Case No. 87572

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA

In the MATTER OF THE JORDAN DANA FRASIER FAMILY TRUST

AMY FRASIER WILSON,

Appellant,

v.

U.S. BANK WEALTH MANAGEMENT: BRADLEY L. FRASIER, M.D.; NORI STANLEY_H. FRASIER; JR., BROWN Special Administrator, ESTATE OF DINNY UNIVERSITY: FRASIER; CHAPMAN TEMPLE BETH SHOLOM OF ORANGE COUNTY, INC.; IRVINE COMMUNITY ALLIANCE FUND; AMERICAN SOCIETY PREVENTION OF CRUELTY FOR ΤO ANIMALS; ST. JUDE CHILDREN'S RESEARCH HOSPITAL, INC.; SARA CADY; DANIELLE FRASIER AROESTE; ELIOT CADY; ELISSA CADY; and BRENDAN FRASIÉR,

Electronically Filed Apr 22 2024 03:28 PM Elizabeth A. Brown Clerk of Supreme Court

Respondents.

APPEAL

from the Second Judicial District Court, Washoe County The Honorable Tammy Riggs, District Judge District Court Case No. PR16-00128

APPENDIX TO APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF VOLUME 5 OF 6

Alexander G. LeVeque (SBN 11183) Roberto M. Campos (SBN 15189) SOLOMON DWIGGINS FREER & STEADMAN, LTD. 9060 West Cheyenne Avenue Las Vegas, Nevada 89129 Telephone: (702) 853-5483 Facsimile: (702) 853-5485 <u>aleveque@sdfnvlaw.com</u> rcampos@sdfnvlaw.com

Attorneys for Appellant

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that I am an employee of SOLOMON DWIGGINS FREER & STEADMAN, LTD. and that on the 22nd day of April, 2024, **APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF** ("Brief"), and **APPELLANT'S APPENDIX (VOLUMES 1-6)** ("Appendix") were filed electronically with the Clerk of the Nevada Supreme Court, and that I caused a true and correct copy of the Brief and Appendix to the following in the manner set forth below:

Via:

[<u>XXX</u>]

E-Service by eFlex:

Patricia Halstead, Esq.	Patrick Millsap, Esq.
HALSTEAD LAW OFFICES	WALLACE & MILLSAP
615 S. Arlington Avenue	510 W. Plumb Lane, Ste. A
Reno, Nevada 89509	Reno, Nevada 89509
<i>Counsel for U.S. Bank Wealth</i>	Attorneys for Stanley Brown, Special
<i>Management, Trustee</i>	Administrator, Estate of Dinny Frasier
Ryan J. Earl, Esq. LAW OFFICES OF RYAN J. EARL 548 W. Plumb Lane, Suite B Reno, Nevada 89509 Counsel for Chapman University; Temple Beth Sholom of Orange County, Inc.; Irvine Community Alliance Fund; American Society for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals; and St. Jude Children's Research Hospital	G. David Robertson, Esq. Richard Williamson, Esq. ROBERTSON, JOHNSON, MILLER & WILLIAMSON 50 W. Liberty St., Ste 600 Reno, Nevada 89501 Attorney for Premier Trust, Inc. formed Trustee

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid: [<u>XXX]</u>

Elissa Cady	Bradley L. Frasier, M.D.
3735 Quimby Road	3609 Vista Way
San Jose, California 95148	Oceanside, California 92056
Nori Frasier	Eliot Cady
4372 Pacifica Way, Unit 3	23 Cynthia Lane
Oceanside, California 92056	Hollis Center, Maine 04042
Danielle Frasier Aroeste	Brendan Fraiser
7232 Sitio Arago	3585 Brook Street, Apartment 7
Carlsbad, California 92009	Lafayette, California 94549
Mark G. Simons Simons Hall Johnston PC 690 Sierra Rose Dr Reno, Nevada 89511	Dr. Sara Cady 1181 Reading Drive, Apartment 5308 Montgomery, Illinois 60538
The Honorable Tammy Riggs Second Judicial District Court, Dept. 3 75 Court Street Reno, Nevada 89501	

/s/ Terrie Maxfield An Employee of SOLOMON DWIGGINS FREER & STEADMAN, LTD.

i			FILE Electroni	cally
			PR16-00 2023-08-08 01	42:02 PM
			Alicia L. L Clerk of the Transaction # 9818	Court
1	Patricia Halstead, Esq. NV. Bar No. 6668			
2	Halstead Law Offices			
3	615 S. Arlington Avenue Reno, NV 89509			
4	(775) 322-2244 phalstead@halsteadlawoffices.com	ant Truston		
5	Attorney for U.S. Bank Private Wealth Manageme	eni, Trusice		
6	IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTR	NICT COURT OF THE STAT	ГЕ OF	
7	NEVADA IN AND FOR TH	E COUNTY OF WASHOE		
8				
9	In the Matter of	Case No.: PR16-00128		
10	JORDAN DANA FRASIER FAMILY TRUST	Dept. No.: PR		
11	/			
12	DR. BRADLEY FRASIER'S AND NORI FRA			
13	IDENTIFIED PROVISIONS OF THE PRO THAT ARE DIRECLTY CONTRARY TO C			
14	WHICH THE TRUS	TEE IS BOUND		
15	Based upon their communicated desire to			
16	Management's Objection to Identified Provisions	-	_	
17	Are Contrary to Controlling Trust Mandates by W			
18	Bank Private Wealth Management ("U.S. Bank"),			
19	Bank hereby submits this joinder as signed by Dr.			
20	also lodge their concerns individually and indepen	ndently here from. By and th	rough their	
21				
22	///			
23				
24				-
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26	///			
27	///			
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1	signatures below, Dr. Bradley Frasier and Nori Frasier acknowledge and hereby submit their
2	joinder in support of the Petition.
3	
4	Now Teasier
5	Bradley Frasier, M.D. Nori Frasier
6	
7	STATE OF CALIFORNIA)) ss.
8	COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO)
9	The free sing instrument titled DD DD ADI EV ED A STED'S AND NODI ED A STED'S
10	The foregoing instrument titled DR. BRADLEY FRASIER'S AND NORI FRASIER'S JOINDER TO OBJECTION TO IDENTIFIED PROVISIONS OF THE PROPOSED
11	SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT THAT ARE DIRECLTY CONTRARY TO CONTROLLING
12	TRUST MANDATES BY WHICH THE TRUSTEE IS BOUND was acknowledged before me
13	on the day of, in the year 2023 by BRADLEY FRASIER.
14	
15 16	(Signature of notarial officer)
17	(Signature of notarial officer)
18	STATE OF CALIFORNIA)
19) ss. COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO)
20	
21	The foregoing instrument titled DR. BRADLEY FRASIER'S AND NORI FRASIER'S
22	JOINDER TO OBJECTION TO IDENTIFIED PROVISIONS OF THE PROPOSED
23	SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT THAT ARE DIRECLTY CONTRARY TO CONTROLLING
24	TRUST MANDATES BY WHICH THE TRUSTEE IS BOUND was acknowledged before me on the day of AUGUST, in the year 2023 by NORI FRASIER.
25	on the 6 day of August in the year 2023 by NORI FRASIER.
26	Dacene Mars
27	(Signature of notarial officer)
28	
	Linde V. Star House Metary Rud voltary San Diego Sourry Commission # 2392896 My Commission # 2392896
	APP59

1 signatures below, Dr. Bradley Frasier and Nori Frasier acknowledge and hereby submit their 2 joinder in support of the Petition 3 4 5 Nori Frasier Bradley Frasier, M.D. 6 STATE OF CALIFØRNIA 7) ss. 8 COUNTY OF SÁN DIEGO 9 The foregoing instrument titled DR. BRADLEY FRASIER'S AND NORI FRASIER'S 10 JOINDER TO OBJECTION TO IDENTIFIED PROVISIONS OF THE PROPOSED 11 SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT THAT ARE DIRECLTY CONTRARY TO CONTROLLING 12 TRUST MANDATES BY WHICH THE TRUSTEE IS BOUND was acknowledged before me 13 , in the year 2023 by BRADLEY FRASIER. op the day of 14 15 (Signature of notarial officer) 16 17 BEE ATTACHED CALIFORNIA CERTIFICATE KIRAN B. MISRA 08/02/2023 STATE OF CALIFORNIA 18) ss. COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO 19 20 The foregoing instrument titled DR. BRADLEY FRASIER'S AND NORI FRASIER'S 21 JOINDER TO OBJECTION TO IDENTIFIED PROVISIONS OF THE PROPOSED 22 SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT THAT ARE DIRECLTY CONTRARY TO CONTROLLING 23 TRUST MANDATES BY WHICH THE TRUSTEE IS BOUND was acknowledged before me 24 on the _____ day of ______, in the year 2023 by NORI FRASIER. 25 26 (Signature of notarial officer) 27 28

CALIFORNIA ALL PURPOSE ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

CIVIL CODE SECTION 1189

A notary public or other officer completing this certificate verifies only the identity of the individual who signed the document to which this certificate is attached, and not the truthfulness, accuracy, or validity of that document.

State of California

County of SAN DIEGO On 08(02/2023 before me, KIRAN B. MIISRA, PUBLIC personally appeared BRADLEY FRASIER.

who proved to me on the basis of satisfactory evidence to be the person(y) whose name(y) is/y e subscribed to the within instrument and acknowledged to me that he/she/they executed the same in his/her/their authorized capacity(jes), and that by his/her/their signature(s) on the instrument the person(s), or the entity upon behalf of which the person(s) acted, executed the instrument.

> Laws of the State of California that the foregoing paragraph is true and correct. TARY PUBLIC . CALIFORNIA WITNESS my hand and official seal. SAN DIEGO COUNTY

Signature _____

I certify under PENALTY OF PERJURY under the

Signature of Notary Public

Place Notary Seal and/or Stamp Above

ion Expires OCT 14, 2026

OPTIONAL
Description of Attached Document: Re: JORDAN DANA FRASIER FAMILY TRUST
Document Date:Number of Pages:KBL
Signer(s) other than named above:

1	AFFIRMATION
3	The foregoing document titled DR. BRADLEY FRASIER'S AND NORI FRASIER'S
	JOINDER TO OBJECTION TO IDENTIFIED PROVISIONS OF THE PROPOSED
4	SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT THAT ARE DIRECLTY CONTRARY TO CONTROLLING
5	TRUST MANDATES BY WHICH THE TRUSTEE IS BOUND does not contain the social
6	security number of any person.
7	Respectfully submitted this 8th day of August 2023.
8	/s/ Patricia Halstead
9	Attorney for U.S. Bank Private Wealth Management, Trustee
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	³ APP596

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I am an employee or otherwise affiliated with Halstead Law Offices and that on 8th day of August 2023, I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing document titled DR. BRADLEY FRASIER'S AND NORI FRASIER'S OBJECTION TO IDENTIFIED PROVISIONS OF THE PROPOSED SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT THAT ARE DIRECLTY CONTRARY TO CONTROLLING TRUST MANDATES BY WHICH THE TRUSTEE IS BOUND to be served by depositing a copy of the document in the U.S. Mail, first class postage prepaid, to the following:

Stanley Brown, Esq. c/o Patrick Millsap, Esq. 510 W. Plumb Lane, Ste. A Reno, NV 89509 Bradley L. Frasier, M.D. 3609 Vista Way Oceanside, CA 92056

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Nori Frasier 4372 Pacifica Way, Unit 3 Oceanside, CA 92056

Amy Frasier Wilson c/o Mark Simons, Esq. 690 Sierra Rose Drive Reno, NV 89511

Chapman University; Temple Beth Shalom; Irvine Community Alliance Fund; ASPCA; and St. Jude Children's Research Hospital c/o Ryan Earl, Esq. 548 W. Plumb Lane

Reno, NV 89509

/s/ Martina Beatty

1 2 3 4 5 6 7	2501 MARK G. SIMONS, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 5132 <u>MSimons@SHJNevada.com</u> 690 Sierra Rose Drive Reno, Nevada 89511 Telephone: (775) 785-0088 Facsimile: (775) 785-0087 Attorneys for Amy Frasier Wilson				
8	IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA				
9 10	IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHOE				
11	In the matter of the CASE NO.: PR16-00128				
12	JORDAN DANA FRASIER FAMILY DEPT. NO.: 15 TRUST				
13					
14	AMY FRASIER WILSON'S SUPPLEMENT AND RESPONSE TO OBJECTION				
15	Amy Frasier Wilson, ("Amy") by and through her undersigned counsel submits the				
16	following Supplement and Response in support of the Joint Petition to Confirm Settlement				
17 18	Agreement ("Petition").				
10	I. REASON FOR SUPPLEMENT AND RESPONSE.				
20	Counsel for US Bank ("Bank") has objected to the Petition arguing this Court does				
21	not have jurisdiction to grant the Petition in total and/or does not have the authority to				
22	terminate Trust B. The Bank's objection relies exclusively upon interpretation of				
23	California law and ignores the applicable and controlling Nevada statutes, decisional law				
24	rendered by Judge Hardy and the Nevada Supreme Court's decision.				
The Bank's position is not only baseless, but also improperly and wror 26					
20	brought before this Court. This is because the Bank's objection is barred by the				
28	annlightion of judicial external harrod by judicial admission, harrod by the law of the				
	APP598				

SIMONS HALL JOHNSTON PC 690 Sierra Rose Drive Reno, NV 89511 Phone: (775) 785-0088

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case. barred by the inability to contest Judge Hardy's controlling Order of October 15, 1 2 2018, and barred by the express terms of NRS 164.010, 164.015 and the incorporation of 3 those powers enumerated in NRS 153.031. In addition, the Bank's arguments distort the 4 clear intent of the terms of Trust B, which is that it is simply an asset protection trust to 5 allow Amy to receive public assistance. Amy has not and does not receive public 6 assistance so the purpose and intent of keeping Trust B irrevocable and non-terminable 7 8 does not exist, mandating termination as requested. Each of these points will be 9 addressed in more detail below. In addition, Amy will address the basis for awarding her 10 all of the personal property under the terms of the Settlement Agreement. As used 11 herein, subtrust A and subtrust B are used interchangeably with Trust A, Trust B, the 12 Survivor's Trust A and Tax Exempt Trust B. 13

11. THE DIVISIVE AND ABUSIVE HISTORY OF LITIGATION.

As detailed in the Petition, all parties (other than US Bank and Mr. Resnick) have 15 16 sought to achieve a global resolution and termination of the Frasier Family Trust and subtrust A and subtrust B. Until this point in time, that objective could not be realized. It 18 can now be realized by the granting of the Petition in total including termination of both Trust A and Trust B after successful mediation.

As Judge Hardy stated when he previously modified Trusts A and B pursuant to 21 the provisions of NRS 164.015 and NRS 153.031 (both statutes vesting this Court with 22 the jurisdictional authority to grant this Petition in total as discussed in more detail below), 23 24 the following concerns about the abuse and litigiousness of these proceedings were 25 overly concerning to him as follows:

When I was in private practice I was a nationally certified elder law attorney through the National Academy Elder Law Attorneys. On my 13 years on the bench I have presided for six years over adult guardianship issues, and now I preside

over contested probate and trust matters. I have experienced elderly clients and litigants with full capacity. I also have sensitivity to facts indicating cognitive compromises on the continuum of capacity. Regrettably, I also have experience, too much experience, with the economic principle called Parkinson's Law, wherein litigation expands to fill the space created by the availability of litigation funds. The shameful litigation I have observed as a judge in 13 years is the litigation where lawyers have access to large sums of money without a client directing, approving, or understanding litigation choices and costs.

I left the May 9th hearing concerned that this dispute is creating an injustice for a dear woman in the final season of her life. I heard conflicting arguments from counsel about Ms. Frasier's capacity, her directions in this litigation, but I received no evidence from Ms. Frasier herself. I was concerned about whether - - I was concerned that Ms. Frasier appeared to be surrounded by a private attorney [Mr. Resnick] and a private fiduciary [employed at the insistence of Mr. Resnick] acting as an agent under a power of attorney instrument and that she was refusing to speak with her co-trustee without her private attorney present. I began to detect a form of isolation and thought it possible, if not probable, that Ms. Frasier's decisions were being directed by Mr. Resnick who might not have wanted the scrutiny and oversight Premier asserted.

This Court's concerns increased with reading the post-hearing moving papers and learning that Ms. Frasier was attempting to terminate Premier only increased. I was concerned that it was not Ms. Frasier who was directing this litigation, and I expected her to be present to persuade this Court that it was she who was directing this litigation.

This Court carefully drafted its order. As I indicated on the phone yesterday, those words were not arbitrary or haphazardly chosen. The Court's intent by that order was to bring sense to a senseless litigation.

I carefully read as follows: Quote, this Court is concerned about Ms. Frasier's cognition and capacity and the external influences that have been excluded from and introduced into Ms. Frasier's life. The alleged pattern of altered personal relationships, revolving professional relationships, to include the recent substitution of local counsel, isolation of her capacity, investing confidence in those spacially close, despite the absence of familia or friendship antecedes is familiar to this Court.

Exhibit 1, excerpts of Transcript of Proceedings on October 17, 2017, pp. 4-5.¹

¹ All exhibits identified herein are authenticated by the Declaration of Mark G. Simons attached hereto as Exhibit 10.

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1	In response to Judge Hardy's concerns, Mr. G. David Robertson, former attorney				
2	for Premier Trust, the predecessor to Bank in these proceeding, stated on the record, "as				
3	an officer of the court" the following:				
4	I was able to meet with Ms. Frasier personally for a brief period, an hour,				
5 6	hour and a half, something like that a few weeks ago. I don't want to divulge any of the communications that occurred during that meeting, and				
7	Mr. Resnick asked me to sign a confidentiality agreement and I did. I would just say that I believe my opinion is that as an officer of the court that if Ms.				
8	Frasier were here today, no question in my mind that it wouldn't be within five minutes that the Court would find its concerns were validated.				
9	Ex. 1, pp. 11:19-12-3.				
10	In Judge Hardy's Order After Hearing on December 12, 2021, Judge Hardy also				
11	commented on Bradley Frasier ("Bradley") and his involvement in the ongoing litigation				
12	and Bradley's abusive assertions of self-dealing and incompetence against Mr.				
13	Robertson. Order, p. 5. In addition, Judge Hardy noted that Bradley had been				
14	represented by three (3) attorneys in succession yet continued to personally				
15	represented by three (3) attorneys in succession yet continued to personally				
16	communicate with Mr. Robertson. <i>Id.</i> , p. 5-6. In response to Bradley's criticism of Mr.				
17	Robertson, Judge Hardy noted: "This Court knows Mr. Robertson to be a careful and				
18	professional attorney; thus, no further comment or action is warranted." Id., p. 5, fn. 2.				
19	III. THE BANK'S ARGUMENTS IN OPPOSITION TO ENFORCEMENT OF THE				
20	SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT AND TERMINATION OF TRUST B HAVE NO MERIT.				
21	Strangely, the Bank is opposing the Petition arguing primarily this Court does not				
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23	have jurisdiction to render the relief requested. Instead, Bank argues this Court should				
24	ignore controlling Nevada statutory authority, ignore the Bank's predecessor attorneys'				
25	conduct in invoking Nevada statutory authority in these proceedings, ignore Judge				
26	Hardy's prior Order of October 15, 2018, invoking Nevada's statutory authority to modify				
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Page 4

the trusts at issue in this case and ignore the Nevada Supreme Court's decision affirming this Court's invocation of Nevada's statutory authority.

A. BANK IS BARRED BY JUDICIAL ESTOPPEL TO CONTEST THE RELIEF SOUGHT IN THE PETITION.

Bank spends an inordinate amount of effort trying to convince this Court that it

does not have jurisdiction to grant the Petition and terminate Trust B. Bank's arguments

are all barred because the Bank is judicially estopped from making such arguments. As

stated in *Rissetto v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local* 343, 94 F.3d 597, 600-01 (9th Cir.

1996):

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Judicial estoppel, sometimes also known as the doctrine of preclusion of inconsistent positions, precludes a party from gaining an advantage by taking one position, and then seeking a second advantage by taking an incompatible position. . . Judicial estoppel is intended to protect against a litigant playing fast and loose with the courts.

Id. The Nevada Supreme Court articulated the purpose and intent of applying judicial

estoppel In the Matter of Frei Irrevocable Tr. 133 Nev. 50, 55, 390 P.3d 646, 651-52

(2017), wherein the Court held:

Judicial estoppel is a principle designed to "guard the judiciary's integrity," and "a court may invoke the doctrine at its own discretion." . . . It is a doctrine that applies "when a party's inconsistent position [arises] from intentional wrongdoing or an attempt to obtain an unfair advantage." . . . "Whether judicial estoppel applies is a guestion of law that we review de novo."

Id. The Co-Trustees of the Frasier Family Trust initiated these proceedings asserted to

the Court that pursuant to NRS Chapter 164, this Court had authority to exercise

jurisdiction over the entirety of the trusts and all subtrusts, including interpretation,

construction and enforcement thereof. Judge Hardy exercised such authority. Such

authority was not appealed or contested. Accordingly, the Bank is barred as a matter of

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law from contesting this Court's jurisdiction to terminate Trust B and/or that Nevada statutory law *does not* govern these proceedings.

1. THE ORIGINAL PETITION: NRS Chapter 164 Application. 4 Bank stands in the shoes of its predecessor Premier Trust. On March 2, 2016, 5 Premier Trust and Dinny G. Frasier ("Dinny"), as Co-Trustees of the Frasier Family Trust 6 filed their Petition for Confirmation of Trustees, for Construction of the Trust Instruments, 7 8 and for Instructions ("Original Petition"). The Original Petition cited to and relied upon "the 9 provisions of NRS chapter 164" and specifically cited to and relied upon NRS 164.010(1) 10 for this Court to exercise its jurisdiction in these proceedings. Original Pet., p. 1, p.4. 11 Specifically, and fatal to the Bank's objection, the Original Petition states: 12 Pursuant to NRS 164.010, this Court has jurisdiction of the trusts, the 13 matters brought forth in this petition, and other matters which the Court may need to determine in the future in relation to the trusts. 14 Id., ¶39. The Original Petition was **verified** by both Dinny and Premier Trust. Id., pp. 9, 15 16 10. The Court was also asked to exercise its authority to grant "such other and further 17 relief and determinations as the Court may deem just and proper." Id., ¶H. 18 2. THE ORIGINAL PETITION: Recommendation and Confirming Order. 19 20 On April 21, 2016, the Probate Commissioner issued his Recommendation 21 approving the Court's exercise of jurisdiction over the Trust pursuant to NRS Chapter 164 22 stating: 23 Pursuant to NRS 164.010, the Court does hereby assume jurisdiction of the 24 Jordan Diane Frasier Family Trust and all other subtrusts created thereunder. 25 Id. On August 29, 2016, the Court entered its Confirming Order confirming and adopting 26 the Recommendation in total. 27 28

3. THE SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL PETITION: NRS Chapter 164 Application.

On May 31, 2017, Premier Trust filed its Second Supplemental Petition for Instructions ("2nd Supplement). As with the Original Petition, Premier Trust once again affirmed and relied upon "the provisions of NRS chapter 164". In addition, Premier Trust cited to and relied upon NRS 164.030(1) for this Court to exercise its jurisdiction in these proceedings for the Court to issue "instructions in the administration of the trust of for a construction of the trust instrument" 2nd Supplement, p. 1, ¶14. Specifically, and again dispositive of the rejection of the Bank's objection, the 2nd Supplement states: Accordingly, this Court has jurisdiction of the Frasier Trusts and Co-

Accordingly, this Court has jurisdiction of the Frasier Trusts and Co-Trustees, the matters brought forth in this Second Supplemental Petition, and any other matter which the Court may need to determine in the future in relation to the Frasier Trusts or the Co-Trustees.

Id., ¶15 (emphasis added). The 2nd Supplement was again verified by Premier Trust.

ld., p.11.

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4. JUDGE HARDY'S ORDER MODIFYING THE TRUST TO EFFECTUATE THE TERMS OF THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT.

As this Court is aware, in 2017, the Court was faced with enforcement of a prior

19 settlement agreement relating to the affairs of the Frasier Family Trust and subtrusts A

and B. On October 15, 2018, Judge Hardy was requested to determine the enforceability

²¹ of the settlement agreement and then to modify the trusts, pursuant to his statutory

²² authority to effectuate the terms of the settlement. Again, fatal to the Bank's current

objection, Judge Hardy ordered as follows:

Specifically, both Mrs. Frasier and PT have petitioned this Court regarding the internal affairs of the Trust, including the Trust's administration of the Medical Building as stated above. When issuing orders regarding the internal affairs of the Trust pursuant to NRS 164.015, the Court may afford the relief set forth in NRS 153.031. NRS 164.015(1). NRS 153.031(1)(n) empowers the Court to direct modification of a trust. Pursuant

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to the Court's statutory authority to modify a trust instrument under NRS 153.031(1)(n), the Court finds good cause to modify the Trust . . .

Exhibit 2, Judge Hardy's October 15, 2018 Order, p. 3:16-22 (emphasis added). As Judge Hardy's Order makes abundantly clear, Nevada law controls the internal affairs of the trusts including construction of the trust's terms. Premier Trust and Dinny previously admitted and consented to this Court's jurisdictional authority to interpret, construe and modify the trusts according to Nevada statutory law.

As Judge Hardy noted, NRS 164.015(1) "empowers the Court to direct modification of a Trust" under NRS 153.031's provisions. NRS 153.031 provides, in part:

A trustee or beneficiary may petition the court regarding any aspect of the affairs of the trust, including:

(b) Determining the construction of the trust instrument;

(n) Approving or directing the modification or termination of the trust . . .

Id. (emphasis added). The Petition, which is presented to this Court under the authority
 of NRS Chapter 164, specifically empowers this Court to modify and terminate trusts,
 exactly the same relief requested in the Petition. The Bank's opposition fails to address
 controlling law, fails to address the consent and affirmance of this Court's authority and
 fails to address Judge Hardy's exercise of authority to modify and amend Trust B, and, as
 such, should be disregarded by this Court.

The Bank stands in the shoes of the prior Trustees, Dinny and Premier Trust, and both petitioned this Court to exercise its authority granted under Nevada statutes. Judge Hardy exercised such authority and the Nevada Supreme Court affirmed such authority.

Page 8

B. BANK IS BARRED BY JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS TO CONTEST THE RELIEF SOUGHT IN THE PETITION.

On the same grounds applicable to the bar of judicial estoppel, the Bank is barred by Dinny's and Premier Trust's judicial admissions confirming this Court's statutory authority vested in it under NRS Chapter 164 and NRS 153.031. Judicial admissions are powerful events in the law. "Judicial admissions are defined as deliberate, clear, unequivocal statements by a party about a concrete fact within that party's knowledge." *Reyburn Lawn & Landscape Designers, Inc. v. Plaster Development Co., Inc.*, 127 Nev. 331, 343, 255 P.3d 268, 276 277 (2011). Dinny and Premier Trust have already admitted this Court's authority to enforce settlement agreements and to amend and/or terminate the trusts over which this Court has authority and the Bank's objection is facially baseless. *See* 29A Am. Jur. 2d Evidence § 783 (July 2010) ("A judicial admission is a party's unequivocal concession of the truth of a matter, and removes the matter as an issue in the case. It is a voluntary concession of fact by a party or a party's attorney during judicial proceedings.").

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C. THE LAW OF THE CASE BARS THE BANK'S OBJECTION.

