
any comments along those	lines? About asking to enter a
judgment on an area that	you have little experience or
exposure to.	,

MR. EGLET: May we approach, Your Honor?

THE COURT: Yes.

[Bench Conference Begins]

MR. EGLET: Your Honor, at this time I'm going to ask that the Court give an instruction to the jury panel that they're not permitted to go do their own research, do their own investigation, do any of that stuff, we just had a juror Mr. Aquino who just stated that if he had a question he would go and research is own text and look at his own text and see what was right.

They need to be informed of that right now. This jury needs to be informed of that to let them know that they can't do that.

THE COURT: Well I think not only that but the other prospective juror that asked if she could speak to her colleagues about the case in --

MR. EGLET: Yeah.

THE COURT: -- and refer to the case --

MR. EGLET: Right.

THE COURT: That needs to be addressed too. Because that's one of the admonishments the Court gives the jurors, too.

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ı	MR. EGLET: And I would request it be addressed now
2	THE COURT: Sure.
3	MR. EGLET: While the subject's coming up.
4	MR. WALL: I mean it might come across as a rebuke,
5	but
6	THE COURT: I don't it would be I wouldn't
7	[indiscernible].
8	MR. WALL: I trust. Okay.
9	[Bench Conference Ends]
10	THE COURT: You know, ladies and gentlemen it occurs to
11	me that probably there are some instructions that I should
12	give you now since you're going to hear them later after the
13	jury is impaneled. And a couple of you have addressed some
14	questions, I think they're good questions.
15	One of them was, can you take notes? And the answer
16	is: Yes you can take notes. And after your impaneled and
17	while the Court gives you some preliminary instructions you
18	will actually be given notepads and pencils so you can take
19	notes.
20	You're not to rely entirely on the notes. You're to
21	rely on your own recollection, because sometimes people write
22	things down incorrectly. So you're obligated to rely on your
23	own recollection.
24	One of the other questions was can you discuss the
25	case with each other. You may discuss the case with each

other. You may not discuss the case with anyone during the course of the trial. The only time you can talk about the case with each other is when you get the case and go deliberate.

daily instructions on these types of things. You're not allowed to do any independent research on the case. You're not allowed to consult the internet or do any research whatsoever. You're not allowed to talk to anybody about the case. You're not allowed to consult with anybody about the case. You're not allowed to consult with anybody about the case. And you're to determine the facts of the case on only what you see and hear in this courtroom. Not on anything else. So there are a number of instructions the Court gives you. It's probably good to give you those thoughts now, since you're obviously thinking about it.

I'm glad you're thinking about it. And I think that's enough said. All right? Okay.

Sorry for the interruption, Mr. Rogers. Please proceed.

MR. ROGERS: Okay. I want to switch to the burden of proof now. The Plaintiffs burden is to convince you that his claim is right. Now, does anyone here, just by raising hands think it should be the other way? That the Defendant, Ms. Rish, should have a burden?

There are some who think: Well, if it seems even.

1	but on the same token there's just enough question about that
	evidence that, oh I could side for the Plaintiff on this one.
j	It kind of gets back to Plaintiff counsel's discussion about
	the burden.
	Does anybody here believe that they will lean in

If the Plaintiff says look I've got just enough evidence here,

favor of the Plaintiff even if his evidence is only 50 percent?

There was an example that the Plaintiff gave that a lot of you, I think, intuited the difference in. And that was the fellow with the knees complaints in the hallway versus the knee complaints here in court.

Mr. Barrett [phonetic], I haven't call you out yet. But what in your view is the difference?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR BARRETT: Well I think if someone's just discussing something on the street with you, an acquaintance, you would tend to take their -- what they say at face value.

Whereas if it's on a stand they have a burden of proof.

They are testifying under oath. And people are allowed to dispute their version of things and decide if they're telling the truth or not.

MR. ROGERS: Okay. Ms. K ~-

PROSPECTIVE JUROR KUNGLE: Kungle [phonetic].

MR. ROGERS: Kungle. Yes.

PROSPECTIVE JUROR KUNGLE: Yeah.

MR. ROGERS: Okay. And what's your take on that?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR KUNGLE: As far as someone saying to me outside, that their knee would be hurting, I would have no reason to doubt them. Like I won't walk up to somebody and say, "Gee my knee hurts." For no reason at all. I just have that kind of faith in people.

And as far as on the stand, if it's a professional that were -- are we speaking about a professional saying --

MR. ROGERS: Oh, yeah. Let me clarify. Just a person who's making the claims for themselves. They're saying no this -- it's my knee that hurts. Not an expert or a professional saying that person's --

PROSPECTIVE JUROR KUNGLE: Oh okay.

MR. ROGERS: -- knee hurts.

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PROSPECTIVE JUROR KUNGLE: Well I would like to believe them if they were under oath and they were saying, "My knee hurts." I don't lie if I was under oath.

MR. ROGERS: Okay. And what -- how do you bring the burden of proof into that. In other words, do you take the person in the hallway for face value.

PROSPECTIVE JUROR KUNGLE: Right.

MR. ROGERS: You're taking them at their word.

PROSPECTIVE JUROR KUNGLE: Right.

MR. ROGERS: In this case, in the courtroom, you've got a

Т	burden of proof.
2	PROSPECTIVE JUROR KUNGLE: Okay.
3	MR. ROGERS: And this is where evidence comes into play.
4	PROSPECTIVE JUROR KUNGLE: Okay.
5	MR. ROGERS: And this is an
6	MR. EGLET: Your Honor, I'm going to object. Testimony
7	is evidence.
8	THE COURT: Would counsel approach, please?
9	MR. ROGERS: Sure.
10	[Bench Conference Begins]
11	MR. EGLET: Counsel's attempting to imply that witness's
12	testimony is not evidence. And that's not something that goes
13	toward Plaintiff establishing their case, is if there has
14	to be more than just testimony. And that's not the case.
15	Okay?
16	He's differentiating he says, "Well okay. You'd
L7	take him at face value. But if somebody who is testifying,
18	well there has be evidence." Well that is evidence.
19	THE COURT: Well it
20	MR. ROGERS: No. That's I'm sorry.
21	THE COURT: Go ahead.
22	MR. ROGERS: That wasn't the implication at all. It's
3 }	whether that alone would be sufficient evidence for her.
24	That's the question. Whether she might require something more

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-- this relates back to his 50 or 60 or 70 percent question.

-	MR. WALL	: That's a	a question	that I	decided	and
	anticipated v	erdict unde	er 770			
	MR. EGLE	T: Yeah.				

MR. WALL: Is testimony enough or do we need expert testimony. Is it going to be enough that he says that? That's a question on an ultimate issue of fact. And essentially under 770, I don't know if it's B or C, it's an anticipate a decision based on certain evidence. If that is what the question is, then it's appropriate.

MR. ROGERS: See my hypothetical was totally different than he was giving.

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

MR. EGLET: My hypothetical was simply would your first thought/impression be to believe them without -- or would you tend not to believe them and require additional proof.

He's actually commenting on the actual evidence in this case and a party testifying are you going to believe them on that or are you going to require more proof.

And as Mr. Wall says that touches directly on the Nevada statute and he can't do that.

MR. WALL: Especially against the backdrop of 50/50 and it's even, or you know, is that going to be enough.

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

MR. WALL: Because I was in that area immediately prior to this.

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THE COURT: Well I'm inclined to sustain the objection.

I think I have to sustain the objection. I think this is a fair area -- I think this is a fair subject matter for you to follow up on, but I think you're going to need to redraft your questions in order to be able to properly follow up.

I understand, I think, where you want to go. But I think you need to refocus your questions.

MR. EGLET: All right. Thank you, Your Honor.

MR. ROGERS: Well hold up. Let me --

MR. EGLET: Well I think it -- I'm sorry.

MR. ROGERS: -- fine tune it here --

MR. EGLET: Did you just rule, Your Honor?

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

MR. EGLET: Okay.

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MR. ROGERS: Well I'm going to ask then if this is appropriate, and that is if the -- if Plaintiff counsel, for example were able to ask about quantifying the persuasion, you'd have to persuade at least 70 percent or 80 percent, Defense counsel should be permitted to inquire, well are you going to require additional evidence that is the same thing. Only this just puts a concrete example to the number that the Plaintiff already inquired to.

MR. EGLET: No. It doesn't -- it's a total -- you --

MR. ROGERS: Of course it does.

MR. EGLET: No. It doesn't. Okay. Once again counsel

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is comparing apples to oranges, Your Honor. He's specifically asking well if -- did -- if the party alone says this, are you going to require additional evidence. And he's not even giving a hypothetical. He's talking about, you know, in a case like this. So it's a totally different situation. And the Court's already ruled on it. So --

THE COURT: Well here's the thing, I think part of the problem is that, I'm not sure if one or several -- at least in my mind it's several issues, because I think the burden of proof is a very different subject matter than one's credibility.

MR. EGLET: Yes.

THE COURT: One's credibility is a separate matter apart from whether or not you have expert testimony. So I think there's a lot of things you're kind of lumping together.

I think the question you just posed now, it would also be objectionable and the Court would be inclined to sustain that objection if you posed that particular question. So let's -- you know what, let's take about a ten minute break.

MR. ROGERS: All right.

MR. EGLET: For the record, Your Honor. The objection is sustained?

THE COURT: Objection is sustained for the record.

[Bench Conference Ends]

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Let's take about a ten minute break ladies and
gentlemen. Remind you of your obligation not to talk to
anyone about this case. Not to form or express any opinion
Not to do any research on any subject connected with this
case. Thank you.

[Recess]

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THE MARSHAL: Remain seated. District Court X is back in session.

Thank you. We're ready for our panel, aren't THE COURT: we?

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKERS: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. ROGERS: I believe so.

THE MARSHAL: The jury is coming in. 14

[Prospective Jury In]

16 THE COURT: Okay. Please be seated. Mr. Rogers,

17 whenever you're ready to resume.

MR. ROGERS: Thank you, Your Honor. All right, Ms. 18 Gilmore [phonetic].

PROSPECTIVE JUROR GILMORE: Yes.

MR. ROGERS: Where you and I left off was a discussion of the burden of proof and at the end of the case if the Plaintiff asks for two million dollars, but you find the Plaintiff didn't meet his burden of proof, would you have any difficulty finding against him? If I'm not clear, just tell

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1	me.
2	PROSPECTIVE JUROR GILMORE: Okay. Can you just say it
3	repeat it once more for me?
4	MR. ROGERS: Yeah. Let's say at the end of this case
5	PROSPECTIVE JUROR GILMORE: Okay.
6	MR. ROGERS: the Plaintiff does as was discussed
7	earlier and asks for a million or two million dollars.
8	PROSPECTIVE JUROR GILMORE: Okay.
و	MR. ROGERS: You find that the Plaintiff didn't meet his
10	burden of proof.
11	PROSPECTIVE JUROR GILMORE: Okay.
12	MR. ROGERS: Will you have any difficulty saying you
13	didn't meet your burden, you're not entitled to an award of
14	money?
15	PROSPECTIVE JUROR GILMORE: I wouldn't have any
16	difficulty.
17	MR. ROGERS: Okay. Ms. Grant [phonetic], same question
18	to you.
19	PROSPECTIVE JUROR GRANT: I wouldn't have any difficulty.
20	MR. ROGERS: All right. There are a couple I still
21	haven't spoken with today. Ms. Bell, same question. If the
22	Plaintiff doesn't meet its burden of proof, let's say you
23	sympathize for him but you decide, you know what, I don't
24	think you established this accident caused what you're

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claiming, will you have any difficulty entering a judgment

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1	that he's not entitled to an award of money?
2	PROSPECTIVE JUROR BELL: It would have to be based on
3	proof somehow.
4	MR. ROGERS: That and the question if I may not
5	have been clear. The question presumes that because the
6	Plaintiff didn't meet his burden of proof. It's the Plaintiff
7	who has to convince you of this.
8	MR. EGLET: Your Honor, I'm going to object to the term
9	convince. It's not the burden of proof in Nevada. It's not
10	MR. ROGERS: It absolutely is, Bob.
11	MR. EGLET: It is not, counsel.
12	MR. ROGERS: You objected to open
13	MR. EGLET: May we approach?
14	THE COURT: Hold on, hold on. Heard enough
15	arguing for one day.
16	[Bench Conference Begins]
17	MR. EGLET: We would object to him using the word
18	THE COURT: Wait for everybody.
19	MR. EGLET: I'm objecting to him using the word convince,
20	okay, because that implies a higher standard than just more
21	likely than not. Preponderance of the evidence, nowhere does
22	it say convince. It says just more likely than not.
23	THE COURT: It's usually argued as persuade.
24	MR. EGLET: Yes.
25	MR. ROGERS: That'd be convince is synonymous with

persuade.

MR. EGLET: Convince implies clear and convincing --

THE COURT: Wait, wait. Keep your voices down.

MR. EGLET: Convince implies clear and convincing

evidence which is well above the standard okay?

THE COURT: I think I know where Mr. Eglet's coming from.

I'm thinking of clear and convincing standard and I don't know

if that's what you were thinking. But I think persuade is

probably a better term. Let's go with that.

MR. ROGERS: Let's go back to something though.

Plaintiff earlier objected to Defense counsel making objections in open Court and asked that we approach.

Plaintiff's counsel walked away from the last objection and announced proudly in front of the jury, so the objection is sustained. Completely a double standard here. If they want to keep the objections at the bench, then you do it, too.

You're the one who asked for it.

MR. EGLET: We're making our argument at the bench.

MR. ROGERS: And you didn't though. You still have a --

MR. EGLET: You're right. I will make my argument at the bench.

THE COURT: There's no double standard here. If you want to relay what we've done on the record after you walk away, I'm fine with that.

MR. ROGERS: No, the double standard is their request.

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1	It's not you. It's the question that we approach on
2	everything to keep things away from the jury. And then when
3	it's my turn to vet them, the Plaintiff starts objecting in
4	open Court and asking Your Honor to announce your ruling.
5	That's contra
6	MR. EGLET: And now let's see who is making the record,
7	Your Honor.
8	THE COURT: What we talked about was no speaking
9	objections.
10	MR. EGLET: Yes.
11	THE COURT: And I think we were all on the same page with
12	respect to no speaking objections. I think what I stated was
13	you can state an objection and the lawyer [indiscernible] then
14	it's probably acceptable. Nothing's changed.
15	MR. ROGERS: All right.
16	MR. EGLET: Thank you.
17	[Bench Conference Ends]
18	MR. EGLET: For the record, Your Honor, the objection's
19	sustained.
20	THE COURT: It is for the record. The objection's
21	sustained.
22	MR. ROGERS: The word then is persuade. If the Plaintiff
23	doesn't persuade you that this accident caused the injuries
24	that he's claiming and he asks for an award of a million or

two million, will you have any difficulty, even if you have

sympathy, in finding that he did not meet his burden of proof? And that he is not entitled to an award of money?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR BELL: I will not have any difficulty whatsoever.

MR. ROGERS: And Mr. Johnson, same question.

PROSPECTIVE JUROR JOHNSON: If he was asking for a sum of money and I don't think after everything's been displayed that he deserves that amount of money, no, I would not have any problem saying no.

MR. ROGERS: Okay. Let me go back to something that we discussed a little bit earlier to the same question. And that is the difference between mediating and judging. Would you have any difficulty setting aside sympathy and entering a judgment of no award for damages instead of saying you know what, maybe I could just split this one in half and call it good.

PROSPECTIVE JUROR JOHNSON: No, not at all.

MR. ROGERS: All right. Let's see who has not spoken. I don't think we've discussed anything today. Ms. Ellis. Same question then to you.

PROSPECTIVE JUROR ELLIS: No, I wouldn't. I wouldn't have a problem.

> MR. ROGERS: Okay. And Ms. Sweet [phonetic].

PROSPECTIVE JUROR SWEET: No, I wouldn't have any

25 problems.

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MR. ROGERS: Now something that was discussed at length during the Plaintiff's questioning is personal responsibility. Everyone naturally is in favor of personal responsibility. Somewhere along the way, the example of the broken window came up. If you do that, if you break someone's window, you should take responsibility for it. And Ms. Nolte, this one is for you. Let's say that you do break someone's window and you accept responsibility for that. Then that person says it's going to cost \$10,000 to fix. But you don't believe that. You think fully accepting responsibility for your actions means that you're obliged to accept the amount that that person demanded.

PROSPECTIVE JUROR NOLTE: No, in speaking from like the window incidence, something like that, I would be going out and getting my own appraisals and finding out what something like that would cost. And that's what I would present to the person who owns the window that I broke. I'd say, you know, here's several of these appraisals that I've gotten, I'm willing to pay even the highest of those. I'm not going to be paying something that is way over and above the damages that I've caused.

MR. ROGERS: Okay. Ms. [indiscernible], any thoughts on that same subject? You've done this thing, you've broken someone's window, but they are requesting an amount that you think is excessive? Do you have to accept their amount to

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have accepted responsibility?

UNIDENTIFIED PROSPECTIVE JUROR: I would probably do the same thing that she mentioned. Just like if you're in a car accident, you get different appraisals for your insurance company. I would have someone come, you know, do the diameters, you know, what we're talking about, a little window, a huge window. See how much it costs and also, you know, see where our differences are and say, you know, how are you coming at your estimate when my estimates, you know, are much lower.

MR. ROGERS: Okay. It sounds like a common theme in both of these answers is that you would take it upon yourselves to go out and insure that what you're responsible for is really what they're asking. Is there anybody here who views this any different than the comments that we've gotten so far. Ms. Rosinski.

PROSPECTIVE JUROR ROSINSKI: No, I would definitely take care of it myself. I would not just take by word what he -- well the person that had the broken window. I would definitely take care of that myself. And no, I would not have a problem, what was the -- I would not have a problem -- yeah, saying no to that or whatever it was that you said. Okay.

MR. ROGERS: All right. Ms. Zere {phonetic}, same question then for you.

PROSPECTIVE JUROR ZERE: Yes.

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MR. ROGERS: Okay.

MR. ROGERS: Like for like.

UNIDENTIFIED PROSPECTIVE JUROR:

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MR. ROGERS: You've broken the window, they've asked for what appears to you to be more --

PROSPECTIVE JUROR ZERE: Yes, I'd take responsibility and I would pay and I would get several prices for that window that fits that window instead of working that window. would pay for that with that.

MR. ROGERS: Okay. Now is there anybody here who views this different in any way from the comments that we've heard so far? All right.

UNIDENTIFIED PROSPECTIVE JUROR: I do have one more comment.

MR. ROGERS: Yes.

UNIDENTIFIED PROSPECTIVE JUROR: When they were going out to find the window, it would have to be of the same quality window and quote that they broke. Not just, you know, they say \$10,000. Well, there are windows out there that do cost that kind of money if it was like, you know, a big house, you know, and they had those big huge glass windows. going to expect them to come back with a quote of \$2,000 to replace the window because then the window won't be the same quality. So it's got to be the same quality that it was before.

UNIDENTIFIED PROSPECTIVE JUROR: Because I didn't damage my own window. Someone else did it.

MR. ROGERS: Okay. Very good. Any other comments on this line? Okay. Now in this case, you've seen plenty already of objections. And we've got some sports fans here I know and nobody really much likes to watch a game that's muddied up with a lot of fouls and a lot of time out. Now there will be times I anticipate throughout this trial where I may object because there are rules to be enforced and some people might not like that. Might take offense, you know, just like they might at a football game because too many fouls are getting called. Is anybody here going to hold it against Mrs. Rish, because this isn't about me, if during the course of the trial I stand up for an objection to things that I perceive to be inappropriate? Okay. Yes.

UNIDENTIFIED PROSPECTIVE JUROR: Basically, you each have to do what you feel is best your claim so that's what pulls them too.

MR. ROGERS: Okay. I didn't know if that was a hand or --

UNIDENTIFIED PROSPECTIVE JUROR: No, I was just getting my hair out of my eyes.

MR. ROGERS: Okay.

UNIDENTIFIED PROSPECTIVE JUROR: Sorry.

MR. ROGERS: All right. Now revisiting just briefly the

burden of proof, because this is a case at law, it begins with pleadings where one party files a complaint, that would be the Plaintiff and then the Defendant files what's called an answer. And in the pleadings, the parties can assert their rights to put the other onto their burden of proof.

MR. WALL: Your Honor, may we approach please?

7 THE COURT: Yes.

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[Bench Conference Begins]

MR. WALL: I'm objecting somewhat anticipatory because I believe that this is going to be testimony as to why certain things are put in the pleadings for the client. The client shouldn't be held to what the lawyer did on behalf of the client. That testimony in any form much less during jury selection is inappropriate.

THE COURT: Is that where you're going?

MR. ROGERS: No, it's not. The question is whether they would just like the objections, hold that against me, whether they would hold it against the Defendant if she held the Plaintiff to the burden of proof.

Why were you talking about the pleadings THE COURT: then?

MR. ROGERS: Because she denied the allegations. entitled to hold the Plaintiff to the burden of proof. jury going to hold that against her?

THE COURT: Why don't you ask her this.

understanding the case -- is [indiscernible].

MR. EGLET: She has not. He hasn't --

MR. ROGERS: She actually did and the problem is that she did not stipulate to their form of it. In her -- I'm not quite done. In her [indiscernible] she admitted she was informed. The Plaintiff then submitted a stipulation that was over reaching and we said, look -- she's going to admit liability and she already did. You have the deposition. You don't need a broad sweeping stipulation that encompasses more than that. And they chose not to accept. And they said well we have her testimony. She's admitted the [indiscernible].

THE COURT: Well, here's a thought. I think --

MR. EGLET: We have that recorded.

THE COURT: -- if that's where you're -- no, you can address that when you examine your client. You can ask him all the questions you want to about the pleadings, that's fair. But I think this is where you're headed. I'm going to sustain the objection. However, you know, you told me the substance of your question had to do with [indiscernible] to hear that and I tried to [indiscernible] first.

MR. ROGERS: Okay.

MR. EGLET: Well, it really the way the question is intended is will you hold it against the Defendant if she denies the claims against her and holds the Plaintiff to his burden of proof.

MR.	ROGERS:	And	that	he	is	giving	уоп	the	plea	ding	js
which is	[indisce	rnibl	e].	Tho	se	questic	ons a	are 1	that	the	Court
says are	appropri	ate [indis	cer	mil	ole].					

MR. WALL: See, because the inference is when she denied it, she didn't really mean to deny it.

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

MR. WALL: She and so that's testified on her behalf.

THE COURT: Yeah, I follow you.

MR. ROGERS: That's argument on it though. She has an absolute right. It seems that if they're going to challenge this, the question is will the jury be offended at her absolute right to deny allegations of [indiscernible].

THE COURT: Well, and I think you can ask that question. But I think you need to stay away from the pleadings and if you use them, we would [indiscernible] if you want to address that issue.

MR. ROGERS: Thank you, Your Honor.

MR. EGLET: Okay.

[Bench Conference Ends]

MR. EGLET: Objection sustained, Your Honor?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. ROGERS: The question then is and I can't recall right now the gentleman from up there. Who was I speaking with? Anyone directly? Okay. We'll keep this one to everyone.

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1	UNIDENTIFIED PROSPECTIVE JUROR: I thought you were
2	directing it to me.
3	MR. ROGERS: Okay. Good
4	UNIDENTIFIED PROSPECTIVE JUROR: Maybe I'm misunderstand.
5	MR. ROGERS: That will be great.
6	UNIDENTIFIED PROSPECTIVE JUROR: Maybe I'm
7	misremembering.
8	MR. ROGERS: Would you hold it against Mrs. Rish if she
9	denied any claims against her and held the Plaintiff to his
10	burden of proof?
11	UNIDENTIFIED PROSPECTIVE JUROR: No.
12	MR. ROGERS: Okay. Mr. Johnson.
13	PROSPECTIVE JUROR JOHNSON: I don't know just hear it.
14	UNIDENTIFIED PROSPECTIVE JUROR: Say again, I can't hear
15	you back here sometimes. Please.
16	MR. ROGERS: Yes. Okay. Is there any part of you that
17	would hold it against Mrs. Rish if she denied the claims that
18	Plaintiff has brought against her and put him to his burden of
19	proof?
20	UNIDENTIFIED PROSPECTIVE JUROR: I guess I'm not getting
21	it. Say it again please.
22	MR. ROGERS: All right. And sometimes I don't speak loud
23	enough. Is there any part of you that would be offended is
24	Mrs. Rish denied the claims the Plaintiff has brought against
25	her and put him to his burden of proof?

UNIDENTIFIED PROSPECTIVE JUROR: Is that from the 1 2 Defendant -- it's --3 MR. ROGERS: Okay. Because I don't 4 UNIDENTIFIED PROSPECTIVE JUROR: 5 understand. Okay. Let's take it to that window example 6 MR. ROGERS: 7 we discussed. Someone asks you for \$10,000 and you say, well I've got this receipt here or this estimate that shows it's 8 not worth quite that so I'm denying that I owe you \$10,000. 9 UNIDENTIFIED PROSPECTIVE JUROR: Uh-huh. 10 11 MR. ROGERS: Do you view that as denying or avoiding 12 responsibility? UNIDENTIFIED PROSPECTIVE JUROR: 13 Okay. Does anybody here just by a show of 14 MR. ROGERS: hands have any concern that they might hold it against Mrs. 15 Rish if she denies the claims brought against her and puts the 16 17 Plaintiff to his burden of proof? All right. Now before I leave the sports example, that we left 18 off with the objections. Like all metaphors, they fall apart 19 20

Now before I leave the sports example, that we left off with the objections. Like all metaphors, they fall apart under really close scrutiny. And one thing I want to dispense with right now is this. This is not a competition. This is a search for the truth. And is there anybody here views it otherwise?

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You were asked by Plaintiff's counsel during questioning about experts, experts who are going to be paid,

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paid for their time to come in and testify. And if I	[
understood you all right, that's okay with you, you d	lon't have
that's not going to cause you to question their	
reliability. Was that everyone's answer?	

PROSPECTIVE JURORS: Yes.

MR. ROGERS: Okay. What if I were -- yes.

UNIDENTIFIED PROSPECTIVE JUROR: When you say question their reliability, I think the question was brought up from what I understood was would we have a problem with having them paid to come in and speak. Was that -- that's what I understood as an expert.

MR. ROGERS: Okay.

UNIDENTIFIED PROSPECTIVE JUROR: Because sometimes you have to pay an expert to come in or you have to pay somebody to come in. It wasn't their reliability because sometimes I could be an expert on third grade because I've taught for 16 years and you could pay me to be an expert. But what characterizes them as an expert? Do we have any kind of documentation that shows that they're an expert? And how do we prove that they're an expert as compared to your expert and their expert. So it's like of --

MR. ROGERS: No, you make a good distinction here. Let me change the word reliability to credibility. Will the fact that this person has been paid money in your view diminish that person's credibility? Yeah, that is a good distinction

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and I think that's what you guys all said, you know, in a word
we understand these people get paid and if they're here that
means they're not elsewhere where they could be earning a
living.
Now the next question to that is this. What if I
were to bring in a witness who was a friend? A friend of

mine? Would that in your view weigh on that witness' credibility? Yes.

UNIDENTIFIED PROSPECTIVE JUROR: Are they an expert? UNIDENTIFIED PROSPECTIVE JUROR: How would we know -- how would we have evidence that this witness is a friend of yours?

MR. ROGERS: Well, the only evidence you'll get from the witnesses is their testimony aside from whatever documents they might bring. So the testimony is this. This is a friend of mine. Might that cause you to think that does affect my view of his credibility.

UNIDENTIFIED PROSPECTIVE JUROR: But do they not have to show us their credentials?

MR. ROGERS: Yes.

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UNIDENTIFIED PROSPECTIVE JUROR: What their training is, their experience and all that?

UNIDENTIFIED PROSPECTIVE JUROR: Even though they're a friend?

MR. ROGERS: I'm sorry.

UNIDENTIFIED PROSPECTIVE JUROR: Even though they're a

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MR. WALL:

That ask them their opinion about inadmissible I made a motion -- or a mention of this during the motion hearing almost a month ago and you told him that if he wanted to bring that up, he would need to file a separate motion about any relationships between witnesses and counsel. And you would consider it. He has not done so. That means it's inadmissible unless and until he did it and he didn't. So this is questioning about -- it's at the very least sending an inference that somehow witnesses that testify who's a friend of one of the lawyers. That can't come in. it's inadmissible, it's no different than asking a question about something else that might be inadmissible. Whether it's

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friend of yours, their credentials are still going to be out there for us to look at.

MR. ROGERS: Okay. And let's assume that you guys make a good point that these people are qualified. They went to They got their degrees. They know the area that they're talking about.

MR. WALL: Your Honor, may we approach, Your Honor?

THE COURT: Yes.

UNIDENTIFIED PROSPECTIVE JUROR:

[Bench Conference Begins]

MR. WALL: These are questions that ask them their opinion --

THE COURT: Okay.

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L	how much or if you know if the Defendant had insurance. He
2	can't ask her that because whether she had insurance is
3	inadmissible. It's the same, same theory.
1	MR. EGLET: It's absolutely
5	THE COURT: This came out in a roundabout way. It wasn't

MR. WALL: It was. It was mentioned in his opposition to a motion.

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

the subject of any pretrial motions.

MR. WALL: He wanted to bring out a relationship between counsel and one of the physicians.

MR. EGLET: It was the motion on --

MR. ADAMS: The Senate investigation I thought.

MR. EGLET: -- lawyers who have been medical billed out.

THE COURT: Right, but there wasn't --

MR. EGLET: He argued well I should be able to {indiscernible} had relationships that Plaintiff's counsel had with the treating physicians. But you told him specifically that he would have to file a separate motion on the issue for you to consider whether you would allow him to do that. He never filed a motion. That is exactly what the [indiscernible] on that case.

THE COURT: When I say it came up in a roundabout way, it was a subject motion but this particular issue wasn't argued in the pleadings. It just came up in oral argument.

MR. EGLET: It did.

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MR. WALL: Yes, it actually came up in his opposition to I'm not going to call it medical the medical buildup motion. buildup but I do have the right to bring out the relationships between counsel. And at the hearing if you'll recall, we actually took a break at one point because he was really reluctant to say who it was or what the relationship was, came back and he -- I think he did it on the record or whether he told me during the break, I don't remember which. And you said and I arqued vociferously against that, saying it wasn't relevant to anything. It is brought in only essentially to There's no other inference. And bring up medical buildup. you told him if he wanted that in and I think it's in the order, you told him that if he wanted to bring that up, he needed to file a separate motion to admit evidence of the relationship between a lawyer and their counsel. So as it stands, that wasn't filed, that makes it inadmissible. can't cross-examine an expert doctor, a witness, saying aren't you friends with so and so.

MR. ROGERS: May I?

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

MR. ROGERS: There is no order on this question and it is absolutely unlike insurance where there's a black letter rule against it whereas with witnesses, the rule is that a jury is charged to consider all the evidence about the witness

including bias or prejudice, relationships and so forth.
Relationships is in the instruction. There is no order from
this Court contrary to the jury instruction and I don't
believe I think I I believe you're correct, this issue
was never addressed in a motion.

MR. EGLET: It was the [indiscernible] opposition, okay, specifically I would argue it was made in his opposition [indiscernible] that it was in -- it's on the motion for lawyer [indiscernible]. If he says [indiscernible] to cross-examine the witnesses about what relationship and specifically relationship came up with Dr. McNulty about his [indiscernible] for Dr. McNulty [indiscernible]. So he said I should have cross-examined our relation -- what is there to bring that up and trying to argue that Mr. Eglet has some relationship with Dr. McNulty. If not, to leave in the jury's mind that well maybe this was some sort of buildup at least between Mr. Eglet and Dr. McNulty. Okay. Will you let me finish please?

