issue arose, all parties were under the impression that Simon would be helping out the Edgeworths, as a favor.

The Court finds that an implied fee agreement was formed between the parties on December 2, 2016, when Simon sent the first invoice to the Edgeworths, billing his services at \$550 per hour, and the Edgeworths paid the invoice. On July 28, 2017 an addition to the implied contract was created with a fee of \$275 per hour for Simon's associates. Simon testified that he never told the Edgeworths not to pay the bills, though he testified that from the outset he only wanted to "trigger coverage". When Simon repeatedly billed the Edgeworths at \$550 per hour for his services, and \$275 an hour for the services of his associates; and the Edgeworths paid those invoices, an implied fee agreement was formed between the parties. The implied fee agreement was for \$550 per hour for the services of Daniel Simon Esq. and \$275 per hour for the services of his associates.

Constructive Discharge

Constructive discharge of an attorney may occur under several circumstances, such as:

- Refusal to communicate with an attorney creates constructive discharge. Rosenberg v. Calderon Automation, 1986 Ohio App. LEXIS 5460 (Jan. 31, 1986).
- Refusal to pay an attorney creates constructive discharge. See e.g., Christian v. All Persons Claiming Any Right, 962 F. Supp. 676 (U.S. Dist. V.I. 1997).

- Suing an attorney creates constructive discharge. See <u>Tao v. Probate Court for the Northeast Dist.</u> #26, 2015 Conn. Super. LEXIS 3146, *13-14, (Dec. 14, 2015). See also <u>Maples v. Thomas</u>, 565 U.S. 266 (2012); Harris v. State, 2017 Nev. LEXIS 111; and <u>Guerrero v. State</u>, 2017 Nev. Unpubl. LEXIS 472.
- Taking actions that preventing effective representation creates constructive discharge. McNair v. Commonwealth, 37 Va. App. 687, 697-98 (Va. 2002).

Here, the Court finds that the Edgeworths constructively discharged Simon as their lawyer on November 29, 2017. The Edgeworths assert that because Simon has not been expressly terminated, has not withdrawn, and is still technically their attorney of record; there cannot be a termination. The Court disagrees.

On November 29, 2017, the Edgeworths met with the Law Firm of Vannah and Vannah and signed a retainer agreement. The retainer agreement was for representation on the Viking settlement agreement and the Lange claims. (Def. Exhibit 90). This is the exact litigation that Simon was representing the Edgeworths on. This fee agreement also allowed Vannah and Vannah to do all things without a compromise. Id. The retainer agreement specifically states:

Client retains Attorneys to represent him as his Attorneys regarding Edgeworth Family Trust and AMERICAN GRATING V. ALL VIKING ENTITIES and all damages including, but not limited to, all claims in this matter and empowers them to do all things to effect a compromise in said matter, or to institute such legal action as may be advisable in their judgment, and agrees to pay them for their services, on the following conditions:

- a) ...
- b) ...
- c) Client agrees that his attorneys will work to consummate a settlement of \$6,000,000 from the Viking entities and any settlement amount agreed to be paid by the Lange entity. Client also agrees that attorneys will work to reach an agreement amongst the parties to resolve all claims in the Lange and Viking litigation.

Id.

This agreement was in place at the time of the settlement of the Viking and Lange claims. Mr. Simon had already begun negotiating the terms of the settlement agreement with Viking during the

week of November 27, 2017 prior to Mr. Vannah's involvement. These negotiated terms were put into a final release signed by the Edgeworths and Mr. Vannah's office on December 1, 2017. (Def. Exhibit 5). Mr. Simon's name is not contained in the release; Mr. Vannah's firm is expressly identified as the firm that solely advised the clients about the settlement. The actual language in the settlement agreement, for the Viking claims, states:

PLAINTIFFS represent that their independent counsel, Robert Vannah, Esq. and John Greene, Esq., of the law firm Vannah & Vannah has explained the effect of this AGREEMENT and their release of any and all claims, known or unknown and, based upon that explanation and their independent judgment by the reading of this Agreement, PLAINTIFFS understand and acknowledge the legal significance and the consequences of the claims being released by this Agreement. PLAINTIFFS further represent that they understand and acknowledge the legal significance and consequences of a release of unknown claims against the SETTLING PARTIES set forth in, or arising from, the INCIDENT and hereby assume full responsibility for any injuries, damages, losses or liabilities that hereafter may occur with respect to the matters released by this Agreement.

<u>Id</u>.

Also, Simon was not present for the signing of these settlement documents and never explained any of the terms to the Edgeworths. He sent the settlement documents to the Law Office of Vannah and Vannah and received them back with the signatures of the Edgeworths.

Further, the Edgeworths did not personally speak with Simon after November 25, 2017. Though there were email communications between the Edgeworths and Simon, they did not verbally speak to him and were not seeking legal advice from him. In an email dated December 5, 2017, Simon is requesting Brian Edgeworth return a call to him about the case, and Brian Edgeworth responds to the email saying, "please give John Greene at Vannah and Vannah a call if you need anything done on the case. I am sure they can handle it." (Def. Exhibit 80). At this time, the claim against Lange Plumbing had not been settled. The evidence indicates that Simon was actively

working on this claim, but he had no communication with the Edgeworths and was not advising them on the claim against Lange Plumbing. Specifically, Brian Edgeworth testified that Robert Vannah Esq. told them what Simon said about the Lange claims and it was established that the Law Firm of Vannah and Vannah provided advice to the Edgeworths regarding the Lange claim. Simon and the Law Firm of Vannah and Vannah gave different advice on the Lange claim, and the Edgeworths followed the advice of the Law Firm of Vannah and Vannah to settle the Lange claim. The Law Firm of Vannah and Vannah drafted the consent to settle for the claims against Lange Plumbing (Def. Exhibit 47). This consent to settle was inconsistent with the advice of Simon. Mr. Simon never signed off on any of the releases for the Lange settlement.

Further demonstrating a constructive discharge of Simon is the email from Robert Vannah Esq. to James Christensen Esq. dated December 26, 2017, which states: "They have lost all faith and trust in Mr. Simon. Therefore, they will not sign the checks to be deposited into his trust account. Quite frankly, they are fearful that he will steal the money." (Def. Exhibit 48). Then on January 4, 2018, the Edgeworth's filed a lawsuit against Simon in Edgeworth Family Trust; American Grating, LLC vs. Daniel S. Simon; the Law Office of Daniel S. Simon, a Professional Corporation d/b/a Simon Law, case number A-18-767242-C. Then, on January 9, 2018, Robert Vannah Esq. sent an email to James Christensen Esq. stating, "I guess he could move to withdraw. However, that doesn't seem in his best interests." (Def. Exhibit 53).

The Court recognizes that Simon still has not withdrawn as counsel of record on A-16-738444-C, the Law Firm of Vannah and Vannah has never substituted in as counsel of record, the Edgeworths have never explicitly told Simon that he was fired, Simon sent the November 27, 2018 letter indicating that the Edgeworth's could consult with other attorneys on the fee agreement (that was attached to the letter), and that Simon continued to work on the case after the November 29,

2017 date. The court further recognizes that it is always a client's decision of whether or not to accept a settlement offer. However the issue is constructive discharge and nothing about the fact that Mr. Simon has never officially withdrawn from the case indicates that he was not constructively discharged. His November 27, 2017 letter invited the Edgeworth's to consult with other attorneys on the fee agreement, not the claims against Viking or Lange. His clients were not communicating with him, making it impossible to advise them on pending legal issues, such as the settlements with Lange and Viking. It is clear that there was a breakdown in attorney-client relationship preventing Simon from effectively representing the clients. The Court finds that Danny Simon was constructively discharged by the Edgeworths on November 29, 2017.

Adjudication of the Lien and Determination of the Law Office Fee

NRS 18.015 states:

- 1. An attorney at law shall have a lien:
 - (a) Upon any claim, demand or cause of action, including any claim for unliquidated damages, which has been placed in the attorney's hands by a client for suit or collection, or upon which a suit or other action has been instituted.
 - (b) In any civil action, upon any file or other property properly left in the possession of the attorney by a client.
 - 2. A lien pursuant to subsection 1 is for the amount of any fee which has been agreed upon by the attorney and client. In the absence of an agreement, the lien is for a reasonable fee for the services which the attorney has rendered for the client.
 - 3. An attorney perfects a lien described in subsection 1 by serving notice in writing, in person or by certified mail, return receipt requested, upon his or her client and, if applicable, upon the party against whom the client has a cause of action, claiming the lien and stating the amount of the lien.
 - 4. A lien pursuant to:
 - (a) Paragraph (a) of subsection 1 attaches to any verdict, judgment or decree entered and to any money or property which is recovered on account of the suit or other action; and
 - (b) Paragraph (b) of subsection 1 attaches to any file or other property properly left in the possession of the attorney by his or her client, including, without limitation, copies of the attorney's file if the original documents

received from the client have been returned to the client, and authorizes the attorney to retain any such file or property until such time as an adjudication is made pursuant to subsection 6, from the time of service of the notices required by this section.

- 5. A lien pursuant to paragraph (b) of subsection 1 must not be construed as inconsistent with the attorney's professional responsibilities to the client.
- 6. On motion filed by an attorney having a lien under this section, the attorney's client or any party who has been served with notice of the lien, the court shall, after 5 days' notice to all interested parties, adjudicate the rights of the attorney, client or other parties and enforce the lien.
- 7. Collection of attorney's fees by a lien under this section may be utilized with, after or independently of any other method of collection.

Nev. Rev. Stat. 18.015.

NRS 18.015(2) matches Nevada contract law. If there is an express contract, then the contract terms are applied. Here, there was no express contract for the fee amount, however there was an implied contract when Simon began to bill the Edgeworths for fees in the amount of \$550 per hour for his services, and \$275 per hour for the services of his associates. This contract was in effect until November 29, 2017, when he was constructively discharged from representing the Edgeworths. After he was constructively discharged, under NRS 18.015(2) and Nevada contract law, Simon is due a reasonable fee- that is, quantum meruit.

Implied Contract

On December 2, 2016, an implied contract for fees was created. The implied fee was \$550 an hour for the services of Mr. Simon. On July 28, 2017 an addition to the implied contract was created with a fee of \$275 per hour for the services of Simon's associates. This implied contract was created when invoices were sent to the Edgeworths, and they paid the invoices.

The invoices that were sent to the Edgeworths indicate that they were for costs and attorney's fees, and these invoices were paid by the Edgeworths. Though the invoice says that the fees were

reduced, there is no evidence that establishes that there was any discussion with the Edgeworths as to how much of a reduction was being taken, and that the invoices did not need to be paid. There is no indication that the Edgeworths knew about the amount of the reduction and acknowledged that the full amount would be due at a later date. Simon testified that Brian Edgeworth chose to pay the bills to give credibility to his actual damages, above his property damage loss. However, as the lawyer/counselor, Simon did not prevent Brian Edgeworth from paying the bill or in any way refund the money, or memorialize this or any understanding in writing.

Simon produced evidence of the claims for damages for his fees and costs pursuant to NRCP 16.1 disclosures and computation of damages; and these amounts include the four invoices that were paid in full and there was never any indication given that anything less than all the fees had been produced. During the deposition of Brian Edgeworth it was suggested, by Simon, that all of the fees had been disclosed. Further, Simon argues that the delay in the billing coincides with the timing of the NRCP 16.1 disclosures, however the billing does not distinguish or in any way indicate that the sole purpose was for the Lange Plumbing LLC claim. Since there is no contract, the Court must look to the actions of the parties to demonstrate the parties' understanding. Here, the actions of the parties are that Simon sent invoices to the Edgeworths, they paid the invoices, and Simon Law Office retained the payments, indicating an implied contract was formed between the parties. The Court find that the Law Office of Daniel Simon should be paid under the implied contract until the date they were constructively discharged, November 29, 2017.

Amount of Fees Owed Under Implied Contract

The Edgeworths were billed, and paid for services through September 19, 2017. There is some testimony that an invoice was requested for services after that date, but there is no evidence

that any invoice was paid by the Edgeworths. Since the Court has found that an implied contract for fees was formed, the Court must now determine what amount of fees and costs are owed from September 19, 2017 to the constructive discharge date of November 29, 2017. In doing so, the Court must consider the testimony from the witnesses at the evidentiary hearing, the submitted billings, the attached lien, and all other evidence provided regarding the services provided during this time.

At the evidentiary hearing, Ashley Ferrel Esq. testified that some of the items in the billing that was prepared with the lien "super bill," are not necessarily accurate as the Law Office went back and attempted to create a bill for work that had been done over a year before. She testified that they added in .3 hours for each Wiznet filing that was reviewed and emailed and .15 hours for every email that was read and responded to. She testified that the dates were not exact, they just used the dates for which the documents were filed, and not necessarily the dates in which the work was performed. Further, there are billed items included in the "super bill" that was not previously billed to the Edgeworths, though the items are alleged to have occurred prior to or during the invoice billing period previously submitted to the Edgeworths. The testimony at the evidentiary hearing indicated that there were no phone calls included in the billings that were submitted to the Edgeworths.

This attempt to recreate billing and supplement/increase previously billed work makes it unclear to the Court as to the accuracy of this "recreated" billing, since so much time had elapsed between the actual work and the billing. The court reviewed the billings of the "super bill" in comparison to the previous bills and determined that it was necessary to discount the items that had not been previously billed for; such as text messages, reviews with the court reporter, and reviewing, downloading, and saving documents because the Court is uncertain of the accuracy of the "super

bill."

Simon argues that he has no billing software in his office and that he has never billed a client on an hourly basis, but his actions in this case are contrary. Also, Simon argues that the Edgeworths, in this case, were billed hourly because the Lange contract had a provision for attorney's fees; however, as the Court previously found, when the Edgeworths paid the invoices it was not made clear to them that the billings were only for the Lange contract and that they did not need to be paid. Also, there was no indication on the invoices that the work was only for the Lange claims, and not the Viking claims. Ms. Ferrel testified that the billings were only for substantial items, without emails or calls, understanding that those items may be billed separately; but again the evidence does not demonstrate that this information was relayed to the Edgeworths as the bills were being paid. This argument does not persuade the court of the accuracy of the "super bill".

The amount of attorney's fees and costs for the period beginning in June of 2016 to December 2, 2016 is \$42,564.95. This amount is based upon the invoice from December 2, 2016 which appears to indicate that it began with the initial meeting with the client, leading the court to determine that this is the beginning of the relationship. This invoice also states it is for attorney's fees and costs through November 11, 2016, but the last hourly charge is December 2, 2016. This amount has already been paid by the Edgeworths on December 16, 2016.

The amount of the attorney's fees and costs for the period beginning on December 5, 2016 to April 4, 2017 is \$46,620.69. This amount is based upon the invoice from April 7, 2017. This amount has already been paid by the Edgeworths on May 3, 2017.

The amount of attorney's fees for the period of April 5, 2017 to July 28, 2017, for the services of Daniel Simon Esq. is \$72,077.50. The amount of attorney's fees for this period for

²There are no billing amounts from December 2 to December 4, 2016.

Ashley Ferrel Esq. is \$38,060.00. The amount of costs outstanding for this period is \$31,943.70. This amount totals \$142,081.20 and is based upon the invoice from July 28, 2017. This amount has been paid by the Edgeworths on August 16, 2017.³

The amount of attorney's fees for the period of July 31, 2017 to September 19, 2017, for the services of Daniel Simon Esq. is \$119,762.50. The amount of attorney's fees for this period for Ashley Ferrel Esq. is \$60,981.25. The amount of attorney's fees for this period for Benjamin Miller Esq. is \$2,887.50. The amount of costs outstanding for this period is \$71,555.00. This amount totals \$255,186.25 and is based upon the invoice from September 19, 2017. This amount has been paid by the Edgeworths on September 25, 2017.

From September 29, 2017 to November 29, 2017, the Court must determine the amount of attorney fees owed to the Law Office of Daniel Simon.⁴ For the services of Daniel Simon Esq., the total amount of hours billed are 340.05. At a rate of \$550 per hour, the total attorney's fees owed to the Law Office for the work of Daniel Simon Esq. is \$187,027.50. For the services of Ashley Ferrel Esq., the total amount of hours billed are 337.15. At a rate of \$275 per hour, the total attorney's fees owed to the Law Office for the work of Ashley Ferrel Esq. from September 19, 2017 to November 29, 2017 is \$92,716.25.⁵ For the services of Benjamin Miller Esq., the total amount of hours billed are 19.05. At a rate of \$275 per hour, the total attorney's fees owed to the Law Office for the work of Benjamin Miller Esq. from September 19, 2017 to November 29, 2017 is \$5,238.75.⁶

The Court notes that though there was never a fee agreement made with Ashley Ferrel Esq. or Benjamin Miller Esq., however, their fees were included on the last two invoices that were paid

³ There are no billings from July 28 to July 30, 2017.

⁴ There are no billings for October 8th, October 28-29, and November 5th.

⁵ There is no billing for the October 7-8, October 22, October 28-29, November 4, November 11-12, November 18-19, November 21, and November 23-26.

There is no billing from September 19, 2017 to November 5, 2017.

by the Edgeworths, so the implied fee agreement applies to their work as well.

The Court finds that the total amount owed to the Law Office of Daniel Simon for the period of September 19, 2018 to November 29, 2017 is \$284,982.50.

Costs Owed

The Court finds that the Law Office of Daniel Simon is owed for outstanding costs of the litigation in Edgeworth Family Trust; and American Grating, LLC vs. Lange Plumbing, LLC; The Viking Corporation; Supply Network, Inc. dba Viking Supplynet in case number A-16-738444-C. Pursuant to the Memorandum of Costs and Disbursements filed on January 17, 2018, the Law Firm submits that it is owed \$71,594.93 in costs. These costs include \$3,122.97 in Clerk's Fees; \$9,575.90 in Video and Court Recorder's Fees; \$57,646.06 in Expert Witness Fees; and \$1,250.00 in Copy Fees. The Court finds that the Law Office of Daniel Simon is owed these costs in the amount of \$71,594.93.

Quantum Meruit

When a lawyer is discharged by the client, the lawyer is no longer compensated under the discharged/breached/repudiated contract, but is paid based on quantum meruit. See e.g. Golightly v. Gassner, 281 P.3d 1176 (Nev. 2009) (unreported) (discharged contingency attorney paid by quantum meruit rather than by contingency fee pursuant to agreement with client); citing, Gordon v. Stewart, 324 P.3d 234 (1958) (attorney paid in quantum meruit after client breach of agreement); and, Cooke v. Gove, 114 P.2d 87 (Nev. 1941) (fees awarded in quantum meruit when there was no contingency agreement). Here, Simon was constructively discharged by the Edgeworths on November 29, 2017. The constructive discharge terminated the implied contract for fees. William

Kemp Esq. testified as an expert witness and stated that if there is no contract, then the proper award is quantum meruit. The Court finds that the Law Office of Daniel Simon is owed attorney's fees under quantum meruit from November 29, 2017, after the constructive discharge, to the conclusion of the Law Office's work on this case.

In determining the amount of fees to be awarded under quantum meruit, the Court has wide discretion on the method of calculation of attorney fee, to be "tempered only by reason and fairness". Albios v. Horizon Communities, Inc., 132 P.3d 1022 (Nev. 2006). The law only requires that the court calculate a reasonable fee. Shuette v. Beazer Homes Holding Corp., 124 P.3d 530 (Nev. 2005). Whatever method of calculation is used by the Court, the amount of the attorney fee must be reasonable under the Brunzell factors. Id. The Court should enter written findings of the reasonableness of the fee under the Brunzell factors. Argentena Consolidated Mining Co., v. Jolley, Urga, Wirth, Woodbury Standish, 216 P.3d 779, at fn2 (Nev. 2009). Brunzell provides that "[w]hile hourly time schedules are helpful in establishing the value of counsel services, other factors may be equally significant. Brunzell v. Golden Gate National Bank, 455 P.2d 31 (Nev. 1969).

The <u>Brunzell</u> factors are: (1) the qualities of the advocate; (2) the character of the work to be done; (3) the work actually performed; and (4) the result obtained. <u>Id</u>. However, in this case the Court notes that the majority of the work in this case was complete before the date of the constructive discharge, and the Court is applying the <u>Brunzell</u> factors for the period commencing after the constructive discharge.

In considering the <u>Brunzell</u> factors, the Court looks at all of the evidence presented in the case, the testimony at the evidentiary hearing, and the litigation involved in the case.

1. Quality of the Advocate

Brunzell expands on the "qualities of the advocate" factor and mentions such items as

training, skill and education of the advocate. Mr. Simon has been an active Nevada trial attorney for over two decades. He has several 7-figure trial verdicts and settlements to his credit. Craig Drummond Esq. testified that he considers Mr. Simon a top 1% trial lawyer and he associates Mr. Simon in on cases that are complex and of significant value. Michael Nunez Esq. testified that Mr. Simon's work on this case was extremely impressive. William Kemp Esq. testified that Mr. Simon's work product and results are exceptional.

2. The Character of the Work to be Done

The character of the work done in this case is complex. There were multiple parties, multiple claims, and many interrelated issues. Affirmative claims by the Edgeworths covered the gamut from product liability to negligence. The many issues involved manufacturing, engineering, fraud, and a full understanding of how to work up and present the liability and damages. Mr. Kemp testified that the quality and quantity of the work was exceptional for a products liability case against a world-wide manufacturer that is experienced in litigating case. Mr. Kemp further testified that the Law Office of Danny Simon retained multiple experts to secure the necessary opinions to prove the case. The continued aggressive representation, of Mr. Simon, in prosecuting the case that was a substantial factor in achieving the exceptional results.

3. The Work Actually Performed

Mr. Simon was aggressive in litigating this case. In addition to filing several motions, numerous court appearances, and deposition; his office uncovered several other activations, that caused possible other floods. While the Court finds that Mr. Edgeworth was extensively involved and helpful in this aspect of the case, the Court disagrees that it was his work alone that led to the other activations being uncovered and the result that was achieved in this case. Since Mr. Edgeworth is not a lawyer, it is impossible that it was his work alone that led to the filing of motions

and the litigation that allowed this case to develop into a \$6 million settlement. All of the work by the Law Office of Daniel Simon led to the ultimate result in this case.

4. The Result Obtained

The result was impressive. This began as a \$500,000 insurance claim and ended up settling for over \$6,000,000. Mr. Simon was also able to recover an additional \$100,000 from Lange Plumbing LLC. Mr. Vannah indicated to Simon that the Edgeworths were ready so sign and settle the Lange Claim for \$25,000 but Simon kept working on the case and making changes to the settlement agreement. This ultimately led to a larger settlement for the Edgeworths. Recognition is due to Mr. Simon for placing the Edgeworths in a great position to recover a greater amount from Lange. Mr. Kemp testified that this was the most important factor and that the result was incredible. Mr. Kemp also testified that he has never heard of a \$6 million settlement with a \$500,000 damage case. Further, in the Consent to Settle, on the Lange claims, the Edgeworth's acknowledge that they were made more than whole with the settlement with the Viking entities.

In determining the amount of attorney's fees owed to the Law Firm of Daniel Simon, the Court also considers the factors set forth in Nevada Rules of Professional Conduct – Rule 1.5(a) which states:

- (a) A lawyer shall not make an agreement for, charge, or collect an unreasonable fee or an unreasonable amount for expenses. The factors to be considered in determining the reasonableness of a fee include the following:
- (1) The time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly;
- (2) The likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer;
- (3) The fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services;
 - (4) The amount involved and the results obtained;
- (5) The time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances;

- (6) The nature and length of the professional relationship with the client;
- (7) The experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services; and
 - (8) Whether the fee is fixed or contingent.

NRCP 1.5. However, the Court must also consider the remainder of Rule 1.5 which goes on to state:

- (b) The scope of the representation and the basis or rate of the fee and expenses for which the client will be responsible shall be communicated to the client, preferably in writing, before or within a reasonable time after commencing the representation, except when the lawyer will charge a regularly represented client on the same basis or rate. Any changes in the basis or rate of the fee or expenses shall also be communicated to the client.
- (c) A fee may be contingent on the outcome of the matter for which the service is rendered, except in a matter in which a contingent fee is prohibited by paragraph (d) or other law. A contingent fee agreement shall be in writing, signed by the client, and shall state, in boldface type that is at least as large as the largest type used in the contingent fee agreement:
- (1) The method by which the fee is to be determined, including the percentage or percentages that shall accrue to the lawyer in the event of settlement, trial or appeal;
- (2) Whether litigation and other expenses are to be deducted from the recovery, and whether such expenses are to be deducted before or after the contingent fee is calculated;
 - (3) Whether the client is liable for expenses regardless of outcome;
- (4) That, in the event of a loss, the client may be liable for the opposing party's attorney fees, and will be liable for the opposing party's costs as required by law; and
- (5) That a suit brought solely to harass or to coerce a settlement may result in liability for malicious prosecution or abuse of process. Upon conclusion of a contingent fee matter, the lawyer shall provide the client with a written statement stating the outcome of the matter and, if there is a recovery, showing the remittance to the client and the method of its determination.

NRCP 1.5.

The Court finds that under the <u>Brunzell</u> factors, Mr. Simon was an exceptional advocate for the Edgeworths, the character of the work was complex, the work actually performed was extremely significant, and the work yielded a phenomenal result for the Edgeworths. All of the <u>Brunzell</u> factors justify a reasonable fee under NRPC 1.5. However, the Court must also consider the fact

that the evidence suggests that the basis or rate of the fee and expenses for which the client will be responsible were never communicated to the client, within a reasonable time after commencing the representation. Further, this is not a contingent fee case, and the Court is not awarding a contingency fee. Instead, the Court must determine the amount of a reasonable fee. The Court has considered the services of the Law Office of Daniel Simon, under the <u>Brunzell</u> factors, and the Court finds that the Law Office of Daniel Simon is entitled to a reasonable fee in the amount of \$200,000, from November 30, 2017 to the conclusion of this case.

CONCLUSION

The Court finds that the Law Office of Daniel Simon properly filed and perfected the charging lien pursuant to NRS 18.015(3) and the Court must adjudicate the lien. The Court further finds that there was an implied agreement for a fee of \$550 per hour between Mr. Simon and the Edgeworths once Simon started billing Edgeworth for this amount, and the bills were paid. The Court further finds that on November 29, 2017, the Edgeworth's constructively discharged Mr. Simon as their attorney, when they ceased following his advice and refused to communicate with him about their litigation. The Court further finds that Mr. Simon was compensated at the implied agreement rate of \$550 per hour for his services, and \$275 per hour for his associates; up and until the last billing of September 19, 2017. For the period from September 19, 2017 to November 29, 2017, the Court finds that Mr. Simon is entitled to his implied agreement fee of \$550 an hour, and \$275 an hour for his associates, for a total amount of \$284,982.50. For the period after November 29, 2017, the Court finds that the Law Office of Daniel Simon properly perfected their lien and is entitled to a reasonable fee for the services the office rendered for the Edgeworths, after being

constructively discharged, under quantum meruit, in an amount of \$200,000. The Court further finds that the Law Office of Daniel Simon is entitled to costs in the amount of \$71,594.93.

ORDER

It is hereby ordered, adjudged, and decreed, that the Motion to Adjudicate the Attorneys Lien of the Law Office of Daniel S. Simon is hereby granted and that the reasonable fee due to the Law Office of Daniel Simon is \$556,577.43, which includes outstanding costs.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 10th day of October, 2018.

DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on or about the date e-filed, this document was copied through e-mail, placed in the attorney's folder in the Regional Justice Center or mailed to the proper person as follows:

Electronically served to:

Peter S. Christiansen, Esq. James Christensen, Esq. Robert Vannah, Esq. John Greene, Esq.

Tess Driver

Judicial Executive Assistant

Department 10

Electronically Filed 11/19/2018 2:27 PM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT

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Hon. Tierra Jones DISTRICT COURT JUDGE DEPARTMENT TEN LAS VEGAS, NEVADA 89155

DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

EDGEWORTH FAMILY TRUST; and AMERICAN GRATING, LLC,

Plaintiffs,

VS.

LANGE PLUMBING, LLC; THE VIKING CORPORATION, a Michigan Corporation; SUPPLY NETWORK, INC., dba VIKING SUPPLYNET, a Michigan Corporation; and DOES 1 through 5; and, ROE entities 6 through 10;

Defendants.

EDGEWORTH FAMILY TRUST; and AMERICAN GRATING, LLC,

Plaintiffs,

vs.

DANIEL S. SIMON; THE LAW OFFICE OF DANIEL S. SIMON, a Professional Corporation d/b/a SIMON LAW; DOES 1 through 10; and, ROE entities 1 through 10;

Defendants.

CASE NO.: A-18-767242-C DEPT NO.: XXVI

Consolidated with

CASE NO.: A-16-738444-C

DEPT NO.: X

DECISION AND ORDER ON MOTION TO ADJUDICATE LIEN

DECISION AND ORDER ON MOTION TO ADJUDICATE LIEN

This case came on for an evidentiary hearing August 27-30, 2018 and concluded on September 18, 2018, in the Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County, Nevada, the Honorable Tierra Jones presiding. Defendants and movant, Daniel Simon and Law Office of Daniel S. Simon d/b/a Simon Law ("Defendants" or "Law Office" or "Simon" or "Mr. Simon") having appeared in

person and by and through their attorneys of record, Peter S. Christiansen, Esq. and James Christensen, Esq. and Plaintiff Edgeworth Family Trust and American Grating, ("Plaintiff" or "Edgeworths") having appeared through Brian and Angela Edgeworth, and by and through their attorneys of record, the law firm of Vannah and Vannah, Chtd. Robert Vannah, Esq. and John Greene, Esq. The Court having considered the evidence, arguments of counsel and being fully advised of the matters herein, the **COURT FINDS**:

FINDINGS OF FACT

- 1. The Court finds that the Law Office of Daniel S. Simon represented the Plaintiffs, Edgeworth Family Trust and American Grating in the case entitled Edgeworth Family Trust and American Grating v. Viking, et al., case number A-16-738444-C. The representation commenced on May 27, 2016 when Brian Edgeworth and Daniel Simon Esq. met at Starbucks. This representation originally began as a favor between friends and there was no discussion of fees, at this point. Mr. Simon and his wife were close family friends with Brian and Angela Edgeworth.
 - 2. The case involved a complex products liability issue.
- 3. On April 10, 2016, a house the Edgeworths were building as a speculation home suffered a flood. The house was still under construction and the flood caused a delay. The Edgeworths did not carry loss insurance if a flood occurred and the plumbing company and manufacturer refused to pay for the property damage. A fire sprinkler installed by the plumber, and within the plumber's scope of work, caused the flood; however, the plumber asserted the fire sprinkler was defective and refused to repair or to pay for repairs. The manufacturer of the sprinkler, Viking, et al., also denied any wrongdoing.
- 4. In May of 2016, Mr. Simon agreed to help his friend with the flood claim and to send a few letters. The parties initially hoped that Simon drafting a few letters to the responsible parties could resolve the matter. Simon wrote the letters to the responsible parties, but the matter did not resolve. Since the matter was not resolved, a lawsuit had to be filed.
 - 5. On June 14, 2016, a complaint was filed in the case of Edgeworth Family Trust; and

American Grating LLC vs. Lange Plumbing, LLC; the Viking Corporation; Supply Network Inc., dba Viking Supplynet, in case number A-18-738444-C. The cost of repairs was approximately \$500,000. One of the elements of the Edgeworth's damages against Lange Plumbing LLC ("Lange") in the litigation was for reimbursement of the fees and costs that were paid by the Edgeworths.

6. On August 9, 2017, Mr. Simon and Brian Edgeworth traveled to San Diego to meet with an expert. As they were in the airport waiting for a return flight, they discussed the case, and had some discussion about payments and financials. No express fee agreement was reached during the meeting. On August 22, 2017, Brian Edgeworth sent an email to Simon entitled "Contingency." It reads as follows:

We never really had a structured discussion about how this might be done.

I am more that happy to keep paying hourly but if we are going for punitive we should probably explore a hybrid of hourly on the claim and then some other structure that incents both of us to win an go after the appeal that these scumbags will file etc.

Obviously that could not have been doen earlier snce who would have thought this case would meet the hurdle of punitives at the start.

I could also swing hourly for the whole case (unless I am off what this is going to cost). I would likely borrow another \$450K from Margaret in 250 and 200 increments and then either I could use one of the house sales for cash or if things get really bad, I still have a couple million in bitcoin I could sell. I doubt we will get Kinsale to settle for enough to really finance this since I would have to pay the first \$750,000 or so back to Colin and Margaret and why would Kinsale settle for \$1MM when their exposure is only \$1MM?

(Def. Exhibit 27).

- 7. During the litigation, Simon sent four (4) invoices to the Edgeworths. The first invoice was sent on December 2, 2016, seven (7) months after the original meeting at Starbucks. This invoice indicated that it was for attorney's fees and costs through November 11, 2016. (Def. Exhibit 8). The total of this invoice was \$42,564.95 and was billed at a "reduced" rate of \$550 per hour. <u>Id</u>. The invoice was paid by the Edgeworths on December 16, 2016.
- 8. On April 7, 2017 a second invoice was sent to the Edgeworths for attorney's fees and costs through April 4, 2017 for a total of \$46,620.69, and was billed at a "reduced" rate of \$550 per

hour. (Def. Exhibit 9). This invoice was paid by the Edgeworths on May 3, 2017. There was no indication on the first two invoices if the services were those of Mr. Simon or his associates; but the bills indicated an hourly rate of \$550.00 per hour.

- 9. A third invoice was sent to the Edgeworths on July 28, 2017 for attorney's fees and costs through July 28, 2017 totaling of \$142,080.20. (Def. Exhibit 10). This bill identified services of Daniel Simon Esq. for a "reduced" rate of \$550 per hour totaling \$104,021.20; and services of Ashley Ferrel Esq. for a "reduced" rate of \$275 per hour totaling \$37,959.00. Id. This invoice was paid by the Edgeworths on August 16, 2017.
- 10. The fourth invoice was sent to the Edgeworths on September 19, 2017 in an amount of \$255,186.25 for attorney's fees and costs; with \$191,317.50 being calculated at a "reduced" rate of \$550 per hour for Daniel Simon Esq., \$60,981.25 being calculated at a "reduced" rate of \$275 per hour for Ashley Ferrel Esq., and \$2,887.50 being calculated at a "reduced" rate of \$275 per hour for Benjamin Miller Esq. (Def. Exhibit 11). This invoice was paid by the Edgeworths on September 25, 2017.
- 11. The amount of attorney's fees in the four (4) invoices was \$367,606.25, and \$118,846.84 in costs; for a total of \$486,453.09. These monies were paid to Daniel Simon Esq. and never returned to the Edgeworths. The Edgeworths secured very high interest loans to pay fees and costs to Simon. They made Simon aware of this fact.
- 12. Between June 2016 and December 2017, there was a tremendous amount of work done in the litigation of this case. There were several motions and oppositions filed, several depositions taken, and several hearings held in the case.
- 13. On the evening of November 15, 2017, the Edgeworth's received the first settlement offer for their claims against the Viking Corporation ("Viking"). However, the claims were not settled until on or about December 1, 2017.
 - 14. Also on November 15, 2017, Brian Edgeworth sent an email to Simon asking for the

¹ \$265,677.50 in attorney's fees for the services of Daniel Simon; \$99,041.25 for the services of Ashley Ferrel; and \$2,887.50 for the services of Benjamin Miller.

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open invoice. The email stated: "I know I have an open invoice that you were going to give me at a mediation a couple weeks ago and then did not leave with me. Could someone in your office send Peter (copied here) any invoices that are unpaid please?" (Def. Exhibit 38).

- 15. On November 17, 2017, Simon scheduled an appointment for the Edgeworths to come to his office to discuss the litigation.
- 16. On November 27, 2017, Simon sent a letter with an attached retainer agreement, stating that the fee for legal services would be \$1,500,000 for services rendered to date. (Plaintiff's Exhibit 4).
- On November 29, 2017, the Edgeworths met with the Law Office of Vannah & 17. Vannah and signed a retainer agreement. (Def. Exhibit 90). On this date, they ceased all communications with Mr. Simon.
- 18. On the morning of November 30, 2017, Simon received a letter advising him that the Edgeworths had retained the Vannah Law Firm to assist in the litigation with the Viking entities, et.al. The letter read as follows:

"Please let this letter serve to advise you that I've retained Robert D. Vannah, Esq. and John B. Greene, Esq., of Vannah & Vannah to assist in the litigation with the Viking entities, et.al. I'm instructing you to cooperate with them in every regard concerning the litigation and any settlement. I'm also instructing you to give them complete access to the file and allow them to review whatever documents they request to review. Finally, I direct you to allow them to participate without limitation in any proceeding concerning our case, whether it be at depositions, court hearings, discussions, etc."

(Def. Exhibit 43).

- 19. On the same morning, Simon received, through the Vannah Law Firm, the Edgeworth's consent to settle their claims against Lange Plumbing LLC for \$25,000.
- Also on this date, the Law Office of Danny Simon filed an attorney's lien for the 20. reasonable value of its services pursuant to NRS 18.015. (Def. Exhibit 3). On January 2, 2018, the Law Office filed an amended attorney's lien for the sum of \$2,345,450, less payments made in the sum of \$367,606.25, for a net lien in the sum of \$1,977,843.80. This lien includes court costs and

out-of-pocket costs advanced by the Law Office of Daniel S. Simon in the sum of \$76,535.93.