The law of the case applies to these proceedings on remand. *In the Estate of Adams By & Through Adams v. Fallini*, 132 Nev. 814, 819, 386 P.3d 621, 624 (2016) the
 Nevada Supreme Court explained as follows:

"The law-of-the-case doctrine refers to a family of rules embodying the general concept that a court involved in later phases of a lawsuit should not re-open questions decided (i.e., established as law of the case) by that court or a higher one in earlier phases."

Id. (citation omitted). This case is on remand from the *Matter of Jordan Dana Frasier Family Tr.*, 136 Nev. 486, 471 P.3d 742 (2020). The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed this
 Court's "assumption of jurisdiction over the trust under NRS 164.010." *Id.*, at 486, 471

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P.3d at 743. The Nevada Supreme Court also noted the Court was asked to also "provide guidance regarding dispute". Id. at 487, 471 P.3d at 743. Under the law of the case, this Court has complete jurisdiction over the trusts and NRS 153.031 empowers the Court to direct modifications and termination of Trust B as requested in the Petition.

D. JUDGE HARDY'S CONTROLLING ORDER CANNOT BE CONTESTED BY THE BANK IN THESE PROCEEDINGS.

The Bank is also barred from contesting that this Court has complete jurisdiction over the trusts under NRS Chapter 164 and NRS 153.031 as Judge Hardy has already ruled in his October 15, 2018 Order because Judge Hardy's ruling cannot be contested, revisited or amended. Judge Hardy's October 15, 2018 Order was not appealed, because all parties consented, agreed and acknowledged the Court's exercise of jurisdiction over the trusts under NRS Chapter 164 and NRS 153.031 to modify and terminate the trusts. Ex. 2.

15 This Court cannot revisit, amend, modify or alter Judge Hardy's ruling because a 16 district court judge does not have the jurisdictional authority to review or alter another 17 judge's order. In Rohlfing v. District Court, 106 Nev. 902, 906, 803 P.2d 659, 662 (1990), 18 the Nevada Supreme Court recognized: "[t]he district courts of this state have equal and 19 coextensive jurisdiction; therefore, the various district courts lack jurisdiction to 20 review the acts of other district courts." (emphasis added)). See also Nev. Const. art. 22 6, § 4 ("The Supreme Court and the court of appeals have appellate jurisdiction in all civil 23 cases arising in district courts "); art. 6, § 6 (setting the jurisdiction of the district 24 courts); NRS 3.220 (providing that district court judges possess equal, coextensive and 25 concurrent jurisdiction and power-not appellate power over each other); Warden v. 26 Owens, 93 Nev. 255, 563 P.2d 81 (1977) (holding that a district court lacks jurisdiction to 27

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vacate another district court's judgment of conviction and remand a case to another
 district court).

E. THE BANK'S OBJECTION IS BARRED BY THE TERMS OF NRS 164.010.

Again, Dinny and Premier Trust petitioned this Court to assume jurisdiction over

the Frasier Family Trust and subtrusts A and B, which this Court did. Pursuant to NRS

160.010(5)(d), this Court is specifically vested with the following authority:

(d) [The Court] May consider at the same time granting orders on other matters relating to the trust, including, without limitation, matters that might be addressed in a declaratory judgment relating to the trust under subsection 2 of NRS 30.040 or petitions filed pursuant to NRS 153.031 or 164.015 whether such matters are raised in the petition to assume jurisdiction pursuant to this section or in one or more separate petitions that are filed concurrently with the petition to assume jurisdiction.

The broad power and authority of the Court pursuant to NRS 153.031 is discussed above.

In addition, NRS 30.040(2) provides:

2. A maker or legal representative of a maker of a will, trust or other writings constituting a testamentary instrument may have determined any question of construction or validity arising under the instrument and obtain a declaration of rights, status or other legal relations thereunder.

Accordingly, contrary to the Bank's arguments, this Court is also vested with the authority

to obtain interpretation and application of the terms of the trusts and substrusts, and may

further modify or terminate such trusts according to the provisions of NRS 153.031. The

Bank fails to address the application of NRS 153.031, and such failure is a concession

the Bank's arguments are without merit. *Edwards v. Emperor's Garden Rest.*, 122 Nev.

24 317, 330 n.38, 130 P.3d 1280, 1288 n.38 (2006) (court need not consider claims that are

²⁵ not cogently argued and supported with relevant authority).

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APP608

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IV. TRUST B SHOULD BE TERMINATED.

The foregoing information highlights to this Court the necessity for granting the Petition in total and terminating both Trust A and Trust B. This litigation has existed for going on eight (8) years with one successful appeal. There is no valid reason to refrain from terminating Trust B as detailed in the Petition. Prior counsel Mr. Robertson filed his Pre-Hearing Statement on May 5, 2017, stating the following:

- "The Trustees and Amy Frasier Wilson sought a global resolution of all disputes at the Mediation, but the Mediator was unable to convince all parties to achieve that outcome." P. 2:24-26.
- "The Trustees therefore worry that substantial litigate is still likely to arise in the future. Accordingly, the Trustee respectfully request that the Court confirm this Settlement, but do so in a manner which hopefully diminishes the likelihood for future litigation." P. 2:26-28.
- "Although Premier has diligently tried to pursue a global resolution of the various pending disputes, it has thus far been unable to achieve a global resolution." P.3:27-28.
- "the Trustees' concerns about future litigation" and the need to "discourage future litigation". P. 7:20-21.

Pre-Hearing Statement on May 5, 2017, on file herein. Global resolution was sought by the Bank's prior counsel and trustee, however, Bank and Mr. Resnick are desirous to continue the litigious behavior in these proceedings.

In addition, Premier Trust advised the Court of Bradley's litigious and vexatious conduct wherein Bradley left messages for his mother stating "I'm going to beat the crap out of you", "your attorney is a real idiot", "*Starts Yelling* we are going to court and you are going to pay a lot of money in legal fees and some am I and the lawyers are going to win.", "So tell that asshole Bill and stupid Amy that if they're going to be greedy they're going to lose", "You can tell Amy and Bill that I'm going to sue them for undue influence and I'm going to take them for everything they have" *Id.*, pp. 8-10.

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1 Also included in the filings in this case are Bradley's venomous emails to Amy 2 stating: "You are so evil. If there were a hell, that's where you would and should end up 3 for eternity." **Exhibit 3**. Bradley also shared his hostilities with Mr. Robertson stating: 4 "You son of a bitch! You want to steal all of my mother's money now? I am going to the 5 FBI to report this one. You are an immoral criminal!." Exhibit 4. Even more recently, 6 Bradley has emailed Amy's and the Estate's counsel stating: "Just saw the backroom deal 7 you made with Amy and the charities. ... I thought you both had more integrity than that. 8 9 My mistake." Exhibit 5. And, not to be outdone, Bradley emailed the undesigned 10 counsel stating: "We're tired of unethical attorneys manipulating our parents' estate and 11 our evil psychopath sister and her grifter husband changing our parents' wishes for their 12 estate... The fact you vacated the trial without a clear path is legal malpractice?". 13

Exhibit 6.

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Nevada law is clear that irrevocable trusts can be modified and terminated. *In the Matter of Frei Irrevocable Tr.* 133 Nev. 50, 53, 390 P.3d 646, 650 (2017). The Settlement
 Agreement contemplates the termination of Trust B and specifically includes termination
 of Trust B as a condition enforceable under NRS 164 and 153. However, because the
 Court must exercise its statutory authority to terminate Trust B, the parties could not
 condition the totality of the Settlement Agreement on the subsequent act of the Court.

However, the terms of the Settlement Agreement were negotiated fairly and reasonably so that payment of funds to both Bradley and Nori would occur from Trust B, without further delay. This in turn allows Bradley and Nori's heirs to receive the benefit of these rapid distributions.

Pursuant to the terms of Trust B, the residual beneficiaries are not to be
 considered and Amy's rights and entitlement is paramount. See Tax-Exempt Trust ("it is

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the settlors' desire that this trust fund be preserved **primarily for the benefit of Amy Michelle Frasier Wilson, and not for any remainder beneficiaries**." (emphasis added). Despite the Bank's strained interpretation, the limitation on Trust B's distribution out of trust to Amy was to protect her ability to receive public assistance. In fact, it can be argued that the Tax-Exempt Trust was intended to be subject to termination because it states "Amy is to be preferred to more remote beneficiaries." The primary method to benefit Amy and to prefer her over remote beneficiaries is to state exactly this in that what is best for Amy is paramount. What is best for Amy is to receive her share of the assets from Trust B free and clear of the trust so that she is not exposed to further litigation and further professionals billing hundreds of thousands of dollars depleting the remainder of her money for "administration" of a needless and unwarranted trust.

Of further note, with the enactment of the Affordable Care Act (ACA), pre-existing health conditions which once prevented health coverage for individuals like Amy, were no longer of concern. Amy is now eligible to receive insurance coverage even for preexisting conditions. The purpose of withholding the funds in Trust B for Amy to assist her with public assistance is not relevant or material and Amy should be disbursed the proceeds of Trust B.²

In addition, under Nevada law, a "spendthrift clause, in and of itself, does not
 prevent modification" or termination of an irrevocable trust. *Matter of Frei Irrevocable Tr.*,

 ² Also demonstrating the lack of candor with this Court, the Bank fails to address
 ²⁵ California Probate code 15409, which, consistent with NRS 153.031 allows a court to
 ²⁶ terminate Trust B when "the continuation of the trust would defeat or substantial impair
 ²⁷ the accomplishment of the purpose of the trust." With the enactment of the ACA and
 ²⁷ Amy's lack of public assistance, the purpose of Trust B no longer exists warranting its
 ²⁸ termination as requested.

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1 133 Nev. 50, 54, 390 P.3d 646, 650 (2017). Amy was distributed the Mission Viejo house
 free and clear out of trust. In Judge Hardy's July 6, 2017, Order Granting Motion to
 Approve and Enforce Settlement Agreement and Vacate Trial Date, Judge Hardy ruled:

 [A]s to the distribution of the Mission Viejo Property to Amy Frasier Wilson free of trust, all parties at the hearing acknowledge this was the intent of the Settlement Agreement and the Court accepts that representation.

July 6, 2017, Order, p.4:3-5. Accordingly, this Court has already ordering distributions directly to Amy out of trust.

V. MR. ROBERTSON CONFIRMS TRUST B SHOULD BE TERMINATED.

Mr. Robertson has confirmed the merits, reasons and justification for the Settlement Agreement and Petition. Mr. Robertson, former counsel to Dinny and Premier Trust, has extensive experience in trust administration and is a prominent attorney in our community. As stated by Judge Hardy, Mr. Robertson's credentials are impeccable. See **Exhibit 7**, Declaration of G. David Robertson at ¶¶2-3.

Mr. Robertson agrees that the Petition is warranted and is an appropriate and legally sound basis for concluding the ongoing litigation of all disputes. Mr. Robertson agrees that the modification and termination of Trust B under the terms of the Settlement Agreement pursuant to the Court's authority vested in it under NRS Chapter 164 and NRS 153.031 is also appropriate and legally sound. *Id.* at ¶4.

Mr. Robertson agrees that the Trustees had previously petitioned the Court to assume jurisdiction over the trust and subtrust A and B pursuant to NRS Chapter 164 which incorporates the powers of the Court to modify and/or terminate trusts as contained in NRS 153.031. Mr. Robertson further confirms that in 2017, the Trustees and Amy were also seeking a global settlement agreement that would have necessarily incorporated the

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modification and termination of Trust B, however, that agreed upon resolution could not 2° occur at that time due to other unrelated issues. *Id.* at ¶¶5-6.

In addition, Mr. Robertson confirms it is his opinion and belief, based on his extensive involvement in this matter, that Mr. Resnick has attempted to manipulate both Dinny and the Frasier estate proceedings in every way possible for his own personal benefit. *Id.* at ¶7.

Based upon the reasons stated in the Petition and in this Supplement, Mr. Robertson *disagrees* with the Bank's assertions and contentions that California law is applicable to the Petition and the remedies and relief requested. Rather, Mr. Robertson *agrees* the Petition, and the relief requested therein, is warranted and appropriate under Nevada law. *Id.* at ¶¶8-9.

VI. AMY SHOULD BE AWARDED ALL OF THE PERSONAL PROPERTY AS STATED IN THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT.

Amy's position is pursuant to the terms of the Settlement Agreement, all personal 16 property appraised in the amount of approximately \$32,381.00 is held in the Survivor's 17 Trust. This is because the personal property was appraised by Yvonne Karn for Bank in 18 July 2019 and was paid by Bank from Trust A in the total amount of \$21,125. See Exhibit 19 20 8. This personal property was located at the San Juan Capistrano house and/or Irvine 21 house, both of which were always in Trust A. See Exhibit 9, Appraisal. Thus, the 22 property listed on the inventory list by Karn should be considered part of the corpus of 23 Trust A. As Amy understands, there has never been an inventory or appraisal of 24 personal property located at the Palm Desert house which is in Trust B, accordingly, 25 whatever personal property in the Palm Desert house (and not part of the appraised 26 27

personal property) should be part of Trust B and divided equally upon termination of Trust
 B in total.
 With a control upperty

VII. CONCLUSION.

Amy respectfully requests the Court grant the Petition in total, including the termination of Trust B as requested allowing her to receive directly and out of trust all proceeds she is entitled to receive.

AFFIRMATION: This document does not contain the social security number of any

person.

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P DATED this _____ day of August, 2023.

SIMONS HALL JOHNSTON PC 690 Sierra Rose Drive Reno, NV 89511

By:

G. SIMONS MARK Attorneys for Amy Frasier Wilson

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		Page 17		
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1	CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
2	Pursuant to NRCP 5(b), I certify that I am an employee of SIMONS HALL
3	JOHNSTON PC and that on this date I caused to be served a true copy of the AMY
4	FRASIER WILSON'S SUPPLEMENT AND RESPONSE TO OBJECTION on all parties
5	to this action by the method(s) indicated below:
6 7	by placing an original or true copy thereof in a sealed envelope, with sufficient postage affixed thereto, in the United States mail at Reno, Nevada, addressed to:
8 9	BRADLEY FRASIER, M.D. 3609 Vista Way Oceanside, California 92056
10 11	NORI FRASER 4372 Pacifica Way, Unit 3 Oceanside, CA 92056
12 13	DR. SARA CADY 1181 Reading Drive, Apt. 5308 Montgomery, IL 60538
14 15	DANIELLE FRASIER AROESTE 7232 Sitio Arago Carlsbad, CA 92009
16 17	ELIOT CADY 23 Cynthia Lane Hollis Center, Maine 04042
18 19	ELISSA CADY 3735 Quimby Road San Jose, CA 95148
20 21	BRENDAN FRASIER 3235 Divisardero Street San Francisco, CA 94123
22	
23	I hereby certify that on the date below, I electronically filed the foregoing with the Clerk of the Court by using the ECF system which served the following parties electronically:
24	PATRICK R. MILLSAP, ESQ.
25 26	F. MCCLURE WALLACE, ESQ. RICHARD WILLIAMSON, ESQ. Attorneys for DINNY FRASIER
27	PATRICIA C. HALSTEAD, ESQ.
28	Attorney for US BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION
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RYAN EARL, Esq. Attorney for ASPCA, Temple Beth Sholom, St. Jude's Children's Hospital, Chapman University, Irvine Community Alliance Fund DATED this \underline{b} day of August, 2023. Employé¢ of Simons Hall Johnston PC 690 Sierra Rose Drive Reno, NV 89511 Phone: (775) 785-0088 Page 19

SIMONS HALL JOHNSTON PC

	EXHIBIT LIST	
NO	DESCRIPTION	PAGES
1	10/17/2017 Transcript Excerpts	5
2	10/15/2018 Order	4
3	Bradley Frasier 6/28/2017 Email	1
4	Bradley Frasier 7/12/2017 Email	1
5	Bradley Frasier 6/26/2023 Email	1
6	Bradley Frasier 6/28/2023 Email	2
7	Declaration of David Robertson	2
8	Cash Disbursement	1
9	Appraisal	102
10	Declaration of Mark G. Simons	2

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EXHIBIT 1

EXHIBIT 1

	1 CODE #4185
	2 SUNSHINE REPORTING SERVICES
	3 151 Country Estates Circle
	4 Reno, Nevada 89511 \bigcirc
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	7
	8 IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA
	9 IN AND FOR WASHOE COUNTY
<u>.</u> .	10 HONORABLE DAVID A. HARDY, JUDGE
ן 	-000-
•••	12 IN RE:
	13 Case No. PR16-00128
••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••	14 Dept. No. 15 JORDAN DANA FRASIER FAMILY
•	15 TRUST,
	16 TRUST/CONSERVATORSHIP 17
an ana, an 11, 18, 11, 8 ang an an an an an an ang ang ang ang ang ang ang ang ang a	18
	19 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
be be used and	20 ORAL ARGUMENTS
	21 OCTOBER 17, 2017
	22 RENO, NEVADA
	23
	24
	25 REPORTED BY: AMY JO TREVINO, CRR #825 SUNSHINE LITIGATION SERVICES (775) 323.3411
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	1	Page 4 Counsel, when I was in private practice I was a	
	2	nationally certified elder law attorney through the National	
	3	Academy Elder Law Attorneys. On my 13 years on the bench I	
	4	have presided for six years over adult guardianship issues, and	
	.5	now-I preside over contested probate and trust matters. I have	
	6	experienced elderly clients and litigants with full capacity.	
	7	I also have sensitivity to facts indicating cognitive	
····· ··· ··· ··· ···	····· 8 ·	compromises on the continuum of capacity. Regrettably, I also	
	9	have experience, too much experience, with the economic	
	10	principle called Parkinson's Law, wherein litigation expands to	
an a	11	fill the space created by the availability of litigation funds.	алын ар Ал — Манил
	12	The shameful litigation I have observed as a judge in 13 years	
	13	is that litigation where lawyers have access to large sums of	
	14	money without a client directing, approving, or understanding	
• • • •	15	litigation choices and costs.	
	16	I left the May 9th hearing concerned that this dispute	
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •	17	is creating an injustice for a dear woman in the final season	
	18	of her life. I heard conflicting arguments from counsel about	
	19	Ms. Frasier's capacity, her directions in this litigation, but	
	20	I received no evidence from Ms. Frasier herself. I was	
	21	concerned about whether I was concerned that Ms. Frasier	- ·
· · · ·	22	appeared to be surrounded by a private attorney and a private	
• •	23	fiduciary acting as an agent under a power of attorney	
•	24	instrument and that she was refusing to speak with her	
	25	co-trustee without her private attorney present. I began to	
a an an an an an	1	2. And the second se Second second se Second second sec	

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	1	Page 5 detect a form of isolation and thought it possible, if not
· · ·	2	probable, that Ms. Frasier's decisions were being directed by
	3	Mr. Resnick who might not have wanted the scrutiny and
	4	oversight Premier asserted.
	·5	This Court's concerns increased with reading the post-
	6	hearing moving papers and learning that Ms. Frasier was
	7	attempting to terminate Premier only increased. I was
and the management	····8···	concerned that it was not Ms. Frasier who was directing this
	9	litigation, and I expected her to be present to persuade this
. ,	10	Court that it was she who was directing this litigation.
· · · · · · · · · · ·	·11 ·	This Court carefully drafted its order As I.
	12	indicated on the phone yesterday, those words were not
	13	arbitrary or haphazardly chosen. The Court's intent by that
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	14	order was to bring sense to a senseless litigation.
· · ·	.15	I carefully read as follows: Quote, this Court is
	16	concerned about Ms. Frasier's cognition and capacity and the
	17	external influences that have been excluded from and introduced
	18	into Ms. Frasier's life. The alleged pattern of altered
	19	personal relationships, revolving professional relationships,
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	20	to include the recent substitution of local counsel, isolation
	21	of her capacity, investing confidence in those spacially close,
· · · .	22	despite the absence of familia or friendship antecedes is
	23	familiar to this Court. Given the unworkable relationship
· · · · ·	24	between co-trustees, it appears that one trustee may be removed
	25	from service.
	·	n na shekara

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	Page 12 1 Ms. Frasier were here today, no question in my mind that it
	2 wouldn't be within five minutes that the Court would find that
	3 its concerns were validated.
	4 THE COURT: Counsel.
	6 believe Premier was advised that that was from the Bank of
	7 America account was closed and the Opus bank account was
n na sa na sa	8 opened, and there is correspondence to that effect to Premier
	9 bank and to Mr. Robertson, and I'll offer on behalf of Jane
• • • •	10 Mulrain, who I do not represent, that she has said she is
······································	11 willing to give you her accounting in camera to review. She
	12 does not pay any bill over \$1,000 unless she discusses it with
	13 Dinny Frasier and she initials the bill. She is a professional
· .	14 fiduciary licensed in California, excellent reputation, and if
•• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •	15 necessary she will come up and testify before you at anytime
	16 you want, but she has offered to give you her accounting in
	17 camera. Obviously, it deals with personal expenses.
	18 As to Dr. Spar, we didn't find out until yesterday
	19 that the Inspector General was doing a spot audit at the UCLA
, and a set of the set	20 facility that he is the professor of. He said it would be
	21 criminal on his part not to attend. He had to be at 1:00
•	22 o'clock at this meeting with the Inspector General from the
	23 U.S. I tried my best to get him here. We had tickets, he was
	24 ready to go. Didn't find out until yesterday. I didn't I
	25 couldn't do anything else. As to

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•	[Page 48
	1	STATE OF NEVADA)) ss.
	2	WASHOE COUNTY)
	3	
:	4	I, AMY JO TREVINO, an Official Reporter of the Second
	5	Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada, in and for
:	6	Washoe County, DO HEREBY CERTIFY;
	7	That I was present in Department 15, of the
a na an	. 8	above-entitled Court on October 17, 2017, and took verbatim
	9	stenotype notes of the proceedings had upon the matter
· · ·	10	captioned within, and thereafter transcribed them into
www.com.com.com.com.com.com.com.com.com.com	11	-typewriting as herein appears;
	12	That the foregoing transcript, consisting of pages 1
	13	through 48, is a full, true and correct transcription of my
	14	stenotype notes of said proceedings.
• • • • • • • •	15	DATED: At Reno, Nevada, this 23rd day of October,
	16	2017.
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·	18	
	19	
• • ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••	20	
	21	/s/ Amy Jo Trevino AMY JO TREVINO, CRR #825
•	22 ·	AMI OO IKEVINO, CAR #025
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and the second second

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EXHIBIT 3

EXHIBIT 3

David Robertson

From: Sent: To: Subject: Amy Wilson <digitalmermaid8@gmail.com> Friday, July 07, 2017 1:37 PM David Robertson Fwd:

David,

The below email was sent by Bradley Frasier after the Joinder was filed with the Court.

Thank you,

Amy Frasier-Wilson

------ Forwarded message ------From: **Bfrasier** <<u>bfrasiermd@gmail.com</u>> Date: Wed, Jun 28, 2017 at 8:14 PM Subject: To: <u>digitalmermaid8@gmail.com</u>

You are so evil. If there were a hell, that's where you would and should end up for eternity. You will get what's coming to you someday as the forces of karma will take care of you.

Sent from my iPhone



EXHIBIT 4

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EXHIBIT 4

David Robertson

From:	Bfrasier <bfrasiermd@gmail.com></bfrasiermd@gmail.com>
Sent:	Wednesday, July 12, 2017 1:20 PM
То:	David Robertson
Cc:	Mike Sullivan; Scott Hernandez

You son of a bitch! You want to steal all of my mother's money now? I am going to the FBI to report this one. You are an immoral criminal!

Sent from my iPhone

EXHIBIT 6

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EXHIBIT 6

Mark Simons

From: Sent: To: Cc: Subject: Bfrasier <bfrasiermd@gmail.com> Wednesday, June 28, 2023 10:57 AM Patrick Millsap Mark Simons; Nori Frasier Re: Nice end-around!

Mark,

I fully expected this from you, given the secrecy of the negotiations. You should have included Nori and me if you're changing the Trust. Yes, I would question the integrity of the way the secret negotiations were handled. Nori and I learned very late that Amy had used undue influence to convince our mother to disinherit us and our children. That was a secret negotiation with Travis that was perpetuated by Robertson. We're tired of unethical attorneys manipulating our parents' estate and our evil psychopath sister and her grifter husband changing our parents' wishes for their estate.

As previously requested, please provide the specific legal reasons why you are changing the B Trust without consent of the beneficiaries. The fact you vacated the trial without a clear path is legal malpractice!

We will pursue that option if we have to.

Best regards,

Bradley L. Frasier, M.D.

Sent from my iPhone

On Jun 27, 2023, at 9:11 AM, Patrick Millsap <Patrick@wallacemillsap.com> wrote:

Dr. Frasier,

As you know, the B Trust is divided three ways following Ms. Frasier's passing. The only provision of the B Trust the Settlement Agreement modifies is Amy's 1/3 interest. The Agreement does *not* modify yours or Nori's interest in the B Trust. Instead, the Agreement actually benefits your interest in the B Trust by agreeing the A Trust will make the equalization payments to the B Trust contained in the Fifth Amendment to the A Trust. Therefore, in response to your question below yours and Nori's involvement in negotiations was not necessary because the Agreement does not modify or effect your interest in the B Trust and, instead, is actually designed to expedite distribution of that Trust. I hope this helps clarify your question Dr. Frasier and I am always available to discuss this further with you if you that would help. Thank you Dr. Frasier. – Pat

Patrick R. Millsap, Esq. Founding Member & Attorney-at-Law



510 W. Plumb Ln., Suite A Reno, Nevada 89509 (775) 683-9599

From: Brad Frasier <bfrasiermd@gmail.com>
Sent: Monday, June 26, 2023 11:04 PM
To: Mark Simons <msimons@shjnevada.com>; Patrick Millsap <Patrick@wallacemillsap.com>
Subject: Nice end-around!

Counselors:

Just saw the backroom deal you made with Amy and the charities. Since you are altering the B Trust terms, you should have included Nori and me in the negotiations. Not sure what legal right you have to change an irrevocable trust without the consent of two of the three beneficiaries. Please provide me with the legal reason why you did it.

I thought you both had more integrity than that. My mistake.

Dr. Frasier

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EXHIBIT 7

EXHIBIT 7

DECLARATION OF G. DAVID ROBERTSON

I, G. David Robertson hereby declare as follows:

1. I am over the age of 18 and I make this declaration under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States and the State of Nevada. I could and would competently testify about the information this declaration contains.

2. I am an attorney licensed to practice law in the State of Nevada, and am a Senior Shareholder at Robertson, Johnson, Miller & Williamson. I am former counsel to Dinny Frasier ("Dinny") and Premier Trust ("Premier"), as Co-Trustees of the Jordan Dana Frasier Family Trust, and resulting subtrusts, and have extensive experience in trust administration in our community. This Declaration is provided in my individual capacity at Mr. Simons' request and not on behalf of Dinny, Premier or any other client.

3. I agree the Petition is warranted and is an appropriate and legally sound basis for concluding the ongoing litigation of all disputes.

4. I also agree the modification and termination of Trust B under the terms of the Settlement Agreement is also appropriate and legally sound pursuant to the Court's authority vested in it under NRS Chapter 164 and NRS 153.031.

5. I agree that the Co-Trustees Dinny and Premier had previously petitioned 20 the Court to assume jurisdiction over the trust and subtrust A and B pursuant to NRS Chapter 164 which incorporates the powers of the Court to modify and/or terminate trusts 22 as contained in NRS 153.031. 23

24 6. I further confirm that in 2017, the Co-Trustees and Amy were also seeking a 25 global settlement agreement that would have necessarily incorporated the modification 26 and termination of Trust B, however, that agreed upon resolution could not occur at that 27 time due to other unrelated issues. 28

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8. Based upon the reasons stated in the Petition and in this Supplement, I *disagree* with the Bank's assertions and contentions that California law is applicable to the Petition and the remedies and relief requested.

