#### IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

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Counsel for Appellant

ORIGINAL

Case No. 41405

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### RESPONDENT'S ANSWERING BRIEF

Appeal From Amended Judgment of Conviction Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County

PAUL E. WOMMER, ESQ. Law Offices of Paul E. Wommer Nevada Bar #000015 625 South Sixth Street Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 (702) 388-8817

GREGORY SCOTT HERMANSKI.

Appellant,

Respondent.

a/k/a Robert James Day,

THE STATE OF NEVADA.

DAVID ROGER Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #002781 Clark County Courthouse 200 South Third Street, Suite 701 Post Office Box 552212 Las Vegas, Nevada 89155-2212 (702) 455-4711 State of Nevada

BRIAN SANDOVAL Nevada Attorney General Nevada Bar No. 003805 100 North Carson Street Carson City, Nevada 89701-4717 (775) 684-1265



Counsel for Respondent

#### 1 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA 2 3 4 5 GREGORY SCOTT HERMANSKI, 6 a/k/a Robert James Day, 7 Appellant, Case No. 41405 8 v. 9 THE STATE OF NEVADA. 10 Respondent. 11 12 RESPONDENT'S ANSWERING BRIEF 13 **Appeal From Amended Judgment of Conviction Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County** 14 15 PAUL E. WOMMER, ESQ. Law Offices of Paul E. Wommer DAVID ROGER Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #002781 16 Nevada Bar #000015 Clark County Courthouse 625 South Sixth Street 17 Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 (702) 388-8817 200 South Third Street, Suite 701 Post Office Box 552212 18 Las Vegas, Nevada 89155-2212 (702) 455-4711 19 State of Nevada 20 **BRIAN SANDOVAL** Nevada Attorney General Nevada Bar No. 003805 21 100 North Carson Street 22 Carson City, Nevada 89701-4717 (775) 684-1265 23 24 25 26 27 28 Counsel for Appellant Counsel for Respondent

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## IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

GREGORY SCOTT HERMANSKI,

a/k/a Robert James Day,

Appellant,

V.

THE STATE OF NEVADA,

Respondent.

#### RESPONDENT'S ANSWERING BRIEF

Appeal From Amended Judgment of Conviction Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County

#### STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

- 1. Whether the State violated Defendant's due process rights when the Defendant perjured himself by claiming a false identity at trial.
- 2. Whether the Defendant received adequate notice of the habitual criminal proceedings.

#### STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Gregory Scott Hermanski was arrested and prosecuted for committing the crimes of robbery with the use of a deadly weapon and burglary while in possession of a deadly weapon. (Appellant's Appendix (AA) 14-16). When arrested, the State believed his name was Robert James Day and the case proceeded to trial with that understanding. (AA 1-7). Defendant was convicted and he appealed. (AA 67-71). This Court affirmed the conviction but remanded to district court because the trial judge had not sentenced Defendant properly under the habitual criminal statute. (*Day v.* State, Docket No. 38028. The Defendant was resentenced and now appeals from the Amended Judgment of Conviction.

#### STATEMENT OF FACTS

The Statement of Facts set forth in Appellant's Opening Brief relates the Defendant's version of the testimony at trial. On page 5, the brief indicates that references to the "record on appeal" are to the record filed on the direct appeal unless otherwise noted. That record, however, is no longer on file with the Court. Nevertheless, because the facts constituting the commission of the crimes are not relevant to the issues on appeal, the absence of the entire trial transcript is not necessary for this Court's review of the issues presented. Portions of the district court record which are relevant to the Defendant's perjury at trial with respect to his true identity are set forth in Respondent's Appendix.

After this Court remanded this case to the district court for resentencing, Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss Counsel and Appointment of Substitute Counsel. (Respondent's Appendix (RA) 75). In support of this motion, Defendant attached his affidavit. In that affidavit, he stated that when he was arrested, he had in his possession the birth certificate of Robert James Day who he claimed had given it to him. (RA 82-83). He further stated that when asked by the police what his name was, he didn't respond because he had an outstanding warrant issued by the United States Parole Commission for violation of his federal parole. When he was booked into the Clark County Detention Center, he was booked in as Robert James Day, "presumably because the arresting officer assumed my name was the same as that reflected on the Birth Certificate which police took from my pocket." (RA 83).

During the booking process, Defendant states that he was fingerprinted and that he assumed that the "scanning machine …has direct link to F.B.I. laboratory computer systems for identification." (RA 83). He further claimed that he believed throughout the prosecution of his case, the State knew full well that it was prosecuting him under an assumed name. *Id*.

At trial, he testified. Defense counsel asked him, "Mr. Day, could you tell the ladies and gentlemen of the jury your name, please?" He responded, "My name is

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Robert Jamie Day." (RA 3). After his testimony, the defense called Price Beasley as a witness. Defense counsel stated to him "I'm going to ask you to look at Robert Day over here." Mr. Beasley responded "Yeah, I worked with him several times." (RA 55). This demonstrates that Defendant was passing himself off to others as Robert Day.

