impact of the collision was insufficient to cause the Plaintiff's injuries (RTP March 28, 2011, pp. 92-95). Counsel for the Defendant failed to offer during the bench conference a sufficient explanation of how the speed of the vehicles prior to the collision has a tendency to make the existence of any fact of consequence more or less probable, *see*, NRS 48.015, other than to suggest a minor impact (RTP March 28, 2011, p. 94-96).

The Plaintiffs' objection was sustained.

What then followed can only be described by this Court as an intentional attempt to further violate this Court's clear and unambiguous Order.

Regarding the post-accident response by law enforcement and medical personnel, counsel for the Defendant asked the following questions of Mr. Simao:

[Defense Counsel] Now, we've heard several times through this trial that an ambulance came to the scene.

[Mr. Simao] Yes.

[Defense Counsel] And that you declined treatment.

[Mr. Simao] I did.

[Defense Counsel] And the paramedics didn't transport anyone from Mrs. Rish's car?

(RTP March 28, 2011, p. 98) (Emphasis supplied).

An immediate objection was interposed by Plaintiffs' counsel and a brief bench conference was convened before this Court excused the jury and addressed the matter on the record outside their presence.

2. Plaintiff's Request to Strike Defendant's Answer

During the hearing outside the jury's presence, counsel for the Plaintiffs again made an exhaustive record of all of the occasions this Court had to direct and admonish Defendant not to

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address "minor impact" issues as a result of this Court's previous Orders. A significant record was made of the notice provided to the Defendants that not only was the conduct violative of this Court's Order, but further that the Plaintiffs would be asking the Court to strike the Defendant's Answer as a sanction therefore (RTP March 28, 2011, pp. 101-05).

The response from the Defendant was essentially that she should not be precluded from any discussion of the accident in question. Such an argument, this Court noted, misses the point and unfairly and incorrectly broadens the scope of the pretrial Order. An incorrect summary of the Court's Order that any and all discussion of the accident in question is precluded is vastly different from questioning four separate witnesses as to whether anyone from the Defendant's vehicle was injured in the crash. On this issue, the Court's prior pronouncements could not have been clearer.

While inclined to grant the Plaintiffs' motion to strike the Defendant's Answer at the conclusion of the hearing outside the presence of the jury, this Court instead took the opportunity to recess to again review the appropriate law, including the Nevada Supreme Court's opinion in *Young v. Ribeiro Building, Inc.*, on the issue of case concluding sanctions for abusive litigation practices and continuous violations of Orders of the Court.

3. This Court's Consideration of the Law as Applied to the Facts of This Case

As set forth above, the Nevada Supreme Court in *Young* reiterated that trial courts have inherent equitable powers to issue sanctions for abusive litigation practices, including case concluding sanctions such as dismissal or the striking of pleadings. *Young, supra* at 92. Case concluding sanctions are subject to a "somewhat heightened standard of review," *Id.; Foster v. Dingwall*, 227 P.3d 1042, 1048 (Nev. 2010), to determine if the sanctions are just and relate to the claims at issue.

Before issuing such sanctions, a trial court should carefully consider the factors

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announced in Young, although no single factor is necessarily dispositive and each of the nonexhaustive factors should be examined in the light of the case before the trial court. Young, supra at 92. Additionally, case concluding sanctions shall be supported by an express, careful and preferably written explanation of the trial court's analysis of the Young factors. Id. at 93; Bahena v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 235 P.3d 592, 598 (Nev. 2010), rehearing denied, 245 P.3d 1182 (2010).

This Court carefully considered the plethora of violations of Court Orders before granting the Plaintiffs' request to strike the Defendant's Answer. The hearing outside the presence of the jury encompasses fifteen pages (15), which does not include the independent research and analysis conducted by this Court during a lengthy recess in the proceedings. The Court's consideration of the Young factors, although similar in many respects to the consideration of the same factors three days earlier at the time of the irrebuttable presumption sanction, includes the following:

a) Degree of willfulness of the violations

A violation of an Order on a motion in limine may serve as a basis for some type of sanction if the Order is specific in its prohibition and the violation is clear. BMW v. Roth, 127 Nev.Ad.Op. 11, p.12, citing to Black v. Schultz, 530 F.3d 702, 706 (8th Cir. 2008). As set forth previously, the violations of this Court's clear and unambiguous Orders were continuous, systematic and pervasive. Such violations include, but are not limited to, the following:

- i. Violation of Order precluding evidence of "medical build-up" during Opening Statement;
- ii. Violation of Order precluding evidence of "medical build-up" during the testimony of Dr. Patrick McNulty;
 - iii. Violation of Order precluding evidence of unrelated accidents during Opening

Statement;

- iv. Violation of Order precluding evidence or argument in support of "minor impact" defense during Opening Statement;
- v. Violation of Order precluding evidence or argument in support of "minor impact" defense during testimony of Dr. Jorg Rosler (question regarding injuries to the Defendant or her passengers);
- vi. Violation of Order precluding evidence or argument in support of "minor impact" defense during testimony of Dr. Patrick McNulty (question regarding injuries to Defendant or her passengers);
- vii. Violation of Order precluding evidence or argument in support of "minor impact" defense during testimony of Dr. Jaswinder Grover (question regarding injuries to Defendant or her passengers);
- viii. Defendant's abject failure to apprise defense expert Dr. David Fish of court's rulings on all motions in limine;
- ix. Violation of Order precluding evidence or argument in support of "minor impact" defense during testimony of Dr. David Fish (question and answer regarding the nature of the accident);
- x. Violation of Order precluding evidence or argument in support of "minor impact" defense during testimony of Plaintiff William Simao (question regarding injuries to the Defendant or her passengers);

These violations of the Court's Order precluding the "minor impact" defense are considered by this Court to be even more egregious given the numerous hearings outside the presence of the jury wherein this Court repeatedly and unequivocally prohibited the areas of inquiry subsequently broached by counsel for Defendant. Those hearings include:

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- ii. Hearing outside the presence of jury to discuss "minor impact," March 18,2011;
- iii. Hearing outside the presence of jury to discuss whether the Plaintiffs opened the door to "minor impact" defense during Opening Statement, March 21, 2011;
- iv. Objection sustained to counsel for the Defendant's question of Dr. Rosler regarding injuries to occupants of the Defendant's vehicle, March 22, 2011;
- v. Objection sustained to counsel for the Defendant's question of Dr. McNulty regarding injuries to occupants of the Defendant's vehicle, March 25, 2011;
- vi. Objection sustained to counsel for the Defendant's question of Dr. Grover regarding injuries to occupants of the Defendant's vehicle, March 25, 2011;
- vii. Hearing outside the presence of the jury to discuss "minor impact" defense and the Plaintiffs' notice of seeking progressive sanctions, March 25, 2011;
- viii. Objection sustained to counsel for the Defendant's question of Dr. Fish which resulted in response citing to the nature of the impact, March 28, 2011;
- ix. Hearing outside the presence of the jury to discuss "minor impact" defense and the Plaintiffs' request for irrebuttable presumption instruction for the Defendant's continued violations of Court's Order, March 28, 2011;
- x. Objection sustained to counsel for the Defendant's question of Plaintiff William Simao regarding injuries to occupants of the Defendant's vehicle, March 31, 2011;

At the hearing on the Plaintiffs' oral motion to strike the Defendant's Answer, this Court characterized the continuing violations as having been "willfull, deliberate, [and] abusive," (RTP March 31, 2011, pp. 111-12), based on the fact that counsel for Defendant "refuses to comply

with this Court's rulings" (RTP March 31, 2011, p. 112). Particularly disturbing was counsel for Defendant's systematic insistence upon asking the Plaintiff and three separate treating doctors whether they were aware of any injuries to passengers in the Defendant's vehicle, despite this Court's clear preclusion of that inquiry after each instance of misconduct.

b) The extent to which the non-offending party would be prejudiced by a lesser sanction

As set forth previously, the imposition of lesser sanctions did not act to curb the Defendant's violations of this Court's pretrial Orders. An attorney's violation of an Order on a motion in limine is misconduct which justifies evidentiary sanctions or even a new trial. *See, BMW v. Roth*, 127 Nev.Ad.Op. 11, p.12; *Lioce v. Cohen,* 124 Nev. 1 (2008). Although Nevada precedent does not follow the federal model of requiring progressive sanctions before imposing a case concluding sanction, *see, Bahena v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber, supra,* 245 P.3d at 1184-85, this Court nevertheless imposed progressive sanctions against the Defendant including the irrebuttable presumption instruction to no avail. Nothing this Court could fashion, short of a case concluding sanction, was successful to halt violations of this Court's pretrial Orders.

Given the frequency of the Defendant's violations of this Court's Order precluding a "minor impact" defense, all of which occurred in front of the jury, the Plaintiffs were prejudiced by having this issue repeatedly brought to the jury's attention. In the eyes of the jury, the Plaintiffs were repeatedly preventing the jury from hearing about the significance of the impact, when in fact this Court had determined that a "minor impact" defense was unavailable to the Defendants given the lack of evidence (and expert testimony) to support such a defense. In reliance upon this Court's Order granting the Plaintiffs' Motion in Limine, the Plaintiffs had released their biomechanical expert and had neither mentioned his name nor offered his opinions in Opening Statement. The Plaintiffs had relied on this Court's Order that no "minor impact" defense would be presented to the jury. The Plaintiffs had further relied on the fact that such a

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ruling would be upheld by this Court during the course of trial. The unfair prejudice to the Plaintiffs was clearly shown. See, Roth, supra.

This Court also recognizes the prejudice to the Plaintiffs in making objection after objection to the Defendant's inappropriate questions. "[W]hen...an attorney must continuously object to repeated or persistent misconduct, the non-offending attorney is placed in the difficult position of having to make repeated objections before the trier of fact, which might cast a negative impression on the attorney and the party the attorney represents, emphasizing the improper point." *Lioce v. Cohen*, 174 P3d 970, 981 (Nev. 2008).

As such, it is the finding of this Court that the Plaintiffs would be unfairly prejudiced by the continuous introduction of questions, evidence and argument designed to create an inference that the subject motor vehicle accident was too minor to cause the Plaintiff's injuries.

c) The severity of a sanction of striking Defendant's Answer relative to the severity of the abuse

Again, the pervasive and continuous nature of these violations warrants the sanction ultimately imposed. Every litigant has the right to disagree with any ruling made or Order entered by a trial court. His remedy is with an appellate court, based upon reasonable grounds as the law requires. His remedy is never to just continue violating the Orders unchecked.

d) The feasibility and fairness of an alternative, lesser sanction

As set forth above, alternative lesser sanctions were apparently rejected by the Defendant in favor of continuing to violate the Orders of the Court. When the Plaintiffs first asked this Court to strike the Defendant's Answer on March 28, 2011, the Court considered this factor from the *Young* decision to impose an alternative sanction of an irrebuttable presumption instruction.

As this Court indicated at the hearing on the Plaintiffs' second oral request to the strike Defendant's Answer:

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[Court] Regarding the feasibility and fairness of an alternative, lesser sanction, you know, the only thing I can say is less severe sanctions were imposed to no avail. (RPT March 31, 2011, p. 113).

This analysis is bolstered by the fact that the Plaintiffs requested that the Court strike the Defendant's Answer three days earlier and put the Defendant on notice that they would seek to strike the Defendant's Answer should any future violations occur.

e) The policy favoring adjudication on the merits

As set forth above, this Court opted for less severe sanctions for all of the violations prior to March 31, 2011, in large measure because of the policy favoring adjudication on the merits. Even the irrebuttable presumption instruction given as a lesser, alternative sanction did not prevent the Defendant from presenting any defense that they actually had evidence to present. It is also worth noting that the Defendant had already agreed on the record not to challenge liability for the accident.

Further, this Court recognizes that the Nevada Supreme Court has upheld the striking of pleadings for a party's failure to attend his deposition, Foster v. Dingwall, supra; for repetitive, abusive and recalcitrant conduct during discovery, Young, supra; Hamlett v. Reynolds, 114 Nev. 863 (1998) (upholding the trial court's strike order where the defaulting party's constant failure to follow the court's orders was unexplained and unwarranted); for a party's continued failure to appear at scheduled court proceedings, Durango Fire Protection, Inc. v. Troncoso, 120 Nev. 658, 662 (2004); and for the failure to abide by rulings of the Discovery Commissioner, Bahena v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber, supra. Additionally, the Nevada Supreme Court has approved consideration of the Young factors as a guide to trial courts for sanctions grounded in violations of court orders at trial. See, Romo v. Keplinger, 115 Nev. 94, 97 (1999).

The willful and deliberate violations of this Court's Orders are equally as egregious as

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any discovery violation, especially given the fact that the repeated violations in the instant case occurred in front of the jury.

f) The need to deter parties and future litigants

Given its inherent powers derived from the Nevada Constitution and strong case precedent, this Court simply cannot allow litigants to openly and deliberately abuse the litigation process by disregarding Orders of the Court when convenient or tactically advantageous to do so, especially when unfair prejudice to the non-offending party results. Such an allowance would render courts of justice meaningless in the State of Nevada.

In the final analysis, after review and consideration of all of the various factors announced in <u>Young</u>, it is the determination of this Court that the intentional, deliberate, abusive and unfairly prejudicial conduct of the Defendant in repeatedly violating clear Orders of this Court warrants the ultimate sanction of striking the Defendant's Answer.

It is immaterial whether, as the Plaintiffs suggested several times during the trial, it was the true intention of the Defendant to force or goad the Plaintiffs to seek a mistrial. What is material is that the deliberate conduct of counsel for the Defendant in disregarding and violating Court Orders could not be halted by this Court with any other sanction.

Neither sustained objections, a multitude of hearings outside the presence of the jury, nor progressive sanctions deterred the Defendant's ignorance of Orders of this Court.

Having carefully and thoughtfully considered the available remedies, it is the decision of this Court, for all of the reasons set forth above, that striking the Defendant's Answer is appropriate under the particular circumstances presented herein.

II. Plaintiffs' Request for a Prove-Up Hearing to Establish Damages

By the time of the last violation of this Court's Orders by the Defendant, most of the Plaintiffs' evidence had been presented to the Court over the first ten (10) days of testimony.

Counsel for the Plaintiffs requested a hearing the following day for essentially a prove-up hearing similar to the entry of a default judgment under NRCP 55b.

Counsel for the Defendant then requested the ability to be heard at the argument on damages, pursuant to *Hamlett v. Reynolds*, 114 Nev. 863 (1998). In *Hamlett*, the Nevada Supreme Court struck Hamlett's Answer as a sanction for his continued failure to comply with discovery orders pursuant to *Young v. Ribeiro Building, supra*. Hamlett claimed the trial court erred in restricting his participation in the prove-up hearing to cross-examining Reynolds' witnesses. In analyzing this issue under NRCP 55(b)(2), the Court stated:

The language of NRCP 55(b)(2) that the "court may conduct such hearings or order such references as it deems necessary and proper" suggests to us an intent to give trial courts broad discretion in determining how prove-up hearings should be conducted. Thus, we conclude that the extent to which a defaulting party will participate in prove-up is a decision properly delegated to the trial courts. The trial courts should make this determination on a case-by-case basis and not according to static rules implemented by this court.

In deciding the extent to which a defaulted party will be permitted to participate in prove-up, if at all, trial courts should remember that the purpose of conducting a hearing after default, according to NRCP 55(b)(2), is to determine the amount of damages and establish the truth of any averment. To that end, trial courts should determine the extent to which full participation by the defaulted party will facilitate the truth-seeking process.

Hamlett, supra at 866-67.

In Foster v. Dingwall, supra, the Nevada Supreme Court clearly stated the standard for proving up damages after a default is entered as a sanction. During the prove-up hearing, this Court shall consider the allegations deemed admitted by the fact of the default to determine if the Plaintiff has established a prima facie case for liability. Foster, supra, 227 P.3d at 1049-50. A prima facie case is defined as sufficiency of evidence in order to send the question to the jury. Id. at 1050. In the instant case, Defendant Rish admitted responsibility for the accident and stipulated to liability. What was left was a determination of the Plaintiffs' damages, and the Plaintiffs requested that this Court take notice of the evidence that had been presented in the

preceding ten (10) days of testimony. Even though allegations in the pleadings are deemed admitted as a result of the entry of default, the admission does not relieve the non-offending party's obligation to present substantial evidence of the amount of damages suffered by both of the Plaintiffs. *Id.* Having reviewed the evidence and concluding that a *prima facie* case had been established by both Plaintiffs, this Court determined that the Plaintiffs are entitled to damages for the harms proximately caused by the motor vehicle accident.

In determining the level of participation of the Defendant in the prove-up hearing, this Court was mindful of the Nevada Supreme Court's pronouncement in *Foster* and *Young* that because the default was entered as a result of the Defendant's abusive litigation practices, the Defendant "forfeited his right to object to all but the most patent and fundamental defects" in the prove-up. *Foster, supra* at 1050; *Young, supra* at 95.

Nevertheless, in an exercise of discretion authorized by *Hamlett*, this Court determined that the Defendant would be allowed to address the Plaintiffs' brief final argument on damages in an argument of her own, to be followed by a brief rebuttal argument on behalf of the Plaintiffs.

Based on all of the foregoing, **THIS COURT HEREBY ORDERS** that Plaintiffs' oral Motion to Strike Defendant's Answer is **GRANTED**.

This matter stands submitted following the arguments of counsel and the prove-up hearing of April 1, 2011, pending further Order of this Court.

DATED this ___21St day of April, 2011.

DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

24 Submitted by:

DAVID T. WALL, ESQ.

Nevada Bar No. 2805

MAINOR EGLET

400 South Fourth Street, Suite 600

Las Vegas, Nevada 89101

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PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that a Decision and Order Regarding Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike Defendant's Answer was entered in the above-entitled matter on April 22, 2011 and is attached hereto.

DATED this 26 day of April, 2011.

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ROBERT T. EGLET, ESQ.
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DAVID T. WALL, ESQ.
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CERTIFIATE OF MAILING

The undersigned hereby certifies that on the 2ψ day of April, 2011, a copy of the above and foregoing NOTICE OF ENTRY OF ORDER was served by enclosing same in an envelope with postage prepaid thereon, address and mailed as follows:

Stephen H. Rogers, Esq.
ROGERS, MASTRANGELO,
CARVALHO & MITCHELL
300 South Fourth Street, Suite 710
Las Vegas, Nevada 89101
Attorneys for Defendants

An employee of MAINOR EGLET

ORDR 1 ROBERT T. EGLET, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 3402 2 **CLERK OF THE COURT** DAVID T. WALL, ESQ. 3 Nevada Bar No. 2805 ROBERT M. ADAMS, ESQ. 4 Nevada Bar No. 6551 MAINOR EGLET 5 400 South Fourth Street, Suite 600 6 Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 Ph: (702) 450-5400 7 Fx: (702) 450-5451 dwall@mainorlawyers.com 8 9 MATTHEW E. AARON, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 4900 10 AARON & PATERNOSTER, LTD. 2300 West Sahara Avenue, Ste.650 11 Las Vegas, Nevada 89102 12 Ph.: (702) 384-4111 Fx.: (702) 384-8222 13 Attorneys for Plaintiffs 14 DISTRICT COURT 15 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 16 WILLIAM JAY SIMAO, individually and CASE NO.: A539455 17 CHERYL ANN SIMAO, individually, and as DEPT. NO.: X 18 husband and wife, 19 Plaintiffs, 20 ٧. 21 JENNY RISH, 22 Defendant. 23 24 **DECISION AND ORDER REGARDING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO STRIKE** 25 <u>DEFENDANT'S ANSWER</u> 26 This matter having come before the Court on March 31, 2011, on Plaintiffs' oral Motion 27 to Strike Defendant's Answer, ROBERT T. EGLET, ESQ., DAVID T. WALL, ESQ. and 28 ROBERT M. ADAMS, ESQ. present for Plaintiffs, WILLIAM SIMAO and CHERYL SIMAO,

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<u>STRIKE</u>

This matter having come before the Court on March 31, 2011, on Plaintiffs' oral Motion to Strike Defendant's Answer, ROBERT T. EGLET, ESQ., DAVID T. WALL, ESQ. and ROBERT M. ADAMS, ESQ. present for Plaintiffs, WILLIAM SIMAO and CHERYL SIMAO,

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STEPHEN H. ROGERS, ESQ. and DANIEL F. POLSENBERG, ESQ. present for Defendant, JENNY RISH, and following the Court's oral pronouncement from the bench GRANTING Plaintiffs' Motion, the Court hereby enters the following written Decision and Order:

I. Factual and Procedural Background

This case involves a motor vehicle accident occurring on April 15, 2005. The Plaintiff, WILLIAM SIMAO, was driving southbound on Interstate 15 when he was rear-ended by a vehicle driven by the Defendant, JENNY RISH. Defendant did not deny causing the accident. Plaintiff WILLIAM SIMAO was injured in the accident and brought the instant action, which included a claim for loss of consortium by WILLIAM SIMAO's wife, Plaintiff CHERYL SIMAO.

This matter was presented for jury trial beginning on March 14, 2011, and the trial had nearly been completed before the instant Motion was made. However, the facts supporting the Motion and the grounds upon which to analyze the Motion include rulings made by this Court before the trial commenced. The Plaintiffs' oral motion to strike the Defendant's Answer is rooted primarily in the Defendant's repeated violations of this Court's Order granting the Plaintiffs' Motion in Limine to Preclude Defendant From Raising a Minor Impact Defense. However, this Court recognizes that Defendant violated other Orders of this Court during the trial, and the cumulative effect of such violations is material to the Court's analysis. Before itemizing and analyzing the violations of this Court's Order on "minor impact," it is necessary to consider the violations of other Court orders by the Defendant.

A. Violation of Order Precluding Evidence of Unrelated Accidents, Injuries or Medical Conditions

1. Plaintiffs' Motion in Limine

On January 7, 2011, Plaintiffs brought an Omnibus Motion in Limine, which included a

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request to preclude the Defendant from introducing evidence of Prior and Subsequent Unrelated Accidents, Injuries and Medical Conditions and Prior and Subsequent Claims or Lawsuits. This portion of the Omnibus Motion in Limine specifically asked this Court to preclude evidence of an unrelated 2003 motorcycle accident involving the Plaintiff, since no medical provider had connected any of the minor injuries sustained by the Plaintiff in the 2003 motorcycle accident to any injuries suffered in the instant accident. In short, the evidence established that the motorcycle accident was irrelevant.

The Defendant filed an Opposition to Plaintiffs' Omnibus Motion in Limine, and the matter was heard by this Court on February 15, 2011, at which time this Court GRANTED Plaintiffs' request. On March 9, 2011, this Court entered a written Order which stated in pertinent part as follows:

"IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs' request to exclude prior and subsequent unrelated accidents, injuries and medical conditions, and prior and subsequent claims or lawsuits is GRANTED in all respects."

Following the entry of the foregoing Order, all parties were on notice that this Court had specifically precluded the Defendant from introducing evidence of unrelated accidents, including the 2003 motorcycle accident.

2. <u>Defendant's Clear Violation in Opening Statement</u>

In his Opening Statement, counsel for the Defendant presented to the jury a Power Point slide referencing William Simao's 2003 motorcycle accident. The Plaintiffs objected, asked that the slide be shielded from the jury, and approached for a sidebar conference.

The slide clearly and unambiguously violated the Order of this Court on the Plaintiffs' Omnibus Motion in Limine, which Motion specifically referenced the 2003 motorcycle accident as an accident unrelated to any issue in the instant case. The jury was directed to disregard the

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slide and was further admonished that a pretrial ruling of the Court excluded evidence of the 2003 motorcycle accident.

The Plaintiffs' objection was sustained.

Following this admonition, this Court held a hearing outside the presence of the jury to allow the Defendant's counsel and the Plaintiffs' counsel to review the remaining slides accompanying the defense Opening Statement to determine if any of them violated court orders. Several of them violated orders and were removed (RTP, March 21, 2011, p. 75). Notably, the Plaintiffs' counsel made the following statement outside the presence of the jury:

There were multiple other slides that had the same type of problems in them. Most of them Mr. Rogers agreed with and took those statements out of the slides, but again, if we hadn't done that, there would have been three to four more clear violations of ... this Court's pretrial orders.

As Mr. Wall [Plaintiffs' co-counsel] said at the bench, I think it's clear - I think it's abundantly clear that Mr. Rogers is going to try to mistry this case. I think it is abundantly clear that that's what's going on.

I told the Court at the last bench conference that that was two. If there were any additional ones, we were going to start asking for monetary sanctions and other potential sanctions in this case for this type of systematic refusal to comply with pretrial court orders.

I expect his experts are going to do it as well. I can assure this Court that they are going to violate a number of the orders in their testimony, just like Mr. Rogers did up there....

(RTP, March 21, 2011, p. 75) (emphasis supplied).

B. Violations of Order Precluding Evidence That This is a "Medical Build-up" Case

1. Plaintiffs' Motion in Limine

Within the afore-mentioned Omnibus Motion in Limine, the Plaintiffs also sought to preclude any evidence or argument that the case was "attorney driven" or a "medical build-up" case. This section of the Plaintiffs' Omnibus Motion in Limine was also heard by this Court on February 15, 2011, at which time this Court GRANTED the Plaintiffs' request. During the hearing on this Motion, counsel for the Defendant conceded he had no evidence of any kind suggesting that this case was "attorney driven" or a "medical build-up" case. This Court's written Order of March 9, 2011, also stated as follows:

"IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs' request to preclude argument that this case is 'attorney driven' or a 'medical build-up' case is GRANTED."

Following the entry of the foregoing Order, all parties were on notice that this Court had specifically precluded the Defendant from arguing or presenting evidence that the instant case was a "medical build-up" case, in large measure as a result of the Defendant having no such evidence to present.

2. Defendant's Clear Violation During Opening Statement

In his Opening Statement, counsel for the Defendant made the following statement when discussing the testimony of the Plaintiff's treating physicians:

"And we are going to hear from various different kinds of doctors in this case.

One of them are doctors who appear down here regularly in court, as often, if not more than trial lawyers. Doctors McNulty, and Grover..."

(RTP March 21, 2011, p. 72).

Defense counsel's statement was interrupted by an objection from the Plaintiffs, who additionally asked that the Power Point slide that accompanied the defense's Opening Statement

be shielded from the jury. The slide referenced the Plaintiff's treating physicians as "Trial Doctors."

At the sidebar conference that followed, the Plaintiffs objected to the statements of counsel and the "Trial Doctors" slide as violating this Court's Order precluding any argument that the case was "attorney driven" or a "medical build-up" case. Since no other purpose for the statement or the slide was forthcoming from counsel for the Defendant at the sidebar, the jury was directed to disregard the slide.

The Plaintiffs' objection was sustained.

3. <u>Defendant's Clear Violation During Cross-Examination of Dr. Patrick McNulty</u>

Despite this Court's ruling during the Defendant's Opening Statement on the issue of medical build-up and "Trial Doctors," counsel for the Defendant asked the following question of Dr. McNulty, one of the Plaintiff's treating doctors:

"Now, Doctor, yesterday there was a discussion about the testimony history of a doctor. I don't broach this topic with you to be insensitive, but I want to touch on it since that issue has been raised. You testified under oath, whether it be in trial or in deposition, somewhere around 100 times; is that right?"

(RTP, March 25, 2011, pp. 21-22).

Counsel for the Plaintiffs immediately objected and approached the Court for a sidebar bench conference. There, the Court heard argument regarding the "discussion" "yesterday" which was the Plaintiffs' use of specific prior deposition testimony to impeach the Defendant's expert witness during cross-examination. Further, the Court heard argument that this line of questioning could only be presented to create an inference of "medical build-up." Counsel for the Defendant did not sufficiently explain to this Court how this line of questioning was not a violation of the pretrial order precluding evidence of "medical build-up," especially in light of

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the fact that the Defendant admittedly had no evidence to support a "medical build-up" defense.

The Plaintiffs' objection was sustained.

C. Violations of Pretrial Order Precluding "Minor Impact" Defense

As set forth above, the Plaintiffs' ultimate motion to strike the Defendant's Answer was based primarily on repeated violations of this Court's pretrial Order on the issue of a "minor impact" defense.

1. Plaintiff's Motion in Limine

On February 17, 2011, Plaintiffs brought a Motion in Limine to: 1) Preclude Defendant from Raising a "Minor" or "Low Impact" Defense; 2) Limit the Trial Testimony of Defendant's Expert, David Fish, M.D.; and 3) Exclude Evidence of Property Damage. The Motion set out the fact that the Nevada Highway Patrol Trooper who completed the Accident Report referred to the vehicle damage as "moderate." Specifically, the Motion asked the Court to preclude the Defendant from "arguing, suggesting or insinuating at trial that the crash was a 'minor impact' or 'low impact' collision, and not significant enough to cause Plaintiff's injuries." The Motion was primarily based on Hallmark v. Eldridge, 189 P.3d 646 (Nev. 2008), coupled with the fact that Defendant did not have any expert qualified to testify whether the impact in the instant collision was sufficient to cause the injuries complained of. Conversely, the Plaintiffs had disclosed a biomechanical expert who was prepared to testify that the accident was of the type to have proximately caused injury to the Plaintiff. The Motion further sought to limit Defendant's pain management expert, Dr. David Fish, from testifying to opinions rooted in biomechanical science, as he lacks the qualifications to testify to such opinions under the standard announced in Hallmark.

On February 25, 2011, Defendant filed an Opposition to the Motion and the matter was heard by this Court on March 1, 2011, at which time the Court GRANTED Plaintiffs' Motion in

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its entirety. Defendants provided no evidence or information to correlate the amount of damage to a vehicle in a collision to the severity of the injury suffered by a passenger. Defendants had no expert witness on biomechanics to support an argument or inference that this accident was too minor to cause the injuries alleged to have been suffered by the Plaintiff. Based on the Nevada Supreme Court's rulings in Hallmark, supra, Levine v. Remolif, 80 Nev. 168 (1964) and Choat v. McDorman, 86 Nev. 332 (1970), this Court found that issues of accident reconstruction and biomechanics are not within the common knowledge of laypersons and require expert witness testimony. As such, this Court found no evidentiary or factual foundation upon which the Defendant could argue or infer that the accident was too minor to cause the Plaintiff's injuries.

On March 8, 2011, this Court entered a written Order which stated in pertinent part as follows:

"IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs' request to preclude Defendant from Raising a "Minor" or "Low Impact" Defense is **GRANTED**.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs' request to limit the trial testimony of Defendant's expert, David Fish, M.D., to those areas of expertise that he is qualified to testify in regards to is GRANTED. Neither Dr. Fish nor any other defense expert shall opine regarding biomechanics or the nature of the impact of the subject crash at trial.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs' request to exclude the property damage photos and repair invoice(s) is GRANTED."

Following the entry of the foregoing Order, all parties were on notice that this Court had specifically precluded a defense (or even an argument) that the accident was too minor to cause the injuries for which Plaintiff sought to recover damages.

Despite a clear and unambiguous Order precluding the Defendant from raising as a defense that the impact of the accident was too minor to cause the Plaintiff's injuries, counsel for

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the Defendant persisted in violating this Court's order, ultimately leading to the sanction imposed herein. There can be no question or argument that the Defendant was on notice of this Court's Order, based on the following: a) Hearing Outside the Presence of the Jury on March 18, 2011

After jury selection had been completed and before Opening Statements, this Court held a hearing outside the presence of the jury to discuss, among other things, the issue of a minor impact defense. The discussion on the record was extensive and comprises seventeen (17) pages of the transcript (See, RTP, March 18, 2011, pp. 112-129).

During this hearing, the Plaintiffs' counsel brought to this Court's attention the fact that counsel for the Defendant, in his Opening Statement, might broach the subject of minor impact by referring to the Defendant's deposition testimony that the impact of the accident was merely "a tap." Counsel for the Defendant conceded that it was his impression that this Court had not precluded such an argument:

"What happened was, there was a motion to exclude a defense that a minor impact cannot cause injury. The Plaintiffs' argument in the motion was because the defense did not retain a biomechanical engineer they would not be able to argue the general proposition that minor impacts cannot cause injury.

The defense appeared at the hearing and said, 'This is not a biomechanical case. The defense is not going to argue that no minor impact can cause injury. The defense is that this minor impact did not cause injury."

(RTP, March 18, 2011, p. 114)(emphasis supplied).

It became clear to this Court that the Defendant intended to present a minor impact defense, despite the Order of this Court to the contrary. Plaintiffs' counsel was allowed to once again state on the record their position on the original Motion in Limine, outlining that the

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Defendant had no expert witness to opine that the accident was too minor to cause the claimed injuries, and further that the Order of this Court on the Motion in Limine precluded a "minor impact" defense at trial.

By the conclusion of the hearing outside the presence of the jury, this Court reiterated its ruling on the Motion in Limine precluding a "minor impact" defense (RTP March 18, 2011, p. 125-26). Likewise, this Court precluded counsel for the Defendant from referencing in his Opening Statement that it was a minor impact, or simply "a tap," for the purpose of raising an inference that the accident was too minor to cause the Plaintiff's injuries (RTP March 18, 2011, pp. 127-28). This Court further reminded counsel for the Defendant to review the Order entered on this issue to avoid violating it in the future (RTP March 18, 2011, p. 126, 127).

b) Hearing Outside the Presence of the Jury on March 21, 2011

On the first court day following the hearing set forth above, the issue of "minor impact" was again raised outside the presence of the jury immediately following the Plaintiffs' Opening Statement. At this hearing, the Defendant sought permission to claim a "minor impact" defense based on the door allegedly being opened by the Plaintiffs in their Opening Statement when counsel referred to the accident as a "motor vehicle crash." This Court noted that the Plaintiffs in their Opening Statement did not refer to the nature of the impact, the severity of the impact, the fact that the impact was significant enough to cause the Plaintiff's injuries nor any violence associated with the impact. In fact, this Court noted that Plaintiffs' counsel did not describe the impact of the vehicles in any way.

Based on that finding, the Court denied the Defendant's renewed request to be able to raise a "minor impact" defense. Again, the Defendant was clearly and unequivocally on notice that such a defense was precluded.

2. Reference to Minor Impact during Defendant's Opening Statement

Immediately following the foregoing discussion outside the presence of the jury, counsel for the Defendant delivered his Opening Statement. He described the stop and go traffic the Defendant encountered before the accident, and stated that the Defendant was nearly stopped before the impact (RTP, March 21, 2011, p. 63). Plaintiffs did not object to this statement, although it arguably raises an inference of a minor impact.

Thereafter, counsel for the Defendant proceeded to attempt to play selected portions of his client's videotaped deposition regarding the nature of the accident, which drew an objection from the Plaintiffs. After a bench conference, this Court determined that not only was the Defendant's deposition hearsay when offered on her own behalf, but also that testimony regarding the nature of the accident, if offered to show it was a minor impact, would be in violation of this Court's pretrial Order.