- 21. Mr. Edgeworth alleges that the fee agreement with Simon was only for an hourly express agreement of \$550 an hour; and that the agreement for \$550 an hour was made at the outset of the case. Mr. Simon alleges that he worked on the case always believing he would receive the reasonable value of his services when the case concluded. There is a dispute over the reasonable fee due to the Law Office of Danny Simon.
 - 22. The parties agree that an express written contract was never formed.
- 23. On December 7, 2017, the Edgeworths signed a Consent to Settle their claims against Lange Plumbing LLC for \$100,000.
- 24. On January 4, 2018, the Edgeworth Family Trust filed a lawsuit against Simon in Edgeworth Family Trust; American Grating LLC vs. Daniel S. Simon, the Law Office of Daniel S. Simon, a Professional Corporation, case number A-18-767242-C.
- 25. On January 24, 2018, the Law Office of Danny Simon filed a Motion to Adjudicate Lien with an attached invoice for legal services rendered. The amount of the invoice was \$692,120.00. The Court set an evidentiary hearing to adjudicate the lien.

CONCLUSION OF LAW

The Law Office Appropriately Asserted A Charging Lien Which Must Be Adjudicated By The

Court

An attorney may obtain payment for work on a case by use of an attorney lien. Here, the Law Office of Daniel Simon may use a charging lien to obtain payment for work on case A-16-738444-C under NRS 18.015.

NRS 18.015(1)(a) states:

- 1. An attorney at law shall have a lien:
- (a) Upon any claim, demand or cause of action, including any claim for unliquidated damages, which has been placed in the attorney's hands by a client for suit or collection, or upon which a suit or other action has been instituted.

Nev. Rev. Stat. 18.015.

The Court finds that the lien filed by the Law Office of Daniel Simon, in case A-16-738444-C, complies with NRS 18.015(1)(a). The Law Office perfected the charging lien pursuant to NRS 18.015(3), by serving the Edgeworths as set forth in the statute. The Law Office charging lien was perfected before settlement funds generated from A-16-738444-C of \$6,100,000.00 were deposited, thus the charging lien attached to the settlement funds. Nev. Rev. Stat. 18.015(4)(a); Golightly & Vannah, PLLC v. TJ Allen LLC, 373 P.3d 103, at 105 (Nev. 2016). The Law Office's charging lien is enforceable in form.

The Court has personal jurisdiction over the Law Office and the Plaintiffs in A-16-738444-C. Argentina Consolidated Mining Co., v. Jolley, Urga, Wirth, Woodbury & Standish, 216 P.3d 779 at 782-83 (Nev. 2009). The Court has subject matter jurisdiction over adjudication of the Law Office's charging lien. Argentina, 216 P.3d at 783. The Law Office filed a motion requesting adjudication under NRS 18.015, thus the Court must adjudicate the lien.

Fee Agreement

It is undisputed that no express written fee agreement was formed. The Court finds that there was no express oral fee agreement formed between the parties. An express oral agreement is formed when all important terms are agreed upon. See, Loma Linda University v. Eckenweiler, 469 P.2d 54 (Nev. 1970) (no oral contract was formed, despite negotiation, when important terms were not agreed upon and when the parties contemplated a written agreement). The Court finds that the payment terms are essential to the formation of an express oral contract to provide legal services on an hourly basis.

Here, the testimony from the evidentiary hearing does not indicate, with any degree of certainty, that there was an express oral fee agreement formed on or about June of 2016. Despite Brian Edgeworth's affidavits and testimony; the emails between himself and Danny Simon, regarding punitive damages and a possible contingency fee, indicate that no express oral fee agreement was formed at the meeting on June 10, 2016. Specifically in Brian Edgeworth's August 22, 2017 email, titled "Contingency," he writes:

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"We never really had a structured discussion about how this might be done. I am more than happy to keep paying hourly but if we are going for punitive we should probably explore a hybrid of hourly on the claim and then some other

structure that incents both of us to win an go after the appeal that these scumbags will file etc. Obviously that could not have been done earlier snce who would have thought this case would meet the hurdle of punitives at the start. I could also swing hourly for the whole case (unless I am off what this is going to cost). I would likely borrow another \$450K from Margaret in 250 and 200 increments and then either I could use one of the house sales for cash or if things get really bad, I still have a couple million in bitcoin I could sell. I doubt we will get Kinsale to settle for enough to really finance this since I would have to pay the first \$750,000 or so back to Colin and Margaret and why would Kinsale settle for \$1MM when their exposure is only \$1MM?"

(Def. Exhibit 27).

It is undisputed that when the flood issue arose, all parties were under the impression that Simon would be helping out the Edgeworths, as a favor.

The Court finds that an implied fee agreement was formed between the parties on December 2, 2016, when Simon sent the first invoice to the Edgeworths, billing his services at \$550 per hour, and the Edgeworths paid the invoice. On July 28, 2017 an addition to the implied contract was created with a fee of \$275 per hour for Simon's associates. Simon testified that he never told the Edgeworths not to pay the bills, though he testified that from the outset he only wanted to "trigger coverage". When Simon repeatedly billed the Edgeworths at \$550 per hour for his services, and \$275 an hour for the services of his associates; and the Edgeworths paid those invoices, an implied fee agreement was formed between the parties. The implied fee agreement was for \$550 per hour for the services of Daniel Simon Esq. and \$275 per hour for the services of his associates.

Constructive Discharge

Constructive discharge of an attorney may occur under several circumstances, such as:

- Refusal to communicate with an attorney creates constructive discharge. Rosenberg v. Calderon Automation, 1986 Ohio App. LEXIS 5460 (Jan. 31, 1986).
- Refusal to pay an attorney creates constructive discharge. See e.g., Christian v. All Persons Claiming Any Right, 962 F. Supp. 676 (U.S. Dist. V.I. 1997).

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- Suing an attorney creates constructive discharge. See <u>Tao v. Probate Court for the Northeast Dist</u>. #26, 2015 Conn. Super. LEXIS 3146, *13-14, (Dec. 14, 2015). See also <u>Maples v. Thomas</u>, 565 U.S. 266 (2012); Harris v. State, 2017 Nev. LEXIS 111; and <u>Guerrero v. State</u>, 2017 Nev. Unpubl. LEXIS 472.
- Taking actions that preventing effective representation creates constructive discharge. McNair v. Commonwealth, 37 Va. App. 687, 697-98 (Va. 2002).

Here, the Court finds that the Edgeworths constructively discharged Simon as their lawyer on November 29, 2017. The Edgeworths assert that because Simon has not been expressly terminated, has not withdrawn, and is still technically their attorney of record; there cannot be a termination. The Court disagrees.

On November 29, 2017, the Edgeworths met with the Law Firm of Vannah and Vannah and signed a retainer agreement. The retainer agreement was for representation on the Viking settlement agreement and the Lange claims. (Def. Exhibit 90). This is the exact litigation that Simon was representing the Edgeworths on. This fee agreement also allowed Vannah and Vannah to do all things without a compromise. <u>Id</u>. The retainer agreement specifically states:

Client retains Attorneys to represent him as his Attorneys regarding Edgeworth Family Trust and AMERICAN GRATING V. ALL VIKING ENTITIES and all damages including, but not limited to, all claims in this matter and empowers them to do all things to effect a compromise in said matter, or to institute such legal action as may be advisable in their judgment, and agrees to pay them for their services, on the following conditions:

- a) ...
- b) ...
- c) Client agrees that his attorneys will work to consummate a settlement of \$6,000,000 from the Viking entities and any settlement amount agreed to be paid by the Lange entity. Client also agrees that attorneys will work to reach an agreement amongst the parties to resolve all claims in the Lange and Viking litigation.

<u>Id</u>.

This agreement was in place at the time of the settlement of the Viking and Lange claims. Mr. Simon had already begun negotiating the terms of the settlement agreement with Viking during the week of November 27, 2017 prior to Mr. Vannah's involvement. These negotiated terms were put

Id.

into a final release signed by the Edgeworths and Mr. Vannah's office on December 1, 2017. (Def. Exhibit 5). Mr. Simon's name is not contained in the release; Mr. Vannah's firm is expressly identified as the firm that solely advised the clients about the settlement. The actual language in the settlement agreement, for the Viking claims, states:

PLAINTIFFS represent that their independent counsel, Robert Vannah, Esq. and John Greene, Esq., of the law firm Vannah & Vannah has explained the effect of this AGREEMENT and their release of any and all claims, known or unknown and, based upon that explanation and their independent judgment by the reading of this Agreement, PLAINTIFFS understand and acknowledge the legal significance and the consequences of the claims being released by this Agreement. PLAINTIFFS further represent that they understand and acknowledge the legal significance and consequences of a release of unknown claims against the SETTLING PARTIES set forth in, or arising from, the INCIDENT and hereby assume full responsibility for any injuries, damages, losses or liabilities that hereafter may occur with respect to the matters released by this Agreement.

Also, Simon was not present for the signing of these settlement documents and never explained any of the terms to the Edgeworths. He sent the settlement documents to the Law Office of Vannah and

Further, the Edgeworths did not personally speak with Simon after November 25, 2017.

Vannah and received them back with the signatures of the Edgeworths.

Though there were email communications between the Edgeworths and Simon, they did not verbally speak to him and were not seeking legal advice from him. In an email dated December 5, 2017, Simon is requesting Brian Edgeworth return a call to him about the case, and Brian Edgeworth responds to the email saying, "please give John Greene at Vannah and Vannah a call if you need anything done on the case. I am sure they can handle it." (Def. Exhibit 80). At this time, the claim against Lange Plumbing had not been settled. The evidence indicates that Simon was actively working on this claim, but he had no communication with the Edgeworths and was not advising them on the claim against Lange Plumbing. Specifically, Brian Edgeworth testified that Robert Vannah Esq. told them what Simon said about the Lange claims and it was established that the Law Firm of Vannah and Vannah provided advice to the Edgeworths regarding the Lange claim. Simon

and the Law Firm of Vannah and Vannah gave different advice on the Lange claim, and the Edgeworths followed the advice of the Law Firm of Vannah and Vannah to settle the Lange claim. The Law Firm of Vannah and Vannah drafted the consent to settle for the claims against Lange Plumbing (Def. Exhibit 47). This consent to settle was inconsistent with the advice of Simon. Mr. Simon never signed off on any of the releases for the Lange settlement.

Further demonstrating a constructive discharge of Simon is the email from Robert Vannah Esq. to James Christensen Esq. dated December 26, 2017, which states: "They have lost all faith and trust in Mr. Simon. Therefore, they will not sign the checks to be deposited into his trust account. Quite frankly, they are fearful that he will steal the money." (Def. Exhibit 48). Then on January 4, 2018, the Edgeworth's filed a lawsuit against Simon in Edgeworth Family Trust; American Grating, LLC vs. Daniel S. Simon; the Law Office of Daniel S. Simon, a Professional Corporation d/b/a Simon Law, case number A-18-767242-C. Then, on January 9, 2018, Robert Vannah Esq. sent an email to James Christensen Esq. stating, "I guess he could move to withdraw. However, that doesn't seem in his best interests." (Def. Exhibit 53).

The Court recognizes that Simon still has not withdrawn as counsel of record on A-16-738444-C, the Law Firm of Vannah and Vannah has never substituted in as counsel of record, the Edgeworths have never explicitly told Simon that he was fired, Simon sent the November 27, 2018 letter indicating that the Edgeworth's could consult with other attorneys on the fee agreement (that was attached to the letter), and that Simon continued to work on the case after the November 29, 2017 date. The court further recognizes that it is always a client's decision of whether or not to accept a settlement offer. However the issue is constructive discharge and nothing about the fact that Mr. Simon has never officially withdrawn from the case indicates that he was not constructively discharged. His November 27, 2017 letter invited the Edgeworth's to consult with other attorneys on the fee agreement, not the claims against Viking or Lange. His clients were not communicating with him, making it impossible to advise them on pending legal issues, such as the settlements with Lange and Viking. It is clear that there was a breakdown in attorney-client relationship preventing

Simon from effectively representing the clients. The Court finds that Danny Simon was constructively discharged by the Edgeworths on November 29, 2017.

Adjudication of the Lien and Determination of the Law Office Fee

NRS 18.015 states:

- 1. An attorney at law shall have a lien:
 - (a) Upon any claim, demand or cause of action, including any claim for unliquidated damages, which has been placed in the attorney's hands by a client for suit or collection, or upon which a suit or other action has been instituted.
 - (b) In any civil action, upon any file or other property properly left in the possession of the attorney by a client.
 - 2. A lien pursuant to subsection 1 is for the amount of any fee which has been agreed upon by the attorney and client. In the absence of an agreement, the lien is for a reasonable fee for the services which the attorney has rendered for the client.
 - 3. An attorney perfects a lien described in subsection 1 by serving notice in writing, in person or by certified mail, return receipt requested, upon his or her client and, if applicable, upon the party against whom the client has a cause of action, claiming the lien and stating the amount of the lien.
 - 4. A lien pursuant to:
 - (a) Paragraph (a) of subsection 1 attaches to any verdict, judgment or decree entered and to any money or property which is recovered on account of the suit or other action; and
 - (b) Paragraph (b) of subsection 1 attaches to any file or other property properly left in the possession of the attorney by his or her client, including, without limitation, copies of the attorney's file if the original documents received from the client have been returned to the client, and authorizes the attorney to retain any such file or property until such time as an adjudication is made pursuant to subsection 6, from the time of service of the notices required by this section.
 - 5. A lien pursuant to paragraph (b) of subsection 1 must not be construed as inconsistent with the attorney's professional responsibilities to the client.
 - 6. On motion filed by an attorney having a lien under this section, the attorney's client or any party who has been served with notice of the lien, the court shall, after 5 days' notice to all interested parties, adjudicate the rights of the attorney, client or other parties and enforce the lien.
 - 7. Collection of attorney's fees by a lien under this section may be utilized with, after or independently of any other method of collection.

Nev. Rev. Stat. 18.015.

NRS 18.015(2) matches Nevada contract law. If there is an express contract, then the contract terms are applied. Here, there was no express contract for the fee amount, however there was an implied contract when Simon began to bill the Edgeworths for fees in the amount of \$550 per hour for his services, and \$275 per hour for the services of his associates. This contract was in effect until November 29, 2017, when he was constructively discharged from representing the Edgeworths. After he was constructively discharged, under NRS 18.015(2) and Nevada contract law, Simon is due a reasonable fee- that is, quantum meruit.

Implied Contract

On December 2, 2016, an implied contract for fees was created. The implied fee was \$550 an hour for the services of Mr. Simon. On July 28, 2017 an addition to the implied contract was created with a fee of \$275 per hour for the services of Simon's associates. This implied contract was created when invoices were sent to the Edgeworths, and they paid the invoices.

The invoices that were sent to the Edgeworths indicate that they were for costs and attorney's fees, and these invoices were paid by the Edgeworths. Though the invoice says that the fees were reduced, there is no evidence that establishes that there was any discussion with the Edgeworths as to how much of a reduction was being taken, and that the invoices did not need to be paid. There is no indication that the Edgeworths knew about the amount of the reduction and acknowledged that the full amount would be due at a later date. Simon testified that Brian Edgeworth chose to pay the bills to give credibility to his actual damages, above his property damage loss. However, as the lawyer/counselor, Simon did not prevent Brian Edgeworth from paying the bill or in any way refund the money, or memorialize this or any understanding in writing.

Simon produced evidence of the claims for damages for his fees and costs pursuant to NRCP 16.1 disclosures and computation of damages; and these amounts include the four invoices that were paid in full and there was never any indication given that anything less than all the fees had been produced. During the deposition of Brian Edgeworth it was suggested, by Simon, that all of the fees

had been disclosed. Further, Simon argues that the delay in the billing coincides with the timing of the NRCP 16.1 disclosures, however the billing does not distinguish or in any way indicate that the sole purpose was for the Lange Plumbing LLC claim. Since there is no contract, the Court must look to the actions of the parties to demonstrate the parties' understanding. Here, the actions of the parties are that Simon sent invoices to the Edgeworths, they paid the invoices, and Simon Law Office retained the payments, indicating an implied contract was formed between the parties. The Court find that the Law Office of Daniel Simon should be paid under the implied contract until the date they were constructively discharged, November 29, 2017.

Amount of Fees Owed Under Implied Contract

The Edgeworths were billed, and paid for services through September 19, 2017. There is some testimony that an invoice was requested for services after that date, but there is no evidence that any invoice was paid by the Edgeworths. Since the Court has found that an implied contract for fees was formed, the Court must now determine what amount of fees and costs are owed from September 19, 2017 to the constructive discharge date of November 29, 2017. In doing so, the Court must consider the testimony from the witnesses at the evidentiary hearing, the submitted billings, the attached lien, and all other evidence provided regarding the services provided during this time.

At the evidentiary hearing, Ashley Ferrel Esq. testified that some of the items in the billing that was prepared with the lien "super bill," are not necessarily accurate as the Law Office went back and attempted to create a bill for work that had been done over a year before. She testified that they added in .3 hours for each Wiznet filing that was reviewed and emailed and .15 hours for every email that was read and responded to. She testified that the dates were not exact, they just used the dates for which the documents were filed, and not necessarily the dates in which the work was performed. Further, there are billed items included in the "super bill" that was not previously billed to the Edgeworths, though the items are alleged to have occurred prior to or during the invoice billing period previously submitted to the Edgeworths. The testimony at the evidentiary hearing

²There are no billing amounts from December 2 to December 4, 2016.

indicated that there were no phone calls included in the billings that were submitted to the Edgeworths.

This attempt to recreate billing and supplement/increase previously billed work makes it unclear to the Court as to the accuracy of this "recreated" billing, since so much time had elapsed between the actual work and the billing. The court reviewed the billings of the "super bill" in comparison to the previous bills and determined that it was necessary to discount the items that had not been previously billed for; such as text messages, reviews with the court reporter, and reviewing, downloading, and saving documents because the Court is uncertain of the accuracy of the "super bill."

Simon argues that he has no billing software in his office and that he has never billed a client on an hourly basis, but his actions in this case are contrary. Also, Simon argues that the Edgeworths, in this case, were billed hourly because the Lange contract had a provision for attorney's fees; however, as the Court previously found, when the Edgeworths paid the invoices it was not made clear to them that the billings were only for the Lange contract and that they did not need to be paid. Also, there was no indication on the invoices that the work was only for the Lange claims, and not the Viking claims. Ms. Ferrel testified that the billings were only for substantial items, without emails or calls, understanding that those items may be billed separately; but again the evidence does not demonstrate that this information was relayed to the Edgeworths as the bills were being paid. This argument does not persuade the court of the accuracy of the "super bill".

The amount of attorney's fees and costs for the period beginning in June of 2016 to December 2, 2016 is \$42,564.95. This amount is based upon the invoice from December 2, 2016 which appears to indicate that it began with the initial meeting with the client, leading the court to determine that this is the beginning of the relationship. This invoice also states it is for attorney's fees and costs through November 11, 2016, but the last hourly charge is December 2, 2016. This amount has already been paid by the Edgeworths on December 16, 2016.²

The amount of the attorney's fees and costs for the period beginning on December 5, 2016 to April 4, 2017 is \$46,620.69. This amount is based upon the invoice from April 7, 2017. This amount has already been paid by the Edgeworths on May 3, 2017.

The amount of attorney's fees for the period of April 5, 2017 to July 28, 2017, for the services of Daniel Simon Esq. is \$72,077.50. The amount of attorney's fees for this period for Ashley Ferrel Esq. is \$38,060.00. The amount of costs outstanding for this period is \$31,943.70. This amount totals \$142,081.20 and is based upon the invoice from July 28, 2017. This amount has been paid by the Edgeworths on August 16, 2017.³

The amount of attorney's fees for the period of July 31, 2017 to September 19, 2017, for the services of Daniel Simon Esq. is \$119,762.50. The amount of attorney's fees for this period for Ashley Ferrel Esq. is \$60,981.25. The amount of attorney's fees for this period for Benjamin Miller Esq. is \$2,887.50. The amount of costs outstanding for this period is \$71,555.00. This amount totals \$255,186.25 and is based upon the invoice from September 19, 2017. This amount has been paid by the Edgeworths on September 25, 2017.

From September 19, 2017 to November 29, 2017, the Court must determine the amount of attorney fees owed to the Law Office of Daniel Simon.⁴ For the services of Daniel Simon Esq., the total amount of hours billed are 340.05. At a rate of \$550 per hour, the total attorney's fees owed to the Law Office for the work of Daniel Simon Esq. is \$187,027.50. For the services of Ashley Ferrel Esq., the total amount of hours billed are 337.15. At a rate of \$275 per hour, the total attorney's fees owed to the Law Office for the work of Ashley Ferrel Esq. from September 19, 2017 to November 29, 2017 is \$92,716.25.⁵ For the services of Benjamin Miller Esq., the total amount of hours billed are 19.05. At a rate of \$275 per hour, the total attorney's fees owed to the Law Office for the work of Benjamin Miller Esq. from September 19, 2017 to November 29, 2017 is \$5,238.75.⁶

The Court notes that though there was never a fee agreement made with Ashley Ferrel Esq.

³ There are no billings from July 28 to July 30, 2017.

⁴ There are no billings for October 8th, October 28-29, and November 5th.

⁵ There is no billing for the October 7-8, October 22, October 28-29, November 4, November 11-12, November 18-19, November 21, and November 23-26.

⁶ There is no billing from September 19, 2017 to November 5, 2017.

or Benjamin Miller Esq., however, their fees were included on the last two invoices that were paid by the Edgeworths, so the implied fee agreement applies to their work as well.

The Court finds that the total amount owed to the Law Office of Daniel Simon for the period of September 19, 2018 to November 29, 2017 is \$284,982.50.

Costs Owed

The Court finds that the Law Office of Daniel Simon is not owed any monies for outstanding costs of the litigation in Edgeworth Family Trust; and American Grating, LLC vs. Lange Plumbing, LLC; The Viking Corporation; Supply Network, Inc. dba Viking Supplynet in case number A-16-738444-C. The attorney lien asserted by Simon, in January of 2018, originally sought reimbursement for advances costs of \$71,594.93. The amount sought for advanced cots was later changed to \$68,844.93. In March of 2018, the Edgeworths paid the outstanding advanced costs, so the Court finds that there no outstanding costs remaining owed to the Law Office of Daniel Simon.

Quantum Meruit

When a lawyer is discharged by the client, the lawyer is no longer compensated under the discharged/breached/repudiated contract, but is paid based on quantum meruit. See e.g. Golightly v. Gassner, 281 P.3d 1176 (Nev. 2009) (unreported) (discharged contingency attorney paid by quantum meruit rather than by contingency fee pursuant to agreement with client); citing, Gordon v. Stewart, 324 P.3d 234 (1958) (attorney paid in quantum meruit after client breach of agreement); and, Cooke v. Gove, 114 P.2d 87 (Nev. 1941) (fees awarded in quantum meruit when there was no contingency agreement). Here, Simon was constructively discharged by the Edgeworths on November 29, 2017. The constructive discharge terminated the implied contract for fees. William Kemp Esq. testified as an expert witness and stated that if there is no contract, then the proper award is quantum meruit. The Court finds that the Law Office of Daniel Simon is owed attorney's fees under quantum meruit from November 29, 2017, after the constructive discharge, to the conclusion of the Law Office's work on this case.

In determining the amount of fees to be awarded under quantum meruit, the Court has wide discretion on the method of calculation of attorney fee, to be "tempered only by reason and fairness". Albios v. Horizon Communities, Inc., 132 P.3d 1022 (Nev. 2006). The law only requires that the court calculate a reasonable fee. Shuette v. Beazer Homes Holding Corp., 124 P.3d 530 (Nev. 2005). Whatever method of calculation is used by the Court, the amount of the attorney fee must be reasonable under the Brunzell factors. Id. The Court should enter written findings of the reasonableness of the fee under the Brunzell factors. Argentena Consolidated Mining Co., v. Jolley, Urga, Wirth, Woodbury Standish, 216 P.3d 779, at fn2 (Nev. 2009). Brunzell provides that "[w]hile hourly time schedules are helpful in establishing the value of counsel services, other factors may be equally significant. Brunzell v. Golden Gate National Bank, 455 P.2d 31 (Nev. 1969).

The <u>Brunzell</u> factors are: (1) the qualities of the advocate; (2) the character of the work to be done; (3) the work actually performed; and (4) the result obtained. <u>Id</u>. However, in this case the Court notes that the majority of the work in this case was complete before the date of the constructive discharge, and the Court is applying the <u>Brunzell</u> factors for the period commencing after the constructive discharge.

In considering the <u>Brunzell</u> factors, the Court looks at all of the evidence presented in the case, the testimony at the evidentiary hearing, and the litigation involved in the case.

1. Quality of the Advocate

Brunzell expands on the "qualities of the advocate" factor and mentions such items as training, skill and education of the advocate. Mr. Simon has been an active Nevada trial attorney for over two decades. He has several 7-figure trial verdicts and settlements to his credit. Craig Drummond Esq. testified that he considers Mr. Simon a top 1% trial lawyer and he associates Mr. Simon in on cases that are complex and of significant value. Michael Nunez Esq. testified that Mr. Simon's work on this case was extremely impressive. William Kemp Esq. testified that Mr. Simon's work product and results are exceptional.

2. The Character of the Work to be Done

The character of the work done in this case is complex. There were multiple parties,

multiple claims, and many interrelated issues. Affirmative claims by the Edgeworths covered the gamut from product liability to negligence. The many issues involved manufacturing, engineering, fraud, and a full understanding of how to work up and present the liability and damages. Mr. Kemp testified that the quality and quantity of the work was exceptional for a products liability case against a world-wide manufacturer that is experienced in litigating case. Mr. Kemp further testified that the Law Office of Danny Simon retained multiple experts to secure the necessary opinions to prove the case. The continued aggressive representation, of Mr. Simon, in prosecuting the case that was a substantial factor in achieving the exceptional results.

3. The Work Actually Performed

Mr. Simon was aggressive in litigating this case. In addition to filing several motions, numerous court appearances, and deposition; his office uncovered several other activations, that caused possible other floods. While the Court finds that Mr. Edgeworth was extensively involved and helpful in this aspect of the case, the Court disagrees that it was his work alone that led to the other activations being uncovered and the result that was achieved in this case. Since Mr. Edgeworth is not a lawyer, it is impossible that it was his work alone that led to the filing of motions and the litigation that allowed this case to develop into a \$6 million settlement. All of the work by the Law Office of Daniel Simon led to the ultimate result in this case.

4. The Result Obtained

The result was impressive. This began as a \$500,000 insurance claim and ended up settling for over \$6,000,000. Mr. Simon was also able to recover an additional \$100,000 from Lange Plumbing LLC. Mr. Vannah indicated to Simon that the Edgeworths were ready so sign and settle the Lange Claim for \$25,000 but Simon kept working on the case and making changes to the settlement agreement. This ultimately led to a larger settlement for the Edgeworths. Recognition is due to Mr. Simon for placing the Edgeworths in a great position to recover a greater amount from Lange. Mr. Kemp testified that this was the most important factor and that the result was incredible. Mr. Kemp also testified that he has never heard of a \$6 million settlement with a \$500,000 damage case. Further, in the Consent to Settle, on the Lange claims, the Edgeworth's acknowledge that they

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were made more than whole with the settlement with the Viking entities.

In determining the amount of attorney's fees owed to the Law Firm of Daniel Simon, the Court also considers the factors set forth in Nevada Rules of Professional Conduct - Rule 1.5(a) which states:

- (a) A lawyer shall not make an agreement for, charge, or collect an unreasonable fee or an unreasonable amount for expenses. The factors to be considered in determining the reasonableness of a fee include the following:
- (1) The time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly;
- (2) The likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer;
- (3) The fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services:
 - (4) The amount involved and the results obtained;
- (5) The time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances;
- (6) The nature and length of the professional relationship with the client;
- (7) The experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services; and
 - (8) Whether the fee is fixed or contingent.

NRCP 1.5. However, the Court must also consider the remainder of Rule 1.5 which goes on to state:

- (b) The scope of the representation and the basis or rate of the fee and expenses for which the client will be responsible shall be communicated to the client, preferably in writing, before or within a reasonable time after commencing the representation, except when the lawyer will charge a regularly represented client on the same basis or rate. Any changes in the basis or rate of the fee or expenses shall also be communicated to the client.
- (c) A fee may be contingent on the outcome of the matter for which the service is rendered, except in a matter in which a contingent fee is prohibited by paragraph (d) or other law. A contingent fee agreement shall be in writing, signed by the client, and shall state, in boldface type that is at least as large as the largest type used in the contingent fee agreement:
- (1) The method by which the fee is to be determined, including the percentage or percentages that shall accrue to the lawyer in the event of settlement, trial or appeal;
- (2) Whether litigation and other expenses are to be deducted from the recovery, and whether such expenses are to be deducted before or after the contingent fee is calculated;

(3) Whether the client is liable for expenses regardless of outcome;

(4) That, in the event of a loss, the client may be liable for the opposing party's attorney fees, and will be liable for the opposing party's costs as required by law; and

(5) That a suit brought solely to harass or to coerce a settlement may result in liability for malicious prosecution or abuse of process. Upon conclusion of a contingent fee matter, the lawyer shall provide the client with a written statement stating the outcome of the matter and, if there is a recovery, showing the remittance to the client and the method of its determination.

NRCP 1.5.

The Court finds that under the <u>Brunzell</u> factors, Mr. Simon was an exceptional advocate for the Edgeworths, the character of the work was complex, the work actually performed was extremely significant, and the work yielded a phenomenal result for the Edgeworths. All of the <u>Brunzell</u> factors justify a reasonable fee under NRPC 1.5. However, the Court must also consider the fact that the evidence suggests that the basis or rate of the fee and expenses for which the client will be responsible were never communicated to the client, within a reasonable time after commencing the representation. Further, this is not a contingent fee case, and the Court is not awarding a contingency fee. Instead, the Court must determine the amount of a reasonable fee. The Court has considered the services of the Law Office of Daniel Simon, under the <u>Brunzell</u> factors, and the Court finds that the Law Office of Daniel Simon is entitled to a reasonable fee in the amount of \$200,000, from November 30, 2017 to the conclusion of this case.

CONCLUSION

The Court finds that the Law Office of Daniel Simon properly filed and perfected the charging lien pursuant to NRS 18.015(3) and the Court must adjudicate the lien. The Court further finds that there was an implied agreement for a fee of \$550 per hour between Mr. Simon and the Edgeworths once Simon started billing Edgeworth for this amount, and the bills were paid. The Court further finds that on November 29, 2017, the Edgeworth's constructively discharged Mr. Simon as their attorney, when they ceased following his advice and refused to communicate with

him about their litigation. The Court further finds that Mr. Simon was compensated at the implied agreement rate of \$550 per hour for his services, and \$275 per hour for his associates; up and until the last billing of September 19, 2017. For the period from September 19, 2017 to November 29, 2017, the Court finds that Mr. Simon is entitled to his implied agreement fee of \$550 an hour, and \$275 an hour for his associates, for a total amount of \$284,982.50. For the period after November 29, 2017, the Court finds that the Law Office of Daniel Simon properly perfected their lien and is entitled to a reasonable fee for the services the office rendered for the Edgeworths, after being constructively discharged, under quantum meruit, in an amount of \$200,000.

ORDER

It is hereby ordered, adjudged, and decreed, that the Motion to Adjudicate the Attorneys Lien of the Law Office of Daniel S. Simon is hereby granted and that the reasonable fee due to the Law Office of Daniel Simon is \$484,982.50.

IT IS SO ORDERED this /9 day of November, 2018.

DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on or about the date e-filed, this document was copied through e-mail, placed in the attorney's folder in the Regional Justice Center or mailed to the proper person as follows:

Electronically served on all parties as noted in the Court's Master Service List and/or mailed to any party in proper person.

Tess Driver

Judicial Executive Assistant

Department 10

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

EDGEWORTH FAMILY TRUST; AND AMERICAN GRATING, LLC, Appellants/Cross-Respondents, V8. DANIEL S. SIMON; AND THE LAW OFFICE OF DANIEL S. SIMON. A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION, Respondents/Cross-Appellants. EDGEWORTH FAMILY TRUST; AND AMERICAN GRATING, LLC, Appellants, VS. DANIEL S. SIMON; AND THE LAW OFFICE OF DANIEL S. SIMON, A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION, Respondents.



No. 78176

ORDER AFFIRMING IN PART, VACATING IN PART AND REMANDING

These consolidated matters include two appeals and a cross-appeal that challenge district court orders dismissing a complaint under NRCP 12(b)(5), adjudicating an attorney lien, and granting in part and denying in part a motion for attorney fees and costs.¹ Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; Tierra Danielle Jones, Judge.²

Brian and Angela Edgeworth are business owners and managers. A fire sprinkler malfunctioned and flooded a home they were constructing, causing \$500,000 in damages. Both the fire-sprinkler

SUPREME COURT OF NEWACIA

20-46984

¹Pursuant to NRAP 34(f)(1), we have determined that oral argument is not warranted in this appeal.

²The Honorable Abbi Silver, Justice, did not participate in the decision of this matter.

manufacturer and plumbing company refused to pay for the damage. Daniel Simon, a Las Vegas attorney and close friend of the Edgeworths, offered to help. There was no written fee agreement, as Simon only planned to send a few letters. However, Simon eventually sued the responsible parties on the Edgeworths' behalf, billing the Edgeworths a "reduced" rate of \$550 per hour through four invoices totaling \$367,606, which the Edgeworths paid in full. Eventually, Simon helped secure a \$6 million settlement agreement, and when the Edgeworths asked Simon to provide any unpaid invoices, Simon sent them a letter with a retainer agreement for \$1.5 million beyond what they had already paid him for his services. The Edgeworths refused to pay and retained new counsel. Simon then filed an attorney lien. The Edgeworths responded by suing him for breach of contract and conversion.

Simon moved to dismiss the Edgeworths' complaint under both NRCP 12(b)(5) and Nevada's anti-SLAPP statutes and he moved for adjudication of the lien. The district court consolidated the cases. The district court first addressed Simon's attorney lien and held an extensive evidentiary hearing. After the hearing, the district court found that Simon and the Edgeworths did not have an express oral contract. Although the district court found that Simon and the Edgeworths had an implied contract for the hourly rate of \$550 per hour for Simon and \$275 per hour for Simon's associates, it also determined that the Edgeworths constructively discharged Simon when they retained new counsel. Therefore, the district court awarded Simon roughly \$285,000 for attorney services rendered from September 19 to November 29, 2017, and \$200,000 in quantum meruit for the services he rendered after November 29, the date of the constructive

SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA discharge.³ Relying on the evidence presented at the hearing adjudicating the attorney lien, the district court dismissed the Edgeworths' complaint and awarded Simon \$55,000 in attorney fees and costs for defending the breach of contract action. It then denied Simon's anti-SLAPP motion as moot.

The constructive discharge for purposes of adjudicating attorney lien and \$200,000 quantum meruit award

We review a "district court's findings of fact for an abuse of discretion" and "will not set aside those findings unless they are clearly erroneous or not supported by substantial evidence." NOLM, LLC v. Cty. of Clark, 120 Nev. 736, 739, 100 P.3d 658, 660-61 (2004) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Edgeworths argue that substantial evidence does not support the district court's constructive discharge finding because Simon never withdrew from the case, continued working on it through its conclusion, and billed them after the date of the constructive discharge. We disagree.

A constructive discharge occurs when a party's conduct "dissolves the essential mutual confidence between attorney and client," Brown v. Johnstone, 450 N.E.2d 693, 695 (Ohio Ct. App. 1982) (holding that a client terminated the attorney-client relationship when he initiated grievance proceedings against and stopped contacting his attorney), or the client takes action that prevents the attorney from effective representation, McNair v. Commonwealth, 561 S.E.2d 26, 31 (Va. Ct. App. 2002) (explaining that in the criminal context, constructive discharge can occur where "the defendant place[s] his counsel in a position that precluded effective

³On appeal, the Edgeworths challenge only the \$200,000 award in quantum meruit.

representation"). Substantial evidence in the record demonstrates that the Edgeworths hired new counsel; stopped directly communicating with Simon; empowered their new counsel to resolve the litigation; and settled claims against Simon's advice at the urging of new counsel. Accordingly, we conclude that the district court acted within its sound discretion by finding that the Edgeworths constructively discharged Simon on November 29, 2017.

Although we conclude that the district court correctly found that Simon was entitled to quantum meruit for work done after the constructive discharge, see Gordon v. Stewart, 74 Nev. 115, 119, 324 P.2d 234, 236 (1958) (upholding an award in quantum meruit to an attorney after breach of contract), rejected on other grounds by Argentena Consol. Min. Co. v. Jolley Urga Wirth Woodbury & Standish, 125 Nev. 527, 537-38, 216 P.3d 779, 786 (2009), we agree with the Edgeworths that the district court abused its discretion by awarding \$200,000 in quantum meruit without making findings regarding the work Simon performed after the constructive discharge. Gunderson v. D.R. Horton, Inc., 130 Nev. 67, 82, 319 P.3d 606, 616 (2014) (reviewing district court's attorney fee decision for an abuse of discretion).

A district court abuses its discretion when it bases its decision on an erroneous view of the law or clearly disregards guiding legal principles. See Bergmann v. Boyce, 109 Nev. 670, 674, 856 P.2d 560, 563 (1993), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in In re DISH Network Derivative Litig., 133 Nev. 438, 451 n.6, 401 P.3d 1081, 1093 n.6 (2017). "[T]he proper measure of damages under a quantum meruit theory

⁴The Edgeworths do not contest the validity of the attorney lien or the district court's jurisdiction to adjudicate it.

of recovery is the reasonable value of [the] services." Flamingo Realty, Inc. v. Midwest Dev., Inc., 110 Nev. 984, 987, 879 P.2d 69, 71 (1994) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). A district court must consider the Brunzell factors when determining a reasonable amount of attorney fees. Logan v. Abe, 131 Nev. 260, 266, 350 P.3d 1139, 1143 (2015). Those factors are: (1) the quality of the advocate; (2) the character of the work, e.g., its difficulty, importance, etc.; (3) the work actually performed by the advocate; and (4) the result. Brunzell v. Golden Gate Nat'l Bank, 85 Nev. 345, 349, 455 P.2d 31, 33 (1969). The Edgeworths challenge the third factor, arguing that the district court's order did not describe the work Simon performed after the constructive discharge. While the district court stated that it was applying the Brunzell factors for work performed only after the constructive discharge, much of its analysis focused on Simon's work throughout the entire litigation. Those findings, referencing work performed before the constructive discharge, for which Simon had already been compensated under the terms of the implied contract, cannot form the basis of a quantum meruit award. Although there is evidence in the record that Simon and his associates performed work after the constructive discharge, the district court did not explain how it used that evidence to calculate its award. Thus, it is unclear whether \$200,000 is a reasonable amount to award for the work done after the constructive discharge. Accordingly, we vacate the district court's grant of \$200,000 in quantum meruit and remand for the district court to make findings regarding the basis of its award.