MR. ROGERS: Yes.

MR. EGLET: So what basis is there to do that other than to imply that there is some, you know, that maybe Dr. McNulty had this unnecessary surgery which his experts are claiming because it's Mr. Eglet's friend. You granted that motion on the medical buildup.

THE COURT: Yeah.

MR. EGLET: You specifically told him that he -- if he wanted to address this issue, he was going to have do a separate motion. That's in the record. It's on the record.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. EGLET: And let me finish. And most importantly, why this is so ridiculous is because we didn't have this case until Dr. McNulty had already done the surgery and almost had it done. So it's totally irrelevant. Thank you.

THE COURT: I think Mr. [indiscernible]. It was a really nebulous sort of issue that was proposed. I didn't have any idea what Mr. Rogers -- where he was headed and even though he say to me on the record so we had some kind of discussions with Mr. Wall though I stepped down.

MR. ROGERS: Correct.

THE COURT: And then you addressed it but in a very negative sort of fashion. If that's the ruling that I made and I don't have any doubt that that was the ruling that you were in front of me, the objection is sustained.

MR. ROGERS: Thank you, Your Honor.

[Bench Conference Ends]

MR. ROGERS: You were asked earlier if anyone here has had neck surgery or is close to anyone who's had neck surgery. Let me change that just a little bit. Has anyone here had a history of headaches bad enough that you needed to undergo medical care for it?

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1.116	подыт.	objection, roar nonor, may we approach.
THE	COURT:	Yes. It's been so long. I was missing you.
[Ber	nch Confe	erence Begins]
MR.	EGLET:	Maybe I didn't hear the question correctly
did y	you just	say migraine headaches?
THE	COURT:	Yeah, that's what I heard him say.
MR.	EGLET:	All right. Well and this like the earlier

question, this is somewhat of an anticipatory objection and if he's going to get into asking people about their migraine headaches and how it's affected them or whatever, that is an issue that's with this in this case and I guess I'm trying to understand where you're going with this.

MR. ROGERS: It's the same place you went with the neck surgery question.

MR. EGLET: Which is what?

MR. ROGERS: Well, you went there.

MR. EGLET: Well, I'm asking -- just give us an offer of proof exactly what the basis --

MR. ROGERS: You asked the jury whether any of them or anyone close to them had neck surgery.

MR. EGLET: Actually the question I asked them was does anyone on this panel know anyone who's had any neck surgery before. That was the question.

THE COURT: Well, you know, refresh my recollection on the migraine issue because we discussed that issue in some of

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the pretrial motions that were argued.	Is this I mean is
this an issue that's going to come up?	

MR. ROGERS: It's a preexisting condition exacerbated by the accident.

MR. EGLET: Right.

THE COURT: So why is it not fair game?

MR. EGLET: Well, it's fair game except that I'm trying to figure out if he's going to -- if his question is going to be, you know, well how do you deal with your headaches and things like that. That's not appropriate because their headaches -- there's no relevance as to whether their headaches are the same as our client's headaches. If he's simply asking do you know anybody who's ever suffered from migraine headaches and they're going to raise their hands on that, I don't have any problem with that question. But his question I think was do any of you -- have any of you suffered from migraine headaches and I that I think is different.

MR. ROGERS: The question was asked of the jury to insure that their impartiality of the case is whether you or anyone close to you has undergone a similar thing. And can you still be impartial without that, even with that.

MR. EGLET: Well, that's a question I have -- I have no problem with that question.

THE COURT: That's fair game, Mr. Rogers. That's fair game.

1	MR. ROGERS: And the next question that's not the end
2	of it though. The next question is
3	THE COURT: There's more?
4	MR. ROGERS: Yeah, sure. The next question is what kind
5	of treatment have you undergone or this person close to you.
6	Because the question was treatment sufficient for medical or
7	pardon me the condition that was bad enough that you needed
8	treatment for.
9	MR. EGLET: Say that again. That was two questions.
10	MR. ROGERS: I think that was two questions. The
11	question was have you or anyone
12	MR. EGLET: No, I heard that part.
13	MR. ROGERS: close to you had headaches bad enough
14	that you have needed medical treatment for them.
15	MR. EGLET: Okay.
16	MR. ROGERS: And then the question following is what kind
17	of treatment and I'm not
18	MR. EGLET: And I don't have a problem with that. That's
19	fine.
20	THE COURT: Thanks.
21	[Bench Conference Ends]
22	MR. ROGERS: All right. Same question. Have you or
23	anyone close to you had headaches bad enough you've required
24	medical care for them? Yes, and I'm not going to pry or I'm
25	going to try not to pry. What just generically what kind of

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1	medical care have you had for them?
2	UNIDENTIFIED PROSPECTIVE JUROR: Just Imitrex.
3	MR. ROGERS: Medications?
4	UNIDENTIFIED PROSPECTIVE JUROR: Yeah.
5	MR. ROGERS: There were a couple other hands on this.
6	UNIDENTIFIED PROSPECTIVE JUROR: My dad and I both.
7	MR. ROGERS: Okay. So it runs in the family? All right.
8	Yes.
9	UNIDENTIFIED PROSPECTIVE JUROR: I had a headache that
10	wouldn't go away for two, three months. And I finally went to
11	the doctor after I passed out at work and found out that it
12	was viral spinal meningitis. So I had a spinal punch.
13	UNIDENTIFIED PROSPECTIVE JUROR: [Indiscernible].
14	UNIDENTIFIED PROSPECTIVE JUROR: No, I was too
15	[indiscernible], I had a tap. Spinal tap. And then from
16	since then I've had migraines off and on since then.
17	MR. ROGERS: Okay.
18	UNIDENTIFIED PROSPECTIVE JUROR: So yeah, I had to have
19	medical care.
20	MR. ROGERS: And do you have to get any ongoing medical
21	care for that?
22	UNIDENTIFIED PROSPECTIVE JUROR: No, just enough just if
23	the migraines shows up to take it like when I have minor
24	migraine but that was due to the infection.
25	MR. ROGERS: Okay. Any other pains [indiscernible]?

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1	UNIDENTIFIED PROSPECTIVE JUROR: Migraines but it turned
2	out to be food allergies. So as long as I don't eat those
3	foods, then I don't get the migraines.
4	MR. ROGERS: And you don't require ongoing medication?
5	UNIDENTIFIED PROSPECTIVE JUROR: No.
6	MR. ROGERS: [Indiscernible].
7	UNIDENTIFIED PROSPECTIVE JUROR: My husband and my
8	mother-in-law and my daughter all have migraines. My mother-
9	in-law has medical care for that. She lives in Texas so I'm
10	not involved but my husband, his medical care is ice pack and
11	my daughter she gives, you know
12	MR. ROGERS: Like over the counter?
13	UNIDENTIFIED PROSPECTIVE JUROR: Yeah, you know, just
14	Ibuprofen.
15	MR. ROGERS: Okay. And any others?
16	UNIDENTIFIED PROSPECTIVE JUROR: My daughter suffers from
17	migraines?
18	MR. ROGERS: I'm sorry.
19	UNIDENTIFIED PROSPECTIVE JUROR: My daughter suffers from
20	migraines. She has to medicate [indiscernible].
21	MR. ROGERS: Okay. And

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[indiscernible]. Some doctors say, you know, it's actually

having headaches, these are from high school and it's once in

a while he actually gets where you take medication

UNIDENTIFIED PROSPECTIVE JUROR: My brother is constantly

some combination of allergies and something else. He is getting medications for it.

MR. ROGERS: Okay. All right. Very good. I'm actually very nearly done. Has anyone here and this one I'm not going to ask the specifics on because this one can [indiscernible] and that's not the intention of this. All right. It's simply to gauge whether any of you have experience with this problem. Has anybody here had a medical condition that the doctors did not figure out? Okay. And now let's broaden that out. It's not just you but you and people you know who have had a problem where the doctors just haven't been able to figure it out? Okay.

And then finally, has anybody here been involved in a claim like that window example that we discussed earlier where they felt that someone was taking advantage? All right. Ladies and gentlemen, thank you very much for your time.

Your Honor, can we approach?

THE COURT: Yes.

[Bench Conference Begins]

MR. ROGERS: Before the Defense passes for cause, we were going to hear this motion that was brought this morning and --

THE COURT: You mean the motion for the mistrial?

MR. ROGERS: Right. And I haven't prepared it. I'm not going to argue it. But --

THE COURT: You didn't do what?

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1	MR. ROGERS: I didn't prepare it so I'm not going to be
2	arguing it. Mr. Michalek did that.
3	THE COURT: Who?
4	MR. ROGERS: Charles Michalek from my office is going to
5	be arguing it.
6	MR. EGLET: He sat in the back row [indiscernible].
7	THE COURT: Oh. How do you spell that name?
8	MR. ROGERS: It looks like Mikelek [phonetic]. It's
9	Michalek.
10	THE COURT: Michalek.
11	MR. ROGERS: Yes.
12	MR. EGLET: Charles Michalek.
13	MR. ROGERS: And so he's going to make that motion. It's
14	a motion the procedurally must be made before the jury's
15	impaneled. So I'd prefer to do it before we excuse for cause.
16	THE COURT: Sure. Let's wait a few minutes though. We
17	need to do it on our break.
18	MR. WALL: Yeah, because if it were to be denied, then
19	the next part of the process would be exercising preempts and
20	that may take a little while. So I don't know break you
21	might want to tell them it's going to be.
22	MR. EGLET: Well, I think we want the jury in here when
23	we exercise our preempts [sic]. Because what I think is
24	[indiscernible].
25	MR. WALL: Okay. All right.

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+	MR. EGLET: That's line.
2	MR. WALL: So probably 15 minutes.
3	THE COURT: How long do you think Mr. Michalek will take
4	for arguments?
5	MR. ROGERS: I don't think it's a long motion. I don't
6	know it well enough to give you a good gauge on that. But 10
7	to 15 minutes at the very outside.
8	THE COURT: Okay.
9	[Bench Conference Ends]
10	THE COURT: Well, there's good news and bad news, ladies
11	and gentlemen. The good news for you is that you get to take
12	a little break here while counsel and I discuss some issues we
13	must discuss outside your presence as a matter of law. I'm
14	going to guess that it probably will take about 15 minutes.
15	[Court Admonishes Jury]
16	THE COURT: So please return back here at 2:45 if you
17	would. Thank you.
18	[Prospective Jury Out]
19	THE COURT: Okay, so outside the presence of the jury,
20	Mr. Michalek.
21	MR. MICHALEK: Yes, good afternoon.

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then Mr. Rogers can take up the issue of whatever the opening

MR. MICHALEK: I believe there's a number of issues.

ones I'm going to discuss involve the jury voir dire. And

THE COURT: Good afternoon.

The

1	statement arguments will be.
2	THE COURT: I thought this was going to be your argument.
3	MR. MICHALEK: It is and I don't know I didn't know
4	whether we were going to do the opening statements at the same
5	time. There's two separate issues.
6	MR. EGLET: No.
7 ·	MR. WALL: No.
8	MR. MICHALEK: There's two separate issues. There is
9	the
10	THE COURT: What am I missing?
11	MR. MICHALEK: Okay, that's fine.
12	THE COURT: What am I missing, Mr. Wall?
13	MR. EGLET: You're not, Your Honor. Mr. Michalek is
14	missing. He doesn't realize, he wasn't at the bench
15	conference, he doesn't realize we're just doing the motion on
16	the voir dire.
17	MR. WALL? Correct.
18	THE COURT: Okay.
19	MR. MICHALEK: I will start with the statute which is NRS
20	16.030 and that states that both parties including the
21	Defendant is entitled to the right of voir dire. And there's
22	been no flurry from the other side saying that that does not
23	apply to a civil case. In fact, both parties have conducted
24	voir dire.

The second part of that statute or second statute

after that is NRS 16.050 and the subsection I will point to a subsection f and g of that statute. Now this is when a challenge for cause can be made. F states having formed or expressed an unqualified opinion or belief as to the merits of the action or the main question involved therein. And g is for the existence of a state of mind in the juror evidencing enmity or a bias towards either party.

Then we turn to NRS 16.060 which says that the challenges for cause are to be tried by the Court, that would be you, Your Honor. And of course it states that in determining whether there should be a challenge for cause, there can be examination of witnesses or the juror to determine whether a cause is valid.

The problem in this case is that we were denied the opportunity to conduct voir dire into the I believe it's 11 jurors that have been stricken for cause. One, Mr. Rogers was actually able to conduct some voir dire.

But I want to get to the standard because the Plaintiffs say in their brief, well the test for cause is whether a prospective juror's views would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror. And I'm going to agree with that standard. And that's the important point, Your Honor, is that think about what that means. Prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror. That means that a juror can't have bias,

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just not bias that's going to substantially impair that juror's ability. And the jurors have a right to that bias but the issue is where they can set that bias aside and listen to the evidence and determine from that evidence which party's in the right.

The problem in this case is that allegedly the Plaintiffs were able to establish some sort of bias in an answer to a yes or no question. But what wasn't asked of these jurors was well, can you set that bias aside. If I present you the evidence and I instruct you this way, can you set your bias aside. And that is the issue. Not that there's a bias. But can the bias be set aside. And I will cite to you two Nevada cases that say that.

And the first one is <u>Bean v. State</u>, this is 86 Nev. 80 and it says that before a juror is going to be excluded for cause, it must be unmistakably clear that he would automatically vote for or against capital punishment. Now this is from the 1970s and this is how this whole thing started, Your Honor.

You know, there would be a question to a juror, the juror they would ask well, can you -- you think you could invoke capital punishment? Or if you think you've have a problem invoking capital punishment. Some jurors would say yeah, you know, I couldn't fry anybody. And one other juror would say well, no, no, no. I have an objection to capital

punishment. Another juror might say no, no, no, I have no

problem. If it's warranted, fry them every time. I don't

3 even worry about life sentences.

And so the Court said well wait a minute, that's a problem. But in Bean v. State, when the Judge asked well, do you have a problem with the death penalty and the juror said yes, I do. And then the Judge said well, do you feel that you cannot render a decision for the death penalty and the juror said, I'm afraid not. And the Court said all right, well you answered yes, you couldn't. I'm going to strike you. And the Supreme Court said no, that that was an improper striking. And it said if they simply state that they are against capital punishment and are thereby excused, reversible error is committed.

Honor? Well, they say that in order for a challenge to be properly asserted, under the statute, there must be a thorough examination of each juror who asserts a bias for or against the death penalty. And to determine whether or not his bias can be set aside. And whether the juror could nevertheless determine the issue of innocence or guilt and penalty upon the evidence presented to him. Again, we're not talking about Mr. Eglet standing up in front of the jury asking them the questions are you biased, you know, he's got a list of questions he's going through and he gets a checkmark to one of

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the Dr.	Phil phil	losophical	question	ıs an	d says	okay,	that
juror's	biased.	I'm going	to move	for	cause.	That's	not
enough.							

The standard is can that juror set aside that bias assuming its correct? Mr. Eglet's not going to ask those We wanted to and we were denied that opportunity and under the case law from the Supreme Court, Bean, that's an error.

I'll cite to you again a second Supreme Court decision, Blake v. State, 121 Nev. 779.

MR. WALL: What was that?

MR, MICHALEK: Blake.

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MR. WALL: I'm sorry.

MR. MICHALEK: And it states that once again the hold that the mere existence of any preconceived notion as to the quilt or innocence of an accused without more is not sufficient and rather it is sufficient if a juror can lay aside his impression or opinion and render a verdict based upon the evidence presented in Court.

What we have is an admonishment from the Supreme Court that says it's not enough to just say someone's biased. They check a yes question on a questionnaire or answer a question in Court. But you've got to take the totality of their answers and determine whether if they have a bias, but too, whether they can set it aside.

There's an important reason

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that but maybe after listening to him, I understand that my job is to listen to the evidence without any bias or prejudice and if I have any, I can set it aside. The fact is is we don't what they're meaning of bias or prejudice was. Was there a language barrier they may have had? Did they have a different definition of bias? and counsel and lawyers have one definition. But certainly

Now a couple of things.

as to why rehabilitation has got to go forward and why Mr.

Rogers should have been able to rehabilitate these jurors.

And I think that the jurors' responses today show that.

Because when Mr. Rogers was up there asking the questions

lay jurors may have a different one. And so what do they

somebody? We don't know because we were not allowed to

think? Does it mean that they lean one way or another? Or

does it mean that they have a hatred or some prejudice towards

about their yes answers on the forms, some of them said well

I'm not sure I really meant that, I think I misunderstood the

question or they may have said well, I understood that I wrote

And so the nuances about what bias means or a yes answer means was never answered. And what it would do was show any possible misunderstandings. Oh, no, no, no, I didn't

explore those.

mean that, Mr. Eglet. And now that you mentioned it, I

misunderstood your question. Certainly I can be fair.

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didn't explore that. He took the yes answer and wanted to move for cause. And we were denied that opportunity.

Now, as the point of our motion, I cited Nevada statutes, I cited Nevada case law and I cited four cases from other jurisdictions that specifically said when you dismiss a juror for cause and the Plaintiffs have had an opportunity to question and the Defense hasn't, that's a violation. That's an error. And not only in Nevada cases and my cases that have been cited, there was a 14-page opposition from the Plaintiffs. And I read their brief this morning. And they didn't cite to you one single case, not one that says it's okay for the Court to dismiss a juror for cause when the Plaintiffs have inquired and not the Defendant. They did not cite a single case or statute that says no, that's proper.

Here's what they cited. They cited Weber and they cited Thompson. Two Nevada criminal cases. Of course, the way our laws in Nevada and most cases go up on appeal are criminal. But Weber and Thompson talked about the detached language of the juror. And I'll explain that in a little bit. What that means is when the Court and the counsel were questioning the juror, they said well, yeah, I may have some bias and they went through the list of the things that may have been wrong. And at the very end, they said well, yeah, I guess I can be fair.

Well, the distinction between what happened in Weber

and Thompson as opposed to this case is there was the dialogue. The Defendants got the chance to rehabilitate and ask them questions. And the Court got to look at this totality of the circumstances and say well, you may have said one time that you can be fair but you were asked 12 or 13 times whether you thought the Defendant looked like a thug or whether he looked like he might have committed the crime. And you answered yes to all those. So the Court had a totality of circumstances to determine bias from.

In fact, the Court distinguished the <u>Snow v. State</u> case and this is the one, the <u>Thompson</u> case, where they talked about how there was rehabilitation conducted by the Court, which showed the juror could set aside the bias.

And again we're talking about these two cases that are talking about not the yes answer. Not the yes, there's bias. But whether the juror could set that bias aside. And that hasn't been established. That was not established with the 11 jurors that were improperly kicked off, Your Honor.

They haven't got a statute. The statute clearly says we're entitled to voir dire. They haven't got a single case that says no, no, no, we're allowed to kick off a juror without you asking any questions. Certainly the Court can kick off a juror for bias. But the question is can they not set aside that bias. And that wasn't established.

I have the second issue about the indoctrination.

can go into that or we can give Mr. Eglet a chance to respond to the first issue.

THE COURT: I'd like you to finish all of your argument before I hear from Plaintiff's counsel.

MR. MICHALEK: Certainly, Your Honor. The indoctrination issue. I cited in our brief the duty of the trial judge to restrict voir dire. And certainly although the parties have a right to voir dire, it's not limitless. There are certain things that should not be asked in the courtroom. And one of the things that Lamb v. State and this is a very new case, Your Honor, it's 129, I'm sorry, 127 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 3, it's from March 3rd, 2011. What it says is that you should exclude voir dire aimed at what's called indoctrination.

what that means. Mr. Eglet had approximately three and a half days of questioning the jury all by himself. And he monopolized the time, no doubt about it, that's fine. We could take three days of our own to go through each and every juror and take voir dire to next week. But the point is he was setting the jury up for an indoctrination as to I want you to believe certain things when I get done with my examination. And we saw that when Mr. Rogers finally got his chance. Because he asked the jury well, do you believe that the Plaintiff has been injured? And that this case is worth two million dollars? And all of the panel said yeah, you know,

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we were kind of under that impression. You know, this case is worth two million dollars now.

MR. WALL: Actually, Judge, just to interject, I mean 've tried to be patient but you were here --

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

MR. WALL: -- and you heard them. And that wasn't their response from the 24 individuals.

THE COURT: That's correct.

MR. MICHALEK: Your Honor, and Mr. Rogers can discuss it if you want to, he was here.

MR. WALL: Well, that's the point is he's making a record about what took place without having been here and that's what I'm objecting to.

THE COURT: Well, and your objection is well taken. I understand that. Please proceed.

MR. WALL: Thank you.

MR. MICHALEK: There were questions to the jurors and we can go back and look at the record. I think the record will reflect it, that Mr. Rogers asked the jurors what their impression was. And they gave -- the first jurors that were asked the question, said yeah, I kind of was given that impression that this case is worth two million dollars. That the Plaintiff had been injured. We can look back at the voir dire. It's there. I can't testify about it and we can look at the record. Mr. Rogers has that recollection. He can come

up here and tell you about it. But it was certainly there. They had that impression. And that's what indoctrination is. It tells the jury okay, I'm going to give you a certain viewpoint for three days before the Defendants even get a chance to speak to you.

In trying to combat that prejudice, Mr. Rogers attempted to ask some questions of the jury this afternoon and he was prohibited from going into the same issues that the Plaintiffs were allowed into. And those objections have been noted at the bench and I'm not going to go through those again. But there were several objections made by Plaintiffs during the examination.

So I want to be clear about what we're asking for, Your Honor, because I think the purpose of this is not to go up on appeal. The purpose is to fix whatever errors there are now. And we still have a chance to have an unbiased panel. We haven't started evidence yet. We could start over with a new panel that hasn't been improperly influenced and a new panel where the jurors won't be excused for cause without the opportunity of the Defendants to question them.

So I'm first asking for a mistrial, that we start over fresh on Monday and we have a new set of jurors and we go through this process without the problems. If that's going to be denied, Your Honor, then I ask the standard that the Plaintiff used regarding the yes or no questions be applied.

1	There were jurors who answered yes to questions. Now under
2	the standard by Mr. Eglet, once you've said yes to an answer,
3	you can't really explain it or get away from it. It's an
4	answer and it shows a bias. We have seven jurors that we
5	would move to exclude for cause based upon those yes answers.
6	Not only in the courtroom but in their jury questionnaires.
7	THE COURT: Well, let me interject just for a moment. Do
8	you mean that the very answers that Mr. Rogers inquired into
9	and clarified?
10	MR. MICHALEK: There were under the standard by the
11	Plaintiff's counsel that once there's been a yes answer, that
12	there's no way for the juror to sort of explain or kind of get
13	around that bias. They were answers
14	THE COURT: I'm not sure, Mr. Michalek, you answered my
15	question.
1,6	MR. MICHALEK: Sure. And maybe I misunderstood your
17	question.
18	THE COURT: Are you talking when you talk about the
19	yes answers that the jurors gave, do you mean the very
20	questions that they filled out on their forms
21	MR. MICHALEK: Their questions and the questionnaire.
22	THE COURT: and that Mr. Rogers clarified when he
23	examined them?

MR. MICHALEK: Yes, I do and that's exactly my point,

Because when Mr. Eglet was moving to exclude the

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Your Honor.

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jurors for cause, we were stuck with the yes answer. And when Mr. Rogers was able to clarify, he showed that the yes answer - well they were under a mistaken assumption. But if the rule is well, a yes answer excludes you, then it doesn't matter what they said during Mr. Rogers' examination. The juror questionnaires showed the bias already and those seven must be excluded. It's got to work the same way. It's got to be fair for both sides. If a yes answer excludes a juror and nothing they say afterwards matters, such that we weren't entitled to voir dire, then the same thing applies on the Plaintiff's side. These jurors said in their questionnaires yes, they have a bias. It doesn't matter what they say on the stand. They should be excluded as well. It's just the fairness, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Well, I just have one comment I guess based on that last argument regarding the yes answers and that is several of the jurors conceded that those questions were so poorly drafted, that they had trouble understanding them. And then Mr. Rogers had an opportunity to clarify what their through process was.

But the other question that I had for you is this. It's true we've had almost -- well we've had four days not including today but only half days of voir dire. My question is were you present during these past four days? Monday through Thursday?

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MR. MICHALEK: No, I wasn't.
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THE COURT: When Plaintiff's counsel was examining the panel?

MR. MICHALEK: No, I wasn't, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. That's all I have. Thank you. Mr. Wall.

MR. MICHALEK: May I respond to your first question? When you have a rehabilitation.

THE COURT: It wasn't really a question. It was a comment.

MR. MICHALEK: Okay.

THE COURT: Thank you. Mr. Wall.

MR. WALL: Your Honor, with all due respect, Mr. Michalek fails from a lack of perspective on two different issues. One of them is the one that you just hit. He wasn't here. Look, we all understand what the statute is on voir dire. And the fact that no one should be completely denied their right to voir dire. That's what Whitlock says and there's other District Judges in this community who feel perhaps that all of the voir dire questions should be done from the bench and none from the lawyers. So that's the absolute right that the law protects.

Here there isn't obviously a denial of the right to conduct voir dire because Mr. Rogers has had the opportunity to conduct voir dire. So all of that under the statute and

under <u>Whitlock</u> doesn't apply in this case. What they're saying is that a mistrial is necessary because of a denial of a right to rehabilitate jurors who otherwise were excused for cause.

First of all, and I took his last comments about the yessed [sic] answers to mean that if Mr. Eglet asked a question and they responded yes, that's it and no one was allowed to ask them how their answers were explained. That never happened with any of the jurors who were excluded for cause.

What also didn't happen is that there wasn't a situation where there was a language barrier or a lack of understanding of the question that led to a juror being stricken for cause. For each of the jurors that was stricken for cause, there was an argument at the bench. There was careful consideration by the Court of the reasons why that particular juror under the law that's been provided had a view that might impair their ability to be fair and impartial, which is the standard under which they are disqualified as a matter of law.

The issue that was discussed at the bench and for the record the Court considered this, is that this right to rehabilitate a juror that they're claiming is grounds for a mistrial is completely incorrect. They try to bootstrap cases that say we have a right to voir dire the prospective jury.

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And they do. And that has been provided. What they do not
necessarily have a right to do is to take a juror who has
already indicated through their answers that they cannot be
fair and impartial and that they ought to be stricken and try
to rehabilitate them. Because the case law is even if they
get a contrary answer, well could you follow the law, are you
saying you're not going to follow the Judge's law? And they
get a contrary answer, it doesn't matter. It doesn't matter.
Because at that point they've still stated that position that
caused them to be disqualified. And as the case law suggests
and Bean isn't the law anymore in the State of Nevada, that i
doesn't have to be shown with unmistakable clarity that they
have a particular view that disqualifies them. And any doubt
must be waived by the trial judge in favor of
disqualification. So even if they say on the one hand when
they're being examined by Plaintiff's counsel that they have
this disqualifying bias, if on questioning from the Defense,
they say well, maybe I don't, it doesn't matter. Because at
that point, they've already stated that bias and any doubt is
in favor of disqualification. That's why the Court did not
allow rehabilitation of those jurors for that reason. Mr.
Michalek wasn't present for that.

And virtually all of them, if not all of them, were asked by Mr. Eglet regarding the bias whether or not they could set it aside and they said no.

The other perspective that he does not have I do not believe and with respect if I'm wrong, I'll withdraw it, is that he's never picked a jury in a death penalty case.

Because the law is fundamentally different in a capital case when it comes to selecting a jury. I've selected about 25 capital juries. So I understand the difference. And they cite to the Florida cases from the death penalty citing to Witherspoon, the United States Supreme Court case that says just because a juror says I don't think I could impose the death penalty, you don't get to exclude them until the Defense has the opportunity to ask if they would at least consider all of the possible punishments.

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And as the Florida cases, I think it's <u>Summers</u> that they cited, suggest which comes straight out of <u>Witherspoon</u>, we're not going to allow someone state, to say well just because someone doesn't necessarily believe in the death penalty, that they're not going to be a juror in a death penalty case because a person's life is at stake. And the laws and the rules for picking a jury in a capital case are fundamentally different. And that's the only case law they've given you that says when someone has shown an unmistakable bias, we have a right still to ask them questions. You can't strike them until we have the ability to rehabilitate. And if you look at <u>Witherspoon</u>, it is very clear to say the reason they're allowed the right to rehabilitate is because it's a

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death penalty case. And because the laws are fundamentally different when it comes to death qualifying a jury.

And there isn't any case law that he has cited to you that says in a civil case, once the bias has been made clear, that the Court can't exercise its discretion to strike that juror for cause before rehabilitation takes place. Not one.

And by the way, <u>Bean</u> and <u>Blake</u> weren't in their brief but I happen to be familiar with <u>Blake</u>.

Now, on this second issue of indoctrination, they cite to you the <u>Lamb</u> case. And what's important about this is that when they cite <u>Lamb</u>, what <u>Lamb</u> tells you is decisions concerning the scope of voir dire and the manner in which it is conducted are reviewable only for abuse of discretion. And the Supreme Court even went further. It says considerable deference is given to the trial court in matters under the scope of voir dire. But <u>Lamb</u> isn't factually on point with this case at all.

And I have to ask about this indoctrination, whether this is really sort of an untimely and inappropriate motion for reconsideration of the questions contained within the jury questionnaire. Because this same argument came up at that point if you'll recall. Or is this reconsideration on the motions in limine regarding the appropriate scope of voir dire? We have had four days, four half days, essentially two

days where there was no inappropriate indoctrination. The Court has already ruled on the areas of inquiry in the questionnaire and generally those in many respects for the live voir dire in the motions in limine. And so any suggestion that you should reconsider that after voir dire has already been completed is completely inappropriate.

The final question that I would have because I saw nothing in their trial brief that suggested to you that anything that has happened here reaches the standard of manifest necessity that you would have to find to grant a mistrial. I didn't see anything about mistrial or the scope of it or the authority for it in their motion.

So I'd ask that the motion be denied.

THE COURT: Mr. Michalek.

MR. MICHALEK: Yes, Your Honor. First of all, in regards to the last point, you know, I did that as a courtesy. It was 4:00 yesterday. I knew this issue had arisen. I wanted to get at least a brief out so that the parties would have something in case the issue was going to be argued last night.

The opportunity for the Plaintiffs, however, to submit a 14-page brief I note was given and nowhere in that brief again was there any specific case in Nevada or from another jurisdiction that said what they did was proper.

Now, I'll admit I haven't been a judge. And I'll also admit I haven't picked a death penalty jury. I do civil

law. But I have practiced appellate law for quite some time and I have been a PI lawyer. And the first thing that a judge wants to know when I come into a courtroom or when I go to talk to Steve and Dan is, well do you have any authority for the proposition that you're citing? And I will note that I gave Nevada law, Nevada statutes and four cases that specifically said yes, in a criminal context but you can't dismiss a juror for cause without giving the other side a right to voir dire especially when the Plaintiff or the prosecutor has already got their opportunity.

Now, he says well this is not a criminal case. It's a civil case. But Mr. Eglet made the argument that voir dire is the Constitutional right. They have the right to do it. Well, if it's a Constitutional right, it's the same whether it applies in criminal or civil. You can't violate someone's Constitutional rights. And I haven't heard any argument that says the Nevada cases that I've cited to you, Blake or Bean or the statutes that I cited, don't apply in civil cases. They haven't made that argument. They said well you cited criminal cases. But the statutes apply to both civil and criminal cases. There's no limitation in Blake or Bean that says well, it's only the criminal context.