The Plaintiffs' objection was sustained.

3. Clear Violation of Order During Cross-Examination of Dr. Jorg Rosler

During the testimony of Dr. Rosler, one of the Plaintiff's treating pain management physicians, counsel for the Defendant asked the following question:

"Do you know anything about what happened to [Defendant] Jenny Rish and her passengers in this accident?"

(RPT, March 22, 2011, p. 84)

Before the witness could answer, the Plaintiffs objected, citing this Court's pretrial motion ruling.

The only potential relevance of such an inquiry would be to raise an inference that since the Defendant or her passengers were not injured (or that the Plaintiff's treating physician was unaware of any injury), the accident must not have been significant enough to injure the Plaintiff.

There is no other potential purpose in obtaining an answer from this witness to that question. Such an inference would be directly contrary to this Court's Order precluding a "minor impact" defense.

The Plaintiffs' objection was sustained.

4. Clear Violation During Cross-Examination of Dr. Patrick McNulty

Despite the fact that the Court sustained the Plaintiffs' objection to the improper question of Dr. Rosler, counsel for Defendant asked an almost identical question of the next treating physician to testify for Plaintiff. Within the first two minutes of the Defendant's cross-examination of Dr. McNulty, the following questions were asked:

[Defense Counsel] And you don't know anything about the car accident other than what [Plaintiff] told you?

[Dr. McNulty] It was simply he said he had a car accident and that's when he – his problems started.

[Defense Counsel] Okay. But did you discuss with him whether he was able to drive from the scene of the accident?

[Dr. McNulty] No, I really didn't go into the other – into the other details. No, I did not discuss that.

[Defense Counsel] Do you know anything about the folks in Jenny Rish's car? (RTP 3/25/11, p. 4) (Emphasis supplied).

Counsel for the Plaintiffs immediately objected and a bench conference ensued. At the bench conference, counsel for the Defendant indicated his position on the relevance of the question:

[Defense Counsel] The relevance is that if one of them were injured or were not, that would be relevant or probative to whether the others were injured.

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(RTP 3/25/11, p. 5).

In fact, based on this Court's prior rulings, such a position is untenable. As stated in the authority supporting the grant of the Plaintiffs' pretrial Motion in Limine, there is no correlation between the size of the impact and the potential for injury to the Plaintiff. There is no correlation between whether the Defendant or one of her passengers was injured and the potential for injury to the Plaintiff. The Defendant had no credible or admissible evidence suggesting such a correlation and no expert testimony to support such a proposition.

Further, since the question asked on cross-examination of Dr. McNulty was exactly the same question precluded during the cross-examination of Dr. Rosler, the Defendant was clearly on notice that this area of inquiry was improper.

The Plaintiffs' objection was sustained.

5. Clear Violation During Cross-Examination of Dr. Jaswinder Grover

On the very same afternoon as Dr. McNulty's cross-examination, the Defendant had the opportunity to cross-examine Dr. Grover, another of the Plaintiff's treating physicians. During that cross-examination, counsel for the Defendant again asked the very same type of question precluded during the cross-examination of Drs. Rosler and McNulty:

[Defense Counsel] You know the Plaintiff wasn't transported by ambulance.

[Dr. Grover] Yes, sir.

[Defense Counsel] You know [whether] Jenny Rish -

[Plaintiff's Counsel] Objection, Your Honor.

[Defense Counsel] – was lifted from the scene?

(RTP 3/25/11, p. 141).

After all of the previous hearings on the issue of a "minor impact" defense, and after the objections to the same type of question were sustained by this Court, such a question of Dr.

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Grover is simply inexplicable. Again, there is no potential relevance to a question asked of one of the Plaintiff's treating doctors (who didn't treat the Plaintiff until almost three years after the accident) about any injuries to the Defendant, other than to attempt to infer that the accident was too minor to injure the Plaintiff if the Defendant was not injured. That inference is precluded, based on the fact that the Defendant had no expert witness or admissible evidence to support that inference.

The Plaintiffs' objection was sustained and the jury was directed to disregard the last question.

6. Hearing Outside the Presence of the Jury on March 25, 2011

Following the testimony of Dr. Grover, at a hearing outside the presence of the jury, counsel for the Plaintiffs made the following record regarding the pervasive and continuous violations of this Court's Orders on pretrial Motions by counsel for the Defendant:

[Plaintiffs' Counsel] Despite the ruling of the Court, despite the arguments we've had outside the presence on the issue of minor impact, in Opening Statement and with each and every witness so far, there's been a question which leads to a conclusion or an argument about minor impact, whether the Defendant was injured in – whether the doctor knows whether the Defendant was injured in the accident, which could only potentially be relevant to some argument that the accident was too minor to have caused injury, because she wasn't injured.

Each time we've objected. Each time the Court has sustained the objection. I would look for, frankly, some guidance from the Court on what we can do from here out, because it - I can only assume that it will continue to occur. And so, I don't know whether a progressive sanction that we'd ask for, that there should be a warning from the Court before this should happen again. But those are my concerns, and I don't know

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what other potential relevance there could be to asking a treating physician whether he's aware of whether or not the Defendant was injured in the accident.

(RTP 3/25/11, pp. 164-65) (emphasis supplied).

Thereafter, a discussion ensued on the record regarding the Court's pretrial ruling and the fact that the Defendant had repeatedly violated it. At the conclusion of the hearing outside the presence of the jury, this Court attempted, once again, to make it clear that the violations were continuous and that the Court would take necessary measures if the violations occurred again. To the Plaintiffs' counsel's suggestion of a progressive sanction, the Court responded thusly:

[Court] I think you're right, and I think that the defense is on notice. I think the Order is very clear. I think it clearly has been violated. I was really surprised to hear a question posed of [Dr. Grover] regarding Ms. Rish when the Court sustained a previous question regarding Ms. Rish of another witness and ruled that that was not relevant. So I was really surprised to hear that very same question posed as to Ms. Rish.

- - -

So I don't know. It does seem to be at this point to be deliberate, Mr. Rogers.

And so, I'm inclined to agree that you're on notice. The Court will consider progressive sanctions. I don't know what they will be. I hope there won't have to be any assessed.

But I don't know what else to do to try to get you to comply with the Court's previous Orders.

(RTP 3/25/11, pp. 166-67) (emphasis supplied).

7. Testimony of Defendant's Expert Witness, Dr. David Fish

a) Voir Dire Examination Prior to Direct Examination

Defense expert Dr. Fish testified out of order during the Plaintiffs' case-in-chief as an accommodation by the Plaintiff to the Defendant and her expert. At request of the Plaintiffs'

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counsel immediately prior to Dr. Fish's testimony to the jury, this Court held a hearing outside the presence of the jury to allow the Plaintiffs' counsel to take Dr. Fish on voir dire to ensure he was aware of the Court's previous rulings (including an Order granting the Plaintiffs' Motion in Limine to Limit the Testimony of Dr. Fish). Dr. Fish's testimony outside the presence of the jury comprises eighteen pages of the record (See, RTP March 24, 2011, pp. 12-30).

This questioning of Dr. Fish revealed that he was unaware of virtually every pretrial Order entered by this Court, including the Order limiting his testimony. He was unaware of this Court's Order precluding:

- 1) Plaintiff's unrelated 2003 motorcycle accident;
- 2) Plaintiff's unrelated 2008 motor vehicle accident;
- 3) Plaintiff's unrelated medical conditions;
- 4) Any suggestion of secondary gain, symptom magnification or malingering;
- 5) Sub rosa video surveillance of Plaintiff (ruling deferred until the conclusion of Plaintiff's direct examination);
- 6) Dr. Fish's testimony regarding biomechanical opinions related to the accident.

Of obvious concern to this Court was the fact that despite the voluminous pretrial motions, the thorough and even repetitious hearings and arguments entertained by this Court on the issues and the consistency of the enforcement of those rulings by this Court, the Defendant had not properly prepared her expert witness. When Dr. Fish volunteered that he thought some of the impediments to his testimony were "strange," the Court responded:

[Court] You know what seems strange to me? That this witness obviously doesn't have any idea what the Court has ruled prior to these motions in limine. (RTP March 24, 2011, p. 24).

The Court unambiguously placed Dr. Fish and the Defendant on notice that violations of

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the Court's pretrial Orders carried the possibility of sanctions, including striking the testimony of Dr. Fish in its entirety (RTP March 24, 2011, p. 15).

b) Violation During Cross-Examination

Nevertheless, during cross-examination, Dr. Fish persisted in failing to respond to pertinent questions from the Plaintiffs' counsel and on more than one occasion responded to questions by stating, inferring or insinuating that he was unfairly prohibited from answering the questions based on this Court's prior rulings (RTP March 24, 2011, p. 106, 133).

Despite the repeated and systematic violations of the pretrial Orders in this case and the Court's efforts to cure and prevent the same, Dr. Fish violated rulings on "minor impact" during cross-examination.

When presented with contrary testimony on issues of medicine in prior depositions from other cases, Dr. Fish responded by suggesting that the instant accident was not a "significant accident." The Plaintiffs' oral Motion to Strike was Granted by this Court (RTP March 28, 2011, p.71-72).

c) Violation During Redirect Examination

At the end of the Defendant's redirect examination of Dr. Fish, counsel for the Defendant in a conclusory fashion asked Dr. Fish to summarize his opinions on causation.

[Defense Counsel] ...Doctor, how is it that you can reach an opinion to a medical probability that this accident didn't cause the pain that [the Plaintiff] complained of following this accident?

[Dr. Fish] Well, it's based on multiple factors. It's based on the actual - looking at the images of the MRI. It's looking at the discogram and the results of the discogram. It's looking at the pattern of pain. It's looking at the notes that were taken of the events that happened and it's knowing about the accident itself.

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(RTP March 28, 2011, p.87) (Emphasis supplied).

Based on this Court's observation of Dr. Fish's testimony, there is no question that Dr. Fish's response, clearly in violation of this Court's Order, was deliberate. The Plaintiff's objection was sustained, and the jury was admonished to disregard the final statement in Dr. Fish's response.

D. Irrebuttable Presumption Instruction to the Jury

1. Plaintiffs' Request for a Special Instruction to the Jury

Following the testimony of Dr. Fish, the Court conducted a hearing outside the presence of the jury at the request of counsel for the Plaintiffs to consider a progressive sanction against the Defendant for the continuous and systematic violations of this Court's Orders on pretrial The Plaintiff offered, as an alternative to striking Defendant's Answer, a special motions. instruction to the jury directing them to presume that the accident in question was of a sufficient quality to have caused the injuries of which Plaintiff complained. The entire hearing on this issue outside the jury's presence comprises twenty-three (23) pages of transcript, which includes a recess by the Court to consider the appropriate language of an adverse inference instruction (See, RTP March 28, 2011, pp. 89-112).

During the hearing, the Plaintiffs' counsel correctly identified the factual and procedural history of the issue of a "minor impact" defense in this case (much of which is set forth above), including the rulings on pretrial motions, the numerous hearings outside the presence of the jury on this issue, the repeated violations of this Court's Order on "minor impact" and the records made establishing notice to the Defendant of possible progressive sanctions for any further violations (RTP March 28, 2011, pp. 89-93).

Counsel for the Plaintiffs then made a further record outlining the proper standard for consideration by this Court under Young v. Ribeiro Building, Inc., 106 Nev. 88 (1990).

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2. This Court's Consideration of the Young Factors

In Young, the Nevada Supreme Court reiterated that trial courts have inherent equitable powers to issue sanctions for abusive litigation practices. *Id.* at 92. Before issuing such sanctions, a trial court should carefully consider the factors announced in *Young*, although no single factor is necessarily dispositive and each of the non-exhaustive factors should be examined in the light of the case before the trial court. *Id.* As outlined during the hearing by counsel for the Plaintiffs, this Court considered the following factors set forth in *Young* before addressing the language of the special instruction to the jury.

a) Degree of willfulness of the violations

The violations of this Court's pretrial Orders were continuous and systematic. As set forth above, the Defendant was clearly on notice of the Court's Order regarding this "minor impact" defense yet the Defendant violated this particular Order on numerous occasions. Based on the sheer number of violations of the same order in the same fashion, this Court can only conclude that such violations were willful in nature.

b) The extent to which the non-offending party would be prejudiced by a lesser sanction

To date, no lesser sanction had been successful in precluding future violations. This Court has consistently sustained the Plaintiffs' objections and stricken offending questions and answers. At some point, simply directing jurors to disregard continuous violations of pretrial Orders is insufficient.

Counsel for the Plaintiffs indicated that the violations to this point were sufficient to

In considering non-case concluding sanctions, a trial court shall hold such hearing as it reasonably deems necessary to consider matters that are pertinent to the imposition of appropriate sanctions Bahena v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 245 P.3d 1182, 1185 (Nev. 2010) This court heard extensive arguments from the Plaintiffs and the Defendant before granting the Plaintiffs' request for a progressive sanction. While an "express, careful and preferably written" order is required by the Nevada Supreme Court for case concluding sanctions only, Young, supra at 93; Foster v. Dingwall, 227 P.3d 1042, 1048-49 (Nev. 2010), this Court outlines herein its analysis of the Young factors that supported the imposition of the non-case concluding sanction of an irrebuttable presumption instruction.

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warrant a request that this Court impose a case concluding sanction of striking the Defendant's Answer, but that in harmonizing this particular factor from Young it might be necessary for this Court to consider a lesser sanction of a presumption instruction.

c) The severity of a sanction of dismissal relative to the severity of the abuse

This Court considered, at the time of imposing the sanction of an irrebuttable presumption instruction to the jury, whether the alternative request of striking Defendant's Answer would be an appropriate response to Defendant's continuous violations of this Court's pretrial Orders. While the abuse to this point was systematic and severe, this Court determined that a progressive sanction would be appropriate before consideration of a case concluding sanction.

d) The feasibility and fairness of an alternative, lesser sanction

Again, against the backdrop of the Plaintiffs' alternative request to strike Defendant's Answer, this Court considered the feasibility and fairness of a lesser sanction and determined that the irrebuttable presumption instruction requested by Plaintiff appropriately addressed the nature of the violations of the Court's Order precluding evidence to support a "minor impact" defense.

An irrebuttable presumption is a presumption that cannot be overcome by any additional evidence or argument. Employers Insurance Co. of Nevada v. Daniels, 122 Nev. 1009, 1015-16, fn. 15 (2006), quoting Black's Law Dictionary 1223 (8th ed. 2004). As this Court noted during the sanction hearing, the Order granting the Motion in Limine was based on the Defendant's complete lack of evidence bearing on a "minor impact" defense:

[Court] But the point of the matter was that Defense had no witness who could testify that this was a minor impact and no witness who could testify that this was a minor impact that could not have caused the injuries to Plaintiff, that Plaintiff sustained.

Defense simply didn't have any witnesses to so testify. That's why the motion in limine was granted.

(RTP March 28, 2011, p. 104).

Given that the Defendant had no admissible, credible evidence to offer to support this "minor impact" defense, an irrebuttable presumption instruction was appropriate to communicate to the jury what the Defendant failed to comprehend throughout the trial: namely, that there is no evidence to suggest that the impact in this accident was too minor to cause the injuries the Plaintiff claims to have suffered. An alternative adverse inference instruction or a rebuttable presumption instruction would have given the Defendant exactly what was precluded in the Order on the pretrial motions: namely, an opportunity to rebut the contention that the accident was of sufficient character to have caused injury. Again, the Defendant had no evidence with which to rebut that contention.

e) The policy favoring adjudication on the merits

Mindful of this policy, the Court declined at this point to grant the Plaintiffs' request to strike the Defendant's Answer and instead issued the irrebuttable presumption instruction.

Given the Defendant's concession of responsibility for the accident, the "merits" of this case for the trier of fact to adjudicate were limited to the amount of damages suffered as a result of the accident. Since the Defendant had no evidence to support a contention that the nature of the impact in the accident was relevant to the amount of damages, the issues for the trier of fact were not materially affected by the irrebuttable presumption instruction.

f) Whether sanctions unfairly penalize a party for the misconduct of her attorney

In this Court's view, the key to this factor from *Young* is whether the Defendant is **unfairly** penalized for her attorney's misconduct. However, the irrebuttable presumption instruction imposed as a sanction by the Court did not unfairly penalize the Defendant. It simply

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allowed the jury to irrebuttably presume the very fact that Defendant had no admissible evidence to rebut – that the motor vehicle accident was sufficient in character and quality to have caused the injuries suffered by the Plaintiff.

Additionally, as set forth below, it must be noted that the special instruction to the jury still allowed them to consider whether the accident in question actually and proximately caused Plaintiff's injuries. The only presumption was that the accident was sufficient in character and quality to have potentially done so. The only issue eliminated or restricted by the irrebuttable presumption instruction was the "minor impact" defense for which Defendant had no evidence to support.

g) The need to deter parties and future litigants

As set forth in great detail above, the sanctions employed by the Court to deter this conduct had proven unsuccessful. Although this particular factor was not the overriding factor in determining that the special instruction to the jury was warranted, this Court hoped that this progressive sanction would at least deter the Defendant from continuing to violate the Orders of this Court.

3. The Irrebuttable Presumption Instruction

This Court took a recess to allow the Plaintiffs' counsel to draft a proposed instruction and then heard argument from both sides regarding the exact language of the instruction. After considering the proposed language and making some amendments thereto, as well as considering the necessity of instructing the jury immediately as a curative measure, the Court read the following instruction to the jury:

[Court] Furthermore, ladies and gentlemen of the jury, the Defendant has, on numerous occasions, attempted to introduce evidence that the accident of April 15, 2005, was too minor to cause the injuries complained of. This type of evidence has previously

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been precluded by this Court.

In view of that, this Court instructs the members of the jury that there is an irrebuttable presumption that the motor vehicle accident of April 15, 2005, was sufficient to cause the type of injuries sustained by the Plaintiff. Whether it proximately caused those injuries remains a question for the jury to determine.

(RTP March 28, 2011, p. 113, 149-50).

Before making the discretionary ruling to issue that curative instruction to the jury, this Court examined the relevant facts, applied a proper standard of law and used a demonstratively rational process to reach a reasonable conclusion. See, Bass-Davis v. Davis, 122 Nev. 442, 447-48 (2006).

E. Plaintiffs' Request to Strike Defendant's Answer Based on Repeated Violations of This **Court's Pretrial Orders**

During the hearing on March 28, 2011, wherein this Court considered the above-quoted special instruction in lieu of the Plaintiffs' request to strike Defendant's Answer, counsel for the Plaintiffs made clear that a further violation of this Court's Orders would be met with the Plaintiffs' renewed request of the Court to strike the Defendant's Answer (RTP March 28, 2011, p. 97).

1. Cross-Examination of Plaintiff, William Simao

During the Defendant's cross-examination of Plaintiff WILLIAM SIMAO, counsel asked about circumstances surrounding the accident, including questions regarding the stop-and-go nature of traffic on the freeway before the accident took place. The Plaintiffs objected, and a bench conference ensued.

At the bench conference, the Plaintiffs asked for an offer of proof of what potential relevance the speed of the vehicles would have, other than to suggest an inference that the

impact of the collision was insufficient to cause the Plaintiff's injuries (RTP March 28, 2011, pp. 92-95). Counsel for the Defendant failed to offer during the bench conference a sufficient explanation of how the speed of the vehicles prior to the collision has a tendency to make the existence of any fact of consequence more or less probable, *see*, NRS 48.015, other than to suggest a minor impact (RTP March 28, 2011, p. 94-96).

The Plaintiffs' objection was sustained.

What then followed can only be described by this Court as an intentional attempt to further violate this Court's clear and unambiguous Order.

Regarding the post-accident response by law enforcement and medical personnel, counsel for the Defendant asked the following questions of Mr. Simao:

[Defense Counsel] Now, we've heard several times through this trial that an ambulance came to the scene.

[Mr. Simao] Yes.

[Defense Counsel] And that you declined treatment.

[Mr. Simao] I did.

[Defense Counsel] And the paramedics didn't transport anyone from Mrs. Rish's car?

(RTP March 28, 2011, p. 98) (Emphasis supplied).

An immediate objection was interposed by Plaintiffs' counsel and a brief bench conference was convened before this Court excused the jury and addressed the matter on the record outside their presence.

2. Plaintiff's Request to Strike Defendant's Answer

During the hearing outside the jury's presence, counsel for the Plaintiffs again made an exhaustive record of all of the occasions this Court had to direct and admonish Defendant not to

address "minor impact" issues as a result of this Court's previous Orders. A significant record was made of the notice provided to the Defendants that not only was the conduct violative of this Court's Order, but further that the Plaintiffs would be asking the Court to strike the Defendant's Answer as a sanction therefore (RTP March 28, 2011, pp. 101-05).

The response from the Defendant was essentially that she should not be precluded from any discussion of the accident in question. Such an argument, this Court noted, misses the point and unfairly and incorrectly broadens the scope of the pretrial Order. An incorrect summary of the Court's Order that any and all discussion of the accident in question is precluded is vastly different from questioning four separate witnesses as to whether anyone from the Defendant's vehicle was injured in the crash. On this issue, the Court's prior pronouncements could not have been clearer.

While inclined to grant the Plaintiffs' motion to strike the Defendant's Answer at the conclusion of the hearing outside the presence of the jury, this Court instead took the opportunity to recess to again review the appropriate law, including the Nevada Supreme Court's opinion in *Young v. Ribeiro Building, Inc.*, on the issue of case concluding sanctions for abusive litigation practices and continuous violations of Orders of the Court.

3. This Court's Consideration of the Law as Applied to the Facts of This Case

As set forth above, the Nevada Supreme Court in *Young* reiterated that trial courts have inherent equitable powers to issue sanctions for abusive litigation practices, including case concluding sanctions such as dismissal or the striking of pleadings. *Young, supra* at 92. Case concluding sanctions are subject to a "somewhat heightened standard of review," *Id.; Foster v. Dingwall*, 227 P.3d 1042, 1048 (Nev. 2010), to determine if the sanctions are just and relate to the claims at issue.

Before issuing such sanctions, a trial court should carefully consider the factors

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announced in Young, although no single factor is necessarily dispositive and each of the nonexhaustive factors should be examined in the light of the case before the trial court. Young, supra at 92. Additionally, case concluding sanctions shall be supported by an express, careful and preferably written explanation of the trial court's analysis of the Young factors. Id. at 93; Bahena v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 235 P.3d 592, 598 (Nev. 2010), rehearing denied, 245 P.3d 1182 (2010).

This Court carefully considered the plethora of violations of Court Orders before granting the Plaintiffs' request to strike the Defendant's Answer. The hearing outside the presence of the jury encompasses fifteen pages (15), which does not include the independent research and analysis conducted by this Court during a lengthy recess in the proceedings. The Court's consideration of the Young factors, although similar in many respects to the consideration of the same factors three days earlier at the time of the irrebuttable presumption sanction, includes the following:

a) Degree of willfulness of the violations

A violation of an Order on a motion in limine may serve as a basis for some type of sanction if the Order is specific in its prohibition and the violation is clear. BMW v. Roth, 127 Nev.Ad.Op. 11, p.12, citing to Black v. Schultz, 530 F.3d 702, 706 (8th Cir. 2008). As set forth previously, the violations of this Court's clear and unambiguous Orders were continuous, systematic and pervasive. Such violations include, but are not limited to, the following:

- i. Violation of Order precluding evidence of "medical build-up" during Opening Statement;
- Violation of Order precluding evidence of "medical build-up" during the testimony of Dr. Patrick McNulty;
 - iii. Violation of Order precluding evidence of unrelated accidents during Opening

Statement;

- iv. Violation of Order precluding evidence or argument in support of "minor impact" defense during Opening Statement;
- v. Violation of Order precluding evidence or argument in support of "minor impact" defense during testimony of Dr. Jorg Rosler (question regarding injuries to the Defendant or her passengers);
- vi. Violation of Order precluding evidence or argument in support of "minor impact" defense during testimony of Dr. Patrick McNulty (question regarding injuries to Defendant or her passengers);
- vii. Violation of Order precluding evidence or argument in support of "minor impact" defense during testimony of Dr. Jaswinder Grover (question regarding injuries to Defendant or her passengers);
- viii. Defendant's abject failure to apprise defense expert Dr. David Fish of court's rulings on all motions in limine;
- ix. Violation of Order precluding evidence or argument in support of "minor impact" defense during testimony of Dr. David Fish (question and answer regarding the nature of the accident);
- x. Violation of Order precluding evidence or argument in support of "minor impact" defense during testimony of Plaintiff William Simao (question regarding injuries to the Defendant or her passengers);

These violations of the Court's Order precluding the "minor impact" defense are considered by this Court to be even more egregious given the numerous hearings outside the presence of the jury wherein this Court repeatedly and unequivocally prohibited the areas of inquiry subsequently broached by counsel for Defendant. Those hearings include:

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- i. Hearing on the Plaintiffs' Motion in Limine, March 1, 2011;
- ii. Hearing outside the presence of jury to discuss "minor impact," March 18, 2011;
- iii. Hearing outside the presence of jury to discuss whether the Plaintiffs opened the door to "minor impact" defense during Opening Statement, March 21, 2011;
- iv. Objection sustained to counsel for the Defendant's question of Dr. Rosler regarding injuries to occupants of the Defendant's vehicle, March 22, 2011;
- v. Objection sustained to counsel for the Defendant's question of Dr. McNulty regarding injuries to occupants of the Defendant's vehicle, March 25, 2011;
- vi. Objection sustained to counsel for the Defendant's question of Dr. Grover regarding injuries to occupants of the Defendant's vehicle, March 25, 2011;
- vii. Hearing outside the presence of the jury to discuss "minor impact" defense and the Plaintiffs' notice of seeking progressive sanctions, March 25, 2011;
- Objection sustained to counsel for the Defendant's question of Dr. Fish which resulted in response citing to the nature of the impact, March 28, 2011;
- ix. Hearing outside the presence of the jury to discuss "minor impact" defense and the Plaintiffs' request for irrebuttable presumption instruction for the Defendant's continued violations of Court's Order, March 28, 2011;
- Objection sustained to counsel for the Defendant's question of Plaintiff William Simao regarding injuries to occupants of the Defendant's vehicle, March 31, 2011;

At the hearing on the Plaintiffs' oral motion to strike the Defendant's Answer, this Court characterized the continuing violations as having been "willfull, deliberate, [and] abusive," (RTP March 31, 2011, pp. 111-12), based on the fact that counsel for Defendant "refuses to comply

with this Court's rulings" (RTP March 31, 2011, p. 112). Particularly disturbing was counsel for Defendant's systematic insistence upon asking the Plaintiff and three separate treating doctors whether they were aware of any injuries to passengers in the Defendant's vehicle, despite this Court's clear preclusion of that inquiry after each instance of misconduct.

b) The extent to which the non-offending party would be prejudiced by a lesser sanction

As set forth previously, the imposition of lesser sanctions did not act to curb the Defendant's violations of this Court's pretrial Orders. An attorney's violation of an Order on a motion in limine is misconduct which justifies evidentiary sanctions or even a new trial. See, BMW v. Roth, 127 Nev.Ad.Op. 11, p.12; Lioce v. Cohen, 124 Nev. 1 (2008). Although Nevada precedent does not follow the federal model of requiring progressive sanctions before imposing a case concluding sanction, see, Bahena v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber, supra, 245 P.3d at 1184-85, this Court nevertheless imposed progressive sanctions against the Defendant including the irrebuttable presumption instruction to no avail. Nothing this Court could fashion, short of a case concluding sanction, was successful to halt violations of this Court's pretrial Orders.

Given the frequency of the Defendant's violations of this Court's Order precluding a "minor impact" defense, all of which occurred in front of the jury, the Plaintiff's were prejudiced by having this issue repeatedly brought to the jury's attention. In the eyes of the jury, the Plaintiff's were repeatedly preventing the jury from hearing about the significance of the impact, when in fact this Court had determined that a "minor impact" defense was unavailable to the Defendants given the lack of evidence (and expert testimony) to support such a defense. In reliance upon this Court's Order granting the Plaintiffs' Motion in Limine, the Plaintiffs had released their biomechanical expert and had neither mentioned his name nor offered his opinions in Opening Statement. The Plaintiffs had relied on this Court's Order that no "minor impact" defense would be presented to the jury. The Plaintiffs had further relied on the fact that such a

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ruling would be upheld by this Court during the course of trial. The unfair prejudice to the Plaintiffs was clearly shown. See, Roth, supra.

This Court also recognizes the prejudice to the Plaintiffs in making objection after objection to the Defendant's inappropriate questions. "[W]hen...an attorney must continuously object to repeated or persistent misconduct, the non-offending attorney is placed in the difficult position of having to make repeated objections before the trier of fact, which might cast a negative impression on the attorney and the party the attorney represents, emphasizing the improper point." Lioce v. Cohen, 174 P3d 970, 981 (Nev. 2008).

As such, it is the finding of this Court that the Plaintiffs would be unfairly prejudiced by the continuous introduction of questions, evidence and argument designed to create an inference that the subject motor vehicle accident was too minor to cause the Plaintiff's injuries.

c) The severity of a sanction of striking Defendant's Answer relative to the severity of the abuse

Again, the pervasive and continuous nature of these violations warrants the sanction ultimately imposed. Every litigant has the right to disagree with any ruling made or Order entered by a trial court. His remedy is with an appellate court, based upon reasonable grounds as the law requires. His remedy is never to just continue violating the Orders unchecked.

d) The feasibility and fairness of an alternative, lesser sanction

As set forth above, alternative lesser sanctions were apparently rejected by the Defendant in favor of continuing to violate the Orders of the Court. When the Plaintiffs first asked this Court to strike the Defendant's Answer on March 28, 2011, the Court considered this factor from the Young decision to impose an alternative sanction of an irrebuttable presumption instruction.

As this Court indicated at the hearing on the Plaintiffs' second oral request to the strike Defendant's Answer:

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[Court] Regarding the feasibility and fairness of an alternative, lesser sanction, you know, the only thing I can say is less severe sanctions were imposed to no avail. (RPT March 31, 2011, p. 113).

This analysis is bolstered by the fact that the Plaintiffs requested that the Court strike the Defendant's Answer three days earlier and put the Defendant on notice that they would seek to strike the Defendant's Answer should any future violations occur.

e) The policy favoring adjudication on the merits

As set forth above, this Court opted for less severe sanctions for all of the violations prior to March 31, 2011, in large measure because of the policy favoring adjudication on the merits. Even the irrebuttable presumption instruction given as a lesser, alternative sanction did not prevent the Defendant from presenting any defense that they actually had evidence to present. It is also worth noting that the Defendant had already agreed on the record not to challenge liability for the accident.

Further, this Court recognizes that the Nevada Supreme Court has upheld the striking of pleadings for a party's failure to attend his deposition, Foster v. Dingwall, supra; for repetitive, abusive and recalcitrant conduct during discovery, Young, supra; Hamlett v. Reynolds, 114 Nev. 863 (1998) (upholding the trial court's strike order where the defaulting party's constant failure to follow the court's orders was unexplained and unwarranted); for a party's continued failure to appear at scheduled court proceedings, Durango Fire Protection, Inc. v. Troncoso, 120 Nev. 658, 662 (2004); and for the failure to abide by rulings of the Discovery Commissioner, Bahena v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber, supra. Additionally, the Nevada Supreme Court has approved consideration of the Young factors as a guide to trial courts for sanctions grounded in violations of court orders at trial. See, Romo v. Keplinger, 115 Nev. 94, 97 (1999).

The willful and deliberate violations of this Court's Orders are equally as egregious as

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any discovery violation, especially given the fact that the repeated violations in the instant case occurred in front of the jury.

f) The need to deter parties and future litigants

Given its inherent powers derived from the Nevada Constitution and strong case precedent, this Court simply cannot allow litigants to openly and deliberately abuse the litigation process by disregarding Orders of the Court when convenient or tactically advantageous to do so, especially when unfair prejudice to the non-offending party results. Such an allowance would render courts of justice meaningless in the State of Nevada.

In the final analysis, after review and consideration of all of the various factors announced in Young, it is the determination of this Court that the intentional, deliberate, abusive and unfairly prejudicial conduct of the Defendant in repeatedly violating clear Orders of this Court warrants the ultimate sanction of striking the Defendant's Answer.

It is immaterial whether, as the Plaintiffs suggested several times during the trial, it was the true intention of the Defendant to force or goad the Plaintiffs to seek a mistrial. What is material is that the deliberate conduct of counsel for the Defendant in disregarding and violating Court Orders could not be halted by this Court with any other sanction.

Neither sustained objections, a multitude of hearings outside the presence of the jury, nor progressive sanctions deterred the Defendant's ignorance of Orders of this Court.

Having carefully and thoughtfully considered the available remedies, it is the decision of this Court, for all of the reasons set forth above, that striking the Defendant's Answer is appropriate under the particular circumstances presented herein.

II. Plaintiffs' Request for a Prove-Up Hearing to Establish Damages

By the time of the last violation of this Court's Orders by the Defendant, most of the Plaintiffs' evidence had been presented to the Court over the first ten (10) days of testimony.

Counsel for the Plaintiffs requested a hearing the following day for essentially a prove-up hearing similar to the entry of a default judgment under NRCP 55b.

Counsel for the Defendant then requested the ability to be heard at the argument on damages, pursuant to *Hamlett v. Reynolds*, 114 Nev. 863 (1998). In *Hamlett*, the Nevada Supreme Court struck Hamlett's Answer as a sanction for his continued failure to comply with discovery orders pursuant to *Young v. Ribeiro Building, supra*. Hamlett claimed the trial court erred in restricting his participation in the prove-up hearing to cross-examining Reynolds' witnesses. In analyzing this issue under NRCP 55(b)(2), the Court stated:

The language of NRCP 55(b)(2) that the "court may conduct such hearings or order such references as it deems necessary and proper" suggests to us an intent to give trial courts broad discretion in determining how prove-up hearings should be conducted. Thus, we conclude that the extent to which a defaulting party will participate in prove-up is a decision properly delegated to the trial courts. The trial courts should make this determination on a case-by-case basis and not according to static rules implemented by this court.

In deciding the extent to which a defaulted party will be permitted to participate in prove-up, if at all, trial courts should remember that the purpose of conducting a hearing after default, according to NRCP 55(b)(2), is to determine the amount of damages and establish the truth of any averment. To that end, trial courts should determine the extent to which full participation by the defaulted party will facilitate the truth-seeking process.

Hamlett, supra at 866-67.

