IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

Electronically Filed Nov 13 2023 03:19 PM Elizabeth A. Brown Clerk of Supreme Court

DAISY LYNNE MEADOWS, f/k/a ROY JAMES TROST,

Appellant(s),

VS.

STATE OF NEVADA. Respondent(s), Case No: 08C247731 *Related Case A-23-873087-W*Docket No: 87426

RECORD ON APPEAL **VOLUME**

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT DAISY LYNNE MEADOWS # 1027585, **PROPER PERSON** P.O. BOX 650 **INDIAN SPRINGS, NV 89070**

ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT STEVEN B. WOLFSON, DISTRICT ATTORNEY 200 LEWIS AVE. LAS VEGAS, NV 89155-2212

08C247731

The State of Nevada vs Daisy Lynne Meadows

VOLUME:	PAGE NUMBER:
1	1 - 243
2	244 - 338

VOL	DATE	PLEADING	PAGE NUMBER:
1	8/9/2023	Amended Judgment of Conviction (Plea of Guilty)	237 - 240
1	5/1/2023	Application to Proceed Informa Pauperis (Filing Fees/Service Only) (Confidential)	177 - 190
1	5/12/2011	Certificate of Mailing	168 - 169
2	11/13/2023	Certification of Copy and Transmittal of Record	
1	9/12/2008	Criminal Bindover (Confidential)	4 - 42
2	11/13/2023	District Court Minutes	324 - 338
1	11/10/2009	Ex Parte Motion for Appointment of Counsel and Request for Evidentiary Hearing	101 - 104
1	11/10/2009	Financial Certificate (Confidential)	77 - 78
1	3/25/2010	Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order	139 - 148
1	5/31/2023	Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order	215 - 220
1	5/31/2023	Findings of Fact, Conclusions or Law and Order	221 - 226
1	9/23/2008	Guilty Plea Agreement	43 - 53
1	9/11/2008	Information	1 - 3
1	11/25/2008	Judgment of Conviction (Plea of Guilty)	66 - 68
1	9/29/2008	Media Request and Order for Camera Access to Court Proceedings	54 - 55
2	9/27/2023	Motion Defendant Objects to States Opposition and Moves to Compel This Honorable Court to Deliver Justice in Favor of Defendant a Victim of Sex Crimes by Plaintiff Acts	244 - 280
1	5/1/2023	Motion for Appointment of Counsel	198 - 201

VOL	DATE	PLEADING	PAGE NUMBER:
1	1/8/2016	Motion for Order Directing Clerk to Issue Presentence Investigation Report to Defendant	170 - 173
1	11/10/2009	Motion to Appoint Counsel	96 - 100
1	7/6/2023	Motion to Change Gender Sex/Marker on Judgement of Conviction	231 - 232
1	7/6/2023	Motion to Change Name on Judgment of Conviction	227 - 230
1	8/15/2023	Motion to Make Correction of Defendant's Judgment of Conviction JOC Wrong Name on Conviction	241 - 243
1	11/10/2009	Motion to Proceed in Forma Pauperis (Confidential)	71 - 76
2	10/11/2023	Motion to Submit Evidence in Support of My Objection to Further My Case and Point	288 - 308
1	4/6/2011	Motion to Withdraw Counsel	161 - 167
1	5/1/2023	Motion to Withdraw Plea	191 - 197
1	3/30/2010	Notice of Entry of Decision and Order	149 - 159
1	1/29/2010	Notice of Evidentiary Hearing	137 - 138
1	5/1/2023	Notice of Motion	202 - 202
2	10/11/2023	Notice of Motion	287 - 287
1	5/4/2016	Order Denying Defendant's Motion for Order Directing Clerk to Issue Presentence Investigation Report to Defendant	175 - 176
2	10/24/2023	Order Denying Defendant's Motion to Compel Court to Deliver Justice in Favor of Defendant	309 - 312
2	11/6/2023	Order Denying Defendant's Motion to Compel Court to Deliver Justice in Favor of Defendant	318 - 320

VOL	DATE	PLEADING	PAGE NUMBER:
2	11/6/2023	Order Denying Defendant's Motion to Submit Evidence in Support of My Objection to Further My Case and Point	321 - 323
1	11/23/2009	Order for Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus	106 - 106
1	1/25/2010	Order for Production of Inmate Roy James Trost, BAC #1027585	135 - 136
1	12/8/2009	Order for Transcript	118 - 118
1	8/2/2023	Order Granting Defendant's Motion to Change Gender/Sex Marker on Judgment of Conviction	233 - 234
1	8/2/2023	Order Granting Motion to Change Name of Judgment of Conviction	235 - 236
1	11/10/2009	Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Post-Conviction)	79 - 95
1	11/4/2008	Presentence Investigation Report (Unfiled) Confidential	56 - 65
2	10/25/2023	State's Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Submit Evidence in Support of My Objection to Further My Case and Point	313 - 317
1	5/22/2023	State's Opposition to Defendant's Pro Per Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea Agreement	209 - 214
2	10/3/2023	State's Response to Defendant's Motion to Compel Court to Deliver Justice in Favor of Defendant	281 - 286
1	1/11/2010	State's Response to Defendant's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Post-Conviction)	119 - 134
1	5/22/2023	State's Response to Defendant's Pro Per Motion to Appoint Counsel	203 - 208
1	12/1/2008	Transcript of Hearing Held on September 10, 2008	69 - 70

08C247731

The State of Nevada vs Daisy Lynne Meadows

VOL	DATE	PLEADING	<u>PAGE</u> NUMBER:
1	12/4/2009	Transcript of Hearing Held September 23, 2008	107 - 117
1	4/6/2011	Unsigned Document(s) - Order	160 - 160
1	1/8/2016	Unsigned Document(s) - Order	174 - 174
1	11/10/2009	Unsigned Document(s) - Order (Confidential)	105 - 105

Electronically Filed 09/11/2008 04:04:40 PM

1	INFO DAVID ROGER		Ray Shi
2	Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #002781		CLERK ØF THE COURT
3	SUMMER CLARKE		
4	Deputy District Attorney Nevada Bar #008988 200 Lewis Avenue		
5	Las Vegas, Nevada 89155-2212 (702) 671-2500		
6	Attorney for Plaintiff		
7 8	I.A. 09/15/2008 DISTRICT 9:00 A.M. CLARK COUNT PUBLIC DEFENDER		
	FUBLIC DEFENDER		
9	THE STATE OF NEVADA,)	
10	Plaintiff,) Case No:	C247731
11	-VS-	Dept No:	XXI
12 13	ROY JAMES TROST, #2679137)) 	RMATION
14	Defendant.)))	RMATION
15	STATE OF NEVADA)	,	
16	COUNTY OF CLARK) ss.		
17	DAVID ROGER, District Attorney	within and for the	County of Clark, State of
18	Nevada, in the name and by the authority of t	he State of Nevada, i	nforms the Court:
19	That ROY JAMES TROST, the Defendant above named, having committed the		
20	crimes of SEXUAL ASSAULT WITH US	SE OF A DEADLY	WEAPON (Category A
21	Felony - NRS 200.364, 200.366, 193.165);	SEXUAL ASSAU	LT (Category A Felony -
22	NRS 200.364, 200.366); FIRST DEGREE	KIDNAPPING (C	ategory A Felony - NRS
23	200.310, 200.320); and SEXUAL ASSAU	LT WITH A MIN	OR UNDER SIXTEEN
24	YEARS OF AGE (Category A Felony - NI	RS 200.364, 200.366), in the manner following,
25	to-wit: That the said Defendant, on or between the 31st day of May, 2007, and the 18th day		ay, 2007, and the 18th day
26	of May, 2008, at and within the County of Cla	ark, State of Nevada,	contrary to the form, force
27	and effect of statutes in such cases made and	provided, and again	st the peace and dignity of
28	the State of Nevada,		

COUNT 1 - SEXUAL ASSAULT WITH USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON

did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously sexually assault and subject MELISSA SUDDUTH, a female person, to sexual penetration, to-wit: sexual intercourse, by said Defendant placing his penis into the genital opening of the said MELISSA SUDDUTH, against her will, said Defendant using a deadly weapon, to-wit: a knife, during the commission of said crime.

COUNT 2 - SEXUAL ASSAULT

did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously sexually assault and subject AMBERLY CURFMAN, a female person, to sexual penetration, to-wit: fellatio, by said Defendant placing his penis on or in the mouth of the said AMBERLY CURFMAN, against her will.

COUNT 3 - FIRST DEGREE KIDNAPPING

did willfully, unlawfully, feloniously, and without authority of law, seize, confine, inveigle, entice, decoy, abduct, conceal, kidnap, or carry away AMBERLY CURFMAN, a human being, with the intent to hold or detain the said AMBERLY CURFMAN against her will, and without her consent, for the purpose of committing sexual assault.

COUNT 4 - SEXUAL ASSAULT WITH A MINOR UNDER SIXTEEN YEARS OF AGE

did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously sexually assault and subject SARAH QUINN, a female child under sixteen years of age, to sexual penetration, to-wit: digital penetration by said Defendant placing his finger into the genital opening of the said SARAH QUINN, against her will, or under conditions in which Defendant knew, or should have known, that the said SARAH QUINN was mentally or physically incapable of resisting or understanding the nature of Defendant's conduct.

COUNT 5 - SEXUAL ASSAULT

did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously sexually assault and subject LACEY MARION, a female person, to sexual penetration, to-wit: digital penetration, by said Defendant placing his finger into the genital opening of the said LACEY MARION, against her will.

COUNT 6 - FIRST DEGREE KIDNAPPING

did willfully, unlawfully, feloniously, and without authority of law, seize, confine, inveigle, entice, decoy, abduct, conceal, kidnap, or carry away LACEY MARION, a human being, with the intent to hold or detain the said LACEY MARION against her will, and without her consent, for the purpose of committing sexual assault.

DAVID ROGER DISTRICT ATTORNEY Nevada Bar #002781

BY SUMMER CLARKE

Deputy District Attorney Nevada Bar #008988

DA#08F10691X/hjc/SVU LVMPD EV#0805180480 SAWDW; SA; 1stKN;

SAM<16 - F

 $(TK\bar{0}8)$

THIS SEALED
DOCUMENT,
NUMBERED PAGE(S)
4 - 42
WILL FOLLOW VIA
U.S. MAIL

FILED IN OPEN COURT 1 GMEM P 2 3 Zuco DAVID ROGER **EDWARD A. FRIEDLAND** 2 DISTRICT ATTORNEY CLERK OF THE COURT Nevada Bar #002781 3 SUMMER CLARKE DENISE HUSTEL, DEPUTY Deputy District Attorney 4 Nevada Bar #008988 200 Lewis Avenue 5 Las Vegas, NV 89155-2212 (702)671-2500 6 Attorney for Plaintiff DISTRICT COURT 7 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 8 9 THE STATE OF NEVADA. Plaintiff, CASE NO: C247731 10 DEPT NO: XXI 11 -VS-12 ROY JAMES TROST, #2679137 13 Defendant. 14 **GUILTY PLEA AGREEMENT** 15 I hereby agree to plead guilty to: COUNT 1 - SEXUAL ASSAULT WITH USE OF 16 A DEADLY WEAPON (Category A Felony); COUNTS 2 & 5 - SEXUAL ASSAULT 17 (Category A Felony); COUNTS 3 & 6 - FIRST DEGREE KIDNAPPING (Category A 18 Felony); and COUNT 4 - SEXUAL ASSAULT WITH A MINOR UNDER SIXTEEN 19 YEARS OF AGE (Category A Felony), as more fully alleged in the charging document 20 attached hereto as Exhibit "1". 21 My decision to plead guilty is based upon the plea agreement in this case which is as 22 follows: 23 Both parties stipulate that Counts 1, 2 and 3 will run consecutively to one another. 24 Further, both parties stipulate that Counts 4, 5 and 6 will run consecutively to one another. 25 Both parties retain the right to argue as to whether Counts 4 through 6 will run concurrently 26 or consecutively to Counts 1 through 3. Additionally, this plea is conditional upon the Court 27

Î

accepting the aforestated stipulation.

28

CONSEQUENCES OF THE PLEA

I understand that by pleading guilty I admit the facts which support all the elements of the offenses to which I now plead as set forth in Exhibit "1".

I understand that as a consequence of my plea of guilty as to

î

Count 1 - the Court must sentence me to LIFE with the possibility of parole with parole eligibility beginning at ten (10) years with and equal and consecutive term of LIFE with the possibility of parole with parole eligibility beginning at ten (10) years for the use of a deadly weapon; as to

- <u>Count 2</u> the Court must sentence me to LIFE with the possibility of parole with parole eligibility beginning at ten (10) years; as to
- Count 3 the Court must sentence me to LIFE with the possibility of parole with parole eligibility beginning at five (5) years; as to
- Count 4 the Court must sentence me to LIFE with the possibility of parole with parole eligibility beginning at twenty (20) years; as to
- Count 5 the Court must sentence me to LIFE with the possibility of parole with parole eligibility beginning at ten (10) years; and, as to
- <u>Count 6</u> the Court must sentence me to LIFE with the possibility of parole with parole eligibility beginning at five (5) years. I understand that the law requires me to pay an Administrative Assessment Fee.

I understand that, if appropriate, I will be ordered to make restitution to the victim of the offenses to which I am pleading guilty and to the victim of any related offense which is being dismissed or not prosecuted pursuant to this agreement. I will also be ordered to reimburse the State of Nevada for any expenses related to my extradition, if any.

I understand that I am not eligible for probation for the offenses to which I am pleading guilty.

Further, that <u>before I am eligible for parole</u> a panel consisting of the administrator of the mental health and developmental services of the department of human resources or his designee; the director of the department of corrections or his designee; and a psychologist license to practice in this state or a psychiatrist license to practice medicine in this state certifies that I was under observation while confined in an institution of the department of corrections that I do not represent a high risk to reoffend based upon a currently accepted standard of assessment.

I further understand that the Court will include as part of my sentence, in addition to any other penalties provided by law, lifetime supervision commencing after any period of probation or any term of imprisonment and period of release upon parole; said special sentence of lifetime supervision must begin upon release from incarceration.

I further understand that the Court will include as part of my sentence, in addition to any other penalties provided by law, pursuant to NRS 179D.450, I must register as a sex offender within 48 hours of release from custody.

I also understand that I must submit to blood and/or saliva tests under the Direction of the Division of Parole and Probation to determine genetic markers and/or secretor status.

I understand that if more than one sentence of imprisonment is imposed and I am eligible to serve the sentences concurrently, the sentencing judge has the discretion to order the sentences served concurrently or consecutively.

I also understand that information regarding charges not filed, dismissed charges, or charges to be dismissed pursuant to this agreement may be considered by the judge at sentencing.

I have not been promised or guaranteed any particular sentence by anyone. I know that my sentence is to be determined by the Court within the limits prescribed by statute.

I understand that if my attorney or the State of Nevada or both recommend any specific punishment to the Court, the Court is not obligated to accept the recommendation.

I understand that if the State of Nevada has agreed to recommend or stipulate a particular sentence or has agreed not to present argument regarding the sentence, or agreed not to oppose a particular sentence, such agreement is contingent upon my appearance in court on the initial sentencing date (and any subsequent dates if the sentencing is continued). I understand that if I fail to appear for the scheduled sentencing date or I commit a new

ñ

criminal offense prior to sentencing the State of Nevada would regain the full right to argue for any lawful sentence.

I understand if the offenses to which I am pleading guilty to was committed while I was incarcerated on another charge or while I was on probation or parole that I am not eligible for credit for time served toward the instant offenses.

I understand that as a consequence of my plea of guilty, if I am not a citizen of the United States, I may, in addition to other consequences provided for by federal law, be removed, deported, excluded from entry into the United States or denied naturalization.

I understand that the Division of Parole and Probation will prepare a report for the sentencing judge prior to sentencing. This report will include matters relevant to the issue of sentencing, including my criminal history. This report may contain hearsay information regarding my background and criminal history. My attorney and I will each have the opportunity to comment on the information contained in the report at the time of sentencing. Unless the District Attorney has specifically agreed otherwise, then the District Attorney may also comment on this report.

WAIVER OF RIGHTS

By entering my plea of guilty, I understand that I am waiving and forever giving up the following rights and privileges:

- 1. The constitutional privilege against self-incrimination, including the right to refuse to testify at trial, in which event the prosecution would not be allowed to comment to the jury about my refusal to testify.
- 2. The constitutional right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury, free of excessive pretrial publicity prejudicial to the defense, at which trial I would be entitled to the assistance of an attorney, either appointed or retained. At trial the State would bear the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt each element of the offense charged.
- 3. The constitutional right to confront and cross-examine any witnesses who would testify against me.
 - 4. The constitutional right to subpoena witnesses to testify on my behalf.

6. The right to appeal the conviction, with the assistance of an attorney, eith	ıer
appointed or retained, unless the appeal is based upon reasonable constitutional jurisdiction	ıal
or other grounds that challenge the legality of the proceedings and except as otherwise	se
provided in subsection 3 of NRS 174.035.	

VOLUNTARINESS OF PLEA

I have discussed the elements of all of the original charges against me with my attorney and I understand the nature of the charges against me.

I understand that the State would have to prove each element of the charges against me at trial.

I have discussed with my attorney any possible defenses, defense strategies and circumstances which might be in my favor.

All of the foregoing elements, consequences, rights, and waiver of rights have been thoroughly explained to me by my attorney.

I believe that pleading guilty and accepting this plea bargain is in my best interest, and that a trial would be contrary to my best interest.

I am signing this agreement voluntarily, after consultation with my attorney, and I am not acting under duress or coercion or by virtue of any promises of leniency, except for those set forth in this agreement.

I am not now under the influence of any intoxicating liquor, a controlled substance or other drug which would in any manner impair my ability to comprehend or understand this agreement or the proceedings surrounding my entry of this plea.

23 | //

24 | //

25 //

26 //

27 | //

//

1	
2	∦ i
3	i
4	
5	
6	
6 7	
8	1
9	
10	
11	
12	
13	
14	
15	
16	
17	
18	
19	
20	
21	
22	
23	
24	
25	
26	
	- II

27

28

My attorney has answered all my questions regarding this guilty plea agreement and its consequences to my satisfaction and I am satisfied with the services provided by my attorney.

DATED this **2**/ day of September, 2008.

ROY /XMES TROST

Defendant

AGREED TO BY:

SUMMER CLARKE Deputy District Attorney Nevada Bar #008988

6

CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL:

- I, the undersigned, as the attorney for the Defendant named herein and as an officer of the court hereby certify that:
- 1. I have fully explained to the Defendant the allegations contained in the charges to which guilty pleas are being entered.
- 2. I have advised the Defendant of the penalties for each charge and the restitution that the Defendant may be ordered to pay.
- 3. All pleas of guilty offered by the Defendant pursuant to this agreement are consistent with the facts known to me and are made with my advice to the Defendant.
 - 4. To the best of my knowledge and belief, the Defendant:
 - a. Is competent and understands the charges and the consequences of pleading guilty as provided in this agreement.
 - b. Executed this agreement and will enter all guilty pleas pursuant hereto voluntarily.
 - c. Was not under the influence of intoxicating liquor, a controlled substance or other drug at the time I consulted with the defendant as certified in paragraphs 1 and 2 above.

Dated: This 21 day of September, 2008.

hic/SVU

Conrad, Howard

From:

Garst, Mary Ann [GarstM@clarkcountycourts.us] on behalf of Clerk Register of Actions

[clerkroa@clarkcountycourts.us]

Sent:

Thursday, September 11, 2008 8:32 AM

To: Subject: Conrad, Howard RE: TROST, ROY

C247731

From: Conrad, Howard [mailto:Howard.Conrad@ccdanv.com]

Sent: Wednesday, September 10, 2008 2:46 PM

To: Clerk Register of Actions **Subject:** TROST, ROY

Howard Conrad
Special Victims Unit
Clark County District Attorney
(202) 671-2790

"Honk if you love Justice!"

8 To

1,13

***** This electronic transmission is for the sole use of the intended recipient(s) and may contain confidential and/or privileged information. Any unauthorized review, use, disclosure or distribution is prohibited. If you are not the intended recipient, please contact the sender by reply email and destroy all copies of the original. - Clark County District Attorney's Office

Electronically Filed 09/11/2008 04:04:40 PM

INFU DAVID BOOCED		Stan Stan
Clark County District Attorney		CLERK OF THE COURT
Nevada Bar #002781 SUMMER CLARKE		
Deputy District Attorney Nevada Bar #008988		
200 Lewis Avenue		
(702) 671-2500		
, and the second se	COURT	
THE STATE OF NEVADA,)	
Plaintiff,	Case No:	C247731 XXI
-vs-) Dept 140.	M
ROY JAMES TROST,)	
) INFO	RMATION
Detendant.)	
STATE OF NEVADA)		
COUNTY OF CLARK 5 33.		
DAVID ROGER, District Attorney	within and for the	County of Clark, State of
Nevada, in the name and by the authority of t	he State of Nevada, i	nforms the Court:
That ROY JAMES TROST, the De	fendant above nam	ed, having committed the
crimes of SEXUAL ASSAULT WITH US	SE OF A DEADLY	WEAPON (Category A
Felony - NRS 200.364, 200.366, 193.165);	SEXUAL ASSAU	LT (Category A Felony -
NRS 200.364, 200.366); FIRST DEGREE	KIDNAPPING (C	ategory A Felony - NRS
200.310, 200.320); and SEXUAL ASSAU	LT WITH A MI	NOR UNDER SIXTEEN
YEARS OF AGE (Category A Felony - NI	RS 200.364, 200.366), in the manner following,
to-wit: That the said Defendant, on or betwe	en the 31st day of M	lay, 2007, and the 18th day
	DAVID ROGER Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #002781 SUMMER CLARKE Deputy District Attorney Nevada Bar #008988 200 Lewis Avenue Las Vegas, Nevada 89155-2212 (702) 671-2500 Attorney for Plaintiff I.A. 09/15/2008 9:00 A.M. PUBLIC DEFENDER THE STATE OF NEVADA, Plaintiff, -vs- ROY JAMES TROST, #2679137 Defendant. STATE OF NEVADA COUNTY OF CLARK DAVID ROGER, District Attorney Nevada, in the name and by the authority of t That ROY JAMES TROST, the De crimes of SEXUAL ASSAULT WITH US Felony - NRS 200.364, 200.366, 193.165); NRS 200.364, 200.360); FIRST DEGREE 200.310, 200.320); and SEXUAL ASSAU YEARS OF AGE (Category A Felony - NI	DAVID ROGER Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #002781 SUMMER CLARKE Deputy District Attorney Nevada Bar #008988 200 Lewis Avenue Las Vegas, Nevada 89155-2212 (702) 671-2500 Attorney for Plaintiff I.A. 09/15/2008 9:00 A.M. PUBLIC DEFENDER THE STATE OF NEVADA, Plaintiff, -vs- ROY JAMES TROST, #2679137 Defendant. STATE OF NEVADA SS.

of May, 2008, at and within the County of Clark, State of Nevada, contrary to the form, force

and effect of statutes in such cases made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of

26

27

28

the State of Nevada,

COUNT 1 - SEXUAL ASSAULT WITH USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON

did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously sexually assault and subject MELISSA SUDDUTH, a female person, to sexual penetration, to-wit: sexual intercourse, by said Defendant placing his penis into the genital opening of the said MELISSA SUDDUTH, against her will, said Defendant using a deadly weapon, to-wit: a knife, during the commission of said crime.

COUNT 2 - SEXUAL ASSAULT

did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously sexually assault and subject AMBERLY CURFMAN, a female person, to sexual penetration, to-wit: fellatio, by said Defendant placing his penis on or in the mouth of the said AMBERLY CURFMAN, against her will.

COUNT 3 - FIRST DEGREE KIDNAPPING

did willfully, unlawfully, feloniously, and without authority of law, seize, confine, inveigle, entice, decoy, abduct, conceal, kidnap, or carry away AMBERLY CURFMAN, a human being, with the intent to hold or detain the said AMBERLY CURFMAN against her will, and without her consent, for the purpose of committing sexual assault.

COUNT 4 - SEXUAL ASSAULT WITH A MINOR UNDER SIXTEEN YEARS OF AGE

did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously sexually assault and subject SARAH QUINN, a female child under sixteen years of age, to sexual penetration, to-wit: digital penetration by said Defendant placing his finger into the genital opening of the said SARAH QUINN, against her will, or under conditions in which Defendant knew, or should have known, that the said SARAH QUINN was mentally or physically incapable of resisting or understanding the nature of Defendant's conduct.

COUNT 5 - SEXUAL ASSAULT

did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously sexually assault and subject LACEY MARION, a female person, to sexual penetration, to-wit: digital penetration, by said Defendant placing his finger into the genital opening of the said LACEY MARION, against her will.

CAPROGRAM FILESINEEVIA.COM/DOCUMENT CONVERTER/TEMP/346091-13084

COUNT 6 - FIRST DEGREE KIDNAPPING

did willfully, unlawfully, feloniously, and without authority of law, seize, confine, inveigle, entice, decoy, abduct, conceal, kidnap, or carry away LACEY MARION, a human being, with the intent to hold or detain the said LACEY MARION against her will, and without her consent, for the purpose of committing sexual assault.

DAVID ROGER DISTRICT ATTORNEY Nevada Bar #002781

BY

SUMMER CLARKE Deputy District Attorney Nevada Bar #008988

DA#08F10691X/hjc/SVU LVMPD EV#0805180480 SAWDW; SA; 1stKN; SAM<16 - F (TK08)

C:\PROGRAM FILES\NEEVIA.COM\DOCUMENT CONVERTER\TEMP\346091-13084

2

3

4

5

6

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

80%7

o,

FILED AFTER HOURS

FILED AFTER HOURS

)Ŋ

SEP 29 2008

ORIGINAL RAO

EDWARD A. FRIEDLAND CLERK OF THE COURT RECEIVED IN RECEIV

District Court

Clark County, Nevadally SEP 29 A 8: 47:

amama of Metaba) Case No.: 08F10691X
STATE OF NEVADA	• •
Plaintiff,	Dept No.: Dept 21

٧3.

ROY TROST

MEDIA REQUEST AND ORDER FOR CAMERA ACCESS TO COURT PROCEEDINGS

Defendant

MIRIAM FIRESTONE of KVBC , requests permission to broadcast, record, photograph or televise proceedings in the above-entitled case in the courtroom of Dept. No. 2/2, the Honorable // O/2/2 commencing on the 1877 day of SEPTEMBER , 2008 . 9,80 am

I certify that I am familiar with the contents of Nevada Supreme Court Rule 230, et seq., and understand this form MUST be submitted to the Court at least SEVENTY-TWO (72) hours before the proceedings commence, unless good cause can be shown.

DATED this 10TH day of SEPTEMBER , 20 08

MIRIAM FIRESTONE

Media Representative

The Court determines camera access to proceedings, in compliance with the court's policy, D WOULD NOT distract participants, impair the dignity of the court or otherwise materially interfere with the achievement of a fair trial or hearing herein;

Therefore, the Court hereby [] DENIES GRANTS permission for camera access to MIRIAM FIRESTONE of KVBC as requested for each and every hearing on the above-entitled case, at the discretion of the judge, and unless otherwise notified. This Order is in accordance with Nevada Supreme Court Rule 230, et seq., and is subject to reconsideration upon motion of any party to the action.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this entry shall be made a part of the record Lof the proceedings in this case.

