1 to that, Mr. Peterson?

MR. PETERSON: Judge, again, that's not entirely correct. There are no documents of a restoration because they are automatic. She doesn't have to apply.

There are persons in the State of Florida who would have to apply for restoration of civil rights.

For example, felons who go to prison. You need an application process for those persons.

However, persons who serve the sentence imposed by them, or are granted final release or receive pardons, et cetera, these persons are automatically restored. And the case statute from Florida Statutes 940.05, and there's a case interpreting it that says:

"Civil rights shall be automatically reinstated, except the right to possess or own a firearm which shall be specifically withheld. Under that provision of the clemency rules, restoration of civil rights would be automatic following completion of service of sentence by one who so completed sentence on or after November 1, 1975."

THE COURT: How do we explain this Jeanette Cools, the coordinator of the Office of Clemency in Florida saying Ms. Barrs' rights have not been restored?

MR. PETERSON: I don't know because I

haven't spoken with this person. My understanding is,

1	she's a records custodian. I assume she checked her
2	records and saw there were no documents saying that, and
3	reported back saying there are no documents restoring
4	that.
5	But in the case of an automatic restoration
6	of rights, what documents would there be to find?
7	MR. COLUCCI: If she went to vote in
8	the State of Florida, Your Honor, they have a computer
9	system. They could check to see if her civil rights have
10	been restored, provided she disclosed she was a convicted
11	felon. And they would know that she's not entitled to
12	vote. They would also know that she's not entitled to
13	carry a firearm.
14	THE COURT: Now, there's two different
15	things. Specifically, they take exception to firearms,
16	right?
17	MR. COLUCCI: That's right. But I'm
18	going to direct the Court to Page 7 of our brief.
19	MR. PETERSON: We're still past the
20	part of the seven-day issue. None of this goes to the
21	seven-day issue.
22	THE COURT: Page 7?
23	MR. COLUCCI: Page 7. In the middle of
24	that Page at Line 14, if the Court is on the same page, it
25	shows a Florida statute with a 2004 date.

And it says, "Any person who has been convicted of a felony may be entitled to the restoration of all rights of citizenship enjoyed by him or her prior to the conviction if the person has -- and then those are the things that apply, which would apply to Karen Barrs.

2.0

The problem is, she hasn't gone through the procedure of the application process.

And as far as the Clerk -- if the issue is if Exhibit A, the questioning of Exhibit A is the dispositive issue for this motion, I would invite Mr. Peterson to call the State of Florida and to provide us with proof that her civil rights under any scenario have been restored.

Certainly, there has to be some document somewhere. She went to jail. She did jail time. She was convicted of a felony. I provided all those records to the Court. If her civil rights were restored anywhere, then Mr. Peterson can find those and provide those to the Court.

I contacted the State of Florida and I'm telling you, as far as we know her civil rights have not been restored.

If I could address the voting issue, just like the Jury Commissioner issue, they rely on the representations of the person applying or registering to

I've provided you with the voter registration 1 2 application in my paperwork as well. THE COURT: Where are you referring to? 3 MR. COLUCCI: I'm going to look for it, 4 Your Honor. It is Exhibit E. And in Exhibit E -- if you 5 found it? 6 THE COURT: Yes. MR. COLUCCI: In the lower right-hand 8 box as you're looking at the document it says, "I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and 10 correct." 11 And above that it says, "I am not laboring 12 under any felony conviction or other loss of civil rights 13 which would make it unlawful for me to vote." 14 They rely on her representation. They 15 don't check. The same with the Jury Commissioner. The 16 17 Jury Commissioner relied on her representations she was not a convicted felon. 18 When they send out the jury summons -- and 19 I'm sorry to jump around. Slow me down if you feel it 20 necessary. When they send out the jury summons they say 21 if you've been convicted of a felony, it's one of the 22 problems you have with your qualifications. 23 You can telephonically respond to the Jury 24

Commissioner and let her know whether or not you've been

convicted of a felony. I did a check, and you have an 1 affidavit. She did not respond telephonically that she had been convicted of a felony, even though in her 3 affidavit she said that she did. Secondly, she said she filled out a jury 5 questionnaire indicating she was an ex-felon. 6 not. She did not disclose it in a jury information sheet. 7 And what's really interesting is, that we 8 have three documents, four documents attached to the 9 affidavit from the Jury Commissioner where Ms. Barrs did 10 call in. And she called to continue her jury service 11 date. And she never once mentioned during that time that 12 she was a convicted felon or had a problem with a felony 13 conviction. 14 THE COURT: All right. Well, let me 15 inquire. And you're correct that she has, in fact, in 16 Florida maintained that she was not a felon for the 17 purpose of acquiring her registration as a voter. 18 In her affidavit -- did she file an 19 affidavit? 20 MR. PETERSON: She did, Judge. I 21 actually spoke with her. 22 THE COURT: Does it indicate that she 23 was under the belief that she was absolved of this by 24 virtue of what she read?

MR. PETERSON: Absolutely. In fact, it was a great shock to her to hear these allegations made.

She's a registered nurse. She's voted for some time. She obviously is not an expert in the legal field.

Nevertheless, she indicated to me that she

1.1

Nevertheless, she indicated to me that she called in to the Jury Commissioner and she spoke with a person on the phone. She indicated to them she had something, that it was 20 years old. They said: Was it in Nevada? She said: No. And they said: Come on down and report for service.

She also says she filled out a jury questionnaire. I and Mr. Colucci, both parties have subpoenaed, and there are no, apparently, written questionnaires for any of the jurors.

So to say that it's not present, I don't think it means it wasn't filled out. We don't have those documents from the Jury Commissioner in whatever state they may be.

Nevertheless, we're still getting past this seven-day issue. There's nothing that we've heard about this that gets us past the statutory seven-day prohibition against a motion for a new trial.

Because if we're going to talk about the question of her being a proper juror, now the question becomes, once we get past that seven-day issue to talk

about the merits, clearly, this is not an intentional concealment on her part.

She was very willing to talk about her son who is in custody in the State Prison, and had been for a long period of time. She believed that the Judge knew about anything she had in her past. That's what she related to me.

And, in addition, it certainly is unique to me to hear the Defense claim that there's a person on the jury with a prior felony. That's normally the State's concerns. We don't want persons who have criminal records on the jury. It's certainly a unique position for me to be in that situation.

In any event, it's not intentional concealment, and I don't believe there's anything here that shows there's any prejudice to the verdict that was rendered at all.

So I think we still have the seven-day issue, Judge. You know my position regarding this juror, and submit it to the Court on that.

THE COURT: Well, Mr. Colucci, let me ask you a question as a general proposition. I know you have a function here to defend your client, and I respect that. Maybe this is a rhetorical question.

But as I understand what's being requested

here, you're asking me to overturn the Supreme Court of the State of Nevada when they made the determination that in a situation very similar to this, although more severe, in my judgement, and a juror lies about a relative being murdered, that to me suggests more of a bent one way or the other than having suffered a --MR. COLUCCI: He just didn't disclose

1

2

3

5

6

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

it.

THE COURT: Well, he failed to disclose that. I misspoke. That to me is a more severe abrogation of their responsibility, than someone who is convicted 20 years ago of a bad check or something. I believe it wasn't a violent offense.

But the Supreme Court says eight days doesn't matter. And then they set the reasoning behind it which is legitimate, in my view, and if I might be so bold as to agree with the Supreme Court and give my stamp of approval.

You can't work these things to death with these jurors indeterminately. I mean, jurors get berated enough by the time they have rendered verdicts, and then they go out in the hall and they go through another trial, essentially, something we don't encourage.

But aside from my view one way or the other, the Supreme Court has addressed this issue, I think.

am I supposed to say? They didn't mean that, we're going to make it two months and eight days, whatever, and keep going?

MR. COLUCCI: No. I don't believe the Supreme Court has addressed this issue. The Supreme Court addressed an issue where a qualified juror had a bias that was not disclosed. But that juror had qualified as a juror. That person was in the box legitimately.

Ms. Barrs was not in the box legitimately, before you even get to the bias, or the prejudice, or the nondisclosure, or the misconduct, or the standards that go with all of that.

You have to determine was this a valid verdict? Was this a jury? The Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of Nevada, this man is entitled to a jury of 12 people, not 11. She was not before 176.515 even kicks in, she was not.

And let me say something if I could, Judge, and I don't mean to hold you up. If I could just say one more thing. If the Court would look at -- you know, we're taking her word that this wasn't intentional concealment.

But if you look at the affidavit of the Jury Commissioner which is very, very clear, and we have exhibits. We have three or four people that she's supposedly had contact with. We have documented the

contact with people in the Jury Commissioner's office. 1 She didn't tell anybody, and nobody 2 remembers her telling anybody that she had a felony 3 She's the only one that remembers talking to conviction. 4 three or four people that don't remember talking to her. 5 6 And they take notes on why she couldn't Her mother had Alzheimer's disease, was busy at 7 work, had another problem. They document that. 8 9 said: I have a felony conviction, which is so important to them, that would have been documented in their notes. 10 THE COURT: Well, did she say she told 11 12 them? MR. PETERSON: She says on the 13 Centofanti matter she informed them: Yes, I have a felony 14 that's 20 years old. Because, apparently, you have to 15 push a button when you phone in on the phone-in system. 16 And they asked her: Is it in Nevada? 17 Did you go to prison for it? 18 Have you had anything else? 19 20 And she said no. 21 I, mean, the funny thing that I guess what Mr. Colucci is alleging by this, that there are other 22 times that she's called in and had her jury service 23 rescheduled. To my mind, that shows she believes she is 24 eligible for jury service. 25

Because if you want an easy way out of jury service, just admit you're a felon, for goodness sake.

She obviously believes she has the right to do this. She votes. I mean, we're talking about intentional concealment, or Mr. Colucci is.

. 6

She's rescheduling jury service and willing to show up and serve. I mean, in my experience persons who want out of jury service, that's a substantial portion of the population that don't want to serve and find it an announce.

Here she is willing to serve. That indicates in my mind that she believes she has the right to serve, and I believe that goes to the intention of the concealment issue.

THE COURT: Now, there is, I think, something to be said about an indication at one point that she told these people that she had this problem 20 years ago, and then perhaps a record showing the absence of such. That's something worth discussing, I guess.

I'm not particularly taken aback by the fact that she was consistent in her denial of her criminal record. If she firmly believed it was absolved, that she had no duty to divulge, it would be consistent.

And I'm not so sure, candidly, how many people really understand what a pardon or what a

restoration of civil rights or some of those things really means. Can you go to an employer and fill out an application that says you've been arrested of a felony, and you say no?

Can you go and buy a gun and say no? Can you go to vote? I don't know if a lot of people understand that, even lawyers, frankly, because it varies so much among the states. But that doesn't surprise me that she was consistent in that.

Now, if there's some argument that she did divulge that and then somebody said she didn't, then that goes to veracity.

MR. COLUCCI: That's different. See, she wasn't consistent, because supposedly she told the Jury Commissioner and told members of the Jury Commissioner's office that she did have a felony conviction. Nobody seems to remember it.

And as far as telephonically, they keep a record if there's a telephonic -- if they push the button and indicate they're a convicted felon, then there's a record of that.

Judge, just read the Jury Commissioner's affidavit and compare it to the affidavit of Karen Barrs. You're going to see that she just is not being truthful and candid.

Even in the voir dire Mr. Peterson picked up on her hesitation in response to your question, has any member of your family, you or any member of your family ever had contact with the criminal justice system.

Even Mr. Peterson himself picked up on her hesitation. And then she gave him some story: I was hesitating because I know I could be a good juror. I don't have the record in here, Judge, but I'll make one other representation to you, and that's this.

She had to apply for a nursing license, and because of all of the laws protecting confidentiality in the medical profession, we were unable to get her application for her nursing license. But she did disclose the felony conviction on the nursing license.

And one other thing.


MR. COLUCCI: Because I talked to the attorney for the Nursing Board, and he refused to give me the license. But I sent up a subpoena to ask for the information, and the best he would do for me is tell me on

THE COURT: How do you know that?

21 that one issue, yes or no, had she applied, had she

22 disclosed a felony conviction? Yes, she did.

And I did put in the opposition, not that, but I did put in the opposition that she in 1998 had applied for records from her criminal case. And I don't



what does that mean?

2.3

MR. COLUCCI: I think you just resolved the case, Judge. If she was not legally impaneled, then only 11 people sat on that jury. And my client is entitled to have 12 qualified jurors to make a decision, not in a robbery case, not in a dope case, but in a first degree murder case.

He's facing life without the possibility of parole. I think the case is serious. I think he's entitled to the full benefit of the law. I think he has a constitutional right to have 12 qualified jurors.

And, frankly, I have to take exception. If she was consistent in denying that she had a felony conviction because she felt it had been sealed, expunged or restored, then why did she have to tell it to the Jury Commissioner?

If you take what she said as true, she disclosed it because she knew she had the conviction. If you take what the Jury Commissioner says is true, she never disclosed anything on the four occasions she had contact with their office.

MR. PETERSON: Judge, their vehicle is a motion for a new trial, and there's no other vehicle for it. The vehicle for a motion for a new trial indicates what the time limits are. And Mr. Colucci wants to make

show of it's not a drug case, it's not a burglary case, 1 it's a murder case. Well, the Depasquale case I mentioned to the Court is a capital case. And that motion was one day 4 late, and the Court upheld the District Court's denial of 5 it because it's outside the time period. 6 Submit it to the Court. THE COURT: Well, in my view, frankly, 8 in that case there is a much more serious misstatement or 9 omission. Here the defendant is being found guilty of a 10 capital murder by a juror whose family member has been 11 murdered which, obviously, if it goes against anyone, goes 12 against the defendant. 13 Here we have a felony that I'm not sure 14 prejudices anybody, a paper crime 20 years old. 15 How does that prejudice you, counsel? 16 MR. COLUCCI: I don't have to show 17 prejudice. 18 THE COURT: Well, I'm asking you. 19 MR. COLUCCI: How does it prejudice? 20 . Well, if you take that together with the 21 fact that she didn't disclose the truth to the Jury 22 Commissioner, that she came into this Court and didn't 23 disclose it to this Court. 2.4

25

THE COURT: And would your position be,

again, this is just hypothetically, if a juror is found to 1 have honestly made a mistake in evaluating whether or not 2 their record had been expunded; in other words, they 3 wouldn't have to disclose under these circumstances, and 4 it's later found that, in fact, they are wrong, does that 5 mean that it invalidates the entire proceeding? 6 MR. COLUCCI: Well, let me just -- I'm 7 trying to think of a really good example. 8 THE COURT: Mine is pretty good. 9 MR. COLUCCI: Well, if I tell you the 1.0 top of your water thing is white and I truly believe it's 11 white, does that make it white? It's still black. 12 THE COURT: You've read prophecies. 13 You're answering a question with a question. 14 MR. COLUCCI: I'm sorry about that. Ιf 15 she's not qualified in the first instance, she's not 16 qualified all the way down the road. That's our position. 17 THE COURT: So there's a glitch in the 18 proceedings, and someone that answers their questions 19 under the mistaken belief that they are no longer a felon 20 or whatever might be the circumstance, then all that goes 21 on, the weeks, maybe months that goes on in trial can all 22 be set aside, and many thousands and thousands of dollars 23 of tax †payers' money is all just pooped away because there 24

was this omission.

Is that your position? 1 MR. COLUCCI: We call that the 2 appellate process, Judge. 3 THE COURT: I have several other things 4 that I could call it, but I'll tell you this. I am not 5 convinced that there was, number one, anything that even 7 remotely approaches an inequity or injustice by virtue of 8 this scenario that I'm being presented with having to do with this jury. And I don't fault you for bringing it up, 1.0 certainly. But we are working this to death. We have 11 gone all over these jurors and we're just taking a little 12 piece here, and a little piece there, and on total it 13 doesn't amount to much at all, in my view. But that's on the 14 merits. 15 16 I don't think that we have jurisdiction, and 17 I am so finding. So we have those two things to pose to 18 whatever appellate proceedings you might want to take it 19 to. 20 Now, what else do we have? Do we have a sentencing date? 21 22 MR. COLUCCI: We have sentencing date 23 which is tomorrow. And if the Court -- if I could just be 24 heard on that for one moment.

Based on the Court's decision, I am planning

on filing a writ with the Supreme Court, and they may decide to rule on the merits, or they may not. And I would ask that the sentencing date be put off for a week so I can get the writ up to the Supreme Court. THE COURT: Well, there's no way the Supreme Court is going to answer it in time. 6

1

2

4

7

8

10

11

12

1.3

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

MR. COLUCCI: They may issue a stay, they may not.

MR. PETERSON: Judge, I think the matter should move forward, in all honesty. Sentencing the defendant after the denial of the motion for a new trial certainly doesn't interfere with whatever appellate rights he might feel he has on this particular motion.

If he's sentenced and somehow Mr. Colucci persuades them that a new trial motion should have been granted, it's all undone and we go back to the beginning. There's no need to delay.

All that does is, in the event Mr. Colucci loses his motion, we just sort of sat around for a long time not doing anything. There's no legal impediment going forward with the sentencing.

It doesn't change his posture at all. All it does is, in the event his writ for a petition is denied, now the defendant has been sentenced and his appellate rights begin to run.

1 THE COURT: Well, one way or the other it doesn't make any difference to me. I don't know. 2 3 Is it going to serve a purpose? MR. COLUCCI: Your Honor, I would like 4 to get this Court's findings on the motion for a new 5 6 trial, including a ruling on the other issues we've raised about the T-shirt, and the sleeping juror, and the other 7 issues, and the gun experiment that we put forth. 8 9 THE COURT: I'm finding that you don't have standing, and so that's the primary ruling of the 10 Court. 11 I mean, I'm not going to say you don't have 12 13 a right to any hearing and, by the way, let's have a hearing. Because, candidly, if you have a right to a 14 15 hearing based on what you're suggesting here, I'd have to 16 have all those people in here and we'd have to have a 17 hearing because there's so many factual contentions here. 18 And I would concede that readily. And if the Supreme Court says a hearing is needed, that's what 19 20 we'll do, in my view. 21 But as I look at some of those things, again, I don't mean to be unpleasant about it, but 22 nothing -- what was it Justice Mulder used to say? And I 23 don't mean to be trite, but he would say this on the 24

record. He would say, "Counsel, you're fly-specking."

And what he was meaning is, you take a little here and little there and you try to make this big thing out of it. And that's what we're doing here, it looks like, because here's a little something on a T-shirt. Here's a guy that dozes off a little bit.

Now, granted, that's not something we want

1.7

Now, granted, that's not something we want to see. But let's face it, five weeks of trial, people are human. We don't expect -- I think there was some suggestion the guy was tapping him on occasion. I don't know what the facts are.

But one juror that perhaps is inattentive a total of maybe two minutes in five weeks, whatever we're talking about, is not a major thing. Now, granted, it's important, but you have to balance these things.

And when I looked at all this, I was not taken aback by this terrible specter of some injustice being done.

MR. COLUCCI: Judge, just as a side note with respect to the T-shirt issue, the fact that somebody comes in and wears a T-shirt in the courtroom that says, "What does a murderer look like," and is sitting as a juror is not a small matter. That's not fly-specking.

THE COURT: I don't think anybody saw that.

1	MR. PETERSON: No one saw it. It's a
2	T-shirt, it's a name of a song of a local band. This kid
3	was wearing the band's T-shirt, it said on the back near
4	the belt. Apparently some other juror saw it and said:
5	You know what, Chris, that's a silly thing to wear given
6	the trial we're in, cover it up. No one noticed it.
7	The sleeping issue is something that neither
8	Mr. Bloom, who was sitting where Mr. Colucci is, nor
9	myself, nor Ms. Goettsch, nor the other Defense trial
10	counsel from the Special Public Defender's office,
11	Ms. Navarro.
12	Mr. Centofanti apparently never noticed it,
13	and the Court never saw it, the Court's staff never
14	noticed it. No one ever made any objection or record
15	about any of that. I never saw it.
16.	The jurors when we talked to them said:
17	Yeah, Chris nodded, but Matthew sat next to him and nudged
18	him and woke him up, and it was apparently immediate.
19	THE COURT: All right. So Friday the
20	10th is out next date.
21	MR. COLUCCI: Your Honor, may I submit
22	an order? I'll pass it by Mr. Peterson, but I'd like to
23	get to the Court as soon as possible on the denial of the
24	motion.

25

THE COURT: You may.

1	MR. COLUCCI: Thank you very much.
2	THE COURT: Sorry you had to wait.
3	Court's adjourned.
4	
5	
6	ATTEST: Full, true and accurate transcript of
7	proceedings.
8	
9	
10	MAUREEN SCHORN, CCR NO. 496, RPR
11	PHOREEN SCHOOL, CCA NO. 1200, KIN
12	
13	•
14	
15	
16	
17	
18	
19	
20	
21	
22	
23	
24	
25	

 $\mathbb{E}$ 

///

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Defendant's Motion for New Trial, shall be, and it is denied, on jurisdictional grounds because it does not allege newly discovered evidence regarding the Defendant and was filed more than seven (7) days after the verdict in this case. NRS 176.515(4).

DATED this

DAVID ROGER DISTRICT ATTORNEY Nevada Bar #002781

4554929 -

msf

Deputy District Attorney Nevada Bar #006316

,1

2

3

6

7

8

9

ORIGINAL

**JOCP** 

FILED

**DAVID ROGER** Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #002781 200 South Third Street Las Vegas, Nevada 89155-2212 (702) 455-4711

2005 MAR 11 P 4: 15

4 Attorney for Plaintiff 5

DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

THE STATE OF NEVADA,

Plaintiff,

Case No: C172534

-VS-

Dept No:

VIX

ALFRED PAUL CENTOFANTI, III, #1730535

11 12

10

Defendant.

13 14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION (JURY TRIAL)

The Defendant previously entered plea(s) of not guilty to the crime(s) of MURDER WITH USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON (Category A Felony), in violation of NRS 200.010, 200.030, 193.165, and the matter having been tried before a jury, and the Defendant being represented by counsel and having been found guilty of the crime(s) of FIRST DEGREE MURDER WITH USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON (Category A Felony - NRS 200.010, 200.030, 193.165); and thereafter on the 4th day of March, 2005, the Defendant was present in Court for sentencing with his counsel, CARMINE J. COLUCCI, ESQ., and good cause appearing therefor,

THE DEFENDANT HEREBY ADJUDGED guilty of the crime(s) as set forth in the jury's verdict and, in addition to the \$25.00 Administrative Assessment Fee, the Defendant is sentenced as follows: to LIFE WITHOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF PAROLE plus an equal

≥26 ∰

28 ///

///

///

P:\WPDOCS\JUDG\121\02154201.doc

and consecutive LIFE SENTENCE WITHOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF PAROLE for use of l a deadly weapon. Defendant will received (374) days credit for time served. DATED this que day of March, 2005. DISTRICT SUDGE MOSLLY & ddm P:\WPDOC\$\UDG\121\02154201.DOC 

# ORIGINAL

FILED
Mar 24   55 PM '05
CLERY C language

CARMINE J. COLUCCI, ESQ. CARMINE J. COLUCCI, CHTD. Nevada Bar No. 000881 629 South Sixth Street Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 (702) 384-1274 Attorney for Defendant

7

6

5

NOAS

8 9

10

11 12

13

15

14

16 17

18

19 20

21

23

22

24 25

26

27 28 DISTRICT COURT

CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

THE STATE OF NEVADA, CASE NO. C172534 DEPT NO. XIV Plaintiff, vs. ALFRED PAUL CENTOFANTI, III,

Defendant.

## NOTICE OF APPEAL

Notice is hereby given that the Defendant, ALFRED PAUL CENTOFANTI, III, hereby appeals to the Supreme Court of Nevada from this court's Judgment of Conviction (Jury Trial)filed on March 11, 2005, in the above-entitled action.

DATED this 23 day of March, 2005.

CARMINE J. COLUCCI, CHTD.

CARMINE J. COLUCCI, ESQ.

Nevada Bar No. 0881

629 South Sixth Street Las Vegas, Nevada 89101

Attorney for Defendant

#### **CERTIFICATE OF MAILING**

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 24 day of March, 2005, I deposited in the United States Mail at Las Vegas, Nevada, a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing NOTICE OF APPEAL enclosed in a sealed envelope upon which first class postage has been fully prepaid, addressed to:

DAVID ROGER CLARK COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY 200 SOUTH THIRD STREET LAS VEGAS, NV 89155

BRIAN SANDOVAL NEVADA ATTORNEY GENERAL 100 NORTH CARSON STREET CARSON CITY, NV 89701-4717

2

4

6

. 7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

ALFRED PAUL CENTOFANTI, III, 85237 P.O. Box 650 INDIAN SPRINGS, NV 89018

An employee of

CARMINE J. COLUCCI, CHTD.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

AFFIDAVIT

STATE OF NEVADA COUNTY OF CLARK

DIANA MILLER, being first duly sworn, deposes and says:

- 1. That I am a resident of Clark County, Nevada and that I served as a juror in State of Nevada v. Alfred P. Centofanti, III., Case No. C172534.
- 2. That neither before nor during deliberation did any juror discuss conducting any test, experiment, or reenactment regarding the evidence.
- 3. That juror Wheeler never mentioned during deliberation any experience shooting a weapon,
- 4. That my verdict was not affected by any clothes worn by any other juror during the mal.
- 5. That during the trial I was not aware of whether other jurors may or may not have been sleeping during the course of the trial.
- 6. That at no time during deliberations did any juror indicate that they had missed evidence or were unable to deliberate because they were sleeping.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the law of the State of Nevada that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on 5-august 2014
(Date)

BG/mmw

27

28

C:\DOCUME~1\GOETTSB\LOCALS~1\TEMP\DMILLE~1.DOC

1

2

4

5

7 8

10

9

12 13

11

14 15

16 17

18

19 20

2122

23

2425

26

27 28 <u>AFFIDAVIT</u>

STATE OF NEVADA ) ss:

CAREN BARRS, being first duly sworn, deposes and says:

- 1. That I am a resident of Clark County, Nevada and that I served as a juror in State of Nevada v. Alfred P. Centofanti, III., Case No. C172534.
- 2. That neither before nor during deliberation did any juror discuss conducting any test, experiment, or reenactment regarding the evidence.
- 3. That Juror Wheeler never mentioned during deliberation any experience shooting a weapon.
- 4. That my verdict was not affected by any clothes worn by any other juror during the trial.
- 5. That during the trial I was not aware of whether other jurors may or may not have been sleeping during the course of the trial.
- 6. That at no time during deliberations did any juror indicate that they had missed evidence or were unable to deliberate because they were sleeping.
- 7. That I was convicted of a felony involving bad checks over twenty (20) years ago in Florida.
- 8. That when I called into the jury commissioner and was quizzed over the telephonic information system, I pushed the number indicating that I did in fact have a felony conviction.
  - 9. That I have never been convicted of anything in Nevada.
- 10. That I also indicated in writing to the jury commissioner that I did have a felony conviction in Florida in excess of twenty (20) years ago.
- 11. That I have had my rights restored as a result of that felony conviction and I am allowed to vote and maintain my nursing license.
  - 12. That due to the fact that I had already disclosed this information on two (2)

occasions, I was under the impression that the Court and parties knew from my prior disclosure that I did have a felony conviction. 13. That I did not intentionally conceal my felony conviction from the Court or the parties. I declare under penalty of perjury under the law of the State of Nevada that the foregoing is true and correct. Carenbau Executed on Aug. (2004) (Date) 

1	0001
2	CARMINE J. COLUCCI, ESQ. CARMINE J. COLUCCI, CHTD. Nevada Bar #000881
3	629 South Sixth Street
4	Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 (702) 384-1274
5	Attorney for Defendant, ALFRED P. CENTOFANTI III
6	
7	Ī
8	CLAF
9	STATE OF NEVADA,
10	
11	Plaintiff,
12	vs. ALFRED P. CENTOFANTI III,
13	Defendant.
14	Delendant.
15	DEFENDANT'S EX PARTE MO
16	TO RELEASE JUROR INF IN STATE OF NEVAL
17	Upon the ex parte applica
18	and through his attorney, CA
19	CARMINE J. COLUCCI, CHTD.
20	authorizing the Clark County Ju

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

FILED

Aug 20 | 25 PH 'NJ

Thereby & Brangaine.

#### DISTRICT COURT

#### CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

CASE NO. C172534 DEPT NO. XIV Date of Hearing: 8/26/04 Time of Hearing: 9:00 a.m.

#### S EX PARTE MOTION AND ORDER TO JURY COMMISSIONER SE JUROR INFORMATION FOR JUROR NUMBER THREE ATE OF NEVADA V. ALFRED PAUL CENTOFANTI, III

ex parte application of the Defendant, PAUL CENTOFANTI III, by s attorney, CARMINE J. COLUCCI, ESQ., of the law firm of DLUCCI, CHTD., the Defendant seeks an order from this Court authorizing the Clark County Jury Commissioner to release to defense counsel all information about Juror Number Three, Caren Barrs, date of birth June 23, 1946, so that the defense may respond to the assertions by the State in their Opposition to the defense Motion for New Trial.

### MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

Between March 15, 2004, and April 15, 2004, this case was tried in Department XIV of the Eighth Judicial District Court. The jury returned a verdict of guilty of First Degree Murder on April 15, 2004. Juror Number Three seated

on this jury was Caren Barrs. After the conviction, the jurors were investigated by new defense cousel and it was learned that Ms. Barrs had in fact been convicted of a felony in Pinellas County, Florida in 1980. This was a felony conviction for Obtaining Property in Return for Worthless Check. The state has asserted that pursuant to Florida law, after a period of twenty (20) years, a felon's Civil Rights are restored.

The state has asserted that they conducted their own investigation into the juror's felony conviction and learned that the juror had disclosed her felony conviction when she called into the jury commissioner and answered the questions on the telephonic information system. The state asserts that upon Ms. Barrs' receipt of her jury summons, she called in as instructed and disclosed that she did have a felony conviction. The state has asserted that she also disclosed this information on her questionnaire to the jury commissioner. The Jury Commissioner or their representative then allegedly inquired of this potential juror as to whether or not she had any felony convictions in Nevada. The state asserts that after a negative response, the Jury Commissioner or representative told Ms. Barrs that she should in fact show up in court. The state has asserted that when she arrived in court she assumed that all parties were aware of her prior felony conviction and did not offer the information during the jury selection process despite this Court's inquiry.

The defense has brought a motion for a new trial based on jury misconduct alleging the defendant is entitled to a new trial due to the fact that a juror on the case was a convicted felon and failed to disclose this information to the Court. In order to be able to fully support the allegations made in its Motion for a New Trial, and to refute the allegations made by the state in its opposition to that motion, the defense is seeking the release of the information provided to the Jury Commissioner by juror Caren Barrs which has already been provided to the state

and used in their opposition to the defense Motion for New Trial.

CONCLUSION

Based upon the foregoing, the defense request that the Court order the Jury Commissioner to release any information provided to the jury commissioner by Juror Number Three, identified as Caren Barrs.

DATED this /7 day of August, 2004.

CARMINE J. COLUCCI, CHTD.

CARMINE J. COLUCCI, ESQ.
Nevada Bar No. 000881
629 South Sixth Street
Las Vegas, Nevada 89101
Attorney for Defendant

#### **ORDER**

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that all information regarding Juror Number Three, Caren Barrs, in the case of State of Nevada v. Alfred P. Centofanti III, be provided by the Jury Commissioner to Carmine J. Colucci, Esq., attorney for the defendant.

DATED this 10 day of August, 2004.

DISTRICT JUDGE

CARMINE J. COLUCCI, CHTD.

/ Whine I Clucc CARMINE J. COLUCCI, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 000881

Nevada Bar No. 000881 629 South Sixth Street Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 Attorney for Defendant

# CERTIFICATE OF FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION

I hereby certify that service of DEFENDANT'S EX PARTE MOTION AND ORDER TO THE JURY COMMISSIONER TO RELEASE JUROR INFORMATION FOR JUROR NUMBER THREE IN STATE OF NEVADA V. ALFRED PAUL CENTOFANTI III was made this \_\_\_\_\_ day of August, 2004, by facsimile transmission to:

is hereby acknowledged this \_\_\_\_ day of August, 2004.

Becky Goettsch Deputy District Attorney 200 South Third Street Las Vegas, NV 89155 Attorney for Plaintiff Facsimile No. 384-0146

An employee of Carmine J. Colucci, Chtd.

### RECEIPT OF COPY

RECEIPT OF A COPY of the above and foregoing DEFENDANT'S EX PARTE MOTION AND ORDER TO THE JURY COMMISSIONER TO RELEASE JUROR INFORMATION FOR JUROR NUMBER THREE IN STATE OF NEVADA V. ALFRED PAUL CENTOFANTI III is hereby acknowledged this 20day of August, 2004.

DAVID ROGER CLARK COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY

BY ULO

Becky Goettsch Deputy District Attorney Nevada Bar No. 006316 200 South Third Street Las Vegas, NV 89155 Attorney for Plaintiff

PROPERTY PROPERTY AND A STATE WITH THE PROPERTY OF A STATE OF A ST

2004 AUG 20 P 1

. 3

1 2	CARMINE J. COLUCCI ESO	FILED							
3	CARMINE J. COLUCCI, CHTD. Nevada Bar #000881 629 South Sixth Street	Aug 24 3 10 PH '04							
4	Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 (702) 384-1274								
5	Attorney for Defendant, ALFRED P. CENTOFANTI III	Schooley L. Rusyima							
6									
7									
8	DISTRICT COURT								
9		UNTY, NEVADA							
10	STATE OF NEVADA,								
11	Plaintiff,	CASE NO. C172534							
12	vs.	) DEPT NO. XIV							
13	ALFRED P. CENTOFANTI III,	Deta CIV : 040545							
14	Defendant.	Date of Hearing: 8/26/04 Time of Hearing: 9:00 a.m.							
15	- Determant.								
16	REPLY TO STATE'S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL								
17	COMES NOW, the Defendant, ALFRED P. CENTOFANTI III, by and through								
18	his attorney, CARMINE J. COLUCCI, ESQ., of the law firm of CARMINE J.								
19	COLUCCI, CHTD., who now files this Reply to the State's Opposition to the								
20									
21	This reply is based upon the points and authorities submitted herewith, the								
22	exhibits attached hereto, and all papers, pleadings and court records on file								
23	/////								
24	/////	•							
25	////								
26	/////								
27	////	ľ							
28	////								
11		ī							

herein.