During sentencing, Defendant continued to pretend he was Robert Day. After defense counsel read a self serving letter the Defendant had written, the Defendant asked if he could be heard. The court allowed him to briefly address the court. He asked the court to give him a sentence that would allow him to get a medical parole. (RA 73). The court responded, "All right. Mr. Day, all you're interested in is trying to manipulate the system once again." *Id.* It's clear that the Defendant had successfully assumed his false identity all the way through the district court proceedings.

Following remand from this Court, the matter was before the district court on July 25, 2002, on various proper person motions filed by the Defendant. At that time, defense counsel advised the court that had obtained information that her client was not Robert Day. (RA 95). The matter was back in court on October 2, 2002, for pending motions. The State represented that it agreed that the Defendant was not who everyone thought he was and that he should be resentenced under his true name. The State asked that a new Presentence Report be prepared. (RA 96). The matter was next on calendar on December 4, 2002, at which time the State advised the court that the Defendant, now identified as Gregory Hermanski, has eleven felony convictions. The court noted that the Defendant had lied to the court. The court ordered Parole and Probation to prepare a new presentence report. (RA 98-99). The matter was on calendar again on December 16, 2002, at which time the deputy public defender who had represented the Defendant throughout the proceedings asked to withdraw in light of the Defendant's request that different counsel be appointed. (RA 100, 75). The court granted the request. *Id*.

On December 26, 2002, the State filed its Notice of Intent to Seek Punishment as a Habitual Criminal. (RA 91-94). Said notice identified Defendant as Gregory

Hermanski and listed his eleven prior felony convictions. *Id.* The new presentence report was prepared and submitted to the court (RA 102-108).

On April 30, 2003, the Defendant was again adjudicated a habitual criminal, this time under his true name and criminal history. (RA 101). On May 16, 2003, an Amended Judgment of Conviction was filed memorializing the court's sentence. (RA 109-110).

#### **ARGUMENT**

I

# THE STATE DID VIOLATE DEFENDANT'S DUE PROCESS RIGHTS

The Defendant claims that when he knowingly assumed a false identity at trial, pretending to be Robert Day when in fact he was not, the State knew it all along and thereby violated his due process right to a fair trial. He asserts that the State, by playing along with Defendant's perjurious charade, was able to impeach his trial testimony with Robert Day's four felony convictions. (Appellant's Opening Brief (AOB), p. 13). That assertion is patently ridiculous. Why would the prosecutor want to impeach the Defendant with someone else's four felony convictions when it could have more effectively impeached him with his own eleven? The Defendant claims that the State knew from the beginning that he was not really Robert Day because it ran a fingerprint check through the F.B.I. fingerprint database. (AOB, p. 14). He offers no support for this assertion. The Defendant's self-serving affidavit filed in December of 2002, engages in such speculation but the record doesn't support the claim. Knowingly prosecuting an individual under a false identity would be utterly nonsensical for the State to do.

As additional support for his wild speculation, the Defendant states that the temporary custody record reflects a N.C.I.C number of 00F06978X. (AOB p. 14). That number is found on the temporary custody record under a box labeled "WARR/NCIC NUMBER" (AA 3). However, that number is nothing more than the justice court

number found on the criminal complaint. (AA 1). Right below the number on the temporary custody record, it displays the notation "JC1". (AA 3). That stands for Justice Court 1. The criminal complaint is clearly marked as being filed in Justice Court Department 1. (AA 1). Defendant goes to argue that the report of Cheryl Stubblefield, LVMPD Senior Law Enforcement Technician, concluded that the booking card of the Defendant does not contain the fingerprints of Robert Day. (AOB, p. 14; Appellant's Latest Appendix (ALP) 7-11). However, it must be noted that her report is dated March 20, 2002, which is after this Court remanded this case back to district court for resentencing and during the time when the defense began asserting that the Defendant was not Robert Day. (RA 95). If anything, this suggests that LVMPD had not done any fingerprint checking prior to the time of Stubblefield's report.

The Defendant also asserts that the presentence report "clearly indicates Day's true name is Gregory Scott Hermanski and Robert James Day is only an alias." He cites to page 4 of Appellant's Latest Appendix. (AOB p. 14). However, page 4 of Appellant's Latest Appendix served on the State is page 2 of this Court's Order Affirming in Part and Remanding in Part. The presentence report prepared for the Defendant's resentencing does clearly reveal that the Defendant's true name is Gregory Scott Hermanski and that Robert Day is an alias but that is obviously because Defendant's true identity was discovered after remand by this Court. (RA 102). The original presentence report, prepared when the State believed Defendant was Robert Day, does list Gregory Scott Hermanski as an alias but that doesn't mean that the State knew that Robert Day and Gregory Hermanski were two different people. When a presentence report lists aliases, that just means that that defendant uses other names but those other names may not actually be other people but just made-up names.