I'm not here to reargue motions in limine. I'm here
to preserve the record. That's how I was taught as appellate
counsel and that's what I'm doing. Just because you file a

motion in limine doesn't mean that the issue is solved. In fact, sometimes when you raise the issue during trial, the Courts have the opportunity to rethink it and take a look at it and said, you know what, I may have made the wrong decision. I'm going to reverse myself. That's why you raise objections during trial in addition to filing motions in limine. That's what I'm hoping the Court will do here. The Court will say, you know what, on reflection, I think I should have given Mr. Rogers that opportunity.

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MR. WALL: Could I just make one final comment, Judge? THE COURT: Sure.

MR. WALL: Because it strikes me that what you haven't heard is that any of the grounds for excluding those jurors for cause were incorrect. So you start from a premise that, because they haven't even raised it, that all of the reasons that they were stricken for cause were correct. And so what they're saying is we have the right to bring in an rehabilitate and try to either change their mind or get a contrary answer. And that's our position. That doesn't matter. That once they've expressed that belief which would disqualify them for cause, it doesn't matter whether you get a different answer from them when someone else is asking them a pointed question. I'll just submit it on that.

MR. MICHALEK: Let me respond to that last point, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Any last comments, yes.

MR. MICHALEK: Yeah. The point is is that we were not able to discuss with the jurors whether they had any misapplication or whether they misunderstood the question or whether there was a language barrier or anything. We were denied the opportunity to say anything to those jurors whatsoever. And so how we can establish to Your Honor in a bench conference whether they were mistaken or misunderstood something without the opportunity to actually ask them first is I think disingenuous on the part of Plaintiff's counsel to say.

We weren't given that opportunity. Certainly if Mr. Rogers had asked, I am sure he would have been able to discover those reasons and some of those jurors like the jurors today may have said, yeah, I misunderstood the question.

THE COURT: Well, it strikes me that we haven't heard any specific instances of any of the particular jurors who were excused for cause. We haven't heard argument about any of them. And I understand, Mr. Michalek, you weren't here during the voir dire examination, the past four days. But we haven't heard any specific argument.

When a prospective juror states that he or she can't be fair to a party or that he or she cannot follow the law as given by the Court, that's cause for excusal. The motion is

denied.

MR. EGLET: Your Honor, and I just want to make sure that this is clear for the record because Mr. Michalek has implied or argued multiple times that the Court excused these jurors for cause based on their answers in the questionnaires. And that is not the case on any one of the people --

THE COURT: No.

MR. EGLET: -- who were excused for cause. They were excused for cause for what they said in the courtroom. We have people still on this panel who answered questions that they think there should be caps on damages, that they would have a hard time with a multimillion dollar verdict. No juror was excused for cause based on an answer, any one answer to a question on the questionnaire. That is just an absolute misrepresentation of what occurred here in this courtroom.

THE COURT: That is true. That is correct.

MR. MICHALEK: Your Honor, I think counsel misunderstood what I was saying. I didn't say that they were excluded based upon the jury questionnaires. What I asked you was if you were going to deny my motion, then I wanted the jurors who circled yes as a bias towards the Defendant to be excused based on the questionnaires. I never said that Mr. Eglet got jurors excused based upon that ground. I'm saying I'm asking for that ground. If the answer is going to be you've given a yes answer, and you can't be rehabilitated, then I'm moving

I never said Mr. Eglet did that.

6 And in fact, that's what he did do. He did explore specific 7 questions with prospective jurists. That's exactly what he did. Let's take about a ten minute break. 9 MR. WALL: Thank you. 10 [Recess] 11 [Outside the Presence of the Prospective Jury] 12 [Court and Court Deputy Confer] 13 THE COURT: Okay. We're outside the presence of the jury. It's my understanding counsel wishes to exercise their 14 15 preemptory challenges outside the presence of the jury; is 16 that correct? 17 MR. ROGERS: Correct, Your Honor. 18 MR. EGLET: Yes, Judge.

Okay. First the Plaintiff.

on this, the stipulation and the order is that each party has

MR. ROGERS: Your Honor, just to make certain I'm clear

Correct. That's what I understood counsel to

THE COURT: And my response to that is that's what Mr.

Rogers has had every opportunity to do during his examination.

the seven jurors who have those yes answers in those

questionnaires be excluded.

I think he misunderstood.

THE COURT:

THE COURT:

MR. ROGERS: Very good.

stipulate to.

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1	[Counsel Confer]
2	THE COURT DEPUTY: Could I ask you a question?
3	THE COURT: Yes.
4	[Court and Court Deputy Confer]
5	[Counsel Confer]
6	MR. ROGERS: Your Honor, one more clarification, if I
7	remember right the parties agreed that it would be the last
8	four jurors would be seated as alternates. It wouldn't be a
9	lottery; is that correct?
10	THE COURT: Is that counsel's recollection?
11	MR. WALL: Right. It's the last four, and they'd be one,
12	two, three, four.
13	MR. EGLET: The first
14	MR. WALL: I guess
15	MR. EGLET: The lowest number is Juror Number
16	Alternate Number 1, and in other words, the last four
17	seats.
18	THE COURT: So it would be seats 21, 22, 23, and 24?
19	MR. EGLET: Well, when we're done it's going to be seats
20	9, 10, 11, and 12.
21	MR. WALL: Right.
22	MR. EGLET: They'll move up.
23	THE COURT: Right.
24	MR. EGLET: And then 9, and then 10 and then they'll
25	be in the order of their numbers for their order of

1 alternates. 2 MR. WALL: Right. 3 MR. ROGERS: And in the order of the number that they 4 presently have? 5 MR. WALL: Right. So Ms. -б MR. EGLET: Like Ms. Zwifel [phonetic throughout] --7 MR. WALL: -- Zwifel can only be the Number 4 alternate. 8 MR. ROGERS: Yes, okay. I think I get it. 9 [Counsel Continue to Exercise Preemptory Challenges] 10 MR. ROGERS: Your Honor, there's something about this 11 form that's -- it might be different from our agreement on 12 It appears that there are alternate -- there are 13 additional strikes for alternates. That's not so, is it? 14 MR. EGLET: No. 15 MR. WALL: No. 16 THE COURT: No. 17 MR. ROGERS: Just six for --18 MR. WALL: Right. 19 MR. EGLET: Just six per side. 20 MR. ROGERS: -- six for whatever? 21 THE COURT: There's six total. 22 MR. ROGERS: Got it. 23 MR. WALL: No, per side. 24 THE COURT: Right, per side. The four each, and then two 25 for the alternate -- two each for the alternates.

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1	MR. EGLET: No, there's six total, Your Honor.
2	MR. WALL: That's how you
3	MS. EGLET: For each, yeah.
4	MR. WALL: We stipulated just six total to use however we
5	wanted.
6	THE COURT: Each side. Each side has six.
7	MR. WALL: Yeah, right, each. Yeah.
8	THE COURT: Yeah.
9	MR. EGLET: Your Honor, could we we see the sheets so
10	we could see the last strike?
11	THE COURT: Yes.
12	MR. EGLET: Thank you.
13	MR. ROGERS: Thank you.
14	THE COURT: Marshall.
15	Let me ask you this, does either side have any
16	objections to the use of the other side's preemptory
17	challenges?
18	MR. WALL: No.
19	MR. EGLET: No, Your Honor.
20	THE COURT: Do you have any objections to their exercise
21	of any of the preemptory challenges?
22	MR. ROGERS: No, Your Honor.
23	[Counsel Reviews Document]
24	[Court and Court Deputy Confer]
25	[Court and Clerk Confer]

[Prospective Jury Panel Enters Courtroom]

[Within the Presence of the Prospective Jury Panel]

THE COURT: Please be seated, ladies and gentlemen.

Ladies and gentlemen, on behalf of the Court and
counsel, I apologize for the delay. But the good news is,
we're very close to empanelling a jury.

Yes.

MR. EGLET: Yes, Your Honor.

[Counsel Confer]

MR. ROGERS:

MR. WALL: Yes.

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counsel?

challenges were exercised on the record outside the presence of the jury? Yes, Your Honor. MR. EGLET: MR. ROGERS: Yes. If we may approach for a moment, please? Yes. MR. WALL: THE COURT: Yes. MR. WALL: Sorry. [Bench Conference Begins] I don't think Mr. Rogers passed for cause on the record. THE COURT: All right.

So will counsel stipulate that the preemptory

THE COURT: All right. Are we ready for our panel,

THE COURT: Very well. Marshall, will you be so kind.

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THE COURT:
                 Is that acceptable?
               I'm not sure that's on the record.
     MR. WALL:
to do it up here.
     MR. ROGERS: Okay.
     [Bench Conference Ends]
     THE COURT:
                 I forgot to ask you, Mr. Rogers, if you pass
this entire panel for cause?
     MR. ROGERS: Yes, Your Honor.
     THE COURT: Very well. All right, even closer.
     I'm going to ask the Clerk to read the names of those
jurors remaining in the order in which their names were
          Madam Clerk.
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MR. WALL: He didn't, Judge. He didn't pass --

-- the panel for cause.

Okay. I can do it right here.

THE COURT: I think you're right.

Thank you.

MR. WALL:

THE COURT:

MR. ROGERS:

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called.

and Janelle Zwiffel.

THE COURT: Okay.

please step to the spectator section just for a few moments.

THE CLERK: Melton Daniels; Debbie Kissler; Josie Nolty;

Ladies and gentlemen, if your name was not called,

Charlotte Lewis; Jenny Prince; Charles Barrett; Tamera Bell;

Matthew Johnson; Ebony Jones; Gustavo Miranda; Angela Ellis;

Thank you.

Ladies and gentlemen, those of you who are seated in the gallery, it's not likely that I or counsel will have an opportunity to thank you. But we surely could not have reached this point in the proceedings without your participation. And, frankly, you've been incredibly patient and tolerant of all of us, and we appreciate it more than we can say.

We finally reached the stage of the proceedings where the parties may have their constitutional jury trial right exercised. So it wouldn't have been possible without your help and participation.

You may be excused with the thanks of the Court and counsel.

[Excused Prospective Jury Panel Exit Courtroom]

PROSPECTIVE JUROR/LEWIS: That includes me, too, right?

THE COURT DEPUTY: Yes.

PROSPECTIVE JUROR/LEWIS: Okay.

18 THE CLERK: Thank you.

THE COURT: Yes, Mr. Lewis, right? Yes, sir. You may be excused as well.

It's been a long afternoon, and I think this is a good time to break for the day. I'm inclined to, you know, ask you to return Monday promptly at 1:00 so that the Court may give you some initial instructions, and then you will hear opening statements, I would imagine, probably by both counsel.

Wouldn't you think, counsel?

MR. ROGERS: Yes.

MR. EGLET: Yes, I would just request the jury be sworn and the admonition be given before they are --

THE COURT: Very well.

MR. EGLET: -- excused, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen, will you please stand, raise your right hand, and be sworn by Madam Clerk.

[Empanelled Jury Sworn]

THE CLERK: Thank you.

THE COURT: Just a couple of thoughts, I wanted to refresh your recollection that I -- I said earlier that the marshal is the only point of contact you may have during these proceedings. That remains the case throughout the entire trial. He's the only one in this room that may have any direct contact with you. So if we see you in the hallway of the courthouse, please don't think us discourteous if we don't chat with you. We're not allowed to.

You're advised again of your ongoing obligation not to discuss this case with anyone; not to form or express any opinion until this case is given to you. You're instructed not to do any research on any subject connected with this case, meaning not the internet, not newspapers, not radio, not television, not anything. All right?

Thank you, ladies and gentleman. And we'll see you

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,	an Mandau at 1,00
1	on Monday at 1:00.
2	[Jury Out]
3	THE COURT: You might check with jury services when you
4	take them down. Thank you.
5	See you Monday.
6	MR. WALL: There may be a couple issues.
7	THE COURT: All right. Outside the presence of the jury?
8	MR. WALL: Yes. I received a, and I don't know if the
9	Court received, a trial brief from the Defense this morning
10	regarding the issue of minor impact. And
11	THE COURT: I didn't well, I received one that's
12	titled "Trial Brief on Percipient Testimony Regarding the
13	Accident".
1.4	MR. WALL: Correct.
15	THE COURT: Is that the one?
16	MR. WALL: Yes, that's the one.
17	THE COURT: Okay.
18	MR. WALL: And so I don't I don't know procedurally
19	exactly what it was when we got it. I'm not sure if it's a
20	motion for reconsideration styled as a motion as a trial
21	brief. And we already had a motion for on the minor impact.
22	So I don't know what I get from this brief is that they
23	want to introduce testimony to support a minor impact defense.
24	If that's going to come up during opening statement, then I
25	think it's appropriate to reach that issue now.

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The Court was very clear in granting our motion to preclude the Defendant from raising a minor or low-impact defense, which included the testimony of witnesses, any physicians who might want to testify as experts regarding some bio-mechanical opinion that a minor impact, which it isn't, whether that could have caused certain injuries. The -- whether they want to introduce testimony from either the Defendant or her -- I think it's daughter-in-law. Daughter-in-law, Linda -- daughter-in-law who was present in the car about this being a minor impact. That's the -- exactly what was precluded in the motion.

So -- so I don't know what it is. If it's a motion for reconsideration, it's not only -- well, it's probably timely, frankly, if it was. And I think it's within ten days of the notice of entry of order. But it doesn't have any of the procedural requirements for a motion for reconsideration because the first step is to seek leave from the Court. You can't just argue the same matters over again.

So -- so I don't know what it is. But before there's an opening statement made by the Defense that raises issues that this Court has already precluded, I think we need to -- to make sure that the Court's order that was entered granting our motion to preclude the Defendant from raising a minor or low-impact defense remains. And I have a copy of the order where it says that "The request to preclude the

Defendant from raising a minor or low-impact defense is granted; and further that the property damage estimates and photographs are excluded."

THE COURT: You know, it's interesting, Mr. Wall, because I saw this this morning also for the very first time. And as I read it I wondered what it was also because the title doesn't really go along with anything that's contained in the motion or even really reflect the law that's cited in the motion. So I'm not really sure what the intent is either.

Mr. Rogers?

MR. ROGERS: Okay. Let's see if I can spell that out, and this is the very issue that Mr. Polsenberg's office has come here to discuss with you on the issues of law. I want to address how this motion came to be, though.

What happened was, there was a motion to exclude a defense that a minor impact cannot cause injury. The Plaintiffs' argument in the motion was that because the Defense did not retain a bio-mechanical engineer they would not be permitted to argue the general proposition that minor impacts cannot cause injury.

The Defense appeared at the hearing and said, "This is not a bio-mechanical case. The Defense is not going to argue that no minor impact can cause injury. The defense is that this minor impact did not cause injury."

And our understanding of your order was that on a

bio-mechanical basis, that general proposition, that minor

2 impacts can't cause injury, is not going to be admitted.

At the 267 conference, which counsel reported so there is a record of this, there was a point where Plaintiff's counsel asked me whether -- whether we were calling the Defendant to the stand. And when he first asked the question I thought it was a -- I didn't even think he was serious. He then asked later on, "Are you going to call the Defendant?"

And I said, "Well, of course I am."

"Well, what is she going to testify to?"

I said, "The facts of the accident."

And he said, "Well, what's the relevance of the facts of the accident?"

And I said, "My goodness, you are not taking the position that this jury will not hear a single fact about this accident; are you?"

And he said, "Yes, that is the meaning of the order."

And I said, "That is not at all what happened at that hearing. And if that is your position, you'll be inviting the jury to do nothing but speculate. How could they possibly reach a determination on the elements of this negligence claim when they don't know a single thing about the car accident?"

He said, "That's our very position."

And so I brought Mr. Polsenberg's office here to address the law, but those -- that's the reason that that brief is before you, is because of this surprise discussion at the 267 conference.

THE COURT: Well, it looks to me like there's two things going on. One, it looks like this is indeed then a disguise, a motion for reconsideration. Number two, there's a whole separate issue about whether or not the defendant testifies. That's all kind of jumbled up in this one motion?

MR. ROGERS: Right. We're not asking for reconsideration about the photos or about the property damage; the things that were excluded as a result of the motion. Perhaps it would be better phrased a motion for clarification because the plaintiff's interpretation of the order is not at all my understanding of what occurred at that hearing. I did not hear Your Honor say that no facts of this accident will be admitted, testimonial or otherwise. I understand that photos are excluded, but not at all the testimony won't be admitted.

THE COURT: Well, I wasn't at the conference. Mr. Wall?

MR. WALL: Well, I have the transcript. May I approach,

Your Honor?

THE COURT: Sure. Thank you.

MR. WALL: See, the reason that the photos and the estimates are kept out is because you can't just raise an inference. Look at these photos, it was a minor crash. He

couldn't have been injured the way you say he was. That's why they're out because there's no expert who correlates a minor impact, although this one, even in the police reports is described as moderate. There's no correlation between the size of the impact and the amount of injured. All the doctors have even said there's no -- generally no rule of thumb. There's no correlation. So that's why the photos and damage estates are out.

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The motion was to preclude a minor impact defense. That's the title of the motion. The motion itself is very clear when it says the defense and/or experts should be precluded from presenting testimony or argument; that the subject crash was merely a minor impact and not sufficient enough to cause plaintiff's injuries.

The defense must be precluded from commenting upon the dynamics of the motor vehicle crash and from arguing, suggesting, or insinuating at trial that the crash was a minor impact or low impact collision and not significant enough to cause injuries.

So that issue, that argument, this crash was too minor to cause these injuries is out. And it's reliably out, and it's correctly out because under Hallmark and Higgs [phonetic] even, they can't make that without an expert since there is no correlation. That argument doesn't make sense scientifically and so it's not admissible.

So the only point to having either the defendant or her daughter-in-law testify that this was a minor impact, this was a tap, we didn't hit him very hard is the exact same conclusion that the photos in the estimates would be for, to say this was too small a crash for him to have been hurt in. That's the only point to it. It's not relevant because relevance is it makes a fact of consequence more or less probable. The only reason to have the defendant or a passenger in her car say this was a minor crash -- the only fact that it might make more probable is the one that can't come in. The defense that it's a minor impact and therefore he couldn't have been hurt.

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And in the 267 conference we discussed that because I asked what Jenny Rish, the defendant, or her daughter-in-law, Linda Rish's testimony would be. And on Page 32 of the transcript, Mr. Rogers says:

"She's going to be able to describe the accident.

This is what happened. And I mean, how else? The jury's got to know something about this. I know the Judge took the photos away, but the jury is still going to hear about the accident.

I said, "She won't be able to testify to it being a minor impact or anything like that."

Mr. Roger's says, "She might not be able to use that term, but she's going to be able to say this is the accident.

This is what happened. Did you guys take what the Judge said to me that the jury can't hear a thing about this accident?"

I said, "Well, there can't be a defense presented saying this was a minor impact. She granted that motion, I believe, in its entirety."

Mr. Rogers goes on to say, "But the motion was that the defense is precluding that a minor impact can't cause injury. It's not that the jury can't hear the nature of the accident. I mean, the way I look at that if she said that, or if there were an order interpreting things that way, there'd be no way around trying this thing twice. How can the jury not know anything about the accident?"

I responded, "Because there's no correlation between the type of impact and damages. I mean, if you don't have an expert to correlate this impact, was too minor to cause this injury and the testimony of the defendant or the passenger in her vehicle about what the impact, how minor the impact was has no relevance to any fact in issue."

And that's the whole point. So you can't get around your order saying that a minor impact defense can't be presented by presenting witnesses to say it was a minor impact. And the only way that you could is if we somehow opened the door to it. But as it stands -- and I know the Court indicated earlier today that you weren't going to rehear motions, but that's what this is. This is a motion for

reconsideration. And before it comes up in opening and rings a bell that can't be unrung, we wanted to -- and I know -- I guess they wanted to present it as well today. So --

THE COURT: Mr. Rogers?

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MR. HENRIOD: Your Honor, may I? Joel Henriod for defendant?

THE COURT: Sure. Why not? I say, why not?

MR. HENRIOD: Thank you, Your Honor. I'll be very brief.

I don't think it goes just to the ultimate issue of whether or not a minor accident could ever cause, or even the ultimate issue for the jury whether or not it did in this case.

I think it goes intermediately, and at very least to plaintiff's creditability. And causation here, the causation of damages, creditability plaintiff -- or plaintiff's creditability is key to that determination. Because when you look at the opinions -- the causations opinions of plaintiff's doctors, ultimately what their assessment is is two factors, a doctor's general notion of what types of accidents can cause what types of injuries. Plus then plaintiff's statements and representations to the doctor about what their symptoms were before the accident, what they were after the accident, and what other events were taking place in their lives in the relevant time period.

So the doctor takes a general knowledge about what's possible and then relies upon the representations of the

plaintiff, what my symptoms were before, what my symptoms were after, the other things that were happening in my life and the relevant time periods. And the doctor says, "Well, then given all of that, yes, I would attribute these damages to that accident."

And I believe that plaintiff's doctors will come in, as they do in every case, and say, "Yes, I attribute all of these damages to that accident." But based entirely on the creditability of plaintiff's representation to the doctor, here we have a representation to one of the care givers that this was a 55 mile an hour accident.

Now, this is why I think it is at most a motion to clarify because I understand having read the briefing on the motion in limine that there is authority for the determination that Your Honor made on the accident photos. I think there's counter authority. I don't think that Nevada would necessarily go that way, but I do see that there is Illinois, Delaware authority keeping out the accident photos.

But there is no authority for is keeping out the percipient witness. The testimony of a percipient witness to say, "This is my recollection of the day." Why? Because it bears on the creditability of the representations about that day the plaintiff is making to his doctors. None of those cases suggest that a defendant can't say, "This is my recollection of the event."

Hallmark doesn't say that. What Hallmark says is that you cannot come in and elevate somebody to the lofty status of an exert and have that expert say to a jury, "Take away from them the ultimate determination in an opinion as to whether or not this accident could have possibly caused these injuries."

But what it doesn't say and what no case that's been cited to you says is that the percipient witness can't come in and say, "This is my recollection of the day." And if that is necessarily out -- I'm sorry, I'll be very brief. If that is necessarily out because there is no correlation between the type of impact and the type of damages you could have, then I think Your Honor would have to reconsider whether or not the subsequent accident comes in.

Because my understanding, having read the motions in limine is that the reason that is out is unrelated, is because a plaintiff's characterization, both the counsel and the Court and to his doctors, that that was just a ding. That it wasn't significant.

Well, I think what's good for the goose is good for the gander. If plaintiff can keep out that second accident on the representation that it was just a small accident and therefore irrelevant, then -- and keep that information from his doctors, then that must come in. Either they're both in or they're both out if the reason that we're doing it is a

categorical rule that there is no correlation between the type or severity of the accident and the type of damages. Thank you, Your Honor, unless you have questions.

THE COURT: Not yet. Mr. Wall?

MR. WALL: Briefly, Your Honor. First of all with regard to the subsequent accident, the subsequent accident is out because neither of their experts related to any condition that he has. That's why it was kept out.

THE COURT: Subject of yet another pretrial ruling.

MR. WALL: Not one doctor was going to testify on behalf of the plaintiff -- and I'm not aware of one in the entire case, and he's had 141 medical visits since the crash that are related to the crash -- says I formed my opinion based on the mechanism of the crash. Not one.

Every single one is talking about the fact that he was asymptomatic before the crash, symptomatic after the crash, looking at what he was treated for on the day of the crash and all of the treatment subsequent to that. So it isn't relevant.

And I've got to tell you, if this is a motion for reconsideration, what I haven't heard yet is why this couldn't have been raised in the prior pleadings, which is one of the - I'm paraphrasing it, but that's one of the considerations under 80CR224 when it talks about motions for reconsideration.

Now, keep in mind that since the Court correctly

granted the motion restricting the minor impact defense -- and it's very clear in the motion that we're not just talking about some theoretical minor impacts and injuries generally. It is testimony and evidence to preclude that exact defense.

But not only could it have been put in here, but based on the Court's order, as you are aware, we withdrew our biomechanical expert at -- maybe not specifically withdrew him, but we haven't contacted him to prepare for trial. We've prepared for trial in line with the Court's order. So that's why the law in a motion for reconsideration under 80CR224 would be that it has to be something that couldn't have been raised in the initial briefs.

THE COURT: Any final thoughts?

MR. POLSENBERG: Your Honor, just a few if I may?

THE COURT: I hope they're brief, Mr. Polsenberg. It's been a long week.

MR. POLSENBERG: I understand. And you can tell it's Mr. Henriod's brief because it's so well written.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. POLSENBERG: Judge, if we're talking about Rule 224, really what the Supreme Court has said repeatedly, and most especially in <u>Insurance Companies of the West versus Gibson</u>

<u>Tile</u>, is that Rule 224 doesn't preclude the trial judge from the obligation to make the right ruling. And in fact, Justice Moffin [phonetic] concurring in that opinion said it's the

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controlling rule is Rule 54. You can't stick with the wrong ruling.

Even if we were required to bring in a reason for why this wasn't raised before, it's obviously what we are saying is that we thought that that original motion that they made went to photographs and to estimates.

Now, you can see why you would need an expert to make the leap from photographs and estimates to the speed. But we don't have that here. We have percipient testimony of the speed. And the fact of an accident is not something you need an expert for.

In United Exhibition Services they talk about two different ways to cause causation. Now, I don't think the defendant has the duty to prove causation, only to refute what they're arguing. But the two different ways are through an expert or through the facts. And so I think it would be a grievous error for the Court to preclude those facts. Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. I appreciate the brief argument.

Here's the thing, I don't know that this motion was really even necessary because the Court's ruling was based on the written pleadings and the argument that the Court heard.

And it was a very specific ruling. And I never said defendant can't testify. I don't know what she's going to testify to.

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1 I sure hope she complies with the Court's pretrial orders. MR. WALL: Well, she can't testify that it was a minor 3 impact. 4 THE COURT: Right. 5 MR. WALL: All right. б THE COURT: Right. But I don't know what else she may 7 say. I don't know. 8 MR. ROGERS: But, Your Honor --9 This motion didn't really talk anything at 10 all about what Jenny Rish might testify to, although it's 11 titled trial brief on percipient testimony regarding the 12 accident. 13 Okay. Let me tell you one thing she has 14 said and then the defend- -- plaintiff's counsel actually used 15 the word. She described the impact as a tap. And what we're 16 not clear on now is what can she say and what can't she say. 17 If she's going to appear before this jury and be asked please 18 describe this accident, where can she begin and where does she 19 end? 20 THE COURT: I urge you to re-read the order. 21 MR. ROGERS: Well, the -- you can see that the order has 22

confused plaintiff's counsel and us.

MR. WALL: Not one bit. Not one bit.

MR. ROGERS: That's why we're here.

MR. WALL: No, I'm here because I've got a brief telling

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πe	that	wh	at	s.	inac	lmissible	is	going	to	come	in	and	that	there
was	goir	ng	to	be	an	opening	that	refer	cenc	ced it	Ξ.			

MR. ROGERS: It's --

MR. WALL: That's why we're here. I'm not confused one bit on a very clear order.

THE COURT: I didn't think you were, Mr. Wall.

MR. ROGERS: The 267 discussion that he just recited to you show that the parties are not clear on this.

THE COURT: Well, I don't know what to tell you then.

MR. POLSENBERG: And I think, Your Honor, it is admissible for the witnesses to say it was a minor impact.

THE COURT: Well, I don't know what to tell you. I'm not going to tell you how to defend your case. I sure would never presume to tell anybody how to try or defend a case. But, you know, I think the order is pretty clear. There was plenty of opportunity to brief it and respond to it. The Court gave counsel lots of time to argue it because that's my standard procedure. I think we've made a pretty clear record. And I just really hope that, you know, both sides would honor the Court's pretrial orders.

MR. POLSENBERG: But, Your Honor, on what we've done today, if I were doing the opening statement I would say to the jury that this was a minor accident.

MR. WALL: And then I would seek contempt.

THE COURT: I would say that would be a problem.

1 MR. POLSENBERG: And that's why we're asking for 2 direction from you. 3 I'm not going to -- you know, I can't tell THE COURT: you you can say this, you can't say that, you can say the 4 5 I mean, you're all very smart individuals. б very respectable lawyers. You're very capable and you're 7 certainly capable of reading and comprehending the Court's 8 order that all the parties briefed and argued. 9 MR. POLSENBERG: Well, Your Honor, I don't think we 10 briefed and argued this issue. And we certainly would be able 11 to say to the jury that this was just a tap. 12 THE COURT: Well, I don't think so, Mr. Polsenberg. 13 I really don't want to engage in any sort of argument. 14 not the Court's rule. I think I've done my job to the best of

MR. POLSENBERG: Here's the problem I have though, the Court said that you wouldn't tell us how to try the case.

my ability and I would expect all of you to do the same.

THE COURT: Right.

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MR. POLSENBERG: I've suggested two things that I would say in opening statement and you've told me both of those I couldn't say. I can't figure out what I can say.

THE COURT: Are you the attorney making the opening statement?

MR. POLSENBERG: No.

THE COURT: Well, then it's not really an issue.

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1	MR. POLSENBERG: Well, it is an issue, Your Honor.
2	THE COURT: Well, Mr. Polsenberg, I don't want to argue
3	with you.
4	MR. POLSENBERG: Well, I'll let you argue with Mr. Rogers
5	then.
6	THE COURT: Well, that's fine.
7	MR. POLSENBERG: All right.
8	THE COURT: I've made my ruling. Unless there are any
9	other issues we need to address, I'm inclined to call it a
10	day.
11	MR. WALL: Judge, in the same order that precluded the
12	low impact defense, there was also a preclusion of any sub-
13	rosa or surveillance video until after the direct testimony of
14	the plaintiff to see whether or not video would impeach any of
15	his testimony. And it wasn't going to be discussed with
16	witnesses or shown during opening or referenced during
17	opening. And I just want to make sure that that order is
18	still in place.
19	THE COURT: Yes. I'm not revisiting any other pretrial
20	rulings.
21	MR. WALL: All right.
22	THE COURT: We've made a very clear record along the way.
23	MR. ROGERS: I don't
24	THE COURT: Mr. Rogers?
25	MR. ROGERS: Yeah. I don't believe that order, which I

did not sign, accurately reflects our discussion at that hearing. What actually occurred was you said, "I haven't seen the DVD of the surveillance yet." I said, "Okay. I'll send it over today." Sometime after today, plaintiff's counsel submitted this order, which again, I don't recall. And the DVD has been in chambers ever since.

Our position on the surveillance was that the foundation, which was your concern -- you said, "Well, look, I haven't seen the surveillance so I'm not sure what it's relevant to." I said, "Okay. Here's what it's relevant to: The medical records from before and after the surveillance repeatedly state that the plaintiff is in severe and intolerable pain, that he is at wits end. And then you go to the surveillance and you see what he can do in there in that footage."

That's why we provided that to you, not knowing that this order was submitted. We were actually waiting on an order from Your Honor so that we would know whether we could show that in the opening.

THE COURT: No. You weren't waiting on anything from me. It was pretty clear that I don't know what the defendant -- what the plaintiff's going to testify. I don't know what he's going to say. So I don't know that anything that's contained within that video is going to serve to impeach him. I don't know what he's going to say until he gets here in the

courtroom and we all hear what he has to say.

MR. ROGERS: But it's what he's already said is the point in the medical records. When he reports to a medical provider that he is suffering severe and intolerable pain and is at wits end, then we know what he has said.