DATED this 24 day of August, 2004.

CARMINE J. COLUCCI, CHTD.

CARMINE J. COLUCCI, ESQ. Nevada Bar No.000881

629 South Sixth Street Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 Attorney for Defendant

## MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

I.

## THE DEFENDANT WAS NOT A QUALIFIED JUROR AS HER CIVIL RIGHTS WERE NEVER RESTORED

The state concedes that the Centofanti case juror Caren Barrs was convicted in Florida of a felony which occurred in 1980. At the time that she was convicted, she lost her civil rights including the right to serve as a juror in Florida until those civil rights were restored. The state at page 5 of its opposition has asserted **as fact**, "THE DEFENDANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO A NEW TRIAL BASED ON A PRIOR FELONY CONVICTION OF CAREN BARRS BECAUSE HER CIVIL RIGHTS HAVE BEEN RESTORED, ENTITLING HER TO SERVE ON A JURY, AND SHE DID NOT COMMIT MISCONDUCT DURING VOIR DIRE." Attached hereto as Exhibit A is a certified document from the Office of Executive Clemency of the State of Florida, Florida Parole Commission, which unequivocally shows that **Ms. Barrs has not had her civil rights restored in Florida.** Since 1980 she has not been qualified to be a juror in Florida and she has therefore not qualified to sit as a juror in Nevada at the time that the Centofanti matter was tried.

The state has also asserted as fact that Ms. Barrs' civil rights were restored after twenty years by law in Florida. They have asserted in their Ex Parte Motion and Order to Jury Commission to Release Juror Information for Juror Number

Three in State of Nevada v. Alfred Paul Centofanti III, at page two, "Pursuant to Florida law, after a period of twenty (20) years, a felon's Civil Rights are restored." This is also not true.

The state has cited no statute or case law as authority for this proposition which the defense asserts is not the state of the law in Florida. The pertinent Florida law and article of the Florida constitution concerning the suspension and restoration of civil rights are set forth below:

## Fla. Stat. § 944.292 Suspension of civil rights.

- (1) Upon conviction of a felony as defined in s. 10, Art X of the State Constitution, the civil rights of the person convicted shall be suspended in Florida until such rights are restored by a full pardon, conditional pardon, or restoration of civil rights granted pursuant to s. 8, Art. IV of the State Constitution.
- (2) This section shall not be construed to deny a convicted felon access to the courts, as guaranteed by s. 21 Art. I of the State Constitution, until restoration of her or his civil rights.

## Fla. Stat. § 944.293 Initiation of restoration of civil rights.

With respect to those persons convicted of a felony, the following procedure shall apply: Prior to the time an offender is discharged from supervision, an authorized agent of the department shall obtain from the Governor the **necessary application and other forms required for the restoration of civil rights**. The authorized agent shall assist the offender in completing these forms and shall ensure that the application and all necessary material are forwarded to the Governor before the offender is discharged from supervision. (Emphasis added)

## Art. IV, Section 8, Fla. Const.

- 1. (a) Except in cases of treason and in cases where impeachment results in conviction, the governor may, by executive order filed with the custodian of state records, suspend collection of fines and forfeitures, grant reprieves not exceeding sixty days and, with the approval of two members of the cabinet, grant full or conditional pardons, restore civil rights, commute punishment, and remit fines and forfeitures for offenses.
- (b) In cases of treason the governor may grant reprieves until adjournment of the regular session of the legislature convening next after the conviction, at which session the legislature may grant a pardon or further reprieve; otherwise the sentence shall be executed.

(c) There may be created by law a parole and probation commission with power to supervise persons on probation and to grant paroles or conditional releases to persons under sentences for crime. The qualifications, method of selection and terms, not to exceed six years, of members of the commission shall be prescribed by law.

Attached hereto as Exhibit B is a copy of the Restoration of Civil Rights Application presently in use in Florida. The state has not asserted, nor has the defense investigation disclosed that Ms. Barrs has properly applied for and had her civil rights restored through the process required by Florida law. In fact, in Exhibit A it is stated that an application for restoration is not even pending.

II.

# JUROR BARRS DID COMMIT MISCONDUCT BEFORE AND DURING VOIR DIRE AND AFTER TRIAL WAS CONCLUDED

What is also abundantly clear is that although Ms. Barrs swears under oath that she did, she never disclosed her felony conviction to the Clark County Jury Commissioner. See the affidavit of the Clark County Jury Commissioner attached hereto as Exhibit C. To make matters worse, after the trial was concluded, Ms. Barrs was not truthful in her affidavit which is attached to the state's opposition, when she said she disclosed her felony conviction to the Jury Commissioner, and she was not truthful when she told the prosecutor, Becky Goettsch, that her civil rights had been restored 20 years ago. See copy of Ms. Barrs' affidavit which is attached hereto as Exhibit D.

To compound the previously mentioned intentional concealment, Ms. Barrs claims that since she disclosed her conviction to the Clark County Jury Commissioner, by telephone, verbally and in writing, which she never did, she felt that she was not required to mention it to the court even when directly asked. She goes on to state in her affidavit, declaring under penalty of perjury, that her statements therein were true, "That I have had my rights restored as a result of that felony conviction and I am allowed to vote and maintain my nursing license."

This statement insinuates that she took some affirmative action to get her rights restored even though the state claims that her rights were automatically restored. Neither of these statements is true.

In her Voter Registration application, dated March 16, 2000 which is attached hereto as Exhibit E, Ms. Barrs declared under penalty of perjury that, "I am not laboring under any felony conviction or other loss of civil rights which would make it unlawful for me to vote." This was also not true. If she has voted, she has voted unlawfully. If she has concealed her conviction from the registrar of voters, why would she reveal it to the Jury Commissioner? She knew or should have known that her record was not sealed or expunged and that her civil rights were not restored as she contacted the clerk in Florida to get copies of her record in 1998.

Even the prosecutor, Clark Peterson, picked up on Ms. Barrs' reluctance to disclose her conviction and present status when he conducted his voir dire of her. See transcript of Voir Dire at pp. 71-72 of Exhibit C to the Defendant's Motion for a New Trial. If all of the parties were supposedly "aware of her conviction" why would the Court feel the need to explicitly ask her a question whose purpose was partly to discover the very thing that she intentionally concealed?

The state has asserted in their opposition to Defendant's Motion for New Trial, at p. 6, that Ms. Barrs did not commit misconduct during voir dire. They bolster this assertion by stating: "When she (Barrs) arrived in court she assumed that all parties were aware of her prior felony conviction and did not **offer** the information during the jury selection process." Who advised Ms. Barrs that as a prospective juror in a murder case, she was allowed to disclose whatever information that she felt like offering? She was asked a direct question in voir dire by this Court.

The state then offers the explanation that she telephonically disclosed, in

person and then "wrote down the information on the Jury Commissioner information sheet." As previously mentioned, there was no writing or other method of disclosure so this apparent assertion of fact is false. So Ms. Barrs not only did not "offer" this information, she made the conscious and intentional decision not to disclose it. Nevertheless, she did intentionally disclose her son's information (See pp. 62-64 of Exhibit C to the Defendant's Motion for a New Trial).

While the defense asserts that since Ms. Barrs was objectively and therefore

While the defense asserts that since Ms. Barrs was objectively and therefore legally never a qualified juror, and that no further inquiry needs to be made for the Defendant's motion to be granted on that ground alone, this Court should recognize that the defense is entitled to honest answers to voir dire questions especially when they are asked by this Court. The Nevada Supreme Court has held that "where a juror has failed to reveal potentially prejudicial information during voir dire, the relevant inquiry is whether the juror is guilty of intentional concealment . . . ." Canada v. State, 113 Nev. 938, 944 P.2d 781 (1997). Conviction of a felony is potentially prejudicial information. The Nevada Supreme Court held in Canada that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to find that the juror had intentionally concealed important information during voir dire when in fact he did.

Now the State seeks to justify the act of intentional concealment by Ms. Barrs, asserting that she "assumed" her civil rights were restored under a Florida law when they were not and because she mistakenly "assumed" that all parties (and the Court?) were aware of her felony conviction. Why she made these incorrect "assumptions" is unknown but the facts are unrefutable – Caren Barrs is a convicted felon whose civil rights have not been restored in Florida. Nevada cannot restore the civil rights of a felon convicted and disenfranchised under Florida law. See Op. Atty Gen. Nev. 146, 96-27 (1996) attached hereto as Exhibit F.

The state has conceded that since the felony conviction was in Florida and not Nevada, the Court must look to Florida law to see if Florida automatically restored her rights. See page 5 of the state's opposition. Obviously her civil rights were not restored although they **may** have been if she had filed the necessary application and the appropriate Florida state government agency had determined that she met the qualifications. However, these two steps must be taken first.

Ms. Barrs made contact with the Pinellas County criminal court on July 20, 1998, eighteen years after her conviction in order to obtain copies of documents from her case. It would probably take an evidentiary hearing in order to discern exactly why she wanted those copies but it may very well have been so that she could start the restoration of civil rights application process which Florida law requires and which she apparently never completed. Fla. Stat. §940.05 (2004) states:

## Fla. Stat. § 940.05 (2004)

Any person who has been convicted of a felony **may** be entitled to the restoration of all the rights of citizenship enjoyed by him or her prior to conviction if the person has:

(1) Received a full pardon from the board of pardons:

(2) Served the maximum term of the sentence imposed upon him or her; or

(3) Been granted his or her final release by the Parole Commission. (Emphasis added)

This contact with the clerk in Pinellas County shows that in 1998 she had some concern about her felony conviction and this contact provided her with an opportunity to get documentary or verbal confirmation on the status of the restoration of her civil rights. If the defense could obtain this information without any court orders, certainly Ms. Barrs could get it. It is obvious that this conviction, up to today, is a matter of public record and has not been sealed or expunged under Florida law and her civil rights have not been restored.

11,111

#### III.

## JUROR WHEELER DID CONDUCT A FIREARM TEST

With respect to the statements of juror Josh Wheeler to the state's investigator which conflict with the statements contained in the Defendant's original motion, the defense is prepared to offer the testimony of Mike Pfriender in order to rebut Mr. Wheeler's latest statements and to prove the accuracy of the defense's assertions regarding the shooting test conducted by him. There were two interviews with Mr. Wheeler. One was recorded and one was not. See the affidavit of Mike Pfriender attached hereto as Exhibit G.

### IV.

# DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO A NEW TRIAL DUE TO THE INAPPROPRIATE CONDUCT OF OTHER JURORS

With respect to the inappropriately lettered tee shirt worn by the juror which was mentioned in the Defendant's initial moving papers, the defense is prepared to bring in several witnesses who saw him wearing the shirt before the case was ever submitted to the jury. Most of the other jurors also saw the shirt that said "Do you know what a Murderer looks like?" See the affidavits of the jurors attached to the state's opposition. This shows his inability to take this case seriously, which is a violation of his oath, and his decision predisposition. It was unbelievably inappropriate given the gravity and gruesomeness of the case and shows that this juror was unfit for service. Further, the jury foreman, Nancy Gordinier, in her affidavit, claims that she brought this to the bailiff's attention. It is unknown if the Court was made aware of it, but this act of immaturity and conscious disregard for the seriousness of the proceedings by this juror would, at least, have required his removal from the jury.

The defense is also prepared to present witnesses who saw two of the jurors sleeping during the case for periods of time which had to have an impact on their

ability to remember and to consider the evidence presented to them. An inquiry must be made in this area in order to insure that the Defendant was given due process and a fair trial as guaranteed under the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States.

### V.

## DEFENDANT'S MOTION IS NOT UNTIMELY

The defense asserts that NRS 176.515 does not even apply to this situation. This was misconduct which facilitated the seating of a person who was not even qualified to be a juror in the first instance. She was not even a juror at the time of her initial concealments. But even juror misconduct should not be protected by this statute. If this Court determines that juror misconduct which occurs during a trial is subject to this statute, the conduct in this case must be viewed as a continuing pattern of concealment which commenced when she responded to the jury summons and continued through all of her contact with the Jury Commissioner and then even with this Court up to today. She signed her affidavit in support of the state's opposition on August 6, 2004, still asserting as under oath, statements which the attached exhibits clearly show are untrue. Neither this "juror" or the state ever bothered to check the accuracy of these important statements which are asserted under oath as true.

As set forth above, juror Barrs intentionally engaged in a pattern of non-disclosure. Initially neither this Court, the state or defense had any reason to suspect that she would engage in activity that would violate her oath as a venireman and then as a juror. The state now asserts a position where it asks this Court to reward this deception by upholding this juror's fitness to serve on this jury as a result of her being untruthful with this Court or anyone connected with this case. NRS 176.515 was not enacted for this purpose.

This intentional concealment made the discovery of her prior felony

conviction virtually impossible during the seven (7) days following the verdict. The defense does not have unfettered access to a person's local criminal history or scope or the National Criminal Information Center (NCIC) data base as the state does. Even if it did, Ms. Barrs' conviction may not have been discovered because it was a Florida conviction **and** it is assumed that Ms. Barrs did not register in Nevada as a convicted felon. Therefore, this is not the type of situation contemplated and therefore covered under the above referenced statute.

Although the defense is not conceding this, this issue could conceivably come under the section of NRS 176.515, relating to newly discovered evidence which sets forth a two (2) year time limitation. But the defense asserts that if the juror was not legally qualified in the first instance, this deficiency cannot be cured by the passage of time especially where deception and concealment from everyone prevented discovery even by the most diligent inquiry.

Further, the Defendant's constitutional right to due process and the right to a fair trial would be violated by holding him to a legal standard that he could not have possibly met. This is not like the late discovery of a witness or some documentary evidence which the defense should have discovered through normal investigation. This juror's intentional non-disclosure caused this Court and all parties not to challenge her qualifications. In the civil arena, this action would be considered fraud. Can this Court hold the defense to a higher standard in requiring it to discover this felony conviction than the Jury Commissioner whose duty it is to screen jurors or to the higher standard then this Court even though the Court asked the direct question or the state who has access to scope and NCIC? To do so would be to defy common sense as well as the principles of due process and fundamental fairness.

For the above stated reasons, the defense asserts that this Court cannot reward fraudulent concealment of information required to be disclosed in response

to this Court's own question and in response to her oath to answer truthfully all questions put forth to her. There is no law which authorizes a juror to pick and choose what information not to disclose when asked a direct question by the Court or by the parties which absolutely probes her qualifications to be a juror. Someone other than the defense should have the obligation to determine whether a juror is legally even eligible to sit as a juror. Everyone assumes that the Jury Commissioner only calls up qualified candidates for jury service. Apparently, she too must rely upon the honesty of those called up.

### **CONCLUSION**

Because this juror intentionally concealed her felony conviction from the Jury Commissioner and then claimed that she had advised the Jury Commissioner, telephonically, verbally and in writing, when it is clear that she did not do so, and for all of the above stated reasons as well as those raised in the initial moving papers in this motion, the Defendant asserts that he was denied his right to be tried by twelve "qualified" jurors and that his constitutional rights under the Constitution of the United States to due process and a fair trial as guaranteed under the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments were violated and therefore the Defendant's Motion for a New Trial should be granted.

DATED this 24 day of August, 2004.

CARMINE J. COLUCCI, CHTD.

CARMINE J. COLUCCI, ESQ Nevada Bar No. 000881 629 South Sixth Street

Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 Attorney for Defendant

## RECEIPT OF COPY

RECEIPT OF COPY of the above and foregoing REPLY TO STATE'S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL is hereby acknowledged this 2 day of August, 2004.

DAVID ROGER CLARK COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY

BECKY COETTSCH Nevada Bar No. 6316 Deputy District Attorney 200 South Third Street Las Vegas, NV 89155 Attorney for Plaintiff

# **EXHIBIT A**

STATE OF FLORIDA



EB BUSH, GOVERNOR, CHAIRMAN HARLES CRIST, ATTORNEY GENERAL TOM GALLAGHER, CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER CHARLES H. BRONSON, COMMISSIONER OF AGRICULTURE MRS. JANET H. KEELS, COORDINATOR

PHONE: 850/488-2952

#### OFFICE OF EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY

2601 BLAIRSTONE ROAD BUILDING C. ROOM 229 TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32399-2450

STATE OF FLORIDA, -COUNTY OF LEON.

I HEREBY CERTIFY that I, Janet H. Keels, am Coordinator of the Office of Executive Clemency of the State of Florida which is located in the Florida Parole Commission. I further certify that this seal is the official seal of the Florida Parole Commission. As Coordinator of the Office of Executive Clemency, I am custodian of the records of the clemency office. The Office of Executive Clemency is the custodian of and has access to all records of civil rights restorations in the State of Florida.

[I have made a thorough search of the clemency records and there is no record of restoration of civil rights; specific authority to sit as a juror, to vote, to receive, possess or transport in commerce a firearm, or a pardon of any kind, having been granted by the Governor and Cabinet of the State of Florida to a CAREN BARRS, DOB 06/23/1946, in connection with her felony conviction in the State of Florida.

[Therefore, I certify that the civil rights of CAREN BARRS have not been restored. In addition, there is no application pending for clemency at this time for the above-named person.

August 17, 2004

Janet H. Keels, Coordinator
Office of Executive Clemency
of the State of Florida

Florida Parole Commission

# EXHIBIT B

### OFFICE OF EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY

2601 Blairstone Road Building C, Room 229 Tallahassee, FL 32399-2450 Phone 850-488-2952

## INFORMATION AND INSTRUCTIONS ON APPLYING FOR RESTORATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS

(If you are applying for other types of clemency, please see instructions for applying for clemency.)

## THIS PROCESS IS NOT AN ADVERSARIAL PROCEDURE AND YOU <u>DO NOT NEED</u> AN ATTORNEY TO REPRESENT YOU.

It is important that the completed application form be entirely legible; therefore, please print or type. It should be fully and accurately completed.

The Executive Clemency Board will consider, but not be limited to, the following factors when determining whether to grant an applicant restoration of civil rights:

(1) The nature of the offense;

- (2) Whether the applicant has any history of mental instability, drug or alcohol abuse;
- (3) Whether the applicant has a prior or subsequent criminal record, including traffic offenses;
- (4) The applicant's employment;
- (5) Whether the applicant is current or delinquent on child support requirements;
- (6) Letters submitted in support of, or opposition to, the grant of executive elemency.

The information which we request from you on the application form, and if you are interviewed by a Parole Examiner of the Florida Parole Commission, is needed to help provide the basis of an informed judgment as to whether or not you should be granted restoration of civil rights. This is our only purpose in asking you to complete and sign the application and requesting that an investigation be made. You are under no obligation to furnish any information. However, unless you do provide us with this information, we will be unable to process your application.

In making inquiries with respect to these matters, the Florida Parole Commission may interview you, persons who execute character affidavits or who write letters of reference concerning you, neighbors, employers, and other individuals who may be able to provide relevant information concerning you. While such inquiries are made discreetly and a reasonable effort is made not to disclose the reason for the investigation, we cannot assure that under no circumstances will the nature of the inquiry become known to some of the persons interviewed.

The Investigator will request you sign a notarized release statement to facilitate such investigation,

however, it may not be necessary to make contact with all individuals listed in such release statement. Pursuant to the Privacy Act of 1974, Chapter V, Section 552a, you will need to authorize any criminal justice agency, police department, sheriff's office, Federal or State agency, to make full disclosure and furnish copies of any information in its possession to any authorized Investigator of the Florida Parole Commission, as to your past and present background; and further authorize any and all physicians, hospitals, clinics, public health authorities and others to furnish full information about your physical and mental history and condition.

Executive clemency files are maintained to provide for the exercise of the Governor and Cabinet's constitutional clemency power and are, of course, routinely made available to them, members of their staff and other officials concerned with these proceedings. After the Board either grants or denies an application, an Order is prepared as to each grant of clemency and a copy of each order is maintained in the Office of Executive Clemency as an official record. Upon specific request, we advise anyone who asks whether a named person has applied for, been granted or denied clemency. Disclosures of the contents of Executive Clemency files to anyone may be made by the Governor when the disclosure is required by law or the ends of justice.

PLEASE NOTE: All information submitted to the Office of Executive Clemency becomes the property of this office and will not be returned. Please keep copies of any paperwork you think you may need in the future.

# EXHIBIT C

AFFT
CARMINE J. COLUCCI, ESQ.
CARMINE J. COLUCCI, CHTD.
Nevada Bar #000881
629 South Sixth Street
Las Vegas, Nevada 89101
(702) 384-1274
Attorney for Defendant,
ALFRED P. CENTOFANTI III

## DISTRICT COURT

## CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

Plaintiff,

vs.

ALFRED P. CENTOFANTI III,

Defendant.

CASE NO. C172534

DEPT NO. XIV

Date of Hearing: 8/26/04

Time of Hearing: 9:00 a.m.

## AFFIDAVIT OF JUDY ROWLAND IN SUPPORT OF REPLY TO OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL

STATE OF NEVADA ) ss: COUNTY OF CLARK )

I JUDY ROWLAND, being first duly sworn, deposes and says:

- 1. That I am the Clark County Jury Commissioner.
- 2. That on August 19, 2004, I received a court order directing me to give juror information about former juror Caren Barrs to Carmine J. Colucci, Esq., the defendant's counsel in this case.
- 3. That Mr. Colucci requested that I advise him about whether former juror Caren Barrs had ever advised me or any members of my staff about her felony conviction in Florida, prior to her jury service in the Centofanti trial.
- 4. That I have searched our telephone records, computer records, spoke with all of the representatives of my office who had contact with her and have

checked for any writings that she or anyone else might have tendered to us and am satisfied that despite having contact with our office on three (3) occasions when she requested a change in her jury service reporting date, before her jury service and despite having access to me and my representatives during the term of her jury service, she did NOT disclose to us that she had a felony conviction.

- 5. That the four pages attached hereto collectively as Exhibit 1, titled Pool Summary Report Participant Detail, show the dates that she called, the dates that her service dates were deferred to and under NOTES any important information that she provided to us.
- 6. That I have reviewed her affidavit dated August 6, 2004, which is attached to the State's Opposition to Defendant's Motion for New Trial and based upon our records and the recollections of our representatives, I have concluded that she could not have and did not respond on our telephonic information system indicating that she had a felony conviction.
- 7. That Ms. Barrs did not indicate to us, in writing, on a jury information sheet that she had a felony conviction prior to her scheduled jury service.
- 8. That Ms. Barrs was not given and therefore did not complete a verbal, computer, telephone or paper questionnaire wherein she disclosed her felony conviction to us.
- 9. That we take it very seriously when a potential juror advises us that he or she has a felony conviction and upon being so advised we investigate further and document any information provided to us for possible disclosure to the court.
- 10. That no one in our office ever advised Ms. Barrs that her felony conviction would be disclosed to the court, the state or the defense by us since we did not know about her felony conviction.
- 11. That Ms. Barrs was clearly advised both by the printed material on the jury summons and telephonically that a felony conviction was important to

disclose as it could disqualify a person from jury service.

12. That all juror information about Ms. Barrs was previously provided to the district attorney's office pursuant to this Court's previously issued order.

DATED this  $\underline{\partial Y}$  day of August, 2004.

Judy Coulland

SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before

me this 24 day of August, 2004.

NOTARY PUBLIC in and for said County and State




EXHIBIT 1



Date: 8/20/04

Time: 1:39 PM

## **INACTIVE**

## **Current Status**

Last Name: BARRS

Participant No: 100224264

First Name: CAREN

Responded: Responded

Jurisdiction Code: DISTRICT

Pool No: 001030921

Next Report Date:

User Edt: admnjs10

Pool Type: PETIT

Pool Seq: 0874

Regular

Room:

Status: Deferred

Event No:

Return Date: 9/30/2003

No Attendances: 2

No AWOL:

Times Deferred: 1

Notes: DR APPOINTMENT 8/21

**FTA** 

FTA Status

No. FTA

No. Show Cause

No. Warrants Printed

**Birthstone** 

Address: 8734 WARTAGN MEADOWS

City: LAS VEGAS

State: NV

Zip: 89131-

Mileage:

Home Phone: 702-240-2866

Work Phone: 702-604-3940 Local:

Occupation: NURSE

DOB: 6/23/1946

Gender: Female

Voter Reg No:

Court Emp:

Drivers Licence:

State:

**Disqualified/Excused** 

Disqualified:

Date:

Excused: \*

Date: 8/21/2003 Accept: Yes

Deferred To: 10/2/2003

## Pool Summary Report Participant Detail

Date: **8/20/04** Time: **1:39 PM** 

## **INACTIVE**

## **Current Status**

Last Name: BARRS

Participant No: 100224264

First Name: CAREN

Pool No: 001031004

Responded: Responded

User Edt: admnjs10

Jurisdiction Code: DISTRICT

Next Report Date:

, . . . **. . . . . . . .** 

Pool Type: PETIT

Status: Deferred

Pool Seq: 0030

Regular

Room:

Event No:

Return Date: 10/2/2003

No Attendances: 2

No AWOL:

Times Deferred: 2

Notes: BUSY WORK 9/30

**FTA** 

FTA Status

No. FTA

No. Show Cause

No. Warrants

Printed

## **Birthstone**

Address: 8437 WARTAGN MEADOWS STREET

City: LAS VEGAS

State: NV

Zip: 89131-

Work Phone: 702-604-3940 Local:

Occupation: NURSE

Home Phone: 702-240-2866

DOB: 6/23/1946

Gender: Female

Voter Reg No:

Court Emp:

Mileage:

Drivers Licence:

State:

## Disqualified/Excused

Disqualified:

Date:

Excused: \*

Deferred To: 12/10/2003

## Pool Summary Report Participant Detail

Date: **8/20/04** 

Time: 1:39 PM

## **INACTIVE**

**Current Status** 

Last Name: BARRS

Participant No: 100224264

First Name: CAREN

Pool No: 001031210

Responded: Responded

User Edt: admnjS03

Jurisdiction Code: DISTRICT

Next Report Date:

---- --- --- ------

Pool Type: PETIT

Status: Deferred

Pool Seq: 0027

Regular

Room:

Event No:

Return Date: 12/10/2003

No Attendances: 2

No AWOL:

Times Deferred: 3

Notes: BUSY WORK 9/30

MOM HAS ALZHEIMERS IN NY MUST GO GET HER IN ALZHEIMERS

HOME 12-2

<u>FTA</u>

FTA Status

No. FTA

No. Show Cause

No. Warrants Printed

**Birthstone** 

Address: 8437 WARTAGN MEADOWS STREET

City: LAS VEGAS

State: NV

Zip: 89131-Home Phone: 702-240-2866

Work Phone: 702-604-3940 Local:

Occupation: NURSE

DOB: 6/23/1946

Gender: Female

Voter Reg No:

Court Emp:

Mileage:

Drivers Licence:

State:

Disqualified/Excused

Disqualified:

Date:

Excused: \*

Date: 12/2/2003 Accept: Yes

Deferred To: 3/15/2004

## Pool Summary Report Participant Detail

Date: **8/20/04** Time: **1:39 PM** 

### **ACTIVE**

**Current Status** 

Last Name: **BARRS** 

Participant No: 100224264

First Name: CAREN

Pool No: 001040314

Responded: Responded

User Edt: admnjs07

Jurisdiction Code: DISTRICT

Next Report Date: 3/15/2004

Pool Type: PETIT

Status: Juror

Pool Seq: 0285

Regular

Room: DEPT. 14

Event No: C172534

Return Date: 3/15/2004

No Attendances: 23

No AWOL:

Times Deferred: 3

Notes: BUSY WORK 9/30

MOM HAS ALZHEIMERS IN NY MUST GO GET HER IN ALZHEIMERS

**HOME 12-2** 

**FTA** 

FTA Status

No. FTA

No. Show Cause

No. Warrants Printed

**Birthstone** 

Address: 8437 WARTAGN MEADOWS STREET

City: LAS VEGAS

State: NV

Zip: 89131-

Home Phone: 702-240-2866

Work Phone: 702-604-3940 Local:

Occupation: NURSE

DOB: 6/23/1946

Gender: Female

Voter Reg No:

Court Emp:

Mileage:

Drivers Licence:

State:

Disqualified/Excused

Disqualified:

Date:

Excused:

Date:

Accept:

Deferred To:

# EXHIBIT D

### AFFIDAVIT

STATE OF NEVADA SS:

CAREN BARRS, being first duly sworn, deposes and says:

- 1. That I am a resident of Clark County, Nevada and that I served as a juror in State of Nevada v. Alfred P. Centofanti, III., Case No. C172534.
- 2. That neither before nor during deliberation did any juror discuss conducting any test, experiment, or reenactment regarding the evidence.
- 3. That Juror Wheeler never mentioned during deliberation any experience shooting a weapon.
- 4. That my verdict was not affected by any clothes worn by any other juror during the trial.
- 5. That during the trial I was not aware of whether other jurors may or may not have been sleeping during the course of the trial.
- 6. That at no time during deliberations did any juror indicate that they had missed evidence or were unable to deliberate because they were sleeping.
- 7. That I was convicted of a felony involving bad checks over twenty (20) years ago in Florida.
- 8. That when I called into the jury commissioner and was quizzed over the telephonic information system, I pushed the number indicating that I did in fact have a felony conviction.
  - 9. That I have never been convicted of anything in Nevada.
- 10. That I also indicated in writing to the jury commissioner that I did have a felony conviction in Florida in excess of twenty (20) years ago.
- 11. That I have had my rights restored as a result of that felony conviction and I am allowed to vote and maintain my nursing license.
  - 12. That due to the fact that I had already disclosed this information on two (2)

occasions, I was under the impression that the Court and parties knew from my prior disclosure that I did have a felony conviction.

13. That I did not intentionally conceal my felony conviction from the Court or the parties.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the law of the State of Nevada that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on Aug. 6 2004 (Date)

CAREN BARRS

**EXHIBIT E** 

# Voter Registation Application

State of Nevada

BARRS, CAREN C			**OFFICE USE ONLY**							
		FF: AHA 0654321 Ilio	ation is	CANCELLED:	R	ECEIVED FROM:				
! !	01	e!	į	DIA CEDIC		□agency				
	181		ur muet	INACTIVE:		□field registrar □mail				
V	ote i	n person at the next election, unless you have your			other					
		request notarized or comply with other provisions of st	Precinct Code	r / . C. Ber	ceived/Witnessed by					
(1	NRS	293.272).		1 1001101 0000	6019 Hed	elved/Millessed by				
CS51679 GCSY Use pen-please print clearly-black ink preferred										
r	Use pen-please print clearly-black ink preferred									
	1 Reason(s) for registration: ☐ new registration ☐ address change ☐ party change ☐ name change									
		Mr. First Name Middle Name		Last Name		Jr. Sr.				
	2	Miss / H(EV)		Krur	7/3	U DI IV				
r		Address Where You Live (not a post office box)		Apt.#	City	ZIp Code				
	3	IMPORTANT! You may not list your address as a business unless you act	ually reside	there.		·				
3153 mediterranean or Las Vegas NU 8						117				
$\vdash$		Address Where You Get Your Mail (if different from #3)	<u> </u>	Apt.#	City	Zip Code				
	4	, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,			,	- P				
$\downarrow$					<del></del>					
1	- 1	(matterial)		ity, Nevada Driver's License ion Card Number ( <u>required</u> )	·       ·	mber (optional)				
	5	(10/03/y)) (6) Car aga com 1/2			8 7 7	u Gena				
Ļ		0123/10 (PTUDWN) NY			1020	409579				
9	9	(absolv ask ass boy)	10	ear or affirm that:						
	1	n you do not anniate with	- 1:	am a citizen of the United S						
1		January and Sounds and		n the date of the next election will have continuously reside						
30 days and in my precinct at least 10 days before						next election;				
Independent American Party  Nonpartisan Ballot and will claim no other place as my legal residence; and another place a					esent address listed herein is my sole legal place of residence and I no other place as my legal residence; and					
					lelony conviction or other I	loss of civil rights				
		☐ Libertarian Party ☐ Natural Law Party ☐ Natural Law Party ☐ Representation of the party candidates at the party candidates	W	hich would make it unlawful	for me to vote."					
ļ		PHIMARY ELECTION.								
1		ricgistening nonpartisan		declare under pe		that the				
□ No Party Affiliation (Nonpartisan) means you have no political party affiliation.  □ Other Party foregoing is true and correct						-				
(write on line below) Executed on:					Jarch 16000					
				/ (0	date)					
Ì	11	Name and Address on Your Last Voter Registration:		•						
-										
1		First Name Last Name			R.					
			(aren Barn							
١		Street Name and Number	SIGNATURE OF APPLICANT REQUIRED!							
]		City/State/Zip	(Ap	phication No.) AHA	654321	<u> </u>				
	12 IMPORTANT! If you are assisting a person to register to vote by mail and you are NOT a field registrar or an employee of a voter									
agency, you MUST complete the following. Failure to do so is a felony. MAD 1.6.2000										
	CERTIFIED COPY 3-16-00									
		Name (print) USCOMENT ATTACH		4 1	Signature					
		Street Name and Number OF THE ORIGINAL O			City/State/Zip					
	Prescribed by Secretary of State									
		83.507, NRS 293.5235, NRS 293.524 AU(5 1 9)	1 <u>4</u>			1				
		v=				1				

Amail Llong

# **EXHIBIT F**

#### 1 of 100 DOCUMENTS

#### OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

**OPINION No. 96-27** 

1996 Nev. AG LEXIS 27; 1996 Op. Atty Gen. Nev. 146

September 25, 1996

#### SYLLABUS:

[\*1]

CIVIL RIGHTS; FELONS; VOTING: Felons convicted in a Nevada district court may have their civil rights restored pursuant to NRS. Nevada can only restore the civil rights of Nevada felons. Federal felons may have their civil rights restored only by presidential pardon. Whether Nevada must afford full faith and credit to the restoration of civil rights by a foreign jurisdiction depends on the individual circumstances.