In Foster v. Dingwall, supra, the Nevada Supreme Court clearly stated the standard for proving up damages after a default is entered as a sanction. During the prove-up hearing, this Court shall consider the allegations deemed admitted by the fact of the default to determine if the Plaintiff has established a prima facie case for liability. Foster, supra, 227 P.3d at 1049-50. A prima facie case is defined as sufficiency of evidence in order to send the question to the jury. Id. at 1050. In the instant case, Defendant Rish admitted responsibility for the accident and stipulated to liability. What was left was a determination of the Plaintiffs' damages, and the Plaintiffs requested that this Court take notice of the evidence that had been presented in the

preceding ten (10) days of testimony. Even though allegations in the pleadings are deemed admitted as a result of the entry of default, the admission does not relieve the non-offending party's obligation to present substantial evidence of the amount of damages suffered by both of the Plaintiffs. *Id.* Having reviewed the evidence and concluding that a *prima facie* case had been established by both Plaintiffs, this Court determined that the Plaintiffs are entitled to damages for the harms proximately caused by the motor vehicle accident.

In determining the level of participation of the Defendant in the prove-up hearing, this Court was mindful of the Nevada Supreme Court's pronouncement in *Foster* and *Young* that because the default was entered as a result of the Defendant's abusive litigation practices, the Defendant "forfeited his right to object to all but the most patent and fundamental defects" in the prove-up. *Foster, supra* at 1050; *Young, supra* at 95.

Nevertheless, in an exercise of discretion authorized by *Hamlett*, this Court determined that the Defendant would be allowed to address the Plaintiffs' brief final argument on damages in an argument of her own, to be followed by a brief rebuttal argument on behalf of the Plaintiffs.

Based on all of the foregoing, **THIS COURT HEREBY ORDERS** that Plaintiffs' oral Motion to Strike Defendant's Answer is **GRANTED**.

This matter stands submitted following the arguments of counsel and the prove-up hearing of April 1, 2011, pending further Order of this Court.

DATED this ___2\square day of April, 2011.

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DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

Submitted by:

DAVID T. WALL, ESQ.

Nevada Bar No. 2805

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400 South Fourth Street, Suite 600

Las Vegas, Nevada 89101

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DISTRICT COURT

Alun J. Column

CLERK OF THE COURT

CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

WILLIAM JAY SIMAO; and CHERYL ANN SIMAO,

CASE NO.: A539455

DEPT. NO.: X

Plaintiffs,

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JUDGMENT

JENNY RISH,

Defendant.

WHEREAS, a hearing for Default Judgment having come before the Court on April 1, 2011. IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, that Judgment is hereby entered in favor of Plaintiffs and against Defendant, Jenny Rish as follows:

William Simao's past medical and related expenses \$194,390.96

William Simao's pain and suffering:

- Past pain and suffering \$\frac{413.040}{.}

- Future pain and suffering \$1,140,552.

- Loss of Enjoyment of Life \$\frac{905.169}{.}

Cheryl Simao's loss of consortium (Society and Relationship) \$_\log 81, 2\log 6.

Attorneys' fees \$_TBD

Litigation costs \$ 99,555.49

TOTAL \$3,493,983.45

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Judgment against Defendant, Jenny Rish, shall bear interest in accordance with N.R.S. 17.130 and Lee v. Ball, 116 P.3d 64 (2005).

Dated this <u>27</u>thday of April, 2011.

DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

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Court on the 28th day of April, 2011, a copy of which is attached hereto.

DATED this 2nd day of May, 2011.

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OPEDT T EGIET

ROBERT T. EGLET, ESQ.

Nevada Bar No. 3402

DAVID T. WALL, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 2805

ROBERT M. ADAMS, ESQ.

Nevada Bar No. 6551

400 South Fourth Street, Suite 600

Las Vegas, Nevada 89101

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

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RECEIPT OF COPY

RECEIPT OF COPY of the foregoing file stamped NOTICE OF ENTRY OF

Date: 5/2/11 Time: 2:19

Date: 5211 Time: 3:24pm

JUDGMENT in the matter of SIMAO v. RISH, et al is hereby acknowledged:

Stephen H. Rogers, Esq. ROGERS, MASTRANGELO,

CARVALHO & MITCHELL, LTD.

300 S. Fourth Street, #710 Las Vegas, NV 89101 Attorneys for Defendants

Daniel F. Polsenberg, Esq.

Jowl D. Henriod, Esq. LEWIS AND ROCA, LLP.

3993 Howard Hughes Pkwy., Suite 600

Las Vegas, Nevada 89129 Attorneys for Defendants

Electronically Filed 04/28/2011 01:45:32 PM

DISTRICT COURT

CLERK OF THE COURT

CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

WILLIAM JAY SIMAO; and CHERYL ANN SIMAO,

CASE NO.: A539455

DEPT. NO.: X

Plaintiffs,

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JUDGMENT

JENNY RISH,

Defendant.

WHEREAS, a hearing for Default Judgment having come before the Court on April 1. 2011. IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, that Judgment is hereby entered in favor of Plaintiffs and against Defendant, Jenny Rish as follows:

William Simao's past medical and related expenses

\$194, 390.96

William Simao's pain and suffering:

Past pain and suffering \$<u>473,640.</u>

Future pain and suffering \$<u>1,140,552</u>.

\$ 905,169. Loss of Enjoyment of Life

Cheryl Simao's loss of consortium (Society and Relationship) \$ 1081,296.

Attorneys' fees \$ TBD

Litigation costs <u>\$ 99,555.49</u>

> \$3,493,983.45 TOTAL

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Judgment against Defendant, Jenny Rish, shall bear interest in accordance with N.R.S. 17.130 and Lee v. Ball, 116 P.3d 64 (2005).

Dated this <u>27</u>thday of April, 2011.

DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

Negligence - Auto COURT MINUTES December 11, 2009

07A539455 William Simao, Cheryl Simao
vs
Jenny Rish

December 11, 2009 9:00 AM Pre Trial Conference

HEARD BY: Walsh, Jessie COURTROOM: RJC Courtroom 14B

COURT CLERK: Teri Braegelmann

RECORDER:

REPORTER:

PARTIES

PRESENT: Palermo, John E. Attorney

JOURNAL ENTRIES

- COURT ORDERED trial date VACATED and RESET.

05/03/10 9:00 AM CALENDAR CALL

05/10/10 9:00 AM JURY TRIAL

Negligence - Auto COURT MINUTES January 20, 2011

07A539455 William Simao, Cheryl Simao
vs
Jenny Rish

January 20, 2011 9:30 AM Motion

HEARD BY: Walsh, Jessie COURTROOM: RJC Courtroom 14B

COURT CLERK: Teri Braegelmann

RECORDER: Victoria Boyd

REPORTER:

PARTIES

PRESENT: Rogers, Stephen H Attorney

Wall, David T Attorney

JOURNAL ENTRIES

- Court notes there was a limited opposition to the motion. Argument by Mr. Wall in support of his motion to the opposed questions. Argument by Mr. Rogers in opposition to plaintiff's motion. Following arguments, Court Stated its Findings and ORDERED, Plaintiffs' Motion to Allow Plaintiffs to Present a Jury Questionnaire Prior to Voir Dire motion GRANTED as to those Questions unopposed. FURTHER COURT ORDERED, GRANTED as to Questions 42 and 43. FURTHER COURT ORDERED motion DENIED as to Questions 33, 34, and 49. Counsel to REMOVE 33, 34, and 49. FURTHER COURT ORDERED, Defendant's motion for leave to propose question Re: Million dollar Verdict. COURT ORDERED motion GRANTED.

PRINT DATE: 06/02/2011 Page 2 of 29 Minutes Date: December 11, 2009

Negligence - Auto COURT MINUTES February 15, 2011

07A539455 William Simao, Cheryl Simao
vs
Jenny Rish

February 15, 2011 9:00 AM All Pending Motions

HEARD BY: Walsh, Jessie COURTROOM: RJC Courtroom 14B

COURT CLERK: Teri Braegelmann

RECORDER: Victoria Boyd

REPORTER:

PARTIES

PRESENT: Lewis, Bryan W. Attorney

Rogers, Stephen H Attorney Wall, David T Attorney

JOURNAL ENTRIES

- Plaintiff's Omnibus Motion in Limine...Defendant Jenny Rish's Motion in Limine to Exclude the Traffic Accident Report and the Investigating Officer's Conclusions...Defendant Jenny Rish's Motion in Limine to Preclude Questions Regarding Verdict Amounts During Voir Dire...Defendant Jenny Rish's Motion in Limine to Prevent Plaintiff from Arguing Responsibility Avoidance...Defendant Jenny Rish's Motion in Limine Enforcing the Abolition of the Treating Physician Rule...Defendant Jenny Rish's Motion in Limine to Limit the Testimony of Plaintiff's Treating Physicians...Defendant Jenny Rish's Motion in Limine to Exclude Graphic and Lurid Video or Animated Depictions of Surgical Procedures...Defendant's Motion in Limine to Preclude Plaintiffs' Medical Providers and Experts from Testifying Regarding New or Undisclosed Medical Treatment and Opinions...Defendant's Motion in Limine to Exclude Evidence of Senate Investigation...Defendant Jenny Rish's Motion in Limine to Preclude Witnesses from Offering Testimony Regarding the Credibility or Veracity of Other Witnesses...Defendant Jenny Rish's Motion to Preclude Argument of the Case During Voir Dire...Defendant Jenny Rish's Motion to Exclude the Report and Opinions Plaintiff's Accident Reconstruction Expert, David Ingebretsen...Defendant Jenny Rish's Motion to Exclude the Report and Opinions Plaintiff's Economist Stan V. Smith...Defendant Jenny Rish's Motion in Limine to Exclude Plaintiffs' Life Care Expert, Kathleen Hartmann, R.N...Defendant Jenny Rish's Motion in Limine to Exclude Duplicative and Cumulative Testimony

PRINT DATE: 06/02/2011 Page 3 of 29 Minutes Date: December 11, 2009

Following arguments by Mr. Wall, Mr. Lewis and Mr. Rogers, Court Stated Its Findings and ORDERED,

As to Plaintiff's Omnibus Motion in Limine: 1. Prior and Subsequent Unrelated Accidents, Injuries and Medical Conditions and Prior and Subsequent Claims or Lawsuits, GRANTED. 2. Reference to William Being a Malingerer, Magnifying Symptoms or Manifesting Secondary Gain Motives Should tie Excluded, GRANTED. 3. Treating Physicians Do Not Need to Prepare Expert Reports Separate From and

in Addition to Their Medical Records and Dictated Reports, GRANTED. 4. References to Defense Medical Examiners as Independent. . There being no opposition, motion GRANTED. 6. References to Collateral Sources of Payment of Medical Bills and All Other

Expenses, Including Health Insurance, Liens and/or Medicare, GRANTED. 7. Evidence of When Plaintiff Retained Counsel, GRANTED. 8. Closing Argument, There being no opposition, motion GRANTED.

As to Defendant Jenny Rish's Motion in Limine to Exclude the Traffic Accident Report and the Investigating Officer's Conclusions, motion GRANTED.

As to Defendant Jenny Rish's Motion to Preclude Argument of the Case During Voir Dire, motion, GRANTED IN PART base on counsel's statements and representations. Court will play by ear.

As to Defendant Jenny Rish's Motion in Limine to Preclude Witnesses from Offering Testimony Regarding the Credibility or Veracity of Other Witnesses, GRANTED. Court notes non-opposition filed.

As to Defendant Jenny Rish's Motion in Limine to Exclude Duplicative and Cumulative Testimony, DENIED.

As to Defendant Jenny Rish's Motion to Exclude the Report and Opinions Plaintiff's Economist Stan V. Smith, GRANTED as it relates to loss of business earnings; DENIED with respect to loss of housekeeping, household services; and DENIED as to reduction in value of life; and DENIED as to society and relationship.

As to Defendant Jenny Rish's Motion in Limine to Exclude Graphic and Lurid Video or Animated Depictions of Surgical Procedures, GRANTED IN PART; GRANTED as to bloody lurid depictions of spinal surgery and DENIED as to actual photos that aren t bloody or lurid or in the alternative animated videos.

FURTHER COURT ORDERED, remaining motions CONTINUED.

02/22/11 9:00 AM Defendant Jenny Rish's Motion in Limine to Prevent Plaintiff from Arguing Responsibility Avoidance...Defendant Jenny Rish's Motion in Limine Enforcing the Abolition of the

PRINT DATE: 06/02/2011 Page 4 of 29 Minutes Date: December 11, 2009

07A539455

Treating Physician Rule...Defendant Jenny Rish's Motion in Limine to Limit the Testimony of Plaintiff's Treating Physicians...Defendant's Motion in Limine to Preclude Plaintiffs' Medical Providers and Experts from Testifying Regarding New or Undisclosed Medical Treatment and Opinions...Defendant's Motion in Limine to Exclude Evidence of Senate Investigation...Defendant Jenny Rish's Motion to Preclude Argument of the Case During Voir Dire...Defendant Jenny Rish's Motion to Exclude the Report and Opinions Plaintiff's Accident Reconstruction Expert, David Ingebretsen... Defendant Jenny Rish's Motion in Limine to Exclude Plaintiffs' Life Care Expert, Kathleen Hartmann, R.N

PRINT DATE: 06/02/2011 Page 5 of 29 Minutes Date: December 11, 2009

Negligence - Auto COURT MINUTES February 22, 2011 07A539455 William Simao, Cheryl Simao Jenny Rish

February 22, 2011 9:30 AM All Pending Motions

HEARD BY: Walsh, Jessie COURTROOM: RJC Courtroom 14B

COURT CLERK: Teri Braegelmann

RECORDER: Victoria Boyd

REPORTER:

PARTIES

PRESENT: Eglet, Robert T. Attorney

Rogers, Stephen H Attorney Wall, David T Attorney

JOURNAL ENTRIES

- Defendant Jenny Rish's Motion in Limine to Exclude Plaintiffs' Life Care Expert, Kathleen Hartmann, R.N....Defendant Jenny Rish's Motion to Exclude the Report and Opinions Plaintiff's Accident Reconstruction Expert, David Ingebretsen...Defendant's Motion in Limine to Exclude Evidence of Senate Investigation...Defendant's Motion in Limine to Preclude Plaintiffs' Medical Providers and Experts from Testifying Regarding New or Undisclosed Medical Treatment and Opinions...Defendant Jenny Rish's Motion in Limine Enforcing the Abolition of the Treating Physician Rule...Defendant Jenny Rish's Motion in Limine to Prevent Plaintiff from Arguing Responsibility Avoidance...Plaintiff's Motion to Exclude Sub Rosa Video

Argument by Mr. Rogers in support of Defendant Jenny Rish's Motion in Limine to Exclude Plaintiffs' Life Care Expert, Kathleen Hartmann, R.N, stating Ms. Hartmann is a nurse and is not qualified to give an opinion as to future medical care. Further Ms. Hartman prepared a report for future treatment that is not supported any medical doctors. Further counsel requested her report and testimony should be excluded. Argument in opposition by Mr. Wall, defendant s disagreements with Ms. Harmann is subject to cross examination. Further, plaintiff is still treating and whatever is established is correlated to a cost. Additionally, Mr. Wall requested the motion be denied without prejudice until time of testimony. Following further arguments by counsel, COURT ORDERED,

PRINT DATE: 06/02/2011 Minutes Date: Page 6 of 29 December 11, 2009

07A539455

Defendant Jenny Rish's Motion in Limine to Exclude Plaintiffs' Life Care Expert, Kathleen Hartmann, R.N, DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

Argument by Mr. Rogers in support of Deft. Jenny Rish's Motion to Exclude the Report and Opinions Plaintiff's Accident Reconstruction Expert, David Ingebretsen, stating Mr. Ingebretsen's opinions offered in the report, establishes that he is offering up himself as an expert. Further argument stating Mr. Ingebretsen doesn't comply with Hallmark. Argument in opposition by Mr. Wall requesting to deny outright or in the alternative to let counsel lay the foundation for his testimony outside the presence. Following further arguments by counsel, COURT ORDERED motion DENIED. Deft. Jenny Rish's Motion to Exclude the Report and Opinions Plaintiff's Accident Reconstruction Expert, David Ingebretsen, Court notes Mr. Ingebretsen can't testify as to medical causation, but assuming he stays within his scope of expertise and assuming that a proper foundation can be laid, Court is not inclined to Strike him as a witness all together. Counsel can object if needed.

Argument by Mr. Rogers in support of Defendant Jenny Rish's Motion in Limine to Prevent Plaintiff from Arguing Responsibility Avoidance. Upon Court's inquiry, Mr. Eglet stated this issue always comes up. Colloquy regarding Jury questionnaire. Following arguments by counsel, COURT ORDERED Defendant Jenny Rish's Motion in Limine to Prevent Plaintiff from Arguing Responsibility Avoidance, GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. Counsel can't argue to the jury this issue. Counsel can follow up to a question.

Argument by Mr. Rogers in support of Defendant's Motion in Limine to Exclude Evidence of Senate Investigation, stating investigation evidence is not admissible. Further counsel stated plaintiff's submitted a stipulation seeking preclusion as to doctors and local attorneys and defense will stipulate if the preclusion is applied evenly. Court noted it sounds like court ruled on this previously. Mr. Wall stated he wasn't aware of Mr. Roger's request until just now. Following further arguments by counsel, Court noted it would like to see a supplemental opposition. Mr. Wall to submit the supplemental by Thursday 02/24/11, and Mr. Rogers will reply by Friday 02/25/11. COURT ORDERED, matter CONTINUED.

As to Defendant Jenny Rish's Motion in Limine Enforcing the Abolition of the Treating Physician Rule, COURT PREVIOUSLY RULED ON THIS MATTER.

As to Defendant's Motion in Limine to Preclude Plaintiffs' Medical Providers and Experts from Testifying Regarding New or Undisclosed Medical Treatment and Opinions, motion DENIED.

As to Defendant Jenny Rish's Motion to Preclude Argument of the case during Voir Dire, COURT PREVIOUSLY RULED ON THIS.

Mr. Wall advised there is a 247 stipulation as to 12-15 motion that hasn't been signed yet. Mr. Rogers advised he will get to that today. Mr. Rogers advised one of the defense expert will be out of the country and will only be here on the March 18th. Court noted it shares the courtroom with Judge Wiese and it will have to be an afternoon witness.

PRINT DATE: 06/02/2011 Page 7 of 29 Minutes Date: December 11, 2009

07A539455

FURTHER COURT ORDERED, Plaintiff's Motion to Exclude Sub Rosa Video, CONTINUED.

03/01/11 9:00 AM Plaintiff's Motion to Exclude Sub Rosa Video... Defendant's Motion in Limine to Exclude Evidence of Senate Investigation

PRINT DATE: 06/02/2011 Page 8 of 29 Minutes Date: December 11, 2009

Negligence - Auto COURT MINUTES March 01, 2011

07A539455 William Simao, Cheryl Simao
vs
Jenny Rish

March 01, 2011 9:00 AM All Pending Motions

HEARD BY: Walsh, Jessie COURTROOM: RJC Courtroom 14B

COURT CLERK: Sandra Harrell

RECORDER: Victoria Boyd

REPORTER:

PARTIES

PRESENT: Adams, Robert M Attorney

Rogers, Stephen H Attorney Wall, David T Attorney

JOURNAL ENTRIES

- PLAINTIFF'S MOTION IN LIMINE TO (1) PRECLUDE DEFENDANT FROM RAISING A "MINOR" OR "LOW IMPACT" DEFENSE; (2) LIMIT THE TRIAL TESTIMONY OF DEFENDANT'S EXPERT DAVID FISH M.D. AND; (3) EXCLUDE EVIDENCE OF PROPERTY DAMAGE...DEFENDANT JENNY RISH'S MOTION IN LIMINE TO EXCLUDE EVIDENCE OF SENATE INVESTIGATION...PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO EXCLUDE SUB ROSA VIDEO

PLAINTIFF'S MOTION IN LIMINE TO (1) PRECLUDE DEFENDANT FROM RAISING A "MINOR" OR "LOW IMPACT" DEFENSE; (2) LIMIT THE TRIAL TESTIMONY OF DEFENDANT'S EXPERT DAVID FISH M.D. AND; (3) EXCLUDE EVIDENCE OF PROPERTY DAMAGE:

Mr. Wall argued Dr. Fish cannot testify as to bio-mechanics. Further, Defense has no expert to testify about bio-mechanics, therefore, photos and damage estimates are irrelevant - jury can't speculate. Mr. Rogers argued Plaintiff signed admission that photos are authentic, also signed amount of property damage as accurate. Further, statement by Plaintiff of 55 mile per hour impact not true - all are relevant and do not require expert testimony. COURT FINDS if Defense had a witness, accident reconstructionist or bio-mechanical engineer then photos and damage estimates come in, but Dr. Fish or any medical doctor may not testify because there appears to be minimal property damage.

PRINT DATE: 06/02/2011 Page 9 of 29 Minutes Date: December 11, 2009

07A539455

COURT ORDERED, Motion GRANTED in its entirety.

PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO EXCLUDE SUB ROSA VIDEO:

COURT NOTED it has not viewed the surveillance video. Mr. Wall argued video admitted only for impeachment purposes and report is hearsay. As an alternative, Mr. Wall requested Court defer ruling until after direct examination, then make determination. Mr. Rogers argued Plaintiff testified to disabling pain preventing him from working, however, surveillance is at workplace and shows Plaintiff lifting heavy machine and changing tire - clearly probative. COURT NOTED if video impeaches witness testimony then admissible or portions are admissible, however, since Court has not seen video or heard witness testimony, Court not in position to rule and will DEFER until after Plaintiff testifies, then Court should have opportunity to review video. Mr. Wall requested not be used during opening. Mr. Rogers argued doctor reports Plaintiff disabled. Mr. Rogers advised he will provide video to Court today.

DEFENDANT JENNY RISH'S MOTION IN LIMINE TO EXCLUDE EVIDENCE OF SENATE INVESTIGATION:

Mr. Rogers argued Senate investigation of Dr. Wong was withdrawn and not admissible - no evidence of bias - evidence more prejudicial that probative and disclosed after discovery deadline. Mr. Wall advised may be two separate issues or investigations. Further, there are factual ties - Dr. Wong works for UCLA and failed to disclose financial relationships and is conflict of interest. Mr. Roger argued only submitted incomplete form. COURT ORDERED, Motion GRANTED.

Mr. Wall and Mr. Rogers to prepare their respective Orders.

PRINT DATE: 06/02/2011 Page 10 of 29 Minutes Date: December 11, 2009

Negligence - Auto	COURT MINUTES	March 04, 2011
07A539455	William Simao, Cheryl Simao	
	VS	
	Jenny Rish	
	· · · · ·	

March 04, 2011 9:00 AM Calendar Call

HEARD BY: Walsh, Jessie COURTROOM: RJC Courtroom 14B

COURT CLERK: Teri Braegelmann

RECORDER: Victoria Boyd

REPORTER:

PARTIES

PRESENT: Adams, Robert M Attorney

Rogers, Stephen H Attorney Wall, David T Attorney

JOURNAL ENTRIES

- Counsel announced ready for trial. Further they will need 10-15 days for trial with jury questionnaire. Counsel advised they will need the following equipment: Elmo and screen.

PRINT DATE: 06/02/2011 Page 11 of 29 Minutes Date: December 11, 2009

Negligence - Auto	COURT MINUTES	March 08, 2011
07A539455	William Simao, Cheryl Simao	
	vs	
	Jenny Rish	

March 08, 2011 9:00 AM Omnibus Motion in Limine

HEARD BY: Walsh, Jessie COURTROOM: RJC Courtroom 14B

COURT CLERK: Teri Braegelmann

RECORDER: Victoria Boyd

REPORTER:

PARTIES

PRESENT: Myers, Bradley J. Attorney
Rogers, Stephen H Attorney

JOURNAL ENTRIES

- Following argument by Mr. Myers in support of Plaintiff's Omnibus motion in Limine and Opposition by Mr. Rogers, Court Stated its Findings and ORDERED; As to 1. Prior and Subsequent Unrelated Accidents, Injuries and Medical Conditions and Prior and Subsequent Claims or Lawsuits, GRANTED IN PART; GRANTED as to Class Action and DENIED as to Cancerous Tumor. As to 2. Hypothetical Medical Condition, GRANTED as Pled. As to 3. Evidence of the Absence of Medical Records for Any Period of Time Prior to the Accident, GRANTED as Drafted. As to 4. Any Reference to an Alleged Federal Grand Jury Investigation into Doctors and Lawyers in Las Vegas, Court previously GRANTED. As to 5. Reference to Attorney Advertising, GRANTED. Mr. Myers to prepare the order and submit to opposing counsel for review before final submission to the court.

PRINT DATE: 06/02/2011 Page 12 of 29 Minutes Date: December 11, 2009

Negligence - Auto	COURT MINUTES	March 14, 2011
07.4.520.455	William Circle 10	
07A539455	William Simao, Cheryl Simao	
	VS	
	Jenny Rish	

March 14, 2011 1:00 PM Jury Trial

HEARD BY: Walsh, Jessie COURTROOM: RJC Courtroom 14B

COURT CLERK: Alan Castle

RECORDER: Victoria Boyd

REPORTER:

PARTIES

PRESENT: Adams, Robert M Attorney

Eglet, Robert T. Attorney
Eglet, Tracy A. Attorney
Rish, Jenny Defendant
Rogers, Stephen H Attorney
Attorney
Simao, Cheryl A Plaintiff

Simao, Cheryl A Plaintiff Simao, William J Plaintiff Wall, David T Attorney

JOURNAL ENTRIES

- Jury Selection begins. Flagged for follow up.

Negligence - Auto	COURT MINUTES	March 15, 2011
07.4.520.455		
07A539455	William Simao, Cheryl Simao	
	VS	
	Jenny Rish	

March 15, 2011 1:00 PM Jury Trial

HEARD BY: Walsh, Jessie COURTROOM: RJC Courtroom 14B

COURT CLERK: Phyllis Irby

RECORDER: Victoria Boyd

REPORTER:

PARTIES

PRESENT: Adams, Robert M Attorney

Wall, David T

Eglet, Robert T. Attorney
Eglet, Tracy A. Attorney
Rish, James Defendant
Rish, Jenny Defendant
Rogers, Stephen H Attorney
Attorney
Simao, Cheryl A Plaintiff
Simao, William J Plaintiff

JOURNAL ENTRIES

Attorney

- OUTSIDE THE PRESENCE OF THE JURY. Counsel has some scheduling issues. Prospective Jurors present. Jurors excused for the evening. COURT ORDERED, MATTER CONTINUED.

3-16-11 1:00 PM JURY TRIAL (DEPT. X)

PRINT DATE: 06/02/2011 Page 14 of 29 Minutes Date: December 11, 2009

Negligence - Auto	COURT MINUTES	March 16, 2011
07A539455	William Simao, Cheryl Simao	
	VS	
	Jenny Rish	

March 16, 2011 1:00 PM Jury Trial

HEARD BY: Walsh, Jessie COURTROOM: RJC Courtroom 14B

COURT CLERK: Phyllis Irby

RECORDER: Victoria Boyd

REPORTER:

PARTIES

PRESENT: Adams, Robert M Attorney

Eglet, Robert T. Attorney Eglet, Tracy A. Attorney Rish, James Defendant Rish, Jenny Defendant Rogers, Stephen H Attorney Attorney Plaintiff Simao, Cheryl A Simao, William J Plaintiff Wall, David T Attorney

JOURNAL ENTRIES

- OUTSIDE THE PRESENCE OF THE JURY. Mr. Eglet informed the Court one of his witnesses is having family issues and there may not be a witness for Monday. Colloquy regarding prospective jurors proving hardships. JURY PRESENT. OUTSIDE THE PRESENCE OF THE JURY. Pltf requested to dismiss 3 jurors. MOTION GRANTED. JURY PRESENT. Perspective jurors excused for the evening. COURT ORDERED, MATTER CONTINUED.

3-17-11 1:00 PM JURY TRIAL (DEPT. X)

PRINT DATE: 06/02/2011 Page 15 of 29 Minutes Date: December 11, 2009

Negligence - Auto	COURT MINUTES	March 17, 2011
07.4.520.455	147:11: C: C1 1.C:	
07A539455	William Simao, Cheryl Simao	
	VS	
	Jenny Rish	

March 17, 2011 1:00 PM Jury Trial

HEARD BY: Walsh, Jessie COURTROOM: RJC Courtroom 14B

COURT CLERK: Phyllis Irby

RECORDER: Victoria Boyd

REPORTER:

PARTIES

PRESENT: Adams, Robert M Attorney

Eglet, Robert T. Attorney Eglet, Tracy A. Attorney Rish, James Defendant Rish, Jenny Defendant Rogers, Stephen H Attorney Attorney Simao, Cheryl A Plaintiff Simao, William J Plaintiff Wall, David T Attorney

JOURNAL ENTRIES

- PROSPECTIVE JURORS PRESENT. OUTSIDE THE PRESENCE OF THE JURY. Parties agree to make juror appearing late the last juror. COURT CONCURRED. Jury recessed for the evening. COURT ORDERED, MATTER CONTINUED.

3-17-11 1:00 PM JURY TRIAL (DEPT. X)

PRINT DATE: 06/02/2011 Page 16 of 29 Minutes Date: December 11, 2009

Negligence - Auto	COURT MINUTES	March 18, 2011
07A539455	William Simao, Cheryl Simao	
	VS	
	Jenny Rish	

March 18, 2011 1:00 PM Jury Trial

HEARD BY: Walsh, Jessie COURTROOM: RJC Courtroom 14B

COURT CLERK: Phyllis Irby

RECORDER: Victoria Boyd

REPORTER:

PARTIES

PRESENT: Adams, Robert M Attorney

Eglet, Robert T. Attorney Eglet, Tracy A. Attorney Rish, James Defendant Rish, Jenny Defendant Rish, Linda Defendant Rogers, Stephen H Attorney Attorney Simao, Cheryl A Plaintiff Simao, William J Plaintiff Wall, David T Attorney

JOURNAL ENTRIES

- OUTSIDE THE PRESENCE OF THE JURY. Arguments of counsel. Mr. Rogers argued for a mistrial stated Mr. Eglet has tainted the jury for 4 days, COURT ORDERED, MOTION DENIED. JURY PRESENT. OUTSIDE THE PRESENCE OF THE JURY. Mr. Rogers requested a mistrial and to start over with a new jury. MOTION DENIED. JURY PRESENT. Jury selected and sworn. OUTSIDE THE PRESENCE OF THE JURY. Mr. Rogers argued regarding Deft. being allowed to testify about the impact of the accident. MOTION DENIED. COURT ORDERED, MATTER CONTINUED.

3-21-11 1:00 PM JURY TRIAL (DEPT. X)

PRINT DATE: 06/02/2011 Page 17 of 29 Minutes Date: December 11, 2009

Negligence - Auto	COURT MINUTES	March 21, 2011
07A539455	William Simao, Cheryl Simao	
07 A339433	vs	
	Jenny Rish	

March 21, 2011 1:00 PM Jury Trial

HEARD BY: Walsh, Jessie COURTROOM: RJC Courtroom 14B

COURT CLERK: Phyllis Irby

RECORDER: Victoria Boyd

REPORTER:

PARTIES

PRESENT: Adams, Robert M Attorney

Eglet, Robert T. Attorney Eglet, Tracy A. Attorney Rish, James Defendant Rish, Jenny Defendant Rish, Linda Defendant Rogers, Stephen H Attorney Attorney Simao, Cheryl A Plaintiff Wall, David T Attorney

JOURNAL ENTRIES

- JURY PRESENT. Court instructed the jury. Opening statements. OUTSIDE THE PRESENCE OF THE JURY. Arguments of counsel regarding using the word "CRASH" during testimony. MOTION DENIED. JURY PRESENT. OUTSIDE THE PRESENCE OF THE JURY. Mr. Eglet stated Mr. Rogers has tainted the jury by not following the Court's pre-trial Orders. JURY PRESENT. COURT ORDERED, MATTER CONTINUED.

3-22-11 1:00 PM JURY TRIAL (DEPT. X)

PRINT DATE: 06/02/2011 Page 18 of 29 Minutes Date: December 11, 2009

Negligence - Auto	COURT MINUTES	March 22, 2011
07A539455	William Simao, Cheryl Simao	
	VS	
	Jenny Rish	

March 22, 2011 1:00 PM Jury Trial

HEARD BY: Walsh, Jessie COURTROOM: RJC Courtroom 14B

COURT CLERK: Phyllis Irby

RECORDER: Victoria Boyd

REPORTER:

PARTIES

PRESENT: Adams, Robert M Attorney

Eglet, Robert T. Attorney Eglet, Tracy A. Attorney Rish, James Defendant Rish, Jenny Defendant Rish, Linda Defendant Rogers, Stephen H Attorney Attorney Simao, Cheryl A Plaintiff Wall, David T Attorney

JOURNAL ENTRIES

- JURY PRESENT. OUTSIDE THE PRESENCE OF THE JURY. Colloquy between counsel regarding Dr. Lacks testimony about medical cause. MOTION DENIED. JURY PRESENT. Testimony and exhibits presented (see worksheets.) COURT ORDERED, MATTER CONTINUED.

3-23-11 1:00 PM JURY TRIAL (DEPT. X)

PRINT DATE: 06/02/2011 Page 19 of 29 Minutes Date: December 11, 2009

Negligence - Auto	COURT MINUTES	March 23, 2011	
07A539455	William Cimaa Chawl Cimaa		
07 A339433	William Simao, Cheryl Simao		
	VS		
	Jenny Rish		

March 23, 2011 1:00 PM Jury Trial

HEARD BY: Walsh, Jessie COURTROOM: RJC Courtroom 14B

COURT CLERK: Phyllis Irby

RECORDER: Victoria Boyd

REPORTER:

PARTIES

PRESENT: Adams, Robert M Attorney

Eglet, Robert T. Attorney Eglet, Tracy A. Attorney Rish, James Defendant Rish, Jenny Defendant Rish, Linda Defendant Rogers, Stephen H Attorney Attorney Simao, Cheryl A Plaintiff Wall, David T Attorney

JOURNAL ENTRIES

- OUTSIDE THE PRESENCE OF THE JURY. Mr. Michaelek objected to yesterday's witness; stated he wasn't an expert requested he not be allowed to testify as an expert. MOTION DENIED. JURY PRESENT. COURT ORDERED, MATTER CONTINUED.

3-24-11 1:00 PM JURY TRIAL (DEPT. X)

PRINT DATE: 06/02/2011 Page 20 of 29 Minutes Date: December 11, 2009

Negligence - Auto	COURT MINUTES	March 24, 2011
07A539455	William Simao, Cheryl Simao	
	VS	
	Jenny Rish	

March 24, 2011 1:00 PM Jury Trial

HEARD BY: Walsh, Jessie COURTROOM: RJC Courtroom 14B

COURT CLERK: Phyllis Irby

RECORDER: Victoria Boyd

REPORTER:

PARTIES

PRESENT: Adams, Robert M Attorney

Eglet, Robert T. Attorney Eglet, Tracy A. Attorney Rish, James Defendant Rish, Jenny Defendant Rish, Linda Defendant Rogers, Stephen H Attorney Attorney Simao, Cheryl A Plaintiff Wall, David T Attorney

JOURNAL ENTRIES

- OUTSIDE THE PRESENCE OF THE JURY. Mr. Eglet stated Dr. Fish isn't qualified in expertise of spinal management or spinal surgery and shouldn't be allowed to testify in these areas. MOTION GRANTED. JURY PRESENT. Testimony and exhibits presented (see worksheets.) COURT ORDERED, MATTER CONTINUED.