DATED this 26 day of Systems, 2008.

Valeni Adam.
District Court Judge

Fax Form 72 hours prior to the hearing to (702)386-9104

RCEIVED

436 27

ORIGINAL

Eighth Judicial District Court Clark County, Nevada

1 1			
3)	
4	State of Nevada) Case No.: C247731	
5	Plaintiff,) Dept No.: 21	
6	vs.))	
7	Roy Trost)) NOTIFICATION OF	
8	Defendant) MEDIA REQUEST)	
9)	
10	TO: COUNSEL OF RECORD IN THE A	BOVE-CAPTIONED CASE:	
11		nt to Nevada Supreme Court Rules resentatives have requested to obtain	
12	permission to broadcast, televise, hearings in this case. Any objects	record or take photographs of all ion should be filed at least 24 hours	
13	prior to the subject hearing.		
14	DATED this 24 day of Acpt, 2008.		
15		Eh. Elhanen	
16	Eighth Judicial District Court		
17			
18	CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE B	Y FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION	
19	I hereby certify that on the	$\frac{27}{2}$ day of $\frac{\sqrt{2008}}{2}$, 2008, by facsimile transmission only,	
20	pursuant to Nevada Supreme Court Ru	iles 229-249, inclusive, this date by the same to each Attorney of Record	
21	addressed as follows:	the same to each Attorney of Record	
22			
23	Plaintiff	Defendant	
	District Attorney	Public Defender	
24	455-2294	455-5112	
25			
26			
27		C/h. E/haver	
28		Eighth Judicial District Court	

THIS SEALED
DOCUMENT,
NUMBERED PAGE(S)
56 - 65
WILL FOLLOW VIA
U.S. MAIL

JOCP

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

FILED

2000 NOV 25 A 6: 44

DISTRICT COURT

CLERK OF THE COURT

CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

THE STATE OF NEVADA,

Plaintiff,

-VS-

CASE NO. C247731

DEPT. NO. XXI

ROY J. TROST

Defendant.

#2679137

JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION (PLEA OF GUILTY)

The Defendant previously appeared before the Court with counsel and entered a plea of guilty to the crime of COUNT 1 - SEXUAL ASSAULT WITH USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON (Category A Felony) in violation of NRS 200.364, 200.366, 193.165, COUNTS 2 & 5 - SEXUAL ASSAULT (Category A Felony) in violation of NRS 200.364, 200.366, COUNTS 3 & 6 - FIRST DEGREE KIDNAPPING (Category A Felony) in violation of NRS 200.310, 200.320 and COUNT 4 - SEXUAL ASSAULT WITH A MINOR UNDER SIXTEEN (16) YEARS OF AGE (Category A Felony) in violation of NRS 200.364, 200.366; thereafter, on the 17TH day of November, 2008,

2

4

1

5 6 7

9 10

8

12 13

14

11

15 16

17 18

19

20

21

22 23

24 25

26 27

28

the Defendant was present in court for sentencing with his counsel JEFFREY MANINGO, Deputy Public Defender, and good cause appearing,

THE DEFENDANT IS HEREBY ADJUDGED guilty of said offenses and, in addition to the \$25.00 Administrative Assessment Fee, \$150.00 DNA Analysis Fee including testing to determine genetic markers, the Defendant is sentenced as follows: As to COUNT 1 - TO A MAXIMUM term of LIFE WITH THE POSSIBILITY OF PAROLE after ONE HUNDRED TWENTY (120) MONTHS in the Nevada Department of Corrections (NDC), plus an EQUAL and CONSECUTIVE term of LIFE WITH THE POSSIBILITY of PAROLE after ONE HUNDRED TWENTY (120) MONTHS MINIMUM in the Nevada Department of Corrections (NDC) and pay \$357.00 Restitution; as to COUNT 2 - TO A MAXIMUM term of LIFE WITH THE POSSIBILITY of PAROLE with a MINIMUM parole eligibility of ONE HUNDRED TWENTY (120) MONTHS in the Nevada Department of Corrections (NDC), COUNT 2 to run CONSECUTIVE to COUNT 1 and pay \$2,551.88 Restitution; as to COUNT 3 – TO A MAXIMUM term of LIFE WITH THE POSSIBILITY of PAROLE after SIXTY (60) MONTHS in the Nevada Department of Corrections (NDC), COUNT 3 to run CONSECUTIVE to COUNT 2; as to COUNT 4 - TO A MAXIMUM term of LIFE WITH THE POSSIBILITY of PAROLE after THREE HUNDRED (300) MONTHS in the Nevada Department of Corrections (NDC), COUNT 4 to run CONSECUTIVE to COUNT 3; as to COUNT 5 - TO A MAXIMUM term of LIFE WITH THE POSSIBILITY of PAROLE after ONE HUNDRED TWENTY (120) MONTHS in the Nevada Department of Corrections (NDC), COUNT 5 to run CONSECUTIVE to COUNT 4 and pay \$472.26 Restitution; and as to COUNT 6 TO A MAXIMUM term of LIFE WITH THE POSSIBILITY of PAROLE after SIXTY


(60) MONTHS in the Nevada Department of Corrections (NDC), COUNT 6 to run CONSECUTIVE to COUNT 5; with ONE HUNDRED SIXTY-THREE (163) days credit for time served.

FURTHER ORDERED, a SPECIAL SENTENCE of LIFETIME SUPERVISION is imposed to commence upon release from any term of imprisonment, probation or parole.

ADDITIONALLY, the Defendant is ORDERED to REGISTER as a sex offender in accordance with NRS 179D.460 within FORTY-EIGHT (48) HOURS after any release from custody.

DATED this ______ day of November, 2008.

VALERIE ADAIR
DISTRICT JUDGE



Both parties have the right to argue. In order to get 2 into that penalty phase we had to do some waiving of the 3 defects and make it somewhat of a fictional plea. 4 MR. MANINGO: Because both of the offenses 5 occurred before July of this year and would be under the 6 old law which was 20 to life. We are waiving the 7 defects so that -- we are using the new law. 8 MR. O'BRIEN: That's correct. 9 THE COURT: Mr. Trost, do you understand 10 that? 11 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am. 12 THE COURT: Do you wish to accept the 13 State's offer? 14 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 15 THE COURT: Do you understand you have a 16 right to a preliminary hearing in this matter? THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 17 18 THE COURT: You have the right to confront 19 and cross-examine the witnesses the state presents; you 20 have the right to present witnesses and evidence on your 21 behalf; you have the right to testify and you have the 22 right to remain silent and that may not be used against 23 you. Do you understand you're waiving these rights 24 today? 25 THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

LAS VEGAS, CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA, SEPTEMBER 10, 2008 AT 9:00 A.M.

2

7

PROCEEDINGS

4 5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

1

2

3

THE COURT: This is the time set for the State of Nevada versus Roy James Trost, 08F10961X. MS. CLARKE: Summer Clarke and Glen O'Brien

for the state.

MR. MANINGO: Jeff Maningo for Mr. Trost. Mr. Trost is present in custody. Judge, we are going to unconditionally waive preliminary hearing for the negotiations of two counts of sexual assault on a minor under the age of 16. We are going in Count 1 name victims Sara Quinn and Melissa Suta and in Count 2 victims Amberly Kirkman and Lacy Marion. We are going -- it will be right to argue as far as consecutive or concurrent. We are going to waive any defects because it is a fictional plea because of the age of the victims and also as to the dates of the offenses in order to get that penalty range.

22 MR. O'BRIEN: That's correct, Judge. It's 23 going to be the new penalty range which is the minimum 24 35 years in prison. It's a life sentence with the 25 minimum parole eligibility of 35 years for each count.

THE COURT: When you get to District Court 2 if you change your mind about these negotiations, you'll proceed to trial on the original charge. You will not 3 4 be able to come back to Justice Court for a preliminary 5 hearing. Do you understand that? 6 THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

8 criminal complaint on file herein that crimes have been 9 committed, to wit: Five counts of sexual assault with 10 use of a deadly weapon; one count of battery with use of 11 a deadly weapon with intent to commit sexual assault 12 with substantially bodily harm; Sexual assault with a 13 minor under the age of 16 years; burglary with use of a 14 deadly weapon; two counts of coercion with use of a 15 deadly weapon; two counts of first degree kidnapping with use of a deadly weapon; two counts of open and

THE COURT: The Court having found from the

16 17 gross lewdness with use of a deadly weapon; two counts 18

of robbery with use of a deadly weapon, and there's probable cause to believe that Roy James Trost has ED 19

20 committed said crimes. I'm holding you to answer

said charges in the Eighth Judicial District port of 2008 21 22 the date my clerk gives you. CLEAK OF THE CONTAIL

24 25 ATTEST: FULL, TRUE AND ACCURATE

69

23

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS. ATTEST: I further certify that I am not CHRISTA D. BROKA, CCR 574 CHRISTA D. BROKA, CCR 574

```
1
      IN THE JUSTICE COURT OF LAS VEGAS TOWNSHIP
 2
         COUNTY OF CLARK, STATE OF NEVADA
 3
               -000-
 4
 5
    STATE OF NEVADA,
                            )
 6
          Plaintiff,
 7
                     ) Case No. 08F10691X
 8
    ROY JAMES TROST,
                            ) ATTEST RE: NRS 239B.030
 9
      Defendant,
10
11
    STATE OF NEVADA)
12
              ) ss
    COUNTY OF CLARK)
13
14
         I, Christa D. Broka, a Certified Shorthand
15
    Reporter within and for the county of Clark and the
16
    State of Nevada, do hereby certify:
17
         That REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS was
18
    reported in open court pursuant to NRS 3.360 regarding
19
    the above proceedings in Justice Court Department 8, 200
20
    Lewis Avenue, Las Vegas, Nevada.
21
         That said TRANSCRIPT:
22
    <u>X</u>
             Does not contain the Social Security number
23
    of any person.
24
            Contains the Social Security number of a
    person.
```

THIS SEALED
DOCUMENT,
NUMBERED PAGE(S)
71 - 76
WILL FOLLOW VIA
U.S. MAIL

THIS SEALED
DOCUMENT,
NUMBERED PAGE(S)
77 - 78
WILL FOLLOW VIA
U.S. MAIL

ı	_	- <i>D</i>
	o to the	FILED
1	Roy James Trost	NOV 1 0 2009
2	Petitioner/In Propria Persona Post Office Box 650 [HDSP]	A 1.66
3	Indian Springs, Nevada 89018	CLERK OF COURT
4		
5	District (Court County. Nevada
6	(_,/a//C_	County. (Nevada
7 8	Roy James Trost.	` }
9	Petitioner,) }
10	vs. ,	Case No. <u>C24773</u> /
11	State of Nevada	Dept. No. XX
12	County of Clark	Docket
13	Respondent(s).	
14		
15	PETITION FOR WRIT OF HA	ABEAS CORPUS (POST-CONVICTION)
16	INSTRUCTIONS:	· · · · · ·
17	(1) This petition must be legibly handwritt	tten or typewritten signed by the petitioner and verified
18	(2) Additional pages are not permitted exc	ccept where noted or with respect to the facts which you No citation of authorities need be furnished. If briefs registed in the form of a separate memorandum.
19	arguments are submitted, they should be submitted.	mitted in the form of a separate memorandum.
20	(3) If you want an attorney appointed, you	ou must complete the Affidavit in Support of Request t
21	Proceed in Forma Paupens. You must have a certificate as to the amount of money and sec	an authorized officer at the prison complete the curities on deposit to your credit in any account in the
22	institution.	
23		rson by whom you are confined or restrained. If you a corrections, name the warden or head of the institution
24	in a specific institution of the department of o	corrections, name the warden or head of the institution partment within its custody, name the director of the
	department of corrections.	·
25	(5) Vou must include all arounds or claim	ms for relief which you may have regarding your
20	conviction and semence.	
2		RECEIVED
28	}	NOV 1 0 2009

CLERK OF THE COURT

Failure to raise all grounds I this petition may preclude you from filing future petitions challenging your conviction and sentence. (6) You must allege specific facts supporting the claims in the petition you file seeking relief from any conviction or sentence. Failure to allege specific facts rather than just conclusions may cause your 3 petition to be dismissed. If your petition contains a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, that claim will operate to waive the attorney-client privilege for the proceeding in which you claim your counsel was ineffective. 5 (7) If your petition challenges the validity of your conviction or sentence, the original and one copy must be filed with the clerk of the district court for the county in which the conviction occurred. 6 Petitions raising any other claim must be filed with the clerk of the district court for the county in which you are incarcerated. One copy must be mailed to the respondent, one copy to the attorney 7 general's office, and one copy to the district attorney of the county in which you were convicted or to the original prosecutor if you are challenging your original conviction or sentence. Copies must 8 conform in all particulars to the original submitted for filing. 9 PETITION 10 1. Name of institution and county in which you are presently imprisoned or where and who you 11 are presently restrained of your liberty: Po Box 650; Indian Springs, Neverland 12 2. Name the location of court which entered the judgment of conviction under attack: \(\sqrt{a} \) 13 Adair Department XXI, Clark County Fighth Judicial District Count 14 3. Date of judgment of conviction: November 15 4. Case number: 16 5. (a) Length of sentence: 2-35 year to Life Sentences running Concurrently 17 (b) If sentence is death, state any date upon which execution is scheduled: _ 18 6. Are you presently serving a sentence for a conviction other than the conviction under attack in 19 this motion: 20 No If "Yes", list crime, case number and sentence being served at this time: 21 22 7. Nature of offense involved in conviction being challenged: Count 1: Sexual Assault 23 agon (F) catagony A. Count Land 5: Sexua 26 27 2

28

1	8. What was your plea? (Check one)
2	(a) Not guilty
3	(b) Guilty
4	(c) Nolo contendere
5	9. If you entered a guilty plea to one count of an indictment or information, and a not guilty plea
6	to another count of an indictment or information, or if a guilty plea was negotiated, give details: att parties stipulate that counts 1,2, and 3 will run consecutively to one another parties stipulate that counts 1,2, and 3 will run consecutively to one another
7	Further both parties stigulate that course to argue as to wheather
8	Counts Athorny 6 will our Concurrently or Consecutively to Counts I through
9	3, tody handly this plea is conditional upon the Court accepting the abstracted to 10. If you were found guilty after a plea of not guilty, was the finding made by: (check one) Stipulated
10	
11	(b) Judge without a jury
12	II. Did you testify at that? I es 140
13	12. Did you appeal from the judgment of conviction?
14	Yes No
15	13. If you did appeal, answer the following:
16	(a) Name of court:
17	(b) Case number or citation:
18	(c) Result:
19	(d) Date of appeal:
20	(Attach copy of order or decision, if available).
21	14.) If you did not appeal, explain briefly why you did not: 1. Make 11 File of Making
22	14.) If you did not appeal, explain briefly why you did not: I know withing about the law, My Attorney intermed me that he would File a Motion and petition and failed to do so I have not been able to contact my
23	and perition and failed to do so I have not been able to contact rapellegal council. My afformed made all decisions; 15. Other than a direct appeal from the judgment of conviction and sentence, have you previously
24	
25	filed any petitions, applications or motions with respect to this judgment in any court, state or
26	federal? YesNoV
27	
28	3

	16. If your answer to No 15 was "Yes", give the following information:
2	(a) (1) Name of court:
3	(2) Nature of proceedings:
4 5	(3) Grounds raised: N/A .
7 8 9	(4) Did you receive an evidentiary hearing on your petition, application or motion? Yes No
10	(5) Result: 1/A
11	(6) Date of result:
12	(7) If known, citations of any written opinion of date of orders described and the second of the sec
13	result:
14	(b) As to any second petition, application or motion, give the same information:
15	(1) Name of Court:///
16	(2) Nature of proceeding:
17	(3) Grounds raised: ////
18	(4) Did you receive an evidentiary hearing on your petition, application or motion?
19	Yes No ///
20	(5) Result:
21	(6) Date of result: ////
22	(7) If known, citations or any written opinion or date of orders entered pursuant to each
23	result:
24	(c) As to any third or subsequent additional application or motions, give the same information
25	as above, list them on a separate sheet and attach.
26	
27	

1	(d) Did you appeal to the highest state or federal court having jurisdiction, the result or action
2	taken on any petition, application or motion?
3	(I) First petition, application or motion?
4	YesNo
5	Citation or date of decision:
6	(2) Second petition, application or motion?
7	YesNo
8	Citation or date of decision:
9	(e) If you did not appeal from the adverse action on any petition, application or motion, explains
10	briefly why you did not. (You may relate specific facts in response to this question. Your response
11	may be included on paper which is 8 ½ x 11 inches attached to the petition. Your response may not
12	exceed five handwritten or typewritten pages in length).
13	
14	17. Has any ground being raised in this petition been previously presented to this or any other
15	court by way of petition for habeas corpus, motion or application or any other post-conviction
16	proceeding? If so, identify: N/A
17	(a) Which of the grounds is the same:
18	(b) The proceedings in which these grounds were raised:
19	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
20	You must relate specific facts in
21	Wave response may be included on paper which is 8 ½ x 11 inches attached
22	the pages in length)
23	N/A
24	
20	
21	
2.	5

1	18. If any of the grounds listed in Nos. 23(a), (b), (c), and (d), or listed on any additional pages
2	you have attached, were not previously presented in any other court, state or federal, list briefly what
3	grounds were not so presented, and give your reasons for not presenting them. (You must relate
4	specific facts in response to this question. Your response may be included on paper which is 8 ½ x
5	11 in the attached to the petition. Your response may not exceed five handwritten or typewritten
6	pages in length). N/A Never Filed onything else before
7	
8	19. Are you filing this petition more than one (1) year following the filing of the judgment of
9	conviction or the filing of a decision on direct appeal? If so, state briefly the reasons for the delay.
10	(You must relate specific facts in response to this question. Your response may be included on paper
11	which is 8 ½ x 11 inches attached to the petition. Your response may not exceed five handwritten or
12	typewritten pages in length). No, Im Filing within one year
13	of Judgment of Conviction
14	
15	20. Do you have any petition or appeal now pending in any court, either state or federal, as to the
16	judgment under attack?
17	Yes No
18	If "Yes", state what court and the case number:
19	
20	21. Give the name of each attorney who represented you in the proceeding resulting in your
21	conviction and on direct appeal: <u>Jeffrey S. Maningo, DPD</u>
22	
23	
24	22. Do you have any future sentences to serve after you complete the sentence imposed by the
25	judgment under attack?
26	Yes No If "Yes", specify where and when it is to be served, if you know:
27	
28	6

1	Summarize briefly the facts supporting each ground. If necessary, you may attach pages stating
2	additional grounds and facts supporting same.
3	23. (a) GROUND ONE: <u>Ineffective</u> Assistance of
4	Coursel
5	
6	
7	23. (a) SUPPORTING FACTS (Tell your story briefly without citing cases or law): While
8	in Custody at the clark County Detention Center in
9	Las Vegas Nevada after Being / ransfered From California
10	By US Exhaltin Senices, I was unable to aford my
11	own selfagointed lawyer. So therfore was againted
12	a DPD by the Court Settery S. Manings Lake had
13	a Investigator that was also againsted by the Nate of
14	Nevada, And there was also conother allower that had
15	been growted by the state to my case.
16	While in the County Jail my lawyer was hard
17	to get ahold of there was very little investigating done
18	on my case by my legal team PIM detense.
19	Luras only vissited by my aftorney a very few times,
20	and was eventually Cupriosed into making a plea
21	agreement by my attorney out of Fear of having to spend
22	the rest of my life lacked up in a trison facility
23	Behind Bars,
24	I do not feel that I had alequite legal
25	representation in and Ameurat my case, And affer
26	my sentencing late on November 1 m 2008 my drawer
27	Mr Jeffery S. Manings intermed me that he would
28	7

	GROUND CONTINUED
1	Start Filing Patitions and Motions to get me back
2	into Court, and he also intermed me that he would
3	Keep in touch with me, and talk to me again before
4	being transported to USP High Desert State Prison,
5	I have never been able to get about of
6	my attorney since my sentencing, I have not recient
7	must from him, vissits, or been able to contact with
8	him over the Phone I have been trying beget
9	about of him for the Past 6 to I months and have
10	been unable to do so
11	I muself know nothing about the law, and
12	I don't know if my aftorney has Filled any letitions
13	or Motions do the court of even it has still working
14	on my case. My attorney failed to File motions
15	he tailed to prepure for Court the distant research
16	For my Case or cle Fense
17	
18	
19	
20	
21	
22	
23	
24	
25	
26	
27	
28	
	Page \mathcal{Q}

	23. (b) GROUND TWO: Prior Bad Acts
1	23. (b) GROUND I WO
3	
1	
	23. (b) SUPPORTING FACTS (Tell your story briefly without citing cases or law):
6	Puring Court hearing, my Prior Criminal afterses
7	That were committed as a Juvinite Front 1-2003
8	my whole Jusinite record was afformed into court
9	and used usingst me, None of my Juninite criminal
10	offenses had any similaretys of the current
11	charges, and My Tourisite record should not have
12	harn allowed in law.
13	My Attorney about the evidence into court
14	and my Juvinile record into Court without my
15	or any of my frevious Juil incorcerations after
16	that as an adoubt should have been affaired
18	into Court
19	7000-Can-
20	
21	
22	
23	
24	
25	
26	
27	
28	8

1	23. (c) GROUND THREE: In Competence
2	
3	
4	
5	23. (c) SUPPORTING FACTS (Tell your story briefly without citing cases or law):
6	the time of my Case I was unable to Kelly undostand
7	or Comprehend what was gring on I was never able
8	to see a pach istrist, and never had a phych evaluation
9	done, I have been Add all my life, I didn't
10	Know anything about the Legal system, and was
11	also anaware of the punishment that was possible
12	as of the crime's die were comes
13	I was also Confused about what was
۱4	
15	not understand what was hargening, and Could
16	not Fully under stand the advice that my attorney
17	gave me,
18	I was never pluced on any phych medicultar
19	even thought of clearly needed it.
20	
21	
22	
23	
24	
25	
26	
27	
8	9

1	23. (d) GROUND FOUR: Double Teopardy
2	
3	
4	
5	23. (d) SUPPORTING FACTS (Tell your story briefly without citing cases or law):
6	was changed on Separate Changes of Kidneyens
7	when the dur people were together in the same
8	car, and was also chand with a Robberg and
9	use of a deadly wegins against the same 2
10	people who were in a gray together and went
11	off of all the same tacks once some of
12	the charges were reduced.
13	
14	
15	
16	
17 18	
19	
20	
21	
22	
23	
24	
25	
26	
27	
28	10

(a)	Ground Five: SelF-Incrimination/ Milanda Rights
Supporting 1	FACTS (Tell your story briefly without citing cases or law): When I was
(b)	Ground Six: Prosecutorial Misconduct
pry Cond for also, so one or	PACTS (Tell your story briefly without citing cases or law.): The Prosecuter in ace Clark Summers (see for me about exidence the Judge about the weapon used in the Comme Saxing has a real briefle our when it was a take goon, and said that these colds evidence that didn't excising so said that the witnesses she presented were all destring with. Ground Seven: Right To Counsel
Supporting in Calif	FACTS (Tell your story briefly without citing cases or law.): When I was assessed ifornia and Coeffed up in the Cot County Juil and City Juil of to see an afterney but was never aparated a lawyer in weeks I was there, I had no legal councel.
(d) Ground Eight: Brady Violation
Supporting Sarah Cause The	FACTS (Tell your story briefly without citing cases or law.): Let a cuitness. Aften lied about what humsen to her, and was her in first, even said that she was lieng at fines, come that she was lieng but still went known charges. Charges.


(a)	Ground Nine:	Direc	+ A	greal_			
pporting Speak Speak	FACTS (Tell you my Asterna gne se el For ne new) thus	Her and	ithout citing the State of Charles	rd the	Step of Coxy of Phe Se	my Sent e For ein rever 99 en Fhough evices of	encir)
(b)	Ground Ten:	Enhan	ced:	Sentenc	ing		
MA P Sentes poss (6)	FACTS (Tell you for the form of the form o	me h	9,WE_1	ne th	[ma	Tudge US CMEST KIMUM S	ref for enter
	FACTS (Tell you		without citi	ng cases or lav		ras indi ets even he of them he	iy g N Hiyy Fox
((d) Ground Twe	ve:					
Supporting	g FACTS (Tell ye	our story briefly	without citi	ng cases or la	w.):		

ı	
1	WHEREFORE, Roy Tios 1#1027585 prays that the court grant _Said
2	relief ti which he may be entitled in this proceeding.
3	EXECUTED at High Desert State Prison Po Box 650 Indian Springs, NV, 870
4	relief ti which he may be entitled in this proceeding. EXECUTED at <u>High Desert State Prison & Bon 650 Indian Springs</u> NV, 896 on the 4th day of November, 2009.
5	in the state of th
6	Signature of Petitioner
7	
8	<u>VERIFICATION</u>
9	Under penalty of perjury, pursuant to N.R.S. 208.165 et seq., the undersigned declares that he is
10	the Petitioner named in the foregoing petition and knows the contents thereof, that the pleading is
11	true and correct of his own personal knowledge, except as to those matters based on information and
12	belief, and to those matters, he believes them to be true.
13	E DO HEND
14	Signature of Positioner
15	
16	None, NA
17	Atttorney for Petitioner
18	
19	
20	
21	
22	
23	
24	
25	
26	

1	CERTFICATE OF SERVICE BY MAILING	, ,
2	I, Roy James Trost, hereby certify, pursuant to NRCP 5(b), that on this 4	_
3	in of A/culember 2002 I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing, " Pestition	
4	For writ of Habeas Corpus (Post Conviction)	7
5	by depositing it in the High Desert State Prison, Legal Library, First-Class Postage, fully prepaid,	
6	addressed as follows:	
7		
8	Waden D. Neven Clark County Clark of County 200 F Lewis	
9	PO BOX 650 - 89155	
10	- 87070 -0650	
11	And Property	
12	Newda Attorney Generals office Levid Logers 555 East Washington Ave 200 south thirt street	
13	Las Vegus , NV 89101-0000 89154-2212	
14		
15		
16	·	
17	CC:FILE	
18	DATED: this 4th day of November, 2009.	
19	DATED: tms _/_ day or _///////////////////////////////////	
20	contested time hat	_
21	Rey Fame Tiest # 1027585 An Propria Persona	
22	Post Office box 650 [HDSP] Indian Springs, Nevada 89018	
23	IN FORMA PAUPERIS:	
24		
25 26		
27		

AFFIRMATION Pursuant to NRS 239B.030

Petition
The undersigned does hereby affirm that the preceding Petition
For writ of Habeas Corprus Clost-Conviction, (Title of Document)
filed in District Court Case number $C247731$
Does not contain the social security number of any person.
-OR-
☐ Contains the social security number of a person as required by:
A. A specific state or federal law, to wit:
(State specific law)
-or-
B. For the administration of a public program or for an application for a federal or state grant.
Signature Date
Roy James Trost Print Name
Inmate.



s j		•
Mode	1 2 3 4	Loy Tames Defendant/In Propr Post Office Box 656 Indian Springs, Nev
	5	
	6	
	7	Loy Tume
	8	Loy Jeams
	9	_
	10	State of County of
	11	County of
	12	
	13	
	14	
(15	
	16	
		1

	FILED
1	Defendant/In Propria Persona NOV 1 0 2009
2	Post Office Box 650 (HDSP) Indian Springs, Nevada. 89018
3	Thomas Springs, Novada System
4	DISTRICT COURT
5	CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA
6	
7	Loy Jumes Trost Plaintiff, vs. Case No. <u>C24773/</u>
8	Plaintiff,
9	vs. Clarks of Alouals. Case No. <u>C24</u> 773/
10	State of Nevada Dept. No. XX/ County of Defendant.
11	Class Defendant. Docket
12	
13	
14	MOTION TO APPOINT COUNSEL
15	DATE OF HEARING: TBZ
16	TIME OF HEARING: TBD
17	
18	COMES NOW the Defendant Lon James Trost, in proper persona and moves
19	this court for an Order granting him counsel in the proceeding action.
20	This motion is made and based upon all papers and pleadings on file herein and attached
21	points and authorities.
22	
23	Dated this 4th day of Abvember, 200 9.
24	
25	RECEIVED Respectfully Submitted,
26	RECEIVED NOV 1 0 2009 CLEDICO Respectfully Submitted, CALINGTON
27	CLERKOFTHE COURT 1
28	THE COURT 1

1	
1	Roy Tames Tost / In Propria Personam
2	Post Office Box 650 [HDSP]
3	Indian Springs, Nevada 89018
4	
5	DISTRICT COURT
6	CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA
7	
8	Roy Tames Trost Vs. State of Nevada County of Clark Docket Docket
9	vs. (2. No. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1.
10	State of Nevada Dept No
11	country of Clark
. ~) Docket
13	NOTICE OF MOTION
14	NOTICE OF MOTION
15	YOU WILL PLEASE TAKE NOTICE, that
16	The same of the bearing before the above entitled Court on the day of 20
17	will come on for hearing before the above-children court on the and
18	
19	
20	CC:FILE
21	DATED: this 4th day of November, 2009.
22	
23	Part Tames Ticket
24	Carl sels of Almost 1010 #104 130
25	
26	
27	

POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

NRS 34.750 Appointment of Counsel for indigents; pleading supplemental to petition; response to dismiss.