The NRCP 12(b)(5) motion to dismiss

Following the evidentiary hearing regarding the attorney lien, the district court dismissed the Edgeworths' complaint. In doing so, the district court relied on the evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing to

SUPREMIE COURT OF NEVADA find that there was no express contract and thus dismissed the breach of contract, declaratory relief, and breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing claims. It further found that Simon complied with the statutory requirements for an attorney lien and therefore dismissed the conversion and breach of fiduciary duty claims, as well as the request for punitive damages.

The Edgeworths argue that the district court failed to construe the allegations in the amended complaint as true and instead considered matters outside the pleadings—facts from the evidentiary hearing. In effect, the Edgeworths argue that, under the NRCP 12(b)(5) standard, the district court was required to accept the facts in their complaint as true regardless of its contrary factual findings from the evidentiary hearing. Under the circumstances here, we are not persuaded that the district court erred by dismissing the complaint.

While the district court should have given proper notice under NRCP 12(d) that it was converting the NRCP 12(b)(5) motion to one for summary judgment, it did not err by applying its findings from the evidentiary hearing when ruling on the NRCP 12(b)(5) motion, as it had told the parties it was waiting to rule on this motion until after the lien adjudication hearing. Under the law-of-the-case doctrine, a district court generally should not reconsider questions that it has already decided. See Reconstrust Co., N.A. v. Zhang, 130 Nev. 1, 7-8, 317 P.3d 814, 818 (2014) ("The law-of-the-case doctrine 'refers to a family of rules embodying the general concept that a court involved in later phases of a lawsuit should not re-open questions decided (i.e., established as law of the case) by that court or a higher one in earlier phases.") (quoting Crocker v. Piedmont Aviation, Inc., 49 F.3d 735, 739 (D.C. Cir. 1995)); see also United States v. Jingles, 702 F.3d 494, 499 (9th Cir. 2012) ("Under the law of the case doctrine, a court is

SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA ordinarily precluded from reexamining an issue previously decided by the same court, or a higher court, in the same case.") (internal quotation marks omitted). The doctrine applies where "the issue in question [was] 'decided explicitly... in [the] previous disposition." Jingles, 702 F.3d at 499 (second alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Lummi Indian Tribe, 235 F.3d 443, 452 (9th Cir. 2000)).

Because it was necessary for the district court to determine if there was an express contract when adjudicating the attorney lien, its finding that there was no express oral contract between Simon and the Edgeworths became the law of the case in the consolidated action. See NRS 18.015(6) (requiring the court where an attorney lien is filed to "adjudicate the rights of the attorney, client or other parties and enforce the lien"); NRCP 42(a) (allowing consolidation where actions "involve a common question of law or fact"). As it was the law of the case, that finding bound the district court in its adjudication of the NRCP 12(b)(5) motion.⁵ See Awada v. Shuffle Master, Inc., 123 Nev. 613, 623, 173 P.3d 707, 714 (2007) (upholding a district court's decision where the district court held a bench trial to resolve equitable claims and then applied those findings to dismiss the remaining legal claims). Similarly, the district court's finding that Simon properly perfected the attorney lien became the law of the case and thus bound the district court during its adjudication of the NRCP 12(b)(5) motion. Accordingly, because the district court properly applied its past

⁵The Edgeworths do not argue that the district court's finding of an implied contract could have formed the basis of their breach of contract and good faith and fair dealing claims.

findings to the present motion, it did not err in granting the NRCP 12(b)(5) motion.⁶

The \$50,000 attorney fee award under NRS 18.010(2)(b)

The Edgeworths argue that the district court abused its discretion by awarding attorney fees to Simon in the context of dismissing their conversion claim because their claim was neither groundless nor brought in bad faith and the district court failed to consider the *Brunzell* factors.

The district court awarded attorney fees under NRS 18.010(2)(b) for the Edgeworths' conversion claim alone because it found that the Edgeworths' conversion claim was not maintained upon reasonable grounds. Once Simon filed the attorney lien, the Edgeworths were not in exclusive possession of the disputed fees, see NRS 18.015(1), and, accordingly, it was legally impossible for Simon to commit conversion, see M.C. Multi-Family Dev., LLC v. Crestdale Assocs., Ltd., 124 Nev. 901, 911, 193 P.3d 536, 543 (2008) (holding that to prevail on a conversion claim, the plaintiff must have an exclusive right to possess the property). We perceive no abuse of discretion in this portion of the district court's decision. See NRS 18.010(2)(b) (authorizing courts to award attorney fees for claims "maintained without reasonable ground or to harass the prevailing party"). As to the amount of the award, however, we conclude that the district court's order lacks support. The district court need not explicitly mention each

⁶In his cross-appeal in Docket No. 77678, Simon argues that the district court erred by denying his anti-SLAPP special motion to dismiss as moot. However, Simon failed to present cogent arguments and relevant authority in his opening brief. Accordingly, we do not consider his argument. See Edwards v. Emperor's Garden Rest., 122 Nev. 317, 330 n.38, 130 P.3d 1280, 1288 n.38 (2006) (declining to consider issues that are not supported by cogent argument).

Brunzell factor in its order so long as the district court "demonstrate[s] that it considered the required factors, and the award [is] supported by substantial evidence." Logan, 131 Nev. at 266, 350 P.3d at 1143 (mandating that a district court consider the Brunzell factors, but explaining that "express findings on each factor are not necessary for a district court to properly exercise its discretion").

While the district court did not make explicit Brunzell findings, it satisfied the first prong under Logan by noting that it "[had] considered all of the factors pertinent to attorney's fees." However, the district court did not provide sufficient reasoning explaining how it arrived at \$50,000, and it is not obvious by our review of the record. Accordingly, we vacate the district court's order awarding attorney fees and remand for further findings.

The costs award

The Edgeworths challenge the award of costs, arguing that the district court failed to explain or justify the amount. Having considered the record and the parties' arguments, we conclude that the district court acted within its sound discretion in awarding Simon \$5,000 in costs. Logan, 131 Nev. at 267, 350 P.3d at 1144 (explaining that this court reviews an award of costs for an abuse of discretion). Here, the district court explained that it awarded \$5,000 of the requested \$18,434.74 because Simon only requested an award for work performed on the motion to dismiss, not the adjudication of the attorney lien. As Simon's counsel acknowledged, only \$5,000 of the requested costs related to the motion to dismiss and thus only that \$5,000 is recoverable. Because the cost award is supported by an invoice and memorandum of costs, we conclude that the district court acted within its sound discretion when it awarded \$5,000 in costs to Simon.

Suprimit Count of Nevada In sum, as to the Edgeworths' appeal in Docket No. 77678, we affirm the district court's order granting Simon's motion to dismiss as well as the order awarding \$5,000 in costs. However, we vacate the district court's order awarding \$50,000 in attorney fees and \$200,000 in quantum meruit and remand for further findings regarding the basis of the awards. As to Simon's cross-appeal in Docket No. 78176, we affirm the district court's order denying Simon's anti-SLAPP motion as moot.

For the reasons set forth above, we

ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED in part and VACATED in part AND REMAND this matter to the district court for proceedings consistent with this order.

Pickering	C.J.
Pickering ()	
Gibbons	J,
Harlesty.	J.
Parraguirre	J.
Mielino.	J.
Stiglich	
Cadish	J.

SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA

MI INTA

cc: Hon. Tierra Danielle Jones, District Judge Dana Jonathon Nitz, Settlement Judge James R. Christensen Vannah & Vannah Christiansen Law Offices Eighth District Court Clerk

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

EDGEWORTH FAMILY TRUST; AND AMERICAN GRATING, LLC, Appellants/Cross-Respondents, vs.

DANIEL S. SIMON; AND THE LAW OFFICE OF DANIEL S. SIMON, A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION, Respondents/Cross-Appellants.

EDGEWORTH FAMILY TRUST; AND AMERICAN GRATING, LLC, Appellants, vs.

DANIEL S. SIMON; AND THE LAW OFFICE OF DANIEL S. SIMON, A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION, Respondents,

No. 77678

MAR 1 8 2021

No. 78176

ORDER DENYING REHEARING

Rehearing denied. NRAP 40(c). It is so ORDERED.

Larlesty, C.J.

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Parage J.	Miglia.
Parraguirre	Stiglich
Cadish J.	Silver 3
Pickering J.	Herndon

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cc: Hon. Tierra Danielle Jones, District Judge Vannah & Vannah James R. Christensen Christiansen Law Offices Eighth District Court Clerk

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

EDGEWORTH FAMILY TRUST; AND AMERICAN GRATING, LLC, Appellants/Cross-Respondents, vs.
DANIEL S. SIMON; AND THE LAW OFFICE OF DANIEL S. SIMON, A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION, Respondents/Cross-Appellants.

Supreme Court No. 77678 District Court Case No. A738444

EDGEWORTH FAMILY TRUST; AND AMERICAN GRATING, LLC, Appellants, vs.
DANIEL S. SIMON; AND THE LAW OFFICE OF DANIEL S. SIMON, A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION, Respondents.

Supreme Court No. 78176 District Court Case No. A738444

REMITTITUR

TO: Steven D. Grierson, Eighth District Court Clerk

Pursuant to the rules of this court, enclosed are the following:

Certified copy of Judgment and Opinion/Order. Receipt for Remittitur.

DATE: April 12, 2021

Elizabeth A. Brown, Clerk of Court

By: Kaitlin Meetze Administrative Assistant

cc (without enclosures):

Hon. Tierra Danielle Jones, District Judge Vannah & Vannah James R. Christensen Christiansen Law Offices \ Peter S. Christiansen

RECEIPT FOR REMITTITUR

Received of Elizabeth A. Brown, Clerk of the Supreme Court of the State of Nevada, the REMITTITUR issued in the above-entitled cause, onAPR 1 3 2021
HEATHER UNGERMANN
Deputy District Court Clerk

RECEIVED APPEALS APR 1 3 2021

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Hon. Tierra Jones
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

DEPARTMENT TEN
LAS VEGAS, NEVADA 89155

DISTRICT COURT
CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

AMERICAN GRATING, LLC,
Plaintiffs.

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EDGEWORTH FAMILY TRUST; and

VS.

VS.

LANGE PLUMBING, LLC; THE VIKING CORPORATION, a Michigan Corporation; SUPPLY NETWORK, INC., dba VIKING SUPPLYNET, a Michigan Corporation; and DOES 1 through 5; and, ROE entities 6 through 10;

Defendants.

EDGEWORTH FAMILY TRUST; and AMERICAN GRATING, LLC,

Plaintiffs,

DANIEL S. SIMON; THE LAW OFFICE OF DANIEL S. SIMON, a Professional Corporation d/b/a SIMON LAW; DOES 1 through 10; and, ROE entities 1 through 10;

Defendants.

CASE NO.: A-18-767242-C

DEPT NO.: X

Consolidated with

CASE NO.: A-16-738444-C

DEPT NO.: X

SECOND AMENDED DECISION AND ORDER ON MOTION TO ADJUDICATE LIEN

SECOND AMENDED DECISION AND ORDER ON MOTION TO ADJUDICATE LIEN

This case came on for an evidentiary hearing August 27-30, 2018 and concluded on September 18, 2018, in the Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County, Nevada, the Honorable Tierra Jones presiding. Defendants and movant, Daniel Simon and Law Office of Daniel S. Simon d/b/a Simon Law ("Defendants" or "Law Office" or "Simon" or "Mr. Simon") having appeared in

Statistically closed: USJR - CV - Other Manner of Disposition (USJROT)

person and by and through their attorneys of record, Peter S. Christiansen, Esq. and James Christensen, Esq. and Plaintiff Edgeworth Family Trust and American Grating, ("Plaintiff" or "Edgeworths") having appeared through Brian and Angela Edgeworth, and by and through their attorneys of record, the law firm of Vannah and Vannah, Chtd. Robert Vannah, Esq. and John Greene, Esq. The Court having considered the evidence, arguments of counsel and being fully advised of the matters herein, the **COURT FINDS**:

FINDINGS OF FACT

- 1. The Court finds that the Law Office of Daniel S. Simon represented the Plaintiffs, Edgeworth Family Trust and American Grating in the case entitled Edgeworth Family Trust and American Grating v. Viking, et al., case number A-16-738444-C. The representation commenced on May 27, 2016 when Brian Edgeworth and Daniel Simon Esq. met at Starbucks. This representation originally began as a favor between friends and there was no discussion of fees, at this point. Mr. Simon and his wife were close family friends with Brian and Angela Edgeworth.
 - 2. The case involved a complex products liability issue.
- 3. On April 10, 2016, a house the Edgeworths were building as a speculation home suffered a flood. The house was still under construction and the flood caused a delay. The Edgeworths did not carry loss insurance if a flood occurred and the plumbing company and manufacturer refused to pay for the property damage. A fire sprinkler installed by the plumber, and within the plumber's scope of work, caused the flood; however, the plumber asserted the fire sprinkler was defective and refused to repair or to pay for repairs. The manufacturer of the sprinkler, Viking, et al., also denied any wrongdoing.
- 4. In May of 2016, Mr. Simon agreed to help his friend with the flood claim and to send a few letters. The parties initially hoped that Simon drafting a few letters to the responsible parties could resolve the matter. Simon wrote the letters to the responsible parties, but the matter did not resolve. Since the matter was not resolved, a lawsuit had to be filed.
 - 5. On June 14, 2016, a complaint was filed in the case of Edgeworth Family Trust; and

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American Grating LLC vs. Lange Plumbing, LLC; the Viking Corporation; Supply Network Inc., dba Viking Supplynet, in case number A-18-738444-C. The cost of repairs was approximately \$500,000. One of the elements of the Edgeworth's damages against Lange Plumbing LLC ("Lange") in the litigation was for reimbursement of the fees and costs that were paid by the Edgeworths.

6. On August 9, 2017, Mr. Simon and Brian Edgeworth traveled to San Diego to meet with an expert. As they were in the airport waiting for a return flight, they discussed the case, and had some discussion about payments and financials. No express fee agreement was reached during the meeting. On August 22, 2017, Brian Edgeworth sent an email to Simon entitled "Contingency." It reads as follows:

We never really had a structured discussion about how this might be done. I am more than happy to keep paying hourly but if we are going for punitive we should probably explore a hybrid of hourly on the claim and then some other structure that incents both of us to win an go after the appeal that these scumbags will file etc.

Obviously that could not have been done earlier since who would have thought this case would meet the hurdle of punitive at the start.

I could also swing hourly for the whole case (unless I am off what this is going to cost). I would likely borrow another \$450K from Margaret in 250 and 200 increments and then either I could use one of the house sales for cash or if things get really bad, I still have a couple million in bitcoin I could sell. I doubt we will get Kinsale to settle for enough to really finance this since I would have to pay the first \$750,000 or so back to Colin and Margaret and why would Kinsale settle for \$1MM when their exposure is only \$1MM?

(Def. Exhibit 27).

- 7. During the litigation, Simon sent four (4) invoices to the Edgeworths. The first invoice was sent on December 2, 2016, seven (7) months after the original meeting at Starbucks. This invoice indicated that it was for attorney's fees and costs through November 11, 2016. (Def. Exhibit 8). The total of this invoice was \$42,564.95 and was billed at a "reduced" rate of \$550 per hour. Id. The invoice was paid by the Edgeworths on December 16, 2016.
- 8. On April 7, 2017 a second invoice was sent to the Edgeworths for attorney's fees and costs through April 4, 2017 for a total of \$46,620.69, and was billed at a "reduced" rate of \$550 per

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hour. (Def. Exhibit 9). This invoice was paid by the Edgeworths on May 3, 2017. There was no indication on the first two invoices if the services were those of Mr. Simon or his associates; but the bills indicated an hourly rate of \$550.00 per hour.

- 9. A third invoice was sent to the Edgeworths on July 28, 2017 for attorney's fees and costs through July 28, 2017 totaling of \$142,080.20. (Def. Exhibit 10). This bill identified services of Daniel Simon Esq. for a "reduced" rate of \$550 per hour totaling \$104,021.20; and services of Ashley Ferrel Esq. for a "reduced" rate of \$275 per hour totaling \$37,959.00. <u>Id</u>. This invoice was paid by the Edgeworths on August 16, 2017.
- 10. The fourth invoice was sent to the Edgeworths on September 19, 2017 in an amount of \$255,186.25 for attorney's fees and costs; with \$191,317.50 being calculated at a "reduced" rate of \$550 per hour for Daniel Simon Esq., \$60,981.25 being calculated at a "reduced" rate of \$275 per hour for Ashley Ferrel Esq., and \$2,887.50 being calculated at a "reduced" rate of \$275 per hour for Benjamin Miller Esq. (Def. Exhibit 11). This invoice was paid by the Edgeworths on September 25, 2017.
- 11. The amount of attorney's fees in the four (4) invoices was \$367,606.25, and \$118,846.84 in costs; for a total of \$486,453.09. These monies were paid to Daniel Simon Esq. and never returned to the Edgeworths. The Edgeworths secured very high interest loans to pay fees and costs to Simon. They made Simon aware of this fact.
- 12. Between June 2016 and December 2017, there was a tremendous amount of work done in the litigation of this case. There were several motions and oppositions filed, several depositions taken, and several hearings held in the case.
- 13. On the evening of November 15, 2017, the Edgeworth's received the first settlement offer for their claims against the Viking Corporation ("Viking"). However, the claims were not settled until on or about December 1, 2017.
 - 14. Also on November 15, 2017, Brian Edgeworth sent an email to Simon asking for the

¹ \$265,677.50 in attorney's fees for the services of Daniel Simon; \$99,041.25 for the services of Ashley Ferrel; and \$2,887.50 for the services of Benjamin Miller.

open invoice. The email stated: "I know I have an open invoice that you were going to give me at mediation a couple weeks ago and then did not leave with me. Could someone in your office send Peter (copied here) any invoices that are unpaid please?" (Def. Exhibit 38).

- 15. On November 17, 2017, Simon scheduled an appointment for the Edgeworths to come to his office to discuss the litigation.
- 16. On November 27, 2017, Simon sent a letter with an attached retainer agreement, stating that the fee for legal services would be \$1,500,000 for services rendered to date. (Plaintiff's Exhibit 4).
- 17. On November 29, 2017, the Edgeworths met with the Law Office of Vannah & Vannah and signed a retainer agreement. (Def. Exhibit 90). On this date, they ceased all communications with Mr. Simon.
- 18. On the morning of November 30, 2017, Simon received a letter advising him that the Edgeworths had retained the Vannah Law Firm to assist in the litigation with the Viking entities, et.al. The letter read as follows:

"Please let this letter serve to advise you that I've retained Robert D. Vannah, Esq. and John B. Greene, Esq., of Vannah & Vannah to assist in the litigation with the Viking entities, et.al. I'm instructing you to cooperate with them in every regard concerning the litigation and any settlement. I'm also instructing you to give them complete access to the file and allow them to review whatever documents they request to review. Finally, I direct you to allow them to participate without limitation in any proceeding concerning our case, whether it be at depositions, court hearings, discussions, etc."

(Def. Exhibit 43).

- 19. On the same morning, Simon received, through the Vannah Law Firm, the Edgeworth's consent to settle their claims against Lange Plumbing LLC for \$25,000.
- 20. Also on this date, the Law Office of Danny Simon filed an attorney's lien for the reasonable value of its services pursuant to NRS 18.015. (Def. Exhibit 3). On January 2, 2018, the Law Office filed an amended attorney's lien for the sum of \$2,345,450, less payments made in the sum of \$367,606.25, for a net lien in the sum of \$1,977,843.80. This lien includes court costs and

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out-of-pocket costs advanced by the Law Office of Daniel S. Simon in the sum of \$76,535.93.

- 21. Mr. Edgeworth alleges that the fee agreement with Simon was only for an hourly express agreement of \$550 an hour; and that the agreement for \$550 an hour was made at the outset of the case. Mr. Simon alleges that he worked on the case always believing he would receive the reasonable value of his services when the case concluded. There is a dispute over the reasonable fee due to the Law Office of Danny Simon.
 - 22. The parties agree that an express written contract was never formed.
- 23. On December 7, 2017, the Edgeworths signed Consent to Settle their claims against Lange Plumbing LLC for \$100,000.
- 24. On January 4, 2018, the Edgeworth Family Trust filed a lawsuit against Simon in Edgeworth Family Trust; American Grating LLC vs. Daniel S. Simon, the Law Office of Daniel S. Simon, a Professional Corporation, case number A-18-767242-C.
- 25. On January 24, 2018, the Law Office of Danny Simon filed a Motion to Adjudicate Lien with an attached invoice for legal services rendered. The amount of the invoice was \$692,120.00. The Court set an evidentiary hearing to adjudicate the lien.

CONCLUSION OF LAW

The Law Office Appropriately Asserted A Charging Lien Which Must Be Adjudicated By The <u>Court</u>

An attorney may obtain payment for work on a case by use of an attorney lien. Here, the Law Office of Daniel Simon may use a charging lien to obtain payment for work on case A-16-738444-C under NRS 18.015.

NRS 18.015(1)(a) states:

- 1. An attorney at law shall have a lien:
- (a) Upon any claim, demand or cause of action, including any claim for unliquidated damages, which has been placed in the attorney's hands by a client for suit or collection, or upon which a suit or other action has been instituted.

Nev. Rev. Stat. 18.015.

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The Court finds that the lien filed by the Law Office of Daniel Simon, in case A-16-738444-C, complies with NRS 18.015(1)(a). The Law Office perfected the charging lien pursuant to NRS 18.015(3), by serving the Edgeworths as set forth in the statute. The Law Office charging lien was perfected before settlement funds generated from A-16-738444-C of \$6,100,000.00 were deposited, thus the charging lien attached to the settlement funds. Nev. Rev. Stat. 18.015(4)(a); Golightly & Vannah, PLLC v. TJ Allen LLC, 373 P.3d 103, at 105 (Nev. 2016). The Law Office's charging lien is enforceable in form.

The Court has personal jurisdiction over the Law Office and the Plaintiffs in A-16-738444-C. Argentina Consolidated Mining Co., v. Jolley, Urga, Wirth, Woodbury & Standish, 216 P.3d 779 at 782-83 (Nev. 2009). The Court has subject matter jurisdiction over adjudication of the Law Office's charging lien. Argentina, 216 P.3d at 783. The Law Office filed a motion requesting adjudication under NRS 18.015, thus the Court must adjudicate the lien.

Fee Agreement

It is undisputed that no express written fee agreement was formed. The Court finds that there was no express oral fee agreement formed between the parties. An express oral agreement is formed when all important terms are agreed upon. See, Loma Linda University v. Eckenweiler, 469 P.2d 54 (Nev. 1970) (no oral contract was formed, despite negotiation, when important terms were not agreed upon and when the parties contemplated a written agreement). The Court finds that the payment terms are essential to the formation of an express oral contract to provide legal services on an hourly basis.

Here, the testimony from the evidentiary hearing does not indicate, with any degree of certainty, that there was an express oral fee agreement formed on or about June of 2016. Despite Brian Edgeworth's affidavits and testimony; the emails between himself and Danny Simon, regarding punitive damages and a possible contingency fee, indicate that no express oral fee agreement was formed at the meeting on June 10, 2016. Specifically in Brian Edgeworth's August 22, 2017 email, titled "Contingency," he writes:

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"We never really had a structured discussion about how this might be done. I am more than happy to keep paying hourly but if we are going for punitive we should probably explore a hybrid of hourly on the claim and then some other structure that incents both of us to win an go after the appeal that these scumbags will file etc. Obviously that could not have been done earlier since who would have thought this case would meet the hurdle of punitive at the start. I could also swing hourly for the whole case (unless I am off what this is going to cost). I would likely borrow another \$450K from Margaret in 250 and 200 increments and then either I could use one of the house sales for cash or if things get really bad, I still have a couple million in bitcoin I could sell. I doubt we will get Kinsale to settle for enough to really finance this since I would have to pay the first \$750,000 or so back to Colin and Margaret and why would Kinsale settle for \$1MM when their exposure is only \$1MM?"

(Def. Exhibit 27).

It is undisputed that when the flood issue arose, all parties were under the impression that Simon would be helping out the Edgeworths, as a favor.

The Court finds that an implied fee agreement was formed between the parties on December 2, 2016, when Simon sent the first invoice to the Edgeworths, billing his services at \$550 per hour, and the Edgeworths paid the invoice. On July 28, 2017 an addition to the implied contract was created with a fee of \$275 per hour for Simon's associates. Simon testified that he never told the Edgeworths not to pay the bills, though he testified that from the outset he only wanted to "trigger coverage". When Simon repeatedly billed the Edgeworths at \$550 per hour for his services, and \$275 an hour for the services of his associates; and the Edgeworths paid those invoices, an implied fee agreement was formed between the parties. The implied fee agreement was for \$550 per hour for the services of Daniel Simon Esq. and \$275 per hour for the services of his associates.

Constructive Discharge

Constructive discharge of an attorney may occur under several circumstances, such as:

Refusal to communicate with an attorney creates constructive discharge. Rosenberg v. Calderon Automation, 1986 Ohio App. LEXIS 5460 (Jan. 31, 1986).

- Refusal to pay an attorney creates constructive discharge. *See e.g.*, Christian v. All Persons Claiming Any Right, 962 F. Supp. 676 (U.S. Dist. V.I. 1997).
- Suing an attorney creates constructive discharge. See <u>Tao v. Probate Court for the Northeast Dist</u>. #26, 2015 Conn. Super. LEXIS 3146, *13-14, (Dec. 14, 2015). See also <u>Maples v. Thomas</u>, 565 U.S. 266 (2012); Harris v. State, 2017 Nev. LEXIS 111; and <u>Guerrero v. State</u>, 2017 Nev. Unpubl. LEXIS 472.
- Taking actions that preventing effective representation creates constructive discharge. McNair v. Commonwealth, 37 Va. App. 687, 697-98 (Va. 2002).

Here, the Court finds that the Edgeworths constructively discharged Simon as their lawyer on November 29, 2017. The Edgeworths assert that because Simon has not been expressly terminated, has not withdrawn, and is still technically their attorney of record; there cannot be a termination. The Court disagrees.

On November 29, 2017, the Edgeworths met with the Law Firm of Vannah and Vannah and signed a retainer agreement. The retainer agreement was for representation on the Viking settlement agreement and the Lange claims. (Def. Exhibit 90). This is the exact litigation that Simon was representing the Edgeworths on. This fee agreement also allowed Vannah and Vannah to do all things without a compromise. <u>Id</u>. The retainer agreement specifically states:

Client retains Attorneys to represent him as his Attorneys regarding Edgeworth Family Trust and AMERICAN GRATING V. ALL VIKING ENTITIES and all damages including, but not limited to, all claims in this matter and empowers them to do all things to effect a compromise in said matter, or to institute such legal action as may be advisable in their judgment, and agrees to pay them for their services, on the following conditions:

- a) ...
- b) ...
- c) Client agrees that his attorneys will work to consummate a settlement of \$6,000,000 from the Viking entities and any settlement amount agreed to be paid by the Lange entity. Client also agrees that attorneys will work to reach an agreement amongst the parties to resolve all claims in the Lange and Viking litigation.

Id.

This agreement was in place at the time of the settlement of the Viking and Lange claims. Mr. Simon had already begun negotiating the terms of the settlement agreement with Viking during the

week of November 27, 2017 prior to Mr. Vannah's involvement. These negotiated terms were put into a final release signed by the Edgeworths and Mr. Vannah's office on December 1, 2017. (Def. Exhibit 5). Mr. Simon's name is not contained in the release; Mr. Vannah's firm is expressly identified as the firm that solely advised the clients about the settlement. The actual language in the settlement agreement, for the Viking claims, states:

PLAINTIFFS represent that their independent counsel, Robert Vannah, Esq. and John Greene, Esq., of the law firm Vannah & Vannah has explained the effect of this AGREEMENT and their release of any and all claims, known or unknown and, based upon that explanation and their independent judgment by the reading of this Agreement, PLAINTIFFS understand and acknowledge the legal significance and the consequences of the claims being released by this Agreement. PLAINTIFFS further represent that they understand and acknowledge the legal significance and consequences of a release of unknown claims against the SETTLING PARTIES set forth in, or arising from, the INCIDENT and hereby assume full responsibility for any injuries, damages, losses or liabilities that hereafter may occur with respect to the matters released by this Agreement.

<u>Id</u>.

Also, Simon was not present for the signing of these settlement documents and never explained any of the terms to the Edgeworths. He sent the settlement documents to the Law Office of Vannah and Vannah and received them back with the signatures of the Edgeworths.

Further, the Edgeworths did not personally speak with Simon after November 25, 2017. Though there were email communications between the Edgeworths and Simon, they did not verbally speak to him and were not seeking legal advice from him. In an email dated December 5, 2017, Simon is requesting Brian Edgeworth return a call to him about the case, and Brian Edgeworth responds to the email saying, "please give John Greene at Vannah and Vannah a call if you need anything done on the case. I am sure they can handle it." (Def. Exhibit 80). At this time, the claim against Lange Plumbing had not been settled. The evidence indicates that Simon was actively working on this claim, but he had no communication with the Edgeworths and was not advising them on the claim against Lange Plumbing. Specifically, Brian Edgeworth testified that Robert Vannah Esq. told them what Simon said about the Lange claims and it was established that the Law

Firm of Vannah and Vannah provided advice to the Edgeworths regarding the Lange claim. Simon and the Law Firm of Vannah and Vannah gave different advice on the Lange claim, and the Edgeworths followed the advice of the Law Firm of Vannah and Vannah to settle the Lange claim. The Law Firm of Vannah and Vannah drafted the consent to settle for the claims against Lange Plumbing (Def. Exhibit 47). This consent to settle was inconsistent with the advice of Simon. Mr. Simon never signed off on any of the releases for the Lange settlement.

Further demonstrating a constructive discharge of Simon is the email from Robert Vannah Esq. to James Christensen Esq. dated December 26, 2017, which states: "They have lost all faith and trust in Mr. Simon. Therefore, they will not sign the checks to be deposited into his trust account. Quite frankly, they are fearful that he will steal the money." (Def. Exhibit 48). Then on January 4, 2018, the Edgeworth's filed a lawsuit against Simon in Edgeworth Family Trust; American Grating, LLC vs. Daniel S. Simon; the Law Office of Daniel S. Simon, a Professional Corporation d/b/a Simon Law, case number A-18-767242-C. Then, on January 9, 2018, Robert Vannah Esq. sent an email to James Christensen Esq. stating, "I guess he could move to withdraw. However, that doesn't seem in his best interests." (Def. Exhibit 53).

The Court recognizes that Simon still has not withdrawn as counsel of record on A-16-738444-C, the Law Firm of Vannah and Vannah has never substituted in as counsel of record, the Edgeworths have never explicitly told Simon that he was fired, Simon sent the November 27, 2018 letter indicating that the Edgeworth's could consult with other attorneys on the fee agreement (that was attached to the letter), and that Simon continued to work on the case after the November 29, 2017 date. The court further recognizes that it is always a client's decision of whether or not to accept a settlement offer. However the issue is constructive discharge and nothing about the fact that Mr. Simon has never officially withdrawn from the case indicates that he was not constructively discharged. His November 27, 2017 letter invited the Edgeworth's to consult with other attorneys on the fee agreement, not the claims against Viking or Lange. His clients were not communicating with him, making it impossible to advise them on pending legal issues, such as the settlements with Lange and Viking. It is clear that there was a breakdown in attorney-client relationship preventing

Simon from effectively representing the clients. The Court finds that Danny Simon was constructively discharged by the Edgeworths on November 29, 2017.

Adjudication of the Lien and Determination of the Law Office Fee

NRS 18.015 states:

- 1. An attorney at law shall have a lien:
 - (a) Upon any claim, demand or cause of action, including any claim for unliquidated damages, which has been placed in the attorney's hands by a client for suit or collection, or upon which a suit or other action has been instituted.
 - (b) In any civil action, upon any file or other property properly left in the possession of the attorney by a client.
 - 2. A lien pursuant to subsection 1 is for the amount of any fee which has been agreed upon by the attorney and client. In the absence of an agreement, the lien is for a reasonable fee for the services which the attorney has rendered for the client.
 - 3. An attorney perfects a lien described in subsection 1 by serving notice in writing, in person or by certified mail, return receipt requested, upon his or her client and, if applicable, upon the party against whom the client has a cause of action, claiming the lien and stating the amount of the lien.
 - 4. A lien pursuant to:
 - (a) Paragraph (a) of subsection 1 attaches to any verdict, judgment or decree entered and to any money or property which is recovered on account of the suit or other action; and
 - (b) Paragraph (b) of subsection 1 attaches to any file or other property properly left in the possession of the attorney by his or her client, including, without limitation, copies of the attorney's file if the original documents received from the client have been returned to the client, and authorizes the attorney to retain any such file or property until such time as an adjudication is made pursuant to subsection 6, from the time of service of the notices required by this section.
 - 5. A lien pursuant to paragraph (b) of subsection 1 must not be construed as inconsistent with the attorney's professional responsibilities to the client.
 - 6. On motion filed by an attorney having a lien under this section, the attorney's client or any party who has been served with notice of the lien, the court shall, after 5 days' notice to all interested parties, adjudicate the rights of the attorney, client or other parties and enforce the lien.
 - 7. Collection of attorney's fees by a lien under this section may be utilized with, after or independently of any other method of collection.

Nev. Rev. Stat. 18.015.

NRS 18.015(2) matches Nevada contract law. If there is an express contract, then the contract terms are applied. Here, there was no express contract for the fee amount, however there was an implied contract when Simon began to bill the Edgeworths for fees in the amount of \$550 per hour for his services, and \$275 per hour for the services of his associates. This contract was in effect until November 29, 2017, when he was constructively discharged from representing the Edgeworths. After he was constructively discharged, under NRS 18.015(2) and Nevada contract law, Simon is due a reasonable fee- that is, quantum meruit.

Implied Contract

On December 2, 2016, an implied contract for fees was created. The implied fee was \$550 an hour for the services of Mr. Simon. On July 28, 2017 an addition to the implied contract was created with a fee of \$275 per hour for the services of Simon's associates. This implied contract was created when invoices were sent to the Edgeworths, and they paid the invoices.

The invoices that were sent to the Edgeworths indicate that they were for costs and attorney's fees, and these invoices were paid by the Edgeworths. Though the invoice says that the fees were reduced, there is no evidence that establishes that there was any discussion with the Edgeworths as to how much of a reduction was being taken, and that the invoices did not need to be paid. There is no indication that the Edgeworths knew about the amount of the reduction and acknowledged that the full amount would be due at a later date. Simon testified that Brian Edgeworth chose to pay the bills to give credibility to his actual damages, above his property damage loss. However, as the lawyer/counselor, Simon did not prevent Brian Edgeworth from paying the bill or in any way refund the money, or memorialize this or any understanding in writing.

Simon produced evidence of the claims for damages for his fees and costs pursuant to NRCP 16.1 disclosures and computation of damages; and these amounts include the four invoices that were paid in full and there was never any indication given that anything less than all the fees had been

1 produced. During the deposition of Brian Edgeworth it was suggested, by Simon, that all of the fees 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

had been disclosed. Further, Simon argues that the delay in the billing coincides with the timing of the NRCP 16.1 disclosures, however the billing does not distinguish or in any way indicate that the sole purpose was for the Lange Plumbing LLC claim. Since there is no contract, the Court must look to the actions of the parties to demonstrate the parties' understanding. Here, the actions of the parties are that Simon sent invoices to the Edgeworths, they paid the invoices, and Simon Law Office retained the payments, indicating an implied contract was formed between the parties. The Court find that the Law Office of Daniel Simon should be paid under the implied contract until the date they were constructively discharged, November 29, 2017.

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Amount of Fees Owed Under Implied Contract

The Edgeworths were billed, and paid for services through September 19, 2017. There is some testimony that an invoice was requested for services after that date, but there is no evidence that any invoice was paid by the Edgeworths. Since the Court has found that an implied contract for fees was formed, the Court must now determine what amount of fees and costs are owed from September 19, 2017 to the constructive discharge date of November 29, 2017. In doing so, the Court must consider the testimony from the witnesses at the evidentiary hearing, the submitted billings, the attached lien, and all other evidence provided regarding the services provided during this time.

At the evidentiary hearing, Ashley Ferrel Esq. testified that some of the items in the billing that was prepared with the lien "super bill," are not necessarily accurate as the Law Office went back and attempted to create a bill for work that had been done over a year before. She testified that they added in .3 hours for each Wiznet filing that was reviewed and emailed and .15 hours for every email that was read and responded to. She testified that the dates were not exact, they just used the dates for which the documents were filed, and not necessarily the dates in which the work was performed. Further, there are billed items included in the "super bill" that was not previously billed to the Edgeworths, though the items are alleged to have occurred prior to or during the invoice

billing period previously submitted to the Edgeworths. The testimony at the evidentiary hearing indicated that there were no phone calls included in the billings that were submitted to the Edgeworths.