3-25-11 1:00 PM JURY TRIAL (DEPT. X)

PRINT DATE: 06/02/2011 Page 21 of 29 Minutes Date: December 11, 2009

Negligence - Auto	COURT MINUTES	March 25, 2011
0-1-0-1-		
07A539455	William Simao, Cheryl Simao	
	VS	
	Jenny Rish	

Jury Trial March 25, 2011 1:00 PM

HEARD BY: COURTROOM: RJC Courtroom 14B Walsh, Jessie

COURT CLERK: Phyllis Irby

RECORDER: Victoria Boyd

REPORTER:

PARTIES

PRESENT: Adams, Robert M Attorney

Eglet, Robert T. Attorney Eglet, Tracy A. Attorney Rish, James Defendant Rish, Jenny Defendant Rish, Linda Defendant Rogers, Stephen H Attorney Attorney Simao, Cheryl A Plaintiff Simao, William J Plaintiff Wall, David T

JOURNAL ENTRIES

Attorney

- JURY PRESENT. OUTSIDE THE PRESENCE OF THE JURY. Argument of counsel. Testimony and exhibits presented (see worksheet.) COURT ORDERED. MATTER CONTINUED.

3-38-11 1:00 PM JURY TRIAL (DEPT. X)

PRINT DATE: 06/02/2011 Minutes Date: December 11, 2009 Page 22 of 29

Negligence - Auto	COURT MINUTES	March 28, 2011
07A539455	William Simao, Cheryl Simao	
	vs	
	Jenny Rish	
	-	

March 28, 2011 1:00 PM Jury Trial

HEARD BY: Walsh, Jessie COURTROOM: RJC Courtroom 14B

COURT CLERK: Phyllis Irby

RECORDER: Victoria Boyd

REPORTER:

PARTIES

PRESENT: Adams, Robert M Attorney

Wall, David T

Eglet, Robert T. Attorney
Eglet, Tracy A. Attorney
Rish, James Defendant
Rish, Jenny Defendant
Rogers, Stephen H Attorney
Attorney
Simao, Cheryl A Plaintiff
Simao, William J Plaintiff

JOURNAL ENTRIES

Attorney

- OUTSIDE THE PRESENCE OF THE JURY, argument of counsel. JURY PRESENT. Testimony and exhibits presented (see worksheet.). COURT ORDERED, MATTER CONTINUED.

3-29-11 1:00 PM JURY TRIAL (DEPT. X)

PRINT DATE: 06/02/2011 Page 23 of 29 Minutes Date: December 11, 2009

Negligence - Auto	COURT MINUTES	March 29, 2011
07A539455	William Simao, Cheryl Simao	
	VS	
	Jenny Rish	

March 29, 2011 1:00 PM Jury Trial

HEARD BY: Walsh, Jessie COURTROOM: RJC Courtroom 14B

COURT CLERK: Phyllis Irby

RECORDER: Victoria Boyd

REPORTER:

PARTIES

PRESENT: Adams, Robert M Attorney

Eglet, Robert T. Attorney Eglet, Tracy A. Attorney Rish, James Defendant Rish, Jenny Defendant Rish, Linda Defendant Rogers, Stephen H Attorney Attorney Simao, Cheryl A Plaintiff Wall, David T Attorney

JOURNAL ENTRIES

- OUTSIDE THE PRESENCE OF THE JURY, argument by counsel regarding Mr. Rogers wants to show slide show of anatomy of spinal cord. Mr. Eglet opposed. MOTION DENIED. JURY PRESENT. Testimony and exhibits presented (see worksheet.). COURT ORDERED, MATTER CONTINUED.

3-30-11 1:00 PM JURY TRIAL (DEPT. X)

PRINT DATE: 06/02/2011 Page 24 of 29 Minutes Date: December 11, 2009

Negligence - Auto	COURT MINUTES	March 30, 2011	
05.4.500.455	Livilla Caracta 1 Caracta		
07A539455	William Simao, Cheryl Simao		
	VS		
	Jenny Rish		

March 30, 2011 1:00 PM Jury Trial

HEARD BY: Walsh, Jessie COURTROOM: RJC Courtroom 14B

COURT CLERK: Phyllis Irby

RECORDER: Victoria Boyd

REPORTER:

PARTIES

PRESENT: Adams, Robert M Attorney

Eglet, Robert T. Attorney Eglet, Tracy A. Attorney Rish, James Defendant Rish, Jenny Defendant Rish, Linda Defendant Rogers, Stephen H Attorney Attorney Simao, Cheryl A Plaintiff Wall, David T Attorney

JOURNAL ENTRIES

- OUTSIDE THE PRESENCE OF THE JURY, argument of counsel regarding scheduling of witnesses. JURY PRESENT. Testimony and exhibits presented (see worksheet.) COURT ORDERED,. MATTER CONTINUED.

3-31-11 1:00 PM JURY TRIAL (DEPT. X)

PRINT DATE: 06/02/2011 Page 25 of 29 Minutes Date: December 11, 2009

Negligence - Auto	COURT MINUTES	March 31, 2011
07A539455	William Simao, Cheryl Simao	
	vs	
	Jenny Rish	
	·	

March 31, 2011 1:00 PM Jury Trial

HEARD BY: Walsh, Jessie COURTROOM: RJC Courtroom 14B

COURT CLERK: Teri Braegelmann

RECORDER: Victoria Boyd

REPORTER:

PARTIES

PRESENT: Adams, Robert M Attorney

Eglet, Robert T. Attorney Polsenberg, Daniel F. Attorney Rish, James Defendant Rish, Jenny Defendant Rogers, Stephen H Attorney Attorney Plaintiff Simao, Cheryl A Simao, William J Plaintiff Wall, David T Attorney

JOURNAL ENTRIES

- OUTSIDE THE PRESENCE OF THE JURY: Mr. Adams advised there are some housekeeping issues that need to be resolved and submitted stipulation and order dismissing defendants James Rish and Linda Rish with prejudice. Stipulation SIGNED and FILED IN OPEN COURT. Arguments by counsel regarding Dr. Wang's testimony out of order. Mr. Wall advised deft. may be trying to force a mistrial. Colloquy regarding Court's schedule and order of witnesses. Mr. Eglet moved to exclude Deft's daughter, Linda Rish from testifying. Argument by Mr. Rogers in opposition. Following arguments by counsel, COURT ORDERED motion GRANTED.

INSIDE THE PRESENCE OF THE JURY: Testimony and exhibits presented. (See worksheets).

PRINT DATE: 06/02/2011 Page 26 of 29 Minutes Date: December 11, 2009

07A539455

OUTSIDE THE PRESENCE OF THE JURY: Argument by Mr. Wall as to Deft's continued violations and requested sanctions. Argument by Mr. Rogers on opposition. Mr. Wall requested to have the answer stricken dismiss the jury and proceed to prove up damages. Argument by Mr. Eglet as to the violations and court's curative instruction to the jury and order on rebuttable presumption. Following further arguments by counsel. Mr. Wall advised he would put the statutes as to the Young factors on the record. Following brief recess, Court Stated Its Findings and ORDERED ANSWER STRICKEN.

Court Stated Its Findings and ORDERED, ANSWER STRICKEN.

INSIDE THE PRESENCE OF THE JURY: Court thanked and excused the jury.

OUTSIDE THE PRESENCE OF THE JURY: Argument by Mr. Wall in support of rule 55 motion and prove up hearing. Argument by Mr. Polsenburg in opposition requesting to brief the matter and have a jury for the damages hearing. Further argument by Mr. Wall stating most of the witnesses have been examined and evidence presented. Mr. Polsenberg requested a mistrial and prove-up on liability. Argument by Mr. Adams as to the Life care plan. Following further arguments by counsel, COURT ORDERED, matter SET for Prove-up Hearing. Counsel stipulated to exhibits 1-58. COURT SO ORDERED.

04/01/11 1:00 PM HEARING: PROVE-UP (DAMAGES)

PRINT DATE: 06/02/2011 Page 27 of 29 Minutes Date: December 11, 2009

Negligence - Auto	COURT MINUTES	April 01, 2011	
07A539455	William Simao, Cheryl Simao		
	VS		
	Jenny Rish		

April 01, 2011 1:00 PM Hearing

HEARD BY: Walsh, Jessie COURTROOM: RJC Courtroom 14B

COURT CLERK: Billie Jo Craig

RECORDER: Victoria Boyd

REPORTER:

PARTIES

PRESENT: Adams, Robert M Attorney

Polsenberg, Daniel F. Attorney
Rish, James Defendant
Rish, Jenny Defendant
Rogers, Stephen H Attorney
Attorney
Simao, Cheryl A Plaintiff

Simao, Cheryl A Plaintiff Simao, William J Plaintiff Wall, David T Attorney

JOURNAL ENTRIES

- Damages presented by counsel. Arguments by counsel. At request of counsel, COURT ORDERED, counsel to submit additional briefing on fees and costs simultaneously on 4/15/11. Matter SET for Status Check: Fees and Costs on the Chambers Calendar. Court will order additional briefing if necessary. There will be no further hearings.

4/28/11 STATUS CHECK: FEES AND COSTS - CHAMBERS

PRINT DATE: 06/02/2011 Page 28 of 29 Minutes Date: December 11, 2009

Negligence - Auto	COI	URT MINUTES	Apri	1 28, 2011
07 A E204EE	TA7:11: C:	Charal Circa		
07A539455	William Simao,	Cneryi Simao		
	VS			
	Jenny Rish			
	_			
April 28, 2011	3:00 AM	Status Check		
HEARD BY: Wal	sh, Jessie		COURTROOM:	RJC Courtroom 14B
COURT CLERK:	Teri Braegelmann			
RECORDER:				

PARTIES PRESENT:

REPORTER:

JOURNAL ENTRIES

- Following review of the papers and pleadings on file herein, COURT ORDERED motion DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE, for plaintiff to provide further briefing that fees should be awarded pursuant to plaintiff's offer of judgment.

PRINT DATE: 06/02/2011 Page 29 of 29 Minutes Date: December 11, 2009



PLAINTIFFS' EXHIBIT LIST

TRIAL DATE: MARCH 14, 2011

Case No. A539455	Clerk: T. Braegelmann
Dept. X Judge: Jessie Walsh	Recorder: Victoria Boyd
Pitf(s):	Pitfs' Counsel:
WILLIAM J. SIMAO and CHERYL ANN SIMAO	ROBERT T. EGLET, ESQ.
	DAVID T. WALL, ESQ.
	ROBERT M. ADAMS, ESQ.
Defi(s):	Deft's Counsel:
JENNY RISH; JAMES RISH; LINDA RISH; individually	STEPHEN H. ROGERS, ESQ.
and DOES I though V; and ROE CORPORATIONS I through V,	

No.	•	Description		Offered	Obj.	Adm.	Admitted
	1.	Medical Specials Summary	4	31-11	12	git	3-31-11
	2.	Medical Billing of Southwest Medical Associates	·				
	3.	Medical Billing of Steinberg Diagnostic Medical Imaging					
	4.	Medical Billing of Desert Valley Therapy					
. 	5.	Medical Billing of Apria Healthcare	-			1	
	6.	Medical Billing of Nevada Orthopedic & Spine Center					
	7.	Medical Billing of Las Vegas Surgery Center					
	8.	Medical Billing of Medical District Surgery Center					
	9.	Medical Billing of University Medical Center					
	10.	Medical Billing of Nevada Spine Clinic			\Box		
	11.	Medical Billing of Newport MRI				 	
	12.	Medical Billing of Center for Spine and Special Surgery				1	
-	13.	Medical Billing of Nevada Anesthesia Consultants					
	14.	Medical Billing of Las Vegas Radiology				<u> </u>	
	15.	Medical Billing of PBS Anesthesia	·			† · · · ·	
	16.	Medical Billing of Hans Jorg Rosler, M.D.					
_	17.	Medical Billing of CVS Pharmacy	-				
	18.	Medical Records of Southwest Medical Associates		_	† †	1	
· · ·	19.	Medical Records of Steinberg Diagnostic Medical Imaging		1		-	\bigvee



Exhibit

20.	Medical Records of Desert Valley Therapy	-31	11-7	Z	ه	3-31	
21.	Medical Records of Apria Healthcare				7	1	
22.	Medical Records of Nevada Orthopedic & Spine Center	Н			-		
23.	Medical Records of Las Vegas Surgery Center					1	-
24.	Medical Records of Medical District Surgery Center	I					
25.	Medical Records of University Medical Center		-		ļ		
26.	Medical Records of Nevada Spine Clinic	H					
27.	Medical Records of Newport MRI	-1			-		
28.	Medical Records of Center for Spine and Special Surgery						
29.	Medical Records of Nevada Anesthesia Consultants		Н			-	
30.	Medical Records of Las Vegas Radiology						
31.	Medical Records of PBS Anesthesia		\Box				
32.	Medical Records of Hans Jorg Rosler, M.D.		H				
33.	X-Rays of the Cervical Spine Taken at Southwest Medical Associates on 04/15/05		\parallel				
34.	X-Rays of the Left Elbow and Left Forearm Taken at Southwest Medical Associates on 04/15/05						
35.	CT Scans of the Brain Taken at Southwest Medical Associates on 05/11/05						
36.	MRI Scans of the Brain Taken at Steinberg Diagnostic Medical Imaging Center on 05/23/05		-				
37.	X-Rays of the Left Shoulder Taken at Southwest Medical Associates on 10/18/05						
38.	X-Rays of the Cervical Spine Taken at Southwest Medical Associates on 10/18/05						
39.	MRI Scans of the Cervical Spine Taken at Steinberg Diagnostic Medical Imaging Center on 03/22/06						
40.	MRI Scans of the Cervical Spine Taken at Steinberg Diagnostic Medical Imaging Center on 09/24/07						
41.	X-Rays of the Chest Taken at Southwest Medical Associates on 10/05/07						
42.	CT Scans of the Mandible Taken at Southwest Medical Associates on 04/15/08						
43.	MRI Scans of the Cervical Spine Taken at Nevada Spine Clinic on 04/30/08						
44.	X-Rays of the Cervical Spine Taken at Nevada Spine Clinic on 06/17/08						
45.	CT Scans of the Cervical Spine Taken at Nevada Spine Clinic on 08/08/08		<i>\</i> .			1	4

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46.	MRI Scans of the Cervical Spine Taken at Steinberg Diagnostic	2-31-11		'-	3400
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47.	X-Rays of C3-C4 and C4-C5 Bilateral Transforaminal Epidural	i I			
	Injections Taken at University Medical Center on 02/13/09				
48.	X-Rays of the Chest Taken at Southwest Medical Associates on 03/19/09				
49.	X-Rays of the Cervical Spine Taken at University Medical Center 03/25/09				
50.	CT Scans of the Brain Taken at Southwest Medical Associates on 04/13/09				
51.	X-Rays of the Cervical Spine Taken at Nevada Orthopedic and Spine Center on 04/14/09				
52.	X-Rays of the Cervical Spine Taken at Nevada Orthopedic and Spine Center on 05/26/09				
53.	X-Rays of the Cervical Spine Taken at Nevada Orthopedic and Spine Center on 07/14/09				
54.	CT Scans of the Cervical Spine Taken at Steinberg Diagnostic Medical Imaging Center on 08/11/09				
55.	MRI Scans of the Cervical Spine Taken at Steinberg Diagnostic Medical Imaging Center on 08/11/09				
56.	X-Rays of the Cervical Spine Taken at Southwest Medical Associates on 01/11/10				
57.	X-Rays of the Cervical Spine Taken at Nevada Orthopedic and Spine Center on 03/23/10				
58.	CD Containing MRI Scans of the Cervical Spine taken at Steinberg Diagnostic Medical Imaging Center on 02/03/11	1	7	/ ,	
59.	Life Expectancy Table	3/29/11	y	y	3/29/11
60.	Defendant's Responses to Plaintiffs' First Set of Interrogatories, Dated October 17, 2008	/		·	
61.	Defendant's Responses to Plaintiffs' First Set of Requests for Admissions, dated October 17, 2008				
62.	Plaintiffs' Complaint				
63.	Defendants' Answer to Plaintiff's Complaint	2/1	 	. 1	2//
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	DEMONSTRATIVE EXHIBITS:				
71.	Actual cervical plates, screws surgical tools, and surgical equipment as used in Plaintiff's medical treatment and anticipated to be used in future treatment;				
72.	Demonstrative and actual photographs, animations and videos of surgical procedures and other diagnostic tests Plaintiff has undergone and will undergo in the future;				
73.	Actual diagnostic studies and computer digitized diagnostic studies				
74.	Samples of tools used in surgical procedures				
75.	Diagrams, drawings, pictures, photos, film, video, DVD and CD ROM of various parts of the human body, diagnostic tests and surgical procedures;				
76.	Computer simulation, finite element analysis, mabymo and similar forms of computer visualization				
77.	Power point images/drawings/diagrams/animations/story boards, of the related vehicles involved, the parties involved, the location of the motor vehicle accident and what occurred in the motor vehicle accident.			÷	
78.	Google Earth				
79.	Google Earth Images of Scene and Routes by Parties Prior to MVA				
80.	Pictures of Plaintiff prior and subsequent to the subject accident				
81.	Surgical Timeline				
82.	Medical treatment timeline				
83.	Future Medical Timeline				
84.	Charts depicting Plaintiff's Life Care Plans		-		
85.	Charts depicting Plaintiff's Loss of Household Services	_			- "
86.	Photographs of Plaintiff's Witnesses				
87.	Charts depicting Plaintiff's Life Expectancy				
88.	Story boards and computer digitized power point images;				
89.	Blow-ups/transparancies/digitized images of medical records, medical bills, photographs and other exhibits				
90.	Diagrams/story boards/computer re-enactment of motor vehicle accident				
91.	Diagrams of various parts of the human body related to Plaintiff's injuries				
92.	Photographs of various parts of the human body related to Plaintiff's injuries				

93.	Models of the human body related to Plaintiff's injuries			
94.	Samples of the needles and surgical tools used in Plaintiff's various diagnostic and therapeutic pain management procedures	į		
95.	Aerial views of the accident scene			

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Certification of Copy

State of Nevada		CC.
County of Clark	-	SS:

I, Steven D. Grierson, the Clerk of the Court of the Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County, State of Nevada, does hereby certify that the foregoing is a true, full and correct copy of the hereinafter stated original document(s):

NOTICE OF APPEAL; CASE APPEAL STATEMENT; DISTRICT COURT DOCKET ENTRIES; CIVIL COVER SHEET; DECISION AND ORDER REGARDING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO STRIKE DEFENDANT'S ANSWER; NOTICE OF ENTRY OF ORDER; JUDGMENT; NOTICE OF ENTRY OF JUDGMENT; DISTRICT COURT MINUTES; EXHIBITS LIST

Case No: A539455 Dept No: XX

WILLIAM JAY SIMAO; CHERYL ANN SIMAO,

Plaintiff(s),

vs.

JENNY RISH; JAMES RISH; LINDA RISH,

Defendant(s),

now on file and of record in this office.

IN WITNESS THEREOF, I have hereunto Set my hand and Affixed the seal of the Court at my office, Las Vegas, Nevada This 2 day of June 2011.

Steven D. Grierson, Clerk of the Court

Heather Ungermann, Debuty Clerk

05/31/11

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NV Operating Acct 0229245550



3993 Howard Hughes Parkway, Suite 600 Las Vegas, Nevada 89169 Telephone (702) 949-8200 CHECK NO: 611892

WELLS FARGO Main Office Phoenix, Arizona

91-527/1221

CHECK AMOUNT

\$250.00

TWO HUNDRED FIFTY AND 00/100 Dollars

PAY TO THE ORDER OF **Clerk of the Supreme Court**

Las Vegas, NV

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"O229245550"

#611892#

:12210527B:

1 2 3 4 5	NOTC DANIEL F. POLSENBERG State Bar No. 2376 JOEL D. HENRIOD State Bar No. 8492 LEWIS AND ROCA LLP 3993 Howard Hughes Parkway, Suite 600 Las Vegas, Nevada 89169 (702) 474-2616
6 7 8	Stephen H. Rogers (SBN 5755) Rogers Mastrangelo Carvalho & Mitchell 300 South Fourth Street, Suite 170 Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 (702) 383-3400
9	Attorneys for Defendant Jenny Rish
0	DISTRICT COURT
1	Clark County, Nevada
2	WILLIAM JAY SIMAO, individually and CHERNI ANN SIMAO individually and as
3	CHERYL ANN SIMAO, individually and as husband and wife, Dept. No. XX
4	Plaintiffs, }
.5 .6 .7	JENNY RISH; JAMES RISH; LINDA RISH; DOES I through V; and ROE Corporations I through V, inclusive,
8	Defendants.
9	NOTICE OF APPEAL
20	Please take notice that defendant JENNY RISH hereby appeals to the Supreme
21	Court of Nevada from:
22	1. All judgments and orders in this case;
23	2. "Decision and Order Regarding Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike Defendant's
24	Answer, filed April 22, 2011";
25	3. Judgment, filed April 28, 2011, notice of entry of which was served via
26	hand delivery on May 2, 2011; and
27	
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- 1	

1	4. A	All rulings and interlocutory orders made appealable by any of the
2	foregoing.	
3		
4	Dated	this 31 st day of May 2011.
5		LEWIS AND ROCA LLP
6		
7		By: s/ Daniel F. Polsenberg DANIEL F. POLSENBERG (SBN 2376) LEWIS AND ROCA LLP
8		LEWIS AND ROCA LLP 3993 Howard Hughes Parkway, Suite 600
9		3993 Howard Hughes Parkway, Suite 600 Las Vegas, Nevada 89169 (702) 474-2616
10		Attorneys for Defendant Jenny Rish
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1	CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
2	Pursuant to Nev. R. Civ. P. 5(b), I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 31st day of May,
3	2011, I served the foregoing NOTICE OF APPEAL by depositing a copy for mailing,
4	first-class mail, postage prepaid, at Las Vegas, Nevada, to the following:
5	ROBERT T. EGLET DAVID T. WALL
6	ROBERT M. ADAMS MAINOR EGLET
7	400 South Fourth Street, Suite 600 Las Vegas, NV 89101
8	s/ Mary Kay Carlton An Employee of Lewis and Roca LLP
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EXHIBIT A

EXHIBIT A

Alun D. Colum NEO ŧ ROBERT T. EGLET, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 3402 **CLERK OF THE COURT** 2 DAVID T. WALL, ESQ. 3 Nevada Bar No. 2805 ROBERT M. ADAMS, ESQ. 4 Nevada Bar No. 6551 **MAINOR EGLET** 5 400 South Fourth Street, Suite 600 Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 6 Ph: (702) 450-5400 7 Fx: (702) 450-5451 reglet@mainorlawyers.com 8 dwall@mainorlawyers.com badams@mainorlawyers.com 9 Attorneys for Plaintiffs 10 MATTHEW E. AARON, ESQ. 11 Nevada Bar No. 4900 AARON & PATERNOSTER, LTD. 12 2300 West Sahara Avenue, Ste. 650 13 Las Vegas, Nevada 89102 Ph.: (702) 384-4111 14 Fx.: (702) 384-8222 15 Attorneys for Plaintiffs DISTRICT COURT 16 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 17 18 WILLIAM JAY SIMAO, individually CASE NO.: A539455 CHERYL ANN SIMAO, individually, and as DEPT. NO.: X 19 husband and wife, 20 Plaintiffs, **NOTICE OF ENTRY OF ORDER** 21 ٧. 22 JENNY RISH; JAMES RISH; LINDA RISH; 23 DOES I through V; and ROE CORPORATIONS I through V, inclusive, 25 Defendants. 26 27 28

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Jl

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that a Decision and Order Regarding Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike Defendant's Answer was entered in the above-entitled matter on April 22, 2011 and is attached hereto.

DATED this 26 day of April, 2011.

MAINOR EGLET

ROBERT T. EGLET, ESQ.
Nevada Bar No. 3402
DAVID T. WALL, ESQ.
Nevada Bar No. 2805
ROBERT M. ADAMS, ESQ.
Nevada Bar No. 6551
400 South Fourth Street, Suite 600
Las Vegas, Nevada 89101
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

MAINOR EGLET

12.

CERTIFIATE OF MAILING

The undersigned hereby certifies that on the 2ω day of April, 2011, a copy of the above and foregoing NOTICE OF ENTRY OF ORDER was served by enclosing same in an envelope with postage prepaid thereon, address and mailed as follows:

Stephen H. Rogers, Esq.
ROGERS, MASTRANGELO,
CARVALHO & MITCHELL
300 South Fourth Street, Suite 710
Las Vegas, Nevada 89101
Attorneys for Defendants

An employee of MAINOR EGLET

CLERK OF THE COURT

28

ORDR 1 ROBERT T. EGLET, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 3402 2 DAVID T. WALL, ESQ. 3 Nevada Bar No. 2805 ROBERT M. ADAMS, ESQ. 4 Nevada Bar No. 6551 MAINOR EGLET 5 400 South Fourth Street, Suite 600 б Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 Ph: (702) 450-5400 7 Fx: (702) 450-5451 dwall@mainorlawyers.com 8 9 MATTHEW E. AARON, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 4900 10 AARON & PATERNOSTER, LTD. 2300 West Sahara Avenue, Ste.650 11 Las Vegas, Nevada 89102 12 Ph.: (702) 384-4111 Fx.: (702) 384-8222 13 Attorneys for Plaintiffs 14 DISTRICT COURT 15 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 16 WILLIAM JAY SIMAO, individually and CASE NO.: A539455 17 CHERYL ANN SIMAO, individually, and as DEPT. NO.: X 18 husband and wife, 19 Plaintiffs, 20 ٧. 21 JENNY RISH, 22 Defendant. 23 24 25 **DEFENDANT'S ANSWER** 26 27

DECISION AND ORDER REGARDING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO STRIKE

This matter having come before the Court on March 31, 2011, on Plaintiffs' oral Motion to Strike Defendant's Answer, ROBERT T. EGLET, ESQ., DAVID T. WALL, ESQ. and ROBERT M. ADAMS, ESQ. present for Plaintiffs, WILLIAM SIMAO and CHERYL SIMAO.

MAINOR EGLET

STEPHEN H. ROGERS, ESQ. and DANIEL F. POLSENBERG, ESQ. present for Defendant, JENNY RISH, and following the Court's oral pronouncement from the bench GRANTING Plaintiffs' Motion, the Court hereby enters the following written Decision and Order:

I. Factual and Procedural Background

This case involves a motor vehicle accident occurring on April 15, 2005. The Plaintiff, WILLIAM SIMAO, was driving southbound on Interstate 15 when he was rear-ended by a vehicle driven by the Defendant, JENNY RISH. Defendant did not deny causing the accident. Plaintiff WILLIAM SIMAO was injured in the accident and brought the instant action, which included a claim for loss of consortium by WILLIAM SIMAO's wife, Plaintiff CHERYL SIMAO.

This matter was presented for jury trial beginning on March 14, 2011, and the trial had nearly been completed before the instant Motion was made. However, the facts supporting the Motion and the grounds upon which to analyze the Motion include rulings made by this Court before the trial commenced. The Plaintiffs' oral motion to strike the Defendant's Answer is rooted primarily in the Defendant's repeated violations of this Court's Order granting the Plaintiffs' Motion in Limine to Preclude Defendant From Raising a Minor Impact Defense. However, this Court recognizes that Defendant violated other Orders of this Court during the trial, and the cumulative effect of such violations is material to the Court's analysis. Before itemizing and analyzing the violations of this Court's Order on "minor impact," it is necessary to consider the violations of other Court orders by the Defendant.

A. Violation of Order Precluding Evidence of Unrelated Accidents, Injuries or Medical Conditions

1. Plaintiffs' Motion in Limine

On January 7, 2011, Plaintiffs brought an Omnibus Motion in Limine, which included a

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request to preclude the Defendant from introducing evidence of Prior and Subsequent Unrelated Accidents, Injuries and Medical Conditions and Prior and Subsequent Claims or Lawsuits. This portion of the Omnibus Motion in Limine specifically asked this Court to preclude evidence of an unrelated 2003 motorcycle accident involving the Plaintiff, since no medical provider had connected any of the minor injuries sustained by the Plaintiff in the 2003 motorcycle accident to any injuries suffered in the instant accident. In short, the evidence established that the motorcycle accident was irrelevant.

The Defendant filed an Opposition to Plaintiffs' Omnibus Motion in Limine, and the matter was heard by this Court on February 15, 2011, at which time this Court GRANTED Plaintiffs' request. On March 9, 2011, this Court entered a written Order which stated in pertinent part as follows:

"IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs' request to exclude prior and subsequent unrelated accidents, injuries and medical conditions, and prior and subsequent claims or lawsuits is GRANTED in all respects."

Following the entry of the foregoing Order, all parties were on notice that this Court had specifically precluded the Defendant from introducing evidence of unrelated accidents, including the 2003 motorcycle accident.

2. Defendant's Clear Violation in Opening Statement

In his Opening Statement, counsel for the Defendant presented to the jury a Power Point slide referencing William Simao's 2003 motorcycle accident. The Plaintiffs objected, asked that the slide be shielded from the jury, and approached for a sidebar conference.

The slide clearly and unambiguously violated the Order of this Court on the Plaintiffs' Omnibus Motion in Limine, which Motion specifically referenced the 2003 motorcycle accident as an accident *unrelated* to any issue in the instant case. The jury was directed to disregard the

slide and was further admonished that a pretrial ruling of the Court excluded evidence of the 2003 motorcycle accident.

The Plaintiffs' objection was sustained.

Following this admonition, this Court held a hearing outside the presence of the jury to allow the Defendant's counsel and the Plaintiffs' counsel to review the remaining slides accompanying the defense Opening Statement to determine if any of them violated court orders. Several of them violated orders and were removed (RTP, March 21, 2011, p. 75). Notably, the Plaintiffs' counsel made the following statement outside the presence of the jury:

There were multiple other slides that had the same type of problems in them. Most of them Mr. Rogers agreed with and took those statements out of the slides, but again, if we hadn't done that, there would have been three to four more clear violations of ... this Court's pretrial orders.

As Mr. Wall [Plaintiffs' co-counsel] said at the bench, I think it's clear – I think it's abundantly clear that Mr. Rogers is going to try to mistry this case. I think it is abundantly clear that that's what's going on.

I told the Court at the last bench conference that that was two. If there were any additional ones, we were going to start asking for monetary sanctions and other potential sanctions in this case for this type of systematic refusal to comply with pretrial court orders.

I expect his experts are going to do it as well. I can assure this Court that they are going to violate a number of the orders in their testimony, just like Mr. Rogers did up there....

(RTP, March 21, 2011, p. 75) (emphasis supplied).

B. Violations of Order Precluding Evidence That This is a "Medical Build-up" Case

1. Plaintiffs' Motion in Limine

Within the afore-mentioned Omnibus Motion in Limine, the Plaintiffs also sought to preclude any evidence or argument that the case was "attorney driven" or a "medical build-up" case. This section of the Plaintiffs' Omnibus Motion in Limine was also heard by this Court on February 15, 2011, at which time this Court GRANTED the Plaintiffs' request. During the hearing on this Motion, counsel for the Defendant conceded he had no evidence of any kind suggesting that this case was "attorney driven" or a "medical build-up" case. This Court's written Order of March 9, 2011, also stated as follows:

"IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs' request to preclude argument that this case is 'attorney driven' or a 'medical build-up' case is GRANTED."

Following the entry of the foregoing Order, all parties were on notice that this Court had specifically precluded the Defendant from arguing or presenting evidence that the instant case was a "medical build-up" case, in large measure as a result of the Defendant having no such evidence to present.

2. <u>Defendant's Clear Violation During Opening Statement</u>

In his Opening Statement, counsel for the Defendant made the following statement when discussing the testimony of the Plaintiff's treating physicians:

"And we are going to hear from various different kinds of doctors in this case.

One of them are doctors who appear down here regularly in court, as often, if not more than trial lawyers. Doctors McNulty, and Grover..."

(RTP March 21, 2011, p. 72).

Defense counsel's statement was interrupted by an objection from the Plaintiffs, who additionally asked that the Power Point slide that accompanied the defense's Opening Statement

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be shielded from the jury. The slide referenced the Plaintiff's treating physicians as "Trial Doctors."

At the sidebar conference that followed, the Plaintiffs objected to the statements of counsel and the "Trial Doctors" slide as violating this Court's Order precluding any argument that the case was "attorney driven" or a "medical build-up" case. Since no other purpose for the statement or the slide was forthcoming from counsel for the Defendant at the sidebar, the jury was directed to disregard the slide.

The Plaintiffs' objection was sustained.

3. Defendant's Clear Violation During Cross-Examination of Dr. Patrick McNulty

Despite this Court's ruling during the Defendant's Opening Statement on the issue of medical build-up and "Trial Doctors," counsel for the Defendant asked the following question of Dr. McNulty, one of the Plaintiff's treating doctors:

"Now, Doctor, yesterday there was a discussion about the testimony history of a doctor. I don't broach this topic with you to be insensitive, but I want to touch on it since that issue has been raised. You testified under oath, whether it be in trial or in deposition, somewhere around 100 times; is that right?"

(RTP, March 25, 2011, pp. 21-22).

Counsel for the Plaintiffs immediately objected and approached the Court for a sidebar bench conference. There, the Court heard argument regarding the "discussion" "yesterday" which was the Plaintiffs' use of specific prior deposition testimony to impeach the Defendant's expert witness during cross-examination. Further, the Court heard argument that this line of questioning could only be presented to create an inference of "medical build-up." Counsel for the Defendant did not sufficiently explain to this Court how this line of questioning was not a violation of the pretrial order precluding evidence of "medical build-up," especially in light of

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the fact that the Defendant admittedly had no evidence to support a "medical build-up" defense.

The Plaintiffs' objection was sustained.

C. Violations of Pretrial Order Precluding "Minor Impact" Defense

As set forth above, the Plaintiffs' ultimate motion to strike the Defendant's Answer was based primarily on repeated violations of this Court's pretrial Order on the issue of a "minor impact" defense.