#### REQUESTBY:

The Honorable Stewart L. Bell Clark County District Attorney 500 South Grand Central Parkway Post Office Box 552215 Las Vegas, Nevada 89155-2255

#### OPINIONBY:

FRANKIE SUE DEL PAPA, Attorney General

CHARLES HILSABECK, Deputy Attorney General, Litigation Division

#### OPINION:

You have requested an opinion on the "correct course of action" to take on the request of a Clark County resident who is a federal felon convicted in the United State District Court, Southern District of New York, who wishes to regain the right to vote. Your inquiry raises several questions.

#### QUESTION ONE

How do Nevada felons (felons convicted in a Nevada district court) obtain restoration of their civil rights?

#### **ANALYSIS**

Article 2, § 1 of the Nevada Constitution states: "no person who has been or may be convicted [\*2] of treason or felony in any state or territory of the United States, unless restored to civil rights" may vote. There are several statutory mechanisms in place for restoration of civil rights to Nevada felons depending on whether the felon is on probation, receives a pardon, successfully completes probation, or serves a sentence.

NRS 176.227 provides for the restoration of civil rights of a convicted person after honorable discharge from probation by the district court where the felon was convicted. If the convicted person was granted an honorable discharge from probation, has not previously been restored to his civil rights, and is not convicted of any offense greater than a traffic violation within six months after the discharge, he may apply to the Division of Parole and Probation for restoration of civil rights. The Division of Parole and Probation then petitions the court in which the applicant was

convicted for restoration of the convicted person's civil rights. If the Division refuses to petition the court, the convicted person may petition the district court in which the conviction was obtained directly for restoration of his civil rights.

Pursuant to NRS 213.090, the Nevada [\*3] Board of Pardons Commissioners may restore civil rights of felons at the time a pardon is granted or at a later date. If restoration of civil rights is granted at a date subsequent to the pardon, the applicant shall not have been convicted of any offense greater than a traffic violation within five years after the pardon was granted. If the Board of Pardons Commissioners refuses to restore the applicant's civil rights, the applicant may petition the district court in which the conviction was obtained for an order directing the Board of Pardons to grant such restoration.

The Nevada Parole Board, pursuant to NRS 213.155, may restore a paroled prisoner to his civil rights at expiration of his parole. If the convicted person did not receive a restoration upon expiration of his parole, and has not been convicted of an offense greater than a traffic violation within five years after completion of parole, he may apply to the Parole Board for restoration of his civil rights. If the Parole Board refuses to restore the applicant's civil rights, the applicant may petition the district court in which the conviction was obtained for an order directing the Parole Board to grant such restoration. [\*4]

The Division of Parole and Probation may restore a convicted person's civil rights after his sentence has been served pursuant to NRS 213.157. If the convicted person has not been convicted of any offense greater than a traffic violation within five years of his release, he may apply to the Division for restoration of his civil rights. Upon submission of proof that the convicted person meets the criteria for restoration of his civil rights, the Division of Parole and Probation shall petition the district court in which the conviction was obtained for restoration of the applicant's civil rights. If the Division of Parole and Probation refuses to submit such a petition, the applicant may directly petition the district court in which the conviction was obtained for an order directing the Division of Parole and Probation to grant such restoration.

### CONCLUSION TO QUESTION ONE

Depending on the status of the convicted person, restoration of civil rights may be obtained for Nevada felons from the district court in which the felon was convicted, the Board of Pardons or the Parole Board.

#### **QUESTION TWO**

Can Nevada restore civil rights of felons who were not convicted in a Nevada district [\*5] court?

#### **ANALYSIS**

The statutory language referred to in Question One limits authority of the Board of Pardons Commissioners, the Board of Parole Commissioners, and the Nevada district courts to restoring the rights of Nevada felons only. It is almost axiomatic that a state's ability to pardon and restore civil rights is limited to convicted persons over which the state has jurisdiction. This proposition is buttressed by the opinion of the U.S. Supreme Court in Beecham v. U.S., U.S., 114 S. Ct. 1669 (1994). Beecham involved federal felons who obtained state restorations of their civil rights and were subsequently convicted of being felons in possession of firearms in violation of 18 U.S.C.A. § 922(h) (1994).

The question before the Supreme Court in Beecham was "Which jurisdiction's law is to be considered in determining whether a felon 'has had civil rights restored." Beecham, 114 S. Ct. at 1670 (emphasis added).

The Beecham Court went on to hold:

Throughout the statutory scheme, the inquiry is: Does the person have a qualifying conviction on his record? Section 922(g) imposes a disability on people who "have been convicted." The choice-of-law [\*6] clause defines the rule for determining "what constitutes a conviction." The exemption clause says that a conviction for which a person has had civil rights restored "shall not be considered a conviction." Asking whether a person has had civil rights restored is thus just one step in determining whether something should "be considered a conviction." By the terms of the choice-of-law clause, this determination is governed by the law of the convicting jurisdiction.

This interpretation is supported by the fact that the other three procedures listed in the exemption clause-pardons, expungements, and set-asides--are either always or almost always (depending on whether one considers a federal grant of habeas corpus to be a "set aside," a question we do not now decide) done by

the jurisdiction of conviction. That several items in a list share an attribute counsels in favor of interpreting the other items as possessing that attribute as well. Dole v. Steelworkers, 494 U.S. 26, 36, 110 S.Ct. 929, 934-935, 108 L.Ed.2d 23 (1990); Third Nat. Bank in Nashville v. Impac Limited, Inc., 432 U.S. 312, 322, 97 S.Ct. 2307, 2313, 53 L.Ed.2d 368 (1977); Jarecki v. G.D. Searle [\*7] & Co., 367 U.S. 303, 307, 81 S.Ct. 1579, 1582, 6 L.Ed.2d 859 (1961).

Beecham, 114 S. Ct. at 1671 (emphasis added). See also U.S. v. Jones, 993 F.2d. 1131 (4th Cir. 1993) (state's post-conviction restoration of rights scheme cannot eliminate prior federal conviction as prior conviction for federal offense as being a felon in possession of a firearm); U.S. v. Dupaquier, 74 F.3d 615, 617 (5th Cir. 1996) (the federal court looks to state law to determine whether a defendant's civil rights were restored); and U.S. v. Lowe, 50 F.3d 604 (8th Cir. 1995) (Minnesota lacks authority to restore civil rights of Minnesota resident convicted in another state).

Beecham involved a violation of federal firearms laws. However, the rationale of Beecham and its application to voting rights cases is supported by a lack of authority or rationale for deviating from it.

#### CONCLUSION TO QUESTION TWO

Because of Nevada's express statutory language and the rationale of the *Beecham* line of cases, Nevada can only restore the civil rights of Nevada felons.

#### **QUESTION THREE**

How do federal felons obtain restoration of their civil rights?

#### **ANALYSIS**

There does not appear [\*8] to be a procedure under federal law for restoring a federal felon's civil rights. See United States v. Geyler, 932 F.2d 1330, 1333 (9th Cir. 1991); Beecham, at 1671-72. In a footnote, the Beecham Court stated:

We express no opinion on whether a federal felon cannot have his civil rights restored under federal law. This is a complicated question, one which involves the interpretation of the federal law relating to federal civil rights, see U.S. Const., Art. 1, Sec. 2, cl. 1 (right to vote for Representatives); U.S. Const., Amdt. XVII (right to vote for Senators); 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1865 (right to serve on a jury); consideration of the possible relevance of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 925(c) (1988 ed., Supp. IV), which allows the Secretary of the Treasury to grant relief from the disability imposed by Sec. 922(g); and the determination whether civil rights must be restored by an affirmative act of a government official, see United States v. Ramos, 961 F.2d 1003, 1008 (CA1), cert. denied, 506 U.S. , 113 S.Ct. 364, 121 L.Ed.2d 277 (1992), or whether they may be restored automatically by operation of law, see United States v. Hall, 20 F.3d 1066 (CA10 1994). We do not [\*9] address these matters today.

#### Id. at 1672, n. 2.

### CONCLUSION TO QUESTION THREE

The only method available for a federal felon to obtain restoration of his civil rights appears to be a presidential pardon pursuant to U.S. Const., art II, § 2; authority of the President as Chief Executive, 28 U.S.C. § § 509 and 510 (1993); and 28 C.F.R. 0.35 and 1.1 (1993).

#### QUESTION FOUR

Is Nevada required to give full faith and credit to restorations of civil rights by other states?

#### **ANALYSIS**

The Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution provides: "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof." U.S. Const. art. IV, § 1.

The purpose of the Full Faith and Credit Clause is to preserve rights acquired or confirmed under public acts or judicial proceedings of one state by requiring recognition of their validity in other states. 16A Am. Jur. 2d Constitutional Law § 863 (1995). However, "the Full Faith and Credit Clause does not compel 'a [\*10] state to substitute the statutes of other states for its own statutes dealing with a subject matter concerning which it is competent to legislate." Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 108 S. Ct. 2117, 2122 (1988), quoting Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 59 S. Ct. 629, 632 (1939). Nor is a state required to enforce a law obnoxious to its public policy. Griffin v. McCoach, 313 U.S. 498 (1941), citing Bradford Electric Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145 (1932); Hartford Indemnity Co. v. Delta Co., 292 U.S. 143 (1934).

A split of authority exists regarding recognition of acts of clemency by sister states. There is authority that, under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, one state need not recognize a pardon issued by a sister state for an offense committed in that sister state. See Carlesi v. New York, 233 U.S. 51 (1914) (a presidential pardon operated only with regard to the sovereign that issued it); Thrall v. Wolfe, 503 F.2d 313 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 972 (1975) (U.S. not required to recognize state pardon); White v. Thomas, 660 F.2d 680 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1027 (1982) (Texas sheriff not barred from [\*11] firing a deputy who failed to indicate at the time of hire that he had been convicted of a felony in California even though that conviction was later expunged); Yaconvone v. Bolger, 645 F.2d 1028, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 844 (1981) (U.S. Postal Service in deciding whether to employ someone convicted of shoplifting in Vermont was not required to recognize Vermont's pardon of the offense); Groseclose v. Plummer, 106 F.2d 311 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 614 (1939) (California not required to recognize Texas pardon); Delehant v. Board of Police Standards and Training, 855 P.2d 1088 (Or. 1993) (Oregon not required to recognize Idaho's expunction of defendant's Idaho conviction); State v. Edmondson, 818 P.2d 855, cert. quashed, 818 P.2d 419 (N.M. 1991) (New Mexico not required to recognize Texas expunction of defendant's Texas conviction).

Other courts, however, have ruled that the law of comity requires that states recognize a sister state's restoration of a convicted person's civil rights. See Wickizer v. Williams, 173 S.W. 288 (Tex. Ct. App. 1914) (pardon for felony committed in Mississippi by Mississippi authorities removes disability of person [\*12] to sit on jury in Texas); U.S. v. McMurrey, 827 F.Supp. 424 (S.D. Tex. 1993) (U.S. required to recognize Governor of Oklahoma's pardon of defendant's prior Oklahoma conviction); People v. Willis, 435 N.Y.S.2d 655 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982) (New York would not consider a Texas felony conviction for enhancement purposes where Texas would not use the same conviction for enhancement under Texas law).

In determining whether the statute of a state under which foreign rights arose or the law of the forum should control in matters involving policy and conflicting interests, the rule is fairly well settled that different considerations usually apply where the statute creating a foreign right, which it is claimed should be given effect, is set up by way of defense to an asserted liability, from those where merely affirmative rights are claimed under a foreign statute. . . . In both the conflict is to be resolved not by giving automatic effect to the full faith and credit clause, compelling the courts of each state to subordinate its statutes to those of the other, but by appraising the governmental interests of each jurisdiction and turning the scale of decision according to their weight.

[\*13]

16A Am. Jur. 2d Constitutional Law § 867 (1995) (footnotes omitted).

As a general rule, recognition will be required, unless the matter involves local sovereignty over purely local questions, such as criminal or penal laws, or the statute conflicts with a statute or policy of the forum state and the governmental interests of the forum state in the persons, property, or events in the state involved in the litigation outweigh the governmental interests of the foreign state for whose statute recognition is sought.

Id. at § 868 (footnote omitted).

Recognition of restoration of civil rights almost always involves affirmative rights that are claimed under a foreign statute. Therefore, the question of whether Nevada must recognize a sister state's restoration of a convicted person's civil rights is determined by weighing the governmental interests of Nevada and the foreign state. Several factors are relevant to this process including what jurisdiction restored the civil rights, whether the restoration of civil rights was

pursuant to some affirmative act or by operation of law, the interest of the foreign state in having Nevada recognize its restoration, and Nevada's [\*14] interest in not recognizing the restoration.

Restoration of civil rights of a felon who was convicted in that state's courts would tend to support extending full faith and credit to that state's restoration. If the restoring state purports to restore the civil rights of a felon who was not convicted within that jurisdiction, it would present a strong argument for nonrecognition under the full faith and credit clause. See Beecham, 114 S. Ct. at 1671 and Question Two.

Judgments of other states are almost always given recognition under the full faith and credit clause. Under full faith and credit principles, if the court that issued the judgment had jurisdiction to render the judgment, other states are obligated to recognize the judgment. *Underwriters Nat. Assur. Co. v. North Carolina Life & Acc. & Health Ins. Guaranty Assn.*, 102 S. Ct. 1357 (1982). Therefore, if a state restores the civil rights of one of its felons by way of an affirmative act that results in a judgment or a finding by a tribunal, board or commission, rather than by mere operation of law, a stronger argument is presented for recognition.

The jurisdiction that originally imposed the disabilities on the [\*15] convicted felon has strong interests in whether those disabilities are removed or remain with the felon. Certainly, there are situations where the convicting jurisdiction would desire to have the disabilities associated with a felony conviction removed. For example, if the convicting state issued the felon a pardon based on information that the convicted person was actually innocent of the crimes he was convicted of, the convicting state would have a strong interest in restoring the convicted person's civil rights and remove any stigma that person might have for the unjust conviction.

A jurisdiction that purports to restore the civil rights of a felon who was not convicted in that jurisdiction and did not impose the disabilities associated with being a convicted felon on that person, has little, if any, governmental interest in removing those disabilities. Likewise, that jurisdiction's governmental interest in having that person vote in Nevada is nonexistent.

Nevada's interest in carefully scrutinizing another state's restoration of civil rights to a convicted felon is founded in Nevada's Constitution. Nevada's constitutional mandate that "no person who has been or may be convicted [\*16] of treason or felony in any state or territory of the United States, unless restored to civil rights" may vote, expresses Nevada's very strong interest in keeping convicted felons from voting. Nev. Const. art. 2, § 1. Nevada's interest in not recognizing another state's restoration of civil rights is especially strong where the restoration is relevant only to rights exercised in, and relating to, Nevada, such as voting in state elections.

Although the National Voter Registration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-6, prohibits felons from voting, the right to vote is primarily a function of a state's prerogative. Certainly, a state may decide who votes in its own state elections. If one state has the prerogative to allow federal felons to vote in its elections, then Nevada certainly can just as surely prevent federal felons from voting in its elections unless their civil rights have been restored.

When all of the factors mentioned above are weighed and evaluated, the conclusion is that Nevada is not bound to recognize another state's statute authorizing federal felons or out-of-state felons to vote in that state's elections as having restored the convicted felon's constitutional rights [\*17] pursuant to the full faith and credit clause for two primary reasons: (1) Pursuant to Beecham, states do not have jurisdiction to remove disabilities imposed by the federal government or by other states; and (2) such statutes are not restorations at all. Rather, statutes that merely authorize federal and out-of-state felons to vote do only that. Such statutes clearly do not purport to restore civil rights.

#### CONCLUSION TO QUESTION FOUR

Nevada should give full faith and credit to restorations of civil rights where certain criteria are met. The restoring jurisdiction must have also been the convicting jurisdiction. The restoration must purport to be just that, a restoration of the convicted person's civil rights, and meet all the constitutional and statutory requirements of the restoring jurisdiction. Nevada must not have any overriding reason, such as a public policy set out in a statute or Nevada's Constitution, for not recognizing the restoration. If all these questions can be answered affirmatively, then Nevada should recognize a restoration of civil rights by a foreign jurisdiction.

#### **QUESTION FIVE**

What is the "correct course of action" to take on the request of a [\*18] Clark County resident to regain the right to vote who is a federal felon convicted in federal district court?

**ANALYSIS** 

As stated above in Question One, the Nevada Constitution prohibits felons from voting unless they have had their civil rights restored. Nev. Const. art. 2, § 1. The federal felon in question has supplied documentation that on November 16, 1977, he was convicted of a felony in the United States District Court-Southern District of New York. This person served his sentence at the Federal Prison Camp at Lompoc, California, and was released to the Central District of California where he was under special parole supervision with the U.S. Probation Office for the Central District of California. This person has supplied documentation that he was successfully discharged from parole supervision on October 3, 1985.

The federal felon claims that his civil rights have been restored by New York State and relies on a New York statute that states in pertinent part:

No person who has been convicted in a federal court, of a felony, or a crime or offense which would constitute a felony under the laws of this state, shall have the right to register for or to vote at any election [\*19] unless he shall have been pardoned or restored to the rights of citizenship by the president of the United States, or his maximum sentence of imprisonment has expired, or he has been discharged from parole.

#### N.Y. Election Law § 3 (Consol. 1995).

The statutory language quoted above does not purport to restore the civil rights of federal felons as required by the Nevada Constitution. The language of the statute itself contemplates the distinction between a pardon or a restoration of rights and merely expiring a sentence or being discharged from parole. The cited language simply allows federal felons who have been pardoned or restored or who have expired their sentences or who have been discharged from parole to vote in New York. The statute does not purport to confer any rights that would be associated with a restoration of rights.

The federal felon argues that his rights were restored by the State of New York even though he was convicted in federal court. Pursuant to the rationale of *Beecham*, New York was without jurisdiction or authority to restore his civil rights. Hence, recognition of his "restoration" is not required. *See* Question Two. Moreover, since the language [\*20] of the New York Statute does not even purport to constitute a restoration of the convicted person's civil rights, a full faith and credit issue is not presented. There is no restoration of civil rights to recognize or not recognize.

In order for this person to vote in Nevada, he must obtain a restoration of his civil rights from the jurisdiction that convicted him--federal authorities. He will need to seek a presidential pardon, which is admittedly an exacting and time-consuming process. Nevada could allow this person, and others similarly situated, to vote if the language in Nevada's Constitution were modified and Nevada enacted statutory language similar to that found in the New York statute relied on by the federal felon. However, at present, this person is not qualified to vote in Nevada.

### CONCLUSION TO QUESTION FIVE

The proper course of action in this person's case is to direct him to the United States Pardon Office. The Clark County Registrar of Voters should not allow him to register to vote until he has obtained restoration of his civil rights from federal authorities.

# EXHIBIT G

## AFFIDAVIT OF MIKE PFRIENDER IN SUPPORT OF REPLY TO STATE'S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL

STATE OF NEVADA ) ss:

MIKE PFRIENDER, being first duly sworn, deposes and says:

- 1. That affiant is the Las Vegas Branch Manager of Frasco Investigative Services and a private investigator duly licensed by the State of Nevada, and has personal knowledge of all matters set forth herein except for those stated upon information and belief and is competent to testify thereon.
- 2. That at the request of defense counsel, affiant has engaged in the post-trial investigation into various matters relating to the instant case including the backgrounds of several jurors.
- 3. That on June 23, 2004, affiant conducted the second interview, this time by telephone, with former juror Josh Wheeler.
- 4. That Mr. Wheeler would not consent to this interview being tape recorded and therefore it was not.
- 5. That affiant asked Mr. Wheeler why he went shooting during the trial and he stated the following:

My dad had the gun out cleaning it and I asked him how long it would take him to empty it and he said 5 seconds.

I didn't tell him what kind of gun was involved, but we both said let's go try it and that's how it happened. It was purely coincidental. I mean my dad knew what was going on and I really didn't talk to him about the case. I may have mentioned 2.3 seconds to him, but I don't really remember.

6. That the above is what Josh Wheeler told affiant and from the tone of his

conversation it was apparent to affiant that he had conducted his own test despite using a different firearm to do so.


MIKE PFRIENDER

SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before

me this <u>24</u> day of August, 2004.

NOTARY PUBLIC in and for said

County and State



i

**ERR** CARMINE J. COLUCCI, ESQ. CARMINE J. COLUCCI, CHTD. Nevada Bar #000881 629 South Sixth Street Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 (702) 384-1274 Attorney for Defendant, ALFREĎ P. CENTOFANTI III

FILED

Aug 24 4 31 PM '04

Shilly & Panyine

### DISTRICT COURT

## CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

STATE OF NEVADA, CASE NO. C172534 Plaintiff, DEPT NO. XIV VS. ALFRED P. CENTOFANTI III, Date of Hearing: 8/26/04 Time of Hearing: 9:00 a.m. Defendant.

## NOTICE OF CLERICAL ERROR AND/OR ERRATA

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the Restoration of Civil Rights Application was inadvertently omitted from Exhibit B to Defendant's Reply to State's Opposition to Defendant's Motion for New Trial. Said application is attached hereto.

DATED this 24 day of August, 2004.

CARMINE J. COLUCCI, CHTD.

CARMINE(J. COLUCCI, ESO. Nevada Bak No. 000881 629 South Sixth Street

Las Vegas, NV 89101

Attorney for Defendant

## **RECEIPT OF COPY**

RECEIPT OF COPY of the above and foregoing NOTICE OF CLERICAL ERROR AND/OR ERRATA is hereby acknowledged this 24 day of August, 2004.

DAVID ROGER CLARK COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY

BECKY COETTSCH Nevada Bar No. 6316 Deputy District Attorney 200 South Third Street Las Vegas, NV 89155 Attorney for Plaintiff

## RESTORATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS APPLICATION

Restoration of Civil Rights restores the right to vote, serve on a jury, hold public office. (Certain types of employment may require restoration of civil rights prior to application in compliance with Florida Statutes)

(Please check the box that applies)				
.  Restoration of C	ivil Rights for Flo	rida Conviction		
Restoration of C	ivil Rights in Flor	ida for Federal, Militar	y or Out-of State Conv	iction
	Please 3	Print or Type.		
Name When Convicte	ed:			
Current Name:				· <u>,                                     </u>
		Race:		
Social Security No.: _		Driver License	No.:	
Prison or Probation N	o. (if known):			
Home Address:				
	(Street)	(City)	(State)	(Zip)
Mailing Address:	(Street)	(City)	(State)	(Zip)
Home Telephone No.	•	Daytime Tele	•	• • •
		sentenced or placed on p		
	•			
(Signati	ıre)		(Date)	
Attorney Name Addi	ress & Telenhone N	Number:_(NOTE: You	, ,	for this process
1	toto de Totophono I	tamoon_(tto1b. 100	do not deed an attorney	for tims process.)
		7-		
		able on the internet at y nency, please use form		<u>lem.html</u> .
Mailing address:	2601 Blairston	utive Clemency ne Road, C-229 L 32399-2450	Form	ADM 1501A (3/02)

	_
1	COPY DISTRICT COURT FILED
2	CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA [15 33   25 PH 10]
3	* * * * Othersy of Language
4	CFESK
5	STATE OF NEVADA,
6	Plaintiff,
7	vs. ) Case No. C172534
8	) Dept. XIV ALFRED P. CENTOFANTI III, )
9	Defendant.
10	<del></del>
11	
12	REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT
13	OF STATE'S MOTION TO COMPEL AUDIO TAPED INTERVIEW/
14	DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL
15	BEFORE THE HONORABLE DONALD M. MOSLEY
16	DISTRICT JUDGE
17	Taken on Thursday, August 26, 2004
18	At 9:00 a.m.
19	
20	APPEARANCES:
21	For the State: CLARK PETERSON, ESQ.
21 22	Deputy District Attorney
22	Deputy District Attorney

1	LAS VEGAS, NEVADA. THURSDAY, AUGUST 26, 2004, 9:00 A.M.
2	* * *
3	
4	THE COURT: C172534, State
5	versus Alfred P. Centofanti, III. The record will reflect
6	the presence of the defendant custody. Mr. Colucci is
7	Defense counsel, Mr. Peterson is here for the State.
8	This matter is on for a motion to compel
9	audio taped interview, and for motion for a new trial.
10	As to the former, I understand that there
11	was some sort of a taped interview by your investigator,
12	Mr. Colucci?
13	MR. COLUCCI: Your Honor, the tape and
14	the transcript of that interview have been previously
15	supplied to the District Attorney's office.
16	THE COURT: In their entirety?
17	MR. COLUCCI: In their entirety.
18	MR. PETERSON: Judge, that's correct.
19	We're in receipt of that. I should probably file a copy
20	of it with the Court. I had a copy made.
21	Our motion is mute since it's been provided.
22	The reason it was requested is, we had concerns about the
23	investigation into the juror.
24	As the Court may recall, starting back after
25	trial I received a phone call from an alternate juror, the

male alternate juror who indicated to me someone contacted him representing himself as a member of the District Attorney's office, an affiliate.

I indicated there's no such person. I subsequently contacted this investigator and he mentioned Mr. Colucci had substituted in. I contacted Mr. Colucci and we were able to sort of resolve any potential problems that there may have been.

I should note in subsequently investigating this motion, at least two other jurors who actually served as jurors felt that they were somewhat misled by this individual as to who he worked for until the actual -- either the tape started rolling, or the questioning began.

And the reason we requested this taped statement is because in interviewing one of the jurors, Joshua Wheeler, he's telling me: Look, I never said any of those things that is in that investigator's affidavit.

We requested the taped statement, and the taped statement certainly does not back up the allegations that are made in the investigator's statement. The investigator then has an affidavit indicating, yeah, those tapes were made in a later untaped statement with this juror, which the juror has denied by affidavit.

And, in fact, the comments that are referred

1	to in that taped statement by the investigator, sort of an
2	interesting spin on what's actually said in the taped
3	transcript.
4	But as far as our motion to compel those,
5	Mr. Colucci was kind enough to provide them and we
6	certainly appreciate that.
7	THE COURT: Is this investigator
8	present?
9	MR. COLUCCI: He is.
10	THE COURT: Well, so far I've heard
11	three allegations. One is, he's representing himself to
12	be a District Attorney representative. Then he's
13	represented himself falsely as to what was said on the
14	tape. And then he's putting his own spin on the tape.
15	Are those the three things you're
16	suggesting?
17	MR. PETERSON: Yes; with the second one
18	not quite as strongly as the Court has just put it.
19	THE COURT: Well, that doesn't please
20	me, particularly. Now, I realize I've heard one side of
21	the thing.
22	MR. COLUCCI: If the Court will look at
23	the transcript provided to you, you'll see that the first
24	thing the investigator does is clearly say who he works
25	for, and what his purpose is in conducting the

1 investigation.

THE COURT: Mr. Peterson said that this was divulged, but prior to that, as I understood it.

MR. PETERSON: That's correct, Judge.

The male alternate indicated that this person represented himself on the phone as working with the office of the DA.

Two of the other jurors who actually served, both Josh Wheeler and Matt -- his last name escapes me.

Josh Wheeler is certainly a younger juror, and I understand mistakes are made there.

But Matt was the individual who worked with the camera crew with one of the local news agencies, is certainly not a neophyte to the Court process. He indicated that he felt similarly, that he had not had full disclosure.

He was told before being interviewed by this investigator that he did work with the Defense, but he felt like it had been certainly kept purposely vague prior to their meeting together.

And that's the information I learned from that juror. We subsequently interviewed them after this motion was brought forward. But that's the situation as it stands today.

The Court may recall that I was at a point of -- which I did not do after I spoke with Mr. Colucci.

He said he would talk to his investigator and the matter will be handled.

But it was my intention to request the Court to actually send out a neutral letter to the jurors saying there's no one from the DA's office that's trying to contact you, and to instruct them that you can speak or not speak with anyone as you wish.

Because it was my concern that improper contact was maybe being made based on the phone call I got from an alternate juror saying someone was representing they were from the District Attorney's office.

THE COURT: Let's put that issue aside for just a moment here. Before we go into the merits of the matters, there's an argument that it's not timely. That seems to be straightforward.

Mr. Colucci, what's your view of this?

MR. COLUCCI: Your Honor, I have two

problems with that argument. The first problem is, that

in order for a juror to sit as a juror, the juror must be

qualified as a juror.

Now, one of the qualifications for being a juror is that you don't have any felony conviction, or if you do, your civil rights have been restored. That is prior to being put on the jury panel.

So in order to qualify to sit on the jury in

the first instance, you have to be a qualified juror. I think, clearly, we have shown that she's not a qualified juror.

Now, you can't fix that. That happened before. I don't know that 176.515 even applies. Because before you get to 176.515, you have to get to the qualification for sitting as a juror, and she doesn't qualify as a juror.

The second problem I have is, that this conviction and nonrestoration of civil rights was concealed from everyone. Now, whether it was concealed intentionally or not intentionally, if doesn't matter. It was concealed.

How can someone be required to show something or prove something within a seven-day time period when it's been intentionally concealed, or even mistakably concealed, which I'm not ready to concede at this point.

If the Court has gone through the motion, you know the reasons why I'm saying that. So we've had an impediment placed in front of us. The Court has had an impediment placed in front of it because you asked: Has anyone in your family, have you or anyone in your family ever been involved in the criminal justice process as a defendant or as a witness.

She had no problem disclosing her son's problem, but she hesitated and she did not, quote, offer the information in response to your question.

So for us to be held to a standard where we have to find out this information within that seven-day time period, I don't think the Legislature intended to reward somebody for lying to the Court, not being forthcoming with the Jury Commissioner, not being forthcoming with the District Attorney, and then subsequent to all of that, file an affidavit saying her civil rights have been restored when, in fact, they absolutely have not, according to the records that we were provided from the State of Florida.

THE COURT: Well, the problem,

Mr. Colucci, is that simply stated, and I'll grant you

what I'm about to say is rather simplistic, but simply

stated, the law clearly indicates a motion for a new trial

absent new evidence, and that's a different situation, has

to be within seven days of the finding of guilt.

This has been over two months and seven days. And, again, simply stated, if we're not going -- if we are going to ignore a rule, why do we have it?

It doesn't say seven days unless there's something wrong with the jury, or seven days unless, as you know, in the law oftentimes there is where you knew or

should have known, such as defrauding or someone secreting 1 2 a situation, and all those kinds of provisions, and we're 3 aware of that. 4 There's nothing like that written in the law here. And, obviously, this is so you can't four years 5 6 from now have a new trial and everybody is gone, the 7 witnesses, and it's just over. So that's the problem. 8 Go ahead. 9 MR. COLUCCI: If there's some irregularity with the jury proceeding or system, or 10 irregularity in the court proceedings, then discovery 11 12 within the seven days, I think, falls within that statute. 13 But before we get to 176.515, you've got 206.010, the qualification. THE COURT: Are you saying there was no 15 16 trial because the juror was not properly impaneled? 17 MR. COLUCCI: Judge, let me ask you a question hypothetically. If you try to run for office and 18 19 were convicted of a felony and you were elected to the 20 office, and subsequently they found out that you were 21 convicted a felony and did not have your civil rights 22 restored, would all of your judgements be valid if you 23 were not qualified to sit in that position in the first

And that's what I'm saying about the juror.

instance?

24

1	The juror was not entitled to be on the panel; therefore,
2	only 11 people, 11 qualified jurors heard this case.
3	THE COURT: All right. Well, I
4	understand your argument. I understand that that goes to
5	the merits, primarily. But how does it relate back to
6	ignoring the time division?
7	MR. COLUCCI: Isn't there also a
8	statute that says he's entitled to be tried by 12 jurors,
9	and the jury verdict has to be unanimous? And that would
10	be 12 people. Neither of those occurred.
11	She wasn't a juror. She shouldn't have been
12	sitting.
13	THE COURT: Let's assume that. What
14	does that do to the time constraints that would militate
15	against the requirement that something of this nature
16	should have been brought within seven days?
17	MR. COLUCCI: Because that, I think,
18	violates the spirit of the Constitution of the United
19	States and the Constitution of this state. I think it
20	takes precedent over a seven-day time period.
21	Is it more important we do the seven-day
22	thing, or is it more important that we give people in this
23	country a fair trial with qualified jurors?
24	Otherwise, we could have a jury panel full
25	of ex-felons who have not had their civil rights restored,

and they could sit in there and make a decision. And because I don't question the jurors and nobody questions the panel, you did, but nobody really thinks the Jury Commissioner is going to send a person, an ex-felon without their civil rights restored to sit as a member.

·25

This is effectively what you could have, is

12 people without their civil rights restored. They come

from other jurisdictions where I don't have access to

NCIC. I don't know what the records are. I can't get

them that fast. I can't get them with a push of a button

like the District Attorney's office.

I have to go through all the investigative procedures to get the information, and seven days is not reasonable. We need to have 12 qualified jurors because that's what the law is.

There are three or four statutes covering this that I think supersedes the seven-day rule, which I'm not conceding even applies in this case because she is not a juror.

THE COURT: You gave me an example of a situation. Let me give you one. Is there any rule that years later can you come in and say: Yes, this juror wasn't qualified, he lied or she lied or whatever, and let's invalidate the trial and try to go over it, and it would be impossible.

1	So where is the limit?
2	MR. COLUCCI: I don't know. But what
3	if six months after the Court enters a judgment they find
4	that the Judge shouldn't be sitting as a Judge. He didn't
5	go to law school and he has a felony conviction.
6	Would they set aside those judgements?
7	Would he be qualified to make those judgements in the
8	first instance?
9	This juror was not qualified to make the
10	judgement that she made and, therefore, there were not 12
11	jurors in the box. There were only 11; 11 and a person
12	who did not have their civil rights restored.
13	THE COURT: Mr. Peterson, anything
14	further?
15	MR. PETERSON: Judge, just as a
16	predicate, Your Honor, it's an out-and-out incorrect
17	assertion to say she did not have her civil rights
18	restored. The felony is from 20 years ago in Florida.
19	Certainly, none of the parties knew about it.
20	By operation of Florida law passed in 1975,
21	when a person completes their probationary sentence, their
22	civil rights, other than possessing a gun, shall be
23	automatically reinstated. Automatically reinstated.
24	When Mr. Colucci says the documents we have

show she's not reinstated, it's because there's no

petition for reinstatement filed. None of those things 1 were done in her case, because she's automatically 2 reinstated. She votes. She has a nursing license. 3 So when we pose these hypotheticals about a 5 jury with a person who wasn't qualified to sit, that's just, frankly, it's not true. Karen Barrs was qualified 6 to sit as a juror. 7 But beyond that, the Court hit on the matter 8 that's the most important, the inquiry into new trial 9 motions. And that's the vehicle that's been brought by 10 the defendant. It's his only vehicle for a new trial is 11 by statute by 176.515, strictly construes the seven-day 12 time bar. 13 A death penalty case, the guy files one 14 eight days after the verdict. The Court said, no, that's 15 not good enough. 16 THE COURT: Excuse me. Are you 1.7 referring to a case? 18 MR. PETERSON: Yes, sir. It's in our 19 20 moving papers. MR. COLUCCI: Your Honor, I am going to 21 22 concede that. That's exactly right. THE COURT: Is that a Nevada case? 23 MR. PETERSON: Yes, sir. 24 MR. COLUCCI: 25

 $\mathtt{MR.\ PETERSON:\ Depasquale,}$ 

2 | D-e-p-a-s-q-u-a-l-e versus State, 106 Nevada 843.