This attempt to recreate billing and supplement/increase previously billed work makes it unclear to the Court as to the accuracy of this "recreated" billing, since so much time had elapsed between the actual work and the billing. The court reviewed the billings of the "super bill" in comparison to the previous bills and determined that it was necessary to discount the items that had not been previously billed for; such as text messages, reviews with the court reporter, and reviewing, downloading, and saving documents because the Court is uncertain of the accuracy of the "super bill."

Simon argues that he has no billing software in his office and that he has never billed a client on an hourly basis, but his actions in this case are contrary. Also, Simon argues that the Edgeworths, in this case, were billed hourly because the Lange contract had a provision for attorney's fees; however, as the Court previously found, when the Edgeworths paid the invoices it was not made clear to them that the billings were only for the Lange contract and that they did not need to be paid. Also, there was no indication on the invoices that the work was only for the Lange claims, and not the Viking claims. Ms. Ferrel testified that the billings were only for substantial items, without emails or calls, understanding that those items may be billed separately; but again the evidence does not demonstrate that this information was relayed to the Edgeworths as the bills were being paid. This argument does not persuade the court of the accuracy of the "super bill".

The amount of attorney's fees and costs for the period beginning in June of 2016 to December 2, 2016 is \$42,564.95. This amount is based upon the invoice from December 2, 2016 which appears to indicate that it began with the initial meeting with the client, leading the court to determine that this is the beginning of the relationship. This invoice also states it is for attorney's fees and costs through November 11, 2016, but the last hourly charge is December 2, 2016. This

amount has already been paid by the Edgeworths on December 16, 2016.²

The amount of the attorney's fees and costs for the period beginning on December 5, 2016 to April 4, 2017 is \$46,620.69. This amount is based upon the invoice from April 7, 2017. This amount has already been paid by the Edgeworths on May 3, 2017.

The amount of attorney's fees for the period of April 5, 2017 to July 28, 2017, for the services of Daniel Simon Esq. is \$72,077.50. The amount of attorney's fees for this period for Ashley Ferrel Esq. is \$38,060.00. The amount of costs outstanding for this period is \$31,943.70. This amount totals \$142,081.20 and is based upon the invoice from July 28, 2017. This amount has been paid by the Edgeworths on August 16, 2017.³

The amount of attorney's fees for the period of July 31, 2017 to September 19, 2017, for the services of Daniel Simon Esq. is \$119,762.50. The amount of attorney's fees for this period for Ashley Ferrel Esq. is \$60,981.25. The amount of attorney's fees for this period for Benjamin Miller Esq. is \$2,887.50. The amount of costs outstanding for this period is \$71,555.00. This amount totals \$255,186.25 and is based upon the invoice from September 19, 2017. This amount has been paid by the Edgeworths on September 25, 2017.

From September 19, 2017 to November 29, 2017, the Court must determine the amount of attorney fees owed to the Law Office of Daniel Simon.⁴ For the services of Daniel Simon Esq., the total amount of hours billed are 340.05. At a rate of \$550 per hour, the total attorney's fees owed to the Law Office for the work of Daniel Simon Esq. is \$187,027.50. For the services of Ashley Ferrel Esq., the total amount of hours billed are 337.15. At a rate of \$275 per hour, the total attorney's fees owed to the Law Office for the work of Ashley Ferrel Esq. from September 19, 2017 to November 29, 2017 is \$92,716.25.⁵ For the services of Benjamin Miller Esq., the total amount of hours billed are 19.05. At a rate of \$275 per hour, the total attorney's fees owed to the Law Office for the work

²There are no billing amounts from December 2 to December 4, 2016.

³ There are no billings from July 28 to July 30, 2017.

⁴ There are no billings for October 8th, October 28-29, and November 5th.

⁵ There is no billing for the October 7-8, October 22, October 28-29, November 4, November 11-12, November 18-19, November 21, and November 23-26.

of Benjamin Miller Esq. from September 19, 2017 to November 29, 2017 is \$5,238.75.6

The Court notes that though there was never a fee agreement made with Ashley Ferrel Esq. or Benjamin Miller Esq., however, their fees were included on the last two invoices that were paid by the Edgeworths, so the implied fee agreement applies to their work as well.

The Court finds that the total amount owed to the Law Office of Daniel Simon for the period of September 19, 2018 to November 29, 2017 is \$284,982.50.

Costs Owed

The Court finds that the Law Office of Daniel Simon is not owed any monies for outstanding costs of the litigation in Edgeworth Family Trust; and American Grating, LLC vs. Lange Plumbing, LLC; The Viking Corporation; Supply Network, Inc. dba Viking Supplynet in case number A-16-738444-C. The attorney lien asserted by Simon, in January of 2018, originally sought reimbursement for advances costs of \$71,594.93. The amount sought for advanced cots was later changed to \$68,844.93. In March of 2018, the Edgeworths paid the outstanding advanced costs, so the Court finds that there no outstanding costs remaining owed to the Law Office of Daniel Simon.

Quantum Meruit

When a lawyer is discharged by the client, the lawyer is no longer compensated under the discharged/breached/repudiated contract, but is paid based on quantum meruit. See e.g. Golightly v. Gassner, 281 P.3d 1176 (Nev. 2009) (unreported) (discharged contingency attorney paid by quantum meruit rather than by contingency fee pursuant to agreement with client); citing, Gordon v. Stewart, 324 P.3d 234 (1958) (attorney paid in quantum meruit after client breach of agreement); and, Cooke v. Gove, 114 P.2d 87 (Nev. 1941) (fees awarded in quantum meruit when there was no contingency agreement). Here, Simon was constructively discharged by the Edgeworths on November 29, 2017. The constructive discharge terminated the implied contract for fees. William Kemp Esq. testified as an expert witness and stated that if there is no contract, then the proper award

⁶ There is no billing from September 19, 2017 to November 5, 2017.

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is quantum meruit. The Court finds that the Law Office of Daniel Simon is owed attorney's fees under quantum meruit from November 29, 2017, after the constructive discharge, to the conclusion of the Law Office's work on this case.

In determining the amount of fees to be awarded under quantum meruit, the Court has wide discretion on the method of calculation of attorney fee, to be "tempered only by reason and fairness". Albios v. Horizon Communities, Inc., 132 P.3d 1022 (Nev. 2006). The law only requires that the court calculate a reasonable fee. Shuette v. Beazer Homes Holding Corp., 124 P.3d 530 (Nev. 2005). Whatever method of calculation is used by the Court, the amount of the attorney fee must be reasonable under the Brunzell factors. Id. The Court should enter written findings of the reasonableness of the fee under the Brunzell factors. Argentena Consolidated Mining Co., v. Jolley, Urga, Wirth, Woodbury Standish, 216 P.3d 779, at fn2 (Nev. 2009). Brunzell provides that "[w]hile hourly time schedules are helpful in establishing the value of counsel services, other factors may be equally significant. Brunzell v. Golden Gate National Bank, 455 P.2d 31 (Nev. 1969).

The <u>Brunzell</u> factors are: (1) the qualities of the advocate; (2) the character of the work to be done; (3) the work actually performed; and (4) the result obtained. <u>Id</u>. However, in this case the Court notes that the majority of the work in this case was complete before the date of the constructive discharge, and the Court is applying the <u>Brunzell</u> factors for the period commencing after the constructive discharge.

In considering the <u>Brunzell</u> factors, the Court looks at all of the evidence presented in the case, the testimony at the evidentiary hearing, and the litigation involved in the case.

Quality of the Advocate

Brunzell expands on the "qualities of the advocate" factor and mentions such items as training, skill and education of the advocate. Mr. Simon has been an active Nevada trial attorney for over two decades. He has several 7-figure trial verdicts and settlements to his credit. Craig Drummond Esq. testified that he considers Mr. Simon a top 1% trial lawyer and he associates Mr. Simon in on cases that are complex and of significant value. Michael Nunez Esq. testified that Mr. Simon's work on this case was extremely impressive. William Kemp Esq. testified that Mr. Simon's

work product and results are exceptional.

The Character of the Work to be Done

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The character of the work done in this case is complex. There were multiple parties, multiple claims, and many interrelated issues. Affirmative claims by the Edgeworths covered the gamut from product liability to negligence. The many issues involved manufacturing, engineering, fraud, and a full understanding of how to work up and present the liability and damages. Mr. Kemp testified that the quality and quantity of the work was exceptional for a products liability case against a world-wide manufacturer that is experienced in litigating case. Mr. Kemp further testified that the Law Office of Danny Simon retained multiple experts to secure the necessary opinions to prove the case. The continued aggressive representation, of Mr. Simon, in prosecuting the case that was a substantial factor in achieving the exceptional results.

The Work Actually Performed

Mr. Simon was aggressive in litigating this case. In addition to filing several motions, numerous court appearances, and deposition; his office uncovered several other activations, that caused possible other floods. While the Court finds that Mr. Edgeworth was extensively involved and helpful in this aspect of the case, the Court disagrees that it was his work alone that led to the other activations being uncovered and the result that was achieved in this case. Since Mr. Edgeworth is not a lawyer, it is impossible that it was his work alone that led to the filing of motions and the litigation that allowed this case to develop into a \$6 million settlement. All of the work by the Law Office of Daniel Simon led to the ultimate result in this case.

The Result Obtained

The result was impressive. This began as a \$500,000 insurance claim and ended up settling for over \$6,000,000. Mr. Simon was also able to recover an additional \$100,000 from Lange Plumbing LLC. Mr. Vannah indicated to Simon that the Edgeworths were ready so sign and settle the Lange Claim for \$25,000 but Simon kept working on the case and making changes to the settlement agreement. This ultimately led to a larger settlement for the Edgeworths. Recognition is due to Mr. Simon for placing the Edgeworths in a great position to recover a greater amount from

Lange. Mr. Kemp testified that this was the most important factor and that the result was incredible. Mr. Kemp also testified that he has never heard of a \$6 million settlement with a \$500,000 damage case. Further, in the Consent to Settle, on the Lange claims, the Edgeworth's acknowledge that they were made more than whole with the settlement with the Viking entities.

In determining the amount of attorney's fees owed to the Law Firm of Daniel Simon, the Court also considers the factors set forth in Nevada Rules of Professional Conduct – Rule 1.5(a) which states:

- (a) A lawyer shall not make an agreement for, charge, or collect an unreasonable fee or an unreasonable amount for expenses. The factors to be considered in determining the reasonableness of a fee include the following:
- (1) The time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly;
- (2) The likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer;
- (3) The fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services;
 - (4) The amount involved and the results obtained;
- (5) The time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances;
- (6) The nature and length of the professional relationship with the client;
- (7) The experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services; and
 - (8) Whether the fee is fixed or contingent.

NRCP 1.5. However, the Court must also consider the remainder of Rule 1.5 which goes on to state:

- (b) The scope of the representation and the basis or rate of the fee and expenses for which the client will be responsible shall be communicated to the client, preferably in writing, before or within a reasonable time after commencing the representation, except when the lawyer will charge a regularly represented client on the same basis or rate. Any changes in the basis or rate of the fee or expenses shall also be communicated to the client.
- (c) A fee may be contingent on the outcome of the matter for which the service is rendered, except in a matter in which a contingent fee is prohibited by paragraph (d) or other law. A contingent fee agreement shall be in writing, signed by the client, and shall state, in boldface type that is at least as large as the largest type used in the contingent fee agreement:

- (1) The method by which the fee is to be determined, including the percentage or percentages that shall accrue to the lawyer in the event of settlement, trial or appeal;
- (2) Whether litigation and other expenses are to be deducted from the recovery, and whether such expenses are to be deducted before or after the contingent fee is calculated;
 - (3) Whether the client is liable for expenses regardless of outcome;
- (4) That, in the event of a loss, the client may be liable for the opposing party's attorney fees, and will be liable for the opposing party's costs as required by law; and
- (5) That a suit brought solely to harass or to coerce a settlement may result in liability for malicious prosecution or abuse of process. Upon conclusion of a contingent fee matter, the lawyer shall provide the client with a written statement stating the outcome of the matter and, if there is a recovery, showing the remittance to the client and the method of its determination.

NRCP 1.5.

The Court finds that under the <u>Brunzell</u> factors, Mr. Simon was an exceptional advocate for the Edgeworths, the character of the work was complex, the work actually performed was extremely significant, and the work yielded a phenomenal result for the Edgeworths. All of the <u>Brunzell</u> factors justify a reasonable fee under NRPC 1.5.

However, the Court must also consider the fact that the evidence suggests that the basis or rate of the fee and expenses for which the client will be responsible were never communicated to the client, within a reasonable time after commencing the representation. Further, this is not a contingent fee case, and the Court is not awarding a contingency fee.

Instead, the Court must determine the amount of a reasonable fee. In determining this amount of a reasonable fee, the Court must consider the work that the Law Office continued to provide on the Edgeworth's case, even after the constructive discharge. The record is clear that the Edgeworths were ready to sign and settle the Lange claim for \$25,000 but Simon kept working on the case and making changes to the settlement agreement. This resulted in the Edgeworth's recovering an additional \$75,000 from Lange plumbing. Further, the Law Office of Daniel Simon continued to work on the Viking settlement until it was finalized in December of 2017, and the

Vannah to attempt to get the checks endorsed by the Edgeworths, and this lasted into the 2018 year. The record is clear that the efforts exerted by the Law Office of Daniel Simon and Mr. Simon himself were continuing, even after the constructive discharge. In considering the reasonable value of these services, under quantum meruit, the Court is considering the previous \$550 per hour fee from the implied fee agreement, the Brunzell factors, and additional work performed after the constructive discharge. As such, the COURT FINDS that the Law Office of Daniel Simon is entitled to a reasonable fee in the amount of \$200,000, from November 30, 2017 to the conclusion of this case.

checks were issued on December 18, 2017. Mr. Simon continued to personally work with Mr.

CONCLUSION

The Court finds that the Law Office of Daniel Simon properly filed and perfected the charging lien pursuant to NRS 18.015(3) and the Court must adjudicate the lien. The Court further finds that there was an implied agreement for a fee of \$550 per hour between Mr. Simon and the Edgeworths once Simon started billing Edgeworth for this amount, and the bills were paid. The Court further finds that on November 29, 2017, the Edgeworth's constructively discharged Mr. Simon as their attorney, when they ceased following his advice and refused to communicate with him about their litigation. The Court further finds that Mr. Simon was compensated at the implied agreement rate of \$550 per hour for his services, and \$275 per hour for his associates; up and until the last billing of September 19, 2017. For the period from September 19, 2017 to November 29, 2017, the Court finds that Mr. Simon is entitled to his implied agreement fee of \$550 an hour, and \$275 an hour for his associates, for a total amount of \$284,982.50. For the period after November 29, 2017, the Court finds that the Law Office of Daniel Simon properly perfected their lien and is entitled to a reasonable fee for the services the office rendered for the Edgeworths, after being constructively discharged, under quantum meruit, in an amount of \$200,000. The Court further finds that the Law Office of Daniel Simon is entitled to costs in the amount of \$71,594.93.

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4 5	OPDER
	ORDER
6	It is hereby ordered, adjudged, and decreed, that the Motion to Adjudicate the Attorneys Lien
7	of the Law Office of Daniel S. Simon is hereby granted and that the reasonable fee due to the Law Dated this 16th day of March, 2021
8	Office of Daniel Simon is \$556,577.43, which includes outstanding costs.
9	IT IS SO ORDERED this 16 th day of March, 2021.
10	Illu
11	DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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13	B7B 840 B8A7 FF62 Tierra Jones
14	District Court Judge
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1 **CSERV** 2 DISTRICT COURT 3 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 4 5 Edgeworth Family Trust, CASE NO: A-16-738444-C 6 Plaintiff(s) DEPT. NO. Department 10 7 vs. 8 Lange Plumbing, L.L.C., 9 Defendant(s) 10 11 **AUTOMATED CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE** 12 This automated certificate of service was generated by the Eighth Judicial District 13 Court. The foregoing Order was served via the court's electronic eFile system to all recipients registered for e-Service on the above entitled case as listed below: 14 Service Date: 3/16/2021 15 16 Daniel Simon. lawyers@simonlawlv.com 17 Rhonda Onorato. ronorato@rlattorneys.com 18 Mariella Dumbrique mdumbrique@blacklobello.law 19 Michael Nunez mnunez@murchisonlaw.com 20 Tyler Ure ngarcia@murchisonlaw.com 21 Nicole Garcia ngarcia@murchisonlaw.com 22 Bridget Salazar bsalazar@vannahlaw.com 23 24 John Greene jgreene@vannahlaw.com 25 James Christensen jim@jchristensenlaw.com 26 **Daniel Simon** dan@danielsimonlaw.com 27

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2	Gary Call	gcall@rlattorneys.com	
3	J. Graf	Rgraf@blacklobello.law	
5	Robert Vannah	rvannah@vannahlaw.com	
6	Christopher Page	chrispage@vannahlaw.com	
7	Jessie Church	jchurch@vannahlaw.com	
8		J	
9	If indicated below, a copy of the above mentioned filings were also served by mail via United States Postal Service, postage prepaid, to the parties listed below at their last known addresses on 3/17/2021		
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11	Theodore Parker	2460 Professional CT STE 200	
12		Las Vegas, NV, 89128	
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Electronically Filed 3/30/2021 6:52 PM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT

MTRC 1 Lauren D. Calvert, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 10534 Christine L. Atwood, Esq. 3 Nevada Bar No. 14162 David M. Gould, Esq. 4 Nevada Bar No. 11143 5 MESSNER REEVES LLP 8954 West Russell Road, Suite 300 6 Las Vegas, Nevada 89148 Telephone: (702) 363-5100 7 Facsimile: (702) 363-5101 E-mail: catwood@messner.com 8 lcalvert@messner.com 9 dgould@messner.com Attorneys for Plaintiffs Edgeworth 10 Family Trust and American Grating, LLC 11 **DISTRICT COURT** 12 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 13 EDGEWORTH FAMILY TRUST, and CASE NO.: A-18-767242-C 14 AMERICAN GRATING, LLC, DEPT NO.: X 15 Plaintiffs, Consolidated with v. 16 CASE NO.: A-16-738444-C 17 LANGE PLUMBING, LLC; THE VIKING DEPT NO.: X CORPORATION, a Michigan Corporation; 18 SUPPLY NETWORK, INC., dba VIKING SUPPLYNET, a Michigan Corporation; and DOES 19 1 through 5; and, ROE entities 6 through 10; DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR Defendants. RECONSIDERATION REGARDING 20 **COURT'S AMENDED DECISION** EDGEWORTH FAMILY TRUST; AMERICAN 21 AND ORDER GRANTING IN PART GRATING, LLC AND DENYING IN PART SIMON'S 22 MOTION FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES Plaintiffs, AND COSTS AND SECOND VS. 23 AMENDED DECISION AND ORDER ON MOTION TO DANIEL S. SIMON; THE LAW OFFICE OF 24 ADJUDICATE LIEN DANIEL S. SIMON, a Professional Corporation 25 d/b/a SIMON LAW; DOES 1 through 10; and (HEARING REQUESTED) ROE entities 1 through 10; 26 Defendants. 27 28 {04727973 / 1}1

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COME NOW, Defendants EDGEWORTH FAMILY TRUST; AMERICAN GRATING, LLC by and through their attorneys of record, LAUREN D. CALVERT, ESQ., and CHRISTINE L. ATWOOD ESQ., of MESSNER REEVES LLP, and hereby submit Defendants' Motion For Reconsideration Regarding Court's Amended Decision And Order Granting In Part And Denying In Part Simon's Motion For Attorney's Fees And Costs and Second Amended Order on Motion to Adjudicate Lien.

DATED this 30th day of March, 2021.

MESSNER REEVES LLP

/s/ Christine Atwood

Lauren D. Calvert, Esq.
Nevada Bar No. 10534
Christine L. Atwood, Esq.
Nevada Bar No. 14162
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Las Vegas, Nevada 89148
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
Edgeworth Family Trust and American
Grating, LLC

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

I. INTRODUCTION

This matter arises from a complex litigation arising from water damage to a property being built by Brian and Angela Edgeworth (hereinafter "Edgeworth" and "Angela Edgeworth" respectively). The Edgeworths, by and through the Edgeworth Family Trust, and their company American Grating (collectively hereinafter "the Edgeworths"), were represented by Daniel Simon of the Law offices of Daniel Simon (hereinafter "Simon") in case A-16-738444-C (hereinafter referred to as the "flood litigation"). At the conclusion of the flood litigation, a dispute arose between Simon and Edgeworth regarding the remaining attorney's fees owed to Simon. After an evidentiary hearing on the motion to adjudicate lien – during which Simon's case file for the Edgeworth litigation had not been turned over to

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the client and still has not been turned over to the Edgeworths, in apparent contravention of NRS 7.055 – this Court ordered additional fees paid to Simon by Edgeworth and dismissed the Edgeworth Complaint. The matters were appealed, and in the consolidated case before the Nevada Supreme Court, an order was issued on December 30, 2020, stating "we vacate the district court's order awarding \$50,000 in attorney fees and \$200,000 in quantum meruit and remand for further findings regarding the basis of the awards." After the matter was remanded, on March 16, 2021, this Court issued a Second Amended Decision and Order on Motion to Adjudicate Lien, and Amended Decision and Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part, Simon's Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs, despite the fact that the full case file had still not been provided to the Edgeworths or this Court for evaluation, in apparent contravention of NRS 7.055. The Edgeworths now seek reconsideration on matters related to the Amended Orders as outlined below.

II. STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This matter arises out of two civil cases that have since been consolidated. On April 10, 2016, a house the Edgeworths were building suffered a flood. The house was still under construction, but the cost of repairs was approximately \$500,000. Simon represented the Edgeworths in the resulting case of Edgeworth Family Trust and American Grating LLC vs. Lange Plumbing, LLC, the Viking Corporation, Supply Network Inc., dba VikingSupplynet, which was assigned case No. A-16-738444-C. Over the course of his representation of the Edgeworths Simon was paid \$368,588.70 in attorney fees and \$114,864.39 in litigation costs, making the total amount paid out of pocket by the Edgeworths to Simon \$483,453.09 through September 25, 2017. These bills were billed at the rate of \$550.00 per hour, and were found by this court to be an implied contract between Simon and Edgeworth.

On or about November 15, 2017, the Edgeworths accepted a mediator's proposal to settle with Viking for \$6,000,000 (hereinafter "Viking Settlement"). On November 17, 2017, Simon called the Edgeworths to his office to discuss the settlement. During that meeting, Simon indicated that he believed he was entitled to compensation over and above the hourly rate he was being paid. He supported his argument by stating that a judge would automatically award him forty (40) percent of the Viking

settlement, so taking anything less was cheating himself. Simon further stated that if the Edgeworths did not agree to additional compensation for Simon, the Viking Settlement would fall apart because it required his signature and there were *many terms to still be negotiated*. In the following days, Simon, who was on vacation in Peru, placed numerous phone calls to the Edgeworths, asking them to commit to additional compensation. On November 21, 2017, counsel for Viking Janet Pancoast, Esq., sent a draft of the settlement agreement for the Viking settlement to the other counsel for Viking, Dan Polsenberg, Esq., which indicated that issues had arose with the confidentiality and non-disparagement clauses proposed therein.¹ This email and the attached version of the settlement agreement, are evidence irreconcilable with Simon's testimony that he negotiated regarding the confidentiality clause on November 27, 2017.

A bill from James Christensen indicates that Simon hired him on November 27, 2017 to represent Simon regarding the "Edgeworth Fee Dispute," a dispute that notably did not exist at that time. That same day Simon sent correspondence to the Edgeworths detailing his position and asking them to sign a fee agreement entitling him to nearly \$1,200,000 in additional attorney's fees. Based upon this and other new evidence, which was not presented at the time of evidentiary hearing, it appears that many facts as presented by Simon are irreconcilable with the facts contained in the documents and, as such, the Edgeworths respectfully request that this Court reconsider the new evidence in order to make a determination regarding whether what was testified to as the evidentiary or the documentary new evidence is more credible in this Court's resolution of the matter and corresponding orders.

In the November 27 letter to the Edgeworths, Simon indicated that there was a lot of work left to be done on the settlement, including the language, "which had to be very specific to protect everyone."

¹ See Email from Pancoast to Polsenberg dated November 21, 2017, including attached draft settlement agreement, attached hereto as **Exhibit A**.

See Billing Invoice from James Christensen, attached hereto as Exhibit B.

³ Although no conclusive response was provided to questions at the lien adjudication hearing regarding when he hired James Christensen, we now know from Christensen's own bill that Simon retained him on or before November 27, 2017, to represent him for the Edgeworth Fee Dispute.

See Letter of Daniel Simon, Esq. dated November 27, 2017, attached hereto as Exhibit C.

⁵ See Exhibits A, B and C; see also December 12, 2017 Email from Janet Pancoast, without attachments, Exhibit D; see also Full Version of December 12, 2017 Email from Janet Pancoast, with attachments, attached hereto as Exhibit E. The Edgeworths further note that there are many other instances of irreconcilable "facts" as testified to by Mr. Simon at the evidentiary hearing and as found in the record and/or newly discovered evidence. The Edgeworths believe that more irreconcilable purported "facts" will come to light upon Simon finally turning over his entire, unredacted case file for his representation of the Edgeworths apparently compliance to NRS 7.055. The Edgeworths hereby specifically reserve any and all rights and/or objections in this regard.

He claimed that this language must be negotiated, and if that could not be achieved, there would be no 2 settlement. He asked the Edgeworths to sign the fee agreement so that he could proceed to attempt to 3 finalize the agreement. Simon went on to assert that he was losing money working on the Edgeworths' 4 matter despite being paid \$550 per hour. Interestingly, at the time Simon drafted the November 27, 2017 5 Letter he had been paid \$368,588.70 in attorney fees plus costs over 16 months. Simon further claimed 6 that he had thought about it a lot, and the proposed fee agreement was the lowest amount he could accept, 7 and if the Edgeworths were not agreeable he could no longer "help them." Simon claimed he would be 8 able to justify the attorney's fee in the attached agreement in any later proceeding, as any court will look 9 to ensure he was fairly compensated for the work performed and the exceptional result achieved. The 10 first time the Edgeworths ever saw this agreement was after the \$6,000,000 settlement was agreed upon, 11 and after Simon had hired James Christensen to represent him in the "Edgeworth Fee Dispute." Simon 12 conceded in the letter that he did not have a contingency agreement and was not trying to enforce one.⁷ 13 Simon concluded the letter by indicating to Brian and Angela that if they did not agree to the modified 14 fee arrangement entitling him to an additional \$1.2mil, that he would no longer represent the Edgeworths.⁸ 15

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See Exhibit C, at p. 5.

⁶ See Exhibits B and C.

⁷ See Exhibit C, at page 4.

personal attorney. 11 No response was received.

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At this point the Edgeworths were unaware that Simon had retained Christensen to represent him.

On November 27, 2017, Angela Edgeworth requested a copy of the settlement agreement. Simon

On November 29, 2017, the Edgeworths' engaged Robert Vannah, Esq. and the firm of Vannah

replied that he did not have the agreement, likely because of the holidays. 10 Angela responded, requesting

that she be informed of all settlement discussions both verbal and in writing so she could run it by her

& Vannah. On that same day, November 29, 2017, at approximately 9:35 a.m., Mr. Simon received a

faxed letter from Brian Edgeworth advising that the Edgeworths had retained Vannah to assist in the

⁹ See Email String Between Angela Edgeworth Simon dated November 27, 2017, attached hereto as **Exhibit F**.

¹⁰ Id. Interestingly, according to the email from Pancoast on November 21, 2017, we now know that the agreement did exist at that time. Further, Simon testified at the hearing that he had the agreement as soon as he returned from Peru, which occurred on November 25, 2017. ¹¹ *Id*.

John Greene, Esq., of Vannah and Vannah (hereinafter "Greene").

litigation and cooperate with Simon. 12 This email was followed up with a phone call between Simon and

On November 30, 2017, at 8:39am, Simon sent a proposed Viking Settlement agreement to the Edgeworths.¹³ The proposed agreement included an edit identified with track changes, that would add Simon's name on the settlement check and included a confidentiality agreement.¹⁴ Interestingly, Simon testified at the lien adjudication hearing that the settlement terms were all negotiated on November 27, 2017, including removal of the confidentiality agreement and that the final settlement agreement was not reached until December 1, 2017, despite the fact that Simon sent Greene and the Edgeworths what Simon called the "final settlement agreement" via email on November 30, 2017 at 5:31 p.m., as discussed below.¹⁵ Further, a draft of the original settlement agreement shows that Simon's name was not originally slated to be included on the settlement check.¹⁶ The change was made without the consent of the Edgeworths sometime between when the original settlement agreement was drafted by Viking and when it was presented as the proposed settlement agreement to the Edgeworths on the morning of November 30, 2017, notably after Angela had asked to be involved in negotiation of any and all terms of the agreement.

On November 30, 2017, at 5:31pm that day, Simon sent a "final settlement agreement" to Vannah.¹⁷ Simon confirmed that Vannah would advise the Edgeworths of the effects of the release and confirmed that the Edgeworths had desired to sign the settlement agreement "as is" as it was sent that morning. Regardless of the Edgeworths wanting to sign the agreement as drafted, without their knowledge or consent, Simon negotiated terms that only benefited him. Simon confirmed this in the email stating that he had negotiated to "omit the confidentiality provision, provide a mutual release and allow the opportunity to avoid a good faith determination from the court if the clients resolve the Lange claims,

 ¹² See November 29, 2017 Faxed Correspondence from B. Edgeworth to Simon, attached hereto as Exhibit G.
 13 See Email from Simon to the Edgeworths dated Nov. 30, 2017 at 8:39am, attached hereto as Exhibit H.
 14 Id. at Simon's "Proposed" Settlement Agreement as attached to the Email Simon sent to the Edgeworth on Nov. 30, 2017 at

¹⁴ Id. at Simon's "Proposed" Settlement Agreement as attached to the Email Simon sent to the Edgeworth on Nov. 30, 2017 at 8:39 a.m.

¹⁵ See Transcript of Day 4 of Evidentiary, dated August 30, 2019, at 15:19-24, 16:6-8, 16:17-17:18, 82:16-85:5, 38:14-23, attached hereto as **Exhibit I**.

¹⁶ See Exhibit A.

¹⁷ See Email from Simon to Greene, Dated November 30, 2017, at 5:31pm, attached hereto as Exhibit J. (04727973/1)6

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provided Lange agreed to dismiss its claims against Viking." Simon claimed that these were substantial and additional beneficial terms to the Edgeworths. However, the Edgeworths never agreed to these changes, and were not in agreement with the removal of the confidentiality agreement.

Later that day, on November 30, 2017, Simon contacted Ruben Herrera (hereinafter "Herrera"), club director and coach of the Las Vegas Aces Volleyball Club, where both Simon and Edgeworth's daughters played. In his email Simon stated that due "ongoing issues with the Edgeworths," Simon was requesting that his daughter be released from her player's contract with the Club. 19 On December 4, 2017, Simon sent a second email to Herrera, stating "[a]s for the other issue with the Edgeworths, just as you, we believed we were friends. However, as parents, we must do everything in our power to protect our children. This is why she could not have come to the gym." The statements in these emails clearly implied wrongdoing by the clients Simon allegedly still represented, and had a duty to act in their best interest.

Without providing any further invoices for payment of his fees under the hourly agreement, and without an agreement by the Edgeworths to pay any additional compensation outside the hourly agreement, on November 30, 2017, Simon filed a Notice of Attorney's Lien against the Viking Settlement, claiming by supporting affidavit that \$80,326.86 was allegedly outstanding and had not been paid by the Edgeworths.²⁰ On January 2, 2018, Simon filed a second Notice of Amended Attorney's Lien wherein he claimed outstanding costs of \$76,535.93 and entitlement to a sum total of \$2,345,450 in attorney's fees, less payments received in the sum of \$367,606.25, for a net lien in the sum of \$1,977,843.80 in total attorneys' fees against the Viking Settlement.²¹

On December 1, 2017, the Edgeworths fully executed the Viking settlement agreement even though it contained terms they were not in agreement with. ²² On December 7, 2017, the Edgeworths fully executed the Lange settlement agreement.²³ On December 12, 2017, Janet Pancoast emailed Simon and

¹⁸ Negotiation of the removal of this term was unbeknownst to the Edgeworths, and without their consent. Further, Simon testified at the evidentiary hearing that he had negotiated that term out days before.

19 See Emails Between Simon and Herrera, Attached hereto as Exhibit K.

20 See November 30, 2017 Notice of Attorney's Lien, attached hereto as Exhibit L.

21 See Notice of Amended Attorney's Lien, attached hereto as Exhibit M.

²² See Executed Viking Settlement Agreement, attached hereto as Exhibit N.
²³ See Executed Lange Settlement Agreement attached hereto as Exhibit O.

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²⁴ See Exhibits D and E.

²⁵ See pleadings on file herein.

consolidated by the Nevada Supreme Court.²⁸

informed him that the checks had arrived but were not certified as previously agreed upon.²⁴ Pancoast

indicated that she wanted to exchange the checks that day for a limited Stipulation and Order for dismissal

of the claims against Viking only to ensure they cleared and the Edgeworths received the funds by

December 21, 2017, as agreed. The Edgeworths were never notified that the checks were available at that

time, and this fact is irreconcilable with Simon's testimony that he did not have access to the checks much

declaratory relief and conversion.²⁵ In response to this and the Amended Complaint later filed, Plaintiffs

filed a Motion to Dismiss and a Special anti-SLAPP Motion to Dismiss. The Edgeworths filed Oppositions

to same. On January 24, 2018, Simon filed a Motion to Adjudicate Lien. This Court held a five (5) day

evidentiary hearing on the Motion to Adjudicate the Lien between August 27, 2018 and September 18,

2018.²⁶ On November 19, 2018, this Court granted Plaintiffs' Motion to Adjudicate Attorney's Lien,

finding that Simon was entitled to attorney's fees totaling \$484,982.50 under the hourly agreement.²⁷

Simon's Special Anti-SLAPP Motion to Dismiss was specifically denied as moot and the Edgeworths'

Complaints were dismissed. On August 8, 2019, the Edgeworths filed an appeal challenging this Court's

Order Adjudicating the Lien. Plaintiffs also filed a Petition for Writ of Prohibition or Mandamus on

October 17, 2019, challenging the amount adjudicated by Judge Jones. The Appeal and Writ were

in Part and Remanding the case to address how this Court arrived at its decision to award \$50,000 in fees,

and \$200,000 in quantum meruit to Simon, pursuant to Brunzell.²⁹ On March 16, 2021, this Court issued

the Amended Decision and Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Simon's Motion for Attorney's

On December 30, 2020, the Nevada Supreme Court issued an order Affirming in Part, Vacating

On January 4, 2018, Vannah filed a Complaint in case A-18-767242-C alleging breach of contract,

later in support of his argument that conversion was a legal impossibility.

 ²⁶ See Transcript of Proceedings in its entirety, on file herein.
 27 Notably, this amount is nearly \$1,500,000 less than the amount Simon was exercising dominion and control over by refusing to provide his signature for it to be released.

See Pleadings and exhibits related to docket 78176, and 79821 respectively.
 See December 30, 2020 Supreme Court Order, attached hereto as Exhibit P.

Fees and Costs, and Second Amended Decision and Order on Motion to Adjudicate Lien. This Motion for Reconsideration follows for the reasons outlined *infra*.

III. <u>LEGAL STANDARD</u>

Courts have the discretion and power to "mend, correct, resettle, modify, or vacate, as the case may be, an order previously made and entered on a motion in the progress of the cause or proceeding." *Trail v. Faretto*, 91 Nev. 401, 403 (1975). EDCR 2.24, which governs rehearing and reconsideration of motions, states:

(b) A party seeking reconsideration of a ruling of the court, other than any order which may be addressed by motion pursuant to N.R.C.P. 50(b), 52(b), 59 or 60, must file a motion for such relief within 14 days after service of written notice of the order or judgment unless the time is shortened or enlarged by order. A motion for rehearing or reconsideration must be served, noticed, filed and heard as is any other motion. A motion for reconsideration does not toll the 30-day period for filing a notice of appeal from a final order or judgment.

The trial judge is granted discretion on the question of a rehearing. See, Harvey's Wagon Wheel, Inc. v. MacSween, 96 Nev. 215, 606 P.2d 1095 (1980). In Harvey's Wagon Wheel, Inc. the District Court denied the first motion for partial summary judgment without prejudice, initially concluding that the contract language was not clear and thus summary judgment was not warranted. Id. Later, the District Court reconsidered the motion for partial summary judgment, finding that although the facts and the law were unchanged, the judge was more familiar with the case by the time the second motion was heard, and he was persuaded by the rationale of the newly cited authority. Id. at 218. The Nevada Supreme Court found that the district judge did not abuse his discretion by rehearing the motions for partial summary judgment. Id. A rehearing is appropriate when "the decision is clearly erroneous." See, Masonry & Tile Contractors v. Jolley, Urga & Wirth, 113 Nev. 737, 941 P.2d 486 (1997)(emphasis added); see also, Moore v. City of Las Vegas, 92 Nev. 402, 405,551 P.2d 244 (1976); Mustafa v. Clark County School Dist., 157 F.3d 1169, 1179 (9th Cir. 1998)(holding reconsideration is appropriate when "district court committed clear error or manifest injustice").

In *Trail v. Faretto*, the Nevada Supreme Court explained it is well-within this Court's inherent authority to amend, correct, reconsider or rescind any of its prior orders. 91Nev. 401, 403, 536 P.2d 1026,

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2012) ("the court has inherent jurisdiction to modify, alter or revoke [a non-appealable order]"); Sussex v. Turnberry/MGM Grand Towers, LLC, 2011 WL 4346346, at *2 (D. Nev. Sept. 15, 2011) (court has "inherent procedural power to reconsider, rescind, or modify an interlocutory order for cause seen by it to be sufficient"). Further, in deciding this dispute, Nevada jurisprudence has long held a "policy of favoring adjudication on the merits." Five Star Capital Corp. v. Ruby, 124 Nev. 1048, 1059, 194 P.3d 709, 716 (2008); Nevada Power Co. v. Fluor Illinois, 108 Nev. 638, 645, 837 P.2d 1354, 1359 (1992); Blanco v. Blanco, 129 Nev. 723, 730, 311 P.3d 1170, 1174 (2013).