1. Plaintiff's Motion in Limine

On February 17, 2011, Plaintiffs brought a Motion in Limine to: 1) Preclude Defendant from Raising a "Minor" or "Low Impact" Defense; 2) Limit the Trial Testimony of Defendant's Expert, David Fish, M.D.; and 3) Exclude Evidence of Property Damage. The Motion set out the fact that the Nevada Highway Patrol Trooper who completed the Accident Report referred to the vehicle damage as "moderate." Specifically, the Motion asked the Court to preclude the Defendant from "arguing, suggesting or insinuating at trial that the crash was a 'minor impact' or 'low impact' collision, and not significant enough to cause Plaintiff's injuries." The Motion was primarily based on Hallmark v. Eldridge, 189 P.3d 646 (Nev. 2008), coupled with the fact that Defendant did not have any expert qualified to testify whether the impact in the instant collision was sufficient to cause the injuries complained of. Conversely, the Plaintiffs had disclosed a biomechanical expert who was prepared to testify that the accident was of the type to have proximately caused injury to the Plaintiff. The Motion further sought to limit Defendant's pain management expert, Dr. David Fish, from testifying to opinions rooted in biomechanical science, as he lacks the qualifications to testify to such opinions under the standard announced in Hallmark.

On February 25, 2011, Defendant filed an Opposition to the Motion and the matter was heard by this Court on March 1, 2011, at which time the Court GRANTED Plaintiffs' Motion in

its entirety. Defendants provided no evidence or information to correlate the amount of damage to a vehicle in a collision to the severity of the injury suffered by a passenger. Defendants had no expert witness on biomechanics to support an argument or inference that this accident was too minor to cause the injuries alleged to have been suffered by the Plaintiff. Based on the Nevada Supreme Court's rulings in *Hallmark*, *supra*, *Levine v. Remolif*, 80 Nev. 168 (1964) and *Choat v. McDorman*, 86 Nev. 332 (1970), this Court found that issues of accident reconstruction and biomechanics are not within the common knowledge of laypersons and require expert witness testimony. As such, this Court found no evidentiary or factual foundation upon which the Defendant could argue or infer that the accident was too minor to cause the Plaintiff's injuries.

On March 8, 2011, this Court entered a written Order which stated in pertinent part as follows:

"IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs' request to preclude Defendant from Raising a "Minor" or "Low Impact" Defense is GRANTED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs' request to limit the trial testimony of Defendant's expert, David Fish, M.D., to those areas of expertise that he is qualified to testify in regards to is GRANTED. Neither Dr. Fish nor any other defense expert shall opine regarding biomechanics or the nature of the impact of the subject crash at trial.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs' request to exclude the property damage photos and repair invoice(s) is GRANTED."

Following the entry of the foregoing Order, all parties were on notice that this Court had specifically precluded a defense (or even an argument) that the accident was too minor to cause the injuries for which Plaintiff sought to recover damages.

Despite a clear and unambiguous Order precluding the Defendant from raising as a defense that the impact of the accident was too minor to cause the Plaintiff's injuries, counsel for

the Defendant persisted in violating this Court's order, ultimately leading to the sanction imposed herein. There can be no question or argument that the Defendant was on notice of this Court's Order, based on the following:

a) Hearing Outside the Presence of the Jury on March 18, 2011

After jury selection had been completed and before Opening Statements, this Court held a hearing outside the presence of the jury to discuss, among other things, the issue of a minor impact defense. The discussion on the record was extensive and comprises seventeen (17) pages of the transcript (See, RTP, March 18, 2011, pp. 112-129).

During this hearing, the Plaintiffs' counsel brought to this Court's attention the fact that counsel for the Defendant, in his Opening Statement, might broach the subject of minor impact by referring to the Defendant's deposition testimony that the impact of the accident was merely "a tap." Counsel for the Defendant conceded that it was his impression that this Court had not precluded such an argument:

"What happened was, there was a motion to exclude a defense that a minor impact cannot cause injury. The Plaintiffs' argument in the motion was because the defense did not retain a biomechanical engineer they would not be able to argue the general proposition that minor impacts cannot cause injury.

The defense appeared at the hearing and said, 'This is not a biomechanical case.

The defense is not going to argue that no minor impact can cause injury. The defense is that this minor impact did not cause injury."

(RTP, March 18, 2011, p. 114)(emphasis supplied).

It became clear to this Court that the Defendant intended to present a minor impact defense, despite the Order of this Court to the contrary. Plaintiffs' counsel was allowed to once again state on the record their position on the original Motion in Limine, outlining that the

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Defendant had no expert witness to opine that the accident was too minor to cause the claimed injuries, and further that the Order of this Court on the Motion in Limine precluded a "minor impact" defense at trial.

By the conclusion of the hearing outside the presence of the jury, this Court reiterated its ruling on the Motion in Limine precluding a "minor impact" defense (RTP March 18, 2011, p. 125-26). Likewise, this Court precluded counsel for the Defendant from referencing in his Opening Statement that it was a minor impact, or simply "a tap," for the purpose of raising an inference that the accident was too minor to cause the Plaintiff's injuries (RTP March 18, 2011, pp. 127-28). This Court further reminded counsel for the Defendant to review the Order entered on this issue to avoid violating it in the future (RTP March 18, 2011, p. 126, 127).

b) Hearing Outside the Presence of the Jury on March 21, 2011

On the first court day following the hearing set forth above, the issue of "minor impact" was again raised outside the presence of the jury immediately following the Plaintiffs' Opening Statement. At this hearing, the Defendant sought permission to claim a "minor impact" defense based on the door allegedly being opened by the Plaintiffs in their Opening Statement when counsel referred to the accident as a "motor vehicle crash." This Court noted that the Plaintiffs in their Opening Statement did not refer to the nature of the impact, the severity of the impact, the fact that the impact was significant enough to cause the Plaintiff's injuries nor any violence associated with the impact. In fact, this Court noted that Plaintiffs' counsel did not describe the impact of the vehicles in any way.

Based on that finding, the Court denied the Defendant's renewed request to be able to raise a "minor impact" defense. Again, the Defendant was clearly and unequivocally on notice that such a defense was precluded.

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2. Reference to Minor Impact during Defendant's Opening Statement

Immediately following the foregoing discussion outside the presence of the jury, counsel for the Defendant delivered his Opening Statement. He described the stop and go traffic the Defendant encountered before the accident, and stated that the Defendant was nearly stopped before the impact (RTP, March 21, 2011, p. 63). Plaintiffs did not object to this statement, although it arguably raises an inference of a minor impact.

Thereafter, counsel for the Defendant proceeded to attempt to play selected portions of his client's videotaped deposition regarding the nature of the accident, which drew an objection from the Plaintiffs. After a bench conference, this Court determined that not only was the Defendant's deposition hearsay when offered on her own behalf, but also that testimony regarding the nature of the accident, if offered to show it was a minor impact, would be in violation of this Court's pretrial Order.

The Plaintiffs' objection was sustained.

3. Clear Violation of Order During Cross-Examination of Dr. Jorg Rosler

During the testimony of Dr. Rosler, one of the Plaintiff's treating pain management physicians, counsel for the Defendant asked the following question:

"Do you know anything about what happened to [Defendant] Jenny Rish and her passengers in this accident?"

(RPT, March 22, 2011, p. 84)

Before the witness could answer, the Plaintiffs objected, citing this Court's pretrial motion ruling.

The only potential relevance of such an inquiry would be to raise an inference that since the Defendant or her passengers were not injured (or that the Plaintiff's treating physician was unaware of any injury), the accident must not have been significant enough to injure the Plaintiff.

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There is no other potential purpose in obtaining an answer from this witness to that question. Such an inference would be directly contrary to this Court's Order precluding a "minor impact" defense.

The Plaintiffs' objection was sustained.

4. Clear Violation During Cross-Examination of Dr. Patrick McNulty

Despite the fact that the Court sustained the Plaintiffs' objection to the improper question of Dr. Rosler, counsel for Defendant asked an almost identical question of the next treating physician to testify for Plaintiff. Within the first two minutes of the Defendant's crossexamination of Dr. McNulty, the following questions were asked:

[Defense Counsel] And you don't know anything about the car accident other than what [Plaintiff] told you?

[Dr. McNulty] It was simply he said he had a car accident and that's when he his problems started.

[Defense Counsel] Okay. But did you discuss with him whether he was able to drive from the scene of the accident?

[Dr. McNulty] No, I really didn't go into the other – into the other details. No, I did not discuss that.

[Defense Counsel] Do you know anything about the folks in Jenny Rish's car? (RTP 3/25/11, p. 4) (Emphasis supplied).

Counsel for the Plaintiffs immediately objected and a bench conference ensued. At the bench conference, counsel for the Defendant indicated his position on the relevance of the question:

[Defense Counsel] The relevance is that if one of them were injured or were not, that would be relevant or probative to whether the others were injured.

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(RTP 3/25/11, p. 5).

In fact, based on this Court's prior rulings, such a position is untenable. As stated in the authority supporting the grant of the Plaintiffs' pretrial Motion in Limine, there is no correlation between the size of the impact and the potential for injury to the Plaintiff. There is no correlation between whether the Defendant or one of her passengers was injured and the potential for injury to the Plaintiff. The Defendant had no credible or admissible evidence suggesting such a correlation and no expert testimony to support such a proposition.

Further, since the question asked on cross-examination of Dr. McNulty was exactly the same question precluded during the cross-examination of Dr. Rosler, the Defendant was clearly on notice that this area of inquiry was improper.

The Plaintiffs' objection was sustained.

5. Clear Violation During Cross-Examination of Dr. Jaswinder Grover

On the very same afternoon as Dr. McNulty's cross-examination, the Defendant had the opportunity to cross-examine Dr. Grover, another of the Plaintiff's treating physicians. During that cross-examination, counsel for the Defendant *again* asked the very same type of question precluded during the cross-examination of Drs. Rosler and McNulty:

[Defense Counsel] You know the Plaintiff wasn't transported by ambulance.

[Dr. Grover] Yes, sir.

[Defense Counsel] You know [whether] Jenny Rish -

[Plaintiff's Counsel] Objection, Your Honor.

[Defense Counsel] - was lifted from the scene?

(RTP 3/25/11, p. 141).

After all of the previous hearings on the issue of a "minor impact" defense, and after the objections to the same type of question were sustained by this Court, such a question of Dr.

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Grover is simply inexplicable. Again, there is no potential relevance to a question asked of one of the Plaintiff's treating doctors (who didn't treat the Plaintiff until almost three years after the accident) about any injuries to the Defendant, other than to attempt to infer that the accident was too minor to injure the Plaintiff if the Defendant was not injured. That inference is precluded, based on the fact that the Defendant had no expert witness or admissible evidence to support that inference.

The Plaintiffs' objection was sustained and the jury was directed to disregard the last question.

question.

6. Hearing Outside the Presence of the Jury on March 25, 2011

Following the testimony of Dr. Grover, at a hearing outside the presence of the jury, counsel for the Plaintiffs made the following record regarding the pervasive and continuous violations of this Court's Orders on pretrial Motions by counsel for the Defendant:

[Plaintiffs' Counsel] Despite the ruling of the Court, despite the arguments we've had outside the presence on the issue of minor impact, in Opening Statement and with each and every witness so far, there's been a question which leads to a conclusion or an argument about minor impact, whether the Defendant was injured in – whether the doctor knows whether the Defendant was injured in the accident, which could only potentially be relevant to some argument that the accident was too minor to have caused injury, because she wasn't injured.

Each time we've objected. Each time the Court has sustained the objection. I would look for, frankly, some guidance from the Court on what we can do from here out, because it – I can only assume that it will continue to occur. And so, I don't know whether a progressive sanction that we'd ask for, that there should be a warning from the Court before this should happen again. But those are my concerns, and I don't know

what other potential relevance there could be to asking a treating physician whether he's aware of whether or not the Defendant was injured in the accident.

(RTP 3/25/11, pp. 164-65) (emphasis supplied).

Thereafter, a discussion ensued on the record regarding the Court's pretrial ruling and the fact that the Defendant had repeatedly violated it. At the conclusion of the hearing outside the presence of the jury, this Court attempted, once again, to make it clear that the violations were continuous and that the Court would take necessary measures if the violations occurred again. To the Plaintiffs' counsel's suggestion of a progressive sanction, the Court responded thusly:

[Court] I think you're right, and I think that the defense is on notice. I think the Order is very clear. I think it clearly has been violated. I was really surprised to hear a question posed of [Dr. Grover] regarding Ms. Rish when the Court sustained a previous question regarding Ms. Rish of another witness and ruled that that was not relevant. So I was really surprised to hear that very same question posed as to Ms. Rish.

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So I don't know. It does seem to be at this point to be deliberate, Mr. Rogers. And so, I'm inclined to agree that you're on notice. The Court will consider progressive sanctions. I don't know what they will be. I hope there won't have to be any assessed. But I don't know what else to do to try to get you to comply with the Court's previous Orders.

(RTP 3/25/11, pp. 166-67) (emphasis supplied).

7. Testimony of Defendant's Expert Witness, Dr. David Fish

a) Voir Dire Examination Prior to Direct Examination

Defense expert Dr. Fish testified out of order during the Plaintiffs' case-in-chief as an accommodation by the Plaintiff to the Defendant and her expert. At request of the Plaintiffs'

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counsel immediately prior to Dr. Fish's testimony to the jury, this Court held a hearing outside the presence of the jury to allow the Plaintiffs' counsel to take Dr. Fish on *voir dire* to ensure he was aware of the Court's previous rulings (including an Order granting the Plaintiffs' Motion in Limite to Limit the Testimony of Dr. Fish). Dr. Fish's testimony outside the presence of the jury comprises eighteen pages of the record (See, RTP March 24, 2011, pp. 12-30).

This questioning of Dr. Fish revealed that he was unaware of virtually every pretrial Order entered by this Court, including the Order limiting his testimony. He was unaware of this Court's Order precluding:

- 1) Plaintiff's unrelated 2003 motorcycle accident;
- 2) Plaintiff's unrelated 2008 motor vehicle accident;
- 3) Plaintiff's unrelated medical conditions;
- 4) Any suggestion of secondary gain, symptom magnification or malingering;
- 5) Sub rosa video surveillance of Plaintiff (ruling deferred until the conclusion of Plaintiff's direct examination);
- 6) Dr. Fish's testimony regarding biomechanical opinions related to the accident.

Of obvious concern to this Court was the fact that despite the voluminous pretrial motions, the thorough and even repetitious hearings and arguments entertained by this Court on the issues and the consistency of the enforcement of those rulings by this Court, the Defendant had not properly prepared her expert witness. When Dr. Fish volunteered that he thought some of the impediments to his testimony were "strange," the Court responded:

[Court] You know what seems strange to me? That this witness obviously doesn't have any idea what the Court has ruled prior to these motions in limine.

(RTP March 24, 2011, p. 24).

The Court unambiguously placed Dr. Fish and the Defendant on notice that violations of

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the Court's pretrial Orders carried the possibility of sanctions, including striking the testimony of Dr. Fish in its entirety (RTP March 24, 2011, p. 15).

b) Violation During Cross-Examination

Nevertheless, during cross-examination, Dr. Fish persisted in failing to respond to pertinent questions from the Plaintiffs' counsel and on more than one occasion responded to questions by stating, inferring or insinuating that he was unfairly prohibited from answering the questions based on this Court's prior rulings (RTP March 24, 2011, p. 106, 133).

Despite the repeated and systematic violations of the pretrial Orders in this case and the Court's efforts to cure and prevent the same, Dr. Fish violated rulings on "minor impact" during cross-examination.

When presented with contrary testimony on issues of medicine in prior depositions from other cases, Dr. Fish responded by suggesting that the instant accident was not a "significant accident." The Plaintiffs' oral Motion to Strike was Granted by this Court (RTP March 28, 2011, p.71-72).

c) Violation During Redirect Examination

At the end of the Defendant's redirect examination of Dr. Fish, counsel for the Defendant in a conclusory fashion asked Dr. Fish to summarize his opinions on causation.

[Defense Counsel] ... Doctor, how is it that you can reach an opinion to a medical probability that this accident didn't cause the pain that [the Plaintiff] complained of following this accident?

[Dr. Fish] Well, it's based on multiple factors. It's based on the actual - looking at the images of the MRI. It's looking at the discogram and the results of the discogram. It's looking at the pattern of pain. It's looking at the notes that were taken of the events that happened and it's knowing about the accident itself.

(RTP March 28, 2011, p.87) (Emphasis supplied).

Based on this Court's observation of Dr. Fish's testimony, there is no question that Dr. Fish's response, clearly in violation of this Court's Order, was deliberate. The Plaintiff's objection was sustained, and the jury was admonished to disregard the final statement in Dr. Fish's response.

D. Irrebuttable Presumption Instruction to the Jury

1. Plaintiffs' Request for a Special Instruction to the Jury

Following the testimony of Dr. Fish, the Court conducted a hearing outside the presence of the jury at the request of counsel for the Plaintiffs to consider a progressive sanction against the Defendant for the continuous and systematic violations of this Court's Orders on pretrial motions. The Plaintiff offered, as an alternative to striking Defendant's Answer, a special instruction to the jury directing them to presume that the accident in question was of a sufficient quality to have caused the injuries of which Plaintiff complained. The entire hearing on this issue outside the jury's presence comprises twenty-three (23) pages of transcript, which includes a recess by the Court to consider the appropriate language of an adverse inference instruction (See, RTP March 28, 2011, pp. 89-112).

During the hearing, the Plaintiffs' counsel correctly identified the factual and procedural history of the issue of a "minor impact" defense in this case (much of which is set forth above), including the rulings on pretrial motions, the numerous hearings outside the presence of the jury on this issue, the repeated violations of this Court's Order on "minor impact" and the records made establishing notice to the Defendant of possible progressive sanctions for any further violations (RTP March 28, 2011, pp. 89-93).

Counsel for the Plaintiffs then made a further record outlining the proper standard for consideration by this Court under Young v. Ribeiro Building, Inc., 106 Nev. 88 (1990).

2. This Court's Consideration of the Young Factors

In Young, the Nevada Supreme Court reiterated that trial courts have inherent equitable powers to issue sanctions for abusive litigation practices. *Id.* at 92. Before issuing such sanctions, a trial court should carefully consider the factors announced in Young, although no single factor is necessarily dispositive and each of the non-exhaustive factors should be examined in the light of the case before the trial court. *Id.* As outlined during the hearing by counsel for the Plaintiffs, this Court considered the following factors set forth in Young before addressing the language of the special instruction to the jury.

a) Degree of willfulness of the violations

The violations of this Court's pretrial Orders were continuous and systematic. As set forth above, the Defendant was clearly on notice of the Court's Order regarding this "minor impact" defense yet the Defendant violated this particular Order on numerous occasions. Based on the sheer number of violations of the same order in the same fashion, this Court can only conclude that such violations were willful in nature.

b) The extent to which the non-offending party would be prejudiced by a lesser sanction

To date, no lesser sanction had been successful in precluding future violations. This Court has consistently sustained the Plaintiffs' objections and stricken offending questions and answers. At some point, simply directing jurors to disregard continuous violations of pretrial Orders is insufficient.

Counsel for the Plaintiffs indicated that the violations to this point were sufficient to

¹ In considering non-case concluding sanctions, a trial court shall hold such hearing as it reasonably deems necessary to consider matters that are pertinent to the imposition of appropriate sanctions Bahena v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 245 P.3d 1182, 1185 (Nev. 2010) This court heard extensive arguments from the Plaintiffs and the Defendant before granting the Plaintiffs' request for a progressive sanction. While an "express, careful and preferably written" order is required by the Nevada Supreme Court for case concluding sanctions only, Young, supra at 93; Foster v. Dingwall, 227 P.3d 1042, 1048-49 (Nev. 2010), this Court outlines herein its analysis of the Young factors that supported the imposition of the non-case concluding sanction of an irrebuttable presumption instruction.

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warrant a request that this Court impose a case concluding sanction of striking the Defendant's Answer, but that in harmonizing this particular factor from Young it might be necessary for this Court to consider a lesser sanction of a presumption instruction.

c) The severity of a sanction of dismissal relative to the severity of the abuse

This Court considered, at the time of imposing the sanction of an irrebuttable presumption instruction to the jury, whether the alternative request of striking Defendant's Answer would be an appropriate response to Defendant's continuous violations of this Court's pretrial Orders. While the abuse to this point was systematic and severe, this Court determined that a progressive sanction would be appropriate before consideration of a case concluding sanction.

d) The feasibility and fairness of an alternative, lesser sanction

Again, against the backdrop of the Plaintiffs' alternative request to strike Defendant's Answer, this Court considered the feasibility and fairness of a lesser sanction and determined that the irrebuttable presumption instruction requested by Plaintiff appropriately addressed the nature of the violations of the Court's Order precluding evidence to support a "minor impact" defense.

An irrebuttable presumption is a presumption that cannot be overcome by any additional evidence or argument. Employers Insurance Co. of Nevada v. Daniels, 122 Nev. 1009, 1015-16, fn. 15 (2006), quoting Black's Law Dictionary 1223 (8th ed. 2004). As this Court noted during the sanction hearing, the Order granting the Motion in Limine was based on the Defendant's complete lack of evidence bearing on a "minor impact" defense:

[Court] But the point of the matter was that Defense had no witness who could testify that this was a minor impact and no witness who could testify that this was a minor impact that could not have caused the injuries to Plaintiff, that Plaintiff sustained.

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Defense simply didn't have any witnesses to so testify. That's why the motion in limine was granted.

(RTP March 28, 2011, p. 104).

Given that the Defendant had no admissible, credible evidence to offer to support this "minor impact" defense, an irrebuttable presumption instruction was appropriate to communicate to the jury what the Defendant failed to comprehend throughout the trial: namely, that there is no evidence to suggest that the impact in this accident was too minor to cause the injuries the Plaintiff claims to have suffered. An alternative adverse inference instruction or a rebuttable presumption instruction would have given the Defendant exactly what was precluded in the Order on the pretrial motions: namely, an opportunity to rebut the contention that the accident was of sufficient character to have caused injury. Again, the Defendant had no evidence with which to rebut that contention.

e) The policy favoring adjudication on the merits

Mindful of this policy, the Court declined at this point to grant the Plaintiffs' request to strike the Defendant's Answer and instead issued the irrebuttable presumption instruction.

Given the Defendant's concession of responsibility for the accident, the "merits" of this case for the trier of fact to adjudicate were limited to the amount of damages suffered as a result of the accident. Since the Defendant had no evidence to support a contention that the nature of the impact in the accident was relevant to the amount of damages, the issues for the trier of fact were not materially affected by the irrebuttable presumption instruction.

f) Whether sanctions unfairly penalize a party for the misconduct of her attorney

In this Court's view, the key to this factor from Young is whether the Defendant is unfairly penalized for her attorney's misconduct. However, the irrebuttable presumption instruction imposed as a sanction by the Court did not unfairly penalize the Defendant. It simply

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allowed the jury to irrebuttably presume the very fact that Defendant had no admissible evidence to rebut – that the motor vehicle accident was sufficient in character and quality to have caused the injuries suffered by the Plaintiff.

Additionally, as set forth below, it must be noted that the special instruction to the jury still allowed them to consider whether the accident in question actually and proximately caused Plaintiff's injuries. The only presumption was that the accident was sufficient in character and quality to have potentially done so. The only issue eliminated or restricted by the irrebuttable presumption instruction was the "minor impact" defense for which Defendant had no evidence to support.

g) The need to deter parties and future litigants

As set forth in great detail above, the sanctions employed by the Court to deter this conduct had proven unsuccessful. Although this particular factor was not the overriding factor in determining that the special instruction to the jury was warranted, this Court hoped that this progressive sanction would at least deter the Defendant from continuing to violate the Orders of this Court.

3. The Irrebuttable Presumption Instruction

This Court took a recess to allow the Plaintiffs' counsel to draft a proposed instruction and then heard argument from both sides regarding the exact language of the instruction. After considering the proposed language and making some amendments thereto, as well as considering the necessity of instructing the jury immediately as a curative measure, the Court read the following instruction to the jury:

[Court] Furthermore, ladies and gentlemen of the jury, the Defendant has, on numerous occasions, attempted to introduce evidence that the accident of April 15, 2005, was too minor to cause the injuries complained of. This type of evidence has previously

been precluded by this Court.

In view of that, this Court instructs the members of the jury that there is an irrebuttable presumption that the motor vehicle accident of April 15, 2005, was sufficient to cause the type of injuries sustained by the Plaintiff. Whether it proximately caused those injuries remains a question for the jury to determine.

(RTP March 28, 2011, p. 113, 149-50).

Before making the discretionary ruling to issue that curative instruction to the jury, this Court examined the relevant facts, applied a proper standard of law and used a demonstratively rational process to reach a reasonable conclusion. *See, Bass-Davis v. Davis*, 122 Nev. 442, 447-48 (2006).

E. Plaintiffs' Request to Strike Defendant's Answer Based on Repeated Violations of This Court's Pretrial Orders

During the hearing on March 28, 2011, wherein this Court considered the above-quoted special instruction in lieu of the Plaintiffs' request to strike Defendant's Answer, counsel for the Plaintiffs made clear that a further violation of this Court's Orders would be met with the Plaintiffs' renewed request of the Court to strike the Defendant's Answer (RTP March 28, 2011, p. 97).

1. Cross-Examination of Plaintiff, William Simao

During the Defendant's cross-examination of Plaintiff WILLIAM SIMAO, counsel asked about circumstances surrounding the accident, including questions regarding the stop-and-go nature of traffic on the freeway before the accident took place. The Plaintiffs objected, and a bench conference ensued.

At the bench conference, the Plaintiffs asked for an offer of proof of what potential relevance the speed of the vehicles would have, other than to suggest an inference that the

impact of the collision was insufficient to cause the Plaintiff's injuries (RTP March 28, 2011, pp. 92-95). Counsel for the Defendant failed to offer during the bench conference a sufficient explanation of how the speed of the vehicles prior to the collision has a tendency to make the existence of any fact of consequence more or less probable, *see*, NRS 48.015, other than to suggest a minor impact (RTP March 28, 2011, p. 94-96).

The Plaintiffs' objection was sustained.

What then followed can only be described by this Court as an intentional attempt to further violate this Court's clear and unambiguous Order.

Regarding the post-accident response by law enforcement and medical personnel, counsel for the Defendant asked the following questions of Mr. Simao:

[Defense Counsel] Now, we've heard several times through this trial that an ambulance came to the scene.

[Mr. Simao] Yes.

[Defense Counsel] And that you declined treatment.

[Mr. Simao] I did.

[Defense Counsel] And the paramedics didn't transport anyone from Mrs. Rish's car?

(RTP March 28, 2011, p. 98) (Emphasis supplied).

An immediate objection was interposed by Plaintiffs' counsel and a brief bench conference was convened before this Court excused the jury and addressed the matter on the record outside their presence.

2. Plaintiff's Request to Strike Defendant's Answer

During the hearing outside the jury's presence, counsel for the Plaintiffs again made an exhaustive record of all of the occasions this Court had to direct and admonish Defendant not to

address "minor impact" issues as a result of this Court's previous Orders. A significant record was made of the notice provided to the Defendants that not only was the conduct violative of this Court's Order, but further that the Plaintiffs would be asking the Court to strike the Defendant's Answer as a sanction therefore (RTP March 28, 2011, pp. 101-05).

The response from the Defendant was essentially that she should not be precluded from any discussion of the accident in question. Such an argument, this Court noted, misses the point and unfairly and incorrectly broadens the scope of the pretrial Order. An incorrect summary of the Court's Order that any and all discussion of the accident in question is precluded is vastly different from questioning four separate witnesses as to whether anyone from the Defendant's vehicle was injured in the crash. On this issue, the Court's prior pronouncements could not have been clearer.

While inclined to grant the Plaintiffs' motion to strike the Defendant's Answer at the conclusion of the hearing outside the presence of the jury, this Court instead took the opportunity to recess to again review the appropriate law, including the Nevada Supreme Court's opinion in Young v. Ribeiro Building, Inc., on the issue of case concluding sanctions for abusive litigation practices and continuous violations of Orders of the Court.

3. This Court's Consideration of the Law as Applied to the Facts of This Case

As set forth above, the Nevada Supreme Court in Young reiterated that trial courts have inherent equitable powers to issue sanctions for abusive litigation practices, including case concluding sanctions such as dismissal or the striking of pleadings. Young, supra at 92. Case concluding sanctions are subject to a "somewhat heightened standard of review," Id.; Foster v. Dingwall, 227 P.3d 1042, 1048 (Nev. 2010), to determine if the sanctions are just and relate to the claims at issue.

Before issuing such sanctions, a trial court should carefully consider the factors

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announced in Young, although no single factor is necessarily dispositive and each of the nonexhaustive factors should be examined in the light of the case before the trial court. Young, supra at 92. Additionally, case concluding sanctions shall be supported by an express, careful and preferably written explanation of the trial court's analysis of the Young factors. Id. at 93; Bahena v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 235 P.3d 592, 598 (Nev. 2010), rehearing denied, 245 P.3d 1182 (2010).

This Court carefully considered the plethora of violations of Court Orders before granting the Plaintiffs' request to strike the Defendant's Answer. The hearing outside the presence of the jury encompasses fifteen pages (15), which does not include the independent research and analysis conducted by this Court during a lengthy recess in the proceedings. The Court's consideration of the Young factors, although similar in many respects to the consideration of the same factors three days earlier at the time of the irrebuttable presumption sanction, includes the following:

a) Degree of willfulness of the violations

A violation of an Order on a motion in limine may serve as a basis for some type of sanction if the Order is specific in its prohibition and the violation is clear. BMW v. Roth, 127 Nev.Ad.Op. 11, p.12, citing to Black v. Schultz, 530 F.3d 702, 706 (8th Cir. 2008). As set forth previously, the violations of this Court's clear and unambiguous Orders were continuous, systematic and pervasive. Such violations include, but are not limited to, the following:

- i. Violation of Order precluding evidence of "medical build-up" during Opening Statement:
- ii. Violation of Order precluding evidence of "medical build-up" during the testimony of Dr. Patrick McNulty;
 - iii. Violation of Order precluding evidence of unrelated accidents during Opening

Statement;

- iv. Violation of Order precluding evidence or argument in support of "minor impact" defense during Opening Statement;
- v. Violation of Order precluding evidence or argument in support of "minor impact" defense during testimony of Dr. Jorg Rosler (question regarding injuries to the Defendant or her passengers);
- vi. Violation of Order precluding evidence or argument in support of "minor impact" defense during testimony of Dr. Patrick McNulty (question regarding injuries to Defendant or her passengers);
- vii. Violation of Order precluding evidence or argument in support of "minor impact" defense during testimony of Dr. Jaswinder Grover (question regarding injuries to Defendant or her passengers);
- viii. Defendant's abject failure to apprise defense expert Dr. David Fish of court's rulings on all motions in limine;
- ix. Violation of Order precluding evidence or argument in support of "minor impact" defense during testimony of Dr. David Fish (question and answer regarding the nature of the accident);
- x. Violation of Order precluding evidence or argument in support of "minor impact" defense during testimony of Plaintiff William Simao (question regarding injuries to the Defendant or her passengers);

These violations of the Court's Order precluding the "minor impact" defense are considered by this Court to be even more egregious given the numerous hearings outside the presence of the jury wherein this Court repeatedly and unequivocally prohibited the areas of inquiry subsequently broached by counsel for Defendant. Those hearings include:

i.	Hearing	g on the	Plair	itiffs'	Motion	in]	Limine,	March	l,	2011	;
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- ii. Hearing outside the presence of jury to discuss "minor impact," March 18,2011;
- iii. Hearing outside the presence of jury to discuss whether the Plaintiffs opened the door to "minor impact" defense during Opening Statement, March 21, 2011;
- iv. Objection sustained to counsel for the Defendant's question of Dr. Rosler regarding injuries to occupants of the Defendant's vehicle, March 22, 2011;
- v. Objection sustained to counsel for the Defendant's question of Dr. McNulty regarding injuries to occupants of the Defendant's vehicle, March 25, 2011;
- vi. Objection sustained to counsel for the Defendant's question of Dr. Grover regarding injuries to occupants of the Defendant's vehicle, March 25, 2011;
- vii. Hearing outside the presence of the jury to discuss "minor impact" defense and the Plaintiffs' notice of seeking progressive sanctions, March 25, 2011;
- viii. Objection sustained to counsel for the Defendant's question of Dr. Fish which resulted in response citing to the nature of the impact, March 28, 2011;
- ix. Hearing outside the presence of the jury to discuss "minor impact" defense and the Plaintiffs' request for irrebuttable presumption instruction for the Defendant's continued violations of Court's Order, March 28, 2011;
- x. Objection sustained to counsel for the Defendant's question of Plaintiff William Simao regarding injuries to occupants of the Defendant's vehicle, March 31, 2011;

At the hearing on the Plaintiffs' oral motion to strike the Defendant's Answer, this Court characterized the continuing violations as having been "willfull, deliberate, [and] abusive," (RTP March 31, 2011, pp. 111-12), based on the fact that counsel for Defendant "refuses to comply

with this Court's rulings" (RTP March 31, 2011, p. 112). Particularly disturbing was counsel for Defendant's systematic insistence upon asking the Plaintiff and three separate treating doctors whether they were aware of any injuries to passengers in the Defendant's vehicle, despite this Court's clear preclusion of that inquiry after each instance of misconduct.

b) The extent to which the non-offending party would be prejudiced by a lesser sanction

As set forth previously, the imposition of lesser sanctions did not act to curb the Defendant's violations of this Court's pretrial Orders. An attorney's violation of an Order on a motion in limine is misconduct which justifies evidentiary sanctions or even a new trial. See, BMW v. Roth, 127 Nev.Ad.Op. 11, p.12; Lioce v. Cohen, 124 Nev. 1 (2008). Although Nevada precedent does not follow the federal model of requiring progressive sanctions before imposing a case concluding sanction, see, Bahena v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber, supra, 245 P.3d at 1184-85. this Court nevertheless imposed progressive sanctions against the Defendant including the irrebuttable presumption instruction to no avail. Nothing this Court could fashion, short of a case concluding sanction, was successful to halt violations of this Court's pretrial Orders.

Given the frequency of the Defendant's violations of this Court's Order precluding a "minor impact" defense, all of which occurred in front of the jury, the Plaintiffs were prejudiced by having this issue repeatedly brought to the jury's attention. In the eyes of the jury, the Plaintiffs were repeatedly preventing the jury from hearing about the significance of the impact, when in fact this Court had determined that a "minor impact" defense was unavailable to the Defendants given the lack of evidence (and expert testimony) to support such a defense. In reliance upon this Court's Order granting the Plaintiffs' Motion in Limine, the Plaintiffs had released their biomechanical expert and had neither mentioned his name nor offered his opinions in Opening Statement. The Plaintiffs had relied on this Court's Order that no "minor impact" defense would be presented to the jury. The Plaintiffs had further relied on the fact that such a

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ruling would be upheld by this Court during the course of trial. The unfair prejudice to the Plaintiffs was clearly shown. See, Roth, supra.