Essentially, this Court loses jurisdiction to even consider a motion for a new trial that is filed outside of that seven days. It is a strictly construed rule.

The concern that the Court has is stated somewhat succinctly in the various case law when they talk about the problem of going years later, or other time later to look back on trials and cast aspersions on jury selections, et cetera.

"Let it once be established that jurors would be harassed and beset by the defeated party in an effort to secure from them evidence of the facts which might establish misconduct sufficient to set aside a verdict. If evidence thus secured can be thus used, the result would be to make what was intended to be a private deliberation, the constant subject of public investigation to the destruction of all frankness and freedom of discussion in confidence."

That's the United States Supreme Court in McDonald versus Plets (phonetic.) There are statutory time limits. He hasn't met them and, essentially, that's a threshold showing.

I am perfectly comfortable that we win on

- 1	
1	the merits of this as well, given the response that the
2	State has filed. But as a threshold matter, this motion
3	is outside of this Court's jurisdictional ability to even
4	consider it.
5	THE COURT: Now, you've alluded to a
6	Nevada case.
7	MR. PETERSON: Yes.
8	THE COURT: That was after this case?
9	MR. PETERSON: Let me double-check.
10	No. Depasquale is a 1990 case. It's a
11	first degree murder death-sentence case. Eight days after
12	the final verdict the defendant filed a motion for a new
13	trial.
14	"The District Court declined to hear it for
15	untimeliness, and the Nevada Supreme Court held that the
16	defendant missed the seven-day deadline by filing it one
17	day late, and it was not error to refuse to consider it."
18	THE COURT: And this was, the basis for
19	the new trial, was the jury misconduct?
20	MR. COLUCCI: Yes.
21	MR. PETERSON: I don't recall what the
22	basis was in Depasquale. I believe it was one of the
23	bases.
24	MR. COLUCCI: Yes. And what happened
25	in that case is, one of the jurors was not truthful during

1	the voir dire. But the distinguishing thing about that
2	case is, that juror was qualified in the first instance to
3	sit there, and that's what made it juror misconduct.
4	In this case
5	THE COURT: Excuse me. What's the
6	distinction in that case?
7	MR. COLUCCI: Ms. Barrs wasn't
8	qualified to sit as a juror.
9	THE COURT: In that case you say the
10	juror was qualified?
11	MR. COLUCCI: Was qualified.
12	THE COURT: What was the factual
13	situation?
14	MR. COLUCCI: He did not disclose to
15	the parties that someone in his family had been murdered
16	and he had a prejudice against people that commit murders,
17	and so he wasn't a fair juror.
18	THE COURT: That would seem to be much
19	more damning than a person who had a felony 20 years ago
20	which was very likely absolved.
21	MR. COLUCCI: Well, it wasn't very
22	likely resolved, because Mr. Peterson said the right
23	thing. She had to apply. There's a procedure to follow
24	in Florida.
25	MR. PETERSON: That's not what I said.

MR. COLUCCI: He mentioned the word 1 "application." 2 THE COURT: I thought it was automatic. 3 It is automatic. MR. PETERSON: 4 doesn't have to apply after 1975. What I said is, 5 Mr. Colucci said there is no application. Correct, 6 because it's unneeded. By executive clemency rules promulgated 8. in Florida in 1975, upon the completion of your 9 probationary period you automatically have your civil 10 rights restored, other than the right to own a firearm. 11 That would require application. 12 Ms. Barrs' conviction was in 1980. 13 executive clemency rules in Florida, her civil rights are 14 restored. She is not a felon. 15 MR. COLUCCI: Her civil rights are not 16 Exhibit A to our opposition is a certificate restored. 17 from the Department of Clemency, or the Department of 18 Parole and Probation in the State of Florida. It clearly 19 says her civil rights have not been restored in the State 20 of Florida. 21 Now, let me tell you why the automatic 22 restoration would occur if it she followed the correct 23 procedure. One, apply; two, be qualified. If you apply 24 and you're qualified, then after a short determination 25

without a hearing they are automatically restored.

If you would look at our Exhibit A to our latest opposition, it clearly shows that what I've just told you is absolutely correct. That's Exhibit A to our opposition, our reply to the State's opposition to the defendant's motion for a new trial.

And it says at the bottom of the certificate that, "I certify that the civil rights of Karen Barrs have not been restored. In addition, there is no application pending for clemency at this time for the above-named person."

Now, if it could be any more clear than that, I don't know how it could be. And I also submitted to the Court as Exhibit B, the instructions for an application to have your civil rights restored.

And we submitted a separate document which was the truthful application. Both of those are presently in use in the State of Florida. If it was an automatic restoration, they don't need instructions, and they don't need the application.

And Karen Barrs could not sit in a jury in the State of Florida. She's not qualified. And if she's not qualified in Florida, she's not qualified in the State of Nevada.

THE COURT: All right. What do you say

б

call it in the blood spatter vernacular, that could have created that blood when she was not at all on the ground, head hitting the ground, for example, creating a splatter, something they call satellite blood, blood dripping into other blood creating droplets and he will testify.

You will have to listen to all that expertise and make a determination as to whether or not she was down on the ground or not and put it together as to what happened on December 20th.

The people were allowed a few moments of kind of conclusionary summation in their opening statement.

I hope I'm allowed the same when I tell you that I believe that the evidence will show by the time you're finished with the case, by the time that we have finished our presentation on behalf of Mr. Centofanti, that in his eyes and what is an objective determination is that there was a very genuine and very real fear of deadly force violence from from Gina Centofanti towards Chip Centofanti and that his action and his conduct and that split two seconds, three seconds of explosion was very much an act of self-defense, justifiable self-defense under those circumstancess.

I ask you to keep open open mind until we've presented all the evidence in this case. Thank you very

	1	much.
 . <u>:</u>	2	THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Bloom.
<del>-</del>	3	(Whereupon, the Court admonished the jury.)
<i>-</i>	4	,
<del>-</del> ;,	5	
	6	
	7	
7	8	
<b></b> ⊶	9	
نا	10	
Γ	11	
نبا	12	·
	13	
<u></u>	14	
L	15	
	16	
Γ-	17	
	18	
[-,	19	
1	20	
	21	
	22	
(	23	,
	24	
ſ	25	
ſ		

MOT FILEU CARMINE J. COLUCCI, ESQ. CARMINE J. COLUCCI, CHTD. Nevada Bar #000881 4 48 PM '04 Jun 28 629 South Sixth Street Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 (702) 384-1274 CLERK Attorney for Defendant. ALFREĎ P. CENTOFANTI III DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA STATE OF NEVADA, CASE NO. C172534 Plaintiff, DEPT NO. XIV vs. Date of Hearing: 7-8-04
Time of Hearing: 9000 am ALFRED P. CENTOFANTI III, 14 Defendant. 15 MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL 16 COMES NOW, the Defendant, ALFRED P. CENTOFANTI III, by and through 17 his attorney, CARMINE J. COLUCCI, ESO., of the law firm of CARMINE J. 18 COLUCCI, CHTD., and moves this Court for an order setting aside the jury verdict 19 of April 16, 2004, and granting the defendant a new trial for the reasons set forth 20 21 herein. This motion is made and based upon the Points and Authorities submitted 22 herewith, the pleadings on file herein together with the affidavit of Mike Pfriender 23 24 ///// 25 ///// 26 ///// 1///// 27

28

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

DATED this 28 day of June, 2004.

CARMINE J. COLUCCI, CHTD.

CARMINE J. GOLUCCI, ESQ.
Nevada Bar No.000881
629 South Sixth Street
Las Vegas, Nevada 89101
Attorney for Defendant

## NOTICE OF MOTION

TO: THE STATE OF NEVADA; Plaintiff; and

TO: DAVID ROGER, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, its Attorney.

DATED this day of June, 2004.

CARMINE J. COLUCCI, CHTD.

CARMINE J. COLUCCI, ESQ.
Nevada Bar #000881
629 South Sixth Street
Las Vegas, Nevada 89101
Attorney for Defendant

## POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

I.

## STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

A. Whether the defendant is entitled to a new trial based upon juror misconduct for not disclosing her prior involvement in the criminal justice process as a defendant which included a felony conviction which would have

precluded her from meeting the statutory requirements in order to sit as a qualified juror in the instant case?

- B. Whether the defendant is entitled to a new trial based upon juror misconduct because juror Joshua Wheeler performed his own firearm testing experiment during the trial?
- C. Whether the defendant is entitled to a new trial based upon juror misconduct as a result of juror Chris Kelly coming to court and sitting on the jury while wearing a tee shirt that read "Do you know what a murderer looks like?"
- D. Whether the defendant is entitled to a new trial based upon juror misconduct as a result of two or more jurors sleeping during the presentation of testimony during the trial in this case?

II.

## STATEMENT OF FACTS

Prior to the commencement of the trial in the instant case, prospective jurors were sent notices about their future jury service. With each notice, prospective jurors were each sent an informational sheet which contained information about the parking facilities, general jury information and about the qualifications for jury service including four of the mandatory requirements. One of the stated qualifications stated was: "You must be without a felony conviction." See Exhibit A attached hereto.

In response to the notice, juror Caren Barrs was required to telephonically contact the Jury Commissioner's office and to respond to various qualification questions. One of the questions that required her response was whether she had a felony conviction.

On March 22, 2004, the jury trial of the defendant commenced. Voir dire was conducted by the Court and by counsel for the respective parties. A jury was selected from the panel furnished through the Clark County Jury Commissioner's

office. The jury trial proceeded after the jury was selected and impaneled. On April 16, 2004, the jury returned with its verdict of guilty of First Degree Murder and With Use of a Deadly Weapon in the Commission of a Crime. Sentencing is presently scheduled for July 9, 2004.

In May, 2004, the defendant decided to discharge his trial counsel and to retain the undersigned as new counsel. Sentencing was originally scheduled for May 28, 2004, but was continued until July 9, 2004, by stipulation of the parties as an accommodation to new defense counsel so that he could obtain the files from the defendant's trial counsel.

#### III.

### **ARGUMENT**

A. DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO A NEW TRIAL BASED UPON JUROR MISCONDUCT FOR NOT DISCLOSING HER PRIOR INVOLVEMENT IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROCESS AS A DEFENDANT WHICH INCLUDED A FELONY CONVICTION AND WHICH WOULD HAVE PRECLUDED HER FROM MEETING THE STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS IN ORDER TO SIT AS A QUALIFIED JUROR IN THE INSTANT CASE.

During a review of the pleadings and transcripts of the defendant's case and after interviewing various people who had attended the trial, defendant's counsel decided to investigate the backgrounds of the jurors. During the course of this investigation, it became apparent that at least one juror had an undisclosed felony conviction which precluded her from meeting the statutory requirements for being a person qualified to sit on a jury. NRS 6.010 states in pertinent part as follows:

## 6.010 Persons qualified to act as jurors.

Except as otherwise provided in this section, every qualified elector of the State, whether registered or not, who has sufficient knowledge of the English language, and who has not been convicted of treason, a **felony**, or other infamous crime, and who is not rendered incapable by reason of physical or mental infirmity, is a qualified juror of the county in which he resides. A person who has been convicted of a **felony** is not a qualified juror of the county in which he resides until his civil right to serve as a juror has been restored pursuant to NRS 176A.850, 179.285, 213.090, 213.155 or 213.157. (Emphasis added)

It is clear from a review of this statute, that, in order to qualify to be a juror, the prospective juror must not have a felony conviction which has not been expunged or sealed or must otherwise qualify under NRS 176A.850. The certified documents submitted herewith, show that Caren Barrs, a member of the jury impaneled in the instant case, was a convicted felon. She also had a misdemeanor conviction which she also failed to disclose to the court or counsel.

Further, since the defense investigator was easily able to obtain certified court documents evidencing this juror's felony and a misdemeanor conviction, without a court order, it was evident that Barrs' convictions were not sealed or expunged. Additionally, during the defense investigator's interview with Barrs, she acknowledged the felony conviction and that she had not sealed her record, had not had the conviction expunged or had her civil rights restored pursuant to Florida law or NRS 176A.850. She was therefore ineligible, by statute, to sit as a juror and deliberate in this case as she had not met the requirements of NRS 176A.850 or NRS 6.010 (See certified copies of Florida court documents attached hereto as Exhibit B).

It is also clear that she could not have been truthful with the Jury Commissioner as each prospective juror is asked via the phone survey whether he or she has a felony conviction prior to being ordered to report for service. Ms. Barrs must have answered the pertinent question by indicating that she did not have a felony conviction in order to be included in the jury pool without being subjected to further inquiry about this. Apparently, relying on the truthfulness of the survey response, the Jury Commissioner did not attempt to verify her response to the felony conviction question.

Prior to the commencement of voir dire, the court clerk administered the oath to the panel of prospective jurors using the language set forth in NRS 16.030 (5) which states in pertinent part as follows:

# NRS 16.030. Drawing and examination of jurors; administration of oath or affirmation.

5. Before persons whose names have been drawn are examined as to their qualifications to serve as jurors, the judge or his clerk shall administer an oath or affirmation to them in substantially the following form:

Do you, and each of you, (solemnly swear, or affirm under the pains and penalties of perjury) that you will well and truly answer all questions put to you touching upon your qualifications to serve as jurors in the case now pending before this court (so help you God)?

After this oath was given, during the voir dire conducted on March 16, 2004, this Court gave Ms. Barrs another opportunity to mention her prior criminal history, including her felony conviction. She was asked:

THE COURT: Have you or a close friend or family member ever been involved in the criminal justice process, either in prosecuting a case, or as a witness, **or as a defendant**? (Emphasis added) (See Reporter's Transcript attached hereto as Exhibit C at p. 62)

A review of her responses to the question asked by this Court, shows that she evaded a direct response about her own record by responding to the Court's question above by talking about her son's New York case. (See Exhibit C at p. 63). She did not at any time mention anything about her own record. She also avoided mentioning that she ever lived in Florida, the actual location of her felony conviction, by responding to another of this Court's questions as set forth below:

THE COURT: And he (her son) moved to New York at some point?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR BARRS: No I'm originally from New York State, and we moved out here, and he and his other brother stayed in New York State. One son came out here with us.

In Meyer v. State 119 Nev. Advance Opinion 61 (Dec. 19, 2003) the Nevada Supreme Court stated:

Jurors who fail to disclose information or give false information during voir dire commit juror misconduct, which, if discovered after the verdict, may be grounds for a new trial under the standards established for juror misconduct during voir dire as opposed to misconduct that occurs during deliberations.

The felony conviction of Caren Barrs was not discovered until after the jury verdict was rendered. It was not disclosed to the Court prior to jury service, as required by law, despite this Court's specific inquiry. Juries must consist of 12 jurors except as provided in NRS 175.021, which is inapplicable. NRS 175.481 requires the verdict to be unanimous. Therefore, the defendant is entitled to have the jury verdict vacated, as it was not rendered by twelve "qualified" jurors as required by statute and he is also entitled to a new trial.

# B. DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO A NEW TRIAL BASED UPON JUROR MISCONDUCT BECAUSE JUROR JOSHUA WHEELER PERFORMED HIS OWN FIREARM TESTING EXPERIMENT DURING THE TRIAL.

Once the jury selection process is completed, the clerk administers the oath which the jurors took pursuant to NRS 16.070:

## NRS 16.070 Jury to be sworn; court may order jury into custody of officer.

1. As soon as the jury is completed, the judge or his clerk shall administer an oath or affirmation to the jurors in substantially the following form:

Do you, and each of you, (solemnly swear, or affirm under the pains and penalties of perjury) that you will well and truly try the case now pending before this court and a true verdict render according to the evidence given (so help you God)?

During the initial interview of Joshua Wheeler which was conducted by licensed investigator Mike Pfriender on June 21, 2004, juror Joshua Wheeler told him that he went shooting with his father sometime between the third week and fourth week of the trial. Juror Wheeler concluded from this shooting session that, "it would be impossible for it to come on a target all six times in under four seconds even. It would be real tough." This comment was made in reference to the testimony of the firearms experts and the theory that the defendant had fired his weapon in an extremely rapid fire manner but was still able to hit the decedent with every shot.

1

19 20

21 22

24

25

23

26 27

28

In the follow-up interview of June 24, 2004, juror Wheeler advised the investigator that he and his father went shooting and the reason that they did so. He stated that he specifically wanted to go out and see how many seconds that it took to empty the gun he was shooting. See the affidavit of Mike Pfriender attached hereto. That constituted an improper experiment and at the very least constituted improper consideration of extrinsic evidence by juror Wheeler and perhaps the other members of the jury if he shared it during deliberations. Whether juror Wheeler alone or if other members of the jury considered this extrinsic "evidence," consideration at all constitutes a violation of the defendant's right to be present and to confront the witnesses against him which Wheeler now had become. Barker v. Nevada, 95 Nev. 309, 594 P.2d 719 (1979). Joshua Wheeler violated the terms of the jurors' oath by rendering his decision partially based on evidence that was not presented to him in court. The conduct of juror Wheeler met the two-prong test for a new trial as set forth in Meyer v. State, supra, in that the misconduct occurred (the independent juror test) and it involved a material issue in the case that undermined the defense's theory. In Meyer, the Nevada Supreme Court cites U.S. v. Navarro-Garcia, 926 F.2d 818 (9th Cir. 1991).

When extrinsic evidence is presented to a jury that is considering a criminal case, the defendant is entitled to a new trial 'if there exists a reasonable possibility that the extrinsic material could have affected the verdict.'

Therefore this juror's conduct constituted juror misconduct entitling the defendant to the relief sought herein.

#### C. DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO A NEW TRIAL BASED UPON JUROR MISCONDUCT AS A RESULT OF JUROR CHRIS KELLY COMING TO COURT AND SITTING ON THE JURY WHILE WEARING A TEE SHIRT THAT READ "DO YOU KNOW WHAT A MURDERER LOOKS LIKE,'

During the trial, juror Chris Kelly went to court dressed in a shirt which bore the writing, "Do you know what a murderer looks like?" In light of the seriousness of the charges and the right of the defendant to a fair trial, this type

of activity was very inappropriate, highly prejudicial and constituted juror misconduct. This also violated the spirit of the juror's oath set forth in NRS 16.070.

Dressing in this type of attire evidences a lack of respect for the court process. It also is evidence that juror Chris Kelly failed to take his oath and duties as a juror seriously. Apparently he thought that this was a joke as he wore the shirt bearing this message while he was seated one day in the jury box. It also shows that juror Kelly had formulated the opinion that the defendant was a murderer.

It is unknown by the defense whether this behavior was ever brought to the Court's attention as it should have been by someone involved in this case. Apparently this juror was never chastised for wearing this shirt nor was he admonished about his duty not to formulate an opinion before the trial was over. The shirt was worn to be "spiteful" as juror Josh Wheeler put it. This shirt's message and this juror's actions evidence either his enmity or his bias against the defendant, that he had made up his mind prior to having this case submitted to the jury and that he did not take his duties seriously. Any one of these mental attitudes constituted the denial of the defendant's constitutional rights to due process of law and a fair trial. This juror misconduct also entitles the defendant to the relief sought herein.

# D. DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO A NEW TRIAL BASED UPON JUROR MISCONDUCT AS A RESULT OF TWO OR MORE JURORS SLEEPING DURING THE PRESENTATION OF TESTIMONY DURING THE TRIAL IN THIS CASE.

The failure to stay awake and alert during the trial constitutes a violation of a juror's duty under NRS 16.070 also. The defense only learned about this misconduct recently. This conduct was confirmed by juror Josh Wheeler. See the Affidavit of Mike Pfriender attached hereto.

At this time, it is not known how often and for what periods of time the

jurors slept or whether they slept at the same time. Perhaps an evidentiary hearing is required in order to make that determination. Josh Wheeler admitted to the investigator that he and Chris Kelly (juror with "the tee shirt") slept during portions of the trial.

The jurors' failure to pay full time and attention violated the defendant's right to due process of law and a fair trial as guaranteed under the Fifth Amendment, Sixth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States.

Sleeping through a trial, thereby missing testimony deprives a juror of the ability to participate in a meaningful way in the deliberations which can result in the permanent deprivation of a person's liability. However, NRS 50.065 seems to preclude a juror from testifying about the deliberative process unless influenced by outside forces. *Echaravarria v. State*, 108 Nev. 734 at 741, 839 P.2d 589 (1992), *Reibel v. State*, 106 Nev. 258 at 263, 790 P.2d 1004 (1990) and *Barker*, *supra*. Nevertheless, the defendants rights under the Constitution of the United States would supersede the limitations imposed by the state statute and case law cited above. Therefore, for the above-stated reasons, the defendant is entitled to a new trial.

#### **CONCLUSION**

Under both state and federal law for the reasons set forth above, the defendant is entitled to have the jury verdict in this case set aside and must be

/////

/////

/////

/////

/////

27 / / / / /

granted a new trial.

I

DATED this 28th day of June, 2004.

CARMINE J. COLUCCI, CHTD.

CARMINE J. COLUCCI, ESQ.
Nevada Bar No 000881
629 South Sinh Street
Las Vegas, Nevada 89101
Attorney for Defendant

#### AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL

STATE OF NEVADA )
COUNTY OF CLARK ) ss:

MIKE PFRIENDER, being first duly sworn, deposes and says:

- 1. That he is the Las Vegas Branch Manager of Frasco Investigative Services and a private investigator duly licensed by the State of Nevada, and has personal knowledge of all matters set forth herein except for those stated upon information and belief and is competent to testify thereon.
- 2. That at the request of defense counsel, affiant has engaged in the post-trial investigation into various matters relating to the instant case including the backgrounds of several jurors.
- 3. That during the course of his investigation, affiant became aware that juror Caren Barrs had a criminal history which included a possible felony conviction.
- 4. That in an attempt to carefully document the existence of the felony conviction, affiant secured a copy of certain public records from the State of Florida which are attached as Exhibit B to defendant's motion for a new trial.
- 5. That affiant verified that these records pertained to this juror by conducting a personal and telephone interview with her.
- 6. That during a phone interview with Ms. Barrs, she admitted that she had a felony conviction in Florida and that it had not been sealed or expunged.
- 7. That affiant believes that Caren Barrs may have another misdemeanor conviction which was not disclosed prior to or during the juror qualification or selection (voir dire) process.
- 8. That affiant also interviewed juror Joshua Wheeler who stated that during the time he served as a juror, he and his father went shooting for the specific purpose of conducting a firearms test which related to testimony of

·

prosecutors and defense witnesses.

l

- 9. That when questioned about this, juror Wheeler stated "My dad had the gun out cleaning it and I asked him how long it would take to empty it and he said five (5) seconds! I didn't tell him what kind of gun was involved, but we both said 'Let's go try it' and that's how it happened. It was purely coincidental. I mean my dad knew what was going on and I really didn't talk to him about the case. I may have mentioned 2.3 seconds to him but I don't really remember."
- 10. That juror Wheeler conducted his own firearm testing in order to confirm or to rebut the testimony of the expert witnesses on shooting speed and accuracy.
- 11. That Wheeler also stated that based on his own tests, using a .357 Magnum handgun, he formed an opinion on the shooting speed and accuracy as it related to the acts of the defendant and this helped him formulate an opinion about the defendant's intent.
- 12. That Wheeler also stated what he and other jurors saw during the trial, juror Chris Kelly wear a tee shirt that he purchased during trial which Wheeler characterized as "It being quite spiteful." The tee shirt had writing on it that said, "Do you know what a murderer looks like?"
- 13. That juror Wheeler told affiant that as soon as juror Kelly came into contact with the other jurors that they all noticed it and reacted to it.
- 14. That juror Wheeler also stated that at various times during the trial, that both he and juror Chris Kelly slept.
- 15. That juror Wheeler went on to say that during the trial, juror Caren Barrs took a lot of notes and other jurors relied on her potes in coming to a decision.

MIKE PFRIENDER

SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me this A day of June, 2004.

NOTARY PUBLIC in and for said County and State




NOTARY PUBLIC STATE OF NEVADA County of Clark ZOE ANN McGOUGH Appt. No. 93-1317-1

## EXHIBIT A

## PRE-PAID PARLING AT 425 FREMONT STREET, ENTER FROM 4TH STREET

#### **PARKING FACILITIES**

On your reporting date and while serving, parking is pre-paid at 425 Fremont Street. Bring your parking stub with you to Jury Services for validation. Maximum vehicle height is 8'2". If you require handicapped parking or your vehicle is over 8'2", please tell the parking attendant. We are unable to pay for parking in restricted areas, timed areas, or at parking meters.



#### **JURY INFORMATION**

YOUR EMPLOYER IS REQUIRED BY NEVADA STATE LAW, NRS 6.190, TO ALLOW YOU, AS A PROSPECTIVE JUROR, THE TIME OFF TO PARTICIPATE IN THE JURY PROCESS. AN EMPLOYER'S FAILURE TO COMPLY MAY RESULT IN A CIVIL ACTION AGAINST THE EMPLOYER.

On your scheduled <u>APPEARANCE DAY</u>, report to the Clark County Courthouse, main entrance, located at 200 South Third Street, and follow the signs to Jury Services. Please be seated until your number is called.

<u>PROPER CLOTHING</u> is required. No shorts, haltertops, muscle shirts, hats, or jogging suits are permitted. A suit and tie are not required.

BEVERAGES AND SNACKS may be purchased at the snack bar on breaks or during lunch. These items may not be taken into the courtroom. The Clark County Courthouse is a NO SMOKING building. Break and lunch times are determined by the Court.

ON THE FIRST DAY OF SERVICE YOU MUST BE PREPARED TO REMAIN AT THE COURTHOUSE UNTIL 5:00 P.M. You are welcome to bring a book, magazine, or personal work with you. However, local newspapers are not permitted.

Each person summoned to report is entitled to a fee of \$40 for each day after the second day of jury selection and, if sworn as a juror, is entitled to a fee of \$40 for each day of service. Mileage is reimbursed at 36.5 cents a mile for each mile traveled if the residence is 65 or more miles from the place of trial.

#### QUALIFICATION REQUIREMENTS FOR JURY SERVICE:

- 1) You must be a citizen of the United States.
- 2) You must be 18 years of age or older.
- 3) You must be a resident of Clark County.
- 4) You must be without a felony conviction

**EXHIBIT B** 

		PINELLAS	Y COURT	
ST.	ATE OF FLORIDA	S. THACTERS CC	ONTY: FLORIDA	
And the state of the state of	NS: New BACKS		CASE NO. CACE	DOOYG5 OF ALLO
	1 and 1	Sex F	A AUENUS REPORT NO	直接が レイード 正規管 精農
Add	11/335 NS 19	A Fine	( ) Traffic (Citation N	0.)
100	St. Petersburg Traffic	Clave a	Felony	3-4-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-
	Clearwater Traffic Divi	Division		On Warrant/
	PCF 044	Sion	( ) Municipal Ord. Vic OFFENSE OCCURRED	作 (行) On View年 第二番目
koc	ARGE Bothogue Box on	ty su Retinal for	( ) No. County	IN:
1-1-1-24	oly in the	<u> </u>	( ) So. County	( ) St. Petersburg ( ) Other
ハ・ヨースタイ 東京	りんしき コー・ディー	COM	PLAINT	
BLF	ORE ME. A NOTABY N			
who.	being duly sworn, says the	ton the day of	L. J. F. MOR	<i>t/l,</i>
Pinell	as County, Florida, one	CAREN BA	Ted Det C F MOR	A.D., 19 80
AKS	ester and alecut	7		in
		Capins	i	
			F   [	EDI
			!	· }
_			1	(t.,
contrat	y to (statute) (Ordinance	) 532 .05	in such also mide de pola	
Sworn	gnity of the STATE OF  10-and Subscribed before n	FLORIDA (N.C.I.C Co	de No	and against the peace
57]	day ofA	T	11.00	च्चीन घर चेतते ।
T.	(DOM	1911 <u>-</u>	JAY CV	27
L(/_ Note:	T Public Public	* Take	Affian	
My com	Trubiic	Scal	PESD	•
	amission expires Malary 20,10	~;	(Alfiant's address	or agency)
. /	Estimated 5, a			
JAIL (Io			DVISORY	
HERE	BY CERTIFY THAT the	D	DVISORY  ATE /- 25-90  TIME  has been advised by me that ed to him at no charge.	
y set and it	f unable to afford counsel	that one will be provided	has been advised by me that	- //-00 AM/940
AMOUN	f unable to afford counsel  T OF BOND/S \$ 25	To "	ed to him at no charge.	inc that a right to comp-
<del></del> -		ARRESTING	has been advised by me that ed to him at no charge.  J/BCOKING OFFICER	Shull!
	<i>i</i> '			The fact of the second
Bonded _	25 day or 90	WOND O	UT  at AM/PM  CATION	7
HEARING	S DATE/TIME	19_81)_	, at AM/PM	By 2011
Ĭ,	G DATE/TIME	LC	CATION	
Bonden-				endant) (Print)
POHOZINAN	Signature		Def TO HAVE (Def d hearing is within 72 hours)	from the time of arrest.
	4.00	V/ICA		
77				
him, his rig.	ht to remain silent, that a	9 at A	M/PM, and was additional	day of
his counsel.	ally unable to afford counse	ily statements by him ma	nd Solvency hearing on the M/PM, and was advised by may be used against him, his rivill be appointed; of his right too will be afforded him to	e of the charge against
	thends, and the	it reasonable implementa	tion will be att	to communicate with
( ) a Det	fendama k	TOKINER CEDATE	TV Three m	TOTAL DIE TOTEROINE
iov	THE THIRD WIE C	Our that he had a		
( c. The	Defendant waited Defen	dant's solvency and non-	ndant solvent and financially a	nsel, and the Court-
<b>{</b>	Defendant waived the relation of the property of the property waive my right of the property o	hi to counsel at the fi	I counsel or will retain coundant solvent and financially a inted the Public Defender to rst appearance only.	represent Defendant
,	my attorney files an ana	lvent and financially able	appearance only.	
	solvency and ability to	secure counsel	rst appearance only. appearance only. to secure counsel, I hereby intil I file a written request	waive counsel until
BOND ∡CTT	IOM			for a review of my
TAKEN, IC .	iny	Defenda	nt's Signature	
HEREnv	A CIVID III	JUDG	p p	
VISORY	VLKNOWLEDGE RECE	IPT OF A COPY OF	THE FOREGOING COMP	
******		STATE OF FLOADA	THE FOREGOING COMP	LANT AND AD-
	De care la Continue			Barrie
Date	De reguli de Stiorney	Popularies applears	amony the files and	1.178.17.17.
	2.63	Addre	59	
		and rayer of	120 04	A
		# 15 (m)		

### IN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR PINELLAS COUNTY, FLORIDA

CASE NO. CRC 8000465CFANO

SPN: 87081

	15.
STATE OF	FLORIDA
	LUUNLUA

CAREN BARRS

)	1.
TO ALL AND SINGULAR THE SHERIFFS OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA, GREETING	Ĭ
TUTGE ARE TO SEEMING OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA, GREETING	:
THE OF ARE IN THIS PARTY VALLE.	
THESE ARE TO COMMAND YOU as you have heretofore been commande to take CAREN BARRS  be found in your County to the	đ
she she	
1 " +" Jour County, and her	٠.
her body before the Judge of the above Court, at the Court-	170
body before the Judge of the	**
hours to a	
noise in Clearwater, PinekDac County INSTAUTED	
nouse in Clearwater, Pinekpes County, INSTANTER, to answer an Information found and now pending in said Courty for said County, for OBTAINING EXCHERNY IN RETURN FOR WORTHLESS CHECK (832.05); BOND SET AT \$250.00	om-
ation tound and now pending in said Courts con	
OBTAINING PROPERTY IN RETURN FOR HODYWIEses THE Said County, for	
TOR WORTHLESS CHECK (832.05); BOND SET AT 1250 00	
INCLUDING SURCHARGE	

and have then and there this writ, with due return of your action endorsed thereon.

> WITNESS, HAROLD MULLENDORE, 35 Clerk of the Court, and the seal of said Could at Clearwater, this 22hd day of ......January ..., 19.80.

HAROLD MULLENDORE As Clerk of the Court

(SEAL)

STATE OF FLORIDA - PRIPLIAS COUNTY Thereby (CLAS Viral Reformation in Status copy as the count appears among the files and according the count.

# IN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR PINELLAS COUNTY, FLORIDA

CARE

CASE NO. CRC 8000465CFANO

SPN: 87081

STATE OF FLORIDA

VB. CAREN BARRS JAN 28 1980

TO ALL AND SINGULAR THE SHERIFFS OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA, GREETING:

and have then and there this writ, with due return of your action endorsed thereon.

witness, Harold Mullendore, as Clerk of the Court, and the seal of said Court at Clearwater, this 22nd.....danuary..., 19.80.

HAROLD MULLENDORE As Clerk of the Co

As Clerk of the Court

By: Shuley a Merifice As Deputy Clerk

(SEAL)

CONT CO.

STATE OF FLOWIDA - TOPLIAS COUNTY Thereby much wolf the flowing in a flue copy of the 12-de abbedis among the files and second this court.