1027 (1975); accord Goodman v. Platinum Condo. Dev., LLC, 2012 WL 1190827, *1 (D. Nev. Apr. 10,

IV. <u>LEGAL ARGUMENT</u>

A. A SECOND AMENDMENT TO THE AMENDED ORDERS IS WARRANTED BASED ON NEW INFORMATION

A motion to reconsider must provide a court with valid grounds for reconsideration by: (1) showing some valid reason why the court should reconsider its prior decision, and (2) setting forth facts or law of a strongly convincing nature to persuade the court to reverse its prior decision. *Frasure v. United States*, 256 F. Supp. 2d 1180, 1183 (D. Nev. 2003). "Reconsideration is appropriate if the district court (1) is presented with newly discovered evidence, (2) committed clear error or the initial decision was manifestly unjust, or (3) if there is an intervening change in controlling law." *Id.* In this case, reconsideration of the Court's Amended Decision and Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Simon's Motion for Fees and Costs is necessary due to the discovery of significant new evidence since the time of the Evidentiary hearing and due to erroneous statements of fact set forth in the Court's Order, as follows.

i. New Evidence Shows That Simon Had Access to The Settlement Proceeds As Early As December 12, 2018 And Failed To Notify The Edgeworths Of Same

The Edgeworths Respectfully Request Reconsideration Regarding the Court's Finding that Simon did not have access to the settlement funds when the conversion claim was made due to new evidence that indicates that Simon had access to the funds as early as December 12, 2017. The Court's

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award of Attorney's Fees was granted pursuant to NRS 18.010(2)(b), which allows the Court to assess attorney's fees:

Without regard to the recovery sought, when the court finds that the claim, counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint or defense of the opposing party was brought or maintained without reasonable ground or to harass the prevailing party. The court shall liberally construe the provisions of this paragraph in favor of awarding attorney's fees in all appropriate situations. It is the intent of the Legislature that the court award attorney's fees pursuant to this paragraph and impose sanctions pursuant to Rule 11 of the Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure in all appropriate situations to punish for and deter frivolous or vexatious claims and defenses because such claims and defenses overburden limited judicial resources, hinder the timely resolution of meritorious claims, and increase the costs of engaging in business and providing professional services to the public.

Here, the Court determined that the Edgeworths' conversion claim was not maintained on reasonable grounds because "it was an impossibility for Simon to have converted the Edgeworth's property at the time the lawsuit was filed." Specifically, the Court reasoned that Simon could not have converted the Edgeworth's funds as of the date the complaint was filed on January 4, 2018, because Simon "was not in possession of the settlement proceeds as the checks were not endorsed or deposited in the trust account."

Here, however, evidence not presented at the lien adjudication hearing conclusively establishes that Simon had the ability to access to the settlement proceeds as early as December 12, 2017. The Edgeworths recently received an email sent by Janet C. Pancoast, Esq., (hereinafter "Pancoast"), counsel for the Viking entities, on December 12, 2017, showing that Simon had access to the settlement funds and critical information regarding the settlement agreement which he intentionally withheld from the Edgeworths and Vannah at that time, and concealed from the Court thereafter.³¹ In this email Pancoast informed Simon that the Viking entities had issued two standard, non-certified settlement checks in breach of the settlement agreement, which contained a specific provision requiring certified checks Pancoast attached scanned copies of the settlement checks to her correspondence stating that she was willing to provide the same to the Edgeworths *that very day* should Simon provide a signed stipulation for dismissal.

³⁰ See Amended Decision and Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part, Simon's Motion for Fees and Costs, Dated March 16, 2021, at Finding No. 2, p.2: 5 – 12, on-file herein.

³¹ See Exhibits D and E.

Simon did not inform the Edgeworths nor Vannah of the Viking entities breach nor was Ms. Pancoast's correspondence ever forwarded to the Edgeworths. In fact, the Edgeworths were not even aware of the existence of the email until Simon provided an edited copy of the same as part of thousands of pages provided years later. The copy of the email was however, stripped of its attachments in what can only be considered a deliberate attempt to conceal or bury this fact. Simon did not inform the Edgeworths or Vannah of any of this extremely pertinent information until December 28, 2017. In withholding information related to the status of the settlement funds and a significant breach in the terms of the settlement agreement, Simon deprived the Edgeworths of their right to determine how to proceed. It cannot be overstated that this right belonged to the Edgeworths exclusively as the clients in the relationship. Simon's omission thus rendered the Edgeworths unable to choose to sign the stipulation and order and obtain the checks on December 12, 2017, should they have wished to do so, and was in direct controversy with their best interests.

In light of this newly discovered evidence, the Court's factual findings with respect to the Edgeworth's conversion claim are misguided. It was not an "impossibility for Simon to have converted the Edgeworth's property" at the time the lawsuit was filed on January 4, 2018 because such a conversion could have and indeed did occur as of December 12, 2017. Conversion occurs where "one exerts wrongful dominion over another person's property or wrongful interference with the owner's dominion." *Bader v. Cerri*, 96 Nev. 352, 609 P.2d 314 (1980). The Nevada Supreme Court has defined conversion as "a distinct act of dominion wrongfully exerted over another's personal property in denial of, or inconsistent with his title or rights therein or in derogation, exclusion or defiance of such title or rights." Wantz v. Redfield, 794 Nev 196, 198, 326 P.2d 413, 414 (1958) (emphasis added).

In failing to inform the Edgeworths that the checks were available, of the breach to the settlement agreement, and the Viking entities proposed solution to exchange a stipulation for dismissal for the settlement checks on December 12, 2017, Simon undeniably asserted wrongful dominion over the Edgeworths' property and acted inconsistent with their rights with respect to the same. Nevada's Rules of Professional conduct delineate specific rights to all clients, including the right to determine whether to

settle a matter as secured by Rule 1.2(a). Furthermore, NRPC 1.4 required Simon to "[r]easonably consult with the client about the means by which the client's objectives are to be accomplished" and to "[K]eep the client reasonably informed about the status of the matter." *See* NRPC 1.4 (2), (3).

Simon's failure to timely inform the Edgeworths or Vannah of Ms. Pancoast's offer to provide the non-certified settlement checks in exchange for a signed Stipulation and Order deprived the Edgeworths of their decision-making authority in violation of the aforementioned rules of professional conduct. Additionally, it deprived them of access to the settlement proceeds that could have been secured as early as December 12, 2017. Simon assured Ms. Pancoast that he would communicate her proffered solution to the Viking entities breach to the Edgeworths yet completely failed to do so for weeks. In doing Simon he deprived the Edgeworth's access to the settlement proceeds and their decision-making power in determining how to address a breach of contract that occurred, which standing alone carries significant potential rights and remedies. As such, the Edgeworths maintain that Simon asserted unlawful dominion over the settlement proceeds, thus the conversion occurred well before the filing of their January 4, 2018 Complaint. Considering this new evidence, the Edgeworths respectfully request that the finding in the Amended Order is reconsidered to correct the Court's finding that their conversion claim was an *impossibility and not maintained upon reasonable grounds*.

Furthermore, the complete version of Ms. Pancoast's email demonstrates that Simon is likely in possession of further evidence supporting the Edgeworth's conversion claim that has been withheld. As is noted above, the copy of Ms. Pancoast's December 12, 2017 email correspondence provided in the file disclosed by Simon in June of 2020 was incomplete in an apparent attempt to conceal the fact that the proposed stipulation and order and settlement checks were attached thereto. As there is no conceivable reason why Simon would have provided an incomplete version of the email other than to mislead the Edgeworths and the Court, one must assume that this withholding was intentional. That Simon provided an edited version of the email is proof positive that Simon has intentionally withheld documents from the Edgeworths and the Court, and that the evidence withheld likely provides further proof in support of the Edgeworth's conversion claim.

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In this case, the reasonableness of the Edgeworth's conversion claim goes to the very heart of the Court's decision to award significant attorney's fees and costs to Simon. As such, the Edgeworths respectfully request that, at a minimum, the Court issue an Order compelling Simon to disclose the full, complete and unredacted Edgeworth file prior to issuing a revised determination on Plaintiff's Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs. Alternative, the Edgeworths request that this finding is amended to conform to the facts.

ii. New Evidence Shows That James Christensen Was Retained On Or Before November 27, 2017

The Edgeworths Respectfully Request Reconsideration Regarding the Court's Finding that James Christensen was retained *after the filing of the lawsuit* against Simon on January 4, 2018. The Court's Order only grants Simon's request for those attorney's fees and costs incurred in defending against the Edgeworth's conversion claim, and explicitly denies Simon's request for fees as to any other claims, including the Motion to Adjudicate Lien.³² The Court granted Simon's request for attorney's fees related to James Christensen, Esq.'s defense of the conversion claim, , finding that his services "were obtained after the filing of the lawsuit against Simon, on January 4, 2018." The Edgeworths respectfully submit that this finding is erroneous given the billing records disclosed by Mr. Christensen as well as testimony given at the evidentiary hearing.

Mr. Christensen's billing statement from November and December of 2017, titled "Simon Law Group-Edgeworth Fee Dispute" provides clear evidence to this Court that he was retained by Simon on November 27, 2017.³⁴ He had multiple meetings, email exchanges and telephone conference with Simon, who is identified as "client" in the billing statement, thus evidencing that an attorney-client relationship had been formed at that time. This Court has unfortunately been misled regarding the date of Mr. Christensen's retention on several occasions. During day four (4) of the evidentiary hearing Simon implied that he did not consult with any counsel until December 1, 2017 when he forwarded the

³² See Amended Decision and Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part, Simon's Motion for Fees and Costs, dated March 16, 2021, at Finding No. 2, p.2: 13 – 22, on-file herein.

³³ Id.

³⁴ See Exhibit B.

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contingency email of August 22, 2017 to Mr. Christensen.³⁵ This deception is significant as it implies that Simon did not seek counsel until after he learned the Edgeworths had retained Vannah, allegedly leading Simon to believe he was "out" of the case. In reality, however, Simon conferred with Mr. Christensen days before he was aware of Vannah's involvement, as plainly evidenced by the bill from Christensen. While this erroneous testimony may seem more easily explained by accidental oversight or forgetfulness, the totality of Simon's testimony at the evidentiary hearing demonstrates that the discrepancy is more than a mishap. Simon testified that he consulted with Mr. Christensen because he felt he was terminated because the Edgeworths were consulting with Vannah.³⁶

This explanation regarding Simon's motivation to consult with Mr. Christensen is incredulous given that the representation began days prior on November 27, 2017, and the two had communicated regarding the "Edgeworth fee dispute" multiple times prior to November 30, 2017, when the Edgeworth's sent Simon the letter of direction first advising him of Vannah's involvement. Mr. Christensen then pursued additional questioning to further solidify December 1, 2017 as the date of retention, despite knowing he was retained days prior, by asking Simon if his retention of Mr. Christensen occurred the same day that Simon's first attorney's lien was filed.³⁷ As Simon's first attorney's lien was filed on December 1, 2017, this testimony only served to mislead the Court regarding the date of and motivation behind Simon's retention of Mr. Christensen.

In this case, whether or not Simon retained Christensen in response to the lawsuit is central to the Court's decision to award related attorney's fees and costs to Simon. Considering this new evidence, the Edgeworths respectfully request that the finding in the Amended Order is reconsidered to reflect that Christensen was retained on or before November 27, 2017, and not after the January 4, 2018 Complaint was filed.

³⁵ See **Exhibit I** at 164-165. ³⁶ Id. at p. 164:21 – 165:3.

 37 *Id.* at p. 165:19 – 21.

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iii. New Evidence Shows That David Clark Was Retained Prior To The Edgeworth Complaint Being Filed On January 4, 2018, And Not **Solely In Response To The Suit**

The Edgeworth's also request reconsideration of the Court's findings regarding the timing and scope of Simon's retention of David Clark, Esq. Here, the Court's Order finds that "the costs of Mr. David Clark, Esq. were solely for the purpose of defending the lawsuit filed against Simon by the Edgeworths."38 This finding requires correction as the available evidence establishes that Mr. Clark was retained and began work on the "Edgeworth Fee Dispute" well before the Edgeworth's Complaint was filed. Mr. Christensen's November/December 2017 Billing Statement reflects that he and Mr. Clark had a call on December 5, 2017 related to the Edgeworth Fee Dispute, and Mr. Clark was seemingly performing work regarding the dispute thereafter as he and Mr. Christensen had a second call on December 28, 2017 to discuss the trust account.³⁹ As such, it is evident that Mr. Clark was initially retained to provide support for Simon's attorney's lien and not solely retained to defend against the Edgeworth's Complaint as is stated in the Court's Amended Order. The Edgeworths do not dispute that Mr. Clark ultimately performed some work in furtherance of Simon's defense against their Complaint, but instead merely wish to correct the record with respect to the fact that it is an impossibility that he was exclusively retained for this purpose because his retention occurred well before the suit was ever filed. Simon has never disclosed an itemized invoice for Mr. Clark's services and has offered only the \$5,000.00 check paid for Mr. Clark's retainer as evidence of these costs. Mr. Clark's declaration states that he charged an hourly rate of \$350.00 in preparing his Declaration and Expert Report, however it is not clear whether his entire retainer was exhausted in preparation of the same, or whether other work was performed on Simon's behalf unrelated to the Edgeworth Complaint.⁴⁰

In this case, whether or not Simon retained Clark solely in response to the lawsuit is central to the Court's decision to award related attorney's fees and costs to Simon. Considering this new evidence, the Edgeworths respectfully request that the finding in the Amended Order is reconsidered to reflect that

³⁸ See Amended Decision and Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part, Simon's Motion for Fees and Costs, dated March 16, 2021, at p. 2:19 – 22, on-file herein.

³⁹ See Exhibit B.

⁴⁰ See <u>Declaration and Expert Report of David Clark</u>, attached hereto as **Exhibit Q**. {04727973 / 1}16

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Clark was retained on or before November 27, 2017, and not after the January 4, 2018 Complaint was filed.

A. SIMON HAS FAILED TO ESTABLISH THAT THE *BRUNZELL* FACTORS WERE MET TO JUSTIFY THE FEES AWARDED

The Edgeworths respectfully request that this Court reconsider its Second Amended Order awarding Simon \$200,000.00 in quantum meruit for legal fees for the period between November 30, 2017 and January 8, 2018, as well as this Court's Order granting Simon \$50,000.00 in attorney's fees for the representation Simon received from his counsel in the lawsuit brought by the Edgeworths. This reconsideration is appropriate because the *Brunzell* factors, and *Logan* do not support an award for same, in direct controversy with the Nevada Supreme Court precedent.

A district court abuses its discretion when it bases its decision on an erroneous view of the law or clearly disregards guiding legal principles. See Bergmann v. Boyce, 109 Nev. 670, 674, 856 P.2d 560, 563 (1993), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in In re DISH Network Derivative Litig., 133 Nev. 438, 451 n.6, 401 P.3d 1081, 1093 n.6 (2017). "Rifle proper measure of damages under a quantum meruit theory of recovery is the reasonable value of [the] services." Flamingo Realty, Inc. v. Midwest Dev., Inc., 110 Nev. 984, 987, 879 P.2d 69, 71 (1994) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). A district court must consider the Brunzell factors when determining a reasonable amount of attorney fees. Logan v. Abe, 131 Nev. 260, 266, 350 P.3d 1139, 1143 (2015). The Brunzell factors are: (1) the quality of the advocate; (2) the character of the work; (3) the work actually performed by the advocate; and (4) the result. Brunzell v. Golden Gate Nat'l Bank, 85 Nev. 345, 349, 455 P.2d 31, 33 (1969). An order of a district court which indicates it considered the Brunzell factors must also demonstrate that its awarding of attorney's fees is supported by substantial evidence. Logan at 266-267, 350 P.3d at 1143 (citing Uniroyal Goodrich Tire, 111 Nev. 318, 324, 890 P.2d 785, 789 (1995) (superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in RTTC Communications, LLC v. Saratoga Flier, Inc., 121 Nev. 34, 110 P.3d 24 (2005))).

i. The Edgeworths Request Reconsideration as To The Court's Application Of The *Brunzell* Factors And *Logan* To The Facts

In this case, the Edgeworths respectfully request reconsideration regarding the Court's award of attorney's fees to Simon based on the application of *Brunzell* factors and *Logan* to the facts at hand. The Viking settlement was reached on November 15, 2017. Simon sent Vannah what he called the finalized Settlement Agreement on November 30, 2017. As such, the work claimed to have been done by Simon between November 30, 2017 and January 8, 2018 (a total of 39 days) is not in furtherance of the settlement and does not warrant an award of fees, especially when viewed in the context of the ruling that Simon was constructively discharged on November 29, 2017. It must also be noted that Simon himself was on vacation and unavailable between December 19, 2017 and January 2, 2018, meaning that there were only a total of 25 days that Simon could have worked on the Edgeworth matter in this same time period.

Despite the reduced time period, Simon's vacation days, and the holidays, Simon billed 51.85 hours (\$28,517.50) and his associate Ashley Ferrell (hereinafter "Ferrell") billed 19.25 hours (\$5,293.75) for a total billing on the file of 71.1 hours (\$33,811.25) *after* this Court adjudicated, he had been constructively discharged and was no longer representing the Edgeworths. As such, the *Brunzell* factors specifically demonstrate that Simon should not have been awarded anywhere near the \$200,000.00 this Court awarded in attorney's fees for the period between November 30, 2017 and January 8, 2018, if anything.

Further, Simon failed to adequately address most, if not all, of the *Brunzell* factors within his Motion for Attorney's Fees upon which this Court granted \$50,000.00 in attorney's fees. ⁴¹ As such, while this Court's Order states that this Court considered the *Brunzell* factors, the Order could not be based upon substantial evidence provided to the Court, requiring reconsideration per *Logan* because they were not sufficiently presented to the Court for consideration. More concerning and supporting the need for reconsideration, is Simon's continuing refusal to provide the Edgeworths with their case file as required by NRS 7.055 to allow for a full evaluation of the work done between November 30, 2017 and January 8, 2018. As such, a full, proper and accurate evaluation of the *Brunzell* factors cannot properly be

⁴¹ See, Simon's Motion for Attorney's Fees and Court's Amended Order, on-file herein.

accomplished by the Edgeworths or the Court until the full, unredacted version of the case file is finally provided by Simon. Based upon this alone, this Court should grant reconsideration and require that Simon provide a full, unredacted version of his case file to the Edgeworths and/or this Court to allow for a full, proper and adequate evaluation of the *Brunzell* factors to be accomplished through additional briefing once provided.

Therefore, based upon the argument above and below, the Edgeworths respectfully request that this Court reconsider its positions regarding attorney's fees awarded in both of its Orders do one of the following: (1) award no attorney's fees; (2) award a minimal amount of attorney's fees commensurate with the *Brunzell* factors; or (3) require Simon to provide a full version of the Edgeworths' case file to allow same to be analyzed in the context of the *Brunzell* factors.

a. *The Quality of the Advocate*

The Edgeworths further request reconsideration of the Court's findings because the Court was not presented sufficient evidence to adequately determine the quality of the advocates pursuant to prong 3 of *Brunzell*. This Court's Order addresses only Simon's quality as an advocate in making its award of attorney's fees based upon billings done by not only Simon, but other attorneys in his firm. *See* Second Amended Order at 18-19. As stated above, the amount of hours billed was wholly excessive and much if not all of the work claimed is not of the character, difficulty or importance required. Therefore, there are questions about what work was actually performed and the reasonableness of the amount of hours billed for work that was completed. Further, the result of that work could be minimal at best, considering that Simon billed \$28,517.50 for the period between November 30, 2017 and January 8, 2018. Despite, this, this Court awarded Simon \$200,000.00 in quantum meruit for work claimed to be done during this period. No evidence was presented regarding the quality of the advocate with respect to any attorneys other than Simon whose work was billed during this time. Having been presented no evidence to this end, this Court could not make any findings as to the quality of the work provided by Simon's associates or staff.

Specifically, the "Superbill" presented to this Court included time billed for in the subject time period by Ferrell (19.2 hours billed for a total of \$5,293.75 in claimed attorney's fees). There was no

finding made upon substantial evidence regarding the quality of Ferrell as an advocate, nor analysis regarding whether Ferrell's claimed hourly rate of \$275.00 is supportable. As such, this Court based its award of \$200,000.00 in attorney's fees either upon only Simon's claimed work totaling \$28,517.50 (for which there is a lack of substantial evidence to support an award of \$200,000.00, approximately *7 times* the amount of claimed billing) or upon all attorney's claimed billings for the time period in question, for which there is no substantial evidence supporting the quality of advocacy, nor substantial evidence to support the award, which is approximately *6 times* the total amount of claimed billing by all attorney's in the Superbill.

Additionally, this Court prevented the Edgeworth's from fully developing the quality of the advocate at the evidentiary hearing when Mr. Vannah began questioning Mr. Simon regarding Mr. Simon's failure to obtain a formal fee agreement from the Edgeworths. Edgeworths after Mr. Simon testified that Mr. Kemp would not have been the *IDIOT I was* in performing work for a client without a fee agreement in place, Mr. Vannah then questioned Mr. Simon about whether Mr. Simon had violated "Bar Rules, Section 1.5" by not doing what the Edgeworths had asked of Mr. Simon regarding the fee agreement. Despite this line of questioning being specifically pertinent to the quality of Mr. Simon as an advocate – as it can be safely assumed that allegedly violating bar rules and the rules of professional conduct would weigh negatively upon an attorney's quality as an advocate – this Court specifically instructed Mr. Simon not to answer that question in case a bar complaint was later filed against Mr. Simon and/or his firm. As such, the Edgeworths were deprived of their due process rights to question Mr. Simon regarding his quality as an advocate due to this Court's stopping of that line of questioning and specifically instructed Mr. Simon not to answer the question at issue regarding violations of Bar Rules.

Further, Simon failed to provide any information regarding the quality of his counsel in his Motion for Attorney's Fees. All that was attached to that Motion were vague billing invoices where James Christensen, Esq., billed at a rate of \$400.00 per hour and Pete Christiansen, Esq. billed at the exorbitant

⁴² See **Exhibit I**, at 132:25-134:9.

⁴⁴ *Id*.

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rate of \$850.00 per hour. While Simon attached the CVs of his counsel to the Reply in Support of his Motion for Attorney's Fees, the only analysis regarding these CVs is the conclusory, five (5) word statement that, allegedly, "[r]etained counsel are highly qualified." Given the amount of fees sought, and especially the exorbitant hourly rate charged by Pete Christiansen, much more was required to demonstrate that awarding \$50,000.00 in costs was appropriate. As such, there simply is not substantial evidence to support the awarding of fees to Simon based upon the exorbitant billing rates of both Peter Christiansen and James Christensen, nor to support the fee award of \$50,000.00. This lack of evidence is the basis for the foregoing request for reconsideration.

A reasonable hourly rate should reflect the "prevailing market rates in the relevant community," with "community" referring to "the forum in which the district court sits." *Tallman*, 23 F. Supp. 3d at 1257 (quoting *Gonzales v. City of Maywood*, 729 F.3d 1196, 1205 (9th Cir. 2013) and *Prison Legal News v. Schwarzenegger*, 608 F.3d 446, 454 (9th Cir. 2010)). A district court must ensure that an attorney's rate is "in line with those prevailing in the community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience and reputation." *Chaudhry v. City of L.A.*, 751 F.3d 1096, 1110 (9th Cir. 2014). The Nevada Supreme Court has previously found that in Nevada, "the hourly rates of \$450 and \$650 per hour are *well over* the range of hourly rates approved in this district." *Gonzalez-Rodriguez v. Mariana's Enters.*, No. 2:15-cv-00152-JCM-PAL, 2016 WL 3869870, at *9 (D. Nev. July 14, 2016) (emphasis added). Further, the Court in *Gonzalez-Rodriguez*, found that these rates could not be justified as counsel's "affidavit does not aver that these rates are usual or customary for this type of work in this locality, only that these rates are what each lawyer typically charges." *Id.*

When an attorney does not actually bill a client, the requested hourly rate and billing entries are more suspect. *See*, *Betancourt v. Giuliani*, 325 F. Supp. 2d 330, 333 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) ("Defendants persuasively argue that those rates far exceed the typical rates at which a civil rights attorney would actually charge a paying client.... [T]he fact that the fees here were not actually charged by [Plaintiff's law firm] to any client suggests that the Court must take a closer look as to whether the hourly rates are

⁴⁵ See Reply to MTN for Attorney's Fees at 9:6, on-file herein. {04727973 / 1}21

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27 28 reasonable."). A court should take a closer look because, with paying clients, an attorney's bills are generally scrutinized to avoid unreasonable or excessive charges, but such scrutiny does not exist with a client that is not responsible for, and likely even sent, an attorney's billing record. Cf. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Martinez Almodovar, 674 F. Supp. 401, 402 (D.P.R. 1987) (recognizing that billing entries were reasonable because "such bills were zealously scrutinized by a client who is very cost conscious. Unreasonable or excessive charges would have not been tolerated.").

Here, there are no affidavits of counsel or anyone else regarding the rates charged by Simon's counsel regarding whether the hourly rates of \$400.00 and \$850.00 per hours are reasonable and customary in this community. See Motion and Reply, on-file herein. This is likely because Simon is aware that the hourly rates charged by his counsel are well over the range for hourly rates approved of in this community. Regardless, this Court did not have substantial evidence upon which to base its awarding of fees to Simon's in regard to the hourly rate charged by Simon's counsel and, as such, the finding was erroneous and, if not corrected, will lead to manifest injustice against the Edgeworths who will be forced to pay an exorbitant award of attorney's fees not based upon substantial evidence.

Further, the Superbill is even more suspect here as Simon has admitted the firm did not bill everything to the Edgeworths regularly and had to go back from memory to create billing entries after the fact. 46 Specifically, Ms. Ferrell testified she was not a good biller, she has no billing software to utilize, she had to go back and bill many things from memory, that there were days of billing of some 22 hours on the file, that she assist Mr. Simon in producing timesheets for **HIS** billing on the file and that Mr. Simon despised billing and left post-it notes all over his office which purportedly was his billing.⁴⁷ As such, this Court should have required a higher level of evidentiary proof and scrutinized the billing entries at a stricter standard given the admitted practice by Simon of not billing everything at the time it was accomplished on the Edgeworths' file.

 $^{^{46}}$ See <u>Transcript of Evidentiary Hearing Day 3</u>, at 105:21-106:3, attached hereto as **Exhibit R**. 47 Id. at 105:21-106:3, 111:5-15, 112:16-114:8 and 115:10-116:13.

⁴⁸ See Exhibit J.

In either case, based upon *Brunzell* and *Logan* as discussed above, this Court's Order awarding Simon \$200,00.00 in quantum meruit for attorney's fees for the time period between November 30, 2017 and January 8, 2018, and awarding Simon \$50,000.00 in attorneys' fees for his counsel's work on the lawsuit brought by the Edgeworths were misguided as there is simply not substantial evidence to support the amount of the award, nor the quality of the other advocate within Simon's law firm or his counsel's exorbitant hourly rates.

Based on the evidence presented above, the Edgeworths respectfully request reconsideration of this Court's Orders to cure the manifest injustice done to the Edgeworths. This Court was simply not presented sufficient evidence to adequately determine the quality of Ferrell, James Christiansen and Pete Christiansen as advocates, or the amount of the award when analyzed against the actual amount Simon claimed was billed by his firm between November 30, 2017 and January 8, 2018, under the first prong of *Brunzell*.

b. The Character of The Work to be Done

The Edgeworths further request reconsideration of the Court's findings because the Court was not presented sufficient evidence to adequately determine the character of the work done under prong 2 of *Brunzell*. As of November 30, 2017, at 5:31 p.m., the settlement terms were finalized and, as such, there was nothing left for Simon to do regarding the Viking settlement other than send an email to opposing counsel with the signed agreement, finalize a stipulation for dismissal of the litigation, receive the settlement drafts and deposit the funds.⁴⁸ There was no longer any negotiations regarding language in the settlement agreement, the amount of the settlement had been agreed to and, despite this, Simon continued billing for things such as undefined email chains (with no explanation regarding the subject), analyzing emails regarding mediation, and telephone calls (again, without any context regarding subject).

Even more concerning are Ferrell's entries for things such as 2.5 hours to draft a notice of attorney's lien and then, on that same day, another 0.30 hours to download, review and analyze that same

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27 28 notice of attorney lien which she drafted earlier that same day. ⁴⁹ The Attorney Lien filed by Simon consist of a total of approximately one (1) page of written content, with no legal analysis and a half-page of a declaration from Simon.⁵⁰ Thereafter, Ferrell billed another 1.5 hours to draft the Amended Lien, which was the same document with only the amount sought by Simon through the attorney's lien changed.⁵¹

As such, the character of the work claimed to have been performed by Simon between November 30, 2017 and January 8, 2018, was minimal at best and – regarding the Notices of Liens –not in any way in furtherance of the clients' interest. Despite this, the Superbill demonstrates that this minimal work resulted in highly inflated billing hours which are simply not indicative of the amount of time and work that would actually have been required to complete the tasks which were billed. Additionally, given that the Superbill does not give context or subjects for most of the entries therein, it was impossible for this Court to determine whether the character of the work was such that Simon was entitled to \$200,000.00 for 39 total days, including Christmas and New Year's, and Simon was unavailable for 14 of those days.

The Court's awarded of fees is specifically supported by Ferrell's testimony that allegedly Simon has documentation to backup all entries in the Superbill for this period. Simon has continuously refused to provide this alleged supporting documentation to the Edgeworths or this Court so same can be reviewed and evaluated.⁵² Further, nothing within the Superbill for this period constituted any difficult work for Simon, as same was simply telephone calls, emails, and the drafting of the, at most, two (2) total pages for the Notice of Attorney's Lien. Again, the Viking settlement agreement had been finalized and there was simply nothing complex, difficult, or important that Simon should have reasonably been doing on behalf of the Edgeworths – who were no longer his clients regarding Viking – beginning on November 30, 2017 and moving forward. Further, the bills from Simon's counsel regarding their defense of the Edgeworth's lawsuit are likewise vague and ambiguous and wholly failed to provide this Court with an understanding of what was actually accomplished and for what purpose. As was the case with the Superbill, many of the entries from Jim Christiansen say nothing other than "Telmail exchange with

⁴⁹ See Ferrell Invoice, at SIMONEW0000340, attached hereto as Exhibit S.

⁵⁰ See Exhibit L. 51 See Exhibit M.

⁵² See Exhibit R at 112:18-20, 23-24 and 116:15-16.

client[,]" "meeting with client[,]" telephone call with client and "[w]ork" on various documents. *See* Exhibit 9 to Motion for attorney's fees. Likewise, the invoices from Pete Christiansen contain exorbitant billed hours for vague entries such as "[a]ssist with findings of fact and conclusions of law; conference with client[,]" for 7.5 hours billed; and "[a]ssist in preparation of reply[.]" 53

The Court has not required Simon nor his counsel to provide supporting documentation to demonstrate that substantial evidence confirms the tasks billed for and the character, difficulty, and importance of those tasks to Simon's representation of the Edgeworths and Simon's counsels' representation of the firm in the suit brought by the Edgeworths. As such, this Court's findings are in contravention of the Nevada Supreme Court's holdings in *Brunzell* and *Logan*.

Based on the evidence presented above, the Edgeworths respectfully request reconsideration of this Court's Orders to cure the manifest injustice done to the Edgeworths. This Court was simply not presented sufficient evidence to adequately determine the character of the work billed under the second prong of *Brunzell*.

c. <u>The Work Actually Performed by the Advocate</u>

The Edgeworths further request reconsideration of the Court's findings because the Court was not presented sufficient evidence to adequately determine the work actually performed by the advocate under *Brunzell*. Specifically, as stated above, despite Ferrell testifying that allegedly Simon has documentation to backup all entries in the Superbill for this time period, Simon has not, and continues to refuse to, provide claimed supporting documentation to the Edgeworths or this Court so it can be reviewed and evaluated.⁵⁴ Further, there are billing entries for items that are inappropriate in the context of the timeline as laid out herein, such as Ferrell billing a full half-hour to review the Viking Settlement Agreement the day **AFTER** the finalized version of that Agreement was provided to the Edgeworths.⁵⁵

Further, the exorbitant amount of time billed by Ferrell to allegedly draft and file the Notice of Attorney's Liens, and then review the filing she had just drafted – a total of 3.8 hours (2.8 hours for the

⁵³ See Exhibit 10 to Simon's Motion for Attorney's Fees, on-file herein.

⁵⁴ See Exhibit R.

⁵⁵ See Exhibit S at SIMONEW0000341.

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of less than a full page of double-spaced content. This calls into question all of the work Simon claimed to have done following November 30, 2017, as the same is simply not reasonable nor commensurate with the documents which are actually available to review. Additionally, given that Simon has never provided the documentary evidence demonstrating the

Original Notice and 1.5 hours for the Amended Notice) – is wholly unreasonable for documents consisting

many email chains, reviewed email attachments, reviewed documents and drafted documents, this Court's finding regarding the work actually performed is not supported by much evidence at all, let alone substantial evidence. The justification given by this Court regarding the work actually performed is all in regard to work claimed to be performed prior to November 30, 2017.⁵⁶ As of November 30, 2107, the settlement with Viking had been agreed upon and the settlement agreement was finalized. As such, the work claimed by Simon actually at issue for this time period does not include any of the claimed efforts which led to the Viking settlement or the reduction of the terms of the Viking settlement to writing within the settlement agreement. Likewise, there are exorbitant amounts of billable hours on the invoices from Simon's counsel. Specifically, Pete Christiansen billed 72.9 hours over the course of seven (7) workdays (10.414 hours per day) to prepare for the evidentiary hearing. See Exhibit 10 to Motion for Attorney's Fees. While the Edgeworths appreciate that time would have to be spent to prepare for the hearing, more than 10 hours per day, for seven straight days is simply not conceivable, nor can it be justified given that it would be the Edgeworths assumption that Christiansen did have other cases active at the time of this hearing.⁵⁷ Further, Christensen billed 3.8 hours for two (2) entries stating nothing more than "MSC Brieff.]"58 In this same vein of vagueness, Christensen billed 11 total hours for undefined "work on motion to adjudicate lien[.]" Id. These entries require further specification and support in order to comply with Brunzell.

Finally, it is concerning that secretarial tasks were billed as attorney time, which wholly inappropriate. Specifically, as an example, Christiansen billed for reviewing a calendar, assisting in

⁵⁶ See Second Amended Order, at 19:12-21, on-file herein.

⁵⁷ In the event Simon is claiming that Pete did not have any other matters active at the time of the evidentiary, the Edgeworths would then argue that this fact goes directly against the quality of the advocate and his exorbitantly charged rate of \$850.00.

See Exhibit 9 to Motion for Attorney's Fees, on-file herein.

preparing a subpoena and faxing a letter, all which are secretarial tasks for which it was even more inappropriate for Pete to bill at the extraordinarily exorbitant rate of \$850.00 per hour.⁵⁹

Based on the evidence presented above, the Edgeworths respectfully request reconsideration of this Court's Orders to cure the manifest injustice done to the Edgeworths. This Court was simply not presented sufficient evidence to adequately determine the work actually performed by the advocates under the third prong of *Brunzell*.

d. The Result of the Work Performed

The Edgeworths further request reconsideration of the Court's findings because the Court was not presented sufficient evidence to adequately determine the result of the work performed under prong 4 of *Brunzell*. This Court's Order awarding \$200,000.00 in fees to Simon must also be reconsidered regarding the fourth *Brunzell* factor, which concerns the result obtained by the advocate. Based upon the record placed before the Court, there was simply no result achieved by Simon on behalf of the Edgeworths on and following November 30, 2017. Again, the Settlement Agreement had been finalized and all that Simon reasonably had left to do – especially following the constructive discharge regarding the Viking matter – was to exchange the fully executed Settlement Agreement with Viking's counsel, finalize and potentially file a stipulation for dismissal, receive the settlement checks and deposit the settlement checks. As such, the case had concluded other than settlement documents and the sending of emails, receiving of mail, drafting and/or reviewing and/or filing a stipulation to dismiss and notice of entry of the order of dismissal, and depositing of the settlement checks. This is certainly not the type of result which *Brunzell* contemplated would support an award of attorney's fees through the theory of quantum meruit, especially in an amount as exorbitant for such work as \$200,000.00.

Further, just as was the case regarding the third *Brunzell* prong discussed above, the Court's findings regarding the fourth *Brunzell* factor were based upon a misapplication of the facts and law, thus requiring reconsideration. Specifically, as of and after November 30, 2017, the result had no connection

⁵⁹ See Exhibit 10 to Motion for Attorney's Fees, on-file herein.

to the Viking settlement amount or the Viking settlement agreement. As such, neither the final amount for which Viking settled, the statements by the Edgeworths that they were made more than whole as a result of the settlement with Viking itself, nor the testimony of Mr. Kemp regarding the result in the context of the Edgeworths settlement with Viking itself, should have been taken into consideration by this Court when resolving whether Simon was entitled to attorney's fees for the time period between November 17, 2017 and January 8, 2018. This Court's finding in that regard was clearly erroneous as Simon did not provide this Court with the required substantial evidence to support said finding, requiring reconsideration. Further, the fact that Simon may have obtained a result in the Lange lawsuit of an additional \$75,000.00 over the course of that same period in no way demonstrates that Simon was entitled to more than twice that amount in attorney's fees for four (4) to five (5) weeks of work.