8 9. Rather, I agree with the Petition, and the relief requested therein is
 9 warranted and appropriate under Nevada law.

I, G. David Robertson, do hereby swear under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of Nevada and the United States of America that the foregoing assertions are true and correct to the best of my knowledge.

DATED this 8th day of August, 2023.

<u>/s/ G. David Robertson</u> G. DAVID ROBERTSON

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EXHIBIT 8

EXHIBIT 8

US Private Wealth Management U.S. Bank			00- M -QQ-QH-215-01 0259534-00-0259-01	
FRASIER SURVIVORS TRUST ACCOUNT NUMBER: XXXXXXX7700				Page 8 of 14
		CASH TRANSACTION DETAIL	July 1, 201	9 to July 31, 2019
	Date Posted	Description	Income	Principal
Taxable Interest	*****	······································	Cash	Cash
First American Government Oblig Fd Cl Y #3763 FGVXX				
	07/01/19	Interest From 6/1/19 To 6/30/19	1,122.68	
Total Taxable Interest			Ad 400 00	
Paid To/For Beneficiary			\$1,122,68	\$0.00
Miscellaneous Payment				
	07/01/19	Cash Disbursement Paid To AAA Quality Repair Removal-Religious Symbol		-65.00
	07/12/19	Cash Disbursement Pald To Southern California Edison Payment To Southern California Edison Utilities-Gas/Elect	-26.46	
	07/16/19	Cash Disbursement Paid To American Society Of Appraisers Inv #71519 Dtd 07/15/19 - 07/10-07/18/19 Services		-21,125.00
	07/22/19	Reversal Paid To American Society Of Appraisers Inv #71519 Dtd 07/15/19 - 07/10-07/18/19 Services		21,125.00
\langle	07/22/19	Cash Disbursement Paid To Yvonne M. Karn, Asa Reissue Ck For Prof.Svcs/Catalog Pers Items		-21,125.00
	07/31/19	Oash Disbursement Paid To Command One Security, Inc Inv #142765 Qtrly Charge		-105.00

EXHIBIT 10

EXHIBIT 10

1		DECLARATION OF MARK G. SIMONS		
2	Mark	G. Simons hereby declares as follows:		
3	1.	I am over the age of 18 and I make this declaration unde	er penalty of	
4 5	perjury unde	er the laws of the United States and the State of Nevada.	I could and would	
6	competently	r testify about the information this declaration contains.		
7	2.	I am an attorney licensed to practice law in the State of	Nevada, and am a	
8	Partner at S	imons Hall Johnston PC. I represent Amy Frasier Wilson	("Amy"), in this	
9	matter.			
10	3.	This declaration is submitted in support of Amy Frasier \	Wilson's	
11	Supplement	t and Response to Objection ("Supplement") in the above-	captioned matter	
12 13	by Amy.			
13	4.	Exhibit 1 to the Supplement are true and correct excerpt	ts of the Transcript	
15	of Proceedings of October 17, 2017.			
16	5.	Exhibit 2 to the Supplement is a true and correct copy o	f Judge Hardy's	
17	October 25,	, 2018 Order.		
18	6.	Exhibit 3 to the Supplement is a true and correct copy o	f Bradley Frasier's	
19 20	June 28, 2017 email to Amy Frasier-Wilson.			
20 21	7.	Exhibit 4 to the Supplement is a true and correct copy o	f Bradley Frasier's	
22	July 12, 20 ⁻	17 email to David Robertson.		
23	8.	Exhibit 5 to the Supplement is a true and correct copy o	f Bradley Frasier's	
24	June 26, 20	023 email to the Estate's counsel and the undersigned cou	insel for Amy.	
25	9.	Exhibit 6 to the Supplement is a true and correct copy o	f Bradley Frasier's	
26	June 28, 20	023 email to the Estate's counsel, the undersigned and No	ri Frasier.	
27 28	10.	Exhibit 8 to the Supplement is a true and correct copy o	f a Cash	
28		Page 1	APP637	
1				

SIMONS HALL JOHNSTON PC 690 Sierra Rose Dr. Reno, NV 89511 Phone: (775) 785-0088

Transaction Detail showing a 7/22/19 cash disbursement to Yvonne M. Karn in the amount of \$21,125.00. Exhibit 9 to the Supplement is a true and correct copy of Yvonne M. Karn 8. ASA's May 3, 2019 Appraisal. I, Mark G. Simons, do hereby swear under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of Nevada and the United States of America that the foregoing assertions are true and correct to the best of my knowledge. DATED this day of August, 2023. MARK/G. SIMONS Page 2 **APP638**

SIMONS HALL JOHNSTON PC 690 Sierra Rose Dr. Reno, NV 89511 Phone: (775) 785-0088

FILED Electronica PR16-0012 2023-08-10 04:03 Alicia L. Ler Clerk of the C Transaction # 98248	ly 8 3:55 PM ud ourt
OF THE STATE OF	
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Patricia Halstead, Esq. NV. Bar No. 6668 Halstead Law Offices 615 S. Arlington Avenue Reno, NV 89509 (775) 322-2244 phalstead@halsteadlawoffices.com Attorney for U.S. Bank Private Wealth Management, Trustee IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT NEVADA IN AND FOR THE COUNTY C In the Matter of Case No.: PR16-00128 JORDAN DANA FRASIER FAMILY TRUST Dept. No.: PR **RESPONSE TO AMY FRASIER WILSON'S SUPPLEMENT IN SUPPORT OF THE** JOINT PETITION TO CONFIRM THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT COMES NOW U.S. Bank Private Wealth Management ("U.S. Bank"), as successor trustee of the Jordan Dana Frasier Family Trust and the sub-trusts derived therefrom (also referred to as the "Trustee"), by and through counsel Patricia Halstead of Halstead Law Offices, and hereby responds to Amy Frasier Wilson's Supplement in Support of the Joint Petition to Confirm the Settlement Agreement, which was filed on August 8, 2023. This Response is supported by the following Points and Authorities.¹ POINTS AND AUTHORITIES 1. Misstatements By Amy Frasier Wilson a. "Counsel for U.S. Bank has objected . . . " Supplement, p. 1, line 20. Counsel is not a party to this matter. Counsel is advocating for her client and her client's position is supported by the law and the facts of the case. Counsel has already endured ¹ U.S. Bank's legitimate concerns with the proposed settlement agreement submitted to the Court on June 26, 2023, were timely brought forth via U.S. Bank's Objection, which was filed on June 30, 2023. Amy Frasier Wilson's

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supplement in support of the petition to confirm the proposed settlement agreement was not filed until the afternoon 27 of August 8, 2023, only three working days prior to the scheduled hearing, and raised primarily new argument. Given that timeframe, this response is necessarily cursory but is nonetheless undertaken to aid the Court to

²⁸ understand U.S. Bank's valid position and to ensure that the Court can make an informed decision that rests on relevant considerations and applicable facts and law.

an unnecessary round of personal and unwarranted attacks and any continuation of such must not be condoned by the Court.

b. U.S. Bank is "arguing this Court does not have jurisdiction to grant the Petition in total and/or does not have the authority to terminate Trust B." Supplement, p. 1, lines 20-22; pp. 4-5.

U.S. Bank plainly stated the exact opposite in its Objection. The Court is directed to the Objection, page 5, line 16, whereat U.S. Bank acknowledged that the Court has jurisdiction over the trusts, after which U.S. Bank points out that "California law applies to [the trusts'] construction and enforcement" as supported by NRS 164.045 and the trust language itself.²

Given the stated acknowledgment of the Court's jurisdiction and participation in the process to date, it is perplexing that Amy Frasier Wilson bases nearly the entirety of her Supplement on the false allegation that U.S. Bank has taken a position that the Court does not have jurisdiction. That is simply not true.

It remains, as U.S. Bank has already addressed in its Objection, that the Court has jurisdiction to address the Trust pursuant to NRS 164.010 and/or NRS 164.015, which allows a court under identified parameters to take jurisdiction over a trust and which, again, no one is

² NRS 164.045, which is found under the heading "CHOICE OF LAW" provides:

NRS 164.045 Circumstances under which laws of this State govern trusts; change of situs to this State.

1. The laws of this State govern the validity and construction of a trust if:

(a) The trust instrument so provides;

(b) Designated by a person who, under the terms of the trust instrument, has the right to designate the laws that govern the validity and construction of the trust, at the time the designation is made; or

(c) The trust instrument does not provide for the law that governs the validity and construction of the trust, a person designated under the terms of the trust instrument to designate the law that governs the validity and construction of the trust, if any, has not made such a designation and the settlor or the trustee of the trust was a resident of this State at the time the trust was created or at the time the trust became irrevocable.

2. A person not domiciled in this State may have the right to designate the laws that govern the validity and construction of a trust if properly designated under the trust instrument.

3. A trust, the situs of which is outside this State, that moves its situs to this State is valid whether or not the trust complies with the laws of this State at the time of its creation or after its creation.

(Added to NRS by 2015, 3548; A 2017, 1696; 2019, 1872)

disputing. It also remains that U.S. Bank has already availed itself of NRS 153.031, by which a trustee or beneficiary may petition the Court with regard to the affairs of a trust.

Separate and apart from an assumption of jurisdiction and a right to request instruction is the issue of choice of law, which is addressed by NRS 164.045. Tellingly, Amy Frasier Wilson completely ignores this statute and U.S. Bank's briefing of it in the Objection.

As was already addressed in U.S. Bank's Objection, NRS 164.045 mandates the application of California law in addressing any requested modification with regard to which legal direction outside of the trust documents themselves is implicated.³ Objection, p. 5, lines 14-21. Nothing argued by Amy Frasier Wilson changes or otherwise impacts that; and, even assuming Nevada law applied, which U.S. Bank does not concede, the applicable law is the same in both California and Nevada (and numerous other jurisdictions) as was already briefed, and the law supports U.S. Bank's position that Amy Frasier Wilson is not permitted an outright distribution of any trust sums (from the A Trust or the B Trust as was briefed) regardless of any agreement made between certain parties.

Again, U.S. Bank is bound by the parameters of the trust, the applicable provisions of which have, for literally decades, mandated that Amy Frasier Wilson's distributions be made in trust and not outright.

c. U.S. Bank is "arguing this Court . . . does not have the authority to terminate Trust B." Supplement, p. 1, line 22.

Not only did U.S. Bank acknowledge the Court's jurisdiction, but U.S. Bank also acknowledged the Court's authority to address the trusts and in doing so pointed out that, when the Court does terminate either or both of the sub-trusts, any sums to be distributed to Amy Frasier Wilson must be distributed to her in trust and not outright pursuant to controlling trust terms and applicable law.

³ Choice of law was not implicated in U.S. Bank's Petition for Instruction as it was premised upon interpretation of the trust documents themselves.

d. U.S. Bank "relies exclusively upon interpretation of California Law and ignores the applicable and controlling Nevada statutes, decisional law rendered by Judge Hardy and the Nevada Supreme Court's decision." Supplement, p. 1, lines 22-23.

U.S. Bank specifically briefed the application of Nevada law, which mirrors California law, as well as the law of numerous other jurisdictions. At page 11 of its Objection, there is a section specifically set out under the heading "Nevada Law Is Not Controlling But Would Nonetheless Render the Same Result." The same legal standards as applicable by both California and Nevada law are further set out by cited case law from several other jurisdictions, the holdings of which are on point and not challenged on their merits. Objection, pp. 6-10.

As for Judge Hardy's cited statements and the Nevada Supreme Court decision, the statements and the decision were rendered in relation to Dinny Frasier's competency and must not be conflated with the valid restraints placed upon any distribution to Amy Frasier Wilson. Such restraint was established many years prior to any question of Dinny's competency even being raised.

For context, the initial restraint upon Amy Frasier' Wilson's distributions in particular, as opposed to restraints on distribution to all of the Frasier Children, was established by Joe and Dinny in the Third Amendment to the Jordan Dana Frasier Family Trust, dated September 21, 1999 – *twenty four (24) years ago* (excluding the prior blanket restraint on all of the children). *See* Amended Petition for Instructions, filed January 20, 2023, Exhibit 4, Article 2, Subsection C(7), p. 13.⁴

That same restraint upon Amy Frasier Wilson's distribution was carried through by Joe and Dinny to the Fifth Amendment to the Jordan Dana Frasier Family Trust, dated June 7, 2000, which is cited in the Objection with respect to its relevance as the last version of the primary trust undertaken by Joe and Dinny prior to Joe's death and as it applies to distribution to Amy Frasier Wilson from the Tax Exempt Trust (the B Trust).

⁴ Before that, distributions for each of the Frasier Children were held in trust and distribution was tiered by age. <u>Id.</u>, Exhibits 1 and 2, Article II of each.

This is not a new issue and the restraint is not in any way related to Dinny's competency. Any observations or rulings in relation to Dinny's competency are inapplicable and irrelevant.

2. <u>The History of the Litigation</u>

The litigation this trust has spawned is undeniably distasteful on many levels. It has increased family tensions, vastly depleted trust sums, spanned years, and blossomed into personal disputes between counsel (as the Court can glean by the unnecessary and unfounded allegations referencing counsel Resnick). With that said, responsibility for the litigation falls squarely with the litigants themselves, at the heart of which is now Amy Frasier Wilson's attempt to meld a competency challenge with an unsubstantiated right to outright distributions.

Plainly stated, putting all the other disputes aside (which U.S. Bank had nothing to do with), the only viable remaining challenge after years of litigation was whether Dinny had capacity to amend the Survivor's Trust (the A Trust) in favor of the Charities and to the exclusion of Amy Frasier Wilson.⁵

Even assuming Amy Frasier Wilson were to prevail entirely on that sole remaining issue, and Dinny was found incompetent to enter into the Third Amendment and Restatement of the Survivor's Trust Created Under the Jordan Dana Frasier Family Trust Dated December 29, 1980 (Amended Petition for Instructions, Exhibit 10), which was the version of the Survivor's Trust (the A Trust) that excluded Amy Frasier Wilson in lieu of the Charities, *the Survivor's Trust (the A Trust) still mandates that Amy Frasier Wilson's distribution be held in Trust and not distributed outright.*

The restraint was never challenged and was in fact emphasized by the settlement of the Tax Exempt Trust (the B Trust) by which the parties, inclusive of Amy Frasier Wilson, acknowledged the restraint as it was also reflected in the Tax Exempt Trust (the B Trust) and agreed that Dinny would nominate a corporate fiduciary to manage Amy Frasier Wilson's distribution therefrom as reflected at paragraph 14 of the January 27, 2017 Settlement

⁵ See a true and correct copy of the Nevada Supreme Court Remand Order, filed August 27, 2020, and provided herewith as **Exhibit 1**, by which the matter was remanded solely for an evidentiary hearing on "challenges to the settlor's or trustee's fitness to amend a trust instrument."

Agreement. *See* Amended Petition for Instructions, filed January 20, 2023, Exhibit 9, provision 14.

Each sub trust subjects Amy Frasier Wilson to the restraint, and applicable law as briefed, regardless of reliance upon Nevada law or California law, disallows Amy Frasier Wilson from negotiating out of the restraint. As such, if anyone should be estopped from making arguments contrary to what has been established via the history of the case and the Court record, it is Amy Frasier Wilson whose trust distributions as granted by her parents *perpetually* had a restraint that was never legally challenged. Rather, Amy Frasier Wilson leveraged settlement of the competency issue to attempt to avoid the valid restraint, which is not legally permissible.

3. <u>The Court Cannot Rubber Stamp Termination of the Trust in Violation of</u> Applicable Law Simply to Cease Ongoing Litigation.

This matter should unquestionably be brought to a close but it must be resolved in accordance with the law and the mandates of the controlling trust documents, which require that any distribution to Amy Frasier Wilson be made in trust with any remainder distributed, as may be applicable, to Amy Frasier Wilson's husband or to Brad Frasier's children and Nori Frasier's children, who have had no say in Amy Frasier Wilson's recent agreement to deprive them of their right to any residual.

With that, it is not U.S. Bank that is precluding resolution, which is clearly the implication, e.g. U.S. Bank is continuing litigation that must be made to end. What U.S. Bank is doing is honoring its duty as trustee and its obligation to follow the terms of the trust and the law as it relates thereto. U.S. Bank would be remiss to ignore its duties to pacify a single beneficiary to the potential detriment of residual beneficiaries and contrary to controlling trust terms and applicable law.

Notably, U.S. Bank has consistently made this position clear, its position was accounted for in previous settlement negotiations with Amy Frasier Wilson's prior counsel,

and it was the reason U.S. Bank was not included in the current settlement negotiations.⁶ It is neither litigious nor vexatious for U.S. Bank to take its obligations seriously and present its concerns to the Court as supported by a plethora of applicable law and a proverbial pounding the table claiming otherwise should be unavailing.

The Court should also consider that, while any trust established for Amy Frasier Wilson's benefit is to prioritize her for purposes of distribution (as opposed to restraint in distribution for the benefit of remainder beneficiaries), such provision does not mean that a trustee can simply ignore residual beneficiaries' rights to a residual if one were to remain, nor undercut that right by acquiescing to the residual beneficiaries being cut out from the get-go.

The Court must also not be persuaded by the assertion that a spendthrift trust is a means by which to premise a supplemental/special needs trust, which is the implication of arguing that Amy Frasier Wilson should not be subject to a spendthrift trust because she is not receiving public benefits. A spendthrift trust and a supplemental/special needs trust are two different estate planning tools. A spendthrift trust is designed to protect trust sums from a spendthrift, which Amy Frasier Wilson's parents deemed her.⁷ A supplemental/special needs trust is designed "to preserve public assistance benefits for the [disabled] trust beneficiary while, simultaneously, providing for the beneficiary's 'special needs' that are not met by public assistance." <u>McGee v. State Dep't of Health Care Servs.</u>, 91 Cal. App. 5th 1161, 1164, 309 Cal. Rptr. 3d 93, 94 (2023) (*citing* Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 3328 (1991-1992 Reg. Sess.) as amended June 10, 1992, pp. 2-3; see Recommendation: Special Needs Trust for Disabled Minor or Incompetent Person (Apr. 1992) 22 Cal. Law Revision Com. Rep. (1992) p. 993.))

⁶ As the parties and counsel are aware, U.S. Bank worked diligently on a global resolution with Amy Frasier Wilson's prior counsel that had gotten so far as to have resulted in a drafted settlement agreement that needed only to be signed.

As an example, a spendthrift trust is recognized by statue in Nevada at NRS Chapter 166 and is defined at NRS 166.020 as follows:

[&]quot;Spendthrift trust" means a trust in which by the terms thereof a valid restraint on the voluntary and involuntary transfer of the interest of the beneficiary is imposed. It is an active trust not governed or executed by any use or rule of law of uses.

The special needs trust is a spendthrift trust that provides him with supplemental income while maintaining his eligibility for public assistance. *See generally* <u>Sullivan v. County of Suffolk</u>, 174 F.3d 282, 284 (2d Cir. 1999) (explaining that a special needs "trust is a 'discretionary trust established for the benefit of a person with a severe and chronic or persistent disability' and is intended to provide for expenses that assistance programs such as Medicaid do not cover" (quoting N.Y. Estates Powers & Trusts Law § 7-1.12(a)(5) (McKinney 1998)). Because the special needs trust is a spendthrift trust, it contains numerous restrictions on the way that the distributed funds can be used. *See generally* <u>Waterbury v. Munn</u>, 159 Fla. 754, 32 So.2d 603, 605 (1947) (stating that a spendthrift trust provides funds for the maintenance of the trust beneficiary while securing the trust's corpus from the beneficiary's own improvidence as well as the beneficiary's creditors).

Alexander v. Harris, 278 So. 3d 721, 722 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2019).

As explained by the Florida Supreme Court,

As the foregoing emphasizes, a spendthrift trust as was created for Amy Frasier Wilson, has no relation to whether she would someday receive benefits; but, with that, should that day ever come, the trust provided for her spendthrift trust sums to be placed in a supplemental/special needs trust to permit any benefits she may someday be eligible for to be supplemented. The reference to a possible supplemental/special needs trust, if one became necessary, reflected planning foresight undertaken by Joe and Dinny and should not be misconstrued to undermine the established spendthrift trust.

Lastly, Amy Frasier Wilson makes the assertion that what is best for her is to receive her distributions outright to avoid further litigation, a claim any restrained beneficiary would likely make, but an assertion that is couched in a threat to drag litigation out even though the end result of winning a competency battle does not negate the restraint. Supplement, p. 14, lines 9-10. Lest it be overlooked, it is Amy Frasier Wilson's very request to be treated in a manner beyond the confines of the trust parameters that is causing the current dispute, and it is Amy Frasier Wilson who would preclude resolution to further attempt to avoid the restraint as opposed to accepting the restraint and concluding the matter. That is a choice she is stating she will make and a choice that arguably emphasizes her parents' designation of her as a spendthrift.

It remains that all that was left at issue was Dinny's competency and even were this matter to continue through an evidentiary hearing on competence and Amy Wilson Frasier were to prevail, if deemed incompetent to have named the Charities to inherit in lieu of her, it would remain that Amy Fraiser Wilson's distributions would be subject to restraint. That was her parents' clear directive; that directive is required to be honored by the Trustee; and it is irrelevant what anyone thinks about that including, but not limited to, counsel for the prior trustee. What does matter is what the law requires and the duty U.S. Bank has to honor the trust provisions and abide by the law despite the unfortunate depletion that threatened continued litigation may create if a ruling on the restraint is not made in favor of Amy Frasier Wilson.⁸ 4. <u>Personal Property</u> Because nothing new was raised in the Supplement with respect to the personal property, U.S. Bank has nothing to add to its prior briefing in relation thereto as set forth in its Objection.

> 5. U.S. Bank Reserves the Right to Brief Any Further and New Argument on the Restraint.

U.S. Bank is entitled to be fairly heard just as any other party in this matter, and the Court is supported by being permitted to make an informed decision. To that end, if there is any further last minute briefing or new argument raised on the restraint issue, U.S. Bank must ///

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
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⁸ Amy Frasier Wilson cites to only one case in her Supplement, Matter of Frei Irrevocable Tr. Dated Oct. 29, 1996, 133 Nev. 50, 390 P.3d 646 (2017), which stands for the inapplicable proposition that a settlor, i.e. a person who establishes a trust (in this case Joe and Dinny) could consent to modification. This issue was briefed by U.S. Bank in its Objection and so it will not be revisited; but, suffice it to say that, aside from this being a Nevada case versus a controlling California case, Joe and Dinny never consented to modify the spendthrift trust established for Amy Frasier Wilson throughout the various iterations of their trust planning.

1	be permitted to address the same on the merits and in briefing and not be forced to argue or
2	address the same on an expedited basis nor on the fly at the hearing.
3	AFFIRMATION
4	I, the undersigned, pursuant to NRS 239B.030, hereby affirm that the foregoing
5	document submitted for filing does not contain the social security number of any person.
6	Respectfully submitted this 10th day of August 2023.
7	/s/ Patricia Halstead
8	Attorney for U.S. Bank Private Wealth Management, Trustee
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1	CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE	
2	I hereby certify that I am an employee or otherwise affiliated with Halstead Law	
3	Offices and that on the 10th day of August 2023, I caused a true and correct copy of the	
4	foregoing document titled RESPONSE TO AMY FRASIER WILSON'S SUPPLEMENT IN	
5	SUPPORT OF THE JOINT PETITION TO CONFIRM THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT	
6	to be served by depositing a copy of the document in the U.S. Mail, first class postage prepaid,	
7	to the following:	
8	Stanley Brown, Esq.	
9	c/o Patrick Millsap, Esq.	
10	510 W. Plumb Lane, Ste. A Reno, NV 89509	
11		
12	Bradley L. Frasier, M.D. 3609 Vista Way	
13	Oceanside, CA 92056	
14	Nori Frasier	
15	4372 Pacifica Way, Unit 3 Oceanside, CA 92056	
16	Amy Frasier Wilson	
17	c/o Mark Simons, Esq.	
18	690 Sierra Rose Drive Reno, NV 89511	
19	Chapman University; Temple Beth	
20	Shalom; Irvine Community Alliance	
21	Fund; ASPCA; and St. Jude Children's Research Hospital	
22	c/o Ryan Earl, Esq. 548 W. Plumb Lane	
23	Reno, NV 89509	
24	/s/ Martina Beatty	
25		
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1	3880 F. McClure Wallace, Esq.	Alicia L. Leru Clerk of the Co Transaction # 982699	
2	Nevada Bar No.: 10264 Patrick R. Millsap, Esq.		
3	Nevada Bar No.: 12043 Wallace & Millsap		
4	510 W Plumb Ln., Ste. A Reno, Nevada 89509		
5	(775) 683-9599 mcclure@wallacemillsap.com		
6	patrick@wallacemillsap.com Attorneys for the Estate of Dinny Frasier		
7	IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT - STATE OF NEVADA		
8	IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHOE		
9		Case No: PR16-00128	
10	In the Matter of the	Case No: PK16-00128	
11	JORDAN DANA FRASIER FAMILY TRUST	Dept. No.: 3 [PR]	
12		J	
13	THE ESTATE OF DINNY FRASIER'S RESI	PONSE TO THE TRUSTEE'S	
14	OBJECTION TO THE JOINT PETITION T AGREEMENT, APPROVE DISTRIBUTION (
15	PURSUANT TO THE SETTLEMENT AGREE		
16	MODIFICATION OF THE TAX-EXEM		
17	TERMINATION OF TRUST AND ALL S THEREUNDER		
18		-	
19	The Estate of Dinny Frasier hereby files	s this Response to the Trustee's	
20	Objection to the Joint Petition to Approve th	e Settlement Agreement ("Joint	
21	Petition"). This Response is based on the followin	g Reply Points & Authorities, any	
22	exhibits attached thereto, any oral argument the	Court requests to supplement the	
23	contents of this Response, and the papers and pleadings on file before the Court of		
24	utility in deciding the Joint Petition.		
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26	111		
27	111		
28	111		

Uallace ≠ Milliap 510 W. Plumb Lane, Suite A, Reno, NV 89509 (775) 683-9599

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REPLY POINTS & AUTHORITIES IN RESPONSE TO OBJECTION

INTRODUCTION

For background, the Interested Party Charities, Amy Frasier Wilson, and the Estate of Dinny Frasier (the "Parties") attended a mediation on the date of March 6, 2023 to resolve a dispute over the validity of the Third, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments to the Survivor's Trust created under the Jordan Dana Frasier Family Trust. During said mediation, the Parties reached a resolution regarding division of the Survivor's Trust between the Charities and Ms. Wilson. Specifically, the Charities are the sole residual beneficiary of the Survivor's Trust after certain equalization payments are made from the Survivor's Trust under the Fifth Amendment. The Charities collectively agreed to split their 100% remainder interest in the Survivor's Trust with Ms. Wilson in order to resolve the dispute regarding validity of the Third, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments to the Survivor's Trust benefitting the Charities. Therefore, the Estate requests the Court approve and confirm the Settlement Agreement's resolution of the Survivor's Trust and discharge the Estate from any further duties in this matter because the Charities have agreed to a division of their share of the Survivor's Trust with Ms. Wilson to resolve her claims regarding validity of the Third, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments to the Survivor's Trust benefitting the Charities.