4 June


HORACI CARCUIT COURT

Deputy Clork

CT CR 1

ld captes not

the section of the se



SEE OTHER SIDE FOR COMMENT IF ANY CHECK TRUE THAGE PORTRAIT REVERSE STATE OF PLOPEDA: \*\*\* PLEAS COUNTY
Therefore His visit meltication gis a true copy
or the contractible and among the files and
Hours of imaginate.

JUNE OF STAKED

Deputy Clark

### IN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR PINELLAS COUNTY, FLORIDA

JUL 1/1980 HAROLD MULLENDORE CLERK CIRCUIT COURT Departy Cleri

CASE NO. CRC 80-465 CFANO STATE OF PLORIDA CAREN BARRS OBTAINING PROPERTY IN RETURN FOR SPN 87081 WORTHLESS CHECK JUDGMENT YRUNOSERVINING The defendant, being present, and with counsel, The derendant, Deing present, and with counsel, warren Larray upon being caused to at and before the bar in the custody of the Sheriff, the Court pronounced OBTAINING PROPERTY IN RETURN FOR MORTHLESS CHECK as(charged) (incimded) in the Information filed herein, and having now identified yourself as(Charged) (indimnum) in the information filed herein; and having now identified yourself to the Court as the defendant named herein; and saying nothing in bar or preclusion why the to the Court as the derendant named herein; and saying nothing in par or preclusion why the judgment and xentered of the law should not now be pronounced against you, the Court hereby They would be guilty and the same amount not now be pronounced against you, to be guilty and they allow they accommodified the same and The defendant is advised of his right to appeal and of his right to have counsel for appeal purposes. The defendant is remanded to the custody of the Sheriff. DONE AND ORDERED this 2nd day of Clearwater , Plorida. 19 80 in open Court, in Left four fingers Judge of the Left thumb t Court four fingers Right thumb 3 3 I hereby certify that the above and foregoing fingerprints on this Judgment are the fingerprints of the defendant placed thereon by said defendant in my presence, in open court, the and that they were 2nd day of STATE OF FLORIDA FREE AND OUN Thereby of safety was the form of safety of the safety o the same appears among the files at CT-CR 27 A 2 2 his court

LAKER

Falix Of Circles Court

Deputy Clerk

DATE:

CLERK'S ACCOUNTING

Please furnish an itemized statement of all costs of Prosecution in the following case.

Case No.

Defendant

St. Petersburg-Clearwater

80-465 CF Caren Barrs

INFORMATION \$20.00

FILED

JUL 7 1980

CLERK CIRCUIT COURT

any of t

On Off

probatio discharge

forth with

cc:

CT CŘ 61

STATE OF 1		Plaintiff	In the	CIRCUIT	Action 1997	현기 (4 - 11) 	Court	21 <b>(</b>
CAREN BARI			of	PINELLAS		County,		, ;,
8PN 87081		Defendant		Case No	CRC 80-465 (	FANO	rioriug	7:
This cause	coming on this	day to be heard before	re me, and you, the	defendant.	Caren Bar	MMANO		
<u> </u>				-	resent before me			
	A PLEA OF G				recint pelote (in	, and you		
the offense of		PROPERTY IN RET		THOU THE THE	UKIXRI			
and with c	ounsel, Warr	en LaFray	TOK HORTHE	ESS CHECK	the defend	ant being	presen	<u>t</u>
·								_
the court hereby	adjudges you to	o be guilty of said off	ense; and					
It appearin	g to the satisfact	tion of the Court that are of society do not a	VOU are not likely					
case encus or justi-	ce and the welfa	tion of the Court that are of society do not a	equire that you sho	again to enga uld suffer the	ge in a criminal penalty authori	course of co	nduct, end	i that
Now, there	fore, It is ordere	d and adjudged that t	he Imposition of sec	ntence is here	by withhead	att of the		
on probation for Officers, such sur	a period of Pervision to be as	FOUR YEARS ubject to the provision	under t	he supervision	of he Departn	L'E	ا دومی	placed
li is further	Andana dalah				1 1111	1 0 1000	- 1	ita
(1)	Not later than	ou shall comply with it the fifth day of each form provided for the the State of Florida t	the following condit	ions of proba-	tion. JUL	10 1980	- 1	
(2)	You will pay	form provided for the State of Florida teless otherwise waived	nt purpose,		CAPACITE C	AUTHERIPS	getich Dan	
(8)	*upervision uni You will not a	less otherwise waived change your residence	in compliance with	Dollars (\$16). Florida Statut	per m <u>onth towa</u>	rd the port e	196	
(4)	procuring the	Content of your but	or employment or	leave the cour	nty of your resid	lence mith		
$\int_{(5)}$	Probation Office	er possess, carry or or	wn any weapons or	firearm witho	ut first securing	the consent	of your	
	be necessary in	ing remain at liberty .	without violating an	y law. A con	riction in a cou	rt of law ab-	II not	
/ (6)	dangerous subst	te intoxicants to exce	es; nor will you visi	t places when	your pronation of intoxicants of	um or other		
(7)	You will work	diligently at a law.	sold, dispensed or u occupation and sup	sed. Port any dens	endente to the t	oto or orner		
(8)								
	Officer, and all- comply with all	ow the Officer to visi I instructions he may	t in your home, at	rcted to you your employn	by the Court on nunt site or else:	the Probation	)ns Su will	
(9)	You will	enroll part	lotosta da				,,,	
	any progr	am or rehabil	litative act	na succe Ivitv. r	SSfully co	omplete		
(10)			ou outlest	mav co	// 1 Pac+			
	TOM WITT 26	TVE ID a Commun				by the ne	na remoni	_
	or the Sher	iff no later the	n 12.00 H	.00 4711 5	urrender yo	urself to	the cus	c stod
(11)	co de neare.	St defendantin .	.1	, -, 2	soo (brac	2 Of inca:	rceratio	nn
(12)	You will may	ke full restitui	cal counseling	, as requi	red by your	probation	superv	/iso:
(13) (14)	rou will hav	ve no interest	أ و المالية	, 01 0	nis date.		-	
(24)	tod will pay	y the cost of the	is prosecution	in the a	mount of \$	ecking ac 20.00	counts.	
	CRC 80-465	robation as to C 5 CFANO.	TC 80-1547 MMA	NO, to rui	- concurrent	ly with		
						-,	<i>,</i> .	
You are been	Defendant	is advised of r	ight to appeal				./	
or may extend the pe	placed on notice riod of probation	e that the Court may	at any time rescind	or modify a	ny of the condit	ions of some	( * 	
which it might have in	of your probation posed before all	e that the Court may n as euthorized by law on, you may be arreste acing you on probation	, or may discharge y d and the Court may	ou from furth	er supervision; as Drobation and to	nd that if you	violate	•
It is further and		you on properior	1.	•	,	those suh sen	tence	
probation, you shall be	released from c	ou have reported to the suitody if you are in co	e Probation Officer	and have been	Instructed as to	the condition	u of	
	•				. October the Brite	ies thereon a	hall stand	
it is further orde orthwith provide certi	red that the Cleri fied copies of sar	k of this Court file thi	order in his office,	record the as	me in the Minus			
DONE AND OR	DERED IN ORCA	k of this Court file this me to the Probation Of COURT, this the	ficer for his use in c	ompliance wi	th the requireme	worthe Coup nia of law,	rt, and	
	THE THE OFFICE	COURT, this the	2nd day	·1 - VW	ly	9 80		
cc: Sheriff				Dam)	J			
		<del></del>	STATEOFILE	CA- RELL	ACCOUNTY	<del></del>		
i acknowledge n	eceipt of a cer	rufun stoneof this	order and Darlo	edis allimina	isatrve copy tiye inaa ana		<u> </u>	
ala:			30. 11 Mile 2000	Homom	nove Neen ex	plained to r	116.	
nstructed by:		.60	19 2004	JUM	robationer		·	
Original: Court Copies: Probationes	_			RIGENCIAN Ciamof Ci	Ca SLAKER		_	
Pu-	•	SERVICE		SHORAGIOI		DC G-9 Rev. 7	<u>%، 0</u> 8	37
Estable at S	pata tau	A C # 3	Loya	M	140			
	0.00	AT F	Sander Santa	Dêi	outy Clerk	20.00		Sec. 18

## EXHIBIT C

}	
1	DISTRICT COURT FILED
2	COPY CLARK COUNTY, NEVADAUN 18 10 28 AM '04
3	* * * * Class & Langines. CLERK
4	CLERK
5	STATE OF NEVADA,
6	Plaintiff,
7	vs. ) Case No. C172534
8	) Dept. XIV ALFRED P. CENTOFANTI III, )
9	Defendant.
10	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
11	·
12	REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT
13	OF JURY TRIAL
14	
.15	-BEFORE THE HONORABLE DONALD M. MOSLEY
16	DISTRICT JUDGE
17	Taken on Tuesday, March 16, 2004
18	At 1:30 p.m.
19	APPEARANCES:
20	For the State: BECKY GOETTSCH, ESQ.
21	CLARK PETERSON, ESQ. Deputy District Attorneys
22	For the Defendant: HOWARD BLOOM, ESQ.
23	GLORIA M. NAVARRO, ESQ.
24	Special public Defender
25	Reported by: Maureen Schorn, CCR No. 496, RPR

1	case until the entire thing is over.
2	Would you be able to make sure to follow the
3	law and not reach any decision until you heard everything
4	on the case, and the Judge gave the law in this case?
5 ·	PROSPECTIVE JUROR SALAS: Yes.
6	MR. BLOOM: Thank you very much. Pass
7	for cause, Your Honor.
8	THE COURT: Thank you. The Defense
9	counsel may exercise the first peremptory challenge.
10	MR. BLOOM: Your Honor, we would ask
11	the Court to thank and excuse Juror No. 3, Mrs. Alley.
12	THE COURT: Thank you very much, ma'am.
13	THE CLERK: Badge No. 285, Caren Barrs,
14	B-a-r-r-s.
15	THE COURT: Is it Miss or Mrs. Barrs?
16	PROSPECTIVE JUROR BARRS: Mrs.
17	THE COURT: Mrs. Barrs, do you know of
18	any reason why you could not serve as a fair juror in this
19	particular case?
20	PROSPECTIVE JUROR BARRS: No.
21	THE COURT: Have you served as a juror
22	before?
23	PROSPECTIVE JUROR BARRS: No, I
24	haven't.
25	THE COURT: Are you or any of your

1	
1	close friends or relatives involved in law enforcement, or
2	have you been in the past?
3	PROSPECTIVE JUROR BARRS: My husband
4	works for Prison Health Services. He's the booking
5	medication nurse at the Clark County Detention Center.
6	THE COURT: How long has he been
7	involved in that kind of work?
8	PROSPECTIVE JUROR BARRS: He's been
9	there almost five years now.
10	THE COURT: You have occasion to
11	discuss his work with him, I take it, from time to time?
12	PROSPECTIVE JUROR BARRS: Occasionally.
13	THE COURT: Do you think when this
14	matter is resolved and you have an opportunity to speak
15	with him about it, you would feel a compunction to explain
16	or justify your verdict to him?
17	PROSPECTIVE JUROR BARRS: Absolutely
18	not.
19	THE COURT: Do you think his employment
20	and your obvious relationship with him would have any
21	effect on your view of this case?
22	PROSPECTIVE JUROR BARRS: No.
23	THE COURT: Do you think you can be a
24	fair juror?
25	PROSPECTIVE JUROR BARRS: Yes.

1	THE COURT: Have you or a close friend
2	or family member ever been a victim of crime?
3	PROSPECTIVE JUROR BARRS: No.
4	THE COURT: Will you follow all the
5	instructions of the Court on the law, even though they may
6	differ from your personal conceptions of what the law
7	ought to be?
8	PROSPECTIVE JUROR BARRS: Yes, I will.
9	THE COURT: A person who is accused of
10	committing a crime is presumed to be innocent in a
11	criminal trial. Do you understand and agree with that?
12	PROSPECTIVE JUROR BARRS: Yes, I do.
13	THE COURT: Are you aware that the
14	defendant does not have to take the stand and testify or
15	offer any evidence if he chooses not to, and you can still
16	find him not guilty? That's because the burden is upon
17	the State to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
18	PROSPECTIVE JUROR BARRS: Yes.
19	THE COURT: Have you or a close friend
20	or family member ever been involved in the criminal
21	justice process, either in prosecuting a case, or as a
22	witness, or as a defendant?
23	PROSPECTIVE JUROR BARRS: My son is
24	incarcerated in New York State on a burglary charge.
25	THE COURT: As we speak?

1	PROSPECTIVE JUROR BARRS: Yes.
2	THE COURT: New York City?
3	PROSPECTIVE JUROR BARRS: New York
. 4	State.
5	THE COURT: How old is your son?
6	PROSPECTIVE JUROR BARRS: He's 34.
7	THE COURT: And he moved to New York at
8	some point?
9	PROSPECTIVE JUROR BARRS: No. I'm
10	originally from New York State, and we moved out here and
11	he and his other brother stayed in New York state. One
12	son came out here with us.
13	THE COURT: When the situation occurred
14	that led to his prosecution, were you here?
15	PROSPECTIVE JUROR BARRS: No. I was in
16	New York State at that time.
17	THE COURT: Do you have some idea of
18	what was alleged and the factual scenario?
19	
20	PROSPECTIVE JUROR BARRS: Yes.
21	THE COURT: As you look at it at this
22	juncture, do you feel that he was treated fairly, or perhaps not?
23	
24	PROSPECTIVE JUROR BARRS: He was
25	treated fairly.
45	THE COURT: Of course, it was a
L	

[

	<u> </u>
1	difficult situation?
2	PROSPECTIVE JUROR BARRS: Yes, it was.
3	THE COURT: Do you think that
4	notwithstanding that situation, that you can objectively
5	evaluate this case?
6	PROSPECTIVE JUROR BARRS: Yes, I do.
7	THE COURT: And you say a burglary?
8	PROSPECTIVE JUROR BARRS: Yes.
9	THE COURT: What did that involve?
10	PROSPECTIVE JUROR BARRS: My son and
11	two other of his friends entered a house. There was an
12	older lady in the house at the time. They didn't know she
13	was there and they attempted to steal an aunt of one of
14	the other boys, attempted to steal some of her jewelery.
15	THE COURT: Have you ever been, or do
16	you know anyone who has ever been a victim of domestic
17	violence?
18	PROSPECTIVE JUROR BARRS: Yes.
19	THE COURT: Tell me about that.
20	PROSPECTIVE JUROR BARRS: My mother by
21	my stepfather.
22	THE COURT: Were you living in the home
23	at the time?
24	PROSPECTIVE JUROR BARRS: Yes, I was.
25	I was five.

1	THE COURT: What length of time are we
2	talking about? Five years old through eight years or
3	something?
4	PROSPECTIVE JUROR BARRS: Probably five
5	through six, because he was killed in an accident shortly
6	after that.
7	THE COURT: So during this
8	year-and-a-half, two years, whatever, you observed
9	violence orchestrated against your mother?
10	PROSPECTIVE JUROR BARRS: I did, but I
11	vaguely remember it.
12	THE COURT: Do you think that would
13	have any bearing on your view of this case?
14	PROSPECTIVE JUROR BARRS: No, I don't.
15	
16	THE COURT: Have you or someone you know ever been accused of demands
1.7	know ever been accused of domestic violence, other than the stepfather?
18	
19	PROSPECTIVE JUROR BARRS: No one else,
20	
21	THE COURT: Tell us, please, of your
	employment, your marital status, the number of children
22	you may have, and how long you've lived in Clark County.
23	PROSPECTIVE JUROR BARRS: I've been in
24	Clark County a little over six years. I'm a Hospice nurse
25	and case manager, home care supervisor. I have three

1	sons, one that lives here who is 27. The other two are in
2	New York State, and one is 38, and the other is 34.
3	THE COURT: And, of course, you've
4	indicated this position with the one son. Are either of
5	the others or their wives involved in a law-related
6	occupation?
7	PROSPECTIVE JUROR BARRS: No.
8	THE COURT: And how long have you been
9	with your current employment?
10	PROSPECTIVE JUROR BARRS: I have been
11	with the Hospice three-and-a-half years now.
12	THE COURT: Any other employment on
1.3	your part here in Clark County?
14	PROSPECTIVE JUROR BARRS: Yes. I was a
15	health and wellness director of an assisted living home,
16	and I also worked in an ICU unit at one of our main
17	hospitals here in the city.
18	THE COURT: Are you a nurse?
19	PROSPECTIVE JUROR BARRS: I am.
20	THE COURT: A Registered Nurse?
21	PROSPECTIVE JUROR BARRS: LPN.
22	THE COURT: And your husband's
23	occupation?
24	PROSPECTIVE JUROR BARRS: He is a
25	nurse, an LPN in the prison health services.

1	THE COURT: In Clark County what other
2	work has he done?
3	PROSPECTIVE JUROR BARRS: In Clark
4	County he worked as a security guard at one of the local
5	casinos.
6	THE COURT: And you moved from New York
7	when you came here?
8	PROSPECTIVE JUROR BARRS: From New York
9	State, yes.
10	THE COURT: Were you employed there?
11	PROSPECTIVE JUROR BARRS: Yes.
12	THE COURT: Tell me about that, please?
13	PROSPECTIVE JUROR BARRS: I have been a
14	nurse for 37 years, and I was employed in a hospital in
15	New York State, and also in three other hospitals in New
16	York State.
17	THE COURT: Any work outside of that
18	area?
19	PROSPECTIVE JUROR BARRS: I owned and
20	operated dog kennels for about ten years on my own. It's
21	more of a hobby.
22	THE COURT: Before you got involved in
23	nursing?
24	PROSPECTIVE JUROR BARRS: During the
25	same time?
i	

,	
1	THE COURT: There was a commercial
2	aspect to this?
3	PROSPECTIVE JUROR BARRS: Yes, it was.
4	THE COURT: You grew up in what city in
5	New York?
6	PROSPECTIVE JUROR BARRS: Owasco, New
7	York. It's a very small farming community in New York
8	State.
9	THE COURT: Is that upper New York?
10	PROSPECTIVE JUROR BARRS: It's near
11	Syracuse, New York.
12	THE COURT: Did you meet your husband
13	in New York?
14	PROSPECTIVE JUROR BARRS: Yes, I did.
15	THE COURT: What kind of work was he
16	doing?
17	PROSPECTIVE JUROR BARRS: At that time
18	he was a news room supervisor in a newspaper.
19	THE COURT: And then from that point to
20	his nursing, was there another occupation or two?
21	PROSPECTIVE JUROR BARRS: Yes. He
22	worked security in one of the local hospitals that I
23	worked in.
24	THE COURT: Is that where you met?
25	PROSPECTIVE JUROR BARRS: Yes, it is.

1	THE COURT: Have you any prejudice as
2	to the nature of the charge in this case?
3	PROSPECTIVE JUROR BARRS: No. I have
4	not.
5	THE COURT: Do you know any of the
6	other prospective jurors?
7	PROSPECTIVE JUROR BARRS: No, I don't.
8	THE COURT: Have you any racial
9	prejudice?
10	PROSPECTIVE JUROR BARRS: No.
11	THE COURT: Do you understand that an
12	Information is a mere accusation and not evidence, that
13	the Defendant is presumed to be innocent until proven
14	guilty, and that the State has the burden of proving the
15	defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt?
16	PROSPECTIVE JUROR BARRS: Yes.
17	THE COURT: If you were charged with an
18	offense similar to the one that's alleged in this case, or
19	if you were prosecuting this case, would you want 12
20	individuals such as yourself to be on your jury?
21	PROSPECTIVE JUROR BARRS: Yes, I would.
22	THE COURT: Do you know of any reason
23	at all why you could not be completely fair and completely
24	impartial in hearing this matter?
25	PROSPECTIVE JUROR BARRS: No.

1	THE COURT: Mrs. Barrs, these
2	proceedings may be conducted in two segments. First, the
3	jury will determine if the defendant is guilty.
4	Punishment would not be considered at that time.
5	Second, if the jury finds the defendant
6	guilty of first degree murder, then the law of this state
7	requires that the jury set the punishment. I would set a
8	date for a hearing on the subject of punishment; do you
9	understand?
10	PROSPECTIVE JUROR BARRS: Yes.
11	THE COURT: In the State of Nevada
12	under these circumstances, there are two possible forms of
13	punishment that the jury may consider; life imprisonment
14	without the possibility of parole, or life imprisonment or
15	a term of 50 years with the possibility of parole.
16	Do you understand that?
17	PROSPECTIVE JUROR BARRS: Yes.
18	THE COURT: In your present state of
19	mind, could you consider fairly both possible forms of
20	punishment and select the one that you feel is most
21	appropriate?
22	PROSPECTIVE JUROR BARRS: Yes, I could.
23	THE COURT: Are there questions from
24	the State?
25	MR. PETERSON: Thank you, Judge. $100$

1	Mrs. Barrs, have you or any of your sons
2	ever been divorced?
3	PROSPECTIVE JUROR BARRS: No.
4	MR. PETERSON: As a nurse, understand
5	that there's going to be probably some medical testimony
6	in this case, and you have to confine yourself to the
7	testimony that's presented in court.
8	You can't go and consult any of the text you
9	may have or resources you have; do you understand that?
10	PROSPECTIVE JUROR BARRS: I understand.
11	MR. PETERSON: Have you had hiring and
12	firing authority in any of your many jobs?
13	PROSPECTIVE JUROR BARRS: Yes, I have.
14	MR. PETERSON: How do you feel like in
15	making those decisions?
16	PROSPECTIVE JUROR BARRS: It's
17	necessary and I have no problem with that.
18	MR. PETERSON: In the incident
19	involving your son in New York, were you called on to be a
20	witness to assist either the Prosecution or the Defense in
21	that matter?
22	PROSPECTIVE JUROR BARRS: No, I wasn't.
23	MR. PETERSON: You answered with some
24	enthusiasm, I thought, when the Judge asked do you
25	think if you were either charged, either the defendant

or the State in this case, could you be fair. And you 1 answered like you had something there you wanted to say. 2 What is it that made you answer in that way? PROSPECTIVE JUROR BARRS: Over the years when I've worked with the public I've had to deal 5 with several different conflicting opportunities. And I've always prided myself to be extremely fair, and to 7 8 look at both sides equally. 9 It's something that I wanted done for me if I'm in that position, and I've always tried to give that 10 back to other people. 11 12 MR. PETERSON: Thank you, ma'am. Pass 13 for cause, Judge. 14 THE COURT: Thank you. 15 Defense counsel? 16 MR. BLOOM: Thank you, Your Honor. Good afternoon, Mrs. Barrs. 17 18 In this case there is going to be the presentation of considerable graphic evidence, photographs 19 of the death, the deceased Virginia Centofanti. Ask a 20 couple questions with regard to the impact of graphic 21 22 evidence. 23 You would be directed if you are a juror on this case to look at that evidence for the evidentiary 24 value it has, because it will have evidence to help us 25

understand what happened. 1 2 But not allow the emotional response of seeing a dead woman and seeing her shot and seeing blood 3 and things like that that will be depicted in a photograph, and not allow that to well up in you such an 5 emotional response that your emotions would cloud your 6 objectivity, cloud your ability to look at it for 7 evidentiary value of what's being presented. 8 9 Do you think you can do that? 10 PROSPECTIVE JUROR BARRS: Yes, I do. 11 MR. BLOOM: Have you seen in your experience as a nurse circumstances of some rather graphic 12 13 or dramatic injuries? 14 PROSPECTIVE JUROR BARRS: I've had several occasions to be called to the emergency room to 15 work in the emergency room when they were short when I was 16 at the hospital, and we had quite number of domestic 17 violence cases come in that needed to be treated. 18 19 MR. BLOOM: Domestic violence or any other kind of violence? Have you seen gunshot injuries? 20 21 PROSPECTIVE JUROR BARRS: Yes, I have. 22 MR. BLOOM: Could you please tell me the difference between Registered Nurse, RN, and the LPN 23 designation? 24 25 PROSPECTIVE JUROR BARRS: A Registered

Nurse has probably a year more education up to a Master's 1 Degree. An LPN, I, for instance, had two years of schooling instead of the three to four years. 3 Basically, we are governed by this in different states under what we can do according to law 5 under an RN's scope of practice. And, basically, an RN earns more money and they also do more supervising and 7 more directorship type things. 8 MR. BLOOM: Your position puts you in 9 contact with patients, am I correct? 10 PROSPECTIVE JUROR BARRS: Very much so. 11 12 MR. BLOOM: You mentioned that your 13 mother was a victim of domestic violence when you were a 14 child. That can have long ranging impacts. Do you think it will impact you in this case? 15 PROSPECTIVE JUROR BARRS: No, I don't. 16 17 MR. BLOOM: You never even said 18 anything about whether or not the allegation was domestic 19 violence against a woman or against a man. Do you believe 20 there could be a situation where there could be some 21 domestic violence against a man? 22 PROSPECTIVE JUROR BARRS: Yes, I do. 23 MR. BLOOM: You've made some very 24 important decisions in your life, but you have -- from my

notes here have not served an a juror before?

1	PROSPECTIVE JUROR BARRS: I have not.
2	MR. BLOOM: Do you believe in this case
3	considering the many experiences you had in your life, and
4	the questions were put regarding hiring and firing, those
5	are important decisions as well?
6	Do you think this decision as you were
7	sitting on a jury involving Mr. Centofanti that it would
8	be one of the most important decisions you would be making
9	in your life?
10	PROSPECTIVE JUROR BARRS: Oh,
11	definitely.
12	MR. BLOOM: You mentioned that
13	sometimes you treat people who have been the victim of
14	domestic violence.
15	Would there be anything about that
16	experience that might cause you to set it aside and look
17	at the evidence we presented in this courtroom, as the
18	Judge said what happens in this courtroom.
19	Would you be able to do that?
20	PROSPECTIVE JUROR BARRS: I think I
21	could.
22	MR. BLOOM: Pass for cause, Your Honor.
23	Thank you very much.
24	THE COURT: Counsel approach the bench,

Schuley B Langum

JUN 29 9 15 AM '04 **ROC** 1 CARMINE J. COLUCCI, ESQ. CARMINE J. COLUCCI, CHTD. 2 Nevada Bar #000881 629 South Sixth Street 3 Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 FILED (702) 384-1274 4 Attorney for Defendant, ALFRED P. CENTOFANTI III 5 6 7 8 DISTRICT COURT 9 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 10 CASE NO. C172534 STATE OF NEVADA, 11 **XIV** DEPT NO. Plaintiff, 12 vs. 13 Date of Hearing: ALFRED P. CENTOFANTI III, Time of Hearing: 14 Defendant. 15 RECEIPT OF COPY 16 RECEIPT OF A COPY of MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL is hereby acknowledged 17 this day of June, 2004. 18 DAVID ROGER 19 DISTRICT ATTORNEY 20 BY 21 Clark Vetersen, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 006088 22 Becky Goettsch, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 006316 23 200 South Third Street Las Vegas, Nevada 89155 24 Attorney for Plaintiff 25 26 27 28

EX PARTE MOTION AND ORDER TO JURY COMMISSIONER TO RELEASE JUROR INFORMATION FOR JUROR NUMBER THREE IN STATE OF NEVADA V. ALFRED PAUL CENTOFANTI, III.

Upon the ex parte application of THE STATE OF NEVADA, Plaintiff, by DAVID ROGER, District Attorney, through BECKY GOETTSCH, Chief Deputy District Attorney, and good cause appearing therefore,

#### POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

Between March 15, 2004, and April 15, 2004, this case proceeded to jury trial in Department XIV of the Eighth Judicial District Court. The jury deliberated over the course of two (2) days and returned a verdict of guilty of First Degree Murder on April 15, 2004. Juror number 3 seated on this jury was Caren Barrs of 4141 Swenson Street, Las Vegas, Clark County, Nevada. After the conviction the jurors were apparently investigated by the defense and it was learned that Ms. Barrs had in fact been convicted of a felony in Pinellas

P:\WPDOCS\MOTION\021\02154206.DOC

County, Florida in 1980. This was a felony conviction for Obtaining Property in Return for Worthless Check. Pursuant to Florida law, after of a period of twenty (20) years a felon's Civil Rights are restored. This statute also exists in Nevada.

The State then conducted its own investigation into the juror's felony conviction and learned that the juror had disclosed her felony conviction when she called into the jury commissioner and answered the questions on the telephonic information system. Upon receipt of her jury summons she called in as instructed and disclosed that she did have a felony conviction. She also disclosed this information on her questionnaire to the jury commissioner. The Jury Commissioner or their representative inquired with this potential juror as to whether or not she had any felony convictions in Nevada. Upon a negative response the Jury Commissioner or representative indicated to Ms. Barrs that she should in fact show up in court. When she arrived in court she assumed that all parties were aware of her prior felony conviction and did not offer the information during the jury selection process.

The defense has brought a motion for a new trial based on jury misconduct alleging the defendant is entitled to a new trial due to the fact a juror on the case was a convicted felon. In order to properly defend against the Motion for a New Trial, the State is seeking the release of the information provided to the Jury Commissioner by juror Caren Barrs.

#### **CONCLUSION**

Based upon forgoing, the State requests that the Court order the Jury Commissioner to release any information provided to the jury commissioner by juror number 3, identified as Caren Barrs.

// //

l ".

//

// //



- II	
2	IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that all information regarding juror number 3 Caren
3	Barrs in the case of State of Nevada v. Alfred P. Centofanti, III., be provided by the Jury
4	Commissioner to the State of Nevada.
5	DATED thisday of August, 2004.
6	Lungh maly
7	DISTRICT JUDGE
8	DAVID ROGER
9	Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar # 002781
10	1 $1$ $1$ $1$ $1$ $1$ $1$ $1$ $1$ $1$
11	BY BECKY GOE CESCH
12	Chief Deputy District Attorney Nevada/Bar #006316
13	.,6.1
14	
15	·
16	CERTIFICATE OF FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION
17	I hereby certify that service of State's Ex Parte Request, was made this day of
18	August, 2004, by facsimile transmission to:
19	CARMINE COLLUCCI, ESQ. 384-4453
20	11,11711119
21	BY M. Warner COVVV Employee of the Pistrict Attorney's Office
22	
23	
24	
25	
26	
27	
28	mmw/SVU

• Canada MAL

**OPPS** 1 FILED DAVID ROGER Clark County District Attorney 2 Nevada Bar #002781 Aug 10 2 24 PH '04 3 BECKY GOETTSCH Chief Deputy District Attorney CLERK Nevada Bar #006316 4 200 South Third Street Las Vegas, Nevada 89155-2212 5 (702) 455-4711 Attorney for Plaintiff 6 7 DISTRICT COURT 8 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 9 THE STATE OF NEVADA, 10 C172534 CASE NO: Plaintiff, 11 XIV DEPT NO: -vs-12 ALFRED PAUL CENTOFANTI, III., 13 #1730535 Defendant. 14 STATE'S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL 15 DATE OF HEARING: 08/12/04 16 TIME OF HEARING: 9:00 A.M. 17 COMES NOW, the State of Nevada, by DAVID ROGER, District Attorney, through 18 BECKY GOETTSCH, Chief Deputy District Attorney, and hereby submits the attached 19 Points and Authorities in Opposition to Defendant's Motion For New Trial. 20 This Opposition is made and based upon all the papers and pleadings on file herein, 21 the attached points and authorities in support hereof, and oral argument at the time of 22 hearing, if deemed necessary by this Honorable Court. 23 24 25  $/\!/$ 26 // RECEIVED 28G 1/0 2004 COUMITY CLERK P:\WPDOCS\OPP\FOPP\021\02154202.doc

### POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

#### STATEMENT OF FACTS

Jury trial in this case commenced on March 15, 2004. Jury selection spanned approximately two trial days. The jury venire was composed of individuals who were summoned by the Jury Commissioner and asked to call in to confirm their report time. Clark County resident Caren Barrs received her jury summons and immediately called to inform the Jury Commissioner that she was a convicted felon from 1980 in Florida for a charge that amounted to "bad checks." She was not able to talk to a live person at that time and provided the commissioner with information via the telephonic information system. When she was quizzed regarding prior felony convictions, she pushed the button indicating she was a convicted felon.

When she actually did talk to a Jury Commissioner representative, she disclosed her felon status along with the fact the conviction dated back to 1980 and that her civil rights had been restored. The Jury Commissioner told her to report for jury duty. Ms. Barrs did so and disclosed, once again, her felony conviction in writing. Ms. Barrs was later chosen to sit on the jury. See attached affidavit of Caren Barrs.

The trial lasted approximately one month after in excess of 40 witnesses were called. Some of the testimony became repetitive and tangential by the nature of the defense. On a few limited occasions during the course of the trial, two individuals were allegedly seen by others "sleeping" or at least having their eyes closed during trial. No objection was made by the defense. Neither party, nor the bailiff, nor the Court noticed any "sleeping behavior" warranting comment or admonition.

In addition, Juror No. 5, was a young man traveling from out of town to serve jury duty on a daily basis. On one occasion, he wore a T-shirt to trial which was believed to be advertising a local band. On the T-shirt were the words "Do you know what a murderer looks like?" One juror found the T-shirt inappropriate and told the young man to change his clothes, cover it up, etc. See attached affidavits collectively. She also brought it to the attention of the bailiff. Neither party was made aware of the T-shirt during the trial.

On April 16, 2004, the jury in the above-entitled case found the defendant guilty of First Degree Murder. The jury was polled and all jurors concurred in the vote. The defendant hired a new attorney who filed a Motion for a New Trial based on juror misconduct, on June 28, 2004, well after the statutory time period for filing a Motion for New Trial. Specifically, the defendant argues that one juror was previously convicted of a felony and did not disclose the information to the parties, that one juror conducted an independent firearm experiment, that one juror wore a t-shirt, halfway through trial, that stated "Do you know what a murderer looks like?" and lastly, that two jurors were sleeping during the trial, all of which denied him a fair trial.

# I. THE DEFENDANT'S MOTION IS UNTIMELY AND SHOULD BE DENIED BASED ON JURISDICTIONAL GROUNDS.

The Court may grant a new trial to a defendant if required as a matter of law or upon the discovery of newly discovered evidence. NRS 176.515. A motion based on newly discovered evidence must be made within two (2) years after a finding of guilt. However, a motion for new trial based on any grounds other than newly discovered evidence must be made within seven (7) days after verdict. NRS 176.515.