THE COURT: The jury hasn't seen or heard anything, nor have I. So he can't very well be impeached until there is something to impeach him with.

MR. WALL: That's correct. And that was the -- that's the -- I mean, that's what the order says. That's what the discussion was at the close of the hearing, then I recall the Court saying, "You know, I haven't even seen this video. So if I can get it ahead of time so that after his direct I will have seen it and you can point me, Mr. Rogers, to what impeaches his testimony because that's the only thing that makes it admissible."

There was no -- it was quite clear that the order was -- and I've got to tell you, I -- I'm going to keep my voice nice and calm, but I resent a little bit the insinuation that I somehow slipped an order to you that wasn't what you said during the course of the hearing because that isn't what happened. The Court can -- we can get a transcript of the hearing. And I'm telling you that it will justify what's in the order that I presented and the order the Court signed.

THE COURT: You know, I review all those orders

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carefully. I didn't sign anything that isn't consistent with my recollection of what was argued and ruled on.

MR. ROGERS: But -- well, the concern here then, Your Honor, is the logical extension of this position. If what the plaintiff has said is -- in the medical records is not admissible, then can the plaintiff get up in the opening and say, "This doctor has recommended surgery based on what the plaintiff said. He said he was in severe and intolerable pain." Well, the plaintiff hasn't taken the stand and said those words, yet the very foundation for the admissibility of that expert opinion is in the record only.

THE COURT: It sounds --

MR. ROGERS: In other words --

THE COURT: It sounds like now you're asking me what is the plaintiff going to say in his opening statement?

MR. ROGERS: Well, I am. What can he -- I'm sorry. Go ahead.

THE COURT: I don't know the answer to that. I don't get a preview of his opening statement.

MR. WALL: This was just about sub-rosa. I can guarantee you I'm not going to violate the Court's order and mention the surveillance video.

THE COURT: I wouldn't expect you to.

MR. ROGERS: Right. But if he is going to state what the plaintiff said in those records and that there's a surgical

recommendation based on it, then he is using those very words that make the surveillance admissible.

THE COURT: I don't know what he's going to say in his opening statement. The Court's not privy to that. I don't quess you're privy to that either.

MR. ROGERS: I'd welcome it.

THE COURT: Just as he's not privy to your opening statement.

MR. WALL: Right. I mean, the surveillance video doesn't show that my client had no pain. I don't know how any video of anyone could say -- as I stand here now, do I have back pain? Does my knee hurt? Just because there's a video of me standing here doesn't mean that it doesn't exist.

So it's not as though the fact that he had a surgical recommendation in November of 2008 and the video was taken in July of 2008 is somehow -- if I say he had a surgical recommendation, that means I'm able to be -- I don't know where it goes. I don't see the connection in that and the surveillance video that the Court has kept out and deferred a ruling on until after the plaintiff testifies. But --

THE COURT: I haven't really kept it out because I don't know whether it's impeachment material.

MR. WALL: Right. You deferred a ruling until that time.

MR. ROGERS: Is it until the plaintiff himself testifies?

Or can a doctor get on the stand and say this is what he told

me?

THE COURT: How can you impeach a doctor's statement about the plaintiff by virtue of video of the plaintiff?

MR. ROGERS: If the doctor's understanding from the plaintiff's representation is that the plaintiff's pain was severe and intolerable, then the question becomes how reliable is that doctor's understanding of the plaintiff's condition.

THE COURT: I don't think you answered my question.

MR. ROGERS: Okay. I can try again.

THE COURT: I don't see how you can impeach a doctor's statement with the video of the plaintiff.

MR. ROGERS: Well, it's that the doctor's statement that we're discussing is actually the plaintiff's statement. The doctor is reciting and/or paraphrasing what the plaintiff is telling him. This is that history part or subjective part of every medical note. It's not the diagnosis that we're discussing. It's not the physical exam. It's the doctor communicating with the patient and then reporting what's communicated.

THE COURT: I think the answer to the question may be in order to impeach the plaintiff with that video it would have to be done after the plaintiff testifies because I haven't really heard you answer the question of how you would do it through a doctor's statement. So I think the answer is it would have to be after the plaintiff testifies before you

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I doi	ı't	have	any	idea	wha	t he	e's go	oing t	o sa	ay.				

MR. WALL: Thank you, Your Honor.

MR. ROGERS: Well, let's move on to the next issue. We have something that we need to clear up on the -- I've got several things here. Sorry to have jumbled. When are the jury instructions due? I just have a note here on that. That's an easy one.

THE COURT: We should have had them already. But as soon as practically possible. I mean, I realize there may be some additional ones submitted, but there should really have been a set submitted before now.

MR. ROGERS: Okay. And next, both parties are having difficulty with scheduling. We want some assurance that we'll get at least a day's notice of the witnesses to come the following day.

THE COURT: I think that's reasonable.

MR. WALL: I've assured Mr. Rogers that we will provide him the day before the witnesses for the next day because of the -- because of the fact we're not doing openings on Monday, we and he --

MR. HENRIOD: Wait, we are doing openings.

MR. WALL: I mean, that we didn't do openings today. We had Dr. Grover scheduled for Monday, and now that has been

thrown all off. We don't have a new date for him yet. We are -- and they'll be no witnesses on Monday. And we're, you know, scrambling who we're going to get on Tuesday because we had a problem with Dr. Zehr [phonetic]. So right now we don't know whether the doctor that we want to call on Tuesday is available or not because he's out of town.

THE COURT: I think both sides have to roll with the punches. There's certain even flow to the trial work. And the Court certainly is sensitive to the fact that these expert witnesses are difficult to schedule. So I don't really anticipate any problems, Mr. Rogers. I'm not going to try -- I'm not going to tell you you have to hurry up and try your case in two days. That's just not going to happen.

MR. ROGERS: Oh, no. Yeah, that's not what I'm asking. It's just advance notice so that we can --

THE COURT: I think you're entitled to that and it sounds like counsel is amenable.

MR. ROGERS: Okay. Very good. And one other issue I want to address is we filed a motion to exclude the investigation evidence relating to a defense expert, Dr. Wong. And there was a wrinkle in that the opposition to that motion introduced something unrelated to that investigation and it was a stipulation and decision.

The Court hasn't yet entered an order relating to the admissibility of that stipulation. If the plaintiff

intends to introduce any evidence of that, I ask that that be
excluded from the opening statement and that it be brought up
outside the presence of the jury in an offer of proof because
our position in the reply brief, remember, the motion was to
exclude a senate investigation. The opposition was, well,
here's this California State stipulation and decision. Our
reply said that's not responsive to the motion, but that's not
admissible either.

Your Court granted -- or Your Honor granted the motion as written, I believe it read, which leaves that -- the investigation is out, but now we don't know about the stipulation.

So my request then is that the plaintiff not be permitted to bring that up in the opening. They have not established any relevance to it. Remember that the decision actually reads that there was no wrongdoing. And they need to establish some proof that it's relevant to something before they can bring it up to the jury because if you tell the jury that some expert has done something wrong, it doesn't matter if he didn't.

You have the state's imprimatur on this stipulation and decision that may mean absolutely nothing at all, but the jury is -- has heard a bell that can't be unrung.

THE COURT: The Court previously granted your motion to exclude the senate investigation. Did you submit an order?

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M	R.	ROGERS:	Ι	believe	I	did.	I	hope	so,	Your	Honor.

THE COURT: Well, if you submitted one and I reviewed it, I signed it.

MR. WALL: And the senate investigation didn't result in any penalty.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. WALL: And when we were at the hearing -- and I feel as though I've been transported back in time to the motion in limine hearings. Being transported back in time sometimes can be a good thing. I'm not so sure today.

But what we argued at length and what we argued in the opposition -- supplemental opposition after Dr. Wong's deposition was that the stipulation in California as an admission of what he did -- and I take a little issue with the fact that it said that he had no wrong doing. In fact, what it said is they didn't believe that it compromise the actual research that he did on behalf of the companies that he had an interest from.

But there's three separate companies for whom he had received a financial benefit or had a financial interest, that he didn't disclose before accepting on behalf of the State of California as an employee of the University of California Los Angeles before accepting money from them to do research with the UCLA imprimatur on it.

So it does admit wrong doing and he paid an

administrative fine. He was fined in the amount of, it was either 10- or \$15,000. I don't remember which. And what we argued at the hearing -- and the Court ruled that the senate investigation was in fact out. Although this is a similar topic, this was a different proceeding by the California Fair Political Reform Committee or under the Political Reform Act of the State of California.

And what I argued in the brief and what I argued at the hearing was that it's a specific instance of conduct that can be inquired into on cross-examination under 50.215 I think, but I can't remember off the top of my head. That's -- and I'm basically stuck with the answer. I can't present extrinsic evidence to prove it up, but I can inquire about the specific instances of conduct. And I'm essentially stuck with his answer.

And what the Court ultimately ruled after we argued about that for a lengthy period of time was that the motion was as to the senate investigation and it was out. And I essentially conceded that since I thought the two were connected. As it turns out it wasn't.

But there was no preclusion of the cross-examination about the specific instances of conduct. And that was the way it was left. So our offer of proof was all of the exhibits that we attached to the supplemental opposition. Oh, I wasn't even close; 50.085 subsection 3. Specific instances of the

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conduct of a witness for the purpose of attacking or
supporting his creditability, other than conviction of a
crime, may not be proved by extrinsic evidence. They may,
however, if relevant to truthfulness, be inquired into on
cross-examination of the witness himself. Thank you.

THE COURT: Yes. And I think what I said was that creditability is always an issue. So --

MR. WALL: Right.

MR. ROGERS: But the point here is whether it has anything to do with creditability. If relevant to truthfulness is the operative phrase and the meaning -- it's clear that nobody has demonstrated to the Court that this stipulation and decision has anything to do with truthfulness because contained within the very decision it says there's no evidence of bias.

The suggestion being there is no wrongdoing. This could be a clerical error for all anybody knows. But if plaintiff's counsel gets up in the opening and shows this or talks about this to the jury, it's at least the same problem as the surveillance video.

THE COURT: I don't see how you can --

MR. WALL: You can't show it.

THE COURT: I don't see how you can put that in your opening statement. I don't see that you can.

MR. WALL: Can't show it. You're right.

	THE	COURT:	And	I f	doı	n't	kr	lOW	whet	her	it's	an	app	propri	late
area	of	inquiry.	I	gu	ess		I	sup	pose	it	deper	nds	on	what	the
witne	288	testifies	to	ο.					•						

MR. ROGERS: At least outside the presence if they intend to bring it up. That's all this discussion is about is if they're going to bring it up, don't do it in the opening because there's no offer of proof on it. And if they're going to bring it up with him on the stand, do it outside the presence of the jury so the Court can make an informed decision on it.

THE COURT: Well, they can't -- I don't see how you can put it in your opening statement. I think that's -- that's pretty clear.

MR. WALL: We don't intend to. I don't intend to. I couldn't -- I can't introduce the stipulation that he signed anyway. So no, that's -- we won't even raise it in the opening. But --

MR. ROGERS: And then on the stand as well. That's \neg -

MR. WALL: No, that's a whole different thing.

MR. ROGERS: That's outside the presence as we request.

MR. WALL: No, you don't get to give your witness two ways to try to explain it. You know, one outside the presence of the jury and well, if that doesn't work too well then another way. He's knows the question is coming. He knows the question is coming obviously, so --

9 THE COURT: Well --MR. ROGERS: That's a spin on it. 10 11 THE COURT: Yes. MR. ROGERS: And that's the point, is does it really say 12 what the plaintiff says? And can this offer of proof 13 14 establish that? THE COURT: I think --15

go to truthfulness though.

MR. WALL:

THE COURT:

MR. WALL: Yes.

THE COURT:

point in time.

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on.

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MR. ROGERS: The question is not relevant if it doesn't

separate occasions he took money, had an interest in the

companies, and told his university conflict of interest

MR. ROGERS: Let's do it outside the presence.

comes. We can have a sidebar if we need to hear from him

outside the presence of the jury. We can consider it at that

letter that Mr. Wall sent to you, Mr. Rogers, and copied me

Let me ask you this, there was something in the

I think you can address it when the time

About this very Dr. Wang [SIC], and I didn't

So that I think it absolutely goes to truthfulness.

committee that he didn't have any interest so that it would be

okay to do research for that company with UCLA's stamp on it.

It absolutely goes to truthfulness.

1	I totally didn't understand that paragraph regarding Dr.
2	Wang.
3	MR. WALL: Oh, no, all I said was in terms of trying to
4	the letter was basically about all the things we had to do
5	today and whether I should be prepared with my opening and
6	whether anything that happens today was going to change it.
7	And the suggestion was basically let's do both of them on a
·8	Monday. Since Dr. Wang was we were going to take Dr. Wang
9	Wong, I'm sorry Dr. Wong out of order on Monday, his
10	father had the stroke that we found out about the day before
11	yesterday. We're scrambling to try to fill up Monday anyway,
12	so let's do the openings Monday. That was the substance of
13	it.
14	THE COURT: So
15	MR. WALL: Does that make sense?
16	THE COURT: He is going to testify at some point?
17	MR. WALL: He is. On the 29th.
18	MR. ROGERS: He has a firm date now. It's the following
19	week on Tuesday. I think the 29th.
20	MR. WALL: Right.
21	MR. ROGERS: He'll be here, it's just not on well,
22	thankfully not on Monday now.
23	THE COURT: All right. Anything else we need to discuss?
24	MR. WALL: No, Judge.
25	MR. ADAMS: Yes.

MR. WALL: Oh, yes.

MR. ADAMS: Just one issue, Your Honor, and I'll be very brief.

THE COURT: Mr. Adams?

MR. ADAMS: Early in the week Mr. Rogers brought to my attention that there were some potential redacting errors in the exhibits. I've combed through them and I've had one of my meticulous assistants comb through them. It looks like there were a few redacting errors. I have them here. I'll provide them to Mr. Rogers at sometime, not today, but sometime before our opening statement I'll get with the clerk and put those in. There's not that many.

But I would like to -- some clarification from Mr.

Rogers here. At our 2.67 he brought certain exhibits with

him. Exhibit O was medical records, but there was nothing

contained within the tab of Exhibit O. So I'm assuming, since

I haven't received any medical exhibits from the defense that

they're going to be using plaintiff's exhibits throughout this

trial. And anything they show in front of this jury through

Power Point or other media is going to be through plaintiff's

exhibits of which we properly did give them a copy of at our

2.67 exchange, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Rogers?

MR. ROGERS: They actually altered the medical records.

25 That is why we produced -- it's a charge, I know. And it does

give you pause. It certainly did me. And so in response to that, the defense, which had already identified those treating records as exhibits, but said okay to the plaintiff, if you're going to just do a joint exhibit on that that's fine. Give us the records.

We discovered that the plaintiff deleted all the medications that he was taking from the records. And we said, well, that's not acceptable to us because that's not the -- an accurate copy of those records at all. And so we produced a COR copy, that's it, of the Southwest Medical Associates records. We said we're going to rely on the actual custodian of records documents.

Plaintiff's counsel, if they want to introduce these redacted copies with no medications in them, they can do that, but we are going to introduce the actual and appropriate records. That's where we are.

The only records the defense has added are the Southwest Medical Associates records. We haven't gone through the remaining records with -- as fine tooth and comb to discover whether there are any alterations there as well.

THE COURT: What about that, Mr. Adams?

MR. ADAMS: Yes, Your Honor. First of all, I take offense with the altering of records. I redacted the records in accordance with this Court's order. I've tried many cases in this department. As you know, I handle the exhibits during

trial. I make sure that I comply with all the Court's orders.

I will say that there was eight records where two medications were taken out and that's part of which we're adding in in correcting those records. Now, in -- when Mr. Rogers brought this up to me earlier in the week, I then went through every record exhibit that we have in the four binders over there. And what I found was additional things that needed to be redacted to comply with the court orders. In other words, things taken out like I missed a few insurances, some conditions not related to this accident. And I actually have a chart here for Mr. Rogers to show what actual motion in limine we're complying with.

Mr. Rogers has not produced one medical record to us, one medical exhibit to be used in this trial. I -- there's no doubt in my mind, okay, that I'm going to get medical records at some point from him now over the weekend it sounds like from Southwest that aren't redacted in complying with this Court's order.

On more than one occasion Mr. Roger's has looked at me and go, "What do you mean redacted?" Like this is something new. I mean, that's why we do motions in limine so we fan out the issues to be -- to resolve at trial and evidence to be used at trial. If he's saying that I altered records, I altered them in accordance with this Court's orders, Your Honor.

MR. ROGERS: I think the proposed correction is an acknowledgement that it was not in accordance with this Court's orders because what I saw in the medical records was, for example, I'm looking right now at a date of treatment dated May 4, 2005. There are roughly ten medications being taken on that date. In its place, in the plaintiff's production was a big empty box. It was the same on May 12. It was the same on April 15, the date of the incident. An empty box where the actual record with the custodian of records affidavit signature on it contains, again, seven or eight medications.

Your Honor didn't exclude medications relating to migraines. And I'm happy to present these to you so that you can see what was redacted. And that is why the defense produced this record that the plaintiff is objecting to now.

MR. ADAMS: Medications, as this Court knows and this Court has ruled in motions in limine to exclude subsequent and unrelated conditions and other medical conditions not related to this incident. My client has high blood pressure. He has diabetes test. He has allergies. I've taken all those medications related to those conditions out of the records.

Why would I take the fact that he's suffering from allergic reaction today out of the records to comply with the court orders and not take the medication that he's using to treat that same condition out of the records? It makes no

sense.

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So when he talks about that I'm redacting out prescription drugs, it's because they're related to conditions that aren't pertaining to this case which are in accordance with this Court's orders.

THE COURT: It looks like we're going with plaintiff's medical records.

MR. ROGERS: The redacted? The altered one?

MR. WALL: The redacted, not altered, counsel. You say that one more time and we're going to meet out in the street.

MR. ROGERS: Hold on. Hold on.

12 THE COURT: Anything else?

MR. ROGERS: Let's go. Let's go.

14 MR. WALL: Yeah. We will. We'll take it outside.

15 THE COURT: Anything else?

16 MR. WALL: That would be a pleasure.

MR. ROGERS: Let's do it.

18 MR. WALL: We will.

MR. ROGERS: Now, Your Honor, the point is the
plaintiff's records and redaction don't redact a select kind
of medication. It erases all of them.

THE COURT: That's not what I heard Mr. Adams state.

MR. ROGERS: But that is what happened.

MR. ADAMS: I just provided you with a packet. There was

eight medical records of -- that I made an error on. Eight

medical records related to his migraine headaches. That's it.

The rest are all other redactions that pertain to other orders of this Court. And I'm giving you a matrix of that.

MR. ROGERS: The new production?

MR. ADAMS: Right there. That's it. Yeah, out of my four binders I have maybe 30 pages here or 40 pages, most of which if you look at the chart are related to other things, not even things that you've been arguing here today.

MR. ROGERS: Well, I haven't seen these to know anything about whether they're reliable and whether a custodian of record affidavit signature even belongs on them because they aren't an accurate copy. So if you would allow me to look them over and see because the first copy they sent was provably not correct.

THE COURT: I think you're entitled to look them over carefully over the weekend, but --

MR. ADAMS: I agree. And I'm willing to work with him, Your Honor. I made that offer early on this week on Monday and Tuesday and got no response. But, I mean, if he's going to look at documents that I just produced to him and I produced all my other exhibits to him, you would think that if he wants to use an exhibit in this department, in this Court, in this trial, he would give me the same courtesy and give me the documents he plans on showing this jury.

MR. ROGERS: There's an ROC today -- signed today.

1	THE COURT: I would think they would have been provided
2	before today.
3	MR. ROGERS: It just arrived today. It's my I was
4	just told by someone that there's an ROC signed today.
5	THE COURT: Anything else?
6	MR. WALL: No, Judge.
7	MR. ROGERS: Not from me.
8	THE COURT: All right. See you Monday.
9	[Proceedings Concluded at 4:54 p.m.]
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
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ATTEST: I do hereby certify that I have truly and correctly transcribed the audio/video recording in the above-entitled case to the best of my ability. BONNIE FURLONG, Transcriber MERIBETH ASHLEY, Transcriber Dianna aldon DIANNA ALDOM, Transcriber Jami J. Mayes TAMI S. MAYES, Transcriber AMANDA SELF, Transcribe

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PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that an Order Regarding Plaintiffs' Omnibus Motion in Limine was entered on March 11, 2011, a copy of which is attached hereto.

DATED this day of March, 2011.

MAINOR EGLET, LLP

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Pursuant to N.R.C.P 5(b), I hereby certify that I am an employee of MAINOR EGLET and that on the 4th day of March, 2011, I deposited for mailing, postage prepaid thereon, at Las Vegas, Nevada the foregoing NOTICE OF ENTRY OF ORDER in the above matter addressed as follows:

Stephen H. Rogers, Esq.

ROGERS, MASTRANGELO, **CARVALHO & MITCHELL**

300 South Fourth Street, Suite 7/16

Las Vegas, Nevada 89101

EXHIBIT "1"

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ORDR 1 ROBERT T. EGLET, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 3402 CLERK OF THE COURT 2 DAVID T. WALL, ESQ. 3 Nevada Bar No. 2805 ROBERT M. ADAMS, ESQ. 4 Nevada Bar No. 6551 **MAINOR EGLET** 5 400 South Fourth Street, Suite 600 6 Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 Ph: (702) 450-5400 7 Fx: (702) 450-5451 dwall@mainorlawyers.com 8 9 MATTHEW E. AARON, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 4900 10 AARON & PATERNOSTER, LTD. 2300 West Sahara Avenue, Ste.650 11 Las Vegas, Nevada 89102 12 Ph.: (702) 384-4111 Fx.: (702) 384-8222 13 Attorneys for Plaintiffs 14 DISTRICT COURT 15 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 16 WILLIAM JAY SIMAO, individually and CASE NO.: A539455 17 CHERYL ANN SIMAO, individually, and as DEPT. NO.: X 18 husband and wife, 19 Plaintiffs. ORDER REGARDING 20 ٧. PLAINTIFFS' OMNIBUS MOTION 21 IN LIMINE JENNY RISH; JAMES RISH; LINDA RISH; 22 DOES I through V; and ROE CORPORATIONS I through V, inclusive, 23 24 Defendants. 25 26 27

This Honorable Court, having read the pleadings and papers on file herein regarding

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Plaintiffs' Omnibus Motion in Limine, the parties appearing before the Court on February 15, 2011 for hearing, DAVID T WALL, ESQ. and Mainor Eglet appearing for Plaintiffs, STEVE ROGERS, ESQ. and Rogers, Mastrangelo, Carvalho and Mitchell appearing for Defendants, and good cause appearing therefore, the Court rules upon the Plaintiffs' Motion as follows:

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs' request to exclude prior and subsequent unrelated accidents, injuries and medical conditions and prior and subsequent claims or lawsuits is GRANTED in all respects;

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs' request to preclude reference to William being a malingerer, magnifying symptoms or manifesting secondary gain motives is GRANTED, such that medical witnesses may testify to medical inconsistencies, but references to Plaintiff being a malingerer, magnifying symptoms or manifesting secondary gain motives are excluded.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that treating physicians do not need to prepare expert reports separate from and in addition to their medical records and dictated reports.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs' request to preclude reference to defense medical examiners as "independent" is GRANTED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs' request to preclude argument that this case is "attorney driven" or a "medical-buildup" case" is GRANTED.


IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs' request to preclude references to collateral sources of payment or medical bills and all other expenses, including health insurance, liens and/or Medicare is GRANTED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs' request to exclude evidence of when Plaintiffs retained counsels is GRANTED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs' request to preclude Defendants from

Las Vegas, Nevada 8910!

arguing that Plaintiffs are asking the jury for an amount greater than they anticipate receiving is GRANTED. Mar
DATED this 9th day of February, 2011. MAINOR EGLET Nevada Bar No. 2805 MAINOR EGLET 400 South Fourth Street, Suite 600



ORIGINAL

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1.	BREF
2	STEPHEN H. ROGERS, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 5755
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₄	Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 03/18/2011 09:22:10 AM Phone (702) 383-3400
5	Fax (702) 384-1460 Attorneys for Defendant Jenny Rish Attorneys for Defendant Jenny Rish
6	DISTRICT COURT CLERK OF THE COURT
7	CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA
8 9	WILLIAM JAY SIMAO, individually and) CHERYL ANN SIMAO, individually, and as) husband and wife,)
10	Plaintiff,
11	v. CASE NO. A539455
12	JENNY RISH; JAMES RISH; LINDA RISH;) DOES I - V; and ROE CORPORATIONS I - V,
13	inclusive, DATE OF HEARING: TIME OF HEARING:
14	Defendants.
15	TRIAL BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF ORAL MOTION FOR MISTRIAL
16	COMES NOW Defendant JENNY RISH, by and through her attorney, STEPHEN H
17	ROGERS, ESQ., and hereby Moves this Court for an Mistrial based upon the dismissal of nine juror
18	for cause. The Reasons in support of said request are contained in the attached Memorandum of Point
19	and Authorities, all pleadings and paper on file, as well as arguments presented at the time of th
20	
21	hearing.
22	DATED this 1777 day of March, 2011.
23	ROGERS, MASTRANGELO, CARVALHO & MITCHELL
24	
25	STEPHEN H. ROGERS, ESQ.
26	Nevada Bar No. 5755 300 South Fourth Street, Suite 710
27	Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 Attorneys for Defendant Jenny Rish
28	Tamasa jar a sponsani ooning taan

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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

I. STATEMENT OF FACTS

During voir dire, at least nine (9) jurors have been struck for "cause" as allegedly being unable to fairly determine the outcome of this trial. Defendants have been denied the opportunity to question these jurors to properly determine whether these jurors could follow the law. Denial of Defendant's right to voir dire mandates a mistrial. Secondly, by allowing Plaintiff to question the jurors uninterrupted for the past 4 days has irrevocably biased the jury pool, as improper questioning of the panel has continued despite numerous objectionable questions.

II. LAW AND ARGUMENT

A. <u>Defendant's right to voir dire has been unreasonably restricted in violation of NRS 16.030.</u>

NRS 16.030 states:

The judge shall conduct the initial examination of prospective jurors and the parties or their attorneys are entitled to conduct supplemental examinations which must not be unreasonably restricted.

Where a trial judge unreasonably restricts or denies supplemental attorney voir dire, she commits reversible error. Leone v. Goodman, 105 Nev. 221, 773 P.2d 342 (1989).

This court has unreasonably denied Defendant's right to voir dire jurors for cause before their dismissal. The right to voir dire by a Defendant is required by NRS 16.030 and it's legislative history:

A review of the legislative history "convinces us that there was no mistake by the Legislature as to the language used in the statute: it gives attorneys a *right* to conduct supplemental examination of prospective jurors."

Whitlock v. Salmon, 104 Nev. 24, 752 P.2d 210 (1988).

Sister states likewise hold that excusing jurors for cause without allowing inquiry by Defendants is reversible error. See Sanders v. State, 707 So.2d 664 (Fla. 1998); People v. Lefebre 981 P.2d 650 (Colo App. 1998); O'Connell v. State, 480 So.2d 1284 (Fla. 1986); State v. Anderson, 4 P.3d 369 (Ariz. 2000).

As nine jurors have already been excused under this method, Defendant has been unfairly and irrevocably prejudiced. A mistrial is the only remedy.

Page 2 of 3

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M:\Rogors\Rish adv. Simao\Pleadings\trial brief re voir dire errors.wpxf

B. This court has failed to properly restrict Plaintiff's voir dire.

While each side has a right to voir dire, unreasonable voir dire can and must be restricted by the trial court. The trial judge has the duty to restrict attorney-conducted voir dire to its permissible scope: obtaining an impartial jury. "NRS 16.030(6) clearly contemplates that the trial judge will supervise the process and that he may reasonably restrict supplemental examination of prospective jurors by the litigant's counsel." Whitlock v. Salmon, 104 Nev. 24 (1988). See also Lamb v. State, 127 Nev. Adv. Op. 3 (March 3, 2011 Nev. 2011) (Proper to exclude voir dire "aimed more at indoctrination than acquisition of information concerning bias or ability to apply the law".)

Plaintiff has irrevocably tainted jury pool with an improper voir dire. Plaintiff has taken the better part of four days to improperly influence the jury pool, asking questions designed to "indoctrinate" the jurors rather than determine bias or prejudice. In addition, the jury pool has been improperly advised on the burden of proof. Plaintiff has advised the jury the parties are "equal", yet the Plaintiff has burden of proof on negligence. See *Joynt v. California Hotel & Casino*, 108 Nev. 539 (1992). Once again, a mistrial is the only appropriate remedy.

III. CONCLUSION

Defendant respectfully requests a mistrial due to irrevocable errors in voir dire.

DATED this 17 day of March, 2011.

ROGERS, MASTRANGELO, CARVALHO & MITCHELL


STEPHEN H. ROGERS, ESQ.

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Attorneys for Defendant Jenny Rish



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1 2	BREF STEPHEN H. ROGERS (SBN 5755) ROGERS MASTRANGELO CARVALHO & MITCHELL 300 South Fourth Street, Suite 170 CLERK OF THE COURT
3	300 South Fourth Street, Suite 170 Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 (702) 383-3400
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5 6	Lewis and Roca LLP 3993 Howard Hughes Parkway, Suite 600 Las Vegas, Nevada 89169
7	(702) 474-2616
8	Attorneys for Defendant Jenny Rish
9	DISTRICT COURT
10	CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA
11	
12	WILLIAM JAY SIMAO, individually and Case No. A539455 CHERYL ANN SIMAO, individually and as husband and wife, Dept. No. X
13	Plaintiffs,
14	vs.
15 16	JENNY RISH; JAMES RISH; LINDA RISH; DOES I through V; and ROE Corporations I through V, inclusive,
17	Defendants.
18)
19	TRIAL BRIEF ON PERCIPIENT TESTIMONY REGARDING THE ACCIDENT
20	Based on statements of plaintiff's counsel at the pre-trial conference, defendant
21	expects that plaintiff may contend that defendant Jenny Rish should be precluded from
22:	testifying about the subject accident.
23	///
24	<i>///</i>
25	///
26	///
27	///
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 Plaintiff must be allowed to testify about her recollection of the accident. DATED this 18th day of March, 2011.

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A DEFENDANT MAY TESTIFY ABOUT THE SUBJECT ACCIDENT WITHOUT PRESENTING A BIOMECHANICAL EXPERT

A. Expert Testimony Is Necessary Only in Limited Circumstances

The rational behind plaintiff's argument is the faulty assumption that, if an expert can't offer opinion testimony about a subject, then the jury may not learn facts on the subject. Plaintiff offers no authority for this proposition, and it simply isn't true. For instance, outside the context of medical malpractice, a medical expert is not necessary even to prove medical causation: "A testifying physician must state to a reasonable degree of medical probability that the condition in question was caused by the industrial injury, or sufficient facts must be shown so that the trier of fact can make the reasonable conclusion that the condition was caused by the industrial injury." United Exposition Service Co. v. S.I.I.S., __ Nev. __, 851 P.2d 423, 425 (1993).