The Nevada Bar Association previously reprimanded an attorney for seeking an unreasonable fee for two (2) weeks of work.⁶⁰ Within the Bar Counsel Report, a Screening Panel of the Southern Nevada Disciplinary Board found that an attorney seeking compensation in the amount of \$12,328.44 for two weeks of work was unreasonable and a violation of NRPC 1.5 requiring reprimand. *Id*.

Here, the amount sought by Simon and awarded by this Court for claimed work done over a period 39-days (between four [4] and five [5] weeks) — which, again, included both the Christmas and New Year's holidays and Simon's vacation when he was not working between December 19, 2017 and January 2, 2018 — is disproportionally excessive when compared against the fee which the State Bar determined was unreasonable and required reprimand. Specifically, Simon was awarded \$200,000.00 for a period of four (4) or five (5) weeks, while the State Bar determined that less than \$12,500.00 was an unreasonable fee for work done by an attorney over the course of two (2) weeks. Extrapolating the bar Counsel's report's unreasonable fee out to the period at issue here, this Court's award is more than <u>8 times</u> the amount found unreasonable over a four (4) week period (\$200,000.00/\$24,656.88 = 8.11%) and is nearly <u>6.5 times</u> the amount found unreasonable over a five (5) week period (\$200,000.00/\$30,821.10 = 6.49%).

 $^{^{60}}$ See, Bar Counsel Report regarding Crystal L. Eller, dated July 2020, attached hereto Exhibit T. $\{04727973/1\}28$

Based on the evidence presented above, the Edgeworths respectfully request reconsideration of this Court's Orders to cure the manifest injustice done to the Edgeworths. This Court was simply not presented sufficient evidence to adequately determine result of the work performed by the advocates under the fourth prong of *Brunzell*.

ii. Reconsideration of All of the Brunzell Factors is Warranted

The Edgeworths respectfully request reconsideration of this Court's orders. Here, all four (4) of the *Brunzell* factors, when evaluated correctly against the context and background of the matter, weigh heavily in favor of the Edgeworths and against Simon being awarded any attorney's fees for himself or his counsel for that time period. Thus, this Court's finding that Simon was entitled to an award of \$200,000.00 in attorney's fees for this time was an unfortunate misapplication of the facts and law. If this decision is allowed to stand, it will lead to manifest injustice being done upon the Edgeworths who will be forced to pay \$200,000.00 to Simon for 39-days of claimed work after the finalizing of the Viking settlement agreement.⁶¹

Given the foregoing, the Edgeworths respectfully request that this Court reconsider its Second Amended Order regarding the attorney's fees awarded to Simon for the time period between November 30, 2107 and January 8, 2018, and its Amended Order awarding attorney's fees to Simon for their counsels' representation during the lawsuit brought by the Edgeworths, as same is warranted based upon the misapplication of facts and law which, if not corrected, will directly lead to manifest injustice against the Edgeworths.

V. CONCLUSION

It is for the foregoing reasons that the Edgeworths submit that reconsideration is appropriate, and request that the court act accordingly. First, the Edgeworths request that based on new evidence, this court amend its finding that the conversion claim was not maintained on reasonable grounds because it was an impossibility for Simon to have converted the Edgeworths' property at the time the lawsuit was

⁶¹ See Court Order, dated March 16, 2021, at 21-22, on-file herein.

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filed. This request is based on newly discovered information that Simon had access to the funds as early as December 12, 2017, well before the suit was filed on January 4, 2018. Second, the Edgeworths request that, based on new evidence, this court amend its finding that James Christensen's services were obtained after the filing of the lawsuit against Simon on January 4, 2018. Christensen's bill, which was not presented at the evidentiary hearing, is in direct controversy with the finding of the court, and the Edgeworths request that the finding be amended to conform to the facts. Finally, the Edgeworths request that, based on new evidence, this court amend its finding that the costs of David Clark were solely for the purpose of defending the lawsuit filed against Simon by the Edgeworths. Billing records indicate that Clark was being consulted as early as December 5, 2017, a month before the Edgeworth complaint was filed on January 4, 2018. The Edgeworths therefore request that the finding is amended to conform to the facts. As to the Brunzell factors, the Edgeworths request that the court EITHER find (1) there was insufficient evidence presented to the Court to establish conformity with the Brunzell factors and therefore the Plaintiff is awarded no attorney's fees for failure to comply with Nevada law; OR (2) there was insufficient evidence presented to the Court to establish conformity with the Brunzell factors and therefore the Plaintiff must produce the entirety of the case file from the representation of the Edgeworths such that the *Brunzell* factors can be analyzed.

DATED this 30th day of March, 2021.

/s/ Christine Atwood

MESSNER REEVES LLP

Lauren D. Calvert, Esq. #10534 Christine L. Atwood, Esq. #14162 David M. Gould, Esq. #11143 Attorneys for the Edgeworths

{04727973 / 1}30

<u>CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE</u>

On this 30th day of March, 2021, pursuant to Administrative Order 14-2 and Rule 9 of the NEFCR, I caused the foregoing **DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION REGARDING COURT'S AMENDED DECISION AND ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART SIMON'S MOTION FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS AND SECOND AMENDED DECISION AND ORDER ON MOTION TO ADJUDICATE LIEN to be transmitted to the person(s) identified in the E-Service List for this captioned case in Odyssey E-File & Serve of the Eighth Judicial District Court, County of Clark, State of Nevada.** A service transmission report reported service as complete and a copy of the service transmission report will be maintained with the document(s) in this office.

10 James R. Christiansen

LAW OFFICES OF JAMES R. CHRISTENSEN

630 South Third Street

12 | Las Vegas, Nevada 89101

Attorney for Defendant

13 DANIEL S. SIMON

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Gary W. Call, Esq.

15 Athanasia E. Dalacas, Esq.

RESNICK & LOUIS, P.C.

9 | 5940 South Rainbow Blvd

17 | Las Vegas, Nevada 89118

Attorneys for Defendant Lange Plumbing, LLC

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Janet C. Pancoast, Esq.

CISNEROS & MARIA

1160 North Town Center Drive, Suite 130

Las Vegas, Nevada 89144

Attorneys for Defendant The Viking Corporation & Supply Network, Inc. d/b/a Viking Supplynet

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|s| Nicholle Pendergraft

Employee of MESSNER REEVES LLP

{04727973 / 1}31

EXHIBIT A

From: <u>Janet Pancoast</u>
To: <u>dpolsenberg@lrrc.com</u>

Cc: Jessica Rogers; robinson (robinson@mmrs-law.com)

Subject: Edgeworth - REL DRAFT Edgeworth Draft Release to DP

Date:Tuesday, November 21, 2017 10:53:56 AMAttachments:REL DRAFT Edgeworth Draft Release to DP.docx

Dan -

Attached is the draft Release. I highlighted the "Confidentiality" and "No Disparagment" clauses on pages 4 and 5.

As we discussed, at this time, I'll ignore the letter regarding the Motions in Limine.

Please send me a copy of anything you get confirming this settlement in writing.

Thanks,

Janet C. Pancoast, Esq. Dir: 702.562.7616 Cell: 702.325.7876

************** PLEASE NOTE ************

This message, along with any attachments, is for the designated recipient(s) only and may contain privileged, proprietary, or otherwise confidential information. If this message has reached you in error, kindly destroy it without review and notify the sender immediately. Any other use of such misdirected e-mail by you is prohibited. Where allowed by local law, electronic communications with Zurich and its affiliates, including e-mail and instant messaging (including content), may be scanned for the purposes of information security and assessment of internal compliance with company policy.

SETTLEMENTAGREEMENTAND RELEASE

This Settlement Agreement and Release (hereinafter the "Agreement"), by and between Plaintiffs EDGEWORTH FAMILY TRUST and its Trustees Brian Edgeworth & Angela Edgeworth, AMERICAN GRATING, LLC, and its managers Brian Edgeworth & Angela Edgeworth (hereinafter "PLAINTIFFS"), Defendants THE VIKING CORPORATION, SUPPLYNETWORK, INC. & VIKING GROUP, INC. (hereinafter "VIKING") for damages sustained by PLAINTIFFS arising from an incident that occurred on or about April 10, 2016, at a residential property located at 645 Saint Croix Street, Henderson, Nevada (Clark County), wherein Plaintiff alleges damages were sustained due to an unanticipated activation of a sprinkler head (hereinafter "INCIDENT"). The foregoing parties are hereinafter collectively referred to as "SETTLING PARTIES."

I. RECITALS

- A. On June 14, 2016, a Complaint was filed by Plaintiff Edgeworth Family Trust, in the State of Nevada, County of Clark, Case Number A-16-738444-C against Defendants LANGE PLUMBING, LLC and VIKING AUTOMATIC SPRINKLER CO. On August 24, 2016, an amended Complaint was filed against Defendants LANGE PLUMBING, LLC, THE VIKING CORPORATION, SUPPLYNETWORK, INC. On March 7, 2017, a Second Amended Complaint was filed adding Plaintiff AMERICAN GRATING, LLC as a Plaintiff against Defendants LANGE PLUMBING, LLC, THE VIKING CORPORATION, SUPPLYNETWORK, INC. On November 1, 2017, an Order was entered permitting PLAINTIFFS to VIKING GROUP, INC. as a Defendant (hereinafter "SUBJECT ACTION").
- B. The SETTLING PARTIES, after extensive, arms-length negotiations, have reached a complete and final settlement of the PLAINTIFFS claims against VIKING, and warrant that they are presently the sole and exclusive owners of their respective claims, demands, causes of action, controversies, obligations or liabilities as set forth in the SUBJECT ACTION and that no other party has any right, title, or interest whatsoever in said causes of action and other matters referred to therein, and that there has been no assignment, transfer, conveyance, or other disposition by them of any said causes of action and other matters referred to therein; and
- C. The SETTLING PARTIES now wish to settle any and all claims, known and unknown, and dismiss with prejudice the entire SUBJECT ACTION as between the SETTLING PARTIES. The SETTLING PARTIES to this Agreement have settled and compromised their disputes and differences, based upon, and subject to, the terms and conditions which are further set forth herein.

II. DEFINITIONS

A. "SETTLING PARTIES" shall mean, collectively, all of the following individuals and entities, and each of them:

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- B. "PLAINTIFFS" shall mean EDGEWORTH FAMILY TRUST and its Trustees Brian Edgeworth & Angela Edgeworth, AMERICAN GRATING, LLC, and its managers Brian Edgeworth & Angela Edgeworth, as Trustees, Managers, individually, and their past, present and future agents, partners, associates, joint venturers, creditors, predecessors, successors, heirs, assigns, insurers, representatives and attorneys, and all persons acting by or in concert with each other.
- C. "VIKING" shall mean THE VIKING CORPORATION, SUPPLYNETWORK, INC. & VIKING GROUP, INC., and all their respective related legal entities, employees, affiliates, agents, partners, associates, joint venturers, parents, subsidiaries, sister corporations, directors, officers, stockholders, owners, employers, employees, predecessors, successors, heirs, assigns, insurers, bonding companies, representatives and attorneys, and all persons acting in concert with them, or any of them.
- D. "CLAIM" or "CLAIMS" shall refer to any and all claims, demands, liabilities, damages, complaints, causes of action, intentional or negligent acts, intentional or negligent omissions, misrepresentations, distress, attorneys' fees, investigative costs and any other actionable omissions, conduct or damage of every kind in nature whatsoever, whether seen or unforeseen, whether known or unknown, alleged or which could have at any time been alleged or asserted between the SETTLING PARTIES in the SUBJECT ACTION.
- E. The "SUBJECT ACTION" refers to the litigation arising from the Complaints filed by PLAINTIFFS in the Eighth Judicial District Court, County of Clark, Case Number A-16-738444-C, State of Nevada, with respect to and between PLAINTIFFS and DEFENDANTS.

III. SETTLEMENTTERMS

- A. The total settlement amount for PLAINTFFS EDGEWORTH FAMILY TRUST & AMERICAN GRATING, LLC is Six Million Dollars and Zero-Cents (\$6,000,000).
- B. This Settlement is contingent upon Court approving a Motion for Good Faith Settlement pursuant to Nevada Revised Statute 17.245, and dismissing any claims being asserted against the Viking by Lange Plumbing, LLC.
- D. The settlement funds will be held in trust until completion of all necessary paperwork, including a Voluntary Dismissal of the SUBJECT ACTION with Prejudice.
- E. The SETTLING PARTIES agree to bear their own attorneys' fees and costs.

IV. AGREEMENT

A. In consideration of the mutual assurances, warranties, covenants and promises set forth herein and other good and valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of which is hereby acknowledged, each of the SETTLING PARTIES agree with every other SETTLING PARTY hereto to perform each of the terms and conditions stated herein, and to abide by the terms of this Agreement.

- B. Each of the SETTLING PARTIES warrant to each other the truth and correctness of the foregoing recitals, which are incorporated in this paragraph by reference.
- C. As a material part of this Agreement, except as otherwise provided herein, all claims held by and between the SETTLING PARTIES relating to the SUBJECT ACTION, including, but not limited to, those for property damage, stigma damages, remediation costs, repair costs, diminution in value, punitive damages, shall be dismissed, with prejudice, including any and all claims for attorneys' fees and costs of litigation. This shall include, but is not limited to, any and all claims asserted by PLAINTIFFS or which could have at any time been alleged or asserted against VIKING, by way of PLAINTIFFS Complaint and any amendments thereto.

V. RELEASE

- A. In consideration of the settlement payment and promises described herein, PLAINTIFFS, on behalf of their insurers, agents, successors, administrators, personal representatives, heirs and assigns do hereby release and forever discharge VIKING and any of VIKING's affiliates, as well as its insurers, all respective officers, employees and assigns, agents, successors, administrators, heirs and assigns, predecessors, subsidiaries, attorneys and representatives as to any and all demands, claims, assignments, contracts, covenants, actions, suits, causes of action, costs, expenses, attorneys' fees, damages, losses, controversies, judgments, orders and liabilities of whatsoever kind and nature, at equity or otherwise, whether now known or unknown, suspected or unsuspected, and whether or not concealed or hidden, which have existed or may have existed, or which do exist, or which hereafter can, shall, or may exist between the SETTLING PARTIES with respect to the SUBJECT ACTION, including, but not limited to, the generality of the foregoing, any and all claims which were or might have been, or which could have been, alleged in the litigation with regard to the SUBJECT ACTION.
- B. It is the intention of the SETTLING PARTIES hereto that this AGREEMENT shall be effective as a bar to all claims, with respect to the INCIDENT that PLAINTIFFS may have against DEFENDANTS, their affiliates, and any other entity that was involved in the INCIDENT, of whatsoever character, nature and kind, known or unknown, suspected or unsuspected, and whether or not concealed or hidden, herein above specified to be so barred; and in furtherance of this intention, PLAINTIFFS and their related persons and entities expressly, knowingly and voluntarily waive any and all rights which they do not know or suspect to exist in their favor with regard to the INCIDENT at the time of executing this AGREEMENT.
- C. SETTLING PARTIES hereto expressly agree that this AGREEMENT shall be given full force and effect in accordance with each and all of its expressed terms and provisions, relating to unknown and unsuspected claims, demands, causes of action, if any, between PLAINTIFF and DEFENDANTS, with respect to the INCIDENT, to the same effect as those terms and provisions relating to any other claims, demands and causes of action herein above specified. This AGREEMENT applies as between PLAINTIFFS and VIKING and their related persons and entities.

- D. PLAINTIFFS represent their counsel of record has explained the effect of a release of any and all claims, known or unknown and, based upon that explanation and their independent judgment by the reading of this Agreement, PLAINTIFFS understand and acknowledge the legal significance and the consequences of the claims being released by this Agreement. PLAINTIFFS further represents that they understand and acknowledges the legal significance and consequences of a release of unknown claims against the SETTLING PARTIES set forth in, or arising from, the INCIDENT and hereby assume full responsibility for any injuries, damages, losses or liabilities that hereafter may occur with respect to the matters released by this Agreement.
- E. PLAINTIFF hereby agrees to indemnify and hold harmless VIKING and their insurers to include from, against and in connection with, any liens of any type whatsoever pertaining to the SUBJECT ACTION including, but not necessarily limited to attorneys' liens, mechanics liens, expert liens and/or subrogation claims.

VI. GOOD FAITH SETTLEMENT

PLAINTIFFS and VIKING agree and stipulate that the settlement herein is made in good faith pursuant to the provisions of Nevada Revised Statute 17.245.

VII. DISMISSAL

The SETTLING PARTIES agree to execute any and all necessary papers to effectuate dismissal of the claims in the SUBJECT ACTION. Each party shall bear its own attorneys' fees and costs associated with prosecuting and/or defending this matter. Concurrently with the execution of this Settlement Agreement, and receipt of the settlement funds, counsel for PLAINTIFF shall provide a copy to VIKING and file a fully executed Dismissal with Prejudice of the Complaints.

VIII. MISCELLANEOUS

A. COMPROMISE:

This AGREEMENT is the compromise of doubtful and disputed claims and nothing contained herein is to be construed as an admission of liability on the part of the SETTLING PARTIES, or any of them, by whom liability is expressly denied, or as an admission of any absence of liability on the part of the SETTLING PARTIES, or any of them.

B. CONFIDENTIALITY:

This Agreement, and all terms and conditions set forth therein, shall remain confidential and the SETTLING PARTIES and their counsel agree not to make any statement to anyone, including the press, regarding the terms of their settlement except to the extent that it may be disclosed to their respective attorneys, consultants, auditors, accountants or insurance carriers, or as any Party may hereafter be required to by law or in response to a properly issued subpoena for other court process or order, or as necessary to enforce the terms of this

Agreement or in connection with the proceedings in the Action as either Party may deem appropriate.

C. SATISFACTION OF LIENS:

PLAINTIFFS do herein specifically further agree to satisfy all liens, claims and subrogation rights of any contractor incurred as a result of the SUBJECT ACTION and to hold harmless and indemnify VIKING and their affiliates, insurers, employees, agents, successors, administrators, personal representatives, heirs and assigns from and against all said liens, claims and subrogation rights of any construction or repair services and material providers.

D. NO DISPARAGEMENT:

The SETTLING PARTIES agree that they shall make no disparaging or defamatory statements, either verbally or in writing, and shall not otherwise make, endorse, publicize or circulate to any person or entity, any statements or remarks that can reasonably be construed as disparaging or defamatory, regarding PLAINTIFF or VIKING.

E. GOVERNING LAW:

This Agreement shall be governed by, construed and enforced in accordance with the laws of the State of Nevada.

F. TERMS OF SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT AND RELEASE INTERDEPENDENT:

It is further agreed by the SETTLING PARTIES that all portions and sections of this Settlement Agreement and Release are interdependent and necessary to the voluntary settlement of the aforementioned litigation.

G. INDIVIDUAL AND PARTNERSHIP AUTHORITY:

Any individual signing this Agreement on behalf of another individual, a corporation, a limited liability company or partnership, represents or warrants that he/she has full authority to do so.

H. GENDER AND TENSE:

Whenever required by the context hereof, the singular shall be deemed to include the plural, and the plural shall be deemed to include the singular, and the masculine and feminine and neuter gender shall be deemed to include the other.

I. ENTIRE AGREEMENT:

This Agreement constitutes the entire Agreement between the SETTLING PARTIES hereto pertaining to the subject matter hereof, and fully supersedes any and all prior understandings, representations, warranties and agreements between the SETTLING PARTIES hereto, or any of them, pertaining to the subject matter hereof, and may be modified only by written agreement signed by all of the SETTLING PARTIES hereto.

J. INDEPENDENT ADVICE OF COUNSEL:

The SETTLING PARTIES hereto, and each of them, represent and declare that in executing this AGREEMENT, they rely solely upon their own judgment, belief and knowledge, and the advice and recommendations of their own independently selected counsel.

K. VOLUNTARY AGREEMENT:

The SETTLING PARTIES hereto, and each of them, further represent and declare that they have carefully read this Agreement and know the contents thereof, and that they have signed the same freely and voluntarily.

L. ADMISSIBILITY OF AGREEMENT:

In an action or proceeding related to this Agreement, the SETTLING PARTIES stipulate that a fully executed copy of this Agreement may be admissible to the same extent as the original Agreement.

M. COUNTERPARTS:

This Agreement may be executed in one or more counterparts, each of which shall constitute a duplicate original. A facsimile or other non-original signatures shall still create a binding and enforceable agreement.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the SETTLING PARTIES agree hereto and this Agreement is executed as of the date and year noted below.

On behalf of The Edge worth Family Trust & An	nerican Grating, LLC
DATED this day of, 2017	DATED this day of, 2017
BRIAN EDGEWORTH as Trustee of The Edge worth Family Trust & Manager of American Grating, LLC	ANGELA EDGEWORTH as Trustee of The Edge worth Family Trust & Manager of American Grating, LLC
APPROVED AS TO FORM AND CONTENT:	
Dated this day of, 2017.	SIMON LAW
	Daniel S. Simon, Esq. 810 South Casino Center Blvd. Las Vegas, NV 89101

Attorney for Plaintiffs

EXHIBIT B

James R. Christensen Esq. 601 S. 6th Street Las Vegas, NV 89101

Ph: (702)272-0406 Fax: (702)272-0415 E-mail: jim@jchristensenlaw.com Admitted in Illinois and Nevada TIN: 26-4598989

SIMON LAW GROUP – EDGEWORTH FEE DISPUTE

November/December 2017 Billing Statement

I. ATTORNEY

11.27.17	Meeting with client	.50
	Email exchange and	.30
11.28.17	Email exchange with client	n/c
11.29.17	Meeting with client	n/c
11.30.17	T/C with client	.50
	Email exchange with client & review attachments	.30
12.1.17	T/C #1 with client	.50
	T/C #2 with client	.20
12.4.17	T/C with client	n/c
	V/M for Robert Vannah	n/c
	Meeting with client	.50
12.5.17	T/C with David Clark	.20
	Meeting with client	n/c
	T/C with John Green	n/c
	T/C with Dave Clark	n/c

	12.7.17	client w/conference call with Vannah. Draft and edit letter to Vannah.	1.0
	12.11.17	Review of; and, t/c with client re: same	.20
	12.12.17	T/C with client	.30
	12.19.17	Review recent email re check endorsement and undisputed amount. T/C with client. E-mail to Vannah's office.	.30
	12.26.17	Review Vannah email of 11.23. T/C with client. Draft reply email.	.50
	12.27.17	Multiple calls with client/review and respond to Vannah email of 12.26.17	1.5
	12.28.17	Forward Vannah email of 12.28.17 to client. T/c with client re: Review of and t/c with David Clark re: separate trust account	n/c .40
	TOTAL Att	forney Time: 7.4 hours @ \$400.00 = \$2,960.00	
II.	PARALEGA	AL	
	N/A		
	TOTAL Par	ralegal Time: -0- hours @ \$100.00 = \$-0-	

III. COSTS

Postage \$ -0-Copies \$2.20 Wiznet filing fees \$ -0-

TOTAL Costs \$2.20

IV. TOTAL DUE THIS INVOICE \$2,962.20

V. RETAINER SUMMARY

Beginning balance \$10,000.00

Payment of this Invoice - 2,962.20

RETAINER BALANCE \$7,037.80

James R. Christensen Esq. 601 S. 6th Street Las Vegas, NV 89101

Ph: (702)272-0406 Fax: (702)272-0415 E-mail: jim@jchristensenlaw.com Admitted in Illinois and Nevada

TIN: 26-4598989

SIMON LAW GROUP - EDGEWORTH FEE DISPUTE

January – February 2018 Billing Statement

I. ATTORNEY

1.4.18	T/C with client Review of recent email. Reply to Greene et al. Call to	.20
	Sarah G.	.30
1.5- 1.9.18	Multiple phone calls	n/c
1.9.18	Call from John Greene re: service. Discussion with client Email back to John.	nt. .30
1.10.18	Meeting at Simon law.	.50
1.12.18	T/C w/ David Clark. Email documents to DC	.30
1.15.18	Work on motion to adjudicate lien	3.0
1.16.18	Work on motion to adjudicate lien	8.0
1.17.18	Discussion with client. Work on motion to adjudicate. Telephone discussion with D. Clark.	4.0
1.18.18	Work on motion to adjudicate	2.0
1.24.18	Review emails from J. Greene. Calls to and from J. Greene.	.40

1.26.18	Review of emergency motion to continue/setting and	
	change of hearing dates	.20
	T/C with client	.40
	Work on motion to dismiss	1.0
1.27.18	Work on motion to dismiss	2.0
1.29.18	T/c with client (x2)	.50
	Research and final MTD	1.3
1.30.18	Additional research. Review. Email to client	1.6
2.3.18	Review Kemp declaration. Work on supplement	2.0
	provided by Client.	2.0
2.5.18	Review opposition. Research and draft reply. Multiple t/c with client	5.0
	t/c with cheft	5.0
2.6.18	Prepare and attend court hearing on motions to Consolidate/adjudicate	3.4
	Consolidate/adjudicate	J. T
2.9.18	Read minute order re: motion to consolidate	.20
2.10.18	T/c with Westlaw and	.40
2.12.18	Edit draft Order	.20
2.12.18	Research and draft Anti-SLAPP motion. T/C with client	6.0
2.13.18	Edit Anti-SLAPP motion	1.4
2.13.18	Review email from J. Greene	.20
2.14.18	Review emails from client re:	.40
2.15.18	Final Anti-SLAPP motion	.40

	2.15.18	Edit supplement to motion to adjudicate. T/C with client	1.0
	2.19.18	Review email from J. Greene	.20
	2.20.18	Prep for, travel to and attend hearing	1.0
	2.20.18	Multiple emails (#11) regarding 100k check and MSC. Related T/C with client	.50
	2.26.18	T/c with client (x2) Emails to Vannah (x2). Email to client	.20 .20
	TOTAL At	torney Time: 48.9 hours @ \$400.00 = \$19,560.00	
II.	PARALEG	FAL	
	1.9.18	Receipt and review of Complaint, calendar, copy, forward to client	.20
	1.16.18	Review and format Motion to Adjudicate	.55
	1.18.18	Review and final Motion to Adj., Motion to Dismiss, Motion to Consolidate	1.5
	1.24.18	Review, process, file, Motion to Dismiss, Motion to Adjudicate and Motion to Consolidate	1.1
	1.26.18	Review and revise Motion to Dismiss	.50
	1.29.18	Review and revise Motion to Dismiss	N/C
	2.5.18	Review, revise, format, file Reply	1.4
	2.7.18	Attempts to obtain brief filed in Beheshti v. Bartley	.50
	2.12.18	Prep Order for attorney review	.20

VI.	BALANCE	DUE		\$13	3,610.49
	RETAINER	BALANCE	\$ -0-		
	Retainer app	plied to this invoice	\$7,037.80		
	Beginning b	palance	\$7,037.80		
V.	RETAINER	SUMMARY			
IV.	TOTAL DU	JE THIS INVOICE		\$20	0,648.29
	TOTAL Co	sts		\$303.29	
	Postage Copies Wiznet filin	g fees	\$ -0- \$ 52.60 \$250.69		
III.	COSTS				
	TOTAL Par	ralegal Time: 7.85 hours @ \$100).00 =	\$785.00	
	3.2.18		.20		
	2.26.18	Review ltr from District Court	and calendar		.20
	2.15.18	Review, revise and format MT	D Anti-Slapp)	1.3
	2.13.18	Contact Vannah re: Order			.20

James R. Christensen Esq. 601 S. 6th Street Las Vegas, NV 89101

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Admitted in Illinois and Nevada TIN: 26-4598989

SIMON LAW GROUP - EDGEWORTH FEE DISPUTE

March - April 2018 Billing Statement

I.	ATTORNE	Y	
	3.1.18	Review latest proposed amended complaint	.20
	3.2.18	Multiple calls with client and E-mail to adverse re: checks	.30
	3.5.18	T/c with client	.20
	3.8.28	Start on MSC draft	.70
	3.12.18	MSC brief	1.8
	3.15.18	MSC brief	2.0
	3.20-21.18	Read opposition and draft reply to special MTD	3.5
	3.23.18	Meet client, and attend MSC	5.0
	4.3.18	Prep/attend hearing on MTDs and Adjudication	1.5
	4.7.18	Work on MTD AC	2.0

II. PARALEGAL

	3.5.18	Begin Settlement brief draft			.20	
	3.21.18	Review, revise, format, serve and file Reply re Anti-Slapp MTD				
	4.9.18	Review/revise MTD Amende	ed Complaint	į.	.75	
	TOTAL Pa	aralegal Time: 2.25 hours @ \$1	00.00 =	\$225.0	0	
III.	COSTS					
	Postage Copies Wiznet fili	ng fees	\$ -0- \$ 83.20 \$ 14.00			
	TOTAL Co	osts		\$97.20	•	
IV.	TOTAL D	UE THIS INVOICE			\$7,202.20	
V.	RETAINE	R SUMMARY				
	Beginning	balance	\$1,389.51			
	Retainer ap	oplied to this invoice	\$1,389.51			
	RETAINE	R BALANCE	\$ -()-		
VI.	BALANC	E DUE			\$5,812.69	

James R. Christensen Esq. 601 S. 6th Street Las Vegas, NV 89101

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SIMON LAW GROUP – EDGEWORTH FEE DISPUTE

May - June 2018 Billing Statement

I. **ATTORNEY** 5.3.18 Meeting with client .60 Telephone conference with potential hearing witness 1 and t/c with client .40 5.7.18 Edit SLAPP for re-filing .80 Call to potential witness 1 and call to potential witness 2 .20 5.15.18 Meeting with Will Kemp 1.2 5.16.18 Research on Email to client .40 5.18.18 Draft Adjudication hearing brief 2.0 TOTAL Attorney Time: 5.6 hours @ \$400.00 \$2,240.00

II. PARALEGAL

V.

BALANCE DUE

5.8.1	.18 Review, revise and format Anti-slapp MTD and amended Complaint						.60	
5.10.18 Final, prep, file, serve Anti-slapp MTD and calendar					1.5			
5.18.	18	Review, revise, format, final, prep, fil	e,	serv	e Evi	dentiary	Brief	1.1
	TOT.	AL Paralegal Time: 3.2 hours @ \$100.	00		entered .	\$320.	00	
III.	COS	TS						
	Posta Copi Wizn		\$	-0- 63.3 3.5	80			
	TOT	AL Costs				\$67.3	0	
IV.	TOT	AL DUE THIS INVOICE					\$2,627	.30

\$2,627.30

James R. Christensen Esq. 601 S. 6th Street Las Vegas, NV 89101

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TIN: 26-4598989

SIMON LAW GROUP - EDGEWORTH FEE DISPUTE

July - August 2018 Billing Statement

I. ATTORNEY

8.20.18	Meeting with client	1.0
8.21.18	Email exchange with John Greene & t/c with client	.20
8.22.18	Meeting with client Meeting with client and expert	1.0 2.0
8.23.18	email exchange with Vannah office t/c(s) with client	.20
8.24.18	Meeting at client's office	1.5
8.25.18	Telephone conversations with Vannah and client	.50
8.26.18	Meeting at client's office	5.0
8.27.18	Draft Vannah agreement bench brief Hearing attendance and preparation – Day 1	1.0 7.0
8.28.18	Hearing preparation and attendance – Day 2	8.0
8.29.18	Hearing preparation and attendance – Day 3	8.0

Hearing preparation and attendance – Day 4 8.0 8.30.18 Work on Offer of Judgment .20 8.31.18 TOTAL Attorney Time: 43.80 hours @ \$400.00 = \$17,520.00 PARALEGAL II. N/A III.**COSTS** N/A TOTAL DUE THIS INVOICE \$17,520.00 IV. \$17,520.00 V. **BALANCE DUE**

James R. Christensen Esq. 601 S. 6th Street Las Vegas, NV 89101

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SIMON LAW GROUP – EDGEWORTH FEE DISPUTE

September - October 2018 Billing Statement

I. ATTORNEY

9.10-11.18	Review and draft party correspondence to Judge Jones and	
	review reply	.30
9.16.18	Review and edit findings of fact; and, add conclusions of law	3.5
9.17.18	Work on proposed orders, findings and conclusions	1.0
	Hearing preparation with client	2.0
9.18.18	Attend evidentiary hearing-day 5	5.0
9.23.18	Review closing brief	2.0
	Review of findings and discussion with client	1.0
10.24.18	Review and reply to adverse email	.20
10.25.18	Work on Rule 52 motion	2.0
10.26.18	Continue work on Rule 52 motion.	2.0
10.26.18	Took call from John Greene, email to client following	.30

10.27	.18 Continue work on Rule 52 motion						
10.29	.18 Final Rule 52 motion						
10.30	Review emails from law clerk re: OST and respond. Review emails from Vannah office and respond.						
10.31	.18	Review and reply to emails from adverse, t/c with client.	.30				
10.31	.18	Review and edit motion for attorney fees.	3.0				
	TOTA	AL Attorney Time: 27.0 hours @ \$400.00 = \$10,800.00					
II.	PARA	ALEGAL					
10.24	.18	File Notice of Entry of Order	.20				
10.25	.18	Review/format/Motion for reconsideration	1.1				
10.29	.18	Final Motions, regular and OST	.40				
10.31	.18	Review/revise/Motion for Attorney Fees	1.4				
	TOTA	AL Paralegal Time: 3.1 hours @ \$100.00 = \$ 310.00					
III.	COST	r'S					
	Wizne	\$ 14.00					
IV.	TOTAL DUE THIS INVOICE \$11,12						
V.	BALANCE DUE \$11,124						

James R. Christensen Esq. 601 S. 6th Street Las Vegas, NV 89101

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E-mail: jim@jchristensenlaw.com *Admitted in Illinois and Nevada*

TIN: 26-4598989

SIMON LAW GROUP - EDGEWORTH FEE DISPUTE

Through November 15, 2018 Billing Statement

I.	ATTO	DRNEY	
11.1.	2018	Reply to adverse emails (2) and forward to client (3)	.20
11.1.	2018	Review of Plaintiffs closing	.40
11.12	.2018	Read opposition and draft reply	1.4
11.13	.18	Final reply	1.5
11.15	.18	Attend motion hearing	1.0
	TOTA	AL Attorney Time: 4.5 hours @ \$400.00 = \$1,800.00	
II.	PARA	ALEGAL	
11.13	.18	Review/revise/final Motion to Amend	1.1
11.14	.18	File and serve Motion to Amend	n/c
	TOTA	AL Paralegal Time: 1.1 hours @ \$100.00 = \$ 110.00	
III.	COST	TS .	
	N/A		

v.	BALANCE DUE	\$1,910.00
IV.	TOTAL DUE THIS INVOICE	\$1,910.00

Exhibit 10

INVOICE



Invoice # 15648 Date: 11/29/2018 Due On: 12/29/2018

Christiansen Law Offices

810 S. Casino Center Boulevard, Suite 104 Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 United States Phone: 702-240-7979 www.christiansenlaw.com

Law Office of Daniel S. Simon 810 S. Casino Center Boulevard Las Vegas, NV 89101

2018-03891-Law Office of Daniel S. Simon-Simon adv Edgeworth

Simon adv Edgeworth

Type	Date	Attorney	Description	Quantity	Rate	Total
Service	01/10/2018	PSC	Meeting with Client re: case history	2.50	\$850.00	\$2,125.00
Service	02/01/2018	PSC	Review file; Discussions with Client.	3.80	\$850.00	\$3,230.00
Service	02/03/2018	PSC	Review Motions to Adjudicate Lien.	1.30	\$850.00	\$1,105.00
Service	02/04/2018	PSC	Review motion to Dismiss; Discussions with Client.	2.30	\$850.00	\$1,955.00
Service	02/06/2018	PSC	Notice to Associate in on case	0.10	\$850.00	\$85.00
Service	02/06/2018	PSC	Attend Hearing on Motion for Determination of Good Faith Settlement, Simon's Motion to Adjudicate the Lien, Motion to Consolidate/New Lawsuit.	2.50	\$850.00	\$2,125.00
Service	02/14/2018	PSC	Review of hearing transcript	0.50	\$850.00	\$425.00
Service	02/15/2018	PSC	Assist in preparing, revising and finalizing Supplement to Motion to Adjudicate Attorney Lien	3.50	\$850.00	\$2,975.00
Service	02/21/2018	PSC	Review Vannah's Opp to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and Countermotion to Amend; conference with client	2.30	\$850.00	\$1,955.00
Service	02/26/2018	PSC	Draft and fax letter to Williams re settlement conference	0.50	\$850.00	\$425.00

Service	03/01/2018	PSC	Review Vannah's Supplement to their Countermotion to amend Complaint; conference with client	1.80	\$850.00	\$1,530.00
Service	03/02/2018	PSC	Review and revise Special Motion to Dismiss- Anti-Slapp on OST	1.30	\$850.00	\$1,105.00
Service	03/15/2018	PSC	Review Amended Complaint filed by Vannah; conference with client	1.30	\$850.00	\$1,105.00
Service	03/16/2018	PSC	R&R MSC brief; conference with client	3.50	\$850.00	\$2,975.00
Service	03/16/2018	PSC	Review Opp to Special motion to Dismiss: Anti-Slapp; conference with client	1.80	\$850.00	\$1,530.00
Service	03/21/2018	PSC	Assist R&R Reply to Motion to Dismiss: Anti-Slapp	1.30	\$850.00	\$1,105.00
Service	03/22/2018	PSC	Assist R&R Reply to Motion to Dismiss 12(b)(5)	1.80	\$850.00	\$1,530.00
Service	03/23/2018	PSC	Meeting re settlement conference with Jim, DS and AF; Prepare for and Attend Mandatory Settlement Conference	5.00	\$850.00	\$4,250.00
Service	04/09/2018	PSC	Assist R&R Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Complaint; meet with client.	1.80	\$850.00	\$1,530.00
Service	04/24/2018	PSC	Review Opp to Defendants' (Third) Motion to Dismiss; conference with client	1.30	\$850.00	\$1,105.00
Service	05/09/2018	PSC	Assist R&R Special Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint: Anti-Slapp	2.30	\$850.00	\$1,955.00
Service	05/15/2018	PSC	Meeting with Will Kemp	1.50	\$850.00	\$1,275.00
Service	05/18/2018	PSC	Assist R&R Bench Brief on Evidentiary Hearing	3.50	\$850.00	\$2,975.00
Service	05/19/2018	PSC	Review Plaintiffs' bench brief on evidentiary hearing; conference with client	1.50	\$850.00	\$1,275.00
Service	05/23/2018	PSC	Review calendar and scheduling issues and draft letter to Judge Jones re: evidentiary Hearing regarding continuing the evidentiary hearing due to trial conflict	0.50	\$850.00	\$425.00
Service	05/24/2018	PSC	Review Opposition to Defendants' 2nd Motion to Dismiss: Anti-Slapp	1.50	\$850.00	\$1,275.00
Service	08/10/2018	PSC	Assist in preparing subpoena to Floyd Hale; finalize and email same.	0.90	\$850.00	\$765.00
Service	08/18/2018	PSC	Reviewed file in preparation for evidentiary hearing.	8.50	\$850.00	\$7,225.00
Service	08/19/2018	PSC	Reviewed file in preparation for evidentiary hearing.	10.50	\$850.00	\$8,925.00
Service	08/20/2018	PSC	Meeting with Jim, DS and AMF; prepare for hearing	7.50	\$850.00	\$6,375.00