This Court also recognizes the prejudice to the Plaintiffs in making objection after objection to the Defendant's inappropriate questions. "[W]hen...an attorney must continuously object to repeated or persistent misconduct, the non-offending attorney is placed in the difficult position of having to make repeated objections before the trier of fact, which might cast a negative impression on the attorney and the party the attorney represents, emphasizing the improper point." *Lioce v. Cohen,* 174 P3d 970, 981 (Nev. 2008).

As such, it is the finding of this Court that the Plaintiffs would be unfairly prejudiced by the continuous introduction of questions, evidence and argument designed to create an inference that the subject motor vehicle accident was too minor to cause the Plaintiff's injuries.

c) The severity of a sanction of striking Defendant's Answer relative to the severity of the abuse

Again, the pervasive and continuous nature of these violations warrants the sanction ultimately imposed. Every litigant has the right to disagree with any ruling made or Order entered by a trial court. His remedy is with an appellate court, based upon reasonable grounds as the law requires. His remedy is never to just continue violating the Orders unchecked.

d) The feasibility and fairness of an alternative, lesser sanction

As set forth above, alternative lesser sanctions were apparently rejected by the Defendant in favor of continuing to violate the Orders of the Court. When the Plaintiffs first asked this Court to strike the Defendant's Answer on March 28, 2011, the Court considered this factor from the *Young* decision to impose an alternative sanction of an irrebuttable presumption instruction.

As this Court indicated at the hearing on the Plaintiffs' second oral request to the strike Defendant's Answer:

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[Court] Regarding the feasibility and fairness of an alternative, lesser sanction, you know, the only thing I can say is less severe sanctions were imposed to no avail.

(RPT March 31, 2011, p. 113).

This analysis is bolstered by the fact that the Plaintiffs requested that the Court strike the Defendant's Answer three days earlier and put the Defendant on notice that they would seek to strike the Defendant's Answer should any future violations occur.

e) The policy favoring adjudication on the merits

As set forth above, this Court opted for less severe sanctions for all of the violations prior to March 31, 2011, in large measure because of the policy favoring adjudication on the merits. Even the irrebuttable presumption instruction given as a lesser, alternative sanction did not prevent the Defendant from presenting any defense that they actually had evidence to present. It is also worth noting that the Defendant had already agreed on the record not to challenge liability for the accident.

Further, this Court recognizes that the Nevada Supreme Court has upheld the striking of pleadings for a party's failure to attend his deposition, Foster v. Dingwall, supra; for repetitive, abusive and recalcitrant conduct during discovery, Young, supra; Hamlett v. Reynolds, 114 Nev. 863 (1998) (upholding the trial court's strike order where the defaulting party's constant failure to follow the court's orders was unexplained and unwarranted); for a party's continued failure to appear at scheduled court proceedings, Durango Fire Protection, Inc. v. Troncoso, 120 Nev. 658, 662 (2004); and for the failure to abide by rulings of the Discovery Commissioner, Bahena v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber, supra. Additionally, the Nevada Supreme Court has approved consideration of the Young factors as a guide to trial courts for sanctions grounded in violations of court orders at trial. See, Romo v. Keplinger, 115 Nev. 94, 97 (1999).

The willful and deliberate violations of this Court's Orders are equally as egregious as

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any discovery violation, especially given the fact that the repeated violations in the instant case occurred in front of the jury.

f) The need to deter parties and future litigants

Given its inherent powers derived from the Nevada Constitution and strong case precedent, this Court simply cannot allow litigants to openly and deliberately abuse the litigation process by disregarding Orders of the Court when convenient or tactically advantageous to do so, especially when unfair prejudice to the non-offending party results. Such an allowance would render courts of justice meaningless in the State of Nevada.

In the final analysis, after review and consideration of all of the various factors announced in Young, it is the determination of this Court that the intentional, deliberate, abusive and unfairly prejudicial conduct of the Defendant in repeatedly violating clear Orders of this Court warrants the ultimate sanction of striking the Defendant's Answer.

It is immaterial whether, as the Plaintiffs suggested several times during the trial, it was the true intention of the Defendant to force or goad the Plaintiffs to seek a mistrial. What is material is that the deliberate conduct of counsel for the Defendant in disregarding and violating Court Orders could not be halted by this Court with any other sanction.

Neither sustained objections, a multitude of hearings outside the presence of the jury, nor progressive sanctions deterred the Defendant's ignorance of Orders of this Court.

Having carefully and thoughtfully considered the available remedies, it is the decision of this Court, for all of the reasons set forth above, that striking the Defendant's Answer is appropriate under the particular circumstances presented herein.

II. Plaintiffs' Request for a Prove-Up Hearing to Establish Damages

By the time of the last violation of this Court's Orders by the Defendant, most of the Plaintiffs' evidence had been presented to the Court over the first ten (10) days of testimony.

Counsel for the Plaintiffs requested a hearing the following day for essentially a prove-up hearing similar to the entry of a default judgment under NRCP 55b.

Counsel for the Defendant then requested the ability to be heard at the argument on damages, pursuant to *Hamlett v. Reynolds*, 114 Nev. 863 (1998). In *Hamlett*, the Nevada Supreme Court struck Hamlett's Answer as a sanction for his continued failure to comply with discovery orders pursuant to *Young v. Ribeiro Building, supra*. Hamlett claimed the trial court erred in restricting his participation in the prove-up hearing to cross-examining Reynolds' witnesses. In analyzing this issue under NRCP 55(b)(2), the Court stated:

The language of NRCP 55(b)(2) that the "court may conduct such hearings or order such references as it deems necessary and proper" suggests to us an intent to give trial courts broad discretion in determining how prove-up hearings should be conducted. Thus, we conclude that the extent to which a defaulting party will participate in prove-up is a decision properly delegated to the trial courts. The trial courts should make this determination on a case-by-case basis and not according to static rules implemented by this court.

In deciding the extent to which a defaulted party will be permitted to participate in prove-up, if at all, trial courts should remember that the purpose of conducting a hearing after default, according to NRCP 55(b)(2), is to determine the amount of damages and establish the truth of any averment. To that end, trial courts should determine the extent to which full participation by the defaulted party will facilitate the truth-seeking process.

Hamlett, supra at 866-67.

In Foster v. Dingwall, supra, the Nevada Supreme Court clearly stated the standard for proving up damages after a default is entered as a sanction. During the prove-up hearing, this Court shall consider the allegations deemed admitted by the fact of the default to determine if the Plaintiff has established a prima facie case for liability. Foster, supra, 227 P.3d at 1049-50. A prima facie case is defined as sufficiency of evidence in order to send the question to the jury. Id. at 1050. In the instant case, Defendant Rish admitted responsibility for the accident and stipulated to liability. What was left was a determination of the Plaintiffs' damages, and the Plaintiffs requested that this Court take notice of the evidence that had been presented in the

preceding ten (10) days of testimony. Even though allegations in the pleadings are deemed admitted as a result of the entry of default, the admission does not relieve the non-offending party's obligation to present substantial evidence of the amount of damages suffered by both of the Plaintiffs. *Id.* Having reviewed the evidence and concluding that a *prima facie* case had been established by both Plaintiffs, this Court determined that the Plaintiffs are entitled to damages for the harms proximately caused by the motor vehicle accident.

In determining the level of participation of the Defendant in the prove-up hearing, this Court was mindful of the Nevada Supreme Court's pronouncement in *Foster* and *Young* that because the default was entered as a result of the Defendant's abusive litigation practices, the Defendant "forfeited his right to object to all but the most patent and fundamental defects" in the prove-up. *Foster*, *supra* at 1050; *Young*, *supra* at 95.

Nevertheless, in an exercise of discretion authorized by *Hamlett*, this Court determined that the Defendant would be allowed to address the Plaintiffs' brief final argument on damages in an argument of her own, to be followed by a brief rebuttal argument on behalf of the Plaintiffs.

Based on all of the foregoing, THIS COURT HEREBY ORDERS that Plaintiffs' oral Motion to Strike Defendant's Answer is GRANTED.

This matter stands submitted following the arguments of counsel and the prove-up hearing of April 1, 2011, pending further Order of this Court.

DATED this ___2| day of April, 2011.

DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

Submitted by:

DAVID T. WALL, ESQ

Nevada Bar No. 2805

MAINOR EGLET

400 South Fourth Street, Suite 600

Las Vegas, Nevada 89101

EXHIBIT B

EXHIBIT B

	,	NEOJ							
	1	ROBERT T. EGLET, ESQ.							
	2	Nevada Bar No. 3402							
	3	DAVID T. WALL, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 2805							
		ROBERT M. ADAMS, ESQ.							
	4	Nevada Bar No. 6551							
	5	MAINOR EGLET							
		400 South Fourth Street, Suite 600							
	6	Ph.: (702) 450-5400 Fx.: (702) 450-5451 reglet@mainorlawyers.com dwall@mainorlawyers.com							
	7								
	· ·								
	9								
	10	Attorneys for Plaintiffs							
	13	DISTRICT COURT							
	12	CLARK COUN	PTV NIEWADA						
EGLET	12	CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA							
	13								
	14	WILLIAM JAY SIMAO, individually and	CASE NO.: A539455						
MAINOR	15	CHERYL ANN SIMAO, individually, and as husband and wife,	DEPT. NO.: X						
Z	,	Massard and Wile,							
ΑĀ	16	Plaintiffs,							
~ .	17	·							
	18	v.							
	1	JENNY RISH LAMES DISH, LINDA							
	19	JENNY RISH; JAMES RISH; LINDA RISH; DOES I through V; and ROE CORPORATIONS I through V, inclusive,							
	20								
	- 1								
	21								
	22	Defendants.							
	23								
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	25	NOTICE OF ENTRY OF JUDGMENT							
	26	PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the Indeed to Indeed to the Indeed to the Indeed to the Indeed to the Indeed to Indeed							
	i								
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Court on the 27th day of April, 2011, a copy of which is attached hereto.

DATED this 2nd day of May, 2011.

MAINOR EGLE

By:
ROBERT T. EGLET, ESQ.
Nevada Bar No. 3402
DAVID T. WALL, ESQ.
Nevada Bar No. 2805
ROBERT M. ADAMS, ESQ.
Nevada Bar No. 6551
400 South Fourth Street, Suite 600
Las Vegas, Nevada 89101
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

MAINOR EGLET

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Las Vegas, Nevada 89129

Attorneys for Defendants

RECEIPT OF COPY

] RECEIPT OF COPY of the foregoing file stamped NOTICE OF ENTRY OF 2 3 JUDGMENT in the matter of SIMAO v. RISH, et al is hereby acknowledged: 4 5 Date: _____ Time: Stephen H. Rogers, Esq. 6 ROGERS, MASTRANGELO, 7 CARVALHO & MITCHELL, LTD. 300 S. Fourth Street, #710 8 Las Vegas, NV 89101 9 Attorneys for Defendants 10 11 Date: 5211 Time: 3:24pm. 12 Daniel F. Polsenberg, Esq. Jowl D. Henriod, Esq. 13 LEWIS AND ROCA, LLP. 3993 Howard Hughes Pkwy., Suite 600 14

Electronically Filed 04/28/2011 01:45:32 PM

DISTRICT COURT

Alun J. Lahrum

CLERK OF THE COURT

CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

WILLIAM JAY SIMAO; and CHERYL ANN SIMAO,

CASE NO.: A539455

DEPT. NO.: X

Plaintiffs,

v.

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JUDGMENT

JENNY RISH,

Defendant.

WHEREAS, a hearing for Default Judgment having come before the Court on April 1, 2011. IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, that Judgment is hereby entered in favor of Plaintiffs and against Defendant, Jenny Rish as follows:

William Simao's past medical and related expenses

\$\frac{194.390.96}{390.96}\$

William Simao's pain and suffering:

- Past pain and suffering

\$\frac{473.640.}{552.}\$

- Loss of Enjoyment of Life \$ 905,169.

Cheryl Simao's loss of consortium (Society and Relationship) \$_\log 1, 29\log.

Attorneys' fees \$_TBD

Litigation costs \$ 99,555.49

TOTAL \$3,493,983.45

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Judgment against Defendant, Jenny Rish, shall bear interest in accordance with N.R.S. 17.130 and Lee v. Ball, 116 P.3d 64 (2005).

Dated this 27th day of April, 2011.

DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

1	ASTA DANIEL E POLSENDERG	Alun D. Column					
2	DANIEL F. POLSENBERG State Bar No. 2376	CLERK OF THE COURT					
3	JOEL D. HENRIOD State Bar No. 8492 LEWIS AND ROCA LLP 3993 Howard Hughes Parkway, Suite 600						
4							
5	Las Vegas, Nevada 89169 (702) 474-2616						
6	STEPHEN H. ROGERS (SBN 5755)						
7	ROGERS MASTRANGELO CARVALHO & MITCHELL 300 South Fourth Street, Suite 170 Las Vegas, Nevada 89101						
8	Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 (702) 383-3400						
9	Attorneys for Defendant Jenny Rish						
10	DISTRICT COURT						
11	Clark County, Nevada						
12	11	o. A539455					
13	CHERYL ANN SIMAO, individually and as Dept. N	o. XX					
14	Plaintiffs,						
15	VS.						
16	JENNY RISH; JAMES RISH; LINDA RISH; DOES I through V; and ROE Corporations I through V, inclusive,						
17)						
18	Defendants.						
19	Case Appeal Statement	<u>Γ</u>					
20	1. Name of appellant filing this case appeal statement	nt:					
21	Defendant JENNY RISH						
22	2. Identify the judge issuing the decision, judgment,	or order appealed from:					
23	THE HONORABLE JESSIE WALSH						
24	3. Identify each appellant and the name and address	of counsel for each appellant:					
25	DANIEL F. POLSENBERG						
26	Nevada Bar No. 2376 LEWIS AND ROCA LLP						
27	3993 Howard Hughes Parkway, Suite 600 Las Vegas, Nevada 89169						
28	(702) 474-2616						

1		Stephen H. Rogers Rogers Mastrangelo Carvalho & Mitchell					
2	300 South Fourth Street, Suite 170 Las Vegas, Nevada 89101						
3		(702) 383-3400					
4		Attorneys for Appellant					
5	4.	Identify each respondent and the name and address of appellate counsel, if known, for each respondent (if the name of a respondent's appellate counsel is unknown, indicate as much and provide the name and address of that					
$\begin{bmatrix} 6 \\ 7 \end{bmatrix}$		respondent's trial counsel):					
8		Robert T. Eglet David T. Wall					
9		ROBERT M. ADAMS MAINOR EGLET					
10		400 South Fourth Street Sixth Floor					
10		Las Vegas, NV 89101 (702) 450-5400					
		Attorney for Respondents					
12 13		William Jay Simao and Cheryl Ann Simao,					
	5.	Indicate whether any attorney identified above in response to question 3 or 4					
14 15		not licensed practice law in Nevada and, if so, whether the district court granted that attorney permission to appear under SCR 42 (attach a copy of any district court order granting such permission):					
16		N/A					
17	6.	Indicate whether appellant was represented by appointed or retained counsel in the district court:					
18		Retained counsel					
19	7.	Indicate whether appellant is represented by appointed or retained counsel on					
20		appeal:					
21		Retained counsel					
22	8.	Indicate whether appellant was granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis, and the date of entry of the district court order granting such leave:					
23		N/A					
24	9.	Indicate the date the proceedings commenced in the district court, e.g., date					
25		complaint, indictment, information, or petition was filed:					
26		Complaint filed April 13, 2007.					
27 28	10.	Provide a brief description of the nature of the action and result in the district court, including the type of judgment or order being appealed and the relief granted by the district court:					
		Similar of mis answer court.					

1		T1.: :
2		complaint alleged negligence and loss of consortium. The case presented for a
3		This is a motor vehicle accident occurring on April 15, 2005. Plaintiff's complaint alleged negligence and loss of consortium. The case presented for a jury trial on March 14, 2011. On March 31, 2011, plaintiff made an oral motion to strike defendant's answer which was granted. After a prove-up hearing on April 1, 2011, judgment was entered on April 28, 2011, in favor of plaintiff in the amount of \$3,493,983.45.
4	11	
5 6	11.	Indicate whether the case has previously been the subject of an appeal or an original writ proceeding in the Supreme Court and, if so, the caption and Supreme Court docket number of the prior proceeding.
7		N/A
8	12.	Indicate whether this appeal involves child custody or visitation:
9		N/A
10	13.	If this is a civil case, indicate whether this appeal involves the possibility of settlement:
11		
12		No.
13		DATED this 31 st day of May 2011.
14		LEWIS AND ROCA LLP
15		
16		By: <u>s/ Daniel F. Polsenberg</u> DANIEL F. POLSENBERG (SBN 2376)
17		LEWIS AND ROCA LLP
18		3993 Howard Hughes Parkway, Suite 600 Las Vegas, Nevada 89169 (702) 474-2616
19		Attorneys for Defendant Jenny Rish
20		Miorneys for Defendant Senny Kish
21		
22		
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1	CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
2	Pursuant to Nev. R. Civ. P. 5(b), I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 31 st day of May,
3	2011, I served the foregoing CASE APPEAL STATEMENT by depositing a copy for
4	mailing, first-class mail, postage prepaid, at Las Vegas, Nevada, to the following:
5	Robert T. Eglet David T. Wall
6	ROBERT M. ADAMS MAINOR EGLET
7	400 South Fourth Street, Suite 600 Las Vegas, NV 89101
8	s/ Mary Kay Carlton An Employee of Lewis and Roca LLP
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Case Summary

CASE No. 07A539455

William Simao, Cheryl Simao

Jenny Rish

Location: Department 10 Judicial Officer: Walsh, Jessie Filed on: 04/13/2007 Conversion Case Number: A539455

§ §

CASE INFORMATION

Case Type: Negligence - Auto

Case Flags: **Appealed to Supreme Court**

Jury Demand Filed

DATE CASE ASSIGNMENT

Current Case Assignment

Case Number 07A539455 Court Department 10 Date Assigned 04/13/2007 Judicial Officer Walsh, Jessie

PARTY INFORMATION

Lead Attorneys **Plaintiff** Simao, Cheryl A

Wall, David T Retained 702-450-5400(W)

Simao, William J Wall, David T

Retained 702-450-5400(W)

Defendant Lewis, Bryan W. Rish, James

> Removed: 03/31/2011 Retained Dismissed 702-870-5571(W)

Rish, Jenny Rogers, Stephen H

Retained 702-383-3400(W)

Rish, Linda

Lewis, Bryan W. Removed: 03/31/2011 Retained Dismissed 702-870-5571(W)

Conversion Extended **Connection Type**

No Convert Value @ 07A539455 Removed: 04/24/2009 Converted From Blackstone

DATE **EVENTS & ORDERS OF THE COURT** INDEX 07A5394550001.tif pages 04/13/2007 (Complaint COMPLAINT FILED Fee \$178.00 07A5394550003.tif pages 04/13/2007 Initial Appearance Fee Disclosure Filed By: Plaintiff Simao, William J; Plaintiff Simao, Cheryl A INITIAL APPEARANCE FEE DISCLOSURE 07A5394550004.tif pages 08/10/2007 Summons Filed by: Plaintiff Simao, William J **SUMMONS**

	CASE NO. 0/A539455	
08/28/2007	Summons Filed by: Plaintiff Simao, William J SUMMONS	07A5394550005.tif pages
08/28/2007	Summons Filed by: Plaintiff Simao, William J SUMMONS	07.45394550006.tif pages
09/27/2007	Association of Counsel Filed By: Defendant Rish, Jenny NOTICE OF ASSOCIATION OF COUNSEL	07A5394550007.tif pages
03/21/2008	Answer Filed By: Defendant Rish, Jenny DEFENDANT JENNY RISH'S ANSWER TO PLAINTIFFS' COMPLAINT	07A5394550008.tif pages
03/21/2008	Demand for Jury Trial Filed By: Defendant Rish, Jenny DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL	07A5394550009.tif pages
03/21/2008	Initial Appearance Fee Disclosure Filed By: Defendant Rish, Jenny INITIAL APPEARANCE FEE DISCLOSURE	07A5394550010.tif pages
05/02/2008	Commissioner's Decision On Request For Exemption COMMISSIONERS DECISION ON REQUEST FOR EXEMPTION	07A5394550011.tif pages
05/08/2008	Notice of Early Case Conference Filed By: Plaintiff Simao, William J NOTICE OF EARLY CASE CONFERENCE REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS PURSUANT TO NRCP 16.1	07A5394550012.tif pages
05/22/2008	List of Witnesses Filed By: Plaintiff Simao, William J PLAINTIFFS LIST OF WITNESSES AND DOCUMENTS PRODUCED PURSUANT TO NRCP 16.1	07A5394550013.tif pages
06/02/2008	Joint Case Conference Report Filed By: Plaintiff Simao, William J; Plaintiff Simao, Cheryl A JOINT CASE CONFERENCE REPORT	07A5394550014.tif pages
06/04/2008	Certificate of Mailing Filed By: Plaintiff Simao, William J; Plaintiff Simao, Cheryl A CERTIFICATE OF MAILING JOINT CASE CONFERENCE REPORT	07A5394550015.tif pages
06/04/2008	List of Witnesses Filed By: Plaintiff Simao, William J; Plaintiff Simao, Cheryl A PLTFS FIRST SUPPLEMENT TO LIST OF WITNESSES AND DOCUMENTS PRODUCED PURSUANT TO NRCP 16.1	07A5394550016.tif pages
06/11/2008	Discovery Scheduling Order SCHEDULING ORDER	07A5394550017.tif pages
06/12/2008	Notice	07A5394550018.tif pages

CASE No. 07A539455		
	Filed By: Defendant Rish, Jenny NOTICE OF TAKING DEPOSITION OF PLTFS	
07/11/2008	Amended Notice Filed By: Defendant Rish, Jenny AMENDED NOTICE OF TAKING DEPOSITION OF PLAINTIFFS	07A5394550019.tif pages
08/18/2008	Conversion Case Event Type PRETRIAL CONFERENCE	07A5394550021.tif pages
08/18/2008	Order Setting Jury Trial ORDER SETTING CIVIL JURY TRIAL	07A5394550023.tif pages
08/19/2008	Amended Notice Filed By: Defendant Rish, Jenny SECOND AMENDED NOTICE OF TAKING PLAINTIFFS DEPOSITION	07A5394550024.tif pages
09/03/2008	Notice Filed By: Defendant Rish, Jenny NOTICE OF TAKING DEPOSITION OF PATRICK MCNULTY MD	07A5394550025.tif pages
09/03/2008	Notice Filed By: Defendant Rish, Jenny NOTICE OF TAKING DEPOSITION OF ADAM ARITA MD	07A5394550026.tif pages
09/15/2008	Amended Notice Filed By: Defendant Rish, Jenny AMENDED NOTICE OF TAKING DEPOSITION OF PATRICK MCNULTY MD	07A5394550027.tif pages
09/15/2008	Notice Filed By: Defendant Rish, Jenny NOTICE OF TAKING DEPOSITION OF BRITT HILL PA C	07.45394550028.tif pages
10/17/2008	Subpoena Filed by: Defendant Rish, Jenny SUBPOENA FOR DEPOSITION - BRITT HILL PA C SOUTHWEST MEDICAL ASSOCIATES	07A5394550029.tif pages
10/22/2008	Supplemental Filed by: Plaintiff Simao, William J; Plaintiff Simao, Cheryl A PLAINTIFFS SECOND SUPPLEMENT TO LIST OF WITNESSESAND DOCUMENTS PRODUCED PURSUANT TO NRCP 16.1	07A5394550030.tif pages
02/26/2009	Notice Filed By: Defendant Rish, Jenny NOTICE OF TAKING DEPOSITION OF JASWINDER SINGH GROVER MD	07A5394550032.tif pages
03/02/2009	Notice Filed By: Plaintiff Simao, William J; Plaintiff Simao, Cheryl A NOTICE OF TAKING VIDEO DEPOSITION OF DEFT JENNY RISH MARCH 26 2009	07A5394550031.tif pages
03/20/2009	Notice Filed By: Defendant Rish, Jenny NOTICE OF TAKING DEPOSITION OF HANS-JORGE ROSLER MD	07A5394550033.tif pages

	CASE NO. 0/A539455	
03/24/2009	Amended Notice Filed By: Plaintiff Simao, William J; Plaintiff Simao, Cheryl A FIRST AMENDED NOTICE OF TAKING VIDEO DEPO OF DEFT JENNY RISH	07.A5394550034.tif pages
03/25/2009	Subpoena Duces Tecum Filed by: Defendant Rish, Jenny; Defendant Rish, James; Defendant Rish, Linda SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM - COR OF SOUTHWEST MEDICAL ASSOCIATES	07.A5394550035.tif pages
03/25/2009	Subpoena Duces Tecum Filed by: Defendant Rish, Jenny; Defendant Rish, James; Defendant Rish, Linda SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM - COR OF STEINBERG DIAGNOSTICS	07.A5394550036.tif pages
03/25/2009	Subpoena Duces Tecum Filed by: Defendant Rish, Jenny; Defendant Rish, James; Defendant Rish, Linda SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM - COR OF NEWPORT MRI	07.A5394550037.tif pages
03/27/2009	Amended Notice Filed By: Defendant Rish, Jenny AMENDED NOTICE OF TAKING DEPOSITION OF HANS-JORG ROSLER MD	07A5394550038.tif pages
05/05/2009	Designation of Expert Witness Plaintiffs' Designation of Expert Witnesses and Reports	
05/06/2009	Stipulation and Order Filed by: Plaintiff Simao, William J; Plaintiff Simao, Cheryl A Stipulation and Order to Extend Discovery (First Request)	
05/08/2009	Notice of Entry of Order Notice of Entry of Order	
05/13/2009	Notice of Taking Deposition Filed By: Defendant Rish, Jenny Notice of Taking Custodian of Records Deposition (AmeriClean)	
05/14/2009	Notice of Deposition Filed By: Plaintiff Simao, William J; Plaintiff Simao, Cheryl A Notice of Taking Deposition of Trooper Shawn Haggstrom	
05/21/2009	Notice of Taking Deposition Filed By: Defendant Rish, Jenny Notice of Taking Deposition	
05/29/2009	Affidavit of Service Affidavit of Service of Subpoena and Notice of Taking Deposition Upon Trooper Shawn Haggstrom	
06/05/2009	List of Witnesses Plaintiffs' Third Supplement to List of Witnesses and Documents Produced Pursuant to NRCP 16.1	
06/05/2009	Expert Witness List Plaintiffs' First Supplement to Designation of Expert Witnesses and Reports	

	CASE No. 07A539455
06/10/2009	Amended Scheduling Order
08/07/2009	Notice of Taking Deposition Filed By: Defendant Rish, Jenny Notice of Taking Custodian of Records Deposition
08/20/2009	Notice of Taking Deposition Filed By: Defendant Rish, Jenny Notice of Taking Deposition of Plaintiff William Jay Simao - Volume II
08/28/2009	Order Setting Civil Jury Trial
09/18/2009	CANCELED Pre Trial Conference (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Walsh, Jessie) Vacated
09/25/2009	Subpoena Duces Tecum Filed by: Defendant Rish, Jenny
09/28/2009	Notice of Taking Deposition Filed By: Defendant Rish, Jenny Notice of Taking Video Deposition of Stan Smith
09/28/2009	Notice of Taking Deposition Filed By: Defendant Rish, Jenny Notice of Taking Video Deposition of Kathleen Hartman RN
09/29/2009	CANCELED Calendar Call (3:00 PM) (Judicial Officer: Walsh, Jessie) Vacated
10/02/2009	Amended Notice of Taking Deposition Filed By: Defendant Rish, Jenny Amended Notice of Taking Deposition of Plaintiff William Jay Simao - Volume II
10/05/2009	CANCELED Jury Trial (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Walsh, Jessie) Vacated - per Stipulation and Order
12/11/2009	Pre Trial Conference (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Walsh, Jessie) Events: 08/28/2009 Order Setting Civil Jury Trial
12/23/2009	CANCELED Calendar Call (3:00 PM) (Judicial Officer: Walsh, Jessie) Vacated
01/04/2010	CANCELED Jury Trial (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Walsh, Jessie) Vacated
03/15/2010	Motion to Continue Motion to Continue Trial on Order Shortening Time
03/24/2010	CANCELED Motion to Continue Trial (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Walsh, Jessie) Vacated
03/31/2010	Stipulation and Order Filed by: Defendant Rish, Jenny Stipulation and Order to Continue Trial Date

	CASE No. 07A539455
04/02/2010	Notice of Entry of Order Notice of Entry of Order
04/02/2010	Notice of Association of Counsel Filed By: Plaintiff Simao, William J; Plaintiff Simao, Cheryl A
04/22/2010	Supplement to Early Case Conference Report Supplement to Early Case Conference Report
04/26/2010	Supplement to Early Case Conference Report Plaintiffs' Ninth Supplement To The List of Witnesses and Documents Produced Pursuant to NRCP 16.1
04/28/2010	Supplement to Early Case Conference Report Party: Plaintiff Simao, William J Plaintiffs' Tenth Supplement To The List of Witnesses and Documents Produced Pursuant to NRCP 16.1
06/23/2010	Deposition Filed By: Defendant Rish, Jenny Notice of Taking Deposition of Ross Seibel, M.D.
07/01/2010	Deposition Filed By: Defendant Rish, Jenny Notice of Taking Deposition of Ross Seibel, M.D.
07/19/2010	Notice of Change of Firm Name Filed By: Plaintiff Simao, William J; Plaintiff Simao, Cheryl A
11/24/2010	Application for Issuance of Commission to Take Deposition Party: Plaintiff Simao, William J Application for Issuance of Commission to Take Deposition Out of State
11/24/2010	Application for Issuance of Commission to Take Deposition Party: Plaintiff Simao, William J Application for Issuance of Commission to Take Deposition Out of State
11/24/2010	Application for Issuance of Commission to Take Deposition Party: Plaintiff Simao, William J Application for Issuance of Commission to Take Deposition Out of State
12/08/2010	Motion Filed By: Plaintiff Simao, William J Plaintiffs' Motion to Allow Plaintiffs to Present a Jury Questionnaire Prior to Voir Dire
12/15/2010	Order Setting Civil Jury Trial Order Setting Civil Jury Trial
12/22/2010	Stipulation Filed by: Defendant Rish, Jenny Stipulation and Order to Continue Trial Date
12/27/2010	Pre-Trial Disclosure

	CASE No. 07A539455
	Party: Defendant Rish, Jenny Defendants' Pretrial Disclosures Pursaunt to NRCP 16.1(a)(3)
12/27/2010	Q Opposition Filed By: Defendant Rish, Jenny Opposition, in Part, to Plaintiff's Motion to Present a Jury Questionnaire Prior to Voir Dire
01/04/2011	CANCELED Pre Trial Conference (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Walsh, Jessie) Vacated - per Stipulation and Order
01/04/2011	Notice of Entry of Order Filed By: Defendant Rish, Jenny Notice of Entry of Order
01/06/2011	Motion in Limine Filed By: Defendant Rish, Jenny Defendant Jenny Rish's Motion in Limine to Preclude Questions Regarding Verdict Amounts During Voir Dire
01/06/2011	Motion in Limine Filed By: Defendant Rish, Jenny Defendant Jenny Rish's Motion in Limine to Prevent Plaintiff from Arguing Responsibility Avoidance
01/06/2011	Motion in Limine Filed By: Defendant Rish, Jenny Defendant Jenny Rish's Motion in Limine to Exclude the Traffic Accident Report and the Investigating Officer's Conclusions
01/06/2011	Motion in Limine Filed By: Defendant Rish, Jenny Defendant Jenny Rish's Motion in Limine Enforcing the Abolition of the Treating Physician Rule
01/06/2011	Motion in Limine Filed By: Defendant Rish, Jenny Defendant Jenny Rish's Motion in Limine to Limit the Testimony of Plaintiff's Treating Physicians
01/06/2011	Motion in Limine Filed By: Defendant Rish, Jenny Defendant Jenny Rish's Motion in Limine to Exclude Duplicative and Cumulative Testimony
01/06/2011	Motion in Limine Filed By: Defendant Rish, Jenny Defendant Jenny Rish's Motion in Limine to Exclude Graphic and Lurid Video or Animated Depictions of Surgical Procedures
01/06/2011	Motion in Limine Filed By: Defendant Rish, Jenny Defendant's Motion in Limine to Preclude Plaintiffs' Medical Providers and Experts from Testifying Regarding New or Undisclosed Medical Treatment and Opinions
01/06/2011	Motion in Limine

	CASE NO. 0/A539455
	Filed By: Defendant Rish, Jenny Defendant's Motion in Limine to Exclude Evidene of Senate Investigation
01/06/2011	Motion in Limine Filed By: Defendant Rish, Jenny Defendant Jenny Rish's Motion in Limine to Preclude Witnesses from Offering Testimony Regarding the Credibility or Verasity of Other Witnesses
01/06/2011	Motion in Limine Filed By: Defendant Rish, Jenny Defendant Jenny Rish's Motion to Preclude Argument of the Case During Voir Dire
01/06/2011	Motion in Limine Filed By: Defendant Rish, Jenny Defendant Jenny Rish's Motion in Limine to Exclude Plaintiffs' Life Care Expert, Kathleen Hartmann, R.N.
01/06/2011	Motion in Limine Filed By: Defendant Rish, Jenny Defendant Jenny Rish's Motion to Exclude the Report and Opinions Plaintifff's Economist Stan V. Smith
01/06/2011	Motion in Limine Filed By: Defendant Rish, Jenny Defendant Jenny Rish's Motion to Exclude the Report and Opinions Plaintiff's Accident Reconstruction Expert, David Ingebretsen
01/07/2011	Omnibus Motion In Limine Filed by: Plaintiff Simao, William J Plaintiff's Omnibus Motion in Limine
01/10/2011	Objection Filed By: Plaintiff Simao, William J Plaintiff's Objections to Defendants' Pre-Trial Disclosure Pursuant to NRCP 16.1 (a)(3) (C)
01/13/2011	Reply to Opposition Filed by: Plaintiff Simao, William J; Plaintiff Simao, Cheryl A Plaintiff's Reply to Defendants' Limited Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion to Allow Plaintiffs to Present a Jury Questionnaire Prior to Voir Dire
01/18/2011	Certificate of Service Filed by: Defendant Rish, Jenny Certificate of Service
01/18/2011	CANCELED Calendar Call (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Walsh, Jessie) Vacated - per Stipulation and Order
01/20/2011	Motion (9:30 AM) (Judicial Officer: Walsh, Jessie) Events: 12/08/2010 Motion Plaintiffs' Motion to Allow Plaintiffs to Present a Jury Questionnaire Prior to Voir Dire
01/24/2011	CANCELED Jury Trial (1:00 PM) (Judicial Officer: Walsh, Jessie) Vacated - per Stipulation and Order
01/27/2011	Questionnaire