One of the courts' general concerns about "expert" testimony is the effect of putting a particular witness's opinion on a pedestal. As some courts have indicated, "the problem here (as with all expert testimony) is not the introduction of one man's opinion on another's future dangerousness, but the fact that the opinion is introduced by one whose title and education (not to mention designation as an "expert") gives

him significant credibility in the eyes of the jury as one whose opinion comes with the imprimatur of scientific fact." Flores v. Johnson, 210 F.3d 456, 465-466 (5th Cir. 2000). Thus, the court's hesitancy to admit expert testimony is not to shelter juries from facts, but rather to prevent uninformed opinions from invading the province of the jury. C.f., Lickey v. State, 108 Nev. 191, 196, 827 P.2d 824, 827 (1992) (danger of speculative expert testimony is the risk that it can "lend a stamp of undue legitimacy" to conclusions that should be left to the jury)(criminal). The court does not bestow the honor "expert" lightly.

Rather, An abundance of Nevada case law has held that in negligence actions, issues of causation are factual issues for the jury to determine. See Nehls v. Leonard, 97 Nev. 325, 328, 630 P.2d 258, 260 (1981) (stating that in Nevada, issues of negligence and proximate cause are considered issues of fact for the jury to resolve); see also Barreth v. Reno, 77 Nev. 196, 198 (1961); White v. Demetelin, 84 Nev. 430, 433 (1968). More specifically, in automobile accident cases, the issue of proximate cause as well as the cause of the damages for which compensation is sought, are issues of fact for the jury to decide. See Fox v. Cusick, 91 Nev. 218, 220, 533 P.2d 466, 467 (1975).

With regard to the matter of injury and damage, it is within the province of the jury to decide that an accident occurred with or without compensable injury. *Id.* It is for the jury to evaluate the evidence presented and to assess the weight to give that evidence. Thus, an expert need not testify as to causation and damages in order to admit relevant evidence. *See Krause Inc. v. Little*, 117 Nev. 929, 938-39, 34 P.3d 566, 572 (2001) (concluding that a jury did not require a medical expert's testimony to appreciate the extent to which a broken bone causes pain and suffering and what amount of future damages would be appropriate).

B. Plaintiff Cites No Authority that Would Justify Limitation of the Defendant Driver's Percipient Testimony

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At most the authorities cited by plaintiff in his motion in *limine* stand only for the proposition that, without testimony from a biomechanical expert, a defendant may not extrapolate from the amount of *damage to a vehicle* the likely severity of resultant physical injury. *See Davis v. Maute*, 770 A.2d 36 (Del. 2001) (vehicle photographs inadmissible); *Eskin v. Carden*, 842 A.2d 1222 (Del. 2004) (same); *DiCosola v. Bowman*, 794 N.E.2d 875 (Ill. Ct. App. 2003) (same). And, even that appears to be a minority position.¹

Undersigned counsel is aware of *no* authority that would curtail the testimony of the defendant driver, based on independent recollections.

C. The Jury May Decline to Accept Even Unrebutted Expert Testimony

In Nevada, juries need not check their common sense at the door and are not obligated to accept the conclusions of plaintiff's experts, even though (1) they spout the magic words "reasonable degree of medical probability." and (2) the defendant has

For example, in Fronabarger v. Burns, 385 Ill. App. 3d 560, 564, 895 N.E.2d 1125, 1129 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008), the court held that expert testimony on the correlation between vehicular damage and plaintiff's injuries was not needed in order to admit photographs of the parties' damaged vehicles. Similarly, the court in Ferro v. Griffiths, 361 Ill. App.3d 738, 742, 297 Ill. Dec. 194, 836 N.E.2d 925 (2005), stated that a trial court has to determine "whether the photographs make the resulting injury to the plaintiff more or less probable" and "whether the nature of the damage to the vehicles and the injury to the plaintiff are such that a lay person can readily assess their relationship, if any, without expert interpretation." Id.

In this case, the jury is entitled to hear testimony and to see evidence that establishes causation or establishes the extent of damages. There is no requirement that such relevant evidence is admissible only if an expert is willing to testify as to its relevance. See, e.g., Brenman v. Demello, 921 A.2d 1110, 1120, 191 N.J. 18, 28 ("We cannot subscribe to the limits of Davis's logic, In the main, the fundamental relationship between the force of impact in an automobile accident and the existence or extent of any resulting injuries does not necessarily require 'scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge' in order to 'assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue' ... expert proofs ... address the weight to be given to photographs of impact, not their admissibility."); Marron v. Stromstad, 123 P.3d 992, 1009 (Alaska 2005) ("[W]e decline to adopt the rigid approach represented by [Davis]. We are unaware of any other jurisdiction which has adopted a rule that collision evidence is per se inadmissible without expert testimony, and we decline to do so. The trial court properly has the discretion to weigh the prejudicial and probative value of photographs and other evidence of the severity of an accident."); Murray v. Mossman, 329 P.2d 1089, 1091 (Wash.1958) (affirming admission of photographs of accident scene for the limited purpose of showing the force of the impact that caused plaintiff's whiplash injury); DiCosola v. Bowman, 794 N.E.2d 875, 881 (III.App.2003) ("[We are rejecting a bright-line rule ... We do not hold that expert testimony must always be required for such photographic evidence to be admissible.") (ultimately upholding trial court's use of discretion to require expert testimony). Thus, once the evidence is shown to be relevant and admissible under Nevada's Rules of Evidence, expert testimony is not required.

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does not call opposing experts. A trier of fact "has the right to consider the credibility of witnesses and disbelieve testimony, even though uncontradicted." Fox v. First Western Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 86 Nev. 469, 472, 470 P.2d 424, 426 (1970). And, that includes unrebutted expert testimony. Smith v. Andrews, 959 A.2d 597, 606 (Conn. 2008) (quotations omitted) ("the jury is under no obligation to credit the evidence offered by any witnesses, including experts; even if that evidence is uncontroverted"); Dionne v. LeClerc, 896 A.2d 923, 929 (Me. 2006) ("a fact-finder, whether it be a jury or a court, is "not required to believe witnesses, even if the testimony of those witnesses, be they experts or lay witnesses, is not disputed ... and has the prerogative selectively to accept or reject it, in terms of the credibility of the witnesses or the internal cogency of the content"); Olander Contracting Co. v. Gail Wachter Investments, 643 N.W.2d 29, 41 (N.D. 2002) ("The jury need not accept undisputed) testimony, even of experts."); Lucks v. Lakeside Mfg., Inc., 830 N.Y.S.2d 747, 749 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007) ("the jury was entitled to discredit the testimony of the plaintiff) and his expert, in whole or in part, even though the defendant adduced no contradictory evidence").

As this Court will instruct, the jurors "are not bound" by the experts' opinions:

A person who has special knowledge, skill, experience, training or education in a particular science, profession or occupation may give his or her opinion as an expert as to any matter in which he or she is skilled. In determining the weight to be given to such opinion, you should consider the qualifications and credibility of the expert and the reasons given for his or her opinion. You are not bound by such opinion. Give it the weight, if any, to which you deem it entitled.

Nev. J.I. 2.11 (emphasis added).

To exercise that right of skepticism, the jury is entitled to know the bare facts.

And, a defendant is entitled to introduce those facts.

C. A Defendant May Undermine Medical Expert Testimony Merely Through Cross-Examination

The defendant may contest the conclusions of plaintiff's medical expert's without calling his own witnesses, and without proposing affirmative, alternative

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theories. Even where medical causation is at issue, "a defendant is not obligated to put on testimony about the cause of an injury or to provide an alternative theory about causation," but may dispute plaintiff's causation theory "through cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence that the negligence was not the probable cause of the injury, or presenting evidence of alternative causes of the injury." Davies, 698 N.E.2d 507, 511 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997). It is well settled that a defendant may cross-examine, rebut and criticize plaintiff's theory of the case without having to prove an alternative theory:

> The defendant ordinarily need not prove, with certainty or otherwise, that he or she is innocent of the alleged wrongdoing. Absent an affirmative defense or a counterclaim, the defendant's case is usually nothing more than an attempt to rebut or discredit the plaintiff's case.

Neal v. Lu, 530 A.2d 103, 109 - 110 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987). Indeed, "evidence" that rebuts or discredits is not necessarily proof" at all, as "it simply vitiates the effect of opposing evidence." Neal, 530 A.2d at 109-10; see also 29A AM, JUR, 2D Evidence § 1373 ("Reasons not to accept the plaintiff's evidence, through cross-examination and argument, may suffice to prevent the meeting of a plaintiff's burden of proof, even without affirmative countervailing evidence").

II.

HALLMARK DOES NOT CONDITION ADMISSIBILITY OF TESTIMONY REGARDING AN ACCIDENT ON THE INTRODUCTION OF A BIOMECHANICAL EXPERT

Nothing in Hallmark v. Eldridge even suggests that biomechanical expert testimony is a prerequisite for percipient testimony about the facts of an accident. Instead, Hallmark teaches that biomechanical engineering is probably not an appropriate subject for "expert" opinion testimony. Indeed, the Nevada Supreme Court cast doubt that expert testimony from a biomechanical expert would ever be admissible: "this court has not yet judicially noticed the general reliability of biomechanical engineering[.]" Hallmark v. Eldridge, 124 Nev. 492, 189 P.3d 646, 653 n. 27 (2008) (expressing skepticism whether "biomechanics was within a

recognized field of expertise" and whether "these types of opinions were generally accepted in the scientific community"). Holding open even the possibility, the supreme court suggested a standard that would be practically insurmountable. To be admissible, an biomechanical opinion would require knowledge and assessment of (a) "the speeds at impact," (b) "the length of time that the vehicles were in contact during impact," (c) "the distances traveled," (d) "the angle at which the vehicles collided," and possibly even an attempt to "recreate the collision by performing an experiment." Hallmark, 189 P.3d at 649, 653. In many cases this information simply isn't available, and the cost of experiments would be cost-prohibitive, especially to plaintiffs.

Under plaintiff's reading of Hallmark, no fact testimony about an accident would ever be allowed, because obtaining proper biomechanical expert testimony would be unfeasible. There is no language in Hallmark, or any other case from our

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CONCLUSION

Defendant must be allowed to testify about her recollection of the accident.

DATED this 18th day of March, 2011.

supreme court, contemplating that absurd result.

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In the Supreme Court of Revada

Case Nos. 58504, 59208 and 59423

JENNY RISH,

Appellant,

vs.

WILLIAM JAY SIMAO, individually, and CHERYL ANN SIMAO, individually and as husband and wife,

Respondents.

Electronically Filed Aug 14 2012 04:07 p.m. Tracie K. Lindeman Clerk of Supreme Court

APPEAL

from the Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County The Honorable JESSIE WALSH, District Judge District Court Case No. A539455

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146	Third Amended Notice of Appeal	10/10/11	21	4849-4864
147	Third Amended Case Appeal Statement	10/10/11	21	4865-4869
148	Portion of Jury Trial - Day 6 (Bench Conferences)	03/21/11	21	4870-4883
149	Portion of Jury Trial - Day 7 (Bench Conferences)	03/22/11	21	4884-4900
150	Portion of Jury Trial - Day 8 (Bench Conferences)	03/23/11	21	4901-4920
151	Portion of Jury Trial - Day 9 (Bench Conferences)	03/24/11	21	4921-4957
152	Portion of Jury Trial - Day 10 (Bench Conferences)	03/25/11	21	4958-4998
153	Portion of Jury Trial - Day 11 (Bench Conferences)	03/28/11	21	4999-5016
154	Portion of Jury Trial - Day 12 (Bench Conferences)	03/29/11	22	5017-5056
155	Portion of Jury Trial - Day 13 (Bench Conferences)	03/30/11	22	5057-5089
156	Portion of Jury Trial - Day 14 (Bench Conferences)	03/31/11	22	5090-5105



MR. EGLET: And when you hear someone who's been hurt, injured, or become ill, do you ever think to yourself that probably happened to them because there's something bad they did earlier in their life?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 398: No.

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MR. EGLET: Okay. Some people think that when someone is killed or injured that it's fate, destiny, God's will, and it was going to happen anyway, so even if it was because of the negligence of someone else they shouldn't sue. Do you agree with that?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 398: No.

MR. EGLET: Who's the public figure you admire most, living or dead?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 398: I would say Gandhi.

MR. EGLET: And why Gandhi?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 398: [Indiscernible] to use his influence violent and has [indiscernible] people and [indiscernible].

MR. EGLET: All right. Thank you very much.

PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 398: Uh-huh.

MR. EGLET: Ms. Jones. Good afternoon.

PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 395: Hi.

MR. EGLET: Can you tell us your date of birth?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 395: 12-2-1977.

MR. EGLET: Okay. And any other names you've been known

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1	pA.s
2	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 395: No.
3	MR. EGLET: Okay. And how often do you wash your car?
4	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 395: Every couple months.
5	MR. EGLET: Okay. And you work for the Detention
6	Department for the State of Nevada, is that correct?
7	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 395: Yes.
8	MR. EGLET: State of Nevada what does D-E-T-R stand
9	for?
10	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 395: Department of
11	MR. EGLET: Transportation?
12	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 395: No. Department of Employer
13	and Rehabilitative Training.
14	MR. EGLET: Oh, I see. Okay. So you take unemployment
15	claims over the phone.
16	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 398: [Indiscernible].
17	MR. EGLET: How long have you been doing that?
18	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 395: A little over two years.
19	MR. EGLET: What makes you good at your job?
20	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 395: Being able to anticipate the
21	needs of the people that are calling on the phone, attention
22	to detail, and methodical, and I carry a mentality of trying
23	to be to understand before being understood, and just, you
24	know, [indiscernible].
25	MR. EGLET: Okay. What did you want to be when you were

_	In high school?
2	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 395: I wanted to go into medicine.
3	MR. EGLET: Okay. And what made you decide not to do
4	that?
5	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 395: The lab was really boring.
6	MR. EGLET: Okay. Good reason. Do you belong strike
7	that.
8	What are your five-year goals?
9	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 395: To spend as much time as I
10	can with my family, to become debt-free, possibly go back to
11	school, and travel.
12	MR. EGLET: Clubs or organizations you belong to?
13	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 395: No.
14	MR. EGLET: Okay. What about earlier, earlier in life?
15	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 395: I used to do a bit of acting,
16	so Young Thespians, played basketball from middle school
17	through high school, participate in band [indiscernible].
18	MR. EGLET: Okay. Your favorite charity? Someone said
19	mine too.
20	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 395: I actually have three.
21	MR. EGLET: Okay.
22	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 395: Breast Cancer, Pancreatic
23	Cancer Network and Hands and Feet.
24	MR. EGLET: Okay. And why those three charities?
25	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 395: I have a lot of cancer in my

1	family. I but I have lot of survivors as well. So I do
2	support those organizations.
3	MR. EGLET: Very good. What's the worst tragedy you've
4	ever had to experience?
5	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 395: Well, like I say, going
6	through my uncle's cancer returning, and he ended up dying of
7	pancreatic cancer.
8	MR. EGLET: When you hear that someone's been killed,
9	injured or become sick, do you ever think to yourself, that
10	probably happened
11	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 395: No.
12	MR. EGLET: Okay. Some people feel that when someone is
13	killed or injured that it was fate, destiny, God's will, and
14	so even if it was because of negligence of someone else they
15	shouldn't sue. Do you agree with that?
16	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 395: No.
17	MR. EGLET: Who's a public figure living or dead you
18	admire?
19	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 395: Jesus.
20	MR. EGLET: Jesus. And why Jesus?
21	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 395: He paid the ultimately
22	sacrifice to give your life to people [indiscernible].
23	MR. EGLET: Thank you.
24	And Ms. Frehner. Did I say that
25	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 403: Frehner.

1	MR. EGLET: Frehner?
2	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 403: Uh-huh.
3	MR. EGLET: Good afternoon. Ms. Frehner, can you tell us
4	your date of birth?
5	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 403: January 4th, 1989.
6	MR. EGLET: Okay. And have you known by any other names?
7	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 403: [Indiscernible].
8	MR. EGLET: All right. And how often do you wash your
9	car?
10	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 403: [Indiscernible].
11	MR. EGLET: Okay. And you are you work at Francesca's
12	Collections?
13	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 403: Uh-huh.
14	MR. EGLET: And what is Francesca's Collections?
15	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 403: It's a little boutique
16	clothes, purses [indiscernible].
17	MR. EGLET: Okay. It's not a collection business then?
18	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 403: Yeah, no.
19	MR. EGLET: You're selling collectibles, right?
20	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 403: No.
21	MR. EGLET: You're not repossession people's cars and
22	things then. Okay. Very good.
23	How long have you been doing that?
24	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 403: I worked there for about two-
25	and-a-half years and then I just went back a few months ago.

1	MR. EGLET: Okay. What makes you good at your job?
2	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 403: I know the product. I know
3	what we have in the store [indiscernible], what people are
4	looking for [indiscernible] I can [indiscernible].
5	MR. EGLET: What are your what did you want to be in
6	high school?
7	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 403: A teacher.
8	MR. EGLET: A teacher. And why did you note go down that
9	
	road?
10	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 403: Well, I'm going to school
11	MR. EGLET: Are you?
12	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 403: now to be a teacher.
13	MR. EGLET: Are you?
14	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 403: Uh-huh.
15	MR. EGLET: Are you in school full time or part time?
16	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 403: Full time.
L7	MR. EGLET: Full time, okay. Where do you go to school?
18	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 403: CSM right now.
٦9.	MR. EGLET: CSM, okay. Do you work during the day and go
20	to school at night?
21	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 403: I have night classes and day
22	classes [indiscernible].
23	MR. EGLET: All right. What are your five-year goals?
24	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 403: To finish school and just be
25	closer to [indiscernible].

experience?

1	MR. EGLET: Any clubs or organizations you belong to?
2	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 403: No.
3	MR. EGLET: What are the two most important values to
4	you?
5	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 403: Respect for yourself and for
6	others and probably personal responsibility.
7	MR. EGLET: And what do you mean by "personal
8	responsibility"?
9	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 403: Just when you do something,
10	owning up to it, not trying to blame other people or other
11	things for why you did what you did.
12	MR. EGLET: Can you tell us situations that you think
13	you're regarded as a leader.
14	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 403: At work. I know a lot of our
15	product, more than some other [indiscernible]. Friends
16	sometimes as far as [indiscernible].
17	MR. EGLET: Your favorite charity?
18	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 403: Probably like humane society.
19	MR, EGLET: Like animals?
20	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 403: Uh-huh.
21	MR. EGLET: Have you had animals?
22	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 403: Yeah.
23	MR. EGLET: What's the worst tragedy you've ever had to

PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 403: When my father died when I

was eight.

MR. EGLET: When you hear that someone has been hurt, injured or killed or becomes sick, do you ever think to yourself that that probably happened to them because of something bad they did earlier in their life?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 403: No.

MR. EGLET: Some people think that if someone is injured or killed by -- because of someone else's fault, that it was -- it was God's will, it was destiny, it was fate, it would have happened anyway, so they shouldn't bring a lawsuit. Do you agree with that?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 403: No.

MR. EGLET: Who's a public figure you admire?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 403: I'd probably say Elvis is (indiscernible).

MR. EGLET: Elvis?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 403: Because he did good with his money, like he would give to the community, and he paid for Pearl Harbor or whatever when that happened, so I just like when people have the means --

MR. EGLET: Okay. Now I'm just talking to the three new people now, and I'm going to kind of go through these same, those same things. Do all of you recall the hypothetical I gave to everybody about the -- if a juror comes out, one of your fellow juror panel members comes out to you in the hall

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1	and says their knee hurts, are you going to have any reason at
2	that point to disbelieve them or are you going to take them at
3	face value when they say that? Ms. Frehner.
4	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 403: I would believe them.
5	MR. EGLET: Okay. Ms. Jones?
6	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 395: I'd believe them.
7	MR. EGLET: Okay.
8	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 389: I would believe them.
9	MR. EGLET: Okay. Now, change the hypothetical. It's a
10	party testifying under oath and they say, "My knee hurts."
11	Are you going to believe them until some other evidence comes
12	along that disproves what they say or are you going to tend to
13	not believe them until evidence comes along that proves what
14	they're saying? Ms. Jones?
15	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 395: I would believe them until
16	I'm given a reason not to.
17	MR. EGLET: Ms. Frehner?
18	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 403: I would be more skeptical
19	[indiscernible].
20	MR. EGLET: Okay. And Ms. Parrette?
21	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 389: I would believe them
22	[indiscernible].
23	MR. EGLET: Okay. All right.
24	Did do you heard the discussion I had with

respect to there's going to be experts or people here,

professionals who are paid for their time. Any of you have any problems with that? Is that going to cause you to be -- discount their testimony or not believe them?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR: No.

MR. EGLET: Okay. Do all of you believe in personal responsibility? I know you do. [indiscernible] okay. Do all of you believe as part of personal responsibility that you should be held accountable for your actions, or do you disagree --

PROSPECTIVE JUROR: -- with that? Okay. We talked at length, the longest discussion we had, on the subject of lawsuit reform. Jackpot justice, verdicts out of hand, the McDonald's hot coffee case, Chili's thumb in the chili case, all these different things and how it affected -- this case is about money -- whether there should be caps on damages, and multimillion verdicts, big verdicts, how comfortable you would feel being on a jury that was asked to put that kind of money in the verdict.

What are your thoughts on this, Ms. Frehner?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 403: As -- I think -- well, as far as the million -- the multimillion, you know, a case for that, I think initially without any evidence I would feel kind of uncomfortable because I think that people in an opportunity to sue or whatever will try to ask for more money just because they're an opportunity to do so.

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MR. EGLET: Uh-huh.

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PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 403: Whether or not it's [indiscernible].

MR. EGLET: The question really is, is would you feel uncomfortable being on a jury that was asked to put that amount of money in the verdict form if it was justified by the evidence? Would you still feel uncomfortable?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 403: A little bit [indiscernible].

MR. EGLET: Okay. Would you ever do it if it was -- if that was the appropriate amount?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 403: Yeah.

MR. EGLET: And Ms. Jones, how do you feel about this issue?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 395: I wouldn't have a problem doing it --

MR. EGLET: Okay.

PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 395: -- no.

MR. EGLET: What do you think about the whole idea of lawsuit reform and that verdicts are out of hand and, you know, lawyers are taking advantage?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 395: Well, I mean in general there's always going to be somebody that's there that's going to try to get what they can, but you have to -- when you're looking at the case, you have to look at the evidence that's presented and make a decision from there. So I mean there's

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1	always going to be somebody that's going to, you know, get out
2	of hand with what they're trying to do [indiscernible] trying
3	to make the best choice possible with the information that
4	you're given.

MR. EGLET: Ms. Parrette, how do you feel about these issues?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 389: I think one of the great things about our country is that individuals can do that, and I mean there is hype, all the negative press about those cases, but I think the majority of the cases are not, and I think the [indiscernible] would be judged by case-by-case.

MR. EGLET: Okay. Okay. Thank you.

The Defendant didn't hurt -- Mrs. Rish didn't hurt Mr. Simao on purpose. Nobody's going to claim that.

MR. ROGERS: Objection, Your Honor.

MR. EGLET: All right. I'll withdraw.

Some folks have a problem -- some folks --

MR. ROGERS: No, I want to approach on this.

THE COURT: Very well.

20 [Bench Conference Begins]

MR. ROGERS: [Indiscernible] just said to the jury that -

- I'll just say to the jury that the --

MR. EGLET: My name is Robert, by the way.

MR. ROGERS: -- Defendant hurt the Plaintiff. He actually testified to that jury.

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1	THE COURT: He I thought
2	MR. EGLET: I said
3	THE COURT: I thought that he said that no one's going to
4	suggest that she intentionally hurt him.
5	MR. ROGERS: He said she didn't hurt him on purpose
6	MR. EGLET: I said no one's
7	MR. ROGERS: presuming
8	MR. EGLET: I said no one's going to
9	MR. ROGERS: the jury
10	MR. EGLET: I said no one is going to say that she hurt
11	him on purpose is what I said.
12	THE COURT: That's what I that's what I recollect.
13	MR. ROGERS: I heard that he said that Mrs. Rish didn't
14	hurt the Plaintiff on purpose.
15	MR. EGLET: I said
16	MR. ROGERS: He has suggested
17	MR. EGLET: no one is going to say
18	MR. ROGERS: over and over that cause is more or less
19	presumed. This
20	THE COURT: Overruled the objection. Let's proceed.
21	[Bench Conference Ends]
22	MR. EGLET: No one is going to suggest that Mrs. Rish
23	hurt Mr. Simao on purpose. Do each of you raise your hand
24	understand the difference between intentional act and
25	negligence? Okay. You have just these three.

PROSPECTIVE JUROR: Oh.

MR. EGLET: We already --

PROSPECTIVE JUROR: Sorry.

MR. EGLET: Confuse me if other hands start to go up.

Do any of the three of you feel like that you wouldn't be able to hold a Defendant in a personal injury lawsuit responsible if they didn't do the act on purpose, it was just negligence? Anybody feel that way? Okay.

Did you hear the discussion I had a few minutes ago about the issue of jury nullification and that you must follow the rules that the judge gives you, even if you disagree, you know? And chances are -- not necessarily you three -- but chances are there's going to be some people who are going to disagree with at least one or two of the instructions or the laws. Even if you disagree with them, are you still going to follow those laws?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR: Yes.

MR. EGLET: Okay. You heard me go through the discussion with the jury regarding decision-making standards and how, you know, sure different people like to be when they make their decisions. And so the question is to each of you: How sure do you have to be when you have to make a decision that -- a very important decision, and it could affect the life or welfare of other people?

Ms. Frehner?

1	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 403: Of other people?
2	MR. EGLET: Yeah.
3	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 403: I would have to be 100
4	percent sure.
5	MR, EGLET: Ms. Jones?
6	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 395: I'd want to be pretty sure.
7	MR. EGLET: You'd like to be pretty sure?
8	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 395: Uh-huh.
9	MR. EGLET: And Ms. Parrette?
10	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 389: I think I'd want to be at
11	least 70 percent sure.
12	MR. EGLET: Okay. Now and you heard the follow-up
13	questions. I told the jury that you're going to be told in
14	this type of case that you're going to that you will make
1 5	your decisions based on just more likely than not, that that's
16	the standard that you will have to apply. That's the
17	instruction that you'll get in every decision that you have to
18	make as a jury juror in this case.
19	And so Ms. Jones, can you do that? Yes?
20	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 395: Yes.
21	MR. EGLET: Ms. Parrette, can you do that?
22	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 389: Yes.
23	MR. EGLET: And Ms. Frehner, can you do that?
24	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 389: Yes.
25	MR. EGLET: Okay. I talked to the panel a few minutes

ago about the subject of when making a decision -- the jury making the decision of how much money should be put in the verdict form, that some folks think you should just consider the amount of harms and losses that the injured party has and put the amount -- right amount of money in there to balance those harms and losses, and other folks think you should consider other things like, you know, how much sympathy you have for the injured party, how much sympathy you have for the Defendant, whether you think the Defendant is able to pay that amount of money, whether it might make prices go up, insurance rate go up, or affect other factors other than the people in this courtroom.

Ms. Jones, which are you closer to, just the harms and losses, or do you think that you ought to consider all those other things?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 395: Well, I mean we're human. We're going to -- you know, we're going to think about the other things as well. But I mean what we actually have to do is we have to weigh the losses, you know. It's kind of like with -- you know, I'm a scientific kind of thought process type person. So, you know, if you are testing something and you only have three variables, then, you know, you have to, you know, look at the outcome on those three variables [indiscernible]. So I mean some -- I mean in a perfect world, you know, that -- that's great, but, you know, sometimes there

1	are there are grey areas as well.
2	MR. EGLET: That's a very good analysis, very, very good.
3	So you would you would be able to do it just on the harms
4	and losses if
5	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 395: I think I would.
6	MR. EGLET: that's what you're told, because that's
7	what you're going to everybody agrees that that's what
8	[indiscernible]?
9	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 395: Yes.
10	MR. EGLET: Ms. Frehner?
11	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 403: I don't think I could do
12	that. I just I couldn't put the Defendant's just what
13	would happen to them out of my mind. I couldn't I don't
14	think I could just think about harms and losses because just
15	growing up, that's how I was raised, to think of both sides
16	MR. EGLET: Uh-huh.
17	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 403: to [indiscernible] people.
18	So I don't think I could.
ا 9	MR. EGLET: And even if the you're told that that's
20	how we everybody here expects
21	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 403: Uh-huh.
22	MR. EGLET: you to make your decision and the judge is
23	going to instruct you that that's how you have to make a
4	decision
5	PROSPECTIVE TUPOR NO 403. T - it would be meetly hand

1	I don't know that I could.
2	MR. EGLET: Okay. You can't commit to us that you would?
3	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 403: Right.
4	MR. EGLET: Ms. Parrette?
5	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 389: I think I could do it on
6	harms and losses.
7	MR. EGLET: You'd be able to do it just on the harms and
8	losses?
9	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 389: Yes.
10	MR. EGLET: Okay. Do any of the three of you know anyone
11	who has had a neck surgery? Raise your hand. Okay. Or a
12	spine surgery of any kind, raise your hand.
13	Ms. Jones.
14	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 395: My aunt.
15	MR. EGLET: Your aunt?
16	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 395: Uh-huh.
17	MR. EGLET: And in her low back, mid-back or
18	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 395: She actually had a piece of
19	her tailbone that broke out.
20	MR. EGLET: Okay.
21	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 395: [Indiscernible] and was
22	pressing on some nerves.
23	MR. EGLET: Is she doing okay now?
24	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 395: Uh-huh.
25	MR. EGLET: Okay. Any of the three of you have other

All right.

than the normal understanding but any specialized
understanding about MRIs? Raise your hand. Or discography or
discograms? Raise your hand. Or spine surgery? Raise your
hands. Okay.
Court's indulgence for a moment, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Sure.
MR. EGLET: Ms. Jones, in your jury questionnaire you
indicated that you knew Gary R. Skoog, Ph.D.
PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 395: No.
MR. EGLET: Do you recall that?
PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 395: No. [Indiscernible].
MR. EGLET: Can we have that jury questionnaire?
UNIDENTIFIED FEMALE: She doesn't know him.
UNIDENTIFIED FEMALE 2: No, doesn't know him.

17 THE COURT: Sure.

MR. EGLET: Okay. Your Honor, may we approach?

Court's indulgence, on moment, Your Honor.

MR. EGLET: You don't know him? Okay.

THE COURT: Yes.

[Bench Conference Begins]

MR. EGLET: Your Honor, at this time I'd like to make a motion to excuse juror in seat number 22, Cayla Frehner, based on the fact that she's indicated she wouldn't be able to follow the law on considering only harms and losses and she would consider outside factors.

1	THE COURT: Mr. Rogers?
2	MR. ROGERS: I'd simply make the same objections I have
3	before about rehabilitation.
4	THE COURT: Noted for the record. The motion is granted.
5	[Bench Conference Ended]
6	THE COURT: At this time the Court would like to thank
7	and excuse Ms. Frehner. Please return to jury services.
8	We need a replacement for seat number 22, please.
9	THE CLERK: Gustavo Miranda, badge number 1404.
10	THE COURT: Bet you didn't think we'd get to you, Mr.
11	Miranda.
12	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 404: No. I know. It's Miranda.
13	THE COURT: Miranda?
14	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 404: Yeah.
15	THE COURT: Okay. Whenever you're ready, Mr. Eglet.
16	MR. EGLET: [Indiscernible] I apologize. [indiscernible]
17	get this far.
18	Let me run through these questions real quickly. I
19	know you've probably got them memorized you heard them so many
20	times.
21	What's your date of birth?
22	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 404: November 10th, 1978.
23	MR. EGLET: Ever been known by any other names?
24	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 404: Rick.
25	MR. EGLET: Okay. How often do you wash our car?