	Service	08/21/2018	PSC	Review of file and prepare for hearing	9.50	\$850.00	\$8,075.00	
	Service	08/23/2018	PSC	Started reviewing exhibits AMF put in dropbox and continue preparing for hearing	8.50	\$850.00	\$7,225.00	
	Service	08/24/2018	PSC	Review case and exhibits and prepare for hearing.	8.50	\$850.00	\$7,225.00	
	Service	08/25/2018	PSC	Prepare for HearingBrian and Angela as witness	10.10	\$850.00	\$8,585.00	
	Service	08/26/2018	PSC	Prepare for HearingBrian as witness	9.80	\$850.00	\$8,330.00	
٠	Service	08/27/2018	PSC	Prepare for and attend evidentiary hearing; conferences with client and co-counsel; prepare for next day of hearing	12.20	\$850.00	\$10,370.00	
	Service	08/28/2018	PSC	Prepare for and attend evidentiary hearing; conferences with client and co-counsel; prepare for next day of hearing	11.90	\$850.00	\$10,115.00	
	Service	08/29/2018	PSC	Prepare for and attend evidentiary hearing; conferences with client and co-counsel; prepare for next day of hearing	12.00	\$850.00	\$10,200.00	
	Service	08/30/2018	PSC	Prepare for and attend evidentiary hearing; conferences with client and co-counsel.	11.80	\$850.00	\$10,030.00	
	Service	08/31/2018	PSC	Conference with client; prepare and serve OOJ and cover letter	1.50	\$850.00	\$1,275.00	
	Service	09/02/2018	PSC	Assist with Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law; conference with client	7.50	\$850.00	\$6,375.00	
	Service	09/10/2018	PSC	Review letter from Vannah re continuing hearing and discuss with client	1.30	\$850.00	\$1,105.00	
	Service	09/10/2018	PSC	Review and discuss production of cell phone records with client	0.80	\$850.00	\$680.00	
	Service	09/11/2018	PSC	Prepare response and serve to Vannah letter re continuing hearing; conference with client	0.80	\$850.00	\$680.00	
	Service	09/13/2018	PSC	Assist R&R updated findings of fact and conclusions of law for motions to dismiss; meet with client re: same	2.50	\$850.00	\$2,125.00	
	Service	09/14/2018	PSC	R&R updated draft findings of fact and conclusions of law for motion to adjudicate and Motions to Dismiss review of record with respect to evidentiary support of same	2.20	\$850.00	\$1,870.00	
	Service	09/15/2018	PSC	Assist R&R findings of fact and conclusions of law for motion to adjudicate; Motion to dismiss/proposed order to dismiss complaint.	3.20	\$850.00	\$2,720.00	
	Service	09/15/2018	PSC	Prepare for Hearing	4.00	\$850.00	\$3,400.00	
	Service	09/16/2018	PSC	Prepare for Hearing	2.80	\$850.00	\$2,380.00	

Invoice # 15648 - 11/29/2018

Service 09/16/2018 PSC Assist R&R spousal privilege brief; Discuss 1.80 \$850.00 \$1,530.00 Service 09/17/2018 PSC Prepare for hearing (prepping for Angela and closing) 2.50 \$850.00 \$2,125.00 Service 09/18/2018 PSC Prepare for and attend Evidentiary Hearing 7.50 \$850.00 \$1,870.00 Service 09/19/2018 PSC Discussion with client and prepare closing 2.20 \$850.00 \$1,020.00 Service 09/23/2018 PSC Review of Court's decision on Motion to Dismiss 12(b)(5) and Motion to Psame 3.00 \$850.00 \$2,125.00 Service 10/12/2018 PSC Discussion with client re: orders; legal research and assess options in light of same 2.20 \$850.00 \$1,870.00 Service 11/02/2018 PSC Assist with preparing Motion for Attorney 3.00 \$850.00 \$2,550.00 Service 11/19/2018 PSC Review Opposition to Mo							
Service 09/18/2018 PSC Prepare for and attend Evidentiary Hearing 7.50 \$850.00 \$6,375.00 Service 09/19/2018 PSC Discussion with client and prepare closing 2.20 \$850.00 \$1,870.00 Service 09/23/2018 PSC Review and revise closing arguments 1.20 \$850.00 \$1,020.00 Service 10/11/2018 PSC Review and revise closing arguments 1.20 \$850.00 \$2,125.00 Service 10/11/2018 PSC Review of Court's decision on Motion to Dismiss 12(b)(5) and Motion to Dismiss: Anti-Slapp; meet with client and discuss necessary action resame 3.00 \$850.00 \$2,155.00 Service 10/12/2018 PSC Discussion with client re: orders; legal research and assess options in light of same 3.00 \$850.00 \$2,550.00 Service 11/02/2018 PSC Review motion to reconsider; discuss with Ara and client re: same 3.00 \$850.00 \$1,870.00 Service 11/09/2018 PSC Review Opposition to Motion for Attorney 3.00 \$850.00 \$2,550.00 Service 11/19/2018 PS	Service	09/16/2018	PSC		1.80	\$850.00	\$1,530.00
Service 09/19/2018 PSC Discussion with client and prepare closing 2.20 \$850.00 \$1,870.00 Service 09/23/2018 PSC Review and revise closing arguments 1.20 \$850.00 \$1,020.00 Service 10/11/2018 PSC Review of Court's decision on Motion to Dismiss 12(b)(5) and Motion to Dismiss 2.Anti-Stapp; meet with client and discuss secssary action re: same 2.50 \$850.00 \$2,125.00 Service 10/12/2018 PSC Discussion with client re: orders; legal research and assess options in light of same 3.00 \$850.00 \$1,870.00 Service 10/26/2018 PSC Review motion to reconsider; discuss with AF and client re: same 2.20 \$850.00 \$1,870.00 Service 11/02/2018 PSC Assist with preparing Motion for Attorney Fees 3.00 \$850.00 \$2,550.00 Service 11/19/2018 PSC Review Opposition to Motion for Reconsideration of Reply. 1.50 \$850.00 \$1,275.00 Service 11/13/2018 PSC Meeting with client re hearing and prepare for same. 1.50 \$850.00 \$1,275.00 Service	Service	09/17/2018	PSC		2.50	\$850.00	\$2,125.00
Service 09/23/2018 PSC Review and revise closing arguments 1.20 \$850.00 \$1,020.00 Service 10/11/2018 PSC Review of Court's decision on Motion to Dismiss 12(b)(5) and Motion to Dismiss: Anti-Slapp; meet with client and discuss necessary action resame 2.50 \$850.00 \$2,125.00 Service 10/12/2018 PSC Discussion with client recorders; legal research and assess options in light of same 3.00 \$850.00 \$1,870.00 Service 10/26/2018 PSC Review motion to reconsider; discuss with AF and client recessame 2.20 \$850.00 \$1,870.00 Service 11/02/2018 PSC Assist with preparing Motion for Attorney Fees 3.00 \$850.00 \$2,550.00 Service 11/09/2018 PSC Review Opposition to Motion for Reconsideration 1.00 \$850.00 \$850.00 \$850.00 Service 11/13/2018 PSC Assist in preparation of Reply. 1.50 \$850.00 \$850.00 \$850.00 Service 11/14/2018 PSC Prepare for hearing on Motion for Reconsideration; Disc. with client 1.50 \$850.00 \$1,275.00 <td>Service</td> <td>09/18/2018</td> <td>PSC</td> <td>Prepare for and attend Evidentiary Hearing</td> <td>7.50</td> <td>\$850.00</td> <td>\$6,375.00</td>	Service	09/18/2018	PSC	Prepare for and attend Evidentiary Hearing	7.50	\$850.00	\$6,375.00
Service 10/11/2018 PSC Review of Court's decision on Motion to Adjudicate, Motion to Dismiss 12(b)(5) and Motion to Dismiss: Anti-Slapp; meet with client and discuss necessary action re: same 2.50 \$850.00 \$2,125.00 Service 10/12/2018 PSC Discussion with client re: orders; legal research and assess options in light of same 3.00 \$850.00 \$2,550.00 Service 10/26/2018 PSC Review motion to reconsider; discuss with AF and client re: same 2.20 \$850.00 \$1,870.00 Service 11/02/2018 PSC Assist with preparing Motion for Attorney Fees 3.00 \$850.00 \$2,550.00 Service 11/109/2018 PSC Review Opposition to Motion for Reconsideration 1.00 \$850.00 \$850.00 Service 11/11/2/2018 PSC Assist in preparation of Reply. 1.50 \$850.00 \$850.00 Service 11/13/2018 PSC Meeting with client re hearing and prepare for same. 1.00 \$850.00 \$1,275.00 Service 11/14/2018 PSC Prepare for hearing on Motion for Reconsideration; Disc. with client 2.50 \$850.00 \$2,125.00	Service	09/19/2018	PSC	Discussion with client and prepare closing	2.20	\$850.00	\$1,870.00
Adjudicate, Motion to Dismiss 12(b)(5) and Motion to Dismiss: Anti-Slapp; meet with client and discuss necessary action resame Service 10/12/2018 PSC Discussion with client re: orders; legal research and assess options in light of same Service 10/26/2018 PSC Review motion to reconsider; discuss with AF and client re: same Service 11/02/2018 PSC Assist with preparing Motion for Attorney 3.00 \$850.00 \$2,550.00 Fees Service 11/09/2018 PSC Review Opposition to Motion for Reconsideration Service 11/12/2018 PSC Assist in preparation of Reply. 1.50 \$850.00 \$1,275.00 Fervice 11/13/2018 PSC Meeting with client re hearing and prepare for same. Service 11/14/2018 PSC Prepare for hearing on Motion for Reconsideration; Disc. with client Service 11/15/2018 PSC Prepare for and attend hearing on Motion for Reconsideration for reconsideration Service 11/15/2018 PSC Final review and revision of Motion for Attorneys Fees Subtotal \$199,495.00	Service	09/23/2018	PSC	Review and revise closing arguments	1.20	\$850.00	\$1,020.00
Service 10/26/2018 PSC Review motion to reconsider; discuss with AF and client re: same 2.20 \$850.00 \$1,870.00	Service	10/11/2018	PSC	Adjudicate, Motion to Dismiss 12(b)(5) and Motion to Dismiss: Anti-Slapp; meet with client and discuss necessary action re:	2.50	\$850.00	\$2,125.00
AF and client re: same Service 11/02/2018 PSC Assist with preparing Motion for Attorney Fees 3.00 \$850.00 \$2,550.00 Service 11/09/2018 PSC Review Opposition to Motion for Reconsideration 1.00 \$850.00 \$850.00 Service 11/12/2018 PSC Assist in preparation of Reply. 1.50 \$850.00 \$1,275.00 Service 11/13/2018 PSC Meeting with client re hearing and prepare for same. 1.00 \$850.00 \$850.00 \$850.00 \$1,275.00 Service 11/14/2018 PSC Prepare for hearing on Motion for Reconsideration; Disc. with client 1.50 \$850.00 \$1,275.00 Service 11/15/2018 PSC Prepare for and attend hearing on Motion for for reconsideration 2.50 \$850.00 \$2,125.00 Service 11/25/2018 PSC Final review and revision of Motion for Attorneys Fees 2.00 \$850.00 \$1,700.00	Service	10/12/2018	PSC	research and assess options in light of	3.00	\$850.00	\$2,550.00
Service 11/09/2018 PSC Review Opposition to Motion for Reconsideration 1.00 \$850.00 \$850.00 Service 11/12/2018 PSC Assist in preparation of Reply. 1.50 \$850.00 \$1,275.00 Service 11/13/2018 PSC Meeting with client re hearing and prepare for same. 1.00 \$850.00 \$850.00 Service 11/14/2018 PSC Prepare for hearing on Motion for Reconsideration; Disc. with client 1.50 \$850.00 \$1,275.00 Service 11/15/2018 PSC Prepare for and attend hearing on Motion for reconsideration 2.50 \$850.00 \$2,125.00 Service 11/25/2018 PSC Final review and revision of Motion for Attorneys Fees 2.00 \$850.00 \$1,700.00	Service	10/26/2018	PSC	The state of the s	2.20	\$850.00	\$1,870.00
Reconsideration Service 11/12/2018 PSC Assist in preparation of Reply. 1.50 \$850.00 \$1,275.00 Service 11/13/2018 PSC Meeting with client re hearing and prepare for same. 1.00 \$850.00 \$850.00 \$850.00 Service 11/14/2018 PSC Prepare for hearing on Motion for Reconsideration; Disc. with client 1.50 \$850.00 \$1,275.00 Service 11/15/2018 PSC Prepare for and attend hearing on Motion for reconsideration 2.50 \$850.00 \$2,125.00 Service 11/25/2018 PSC Final review and revision of Motion for Attorneys Fees 2.00 \$850.00 \$1,700.00	Service	11/02/2018	PSC	, , ,	3.00	\$850.00	\$2,550.00
Service 11/13/2018 PSC Meeting with client re hearing and prepare for same. 1.00 \$850.00 \$850.00 Service 11/14/2018 PSC Prepare for hearing on Motion for Reconsideration; Disc. with client 1.50 \$850.00 \$1,275.00 Service 11/15/2018 PSC Prepare for and attend hearing on Motion for reconsideration 2.50 \$850.00 \$2,125.00 Service 11/25/2018 PSC Final review and revision of Motion for Attorneys Fees 2.00 \$850.00 \$1,700.00	Service	11/09/2018	PSC	· ·	1.00	\$850.00	\$850.00
for same. Service 11/14/2018 PSC Prepare for hearing on Motion for Reconsideration; Disc. with client 1.50 \$850.00 \$1,275.00 Service 11/15/2018 PSC Prepare for and attend hearing on Motion for reconsideration 2.50 \$850.00 \$2,125.00 Service 11/25/2018 PSC Final review and revision of Motion for Attorneys Fees 2.00 \$850.00 \$1,700.00	Service	11/12/2018	PSC	Assist in preparation of Reply.	1.50	\$850.00	\$1,275.00
Reconsideration; Disc. with client Service 11/15/2018 PSC Prepare for and attend hearing on Motion for reconsideration 2.50 \$850.00 \$2,125.00 Service 11/25/2018 PSC Final review and revision of Motion for Attorneys Fees 2.00 \$850.00 \$1,700.00	Service	11/13/2018	PSC		1.00	\$850.00	\$850.00
for reconsideration Service 11/25/2018 PSC Final review and revision of Motion for Attorneys Fees Subtotal \$199,495.00	Service	11/14/2018	PSC		1.50	\$850.00	\$1,275.00
Attorneys Fees Subtotal \$199,495.00	Service	11/15/2018	PSC		2.50	\$850.00	\$2,125.00
	Service	11/25/2018	PSC		2.00	\$850.00	\$1,700.00
Total \$199,495.00					Sui	btotal	\$199,495.00
						Total	\$199,495.00

Detailed Statement of Account

Current Invoice

Invoice Number	Due On	Amount Due	Payments Received	Balance Due

15648 12/29/2018 \$199,495.00 \$0.00 \$199,495.00

> **Outstanding Balance** \$199,495.00

Total Amount Outstanding \$199,495.00

Please make all amounts payable to: Christiansen Law Offices Tax Identification Number: 88-0497171

EXHIBIT C

LAW OFFICE OF DANIEL S. SIMON

A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION 810 SOUTH CASINO CENTER BOULEVARD LAS VEGAS, NEVADA 89101

TELEPHONE (702)364-1650

FACSIMILE (702)364-1655

November 27, 2017

Pursuant to your request, please find attached herewith the agreement I would like signed, as well as the proposed settlement breakdown, if a final settlement is reached with the Viking entities. The following is to merely clarify our relationship that has evolved during my representation so you are not confused with my position.

I helped you with your case and went above and beyond for you because I considered you close friends and treated you like family

As you know, when you first asked me to look at the case, I did not want to take it as I did not want to lose money. You already met with Mr. Marquis who wanted a 50k retainer and told you it would be a very expensive case. If Mr. Marquis did the work I did, I have no doubt his billing statements would reflect 2 million or more. I never asked you for a retainer and the initial work was merely helping you. As you know, you received excellent advice from the beginning to the end. It started out writing letters hoping to get Kinsale to pay your claim. They didn't. Then this resulted in us filing a lawsuit.

As the case progressed, it became apparent that this was going to be a hard fight against both Lange and Viking who never offered a single dollar until the recent mediations. The document production in this case was extremely voluminous as you know and caused my office to spend endless late night and weekend hours to push this case through the system and keep the current trial date.

As you are aware, we asked John to get involved in this case to help you. The loss of value report was sought to try and get a favorable negotiation position. His report was created based on my lawyering and Johns willingness to look at the information I secured to support his position. As you know, no other appraiser was willing to go above and beyond as they believed the cost of repairs did not create a loss. As you know, John's opinion greatly increased the value of this case. Please do not think that he was paid a fee so he had to give us the report. His fee was very nominal in light of the value of his report and he stepped up to help you because of us and our close relationship. Securing all of the other experts and working with them to finalize their opinions were damaging to the defense was a tremendous factor in securing the proposed settlement amount. These experts were involved because of my contacts. When I was able to retain Mr. Pomerantz and work with him to finalize his opinions, his report was also a major factor. There are very few lawyer's in town that would approach the case the way I did to get the results I did for you. Feel free to call Mr. Hale or any other lawyer or judge in town to verify this. Every time I went to court I argued for you as if you were a family member taking the arguments against you personal. I made every effort to protect you and your family during the process. I

was an exceptional advocate for you. It is my reputation with the judiciary who know my integrity, as well as my history of big verdicts that persuaded the defense to pay such a big number. It is also because my office stopped working on other cases and devoted the office to your case filing numerous emergency motions that resulted in very successful rulings. My office was available virtually all of the time responding to you immediately. No other lawyer would give you this attention. I have already been complimented by many lawyers in this case as to how amazing the lawyering was including Marks lawyer who told me it was a pleasure watching me work the way I set up the case and secured the court rulings. Feel free to call him. The defense lawyers in this case have complimented me as well, which says a lot. My work in my motions and the rulings as an exceptional advocate and the relationships I have and my reputation is why they are paying this much. The settlement offer is more than you ever anticipated as you were willing to take 4-4.5 at the first mediation and you wanted the mediator's proposal to be 5 million when I advised for the 6 million. One major reason they are likely willing to pay the exceptional result of six million is that the insurance company factored in my standard fee of 40% (2.4 million) because both the mediator and the defense have to presume the attorney's fees so it could get settled. Mr. Hale and Zurich both know my usual attorney's fees. This was not a typical contract case your other hourly Lawyers would handle. This was a major fight with a world-wide corporation and you did not get billed as your other hourly lawyers would have billed you. This would have forced you to lay out substantially more money throughout the entire process. Simply, we went above and beyond for you.

I have lost money working on your case.

As you know, when I was working on your case I was not working on many other cases at my standard fee and I told you many times that I can't work hourly because I would be losing too much money. I felt it was always our understanding that my fee would be fair in light of the work performed and how the case turned out. I do not represent clients on an hourly basis and I have told this to you many times.

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Value of my Services

The attached agreement reflects a greatly reduced sum for the value of my services that I normally charge in every case. I always expected to be compensated for the value of my services and not lose money to help you. I was troubled at your statements that you paid me hourly and you now want to just pay me hourly when you always knew this was not the situation. When I brought this to your attention you acknowledged you understood this was not just an hourly fee case and you were just playing devil's advocate. As you know, if I really treated your case as only an hourly case, I would have included all of the work my staff performed and billed you at a full hourly fee in 30 day increments and not advance so much money in costs. I would have had you sign just an hourly contract retainer just as Mr. Pomerantz had you sign. I never did this because I trusted you would fairly compensate me for the value of my services depending on the outcome. In the few statements I did send you I did not include all of the time for my staff time or my time, and did not bill you as any other firm would have. The reason is that this was not just an hourly billing situation. We have had many discussions about this as I helped you through a very difficult case that evolved and changed to a hotly contested case demanding full attention. I am a trial attorney that did tremendous work, and I expect as you would, to be paid for the value of my service. I did not have you sign my initial standard retainer as I treated you like family to help you with your situation.

Billing Statements

I did produce billing statements, but these statements were never to be considered full payment as these statements do not remotely contain the full time myself or my office has actually spent. You have acknowledged many times that you know these statements do not represent all of my time as I do not represent clients on an hourly basis. In case you do not recall, when we were at the San Diego Airport, you told me that a regular firm billing you would likely be 3x my bills at the time. This was in August. When I started filing my motions to compel and received the rulings for Viking to produce the information, the case then got substantially more demanding. We have had many discussions that I was losing money but instead of us figuring out a fair fee arrangement, I did continue with the case in good faith because of our relationship focusing on winning and trusted that you would fairly compensate me at the end. I gave you several examples of why I was losing money hourly because my standard fee of 40% on all of my other cases produced hourly rates 3-10 times the hourly rates you were provided. Additionally, just some of the time not included in the billing statement is many phone calls to you at all hours of the day, review and responses of endless emails with attachments from you and others, discussions with experts, substantial review the filings in this case and much more are not contained in the bills. I also spent substantial time securing representation for Mark Giberti when he was sued. My office continued to spend an exorbitant amount of time since March and have diligently litigated this case having my office virtually focus solely on your case. The hourly fees in the billing statements are much lower than my true hourly billing. These bills were generated for several reasons. A few reasons for the billing statements is that you wanted to justify your loans and use the bills to establish damages against Lange under the contract, and this is the why all of my time was not included and why I expected to be paid fairly as we worked through the case.

I am sure you will acknowledge the exceptional work, the quality of my advocacy, and services performed were above and beyond. My services in every case I handle are valued based on results not an hourly fee. I realize that I didn't have you sign a contingency fee agreement and am not asserting a contingency fee, but always expected the value of my services would be paid so I would not lose money. If you are going to hold me to an hourly arrangement then I will have to review the entire file for my time spent from the beginning to include all time for me and my staff at my full hourly rates to avoid an unjust outcome.

How I handle cases

I want you to have a full understanding as to how my office works in every other case I am handling so you can understand my position and the value of my services and the favorable outcome to you.

My standard fee is 40% for a litigated case. I have told you this many times. That is what I get in every case, especially when achieving an outcome like this. When the outcome is successful and the client gets more and I will take my full fee. I reduce if the outcome is not as expected to make sure the client shares fairly. In this case, you received more than you ever anticipated from the outset of this case. I realize I do not have a contract in place for percentages and I am not trying to enforce one, but this merely shows you what I lost by taking your case and given the outcome of your case, and what a value you are receiving. Again, I have over 5 other big cases that have been put on the back burner to handle your case. The discovery period in these cases were continued several times for me to focus on your case. If I knew you were going to try and treat me unfairly by merely asserting we had an hourly agreement after doing a exceptional work with and exceptional result, I wouldn't have continued. The reason is I would lose too much money. I would hope it was never you intention to cause me hardship and lose money when helping you achieve such a an exceptional result. I realize I did not have you sign a fee agreement because I trusted you, but I did not have you sign an hourly agreement either.

Finalizing the settlement

There is also a lot of work left to be done. As you know, the language to the settlement must be very specific to protect everyone. This will need to be negotiated. If this cannot be achieved, there is no settlement. The Defendant will require I sign the confidentiality provisions, which could expose me to future litigation. Depending on the language, I may not be comfortable doing this as I never agreed to sign off on releases. Even if the language in the settlement agreement is worked out, there are motions to approve the settlement, which will be strongly opposed by Lange. If the Court does not grant to the motion, then there is no settlement. If there is an approved settlement and Viking does not pay timely, then further motions to enforce must be filed.

Presently, there are many things on calendar that I need to address. We have the following depositions: Mr. Carnahan, Mr. Garelli, Crane Pomerantz, Kevin Hastings, Gerald Zamiski, and the UL deposition in Chicago. We have the Court hearings for Zurich's motions for protective order, our motion to de-designate the documents as confidential, our motion to make Mr. Pomerantz an initial expert, as well as the summary judgment motions involving Lange, who has

recently filed a counter motion and responses need to filed. Simply, there is a substantial amount of work that still needs to be addressed. Since you knew of all of the pending matters on calendar, it is unfortunate that you were obligated to go to China during a very crucial week to attempt to finalize the case. When I asked if you would be available to speak if necessary, you told me that you are unavailable to discuss matters over the phone. This week was very important to make decisions to try and finalize a settlement.

I understand that the way I am looking at it may be different than the way your business mind looks at things. However, I explained my standard fees and how I work many times to you and the amount in the attached agreement is beyond fair to you in light of the exceptional results. It is much less than the reasonable value of my services. I realize that because you did not sign my retainer that you may be in a position to take advantage of the situation. However, I believe I will be able to justify the attorney fee in the attached agreement in any later proceeding as any court will look to ensure I was fairly compensated for the work performed and the exceptional result achieved.

I really want us to get this breakdown right because I want you to feel like this is remarkable outcome while at the same time I don't want to feel I didn't lose out too much. Given what we have been through and what I have done, I would hope you would not want me to lose money, especially in light of the fact that I have achieved a result much greater than your expectations ever were in this case. The attached agreement should certainly achieve this objective for you, which is an incredible reduction from the true value of my services.

Conclusion

If you are agreeable to the attached agreement, please sign both so I can proceed to attempt to finalize the agreement. I know you both have thought a lot about your position and likely consulted other lawyers and can make this decision fairly quick. We have had several conversations regarding this issue. I have thought about it a lot and this the lowest amount I can accept. I have always felt that it was our understanding that that this was not a typical contract lawyer case, and that I was not a typical contract lawyer. In light of the substantial work performed and the exceptional results achieved, the fee is extremely fair and reasonable.

If you are not agreeable, then I cannot continue to lose money to help you. I will need to consider all options available to me.

Please let me know your decisions as to how to proceed as soon as possible.

702-364-1650 Fax: 702-364-1655

RETAINER AGREEMENT

THAT Brian Edgeworth and Angela Edgeworth on behalf of Edgeworth Family Trust and American Grating have retained and does by this instrument retain the Law Offices of Daniel S. Simon, as his/her attorneys; said attorneys to handle on his/her behalf, all claims for damages arising out of and resulting from an incident on or about April 9, 2016 involving the flood caused by a failed sprinkler head, which clients now have, and which might hereafter accrue against Viking Corporation, Viking Group and Viking Supply Net, for damages arising out of said incident to Brian Edgeworth and Angela Edgeworth on behalf of Edgeworth Family Trust and American Grating that the parties have respectively agreed as follows:

- 1. THE FEE FOR LEGAL SERVICES SHALL BE IN THE SUM OF 1,500,000 for services rendered to date. This sum includes all past billing statements, the substantial time that is not included in past billing statements, the current outstanding billing statements and any further billing statements that may accrue to finalize and secure the settlement with the Viking Entities only. Any future services performed prosecuting Lange Plumbing will be determined by a separate agreement. However, all past services performed prosecuting Lange Plumbing will be included in the above fee. The above sum will be reduced by all payments already made toward the attorneys fees. If for some reason, the settlement cannot be finalized with the Viking Entities, this agreement shall be void as it only contemplates a reasonable fee for services performed and to finalize the settlement agreement.
- 2. ALL COSTS, INCLUDING ARBITRATION COSTS, COSTS OF OBTAINING EXPERTS TO ANALYZE AND EVALUATE THE CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT, COSTS OF EXPERT TESTIMONY, COSTS OF WITNESS FEES, TRAVEL COSTS, DEPOSITION COSTS, COURT COSTS, AND ALL COSTS OF LITIGATION, INCLUDING LONG DISTANCE PHONE CALLS, COPYING EXPENSES, REGARDLESS OF THE OUTCOME, ARE TO BE PAID BY THE CLIENT, AND IF ANY OF THEM SHALL HAVE BEEN ADVANCED BY THE ATTORNEY, HE SHALL BE REIMBURSED FOR THE

	1	SAME. THE ATTORNEY IS A	AUTHORIZED TO PAY ANY OF SAID
	2	EXPENSES OUT OF THE SHARE	OF THE SETTLEMENT ACCRUING TO
	3	THE CLIENT.	
	4	SIGNED this day of	, 2017.
	5		
	6	I AW OFFICES OF DANIEL S. SIMON	Brian Edgeworth on behalf of Edgeworth Family
	7	LAW OFFICES OF DANIEL S. SIMON	Trust and American Grating
u	8		
The Law Office of Daniel S. Simon 810 S. Casino Center Blvd. Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 702-364-1650 Fax: 702-364-1655	9		Angela Edgeworth on behalf of Edgeworth Family Trust and American Grating
f Daniel S. S Center Blvd evada 89101 x· 702-364-1	10		Trust und rimericum Gruenig
Danie Zente vada	11		
Law Office of D 810 S. Casino Co Las Vegas, Nev.	12		
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LAW OFFICE OF

DANIEL S. SIMON

A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION 810 SOUTH CASINO CENTER BOULEVARD LAS VEGAS, NEVADA 89101

TELEPHONE (702)364-1650 FACSIMILE (702)364-1655

SETTLEMENT BREAKDOWN

Date: November 27, 2017

Re: EFT AND AMERICAN GRATING v. ALL VIKING ENTITIES

Settlement \$ 6,000,000.00

Attorney's Fees 1,114,000.00 (1,500,000 Less payments made of

367,606.25)

Costs 80,000.00 (200,000 Less payments made

of 118,846.84)

Balance to Clients

\$4,806,000.00

Clients hereby agree to the above distribution from the settlement proceeds if a settlement is finally reached and finalized. The costs may be adjusted depending on the actual costs incurred and paid. A final accounting will be made at the time of final distribution.

Dated thisday of November, 2	2017.
	Brian Edgeworth on behalf of Edgeworth Family Trust and American Grating
	Angela Edgeworth on behalf of Edgeworth Family Trust and American Grating

EXHIBIT D

Daniel Simon

rom:

Janet Pancoast < janet.pancoast@zurichna.com>

Sent: Tuesday, December 12, 2017 11:51 AM

To: Daniel Simon; Henriod, Joel D. (JHenriod@Irrc.com)

Cc: Jessica Rogers Subject: Edgeworth - Checks -

Attachments: 201712121048.pdf; SPT 171212 Edgeworth SAO to Dismiss - Plaintiff.pdf

Danny -

I was using the Plaintiff's release to prepare a release for Giberti and came across the provision that required "certified checks." I was not aware of that provision and neither was the claims representative. I have the checks (attached) and am willing to give them to you in exchange for the signed stipulation for dismissal. However, there multiple parties that will delay the final entry of a joint stipulation for dismissal. Hence, to give me sufficient comfort level to release these checks, I request that you sign the attached stipulation for dismissal which is only for Plaintiff's claims against the Viking entities. Additionally, I ask that you sign the Stipulation for a Global Dismissal I emailed earlier. That way, I can file the dismissal with the Plaintiffs now and release the checks so that you can get the check in the bank and they can be cleared by 12/21/17. Getting the checks re-issued will take longer and the claims representative is not even sure if he can issue a certified check.

Hence, if you want to pick up these checks. Please sign both stipulations. Thanks.

Janet C. Pancoast, Esq. **CISNEROS & MARIAS**

(Not a Partnership - Employee of Zurich American Insurance Company)

1160 No. Town Center Dr., Suite 130

Las Vegas, NV 89144 Off: 702.233.9660 Dir: 702.562.7616

Cell: 702.325.7876 Fax: 702.233.9665

janet.pancoast@zurichna.com

******* PLEASE NOTE ************

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SIMONEH0004535

EXHIBIT E

From: <u>Janet Pancoast</u>

To: <u>Daniel Simon (dan@simonlawlv.com)</u>; <u>Henriod, Joel D. (JHenriod@lrrc.com)</u>

Cc:Jessica RogersSubject:Edgeworth - Checks -

Date: Tuesday, December 12, 2017 11:51:13 AM

Attachments: <u>201712121048.pdf</u>

SPT 171212 Edgeworth SAO to Dismiss - Plaintiff.pdf

Danny -

I was using the Plaintiff's release to prepare a release for Giberti and came across the provision that required "certified checks." I was not aware of that provision and neither was the claims representative. I have the checks (attached) and am willing to give them to you in exchange for the signed stipulation for dismissal. However, there multiple parties that will delay the final entry of a joint stipulation for dismissal. Hence, to give me sufficient comfort level to release these checks, I request that you sign the attached stipulation for dismissal which is *only* for Plaintiff's claims against the Viking entities. Additionally, I ask that you sign the Stipulation for a Global Dismissal I emailed earlier. That way, I can file the dismissal with the Plaintiffs now and release the checks so that you can get the check in the bank and they can be cleared by 12/21/17. Getting the checks re-issued will take longer and the claims representative is not even sure if he can issue a certified check.

Hence, if you want to pick up these checks. Please sign **both** stipulations. Thanks.

Janet C. Pancoast, Esq.