	CASE NO. 0/A539455
	Filed By: Defendant Rish, Jenny Defendant Jenny Rish's Proposed Additional Questions to the Jury Questionnaire (per the Court's Leave, Granted at the January 20, 2011 Hearing)
01/28/2011	CANCELED Calendar Call (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Walsh, Jessie) Vacated - On in Error
02/02/2011	Notice of Taking Deposition Filed By: Defendant Rish, Jenny Notice of taking Deposition of Patrick McNulty, M.D.
02/02/2011	Notice of Taking Deposition Filed By: Defendant Rish, Jenny Notice of Taking Deposition of Daniel Lee, M.D.
02/04/2011	Opposition Filed By: Defendant Rish, Jenny Defendant Jenny Rish's Opposition to Plaintiffs' Omnibus Motion in Limine
02/04/2011	Opposition to Motion in Limine Filed By: Plaintiff Simao, William J Plaintiffs' Limited Opposition to Defendant Jenny Rish's Motion in Limine to Exclude the Traffic Accident Report and the Investigating Officer's Conclusions
02/04/2011	Opposition to Motion in Limine Filed By: Plaintiff Simao, William J Plaintiffs' Opposition to Defendant Jenny Rish's Motion in Limine to Exclude Kathleen Hartmann, R.N.
02/04/2011	Q Opposition to Motion in Limine Filed By: Plaintiff Simao, William J Plaintiffs' Opposition to Defendant Jenny Rish's Motion in Limine to Exclude Duplicative and Cumulative Testimony
02/04/2011	Opposition to Motion Filed By: Plaintiff Simao, William J Plaintiffs' Opposition to Defendant Jenny Rish's Motion to Exclude the Report and Opinions of Plaintiff's Accident Reconstruction Expert, David Ingrebretsen
02/04/2011	Q Opposition to Motion in Limine Filed By: Plaintiff Simao, William J Plaintiffs' Opposition to Defendant Jenny Rish's Motion in Limine Enforcing the Abolition of the Treating Physician Rule
02/04/2011	Q Opposition to Motion Filed By: Plaintiff Simao, William J Plaintiffs' Combined Opposition to Defendant Jenny Rish's Motion to Preclude Argument of the Case During Voir Dire and Motion to Exclude Questions Regarding Verdict Amounts During Voir Dire
02/04/2011	Opposition to Motion in Limine Filed By: Plaintiff Simao, William J Plaintiffs' Limited Opposition to Defendant Jenny Rish's Motion in Limine to Exclude Evidence of Senate Investigation
02/04/2011	Q Opposition to Motion in Limine

	CASE 110. 0/A337433
	Filed By: Plaintiff Simao, William J Plaintiffs' Limited Opposition to Defendant Jenny Rish's Motion in Limine to Prevent Plaintiff From Arguing "Responsibility Avoidance"
02/04/2011	Opposition to Motion Filed By: Plaintiff Simao, William J Plaintiffs' Opposition to Defendant Jenny Rish's Motion Regarding Treating Physicians' Opinions
02/04/2011	Q Opposition to Motion in Limine Filed By: Plaintiff Simao, William J Plaintiffs' Opposition to Defendant Jenny Rish's Motion in Limine to Exclude Graphic and Lurid Video or Animated Depictions of Surgical Procedures
02/04/2011	Non Opposition Filed By: Plaintiff Simao, William J Plaintiffs' Non-Opposition to Defendant Jenny Rish's Motion to Preclude Witnesses from Offering Testimony Regarding the Credibility or Veracity of Other Witnesses
02/04/2011	Opposition to Motion in Limine Filed By: Plaintiff Simao, William J Plaintiffs' Opposition to Defendant's Motion in Limine to Preclude Plaintiffs' Medical Providers and Experts from Testifying Regarding New or Undisclosed Medical Treatment and Opinions
02/04/2011	Opposition to Motion Filed By: Plaintiff Simao, William J Plaintiffs' Opposition to Defendant Jenny Rish's Motion to Exclude the Report and Opinions of Plaintiff's Economist, Stan V. Smith
02/04/2011	Deposition Filed By: Defendant Rish, Jenny Notice of Taking Deposition of Patrick McNulty, M.D.
02/07/2011	CANCELED Jury Trial (1:00 PM) (Judicial Officer: Walsh, Jessie) Vacated - On in Error
02/08/2011	Reply Filed by: Defendant Rish, Jenny Defendant Jenny Rish's Reply to Plaintiffs' Combined Opposition to Motions (1) to Preclude Argument of Case During Voir Dire, and (2) to Exclude Questions Regarding Verdict Amounts During Voir Dire
02/08/2011	Reply Filed by: Defendant Rish, Jenny Defendant Jenny Rish's Reply in Support of Motion in Limine to Prevent Plaintiff from Arguing "Responsibility Avoidance"
02/08/2011	Reply Filed by: Defendant Rish, Jenny Defendant's Reply to Opposition to Motion in Limine to Exclude Traffic Accident Report and the Investigating Officer's Conclusions
02/08/2011	Reply Filed by: Defendant Rish, Jenny Defendant Jenny Rish's Reply in Support of Motion in Limine to Limit the Testimony of Plaintiff's Treating Physicians

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02/08/2011	Reply Filed by: Defendant Rish, Jenny Defendant Jenny Rish's Reply in Support of Motion in Limine to Preclude Plaintiffs' Medical Providers and Experts from Testifying Regarding New or Undisclosed Medical Treatment and Opinions
02/08/2011	Reply Filed by: Defendant Rish, Jenny Defendant Jenny Rish's Reply in Support of Motion in Limine to Exclude Graphic and Lurid Video or Animated Depictions of Surgical Procedures
02/08/2011	Reply Filed by: Defendant Rish, Jenny Defendant Jenny Rish's Reply in Support of Motion in Limine to Exclude Plaintiffs' Life Care Expert, Kathleen Hartmann, R.N.
02/08/2011	Reply Filed by: Defendant Rish, Jenny Defendant Jenny Rish's Reply in Support of Motion to Exclude the Report and Opinions of Plaintiff's Accident Reconstruction Expert David Ingrebretsen
02/08/2011	Reply Filed by: Defendant Rish, Jenny Defendant's Reply to Opposition to Motion to Exclude the Report and Opinions Plaintiffs' Economist, Stan V. Smith
02/09/2011	Receipt of Copy Filed by: Defendant Rish, Jenny Receipt of Copy
02/11/2011	Reply Filed by: Plaintiff Simao, William J; Plaintiff Simao, Cheryl A Plaintiffs' Reply to Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiffs' Omnibus Motion in Limine
02/14/2011	Subpoena Filed by: Defendant Rish, Jenny Subpoena-Civil
02/14/2011	Subpoena Filed by: Defendant Rish, Jenny Subpoena
02/14/2011	Subpoena Filed by: Defendant Rish, Jenny Subpoena
02/14/2011	Subpoena Filed by: Defendant Rish, Jenny Subpoena-Civil
02/14/2011	Pre-Trial Disclosure Party: Plaintiff Simao, William J Plaintiff's Pre-Trial Disclosures Pursuant to NRCP 16.1 (a)(3)(C)

	CASE 110. 07A337433
02/14/2011	Receipt of Copy Filed by: Plaintiff Simao, William J Receipt of Copy
02/14/2011	Motion to Exclude Filed By: Plaintiff Simao, William J; Plaintiff Simao, Cheryl A Plaintiff's Motion to Exclude Sub Rosa Video
02/15/2011	Motion in Limine (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Walsh, Jessie) Events: 01/06/2011 Motion in Limine Defendant Jenny Rish's Motion in Limine to Exclude the Traffic Accident Report and the Investigating Officer's Conclusions
02/15/2011	Motion in Limine (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Walsh, Jessie) Events: 01/06/2011 Motion in Limine Defendant Jenny Rish's Motion in Limine to Preclude Questions Regarding Verdict Amounts During Voir Dire
02/15/2011	Motion in Limine (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Walsh, Jessie) 02/15/2011, 02/22/2011 Events: 01/06/2011 Motion in Limine Defendant Jenny Rish's Motion in Limine to Prevent Plaintiff from Arguing Responsibility Avoidance
02/15/2011	Motion in Limine (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Walsh, Jessie) 02/15/2011, 02/22/2011 Events: 01/06/2011 Motion in Limine Defendant Jenny Rish's Motion in Limine Enforcing the Abolition of the Treating Physician Rule
02/15/2011	Motion in Limine (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Walsh, Jessie) Events: 01/06/2011 Motion in Limine Defendant Jenny Rish's Motion in Limine to Limit the Testimony of Plaintiff's Treating Physicians
02/15/2011	Motion in Limine (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Walsh, Jessie) Events: 01/06/2011 Motion in Limine Defendant Jenny Rish's Motion in Limine to Exclude Duplicative and Cumulative Testimony
02/15/2011	Motion in Limine (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Walsh, Jessie) Events: 01/06/2011 Motion in Limine Defendant Jenny Rish's Motion in Limine to Exclude Graphic and Lurid Video or Animated Depictions of Surgical Procedures
02/15/2011	Motion in Limine (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Walsh, Jessie) 02/15/2011, 02/22/2011 Events: 01/06/2011 Motion in Limine Defendant's Motion in Limine to Preclude Plaintiffs' Medical Providers and Experts from Testifying Regarding New or Undisclosed Medical Treatment and Opinions
02/15/2011	Motion in Limine (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Walsh, Jessie) 02/15/2011, 02/22/2011, 03/01/2011 Events: 01/06/2011 Motion in Limine Defendant Jenny Rish's Motion in Limine to Exclude Evidene of Senate Investigation
02/15/2011	Motion in Limine (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Walsh, Jessie) Events: 01/06/2011 Motion in Limine Defendant Jenny Rish's Motion in Limine to Preclude Witnesses from Offering Testimony Regarding the Credibility or Verasity of Other Witnesses

	CASE NO. 0/A539455
02/15/2011	Motion in Limine (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Walsh, Jessie) Events: 01/06/2011 Motion in Limine Defendant Jenny Rish's Motion to Preclude Argument of the Case During Voir Dire
02/15/2011	Motion in Limine (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Walsh, Jessie) 02/15/2011, 02/22/2011 Events: 01/06/2011 Motion in Limine Defendant Jenny Rish's Motion in Limine to Exclude Plaintiffs' Life Care Expert, Kathleen Hartmann, R.N.
02/15/2011	Motion in Limine (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Walsh, Jessie) Events: 01/06/2011 Motion in Limine Defendant Jenny Rish's Motion to Exclude the Report and Opinions Plaintifff's Economist Stan V. Smith
02/15/2011	Motion in Limine (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Walsh, Jessie) 02/15/2011, 02/22/2011 Events: 01/06/2011 Motion in Limine Defendant Jenny Rish's Motion to Exclude the Report and Opinions Plaintiff's Accident Reconstruction Expert, David Ingebretsen
02/15/2011	Motion in Limine (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Walsh, Jessie) Events: 01/07/2011 Omnibus Motion In Limine Plaintiff's Omnibus Motion in Limine
02/15/2011	All Pending Motions (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Walsh, Jessie)
02/16/2011	Subpoena Filed by: Defendant Rish, Jenny Subpoena
02/17/2011	Notice to Vacate Deposition Filed by: Defendant Rish, Jenny Notice to Vacate Deposition of Daniel Lee, M.D.
02/17/2011	Notice of Vacating Deposition Filed By: Defendant Rish, James Notice to Vacate Deposition of Patrick McNulty, M.D.
02/17/2011	Motion in Limine Plaintiff's Motion in Limine to (1) Preclude Defendant from Raising a "Minor" or "Low Impact" Defense; (2) Limit the Trial Testimony of Defendant's Expert David Fish M.D. and; (3) Exclude Evidecne of Property Damage
02/18/2011	Q Opposition Filed By: Defendant Rish, Jenny Defendant Jenny Rish's Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion to Exclude Sub Rosa Video
02/18/2011	Receipt of Copy Filed by: Defendant Rish, Jenny Receipt of Copy
02/22/2011	Receipt of Copy Filed by: Plaintiff Simao, William J Receipt of Copy
02/22/2011	All Pending Motions (9:30 AM) (Judicial Officer: Walsh, Jessie)

02/24/2011	Supplemental Filed by: Plaintiff Simao, William J Plaintiffs' Supplemental Opposition to Defendant Jenny Rish's Motion in Limine to Exclude Evidence of Senate Investigation
02/24/2011	Subpoena Filed by: Defendant Rish, Jenny Subpoena
02/24/2011	Subpoena Filed by: Defendant Rish, Jenny Subpoena
02/24/2011	Subpoena Filed by: Defendant Rish, Jenny Subpoena
02/25/2011	Receipt of Copy Filed by: Plaintiff Simao, William J Receipt of Copy
02/25/2011	Q Order Filed By: Plaintiff Simao, William J Order Regarding Plaintiffs' Motion to Allow the Plaintiffs to Present a Jury Questionnaire Prior to Voir Dire
02/25/2011	Reply Filed by: Defendant Rish, Jenny Defendant's Reply to Plaintiff's Supplemental Opposition to Motion to Exclude Evidence of Senate Investigation, and Opposition to Plaintiff's Counter-Motion to Introduce Evidence of a California Fair Political Practices Investigation
02/25/2011	Opposition Filed By: Defendant Rish, Jenny Defendant Jenny Rish's Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion to Preclude Defendant from Raising a "Minor" or "Low Impact" Defense, to Limit the Trial Testimony of Defendant's Expert, Dr. David E. Fish, M.D., and Exclude Evidence of Property Damage
02/27/2011	Reply to Opposition Filed by: Plaintiff Simao, William J Plaintiffs' Reply to Defendant's Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion to Exclude Sub Rosa Video
02/28/2011	Receipt of Copy Filed by: Defendant Rish, Jenny Receipt of Copy
02/28/2011	Receipt of Copy Filed by: Defendant Rish, Jenny Receipt of Copy
02/28/2011	Objection Filed By: Defendant Rish, Jenny Objections to Plaintiffs' Proposed Exhibits Pursuant to NRCP 16.1(a)(3)

	CASE NO. 0/A339433
03/01/2011	Calendar Call (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Walsh, Jessie)
03/01/2011	Motion to Exclude (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Walsh, Jessie) Events: 02/14/2011 Motion to Exclude Plaintiff's Motion to Exclude Sub Rosa Video
03/01/2011	Motion in Limine (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Walsh, Jessie) Events: 02/17/2011 Motion in Limine Plaintiff's Motion in Limine to (1) Preclude Defendant from Raising a "Minor" or "Low Impact" Defense; (2) Limit the Trial Testimony of Defendant's Expert David Fish M.D. and; (3) Exclude Evidecne of Property Damage
03/01/2011	All Pending Motions (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Walsh, Jessie)
03/01/2011	Receipt of Copy Filed by: Plaintiff Simao, William J Receipt of Copy
03/01/2011	Notice Filed By: Plaintiff Simao, William J Notice of 2.67 Conference
03/02/2011	Omnibus Motion In Limine Filed by: Plaintiff Simao, William J; Plaintiff Simao, Cheryl A
03/03/2011	Receipt of Copy Filed by: Plaintiff Simao, William J Receipt of Copy
03/03/2011	Pre-trial Memorandum Filed by: Defendant Rish, Jenny Defendant's Pre-Trial Memorandum
03/03/2011	Pre-trial Memorandum Filed by: Plaintiff Simao, William J Plaintiffs' Pre-Trial Memorandum
03/04/2011	Q Opposition to Motion in Limine Filed By: Defendant Rish, Jenny Defendant's Opposition to Plaintiffs' Second Omnibus Motion in Limine
03/04/2011	Errata Filed By: Plaintiff Simao, William J Errata to Plaintiffs' Pre-Trial Memorandum
03/04/2011	Supplement Filed by: Plaintiff Simao, William J Supplement to the Plaintiffs' Pre-Trial Disclosure Statement
03/04/2011	Calendar Call (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Walsh, Jessie)
03/04/2011	Receipt of Copy Filed by: Plaintiff Simao, William J

	CASE NO. 0/A539455
	Receipt of Copy
03/07/2011	Stipulation Filed by: Plaintiff Simao, William J Stipulation Pursuant to EDCR 2.47
03/07/2011	Receipt of Copy Filed by: Defendant Rish, Jenny Receipt of Copy
03/07/2011	Receipt of Copy Filed by: Defendant Rish, Jenny Receipt of Copy
03/08/2011	Omnibus Motion in Limine (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Walsh, Jessie) Events: 03/02/2011 Omnibus Motion In Limine Plaintiffs' Second Omnibus Motion in Limine
03/09/2011	Errata Filed By: Plaintiff Simao, William J Second Errata to Plaintiffs' Pre-Trial Memorandum
03/10/2011	Notice of Entry of Order Filed By: Plaintiff Simao, William J Notice of Entry of Order
03/11/2011	Order Filed By: Plaintiff Simao, William J; Plaintiff Simao, Cheryl A Order Regarding Plaintiffs' Omnibus Motion in Limine
03/14/2011	Notice of Association of Counsel Filed By: Defendant Rish, Jenny Notice of Association of Counsel
03/14/2011	Jury Trial (1:00 PM) (Judicial Officer: Walsh, Jessie) 03/14/2011-03/18/2011, 03/21/2011-03/25/2011, 03/28/2011-03/31/2011
03/14/2011	Order Filed By: Plaintiff Simao, William J; Plaintiff Simao, Cheryl A Order Regarding Plaintiffs' Motion in Limine to (1) Preclude Defendant from Raising a "Minor" or "Low Impact" Defense; (2) Limit the Trial Testimony of Defendant's Expert, David Fish, M.D. and; (3) Exclude Evidence of Property Damages and Plaintiffs' Motion to Exclude Sub Rosa Video
03/17/2011	CANCELED Hearing (10:30 AM) (Judicial Officer: Walsh, Jessie) Vacated
03/18/2011	Notice of Entry of Order Filed By: Plaintiff Simao, William J Notice of Entry of Order
03/18/2011	Brief Filed By: Defendant Rish, Jenny Trial Brief in Support of Oral Motion for Mistrial

	CASE NO. 0/A539455
03/18/2011	Brief Filed By: Defendant Rish, Jenny Trial Brief on Percipient Testimony Regarding the Accident
03/21/2011	Errata Filed By: Defendant Rish, Jenny First Errata to Defendant's Pre-Trial Memorandum
03/21/2011	Receipt of Copy Filed by: Defendant Rish, Jenny Receipt of Copy
03/21/2011	Amended Jury List
03/22/2011	Order Filed By: Defendant Rish, Jenny Order Granting Motion to Exclude Graphic and Lurid Video of Surgery
03/22/2011	Order Filed By: Defendant Rish, Jenny Order Granting Motion to Exclude Duplicative and Cumulative Testimony
03/22/2011	Order Filed By: Defendant Rish, Jenny Order Granting Motion to Exclude Argument of Case During Voir Dire
03/22/2011	Order Filed By: Defendant Rish, Jenny Order Granting Motion to Exclude Plaintiff's Economist, Stan Smith, for Lack of Foundation to Offer Expert Economist Opinion Testimony
03/22/2011	Opposition Filed By: Plaintiff Simao, William J Plaintiffs' Opposition to Defendant's Trial Brief in Support of Oral Motion for Mistrial
03/22/2011	Receipt of Copy Filed by: Plaintiff Simao, William J Receipt of Copy of Plaintiffs' Opposition to Defendant's Trial Brief in Support of Oral Motion for Mistrial
03/22/2011	Order Filed By: Plaintiff Simao, William J Order Regarding Plaintiffs' Second Omnibus Motion in Limine
03/22/2011	Order Filed By: Defendant Rish, Jenny Order Granting Motion to Exclude Traffic Accident Report and Investigating Officer's Conclusions
03/22/2011	Q Order Filed By: Defendant Rish, Jenny Order Granting Motion to Exclude Life Care Expert, Kathleen Hartmann, R.N.
03/22/2011	Order

	CASE NO. 0/A539455
	Filed By: Defendant Rish, Jenny Order Granting Motion to Exclude Plaintiff's Accident Reconstructionist/Biomechanical Expert David Ingebretsen
03/22/2011	Q Order Filed By: Defendant Rish, Jenny Order Granting Motion to Exclude Witnesses from Testifying Regarding the Credibility or Veracity of Other Witnesses
03/24/2011	Pre-trial Memorandum Filed by: Plaintiff Simao, William J Plaintiffs' Amended Pre-Trial Memorandum
03/24/2011	Designation of Expert Witness Filed By: Plaintiff Simao, William J Plaintiffs' De-Designation of Kathleen Hartman, R.N. as an Expert Witness
03/24/2011	Reporters Transcript Reporter s Transcript Motions Hearing
03/24/2011	Reporters Transcript Reporter s Transcript Trial to the Jury Day 2 - Volume 1
03/24/2011	Reporters Transcript Reporter s Transcript Motions in Limine Hearing
03/24/2011	Reporters Transcript Reporter s Transcript Motions Hearing
03/24/2011	Reporters Transcript Reporter s Transcript Motion Hearing
03/24/2011	Reporters Transcript Reporter s Transcript Trial by Jury Day 1 - Volume 1
03/24/2011	Reporters Transcript Reporter s Transcript Motion Hearing
03/25/2011	Notice of Entry of Order Filed By: Plaintiff Simao, William J Notice of Entry of Order
03/29/2011	Receipt of Copy Filed by: Defendant Rish, Jenny Receipt of Copy
03/29/2011	Riled By: Defendant Rish, Jenny Trial Brief Regarding Exclusion of Future Surgery for Failure to Disclose Computation of Future Damages Under NRCP 16.1(a)(1)C)
03/29/2011	Reporters Transcript Reporter s Transcript Trial To The Jury Day 3 - Volume 1

	CASE NO. 0/A539455
03/30/2011	Reporters Transcript Filed By: Plaintiff Simao, Cheryl A Reporter s Transcript Trial To The Jury Day 4- Volume 1
03/31/2011	Stipulation and Order for Dismissal With Prejudice Filed By: Defendant Rish, James; Defendant Rish, Linda
03/31/2011	Order of Dismissal With Prejudice (Judicial Officer: Walsh, Jessie) Debtors: William J Simao (Plaintiff), Cheryl A Simao (Plaintiff) Creditors: James Rish (Defendant), Linda Rish (Defendant) Judgment: 03/31/2011, Docketed: 04/08/2011
04/01/2011	Brief Filed By: Plaintiff Simao, William J Plaintiffs' Confidential Trial Brief
04/01/2011	Supplement Filed by: Plaintiff Simao, William J Plaintiffs' First Supplement to Their Confidential Trial Brief to Exclude Unqualified Testimony of Defendant's Medical Expert, Dr. Fish
04/01/2011	Supplemental Brief Filed By: Plaintiff Simao, William J Plaintiffs' Second Supplement to Their Confidential Trial Brief to Permit Dr. Grover to Testify with Regard to all Issues Raised During his Deposition
04/01/2011	Supplemental Brief Filed By: Plaintiff Simao, William J Plaintiffs' Third Supplement to Their Confidential Trial Brief; There is no Surprise to the Defense Regarding Evidence of a Spinal Cord Stimulator
04/01/2011	Supplemental Brief Filed By: Plaintiff Simao, William J Plaintiffs' Fourth Supplement to Their Confidential Trial Brief Regarding Cross Examination of Dr. Wang
04/01/2011	Supplemental Brief Filed By: Plaintiff Simao, William J Plaintiffs' Fifth Supplement to Their Confidential Trial Brief to Permit Stan Smith, Ph.D., to Testify Regarding, Evidence Made Known to him During Trial
04/01/2011	Hearing (1:00 PM) (Judicial Officer: Walsh, Jessie) Hearing: Prove-up of damages
04/01/2011	Reporters Transcript Filed By: Plaintiff Simao, William J Reporter s Transcript Trial To the Jury Day 6 - Volume 1
04/01/2011	Reporters Transcript Filed By: Plaintiff Simao, William J Reporter s Transcript Trial To The Jury Day 5 - Volume 1
04/04/2011	Receipt of Copy Filed by: Plaintiff Simao, William J Receipt of Copy of Plaintiffs' Confidential Trial Brief; Supplements 1 Through 5 and

	CASE NO. 0/A539455
	Powerpoint Slide
04/04/2011	Receipt of Copy Filed by: Plaintiff Simao, William J Receipt of Copy of Plaintiffs' Confidential Trial Brief, Supplements 1 Through 5 and Powerpoint Slide
04/04/2011	Reporters Transcript Reporter s Transcript Trial To The Jury Day - 7 Volume 1
04/05/2011	Reporters Transcript Reporter's Transcript Trial To The Jury Jury Panel Voir Dire
04/05/2011	Reporters Transcript Reporter's Transcript Trial To The Jury Jury Panel Voir Dire
04/05/2011	Reporters Transcript Trial To The Jury Jury Panel Voir Dire 3/14/11
04/05/2011	Reporters Transcript Reporter's Transcript Trial To The Jury Day 9 - Volume 1
04/05/2011	Reporters Transcript Reporter's Transcript Trial To The Jury Day 8 - Volume 1
04/07/2011	Reporters Transcript Reporter s Transcript Jury Panel Voir Dire
04/07/2011	Reporters Transcript Reporter s Transcript Summation Hearing
04/15/2011	Reporters Transcript Reporter's Transcript Jury Panel Voir Dire
04/16/2011	Reporters Transcript Filed By: Plaintiff Simao, William J Reporter s Transcript Trial By Jury Day 1 - Volume I
04/16/2011	Reporters Transcript Filed By: Plaintiff Simao, William J Reporter s Transcript Trial to the Jury Jury Panel Voir Dire
04/18/2011	Receipt of Copy Filed by: Plaintiff Simao, William J Receipt of Copy
04/21/2011	Stipulation and Order Filed by: Plaintiff Simao, William J Stipulation and Order to Modify Briefing Schedule
04/22/2011	Opposition Filed By: Defendant Rish, Jenny Defendant's Amended Response in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Request for Attorney Fees


	CASE 110. 07A337433
04/22/2011	Brief Filed By: Plaintiff Simao, William J Plaintiffs' Brief in Favor of an Award of Attorney's Fees Following Default Judgment
04/22/2011	Order Filed By: Plaintiff Simao, William J Decision and Order Regarding Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike Defendant's Answer
04/22/2011	Stipulation and Order Filed by: Defendant Rish, Jenny Stipulation and Order to Modify Briefing Schedule
04/22/2011	Q Opposition Filed By: Defendant Rish, Jenny Defendant's Response in Opposition to Plaintiff's Request for Attorney Fees
04/25/2011	Receipt of Copy Filed by: Plaintiff Simao, William J Receipt of Copy
04/25/2011	Receipt of Copy Filed by: Plaintiff Simao, William J Receipt of Copy
04/25/2011	Notice of Entry of Order Filed By: Plaintiff Simao, William J Notice of Entry of Order
04/26/2011	Notice of Entry of Order Filed By: Plaintiff Simao, William J Notice of Entry of Order
04/26/2011	Memorandum of Costs and Disbursements Filed By: Plaintiff Simao, William J Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Costs and Disbursements
04/26/2011	Notice of Entry of Order Filed By: Defendant Rish, James Notice of Entry of Order
04/28/2011	Status Check (3:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Walsh, Jessie) Fees and Costs
04/28/2011	Judgment Filed By: Plaintiff Simao, William J Judgment
04/28/2011	Judgment Plus Legal Interest (Judicial Officer: Walsh, Jessie) Debtors: Jenny Rish (Defendant) Creditors: William J Simao (Plaintiff) Judgment: 04/28/2011, Docketed: 05/06/2011 Total Judgment: 2,713,151.96 Debtors: Jenny Rish (Defendant) Creditors: Cheryl A Simao (Plaintiff)

	L. J
	Judgment: 04/28/2011, Docketed: 05/06/2011 Total Judgment: 3,394,437.96
	Debtors: Jenny Rish (Defendant)
	Creditors: William J Simao (Plaintiff), Cheryl A Simao (Plaintiff)
	Judgment: 04/28/2011, Docketed: 05/06/2011
	Total Judgment: 99,555.49
04/29/2011	Motion to Retax
04/25/2011	Filed By: Defendant Rish, Jenny
	Defendant's Motion to Retax Costs
	Defendan Sylvion to Retain Costs
05/03/2011	ATT CT CT 1
03/03/2011	Notice of Entry of Judgment
	Filed By: Plaintiff Simao, William J
	Notice of Entry of Judgment
05/03/2011	
05/03/2011	Certificate of Service
	Filed by: Defendant Rish, Jenny
	Certificate of Service
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05/06/2011	🔄 Stipulation and Order
	Filed by: Defendant Rish, Jenny
	Stipulation and Order
	pros
05/09/2011	🔾 Notice of Entry of Order
	Filed By: Defendant Rish, Jenny
	Notice of Entry of Order
	props.
05/16/2011	Opposition to Motion
	Filed By: Plaintiff Simao, William J
	Plaintiffs' Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Retax Costs
05/16/2011	Motion for New Trial
	Filed By: Defendant Rish, Jenny
	Defendant's Motion for New Trial
05/17/2011	Certificate of Service
	Filed by: Defendant Rish, Jenny
	Certificate of Service
05/18/2011	Subpoena Duces Tecum
	Filed by: Defendant Rish, Jenny
	Subpoena Duces Tecum
05/25/2011	Certificate of Service
	Filed by: Plaintiff Simao, William J
	Certificate of Service
05/25/2011	Motion for Attorney Fees
33/23/2011	Filed By: Plaintiff Simao, William J
	Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorneys' Fees
	1 can any 11 to receive you 1 to to
05/26/2011	Motion to Quash
03/20/2011	Filed By: Plaintiff Simao, William J
	Plaintiffs' Motion to Quash Defendant's Subpoena Duces Tecum to Jans-Jorg Rosler,
	M.D. at Nevada Spine Institute on Order Shortening Time
	2

05/26/2011	Reply Filed by: Defendant Rish, Jenny Defendant's Reply to Opposition to Motion to Retax Costs
05/27/2011	Receipt of Copy Filed by: Plaintiff Simao, William J Receipt of Copy
05/31/2011	Notice of Appeal Filed By: Defendant Rish, Jenny Notice of Appeal
05/31/2011	Case Appeal Statement Filed By: Defendant Rish, Jenny Case Appeal Statement
06/01/2011	Q Opposition Filed By: Defendant Rish, Jenny Defendant's Opposition to Motion to Quash
06/01/2011	Judgment Filed By: Plaintiff Simao, William J Judgment
06/02/2011	Motion to Retax (3:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Walsh, Jessie) Events: 04/29/2011 Motion to Retax Defendant Rish's Motion to Retax Costs
06/07/2011	Motion to Quash (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Walsh, Jessie) Plaintiffs' Motion to Quash Defendant's Subpoena Duces Tecum to Jans-Jorg Rosler, M.D. at Nevada Spine Institute on Order Shortening Time
06/16/2011	Motion for New Trial (3:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Walsh, Jessie) Events: 05/16/2011 Motion for New Trial Defendant's Motion for New Trial
06/30/2011	Motion for Attorney Fees (3:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Walsh, Jessie) Plaintiff's Motion for Attorney Fees

DATE	FINANCIAL INFORMATION	
	Conversion Extended Connection Type No Convert Value @ 07A539455	
	Total Charges	279.00
	Total Payments and Credits	279.00
	Balance Due as of 6/2/2011	0.00
	Defendant Rish, Jenny Total Charges Total Payments and Credits Balance Due as of 6/2/2011	24.00 24.00 0.00
	Defendant Rish, Jenny APPEAL BOND Balance as of 6/2/2011	500.00

DEPARTMENT 10 CASE SUMMARY CASE NO. 07A539455



I. Party Information					
Plaintiff(s) (name/address/phone): WILIAM S	SIMAO;	Defendant(s) (name/address/phone): JENNY RISH; JAMES RISH;			
CHERYL ANN SIMAO		LINDA RISH			
Attorney (name/address/phone):		Attorney (name/address/phone):			
Matthew E. Aaron, Esq.		, ,			
2300 W. Sahara Ave., Suite 650, Las Vega	ns, NV 89102				
II. Nature of Controversy (Please ch applicable subcategory, if appropriate)	eck applicable bold of	category and	Arbitration Requested		
Civil Cases					
Real Property	Te		orts		
□ Landlord/Tenant □ Unlawful Detainer □ Title to Property □ Foreclosure □ Liens □ Quiet Title □ Specific Performance □ Condemnation/Eminent Domain □ Other Real Property □ Partition □ Planning/Zoning	Negligence Negligence – Auto Negligence – Medical/Dental Negligence – Premises Liability (Slip/Fall) Negligence – Other		Product Liability Product Liability/Motor Vehicle Other Torts/Product Liability Intentional Misconduct Torts/Defamation (Libel/Slander) Interfere with Contract Rights Employment Torts (Wrongful termination) Other Torts Anti-trust Fraud/Misrepresentation Insurance Legal Tort		
Probate Other Civil Filing Typ		Unfair Competition			
□ Summary Administration □ General Administration □ Special Administration □ Set Aside Estates □ Trust/Conservatorships □ Individual Trustee □ Corporate Trustee □ Other Probate	Insurance C Commercia Other Conti Collection of Employmer Guarantee Sale Contra Uniform Co Civil Petition for Department	Act Construction Carrier Il Instrument racts/Acct/Judgment of Actions nt Contract	Appeal from Lower Court (also check applicable civil case box) Transfer from Justice Court Justice Court Civil Appeal Civil Writ Other Special Proceeding Other Civil Filing Compromise of Minor's Claim Conversion of Property Damage to Property Employment Security Enforcement of Judgment Foreign Judgment — Civil Other Personal Property Recovery of Property Stockholder Suit Other Civil Matters		
III. Business Court Requested (Please check applicable category; for Clark or Washoe Counties only.)					
□ NRS Chapters 78-88 □ Commodities (NRS 90) □ Securities (NRS 90)	☐ Investments (NRS 104 Art. 8) ☐ Deceptive Trade Practices (NRS 598) ☐ Trademarks (NRS 600A)		☐ Enhanced Case Mgmt/Business☐ Other Business Court Matters		
U (3/8) Date Signature of initiating party or representative					

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Hum D. Colum ORDR 1 ROBERT T. EGLET, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 3402 2 **CLERK OF THE COURT** DAVID T. WALL, ESQ. 3 Nevada Bar No. 2805 ROBERT M. ADAMS, ESQ. 4 Nevada Bar No. 6551 **MAINOR EGLET** 5 400 South Fourth Street, Suite 600 6 Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 Ph: (702) 450-5400 7 Fx: (702) 450-5451 dwall@mainorlawyers.com 8 9 MATTHEW E. AARON, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 4900 10 **AARON & PATERNOSTER, LTD.** 2300 West Sahara Avenue, Ste.650 11 Las Vegas, Nevada 89102 12 Ph.: (702) 384-4111 Fx.: (702) 384-8222 13 Attorneys for Plaintiffs 14 **DISTRICT COURT** 15 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 16 WILLIAM JAY SIMAO, individually CASE NO.: A539455 17 CHERYL ANN SIMAO, individually, and as DEPT. NO.: X husband and wife, 18 19 Plaintiffs, 20 ٧. 21 JENNY RISH, 22 Defendant. 23 25 **DEFENDANT'S ANSWER**

DECISION AND ORDER REGARDING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO STRIKE

This matter having come before the Court on March 31, 2011, on Plaintiffs' oral Motion to Strike Defendant's Answer, ROBERT T. EGLET, ESQ., DAVID T. WALL, ESQ. and ROBERT M. ADAMS, ESQ. present for Plaintiffs, WILLIAM SIMAO and CHERYL SIMAO,

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STEPHEN H. ROGERS, ESQ. and DANIEL F. POLSENBERG, ESQ. present for Defendant, JENNY RISH, and following the Court's oral pronouncement from the bench GRANTING Plaintiffs' Motion, the Court hereby enters the following written Decision and Order:

I. Factual and Procedural Background

This case involves a motor vehicle accident occurring on April 15, 2005. The Plaintiff, WILLIAM SIMAO, was driving southbound on Interstate 15 when he was rear-ended by a vehicle driven by the Defendant, JENNY RISH. Defendant did not deny causing the accident. Plaintiff WILLIAM SIMAO was injured in the accident and brought the instant action, which included a claim for loss of consortium by WILLIAM SIMAO's wife, Plaintiff CHERYL SIMAO.