"If the Court is satisfied that the allegation of indigency is true and the petition is not dismissed summarily, the Court may appoint counsel to represent the petitioner."

NRS 171.188 Procedure for appointment of attorney for indigent defendant.

"Any defendant charged with a public offense who is an indigent may, be oral statement to the District Judge, justice of peace, municipal judge or master, request the appointment of an attorney to represent him."

NRS 178.397 Assignment of counsel.

"Every defendant accused of a gross misdemeanor or felony who is financially unable to obtain counsel is entitled to have counsel assigned to represent him at every stage of the proceedings from his initial appearance before a magistrate or the court through appeal, unless he waives such appointment."

WHEREFORE, petitioner prays the Court will grant his motion for appointment of counsel to allow him the assistance that is needed to insure that justice is served.

Dated this Hay of November, 2009

Respectfully submitted

1 2

- -

1	
2	
3	CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE BY MAILING
4	I, Low James Trost, hereby certify, pursuant to NRCP 5(b) that on this
5	day of November,200 Z, I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing "
6	Motion to appoint Courses
7	by depositing it in the High Desert State Prison, Legal Library, First-Class Postage, Fully prepaid
8	addressed as follows: Clark County Clerk of Court 200 E. Lewis Las Vegas, Nevada
9	200 E. Lewis
10	1 08 Vegas, Nevada
11	care r
12	87/33
13	
14	
15	
16	
17	
18	
19	
20	18th N. Carlos 4
21	DATED: THIS 4 day of November ,2004.
22	
23	
24	カナモナ
25	Roy James Trost /In Propria Persona
26	High Desert State Prison P.O. Box 650
27	Indian Springs, Nevada. 89018

AFFIRMATION Pursuant to NRS 239B.030

,			
The undersigned does hereby affirm that the preceding			
Title of Document)			
filed in District Court Case number			
Does not contain the social security number of any person.			
-OR-			
☐ Contains the social security number of a person as required by:			
A. A specific state or federal law, to wit:			
(State specific law)			
-or-			
B. For the administration of a public program or for an application for a federal or state grant.			
Signature Nov 17th 2009 Date			
Roy James Trost Print Name Prisoner			
Prisoner Title			

28

Roy James Tost Inmate No. 1027585 HUSI To Rox (650) Indian Serings, NV 89070 FILED
NOV 1 0 2009

IN THE XX JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF Clark

Roy James Trost
Petitioner.

rem

STATE OF NEVADA.

Respondent.

EX PARTE MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL AND REQUEST FOR EVIDENTIARY HEARING

COMES NOW Petitioner <u>Pay Tames</u> Trust, in Proper Person, and moves this Court for its order allowing the appointment of counsel for Petitioner and for evidentiary hearing. This motion is made and based in the interest of justice.

Pursuant to NRS 34.750(1),

A petition may allege that the petitioner is unable to pay the costs of the proceedings or to employ counsel. If the court is satisfied that the allegation of indigency is true and the petitioner is not dismissed summarily, the court may appoint counsel to represent the petitioner. In making its determination, the court may consider, among other things, the severity of the consequences facing the petitioner and whether:

RECEIVED

NOV 1 0 20

CLERK OF THE COURT

(a)	The issues	presented	are	difficult;
-----	------------	-----------	-----	------------

- (b) The petitioner is unable to comprehend the proceedings, or
- (c) Counsel is necessary to proceed with discovery.

Petitioner is presently incarcerated at <u>HDSP Indian Spring</u> <u>NV</u>

Nevada, where he is unemployed, indigent and unable to retain private counsel to represent him.

Petitioner is unlearned and unfamiliar with the complexities of Nevada state law, particularly state post-conviction proceedings. Further Petitioner alleges that the issues in this case are complex and require an evidentiary hearing. Petitioner is unable to factually develop and adequately present the claims without the assistance of counsel. Counsel is unable to adequately present the claims without an evidentiary hearing.

Petitioner hereby respectfully requests that the Court appoint counsel and set a date for evidentiary hearing for the reasons stated above.

DATED this Hay of November, 2009.

Respectfully submitted,

California hab

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE BY MAIL I, Roy James 1051, hereby certify pursuant to N.R.C.P. 5(b), that on this 1 day of November, 2002 I handed to a prison official for mailing a true and correct copy of the foregoing REQUEST FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL AND REQUEST FOR Clark County Clerk of Court EVIDENTIARY HEARING addressed to: 200 E Lewis

-3-

AFFIRMATION Pursuant to NRS 239B.030

The undersigned does hereby affirm that the preceding <u>Ex Parte</u> metion for appointment of course and Request For (Title of Document) Evedentiary Hearing Does not contain the social security number of any person. -OR-Contains the social security number of a person as required by: A. A specific state or federal law, to wit: (State specific law) -or-B. For the administration of a public program or for an application for a federal or state grant. Nevember 1th 2009

Date Prisoner

THIS SEALED
DOCUMENT,
NUMBERED PAGE(S)
105 - 105
WILL FOLLOW VIA
U.S. MAIL

3

4

6

7 8

9

11

13

14

15 16

17

18 19

20

CLERK OF THE COURT

25 26

VECEIVE!

DISTRICT COURT NOV 2 3 20

ROY JAMES TROST.

Petitioner.

VS.

STATE OF NEVADA COUNTY OF CLARK,

Respondent,

Case No: C247731

ORDER FOR PETITION FOR

Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus (Post-Conviction Relief) on November 10, 2009. The Court has reviewed the petition and has determined that a response would assist the Court in determining whether Petitioner is illegally imprisoned and restrained of his/her liberty, and good cause appearing therefore,

CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Respondent shall, within 45 days after the date of this Order, answer or otherwise respond to the petition and file a return in accordance with the provisions of NRS 34.360 to 34.830, inclusive.

IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED that this matter shall be placed on this Court's

Calendar on the 19th day of January

 $\frac{200}{1}$, at the hour of

925 o'clock for further proceedings.

District Court Judge

11-15-09A11:37 RCVD

FILED TRAN 1 DEC 0 4 2009 2 ORIGINAL 3 DISTRICT COURT 4 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 5 6 STATE OF NEVADA, 7 Plaintiff. CASE NO. C247731 DEPT. XXI 8 VS. 9 ROY J. TROST, 10 Defendant. 11 12 BEFORE THE HONORABLE VALERIE ADAIR, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 13 14 TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 23, 2008 15 RECORDER'S TRANSCRIPT OF HEARING RE: ARRAIGNMENT CONTINUED 16 17 APPEARANCES: 18 FOR THE STATE: GLEN P. O'BRIEN, ESQ. **Chief Deputy District Attorney** 19 SUMMER C. CLARK, ESQ. **Deputy District Attorney** 20 21 JEFFREY S. MANINGO, ESQ. FOR THE DEFENDANT: **Deputy Public Defender** 22 23 24 RECORDED BY: JANIE L. OLSEN, COURT RECORDER/TRANSCRIBER 25 RECEIVED DEC 0 4 2009

-1-

CLERK OF THE COURT

LAS VEGAS, CLARK COUNTY, NV., TUES., SEPT. 23, 2008

THE COURT: State versus Roy Trost. Mr. Trost is present in custody with Mr. Maningo. We've got Mr. O'Brien and Ms. Clark for the State, and this is a continued arraignment.

And do we have anything that needs to be filed this morning?

MR. MANINGO: I do, Judge.

THE COURT: That is the Guilty Plea Agreement?

MR. MANINGO: Yes, ma'am.

THE COURT: And was there an Amended Indictment or Information filed?

MR. O'BRIEN: The original Information filed reflects the plea.

THE COURT: All right. Very good.

MR. MANINGO: And, Judge, this matter is negotiated. Mr. Trost will be pleading to six counts, and as we discussed in chambers and I'll discuss now for the record, they will stack a certain way.

Count 1 will be a sexual assault with the use of a deadly weapon. So that is a 10 to life with another 10 to life for the weapon enhancement. So a 20 to life, and the named victim in that count will be Melissa Suddeth.

Count 2 will be a sexual assault. That is a 10 to life. The named victim in that will be Amberly Curfman.

And Count 3 will be a kidnapping, a 5 to life which is also Amberly Curfman as the named victim.

Those three counts are stipulated to run consecutively with one another.

Count 4, Sexual assault on a minor under the age of 14, that is a 20 to

life, and the named victim is Sarah Quinn.

Count 5 is a sexual assault. That is a 10 to life, named victim Lacey

And Count 6, a kidnapping, a 5 to life with the named victim Lacey

Count 4, 5, and 6 stipulated to run consecutive.

And both sides to retain the right to argue as to whether the set of counts 1, 2 and 3 will run consecutive or concurrent with Counts 4, 5 and 6.

THE COURT: All right.

Yes, Mr. O'Brien.

MR. O'BRIEN: Judge, that's all correct with the exception of it's sexual assault with a minor under 16 as opposed to under 14.

MR. MANINGO: I'm sorry, yes, that's correct.

MR. O'BRIEN: And just for the record, as we told the Court in chambers, the reason for this was the deal we had struck in justice court was going to be simply two counts, both carrying a 35 to life with the possibility of the State arguing for consecutive, the defense arguing for concurrent, but both parties agreeing it was a 35 to life.

When we realized when we looked at it we simply couldn't do that under the law, that's when we fashioned the current plea that comes out the exact same way for the defendant. It's more charges, but it comes out to the exact same penalty, and both parties are in the same position for arguing for consecutive or concurrent.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

MR. MANINGO: Correct.

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am.

THE COURT: And that will be up to the Court as to whether to impose those 2 sentences concurrently or consecutively. Do you understand that? 3 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am. THE COURT: Okay. Now, before -- you said you read the guilty plea 4 5 agreement; is that right? 6 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am. THE COURT: And did you also read the information charging you with 7 Counts 1 through 6 to which you'll be pleading today? 8 9 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am. THE COURT: Okay. Now, did you understand everything contained in the 10 11 guilty plea agreement as well as in the information? 12 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am. THE COURT: Did you have a full opportunity to discuss your plea of guilty as 13 well as the charges to which you are pleading guilty with your attorney Mr. Maningo? 14 15 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am. THE COURT: Okay. Before the Court accepts your plea of guilty, is there 16 anything you would like to ask me about your plea or about the charge to which you 17 18 are pleading guilty -- charges, excuse me? 19 THE DEFENDANT: No, ma'am. THE COURT: All right. We're going to start with Count No. 1. Tell me in your 20 own words what you did on or between May 31, 2007, and May 18, 2008, that 21 causes you to plead guilty to Count No. 1, Sexual assault with use of a deadly 22 23 weapon. THE DEFENDANT: I sexually assaulted a prostitute, and I had a knife. 24

THE COURT: All right. And do you acknowledge the name of the victim was

1	Melissa Suddeth?
2	THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am.
3	THE COURT: All right. And in order to get her to comply against her will, you
4	brandished a knife; is that correct, or held it to her or whatever?
5	THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am.
6	THE COURT: Okay. And the way you sexually assaulted her was by placing
7	your penis into her genital opening; is that correct?
8	THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am.
9	THE COURT: And that was by means of force and against her will; is that
10	true?
11	THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am.
12	THE COURT: All right. Tell me then in your own words what you did
13	between that period within Clark County, Nevada, that causes you to plead guilty to
14	Count No. 2, Sexual Assault.
15	THE DEFENDANT: I sexually assaulted two girls in the parking lot of the
16	Desert Springs Hospital.
17	THE COURT: Okay.
18	MR. MANINGO: And, Judge, if I may, that is for Counts 2, 3, 5 and 6.
19	THE COURT: Okay. Now, was one of those girls a girl or woman by the
20	name of Amberly Curfman?
21	THE DEFENDANT: Yes, it was.
22	THE COURT: And did you sexually assault her by placing your penis in her
23	mouth?
24	THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am.
25	THE COURT: And that was done against her will and without her consent; is

11

12

10

14

15

13

16

17

18 19

21

22

20

24

23

25

that right?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, it was.

THE COURT: All right. And in order to accomplish that, did you -- well, how did you accomplish that?

THE DEFENDANT: Well, I do want to bring this to the attention that it wasn't a deadly weapon.

THE COURT: Well, this one you're not pleading to a deadly weapon with respect to Ms. Amberly Curfman.

THE DEFENDANT: Okay.

THE COURT: Did you restrain her? Did you carry her away from someplace? Did you keep her --

THE DEFENDANT: Oh, yeah, they were in a car.

THE COURT: All right. And did you make them go to another location, or what did you do?

THE DEFENDANT: They were getting into their car, and I just got in their car. THE COURT: Okay. And you forced them to remain in the vehicle; is that right?

THE DEFENDANT: Correct.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. O'Brien.

MR. O'BRIEN: Judge, the only thing I was going to supplement the facts with, he probably is disputing what he had. The girls, however, would have testified that he had what appeared to them to be a deadly weapon, a firearm. I think he's going to allege it was a BB gun or a toy or something like that, but that was what he used to force them to comply although he's not charged with a deadly weapon, that's how he forced them to comply with the kidnapping and the sexual assault.

1	MR. MANINGO: We can argue that at sentencing, but for the purpose of
2	THE COURT: But for the purposes of today it's not a deadly weapon.
3	So you confined them within the vehicle for the purpose of committing
4	sexual assault; is that right?
5	THE DEFENDANT: That is correct.
6	THE COURT: And you detained them within the vehicle thereby committing
7	the crime of first degree kidnapping; is that correct?
8	THE DEFENDANT: Correct.
9	THE COURT: And the other woman or girl in the car was an individual by the
10	name of Sarah Quinn; is that right?
11	MR. MANINGO: No, Judge.
12	THE COURT: Oh, that's a different one.
13	MR. O'BRIEN: Lacey Marion.
14	THE COURT: Okay. Was a girl by the name of Lacey Marion; is that right?
15	THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am.
16	THE COURT: And you also kept Ms. Lacey Marion in the car against her will
17	thereby detaining her for the purpose of committing sexual assault; is that right?
18	THE DEFENDANT: That is correct.
19	THE COURT: All right. And you digitally penetrated her by placing your
20	finger into her genital opening; is that right?
21	THE DEFENDANT: That is correct.
22	THE COURT: All right. And then finally, Count No. 4, Sexual assault with a
23	minor under 16 years of age. Tell me what you did that causes you to plead guilty to
24	Count No. 4, Sexual assault with a minor under 16 years of age.
25	THE DEFENDANT: I inappropriate touched a girl that was under the age of

16, sexual.

THE COURT: All right. Did you touch her by placing your finger into her genital opening?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am.

THE COURT: And you acknowledge that she was under the age of 16; is that right?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am.

THE COURT: All right. And that was done against her will or under conditions where she could not resist or understand what you were doing?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am.

THE COURT: Is that acceptable with the State?

MR. O'BRIEN: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Trost, the Court finds that your pleas of guilty have been freely and voluntarily given and hereby accepts your plea of guilty.

The matter is referred to the Department of Parole and Probation for presentence investigation report and set over for rendition of sentencing, and what we discussed in chambers is there's going to be a number of speakers. We're going to do this at 10:30, and that way the other inmates --

And I believe, Mr. Maningo, you had requested that; is that right?

MR. MANINGO: Yes, Judge, that's correct.

MR. O'BRIEN: Judge, and we'll have some time because there's certain -We want to all actually have time to bring the facts to the Court's light, put on some
sort of a presentation and the witnesses. So I'm anticipating a minimum of an hour
perhaps even two hours for the State to put on what it wants to present because this
Court was not able to hear the trial, and I think it's important you know all the facts

around this case.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

So I know that's pretty late in the morning. Is that going to have any effect on lunch or something like that as far as your staff goes? I just want to make sure we've got enough time for the Court to hear all we have to give.

THE COURT: You are so considerate. We do what we have to do. We could actually, I guess, put it on for a Monday, which we don't normally have a calendar, and that's not a problem because you guys are on a specialty team.

Let's see. This would be a 45 day set.

MR. O'BRIEN: There's no psychosexual required so.

THE COURT: Right. Let's go ahead and do Monday, November 10 --

MR. O'BRIEN: Judge, I apologize. We're both out of the jurisdiction, I think, on that day. So is it possible to do the Monday after the 17th?

Not together.

THE COURT: Well, I know Mr. O'Brien has an upcoming wedding so that really would be very bad form, Mr. O'Brien.

MR. O'BRIEN: I wasn't going to say that on the record, Judge, but that's where I'll be.

THE CLERK: November 17th, and you want to do this --

THE COURT: Let's do it at -- is that a Monday?

We'll do it at 9:30.

MR. O'BRIEN: On the 17th?

THE COURT: Right.

MR. O'BRIEN: And actually, just to correct myself, it looks like I would have been back by that date but my cocounsel would not. So the 17th is fine.

25 | | | | |

MR. MANINGO: Judge, I'll be working all those days.

-000-

ATTEST: I hereby certify that I have truly and correctly transcribed the audio/video proceedings in the above-entitled case to the best of my ability.

JANIE L. OLSEN Recorder/Transcriber

-11-

ORIGINAL

	1
Λ)

1	ORDR UIIGII	V/HL
2	DAVID ROGER Clark County District Attorney	F11
3	Nevada Bar #002781 H. LEON SIMON	DEC - 8 2009
4	Deputy District Attorney Nevada Bar #000411	DEC - 8 2009
5	200 Lewis Avenue	CLERK SELLING
	Las Vegas, Nevada 89155-2212 (702) 671-2500	
6	Attorney for Plaintiff DISTRIC	T COURT
7		NTY, NEVADA
8	THE STATE OF NEVADA,	
9	Plaintiff,	CASE NO: C247731
10	-vs-	DEPT NO: XXI
11	ROY J. TROST,	
12	#20/913 <i>1</i> 	ORDER FOR TRANSCRIPT
13	Defendant.	
14	Upon the ex-parte application of th	e State of Nevada, represented by DAVID
15	ROGER, District Attorney, by and through,	H. LEON SIMON, Deputy District Attorney,
16	and good cause appearing therefor,	
17	IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that a transcript of the Hearing heard on the 23 rd day of	
18	September, 2008, at 9:30 A.M., be prepared b	y Janie Olsen, Court Reporter/Recorder for the
19	above-entitled Court.	
20	DATED this <u>35</u> day of November,	, 2009.
21		- Valeri ada
22		DISTRICT JUDGE
23	DAVID ROGER	
24	District Attorney Nevada Bar, #002781	· ·
25	BY M: Lum Simon	
26	H. LEÓN SIMON Deputy District Attorney Nevada Bar #000411	-
27	Nevada Bar #000411	RECEIVED
28		DEC 0 8 2009
		CLERK OF THE COURT

11-30-09P02:59 RCVD 118 P:\WPDOCS\ORDR\FORDR\810\81069101.doc

Electronically Filed 01/11/2010 03:08:07 PM

1	RSPN	Alun & Chum
2	DAVID ROGER Clark County District Attorney	CLERK OF THE COURT
3	Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #002781 W. JAKE MERBACK	
4	Deputy District Attorney Nevada Bar #009126	
5	200 Lewis Avenue Las Vegas, Nevada 89155-2212 (702) 671-2500	
6	(702) 671-2500 Attorney for Plaintiff	
7		
8		CT COURT
9		NTY, NEVADA
10	THE STATE OF NEVADA,))
11	Plaintiff,	CASE NO: C247731
12	-VS-	DEPT NO: XXI
13	ROY J. TROST, #2679137	
14	Defendant.))
15	CTATES DECRONCE TO	
16		DEFENDANT'S PETITION
17		HABEAS CORPUS
18	· ·	NVICTION)
19	DATE OF HEARING TIME OF HEA	6: JANUARY 19, 2010 RING: 9:30 AM
20	COMES NOW, the State of Nevada, b	by DAVID ROGER, District Attorney, through
21	W. JAKE MERBACK, Chief Deputy District Attorney, and hereby submits the attached	
22	Points and Authorities in Opposition to De	fendant's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus
23	(Post-Conviction).	
24	This response is made and based upon	all the papers and pleadings on file herein, the
25	attached points and authorities in support here	eof, and oral argument at the time of hearing, if
26	deemed necessary by this Honorable Court.	
27	//	
28	//	
	1	

POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On May 22, 2008, Roy J. Trost (Defendant) was charged by way of Criminal Complaint with: Count 1 – Sexual Assault With a Minor Under Sixteen Years of Age, Count 2 – Burglary With Use of a Deadly Weapon, Counts 3 and 4 – Coercion With Use of a Deadly Weapon, Counts 5 and 6 – First Degree Kidnapping With Use of a Deadly Weapon, Counts 7 and 8 – Sexual Assault With Use of a Deadly Weapon, Count 9 – Sexual Assault, Counts 10 and 11 – Open and Gross Lewdness, and Counts 12 and 13 – Robbery With Use of a Deadly Weapon.

On July 31, 2008, the State filed an Amended Criminal Complaint, charging Defendant with Count 1 – Sexual Assault With Use of a Deadly Weapon, Count 2 – Sexual Assault With Use of a Deadly Weapon, Count 3 – Battery With Use of a Deadly Weapon With Intent to Commit Sexual Assault With Substantial Bodily Harm, Count 4 – Sexual Assault With a Minor Under Sixteen Years of Age, Count 5 – Burglary With Use of a Deadly Weapon, Count 6 – Coercion With Use of a Deadly Weapon, Count 7 – Coercion With Use of a Deadly Weapon, Count 8 – First Degree Kidnapping With Use of a Deadly Weapon, Count 9 – First Degree Kidnapping With Use of a Deadly Weapon, Count 10 – Sexual Assault With a Deadly Weapon, Count 11 – Sexual Assault With a Deadly Weapon, Count 12 – Sexual Assault With a Deadly Weapon, Count 13 – Open and Gross Lewdness With Use of a Deadly Weapon, Count 15 – Robbery With Use of a Deadly Weapon, and Count 16 – Robbery With Use of a Deadly Weapon.

On September 11, 2008, the State charged Defendant by way of Information with Count 1 – Sexual Assault With Use of a Deadly Weapon, Count 2 – Sexual Assault, Count 3 – First Degree Kidnapping, Count 4 – Sexual Assault With a Minor Under Sixteen Years of Age, Count 5 – Sexual Assault, and Count 6 – First Degree Kidnapping.

28 | //

//

//

//

//

On September 23, 2008, pursuant to negotiations, Defendant pled guilty to the charges as contained in the Information filed September 11, 2008. The Guilty Plea Agreement (GPA), in which both parties stipulated that Counts 1-3 will run consecutively to each other and Counts 4-6 will run consecutively to each other but both parties retain the right to argue whether the two sets of counts would run concurrently or consecutively, was filed in open court the same day.

On November 17, 2008, Defendant was sentenced as to Count 1 – Life with the possibility of parole after one hundred twenty (120) months, plus an equal and consecutive term of Life with the possibility of parole after one hundred twenty (120) months; as to Count 2 – Life with the possibility of parole after one hundred twenty (120) months, Count 2 to run consecutive to Count 3 – Life with the possibility of parole after sixty (60) months, Count 3 to run consecutive to Count 2; as to Count 4 – Life with the possibility of parole after three hundred (300) months, Count 4 to run consecutive to Count 3; as to Count 5 – Life with the possibility of parole after one hundred twenty (120) months, Count 5 to run consecutive to Count 4; as to Count 6 – Life with the possibility of parole after sixty (60) months, Count 6 to run consecutive to Count 5. Defendant was further ordered to a special sentence of lifetime supervision and register as a sex offender upon any release from custody. Defendant was also given one hundred sixty-three (163) days credit for time served. The Judgment of Conviction was filed on November 25, 2008.

On December 9, 2008, at the State's request, the Court modified Defendant's sentence as to Count 4, making the sentence Life with the possibility of parole after two hundred forty (240) months, instead of three hundred (300) months.

On November 10, 2009, Defendant filed the instant Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Post-conviction), motion for appointment of counsel, and request for evidentiary hearing. The State's Response is as follows.

```
C:\Pro2ram Files\Neevia.Com\Document Converter\temp\702923-787130.DOC
```


<u>ARGUMENT</u>

I. DEFENDANT RECEIVED EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL.

In Defendant's first ground for relief, he alleges that his former counsel was ineffective for not visiting him often enough and failing to investigate his case. However, Defendant's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel lack merit.

The Sixth Amendment to the United State Constitution provides that, "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense." This court has long recognized that "the right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel." <u>Strickland v. Washington</u>, 466 U.S. 668, 686, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2063 (1984); <u>see also State v. Love</u>, 109 Nev. 1136, 1138, 865 P.2d 322, 323 (1993).

To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel a defendant must prove he was denied "reasonably effective assistance" of counsel by satisfying the two-prong test of Strickland. 466 U.S. at 686-87, 104 S. Ct. at 2063-64; see also Love, 109 Nev. at 1138, 865 P.2d at 323. Under the Strickland test, a defendant must show first that his counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and second, that but for counsel's errors, there is a reasonable probability that the result of the proceedings would have been different. 466 U.S. at 687-88, 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2065, 2068; Warden, Nevada State Prison v. Lyons, 100 Nev. 430, 432, 683 P.2d 504, 505 (1984) (adopting the Strickland two-part test). "[T]here is no reason for a court deciding an ineffective assistance claim to approach the inquiry in the same order or even to address both components of the inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on one." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697, 104 S. Ct. at 2069.