The Defendant is seeking a new trial based on reasons other than newly discovered evidence. Therefore, the defendant was required by statute to file his motion for a new trial within seven days. The verdict was received on April 16, 2004. The Motion was due on April 23, 2004. The Defendant's Motion for a New Trial was filed on June 28, 2004, approximately two months too late. NRS 176.515. There is no basis for the untimeliness of the Defendant's motion and therefore, the Defendant's motion should be denied.

The case law interpreting NRS 176.515 interprets this deadline strictly. In Depasquale v. State, 106 Nev. 843, 803 P.2d 218 (1990), the Defendant was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to death. Eight (8) days after the final verdict, he filed a motion for a new trial. The District Court declined to hear the motion due to its untimeliness. On appeal, the Nevada Supreme Court held that since the Defendant missed the seven (7) day deadline imposed by NRS 176.515 by filing his motion for new trial eight

(8) days after the completion of the proceedings, the District Court did not err in failing to hear the motion.

In fact, this Court lacks jurisdiction if a motion for a new trial is not timely filed. The language of NRS 176.515 is taken verbatim from Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33. The Nevada Supreme Court has relied on Rule 33 in interpreting NRS 176.515. The time limits in Rule 33 have been held to be jurisdictional. If a motion is not timely filed, the Court lacks power to consider it. <u>U.S. v. Dukes</u>, 727 F.2d 34, 38 (2<sup>nd</sup> Cir. 1987). Since the Defendant's Motion is late, the Court similarly lacks jurisdiction to consider the Motion.

Furthermore, NRS 176.515 specifically states, "A motion for a new trial based on any other grounds must be made within 7 days after verdict or finding of guilt or within such further time as the Court may fix during the 7 day period." (emphasis added). The statute does allow for an extension of time of the seven (7) days if the Court so grants an extension, however, the Legislature was clear that this request for an extension must take place during the seven (7) day period. The Defense did not ask for an extension of time. Furthermore, there is no valid reason for extending the time in this case. Therefore, the Defendant's motion remains untimely and should be dismissed.

## II. THE DEFENDANT'S REQUEST FOR A NEW TRIAL FAILS ON ITS MERITS

The granting of a new trial is within the trial court's discretion and will not be reversed on appeal absent abuse. Sanborn v. State, 107 Nev. 399 (1991). The Defendant argues that he is deserving of a new trial as a matter of law based on juror misconduct. The analysis of these issues must be 1) did any misconduct occur; and 2) if there was misconduct, is it sufficiently or prejudicial to the defendant to justify a new trial. Meyer v. State, 80 P.3d 447 457 (2003).

///

///

, | ///

1
2
3
, 4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26

28

A.	THE DEFENDANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO A NEW TRIAL BASED ON A
	PRIOR FELONY CONVICTION OF CAREN BARRS BECAUSE HER
	CIVIL RIGHTS HAVE BEEN RESTORED, ENTITLING HER TO SERVE
	ON A JURY, AND SHE DID NOT COMMIT MISCONDUCT DURING
	VOIR DIRE.

### 1. CAREN BARRS IS QUALIFIED TO SIT ON A JURY BECAUSE HER CIVIL RIGHTS HAVE BEEN RESTORED

Defendant cites NRS 6.010 for the proposition that Caren Bars is not qualified to serve on a jury. This justification for a new trial must fail because she was in fact qualified to sit on the jury. NRS 6.010 reads:

Except as otherwise provided in this section, every qualified elector of the State, whether registered or not, who has sufficient knowledge of the English language, and who has not been convicted of treason, a felony, or other infamous crime, and who is not rendered incapable by reason of physical or mental infirmity, is a qualified juror of the county in which he resides. A person who has been convicted of a felony is not a qualified juror of the county in which he resides until his civil rights to serve as a juror has been restored pursuant to NRS 176A.850, 179.285, 213.090, 213.155 or 213.157.

Defendant conveniently fails to cite NRS 213.157 which reads in pertinent part:

- 1. Except as otherwise provided in subsection 2, a person convicted of a felony in the State of Nevada who has served his sentence and has been released from prison:
- (a) Is immediately restored to the following civil rights:

(1) The right to vote; and

- (2) The right to serve as a juror in a civil action.
- (c) Six years after the date of his release from prison, is restored to the right to serve in a criminal action.

Of course, since the felony conviction was in Florida and not Nevada, the Court must look to Florida law to see if Florida automatically restores a person's civil rights after completion of sentence.

Fla. Stat. § 940.05 (2004), states:

Any person who has been convicted of a felony may be entitled to the restoration of all the rights of citizenship enjoyed by him or her prior to conviction if the person has:

(1) Received a full pardon from the board of pardons;

- (2) Served the maximum term of the sentence imposed upon him or her;
- (3) Been granted his or her final release by the Parole Commission.

Florida court explained:

In State v. Haden, 370 So. 2d 849, 851 (Fla. App. 1979), referring to Fla. Stat. § 940.05, the

On September 10, 1975, certain Rules of Executive Clemency of Florida were promulgated which were effective November 1, 1975. Included therein were two provisions material to this case.

By Section 9 of the Rules it was provided that 'A. When a

person receives final release from the Florida Parole and Probation Commission, Department of Offender Rehabilitation

or county jail, his civil rights shall be automatically reinstated,

1 2

3

5

6

7

8

10 11

12 13

14

15 16

17

18 19

20

2122

23

24

25

26 27

28

except the right to possess or own a firearm shall be specifically withheld.'
Under that provision of the elemency rules, restoration of civil rights would be automatic following completion of service of sentence by one who so completed his sentence on or after November 1, 1975.

Caren Barrs' Judgment of Conviction was filed on July 10, 1980, and she was sentenced to four (4) years probation. Her civil rights were, therefore, automatically restored sometime in

1984. Consequently, she was qualified to serve on the jury.

### 2. MS. BARRS DID NOT COMMIT MISCONDUCT DURING VOIR DIRE

Even if she was ultimately qualified to sit as a juror, the issue becomes whether she committed misconduct by failing to inform the parties of the conviction during voir dire. Whether Caren Barrs' failure to mention her prior felony warrants a new trial is a two step inquiry. The first inquiry is whether there was "misconduct." To constitute misconduct, the failure of a juror to answer a question touching upon potentially prejudicial information must amount to an "intentional concealment." Canada v. State, 113 Nev. 938, 941, 944 P.2d 781, 783 (1997); Lopez v. State, 105 Nev. 68, 89, 769 P.2d 1276, 1290 (1989); Hale v. Riverboat Casino, 100 Nev. 299, 305, 682 P.2d 190, 193 (1984). As the United States Supreme Court has stated, "To invalidate the result of a three-week trial because of a juror's mistaken, though honest response to a question, is to insist on something closer to perfection than our judicial system can be expected to give." Hale, 100 Nev. at 306, 682 P.2d at 194, quoting McDonough Power Equipment v. Greenwood, 104 S.Ct. 845, 850 (1984).

In the attached affidavit, Caren Barrs explained that she believed she did disclose her prior felony conviction. She entered the appropriate data via telephone and in person and was told to appear for jury duty. She also wrote the information down on the Jury

Commissioner information sheet. There has been no "intentional concealment" on her part, and it is not juror misconduct. See Echavarria v. State, 108 Nev. 734, 740 (1992) (failure to disclose assault by juror was not intentional because juror considered it a "fight" not an assault where he was a victim).

The second inquiry (if intentional concealment is found by the court) is whether the misconduct amounted to harmless or prejudicial error. Canada, 113 Nev. at 941, 944 P.2d at 783, citing Geary v. State, 110 Nev. 261, 265, 871 P.2d 927, 930 (1994) vacated on other grounds by Geary v. State, 112 Nev. 1434, 930 P.2d 719 (1996); see also, Hale, 100 Nev. at 306, 682 P.2d at 194. "A new trial must be granted unless it appears, beyond a reasonable doubt, that no prejudice has resulted." Canada, 113 Nev. at 941, 944 P.2d at 783, quoting Lane v. State, 110 Nev. 1156, 1163, 881 P.2d 1358, 1362-64 (1994). Not every incident of misconduct justifies a new trial. Meyer v. State, 80 P.3d 447 453 (2003). Factors to be considered when determining whether juror misconduct constituted harmless error include "whether the issue of innocence or guilt is close, the quantity and character of the error, and the gravity of the crime charged." Canada, 113 Nev. at 941, 944 P.2d at 783, quoting Rowbottom v. State, 105 Nev. 472, 486, 779 P.2d 934, 943 (1989).

The character of the error made by Caren Barr is minimal. It's a crime that occurred more than twenty years ago. The crime was for obtaining property in return for a worthless check. Her civil rights had been restored and she was allowed to regain her right to vote as well as her nursing license. Most importantly however, Ms. Barrs told the Jury Commissioner on more than one occasion about the felony conviction. She did not intentionally conceal the conviction. In fact, the Jury Commissioner told her to appear for jury service and she did so.

In addition, there is absolutely no prejudice to the defendant. Normally, a juror's prior conviction for any crime would be prejudicial to the State and not the Defendant. Also, Defendant had no problem with Caren Barr being on the jury in light of the fact her son is currently in prison in New York, having served eighteen years of incarceration, which she did disclose during voir dire. The question of guilt or innocence was not so close in this case

l

that a twenty year old worthless check conviction for one juror would prejudice the defendant.

Most importantly, however, it is well established that the fact a juror on voir dire, concealed bias or prejudice, and thereafter was sworn and served, does not constitute the type of misconduct covered by the statute for a new trial. Such misconduct that warrants a new trial is only that which occurs after the jury has been impaneled and sworn. State v. Marks, 15 Nev. 33 (1880); State v. Harvey, 62 Nev. 287, 290 (1944)(noting that legislative intent dictates that a subsequently discovered ground for challenge of a juror cannot be used as grounds for a new trial and judicial construction to avoid the harshness of the rule would be improper).

## B. JOSHUA WHEELER DID NOT CONDUCT FIREARM TESTING OR USE ANY INAPPROPRIATE EVIDENCE TO REACH A VERDICT

The defendant next asserts that Juror Wheeler committed misconduct by conducting an experiment with a gun in order to evaluate the evidence. First, it must be established that Joshua Wheeler even conducted an inappropriate test, reenactment, or experiment; and therefore, committed misconduct. Although the defendant's investigator indicates that such an experiment was conducted, the attached affidavit shows that Mr. Wheeler did not conduct any test or experiment regarding a 9 mm murder weapon. Mr. Wheeler did at some point during the pendency of the trial have an opportunity to shoot a .357 Magnum with his father as part of his everyday life. There is nothing inappropriate about a juror going about living his daily life and using his daily experiences and common sense to deliberate and reach a conclusion.

It should also be noted that Mr. Wheeler never considered the shooting with his father to be an experiment or a test. He never discussed it with anyone in the jury room and never even discussed firearms experience with the other jurors, which is indicative of how Mr. Wheeler treated the experience of shooting with his father as a nonissue in the case or deliberations.

Even if we assume however, that Joshua Wheeler's did something wrong in shooting the .357, it does not inherently warrant a new trial. Whether it warrants a new trial requires

1
 2
 3

the District Court to look at two issues: What evidence can the Court consider in setting aside a verdict; and whether the defendant was prejudiced.

"Not every incidence of juror misconduct requires the granting of a motion for a new trial." Meyer v. State, 119 Nev. Adv. Rep. 61, 80 P.3d 447, 454 (2003), <u>quoting Barker v. State</u>, 95 Nev. 309, 313, 594 P.2d 719, 721 (1979). "Each case turns on its own facts, and on the degree and pervasiveness of the prejudicial influence." Meyer, 80 P.3d at 454, <u>quoting United States v. Paneras</u>, 222 F.3d 406, 411 (7th Cir. 2000).

NRS 50.065 states in pertinent part:

2. Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment:
(a) A juror shall not testify concerning the effect of anything upon his or any other juror's mind or emotions as influencing him to assent to or dissent from the verdict or indictment or concerning his mental processes in connection therewith.
(b) The affidavit or evidence of any statement by a juror

indicating an effect of this kind is inadmissible for any purpose.

However, where the misconduct involves extrinsic information or contact with the jury, juror affidavits or testimony establishing the fact that the jury received the information or was contacted are permitted. Meyer, 80 P.2d at 454. A motion for a new trial may only be premised upon juror misconduct where such misconduct is readily ascertainable from objective facts and overt conduct without regard to the state of mind and mental processes of any juror. Id. The District Court's factual inquiry is limited to determining the extent to which jurors were exposed to the extrinsic evidence. Id. at 456.

If Juror Wheeler told the jury, "I went out and conducted a test and this is the result and this means he's guilty," that would be an extrinsic effect on a jury and subject to proof via affidavit. However if Juror Wheeler happened to have a life experience that he may or may not have used in his own mind to form an opinion, such as "it would be impossible for it to come on a target all six times in under four seconds even. It would be real tough," he has not committed misconduct. But most importantly, his statements regarding this is simply not admissible to impeach a verdict as it gets into his mental processes. The latter reflects the situation at bar.

This conclusion is confirmed by Meyer v. State, 80 P.3d at 447. On this case, the defendant was convicted of sexual assault of his estranged wife. The victim later recanted. At issue were raised bumps on the victim's scalp and an issue arose as to whether the bumps were from abusive hair pulling or Accutane medication. During deliberations one juror discussed how the bumps were similar to hair pulling she had seen in her work with domestic violence victims. Another consulted a PDR regarding the medication. Defendant brought a new trial based on juror misconduct. See also Barker v. Nevada, 95 Nev. 309, 311 (1979) (fact foreperson reported to jury effects if heroin on body was harmless error).

The appellate court found no misconduct on the part of a juror using her every day experience with domestic violence victims. This is similar to Mr. Wheeler shooting with his father. The court went on to find that consulting the PDR, and relaying it to other jurors, was prejudicial misconduct. In the case at bar, however, Mr. Wheeler never even discussed shooting experience with other jurors. Therefore, any impeachment of the verdict by Josh Wheeler's mental processes is impermissible.

Furthermore, Prejudice is shown whenever there is a reasonable probability or likelihood that the juror misconduct affected the verdict. <u>Id.</u> at 454. A conclusive presumption of prejudice applies only in the most egregious cases, such as jury tampering.

However, other types of extrinsic material, such as media reports, including television stories or newspaper articles, generally do not raise a presumption of prejudice. Jurors' exposure to extraneous information via independent research or improper experiment is likewise unlikely to raise a presumption of prejudice. In these cases, the extrinsic information must be analyzed in the context of the trial as a whole to determine if there is a reasonable probability that the information affected the verdict.

Id. at 456. To determine whether there is a reasonable probability that juror misconduct affected a verdict, a court may consider a number of factors.

For example, a court may look at how the material was introduced to the jury (third-party contact, media source, independent research, etc.), the length of time it was discussed by the jury, and the timing of its introduction (beginning, shortly before verdict, after verdict, etc.) Other factors include whether the information was ambiguous, vague, or specific in content; whether it was cumulative of other evidence adduced at trial;

whether it involved a material or collateral issue; or whether it involved inadmissible evidence (background of the parties, insurance, prior bad acts, etc.). In addition, a court must consider the extrinsic influence in light of the trial as a whole and the weight of evidence.

<u>Id.</u> See also <u>United States v. Rogers</u>, 121 F.3d 12, 17 (1st Cir. 1997) (Use of dictionary by juror not prejudicial per se).

There does not appear to be any evidence that Joshua Wheeler even discussed his shooting experience with other jurors, let alone the performance of any sort of test or experiment. See attached affidavits. It should also be noted that it was uncontroverted in this case, by both the defense and prosecution experts, that there were two separate shooting "moments" at the murder scene due to the fact one set of shell casings were between the end table and the end of the couch and the other set of shell casings were near the body, by the fireplace and exercise bike. Even the defense expert said that the shooting took place in two parts, or the shots were separated by a pause, and it appeared that the defendant "followed" the victim around the coffee table, all of which supports a first degree murder conviction regardless of how fast the defendant could empty the gun, which is allegedly the nature of Juror Wheeler's alleged experiment. In light of that overwhelming evidence, no evidence of self-defense as put forth by the defendant, the fact none of Juror Wheeler's experiences regarding guns was brought to the deliberations, Mr. Wheeler's shooting a .357 with his father is of no consequence and does not justify a new trial.

## C. THE DEFENDANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO A NEW TRIAL DUE TO A SHIRT WORN BY A JUROR

The defendant alleges that one of the jurors wore a t-shirt to trial, during the evidence portion, stating, "Do you know what a Murderer looks like?" or something similar. One juror, later to be elected the jury foreperson, noticed the t-shirt and pointed it out to the bailiff and to the juror that it was not appropriate. The juror then apparently made efforts to conceal it during trial. Neither party noticed it during the trial and no record was made regarding any shirts worn by jurors. There is no evidence the shirt was made for the trial or

that the juror was making any comment on the evidence. The t-shirt appeared older and pertained to a local band. See attached affidavits.

It is inconceivable how this fact could warrant a new trial and an undoing of months of time and expense by our Courts. A juror's clothing choice does not constitute misconduct absent a finding that the clothing reflects a preconceived opinion or is otherwise inappropriate for Court. The defense cites no authority to the contrary and there is absolutely no authority for the defense's position that a juror's clothing choice warrants a new trial.

This is especially true since no record was made at the time it was worn and no inquiry was made as to the Juror intent, if any. There is no misconduct in a juror wearing whatever he or she wants to Court. There is now no method of inquiry as to what the juror meant by the shirt, if it affected what he was thinking about the case or how it factored in to his deliberations if at all. To make such an inquiry of the juror at this time is inadmissible intrinsic juror testimony precluded by NRS 50.065, as discussed supra.

# D. THE DEFENDANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO A NEW TRIAL DUE TO A ALLEGED SLEEPING BY JURORS

The defendant must first establish misconduct: i.e. that the jurors were sleeping during the trial. In his moving papers, the defendant specifically accuses Joshua Wheeler of sleeping. He denies ever falling asleep during trial. There is some evidence that Juror no. 7, Chris Kelly, did nod off a few isolated times during the trial. The juror sitting next to him, Matt Adams, indicated that he nudged him immediately each time and Juror Kelly then woke up. These were during times when the evidence was becoming tedious and repetitive per the juror's own opinion. See affidavit of Juror Adams. There is no evidence that this juror missed critical portions of testimony or had trouble participating in deliberations because he missed evidence due to sleeping. See attached affidavits.

If our American justice system is going to grant a new trial every time a juror nods off during trial, there will never be a case tried to verdict. Cases uniformly decline to order a new trial in absence of convincing proof jurors were actually asleep during material portions

of testimony. Hasson v. Ford Motor Co., 32 Cal.3d 388, 411 (1982). It is inconceivable that the nodding off on a limited basis over a month long trial has somehow prejudiced the defendant to the point of needing a new trial. Cf. Geary v. State, 110 Nev. 261, 264 (1994) (fact juror wrote brief note to daughter during trial but testified she did not miss evidence and participated fully in deliberations did not warrant new trial); Callegari v. Maurer, 4 Cal.App.2d 178, 184 (1935) (fact juror slept during trial is not grounds for disturbing verdict if it does not appear that sleep was for such a length of time or at such a stage of trial to affect ability to fairly consider case).

It should also be noted that the defense did not raise an issue during trial regarding juror inattentiveness even though he sat closest to the jury. See Rivera v. United States, 295 F.3d 461 (5th Cir. 2002) (defendant waived misconduct claim based on jurors sleeping when it was not raised until after verdict). There was no record made, no objection lodged and no call for an admonition by the judge. As a result, this issue was not preserved as it is virtually impossible now to determine, assuming arguendo that anyone was sleeping, when it took place, by who or how long.

The United State Supreme Court has addressed the danger to the administration of justice when jurors are allowed to later comment upon the sanctity of deliberations to impeach their verdict:

Let it once be established that verdicts solemnly made and publicly returned into court can be attacked and set aside on the testimony of those who took party in their publication and all verdicts could be, and many would be followed by an inquiry in the hope of discovering something which might invalidate a finding. Jurors would be harassed and beset by the defeated party in an effort to secure from them evidence of the facts which might establish misconduct sufficient to set aside a verdict. If evidence thus secured could be thus used, the result would be to make what was intended to be a private deliberation, the constant subject of public investigation — to the destruction of all frankness and freedom of discussion and conference.

McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264, 267-68 (1915).

This is exactly what has occurred in this case. After a conviction of First Degree Murder, the defense has hired an investigator to fish for any slight or perceived inappropriate

1 behavior on anyone's part. This cannot justify the flushing of months of judicial resources, 2 3 summed it up best by stating: 4 5 6 7 conduct. 8 Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 121 (1983). 9 CONCLUSION 10 11 Defendant's Motion for a New Trial should be denied. 12 day of August, 2004. DATED this 13 Respectfully submitted, 14 DAVID ROGER 15 Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #002781 16 17 BY 18 19 Nevada-Bar #006316 20 21 22 August, 2004, by facsimile transmission to: 23 CARMINE COLUUCI, ESQ. 24 25 26 BY M. Warner 27 28

nor does any of it prejudice the fair trial of the defendant, nor is it fair to jurors. The Court Allegations of juror misconduct, incompetency, or inattentive-

ness raised for the first time in days, weeks, or months after the verdict, seriously disrupt the finality of the process. Moreover, full and frank discussion in the jury room, juror's willingness to return an unpopular verdict, and the community's trust in a system that relies on the decisions of lay people would all be undermined by a barrage of post-verdict scrutiny of juror

For all of the foregoing reasons, including the untimely nature of the motion, the

Chief Debuty District Attorney

#### CERTIFICATE OF FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION

I hereby certify that service of State's Opposition, was made this day of

Employee of the District Attorney's Office

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

U

08/05/2004 14:43 FAX 3640146

DA CRIMINAL DIVISION

Ø 002

#### AFFIDAVIT

STATE OF NEVADA ) ss:

JOSH WHEELER, being first duly sworn, deposes and says:

- 1. That I am a resident of Clark County, Nevada and that I served as a juror in State of Nevada v. Alfred P. Centofanti, III., Case No. C172534.
- 2. That during the evidence portion of the trial I had an opportunity to shoot a .357 Magnum gun with my father. This was an activity we had done before.
- 3. That I did not shoot the .357 to conduct any experiments or test fires of the evidence that was presented in the trial.
- 4. That I never mentioned shooting the .357 Magnum to the other jurors during deliberations.
- 5. That I did speak with an investigator for the defense and was aware that it was tape recorded.
- 6. That during the interview with the defense investigator I was asked if anyone conducted any experiments and I replied "No."
- 7. That during the interview with the defense investigator I was asked if anyone drew any diagrams regarding the evidence and I replied "No."
- 8. That none of my shooting experience was addressed or brought up during deliberations.
- 9. That during the evidence portion of the trial I was aware that another juror had worn a t-shirt that others thought was improper. The shirt appeared old and the controversial writing was on the back of the shirt near the belt.
  - 10. That the other juror's clothing had no bearing or effect on my verdict.
  - 11. That I did not sleep during the evidence portion of the trial.
- 12. That I was aware that on one occasion another juror did fall asleep but he was awakened by other jurors immediately.

C-\DOCUME-1\GOETTSH\LOCALS-1\TEMP\WHEELE-1.DOC

08/05/2004 14:43 FAX 3840148

DA CRIMINAL DIVISION

Ø003

13. That this occurred during the end of the trial when no new material was being presented.

14. That at no time during deliberations did any juror indicate that they had missed evidence or were unable to deliberate because they were sleeping.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the law of the State of Nevada that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on

JØSH WHEELER

BG/mmw

DA CRIMINAL DIVISION GRAGSEN ES

② 017 PAGE 01 ② 002

08/05/2004 13:55 FAX 3840146

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

DA CRIMINAL DIVISION

	AF	FI	DA.	V)	<u>[ T</u>
--	----	----	-----	----	------------

STATE OF NEVADA
COUNTY OF CLARK

EMILY CARLSEN, being first duly sworn, deposes and says:

- 1. That I am a resident of Clark County, Nevada and that I served as a juror in State of Nevada v. Alfred P. Centofanti, III., Case No. C172534.
- 2. That neither before nor during deliberation did any juror discuss conducting any test, experiment, or reenactment regarding the evidence.
- 3. That juror Wheeler never mentioned during deliberation any experience shooting a weapon.
- 4. That my verdict was not affected by any clothes worn by any other juror during the trial.
- 5. That during the trial I was not aware of whether other jurors may or may not have been sleeping during the course of the trial.
- 6. That at no time during deliberations did any juror indicate that they had missed evidence or were unable to deliberate because they were sleeping.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the law of the State of Nevada that the foregoing is true and correct.

21 Executed on 7/6/04
22 (Date)

EMILY CAPLSEN

23

24

25

BG/mmw

26

27

28

C:\DOCUME~1\GOETTSB\LOCALS~1\TEMP\CARLSE-1.DOC

1 **AFFIDAVIT** 2 STATE OF NEVADA 3 COUNTY OF CLARK 4 ALAN MILLER, being first duly sworn, deposes and says: 5 1. That I am a resident of Clark County, Nevada and that I served as a juror in State of 6 Nevada v. Alfred P. Centofanti, III., Case No. C172534. 7 2. That neither before nor during deliberation did any juror discuss conducting any 8 9 test, experiment, or reenactment regarding the evidence. 10 3. That juror Wheeler never mentioned during deliberation any experience shooting a 11 weapon. 4. That my verdict was not affected by any clothes worn by any other juror during the 12 trial. I was aware of Juror Kelly wearing a shirt with writing others found inappropriate but 13 the controversial writing was in small print and not visible unless viewed in close proximity. 14 5. That during the trial I was not aware of whether other jurors may or may not have 15 been sleeping during the course of the trial. 16 17 6. That at no time during deliberations did any juror indicate that they had missed 18 evidence or were unable to deliberate because they were sleeping. I declare under penalty of perjury under the law of the State of Nevada that the 19 20 foregoing is true and correct. 21 Executed on 8/6/04 22 23 24 25 26 BG/mmw 27 28

AFFIDAVIT

2

1

STATE OF NEVADA COUNTY OF CLARK

ss:

4

5

б

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

3

MATT ADAMS, being first duly sworn, deposes and says:

- 1. That I am a resident of Clark County, Nevada and that I served as a juror in State of Nevada v. Alfred P. Centofanti, III., Case No. C172534.
- 2. That neither before nor during deliberation did any juror discuss conducting any test, experiment, or reenactment regarding the evidence.
- 3. That juror Wheeler never mentioned during deliberation any experience shooting a weapon.
- 4. That my verdict was not affected by any clothes worn by any other juror during the trial.
- 5. That during the evidence portion of the trial, I did notice that one other juror was nodding off and I immediately nudged him to wake him up.
- 6. That this occurred during repetitive portions of the trial and there was no indication that he had missed critical evidence or that his sleeping deprived him of the ability to participate in a meaningful way in deliberations.
- 6. That at no time during deliberations did any juror indicate that they had missed evidence or were unable to deliberate because they were sleeping.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the law of the State of Nevada that the foregoing is true and correct.

2**3** 

24 Executed on

(Date)

MATT ADAMS

26

25

27

I <u>AFFIDAVIT</u> 2 STATE OF NEVADA 3 CCUNTY OF CLARK DENORIO PAUL DENARIO, being first duly sworn, deposes and says: 5 1. That I am a resident of Clark County, Nevada and that I served as a juror in State of б Nevada v. Alfred P. Centofanti, III., Case No. C172534. 7 2. That neither before nor during deliberation did any juror discuss conducting any 8 test, experiment, or reenactment regarding the evidence. 9 10 3. That juror Wheeler never mentioned during deliberation any experience shooting a 11 weapon. 4. That my verdict was not affected by any clothes worn by any other juror during the 12 13 trial. 5. That during the trial I was not aware of whether other jurors may or may not have 14 15 been sleeping during the course of the trial. 6. That at no time during deliberations did any juror indicate that they had missed 16 evidence or were unable to deliberate because they were sleeping. 17 I declare under penalty of perjury under the law of the State of Nevada that the 18 foregoing is true and correct. 19 20 21 Executed on 22 23 24 25 BG/mmw 26 27 28 C:\DDCUME-1\GOETTSB\LOCALS~1\TEMP\DENARI~1.DOC

I

2

3

STATE OF NEVADA COUNTY OF CLARK

69:

5

6 7

8 9

10

11 12

13

14 15

16

17 18

19

20 21

22

23 24

25

2б

27

BG/mmw

28

C:\DOCUME-1\GOETTSB\LOCALS-1\TEMP\GORDIN-1.DOC

66

### <u>AFFIDA VIT</u>

NANCY GORDINIER, being first duly sworn, deposes and says:

- 1. That I am a resident of Clark County, Nevada and that I served as a juror in State of Nevada v. Alfred P. Centofanti, III., Case No. C172534.
- 2. That neither before nor during deliberation did any juror discuss conducting any test, experiment, or reenactment regarding the evidence.
- 3. That juror Wheeler never mentioned during deliberation any experience shooting a weapon.
- 4. That my verdict was not affected by any clothes worn by any other juror during the trial.
- 6. That I did notice another juror wearing a shirt with writing I found inappropriate and informed the bailiff and told the juror to remove the shirt or turn it inside out.
- 7. That during the trial I was not aware of whether other jurors may or may not have been sleeping during the course of the trial.
- 8. That at no time during deliberations did any juror indicate that they had missed evidence or were unable to deliberate because they were sleeping.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the law of the State of Nevada that the foregoing is true and correct.