This matter was presented for jury trial beginning on March 14, 2011, and the trial had nearly been completed before the instant Motion was made. However, the facts supporting the Motion and the grounds upon which to analyze the Motion include rulings made by this Court before the trial commenced. The Plaintiffs' oral motion to strike the Defendant's Answer is rooted primarily in the Defendant's repeated violations of this Court's Order granting the Plaintiffs' Motion in Limine to Preclude Defendant From Raising a Minor Impact Defense. However, this Court recognizes that Defendant violated other Orders of this Court during the trial, and the cumulative effect of such violations is material to the Court's analysis. Before itemizing and analyzing the violations of this Court's Order on "minor impact," it is necessary to consider the violations of other Court orders by the Defendant.

A. Violation of Order Precluding Evidence of Unrelated Accidents, Injuries or Medical Conditions

1. Plaintiffs' Motion in Limine

On January 7, 2011, Plaintiffs brought an Omnibus Motion in Limine, which included a

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request to preclude the Defendant from introducing evidence of Prior and Subsequent Unrelated Accidents, Injuries and Medical Conditions and Prior and Subsequent Claims or Lawsuits. This portion of the Omnibus Motion in Limine specifically asked this Court to preclude evidence of an unrelated 2003 motorcycle accident involving the Plaintiff, since no medical provider had connected any of the minor injuries sustained by the Plaintiff in the 2003 motorcycle accident to any injuries suffered in the instant accident. In short, the evidence established that the motorcycle accident was irrelevant.

The Defendant filed an Opposition to Plaintiffs' Omnibus Motion in Limine and the

The Defendant filed an Opposition to Plaintiffs' Omnibus Motion in Limine, and the matter was heard by this Court on February 15, 2011, at which time this Court GRANTED Plaintiffs' request. On March 9, 2011, this Court entered a written Order which stated in pertinent part as follows:

"IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs' request to exclude prior and subsequent unrelated accidents, injuries and medical conditions, and prior and subsequent claims or lawsuits is GRANTED in all respects."

Following the entry of the foregoing Order, all parties were on notice that this Court had specifically precluded the Defendant from introducing evidence of unrelated accidents, including the 2003 motorcycle accident.

2. <u>Defendant's Clear Violation in Opening Statement</u>

In his Opening Statement, counsel for the Defendant presented to the jury a Power Point slide referencing William Simao's 2003 motorcycle accident. The Plaintiffs objected, asked that the slide be shielded from the jury, and approached for a sidebar conference.

The slide clearly and unambiguously violated the Order of this Court on the Plaintiffs' Omnibus Motion in Limine, which Motion specifically referenced the 2003 motorcycle accident as an accident *unrelated* to any issue in the instant case. The jury was directed to disregard the

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slide and was further admonished that a pretrial ruling of the Court excluded evidence of the 2003 motorcycle accident.

The Plaintiffs' objection was sustained.

Following this admonition, this Court held a hearing outside the presence of the jury to allow the Defendant's counsel and the Plaintiffs' counsel to review the remaining slides accompanying the defense Opening Statement to determine if any of them violated court orders. Several of them violated orders and were removed (RTP, March 21, 2011, p. 75). Notably, the Plaintiffs' counsel made the following statement outside the presence of the jury:

There were multiple other slides that had the same type of problems in them. Most of them Mr. Rogers agreed with and took those statements out of the slides, but again, if we hadn't done that, there would have been three to four more clear violations of ... this Court's pretrial orders.

As Mr. Wall [Plaintiffs' co-counsel] said at the bench, I think it's clear – I think it's abundantly clear that Mr. Rogers is going to try to mistry this case. I think it is abundantly clear that that's what's going on.

I told the Court at the last bench conference that that was two. If there were any additional ones, we were going to start asking for monetary sanctions and other potential sanctions in this case for this type of systematic refusal to comply with pretrial court orders.

I expect his experts are going to do it as well. I can assure this Court that they are going to violate a number of the orders in their testimony, just like Mr. Rogers did up there....

(RTP, March 21, 2011, p. 75) (emphasis supplied).

B. Violations of Order Precluding Evidence That This is a "Medical Build-up" Case

1. Plaintiffs' Motion in Limine

Within the afore-mentioned Omnibus Motion in Limine, the Plaintiffs also sought to preclude any evidence or argument that the case was "attorney driven" or a "medical build-up" case. This section of the Plaintiffs' Omnibus Motion in Limine was also heard by this Court on February 15, 2011, at which time this Court GRANTED the Plaintiffs' request. During the hearing on this Motion, counsel for the Defendant conceded he had no evidence of any kind suggesting that this case was "attorney driven" or a "medical build-up" case. This Court's written Order of March 9, 2011, also stated as follows:

"IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs' request to preclude argument that this case is 'attorney driven' or a 'medical build-up' case is GRANTED."

Following the entry of the foregoing Order, all parties were on notice that this Court had specifically precluded the Defendant from arguing or presenting evidence that the instant case was a "medical build-up" case, in large measure as a result of the Defendant having no such evidence to present.

2. <u>Defendant's Clear Violation During Opening Statement</u>

In his Opening Statement, counsel for the Defendant made the following statement when discussing the testimony of the Plaintiff's treating physicians:

"And we are going to hear from various different kinds of doctors in this case.

One of them are doctors who appear down here regularly in court, as often, if not more than trial lawyers. Doctors McNulty, and Grover..."

(RTP March 21, 2011, p. 72).

Defense counsel's statement was interrupted by an objection from the Plaintiffs, who additionally asked that the Power Point slide that accompanied the defense's Opening Statement

be shielded from the jury. The slide referenced the Plaintiff's treating physicians as "Trial Doctors."

At the sidebar conference that followed, the Plaintiffs objected to the statements of counsel and the "Trial Doctors" slide as violating this Court's Order precluding any argument that the case was "attorney driven" or a "medical build-up" case. Since no other purpose for the statement or the slide was forthcoming from counsel for the Defendant at the sidebar, the jury was directed to disregard the slide.

The Plaintiffs' objection was sustained.

3. <u>Defendant's Clear Violation During Cross-Examination of Dr. Patrick McNulty</u>

Despite this Court's ruling during the Defendant's Opening Statement on the issue of medical build-up and "Trial Doctors," counsel for the Defendant asked the following question of Dr. McNulty, one of the Plaintiff's treating doctors:

"Now, Doctor, yesterday there was a discussion about the testimony history of a doctor. I don't broach this topic with you to be insensitive, but I want to touch on it since that issue has been raised. You testified under oath, whether it be in trial or in deposition, somewhere around 100 times; is that right?"

(RTP, March 25, 2011, pp. 21-22).

Counsel for the Plaintiffs immediately objected and approached the Court for a sidebar bench conference. There, the Court heard argument regarding the "discussion" "yesterday" which was the Plaintiffs' use of specific prior deposition testimony to impeach the Defendant's expert witness during cross-examination. Further, the Court heard argument that this line of questioning could only be presented to create an inference of "medical build-up." Counsel for the Defendant did not sufficiently explain to this Court how this line of questioning was not a violation of the pretrial order precluding evidence of "medical build-up," especially in light of

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the fact that the Defendant admittedly had no evidence to support a "medical build-up" defense.

The Plaintiffs' objection was sustained.

C. Violations of Pretrial Order Precluding "Minor Impact" Defense

As set forth above, the Plaintiffs' ultimate motion to strike the Defendant's Answer was based primarily on repeated violations of this Court's pretrial Order on the issue of a "minor impact" defense.

1. Plaintiff's Motion in Limine

On February 17, 2011, Plaintiffs brought a Motion in Limine to: 1) Preclude Defendant from Raising a "Minor" or "Low Impact" Defense; 2) Limit the Trial Testimony of Defendant's Expert, David Fish, M.D.; and 3) Exclude Evidence of Property Damage. The Motion set out the fact that the Nevada Highway Patrol Trooper who completed the Accident Report referred to the vehicle damage as "moderate." Specifically, the Motion asked the Court to preclude the Defendant from "arguing, suggesting or insinuating at trial that the crash was a 'minor impact' or 'low impact' collision, and not significant enough to cause Plaintiff's injuries." The Motion was primarily based on Hallmark v. Eldridge, 189 P.3d 646 (Nev. 2008), coupled with the fact that Defendant did not have any expert qualified to testify whether the impact in the instant collision was sufficient to cause the injuries complained of. Conversely, the Plaintiffs had disclosed a biomechanical expert who was prepared to testify that the accident was of the type to have proximately caused injury to the Plaintiff. The Motion further sought to limit Defendant's pain management expert, Dr. David Fish, from testifying to opinions rooted in biomechanical science, as he lacks the qualifications to testify to such opinions under the standard announced in Hallmark.

On February 25, 2011, Defendant filed an Opposition to the Motion and the matter was heard by this Court on March 1, 2011, at which time the Court GRANTED Plaintiffs' Motion in

its entirety. Defendants provided no evidence or information to correlate the amount of damage to a vehicle in a collision to the severity of the injury suffered by a passenger. Defendants had no expert witness on biomechanics to support an argument or inference that this accident was too minor to cause the injuries alleged to have been suffered by the Plaintiff. Based on the Nevada Supreme Court's rulings in *Hallmark*, *supra*, *Levine v. Remolif*, 80 Nev. 168 (1964) and *Choat v. McDorman*, 86 Nev. 332 (1970), this Court found that issues of accident reconstruction and biomechanics are not within the common knowledge of laypersons and require expert witness testimony. As such, this Court found no evidentiary or factual foundation upon which the Defendant could argue or infer that the accident was too minor to cause the Plaintiff's injuries.

On March 8, 2011, this Court entered a written Order which stated in pertinent part as follows:

"IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs' request to preclude Defendant from Raising a "Minor" or "Low Impact" Defense is GRANTED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs' request to limit the trial testimony of Defendant's expert, David Fish, M.D., to those areas of expertise that he is qualified to testify in regards to is **GRANTED**. Neither Dr. Fish nor any other defense expert shall opine regarding biomechanics or the nature of the impact of the subject crash at trial.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs' request to exclude the property damage photos and repair invoice(s) is GRANTED."

Following the entry of the foregoing Order, all parties were on notice that this Court had specifically precluded a defense (or even an argument) that the accident was too minor to cause the injuries for which Plaintiff sought to recover damages.

Despite a clear and unambiguous Order precluding the Defendant from raising as a defense that the impact of the accident was too minor to cause the Plaintiff's injuries, counsel for

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the Defendant persisted in violating this Court's order, ultimately leading to the sanction imposed herein. There can be no question or argument that the Defendant was on notice of this Court's Order, based on the following:

a) Hearing Outside the Presence of the Jury on March 18, 2011

After jury selection had been completed and before Opening Statements, this Court held a hearing outside the presence of the jury to discuss, among other things, the issue of a minor impact defense. The discussion on the record was extensive and comprises seventeen (17) pages of the transcript (See, RTP, March 18, 2011, pp. 112-129).

During this hearing, the Plaintiffs' counsel brought to this Court's attention the fact that counsel for the Defendant, in his Opening Statement, might broach the subject of minor impact by referring to the Defendant's deposition testimony that the impact of the accident was merely "a tap." Counsel for the Defendant conceded that it was his impression that this Court had not precluded such an argument:

"What happened was, there was a motion to exclude a defense that a minor impact cannot cause injury. The Plaintiffs' argument in the motion was because the defense did not retain a biomechanical engineer they would not be able to argue the general proposition that minor impacts cannot cause injury.

The defense appeared at the hearing and said, 'This is not a biomechanical case.

The defense is not going to argue that no minor impact can cause injury. The defense is that this minor impact did not cause injury."

(RTP, March 18, 2011, p. 114)(emphasis supplied).

It became clear to this Court that the Defendant intended to present a minor impact defense, despite the Order of this Court to the contrary. Plaintiffs' counsel was allowed to once again state on the record their position on the original Motion in Limine, outlining that the

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Defendant had no expert witness to opine that the accident was too minor to cause the claimed injuries, and further that the Order of this Court on the Motion in Limine precluded a "minor impact" defense at trial.

By the conclusion of the hearing outside the presence of the jury, this Court reiterated its ruling on the Motion in Limine precluding a "minor impact" defense (RTP March 18, 2011, p. 125-26). Likewise, this Court precluded counsel for the Defendant from referencing in his Opening Statement that it was a minor impact, or simply "a tap," for the purpose of raising an inference that the accident was too minor to cause the Plaintiff's injuries (RTP March 18, 2011, pp. 127-28). This Court further reminded counsel for the Defendant to review the Order entered on this issue to avoid violating it in the future (RTP March 18, 2011, p. 126, 127).

b) Hearing Outside the Presence of the Jury on March 21, 2011

On the first court day following the hearing set forth above, the issue of "minor impact" was again raised outside the presence of the jury immediately following the Plaintiffs' Opening Statement. At this hearing, the Defendant sought permission to claim a "minor impact" defense based on the door allegedly being opened by the Plaintiffs in their Opening Statement when counsel referred to the accident as a "motor vehicle crash." This Court noted that the Plaintiffs in their Opening Statement did not refer to the nature of the impact, the severity of the impact, the fact that the impact was significant enough to cause the Plaintiff's injuries nor any violence associated with the impact. In fact, this Court noted that Plaintiffs' counsel did not describe the impact of the vehicles in any way.

Based on that finding, the Court denied the Defendant's renewed request to be able to raise a "minor impact" defense. Again, the Defendant was clearly and unequivocally on notice that such a defense was precluded.

2. Reference to Minor Impact during Defendant's Opening Statement

Immediately following the foregoing discussion outside the presence of the jury, counsel for the Defendant delivered his Opening Statement. He described the stop and go traffic the Defendant encountered before the accident, and stated that the Defendant was nearly stopped before the impact (RTP, March 21, 2011, p. 63). Plaintiffs did not object to this statement, although it arguably raises an inference of a minor impact.

Thereafter, counsel for the Defendant proceeded to attempt to play selected portions of his client's videotaped deposition regarding the nature of the accident, which drew an objection from the Plaintiffs. After a bench conference, this Court determined that not only was the Defendant's deposition hearsay when offered on her own behalf, but also that testimony regarding the nature of the accident, if offered to show it was a minor impact, would be in violation of this Court's pretrial Order.

The Plaintiffs' objection was sustained.

3. Clear Violation of Order During Cross-Examination of Dr. Jorg Rosler

During the testimony of Dr. Rosler, one of the Plaintiff's treating pain management physicians, counsel for the Defendant asked the following question:

"Do you know anything about what happened to [Defendant] Jenny Rish and her passengers in this accident?"

(RPT, March 22, 2011, p. 84)

Before the witness could answer, the Plaintiffs objected, citing this Court's pretrial motion ruling.

The only potential relevance of such an inquiry would be to raise an inference that since the Defendant or her passengers were not injured (or that the Plaintiff's treating physician was unaware of any injury), the accident must not have been significant enough to injure the Plaintiff.

There is no other potential purpose in obtaining an answer from this witness to that question. Such an inference would be directly contrary to this Court's Order precluding a "minor impact" defense.

The Plaintiffs' objection was sustained.

4. Clear Violation During Cross-Examination of Dr. Patrick McNulty

Despite the fact that the Court sustained the Plaintiffs' objection to the improper question of Dr. Rosler, counsel for Defendant asked an almost identical question of the next treating physician to testify for Plaintiff. Within the first two minutes of the Defendant's cross-examination of Dr. McNulty, the following questions were asked:

[Defense Counsel] And you don't know anything about the car accident other than what [Plaintiff] told you?

[Dr. McNulty] It was simply he said he had a car accident and that's when he – his problems started.

[Defense Counsel] Okay. But did you discuss with him whether he was able to drive from the scene of the accident?

[Dr. McNulty] No, I really didn't go into the other – into the other details. No, I did not discuss that.

[Defense Counsel] Do you know anything about the folks in Jenny Rish's car? (RTP 3/25/11, p. 4) (Emphasis supplied).

Counsel for the Plaintiffs immediately objected and a bench conference ensued. At the bench conference, counsel for the Defendant indicated his position on the relevance of the question:

[Defense Counsel] The relevance is that if one of them were injured or were not, that would be relevant or probative to whether the others were injured.

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(RTP 3/25/11, p. 5).

In fact, based on this Court's prior rulings, such a position is untenable. As stated in the authority supporting the grant of the Plaintiffs' pretrial Motion in Limine, there is no correlation between the size of the impact and the potential for injury to the Plaintiff. There is no correlation between whether the Defendant or one of her passengers was injured and the potential for injury to the Plaintiff. The Defendant had no credible or admissible evidence suggesting such a correlation and no expert testimony to support such a proposition.

Further, since the question asked on cross-examination of Dr. McNulty was exactly the same question precluded during the cross-examination of Dr. Rosler, the Defendant was clearly on notice that this area of inquiry was improper.

The Plaintiffs' objection was sustained.

5. Clear Violation During Cross-Examination of Dr. Jaswinder Grover

On the very same afternoon as Dr. McNulty's cross-examination, the Defendant had the opportunity to cross-examine Dr. Grover, another of the Plaintiff's treating physicians. During that cross-examination, counsel for the Defendant *again* asked the very same type of question precluded during the cross-examination of Drs. Rosler and McNulty:

[Defense Counsel] You know the Plaintiff wasn't transported by ambulance.

[Dr. Grover] Yes, sir.

[Defense Counsel] You know [whether] Jenny Rish -

[Plaintiff's Counsel] Objection, Your Honor.

[Defense Counsel] – was lifted from the scene?

(RTP 3/25/11, p. 141).

After all of the previous hearings on the issue of a "minor impact" defense, and after the objections to the same type of question were sustained by this Court, such a question of Dr.

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Grover is simply inexplicable. Again, there is no potential relevance to a question asked of one of the Plaintiff's treating doctors (who didn't treat the Plaintiff until almost three years after the accident) about any injuries to the Defendant, other than to attempt to infer that the accident was too minor to injure the Plaintiff if the Defendant was not injured. That inference is precluded, based on the fact that the Defendant had no expert witness or admissible evidence to support that inference.

The Plaintiffs' objection was sustained and the jury was directed to disregard the last question.

6. Hearing Outside the Presence of the Jury on March 25, 2011

Following the testimony of Dr. Grover, at a hearing outside the presence of the jury, counsel for the Plaintiffs made the following record regarding the pervasive and continuous violations of this Court's Orders on pretrial Motions by counsel for the Defendant:

[Plaintiffs' Counsel] Despite the ruling of the Court, despite the arguments we've had outside the presence on the issue of minor impact, in Opening Statement and with each and every witness so far, there's been a question which leads to a conclusion or an argument about minor impact, whether the Defendant was injured in – whether the doctor knows whether the Defendant was injured in the accident, which could only potentially be relevant to some argument that the accident was too minor to have caused injury, because she wasn't injured.

Each time we've objected. Each time the Court has sustained the objection. I would look for, frankly, some guidance from the Court on what we can do from here out, because it – I can only assume that it will continue to occur. And so, *I don't know whether a progressive sanction that we'd ask for*, that there should be a warning from the Court before this should happen again. But those are my concerns, and I don't know

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what other potential relevance there could be to asking a treating physician whether he's aware of whether or not the Defendant was injured in the accident.

(RTP 3/25/11, pp. 164-65) (emphasis supplied).

Thereafter, a discussion ensued on the record regarding the Court's pretrial ruling and the fact that the Defendant had repeatedly violated it. At the conclusion of the hearing outside the presence of the jury, this Court attempted, once again, to make it clear that the violations were continuous and that the Court would take necessary measures if the violations occurred again. To the Plaintiffs' counsel's suggestion of a progressive sanction, the Court responded thusly:

[Court] I think you're right, and I think that the defense is on notice. I think the Order is very clear. I think it clearly has been violated. I was really surprised to hear a question posed of [Dr. Grover] regarding Ms. Rish when the Court sustained a previous question regarding Ms. Rish of another witness and ruled that that was not relevant. So I was really surprised to hear that very same question posed as to Ms. Rish.

So I don't know. It does seem to be at this point to be deliberate, Mr. Rogers. And so, I'm inclined to agree that you're on notice. The Court will consider progressive sanctions. I don't know what they will be. I hope there won't have to be any assessed. But I don't know what else to do to try to get you to comply with the Court's previous Orders.

(RTP 3/25/11, pp. 166-67) (emphasis supplied).

7. Testimony of Defendant's Expert Witness, Dr. David Fish

a) Voir Dire Examination Prior to Direct Examination

Defense expert Dr. Fish testified out of order during the Plaintiffs' case-in-chief as an accommodation by the Plaintiff to the Defendant and her expert. At request of the Plaintiffs'

counsel immediately prior to Dr. Fish's testimony to the jury, this Court held a hearing outside the presence of the jury to allow the Plaintiffs' counsel to take Dr. Fish on *voir dire* to ensure he was aware of the Court's previous rulings (including an Order granting the Plaintiffs' Motion in Limite to Limit the Testimony of Dr. Fish). Dr. Fish's testimony outside the presence of the jury comprises eighteen pages of the record (See, RTP March 24, 2011, pp. 12-30).

This questioning of Dr. Fish revealed that he was unaware of virtually every pretrial Order entered by this Court, including the Order limiting his testimony. He was unaware of this Court's Order precluding:

- 1) Plaintiff's unrelated 2003 motorcycle accident;
- 2) Plaintiff's unrelated 2008 motor vehicle accident;
- 3) Plaintiff's unrelated medical conditions;
- 4) Any suggestion of secondary gain, symptom magnification or malingering;
- 5) Sub rosa video surveillance of Plaintiff (ruling deferred until the conclusion of Plaintiff's direct examination);
- 6) Dr. Fish's testimony regarding biomechanical opinions related to the accident.

Of obvious concern to this Court was the fact that despite the voluminous pretrial motions, the thorough and even repetitious hearings and arguments entertained by this Court on the issues and the consistency of the enforcement of those rulings by this Court, the Defendant had not properly prepared her expert witness. When Dr. Fish volunteered that he thought some of the impediments to his testimony were "strange," the Court responded:

[Court] You know what seems strange to me? That this witness obviously doesn't have any idea what the Court has ruled prior to these motions in limine.

(RTP March 24, 2011, p. 24).

The Court unambiguously placed Dr. Fish and the Defendant on notice that violations of

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the Court's pretrial Orders carried the possibility of sanctions, including striking the testimony of Dr. Fish in its entirety (RTP March 24, 2011, p. 15).

b) Violation During Cross-Examination

Nevertheless, during cross-examination, Dr. Fish persisted in failing to respond to pertinent questions from the Plaintiffs' counsel and on more than one occasion responded to questions by stating, inferring or insinuating that he was unfairly prohibited from answering the questions based on this Court's prior rulings (RTP March 24, 2011, p. 106, 133).

Despite the repeated and systematic violations of the pretrial Orders in this case and the Court's efforts to cure and prevent the same, Dr. Fish violated rulings on "minor impact" during cross-examination.

When presented with contrary testimony on issues of medicine in prior depositions from other cases, Dr. Fish responded by suggesting that the instant accident was not a "significant accident." The Plaintiffs' oral Motion to Strike was Granted by this Court (RTP March 28, 2011, p.71-72).

c) Violation During Redirect Examination

At the end of the Defendant's redirect examination of Dr. Fish, counsel for the Defendant in a conclusory fashion asked Dr. Fish to summarize his opinions on causation.

[Defense Counsel] ...Doctor, how is it that you can reach an opinion to a medical probability that this accident didn't cause the pain that [the Plaintiff] complained of following this accident?

[Dr. Fish] Well, it's based on multiple factors. It's based on the actual - looking at the images of the MRI. It's looking at the discogram and the results of the discogram. It's looking at the pattern of pain. It's looking at the notes that were taken of the events that happened and it's knowing about the accident itself.

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(RTP March 28, 2011, p.87) (Emphasis supplied).

Based on this Court's observation of Dr. Fish's testimony, there is no question that Dr. Fish's response, clearly in violation of this Court's Order, was deliberate. The Plaintiff's objection was sustained, and the jury was admonished to disregard the final statement in Dr. Fish's response.

D. Irrebuttable Presumption Instruction to the Jury

1. Plaintiffs' Request for a Special Instruction to the Jury

Following the testimony of Dr. Fish, the Court conducted a hearing outside the presence of the jury at the request of counsel for the Plaintiffs to consider a progressive sanction against the Defendant for the continuous and systematic violations of this Court's Orders on pretrial motions. The Plaintiff offered, as an alternative to striking Defendant's Answer, a special instruction to the jury directing them to presume that the accident in question was of a sufficient quality to have caused the injuries of which Plaintiff complained. The entire hearing on this issue outside the jury's presence comprises twenty-three (23) pages of transcript, which includes a recess by the Court to consider the appropriate language of an adverse inference instruction (See, RTP March 28, 2011, pp. 89-112).

During the hearing, the Plaintiffs' counsel correctly identified the factual and procedural history of the issue of a "minor impact" defense in this case (much of which is set forth above), including the rulings on pretrial motions, the numerous hearings outside the presence of the jury on this issue, the repeated violations of this Court's Order on "minor impact" and the records made establishing notice to the Defendant of possible progressive sanctions for any further violations (RTP March 28, 2011, pp. 89-93).

Counsel for the Plaintiffs then made a further record outlining the proper standard for consideration by this Court under *Young v. Ribeiro Building, Inc.*, 106 Nev. 88 (1990).

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2. This Court's Consideration of the Young Factors

In Young, the Nevada Supreme Court reiterated that trial courts have inherent equitable powers to issue sanctions for abusive litigation practices. Id. at 92. Before issuing such sanctions, a trial court should carefully consider the factors announced in Young, although no single factor is necessarily dispositive and each of the non-exhaustive factors should be examined in the light of the case before the trial court. Id. As outlined during the hearing by counsel for the Plaintiffs, this Court considered the following factors set forth in Young before addressing the language of the special instruction to the jury.

a) Degree of willfulness of the violations

The violations of this Court's pretrial Orders were continuous and systematic. As set forth above, the Defendant was clearly on notice of the Court's Order regarding this "minor impact" defense yet the Defendant violated this particular Order on numerous occasions. Based on the sheer number of violations of the same order in the same fashion, this Court can only conclude that such violations were willful in nature.

b) The extent to which the non-offending party would be prejudiced by a lesser sanction

To date, no lesser sanction had been successful in precluding future violations. This Court has consistently sustained the Plaintiffs' objections and stricken offending questions and answers. At some point, simply directing jurors to disregard continuous violations of pretrial Orders is insufficient.

Counsel for the Plaintiffs indicated that the violations to this point were sufficient to

¹ In considering non-case concluding sanctions, a trial court shall hold such hearing as it reasonably deems necessary to consider matters that are pertinent to the imposition of appropriate sanctions Bahena v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 245 P.3d 1182, 1185 (Nev. 2010) This court heard extensive arguments from the Plaintiffs and the Defendant before granting the Plaintiffs' request for a progressive sanction. While an "express, careful and preferably written" order is required by the Nevada Supreme Court for case concluding sanctions only, Young, supra at 93; Foster v. Dingwall, 227 P.3d 1042, 1048-49 (Nev. 2010), this Court outlines herein its analysis of the Young factors that supported the imposition of the non-case concluding sanction of an irrebuttable presumption instruction.

warrant a request that this Court impose a case concluding sanction of striking the Defendant's Answer, but that in harmonizing this particular factor from *Young* it might be necessary for this Court to consider a lesser sanction of a presumption instruction.

c) The severity of a sanction of dismissal relative to the severity of the abuse

This Court considered, at the time of imposing the sanction of an irrebuttable presumption instruction to the jury, whether the alternative request of striking Defendant's Answer would be an appropriate response to Defendant's continuous violations of this Court's pretrial Orders. While the abuse to this point was systematic and severe, this Court determined that a progressive sanction would be appropriate before consideration of a case concluding sanction.

d) The feasibility and fairness of an alternative, lesser sanction

Again, against the backdrop of the Plaintiffs' alternative request to strike Defendant's Answer, this Court considered the feasibility and fairness of a lesser sanction and determined that the irrebuttable presumption instruction requested by Plaintiff appropriately addressed the nature of the violations of the Court's Order precluding evidence to support a "minor impact" defense.

An irrebuttable presumption is a presumption that cannot be overcome by any additional evidence or argument. *Employers Insurance Co. of Nevada v. Daniels*, 122 Nev. 1009, 1015-16, fn. 15 (2006), quoting *Black's Law Dictionary* 1223 (8th ed. 2004). As this Court noted during the sanction hearing, the Order granting the Motion in Limine was based on the Defendant's complete lack of evidence bearing on a "minor impact" defense:

[Court] But the point of the matter was that Defense had no witness who could testify that this was a minor impact and no witness who could testify that this was a minor impact that could not have caused the injuries to Plaintiff, that Plaintiff sustained.

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Defense simply didn't have any witnesses to so testify. That's why the motion in limine was granted.

(RTP March 28, 2011, p. 104).

Given that the Defendant had no admissible, credible evidence to offer to support this "minor impact" defense, an irrebuttable presumption instruction was appropriate to communicate to the jury what the Defendant failed to comprehend throughout the trial: namely, that there is no evidence to suggest that the impact in this accident was too minor to cause the injuries the Plaintiff claims to have suffered. An alternative adverse inference instruction or a rebuttable presumption instruction would have given the Defendant exactly what was precluded in the Order on the pretrial motions: namely, an opportunity to rebut the contention that the accident was of sufficient character to have caused injury. Again, the Defendant had no evidence with which to rebut that contention.

e) The policy favoring adjudication on the merits

Mindful of this policy, the Court declined at this point to grant the Plaintiffs' request to strike the Defendant's Answer and instead issued the irrebuttable presumption instruction.

Given the Defendant's concession of responsibility for the accident, the "merits" of this case for the trier of fact to adjudicate were limited to the amount of damages suffered as a result of the accident. Since the Defendant had no evidence to support a contention that the nature of the impact in the accident was relevant to the amount of damages, the issues for the trier of fact were not materially affected by the irrebuttable presumption instruction.

f) Whether sanctions unfairly penalize a party for the misconduct of her attorney

In this Court's view, the key to this factor from *Young* is whether the Defendant is **unfairly** penalized for her attorney's misconduct. However, the irrebuttable presumption instruction imposed as a sanction by the Court did not unfairly penalize the Defendant. It simply

allowed the jury to irrebuttably presume the very fact that Defendant had no admissible evidence to rebut – that the motor vehicle accident was sufficient in character and quality to have caused the injuries suffered by the Plaintiff.

Additionally, as set forth below, it must be noted that the special instruction to the jury still allowed them to consider whether the accident in question actually and proximately caused Plaintiff's injuries. The only presumption was that the accident was sufficient in character and quality to have potentially done so. The only issue eliminated or restricted by the irrebuttable presumption instruction was the "minor impact" defense for which Defendant had no evidence to support.

g) The need to deter parties and future litigants

As set forth in great detail above, the sanctions employed by the Court to deter this conduct had proven unsuccessful. Although this particular factor was not the overriding factor in determining that the special instruction to the jury was warranted, this Court hoped that this progressive sanction would at least deter the Defendant from continuing to violate the Orders of this Court.

3. The Irrebuttable Presumption Instruction

This Court took a recess to allow the Plaintiffs' counsel to draft a proposed instruction and then heard argument from both sides regarding the exact language of the instruction. After considering the proposed language and making some amendments thereto, as well as considering the necessity of instructing the jury immediately as a curative measure, the Court read the following instruction to the jury:

[Court] Furthermore, ladies and gentlemen of the jury, the Defendant has, on numerous occasions, attempted to introduce evidence that the accident of April 15, 2005, was too minor to cause the injuries complained of. This type of evidence has previously

been precluded by this Court.

In view of that, this Court instructs the members of the jury that there is an irrebuttable presumption that the motor vehicle accident of April 15, 2005, was sufficient to cause the type of injuries sustained by the Plaintiff. Whether it proximately caused those injuries remains a question for the jury to determine.

(RTP March 28, 2011, p. 113, 149-50).

Before making the discretionary ruling to issue that curative instruction to the jury, this Court examined the relevant facts, applied a proper standard of law and used a demonstratively rational process to reach a reasonable conclusion. *See, Bass-Davis v. Davis*, 122 Nev. 442, 447-48 (2006).

E. Plaintiffs' Request to Strike Defendant's Answer Based on Repeated Violations of This Court's Pretrial Orders

During the hearing on March 28, 2011, wherein this Court considered the above-quoted special instruction in lieu of the Plaintiffs' request to strike Defendant's Answer, counsel for the Plaintiffs made clear that a further violation of this Court's Orders would be met with the Plaintiffs' renewed request of the Court to strike the Defendant's Answer (RTP March 28, 2011, p. 97).

1. Cross-Examination of Plaintiff, William Simao

During the Defendant's cross-examination of Plaintiff WILLIAM SIMAO, counsel asked about circumstances surrounding the accident, including questions regarding the stop-and-go nature of traffic on the freeway before the accident took place. The Plaintiffs objected, and a bench conference ensued.

At the bench conference, the Plaintiffs asked for an offer of proof of what potential relevance the speed of the vehicles would have, **other** than to suggest an inference that the