The Defendant states: "Had the jury been apprised of the true facts [that Robert Day was in fact Gregory Hermanski], however, it may have concluded that Hermanski was not the same violent-type person as Day. Thus, in this case, the prosecutor's

conduct rises to the level of a due process violation." (AOB 15). However, the use of prior felony convictions for impeachment is to demonstrate that the Defendant is not a credible witness. See NRS 50.095. They are not used as propensity evidence. See NRS 48.045; NRS 48.055. In any event, Hermanski's criminal history is worse than Day's and Hermanski has numerous convictions for crimes of violence. (RA 103-105).

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The Defendant's final attempt to demonstrate the validity of his claim is that, believing Defendant was Day, the State offered him a plea negotiation where he would be adjudicated under the "small" habitual criminal based upon Day's criminal history. Had the State prosecuted him under his true identity, the State would not offered him such a negotiation but would have insisted that he plead and be subject to the "big" habitual criminal, and since no defendant would accept such a negotiation, the State would be forced to take the case to trial. (AOB p.16). First of all, the Defendant is apparently clairvoyant enough to know what the State would offer as a plea negotiation if the Defendant were prosecuted under his true identity. But if, as the Defendant seems to be suggesting, the State's motive was to avoid going to trial, even if the State were prosecuting the Defendant under his true identity, the State could have offered the same negotiation as was offered to Defendant as Robert Day. Offering a plea negotiation which would subject the Defendant to being adjudicated under the "large" habitual criminal statute would, as the Defendant asserts, be rejected by any knowledgeable defense attorney, thus defeating the State's attempt to avoid trial. But this whole argument made by the Defendant is so lacking in common sense that it should be apparent to any objective person that this Defendant went through the criminal justice with everyone believing he was Robert Day.

The Defendant's entire premise for his due process violation claim is based on a false premise: that the State knew from the beginning that he was not Robert Day but wanted to prosecute him under that name for some tactical advantage. The problem with his position is that it simply is not true and makes no sense. Defendant

Hermanski is a career criminal and a manipulative liar. He fooled everyone in the criminal justice system up until the remand to district court when his charade was discovered. To now turn his deceit into an allegation of misconduct by the State is totally disingenuous. This Court should reject this ridiculous claim.

H

# THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR IN ADJUDICATING DEFENDANT A HABITUAL CRIMINAL

The Defendant argues that the district court improperly imposed the enhanced sentence under NRS 207.012(a) because the State never filed the information under the name Gregory Hermanski and thus no notice was given pursuant to the abovementioned statute. See, *Crutcher v. District Court*, 111 Nev. 1286, 903 P.2d 823 (1995). The suggestion that the Defendant never received notice that he was going to be considered for habitual criminal treatment under the name Gregory Hermanski is ludicrous. The numerous court proceedings in late 2002 mention over and over that the Defendant's true identity was now known and the State was going to seek adjudication as a habitual criminal for Gregory Hermanski using his eleven prior felony convictions. (RA 96-100). Indeed, the State served formal notice of its intention to seek habitual criminal treatment of the Defendant as Gregory Hermanski. (RA 91-94).

When the matter came before the district court on April30, 2003, neither the Defendant nor his counsel objected to the lack of notice. This claim is meritless.

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# **CONCLUSION** Based on the foregoing this Court should affirm the Defendant's Amended Judgment of Conviction Dated this 1<sup>st</sup> day of March, 2004. **DAVID ROGER** Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar # 002781 BY

Office of the Clark County District Attorney Clark County Courthouse 200 South Third Street, Suite 701 Post Office Box 552212 Las Vegas, Nevada 89155-2212 (702) 455-4711

Chief Deputy District Attorney Nevada Bar #000439

#### **CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE**

I hereby certify that I have read this appellate brief, and to the best of my knowledge, information, and belief, it is not frivolous or interposed for any improper purpose. I further certify that this brief complies with all applicable Nevada Rules of Appellate Procedure, in particular NRAP 28(e), which requires every assertion in the brief regarding matters in the record to be supported by appropriate references to the record on appeal. I understand that I may be subject to sanctions in the event that the accompanying brief is not in conformity with the requirements of the Nevada Rules of Appellate Procedure.

Dated this 1st day of March, 2004

DAVID ROGER Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #002781

BY

Chief Deputy District Attorney

Nevada Bar #000439

Office of the Clark County District Attorney

Clark County Courthouse

200 South Third Street, Suite 701 Post Office Box 552212

Las Vegas, Nevada 89155-2212

(702) 455-4711

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### **CERTIFICATE OF MAILING**

I hereby certify and affirm that I mailed a copy of the foregoing Respondent's Answering Brief to the attorney of record listed below on March 1, 2004.

Paul E. Wommer, Esq. Law Offices of Paul E. Wommer 625 South Sixth Street Las Vegas, Nevada 89101

Employee Clark County District Attorney's Office

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