Separate and apart from the Settlement Agreement's resolution of the Survivor's Trust, the Estate and Ms. Wilson agreed to a modification of the Tax-Exempt Trust in order to enable its distribution and termination, to which the Charities had no objection. Of note, resolution of the Tax-Exempt Trust <u>does not</u> **alter or modify Dr. Bradley Frasier's or Nori Frasier's interest in the Tax-Exempt Trust**. Rather, it simply allows for a free of trust distribution to Amy Frasier Wilson of her share in the Tax-Exempt Trust so there is nothing left in the Tax-Exempt Trust to administer, enabling its termination for the myriad of reasons

stated in the Parties' Joint Petition to Confirm the Settlement Agreement. However, $\mathbf{2}$ the Trustee has objected to Ms. Wilson receiving her share of the Tax-Exempt Trust 3 free of trust because the Trustee claims the language of the Trust cannot be modified to enable said distribution. The Trustee's premise contradicts Nevada law and the $\mathbf{5}$ precedent of this case, rendering the Trustee's objection immaterial as discussed below. 6

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LAW & ARGUMENT IN RESPONSE TO THE TRUSTEE'S OBJECTION

I. California Law does not govern modification of the Trust to enable distribution of the Trust Res over which this Court has in rem jurisdiction, and modification of the Trust is appropriate under Nevada statutory law.

13As anticipated, the Trustee's skilled Counsel artfully recites jurisdictional law governing construction of Trust instruments. While expertly drafted and thoroughly 14 15researched, the Objection ignores the Joint Petition is not requesting the Court make certain declarations regarding construction of the Trust Instrument under provision 1617Trust Article IV, Section G referenced in the Objection. The plain language of Trust 18 Article IV, Section G, relied upon by the Trustee relates to determining the validity 19of the Trust or constructing the meaning of its provisions under California law. 20However, the Joint Petition does not call upon the Court to determine the validity of 21the Trust or construct the meaning of its provisions when approving this Settlement 22Agreement, rendering Trust Article IV, Section G, inapplicable to approving the Joint 23Petition.

24Instead, the Court is called upon to approve a settlement agreement disposing 25of the Trust's tangible assets under the *in rem* jurisdiction of the Court. Because the 26Court has *in rem* jurisdiction over the Trust Res, it has authority to make and issue 27orders regarding the Res under NRS 164.015(1), such as modifying the Trust to 28enable distribution of the Assets. See NRS 164.015(1); see also NRS 153.031(1).

The Court's authority to modify the Trust to enable distribution of assets is not 1 $\mathbf{2}$ novel or theoretical. Instead, the District Court previously modified the provisions of 3 the Survivor's Trust pursuant to the same statute relied upon in the Joint Petition, NRS 153.031(1)(n), to enable distribution of Trust Assets in satisfaction of a 4 $\mathbf{5}$ settlement agreement. See October 15, 2018 Court Order attached as Exhibit 1. Specifically, the District Court's October 15, 2018 Order modified the Survivor's Trust 6 7 pursuant to NRS 153.031(1)(n) to distribute real properties from the Survivor's Trust 8 to the beneficiaries in accordance with the Parties' January 27, 2017 Settlement Agreement to resolve a dispute over a medical building with Dr. Bradley Frasier. The 9 10 Trustee had no objection to the October 15, 2018 Order modifying the Trust pursuant 11 to NRS 153.031(1)(n) to permit distribution of Trust Assets in satisfaction of the 12January 27, 2017 Settlement Agreement agreed to by the Trustee. Therefore, this 13Court has statutory authority to modify the Tax-Exempt Trust to distribute Ms. Wilson's interest to her in full resolution of this Trust Dispute; analogous to the 14 15October 15, 2018 Order where the Court modified the Survivor's Trust to effectuate distribution of Trust Assets pursuant to the January 27, 2017 Settlement Agreement 1617under NRS 164.015(1) and NRS 153.031(1)(n).

18 In addition to the District Court recognizing the authority to modify the Trust in its October 15, 2018 Order, to which the Trustee never objected, the Nevada 1920Supreme Court also recognized the District Court has jurisdictional authority to issue 21orders in this case pursuant to NRS 164.015. Specifically, the Nevada Supreme Court 22acknowledged the District Court had lawfully assumed in rem jurisdiction over the Trust pursuant to NRS 164.010, thereby enabling the Court to issue orders under 2324NRS 164.015(1). Matter of Jordan Dana Frasier Fam. Tr., 136 Nev. at 493, 471 P.3d 25at 747. NRS 164.015(1) permits the Court to order the relief codified in NRS 153.031, 26including modification of the Trust pursuant to NRS 153.031(1)(n). Thus, to conclude the Court lacks authority to modify the Trust under NRS 164.015(1) and NRS 2728153.031(1)(n) defies the law of the case wherein the District Court previously

modified the Trust to distribute assets in satisfaction of the January 27, 2017 $\mathbf{2}$ Settlement Agreement, in addition to the Supreme Court confirming the District 3 Court has authority to issue orders under NRS 164.015(1), which encompasses the relief codified in NRS 153.031(1). Consequently, the Trustee's argument to disregard $\mathbf{5}$ controlling Nevada law is respectfully incorrect and asks the Court to commit reversible legal error. 6

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II. The Trustee's arguments regarding the intent of the Settlor are not relevant to resolution of a legal dispute subsequent to both Settlors' deaths.

10 The Trustee argues against approval of the Settlement Agreement because the 11 Agreement purportedly violates the intent of the Settlors as stated in the Trust 12Agreement by giving Ms. Wilson money free of trust. Pragmatically, it is conjecture 13to argue what the intent of the Settlors would be with respect to resolution of an 14 ongoing legal dispute persisting years after their respective deaths. For this reason, 15the Trustee owes a fiduciary duty to the Beneficiaries of the Trust following the 16Settlors' death, not the Settlors. See Hearst v. Ganzi, 145 Cal. App. 4th 1195, 1208, 1752 Cal. Rptr. 3d 473, 481 (2006) (holding "[t]rustees owe all beneficiaries...a fiduciary 18 duty. Where a fiduciary relationship exists, there is a duty to act with the utmost 19good faith for the benefit of the other party."). In other words, the Trustee's duty with 20respect to the ongoing administration of the Trust after the Settlors' death is owed 21strictly to the Beneficiaries, not the deceased Settlors. Therefore, the undercurrent of 22the Trustee's objection to the Settlement Agreement is misplaced because the intent 23of the Settlors is not relevant to the present administration of the Trust for the benefit 24of its Beneficiaries following the Settlors' deaths.

25Along that line, the Objection does not say how the Settlement Agreement is 26not in the best interest of the Beneficiaries. The Objection does not clearly identify 27why invalidation of the Agreement, thereby reverting this matter back into a seven-28year litigation cycle, will somehow benefit Ms. Wilson, Dr. Bradley Frasier, the 1 Charities, and/or Nori Frasier. Thus, the relevant inquiry for the Court in 2 considering confirmation of this Agreement is whether the Agreement is in the best 3 interest of the Beneficiaries to whom fiduciary duties are presently owed, not whether 4 it violates the assumed intent of the deceased Settlors with respect to resolution of 5 this lawsuit. Since the Objection fails to state how the Beneficiaries will benefit from 6 invalidation of the settlement and reversion of this matter back into adversarial 7 litigation, the Trustee's Objection should be denied.

III. At a minimum, the Court should approve resolution of the Survivor's Trust Dispute currently before the Court because the First and Second Amendments to the Survivor's Trust are not operable.

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As stated above, resolution of the Survivor's Trust is not contingent upon
resolution of the Tax-Exempt Trust. Therefore, the Court may approve the resolution
agreed upon by the Charities and Ms. Wilson with respect to the Survivor's Trust
regardless of the Agreement with respect to the Tax-Exempt Trust.

15The Survivor's Trust resolution as stated in the Agreement calls for 16distribution of 45% of the Survivor's Trust to Ms. Wilson free of trust. The Trustee 17objects to the Survivor's Resolution under the flawed premise the First and Second 18 Amendments to the Survivor's Trust do not permit Ms. Wilson to receive money from 19the Survivor's Trust free of trust. This argument incorrectly presumes the First and 20Second Amendments to the Survivor's Trust are operable. On the contrary, the 21Amendments before the Court are the Third, Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the 22Survivor's Trust. In the Third, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments to the Survivor's 23Trust, the Charities are the residual beneficiary. The Charities have agreed to split 24their 100% residual interest in the Survivor's Trust with Ms. Wilson in order to 25resolve the dispute regarding validity of the Third, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments to 26the Survivor's Trust. Therefore, the Survivor's Trust resolution is not being 27administered pursuant to the First and Second Amendments to the Survivor's Trust 28referenced by the Trustee because those Amendments are not operable. If they were,

Page 6 of 10

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the Charities would receive nothing because they are not beneficiaries of the First
 and Second Amendments. Instead, the Survivor's Trust resolution is a division of the
 Charities interest in the Survivor's Trust under the Third and Fifth Amendments in
 dispute before the Court, rendering the argument to hold Ms. Wilson's money in the
 Survivor's Trust pursuant to inoperable amendments moot.

6 The District Court recognized this fact in its prior Order identifying issues 7 flowing from ongoing litigation in this case absent resolution. Therein, the District 8 Court questioned whether the First and Second Amendments are operable if the 9 Third, Fourth and Fifth Amendments are invalidated. See November 30, 2020 Order 10 attached as Exhibit 2, p. $6 \P 4$. In response to this question, there was no judicial 11 ruling holding the First and Second Amendments to the Survivor's Trust are 12operable. Similarly, the Court never held the Third, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments 13were invalid, thereby bringing into question whether the First and Second Amendments are valid if the Third, Fourth and Fifth Amendments are invalid. 1415Instead, Ms. Wilson agreed to forego her challenge to the Third, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments to the Survivor's Trust in consideration of the Charities conferring 45% 1617of their residual interest in the Survivor's Trust. Consequently, if the Court 18 invalidated the Settlement Agreement with respect to the Survivor's Trust under the auspice Ms. Wilson cannot receive money free of trust from the Survivor's Trust 1920pursuant its First and Second Amendments, the Court will commit plain legal error 21by holding the terms of the First and Second Amendment to the Survivor's Trust are 22operable when the Third, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments were never declared 23invalid. As such, the Court may confidently approve resolution of the Survivor's 24Trust giving Ms. Wilson 45% of the Charities residual interest in the Survivor's Trust 25outright and free of trust because the First and Second Amendments to the Survivor's 26Trust allegedly preventing such an agreement are not operable.

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1	AFFIRMATION	
2	The undersigned affirms this document does not contain the social security	
3	number or legally private information of any person.	
4	Dated this <u>11th</u> day of August 2023	
5	By: Is/ Patrick R. Millsap .	
6	F. McClure Wallace, Esq. Nevada Bar No.: 10264	
7	Patrick R. Millsap, Esq.	
8	Nevada Bar No.: 12043 Wallace & Millsap	
9	510 W Plumb Ln., Ste. A Reno, Nevada 89509	0
10	(775) 683-9599 Attorneys for the Estate of Dinny Frasier	8950
11 12	Anomeys for the Estate of Dinny Praster	o, NV
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10		<i>Ulallace</i> ← <i>Millsap</i> 10 W. Plumb Lane, Suite A, Reno, NV 89509 (775) 683-9599
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	Page 8 of 10 APP658	

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

 $\mathbf{2}$ The undersigned certifies the foregoing RESPONSE in support of the JOINT 3 PETITION ТО CONFIRM SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT, APPROVE DISTRIBUTION THE SURVIVOR'S TRUST TO $\mathbf{4}$ OF PURSUANT THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT, AND PETITION FOR MODIFICATION OF THE $\mathbf{5}$ 6 TAX-EXEMPT TRUST TO ENABLE TERMINATION OF TRUST AND ALL SUB-TRUSTS CREATED THEREUNDER was served upon Plaintiff Amy Frasier Wilson, 7 8 by and through her Counsel Simons, Hall & Johnston; Trustee U.S. Bank, by and through its Legal Counsel Patricia Halstead; and the Interested Party Charities, by 9 10 and through their legal counsel Ryan J. Earl, via the Court's electronic filing system "eFlex" on the date shown below. 11

Dated this 11th day of August 2023

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
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By: <u>/s/ Caroline Carter</u> Paralegal for Counsel for the Estate of Dinny Frasier Uallace ≁ Millap 510 W. Plumb Lane, Suite A, Reno, NV 89509 (775) 683-9599



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CASE NO. PR16-00128

TRUST: JORDAN DANA FRASIER FAMILY TRUST

DATE, JUDGE OFFICERS OF COURT PRESENT	APPEARANCES-HEARING	
8/15/23 HON. TAMMY M.	HEARING ON PETITION - SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT Hearing conducted via Zoom audiovisual conferencing.	
	agreements before the Court, addressing the distinction between the two, and argued that NRS 164.010 applies herein. Further, counsel Millsap responded to the	

Court's questions related to the application of California law to the original question of capacity of Dinny Frasier and her ability to amend the Trust and discussed the prior proceedings which occurred when this case was assigned to Department 15. The Court addressed counsel Simons regarding his client's participation in the settlement conference and discussed the modifications to the proposed agreement made by Ms. Frasier Wilson in June of 2023, which voids the original intent of the settlement.

In response to the Court, counsel Simons confirmed that Amy Frasier Wilson was present and participated in the settlement conference in March 2023. Counsel Simons discussed the modifications made to the settlement agreement and provided an explanation as to why the agreement was modified, stating his belief that the change was not substantive.

The Court stated that the modifications made by Ms. Frasier Wilson were substantive and made the terms of the settlement confusing as to whether all claims were being resolved. Therefore, the Court was not willing to accept the settlement agreement in its current form.

Additionally, the Court expressed concern with issues raised by the Trustee in its Objection.

Counsel Simons responded to the Court's concerns, including the concern regarding whether this Court has proper jurisdiction; counsel Simons discussed NRS 153.031 and the authority of the Court to direct modifications of the trust.

The Court reviewed the Fifth Amendment to the Trust and read a portion of Provision C(7) of the Children's Trust into the record.

Counsel Simons responded to the Court's statements; further discussion was held between the Court and counsel Simons as to this issue.

Counsel Millsap addressed the Court regarding the Material Term Sheet signed by all parties, which counsel argued was proof of the agreement reached herein with said document being an enforceable and binding executed agreement.

Further, counsel Millsap discussed the Tax-Exempt Trust and argued that said Trust must be kept separate from the Survivor's Trust.

Counsel Halstead discussed the Tax-Exempt Trust which included a spendthrift provision, and stated her belief that the same applies to the Survivor's Trust; counsel Halstead provided an explanation for said belief and discussed the Trustee's position.

Counsel Millsap objected to counsel Halstead's position and provided further explanation to the Court.

Further arguments were presented by counsel Millsap and Halstead on this issue, with both counsel responding to questions posed by the Court.

The Court addressed Bradley Frasier and Nori Frasier and noted that neither were named parties to this litigation; however, the Court acknowledged that they were interested parties to the Trust.

Counsel Millsap stated that he had no objection to the distribution of the personal property as set out in the Settlement Agreement.

In response to the Court, counsel Simons stated that Amy Frasier Wilson, Brad Frasier and Nori Frasier were unable to agree to the distribution of personal property. The Court suggested that if the parties were unable to confer and agree to the distribution of the personal property items, the parties would need to review the list of personal property items and determine which items, if any, were not in dispute; the remaining items would then go to auction with any residual items to be subject to a lottery.

Counsel Simons agreed with the Court's suggestion as to the distribution of personal property items.

The Court acknowledged the work that counsel Halstead conducted in attempting to distribute the personal property items. Counsel Halstead discussed the procedure which would take place in distributing said property among the three siblings, noting that the Trustee would inventory the personal property and provide a list to the parties. Any items that could not be agreed upon would be sold with the proceeds being distributed.

Regarding the real property in San Juan Capistrano (SJC House), counsel Millsap agreed with counsel Halstead that said real property should be sold immediately. Further, counsel Millsap requested that the Court determined that all parties were properly noticed under Chapter 155.

In response to the Court, neither counsel Simons nor counsel Earl had an objection to the SJC House being sold.

Counsel Simons read NRS 132.185 related to interested parties and noted that neither Bradley Frasier nor Nori Frasier were interested parties to the Tax-Exempt Trust.

Counsel Halstead discussed the Tax-Exempt Trust allocations with the Court. Counsel Simons confirmed the agreement that the Tax-Exempt Trust be divided among the three siblings.

Counsel Halstead responded to the Court's questions regarding the fiduciary obligations of the Trustee to all residual beneficiaries and expressed concern that the grandchildren have not been heard in this matter.

The Court noted that the grandchildren were given an opportunity to join this action as named parties and did not do so.

Counsel Millsap stated that the grandchildren were not interested parties to the Survivor's Trust but only to the Tax-Exempt Trust and the Estate provided proper notice of this hearing under NRS Chapter 155 on August 7, 2023. Additionally, counsel Millsap noted that the grandchildren were present as attendees at this Zoom hearing.

Counsel Simons agreed that proper notice was given.

Counsel Earl addressed the Court on behalf of the various interested party charities regarding their position as to the residuary of the Trust and had no objection to the sale of the SJC House.

The Court stated that this Court will take the Petition under advisement but will order that the SJC House be placed on the market; **SO ORDERED.**

Counsel Halstead requested that all outstanding trust obligations be fully paid from the proceeds of the sale of the SJC House; all counsel agreed to said request; **SO ORDERED.**

COURT ORDERED: The SJC House shall be sold by the Trustee, with the Trust obligations to be paid out of the proceeds of said sale; the remainder shall be distributed pursuant to Court order should the Court determine that the proposed

settlement is approved.

Counsel Halstead confirmed that no distribution of any remaining funds would be made pending the Court's order.

Counsel Halstead further requested confirmation that the equalization payments can be made pursuant to the proposed settlement agreement; all counsel confirmed said payments could be made; **SO ORDERED.**

Additionally, counsel Halstead requested that the Trustee be allowed to inventory the personal property located in the SJC House; all counsel agreed; **SO ORDERED.**

Counsel Halstead addressed the issue of the sale of the Palm Desert House to Nori Frasier and the possibility of it being turned over as a portion of the distribution to Nori Frasier, so long as doing so wouldn't exceed Nori Frasier's total portion. Neither counsel Millsap nor counsel Earl had an objection to the Palm Desert House being distributed in that fashion. However, counsel Simons was unable to agree to counsel Halstead's suggestion at this time.

Further discussion was held on this issue.

As to the proposed settlement agreement and the amendments made thereto by Amy Frasier Wilson, the Court directed that Ms. Frasier Wilson must withdraw the amendments in order for the Court to consider approval of the proposed agreement. The Court expects that counsel Simons will submit documentation indicating that Ms. Frasier Wilson agrees with the resolutions contained in the proposed agreement as reached during the settlement conference, with no amendments made.

Counsel Millsap addressed the issue of resolution of the Survivor's Trust, which would discharge the Special Administrator, Stanley Brown from further duty. Counsel Millsap suggested that he provide the Court with a proposed order encompassing the Court's rulings and directives herein; **SO ORDERED.**

COURT ORDERED: The Joint Petition to Confirm Settlement Agreement is hereby taken under advisement. The Court directed that a proposed order be submitted as to the orders and directives entered by the Court herein, with respective counsel having an opportunity to review the same. Additionally, the Court directed that either a withdrawal of the amendments made by Amy Frasier Wilson be filed or an amended agreement be submitted clarifying that Amy Frasier Wilson agrees with all terms of the settlement reached herein.

Discussion was held regarding the best way to proceed on that issue with the Court determining that counsel proceed with whatever means is the most efficient.

Counsel Millsap requested clarification from the Court regarding the contents of the proposed order; the Court provided said clarification and reviewed the rulings made herein.

With no additional matters to be addressed by the Court at this time, this matter was adjourned.

Clerk note: Upon the Court calling a recess, Nori Frasier requested that the Court allow the grandchildren, who were attendees to the remote hearing, an opportunity to address the Court. During the Court's response, the Clerk mistakenly disconnected the remote proceedings and was unable to reconnect the parties.

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б	SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA
7	IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHOE
8	THE HONORABLE TAMMY RIGGS, DISTRICT JUDGE
9	000
10	
	TRUST: JORDAN DANA) Case No. PR16-00128
11	FRASIER FAMILY TRUST)
)
12) Dept. No. 3
) TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
13)
14	HEARING ON JOINT PETITION
	TO CONFIRM SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT
15	AUGUST 15, 2023, RENO, NEVADA
16	APPEARANCES:
17	For the Trustee U.S HALSTEAD LAW OFFICES
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18	615 Arlington Avenue
	Reno, Nevada 89509
19	
20	For Various Interested LAW OFFICES OF RYAN J. EARL
	Charities: By: Ryan J. Earl, Esq.
21	(Via Zoom) 548 W. Plumb Lane
	Reno, Nevada 89509
22	
23	
24	Reported by: JULIE ANN KERNAN, CCR #427, CP, RPR
	Job No. 6260094 Computer-Aided Transcription
	Page 1

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1
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                               BY:
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 7
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 8
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11
                               Brad Frasier
     Also present:
12
     (Via Zoom)
                               Nori Frasier
                               Don Frasier
                               Danielle Frasier Aroeste
13
                               Eliot Cady
14
                               Dr. Sara Cady
15
16
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18
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2.2
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1	RENO, NEVADA; TUESDAY, AUGUST 15, 2023; 9:00 A.M.
2	000
3	
4	THE COURT: Ms. Clerk, will you please call
5	the case?
6	COURT CLERK: Your Honor, this is PR16-00128,
7	Trust: Jordan Dana Frasier Family Trust.
8	Counsel, please state your appearances for the
9	record.
10	THE COURT: All right. We'll start with you,
11	Ms. Halstead, since you're in the courtroom.
12	MS. HALSTEAD: Thank you, your Honor.
13	Patricia Halstead on behalf of the Trustee U.S. Bank.
14	THE COURT: Thank you. Mr. Simons?
15	MR. SIMONS: Good morning, your Honor. Mark
16	Simons on behalf of Amy Frasier Wilson.
17	THE COURT: Mr. Brown?
18	MR. BROWN: Good morning, your Honor. Stan
19	Brown, Special Administrator of the Estate of Dinny
20	Frasier. I'm represented by Mr. Millsap.
21	THE COURT: And Mr. Millsap?
22	MR. MILLSAP: Patrick Millsap of Wallace and
23	Millsap on behalf of Stan Brown, the Special
24	Administrator of the Estate.
	Page 3

1 THE COURT: And Mr. Brad Frasier? 2 MR. BRAD FRASIER: Yeah, Brad Frasier. I'm the beneficiary of the Jordan Frasier Family Trust. And 3 here to represent Jordan Frasier. 4 THE COURT: All right. And this is Frasier N. 5 6 who I believe may be Nori Frasier? MS. FRASIER: Yes. 7 8 THE COURT: All right. Would you please 9 operate your camera or activate your camera, ma'am? 10 MS. FRASIER: Oh. THE COURT: Thank you. 11 12 MS. FRASIER: Thank you. Nori Frasier on behalf of the trust. 13 14 THE COURT: All right. Thank you. All right. 15 And so -- I'm sorry, Mr. Brad Frasier, you're 16 representing yourself, correct? 17 MR. BRAD FRASIER: Correct. 18 THE COURT: All right. Thank you. All right. 19 So we're here on the Joint Petition, or the hearing on 20 the Joint Petition to confirm settlement agreement approved distribution of the Survivor's Trust pursuant 21 2.2 to settlement agreement and petition for modification of the tax-exempt trust to Enable Termination of Trust and 23 All Trusts Created Thereunder. 24

1 So I have read all the pleadings in this case. 2 I reviewed the entire filing in the Joint Petition, as well as the objections that were filed by the -- by U.S. 3 Trust and the joinder by Mr. Brad Frasier and Nori 4 5 Frasier. Again, I've read everything in this case. 6 Does anybody have anything to add in addition to what has already been included in your pleadings? 7 8 I'll start with you, Ms. Halstead. 9 MS. HALSTEAD: I do. Would you like me to 10 stand instead of being in frong of the microphone? 11 THE COURT: You may. Everybody else is 12 getting to appear by zoom. I thought that we would all 13 be appearing in person today except for the persons who 14 are appearing from out of town, but you may remain 15 seated, ma'am. Go ahead. 16 MS. HALSTEAD: Thank you. So it's a, you 17 know, there was a filing by the estate in support of the 18 objection that was filed late on Friday, so with that I 19 do have a small bit of commentary just to respond to that so the Court can have a full picture of what the 20 21 trust position is with regard to the issues that were 2.2 raised there. 23 THE COURT: All right. Go ahead. 24 MS. HALSTEAD: So just to start with this, you Page 5

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www.veritext.com APP669 1 know there's a lot of information being given to you, 2 the case has been contentious. There's allegations about how the attorneys have treated each other in their 3 -- their -- their sort of relationships. The only 4 question before the Court prior to the settlement was 5 whether Dinny was competent, Ms. Frasier, I'm just going 6 to call her Dinny because there's a lot of Frasiers. 7 8 THE COURT: Sure. Go ahead. 9 MS. HALSTEAD: That what the sole remaining

issue that is no longer the issue due to the settlement. 10 11 The question is whether that settlement can be confirmed 12 by the Court. And as you know, there was an objection 13 filed by the trustee as to just a particular part of 14 that settlement and that is whether Amy Frasier Wilson's 15 distribution could be distributed outright, and that 16 includes an outright distribution for both the 17 Survivor's Trust and the tax-exempt trust.

There is some debate about which law would apply whether that's California or Nevada, but I don't want to belabor that point, I think it's the same--

THE COURT: I will just tell you California, it's the Court's position that California law applies in this case.

24

MS. HALSTEAD: Okay.

1 THE COURT: You know, that's -- that has been, 2 as far as I'm concerned, the case going forward, or from the beginning. If anybody else is going to challenge 3 that I haven't seen that challenge so California law is 4 the law that is applicable to this case as far as I'm 5 concerned. So go ahead, Ms. Halstead. 6 7 MS. HALSTEAD: Thank you, you Honor. With that, there was one case cited in the Estate's filing 8 9 and that is case the Hearst v. Ganzi, and that's 145 10 Cal.App.4th 1195 2006. And in that matter, the issue 11 was -- and I have a copy for the Court if I may 12 approach? 13 THE COURT: Yes. Thank you. 14 Thank you. On the basis for MS. HALSTEAD: 15 citing that case pursuant to the Estate was the premise 16 that once a Settlor dies, or Settlors in this case die, 17 then the remaining obligation is not to the Settlors or 18 the terms of the trust but is instead to the 19 beneficiaries. And this case was cited for that proposition. 20 21 So I wanted to address that case, I've 2.2 initialed the premise -- or underlying the premise of 23 the case and I'll just go over it briefly. If you go to 24 Page 6, there's underlying language. It says "The

gravamen the plaintiff's proposed petition for breach of fiduciary duty is that the trustee failed to act impartially towards the income beneficiaries, plaintiffs assert the trustee should have generated and should be required in the future to generate more income for the current income beneficiaries".