The court begins with the presumption of effectiveness and then must determine whether the defendant has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that counsel was ineffective. Means v. State, 120 Nev. 1001, 103 P.3d 35 (2004). "Effective counsel does not mean errorless counsel, but rather counsel whose assistance is '[w]ithin the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases." Jackson v. Warden, 91 Nev. 430, 432, 537 P.2d 473, 474 (1975).

Counsel cannot be ineffective for failing to make futile objections or arguments. <u>See Ennis v. State</u>, 122 Nev. 694, 137 P.3d 1095 (2006). Trial counsel has the "immediate and ultimate responsibility of deciding if and when to object, which witnesses, if any, to call, and what defenses to develop. <u>Rhyne v. State</u>, 118 Nev. 1, 8, 38 P.3d 163, 167 (2002).

Based on the above law, the role of a court in considering allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel is "not to pass upon the merits of the action not taken but to determine whether, under the particular facts and circumstances of the case, trial counsel failed to render reasonably effective assistance." Donovan v. State, 94 Nev. 671, 675, 584 P.2d 708, 711 (1978). This analysis means the court should neither "second guess reasoned choices between trial tactics nor does it mean that defense counsel, to protect himself against allegations of inadequacy, must make every conceivable motion no matter how remote the possibilities are of success." Id. To be effective, the constitution "does not require that counsel do what is impossible or unethical. If there is no bona fide defense to the charge, counsel cannot create one and may disserve the interests of his client by attempting a useless charade." U.S. v. Cronic, 466 US 648, 657 n.19, 104 S. Ct. 2039, 2046 n.19 (1984).

"There are countless ways to provide effective assistance in any given case. Even the best criminal defense attorneys would not defend a particular client in the same way." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S. Ct. at 689. "Strategic choices made by counsel after thoroughly investigating the plausible options are almost unchallengeable." Dawson v. State, 108 Nev. 112, 117, 825 P.2d 593, 596 (1992); see also Ford v. State, 105 Nev. 850, 853, 784 P.2d 951, 953 (1989). In essence, the court must "judge the reasonableness of counsel's challenged conduct on the facts of the particular case, viewed as of the time of counsel's conduct." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, 104 S. Ct. at 2066.

Even if a defendant can demonstrate that his counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, he must still demonstrate prejudice and show a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the result of the trial would have been different. McNelton v. State, 115 Nev. 396, 403, 990 P.2d 1263, 1268 (1999) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at 2064). "A reasonable probability is a probability

3

4 5

6

8

9

10

11 12

13

14 15

16

17

18

19

21

20

22

23 24

25 26

27

28

sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." McNelton, 115 Nev. at 403, 990 P.2d at 1268 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-89 & 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2064-65 & 2068).

There is a strong presumption that appellate counsel's performance was reasonable and fell within "the wide range of reasonable professional assistance." See United States v. Aguirre, 912 F.2d 555, 560 (2nd Cir. 1990); citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S. Ct. at 2065. The federal courts have held that a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel must satisfy the two-prong test set forth by Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-688, 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2065, 2068; Williams v. Collins, 16 F.3d 626, 635 (5th Cir. 1994); Hollenback v. United States, 987 F.2d 1272, 1275 (7th Cir. 1993); Heath v. Jones, 941 F.2d 1126, 1130 (11th Cir. 1991). In order to satisfy Strickland's second prong, the defendant must show that the omitted issue would have had a reasonable probability of success on appeal. See Duhamel v. Collins, 955 F.2d 962, 967 (5th Cir. 1992); Heath, 941 F.2d at 1132.

This Court has held that all appeals must be "pursued in a manner meeting high standards of diligence, professionalism and competence." Burke v. State, 110 Nev. 1366, 1368, 887 P.2d 267, 268 (1994). In Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751, 103 S. Ct. 3308, 3312 (1983), the Supreme Court recognized that part of professional diligence and competence involves "winnowing out weaker arguments on appeal and focusing on one central issue if possible, or at most on a few key issues." Id. at 751 -752, at 3313. In particular, a "brief that raises every colorable issue runs the risk of burying good arguments. . . in a verbal mound made up of strong and weak contentions." Id. at 753, at 3313. The Court also held that, "for judges to second-guess reasonable professional judgments and impose on appointed counsel a duty to raise every 'colorable' claim suggested by a client would disserve the very goal of vigorous and effective advocacy." <u>Id.</u> at 754, at 3314.

Here, Defendant first claims that his counsel was ineffective for not properly investigating his case. However, a defendant who contends that his attorney was ineffective because he did not adequately investigate must show how a better investigation would have rendered a more favorable outcome probable. Molina v. State, 120 Nev. 185, 87 P.3d 533 (2004). In his petition, Defendant merely claims his counsel did not investigate his case

without giving any factual basis for that claim whatsoever. Defendant does not even allege what a better investigation would have revealed, let alone how any possible additional information would have made a more favorable outcome probable. As such, Defendant fails to meet his burden per Molina and he is not entitled to relief.

Defendant also claims that his counsel was ineffective because he only visited him a few times. However, a defendant is not entitled to a particular "relationship" with his attorney. Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 103 S. Ct. 1610 (1983). There is no requirement for any specific amount of communication as long as counsel is reasonably effective in his representation. Id. First, Defendant does not offer any factual allegations for his claim. Second, even if true, Defendant is not entitled to relief per Morris v. Slappy.

Further, neither of these claims entitle Defendant to relief, as they are bare allegations which are insufficient. Hargrove v. State, 100 Nev. 498, 502-03, 686 P.2d 222, 225 (1984) (holding that bare or naked allegations are insufficient to entitle a defendant to post-conviction relief). Defendant's bare allegations also fail to show either one of the Strickland requirements and has therefore entirely failed to meet his burden of proof. Accordingly, these claims of ineffective assistance of counsel should be denied.

II. DEFENDANT'S PLEA OF GUILTY WAS FREELY, KNOWINGLY AND VOLUNTARILY GIVEN.

Also in ground one of Defendant's Petition, Defendant claims that he was coerced into pleading guilty by his attorney. Further, in ground three, Defendant claims he was incompetent during the negotiations and did not understand what was happening. However, Defendant's arguments that he did not enter into his guilty plea knowingly, freely and voluntarily are belied by the record.

A plea of guilty is presumptively valid, particularly where it is entered into on the advice of counsel. <u>Jezierski v. State</u>, 107 Nev. 395, 812 P.2d 355 (1991). The Defendant has the burden of proving that the plea was not entered knowingly or voluntarily. <u>Bryant v. State</u>, 102 Nev. 268, 721 P.2d 364 (1986); <u>Wynn v. State</u>, 96 Nev. 673, 615 P.2d 946 (1980); <u>Housewright v. Powell</u>, 101 Nev. 147, 710 P.2d 73 (1985). In determining whether the

guilty plea is knowingly and voluntarily entered, the Court is required to review the totality of the circumstances surrounding the Defendant's plea. <u>Id</u>, In <u>Bryant</u>, the Nevada Supreme Court made it very clear that in reviewing the sufficiency of plea canvasses, the Court is permitted to review the "totality of the facts and circumstances of a Defendant's case." In so doing, the reviewing Court may look at matters which extend beyond the formal entry of the plea. <u>Id</u>.

This standard requires the court to personally address the defendant at the time he enters his plea in order to determine whether he understands the nature of the charges to which he is pleading. Bryant, 102 Nev. at 271, 721 P.2d at 367. A court may not rely simply on a written plea agreement without some verbal interaction with a defendant. Id. Thus, a "colloquy" is constitutionally mandated, and a "colloquy" is but a conversation in a formal setting, such as that occurring between an official sitting in judgment of an accused at plea. See id. However, the court also need not conduct a ritualistic oral canvass. State v. Freese, 116 Nev. 1097, 13 P.3d 442 (2000). The guidelines for voluntariness of pleas of guilty "do not require the articulation of talismanic phrases. It required only 'that the record affirmatively disclose that a defendant who pleaded guilty entered his plea understandingly and voluntarily." Heffley v. Warden, 89 Nev. 573, 575, 516 P.2d 1403, 1404 (1973); Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 747-748, 90 S. Ct. 1463, 1470 (1970).

On September 23, 2008, Defendant entered into a guilty plea agreement which was filed in open court. This Agreement, signed by Defendant, specifically reads in pertinent part as follows:

CONSEQUENCES OF PLEA

I understand that by pleading guilty *I admit the facts* which support all the elements of the offense(s) to which I now plead as set forth in Exhibit "1".

I understand that as a consequence of my plea of guilty as to

Count 1 - the Court must sentence me to LIFE with the possibility of parole with parole eligibility beginning at ten (10) years with and equal and consecutive term of LIFE with the possibility of parole with parole eligibility beginning at ten (10) years for the use of a deadly weapon; as to

1	Count 2 - the Court must sentence me to LIFE with the possibility of parole with parole eligibility beginning at ten (10)
2	years; as to
3 4	Count 3 - the Court must sentence me to LIFE with the possibility of parole with parole eligibility beginning at five (5) years; as to
5	Count 4 - the Court must sentence me to LIFE with the
6	possibility of parole with parole eligibility beginning at twenty (20) years; as to
7	Count 5 - the Court must sentence me to LIFE with the
8	possibility of parole with parole eligibility beginning at ten (10) years; as to
9	Count 6 - the Court must sentence me to LIFE with the possibility of parole with parole eligibility beginning at five (5)
10	years
11	I have not been promised or guaranteed any particular sentence
12	by anyone. I know that my sentence is to be determined by the Court within the limits prescribed by statute.
13	GPA, filed 9-23-08, p. 2-3.
14	Further, in his Guilty Plea Agreement Defendant stipulated to the voluntariness of his
15	plea. As his Agreement further reads:
16	<u>VOLUNTARINESS OF PLEA</u>
17	I have discussed the elements of all of the original charge(s) against me with my attorney and I understand the nature of the
18	charge(s) against me
19	All of the foregoing elements, consequences, rights, and waiver of rights have been thoroughly explained to me by my attorney.
20	I believe that pleading guilty and accepting this plea bargain is
21	in my best interest, and that a trial would be contrary to my best interest.
22	I am signing this agreement voluntarily, after consultation with
2324	my attorney, and I am not acting under duress or coercion or by virtue of any promises of leniency, except for those set forth in this agreement
25	My attorney has answered all my questions regarding this guilty
26	plea agreement and its consequences to my satisfaction and I am satisfied with the services provided by my attorney.
27	[Emphasis Added] GPA, filed 9-23-08, p. 5.

1	When Defendant signed the GPA, he agreed that he accepted the language, including the
2	statements quoted above. Essentially, Defendant is asking this Court is disregard the legal
3	agreement he made as well as the assertions he previously made to the court. Further,
4	Defendant not only signed the GPA and agreed with its contents, he also swore under oath
5	that he was guilty of Sexual Assault with Use of a Deadly Weapon, Sexual Assault, First
6	Degree Kidnapping, and Sexual Assault With a Minor Under Sixteen Years of Age on
7	September 23, 2008. The court's canvass of Defendant included the following:
8	THE COURT: Mr. Trost, the Court is in possession of a written guilty plea signed by you. Before I can accept your guilty plea, I must be satisfied that your plea is freely and voluntarily given. Are you making this plea freely and voluntarily?
10	Are you making this plea freely and voluntarily?
11	THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am.
12	THE COURT: Other than what's contained in the written plea of guilty and what has been stated here this morning in open
13	court by your attorney Mr. Maningo as well as the Deputy District Attorney Mr. O'Brien, have any promises or threats been made to induce you to enter your plea?
14	THE DEFENDANT: No.
15	THE COURT: All right. Before you singed the written plea of
16	guilty, did you read it?
17	THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am
18	THE COURT: Did you understand everything contained in the written plea of guilty?
19	THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am.
2021	THE COURT: Okay. And you understand that you are stipulating essentially to 35 to life and 35 to life?
22	THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am.
23	THE COURT: Okay. And the State will probably argue that
24	that be imposed consecutively, which would be 70 to life. Do you understand that?
25	THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am.
26	THE COURT: And Mr. Maningo, I'm sure, will argue that
27	that be imposed concurrently which would be 35 to life, two sentences running concurrently?
28	THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am.

1 THE COURT: And that will be up to the Court as to whether to impose those sentences concurrently or consecutively. Do you 2 understand that? 3 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am. 4 THE COURT: Okay. Now, before -- you said you read the guilty plea agreement; is that right? 5 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am. 6 THE COURT: Okay. Now, did you understand everything contained in the guilty plea agreement as well as in the information? 8 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am. 9 THE COURT: Did you have a full opportunity to discuss your plea of guilty as well as the charges to which you are pleading 10 guilty with your attorney Mr. Maningo? 11 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am. 12 THE COURT: Okay, Before the Court accepts your plea of guilty, is there anything you would like to ask me about your 13 pleas or about the charge to which you are pleading guilty --14 charges, excuse me? 15 THE DEFENDANT: No, ma'am. Arraignment Transcript (AT), 9-23-08, p. 4-5 (emphasis added). 16 Clearly, the record belies Defendant's current claims that he did not understand the 17 proceedings and that he was coerced. In fact, the Court then asked Defendant what he did to 18 19 cause him to plead guilty as to each of the six counts. AT, p. 5-9. During this colloquy, 20 Defendant was not just an inactive participant, answering yes and no. He made admissions 21 in his own words, such as: "I sexually assaulted a prostitute, and I had a knife;" "I sexually 22 assaulted two girls in the parking lot of the Desert Springs Hospital;" and "I inappropriate 23 touched a girl that was under the age of 16, sexual." AT, p. 5:24, 6:15-16, 8:25-9:1. Further, 24 Defendant had the presence of mind to dispute whether he actually had a deadly weapon 25 during one of his attacks as follows: 26 THE COURT: And did you sexually assault her by placing your penis in her mouth? 27 28 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am.

1 2	THE COURT: And that was done against her will and without her consent; is that right?
3	THE DEFENDANT: Yes, it was.
4	
5	THE COURT: All right. And in order to accomplish that, did you well, how did you accomplish that?
6	THE DEFENDANT: Well, I do want to bring this to the
7	attention that it wasn't a deadly weapon.
8	
9	THE COURT: Well, this one you're not pleading to a deadly weapon with respect to Ms. Amberly Curfman.
	weapon with respect to wis. Amoeny Curinian.
10	THE DEFENDANT: Okay.
11	THE COURT Did acetacia hear? Did commula acetacia
12	THE COURT: Did you restrain her? Did you carry her away from someplace? Did you keep her
13	
14	THE DEFENDANT: Oh, yeah, they were in a car.
	THE COURT: All right. And did you make them go to another
15	location, or what did you do?
16	THE DECEMBANT. They were cetting into their can and Livet
17	THE DEFENDANT: They were getting into their car, and I just got into their car.
18	
19	THE COURT: Okay. And you forced them to remain in the
	vehicle; is that right?
20	THE DEFENDANT: Correct.
21	AT, p. 6-7 (emphasis added).
22	
23	Defendant's plea canvass distinctly shows that Defendant understood the specific
24	negotiations in his case and that he felt free to dispute anything with which he disagreed.
25	Yet, he chose to plead guilty on only six of the sixteen counts with which he was charged in
26	the Amended Criminal Complaint. As such, his claims of lack of voluntariness and
27	understanding are completely without merit, as they are belied by the record. Accordingly,
28	Defendant is not entitled to relief and his petition should be denied.

′

III. ALL OTHER CLAIMS IN DEFENDANT'S PETITION ARE NOT COGNIZABLE AND MUST BE DISMISSED.

The remaining grounds in Defendant's Petition – Ground Two: Prior Bad Acts, Ground Four: Double Jeopardy, Ground Five: Self-Incrimination/Miranda Rights, Ground Six: Prosecutorial Misconduct, Ground Seven: Right to Counsel, Ground Eight: Brady Violation, Ground Ten: Enhanced Sentencing, Ground Eleven: Incomplete Record – are inappropriate for a post-conviction petition for relief. Thus, they must be dismissed.

NRS 34.810(1)(a) states:

- 1. The court shall dismiss a petition if the court determines that:
- (a) The petitioner's conviction was upon a plea of guilty or guilty but mentally ill and the petition is not based upon an allegation that the plea was involuntarily or unknowingly entered or that the plea was entered without effective assistance of counsel

Moreover, it is well established that once a defendant pleads guilty, he waives all defects that occurred before the plea, including constitutional errors. Webb v. State, 91 Nev. 469, 470, 538 P.2d 164, 165 (1975) (quoting Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267, 93 S. Ct. 1602, 1608 (1973)); Kirksey v. State, 112 Nev. 980, at 999, 923 P.2d 1102, 1114 (1996) (citing Warden, Nevada State Prison v. State, 100 Nev. 430, 432, 683 P.2d 504, 505 (1984)).

Here, Defendant's claims in these grounds are not only barred by NRS 34.810(1)(a), but they are also rendered moot as Defendant waived any defect in the evidence. Further, as Defendant waived any defect in the proceedings, even if his claims were not belied by the record, which they are, Defendant is not entitled to relief. Accordingly, these claims must be dismissed.

IV. DEFENDANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO COURT APPOINTED COUNSEL.

There is no federal constitutional right under the Sixth Amendment and no state constitutional right to counsel in post-conviction relief proceedings. <u>Coleman v. Thompson</u>, 501 U.S. 722, 725, 111 S. Ct. 2546, 2552 (1991); <u>McKague v. Warden</u>, 112 Nev. 159, 163, 912 P.2d 255, 257-258 (1996). However, a district court judge has the discretion to appoint counsel under the following conditions pursuant to NRS 34.750:

A petition may allege that the petitioner is unable to pay the costs of the proceedings or to employ counsel. If the court is satisfied that the allegation of indigency is true and the petition is not dismissed summarily, the court may appoint counsel at the time the court orders the filing of an answer and a return. In making its determination, the court may consider whether:

- (a) the issues are difficult;
- (b) the petitioner is unable to comprehend the proceedings; or
- (c) counsel is necessary to proceed with discovery.

NRS 34.750 (1999).

Furthermore, to be entitled to counsel, a defendant "must show that the requested review is not frivolous before he may have an attorney appointed." <u>Peterson v. Warden, Nevada State Prison</u>, 87 Nev. 134, 483 P.2d 204 (1971) (citing former statute NRS 177.345(2)).

Here, Defendant has pled guilty and has been sentenced, so he is not entitled to post-conviction counsel under <u>Coleman</u> or <u>McKague</u>. Further, Defendant has failed to make the threshold showing, per NRS 34.750. In fact, none of those requirements are met in this case: Defendant has not raised any complex issues; Defendant has given no indication that he is unable to comprehend the proceedings, instead simply states he has limited knowledge of the law; and there is no discovery required in any of the issues he has raised thus far. In addition, Defendant has not met his burden of showing that his requested review is not frivolous as required by <u>Peterson</u>. In fact, Defendant's motion provides no information specific to the issues Defendant has raised or plans to raise. Accordingly, Defendant's motion should be denied.

V. DEFENDANT IS ONLY ENTITLED TO A VERY LIMITED EVIDENTIARY HEARING.

A defendant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing when his petition is supported by specific factual allegations, which, if true, would entitle him to relief, unless the factual allegations are belied by the record. Marshall v. State, 110 Nev. 1328, 1331, 885 P.2d 603, 605 (1994). "The judge or justice, upon review of the return, answer, and all supporting

documents which are filed, shall determine whether an evidentiary hearing is required." NRS 34.770(1). However, "[a] defendant seeking post-conviction relief is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing on factual allegations belied or repelled by the record." <u>Hargrove v.</u> State, 100 Nev. 498, 503, 686 P.2d 222, 225 (1984).

Here, given the unique facts of this case, Defendant is entitled to a very limited evidentiary hearing to resolve a single issue. Specifically, Defendant is entitled to a hearing to resolve his claim the counsel was seeking post-conviction relief on his behalf; specifically, in Ground One that counsel told Defendant that he would file post-conviction motions for him and in Ground Two that counsel told Defendant he would file a direct appeal. As Defendant's Petition can be resolved without expanding the record as to every other issue, he is not entitled to a hearing on those claims, per Marshall. As such, Defendant's request for an evidentiary hearing should be denied as to all of his grounds, except for the depreviation of an appeal or other post-conviction motion for relief.

CONCLUSION

Based on the aforementioned argument, the State respectfully requests that this court grant a very limited evidentiary hearing to resolve the single issue of whether former counsel told Defendant that he would file a direct appeal or other post-conviction motions for relief on his behalf. The State further respectfully requests this Court DENY Defendant's Motion for Appointment of Counsel and Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Post-Conviction) as to all the other grounds.

DATED this 11th day of January, 2010.

Respectfully submitted,

DAVID ROGER Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #002781

BY /s/ W. JAKE MERBACK
W. JAKE MERBACK
Deputy District Attorney
Nevada Bar #009126

C:\Prdgfam Files\Neevia.Com\Document Converter\temp\702923-787130.DOC

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING I hereby certify that service of the above and foregoing, was made this 11th day of January, 2010, by depositing a copy in the U.S. Mail, postage pre-paid, addressed to: ROY TROST, BAC#1027585 HIGH DESERT STATE PRISON P.O. BOX 650 INDIAN SPRINGS, NV 89018 /s/ HOWARD CONRAD Secretary for the District Attorney's Office hjc/SVU

1		
1	OPI ORIGINA	
2		G 6
3	Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #002781 H. LEON SIMON	Jan 25 17 02 44
4	Chief Deputy District Attorney Nevada Bar #000411	21 10 OI AM 10
5	∥ 200 Lewis Avenue	JAN 25 10 01 AM 10 CLERK OF THE COURT
6	Las Vegas, Nevada, 89155-2211 (702) 671-2500 Attorney for Plaintiff	HE COURT
7		
8		T COURT
9	CLARK COU	NTY, NEVADA
10	THE STATE OF NEVADA,)
11	Plaintiff,	Case No. C247731
12	-vs-	Dept No. XXI
13	ROY JAMES TROST,	
14	#2679137	
15	Defendant.	
16	/	
17	ORDER FOR PROD	UCTION OF INMATE
18	ROY JAMES TRO	OST, BAC # 1027585
19	DATE OF HEARIN	G: MARCH 2, 2010
20	TIME OF HEAR	RING: 10:30 A.M.
21	TO: DWIGHT NEVEN, WARDEN	N, HIGH DESERT STATE PRISON
22	TO: DOUGLAS C. GILLESPIE, S	heriff of Clark County, Nevada
23	Upon the ex parte application of THE	STATE OF NEVADA, Plaintiff, by DAVID
24	ROGER, District Attorney, through H. LEON	SIMON, Chief Deputy District Attorney, and
25	good cause appearing therefor,	
26	//	
27	" RECEIVED REC	CEIVED
28	H //	^ <u>~</u>
	CLERK OF THE GOURT	IKE COURT
	Chause and a second	P;\WPDOCS\ORDR\FORDR\810\81069106.doc

01-22-17477:06 RCVD

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that DWIGHT NEVEN, WARDEN of HIGH DESERT STATE PRISON shall be, and is, hereby directed to produce ROY JAMES TROST, Defendant in Case No. C247731, on a charge of SEXUAL ASSAULT WITH USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON, SEXUAL ASSAULT, FIRST DEGREE KIDNAPPING and SEXUAL ASSAUL WITH A MINOR UNDER SIXTEEN YEARS OF AGE wherein THE STATE OF NEVADA is the Plaintiff, inasmuch as the said Defendant is currently incarcerated in the HIGH DESERT STATE PRISON located in Indian Springs, Nevada, and his presence will be required in Las Vegas, Nevada, commencing on MARCH 2, 2010, at the hour of 10:30 o'clock a.m. and continuing until completion of the prosecution's case against the said Defendant.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that DOUGLAS C. GILLESPIE, Sheriff of Clark County, Nevada, shall accept and retain custody of the said Defendant in the Clark County Detention Center, Las Vegas, Nevada, pending completion of said matter in Clark County, or until the further Order of this Court; or in the alternative shall make all arrangements for the transportation of the said Defendant to and from the Nevada Department of Corrections facility which are necessary to insure the Defendant's appearance in Clark County pending completion of said matter, or until further Order of this Court.