1	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 404: Once or twice a month.
2	MR. EGLET: You work at the Aria Hotel and Casino as a
3	warehouse attendant?
4	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 404: Correct.
5	MR. EGLET: Okay. What makes you good at your job?
6	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 404: Good customer service skills
7	and attention to detail.
8	MR. EGLET: Where did you work before the Aria opened up?
9	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 404: Arajo [phonetic].
10	MR. EGLET: And the same type of position?
11	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 404: I was a runner for Arajo
12	also.
13	MR. EGLET: Very good. And what did you want to be when
14	you were in high school?
15	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 404: Top gun pilot.
16	MR. EGLET: [Indiscernible] my father. But he was a fire
17	Navy fighter pilot. He was an airline pilot.
18	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 404: Okay.
19	MR. EGLET: And why didn't you go that route?
20	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 404: [Indiscernible] the Air
21	Force. Was focused more on graduating high school and
22	[indiscernible].
23	MR. EGLET: What are your five-year goals?
24	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 404: Travel more and start a
25	family.

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MR. EGLET: Are you -- you're single right now, right?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 404: Yeah.

MR. EGLET: Okay. The -- any clubs or organizations you belong to?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 404: I thought about this one, LVAC, Las Vegas Athletic Club.

MR. EGLET: Okay. Like to work out?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 404: Yes, I do.

MR. EGLET: All right. What are the two most important values that you hold?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 404: Integrity and being good to others.

MR. EGLET: And can you tell us, is there situations you think you're regarded as a leader?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 404: I'm the oldest in my family.

I have three sisters, younger sisters, so they look up to me a lot.

MR. EGLET: Your sisters don't boss you around? Usually younger sisters boss their older brothers around.

PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 404: No, not too much.

MR. EGLET: Okay. All right.

PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 404: [Indiscernible].

MR. EGLET: Okay. If someone offers to send money to your favorite charity, what's that?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 404: Make a Wish Foundation.

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1	MR. EGLET: Why the Make a Wish Foundation?
2	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 404: Because they like a lot of,
3	you know, younger kids [indiscernible], you know, bring some
4	happiness to them.
5	MR. EGLET: Okay. Worst tragedy you've ever had to go
6	through?
7	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 404: My brother died in a car
8	accident.
9	MR. EGLET: How long ago was that?
10	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 404: 1992.
11	MR. EGLET: And how old were you?
12	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 404: Thirteen.
13	MR. EGLET: How old was your brother?
14	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 404: Seventeen.
15	MR. EGLET: Okay. And was it a single car accident or
16	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 404: Uh-huh.
17	MR. EGLET: He was driving or a passenger?
18	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 404: He was driving by himself.
19	Fell asleep.
20	MR. EGLET: [Indiscernible]. Fell asleep. I'm sorry.
21	When you hear someone has been hurt or killed or
22	become ill, how often do you think that well, it probably
23	happened to them because of something they did earlier in
24	their life, something bad they did? No?
25	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 404: No.

1	MR. EGLET: Some people think that if a person is injured
2	or killed that it's fate, destiny, God's will, even if it was
3	because of the negligence of someone else, that they shouldn't
4	sue because it would have happened anyway. Do you agree with
5	that?
6	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO, 404: [No audible response]
7	MR. EGLET: Who's the public figure you admire most?
8	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 404: Teachers [indiscernible].
9	MR. EGLET: [Indiscernible].
10	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 404: Teachers.
11	MR. EGLET: Teachers is kind of a career.
12	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 404: Oh.
13	MR. EGLET: Can you tell me a specific person?
14	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 404: I'll go with [indiscernible]
15	person [indiscernible].
16	MR. EGLET: Very good. The hypothetical I gave all the
17	other panel members about a juror out in the hall saying, "My
18	knee hurts," would you have any reason initially to
19	disbelieve?
20	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 404: No.
21	MR. EGLET: A party on the stand under oath says, "My
22	knee hurts." Are you going to believe them initially until
23	some truth comes and shows that they're
24	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 404: Yeah, I'd believe them, uh-

huh.

1	MR. EGLET: Okay. You believe in personal
2	responsibility?
- 3	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 404: Yes.
4	MR. EGLET: Do you believe in accountability?
	-
5	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 404: Yes.
6	MR. EGLET: Okay. The subject of lawsuit reform that
7	we've been talking about, the McDonald's hot coffee, the thumb
8	in the chili case, and jackpot justice, frivolous lawsuits,
9	whether there should be caps on damages, how do you feel about
LO	all that?
L1	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 404: I don't think there should be
L 2	caps.
L3	MR. EGLET: What's your thought on this idea of
L 4	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 404: There's
١5	MR. EGLET: frivolous lawsuits?
.6	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 404: Yeah, there's lawsuits out
١7	there, you know, [indiscernible]. It's case-by-case.
.8	MR. EGLET: Case-by-case. Okay. Would you be
.9	comfortable being on a jury that was asked to place in the
20	verdict form in excess of \$2 million even if that was
21	justified by the evidence?
22	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 404: I would.
23	MR. EGLET: You'd feel okay with that?
24	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 404: [Indiscernible]
25	MR. EGLET: Okay. All right. The fact no one's going to

1	claim that Ms. Rish hurt Mr. Simao on purpose, it's a claim					
2	called negligence, did you hear my kind of hypothetical					
3	[indiscernible] negligence intentionally?					
4	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 404: Yeah.					
5	MR. EGLET: Do you have a problem requiring the Defendant					
6	to compensate the Plaintiff even if the Defendant were just					
7	negligent?					
8	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 404: No.					
9	MR. EGLET: Okay. Did you hear the discussion about jury					
10	nullification?					
11	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 404: Yes.					
12	MR. EGLET: Do you understand the judge is going to					
13	decide the law and give you those instructions, and you agree					
14	to follow that law					
15	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 404: Yes.					
16	MR. EGLET: even if you disagree with i?					
17	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 404: Yes.					
18	MR. EGLET: Okay. You heard the discussion I had					
19	regarding the decision-making standard. How sure do you have					
20	to be before you make a decision that's going to have a effect					
21	on other people?					
22	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 404: About 80 percent.					
23	MR. EGLET: Okay. In this type of case everyone agrees,					
24	and the judge will tell you that you'll base your decisions on					

just the more-likely-than-not standard, just tip the scales.

1	Will you be able to do that
2	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 404:
3	MR. EGLET: if that's what you're instructed to do?
4	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 404: Yes.
5	MR. EGLET: Okay. The discussion I had with the other
6	panel members about some folks think when you decide how much
7	money should go in the verdict form for the injured party that
8	you should only consider the harms and losses that party has
9	and put it up in there and balance those harms and losses, and
10	other folks think you should consider other things like how
11	sorry you feel for the injured party, how sorry you feel for
12	the for the Defendant, whether the Defendant can afford to
13	pay, whether it's going to drive insurance rates up, the cost
14	of business products and things like that. Which do you
15	which category do you fall into?
16	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 404: Harms and losses.
17	MR. EGLET: All right. Just the harms and losses?
18	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 404: Yeah. [indiscernible]
19	MR. EGLET: If you're instructed that that's all you can
20	consider, you will do that?
21	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 404: Yeah.
22	MR. EGLET: Okay. Do you know anyone who's ever had to
23	have a neck surgery or spine surgery?
24	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 404: No.
25	MR. EGLET: Okay. Do you have any more than ordinary

1	familiarity with MRIs?					
2	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 404: No.					
3	MR. EGLET: Or discography or discogram?					
4	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 404: No.					
5	MR. EGLET: Or spine surgery?					
6	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 404: No.					
7	MR. EGLET: Okay. [indiscernible]					
8	Okay. I'm going to go through very quickly and I'm going					
9	to ask two questions of all of you, and I just kind of what a					
10	quick, brief answer. And the two questions are this, I'm					
11	going to ask each of you this. What is there about you that					
12	might help you being a juror in a case like this other than					
13	your ability to be fair and listen to both sides? And the					
14	second question I'm going to ask you is whether what is					
15	there about you that you think might make it just a little					
16	hard for you to be a juror in a case like this?					
17	So Ms. Dearing, what is there about you that might					
18	help you being a juror in a case like this?					
19	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 841: [Indiscernible]					
20	MR. EGLET: Okay.					
21	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 841: [Indiscernible] make					
22	decisions right away. I'm patient.					
23	MR. EGLET: Okay. And what about what do you think					
24	what is there about you that you might think it may be					
25	it'll make it a little bit hard for you to be a juror in a					

1	case like this?
2	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 841: Honestly, sometimes I'm a
3	little slow. That's how I think I am.
4	MR. EGLET: Okay.
5	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 841: I mean I'm not
6	MR. EGLET: No, I understand.
7	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 841: You know.
8	MR. EGLET: My wife tells me I'm slow [indiscernible].
9	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 841: Okay.
10	MR. EGLET: Mr. Daniels, what is there about you that you
11	think might help you be a juror in a case like this?
12	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 338: I usually weigh things and
13	listen carefully.
14	MR. EGLET: Okay.
15	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 338: I'm thoughtful.
16	MR. EGLET: All right. And what about you do you think
17	will make it hard for you to be a juror in a case like this?
18	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 338: I like to I like to move
19	forward fast. I like to, you know, get things done.
20	[indiscernible] something that I know is, you know, in the
21	right direction, I just want to move along instead of, you
22	know [indiscernible] I want to move forward.
23	MR. EGLET: Ms. Kistler, do you remember the first
24	question I asked?
25	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 884: Yeah. I think it's because

1	I'm patient and I can I can see both sides of a question.
2	MR. EGLET; Okay.
3	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 884: And the part that might
4	hinder me is like him. I prefer something at a little faster
5	pace.
6	MR. EGLET: Okay. You're probably real frustrated with
7	me, right? A little?
8	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 884: Well, I understand every time
9	you select someone knew you have to start all over again
10	[indiscernible] everything up, but it's like
11	MR. EGLET: Takes some time.
12	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 884: Yeah.
13	MR. EGLET: And I remember, I warned you that this
14	would be the longest part of the
15	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 884: Yes.
16	MR. EGLET: case, the very beginning.
17	Ms Mr. Aquino, do you remember the first
18	question?
19	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 884: Yes. Well, based on the
20	question being that [indiscernible]
21	MR. EGLET: You've got experience in this being a
22	[indiscernible] professional, okay. All right. And then what
23	about what do you think would make it hard for you
24	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 883: Just my schedule.
25	MR. EGLET: Just your schedule. All right.

1	Ms. [indiscernible], what would help you?						
2	PROSPECTIVE JUROR: Understand the details.						
3	MR. EGLET: Okay.						
4	PROSPECTIVE JUROR: Other than that, I think what would						
5	hurt me is actually these chairs. They're very uncomfortable.						
6	[indiscernible] the whole time so that's						
7	MR. EGLET: I know.						
8	PROSPECTIVE JUROR: that's about it. I have long						
9	legs, I'm hanging, so						
10	MR. EGLET: Yeah.						
11	PROSPECTIVE JUROR: that's the						
12	MR. EGLET: I think I think they have these footrests						
13	they can give you.						
14	PROSPECTIVE JUROR: I gave her one because she was just						
15	dangling, but						
16	MR. EGLET: I also think that the bailiff [indiscernible]						
17	going to raise						
18	PROSPECTIVE JUROR: Oh.						
19	MR. EGLET: and lower those chairs too so they						
20	don't raise and lower? My mistake. Okay. Special order.						
21	Special order.						
22	Ms. Parrette, what will help you in your						
23	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 389: My objectivity.						
24	MR. EGLET: I'm sorry?						
25	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 389: My objectivity.						

MR.	EGLET:	Okay
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PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 389: I'm very objective when I make decisions. And what would probably hurt me is empathy.

MR. EGLET: Okay. All right.

Same question, Ms. Nolte.

PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 903: I like to feel I have an open mind.

MR. EGLET: All right. And what do you think will make hard -- what will make it hard for you?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 903: I think with everybody else, the slow pace of this.

MR. EGLET: Okay. It's going to pick up after this, I promise.

Mr. Doty?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 905: My objectiveness, you know, ability to just, you know, weigh everything out, be objective, not get too wrapped up in anything. And my weakness would probably be kind of like her, for example, empathy, a forgiving nature at the same time.

MR. EGLET: All right.

Ms. Lewis?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 354: Well, I would say what they've said. I'm always [indiscernible]. One side [indiscernible] I don't hear the other side, so I'm [indiscernible] and empathy.

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1	MR. EGLET: Okay. And Mr. Briese?
2	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 388: Yeah, I like what she said.
3	Basically the variables on both sides, you've got to look at
4	what the defense is doing and what the offense is doing.
5	Basically you're the offense. The defense has another game
6	plan.
7	MR. EGLET: Are you implying that I'm offensive?
8	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 388: Yeah. I'm not saying you're
9	like Glen Lerner but but then again, I hear the money
10	train. My opinion is that, you know
11	MR. EGLET: I have told you I've heard everything. I
12	hadn't heard that.
13	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 388: You haven't made a commercial
14	with chasing
15	MR. EGLET: No, I don't
16	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 388: an ambulance
17	MR. EGLET: I don't-
18	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 388: yet either.
19	MR. EGLET: I don't do that.
20	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 388: And the other part would be
21	like the other jurors said, the empathy for the
22	MR. EGLET: Mr Ms. Rosinski?
23	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 918: I same with everybody. I
24	want to be objective with everyone, both sides, and I am very,
25	very sensitive for both parties.

L	MR.	EGLET:	Okay.	All	right

Ms. Frey, what do you think about -- what is it about yourself that helps you be a juror in a case like this?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 060: I'm pretty fair. I like to hear both sides and see -- figure out from there. You know, hearing both sides.

MR. EGLET: But remember the question. Other than the ability to be fair and listen --

PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 060: Oh.

MR. EGLET: -- to both sides?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 060: I'm a good listener. The same as them, being objective, listening to just the facts.

MR. EGLET: Okay. And what is there about you that would make it a little hard for you to be a juror in a case like --

PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 060: Caring about other people, about their feelings not --

MR. EGLET: Okay. All right.

Ms. Smith?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 925: I'm fact-oriented, so I like to know the facts and [indiscernible] both sides. And then --

MR. EGLET: What would make it hard for you? What about you --

PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 925: I think -- I've never done this before, so I'm only imagining that when we go back in the room and we're talking, I speak low and it's hard for people

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1	like when I try to talk they talk over me. So I want to
2	make sure that I am heard.
3	MR. EGLET: Assertive?
4	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 925: Yes.
5	MR. EGLET: All right. Very good.
6	Ms. Prince?
7	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 928: I think my attention to
8	detail would help me, and the ability to weigh the facts on
9	both sides. And like the other gentleman, I once I have
10	the facts and I know what my decision is, I kind of like to
11	let it be known so
12	MR. EGLET: Get there.
13	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 928: Yeah.
14	MR. EGLET: Get to the end.
15	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 928: Yeah.
16	MR. EGLET: Okay. All right.
17	Ms. Kunkel, what about yourself will make it do
18	you think will help you being a juror in a case
19	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 051: I told you I was a good
20	listener earlier.
21	MR. EGLET: Okay.
22	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 051: And I pay a lot of attention
23	to detail. I drive my husband insane with that. So I think
24	that would help me. On the other hand, I like to believe I
25	have a good heart, so the compassion part is where I believe

1	would	be	the	hard	part	•
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MR. EGLET: All right.

Mr. Barrett, what about you will help you be -PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 943: I'd say my ability to reason.

I think I [indiscernible] quite a lot. I can't talk very
well. Sorry about that.

thinking make -- you think would make it hard for you to be -PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 943: I tend to be kind of a
natural -- a natural skeptic. I think I'm open-minded, but I

That's okay. What is there about you

11 | tend to see all sides.

MR. EGLET:

MR. EGLET: Okay. Ms. Bell, what is it about you that you think will help you in being a juror in a case like this?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 953: The ability to be -- to have

a sense of wait and see, to weigh all the evidence before us.

16 MR. EGLET: Uh-huh. All right.

PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 953: But on the flipside of that,

I think that I would be a deep thinker, you know, as far as

the -- want to get it finished, you know, to hurry up so it

goes -- the process, to speed along with it.

MR. EGLET: Sure. Understood.

Mr. Johnson, what about yourself do you think will help you be a juror in a case like this?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 956: I don't like to jump to conclusions. I like to take my time. But because I like to

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1	take my time, I tend to overthink the situation.
2	MR. EGLET: So you think the overthinking, is that what
3	you're saying, that that would make it difficult for you?
4	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 956: A little.
5	MR. EGLET: Okay. Ms. Hubbert?
6	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 293: I have to agree with them.
7	I'm too slow sometimes. I mean not but when I think, I
8	like to take my time, and I'm not a lot of people would
9	probably get really upset with me because I don't want to jump
10	the gun and hurry things along too fast.
11	MR. EGLET: Ms. Manful, what about yourself do you think
12	would help you be a juror in a case like this?
13	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 963: Well, I've served on a jury
14	before.
15	MR. EGLET: Have you? Okay.
16	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 963: Yes. And was able to come to
17	a decision
18	MR. EGLET: Okay.
19	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 963: although it was very
20	difficult. So and the hardest part is I have empathy for
21	all parties.
22	MR. EGLET: Ms. Jones, what about you?
23	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 395: My attention to detail, you
24	know, becoming what I do, I'm a very good listener. And
25	keeping an open mind. And again, I would say as a negative,

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it would probably be empathy.
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MR. EGLET: Empathy. Okay.

Okay. Mr. Miranda, what is it about yourself do you think would help you being a juror on a case like this?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 404: Help me would be attention to detail and being able to, you know, [indiscernible] looking at

MR. EGLET: What do you think would make -- about yourself would make it harder for you to be a juror in a case like this?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 404: Like somebody else said, when you go to the back, and I don't like to, you know, follow everybody just because they all want to go one way, you know. They all want to get it over with. I don't like to pull the gun. I like to argue about it. Make sure everything's right.

MR. EGLET: You like to deliberate.

PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 404: Yeah, yeah.

MR. EGLET: Okay. All right.

PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 404: And another fact is, just being honest, the Defendant, she kind of looks like she could be related to my mom or somebody.

MR. EGLET: So that can cause you to be a little -PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 404: Yeah. Because every time -yeah.

MR. EGLET: Yeah, sure. Understood.

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PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 404: I'm totally being honest.

MR. EGLET: No, absolutely.

Ms. [indiscernible].

PROSPECTIVE JUROR: I think because I know nothing about suing anybody, I think that's what would be good. On the other side, I'm very emotional and very sensitive. I think that could hurt.

MR. EGLET: Okay.

And Ms. Zwefel? Zweifel, sorry.

PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 002: My attention to detail. And I, compassionate.

MR. EGLET: Okay. All right.

Raise your hand -- raise your hand if there's anything that you think we should know about you that I haven't asked you about yet, that I haven't probed with you, you think would be important for either side to know before we make our decision on which of you out of this group is going to sit on this jury? Is there anything else about yourself that you're thinking, gees, if I was in Mr. Eglet's position or if I was in Mr. Rogers' position, or their client's position, I would want to know this about me? Raise your hand if there's something that we haven't covered. Most of the time -- you're not in the box yet so --

PROSPECTIVE JUROR: Oh, okay. No disrespect to the Court. I've got to pee real bad.

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THE COURT: Too much information. Go right ahead, sir.

MR. EGLET: [Indiscernible] when we get to this stage nobody raises their hand, so that means hopefully I've done my job with you.

All right. I've got one more area to talk to you about and it involves four questions, and they're group questions, so pretty easy, and we're going to be done, okay?

As jurors, you have certain rights as jurors, and we want to make sure that each of you are willing to exercise those rights.

The first right you have as a juror is you have the right to see and hear all the testimony, to see all the exhibits that are displayed and hear all the testimony. Everybody understand that? So if you do not or cannot see an exhibit or you cannot hear the testimony of the witness or the question of the attorney asking the witness, will each of you agree to raise your hand, notify Deputy Diamond of the situation so we can rectify that? Everybody who's willing to do that, raise their hand. Okay. Very good. Thank you.

The second right you have as jurors is you have the right to ask questions of witnesses, as jurors, okay.

PROSPECTIVE JUROR: Yeah.

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MR. EGLET: You get to ask questions now. And it's a good thing, because I will tell you that none of us are -- none of the lawyers in here or so presumptuous to think that

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we know every single question to ask. We're not perfect. you get to ask questions. You have to wait till we're done, and there's a procedure the judge will tell you on how to do You have to submit them in writing to the bailiff, and she'll explain that to you. And then she'll make the -- the judge will make the ultimate decision on whether she asks the question. And she may not ask the question because of some procedural thing or it's not appropriate or it's not the appropriate question for this witness or it's going to be covered by another witness later. If your -- if you do a written question and it doesn't get asked, don't be discouraged from not asking any more questions. But if you have a question you feel is important and it hasn't been asked by the attorneys -- and the judge will ask you when we're done asking questions, "Is there any questions from the jury?" and the bailiff will collect them up there. Is everybody here willing to do that, write those questions down? If you are, raise your hand. It's important you participate in this project, in this trial, and we want you to participate. interested in what you have to say and questions you want answered. We don't always think of every question, believe me.

All right. Now, the third right you have is you have the right to know and understand the law. As I told you, at the end of the evidence in this case the judge is going to

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read to you and she's going to provide you written instructions. You have the right not only to get those instructions and have them read to you and read them yourself, but you have the right to understand them. If you don't understand one of those written instructions, you can send a note to the bailiff from the deliberation room who -- he'll notify the judge that you need an explanation of the law on one of those instructions if you don't understand it. It's important to all of us that you understand the law. Is everybody willing to do that, if they don't understand the law or a written an instructions, one of the rules, will they do that? Raise your hand if you're willing to do that. All right. Everybody. Thank you.

Finally, the last right you have as a juror is each of you have the right to not only follow the law, but insist that your fellow jurors follow the law. So if you're back in the deliberation rooms -- deliberation room and one of your fellow jurors says, "I don't care that that's the law. I don't agree with that. I'm not going to do that," you have the right to insist that they abide by their oath and follow the law. And if they still refuse, you have the right to notify the bailiff who will get the judge. Is everybody here willing to do that if that occurs in the deliberation room? Raise your hand. All right. Thank you.

Believe it or not, ladies and gentlemen, I'm

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finished. Thank you.

Your Honor, Plaintiffs pass this panel for cause.

THE COURT: Very well. Let's take about a five-minute break, shall we, Mr. Rogers --

MR. ROGERS: Sure.

THE COURT: -- before you're examined by Mr. Rogers.

Remind you of your duty not to discuss this case.

[Recess]

[Prospective Jury In]

THE MARSHAL: Please remain seated. This court is back in session.

THE COURT: Whenever you're ready Mr. Rogers.

MR. ROGERS: Thank you, Your Honor.

Why I am I grateful? I'm grateful that Jenny Rish, now, gets to participate. And it's not -- I'm humbled by my responsibility to her, to ensure that she gets a fair trial. I'm mindful of your responsibility. It's a hard thing to stand in judgment of another person and I don't take that lightly. And really judgment is what this part of the proceeding is all about. The only real question is: Does anyone bring any prejudgment, because that would be the one thing that would ensure that no one here would get a fair trial.

And you've been examples, by plaintiff's counsel, of prejudgments. They've talked about frivolous lawsuits and

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things like that. There are countless variations. An easy example for me would be that I have young children and if I were asked to sit in a jury where, if someone injured a child, I like most of you would say I'm not sure. I'm not sure I'm the right guy for this one, because it's a little close to home. And so let's focus on this prejudgment issue.

To begin with, is there anybody here, just by a show of hands, who have the perception, after all these days, that the plaintiff was injured in a car accident? Just raise your hand if that's your perception of this case. Okay.

Is there anybody here who has the perception that this is a case worth over a million dollars? Just raise your hand if that's the perception that you've gotten so far.

Okay.

I want to go with each one of you -- and obviously,

I'm not going to go, but a fraction as long as the questions

so far. But I do want to get a moment with each one of you to

discuss this perceptions and its effect on your being able to

be impartial. Okay.

Mrs. Dearing, if you would, the first question was:

Did you have a perception, given what's been discussed over

the past few days that someone has been injured -- I'm going

to sit down if that's okay you guys -- and tell me about that

perception: How you got it and what it is.

PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 0841: Yes, just because he kept

talking	about	it	and	а	similar	case.
Caining	about	1 C	and	4	0 1111 1 0 1	Cape.

MR, ROGERS: All right.

PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 0841: Okay.

MR. ROGERS: Okay. Okay. So saying it enough can create the perception; is that what happened?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 0841: Yes

MR. ROGERS: And what about that second question, whether there's an idea in your head, already, that this case has a given value?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 0841: Excuse me?

MR. ROGERS: Yeah, I might not have been very clear.

I asked whether you had a perception, of any kind, any idea in your head that this was a case worth one or two million dollars.

PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 0841: Yes, because he asked if we had any problem with that decision of money.

MR. ROGERS: Okay. Now, I'm going to go down the line and it'll be the same two questions, just so that we can go through as fast as we can. And I -- actually, I want to add a third one to it and we'll make it that much faster. The third one is, if you think in any way that this discussion has affected your ability to come to this case without any judgment, without any leaning one way or the other on who's right and who's wrong. So if you would answer that third question.

1	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 0841: If I have any
2	MR. ROGERS: Right. Has this perception that you've
3	gotten
4	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 0841: Oh.
5	MR. ROGERS: over the past few days affected your
6	ability to be impartial and to judge this case?
7	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 0841: No.
8	MR. ROGERS: Okay. Very good. All right.
9	Mr. Daniels, same questions: The perceptions about was
10	the plaintiff injured; and is there a value to the case; and
11	have these perceptions affected your ability to be impartial?
12	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 1338: When we talk about motor
13	vehicle accidents, my assumption of that, and it's been
14	mentioned a few times, so this case has to be about Mr. Simao
15	in a motor vehicle accident.
16	MR. ROGERS: All right.
17	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 1338: And as far as perception of,
18	if there is a value placed on it, no, I do not any
19	preconceived notion as of that. So
20	MR. ROGERS: Okay. The discussion about money didn't
21	have any effect on your understanding of what this case is
22	about?
23	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 1338: As far as high value on it,
24	no.
25	MR. ROGERS: But what about as far as low value?

1.	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 1338: No, I've got no perception
2	of the value.
3	MR. ROGERS: Okay. No value is the way you are walking
4	in?
5	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 1338: Uh-huh.
6	MR. ROGERS: Okay. Very good. All right.
7	Mrs. Kistler.
8	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 0864: Hi.
9	MR. ROGERS: Same questions.
10	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 0864: Oh, the same questions.
11	Someone being injured, yes. How, no, not really, because he
12	- you can use any kind of scenario of, maybe, something that's
13	a way from it, so I never really thought that this was
14	definitely an automobile accident, but there's definitely an
15	injury somehow.
16	Do I have any pre-conceptions about amount, yes. How,
17	the questionnaire, number one. The questionnaire had it right
18	on there.
19	Am I able to judge or be able to come up with an amount
20	that's less or more; am I set on a set amount, no. I have no
21	pre-conceptions about that.
22	MR. ROGERS: Now, has this sense that the plaintiff was
23	hurt affected your ability to be impartial when you're called
24	upon to enter a judgment on the question, was the plaintiff?
25	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 0864: No.

1	MR. ROGERS: In other words, can you come into that
2	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 0864: That hasn't been proven yet,
3	so no.
4	MR. ROGERS: Okay.
5	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 0864: That hasn't been proven.
6	That's the only thing we're only here because that's what
7	the case is, that it hasn't been proven, whether or not
8	they've been injured or not.
9	MR. ROGERS: Okay.
10	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 0864: So no.
11	MR. ROGERS: Okay. Very good. All right.
12	Mr. Aquino, our medical expert.
13	PROSEPECTIVE JUROR NO. 1332: Regarding the first
14	question, yes. It seems like it was being addressed like a
15	car accident. The perception regarding the amount of a
16	million or two more and you know, I'm not really I'm not
17	really actually it's not actually clouding my judgment
18	as far as that that's concerned. Then regarding your third
19	question, sir
20	MR. ROGERS: I think you're last answer sort of did just
21	that.
22	PROSEPECTIVE JUROR NO. 1332: Oh, okay.
23	MR. ROGERS: Is this perception going to affect your
24	ability

PROSEPECTIVE JUROR NO. 1332:

MR.	. ROGERS	: tò rem	ain	well, I	guess,	unaffected	to
walk-in	with no	prejudgment	at al	1.			

PROSEPECTIVE JUROR NO. 1332: No, it won't.

MR. ROGERS: Okay. Very good.

Ms. Tatum.

prospective Juror No. 1036: Yes. When he was talking about the -- about my job and he was asking me certain questions about -- about learning about different accidents, that's why I assumed it must have been an accident that this whole thing was going on.

About the money situation, no, I don't think, you know -- I was -- I just thought he threw two million out there.

And can I come into this case open-minded throughout everything I listened to this whole week, yes.

MR. ROGERS: Okay. Good. All right.

Mrs. Parrette.

PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 1389: I think he opened with, that there was an accident on 215 and Cheyenne, so I assume that that is what it was.

And the money thing I think it's just, well, are we able to come to a conclusion if we side with plaintiff -- with plaintiff, so -- but it hasn't really affected my decision one way or the other and I have made no judgment about that.

MR. ROGERS: Okay. I think I get you. One thing I want to explore a little bit more is that question, though, of

injury. Do you have a perception, after all these -- do you have a perception after all of these days and all of these questions, that the plaintiff was injured in this car accident?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 1389: Yeah, I do have that perception. That's -- yes, because that's -- it seems all the questions are around that. And one can say they have three different perceptions that it's more with the spinal, because there's a lot of questions about that. So yes.

MR. ROGERS: Okay. And then let's go revisit that last question, prejudgment, again. If you have that understanding and you have now, I gather, for some time, can you still walk into this case completely impartial with no preconception or leaning on a question of, was the injury actually caused?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 1389: I think so, because -- just because one person says their view of the perception, that's doesn't mean that that is the truth or that I can't make up my mind up myself.

MR. ROGERS: All right. Very good.

And Ms. Nolte.

PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 0903: After coming in here, yes, I perceived that it was an auto accident and that's what a lot of the questions were directed for.

As for the dollar amount, it comes for three mill -it comes from -- going up as much of the two million, the

question on the two million. And because I came in here
not thinking of that kind of a dollar amount, that somebody g
after something like that or that big of a dollar amount. Bu
I can but I have an open mind as to what we can all agree
on as a jury as to what the figure should be, but I was just
little awestruck by that.

MR. ROGERS: Okay. And there's something you said there I want to follow-up on. And that is, what the figure would be and that brings me back to the same question I followed up on with Ms. Parrette, and that is, do you have the perception, after these days of questioning, that there is a figure that, in fact, is owed?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 0903: I do

MR. ROGERS: Okay.

PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 0903: I do have that perception.

MR. ROGERS: Well, and what -- what gave that to you?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 0903: I think just a lot of the questions that were asked of us, you know, about awarding for harm. That's --

20 MR. ROGERS: Okay, All right. Very good.

Mr. Doty, the same questions.

PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 0905: Yeah, like we said, I think that a lot of the statements that were stated, and all the answers to the questions, different various examples we were given, I perceived it was an auto accident and claiming to be

an injury from it.

From the questions I gathered, yeah, my initial impression, is that it might be an asking for an excessive of two million dollars.

Will that have an effect on my impartiality to the case, I don't -- not, it will not.

MR. ROGERS: Okay. Now, there have been some comments, on the back row, all the way back to you, and they are things like, you know, I've gotten the idea that injury was caused here and you've gotten that same idea.

PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 0905: Well, obviously that -- why else would we be here if that wasn't -- in my understanding, we wouldn't be here if that wasn't what was being claimed, and so, yeah, I've gotten that perception, but like everyone said before, but that doesn't necessary mean automatically that I believe being that that's the truth. So I have to be -- I have to see everything going on first before -- but I was -- yeah, we wouldn't be here if that wasn't the plaintiff's claim, that that accident caused his injuries.

MR. ROGERS: You know what, I think my question wasn't very clear, because your answer was right. It seems that my question was not. It's this: We are here because of a claim. The question is whether you, now, have a perception that injury was caused, not simply a claim that it caused.

PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 0905: Yeah, I think if there's

questions of the plaintiff's injuries and then my perception would be towards that, yeah.

MR. ROGERS: Okay.

PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 0905: If I'm understanding.

MR. ROGERS: I think you are, yeah. And that's really brings us to that final question, now, is if you have this perception that there was a car accident that caused injury, can you come to the table as a juror or judge -- which is what all of you are, you will be judges -- with no prejudgment about cause. Can you, now, sit on this case and decide, you know, we're going to have to decide whether injury was caused to him.

PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 0905: Yeah, absolutely.

MR. ROGERS: Okay. All right.

Mrs. Lewis.

PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 1354: Yes. Through everything I've heard, like they've said, we think that it's about a car accident on 215 and Cheyenne and thinking a lot about someone having an issue with a car accident. They were questioning a little bit more of that, so yeah, I think it was the car accident.

MR. ROGERS: Right.

PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 1354: Money amount -- amounts were thrown around. Of course, that's -- you think about that amount. Am I assuming that's the amount and stuff, no. I'm

waiting to hear what's going on and so forth.

As for, am I already thinking, yeah, the person -- that they were injured in the accident, again, I'll listen to you, give me the facts, and I'll make a decision from that.

MR. ROGERS: Okay. So this is something, then, that you can come to with no prejudgment?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 1354: Correct.

MR. ROGERS: Okay. Very good. All right.

And, Mr. William Cool Briese. That does have a flow.

PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 1388: Well, as what everybody had stated, the questionnaire was a dead giveaway. We are here for an accident case. We are here for a money judgment on the plaintiff. The counsel has already explained it's in the around ballpark figure of two million dollars. Like the woman said next to me, it was on Cheyenne and 215, I think it was. And I have no prejudgment or I'm not, basically, making my mind up before I walk in the courtroom, who's innocent, who's guilty. I'm open minded. Let's hear the testimony. Let's get on with it.

MR. ROGERS: Okay. So while the ideas have been presented, your judgment has not affected?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 1388: No, not --

MR. ROGERS: You can come into this thing with no judgment?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 1388: Clear mind. Clear

conscience.

MR. ROGERS: Okay. Very good.

Mrs. Rosinski.

prospective juror No. 0918: Yes, and they stated that the car accident was in '05, so, yes, therefore, I think that it was a car accident, that he was injured, and they talked about the two million or more, and to weigh the money amount. And does it have a judgment on me, no. No, it has no bearing on me. I can come with no judgment in mind, because I haven't heard the other story.

MR. ROGERS: Okay. I appreciate that. All right. And, Mrs. Frye.

PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 1050: I'm the same as everybody else. I know it's a car accident. I kind of figured that out, you know. I know that it's a multimillion dollar, they're asking for that. I know there's a claim that there might be an injury, but I don't have any proof or anything yet, so I have no judgment on either side. I want to see proof of everything.

MR. ROGERS: All right. Good.

And, Mrs. Smith.

PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 0928: Yes. The same thing, he had mentioned about car accidents. And the two million dollars, I believe he was just throwing out a figure. Would we be objectable -- objectionable to not award that? I don't care

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if it's \$10 or two million, it depends on the facts of the case. I have no perception or preconceived notion of what, you know, I'm going to go for or whatever. I have no idea. I don't know who's who, or who was hurt, I don't know what happened, so, you know --

MR. ROGERS: It's all theory right now.

PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 0928: Yeah, everyone is innocent until proven guilty, so I want to see the facts and, you know --

MR. ROGERS: Okay. Okay. Very good.

And, Ms. Prince.

PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 0928: Yeah, I'm -- from the statement, it said it was a car accident, 215 and Cheyenne. The money has no bearing on me. I have no preconceived notion of who's guilty, or who's not, or who's innocent, or who's not. I don't have any of the facts. So I would just into with an open mind.

MR. ROGERS: Okay. Very good.

And, Mrs. Kunkel or is it -- am I pronouncing it right?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 1051: Kunkel.

MR. ROGERS: Kunkel. Very good.

PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 1051: I also remember it being said about a car accident on the 215 and Cheyenne. The money, I remember him asking us a lot, if we would have a problem putting in a judgment for two million, or over two million,

for a judgment. I don't know if that's what they're asking.

I was just -- I'm thinking that's was him asking us our
opinion, if we would be able to do something like that. But
as far as, I don't know who -- if someone was hurt or if
someone wasn't hurt. I haven't heard any facts, I haven't
heard any testimony, and I don't know. So I'm able to listen
to evidence before I make a decision on anything.

MR. ROGERS: Okay. And even though this jury selection has gone on exceptionally long, you will be able to come to judgment, in this case, with a free and open mind and just base your decision on the evidence when it's presented?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 1051: Oh, absolutely.

MR. ROGERS: All right. Very good. Okay.

Mr. Barrett.

prospective juror No. 0943: Yes. I assume that it was an auto accident from the initial statement. And as far as the money amount, the two million dollar figure, I didn't necessarily apply to this case. It could be over or under. And as far as the parties are concerned, they're the same to me, right now, until I get the facts.

MR. ROGERS: Okay. Did you have any perception about whether injury was caused?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 0943: I assumed would be, at least, a claim to injury, but I don't know the facts. So -- MR. ROGERS: All right. Very good. Okay. And, you

1	know,	I have	two	names	written	down	for	you	and	Ι	believe	Bell
2	is th	e right	one									

PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 0953: It's Bell.

MR. ROGERS: All right. The same questions.

PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 0953: I gathered, from the statements, that the -- that that occurred at Cheyenne and the 215. And I -- the statements were made that, you know, we're here for a claim. No proof has -- no evidence has been put before us yet. So am I able to come to the table with no judgment, absolutely.

MR. ROGERS: Okay. And, again, let's just keep with this. We're nearly done. Mr. Johnson, all the questions about any perceptions that have been given.

prospective juror No. 0956: It seemed like it's a covered thing. All of the follow-up questions had to do with traffic reconstruction and things of that nature. But I don't know what happened. I don't know what's worth what. It could have to do with the blender exploded could be involved in this for all I know. So I can't put a dollar amount on any of that.

As far as preconceived notions, I work in retail, so everyone is [indiscernible].

MR. ROGERS: All right. I'm going to let that one hang and we'll come back. Okay.

And Mrs. Hubbert.

PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 1293: Yeah, as everyone said, from the first, he mentioned that there was an incident on 215 and Cheyenne, that the plaintiff was in a van, so I gathered it was a car accident. There's been a claim -- to me, there's a preconception that there may be an injury due to all the questioning regarding, if we were familiar with spinal injuries, or MRIs, and the list of doctors on the questionnaire. As for the money amount, I was a little iffy on it like someone else had mentioned that there was two different issues on the questionnaire, regarding if we would have an issue being on the jury about multimillion dollar And then, of course, here during questioning, I was lawsuit. thinking to myself, after you had asked that, I didn't raise my hand, and I thought, well, yeah, I should have raised my hand, because I do have preconceived notion that that's what they're going to ask for, at least something close to that. But as everyone else has mentioned, I come in here, there's no -- I don't know either person on either side, so I can't say -- I cannot have a preconceived notion that there's fault on either side, or on one side, or the other at this time. have to look at the evidence. None of that has been presented to any of us yet, so I can't come in here and make a judgment until we see it. That was longwinded. MR. ROGERS: All right. Okay.

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Mrs. Manful.

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PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 0963: Yes.

MR. ROGERS: Same questions.

prospective Juror No. 0963: So the only thing I see is that, apparently there was an accident and there's a claim for money for injury, but like -- you know, like she said, we haven't seen any evidence yet or anything that's like injuries. As far as the two million, I think that was a hypothetical question, so -- oh, would you be going in, or can you go in and vote on that. And I don't have any feelings one way or another. I to listen to the facts to make a decision.

MR. ROGERS: Okay. So when the number was presented, you didn't get the idea that a bar was being set?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 0963: No, I thought it was just like a hypothetical question: Would you have a problem being on a jury, you know, and possibly deciding on a settlement of two million dollars?

MR. ROGERS: Okay. Very good. Okay.

Ms. Jones.

PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 1395: As of right now, the only things that I know is, that there was a car accident; there's -- it's alleged that there's an injury. Whether or not there's an injury, whether or not there's -- it's a civil case, so that undoubtedly deciding someone feels that there's a monetary value. What that value is, or if there is -- if it's even merited that there is, you know, to be a cash award,

١	I don't know that. I haven't seen anything. I can't I
	can't make, you know I can't say that, you know, I am for
l	or against anybody right now. I don't have anything, nothing
l	has been given to me to make a decision.

MR. ROGERS: Okay. That is the very thing. You're named after one of the most famous legal cases ever.

PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 1404: That's right.

MR. ROGERS: So what is your answer to all these questions?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 1404: What's the three questions again?

MR. ROGERS: Yeah.

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PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 1404: Because --

MR. ROGERS: They can get lost and they do sort of dovetail in the end, really.

PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 1404: -- I am lost --

MR. ROGERS: It is: Given your role to come to this case with no prejudgment at all, has the past several days' exposure to these questions about two million dollars, about injury, about things like that, given you the perception that the plaintiff was injured and that this case has a value of two million dollars?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 1404: Yeah, there's a perception there that somebody got -- somebody was injured, the plaintiff was injured, with all the questions that are going on. Two

million o	dollars, I just figured that that was just a number
that was	thrown out there, you know, if it's under that or it
could be	like five or six million dollars, and that's not
going to	cloud my judgment.
MR.	ROGERS: All right. And then on the question of

MR. ROGERS: All right. And then on the question of judgment, can you set aside that perception, that you've been given, and come to this case with no judgment, at all, and just simply wait on the evidence?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 1404: Yeah.

MR. ROGERS: All right. Very good.

Ms. Ellis.

PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 1017: I kind of thought a car accident, but I think it has something to do with a carwash, and the two people in back of me, because they said they washed the car. That's my perception.

MR. ROGERS: No, I'm not getting into high school ambivalence.

PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 1017: No, no, no, no --

MR. ROGERS: -- or carwashes.

PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 1017: -- but I'm just saying, a car accident and had to do with a carwash and what --

MR. ROGERS: I got you.

PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 1017: Yeah. What was the point?

MR. ROGERS: Yeah. It's whether you have been given this perception, this idea, that, okay, we're here for an accident,

injury was caused, and there's about two million dollars.

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PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 1017: Yeah, I get -- like everybody else, yeah, I got that same perception with all the questions I asked, and they talked about frivolous, and money, and, you know, pain and suffering. So, yeah, I figured it obvious -- that there was a cranial injury and that it could be in excessive of two million. And it gave me -- when that two million came out, I'll be honest, I was like, you know, just -- and I said it earlier, it did -- I did think about that, and not just for the pain or the -- or not the -- I can't remember what I said now, my mind is all -- but for all I have to look at everything. Would it weigh my judgment, no, because I still have to listen to facts and that it presented that, you know, that is still important. But, yeah, right now I do have a perception. I don't know if that will cloud my judgment, as of -- I mean, I still have to listen to everything. But --

MR. ROGERS: So when you come into this case to begin with, you might bring some of that perception or prejudgment with --

PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 1017: I don't know if it's a prejudgment. I know it's a perception that I've gotten from, you know, all of this. I mean, I'm not judging anybody, but I do have a perception of what's going on and just -- I mean, does that mean -- I mean, are those two different things:

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     Perception of prejudging? I mean --
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                       Do you have the idea --
          MR. ROGERS:
          PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 1017: I mean --
3
4
          MR. ROGERS:
                       I'm trying to make it so --
5
          PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 1017: I don't want to get into a
6
     vocabulary lesson, but --
7
          MR. ROGERS: I'm trying to make it so, but the
     distinction is very small. If the perception is there, can it
9
     cloud your judgment, as you put it?
10
          PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 1017: No, I don't think so.
11
     mean, I think I'm still going to take facts.
                                                    I mean, facts
12
     are going to have weight, I think, than the perception that I
13
     have --
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          MR. ROGERS:
                       All right.
15
          PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 1017: -- once I hear, because I
16
     haven't heard any facts. I mean, I don't -- I'm not -- in my
17
     mind, I don't anybody who's innocent, or guilty, or any of
18
     that, but I just, you know, the money thing is just, for me, I
19
     don't know.
                  That's hard for me.
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MR. ROGERS: And what about cause of injury, can you put aside this perception of that, as well, and say, well, he's going to have to prove that he was actually injured, too?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 1017: Yes, it needs to be proven.

MR. ROGERS: I will mispronounce your name, but we -- I might give a stab at it, Zweifel.

1	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 1002: Very close, Zweifel.
2	MR. ROGERS: Zweifel. That wasn't so close, but you were
3	kind to say so. Okay. Yes, what's your answer to these
4	questions?
5	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 1002: Well, given the statements
6	by the other attorney, about yeah, that it's probably a car
7	accident, and that there was an injury claim. But, at this
8	point, there's no evidence to say that there was injury. And
9	the money, yeah, I didn't feel very good. As they said, I
10	would say that the perception is probably in the million
11	dollar range. I wonder if, can I put all that aside and come
12	to with no preconceptions, yeah, I could.
13	MR. ROGERS: Okay. I'm going to put a you know what,
14	I'm going to take more than seven minutes.
15	THE COURT: Would counsel approach, please.
16	MR. ROGERS: Yes.
17	[Bench Conference Begins]
18	THE COURT: So I don't have any idea, you know, what your
19	schedules are looking like. I wanted to ask up here instead
20	of in front of the jury.
21	MR. ROGERS: How much longer
22	MR. EGLET: I'm sorry.
23	THE COURT: I'm just wondering how long whether Mr.
24	Rogers has a lot more or just a little bit more?
25	MR. ROGERS: I actually have quite a bit more, yes. For

1	example, I don't think we'll have time tomorrow for both
2	parties to open. And if they don't want to split it up, I
3	suppose

MR. EGLET: Well, we can split it up, but that's going to cause us a big problem on Monday when the witness -- you know, we had mentioned earlier in the week about starting at noon on Friday. Could we start tomorrow at noon instead of 1, and then I think we'll have time for openings.

THE COURT: Well, are you going to be more than an hour in concluding the examination?

MR. ROGERS: Yes. Yes.

THE COURT: Then it's going to have to.

MR. EGLET: Well, we still have time to get, at least, the plaintiff's opening in.

THE COURT: Yeah, but you said you're opening will only be about an hour-and-a-half.

MR. EGLET: Hour-and-a-half to two hours. How much time do you think you have still?

MR. ROGERS: It's hard for me to gauge right now. I think there's a fair chance that they could get their opening in, but I don't want to -- I don't want to close off the door to myself, to finish this -- I wish I could be more exact --

MR. ROGERS: That's fine. That's fine. So if we start at 12, then I think that we could at least get the plaintiff's opening done.

1	THE COURT: That's a long day if we go until 5.
2	MR. EGLET: What's that?
3	THE COURT: That's a long day if we go until 5.
4	MR. EGLET: Well, I mean, that's what time a jury goes.
5	We usually go in the morning. We usually it takes six,
6	seven hours. I mean, we're already going
7	THE COURT: You're usually lucky if you get five or six.
8	MR. EGLET: Well, I know.
9	THE COURT: Let's try and find another day.
10	MR. EGLET: Well, we've got an expert that has moved
11	surgeries to meet with our schedule for one day.
12	THE COURT: Okay. If you can do your opening tomorrow,
13	Mr. Rogers doesn't get to do his until Monday afternoon
14	MR. WALL: Do you have a sense of how long yours is?
15	MR. ROGERS: Well, the same.
16	MR. EGLET: Same.
17	MR. ROGERS: Yeah, I would say it's about an hour-and-a-
18	half.
19	THE COURT: You won't get a witness in on Monday, that's
20	the problem, if we got to start at noon tomorrow.
21	THE COURT: Even if we start at noon tomorrow, if we stop
22	after you do your opening
23	MR. EGLET: You see, I don't think that he's I don't
24	think he knows for sure. I mean, let's just assume
25	MR. ROGERS: I don't. I've got to be honest, I don't.

1	MR. EGLET: He doesn't know. So if we start at noon
2	tomorrow, even if we went two hours, and each opening was an
3	hour-and-a-half long, we would get them both done tomorrow.
4	THE COURT: And don't see that we would, Mr. Eglet.
5	MR. EGLET: Well, and he doesn't know. I mean, he may
6	be
7	THE COURT: Right.
8	MR. EGLET: he may only be a another hour. I'm just
9	asking, let's give it a shot as opposed to just because I
10	then I have a huge problem with a witness on Monday. I mean,
11	I don't know what I'm going to do.
12	THE COURT: I don't know what you are, too, but I think
13	you need to give it some thought. We'll start at noon
14	tomorrow.
15	MR. EGLET: Okay.
16	THE COURT: And we'll just do the best we can.
17	MR. EGLET: Okay. All right.
18	THE COURT: All right, So shall we break for the
19	evening?
20	MR. ROGERS: Yes.
21	THE COURT: Okay.
22	[Bench Conference Ends]
23	THE COURT: A lot of discussion about scheduling, ladies
24	and gentlemen. What we're going to do is, break for the
25	evening and ask you to return tomorrow at noon, in the hopes

of getting through this jury selection process, and hearing, at least, maybe one of the two opening statements.

So with that in mind, I'll remind you of your obligation not to discuss this case with anyone; not to form or express any opinions until this case is given to you for decision; and to not to do any research on any subject connected with this case.


See you tomorrow at noon, please.

[Proceedings Concluded at 4:53 p.m.]

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ATTEST: I do hereby certify that I have truly and correctly transcribed the audio/video recording in the above-entitled case to the best of my ability. MERIBETH ASHLEY, Transcriber CYNTHIA ADVINS, Transcriber ERIN PERKINS; Transcriber



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DISTRICT COURT

CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

CLERK OF THE COURT

5 CHERYL A. SIMAO and WILLIAM J. SIMAO, 6

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CASE NO. A-539455 Plaintiffs,

DEPT. X v.

8 JAMES RISH, LINDA RISH 9 and JENNY RISH, 10

Defendants.

BEFORE THE HONORABLE JESSIE WALSH, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

FRIDAY, MARCH 18, 2011

REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT TRIAL TO THE JURY JURY PANEL VOIR DIRE

APPEARANCES:

For the Plaintiffs: DAVID T. WALL, ESQ.

ROBERT M. ADAMS, ESQ.

ROBERT T. EGLET, ESQ.

Mainor Eglet

For the Defendants James and Linda Rish:

BRYAN W. LEWIS, ESQ.

Lewis and Associates, LLC

For the Defendant Jenny Rish:

STEVEN M. ROGERS, ESQ. CHARLES A. MICHALEK, ESQ.

Hutchison & Steffen, LLC

JOEL D. HENRIOD, ESQ. Also Appearing:

DANIEL F. POLSENBERG, ESQ.

Lewis and Roca, LLP

VICTORIA BOYD, COURT RECORDER RECORDED BY:

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FRIDAY, MARCH 18, 2011 AT 12:10 P.M.

[Outside the Presence of the Prospective Jury Panel]

THE MARSHAL: -- presiding, District Court X is now in session.

THE COURT: Please be seated.

Before we bring our jury panel in, I was going to inquire of counsel how long you think it may take to argue these issues we need to discuss outside their presence, because perhaps we should let them take a 30-minute break or something, unless you think it'll take longer than that.

Mr. Wall?

MR. WALL: Well, apparently there's a few issues, Judge. There is a -- what I perceive to be forthcoming, an oral motion for a mistrial. There's also the remaining issues, I guess, that we were going to argue Thursday morning that have to do with what may or may not be admissible, or revisiting certain motions in limine.

Obviously I'd submit it to you, but it may take a substantial period of time to argue all of those. So I don't know whether it should be done after jury selection, so they're not waiting around; at least take up some or all of these issues at that time, rather than argue these for 45 minutes, an hour, hour and a half, and then have them just sit and wait. So.

THE COURT: Well, you know, I hate to have them wait,

because I'm doing my best to try to move it along and be sensitive to the fact that their time is very valuable. There are times during the course of the trial anyway where they often have to wait while we discuss issues and hear arguments on issues.

So, what about that, Mr. Rogers? Can we bring the panel in and allow you to continue examining them, and then address these issues afterwards?

MR. ROGERS: Well, one of the two issues must, as a matter of course, be brought before the Jury is impaneled. If we could address that motion only, which is the motion for a mistrial, which I don't believe should take long -- I don't know how long that'll take, but it shouldn't be but a few minutes.

We've, we have, as you can see, invited

Mr. Polsenberg here to address one issue. I don't know what
the several are that Mr. Wall's referring to about the
admissibility of evidence that, really, you and I discussed
before and our thought was it's best to address this before
the opening, simply because the parties aren't yet clear on
what evidence they can discuss in the opening.

MR. WALL: We're clear.

THE COURT: Let me say this. Let me say this. First of all, I don't anticipate revisiting any issues. The Court's already ruled on motions in limine. That's number one.

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1	Number two	, let's bri	ng our jury	panel	in and	allow
you to con	tinue your	examinatio	n of them.	Before	we imp	anel a
jury you'l	l have an	opportunity	to address	these	issues	which
you have r	aised.					

MR. MICHALEK: Thank you, Your Honor.

[Pause; Jury Panel In]

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THE COURT: Please be seated, everybody.

Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen.

[Simultaneous Response]

THE COURT: Great response. I appreciate that.

Thank you for returning, each and every one. I want to apologize for getting a late start. We'd asked you to be here at noon, but there were still some issues we needed to discuss outside your presence, so I apologize for the brief delay.

We're ready to proceed, then, Mr. Rogers.

MR. ROGERS: Thank you, Your Honor.

All right. Good afternoon, everyone.

[Simultaneous Response]

MR. ROGERS: While I tidy up, yesterday where we left off was we were addressing some concerns about the potential for pre-judgment, for any problems that might be presented in that regard, given your history and given the history of this case until it's over.

And I want to bring that now to a finer point, and

that's this. There have been the questionnaires that have					
been filled out by everyone here. And some of the responses					
to those questions and I don't mean to single anyone out or					
make you feel uncomfortable, but I do want to visit some of					
those responses.					

And again, keep in mind that, as has been said over and over, that there truly is no dishonor and no shame in feeling the way you feel and being the person you are. The only question here is whether you're a good fit for this case.

Now, in order. Mr. Daniels, in response to the following questions -- and these are actually the questions I'll be addressing to just about anybody where there's a concern -- you answered affirmatively. Let me read this to you and make sure that I understand. You were asked, in the questionnaire:

"Do you have any beliefs that would make it difficult for you to return a verdict in favor of the Defendant if the Plaintiff's injuries were caused by something other than the Defendant's conduct even though you may feel sympathy for the Plaintiff?"

Your answer to that question was yes. Is that correct?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR DANIELS: That I feel sympathy?

MR. ROGERS: Let me repeat it. And go off -- because

this is a question we'll be addressing more than with just you. Here goes.

"Do you have any beliefs that would make it difficult for you to return a verdict in favor of the Defendant if the Plaintiff's injuries were caused by something other than the Defendant's conduct even though you feel sympathy for the Plaintiff?"

PROSPECTIVE JUROR DANIELS: I may have misunderstood that question. Because I don't have any beliefs as far as one way or the other as far as, you know -- right now, to me it's an open book right now. I don't -- as far as believing that one person is right over the other one on the evidence I don't have any fact in the matter right now. I may have been -- mistook when I read it.

MR. ROGERS: Okay. Well, what do you understand the question to mean right now, then?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR DANIELS: Do I have beliefs that would stop me from making the correct decision? Is that what you're trying to say?

MR. ROGERS: Right. It's -- it focuses mostly on this clause -- or my question does, anyhow: Do you have any beliefs that would make it difficult for you to return a verdict in favor of Jenny Rish if the Plaintiff's injuries were caused by something or someone other than Jenny Rish?

3	MR. ROGERS: And there was a second one, and it's this:
4	"Do you have any beliefs that would prompt you
5	to return a verdict of money damages even if damages
6	are not justified by the evidence?"
7	And your answer to that question was yes.
8	PROSPECTIVE JUROR DANIELS: [Indiscernible].
9	MR. ROGERS: Don't feel awkward about this. Really.
10	PROSPECTIVE JUROR DANIELS: No.
11	MR. ROGERS: This isn't to
12	PROSPECTIVE JUROR DANIELS: [Indiscernible] at the time.
13	I don't maybe I misunderstood the question. In other
14	words, would I give an answer and would I award something that
15	I think wasn't justified? Is that what the question is trying
16	to say?
17	MR. ROGERS: Yeah. I think that's a fair way of looking
18	at it.
19	PROSPECTIVE JUROR DANIELS: No.
20	MR. ROGERS: Your answer today to that question then
21	would be no?

I don't care

PROSPECTIVE JUROR DANIELS: No.

[indiscernible].

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unless it was justified. Right. Correct.

MR. ROGERS: Okay. Very good.

PROSPECTIVE JUROR DANIELS: Wouldn't be a fair assessment

Now I'm going to single just a few more on the same

1	questions.
2	Ms. Kissler.
3	PROSPECTIVE JUROR KISSLER: Yeah, something tells me I
4	misread the question. Go ahead.
5	MR. ROGERS: Yes. They're the same questions, actually.
6	The first one is number 43:
7	"Do you have any beliefs that would make it
8	difficult for you to return a verdict in favor of
9	the Defendant if the Plaintiff's injuries were
10	caused by something other than the Defendant's
11	conduct?"
12	PROSPECTIVE JUROR KISSLER: And I put?
13	MR. ROGERS: You put yes.
14	PROSPECTIVE JUROR KISSLER: I meant no. I misread the
15	question.
16	MR. ROGERS: Okay. That's a question that can use some
17	tidying up.
18	PROSPECTIVE JUROR KISSLER: Yeah.
19	MR. ROGERS: Okay. Let's go to 46, then. It's the
20	second question we just discussed.
21	"Do you have any beliefs that would prompt you
22	to return a verdict of money damages even if damages
23	are not justified by the evidence?"
24	PROSPECTIVE JUROR KISSLER: That would be no, and I
25	probably put yes.

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5 MR. ROGERS: And it was question 46 --6 PROSPECTIVE JUROR KISSLER: Right. I am dyslexic, so 7 that could have been just I didn't read it right. I thought I went slowly. It took me almost an hour and a half to let up, 8 so I thought I -- I guess I didn't. 10 MR. ROGERS: Okay. 11 PROSPECTIVE JUROR KISSLER: It was toward the end, I was 12 probably getting rushed. 13 MR. ROGERS: Right. Right. Okay. 14 Next, Ms. Karette [phonetic]. You answered yes only 15 to that second question. That is: 16 "Do you have any beliefs that would prompt you 17

are not justified by the evidence?"

MR. EGLET: Would you read that --

MR. EGLET: Could we approach, Your Honor?

Sure.

Yes.

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MR. ROGERS:

[indiscernible] misread it.

it was if there wasn't --

MR. ROGERS:

THE COURT:

Okay.

PROSPECTIVE JUROR KISSLER: I just read it again.

dyslexic, so I have a tendency to not -- to get everything, so

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to return a verdict of money damages even if damages

And your answer to that was yes. Why was that?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR KARETTE: The -- if -- so, how I read

I don't

1	[Bench Conference Begins]
2	MR. EGLET: That's two in a row where he said a question
3	was answered one way and we got it down that the answer was
4	another way. Is this the actual question and
5	MR. ROGERS: This is just one
6	MR. EGLET: Let's see the actual question, because I
7	don't think you're right.
8	THE COURT: These questions are rather confusing.
9	MR. EGLET: Yes.
10	MR. ROGERS: I believe we had it there was
11	UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: [Indiscernible] yeah.
12	THE COURT: Really? [Indiscernible].
13	MR. ROGERS: What question was this?
14	UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: 46.
15	UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Okay. I thought you were asking
16	question 43, (indiscernible) difficulty
17	THE COURT: Could I see the question you read? I found
18	it confusing also.
19	MR. ROGERS: These need 44 was very confusing. Now
20	that I've read it out loud, it really has struck me how
21	confusing
22	MR. EGLET: Right. These are the questions you

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UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: It wasn't on the questionnaire.

MR. ROGERS: Should I ask [indiscernible].

recall if that's true or not.

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Ţ	THE COURT: Those are difficult for me to understand. I
2	didn't have the questionnaire in front of me as you were
3	reading it.
4	MR. ROGERS: Do you want to keep that copy?
5	THE COURT: You know, like well, maybe I should if
6	you're going to be asking lots of questions from it. Okay.
7	MR. EGLET: Could I see the questionnaire for
8	Ms. Kissler?
9	[Pause]
10	THE COURT: It's a good thing we're not going to try to
11	do openings today.
12	MR. EGLET: Now, he just quoted he just said to
13	Ms. Kissler that she answered yes to 43. And she didn't
14	answer yes to 43, she answered no. And that was what's in my
15	notes, and that's why I wanted to approach.
16	MR. ROGERS: She answered yes to 46. That was
17	MR. EGLET: You asked 43 first, Counsel, not 46. You're
18	inaccurate. You need to do this
19	THE COURT: So you need to just correct
20	MR. EGLET: Use the actual question.
21	THE COURT: Yeah. And you need to correct it with her so
22	that she is not left thinking that she mis-answered a
23	question. Yeah.
24	UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I don't have a problem
25	MR. EGLET: Okay, she answered no, not yes.

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1	THE	COURT:	Okay	7 -					
2	MR.	ROGERS:	Oka	ay.					
3	THE	COURT:	Al 1	right,	then.	Back	on	the	record.

[Bench Conference Ends]

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MR. ROGERS: Okay. We've gone through my notes, and it appears I made a mistake. Ms. Kissler, you didn't answer yes to one of those two questions.

PROSPECTIVE JUROR KISSLER: Okay.

MR. ROGERS: So that was my fault.

PROSPECTIVE JUROR KISSLER: Okay.

MR. ROGERS: It's not yours. I apologize.

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: [Indiscernible].

UNIDENTIFIED PROSPECTIVE JUROR: Who said you guys were infallible? Wrong.

MR. ROGERS: All right. And again, this isn't to single anybody out. It really isn't. It's, again, just to make absolutely certain that everybody here really does fit this case.

And Ms. Karette, I don't recall whether we got an answer before we approached the bench.

THE COURT: You did.

PROSPECTIVE JUROR KARETTE: How I read that question was --

THE COURT: May I interrupt for a minute. You did.

Will counsel approach, please?