3

4

5

б

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19 20

21 22

23 24

25

AFFIDAVIT

STATE OF NEVADA
COUNTY OF CLARK

RICARDO SMYTHE, being first duly sworn, deposes and says:

- 1. That I am a resident of Clark County, Nevada and that I served as a juror in State of Nevada v. Alfred P. Centofanti, III., Case No. C172534.
- 2. That neither before nor during deliberation did any juror discuss conducting any test, experiment, or recnactment regarding the evidence.
- 3. That juror Wheeler never mentioned during deliberation any experience shooting a weapon.
- 4. That my verdict was not affected by any clothes worn by any other juror during the trial.
- 5. That during the trial I was not aware of whether other jurors may or may not have been sleeping during the course of the trial.
- 6. That at no time during deliberations did any juror indicate that they had missed evidence or were unable to deliberate because they were sleeping.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the law of the State of Nevada that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on 8-05-04 (Date)

TUGARDO SMYTHE

BG/mmw

2627

28

C:\DOCUME-1\GOETTSE\LOCALS-1\TEMP\SMYTHE-1.DOC

0d/J5/2004 13:30 FAX 3840146

DA CRIMINAL DIVISION



1

2

3 4

5 б

7

8 9

11 12

10

13 14

16 17

15

18

19 20

21

22

23 24

25

26

27

28

#### AFFIDAVIT

STATE OF NEVADA COUNTY OF CLARK

JAMES OWENA being first duly swom, deposes and says:

- 1. That I am a resident of Clark County, Nevada and that I served as a juror in State of Nevada v. Alfred P. Centofanti, III., Case No. C172534.
- 2. That neither before nor during deliberation did any juxor discuss conducting any test, experiment, or recuactment regarding the evidence.
- 3. That juror Wheeler never mentioned during deliberation any experience shooting a weapon.
- 4. That my verdict was not affected by any clothes worn by any other juror during the trial.
- 5. That during the trial I was not aware of whether other jurors may or may not have been sleeping during the course of the trial.
- 6. That at no time during deliberations did any juror indicate that they had missed evidence or were unable to deliberate because they were sleeping.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the law of the State of Nevada that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on

BG/mmw

5 Augus / 2004

C:\DOCUME--1\GOBTTSB\LOCALS--1\TEMP\OWENSA-1.DOC

#### IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA 1 ALFRED P. CENTOFANTI III, 2 3 Appellant, **Electronically Filed** 4 Jan 24 2012 09:49 a.m. DOCKET NUMPAGE K. Line Anna VS. 5 Clerk of Supreme Court E.K. McDANIEL, WARDEN, 6 **ELY STATE PRISON** 7 Respondent. 8 9 APPELLANT'S APPENDIX, VOLUME VIII 10 Clark County District Attorney ROCHELLE T. NGYUYEN, ESQ. 11 Regional Justice Center **NGUYEN & LAY** 200 Lewis Avenue, Third Floor Nevada Bar Identification No. 8205 12 324 South Third Street P.O. Box 552511 Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 Las Vegas, Nevada 89155-2211 13 (702) 383-3200 14 **CATHERINE CORTEZ MASTO** 15 Nevada Bar Identification No. 3926 Nevada Attorney General 16 100 North Carson Street 17 Carson City, Nevada 89701-4717 (702) 687-3538 18 Attorney for Appellant Attorney for Respondent 19 ALFRED P. CENTOFANTI III E.K. McDANIEL, WARDEN **NEVADA STATE PRISON** 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

### **INDEX OF APPENDIX**

2	DOCUMENT Appellant's Opening Brief (October 27, 2005)	<b>VOL.</b> # 9	<b>PAGE #</b> 4-68
3	Appellant's Reply Brief (February 17, 2006)	9	107-131
5	Before the Honorable Mark Gibbons District Judge, June 14, 2001 (July,		
6	17, 2001)	9	154-172
7	Criminal Court Minutes (January 10, 2001 through March 4, 2005)	1	1-54
8	Criminal Court Minutes (December 2, 2009)	16	82
9	Criminal Court Willutes (December 2, 2009)	10	02
10	Criminal Court Minutes (June 1, 2011)	16	83
11	Defendant's Ex Parte Motion and Order to Jury Commissioner to Release		
12	Juror Information for Juror Number Three in State of Nevada vs. Alfred Paul Centofanti, III (August 20, 2004)	8	136-140
13	I dui Contolaiti, III (1 lugust 20, 2001)	0	130-140
14	Defense Response to the Following Motions Filed by the Plaintiff: Motion to Compel Discovery; Motion to Require Parties to Declare Witnesses 21		
15	Day Prior to Trial; Motion to Declare Defendant's Parents Adverse Witnesses; Motion to Admit Evidence of Other Bad Acts (October 29,		
16	2001)	1	95-105
17	Defense Response to the Prosecution's Request that Defendant Be		
18	"Canvassed" By the Court to Approve of Presentation of Self Defense		
19	Evidence (December 26, 2001)	2	1-7
20	Deposition of Allen R. Bloom, San Diego, California, pages 1-250 (April		
21	23, 2010)	15	1-250
22	Deposition of Allen R. Bloom, Sand Diego, California, pages 251-331 (April 23, 2010)	16	1-81
23	(April 23, 2010)	10	1-01
24	Ex Parte Application for Appointment of Counsel and Payment of Costs	10	101 100
25	(April 6, 2010)	12	101-108
26	Ex Parte Motion and Order to Jury Commissioner to Release Juror		
27	Information for Juror Number Three in State of Nevada vs. Alfred Paul Centofanti, III (August 9, 2004)	8	107-109
28	Ex Parte Order (April 7, 2010)	12	109-110
	ii	12	107-110

Instruction to Jurors No. 27 (April 16, 2004)  Judgment of Conviction (Jury Trial) (March 11, 2005)  Jury Instruction No. 9  Jury Instruction No. 26  Memorandum of Law Regarding Issue of Attorney Client Privilege (August 13, 2003)  2 23-32	
Judgment of Conviction (Jury Trial) (March 11, 2005)  Jury Instruction No. 9  Jury Instruction No. 26  Memorandum of Law Regarding Issue of Attorney Client Privilege (August 13, 2003)  2 23-32	
Jury Instruction No. 9  Jury Instruction No. 26  Memorandum of Law Regarding Issue of Attorney Client Privilege (August 13, 2003)  2 23-32	
Jury Instruction No. 26  Jury Instruction No. 26  Memorandum of Law Regarding Issue of Attorney Client Privilege (August 13, 2003)  2 23-32	29
Jury Instruction No. 26  8 Memorandum of Law Regarding Issue of Attorney Client Privilege (August 13, 2003)  2 23-32	
Memorandum of Law Regarding Issue of Attorney Client Privilege (August 13, 2003)  2 23-32	
9 13, 2003) 2 23-32	
9	
Memorandum of Points and Authorities RE (1) Request by Prosecution to	
Introduce Statements of Virginia Centofanti and (2) Request by Prosecution to Limit Introduction of Virginia's Prior Violence and Prior Drug Use	
12 (March 17, 2004) 2 56-64	
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Petition for Writ of	
Habeas Corpus (Post-Conviction), pages 1-191 (February 29, 2008) 10 60-25	0
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Petition for Writ of	
Habeas Corpus (Post-Conviction), pages 192-333 (February 29, 2008) 11 1-143	
17 Motion for New Trial (June 28, 2004) 8 65-10	15
18	_
Motion to Exclude Evidence to Dismiss Charges against Defendant (December 20, 2001)  1 106-1	17
20	17
21 1) Motion to Permit Counsel to Refer to this Brief in Place of Lengthy,	
Record-Making Objections; 2) Motion to Request that Complaining Witnesses and the Defendant Should be Addressed by Their Names and	
Not by Conclusory and Argumentative Labels Which Assume Facts Not in	
Evidence and Undermine the Presumption of Innocence; 30 Motion to  Insure that the Prosecution Does Not Tell the Jury It Represents the	
"People" in a Manner That Implies That He/She Represents the Jurors against the Defendant; Motion to Include the Necessary Level of Certitude	
to the Reasonable Doubt Instruction to Prevent Undermining Defendant's	
Due Process and Sixth Amendment Right to a Jury Decision Based upon Sufficient Evidence of Evidentiary Certainty (December 20, 2001)	
28	31

11			
1	Motion to Remand (July 26, 2011)	16	89-94
2	Motion to Withdraw as Attorney of Record and Appointment of Counsel		
3	(May 10, 2011)	14	1-4
4	Notice of Appeal (March 24, 2005)	8	220-231
5	Notice of Appeal (June 13, 2011)	16	84-88
6			
7	Notice of Clerical Error and/or Errata (Restoration of Civil Rights Application) (August 24, 2004)	8	182-184
8			
9	Notice of Entry of Decision and Order (June 6, 2011)	14	47-53
10	Notice of Motion and Motion for Consideration, Withdrawal, and		
11	Appointment of Alternative Counsel, Stay of Proceedings, and Other Relief (May 19, 2011).	14	14-26
12			
13	Notice of Motion and Motion for Consolidation and Other Relief (May 19, 2011)	14	5-13
14			
15	Notice of Motion and Motion for Evidentiary Hearing Regarding Attorney-Client Privilege (May 1, 2003)	2	12-23
16			
17	Notice of Motion and Motion in Limine to Conduct an Evidentiary Hearing to Establish to What Extent Ms. Cisneros Has an Obligation of Attorney		
ļ	Client Privilege (December 21, 2001)	1	132-138
18		•	132-136
19	Notice of Motion and State's Motion to Admit Evidence of Other Bad Acts		
20	(October 16, 2001)	1	58-94
21	Opposition to Appellant's Motion to Remand (August 2, 2011)	16	95-98
22	Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (December 27, 2001)	2	8-11
23	opposition to Defendant's Wotton to Distinss (December 27, 2001)	2	0-11
24	Order (May 27, 2011)	14	35-36
25	Order Denying Defendant's Motion for Consolidation and Other Relief and		
26	Defendant's Motion for Withdrawal and Appointment of Alternative		
	Counsel, Stay of Proceedings, and Other Relief (August 5, 2011)	14	54-55
27 28	Order Denying Defendant's Motion for New Trial (September 2, 2004)	8	226-227
- 1			

1	Order Denying Defendant's Motion to Disqualify the Clark County District Attorney's Office (July 30, 2008)	11	219-220
2 3	Order Denying Motion for Remand (November 18, 2011)	16	99
4	Order Denying Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (May 9, 2011)	12	119-124
5	Order Denying Rehearing (February 27, 2007)	9	150
6 7	Order of Affirmance (December 27, 2006)	9	133-142
8	Petition for Rehearing (January 18, 2007)	9	144-148
9	Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Post-Conviction) (February 29, 2008)	10	1-59
10 11 12	Petitioner's Notice of Motion and Motion to Disqualify the Clark County District Attorney's Office (July 9, 2008)	11	198-205
13	Petitioner's Reply to Respondent's Answer to Writ of Habeas Corpus (Post-Conviction) (November 3, 2009)	12	1-100
14 15	Petitioner's Supplemental Points and Authorities (June 02, 2011)	14	37-46
16	Receipt of Copy (June 29, 2004)	8	106
17 18	Remittitur (March 27, 2007)	9	152
19	Reply to State's Opposition to Defendant's Motion for New Trial (August 24, 2004)	8	141-181
20 21	Reporter's Transcript of Defendant's Motion to Disqualify Attorney, July 21, 2008 (September 2, 2008)	11	210-218
22 23	Reporter's Transcript of Ex Parte Hearing Outside the Presence of the State, February 20, 2004 (March 12, 2004)	2	38-55
<ul><li>24</li><li>25</li></ul>	Reporter's Transcript of Jury Trial, April 12, 2004 (April 13, 2004)	5	111-148
26	Reporter's Transcript of Jury Trial, April 14, 2004 (April 15, 2004)	5	184-207
27 28	Reporter's Transcript of Jury Trial, April 2, 2004 (April 5, 2004)	4	124-151

1	Reporter's Transcript of Jury Trial, April 6, 2004 (April 7, 2004)	4	188-234
2	Reporter's Transcript of Jury Trial, April 8, 2004 (April 9, 2004)	5	32-65
3	Reporter's Transcript of Jury Trial, March 15, 2004 (June 18, 2004)	6	17-175
4			
5	Reporter's Transcript of Jury Trial, March 16, 2004 (June 18, 2004)	7	1-205
6	Reporter's Transcript of Jury Trial, March 23, 2004 (March 24, 2004)	2	107-147
7	Reporter's Transcript of Jury Trial, March 25, 2004 (March 26, 2004)	3	116-151
8	Reporter's Transcript of Jury Trial, March 29, 2004 (March 30, 2004)	3	187-224
9			
10	Reporter's Transcript of Jury Trial, March 31, 2004 (April 1, 2004)	4	39-83
11	Reporter's Transcript of Proceedings before the Honorable Donald M.		
12	Mosley, April 1, 2004 (April 2, 2004)	4	84-123
13			
14	Reporter's Transcript of Proceedings before the Honorable Donald M. Mosley, April 13, 2004 (April 14, 2004)	5	149-183
15			
16	Reporter's Transcript of Proceedings before the Honorable Donald M. Mosley, April 15, 2004 (April 16, 2004)	5	208-243
17			
18	Reporter's Transcript of Proceedings before the Honorable Donald M. Mosley, April 5, 2004 (April 6, 2004)	4	152-187
19			
20	Reporter's Transcript of Proceedings before the Honorable Donald M. Mosley, April 7, 2004 (April 8, 2004)	5	1-31
21			
22	Reporter's Transcript of Proceedings before the Honorable Donald M. Mosley, April 9, 2004 (April 12, 2004)	5	66-110
23	Reporter's Transcript of Proceedings before the Honorable Donald M.		
24	Mosley, March 12, 2004 (June, 6, 2005)	9	174-191
25	Deporture Transposint of Durance diverse before the Henry 11. December 11.10		
26	Reporter's Transcript of Proceedings before the Honorable Donald M. Mosley, March 17, 2004 (June 25, 2004)	8	1-64
27			
28	Reporter's Transcript of Proceedings before the Honorable Donald M. Mosley, March 22, 2004 (March 23, 2004)	2	65-106

1 2	Reporter's Transcript of Proceedings before the Honorable Donald M. Mosley, March 24, 2004 (March 25, 2004)	3	101-115
3 4	Reporter's Transcript of Proceedings before the Honorable Donald M. Mosley, March 26, 2004 (March 29, 2004)	3	152-186
5 6	Reporter's Transcript of Proceedings before the Honorable Donald M. Mosley, March 30, 2004 (March 31, 2004)	4	1-38
7 8	Reporter's Transcript of Proceedings, Motions Hearing, December 21, 2001 (December 24, 2001)	1	139-249
9 10	Reporter's Transcript of State's Motion to Compel Audio Taped Interview / Defendant's Motion for a New Trial, August 26, 2004 (August 30, 2004)	8	185-225
11	Reporter's Transcript of Verdict, April 16, 2004 (April 19, 2004)	6	4-12
12 13	Respondent's Answering Brief (December 29, 2005)	9	70-105
14	State's Motion to Strike Defendant's Experts (July 28, 2010)	12	111-118
15 16	State's Opposition to Defendant's Motion for New Trial (August 10, 2004)	8	110-135
17	State's Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Disqualify the Clark County District Attorney's Office (July 15, 2008)	11	206-209
18	State's Opposition to Defendant's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Post-Conviction) (April 8, 2008)	11	144-197
20 21	State's Response to Defendant's Memorandum of Law Regarding Issues of Attorney Client Privilege (January 8, 2004)	2	33-37
22 23	State's Response to Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration, Withdrawal, and Appointment of Alternative Counsel, and Stay of Proceedings (May 25,		
24	2011)	14	27-34
25	Stipulation and Order to Continue Sentencing Date (May 25, 2004)	6	15-16
26 27	Substitution of Attorney (May 25, 2004)	6	13-14
	II		

1 2	Transcript of Proceedings State's Motion to Strike Defendant's Expert/ Evidentiary Hearing/ Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, July 30, 2010 (August 30, 2010)	13	1-168
ļ			
3	Transcript of Proceedings Evidentiary Hearing and Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, September 24, 2010 (October 19, 2010)	13	169-206
5			
	Verdict (April 16, 2004)	6	3
6 7			
8			
9			
10			
11			
12			
13			
14			
15	·		
16			
17			
18			
19			
20	·		
21			
22			
23			
24			
25			
26			
27			

1	
1	DISTRICT COURT
2	CLARK COUNTY, NEVABALED IN OPEN COURT JUN 2 5 2004
3	SHIRLEY B. PARRAGUIRRE CLEOK
4	THE STATE OF NEVADA, BY MELISSA SWINN
5	Plaintiff, ) DEPUTY
6	vs. ) No. C172534 ) Dept. No. XIV
7	ALFRED P. CENTOFANTI, III, )
8	Defendant. () ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( (
9	OPENING STATEMENT EXCERPTS
10	REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
, 11	BEFORE THE HONORABLE DONALD M. MOSLEY
12	,
13	March 17, 2004 4:40 p.m.
14	Department XIV
1.5	
16	
17	APPEARANCES:
18	For the State: MR. CLARK PETERSON
19	MS. BECKY GOETTSCH
20	Deputy District Attorneys
21	For the Defendant: MR. ALAN BLOOM
22	MS. GLORIA NAVARRO Attorneys-at-Law
23	
24	Reported by:
25	Joseph A. D'Amato Nevada CCR #17

THE COURT: All right. The State may begin their opening remarks.

MS. GOETTSCH: Thank you, Your Honor.

Good afternoon, Ladies and Gentlemen, on
December 20, 2000, Doctor Larry Simms, a forensic
pathologist and medical examiner with the Clark County
Coroner's Office had an occasion to do an autopsy on the
body of 25 year old Virginia Centofanti.

He will come into this courtroom and he will testify about what he found on that day on the body of Ms. Centofanti. He will tell you that he initially found a gunshot wound and an entry bullet wound into her left breast. This bullet grazed her ribs and lodged and was retrieved from her diapram.

He found a corresponding gunshot wound, which probably grazed her left arm and went into her breast. He found two other bullet wounds on her left arm.

One was into the deltoid area of her left arm and another one was on the back of her arm.

These caused a compound fracture of her humerus. These bullets were also retrieved from her body. He also found that Ms. Centofanti had a thru-and-thru gunshot wound to her right finger. He believes that this bullet continued on into other parts of her body.

He found yet another gunshot wound in her

left lower back. He will tell you that this bullet went near her vertebrae in her back, was lodged in her bowel, was recovered from her bowel and also severed her aorta which caused her to bleed massively, internally.

He then continued on to the head of Ms.

Centofanti and he will tell you that he found an entry

wound into her right forehead. This bullet was recovered

from her brain.

He found yet another gunshot wound into her right eye. This bullet was also recovered from her brain. And he found a last gunshot wound into her mouth which knocked out her teeth and this bullet was also recovered from her brain.

He will also tell you that there was stippling present and associated with probably the gunshot wound to her mouth. He will tell you that stippling indicates that the gunshot wound that she sustained to her mouth, occurred very close to her mouth, less than two feet, probably closer to six to 18 inches away from her mouth.

Doctor Simms will tell you he's been working as a forensic pathologist and medical examiner for over 24 years. He conducted over 3,500 autopsies, in excess of that, and he's had numerous experiences investigating the circumstances surrounding violent death.

He will tell you as a result of that he reached some conclusions about the nature of the injuries to Ms. Centofanti. He will tell you that he views these gunshots in two different groupings.

There is a set of gunshots to her head and there's a set of shots to her body. He can tell you that the shots to her body would have immediately incapacitated her and would have eventually killed her.

They would have been fatal wounds.

He can he can also tell you that the shots to the body came first. He cannot tell you which one of the seven shots was 1, 2, 3, 4, et cetera, but he can tell you that the body shots -- because of certain evidence he found on the body came first.

He can tell you that the body shots were indicative that Ms. Centofanti was turning away and moving away from her shooter when she sustained the shots to her body.

He can tell you that those shots to the head came last. He can tell you that the shots to her head came -- will show was stationary, when she was not moving -- and he can tell you that at least one of the shots to her head came at very close range.

Most importantly, he can tell you that, within a reasonable degree of medical and forensic

certainty, the shots to the head were very focused, assassination-type shots.

He will also tell you that as part of his routine practice as a medical examiner that he conducts a toxicology test on the blood of anyone who he conducts an autopsy on. He tests that person's blood for alcohol and drugs, both legal and illegal.

He will tell you that the toxicology results of Ms. Centofanti showed she was completely clean. She was not under the influence of drugs, not under the influence of alcohol when she died.

He will also tell you that as part of his routine practice he weighs and measures her body. He will tell you Ms. Centofanti was five foot, three inches tall and weighed in at a whopping 117 pounds.

Ladies and Gentlemen, the evidence will show you that the Defendant is the one who shot and killed Gina, Gina Centofanti on December 20, 2000, and this is how this 25 year old woman in the prime of her life wound up on the autopsy table on that day in December.

Who was Ms. Centofanti?

Virginia Centofanti grew up as Virginia

Ramos Eisenmann in San Diego. Her father figure or the person she knew as her father died when she was young.

She was raised by her mother and grew up with her siblings

away.

in San Diego.

Her friends and family referred to her as Gina.

You're going to hear some evidence that Gina had kind of a rough time growing up. She grew up in a rough neighborhood of San Diego. She ran with a rough crowd.

She did some drugs, she drank some alcohol, got into some trouble when she was 15, 16 year's old. She also had a child when she was 15.

His name is Francisco Sanchez. His family refers to him as Quito; that's his nickname. You'll hear from him during the course of this trial.

But you'll also hear that by the time Gina was in her early 20's she was on the right track. She wasn't doing drugs. She was being a good mother to Qito. She was doing the best she can -- could, and she had gotten herself a job at a copy store in downtown San Diego.

While she was working there she met an attorney, the Defendant. Something else that the evidence will show, if you haven't noticed already, Virginia Centofanti was a very beautiful, vivacious young woman.

Certainly the Defendant took her in right

The Defendant was seven years older than Gina and they began to date. Even at that time you will hear that there was kind of a dark side to their relationship, as far as the Defendant was quite possessive, quit jealous and very persistent in pursuing her.

But they worked that out. It wasn't a big problem and they eventually married and moved to Las Vegas in 1999.

Things were good at first. The Defendant had gotten himself a job at a law firm in town here. Gina was working on her career. She got a job with security link which was a company that was selling security systems to residential homes.

They bought themselves a house in a nice Summerlin neighborhood. The Defendant leased her a BMW and the Defendant bought her some plastic surgery to improve herself, and by late 1999 Gina found out she was pregnant.

By July 2000 Gina gave birth to their son,
Nicholas Centofanti, and when you look at the life, in
July 2000 -- the Defendant had crafted himself a very nice
life. He had a good job as a lawyer. He had a beautiful
house, they had nice cars, a beautiful new son and most
importantly, he had a young, vivacious, dynamic, trophy

wife.

But you will also hear and the evidence will show that the dark side that was always present was starting to fester to the surface of this otherwise seemingly idyllic life.

After the baby was born Gina went on with her career. She got a new job at place called Eagle Centry. This was in the same line of work as security, security systems to homes and businesses, and you'll hear this was kind of a fun, dynamic kind of start-up company and the people who worked there were all young and single and they were salespeople there.

They were very outgoing. They spent a lot of time together. They described their work environment as a family.

You'll hear that Gina Centofanti fit into this environment very well. She did very well at this job. She was making good money. She was considered a real go-getter in her new job there.

She also liked to go out with these people who she worked with. They were her friends. She was going out at night and, rightly or wrongly, she progressively started to grow out of love with the Defendant.

The Defendant continued to be possessive of

her, obsessive with her. He would call her frequently.

"Where are you at, what are you going, who are you going out with?" "Can I go to lunch with you? Can I go to the gym with you?"

Although Gina tolerated this, it was starting to weigh heavily on her. Throughout the Fall of 2000 the evidence will show that this marriage was in trouble. In fact, by November of 2000 Gina had made it. known she was thinking about getting a divorce.

In fact, at Thanksgiving dinner in 2000 she told her best friend, Tricia Miller, "I'm thinking about getting a divorce."

Tricia will tell you "I was really shocked.

I thought they had kind to have this perfect life. I

didn't know she was unhappy."

She talked to Gina about it and the Defendant doesn't understand this thought. Gina also broached the subject with the Defendant.

"Look, I'm not happy. I want out."

You will hear that the Defendant told her "I'll kill you before I give you a divorce."

He began to get more jealous. He monitored her work, called her. He missed his own work. He accused her of having an affair, staying out too late, working too hard.

As things are apt to do, evidence will show that things really boiled over on December 5th of 2000. You will hear that on the night of December 4th Gina and her co-workers went out to TGI Friday's after work. They were celebrating an account.

She didn't want to go home to the Defendant. She didn't want to be in the house. She wound up staying out very late.

She sleeps in the next morning, gets up around 10:00 o'clock, realizes "I'm missing a meeting that I'm supposed to be at."

She gets up and starts getting ready. The Defendant hadn't gone to work that day. He was livid she had been out all night. A fight ensues. He starts to accuse her of having an affair with her boss, which her boss will testify that that's not the situation they were in, and he gets on the phone and he's going to call her boss.

Gina is embarrassed. They fight over the phone. Gina is unable to get the phone away from him so she picks up a picture frame and bops him over the head with it. The glass breaks. He gets a cut on his head.

This infuriates the Defendant. He immediately goes over to his nightstand, pulls open the drawer and takes out his nine millimeter Ruger. He puts

it to her head and he pulls the trigger, click, click, click. Nothing happened.

But he tells her "Beg for your life. I'm going to kill you, the kids and myself."

Gina is terrified. There is a struggle over the gun. Turns out that the Defendant, for some reason that will become clear to you, calls his boss, a lady by the name of Eva Cisneros, who is the manager of a firm here in town called Cisneros & Associates.

He starts to say "My wife has these problems."

Mrs. Cisneros doesn't know what to do so she gives the Defendant a number for an employee assistance program that's part of their firm, and they call -- the Defendant calls the employee assistance program, winds up getting connected to a social worker in New York City.

And at that point he gets on the phone and says "My wife has a drug and alcohol problem, you got to help her."

You will hear from the social worker who will tell you that he said "If your wife has a problem she needs to ask for the intervention herself. We often times find that when spouses ask for intervention on behalf of another spouse there may be an alterior motive for that."

The Defendant puts Gina on the phone. You

will hear from Mark Smith that social worker from New York 1 2 City who is going to fly in here and testify, what he 3 heard from Virginia Centofanti that night and what 4 prompted him and scared him to the point that he immediately got on the phone to Las Vegas Metro Police and 6 said "Get police out there right now." 7 The police were called and they arrived at 8 They will tell you when they arrived Gina 9 appeared to be in fear of her life. She was crying, she 10 was trembling, shaking. She was grabbing onto the 11 officers. 12 You will hear about that investigation and how the officers asked Ms. Centofanti what happened and 13 she told them exactly what happened. He put a gun to her 15 head and he pulled the trigger and it didn't fire. 16 17

You will also hear about how the officers approached the Defendant and he asked them "Am I going to jail?"

The officer says "maybe."

And his response is, cool, calm and "How can I help myself?" collected:

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

"Tell us what happened."

He proceeds then to tell them that Gina hit him with a picture frame. The officer then says what about this gun. Yeah, the gun.

Now what? "She pointed that at me."

You will also hear at this point -- you will also hear that the officers were in somewhat of a dilemma. Under the Domestic Violence Laws in the State of Nevada they had to arrest somebody. It's mandatory that when they are called to a domestic violence call somebody has to be arrested and removed from the scene.

They had conflicting stories about what happened with the gun, but Gina fully admitted "I hit him with the picture frame. He was trying to call my boss."

The Defendant had a cut on his head and the Defendant was saying how she hit him with this picture frame and you'll hear that after everything was sorted out Gina Centofanti was arrested for battery domestic violence that night.

But you'll also hear from the officers that they were concerned about the situation and as a result they took into safekeeping -- they took into evidence with them three guns, including the nine millimeter Ruger that was used, a .38 caliber Taurus that Gina kept in her glove box for protection when she went out on sales calls and a shotgun they kept in the house. The officers will tell you their impressions and that they took these guns into evidence.

You'll also hear that Ms. Centofanti went to

jail. She never made her first court appearance on that charge because she was dead by then. You will hear she started to make arrangements. She made up her mind at this point. "There's no maybe. I'm getting a divorce, I'm getting out."

Diego and she called her friend Tricia Miller and they made arrangements to get her an apartment. You'll also hear from Sergeant Winslow, an officer with 20 some years experience that responded to the battery domestic violence call, and he will tell you that he told her "Look, you need to get out of here. Whatever you do, just get out. Leave what you have to leave but get out now."

He gave her his cellphone number and says
"If you want to go back to get your clothes or whatever,
you call me and I'll escort you. Don't try to go back
there alone."

On December 6th Gina did exactly that. She had Tricia Miller drive her to a gas station where she met Sergeant Winslow and had Sergeant Winslow return her to the house to get a few of her belongings.

You will also hear from Tricia Miller. That the night of the domestic violence she had an occasion to call the Defendant, because there was some concern about Quito, because the Defendant was going to be home with

both Nicholas and Quito and Trish wanted to call and say "Is Quito okay?"

Quito witnessed part of the domestic violence.

She will tell you what the Defendant told her that night. He told her "I'm still in love with you. I don't know why she's doing this to me" and he also recounted part of the events of that domestic violence incident and said to her "Who do you think they are going to believe? I'm a lawyer."

Trish drove her -- Gina to Sergeant Winslow to get her clothes and she will tell you that during that ride in the car Gina was trembling, nervous and scared.

Meanwhile, after the domestic violence incident, the Defendant proceeds to go to court where he's familiar and get a temporary protection order against her. He writes something down -- he's very afraid of Gina -- and it's a Restraining Order that Gina cannot contact him.

But meanwhile he proceeds to call her repeatedly, four or five times an hour. "Why are you not up yet? Why are you doing this to me?" Even though he's the one that sought out the TPO.

Clearly Gina has made up her mind at this point and she decides I want a divorce. I'm getting out of here. She's taking Sergeant Winslow's advice.

The Defendant says "Fine. You want a divorce. I'm a lawyer. I'm going to get a lawyer and we're going to get this divorce final immediately."

Between the days of December 11, 12 and 13, the Defendant did just that. He got himself a lawyer. They got the papers signed.

Gina did not contest anything. She said "I don't want the house. I don't want anything. I'm just moving on."

She even agreed at that point to give the Defendant custody of the baby as long as she got visitation and the divorce became final on December 13. At this point Gina Centofanti moved on.

She got an apartment on the other side of town. She went on with her work. He visited -- she visited Nicholas. She sent Quito to San Diego with her mother until the holidays. She made plans to go home for Christmas.

She appeared relieved to people at work and to her friends and she wanted to take Nicholas home with her for Christmas and she also started to act on a relationship with another guy. She was moving on.

However, the Defendant does not move on.

You will hear that the Defendant became more obsessive.

He started to watch Gina. He reported on her comings and

goings.

24|

He called her, he called her family, her friends. He talked incessantly about her. Any subject that would come up at work with his friends, he would revert it right back to Gina, asking about her trust account, and you'll also hear that his family.

His parents moved out here from the East

Coast to live with him and help take care of Nicholas, but

most importantly, he talked about Gina to others and their

relationship.

You will hear he started to go on this smear campaign that started with his call to Eva Cisneros on the 5th. He would tell anybody who would listen "She's a bad mother. She is sleeping with everybody in town. She's doing drugs. She's doing alcohol. I can't believe it."

He continued to paint her in the worst light and himself in the best light.

MR. BLOOM: Excuse me. May we approach?

THE COURT: You may, yes

(DISCUSSION OFF THE RECORD)

THE COURT: Continue, please.

MS. GOETTSCH: Thank you.

As you'll hear, the Defendant is very distraught by what's happening in his life, but he is still able to function, make general decisions on a daily

basis, including trying very hard to get his guns back from Metro police.

You will hear that on the 14th of December, the day after the divorce was final, he starts to call Metro firearms unit. A person by the name of Sharon Zwick will testify he leaves a message on that day inquiring about his guns. She wasn't able to get back to him. He calls back on the 15th.

She pulls the paperwork, finally makes contact on the 8th of December. She explained to the Defendant at that time she needs to go through a background check before, and kind of investigate the situation before she's able to give guns back.

She will tell you there was very much a sense of urgency with the Defendant. He wanted his guns back promptly and that certainly he didn't care so much about the Taurus, didn't really care about the shotgun, but he really wanted that nine-millimeter back.

December 19th, you'll hear on the evening of December 19th, the Defendant was looking for Gina.

He wound up calling her sister Lisa in San

Diego asking "Where is Gina? Have you seen her, talked to
her?"

They have a discussion at that time and the Defendant makes an interesting comment to Lisa. He says

"Be a good mom to Quito."

1.0

1.3

Ironically, coincidentally, Gina didn't go home to her apartment that night. The night of December 19th you will hear was the first night she spent the night with another man. December 20, the Defendant goes to work that day. He is sitting at his desk.

At approximately 10 a.m., you'll hear from his co-worker who came in and said the office was a mess, papers all over which was very unusual for him, but during this time he is also calling Sharon Zwick without getting his gun released.

Sharon Zwick will tell you at that particular time she asked him about the domestic violence that was pending and said "Are you guys living together? What's going on with with you and Gina Centofanti."

He says "We're divorced. She's moved out."

Sharon Zwick will tell you at that point she approved the guns for release. At 11:40 a.m. the Defendant drives over to the impound evidence vault, if you will, and picks up his gun, including the nine millimeter Ruger.

Gina had also gone to work that day and at some point the Defendant had left her a message on her voice mail at work, insuring that she was going to come over on Wednesday night, December 20, to pick up Nicholas. That was her visitation.

His message was confirming that she was going to do just that. Approximately 3:30 p.m. Gina calls Tricia Miller. They make plans to meet Trish's parents for dinner that night because her paretns were from out-of-state. She never met them before. They were going to get together. She tells Trish "I'm going to get Nicholas and he's coming with me. I'm going to go work out."

1.2

Around 4:00 o'clock late afternoon you'll hear that the Defendant was at a hearing for his work.

You will hear from one of his colleagues that there was a discussion about him getting help for obsessive love. She was giving him some self-help books about getting over this type of a situation.

She will tell you that when they walked to their car the Defendant got kind of worried and said "I want to show you something." He opened up his briefcase. She walks over and he gets a funny look on his face and he says "Never mind."

The Defendant goes home.

Approximately 6:00 p.m. Gina calls Trish again. "I'm done working out I have to get Nicholas."

"You ought to be done at Harrahs at seven.

What are you doing?" Gina realizes that she may not be able to make it.

A phone call is made to the Defendant in which she attempts to r schedule her visitation with

Maybe can I get him on Thursday night as opposed to Wednesday night. I'm running late.

You will hear Gina called Trish back, said "Chip is being a jerk."

Chip is a nickname the Defendant went by.

"I'm going to go and get Nicholas, but I'll be down there. I'll meet you for dinner, 7:00 p.m.

These times are confirmed by a 911 call log as well as cellphone records that at seven o'clock p.m. at the Defendant's home he used to shared with Gina Centofanti, 8720 Wintry Garden Avenue, there is a 911 disconnect, meaning someone called 911 and they hung up.

At approximately this time Eva Cisneros, his boss, is once again contacted. At 7:01 p.m. 911 calls back as per standard protocol. "Is everything okay?"

They get the answering machine. "Pick up the phone. Is everything okay?"

No one answers. Officers are on the way.

At that point officers are dispatched to 8720 Wintry

Garden Avenue. Approximately 7:03 p.m. Trish calls Gina again, basically saying where are you? No one answers

Gina's phone.

At 7:05 p.m., a 911 call is finally received from Camille Centofanti, who is the Defendant's mother, who was staying with them at the time. She says to them "Send help. My daughter-in-law has been shot."

And when the 911 operator says who shot her?

She says "I can't talk now," and she hangs up the phone.

Between 7:05 and 7:17, the Defendant is taken over to his neighbor's house at 8716 Wintry Garden Avenue. This is the home of Mark and MeriLee Wright.

First, Camille Centofanti is the house saying "Chip shot Gina" and she's carrying the baby. Few minutes later, the Defendant and his father arrive at the Wright's house with a gun, the nine millimeter Ruger wrapped in a towel. At 7:17 the first officer arrives. At 7:45 lawyers arrive on the scene and at 8:11 homicide arrives on the scene.

You will hear about the investigation into the death of Gina Centofanti and what transpired next.

You will hear from Tiffany Higone (phonetic). She will tell you when she pulled up at the address she was initially called in to 8716 Wintry Garden, the house belonging to the Wrights.

She went in there and she was told that Chip just shot Gina. She will tell you that the Defendant was sitting on the floor next to the gun in the entry of this

house. She will tell you she kicked the gun away from him; took the Defendant into custody.

She will tell you that she immediately ran next door to the house that belonged to the Defendant and that used to belong to Gina Centofanti and at that point she found the lifeless body of Gina Centofanti laying on the floor.

You will also hear from the Crime Scene
Analyst in this case, Robbie Dahn. She was the Crime
Scene Analyst that was primarily in charge of collecting
all the evidence and photographing the crime scene.

She will tell you that she arrived on the scene and saw Gina Centofanti in her workout clothes in this position on the floor. She will tell you that it appeared that Ms. Centofanti lay where she fell after she fell from the quashot wounds.

She will tell you there was no signs of a struggle in the house other than one chair had been tipped over. She will tell you that she found Gina's purse on the table and a temporary Protective Order against Gina that had long expired on the table right where no one could miss it.

She will tell you that she found shell casings, two casings back here in the back of the couch. You'll also hear circumstances where two shell casings

were found in the couch.

She also found shell casings right along this wall and one right by Gina's head. She will tell you that she found blood smeared on the seat of the exercise bike.

She will tell you that she impounded the murder weapon, the nine millimeter Ruger that the.

Defendant had gotten hold of at 11:40 that morning. She will tell you that there was one bullet left in the chamber, one bullet left in the magazine.

She will tell you that she immediately took pictures of the Defendant, that this is how the Defendant appeared on that night; that he was not disheveled, not injured. His shirt wasn't have wasn't even untucked.

You will also hear some other forensic evidence that took place in the investigation of this case. This includes Edward Gunther. He is a fingerprint expert. He does fingerprint analysis.

He will tell you that he reviewed the nine-millimeter Ruger for any fingerprints. He will tell you that the defendant's fingerprints were on teh Ruger and there was no evidence that Gina Centofanti's fingerprints was on that gun.

You will hear from Thomas Wall. He is a DNA expert. He will tell you that he also reviewed the murder

weapon and that there was backsplash of blood on the muzzle of the gun, if you will, blood that had come back onto the weapon and that blood, unequivocally, belongs to Gina Centofanti.