The point of that debate is that a trustee 7 owes a duty to all beneficiaries. And so the point 8 9 being, and that's why some of you see the residual 10 beneficiaries are on zoom today as participants but not 11 actively speaking is because U.S. Trust, or U.S. Bank as 12 the trustee has to look out for all named beneficiaries 13 including the residual ones. The residual beneficiaries 14 weren't a part of that settlement. The point was that, 15 you know, we should be like at one set of beneficiaries 16 and not the whole picture of the trust and all the 17 beneficiaries. So if you turn to Page 7, and there's a 18 star further underlying, it says "The relief which 19 plaintiff seeks, namely a change in the corporation's 20 dividend policy would defeat WRH's intent by (no gate) the trust discretion as already set forth, the paramount 21 role in the construction of wills to which all other 2.2 rules must yield is that a will is to be construed 23 according to the intent of the testator as expressed 24

1 therein. And that's unless the law with regard to 2 trusts. And in that case, it's the trustee's obligation to honor the intent of the Settlors as stated in the 3 trust instrument. So the case cited by the estate 4 5 actually supports US Bank's position. And if you go and look through Nevada law, and I've just taken the liberty 6 7 of just citing to one, two, three, four, five, six cases in Nevada, and I know we've determined that Nevada, that 8 9 California law controls, but it's the same in California 10 and Nevada. That trusts are construed to give effect to 11 the grantors apparent intent. I can give a plethora of 12 case cites for that, but I don't think that's necessary, 13 but if the Court would request them I would be happy to 14 provide them.

15 So with that, there was a prior settlement of 16 the matter, and that was when Dinny was still alive. 17 And so there's being an argument made that the trust was already modified, and so this Court can modify the trust 18 19 This Court can modify the trust but it has to do aqain. so within the confines of the law. And that settlement 20 21 agreement happened to be within those confines and I'll 2.2 tell you why. One, Dinny was still alive and she 23 consented to it, and a modification made was with regard to Survivor's Trust under which --24

1 THE COURT: Survivor's Trust, is that what you 2 said? 3 MS. HALSTEAD: Correct. 4 THE COURT: Thank you. MS. HALSTEAD: Over which she still had 5 authority to address. In the initial trust it gave Amy 6 7 a house outright. It was supposed to be the Settlor's primary residence, that's one of the issues that was 8 9 briefed in the Petition for Instructions. And so 10 through that settlement Amy was granted a house from the 11 Survivor's Trust, which was within Amy's discretion, and 12 the gift of the house was -- to Amy was always outright. 13 So giving her that trust in that settlement agreement 14 was not a breach of any material provisions of any 15 spendthrift trusts. 16 With that I would just -- I think that's the 17 points that were raised in the last filing, so I don't 18 know that I need to address that further. 19 With regard to the fact that the distribution can't be made outright, I think that's fully briefed. 20 The only issues left with that are the personal property 21 issue and that it still remains that the San Juan 2.2 Capistrano house needs to be sold for the trust to meet 23 24 its obligations.

1 THE COURT: All right. And so Ms. Halstead, 2 question for you regarding the Survivor's Trust. So the -- the house is still in the Survivor's Trust, correct, 3 the house that has been gifted to Amy Frasier. 4 MS. HALSTEAD: No. Well, that was part of the 5 -- the petition for instruction. Amy Frasier was given 6 7 a house in the January 27th settlement, I think it was 2017. 8 9 THE COURT: All right. 10 MS. HALSTEAD: Each children was given a 11 property. 12 THE COURT: Right. So the question in the Amended 13 MS. HALSTEAD: 14 Petition for Instructions, well, through all Petition 15 for Instructions was she was already given a house, you 16 know, the trust has since been amended, you know, what 17 are we required to do with this house. THE COURT: Okay. And so but my -- I thought 18 19 that the impetus of the trust argument is that whatever Amy Frasier Wilson receives may not be outright, it 20 needs to remain in trust under the spendthrift -- the 21 2.2 spendthrift provision of the Fifth Amendment to the 23 trust. Correct? 24 MS. HALSTEAD: Correct. Page 11

1 THE COURT: All right. And so how does the 2 house play into that, according to what your argument is 3 today? MS. HALSTEAD: So the initial house, the house 4 was supposed to be given, the house in particular, no 5 other assets, what happened was the house is set aside 6 7 to Amy. 8 THE COURT: Right. 9 MS. HALSTEAD: Said the Settlor's primary 10 residence. Meantime, she got it debate what that would 11 be, she got a house earlier back in 2017 outright as was allowed under the trust. 12 13 THE COURT: So that is no -- that's already 14 been distributed. 15 MS. HALSTEAD: That's been distributed. 16 THE COURT: No longer in the trust. 17 MS. HALSTEAD: Correct. 18 THE COURT: In the -- excuse me. In the 19 Survivor's Trust. 20 MS. HALSTEAD: Well, it is the sense that the compensation for that house still needs to be shifted 21 between the trusts. 2.2 23 THE COURT: All right. Okay. But --24 MS. HALSTEAD: As to Brad and Nori's, but as Page 12

1 to Amy, I believe --2 THE COURT: Right. MS. HALSTEAD: So separate and part from that 3 house, anything else given to Amy under both sub-trusts 4 was supposed to be in spendthrift trust for her. 5 THE COURT: Right. 6 7 MS. HALSTEAD: And so the SJC house meantime, the trust is getting depleted and now with all the 8 9 attorney's fees it's worse than before, and the trust 10 can't meet its obligations without selling the SJC 11 house. Mr. Millsap has not been paid. I have not been 12 paid. There's submitted -- I think there's about 13 \$52,000 left just to maintain assets. 14 THE COURT: Why? MS. HALSTEAD: Because the trust, and there's 15 also outstanding bills from prior professionals who are 16 17 involved in the case. 18 THE COURT: All right. Thank you. All right. 19 So regarding the topic matter that Ms. Halstead just covered, does anybody want to be heard? I'm not seeing 20 21 that -- oh, let's see, Mr. Millsap wants to be heard. 2.2 Go ahead, Mr. Millsap. 23 MR. MILLSAP: Yes, your Honor. First of all, 24 thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today Page 13

1 and I wanted to, one, draw a distinction that there are 2 two separate agreements before the Court today. And so as Ms. Halstead was making her comments she made them in 3 a general sense as though it is applicable to both the 4 Survivor's Trust and the tax-exempt trust which is a 5 fallacy. So drawing the distinction between the 6 7 agreements and I would ask the Court treat separately, 8 there's an agreement with respect to the tax-exempt 9 There is also an agreement with respect to the trust. Survivor's Trust. So the discussion in terms of whether 10 11 Nevada law applies and whether -- I should say whether 12 Nevada law applies, I think, is primarily centered 13 around the agreement with the tax-exempt trust. And in 14 that regard, the agreement with respect to the 15 tax-exempt trust requests that Ms. Frasier's share, I 16 should say Ms. Wilson's share be distributed to her 17 outright and free of trust and, of course, the trustee 18 objects and says that can't be done under California law 19 because it would violate the intent and purpose of the 20 trust and the Settlors.

21 So I want to first say that court made a 22 statement that California law applies, and the Court 23 made that statement generally. In response I would 24 refer the Court to the matter of Jamie Frasier wherein

1 the Nevada Supreme Court specifically held that 164.010 2 applies. And I'm sorry, hang on a second, 3 THE COURT: So 164, can you do that citation again? 4 Mr. Millsap. MR. MILLSAP: I can, yes. 1, NRS 164.010 5 6 applies. THE COURT: All right. To which matter? 7 То 8 which matter? Are you talking about the tax-exempt 9 trust for the entire matter? The entire matter. And I'll be 10 MR. MILLSAP: 11 even more specific, your Honor, so there's no ambiguity 12 in this regard on the record. The Nevada Supreme Court 13 held that there were questions regarding the 14 jurisdiction of the Court, Judge Hardy specifically, and 15 the Nevada Supreme Court resolved those questions over 16 jurisdiction by expressly holding the District Court had 17 properly assumed in rem jurisdiction over the trust res, 18 in other words, the trust assets, pursuant to 164.010. 19 The Nevada Supreme Court in this case then went on to hold that having properly assumed in rem 20 jurisdiction over the res, the Court had authority to 21 issue orders with respect to the internal affairs of the 2.2 23 Trust pursuant to 164.015. Of course, 164.015, Subsection 1, allows the 24 Page 15

1 Court to afford the parties in the trust the relief 2 codified in 153.031. And so the only time the Nevada Supreme Court ever held that California law applied was 3 with respect to the validity of the trust. 4 5 THE COURT: All right. And so -- and just Mr. Millsap, when you're talking about the validity of the 6 trust in general, are we talking about Dinny Frasier's 7 capacity? So which law applies with regard to the 8 9 original question of capacity? 10 MR. MILLSAP: Correct. And so --It was a question. 11 THE COURT: I'm sorry. So 12 is it California law that applies to the original 13 question of capacity? 14 MR. MILLSAP: Yes. 15 THE COURT: All right. Thank you. 16 MR. MILLSAP: So California law would apply to 17 determining whether Dinny Frasier had capacity to amend 18 the Survivor's Trust, specifically the third, fourth and 19 Fifth amendments. California law does not apply to supersede the Court's ability to modify the trust under 20 21 Chapter 164. And in the response I filed last week, 2.2 your Honor, I made clear this is not theoretical, this 23 is not an argument, this is actually the precedent of 24 the case.

THE COURT: Right.

1

2 MR. MILLSAP: Judge Hardy previously modified this -- the Survivor's Trust to make distributions and 3 then Ms. Halstead indicated that that was done pursuant 4 to Dinny's consent that is an absolutely fallacy. Ιf 5 you read that order, your Honor, Judge Hardy 6 7 specifically notes because there are questions regarding Dinny Frasier's capacity, and her ability to amend the 8 9 trust, to effectuate the distributions required by the settlement, rather than deal with the stinky wicked of 10 11 this capacity and unknown questions around that. He 12 modified the trust absent her consent to effectuate the 13 terms of the settlement agreement that were already 14 deemed valid. So that modification wasn't done pursuant 15 to Dinny's consent, it was the opposite. It was done 16 because there were questions about whether she even 17 could consent.

18 THE COURT: All right. And so Mr. Millsap, 19 didn't the Nevada Supreme Court return the case to the 20 District Court with the requirement that the District 21 Court determine Ms. Frasier's capacity?

22 MR. MILLSAP: Only with respect to appoving 23 the Fifth Amendment, and that's something that we have 24 to be clear about, Judge. The modification of the trust

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1	was never appealed, that was never objected to, that was
2	consented by all the parties. In fact, the prior
3	trustee unequivocally supported that.
4	THE COURT: But you're talking about the
5	Fifth, you're talking about the Fifth Amendment to the
6	Trust, correct? And I'm sorry, I'll be more specific.
7	MR. MILLSAP: No.
8	THE COURT: You're not.
9	MR. MILLSAP: No.
10	THE COURT: Which amendment are you talking
11	about?
12	MR. MILLSAP: None. The modification of the
13	trust was not pursuant to any trust amendment.
14	THE COURT: Are you talking about the
15	modification by Judge Hardy or a different modification?
16	MR. MILLSAP: The modification by Judge Hardy.
17	THE COURT: All right. Thank you.
18	MR. MILLSAP: Yeah. And so all I'm getting
19	at, Judge, is that the Court has the authority to modify
20	the tax-except trust. The Court has already modified
21	the Survivor's Trust previously. That was never
22	disputed. That was never objected to. That was never
23	overruled by the Supreme Court. In fact, it was upheld
24	by the parties. The only thing of dispute on remand was
	Page 18

1 the validity of the Third, Fourth and Fifth Amendments, 2 which brings me to my next point. And therein, the trustee objects to distribution of the Survivor's Trust 3 4 which is a separate agreement. 5 And I want to take a step back, too, your 6 Honor. 7 THE COURT: All right. And so before you get 8 -- and I want to hear what you have to say on that, Mr. 9 Millsap, but before we get too far into this, I have a question for Mr. Simons on the -- on this part of the 10 11 trust, all right? 12 So regarding the settlement agreement, so I 13 received the settlement agreement and this was actually 14 pursuant to the settlement conference that was had in 15 front of Judge Sattler in March of 2023. This is 16 correct, Mr. Simons? 17 MR. SIMONS: Correct. 18 THE COURT: All right. And so was Ms. Amy 19 Frasier Wilson present during that conference? 20 MR. SIMONS: Yes. 21 THE COURT: All right. So here's my question. What the Court received is something -- it is a document 2.2 that I believe voids the original intention of the 23 settlement agreement in that Ms. Frasier modified the 24 Page 19 Litigation Services

1 agreement, according to herself, on June 5th, 2023, in 2 that she re -- and I'm referring to the top of the page on all pages, settlement agreement on mutual release of, 3 she scribbles out all claims in the matter of the Jordan 4 Dana Frasier Family Trust. Throughout in Mr. Millsap's 5 submission he said that's the original -- that's the 6 7 whole intent of this settlement agreement is to avoid 8 future litigation, and your client appears to disagree 9 with that.

10 MR. SIMONS: Your Honor, can you direct me to 11 what you're referring?

12 THE COURT: Certainly. Okay. And so Mr. 13 Millsap's submission or the submission, the Joint 14 Petition, is -- goes through Page 16, and then I'm 15 looking at Exhibit 1, and this is the settlement 16 agreement. Now, we've got different documents 17 apparently representing the different understandings of 18 the settlement agreement between the parties, so I am 19 looking at Page 1 of Exhibit 1.

20 So settlement agreement and mutual release of 21 all claims, Amy Frasier Wilson scribbles out all, and 22 then in the heading of each and every page on this 23 settlement agreement she scribbles out all. And so this 24 to me indicates that there was no meeting of the minds

regarding this settlement agreement and the settlement
 of all claims.

So Mr. Simons, what are your thoughts on this? 3 MR. SIMONS: Well, first off, I don't read it 4 that way. That was a modification with regards to the 5 all claims because there was concern that there would be 6 -- if the Court denied the petition in total, there 7 would have to be remedies and rights that she retained, 8 9 and it was not that she would just be submitting to all and any future conduct that was directed toward her. 10 11 That was not in dispute. This is a Joint Petition where 12 the -- that there is a meeting of the minds between all 13 parties with regards to this. So that is a heading and 14 might be even -- I'm not sure if we put in a heading on 15 it but the heading has nothing to do with the substance 16 of the --

17 THE COURT: Well, it sure does because she --18 because she includes it in the title, too. This 19 indicates to me a clear intention by your client to not agree to the settlement that this settlement releases 20 21 all claims, again, which the parties indicate is the 2.2 whole purpose for this to avoid the very expensive 23 litigation going forward.

24

MR. SIMONS: Yeah. What would you like me to

1 clarify to make sure that the Court is aware that the 2 document itself contains this express relief? There's a 3 Paragraph 10 --

THE COURT: And again, Mr. Simons, I think 4 that this document, if accepted by the Court would only 5 add to confusion going forward, only provide confusion 6 to the, you know, confusion on the issue of whether all 7 claims are resolved which, again, the petition indicates 8 9 is the main reason for this document, is the main reason for the settlement. And so I don't know why your client 10 11 would -- you know, it sounds like you weren't -- it 12 sounds like, Mr. Simons, that you did not advise her to 13 do this, this was something that she did, you know, sui 14 sponte, so I don't -- go ahead, Mr. Simons, I don't mean 15 to interrupt.

MR. SIMONS: Yeah, So. Here's what was happening. We were trying to get this on this document completed quickly to get attached to the submission. Quite frankly, I don't think I caught that. If I did I don't remember it we clarified that.

THE COURT: Right.

22 MR. SIMONS: To me that was not a substantive 23 change --

24

21

THE COURT: To me it is. It is to me, Mr.

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www.veritext.com APP686 Simons.

1

2 MR. SIMONS: I hear you. I hear you. But 3 just let me put this in context if the material terms of 4 the settlement agreement were incorporated into a 5 written document, that was signed off at the time with 6 Judge Elliott Sattler, so we have an agreement that says 7 exactly what the waiver and releases are.

8 THE COURT: And then your client amended it, 9 amended her portion before she signed the final 10 document.

MR. SIMONS: No, this was a draft that was going back and forth that Mr. Millsap and I had been working on quite strenuously to get to it. And so I -he gave me a version, I got the version back to him, the -- neither of us -- I didn't, and this is easily correctable in my opinion.

17 THE COURT: Right. Well, all right. Thank 18 you. That is something that I would not -- I would not 19 be willing to accept this agreement in its current form 20 because I believe that it expresses an intent by your client, Amy Frasier Wilson, to not resolve all claims 21 2.2 because she specifically scribbles those portions out --23 MR. SIMONS: Okay. THE COURT: -- in that document. So the 24

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www.veritext.com APP687 other issue, Mr. Simons, is that, you know, I am concerned based on the issues raised by US Trust that the original intent, while the Settlors is not honored in that, is very clear that the Settlors intended that any gift as setting aside the house to that was granted to her to, Amy Frasier Wilson, be subject to a Spendthrift Trust.

Now, you know, again, I don't see the reason 8 9 or the compelling reason, that compelling reason has been raised by, you know, your client why she should be 10 11 released from that original provision. So that is my --12 that is my concern as well is that this -- the settlement agreement provides for, it looks like in both 13 14 the -- the Survivor's Trust as well as the tax-except 15 trust for her to take free and clear without the provisions of a Spendthrift provision. So what is your 16 17 position on that, sir?

MR. SIMONS: Okay. I'm going to step back a little bit to put you in context with what Mr. Millsap said and he was exactly correct. That this Court has jurisdiction, California law does not apply to what we're seeing.

THE COURT: And again, I apologize forinterrupting. I'm aware that I have jurisdiction, but

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1 under both California and Nevada law, as well as trust 2 law across the United States and in general, that's the whole reason why you execute a trust is so that the 3 4 provisions of the settlor can carry through even when they are no longer around, in other words, you know, the 5 original provisions control unless a compelling reason 6 is given why that should not occur. So that's, that's 7 what I'm looking for. What is the compelling reason 8 9 that I should not honor the original intention of the trust was -- which is to retain the restriction on Amy 10 11 Frasier Wilson's gift?

12 MR. SIMONS: All right. So just, again, to 13 recapture it's been admitted that this Court has 14 jurisdiction to modify and terminate under NRS 153.031 15 as Judge Hardy previously found. To effectuate a 16 resolution of a case, and Judge Hardy stated that he had 17 the authority and was empowered to direct modifications 18 of a trust under that statute. And in doing so, he 19 distributed three up trusts, out of trust, a different home, not this SJC home, San Juan Capistrano home, a 20 different home. He overrode the --21

THE COURT: And again, who -- remind me. Who got the distribution of that, Mr. -- who was recipient of that distribution?

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1 MR. SIMONS: Amy did, she got that outright free and clear of trust. 2 3 THE COURT: Right. 4 MR. SIMONS: This was Judge Hardy, October 15th, 2018, order. So when Mr. Millsap said that's the 5 law of the case, that is the law of the case. 6 That was not contested and, in fact, the trustee had petitioned 7 court to exercise that authority because there was a 8 9 question as to Dinny's capacity. So he --10 THE COURT: There's -- I'm sorry, there is a 11 question as to what, Mr. -- I missed that, Mr. Simons. 12 MR. SIMONS: Dinny's capacity. 13 THE COURT: Right. 14 She could not function legally MR. SIMONS: 15 because there was a challenge to her --16 THE COURT: Well, that was the allegation. 17 MR. SIMONS: Correct. That's went to the 18 Supreme Court, came back down. So what Judge Hardy said 19 is look. Her capacity's in question, there are provisions that are Trust B and Trust A, but not Trust A 20 at the time, that he distributed outright. 21 So he 2.2 overrode the spendthrift trust provision to effectuate 23 the terms of a settlement. THE COURT: This I understand that it's 24 Page 26 Litigation Services

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doable, Mr. Simons. The question that I have is why should I do that given the original intention of the Settlors. Now, Judge Hardy made a decision regarding a different matter. Why should I override the intention of the Settlors in this matter and -- and order a distribution free and clear of trust to Amy Frasier Wilson?

8 MR. SIMONS: Well, what I'm saying is it's --9 I don't see there is a matter because he did the exact 10 same thing. Now, when you look what the intention you 11 actually have to look at what the documents say. The 12 trusts say that Dinny is be preferred over anybody else. 13 Okay? That has been reiterated and restated.

14 THE COURT: And I'm sorry, where are you?
15 So what are you -- which document are you referring to,
16 Mr. Simons?

MR. SIMONS: Well, in the Joint Petition that was filed you'll see at -- excuse me -- Page 9, the tax-except trust said the trustees be mindful that a Settlor's desire, that this trust fund be preferred primarily for the benefit of Amy Michael Frasier Wilson, and not for any remainder beneficiaries. She i's to be preferred --

24

THE COURT: And I'm sorry, I'm not at the same

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1	place as you. So you're talking about the tax-except
2	trust provision at Page 9 of 16?
3	MR. SIMONS: No, I was referring to the
4	language that was cited within the petition itself.
5	THE COURT: All right. And I'm looking at the
6	petition. Where are you in the actual petition?
7	MR. SIMONS: Page 9, you start at line 20.
8	THE COURT: 20?
9	MR. SIMONS: Correct.
10	THE COURT: Okay. Go ahead.
11	MR. SIMONS: Okay. So that shows first off
12	that the concept of the Settlors was just prefer Amy,
13	Amy is to be preferred. Decision are to be made in her
14	favor. Then within that same frame work the tax-except
15	trust was structured as an asset-protection trust, that
16	the Court entire practice are you familiar with the
17	asset protection concepts? If not, I'll just give you a
18	brief overview which is in order to ensure clients'
19	rights in personal injury cases, that they have access
20	to public insurance and public benefits, they have to
21	show that they lack income, that they don't have assets
22	to pay for their own medical care and treatment. If
23	they do, they're denied public assistance. That's how
24	this was structured because it said to allow her to

participate in public assistance programs.

1

2 THE COURT: But that's not the only provision in that, Mr. Simons. Now, I am looking at the actual 3 terms of the Fifth -- let's see. It's the Fifth 4 Amendment to the Jordan Dana Frasier Family Trust, and 5 I'm at Page 8, and this is Provision 7 C, this is 6 Children's Trust. And so number 7, this is Page 8. 7 "The Trustee desires that the funds set aside for Amy 8 9 Michelle Frasier Wilson shall last her lifetime so that 10 the trustee will not rapidly dissipate the corpus of the 11 share by distributing the principal and interest of the 12 trust to her. It is the Settlor's desire that the 13 trustee be mindful of the fact that Amy Frasier Michelle 14 Frasier Wilson has physical limitations that prevent her 15 from obtaining gainful employment, and may have certain 16 spendthrift disabilities, although they do not amount to 17 any legal disability or a sufficient disability at this 18 time to qualify for public programs.

In the event she does qualify for public assistance, the trustee shall have the absolute discretion whether or not to distribute income or principal to her at the trustee's unfettered discretion. Now, going down two sentences "The Settlors

23 Now, going down two sentences "The settions 24 are mindful of the subjective nature of determination

1 required, and the burden on the trustee and the anguish 2 that the recipient may have in withholding funds. And 3 difficulty of making an absolute correct and perfect 4 decision in making the trust funds last over her 5 lifetime which is not predictable", et cetera.

6 So and then this goes on on Page 9 to cite the 7 language you just cited, Mr. Simons. "The trustee is to 8 be mindful that it is the Settlor's desire that this 9 trust fund be preserved primarily for the benefit of Amy 10 Michelle Frasier Wilson, and not for the remainder 11 beneficiaries".

So what that says to me is that the Settlors had an absolute intent to keep Amy Frasier Wilson's distribution in trust, however, their additional intent is that she be the one that be considered, not the remainder beneficiaries, regarding this particular provision, the provision that applies to her portion of the trust fund.

19 So that is -- so Mr. Simons, to me, yes, I 20 agree with you that the Settlors intended that she be --21 that the Trustee distribute for her benefit or, you 22 know, manage the trust to her benefit if she is required 23 to have public assistance, understood, but that does not 24 negate their intent to keep her funds in trust.

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1	MR. SIMONS: Understood. And if that was the
2	gonna be the case, then NRS 153.031 would not have any
3	reason beyond the books and records. It would not
4	there would be no reason to ever allow for a termination
5	or modification of a trust. And
б	THE COURT: And so, you know, and so Mr.
7	Simons, that's I don't think that is the issue. I
8	understand that California and Nevada law provide for
9	that. But what I'm trying to figure out is and what
10	I'm trying to understand is what is the reason that your
11	client is asserting that I should override the original
12	intent of the Settlors in this case and allow, you know,
13	approve this petition for the distribution free and
14	clear of trust?
15	MR. SIMONS: Okay. I'll try to direct my
16	comments directly on that specific issue.
17	THE COURT: Thank you.
18	MR. SIMONS: The structure of the settlement
19	was contemplated to terminate the dispute. That was
20	ongoing because Trust B was under original settlement
21	was entitled to receive some funds from the settlement
22	agreement, but that settlement agreement was conditioned
23	on the determination whether it meant if 3 and 5 were
24	applicable. If not, it went back to 2, possibly that

1 was the argument. So in structuring the settlement, he 2 said how can he benefit and pay in total Nori and Brad, under the Trust B, and get the equalization payments 3 So the entire structure of the deal was the case 4 out? 5 with regard to competency of Dinny would be resolved, put to bed, charities get paid, they're not having to 6 fund litigation and their right to receive money is 7 being depleted. Mr. Millsap is not incurring hundreds 8 9 of thousands of dollars in legal fees, instead, those monies are being distributed to the kids, the family. 10 11 THE COURT: Sure.

There's been millions of dollars 12 MR. STMONS: 13 in this estate that has gone to professionals. And, 14 unfortunately, as you saw from Mr. Robertson, the 15 depletion of the estate has been the driving factor, not 16 what could be done, the intent of the trusts were to get assets to the children. Let them enjoy the wealth that 17 18 had been accumulated by the family.

19THE COURT: True. But why should Amy Frasier20Wilson's portion of that wealth be free of trust?

21 MR. SIMONS: Okay, I'm getting there. So 22 because the first step was she'd already been 23 distributing outside of trust by the Court. Court said 24 hey, look, there are reasons to distribute outside the

1 trust, we'll effectuate a settlement. Step 2. Step 2 is 2 Trust B in order to get the monies paid to Brad and Nori, that was -- the settlement agreement couldn't be 3 conditioned upon the termination of Trust B because that 4 requires a court order with regard to Amy. But it was 5 structured that way so that they would get paid in full 6 immediately, rather than have to sit and wait while the 7 case went forward on appeal in legal fees, so that was 8 9 part of the consideration that was structured. 10 Keep following me. Then what happened is as

part of this resolution, the -- going back to the asset protection -- so we satisfied all these other beneficiaries, they get their monies, and including their beneficiary, right, their offspring, same kids, get their money, it goes into that family frontline --THE COURT: Sure.

MR. SIMONS: -- they spend it, these people
don't have any contact with each other.