DATED this 20 day of January, 2010.

outy District Attorney

DISTRICY JUDGE

DAVID ROGER

Clark County District Attorney

Nevada Bar #002781

hjc/SVU

Electronically Filed 01/29/2010 03:50:56 PM

1	NOH		Alm & Louin
2	DAVID ROGER Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #002781		CLERK OF THE COURT
3	H. LEON SIMON		
4	Chief Deputy District Attorney Nevada Bar #000411		
5	200 Lewis Avenue Las Vegas, Nevada 89155-2212		
6	(702) 671-2500 Attorney for Plaintiff		
7			
8		CT COURT	
9	CLARK COU	NTY, NEVADA	
10	THE STATE OF NEVADA,)	
11	Plaintiff,) Case No.	C247731
12	-VS-	Dept No.	XXI
13	ROY JAMES TROST, #2679137)))	
14 15	Defendant.))	
16)	
17	NOTICE OF EVIDI	ENTIARY HEAR	<u>ING</u>
18	TO: ROY JAMES TROST, BAC	#1027585.	
19	YOU AND EACH OF YOU ARE	HEREBY NOT	IFIED that an Evidentiary
20	Hearing for the above entitled matter will be	e heard in Distric	t Court, Department XXI,
21	Clark County, 200 Lewis Avenue, Las Vegas,	, NV 89155 on the	2ND day of MARCH, 2010
22	at 10:30 A.M. or as soon thereafter as counse	l may be heard.	
23	DATED this 29th day of January, 2010.		
24		DAVID ROGER	
25		Clark County Di Nevada Bar#002	strict Attorney 2781
26	DX		4ON
27	BY	H. LEON SIMO	N
28		Chief Deputy Di Nevada Bar #000	strict Attorney 0411

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING I hereby certify that service of the above and foregoing, was made this 29th day of January, 2010, by depositing a copy in the U.S. Mail, postage pre-paid, addressed to: ROY JAMES TROST, BAC#1027585 HIGH DESERT STATE PRISON P.O. BOX 650 **INDIAN SPRINGS, NV 89070** BY /s/ HOWARD CONRAD Secretary, District Attorney's Office hjc/SVU

C247731

XXI

ORIGINAL **ORDR** 1 DAVID ROGER 2 Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #002781 Har 25 9 25 AM 10 3 JAMES R. SWEETIN Chief Deputy District Attorney 4 Nevada Bar #005144 200 Lewis Avenue Las Vegas, Nevada 89155-2212 (702) 671-2500 5 6 Attorney for Plaintiff 7 DISTRICT COURT 8 **CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA** 9 10 THE STATE OF NEVADA, 11 CASE NO: Plaintiff, 12 **DEPT NO:** -VS-13 ROY TROST, #2679137 14 Defendant. 15 16 FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF 17 LAW AND ORDER 18 DATE OF HEARING: MARCH 2, 2010 19 TIME OF HEARING: 10:30 A.M. THIS CAUSE having come on for hearing before the Honorable VALERIE ADAIR, 20 District Judge, on the second day of March, 2010, the Petitioner being present, Proceeding 21 IN FORMA PAUPERIS, the Respondent being represented by DAVID ROGER, District 22 23 Attorney, by and through FELICIA QUINLAN, Deputized Law Clerk, and the Court having

RECEIVED

24

25

26

27

28

//

//

//

MAR 2 5 2010

CLERK OF THE COURT

03-22-10A03:42 RCND

considered the matter, including briefs, transcripts, oral arguments, and documents on file

herein, now therefore, the Court makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law:

P:\WPDOCS\FOF\810\81069101,doc

FINDINGS OF FACT

- On May 22, 2008, Roy J. Trost (Defendant) was charged by way of Criminal Complaint with: Count 1 Sexual Assault With a Minor Under Sixteen Years of Age, Count 2 Burglary With Use of a Deadly Weapon, Counts 3 and 4 Coercion With Use of a Deadly Weapon, Counts 5 and 6 First Degree Kidnapping With Use of a Deadly Weapon, Counts 7 and 8 Sexual Assault With Use of a Deadly Weapon, Count 9 Sexual Assault, Counts 10 and 11 Open and Gross Lewdness, and Counts 12 and 13 Robbery With Use of a Deadly Weapon.
- 2. On July 31, 2008, the State filed an Amended Criminal Complaint, charging Defendant with Count 1 Sexual Assault With Use of a Deadly Weapon, Count 2 Sexual Assault With Use of a Deadly Weapon, Count 3 Battery With Use of a Deadly Weapon With Intent to Commit Sexual Assault With Substantial Bodily Harm, Count 4 Sexual Assault With a Minor Under Sixteen Years of Age, Count 5 Burglary With Use of a Deadly Weapon, Count 6 Coercion With Use of a Deadly Weapon, Count 7 Coercion With Use of a Deadly Weapon, Count 8 First Degree Kidnapping With Use of a Deadly Weapon, Count 9 First Degree Kidnapping With Use of a Deadly Weapon, Count 10 Sexual Assault With a Deadly Weapon, Count 11 Sexual Assault With a Deadly Weapon, Count 12 Sexual Assault With a Deadly Weapon, Count 13 Open and Gross Lewdness With Use of a Deadly Weapon, Count 15 Robbery With Use of a Deadly Weapon, and Count 16 Robbery With Use of a Deadly Weapon.
- 3. On September 11, 2008, the State charged Defendant by way of Information with Count 1 Sexual Assault With Use of a Deadly Weapon, Count 2 Sexual Assault, Count 3 First Degree Kidnapping, Count 4 Sexual Assault With a Minor Under Sixteen Years of Age, Count 5 Sexual Assault, and Count 6 First Degree Kidnapping.

| //

//

//

4. On September 23, 2008, pursuant to negotiations, Defendant pled guilty to the charges as contained in the Information filed September 11, 2008. The Guilty Plea Agreement (GPA), in which both parties stipulated that Counts 1-3 will run consecutively to each other and Counts 4-6 will run consecutively to each other but both parties retain the right to argue whether the two sets of counts would run concurrently or consecutively, was filed in open court the same day.

- 5. On November 17, 2008, Defendant was sentenced as to Count 1 Life with the possibility of parole after one hundred twenty (120) months, plus an equal and consecutive term of Life with the possibility of parole after one hundred twenty (120) months; as to Count 2 Life with the possibility of parole after one hundred twenty (120) months, Count 2 to run consecutive to Count 1; as to Count 3 Life with the possibility of parole after sixty (60) months, Count 3 to run consecutive to Count 2; as to Count 4 Life with the possibility of parole after three hundred (300) months, Count 4 to run consecutive to Count 3; as to Count 5 Life with the possibility of parole after one hundred twenty (120) months, Count 5 to run consecutive to Count 4; as to Count 6 Life with the possibility of parole after sixty (60) months, Count 6 to run consecutive to Count 5. Defendant was further ordered to a special sentence of lifetime supervision and register as a sex offender upon any release from custody. Defendant was also given one hundred sixty-three (163) days credit for time served. The Judgment of Conviction was filed on November 25, 2008.
- 6. On December 9, 2008, at the State's request, the Court modified Defendant's sentence as to Count 4, making the sentence Life with the possibility of parole after two hundred forty (240) months, instead of three hundred (300) months.
- 7. On November 10, 2009, Defendant filed the instant Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Post-conviction), motion for appointment of counsel, and request for evidentiary hearing. The State filed its response on January 11, 2010.

- 8. On March 2, 2010, the district court held a limited evidentiary hearing to resolve the issue of whether Defendant's counsel promised to file an appeal on his behalf. Defendant's former counsel, Jeffrey Maningo, Esq., testified that he did not recall telling Defendant he would file an appeal, either immediately after sentencing or any other time. Mr. Maningo further testified that he would have pursued an appeal by seeking the advice of the Public Defender's appellate division supervisor in an effort to find appealable issues if he could not find any on his own. He would have noted the file regarding Defendant asking for an appeal and any follow-up work he would have done to pursue an appeal, but there are no such notes in Defendant's file. Mr. Maningo testified that he felt very badly for Defendant because he thought, based on the mitigating evidence he presented to the court, Defendant would not have gotten such a harsh sentence; however, there was no basis for an appeal in Defendant's case.
- 9. Mark LaPerna also testified at the evidentiary hearing on March 2, 2010, as he was Defendant's friend and roommate at the time of the commission of the crimes and Defendant's arrest. He testified that he knew Defendant wanted an appeal and that he tried to contact Mr. Maningo by calling four times. However, these four phone calls occurred before Defendant was sentenced, not during the time Mr. LaPerna and Defendant discussed his desire to appeal. Mr. LaPerna testified that he did not attempt to contact Mr. Maningo after discovering Defendant wanted an appeal.
- 10. Defendants claims in grounds two prior bad acts, four double jeopardy, five Self-Incrimination/Miranda Rights, six Prosecutorial Misconduct, seven Right to Counsel, eight Brady Violation, ten Enhanced Sentencing, and eleven Incomplete Record, do not entitle him to relief as they are not cognizable claims.
- 11. Defendant received effective assistance of counsel.
- 12. Defendant entered his guilty plea freely, knowingly, and voluntarily.
- 13. Defendant has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that he was deprived of his right to an appeal.
- 14. Defendant is not entitled to court appointed post-conviction counsel.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

- 1. To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel a defendant must prove he was denied "reasonably effective assistance" of counsel by satisfying the two-prong test of Strickland. 466 U.S. at 686-87, 104 S. Ct. at 2063-64; see also State v. Love, 109 Nev. 1136, 1138, 865 P.2d 322, 323 (1993). Under the Strickland test, a defendant must show first that his counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and second, that but for counsel's errors, there is a reasonable probability that the result of the proceedings would have been different. 466 U.S. at 687-88, 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2065, 2068; Warden, Nevada State Prison v. Lyons, 100 Nev. 430, 432, 683 P.2d 504, 505 (1984) (adopting the Strickland two-part test). "[T]here is no reason for a court deciding an ineffective assistance claim to approach the inquiry in the same order or even to address both components of the inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on one." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697, 104 S. Ct. at 2069.
- 2. The court begins with the presumption of effectiveness and then must determine whether the defendant has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that counsel was ineffective. Means v. State, 120 Nev. 1001, 103 P.3d 35 (2004). "Effective counsel does not mean errorless counsel, but rather counsel whose assistance is '[w]ithin the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases." Jackson v. Warden, 91 Nev. 430, 432, 537 P.2d 473, 474 (1975).
- 3. Counsel cannot be ineffective for failing to make futile objections or arguments. <u>See Ennis v. State</u>, 122 Nev. 694, 137 P.3d 1095 (2006). Trial counsel has the "immediate and ultimate responsibility of deciding if and when to object, which witnesses, if any, to call, and what defenses to develop. <u>Rhyne v. State</u>, 118 Nev. 1, 8, 38 P.3d 163, 167 (2002).
- 4. Based on the above law, the role of a court in considering allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel is "not to pass upon the merits of the action not taken but to determine whether, under the particular facts and circumstances of the case, trial

counsel failed to render reasonably effective assistance." <u>Donovan v. State</u>, 94 Nev. 671, 675, 584 P.2d 708, 711 (1978). This analysis means the court should neither "second guess reasoned choices between trial tactics nor does it mean that defense counsel, to protect himself against allegations of inadequacy, must make every conceivable motion no matter how remote the possibilities are of success." <u>Id</u>. To be effective, the constitution "does not require that counsel do what is impossible or unethical. If there is no bona fide defense to the charge, counsel cannot create one and may disserve the interests of his client by attempting a useless charade." <u>U.S. v. Cronic</u>, 466 US 648, 657 n.19, 104 S. Ct. 2039, 2046 n.19 (1984).

- 5. "There are countless ways to provide effective assistance in any given case. Even the best criminal defense attorneys would not defend a particular client in the same way." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S. Ct. at 689. "Strategic choices made by counsel after thoroughly investigating the plausible options are almost unchallengeable." Dawson v. State, 108 Nev. 112, 117, 825 P.2d 593, 596 (1992); see also Ford v. State, 105 Nev. 850, 853, 784 P.2d 951, 953 (1989). In essence, the court must "judge the reasonableness of counsel's challenged conduct on the facts of the particular case, viewed as of the time of counsel's conduct." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, 104 S. Ct. at 2066.
- 6. Even if a defendant can demonstrate that his counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, he must still demonstrate prejudice and show a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the result of the trial would have been different. McNelton v. State, 115 Nev. 396, 403, 990 P.2d 1263, 1268 (1999) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at 2064). "A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." McNelton, 115 Nev. at 403, 990 P.2d at 1268 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-89 & 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2064-65 & 2068).

//

//

7.	There is a strong presumption that appellate counsel's performance was reasonable
	and fell within "the wide range of reasonable professional assistance." See United
	States v. Aguirre, 912 F.2d 555, 560 (2nd Cir. 1990); citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at
	689, 104 S. Ct. at 2065. The federal courts have held that a claim of ineffective
	assistance of appellate counsel must satisfy the two-prong test set forth by Strickland,
	466 U.S. at 687-688, 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2065, 2068; Williams v. Collins, 16 F.3d 626,
	635 (5th Cir. 1994); Hollenback v. United States, 987 F.2d 1272, 1275 (7th Cir.
	1993); Heath v. Jones, 941 F.2d 1126, 1130 (11th Cir. 1991). In order to satisfy
	Strickland's second prong, the defendant must show that the omitted issue would
	have had a reasonable probability of success on appeal. See Duhamel v. Collins, 955
	F.2d 962, 967 (5th Cir. 1992); Heath, 941 F.2d at 1132.

- 8. A post-conviction petition for writ of habeas corpus must contain specific factual allegations which, if true, would entitle a defendant to relief; therefore, bare or naked allegations are insufficient to entitle a defendant to post-conviction relief. Hargrove v. State, 100 Nev. 498, 502-03, 686 P.2d 222, 225 (1984).
- 9. A defendant who contends that his attorney was ineffective because he did not adequately investigate must show how a better investigation would have rendered a more favorable outcome probable. Molina v. State, 120 Nev. 185, 87 P.3d 533 (2004).
- 10. A defendant is not entitled to a particular "relationship" with his attorney. Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 103 S. Ct. 1610 (1983).
- 11. A plea of guilty is presumptively valid, particularly where it is entered into on the advice of counsel. <u>Jezierski v. State</u>, 107 Nev. 395, 812 P.2d 355 (1991). The Defendant has the burden of proving that the plea was not entered knowingly or voluntarily. <u>Bryant v. State</u>, 102 Nev. 268, 721 P.2d 364 (1986); <u>Wynn v. State</u>, 96 Nev. 673, 615 P.2d 946 (1980); <u>Housewright v. Powell</u>, 101 Nev. 147, 710 P.2d 73 (1985).

- 12. In determining whether the guilty plea is knowingly and voluntarily entered, the Court is required to review the totality of the circumstances surrounding the Defendant's plea. <u>Id.</u> In <u>Bryant</u>, the Nevada Supreme Court made it very clear that in reviewing the sufficiency of plea canvasses, the Court is permitted to review the "totality of the facts and circumstances of a Defendant's case." In so doing, the reviewing Court may look at matters which extend beyond the formal entry of the plea. <u>Id.</u>
- 13. This standard requires the court to personally address the defendant at the time he enters his plea in order to determine whether he understands the nature of the charges to which he is pleading. Bryant, 102 Nev. at 271, 721 P.2d at 367. A court may not rely simply on a written plea agreement without some verbal interaction with a defendant. Id. Thus, a "colloquy" is constitutionally mandated, and a "colloquy" is but a conversation in a formal setting, such as that occurring between an official sitting in judgment of an accused at plea. See id.
- 14. However, the court also need not conduct a ritualistic oral canvass. <u>State v. Freese</u>, 116 Nev. 1097, 13 P.3d 442 (2000). The guidelines for voluntariness of pleas of guilty "do not require the articulation of talismanic phrases. It required only 'that the record affirmatively disclose that a defendant who pleaded guilty entered his plea understandingly and voluntarily." <u>Heffley v. Warden</u>, 89 Nev. 573, 575, 516 P.2d 1403, 1404 (1973); <u>Brady v. United States</u>, 397 U.S. 742, 747-748, 90 S. Ct. 1463, 1470 (1970).

15. NRS 34.810(1)(a) states:

- 1. The court shall dismiss a petition if the court determines that:
- (a) The petitioner's conviction was upon a plea of guilty or guilty but mentally ill and the petition is not based upon an allegation that the plea was involuntarily or unknowingly entered or that the plea was entered without effective assistance of counsel
- 16. It is well established that once a defendant pleads guilty, he waives all defects that occurred before the plea, including constitutional errors. Webb v. State, 91 Nev. 469, 470, 538 P.2d 164, 165 (1975) (quoting Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267, 93

•	
2	
3	
4	
5	
6	
7	
8	
9	
10	
11	
12	
13	
14	
15	
16	
17	
18	
19	
20	
21	
22	
23	
24	
25	
26	
27	

1

S. Ct. 1602, 1608 (1973)); <u>Kirksey v. State</u>, 112 Nev. 980, at 999, 923 P.2d 1102, 1114 (1996) (citing Warden, Nevada State Prison v. State, 100 Nev. 430, 432, 683 P.2d 504, 505 (1984)).

- 17. Factors to be considered in determining whether a defendant was denied his right to an appeal include: 1) whether his conviction was the result of a guilty plea or a trial;
 2) whether the defendant asked his attorney to appeal; and 3) whether the defendant had any non-frivolous issues to raise on appeal. Roe v. Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 120 S.Ct. 1029 (2000).
- 18. NRS 177.015(4) provides:

Except as otherwise provided in subsection 3 of NRS 174.035, the defendant in a criminal case shall not appeal a final judgment or verdict resulting from a plea of guilty, guilty but mentally ill or nolo contendere that the defendant entered into voluntarily and with a full understanding of the nature of the charge and the consequences of the plea, unless the appeal is based upon reasonable constitutional, jurisdictional or other grounds that challenge the legality of the proceedings. The Supreme Court may establish procedures to require the defendant to make a preliminary showing of the propriety of the appeal.

- 19. There is no federal constitutional right under the Sixth Amendment and no state constitutional right to counsel in post-conviction relief proceedings. <u>Coleman v. Thompson</u>, 501 U.S. 722, 725, 111 S. Ct. 2546, 2552 (1991); <u>McKague v. Warden</u>, 112 Nev. 159, 163, 912 P.2d 255, 257-258 (1996).
- 20. A district court judge has the discretion to appoint counsel under the conditions pursuant to NRS 34.750.
- 21. NRS 34.750 provides:

A petition may allege that the petitioner is unable to pay the costs of the proceedings or to employ counsel. If the court is satisfied that the allegation of indigency is true and the petition is not dismissed summarily, the court may appoint counsel at the time the court orders the filing of an answer and a return. In making its determination, the court may consider whether:

- (a) the issues are difficult;
- (b) the petitioner is unable to comprehend the proceedings; or

1	(c) counsel is necessary to proceed with discovery.
2	22. To be entitled to post-conviction counsel, a defendant "must show that the requested
3	review is not frivolous before he may have an attorney appointed." Peterson v.
4	Warden, Nevada State Prison, 87 Nev. 134, 483 P.2d 204 (1971) (citing former
5	statute NRS 177.345(2)).
6	23. At an evidentiary hearing on a petition for a post-conviction writ of habeas corpus,
7	the defendant has the burden of proving contested facts by a preponderance of the
8	evidence. Means v. State, 120 Nev. 1001, 103 P.3d 25 (2004).
9	<u>ORDER</u>
10	THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Petition for Post-Conviction
11	Relief shall be, and is, hereby DENIED.
12	DATED this 22 day of March, 2010.
13	Valui ada
14	DISTRICT JUDGE
15	
16	DAVID ROGER
17	DISTRICT ATTORNEY Nevada Bar #002781
18	
19	BY for for
20	Deputized Law Clerk Nevada Bar #011690
21	Nevada Bar #011690
22	
23	
24	
25	
26	
27	

28 hjc/SVU

ORIGINAL

NOED

ROY TROST,

VŞ.

2

3

1

4

5 6

7

8

9

10

11

12 13

14

15 16

17

18

19

20

21

Order in:

22

23 24

26

25

27

28

DISTRICT COURT

CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

Petitioner,

THE STATE OF NEVADA,

Respondent,

Case No: C247731 Dept No: XXI

NOTICE OF ENTRY OF DECISION AND ORDER

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on March 25, 2010, the court entered a decision or order in this matter, a true and correct copy of which is attached to this notice.

You may appeal to the Supreme Court from the decision or order of this court. If you wish to appeal, you must file a notice of appeal with the clerk of this court within thirty-three (33) days after the date this notice is mailed to you. This notice was mailed on March 30, 2010.

STEVEN D. GRIERSON, CLERK OF THE COURT

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that on this 30 day of March 2010, I placed a copy of this Notice of Entry of Decision and

The bin(s) located in the Office of the District Court Clerk of:

Clark County District Attorney's Office Attorney General's Office - Appellate Division

☑ The United States mail addressed as follows:

Roy Trost # 1027585

P.O. Box 650

Indian Springs, NV 89070

,	
1	ORDR DAVID ROGER FILED
2	Clark County District Attorney
3	JAMES R. SWEETIN
4	Chief Deputy District Attorney Nevada Bar #005144 200 Lewis Avenue
5	200 Lewis Avenue Las Vegas, Nevada 89155-2212 (702) 671-2500
6	(702) 671-2500 Attorney for Plaintiff
7	DISTRICT COURT
8	
9	CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA
0	
1	THE STATE OF NEVADA, Plaintiff. CASE NO: C247731
2	\ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \
13	-vs- S DEPT NO: XXI
4	ROY TROST,
15	Defendant.
16	
۱7	FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF
18	LAW AND ORDER
19	DATE OF HEARING: MARCH 2, 2010 TIME OF HEARING: 10:30 A.M.
20	THIS CAUSE having come on for hearing before the Honorable VALERIE ADAIR,
21	District Judge, on the second day of March, 2010, the Petitioner being present, Proceeding
22	IN FORMA PAUPERIS, the Respondent being represented by DAVID ROGER, District
23	Attorney, by and through FELICIA QUINLAN, Deputized Law Clerk, and the Court having
24	considered the matter, including briefs, transcripts, oral arguments, and documents on file
25	herein, now therefore, the Court makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law:

RECEIVED

26

27

28

MAR 2 5 2010

CLERK OF THE COURT

05-22-10A93:42 RCVD

P:\WPDOC\$\FOI^\810\81069101.doc

28 //

- On May 22, 2008, Roy J. Trost (Defendant) was charged by way of Criminal Complaint with: Count 1 Sexual Assault With a Minor Under Sixteen Years of Age, Count 2 Burglary With Use of a Deadly Weapon, Counts 3 and 4 Coercion With Use of a Deadly Weapon, Counts 5 and 6 First Degree Kidnapping With Use of a Deadly Weapon, Counts 7 and 8 Sexual Assault With Use of a Deadly Weapon, Count 9 Sexual Assault, Counts 10 and 11 Open and Gross Lewdness, and Counts 12 and 13 Robbery With Use of a Deadly Weapon.
- 2. On July 31, 2008, the State filed an Amended Criminal Complaint, charging Defendant with Count 1 Sexual Assault With Use of a Deadly Weapon, Count 2 Sexual Assault With Use of a Deadly Weapon With Intent to Commit Sexual Assault With Substantial Bodily Harm, Count 4 Sexual Assault With a Minor Under Sixteen Years of Age, Count 5 Burglary With Use of a Deadly Weapon, Count 6 Coercion With Use of a Deadly Weapon, Count 8 First Degree Kidnapping With Use of a Deadly Weapon, Count 9 First Degree Kidnapping With Use of a Deadly Weapon, Count 10 Sexual Assault With a Deadly Weapon, Count 11 Sexual Assault With a Deadly Weapon, Count 12 Sexual Assault With a Deadly Weapon, Count 13 Open and Gross Lewdness With Use of a Deadly Weapon, Count 14 Open and Gross Lewdness With Use of a Deadly Weapon, Count 15 Robbery With Use of a Deadly Weapon, and Count 16 Robbery With Use of a Deadly Weapon.
- 3. On September 11, 2008, the State charged Defendant by way of Information with Count 1 Sexual Assault With Use of a Deadly Weapon, Count 2 Sexual Assault, Count 3 First Degree Kidnapping, Count 4 Sexual Assault With a Minor Under Sixteen Years of Age, Count 5 Sexual Assault, and Count 6 First Degree Kidnapping.

P:\WPDOCS\FQF\810\81069101.doc

//

4. On September 23, 2008, pursuant to negotiations, Defendant pled guilty to the charges as contained in the Information filed September 11, 2008. The Guilty Plea Agreement (GPA), in which both parties stipulated that Counts 1-3 will run consecutively to each other and Counts 4-6 will run consecutively to each other but both parties retain the right to argue whether the two sets of counts would run concurrently or consecutively, was filed in open court the same day.

- 5. On November 17, 2008, Defendant was sentenced as to Count 1 Life with the possibility of parole after one hundred twenty (120) months, plus an equal and consecutive term of Life with the possibility of parole after one hundred twenty (120) months; as to Count 2 Life with the possibility of parole after one hundred twenty (120) months, Count 2 to run consecutive to Count 1; as to Count 3 Life with the possibility of parole after sixty (60) months, Count 3 to run consecutive to Count 2; as to Count 4 Life with the possibility of parole after three hundred (300) months, Count 4 to run consecutive to Count 3; as to Count 5 Life with the possibility of parole after one hundred twenty (120) months, Count 5 to run consecutive to Count 4; as to Count 6 Life with the possibility of parole after sixty (60) months, Count 6 to run consecutive to Count 5. Defendant was further ordered to a special sentence of lifetime supervision and register as a sex offender upon any release from custody. Defendant was also given one hundred sixty-three (163) days credit for time served. The Judgment of Conviction was filed on November 25, 2008.
- 6. On December 9, 2008, at the State's request, the Court modified Defendant's sentence as to Count 4, making the sentence Life with the possibility of parole after two hundred forty (240) months, instead of three hundred (300) months.
- 7. On November 10, 2009, Defendant filed the instant Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Post-conviction), motion for appointment of counsel, and request for evidentiary hearing. The State filed its response on January 11, 2010.

 8. On March 2, 2010, the district court held a limited evidentiary hearing to resolve the issue of whether Defendant's counsel promised to file an appeal on his behalf. Defendant's former counsel, Jeffrey Maningo, Esq., testified that he did not recall telling Defendant he would file an appeal, either immediately after sentencing or any other time. Mr. Maningo further testified that he would have pursued an appeal by seeking the advice of the Public Defender's appellate division supervisor in an effort to find appealable issues if he could not find any on his own. He would have noted the file regarding Defendant asking for an appeal and any follow-up work he would have done to pursue an appeal, but there are no such notes in Defendant's file. Mr. Maningo testified that he felt very badly for Defendant because he thought, based on the mitigating evidence he presented to the court, Defendant would not have gotten such a harsh sentence; however, there was no basis for an appeal in Defendant's case.

- 9. Mark LaPerna also testified at the evidentiary hearing on March 2, 2010, as he was Defendant's friend and roommate at the time of the commission of the crimes and Defendant's arrest. He testified that he knew Defendant wanted an appeal and that he tried to contact Mr. Maningo by calling four times. However, these four phone calls occurred before Defendant was sentenced, not during the time Mr. LaPerna and Defendant discussed his desire to appeal. Mr. LaPerna testified that he did not attempt to contact Mr. Maningo after discovering Defendant wanted an appeal.
- 10. Defendants claims in grounds two prior bad acts, four double jeopardy, five Self-Incrimination/Miranda Rights, six Prosecutorial Misconduct, seven Right to Counsel, eight Brady Violation, ten Enhanced Sentencing, and eleven Incomplete Record, do not entitle him to relief as they are not cognizable claims.
- 11. Defendant received effective assistance of counsel.
- 12. Defendant entered his guilty plea freely, knowingly, and voluntarily.
- 13. Defendant has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that he was deprived of his right to an appeal.
- 14. Defendant is not entitled to court appointed post-conviction counsel.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

- 1. To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel a defendant must prove he was denied "reasonably effective assistance" of counsel by satisfying the two-prong test of Strickland. 466 U.S. at 686-87, 104 S. Ct. at 2063-64; see also State v. Love, 109 Nev. 1136, 1138, 865 P.2d 322, 323 (1993). Under the Strickland test, a defendant must show first that his counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and second, that but for counsel's errors, there is a reasonable probability that the result of the proceedings would have been different. 466 U.S. at 687-88, 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2065, 2068; Warden, Nevada State Prison v. Lyons, 100 Nev. 430, 432, 683 P.2d 504, 505 (1984) (adopting the Strickland two-part test). "[T]here is no reason for a court deciding an ineffective assistance claim to approach the inquiry in the same order or even to address both components of the inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on one." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697, 104 S. Ct. at 2069.
- 2. The court begins with the presumption of effectiveness and then must determine whether the defendant has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that counsel was ineffective. Means v. State, 120 Nev. 1001, 103 P.3d 35 (2004). "Effective counsel does not mean errorless counsel, but rather counsel whose assistance is '[w]ithin the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases." Jackson v. Warden, 91 Nev. 430, 432, 537 P.2d 473, 474 (1975).
- 3. Counsel cannot be ineffective for failing to make futile objections or arguments. See Ennis v. State, 122 Nev. 694, 137 P.3d 1095 (2006). Trial counsel has the "immediate and ultimate responsibility of deciding if and when to object, which witnesses, if any, to call, and what defenses to develop. Rhyne v. State, 118 Nev. 1, 8, 38 P.3d 163, 167 (2002).
- 4. Based on the above law, the role of a court in considering allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel is "not to pass upon the merits of the action not taken but to determine whether, under the particular facts and circumstances of the case, trial



counsel failed to render reasonably effective assistance." <u>Donovan v. State</u>, 94 Nev. 671, 675, 584 P.2d 708, 711 (1978). This analysis means the court should neither "second guess reasoned choices between trial tactics nor does it mean that defense counsel, to protect himself against allegations of inadequacy, must make every conceivable motion no matter how remote the possibilities are of success." <u>Id</u>. To be effective, the constitution "does not require that counsel do what is impossible or unethical. If there is no bona fide defense to the charge, counsel cannot create one and may disserve the interests of his client by attempting a useless charade." <u>U.S. v. Cronic</u>, 466 US 648, 657 n.19, 104 S. Ct. 2039, 2046 n.19 (1984).