	13
1	[Bench Conference Begins]
2	THE COURT: I forget whether it was 43 or 44, but one of
3	these you said she had answered yes to and she answered no.
4	MR. EGLET: Yeah, but that was Ms. Kissler.
5	THE COURT: Also Ms. Karette.
6	MR. EGLET: You also said it to Ms. Karette.
7	MR. ROGERS: Okay no, that one was Karette.
8	THE COURT: Okay. We can take a break and look at the
9	record, but I have pretty good recall even without the
10	questionnaire. You told her she answered one of these
11	questions yes, and she answered both of these questions no.
12	MR. ROGERS: I [indiscernible].
13	THE COURT: You didn't ask her about 46. You asked her
.4	either 43 or 44, or both of them. But I think it was 44,
15	which you said she answered yes to. So you need to correct it
L6	with her so she doesn't think that she's mis-answered the
L7	question.
18	MR. ROGERS: Sure.
L9	THE COURT: Yeah. Okay.
0 0	[Bench Conference Ends]
21	MR. ROGERS: All right. Ms. Karette, let me repeat the
22	question. This is question 46.

PROSPECTIVE JUROR KARETTE: Okay.

instructed him to do?

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MR. EGLET: Well, Your Honor, can Counsel do what you've

7	THE C	COURT:	Well,	I wish	you'd	addre	ss	just	the	first
issue	firs	t, bec	ause we	hadn't	gotte	n to	46	yet.		

MR. ROGERS: Okay. I -- okay. I recalled asking if you had answered a question wrong. And it may be that I read the wrong question. Let's see. Question 46, which reads:

"Do you have any beliefs that would prompt you to return a verdict of money damages even if damages are not justified by the evidence?"

Was that the question that I read to you earlier? PROSPECTIVE JUROR KARETTE: Yes.

MR. ROGERS: Okay. And your response to that was yes, that you have some beliefs that would prompt you to return a verdict of money damages even if the evidence didn't support it.

Okay, why is that?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR KARETTE: Maybe I misread the question. How I took that question was, would you not give the damages to the Plaintiff if there was not enough to evidence to support it. I think the burden of proof would be on the Plaintiff to prove that that injury was caused by whatever, to [indiscernible] the accident.

MR. ROGERS: Okay.

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PROSPECTIVE JUROR KARETTE: So that's -- so, did I misread the question?

MR. ROGERS: Well, you know what? It seems to me that

there's a running theme here, and that it's not uncommon in
legal documents that things can get a little jumbled. And if
that's so, that's fine. And it sounds like that's your
response, is that your take on it wasn't exactly what we
thought it was.

PROSPECTIVE JUROR KARETTE: I think -- so from this dialogue, I'm receiving that you wanted -- the key word is do I have any beliefs -- pre-existing beliefs.

MR. ROGERS: You got it.

PROSPECTIVE JUROR KARETTE: Right? So how I -- I didn't focus on that word. I focused on if there was not enough evidence to support the Plaintiff's case, would I have an issue giving that award to the Plaintiff. And I said yes, I would. Because the evidence would have to support -- support it.

MR. ROGERS: Okay. Okay, I got it. Right.

Next is Mrs. Frye [phonetic]. And these are the same questions -- well, not exactly the same that we've been discussing, but let's focus on the question that Ms. Karette just responded to. And that --

PROSPECTIVE JUROR FRYE: I didn't understand a lot of the ques -- I just couldn't comprehend them the right way. Maybe I was rushing.

MR. ROGERS: Okay.

PROSPECTIVE JUROR FRYE: But I don't have any -- I

wouldn't award anyone something that had nothing to do with the case. Is that what the question is?

MR. ROGERS: It is.

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PROSPECTIVE JUROR FRYE: Yeah. I would never do that. If it has to do with -- you know, if there's injuries that happened that had nothing to do with this at all, then no, that would not be my feeling to award from this case.

Does that make sense?

MR. ROGERS: It does.

PROSPECTIVE JUROR FRYE: Okay.

MR. ROGERS: It does.

Okay, and then Ms. Manfil (phonetic). This is question 43, which is the first [indiscernible] read. The question is:

"Do you have any beliefs that would make it difficult for you to return a verdict in favor of the Defendant, Mrs. Rish, if the Plaintiff's injuries were caused by something other than the Defendant's conduct?" than Mrs. Rish's conduct. I believe your answer to that was yes.

1 Delleve your amover to that was

So, let's get to --

PROSPECTIVE JUROR MANFIL: Maybe I misunderstood. Yeah. It's the way it's worded, I think.

MR. ROGERS: Okay. We're going to have work this questionnaire over.

PROSPECTIVE JUROR MANFIL: Maybe -- yeah, reword it a little different.

Okay. So, do I have any beliefs -- what was that?

MR. ROGERS: Let me cast it this way. This is the main concern about this question. It is, if the Plaintiff claims injuries which were conditions, but does not meet his burden of proof in establishing that his conditions or injuries were caused by this car accident, would you still have difficulty in not awarding him compensation for those conditions?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR MANFIL: Oh. No.

MR. ROGERS: Okay.

And Mr. Miranda [phonetic]. Yours was a question of the presentation of the evidence. That's kind of where I started yesterday. Where we were talking about that metaphor of a race, and it might seem unfair if someone gets to start ahead of you. You're competing against someone and he gets to start, let's say, three seconds before you. I imagine you'd say that doesn't seem fair.

One of the questions that was presented in this questionnaire was whether you would be able to wait until the end of the case before making a decision. Your answer to that question was no, you would have difficulty waiting until the end before deciding the case. Why is that?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR MIRANDA: Difficulty waiting till the end?

MR. ROGERS: Right.

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PROSPECTIVE JUROR MIRANDA: Well, I mean, I'd wait for, you know, both -- both parties to bring in things that argue the case, but I'm going to have -- after, you know, somebody presents their evidence in that case I'm going to have some -- you know, something going on, you know, to where, okay, do I believe this person. I know when, you know, that person goes, you know, it's kind of like arguing back and forth. So I would have a little bit of difficulty waiting, but at the end I'll bring everything together.

MR. ROGERS: Okay. Super.

PROSPECTIVE JUROR MIRANDA: Make my decision.

MR. ROGERS: Well, but do you think you'll have any difficulty, then, waiting until the end before you formulate your opinion?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR MIRANDA: [No audible response].

MR. ROGERS: All right. That's the end of that.

Let's turn to some questions that you guys have answered while you've been here.

Ms. Jones. One is for you. You mentioned that your aunt had back surgery, is that right?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR JONES: Uh-huh. Uh-huh.

MR. ROGERS: Do you know who the surgeon is?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR JONES: No, it's in Michigan.

MR. ROGERS: Oh, okay. Wouldn't be anybody involved in

1	this case.
2	PROSPECTIVE JUROR JONES: No.
3	MR. ROGERS: And when did you say it was what kind
4	of surgery?
5	PROSPECTIVE JUROR JONES: She had a piece of her I want
6	to say the tailbone that broke off and was pressing on a
7	nerve, and they just went in and removed that piece.
8	MR. ROGERS: Okay. And I remember you said she's doing
9	fine now?
LO	PROSPECTIVE JUROR JONES: Uh-huh.
1.1	MR. ROGERS: And Mr. Atina [phonetic]. You mentioned
12	that you work with surgeons in town. Do you work with any
1.3	pain management doctors?
14	PROSPECTIVE JUROR ATINA: No.
L 5	MR. ROGERS: Do you work with any spine surgeons other
۱6	than Drs. McNulty and Grover?
۱7	PROSPECTIVE JUROR ATINA: Yes. I have.
18	MR. ROGERS: Okay. Do you specialize in a given area of
19	orthopedics? Like, you mentioned joints earlier.
20	PROSPECTIVE JUROR ATINA: Yes.
21	MR. ROGERS: But I don't think Grover and McNulty do
22	joints.
23	PROSPECTIVE JUROR ATINA: No.
24	MR. ROGERS: So do you do spine as well?
) E	PROGREGATIVE THROP AMENIA. You I do

Okay. And who are the other spine surgeons

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2	you work with?
3	PROSPECTIVE JUROR ATINA: Dr. Vasquez, Dr. Changus
4	[phonetic], Dr. Duke, Sy [phonetic], Kaplan, a few more in
5	CNI
6	MR. ROGERS: Okay. Quite a few, then.
7	PROSPECTIVE JUROR ATINA: Yeah.
8	MR. ROGERS: Ms. Frye, we you mentioned that your
9	husband is treated with pain management now. Do you know now
10	
10	who his physician is?
11	PROSPECTIVE JUROR FRYE: I don't. I don't. He just went
12	for the second time on Monday. I don't know who it is.
13	MR. ROGERS: And I forgot, was it neck or low back?
14	PROSPECTIVE JUROR FRYE: It's nerve damage throughout his
15	back. He just got pain shot or, shots, cortisone shots in
16	his head on Monday for the first time, and it was I think
17	it's mostly his upper back.
18	MR. ROGERS: How long ago was that car accident?
19	PROSPECTIVE JUROR FRYE: November.
20	MR. ROGERS: Okay. Were you in the car?
21	PROSPECTIVE JUROR FRYE: [No audible response]
22	MR. ROGERS: Was anyone else in the car with him?
23	PROSPECTIVE JUROR FRYE: Nope. He was in it by himself.
24	MR. ROGERS: Okay. Did he sustain any injuries other
25	than the back injuries?

MR. ROGERS:

PROSPECTIVE JUROR FRYE:	Minor. He had a	he hit his
head on the rearview mirror,	so he had like a big	lump on his
head but no concussion. And	he had like a cut on	the inside
of his eye. But it's all hea	aled.	

MR. ROGERS: Okay.

PROSPECTIVE JUROR FRYE: It's mostly back problems that he's having. And it doesn't stop him from doing anything. It's just uncomfortable all the time. He's not limited; just very uncomfortable. And they said it will never not be that way.

MR. ROGERS: This is a permanent condition? PROSPECTIVE JUROR FRYE: Pretty much.

MR. ROGERS: Do you recall the example that I brought up yesterday of cases that I might have difficulty sitting in judgment on? Things that are a little too close to home? In this case, you have something going on at home, close to this case --

PROSPECTIVE JUROR FRYE: Uh-huh.

MR. ROGERS: -- that there are neck claims in this case. Do you think that your experience can in any way affect your complete impartiality?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR FRYE: No. Because it's like I said before, I have to see the facts. I'm just -- everything is facts. You know, that's what I go through with my kids, show me the facts. If they get, you know -- if something's going

on in their lives and they get -- it's like, show me why you want to do something or why not. Like, you have to make a case for me.

MR. ROGERS: You bring up a good topic, and it's something I wanted to discuss with all of you. Mothers, especially, have a lot more experience with moderating disputes. School teachers, I imagine, as well.

And a question I have is, I imagine there have been instances where your children, like mine, have come to you with different stories about something that's happened. How do you moderate or judge those kinds of situations?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR FRYE: Well, yesterday you were asking if you -- or he was asking if you're 50 percent sure or 100 percent sure. I'm never 100 percent sure with any of the decisions I make with my kids. When they get their driver's license, I'm never 100 percent sure that you want to let them out there driving. Everything has -- I always tell my kids that they earn any kind of privileges, so they have to prove to me that they're capable of doing whatever they want to do.

So, again, everything is facts. Facts. Show me why you want to do it, show me that you're going to be responsible doing it, and prove to me.

MR. ROGERS: Okay, good. Let's take the scenario where maybe there's an argument. You know, he it me or she pushed me; that kind of thing. And they come to you with completely

polarized versions of what happened. What do you generally do in those circumstances to figure out what happened?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR FRYE: I don't figure it out at that I go deal -- if no one's really hurt, I don't want to be bothered with it.

MR. ROGERS: Okay.

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PROSPECTIVE JUROR FRYE: Sorry. That's probably not what you're looking for.

MR. ROGERS: Well, no, there is no perfect answer to this one. Because people come with different qualities. people, I think, approach things with more emotion, whereas others approach it a bit more with reason.

I read an educator's book a while back that said the goal of education is to harmonize those two qualifies in a person, the emotional and the rational. And none of us are perfect. None of us have completely harmonized those two qualities. And so we bring one or the other to bear more where it has to make decisions.

Would you put yourself more in the emotional or in the rational camp?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR FRYE: Oh, it depends on the situation. You know. Like you just said, my kids are older now so it's been a long time. When they were little, if they were fighting and I didn't know who started it they both got time You know, that's it. Don't bother me. out.

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ļ	If they were fighting over a toy, the toy would go
	in time out, you know?
	But now you're talking about I said earlier tha
١	I have a child who had cancer last year, and that was an
	emotional thing and, you know, there was issues, if there was

that, then I'm emotional. If it's stupid things that I can't figure out, you know, who was right or wrong, then you're both

something that came down to my kid's health or things like

9 being punished.

MR. ROGERS: That makes sense. Okay.

PROSPECTIVE JUROR FRYE: I don't know if I'm helping you out or --

MR. ROGERS: No, no, no, you are. You are.

It's Ms. Smith? Yeah. You're a school teacher, right? How do you deal with this at school?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR SMITH: Every day.

MR. ROGERS: Sure.

PROSPECTIVE JUROR SMITH: I'm lawyer, I'm judge. Every day. He hit me, he cried, you know, blah blah blah blah. All right.

I know my kids. I know who did it, usually. I know why. When I don't, and it's like a surprise, like really, you two were fighting? I'm shocked. I have them write it down.

Do you have any witnesses? I love that. You know. Give me the witnesses. Who saw it, who was there, go get them. They

write it down, because then I can get the story, you know.

And it did happen once, two totally different stories. So then I try to get witnesses and find it -- find out. I have to hear it first verbally to see if it matches what they wrote. And then if I totally have no idea and I cannot make a decision, I set them down in the hall, one over there and one over there, and we think about it. That's part of living [indiscernible] logic. You know. And then I say -- I come up and I say, ready to tell me the story?

But he -- I'll come back to you.

Are you ready to tell me? Well, I really --

You know, someone will confess. Eventually. Yo leave them out there long enough; they're kids; they'll confess. They want to get back in the class.

You kind of have -- you know the people, you listen to the evidence, you kind of know, depending on what it is and how bad it is, you know. And if I really don't know and I'm just -- don't have time for it, send them to the alternate judge: the principal. He will figure it out. So, you know, it's kind of like -- yeah, that'll do it.

MR. ROGERS: You know, in this experience -- and I have a fourth-grader, so they're not too far removed from where you are. You teach third grade?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR SMITH: Yeah.

MR. ROGERS: In your experience you have the advantage of

a history with these kids. And you've developed an understanding of their personalities and what they're more or less likely to do.

In this case, you're going to be meeting people you've never met before. And you're probably going to be hearing evidence, for example, of medicine that you never heard of before. How would you bring your experience in moderating or being a judge to that kind of a scenario?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR SMITH: That's where listening, taking notes, weighing, you know, both sides. I don't know if we can take notes or not. I'm not sure. We're allowed to? You know, listening to both sides. Weighing evidence on both sides. Making a fair judgment. Talking, discussing with -- I want to say co-workers, but jurors; you know, co-jurors. Just hearing both cases. I have to hear both sides. I have to hear all the evidence.

Just like with the students in my class. I have to investigate in my -- in my classroom, I investigate. You know. Okay, tell me who was there, go find the other person in the other class, bring them here, ask them, have them write it down -- you know, as much as I can.

In this situation, I've never been in this situation. I'd have to just use my ears and my eyes, and just listen, take it all in, discuss it. See what others have to say. Talk about it. Come to my conclusions, with others.

MR.	ROGERS:	Okay.	Good.
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Mr. Breeze [phonetic], I think you said you were a supervisor at work?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR BREEZE: Yeah.

MR. ROGERS: You probably run into this stuff in that setting.

PROSPECTIVE JUROR BREEZE: Uh-huh.

MR. ROGERS: Tell me about your experience moderating disputes between --

PROSPECTIVE JUROR BREEZE: Well, here's one that you'll love. I always come in and we have six lanes, and the NASCAR people just came back, and they were all running late. Six, seven, eight, ten cars come in. So I'm dealing with one customer, knock him out. Deal with another customer, knock him out. Send him on his way.

Then the next thing I know I kind of lose track of who's where. So I just say, raise your hand, who's next? And guess what happens.

PROSPECTIVE JUROR UNIDENTIFIED: Everybody raises --

PROSPECTIVE JUROR BREEZE: Everybody raises their hands.

I'm like, well be honest now. And they all start laughing;

22 they go, well, I was next, I was --

I just -- I look at their faces. I could tell who's lying and who's not. Believe me.

But you know, you try to be a moderator and you say,

okay, who's really -- you know, who needs to go really fast, who needs -- then I send them on their way if they're nice.

And then, you know, you just -- you could judge by their character or how they're acting that, you know, you pinpoint who's the next one, who's the next one?

It's kind of like a balancing act, you know. And it works out fine, you know? And you deal with people's problems right then and there, you evaluate what's going on with the car or the people or something. If the person needs to go to the airport and they're handicapped, we send them on their way, you know. We get another driver and we send them right to the airport. We take care of them. You know.

Some guy comes in, he's 20 years old, 21 years old, and he's running late. Well, you know, he should have got up early, you know. Just because you're late, oh, you're going to take that person? Yeah, that person's handicapped. Look at all that luggage she's got. What do you got, a briefcase? Send them on their way.

You just judge. I'm a good judge of character, a good judge of people. I could tell when you're lying too, pretty much. And I met a lot of liars in the airline -- in the rent-a-car business.

How'd that dent get there, Mr. Smith?
Oh, I didn't do it.

Yeah, well. You know what, I wasn't born yesterday.

You h	ıad	this	car	out	for	seven	days,	λοπ	went	1,500	miles,
want	to	tell	me	anoth	er :	story?	You	want	to -	you l	know.

MR. ROGERS: You bring up a good point. And that's a departure from mediation and doing what you guys are actually going to be doing here, and that's judging. And for some people that is an awful task, to make not a middle-of-the-road decision, but to make a final decision that is going to affect people. That's a difficult proposition for some --

PROSPECTIVE JUROR BREEZE: I do that every day at work.

MR. ROGERS: It sounds like it.

PROSPECTIVE JUROR BREEZE: Every day. Every day I gotta make a split decision whether you did that accident, whether you caused that, you know, tire to be out of alignment.

A guy came in, brand-new Camaro, 60 miles. He goes, all of a sudden this speed bump came out of nowhere.

Well, the wheel didn't come out of the factory with a tilt like that. You know, come on. Tell me another one.

Oh, okay, I was doing 60 miles an hour and I hit the curb.

Okay. Do you have insurance?

No.

Well, we're going to fill out this little form here.

Oh, am I liable?

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MR. ROGERS: Well, it sounds like you don't have much

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PROSPECTIVE JUROR BREEZE: No. I --

MR. ROGERS: -- making a judgment.

PROSPECTIVE JUROR BREEZE: We only have a certain amount of time, and we have to make sure that we're correct almost all the time. If I'm, say, not sure of something, we send them upstairs, especially with like the bill, like they want their GPS taken off or they some of the insurance taken off or a gas receipt that I didn't see taken off. We have to send them upstairs. That's a decision I make right then and there.

But accidents, damage to the car, damage inside the car, how did the upholstery get ripped or burned, I'm right there. I make a decision right then and there, either you did it or that was there before. I could either tell if they're lying or they're not lying. It -- you just get a feel for the people. You could just tell, just looking at them.

I had a guy come in and he was from New York City and he said, everything's great with the car, everything's great. So we're talking about New York and I got kind of caught up with that. Five minutes later I walk around the car. I said, well, what happened here?

Oh. Oh, I was going to tell you about that. I backed into a parking pole and took off the bumper, almost.

MR. ROGERS: Slipped his mind.

PROSPECTIVE JUROR BREEZE: Yeah. I thought you told me

_	is not char, one can has char.
2	Oh, I forgot about that.
3	Well, that's why we do our walk-around. You know.
4	Were you gonna lie to me?
5	MR. ROGERS: Now, you clearly have no reservations and no
6	problem judging, and that's what you'll be called on to do
7	here. And as I said, there are some people who aren't so
8	comfortable with that, and I want to know by a show of hands,
9	is there anybody here who would, for any reason, be more
10	inclined to just say, you know what, I don't want to make the
11	decision here. I just want to cut this in half and call that
12	good. Let's just mediate this thing instead of judging.
13	Everybody here is okay making a judgment? Okay.
14	Now, I want to switch over to you, Mr. Dobie
15	[phonetic]. You said you used to work in construction. Did
16	you ever work in the flooring trade?
17	PROSPECTIVE JUROR DOBIE: In the what trade?
18	MR. ROGERS: Flooring installation, things like that.
19	PROSPECTIVE JUROR DOBIE: Asphalt, concrete, stuff like
20	that. Putting drywall up. But no flooring.

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MR. ROGERS: Okay. All right. I lost my place here.

It's Ms. Lewis. I believe you wrote that your

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Just one moment.

husband is in the police department?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR LEWIS: Yes, he is.

1	MR. ROGERS: And he has experience in accident
2	reconstruction?
3	PROSPECTIVE JUROR LEWIS: He's a motor officer. So he
4	gets called to accidents and so forth all the time.
5	MR. ROGERS: How long has he done that?
6	PROSPECTIVE JUROR LEWIS: He's on his fourth year right
7	now. Doing that.
8	MR. ROGERS: And you heard some questions earlier on
9	about advanced training that's provided to some police
10	officers. Has your husband undergone any of that treatment?
11	PROSPECTIVE JUROR LEWIS: Yeah, he's gone to training for
12	accident reconstruction and things like that, yes.
13	MR. ROGERS: Okay. And does he investigate accidents
14	where the parties claim injury?
15	PROSPECTIVE JUROR LEWIS: He will do like the initial
16	reports and things like that, but he's not one of the officers
17	that comes out and reconstructs the accident and things like
18	that. He'll help along, like if he's the initial officer
19	there and everything. But he hasn't gone through as much at
20	school as some of the other officers who come out and they do
21	the investigation of the accident and so forth.
22	MR. ROGERS: Okay.
23	PROSPECTIVE JUROR LEWIS: But he does, I mean, get called
24	to court and things like that for accidents and things.
25	MR. ROGERS: Okay. And he's been qualified as an expert.

gotten on the stand and testified about accidents?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR LEWIS: He's been called in for a few, yes.

MR. ROGERS: All right. Is anybody else here experienced or related to anyone with experience in accident reconstruction? Yeah, Mr. Milly [phonetic].

PROSPECTIVE JUROR MILLY: My brother. He's a motor cop for Metro, he's been in it for four years and he does the same as what she said. I don't think if -- I know he's been in to court a couple times, but I don't know what exactly it's related to or what -- probably somebody wants to dispute the ticket that he wrote, he has to go in. I think that's the main -- for most of his court appearances.

But as far as like coming back and doing, you know, if there's a -- a big injury, I don't think he's done anything like that, but he does the same thing, initial reports, he has all the training to look at the scene and, you know, if the car's not broken, get it off the road. Because, you know, if they trained us to do -- to reconstruct [indiscernible]. I know I could find out what happened with you off the road. Because that's what that looks [indiscernible] parked in the middle of the road. If it's running, looks like a dent in the bumper, well, I go and tow the car myself. But that is beside the point.

Yeah, he has, you know, he has I guess the -- I

don't know exactly what levels of training he has but he's a motors cop and that's all he does all day is write tickets.

Violations and accidents.

MR. ROGERS: Okay. And anyone else here? Yes. Ms. -UNIDENTIFIED PROSPECTIVE JUROR: My brother's a police
officer for the school district, school police.

MR. ROGERS: Okay.

UNIDENTIFIED PROSPECTIVE JUROR: I don't know what he -I'm sure if there was an accident on the school grounds he
would write the tickets, you know, for high school. But I
never talk to him about it and I don't know. But he is a
school police.

MR. ROGERS: Anything to do with cars? Or is this more premises kind of stuff?

UNIDENTIFIED PROSPECTIVE JUROR: It's premises, yeah.

He, he's the -- works at the high school so if maybe like in a parking lot two kids in their cars, you know, hit each other, he probably has to write the report and then call Metro, I think. I don't know; I've never talked to him about it. He always tells me about the bad kids at school that get busted for drugs or something, but I never hear about accidents. I would assume he probably has to do some kind of reports.

MR. ROGERS: I gotcha. He hasn't told you, then, whether he has any experience or training in accident reconstruction?

UNIDENTIFIED PROSPECTIVE JUROR: No, we don't really talk

about that.

MR. ROGERS: I see. Okay. I imagine -- yes, it's Ms. Tatum, that your answer is going to be yes to that too.

PROSPECTIVE JUROR TATUM: Yes.

MR. ROGERS: Now, tell me about your experience.

PROSPECTIVE JUROR TATUM: I usually deal with the school buses, and whenever there is a traffic violation or if there is an accident, if it's on school grounds or even if it's outside the school grounds we have to go to those accidents and we take photos, we do reports. If there's witnesses we get witnesses. Forms. Take photos of the students and the injured parties.

And if it's students on board we have to call Metro in Henderson or whoever jurisdiction that we in, and they'll come out. If it's on school property, we call school police, and school police will come and do their incident report or their accident report. And I do have a couple gentlemen in my job that have went through the training to reconstruct accidents, and they will do it at work and they will ask us what happened and how to get there and this and this and that.

MR. ROGERS: Okay. Have you had any exposure to what's called biomechanical engineering, where an accident reconstructionist will go out and examine an accident and then offer an opinion about whether he --

PROSPECTIVE JUROR TATUM: No, I have not.

1	MR. EGLET: Your Honor, I'm going to object to this
2	question.
3	THE COURT: Counsel approach, please.
4	[Bench Conference Begins]
5	MR. EGLET: There's no relevance to this question. It's
6	an improper question. There was no [indiscernible]
7	Biomechanical engineers in this case who are going to be
8	offering any expert testimony. In fact the Court has ruled
9	that the medical doctors or the Defendant's experts cannot
10	offer biomechanical engineer
11 '	MR. WALL: We are not calling
12	MR. EGLET: And we're not
13	THE COURT: You don't have one either?
14	MR. EGLET: We're not
15	MR. WALL: Yeah.
16	MR. EGLET: We're not calling one.
17	THE COURT: I thought you had one.
18	MR. EGLET: We're not calling
19	MR. WALL: We did. And we're not calling him because
2 0	MR. EGLET: We're not calling him.
21	MR. WALL: there's been
22	MR. ROGERS: They do. That was the purpose of the
23	question.
24	MR. EGLET: Well we're not calling him. So there's
25	it's a

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          THE COURT:
                      Okay. Well that may --
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                      I thought you knew that, so --
          MR EGLET:
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          THE COURT: That may change things up. I hadn't realized
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     that there had been a change. I thought it was a fair area of
5
     inquiry given her expertise. So I thought it was fair.
6
     if you're not calling him. What's the response?
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          MR. ROGERS:
                       I didn't know.
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          THE COURT:
                      Okay.
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          MR. ROGERS:
                       I thought --
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          MR. EGLET: I assumed he knew.
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          MR. ROGERS: I mean, we discussed it, but I still don't
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     have a list of witness who are actually going to appear.
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          THE COURT: You don't?
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          MR. ROGERS: We've exchanged witnesses.
                                                    But in our
15
     discussions --
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          MR. EGLET: We've exchanged our witness lists.
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          MR. ROGERS: -- he's included.
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          MR. EGLET: Well --
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          MR. ROGERS: The biomechanical engineer is.
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          THE COURT: Does the --
21
          MR. EGLET:
                     Well at the 2.6 --
22
          THE COURT:
                     Does the representation change your view of
23
     the question?
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if they're not going to call one.

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MR. ROGERS: Well I don't need to continue on it with it

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1	THE COURT: Okay.
2	MR. EGLET: Okay.
3	THE COURT: Thank you.
4	[Bench Conference Ends]
5	MR. ROGERS: And was there anyone else with a hand up on
6	that question, about accident reconstruction?
7	Okay.
8	Now, Something that you guys will encounter here,
9	that I touched upon with some of you is this, other than Mr.
10	Aquino [phonetic] I don't believe that any of you have
11	experience in medicine. But am I right?
12	All right. What you're going to see is witnesses
13	who are testifying about medicine who have some disagreement
14	and
15	UNIDENTIFIED PROSPECTIVE JUROR: I didn't hear you,
16	I'm sorry.
17	UNIDENTIFIED PROSPECTIVE JUROR: Yeah. Can you
18	repeat that?
19	UNIDENTIFIED PROSPECTIVE JUROR: Can you repeat that?
20	MR. ROGERS: Oh I'm sorry, who absolutely disagree. And
21	this kind of gets back to the same question that you and I
22	discussed earlier and that is how are we going to make a
23	decision on a medical question where two doctors have polar
24	opposite positions?
25	Yes?

UNIDENTIFIED PROSPECTIVE JUROR: Excuse me, I believe
the gentleman over there tells us that we can ask questions.
So if something we don't understand or know, we can write it
down hand it to the Bailiff and the Bailiff and then we can
ask questions about something we don't know about. That's how
we can find out on a medical question or subject matter.
Correct? I mean

MR. ROGERS: Okay.

UNIDENTIFIED PROSPECTIVE JUROR: Further explanation, if needed?

MR. ROGERS: Okay. And I think most of you said you'd have -- and all of you actually said you will not hesitate to ask questions if there are things you don't quite get.

UNIDENTIFIED PROSPECTIVE JUROR: Are we allowed to discuss
-- I know can't discuss the case outside of this, but will we have time once it's started?

THE COURT: None until you deliberate.

MR. ROGERS: There's a point at the very end after all the evidence comes in. And at that point you'll all meet. And at that you'll deliberate. You'll say, "Okay, this is my position." And someone else will say, "Well hold it, I didn't see it exactly that way." And you'll come to your decision after meeting together. Until then --

UNIDENTIFIED PROSPECTIVE JUROR: Well we can also, if we have issues regarding like if somebody forgets something that

was said we can go back and have somebody bring in transcripts or look at evidence afterwards while we're deliberating?

MR. ROGERS: Yes. Yes. I'm really encouraged that you guys are as interested as you are. Because this is going to get interesting. It's going to get complicated, because it involves an area that very few people have exposure to. And that brings me to you, Mr. Aquino.

I've had this kind of close to home discussion with a few of the others. And this is an area that is very close to home for you.

Will your experience in this area, and particularly with some of the local physicians have any effect on your ability to be impartial and unbiased in this case?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR AQUINO: As far as what? The performance in the surgery and then how they [indiscernible] or --

MR. ROGERS: Okay. Let me clarify that. If in this case there is a doctor who disagrees with a doctor you know is that going to effect your ability to be unbiased in deciding which doctor is correct?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR AQUINO: As far as what they know and what I know, we're all actually reading the same texts. It just depending on how they actually approach a particular issue, like say if it's a surgery that -- depending on how they're training at the same, too. I mean if it's -- the

correct diagnosis and outcomes it's usually textbook at one point, but if there is disagreement it's probably because of the approach or the plan.

Any bias? No. Not really. It all depends on the facts. If I see reasonable why he did it and what not it wouldn't -- or if it's something that I disagree upon, I'd go back to my own texts and find out if it's -- I would try and -- I would seek more from them.

MR. ROGERS: Okay.

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PROSPECTIVE JUROR AQUINO: Seek more information.

MR. ROGERS: It sounds like your decision is going to be made more on the facts than the people.

PROSPECTIVE JUROR AQUINO: Yes.

MR. ROGERS: It's not a person you know or don't know. But rather the information --

PROSPECTIVE JUROR AQUINO:

17 MR. ROGERS: The texts.

> PROSPECTIVE JUROR AQUINO: Because I mean it's one -it's one thing that I like exploring every area. I guess that's the reason why I am in where I am at right now. actually is a tendency trying to learn a lot more than -- I mean if it's something new I try to like explore more, if it's actually something that is true and worked, I'd supported it. But if it's not I wouldn't.

MR. ROGERS: Okay. All right. Does anybody else have