Next is how could this deal be structured in a way to, one, reduce legal fees, and litigation expenses, not only for the litigation but trustee. The trustee and Mr. Resnick, they have occurred over a million dollars off this estate, how can we limit that? How can we take the money rather than go to -- professionals go

1 to the kids? So that's how it was also structured. 2 In addition, the asset protection component never triggered because it -- Amy has not received 3 public assistance. She doesn't -- she qualifies as 4 Obama care which is an intervening event. At the time 5 trustees were crafted there was no Obama care, so --6 7 THE COURT: But that's separate and apart from the spendthrift provision, Mr. Simons, that's what I'm 8 9 worried about. I completely agree on what you're saying 10 so far with everything that you've said. 11 MR. SIMONS: Okay. Now let me focus on the 12 spendthrift. The spendthrift trust is hey, can Amy 13 manage her own affairs because --14 THE COURT: Right. 15 -- we the funders intend to last MR. SIMONS: Amy's lifetime, and looking at one concern that Amy is 16 17 not financially viable and can't handle her affairs. So 18 that would be the purpose of this spendthrift trust. 19 But let's look at that. What has transpired over the last seven years? Extensive litigation where Amy is 20 21 actual prevailed. She hired attorneys. She compensated 2.2 her attorneys, she brought this to the Nevada Supreme 23 Court, agreed with the petition, came back down, she's been able to hire me, she's been able to hire her 24

1 professionals. She has been successful in this 2 litigation. So far so the whole component is she's married. There is no evidence before this Court that 3 she has any issues regarding the depletion of her 4 These monies, as the seller admitted, we're 5 monies. told be hers and last for her lifetime or how she needed 6 7 them. So what we're saying is because of all these different components that -- there are so many factors 8 9 contemplated, all these justify the good faith and the basis because the foundational purposes of these trusts 10 11 have been obviated over time with the expensive 12 litigation. That then she now in her own future, 13 separate and apart from you've seen the comments and 14 communications about with her siblings. And the 15 litigation --

16 THE COURT: Just a question for you while 17 we're here, Mr. Simons, is that, you know, if Ms. 18 Frasier -- I'm talking about Amy Frasier Wilson. If Ms. 19 Wilson is, you know, her intent is to resolve all litigation why is she crossing that provision out of the 20 settlement document? You know, that's -- my concern is, 21 2.2 you know, you are arguing one thing and your client is 23 providing evidence of a different intent, all right? So -- and it also I can tell you, you know, I do sympathize 24

1 a little bit with the argument of you as trust in that 2 -- you know, in that the agreement is hey, I won't 3 continue to sue you as long as you agree to override the 4 provision of this, you know, the spendthrift, the 5 provision of this trust. Now I've over simplified this 6 I know --

MR. SIMONS: Yeah.

-- Mr. Simons, but that is, you 8 THE COURT: 9 know, that's basically -- you know, that seems to be 10 part of her intention. And then we get to, you know, her exhibit, Exhibit 1, and she's, you know, she's 11 12 scribbling out hey, you know, I don't really -- I don't 13 really want to be bound to the main, you know, the main 14 intent of our agreement which is this is gonna resolve 15 all future litigation. So that's what -- that is what concerns me. You know, I agree with everything that 16 17 you've you said so far, Mr. Simons. I am just not sure 18 that your client is on the same page as you.

MR. SIMONS: I believe they are. But let me -- that clarification can be fixed. Because as I understand it, the --

MR. MILLSAP: Can I be heard on that issue,your Honor?

24

7

THE COURT: Do you mind, Mr. Simons? I do

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1 want to allow you to finish, sir. It sounds that Mr. 2 Millsap while we're there has something to say. Do you mind, Mr. Simons? 3 MR. SIMONS: Not at all. 4 THE COURT: All right. So go ahead, Mr. 5 6 Millsap. MR. MILLSAP: Your Honor, this issue is easily 7 rectified. There is a material term shift that is 8 9 executed by every party at the mediation that contains the material terms of settlement. That document in and 10 11 of itself an even forcible agreement. The Document 12 attached as Exhibit 1 is a more formal detailed written 13 settlement agreement that was unilaterally modified by 14 Ms. Wilson. To the extent there's questions about the 15 validity of that agreement, then we would simply 16 petition the Court to confirm the material terms 17 document which is an enforceable, binding settlement 18 agreement executed by every single party, before Judge 19 Sattler, contemporaneous with the conclusion of the 20 mediation, that has been an enforceable agreement. 21 With respect to -- with respect to the spendthrift provisions, again, your Honor, I apologize 2.2 to beat a dead horse here and I ask the Court's 23 indulgence but we must delineate between a Survivor's 24

1 Trust and a tax-exempt trust.

2 THE COURT: I was talking about the Survivor's Trust, Mr. Millsap, is what I was referring to. 3 MR. MILLSAP: Yeah, the tax-exempt trust 4 actually has a standard provision. So what Mr. Simons 5 was reading from? And what the Court was quoting was 6 7 from the Third Amendment to the original Jordan Dana Frasier Family Trust, where it is discussing the 8 9 tax-exempt trust. 10 THE COURT: All right. And so Mr. Millsap, 11 thank you. And I apologize, but I just want to ask Ms. 12 Halstead. So -- and that was what I got out of your 13 pleadings is that that tax-exempt trust has the 14 spendthrift provision but somehow that is connected to 15 the -- to the trust A, right? And so can you explain to 16 me what your client's position is, what is the 17 connection and why is -- why do you believe that the 18 Spendthrift provision also applies to the Survivor's 19 Trust? 20 MS. HALSTEAD: So, I'm happy to do that. And 21 if I could just your indulgence, I want to clarify something I moist spoke about earlier and then I'll 2.2 23 answer that question if I could. While you were reading from the trust 24 Page 38

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1 provision Exhibit 6 to the Amended Petition which was 2 the Fifth Amendment to the main trust , I indicated that the house was to be given to Amy outright, but that was 3 a misstatement on my part. It says "The trustee shall 4 allocate the seller's principal residence or the 5 proceeds thereof if it has been sold to the trust for 6 7 Amy." And so -- but my point doesn't change because Dinny was still alive, and she had the authority to 8 9 modify her own trust because that -- that was in the 10 Survivor's Trust eventually.

And then also there was a statement made that she wasn't competent and wasn't able to enter into the settlement agreement. The settlement agreement is Exhibit 9 to the Amended Petition. She is a party to it, she initialed it, she was represented by counsel, and she had not been found to be incompetent. So she has had the authority to do that.

18 THE COURT: All right. So my question,19 though, please.

20 MS. HALSTEAD: And so your question. So with 21 regard to -- so the trust -- you have the main trust, 22 and then when both parties die it splits into the A and 23 B.

THE COURT: Yes.

24

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1 MS. HALSTEAD: So the B trust, the tax-exempt 2 trust, is controlled by the terms of the main trust and so that Spendthrift provision sort of finds its way down 3 to the tax-exempt trust. Where you find those 4 restrictions with regard to the Survivor's Trust is --5 and you heard the conversations that after the 6 7 settlement agreement part of the settlement agreement back in 2017 was Dinny could amend her trust which is 8 9 what she did. So challenges to the Third, Fourth and Fifth. 10 The Third took out Amy and put the charities, 11 the Fourth and Fifth just qualified the -- I forget the 12 term for it, the distributions between the houses, those 13 So if you go back to the very last one where it monies. 14 went to Amy, it still remained in trust pursuant to that 15 -- the terms of that amendment.

So if you go to that amendment, which everyone is referring to that would grant to Amy in lieu of the charities, and I'm just thumbing through the -- sorry, I have it in the exhibits you -- the Amended Petition for Instructions. There was amendment undertaken by Dinny Frasier on -- so she restated it right after -- well, shortly after the settlement agreement.

23 THE COURT: And again, can you refer to what 24 document you are referring, please?

1 So that's gonna be Exhibit 7 to MS. HALSTEAD: 2 the Amended Petition for Instructions. THE COURT: By what is the actual document 3 that is included in Exhibit 7? 4 MS. HALSTEAD: It's the First Amendment and 5 restatement of the Survivor's Trust created under the 6 7 Jordan Dana Family Frasier Trust dated December 29th, 8 1980. 9 THE COURT: So First Amendment. Okav. So the First Amendment to the 10 MS. HALSTEAD: 11 Survivor's Trust. So now it's already split and already 12 went to the Survivor's Trust. And pursuant to that 13 particular document, and I'll have to turn to the right 14 page so you'll have to give me a minute. But it entails 15 a Spendthrift trust for Amy Wilson Frasier's 16 distribution from the Survivor's Trust. And that's 17 reiterated again in the next -- in the next amendment. 18 Basically every distribution to Amy Frasier Wilson's and 19 you want to give me a minute I'll cite you to the exact 20 language. Every provision of every trust that ever gave 21 anything to Amy Frasier Wilson requires that it be held 2.2 in a Spendthrift trust. 23 THE COURT: All right. So that's US Bank's 24 position. And it sounds like the position of Mr.

1 Millsap's client and Mr. Simons' client is that that 2 provision may be modified under Nevada law and has been so modified in a similar way by Judge Hardy. So Mr. 3 4 Millsap's shaking his head. Go ahead, sir. MR. MILLSAP: No. The modification is solely 5 6 related to the tax-exempt trust. 7 THE COURT: All right. 8 MR. MILLSAP: And that's what I'm trying to 9 get across. 10 THE COURT: Right. 11 MR. MILLSAP: The tax-exempt trust, there is a 12 request for a modification. Ms. Halstead is asking the 13 Court to commit absolute legal error because what she is 14 asking is Amy Frasier Wilson's settlement funds from the 15 Survivor's Trust be held in trust pursuant to an 16 amendment that is inoperable. The First Amendment to 17 the Survivor's Trust, and the Second Amendment to the 18 Survivor's Trust were under a Third, Fourth and Fifth 19 In other words, the First and Second Amendment. 20 Amendments to the Survivor's Trust that Ms. Halstead is 21 referring the Court to are not effective. They are not 2.2 operable. They were not before the Court. They were 23 completely a noted and revoked. 24 THE COURT: So Mr. Millsap, you're saying that Page 42

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1	only the Fifth Amendment to the trust is operable at
2	this moment in time.
3	MR. MILLSAP: Correct. When you it's
4	fundamental law. It is fundamental trust law when you
5	enter into amendments to a trust it's presumed valid.
6	THE COURT: Did you say presumed valid or
7	presumed
8	MR. MILLSAP: Presumed, presumed valid. And
9	so if I can, your Honor, I'd like to make a record.
10	THE COURT: Sure.
11	MR. MILLSAP: The Third, Fourth and Fifth
12	Amendments are presumed valid. Ms. Wilson brought a
13	challenge to those amendments in their validity. Those
14	amendments were never invalidated. Instead, the
15	charities are the sole beneficiary, residual beneficiary
16	of the Fifth Amendment. The charities agreed to take
17	their residual interest in the Survivor's Trust and
18	divide that with Ms. Wilson to resolve any dispute about
19	the validity of the Fifth Amendment. So what Ms
20	what Ms. Halstead's asking you to do, Judge, is hold
21	funds in trust in the Survivor's Trust, pursuant to
22	amendments that were revoked, and that is plain legal
23	error. There is no ruling by Judge Hardy or this Court
24	that the Fifth Amendment was invalid, that is the

1 operable amendment before the Court. Any question in 2 regard to its validity has been resolved by the charities, conveying 45 percent of their residual 3 interest to Ms. Wilson to resolve any question as to 4 their validity and, therefore, there is no objection to 5 the validity of the Fifth Amendment because it's been 6 resolved. As such, the only operable amendment before 7 this Court is the Fifth Amendment to the Survivor's 8 9 Trust and that must be followed. And from that Fifth 10 Amendment, the charities have agreed to convey 45 11 percent of the residual interest to Ms. Wilson, and 12 resolution of the dispute.

13 And I want to note, your Honor, to invalidate 14 that agreement would revert the parties back into a 15 seven to eight-year litigation. How that is of benefit 16 to any person in this trust is beyond me. I still can't 17 even believe that we're arguing that this agreement 18 should be invalidated, and we should continue an 19 eight-year litigation that's cost over a million 20 dollars.

THE COURT: And are you talking about the agreement between the parties, the petition? Or --MR. MILLSAP: With respect to the Survivor's Trust. And what's interesting, your Honor, is the

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Litigation Services A Veritext Company dispute before the Court is strictly in regard to the Survivor's Trust. And so the estate was tasked with resolving the issue with respect to the Survivor's Trust, and the estate has done so.

5 Mr. Brown has worked diligently. Counsel for 6 Mr. Brown has worked diligently. Mr. Earl on behalf of 7 the charities has worked diligently. Judge Sattler 8 worked diligently to resolve the dispute before the 9 Court regarding the Survivor's Trust. And --

10 THE COURT: All right. So while -- I'm sorry, 11 I do have some questions but, again, you've indicated 12 you want to make your record. I apologize for 13 interrupting. Go ahead, Mr. Millsap.

14 MR. MILLSAP: There is no provision in the 15 Fifth Amendment that would preclude the charities from 16 conveying 45 percent of their residual interest to Ms. 17 Wilson in order to resolve the only objection to the 18 Fifth Amendment's validity are the benefit of the 19 charities. And if the Court were to hold that the First or Second Amendments are now valid on only that the 20 invalidated the interest of the charities because 21 they're not beneficiaries of the First and Second 2.2 23 Amendment.

24

THE COURT: All right.

1 MR. MILLSAP: So what Ms. Halstead is asking 2 you to do with respect to the Survivor's Trust is 3 absolute legal error. That -- that agreement should be 4 confirmed with respect to the Survivor's Trust without 5 qualification.

6 The Court asked separate and apart from the 7 Survivor's Trust, why should I resolve the tax-exempt 8 trust? Give me a reason to do that. Why should I 9 modify the tax-exempt trust? And again, stated clearly, 10 the modification issues are limited to the tax-exempt 11 trust. That has nothing to do with the resolution of 12 the Survivor's Trust.

Modification of the tax-exempt trust is appropriate, your Honor, basically, to resolve an eight-year litigation that has cost over a million dollars in attorney's fee and professional fees. That's why.

Also, it's plain and simple, Judge, it's written throughout the tax-exempt trust that they responded to be held in trust for her in order to qualify for public assistance. She's not receiving public assistance and so there is these arguments about that she's a Spendthrift, that she's this, she's that. Mr. Simons' correct, your Honor, all of that

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1 is hearsay. There is no evidence before this Court that 2 -- there is no admissible evidence before this Court to suggest that she's incapable of managing these funds. 3 The only evidence before the Court is the following. 4 One. Ms. Frasier's failed in litigation with her 5 children over this trust. Two, Ms. Frasier's been in 6 litigation with the trustee over the admission of this 7 Three, Ms. Frasier's children have been in 8 trust. 9 litigation with each other over this trust. And four, there is litigation over the validity of the amendments 10 to the Survivor's Trust which we now resolved. 11

12 And so the plain and simple fact is for 13 whatever reason, Judge, this case is nothing more that a 14 boondoggle ongoing administration between every party 15 that's involved, literally. And so to perpetuate that 16 is not in the best interests of the trust. And to say 17 that runs contrary to this Settlor's intent is also 18 speculation, Judge, because we don't know what -- what 19 Dana Jordan Frasier would have done to resolve these circumstances before the Court, which is exactly why the 20 Court has authority to terminate a trust. 21

If you had to follow the language in a trust rigidly without exception, then you can never terminate a trust, you can never modify a trust, it would have to

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1 be carried out pursuant to its terms regardless of the 2 consequences or effect upon every beneficiary. That's simply not the law. The law is the duties owed to the 3 beneficiaries to do what is in their best interests, and 4 under the circumstances before this Court, the trustee 5 has provided me no evidence that is in the best 6 interests of the beneficiaries and the trust to 7 8 perpetuate litigation with respect to administration. 9 How is it to their benefit to do that? There's no 10 evidence in that regard. 11 THE COURT: Ms. Halstead. 12 MR. MILLSAP: Can time --THE COURT: And I'm sorry, Mr. Millsap. 13 Ms. 14 Halstead, it sounds like based on your client's 15 admission they're seeking to be released from the 16 obligation to continue to be trustee on this. 17 MS. HALSTEAD: Your Honor, if -- while -- you 18 know, my client will -- is continuous trustee, but my 19 client does not want to be trustee for any of the 20 sub-trusts that are held for the benefit of Amy Frasier 21 Wilson because of these very reasons. And because the 2.2 finger pointing because of the litigation it's 23 distasteful to everyone. Everyone takes Mr. Millsap's point to heart. But that, again, rests at the feet of 24

the litigants, that's the very reason for these Spendthrift, Amy Frasier Wilson is spending down her own proceeds on litigation which emphasizes why her parents deemed her a spendthrift.

5 THE COURT: All right. Thank you. And hang 6 on a second, Ms. -- and I just really wanted that 7 limited answer to my question. Thank you very much, Ms. 8 Halstead. And I will allow you to be heard and make 9 your record as well, but I promised Mr. -- looks like 10 Mr. Millsap has not been done being heard so I promise 11 I'll hear from you next, Mr. Simons.

12

Go ahead. Mr. Millsap.

MR. MILLSAP: So the final thing, your Honor, is I want to make clear modification of the tax-exempt trust is in the discretion of the Court. And Nevada estate will defer to the discretion of the -- I'm sorry, your Honor, I apologize.

18 THE COURT: Sorry, we're getting a request 19 from the Court next door. It sounds like we're a little 20 loud, so -- yeah, just come on up and please continue, 21 Mr. Millsap.

22 MR. MILLSAP: And so your Honor, modification 23 of the tax-exempt trust is within the discretion of the 24 Court. The Court's raised concerns about exercising its

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discretion to modify the tax-exempt trust. I have
outlined the reasons why the estate believes it's
appropriate to modify the tax-exempt trust. However,
the estate will defer to the discretion of the District
Court with respect to modification of the tax-exempt
trust.

Separate and part from that, though, I want to 7 close by saying the dispute actually before the Court is 8 9 with respect to the Survivor's Trust in the litany of 10 the Fifth Amendment. That dispute has been resolved. 11 The terms of the resolution with respect to the Survivor's Trust are lawful. The First and Second 12 13 Amendment are not applicable, they are not operable, 14 they're not amended and revoked, and there is nothing 15 that would prevent fulfillment of the terms of the 16 Survivor's Trust resolution, and so the Estate would 17 request that the Court confirm resolution of the 18 Survivor's Trust without qualification, which would 19 resolve the litigation before the Court. In other words, if the Court confirms the Survivor's Trust 20 resolution, there's no further pending legal claims 21 before the Court, and the Estate can be closed, Mr. 2.2 Brown can be discharged, and at that point there's 23 nothing before the Court to determine. 24

1 So resolution of the Survivor's Trust for 2 confirmation of the Survivor's Trust resolution 3 completely resolves the litigation presently before the 4 Court, and there is no reason not to do that. So we 5 would request that is done.

And to the extent there's any question about Ms. Wilson's Amendment of the formal settlement agreement by interlineation, we're happy to refile this petition with the material term sheet that essentially say the same thing and that is unequivocally a binding agreement.

12 THE COURT: And so Mr. Millsap, one question 13 regarding the Survivor's Trust, the personal property. 14 There's a provision for the distribution of the personal 15 property, is that in, as far as you're concerned, within 16 the Survivor's Trust, sir?

17 MR. MILLSAP: You know, that's an interesting 18 question, your Honor. The trustee actually -- there's 19 never been, I quess, an inventory that delineates what personal property is within the Survivor's Trust or 20 within a tax-exempt trust. It was always the Estate's 21 2.2 position that the personal property was primarily held 23 in the San Juan Capistrano house which was a part of the Survivor's Trust, and by virtue of that fact those are 24

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Survivor's Trust assets.

1

2 So to the extent the personal property is within the Survivor's Trust, and it's subject to Dana 3 Frasier's power of appointment, she gave all that 4 personal property, in essence, to the charities, which 5 are the 100 hundred percent residual beneficiary and 6 they have agreed that they will forgo the personal 7 8 property to Ms. Wilson as part of the settlement 9 agreement, can't believe the charities have no interest 10 in retention of personal property.

11 THE COURT: And so this is where, you know, 12 although not part of the formal litigation, I believe 13 that the -- you know, Mr. Brad Frasier, Ms. Nori Frasier 14 have an interest in that personal property in that it's, 15 from my review of the provision regarding personal property, it was to be distributed in a way that 16 17 everybody was supposed to know about this regarding 18 Dinny Frasier's wishes, however, that document is not 19 able to be found. So we still have that issue regarding the personal property and so do you believe that either 20 Mr. Brad Frasier or Ms. Nori Frasier has any interest in 21 2.2 the personal property given that -- and again, there is 23 a provision in the Fifth Amendment that includes that Ms. Amy Frasier is not to be -- is not to be awarded the 24

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1 personal property, so -- and I know that we're getting 2 down to, you know, to the nitty-gritty here and, again, Mr. Simons, I promise, promise, promise we'll get back 3 to you, but since we're talking about it and the 4 Survivor's Trust, Mr. Millsap, what are your thoughts on 5 6 that? 7 MR. MILLSAP: Yeah. Dr. Frasier and Nori 8 Frasier have no interest in the personal property to the 9 extent it's in the Survivor's Trust. 10 THE COURT: Right. 11 MR. MILLSAP: Right? The Fifth Amendment to 12 the Survivor's Trust makes provisions to Dr. Frasier and 13 Nori Frasier of castic cash equalization payments. The 14 settlement agreement unequivocally confirms that those 15 payments will be made. So that's another point your 16 Honor, I mean, the settlement agreement specifically 17 contemplates that the equalization payments to Dr. 18 Frasier and Nori Frasier will be made. We did that 19 intentionally, your Honor, so that their interests would not be affected. 20 The reason we don't want their interests to be 21 2.2 affected is now they don't have standing to object to

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the settlement of because their interest is completely

unaffected in the Trust. In fact, they benefit from the

settlement agreement because they're being distributed
every time they're owed.

3 THE COURT: All right. So Mr. Millsap -4 MR. MILLSAP: Let me finish, Judge. The sole
5 beneficiary, the charities are the residual
6 beneficiaries. The charities did not want to retain
7 personal property, and they conveyed it to Ms. Wilson as
8 part of this agreement which they have the authority to
9 do as the residual beneficiary of those assets.

10 THE COURT: All right. And so, again, just 11 going back to go back to Page 9 of the Fifth Amendment. 12 Says the trustee to be mindful that is the Settlor's 13 desire that this trust fund be preserved primarily for 14 the benefit of Amy Michelle Frasier Wilson and not for 15 any remainder beneficiaries.

With that in mind, notwithstanding anything else to the contrary, as part of the share that Amy Michelle Frasier Wilson shall receive, she shall receive the Settlor's primary residence but not the contents of the residence, which are to be divided according to the Settlor's known wishes. That's in the Fifth Amendment. Are you --MR. MILLSAP: That's the tax-exempt trust.

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MR. MILLSAP: That's the tax-exempt trust. THE COURT: Okay. So that's what you're

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1 indicating. 2 MR. MILLSAP: That's the Fifth amendment to the original trust, and you're reading from the 3 provisionals, that's the tax-exempt trust. You're not 4 reading from the Fifth Amendment to the Survivor's 5 6 Trust. 7 THE COURT: All right. Got it. Thank you. 8 All right. Mr. Simons. 9 MR. SIMONS: Thank you. This might be the one 10 and only occasion where I tell you I agree with 11 everything Patrick Millsap just told you. And this is 12 why. Because the Trust A that he identified, the 13 resolution of that case gave the Third, Fourth and Fifth 14 Amendments were subject to challenge were -- had to be 15 over turned on contested. It gave everybody to the 16 charities. The charities as part of the resolution 17 distributed portion of their funds to Amy, it has --18 Amy's not getting any of her funds from the amendments 19 1, so as he says, nothing -- the Spendthrift trust, there's no applicability on Spendthrift trust on that, 20 he's absolutely correct 100 percent across the board 21 2.2 everything in Trust A is distributed to Amy according to 23 the terms. 24 THE COURT: All right. Mr. Simons, one

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1	moment. Will Mr. Millsap and Mr. Earl come back on
2	camera, please? We're still in the middle of this
3	hearing. All right. If you can hear me, Mr. Millsap,
4	and Mr. Earl, please resume your appearance at the
5	hearing by activating your cameras.
6	Go ahead, Mr. Simons.
7	MR. SIMONS: Okay. With regard to the
8	personal property, as we discussed, that is separate
9	because that was identified and was paid for by Trust A.
10	So those pieces of personal property are within Trust A,
11	that's why we tried to incorporate and say the charities
12	says well, we don't want this. We don't want used
13	furniture here, we're just we're giving that to Amy. So
14	that's why it was structured that way.
15	Now, moving onto the Trust B component, which
16	was the tax exempt, trust that is where we've been
17	saying Judge Hardy is already modify and distributed
18	assets out of trust. He was not concerned about any
19	Spendthrift limitations. And that's why because he
20	determined based upon the situation that the
21	effectuation of the settlement agreement was beneficial
22	to everybody which included giving Amy monies and assets
23	out of trust.
24	Going back to what you referred to and read

1 earlier, you said she shall receive, Amy shall receive 2 the Settlor's primary residence. Well, you've already seen in the petition by the bank that there's a dispute 3 as to whether San Juan Capistrano house which is a 4 primary residence which should go to Amy. So as part of 5 this, whether Amy got that house, and it would not be 6 available for distribution in Trust A so that Brad and 7 8 Nori could get money, she gave up those rights. She 9 said look, I'll agree that this gets liquidated. This home gets liquidated, all the professionals get paid of 10 11 Trust A, the equalization payments and the swap payments 12 go in Trust B so it can go to my siblings, and as part 13 of this whole project I would have got the house. But 14 instead, I'm gonna exchange that, my right for the house 15 I'll exchange this distribution of assets free of the 16 trust.

17

THE COURT: Right.

18 MR. SIMONS: Free the limitation of the 19 So this settlement agreement was -- there Spendthrift. was extensive work that went into this to craft the best 20 21 resolution for everyone. The charities benefit. Brad 2.2 and Nori get paid every single penny. They've been -as Mr. Millsap points out, they're not interested 23 parties, they have no skin in the game, so to speak. 24

1 Mr. Brown effectuated this, was agreeable to all of 2 this. Judge Hardy -- Sattler agreed to it. We qot David Robertson who has been in this case and who 3 petitioned the Court for the amendment of the trust 4 5 prior to Judge Hardy granted has weighed in and said absolutely the relief that is being requested is 6 7 appropriate under Nevada law, and it's appropriate according to his experience involved in this litigation. 8 9 So we crafted a look but say well, why should I have 10 less concern about this Spendthrift trust is because 11 Judge Hardy -- excuse me, Judge Hardy's already 12 recognized that there's benefits to these children to receive the assets free of trust. 13

14 You pointed out the trustee doesn't even want 15 to be involved in case any more, they want out, we all want out. Literally everybody wants this to be over. 16 17 We found a way to do it. And guess who guess what? 18 Here's what the most amazing thing I can tell you. 19 There's not -- there's not gonna be an appeal. The Estate's granting this petition? The Estate's not 20 21 appealing it, Amy's not appealing it, the charities 2.2 aren't appealing it, Brad and Nori can't appeal it 23 because they're not interested parties under the law. This is done. We have a -- we have a solution that 24

we're presenting to you that literally ends seven years of intense litigation, gives the funds to the children, they can live their lives. They don't have to communicate with each other. They don't have to litigate in the future with each other. And, honestly, I believe this is the best solution that we can achieve for this Court and for everybody involved.

8 Now, with that all being said you have more 9 questions for me?

10 THE COURT: I don't. I do have a question for 11 Ms. Halstead, however. And so Ms. Nori Frasier and Mr. 12 Brad Frasier, you are not parties to this particular 13 litigation, so I'm not going to call on you at this 14 I understand that you are interested parties time. 15 under the terms of the -- at least the tax-exempt trust 16 as the parties have argued today, but I'm not going to 17 call on you, but I thank you for your attendance.

All right. So Ms. Halstead, other than the Spendthrift provision and the agreed-upon distribution of personal property, does US Trust have any disagreement with the equalization payments from Trust A into Trust B as are indicated in the petition for settlement?

24

MS. HALSTEAD: No.