- 5. "There are countless ways to provide effective assistance in any given case. Even the best criminal defense attorneys would not defend a particular client in the same way."

 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S. Ct. at 689. "Strategic choices made by counsel after thoroughly investigating the plausible options are almost unchallengeable."

 Dawson v. State, 108 Nev. 112, 117, 825 P.2d 593, 596 (1992); see also Ford v. State, 105 Nev. 850, 853, 784 P.2d 951, 953 (1989). In essence, the court must "judge the reasonableness of counsel's challenged conduct on the facts of the particular case, viewed as of the time of counsel's conduct." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, 104 S. Ct. at 2066.
- 6. Even if a defendant can demonstrate that his counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, he must still demonstrate prejudice and show a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the result of the trial would have been different. McNelton v. State, 115 Nev. 396, 403, 990 P.2d 1263, 1268 (1999) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at 2064). "A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." McNelton, 115 Nev. at 403, 990 P.2d at 1268 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-89 & 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2064-65 & 2068).

//

| //



- 7. There is a strong presumption that appellate counsel's performance was reasonable and fell within "the wide range of reasonable professional assistance." See United States v. Aguirre, 912 F.2d 555, 560 (2nd Cir. 1990); citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S. Ct. at 2065. The federal courts have held that a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel must satisfy the two-prong test set forth by Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-688, 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2065, 2068; Williams v. Collins, 16 F.3d 626, 635 (5th Cir. 1994); Hollenback v. United States, 987 F.2d 1272, 1275 (7th Cir. 1993); Heath v. Jones, 941 F.2d 1126, 1130 (11th Cir. 1991). In order to satisfy Strickland's second prong, the defendant must show that the omitted issue would have had a reasonable probability of success on appeal. See Duhamel v. Collins, 955 F.2d 962, 967 (5th Cir. 1992); Heath, 941 F.2d at 1132.
- 8. A post-conviction petition for writ of habeas corpus must contain specific factual allegations which, if true, would entitle a defendant to relief; therefore, bare or naked allegations are insufficient to entitle a defendant to post-conviction relief. Hargrove v. State, 100 Nev. 498, 502-03, 686 P.2d 222, 225 (1984).
- A defendant who contends that his attorney was ineffective because he did not
 adequately investigate must show how a better investigation would have rendered a
 more favorable outcome probable. <u>Molina v. State</u>, 120 Nev. 185, 87 P.3d 533 (2004).
- 10. A defendant is not entitled to a particular "relationship" with his attorney. Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 103 S. Ct. 1610 (1983).
- 11. A plea of guilty is presumptively valid, particularly where it is entered into on the advice of counsel. <u>Jezierski v. State</u>, 107 Nev. 395, 812 P.2d 355 (1991). The Defendant has the burden of proving that the plea was not entered knowingly or voluntarily. <u>Bryant v. State</u>, 102 Nev. 268, 721 P.2d 364 (1986); <u>Wynn v. State</u>, 96 Nev. 673, 615 P.2d 946 (1980); <u>Housewright v. Powell</u>, 101 Nev. 147, 710 P.2d 73 (1985).

//

28 | //

- 12. In determining whether the guilty plea is knowingly and voluntarily entered, the Court is required to review the totality of the circumstances surrounding the Defendant's plea. <u>Id.</u> In <u>Bryant</u>, the Nevada Supreme Court made it very clear that in reviewing the sufficiency of plea canvasses, the Court is permitted to review the "totality of the facts and circumstances of a Defendant's case." In so doing, the reviewing Court may look at matters which extend beyond the formal entry of the plea. <u>Id.</u>
- 13. This standard requires the court to personally address the defendant at the time he enters his plea in order to determine whether he understands the nature of the charges to which he is pleading. Bryant, 102 Nev. at 271, 721 P.2d at 367. A court may not rely simply on a written plea agreement without some verbal interaction with a defendant. Id. Thus, a "colloquy" is constitutionally mandated, and a "colloquy" is but a conversation in a formal setting, such as that occurring between an official sitting in judgment of an accused at plea. See id.
- 14. However, the court also need not conduct a ritualistic oral canvass. State v. Freese, 116 Nev. 1097, 13 P.3d 442 (2000). The guidelines for voluntariness of pleas of guilty "do not require the articulation of talismanic phrases. It required only 'that the record affirmatively disclose that a defendant who pleaded guilty entered his plea understandingly and voluntarily." Heffley v. Warden, 89 Nev. 573, 575, 516 P.2d 1403, 1404 (1973); Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 747-748, 90 S. Ct. 1463, 1470 (1970).
- 15. NRS 34.810(1)(a) states:
 - 1. The court shall dismiss a petition if the court determines that:
 - (a) The petitioner's conviction was upon a plea of guilty or guilty but mentally ill and the petition is not based upon an allegation that the plea was involuntarily or unknowingly entered or that the plea was entered without effective assistance of counsel
- 16. It is well established that once a defendant pleads guilty, he waives all defects that occurred before the plea, including constitutional errors. Webb v. State, 91 Nev. 469, 470, 538 P.2d 164, 165 (1975) (quoting Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267, 93



S. Ct. 1602, 1608 (1973)); <u>Kirksey v. State</u>, 112 Nev. 980, at 999, 923 P.2d 1102,
1114 (1996) (citing Warden, Nevada State Prison v. State, 100 Nev. 430, 432, 683
P.2d 504, 505 (1984)).

- 17. Factors to be considered in determining whether a defendant was denied his right to an appeal include: 1) whether his conviction was the result of a guilty plea or a trial;
 2) whether the defendant asked his attorney to appeal; and 3) whether the defendant had any non-frivolous issues to raise on appeal. Roe v. Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 120 S.Ct. 1029 (2000).
- 18. NRS 177.015(4) provides:

Q

Except as otherwise provided in subsection 3 of NRS 174.035, the defendant in a criminal case shall not appeal a final judgment or verdict resulting from a plea of guilty, guilty but mentally ill or nolo contendere that the defendant entered into voluntarily and with a full understanding of the nature of the charge and the consequences of the plea, unless the appeal is based upon reasonable constitutional, jurisdictional or other grounds that challenge the legality of the proceedings. The Supreme Court may establish procedures to require the defendant to make a preliminary showing of the propriety of the appeal.

- 19. There is no federal constitutional right under the Sixth Amendment and no state constitutional right to counsel in post-conviction relief proceedings. <u>Coleman v. Thompson</u>, 501 U.S. 722, 725, 111 S. Ct. 2546, 2552 (1991); <u>McKague v. Warden</u>, 112 Nev. 159, 163, 912 P.2d 255, 257-258 (1996).
- 20. A district court judge has the discretion to appoint counsel under the conditions pursuant to NRS 34.750.
- 21. NRS 34.750 provides:

A petition may allege that the petitioner is unable to pay the costs of the proceedings or to employ counsel. If the court is satisfied that the allegation of indigency is true and the petition is not dismissed summarily, the court may appoint counsel at the time the court orders the filing of an answer and a return. In making its determination, the court may consider whether:

- (a) the issues are difficult;
- (b) the petitioner is unable to comprehend the proceedings; or

1	(c) counsel
2	22. To be entitled to post
3	review is not frivolo
4	Warden, Nevada Sta
5	statute NRS 177.345(
6	23. At an evidentiary hea
7	the defendant has the
8	evidence, Means v. St
9	
10	THEREFORE, IT IS
11	Relief shall be, and is, hereb
12	DATED this 22 d
13	
14	
15	
16	DAVID ROGER
17	DISTRICT ATTORNEY Nevada Bar #002781
18	$\Lambda \cap \Lambda$
19	BY for K
20	FILLICIA QUINCAN Deputized Law Clerk
21	Nevada Bar #011690
22	
23	
24	
25	
26	
27	
. l	1. (0) (1)

(c)	counsel is necessary to proceed with discovery.

- t-conviction counsel, a defendant "must show that the requested ous before he may have an attorney appointed." Peterson v. nte Prison, 87 Nev. 134, 483 P.2d 204 (1971) (citing former (2)).
- aring on a petition for a post-conviction writ of habeas corpus, e burden of proving contested facts by a preponderance of the tate, 120 Nev. 1001, 103 P.3d 25 (2004).

<u>ORDER</u>

S HEREBY ORDERED that the Petition for Post-Conviction y DENIED.

ay of March, 2010.

1	
2	
3	
4	
5	DISTRICT COURT
6	CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA
7 8	State of Nevada Plaintiff,
9	Plaintiff.
10	vs. Roy /1051 } Case No. <u>C27/1</u> 01
11	Dept. No. XX/
12	Defendant, Docket
13	
14	ORDER
15	Upon reading the motion of defendant, Roy Trost, requesting
16	withdrawal of counsel, Attorney Jeffrey S. Maningo, Esq., of the Clark county Public
17	Defender's Office, and Good Cause Appearing,
18	IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendant's Motion for Withdrawal of Counsel is
19	GRANTED.
20	IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED that Counsel deliver to defendant at his address, all
21	documents, papers, pleadings, discovery and any other tangible property in the above-entitled case.
22	
23	DATED and DONE this day of, 20
24	
25	
26	08C247731 DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
27	LSF Lett Side Filing
28	1334213

Post Office Box 650 [HDSP] Indian Springs, Nevada 89018 APR 0 6 2011 DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 6 7 State of Nevada 8 Plaintiff,
vs. Roy J Trost 9 Case No. <u>C247</u>731 10 Dept. No. XX 11 **Docket** 12 Defendant. 13 MOTION TO WITHDRAW COUNSEL 14 15 Date of Hearing: Time of Hearing: 16 'ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED, Yes ____ No _____" 17 COMES NOW, Defendant, Rox Trost proceeding in proper person, 18 moves this Honorable Court for an ORDER Granting him permission to withdraw his present counsel 19 20 of record in the proceeding action, namely, Attorney JEFFIEY S. Maningo 21 This Motion is made and based on all papers and pleadings on file with the Clerk of the Court 22 which are hereby incorporated by this reference, the Points and Authorities herein, and attached 23 Affidavit of Defendant. 24 DATED: this 31st day of March, 2011. ∑3 25 (○) 26 08C247731 MDC Motion to Dismiss Counsel 1334219 Defendant/In Propria Personam 1

į	Par Track
1	/ / In Propria Personam
2	Post Office Box 650 [HDSP] Indian Springs, Nevada 89018
3	
4	
5	DISTRICT COURT
6	CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA
7	State of Nevada Plaintiff vs. Roy, Trost Case No. C24773/ Dent No. XX/
8	State of No.
9	P/ain*111
10	vs. Roy, Trost { Case No. <u>C24773</u> /
11	Dept No. XX
12	Docket
13	<u></u> /
14	NOTICE OF MOTION
15	YOU WILL PLEASE TAKE NOTICE, that
16	
17	will come on for hearing before the above-entitled Court on the day of, 20,
18	at the hour of o'clock M. In Department, of said Court.
19	
20	CC:FILE
21	
22	DATED: this 3/5t day of March 20/1.
23	4 0/
24	BY: Con void for times for
25	/In Propria Personam
26	
27	
28	

POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

NRS 7.055 states in pertinent part:

- An attorney who has been discharged by his client shall upon demand and payment of the fee due from the client, immediately deliver to the client all papers, documents, pleadings and items of tangible personal property which belong to or were prepared for that client.
- 2. . . . If the court finds that an attorney has, without just cause, refused or neglected to obey its order given under this section, the court may, after notice and fine or imprison him until the contempt purged. If the court finds that the attorney has, without just cause, withheld the client's papers, documents, pleadings, or other property, the attorney is liable for costs and attorney's fees.

Counsel in the above-entitled case was court-appointed due to Defendant's indigence. Defendant does not owe counsel any fees.

WHEREFORE, Defendant prays this Honorable Court, Grant his Motion to Withdraw Counsel and that counsel deliver to Defendant all papers, documents, pleadings, discovery and any other tangible property which belong to or were prepared for the Defendant to allow Defendant the proper assistance that is needed to insure that justice is served.

DATED: this 3/st day of March 20/1

Respectfully submitted,

Ray James Trust

Defendant/In Propria Personam Post Office Box 650 [HDSP] Indian Springs, Nevada 89018

NAME: Roy Trost , # 1027585

HIGH DESERT STATE PRISON
P.O. BOX 650
INDIAN SPRINGS, NEVADA 89018

TO: Attorney Je FFrey S

Maningo

200 Lewis Avenue

Las Vegas, NV

SUBJECT: TERMINATION OF COUNSEL/TRANSFER OF RECORDS

CASE NO.: <u>C247731</u>

DEPT. NO.: $\chi\chi$

CASE NAME: Lov Trost

Please be advised that from this date forward, your authority as Attorney of Record in the above-stated action is hereby terminated. All of the professional relations of Attorney and Client do hereby cease.

Please enter your withdrawal from this action with the Court immediately.

Junes front

Pursuant to NRS 7.055, I respectfully request that you deliver to me, forthwith, all documents, papers, pleadings and tangible personal property that is in your possession that relates to the above-named action.

Your prompt attention to this request is genuinely appreciated.

Respectfully,

AFFIRMATION Pursuant to NRS 239B.030

The undersigned does hereby affirm that the preceding <u>motion</u> to
(Title of Document)
(Title of Document)
filed in District Court Case number <u>C247731</u>
Does not contain the social security number of any person.
-OR-
☐ Contains the social security number of a person as required by:
A. A specific state or federal law, to wit:
(State specific law)
-or-
B. For the administration of a public program or for an application for a federal or state grant.
Signature March 3/3t 2011 Date
Print Name
Title

1	CERTFICATE OF SERVICE BY MAILING
2	I, Loy Trost hereby certify, pursuant to NRCP 5(b), that on this 3/5/
3	day of March, 20 // I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing, "Motion
4	to withdraw coursel/termination letter "
5	by depositing it in the High Desert State Prison, Legal Library, First-Class Postage, fully prepaid,
6	addressed as follows:
7	
8	X Attorner Jeffrey S. Marringo 200 Cewis Ave
10	89153 ————————————————————————————————————
11	
12	x Court Clerk
13	Tus Vegas o Nevuda
14	
15	-
16	
17	CC:FILE
18	DATED: this 3st day of March 2011.
19	DATED: this \underline{Y}^{2} day of $\underline{//(\mathcal{ACL})}$, $20//$.
20	And thomas to of
21	To Just # 102285
22	// /In Propria Personam Post Office box 650 [HDSP] Indian Springs, Nevada 89018 IN FORMA PAUPERIS:
23	IN FORMA PAUPERIS:
24 25	
26	
27	
28	

High Desert State Pison
High Desert State Pison
Por Box 650
Indian Sormer NV
89070

USA FOREVER
LUTTER CLICKEN

County Clerk of Court 200 lewis Avers 3rd Hur Las Vegas, Nevada 89155

Electronically Filed 05/12/2011 01:17:26 PM

PHILIP J. KOHN, PUBLIC DEFENDER NEVADA BAR NO. 0556 309 South Third Street, Suite 226 Las Vegas, Nevada 89155 (702) 455-4685 Attorney for Defendant CLERK OF THE COURT

DISTRICT COURT

CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

THE STATE OF NEVADA,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. C247731

v.

ROY JAMES TROST,

Defendant.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

This is to certify that on the 12th day of May, 2011 a true and correct copy of the following documents: Notice of Entry of Decision and Order; Findings of Fact, Conclusions Of Law and Order; Order For Petition For Writ Of Habeas Corpus; [2] sketches; Identification Card; Motion To Withdraw Counsel; Media Reports; Recorder's Transcript of Hearing Re: Arraignment Continued; Criminal Complaint; Amended Criminal Complaint; Parole and Probation Presentence Investigation Report dated November 4, 2008; Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department Voluntary Statement — Brittany Evans; Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department Voluntary Statement — Ashlee Henry; Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department Voluntary Statement — Sarah Quinn; Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department Voluntary Statement — Brittany Evans; Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department - N Madsen Declaration of Warrant/Summons; Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department - John Baltas Declaration of Warrant/Summons; Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department Incident Report; Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department Voluntary Statement - Police Department Voluntary Statement - Leticia Campbell; Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department Voluntary Statement - Roy Trost; Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department - Property Report; Las Vegas

Metropolitan Police Department Incident Recall; Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department Crime Scene Report; Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department Forensic Laboratory biology/DNA Detail; Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department Photo Line-Up Witness Instructions; Justice Court, Las Vegas Township Commitment and Order to Appear; Guilty Plea Agreement; Motion To Proceed In Forma Pauperis; Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department Temporary Custody Record; Clark County Detention Center Arrest Warrant; Justice Court, Las Vegas Township – Request For Arrest Warrant; Justice Court Pretrial Services Information Sheet; Notice To Place On Calendar; Justice Court Las Vegas Township court minutes; Justice Court, Las Vegas Township Media Request; Judgment of Conviction (Plea of Guilty); journal; Reporter's Transcript of Waiver of Preliminary Hearing dated September 10, 2008; Pre-dispositional and Social History Report; Memorandum – Confidential Communication Protected By Attorney-Client and Work Product Privileges; and Reporter's Transcript dated September 23, 2008 Arraignment Continued; were deposited in the United States mail in Las Vegas, Nevada, in a sealed envelope, postage prepaid to:

Roy Trost #1027585 High Desert State Prison PO Box 650 Indian Springs, Nevada 89070-0650

> An employee of the Clark County Public Defender's Office

MC ·		1
PP DA	•	2
		3
		4
		5
		6
		7
		8
		9
	-	10
		11
		12
		13
		14
		15
		16
		17
		18
		19
		20
		21
6.050		22 23
9.1		23

LCC LL FORM 26

CLERK OF THE COURT

JAN 08 201630

24

25

26

RECEIVED 28

Case No. <u>C24773</u> / Dept. No. <u>9</u>

CLERK OF THE COURT

IN THE STATE OF NEVADA

IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF Clark

Plaintiff,

-vs
Roy Tast 102738,

Defendant.

THE STATE OF NEVADA,

Hearing Date: 2-2-16

Time of Hearing: 9:30am

MOTION FOR ORDER DIRECTING
CLERK TO ISSUE PRESENTENCE
INVESTIGATION REPORT
TO DEFENDANT

COMES NOW Defendant, Loy Trost, in pro se, and submits his Motion for Order Directing Clerk to Issue Presentence Investigation Report to Defendant, moving the Court to direct its clerk to provide him a copy of his Presentence Investigation Report ("PSI") as prepared in this case per NRS 176.135. This motion is made and based upon all papers, pleadings and documents on file herein; NRS Ch. 176; the Court's authority to grant the motion; and the following points and authorities.

POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

Pursuant to NRS 176.135, a PSI was generated in this case, and was considered by the Court in sentencing matters per NRS 176.156. While Defendant's PSI was disclosed to him via his counsel, he was never provided a copy to keep for himself. In fact, Defendant's attorney seems to have maintained the PSI, despite Defendant's entitlement to same under NRS 176.156(1).

Defendant's PSI contains information which is relied upon by both prison officials in their placement and treatment of him, U.S. v. Kerr, 876 F.2d 1440, 1445-46 (9th Cir. 1989), and parole commissioners when deciding whether to grant him parole, U.S. v. Petitto, 767 F.2d 607, 610 (9th Cir. 1985). Defendant needs a copy of his PSI so as to be able to address factual disputes, discrepancies, or even misunderstandings which arise in the prison context, and which affect his institutional setting. NRS 176.156(1) certainly envisions Defendant possessing his PSI; however, as his PSI is a confidential document, NRS 176.156(5), this Court need issue an order directing the Clerk of the Court to issue and serve same upon the Defendant. CONCLUSION This Court should direct the Clerk of the Court to issue to Defendant a copy of his PSI report, sending same to him at his place of confinement at the address below. Loy Janes Trest +1021581 Levelich Cornector Derreda Lovelock Correctional Center 1200 Prison Road Lovelock, Nevada Defendant In Pro Se

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE BY MAIL

I do certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing MOTION FOR ORDER DIRECTING CLERK TO ISSUE PRESENTENCE
INVESTIGATION REPORT TO DEFENDANT to the below address(es) on
this 28^{4} day of <u>December</u> , $20/S$, by placing same in
the U.S. Mail via prison law library staff, pursuant to NRCP
5(b):

	County	District	Attorney
301 E (M A	パ <i>年/()</i> Nevada 89	
Las veg Attornev			<i> 0 </i>

Roy Trot, Carelah Cer Cartor MCUPALAN Landshow # 89419 Lovelock Correctional Center 1200 Prison Road Lovelock, Nevada 89419

Defendant In Pro Se

AFFIRMATION PURSUANT TO NRS 239B.030

The undersigned does hereby affirm that the preceding MOTION FOR ORDER DIRECTING CLERK TO ISSUE PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION REPORT TO DEFENDANT does not contain the social security number of any person.

Dated this 1st day of <u>Pecanbor</u>, 20 S.

Defendant In Pro Se

a Correction (INMATE LEGAL
MAIL CONFIDENTIAL BOTO MORROR COCC RECEIVED JAN 0 7 2016 CLERK OF THE COURT

Case No. <u>C247731</u>
name
Dept. No
LEFT
,
IN THE STATE OF NEVADA
in and for the county of <u>Clark</u>
* * * *
THE STATE OF NEVADA,
Plaintiff,)
-vs-) <u>ORDER</u>
Rox Trest 402 7585,
Defendant.
THE COURT, having considered Defendant's Motion for Order
Directing Clerk to Issue Presentence Investigation Report to
Defendant, and with good cause appearing, it is hereby ORDERED
that the said motion is GRANTED.
The Clerk of the Court shall forwith issue to Defendant a
copy of his Presentence Investigation Report which was generated
in the above-entitled case and serve same upon him at the
Lovelock Correctional Center.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated this day of, 20
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
08C247731 LSF

Left Side Filing

ORIGINAL

Electronically Filed 05/04/2016 11:53:01 AM

Alun J. Lemm

CLERK OF THE COURT

ORDR
STEVEN B. WOLFSON
Clark County District Attorney
Nevada Bar #001565
JAMES R. SWEETIN
Chief Deputy District Attorney
Nevada Bar #005144
200 Lewis Avenue
Las Vegas, NV 89155-2212
(702) 671-2500

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

8

9

11

12

13 14

15

16

17 18

19

20

21

22

2324

25

26

//

//

//

27

28

DISTRICT COURT
CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

THE STATE OF NEVADA,

Plaintiff,

-VS-

Attorney for Plaintiff

ROY J TROST, #2679137

Defendant.

CASE NO:

08C247731

DEPT NO:

XXI

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR ORDER DIRECTING CLERK TO ISSUE PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION REPORT TO DEFENDANT

DATE OF HEARING: FEBRUARY 2, 2016 TIME OF HEARING: 9:30 A.M.

THIS MATTER having come on for hearing before the above entitled Court on the 2ND day of FEBRUARY, 2016, the Defendant not being present, IN PROPER PERSON, the Plaintiff being represented by STEVEN B. WOLFSON, District Attorney, through KAREN MISHLER, Deputy District Attorney, without argument, based on the pleadings and good cause appearing therefor,

W:\2008\2008F\106\91\08F10691-ORDR-(TROST_ROY_02_02_2016)-001.DOCX

BY

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR ORDER DIRECTING CLERK TO ISSUE PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION REPORT TO DEFENDANT, shall be, and it is GRANTED, and Mr. Saxe to send a prison appropriate copy of the presentence investigation report to the defendant.

DATED this 28th day of April, 2016.

alui adai

STEVEN B. WOLFSON Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #001565

puty District Attorney vada Bar #013730

hjc/SVU

THIS SEALED
DOCUMENT,
NUMBERED PAGE(S)
177 - 190
WILL FOLLOW VIA
U.S. MAIL

	.e. .e.	
	•	FILED
	1	MAY 0 1 2023
	2	Control of the contro
	3	d services and the services are services are services and the services are servi
	4	
	5	IN THE 3 JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF
	6	NEVADA IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF _CLARK_
	7	
	8	
	9 10	THE STATE OF MENADA
	11	THE STATE OF NEVADA, Plaintiff CASE NO. <u>C247731</u>
	12	DEPT. NO. XXI
	13	V. Kuy James Trost FNA Mrs. Daisy lynne Meadlans May 23, 2023
	14	1000 May 23, 2023
	15	MOTION TO WITHDRAW PLEA
	16	
	17	COMES NOW, Defendant, Mrs Daisy lynne Meadurs-, proceeding in proper
	18	person, and moves this Honorable Court for an Order granting him permission to withdrawal his Plea
	19	Agreement in the the case number $\frac{C24773}{}$, on the date of $\frac{9/3}{3}$ in the month
	20	of 9 in the year 2008 . where defendant was then represented by J.S. Maningo, Drp as
	21	counsel. This Motion is based on all papers and pleadings on file with the Clerk of the Court which ar
	22	hereby incorporated by this reference, and Points and Authorities herein and attached Affidavit of
	23	Defendant.
≥	24 70, ₅	
APR 2.7 2023	RECEVED	Dated this $\frac{8}{8}$ day of $\frac{ApR}{2023}$
7 洲	VE27	Respectfully submitted,
ŭ	28	Defendant in Proper Person
	-	Topol I cison

191 1

APR 2.7 2023

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

NRS. 176.165 PROVIDES:

A motion to withdraw a plea of guilty or nolo contendere may be made only before sentence is imposed, or imposition of sentence is suspended. To correct manifest injustice, the court, after sentencing, may set aside the judgment of conviction and permit the defendant to withdraw his or plea.

Failure to adequately inform a defendant of the full consequencies of his/her plea creates manifest injustice which could be corrected by setting aside the conviction and allowing him/her to withdraw the guilty plea. Meyer v. State, 603 P.2d 1066 (Nev. 1979), and Little v. Warden, 34 P.3d 540 (Nev. 2001).

Defendant herein alleges that his/her plea is in error and must withdraw the plea pursuant to the following facts: State my actions, Allegel

Page

Therefore, pursuant to the facts and the law stated herein, Defentant requests that his guilty plea be withdrawn.

Dated this 18 day of April, 2023.

Respectfully Submitted,

SERVICE CERTIFICATE OF

I, Mr Jainfynne Meadur, hereby certify, pursuant to NRCP 5(b), that
on this 18 day of April , 2023, I mailed a true and correct copy of
the foregoing Motion to Withdraw Plea.
by depositing it in the High Derest State Prison legal mail service provided through
the Law Library, with First class Postage prepaid, and addressed to the following:

NO North Carson St. Carson City, NU	Waden Brian Williams ADSP Bio, Box 650 Indian Spring IN
89710	89010
D.A. Stever B. Wel From 200 lewit Ave.	Clerk of the Court 200 Lewis Ave
Cut Vegat INV 89155	<u>Car Vegar, NV</u> 89/155

CC: File

Dated this 182° day of 400° , 2023

AFFIRMATION Pursuant to NRS 239B.030

	The undersigned does hereby affirm that the preceding
	Motion to withdraw Mea (Title of Document)
filed in	District Court Case number <u>C24773</u> /
	Does not contain the social security number of any person.
	-OR-
	Contains the social security number of a person as required by:
	A. A specific state or federal law, to wit:
	(State specific law)
	-or-
	B. For the administration of a public program or for an application for a federal or state grant.
	Signature Toist Date
,	FKA Ohr Dasylynne Meadeur Print Name
	Title

Under Penalty of Perjury Statement

"I declare (certify, verify, or state) under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct in accordance with NRS 208.165 and 28 USCA § 1746.