1.

You will hear from James Krylo. He's a firearms expert. He will talk to you a little bit more about the stippling and that he tested this particular murder weapon and he will tell you that stippling on this gun occurs when the gun is fired at skin less than two feet away, probably closer between six and 18 inches from the face when this gun is fired.

He will tell you that only one gun was involved in this scene. You will also hear from Randall McLaughlin. He's also a Crime Scene Analyst. He has special expertise in blood spatter evidence.

He will tell you he was there that night.

He saw the scene and he later had a chance to sit down

with the pictures that were taken and look at the blood

spatter. He will interpret some of that spatter for you.

He will tell you that there is no evidence that Gina Centofanti was upright when the shots to the head occurred. He will tell you this spatter right in here by the bike indicates that her head was very close to that bike when she sustained the gunshot wounds that she did.

You will also hear from homicide detectives that were responsible for this investigation, Thomas

Thowsen as well as James LaRochelle. They will tell you what they did in their investigation, who they talked to, who they interviewed to get to investigate this case.

You will not hear that Gina had a gun. You will not hear that Gina had any sort of weapon that night

1.5

will not hear that Gina had a gun. You will not hear that Gina had any sort of weapon that night.

The evidence will show that there was no struggle, there was no forced entry.

There was no evidence in their investigation that the Defendant had been involved in a fight. It will tell you there is no evidence that the Defendant and his ex-wife were arguing or fighting before there were quashots.

In fact, the evidence will show that Gina Centofanti was moving and turning away from her shooter when she was killed.

Most most importantly, the evidence will show in this case that the Defendant shot seven times and never missed once.

At the close of evidence the evidence will show you, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the Defendant willfully, deliberately, and premeditatedly killed his ex-wife, Gina Centofanti.

I am confident that at the close of evidence

1 you will find him guilty of First Degree Murder. 2 you. 3 THE COURT: Thank you. Mr. Bloom? 4 MR. BLOOM: Thank you, Your Honor. 5 of the time are we going to go until about 5:30 or 5:45? 6 THE COURT: We'll go as long as it is 7 necessary. 8 MR. BLOOM: Thank you very much. 9 An opening statement, Ladies and Gentlemen, is meant to be a road map of where we expect the evidence 1.0 11 will go in the case. It's not meant to be argument at 12 this time. 13 I'm going to try to lay an outline for you of what I expect the evidence will show. Before every 14 15 time I make a statement I'm not going to say the evidence 16 will show such and such, but that's really what I'm trying to show you, tell you right now. 17 My comments now over probably the next 40 18 minutes or so are going to be what I believe the evidence 19 20 will show in this case. I'm going to start at a different point than 21 where the prosecution started because I think this case 22 starts at a different point, the evidence will show. 23 Nine year old Quito Sanchez never had a home 24 with his mom until Chip Centofanti -- his name is Alfred, 25

the III. His dad is Alfred, Junior. They are both Chips, Big Chip, Little Chip -- he never had a home until Chip Centofanti and Gina Centofanti met, got together and got married.

Chip brought Quito in their into their house. Quito was at their house on December 5th, 2000.

Two distinct dates. Two incidents, December 5th and December 20th. Quito had been raised by his grandmother in San Diego most of the time in his life.

Gina had him when she was 15 or 16, yet

Quito witnessed the events in some part of what happened

on December 5th. I'd like to describe for you the events

that occured on December 5th.

Nicholas, now a little over two, was at that point four months old. That's the baby Gina and Chip had together. He had kind of an asthmatic problem.

On the night of December 4 he had a bad attack. Chip was taking care of his baby and taking care of Quito and Gina was nowhere to be found. That evening they had to take -- Chip had to take the baby to an emergency room for treatment.

There were lots of calls between Chip and Gina's phone number. "Where are you? Come and help."

He's a new father. It's true, he brought in nine year old Quito, not his boy, into his house to make him one of his

family members.

In terms of all the things going on with a new parent, Chip is four months a parent as of that time.

The baby is ill and they go to the emergency room and get some treatment for the child.

They have to get some medicine and they bring the baby home and most of that evening he has to care for young Nicholas. He calls a number of occasions of "Where are you, Gina? Where are you?"

To say he was frantic or upset is very true. Gina never showed up. He slept with both the baby and Quito that night, woke up in the middle of the night to administer the medication and Gina came home, stumbling drunk at about 7:00 a.m. actually it was a little earlier than that.

She passed out. She actually went into the room kind of drunk and took the baby and put the baby down on the floor on a blanket and tried to lie down with the baby. She passed out. He picks up Nicholas, puts him back in the crib next to his bed.

His parents, by the way, are not there yet.

His parents, Chip and Camille, will play a part of what

happened in this case. They aren't there. They still

live in Massachusetts. They are in transit.

They are moving from an area outside of

24

25

Boston. They are driving at the time. They are not there on that evening on December 4th, the morning of December

That next morning Gina wakes up. cellphone is ringing and ringing. She finally wakes up. Chip is finally upset. "Where were you last night?" He's upset -- "The baby wasn't taken care of. What's going

She's smelling of alcohol, she's still

By the way, when the police officers come and they will come a little bit later after this domestic violence incident. The officers still smell alcohol on her, even though it's hours later. He's yelling at her.

You'll decide whether you think it's understandable or not when he says to her "Where the hell were you? What's going on?"

She's making phone calls and she's making appointments and things. "Were you out drinking?"

He accuses her of going out and having sex and messing around with somebody.

Mostly he's upset about "How come you weren't home?" She denies any of the relationship of having sex. We now know those accusations are absolutely correct.

A witness by the name of Steve Shula will come in. He's one of the co-workers. He said that very fact, that, prior to December 5th, he in fact did have sexual relations with -- and he calls it kind of recreational, with Gina. They had it after December 5th and before December 5th. He doesn't know that for sure.

Chip doesn't know that for sure as of that point. He knows his wife wasn't there. She's nowhere around and the baby is sick.

During the conversation that's happened -speed through them a little bit here -- you'll hear the
evidence yourself -- during that time she gets a couple of
phone calls and finally he says "What's going on with that
phone? Who is on the phone? We'll see who is calling
you. Are these people you were with?"

He starts to grab the phone. She doesn't want him to listen to who that is pressing the redial button on the phone or checking out the display of who -- of who it was that called. She struggles over the phone and they start to fight over the phone.

He grabs the phone from her and starts to push the button and walk away. They are in an upstairs bedroom of their house. Two-story house, nice house Wintry Garden, and kind of a nice neighborhood.

He grabs the phone and turns away from her.

Next thing he knows he's down on the ground. He's been knocked to the ground.

That picture frame she grabbed off the counter or off a table area like this has smacked him in the head and knocked him to the ground. He's cut, bleeding. Glass is everywhere.

Quito, a nine year old, is watching his mom do this. He turns around and sees her digging into the nightstand at the table and coming out with this weapon, with a nine-millimeter gun that they have.

She's taking it and turns around and starts pointing it to him and he stops. He comes at her. He grabs her. He pulls the gun, he lays down, he's trying -- she fights him. They are struggling.

She is a small person, but in a moment I'm going to tell you about the ferocity and the rage and the violence that that small person can show and manifest.

Right now I'll go back to that night when that time of the struggle with the gun.

She has the gun in her hand. He feels it pointed and he hears the click. He ultimately takes the gun from her.

First, he puts it in a place up high where nobody can get at it, away from Quito and away from her. They are talking and they are screaming at each other.

21

22

23

24

25

Finally things are calming down.

"What are you doing, what are you doing?"

She cries. He says "That's it. You're out.

I'm not going to be with you anymore."

She breaks down. She starts to cry. sorry. I shouldn't have grabbed the phone. I didn't mean to grab the gun."

I don't care. He does not want to call the police on her, though he's injured, because he knows exactly what Ms. Goettsch says. If the police come somebody will be arrested and he doesn't want it to be his

He calls miss because, Eva Cisneros, because he knows there's some counselor that they work with and she puts him in touch with Mark Smith who he calls.

He tells Mark Smith "My wife has problems. My wife needs therapy because she has agreed, I'll talk to

Mark Smith says "I have to get it from her

He voluntarily hands her the phone, never once tries to in any way prevent Mark Smith from talking to her. She takes the phone into the other room and tells a version of the story that that says he came at her and attacked her and he's trying to kill her.

The police -- Mark Smith ultimately calls the police and the police come. Two officers, Officer Laurenco and McGregor, and ultimately another officer by the name of Winslow shows up as well.

Now, this is not the first time there has been a domestic violence involving Gina and Chip. Three days before, December 2nd, they are in an argument again because she's home very late. "What's going on?"

And she's literally tackles him and knocks him down. At that point she says "I'll get therapy."

He says "Look, this cannot continue."

Chip Centofanti is a conservative kind of guy in terms of wanting a family and having a relationship, but even he does not want to be in a situation even if it is going to break up a family with his new baby Nicholas, just four months, but he will not tolerate a situation of this violence.

She says she will get therapy, under the understanding, the condition that if it happens again, that's it. It's over.

December 5th it happens again. Even then he doesn't want to call the police on her but the police arrive. Officers Laurenco and McGregor and Sergeant Winslow. They see the -- they see, how do they handle the arrest?

They put Gina in one area and they take Chip and put him in another area. His shirt is ripped off.

They ultimately find the shirt. It's ripped off.

He's bleeding. He's bleeding on the back, scratched there, bleeding on the arm. There's glass all over the house. He's bleeding on the rug -- from burns on his legs, rug burns from the struggle. They make a decision in this case as to whether or not they should arrest someone and they arrest Gina Centofanti.

Now, later on at various testimonies they are asked by the prosecution "Isn't it correct that the reason why you arrested Gina and didn't arrest Chip was because you're only concerned about somebody being home for the baby?"

Their answer is very straight.

"No. We arrested Gina because when we talked to her and when we saw the injuries it was clear she has inflicted the injury on Chip and he didn't on her."

Though she did have a little cut lip, not a cut lip, a little swollen lip which she said she got during the struggle. They also -- so the question was "But you left him, Chip, home, because you're taking care of the baby?"

"No."

1 The officers say "We did not have cause, we 2 did not have probable cause to arrest Chip so we didn't 3 arrest him. We arrested her because we did have cause to arrest her. And we took her into custody." 5 Now, before they left, though, they attempted to find out about the gun. Ms. Goettsch 6 7 presented to you a statement of Gina's version of the gun, 8 who had the gun. 9 Gina said "He had the gun. He pointed it at 10 I took it away from him." 11 The same police officers asked him "What 12 about the gun? Was there a qun?" 13 He said "Yes. She had the gun. She pointed 14 it at me. And I took it away from her." 15 When the officers got both of those 16 statements they went to Gina and said "Okay. You took the 17 gun away from him. Where is the gun?" 18 She said "Probably in the kitchen, maybe in the kitchen." She didn't know. 19 20 They went to Chip and asked him "Okay, I took the gun away from her after she pointed it at you. 21 22 Where is the gun?" 23 He said "It's on top of the counter above the range in the kitchen up high where I put it so she 24 25 couldn't get to it."

Sure enough, the police officers went in there, exactly the spot where he said he had taken the gun from her and found the gun. Exactly where he said it was.

You will decide, based upon the evidence, you'll make a decision as to whether or not she had that gun.

The evidence will show that Chip Centofanti said "That's it." He was absolutely petrified at that point. This woman was not the woman he had married.

They had met some several years before and the relationship was good. She was kind of messing around on him when they first went out.

He actually saw a boyfriend of hers when they were together and he sat down with him and said "What's going on? Are you going with Gina or not going with Gina?"

She found out he found out. She apologized and said "I want to be with you."

The relationship was good, but there -- it was a lot of information about Gina that had come out, but by the time December 5th -- let me go back to December 5th. Let me finish with what happened right at that point.

Right at that point after December 5th, after the police arrested Gina, he is very, very afraid

and scared and very shaken.

He is so shaken that he asks the help of
Mark Wright. You saw the picture of his next door
neighbor's house. He asked Mark Wright to take him down
to the police station. "I can't go to the courts, I can't
drive myself."

Mark will tell you he sees Chip visibly shaken and upset. Goes down and gets an immediate temporary Protective Order against her. It is served on her that night -- against her. It is served that night on her at the jail.

He doesn't wait until two days or weeks go

by. He says -- he says that's it and he gets a Protective

Order. Despite the fact it's served on her that night at

the jail she calls them on a number of occasions in

violation of the Order, and between December 5th and

December 20tha couple of events happen with regards to

Chip wanting out of that relationship.

I'm going to get to those in just a minute, but I think it's appropriate at this time to tell you what the evidence will show about Gina and her background I think it's appropriate.

Now Chip spends the next 20 days very, very much afraid of that little person. She is just a little person. I think the evidence will show the good cause for

1 that fear.

Chip learns over a course of time during their relationship, over the several years before happened that Gina has quite a history. To characterize it as growing up in a rough neighborhood is not accurate.

She grew up in a rather middle class neighborhood, but it does have some gaps in it. She chose to participate in those gangs and the violence that went with it. Chip found this out kind of slowly.

For example, her own mother would talk to Chip and say "You know, I don't think this thing is going to last long. Everybody in the family is taking odds on how long your marriage is going to be, because Gina is very wild."

"What do you mean wild?"

"Well, did she tell you what she tried to do back when she was 16?"

What Gina tried to do when she was 16, what she did when she was 16 was try to -- one day it was a particularly graphic day for her. She tried to kill somebody. She was a gangbanger. She was a member of a gang. Her nickname was Fly Girl, southside gang in Escondido, a city in northern San Diego County.

She had run with the gang for a while. One day when she was about 15 and 16 years of age she took a

van and she tried to run over a guy, Adrian Medina.

He will tell you that the van she was driving almost killed him, but for -- it ran him over, knocked him down and and ran over his leg. He was bruised, but not dead.

She did so because he was running after another friend of her's, a co-gang member of her's, and she was trying to kill him. She was brought to juvenile court for that but not yet.

Two hours later that same day Gina is walking around -- she's walking around and she sees -- happens to be standing by Lori Brown who is a crossing quard in northern San Diego county.

He's a crossing guard for kids. About time for kids to get out of school. You know how they have those chairs on the curb. Gina decides to steal the chair and Lori says "Excuse me, that's my chair. Excuse me."

Gina, in response to that, picks up that chair and starts to bludgeon Lori with it. She's wanted now for the attempt murder, assault and a second assault against the crossing guard.

Gary Floyd, a sheriff's officer in San Diego, several hours later, tries to arrest her. He tracks her down and he starts to effect the arrest.

This little person so resistant, is so

resistant to that arrest, that Gary Floyd says it's one of 1 the most vile persons he's ever arrested in his long 2 career, the most violent person he's ever seen, that his 3 attempt to arrest her is so resisted by her that he 4 literally has to -- in trying to get the cuffs on her ends 5 up breaking her arm. 6 He says "It's like she was whacked out on 7 PCP." 8 We'll talk about her delusion in just a 9 second. 10 Two days later she's in juvenile hall. 11 She's observed clubbing a girl with the very cast put on 12 her hand, on her arm that had to be put there when she 13 was -- had her arm broken by the officer. This is the 14 violence and the rage you will see is in -- and the 15

strength that is in this little person.

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

She knows it has a lot to to with using drugs and she makes that admission to various juvenile authorities.

Chip finds out about this, not because he went out to check out juvenile records, but because it gradually comes out.

Her mother tells Chip "You know her history" and she says -- he talks to her. "What about this?"

Gina said "That was in the past. That's not

me now."

To be perfectly frank, it doesn't look like her because she was a different person at at that point it seemed. He finds stuff out. The way a relationship does and goes is up on and cycles through -- you find information in various ways.

One thing Chip finds out is a very extensive drug use and this history of crystal methamphetamine on Gina. One of the occasions, she wants to have a nose job to become more attractive.

She goes to the plastic surgeon to get the procedure and the surgeon comes out and talks to Chip. He says "We also have a problem here. She has her septum which is so deteriorated, that it has holes in it because of all the drug use. We'd have to do that as well."

Information comes to Chip about this background and she again says "That's a long time ago.

I'm not involved with that. I don't do that kind of thing" and so forth.

Her mother sits down with Camille and big
Chip, his father, during the time they are having the
rehearsal dinner. It's like she's not quite trying to
break it up, but for whatever the reason, she's saying "Do
you know the history of Gina. Did she tell you about the
story that she tried to kill somebody when she was in a

gang and used drugs?"

The information about Gina becomes more and more known to Chip over the course of time. That does not stop him from wanting to be with her. This is not how she displays as of that time.

People can change. He thinks that this change has really happened within her. He probably never would have come to any other conclusion regarding that if there hadn't culminated on this event on December 5th when she pulled a gun and tried to shoot him twice.

But for the fact she didn't know how to load the chamber he would have been dead. That's not the first time he saw some changes in her behavior.

This idea of Gina wanting to be with the baby is -- the evidence will show that that's very much not the situation.

Evidence will show that she very much didn't want to be with the baby. Maybe it's similar to the way she didn't want to be with Quito, her younger son, but it seems as if almost from the point that she was pregnant with --

MR. PETERSON: May we approach?

THE COURT: You may.

(Discussion off the record.)

THE COURT: Proceed.

MR. BLOOM: We have different views about the evidence. I represent Mr. Centofanti.

To make it clear what I'm trying to tell you is what I believe from the witness stand you will hear what the evidence is: There is a picture shown of Gina holding the baby.

In fact, it was not long after that that she was on the phone making business calls and making business arrangements. There's nothing wrong with a young mom being very interested in her business and so forth.

My point is what I think the evidence will show is that there was a very big change coming on in Gina, even before that December 5th and December 3rd incident where she knocked Chip down.

That change had a lot to do with the fear that Chip felt about her. He knew that if she's going out all night, drinking all night, not wanting to spend time with him and not wanting to spend time with the child, that's very different than the reason -- the feelings that he had towards her when he didn't have fear of her.

He didn't have fear of her early on when she seemed family-oriented and not using a lot of alcohol and not going out all night. All of a sudden now her behavior changes. T

hat effects him enormously. All that

history, though, of her with the violence and clubbing the person and the officer trying to arrest her and the broken arm, where does that fit in?

2.2

It fits in by the time she tries to kill him on December 5th he becomes petrified of her. Any claims, any assertion that he was anxious, obsessed with her, upset with her and there was some of that going on, quite admittedly, when your wife is going out on you and coming home drunk 7:00 o'clock in the morning, he felt upset.

You'll decide if that's obsessive or if that's reasonable. We know from Steve Shula in fact she was having sex. His suspicions were correct.

You'll decide if his conduct was obsessive, possessive, as described by Ms. Goettsch, or rather a reasonable response to the fact your wife is out drinking all night, especially when you have a brand new baby.

Were those calls about jealousy or were those calls about "How come you're not here with your family?"

Nonetheless, if there was any issue about obsessiveness or jealousy, by the time of December, before December 5th, they are all gone as of that time, because on December 5th, after this incident, when she tries to kill him, he says "That's it. I don't want anything else."

He gets the Restraining Order, files for the divorce, himself. This person who supposedly says "I won't ever give you a divorce" or something like that, files for it on his own. He requests and obtains custody of Nicholas and yes, he feels sad about losing Quito and not having Quito in his family.

Of course, when he gets sent back, the nine year old gets sent back to California, because Gina doesn't want to be with him at that point either, he does call the family and say "Be a good mom to Quito," because he knows Gina is not going to be a mom to Quito. And Chip cares for Quito very much.

In fact on the night of December 5th on that DV incident, at that time Quito is watching and he sees it. Chip says to Quito "You shouldn't be in the middle of this. You're not going to school today. Here's five dollars. Ride your bike over to the Burge King." Just so he won't be around.

Of course he comes back and he sees the police there anyway, but that's how Chip feels about Quito and why he calls the family and says "Be a good parent to him."

Between the December 5th and December 20th time it was a combination of events going on in your life.

Imagine, you're a 32 year old man, just had a baby. First

child. Your wife -- he's Catholic, very committed to a relationship, very committed to family, very upset at losing his family. He thinks it's a very bad break for young Nicholas for there to be a divorce. The kid is dealt a bad set of cards. He loves his son.

MR. PETERSON: I'm sorry.

THE COURT: Counsel, you're arguing at this point.

MR. BLOOM: I apologize. The judge is right. I'm not supposed to argue.

Let me step back. Tell you what the facts are going to show. I would think you'll see evidence of that. I apologize.

The evidence will show that he very much -it was very hard to be with his son in those next 15 days.

Explore what happened in those next 15 days, the days
between the 5th and the 20th.

He files -- gets the Restraining Order, files for the divorce, files requesting custody of his son and he asks for and obtains the right to have him at home, because he is going to have the baby.

Gina has to pay child support. Not much equity in the home. She is supposed to pay child support, because he's going to be the primary caregiver.

His parents have finally have arrived. They

get a call that night and they are very upset.

On the 5th they are on the road. Be there as quick as I can. MeriLee and Mark Wright see how very upset Chip is after she, Gina, has tried to kill him.

There are other witnesses who see that and see how upset he is. The parents arrive about two days later, on the 6th, very late on the 6th, early morning of the 7th.

They see a young man who is caring for his infant, dealing with the loss of his wife and having a divorce and they also see a man very afraid. They see that on a number of occasions throughout those next 15 days. Chip's life goes on. He does miss some work. He talks to people about what's going on.

They are coming in to tell you they did not believe him to be talking about what happened with jibe in some obsessive way. He appeared upset. He wasn't angry at her and he wasn't obsessing over the loss of relationship. He felt more sad about the loss of Nicholas having a family.

The evidence will show -- maybe only, maybe only in Las Vegas could this happen, in 11 days all of that divorce is final. Even quicker than that, maybe it happens to be one of the ladies who works in this courthouse who sees his papers come across her desk, Kathy

Prock is that person, and she sees the divorce papers come across on the 13th and she happens to know Chip, because she worked with him at Cisneros.

She calls him. It's not usual you would see your own friend's divorce papers coming through your Desk. She talks to them. Her evidence will be -- her conversation with him was pretty much like most people that saw Chip. He was okay with it. It wasn't the happiest time of his life, but neither was it a terribly upset time. He seemed pretty much like the old Chip, happy and friendly person.

Other witnesses will say very much the same thing. They didn't -- they didn't go and tap everybody on the shoulder and speak to team. He also had this very very real fear.

He's getting calls back from the family about how she's twisted this around to say he tried to shoot her. He has seen she is now no longer the person she never was. That rage he saw on December 5th was never any kind of person he had ever seen before. It wasn't the Gina he married or had courted or had loved. That image didn't leave him.

On the day of December 20th, the very day of the shooting, he happens to be late in that afternoon at a meeting with a lot of different people and several

different people saw him there at this big meeting.

Something at a Court Reporter's office where the statements are depositions were being taken of a large group of people of which Chip had one of the small pieces in that litigation and he was there in a room where somebody called a special master, which is like a judge for that type of hearing.

5 .

You'll hear from that judge or special master. It's very close to Christmas and he will remember it for a variety of reasons, one of which he came in with a Santa Clause suit on. That night he had to leave that special master hearing and go to a special event he does for kids. He decides I'll wear the Santa Clause suit to this thing on December 20th.

He saw Chip there and talked with him. Chip seemed just fine. He talked about appropriate things, some sports. Other people were there and said very much the same thing. One person, another attorney, didn't know him that well, but knew him occasionally and talked to them several different times. They had a conversation just as normal as could be.

She says after she heard, interesting to note, her name is Laurie Sidermann. She says "I'm wondering when you were going to call me. I took some notes."

When we talked to her recently, when my investigator went and talked to her, what did you see, do you remember this happening, she said "I was wondering when you were going to call me. I took some notes that day about my observations of Chip. They were, my notes -- I figured after I heard about" -- it was heavily publicized, the shooting.

1.2

She heard about it and it was -- everybody of course was talking about it. After she saw it on the news she decided to write some notes about her contact with Chip few days before. He was fine, regular, normal, not obsessive.

What happened on December 20th? On December 20th was was a day Chip was -- it was a Wednesday that Chip was supposed -- Gina was supposed to have her visitation.

She had every time -- in the two times beforehand she had attempted to avoid the visitation or change it. This time Chip made some plans to go out that evening. She made number of calls that evening about, that day, not to him, but to his parents at his house and the calls went back and forth from the parents and so forth about what's going on on?

When Gina would call up and say "I don't want to come. Can I change the time?" It was on again

off again, on again off again.

Finally Chip comes home at about 5:30 and by that time his plans had dropped out because the girl he was going out with had a cold. There wasn't any plans to go out. When Gina called it was "Can I get out of it?"

"No. This is your night to be with your baby. You're supposed to be here. Fuck you. And hang up.

She calls Trish Miller and says "Trish, Chip is being a jerk about this. I have to go pick up the baby."

She storms over to pick up the baby. Now, we know several different things. I can't tell you what her mind was when she got out of the car. You can get some information for how she parked the car in the wrong direction, on the street pointed the wrong way, half way up onto the curb, as if you will that evidence shows she was angry and storming out and getting out.

She comes into the house, doesn't ring the door bell. She bursts into the house and it's not her house anymore and she is not supposed to be there. Chip that day had gotten the gun back from the police.

They were in a bag, sitting inside the house. He had come home a fairly short time before. The first thing he notes about her being in there -- one

second, please. I'm going the put this away because this is pretty much the way the room lays out.

THE COURT: Mr. Bailiff.

Proceed.

MR. BLOOM: I put it up like this on purpose even though the words will make it hard for you to understand.

This is the layout of the house. Front door over here, she entered in this direction from here. The stairway leading up to the second floor is over here. The master bedroom right above this room.

enter this way, living room. You enter from here. The street is over here. Her car was parked up on the curb up on the sidewalk in front of the house. She storms into the front door from over here. First thing Chip sees is her coming into it is room. He's watching t.v. The bag with the guns over here.

Now, in the next two minutes an event will occur which will change everybody's live in this whole case ending in her death, Gina's death, Chip having shot her. The details of that two minutes are -- or three minutes is going to be difficult to recover. Only thing he remembers is this enormous argument. Seeing a rage of a person that was more violent than he had ever seen in

his life; moreso than had been two weeks before when she tried to kill him, and her coming at him and a recollection of hearing shots and if he had any clear thought of what's happened is that if she gets past him, then she's going to kill the baby and the parents, his parents upstairs.

Next thing he knows he's outside in a police car. Maybe an hour or so later or more, being touched on the shoulder by a person by the name of Janine, a lawyer, co-worker of his that his mom or his dad called or that somebody called, I think the mom called Cisneros who called Janens Much and she comes out at some point.

An hour later he is absolutely catatonic. The officer Gogean who comes and sees him standing there on the floor with a gun on the stair nearby at the next door house, he had no idea how he got there.

She will say, Office Gogean will say in a written see in a written report he was catatonic, non-resonsibe, not aware of what's going on at all.

The fear that he had walking in and how violent she appeared and what she -- what he thought was going to happen is all going to be up to you to decide about the issue of whether this prosecution can prove there was no self-defense.

It's been talked about seven shots. The

evidence will show we're talking about 2.7 seconds, that that weapon can be fired seven times in less than three seconds.

You're not going to be alone, though, in deciding the events that happened during those three seconds and the few moments that happened beforehand.

Because you're going to have the assistance of a variety right of experts. Doctor Simms is just one.

Doctor Simms, in fact, will say, even though he does concludes as it was established in the power point presentation by the prosecution that these shots, the shots to the face and so forth are what's consistent with or of the type of some type, an assassination-type shot.

He's also going to say he can't rule out the fact that she was upright at the time of those shots.

Now, the prosecution presenting evidence or will present evidence and talk to you about what evidence they are going to present of one theory of how the shooting occurred to her body, and then when she's on the ground, to the head shots.

You're going to hear from a number of experts from the defense. We won't get to present those until after the prosecution has completed their evidence. But you'll hear from several different people. One of whom is doctor John Eisele. Doctor John Eisele is a

forensic pathologist out of San Diego county and northern California who has worked and been the chief pathologist for several different counties and he will tell you that Doctor Simms is right to stay he can't rule out the fact that the shots were of the kind, of, were administered in a pattern described by the prosecution, but it's equally as possible from the evidence that, in fact, Gina was upright at the time of all the shots.

A person by the name of Jimmy Traheen will come in. He is a man who drew this diagram, created this diagram. He is an ex police officer in San Diego who has -- no -- ex police officer in Los Angeles, excuse me, who does the shooting reconstructions for San Diego, for Los Angeles District Attorney's Office.

He has been a police officer, was a police officer for many years and now is in private practice, in private practice in terms of doing reconstruction. He created these diagrams. When he went out to the house on Wintry Garden, he made measurements of the house, of the room and then he lays down the -- measures the distances and so forth, that he takes himself.

Then he lays out the location with tape and everything else of exactly where it is, then he brings in a figure into the house and we'll have the pictures to show you and he brings a probe to show the angle of each

of the shots so he can determine the shots, because he's able, based upon some of the autopsy information, to make a determination on the scientific proof of how she was shot.

Two different theories. Talking about the head shots. The face shots, was it a situation where she was dropped to the ground and while she's on the ground Mr. Centofanti comes over and shoots her?

Mr. Traheen will tell you that he can't rule out that as a possibility, but believes it is not indicative of most of the evidence that is there for two primary reasons: First, the angle of the shots into the body, there's one, into the head, one shot which goes straight in and there's two shots which are at an upright angle.

If Gina was down on the ground receiving those shots she's down here like this, the shot comes straight down, the shooter could have been over and fired that shot. We know that the gun is close to the body, but then in order to create the upward angle the person would have to shoot and they get down and change the angle of the gun. So it's no longer down. It's like this and like that.

An improbable circumstance says Mr. Traheen.

Not how people usually shoot. Doesn't make sense one

would do that and change the angle. We know the angles are the entries.

What does make sense from those shots that she was very close to that weapon. Does that mean she was attacking him?

Mr. Traheen will say he can't read into the minds of what the people are doing.

But that evidence is consistent with her having come at home and being that close to the muzzle. What happens with gunshot is not only does the bullet expel out of the muzzle, but the gunpowder gets fired and it fires out afterwards, too.

It doesn't have much weight to it. It drops down pretty quick but in a short distance of 12, 18, 20 inches or so, probably under 24. It has impact like a gunshot. It's like bird shot, lighter than that, but that's the area it creates that stippling that you see indicating that she was very close to the weapon, but there is indication of her coming at him and firing that way.

The aim of the shot is more consistent, says Mr. Traheen, with a situation where Chip has the weapon and she is standing and coming at him and she is shot and she is shot here and her head goes back and she starts to drop and the shots, remember, it takes 2.7 seconds to fire

off seven rounds, let alone three, and the gun goes off and her head goes back and that explains the angles of the shots.

1.3

Now, seven shots. Let's talk about seven shots before I go on. Before I finish with Mr. Traheen's statements, seven shots in 2.7 seconds. You'll hear the testimony from Lt. Steve Franks of Las Vegas Metro. Lt. Franks is a very, very experienced officer with regards to shooting.

He is the person who for years went to every officer involved shooting that Metro had in Las Vegas. He will tell you that his experience is that people just don't have -- these are trained officers -- don't have any idea how many times they shot or how quickly they shoot. They shoot until somebody stops being a threat.

He will tell you officers many many times will write out their statements when they are doing the post shooting event, write out their statements and today will say "I fired one time."

"How do you explain your gun is empty?"

They don't even know they fired that many times. Seven shots caused a hush in everyone as those charges were read. Lt. Franks will talk to you about the firing power of that weapon, how quickly it can be fired and how even trained police officers trained to shoot in

bursts of three will empty their gun or fire some indeterminate amount and not know, not realize they even did it.

You're talking about a very, very short period of time. Chip Centofanti had -- for both of them to get the gun, to own the gun they they had to go to this class. They went to the class at Bob Irwin's Gun Shop on Tropicana and they completed some classes. Gina was certified to own a gun and as you already heard she had a gun in her BMW on December 5th, and they had another weapon, they were joint owners and so forth. Each had a weapon.

Back to Jim Traheen and tell you one more important piece of of evidence as to whether Gina was lying on the ground at the time of the shooting, not the angle of the wounds spoke to her being upright, there is another, stippling on her arm.

That means the gun must have been close to that.

She only had one bleeding wound. The only thru-and-thru wound here. Bleeding wound is not correct. Only one wound which is bloodletting.

The other wounds made through and through on any of the other shots, that was through her finger.

Counting the number of bullets fired and the

number of injuries she suffered it is clear this wound must be part of -- this bullet that created that must be part of one of the other bullet that entered the body.

The stippling here shows the stippling on the face and shows her hand was -- must have been at her face at that point. Moving down in a -- in an aggressive move or in a defensive move.

Mr. Traheen will say "I can't tell," but he can tell this injury is linked to this. This injury is a bloodletting injury.

What has not been told to you is that there is blood found at the scene, not just the area her body resides, but some four to five feet off the ground in this area over here near the fireplace, down on the ground as if she was shot down on the ground.

If this is the only source of bloodletting that could create that type of blood spatter, that type of blood residue on the wall, four to five feet off the ground, she would have had to have been down on the ground, her hand like this and somehow move the hand up creating -- flicking off the blood into the position it was found up on the wall.

That is not consistent with that injury.

What is consistent is she was upright at the time she was shot, leaving her high enough to create that.

You'll have to decipher that physical evidence to make a determination of whether or not there was, if that explosion that happened during that assault, whether or not she was down on the ground or upright.

That's the physical evidence you'll see.

You'll see some more physical evidence, because the statement that on this exercise bike over here; the statement this exercise bike over here has blood on it is correct.

The government did not take that exercise bike in to evidence.

Though we don't have the benefit of looking at it in any preserved state; but the blood spatter people who will come in and explain to you, one by the name of Stewart James who is an internationally known blood spatter expert, and a person by the name of Lisa DeMeo who is a 20 year police officer criminalist and blood spatter expert out of San Diego, California.

Mr. James happens to have his office in Florida. He's a person who -- he has testified on behalf of the countries of Great Britain, many many countries throughout the world on reconstructing matters, will tell you that that blood which is on that exercise machine is not at all limited to just her being shot on the ground, but that there are several different ways, mechanisms they