1 THE COURT: So there's no problem with that. 2 So your clients -- your client's objections are limited to the provision -- or the elimination of the 3 Spendthrift provision and the distribution of the 4 5 personal property. MS. HALSTEAD: Correct. And we'll defer to 6 7 the Court as to the distribution of the personal 8 property. We already sought instruction on that, so 9 we'll do whatever the Court directs. 10 THE COURT: All right. Thank you. All right, 11 then, does anybody else wish to be heard? 12 MS. HALSTEAD: I would like to be heard, your 13 Honor. 14 THE COURT: Okay. Go ahead, Ms. Halstead. 15 MS. HALSTEAD: So, you know, I think we all appreciate that we want this litigation to end, but the 16 17 fact of the matter is we're bound by the law. And Mr. 18 Millsap's point with regard to the settlement agreement 19 is look, this is the charities' money, and the charities are basically paying Amy to go away and not continue to 20 21 stir the pot, and they should be able to do that. 2.2 The problem with that argument, and the 23 problem with saying that I'm asking you to commit reversible error is that I'm the authority who has no 24 Page 60

1 dog in the fight and I submitted the law to the Court 2 that says you can not just give trust funds away outside of the restriction, you can't agree to that. So that's 3 nice charities that you want to do, that and I'm sure 4 everyone appreciates that, and I'm sure everyone wants 5 to here -- get this litigation to end. But we're all 6 7 bound by the law. And the law says you have to honor the Spendthrift provisions, that's California law. 8 9 That's Nevada law. You can't just say you can't just do 10 an end-run and say I'm gonna pay you off, go away.

11 This litigation is being brought forward by 12 Ms. Wilson, that's her decision. So she can live by the 13 sword and she can die by the sword, but the trustee has 14 an obligation, as does this Court, for any trust sums to 15 go to her in trust. And you can't end-run that by an agreement, and that's what the law says throughout the 16 17 country. It's the law in Nevada. It's the law in 18 California.

19As to your point earlier to do so would20undermine the entire basis of doing the trust.

THE COURT: All right. And so what do you say, Ms. Halstead, to Mr. Millsap's argument that the Spendthrift trust provision does not apply to Trust A? MS. HALSTEAD: Well, it applies to any

1 distribution to Amy. So if the -- what he's saying is 2 look, this is -- this is the charities' money, and they're giving it to Amy as part of a settlement, but 3 you -- and as I have said earlier I said that, but his 4 reasoning is exactly contrary to the law that says you 5 can't give outright. All the provisions of the trust 6 7 say you can't give any outright. In giving that money, whether it comes from the trust whether it comes to the 8 9 charities, it's trust money, and it's subject to the confines of the Settlors. 10

11 THE COURT: But Mr. Millsap's argument is that 12 the provision that creates that limitation was in the 13 First Amendment, and that First Amendment has been 14 overridden by the remaining amendments to trust.

15 MS. HALSTEAD: It's in the first amendment. 16 It's also carries through the Second Amendment. And so 17 if you want to argue the amendment should be 18 enforceable, that was never found, that was never 19 So you can't say that these amendments are litigated. 20 enforceable and these amendments aren't because that 21 settlement agreement. That's the whole point of a 2.2 settlement agreement we don't know what's gonna control. So we don't know if the Third amendment's gonna control, 23 we don't know of the Fifth Amendment's gonna control. 24

But what we do know is that any restraint of that money going to Amy is subject to a Spendthrift trust so you can't end-run and say oh, you know, she's axed the tree ten times, the tree's gonna fall, just give it to her to make it go away. That defeats the intent of the settlor.

7 THE COURT: And so what do you say about the 8 fact that Judge Hardy has already determined that there 9 are distributions can be made to Ms. Frasier's free of 10 the Spendthrift provision.

11 MS. HALSTEAD: Well, because that was when 12 Dinny was still alive, that was pursuant to the 13 settlement agreement which was Exhibit 9 to the Amended 14 Petition, that was a distribution from the Survivor's 15 Trust that was Dinny's trust that she still had 16 authority to amend or do whatever she wanted with. She had not been deemed incompetent, so there is -- there's 17 18 theories that she was, that's never been adjudicated. 19 So as far as the law and interpretations is concerned she was a party to this, she initialed it, she was 20 represented by counsel, she agreed to that change to her 21 2.2 trust, that was at her liberty to do. She's not here now, she's gone. As of her death, that trust is 23 irrevocable and her intent must be maintained. You 24

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1 heard argument you don't know it was her intent --2 THE COURT: You say that trust. What part of the trust? Which amendments are in effect as of Ms. 3 4 Dinny Frasier's death? MS. HALSTEAD: Any -- any amendment that would 5 6 apply to Amy and allow her to have money has a 7 Spendthrift provision. So if Amy's to get any money it doesn't matter -- you could go back to the very first 8 9 initial trust. It carried all throughout, 24 years she's had that restriction. She had that restriction 10 11 before that along with her siblings. Her -- no matter 12 -- no matter I could pick anyone. THE COURT: Well, and so -- but the Exhibit 6 13 14 that I was quoting from, Mr. Millsap indicated this is 15 specific to Trust B, the tax-exempt trust. So where is 16 the Spendthrift provision literally for the Survivor's 17 Trust, through account? 18 MS. HALSTEAD: I had it and I had it when he 19 talked about it earlier and I turned the page, so if you go to Exhibit 10, or -- so let me -- sorry, let me back 20 21 up. And I'm gonna --2.2 MR. MILLSAP: Can I briefly be heard while she looks for that? 23 24 THE COURT: Well, no. Let's let her finish. Page 64

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24	MS. HALSTEAD: Sorry, spendthrift trust.
23	is
22	THE COURT: The supplemental needs, but where
21	Survivor's Trust.
20	page 7.37 that created supplemental needs trust from the
19	to read but starting at 7.1 through page 7.2 through
18	entire income of the family and on Section 2, it's a lot
17	reading from page 7-2. And it goes on to create the
16	the trust created for Amy Frasier Wilson, and I'm
15	So the trustee designated role shall act with regard to
14	the quote unquote Century Trust to Amy Frasier Wilson.
13	provides and I briefed this, that's what provided for
12	MS. HALSTEAD: If you go to 7-1, that's what
11	THE COURT: All right.
10	to the Amended Petition.
9	restatement of the Survivor's Trust, which is Exhibit 7
8	MS. HALSTEAD: To the First Amendment and
7	THE COURT: First amendment to what?
6	it is.
5	the First Amendment, if you go to Section 7, I believe
4	agreement, and then you had the First Amendment. And so
3	MS. HALSTEAD: So you have the settlement
2	you be heard once she's finished this point. Thank you.
1	She's almost finished, Mr. Millsap, I promise I will let

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1 THE COURT: So where's the language that 2 creates the Spendthrift provision? I pointed this out the other 3 MS. HALSTEAD: day that counsel. I just gotta find it again. 4 5 THE COURT: All right. Thank you. MS. HALSTEAD: So Amy Frasier Wilson is named 6 7 as the hundred percent beneficiary. THE COURT: Oh, of Trust A. 8 9 MS. HALSTEAD: Of the Survivor's Trust 10 pursuant to that amendment. And then it provides if she 11 should die, says my trustee shall hold and distribute 12 the shares such beneficiary as provided under terms of such share --13 14 THE COURT: You said -- an I'm sorry, did you say this is the First Amendment? 15 16 MS. HALSTEAD: This is the First Amendment. 17 THE COURT: And again, I think Mr. Millsap's 18 gonna argue that this is not applicable, or has been 19 overriding by the subsequent amendments to the trust. 20 MS. HALSTEAD: That's what he's arguing. 21 THE COURT: All right. 2.2 MS. HALSTEAD: Yes. 23 THE COURT: All right. Thank you. 24 MS. HALSTEAD: And so do you want me to find Page 66

1	that language?
2	THE COURT: No, that is you've indicated
3	that it's in Exhibit 7 to your amended or to the
4	original petition. Correct?
5	MS. HALSTEAD: Well, it's in Exhibit 7 on page
6	7.1 through 7.3 and it carries through her through
7	her subsequent amendment, and then and then you have the
8	settlement agreement, and then you have where she amends
9	it again.
10	So if you go to the third restatement, which
11	is Exhibit 10, it's the Third Amendment and Restatement
12	of the Survivor's Trust. And I don't want to misspeak
13	so I'm taking my time to go through this because it's
14	important the Court knows where to find these things.
15	THE COURT: All right. So Mr. Millsap is
16	asking to speak so while you find that, then I'm going
17	to allow Mr. Millsap to be heard. Go ahead, Mr.
18	Millsap.
19	MS. HALSTEAD: I'm just
20	THE COURT: And I'm sorry, Mr. Millsap, it
21	sounds like Ms. Halstead's found her place.
22	MS. HALSTEAD: Now I have already found what
23	pointed to. It's the Third Amendment that gives to the
24	charities. So the first and second of the Spendthrift.
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1 THE COURT: So the Third Amendment gives the 2 entire corpus of Trust A to charities? MS. HALSTEAD: I mean the equalization 3 4 payments. THE COURT: All right. And then so that to me 5 sounds like it would override the intention of the First 6 Amendment, right? If -- okay. So it completely negates 7 8 Ms. -- you know, any sort of gift to Ms. Amy Frasier 9 Wilson it sounds like there's override there. Would you 10 agree? 11 MS. HALSTEAD: Well, then you would have to 12 accept the premise that the charities can end-run that 13 and give her trust money outside of trust despite what 14 the intent of the trustor was. 15 THE COURT: That's a settlement issue and 16 that's kind of what Judge Hardy determined, correct, 17 that we can make modifications in that regard? 18 MS. HALSTEAD: Well, Judge Hardy just 19 confirmed what Dinny wanted with regard to her own 20 trust. 21 THE COURT: All right. Go ahead, Mr. Millsap. MR. MILLSAP: Your Honor, the trustee's 2.2 argument defeats itself and that's where the trustee's 23 getting lost here is if you listen carefully --24

1 THE COURT: And -- all right. Mr. Millsap, I 2 would just ask you know what? I think Ms. Halstead was correct in that, you know, there's been a lot of 3 disagreement between the parties and, you know, because 4 of the extent, the nature, the time, the amount of money 5 that's gone into this litigation there may be somewhat 6 7 some animosity between the parties. Everybody is 8 arguing to the extent that they are legally capable of 9 on behalf of their clients, and that's my expectation, so I would prefer that we not denigrate our opponents 10 11 here which is sort of what you just did, Mr. Millsap. Ι 12 don't think that was your intention, but we're getting 13 to the -- it's -- we're getting to what seems to be the 14 end of this litigation and I just prefer going forward 15 that we all treat each other respectfully. 16 Go ahead, Mr. Millsap. 17 MR. MILLSAP: Yeah, that certainly was not my 18 intent, Judge. I know Ms. Halstead personally, she's a 19 wonderful, wonderful human being. I'm solely talking about the validity of the argument. 20 21 THE COURT: All right, thank you. Go ahead. 2.2 MR. MILLSAP: With respect to the argument, the trustee's counsel noted we don't know which 23 amendment is applicable, hence the point of the 24

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1 settlement agreement, then simultaneously says follow 2 the provisions of the First Amendment to the Survivor's Those two statements are completely incongruous 3 Trust. with each other. The law is the Fifth Amendment is 4 presumed valid until deemed otherwise. There is no 5 ruling invalidating the Fifth Amendment, the charities 6 resolve the lone objection to the validity of the Fifth 7 Amendment and, therefore, that is controlling, the 8 9 charities convey part of their residual interest to Ms. Wilson's to resolve the sole objection to the Fifth 10 11 Amendment benefiting them.

12 The final thing I want to say is with respect 13 to the intent of Dinny Frasier. The argument is Ms. 14 Frasier didn't intend to convey assets to Ms. Wilson 15 free of trust, yet, as Ms. Halstead correctly notes, as 16 part of a resolution to the medical building case, Dinny 17 Frasier specifically agreed to convey assets to Ms. 18 Wilson free of trust. So the only intent before the 19 Court with respect to resolution of a lawsuit evidence is Ms. Dinny Frasier expressly agreed to convey Ms. 20 Wilson's assets free of trust. 21

22 So the argument about intent and how it 23 applies to resolution of a lawsuit is completely false 24 because the only evidence before the Court is when there

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1 was a case, that Dinny Frasier what involved in, she 2 expressly tried to convey assets free of trusts to Ms. Wilson. That's the evidence before the Court about how 3 Ms. Dinny Frasier would have resolved cases. 4 5 THE COURT: And now you're talking about the 6 Survivor's Trust, correct? 7 MR. MILLSAP: Survivor's Trust, yeah. 8 THE COURT: All right. So now, I hate to open 9 up a new can of worms, but that's what we're here for 10 regarding the tax-exempt trust. What is -- is there a 11 position regarding whether that should be conveyed free 12 and clear, I think that that's Mr. Simons' client's 13 position, but what is it -- do you have any arguing in 14 that regard, Mr. Millsap? Given the language that we 15 discussed that is from the Fifth amendment to the 16 tax-exempt trust that appears to me to indicate the 17 intent to impose a Spendthrift provision. 18 MR. MILLSAP: Yeah. You make a great point, 19 I want to distinguish between the vour Honor. 20 Survivor's Trust and the tax-exempt trust. 21 THE COURT: Right. And now I'm talking about 2.2 the tax-exempt trust specifically. The Survivor's Trust didn't have 23 MR. MILLSAP: 24 a power of the bending over and a power of appointing. Page 71

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1 She was free to do with Survivor's Trust whatever she 2 wanted assuming she had the capacity. The tax-exempt trust became irrevocable upon the death of Jordan 3 Frasier, which is to say Dinny Frasier nor the estate 4 has the authority to unilaterally amend the tax-exempt 5 That's why rather that entering into an 6 trust. 7 agreement to change the tax-exempt trust, instead, the parties agreed to petition the Court for modification. 8

9 The parties don't have authority to do that unlike the Survivor's Trust, the tax-exempt trust only 10 11 the Court has the ability to modify pursuant to 153.031. 12 The argument for modification, as I have said earlier, 13 your Honor, and I don't want to repeat myself or waste 14 the Court's time, it's simply to end this litigation, to 15 end this case. To effectuate a full and complete 16 distribution, it's pretty clear when you read the 17 tax-exempt trust that those monies were being held to 18 enable her to qualify for public assistance. There's no 19 evidence that she's ever utilized public assistance programs that distribution of the funds would preclude 20 her receipt of public assistance, nothing like that is 21 before the Court. What is before the Court is seven to 2.2 23 eight years worth of litigation over the administration of this trust, and that's bound to continue if it's not 24

terminated in totality.

1

2 The case law across the country is legion, your Honor, that courts have authority to terminate a 3 trust when its purpose is frustrated. I think this is 4 the case where after eight years of litigation, almost a 5 million dollars in professional fees, there is a total 6 7 frustration of purpose in this trust, it's a boondoggle of litigation. And the best part is, Judge, the way we 8 structured the settlement, it doesn't affect the 9 interest of Dr. Frasier or Nori Frasier. 10 They will be 11 paid in full. The other children of these two 12 individuals will not be affected by this agreement 13 negatively. And so at this juncture, your Honor, the 14 Estate has no reason to object to a distribution of Ms. 15 Wilson's share to her freedom trust.

16 THE COURT: All right. Thank you. Mr.17 Simons.

18 MR. SIMONS: Thank you, your Honor. Just a 19 The reference to the First Amendment couple points. that was shown and discussed by Ms. Halstead? I see 20 that it was identified as Premier Trust was the trustee. 21 David Robertson's declaration, he represents both Dinny 2.2 and Premier Trust as the co-trustees of the trust. He 23 24 also affirms that as part of the efforts early on in

this case global settlement was attempted. Couldn't be
 accomplished that time which encompassed the termination
 of Trust B and the restrictions on Trust B to Amy.

So what we can decipher from that, in addition 4 to the fact that there was distributions, outright free 5 of trust to Amy, is that there was an intent and a 6 7 desire to conclude the ongoing litigation with termination of all the trusts. So we had that 8 9 paperwork. We can't just make a decision in a vacuum 10 and say well, the language says it there's a prohibition 11 on distribution Amy so that stands in a vacuum. That's 12 not what the law allows. The law gives you discretion 13 to review the totality of the circumstances, just like 14 Judge Hardy did, and at the time, Dinny was not -- there 15 was a dispute as to her competency. He overrode that, 16 took that out of dispute and said I'm exercising my 17 authority as a judge under Nevada Statute, and I'm 18 modifying amending trusts.

So that is a very big powerful thing. And lastly what we've noticed is there is not any presentation of evidence to you in these proceedings that this -- that there is a need or a necessity to prevent the distribution to Amy as requested. Amy gave up significant value with regards to whether she had a

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right to the totality of the Estates, including the San
 Juan Capistrano house, in order to effectuate payment to
 the siblings. So given the totality of the
 circumstances we believe that the petition should be
 granted in total.

THE COURT: All right. So Mr. Simons, I do 6 7 have one more question. And Mr. Millsap, when I was 8 questioning him regarding the personal property, his 9 position was that that was the -- under the terms of the 10 trust, that belonged to the charities, as part of this 11 settlement they have -- they have reverted that personal 12 property back to your client. What do you think about 13 the equity issue involved here in that that is personal 14 property that is now the charity is saying we don't want 15 it, you know, the terms of at least the tax-exempt trust 16 indicate that, you know, Ms. Frasier isn't entitled to 17 that. Understood, you know, I understand how far we've 18 gone down the road on argument on that, but I'm asking 19 about equity. What is the equitable reason why this personal property should not be divided amongst all 20 three of the siblings? 21

22 MR. SIMONS: I'm going to give you the 23 framework. When we were trying to resolve the case in 24 totality, we believed that the assets were held in Trust

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1 A, that was the assumption and premise that we were 2 working on because we were trying to wrap that, put a bow on that, present that to you, in total we're done. 3 If you say look, there is an issue as to whether the 4 personal property under the equity should be divided in 5 some fashion, I'm totally comfortable and I think Mr. 6 Millsap would be comfortable the court retains 7 jurisdiction over that issue and makes a determination. 8 9 Draw lots, identify, you know, the top five things, there's different methodologies to effectuate the 10 11 distribution of the assets, those personal properties.

We tried to use a methodology that concluded the disputed in total rather than continuing to embrace ongoing contentions and disputes. But the Court has the authority on that because it -- again, there was not a determination but it appeared that at all times it was in Trust A.

18 THE COURT: All right. So Mr. Millsap,19 anything on that, sir?

20 MR. MILLSAP: No, I agree, your Honor, there 21 was never an initial determination of whether the 22 personal property was in Trust A or Trust B. It was 23 contained primarily San Juan Capistrano house which is 24 an asset of the Trust A so it was assumed to be an asset

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1 of Trust A within the San Juan Capistrano house. To the 2 extent the Court wants to make an equitable distribution of the personal property of all of the Settlor's 3 children's the Estate has no objection. 4 THE COURT: All right. And so this is the one 5 time that I -- and so I'll ask you first, Mr. Simons, 6 7 and then I am going to ask Mr. Brad Frasier and Ms. Nori 8 Frasier to speak. 9 Mr. Simons, do you think that there is any 10 possibility that the three -- the three, you know, the 11 two residual beneficiaries, as well as your client, 12 could confer personally regarding the personal property, 13 or do you think that that -- and I quess I'm just asking 14 for your client's perspective on that. Is this 15 something that is possible? 16 From -- and you're asking if Amy MR. SIMONS: 17 would be able to converse with Brad and Nori? 18 THE COURT: Yes. 19 I think --MR. SIMONS: No. 20 THE COURT: All right. 21 MR. SIMONS: -- the tensions are so high that 2.2 there will be no good outcome that results from that. 23 THE COURT: Regarding -- even just regarding 24 the personal property and no other issue? Page 77 Litigation Services

1 MR. SIMONS: Correct. It -- Judge, this has 2 been going on and the parties are so polarized, there's -- I just can't see that functioning in any rational 3 way, it will just deteriorate, so I can't find a 4 different methodology to approach the Court with. 5 Ms. Halstead tried to find a way to say 6 everybody submit some information to us, see if there 7 can be some commonality that. I know everybody's very 8 9 entrenched with what they believe their parents intended them to receive. And so the short answer is no, I don't 10 11 think that there is a way to do that informally. 12 THE COURT: Well, and so long as the parties are unable to confer, you know, and Ms. Halstead has, I 13 14 do notice that she's done some work as far as -- as far 15 as asking the separate parties what their preferences 16 are, I think that the -- initially, and I'm not saying 17 that this is going to be any final determination, but if 18 I -- if I did decide that an equitable distribution was 19 appropriate, the way that I would likely proceed is to go through Ms. Halstead's list to distribute the 20 21 property that is not in dispute and then to send the rest to auction, you know, to sell the rest of it, to 2.2 23 distribute the cash proceeds among the siblings, and for 24 anything that was not able to be sold, you know, proceed

1 in some sort of lottery fashion. But that's --2 MR. SIMONS: Your Honor. THE COURT: Go ahead, Mr. Simons. 3 MR. SIMONS: Actually, that's -- that's 4 actually a really good idea because then the parties 5 would have the ability to participate at the auction and 6 7 generate the most value they really believe that things 8 had value rather than -- than they could bet on them and 9 acquire them. 10 THE COURT: Thank you. Mr. Simons, that's not 11 -- again, that's not my final determination but that was 12 my thought and, you know, I would also thank Ms. 13 Halstead for her work to try to achieve an equitable 14 division among those three parties. 15 MS. HALSTEAD: And your Honor, If I may add a piece of information? 16 17 THE COURT: Certainly. 18 MS. HALSTEAD: I was informed that there were 19 -- there is property that was set aside that was deemed to belong to the family that was not inventoried or part 20 of the inventory so there is a room of items that are 21 believed to be family items that should go to the family 2.2 23 in some manner that were not inventoried. THE COURT: Do you mind if I ask where that 24 Page 79 Litigation Services

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1 information came from? 2 MS. HALSTEAD: From U.S. Bank. 3 THE COURT: All right. 4 MS. HALSTEAD: The trustee. THE COURT: So, again, Ms. Halstead, are you 5 able to generate a list of that and to inquire -- if I 6 did so, if I did order so, what would be your ability to 7 confer with the beneficiaries under this trust to 8 9 determine their request for that individual property? MS. HALSTEAD: So U.S. Bank could inventory 10 11 that particular property. I don't know that U.S. Bank 12 would be able to lend good descriptions, and then it 13 would still come down to the parties debating it amongst 14 themselves what they deserve from that property, taking 15 the other out equation, one of the suggestions was that 16 the parties all come to the house, that there be 17 security provided, and that they all just take turns 18 picking. I don't know that that's the best idea. THE COURT: No. And so -- and I did read your 19 -- one of your original suggestions was. And so no, you 20 know, this litigation has gone on for several years. If 21 2.2 the parties can't communicate with each other I'm not 23 gonna force them to come into one room. If you can not -- if the three -- if the three siblings can not agree 24

to the distribution of property, then whatever is
 disputed will be sold, and we'll have the proceeds
 divided among them.

Now, it seems to me that there are some items 4 5 in there that have great personal value that would be, should be kept within the family but, you know, if --6 you know, if you can't agree that, you know, it's better 7 8 to, you know, have a stranger be, you know, to be 9 involved in having this property then to just, you know, 10 to allow one of the siblings to have it, that's the way 11 it's gonna be.

So thank you, Ms. Halstead. If I do execute an order in that manner, what I would be doing would be asking you as trust to proceed in the manner that you have discussed, but I would also be putting a time frame on this. We're not going to be arguing over personal property for the next 12 months.

MS. HALSTEAD: With regard to the -- since the parties cannot be together with regard to the family items, I don't see any other option but then to have it at least listed and described.

THE COURT: Certainly. And that's -- thank you also for bringing that to the attention of the Court and the parties or the parties to the trust so that they

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understand that there's more property out there and also, you know, I'm hoping that Mr. Brad Frasier, Ms. Nori Frasier and Ms. Amy Frasier Wilson will understand that if they can't come to an agreement on this, you know, very valuable personal property that has deep sentimental value a stranger's gonna own it, so.

All right. So any other issues that need to8 be brought to the attention of the Court? Mr. Millsap.

9 MR. MILLSAP: Briefly, your Honor, we would 10 echo the trustee's request that the Court order the San 11 Juan Capistrano house can be sold immediately.

12 And finally, we would request that as part of 13 the Court's ruling today, whatever that may be, that 14 proper notice was provided to all interested persons in 15 the petition. Pursuant to NRS Chapter 155, obviously, 16 Dr. Frasier is here and Nori Frasier is here, several of 17 the grandchildren are on the call as well so we would 18 just request that the Court order that proper notice 19 was effectuated and the sale of the San Juan Capistrano house also be permitted immediately. 20

21THE COURT: All right. Any objection to that,22Mr. Simons?

23 MR. SIMONS: No, your Honor. But I do have24 one comment when you're ready for me.

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1 All right. And then I want to ask THE COURT: 2 Mr. Earl any objection on behalf of the charities for the immediate sale of the San Juan Capistrano house? 3 MR. EARL: No objection, your Honor. 4 Thank 5 you. 6 THE COURT: All right. Go ahead, Mr. Simons? MR. SIMONS: Note that what I need to do to 7 8 protect the record, your Honor, that you identify that 9 Brad and Nori were potentially interested parties under 10 NRS 132.185. Interested party's only someone whose 11 right or interest under a trust may be materially 12 affected by a decision of a court. And the Court shall 13 determine if the interested party exists in light of the 14 particular purposes of the matter. 15 My objection is that both Brad and Nori are 16 not interested parties subject to a right to contest or 17 participate because they're being paid out 100 percent 18 in total, therefore --19 THE COURT: Except for the personal property, right, Mr. Simons? 20 21 MR. SIMONS: Yes, but the personal property 2.2 relates to Trust A. 23 THE COURT: All right. MR. SIMONS: And to the extent that -- if I'm 24 Page 83

1 hearing you correctly, to the extent you're saying your 2 interested party with regards to the personal property? I don't -- I won't pose an objection to that, but to the 3 4 extent --5 THE COURT: That was my intention. That was my intention to -- I was speaking about the personal 6 7 property. 8 MR. SIMONS: Okay. My correction. Thank you, 9 for that, your Honor. 10 THE COURT: All right, now, and so Ms. 11 Halstead, I did not go through the distribution or did 12 not compare the distribution that is suggested in the 13 petition for settlement against your original petition 14 for instructions. Do you happen to know if those are 15 consistent or are there -- are there differences in the 16 request for distribution, as far as you know, other than 17 the --18 MS. HALSTEAD: Yes. 19 THE COURT: -- issues that you've already brought? 20 So what is consistent is the 21 MS. HALSTEAD: 2.2 sale of the SJC house, and the payment of all outstanding obligations, and how the personal property 23 should be allocated which seems to be resolved. 24 And Page 84

1 there is the issue of the other Palm Desert house that 2 has value that's in the B Trust, but that needs -- you know, I guess my concern is it's not easy to work this 3 stuff out between the parties. Nori has requested that 4 house in her distribution and its contents. So we have 5 requested that it just be permitted to be sold. 6 7 THE COURT: All right, again, yes. And I think Mr. Simons is now -- Mr. Simons, now we're talking 8 9 about Trust B, so the tax-exempt trust which contains as one of the items the Palm Desert house. Is that true? 10 11 MS. HALSTEAD: Right. So I guess my question 12 is whether the trustee can have the authority to either 13 sell the house, or if there's no objection to the value 14 to account for its value and its contents in Ms. Nori 15 Frasier's distribution. 16 THE COURT: All right.

MS. HALSTEAD: There is if there's noobjection.

THE COURT: And so Mr. Simons, again, the -your client's position as to the allocation of the assets in Trust B is -- can you just review it for the record, sir?
MR. SIMONS: I'm sorry, I didn't follow the

24 question, your Honor.