CISNEROS & MARIAS

(Not a Partnership – Employee of Zurich American Insurance Company)

1160 No. Town Center Dr., Suite 130 Las Vegas, NV 89144

Off: 702.233.9660 Dir: 702.562.7616 Cell: 702.325.7876 Fax: 702.233.9665

janet.pancoast@zurichna.com

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1	STP	
2	JANET C. PANCOAST, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 5090	
3	CISNEROS & MARIAS	
4	1160 N. Town Center Dr., Suite 130 Las Vegas, NV 89144	
5	Tel: (702) 233-9660 Fax: (702) 233-9665	
6	janet.pancoast@zurichna.com in Association with	
7	S. Seth Kershaw, Esq.	
8	State Bar No. 10639 MEYERS MCCONNELL REISZ SIDERMAN P.C.	
9	11620 Wilshire Blvd., Suite 800 Los Angeles, CA 90025	
10	Tel: 1-310-312-0772 Fax: 1-310-312-0656	
11	kershaw@mmrs-law.com	
12	Attorneys for Defendant/Cross-Defendant	
13	Cross-Claimant/Third Party Plaintiffs The Viking Corporation & Supply Network, Inc.	
14	d/b/a Viking Supplynet	
15		
16	DISTRICT	COURT
17	CLARK COUNT	TY, NEVADA
18	EDGEWORTH FAMILY TRUST, and) CASE NO.: A-16-738444-C
19	AMERICAN GRATING, LLC Plaintiffs,	DEPT. NO.: X
20	vs.))
21	LANGE PLUMBING, LLC; THE VIKING))
22	CORPORATION, a Michigan corporation; SUPPLY NETWORK, INC. d/b/a VIKING) STIPULATION FOR DISMISSAL) WITH PREJUDICE OF PLAINTIFFS
23	SUPPLYNET, a Michigan corporation; and DOES I through V and ROE CORPORATIONS) CLAIMS AGAINST VIKING ENTITIES
24	VI through X, inclusive, Defendants.))
25	Defendants.))
26		Plumbing, LLC, et. al. Case No. A-16-738444-
27	-	ismissal of Viking Entities by Plaintiffs
28	1 of	5
		AA0188

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Cross-Claimant,) vs. THE VIKING CORPORATION, a Michigan corporation; SUPPLY NETWORK, INC. d/b/a VIKING SUPPLYNET, a Michigan corporation; and DOES I through V and ROE CORPORATIONS VI through X, inclusive. Cross-Defendants THE VIKING CORPORATION, a Michigan corporation; SUPPLY NETWORK, INC. d/b/a VIKING SUPPLYNET, a Michigan corporation LANGE PLUMBING, LLC, Counter-Claimant, vs. LANGE PLUMBING, LLC, and DOES I through V and ROE CORPORATIONS VI through X, inclusive. Counter-Defendant THE VIKING CORPORATION, a Michigan corporation; SUPPLY NETWORK, INC. d/b/a VIKING SUPPLYNET, a Michigan corporation, Defendants/Third Party Plaintiffs, v. GIBERTI CONSTRUCTION, LLC, a Nevada Limited Liability Company and DOES I through V and ROE CORPORATIONS VI through X, inclusive, Third Party Defendant.	
Cross-Claimant,) vs. THE VIKING CORPORATION, a Michigan corporation; SUPPLY NETWORK, INC. d/b/a VIKING SUPPLYNET, a Michigan corporation; and DOES I through V and ROE CORPORATIONS VI through X, inclusive. Cross-Defendants THE VIKING CORPORATION, a Michigan corporation; SUPPLY NETWORK, INC. d/b/a VIKING SUPPLYNET, a Michigan corporation LANGE PLUMBING, LLC, Counter-Claimant, vs. LANGE PLUMBING, LLC, and DOES I through V and ROE CORPORATIONS VI through X, inclusive. Counter-Defendant THE VIKING CORPORATION, a Michigan corporation; SUPPLY NETWORK, INC. d/b/a VIKING SUPPLYNET, a Michigan corporation, Defendants/Third Party Plaintiffs, v. GIBERTI CONSTRUCTION, LLC, a Nevada Limited Liability Company and DOES I through V and ROE CORPORATIONS VI through X, inclusive, Third Party Defendant.	
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1	GIBERTI CONSTRUCTION, LLC, a Nevada) Limited Liability Company,)
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5	THE VIKING CORPORATION, a Michigan) corporation; SUPPLY NETWORK, INC. d/b/a)
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7	Counter-Defendant.
8	GIBERTI CONSTRUCTION, LLC, a Nevada) Limited Liability Company,)
9	Cross-Claimant
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11	v.)
12	LANGE PLUMBING, LLC, and DOES I through) V and ROE CORPORATIONS VI through X,
13	inclusive.
14	Cross-Defendant.
15	COMES NOW, PLAINTIFFS EDGEWORTH FAMILY TRUST & AMERICAN
16	GRATING, LLC by and through their attorney of record Daniel Simon, Esq. of SIMON LAW;
17	DEFENDANTS/CROSS-DEFENDANTS/CROSS-CLAIMANTS THE VIKING CORPORATION
18	& SUPPLY NETWORK, INC. d/b/a VIKING SUPPLYNET by and through their attorney of record,
19	Janet C. Pancoast, Esq. of the law firm of CISNEROS & MARIAS, in association with counsel of
20 21	MEYERS MCCONNELL REISZ SIDERMAN P.C. and LEWIS ROCA ROTHGERBER
$\begin{bmatrix} 21 \\ 22 \end{bmatrix}$	CHRISTIE, LLP; hereby stipulate that:
23	All claims asserted in any and all Complaints filed herein by PLAINTIFFS EDGEWORTH
24	FAMILY TRUST & AMERICAN GRATING, LLC and each and every cause of action alleged
25	
26	Edge worth Family Trust v. Lange Plumbing, LLC, et. al. Case No. A-16-738444-
27	Stipulation and Order for Dismissal of Viking Entities by Plaintiffs
28	3 of 5

1	therein against THE VIKING CORPORATI	ON & SUPPLY NETWORK, INC. d/b/a VIKING
2	SUPPLYNET and VIKING GROUP, shall be	dismissed with prejudice.
3	Each party shall bear their own fees and	d costs.
4	Dated this day of December, 2017.	Dated this day of December, 2017.
5	SIMON LAW	CISNEROS & MARIAS
6		
7 8	Daniel S. Simon, Esq. 810 South Casino Center Blvd.	Janet C. Pancoast, Esq. 1160 Town Center Drive, Suite 130
9	Las Vegas, NV 89101 Attorney for Plaintiff	Las Vegas, Nevada 89144
10		In Association with and with the agreement of MEYERS REISZ SIDERMAN P.C. &
11		LEWIS ROCA ROTHGERBER CHRISTIE, LLP
12		Attorneys for Viking Defendants
13		ORDER
14	Based on the Stipulation of the parties a	
15		asserted in any and all Complaints filed herein by
16		ST & AMERICAN GRATING, LLC and each and
17		nst THE VIKING CORPORATION & SUPPLY
18 19		ET and VIKING GROUP, shall be dismissed with
20	prejudice. Each party shall bear their own fees	
21	Dated this day of	
22	Dated this day of	, 2017
23		
24	\overline{D}	ISTRICT COURT JUDGE
25	//	
26	Edge worth Family Trust v. Lo	ange Plumbing, LLC, et. al. Case No. A-16-738444-
27		for Dismissal of Viking Entities by Plaintiffs
28		4 of 5

1	Submitted by:
2	CISNEROS & MARIAS
3	
4	BY: Janet C. Pancoast, Esq.
5	Janet C. Pancoast, Esq. 1160 N. Town Center Drive, Suite 130 Las Vegas, NV 89144
6	Attorneys for Viking Defendants
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27	Edge worth Family Trust v. Lange Plumbing, LLC, et. al. Case No. A-16-738444- Stipulation and Order for Dismissal of Viking Entities by Plaintiffs
28	5 of 5

EXHIBIT F

From: Daniel Simon <dan@simonlawlv.com> Sent: Monday, November 27, 2017 3:50 PM To: Angela Edgeworth Cc: Brian Edgeworth (brian@pediped.com) Subject: RE: Edgeworth v. Viking, et al I have not received the Viking agreement. When I receive I will forward. Let me know as soon as you can. Thanks From: Angela Edgeworth [mailto:angela.edgeworth@pediped.com] Sent: Monday, November 27, 2017 3:20 PM To: Daniel Simon <dan@simonlawlv.com>

Danny,

As you know, Brian is out of town and in China at the moment. I will need a couple of days to discuss this with him. We will be glad to meet once he is back.

We would need to have our attorney look at this agreement before we sign.

Subject: Re: Edgeworth v. Viking, et al

In the meantime, please send us the Viking Agreement immediately, so we review it.

Angela Edgeworth

D 702.352.2585 | T 702.567.0311 | F 702.567.0319

1191 Center Point Drive | Henderson, NV 89074

angela.edgeworth@pediped.com | www.pediped.com

On Mon, Nov 27, 2017 at 2:26 PM, Daniel Simon < dan@simonlawlv.com > wrote:

Please review and advise me of your position at your earliest possible convenience. If you would like to discuss, please call me anytime. Thanks



Brian Edgeworth <bri>dpediped.com>

Re: Edgeworth v. Viking, et al

1 message

Angela Edgeworth <angela.edgeworth@pediped.com>

Mon, Nov 27, 2017 at 5:31 PM

To: Daniel Simon <dan@simonlawlv.com>

I do have questions about the process, and am quite confused. I had no idea we were on anything but an hourly contract with you until our last meeting.

I am glad to meet once Brian gets back unless you think it's urgent and we meet right away.

If the contract is not drawn yet, we still have some time to hash things out.

I want a complete understanding of what has transpired so I can consult my attorney. I do not believe I need to have her involved at this time.

Please let me know what the terms of the settlement are to your knowledge at this point if they are not detailed in your letter. Please send over whatever documentation you have or tell us what they verbally committed to. Otherwise, I will review the letter in detail and get back to you in a couple days.

In the meantime, I trust we are still progressing with Lange et al and any other immediate concerns that should be addressed.

As I mentioned at our last meeting, we should still be progressing as originally planned. I would hate to see a delay for any reason. Until we see an agreement, no agreement exists. Please let me know if there are any upcoming delays that you can foresee.

I think everyone has been busy over the holidays and has not had a lot of time to process everything.

To confirm, you have not yet agreed to the settlement. Is this correct?

Angela

On Mon, Nov 27, 2017 at 4:58 PM Daniel Simon dan@simonlawlv.com wrote:

It appears that you have a lot of questions about the process which is one reason I wanted to meet with you. If you would like to come to the office or call me tomorrow I will be happy to explain everything in detail. My Letter also explains the status of the settlement and what needs to be done. Due to the holiday they probably were not able to start on it. I will reach out to lawyers tomorrow and get a status. I am also happy to speak to your attorney as well. Let me know. Thx

On Nov 27, 2017, at 4:14 PM, Angela Edgeworth <angela.edgeworth@pediped.com> wrote:

Did you agree to the settlement? Why have they not sent it yet and when is it coming? Please clarify.

Angela

EXHIBIT G

To:

Fax: (702) 364-1655 Page 1 of 2 11/30/2017 9:35 AM

FAX

Date: 11/30/2017	Dato. 11/00/2017
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Pages including cover sheet: 2

To:	
Phone	
Fax Number	(702) 364-1655

From:	Jessie Romero		
	Vannah & Vannah		
	400 S. 7th Street		
	Las Vegas		
	NV	89101	
Phone	(702) 369-4161	* 302	
Fax Number	(702) 369-0104		

NOTE:	

Page 2 of 2 11/30/2017 9:35 AM

November 29, 2017

VIA FACSIMILE: (702) 364-1655

Fax: (702) 369-0104

Daniel S. Simon, Esq. LAW OFFICE OF DANIEL S. SIMON 810 S. Casino Center Blvd. Las Vegas, Nevada 89101

RE: Letter of Direction

Dear Mr. Simon:

From: Jessie Romero

Please let this letter serve to advise you that I've retained Robert D. Vannah, Esq., and John B. Greene, Esq., of Vannah & Vannah to assist in the litigation with the Viking entities, et.al. I'm instructing you to cooperate with them in every regard concerning the litigation and any settlement. I'm also instructing you to give them complete access to the file and allow them to review whatever documents they request to review. Finally, I direct you to allow them to participate without limitation in any proceeding concerning our case, whether it be at depositions, court hearings, discussions, etc.

Thank you for your understanding and compliance with the terms of this letter.

Sincerely,

Brian Edgeworth

EXHIBIT H

brian@pediped.com

From: Daniel Simon <dan@simonlawlv.com>
Sent: Thursday, November 30, 2017 8:39 AM

To: Brian Edgeworth; angela.edgeworth@pediped.com

Subject: Settlement

Attachments: Edgeworth -- Settlement Agreement (redline v. 2).docx; ATT00001.txt

Attached is the proposed settlement release. Please review and advise when you can come in to discuss. I am available today anytime from 11-1pm to meet with you at my office. Thx

SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT AND RELEASE

This Settlement Agreement and Release (hereinafter the "Agreement"), by and between Plaintiffs EDGEWORTH FAMILY TRUST and its Trustees Brian Edgeworth & Angela Edgeworth, AMERICAN GRATING, LLC, and its managers Brian Edgeworth & Angela Edgeworth (hereinafter "PLAINTIFFS"), Defendants THE VIKING CORPORATION, SUPPLY NETWORK, INC. & VIKING GROUP, INC. (hereinafter "VIKING") for damages sustained by PLAINTIFFS arising from an incident that occurred on or about April 10, 2016, at a residential property located at 645 Saint Croix Street, Henderson, Nevada (Clark County), wherein Plaintiff alleges damages were sustained due to an unanticipated activation of a sprinkler head (hereinafter "INCIDENT"). The foregoing parties are hereinafter collectively referred to as "SETTLING PARTIES."

I. RECITALS

- A. On June 14, 2016, a Complaint was filed by Plaintiff Edgeworth Family Trust, in the State of Nevada, County of Clark, Case Number A-16-738444-C against Defendants LANGE PLUMBING, LLC and VIKING AUTOMATIC SPRINKLER CO. On August 24, 2016, an amended Complaint was filed against Defendants LANGE PLUMBING, LLC, THE VIKING CORPORATION, SUPPLY NETWORK, INC. On March 7, 2017, a Second Amended Complaint was filed adding Plaintiff AMERICAN GRATING, LLC as a Plaintiff against Defendants LANGE PLUMBING, LLC, THE VIKING CORPORATION, SUPPLY NETWORK, INC. On November 1, 2017, an Order was entered permitting PLAINTIFFS to VIKING GROUP, INC. as a Defendant (hereinafter "SUBJECT ACTION").
- B. The SETTLING PARTIES now wish to settle any and all claims, known and unknown, and dismiss with prejudice the entire SUBJECT ACTION as between the SETTLING PARTIES. The SETTLING PARTIES to this Agreement have settled and compromised their disputes and differences, based upon, and subject to, the terms and conditions which are further set forth herein.

II. DEFINITIONS

- A. "SETTLING PARTIES" shall mean, collectively, all of the following individuals and entities, and each of them:
- B. "PLAINTIFFS" shall mean EDGEWORTH FAMILY TRUST and its Trustees Brian Edgeworth & Angela Edgeworth, AMERICAN GRATING, LLC, and its managers Brian Edgeworth & Angela Edgeworth, as Trustees, Managers, individually, and their past, present and future agents, partners, associates, joint venturers, creditors, predecessors, successors, heirs, assigns, insurers, representatives and attorneys, and all persons acting by or in concert with each other.
- B. "VIKING" shall mean THE VIKING CORPORATION, SUPPLY NETWORK, INC. & VIKING GROUP, INC., and all their respective related legal entities, employees, affiliates, agents, partners, associates, joint venturers, parents, subsidiaries, sister corporations, directors, officers, stockholders, owners, employers, employees, predecessors, successors, heirs.

assigns, insurers, bonding companies, representatives and attorneys, and all persons acting in concert with them, or any of them.

- C. "CLAIM" or "CLAIMS" shall refer to any and all claims, demands, liabilities, damages, complaints, causes of action, intentional or negligent acts, intentional or negligent omissions, misrepresentations, distress, attorneys' fees, investigative costs and any other actionable omissions, conduct or damage of every kind in nature whatsoever, whether seen or unforeseen, whether known or unknown, alleged or which could have at any time been alleged or asserted between the SETTLING PARTIES relating in any way to the SUBJECT ACTION.
- D. The "SUBJECT ACTION" refers to the litigation arising from the Complaints filed by PLAINTIFFS in the Eighth Judicial District Court, County of Clark, Case Number A-16-738444-C. State of Nevada, with respect to and between PLAINTIFFS and DEFENDANTS.

III. SETTLEMENT TERMS

- A. VIKING will pay PLAINTFFS Six Million Dollars and Zero-Cents (\$6,000,000) by December 21, 2017. The \$6,000,000 settlement proceeds shall be delivered via a certified check made payable to the "EDGEWORTH FAMILY TRUST and its Trustees Brian Edgeworth & Angela Edgeworth; and AMERICAN GRATING, LLC; and Law Office of Daniel S. Simon."
- B. PLAINTIFFS will execute a stipulation to dismiss all of their claims against the VIKING entities with prejudice, which will state that each party is to bear its own fees and costs. PLAINTIFFS will provide an executed copy of the stipulation to VIKING upon receipt of a certified check.
- C. PLAINTIFFS agree to fully release any and all claims against the VIKING entities (as defined below § IV.C). The RELEASE included in this document (§ V) shall become effective and binding on PLAINTIFFS upon their receipt of the \$6,000,000 settlement funds.
- D. This settlement is based upon a mutual acceptance of a Mediator's proposal which makes this settlement subject to the District Court approving a Motion for Good Faith Settlement pursuant to NRS 17.245, dismissing any claims against the Viking entities by Lange Plumbing, LLC.
- E. The SETTLING PARTIES will bear their own attorneys' fees and costs.

IV. AGREEMENT

- A. In consideration of the mutual assurances, warranties, covenants and promises set forth herein and other good and valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of which is hereby acknowledged, each of the SETTLING PARTIES agree with every other SETTLING PARTY hereto to perform each of the terms and conditions stated herein, and to abide by the terms of this Agreement.
- B. Each of the SETTLING PARTIES warrant to each other the truth and correctness of the foregoing recitals, which are incorporated in this paragraph by reference.

2 of 6

C. As a material part of this Agreement, except as otherwise provided herein, all claims held by and between the SETTLING PARTIES relating to the SUBJECT ACTION, including, but not limited to, those for property damage, stigma damages, remediation costs, repair costs, diminution in value, punitive damages, shall be dismissed, with prejudice, including any and all claims for attorneys' fees and costs of litigation. This shall include, but is not limited to, any and all claims asserted by PLAINTIFFS or which could have at any time been alleged or asserted against VIKING, by way of PLAINTIFFS Complaint and any amendments thereto.

V. RELEASE

- A. In consideration of the settlement payment and promises described herein, PLAINTIFFS, on behalf of their insurers, agents, successors, administrators, personal representatives, heirs and assigns do hereby release and forever discharge VIKING and any of VIKING's affiliates, as well as its insurers, all respective officers, employees and assigns, agents, successors, administrators, heirs and assigns, predecessors, subsidiaries, attorneys and representatives as to any and all demands, claims, assignments, contracts, covenants, actions, suits, causes of action, costs, expenses, attorneys' fees, damages, losses, controversies, judgments, orders and liabilities of whatsoever kind and nature, at equity or otherwise, whether now known or unknown, suspected or unsuspected, and whether or not concealed or hidden, which have existed or may have existed, or which do exist, or which hereafter can, shall, or may exist between the SETTLING PARTIES with respect to the SUBJECT ACTION, including, but not limited to, the generality of the foregoing, any and all claims which were or might have been, or which could have been, alleged in the litigation with regard to the SUBJECT ACTION.
- B. It is the intention of the SETTLING PARTIES hereto that this AGREEMENT shall be effective as a bar to all claims, with respect to the INCIDENT that PLAINTIFFS may have against DEFENDANTS, their affiliates, and any other entity that was involved in the INCIDENT, of whatsoever character, nature and kind, known or unknown, suspected or unsuspected, and whether or not concealed or hidden, herein above specified to be so barred; and in furtherance of this intention, PLAINTIFFS and their related persons and entities expressly, knowingly and voluntarily waive any and all rights which they do not know or suspect to exist in their favor with regard to the INCIDENT at the time of executing this AGREEMENT.
- C. SETTLING PARTIES hereto expressly agree that this AGREEMENT shall be given full force and effect in accordance with each and all of its expressed terms and provisions, relating to unknown and unsuspected claims, demands, causes of action, if any, between PLAINTIFF and DEFENDANTS, with respect to the INCIDENT, to the same effect as those terms and provisions relating to any other claims, demands and causes of action herein above specified. This AGREEMENT applies as between PLAINTIFFS and VIKING and their related persons and entities.
- D. PLAINTIFFS represent their counsel of record has explained the effect of a release of any and all claims, known or unknown and, based upon that explanation and their independent judgment by the reading of this Agreement, PLAINTIFFS understand and acknowledge the legal significance and the consequences of the claims being released by this Agreement.

PLAINTIFFS further represent that they understand and acknowledge the legal significance and consequences of a release of unknown claims against the SETTLING PARTIES set forth in, or arising from, the INCIDENT and hereby assume full responsibility for any injuries, damages, losses or liabilities that hereafter may occur with respect to the matters released by this Agreement.

VI. GOOD FAITH SETTLEMENT

PLAINTIFFS and VIKING each warrant that they enter this settlement in good faith, pursuant to the provisions of NRS 17.245.

VIII. MISCELLANEOUS

A. COMPROMISE:

This AGREEMENT is the compromise of doubtful and disputed claims and nothing contained herein is to be construed as an admission of liability on the part of the SETTLING PARTIES, or any of them, by whom liability is expressly denied, or as an admission of any absence of liability on the part of the SETTLING PARTIES, or any of them.

B. CONFIDENTIALITY:

The amount of this Agreement shall remain confidential and the SETTLING PARTIES and their counsel (Daniel Simon) agree not to make any statement to anyone, including the press, regarding the amount of this settlement except to the extent that it may be disclosed to their respective attorneys, consultants, auditors, accountants or insurance carriers, or as any Party may hereafter be required to by law or in response to a properly issued subpoena for other court process or order, or as necessary to enforce the terms of this Agreement or in connection with the proceedings in the Action as either Party may deem appropriate.

C. SATISFACTION OF LIENS:

- 1. PLAINTIFFS warrant that they are presently the sole and exclusive owners of their respective claims, demands, causes of action, controversies, obligations or liabilities as set forth in the SUBJECT ACTION and that no other party has any right, title, or interest whatsoever in said causes of action and other matters referred to therein, and that there has been no assignment, transfer, conveyance, or other disposition by them of any said causes of action and other matters referred to therein.
- 2. PLAINTIFFS do herein specifically further agree to satisfy all liens, claims and subrogation rights of any contractor incurred as a result of the SUBJECT ACTION and to hold harmless and indemnify VIKING and their affiliates, insurers, employees, agents, successors, administrators, personal representatives, heirs and assigns from and against, and in connection with, any liens of any type whatsoever pertaining to the SUBJECT ACTION including, but not necessarily limited to attorneys' liens, mechanics liens, expert liens and/or subrogation claims.

D. GOVERNING LAW:

This Agreement shall be governed by, construed and enforced in accordance with the laws of the State of Nevada.

E. INDIVIDUAL AND PARTNERSHIP AUTHORITY:

Any individual signing this Agreement on behalf of another individual, a corporation, a limited liability company or partnership, represents or warrants that he/she has full authority to do so.

F. GENDER AND TENSE:

Whenever required by the context hereof, the singular shall be deemed to include the plural, and the plural shall be deemed to include the singular, and the masculine and feminine and neuter gender shall be deemed to include the other.

G. ENTIRE AGREEMENT:

This Agreement constitutes the entire Agreement between the SETTLING PARTIES hereto pertaining to the subject matter hereof, and fully supersedes any and all prior understandings, representations, warranties and agreements between the SETTLING PARTIES hereto, or any of them, pertaining to the subject matter hereof, and may be modified only by written agreement signed by all of the SETTLING PARTIES hereto.

H. INDEPENDENT ADVICE OF COUNSEL:

The SETTLING PARTIES hereto, and each of them, represent and declare that in executing this AGREEMENT, they rely solely upon their own judgment, belief and knowledge, and the advice and recommendations of their own independently selected counsel.

I. VOLUNTARY AGREEMENT:

The SETTLING PARTIES hereto, and each of them, further represent and declare that they have carefully read this Agreement and know the contents thereof, and that they have signed the same freely and voluntarily.

J. ADMISSIBILITY OF AGREEMENT:

In an action or proceeding related to this Agreement, the SETTLING PARTIES stipulate that a fully executed copy of this Agreement may be admissible to the same extent as the original Agreement.

K. COUNTERPARTS:

This Agreement may be executed in one or more counterparts, each of which shall constitute a duplicate original. A facsimile or other non-original signatures shall still create a binding and enforceable agreement.

Release - Edgeworth Family Trust, et. al. v. The Viking Corp., et. al.

5 of 6

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the SETTLING PARTIES agree hereto and this Agreement is executed as of the date and year noted below. On behalf of The Edge worth Family Trust & American Grating, LLC DATED this ____ day of ______, 2017 DATED this ____ day of _____, 2017 BRIAN EDGEWORTH as Trustee of ANGELA EDGEWORTH as Trustee of The Edge worth Family Trust & The Edge worth Family Trust & Manager of American Grating, LLC Manager of American Grating, LLC Agreeing to bind himself to the confidentiality obligation set forth in Section VIII.B.. Dated this _____ day of ______, 2017. SIMON LAW Daniel S. Simon, Esq. 810 South Casino Center Blvd. Las Vegas, NV 89101 Attorney for Plaintiffs On behalf of The Viking Corporation, Supply Network, Inc. and Viking Group, Inc. Dated this _____ day of ______, 2017. SCOTT MARTORANO Vice President-Warranty Managment

EXHIBIT I

Electronically Filed 5/8/2019 2:03 PM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT

RTRAN 1 2 3 4 5 **DISTRICT COURT** CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 6 7 **EDGEWORTH FAMILY TRUST;** AMERICAN GRATING, LLC, CASE#: A-16-738444-C 8 Plaintiffs, DEPT. X 9 VS. 10 LANGE PLUMBING, LLC, ET AL., 11 Defendants. 12 **EDGEWORTH FAMILY TRUST;** CASE#: A-18-767242-C 13 AMERICAN GRATING, LLC, DEPT. X 14 Plaintiffs, 15 VS. 16 DANIEL S. SIMON, ET AL., 17 Defendants. 18 BEFORE THE HONORABLE TIERRA JONES, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 19 THURSDAY, AUGUST 30, 2018 20 **RECORDER'S TRANSCRIPT OF EVIDENTIARY HEARING - DAY 4** 21 **APPEARANCES:** 22 For the Plaintiff: ROBERT D. VANNAH, ESQ. JOHN B. GREENE, ESQ. 23 For the Defendant: JAMES R. CHRISTENSEN, ESQ. 24 PETER S. CHRISTIANSEN, ESQ. 25 RECORDED BY: VICTORIA BOYD, COURT RECORDER

- 1 -

1	<u>INDEX</u>
2	
3	Testimony6
4	
5	
6	WITNESSES FOR THE PLAINTIFF
7	DANIEL SIMON
8	Direct Examination by Mr. Christensen6
9	Cross-Examination by Mr. Vannah 59
10	Redirect Examination by Mr. Christensen149
11	Recross Examination by Mr. Vannah166
12	Further Redirect Examination by Mr. Christensen172
13	
14	WILLIAM KEMP
15	Direct Examination by Mr. Christensen
16	Cross-Examination by Mr. Vannah 199
17	Redirect Examination by Mr. Christensen
18	Recross Examination by Mr. Vannah222
19	Further Redirect Examination by Mr. Christensen224
20	
21	
22	
23	
24	
25	

1	А	Correct.
2	Q	Okay. There was a Settlement Agreement between
3	Edgewortl	n Family Trust, American Grating, LLC, and Viking?
4	А	Yes.
5	Q	That's Office Exhibit Number 5. This is the lead page, which
6	is bate I believe the Bate is 36; do you see that?	
7	А	Yes.
8	Q	Now, on page 4 of the release, which is bates number 39 of
9	Exhibit 5,	there's a paragraph E. Obviously, that paragraph mentions
10	Vannah ar	nd Vannah as attorneys for the Edgeworth's; fair to say?
11	А	Yes. Can you show me the date of this release? I think it's
12	December	1st, but I just want to confirm.
13	Q	On page 42 of Exhibit 5 I'm sorry, bate 42 of Exhibit 5, I
14	can show	you the dates that both Brian and Angela signed the release,
15	December	1 of 2017; is that correct?
16	А	Yes.
17	Q	So after that and that's after the date you felt after the
18	date that y	ou felt you had been fired, correct?
19	А	Yeah. So, if I can just explain briefly. I get back on 9-20 or
20	11-27. laı	m basically negotiating, not torpedoing any settlement, not
21	making ar	ny threats. I'm basically getting this release where they omitted
22	the confidentiality clause and preserved the Lange claim, and I get the	
23	Edgewort	ns, which is a very uncommon term, as a mutual release
24	because th	nis case was so contentious, all right?

And Mr. Edgeworth was I'm going to use the word scared,

25

nervous, you know, whatever you want to use, he was very nervous that Viking was ultimately going to come after him if they had some type of opportunity. So that's why the confidentiality clause was not a good idea, and we wanted to preserve the Lange claim, as well, and I got a mutual release, I think, for them, on or about 11-27.

THE COURT: And you got the mutual release on 11-27?

THE WITNESS: Right in that range, yeah. It was -- it was before I got the Letter of Direction, and I was out of the case.

BY MR. CHRISTENSEN:

Q Did Mr. -- a Viking sprinkler flooded Mr. Edgeworth's house that he was building as an investment, and he thought Viking was going to sue him?

A If they had -- if they had some type of basis, they probably would have.

Q Okay. Now, you did reach out to Mr. Edgeworth on December 5?

THE COURT: Okay, and I'm sorry, Mr. Christensen, before you move on, on December 1, when that Settlement Agreement is signed, the one that's Exhibit 5, how did you -- when's the first time you saw that document?

THE WITNESS: That was a prior one that was proposed.

THE COURT: That had the confidentiality and all that?

THE WITNESS: Yeah, it had all of that.

THE COURT: Okay.

THE WITNESS: And so, you know, the Edgeworth's were

1	pressing me, right. There's an email from while Brian's in well,		
2	Brian's in China, unavailable, no phone calls, no emails with me. He no		
3	has Angela stepping up, typing all these emails, saying hey, where's the		
4	Viking Settlement Release, where is it, where is it, where is it, get it to us		
5	And I just got back in town from a vacation over Thanksgiving.		
6	So right when I get back there was probably the, you know,		
7	proposed release. And so, I went over to the office with Mr. Henriod,		
8	who was Viking counsel, and I have a great relationship with him, and		
9	we basically just hammered out the terms of the release right there. And		
10	then I was done, I was out of it.		
11	THE COURT: Okay. But you hammered out the terms of the		
12	release of that final agreement?		
13	THE WITNESS: Before I was fired, yeah.		
14	THE COURT: Okay. So, this is before 11-30?		
15	THE WITNESS: Yes.		
16	THE COURT: And then were you present when the		
17	Edgeworth's signed that document?		
18	THE WITNESS: Nope.		
19	THE COURT: Okay. So, when did you see the signed copy?		
20	THE WITNESS: When Mr. Vannah's office delivered it to me		
21	to then forward it to Viking counsel.		
22	THE COURT: But you received it from Vannah's office?		
23	THE WITNESS: Correct.		
24	THE COURT: Okay.		
25	THE WITNESS: And just one other note. I didn't explain any		

THE COURT: A little bit later in '17?

25

1	witness and provide him with my copy of Exhibit 12	
2	THE COURT: Okay.	
3	MR. CHRISTENSEN: So that he can read the whole thing	
4	easily.	
5	THE COURT: Sure.	
6	MR. VANNAH: That's a great idea. Thank you. Thank you	
7	very much.	
8	UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Almost there? Oh, yes.	
9	THE COURT: This might assist you.	
10	MR. GREENE: That's all of it. Okay.	
11	THE COURT: Okay. It looks like it's all on there now.	
12	MR. GREENE: All right. Beautiful.	
13	MR. VANNAH: We're probably all looking at the regular	
14	document.	
15	BY MR. VANNAH:	
16	Q So what do you say to, and I think mainly this is Mr. Greene,	
17	but you do you do carbon, cc Brian Edgeworth and Angela Edgeworth	
18	in this too, right?	
19	A Yes.	
20	Q All right. And it says: Please find attached, the final	
21	settlement agreement.	
22	A Correct.	
23	Q And that's forwarded to all right, it says: Please have	
24	clients sign as soon as possible to avoid any delay in processing	
25	payment. This shall also confirm that your office that would be	

Vannah and Vannah, right?

- A Right.
- Q Is advising them about the effects of their release and representing them to finalize settlement through my office. We're going to explain the effects of release to them. Because you're not going to talk to them, right? And you're saying that we're going to represent them to finalize settlement through your office.

Right? Is that what you're saying?

- A Through your office.
- O No, it says -- I'll read it to you again.
- A Oh, through my office, okay.
- Q Through your office.
- A Oh, yes. Okay.
- Q We're going to finalize --
- A I'm with you.
- Q -- the settlement through your office. Also, I first received a call from you this morning advising the clients wanted to sign the initial draft of the settlement agreement as is.

So, what that meant was, that morning, we had advised you that, you know what, the settlement agreement is fine as is, the way it is, they're willing to sign it as is, but you made some modifications, right?

- A Yep.
- Q All right. And you -- and you state: Since, this time, and that would -- when I say since this time, that would be on November 30th, from that morning, you had gotten involved and made some

modifications, right?

You said: Since that time, I spent substantial time negotiating more beneficial terms to protect the clients. Specifically, I was able to get the Defendants to agree to omit the confidentiality provision providing mutual release and allow the opportunity to avoid a good faith determination of the Court if the clients resolve the Lange claims, providing Lange will dismiss his claims against Viking. Just so we are clear, your office did not ask for these substantial additional beneficial terms to protect the client.

Do you see that? Did I read that right?

- A Yep.
- Q So, what you're saying is, look, this morning, you told me that the clients were ready to sign the agreement as it is, but guess what, I did a great job. I spent substantial time -- and that's fine -- I spent substantial time working on the case, meeting with the other side, and getting them to take some provisions out of the original settlement agreement that you were already willing to sign. I got them to take the confidentiality agreement out. I got a mutual release. And I got in a position where everybody's going to agree to waive the good faith settlement if you -- if we settle with Lange, right? And that was beneficial to the clients, right?
 - A I guess, based on
 - Q What --
- A Yeah, based on this email that's -- the email says what it says.

Q Well, it says here, this is very beneficial. You guys didn't ask for it. I went and did it and I did a great job, and I got a better deal on the release on the one you were willing to sign, right? And that's what you're saying?

A Yep.

Q Okay. Additionally, this morning -- and that would be the morning of November 30th -- you asked me to approach Lange to accept the \$25,000 offer from mediation.

Do you see that?

A Yes.

Q All right. So there had been an offer from Lange for 25,000 at the mediation, and your recollection of the conversation, I'm not disputing it, was that we had said look, we want the Lange case settled, take the 25,000, we want the Lange case settled, right?

A Yep.

Q All right. And by the way, don't let me -- I don't want to digress yet. All right. Since this time, now that would be the same morning, right, the same day, because that morning I said, go ahead and accept it if that's what you do. Do better, do better, but whatever, we'll accept it if that's what it is. Since that time, and that -- that would be the same day, I was able to secure a \$100,000 offer, less all money Lange is claiming they are owed.

Do you see that?

A Yes.

Q Lange would then dismiss their claims against Viking,

MR. VANNAH: It's page 3.

THE COURT: -- starts on page 3.

MR. VANNAH: Yeah, that's my --

BY MR. VANNAH:

Q Let's just go through this letter. The -- on the first page, you talked about -- you have headings. I helped you with your case and went above and beyond for you because I considered you close friends and treated you like family, right?

A Yes.

Q And then that, you talk about what a -- well, on Page 4 of that exhibit, you talk about, I was an exceptional advocate for you. I was an exceptional advocate for you. It is my reputation with the judiciary, who know my integrity, as well as my history of big verdicts, that persuaded the Defense to pay such a big number. Did you write that?

A Yes.

Q And I don't like to talk braggy about yourself, but here we are, right? Your bragging a little here?

A I'm bragging to the extent that --

Q I'm not saying that's bad. I'm just saying you -- but you're surely touting yourself as you've got big verdicts, a history of big verdicts. You've got a great reputation with the Judges. They know how honest you are, and no other lawyer would give you this attention. Do you see that a little further down?

- A I definitely agree with that.
- Q Do you think Mr. Kemp wouldn't have given him this

MR. VANNAH: There was. I said you had violated the Bar rules, Section 1.5, when you didn't have a clear understanding of where the client is to what the fee was going to be, correct?

THE COURT: Well, I mean, Mr. Vannah, I think that those are allegations that I don't want Mr. Simon answering that question at this point in time, because if there was some Bar complaint or something out there, which I know absolutely nothing about, I don't want him answering that question.

Mr. Simon, don't answer that question.

THE WITNESS: All right.

THE COURT: Mr. Vannah, can you ask him another

MR. VANNAH: I will.

BY MR. VANNAH:

question?

Q Going on further with this, it says, one major reason they are likely willing to pay the exceptional result of six million, is that the insurance company factored in my standard fee of 40 percent, 2.4 million, because both the mediator and the Defense have to presume the attorney fees so it can get settled. Do you see that?

A I do.

Q Well, you know, that's interesting. Why would they presume that, that you earn 40 percent, when you are submitting invoice after invoice after invoice after invoice totaling your hourly fee? You're telling them you're charging hourly at 550 an hour. Isn't that what those fee invoices show to the other side?

1	Q	When you receive that fax and/or when you received the call	
2	did you just drop everything on the file?		
3	А	What do you mean?	
4	Q	Did you stop work on the file?	
5	Α	No, of course not.	
6	Q	Could stopping work place the clients in jeopardy?	
7	Α	It depends on the situation.	
8	Q	But at any rate you continued to do some work on the file	
9	and actually increased offers for them, correct?		
10	А	Yes.	
11	Q	Now that work all occurred on November 30th, correct?	
12	А	Yes.	
13	Q	We were shown, this is Edgeworth Exhibit 3, this is Bate 1,	
14	this is that infamous contingency email of August 22, 2017?		
15	Α	Yes.	
16	Q	And the forward on this indicates that you sent it to me on	
17	December 1, 2017?		
18	А	Yes.	
19	Q	So you went out and consulted your own lawyer?	
20	Α	Yes.	
21	Q	Why did you do that?	
22	Α	Because I felt that I was terminated, when he's meeting with	
23	other lawyers, and I'm getting letters that I'm supposed to be talking to		
24	other lawyers about a case that I had been representing on for a		
25	substantia	al time and did amazing work on and gave amazing advice.	

And the only reason for that would -- for another law firm to get involved is if I'm out.

- Q And you were in an awkward position, weren't you? As I think Mr. Vannah made abundantly clear you never did move to withdraw?
 - A Right.
 - Q Why not.

A Number one, I'm not going to just blow up any settlements, number one. I've never done that, never will. I continue to work, and I always put the client's interest above mine, which I did in this case, even after I'm getting all of these letters.

Number two, even later, Mr. Vannah was making it abundantly clear that they were coming after me, if I decided to do something that might even remotely be considered adverse to the client.

So, I'm in an awkward position, I'm going to fulfill my duties regardless, and it was clear they didn't want to pay me. But I'm still going to do it, and do my job for the client regardless, and payment is going to be an issue that we deal with later.

- Q And that's the same day I believe you filed your first attorney's lien?
 - A Yes.

THE COURT: And what was the first day you consulted with Mr. Christensen to represent you? Do you remember?

THE WITNESS: I don't, but it would have been around that time, or a few days or more, before, when I felt that I wasn't getting

1	MR. VANNAH: Thank you.
2	THE COURT: No problem.
3	MR. VANNAH: That's been great.
4	[Proceedings adjourned at 4:16 p.m.]
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19	ATTEST: I do hereby certify that I have truly and correctly transcribed the audio-visual recording of the proceeding in the above entitled case to the
20	best of my ability.
21	O - Po (1/1/
22	Simia B Cakell
23	
24	Maukele Transcribers, LLC
25	Jessica B. Cahill, Transcriber, CER/CET-708

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that I am an employee of MORRIS LAW GROUP; I am familiar with the firm's practice of collection and processing documents for mailing; that, in accordance therewith, I caused the following document to be eserved via the Supreme Court's electronic service process. I hereby certify that on the 4th day of December, 2023, a true and correct copy of the foregoing EDGEWORTH APPELLANTS' APPENDIX TO OPENING BRIEF (VOLUME I) was served by the following method(s):

☑ Supreme Court's EFlex Electronic Filing System

Peter S. Christiansen Kendelee L. Works CHRISTIANSEN LAW OFFICE 810 S. Casino Center Blvd., Ste 104 Las Vegas, NV 89101

and

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Attorneys for Respondent Law Office of Daniel S. Simon, A Professional Corporation; and Daniel S. Simon

DATED this 4th day of DECEMBER, 2023.

By: /s/ CATHY SIMICICH