Executed on 4-18-23 (Date)

Mrs Duiy lynne Mewburs Trist
Hist Desort School Chica
FOLLOOD 650

Ludian Spring 11

Clerk of the Court 800 lewis Ave Las Vegas, NV

26 APR 2023 PM 5 L

LAS VEGAS NV 890

- 11	
1	Mrs Daisylynn Meadur # 1027588 Hill Blief State Prison FILED
2	100 Bys (50)
3	Indian Spring NV 87010
4	Petitioner In Pro Se CLERK OF COURT
5	
6	May 23, 2023 8:30 AM
7	
8	*****
9	The State of Nevada, Case No. C247731
10	Petitioner,
11	-va- Roy James Trost . APPOINTMENT OF COURSEL
12	FNA Mr. Daisy Lynne Meadown
13	Respondents.
14	
15	
16	1) and for the instant 9 2234
17	•1
18	This motion is made and based upon 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(g), 28 U.S.C.
19	§ 1915(e)(1), 28 U.S.C. § 2254(h); all papers, pleadings and documents on file
20	herein; and the following points and authorities.
2	FOUNTS AND AUTHORITHES
2:	
2	Petitioner is unable to afford counsel. See Application to Proceed In
2	Forma Pauperis on file herein.
2	The substantive issues and procedural matters in this case are too complete
2	for Petitioner's comprehension and abilities.
2	Petitioner, by reason of his incarceration, cannot investigate, take

28 depositions, or otherwise discover evidentiary materials on his own accord.

Petitioner's sentence structure is 10 whitex3: 5 to life x2: 20 blitex 1 There are u are not additional facts attached hereto on additional page(s) to be incorporated herein.

2

3

4

5

8

Q

11

12

13

1.5

17

18

19

21

25

Counsel could not only assist Petitioner with a much better presentation of the substantive and procedural issues before this Court, e.g., merits of the claims, AEDPA's § 2254(d) test, exhaustion, etc., but counsel would likewise make much easier this Court's task of discerning the issues and adjudicating them as upon a competent counsel's ability to present same to the Court.

The ends of justice would best be served in this case via the appointment of counsel, as Petitioner's sentence structure, in conjunction with the complexities of the legal issues herein, plead for such an appointment.

II. ARGUMENT FOR APPOINTMENT

Appointment of counsel in § 2254 cases is authorized within 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(g) and 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(1); 2254(h). This Court may appoint counsel where the "interests of justice" so require. Jeffers v. Lewis, 68 F.3d 295, 297-98 (9th Cir. 1995). This interest is best served when indigent petitioners who are unable to "adequately present their cases" are appointed counsel to do so for them. III.

Although appointment is usually within this Court's sound discretion, a handy formula for this Court's consideration is a balancing of the complexities of the issues with a consideration of the severity of the petitioner's penalty. Chaney v. Lewis, 801 F.2d 1191, 1196 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1023 (1987). Ultimately, however, absent a due process implication, this Court has discretion to appoint counsel when it feels that it promotes justice in doing so. Iti. See Brown v. United States, 623 F.2d 54, 61 (9th Cir. 1980)(court 26 must appoint counsel where the complexities of the case are such that denial of counsel would amount to denial of due process); Hawkins v. Bennett, 423 F.2d 948 (8th Cir. 1970)(counsel must be appointed where petitioner is a person of

such limited education as to be incapable of presenting his claims fairly). Petitioner submits that the facts above, in conjunction with these legal principles, compel appointment of counsel. Indeed, the complexities of the issues in relation to Petitioner's sentence, implicate the need of counsel to promote not only justice, but fairness, as well. Jeffers, 68 F.3d at 297-98. III. CONCLUSION For the reasons set forth above, this Court should appoint counsel to represent Petitioner in and for all further proceedings in this § 2254 habeas corpus action. Dated this 18th day of April 16 / / /

- 3 and LAST -

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

2	I do certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
8	foregoing Motion For appointment of Counsel
4	to the below address(es) on this 18 day of april
5	2002, by placing same into the hands of prison staff for
6	posting in the U.S. Mail, pursuant to FRCP 5(b):
7	Mr. Daisy lynne Meaders Trust
8	1077535 JA(1) 50 10 Box 680
9	Indian Springs NV . Nevada 89070
10	Counsel for
11	(>) check for additional addresses deter
12	Just fiven *102758\$
18	
14	22/2
15	In Pro Se
16	
17	ADDRESS(ES) Continued from Above: (If applicable)
18	Took of the Const
19	189155 , Nevada 89/55
2 0	
21 20	
22	
23	, Nevada 89
24 05	
25	

	1 2 3 4	Post Office Box 650 [HDSP] Indian Springs, Nevada 89018 PISTERICT COLIET
	5	DISTRICT COURT
	6	CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA
	7	1
	8	State of Nevada
	9	\
	10	vs. Pay Tour Tour !
	11	Roy Javes Trust AKA Mis Daix (your Meadow) Docket Docket
	12	Docket
	13	NOTICE OF MOTION
	14	NOTICE OF MOTION
	15	YOU WILL PLEASE TAKE NOTICE, that
	16	will come on for hearing before the above-entitled Court on the day of, 20,
	17	at the hour of o'clock M. In Department, of said Court.
	18	at the hour of o clock M. In Department, or said court.
	19 20	CC:FILE
	21	
	22	DATED: this <u>/8 day of April</u> , 20 <u>23</u>
	23	2 11 2 22 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
	24	BY But
ΑР		Rey TOST (Miny Lynn Mendan #102 7585) /In Propria Personam
₹ 2 ;	C E 26	
APR 2 7 2023	RECEIVED	
డు	28	
	·	l l

CLERK OF THE COURT

Electronically Filed 5/22/2023 7:35 AM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT 1 RSPN STEVEN B. WOLFSON 2 Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #001565 3 JONATHAN VANBOSKERCK Chief Deputy District Attorney Nevada Bar #6528 4 200 Lewis Avenue Las Vegas, Nevada 89155-2212 5 (702) 671-2500 6 Attorney for Plaintiff 7 DISTRICT COURT 8 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 9 THE STATE OF NEVADA, 10 Plaintiff, 11 -VS-CASE NO: 08C247731 12 ROY JAMES TROST, DEPT NO: XV 13 #2679137 Defendant. 14 15 STATE'S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S PRO PER MOTION TO APPOINT COUNSEL 16 DATE OF HEARING: MAY 23, 2023 17 TIME OF HEARING: 8:30 AM COMES NOW, the State of Nevada, by STEVEN B. WOLFSON, Clark County 18 District Attorney, through JONATHAN VANBOSKERCK, Chief Deputy District Attorney, 19 and hereby submits the attached Points and Authorities in Response to Defendant's Pro Per 20 21 Motion to Appoint Counsel. This Response is made and based upon all the papers and pleadings on file herein, the 22 attached Points and Authorities in support hereof, and oral argument at the time of hearing, if 23 deemed necessary by this Honorable Court. 24 25 /// /// 26 /// 27 /// 28

POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On May 22, 2008, Roy J. Trost (Defendant) was charged by way of Criminal Complaint with: Count I – Sexual Assault With a Minor Under Sixteen Years of Age, Count 2 – Burglary With Use of a Deadly Weapon, Count 3 and 4 – Coercion With Use of a Deadly Weapon, Counts 5 and 6 – First Degree Kidnapping With Use of a Deadly Weapon, Counts 7 and 8 – Sexual Assault With Use of a Deadly Weapon, Count 9 – Sexual Assault, Count 10 and 11 – Open and Gross Lewdness, and Count 12 and 13 – Robbery With Use of a Deadly Weapon.

On July 31, 2008, the State filed an Amended Criminal Complaint, charging Defendant with Count 1 – Sexual Assault With Use of a Deadly Weapon, Count 2 – Sexual Assault With Use of a Deadly Weapon, Count 3 – Battery With Use of a Deadly Weapon With Intent to Commit Sexual Assault With Substantial Bodily Harm, Count 4 – Sexual Assault With a Minor Under Sixteen Years of Age, Count 5 – Burglary With Use of a Deadly Weapon, Count 6 – Coercion With Use of a Deadly Weapon, Count 7 – Coercion With Use of a Deadly Weapon, Count 8 – First Degree Kidnapping With Use of a Deadly Weapon, Count 9 – First Degree Kidnapping With Use of a Deadly Weapon, Count 10 – Sexual Assault With a Deadly Weapon, Count 11 – Sexual Assault With a Deadly Weapon, Count 12 – Sexual Assault With a Deadly Weapon, Count 13 – Open and Gross Lewdness With Use of a Deadly Weapon, Count 15 – Robbery With Use of a Deadly Weapon, and Count 16 – Robbery With Use of a Deadly Weapon.

On September 11, 2008, the State charged Defendant by way of Information with Count 1 – Sexual Assault With Use of a Deadly Weapon, Count 2 – Sexual Assault, Count 3 – First Degree Kidnapping, Count 4 – Sexual Assault With a Minor Under Sixteen Years of Age, Count 5 – Sexual Assault, and Count 6 – First Degree Kidnapping.

25 | ///

26 ///

27 | ///

28 | ///

28 | ///

On September 23, 2008, pursuant to negotiations, Defendant pled guilty to the charges as contained in the Information filed September 11, 2008. The Guilty Plea Agreement (GPA), in which both parties stipulated the Counts 1-3 will run consecutively to each other and Counts 4-6 will run consecutively to each other but both parties retain the right to argue whether the two sets of counts would run concurrently or consecutively, was filed in open Court the same day.

On November 7, 2008, Defendant was sentenced as to Count 1 – Life with the possibility of parole after one hundred twenty (120) months, plus an equal and consecutive term of Life with the possibility of parole after one hundred twenty (120) months; as to Count 2 – Life with the possibility of parole after one hundred twenty (120) months, Count 2 to run consecutive to Count 1; as to Count 3 – Life with the possibility of parole after sixty (60) months, Count 6 to run consecutive to Count 5. Defendant was further ordered to a special sentence of lifetime supervision and register as a sex offender upon any release from custody. Defendant was also given one hundred sixty-three (163) days credit for time served. The Judgement of Conviction was filed on November 25, 2008.

On December 9, 2008, at the State's request, the Court modified Defendant's sentence as to Count 4, making the sentence Life with the possibility of parole after two hundred forty (240) months, instead of three hundred (300) months.

On November 10, 2009, Defendant filed the instant Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Post-Conviction), Motion for Appointment of Counsel, and request for evidentiary hearing. The State filed its response on January 11, 2010. The Court denied Defendant's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus on January 19, 2010. On March 25, 2010, the Court filed a Finding of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order denying Defendant's Petition.

On April 6, 2011, Defendant filed a Pro Per Motion to Withdraw Counsel. The matter was heard and granted on April 19, 2011.

On May 1, 2023, Defendant filed a Motion for Appointment of Attorney and a Motion to Withdraw Plea.

<u>ARGUMENT</u>

Defendant requests this Court appoint counsel on his behalf. Motion for Appointment of Counsel 2-3. Under the U.S. Constitution, the Sixth Amendment provides no right to counsel in post-conviction proceedings. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 752, 111 S. Ct. 2546, 2566 (1991). In McKague v. Warden, 112 Nev. 159, 163, 912 P.2d 255, 258 (1996), the Nevada Supreme Court similarly observed "[t]he Nevada Constitution...does not guarantee a right to counsel in post-conviction proceedings, as we interpret the Nevada Constitution's right to counsel provision as being coextensive with the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution." McKague held that with the exception of NRS 34.820(1)(a) (entitling appointed counsel when Petitioner is under a sentence of death), one does not have "any constitutional or statutory right to counsel at all" in post-conviction proceedings. Id. at 164, 912 P.2d at 258.

The Nevada Legislature has given Courts the *discretion* to appoint post-conviction counsel so long as "the Court is satisfied that the allegation of indigency is true and the Petition is not dismissed summarily," NRS 34.750. This statute states in relevant part:

A Petition may allege that the Petitioner is unable to pay the costs of the proceedings or to employ counsel. If the Court is satisfied that the allegation of indigency is true and the Petition is not dismissed summarily, the Court may appoint counsel to represent the Petitioner. In making its determination, the Court may consider, among other things, the severity of the consequences facing the Petitioner and whether:

- (a) The issues presented are difficult;
- (b) The Petitioner is unable to comprehend the proceedings; or
- (c) Counsel is necessary to proceed with discovery.

NRS 34.750(1). As contemplated by the statute, the Court may consider appointing counsel if the Defendant is indigent and if the Petition is not summarily dismissed. A Petition can be summarily dismissed where the Petitioner's claims are conclusory, without specific factual allegations, or are belied by the record.

26 | ///

27 || ///

28 | ///

5 6

7 8

9 10

11 12

13 14

15 16

17

18 19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Defendant cites no authority for appointment of counsel in a post-conviction setting to assist with a Motion to withdraw plea. Motion for Appointment of Counsel 1-3. As such the Court lacks authority to appoint counsel and the Motion should be denied. Should the Court construe the Motion to withdraw plea as a Habeas Petition the request for counsel should still be denied because the factors of NRS 34.750(1)(a)-(c) do not warrant appointment of counsel.

Defendant complains that his plea was involuntary because his counsel did not request a psychological evaluation and he was in no condition to enter a plea. Motion to Withdraw Plea 2-3. However, Defendant has failed to demonstrate how this issue is difficult. Moreover, Counsel is not necessary to proceed with discovery. Defendant argues "[Defendant], by reason of her incarceration, cannot investigate, take depositions, or otherwise discover evidentiary materials on his own accord." Motion for Appointment of Counsel 1. However, Defendant has failed to explain what such discovery would be necessary for the Motion to Withdraw.

Defendant is able to comprehend the proceedings. Defendant argues that "the substantive issues and procedural matters in this case are too complex for [Defendant's] comprehension and abilities. Id. However, in the Motion to Withdraw Defendant states that he knows now from the legal research he has conducted that he should not have signed the plea for his case. Motion to Withdraw 3. Because Defendant is able to conduct legal research, he should be able to comprehend the proceedings. Moreover, Defendant provides reasoning as to why he believes he is innocent as to counts one (1) and four (4) further showing that he has the ability to comprehend the proceedings.

///

///

///

///

///

///

///

///

1	CONCLUSION		
2	Based on the arguments as set forth above, the State respectfully requests that the Cour		
3	DENY Defendant's Motion for the Appointment of Counsel.		
4	DATED this 22 nd day May, 2023.		
5	Respectfully submitted,		
6	STEVEN B. WOLFSON		
7	Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #001565		
8			
9	BY /s/ Jonathan Vanboskerck		
10	JONATHAN VANBOSKERCK Chief Deputy District Attorney Nevada Bar #6528		
11	CERTIFICATE OF MAILING		
12	I hereby certify that service of the above and foregoing was made this 22nd day of May,		
13	2023, by depositing a copy in the U.S. Mail, postage pre-paid, addressed to:		
14	ROY JAMES TROST, BAC# 1027585		
15	HIGH DESERT STATE PRISON P. O. BOX 650		
16	INDIAN SPRINGS, NV 89070		
17	BY /s/ E. Goddard Secretary – District Attorney's Office		
18			
19			
20			
21			
22			
23			
24			
25			
26			
27			
28			

Electronically Filed Ś. 5/22/2023 7:47 AM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT 1 **OPPS** STEVEN B. WOLFSON 2 Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #001565 JONATHAN E. VANBOSKERCK 3 Chief Deputy District Attorney 4 Nevada Bar #006528 200 Lewis Avenue 5 Las Vegas, Nevada 89155-2212 (702) 671-2500 6 Attorney for Plaintiff 7 DISTRICT COURT 8 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 9 THE STATE OF NEVADA, 10 Plaintiff. 11 -VS-CASE NO: 08C247731 12 ROY JAMES TROST, DEPT NO: XV #2679137 13 Defendant. 14 15 STATE'S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S PRO PER MOTION TO WITHDRAW GUILTY PLEA AGREEMENT 16 DATE OF HEARING: MAY 23, 2023 17 TIME OF HEARING: 8:30 AM COMES NOW, the State of Nevada, by STEVEN B. WOLFSON, Clark County 18 District Attorney, through JONATHAN E. VANBOSKERCK, Chief Deputy District 19 Attorney, and moves this Honorable Court for an order denying the Defendant's Pro Per 20 21 Motion filed in the above-entitled matter. This Opposition is made and based upon all the papers and pleadings on file herein, the 22 attached Points and Authorities in support hereof, and oral argument at the time of hearing, if 23 deemed necessary by this Honorable Court. 24 25 /// /// 26 27 $/\!/\!/$ /// 28

POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On May 22, 2008, Roy J. Trost (Defendant) was charged by way of Criminal Complaint with: Count 1 – Sexual Assault With a Minor Under Sixteen Years of Age, Count 2 – Burglary With Use of a Deadly Weapon, Count 3 and 4 – Coercion With Use of a Deadly Weapon, Counts 5 and 6 – First Degree Kidnapping With Use of a Deadly Weapon, Counts 7 and 8 – Sexual Assault With Use of a Deadly Weapon, Count 9 – Sexual Assault, Count 10 and 11 – Open and Gross Lewdness, and Count 12 and 13 – Robbery With Use of a Deadly Weapon.

On July 31, 2008, the State filed an Amended Criminal Complaint, charging Defendant with Count 1 – Sexual Assault With Use of a Deadly Weapon, Count 2 – Sexual Assault With Use of a Deadly Weapon With Intent to Commit Sexual Assault With Substantial Bodily Harm, Count 4 – Sexual Assault With a Minor Under Sixteen Years of Age, Count 5 – Burglary With Use of a Deadly Weapon, Count 6 – Coercion With Use of a Deadly Weapon, Count 7 – Coercion With Use of a Deadly Weapon, Count 8 – First Degree Kidnapping With Use of a Deadly Weapon, Count 9 – First Degree Kidnapping With Use of a Deadly Weapon, Count 10 – Sexual Assault With a Deadly Weapon, Count 11 – Sexual Assault With a Deadly Weapon, Count 12 – Sexual Assault With a Deadly Weapon, Count 13 – Open and Gross Lewdness With Use of a Deadly Weapon, Count 15 – Robbery With Use of a Deadly Weapon, and Count 16 – Robbery With Use of a Deadly Weapon.

On September 11, 2008, the State charged Defendant by way of Information with Count 1 – Sexual Assault With Use of a Deadly Weapon, Count 2 – Sexual Assault, Count 3 – First Degree Kidnapping, Count 4 – Sexual Assault With a Minor Under Sixteen Years of Age, Count 5 – Sexual Assault, and Count 6 – First Degree Kidnapping.

25 | ///

26 ///

27 | ///

28 ///

28 ///

On September 23, 2008, pursuant to negotiations, Defendant pled guilty to the charges as contained in the Information filed September 11, 2008. The Guilty Plea Agreement (GPA), in which both parties stipulated the Counts 1-3 will run consecutively to each other and Counts 4-6 will run consecutively to each other but both parties retain the right to argue whether the two sets of counts would run concurrently or consecutively, was filed in open Court the same day.

On November 7, 2008, Defendant was sentenced as to Count 1 – Life with the possibility of parole after one hundred twenty (120) months, plus an equal and consecutive term of Life with the possibility of parole after one hundred twenty (120) months; as to Count 2 – Life with the possibility of parole after one hundred twenty (120) months, Count 2 to run consecutive to Count 1; as to Count 3 – Life with the possibility of parole after sixty (60) months, Count 6 to run consecutive to Count 5. Defendant was further ordered to a special sentence of lifetime supervision and register as a sex offender upon any release from custody. Defendant was also given one hundred sixty-three (163) days credit for time served. The Judgement of Conviction was filed on November 25, 2008.

On December 9, 2008, at the State's request, the Court modified Defendant's sentence as to Count 4, making the sentence Life with the possibility of parole after two hundred forty (240) months, instead of three hundred (300) months.

On November 10, 2009, Defendant filed the instant Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Post-Conviction), Motion for appointment of counsel, and request for evidentiary hearing. The State filed its response on January 11, 2010. The Court denied Defendant's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus on January 19, 2010. On March 25, 2010, the Court filed a Finding of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order denying Defendant's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.

On April 6, 2011, Defendant filed a Pro Per.Motion to Withdraw Counsel. The matter was heard and granted on April 19, 2011.

On May 1, 2023, Defendant filed a Motion for Appointment of Attorney and a Motion to Withdraw Plea.

ARGUMENT

I. HARRIS REMAINS THE EXCLUSIVE REMEDY TO CHALLENGE A GUILTY PLEA AFTER SENTENCING

Defendant offers various complaints that are not properly raised in a Motion to withdraw a guilty plea. Defendant alleges that his plea was involuntary because his counsel did not request a psychological evaluation and he was in no condition to enter a plea. Such a claim is beyond the scope of a Motion to withdraw a guilty plea since a post-conviction Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus is the exclusive remedy to challenge the validity of a guilty plea after sentencing. Harris v. State, 130 Nev.437, 466, 329 P.3d 619, 628 (2014); NRS 34.724(2)(b). As such the Motion must be denied.

<u>Harris</u> remains the exclusive remedy for challenging a guilty plea after sentencing. <u>Id</u>. at 466, 329 P.3d. at 628. "Pursuant to NRS 34.724(2)(b), a post-conviction Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus comprehends and takes the place of all other common-law, statutory, or other remedies which have been available for challenging the validity of the conviction or sentence, and must be used exclusively in place of them." <u>Id</u>. at 443, 329 P.3d. at 626 (internal quotations omitted).

Excepted from this exclusivity are remedies that are "incident to the proceedings in the trial Court." <u>Id</u>. (citing NRS 34.724(2)(a)). However, the <u>Harris</u> Court clearly stated, "that a Motion is 'incident to the proceedings in the trial Court' when it is filed prior to sentencing." <u>Id</u>., 130 Nev. at 437, 329 P.3d at 627. "Thus, a Motion to withdraw the guilty plea filed after sentencing is not 'incident to the proceedings in the trial Court." <u>Id</u>.

Because Defendant filed his Motion on May 1, 2023, almost fifteen years after being sentenced, the Motion is not incident to the proceedings in the trial Court, as defined by the Nevada Supreme Court. Thus, Defendant's Motion is not cognizable as a freestanding claim for relief. Therefore, Defendant's only potential avenue for relief is a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.

///

///

II. THE COURT SHOULD NOT CONSTRUE THE MOTION AS A HABEAS PETITITON

NRS 34.735 directs Defendants to file Petitions in a manner substantially consistent with the form provided by that statute. Defendant has failed to comply with the statute's directive. He has failed to include in his Motion the date of the judgment of conviction, whether or not he is currently serving a sentence under this case number or any other, whether he appealed from the judgment of conviction – and if not, why not – whether he has previously filed any Petitions, applications, or Motions with respect to the judgment in this case, or whether any Petition or appeal with respect to this judgment of conviction is pending in any Court. Additionally, Defendant has filed a previous Habeas Petition. Treating this pleading as a Habeas Petition would require consideration of the procedural bars, something Defendant has neglected. State v. Eighth Judicial District Court (Riker), 121 Nev. 225, 234, 112 P.3d 1070, 1076 (2005) (District Courts have a duty to consider whether post-conviction claims are procedurally barred).

Defendant's filing is not substantially consistent with the form provided by NRS 34.735. Therefore, this Court should decline to treat the Motion as a Habeas Petition. Should this Court opt to treat Defendant's Motion as a Petition and desires a response from the State, the Court should issue an order directing response and give the State 45 days to response as required by NRS 34.7745(1).

20 | ///

21 | ///

22 | ///

23 ///

24 | ///

25 ///

26 | ///

27 | ///

28 | ///

CONCLUSION 1 Based on the foregoing reasons, Defendant's Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea 2 Agreement should be DENIED. 3 DATED this 22nd day of May, 2023. 4 Respectfully submitted, 5 6 STEVEN B. WOLFSON Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #10539 7 8 BY /s/ Jonathan Vanboskerck JONATHAN VANBOSKERCK 9 Deputy District Attorney Nevada Bar #006528 10 11 12 CERTIFICATE OF MAILING I hereby certify that service of the above and foregoing was made this 22nd day of May, 13 2023, by depositing a copy in the U.S. Mail, postage pre-paid, addressed to: 14 ROY JAMES TROST, BAC# 1027585 15 HIGH DESERT STATE PRISON 16 P.O. BOX 650 INDIAN SPRINGS, NV 89070 17 /s/ E. Goddard BY 18 Secretary - District Attorney's Office 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

Electronically Filed 05/31/2023 12:13 PM CLERK OF THE COURT

FCL 1 STEVEN B. WOLFSON 2 Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #001565 3 JONATHAN VANBOSKERCK Chief Deputy District Attorney 4 Nevada Bar #6528 200 Lewis Avenue 5 Las Vegas, Nevada 89155-2212 (702) 671-2500 6 Attorney for Plaintiff 7 DISTRICT COURT 8 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 9 THE STATE OF NEVADA, 10 Plaintiff, 11 CASE NO: 08C247731 -VS-12 ROY JAMES TROST, 13 #2679137 DEPT NO: XVDefendant. 14 FINDING OF FACTS, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER 15 DATE OF HEARING: MAY 23, 2023 16 TIME OF HEARING: 8:30 AM 17 THIS MATTER having come on for hearing before the above-entitled Court on the 18 23rd day of May, 2023, the Defendant not being present, proceeding for Motion for 19 20 Appointment of Counsel, Respondent being represented by STEVEN B. WOLFSON, Clark County District Attorney, by and through ELAN A ELDAR, Deputy District Attorney, and 21 the Court having considered the matter, including briefs, transcripts, arguments of counsel, 22 23 and documents on file herein, now therefore, the Court makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law: 24 // 25 // 26 27 $/\!/$ 28 //

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On May 22, 2008, Roy J. Trost (Defendant) was charged by way of Criminal Complaint with: Count 1 – Sexual Assault With a Minor Under Sixteen Years of Age, Count 2 – Burglary With Use of a Deadly Weapon, Count 3 and 4 – Coercion With Use of a Deadly Weapon, Counts 5 and 6 – First Degree Kidnapping With Use of a Deadly Weapon, Counts 7 and 8 – Sexual Assault With Use of a Deadly Weapon, Count 9 – Sexual Assault, Count 10 and 11 – Open and Gross Lewdness, and Count 12 and 13 – Robbery With Use of a Deadly Weapon.