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1 THE COURT: All right. So Trust B we're 2 talking about now the --MR. SIMONS: 3 Yes. 4 THE COURT: -- tax-exempt trust. So my -and correct me if I'm wrong, my understanding of the 5 agreement is to divide that. After -- after all 6 7 expenses have been paid, then the remainder should be divided among the -- Mr. Brad Frasier, Ms. Nori Frasier, 8 9 and your client; is that correct? Am I recalling that --Yes. 10 MR. SIMONS: 11 THE COURT: -- provision correctly? 12 MR. SIMONS: That's correct, it will be 13 divided in thirds, correct. 14 THE COURT: All right. Thank you. All right. 15 Does anybody have anything else that's wanted to include 16 on the record here? 17 MS. HALSTEAD: If I may, your Honor? 18 THE COURT: Yes. 19 MS. HALSTEAD: I just was -- I want to clarify for the record that U.S. Bank will see this through. 20 It's only in sub-trusts that are held for the benefit of 21 Amy Frasier Wilson with which U.S. Bank does not want to 2.2 23 participate. U.S. Bank is a new trustee so that there has been allegations about all fees paid to the trustee. 24 Page 86

U.S. Bank is new relatively in comparison to the length
 of the litigation.

And then I also want to point out there is an 3 issue that hasn't been addressed. U.S. Bank has 4 residual obligations to all the beneficiaries, including 5 residual beneficiaries. The residual beneficiaries have 6 a share, vested share in any residual of any sub-trust 7 that are held for the benefit of Ms. Wilson. That's why 8 9 they are here today, although they have never been 10 noticed, they weren't part of the settlement agreement, 11 they haven't been heard from, their rights would be 12 directly impacted if -- if the -- either trust, 13 depending on how the Court fell on them.

14 THE COURT: All right. But again, under the 15 terms of the Fifth Amendment, and this is regarding the -- again, according to Mr. Millsap and, you know, I've 16 17 been convinced that this is the case. The terms of the 18 Fifth Amendment indicate that Ms. Amy Frasier Wilson's, 19 her interest is paramount in the intention of the Settlors were to manage this part of the trust to her 20 benefit, not for the residual beneficiaries. 21

MS. HALSTEAD: That's accurate. And you were accurate what you stated before. So if the funds were held in a sub-trust for her, her needs would be taken to

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1 account, but also takes into account her income from 2 other sources, necessity, that sort of thing. Obviously 3 she's been living without these funds for years now so 4 who's to say that how much she would actually need.

And as you also read, it's the trustee's 5 obligation to maintain these funds in a way that they 6 7 last for a lifetime, so although she is supposed to be a 8 primary, and she would be treated as a primary, any 9 residual, if there was any, the grandchildren have a right to that, and if they haven't been heard on this 10 11 matter and if this were to be litigated in favor of Ms. 12 Wilson and she was to be given it outright, that would 13 be contrary to their rights under the trust as written. 14 And then just one further point?

15 THE COURT: Well, before you to go the further point. Are you saying that if I approve the Joint 16 17 Petition for settlement, then that's in derogation of 18 the law in regard to consideration of the residual 19 beneficiaries' interest? Or are we just saying that the point would be moot because simply there's no 20 subcontract to manage anymore, then the issue would be 21 2.2 concluded.

23 MS. HALSTEAD: I would say that it would be 24 contrary to their rights and they haven't been heard on

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1 the matter. 2 THE COURT: All right. MS. HALSTEAD: And I would say that you're 3 leaving a door open for them to challenge it. I don't 4 know that they would or not, but -- but their rights are 5 being impacted and they haven't participated, they 6 haven't--7 8 THE COURT: But haven't they had an opportunity to join the litigation during the past six 9 I mean, they declined to join, correct? 10 years? 11 MS. HALSTEAD: Well, I wouldn't necessarily 12 say that because the charities you could say declined to 13 join but they didn't know about their rights, so they --THE COURT: Well, they -- okay. But they --14 15 let's put it this way. So long as they knew about the 16 litigation and their -- that they were residual 17 beneficiaries they have the opportunity to join as 18 parties necessary to the case. Correct? 19 MS. HALSTEAD: No one joined them. I imagine that they could have stock to be joined. 20 21 THE COURT: Right. 2.2 MS. HALSTEAD: But I don't want to speak as to 23 their --24 THE COURT: I'm assuming they are adults at Page 89

1	this point.
2	MS. HALSTEAD: Right. I want to make the
3	point for the record because the trust has a fiduciary
4	obligation to everybody.
5	THE COURT: All right. Thank you.
6	Mr. Millsap, want to be heard? Go ahead.
7	MS. HALSTEAD: I if may?
8	THE COURT: Sorry, it sounds like Ms.
9	Halstead's not finished.
10	MS. HALSTEAD: Right. So there was a point
11	made by Mr. Simons about how this can't be this
12	decisions can't be made in a vacuum and that there has
13	been no evidence that Amy is in need of a Spendthrift
14	trust. That is not the that's not the standard. The
15	parole evidence rule applies she's been deemed a
16	Spendthrift. This Court looks at the trust, it is, for
17	lack of a better term, to be determined in a vacuum
18	because it's controlled by the trust document.
19	THE COURT: All right. Thank you. Mr.
20	Millsap wants to be heard. Mr. Millsap.
21	MR. MILLSAP: Yeah, your Honor. I just want
22	to correct something for the record. The trustee
23	indicated that notice was not provided to the residual
24	beneficiaries of the tax-exempt trust. And before I get
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to that I do want to make clear for the record the grandchildren, I'll refer to them generally as the grandchildren, they're not interested persons in the Survivor's Trust at all.

To be clear, they are interested person in 5 6 Amy's share of the tax-exempt trust. So Dr. Frasier's children and Nori Frasier's children are interested 7 persons in Amy Frasier Wilson's one-third share of the 8 9 tax-exempt trust. For that reason, the Estate provided 10 a notice appearing dated August 7th, 2023, to those 11 grandchildren. The Notice of hearing is in compliance 12 with NRS Chapter 155. Several of the grandchildren are 13 fully a part of this, they just weren't admitted as 14 participants, but my understanding on the zoom call is 15 that they're -- they're not participants but they're 16 observing these proceedings. So they had notice of 17 these proceedings, they had notice of the petition, 18 notice of the hearing, several of them have appeared 19 today, so that's why you asked earlier that the Court confirm that notice to the interested persons in the 20 petition was effectuated under Rule 155, and that these 21 people did, in fact, appear today. But I just want the 2.2 23 record to be clear they're not interested persons in the 24 Survivor's Trust. They are interested persons in Amy's

1 one-third share of the tax-exempt trust, and they were 2 properly noticed in the note, in the Amended Notice of Hearing filed August 7, 2023. 3 THE COURT: All right. And does --4 MS. HALSTEAD: We'll just start by I think 5 6 they would be interested persons unless the Court agrees 7 with Mr. Millsap's position that --8 THE COURT: Right that they -- do you have any 9 dispute that they were notified? 10 MS. HALSTEAD: I don't have Mr. Millsap's 11 notice in front of me. I would note that they are on 12 the hearing and they have not been -- we haven't heard from them. 13 14 THE COURT: Right. And I'm not going to admit 15 anybody at this point unless anybody, any of the actual 16 litigants have a dispute that, and that the parties have 17 not been, these residual beneficiaries have not been 18 notified pursuant to NRS 155. Does anybody -- and Mr. 19 Simons wishes to be heard. Go ahead, sir. 20 MR. SIMONS: Yeah, I'll stipulate that what 21 Mr. Millsap says is absolutely correct, proper notice 2.2 was initiated. Everybody was properly noticed so --23 THE COURT: All right. So --24 MR. SIMONS: -- from our position we agree. Page 92

THE COURT: And I'm sorry. Mr. Earl, you have your hand up, and I did not notice it earlier, sir, so go ahead, sir.

Thank 4 MR. EARL: That's okay, your Honor. I just wanted to just reiterate on behalf of the 5 you. charities that their position, which is that the Third, 6 Fourth Amendment are valid that it directed the residual 7 to the charities. It was our interest to try and 8 9 resolve the matter and reduce litigation. A little -to the extent that any funds from the Survivor's Trust 10 11 were to go into a trust briefly, but that might create 12 complications and further litigation which we are trying 13 to avoid, and just are seeking to minimize the costs 14 associated with -- with this matter, along with just 15 reiterating that charities did not have any interest in 16 the personal property. That's all that I'm going to 17 say.

18 THE COURT: And Mr. Earl, do you stipulate 19 that proper notice was provided to the residual 20 beneficiaries pursuant to NRS 155?

21

MR. EARL: Yes.

THE COURT: All right. Does anybody else wish to place anything on the record? All right. Does any party object to me ordering at this point that the San

Juan Capistrano house be sold and distributed according to the applicable and operable trust documents in this case? Mr. Millsap?

MR. MILLSAP: I have no objection to the sale of the San Juan Capistrano house pursuant to the settlement agreement.

THE COURT: All right. And the reason I'm 7 wanting to do this now is because of the -- you know, we 8 9 have been -- I have been holding off the trustee for quit a long time in anticipation of resolution in this 10 11 case and I think that if nobody objects to the sale of 12 the San Juan Capistrano house, and that is part of the 13 request of the trustee, that we go ahead and get that 14 process going, as well as distribution according to the 15 terms of the trust.

16

Any objection, Mr. Simons?

MR. SIMONS: It might be a semantic because we have submitted under Joint Petition to go ahead and sell that and distributing funds according to the settlement agreement. And you're saying trust, I'm not sure because we have some.

THE COURT: Well, okay. So I'm not -- today I'm not going to rule. I need to take this under submission to ensure that I get all of the parties'

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1 arguments into an appropriate order, at least I 2 appropriately consider all of those arguments that were made today. 3 So I'm sorry, Mr. Simons, it appears that 4 5 nobody has objected to the immediate sale of the San Juan Capistrano house. Are you objecting to the 6 distribution of funds at this point or what is that you 7 8 object to? 9 MR. SIMONS: No, you used a different 10 verbiage. We submitted the sale pursuant to the terms 11 of the petition and with your clarification that look, I 12 need to take some time to render a decision, I don't 13 have a problem with that because we've all agreed to 14 sell the San Juan Capistrano home. 15 THE COURT: All right. So if we get that process going, does your client have any issue or 16 17 problem with that, Ms. Halstead? 18 MS. HALSTEAD: No, your Honor. My client's 19 been wanting to do that for months. I would just ask to clarify, I mean, outstanding debts are being held up 20 pending that sale. I just want to make clear that the 21 house will be sold and all outstanding obligations will 2.2 23 be honored. THE COURT: Well, and to --24 Page 95

1 MS. HALSTEAD: Not distributions, but trust 2 obligations. THE COURT: All right. So yes. Thank you. 3 So thank you for the clarification. Anybody have an 4 objection to the proceeds being distributed to trust 5 obligations pending my determination whether I'm going 6 to honor the intended settlement? Mr. Simons. 7 8 MR. SIMONS: No, your Honor. 9 THE COURT: Mr. Millsap. 10 MR. MILLSAP: No, we would support that. 11 THE COURT: All right. Thank you. Mr. Earl. MR. EARL: No objection, your Honor. That was 12 13 contemplated in the settlement agreement. 14 THE COURT: All right. So that will be 15 included in the order after this hearing I'm entering 16 that oral order now but it also will be memorialized in 17 a written order San Juan Capistrano home is to be sold 18 by US Trust, the trust obligations are to be paid out of 19 the proceeds, and the proceeds distributed according to my ultimate order in this case if I honor the petition 20 21 or if I honor the settlement agreement. If I don't, 2.2 then we will have a different discussion. Any problem 23 with -- I don't want to say in clarity but with the pending -- my deciding to hold the proceeds that U.S. 24

1	Trust has after honoring of the obligations holding that
2	until my decision is entered?
3	MS. HALSTEAD: U.S. Bank has no intention of
4	doing any distributions absent a court order.
5	THE COURT: All right.
6	MS. HALSTEAD: But with that said, and you're
7	probably getting there, but U.S. Bank would also ask to
8	be able to make the equalization payments and transfer
9	the funds that were contemplated as compensation for the
10	property exchanges between the two trusts which were
11	also agreed upon in the settlement agreement.
12	THE COURT: Does anybody have any objection to
13	Ms. Halstead's suggestion, Mr. Simons?
14	MR. SIMONS: No, your Honor. That's all
15	contemplated under the terms of the settlement agreement
16	and I think it's this is not gonna be a quick sales
17	is what the concern may be so there is likely to be time
18	to flush this stuff out, but this is everything that
19	was just requested is all part of the terms of the
20	global settlement agreement.
21	THE COURT: Right. So Mr. Millsap, any
22	objection to U.S. Trust also excuse me, U.S. Bank
23	also going ahead and making those equalization payments
24	as contemplated by the settlement agreement but which
	Page 97

1 was also requested prior in U.S. Bank's request for 2 instruction? 3 MR. MILLSAP: No, your Honor. THE COURT: All right. Any objection, Mr. 4 Earl? 5 MR. EARL: 6 No, your Honor. Thank you. TH COURT: All right. Thank you. So that 7 will be also part of the order, my written order after 8 this hearing. And then we'll -- after full review of 9 all of the arguments made today, then I'll make my 10 determination on whether the Joint Petition should be 11 12 approved. 13 Any other questions or anything else that 14 needs to be considered or placed on the record at this 15 time? 16 MS. HALSTEAD: I would ask that U.S. Bank also 17 be able to go in and inventory the personal family 18 property assets. 19 THE COURT: Where is it? 20 MS. HALSTEAD: It's in the -- my understanding is it's in the dining room of the San Juan Capistrano 21 2.2 house. THE COURT: All right. Well, and U.S. Bank is 23 24 in charge of liquidating that property anyway, so any Page 98

1 objection to that request? Mr. Millsap. 2 MR. MILLSAP: No, your Honor. THE COURT: Mr. Simons. 3 MR. SIMONS: 4 No. THE COURT: Mr. Earl. 5 6 MR. EARL: No, your Honor. Thank you. 7 THE COURT: That request would also be 8 granted. Anything else, Ms. Halstead? 9 MS. HALSTEAD: I'm not sure where we landed on 10 the Palm Desert home. 11 THE COURT: Oh, we're not, we haven't landed 12 on it--13 MS. HALSTEAD: Okay. 14 THE COURT: -- so I'll make my determination. 15 MS. HALSTEAD: Well, I guess I'm not clear any 16 other parties -- if any other parties were concerned if 17 they want that or not if they were okay with it being 18 distributed within Ms. Nori Frasier's. 19 THE COURT: Well, I think it depends on 20 whether there is more in the tax-exempt trust than the one third that would be -- well, let me back up. 21 2.2 Is the value of the Palm Desert house less 23 than what is contemplated as Ms. Frasier's one-third share? 24

1 MS. HALSTEAD: I believe it would be but it 2 wouldn't be, then that wouldn't be an option, it would just be sold. 3 THE COURT: All right. So does either -- if 4 the calculation works out and, you know, I'm not sure 5 I'm gonna have access to that sort of calculation, but 6 7 let me just ask. Does any party object if Ms. Nori Frasier's distribution can be made with that Palm Desert 8 9 house being within her one-third share, does any party 10 object? Mr. Simons. And we're talking about the trust 11 again. 12 MR. SIMONS: Yeah, that's an issue that I 13 don't know -- it wasn't part of the settlement 14 agreement, and part of the petition, I think we can 15 provide information to -- depending on how the Court 16 rules, I don't -- unfortunately I'm at a loss, I don't 17 think that should be a problem. 18 THE COURT: All right. 19 I'm not authorized to engage in MR. SIMONS: that, and I don't want to waive a client's contention 20 21 given the current statute, I'm just being cognizant of the situation. 2.2 23 THE COURT: All right. Have you been made aware that your client is interested in the Palm Desert 24 Page 100

1 house? 2 MR. SIMONS: Well, it depends on what the assets would because if that goes in the tax-exempt 3 trust --4 THE COURT: It's my understanding is it is in 5 6 the tax-exempt trust. 7 MS. HALSTEAD: It is. MR. SIMONS: Correct. But how the Court would 8 9 distribute the assets if it is a part of her one-third, I don't think that would be a necessary --10 11 THE COURT: Right. 12 MR. SIMONS: -- objection because the trustee 13 would say everybody gets one third and here's your 14 allocation. 15 THE COURT: All right. So this contemplates, 16 again, I've not made any final decision about a 17 one-third, one-third, one-third distribution. 18 MR. SIMONS: Yeah. To be honest, I think if 19 that occurs and the trustee allocates the value of that 20 home and the contents to Nori Frasier's one third, then 21 there -- there can not be an objection to it because 2.2 everybody's getting their one-third value, so. 23 THE COURT: Well, and I want to -- again, Mr. Simons, your client has already, you know, indicated 24 Page 101 Litigation Services

1 that she may not be completely on board with the 2 settlement, so we'll get to that in a moment --3 MR. SIMONS: Okay. -- but Mr. Millsap, any objection 4 THE COURT: 5 to the Palm Desert's resolution suggested by Ms. 6 Halstead? 7 MR. MILLSAP: No, your Honor. 8 THE COURT: All right. Thank you. Mr. Earl, 9 any objection? 10 MR. EARL: No, your Honor. 11 THE COURT: All right. Thank you. All right. 12 So finally, as a condition for me honoring or approving this settlement, Mr. Simons, I would need Ms. Amy 13 14 Frasier Wilson to withdraw her amendments to that 15 petition because I think it just -- you know, I agree 16 with Mr. Millsap that the terms, the term sheet would be controlling so long as I ordered that that's the 17 18 controlling document, however, I think that her 19 amendments only provide confusion as in regard to future litigation, so I would be -- my expectation is that you 20 would submit a new -- or you would submit a document 21 2.2 that indicates that your client agrees to the resolution 23 as reached before Judge Sattler. 24 MR. SIMONS: Agreed, your Honor. And I work Page 102

1	with Mr. Millsap and we'll get that supplement on file.
2	And your comments are well taken.
3	THE COURT: All right. Thank you. All right.
4	Anybody have oh, go ahead, Mr. Millsap.
5	MR. MILLSAP: Yes, one housekeeping matter.
6	Assuming the Court approves resolution of the Survivor's
7	Trust, that would conclude the only litigation before
8	the Court that the Estate is involved in so I would just
9	request that if the Court's inclined to approve
10	resolution of the Survivor's Trust that that order also
11	discharge Mr. Brown as the special administrator from
12	any further duty and from any further liability in that
13	the estate can be concluded in totality.
14	THE COURT: All right. Thank you. And so I'm
15	indicated
16	MR. SIMONS: Your Honor, since we filed a
17	Joint Petition, would you like to allow us to present
18	you with a proposed order that would address things like
19	the
20	THE COURT: Please, yes, absolutely. And who
21	would like to be in charge of drafting the proposed
22	order?
23	MR. SIMONS: Mr. Millsap is the best scrivener
24	on this zoom call so I'm

1 Mr. Millsap, you've been THE COURT: 2 volunteered. I would suggest Ms. Halstead's 3 MR. MILLSAP: probably the best scrivener but if I'm forced to write 4 the order I will. 5 THE COURT: Ms. Halstead has been quite an 6 excellent scrivener and, again, I thank Ms. Halstead for 7 her pleadings to date which have been extraordinary 8 9 informative to the Court in understanding issues in this 10 case so thank you. 11 MS. HALSTEAD: Thank you, your Honor. THE COURT: Again, the Court has not made a 12 13 determination but to the extent that the parties, the 14 settling parties contemplate resolution if you could 15 please include in order the final, what your final terms 16 are intended to be. And Mr. Simons, if you could submit 17 with the assistance of Mr. Millsap your client's either 18 withdrawal or amended agreement regarding her intent to 19 enter the settlement as contemplated by the parties at 20 settlement conference before Judge Sattler. Anything --21 MR. EARL: Your Honor? 2.2 THE COURT: Yes. I'm sorry, if I could just comment 23 MR. EARL: on that? It seems like an alternative where Amy Frasier 24 Page 104

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www.veritext.com APP768 would be simply to sign, under amended settlement agreement as part of her noted withdrawal of her objections that she just sign what was prepared and circulated as opposed to the possession of -- of -- of withdrawing -- of agreeing to the settlement agreement as signed at the settlement conference.

THE COURT: Well, you know, whatever --7 whatever Mr. -- I'm going to leave this up to Mr. 8 9 Simons, however you can accomplish this, the less 10 additional paper, the better. Of course, we already 11 have missing documents related to this case. And I just wanted to be clear on the record that Ms. Frasier is 12 13 entering this settlement agreement as contemplated by 14 the parties as agreed upon by the settling parties 15 before Judge Sattler.

16 MR. MILLSAP: Your Honor, just one final thing 17 in regard to the proposed order requested by the Court. 18 Just to be clear, my understanding is the proposed order 19 prepared by the Estate will be circulated to all counsel will contemplate what I'll call the administrative 20 21 rulings of the Court, i.e., the San Juan Capistrano house can be sold, the Court's order with respect to 2.2 23 division of the personal property, et cetera, but the proposal order would not include or encompass the 24

1	Court's ruling on the resolution of Survivor's Trust and	
2	the tax-exempt trust.	

THE COURT: Correct.

3

4 MR. MILLSAP: We're continuing that we write a
5 proposal in that regard to.

That was -- okay. So, again, I 6 THE COURT: not have made the determination yet. What will likely 7 happen if I make the determination resolving or 8 9 approving the resolution or the settlement, I will 10 probably request Mr. Millsap to ensure completeness that 11 you write that order. So I probably do some sort of 12 interim administrative order and then ask you to write 13 the complete order that contemplates all of the terms by 14 the parties to ensure that those are all captured.

15 So -- but the original administrative order 16 that you will be writing, yes, thank you for that. So 17 that will include that -- the sale of the San Juan 18 Capistrano house, the payment of the trust obligations 19 out of those proceeds, that also that proper notice has is been provided to all parties of the settlement 20 pursuant to NRS 155, that -- that U.S. Bank be permitted 21 2.2 to enter the property, the San Juan Capistrano property 23 to inventory the remaining personal property, that the Survivor's Trust -- well, I'm sorry, this part should 24

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1 probably not be included until -- it should not be 2 included until any final determination. I was going to include your request that Mr. Brown be released but 3 4 we're not there yet. So --MR. MILLSAP: Didn't the Court also order that 5 6 the equalization payments will be made? 7 THE COURT: Yes, please. Thank you for the 8 reminder. 9 MR. MILLSAP: And Ms. Halstead, any other 10 issues that need to --11 MS. HALSTEAD: I'm sorry, I don't know if you 12 said the exchange sums. So what I have is immediate 13 sale of the San Juan Capistrano house and distributions 14 for trust obligations only, not distribution to the 15 parties. 16 THE COURT: But equalization payments made 17 also, that's Mr. Millsap. 18 MS. HALSTEAD: The equalization payments being 19 made, the exchange sums being exchanged between the trusts for the property --20 THE COURT: And just hold there, there's no 21 2.2 objection to the exchange sums being made, correct? 23 MS. HALSTEAD: Correct. 24 THE COURT: Mr. Millsap? Page 107

1	MR. MILLSAP: So I'm not sure what she means
2	by the exchange. I believe that's the equalization
3	payments.
4	THE COURT: Right.
5	MS. HALSTEAD: Well, there's the equalization
6	payments where the parties get paid out for their
7	distributions of the real properties that they have
8	received, but there was the properties were exchanged
9	between the properties were transferred to the trust
10	without the trust that received those properties
11	compensating other trusts for that value as was
12	contemplated in the settlement agreement. So one trust
13	has had benefit of the properties and their value
14	versus versus the value the value of the
15	property's exchange being exchanged.
16	THE COURT: So that needs to be done no matter
17	what.
18	MS. HALSTEAD: That's in the settlement
19	agreement.
20	THE COURT: Right. Okay. So yes, please.
21	So
22	MR. MILLSAP: Sorry, your Honor, I apologize.
23	Ms. Halstead's absolutely correct. We'll do that.
24	THE COURT: Thank you. I'm sorry. Any other
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1 issues? 2 MS. HALSTEAD: And you already mentioned inventory to family property. I think the only -- if I 3 understand right, the only outstanding issues are -- and 4 I'm going to add them separately, whether Amy gets the A 5 Trust distributions outright and separately whether she 6 7 gets the B trust --8 THE COURT: That's not -- that's not part of 9 the final term, that's left out --10 MS. HALSTEAD: Right, so --11 THE COURT: -- of the settlement agreement, 12 so that's everyone. 13 MS. HALSTEAD: That's only thing left out. 14 THE COURT: Right. 15 MS. HALSTEAD: And the rest has been resolved. 16 THE COURT: All right. Thank you. So that, 17 Mr. Millsap, is not to be included in the original 18 administrative order. 19 MR. MILLSAP: The only thing that wasn't definitive ruling on by the Court, aside from the 20 resolution of the Survivor's Trust and tax-exempt trust 21 2.2 is the procedure the Court wanted to follow with respect 23 to liquidation in personal property, your Honor had said 24 you wanted to reserve a ruling on that.

1 THE COURT: I do. I want to reserve that 2 because arguments of the parties I haven't determined whether -- how those should be -- whether they should be 3 distributed outside of the transfer to a -- contemplated 4 in the agreement to Amy Frasier, or whether those should 5 be equitably divided, I still need to think about that. 6 MR. MILLSAP: I'll omit that from the 7 8 administrative order then at this time, your Honor. 9 THE COURT: All right. Thank you. Mr. 10 Simons, any comment on anything else that should be 11 included in the administrative order? 12 MR. SIMONS: No, your Honor. 13 THE COURT: All right. Thank you, Mr. Earl? 14 MR. EARL: Nothing further. Thank you for 15 your effort. 16 THE COURT: All right. Thank you. All right. 17 Well, thank you, parties, for excellent arguments and 18 your enlightenment on this issue. 19 Thank you, Ms. Halstead, for being here personally, I do appreciate that you are here. And I 20 will -- I'm not going to put a time line on my 21 determination, I don't anticipate it's going to take 2.2 23 very much longer but I do look forward to getting that initial administrative order, Mr. Millsap, just please 24

1	circulate that among not only Mr. Simons and Mr. Earl
2	but also if you can circulate that to Ms. Halstead so
3	that we can ensure that it's consistent with what I have
4	asked the parties for today.
5	MR. MILLSAP: Certainly, your Honor. I'm
6	happy to do.
7	THE COURT: All right. Thank you.
8	MS. HALSTEAD: Thank you. Your Honor.
9	THE COURT: All right. Thank you all. And we
10	are in recess.
11	(Proceedings concluded.)
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1 STATE OF NEVADA)

2 COUNTY OF WASHOE)

I, JULIE ANN KERNAN, official reporter of the Second Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada, in and for the County of Washoe, do hereby certify:

7 That as such reporter I was present in 8 Department No. 3 of the above court on Tuesday, August 9 15, 2023, at the hour of 9:00 a.m. of said day, and I 10 then and there took verbatim stenotype notes of the 11 proceedings had and testimony given therein upon the 12 Hearing on Joint Petition of the case of Trust: Jordan 13 Dana Frasier Family Trust Case No. PR16-00128.

14 That the foregoing transcript, consisting of pages numbered 1 through 111, both inclusive, is a full, 15 true and correct transcript of my said stenotype notes, 16 17 so taken as aforesaid, and is a full, true and correct statement of the proceedings of the above-entitled 18 19 action to the best of my knowledge, skill and ability. 20 At Reno, Nevada, this 5th day of April, 2024. 21 DATED: 2.2 /s/ Julie Ann Kernan 23 JULIE ANN KERNAN, CCR #427 24 Page 112

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