On July 31, 2008, the State filed an Amended Criminal Complaint, charging Defendant with Count 1 – Sexual Assault With Use of a Deadly Weapon, Count 2 – Sexual Assault With Use of a Deadly Weapon With Intent to Commit Sexual Assault With Substantial Bodily Harm, Count 4 – Sexual Assault With a Minor Under Sixteen Years of Age, Count 5 – Burglary With Use of a Deadly Weapon, Count 6 – Coercion With Use of a Deadly Weapon, Count 7 – Coercion With Use of a Deadly Weapon, Count 8 – First Degree Kidnapping With Use of a Deadly Weapon, Count 9 – First Degree Kidnapping With Use of a Deadly Weapon, Count 10 – Sexual Assault With a Deadly Weapon, Count 11 – Sexual Assault With a Deadly Weapon, Count 12 – Sexual Assault With a Deadly Weapon, Count 13 – Open and Gross Lewdness With Use of a Deadly Weapon, Count 15 – Robbery With Use of a Deadly Weapon, and Count 16 – Robbery With Use of a Deadly Weapon.

On September 11, 2008, the State charged Defendant by way of Information with Count 1 – Sexual Assault with Use of a Deadly Weapon, Count 2 – Sexual Assault, Count 3 – First Degree Kidnapping, Count 4 – Sexual Assault With a Minor Under Sixteen Years of Age, Count 5 – Sexual Assault, and Count 6 – First Degree Kidnapping.

On September 23, 2008, pursuant to negotiations, Defendant pled guilty to the charges as contained in the Information filed September 11, 2008. The Guilty Plea Agreement (GPA), in which both parties stipulated the Counts 1-3 will run consecutively to each other and Counts 4-6 will run consecutively to each other but both parties retain the right to argue whether the

two sets of counts would run concurrently or consecutively, was filed in open court the same day.

On November 7, 2008, Defendant was sentenced as to Count 1 – Life with the possibility of parole after one hundred twenty (120) months, plus an equal and consecutive term of Life with the possibility of parole after one hundred twenty (120) months; as to Count 2 – Life with the possibility of parole after one hundred twenty (120) months, Count 2 to run consecutive to Count 1; as to Count 3 – Life with the possibility of parole after sixty (60) months, Count 6 to run consecutive to Count 5. Defendant was further ordered to a special sentence of lifetime supervision and register as a sex offender upon any release from custody. Defendant was also given one hundred sixty-three (163) days credit for time served. The Judgement of Conviction was filed on November 25, 2008.

On December 9, 2008, at the State's request, the Court modified Defendant's sentence as to Count 4, making the sentence Life with the possibility of parole after two hundred forty (240) months, instead of three hundred (300) months.

On November 10, 2009, Defendant filed the instant Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Post-Conviction), motion for appointment of counsel, and request for evidentiary hearing. The State filed its response on January 11, 2010. The Court denied Defendant's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus on January 19, 2010. On March 25, 2010, the Court filed a Finding of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order denying Defendant's Petition.

On April 6, 2011, Defendant filed a Pro Per Motion to Withdraw Counsel. The matter was heard and granted on April 19, 2011.

On May 1, 2023, Defendant filed a Motion for Appointment of Attorney and a Motion to Withdraw Plea.

<u>ARGUMENT</u>

Defendant requested this Court to appoint counsel on his behalf. Motion for Appointment of Counsel 2-3. Under the U.S. Constitution, the Sixth Amendment provides no right to counsel in post-conviction proceedings. <u>Coleman v. Thompson</u>, 501 U.S. 722, 752, 111 S. Ct. 2546, 2566 (1991). In McKague v. Warden, 112 Nev. 159, 163, 912 P.2d 255, 258

(1996), the Nevada Supreme Court similarly observed "[t]he Nevada Constitution...does not guarantee a right to counsel in post-conviction proceedings, as we interpret the Nevada Constitution's right to counsel provision as being coextensive with the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution." McKague held that with the exception of NRS 34.820(1)(a) (entitling appointed counsel when petitioner is under a sentence of death), one does not have "any constitutional or statutory right to counsel at all" in post-conviction proceedings. Id. at 164, 912 P.2d at 258.

The Nevada Legislature has given courts the *discretion* to appoint post-conviction counsel so long as "the court is satisfied that the allegation of indigency is true and the petition is not dismissed summarily." NRS 34.750. This statute states in relevant part:

A petition may allege that the petitioner is unable to pay the costs of the proceedings or to employ counsel. If the court is satisfied that the allegation of indigency is true and the petition is not dismissed summarily, the court may appoint counsel to represent the petitioner. In making its determination, the court may consider, among other things, the severity of the consequences facing the petitioner and whether:

- (a) The issues presented are difficult;
- (b) The petitioner is unable to comprehend the proceedings; or
- (c) Counsel is necessary to proceed with discovery.

NRS 34.750(1). As contemplated by the statute, the court may consider appointing counsel if the defendant is indigent and if the petition is not summarily dismissed. A petition can be summarily dismissed where the petitioner's claims are conclusory, without specific factual allegations, or are belied by the record.

Defendant did not cite any authority for appointment of counsel in a post-conviction setting to assist with a motion to withdraw plea. Motion for Appointment of Counsel 1-3. As such this Court lacks the authority to appoint counsel and Defendant's motion is denied.

Defendant complained that his plea was involuntary because his counsel did not request a psychological evaluation and he was in no condition to enter a plea. Motion to Withdraw Plea 2-3. However, Defendant has failed to demonstrate how this issue is difficult. Moreover, Counsel is not necessary to proceed with discovery. Defendant argued "[Defendant], by reason

of her incarceration, cannot investigate, take depositions, or otherwise discover evidentiary 2 materials on his own accord." Motion for Appointment of Counsel 1. However, Defendant has 3 failed to explain what such discovery would be necessary for the Motion to Withdraw. 4 Defendant is able to comprehend the proceedings. Defendant argued that "the 5 substantive issues and procedural matters in this case are too complex for [Defendant's] 6 comprehension and abilities. Id. However, in the Motion to Withdraw Defendant stated that 7 he now knows from the legal research he has conducted that he should not have signed the 8 plea for his case. Motion to Withdraw 3. Because Defendant is able to conduct legal research, 9 this Court finds that he is able to comprehend the proceedings. Moreover, Defendant provided 10 reasoning as to why he believes he is innocent as to counts one (1) and four (4), further 11 showing that he has the ability to comprehend the proceedings. 12 **ORDER** THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion for Appointment of Dated this 31st day of May, 2023 13 14 Counsel shall be, and is, hereby DENIED. 15 16 17 **59F 1CD EEEC 8E40** Joe Hardy 18 **District Court Judge** STEVEN B. WOLFSON Clark County District Attorney 19 Nevada Bar #001565 20 BY /s/ Jonathan Vanboskerck 21 JOHNATHAN VANBOSKERCK Chief Deputy District Attorney Nevada Bar #6528 22 23 24 25 26 27

1

JV/kf/SVU

Electronically Filed 05/31/2023 12:13 PM CLERK OF THE COURT

			CLENK OF THE COOK
1	FCL STEVEN B. WOLFSON		
2	Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #001565		
3	JONATHAN E. VANBOSKERCK Chief Deputy District Attorney		
4	Nevada Bar #006528 200 Lewis Avenue		
5	Las Vegas, Nevada 89155-2212 (702) 671-2500		
6	Attorney for Plaintiff		
7	DISTRIC	CT COURT	
8		NTY, NEVADA	
9	THE STATE OF NEVADA,		
10	Plaintiff,		
11	-vs-	CASE NO:	08C247731
12	ROY JAMES TROST,		
13	#2679137	DEPT NO:	XV
14	Defendant.		
15	FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCL	USIONS OR LAV	V AND ORDER
16	DATE OF HEARI	NG: May 23, 20 2 Ring: 8:30 am	23
17	IIME OF HEA	ARING: 8:30 AM	
18	THIS MATTER having come on for he	earing before the ab	ove-entitled Court on the 23 rd
19	day of May, 2023, the Defendant not being pr	resent, proceeding f	or Motion to Withdraw Plea,
20	Respondent being represented by STEVEN B. WOLFSON, Clark County District Attorney,		
21	by and through ELAN A ELDAR, Deputy District Attorney, and the Court having considered		
22	the matter, including briefs, transcripts, arguments of counsel, and documents on file herein,		
23	now therefore, the Court makes the following	findings of fact an	d conclusions of law:
24	//		
25	//		
26	//		
27			
	//		

POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On May 22, 2008, Roy J. Trost (Defendant) was charged by way of Criminal Complaint with: Count 1 – Sexual Assault With a Minor Under Sixteen Years of Age, Count 2 – Burglary With Use of a Deadly Weapon, Count 3 and 4 – Coercion With Use of a Deadly Weapon, Counts 5 and 6 – First Degree Kidnapping With Use of a Deadly Weapon, Counts 7 and 8 – Sexual Assault With Use of a Deadly Weapon, Count 9 – Sexual Assault, Count 10 and 11 – Open and Gross Lewdness, and Count 12 and 13 – Robbery With Use of a Deadly Weapon.

On July 31, 2008, the State filed an Amended Criminal Complaint, charging Defendant with Count 1 – Sexual Assault With Use of a Deadly Weapon, Count 2 – Sexual Assault With Use of a Deadly Weapon With Intent to Commit Sexual Assault With Substantial Bodily Harm, Count 4 – Sexual Assault With a Minor Under Sixteen Years of Age, Count 5 – Burglary With Use of a Deadly Weapon, Count 6 – Coercion With Use of a Deadly Weapon, Count 7 – Coercion With Use of a Deadly Weapon, Count 8 – First Degree Kidnapping With Use of a Deadly Weapon, Count 9 – First Degree Kidnapping With Use of a Deadly Weapon, Count 10 – Sexual Assault With a Deadly Weapon, Count 11 – Sexual Assault With a Deadly Weapon, Count 12 – Sexual Assault With a Deadly Weapon, Count 13 – Open and Gross Lewdness With Use of a Deadly Weapon, Count 15 – Robbery With Use of a Deadly Weapon, and Count 16 – Robbery With Use of a Deadly Weapon.

On September 11, 2008, the State charged Defendant by way of Information with Count 1 – Sexual Assault with Use of a Deadly Weapon, Count 2 – Sexual Assault, Count 3 – First Degree Kidnapping, Count 4 – Sexual Assault With a Minor Under Sixteen Years of Age, Count 5 – Sexual Assault, and Count 6 – First Degree Kidnapping.

On September 23, 2008, pursuant to negotiations, Defendant pled guilty to the charges as contained in the Information filed September 11, 2008. The Guilty Plea Agreement (GPA), in which both parties stipulated the Counts 1-3 will run consecutively to each other and Counts 4-6 will run consecutively to each other but both parties retain the right to argue whether the

two sets of counts would run concurrently or consecutively, was filed in open court the same day.

On November 7, 2008, Defendant was sentenced as to Count 1 – Life with the possibility of parole after one hundred twenty (120) months, plus an equal and consecutive term of Life with the possibility of parole after one hundred twenty (120) months; as to Count 2 – Life with the possibility of parole after one hundred twenty (120) months, Count 2 to run consecutive to Count 1; as to Count 3 – Life with the possibility of parole after sixty (60) months, Count 6 to run consecutive to Count 5. Defendant was further ordered to a special sentence of lifetime supervision and register as a sex offender upon any release from custody. Defendant was also given one hundred sixty-three (163) days credit for time served. The Judgement of Conviction was filed on November 25, 2008.

On December 9, 2008, at the State's request, the Court modified Defendant's sentence as to Count 4, making the sentence Life with the possibility of parole after two hundred forty (240) months, instead of three hundred (300) months.

On November 10, 2009, Defendant filed the instant Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Post-Conviction), motion for appointment of counsel, and request for evidentiary hearing. The State filed its response on January 11, 2010. The Court denied Defendant's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus on January 19, 2010. On March 25, 2010, the Court filed a Finding of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order denying Defendant's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.

On April 6, 2011, Defendant filed a Pro Per Motion to Withdraw Counsel. The matter was heard and granted on April 19, 2011.

On May 1, 2023, Defendant filed a Motion for Appointment of Attorney and a Motion to Withdraw Plea.

ARGUMENT

I. HARRIS REMAINS THE EXCLUSIVE REMEDY TO CHALLENGE A GUILTY PLEA AFTER SENTENCING

Defendant offered various complaints that are not properly raised in a motion to withdraw a guilty plea. Defendant alleged that his plea was involuntary because his counsel

did not request a psychological evaluation and he was in no condition to enter a plea. Such a claim is beyond the scope of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea since a post-conviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus is the exclusive remedy to challenge the validity of a guilty plea after sentencing. Harris v. State, 130 Nev.437, 466, 329 P.3d 619, 628 (2014); NRS 34.724(2)(b). As such the motion must be denied.

Harris remains the exclusive remedy for challenging a guilty plea after sentencing. <u>Id.</u> at 466, 329 P.3d. at 628. "Pursuant to NRS 34.724(2)(b), a post-conviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus comprehends and takes the place of all other common-law, statutory, or other remedies which have been available for challenging the validity of the conviction or sentence and must be used exclusively in place of them." <u>Id.</u> at 443, 329 P.3d. at 626 (internal quotations omitted).

Excepted from this exclusivity are remedies that are "incident to the proceedings in the trial court." <u>Id</u>. (citing NRS 34.724(2)(a)). However, the <u>Harris</u> Court clearly stated, "that a motion is 'incident to the proceedings in the trial court' when it is filed prior to sentencing." <u>Id</u>., 130 Nev. at 437, 329 P.3d at 627. "Thus, a motion to withdraw the guilty plea filed after sentencing is not 'incident to the proceedings in the trial court." <u>Id</u>.

Because Defendant filed his Motion on May 1, 2023, almost fifteen years after being sentenced, the motion is not incident to the proceedings in the trial court, as defined by the Nevada Supreme Court. Thus, Defendant's motion is not cognizable as a freestanding claim for relief. Therefore, Defendant's only potential avenue for relief is a petition for writ of habeas corpus.

II. THE COURT SHOULD NOT CONSTRUE THE MOTION AS A HABEAS PETITITON

NRS 34.735 directs defendants to file petitions in a manner substantially consistent with the form provided by that statute. Defendant has failed to comply with the statute's directive. He has failed to include in his Motion the date of the judgment of conviction, whether or not he is currently serving a sentence under this case number or any other, whether he appealed from the judgment of conviction – and if not, why not – whether he has previously filed any

petitions, applications, or motions with respect to the judgment in this case, or whether any 1 petition or appeal with respect to this judgment of conviction is pending in any court. 2 Additionally, Defendant has filed a previous habeas petition. Treating this pleading as a habeas 3 petition requires consideration of the procedural bars, something Defendant has neglected. 4 State v. Eighth Judicial District Court (Riker), 121 Nev. 225, 234, 112 P.3d 1070, 1076 (2005) 5 (district courts have a duty to consider whether post-conviction claims are procedurally 6 barred). 7 Defendant's filing is not substantially consistent with the form provided by NRS 8 9 34.735. Therefore, this Court declines to treat the Motion as a Habeas Petition. ORDER 10 THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion to Withdraw Plea shall be, 11 and is, hereby DENIED. 12 Dated this 31st day of May, 2023 13 14 15 16 F96 8D9 6366 164F STEVEN B. WOLFSON

Joe Hardy

District Court Judge

Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #10539

BY /s/ Jonathan Vanboskerck
JOHNATHAN VANBOSKERCK
Chief Deputy District Attorney
Nevada Bar #6528

JV/kf/SVU

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

XXX

In the 8th Judicial District Court of the State OF Nevadu in and For the Country of Clark

The State of Nevada

Mrs Paise lynne Meaders JeFendant

Case No. C247731 Dept No. XXI

Motion To Change name On Judgement of Conviction

Corner now, DeFendant, Mrs Jaise fyrne Meadows, Proceeding in Proper Joson and mover this Henorable Court Fer an Order to Change her name on The Judgement of Conviction to her legal name Maisy lynne Meadows and Provide The NDOCwith a Copy of the Updated Judgement of Conviction To ReFlect the True Name legal name through a Petition For change of Name and Recieved an order From the Court ORder Changing Name That Order is being Provided along with Detendant Metione Dated this 26t Way of Tung 2023 Sworn under bonalty of Forthery freel

RECEIVED

յՍլ 0 **3 20**23

CLERK OF THE COURT

Daisy lynne pleadeur HOSP P.O. Box 650 Indian Springs, NV

EXHIBIT

1	Case No. <u>CV3207034</u>
3	Pept. No. FILED
T 2 E 5	2023 JUN 15 P 2: 58
KICLIVIO JUL 11 2022 2 CCIERY'S OFF	IN THE Sevent JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF While Fine.
8	* * * *
9	In the Matter of the Application of Mrt Troof alm Pary Lynne)
11	Petitioner,) ORDER CHANGING NAME
12 13	For Change of Name.
13	The Petition of Roy Trost , seeking
. 15	an order from the Court changing his name to Daisy Cynne
16	Meadows in place or her present name, and proof
17	having been made to the satisfaction of the Court that notice
18	thereof was given as required by law, and no objections having
19	been filed by any person, and the Court being satisfied that
20	there is no reasonable objection to Petitioner assuming the name
21	proposed,
22	IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the name of Petitioner Roy TRAST
23	Is hereby changed to
24	Daisy Lynne Mendows . IT IS SO ORDERED.
25	Dated this 15 day of June , 20 23
26	Dhan
27	District Court Judge
28	

Mrs Daisy lyne Micadows

High Desert State Prison

Tradian Spring / N

89070 RECEIVED

JUL U 3 2023

SERVOE THE COURT

Clerk ck the Court
800 Cewis Ave
Cas Vegas, Ni

In the 8th Judicial District Cerust of the State of Nevada in and For the Country of Clark FILED JUL 0 6 2023 The state of Nevada Case No. C24773 MERROF COURT Port No. XX/ July 27, 2023 Mrs Daisy lynne Meadowr Motion to Change Gender Sex/Marker on Judgement OF Conviction SeFendant Corner new, DeFendant, Mrs Daisy Lynne Meadeux, Proceeding in Proper Person and never this Honorable Court For an order to Change her Gender/Sex Marter on the Judgement of Conviction Detendant is, a Female She Regustor, a order to REFlect that on her Judgement of Conviction, This is Detendants True Gender and Sex, Dated this 26t Day of June, 2023 Sworn under Penalty of Perjung Verist Typne Meadeur 1027585 HDSP P.O Bex 650 Indian Springs , NV

I	CERTFICATE OF SERVICE BY MAILING
2	I, Daisy Jane Meadows, hereby certify, pursuant to NRCP 5(b), that on this <u>He</u>
3	day of, 20_23, I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing, " Motion to
4	Change name on Judget amounts Gend & 2.
5	
6	addressed as follows:
7	
8	800 Cewir Ave
9 10	1 84155
11	
12	
13	
14	
15	,
16	
17	CC:FILE
18	
19	DATED: this 26 day of June, 20 2,3
20	
21	Duit Jane Meadow # 1027588
22	/In Prontia Personam
23	Post Office box 650 [HDSP] Indian Springs, Nevada 89018 IN FORMA PAUPERIS
24	
25 26	
27	
28	
20	

Electronically Filed 08/02/2023 3:53 PM CLERK OF THE COURT

OGM

2

1

3

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5 THE STATE OF NEVADA

Plaintiff(s),
v.

DAISY LYNNE MEADOWS, fka Roy
James Trost,
Defendant(s).

THE STATE OF NEVADA,

CASE NO. 08C247731 DEPT NO. XV

ORDER GRANTING

DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO

CHANGE GENDER/SEX

MARKER ON JUDGMENT OF

CONVICTION

On July (2022 Defendent Deien Lemma Meed

On July 6, 2023, Defendant, Daisy Lynne Meadows, filed a Motion to Change Gender/Sex Marker on Judgment of Conviction. A hearing was set for July 27, 2023. During the July 27, 2023 hearing, the Court GRANTED Defendant's motion, changing Defendant's gender/sex marker on her Judgment of Conviction from male to female.

DISTRICT COURT

CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, Defendant's Motion to Change Gender/Sex

Dated this 2nd day of August, 2023

Marker on Judgment of Conviction is **GRANTED**.

09E 52C 9A4D DD41 Joe Hardy

District Court Judge

Electronically Filed 08/02/2023 3:53 PM CLERK OF THE COURT

¹ | oGM

ΤĊ

1

DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

THE STATE OF NEVADA,) CASE NO. 08C247731
Plaintiff(s),) DEPT NO. XV
v.)
) ORDER GRANTING MOTION
DAISY LYNNE MEADOWS, fka Roy) TO CHANGE NAME OF
James Trost,) JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION
Defendant(s).	

On July 6, 2023, Defendant, Daisy Lynne Meadows, filed a Motion to Change Name of Judgment of Conviction. A hearing was set for July 27, 2023. During the July 27, 2023 hearing, the Court GRANTED Defendant's motion, changing Defendant's name on her Judgment of Conviction from Roy James Trost to Daisy Lynne Meadows.

THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, Defendant's Motion to Change Name of Judgment of Conviction is GRANTED.

Dated this 2nd day of August, 2023

Judgment of Conviction is GRANTED.

346 052 3807 7F4D Joe Hardy District Court Judge

Electronically Filed 08/09/2023 2:38 PM CLERK OF THE COURT

AJOC

#2679137

DISTRICT COURT

CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

THE STATE OF NEVADA,

Plaintiff,

-vs-

S-

DAISY LYNNE MEADOWS,

Defendant.

CASE NO. C247731

DEPT, NO. XV

AMENDED JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION (PLEA OF GUILTY)

The Defendant previously appeared before the Court with counsel and entered a plea of guilty to the crime of COUNT 1 – SEXUAL ASSAULT WITH USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON (Category A Felony) in violation of NRS 200.364, 200.366, 193.165, COUNTS 2 & 5 – SEXUAL ASSAULT (Category A Felony) in violation of NRS 200.364, 200.366, COUNTS 3 & 6 – FIRST DEGREE KIDNAPPING (Category A Felony) in violation of NRS 200.310, 200.320 and COUNT 4 – SEXUAL ASSAULT WITH A MINOR UNDER SIXTEEN (16) YEARS OF AGE (Category A Felony) in violation of NRS 200.364, 200.366; thereafter, on the 17TH day of November, 2008,

12 13

15

14

17

16

18 19

20

21 22

23 24

25 26

27 28 the Defendant was present in court for sentencing with her counsel JEFFREY MANINGO, Deputy Public Defender, and good cause appearing,

THE DEFENDANT IS HEREBY ADJUDGED guilty of said offenses and, in addition to the \$25.00 Administrative Assessment Fee, \$150.00 DNA Analysis Fee including testing to determine genetic markers, the Defendant is sentenced as follows: As to COUNT 1 - TO A MAXIMUM term of LIFE WITH THE POSSIBILITY OF PAROLE after ONE HUNDRED TWENTY (120) MONTHS in the Nevada Department of Corrections (NDC), plus an EQUAL and CONSECUTIVE term of LIFE WITH THE POSSIBILITY of PAROLE after ONE HUNDRED TWENTY (120) MONTHS MINIMUM in the Nevada Department of Corrections (NDC) and pay \$357.00 Restitution; as to COUNT 2 - TO A MAXIMUM term of LIFE WITH THE POSSIBILITY of PAROLE with a MINIMUM parole eligibility of ONE HUNDRED TWENTY (120) MONTHS in the Nevada Department of Corrections (NDC), COUNT 2 to run CONSECUTIVE to COUNT 1 and pay \$2,551.88 Restitution; as to COUNT 3 – TO A MAXIMUM term of LIFE WITH THE POSSIBILITY of PAROLE after SIXTY (60) MONTHS in the Nevada Department of Corrections (NDC), COUNT 3 to run CONSECUTIVE to COUNT 2; as to COUNT 4 - TO A MAXIMUM term of LIFE WITH THE POSSIBILITY of PAROLE after THREE HUNDRED (300) MONTHS in the Nevada Department of Corrections (NDC), COUNT 4 to run CONSECUTIVE to COUNT 3; as to COUNT 5 - TO A MAXIMUM term of LIFE WITH THE POSSIBILITY of PAROLE after ONE HUNDRED TWENTY (120) MONTHS in the Nevada Department of Corrections (NDC), COUNT 5 to run CONSECUTIVE to COUNT 4 and pay \$472.26 Restitution; and as to COUNT 6 TO A MAXIMUM term of LIFE WITH THE POSSIBILITY of PAROLE after SIXTY

(60) MONTHS in the Nevada Department of Corrections (NDC), COUNT 6 to run CONSECUTIVE to COUNT 5; with ONE HUNDRED SIXTY-THREE (163) days credit for time served.

FURTHER ORDERED, a SPECIAL SENTENCE of LIFETIME SUPERVISION is imposed to commence upon release from any term of imprisonment, probation or parole.

ADDITIONALLY, the Defendant is ORDERED to REGISTER as a sex offender in accordance with NRS 179D.460 within FORTY-EIGHT (48) HOURS after any release from custody.

THEREAFTER, on the 27th day of July, 2023, the Defendant not present, and pursuant to Defendant's Motion to Change Name and Gender on Judgment of Conviction; COURT ORDERED, Motion GRANTED; Defendant's Name to change from Roy James Trost to Daisy Lynne Meadows and Defendant's Gender to change from Male to Female.

Dated this 9th day of August, 2023

511 FB0 4D09 794E Joe Hardy District Court Judge

Vary Lupre Weadows UNITED STATES DISTRICT CONFILED) 10 Ben 650 DISTRICT OF Nevada AUG 15 2023 Indian Springs, NV 89010 Ruy James Trost - 2679137 Detendant The State of Nevada Plantiff.

AUG 14 7073 Comes Now MuintiFF Daisy lynne Meadeut in Po Se

Case No 08C247731 Dept No. X September 5, 2023 8:30 AM Meticn to make correction OF Petenbant Judgment OF Conviction JOC Wrong name on Conviction

Compelling this Honorable Court to change her name that is on ther Judgement of Conviction to that of Daisy Cyrine Meadout her legal True Name see Case No de 22070 54 Pert No. 2 In the Seventh Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada In and For the Country of white Vine on June 15# 2023 Sighned the order changing her name to Daisy June Meadows as Such she seek and Requests that this thenwalk Court issue her a new Judgment of conviction to letted by The name Pated this It day of August 2023 by Hang

Case No. CV8907034 Dept. No. JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WHILE In the Matter of the Application of 10 11 12 For Change of Name. 13 The Petition of 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 proposed. 21 22 Petitioner 23 24 Dated this 25 26 District Court 27 28

FILED

2023 JUN 15 P 2:58

ORDER CHANGING NAME

seeking an order from the Court changing her name to Daisy in place of his present name, and proof having been made to the satisfaction of the Court that notice thereof was given as required by law, and no objections having been filed by any person, and the Court being satisfied that there is no reasonable objection to Petitioner assuming the name

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the name of ____ is hereby changed to

___. IT IS SO ORDERED.

Mrs Paist Jum Meadure Tiest 1027\$86 High Devet State Riser, 10. Box 650 Indian Springs, NO 89070

RECEIVED

AUG 14 2023

CLERK OF THE COURT

INS VECTOR ON

9 AUG 2023 PM 3 L

Clerk of the Court Regional Justice Cente 200 lewin avenue 3072 (as Vegas, Nevada 89155

0000000-1010000

հյ վայի ականի այրային այրային այրային այրային եր